War In Peace Volume 10
1974-1984
War In Peace The Marshall Cavendish
Illustrated Encyclopedia of
Postwar Conflict
Editors-in-Chief
Ashley Brown Dr.
John Pimlott
Editorial
Board
Brig-Gen. James Collins Jr (USA Retd.) Vice-Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly KBE CB Ian V Hogg; David Floyd Professor Laurence Martin Air-Vice Marshal
SWB Menaul CB CBE DFC AFC
MARSHALL CAVENDISH NEW YORK, LONDON, TORONTO
REf Reference Edition Published 1987
J-
Published by Marshall Cavendish Corporation 147 West Merrick Road Freeport, Long Island N.Y. 11520
Printed and
Bound
in Italy
by L.E.G.O.
S.p.a. Vicenza.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the copyright holders. (c,
Marshall Cavendish Limited Publishing 1983. 19H4
© Orbis
British Library Cataloguing in Publication
Data
Brown, Ashley
War in peace
the Marshall Cavendish illustrated encyclopaedia of post-wa conflict. 2. War -History 1. History, Modern-1945:
—20th century I.
Title
909.82
ISBN
II.
Dartford,
Mark
D842
0-86307-293-3 0 86307 303 4
vol. 10
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under
War
title:
in peace.
Includes bibliographies and index. 2. Military 1. Military history, Modern— 20th century. and science— History— 20th century. 3. World politics— 1945I. Marshall Cavendish Corporation. U42.W373 1984 355'.009'04 84-19386 ISBN 0-86307-293-3 vol. 10 0 86307 303 4 '
art
Reference Edition Staff
Editorial Staff Editor
Ashley Brown
Editorial Director Editorial Manager Editorial Editors
Brian Innes Clare Byatt
Sam Elder
Sub Editors
Adrian Gilbert Sue Leonard
Artwork Editor Artwork Buyer
Jonathan Reed Jean Morley
Picture Editor Picture Consultant
Carina Dvorak Robert Hunt
Design
EDC
Simon Innes
Editor Designer Consultant Indexers Creation
Mark Dartford Graham Beehag Robert Paulley
F&
K Gill
DPM Services
Editorial
Board
Brigadier-General James L Collins Jr (USA at the US Military Rtd) received his Academy, Va, and was a postgraduate at both the Naval War College and the Armed Forces Staff College. Commissioned into the US Army as 2nd Lieutenant in 1939, General Collins has held a variety of distinguished posts, including Chief of Mihtary History, US Department of the Army, Director of the Defense Language Institute and Commander of the Military History Center, Washington DC. He served with Military Assistance Command in
Vice Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly KBE OBE CB is Director-General of InteUigence at the Ministry of Defence in London. He was educated at the Royal Navy College, Dartmouth and served during World War II with the RNEC, and on Hood. His distinguished postings include Naval Attache to Washington DC, and Commander of the British Navy Staff. He is a member of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, and Deputy-Director of Marine Engineering.
V Corps Artillery Germany. He was Director of the US Commission for Mihtary History, American Institute and is a member of the Historical Association, and the US Army Association. His published works include, inter alia. The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army 1950-1972 (1975) and Allied Participation in Vietnam (1975).
Air Vice Marshal SWB Menaul is Defence Consultant to the Institute for the Study of Conflict and the Institute for Foreign Pohcy Analysis at Cambridge, Mass. He was educated at the RAF College, Cranwell and
David Floyd was educated at Oxford, and began his career with the British RAF mission in Moscow during World War II. After the war he served in the diplomatic service in Romania and Yugoslavia, following which he joined the staff of the London Daily Telegraph. For more than 30 years he was the Telegraph's correspondent on Eastern European and Communist bloc affairs. He now works as a freelance journalist and translator, and is one of the most respected British commentators on the
Commander of British Trials Task Forces, Commandant Joint Staff College, and Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute. His
MA
Vietnam, and commanded in
politics of the Soviet
Ian
Union.
V Hogg served for 27 years in the Royal
and retired in 1972 with the rank Master Gunner. He has since devoted his time to writing and research, and is a wellknown expert on all aspects of gunnery, firearms and the history of fortifications. His many published works include A History of Artillery, Military Smallarms of the 20th Century, Coastal Defences of England and Wales and Pistols of the World.
Artillery,
of
HMS
served with Bomber Command from 1936-1940. During the latter part of the war he was an instructor, and also served with the famous Pathfinder squadron. He has held various senior posts in the UK and abroad, including
Atomic
recent published works include Soviet War (1980) and Countdown: British Strategic nuclear forces (1980).
Machine
Dr John Pimlott was educated
at Leicester
studying History and the British Army. Since 1973 he has been a University,
civilian lecturer in the
Department
of
War
Studies and International Affairs at the Royal Mihtary Academy, Sandhurst, where his teaching specialisations include the Middle East and post- 194 5 British Defence Policy. He has written a number of books, including B-29 Superfortress (1980), The in Battle of the Bulge (1981), World War
H
(1984), The Middle East Conflicts (1983) and Vietnam: The History and the Tactics {1982).
photographs
Coiitributors David Blue served with the CIA
in various
countries of Southeast Asia, including Laos, and ib a writer on and a student of small wars.
Gordon Brook-Shepherd spent 15 years in Vienna, first as lieutenant-colonel on the staff of the British High Commission and then as a foreign correspondent for the Daily Telegraph. A graduate in history from Cambridge, he is currently Chief Assistant Editor of the Sunday Telegraph. an expert on recent military history, particularly the Vietnam War, and has written for the American Center of Military
Jeffrey
J.
Clarke
is
History.
Major-General Richard Clutterbuck OBE has been Senior Lecturer in politics at Exeter University since his retirement from the army in 1972. His works include Protest and the Urban Guerrilla, Guerrillas
and Terrorists and Kidnap
Hugh Lunghi
served in Moscow in the British Military Mission and the British Embassy for six years during and after World War II. He was interpreter for the British Chiefs of Staff at the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences, and also interpreted for Churchill and Anthony Eden. He subsequently worked in the BBC External Services and is a former editor of Index on Censorship. Charles Messenger retired from the army in 1980 to become a fulltime military writer after 21 years service in the Royal Tank Regiment. Over the past 10 years he has written several books on 20th century warfare, as well as contributing articles to a number of defence and historical journals. He is currently a Research Associate at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies in London. Billy C. Mossman is a well-known American writer and historian. He is currently working on
a volume on the Korean War for the Center of Mihtary History.
and Ransom. S. Cochran Jr is a historian whose area of research is modern Indochinese affairs with particular reference to the war in Vietnam since 1945. He is at present working in the Southeast Asia Branch of the Center of Military
US Army
Alexander
History, Department of the
Army.
Colonel Peter M. Dunn is a serving officer in the USAF. His doctoral thesis is on the history of Indochina during the mid-1940s.
Bryan Perrett served in the Royal Armoured Corps from 1952 to 1971. He contributes regularly to a number of estabhshed mihtary journals and acted as Defence Correspondent to the Liverpool Echo during the Falklands War. His recent books include Weapons of the Falklands Conflict and A History of Blitzkrieg.
Chapman Pincher
is one of England's leading international espionage and He is the author of poHtical novels and books on spying, the most recent of which is Their Trade is Treachery, which deals with the penetration of Britain's secret services by the Russian secret police.
authorities
on
John B. Dwyer served both with the infantry and with armoured units in Vietnam. He was editor and publisher of the Vietnam veteran's newsletter Perimeter and has been a writer and correspondent for National Vietnam Veteran's Review for the past few years. His particular interest are Special Forces and Special
counter-intelligence.
Operations.
in Jerusalem. He has made a special study of the Palestinian problem and is the author of two books on the subject, the most recent of which is The Palestinian Arab National
Brenda Ralph Lewis has speciaHsed in poHtical and mihtary history since 1964. She s a regular contributor to military and historical magazines in both Britain and the United States.
Yehoshua Porath Hebrew University
is
a noted scholar at the
Movement 1929—39, which was published Britain in 1977.
in
ContributOTs Naval Editor of the military magazine Defence and author of numerous
Antony Preston
is
publications including Battleships, Carriers and Submarines.
Aircraft
Brigadier-General Edwin H. Simmons, US Marine Corps, Retired, is the Director of Marine Corps History and Museums. At the time of the Inchon operation and the Chosin Reservoir campaign, he, as a major, commanded Weapons Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. Widely published, he is the author of The United States
Marines.
Ronald Spector is an expert on Vietnam and has book on that subject for the Center of Mihtary History in the United States. recently completed a
Andres Suarez served in the Cuban ministry of education from 1948—1951, took part in the Cuban revolution, and served in the ministry of housing from 1959, From 1965, he has been
Professor of Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. Other publications include Cuba and the Sino— Soviet Rift. Sir Robert Thompson KBE, CMG, DSO, v is a world authority on guerrilla warfare, on which he has written extensively. He was directly involved in the Emergency in Malaya in the 1950s and
become permanent Secretary for Defence. From 1961 to 1965 he headed the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam and since then he has advised several governments, including the United States, on counter-insurgency operations Sir Robert Thompson is a Council member of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, London. His books include Defeating Communist Insurgency and Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-69. rose to
Patrick Turnbull commanded 'D' Force, Burma during World War II. His 29 pubhshed works include a history of the Foreign Legion.
Contents of Volume 1809
Kampuchea
Israel triumphant The raid on Entebbe
1814
The Dragon
Mogadishu
1819
China attacks Vietnam Chemical warfare From nerve gas to defoliants
'The turning of the tide International terrorism, 1973-78
A
victory for counter-terrorism
Electronic Warfare:
New
allies,
The Air War
old enemies
The superpowers adapt Taking to the hills
to
change
1912
Vietnamese invasion and
in
1823 1829 Southeas t Asia 1832
Africa in the Cold
War
1838
Polisario
1843 1849
Armoured Cars The fall of the Shah
fall
of Idi
Amin
1938
1854 1858
1863 1869 1872
1960 in the
Gulf
In the Bear's hug Soviet influence in Afghanistan up to 1979
Takeover 1878
A shattered state
1893
The Afghan
1900
A Mujahidin attack
Air-to-Surface Missiles
Warriors of Allah
1903 1909
1978 1983 1989
guerrilla fighters
Hit and run
Afghan trap The Soviet Army's techniques In the
1963 1969 1973
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan The Cold War hots up The decline in superpower relations, 1978-84
Lebanon's civil war, 1975-78 Operation Litani The Israelis go into Lebanon
Indochina 1975-78
1954 1956
Air-to-Air Missiles
1883 1889
in rivalry
1943 1949
1976-80
America defied The Iranian hostage crisis Rapid deployment The US prepares for intervention
Nato cruisers The peacemakers Egypt and Israel 1975-1979
F-5/F-20
1932
1936
The Iranian revolution 1978-79
Tanzanian forces invade Uganda
Reds
Cape
The struggle for the Western Sahara
Guerrilla
Ihe
to the
Prophet of revolution Colonel Gaddafi's Libya Dogfight The GulfofSirte incident, 1981
South Moluccan exiles turn MusHms and Maoists
Interested parties Western intervention in black Africa In with the Legion The Kolwezi rescue mission, 1978
1920
1923 1929
Superpower involvement from Cairo
1836
to terror
1916
Anti-aircraft artillery
Resistance to Indonesia in East Timor The forgotten people
war in the Philippines Electronic Warfare: The Land War Empire in turmoil The Ethiopian revolution and its aftermath Revolt on the Red Sea The struggle for Eritrean independence The Ogaden War The Somali invasion of Ethiopia Elet ronic Warfare: The Sea War
Khmer resistance
strikes
1994
1996 in Afghanistan Rotors against rebels 2000 The helicopter in counter-insurgency operations Landmines 2003
The tumino ofthe^ tide International terrorism,
1973-78 The growth of international terrorism in the late 96( is and early i970s was tightly linked to the Palestinian struggle to achieve a homeland at the expense of the Israelis. The decision of George Habash's Populai Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to embark on a campaign of spectacular plane hijacks m the wake of the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War ol 1967 set the ball rolling, and Yassir Arafat's Fatah through its front organisation Black September 1
joined in after 1971. Terrorists of the
New
Left
in
Europe and Japan were drawn into the intemational campaign, as well as receiving training from the Palestinians for their domestic operations, But by 1973 the leaders of the PFLP and Fatah had come to have severe doubts about the effectiveness of intemational terrorism. Such dramatic coups as the hijackings to Dawson" s Field in 970 and the Munich Olympics hostage-taking in 972 had very effectively brought the Palestinian cause to the notice of world opinion, but they had also awoken intense hostility to the Palestinian movements both in the West and among the leaders of the more conservative Arab states. It was also far from obvious how such tactics 1
1
could lead to the eventual establishment of a Palestinian state. Arafat and Habash were deeply divided over their attitude to conservative Arab regimes -
Habash
savv the Palestinian
two main Palestinian leaders were in no position to stop the wave of intemational terrorism which they had largely started. A network was in place, trained terrorists were available, and political backing (plus finance) would come from some radical Arab states. The scene was set for a continuation of terrorism in which the Palestinians and other Arabs were to find them.selves the object of attacks as often as were the Israelis
and
for inter-Arab conflict
was
the question
Black September campaign was called off
of the attitude to take towards negotiation w ith Israel Especially after the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, many Arab leaders felt that diplomacy could
and Habash disassociated the PFLP from the terrorist activities of Wadi Haddad, the notorious head of the
lead towards theirobjectives, but this involved tacitly or explicitly accepting the existence of an Israeli state
movement's "Hxternai Operations'. But, even if they were totally sincere - which at least in the case of Habash many have doubted - the
some shape or form. The most radical Arab states and Palestinian groups persisted in refusing to accept the existence of Israel in anv form. Arafat, as head of
revolutionary process in the Arab world-but by 973 they were agreed that the time for terrorism was over. 1
Fatah
s
in
Europe, such as Orly airport, Paris,
were
frequenttargets for terrorist attacks in the
1970s. Top: A Palestinian moves through Orly with an RPG-2 rocket in Janu? ry 1975. The rockets misse^ their target; despite several
their backers.
The focus
cause as part of a general
The airports of Western
attempts, no airliner was ever shot down in this way.
Above:
All
Western
countries stepped up the
arming and training
of their
security forces to counter
terrorism.
These French
police at Orly carry a special long-barrelled version of the MAT-49 sub-machine gun.
Right;
A burnt-out Pan Rome airpc
airliner at
guarded by police of the most ferot terrorist attaci
witnessed
Decemb mem'
five
ihe
.ckedNAYLP
Lib\
out an incendiary attack on the aircraft ground, burning 32 cai
1
..,^1
passengers to death
The playboy of terror llich
Ramirez Sanchez, known as Carwas born on 1 2 October
los the Killer, 1
949, the eldest son of a Venezuelan
communist and
millionaire. In
versity
in
Moscow,
and wealthy
1968
gained Carlos
his father's contacts
Lumumba
entn/ to the Patnce
Uni-
but his reckless
life-style
was
ill-suited to
the Soviet Union. Within a year he
was expelled from both the university andthecountn/. Aftera short spell
in
London, Carlos
the PFLP camps in the Middle where so many terronsts of his
left for
East
the Palestine Liberation Organisation
generation received theirtraining. The
PFLP needed non-Arab operatives Europe to organise actions: Carlos
was sent back to
behind his facade as a wealthy
and womaniser. 1973 Carlos was 'activated' by Wadi Haddad, moving to Pans. His style was dramatic: he loved to get into the action himself, and was desocialite In
lighted
public
OPEC
when
his
knowledge
existence in
1
became
975. During the
kidnap he announced himself
hostages as 'the famous Carlos', and he collected press-cuttings about himself. But his notonety necessanlylimited his usefulness asa terronst in the field. After the death of Wadi Haddad in 1 978, Carlos appears to have moved into the service first of to the
committed
address the Colonel Gaddafi and then of President
Assad
of Syria.
It
was thought
that
Carlos might have retired into private life
by 1983, but
in
December
of that
year the bombing of Marseilles
rail-
way
station was apparently once more his work. The fascination exercised by Carlos
(
PLO became )
.
to a diplomatic approach, reaching a
pinnacle of achievement
Lon-
to await the moment for action, remaining unnoticed by the author-
don
ities
fully
in
their international
UN
when he was
General Assembly
invited to
November
in
1974. Those Palestinians opposed to Arafat's line were meanwhile organised by the Iraqi regime into a 'Front of Palestinian Forces Rejecting Surrenderist
The PFLP and the PFLP-General Command were among the groups forming this Rejection
Solutions".
Front. It was not the so-called Rejection Front itself that was responsible for the continuation of terrorism after
had resulted from the contrast be-
1973, however, but three distinct centres of support
tween
for the rejectionist principle.
his ruthless dedication to the
revolutionary cause and his flagrant taste for luxurious
living.
Neither his
tastes nor his spectacular exhibitionist
style
have recommended them-
selves to other professionals
in
the
world of terrorism, but Carlos's abilities as an organiser and executor of operations has been unquestioned
One was
Iraq,
whose
Ba'athist rulers obtained the services of Sabri
Banna, better knov\n Black September that
Abu
Baghdad and
representative in
when
as
who
al
Nidal. former Fatah a leading
member
of
refused to stop his activities
movement was wound
up. Another major
source of terrorist initiatives was Libya under its eccentric and excitable ruler. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. He set up the National Arab Youth Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine
(NAYLP)
as
his terrorist arm. at
services
(^t
a
lirst like the Iraqis using the Black .Sc|Mcniber detector. .Ahmed
Abdel Ghal lar. know n as Abu Mahmoud. The third main centre o\ terrorism alter 1^7,'^ was Wadi Haddad. PFLP External Operations had established a close working
the network connected with
relationship with the .lapancse
Red .Anin
man Baadei-Memln>rRed Army ber of otiieiw ise
iiiiallacliei.!
,
tiic
HractuMi and a
(icr-
num-
international tcnorists.
OneoHhesc. the \ ene/uehm llich Ramiie/ Sanche/. known simpK as Carlos, look o\cr control of the I
iiropeaii pari ot the iiclwoik in Iuik- 1'>^;^ alter the
lioiidia.
I
his mil\
be responsihle lor
IXIO
I
iTMns: out
some
web ol
\-
the
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
1973-7;
another group took o\er the Japanese embassy in Kuwait. All the '-usis unoKcL uere eventually i.
Oown
to
Hadda.
hiional base. .^den. Carlos
became involves
, Japanese connection in he played a large part in organising a Japanese Red Army takeover of the French embassy in the Nether', nds which successfully achieved the release oi operative in
September 1974.
French custody.
Meanwhile hijackings and atta. ors contmued, chiefly carried out by Lib\ai m In March 1974 a British VC-IO wa^ way from Bombay to London, lander, and finally blown up on the ground. ii^ October a airliner was blown up in flight over the Aegean, killing all 88 passengers. A further hijacking of a British Airways airliner followed in November. Carlos attempted to get in on the act by organising - or perhaps himself carrying out - two 1
i
,
TWA
missile attacks on El Al airliners taking off from Orly
January 1975. The first attack redamage to one aircraft on the ground, and the later was interrupted by security
airport. Paris, in
sulted in
second a week
guards: after a gunfight and the seizing of hostages, the terrorists involved
were able to negotiate their way
onto a flight to Iraq.
A climate of terror While these attacks had no precise political objectives besides the maintenance of a general climate of terror
- and Above
right: Yassir Arafat,
once regarded as the archterrorist leader, addresses the UN as representative of the Palestinian people, 13
November
1974.
970s began operations in August 1973 with a machine-gun and grenade attack on passengers waiting to board a flight from Tel Aviv which had just landed at Athens airport; five passengers were killed and 55 wounded. But worse was to come: on 7 December five NAYLP terrorists ran onto the tarmac at Rome airport and lobbed a thermite bomb into a taxiing Pan Am airliner, burning 32 passengers to death. The terrorists then hijacked a Lufthansa aircraft, shooting an airline worker in the process, and flew via Damascus to Kuwait. In Kuwait they were induced to surrender to the authorities and later, under interrogation, apparently revealed that the aim of the operation had been to disrupt ArabIsraeli negotiations that were about to begin in Geneva. The Fatah leaders of the PLO were furious over the Rome attack; the five terrorists were handed over to the PLO and tried by a "revolutionary court" spectacular operations of the
The Libyan-backed
1
NAYLP
TWA
1
Above: WadiHaddad, head of the PFLP External Operations network, was behind many of the most spectacular terrorist incidents, including the
Dawson's Field hijackings in September 1970, the
OPEC kidnapping December Mogadishu
1
975,
in
and the
hijack in
October 1977, Disowned by the PFLP leader George
Habash
after 1973,
he
continued to exploit the connections established
between the Palestinians and the terrorists of other countries, notably the
Baader-Meinhof group and theJapanese Red Army, until his
death
in
1978.
Abu Mahmoud. became
a
Gaddafi's ex-Fatah terrorist leader,
marked man. The following year he im-
prudently visited the Lebanon where he was picked up by Fatah's security section, led by Arafat's deputy
Abu lyad, and executed by a Palestinian firing squad.
the circular goal of obtaining the release of
terrorists
captured
in the
course of previous opera-
- the critical divisions within the Arab world became the pretext for more precisely motivated actions. In October 1974 Arab heads of state were gathered for a summit conference in Rabat, capital of Morocco, with on the agenda a proposal to confirm tions
PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and. in effect, to give Yassir Arafat a veto on any peace settlement in the Middle East. Opposititm the
to this
move
Husscm o( loalaii. demands were in i'iillict u itli West Bank nl iIk- Joi Jan summit met, Moroccan secunt\ aLiihuntics
whose own
centred on King
territorial
L
the Palestinian claim to the
As
the
received a tip-off from the
Israeli secivi sci
men who were on
led to the airest of 15
\
;
tli;ii
a niissioii to
assassinate Hussein and possibly other conservatn c leaders. Abu lyad. Arafat's deputy and former head of Black September, was reportedly implicated in this plot - remarkable if true, since .Arafat hinisdl was actually- at the conference. Whether hcanisc ot the threat to his lifeor not. King Hussein surpi i^imlIv withdrew his opposition to the PL()\ claims in Arafat achieved another diplomatic triu inl The most spectacular of all tenon s
Arab
'
1
i
1
Meanwhile Carlos had initiated his terrorist career December 1973 with the attempted assassination of Teddy Sieff. A month later he was involved in the bombing of an Israeliowned bank in the City of London. By August 1974 he was operating in Paris, car-bombing supposedly pro-Israeli media targets. At the same time, Wadi Haddad's External Operations network was continuing its connection with the Japanese Red Army, which had so dramatically surfaced in the Lod aiiport
the Arab conservatives, howc v in 975 and was the w drk of the Wadi Haddad-Carlos network. Carlos had only narrowly escaped capture in June w'^lh Michel Moukharbel. his liaison officer w ith ilauu.^i. inad\crtcntl\ led French police to his tlal. Carlos escaped alter ki!:. two of the poliLCincn and Moukharbel. suspected ol livachcr\ hul liis nU niiix
massacre of May 1972. At the end of January 1974. in u series of linked actions on opposite side^ of Asia. Palestinian and Japanese terrorists attacked Shell fuel installations and seized hostages in Singapore uhilc
he planned lo kidnap the world, the oi! Pctroleuiii lApoiiin
in
a leading Zionist in Britain,
against the
i
following year,
1
,
'1
.
known
to the world's police lories reason lladdatldecKlcd louse (,,!.>.
be meeting
m
I
I
\ icniui in
i
>^^...'.'
I',
i!
,
INTERNATIONALTERRORISM
1973-78
view ot Haddad and other rejectionists. Palestinian - and indeed, the
In the
OPHC had betrayed the Arab - cause by sut'ticiently
failure to put
its
its
oil
wealth
the disposal of their cause and
at
reluctance to use the against the West.
"oil
weapon"
its
to crippling effect
he particular objects of their
1
were the ml mnusters of Iran (Jamshin Ainouzegar) and Saudi Arabia (Sheikh Yamani). The plan was to kidnap the ministers, extort a declaration of support for the Palestinians, and execute Yamani and Amouzegar. On 2 December six hostility
terrorists"
1
- Carios. Baader-Meinhof members Hans Joachim Klein and Gabriele Krocher-Tiedemann and three Arabs - penetrated the OPEC building with remarkable ease. Three men were killed mounting a forlorn last-minute resistance lo the kidnap, and once the terrorists had their hostages they controlled the situation. Only one terrorist. Klein, was wounded by terrorists
.AListnan police. .A statement from the terrorists was broadcast and they were allowed to leave Austria with their hostages
DC-9. Their intention was
in a
to fly
from country
to
country, dropping an oil minister off at each stop, until only the intended victims were left to be shot on
Aden. At the first stop in Algiers, however, difficulties mounted, and Carios soon agreed to accept an unspecified sum of ransom arrival at the final destination.
money
in return for the
release of all the hostages.
Throughout the kidnap, Carios boasted
to
Sheikh
Yamani of the capacity of the organisation to mount furtheroperations,andpredictably in June 1976came the next spectacular - the hijacking of an airbus to Entebbe in Uganda, by a mixed groupof Germans and Pal - The teiTorists felt so secure that Haddad hiiii^
the
'
jaiida to super\ ise proceedings, but
:nmg-po:iit
ri, :
terri)nsm
i
in
the history of
mivlv vsIuI assault by the Israelis which
freed the hostaiies. and inflicted heavy losses on their captors. It w as a sign ol things to come.
October U)77
In
Palestinians
gm hijcK
i,,
'
. ,
ol
a
it
was
tiic
ui\eii
them so
iiuich
lici|i.
but the
Lufthansa aircraft to .Mogadishu
Somalia once more resulted 1X12
Wadi Haddad's Haader-Meinhof
turn of
pa\ th. irdeht to the
who had
in
in disaster for the terror-
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
1973-78
Theseizure oftheOPeCoil ministers, meeting at their headquarters in Vienna on
December 1975, was a high point of international It was also 21
terrorism.
Carlos's only public
appearance.
Left:
Wounded terrorist Klein carried from the OPEC building.
is
Below left: Traces
of the brief gun-battle
inside the building. Below:
Carlos oil
raincoat and shepherds
(in light
beret, centre)
the
ministers onto a bus
provided by the authorities. Bottom: At the airport, the ministers are moved onto a plane bound for Algiers.
When Egyptian forces tried to at
emulate Israel's success Entebbe with a
commando assault on a hijacked airliner at Nicosia. Cyprus, in February 1978, the results were disastrous. Above: Three of the 15 Egyptian commandos shot
dead bytheCypriot National Guard,
defended the
who
airport
againstthe raiders. Right Leaders of the commando force at their comrades' funeral.
The West German
ists.
squad, with
(jSd*-)
a httle lielp Iroiii the
assaulted the
.iiieiari.
countef-terrofist
SAS.
and none
oi
siiccesstiilly
the hi)ackers'
demands w eie mel l
I
I'alestinian assassins killed an h,gyptian editor
m la\ ourol
pt s
Nieosia, C \prus.
uavs
return to Nieosia.
seniliiiii in a
known
iveoneiliation with Israel, in
he\ then hi|acked a Cyprus Air-
I
airliner whieli. alter taking ott.
out theii-ov\ n \ei
Palestinians
engageil
Haeldad ami the taetics he had pursued were in sharpdechne In eln uarx ^)7(S a hnal operation was mounted, this tune aijainst an Arab enemy. I wo to be
Fatah deteetor
I
was toreed
here the hgx ptians tried
si,.ii
ol the Israelis
raid
t(t
to
earrv
Abu
as Blaek .lune
in a
Nidal had lormed a group
Lebanon
war
m
were badly mauled by
whieh was
still
ol assassination, tirst against the
(
iuard
at
I
April h)7S
Wadi Haddail
dieil ol
eaneer
in a
settlement in\ol\in>: the i^ossilMe eo-existeik Palestinian and an Isiaeh stale
mounted through E'7N; diplomat 111 London and 111 .lune the PI .(
the
same
tate,
I
•
111 J,
I
lie leiiu>' n-j
iiiu:ii
,111 sill
i
iijList Iraqi
Iikm
lid
in 1
anything
t
ehantiini:
il
attempted
!
hospital in East (ieimanv. His death iiiaiked the end ot a speetaeular stage in the historx ol terrorisni. e\eii
thee\istiiig
though terrorist in-lightmg between eonlheting Arab groups rciiuiined very much alive. he lra(.|i-baeked
action.
I
,().
piirsuinL: the possihilit\ ol a nei:i>!Mks!
mi Entebbe,
the Cvpriot National
1976 - and
Syrians and then againsi rejtresentalives ot the El
seeure the agreeinenl o\ the ("yiiriot authorities and
On
June
eoniniaiido toree. but the\ had tailed to
the airpoil.
known
alter the Syrian ollensive against
the
in
powei
s\
stem was
internecine teudiiig and
more
ti
i.
PLO
lere
dipK
olliees h
and karaehi.
marked
;is\vdi
.
