UNFLICT INTHE 2(h'H€lOT||i 1 I ESStVERSUSWEST DuJOHNWMiiWil Designer: Malcolm Smythe Editor: Don Slater Researcher: Cecilia Weston-Baker Illustrated b...
15 downloads
67 Views
13MB Size
UNFLICT IN THE 2(h'H€lOT||i
1
I ESStVERSUSWEST
DuJOHNWMiiWil
Designer: Editor:
© Aladdin Books Ltd
Malcolm Smythe
Don
Slater
Researcher: Cecilia
Weston-Baker
Designed and produced
b}'
Aladdin Books Ltd
70 Old Compton Street Illustrated by
Stefan Chabluk
London W1V5PA First published in the
United States
All rights reserved
in
1987 by
Franklin Watts
387 Park Avenue South
New York NY
10016
ISBN0-531-10320-X Library of Congress Catalog Front cover:
A
Mujaheddin
looks on
Card Number: 86-62904
following an attack on a Soviet target
Printed in Belgium
in Afghanistan.
Photographic Credits: Cover: Frank Spooner contents page: Stern; page 7: Robert Hunt; page 8: Topham; page«10: Topham; page 11: Topham; page 12: BBC/Bettman Archives; page 13: The Research House (TRH)/NATO; page 14: Photosource/Keystone; page 15: BBC Hulton; page 16 (top): Stern; page 16 (bottom): Ullstein Bilderdienst; pages 18-19: Stern; page 19: Camera Press; page 20: Robert Hunt; page 23: Photosource/Keystone; page 24 (both): Popperfoto; page 27: Stern; page 28 (top): MARS/Swedish Air Force; page 28 (bottom): TRH/ Boeing; page 30 (top): Hutchinson; page 30 (bottom): Stern; page 32: TRH/T.A. Davies; page 35: Catherine ;
TRH/USN; MARS/Martin Marietta; page 40: TRH/USAF; PASS; page 44: TRH/DoD; page 45: TRH/
Bradley; page 36: Robert Hunt; page 37:
page 39: page 43: NATO; page 47: Hutchinson; page 48 (both): Popperfoto; page 49 (top and bottom left): Robert Hunt; page 49 (bottom center): MARS/DoD; page 49 (bottom right): Photosource/Keystone; page 51: Stern: page 52: Stern; page 53: TRH/General Dynamics; page 54 (top): TRH; page 54 (bottom): Barry Ambrose; page 55 (top): Ullstein Bilderdienst; page 55 (bottom): Topham; page 56 (top): Robert Hunt: page 56 (bottom):
TRH/NASA.
CONFLICT IN THE 20th CENTURY
THE
COLD 1)11
JOHN PIMLOTT
FRANKLIN WATTS New York London •
Toronto
•
Sydney
INTRODUCTION
EDITORIAL PANEL
The modern world
Scries Editor:
a very
is
1945 relations between the
dangerous place. Since
rival
superpower blocs, led
by the United States and Soviet Union respectively,
The invention and refinement of weapons have made war a more frightening
have been very tense. nuclear
As the armed
prospect.
each other take
in a
number of
end of the world
as
we know
Sandhurst,
UK
and West face
Editorial Advisory Panel:
would
Brigadier General James
"flashpoint" areas,
it
which could lead
to spark off a confrontation
little
to the
forces of East
Dr John Pimlott, Senior Lecturer in the Department of War Studies and International Affairs, RMA
L
Collins Jr,
US Army
Chief of Military History 1970-82
it.
This volume offers an explanation of why this should
General Sir John Hackett, former Commander-in-
be, charting the relationship between the superpowers
Chief of the British Army of the Rhine and Principal
since the heady days of Allied victory at the end of the
of King's College, London,
Second World War. The period "phases." Between 1945 and the
of October 1962, of war,
the
when
known
confrontation
divides into three
Cuban
Missile Crisis
the world teetered
relationship
deteriorated
as the
on the brink
into
that
superpowers
expand
Ian Hogg, retired Master Gunner of the British
Army, and editor of Jane's
Artillery,
Infantry Weapons
frosty
economic
between East and West. Both
existed tried to
a
Cold War. This reflected
the deep differences of political, social and beliefs
UK
their spheres of influence;
John Keegan, former Senior Lecturer partment of
War
in the
De-
Studies and International Affairs,
RMA Sandhurst, now Defense Correspondent, Daily Telegraph, UK
both sides continued to develop nuclear weapons of
awesome fears;
capability
which did nothing
to
calm people's
both sides refused to accept that the motives of
Professor Laurence Martin, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne,
UK
Europe divided: the Berlin Wall was
1961
the other were anything less than threatening.
This was followed by
known
a
period of comparative calm,
as detente (1963-79),
when both superpowers
followed policies designed to prevent confrontation,
but this did not
last.
Since 1979, the old tensions have
reemerged, producing a situation known as the
"New
Cold War."
We
are
still
living in the latter period, with
both sides
mistrusting the other, vying for territorial control in key areas and remorselessly increasing their nuclear stockpiles.
The
future looks bleak, but if
the history of the last
40
years, there
one looks back is
at
some hope. As
long as both sides remain fearful of the consequences of is
nuclear war, the world
may
yet survive.
This volume
designed to provide that historical perspective.
East Germans escaping well over
1
)k
John Pimlott
Series Editor
West.
20
to
built in
West Berlin.
It
to stop
has remained for
years symbolizing the divide between East
and
CONTENTS
Chapter
1
Chapter
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
The Superpower Divide, 1945-62 Detente and the
New Cold War
The Nuclear Backcloth
NATO and the Warsaw Pact
6
22
36 42
Appendices Personalities
48
East-W' est Flashpoints
50
East-West Balance of Forces
52
Spies and Spying
54
The Space Race
56
Chronology
58
Index
60
Glossary
62
DRY
THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE,
GREVT
se
^
)
)
QD e
Warsaw
Q
BRITAIN <*N r
\
\\J>S
/ft) \gniKRI
^^^z^^S'-* -^f^.
•
MOSCOW
)
•
Communist/neutral countries
\
POLAND
/ republic/
IXV^ui/RG
GERMAN
N^
a\dW_
/^it/iri
«PRAGUE^X
\
FEDERAL REPUBLIC
p
\
\
\CZECHOSLOYAKlA^->
—
^^
AUSTRIA
r .
*-^-^
BUDAPEST
•
SOVIET UNION
/
/
HUNGARY / RUMANIA
ITALY
)
Neutral countries
WARSAW
(
GERMAN
X
V.
© BERL N
J pEMOCRvnt
(
Sbf.lgilm);
FRANCE
members
NATO members
LONDON* {r
PARIS •
Pact
1945-86
^
X
f
™=<
(f^Y YUGOSLAVIA
SPAIN
BULGARIA 'ROME OKm
U.B.ttSIAl
TURKEY
fW J
GREECE
Miles
The Second World War produced deYastation on an unprecedented scale. The toll in human lives is
CHAPTER
estimated to have been about 50 million, of \Yhich
TillB
some 20 1.6
SUPERPOWER I
l
to
nitedSta plit into
%>'
to rubble
as well as material terms,
was given top
priority.
)45, they were at
up between the
-
without
by mass bombing or the effects of battle, while Japan had experienced the full horror of atomic attacks. Once the war was over, the need for massive reconstruction, in human
reduced
within months l
left
turn to their prewar homes. Entire cities had been
working together
•,
of the^survivors were
the future as refugees, unwilling or unable to re-
'nited Stares «j\ interim
Hies,
Many
food or shelter and hundreds of thousands faced
1945-1962 the
million Japanese, 397,000 British
American.
DIVIDE >
German, and 300,000
million were Soviet, 5 million
in ton Churchill, but
it
in
March
ded upon the
Denazification
To
begin with, the victorious Allies had one aim in
common:
to prevent a return
of fascism - the ruthless
form of government exemplified by the Nazis cularly in
Germany. Their methods varied -
parti-
in areas
occupied by the British and Americans, a careful policy of "denazification" was initiated, whereby
who had been
active in
all
people
Adolf Hitler's regime were
THE SUPERPOW ER DIMDE, removed from public areas,
all
Nazi
office,
officials
while in Soviet-controlled
were imprisoned and many of
them shot - but the idea was
to free
scourge of Nazism, exposing
its
that future generations
In the
Western
crimes and ensuring
were made aware of its
areas, school children
the horrors of the
some regions
Europe from the
told of
concentration camps - indeed,
the local people were forced to
emaciated bodies of the victims, often of newsreel publicity - and special out to find and punish the guilty
men
bun
in
the
in the full glare
trials
were carried
(and
women) of
the Nazi era.
more notorious Nazi
leaders, including Hitler's
men Hermann Goering and Rudolf to justice at
was soon obvious
existed over the future of Europe.
in
December 1944, and
to
Japanese military leaders captured
similar justice
many
trials
took
September 1945. leaders on trial at
Malmedy
was meted out in
three major wartime Allies Hritain
1945.
in
-
of these were
when
the
the United States, Great
and the Soviet Union - met There the "Big Three"
at Yalta in
February
leaders,
Franklin
Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin,
"deal" involving concessions by the
made
a
West which would
prove to be crucial to the postwar world.
main aim was
to protect the Soviet
from future attacks from the west (something
August and
as the
first line
Union
that
had
of defense. His ideal solution was a
larger Poland, ruled by a
government
friendly to the
Soviet Union. Stalin therefore proposed that Poland's
western border should be moved, taking over territory
Soviet
up
to the
Oder and Neisse
Union receiving
government
of
would be allowed Nuremberg
Some
differences
"buffer zone," using the territory of western neighbors
place elsewhere, dealing with specific atrocities such as at
fundamental
that
were
Nuremberg; 12 of them were sen-
American prisoners of war
as far as Allied cooperation went, for
already happened in both 1914 and 1941) by creating a
Hess,
more received long prison sentences. Other
Nazi
was about
hench-
tenced to death for crimes against humanity, and
the massacre of
it
this
Stalin's
Between November 1945 and October 1946, the
brought
Hut
»45-h2
Yalta deal
already emerging toward the end of the war,
evil.
were
The
l'
November 1945; Hermann Goering
is
and with the
part of eastern Poland.
communists
and
to take office in
seated far
ri\ers,
left,
A
Polish
non-communists
Warsaw.
middle row.
German
IN THE
20TH CENTURY of Berlin. Austria was to be occupied in
much
same
the
way, with Vienna under four-power control. Final arrangements along these lines should have
been made at
of the wartime conferences, held
at the last
Potsdam
(a
suburb of Berlin)
1945, but by
in July
then circumstances had changed. Roosevelt was dead
and had been replaced by
Harry
his vice-president,
Truman. The results of a British general election, announced while the conference was in session, meant that Churchill was replaced by the leader of the new Uabor (socialist) government, Clement Attlee. Both
much had
already
and were determined
to alter
newcomers were convinced been given away
to Stalin
the agreements. But
begun
that too
was already too
it
had
late. Stalin
pave the way for a communist takeover of
to
Poland and was prepared to offer no concessions over the future of Germany.
Germany
At Potsdam, the Allies did agree that
should be run by a Control Council
commanders of Churchill, Roosevelt
The Western
and Stalin
exchange for a
Soviet promise to enter the war against Japan two
months this
surrender.
for example, that Roosevelt
and
in April)
Many
reasons for
agreement have been suggested.
fateful
known,
German
after a
was very
that he believed he could
ill
expense involved
in
(he died
state indefinitely.
The
keep Stalin
under control, while both Roosevelt and Churchill were desperate
to
ensure a Soviet declaration of war on
Japan. In reality there was
little
anyone could do
to stop
still
determined
man), even
a treaty
few weeks
lier
well to the west of the
Oder-Neisse
He was
favor of extracting financial "rep*arations"
from Germany
sation)
damage
inflicted
bitter war.
I
le
on
to help
the equivalent of 20 billion
and mineral assets and
Germany of her
to use her people to
rebuild Soviet economic strength. In order to gain control
over
German
territory so that this
could be carried
out, Stalin readily agreed to the division of
signed - even today,
Although some of the ear-
to
between
become known
the
as the
1945,
8,
Allies
had
"Cold War"
had begun.
Germany
The Cold War A "Cold War" is
of hostility between
rival
coun-
of actual fighting. Instead conflict
takes the form of propaganda, economic measures and
There were many
a general policy of noncooperation.
reasons for the post- 1945 Cold
them liefs
all
W ar. r
Underpinning
were the fundamentally opposed
political
be-
of the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, for
of the United States, Great Britain, France and the
enemy of
respectively, with a similar split in the city
a state
tries that stops short
although
Union
exi$t.
relationship
What was
into four zones, administered by the occupying armies
Soviet
ensured that no formal peace
(compen-
pay for the enormous
dollars as well as the right to strip industrial
firmly in
his country during four years of
demanded
rift
does not
wartime
soured. other demands.
of demanding some of this
Soviet declaration of war on Japan on August
line.
Germany divided made
heavy reparations from Ger-
agreements were carried out, most notably the
the
Stalin also
on the other hand, were
Germany could be
such
enemy
sectors.
This deepening with
they had advanced as far as the Elbe,
Soviets,
to exact
from the Western
treaty
later,
administering a shattered
to the extent
By the beginning of 1945, Soviet troops already controlled Poland and by the end of the war a the Soviets.
new
German government. However, fundamental differences of opinion about the future of Germany soon emerged. The Western Allies wanted to rebuild Germany as a self-sufficient country, and did not want the
is
It
the
the four occupying armies, with free
elections being held as soon as possible to create a
at Yalta, 1945.
Allies agreed to this in
made up of
all
had come together
to defeat the
fascism, their world views
that rivalry
was
inevitable.
common
were so different
FRANCE
A DIVIDED GERMANY: THE OCCUPYING POWERS, (France
I
1945-55 l
I
llnited States
rejected this in the 1930s, aware that he faced
enough
Union without taking on
the rest
Soviet Union
Great Britain
problems
in the Soviet
of the world, a general fear of Soviet expansion soon took hold
To
the West, the ideal political system
on elections
to a multi-party,
despite victory over the
with economic policies determined by the free-market
that the
enterprise of capitalism, in which people were able to
their
enjoy the fruits of their
would,
own
it
lives
own
labors.
Such
was believed, allow the people and
to enjoy certain basic
a
system
to live their
freedoms such as
those of political and religious belief.
West.
This was made worse by the events of 1945,
was one based
democratic parliament,
in the
Germans
there was
little
for
sign
Soviets were prepared to withdraw behind
prewar borders. The Soviet armies
in eastern
more
significant-
Europe were not reduced
in size and,
the countries occupied by the Soviets in the final
ly,
months of the war were not allowed
to
hold free elec-
tions or to adopt Western-style governments.
To many
communism seemed
By comparison, the Soviet system was controlled by the ideals of communism, in which the needs of the in-
gaining ground, and this view of Soviet motives cannot
dividual were subordinated to those of the society as a
be ignored when trying
whole. Although the aim of a classless society in which
To
the profits of labor ple as required
been forced
to
would be shared between the peo-
sounded
fine in theory, the Soviets
had
impose strong central control on the
economy and society in an attempt to put it into practice. In Western eyes, this destroyed the freedom of the individual; to the Soviets,
it
was
a
much
fairer
and
less
chaotic state of affairs.
Moreover, since the revolution of 1917, which had brought the communists to power
in Russia, a
aim of the communists had been
to
to
other
countries,
and
although
declared
spread their ideas Stalin
officially
West,
in the
to
to
be
understand the Cold War.
the West, the Soviets were merely pausing before
extending their rule over the rest of Europe; to the
need
Soviets, the
for a buffer
zone
to protect their
homeland was the overwhelming concern, justifying their policy of creating communist governments throughout eastern Europe.
Add
to this the Soviets'
American atomic weapons - which they could not even begin to match until 1949 - and the unfear of
doubted personality clashes between leaders such as
Truman and talk calmly,
Stalin,
and
who found
it
virtually impossible to
a pattern of reasons for the
begins to emerge.
Cold
War
(
iONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
Soviet expansion
These reasons
are best illustrated by looking at events
between 1945-62. Viewed through
that took place
Truman's
threatening place.
United States
-
1945-46 seemed
eyes, the world in
When
a very
he took over as president of the
most of eastern Europe
in April 1945,
Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary
Bulgaria,
and parts of Austria and Germany - was already
under Soviet military control. Stalin soon made that
he was prepared
to
clear
impose permanent communist
governments on the areas under if this
it
control,
his
even
required blatantly undemocratic methods.
Communist governments had
been
also
set
up
in
Albania and Yugoslavia, and in Greece communist and royalist factions
October 1944.
had been embroiled
of Mao
Stalin's
achieve
success
Nationalists. its
grip
It
most American eyes Russia were beginning to
different in
from the forces of military
looked as
if
against
the
pro-Western
communism was
extending
on key areas of the world.
The
situation
worsened when, on February 24,
1947, Britain announced that to
war since
China the communist forces
Finally, in
Tse-tung - no
in a civil
it
could no longer afford
pay for military aid to the Greek royalists or continue
Turkey, a neighbor of the Soviet Union under
to help
The Marshall Plan This was followed by the unveiling of
a
keep western Europe out of communist hands,
to
General George
pressure from Stalin to allow the establishment of
known
Soviet bases on her
Marshall, Truman's Secretary of State
Britain's
soil.
triggered
plight
as the Marshall Plan after
Truman into launching a worldwide crusade against communism known as the Truman Doctrine. On March 12, 1947, Truman outlined his policies to
suggested
the United States Congress, arguing that the world
free
faced a stark choice between two political philosophies.
Europeans,
He
time in
"one way of
said
and
majority,
is
life is
based upon the
distinguished
by free
will
of the
institutions,
representative government, free elections, guarantees
of individual
liberty,
and freedom from of
life
is
freedom of speech and
political repression.
based upon the
will
religion
The second way
of a minority forcibly
broad strategy
massive
On
it.
US
June
5,
economic aid
emergence of
and
political
can
institutions
was too good V agreeing.
Even the
Soviets,
originally
1947, Marshall proposed to
Europe
"permit the
to
social conditions in
exist."
it
who
To
the
to resist
which
hard-pressed
and they
no
lost
ravaged by war, expressed an
interest, applying for a six billion dollar loan
from the
Americans. But there were strings attached, for the
Americans expected the receiving countries not only adopt
liberal
democratic
political ideas
to
but also to use
oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections
money to buy American goods. As soon as became apparent, the Soviets walked out of
and the suppression of personal freedom."
negotiations in Paris (July 12, 1947), taking the east
imposed upon the
majority.
It.
relies
upon. terror and
Congress, despite some opposition from radicals
and even from some conservatives, approved
Truman's commitment challenge wherever for
it
to
"containment,"
as
spread of
confront the communist
appeared. Funds were approved
Greece and Turkey. The
known
liberals,
threat.
the
Europeans with them. Nevertheless, 16 countries took advantage of Marshall
Aid,
receiving
a
total
of 72.5
billion
December 1959. The money played
dollars
by
a vital part in the
postwar economic recovery of western Europe, but
designed to prevent the
funds were also used by the United States to interfere
communism beyond
under
this
a general policy
result
its
was
existing boundaries
by offering military and economic aid to those countries
the
in the internal politics
of France and
which had strong communist thirds of the
Italy,
parties. After
money was devoted
both of
1950 two-
to military purposes.
THE SUPERPOWER The
Soviet bloc
The
result
capitalist
was
that the "Iron Curtain" dividing the
west from communist eastern Europe became
even more of a
communist bloc ist
To
reality.
Stalin reacted by forcing the
into a tighter grouping, the
Commun-
Information Bureau (Cominform), and setting up a
prevent defeat, the communists, aided by the seized
Soviets,
results could
power before
political
The
was
official verdict
suicide, but state
known
1948, Czechoslovakia was firmly
(Comecon),
in
Stalin,
who dominated
the Soviet system at
same time
machine and
home,
show
later,
that he
impose
communist hands.
in
his
all
own
as the Czechoslovakian coup,
his authority
archives,
was murdered. By March
But Stalin did not have things
1949 with the aim of fostering economic
development based on loans from the Soviet Lnion.
election
were arrested and one of the most prominent, Jan Masaryk, was found dead beneath his office window.
opened
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
the
be announced. Non-communist ministers
communist "common market," or economic union, as the
DIVIDE, 1945-62
on Yugoslavia,
a
way. At the
he
tried to
country already
ruthlessly eliminat-
ruled by communists under the wartime guerrilla leader
to establish a firm control
Tito (Josip Broz). Since 1945, Tito had insisted on
over the so-called "satellite states" of eastern Europe.
taking an independent line, defying the Soviets, and
This policy came
when
controlling the party
ing his
rivals,
was determined
to
a
head
Czechoslovakia,
in
a
country which had enjoyed a brief period of democracy
an effort
under elected communist governments immediately after the
Second World War. Soviet influence had
been
not least in pressures
reject
felt,
Marshall
February
Aid.
But
upon
elections
the
Czechs
were
held
in
to control the Yugoslavs,
in
to
back down.
been able
Lp
of sending Soviet
invasion, Stalin
maintain an independent foreign and
to
still
embracing communism.
relations,
1949.
1U
,.n,
vl
1
I
"gSlJSWEDLHOST •-" "'Bin I
SniOUVA
5
5S5R
1
- ZMMJftASi "POUIIKY
Ct
TV
had
to the present day, Yugoslavia has
Czech communists demonstrate in favor of "world peace" during a period oftense East- West
,
in
Tito called his bluff.
difficulties
West over any attempted
economic policy while
1
withdrew technical aid
forces to Yugoslavia and the chances of confrontation
with the
sure to win.
