The Battle for Budapest 1944 - 1945 (Images of War)

IMAGES OF WAR

THE BATTLE FOR BUDAPEST 1944–1945

A factory worker in Budapest maintaining a Hungarian-built Turán tank. The Turán saw extensive combat with several Hungarian armoured divisions during the Battle for Budapest.

IMAGES OF WAR

THE BATTLE FOR BUDAPEST 1944–1945 RARE PHOTOGRAPHS FROM WARTIME ARCHIVES

Anthony Tucker-Jones

First published in Great Britain in 2016 by PEN & SWORD MILITARY an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire S70 2AS Text copyright © Anthony Tucker-Jones, 2016 Photographs copyright © as credited, 2016 Every effort has been made to trace the copyright of all the photographs. If there are unintentional omissions, please contact the publisher in writing, who will correct all subsequent editions. A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978 147387 732 0 eISBN 978 1 47387 734 4 Mobi ISBN 978 1 47387 733 7 The right of Anthony Tucker-Jones to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Pen & Sword Books Ltd incorporates the imprints of Pen & Sword Archaeology, Atlas, Aviation, Battleground, Discovery, Family History, History, Maritime, Military, Naval, Politics, Railways, Select, Social History, Transport, True Crime, Claymore Press, Frontline Books, Leo Cooper, Praetorian Press, Remember When, Seaforth Publishing and Wharncliffe. For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact Pen & Sword Books Limited 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.pen-and-sword.co.uk

Contents Introduction Photograph Sources Chapter One

Hungarian Turning Point Chapter Two

Skorzeny’s Panzerfaust Chapter Three

SS Trapped in Budapest Chapter Four

Konrad Fails Chapter Five

Fatal Breakout Chapter Six

Defeat at Balaton Chapter Seven

Tolbukhin’s Masterstroke Chapter Eight

‘Thanks for Everything’

Introduction

G

erman dictator Adolf Hitler and his generals, looking at their situation maps in the late summer of 1944, knew the tide of war was unrelentingly against them. In the West the Allies had liberated Paris, Brussels and Antwerp, while in the east Minsk and Kiev had been liberated and the Red Army was only just halted before Warsaw. This placed it firmly on the road to Berlin. Further to the south, despite the disastrous defection of Romania, the Carpathian Mountains had slowed the Red Army. It was now vital to hold Hungary to stop the Soviets swinging into Austria and taking Vienna. Similarly, if Prague could be held it would prevent the enemy getting into Germany. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was intent on punishing Hungary for the untold misery and destruction the Hungarian Army had helped Hitler’s forces inflict on the Soviet people for four long years. His intention was to seize the Hungarian city of Debrecen and advance to the Tisza River. Such a move would undoubtedly cause a crisis within the Hungarian government, which would be forced to sue for peace. It seemed to Stalin that Hitler was in no position to protect the Hungarians after his forces had been soundly routed in neighbouring Romania and Ukraine. Hungary was on its own. Besides, Hitler’s attention was firmly on the Rhine, Vistula and Oder rivers, which he needed to hold at all costs to safeguard Berlin. Stalin was confident that the Battle of Debrecen would knock the Hungarians out of the war. Hitler had other plans, however, which would ensure the Battle for Budapest would be key to keeping the Hungarians firmly on his side. Hitler’s Wehrmacht was haemorrhaging men and equipment at an unprecedented rate. He had just 495 tanks in eighteen panzer divisions on the Eastern Front by February 1943. While many see Hitler’s twin defeats at Stalingrad in January 1943 and Kursk in June 1943 as the turning point on the Eastern Front, in fact the catastrophic destruction of Army Group Centre at the hands of Stalin’s Operation Bagration in June 1944 was a blow from which the Wehrmacht could never recover. The German Army lost twenty-five divisions, totalling some 300,000 men and 2,000 tanks. Hitler’s armies were reeling on both the Western and Eastern Fronts throughout 1944. His forces lost a staggering 1.4 million men (900,000 of them

on the Eastern Front) during the summer and autumn of that year. Hitler’s lastgasp offensive in the West, launched into the Ardennes region of Belgium in December 1944, was the death knell for his once seemingly invincible Panzer forces; it cost the German Army some 800 tanks. Three months later he launched a futile counteroffensive in Hungary, losing nearly 500 tanks and assault guns. Attempting to halt the Red Army’s juggernaut around Budapest and Vienna cost the Germans a further 1,300 armoured fighting vehicles. Hitler’s war machine was falling to pieces. In the West things had gone badly for Hitler following the Allied liberation of France. By the end of August 1944 he had lost forty-three divisions (thirty-five infantry and eight panzer divisions), sustaining a total loss of 450,000 men as well as most of their equipment, including 1,500 tanks, 3,500 pieces of artillery and 20,000 vehicles. Only in Italy were the German armed forces keeping the Allies at bay, following the landings there in 1943, although this secondary theatre of operations was a constant drain on Hitler’s resources. The loss of Rome cost him some 30,000 troops. In the Balkans Army Groups E and F were driven back through Yugoslavia by the advancing Red Army. As the situation on the Eastern Front deteriorated, Budapest, the Hungarian capital, came under the protection of General Otto Wohler’s Army Group South. However, in October 1944 it became apparent that Admiral Miklós Horthy, the Hungarian regent, was intent on joining Romania and Bulgaria in defecting to Stalin. Acting swiftly, Hitler temporarily stabilised the situation by installing a puppet government led by the fascist Arrow Cross party, but the Soviets were soon hammering at the gates of Budapest. The German-Hungarian garrison trapped in the city simply did not have the resources to keep the Red Army at bay. Slowly but surely, their defensive perimeter shrank and they were driven from Pest and the east bank of the Danube before being confined in a kessel (cauldron) in Buda, on the western bank. In the winter of 1944 Hitler launched three last-ditch operations to cut his way through to Budapest – each failed in the face of determined Soviet resistance. The desperate garrison, running out of ammunition and food, clung on for six grim weeks until the men were finally authorised to break out. By then it was too late and those fleeing were mown down by Soviet troops as they fled through the city and beyond. Two whole SS divisions were wiped out and the German garrison commander was captured. Almost 44,000 men tried to escape – just 800 made it to German lines. Budapest was left a ruin and the Red Army ran amok. The crumbling German war effort threatened the loss of the vital Hungarian oilfields at Nagykanizsa. These and the Austrian oil fields were providing fourfifths of Germany’s oil supplies, and Hitler convinced himself that they could be saved by a massive counteroffensive that would throw the Soviets back over

the Danube and secure Austria. Even if the plan failed, Hitler hoped it would delay the Soviet offensive against Vienna. To his generals this seemed madness: why defend foreign lands when the Red Army was only 45 miles from Berlin? The Führer’s Hungarian adventure was an effort the exhausted German armed forces could ill afford. Perhaps Hitler misguidedly hoped that what the 6th SS Panzer Army had so conspicuously failed to achieve in the Ardennes it might pull off in Hungary, boosting morale on the Eastern Front and on the Rhine. While the Soviets claimed their winter offensives saved the Western Allies, there were in fact more German tanks on the Western front at this time. The absence of the 5th and 6th Panzer Armies committed to Operation Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine) or Herbstnebel (Autumn Mist) greatly helped the Soviets. At the end of 1944 over 2,200 tanks and assault guns had been committed to the West, compared to just 950 tanks in the East. When the Soviets launched their Vistula offensive the absence of two of Hitler’s most formidable tank armies was a considerable bonus. In the closing stages of the Second World War Hitler desperately threw over 400,000 men into an attack intended to halt the Soviet steamroller in Hungary. During the massive battle round Lake Balaton his elite SS met with defeat and shame, while the Red Army fought its last major defensive action of the war with distinction and courage. The Red Army then went on the offensive and drove Hitler’s remaining forces from Hungary.

Photograph Sources This book has greatly benefitted from photographs made available by the German Bundesarchiv and the Hungarian Fortepan photo archive, in particular the collections of Paul Berko, Dr István Kramer, Theodore Lissák and Dr Krisztián Ungváry (author of Battle for Budapest 100 Days in World War II), and the Scot Pick Collection. The author and publishers are particularly grateful to the Fortepan photographic resource, which records in great detail the destruction wrought on Budapest during 1944–45.

Chapter One

Hungarian Turning Point

A

s the war on the Eastern Front progressed, the Hungarian government sought to reduce its military commitment to Hitler. For some time it managed to deploy only relatively modest forces against the Red Army. Between 1942 and 1943 this had consisted of the Hungarian 2nd Army, numbering some 200,000 men. At the same time it had also been engaged in secret negotiations with America and Britain as it sought to disentangle itself from the Axis Pact. In response Hitler occupied Hungary in March 1944 to ensure that it did not defect and appointed SS Brigadeführer Edmund Veesenmayer as Reich representative in Hungary. In Eastern Europe things went from bad to worse for Hitler’s Third Reich as the Wehrmacht was driven from Byelorussia and Ukraine. In August 1944 Romania changed sides, which proved a disaster for Hitler’s Army Group North Ukraine. Some 211,000 men were killed or captured. Romania’s defection completely exposed Hungary’s eastern frontier. While the Allies had been contained in Italy, the loss of Romania undermined German defences in southern Europe. The defection of Romania cost Hitler sixteen irreplaceable divisions. As the Red Army overran western Romania and entered Bulgaria there was nothing between them and Budapest, and then nothing between them and the rear lines of the German Balkan front. The only way to plug the gap was by withdrawing forces from elsewhere. In Budapest the pro-German government agreed to the full mobilisation of the Hungarian Army to fight the Soviets. The better units were deployed to the PreCarpathian region, where they held Colonel-General Ivan Petov’s 4th Ukrainian Front for six months. Under unrelenting pressure from the Red Army, by the end of 1944 the Hungarian 1st Army had withdrawn into Slovakia, while the 2nd Army, smashed at Stalingrad, had to be re-formed. Units were also transferred to the battered Hungarian 3rd Army south of Lake Balaton, or to the German 6th and 8th Armies in northern Hungary. The Romanian defection to the Soviet camp also unhinged the German position in the eastern Balkans, forcing the withdrawal of Army Group E from Greece, Albania and southern Yugoslavia. Bulgaria swapped sides in