-
triumphant
Israel
The
raid
on Entebbe
At 0900 hours on 27 June 976 Air France Flight 39 took off from Tel Aviv bound for Paris. The aircraft, an A-300 airbus, made an intermediate stop at Athens; when it took off again shortly after noon there were four terrorists among the 12 crew and 256 passengers aboard, two of them belonging to the Gemian Baader-Meinhof gang - Wilfried Bose and Gabriele Krocher-Tiedemann - and two of them members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). They had studied the security arrangements at Athens airport and detected a flaw which permitted them to smuggle grenades and automatic weapons aboard the aircraft. At 1210 hours the terrorists hijacked Flight 139 and following a carefully prepared plan diverted it to Benghazi. Here the aircraft remained for the next six-and-a-half hours, during which it was refuelled out numanitanan concern for the hostages, according Colonel Gaddah - before becoming airborne 1
i
,
,
'
again,
li
tlew steadily south during the night, crossing
Sudan and at approximate03 5 hours on 28 June the A-300 touched down at Entebbe International Airport in Uganda. 'flu' clioKc ol jiieblv as a destination was determined In the kiiiiw n altiliulcs ami characterof Uganda's ruler. Iickl Marshal Mi Ainin )ada. Although in the Libyan Sahara and the ly
,
1
I
1
Ihe Inst vcarsol Ins rule Aiiiin UmI ivccivcd extensive ai
iiMin
Ugai.
:.
the
Isiaelis
n Anii_\
.
1814
iIk-\
had helpeil liain llie paiaUoopers' vMiigs
Iieiicetlie Israeli
that Aiiiiii pioutlly
wore on
his
many u in onus I
uiuler
the influence of Colonel Gaddafi the
Ugandan
ruler
had become a sworn enemy of Israel Oflieially Amin adopted a neutral attitude towards the hijackers, but in fact they were welcomed. Leading Palestinians were at the airport to meet the aircraft when ii armed, as were units of the Ugandan Army. The hosiages ucre shepherded into the airport's old terminal building
A jubilant crowd welcomes back the 105 liberated
.
The
hijackers'
demands did
not
become
clear until
29 June, when they were made public by Uganda Radio. The price of freedom for the hostages was to be the release of 53 tenorists, of whom 40 were imprisoned in Israel, six in West Germany, five in Ken\a. one in France and one in Switzerland. Israel, the nation most affected, had always made perfectly clear that she would never ciimproniise u iih terrorism, and that she was quite prepared to shed the or blood of her own citizens to prove the point example, in May 974 teiTorists had nuiilecaptix e the pupils of a school at Maalot in Galilee: the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) had stormed the huilding and killed the gunmen, but 22 children had died m the exchange of fire. At Entebbe, howev though whatever happened Is ould not w ill. only 10.5 of the hostages were ish. aiul Ihe Isiai government simply dare not isks u nil the li\
hiostages and their rescuers at Lod airport, Tel Aviv,on4July 1976. The
long-distance raid to free the hostages held at
Entebbe airport in Uganda was an extraordinary display of skill and daring which gave a considerable
boost to
Israeli
morale.
il
1
1
I
I
of the remainder. Ci
lsl\
squai
Ihe
-
e pi
I
ek-
non-Jc
Israeli
Chief of
Staff Lieutenant-General
Mordechai Gur
(left)
and
Major-General Dan Shomron, who planned the raid on Entebbe.
Bottom
right: Idl
Amin
Dada, president of Uganda, in front of a
wrecked
Israeli
tank during a visit to Egypt in 1976. Amin'santi-lsraeli feeling was an important element in the hijackers' plans, but the Israeli paratroopers' wings on his
uniform
the Israelis Willu ol the act they segregated the
Top right:
testify to a
previous close relationship with the Israelis.
Tel
Aviv
cThe
ISRAEL
<
s.„n,
Israeli
flight plan
and. as a gesture to world opinion, allowed them to
continue their journey to France. Not only were the released hostages able to provide a great deal of
valuable information concerning the military situation at
Entebbe,
all
of which was passed on to Israel, now free to concentrate on
but also the Israelis were
the plight of their own people without further international complications. still
in control
Nonetheless, the terrorists were
of the overall situation.
The
Israeli
government therefore temporised, announcing that the imprisoned terrorists would be released, but that the necessary arrangements could not be concluded before 4 July. This the hijackers accepted. Meanwhile the Israelis desperately sought a military plan to liberate the
hostages before that date.
No place for failure The
feasibility
of a raid had been under discussion
since 28 June, but the difficulties
were enormous, 5000km (3000
especially since the objective lay over
miles) distant.
The
of
Israeli chief
General Mordechai Gur,
felt that
staff,
Lieutenant-
the consequences of
would be so catastrophic that he would not even consider recommending such a mission unless it failure
had a reasonable chance of success. After the release of the non-Israeli hostages, however, Gur, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Minister of Defence Shimon Peres were prepared to examine a plan prepared by Major-General Dan Shomron. the director of infantry and paratroops. The basis of Shomron's plan was a night landing at Entebbe by four C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, which would then disgorge troops and the appropriate
them a high degree of ground mobility. In order to elude detection on the inward flight, the first Hercules would come in directly behind a scheduled British cargo flight. The troops
transport vehicles to give
detailed to carry out the raid
divided into five groups: illuminate the runway;
on the ground were to secure and
Group Group 2
1
to seize the old
THE ENTEBBH RAID
terminal building and release the hostages; Group 3 to seize the new terminal building; Group 4 to secure the airfield, prevent interference by several of Amin's armoured units which were known to be present in Kampala, 30km (20 miles) distant, and destroy the Ugandan MiG- 7 and MiG-2 fighter aircraft on the airfield itself, thereby inhibiting pursuit; and Group 5 to evacuate the hostages and see them into the waiting Hercules which would either be refuelled on the spot or at Nairobi in neighbouring Kenya. The degree of resistance which might be expected remained an unknown quantity. The IDF knew that the post-independence Ugandan Army was descended directly from the efficiently-run regiments of the King's African Rifles, and that their own men had given it more recent training. It was felt that, despite giving the appearance of having reverted to an armed mob, Amin's troops might put up a very stiff fight. Due allowance had to be made for heavy casualties and with this in mind a Boeing 707, equipped as a 1
1
.
assault group four
moves behind airport
buildingstoestablish defencesagai possible arrival of Ugandan troops
from Kampala. Group ais' -destroys
"
Ugandan MiGs
rear
hangar
_
The Entebbe raid assault tear off
and
towards new terminal building
THE ENTEBBE RAID into the leading
Hercules with a view to confusing the Ugandans during the first vital few minutes A rehearsal of the raid took place during the evening of Friday 2 July using a model and at 530 hours the following afternoon the four Hercules transports took off in succession from Sharm el Sheikh at the southern tip of ,
1
.
two 707s. By elements of the raiding force were
the Sinai peninsula, followed by the 1
600 hours
all
airborne.
Their route took them south down the middle of the Red Sea. They flew at high altitude without attracting
undue attention
in either the
Egyptian or Saudi Ara-
Formostof their journey, howevthey would be flying close to the Sudan and in the normal course of events they would be at high risk
bian radar stations. er,
from the moment they made the necessary in
alteration
course to the southwest. On this occasion, howevluck was running with them, for the previous day
er,
an abortive coup in the Sudan had led to
all
but one of
down, The aircraft droned on crews more concerned about the
the country's radar installations being closed
and
that presented
little
across Africa, their
threat.
prospect of the bad weather known to be developing in
Lake Victoria than the possibility of Sudanese intervention. Some way short of the objec707 peeled off en route to head for
the vicinity of
tive, the hospital
Nairobi.
The iynch-pin of Shomron's plan lay in landing the Hercules directly behind the scheduled British cargo flight, as the latter would not only absorb the attention of the Ugandan radar operators but also mask the noise made by the Israeli aircraft. The timing had to be exact, and it was Seven hours after take-off, the Israeli force was approaching Entebbe through first
.
rain-laden skies,
listening to the
British captain
acknowledging the control tower's instructions. Shomron's C-130 slotted in behind the freighter, its pilot imagining that he would have to make a difficult instrument landing. As altitude was lost, however, the rain stopped and Entebbe airport lay brilliantly illuminated ahead.
would fly directly to Nairobi, Kenya - one of the few African countries friendly to Israel while the raid was in progress. Simultaneously, a second 707 would circle Entebbe and act as a flying communications link with General Headquarters in Israel. The raid was to be commanded by General
The assault begins
Shomron
it transpired there was no need for these as the radar operators had not spotted the intruder and no alarm had been raised; for this mistake they were promptly shot by the enraged and humiliated Idi
hospital aircraft,
himself, while the all-important task ot
seizing the old terminal building and releasing the hostages would be the responsibility of LieutenantColonel Jonathan Netanyahu, a young, dashing and
resourceful paratroop officer
who had
already dis-
tinguished himself during the Six-Day and
Yom
Kippur Wars. Shomron was only too aware that his plan contained no margin for error. It was, however, the only option open to Israel other than complete surrender to the terrorists' demands, and was therefore adopted. Intelligence sources continued to piece together a
picture of the situation at Entebbe, while those
would
who
actually be involved in the operation stuiiicd
photographs and plans ofthe airport- whit li hadhccn modernised by the Israelis during their iJa\s ot friendship with Amin. As far as possible, everything was done U) reduce the element of risk. It was known, for cvaniplc. that Idi Amin had once arrived at Entebbe in a black Mercedes car escorted by a Land Rover, and similar vehicles were obtained and loaded
Immediately on touch-down the Hercules' legendary
was put to good use. The slowed down and the runway group tumbled
short-landing capability aircraft
out in sequence, taking with them alternative lights in case the Ugandans turned off their own landing
system As
.
.
Amin. The Hercules rolled on towards a darker area of the airport
and while the British freighter taxied towards
Land Rovers, containwas to assault the old terminal, were driven down the ramp and set off for their its
bay. the Mercedes and two
ing the group which
objective.
The
assault
group was led by Netanyahu, who It seemed that the Ugan-
travelled in the Mercedes.
dans were not altogether taken in by the deception plan toi 100 metres from the terminal two sentries onkid ilic car to stop at gun-point. Netanyahu and anotlici
hitting
(ilficer
opened
fire
with silenced pistols,
one of the men, and the group drove on
within 30 metres of the building.
From
commandos went in on were all lying down in the main
foot.
Israeli
hall
to
this point the
The hostages
and
many were 1X17
.
THEENTEBBERAID askvp
l
our IcrroriMs IkkI hccn Icit lo ''iiard ihcin. iiL'hl.luooMilKkU.iiiJuiK .iiilK'hackol
tlic hall, all
tilicd In
uiu-
ucapons
Ih.ai
(
.
a
..iiipk'lcK siiiprise-d. lhc>
on up wciv quickK k\\k\\ mk\ iliL- assauil \\ a\L' sums. Iiavinv Iw uaiiK-d h\ ihc hosia^'cs thai there were inoiv k-iu'iisi- .null -andan lnu^psoii the Hoor above. ( )rders weiv iliai ilk- 'jandans uplmkhI fire they weiv in he lu aied as an aimed eiieni\. hul Otherwise tiie\ were to he pei milled lo esca|X- oi llic
Man\ were
shot dead
halt asleep
Alto-elher.
ufie
teiToiisis
dm
•I'ledenianM soldiers
killed
are
i
iie
at
I
helie\ed
al
ion
Some
f)(
have escaped
lo
)
I
.1
-andaii
Iroin
the
building.
al l)(l.-S4
the
.
I
post
lirst
of the at this
the
imnutes had passed smee the raid
them
elimmate the w nil their
andan
I
n
.\li(.s
lelime uuns.
into balls ol llame
iiiained
lard mini the outi
.^^ I
mehidiiie iiose and Kn-eher-
the opei
.'^7
command
l^S hours
tion ol Kami'iala.
still
-aiidan s,,|diers and
ilesp.iulied
ili\el\ lew miiuiles
^ei;jhtol
1
elosc ^|uarlers while
.vS
mere
lie
ith hosi;iL'es. al 2
learn detailed to
ii
il
laden w
the airborne
\ la
\erlieail.
and ucu' inManlK klcn-
slanJiii-
jilan
al
oiK-(HiliK-
hoLiis the last
yaiidaiis lmall>
1
J
pulled
ereiiles lilted oil: as .xtiii'juislied the
it
in
did
runwav
hghls. in additmn to Netan\ahu. three hostages had been w arnings to keep down, and a small number ot the raiders had been wounded. .At Nairobi these were transterred to
killed during the assault despite shouted
Total victory Seven minutes
after the first Hercules landed the second touched down, followed by the third and the fourth. As the ramps were lowered, jeeps and persitnnel carriers sped across the tarmac to perform their allotted tasks. The group under Colonel Matan Vilnai
assaulted the
new terminal buiding, which was hastily
by the Ugandans, 15 of whom surrendered and were locked inside a room after being
abandoned disarmed.
Below: One of the four C-130 Hercules transports used in the raid arrives back at Led airport with a cargo of freed hostages. Thecapacity of the Hercules to carry out a very short landing helped achieve the total surprise that characterised the
Entebbe
raid.
Amin's troops seemed totally confused by events and incapable of mounting a coherent reaction. The only determined resistance came from the control tower, a burst of fire from which killed Netanyahu just outside the old terminal. Vilnai's unit quickly eliminated this centre of opposition with concentrated machine-gun and
RPG fire.
Colonel Uri Orr's group was
embarking
the hospital aireratt and. alter being reluelled. the Israelis were on their way home h\ ()4()K hours. By now. it could safel_\ be assumed that airspace along Sudanese border would not be a\ ailable. so their route took them out over the Indian Ocean, round the Horn of Africa and up the Red Sea The an-i\ al
the
Crowds surged loiwaid champagne,
earned shoulderdiigh. The Entebbe Raul will alwa\ in the history
so
now
with gilts ol llowers and
there were tears of relief and
jo_\
for the
released hosta'jes. and the returned paiatroopers w ere
s
remain a high point
of airborne tinees. despite the fact that
many elements
in the Israeli
plan were interdepen-
free to set about
dent and that good luck was xirtualN an essential
the hostages in the waiting Hercules. For
ingredient. Such a venture eould not even ha\e been contemplated w ithout troops and aireiew motixated and trained to a quite e.\traordinar\ degree.
various technical reasons
Shomron was
ad\ ised to
defer refuelling until the force had reached Nairobi and. having obtained approval of this departure from
Bryan Perrett
A
victory for
counter-terrorism By the middle of 1977 the majority of Western governments had made inroads into the problems posed by urban terrorist organisations and had, in the process, formed specially trained groups to combat ihcm. In the United Kingdom, for example, the Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment's Counter Revolutionary Warfare Team had developed weapons and techniques which were particularly suitable for use in situations where terrorists were holding their
Germany the massacre of Munich Olympic Games had led fonnation of the Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG9) anti-terrorist squad under Ulrich Wegener. It was in Germany that urban terrorism showed its most vicious face in the form of the ruthless Baadervictims hostage, while in Israeli athletes at the
to the
Meinhof Red Army Fraction. By August 1977 most of the group's leaders were behind bars but a wealthy industrialist, Hanns-Martin Schleyer. was kidnapped and held to ransom as a hostage for their release It was soon clear that the Bonn government was not going to submit to this demand and the terrorists decided to increase the pressure by hijacking a German passenger aircraft. Since Entebbe security had been tightened up at most of the world's major airports, but a careful study by the terrorists revealed that at Palma, .
Majorca, it was still possible for a hijack team to smuggle its weapons aboard an aircraft. The Baader-Meinhof group had performed a number of services for Palestinian terrorists in the past for example, their participation in the Entebbe hijack - and now it was the turn of their Palestinian colleagues to return the compliment. The hijacking team was to be led by Zohair Akache, a Palestinian with
several killings already to his credit,
1400 hours 13 October 1977 Lufthansa flight LH181 hijacked and ordered to Rome. 1.
2. Aircraft refuelled at
ortand
flies to
Rome
Larnaca,
Cyprus. 3rrorists then order flight to Danrain and on to Dubai. 4.
to
GSG-9 and SAS teams also fly Dubai and
disguised as ground crew. 5.
Aircraft then flown to
Aden
where empty fuel tanks force
,
unauthorised landing. Pilot shot by terrorist leader. 6. After refuelling, co pilot continues flight and lands at
Mogadishu. 7.
GSG 9and SAS
Mogadishu on 17 October and following morning storm plane killing three terrorists and successfully rescuing hostages.
who
called
himself 'Captain Mahmoud' At 1300 hours on 13 October Lufthansa Flight LH 8 from Palma. Boeing 737 Charlie Echo, lifted smoothly from the tarmac under the control of Captain JurgeiiSciuimann, setting course forthe southern 1
1
coast of France and thence home. traffic controllers
An
Schumann
heard
hour
later air
report that his
he had been ordered to fly to Rome. Simultaneously, the voice of Mahmoud broke in. announcing the C/iarZ/VEc/io was now flying under his supervision. The 737. fitted only with medium-range comaircraft
had been hijacked and
nuinications c.iuipnicnt.
com, and nioie k
east,
opened
nil Its
!
base
end.
all
swung away to the southGermany becoming more
in
iiuoiis as the
In the
that
distance between the iwo messages had to be relayed which happened to
throuiih othei l.tilthansa aircraft
he
m
I
lie aie.i
and were
fitted
with long-range radios.
Iheienonsisnoumade known theirdemands. which ineluded noi onl\ the release of the Baader-Meinht)f
1819
rillM(
M
,
HIJACKING
ADISIILl
uhich wcnl
iiicnl Ml Dili VII.
A
.
-III
as
ihclrainmLMil the
lai a
,S,.\S|viM,i iid aiulthcN
R.MIl
111
.liHik-cl
SLiiiiniaiiii
.
ilc.k Ull
S \S
I
ol
successful completion of the mission to free the hostaaes of the Moaadishu
Sci;:.
llasli-ba
Ilk'
.1
lor
Kill
laiKl
\.
..I
i.MuLiiids that tlK'aii|VMi Il,>!
Unw\K\\ ih.wii at asked 111 i:i\ upilk ininisUa'aiKl
llu
Ik'u-.
plan.
Ill n1 l>\
h\
ilk'
ii
lural
\ollm,- lhal
,
uas
Ik-
triT>.iis|x
llu' ilk'
(
'n
pi
i\
the '^'^
u^av
c ol
.Maliiuoikl
ilic
KMClcd
no[ iiikavsk-d in aiulhiiiL^
had to sa\ Ik- ihivalcik-d lo ha\c the aiK ialt biiow n u|i on the spot unless it \\as lelueiied iiistaiitK Ills threat was taken \ei\ serioiisl\ and m due coiiise i'lnirlw IaIio took oil once more. mt.a
till.-
iik
diaik
s
:
laiidiiii!brieri\ at Balii
turthci- short
critical
hop
as
am on
lai
the
(
mil
Dubai
as
his pio\
I
ed
to
be
howe\
ei
.
the hostai:es
were loiced
ihcswelleruiL' heatot the^iult
now
tosta_\ put in
.
was iiathering momentum, .A ."^O-stront; (i.SO^ team had llown to l.arnaca but arri\cd just as Clmrlw I-a Iic was takms: B\
oil
.
the
response
Ciermaii
rhc\ returned io(ieiiiian\ \ia
l
iirkex but
when
it
Dubai was Mahmoud's intended second CkSCi^) team under Wegener himselt Hew diicctl\ lliere. laiidini^ at lirst lii:ht on 15
became
clear that
destiiialion
!
Octi^ber,
a
S-'iuiltancoLisK
government
l,ad
\
isited"
.
a senior
kondon
member
to ask the
ot the
British
mmistei lamesCallaghan, to use his mtluence to obtain p.'rmisMon lor CiSCiy lo go inti) action on sovereign Dubai tcri itorv It seems unlikeK that the Germans were aware of the extent ol SAS iinoKepriiik
.
.
\\
ihc siclic'
hen the\ ari i\ed ihev loiind that llie local authorliad placed polite' but stri.t curbs on G.SG'/s
ities
hijackina,
GSG9 had been
specifically created for this type of operation after the botched handling of the
Munich Olympics hostage-tal
in
1972.
team was able to ease these Germans, disguised as airport personnel,
acti\ ities. but the British
so ihat
w
tlie
ei e at least
able to
the .iiiciali Its
tlkii
ow
make a detailed reci)nnaissanee of was argumg
he Ltoveniment ot Dubai
I
n troops
should be used to break the siege,
an insistence which found favmir with neither the nor the
[British
the
Royal
(
iermaiis. Botli pointed out that
w
iuard's etiicienev as an intantrv unit
(
i.|uestio
I
the
hile
was
^pec
a
.•Xiab
hmifales which had \ei\ ^lose links with Hntam: it was. iiioieo\er. one area ot the world w itli w hich the S.A.S had an espeualls ek^se association. In the meantmie.
W lui sluHild break
heloiemakmya
mistake. lorDiibai w asoneol the rnited
Dubai.
priis
lorciL'n
i>il
pu's.-nlal
i.
I'ak'stiik-I iIh ialu>ii( )pLMiiisali>>ii
uildK
\
>'.ii
.Iniilh.-
>
aiii.u.i II
I
I.'
C
iiv>h1
LI
Previous page: Ulnch Weaener. the coiTimander of GSG9. expresses his satisfaction after the
lia
ami
I'uinissuMi to
uuc
\
.Meanwhile, .\lahmoud had promised to blow up the aiicralt
and
his hostages during the
October unless
German
his
morning of 16
demands were met. The
ehiet
Wischnewski. was in touch with him throueh the control tower radio but the terrorist leader was clearly in no mood for reasoned discussion. Then, with a mere 40 minutes lelt to
negotiator. Hans-Jurgen
airerai t
was
rel
continued to QLiarter
destination remained
its
in
unknown.
he
used permission to land in Oman and it southwest across Arabia s hmpty
Aden,
capital
the
ot
People's Democratic Republic of ^ emen. Neither that country
's
Marxist rulers nor its legion iif Soviet isers had any w ish lo become retused |iermission
and Hast German ad\ involved
in the attair. so the\ also
to land, blocking the
mam runw a\
now
tuci tanks
Cluiiiic
Ech(>\
Schumann was
torced to
make
I
'nioi
tunateh
,
by
were almost drv and the best landint: he
up the
of the
hijacked Lufthansa
flight,
Jurgen Schumann, from the tarmac at Mogadishu.
Schumann
(inset
left)
was
shot by the terrorist leader, Zohair Akache, after he had allegedly communicated with the authorities during a refuelling stop at Aden,
and
his
body was thrown
reached I
tlv
the direction o\
Officials pick
body of thecaptain
out of the plane
IM took off.
the e\pir_\ ol the deadline, the
At Inst
Below:
its
when
right:
above
One of the terrorists
crouches the
it
final
destination. Insert
in
aircraft.
a
doorway of
THE MOGADISHU HIJACKINC; could. Wonicil that the nose-wheel had sustained damage in tlic process, he disembarked brietly to cairy out a eui soi y uispectioii. and then climbed back aboard. Screanimg tiiat the Captain had been comiiuinieating secretly
v\
ith
the authorities.
Mahmoud
him to kneel and then shot him dead Wegener and his team, accompanied by the two SAS men, had flown on from Dubai but the South Yemen government adamantly refused to let them land, even when offered German economic aid, and loreed
they were forced to divert to Jiddah in Saudi Arabia.
Next morning, 17 October, pilot Jiirgen
Victor
Mahmoud made
fly the refuelled
co-
Charlie Echo to
Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. Advised of this development, Wegener and his team flew there from Jiddah, joined after dusk by the original GSG9 team which, after first returning to Germany, had been standing by in Crete waiting for the situation to stabilise again. If
it
was
possible, the
at all
Germans wanted
to
secure the release of the hostages and the aircraft
w ithout recourse to violence and they had brought the ransom money with them in a large box. As the dialogue between the control tower and Mahmoud progressed, however, the terrorist leader once more threatened to blow up the 737 unless all his demands were met, and to emphasise the point he had Schumann's body throw n onU^ tiic tarmac to lie under the African sun. To buy time, the negotiators told
Mahmoud
that
1
1
tenorists held in
German
gaols
would be released and flown out to Mogadishu. Mahmoud responded by announcing that, pending the arrival of the prisonci s from Gcrmanw his dead-
THEMO(;ADISHUHlJA('KIN(i on ISOctolvi.
In
Right: lies
One of ttie hijackers
dying
after
being
riddled with bullets during the assault on the airliner
bytheGSG9andSAS
Thcuv ;uul I
am
'
Mioallci
force.
iscnal a\|i
.1'
.
I
GSG9
..>cd
were
killed.
to take
The two SAS
saiy.
Three of the four
terrorists involved
Jimidl, rivsid
Id'
ii
Sergeant Davies. were sii him draw up the plan lo:
l
'I'hc
While
Ilk-
in
:,\
Alli^io
Iv-an at two liiiacker
assault
i
(
.
:
the cahin
stepladdc
an
I'jiiiied oil
disti aetiiig the
deek tower
Below: The 79 passengers the
drum was
Then,
at
rolled in trontof
attention of the terrorists in
same time, the attackers placed emergency doors. Morrison and
the
\i
to the
s u[i
mio
ICS hi 1st
the aiieialt
liiselaL'ca and tossed then
I
lli.jht
out low aids die aiivrall.
althil\
s
the
blaekened. s,
The
horns on IS Oel. the eoiitiol
n
thcaiicral
Da\
I
.
from both sides of the
flash-bangs into the
man commandos surged
(ierii
interit)r.
past into the
tlat
lenee created by the detonation of the stun grenades,
shoiitiiiL: at
liielight
the hostages to
keep down. The ensuing
lasted for eight minutes.
cahin the Ciermans engaged one
another
door
alt. hitting
both.
Inside the
main
gunman forward and
Mahmoud
appeared
in the
and was shot down, as was the Mahmoud and two of his dead or dying, while the fourth member
to the tlightdeck
fourth terrorist. At the end,
comrades
lay
of theirteam, a
commando,
woman, was seriously wounded. One
and four passengers were had been and alcohol by the hijackers the attack, but miraculously this had not a stewardess
slightly injured.
The
doused with aviation prior to
interior of the cabin
fuel
ignited during the fighting.
There was a bloody postscript to the hijacking, however. Within hours of the successful freeing of the hostages, the imprisoned leaders of the BaaderMeinhof gang were found dead in their cells. In revenge those members of the gang still at liberty murdered Hanns-Martin Schleyer, the kidnapped industrialist His body was found in the boot of acar. si,\ da\ s after the gun battle at Mogadishu. \ et none of this detracted from the technical .
success of the
demonstrated
GSG9/SAS
in the
operation. Mogadishu most dramatic way possible that met and defeated by
international terrorism could be international means.
Brvan Perrett
arrive back in Frankfurt after their ordeal as
hostages. Bottom: Ulrich Wegener (centre) and the West German minister of the interior inspectthe
GSG9 group on its return from Mogadishu. The operation
German
made GSG9
national heroes
overnight.
KeyV\Aea
ELECTROI^ WARFARt THE AIR WAR
)
KEY WEAPONS One
the
of"
combat
most
iiiipoi lani
electronic warl aiv
is
the availability of radar ami
vided a means to use aiip through detection (
ceptors. na\ igatioi: aiiJtlK-i
hy
inunitiinis
w
ilhiHit Ihcni
hi
Ik Npi
I
latcdthcdc\clo|
(HCMl Radar tunclu
llic trail
^
1
beam
ol a
ol
and the retlection by an object in its path. The rcl Li- k-il Muiial ^an Iv iiscd togaugedistance, bearing or location, dcpcikliii^i on the role of the particular adar system. Hul llicaccurac\ ol lhis inlormation can
elL\ iio-iiia,L!iKii. ua\i.^ into space ol aii\ pait ol ihai si.jnai
l
be undermined b\ dclibcralcK ing radar "echo'. This active'
dislorliiiLi the return-
hC'M
ov "jamming"
is
intended either to blot out the signal completely or to intended to counter. Large aircraft such as the American B-52 and B-1 bombers or the Soviet Tu-22M
common
bomber
ECM
.Active
one
most
the
111
cIcciroiiK
iiois^-
m
equipment takes
provide a false one
I
.
ils
place.
a number of forms, being a device that creates hisis intended to swamp the enemy
can no longer discern the on a domestic radio set is a L'ocid example of the same principle). Noise lamnicrs arc very effective and can be divided into two ivpcs. ihc spot jammer and the barrage jammer. Spot lainmcis operate against a precise and fi.xed radio railar liec|Liciic_\ v\ hilc barrage jammers covera spread ol such frequencies. The spot jammer allows the maximum jamming power to be brought to bearon a specific target; the barrage jammer can be used against a range of targets or a "frequency agile' system (one which can transmit on a number of frequencies and change rapidly from one to another). .Another t\pe of active ECM is the deception jammer. This normally consists of a receiver which takes in the enem\ radar transmission and amplifies it, transnutting it back at an artificially delayed time, fins creates a false target at a range or position diHercnt lioni that of the real target. A development cil this sNsiem IS the reverberation jammer which rc^ciN cr lo the iioint
vs
here
it
true sii^ual (tliccffect of static
creates luinicKius false targets.