Stalin
Because of the practical
to
1948 which the non-communists seemed
March 1948
-
VSEN
-I.""'.
fS*.:
C-54 Skymaster carrying essential supplies
Children watch as a
The
Berlin
of
airlift
But Stalin did not stop there, for provoked
test the resolve
Germany and surrounded by tory,
to
had been divided
probably in an
threatened to undermine Soviet attempts to impose
miles)
its
policy of
of
Nazism,
inside
east
Soviet-controlled terri-
into four sectors in 1945, each
be occupied by the army of one of the victorious
wartime
single
to the city
motorway,
from the west was restricted
a railway, a
carefully defined air corridor. Allies
to a
to
occupy their
had already
endured over two months of ruthless Soviet occupain the
Western sectors therefore welcomed
the arrival of their
new
rulers. Instead
reparations, the American, British and
Kommandatura (occupying
ities in
the
duced
policies
closed "for repairs."
was
also closed
of demanding
French authorauthority) intro-
of recovery and aid as they had in
western Germany.
These culminated
an extremely provocative move,
Soon
afterwards, the railway link
and the use of the canals
implication was clear: the Soviets were trying to
force the
Western to
allies to
June 1948
in the introduction
But the
Berlin.
be intimidated and turned to the
air corridor
as a
million inhabitants of
the
abandon
Americans and
means of supplying
West
British
Berlin.
On June
began an
still
the IVi 26, 1948
airlift
of
vital
supplies and a crisis quickly developed. As aircraft
followed aircraft into and out of the Western sectors, the
Soviets responded by pouring troops into east
Germany. Tensions rose even higher when three groups of American strategic atomic bombers were flown openly to bases in Britain.
major war developing increased in
restricted.
Berlin was cut off from the West.
open
Western
in
withdrew from the
Soviets
informed the West fhat\the motorway into Berlin was
By the time
had gained Soviet permission
Those
Kommandatura and,
West refused
the
The
control.
network of canals and a
sectors in July 1945, the people of Berlin
tion.
economic
The
allies.
Access
Deutschmark. The
stable currency, the
resulting flow of funds from eastern to western sectors
capital
more than 100 km (60
new and
a
June 1948 he
of the West in
The former
anti-communism. situated
in
a deliberate crisis over Berlin,
attempt to
sweeps low aver West Berlin, 1 948
The chances
daily,
of a
hinging on the
degree of Western determination and whether the
THE SUPERPOWER Soviets would allow the
airlift to
handing power back
continue.
In the event, the Soviets proved unwilling to take the
and despite further intimidation - including the
risk,
German
the
into the
- they held hack from
five
awesome
decision to close
the air corridor, hoping no douht that the high cost of
the
would force the West
airlift
West regarded
when major
to stand
down. But the
the crisis as a test of resolve and even
difficulties arose, particularly in the
winter
efforts saved
West
German Democratic Republic
months
later.
By
(East
tially
dangerous
the process of the
The
first
camps
rival
in
Cold War was played
Germany)
out.
of these was the creation by the West of the
Berlin. Despite desperate
had
its
origins in treaties
(the
This
between Britain and France
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and
in
Treaty of Dunkirk) and between Britain,
Luxemburg
a
over a period of 318 days, kept the Berliners
year later (the Treaty of Brussels), in which the various
few minutes,
parties agreed to help each other in the event of war.
At times,
aircraft
and Gatow airport
were landing
(see
even,'
map on page
9)
was
said to be
NATO
itself
came
into existence
the busiest airport in the world, handling an average
while the Berlin crisis was
of 540 movements a day throughout the period of
total
airlift.
Allied aircraft also flew out Berlin's exports,
as well as undernourished children
needed medical treatment. By was forced although the
to
May
admit defeat and
airlift
was
and people who 12,
lift
the blockade,
to continue until late
Septem-
NATO
creation of
The
Berlin crisis led to a permanent division of Ger-
of
- Belgium,
Iceland,
4,
1949,
going on, and involved a
Italy,
Britain,
Canada,
Luxemburg,
The core of the Treaty was contained which stated
that
would be viewed up and,
the
an attack upon any
tionist policies
war
in
member
as an attack against
A
in Article 5,
joint military
them
country all
and
command was
it was headed by a US general: - departing from its normally isola-
significantly,
the United States
to their policy
states
reacted to accordingly.
The
birth
member
still
on April
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States.
set
many. The Western powers, true
of 12
Denmark, France,
1949, Stalin
ber as stockpiles of supplies were built up.
The
zone
Europe, between which
tons of food and supplies, delivered by 195,530 aircraft
the
their
had taken place which insured the creation of poten-
1947
alive.
May
then, two further developments
shortages of fuel and electricity, a total of 2,555,300
flights
in
Federal Republic (West Germany)
North Atlantic Treat) Organization (NATO).
months, they maintained the flow of supplies.
Their
politicians, created
1949 and the Soviets responded by forming
use of fighter aircraft to "buzz" the Western transports the
non-Nazi
to
DIVIDE, 1945-62
Europe
- was in the
formally committed to going to
event of Soviet aggression.
ofNATO: representatives ofthe 12 founder member countries sign the treaty in April 1949.
I
.ICT IN TI IE 20TI I
SI
This was
CENTURY
development
a crucial
Cold War,
in the
highlighting the growing awareness of Soviet policies that existed in the it
than
rise
that.
United States, but there was more
Fears of Soviet intentions increased, giving
Two Americans,
spying scandals.
Rosenberg, were found information traitors,
to
the
of having passed secret
guilt)
Soviets
and Dr Klaus Fuchs,
and Ethel
Julius
and were executed a
as
German-born nuclear
physicist living in Britain, confessed to spying activities.
soil,
the fact that they had "caught up" so
quickly with the Americans (who had been hoping to maintain a
monopoly of such weapons) increased
public disquiet.
number of
sense of paranoia, fueled by a
to a
to
American
This was further fueled by government propaganda, determined
to paint the blackest picture
of the Soviet
Union. Radio broadcasts from stations such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe spread
this
view worldwide, leading to Soviet moves to jam the
waves and
to
air
spread counterpropaganda.
Fears of the Soviets were translated into general
communism and other left-wing beliefs United States, and when Senator Joseph
hysteria about in
the
McCarthy manship, citizens
instigated a Senate inquiry
a virtual
witchhunt ensued.
were called
to
his chair-
Some
3,000
US
China
their jobs in
government
1940s - the sudden Soviet
ability
to
drop such a
under
Mao
test
bomb
Senator Joseph McCarthy during the hearings of the
I
onto
interests of the
an entirely unreasonable fell
to the
to Soviet calls for the Nationalist in the Security
Chinese
in
to step
down
Council of the United
Nations and to an American veto of such
and
communists
Tse-tung - an event which immediately led
from their place
explosion of an atomic device in 1949. Although the Soviets lacked the
undermine the
view. In October 1949,
and even entertainment when they
late
to
and many
Activities"
was made worse by another important
development of the
designed specifically
this
were accused of less than right-wing views. situation
the
United States. Nor was
more were forced out of
The
many Americans began to see spread of communism as an integrated campaign
In such circumstances,
appear before the Senate sub-
committee on "Un-American service, education
under
Beyond Europe
a
proposal
-
June 1950 the communist North Koreans, with
Soviet backing, invaded pro-American South Korea, clearly intent
n-American
upon expansion.
Activities subcommittee in
1950.
He was
later discredited.
THE SUPERPOWER DIVIDE, Death of Stalin On March 5, 1953, era in which
Stalin died, bringing to an
potential "superpower" (a
and
prestige), capable of challenging the
United States
world influence. But the cost had been high, and
for
aware of the weaknesses of their
Stalin's successors,
country as
of
end an
Union had emerged as a country of immense power
Soviet
the
1945-62
it
recovered from the ravages of four years
move away from
war, began to
total
a policy
of
confrontation. In 1955 Nikita Khrushchev, a bluster-
new
argumentative man, emerged as the
ing,
Communist
Secretary of the Soviet Stalin,
he proved willing
First
Part} and, unlike
to talk to the
Western powers.
In February 1955, he offered to withdraw Soviet
troops from Austria if
Korean
refugees flee from
t lie
became
come. In July, In
the
case,
latter
the
the
West would do
a neutral state; three
the
same and
months
later,
the Austrian State Treat} achieved just such an out-
1950.
fighting,
Austria
if
Americans were able
to
in a
new
spirit
of hope, Khrushchev met
Eisenhower, together with the leaders of Britain and
mobilize "Free World" opinion (and forces) to fight the
France, in Geneva for the
aggression in a war that was to
Potsdam. Although nothing dramatic was decided,
was not the
Korea, but
this
Elsewhere
in the
full
last for
three years in
extent of the problem.
Far East, various Western or West-
ern-backed countries were fighting against communist
- the French
uprisings
Malaya and the Americans did
in Indochina, the British in
home
Filipinos in their
all
islands.
The
they could to help, short of actually
Money and
putting troops on the ground.
equipment were made
military
government forces
available to
an easing of tension seemed
when,
larly
a
and declared
form the Organization of American States
(OAS) (1948) and NATO was protecting western Europe. They now formed other alliances to complete the encirclement of the communist bloc.
The
details
were
tary of State to to replace
John Foster Dulles, SecrePresident Dwight Eisenhower, elected
Truman
created an "Asian Britain,
left to
in 1952. In
NATO"
France, Australia,
September 1954, Dulles
when
New
the United States,
Zealand, Thailand,
came together to form the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and in 1955 the "wall" of containment was completed when Britain, Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan signed the Baghdad Pact, designed to keep the Soviets out of the Middle East. The latter had to be renamed the Central Treaty Pakistan and the Philippines
Organization
(CENTO)
in
1959 when Iraq refused
to
agree to the inclusion of Iran, but the basic intention did not alter.
By
had begun
change.
to
then, however, the situation in
Europe
later,
Khrushchev openly him
as a tyrant,
between East
and West was desirable. But the Cold
War
could not be finished quite so
simply, and both sides continued to feel threatened by
the actions of the other. In
West Germany by ending
to
since
be on the cards, particu-
that "peaceful coexistence"
United States had already used
America
"summit meeting"
attacked the policies of Stalin, describing
Western
influence in Latin
to
few months
and the idea of "containment" was extended. The its
first
May
1955, for example, the
Allies decided to recognize the existence of
the occupation and allowing
controlled rearmament within the context of
NATO.
By then, the NATO alliance had already been expanded by the addition of Greece and Turkey (in 1952), but this latest move could only help to provoke the Soviets - after all, it was still only 10 years since the end of the "Great
Patriotic
Second World War, died,
the
in
War,"
as they called the
which 20 million Russians had
and the Western countries were already rearming
Germans.
In response, the Soviets sought their
own
security
agreement, designed to ensure their unquestioned military control of the satellite states of eastern Europe.
On May came
a
West Germany beWarsaw Pact was signed
14, 1955, the day before
NATO
member, the
between Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union, with East
Germany
as
an
official
the
end of the
into
two armed camps.
year).
"observer" (she joined before
Europe was now firmly divided
IN THE 20TH
CENTURY
The invasion of Hungary To the Soviets, the Warsaw able counter to
NATO,
view, particularly
when
their policies
the
in
Pact was a perfectly
justifi-
but the West took a different the Soviets used
member
states.
to enforce
it
East European
countries had already suffered the experience of Soviet
troops maintaining
communist
June 1953, T-34 tanks had been used to put
down
when,
"solidarity" in
East
in
Germany
a workers' strike, called in opposition to
food shortages and religious persecution.
However,
this
was nothing compared
to events in
Hungary
three years later. In July 1956 students, intel-
lectuals,
workers and peasants demanded the removal
of Hungary's Stalin-like leader, Matyas Rakosi, and the return of the
The
crisis
opened
fire
came on
more moderate to
a
head
a student
in
politician,
October when police
demonstration
and suddenly the whole country was up
army joined the uprising and
Imre Xagy.
in
in
Budapest, arms.
at first the Soviets
The
seemed
prepared to compromise, recalling Xagy and allowing a
measure of political and
religious freedom.
Disabled Soviet tank, Budapest, 1 956.
Stalin
'$
head
is
knocked down in Hungary, 19^6.
THE SUPERPOWER
On November
But the jubilation was short-lived.
Western attention was diverted
as
1,
to a crisis in Egypt,
Moscow
the politburo, or ruling body, in
voted to
Nagy had just announced his intention to leave the Warsaw Pact. On November 4, the Soviet Army entered Hungary in force and tanks
ICBM
DIVIDE, 1945-62
The Americans
could no longer be doubted.
suddenly began to fear the potential consequences of
Cold War.
the
invade Hungary, where
patrolled the streets of the major towns and cities.
Hungarian
many
back with what they had -
patriots fought
cases
more than Molotov
little
bombs) and
The in
cocktails (gasoline
inevitable.
Within
a vers
few days,
Soviets had reestablished control, rounding up
thousands of dissidents, executing Nagy and installing a "safe"
communist
leader, Janos Kadar, in his place.
then, a similar uprising in Poland had been nipped
By
bud, fortunately without the need for tanks on
in the
the streets, and
Wladyslaw Gomulka,
was nonetheless prepared
been put were
To
in office.
to toe the
a
moderate who
Moscow
had
line,
the outside world, the Soviets
clearly willing to go to great lengths to ensure the
survival of the
At
missile gap
first,
the
chances of
new developments appeared
"thaw," or relaxation, in superpower
a
and
in
United States
to
relations,
Warsaw
Pact regardless of the opinions
of outside powers.
1959 Khrushchev even
War had been
which fueled the Cold
fear
Amid widespread
calls in the
hold presidential elections
November 1960)
for
in
gram of ICBM development, 1,
to
supposed "missile gap" by
policies to close the
On May
the
summit was doomed.
news came
sance
aircraft, flying
an American
in that
U-2
been shot down by
a surface-to-air missile. Its pilot,
Gary Powers, had been captured
alive
and the cameras,
containing photographs of various military and indussites
the
in
Soviet at
had
heartland,
from the Americans, punishment
those responsible and a promise that no
time in office was
full
of crises which did nothing to
ease the tensions between East and West. Once,
United Nations, he took
his
at
shoe off and banged
Union had
the table, shouting that the Soviet
its
it
the
on
own
nuclear missiles and no longer feared the possibility of
an American attack. the Americans, the Soviet
upon aggression,
communists appeared
Union when,
particularly
gain
to
a
still
in
seemed
1957, the
dangerous lead
in
nuclear capability. Before that date, there was no real
danger of a Soviet nuclear for
the
on the United States,
reason that the
simple
weapons with
strike
Soviets
the necessary range. But in
Khrushchev announced had been carried out
that successful
to test
lacked the
August 1957 experiments
an intercontinental
ballistic
(ICBM), capable of traveling from the Soviet Union to American territory.
missile
Less than two months Sputnik
I,
later,
the Soviets launched
the first-ever space satellite,
up with Sputnik
II,
and followed
it
containing the dog Laika. Other
than the fact that this was a major blow to American prestige, the implications
could launch a
seemed clear-
satellite, their
if
the Soviets
claims to have a viable
survived.
summit demanding an
the
Indeed, despite his declared intention to create a more
unpredictable leader, given to public outbursts, and his
reconnais-
high over the Soviet Union, had
instant apology
West, Khrushchev was an
a pro-
1960, as the two leaders were arriving in
Paris,
trial
settled relationship with the
revived.
United States (due
Increasing tension
intent
the
visited
pave the way for a summit meeting
Khrushchev appeared
To
to boost the
with Eisenhower in Paris the following spring. But the
rifles.
The outcome was the
The
for
more spying flights would take place. The flights were stopped - the development of satellites was making them no longer necessary - but Eisenhower refused to apologize. The Paris It
summit
was
collapsed.
in this
atmosphere of renewed tension
Democrats won the 1960
presidential
that the
election
and
John Kennedy entered the White House. He had based his campaign on the need to close the missile gap, even though he was probably aware in fact exist (even if
it
did, the
that
such a gap did not
Americans
still
enjoyed
undoubted superiority of numbers and technology
in
nuclear terms), but his inauguration in January 1961
represented something
much more
profound. As the
youngest-ever president, Kennedy seemed to encourage a feeling of hope in the future. Unfortunately, such a hope was not immediately
Kennedy found
realized.
personality on the this
was
it
American
difficult
political
to
impose
his
establishment and
reflected in his relations with the Soviets.
Despite the failure of the Paris summit, another was
scheduled
to take place in
Kennedy did not succeed in who came away convinced president was weak.
It
was
crises for this impression to
June 1961, and impressing Khrushchev,
Vienna
in
that the
new American
to take a series of fresh
be altered.
rii(
The
Berlin Wall
The
first
of these crises had already begun to develop
Kennedy assumed
before
ENTURY
the presidency. Khrushchev,
The division ofBerlin: the Brandenburg Gate
An
the Berlin (below), a
German
eager to capitalize on Western desires to settle the
glorious past.
future of Europe, had suggested a conference to nego-
guards in August 1962
tiate
a "deal" over the future of
Germany,
possibly
along the same lines as that which had led to the Austrian State Treaty.
The Western
leaders had re-
fused to compromise, however, and the the two
split
between
Germanics remained.
This was also the case with Berlin, where the
communists were experiencing Because the
city
a
was situated
number of problems. in
the heart of East
Germany, many people were taking the opportunity "defect," simply by walking across the
problem was acute,
numbers of people vast majority
for
were from the more professional
German
society, the loss
of
threatened
the future of the
country.
sectors.
joining the exodus, but the
classes of East
whom
open border
By 1961, not only were huge
between the Soviet and Western
to
the
East
(right).
Hall passes in front of symbol ofGermany
's
escapee falls victim to
^
THE SUPERPOWER
DIVIDE, 1945-62
Khrushchev responded by demanding should be turned into a "free"
that
Kennedy
troops should be withdrawn.
more the Soviets increased
and
city
Berlin
that
Western
refused.
The
the tension, the greater the
West by people fearful that it would soon be too late. During the last week of July 1961, 10,000 East Germans crossed the border. exodus
to the
Their fears were well
August
12/13,
During the night of
justified.
German
East
closed
soldiers
the
crossing points and began to construct a wall to block off the Soviet sector from the west.
The wall provoked
an immediate outcry from the Western powers:
denounced
cians
Kennedy
and
it
Lyndon Johnson,
president,
sent
politi-
vice-
his
Berlin to assure the
to
people of the Western sectors that they would not be
The outcry reached new heights
deserted.
trying to escape across the wall into the
down by
East
became, and divide.
To
in the
still
German border
as people
West were shot The
guards.
wall
remains, a symbol of the East-West
the West,
East; to the
it
represents the denial of freedom
East,
essential to stop the
is
it
movement of people westwards, and
their
in
own
words, to "prevent the insertion of Western agents and disruptive elements" into the Eastern bloc.
The Cuban
Missile Crisis
But the most dangerous
between the super-
crisis
powers, and one that came closest to open war, occurred over the island of Cuba. In January 1959 the revolutionary leader Fidel Castro led his followers into the capital, Havana, and overthrew the resident dictator,
Fulgencio Batista.
mixture actually to the
that
it
It
of nationalism
was
a
and
communist) ideologies
triumph for the heady (though
left-wing
that Castro
oppressed Cuban people, and there
not
had offered
is little
doubt
took the United States by surprise. American
companies
investments in the sugar and
lost valuable
tobacco crops of Cuba.
The American government, fearing communism into their own "back yard" South America, reacted by imposing
the spread of
of Central and
a strict
economic
blockade, hoping to starve Castro into submission to
American
policy.
There
is
evidence that Castro was
prepared to moderate his beliefs
in the face
of
Amer-
ican pressure, but he could not cope with the blockade. In desperation, he turned to the Soviets to redress the balance, a ideals
of
move
that ensured his
communism
adherence
to the
which, in truth, he probably
favored. In February 1960, he signed a trade pact with the
Soviet
Union and
in
May
the
established close diplomatic relations.
II
two countries
E3
CONFLICT IN THE 20T1I KNTl RV (
To the Americans,
was
this
a highly
dangerous de-
communism
velopment, threatening to introduce
to a
continent hitherto kept free of openly left-wing govern-
ments. Eisenhower authorized aid to
Cuban
exiles in
the United States and the Central Intelligence
(CIA)
began
prepared
to
train
selected
to re-enter their
groups
Agency
who were
homeland and overthrow
Castro's government.
assumed the presidency astrously at the
could be pushed before reacting. strategy but one which, if
Soviet
One
ance.
would be
in
Bay of Pigs
1961.
Kennedy when he It
was
in April, with
to
end
dis-
Castro prov-
far the
Americans
was
dangerous
It
a
worked, could give the
it
Union new advantages
in the
East-West bal-
of the mostsimportant of these advantages
some way of
gain
to
stationing
nuclear
missiles close to the United States, threatening such
devastation
This was the plan inherited by
how
cy of "brinkmanship," seeing
confront their
Americans would be
the
that
afraid
to
enemy elsewhere.