September 1944, but the Germans moved swiftly to deal with those Bulgarian troops occupying Serbia and Macedonia. The Bulgarian 1st Army was disarmed and the 5th Army offered only brief resistance. As a result the Bulgarian Army was forced to regroup before it could join the Red Army. Marshal Rodion Malinovsky’s 2nd Ukrainian Front set about the remains of General Johannes Friessner’s Army Group South Ukraine on 6 October 1944, attacking General Maximilian Fretter-Pico’s German 6th Army and the Hungarian 7th Corps. His target was the Hungarian city of Debrecen and the River Tisza. In four days Malinovsky was over the river and within 45 miles of Budapest. Friessner was instructed to smash the Soviet 27th Army and Soviet 6th Guards Tank Army and to retake two vital passes in the Southern Carpathians to cut Malinovsky’s lines of communication. To begin with, the northern part of Malinovsky’s pincer attack ran into the 1st and 23rd Panzer Divisions and stalled near the Hungarian border city of Oradea. The southern part of the pincer, near the Romanian border town of Arad, cut through the Hungarian 1st Army. Fretter-Pico moved the German 76th Infantry Division to Oradea and despatched 23rd Panzer to counter the breakthrough at Arad. To distract the Germans from Oradea Malinovsky turned his southern pincer northwards towards Debrecen. This enabled the northern force to destroy the German forces between the Soviet 6th Guards Tank Army and the Cavalry Mechanized Group Pliyev. By 10 October his forces had crossed the Tisza at several points. Hungarian counterattacks against the Mindszent bridgehead required the Soviets to rely on Romanian reinforcements to hold the bridghead below Szolnok, which came under attack from Hungarian and German troops. The Romanian 4th Division was surrounded and forced to surrender on the 20th and the 2nd Romanian Division was driven back across the river. The Romanian bridgehead at Alpar, however, was not dislodged. On 11 October the Soviet 4th Guards Cavalry Corps, part of Cavalry Mechanized Group Pliyev, reached Debrecen and nine days later Romanian troops captured the city. Realising the peril his country faced, on 15 October Admiral Miklós Horthy, the Hungarian regent, announced on the radio that he had requested an armistice with the Soviet Union, Britain and America. There is no denying that Hungary was vital for the defence of Austria and Germany. Italy, Romania and Bulgaria had already abandoned the Axis and now a fourth ally was about to switch sides. It was simply too much for the Führer and he moved to secure Budapest. The fighting was not all one-sided, however, and Soviet plans did not run smoothly. On 23 October the Germans counterattacked with five divisions, striking east and west, and surrounded Pliyev, whose men were forced to abandon their weapons and flee to Soviet lines five days later. Malinovsky tried

to reach Pliyev on the 25th but was stopped by the 1st Panzer Division and elements of 23rd Panzer Division. Despite occupying Debrecen on 20 October, the Red Army failed to trap the German 8th Army and the Hungarian 1st Army in Transylvania and the Carpathians. Petrov’s 4th Ukrainian Front had also failed to complete the encirclement to the north because it had gained little ground. The Germans had put up a spirited fight at Debrecen and in places their superior skill showed. Indeed, they had lost only 133 panzers and claimed some 500 Soviet tanks – over 70 per cent of the Russian tank strength. These losses greatly weakened the Soviet advance. An attack on Budapest was risky because the German armour that had been fighting on the border could regroup to defend the city. Nonetheless, the defences to the southeast of the city were weak. There were just seven exhausted divisions of the Hungarian 3rd Army and twenty panzers of the German 24th Panzer Division, between Szolnok to the southeast and Baja to the south, facing the Soviet 46th Army. Having blunted the Soviet advance, the Germans and Hungarians lost up to 35,000 men killed or missing, as well as 500 tanks and 1,656 guns and mortars. Some 20–40,000 Axis troops were captured. The Red Army claimed it sustained 11,900 dead and 6,662 missing, as well as 358 tanks knocked out.

By the autumn of 1944 Stalin and his Red Army were casting a long shadow over eastern and southern Europe. Firmly in his sights was Hungary, whose army had

fought alongside German forces on the Eastern Front.

Castle Hill, overlooking the Danube, was the seat of power in the Hungarian capital. Its grand architecture reflected the fact that it had once been one of the dual seats of power within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The Hungarian regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy, and German Führer Adolf Hitler in happier times. By October 1944 Horthy wanted to rid himself of his alliance with Nazi Germany. Hitler had other plans for his one-time ally.

A German column rumbles over the Danube via the Margit Bridge between Buda and Pest. To preempt Horthy switching sides, Hitler first occupied the country in March 1944. This forced the Hungarian government to call a full mobilisation to fight the Red Army.

A Red Army T-34 tank crew celebrate their arrival in Romania. The defection of the Romanian Army in August 1944 left the Germans dangerously exposed in Hungary.

This very young German Army recruit faced an uncertain future on the Eastern Front. Increasingly, Hitler’s exhausted divisions were fleshed out with inexperienced teenagers.

German fatalities are given field graves consisting of simple crosses and the dead men’s helmets. The destruction of Army Group North Ukraine cost Hitler 210,000 men killed or captured.

Hungarian solders get a closer look at the German Tiger tank. In the background, left to right, are a StuG III and Panzer IV. Very limited numbers of all three were supplied to the Hungarian Army.

A Hungarian 40M Turán medium tank on the streets of Budapest. Intially armed with

a 40mm gun, around 500 were built between 1941 and 1944. This total included the upgunned Turán II armed with a 75mm gun. Turáns equipped the Hungarian 1st and 2nd Armoured Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division.

Hungarian children clamber on a Hungarian-built 40M Nimrod self-propelled antiaircraft gun. This went into production in 1940, comprising a licence-built Landsverk LVKV40 chassis, with a turret made by Manfred Weiss, armed with a 40mm l/70 Bofors gun, also produced under licence as the 36M.

Hungarian Turán medium tanks and 38M Toldi lights tanks (on the right) in the workshop. These two types of tank constituted the majority of the tanks equipping the Hungarian armoured and cavalry units.

A Soviet assault gun team consult their maps. On 6 October 1944 Marshal Malinovsky’s 2nd Ukrainian Front lauched an offensive from Romania toward the Hungarian city of Debrecen, sparking a chain of events that led to the Battle for Budapest.

German Panther tanks of the 23rd Panzer Division en route to the front at Debrecen in early October 1944. Heavily outnumbered, the German and Hungarian forces struggled to contain the Soviet offensive.

A German MG34 gunner keeps his eyes peeled. German defences held at Oradea, but the Hungarian defence at Arad was pierced.

The Germans also deployed the Tiger II in an effort to stop the Red Army at Debrecen.

Soviet dead, killed by counterattacking panzers. Malinovsky’s northern pincer ran into the 1st and 23rd Panzer Divisions near Oradea and was held up until his southern pincer headed for Debrecen.

The Hungarian 2nd Armoured Division, serving with the Hungarian 2nd Army, fought at Debrecen. Its Toldi light tanks, armed with a 20mm or 40mm gun, were no match for Soviet T-34 and IS tanks. Note the circular radio antenna.

Red Army prisoners being escorted to the rear. On 23 October 1944, under the command of General of Artillery Maximilian Fretter-Pico, the German 6th Army encircled and destroyed three Soviet tank corps of Mobile Group Pliyev under the command of Issa Pliyev in the Battle of Debrecen.

This was the reality facing the German Army. Stopping the Soviet Debrecen offensive cost the German-Hungarian forces 35,000 killed or missing and up to 40,000 men captured.

Following the battle of Debrecen the people of Hungary faced an uncertain fate.

The graves of unknown Soviet soldiers – the Red Army claimed to have suffered 18,500 casualties during the opening stages of the invasion of Hungary.

Chapter Two

Skorzeny’s Panzerfaust

I

n the face of Malinovsky’s Debrecen offensive, Hitler was determined that Hungarian regent Admiral Horthy should not be allowed to abandon him, nor should the Hungarian government be given the opportunity to change sides. Ironically, after the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944 Horthy had announced he would take no further interest in the activities of the government and retired to his apartment in Buda Castle. Nonetheless, there was no doubting that most war-weary Hungarians would heed his call for a ceasefire. On 9 October 1944 the Soviets had agreed to stop 50 miles east of Budapest and receive Horthy’s emissaries. Interestingly, also on the 9th Hungarian Joint Chief of Staff General János Vörös ordered all Hungarian antiaircraft units and other available forces to secure the access roads into Budapest. He also directed the Hungarian 1st Corps (which had no divisions under its command and was therefore only in charge of those units available in the city), plus the gendarmeries and police, to take up positions on the Attila Line. Three days later the Hungarian 6th Corps and the Hungarian 10th Infantry Division were moved from the Carpathians to Budapest, as was one of the best units of the Hungarian Army, the Hungarian 1st Parachute Group. Then, on 13 October, the Hungarian General Staff ordered all mobile Hungarian units to be despatched to the capital. There has been some speculation that rather than moving to protect the city from the Red Army, Vörös was actually acting to support Horthy’s ceasefire with the Soviets. To the Germans it must have looked as if a coup was about to take place, which meant their own planned seizure of power in Hungary was likely to be resisted. By this stage the Maria Theresia 22nd SS Cavalry Division was deployed west of Buda ready to act. All available Waffen-SS units were put on notice to occupy Budapest, with force if necessary. German reinforcements were also on their way as elements of the 24th Panzer Division and the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion were summoned to Budapest. The latter unloaded forty-two Tiger II tanks at the city’s station in a brazen show of brute force. In the meantime, Hitler despatched SS Sturmbannführer (lieutenant colonel)