Passive
PCM
stems are those which do not o| a signal. Most warplanes are
s\
involve the emission
now
littetl vv iili
the crew
asniiple warning receiver which alerts
been tlctected b_v' a hostile and most v\ idelv used passive is the dropping of "chaff. This usuallv comprises coated glass-fibre needles cut to a length w hich is a proportion of the elen'jth ol the r s aimed. Clump? ol ehal' e dropped Irom the n eraft and. on hitting niar-renecting cloud cloud and sees hat il
the aiieiatt has
radar. But the sini|)lest
counter-mcasLires
technique
cho(
tlie
C'hall
V..,
known
111
il,
,:
War
when
ii^.d
111
\\,Mid
as
W
iiidow (the .lapanese eallo
PiiL'li^li
II
ii
which means "deceiving pajvr' .lapanese bombers during May PM,^ over( iuculak (itiiHiii
with devasialmi'
al.
exiremelv iiolcril biil Ihenaturcol the. ,ill
lar
;
c
u- .nils
impk
-
It
ii.-mulei
leinains
.iiii!U
i
v',.iii.iu 1
Ihe
s
,
todav
meaMlie iiistallalioii
ol the
1
iltlH
rlrame and also the type ol hostile emitter
it
i
carry a 'suite' of such equipment internally.
Top: AUS unmanned reconnaisance aircraft mounted on top of an ST-71 Above: Two drones beneath a B-52. Above right: A Tornado prototype P02 with a West German EL/73 deception jammer underthe wing. Right: The Marconi Skyshadow ECM .
Such
installations are multi-functional
and feature
a
range of active jammers tailored to specific threats (such as the Northrop AN/ALQ- 55 or the ITT ALQ1 72 against radar), reception equipment to warn of the 1
appearance of hostile signals (the ALR-46 in the B-52). extensive computercontrol to speed and maximise the svstem's response, and chaff dispensers (AN/ALE-24 or AN/ALE-27. for example). The latest development in counter-measures is the introduction of an airframe which is designed to give the least possible radar
section) and
materials
cated
-
is
image (known
as the radar cross-
built incorporating radar
the 'stealth' technology.
absorbent
The
sophisti-
ECM systems built into modem aircraft require
specialised operators and the electronic warfare operator has
become
a vital
member of the crew
of
many
aircraft.
Not all
all
electronic warfare systems are defensive;
the emissions
from the electronic apparatus used
pods on this Tornado are ontheouterwing pylons. Below right: A US Marine Sea Cobra with an ALE-29A chaff dispenser mounted above the carried
weapons pylon. Below: Insidethe Hughes APG-63 radar of an F-1 5A. Previous page: Harrier GR Mk3s carrying AR1 18223 radar
onthetail-finand projecting rearwards, operating in front and rear arcs.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE: AIR
weapons systems reveal and this can be exploited by a potential Airborne early warning, maritime patrol .md anti-submarine warlare aircralt are now fitted w ith electronic support measures (ESM) equipment comprising sensitive receivers designed to pick up radiations emanating from other ships and aircraft and to provide a fix on them as a back-up to conventional b> nu)dL'i n aircraft and other their position, .iiiacker.
search radars.
Many I'll
electronic warfare items can be easily seen
current warplanes. For example, the box-like
tail rudder-fin of many RAF aircraft houses the antenna for a radar warning system - the Marconi ARI 8223 on the Jaguar and the Harrier, or the similar ARI 18228 on the Phantom and the Buccaneer. Examples of podded jammers include the Marconi Sky Shadow to be seen on Tornado aircraft and the widely used American-produced Westinghouse AN/ALQ-101 and -131 units. These systems are now being given digital processors in an
icature
on the
1
attempt to achieve higher performance and greater flexibility. Chaff systems are slightly less visible forexample the F- 6"s AN/ALE is mounted internally - but the French Alkan counter-measure dispersal pods are carried externally on the Mirage and the 1
.
Jaguar.
There are also either dedicated electronic intelligence
some of the most
in
production or in operation
w arfare platforms and electronic
(FLINT)
aircraft.
FLINT
aircraft are
secret electronic warfare
machines
of the present day. In a situation of "Cold War" the eavesdropping performed by these aircraft is vitally important. As well as listening-in to the enemy's communications traffic, FLINT aircraft are used to build up a library of knowledge on the enemy's radar equipment and frequencies. This can be vital intoniiation when designing jammers and a useful
Miurec of intelligence about
enemy operational proce-
kkiresand dispositions. Only a few air forces currently
ha\c an
FLINT capability, and the
naturally
enough
in
largest capacity
is
the possession of the United I82.S
KEY WI APONS
States and the Soviet Union. Both the
USAF and
the
USN operate such aircraft as the Boeine RC-135 family and the Lockheed 1-2 and TR-1. while the Navy tlies the Lockheed I' -31. Orion from its land 1
bases and the Douijlas L A 3B Sk\\\arrior from its carriers. The Soviet Na\ \ operates the Antonov An2 Cub-B and the Tupole v Tu- 6 Badger-D and -F in an ELINT mode. The So\ iet Air Force uses the two Tu- 6 models. Within Nato. aside from the American systems, both the RAF and the W est Cierman Na\ \ are known to have FLINT planes. Kihl:. rcspcctne ly, the Nimrod Rl and modified Bieguet .Atlaiiiics Further aheld, both Israel and Japan are also knou n ii have such a capacity. F\-rhaps even more exclusi\e are the dedicated electronic warfare aircraft, machines uhose primaiA 1
1
.
1
i
>
\hc\
111
ckviii'iik
cspcciail\ usl
IliI
liM
siand-otl janiiiiini:.
blanketing ol
all
signilicant radar in a specific area.
fLiiii.luHi
\
In
tluii
lanimiiis:.
aluable forcoverine tiehterstrikes.
which
is
are the
American forces Top left: fiasan
This
USAF F-4C
AN/ALQ-n9ECM
pod mounted on thie inner wing pylon. Developed to protect strike aircraft,
tfie
AN/ALQ-119isbottia noise jammeranda deception jammer. Above: Thie TU-95 Bear has a Bee Hind radar in the tail, above the rear gunner's position Left:
The AV-8B Harrier American and an internal
carries
electronics
chaff dispenser.
I'
can earn/
anAN/ALQ-164ECMpod.
Centre
Made by SpA of Italy,
right:
Electronica
ELT/460 noise jammer is designed for installation on high performance ground attack aircraft and
this
fighters. Right:
The
ELT/555 airborne deception lammer, here
wing of an MB-339K, isalso produced by Electronica SpA. It is designed for use against SAM, AAM and AA radars. The ELT/555 can be mounted on the MiG-21 as well as on the Phantom, Mirage and other Nato carried under the
,
aircraft.
ELECTRONIC W ARFARE; AIR
s
KEY WEAPONS operate the Cimniiiian
III A
and the Gi-umnuiii
Mi
USMC.
The Soviet
tern.
ger-H and
-J;
I
\
I
both iisniy
iIk-
Naw
Ka\eii
\I
uses ihe
U
W>)
i
I
I
SA!s\
u
Had
ih.-
I
!(>
^ako\k\
ll.niiul
C
cleciioni. lam-
estimated as
smee
It
has played a major role in three
During the American bombing ol NphIi Koua between 1951-53. World War II laniiners slk as ihe AN/APQ-9 barrage type and the AN AIM -2 and AN/APT-5 spot types were used to lain Ni'i ih Korean radar which was proving effective a;jaiiisi 1^29 bombing raids. The Vietnam War was 1^)45.
m
ebanoi
I
I
.id,
.Shrike
II
aii
I
-laiinelied
Ihe
and Wolt
Smi -luiiiid at
the
llic
stxnc of inajor
US
efforts to counteract its
ALQ-7 pod was built
in
radar
The
I
lu-lics
1
tratcs the in
importance of elfeclne
any future
ele*
conllict.
the
Fansoni: response
posed by these Vietnamese AA meaDuring the B-52 raids of December 1972. Republic F105G Wild Weasels -aircraft designed to
to the threat
sures.
and launch anti-radiation misthem - were used in conjunction with amounts of chaff to defeat the SAM defences of Hanoi and Haiphong. The eftectiveness of these tactics can be shown by the results. The USAF tlew over 700 sorties during an 1-day period between 18-29 December 1972. An average of 64 B-52s appeared over the Hanoi area every night except Christmas Day and although between 750 and 1000 SA-2s were launched at them, only 15 B-52s were brought down. Most recently, electronic warfare showed itseffecidentity hostile radars
siles against
large
1
Right: The Italian-made ELT/156 warns when the is illuminated by search ortracking radar. aircraft
Below: The
EA-6B
is
Grumman
a four-seat variant
of the A-6 Intruder with five
AN/ALQ-99 jamming pods underthe wings and fuselage.
^JjN NAVY
I
s:x
^
This successful opeialmn alloued achieve air supremae\ over Eebaiioi
Ii
radar-L!uidcd S \-2 Guideline missile and
(
f>
)n
9
J
line
hatteru
Below: The Atlantic ATL-2 Mll,
radiatn)n missiles were lired
he niipaei ol electronic warfare cannot be over-
conllieis
\ alle\
illa.ked S\li,ni S \
.md
iole.
nii.'
a
S\ and
|.,niiiiniL'
lii|n.l.-\
Am Iouv
the Stnici
Yak-28 Brewer-E an*! iIk' Mil \li Mi-X Hip-J and -K helieopieis m liie I
in ihe
I'n-ulei in (he
W
IS the latest development the Atlantic family of aeroplanes. It is well-equipped with
in
electronic warfare
equipment, with ECM pods on the wings and a radar detector carried internally, the crew of 12containsan
ECM-ESM operator.
New allies, old enemies The superpowers adapt
ThefallofSaigon in April 1975 (below: an NVA soldier on the roof of the former US embassy) altered the balance of
power in Souttieast Asia. The US feared for the stability of its
remaining
friends in the region
(above: meeting
in
Manila
The
Irantic helicopter-borne
embass\
m
dramatiealb
S;iiL'on
in
tele\isLKil
to
change
e\acuation
April
l'-,*7.>.
s\mbol
ot the L S
was onl\
the
ol a reali'jnment o\
1981,
left
to right,
men
only, US Vice-President Bush, Vice President Malik
of Indonesia, Prime
Minister
Prem
Tinsulanonda of Thailand, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, and President
Marcos of the
Philippines).
Peking had the added advantage
ot bringing ijito pla\
Union, which would ha\c iniphcations tor the global superpower con-
a reguinal balance to the Soviet
m Southeast .Asia that had been under wa_\ since the \isit ol L S presideiituil ad\isei HeniA Kissinger to f\'kmg in .lul\ 1^71. he I nited States had b_\ that time recognised the lutilitx ol its massi\e commitment ot ground lorces to an .Asian war It had not the sliL'htest hope 'I w innin>j President Richard Ni\on drew the ne.essar\ con-
ob]ecli\el\ as lundaincntalK peripheral to
clusion that the diplomatic pursuit ot adiustments to
Southeast Asia, could be discrectK abandoned: and
strategic relations
I
i
in
Southeast Asia
in
the regional biilance ot
power \^ould pro\
economical and citcctixe altcrnatixc
ide a
to the
more
hea\
\
\ote-losing casualties which the L nited Sl:iies was suttering
in
X'letnam. Having belatedK recoi^nised
trontationI
ColdW
ar idcohnjieal
baggage labelled monolithic communist bloc and sought through improved relations with the Peo ple"s Republic of China to limit the damai:e that might becaused to L'S interests b\ acommunisi \ictor\ m lndochin;i T he rapprochement with .
niaiiilaiKl
elopments w ere that, hrstot
Scuitheast A^ia could be seen
interests:
.
thirdb. China shitted the emphasis ot
its
po|ic\
touaids the icjinn tiom one oi c\cludin>: L S inlluopposition to penetration ol the area It\ encc to one nion the So\ let 1
)t
I
the sigmticancc ot the decade-old Sino-So\iei spin, the L S jettistmedthat partofits
liLMVsultsol these de\
more American secondh the lhcor\ ol promiscuousK tailing dominoes. v>,hich had pnnided the public rationale tor the whole LS mililarx iinoNement in all.
I
b\
la\ Its
III'.:
burnt
its
tin>:ers
m
new relationship with
content, duriivj the mid-
1
'-J7(
\
letnam. and reassured
Pekiivj. the
K.
I
torcK upon
S
seemed
a sccurit>
a\is :inchored on .lapan. and strelehini: trom South
Korea SKI.
thr(Hi«:h
laiw an to the
Ihe tocusot
this a\is
I'h-
was
m
iippiiies
and Indone-
the norlheast. but
it
also provided the L nited States with allies and bases
1
SOUTHHAST ASIA the
in
I97I-S4
situlheast region
inunications between the
trum uhiJi
Pauiu
mJ
vi.\imc lii^li.iii
^oni-
(
could be guaranteed. The stability of US intliicixc m SouiIkmsI \sia\\as dependent. howe\cr. on iIk- ^I'lunuied tenure ol
regimes la\ouiahlc lo the West in the Mala\sia and Thailand. In the Americans" main ally in the region and site ot'an important US Seventh Fleet base at Subic Bay. the government of President Ferdinand .Marcos in Manila faced mounting opposition in the
power
b\
Philip; ;iics. Indonesia.
the
late
I'hilippines.
1
970s and early
198()s. notonl\
from the guerrilla
communist New People's Arni\ and the Muslim .Moro National Liberation Front, but also from liberal npinion in the urban centres. The martial law legime esiahlished in 1972. which gave Marcos almost dietatorial powers, was severely shaken in 1983 by the \ iolent protests which followed in the wake of the murder at Manila airport of leading opposition politician. Benigno Aquino, as he reforces of the
eialK sian
ouiImivj isiaiuK
llie
111
eliaiii,
nun eii lent
I
lie
secant) problems
w
face on a
ider
ii:
J,
jiierrilla
i.
I
minr
I
1
1:
MiiialK
:
inN of
-
^i:
:
i
of alL-_.\:
the Suharto regime, ihe interested in
its
Malaxsia.
cemed w respect
enced
lMllmlhe
,
>;.'LiIioiis
niled St.iies lemaiiis
\
h_\
iiall\
is
ol internal ^e^
armed lorees with
lii
ii\
and
.
are anuuiLjsi ihc nu
Indonesia during
'^t
m
the
^^fiiu.
ol \\ orld
.Although the eoninuinist threat has been
negligible since the end ol the hiiiergenex
m
IM6II.
h_\
which time
.
I
X
^1
British lorees
had sueeessUillx suppres-
ments of the eommunist lorees remain aeti\e
alon^:
serious internal seeuritx problem has been
faced by Thailand, which confronts insurgencx
.
allied
w
ith
east of the eountrx .and
a
ethnic minorities
backed b\ the\
eiHiimunist
m the
north-
letiianie-e as
,i
counter to Thai support lor the aiili-X letnaiiiesc forces operating m Kampuchea. The hai niililarx I
goxernmcnt imds itscll under pressLire Irom all sides: from X'letnam. Irom its Association ol South Hast Asian .Nations (.Aseani allies who would preler a compromise settlement with \ letnain. and Irom its internal
in
power.
Below: The assassination of Philippine opposition
leader Benigno Aquino at Manila airport on21 August 1983. Aquino's body IS lifted into an airport security
(AVSECOM)
vehicle as other security officers (right)
journalist
the Thai border
A more
ethnic differences, poverty, or the corruption of those
the
sed a large-seale eonimunist guerrilla campaign, ele-
e.xile in the United could rely on the United it could devote its own defence effort to counter-insurgency w ith a reasonable chance of holding firm, but it w as more difficult for the Americans to help Marcos handle the potentially explosive urban liberal discontent. Indonesia, though not directl\ linked b\ treat\ to the United States, is also an impoilant factor in American perceptions of t'le Southeast .Asian pow er equation. The regime of President Suharto, established in 1966 in reaction to an attempted communist coup, is dominated by the militar\ itself predominantly Javanese. There is widespread disaffection w ith the Suharto government within Indonesia, espe-
external defence,
West's allies in Southeast Asia were troubled to some degree by insurgent movements, provoked by
this
States. Since the Philippines its
guerrillas
Most of the
experi-
turned to the Philippines from States for
Muslim
the south of the
Philippines.
period o! Con-
of the .Malax sian eoniniunists since the end II.
in
esscntiall\ oui-
Malaysian armed torces ha\e been eii^aijed m an almost constant campaign against the guerrilla lorees
War
Right:
coniiiuied stjl^ihtv
in the region. .Apart Ironi the
frontation
:
iiuiiMii I
like the Philippine^,
problems
ith
its
.wiiei-
;
work!,
in the
US Congress
iiileriial
i;.
lndt)nesia straddk
w ays
Indone-
lluii-
Mi.
|X'isisteik.
in l:ast
enemies, and
is
undoubtedlx the weakest
link
menace the
photographing
the event from inside the aircraft.
On the left
lies
the
body of Rolando Galman, shot by the security forces immediately after the killing of Aquino. According to the official version of events, Galman was the assassin, but he is widely believed to have
been framed
for a
murder
actually carried out ity
by the
forces themselves.
SOUTHEAST ASIA in the
chain of pro-Western countries
\91\-x^
in the region.
The most serious regional conflicts after 1975 how ever, as a result of the pattern of pov\ cr established by the American withdrawal and comoccurred,
munist
victory- in Indochina.
Vietnam, reunited and strengthened after the collapse of the
militarily
Saigon regime, reasserted
it.
traditional claim to
in Indochina. The latent conflict between Vietnamese and the Khmer of Kampuchea formerl> Cambodia) re-emerged ahno.-': immediatel\ after the fall of Saigon and Phnom enh to the communists, and border clashes developed to a ^cnous scale. Asean. which includes Thailand. Singapore. Malaysia. Indonesia and the Philippines, called for ic establishment of a "zone of peace, freedom and jLitrality" in Southeast Asia, but the Vietnamese. ho regarded Asean as a tool of the United States. . ucted this proposal, countering with the offer of a
leadership
the (
'
•i
I
ies
l
of bilateral treaties of friendship.
Soviet influence A
these negotiations dragged on. the confrontaVietnam and Kampuchea, which was ked by China, became increasingly serious, and \ ictnam turned in 197^ to the Soviet Union, hoping b\ this means to counter the threat of Chinese intervention in support of the Khmer Rouge. In June iiile
n betv\een
.i.
1978. Vietnam became a full member of the Council Economic Assistance (Comecon). the East European equivalent of the EEC. and in November 197S. Vietnam and the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Reassured by the security clauses of this agreement. Vietnam moved swiftly against the Khmer Rouge, invading Kampuchea and installing a pro-Hanoi government there in January 979. China reacted by mounting an indecisive puniot Mutual
1
ti\e invasion
Vietnam
in
of the northern border provinces of February -March 1979. provoking Hanoi
encourage the departure of its ethnic Chinese minority. Soon the steady stream of "boat people" had transformed a localised contlict into a major international issue. The shock-v\ aves of these events spread throughout the region, and introduced a potential split in the ranks of .'Xsean. between those states, such as Singapore and Thailand, which aligned themselves with China and feared Vietnamese expansionism, and those, such as .Malaysia and Indonesia, which having large Chinese minorities themselves tended to be more suspicious of the long-term grow th of Chinese activeK
intluence
to
in the
region.
This essentially regional contlict provided the juscontinued involvement of external
tification for the
in the area. The Soviet Union, in particular, by extracting the use of military bases on letnamese territory as the price of its continued support. Soviet vessels, such as the aircraft carrier V///;.vA. and its supporting units, maderegularuseofthe American-built facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. while Soviet Tu-95D reconnaissance aircraft, based i' Da Nang. were able to monitor naval movements
powers
profited \
throughout the region. he end of US combat involvement in Southeast Asia has clearly not led. therefore, to a reduction in imoKement in the region. The United States, the Sox lel Union and China remain extensive1
sLipcrpouc!
l\
committed
in
Southeast Asia, although in a new
pattern dictated h\ local conflicts.
RobinCorbett
laking to the hills
Resistance to Indonesia The
April 1974
chain-reaction
let't-u
of
coup
inu
in
Portugal set otT a
which
decolonisation
spread
East Timor
in
Independencia Fretilin ). From the beginning, however, external forces (
As
throught)ut PortugaFs overseas empire. In Angola.
showed an
Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau nationalist movements were in a position to take power and establish
September 1974. President Suharto ol liulonesia and Prime Mmisiei (lough Whillani ol Australia were
independent
reported to ha\e agreed,
states. In the
small Portuguese colony of
East Timor, however, no such national liberation movement existed to which the Portuguese could
interest in the
colonx
at
a
s
inline
meeting
m
earl\ as
.la\a. that
incorporation nito Indonesia would he the most satisfactory solution. DiseLissions between PoitLigal. the
:s
haiul o\cr i^oucr.
UDTandApodetiatacoiiteieneein\lacaoon'2(i
tical |\ii iics
June 1975, led to an agreement on the gradual decolonisation of East Timor, piovuling lor contmuctl Portuguese sovereigntx until October I97.S. with
1
and the creation of Timorese poliu,is(hc lirsicttcctot ihc ripples spreading
he uiKlamcntal issue w hich
cli\
I
idcd
ll
eTiniorc
parties w as that of u licthci h in an iidcp ndcnt Timor would be a \iahic iHi-posiiion, Democratica de Tmior (11)1 Icll that il
(
i
l:a
1
though independent, associaiiim with the
best
solution,
while
iIk
Democratica dosTimorcnses
i
elections to a People's that, in
i
i
\|>n,lL
ii
i
xi,
he
October
.
Popular
.rI
I.
h lull
to
the
Assembl\
possibihlN
leaniiL-
llial
which
the
it
to be held belore
197(i.
FDT. however, was
talks with Indonesia,
I'o
Assduaca
1
ol
inidil
at
(he
same lime
hokliiiL]
which was incieasmL'K an
lall
iiule|K'iKleiit
liostife
hinoi,
last
niulei the eontiol ol
I
ivlilin.
hulonesians :egauled as a eoinniimist oi'janisalion )n 6 Au-jusi l')?^. the |iiesklent ol the (
iiiiiiicihalc anil tot.ii iikIcjk-ikIcmcc
11)1 declared:
Frente Kc\ olucionaria
independent
fimorcnsL
we
We
aie realists.
||
we w.mt
to
be
nuisi lollow the Indonesian political
Above:
A Fretilin patrol on
the border with West Timor shortly before President
Suharto (below) ordered histroopsto invade.
Well-armed with G3 and Mauser rifles from stocks of theformer Portuguese garrison, Fretilin to crush
its
was able
internal
opponents during a short, fierce civil war (right).
EAST TIMOR line:
otherwise
month
it
is
independence for
a
week or
a
in
1976. the Indonesians
set
up
a
1974-84
2S-member
repre-
.
sentative council in f ast
Internal rivalries spilled over into full-scale civil
w ar when the
UDT staged a coup on
council called onPiv^
1
iit
inioi
.
nul
on 31
May
this
.Suharto to incorporate the
August 1975. Fighting broke out between Fretilin, which was relatively well armed with equipment supplied by the local Portuguese garrison, and the UDT. which was supported by Apodeti and the smaller Kota and Trabalhista parties. .Accepting that they were powerless to control the situation, the Portuguese began to organise an evacuation of their forces, and by early
ex-Portuguese colo^^ liuo Indonesia. On 14 August Suharto duly proelaimed East Timor, renamed Loro Sae. Indonesia's 27th province. Fighting continued, however, and the Indonesian forces seem to have acted w ith great brutality towards the local population, with even the vice-chairman of
.September, after a period
East Timorese had lost their lives since the
'of fierce
1
1
street-fighting,
cti lin was in complete command of the capital Dili and claimed to be in control of the whole colony. I
i
,
lla\ing established
pnKlaiiiicd
Republic
the
ot
Indonesia,
dered the
its
own
administration, Fretilin
independence of the Democratic
Timor on 28 November 1975. whose province of West Timor
Hast
l\)rtLi^juese
the provisional
Cruz, admitting
government. Francisco Xavier da in February 1976 that some 60.000
I'DT coup
of August the previous year. A former Australian consul in East Timor. James Dunn, estimated in a report published in February 977 that the Indonesian 1
Army had massacred up
to
100.000 Timorese
after
the invasion of 1975. including half of the former
bor-
colony, had been watching
de\ ek>pments v\ ith alarm, and there were severreports of troop concentrations along the border, although the Indonesians claimed their soldiers were
colony's 7000-strong Chinese community. Information on the situation in East Timor was limited,
al
however, since the Indonesian authorities imposed a ban on all foreign journalists, and refused entry to the
jects.
only engaged in manoeuvres and road-building proThen, on 7 December 1975 a force of some
The
6000 Indonesian paratroopers, described officially as "volunteers", invaded East Timor under cover of
The
naval gunfire.
Portugal, for example, immediately cut
tiiese
was so strong that a second wave of
Fretilin resistance to the invasion
Indonesia was forced to send in troops on 25 December in order to secure control of
Withdrawing to the hills. Fretilin embarked on a war against the Indonesian armed forces and claimed in January 976 to retain control of some 80 Dili.
guerrilla
1
International
Red Cross.
international reaction international reaction to the Indonesian occupa-
tion of East
Timor was uneven and
contradictory. all
diploma-
and insisted that it retained sovereignty over East Timor. A report published in Lisbon in 1981 however, disclosed that Portuguese officials had indicated to Indonesia, at a meeting held in Hong Kong in June 1975. the willingness of tic
links with Djakarta,
,
Portugal's left-wing military rulers
at that
time to
per cent of the country
accept an incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia.
The anli-Fretilin Timorese parties were meanwhile cooperating w ith the Indonesians, and formed a proxisional government on 17 December 1975. led by
which had also apparently encouraged the Indonesian annexation of East Timor, neverthe-
\inolddos Reis Arauio.
a
member of Apodeti.
Early
Australia,
adopted a critical attitude towards the invasion. But an .Australian Foreign Ministry report of June less
1
\s
1
)R
I
1""-
977 spoke of Indonesia's incorporation ot the former Portuguese colony as an "irrex ersible fact" and on 20 1978 Australia formally recognised East Timor to be a province of Indonesia. NewZealand has likewise supported Indonesian claims to East Timor, as have several of Indonesia's allies in the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean). The United Nations, on the other hand, consistently condemned Indonesia, and resolutions passed by the UN Trusteeship Comminee. the General Assembly and the Security Council called for Indonesian w ithdrawal and a recognition of the right of selfdetermination of the people of East Timor. Throughout 1976 and 1977 fighting continued, and while an Indonesian offer of an amnesty in August 1 977 encouraged large numbers of Fretilin supporters 1
.
Januan.
it also triggered off a power struggle within the organisation, w hich resulted in the replacement of Francisco Xa\ ier do Amaral. president of
to surrender,
both Fretilin and the Demcxrratic Republic of East Timor, by the hard-line Nicolau dos Reis Lobato.
Isolated guerrillas \\ hile Indonesia continued to claim that onl\ a small, unimportant remnant of Fretilin fighters remained active, in fact the Indonesian Arni\ mounted a major offensive in 1978. in an effort to force the Fretilin guerrillas into isolated areas and then to star\ e them into submission. The Indonesian offensi\c relied hea\ ily upon localK recruited conscripts and militia, though the latter appear to ha\e pro\ed unreliable, often going o\ erto the guerrillas w ith their weapons. The shock troops o\ the offensixe were elite Indonesian commando units, howexer. and it was reported
that
tanks,
napalm, heavy area-bombing and de-
foliants were being empkned. The offensue appears to ha\e achie\ed a large degree of success and to ha\e decimated the Fretilin .lanuar\ leadership. Lobato himself being killed on 1
19~9. All ivpoiis populaii>'i:
died o:
in
and thiHisands Timor,
iigures lor East in
I'-r^.anJiiLiures published b\ Indonesia
November 1
that the ci\ilian
sut'terers.
._\!. OMiiparison of the last
p.
published o\ er
-I
.
1
oftieial
howeCer.
..L-ree.
'!
1979. re\ eals a decline
30.000. to a
in
population of
of 52: .4.v>
total
was uidel> believed that Fretilin resistance was more or lesv v>\er .mJ that Indonesian control was being consolidated In la^t. now appears that during this peru>d Fretilin was reco\ ering under the new leadership ot Jose Gusmao Sha .Na Na. and that guenilla acti\it\ persisted,
By
the eariy
19SOs.
it
it
though
at a
lower
le\ el
By March
V v
s secret
and the \'r,J.- 'i.e which :.;>cJ might be howe\er. a 5()-strong organised Ci\ Guard, ports ma\ ha\e been Fretilin
ne'.:otiations .iiitliorities
had led
to
hie.
In
August
1
iier
Fretilin
L'uernllas
ambushed 14 Indonesian soldiers and look loilie hilN The attack pnnoked a massi\e response liom the Indonesian .Arm\ Up to S(K)0 men. including a large number of fresh reinforcements, were deployed in a .
ficance.