(Alba was an obvious base for such missiles - the island
is
less than
- and
144
km
(90 miles) from the Florida
1962 the Americans began
ing well able to counter the poorly organized invasion.
coast
The
receive disturbing reports of Soviet activities on the
boost to his prestige and the embarrassment to
Kennedy were essential factors in what happened next. By early 1962, Khrushchev was convinced that the Americans were weak. They had ceased to earn out U-2 reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union after the capture of Gary Powers, Kennedy had seemed out of his depth at the Vienna summit and the Bay of Pigs invasion had suggested that the new president was afraid to confront Castro with his own forces. In such circumstances, the Soviets
felt
able to enter into a poli-
in July
island. In August, a
U-2 brought back
anti-aircraft facilities
to
pictures of new-
around Havana and
in
October
Soviet aircraft capable of earning nuclear weapons
were spotted on the
island.
the most worrying evidence
what appeared missiles
days
to
Then on October 14 came of all: another U-2 spotted
be launch
sites for
medium-range
which could reach most American
later,
Kennedy was informed by
chiefs that there
cities.
Two
his intelligence
was no doubt about Soviet
intentions.
THE SUPERPOWER
I The president immediately convened
Committee" of
ecutive
a special
monitor
his closest advisers to
events and decide on policy moves. air strike against the missile sites
"Ex-
They considered an
and even the
possibil-
of all-out invasion to topple Castro, but the chances
ity
of escalation to nuclear war were
he had gone too
October 28,
American people
demobilize the invasion forces gathered
a "quarantine")
in
earning
"offensive
would
equipment"
military
to
be
were
be placed on
to
alert
that any missile attack
Cuban
sites
The world
it
plain
on the United States from the
would be taken
and responded
and Kennedy made
as a deliberate Soviet
move
in
Washington
that the
American
be taken away.
Cuban
The triumph
for
Missile
was
Crisis
Kennedy, showing
that
waited with bated breath, aware that the
slightest naval incident could trigger a nuclear war.
the
pressures exerted
by Khrushchev.
On
US
not
mean
it:
Hemisphere still
in the
I
think the other
Western
Cuba became, and
Union can monitor American
naval
movements
Caribbean and, as future events were
munism
into Central
to
show,
a
com-
and South America, threatening
the influence of the United States in an area of crucial
and economic importance.
When
this
coincided
with
a
sudden growth of
nationalism in certain Central and South American countries, based
fellow just blinked."
the
useful base from which to spread the ideals of
of the Executive Committee,
"we're eyeball to eyeball and
into a firm foothold.
in
to turn
an invaluable listening post from which the
is,
Soviet
The Amer-
Cuba allowed them
ican pledge not to invade
strategic
put
Indeed, the
that the Soviets lost out entirely.
Soviet ships had halted, then that they had turned back.
member
all,
humiliation suffered by the Soviet leader probably con-
what had been an insecure toehold
a
he was, after
quite capable of coping with crises and of dealing with
Navy intercepted the first of 25 Soviet-chartered vessels known to be on their way to Cuba, but did not board her. Early the next morning the Maruda, known to be under charter to the Soviets, was stopped and searched. No offensive weapons were found and the Manilla was allowed to proceed, but the danger of conflict was acute. Fortunately, as October 26 progressed, reports began to come in that the other As Dean Rusk,
undoubted
an
tributed to his downfall two years later, but this does
to accordingly.
October 25, the
missiles
Turkey, already obsolete in an age of ICBMs, would
be
allowed to pass. At the same time, American forces
Florida.
in
declined, aided by unofficial indications to the Soviet
impose
around Cuba, through which no ships found
to
quickly responded and the level of tension
ambassador
it
soon as the United States agreed
as
his intention to
blockade (he called
desperately needed. Early on
the end of 13 days of heart-stopping
at
from Cuba
on October 22, Kennedy announced a naval
tar,
the Soviets agreed to withdraw their missiles
crisis,
Kennedy
just too great.
Instead, in a televised speech to the
that
DIVIDE, 1945-62
upon
a reaction against existing right-
wing, pro-United States governments, the problem was
Back from the brink
A
made even
message arrived from Khrushchev,
Soviet
Union was ready
withdraw
its
missiles
promised not lived,
from Cuba
if
and would
the United States
to invade the island. Relief
was short-
however, for within a matter of hours a second
message insisted
that the
Americans
their missile sites in northern
There was much more
stating that the
to relax the tension
also dismantle
Turkey and withdraw
nuclear weapons from both Britain and
Italy,
which were causing "uneasiness and anxiety"
all
of
to the
worse.
ever, for
how-
to the crisis than that,
represented a turning-point in superpower
it
relations during the post- 1945 period.
Up
to
October
1962, the various factors which created the Cold
War -
the different political beliefs, the clashes over territorv in
Europe and Korea, the
fears
prompted by the spread
of nuclear weapons and the personality clashes be-
tween the various leaders of the superpowers - had
seemed
to
push the world
inevitably towards confronta-
Kennedy refused and the tempo of the crisis flared up again, particularly when a U-2 was shot down over Cuba and another, on a routine flight over Alaska, inadvertently strayed into Soviet airspace. War seemed
tion
inevitable.
the basic causes of hostility did not disappear, a general
Soviets.
Then
the
Americans
had
a
brain-wave.
They
ignored Khrushchev's second letter and replied to the first,
promising not
to invade
Cuba.
It
was
just the sort
of face-saving gesture that Khrushchev, by
now aware
and war.
Cuba changed
all
that,
reminding both sides that
nuclear weapons introduced new pressures and responsibilities to the
superpower
divide,
and although
desire to prevent similar crises began to take hold.
The
process was by no means immediate or easy, but a thaw in the
Cold
War was
discernible.
A new
era of more re-
sponsible superpower relations was about to
start.
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
SUPERPOWER RIVALRY: SPHERES OF INFLUENCE
NATO members
East/West-influenced'O countries
Pro-West countries
China
Warsaw
Muslim Fundamentalists
Pact
members
Communist and
CHAPTER
pro-East countries
Once
Neutral countries
the dust of the
settled,
Cuban
Missile Crisis had
both superpowers began
to analyze recent
Since the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962,
There was no^ doubt that they had come dangerously close to war - Kennedy is on record as saying that he had "been to the edge of the abyss and looked over" - and their first reaction was to set up a means of preventing a repetition of such misunderstanding. On June 20, 1963, the "Hot-Line" Agreement was signed, creating a direct communication link between Washington and Moscow that would enable the two leaders to
superpower relations have fluctuated. At fust the
talk
events.
DETENTE AND THE NEW COLD MAR superpowers followed the twin policies of "crisis
management" and arms
limitation.
traditional flashpoint of
Europe became more settled,
confrontation
and hostility moved
the Third World.
By
the early
But although the
new arena of 1980s, amid signs that to
the
cooperation was a thing of the past, the superpowers drifted into a
new Cold War.
through their differences rather than merely react to events. It was the beginning of what was to
become known
as "detente."
Detente Detente means,
literally,
the easing of tensions.
The
term comes from the days of the crossbow and describes the action of releasing the taughtened string of the
weapon without
actually firing a bolt.
DETENTE AND THE NEW COLD WAR It
aptly reflects
superpower relations
as they
de-
veloped in the 1960s and early 1970s, for although
awesome weapons
neither side got rid of the
- indeed,
disposal
crease
in
the
displayed a
the period
weapons - they
responsible attitude and an
awareness of the consequences of hostility.
But
if
the
initial
motive for detente was
went much deeper,
fear, its roots
reflecting changes to the super-
power balance which would have had an
effect
even
if
By the early 1960s, Soviet Union was catching up
more
take a
Kennedy
1963, had no choice but to
in
careful line, searching for other altern-
atives to confrontation.
At the same time, Europe became more settled, les-
to see a massive in-
of such
capability
much more
was
at their
assassination of
FE1
sening the chances of confrontation
at the
point where
the two superpowers had their major forces.
This re-
flected a
growing belief that the
posed
1945 could not be altered by anything short of
in
a suicidal
war and,
in the
West
changes im-
territorial
at least, led to policies
designed to make the best of the situation.
the missile crisis had not occurred. it
was obvious
that the
The European Community West Germany,
with the United States in nuclear capability, deploying
In
ICBMs
tion with the eastern part of the country
and the
ballistic missiles
first
of her submarine launched
(SLBMs),
all
able to hit the
American
for example, the ideal of reunifica-
was gradually
dropped and relations with the other Western
states
homeland. The two superpowers probably achieved
improved. In September 1958, Konrad Adenauer of
"nuclear parity," in which both had the
\\ est
targets in the other's
home
territory,
ability to hit
sometime
in the
Germany and Charles de Gaulle of France met
a spirit of friendship, having already agreed
in
to co-
mid-1960s. As parity was reached, the Americans,
operate in the creation of a European Economic
Com-
under the presidency of Lyndon Johnson
munity (EEC), and in 1963 a Franco-German
treaty
after the
was signed, burying the bitterness of two world wars. The "Hot-Line" nerve center in Washington
in
1974.
Six years
West Germany
later, elections in
tory for the Social
led to vic-
Democrats and, under the chancel-
lorship of Willy Brandt, the idea of improved relations
was extended
to the east. In
August 1970,
as part of a
policy of Ostpolitik ("eastern politics"), Brandt negoti-
ated a treats with the Soviet existing national frontiers,
agreements
similar
with
Union which confirmed
and
this
was followed by and
Poland
both
East
Germany. September 1971, the four occupying powers signed an agreement over Berlin - the Quadripartite In
Agreement - which
settled
some of the remaining
ferences in this traditional flashpoint stay totally separate
city.
dif-
Berlin was to
from the two Germanics and the
four powers were to maintain their troops in the various sectors.
Channels
were
down.
carefully laid
By
for the settlement of disputes
western
then,
Europe had become
stronger region, chiefly through the
a
much
EEC. Based on
Treaty of Rome, signed by Belgium, France,
Italy,
Luxemburg, the Netherlands and West Germany
March
1957, this was an attempt to create a
the
in
"Common
Market," free from trade barriers and economically strong,
and there were hopes that
this
was merely
a first
some form of close political union. As other countries joined - by 1986 Greece, Denmark, step towards
Ireland, Great Britain, Spain
added
to the original six
that western
and Portugal had been
member
Europe was entering
states a
-
more
it
was obvious
settled period.
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
The
invasion of Czechoslovakia
At the same time, the Soviets were making sure that
communist governments would eontinue eastern
dominate
to
Europe within the borders of 1945. The
process was hy no means entirely peaceful, as events in
Czechoslovakia
in
1968 went
At the be-
prove.
to
ginning of that year Antonin Novotny, a hard-line communist, was replaced by the
Dubcek
as leader
lowers, intent
more
liberal
Alexander
of the country. Dubcek and his
on introducing "socialism with
a
fol-
W
human
face," set about loosening state control over the eco-
nomy, abolishing censorship and opening up contacts
ClYUIAfl!
with
the
West, while insisting that Czechoslovakia
ftlHXQIHH-, LCOIfflMUJH '
would remain the
Warsaw
a
communist country and
a
member
|HL\0T!1|
of
lOKYIlAllJ
ImnpHuf
Pact.
Hilt
HA!
jiPHCWBHl I
Pro-Dubcek demonstrations
in
Prague
(right),
a week after
the Soviet invasion (below), 1968.
ml
35}
NE
#
HRO
IMtAj
^-
nr:
„>
L*
*
'
.
S
DETENTE AND THE NEW COLD WAR They were heady
Czech nation seemed
the entire
With
ly.
During the "Prague Spring,"
days.
to
come
speech allowed for the
free
were
streets of the capital, Prague,
alive political-
with people
filled
impromptu
taking part in political discussions, holding
meetings and distributing uncensored ly
time, the
first
literature.
became alarmed, seeing the over eastern Europe if such
dangers to their control liberal
At
views spread elsewhere in the
when
means of
a
the Americans, detente
controlling Soviet actions, preventing
the sort of aggressive foreign policy and brinkmanship that
had culminated
This was
economic
to
in
Cuba
be achieved
front,
in
in a
October 1962.
number of ways. On
new
the Americans recognized that the
Soviets were desperate for high technology and grain,
Soviets therefore
became dependent upon
conditional on the "good behavior" of the Soviets,
Warsaw
agreements that they would be unable
Pact maneuvers, an invasion force was put
together and the tanks sent
caught by surprise, offering
in.
The Czechs were
more
little
forced to stand down, to be replaced by a
pro-Moscow
Gustav Husak, and the reforms of
leader,
1968 were overthrown. they chose the
Czechs
carefully, lulling the ity
in
and waiting
bogged down student
in
democracies
of secur-
was elsewhere -
where the Americans were
an unpopular war, and Paris, where
throughout
(widespread
unrest
for invasion
into a false sense
Western attention
Vietnam,
case
this
until
moment
the
liberal
1968) had threatened to burst into
in
Second, the Soviets were aware that the settled state of
would respond
Europe made to the
it
West
Czechoslovakian troubles with
line.
Americans could play the "China
Peking, the Soviets would
become alarmed and would
cease to create crises for fear of a war on two fronts.
split
that
powers
made
possible by the political and ideological
had emerged between the two communist
in the 1960s,
culminating
west so
far as the politburo
who
Nixon,
president in 1968,
at this policy
of playing off one-
communist superpower in
against
accepted state of
affairs.
become an
Just to reinforce the point,
Leonid Brezhnev, the man who had gained power
Moscow
in the aftermath
in
of Khrushchev's downfall in
the mid-1960s, declared his right to intervene in the affairs
of countries
influence"
-
within
a declaration that
the
was
Soviet to
"sphere
become known
different. to
As they were never going
rather
than
friendship. This
more
to
divert
global policies.
the series of crises
1948-49, Hungary
1962 - had helped
that
between East and West - Berlin
in
Cuba
in
in
1956, Berlin in 1961,
to strengthen the resolve
of Western
powers, giving them something concrete to fear and
them
as
wherever
it
to react to the
spread of Soviet influence
might appear.
West could be lulled into a sense of trust and security, the Soviets would be free to pursue their policy objectives in the Third World - the key regions in
an atmosphere of enforced
of
sides.
settle-
new understanding
was reflected
adopted by the two trust
one
relations
use the
If the
calm based upon nuclear equality and European
ment
their
to
For some time, the politburo had been convinced
forcing
policies of detente
Thus, detente developed
visiting
themselves
to allow
be controlled by the West, they preferred
of
the "Brezhnev Doctrine."
The
other,
Unfortunately, Soviet definitions of detente were
Western attention away from
Soviet control of the eastern bloc, had
the
February 1972.
The
of
as well as the
US
replaced Johnson as
was particularly adept
Union
was concerned. Richard
new atmosphere of superpower
reality
border clashes on
was threatened by attack from the south
anything more than verbal or diplomatic complaints.
borders of Europe, and with them the
in
the Ussuri River in 1969. After this, the Soviet
relatively
unlikely that the
an
take
to
card" by improving relations between Washington and
China
full-scale revolution.
"web" of economic
so entangled in a
Similarly, if the
This was
Soviets succeeded in this policy for two main First,
independent
resistance than
demonstrations on the streets of Prague. Dubcek was
reasons.
the West,
not produce results, they resolved to
who would be
The
If the
supplies of such essential commodities could be made-
use force instead. In August 1968, under the guise of
communist
the
on the Soviet-Czech border,
a train
this did
was
To
both of which could be provided by the West.
Pact.
they attempted negotiation, meeting the
first,
Czech leaders on but
Warsaw
motives for detente differed in both
Washington and Moscow.
Hard-
surprisingly, the Soviets
The
each other.
in the sorts
of policies
The superpowers
each other, they had merely learned
or
did not
to live with
of the globe that were neither industrialized
democracies states to
(First
liberal
World) nor established communist
(Second World). In addition, Brezhnev was keen
get access to
Western technology
to
modernize
Soviet industry and was aware that this would not be possible in an atmosphere of hostility
E3
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
A number
An uneasy calm These differences of definition were
undermine the
to
prohibiting nuclear testing in the atmosphere, and this
was achieved. Regard-
was followed on February 27, 1967 by an Outer Space
of underlying motives, both superpowers were
Treaty which banned the deployment of weapons of
wrong
to
presume
that nothing
it
interested in pursuing policies of cooperation in two
important areas.
The
of these was "crisis manage-
first
ment," for both sides recognized that territorial clashes
were allowed
to
if
ideological or
develop unchecked,
war were very high indeed. The
the chances of nuclear
Agreement
signing of the Hot-Line
in
1963 was an two sides
essential first step in this direction, giving the
an
1963, a Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty was signed,
25,
would be
process of detente hy the mid-1970s, but
less
of agreements emerged. As early as July
to
ability
put forward their respective views clearly
mass destruction
in orbit
to
Non-Proliferation Treaty, promising to
sign the
from acquiring nuclear weapons. Although
refrain
was
undermined when
on the Africa
- refused
to sign, the fact that
development.
Seabed
prevent the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968
to explode should a
When crises
genuine attempts were made escalation. In
tween
Israel
to
did occur,
prevent unnecessary
June 1967, during the Six-Day
and her Arab neighbors,
War
ship
in
USS
response to
and not
Libert]'
to
nuclear weapons, for by the late 1960s both sides were
aware of the need for a balance of capability
would enjoy
in
which
sufficient advantage to
gain a "victory" and so be tempted to launch a surprise attack.
There were
a
number of ways
in
which such an
advantage might be gained. Both sides had the
weapons
station
in suitable areas for a surprise attack
pursuing the idea of
(ABMs) which could be used warheads before they
-
anti-ballistic
to Hestroy
missiles
enemy nuclear
(a
needed checking
process
in case
government developed something had
to
known
as "proliferation")
an ambitious or irresponsible
its
own
be done
nuclear warheads in case of
nuclear weapons. Also
to control the testing
damage
These negotiations were not
particularly difficult in
when
the superpowers turned to arms control,
although the Strategic
began
in Helsinki in
Arms Limitation November 1969,
Talks it
was
for
(SALT) to take
nearly three years for an agreement to be reached.
limiting the
The
to the world's
of
en-
in
development of ABMs because of the crip-
pling expense that
would be involved, and both were
aware that the nuclear balance was under threat.
However, they found
it
common
weapons numbers beyond which
"ceiling" of
extremely
difficult to
agree to a
they would not go.
One
of the main difficulties was the matter of defin-
The
ing just what should be included in the talks.
weapons
under
"strategic."
were
discussion
However,
to the
meant
Americans,
those nuclear weapons which,
when
other; to the Soviets,
might be
-
it
included
fired at the Soviet
a definition that
all
this
fired
superpower homeland, had the range
hit their targets.
At the same time, the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries
The SALT talks
ability to
notably outer space and the seabed. Also both were actively
war begin.
problems were immense. Both sides were interested
allies.
The second area of "common ground" concerned
neither superpower
key "chokepoints" in the world's oceans, ready
superpower homelands. The same was not the case
a deliberately provocative
gesture against the Soviets' Arab
them from placing nuclear
for example, the
on the American
Israeli attacks
importance was the
that they did not immediately affect the security of the
the Israeli coast, carefully explaining to the Soviets that
was
at
was
by the superpowers on February
11, 1971, for this prevented
mines
states did
be-
Americans moved elements of their Sixth Fleet close
this
Treat}', signed
Of equal
124
Cuban
support
policies towards Latin America.
to
a
Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan and South
minimum. Superpower "spheres of influence" were respected for example, the Americans made no moves actively to little
this
number of countries threshold of nuclear capability - including
seriously
a significant
and, for a time, the Soviets did
1,
1968, the countries of the United Nations were invited
and precisely, so that misunderstandings could be kept to a
On July
around the Earth.
to
to
be
covered
from
one-
reach the
weapons which
Union, regardless of range
included those missiles and aircraft
of the Western alliance that were stationed in Europe.
The
situation
was not helped by the
fact that
the
nuclear arsenals of the superpowers were not evenly
vironment. Finally, both sides were attracted by the
matched: the Soviets had concentrated on
prospect of "arms control," mutual agreements to limit
land-based missiles while the Americans had begun to
the development or deployment of
deploy lighter, more accurate weapons,
for this
would save money.
weapons systems,
more than one warhead.
large,
fitted
heavy
with
DETENTE AND TI IE NEW COLD WAR weapons
the size of nuclear
Nixon's
successor,
Brezhnev
at
Live
tests.
months
later,
Lord,
met
Gerald
President
Vladivostok in eastern Russia to finalize
Both sides agreed
ceiling figures.
to limit their
num-
bers to 2,400 strategic weapons platforms, of which
(MRYs) - weapons with the capability of earning more than one warhead - and arrangements were made for nego1,320 could contain multiple re-entry vehicles
tiations
The
designed to bring that ceiling down.
Helsinki Accords
SALT was
a
major breakthrough and one that acted
a spur to other negotiations
blocs.
On
between the superpower
October 30, 1973, the Mutual and Balanced
(MBLR)
Reduction
Lorce
NATO
began
talks
Vienna
and Warsaw Pact countries, aiming
to in
central Europe,
and two years
Europe (except Albania) met
later all the countries
in Helsinki for a
ence on Security and Cooperation
The
latter led to
of
Confer-
Europe (CSCE).
in
an agreement, usually known as the
Helsinki Accords, signed on August
CSCE in Helsinki,
in
reduce the number of troops and weapons stationed
between
Brezhnev addresses the
as
1,
1975, which
is
often seen as the high point of detente. Together with
1975.
the United States and Canada, the Europeans on both
The
result
was
a
lengthy process of negotiation, hut
some success was achieved. At
Moscow
in
summit meeting
a
in
\lav 1972, Nixon and Brezhnev signed two
linked agreements
known
as
SALT
The
I.
first,
an In-
terim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, froze
numher of
the
strategic nuclear launchers (missiles,
hombers and submarines) permitted
to
each side, and
although the Soviets refused to say precisely
how many
sides
of the political divide accepted the frontiers
drawn up
in 1945, effectively
the Soviet-created buffer zone of eastern Europe. In
return for this formal "blessing" by the
Second World War - the Soviet Union and her allies promised to respect and improve the human the
rights of their citizens.
freedom
1,054 on the American side and 1,618 on the Soviet.
governments
The agreement was
meetings,
be treated as the
first
designed to set a
common
step to
more
and was
to
detailed negotiations
The second agreement,
These
rights included
more
for eastern bloc citizens to disagree with their in
speech and writing, freedom to hold
travel
to
and
to
join
rights pledges
were
members of
their
families living in the West.