Otto Skorzeny, who headed the SS’s special forces, to Budapest on an intelligencegathering mission. The presence of Skorzeny in the city did not bode well for Horthy and his supporters. Thanks to the rivalry between the SS and the Abwehr (German counter-intelligence) Brandenburg units, the SS had its own intelligence service, the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). It also established its own special forces. Skorzeny was responsible for setting up Jagdverbande (Hunting Group) 502. He then assumed command of the 500th SS Parachute Battalion. Although it was a Luftwaffe-led operation, Skorzeny grabbed all the glory for ‘rescuing’ Italian dictator Mussolini from house arrest in September 1943. Subsequently, Skorzeny’s Jagdverbande Southeast was lost when the Red Army steamrollered into Romania in August 1944 and the front collapsed. Despite having been firm allies for so long, German and Hungarian forces in Budapest understandably eyed each other with suspicion. Most of the German garrison in the city had moved out to counter the Soviet offensive launched in early October 1944. The time was ripe for Horthy to make his move and assert control in defiance of Hitler. When he ordered the radio announcement on 15 October heralding a ceasefire with the Soviets, Hitler put in motion Operation Panzerfaust (bazooka). Horthy had inadvertently sealed Budapest’s fate. SS General Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was charged with ensuring Hungary’s loyalty. He had recently ruthlessly crushed the Warsaw Rising with an iron fist and was keen to do the same to Budapest. He felt that blasting the Castle District on Castle Hill, also known as the Burgberg Citadel, with the massive railway-mounted 650mm Karl mortar, would teach the Hungarians a lesson they would never forget. It would also ensure Horthy’s surrender. Fortunately for Budapest, the general was summoned back to Berlin. Skorzeny was more in favour of a swift, bloodless German coup, achieved through a display of military might and pure bluff. To ensure that Horthy was compliant when captured, a squad of civilian-clothed SD men snatched his son and whisked him off to Germany. While Skorzeny briefed his units, the Maria Theresia 2nd SS Cavalry Division moved to cut off Burgberg to trap Horthy and his government. Skorzeny had several hundred commandos from the Jagdverbande Centre and the 500th SS Parachute Battalion at his disposal, supported by four Tiger II tanks from the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion. Also on call was a unit equipped with Goliath remote-control demolition tanks to deal with any unwanted roadblocks. The utility of the hulking Tiger II, also known as King Tiger, must be questioned. It had no real value in urban warfare, but its sheer size made it a symbol of Nazi military strength and the sight of it parked on a street corner was likely to cow all who saw it. Skorzeny’s assault force headed for the citadel at 0600 hours on 16 October 1944. His truck was in the lead, followed by the Tiger tanks. This was hardly a

covert mission, thanks to all the noise created by the tanks’ engines. At the first checkpoint the Hungarian guards simply waved them through and Skorzeny saluted back. However, at the gates of the Burgberg they were halted by a rubble roadblock. Skorzeny signalled for one of the Tiger tanks to come forward and it made easy work of the barricade and rolled into the citadel courtyard. The panzer commander swung his 88mm gun towards a battery of anti-tank guns guarding the Hungarian government. For a few tense seconds there was an ugly standoff. The Hungarian guards, bewildered by this sudden turn of events, did not react and the SS assault team ran around the Tiger and quickly disarmed them. Skorzeny, brandishing his pistol, demanded that a Hungarian officer escort him to the citadel’s commandant. The order was then given for the garrison to surrender, but there was some brief resistance when several Hungarian soldiers opened fire. The Germans dealt with them using bazookas. Much to Skorzeny’s disappointment, Horthy was not in his apartment. He had already slipped out and surrendered to another senior SS officer in the city, Reich representative SS Brigadeführer Veesenmayer. Nonetheless, Skorzeny was entrusted with the task of escorting Horthy to the ‘safety’ of a Bavarian castle. Across Budapest the Germans secured most other government buildings with relative ease. At the Ministry of War, however, four Hungarians were killed for resisting, at a cost of four German dead. Budapest was now to become the epicentre of the battle for Hungary. It transpired that Operation Panzerfaust had been a needless and fruitless exercise. Not only had Horthy given Skorzeny the slip, but he had also already acquiesced to Hitler’s demands. Throughout the night the German embassy had been in continual communication with Horthy. At 0530 hours, 30 minutes before Skorzeny launched his operation to grab Castle Hill, Horthy offered to abdicate and agreed to the premiership of Ferenc Szálasi, who headed the Hungarian fascist Arrow Cross party. Horthy later claimed that Skorzeny’s commandos had looted his rooms.

On 15 October 1944, following the Soviet invasion of Hungary, Admiral Horthy announced a ceasefire with Stalin that resulted in a German coup.

Lieutenant Colonel Otto Skorzeny, who was in charge of Hitler’s SS Special Forces, was sent to Budapest to seize power under the codename Operation Panzerfaust.

Hungarian Nimrod self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. Just before Horthy’s announcement, the Hungarian Joint Chief of Staff General Vörös ordered all Hungarian anti-aircraft units to secure the roads into Budapest.

German Tiger II heavy tanks from the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion on the streets of Budapest. In the first shot, taken in the courtyard of Buda Castle, a Hungarian Nimrod can also be seen parked at the road junction.

German troops at Mathias Church, Castle Hill.

Four Tiger IIs supported Skorzeny’s assault force. One was used to break down the gates into the grounds of Buda Castle and frighten the Hungarian garrison into surrendering.

Men of the Maria Theresia 22nd SS Cavalry Division gathering captured weapons taken from the Hungarian garrison in Buda Castle. Heavier equipment in the background includes a Nimrod 40mm self-propelled gun and a 40mm anti-tank gun.

SS troops admire the view from Castle Hill and the Castle district. Little did they realise that this would become their prison once the Red Army encircled the city.

A confident-looking Otto Skorzeny, photographed in the Burgberg on 16 October 1944, shortly after his coup against Admiral Horthy. His mission was largely

nugatory, as Horthy had already caved in to Hitler’s demands.

Hungarian officers wearing fascist Arrow Cross armbands liaise with men from Skorzeny’s 500th SS Parachute Battalion outside the Hungarian Ministry of Defence.

Paratroops belonging to the 500th SS Parachute Battalion welcome Hungary’s new fascist head of state, Ferenc Szálasi.

The intimidating sight of Tiger II tanks on the streets of Budapest. They are

supported by Hungarian infantry loyal to the Arrow Cross party.

Arrow Cross forces on the march in Budapest. The Hungarian Army chose not to resist Skorzeny’s takeover.

Hungarian soldiers fraternise with German panzertruppen and admire their Tiger II. The Hungarian Army had nothing in their armoury capable of tackling this massive

panzer.

Hungarian gunners manning a German-supplied PaK40 75mm anti-tank gun in Budapest’s suburbs. Although General Vörös secured the roads leading into the Hungarian capital, they made no attempt to impede the German takeover.

Members of the newly installed Arrow Cross Party government. Their leader Ferenc Szálasi is seated in the centre of the front row. His first act was to deport Hungary’s Jewish population.

A Hetzer 38(t) tank destroyer of the Maria Theresia 22nd SS Cavalry Division. The presence of this division, which included two regiments of Hungarian ethnic Germans, helped to ensure the Hungarians did not resist Operation Panzerfaust.

A blurred shot showing Tiger IIs of the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion parked below Castle Hill at the cavalry gunners’ monument. This unit was involved in resisting the Soviets’ Debrecen offensive.

Chapter Three

SS Trapped in Budapest

W

ork on building up Budapest’s defences had started in late September 1944, with the creation to the east of the Attila Line, in the north the Karola Line between the Cserhát, Mátra and Zemplén Hills, and in the southwest the Margit Line between the city and Lake Balaton. The eastern Pest bridgehead was protected by three semi-circular defensive belts consisting of minefields, antitank ditches, barbed wire and earth bunkers. The 2nd Ukrainian Front renewed its attempt on Budapest on 29 October 1944 and secured the southern approaches to the city by 2 November, but could get no further. A frontal attack on the city from the east was also fended off. The Soviets launched a fresh assault on 5 December, aiming to trap the city in a pincer movement. The Soviet 7th Guards and 6th Guards Tank armies and Pliyev’s mechanised cavalry group struck from the northeast, while the 46th Army attacked from the southwest. Four days later they had got as far as Sahy and the Danube to the north of the city. While the 46th Army did manage to cross the river – although at great cost – it still could not break through the defences to the southwest. On 12 December the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts were instructed to take Budapest. The 2nd Ukrainian Front on the left was to attack from Sahy southward to the Danube north of Esztergom, which would cut off any German retreat to the northwest. The 3rd Ukrainian Front was directed to move northward from Lake Velence and link up with the 2nd Ukrainian front near Esztergom. This offensive commenced on 20 December and within six days the two fronts had met, finally encircling the Hungarian capital. Budapest was completely cut off by the Red Army once the Budapest-Vienna road was severed on 26 December 1944. This trapped almost 43,000 German and 37,000 Hungarian troops, along with over 800,000 civilians. Refusing any withdrawal, Hitler declared Festung (Fortress) Budapest, which was to be defended until the last. Hitler pursued his ‘fortress’ strategy until the end of the war. His rationale was that reinforcements would cut their way through to a designated fortress, which could then be used as a springboard for a counteroffensive.

Trapped in the Budapest pocket was the 9th SS Mountain Corps, comprising the Florian Geyer 8th SS and Maria Theresia 22nd SS Cavalry Divisions, 13th Panzer Division, 60th Panzergrenadier Division ‘Feldherrnalle’ with a handful of King Tigers and the 271st Volksgrenadier Division. Hungarian forces in the city included the 1st Armoured, 10th Mixed and 12th Reserve Divisions, as well as elements of six assault artillery battalions and a number of armoured car units. The assault artillery was equipped with Hungarian-built Zrinyi and German supplied StuG III assault guns. To the south of Budapest the Horst Wessel 18th SS Panzergrenadier Division managed to retreat. Florian Geyer had started its career as a brigade conducting anti-partisan operations in the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1942 it was expanded to a division and the following year was deployed to Yugoslavia. Under the command of SS Brigadeführer Joachim Rumhor it saw action in Czechoslovakia in 1944 and then moved into Hungary. The Maria Theresia division was essentially its bastard child, having been raised in Hungary in the spring and summer of 1944 under SS Brigadeführer Zehender. It was formed around Florian Geyer’s 17th SS Cavalry Regiment, supplemented by two regiments of Hungarian ethnic Germans. By the time the division went into action at Debrecen only the 17th and 52nd SS Cavalry Regiments had been assembled. In October they were joined by the 53rd SS Cavalry Regiment and the whole division fought in the Budapest area until encircled. Similarly, the 18th SS Panzergrenadier Division, which had been formed in early 1944, drew its recruits from the ethnic German community in Hungary. The 13th Panzer Division had formed in Romania in October 1940, where it served as a training unit until June 1941. After fighting on the Eastern Front in Ukraine, the Caucasus and Kuban, the division was withdrawn to Germany in September 1944 and sent to Hungary the following month. The three other panzer divisions committed to the battle of Debrecen had since been redeployed. The 23rd Panzer Division was sent north to the Baranów bridgehead in Poland; 24th Panzer from December 1944 to January 1945 was in Slovakia before being sent to West Prussia. Only 1st Panzer remained in Hungary available to help, but on its own it was very unlikely to cut its way through to Budapest. Reinforcements were on their way from Poland, comprising the 3rd Panzer Division and the 4th SS Panzer Corps with two tough SS panzer divisions. Defence of the city presented a number of problems, not least the differing geography either side of the Danube. Pest on the eastern bank was very flat and hard to fortify, while hilly Buda on the western bank, with its Castle Hill government district, offered much better defensive positions. General PfefferWildrenbruch, who was appointed garrison commander, would probably have liked to abandon the eastern bank and anchor his defence on the Danube, but