The
relatne obscuritx
.
the struggle for
Timor poientialK of great signiTimor lies astride the .Straits of is
receiving
from a
Fretilin
outside Dili during the civil war. Above right; The first Fretilin president of East Timor, Francisco Xavier do
Amaral Deposed by a
more
hard-line faction
in
1 977, he was later killed in a clash with Indonesian troops. Far right: Fretilin soldiers tend a wounded
comrade.
Right: At a secret
conference in March 1983, Indonesian officers (left)
and
Fretilin representatives negotiate a ceasefire
agreement. An Indonesian offensive during 1978
which pro\ ide a \ital route lor nuclear missile submarines movine between
Fretilin
forces, but after a period of
reorganisation, guerrilla
US
operations again provided a serious problem for the Indonesians during the
the
early 1980s.
island ot
etar.
is
instructions
officer at a road-block
severely mauled
renewed offensiv e
Ombai-W
Mausers and bows and arrows,
19S.>
up of the Indonesian according to some re
il
control of Flasi
regular Fretilin forces. This
group, armed with
;
aiLition that a politiea
Its
Local, poorly-
militia units
provided a back-up to
between
settlement
of
armed
of intensii\
ceasefire,
In spite
Above:
1
The forgotten people South Moluccan exiles turn to After a bitter lands
F.asl
national liberation, the Nether-
\\ai- dI
Inches aehiexed indepenJenee as
itedStalesol hui(>nesiaon::'l)eeenibei 1^4') l\
aeonleJeral ie|Uilihe.
liuliMiesi.i iiv
ternlor\ the islandsol Soalli
Molueea.
iIk-
I
i>-
Inilial-
liiJeJw ithin Us inhahitants
(lie
oluhieh had Iven eon\erled to ( 'hi isi ianil\ In ihe Duteh. m uhosc Ro\al Nelherlands Indies \nu\ (KMIJiiiaiiN ol lheniscr\ed. Immediatel\ alter indepeiidenee ihe liidonesKiii iH)\ernineni made iiuncs towaixls the eslahlishmeiil of a unitar\ stale; this alarmed llie Mokieeans, who
responded b\ pmelaiminL' an independent Repubhe of the Sou!h'.\lolueuis (Rcpublik \lalul^u Selatan RMS)on:.-S April 1^)^(1. Indonesia, how ever, did not recognise the RMS aiui proeeeded to ineorporate the South Moluccas into a iinitar\ Reiniblie ot Indonesia in
May
1950. Scattered resistaiiee was led
presitlentofthe
RMS.
b_\
How n
on Fast
1
imor.
Moluccan on
tiic
]ii
1
terror coLild |oin the Fretilin
mcn ement
he\ also called for the release of
is(iners in the
all
Netherlands, and for talks
indcpeiKlence ot the South Moluccas, to be
held under
FN
auspices.
da\s later, another group of si\ .Moluccans occupied Ihe Indonesian consulate-general in Amsterdam, taking a number of Dutch and Indonesian hostages. IliemlensiiN ot South Moluccan bitterness was biutalh shown on 4 December, when the tram \\o
I
111
lackers sin it one oft heir hostages and threw hisbod)
out onto the railwa\ tracks. NegotiatKMis continued,
howexer. and the hijackers graduallx released all of their hostages, surrendering on 14 December, to be followed fi\ e(.la\ s later bv the iiroup in the Indonesian consulate.
A second
the
nrCdiristian Sumotil
w here the\
to
train hi|ack. this time coordinated with on 23 Ihe Roiterdam-Cjroiiint:en express was
the iKcupation ol a priiiiar\ school, took place
Max
1^77.
halted near the
\
ilki'je ol
Oiinan b\
a iiroup ol
armed .Moluccans. who released about ballot
nine
the 100
passeni:ers. Imldini: the rest as hostaiies. At the
same
time, lour .Moluccans entered the primaiA school
nearbx Bo\ensmilde. takuiL' about li\
e teachers prisoner. Police
in
K) children and and troops sealed ott the I
(
Moluccans made known their demands, which included the release ot all South Moluccans imprisoned tor earlier incidents, and lor a Boeine 747 to be made readv at Schipol aiiport. area, while the
he terrorists threatened to
I
.Meanwhile, in Makassar, capital of the island of
KNIL- which had
Sulawesi. Moluccan troops of the
-
not yet been disbanded
who had
was suppressed, but
the
1
ended when Dr Sumotil captured in 1963. but the growing militancy ol uiLing South in the exiled communit\ w as re\ealed b\
effectively
Moluccans
upon Indonesian targets in the Netheriands which followed the execution of Dr Sumotil in 1966. in 1975. the Free South Moluccan Youth Organisation Vrije Zuidmolukse Jongeren VZJ) decided upon a strategy of violent action, and
the series of attacks,
(
broke away ti oni ihc moderate RMS "government-inexile" headed b\ Hi .Ian Manusama. Follow int: an unsuccessful attempt lo kidnap Queen .luliana ol the Netherlands, the \'ZJ mounted t'\ attack in December 1^75 which broughtitworki^ Icaiicntion. ii. cans hi jacked )n 2 December. sc\ en armed ^
'
>
'
near the village of Beilen. i.illing the driver, look the passengers hostage and demanded io be
in
three
schoolchildren on 27 eminent decided that it must end and at dawn on .kmc 1977 Marines stormed the school and the train simultaneousK he troops released the remaining
I
>
neeotiatioiis until
Meanw hile,
Moluccan troops
participated in the rising then refused to be
.
hostaees. but
kill their
Dutch eovernment ruled oM an\ the children had been released.
ollicers ot the British S.AS arri\ed in the Netherlands
demobilised by the Dutch in Indonesia. Thus in '^^5 they were transported with their families to the Netherlands, where they were demobilised and housed in temporary camps. The community of some 15,000 experienced enormous problems of assimilation, dreaming rath a ivturn to an independent South Moluccas. Resistance to Indonesia in the South Moluccas
(
all
armed The
participated in an
rebellion against the Indonesian government. rebellion
the
to ad\ ise the 13utch i:o\
ernment on the
sicl'cs.
In spite ol the release ol the
.Ma\
.
the
Dutch
l:o\
the sicLies b\ torce.
I
.
1
I
Left:
Indonesian troops
advance past the bodies of supporters of Moluccan independence during the fighting which accompanied the incorporation of the Moluccas into Indonesia 1950. Below:
Young
Moluccans
the
in
in
Netherlands express their support for the terrorists in 1977,
in front of
the
emblem of the South Moluccan Republic. None young people had ever seen the homeland of which they dreamed. of these
THE SOUTH MOLUCCANS The assault on the hijacked train, llJune 1977
0 minutes even/thing was over. The surviving hostages to hospital, along with two injured terrorisfe and two Marines. The tram, peppered with bullet holes, was towed slowly away. Within
1
were taken ~"e operation to free the 51 hostages began at 0453 hours with six =- 04 Starf ighters screaming in at treetop height, dropping smoke v:r sters and making repeated passes over the train in order to :o^fusethe terronsts and mask the actual assault, Down below, a Dink flare fired over the train
gave the
signal for the assault
group of
wounded
Below: The bullet-scarred train afterthe assault by Dutch Marines which sixterrorists and two hostages died.
in
Dutch Mannesto advance. Giving repeated warnings over loud hailers for the hostages to remain ,calm and keep down, the troops rushed the train, spraying fire into
Moluccan
terrorists
of the tram lay
was a
where theyknew the were concentrated. Within moments the front
the driver's compartment,
automatic
bullet-nddled wreck,
and
six of
the nine terronsts
dead.
Blowing
off
the doors with plastic explosives, the Marines
entered the train, searching from carriage to carriage forthe remaining terrorists. The hostages, concentrated in the second and fourth compartments, had obeyed the instruction to stay down, but in the confusion of the battle, a 1 9-year-old girl and a 40-year-old man were killed in the crossfire as they stood up when the Mannes burst m
schoolteacher hostages without train six South .Moluccan^ anJ
Overall HtMthe dead terroriv!accompanied the trial
(
lalties. .
i
>
hut
at
the
hostages were tlie
killed.
tuneral ot
Muslims and Maoists war
Guerrilla
the Philippines
in
Ferdinand Marcos was elected president nl the Philippines in 965 ruling by decree under a state ot martial law from September 1972. Overthe \cars char>:es ot con-uption and electoral malpraciicc i;ivu more insis tent against his regime, culminaiinL: in the worldu kIc 1
,
Marcos
criticism directed at
murder
the
after
ol
Beniijiio .ALiiiino. a leadiuL; opposition politician, as
he
arm ed Rill ilk-
po'>
'
th.
Manila airport m August 19S3. most xenons threat to President Marcos's 11. iiom gueiTilla wars being waged by
at
'
uKil
I.
1
south
rebellion
(MNLF)
Liberation Front
ihe aiLintry
ol
Arm\ (NPA)
and the Maoist
north. Initialix
in the
which posed the greater
it
in the
New
People's
uas
the ,Moro
threat
;i
The
.\f.:
I
,^1
iKkluionallv to the
Malays to the southue-! iili ii.Minliex had cultural and economic links, and llieii aniiiiosiu low aiiK the north was intensilied u hen tlieC hrisHaiiised f ilipiiios ser\ed as willing auxihanesol the Spanish inliie long and \ luous w .n^ Jan ml w hi Ji Spam sought tosnbiu.
,.
.-.
'
i:e!he \ Uls
1
1
1
1
1
1X98,
when
interniitleiilK
the Spanish- Ameneaii'
the replacement of S|xiin h\ the
I
trom
W
ai
i
s7S
led to
S as the colonial
power in the Philippines his change lelt unsettled. howe\ er. the question .i| wiiether. ami on w hat hasis. the .Muslim soutii would he meorpoiateil intothe new American piissession I
l-aeed h\ tion ..n
1
polk-.. mI
unw 1838
lai-e-s, a
u/oii. the
I
le
I'hiiiiM'iiie -iieiiilla
lined M.ii
non-inierleienee inwai.l
illmg to proxoke lurtliei
religion.
population of the southern
fheresult was large-sealc fighting. Ill w hichpoorl\ armed and unorganised Muslims la^ed an mereasmgIhe initial ly numeroLis and well ec|ui|-)ped enem\
serious threatto the regime of President Marcos during the mid-1970s.
1
leeened
the
opposi-
iinlialK .idopted a
ihe \h.ios. being
armed opposition.
.Alter
support
enthusiastic
Philippine
ol
nationalists,
only to
.
rebellion ha\ ing been ruthlessl\ sup|iiessed. the States
lted
aim
the
duide and
I
a
IriendK
.Muslim leaders, and pursuing
ol assimilation b\
ol
means of a modei
ii.
posed
a
li-
adopted
poiic\
Philippines,
|-ule.
.Amer-
leanisededLiealioii s\stem. I
he limited selt-gox ernment granted [o the Philip-
pines
in
I'-^V'^
iiieieK
meant the an
i\al ot
new
pine adminisiiati us lor the .Moros. along w ing
numbers
ol
(
ith
Philip-
grow
-
hnstian settlers into the relati\el\
underpopulated south, attracted b\ teitile land, iieii mineral dejiosits and exploitable timber leseixes. The signiheanee ol l'liili|-)|-)ine iiKle|-)endenee in
PMb was
su Itaiiates ol ihesoiilh.
Morouarseonlinued
I
until
was seen by the .Moros as a threat not but also to their their political autonomx
Above: Armed with American World War ll-vmtage Garand rifles and Ml carbines, a group of Muslim guerrillas fords a stream while on patrol. The Bangsa Moro Army, based amongst the Muslim
.
siibsklisii-ig
The original Spanish colonists o| the Philippines discoNcredthe Moros. tu i, ^'K independent .Muslim people, on the islan. 'liikLin.io and the Sulu archipelago.
1901 however, when the Philippinc-.American W ar ended. America gradually increased its presence m the south, instituting direct rule with the aim ol its i-iis ami. w hieh total integration intothe Philippines.
likewise limited
loi
the
Moros, who con-
tinued toexivneiiee semi-eolonial rule trom Manila,
lIuHigh there were P^.^Os.
the
isolated
upnsinL:s
duiiiiL'
the
post-mdepeiideiiee period was one of
general letieal b\
ifie
.Mashms. laced w
grow migration trom ilh
the
-
ing pressure ol large s^ak ( hiisiiaii and a leLMine loi.ilK iins\ mpadiet le to their problems. H\ the earl \ ITDs. ihe iiopulatioii balance the north,
in
whole |iio\ineeso|
had
shilieil in l.i\oni
dameei oUloiii-es. Aiklcd to the
111
Muslim s.tulh Christians, aiul was in
the liadilioiuilK
of the al
m.iie
what the Muslii
Top
right:
Demonstrators
in Manila call for a boycott ofthe May 1984 parliamentary elections.
Urban protest against the rule of President
Marcos
(right)
Ferdinand
grew
dramatically after the murder of opposition
Benigno Aquino August 1983.
politician in
THE PHILIPPINES
1971-84
TIU
l'llll,ll'IMNi:S
l')7l
SI
The Philippine insurgencies 1979 BABUYAN ISLANDS San Vicente
SOUTH CHINA SEA
^O—-'
main areas of IVINLF activity
BURIAS
MASBATE
s^^^,
PANAY
8
Lloilo»
CEBU •Cebu
^ Puerto
PAU\WAN
SULUSEA
• Zamboanga BASILAN
SABAH
Above: Private armies have become a feature
to iLiicai into the nuiin administrative centres,
of lifeinthe Philippine
and
iariic
countrywide. These
memuers ofaaroup known as Charlie s Angels one armed with .
Browning Automatic are involved
.•\
a
Rifle,
operations against auerrillas of the Maoist New People s Army in the northern Philippines. Of questionable military value, such private armies are mostly employed by local
in
landowners to police
their estates.
aicas oi the countrvsido. as well as
cities. Id! into
to
be tollowed b\ the introduction ot autonom\ lor 13
pro\ inces
ua\c ol iiLicn illa acti\ itv came in Februwhen ,\]NI,h forces occupied the city of sexeial da\s. onl\ w ithdiawiniZ when suh-
luithct
m the southern
Maragreement to be conreterendum to be held in question being phrased in
Philippines. President
cos, howexer. inteipieted the
upon
aiv h)74,
ditional
.lolo tor
the atleeted prox inces. the
the result ol a
.MNLF
lected to a conihined na\al and aerial boiiibardinent.
terms
Bv
houexer. the scale ol iiuerrilla operations had bcuun to decline, thoueh it was clear that the
Christians tormed a maioritx
MNLI- was capable
4.(I(K).(MH). the icsiiliing reieclion
1^J7.S.
ol
sustaining the
war almost
with plan
indehnitelv. Realisint: the improbability ot a purely militar\
ol
a
a
\es or
ol
independence.
.\1\1
1
m
Saudi .Arabia
in late
1974. Marcos
made
develop contacts with the Middle hastcin backers ol the MNLF. hopinij to prove to them that tlie ,\loros were not beim: tlireatened with 'jcnocide. as h.td been claimed In the .MNLb. liou>'h this lirst round ol ncjolialions pro\ed IrLiitless. coiiciioits lo
1
laintai
ICts
:d.
ul
Is!
I
(
laiklah
ol
tiie
sineei
interest in a |ust political solution
it\'
ol
it
to
Ciixen that
Muslims'
the
of the aulononn
MNLF.
which had relerendum. this was a,
returned to
spiteolthis, the eeaselire
its
demand
lor total
was largeb observed,
broken oiiK Irom lime to time b\ skirmishes between loucs he warenleied a new the Al Land .MNl stage, how c\ei on l()( ). iohci D^-^. u hen an MNLF unit massacicd a group ot M\ unainied rhilippme iisi \mu olliccrs. including the t'ommaiider ol the DiMsion. leodulioHautista.on.lolo Island he Al l' reacted swiltb. mounling a eam|iai!jn ol ie|">iisals on Pasi'lan and loK) islands against the MNI aige areas were mined, an strikes wcie emplo\ed and Civilian casiiallics uere lice lire /ones declared heaw In Dcccinbci Lr^, \\ p loices discovered anddcsiioved the MNl national hcadquaileis m the dense luiigic noilli ol /aiuboanga Citv ighting reached its peak m .laiuiarv h) ?S.' w hen eiL'ht batta 1
1
.
I
I
I
ImdmLi missions \ isited the i'liihppincs. NcL'otiations were re opened in iipoli in Decenihei |W7.->. alter a \isii h, Lilna b\ Imelda .Marcos, wilc o| the pies, denl. dui iiiL- w Inch she was able to coii\ m.c ( oloiiel
Muamniai
In
rule.
eight ol the |iro\ mees.
lor the
called lor a boxcoll ol the
serious setback, and
in
(>.S(HI.(KK)
was predictable
mic a HI 111 ICS 111 theMiddlc bast, whose iniluence had incrcascdcnoiiiiouslviollowingtheoilcnsisot 1974. I'lesuleiH \lai cos opened peace negotiations with the I
to
ih)
population
sokiiion.^and subject to growing pressure Irom Isla-
'jieai
IH4()
The resulting agreement pro\ ided lor a eeaselire.
while
manv towns
MNLF hands.
CELEBES SEA
TAWITAWI
Philippine
I
1
l
THE PHILIPPINES
lions ot
AhP
(loops stoinicd the licavilv ticlciulo.!
clitt-top toilrcssol dci ivsponsihic
While
I
siiian Sail, the
loi" llic
MNLFconiman-
this toLiL'li niihtaiA
response indicated the
Al l' to contain the Muslim msuiiicncv. Marcos aKo went ahead with a series of
aniht\ ol Ihe
Fresidcni
pohtical miliatixcs. otIcrmL'
assistance lo
MM,
I
holding peace talks u
amnest\ and hnaiicial uho surrendered and
-uerrillas ith
MNLF leaders in the Philip-
pines. 1
tion
he government also went ahead with the introducot
two autonomous zones
in
cast
aiul
west
v\ hieh it hoped woLild satisty the demands Muslim population lor greater control ol their as well as leassuring them that they
Mindanao. ol the
own
Octobci" massacre.
allaiis.
would
not Iv sub|cct lo increasing Christian
domina-
tion. I
he
MM
,1
.
nieanw
liculties. splittniL'
Inst,
led b\
Nur
hilc. cxi>crienced internal dit-
into three separate tactions.
.Misuari and based in Libya,
probabK
the iai>:cst. iliouiili
trom Ihe
local
Nur Misuari in
s
MM
,
I
position
it
Ic.idciship \\
as
The was
had become isolated
m
the Philippines.
weakened by
the decline
acti\e su|i|iort Irom l.ibva lor the rebellion in the
1971-84
Top left: Moros prepare to ambush aftarmy patrol. Relatively well-armed, their
main source of supply
is
the Philippine Army. Above: After the ambush, the guerrillas concentrate on collecting the weapons
and ammunition of the dead soldiers. Top right:
A Moro fighter, fatally wounded during the ambush, haspaidwith life for the weapons.
his
1S41
.
.
THH
.
IMIII.Il'PINHS I97I-S4
Left:
A mountain base of
the communist New People's Army, which constitutes the most
now
serious military threat to the Philippines, Notice the cultivated area around the tents from
which the
guerrillas obtain their
food
Below: The Philippine Army, though better armed and supplied than the guerrillas, and greatly expanded since the beginning of the current insurgency in the early 1970s,
still
faces serious
problems of indiscipline and corruption. Philippines, paill\ as
sLlll
plomalic oHeiisix e h\
Kicnt
group, u Inch
Cairo, u as led b\ llashini
v\
as has^
111
sslLlI dl-
Ihi
Marcos.
I
he second
who
Iroiii .Misuari "in \^ni broke \ Salainat uas m lav our ol a iieL^otialed sellienient u ith the Philippine gox ernnient The smallest group, the Bangsa .Moro jheration ( )rgaiiisaIioii. led h\ Salipa-
Salamat.
.
I
m
men
Marcos's In
response to the
MNLF
and
NPA
insurgency, the Philippine Forces
creased ly,
their
in-
mechanised infantry combat vehicles, and armoured personnel earners. The navy, with 28,000 men, including 9600 Mannes, has played a relatively minor role in the war with
will- ol the .Maoist
Communist
.Arabia,
as a result ol the .Sino-.So\
March
in
let
and
\
l'art\
ol the [Philip-
which was torined
pines. \iar\ist-Leninist.
founded
Saudi
its
i^hS
in
NPA
was
lust ttperational
base
split.
The
was in arlac Pro\ ince. central Pu/on. an area v\ ith a rich tradition ol peasani insurL:enc\ and a former stronghold of the communist llLik gLieriillas. Forced later to move its mam base to Isabela Province, I
Pu/on. the NPA grew steadiK claiming tohaxe 2()()l)men under arins"by 1971 he mliddLietion ot martial law in 1972. and the de\elopment ol a go\ eminent programme ot land retttrni were temporal) setbacks lor the NP.A. but it continued to find recruits Increased Al P el ticienc\ as well as splits withm the NP.A leadership, led to a the northeast ot
in
.
I
series ol reverses tor the
I97.S-7S.
communists
in the
period
Chinese suppc)rt was withdrawn as
part of
Peking's rapprochement with
NPA
V\ ashiii'jton
.
,Man\
leaders uere captured b\
tlie .Af P and the were loiccd to reorganise, adopting smaller militai) units and spreading theiroperatK)ns into new
guerrillas
Progress was slow and caretuL but by the earlv NPA was estimated to have between 7()t)()
I98()s the
and
I
!
.()()()
pari lime
niighl
backed bv thousands of Reports indicated 'that the NI'.A a tactical alliance w ilh the .MNI.I
iVL'ular troops,
militia
have
lo,
med
.
two movcnients cooperalniL' m operations aL^aiiist AFP. he NPA was also reported to have extended itsactivities into Mindanao, m areas bonleiiiiL' the
the
I
the provinces aflected by the ,MNI
atmg the i\
in
NP A
IS
causing: the
-mkIiiil.' the stabilitv
Southeast Asia
1X42
lelvllion
,|-
(
)|vr
two-thirds of the Philippines' 77 prov mces. I
iiileil
ol
its
Staii-s
serious concern
most important VV
;ilU'i-
all\
in
Mollmaiin
ligbt
the
tanks,
MNLF,
The brunt of the fighting against the has been borne by the 43,500-strong Philippine Constabul-
arms
ary (PC), supported by the 46,000-
to the rebels, as well as
strong Integrated National Police. The PC IS equipped with light infantry weapons, roughly comparable to those available to the MNLF, and relies on the army and Mannes for sup-
interception of vessels carrying
for supporting land operations
with
bombardments. The Mannes have, however, been extensively used against the NPA guerrillas. The air force, like the navy, is renaval
latively small,
as the Philippines, with
neighbours and no land borders to protect, rely heavily on the hostile
therefore, basically a coun-
F-8 Crusaders,
being responsible for the
and supplies
no
IS,
F-5A F-5B Freedom Fighters, and SIAI-Marcbetti SF-260 and T-28 Trojan counter-insurgency aircraft. The Philippine Air Force also uses Bell UH-1 Iroquois helicopters.
60,000 men, equipped with Scorpion
and based
to recei\e enc(Hiragenient
force
ter-insurgency force, equipped with
some
was
fVndaiitLin
rumoured
air
manpovA/er enormous-
the arnny by 1 984 nunnbenng
trom the Philippine gineriiment. u hich w as interested m deepening an\ split u ithin the Muslim rebellion. By the I^SOs the .\cu People s .\rm\ iNP.A) had taken the place ot the .MNl.P as the mam securitx threat to the .Manila regime. The NP.A is the militaiA
da
presence of US forces at the Subic Bay naval base and Clark air force base, both on the island of Luzon. The
guernllas
port
when
heavier
weapons
are
necessan/. The army and Marines
tend only to be involved operations
in
large-scale
KEY W HAPONS Thn>Lii;hoiit the
histon ot land waitare. thecoinnian-
der with the better lines ol coiniiuinicatums
aluays had a major ad\antage cner
li.i--
his (ippniKiii.
is however sophisticated the ueapoiirx depli>>ed. the dpcrnioi caiinoi he inseverel\- hampered ilic commander structed u hen and u hciv to liiv. jiid cannot coordinate the actions oi the \ anous elements at his disposal. The emergence of rehable radio equipment during World War il revolutionised battleheld management: the success of the German tactic ot Blit/kricg depended heavily ontheavailabilii
il
il
ot ct tcctixc electr
il\
time .all the u orld as their
"
s
onic communications. Since that annies have come to rely on radio tool. Apan trom
pnmai\ communication
communications equipment, another factor in the growth of the so-called "electronic battleheld' has been the use of radar to detect personnel and vehicles on the ground and the use of direction-finding equipment to locate emitters of radio and radar signals. There can be little doubt as to the effectiveness of available electronic equipment. This effectiveness has generated a need for counter-measures, to which radio and radar are extremely vulnerable. A communications net can be disrupted by jamming, and simply monitoring the transmissions of an enemy whose radio security is lax can reveal valuable intelligence. Also, a group of monitoring stations can be
Previous page: The US TEAIVIPACK, here mounted on a Dragon 300 vehicle, is used to pinpoint hostile itters. Above: The heart of the
'electi
battlefield' will
be
command, control and communications centres (C^)-like this French
installation-analysing /
'ormation from the
used to locate accurately a di\ isional headquarters, for example, by its radio transmissions, allow ing it to be attacked and thereby paraKsing an important sub-
Right:
command structure. Both Nato and the Warsaw Pact have recognised the opportunities of electronic warfare and have provided their ground forces with an array of equipment designed to attack the enemy's sensory and communications systems and to provide signals intelligence (SIGINT). The Soviet Army has adopted the name "radioelectronic combat" for electronic w arfare. They have organised specialised units at army and front level to
infantryman with a TRC 743 field data terminal
section of the overall
carry out the electronic offensive.
The
the Signals Interception Battalion
electronic
Combat
The Signals
basic units are
and the Radio-
Battalion.
Battalion acts as an
Interception
and radio direction-finding According to recent estimates, such a unit comprises 433 officers and men and 114 trucks, divided between an HQ Company and Radio Intercept. Radio Direction-Finding and Radar Intercept Companies. The Radio Intercept Company has an establishment of 97 officers and men and is equipped with 28 SR-.'iO-.Vl intercept receivers covering the \'HF L'HF bands and aimed at FM-voice communications. TheRadioDirection-FindingComp.nn intelligence-gathering force.
is
slightly larger with
and
men
operating
drawn from
the
an establishment of
8 ot Ik
1
1
ei s
16 radio direction-finder sets
SR-19-V. SR-20-V and SR-25-V
types. Together, these three sets can give accurate
bearings on tions.
HF to VHF A.M FM-voice communica-
The Radar
Intercept
establishment of the
liiive.
C(Mnpan\ had the largest w itli 2.'- oiiuei - and men 1
operating 15 radar intercept
s\
stems,
quency bands, or the
lOGHz
I
hese will he
enng ihe ).\1H/- (il 1/ treSM-21-\ eo\ enng the .>().\1H/-
either the SB-2()-\- eov
.^i
1
1
frequencies.
The Radi.vleelroni. Comhat ullv
llK
t
Hattalh 1
the
hese ha
So idle
repre^ et
An
Ihe actual
lanned h> 4^2 •
1X44
made upot
thre
radio
jamming
A French
attached to his radio. Below: Men of the US 82nd Airborne Division deploy
communications equipment on Grenada
in
HLHCTRONIC WARFARE: LAND Left: TheTransportpanzer1 (TPZ-l)Eloka is fitted with an EKSSjar": merand a 5KW generator to provide ijower. Other electronic . 'f-fare variants ofthe 1 are the mobile radar 1
iC;cJei and the command and coiTimunications
model.
Below; The French AMX30 AA tank with the Oeil Vert radar. Thisisapulse doppler system and
works
in
either distant
surveillance
modeloutto
15 km -9 miles) or close-in mode (out to 6.5 km - 4
The radar operates onthe 1710-1750MHZ miles).
frequencies.
men
opcrat
lion-findcrs.
channel
ladic
12
laniiiici^.
olliccis
and
The
|,
lai
men and
and onipan\ |uip|icd
cpt diivedoiidindini
s
and
1
1
tliiv is
iiianncd by
u ith 10 radar lammers.
Both t>pcs ol hattalidn arc lii>:lil\ inohile. with all their cquipnicnl hcin
lurthercapacil\ niounled m \li 4 lound and .\Ii-S liip iielicoplcrs. IS lakcn \cr\ sciiousK b\ Nato .Sonic obscrxers bche\cthat the Sox icl s\ siclii could reduce balllelield comnuinKalions lo the lexcl ol I'^JIb. an c\licmel\ sciiotis proposition when it is considered liow reliant Nato on radio communicaIions. The capabilities ol So\ let ladioelectronic units .