The human
ceiling.
West - some-
thing that the Soviets had been seeking since the end of
they had, the figures were generally reckoned to be
to last for five years only
recognizing the reality of
to
prove embarrass-
the Anti-Ballistic Missile
ing to the Soviet Union, particularly at the regular
Treaty, was of indefinite duration. Each superpower
follow-up conferences that subsequently took place, for
was its
to
be allowed two
capital city
site,
ABM
systems only, one around
and the other around an
the idea being that in neither case
ICBM
launch-
would complete
the
West
lost
no opportunity
However, the mere
fact that
signed seemed to imply a
to
highlight
abuses.
an agreement had been
new
spirit
of freedom.
The
defense be assured - there would always be large parts
Helsinki Accords also dealt with East-West trade and
of the population unprotected, acting as hostages to
further contributed to the stability of
nuclear strikes which neither side would actually dare
agreed "Confidence Building Measures"
to initiate.
reduce misunderstandings over military movements.
SALT common
did not end there, for the creation of a ceiling
controlled.
Moscow to
was
In July
essential if the
1974,
sign a Threshold
arms race was
to
Nixon traveled again Test-Ban Treaty,
be to
limiting
Henceforth,
all
countries
Europe through
(CBMs)
to
agreed to give notice in
advance about military maneuvers or exercises involving
more than 25,000
surprise attack.
troops,
to
remove
fears
of
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
F71
SALT II While the
CSCE
details
were being discussed and car-
superpowers continued their negotiations
ried out, the
SALT II. SALT had
about nuclear weapons, aiming to produce
The
process was not easy, for whereas
dealt with
numbers of
I
-
delivery vehicles
things that
could be seen and counted - technology had begun to complicate matters to a significant extent. As both sides deployed missiles with multiple warheads, it was no longer possible to a single missile
tell at
a glance
what was
might contain up
to
available, for
10 multiple re-
entry vehicles, each capable of hitting an individual target with impressive accuracy. In addition, in the years immediately after the Vladi-
vostok meeting, both sides introduced
which were
difficult to assess.
for example, the cruise missile
On -
the
new weapons
American
a highly accurate
side,
and
The Soviet Tu-26 "Backfire" bomber.
extremely small delivery vehicle, capable of deployment
from both
aircraft
not seem to
SALT
in the
1970s - did
the definitions of "strategic"
hammered
The same applied on the Soviet side to Tupolev Tu-26 "Backfire" bomber. In the latter
out in the
fit
and submarines
case, the
I.
Americans wanted the weapon included
in
the strategic total, arguing that with in-flight refueling it
could reach the
L nited
States with nuclear
bombs on
board, whereas the Soviets pointed out that by this definition, almost any aircraft
had
strategic capability.
The Boeing. 4GM-86BALCM (air-launched cruise
missile)
Because of such arguments, the negotiations and
it
was not
been replaced
SALT down made sides
II
until
as
May
US
was signed
at \ ladivostok
that these
1979, by which time Ford had
president by in
stalled
Jimmy
Carter, that
Vienna. The force ceilings
laid
were confirmed and an agreement
would be gradually reduced
until
both
had no more than 2,250 weapons, of which 1,200
could contain multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).
during a
test flight.
DETENTE AND TI IE NEW COLD WAR The problem of the Backfire bomber was by
dealt with
Soviet statement that the aircraft was of
a
medium-
range and that there was no intention of giving
inter-
it
continental range. Similarly, in a Protocol which was to
remain
December 31, 1981, ranges of more than 600km (375
force
in
missiles with
until
were banned. The main which time,
it
II
nuclear
for
SALT
and
provided
half-hearted
attempts to resolve the issues raised by
new weapons.
To many treaty
people, particularly in the United States, the
seemed
capability,
advantage.
US
undermining
When
Senate for
would be
to allow the Soviets to
match American
West's
the
technological
Carter presented the details to the
ratification,
it
looked as
if the
agreement
Detente had suddenly gone sour.
rejected.
1970s,
early
war /one was declining, and bv
question.
But
was the
it
war grew
only
forces,
ly in
III
achieved no significant reduction in
it
in the
By the
forces.
1973 the combat effectiveness of the arm\ was serious-
important. As
number of counts.
did nothing to boost the confi-
it
armed
American morale
political results
United States
their leaders.
in
Johnson decided not largely
of Vietnam that were
US casualties mounted,
in the
confidence a
US
dence of the
by
out.
was unsatisfactory on
In real terms,
miles)
to last until 1985,
was hoped, negotiations
would have been carried
SALT
was
treaty
cruise
quo - but
the status
E3
itself
opposition to the
and people
For example, President
be
to
1968
to stand for re-election in
because his promises of victory
been seen
lost
in
Vietnam had
during the Tet Offensive, when
false
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces attacked tow ns and
cities
throughout the South.
Although Nixon was elected
specifically to "bring
home" from an unpopular
the boys
to continue the fighting until
involvement
in the
war, he was forced
1973. His subsequent
Watergate scandal, when
covered that he had known about
was
it
dis-
not personally
(if
authorized) attempts to spy on his political opponents
The Vietnam War
in the
This was hardly surprising. By 1979 there were already
confidence.
clear signs that the
America's
ized.
hopes of detente had not been
aim
of controlling
Soviet
real-
actions
United States, further contributed
communist
The
seemed merely
bodia,
had
the Third World.
World, most of which seemed
to
confirm
Third
origins
Although no one
the Vietnam War.
in
doubted the military power of the United States when she
first
Vietnam
committed troops in 1965, that
humiliating
US
withdrawal
in
takeover of the South two years
The impact
of South
to the defense
power had
failed to prevent a
which
They
On
the
Americans were
Washington kept
armed
number of men
hit.
and
a close
forces, restricting the
available in Vietnam, the
use and the targets to be
weapons
There was no attempt,
in
for
example, to invade North Vietnam and, with the exception of a short period in 1972,
enemy
civilian centers in
Americans had no wish
no deliberate bombing of
to
was understandable -
draw the Soviets
(something that could have happened their allies in
if
allies in
The
result
was
a
period of American "soul searching"
which lasted from about 1975
Ronald Reagan
until
as president in 1980.
the election of It
into the
they
North Vietnam were about
to
was
a period
characterized by a lack of resolve in foreign policy as
at, this
precedence.
took
affairs
If
detente it
had
had aimed
would not have mattered, but the Soviets, con-
vinced
that
the
Americans were weak, took every
opportunity to exploit the situation.
To
them, detente was something that only affected
superpower
relations.
Although improved security
Europe was undoubtedly Soviets saw no reason to alter their policies larly
when
ceeding
a
in
major achievement, the
presume
that detente should
towards the Third World, particu-
those policies stood a good chance of suc-
in the
absence
of
American opposition.
As the 1970s progressed, therefore, the Soviets be-
Hanoi or Haiphong.
In a strategic sense, this
Cam-
in retreat
achieved the sort of international control
preferred to fight a "limited war" in
inhibiting hold over the
America
later.
of these events was enormous.
political leaders in
support their
domestic
afraid to use the full potential of their forces to achieve victory.
to
1973 and a communist
military side, they suggested that the
Vietnam,
in
a substantial
decline in the prestige of the United States. This had its
of
confirm that the Americans
to
were neither willing nor able
of crises in the
victory
followed closely by similar successes in Laos and
through economic dependence and the "China card" failed to prevent a series
to a decline
felt
the
gan to interfere
in a
number of key
war
the continuance of detente to
that
false
be de-
stroyed) and were quite content to fight just to preserve
lull
areas.
They used
the Americans into a
sense of security and ruthlessly exploited even
sign of weakness to gain advantage
sphere of influence.
and extend
their
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY In 1976, the Soviets used
Cuban
troops to ensure the
success of communist forces in the Angolan
civil
war,
fending off attacks from Zairean and South African
columns which had expected American backing, and year later Soviet supplies and yet
more Cuban
soldiers
ensured the survival of the pro-communist regime Ethiopia
when
it
was
attacked
from
a
in
neighboring
Somalia. In both cases, the outcome was a communist
presence in countries of strategic importance - Angola lies
perilously close to the mineral resources of
Africa,
on which the West depends, while Ethiopia
controls access to the trading routes of the
Yet the Americans made no counter-moves. Above:
South
A
Cuban
adviser in Angola, 1976.
Below: Ayatullah Khomeini in Iran, 1979.
Red
Sea.
DETENTE AND THE NEW COLD WAR American weakness reached
The United
1979-80.
in
the
Shah of
Iran,
Western leaders
in
a critical point over Iran
early 1960s. President Carter, with
an
States did nothing to protect
eye to elections later in the year, placed an immediate
one of the most important pro-
freeze on the sale of grain to the Soviet Union, sus-
when he was
pended the export of high technology and began orga-
Middle
the
East,
opposed by Muslim fundamentalists under the Ayatollah
Cold War of the
Khomeini. The United States then faced the
Embassy
humiliation of seeing their
in
Tehran stormed
nizing a Western boycott of the Olympic
be held
in
Moscow
According
in the
Games, due
to
summer.
to the original theory
of detente in the
and more than 50 diplomats held hostage. Their
United States, Soviet dependence upon such commod-
demanded that the United States send the Shah back to Iran - he had fled the country in January 1979 - and for over a year, from the seizure of the
ities
captors
Embassy
in
November 1979
to
the release of the
as grain
and technology should have deterred
them from continued but this did not happen. the
military action in Afghanistan,
The
Soviets effectively ignored
American response, preferring
to suffer the loss
of
hostages in exchange for American concessions in
imports rather than halt an invasion that the politburo
January 1981, the American people were forced
deemed essential to the security of the state. They were determined to restore a "friendly" regime
accept that, regardless of country could do
little
The mounting
its
awesome power,
to prevent
to
their
such incidents.
of frustration, fueled by the
tide
of a helicopter rescue mission in April 1980
failure
lost their lives,
Reagan
the election of
ber 1980. His strident
undoubtedly helped
to the
White House
country "walk
the to
West
was hardly the
as a
fault
was
Afghanistan,
1
980 the
invaded
by
first
since 1945 that the Soviet leadership had
felt
confident
enough
Warsaw
send
area, extending
its
its
troops outside the
and 5,000 Soviet troops -
a force
men
airlifted
AFGHANISTAN
SOVIET
UNION
time
Pact
into the
Kabul, where they led an assault on the
and replacing
the Soviets' protege, Babrak Karmal. Within
hours, an estimated 50,000 motorized
rifle
troops and
1,000 tanks had crossed the border from the Soviet
Union, seizing the major towns and communications routes.
By January 1980,
the invasion force
numbered
over 85,000 men.
The
international outcry
14 the United Nations General Assembly roundly condemned such a blatant use of force - and super-
power
Major Soviet/Afghan garrisons
-^
was immediate - on January
relations declined to a point untouched since the
would put
to exploit the
Iran, satisfying a long-held ambition to
of between 4,000
presidential palace, killing the president
him with
weaknesses of
of the crack 105th
Guards Airborne Division - were capital,
an ideal position from which
influence through force of arms.
Christmas night 1979,
Afghan
in
Soviet
the
On
them
The
December 1979. This was
forces in late
an important area.
In addition, a Soviet presence in Afghanistan
whole was convinced that the Soviets were
turning-point
to affect the substantial
SOVIET INVASION AND OCC^P/
of Reagan, for by
abusing detente to gain new strategic advantages.
to
might go on
gain a port in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf.
Afghanistan and the end of detente this
it
in
ease the strains between the superpowers.
But
should spread into Afghanistan,
weaken the hold of communism
on the world stage - did nothing
tall"
to the west. If this
in Iran, further
Novem-
make
to
den growth of Muslim fundamentalism
of the southern republics of the
calls for policies to increase the
power of the United States -
effective
because of the sud-
ensure
to
in
capital, particularly
Muslim population Soviet Union and so
(Operation Eagle Claw) in which eight American ser-
vicemen
Afghan
in the
troops ^> Ground > Airborne troops ^
Mountainous areas
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
The
Vietnam
Soviets'
to
Unfortunately for the Soviets, the invasion soon proved to ly
be the beginning: of a nightmare, for instead of swiftasserting
communist power
it
degenerated into
a
be
replaced
by
vehicles, convoys of trucks traveling along vulnerable
roads were protected and airpower was used to
drawn-out war against anti-communist Muslim
Soviets were
rebels
known
mujaheddin threat was
Americans
in
Vietnam, the Soviets found themselves
extremely inhospitable
involved
in
guerrillas
whose intimate knowledge of the mountains
terrain,
fighting
hit the
mountain bases. By the mid-1980s, the
guerrillas'
costlv,
as mujaheddin ("holy warriors"). Like the
more mobile armored combat
still
bogged down still
in
Afghanistan and the
strong, although the use of
helicopter gunships, concentrated "sweep and destroy"
advances into guerrilla-held territory and even ported use of chemical weapons had prevented
a
a re-
Soviet
and widespread support among the ordinary people-
defeat.
gave them significant advantages.
beyond the major towns and the drain on the economv
The Soviet invasion war
in
force, organized as if for a
Europe, soon found that
major
tactics
of the mujaheddin, and worrying reports of
demoralization
The
situation
tion of the
were quick
among
the soldiers began to appear.
was not helped by the
virtual disintegra-
Afghan Army, many of whose members to desert as
soon as fighting began.
The Soviets were forced with this unexpected war.
to alter their tactics to
Tank
War in Afghanistan: mujaheddin
units
and manpower
Worsening
ot the Soviet
to control little
Lnion was apparent.
died down.
were withdrawn,
condemnation of Soviet actions had not
A number
of countries, including Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and China, showed their displeasure by giving military and it
cope
relations
International
was
most
in
economic
aid to the mujaheddin, but
the Lnited States that Afghanistan had
lasting effect.
The
its
Soviet invasion certainly per-
suaded Carter that detente was no longer of any value.
with a heavy machine gun in the Panjsher
f
continued
heavy tanks and
its
mechanized infantry were useless against the hit-andrun
Even
so, their forces
I
alley prepare for action.
DETENTE AND THE NEW COLD WAR Indeed, in addition to the trade sanctions, the United refused to
States
months of
SALT
ratify
During the
II.
last
his presidency a distinct chill fell over the
superpower
Old
relationship.
\\ alesa, the
workers the right sorship, shorter
The
of communist
fears
Gdansk Agreement was
and promising
strike
to
signed, giving the
cen-
less
working hours and higher wages.
Soviets, ever fearful of the spread of "liberal"
expansion were revived and moves were made towards
ideas in the eastern bloc, viewed the crisis with growing
renewed containment.
concern, and although they did not repeat the pattern
Carter declared that the Persian Gulf was an area
American
central to
permanent
US
strategic interests, establishing a
naval presence in the region and creat-
Deployment Joint Task Force"
ing a special "Rapid
(RDJTF) of Gulf
airmobile troops ready to be sent to the
in the event
of a
Negotiations began with
crisis.
Oman, Kenya and Somalia to provide for the RDJTF, Britain was persuaded to
of armed intervention established in Hungary
and Czechoslovakia
in
1968, they did
they could be-
all
hind the scenes to bolster up the Polish government, led by General
Wojciech Jaruzelski. As trouble
up throughout the country and
Solidarity
demanded
began
military bases
Polish government was about to be overthrown.
Diego Garcia
and military exercises were planned.
A new arms build-up emerged
in this
areas, not least
way,
superpowers
the
late
1970s, a
tion of medium-range nuclear missiles
targets in
re-
to other
Europe, where a Soviet build-up of
arms had been noted. By the the Soviet
had
was quickly extended
it
new genera-
had appeared
in
Union - mobile SS-20s, capable of hitting western Europe but not powerful enough to
November 1979
NATO
ing the deployment of its
ish
own problems.
own improved medium-range
be stationed, under American control,
were
to
tain,
West Germany, Belgium,
Italy
would lead
in Bri-
and the Nether-
lands unless the Soviets agreed to negotiate a
new arms
removal of the
to a
GLCMs arrived at Greenham Com-
November 1983. No new arms agreement had been made and the SS-20s were still
airbase in England in
firmly in place.
Poland
The and
this
seemed
to
be adopting hard-line policies,
view was reinforced
in the eyes
of the West by
events in Poland. In August 1980, a wave of unrest
began
by shipyard workers
in the country, led
port of Gdansk.
Most of
independent
trade
attracted over eight million
ernment proved weak
at the
the confrontations with the
communist government concerned formed
Soviet forces on the Polleft to sort
out
its
Martial law was officially lifted in July
although laws
extending the control
of the
in force.
still
Solidarity, a
union
which
newly
quickly
members. The Polish gov-
in the face
of such opposition
and, after negotiations with Solidarity's leader,
Lech
produce a
fact that the Polish crisis did not
superpower confrontation implied
a residue
hope.
Many
basic
of detente in the
air,
that there
was
War had
fear of nuclear war, territorial rivalry
mistrust - and when
full-
but this was a false
of the characteristics of the Cold
reemerged -
and
these were reinforced by the
rhetoric of Reagan, determined to portray the United
States as a
champion of liberal democracy and freedom
and the Soviet Union
as
an
"evil
empire,"
it
was not
long before people were sensing a
new atmosphere of
superpower tension, dubbing
"New Cold War."
As
Soviets
when
The New Cold War scale
mon
Union and
had moderated
allies
border dispersed, and Poland was
1983,
West pro-
responded by announc-
A total of 464 ground-launched (GLCMs) and 108 Pershing II rockets
first
European
their stance, particularly
cruise missiles
The
arrested, the
extend this to include overall trade sanctions.
then, however, the
The
SS-20s.
trade union activity.
blaming the Soviets. The Americans stopped
tried to
"theater" weapons.
control agreement that
all
the supply of food to Poland and the Soviet
By
that the
1981 Jaruzelski responded by im-
government remained
reach the United States. In
13,
members were
Solidarity
tested,
between
distrust
mass troops on the border, convinced
posing martial law and banning
As
Once
to
On December
Ocean
in the Indian
flared
free elections to the Polish parliament, Soviet leaders
Egypt, Morocco,
lease the island of
1956
in
far as
it
the
Americans were concerned, the Soviets had
become dangerously powerful and
intent
upon extend-
ing their influence, and nowhere was this
than in the United States'
own "back
more
true
yard," Central
America. This was an area that Americans could not ignore, particularly as crucial
to
the
it
contained the
movement of
naval
Panama Canal, and
merchant
shipping between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and they
had done much
communism
in
the
past
to
did not spread there from
Soviet Union.
ensure that
Cuba
or the
Thus, when the Reagan Administration believed had evidence of renewed communist area,
American troops were sent Grenada, where power. swift
The
to the
a revolutionary
much needed
American armed
the
Caribbean island of
government had seized
- Operation Urgent Fun - was
"invasion"
gave a
in
October 25, 1983,
and the island was secured with minimum
life. It
the
On
did not hesitate to act.
it
activity
it
forces,
loss
(J^\ Airports
of
^^K
still
trying to live
down
the
humiliation of Vietnam.
Reagan openly accused the Soviets of he proved Wary of committing his
own
more left wing
Sandinistas had overthrown the corrupt dictatorship of
General Anastasio Somoza aid
to
"Contras" - accusing
in
military-civilian junta
military
guerrilla
1979, Americans pre-
anti-government forces - the the
Sandinistas of spreading
communism into neighboring Chief among these was Leninist
Salvador,
El
Reagan
and
groups,
where
up the
- Nicaragua and
Salvador - there was certainly evidence of
all
a
authorized
aid, in this case to bolster
existing regime. In both countries
among
El
Cuban
the anti-American groups, but in
cases the Americans ignored the popular appeal of
nationalism.
To many
Americans Reagan's response
was understandable, even East-West tensions.
helicoptertroops
j\ Airborne -l/Ran gers Units
Marines' and Rangers' attack
if
it
did
little
Nuclear balances At the same time, both superpowers continued to increase and improve their nuclear stockpiles - the Americans introduced
to ease the
a
new
class of
submarine, the "Ohio," and a new "Peacekeeper,"
countries.
was being opposed by Marxist-
and economic
involvement
Task Force airraids,
i/ Amphibious Unit
forces to
Nicaragua, where the
difficult operations. In
offer
SALINES
interfering in
j\ 22nd Marine
America and the Caribbean, but
the affairs of Central
ferred to
Airborne 82nd Air
\/ Division
boost to the reputation of
nuclear-armed
ICBM,
the
MX
in the early 1980s, while the Soviets
deployed the "Blackjack" bomber and experimented with
a
new generation of ICBMs - and proved
unwilling to discuss the next round of arms limitation seriously.
In
November
1981, the Intermediate-Range
clear Force (INF) talks
began
question of the SS-20s and
in
Geneva, covering the
GLCMs in Europe,
June 1982, the two superpowers met city
for
the
Nu-
in the
and
in
same Swiss
opening round of the Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START). During
was growing public disquiet
in
this
period there
western Europe about
DETENTE AND THE NEW COLD WAR nuclear weapons, voiced by a variety of disarmament
useful
lar
support
recent years. However, neither set of
in
negotiations produced an agreement.