tactically and politically this was not possible. It also ran contrary to Hitler’s dictate that no ground must ever be voluntarily surrendered to the enemy. By late December the Pest bridgehead was considerably larger than the Buda bridgehead. Those forces west of the Danube, including the 8th SS and 271st Volksgrenadiers, were confined to a rectangle that extended north and south of Buda. To the east of the river the remaining defences of the Attila Line, held by the 60th Panzergrenadiers, 13th Panzer, the Hungarian divisions and the 22nd SS, ran in a sizeable arc from Föt in the north through Pécel at its apex to Soroksár in the south. It was only this that gave the defence of the city any depth. Pfeffer-Wildrenbruch had started his career as a gunner and became a highranking policeman before joining the SS. At the start of the Second World War he had commanded the 4th SS Polizei Division before becoming a Corps commander. In Budapest he lacked infantry with which to properly protect the city. Between them the two SS cavalry divisions could muster around 19,000 men with forty-six tanks and assault guns. The SS units included a huge array of foreign ‘volunteers’ of dubious loyalty. The 13th Panzer Division had a listed ration strength of 4,983 men, with seventeen tanks and assault guns. The manpower of Feldherrnhalle Panzergrenadier was slightly better with 7,255 men and twenty-four tanks and assault guns. All these units had artillery and anti-tank guns. The Volksgrenadier was by far the weakest division with around 1,000 men. Aside from the panzer and panzergrenadier regiments, and their supporting anti-tank and artillery units, the bulk of the German manpower was administrative personnel. These were not frontline fighters but rear echelon support staff who by trade were clerks, cooks, medics and radio operators. The Hungarian troops knew that their former allies were now their occupiers and that they were trapped between the Nazis and the encroaching Soviets. The Hungarian units defending Budapest were in a sorry state after fighting on the Hungarian Plain and they kept two sets of troop manifests, one for themselves and one for the Germans. They reported a ration strength of 55,100 and a combat strength of just 15,050. In manpower terms this equated to two divisions, but the combat strength of a single division. The city militias and police showed no signs of wishing to fight and many of the regular army divisions’ soldiers had no inclination either. The Hungarian 1st Armoured Division had a ration strength of 14,000 in early December, but declared only 2,038 infantry to the Germans. The Hungarian assault artillery battalions included the 1st, 7th and 10th, as well as elements of the 13th, 16th and 25th, and numbered 2,000 men, of whom only half were deployable. By the end of the month the Hungarians could muster fewer than forty tanks and assault guns. Likewise, the 10th and 12th Divisions had a

combined ration strength of 11,500, but could muster just 1,500 fighters. By 28 December the Soviets were 2km west of the Danube after capturing János Hospital. They had also closed to 2km northwest of the German and Hungarian Headquarters in the Buda Castle tunnel. Városmajor Grange, the most sensitive point in Buda, was now at risk, and if it was captured the Soviets could reach the Castle Hill District and cut the garrison in half. Defence of the Grange was assigned to the Hungarian Volunteer Vannay Battalion. The Vannay Battalion numbered 450 men, supported by two 40mm automatic guns, six 81mm mortars and two heavy anti-tank guns, plus three guns of a Hungarian artillery battalion. The troops were initially deployed in the church within Városmajor Grange, while their command was in Csaba Street to the south. The defences were anchored on three points at the Cogwheel Railway embankment and the second and third within Városmajor Grange along Temes and Szamos streets. The embankment was protected by machine-gun teams, mines and barbed wire, with a lorry blocking the level crossing. The grange was also mined in case the embankment was overrun. The local school and apartments were turned into strongpoints. On 24 December 1944, just before Budapest was cut off, Hitler despatched the tough 4th SS Panzer Corps from the Warsaw area, plus the 96th and 711th Infantry Divisions, totalling 60,000 men supported by 200 panzers, to Hungary. SS Obergruppenführer Otto Grille, who had been decorated for breaking out of the Cherkassy pocket at the start of the year, was placed in command. This immediately weakened German defences on the Vistula, enabling the Red Army to reach the Oder. Nonetheless, this move signalled that Hitler was intent on holding Budapest at all costs.

Steel girders embedded in the cobbles of Budapest streets as anti-tank obstacles.

A steel cupola in the grounds of Buda Castle, overlooking the river. The Pest half of the joint city was flat and difficult to defend, but the hills on the Buda side of the

Danube offered much better defensive positions for the German-Hungarian garrison.

Wartime aerial view of Castle Hill overlooking the Danube, encompassing Buda Castle and the vast royal palace complex. Once the Red Army had fought its way into the city, this area became the heart of German-Hungarian resistance.

Buda’s southern railway station. The Red Army secured the southern approaches to the city by early November 1944 and finally captured the station on 10 February 1945.

Pristine Hungarian armour comprising Turán tanks and Nimrod self-propelled guns in their storage sheds. Elements of at least three Hungarian divisions, including the 1st Armoured Division, became trapped in Budapest. The bulk of the Hungarian armour was lost during the encirclement battles and by late December 1944 the Hungarians could muster fewer than forty tanks and assault guns for the defence of Budapest.

Two destroyed German self-propelled anti-aircraft guns on Castle Hill. The Luftwaffe struggled to keep the re-equipped Red Air Force at bay.

Another self-propelled 88mm gun on Castle Hill. Soviet dive-bombers and artillery soon silenced such weapons.

This young German soldier has a rather nasty-looking scar on his neck. Many of the German garrison were administrative troops rather than frontline fighters. Similarly, the sizeable Hungarian garrison had few frontline soldiers.

General Karl Pfeffer-Wildrenbruch was appointed commander of the 9th SS Mountain Corps in December 1944 and put in charge of the defence of Budapest.

Tiger IIs photographed 45km from Budapest. When a frontal attack on the city failed, the Red Army struck to the north and south and managed to link up in late December 1944.

German troops smoke outside their earth bunker. Work on Budapest’s defences started in September 1944 and consisted of defensive lines to the north, east and south-west.

A German rifleman on guard. The Attila Line, to the east of Pest, comprised three semi-circular defensive belts held by German and Hungarian troops.

German MG34 gunners await the onslaught of the Red Army. Once the Budapest– Vienna road had been cut on 26 December 1944, the 9th SS Mountain Corps was trapped in the Hungarian capital.

German officers and other ranks hurry to bury their dead in the biting cold.

Wrapped up against the weather, this German guards a railway line. On the Buda side of the Danube the railway came into the southern part of the city that was protected by the Margit Line.

Hungarian casualties are brought into Budapest. The daily stream of wounded soon filled all available hospital and cellar space.

Soviet troops examine a Luftwaffe Focke-Wulf Fw 190 fighter brought down during

the aerial combat over Budapest. The fighters were largely unable to protect the Luftwaffe’s resupply flights into the city.

The Luftwaffe vainly tried to keep the German-Hungarian garrison resupplied by air, using transport aircraft, parachute drops and even gilders. This DFS 230 assault gilder never delivered its supplies, crashing into a building on Kristina Boulevard between Castle Hill and Tabán.

A wrecked German DFS 230 assault gilder on the Vérmezö west of Castle Hill.

Red Army shelling and Red Air Force bombing soon reduced Buda Castle to a ruin.

A Soviet soldier with a looted bicycle peers cautiously round a corner at an abandoned German field gun. He is armed with the ubiquitous PPsh 41 submachine gun.

Once in the suburbs the Soviets used artillery such as this M1937 152mm howitzer to destroy enemy strongpoints.

The bombing and shelling helped the defenders as it blocked the streets, impeding Soviet tanks. Piles of rubble obstruct Váralja Street behind the castle.

More damage on Castle Hill, this time in Fortuna Street.

Budapest’s fine buildings and monuments, especially on Castle Hill, were completely ruined during the siege.

Chapter Four

Konrad Fails

I

nside Budapest General Pfeffer-Wildrenbruch and the men of his 9th SS Mountain Corps were under siege and getting desperate. The Red Army shelled and bombed their positions and squeezed them into an ever-shrinking pocket. Ammunition, food and medical supplies were running low and the men endured a miserable Christmas. The Luftwaffe attempted to airdrop supplies but in the face of the Red Air Force and heavy flak this became increasingly impossible. The only hope was a New Year’s present, thanks to the 4th SS Panzer Corps marshalling its forces to the west. Hitler’s intention was not so much to relieve the Budapest garrison as to reinforce it. On the table were two options – Operation Paula, which would strike from Székesfehérvár to the south-west of the city, or Operation Konrad, which would strike from the north-west. Konrad offered the shortest route, and although the terrain was not ideal the plan was given the go-ahead. The Hungarians offered their 1st Hussar Division, 2nd Armoured Division and 23rd Division to support Konrad, but these units were too exhausted to be of any real assistance. Instead just two battalions of the Hungarian Ney SS Combat Group were attached to the two SS Panzer divisions. The 4th SS Panzer Corps, plus 1st Panzer Division, did have some chance of breaking through, as initially they had 70 per cent more troops and 140 per cent more armour than the Soviet 6th Guards Army holding the outer ring. The Soviets, however, did enjoy a three to one superiority in artillery. Operation Konrad I was launched on 1 January 1945 and saw 4th SS Panzer Corps strike from Tata, north of Budapest. Attacks were also conducted to the west. Martin Steiger, commander of the 3rd SS Panzer Division’s tank regiment, was in the thick of the bitter fighting. ‘The attack began on 1 January 1945, at 6pm, without preparatory artillery fire,’ Steiger recounts, adding, ‘Enemy tanks of the type T-34/85 sat in the farms in town [Dunaalmas] and fired at our point vehicles from only five metres away.’ Every step of the way his men met determined resistance. The Soviet 6th Guards Army thwarted the first attempt, which launched from