1
were
illustrated
m
luiropc duiuiij the mtci
\
m
cntion
w hen the W arsaw I'act loices in\'ol\ed eniplo\cd chalt and barra;jc-|amiiiinL: techniques. toniiiiiL' \;ist electronic seieeii aionu the borders beluccii Vcclioslov akia and West German} This cllccti\cl\ masked the troop moxenients and aiiiitts I'he main conlmL'cnt ol NaloN land cleclionic C"/echoslo\akiain
1
'KiS
;i
(
.
waitare units is pro\ ided h\ the I S Arni\ In each ol its h Ironlline t!i\ isions there is an oi i:;inic cleclionic warfare mtclliyeiice Ixitlalion uhicli combines the ,
\
roles ol the Soviet units alicad\ dcseiibed.
Arm_\ has not \et adopted a stand. a d table tion
and equipment lor
its
The
I
S
ol orLianisa-
electronic warfare units
As
miiiht be expected, these balt;il ions are lurnishcd a
wide
u
ilh
ranL'c ol sophisticated eqiiipmciit. 'I^hrce im-
portant current s\ stems arc the
AN/MLQ-34 TAC-
.lAM communications lanimer. the AN/MSQ-1()3 signals intercept/directioii-tinding sy.stcm and the HXJAM expendable jammer.
The
tirsl
MLQ-34. is designed to enemy communications links.
of these, the
disrupt and decei\e
w hole comprises a number of receivcis lor :;et identilication. high-powered transmitters and a controlling computer, the entire package beiiiL' nioiintcd on an M-548 tracked cargo-carrier chassis acli transmitter is capable of generating a multi-kilowatt signal over a broad frequency range, makinii the s\ stem a powerful and tiexible electronic
The
s\
siem as
a
I
1X4.^
KHY
W
\PONS uartcuc uw\. Produced b\
Git
Sylvania. 17
TAC-
JAMs
have been coniplcled and the US Army has a s\ stems on order. The MSQ-103 TEAMPACK equipment is a mobile s\ stem designed to identity and locate hostile communications transmitters. Used at the divisional further 3
1
level. TEAMPACK covers the 500MH/-5()GHz trequenc) band and can be mounted on a range ot \
chicles including the utility
XM-I()15 tracked chassis,
the
truck and the jeep. Included within the
computer-processing and a uidcband data link lor the transmission of received material back to a control analysis centre. MSQ-'^'-^ is in cunvni use uith the L S .'\rmy and will become the sciMcc s basic electronic warfare receiving equips\sieiii
IS
built-in
ment. I
hc tXJ.A.M s\stem currently underdevelopment
b\ Faiichild \\ eston icpresents the leading-edge of
.American electriinic u artare technolog_\ HssenlialK s\s(eni. HXJAM is made up of a a 'throw -aua\ .
"
number of transmitters mounted in a I5.^mm artillerv shell Once tired, each transmitter package is eiected .
at
pre-set inter\als and falls to earth along the tlight
On hitting the ground, the unit imbeds itself. deplo\s an antenna and begins transmitting a jamming signal almost immediateK EXJA.M was tieldtested during I^K,^^ 14X4 and a manually -emplaced \ ariant is also being dc\ elopctl. path.
.
Left: A TEAM PACK AN/MSQ-103A installed on
thebackofanXIVI-1015. TEAMPACK IS an extremely versatile system, which can be
mounted on many different kinds of vehicles.
HLHCTROMC W ARFARH
Right;
i
A
The battlefields of
the future wi see g reat use of remotely-piloted 1
1
vehicles, like this
Compass Cope-R, for reconnaissance and target observation as well as
jamming and directionfinding. An RPV can carry
a
wide range of communications and surveillance equipment, tailored for specific
mission requirements.
AloHiiside
Its
ground-based
units, the
US Ann\
ot airborne electronie w arfare platforms .such as the RL'-21 series Beechcraft
makes e\tensi\e use the EH-6().A Blaek
sen e s
G ru m m a n
range of
s_\
Hawk
hehcopter and the R\-l
.\ o h a w k S u e h a re ra stems mekiding the Cetl\ 1
.
1
1 1
e arr\
LI
Lanee
Guardrail signals mtereept direetion-hnding
c
u
ide
The
British
Army
operates a combined
tormation has the additional role of maintaining communications sc^unt} monitoring the anny"s own .
signals tral IK to ensure that
an cncnix
is
no information of \ alue to
transmitted because of lax operator
ment on the RL'-2 the Quick Fix lamminii s\ sti HH-60.A and the Quick Look sur\ eillance s;
techniques.
the
current operational equipment.
ontheRV Mohauk
ples
1
.
intelli-
gence electronic u arfare system, believed to be concentrated in the .'^iith Royal Signals Regiment. This
ot"
I
K
The s\
British are reticent about discussing
Two known exam-
stems arc the Marconi S^^'^ and the
Below: The launching of an Aquila remotely-piloted vehicle, the choice of the
US Army for battlefield reconnaissance and electronic warfare.
by Lockheed,
Made
it is still in the prototype stage, and had great difficulty meeting the US Army's requirements.
KHY W EAPONS
Ml-.L l-cnaiili B.u hi^aii units. Both s\ siciii^ arc \ clc-mounied. the S373 providing nuiki-band laniiiiing and surveillance capability and the Barbican earn ing out radar classification, anal_\ sis and direction-finding.
The S373 uses a numberof high-powered transmitfeeding twin parabolic antennae mounted in a
ters
"double bubble" radome which can be h\draulicall\
The system operate s arc housed in mounted behind the radi>me on the earner
raised or low ered. a container
\ehicle.Ji standard 4-tonne Bedford truck.
tem
is
tioiis
The s\s-
STT) pro\ ided uith a self-contained mtcieept
capabilit\
and both
oice and data-link comnniniea-
\
channels.
Baibican uses a similar \ehiclc as a base and is automated, needing onl\ a single operator. A full Barbican system would comprise three intercept stations, all joined b> voice digital data-link channels to a central control. Frequency coverage is believed to be between one and IXGHz. Both these systems are currently in the development stage and no information as to their eventual use in service has been liiL;hl\
t
released.
Outside Naio and the Warsaw Pact, the most experienced nation in electronic warfare is Israel Precise details of Israeli equipment remain obsvaiie. It is belic\ed that the eountr\ has a u ide raiiL'c ol locall\ produced intercept and lainmine ei|uipiiient These are highl> mobile, beme mounted on a \ ai ict\ of wheeled and'traeked \eliiJcs Some cvampk's o'l equipment are the f k "n|n erouikl-l\iscd mobile
but
i
VHFjammerandllK
I
1
SM
l^ll
intercept and identity lailai cmitteis in al
sx
jsiaL-l
Mem
to
unii.|Lic
being lhei)nl\ eountr_\ curreniK makine opci atmnuse of an electronic warfare drone, the Masnit
reniotel\ -piloted
lie
I
tarc tle\
uhieh
dexelopmcni
on land nia\ be indicated b>
eloping
IS IS
\ehielc.
lutuic line ol
a diL'ilal
eleclronic
u
is
..|
a
cniplo\ed
lor
electronic u.ir-
new
I
,S
proicct
arfarc capabilit\ tor
When in
Haile Selassie canie to the throne ot Ethiopia
1930. he inherited a state uhieh could claim a
continuous existence going back
some 2000
years.
The mythical dynastic history of the "King of Kings" went back even further, to King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. During the 19th century, when the rest of Africa was divided up between the European powers, the Emperors of Abyssinia, as it was then known, not only kept their independence but strengthened and expanded their rule.
ment. Amied resistance in Eritrea grew after I960 w hen the region lost its autonomy and was reduced to Ogaden the traditional
the status of a province. In the
hostility of the local nomadic population to central government also took on a new dimension from 960. when the formation of Somalia gave the Somalis an independent homeland. Somalia aspired to incorpo1
rate all the
jects in the
colony of Eritrea, which in 935 became the base for an Italian occupation of Ethiopia. Selassie went into 1
exile until
1941.
British, victorious
when he was
reinstalled
by the
o\er the Italians throughout the
The status ot Eritrea and part of the Somaliinhabited Ogaden region to the southeast remained in doubt until after World War II. Eritrea came effecregion.
the guenilla
movement
in Eritrea
and
tervention in the
absolute rule exercised through his puppet parlia-
officers,
Despite the legitimacy conferred by a long tradi-
throne came increasingly under changing postwar world. The archaic state and society v\ere illadapted to an economy being slowK transformed b\ contact with the world economic system, and opposition developed in many di\erse quarters to Selassie's
tion, the imperial
on the use of Cuban
was forced embark on the expansion and modernisation of its armed forces. The .source of military aid. modern equipment and training was the United States, which by the 1970s was devoting more of its military aid
structures of a feudal
1952. and the
Ogaden w as handed
heavily
to
attack in the
under Ethiopian rule from
British-administered area of the o\ erto Ethiopia in 1955.
invasion, Ethiopia relied
troops.
the threat of Somali irredentism. Ethiopia
budget to Ethiopia than to the rest of Africa put together. By 19'70 the Ethiopian Army consisted of four infantry divisions - each division 8000 strong an armoured brigade, a commando battalion and a parachute battalion: the cnihiAo ol an air force had also been conceived. ciMiipnsmg a squadron equipped with American F-5s. This armed force pun cd quite adequate to contain the Eritrean insuigcnc\ and deter Somalia from in-
ti\el\
1
Ogaden.
To counter
At the time of Haile Selassie's accession, the country was bordered to the northeast by the Italian
Somali-inhabited areas in neighbouring favoured by Ethiopia's Somali sub-
states, a project
Above: Ethiopian leader Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam reviews an Addis Ababa parade with Cuba's Fidel Castro in March 977. Faced with Eritrean insurgency and Somali
Ogaden.
could not tlelend the imperial regime against other souivcs of op|iosiiionbut
it
was itscll a major scat ol discontent. 'nrest indeed. simmered in all ranks, but especiall\am
many
I
of w hom had been on training courses
Above: Emperor Haile Selassie,
whose corrupt
and inefficient regime was overthrown by thearmy in September 1974. Deposed and arrested, Haile Selassie died
in
prison
in
August 1975. I
S4^)
ETHIOPIA
1974-84
Above: Power in post-revolutionary Ethiopia was in the hands of the Derg, a committee
drawn from the army. Between 1974 and 1977, three leading
its
members
were Mengistu
(left),
Brigadier-General Teferi Banti (centre)
and
Lieutenant-Colonel Abate Atnafu (right). Both Banti and Atnafu fell victim to Mengistu in the intense power struggles of 1 977.
in the L'nitcd Slates. C untaet w ith the outside uorkl had made them aniinK aw are ol ihe areliaie hthiopian promotuHi s\ stem \\ hieh denied attainment ol senior
rank to
all
but the
were also aware
memhers
ol the ai istoeiaex
that tlmse at the lop
uere
m
I
.
he\
man\
eases using their exalted position to line their poekets.
an abuse the government
made no attempt
to elimin-
resented the baekuardness ol their eountrx
eountiAside po\
in the
.
-stneken peasants were respon-
The go\
labourers'
adequalel\
nment's inability to respond 1972-74. in whieh some
ci
lo the lamiiie ol
200. 0(10 peasants ma\ ha\e died, was a Imal reselalion ol the regime's moral and politieal bankrupte> .
ate or punish.
storm
I'he
Years of ineonclusive Hghting in remote areas under eonsiderable hardship had sapped the soldiers' morale, but they v\ere above all sensitixe to the general eurrent ol hostilit\ to the go\ ernment m most areas ol Ijliiopiaii societN that had suclleLi to a Hood by 1974. A neu middle'elass had dexeloped in the towns, ineluding students and intelleetuaK. whieh
eit\
sive to spieading agitation eallmg for 'land to the
broke
linall\
1974. First,
in mid-.lantiarx
Sidamo
the garrison ol Neghelle. a remote post in
Pro\ inee. mutinied o\ er liMng eonditions. Oltieers sent to enquire \nlo the eauses
were imprisoned and
loreed to li\e oil the men's rations. loree personnel
Ababa went on stutlents
Debre
the
at
On
/.eit
o\ er pa\
strike
.
1
(
I
|-ebruar\ air
base near .Addis l-our da\
later
s
and teaehers staged nois\ demonstrations
objeeting to the proposctl eurtailmg ol envisaged
Ethiopia in the
1970s
he lolKiwing week the eapitnoted oxer a threatened >() per eent
eilueationai lelorms. al's ia\i drivers
ineieasc iiuijoi
SOUTH YEMEN
pav
in petrol
uprising
I
priees.
The month ek>sed with
a
ranks ol the 2nd Div ision over
in the
eonditionsol serv
.
lee.
andalleged administrative
ei>rruption.
GULF OF ADEN
Time for a change For the lust time smee his aeeession m 19.^M) llaile S2 v ears old. lelt it would be wise to
.Selassie. b\ then
make some eoneession
to
Wold, was saeked Irom past
the
• Berbera
aiistoeiat.
•Hargeisa
SOMALIA
w as
to ilo
\}
veais.
his
minister.
.Aklilu
liable
be replaeed by a die-hard
Fndalkatehew Makonnen. But
to shift
own
to
the position he had held lor
this
mme
nothing to leliev e the tension smee. though
viiiemg support
hoping
popular opinion. The uni-
Linpopular prime
versallv
lor the
muehol
the
'people'.
Makonnen was
power Irom the
Faiipeitirto
elique ol great landow ners. the R.is.
lo be'jin with, eertain appeasim: uesiLires were
made. he loives' dem.inds on pav and liv mg e.>ndiwere granted A veneial sinke thivatened In the I
Iioiis
Conlederai^ion ol
I
lliiopuin
1
.iboui
I
nuMis
tC
'I
I
l')
wasaverled bv giv mil' ollieial permission loi government emplovees to lorm tiaile unions, he projiosed rise 111 the eosi ol petrol was postponed mdelimteK .mil talks were promised on land relorms. On the other hand, no steps were taken to |irobe into eorruption in i
during Eritrean conflict
the sei vices .ind
uspeet senior
Student del
demands
lor the arrest aiul trial of
.d strike'
pea
ETHIOPIA 1974 volts contiriLiecl until June,
decisive development
mutinies
in the
when
there occurred a
army, w ith simultaneous
2nd. 3rd and 4th Divisions, led by
in the
NCOs. A number
junior officers and
of higher-
ranking officers ucic anvsicd and a Coordinating Committee of the Armed oiccs known as the Derg. 1
from an Amharic woixl
for "conmiittee
of equals" -
members, none at the time above the rank of major. The Derg quickly established itself as the most powerful body in the country under the dynamic leadership of an ordnance officer of peasant origin. Mengistu Haile Mariam. It was the Derg which staged the final act of the overthrow of the old regime. On 12 September, an ollicer drove to the imperial palace to read an act of deposition to the emperor, who had for some time been living in almost total isolation. The octogenarian ruler was then airested and taken to a cell in the 4th Division jail where he remained until his death the following August. was
set up.
consisting of 126
Mengistu's Above: The Derg's policy of land reform and its
The Derg
appeal to Ethiopian nationalism made it enormously popular with
visional
at
first
victim
invited an e.\-general. Aman over the country as head of a Pro-
first
to take
Military
Government,
but
this
gesture
Andom was not prepared and w as fundamentally out of synipatin willi nuicli ol llic Derg's radical programme ol national sal ion. land reform and nationalism (which look the form ol resistance to separatist movements). From the start Andom clashed bitterly with Mengistu. especially over the question of the proposed execution of former officials and senior officers jailed by the Derg. and over the advisibility of proved an abysmal
failure.
to act as a tiguichcad.
the peasants, seen here
during a demonstration Addis Ababa.
Andom.
in
Below: Under serious pressure from Eritrean
I
a
negotiated settlement to the Eritrean question,
rearmed with equipment supplied by the Soviet Union. The troops below are carrying Soviet SKS
which Mengistu opposed. On 22 November Mengistu delivered a furious condemnation of those he termed "counterrevolutionaries". That same night the general's house was surrounded by a squadron of tanks and blown to pieces. Andom himself perishing in the ruins. Next day the order was issued for the execution of the political prisoners, aiiiont: them the former prime
7-62mm
niinisici
guerrilla
movementsand
the Somali invasion of the
Ogaden, the Derg rapidly increased the size of the Ethiopian Army and
rifles.
.
Akliki
X4
The control of the country now passed directly to the Derg, constituted as a [Prov isional Miliia; Iniinistrative Council (PM AC'i. but Men.'isui u Id back from taking full power, and Brigadier-Uencral '
.
became head of state. Although the PMAC programme had a strong left-wing element Ethiopia was declared a socialist state in December 1974- it was chiefly marked by intense nationalism,
Teferi Banti
its
slogan coined by Mengistu being f
best translated as Ethiopia First.
atism was combined with a total participation in government.
; '
'<
'iva
Oppo-
Tikdcn.
lo separ-
rejeciiv-i:
,:
civilian
Thus many of those
forces which had threatened the old regime - Eritrean and Somali separatists, and radical students, intellectuals and trade unionists in the towns - also menaced the Derg government. During 1975 the energies of urban radicals were turned aside as they dispersed into the rural areas on a concentrated campaign of political education among the peasantry. But in 1976. in an endeavour to consolidate an anti-military front, various civilian factions formed the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) with its own combat wing, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army (EPRA), determined to launch a campaign of urban tenorism to break the Derg's hold on power and establish a civilian Marxist regime. The first EPRA bombs exploded in Addis Ababa on 30 April 976, and by the autumn of that year the EPRP had become the Derg's major problem, even more directly threatening than 1
the full-scale
war being fought
in Eritrea.
A splinter group from the EPRP. the MEISON Ethiopian Socialist Movement), allied
itself
(
All
with the
Derg against the urban guerrillas and provided an armed militia tocooperate with special military security detachments set up to hunt down EPRA members. Elements of MEISON were suspected of complicity in a naiTowly failed attempt to asassinate Mengistu in September 1976. however, demonstrating how the mounting pressure was creating splits w ithin the Derg and among its supporters. In February 1977 Mengistu moved against his opponents in the Derg. After head of state Teferi Banti had delivered an anti-Mengistu speech, the two men
HTHIOI'IA I974-S4
he met on 3 hcbmary tor discussions. meeting developed mto a violent qiianel which in turn degenerated into a shoot-out; Banti and seven ot his men were killed. 'I he Derg met on February and appointed Mcngistu the new head ot state with a potential rival. Colonel Abate Atnatu. as hi^ deputy. Atnatu would also tall victim t( Mengistu the tollowing November, reportedly tor opposing the tightening links with the Soviet Union. 1977 was the crucial year in the Derg s struggle both to defeat separatism and to crush internal oppositK)n. Mengistu unleashed what he himselt termed a 'Red error" against his radical enemies on the streets ot Addis Ababa. 1
1
1
1
The campaign ot counter-terror against individual members ot the hPRP expanded into mass
killings.
Day
On May militia dialled 1
opened
the country
fire
protest, killing
on siudL iiis
Riglit:
May
some
militia raided students'
?()(). alter uhich gangs ot homes, arresting and subse-
quently executing a further 400.
As
the
EPRP fought
back Addis Ababa became a nightly battleground. Meanwhile Somali pressure on the Ogadcn developed into a full-scale iinasion as,Somalia sought to exploit the chaotic coiuliiions
mer of 1977 saw
a
m
l
.tliiopia
iviiiarkahlc
l
series ol
lie
sum-
Somali
advances which threatened to dri\e the f.lhuipians completely from the Ogadcii In l.nliva. toun alter
town
fell
to separatist guerrillas
l:\eii
supporters o\
trom exile in London, succeeded in infiltrating units into the western province of Begemdir. the old regime, organised
Eritrean fiasco
An
initial attempt by the Derg to expand the army in response to iiiilitar\ tliivats hatl tailed disastrously.
Proloimdl
\>
.
fiel(.l till! Ill
tuliatlpini
.^OO.OOd
'
t
I
iiiLii
gncn
ped,
on u
(i
b\ ihe scl-lxicks registered in the
J,
I,
.,
I
,is
ilic
jcncial inobilisation'. laiscd. hastily
mosi
i
and ihcn thmuii nUn ihc anii\ slu\
i
MengisAforceof
nihiiis.iLiainsi the Ijitrcans,
onl\
and poorly equip-
lulimcntary basic training, Ik-KI as
an "autonomous"
hoped that The experi-
LalerMcn,!jisUi.ul,,iiiicdilKilhchad uei>:ht ol luniilxis udiilil jiicvail.
niLMl pi()\ed to he one ol his Icvs mistakes. Alter sullcrmg appalling losses, this horde was hastily
IXS^
Differences between Derg and the
IVIengistu's
liom
in
pivpaniii; a
withdrawn
to be
employed from then on
in
an internal
degenerated
security role. In
May
1977. however. Mengistu visited
and returned with
a
promise of military aid
civilian leftist parties
Moscow
that
w as to
into a brutal
murder on the Ababa. assassination squads
campaign
of
streets of Addis Rival
retrieve the situation. Initially, despite the declaration
fought a vicious war,
of a socialist state, the Derg had continued to receive American military aid. But already before the tall of
leaving theirvictims'
Haile Selassie's regime, the United States had begun
have doubts about its commitment to Ethiopia. Originally adopted as a conservative bar to the expansion of left-wing influence in the Horn of Africa- seen as strategically important because of its control of the narrow entrance to the Red Sea -support for Ethiopia had hee lulc \ a ued as the government exploited it for a war against hi itrean separatists in which the United States had no interest. Nothing in the development of Ethiopian politics after the overthrow ol the emperor encouraged the Americans to increase their backing. to
I
The Ment'istu
ivlmiiic linalK established in Ivbriiarv
1977 was\listasidul u. ihc I S goxenimcul ol Presi( 'ai lei because ot its Icl l-u Iciulencies and its contempt lor luiman iighls. On 21 April the Pentagon announced the blocking ol all aims su|iplies to .thiopia and the beginning ol ihesuppK ol delensne uea|ions' to its neighbours Sudan and Somalia. lU turning lo (he Russians. ho\\e\ei. Mengistu uas able loeMiael largreater suppcui iluin the .Americans v\ ould ever ha\ e olieied. he So\ let I Inion had been supplying Somalia, backing its lett-wing
dent Jimm\
l
1
bodies on public display.
ETHIOPIA October 1977. but
all
to
no
avail.
By
the military balance in the Ogaden against Somalia and the Ethiopians the Somali
Army from
the
1974-84
end of 1977
hag tipped totally were able to chase in 1978 -
their territory
although pressure from both superpowers halted any possible Ethiopian invasion of Somalia.
A 'wave of madness' At the same time, the Derg ruthlessly achieved control of the situation in Addis Ababa. During the
months of December 1977 and January 1978. the EPRA and MEISON fought bloody battles in the of the capital, while special Derg counterterrorist squads hunted down both sides. By the end of this 'wave of madness", as it has been described, the prisons were overflowing and thousands had died, but Mengistu and the Derg were firmly in control. Only in Eritrea was the Derg unable durably to assert its authority, despite an immensely expanded army, in 1984 it was reckoned that the strength of the Ethiopian Army was at least 00.000 regulars backed by a reasonably trained territorial force of between 150.000 and 200.000 men. The air force had expanded to 3500 men with 3 combat aircraft -mostly MiG-17s. but with one squadron of MiG-23s. The foreign presence was estimated at 1400 Russians, a combat division of 13.000 Cubans and 250 East Germans, many of whom operate aircraft and man the more sophisticated heavy weapons. Yet despite the expansion of the Ethiopian armed forces into probably the biggest and best equipped in black Africa, the Eritrean insurgency remained unrepressed. Into the 1980s Mengistu established his rule on ever firmer bases. Having crushed the opposition civilian radicals, he worked towards establishing a mass party which would make Ethiopia a Soviet-style single-party state. Outside of Eritrea, no apparent streets
1
Above: Ethiopia's new military rulers soon saw the student militants as
dangerous
rivals for
power
and moved to suppress them. Heresoldiersguard students arrested during a demonstration.
regime, but the Soviets had no time tor Somah territorial ambitions. The highest aim of Soviet diplomacy in the region was to achieve a federation of Ethiopia. Somalia. Eritrea and the South Yemen,
under Soviet tutelage, which would have given Russia mastery of the Red Sea. Attempts to create such a grand alliance foundered precisely on Somali territorial claims. In May 1977. given the chance to swap influence over Somalia for influence over Ethiopia, the Soviet Union jumped at the chance. Soon military hardware. Russian and East German military advisers and Cuban combat troops were flowing into Ethiopia. Somalia, on the other hand, wasdisappointed in its hope for Western support. Ina desperate bid to seduce the West. President Siad Barre even allowed (leinuin and British counterterrorist squcids
t(i
against hiiackers
oix'iatc in his capital.
who
iiad
Mogadishu,
flown an airliner there
in
I
1
serious threat to the regime remained.
Patrick Turnbull
The struggle for Eritrean
independence I
hc Italian CO
l
ul Alii
.i
1
iliva.
IS'-^i.
BnlislKKlnimisiialioniniy4l
established on the Red came under temporary when Italy's Hast Alri'-
Icll to Allied troops. Postwar divisions beluecn Ihc eical powers prevented the United Namore permanent solution to the question of Eritrea's future until 1952. when it w as agreed that it should be federated with neighbouring Ethiopia. The large degree of autonomy originally granted to Eritrea under this arrangement was gradually eroded by the autocratic regime of Emperor Haile Selassie, however, until the dissolution of the Eritrean parliament and outright annexation were pushed through in 1962. Eritrean resistance to Ethiopian domination had already begun during the 950s, and by September 1961 the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), founded in I960, had opened an armed struggle for total independence.
can cniinic
tions arriving at a
1
Liberators divided Based originally amongst Eritrea's large Muslim population, the ELF. backed by Syria and Iraq, was able to
tie
down
a large proportion of the Ethiopian
armed forces throughout the 1960s. Its conservative nationalism was gradually radicalised from the mid1960s onward, as it attracted increasing numbers ot the predominantly urban Christian population to
ranks.
The
servative. first
latent divisions
Muslim and
between
radical
its
and con-
Christian, led in 1970 to the
of the major splits which have consistently bede-
villed the Eritrean national liberation
movement.
A
group led by Osman Saleh Sabbe broke away from the ELF to form the more radical Eritrean People's Liberation Forces (EPLF). which received the backing of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Iraq. Serious fighting between the various Eritrean factions
weakened the opposition to Ethiopian control of which nevertheless grew during this period as economic crisis experienced by the
Eritrea,
a result of the
province following the closing of the Suez Canal after
Six-Day War of 967, and the general dissatisfacregime of Haile Selassie which was developing throughout Ethiopia. That dissatisfaction erupted into a wave of strikes and student demonstrations, in Asmara, capital of Eritrea.aswellasin Addis Ababa, in 1974. leading to a take-over by left-wing officers. Ethiopia's new military rulers were well aware of the difhculties to be faced in achieving a purely military solution to the Eritrean insurgency, and General Aman Andom. who became head of state in September 974 and was himself an Eritrean, made peace overtures to the Eritrean nationalists. Opposition from within the Derg led to a violent split in the ruling group, however, and Andom was killed during an armed assault on his home on 23 November. The tenuous possibility of a peaceful compromise the
1
tion with the
1
to the Eritrean conflict disappcaicti in .lanuarv 1975.
a joint ELF-EPLF attack was launched on Asmara. Though the Ethiopians repelled this offen-
when
sive with great brutality, the l.nliean L-ucnillas fol-
1854
The experience, organisation and modern armament of the Eritrean guerrillas (above), shown here displaying their AKM rifles, contrasted sharply with the poorly assault
equipped, unorganised militia hurriedly put together by the Ethiopians and sent off, poorly trained, to crush the Eritrean rebellion. Armed with a collection of Soviet World
WarllPPShandPPS sub-machine guns
(right),
the peasant militia was soon routed and fled.
lowed up
experiment
this
string or successes.
over the
fcritrcan
tinuedtomakc
in |oini nfjt
|.'i;i
cor
,
-
nl-
!
va^'uv
iations with a
ndm' WlaW
iheir control
i-
iluoujjliout
ing a desire or negoiiaiKjiis. the lack of f
Dciy t'r: 975 indicatany concrete
1
proposals convinced the hritreans that only military victory would win thcin total independence. 1976 saw new guerrilla successes \u l.ntrea. which the Derg attempted to counter by l^lising a mass I'-i'
Though
peasant militia.
greatly
Hritrean guerrilla forces, trained,
this
I'lhcring the
milit;;.
more than an armed
little
/
poorly
ds
hoidi:
l.ari/cly
Christian, and motivated by the promise oi
lari'i
in
march on the war-torn prc^vmce confused aspect ofa religious crusade with
l.ntrea. the militia's
on
lie
1
tolornai oveilones. Mil potted to the hritrean border, the militia
I
liadly supplied
(I
I
III
I
iiiiaiion
.May 1976, when they mounted a number
III
attacks on militia
)l
'
and creating
ses
was
and without clear leadership.
ans were able to exploit this confused
Mil
I
I'
1
l
iliiopian
assembly points, inflicting heavy amongst the untrained sending thousands of them
utter panic
peasants,
llcemg southwards.
he source
I
weakness
ol'
marked
his rout of the militia oll- n r/r
I
sei/ureof the military
now began
iniiiaii
i> ,
ih-
i
a decisive
.ritreans,
who
"uU't\ li
ii
'
armoured support highly dangerous, liy December '>77. the Hthiopians were trying desperately to retain iiiirol of Asmara and the Red Sea ports of .Massawa iikI Assab. while the Hritrean separatists were in iiiiiiiiarid of the whole of the rest of the province. A iihin the f'.ritrean nationalist ranks, which hi r'ain in 1976 to produce a third separatist Mill .iii'iii. the HLF-PIJ-, continued toconstitute a laial source ol weakness, however, particularly once ilie revolutionary regime in Addis Ababa began to iiiifirove its relations with the radical Arab states and a l.uropean countries which had been the f:ritI
'
I
II
1
!