1983 the
talks
had
way of getting the superpowers together.
The
and peace groups which have enjoyed increasing popu-
By the end of
process was helped by the sudden change of
Union. Brezhnev died
leadership
in
November
1982, to be followed in quick succession by
Soviet
the
Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, and
effectively ceased.
E3
in
finally
They had not been helped by Reagan's announcement on March 23, 1983 that the United States would
bachev, aged 54.
pursue research into
a
control proposals, including a moratorium on Soviet
fense system, officially
known
seemed
space-based anti-missile de-
to
be
a direct threat to the careful
promising the Americans
capabilities,
extremely futuristic
-
it
is
But
War
yet it
left
met
It
November 1985 he and Reagan
summit
in
Geneva. This produced
balance of
by
little
American unwill-
results, stalling over
ingness to stop research into SDI, but for a time the
seemed
to
unlikely to be deployed be-
How
far this
acted as a basis for improved relations
presuming
in that
to
in
way of concrete
time -
it
presume
that the
be reduced.
depended upon future
that technology
phere of mutual
drove the
deeper between the superpowers.
would be wrong
and
tests,
for a
young Mikhail GorHe announced a number of arms the relatively
tension
fore the turn of the century,
can produce the weapons
nuclear
degree of pro-
a
March 1985 by
Although SDI was
tection the Soviets could not match.
wedge
Defense
as the Strategic
(SDI) but popularly called "Star Wars."
Initiative
in
events, although in an atmos-
distrust, the signs
were not good.
To
the Americans, Soviet policies towards Afghanistan,
New
Central America and parts of Africa constituted a
Cold
the world on the brink of destruction. Despite
major threat
to
world peace and had
to
be opposed; to
America's new-found confidence, im-
the higher incidence of crises since the mid-1970s,
the
none had even approached the danger of the Cuban
proved armed forces and willingness
Missile Crisis of 1962, and despite the failure of arms
indicated a level of power which could not be matched,
control in recent years, both sides were
willing to
thereby undermining the security of the Soviet Union.
SDI announce-
So long as such distrust remained, a settled superpower relationship was impossible: the Cold War was
talk.
In the immediate aftermath of the
ment, the Soviets indicated "talks about talks" in
As
t
S cruise missiles
gs* "
.
still
resume
a willingness to
Geneva, and these proved
arrive at Greenhorn
Common
to
in
be a
Soviets,
to
spend on SDI
likely to continue.
England,
women
"peace protesters
"
continue their
vigil.
mxmwmmm
&5I
Ax*, 1
''///
p:+[ lT{ ,
'
1
'
t
\
a,
---
1
1
is
*s liuiMlK»iIi|Si.;
Am
!>>"
isis;
'nar
m,
i...;
:
y
&f
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
«k/fS
5S
By July
CHAPTER
American Man-
hattan Project had perfected a "fission" device, creating an atomic chain reaction by firing two
THE F
LliAU
pieces of Uranium 235 into each other by
small conventional explosions. After an
BACKCLOTII nuclear war. The destruction ofthe Japanese acts as
means of
initial test
Alamogordo, in the New Mexico desert, bombs were made ready for use against Japan. The results were terrifying: at 8:15 A.M. on August 6, 1945, 80,000 people died in Hiroshima. Three days later, 39,000 were killed in Nagasaki. at
Since 1945, the world has faced the possibility of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
1945, researchers at the
cities
of
a constant reminder
of the awesome power ofeven the smallest nuclear weapon, and
this
potential of nuclear forces.
known
to possess
next generation, of seemingly limitless power. These
and
As
the
the two rival
- the United States and Soviet
Union -
war involving such weapons
are
which neither side dares
to
otherforfear ofthe consequences, but this
means
secure.
if
the
hydrogen nuclei of deuterium and tritium are compressed together with sufficient force, they will be fused to create helium and release enormous bursts of
attack the
by no
Soviets developed one soon after. Since that time most
is
The Cold War world exists on a
knife-edge of uncertainty.
were "fusion" weapons, based upon the idea that
The Americans test-fired such a "hydrogen" or "thermonuclear" bomb in November 1952 and the
always strong. Peace has been maintained through "deterrence, " in
relatively
nuclear weapons could have
main nuclear stockpiles are held by
the chances ofa
bombs were
the mid-1980s, the five
By
destroyed the world at least four times over.
superpowers
today's standards, these
small - both produced explosions equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT - but it did not take long to develop the
that technology constantly increases the size
countries
By
has been reinforced by the knowledge
energy.
nuclear weapons have been based upon this process.
The
"yield," or explosive
power, of such weapons can
equal millions of tons (megatons) equivalent in in
1963 the Soviets tested
a device estimated at
megatons, more than enough to destroy virtually
on
its
own.
TNT;
a small
58
country
THE NUCLEAR BACKCLOTH If nuclear
weapons were ever used, the
A one-megaton
be appalling.
would produce
effects
Deterrence
would
The development of such instantaneous destructive
warhead, for example,
a searing flash of light
blind anyone looking towards
it
up
which would
to
160
km
had
capability has
a
profound
upon the use of
effect
force in international politics. Before nuclear weapons,
(100
war with-
miles) away, while the heat generated by the explosion
any country feeling threatened could
would
out risking complete and guaranteed devastation. This
5
km
rival
that of the sun, melting anything within
(3 miles)
of the point of impact and burning peo-
ple standing as far
away
as
32
km
is
wave and radioactive
Britain,
powers
the United States, Soviet Union,
China and France.
They may
dust, falling to earth for
case, at least for the five nuclear
present age -
of the
(20 miles).
Buildings would disappear under the force of a huge blast
no longer the
start a
still
be able
use their conventional
to
weeks afterwards, would spread sickness and lingering
(non-nuclear) forces against less powerful countries
death. Finally, the electromagnetic pulse produced by
which do not possess nuclear weapons, but
the explosion
would cut out
computers over in
a
1980 estimated
(6,000
ft)
all
wide area. that
telephones, radios and
confront each other, the danger
A
circumstances,
study by Congress
such an explosion 1,800
in the air over the city of Detroit
would
470,000 people and injure 630,000. By the time
m
which forces are used
iority, in
kill
had more than 17,000 warheads capable of delivering
rence."
weapon.
Hiroshima, photographed
and win wars;
1940s, this has been achieved through "deter-
All of us experience the principle of deterrence in
our everyday Left:
to fight
they must be based instead upon war-prevention. Since
this
the
a
nuclear-capable
countries cannot be based on a policy of military super-
study was made, the two superpowers between them
such
enormous. In such
is
between
relations
they
if
in
I
SS Sam
As
children,
we
are deterred from
doing things our parents or teachers do not want us to
March 1946.
Below: Polaris missile tubes on the
lives.
do by threats of punishment.
Ravburn.
Nuclear deterrence
.
power
is
no
saying to the other
different:
is
are
available
their
proven destructive/ them.
counter
to
]
that if certain policies are^
is
pursued nuclear weapons, with power,
±
what one super-
Thus,
the
enemy must think twice about the merits of such policies, and make a "cost-gain" calculation - "is
potential
what If
I
he
am
is
more
after
worth the
rational,
risk
5/€p
he should be put off or deterred. In
language, deterrence
official
5"
of nuclear pVyast^'""
is
"the
to
ability-
prevent aggression by persuading a potential enemy that the gains to be
had by undertaking
a particular
course of action are outweighed by the losses he suffer if he persists;" in other words, "if you hit
can and
For
will hit
this to
no good,
work, certain conditions must be met.
for example, trying to deter
you quite
if
will ever
clearly lack the
which usually go under the "capability." Similarly,
I
he
is
threatening. Finally,
if
he
to is
someone who
to
do so -
factors
of "credibility" and
not going to be deterred to
communications break down he you do not want him
It is
earn out your threat
means
titles
you are unwilling or unable
it is
me
you back harder."
does not believe that you or
will
talk
will
to
him, for
if if
have no idea what
do or what you are exactly irrational or
does not fear
the loss of things you are threatening to destroy, he will
be unable to make the cost-gain calculation and be deterred.
will
not
L>y%
EE1
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY Nuclear strategies These four points tions
and
A more -
to
emerge
are central to the process of
with their enormous destructive potential, but also be-
nuclear strategy since 1945. For the the Soviets tested their
first
first
at
four years,
atomic device
in
cause events
in
both Europe and Korea had shown that
American strength was not preventing the Soviets from threatening or supporting policies of communist ex-
1949, the Americans enjoyed a monopoly of atomic
pansion.
weapons,
never develop into nuclear confrontation.
tion of
easily satisfying the four criteria; the destruc-
Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed
that they
had so
aware that the weapons existed and were rational
State,
to
tempt the Americans
to use
them
against
They
In an effort to
both credibility and capability, the Soviets were clearly
enough not
in the early
1950s, partly because of the advent of nuclear weapons
nuclear deterrence, as can be seen by looking
until
began
communica-
credibility, capability,
rationality
definite strategy
believed that low-level crises would
make
the
American position
clear
and
enhance deterrence, Eisenhower's Secretary of
John Foster Dulles, introduced the
"massive retaliation"
in
strategy of
1954, threatening the Soviets
the Soviet Union. This one-sided situation began to
with instantaneous destruction of selected targets
change once the Soviets entered the "atomic club," but
they ever openly attacked
as they lacked the
American
soil,
atomic attack.
means
no one
to deliver their
in
bombs onto
the United States feared
American had the
allies
NATO
forces in
Europe or
elsewhere. As only the United States
capability to
wage nuclear war, deterrence was
strengthened.
The ultimate weapon: the distinctive mushroom cloud ofan atomic explosion /mugs
if
in the sky over a test-site.
I
TI IE
undermined
This began to be
once the Soviets seemed
in the late 1950s, for
be developing missiles with
to
the range to hit the United States, any attack on Soviet cities
under massive
retaliation
would lead
counter-
to
American population centers, and no
attacks against
one could
really
consciously
commit
Americans would
believe that the
suicide in that way. This was rein-
forced by the fact that massive retaliation was not triggered by the crises over Berlin in 1961 or
year
later: in
an
In
a
other words, the strategy lacked credibility.
redress
to
effort
Kennedy's
balance,
the
McXamara, announced
Secretary of State, Robert
new
Cuba
a
strategy of "graduated deterrence" in 1963. In the
event of a
policy
this
crisis,
number of
offered a
"options" for limited destruction short of full-scale
nuclear war.
for example, the Soviets carried out a
If,
limited attack
on European
hoping
targets,
keep the
to
of aggression below that which would trigger
level
massive retaliation, the Americans would be able to
respond
lower
at that
level,
has
This
countries.
American strategy
remained
the
into the 1980s, with the
Warsaw
basis
of
number and
type of options under constant review.
MAD strategy
The
became more evenly matched in this way, they entered a situation known as "mutual assured destruction" - MAD for short - and this forms the As the two
sides
central core of
upon the
modern nuclear
nuclear attack and
which
to inflict
still
to carry
- they would have silos
containing the
decided
out what to
they could see, namely the
hardened
based
left
with
enormous damage on the enemy.
United States strike"
It is
have sufficient weapons
for example, the Soviets
If,
deterrence.
of both sides to survive ("ride out") a
ability
aim
to attack the
known
is
as a "first
their missiles at targets
ICBMs
American
on
in their specially
soil
and
the
bases
B-1B and B-52 bombers. However
successful this turned out to be (the Americans in the late
1970s were predicting the loss of over 90 per cent
of their
silos in
such an
disarm the Americans
As soon
as
the
attack),
it
would not be able
to
entirely.
attack
took place, the surviving
ICBMs
and bombers, together with the submarinelaunched missiles, immune to surprise attack because the submarines
would be hiding
in
deep-ocean areas,
would be launched against the Soviet Union retaliatory
such
in
a
"second strike" of devastating power. In
circumstances^
it
whatever the effectively
As long
cause
of the
conflict,
would
take
a
particularly
w ar,
EE1 for
he would be
committing suicide. as this situation exists, the world
from general nuclear war, but
it
is
The most
maintaining a balance of nuclear capability.
obvious danger to
stability lies in
side should suddenly gain the
technology, for
gain the
means
if
one
means of protecting
land-based nuclear forces against a
enemy should
relatively
does depend upon
first strike
to destroy
all
the "Triad" of land-, sea- and air-launched
or
if
its
the
elements of
weapons
at
one time, the balance would be upset and the country with the
using
its
new advantage would
not be deterred from
forces.
In the late 1960s, there
was widespread
fear that
improved accuracy of nuclear warheads would create such an imbalance, and although
in this particular case
the two sides kept pace with each other so that neither
gained the advantage, the possibility remains.
threatening the destruction
of limited targets in the Soviet Union or other Pact
leader actually to initiate a nuclear
irrati onal
safe
NUCLEAR BACKCLOTI
Loading warheads on an American ICBM.
E3
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY The more there
is
more chance
accurate the weapon, the
of destroying missile
hence
silos in a first strike:
the development of "multiple independently targeted
re-entry vehicles" (MIRYs), warheads which detach
from the missile
as
travels
towards the
enemy
homeland and
to hit precise
and separate
targets.
fall
it
This was made possible by new on-board computers which, once programmed, can guide the warhead into
an area as small as 42 square meters (50 sq. yards). Multiple warheads
weapons
that can be fired in a
ICBMs now cam
at least
number of nuclear strike - most the
increase
also
MIRVs
10
of the
in place
single
warhead of 20 years ago - and
sides
to
concentrate
on improved protection
counter.
In the late
1960s, the trend was towards
special
anti-ballistic
(ABM)
missile
has led both
this
a
as
using
systems
rockets to intercept the incoming warheads, but these
were expensive and unlikely fraction of the
Star
Wars
The
ABM
two
enemy
to destroy
more than
a
A
force.
Treaty of 1972, restricting such systems to
seemed
would
to insure that neither side
gain the defensive advantage that would upset the balance. But this began to change when, on
ever
Reagan
President
Defense
came
announced
March
23,
Strategic
his
(SDI) or "Star Wars" plan, for
Initiative
if this
into operation, any attack by the Soviets
upon the United
States
warheads reached
would be destroyed before the
first
sign of launch,
would then
alert
space-
based "battle stations" armed with laser-beam weapons or other devices capable of destroying the as they flew
enemy
forces
above the Earth towards the United States.
Reagan's declared intention was
which
its silo.
a first strike
ing, for if the
would be impossible, thus removing at
felt
However,
all.
scheme was dangerously
Americans
destabiliz-
secure behind their
screen, they might choose to launch a
first strike
SDI
which
the Soviets could not answer.
SDI seemed
would gain an advantage which was guaran-
teed to destroy the balance of MAD.
A
final area in
lems
would
be
which technology could cause prob-
sudden
a
submarine warfare,
for if
breakthrough
in
anti-
one side gained the means
to
track the missile-earning submarines of his enemy, he
would be able
Under
MAD,
to destroy
them
as part of a first strike.
the submarines are crucial, containing
loss in the early stages
of a nuclear exchange would give
the attacker the advantage he needed.
It
someone who knew completely disarm his enemy within difficult to deter
would be very that he could
the
first
few
minutes of a war.
to create a situation in
any temptation to use nuclear weapons to the Soviets, the
that race
Whoever won
the bulk of the second-strike forces available, so their
their targets.
Special satellites would monitor Soviet missile sites
and, at the
in
expensive "race" was already underway.
sites only,
1983,
USMinuteman III 1CBM
Nuclear proliferation But the dangers are not the mid-1980s,
it
all
to
do with technology. By
was generally accepted (although im-
possible to prove) that both Israel and South Africa had
acquired nuclear weapons and that a countries, including Argentina, Iraq
number of other
and Pakistan, were
and
very close to joining them. All these countries were in-
there were doubts that even the Americans could pro-
volved in wars or potential conflicts - indeed, that was
duce
probably
In 1983,
futuristic in the extreme,
ICBMs
why they were interested in gaining nuclear capability - and it did not take much imagination to
However
foresee local conflicts escalating to a nuclear level. If
research went ahead. As there was strong evidence that
these involved allies of the superpowers, the latter
a
system capable of destroying an estimated
10,000 warheads to travel
in the short time
from one superpower
the Soviets were trying to volved, producing their
it
takes for
to the other.
match the technology
own
in-
might be forced
version of SDI, a highly
situation already
to intervene,
becoming involved
beyond the stage of deterrence.
in a
NUCLEAR BALANCE: SUPERPOWER STRENGTHS
1986
«£3T
US WARHEADS
BMs
SOVIET WARHEADS SLB\ Is ICBM
Air-launched
Air-launched
jr
^ tP — ^
mil
'
1
=11
X
D=
100(2, ; ;#
= 1 00
00 (5,536;
1
= 1 00
(2,520)
new nuclear-capable countries by leaders who saw no reason to be
in addition, the
If,
were ruled
deterred, either because they were irrational or did not fear the loss of cities or people, difficult to avoid a
it
would be very
use of nuclear weapons.
It
would be
ground
-1
W-
4fc i
-fi-V ZJLlt ^
1
= 1 00
(6, 420)
silos the
*
V-t IX K -Ji U it
i
~-^tZ*^ ±$
L
£^T \ vt
Et
-,=2
y ?t 7
(2,
100(680)
787)
ICBMs began preliminary
crews of the
launch procedures. In June 1980, a
fault}
7
microchip
again indicated a nuclear attack.
Both alarms lasted
American radars and
less
than two minutes before
satellites
monitoring Soviet mis-
sile sites
confirmed that there was no danger, but the
destroy
fact that
mistakes can happen must be worrying. Senior
Iran:
American
extremely unlikely, for example, that any threat to
Tehran would deter the Ayatollah Khomeini of he would probably see it as a necessary sacrifice in
Muslim fundamentalism,
officials insist that there are so
many warning
of
devices that individual faults in the systems will always
people already convinced that death in battle guaran-
be ironed out before the missiles are launched, but one
the spread of
tees
them
a sacrifice
only has to think what might have happened
entry into Paradise.
faults
Human
error
There
one other way
and
is
it is
data
indicating
inside a
posed
between the superpowers in
which deterrence might
fail,
perhaps the most worrying. In November 1979
computers
at
a
the
mountain
to
be
had occurred during
for
nuclear early at
attack
was fed
the
warning headquarters deep
Colorado Springs.
exercise
purposes
alert."
was sup-
It
only,
computers insisted that the attack was
Americans went "on
into
but
real.
the
The
Crews of B-52 bombers
raced to their aircraft for takeoff, and in their under-
a period
such
of high tension
to appreciate the danger.
the Soviets undoubtedly suffer the
same
As
sorts of errors
West does not know
or faults which the
if
about, the
chances of war by mistake are multiplied.
Thus, deterrence ject to all the
tionality
is
by no means secure, being sub-
pressures of technological change, irra-
and human error
of nuclear-capable countries circumstances, that
might not
MAD
is
world where the number
in a
is
likely to
grow. In such
a very delicate balance
last indefinitely.
and one
PE1
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
EAST VERSUS WEST: REAL OR IMAGINED THREATS
Europe has always been a center for alliances. Throughout its history, the continent has con-
CHAPTER 4
NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT The superpower confrontation
is
most obvious on the
continent ofEurope. Since 1955,
when
Union created the Warsaw Pact partly
in response to
West Germany's entry into the NATO
Europe has been divided blocs.
into
the Soviet
alliance,
two heavily armed rival
Both maintain huge armedforces, nuclear as
well as conventional (non-nuclear), facing each other across the
"flanks " in is
perfect.
Inner-German Border (IGB) and on
Norway and Both
The
result
is
Turkey. But neither alliance
political
and
military weaknesses.
a stalemate which, ironically, makes
Europe one of the
least violent areas
world, but the potential for
their neighbors, have
made
military arrangements
with other countries to ensure survival. Before
power" created by these alliances was always shifting and, as a result, wars were frequent. The alliances formed at the end of the Second World War, however, took on a more permanent form, reflecting the military and political reality of the Cold War. Since 1955, Europe has been divided into two rival camps, kept together by a combination of nuclear fear and ideological commitment. 1939, the "balance of
the
NATO and the Warsaw Pact suffer
from geographical,
tained countries which, fearing the intentions of
of the modern
war is frightening.
NATO The
first
of these to emerge was the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization It
had
its
(NATO)
origins in the
formed on April
4,
1949.
immediate aftermath of the
Second World War, when Britain and France signed the Treaty' of Dunkirk (March 4, 1947), promising mutual support
if
either
was attacked by
a third party.
NATO AND TI IE WARSAW PACT This was taken one stage further
Benelux countries
(Belgium,
Luxemburg) were added
when
the
the so-called
Netherlands
to the alliance
and
through the
Treat) of Brussels (March 13, 1948).
The Warsaw Pact The Warsaw different
signed on
Pact,
type
of alliance,
May
formed
14,
1955,
to
ensure
a
is
the
continued dominance of the Soviet Union over eastern
But with the emergence of a perceived Soviet threat
Europe. Between 1945 and 1955, the Soviets control-
shown most clearly by the Berlin Blockade of 1948-49, it was obvious that something more solid and wide-ranging was needed,
creating the "buffer zone" against attack from the west.
preferably based on the strength of the United States,
expanding
to the security of western Europe,
with
its
atomic capability.
The
result
was the
NATO
led the "satellite" states through force of
But there were
limits to Soviet
NATO
eastern bloc.