Komárno (Komárom) and initially pushed the Soviets back along the right bank of the Danube. The 6th Guards were ordered to march down the left bank to Komárno, thereby compromising the Germans’ flank and rear. The Soviets deployed four extra divisions and the German counterattack was halted on a line connecting Bicske, Mány and Zsámbék. By the 12th the Germans were forced to withdraw, having got to within fifteen miles of the city. Despite Konrad, the Soviets did not let up their pressure on the GermanHungarian defences in Budapest. The Soviet 180th Rifle Division attacked Városmajor Grange on 1 January. After a heavy bombardment, up to eight Soviet tanks and supporting infantry overran the Hungarian Vannay Battalion’s machine guns. The Hungarians knocked out two tanks and retook the Cogwheel Railway embankment. This they reinforced by incorporating the wrecked tanks into their defences and creating foxholes underneath them. The embankment remained in Hungarian hands until 19 January. Determined to stop the German relief effort, Tolbukhin redeployed the 2nd Mechanised Guards Corps, 86th Guards Rifle Division and 49th Guards Rifle Division from the encirclement of Budapest on 3 January. The Soviet 46th Army was also instructed to halt its attacks and ensure that the garrison did not attempt a breakout. Key to preventing this was possession of Mátyás-hegy Hill, which changed hands seven times on 3 January. Sashegy and Rózsadomb hills were also fought over. The loss of the former, which dominated the southern part of the city, would have made Buda untenable. From Sashegy Soviet spotters could have called down fire to destroy the defenders’ artillery between the Citadel on Gellért Hill and Castle Hill and eliminated the emergency airfield on Vérmezo Meadow. On 12 January the Soviets made a dent in the Sashegy defensive line and three days later took the heights, only to be driven off by a counterattack. Between 1 and 7 January German and Hungarian losses totalled around 3,500 – almost 10 per cent of the 4th SS Panzer Corps’s strength – killed, wounded or missing, along with thirty-nine tanks and assault guns destroyed. Tolbukin, meantime, had deployed defences blocking both the garrison and the relief force and on 3 January ordered attacks on Buda to stop in order to free up more troops. Three days later seven Soviet divisions were in place to prevent the garrison from breaking out. Despite the hopelessness of the situation, on 11 January 1945 Pfeffer-Wildrenbruch was awarded the Knight’s Cross and on 1 February the Oak Leaves. Desperate to open an air bridge to Budapest, the Germans tried to recapture Budapest airport. Konrad II was launched from Esztergom on 7 January, but again was halted just short of its objective at Pilisszentkereszt. Having failed to breach the Soviet lines to the north, the Germans fell back on the southern option. Konrad III, the last part of the operation, commenced on 17 January

with 4th SS Panzer Corps and 3rd Panzer Corps attacking from the south of Budapest near Székesfehérvár with the aim of trapping ten Soviet divisions against the Danube. Again this operation failed, and the Germans were halted twelve miles from the city at Zámoly, north of Székesfehérvár, with the loss of fifty-seven panzers. During the second counterattack 100 panzers, supported by two regiments of motorised infantry, tried to punch through the Soviet 5th Guards Airborne Division. Eighteen panzers broke through, only to run into the Soviet 1963rd Anti-Tank Regiment, which accounted for half the tanks. The Soviet 34th Guards Division also held fast despite everything that was thrown at them. Hitler reluctantly agreed on the 17th to abandon low-lying Pest in order to hold the hills of Buda. The garrison and the civilian population fled across the five Danube bridges before the Germans brought them down the following day, despite Hungarian objections. The SS ensconced themselves in the Citadel on Gellért Hill, while other units defended Buda Castle on Castle Hill, the city cemetery and Margaret Island. Soviet plans were distracted by a renewed German relief effort, which was attempted on 20 January to the south of the city. General Balck, commander of the 6th Army, seeking to trap the Soviet divisions north of Lake Balaton, summoned 4th SS Corps south to his assistance, but stiff Soviet resistance also thwarted this effort. This diversion of effort sealed the fate of Budapest’s garrison. Karl-Heinz Lichte was with the Wiking 5th SS Panzer Division when their attack was thwarted on 20 January 1945. He observed, ‘A number of “Josef Stalin” tanks were spotted. The numerically vastly superior enemy bypassed us and attacked our flank. Then, the first of our Panzers was knocked out.’ Their commander was killed and Lichte ordered a withdrawal. ‘At the same time I grasped a smoke grenade,’ he recalls, ‘pulled and threw it to obstruct the enemy field of vision of our withdrawal. That very moment, there was an immense bang. I saw a bright flash, then darkness…’ Steiger, of the 3rd SS Panzer, continued the story. Counterattacks began, and our attack had to be stopped… The expected enemy tank attack deep into our flanks took place on 29 January from Vertes Aska. It started a huge tank battle near Pettend. Some 200 enemy tanks were knocked out. The enemy attacks increased on 30 January. We could no longer hold our positions and withdrew westward on both sides of the Velence Lake. This third attack, launched from north of Lake Balaton, proved to be the most threatening. The Germans quickly reached the Danube, near Dunapentele on the western bank of the river, and cut the 3rd Ukrainian Front in two. To counter

this, reinforcements had to be transferred from the 2nd Ukrainian front. From these two combat groups were formed and they counterattacked north and south of the German breakthrough on 27 January. Ten days later they had restored the outer ring. General der Kavallerie Gustav Harteneck, commander of the German Army’s 1st Cavalry Corps, recalled bitterly their role in the relief effort: While the Corps was still in the process of being transferred, we were once again ordered to take up stationary positions, to our great disappointment. The cavalry divisions of the Waffen-SS were fighting in the metropolis of Budapest. Every cavalryman knows that no good could come of that, and, as it turned out, nothing did. The SS divisions were encircled... My Cavalry Corps launched a night attack in an attempt to relieve them, but it was too late, and the Russian forces were too powerful. Although we managed to fight our way to the city limits, only 100 or so cavalrymen, under the command of the famous rider Staff Colonel von Mitzlaff, were able to break through to us. The subsequent battles, in the course of which my Corps was under the command of 6th SS Panzer Army, might have turned out quite differently had the two SS cavalry divisions been deployed to full advantage as cavalry divisions, instead of being ordered to hold Budapest. The Konrad operations cost the German and Hungarian relief forces a total of around 35,000 men. This figure comprised around 8,000 dead, 26,000 wounded and about 1,000 captured.

German troops paying their last respects to fallen comrades.

StuG III assault guns and supporting infantry move up ready for the attack. Operation Konrad, launched by the 4th SS Panzer Corps on 1 January 1945, was designed to cut through to Budapest. The fate of the garrison hung on its success.

A convoy of German supply trucks stand by – the panzers had to push the Red Army out of the way before Budapest could be reinforced.

German troops try to clear a road after a heavy snowfall. The weather conditions during the three phases of Operation Konrad greatly hampered the success of the mission.

German soldiers laying down fire with their rifles.

Soviet dead litter the foreground while a German convoy waits at the roadside in the

background. Tantalisingly, the SS got to within twelve miles of Budapest.

German troops remain vigilant in their foxhole.

German machinegunners try to ward off Soviet counterattacks. Although Operation Konrad III reached the Danube south of Budapest within four days, the Red Army drove it back toward lakes Balaton and Velence.

Soviet troops killed during the winter fighting.

Yet more winter graves. Operation Konrad I cost the German and Hungarian forces 3,500 casualties.

German officers taking stock – the failure of Konrad III meant that within a week the Budapest garrison would be destroyed.

Soviet infantry moving through Budapest. Although some Soviet units were redeployed from the encirclement of the city on 3 January 1945 to counter Konrad, fighting continued in the city to tie the garrison down and prevent a breakout. On 17

January the garrison abandoned Pest to concentrate on defending the Buda hills.

Anti-aircraft artillery, such as this Soviet M39 85mm anti-aircraft gun, ensured nothing got in or out of the Hungarian capital by air. In desperation German gliders were used to get supplies into the city, but most crashed or were shot down. This weapon was also used as an anti-tank weapon, so played a role in thwarting the breakout.

The IS-2 Soviet heavy tank, which appeared in late 1943, also contributed to the German defeat in Hungary thanks to its powerful 122mm gun. It played a role in defeating the 3rd SS and 5th SS Panzer Divisions during Konrad III.

A knocked-out German Panzer IV on the streets of Budapest, belonging to either

the 13th Panzer Division or the 60th Panzergrenadier Division. Armour on both sides suffered heavy losses during the bitter street fighting.

An abandoned Panther tank, probably from 13th Panzer Division, in Retek Street between Városmajor Grange and Szél Kálmán Square. This area was the scene of intense fighting when the garrison finally tried to break out. Note that in the second photograph the turret has been removed.

Bomb and shell damage to Viennese Gate Square on Castle Hill.

Damage to the western close courtyard of the Royal Palace. Bombing and shelling of the defenders by the Red Army was relentless.

Destroyed military transport vehicles on the streets of Budapest.

Chapter Five

Fatal Breakout

I

t took Soviet troops two days to capture the city’s southern railway station, achieving this on 10 February, which allowed them to push up toward Castle Hill. The defenders of Gellért Hill, holding the Citadel fortress successfully, repulsed several Soviet attacks until the 11th, when a three-pronged assault overran them and seized the Citadel. Soviet artillery was quickly moved on to the hill, enabling them to dominate the entire city. In Buda Castle and the palace complex the remains of the trapped garrison continued to refuse to surrender. General Pfeffer-Wildrenbruch gathered his officers on Castle Hill early on 11 February and it was decided that they would run the gauntlet of the Soviet cordon and try to escape. It was an almost impossible task as Soviet troops were in the area around Széll Kálmán Square and Széna Square. Just before Pfeffer-Wildrenbruch decided to break out, the Soviet 180th Guards Rifle Division had deployed to Széll Kálmán Square and Olasz Avenue, supported by T-34 tanks dug in along Bimbó Road and at János Hospital. The road between Tinnye and Perbál was cut by another Soviet tank unit in the Dorog area. In addition, all the civilians living around Széll Kálmán Square and the immediate streets had been evacuated ready to meet any anticipated breakout. Pfeffer-Wildrenbruch’s plan was that the first wave, comprising the 8th SS on the right and the 13th Panzer on the left, would leave at 2000 hours. They were to be divided into groups of thirty, each led by a Hungarian guide. The second wave would consist of the 22nd SS and the Feldherrnhalle Panzergrenadiers and the Hungarian units. The attack on Széll Kálmán Square and Széna Square was to drive the Soviets from their positions along Margit Boulevard for a distance of one kilometre. From there they would drive all out for the fork of Hidegkúti Road and Budakeszi Road, some 2.5km north-west of Széna Square. From Remete-hegy Hill it was hoped that they could escape westward into the nearby forests and on to Tinnye. Their Hungarian allies were not to be informed until the last minute for fear of betrayal. Pfeffer-Wildrenbruch had left it far too late to put his plans in motion. The garrison was exhausted, starving and discipline was at breaking point. Morale was understandably at rock bottom. If the units had been in the countryside,

and discipline had been maintained, they might have fought their way through. In the confines of the city, however, the men would be quickly divided up as they sought different routes and would therefore be easily picked off. In Széll Kálmán Square and Széna Square the fleeing troops were illuminated by Soviet flares and met with machine-gun and mortar fire. Although some broke through the Soviet 180th Guards positions, they were halted with heavy losses 2.5km along Olasz Avenue. Széna Square remained dominated by Soviet machine guns and anti-tank guns and many of those fleeing became casualties or were paralysed by fear. Colonel General Gerhard Schmidhuber, commander of 13th Panzer Division, got across Széna Square only to be killed in Retek Street. Brigadeführer August Zehender, commander of the 22nd SS Cavalry Division, fared no better. A grenade took off his right leg and he promptly committed suicide. The streets were strewn with badly injured men who begged to be put out of their misery rather than capitulate. Elements of the Soviet 297th Rifle Division, who were deployed in Virányos Road, were confronted early in the morning by an enemy column numbering up to 2,000 men, which took up the whole width of the street. The Germans were running and firing into the windows and throwing hand grenades as they went. Into this dense mass Soviet troops fired their weapons and a 120cm mortar began to drop mortar bombs into the column, adding to the carnage. In neighbouring Szarvas Gábor Street a German light tank desperately sought cover until a Soviet bazooka knocked it out. The surviving Germans ran on, straight into Soviet rocket launchers firing at point-blank range. Everywhere the fleeing garrison was massacred. The Soviet 37th Rifle Corps blocked the escape route towards the western end of the Buda Hills. The Germans desperately tried to break out to the west and north-west towards Zugliget and Nagykovácsi. The Soviets claimed that 16,000 German and Hungarian troops broke through the inner encirclement to reach the nearby woods. On the eastern edge of Nagykovácsi the Soviet 19th Rifle Division was redeployed to heights 262 and 544 to stop the enemy coming out of the woods. The Soviet 11th Cavalry Division then hunted down those hiding among the trees. The Red Army had secured Szèll Kálmán Square, which was littered with dead, and parts of the Castle District by the afternoon of 12 February. It took them until noon the following day to move along Olasz Avenue as far as János Hospital. Up to 5,000 men, mainly Hungarians, had been left behind in the Castle District either because they did not get the order to run, or because the fight had simply gone out of them. In the underground tunnels under Buda Castle and the vault of the National Bank several thousand wounded had also been left behind.