.1
<
I
l
u an
|)Miicipal
,
backers.
O-aden War of 1977-78. which might have
Ill-
expected to provide a classic diversion of Hthioforces, allowing the J-.ritreans to consolidate
lieen piaii
on
their grip
their liberated areas, in fact
enormously
strengthened the Derg. which was able to channel patriotic sentiment into the creation of a new mass
same time the left-wing military rulers in became convinced that they must turn to Union and Cuba lor assistance. Massively uppli'il Aith modern Soviet weapons, trained by iiiupcan instructors, and backed by large num<,\( iihaiicofTibat troops, the Hthiopians were not iM liberate the Ogaden from Somafi forces, Mill
army;
the
ai
Addr A S<
ill'
I
I
I
li'
.
I
I
laba
p
t
I
I
,
I.
f
Ml
,il
u
.iiiiea
lurn to preparations for a new offensive in he Jvritreans" chance ol winning total indeto recede as Hthiopian forces massed
I.,
I
pendence began tor the assault.
Although Hidel Castro's hesitation over involvement in the Hritrean conflict deprived the Ethiopians of the direct
and .
I
piM IlII
!
!,
support ol
Cuban
troops, the re-arming'
or'janisation of the Hthiopian
re
Ill]
armed ,
.
II,
io
loixcs.
Uy the Soviet Union and itsallie allowed lebellious .iia tobegin the reconquest of ii One by one the towns held by the |-.rilreans -.lifjcrior Hthiopian forces, and the l:ritreans I
ERITRhA l%l-84 were toreed to revert to yucrnlla tactics. The Hlhiopiaiis were unable to inflict a decisive defeat on their opponents, however, and contnuied to face a longterm insur;jent problem. lic town of .Xalka. m nortlicrn l.ntrca. provided an example ol the iimilsnt l.thiopiaii success, and the 'l
tenacit} ot hritrean resistance. Persistent l.thH)pian
attempts to recapture the town were repulsed, and an assault in 1979
was so decisively defeated
that the
way
Ethiopian survivors were forced to fight their
to
where they were evacuated by Soviet
sea.
the
warships.
Attempts
Nafka were resumed
to retake
again w ithout success, and
in
in 1981, January 1982 Colonel
Haile Mariam. Chairman of the Ethiopian announced preparations tor a nev\ operation, to
.MciiL^istu )c\
1
ii
.
in\oKc 10 divisions, totalling some 12U,(XK) men. Nafka was to be taken in a pincer movement, but having become a symbol of Eritrean resistance, it was strongly defended. Sited in easily defended broken ground which precluded the use of Ethiopian armoured vehicles. Nafka was surrounded by a double line of Eritrean trenches, with dug-outs and
maximum
strongpoints sited to take
advantage of the
ground.
Resolute lesistance flic
and
.\afka lasted foLir months, during w as siih|ectcd to intense dail\ aililler\homhai dnicnl he icsi>lutcl\ -held tren-
siege
w Inch
ol
the tow n
aerial
ches
1
repulsed
c\ci\
assault.
intaiiti\
ihioi^ian
I
thiopiancommaiidci uasobliged The to admit detcal and l'i\c the order \o w itlidrau Ethiopian ollcnsi\e u as also smashed m the Harka sector, u here the f iiieaiis were able to recapture the lelhal neai Keren, important nil akenlie >.
houe\er.
until the
I
.
i
I
I
.
his battle saw some ol the bitterest hghting of the whole war. hut the siieiiLilh ol their armoured lormations and their total coiiinuind of the air enabled the lahiopiaiis to maintain their grip on the open. Hat ground, making e\tensi\ e use ol napalm. |tln>sphorus he Eritreans also insisted that and cluster bombs. tlie\ had been subiected to ner\e-gas attacks, and produced photogiaplis o\ their troops manning positions wearing gas masks. Nevertheless. Ethiopia has I
I
coiisisteiitK eienied these allegations,
H\ mid- IMS:. the out. Iea\
mg
Ljiiesiionol
Ihe Ei
iti
Ihiopian ollensive had li//lcd
I
eaiiMii a shghtv strongei position
how loiesoKeaeonnicl which had
lorovei :(l\eais. eostinganestimated
I
lasted
(KI.IHH)
li\
es.
remained unanswered \\ hile the most satislactorv solution would seem to be a return to ledeiatum w ith a gnai anieed and e\Iensi\ e degree ol aulonomv lor the i-.rilieans, Ihe piohlem ol dilleiciil social and [Political s\ stems eo-e\isiing wiihin such a ledeialion remained W hiletherelali\el\ ad\ anced and democratic
sitiialion
stronglv w
lib
in
1
iiliea
duiing the
contrasted
h),s()s
the leudalisiie autt>ciac> ol
1
laile .Selas-
regime now inptnver in ,\ddis .\haba would beee|uali \ suspicious ol w hat it mnjhl now ie-\\ esiern l-ritrca'. staiKlmg Ivlween il ,ind access to the Red Sea. he \ ital ci. oiiomie and mililai") import. nice ol access to f.iitiea's Red Sea polls lemaiiis the ke\ factor in sie's Ethiopia. lheie\okilionar\
1
l-,thio|ii,rs
eonliniied
seci.'ssioii
and
mihtai
v
.
111
ilelei
eiisiii
assisi.inee loi
minal ion to
resist f ritreaii
ing (he mainlenaiice
I'alru k
1
856
i^l
Sox
let
Addis Ab.iba I
iinihiill
The Ogaden War The Somali
invasion
of Ethiopia One of
the first acts of Somalia, wfien it achieved independence in July I960, was to demand the redrawing of its frontiers to include those areas of neighbouring Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti inhabited by ethnic Somalis The largest area claimed by Soma.
lia was the southern Ethiopian province of the Ogaden, which was largely desert and inhabited predominantly by Somalis. The Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie rejected the claim, and declared a state of emergency in the Ogaden. concentrating his troops along the Somali border. This state of tension erupted into open warfare in 964. when fighting broke out between Ethiopian and Somali forces. Ethiopian military superiority soon made itself felt, however, and the confrontation ended with the resumption of negotiations. Post-independence Somalia faced serious internal problems, which temporarily diverted attention from the problem of the Ogaden. Domestic discontent reached boiling point on 15 October 1969. when the president of the Somali Republic was assassinated by one of his own guards Six days later, the commanderin-chief of the armed forces, Major-General Mohammed Siad Bane, assumed power as the new president 111 a bloodless coup. One of the main goals of the new ji:^vernment, which proclaimed Somalia a socialist state in October 1970, was the incorporation of all 1
.
Somali-populated areas into a unified nation. As sterile negotiations with Ethiopia dragged on, Siad Barre began to supply aid to militant Somalis within the Ogaden,
who were
able to stage a
number
of successful attacks on isolated Ethiopian units
in the
province. Disappointed by the results of the 1974 revolution
in
Ethiopia, which deposed Haile Selassie
but brought to
army
officers,
power a group of nationalist
who were
just as
lelt-w ing
committed
to the
preservation of the unity of the Ethiopian empire.
Siad tion
Banc turned to consideration of a to the Ogaden dispute.
military solu-
Somalia missed its best opportunity to strike at Ethiopia during the period of internal conflicts and chaos which followed the 974 revolution, because at that time the Somali armed forces were divcncd to emergency relief work as a result of the tragic drought which struck the whole region during the mid- 97()s. 1
1
THEOGADENW AR Left:
1977-78
Ogadentribeswomen
display their enthusiastic
supportfortheWest Somali Liberation Front.
The Somali armed forces (below), although well
trained and equipped by their Eastern bloc advisers (right;
Hungarian
off icers
in Mogadishu before the Ogaden War), were no
match forthe Ethiopians once the Soviet Union transferred
its
support to
the other side.
B\
earl\ 1977.
hea\
>
how c\ er. encouraged by
deteats uhich the Ethiopian
the series of
Army was
sut'fer-
hands o\ separatist guerrillas in Eritrea, and b\ the murderous strui:i:le \n .Addis Ababa between the ruhnsj bod\ the Deri:, under Colonel Mengistu ing at the
.
Haile Mariam.
andenihan
cluded that the time had blow
c
leftist J
groups. Barre con-
to strike the decisive
.
Realising the political importance of not being
branded as an aggressor
b]\ cithci the L nited
Nations
orthcOrgani/atmnof .Atrilean I nii\ - w hose foundation stone w as the sanctit> of the frontiers bequeathed bv colonialism - Ban'c refrained from officiallv com-
mitting the Somali
Army
to the
Ogaden, but Somali
troops almost certainly participated, alongside forces
W est
Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). when betueen 3(ini) and 6000 men invaded the Osaden from StHiialia m .May 1977. The WSLF. which had been founded in 1975. was based among the Somali population of the Ogaden. and claimed the right of secession for the territory south of a line running from .Vloyale on the Kenyan border, through Awash, south of .Addis Ahaba. to Djibouti - an area of some 625 H H square km 240.000 square miles), inhabited largel) b\ ethnic Somalis. Somalia's decision to prise the Ogaden awa> from
of the
.1
)
1
THE OG.A DEN WAR
1977-78
THEOGADEN WAR Ethiopia by armed force was based on a faulty estimation of tiie international situation,
however. The most
important factor lay in the superpower alliances of Ethiopia and Somalia, which Barre judged to be stable
and
in
Somalia's favour. In
fact,
however, the
Ethiopian revolution had set off a regional chain-
which by 1977 was causing a realignment of alliances. Ethiopia had been a close ally of the United States under Haile Selassie, and the Ethiopian armed forces had been trained and equipped by America. But the leftward drift of the Derg and its increasing resort to terroristic methods of rule alienated the reaction,
of
administration
- J'
i
President
Jimmy
Carter
in
Washington, which halted all arms supplies to Addis Ababa on 24 February 1977. This weakening of Ethiopia's backing in the West would undoubtedly have been to Somalia's advantage, had it not coincided with a strengthening of the Mengistu regime's links with the Soviet Union. Moscow, which had been allied to Somalia since 1974 by a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, viewed with sympathy the radical course being adopted by the Derg. An Ethiopian delegation to Moscow in December 1976 was able to negotiate the purchase of over $ 00 million worth of arms, the first shipments of which began to am ve in Ethiopia in May 1977. along with a group of Soviet military advisers and instructors. Meanwhile, by rationing supplies of arms to Somalia, Moscow planned to avoid a fullscale war in the Horn of Africa. The Soviet Union sought to gain maximum advantage from the situation by proposing a regional federation of pro-Moscow states, to include Somalia, Ethiopia and South Yemen, An attempt to mediate on this basis by Cuba's Fidel Castro in March 1977, foundered because of Somali insistence on the settlement of its claim to the 1
A group of Somali guard a captured 14.5mm ZPU-2 anti-aircraft machinegun. Although the WSLF had been active in
Above:
guerrillas
the
Ogaden for some time
before 1977, the regular
Somali
Army was
responsible forthe main
operations of the
War.
Ogaden
Ogaden
as a precondition of
its
participation in the
proposed federation. In June 977 the WSLF stepped up its campaign in the Ogaden, cutting the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway line at several points. The success of this offensive decided Siad Barre to commit the Somali Army to an invasion of the Ogaden on 24 July, though the fiction that no regular Somali forces were involved 1
.
was maintained.
1977-78
Throughout the early stages of their advance into the Ogaden, Somali forces had the advantage of operating close to their bases, and amcfigst a population which was overwhelmingly sympathetic to them The Ethiopians, on the other hand, were isolated and disorganised, and their morale was low as a result of the purges and chaos which had resulted from the 1974 revolution. Within a few days. Somali units had taken the south Ogaden towns of K'ebri Debar and Daghabur, as well as the important ann\ and air force base at Code, and were advancing nor- hw wi xl on Jijiga and Harer. Somalia suffered a major setback in early August, however, when the United States, which had promised to supply Mogadishu with 'defensive' weapons as recently as 15 July, and may even have implied more active encouragement of a Somali attack on Ethiopia, became alarmed at the implications of association with the Somali invasion and cancelled the agreement. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, continued to move closer to the Mengistu regime, which proclaimed a state of war between Ethiopia and Somalia, ordered a general mobilisation, and pressed ahead with the formation of a mass peasant militia. This militia, along with the rapidly expanded regular armed forces, was trained by Soviet and Cuban military advisers in the use of the Soviet weapons which had begun to arrive in May 977. Somalia continued to enjoy an unbroken string of successes in the field, and by the time Mengistu had issued his mobilisation order, the whole of southern and central Ogaden was in Somali hands. Heavy fighting was taking place around Harer and Dire Dawa, though the Ethiopian Air Force, Hying from a base at Dire Dawa, was able to blunt the Somali advance, allowing the army, supported by large num1
bers of militia, to stabilise the front.
By September, assault
on
were poised for an most important Ethiopian
the Somalis
Jijiga,
the
base in the whole province. Its retention was of such importance that Mengistu himself is reported to have
flown last lis
to the
town
to exhort
man if necessary.
oveuan
casualties
its
garrison to resist to the
upon
Somasome 3000
After fierce fighting, the
the outer defences, inflicting
the Ethiopian defenders,
who
fell
.
THHOCiADHN
WAR
1977-78
Ixick llllo the tOVMI llscll
;itlacksb\ llicSiiiiKili
\ii
uas;ilrcaJ\ low. and
ilu'
On
I
I
lk' SI
'U^w
I
uill to
h
icmm
lumps nianaLied to Soniah lines and tell halk on llarei inuiihci ol
last 1
I
simvni shp aw
2 Sc|itciiilu'i- the ^'an iscn
.
i
stroiieholdm the O'jaden he hiL^h-pointol Somali siieeess,,
on
bcr. with attacks
llaiei. hut this
the tUfnirii^-point ol the wai
I
lie
,ils
lapn
danL:eious|\ extended the Soniali lines
had taken them into areas uhcie the p Hthiopi
ei
othe but had
hand,
.andw
nixi
was moie
soil that
ei L
eleaii\ idenliliahle
alsii beLiiiii to
mobilise the
eiiei;
by the ie\olLition.
Moie dccisivolv perhaps, the earlv Hthiopian deteats seem to have eonvineed the ,S( \ iet Union to ineiease the seale of
Realisms
u
ith
arms supplie
its
Moseow had deeided
the
to
baekiiiL' treat\
that
Hthiopians.
the So\
let L
o gi\e all-out
.Somalia eaneelled
nion on
So\
to the Deri:,
.
i
I
No ember \
all
diuMi
SoNiet mililaiA laeilities. sik h as the na\
base tie
all
at
ad\ ise
s.
Berbera. Mogadishu alsose\eri .d
Havana, although
relations with
them u
let
ith
it
al
diplomamaintained
Its
.
I'nited States intelhgenee
first v\a\e of a massixe Soviet airiitt. whieh o\er the eoniing months was to provide f.tliiopia with surface-to-surface missiles. T55 and b2 tanks. 122mm BlVl-21 rocket launchers, fighter aircraft and transport helicopters, as well as huge quantities of smallarms and ammunition. W ith the new weapons came inereasing numbers ol So\ let and Cuban advisers, as w ell as laige numbers of Cuban combat troops, who by early 1978 were estimated to
deteeted the
I
number some 15.000.
It
w as reported that the Cubans
had been airlifted directly from Angola, where they had been involved in support of the Marxist government. As well as Russians and Cubans. East German military instructors, reportedly flying
combat mis-
MiGs. and South Yemeni number of tank crew, were also
sions in Soviet-supplied
resent on the Ethiopian side as the fighting in the )gaden became more intense. The increasing weight Soviet intluence in Addis Ababa was indicated by
ol
the fact that the direction
(if
Ethiopian militarx opera-
Ogaden was no\s m the hands ol a committee with included h\e senior So\ let otiieeis among whom w as General Cn iyori Bai iso\ the efiecti\e operational eommaiulei nine C'ribans. led by General .Arnaldo )ehoa Sanehe/. eoiiimanderof the Cuban torees in Ethiopia and formerCuban eommanderin .Angola, and two South Yemenis. tions in the
(
Stitlened b\
the
first
Cuban contingent
ot
troops to reach the front, the Ethiopian delenders ot
Harer were able to throw back the repeated Somali attacks, and the Ogaden War entered a phase ol attrition, in which the e\ er-ineieasmg l.thiopian superiority in manpower and w ai material was to pro\e
General Bans, Somali armed
1862
equipped,
and
stronij
ith
establish a
onnd
l\
air
and
new delen-
Due Daw a.
B\
lor an all-out assault,
fhe
Hai
lebruaiA
and
r
Ethiopiai became lehed on l ebruarx in torrential ram. howe\er. and the Somalis usei.1 the oppoilunitx to withdraw oxer the Gara Marda Pass to piisitioiis around .lipga. On .'^
K)gged down
NEirch. Jijiga
(
d w
fell to a
renexved Ethiopian assault, this
Cuban force of 70 tanks which had been lifted by helicopter to the Somali rear Siad Barre. whoon February had announced the official entry of Somali forces into the )gaden W ar. real ised now that he was facing not on \ a dee s \ e and crushing defeat in the Ogaden, but also the possibilitx of an Ethiopian invasion of Somali tenitory. He therefore began the immediate withdrawal of all Somali heavy equipment from the Ogaden, and on 9 March 1978 announced the total withdrawal of Somali troops. The Ethiopian and Cuban advance rolled southward inexorablx supported by the Ethiopian Air Force, which had alreadx won total command of the air. Fighting was reported to ha\e eeaseil on 14 March, but guerrillas ot the W SEf continued to harass the .thiopian and CLibaii lorees in the )gaden. fhe danger ot an bihiopian iinasK)n ol .Somalia wasaxeited. howexer. reportedlx duetoSoxiet inlluenee. Moscow was interested in maintaining the time invi)lving a
aiiiift
On :b No\ ember
;roops. including a
|97S. and the
.laiiuarx
I
led
t
its
Mi>seow
The Soviet
i
Ethiopians. newl_\ spearheaded b\ C'Lihans.
1^77.
and elosed
expelled
leiiiaininL:
against Somali positions
ormei
l_\
adx
to the
unter-attack
I
I
(
i
I
i
.
(
l
status
quo
111
the
1
lorn ol .Alriea. loreoiitinued tensu>n
So' sthem. >stelle. wax ol ensuring: the eontinucLl di .-ndenei ol theDerg upon Sox let and Cuban backing. .\los .n\ and its piroteges in ,\ddis Ababa, must alsohaxe iken note of a statement b_\ L S Seei etarx of State C> IS V ance on 10 February, which made exidenl the eadmess of Washington to reeommenee the sLipplx of arms to Mogadishu should l.thiopia invade Somalia. Tension along the Somali-1 thiopian border persisted, howexer, intothe I'JSOsand while the W SEE eontiiuied to be aeti\e. inllieting steadx losses on bet^
II
.
!.
thiopian troops stationed
(
iihan unit
1
l
emainetl present
laiei. leailx to
in
the
in
the
move slum id the
Ogaden.
a
large
mountains around
situation deteriorale.
Somalia, meanwhile, lepeatedlx elaimed that l^thiopiaii aiieialt had mounted attacks against targets in Somalia, inllieting heax \ ei\ ilian casualties.
Patrick
1
iirnhull
Above: Soviet Antonov An-12Cubtransport aircraft at Dire Dawa. Deprived of American
arms supplies
after
February 1977, Ettiiopia turned to ttie Soviet tJnion
and Cuba
for military
assistance. Soviet
weapons and
advisers
began to arrive in May 1977, and in Novembera massive airlift of military equipment began which allowed Ethiopia rapidly
to
expand its armed forces and go overtothe offensive. By March 978, the Somalis had been swept from the Ogaden. 1
)
KHY WEAPONS I
s^Miioinc applications
Ik'
tia.c ihcii xi
iL'iiis
Ixkk
i>t
clcclronic uartaiv can
W
lo ilu- Kuss,. j.ip.mcsc
nl
.11
ulicn hiXli sides Liscd iiilcKcpl k-.ci\cis
l^)(M-(l.->
nuiiiilor signals
and
alsci
nuidc atlciiipls in
i,.
|,iin ihciii
end of World W ai II na\ al ciccti mi 1. u ait aiv cIccUdnk suppmi had settled into two niain areas measures (cqriipnienl designed to ieLei\e, ideiiiil\ and locate hostile radio and radar emissions and offensive jamming eiiuipment iloi disiu|iiing and degrading cnem> cleelionie sensi)rs and commuinca-
By
the
.
.
1
tionsgear). In the decade and a half following 1945 more importance was placed on electronic support mealamming as the availability of seaworthy radai sets ie\ealed new possibilities in long-range slnp and an u alt detection in both fair and foul weather. b_\ da\ orb\ night. The emphasis of electronic warfare at sea changed dramatically, however, with the emergence of the radar-homing missile during the early 1960s. The
sures rather than on
smkniL' of the Israeli destroyer Eilat led to a major re
e\
Illation
I
of the situation
eie^iionie warfare.
On
blockading Port Said
in the field
21 October 1967
of naval
the£/towas
when an Egyptian Komar-class
missile boat at anchor in the harbour launched
SS-N-2 Styx missiles against the
its
Israeli ship. Hits
were scored and the Eilat sank as a result of the damage; being an ex- World War II destroyer of the British Z-class. it was not equipped with any radar or jamming devices effective again.st these postwar Soviet missiles.
of
weapon posed an enormous
speed left many conventional air defence weapons incapable of engaging them and their radar-guidance made them very accurate. The emphasis in electronic warfare at sea hence shifted to efforts to deceive missile radars. One effective electronic counter-measure EC.Vl is the transmission of a jamming signal or the generathreat to surface ships: the missiles' high
(
tion of a false return signal to the missile's radar
the intention of
of
making
the
weapon
I
all
ith
\\
shoii or
\\
ide
intended target. Chaft has aU,. heeii wulel)
its
used. Chaff
a rctlecti\e material, liied
IS
tiom
laLiii-
chers. designed to pro\ ide radar with a eontiising
Speed
signal.
most important
an\ counter to anti-ship missiles; the ehati emplo\ed at sea Is known as 'rapid bloom', since it tonus the
'
r.
J
w hen
is
tiie
Joud\er\
luides.
tiii---
qiiiekl\
leatiire ol
At sea. ehal
depending on the range
detected. At extreme and
medium
1
is
used
in
ol the threat
ranges
v.
hal
I
deployed
in either "confusion' or distraction both cases large numbers of clouds ok dial aredischarged in the hope that the missile w ill lock-on is
mode:
in
1
toone of these. These tu o modes are especialK useful for dealing with large-scale missile attacks. .At the
mode is used: in this case a largemassofchaffisdeployed very close ti> the ship to proxide a more attractive signal to the incoming
closest ranges "centroid'
missile.
The use by the Eg\ptians of passive (recei\ingi radar-homing missiles during the 1973 October W ar wasasignoftheappriiaching obsolescence ol a u hole generation
homing
own
of
electronic
tactics
Passive
rad;ii
missiles sudi as the AS-.-s Kelt use the target's
radar transmissions or j.imming si>jnals as
gLii-
dance: against such s\stems ,iiii\ sw itehing-oll the transmission being homed onto will disturb the gui-
dance system, but the latest generation o| missiles m this category have the facilit\ to remember' the 1X64
warfare
is
the
field
SIGINT (SIGnals has a large
of intelligence-gathering or The Soviet Navy "trawlers" equipped with an
INTelligence).
number of
extensive array of listening de\ ices to anal\ se trans-
new breed
This
even though the target may have shut-down all its transmitters. Another, highly secret, sector of naval electronic
target's location
missions from ships nearby. These vessels are regularly in attendance at Nato naval exercises. It has
been reported that a number of Soviet Golf-class submarines have also been given SIGINT equipment. The Americans also have SIGINT ships, the most
Previous page: The mainmast ofthe
amphibious assault ship \JSS Inchon carries
SPS
10
surface search radar, satellite
communications
devices and Tacan (tactical analysis) beacons. Above: ASovietSIGlNT ship, the
Moma-class .yup/fe/-. Below: A chaff rocket being loaded into a Shield chaff launcher, built by Plessey.
f
CTRONIC WARFARE: SEA
which was the LSS Fiieblu. captured by the Nonh Koreans in 1968. The information gathered by these vessels proves most useful in denews\vonh\
ot
signing electronic counter-measures against the missiles of the opposition. The equipment installed on these ships has less sophisticated counterpans on ordinary warships for the detection of enemy signals
To reduce the chance of discovby enemy sensors, a ship u ill operate in E.MCON
under war conditions er\'
.
CONtroli mode uhich m\ol\e> shutting down the radar and radio to the minimum necessan. Currently. na\al electronic warfare equipment is being produced b\ the two superpo\\ers and in a numberof smaller countries. The United Kingdom is probably Europe's largest produccrof electronic u arfare har'duare. Four t>pcv ot chati launchers are in production in the LK: Cor\us which comes m an (EMi'ssion
i
eight-tube uniti. Barricade (six sets of triple tubes).
modules which may be combined to make upto 2 launch tubes and Protean up to four groups of nine launchers carr\ ing four magaThere is aKo achaff zines of 36 chaff grenades each shell forthe4-5in gun common to nn^st larger British ships. For electronic suppon the L K produces three Shield (three-barrelled 1
)
(
.
I.
major systems: SCI.MITAR i-\-tcni tor countering interdiction missiles and target acquisition radars)
fare equipment are the French Thomson-CSF T.VIV 433 which detects incoming missiles and attempts to
Above and below: The Matilda radar
can jam SS.Ms surface-to-surlace missiles) or ASMs (air-to-surface missiles) o\er the 8- 6GHz frequency
jam them and the French Dagaie chaff system. The West Germans also produce a chaff system - the Hot Dog Silver Dog - which is acapable of firing infra-red
warning system.
(
1
range: Susie detects 2-
1
all
is
a passive intercept receiver
which
types of pulsed radar transmissions over the
6GHz frequency: and Cutlass detects signals in the
l-lSGHz range. Electronic support systems
like
decoy grenades as well. Italy's Elettronica Sp.A produces the Neuton naval electronic warfare system consisting of the
ELT
ELT
the
compare the signal
deception jammer.
to a radar librarv
of patterns for
Some other examples of European
electronic war-
31
1
2
1
1
chaff system called the
identification.
electronic support system,
jamming transmitter and the ELT 521 Sweden produces an ingenious
Susie and Cutlass normally have a data processor to
pneumatic operation
EWS-900 which ^uses
to launch chaff missiles.
a
The masthead array (above) is connected tothe display unit and the processor unit (shown with the masthead array below) either on the bridge or in an operations room. Below left: A Protean chaff launcher carried on the
bow of a patrol boat.
KH^
\\ h
\PONS
ELECTRONIC WARFARE: SEA (Jetectiotuit'thc scnirccradardt the iiKtimiiiii missiles.
prnxules lurthei relmeiiients b\ aliowmy
The
the laiiiniinL: ol
tiie
missile.
The
i
\')1
desiL'iied ten
is
smallershipssuehasKiK.N-elasstii-ates.theiX )2U)r the
Spmanee.
and the aireiatt
(\').^
Kickl
and
tor laii:ei
earners. The
Mk33 Mod
(
O
L
)li\
er lla/ard
IVn\
-elasses
ships saeh as ermseis and
nited States also priiduees the
Mod O DC power;
chatt system. This uses a
six-tube fixed launcher
which operates on
as the ship's electricity
is
AC a converter is necessary
operation of the launcher. The manutacturer. Hyeor. produces a Gemini cartridge contaming both
tor the
and chaff. The Mk33 system is to be iL plaeed b\ the Mk36 system in the future. The US \a\\ aK;] uses the AN/SLQ-17 deception jammer, v\ hich automatically tracks signals from missiles. Within Nato a number of bodies have been established concerned with electronic warfare. These include the US Joint Electronic Warfare Center comprising participants from the US Army, Navy and Air Force. In the UK, a Maritime Electronic Support Group has been set up at Royal Navy Air Station Yeovilton to help train Nato naval forces in electronic
Below left: The operations centre oftheSLQ-32
warfare conditions.
frequency wavebands.
intra red flares
electronic warfare system.