When
power
arms alone,
to
match an
and contain growing unrest the Austrian State Treaty
in the
(May
15,
-
1955) forced them to withdraw some troops from the
Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland,
region, the Soviets used the situation to rethink their
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal
future role, allowing the eastern states to take over
alliance, signed
Italy,
and the United
by
a total
of
2 like-minded countries
1
some of the
States.
Since that time, other members have been added. In 1952, both
Greece and Turkey,
of Soviet
fearful
policies towards southern Europe, signed the treaty
documents;
in
1955 West Germany was welcomed into
the alliance and in 1982 Spain brought the total
16 ted
member -
in
states.
Not
1966 France
all
members
left
when
the
other
suit
members
new
a
commit-
NATO
strategy,
between 1974 and 1980 did
nothing to stop the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus. However,
NATO has remained
to
the military structure in
protest at the introduction of a
and Greece followed
are fully
up
in general terms,
remarkably coherent collection
To Pact
responsibility for their
own
defense.
guarantee continued Soviet control, the
was
involving
created,
Albania,
Warsaw
Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the
Germany as an "observer" when she too became a full
Soviet Union, with East until the
end of 1955,
member. Since
then,
Albania has
left
the Pact, in
protest at the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and
Rumania has ceased to take full part in Pact affairs. At the same time, however, the Soviets have shown
willingness to maintain their control over both Hungary
and Czechoslovakia by force of arms, reinforcing the general feeling in the
West
that, in the central parts
Union
of
prepared to go to
of independent states dedicated to protecting each
the Pact at least, the Soviet
other in the event of an attack on one of the members.
considerable lengths to ensure continued domination.
The Warsaw Pact: a parade ofSoviet weapons
is
a
held every year in
Moscow
m
is
in October to celebrate the
1917
revolution.
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
The balance of terror As part of
their respective structures, both alliances
station large
armed
forces in
Europe on
numbers of men and weapons
permanent
a
them with even
basis, with the potential to reinforce
greater
in the event
of a
Most of these forces face each other across the Inner-German Border (IGB), helping to create a "flashpoint" of terrifying potential. Any clash of interests or minor confict between rival camps anycrisis
or war.
where along the
IGB would
escalate into war,
and the same could happen on one of
the
two
either
"flanks,"
almost be guaranteed to
Norway
northern
in
or
fact that this
has not yet occurred
surprising, given the fluctuating state of relations,
Council and
subsidiary military and political
its
and there
(even one agreeing). Individual
made by consensus members cannot be
forced to accept ideas they do not
like.
mittees
all
decisions have to be
This means,
in turn, that every
same amount of military strength.
armed
forces of
member
influence, regardless of
Thus
its
a
country
own, can
its
size or
like Iceland,
with no
in theory stop policies
forward by the United States, even latter is
dominant
enjoys the
in political,
if,
economic and
is
no doubt
that the
is
perhaps
superpower
development of
the political) structure of the alliance
NATO
without breaking up
itself.
But weaknesses do
exist.
The most
important con-
from pursuing policies which might escalate into war,
states
it
than
enough
to
maintain peace, but there
is
more
some
to
fact that neither alliance is strong
dominate Europe entirely has produced
stalemate of
stability.
An
a
examination of the two
alliances in terms of strengths
and weaknesses
will
that tries
it is
derives
its
greatest strength
from the
fact
an alliance of independent, like-minded coun-
which choose
do not form
to join together against
see as a potential enemy. This
is
what they
reflected in the orga-
NATO troops patrol the Inner-German Border.
a solid land bloc within
member
which
a co-
ordinated defense can emerge. In the event of a war with the
Warsaw
Pact,
NATO will depend very heavily
indeed upon the industrial and military strength of the
United States. Yet that country miles)
away from the
immense ocean
illustrate the point.
NATO
military
terms. Similarly, countries like FYance and Greece
cerns the geography of the alliance, for the 16
much to that. The
put
in reality, the
nuclear forces by both sides, deterring the "enemy"
has done
com-
have been able to withdraw from the military (but not
northern Turkey.
The
North Atlantic
nization of the alliance, for within the
likely area
lies
4,800
km
(3,000
of fighting, across an
that will contain Soviet
submarines and
surface ships.
Even within Europe, the geography of the poor, posing difficult problems. If the
alliance
Warsaw
should attack across the IGB, for example,
is
Pact
NATO
\
<
A XATO council meeting. West Germany would have very
forces in
of territory to
fall
back
in,
and
if
little
"depth"
France should remain
mineral exploration rights in the Aegean Sea, an area
dominated by Greece through the
outside the military structure the situation would be
around
even worse.
Turkish
come on
If,
on the other hand, the attack should
the flanks,
NATO
problem of coordination:
faces an even greater
of Norwegian territory leaves no room for maneuver, while in the south, the five Spain,
member
states
-
Portugal,
Greece and Turkey - are separated one
Italy,
from the other or isolated by the sheer distances
The
volved.
existence of the so-called "neutrality gap,"
created by the presence of the neutral, states
in-
non-NATO
At
southern
a
wedge of
tier
territory that physically splits the
of countries from those of central Europe.
a
less
Nor
is
allies
NATO
also suffers political strains. In the past, the decision
France
to follow a separate military line
divisions
between the member
states,
by
showed deep
although in
this
much
case the problem was absorbed without doing too
damage. The same has not been true of the
split
on the
NATO
but
solidarity there
a difference
NATO,
for the
To
a large extent, this
Americans tend
to
to the
see
it
as an
Europeans
it is
specifically anti-Russian.
This has led the Americans on occasions
much more European to
level,
of opinion about the purpose
anti-communist alliance whereas
more
worrying
equally
have often been strained.
stems from of
dramatic
- notably
demand
to
involvement in policies designed
"contain" the spread of
face rejection by
the weakness purely one of terrain, for
virtually
lie
between the United States and her European
NATO area Political tensions
chances of
coast, the
relations
of Austria and Switzerland, does nothing to help,
forming
some of which
waters
are slim.
narrowness
in the north, the
islands,
its
territorial
in
communism
Vietnam
in the
outside the
1960s - only
European countries concerned
to
that
such policies are diverting American resources away
from the defense of Europe
itself.
As many Americans
already believe that the Europeans are not contributing
enough
own
in
terms of money and armed forces to their
defense, depending far too
States, the
much on
development of mistrust
the United
is likely.
between Greece and Turkey. This came
to a
head over Cyprus
in 1974,
when
the
Turkish government, concerned that Turkish-Cypriot citizens
were about
to
be overwhelmed by Greek-
The nuclear umbrella In the early days of the alliance,
tion," threatening to use nuclear
and took over the northern region. Since then, relations
to
between Greece and Turkey have deteriorated
safe,
point where the two countries refuse to cooperate even in
NATO
affairs.
As they
are also in dispute over
Americans
the
adopted the straightforward policy of "massive
Cypriot extremists, ordered an invasion of the island
to the
when
any Soviet aggression sheltering
in
beneath
weapons
in
retalia-
response
Europe, the Europeans the
American
felt
"nuclear
umbrella," but as the Soviets gained the capability to hit
back
at
American
cities,
the situation had to change.
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
E3
The American in
which
attack
adoption of "graduated deterrence,"
number of options
a
short of full-scale nuclear
were introduced, undoubtedly enhanced deter-
rence between the superpowers, but
it
left
the Euro-
peans feeling vulnerable. Their view was that
in the
for in
it
too has
numerical terms, the Pact
NATO
outnumbers
2:1
- and
longer any guarantee that the Americans would re-
cohesion that
spond with nuclear weapons, and
analysis.
they would not be deterred from making such
this,
attacks in the future. Indeed, apparent lack of nuclear
that,
overall,
it
in tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft
a ratio of about
could be argued that Soviet domination in
it
both
the Soviets realized
is
strong - taken
and other conventional equipment by
event of Soviet attack across the IGB, there was no
if
problems. There can be no doubt
its
and
political
military affairs gives the alliance a
NATO
but this
lacks,
is
a superficial
Only when the weaknesses of the Warsaw Pact
we
are recognized can
more accurate
get a
picture of
the balance between the superpower blocs in Europe.
protection was the main reason for the French with-
drawal from the military structure and the subsequent
French development of an independent nuclear capable of earning out
its
own "massive
force,
W arsaw The
Pact weaknesses and most important, of these weaknesses
first,
stems from the nature of the Pact
retaliation."
unlike
itself for,
NATO,
it owes its origins to the policies of one state only the Soviet Lnion. The other member states are
Flexible response - defense and deterrence
Among
NATO
the other
by the introduction of
a
allies,
new
as "flexible response," this
American desire satisfaction of the If,
the
threatening
same to
fit
necessarily in their interests. Admittedly, one of the
of Europe
NATO
As
respond
will
this
if
the
respond with retaliatory
attack
process can be
initial
attack
Soviets begin with nuclear strikes in Europe, will
at
of defense) while
nuclear weapons
almost any level of
strikes against the
--
if
the
NATO Warsaw
Pact while threatening to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet is
homeland
if
the attacks persist
both flexible and appropriate, but
it
- the
strategy
has not quieted
Americans, the strategy
Europeans are willing
to
will
work only
if
the
increase the size of their
conventional forces and to fight a conventional war -
something which they are
clearly reluctant to
do -
while to the Europeans, the American reluctance to use
to leave the alliance
structure and others have tried, with varying degrees of
themselves
distance
to
from
the
policies
imposed by the Soviet Lnion. But they have only gotten
away with
this
because their countries are
difficult to
invade from the east. Albania, for example, has no
other
Warsaw
independent
common
border with
Pact countries, so her decision to take an
line in
1968 could not be countered by
Soviet troops on her
been so fortunate,
soil.
Other countries have not
as events in
Hungary
in
1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968 go to prove, and the fact that the Soviets have
felt it
necessary to impose their views
by force of arms on these two occasions shows the end,
fears within the alliance.
To
members has managed
original
success,
policy
(a
the
to
Pact should attack using
persists (a policy of deterrence).
adapted to
to satisfy the
allies.
Warsaw
level
use
creation of the Pact in 1955 for reasons that were not
defense
purely conventional forces, the
Known
strategy in 1967.
was an attempt
European
for example, the
exactly
not "independent," having been forced to accept the
an alternative to national suicide
for
maintaining
while
the crisis was averted
Pact.
it
When
is
Moscow
it is
members of the
borne
that, in
that dictates the policies of the in
mind
Pact, only
that of the eight original
one (Bulgaria) has shown no
signs of opposing those policies since 1955, any idea of alliance solidarity
seems
false.
Resentment about Soviet control of Pact
affairs
does
nuclear weapons implies a lack of commitment to the
not mean, of course, that the East European armies
security of Europe. Current trends towards the de-
would refuse
velopment of technology
closely seared to the ideals of
levels,
as
an alternative
to
high force
producing weapons which can impose enormous
casualties
on Warsaw Pact attackers and so redress the
to fight in the event
of a war -
communism
remain
loyal to the existing
expensive, the Europeans are less than enthusiastic.
pressures of a major
The
seem
would be wrong
some huge
NATO
military
weaknesses
to
imagine that the Warsaw Pact
is
monster, ready to exploit such in a display of
unstoppable force.
and, as
governments - but there
can be no guarantees that the Pact
It
are
events in Poland since 1980 have proved, they tend to
balance, might solve the problem, but as this will be
controversies continue.
all
to
crisis, particularly if
the Soviets
be losing. There are too many people
in the
who would welcome a weakening of Soviet power Moscow to risk provoking a crisis or war at the
East for
will survive the
superpower
level.
NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT Nor
is
such a weakening
of
power
unlikely, for in
retains a substantial advantage in terms of
weapons
purely military terms, the Pact suffers from certain key
technology, deploying better tanks, missiles and aircraft
members
than the majority of the Pact members, and although
disadvantages. Although the seven surviving
form
Europe, with no oceans
a solid territorial bloc in
or "neutrality gaps" to expose their flanks, that bloc
not ideally placed in the superpower balance.
can contain the Pact by preventing
its
is
NATO
naval forces from
breaking out into the oceans of the world - the exits
from the Baltic through the Skaggerat and from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus Straits are dominated by
NATO countries, while any movement into the
"technology gap" may be closing, the Western
the
development of Emerging Technology (ET) promises
new weapons which match. In the end
and
the Pact will be hard-pressed to
would be
it
and
in political, geographical
may have fewer armed
NATO aircraft and surface ships.
Warsaw
1950s, this disadvantage remains a
major problem. Even within the
communications continue standards, delaying the
to
territorial bloc itself,
be
poor by Western
movement of
troops or the
mobilization of reserves, while the threat to the Soviet
Union from China unavoidably diverts Soviet forces from the European theater. Finally, if
Warsaw
it
Pact
numbers
significant
to defeat the
to
depend upon sheer weight of
NATO
armies.
The West
still
Afghanistan 1985: while the superpowers face each other in the
-rosC
may
easily;
is
gaps," but the
within
its
able to absorb
be
split
Warsaw
Pact
own way
Warsaw Pact has actually The result is a stalemate
is
the potential for
war
is
more
New
all
easily
NATO
more
contained
members may
member
state entirely.
which huge armed forces
Cold
War
politics:
enormous, but the chances of it
developing are kept in check. That
War is
differences
occasionally, but only the
lost a
in
its
by oceans and "neutrality
existing boundaries;
have gone their
capability; the
give a greater impression of coher-
NATO NATO may
ence, but
kill
face each other in a manifestation of
should ever come to a shooting war, the
may have
Pact
NATO
forces available, but they are of
better quality and enjoy a greater
in size since the
military terms,
the two sides are effectively "balanced out."
North Atlantic from Murmansk can be monitored by Although the Soviet navy has increased dramatically
between quantity
guaranteed success.
quality, with neither side
Thus,
a fight
is
what the Cold
about.
Cold War, many
suffer the effects
of actual fighting.
E3
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
CONFLICT IN THE 20 TH CENTURY APPENDICES :
The tensions between East and West take many forms. Around the world there are a number of "flashpoints," each capable of bursting into conflict, and none is more potentially explosive than the Central Front in Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Pact and both devote enormous
forces maintain an uneasy balance. Elsewhere, rivalries exist in Space
superpower blocs, led by politicians
of strong personality
and
beliefs,
energies to gathering information on their rivals.
Minister from 1940-45. Despite his
ltsowunis
im
crucial role in sustaining British
resolve during the Second
World
War, he was defeated
at
election of July 1945.
He returned
the general as
Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev (1906-1982).
Prime Minister
Soviet Premier, 1964-82. After
close relations with the United States
experience in the Ukraine and Moldavia, he became a member
Cold War, but was forced to resign through ill health in 1955.
in 1951, dedicated to
in the
political
of the Soviet Politburo in 1957,
Alexander Dubcek (1921-
succeeding Nikita Khrushchev as First Secretary of the
1967-69. He tried to introduce reforms of a liberal nature in April 1968, helping to trigger a Soviet/ Warsaw Pact invasion of his country in August. He was replaced as Party leader in 1969 and subsequently
He developed the Brezhnev Doctrine, claiming a
Party in 1964.
Soviet right to interfere in
neighboring countries
if
communism seemed threatened, and ordered Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979). He signed the
SALT
I
(1972)
and SALT
II
).
Czechoslovakian Communist leader,
Communist
disgraced.
Mikhail Gorbachev (1930). Soviet First Secretary, from 1985. He is one of the first of a new generation
(1979)
agreements with the United States.
Leonid Brezhnev
James ("Jimmy") Carter (1924-
of Soviet leaders
who
did not take
War of 19^1-45 (Second World War). He
part in the Great Patriotic
Democratic President of the United States, 1976-80. He was elected Governor of Georgia in 1971 and then US President in November 1976. Dedicated to reestablishing ).
became Soviet leader on the death Konstantin Chernenko in March 1985. He has adopted a more
power in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and Watergate,
conciliatory line toward the West,
he pursued policies of detente with the Soviet Union based upon the"
and nuclear weapons
presidential
principles of
offering
of
arms control concessions "freezes,"
although his long-term intentions
human rights. He
are unclear.
negotiated a peace agreement
between Egypt and
Sergei Gorshkov (1910Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, 1956-85. After service in the Great Patriotic War, he was given the task of modernizing the Soviet Navy by Khrushchev in 1956. He succeeded brilliantly, building up a
Israel (1978), but
)
failed to maintain his popularity at
home. He was defeated by Reagan
in
the presidential election of
November Sir
1980.
Winston Churchill (1874-1965). and
balanced, ocean-going fleet of submarines and surface ships which could challenge the US Navy almost
British politician, historian writer.
He entered
politics in 1900,
beginning a remarkable career which led to his
appointment as Prime
Mikhail Gorbachev
anywhere on the high
seas.
APPENDICES John ("Jack*') Kennedy (1917-1963). Democratic President of the United States. 1960-63. Coming from a
elected Governor of California in
1966.
it
was natural
enter politics.
He
for
him
defeated Carter in the
November
1980 and was reelected four years He has taken a much tougher
politically influential East Coast
family,
He
presidential election of
to
later.
served as Senator
line than his predecessor in relations
Massachusetts (1952-60) and defeated Nixon in the presidential
for
with the Soviet Union, condemning
election of
Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Central America.
November
1960. Initially
regarded as too young and inexperienced for international politics, he proved his skill during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.
He was
Harry Truman (1884-1972). Democratic President of the United States. 1945-52. Chosen as Franklin Roosevelt's vice-president in 1944,
assassinated in 1963.
he took over the presidency on Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev (1894-1971). Soviet Premier, 1958.
64.
He
joined the Soviet
Communist
Party in 1918 and progressed steadily
up the
He was elected in his own right in November 1948. An early advocate Roosevelt's death in April 1945.
John Kennech
of policies to prevent the spread of
communism
political ladder,
eventually replacing Stalin as First Secretary on the latter's death in
March 1953. He ruled
60) before being defeated by
Kennedy in the presidential election November 1960. However, he was elected President in November 1968 and reelected four years later. He was responsible for negotiating the
with Nikolai Bulganin until 1958, then on his own. A ruthless man, he engaged in "brinkmanship" policies with the United States, culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, in which he was forced to back down. He was removed from office in October 1964.
of
Richard Nixon (1913). Republican President of the United States. 1968-74. He served as Dwight Eisenhower's vice-president (1952-
Ronald Reagan (1911-
jointly
SALT
I
agreement with the Soviet
Union (1972) and for pulling US troops out of Vietnam (1973), but
was forced
to resign in
over the Watergate
August 1974
affair.
).
Republican President of the United States. 1980-
.
After a career in
Truman
Doctrine),
(1949) and committed
NATO
US troops
to
the defense of South Korea (1950).
Lech Walesa (1943I.Polish trade union activist. Employed as an electrician in the Lenin Shipyard, Gdansk, he was Chairman of the Strike Committee during the troubles of 1970. Sacked in 1976. he reemerged four years later as a driving force behind the creation of the independent trade union "Solidarity."
He was
detained in
1981, and was awarded the Nobel
films he entered politics, being
Peace Prize in 1983.
Ronald Reagan
Lech Walesa
!9gr k.
Richard Nixon
(the
he took the United States into
i|
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
EAST-WEST FLASHPOINTS Since 1945, the world has been dominated by the actions and intentions of the superpowers. The
that has persisted to the present day.
Until the late 1960s, a Soviet (later
Warsaw
advance across the
Pact)
strength of the United States and the
was seen as the most likely cause of superpower war and NATO
Soviet Union have remained roughly
maintained
influence,
power and
in balance, but this
line
military
does not
mean
Throughout the globe there are areas in which superpower interests clash, producing friction and potential danger of war. Such areas are aptly dubbed "flashpoints," on the understanding that any crisis in that the
world
is safe.
readily available
IGB and the
as a deterrent.
Berlin
The decision to divide Berlin
between the of this line and the
between the victorious allies in 1945 was probably meant to be a
a line
a matter of prestige in
when the
Soviets tried to
force the
chances of a surprise attack still persist. The defense of this area is the major concern of NATO, and West Germany, the United States, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Canada all maintain forces there
split
it is
is
became
1948-49,
Group of Germany (GSFG), Guards Tank Army and
for assaults across the
down to the Austrian border.
allies to the west;
West to withdraw, so forces remain in place. To prevent unnecessary provocation. West Berlin is treated as a separate entity - it is not part of the Federal Republic (West Germany) and the Western troops there are not part of NATO - and theoretically the postwar
comprising a its support units,
huge armies faced each other along a line stretching from just east of Lubeck on the Baltic
Western
effective policies of deterrence, the
Soviet Forces
in 1945,
Soviets to the east
Berlin
years. Nevertheless, the
The Inner-German Border (IGB) When the Second World War ended
Germany was
With the gradual acceptance of European borders and evolution of danger has subsided in more recent
them could quite easily lead to fullscale superpower hostility, with all its awesome implications.
coast
forces accordingly.
its
temporary arrangement only, and to the West it must have seemed absurd to maintain an enclave inside the Eastern bloc, surrounded by potentially hostile territory. But continued Western presence in
Kommandatura (four-power ruling still exists, although without a Soviet representative. An incident along the Berlin Wall or at one of the checkpoints could blow up into a major crisis, and any renewed attempt by the East to impose a blockade of Western sectors would probably be met with
authority)
a strong response.