The few who were fortunate enough to break through the Soviet cordons endured a panic-stricken flight that involved ducking and diving from Red Army units intent on their destruction. All around them their comrades were ambushed and slaughtered. During the night of 12 February the first group reached safety at the Szomor Catholic cemetery. They numbered just twenty-three soldiers, three German officers and a Hungarian officer. SS Hauptsturmführer Joachim Boosfeld and a companion reached Remete-hegy Hill and joined a group of 100 mainly German soldiers. Early on the 13th they reached the front line. Tantalisingly, they could see German positions but were given no covering fire. Just ten to twenty of them crossed over; many of the others were shot by Soviet snipers. Lieutenant Colonel Helmut Wolff, commander of the Feldherrnalle Panzergrenadier Division, and Major Wilhelm Schöning, acting commander of the 13th Panzer Division, led the largest group of up to 400 men. On 13 February they reached the forest above Nagykovácsi and fought their way to the German 3rd Cavalry Brigade. They then spilt up into smaller groups to fight through Soviet blocking positions. Schöning, wounded in the legs, called to one of his officers to put him out of his misery. Instead, two wounded panzergrenadiers hauled him to the German lines. Wolff also managed to escape. Just 624 men had reached their destination by 16 February 1945. A group of escapees armed with a sub-machine gun got through the woods and into the northeastern part of Perbál. The commander of the Soviet 49th Guards Division, part of the 37th Rifle Corps, rallied his staff, who either killed or captured all the escapees. The corps continued to combat groups of enemy troops, numbering up to 600, trying to escape the woods until 17 February. Garrison commander General Pfeffer-Wildrenbruch fled through the sewers, only to emerge into the middle of the Red Army. Elsewhere his men were mown down and only 800 men ever reached German lines. The vengeful Soviets annihilated both the SS divisions in the city. During the breakout General Joacham Rumohr, commander of the 8th SS Cavalry Division, was wounded and took his own life rather than face capture. Just 170 of his men escaped. Pfeffer-Wildrenbruch, who was badly wounded, was taken captive. In 1949 he was sentenced to twenty-five years in Soviet labour camps and only after Stalin’s death was he finally released in 1955. Pfeffer-Wildrenbruch might have saved more lives by ordering his garrison to surrender rather than break out. Groups of men in their hundreds and in some cases in their thousands were cut down by the Soviets as they charged through the shattered city, desperately trying to escape. Pfeffer-Wildrenbruch had 43,900 men under his command on 11 February; four days later 17,000 had been killed and 22,350 captured. Up to 3,000 tried to hide in the surrounding hills, but most had been caught by 17 February. To deal with the dead large

pyres were built and mass graves dug. Some Soviet soldiers went on the rampage, looting and raping. Taking Hungary and Budapest cost the Red Army 70,000 dead and over 200,000 wounded and sick. The German and Hungarian armies lost up to 140,000 killed, wounded and captured, while 40,000 civilians perished. Up to 80 per cent of the city lay in ruins. The Red Army now anticipated a trouble-free push through the rest of Hungary to the Austrian capital Vienna, but Hitler, not to be deterred from his grand schemes, planned otherwise.

Soviet M1938 122mm howitzers pounding enemy positions in Budapest. Once the Red Army had its artillery on Gellért Hill, they completely dominated the garrison’s last refuge on Castle Hill.

Soviet infantry working their way through the shattered streets. Throughout February 1945 they squeezed the defenders into an ever-shrinking cauldron or pocket along the west bank of the Danube.

A Soviet gunner armed with the DP28 light machine gun gives covering fire as his

comrades storm a makeshift barricade. Once the Soviet 180th Guards Division took Széll Kálmán Square it made escape for the garrison almost impossible.

After the Germans abandoned the defence of Pest they blew up all the bridges over the Danube, including this one in front of Castle Hill.

Soviet gunners, with a 57mm anti-tank gun, firing across the Danube from Pest. Any exposed vehicles were quickly picked off.

Two views of the tunnel under Castle Hill, which provided one of the last refuges for the garrison.

Dominated by the Red Army, the exposed open spaces of Széll Kálmán Square (seen here) and Széna Square became killing grounds during the night of 11 February 1945.

A Soviet soldier posing with his PPsh 41 sub-machine gun. When the GermanHungarian garrison attempted to escape on 11 February 1945 they ran into determined men such as this.

This is what greeted German and Hungarian troops who managed to break through the Soviet inner encirclement and reach the nearby woods. They were pursued by flare light.

The Red Army took a week to hunt down the remains of the German-Hungarian garrison. Some 17,000 men were killed trying to escape Budapest.

Wreckage of a still smoking German column, caught in the streets as it tried to escape.

The aftermath of the Budapest garrison breakout. Soviet soldiers wander among the debris. This is one of the German columns that the Red Army stopped in its tracks, trying to escape in Fö Street between Castle Hill and the Danube. It comprises Sd Kfz 251 semi-tracked armoured personnel carriers. The lead vehicle on the right is an Sd Kfz 232 armoured car, while behind it are two Sd Kfz 251/21 armed with three 15mm machine guns and designed for an anti-aircraft role. Just visible on the far left is a 251/9 armed with a short 75mm KwK37 L/24 gun.

Another abandoned Sd Kfz 251 armoured personnel carrier.

Captured German Hummel 150mm self-propelled heavy howitzer, photographed at Tában southwest of Castle Hill. It looks to have been blocked in by the vehicles in front of it.

Two German half-tracks and a towed anti-tank gun are among the debris left behind following the failed German-Hungarian breakout. Much of the transport was horse drawn and the draft animals were killed along with their owners.

Soviet equipment destroyed during the fighting: a derelict line of four Red Army T60 light tanks. The tank in the middle, missing its main gun, belonged to the Hungarians and is a French-supplied Hotchkiss light tank. The weapon in the foreground is a Soviet flak gun.

Abandoned cars riddled with bullet holes.

Remains of an Sd Kfz 231 heavy armoured car that once belong to a German reconnaissance unit, photographed on the banks of the Danube.

Vehicles abandoned by the fleeing garrison left on Castle Hill. They mostly comprise staff cars, plus a bus and tanker truck.

Captured German and Hungarian officers: just a few of the 22,350 prisoners taken after the fatal breakout attempt. Some 5,000 Hungarian troops were left behind in the Castle District along with several thousand wounded.

Another victim of the fighting in Budapest – the remains of a German Panzer III. Judging by the gun mantlet, this is an armoured observation vehicle variant or Artillerie-Panzerbeobachtungswagen that was built during 1943–44. A dummy gun was originally attached on the left-hand side of the mantlet, while the opening in the centre was for a machine gun. They were designed to support the Hummel and

Wespe self-propelled guns.

Chapter Six

Defeat at Balaton

I

n late January 1945 SS-Oberstgruppenführer (General) Sepp Dietrich, commander of the 6th SS Panzer Army, was summoned to Berlin, where he met Army Chief of Staff General Heinz Guderian. They agreed that all available troops should be sent immediately to defend the Oder. The Red Army was already over the river at Wriezen near Küstrin, just 45 miles from Berlin. They got 100 tanks across before the Germans moved to seal off the developing bridgehead. The anticipated Soviet offensive toward Berlin would not be for another two and half months, giving the defenders a much-needed breathing space. In the meantime Guderian wanted the occupying divisions redeployed from Kurland, Italy, Yugoslavia, Norway and Denmark to protect Berlin. He also argued that the 6th SS’s armour was desperately needed on the Oder. Hitler, however, had other plans for Dietrich and his panzers in Hungary. Ten panzer and five infantry divisions were to attack between Lake Balaton and Lake Velence, to split Marshal Tolbukhin’s 3rd Ukrainian Front in two. The plan was dubbed Operation Frühlingserwachung (spring awakening), and Hitler was convinced that if the Soviets were caught by surprise it would be their undoing. To this end secrecy was taken to extremes and reconnaissance of the attack routes was forbidden lest it tip the Soviets off. Not only was the offensive relying on surprise, but it also needed the right weather conditions to succeed. Only a severe frost would ensure the marshy ground around Lake Balaton would take the weight of Dietrich’s panzers, especially the massive Tiger II. Under Army Group South’s direction, the 6th SS Panzer Army and 6th Army, supported by the Hungarian 3rd Army, were to strike between the lakes while the 4th SS Panzer Corps held the Margarethe defences around Balaton. The German 8th Army north of Budapest was to remain on the defensive. At the same time, Army Group South’s 2nd Panzer Army, equipped only with assault guns, would employ its four infantry divisions to attack in an easterly direction south of Balaton. This was to be coordinated with a supplementary attack by General Lohrs’ Army Group E in Yugoslavia, which was to launch three divisions from the direction of the Drava to link up with 6th SS Panzer Army.