Below; "I'he antenna array oftheSLQ-32 system; multiple-beam antennae are used /p coverage ..c
:i.
inallbutthel>jv-.c-.=st
1867
KHY WHAPONS The Falklands campaign
how
in l'^)S2
large a role electronic
vv
nia\ have
ait arc will phi\
shown in
any
future conflict, and the dangers ol a lack o\ electronic
HMS
Slujfulilw as u cll equipped with electronic support measures and a dcenv hum-
warfare capability.
cher. yet in the short time
Super Htendard the
weapon
firing its
betueen
AM3^^
hitting the ship,
I
the .\i:^eniiiiiaii
xocct missile and
none of
equipment the Type 996
this
could help. At the time of the attack, search radar was switched off to avoid giving the ship's position away and to enable satellite signals trallic to be transmitted. To compensate for this blindness.
HMS
Sheffield
was linked
to the carrier
HMS
Hermes' radar which plotted the strike formation but wrongly identified the flight as being made up of Mirage aircraft. The computerelement was slow to react to the missile as the Exocet's radar operates on the same frequency as some British equipment and the computer was in any case programmed to regard the ,
,
type as friendly, not as a threat.
was
that the first
the attack
The
result
of
all this
any of the Sheffield's crew knew of
was when
the missile's exhaust
plume was was
spotted four or five seconds before impact; there
no time to lake an\ defensive measures. The fate of motlcrn uarsliip al ihc hands ol a simple missile leinhuced the atliuidc thai more attention must he paid to counierini: the threat ot the this sophisiiLaled
aiiii-shipniisMlc I
he cllekiivcness
lisiiil;
Jialt
uas also
and one of the hazards
illustrated in the
sinking of {he Allaiitic C
\<
'I-
l
ot
alklaiuls h\ the
\r>:cntinian
Super
Etendards spotted a large taicci and laLinched their Exocet missiles. The target u as li.MS in, ihic he attack u asdetected h\ theradarol oncol itscscortine 1
uas alcrtctl. e\er\ na\al Cordis chalt rockets and
ships, and. alter thc'ricet
\esscl
opened
iiearb> lire
lired
oil
uith their .A.A armaments.
1
he missiles
Below:
Ihc ncarb_\ AiUuiiu
Convcxar 'dn^\ sank
Iraq's use ot the anti-ship missile
vulnerability of surface
ships to sea-skimming missiles like the Exocet.
the Persian
Gulf against merchant shippinL' demonstrates the high vulnerabihiN ol ships not equipped uith an electronic uartare capabilitv For those ships u ith such hardware, increasing sophistication and speed of response will be demanded for their electronic warfare equipment. .
A Harpoon missile
being fired from an Asroc
The radarhoming system of the Harpoon is 'frequency launcher.
it.
m
1982,offthe
Falkland Islands. The Falklands War showed the
Insert:
wercsuccessliiIlN dcLO\ ed. but then the\ locked on to
HMS Sheffield,
sunkon3May
changing frequency to defeat attempts to jam the guidance and thus make agile', rapidly
the missile target.
fall
wide of its
Interested parties Western intervention
in
black Africa
hen France and Britain gave independence to most of their African colonies between 1958 and 1964, \\
they did not
abandon
all
involvement
in the internal
of the new states. Both ex-colonial powers, and private companies based there, retained extensive economic interests in Africa, including rights to politics
mineral resources u hich were sometimes of considerable strategic importance as well. interests required stability
well-disposed government
and an if
These economic modestly
at least
they were to function
profitably
and maintain stable supplies of raw mate-
rials to the
home country.
Guaranteeing stable governments in postindependence Africa was in many cases a far from simple matter, however. The new states experienced all the pressures of cultural and economic underdevelopment, as well as the friction of tribal and religious divisions. Governments drawn from a narrow black elite rapidly enriched by corruption soon lost the allegiance of disfavoured sectors of socict\ With a few notable exceptions - such as the Ivor\ Coast and Senegal - most of the new black African regimes were challenged or overthrown within the
decade of independence. There were some tragic cases of outright breakcivil war - in the ex-Belgian Congo (now Zaire) between 1960 and 1965, where the southern province of Katanga (now Shaba) attempted to secede and the east of the country subsequently rose in revolt, in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970, where the Biafran independence movement threatened to split the state, and in Chad, where acivil war, initially between north and south but ever more complicated with time, smouldered and flared almost continually from independence in 1960. In most countries, however, open warfare was avoided, but governments were threatened by or succumbed to military coups. In the three years from 1965 to 1967 alone there were successful military coups in black Africa - three in Nigeria, two in Dahomey, and one each in the ex-Belgian Congo, the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Ghana. Burundi, and Togo. The reasons for each coup were different, but there were general causes for the prevalence of the phenomenon. Since the armed forces were basically the old colonial armies with w hite officers gradually replaced by promoted blacks, they had no ingrained political ideology, but they did have a strong sense of professional pride. Many coups were a direct result of grievances about the place occupied by the army in national life, often almost like strike action in defence of army interests, pay and conditions. A coup was inevitably followed by a diversion of resources to the army, in the form of new equipment, higher salaries and the profits of high public office. The political niotix ation behind the coups was most likely to be disgust w ith ci\ ilian politicians and their corruption or mishandling o\ affairs. Also, the military were in most countries draw n predominantly first
down and
1
1
from one or two ethnic groups - such as northern Hausa in the Nigerian Army - and by taking over the state they could promote or defend the interests of their own group.
Although some military governments proved bereducing corruption and increasing efficiencoups also threw up a number of sinister despots whose tenure of power was characterised by brutality, corruption and megalomania. Such were the regimes of Idi Amin Dada in Uganda. Jean-Bedel Bokassa in the Centra! African Republic and Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire.
Above: French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing with Jean-Bedel Bokassa, the ruler of the Central African Republic. The
neficial,
French kept close links with thisformercolony; Giscard
cy, military
d'Estaing
was personally
on very good terms with Bokassa. The former colonialists did not feel totally
committed to
Bokassa himself, however, and when the
megalomania
Search for The
stability
relationship of the ex-colonial
powers
to military
and internal conflicts in the new African states followed practical self-interest. In general, they supported any government in place if it seemed to ensure rulers
stability,
using their considerable influence
-
of this
self-styled 'emperor' threatened to get out of hand, they were instrumental in overthrowing him in 1979.
in the
form of financial and technical aid - to keep rulers of whatever kind in line with Western economic in-
some cases - such as that of Idi Amin in Uganda- the seizure of power by a military ruler was
terests. In
welcomed
as an alternative to a regime viewed as dangerously left-wing, but almost all instances of direct military intervention
were
in
by ex-colonial powers
defence of an existing government. w as keen to avoid military involvement
Britain
if at
964 British troops were sent quash army mutinies in Tanganyika (now known, with Zanzibar, as Tanzania), Kenya and Uganda, an intervention without which at least one of the governments might have been expected to fall. But this was militarily on a very small scale, and was not to be repeated The only subsequent British armed intervention was reportedly by the Special Air Serall
possible. In .lanuaiA
in
to
1
.
1869
.
.
AFRICA l%4-84 AS)
vice iS
(ianihi.i
troni
1
K-M
puMJcnl,
I
Sii
the rescue of
Init
danihia.
ilk'
Ja law aia
I
put
in to
power from
hh.|is
down
president's family
tlie
apparen(l\ entrusted to a unit of the I
June 19X1
In
i'Kc,iliL-iiiptci.lli)sci/c I
Scncual uciv called
nci;jiihoLii in;j
nMng.
m
Rc;jinicnl
I'olkc
^
Ilk'
the
was
SAS.
intervene with military foree in Africa.
The
to
first
occasion for intervention came only weeks after the British operation in East Africa. In mid-February 1%4 the president of Gabon, l.eon M'Ba. was over-
thrown
in a
imatel\ 100 the counti
joined h\ base
and I
ai
military coup.
s
\
M'Ba hc
I
men up
ii
.
in
the approx-
Gabon under
France were from the French
cal\ of cooperation with
a substantial
Dakai
Very swiftly
rench troops stationed
f
force
Senegal.
Hown
in
2,>0(l
1974. and the base had advanced strike aircraft among its equipment. This presence, aloni: with another substantial garrison in the ("eniral Ali can Republic, greatly facilitated militar\ (ipeiaimns in the continent. The Dakar base wasolliciallx transferred to the Senegal government in 974. but France i
1
much as before, with a battalion of Marines stationed there. The permanent garrison in it
Republic was withdrawn
but reestablished in 1979 with a 1
in
1971
commitment of some
000 men. In
the
I96()s.
much
of France's Africa policy
i
in Niiicria (backini: Bialiai
and the ex-Belgian
Post-colonial intervention in Africa October 1977
1870
Au>jiist siliialicH
menaced by
a rebellion
in
the iKHth n\ ihe ecninti
\
he which French paratnuips were sent in to repress following year, it uas neeessai \ luexpiaiul Ihe tioop presence to 2500 men. his pioxeil the In st dl a series of French troop coniinitiiients ulneh uaxed ami waned with the beu ildering changes ol lorlune m the reneh iiiter\eii ci\il war. H\ llie l')S()s. ihe ami ol 1
I
Chad had
tion in
particulai 'jo\
shilled Iroiii the desire lo iiiainlain a
Lib\an amhilioiis In this.
It
in
ei iiiiieiil
power
Mauritania
in
wish
to repel
the niineral-ricli north ol
in
came to resemble
the siii\i\al ol a
to the
the
the French in\ol\emenl
1977. uhich uas less a t|uesiion ol regime than o| Lipholding a certain
regional haiance ol piowci and lelaining control ol
mineral
resources.
Morocco
in
I97.S
.Mauritania to
occupx
hail
loined
with
lormer Spanish
the
eolon\ of the Western Sahara, hut armed resistance
Iroml'ohsario guerrillas, backed h\ ia,
had pro\ed so sLieeessrul
I
,ih\ a
and Algerw as
thai .Mauritania itself
threatened with collapse, I'olisaiio operations had
included attacks on f-rench ore mines.
Keen
stall at
.Maurilanian iron-
to limit the inlluence ol
Algeria. France drafted
in milit;ir\
Lih\a and
ad\ isers to Mauri-
October 1977. and the follow mg December Jaguar aircraft Irom the Dakar base began air strikes aL'amsi Poiisario units, fhese moxes were coordinated with .MoKkco. which siiiiuitaiieouslN ino\ed some 0.000 troops into Mauritania, heeltect ol the tania in
consisted not of diivei mtei\ention in its own excolonies, but rather ol sLippm leu secessionary move-
ments
In llie
The regiine
point.
in
restored.^
lench garrison in Senegal numbered
the Central African
il
Thecoup was easily reversed
\o
continued to use
lencoLiraging Katanga) \^as uinsideied ih.ii however, former Freiicli eolci
I
on the other hand, has proved ever ready
raiice.
Congo
1
I
Below:
A British
examinesan
soldier
injured
mutineer after the suppression of a mutiny at Colito barracks near Dar Es
Salaam
in
January 1964,
During this period, British forces intervened in Kenya
and Uganda as well as Tanganyika (now Tanzania) to put mutinies.
Asa
in
down
resultthe
governments survived.
AFRICA inlLMAcntion u as not onl\ to stop Polisario but also to
make ol the
Maiiiitanian L:o\cmnK-iit a
iIk-
Moroccans and
tlicn
Mamnanian
inclkxtiial
I
\
iitiial
hosia;jc
ivncli allies. ivnJciinu
L-ltorts {o
negotiate a settle-
nienl with the L^LieiTillas^
hianee's elose elationship u i
her
In st
mtei
\
ention
The eountr\
in
ith
Mofocco allowed
in a eitiintrx that
her lormereolonies to be
lari:el\
question was
w as not one of
eoiukieleJ b\ pro\\
/ane
I
he e\-eolonial
power. Beluiuni. haJ shown an aiiibixalent attitude towards its iesponsihilit\ lor this vast state ever since It became independent as the Gtmgo in JLine I960. The Beigians' precipitate departure at independence and their support tor the Katangese secessionist movement in the south of the country - where valuable mineral reserves were located - helped initiate years oT chaos trom which the state ne\er propcrU recovered. Although desiring to detend iheir interests m Katanga, the Belgians hesUaled o\ei their degree of
commitment. In No\ ember '^(14 Belgian paratroopers did go into StanlcN \ die now Kisangani) against rebels holding w lute hostages: w ith .American kigistic support and the aid ot white mcrccnar\ columns, the Belgians ellectively undermined the rebellion. But the\ were ir from happy with the denunciations for neo colonialism" which tlew in their direction after 1
i
I
this e\ cut.
Backing Mobutu The regime established by General Joseph-Desire
Mobutu
renamed Mobutu Sese Seko) after a November 96? was w elcomed in the olTenng some hope ot stability, and he
(later
militaiA ccuip in
West
as
1
W
suppori e\ en after his regime had rexealed itsell as appallingU coiTupt and inetlicient. marred b\ an e\ti aoidmai \ perscmalitx cult of the leader, and disiLiibed b\ an aiithenlicil\ cami^aign' w Inch in \ oh ed not onl\ an org \ ol namechanging but also attacks on such 'relics ot colonial-
continued to en]o\
estei n
ism' as the Christian religion. It was now in the Western interest to keep the ot Shaba, as Katanga had been renamed, undei tlie control ot the central gm ernmentof Zaire, whereas in the earl\ I9(i(ls such Western countries as rance had backed the idea ot an indepen-
nnneral wealth
I
1964-84
under pro-Western control. In M.ii.i /.ni-ese exiles iinaded Shaba, llie Wc-i.i ,u agreed that .hey must be resisted. he Belgians u ere not eager tc) take the lead, so in April about l.SOO Moroccan troops were tlown into Shaba by the French. They sw iftl\ dealt w ith the in\ aders-a feat that w as lar be\ond .Mobutu's arniy. despite the much-publicised el orts ol p\gniy troops operating under the co\er of tall eleiMKini grass. The follow ing year the Katangans returned, this time seizing the important mining tov\n ot Kolwezi. The Belgians once more held back, and so it was the paratroops of the French Foreign Legion who tlew in to crush the invasion. Once they had succeeded. Belgians and Moroccans w ere among the force w hich relieved theni. Both the Shaba invasions revealed France in the role of an international policeman in Africa, a role which had fallen to her for no other reason than her readiness to turn to rnilitars inter\ ention. and proven ability tocarry it off successfully. But the principle of support lor such regimes as Mobutu's, if they could guarantee a minimum level of stability, often put the moral and political credibility of the French go\ernment under strain. This was nowhere better demonstrated than in the Central African Republic (CAR), the only country in which the French intervened to unseat a government. The civilian regime established there at independence was overthrow n in January 1966 by Colonel Jean-Bedel Bokassa. an officer who had seen service at lower rank in the French colonial army in Algeria and Indochina. France has important uranium interests in the CAR. and Bokassa was suppoHed as liable to protect them, in the I97()s he developed a close relationship with French President Giscard d"Es-
dent
Kai;;t^'vjs^- stale '
.
,'
1
t
taing. later leading to accusations of bribery against
theViench leader who had allegedK received c\'
tiemel\
\
aluable gilts ti,.m BokaCsa.
Bokassa's regime w ascharactcrised by spectacular such as the public beating - to death in some cases - of prisoners in 1972. in which Bokassa personall) participated. In 1976. Bokassa declared hiniself emperor, and his vastly expensive coronation in December 977 w as largel> financed by France. In April 1979. however, the "emperor" went too far: a massacre of schoolchildren on his orders rc\olted international opinion. For the French he had become a liabilit\ In mid-September 1979 they cut
acts of brutal it\
.
1
.
off financial aid io Bokassa. with the predictable
went to Libya in search of Once he was out of the country, on 20 September, the French tlew in 1000 troops from Chad and Gabon, along with the man Bokassa had overthrown 13 years before. David Dacko. designated now to take his place. The takeover was a total success, but Dacko once more showed himself incapable of retaining power. In 1981 the chief of stafL General Kolingba. seized control, almost certainly result that the "emperor"
linancial backing.
w
Ith French encouragement. Given the extrerne weakness of most o\ the states which enierged from the decolonisation ol black .Africa - their vulnerability to regional ie\olts or militar\ coups - continuing in\ ol eineiii ol ihe cx\
colonial
powers
in their internal .illaiis
unless other maior powers ot the
oxer
that role
aeti\e I
rench
seen
st\ ie ol is
likcK
W
I
liable,
is
asi or
West take
hether the eontiiuiation of such an
inter\ ention as i)r
iluii
by the remains to be
|iraetised
desirable, howexei
.
(iraham Brewer 1871
"
.
•Inwiih the Legion The Kolwezi rescue
mission, 1978
Kinshasa, on 13 May 1978, the ambassadors of Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union.
part of that force
France and Belgium v\ ere summoned to an emergency meeting by General Mobutu Sese Seko. president of Zaire (the former Belgian Congo), to hear an
panicipated in the colon l,
In
was no hint as to the subject of this statement, but Andre Ross, the French ambassador, suspected that it must be connected with news received that morning from his militarv' attache, and later confirmed by Colonel Yves Gras. head of the French militan.' mission to Zaire, that Kolwezi had been occupied during the night by a large force of Katangese rebels. Kolwezi was the principal centre of the southern copper and diamond mining province of Shaba (formerly Katanga) and headquarters of the Gecamines mining company, employing locally some 3000 Europeans of various nationalities. Ross was not mistaken in his supposition. When at 1645 hours General Mobutu finally appeared in full military regalia, it was to announce that: "At dawn, mobile rebel Katangese forces attacked Kolw ezi" but that the situation was "well in hand" since the attack had been anticipated. This optimistic view was later "important statement". There
.
repeated by the Zairean commander-in-chief. Gener-
BaBia. who told Colonel Gras, "We are in complete No problems This optimism, however, was far from justified. The invading force was a body of Katangese exiles w ho had fled from Zaire either in the 196()s. after the failure of the Katangese separatist movement led by Moise Tshombe and the subsequent establishment of Mobutu"s autocratic regime, or nmrc ixvcntl} in al
.
control
.
March 1977 after a previous incurM.ui nn,. Sliabj The invaders were generail> known as KaianL;csc L'cndarmes. but reiativelv few had e\er actualK been
During
which had fought
their exile
in
the Portuguese, and in
.AnL
"he
1:
Tshombe.
for
K.:!angans had side of
.nee civil
ti:-
war. on behalf of the Marx.-
;
'pularde
.
Libertacaode.A.ngola(MPLA Katangan supponfor the MPLA had been based on their hostilit) to Mobutu who was backing the other side in the ci\ il war. the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (F.\L.-\). After the MPLA"s victor\ the Katangans w ere rewarded with training and arms from the MPLA"s Cuban and Soviet backers. The Angolans gave them ever\ facility to attack .\lobutu"s territon. hoping to discourage Zaire from backing continued guerrilla action by the FNL.A i.
.
.
Above: French paras of the 2nd REP landing in Zaire's Shaba Province. France reacted swiftly when
Angolan-backed Katangese rebels seized the nnining town of Kolwezi in May 1978.
Below:
Two Katangan
rebels, captured during
an
earlier invasion of Zaire in
March 1977. Someofthe were former Katangese gendarmes, who were highly rebels
experienced soldiers.
ZAIRE Left: Zaire's
197S
president
Mobutu SeseSeko, in the uniform of a Marshal of the Zairean Army. Mobutu seized power in 1965 after an army coup against Moise Tshombe. He was the target of many allegations of corruption
and human
rights
violations but successful his
in
suppression of internal
opposition.
During their previous invasion in March 1977. the Katangans had shown themselves to be more than a match for the ill-disciplined and demoralised Zairean Army, although Moroccan troops had equally easily out-fought the Katangans. Once more, on this occasion, at the first sign of the invasion the small garrison of Kolwezi panicked and fled, or deserted to the other side. The Katangans were greeted with open arms by most of the local population, who were of the same tribal group and largely hostile to Mobutu' s brutal and corrupt government. Showing discipline and efficiency, the Katangans quickly took the military situation in hand. They proved incapable, however, of maintaining order: by the evening of 14 May widespread looting had begun. There were also other disturbing developments. Several Europeans who refused to cooperate with the rebels were summarily
executed, and whole families were incarcerated
in the
cellarsof public buildings as 'hostages'.
When news of events in Kolwezi filtered through to Kinshasa and thence to the outside world, reactions were mixed. Some Western leaders interpreted the invasion as a Soviet-inspired attempt to wrest control
of valuable mineral resources from Western
com-
panies and a pro-Western regime: there were even
unconfirmed reports that Cuban troops were actively involved. Much of world opinion, however, .saw the events as essentially a fully justified revolt against an
unacceptable government. Even in the West, despite concern for the fate of the white hostages doubts were expressed as to the advisability of continuing to prop up Mobutu's regime which seemed incapable of establishing political stability and which had demonstrated an economic incompetence and corruption that
Below; Zairean soldiers investigate a bow and arrow abandoned by a unit of Mobutu's pygmies during the 1977 fighting in Shaba. Though equipped with more modern weapons, the Zairean troops who faced the
.
Katangans were ill-disciplined and demoralised. Only foreign intervention
from defeat.
savedthem
.
ZAIRE
1978
^
Weslcrn backers dear. as up Bel
was
It
s
1:1
>
take
the
Ihe
hc)\se\er. arijued that "luiropean troop
lo:
l^riis
nun
els.
enieiits
m
Africa would only exasperate the rebels and thus L-naJ
them into further excesses". This |ionit ol \ie\\ seemed to be accepted even when it u as learned that the elite corps of the Zairean Army, the 31 1th Parachute Regiment, flown in to retake Kolwezi had been .
virtually annihilated.
Paradrop to disaster The Katangans had been ready for the airborne operation which was launched on 16 May. As the
down to earth many were killed Most of those who touched down fell to Katangese bullets or bayonets before they had time to free themselves of their parachutes. The few who managed to regroup were too demoralised to put up any effective resistance, let alone assume the offensive. By evening, the forlorn survivors had split up into scattered groups, and were trying to make good their escape under cover of the jungle In the meantime. Ambassador Ross had been in direct telephone contact with French President Giscard d'Estaing, urging a military intervention, and a decision to intervene was taken after the French had received an assurance of full American backing from President Jimmy Carter. The need to rescue the hostages and restore order provided an adequate public justification for the operation, and French intervention was, of course, welcomed by Mobutu. The unit designated for the mission was the 2nd Regiment Etrangere Parachutiste (2nd REP), at that Zairean paras floated in the air.
moment stationed at Raffali barracks on the outskirts of Calvi on the island of Corsica. Once the go-ahead had been given, it is doubtful whether any airborne operation has ever got under way so rapidly and with so little normal logistic support. The warning order was issued at 0430 hours on 7 May. By the evening 1
main axes of Foreign Legion advance 19 May
mam axes of Foreign Legion advance 20
1X74
May
Above: French paras regroup
after their
almost
unopposed landing near Kolwezi. Right:
A rebel
suspect is arrested during the operation to clear the captured town. Many of the local population had welcomed the rebels, and some of the massacres had been the result of local bitterness againstthe whites.
Right: Colonel Erulin,
commander of the 2nd REP which conducted the Kolwezi operation, briefs a
group of his officers before the assault.
I/,
all men on leave, those on outlying duty on the island, or attending courses France itself had reassembled, so
in
move by truck to Solenzaro airmade during the night of
that the
port could be
May.
17/1 8
Only five civilian DC8s had been brought together by the morning of the 1 8th but the regimental
commander. Colonel
Phi-
hostages were being held. .
much of the dropping zone was covered by 3 m (10 feet) tall elephant grass interspersed by 4m (13 feet) high ant-hills, which gave effective cover once the legionnaires had touched the ground. Colonel Erulin himself landed on an ant-hill heap and deemed himself lucky to have escaped with no more than a badly cut not expecting the attack. Furthermore,
lippe Hrulin. mindl LiI of the desperate iii ijcncv of his mission, decided that a lirst echelon consisting
cheek.
2nd and 3rd Companies w ith a skeleton HQ company, must take off immediately. By 130 hours all five DC8s were airborne, aniving the following
there
of the
1
St.
1
day. 19
May.
at
Kinshasa. Then there occurred an
Visibility was virtually nil in the elephant grass and was an inevitable delay in regrouping. It was some hours before a number of legionnaires linked up with their units, but the majority was soon reassem-
bled to begin an immediate
These were: for
infuriating delay before the legionnaires could be
objectives.
transfened to Zairean transport aircraft for the flight
Jean XXIII
to
Kolwezi
itself.
mechanism of
the
It was found that the release American TIO parachutes being
issued from local stores did not
fit
standard French
equipment. This meant that hours had to be spent while the legionnaires themselves
on the spot adjustments. Hov\ e\
_^oblem been overcome face
two
made
er.
the necessan.'
no sooner had
ihis
than Colonel Hrulm had to was still no sign of
further obstacles. There
the second echelon - the 4th
Company,
the
SHR 1
1
1
1
Again Colonel hrulin did not liesiiatc. Reports were coming in of the worsening: situation in Kolwezi. He decided that he would n( \\ ai )r the second echelon and that 80 men. instead ol the re-julation 64. uiuild )i
1
Ville; for 2
in the
move on the principal Company, the Lycee
1
southern sector of the Ancienne
Company,
the town's western sector, in
order to free hostages reported to be locked up in the hospital there, thence to seize the
Gecamines
offices
and their huge garage just outside the walls, known to hold a vast stock of vehicles which Colonel Erulin hoped to use until the arrival of the regimental transport; and for 3 Company, to storm the Impala Hotel and the Post Office, and hold the bridge connecting the Ancienne Ville with the Ville Nouvelle.
mm
et de reconnaissance), the 8 mortar platoon and the bulk of HQ company, and the fact that instead ot the fne Zairean C-130s and two Transall C-lWls promised lor the lirst echelon, only four C- 3(K and a sini:le ansall could be mustered.
(Section d'eclairage
was, of course, broad
It
daylight but fortunately this time the Katangans were
1 1
be packed himseir aid. -to seare tlie uits oul ol the most hardened pa ichutist ake-oli was at 1(14(1 liours. At I.^I.Shou the iVi^imcnt began Us hi st operational drop since tl tragic battle of I)ien l^ien Phu 24 \ ears '
1
.
Complete suiprise in the vicinity of the dropping zone, taken completely by surprise, opened up a desultory fire which accounted for the first Legion death, that of Corporal Arnold, an Englishman. Opposition, however, was soon dispersed, but as the companies pressed on into the town they ran into stronger resistance and u ere subject to continual The few astonished Katangans
sniping. I'he
legionnaires u ere heavily outnumbered, but in
addition to then tielermination to uphold regimental
ucic roused to what their war diary suiurhuman efforts' by the awareness ol the hostages depcndcti on the iifrom speedwithv\luehlheKatanganscouKlbitradition. the\
describes as
that the sur\i\
The pre-selected dropping zone, code-named was just to the north of what was known as
:
theirpositions.
the 'Ancienne Ville"
advanced
and in the vicinity of the luxury Impala Hotel where, it was believed, a number of
.il
i
'Alpha',
that
he\ tound pleniil nl massacics had alie.u.
jsthey
I
One legionnaire remembered;
i
place.
"our nostrils were filled
1875
ZAIRH
1978
h\ the stench ot
nia/e ol
w
liicli
the
\
had
decomposing bodies on entering
the
illa-liordered avenues. Corpses. nian\ of
ijnawed by stray dogs. t iv heaped in ihere were pools ol l->KH.d e\er\L ndoubtedly in their eiiihusiasm to
gullets
v\iiere...."
,
advance as quickly as possible, llie iegionnaiies themselves were none too discrimmaiing over ulio they killed. Any blacks encountered weie likel\ lohe shot on sight with iiOL|uestions asked liei e u as lnile time to son out who \\ as the enem> esjieeialK smee most of the local population were eonpeiainiL' wiili I
.
the rebels. Street fighting lasted
Below: While the rebels had massacred considerable numbers of the local white population, there were later reports of large-scale reprisals by the
Zairean Army against Kolwezi mineworkers who were suspected of supporting the rebels. Bottom: A mass is held for four legionnaires, killed during thefighting in
Kolwezi.
heaped u
day. Bui
ilie
lioui
I
(
lo lall. llie
u
s
hrulin
uas so
TMis earr\ing the leiJinienrs seci)nd
Chinese and American origin, had been eaptui ed. One of the last Katangese strongholds to fall was the Impala Hotel. There, the Katangans slaughtered their hostages before succumbine. The cellars were
then
n. hut h\
operations
liial
necessar\
to risk the possible eontiision ihal
.
arise lioin a
ueie
he did not think
drop
niL'lil
kill
I
I
continue
MshK
1-i
\
mile'
le
get
I
day's
the
tlie
might Orders to the
fli.^ilil
onie
lelliMl
M
I
ill
1
the
I'aiaehute
uere to be back over How ing morning.
he reiiilo
at lirst light
uise. or
either
southeast. OL^ Lipied
ed /aiiean ginieiil.
it
Jose . ounlrs
in sueli
;ji\en. theietoie. to
l.uhi
olonel
(
salislied with the lesiiiis ol the
Kaianjes,
defence was so ill-organised that, despite Irequent brief but savage encounters, by late afternoon all major objectives had been secured and a number of Europeans had been rescued, most of them in an advanced state of shock, as v\ ell as suffering se\ eiel\ from hunger and thirst. Leguni easLialiies had been almost miraculously low. wlieieas ihe kaKiiiL^ese dead were estimated to number se\eial hundreds In addition, large stocks of modem amis, of Russian.
men. women and
the suiklen liopieal nighl about
nil
echelon appeaietl o\ er the low
)
all
the nianuled corpses of
ith
children
tx-cii
ciiients
1
Night skirmishes Kolue/i, H uas the third .X double task eonto pre\enl inlillration by rebel toiees tioni outside; the second to deal with Katangans who had shut thenisehes in deserted houses and w hoeiKlea\ouredtobreak through French posts and patrols under eo\cr ol darkness to rejoin l ighting tlared their comrades in the open eountr\ up. ending invariably to the legionnaires' ad\ antage. B\' dawn the toll of Katangese dead had mounted shaipK six legionnaires had been wiiunded. for the legionnaires
in
eonseeLili\e night without sleep.
was
lionted iheni, Ihe Inst
;
Ion
from
l.ubiiiiibashi,
I
he
SHR.