Europe's Central Front
NATO and Warsaw Pact forces and
1
military sectors in Central Europe
A
(
2
^
1
NATO
\C First Polish
)
B
netoerB* NDSO
J
^^
Northern
4 ^^^
^
^-====
Great Britain
UhK MAN
E
5
ClAN
FEDERAL
f
5
1
K
REPUBLIC
1
REPJ^BLlcf
V
Second
Polish
Army United States/Canada
^~^
/
FRANCE
Belgium
DEMOCRATIC
Central ,
.IN
C J
[BELGIUM)
The Netherlands
POLAND 3
r
German Federal Republic
Army
WARSAW PACT
Fourth Polish
Army
\
Second Guards Tank Army
r\^.
I Sixteenth Air Army
-^^AT^CZECHOSLOVAKIA
—
^k
\_^
First
X^
Army
C
j
Third Shock
Army
-
I Twentieth Guards Army
1
('Second Army
Km I
1
1
Miles
V
200
100 I
|
100
s~/
n /^„^. *-"""- / O-^ 1
I
E
^Eighth Guards Army I
First
Guards Tank Army
APPENDICES Yugoslavia Because Yugoslavia has always taken an independent line in the communist camp, it occupies a peculiar position in the "no-man'sland" between East and West. Comprising a number of states and autonomous provinces, each with its
through their respective allies. So long as American backing for Israel and Soviet support for at least some
Central America The spread of communism into the Caribbean and Central America is a
of the "front-line"
Arab states (currently Syria and Iraq) persist, and neither side comes close to
particular nightmare of the United
destroying the other entirely, all should be safe in global terms.
States. Caught by surprise by the success of Fidel Castro in Cuba (1959), Washington has since gone to great lengths to prevent what it sees
own ethnic and
as a
long time, the aftermath of Tito's death seemed a likely occasion for an East-West clash.
However, if the balance is upset if, for example, Israel seems about to be overrun or if Israeli forces approach the capital of Syria (as occurred in October 1973) - then the superpowers may feel obliged to
Many felt that
intervene, with obvious
Americans to act, giving military and economic support to anticommunist groups or governments in the region, even, on occasion,
country
is
political ideas, the
ripe for civil unrest
central authority should ever
For
if
the
fail.
a
it
was
largely his
consequences.
influence that held the country
A similar situation exists in the
together, but his death in 1980
passed without
crisis.
The country
now less of a flashpoint, but
if
is
the
Yugoslav government lost control, the Soviets might be tempted (or asked by more hardline communists) to step in, forcing the
West
to react to
prevent a spread of Soviet influence into the Adriatic.
The Middle East The main source
Arabian (Persian) Gulf, where Iran and Iraq have been fighting since 1980. Although the division of superpower support in the region is less clear-cut, the consequences of a shift in the balance of power could be catastrophic. If Iran seemed about to collapse, for example, the Soviets might step in to
of conflict in the
Middle East - that between Israel and her Arab neighbors - has been kept in check since 1948 by the two superpowers maintaining a balance
Government troops search a
occupy
territory (to protect
Afghanistan), so triggering an American move to safeguard the vital oilfields;
if
Iraq
the Soviets might step in to protect
an
ally,
with similar
results.
village for guerrillas in the bitter civil
war in
and the resources
The success
to
deny
Panama Canal
of Latin
America.
of the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua (1979) and the communist threat to El Salvador have forced the
sending their as in
Grenada
own troops
into action,
(1983).
The future Other flashpoints undoubtedly exist for example, rival forces, backed by East and West, have maintained a very precarious peace on the 38th parallel in Korea -
- since 1953,
more may well arise in the future. The only hope lies in the fact that, in more than 40 years, the and
was threatened,
Moscow-controlled plot
the West access to the
yet
world has not been plunged into global war.
El Salvador, 1982.
m
m
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
EAST-WEST BALANCE OF FORCES In the event of a full-scale
between
NATO and
the
war
Warsaw
Pact
NATO-Warsaw Pact Conventional
Forces, 1986
NATO
Europe, the fighting would probably progress through a number in
of phases in a process
"escalation."
would
known
as
1
Surface Ships
To begin with, both
avoid the use of nuclear weapons, concentrating instead upon their conventional (nonnuclear) ground, air and naval sides
Naval Forces
Submarines Naval Aircraft
try to
2
Land and Air Forces
forces to gain their objectives.
So will
far as
NATO is concerned,
deploy
its
forces to
territory, reacting to
defend
220 217 1100
55
105 28,000 17,500
10,000
4750 2500
Artillery
Aircraft
it
366 190 1950
Divisions
Tanks
Pact attack across the East-West
(Figures taken from the Defense White Paper (UK) and Spanish forces included in NATO totals)
Pact
4750
its
any Warsaw
Warsaw
of
May
1986; French
border. During this phase of the war, the
numbers
of military units
South Atlantic,
far
away from
NATO
balance
lies
firmly in favor of the
(usually counted in terms of
defensive areas. Equally, the Soviet
Warsaw Pact
divisions), tanks, artillery pieces,
Union
Here,
ships, submarines
and
aircraft will
be crucial, but the balance
means
is
by no
straightforward.
is still
engaged
shipbuilding, so
may
NATO,
of naval forces
should be borne in mind that countries such as the United States, Britain and France have global interests which may take some of their naval units away from the North Atlantic. During the Falklands War (1982), for example, Britain was forced to deploy nearly favors
it
two-thirds of her surface fleet to the
catch up in
time.
Even
so,
with Soviet naval forces
effectively "bottled
Naval forces Although the balance
in substantial
up"
in the Baltic
in numerical terms.
NATO would have to fight any
conventional battle with considerable skill. The Warsaw Pact attack would probably follow the pattern of Blitzkrieg ("lightning
and Black Seas, the fighting would
war"), with massive air and ground
be confined largely to the Atlantic where NATO navies, organized and
forces searching for weaknesses in
equipped to protect convoys from North America against air, surface and submarine attack, are in a
NATO's front line and having found them, rushing through in overwhelming numbers. But NATO does enjoy two
marginally better position.
advantages, not First,
The European theater The same is not the case itself, for
Aircraft on board the nuclear-powered carrier
in
Europe
the land and air force
USS Dwight
D. Eisenhower.
the West
shown in the table. would be on the
defensive on familiar ground and, as mg^st strategists agree that an attacker needs at least a 3:1 advantage in
numbers to succeed, the Warsaw Pact would still have to concentrate its
forces at predictable points.
Second, NATO has the technological edge, producing weapons of superior quality
and survivability (although
there are signs that the East
is
catching up). With both these advantages, it is logical for NATO to adopt a strategy which involves the destruction of Warsaw Pact forces as they concentrate for the assault, using high technology, long-range
weapons
to hit
enemy
rear areas
other words, the doctrine of
(Follow
On
-
in
FOFA
Forces Attack), adopted
as a long-term planning guideline in
1984.
APPENDICES Nuclear weapons If
the
Warsaw
Pact should break
Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1986
through, however, NATO may be forced to resort to nuclear weapons as the next phase of escalation.
To
begin with, these would be tactical or battlefield weapons such as the
ICBMs
SLBMs
Lance surface-to-surface missile or
M-110
artillery piece firing nuclear
But if the war goes on, other nuclear systems could be used. At a "theater," or intermediate, level, in which nuclear weapons would be sent against targets in Europe only, systems such as the GLCM (ground-launched cruise missile) - of the type currently deployed at Greenham Common shells.
airbase in
England - or the Soviet
SS-20 would appear.
Long-Range Bombers Numbers
Numbers
of
of
SLBMs
(submarine-launched
ballistic
180 Nuclear Weapons 2520
170 680
Warheads
(Figures taken from the IISS Military Balance, 1985- 1986J
missiles) and long-range bombers such as the American B-lB or Soviet Backfire - all armed with numbers of nuclear weapons or warheads -
would
hit targets in the rival
the Soviets are preparing for a "first
ballistic missiles).
979 2787
Warheads
of Aircraft
which ICBMs
(intercontinental
616 5536
of Missiles
"strategic" nuclear exchanges, in
impossible
to stop the escalation to
1398 6420
Numbers Numbers
of
Americans deploy larger numbers of warheads on board submarines and bombers, while the Soviets have concentrated more on landbased ICBMs. To many, this implies that
Once the fighting had progressed this far, it would be virtually
1018 2118
of Missiles
superpower homeland.
weapons
Soviet Union
Numbers Numbers
In strategic nuclear terms, the
Strategic
USA
attempt to disarm the Americans (hence President Reagan's emphasis on a defensive system - Star Wars to
prevent Soviet success).
The Americans, by comparison, are ready to absorb (or destroy) such a strike,
while keeping
bombers available "second
SLBMs and
for a devastating
(or retaliatory) strike."
So
strike"
on the US homeland, sending
long as that rough balance persists, with neither side in a position to "win," deterrence will hopefully prevail to prevent war. If it does not, the world as we know it would cease
ICBMs
against missile silos in an
to exist.
A Tomurunvk GLCM (ground-launched cruise
missile)
is
test-fired in UUih.
E
23
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
SPIES AM)
SPYING Since the Second World War. both superpowers (and their respective allies) have gone to great lengths to gather information about the
weapons and intentions
of their
United States, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) was set up in 1947, and in 1954 the Soviets responded by creating the KGB (Komifet Gosudarsfvennoi Bezopasnosti, or Committee for State
rivals. In the
Tupolev Tu-20s have been used over Western Europe. definition satellite photographs can
Security). In Britain the equivalent
show remarkable
body
the Americans have recently
is
the Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS), more
known
commonly
as MI6. In all cases, the
discovered a
main
carrier
new
detail; for
example,
discovered), Soviets have
Soviet aircraft
under construction using
their "spy-in-the-sky."
tasks of the intelligence
organizations are to monitor their
opposite numbers in the East or West, to prevent "leakages" of
Spy networks
information from their own side and to indulge in the age-old habit of
and if either side wants to know what its rival is planning or how much it knows, it still turns to traditional spies - special agents
spying.
But there are limits to such methods,
enemy camp
The hardware
infiltrated into the
Information on a potential enemy can be gathered from a variety of sources. Since 1956, the United States has conducted high-altitude spying missions, using aircraft such as the U-2 (an example of which, piloted by Gary Powers, was shot down over Sverdlovsk on May 1, 1960) or the SR-71 "Blackbird." The Soviets have used Tu-20 "Bear" bombers, converted to the reconnaissance role, chiefly over Western Europe. Such aircraft can provide goodquality aerial photographs of enemy weapons sites, but they are vulnerable to interception. Both
gather detailed information. Since
sides, therefore,
add
to their
intelligence picture by
means
of
special "listening posts," capable of
monitoring radio
traffic (the British
example is the Government Communications Headquarters GCHQ- at Cheltenham), and with spy satellites, programmed to fly in orbits designed to take them over key locations. The infrared, high-
can only be based upon those networks that have actually been
to
1945, such spy networks have
enjoyed mixed success, although from the evidence available (which
would seem that the managed to infiltrate
it
the very highest ranks of selected
Western countries. This was obvious as soon as the Second World War ended, for as the West became fearful of Soviet ambitions in Europe, a variety of spy rings were uncovered, principally in the atomic field. In 1946, a British
Dr Alan Nunn May. who had worked on atomic research, was physicist,
caught spying for the Soviet Union (he is known to have provided Moscow with examples of the uranium used in atomic weapons).
Lockheed SR-71 Blackbirds were used over Vietnam
in the 1960s.
"
APPENDICES Four years
later, in a
much more
serious episode. Dr Klaus Fuchs arrested.
had
"Navy Ring," run by Gordon Lonsdale and Peter and Helen Kroger, was also uncovered. The
called
was
A German scientist who
from Hitler's regime in the Fuchs had worked on the atomic bomb project in the United States and had helped to set up Britain's Atomic Research facility at Harwell. He was sentenced to 14 fled
latter
late 1930s.
for gaining
secret information from the Royal
Navy's Underwater Weapons Establishment through Harry Houghton, who had been blackmailed into betraying his country.
By
years in prison for passing crucial
information about
was responsible
bomb
the early 1960s, therefore, key-
design to Moscow and his arrest threatened to expose other spies in Britain.
elements of the West's establishment
Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, officials in the British Foreign Office, fled to the Soviet Union rather than face arrest. In the United States, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were caught passing information to the Soviets at much the same time; they were found
impression. In January 1963 Kim Philby - widely regarded as the "third man" in the Foreign Office spy ring- defected to
seemed to be suspect in security terms, and subsequent events did
In 1951
and executed. Other spy rings followed. In June 1957 Rudolf Ivanovich Abel (alias
guilty
Martin Collins, but actually called William Fischer) was uncovered in Brooklyn, New York, where he had been acting as a masterspy since at least 1948, running a network of agents throughout the United States. His apartment was found to contain a shortwave radio transmitter, Ethel
and
Julius
Rosenberg
in
custody
little to alter this
the East, and rumors began of an
Dr Klaus Fuchs, an "atom spy. cipher pads for sending coded messages and microfilms - all the traditional "tools" of the spying trade.
even more dramatic infiltration by agents working for the Soviets. In 1980 these came into the open
when Anthony
Blunt, then the
Queen's art adviser, was accused of having acted as a spy while working for British Intelligence
British spies
Four years later in Britain, George Blake - a man who had been working within the SIS - was accused of betraying an unspecified number of Western agents operating behind the Iron Curtain. The soin 1951.
during the
Second World War. Defectors from the East But spying has not been entirely onesided. In 1962, for example, Colonel
Oleg Penkovsky was arrested in Moscow and executed for passing secrets to the West. However, a number of important intelligence people have defected from the East, providing invaluable information to their interrogators.
Gouzenko,
first
was
Igor
a cipher clerk in the
Embassy
Soviet
The
in Ottawa,
who
defected in 1945; his information
probably exposed May, Fuchs and the Rosenbergs. In 1960 Anatoli Golitsyn, a Polish intelligence officer,
defected after acting as a spy
West for at least 18 months, and his information may have uncovered Blake and the Navy Ring. Recently there have been a for the
number of spies detected
in the
United States, including John
Walker and members of his family. Spying is a murky business, not at all like the glamorous image created by certain authors and filmmakers. In fact, with satellites, aircraft and sophisticated listening posts
now
available, the age of the traditional
spy
may
be over.
E3
^
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY The Americans did not
THE SPACE RACE
lag
behind
in the race for long. Less than a
month
after Gagarin's epic flight,
Alan Shepard became the first American to leave the Earth's
On
October
4,
1957, the Soviet Union
atmosphere, although it was to take until February 20, 1962 for John Glenn to achieve the first American
surprised the world by successfully
launching Sputnik
I,
the
first
Even then, the Soviets kept producing surprises: on June 16, 1963 Valentina Tereshkova became
artificial satellite to orbit the Earth.
In technological terms,
major
feat,
it
was
orbit.
a
but to the Americans
it
first woman in space, carrying out 48 orbits of the Earth before returning to be feted as a "Heroine of the Soviet Union." The Americans
seemed to confirm their worst fears. Only two months previously a
the
Soviet test-launch of a long-range rocket had suggested that
it
would
had some way
not be long before the United States
still
was threatened by nuclear-armed
a process not aided
ICBMs
of the first
(intercontinental ballistic
Sputnik implied that such rockets were capable of operation far sooner than expected. Many
The first man on the Moon By 1963, however, the superpowers
Americans feared the creation of a "missile gap" in which the United States would be at a distinct
were estimated to be about "neckand-neck" in the space race, and thereafter the Americans forged ahead. Their program culminated in July 1969 when Neil Armstrong
disadvantage and, for the first time in history, vulnerable to direct attack. r
such a gap did not exist, but subsequent Soviet space achievements did nothing to calm
other countries (particularly Third
by President Nixon
the fears. In 1959, the Soviet
World countries
week
unmanned
support either East or West. At the
In reality,
Luna II landed Moon, and on 1961, Yuri Gagarin became spacecraft
on the surface April 12, the
first
of the
human being to
leave the
Earth's atmosphere, conducting a
go to catch up;
by the fact that, 35 space-probe launches,
19 failed to achieve their objectives.
missiles):
enemy
to
Y uri Gagarin, the first cosmonaut.
stepped onto the surface of the
Moon,
same
in the 1960s) to
time, as the
American reaction
at
the end of a flight described as "the greatest
world since the Creation." It was a major achievement, dependent for success on the unrivaled expertise of in the history of the
Sputnik implies, any achievements in space can have
American
military spin-offs to offer.
the exceptionally difficult field of
to
scientists, particularly in
successful orbit before being
recovered safely. This was too much for the Americans, who resolved not merely to match but to surpass the Soviet achievements. In 1961, President Kennedy authorized funds for a US space program. The Cold
War between the superpowers had entered a new dimension.
Why did it happen? The superpower
rivalry in space
is
not difficult to understand. In a
confrontation like the Cold War, where actual fighting is avoided, the
two sides will try to score points off each other by means of propaganda designed
to portray their particular
system as superior to that of is done mainly for domestic consumption but is valuable in terms of persuading political
the enemy. This
US
astronauts meet Soviet cosmonauts in space on July 15, 1975.
APPENDICES microtechnology. The Soviets, clearly incapable of matching such expertise,
seemed
to
have
lost the
on Venus, triggering a similar American experiment on Mars years
six
later.
race.
There
evidence that this was recognized by the Soviets before 1969, for they never really tried to is
carry out the extraordinarily
complex business of placing their cosmonauts on other planets. Instead, they went for the Soyuz program of creating and maintaining a space station, permanently orbiting the Earth under the command of replacement crews, the first of which took up its post in April 1971.
The Americans followed
suit in
The Space Shuttle As with the Moon program, it was American money and expertise that forged ahead. By the early 1980s, scientists at
NASA (National
Aeronautical and Space Agency) had perfected a reusable launch
known
superpower collaboration, Soviet and American crews actually linked up in space, but this was rare. For most of the
program when one of the vehicles blew up soon after launch, killing all seven astronauts on board. For a time, all American experiments
time, the rivalry persisted. In
ceased.
example, the
unmanned probe
75 per cent of these
in space.
More importantly Americans
for the
in 1986, the Shuttle
was
Shuttle to carry supplies of fuel as well as parts of the satellites
moment
for
many as
have been for military use, providing the superpowers with eyes and ears
after appropriate servicing.
Unfortunately, in January 1986, disaster struck the Shuttle
Soviets landed an
that as
an integral part of the Strategic Defense Initiative for the creation of "killer satellites." These are to be armed with laser or charged-particle weapons to destroy incoming Soviet ICBMs and depend heavily upon the
as the
with the Skylab experiments and, in one brief
December 1970,
enormous numbers of satellites since the late 1950s, and it is estimated
Space Shuttle. This was actually a huge aircraft, launched into space by means of a vertical rocket, which could reenter the Earth's atmosphere and land on a normal runway, ready for use again vehicle
May 1973
of
space program as a whole is now tied firmly to military needs. Both sides, for example, have launched
This
is
important not just in terms because the
of prestige, but also
themselves.