In total the German-Hungarian forces destined to assault Tolbukhin’s troops amounted to about thirty divisions, twelve of them tank divisions, plus other supporting formations numbering 431,000 men, 5,630 guns and mortars, 877 tanks and assault guns supported by 850 aircraft. The main strike force accounted for almost 150,000 men, 807 tanks and assault guns and over 3,000 guns and mortars. This was a remarkable achievement considering the catalogue of defeats the Third Reich had suffered since 1943 and in light of the fact that the war would be over within two months. In theory this pincer offensive would crush Tolbukhin’s 3rd Ukrainian Front, which consisted of five Soviet field armies, 4th Guards, 26th, 27th and 57th plus the 1st Bulgarian Army, supported by 17th Air Army. The 9th Guards Army formed the reserve south-east of Budapest. To the north Marshal Malinovsky’s 2nd Ukrainian Front stretched from Zvolen to the River Hron (a northern tributary of the Danube) in Hungary. The Soviets received intelligence from the British Military Mission on 12 February that 6th SS Panzer Army had moved east from the Western Front following the aborted Ardennes offensive. On 17 February 1945 Malinovsky and Tolbukhin were ordered to prepare their own offensive that would destroy the German’s Army Group South, drive them from Hungary, deprive them of the Nagykanizsa oilfields, occupy Vienna and threaten southern Germany. This move would also threaten German forces operating in Yugoslavia and Italy. The Soviet offensive was to open on 15 March. Little did they know that Hitler was about to pre-empt them. The 6th SS Panzer Army fielded six panzer divisions, two infantry and two cavalry divisions, as well as two heavy tank battalions equipped with about sixty Tiger IIs. 6th Army had five panzer and three infantry divisions, and the 3rd Hungarian Army had one tank division, two infantry divisions and a cavalry division. On paper 6th SS Panzer Army was a formidable formation that included four veteran SS panzer divisions, with the 1st SS and 12th SS grouped into the 1st SS Panzer Corps while the 2nd SS and 9th SS formed the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. In reality these units had been exhausted during the Ardennes offensive. The Hungarian 2nd Armoured Division, equipped with Hungarian-built Turan medium tanks, was considered inadequate for offensive operations and only a single Hungarian infantry division was placed under Dietrich’s command. The Germans enjoyed a local 2:1 superiority in tanks, as the Soviet forces in Hungary were weak in armour, which meant anti-tank guns would be their main defence against the 900 panzers and assault guns about to be thrown at them. Soviet anti-tank gunners were particularly contemptuous of the Panzer Mark IV, which they considered old. After taking part in the ill-fated Ardennes offensive in December 1944, the mighty Tiger II was also involved in Hitler’s last major offensive of the war. Between January 1944 and March 1945 some 489 of these monsters were

produced. Issued to training units in May 1944, they joined the first combat units the following month. Tiger IIs were issued to the independent heavy tank battalions of the German Army and Waffen-SS, apart from five tanks issued to the Feldherrnalle Panzergrenadier Division. Schwere Panzer Abteilung 503 was refitted with Tiger IIs in France in 1944 and, after fighting in Normandy, moved into Hungary in October. Similarly, the 509 refitted with Tiger IIs in Germany in late 1944 and moved into Hungary in January 1945. Tolbukhin was ordered to hold the Germans while the Red Army prepared its own offensive. His men established three main defensive lines of considerable depth. He had 407,000 men under his command, equipped with 400 tanks and selfpropelled guns, 7,000 guns and mortars and 965 aircraft. Soviet suspicions about the direction of the Hitler’s attempts to stop them were confirmed on 2 March when Hungarian deserters told their captors of a German assault due in three days time in the Balaton-Velence sector. Fully prepared, Tolbukhin sat back and awaited the enemy offensive. The 1st SS Panzer Corps struck the 7th Guards holding the Hron bridgehead on 17 February 1945 with up to 150 tanks and assault guns. Seven days later the Soviets lost their foothold with the loss of 8,800 men and most of their equipment. However, this victory cost the Germans 3,000 casualties and confirmed to the Soviets that a major counteroffensive was looming. Although 1st SS Panzer Corps’ preliminary attack got off to a good start by destroying the Soviet bridgehead around Esztergom, once Tolbukhin had established the attack was being conducted by Hitler’s elite it was obvious what was happening. When Hitler’s Operation Frühlingserwachung commenced the Soviets were already very well aware of the threat. On the morning of 6 March 1945, after a 30-minute artillery bombardment supported by the Luftwaffe, the 6th SS Panzer and 6th Army crashed into Tolbukhin’s defences. As planned, the Germans launched a furious threepronged offensive, with 6th SS Panzer Army striking in a south-easterly direction between lakes Velence and Balaton. The 2nd Panzer Army struck eastward in the direction of Kaposvar, while Army Group E attacked northeast from the right bank of the Davra with the aim of uniting with Dietrich. The Hungarian plain between the northern extremity of Balaton and the Danube was not good tank country because it was criss-crossed by canals and drainage ditches. Dietrich was furious with General Wohler, who had given assurances that the ground in front of his two panzer corps was passable. The mud claimed 132 tanks and fifteen Tiger IIs, which sank up to their turrets. The SS Panzergrenadiers were dropped off 10 miles from their starting points, so that the Soviets were not alerted by their half-tracks. To make matters worse, 2nd SS Panzer Corps found itself in a sea of mud and penetrated the Soviet defences to a depth of just five miles. 1st SS Panzer Corps made much better

progress, encroaching twenty-five miles into Soviet-held territory. General N.A. Gagen’s 26th Army and elements of the 1st Guards Fortified Area (part of the 4th Guards Army) bore the brunt of the steel storm. In response a Soviet artillery group of 160 field guns and mortars was established to provide 26th Army with massed covering fire. During the opening day General Sudet’s 17th Air Army flew 358 sorties, of which 227 were directed at the exposed panzers. A huge and furious battle followed as each side brought their well-honed tactics to bear. The 2nd SS Panzer Division joined the fight with 250 tanks on 8 March, followed by the 9th SS the next day, bringing the total of panzers committed to the battle up to 600. However, Dietrich was rapidly running out of time and resources. On 11 March he contacted Hitler’s headquarters requesting permission to call off Frühlingserwachung. He repeated this request three days later. His pleas to save his command from complete destruction fell on deaf ears. The 6th Panzer Division, with 200 tanks and self-propelled guns, Frühlingserwachung’s last reserves, were thrown into a desperate push for the Danube on 14 March. They attacked resolutely for two days and almost reached the Soviet’s rear defence line, but Tolbukhin’s men held fast. Although the 9th Guards Army was moved southwest of Budapest, Tolbukhin was under strict instructions not to employ it in his defensive operations. It was to remain ready for the deadly counter-blow to Frühlingserwachung.

Soviet troops involved in rounding up stragglers in Budapest. Note the Alsatian dog in the background that would have been ideal for sniffing out terrified men hiding in cellars and sewers. By mid-February 1945 the Red Army had secured the city and all organised resistance had been overcome.

Marshal Malinovsky, commander of the Soviet 2nd Ukrainian Front, arrives in Budapest to savour his moment of triumph. This victory cost the Red Army total losses of around 280,000 men.

The victors patrol the streets – 70,000 of their comrades were killed taking the city. Some Soviet units took advantage of the helpless population.

Hungarian prisoners are marched off to an uncertain future. Around 3,000 German and Hungarian survivors were caught hiding out in the surrounding hills. To the left is an abandoned German Panzer IV/70(V) tank destroyer.

Soviet sightseers enjoy the view from Castle Hill. Having captured Budapest, the Red Army faced another massive battle to the southwest of the city barely three weeks later.

This was just some of the devastation that greeted the victorious Red Army.

German armour gathers for Hitler’s counteroffensive at Lake Balaton in March 1945. Visible on the right is an Sd Kfz 250 armoured personnel carrier, while coming up the road is a Panther tank.

A single Hungarian division was assigned to support 6th SS Panzer Army during Hitler’s Operation Frühlingserwachen. The Turán tanks of the Hungarian 2nd Armoured Division were considered completely inadequate for offensive operations.

A crudely whitewashed German-supplied StuG III Ausf G going into action. At Balaton the Germans had a 2:1 superiority in tanks and assault guns over the Red Army, but they were thwarted by the appalling weather.

Tough looking panzergrenadiers poised for action, kitted out with winter parkas.

One of the sixty Tiger IIs committed to Frühlingserwachen. Fifteen of these 68-ton panzers were immediately lost in the mud before they even got into the fight.

Two Panzer IV70(V) supporting the offensive in Hungary. This German tank destroyer had only come into service the previous summer.

German troops wrapped against the bitter cold. They had relied on a heavy frost to ensure the progress of their panzers in Hungary; instead they became bogged down in the mud.

Hungarian and German soldiers fraternise next to a Tiger II in late 1944. By the New Year the Germans did not have much faith in the Hungarian Army as a proportion of it had already defected to the Soviets.

Panzergrenadiers riding on a StuG III pass a burning enemy vehicle. By the second week of March 1945 it was obvious that Hitler’s counteroffensive in Hungary had been forced to a halt. Hitler, however, refused to call off the operation.

More tough looking German troops – it would soon be their turn to be on the receiving end when the Red Army launched its own counteroffensive in mid-March 1945. The man on the right is armed with the standard MP40 submachine gun, while the one at the back has the much newer Sturmgewehr 44 assault rifle.

Chapter Seven

Tolbukhin’s Masterstroke

J

ust as Hitler’s Ardennes offensive had expended the last of his military resources on the Western Front, so Frühlingserwachung exhausted his remaining strength on the Eastern Front. By 15 March 1945 Sepp Dietrich had lost over 500 panzers and assault guns, 300 guns and 40,000 men battering themselves to death against the Soviets’ well-prepared defences. Using the excuse of defending Vienna, Dietrich tried to retrieve his shattered forces. Elsewhere, Hitler’s master plan was also coming unstuck. 2nd Panzer Army’s attack, launched east of Nagykanizsa, was broken up by Soviet artillery fire. Similarly, Army Group E, which attacked the 1st Bulgarian Army and 3rd Yugoslav Army on the night of 6 March, was soon driven back across the Drava by massed Soviet artillery. Soviet intelligence must have known that with the commitment of the 6th Panzer Division the Germans had exhausted their last reserves in Hungary. It had been touch and go, but the Soviet 9th Guards Army had not been needed to plug any holes in the Soviets’ final defences. It meant that when Tolbukhin lunched his own offensive the Germans would have nothing left with which to counterattack. While Frühlingserwachung slowed the Soviet attack on Vienna, ultimately it did not greatly affect the Soviets’ plans, although the main axis of their forthcoming offensive was now moved south of the Danube to Tolbukhin’s command. He was still weak in tanks, which numbered just 200, while the mauled German panzer units could still scrape together some 270 tanks and self-propelled guns. To bolster Tolbukhin’s attack the 6th Guards Army from Malinovsky’s command joined him, bringing with them 406 tanks and selfpropelled guns. Their job was the final destruction of the remnants of Dietrich’s 6th SS Panzer Army. Two infantry armies, the 9th and 4th Guards, were assigned the task of cutting the German armour off. The Soviets launched their counterstroke on 16 March along the entire front west of Budapest and Dietrich’s spearhead was sheared off. The weight of the attack fell on General Balck’s 6th Army and the Hungarian 3rd Army north of Lake Velence. Soviet tanks and motorised infantry poured through a breach,