As the Soviets seem to create their
own
to
be striving
Strategic Defense
weapons, such an American setback could be crucial. The Space Race has probably only just entered its second round, with no definite winner yet in sight. Initiative
m
E3
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
CHRONOLOGY
1955 February 24
Baghdad Pact formed
as part of "containment" of
communism by the West (becomes
1945
1949 Yalta Conference -
February 4-11
Stalin, Churchill
and Roosevelt
discuss the postwar settlement
June 26
United Nations Charter
signed in San Francisco July 16
First
US atomic bomb test,
Alamogordo,
New Mexico
July 16-August 2
Conference -
Potsdam
Stalin, Attlee
Truman discuss Germany
and
Allied control of
the Central Treaty Organization,
August 1959)
Comecon
January 18
created
May 5
April 4
NATO formed
May 12
Soviet blockade of West
a
member of NATO
May 14 Warsaw Pact formed
Berlin ends
May 23
West Germany becomes
Austrian State Treaty Allied occupation ends, Austria
May 15
Federal Republic of
Germany (West Germany)
becomes neutral
created
July 14 Soviets test-explode their first atomic bomb
1956
German Democratic
October 7
Republic (East Germany) created
June 28-29 Popular rising in Poland, suppressed with Soviet military aid
1946 March
Churchill's "Iron Curtain"
5
speech
1950
at
Fulton, Missouri
January 19 Communist government "elected" in Poland
February 10
Allies sign peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary
treaties
March 4
Treaty of Dunkirk (Britain France) and
Truman Doctrine
March 12
announced, pledging countries fighting
US
aid to
communist
pressure
Marshall Aid announced, offering US economic supporf to
Europe (Soviets
reject, July 12)
Communists gain power Hungary
August 31
1948 Communist takeover
Czechoslovakia Treaty of Brussels (UK,
France and Benelux countries)
June 24 rail
invasion
March 25 Greece and Turkey
February 18 join
Community
NATO
October 3
Soviets impose road and
blockade on West Berlin
Treaty of
the European
Rome creates
Economic
(EEC); effective from
January 1,1958
UK
1st
November 1 bomb test
First
atomic
bomb
test
US hydrogen
October 4 Sputnik
Soviet I,
the
Union launches
first artificial
satellite
.A
1958
1953 March 5
Death of
Stalin; replaced
June 16-17 Anticommunist riots East Germany; suppressed by Soviet
hydrogen
February 13
bomb test
First
French atomic
bomb test
May 1 US pilot Gary Powers shot down in U-2 spy plane over the Soviet
Union
South East Asia
May 16-17
Treaty Organization (SEATO)
formed as part of "containment" communism by the West
October 23
of the
1960
First Soviet
September 8
Nikita Khrushchev
in
Army
August 12
March 27
assumes sole leadership Soviet Union
1954
February 27
March 13
1952
by "collective leadership"
June 5
in
in
1957
1947
in
North Korean forces invade South Korea; US troops committed to defense of S. Korea
June 25
October 23-November 4 Crisis Hungary ends with Soviet
Agreements West Germany ends
Paris
occupation of
of
Paris Summit between Khrushchev and Eisenhower fails
because of U-2 incident
November 8 President
Kennedy
elected
US
Ill
I
APPENDICES
1969
1961 April
1
CIA-backed invasion
7
Cuba (Bay
of
of Pigs) fails
August 12-13
Berlin Wall built
December 19
Albania breaks off diplomatic links with the Soviet
Union
December 26
(leaves the
Afghanistan
November 1 7
Strategic
Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) begin in Helsinki
1970
Tehran -fails
August 12 West Germany and the Soviet Union sign treaties guaranteeing frontiers
1962
December
October 16-28
Cuban Missile
1980 April 24-25 Operation Eagle Claw - US rescue attempt of hostages in
Warsaw Pact,
1968)
Soviet forces invade
15-20
August
Widespread
1-31
disturbances in Poland, led by the trade union Solidarity
November 4 Civil disorder in
Poland
Reagan elected US
President
Crisis
19»1
1972
1963
May 22 Moscow Summit - Nixon
June 20 Hot-Line Agreement between US and Soviet Union to provide communications in time of crisis
July 25
and Brezhnev sign SALT
I
December 21
Treaty between East and West Germany, recognizing each other's sovereignty
November 30
Intermediate
Nuclear Force (INF) talks begin in Geneva (end without agreement,
December 1983)
December 13 in
Martial law declared
Poland
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
November 22
1973
Kennedy
1962
assassinated
October 30 Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks open in Vienna
1964
May 30
Spain becomes 16th
member of NATO Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) begin in Geneva
June 29
October 15 Khrushchev dismissed from office, replaced by Leonid Brezhnev
1971 July 3
October 20
First
Chinese atomic
bomb test
Moscow Summit - Nixon
19 « 3
and Brezhnev sign Threshold
March 23
Test-Ban Treaty
Reagan announces
his
Strategic Defense Initiative plan
Turkish invasion of Cyprus
July 20
1966 March
7
August 8 France withdraws from
the military structure of
NATO
Nixon resigns
affair;
November 14
replaced by Ford
invade
First
US Cruise
missiles arrive in Britain
Vladivostok
Summit
"ceiling" figures for nuclear arms
Non-Proliferation Treaty
May 3-30
Student disturbances and workers' strike in Paris
1
Geneva Summit Reagan and Gorbachev meet to discuss arms control
November 19-21
Helsinki Accords
1979
November 5 Richard Nixon elected US President
May 18
November 12
November 4 Iranian students US embassy in Tehran
announced
Brezhnev Doctrine
Gorbachev becomes
Soviet leader
Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia to stop the implementation of"liberal"reforms
1985 March 17
1975 August
August 20
US troops
- Ford and Brezhnev agree on
196 « 1
October 25 Grenada
US
President over the Watergate
November 23
July
as
Vienna Summit - Carter and Brezhnev sign SALT II seize
1986 October 1 1 Reagan and Gorbachev meet at Reykjavik; fail to achieve agreement
1 1
I
i
HH
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY Cambodia, 29 Canada, 13,27,43.50
INDEX
capability, 37, 38 Caribbean, 34-35, 51 Carter, President
Jimmy,
28,
29,31,32,48 Castro. Fidel, 19-21,51
Note:
Numbers
in bold refer to
illustrations or
maps
Abel. Rudolf Ivanovich, 55
ABM. 26,27,40 Adenaur, Konrad, 23 Afghanistan, 31. 31-32,32, 35,
47.51 Alamogordo, 36 Albania. 10, 15,43.46 alliances, 42-47 Allies, 6-7, 8, 12-13, 15,50
Andropov, Yuri, 35 Angola. 30, 30
CENTO,
15
Central America, 33-35, 34, 51 Central Intelligence Agency, see CIA Central Treaty Organization, see CENTO Chernenko, Konstantin, 35 China, 10, 14, 25,37 China card. 25, 32 Churchill, Prime Minister
Winston, 7-8,8,48 CIA, 20, 54-55 Cold War, 6, 8-9
Comecon,
anti-ballistic: missiles, see
ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
27
Arabian Gulf, see Persian Gulf Argentina, 26, 40 arms control, 26-27, 34-35 Armstrong, Neil, 56 atomic weapons, see nuclear
Prime Minister Clement, 8
Attlee,
Australia, 15 8, 10, 15,45 Austrian State Treaty, 15, 18, 43
Austria,
B-lB bomber, 39,53 B-52 bomber, 39, 53 Backfire bomber, see Tupolev Tu-26 Baghdad Pact, 15
Com inform, 11 Common Market,
see
communications,
37, 38
EEC
communism, 9 Communist Information Bureau, see Cominform Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, see
CSCE
Contras, 34 Control Council, 8
Brazil,
26
Brezhnev Doctrine,
25, 35 Brezhnev, Leonid, 25, 27, 27,
48,48 brinkmanship, 20-21 25 ,
Broz, )osip. see Tito Brussels, Treaty of, 13, 43
Budapest, 16 buffer zones, 7-8,
9, 27,
43
Ireland. 23
Iron Curtain, 11
flashpoints, 50-51
Israel, 26, 40, 51
46
Italy, 10,
13,21,23,33,43,45
FOFA, 52
Japan,
8
Ford, President Gerald, 27 France; Marshall Plan, 10;
Jaruzelski, General Wojciech,
Florida, 20, 21
and NATO.
13,
EEC, 23; nuclear capability, 37,45 Fuchs.Dr Klaus, 14,55,55 fusion bombs, 36
7,
33 Johnson, President Lyndon
Kabul, 31 Kadar. Janos, 17 Karmal, Babrak, 31 Kennedy, President John
German Democratic
Republic, 13,15, 16, 18-19.23,43 German Federal Republic, 13,
KGB, 54-55
15,23,33,43,45,50,51 Germany; postwar settlement,
Khrushchev, Premier Nikita, 15,17. 18-21,25,49 Kommcmdatura, 12, 50 Korean War. 14, 15, 21. 38, 51 Kroger, Peter and Helen, 55
Khomeini, Ayatollah,
30, 31,
41
Latin America. 19-21, 26,
management, 26
cruise missiles, 29, 35
35 Crisis, 19-21
20,22.35,39 Cyprus, 43, 45 Czechoslovakia, 10, 11, 11, 15,
24,24-25,26,33,43,46 de»Gaulle. Charles, 23 denazification, 6-7
Denmark, 13,23.43 detente, 22-23, 25-32, 33 deterrence, 37-41, 45-47, 53
Diego Garcia, 33 Dubcek, Alexander, 24-25, 24. 48 Dulles, John Foster, 15. 38 Dunkirk, Treaty of, 13,42 Dvviglit D. Eisenhower, LISS. 52 9, 10-12,
16-17,27,43-47 East
Germany, see German
Democratic Republic
F.,
18-21,22,23,49.49.56 Kenya. 33 17,
Gorbachev, Mikhail. 35, 48, 48 Gorshkov, Sergei, 48
crisis
B.,
19.23,25.29
Gagarin, Yuri, 56, 56 Gdansk, 33
'
Eastern Europe,
Bulgaria, 10, 15,43,46 Burgess, Guy, 55
39,40 bombs, 36
15,30,31,41,51 15,40,51
Laika, 17 Laos. 29
Cuban Missile
Brandt, Willy, 23
Iraq,
Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 17
Berlin; 50; division of city, 8,
18-19,19,25,39 4, 5, 18-19,18 Blackjack bomber, 34 Blake, George, 55 Blunt, Anthony, 55 Boeing AGM-86B ALCM missile, 28 Brandenburg Gate, 18
intercontinental ballistic missiles, see ICBM
Assistance, see Comecon credibility, 37, 38
Cuba, 19-21, 25, 26, 29, 33, 34,
Berlin Wall,
Inner-German Border, see IGB
Iran,
first strike,
flexible response,
IGB.44,45,45,50 India, 26
12-13 Glenn, John, 56 Goering, Hermann, 7, 7 Golitsyn, Anatoli, 55
of Pigs, 20 Belgium, 13,23,33.43,50 airlift. 12.
Falklands War. 52 fascism, see Nazi Party fission
Iceland, 13,43
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force talks (INF), 34
6-8, 10; Berlin blockade,
Bay
blockade and
EEC
ICBM, 17,21,23,27,34,39, 39,40,41,53,57
conventional forces, 37, 46, 52-53 cost-gain calculation, 37 Council for Mutual Economic
CSCE, 27,27, 28
12-13, 25, 43; Berlin Wall,
see
15, 42, 43, 45; Indochina, 14;
Batista, Fulgencio, 19
23;
Community,
Berlin, 12;
11
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs),27 containment, 10, 14-15
capability
EEC, 23 Egypt, 17,32,33 Eisenhower, President Dwight D., 15, 17,20 El Salvador, 34,51,51 Emerging Technology, 47 Ethiopia, 30 European Economic
Gouzenko, Igor, 55 Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQJ, 54 graduated deterrence, 39, 45, 50 Greece, 10, 15,23,43,45 Greenham Common, 33, 35, 53 Grenada, 34,34.51 ground-launched cruise
laser-beam weapons, 40
33-35,51
USS. 26 Lonsdale, Gordon, 55
Liberty.
Luxemburg,
23,43
McCarthy. Senator Joseph, 14 Maclean. Donald. 55 McNamara, Robert, 39
missiles (GLCMs), 33, 34,
MAD,
53,53
Malaya, 14
Group of Soviet Forces Germany, 50
13,
39-40, 4
14.
1
Malmedy. 7 Manhattan Project, 36 MaoTse-tung,
Havana, 19,21 Helsinki, 26, 27 Helsinki Accords. 27 Hess, Rudolf, 7
Hiroshima, 36, 36. 38 Hitler, Adolf, 6
Hot-Line Agreement, 22, 23, 26 Houghton, Harry, 55
human human
error, 41
rights,
27
Hungary, 10. 15. 16-17,16,25, 33,43,46 Husak, Gustav, 25
10, 14 Marshall, General George, 10 Marshall Plan, 10, 11, 11 Marucla, 21
Masaryk, Jan, 11 massive retaliation, 38-39, 45 May. Dr. Allen Nunn, 54, 55 MI6, 54
MinutemanIIIICBM,40 MIRVs.
28,
40
missile gap, 17
Morocco, 33 mujaheddin, 32, 32 multiple independently
INDEX
targeted reentrv vehicle, see
Potsdam Conference,
MIRY
Powers, Gary, 17.20.54 Prague. 24. 25 Prague Spring, 25 proliferation, 26
multiple reentrv vehicles
(MRVs)27.28 Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR). 27 mutual assured destruction. see MAD MX "Peacekeeper." 34
Nagasaki. 38 Nagy, Imre, 16-17 NASA, 57 Nationalist Chinese. 10. 14 NATO; creation of, 13. 13. 14.
Radio Free Europe. 14 Rakosi. Matyas. 16 Rapid Deplovment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). 33 rationality, 37,38.41 Reagan, President Ronald. 29, 31,34.35.40.49.49.53
15,16,42-43.43.45.45;
reparations. 8
Rome. Treaty
strategic position, 38. 45-46.
50-51.52-53 naval forces, 52 Navy Ring, 55 Nazi Party, 6-7. 7 Netherlands, 13. 23, 33. 43, 50 New Zealand. 15 Nicaragua. 34, 51 Nixon. President Richard. 25,
27.49.49,56
III,
SamRayburn.USS,37 Sandinistas. 34, 51 satellites,
54-57
Novotny, Antonin. 24 nuclear bombs, 36-37 nuclear capability.
SEATO.
9. 14. 17.
20-21,23,26.36-41.52-53 nuclear mines, 26 nuclear parity, 23, 26 nuclear proliferation. 26 Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. 26 nuclear testing, 26. 35 nuclear umbrella, 45-46 7.
7
"Ohio" class submarine. 34 Olympic Games, 31
Oman, 33 Operation Eagle Claw, 31 Operation Urgent Fury. 34 Organization of American States (OAS). 15 Ostpolitik, 23 Outer Space Treaty, 26
Penkovsky, Oleg, 55 Pershing II missiles, 33 Persian Gulf, 31-33,51 Philby, Kim, 55 Philippines, 14, 15
Poland, 7-8. 10,15.23,33.43, 46 Polaris missiles, 37 Portugal, 13,23.43,45
ballistic
SLBM
technology, nuclear. 39-41 crisis, 31 Tereshkova, Valentina, 56 Tet Offensive. 29 Thailand. 15 theater weapons. 33, 53 Threshold Test-Ban Treaty. 27 Tito. 11.51 Tomahawk GLCM. 53 Truman Doctrine, 10 Truman, President Harry S.. 8,
Tupolev Tu-26 "Backfire" bomber, 28, 28, 29, 54, 54 Turkey, 10. 15.21.43.45
15
Second World War.
6. 15 Secret Intelligence Service
U-2 reconnaissance planes, 20,21,54
(SIS), 54, 55 Shepard, Alan. 56 Shuttle program. 57 Six-Day War. 26 Skvlab program, 57 SLBM. 23.39.40, 53 Solidarity. 33 Somalia. 33 Somoza, General Anastasio, 34 South Africa, 26. 30, 40 South East Asia Treaty
Un-American
Organization, see SEATO South Korea. 14 Soviet Union; postwar settlement. 7-8; political system, 8-9; Berlin. 12-13. 18-19;
Pakistan. 15,26,40 Panama Canal, 33, 51 Panjsher Valley, 32 Paris summit (1959), 17 peaceful coexistence, 15 peace movements. 34-35. 35
submarine-launched
10-12. 15.49
satellite states, 11.
and Warsaw
Pact. 15.
43-47. 50: Hungary, 16-17:
nuclear capability. 17, 23. 34-35. 37-41: Cuba. 19-21;
Czechoslovakia. 24-25:
17,
Activities
subcommittee. 14, 14 United Kingdom: postwar settlement, 6-8: and Greece. 10: Berlin airlift. 12-13;
NATO.
13. 15.42,43.50: Malaya. 14; nuclear weapons, 21, 33. 37 United Nations. 14, 17,23,31 United States; postwar
settlement. 6-8; political system, 8-9; and Soviet expansion, 10: Berlin, 12-13, 18-19; NATO, 13,14-15. 43-47. 50-51: nuclear capability, 17,23.34-35, 37-41; Cuba, 19-21: detente,
25-32: arms control
agreements. 26-29. 34-35: weakness. 29-31 Ussuri River, 25
detente, 25-32; arms control
agreements. 26-29, 34-35; and Third World, 29-31; Afghanistan. 31-32 Soyuz program, 57 space-based weapons. 40-41, 56-57 space race, 56-57 Spain, 23, 43. 45 Sputnik satellites, 17, 56 spying, 54-55
27: strategic position. 45-47. 50-51. 52-53
Watergate. 29
see SDI
Tehran embassy
I, 26-27, 28; 28-29. 33: SALT
arms control.
Yalta Conference. 7-8. 8 Yugoslavia, 10. 11, 51
strategic nuclear launchers, 27
missiles, see
43 Saudi Arabia, 32 SDL 35,40. 53.57.57 Seabed Treaty. 26
Norway, 13.43.44.45
Talks (START). 34
14.55,55 Rumania. 10. 15,43 Rusk, Dean, 21
SALT II.
Pact: creation of. 15,
43; Hungary. 16-17,24.25;
Federal Republic
Strategic Defense Initiative,
superpowers, 15, 23 Switzerland. 45
SALT; SALT
Warsaw
West Berlin, see Berlin Western Allies, see Allies West Germany, see German
Berlin blockade. 12-13 "Star Wars." see SDI Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, see SALT Strategic Arms Reduction
23 Roosevelt. President Franklin D..7-8.8 Rosenberg. Julius and Ethel, of,
29
Nonproliferation Treaty. 26 North Atlantic TreatyOrganization, see NATO North Korea. 14
Nuremberg Trials,
SR-71 Blackbird. 54. 54 SS-20 missiles, 33, 34, 53 Stalin. Marshal Josef; Yalta. 7-8. 8; origins of Cold War. 9; soviet expansion, 10-11;
15
Quadripartite Agreement. 23
arms control.
27, 33:
8.
Vienna, 8
Vienna summit (1961).
17. 20
Viet Cong, 29
Vietnam War. 25,29,32,34. 45 Vladivostok, 27.28
Voice of America. 14 Walesa, Lech. 33. 49. 49 Walker spy ring. 55
Zaire, 30
HI
EB
CONFLICT IN THE 20TH CENTURY
GLOSSARY OF TERMS Arms Control agreements weapons
to limit the
numbers and
(usually nuclear) deployed by East
Arms Race
types of
and West.
the development of weapons systems by both
superpowers, designed to prevent the opposition gaining an
MAD
advantage.
Cold
War the state of mistrust and hostility between East
and West, stopping short of military to the period 1945-62. Crisis
action. Usually applied
Management actions taken by the
superpowers to
prevent minor incidents blowing up into major
Deterrence actions and
superpowers since the
Defense
threats designed to prevent
aggression by persuading a potential opponent that any such
would be too
costly (usually
used
in a
nuclear context, in which the threat of nuclear attack
is
late
1970s.
Initiative
(SDI), announced in
for the creation of space-based
missiles
aimed
at the
Superpower title
physical removal or dismantling of weapons.
Response
a
NATO strategy, adopted in
1967, in
March
1983: a plan
defense against Soviet
United States.
given to countries of immense power,
military strength (notably nuclear)
implied).
Flexible
instant
Star Wars journalistic term for President Reagan's Strategic
usually applied to the period 1963-79.
Disarmament the
forces remain to carry out a devastating retaliatory response.
Massive Retaliation US strategy, adopted in 1954, whereby any attack on the West would be met with
New Cold War the period of renewed tension between the
Detente an easing of tensions between East and West,
his part
any nuclear attack by one side can be absorbed and sufficient
nuclear response. Phased out, early 1960s.
confrontations.
move on
which any Warsaw Pact aggression will be met. War conscious restraint on the use of force in the event of war, usually in terms of weapons (especially nuclear), targets and numbers. (Mutual Assured Destruction) a situation in which
Limited
and influence: currently
and Soviet Union Communist China has the potential the United States
only, although to join
them.
FURTHER READING Ash, T.G., The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1984) Baylis, }., Booth, K., Garnett, J., and Williams, P., Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975) Bonds, R., (ed) An Illustrated Guide to the Soviet Ground Forces (New York: Arco Publishing, 1981) Calder, N.. Nuclear Nightmares (New York: Penguin Bks., 1981) P., World Politics Since 1945, 4th ed. (White Plains, NY: Longman, 1982) Campbell, C, Weapons of War: Present 8r Future Weapons, Systems and Strategies (New York: P. BedrickBks., 1983) Chayes, A., The Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974) • Edmonds, R., Soviet Foreign Policy. The Brezhnev Years, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) Freedman, L., Atlas of Global Strategy (Macmillan, 1985) Giradet, E., Afghanistan: The Soviet War (New York:
Calvocoressi,
St.
Martin's Press, 1985)
J., (ed) The Third World War: The Untold (New York: Macmillan Pub. Co., 1982) Henderson, N., The Birth of NATO (Boulder, CO:
Hackett,
Story
WestviewPr., 1983)
International Institute for Strategic Studies: "The Military Balance," annual publications
(New York:
Facts on File)
and Arkin, W., Nuclear War/rom Hiroshima to Nuclear Winter (Hillside, NJ: Enslow Pringle, P.
Pubs., 1985)
Remington,
R. A.,
The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press,
1971) Shlaim, A., The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949YA Study in Crisis DecisionMaking (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983) Suvorov, V., Inside the Soviet Macmillan, 1983)
Thompson,
E. P. (ed),
Star
Army (New York:
Wars (New York: Penguin
Bks., 1985)
Thompson,
R.,
War in
Peace: Conventional
Guerrilla Warfare Since 1945, updated ed.,
York: Crown Pubs., 1985) Wilson, A., The Disarmers'
Penguin
Bks., 1984)
Er
(New
Handbook (New York:
CONFLICT IN THE 20th CENTURY From the world's
first total
war
to the East- West clashes
and the
ongoing struggles in today's world, this series truly highlights the conflicts of our century. The first four volumes trace the history of conflict, while the final six are topical and up-to-date, providing the basis for current affairs discussion. Conflict
is
used
economic and political impact of the wars that provide the central themes of each book. in its widest sense to include the social,
Titles in the series:
The First World War The Second World War The Middle East
Rise of the Asian Superpowers
Southeast Asia
South and Central America
Africa
The
The Cold War
Terrorism and
A FRANKLIN WATTS LIBRARY EDITION
.•••. •.
V 'iKC
.:;.•.
'
,
.: •>';"::':
•...-.
ISBN 0*531 -1Q320-X
•
'•'. :
;
^\^;
' :
-
.'
•'•
...•''.. :
Rise of the Dictators
Civil Strife
![U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Cold War [G.I.Series 27]](https://docer.tips/img/300x300/us-special-operations-forces-in-the-cold-war-giser_5a4b5450d64ab2979ef4f670.jpg)
![20th Century Military Uniforms [Grange Books]](https://docer.tips/img/300x300/20th-century-military-uniforms-grange-books_5a9c6d5cd64ab2082986fdf2.jpg)