which 12th SS Panzer Division was hastily sent to seal. The Soviets swung in a southwesterly direction toward Lake Balaton. Instead of throwing the Red Army back in disarray, 6th SS Panzer Army and 6th Army found themselves in danger of being cut off and a huge battle ebbed and flowed around Lake Balaton. In a repeat of the disaster at Stalingrad, Hitler’s forces were once again let down by their Eastern Front allies. The inadequately equipped Hungarians on 2nd SS Panzer Corps’ left flank defected with inevitable results. The skeletal Hungarian 3rd Army withdrew west, losing the 1st Hussar Division near Budapest. Its remaining divisions, including the 2nd Armoured, eventually surrendered to the American forces in Austria. Under pressure, the 1st SS Panzer Division gave ground, exposing Balck’s flank. Six days after the Soviet counteroffensive commenced, with just a milewide escape corridor, already under heavy enemy fire, 6th SS Panzer was faced with complete encirclement south of Székesfehérvár. Four panzer divisions and an infantry division fought desperately to keep the Soviet pincers apart and 6th SS Panzer Army only just managed to escape. Against orders Dietrich retreated and when Hitler was informed he flew into a rage. By 25 March 1945 Malinovsky’s offensive had torn a 60-mile gap in the German defences and penetrated more than 20 miles. He then prepared to strike toward Bratislava. Hungary was lost. In the meantime, 6th SS Panzer Army and 6th Army attempted to hold the River Raab, south of Vienna, and Lake Neusiedler against Tolbukhin’s troops. The Soviets crossed on 28 March and brushed aside the exhausted defenders. By the end of the month up to 45,000 German and Hungarian soldiers had surrendered. Vienna now lay open to the Red Army. Once more Hitler was incensed. As an Austrian by birth, he knew the implications of his defeat in Hungary. Some effort was made to reform the German Army divisions lost in Budapest. The remnants of 13th Panzer and the Feldherrnalle 60th Panzergrenadier divisions were immediately used as the nucleus of Panzer Division Feldherrnalle 2 in March 1945. This under-strength division fought its way from Hungary to Austria, where it surrendered at the end of the war. The two Waffen-SS cavalry divisions cut to pieces during the Budapest breakout were not reconstituted. Instead the few survivors, along with Hungarian ethnic Germans, were used to help form the Lützon 37th SS Cavalry Division on the Hungarian-Slovakian border. The retreating 18th SS Panzergrenadier Division made it to Czechoslovakia where it was virtually destroyed.

The shattered remains of Castle Hill overlooking the frozen Danube. The battles for Debrecen, Budapest and Balaton were followed by one final struggle before the Germans were ejected from Hungary.

IS-1 Joseph Stalin heavy tank armed with a massive 122mm gun belonging to the Red Army. Once Hitler’s Operation Frühlingserwachen had spent itself, Marshal Tolbukhin massed over 600 tanks and assault guns for his counteroffensive.

T-34/85 medium tanks, supported by infantry, move in for the kill. Tolbukhin launched his counteroffensive in Hungary on 16 March 1945.

Hungarian infantry manning defensive positions. The defection of Hungarian troops exposed the flank of 2nd SS Panzer Corps during this critical battle.

This German soldier may be listening to the sound of approaching gunfire. German defences around Lake Balaton could not be held, leaving 6th SS Panzer Army in danger of being trapped.

A German StuG III engaging enemy targets in harsh winter conditions. The Red Army had a 3:1 superiority in armoured fighting vehicles when it launched its final Hungarian offensive.

SS Panther tanks. The 6th SS Panzer Army’s remaining panzers simply could not stem the Soviet tide.

Two SS panzergrenadiers grabbing lunch next to the remains of a burned out Soviet tank.

The crew of an IS-2 pose for the camera. This tank was capable of taking on the heaviest of panzers with ease.

An abandoned StuG III. Operation Frühlingserwachen cost Hitler 500 panzers and assault guns, the equivalent of five panzer divisions.

The crew of this IS-2 are handing out rations to grateful civilians.

Another abandoned StuG III. By this stage of the war German assault guns had to function as panzers.

Nothing could withstand the ISU-152 armed with the powerful 152mm gun howitzer ML-20S. This was capable of destroying German Panther and Tiger tanks.

Hungarian 39M Csaba armoured cars. Fewer than 200 were built between 1939–44 and they were used in a reconnaissance role. Their main armament comprised a 20mm gun and a machine gun.

Chapter Eight

‘Thanks For Everything’

T

he Battle for Budapest significantly contributed to Hitler’s downfall. By the end of the war the once-mighty 6th SS Panzer Army and 4th SS Panzer Corps had ceased to exist because of Hitler’s obsession with Hungary’s capital. By the end of March 1945 Hitler’s defences in Hungary lay smashed. All the blood shed at Debrecen, Budapest and Balaton had achieved nothing. Hitler could not believe his Waffen-SS had failed him during his last-ditch Hungarian campaign, declaring, ‘If we lose the war, it will be his, Dietrich’s, fault.’ In a fit of ingratitude and childish petulance he ordered General Guderian to fly to the front to instruct the exhausted troops to remove their SS cuff bands. Guderian was appalled and pointed out that the Waffen-SS were under the jurisdiction of Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, not the Wehrmacht. The spineless Himmler sent a message, but Sepp Dietrich chose to defy it. Upon receiving the teletype order Dietrich remarked with bitterness, ‘This is thanks for everything.’ He summoned his four divisional commanders and threw Hitler’s message on the conference table, saying: ‘There’s your reward for all that you have done the past five years’. Dietrich instructed them not to pass the order on, but word of it quickly spread through the tattered ranks of his SS panzer divisions. It was rumoured that the German Army deliberately ensured their rivals knew of their shame. Removal of unit insignia was largely symbolic, as they had already been removed when 6th SS Panzer Army had moved secretly into Hungary prior to Operation Frühlingserwachung. Nonetheless, Hitler’s order was still seen as an insult by surviving SS veterans. Dietrich’s response was to inform Berlin that he would rather shoot himself than carry out the order. When he got no reply, he reportedly sent all his decorations back to Hitler. Setting Dietrich’s war crimes and political beliefs aside, he had served Nazi Germany well and Hitler’s order displayed appalling ingratitude. The whole episode illustrates the level of insanity that had overtaken Hitler and his entourage by this point in the hostilities, as the Nazi house of cards collapsed around them. After the fall of Hungary, Dietrich was assigned to General von Buenau,

Battle Commander of Vienna. Both men knew the defence could last little more than a few days. By his own admission, the defensive measures around Dietrich’s command post were to protect him from Hitler as much as the Soviets. The Red Army pressed home their attack, pushing towards Papa and Gyor. By 2 April they had reached Lake Neusiedler on the border between Hungary and Austria. Vienna fell eleven days later, with the loss of 125,000 prisoners. 6th SS Panzer Army’s message to Berlin read, ‘The garrison of Vienna has ceased to exist. Despite their exhaustion, the troops are fighting with exemplary courage.’ It was not enough, and within a month the war was over and Hitler was dead. After the fall of the Austrian capital, Dietrich withdrew west to the River Traisen, where 10,000 men reinforced his forces, gathered from local training units, and he held the Soviets for several weeks. The Red Army had shifted its main attention to capturing Brno, an important industrial city in Czechoslovakia. The 1st SS Panzer Division, totalling just 1,500 men, with sixteen panzers, as well as the remnants of the 9th SS, surrendered to US forces at Styer in Austria in May 1945. However, the Soviets captured some of the 1st SS’s rearguard. The 12th SS, numbering just 455 men and one panzer, also capitulated to the Americans in Austria. Survivors from the 2nd SS surrendered to American forces in Slovakia after fighting the insurrection in Prague. Survivors from the two divisions of 4th SS Panzer Corps were handed over to the Soviets. At the time of their surrender the 3rd SS Panzer Division numbered just 1,000 men and six panzers. However, it was the people of Budapest and their city that suffered the most as a result of the campaign fought in their country. In June 1944 Budapest had a population of 1.2 million; by April 1945 it had shrunk to 830,000. Some 25,000 civilians perished as a result of starvation and disease and another 13,000 were killed by military action. Allowing for executions and deportation of the Jewish community, the total dead amounted to 76,000 people. Hungarian military losses defending the city totalled 28,500. The damage to Budapest was extensive, with over 13,500 houses destroyed and another 18,800 rendered uninhabitable.

This 43M Zrínyi II self-propelled howitzer belonged to one of the Hungarian assault artillery battalions defending Budapest. It was armed with a 40M 105mm L/20 howitzer and was a very rare vehicle as only around sixty were ever built.

A German Hummel self-propelled gun destroyed below Buda’s hills. Once the Red Army had captured these heights the fate of the garrison was sealed.

Budapest’s Holy Trinity Square, showing the terrible damage caused to Mathias Church and the Finance Ministry.

Destruction wrought in the Royal Palace complex.

Soviet soldiers bury their dead – securing Hungary came at a fearful price.

German troops salute their dead. The Hungarian campaign marked the end of the ill-fated Axis alliance that had waged war on the Soviet Union since June 1941.

Buda Castle after the fighting stopped. The once grand building was reduced to a hollow shell after the roof and many of the floors were blown up.

The shattered remains of Budapest’s Finance Ministry.

Buda Castle, St George’s Square. Sightseers have come to survey the damage to their city.

More German casualties are laid to rest

A stark reminder of the futility of the war on the Eastern Front.

Six solemn-looking German soldiers carry their fallen comrade to his final resting place.

Damaged Mathias Church – much of its roof has been blown away and the main

spire is full of shell holes.

The Hungarian Army Ministry. A third of the building has been completely destroyed. This was undoubtedly used as a strongpoint by Hungarian troops. The remains of what appears to be a vehicle are just visible to the left in front of the building.

Total German and Hungarian fatalities during the siege of Budapest amounted to 48,000 men.

A makeshift common grave for eight Soviet soldiers. The Red Army and their Romanian allies suffered 70,000 killed taking Budapest.

A Soviet T-34/85 tank acts as a permanent memorial to the Battle of Debrecen that heralded the Battle for Budapest. Hitler’s defeat at Budapest opened the road to Vienna.

Table of Contents Title Copyright Contents Introduction Photograph Sources Chapter One: Hungarian Turning Point Chapter Two: Skorzeny’s Panzerfaust Chapter Three: SS Trapped in Budapest Chapter Four: Konrad Fails Chapter Five: Fatal Breakout Chapter Six: Defeat at Balaton Chapter Seven: Tolbukhin’s Masterstroke Chapter Eight: ‘Thanks for Everything’

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