Ihe bulk ol IKJ .oiiipaiiN
the iiioilar
sectmn and
dropped on /one Alpha.
4Compan\
lell on a new /one. desii:nated "Bravo". lUsilolheJasiotiheXilleNoiixelle/ loxed into action. ined loive then IS to clear the las Katangans from the i
Aiieienne \
forming
ille's
w e .t.ThcSFRmo'\ ed to occup\ the Gendarmerie and
a similar task in the
the north of '.Alpha' to
Camp
I
southern se. or. 2 Coiiipanx per-
Forrest, while
mopping up
ol the \
Companx continued with the ille Nou\elle prior to mo\ ing on .^^
ZAIRE oI'Manika where, it was repoilcd. those KataiiLMiis who had escaped the Legion net were iVLjioupiiiLj Fmm dropping /one "Brave/ 4 jiositKMis to seal off an_\ escape Conipan\ look to the little sLiburh
\elletolliee
The
saw surpi isiii;jl\ little action, but hours, as the Legion pushed out tocomli
loi niiiL'
tou ards
1
l(
)
work mens' suburbs - a network of individual villages 4 Company was heavily engaged m the neighbourhood of Metal Shaba, some 5km {?< miles) tlie
The leading platoon's ser^ent-chcfipldloon sergeant). Daniel, wius killed outright, a legionto the north.
monally wounded, and the platoon momentariA call for support was promptly answ ered by thcSER. Moving m eon iscated \ chicles w ith a section of the SI mm mortal s. the\ opened up an accurate bombardment on the eiieiin jiosuions. The Ka.tangaiis were Ix'ginning to all back w hen a new 1\ arrived Ion v borne K.itangesL- column, suppoited b> two Ipjlil taiiksol Sov lel dcs|i:n. attempted to counter.iigaged b\ the N')nim LRACsof the SLR and attack the moiiais. the coLinler-allack was broken up before it got under w a\ the tanks receiv ing direct hits and the lorries set abla/e. The survivors tied, leav ing over SO of their dead on the ground. The 2 si w as a quiet dav w hich saw the arriv al of pinned down.
I
Below:
A Legion
sergeant
receiving orders during a
lullinfighting.Notethered scarf
worn around ttie
right
shoulderto identify French troops. Highiydiscipiined,
well
equipped and with
a
long tradition of colonial warfare, the Legion was
I
l
.
the ideal instrument for
French interventionist in Africa during the
policy
1970s.
I
means of subsistence
their only
Luilu was found to be deserted, but
naire ly
!')7S
Mobile at last, three companies were despatched on the 22nd to the town of Kapata. well to the southwest of Kolvve/i. where scattered Katangese groups were rounded up w ithout the lossof a single legionnaire. The follow ing tla\. the 2.^rd. a mobile column wassenttoLuilutothc northwest. On the way a group of Europeans was picked up. mostl v women and children who had seen their menlolk hacked to death before their eyes. Half starving and demented with fear, thev had been wandering in the bush for eight days, brackish water the parachutists" regimental vehicles.
at
1
6.^0 hours a
Company w as ambushed to the w est of Hidden by the elephant grass, the Katangans took the legionnaires by surprise. A legionnaire was killed and the senior corporal, Haile, seriously w ounded This minor action showed the rebels at their mosi determined. The ambushing party consisted of platoon of
I
the town.
.
onlv five Katangans, prepared to die after intlicting
maximum night
w as
casualties
on the enemy. It was not until confused skirmish in the finally cornered and the five
tailing that, after a
the pailv
tall Lirass.
was
menkillcd.
Final ambush There was also another brief action that evening, during the return from the search of Kapata. One of the platoon commanders. Lieutenant Bourgain. was driving in a commandeered Mercedes, when two Katangans suddenly leaped from the bush and fired straight into the windscreen, shattering the glass. Reacting automatically, Bourgain's driver accelerated, running the two men down. At the same time a hurst of fire from concealed enemy positions wounded Corporal Breton and Legionnaire Kruger. Fire was promptly returned, resulting in two more Katangans being killed.
By 24 May, it was obvious that what Mobutu had termed 'the second Shaba war" had been won. The Katangans withdrew to Angola: the last action, in fact, took place on 25 May when a large group of retreating Katangans was surprised, surrounded, and w iped out. Though Belgian and Zairean contingents were beginning to arrive, Mobutu was anxious to retain the REP. His request was refused by Giscard d'Estaing, who had no wish to hear France accused of nco-colonialism. The regiment moved into camp in Lubumbashi on 2S May and on 5 June the first batch of 2nd REP emplaned for the flight back to Solenzaro. The operation had brought great credit to the regiment. About 90 per cent of the men engaged had been without battle experience, yet, as Colonel Erulin as soon as the first shot was fired, all acted like slated V cterans' They lost only five dead and 20 wounded. In the aftermath of the invasion, a force of .^000 men from a number of African countries was drafted m to stabilise the situation, while the Belgians and lench strove to improve the quality of the Zairean \i inv which had further disgraced itself by acts of eii je inee against the local population on reoccupyl\' ^e/i. But the crucial contribution to Zaire"s ame from a new diplomatic agreement with \ii ihe end of 1978, under which each country auieed lo w ithdraw support from armed movements Imstilc to the other. Already weakened by defeats in 1977 and I97S. the Katangese exiles were now .
.
I
\
II
!
.
.
ii
depriv ed ot backing and bases.
Patrick Tunibiill
Tanzanian forces invade power by one of the modern world's most infamous rulers in Uganda in 1971 was greeted with enthusiasm by most of the Ugandan population and by much of world opinion It was on the morning of 25 January as President Milton Obote was returning from the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore, that elements of the Ugandan Army and police headed by the country's commanIt is
ironical that the seizure of
.
,
der-in-chief Major-General Idi
Amin Dada.
a former
sergeant in the King's African Rifles, seized control
of the capital, Kampala.
Key points
the international airport at
in the capital and Entebbe were occupied. came from
Resistance to the coup was light and
pro-Obote factions in the armed forces. In all, less than 100 casualties were reported. Popular support for the coup was evidence of how, in the decade since independence in 1962, Obote's government had failed in its efforts to unite Uganda's 22 tribal groups and overcome the serious problems of
economy. Backing for Amin from the West was more a response to extreme measures - known as the Mo\ c to the Left' -adopted by Obote in I970to stem
the
Uganda
the deteriorating political
Most alarming
and economic situation. were extensive
to foreign interests
Yet plenty of evidence was already available to Amin might be expected to install. During his time in the British colonial force before independence, Amin had seen service against Mau Mau in Kenya and had been generally liked by indicate the sort of regime Idi
his British officers, but his career in
Uganda
after
962 was ominous His rise to the top of the army had resulted from a readiness to serve willingly in the repression of opposition: in May 1966 he had led government troops in an assault on the palace of the Kubaka(King)ofBuganda, Sir Edward Mutesa. who was the main focus of opposition to Obote. After some sharp fighting, with casualties on both sides, Mutesa had been driven into exile Ascommander-inchief, Amin had been widely suspected of embezzling government funds on a large scale; in January 1970 an officer who had accused Amin of embezzlement was murdered, along with his wife. It is almost certain that, had the coup not taken place. .Amin 1
.
Above: Atriumphant Tanzanian soldier being carried shoulder-high by
proposals for nationalisation of foreign firms.
Ugandan supporters of the anti-Amin Ugandan National Liberation Front during thecapture of Kampala by Tanzanian and
UNLFtroops in April 1979. Right: Idi Amin, thefeared and brutal dictator deposed by the Tanzanian
.
Left:TheKabakaof Buganda, Sir Edward Mutesa, who was deposed by a 1 966 coup planned by Prime Minister Milton Obote and carried out by Idi Amin, then Obote's loyal
commander-in-chief. Obote (centre) with
Right:
Kenya (left), Kenneth Kaundaof Zambia (second from left), and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (far right). Obote assumed the leadership of Uganda in 1962, but soon became unpopular, relying more and more on his Daniel arap Moi of
security forces, led by
Amin.
would have been charged with these murders. In the weeks following the coup. Amin moved to consolidate the support he had received .while covertly beginning to stifle opposition. Oboce's secret police were disbanded and promises on the economy
were freely bandied about, while within weeks Amin had established himself as head of the state and of the armed forces with no formal constraints on his power.
He was unable
to stifle externa! dissent
from Tanza-
whose president. Julius Nyercre. had given refuge to Obote and was steadfastly refusing to recognia,
nise the
new regime and promising
nents, but secret orders
its oppopurge the
aid to
were given
to
Ugandan Army of pro-Obote groups, drawn from the Lango and Acholi tribes based in the Karamoja region of northern Uganda. the purges
,
1
On 29 January the first victims of
000 soldiers many dead or badly beaten ,
were taken by covered convoy suburbs of Kampala.
to Luzira prison in the
The Ugandan people's honeymoon with the new regime was short-lived as it failed to deliver on its
A series of strikes by key workers between September and December 97 prompted Amin to issue decrees suspending all political activities for two years 'as a temporary measure' Coming from a small Muslim tribe in the west Nile region of northern Uganda, the Kakwa. he was well aware of the fragile nature of the national support he enjoyed and began to consolidate his position by establishing absolute personal control over the state and its machinery. The army and police were to become the instruments of his power. early promises.
1
1
.
Intimidation, torture and
murder
Though Amin had abolished Obote's secret police he wasted no time in setting up his own. Two bodies, the State Research Bureau (SRB) and the Public Safety Unit (PSU) - supposedly operating to curb magendo (black-marketeering) - began to root out and silence dissent. Using intimidation, torture and murder the SRB's 2000 full-time agents, given a weekly allowance of up to £50 to pay informers were likened to God. 'for they were found everywhere'. Both were given the power to detain indefinitely any person suspected ofbeing dangerous or endeavouring to excite enmity between the people of Uganda and its government An SRB identity card gave its owner the power of the state, allowing many to settle their own private scores. The secret police's victims were daily found dumped in Lake Victoria or Namanve forest .
.
outside Kampala.
To ensure the loyalty of the judiciary and civilian Amin handed them overto the armed forces. In September 972 the Ugandan chief justice was dragged out of the East African court of appeals and military tribunals were appointed to judge major police
1
violations of the law.
The inspector-general of police
was replaced by a Police Council whose members were drawn from the army. Military training became compulsory for the police. The militarisation of Uganda was rapid and comprehensive. Between 1971 and 1972 the army's sii cii Ml) trebled and supplies were gathered to equip ihciii hiiiially, the supply of the Ugandan Army was caiMcd oiii bv Britain and Israel. In July 1971 Amin lew Id hiiiii countries and received over £2 million worth oi i.i|iiipineiit, including armoured cars and sinallamis However, by 1972 his relations with the supphcrs were deteriorating, in April 1972 Amin I
1S79
ji ^ purgmg the armed lorces A .Hanging their character b\ drafting in Muslims ironi his own tribe or from Arab states. particularK Sudanese. .Nubians and Palestinians. To reduce uncmpKnnient Uganda s urban ix>or were moved int(> ihe armed forces. In earl> 1973 6(KX) unemployed were gathered in Cit\ Square. Kampala and conscripted into the ami\ after Amin had announced a nationwide programme in which militarv training !.'r >hless volunteers. aclinic- ulTc :
The Tanzanian invasion March 1979
!
, \
.
-
-
i
:
riLip:
.
.
..
:
Lganda"s armed nises to develop economic w ar" .
Between
i.ienc\.
.
September and .\o\ ember the 27.(KX) Ugandan Asians, who formed the countr>"s professional class ..TlI K.;:^".Pahr^ -mall businesses, were .
,
niN. In response to
_
,
-
aiicgL'Ji_\ "stili
.
:
Amin
'Homic aid
_
.
-.
:
'iiipanies that
iiuiKing the ^ounir\
"s
ccononn
were
".
The
expulsions and accusations were used to direct internal dissent against outsiders rather than the regime. air force officers worked Ugandans businesses which were
Thin\ ami\ and tributing to
the British
at disleft
b>
Officers such as .Major .Mali-
.A""sians.
law ungu. commander-in-chief of the 2nd lnfantr>
Brigade at .Masaka. were put in charge of abandoned -hops to ensure "the fair allocation of busine-s'. .Amin himself took personal control of the Kilembe copper
-
.
i
Israelis
l'...j-;ine
on
armed purged and built up
h is control of the
forces,
with
members of his own
Muslim tribe and Arab mercenaries. His secret police were responsible for
many atrocities, and
public
became a feature of Ugandan life. Belo'.v-g'-!: A-'^ executions
-n^^"
a;
o- oTa
group of local white businessmen in July 1 375.
1
»«n
.
.
'P.
.
H:-
,
~
:
^xp.:.-;. t.
Under this inept and self-ser\ ing management the Ugandan econom\ began to collapse, inflation rtKk-
L gandan .Asians in the autumn ot the same \ ear and his prcKlaiming himself "the eonquenirot the British
eted and the output of raw materials plummetted.
Empire" soured relations with Britain. .Amin turned to the So\ iet Union and its satellites tor aid. .As early as July 1972 a delegation \ isited Russia, followed in .April 1973 by a return visit Irom Moscow .At least four consignments of weapons, including T54 55s. amioured personnel carriers, bndgelaying equipment. MiG- 7s and -2 s and artiller\ reached Uganda betu een 973 and 1975. Ugandan troops were sent for training in the Hastem bkx: and So\ iet advisers ga\ e instruction to the air force. .Amin was able to boast to Tanzania that Soviet arms supplies would "make the balance of pow er ecHxl in
declaring that 'oxercharging. hoarding and cheating
Hast Africa".
tele\ ision
.
1
.
witr
and hanJ...
Liberation Ori:an>„;:«
oi
1
1
W hile
publicly ra\ing against black-marketeers and
would be
treated as treason" with those found guilt>
likely to face the firing-squad.
Amin and
his closest
advisers amassed massi\ e personal fortunes. B\ mid-
977 he had given up the economy.
all
1
As the regime
s
pretence of tr> ing to control
attempts to revitalise the
economy
.Amin mo\ ed to secure his ow n future and curr> ta\our with some Islamic states b\ building up a personal retinue of fellow Muslims w hose allegiance failed
wouldbebexond
me of lslamisat!< and
.
J
•"' .
-
f
.
.
.
programladeon -
.
ame
a
UGANDA 1971-84 en«ion to Islam semi-official
conversion was held for the and the "Suicide Mechanised
^ -
)
had been called into question by a series of recent mutinies and to exact some revenge for Nxerere's continuing support for Obote. By ^rly No\ emi>c-: 3000 Ugandan soldiers had occupied the 950 square km 400 square miles of the isolated Kagera salient in (
)
northern Tanzania. Six >ears eariier. in September 1972. a force of " exiles had tried an invaxion in the opposite '
_
.
.
^ Jt their ill-equippec force ~
-
'he
had been easily
Ugandan .Arm% On that occasion -ecome activeh 3n\ oived in the in s air force had bombed some .
jiges in retaliation for the exiles'
part
Lango and
_
-.
In the ear
.
.
-
_
of his
.
.
^
"
man P-
~
-
up
;.
to the
-tile to _
>c.: ?:v
Bekiw:Agro-:
secunt>
victorious Ta-:
uA ^
jr.
-
:
-Amin.
nad now him-
:
r.^rzerby violating a
.,r.w:r.c ^
"s territor>
thus justifying a
.
~ed
dead Libyans Ugandan or : Amin'sinvas Tanza- 5 -
.-.
neighbouring countn Tanzanian riposte
war
international
:
thefallofldiA-
occu-
this occasion
.Amin's bluff and
call
1
:
territor\
on
ever,
^
a
: .
..
pro.:--— between IV
As
:
vtorie-
.iir-
UAU»
Pursuit across the border At first the Tanzanian .\rm>
itsdf to
restricted
its lost territorx in the Kagera doting .November and December. By the start of 1979 this had been achieved, although .Amin"s troop>s had had of the inhabitants of the -ve as Tanzania consi-
regaining
-
_
^
•
'
der. ,
-
> j^^ci-iicj
;r.
:
.An intense political
-.uch-divided
March
Ugandan them as
in uniting
National Liberation Front (UNLF). re c^-' e- c' jJ'':c OKite. Tanzania's
.:n
-
:
v>rce •
•
^.
-^.f-. C-^ '
^^^jL
—
^W/\
^ —
"T^^'^*^.'
\
-
'condemnea
Arrv.r.
w as
on an inva-
-
in Oct. ILi.^^ Sometime to invade Tanzania Uganda he hoped
V
of some
K) exiles
•.ed
against a foreign Stat;
Progress
w as
cautious and slow
.
The Tanzanians
chose to advance at infantry marching pace along two e of Lake \ ictoria and the axes, one Portal and then turning other puv j-ponse of the Ugandan east 323 !r _:!ons of .Amin's rule. or popular ujMising. as :.ordle was clearlv low -
.
UGANDA
1971-84
Uganda found arms supplies hard to obtain, as both Western and Eastern bloc suppliers shunned Amin. Colonel Gaddafi of Libya, however, came to his About 2000 Libyan troops were defend Kampala. After advancing for five weeks, fighting a number of scattered engagements, the Tanzanians assaulted Entebbe airport on 7 April. They then laid siege to fellow Muslim's aid.
airlifted in to
Kampala, bombarding the defensive positions largely manned by Libyans. A counter-offensive was easily halted, with considerable damage inflicted on a Libyan column, and on 10 April Ugandan exiles, soon fol lowed by Tanzanian forces entered the capital virtually unopposed as the remnants of Amin's supporters retreated northwards. At the end of April. ,
Amin
fled the country, eventually to settle in Saudi
By the end of May most organised resistance
Arabia.
had ceased. Despite the possession of quite modem aircraft and armoured vehicles by both sides - largely Sovietsupplied in both cases - the war was chiefly fought at infantry level. Indisciplined Ugandan troops created
mayhem in their retreat, causing considerable civilian Amongst
casualties.
the soldiers, the Libyans suf-
fered proportionally the heaviest losses, with
400 dead,
a large
number
in a
Luilortunatclv tried to land at
had
I;iIIlmi
to the
i
alter the aiiport
;inzanians.
Aliui nKihiilniiiustration. terror
was
some
troop carrier which
Entebbe
and war. Uganda
desperate need ol peace and reconstruction,
III
but Us sorrv plight continued. Ihe hist government,
up bv Dr Yusut Lulc, lasted two months; in Mav 9X0 his successor. Godl rev Umaisa. was deposed bv UNLF s military commis-
set 1
pro-C )h()te elements in the sKiii
I
Ik
eleunm^ loiee
(il
eoiiiiliN
iiiv
ii
liild
J_-^.()(HI
I
)eeeinher. in extremelv dubious
iiiKiei I
mihtarv surveillance, with a
;in/aiiian troops
uiiaeeeiHable lulei
Ic
nuieh
presuleiloxei aluithei slide..!
AheaiK.
h\ the lime
(
ol I
oceupvint; the
still
.Obuie uashiKiM\ returned
to
pow er.
Aiiiiite
the population,
-anda
)bole took
he
into eliaos.
(.\ ei
.
laii/aiuan
and -aiidan .jo\ ei iiiiieiil loives had been aeeiised ol widespread iiiassaues in Aiiiin s home area ol the west Nile, duriiit; operations 111 ( )etoher USOot lieialI
1
18X2
ly
designed
to toil a
supposed invasion by pro-Amin Karamoja. also in
exiles from neighbouring Zaire. In
980. famine took some 30.000 lives, as bureaucratic incompetence, corruption and the breakdown ot law and order made relief operations ineffectual. After Obote's rise to power, the main opposition groups 1
turned to armed resistance, adding various guerrilla
groups to the already considerable number of armed bands of various descriptions roaming the country In January 1982 some of the guerrilla groups formed a Ugandan Popular Front, and declared themselves in control of much of the country. With the final withdrawal of Tanzanian forces in 1982. Obote's regime was very exposed. There were frequent ambushes, attacks on police posts and army barracks, and terrorist acts in Kampala itself. In February 1982 several hundred guerrillas raided the capital in a show of strength, and in March 1983 a general guerrilla offensive
was announced by
the
most active move-
ment, the National Resistance Army. Government forces responded to the deteriorating security situation with mass arrests, torture and massacres. In 982 some 20.000 refugees were reckoned to have fled to neighbouring countries since the government began operations against the rebels, and by 984 no end to the chaotic warfare was in sight. Ian VVestwell 1
1
Above: Tanzanian soldiers arrest two Ugandans suspected of belonging to Amin's army. Though organised resistance had ended by May 1979, groups of undisciplined former Ugandan Army soldiers
still
loyalto
Amin
remained a serious problem for the new government of Yusuf Lule and his successor
security
Milton Obote, the
man
Amin had overthrown on his way to power.
Below: Ugandan refugees flee
across the White Nile
into the
Sudan. Members
of Amin's
own tribe who
feared reprisals, as well as victims of the armed bands which roamed the Ugandan countryside,
swelled the numbers in Sudanese refugee camps.
2
KEY WEAPONS ThcciLMscr had
two
roles
on the niain
origins
its
in
the ncctl Im
nIii|Mi
,i
naval warlarc: lo JeUiiJ
111
troNcrs and other
and
battle tleet.
eonimereial and nnliiai
nouii
ii«
^iiippiii
\
^.m u
ehiells usetl to sereen aiiuall
submarine attaek. althou>jh
m
i
i.
,m!ii.
.ii.k
i
i
-
i
i
...
•
^
::
• :
.m
,i.miiis1
Mia\
tlie\
I
ik^
,iii.k
In iiu
thedeehneorthebaIik'shiph,i-iM.
uln
i
,ilmiiin1
ships ni.ikinL' ioi|v\!.i
lijzht
.iiul
he Liscd
siill
against, or in delenee ot. nierehant and troop eon-
Noys.
The
West ltal> The Frcneh Deeember 1953 and
oldest erinscrs eiirrently scr\ nig in the
are those belonging to Eranee erLiiserO'//)(7-/
was
eiinnnissioned
in
down
laid
and in
.
1959. having been designed origi-
as an anti-aireralt eriiiser. Displaeing
nali\
tonnes
lall)
11.500
loaded Colhcri has been relitted several
times, nuist reeently in 1981-82.
when
it
was
prii-
\ided with
satellite eomnuinieations. Perhaps the most important teatureot'this ship, now used tor radar
eontrol of air strikes,
provided
w ith
DRBV'5()
w
DRBV
The armament
DRB\ :3C
Dccca
.i
air sur-
DRBI lOD
RM4I6
navigation
MM38
consists of tour Exocet
lOOmm single automatic guns, and
launchers, two
is
stem, rad.u
s\
warning radar.
height-finder radar and a radar.
automation
ireless intercept eqiiipiiicnl.
surveillance radar, a
\eillance radar.
n
the electronics. Col/n
is
SENIT data
a
intercept equipment,
Previous page: The USS Mississippi execuitng a
Mark 26 Asroc-Standard MR launcher is prominent on the bow. Above: The French cruiser Colbert. The turn at speed; the
100mm turrets occupy the
1
57mm AA in tw in mounts: lire control is provided b\ twd DRBR 5 radars, one DRBR 32C and one DRBC
forward positions and the launcher aft isforthe
i
Colhcn has an armoured belt of 5()-S0mm 2-3in 5()mm (2in) thick armoured deck. Masucra (Mk 2 Mod 3) missiles pro\ ide the main anti-aircraft defence. Two propeller shafts connected to two sets of CEM-Parsons geared turbines giving 86.000 shp produce a top speed of 31.5 3
I
(
.
Masucra
missiles.
i
thickness and a Forl> -eiL^ht
knots.
Also serving
two
the Mediterranean are the
in
Doha
Andrea
Italian cruisers
and Caio Duilio
(the
latternamed after the Roman admiral Caius Duilius). These are smaller cruisers, weighing 5000 tonnes standard and 6500tonnesfullload (only the American
Leahy
class
is
helicopters for
armed
are
They cany four .AB-212 anti-submarine warfare A.SW and lighter).
i.
(
with
Terrier
(SAMs) updated
surface-to-aii
missiles
Standard-ER missiles were designed as escoil cruisers, and j-ioss^ss for
range search radar (Duilio has SI'S
SI'S
Both ships have 3in duakpiiip.>sc.
768).
automatic guns (eight
he\
I
Iohl:-
4ii.
hill\-
m
in,4/)(//K//^<'/7(/aiKl si\
(
<;/<»
and Gyrofin-.Salmoiraglii roll-damping stabilisers. Propulsion is pro\ itlci.! h\ two lialian-built double-reductii)n geared tuibincs propcllini: two shafts with60.(K)()Chp.Th(High the horsepow ens less than iuCoHh ri. being lighter these two ships attain a
Duilio).
sinnlar specel of 3
The
mam
knots.
1
in Nalu S\i. houc\
cruiser loivc
United States \a\
>
il
the current ciiiisci
llcci
1975.
cruisers until
ci
pnnuled .
b\
the nKii>u
tiie
ii\
oi
Ixomie
Prior lo ihal dale. thc\
termeil destroyer leaders. In this ratetl
is
did not oliiuall\
cruisers either in sei
\
wa\
the
3."^
ships
lee ov leserx e at the lieu in
of the Vietnam \\'arlia\e hecii replaced w ith a lleeloi 32. although oiil> In e \ esscK are present on both lists
and
onl_\ sexeii
The
slups
oldest ships
are the inne
e
ai
in
of new eoiisiruetioii
the present
members
guitled-missilc cruisers
o|
aelne
eriiisei
Heel
the l.eah\ class, rated as In
keeping with the ask trom the carrier battle I
Force doctrine emerging groups of World War II. these ships were intemled
IKX4
to
The Ca/oDty///o underway in the Left:
Mediterranean Sea. Below: The USS /Lea/7y at anchor; the SPS 48 radar is the large square antenna atop the forward mack.
NATO CRUISERS scivcii last caiTK-r loivcs.
I
hc\ wcmv aulhoiiscci
in
and \'->?'->. and llic lasi cnicivJ scixkc ni \'>(^4 [VSS Rn linii'ihl k lumen. The l.cain class was l.ilK.ucd h\ ihc nnK- sliip Bclkna|i class. Ihcsc uciv also cii-nialK latcil as laiL'c elcsinncis. and wciv aLillioi iscd m h'hl and IM^: Holli ol these classes were huilt alter the uorkhs In st nnelear-poweied uarsliip. tlie I SS licach w liieh w as also the hrst w arsliip u iih a Liuidcd-
mam
niissile
the
I
wliicii
halterx
.
I
\\i>
othei sm-le-ship classes,
SS lUiiiihrnl'^c and tiie were nncieai-iioweied,
lionol
I
I
SS IniMiin
both ol
coni|ilele the ijcnera-
Scrnisers aiithoiised Ivlween Woild Warll
W
and the \ letnam
ai
m cruiser hmldmL! h\ earh l')7()s when two ships ol the Cahlornia class were laid down, enterm- ser\ ice in hese w ere lollow cd h\ tiie \'ii;jmia |M74and icondcio-a class, proclass ol lour ships, and the leeledol Dships iw o w ere m sei \ ice m r)S4 At the time these shi|is were iindei eonsideialion. a debate o\er ihe direction ol IS shipi ^ on si ruction w as occmAlter that ihcie w as a jxitisc
the I'SN until the
I
I
I
(
)
American niililaiA esiahlishnieiil Ihe was between snpporicis ol e\|X'nsi\c. pis and those w ho saw the lutrire m lari:er luimbers ol cheaper ships w itii iiiore emphasis on actual ordnance at thee\penscol hit:h-cos| electroriivj
111
Ihe
.
ari;ument
hii;h-technoloL:\ shi
nic warlare equipment. H\ the mid-l')7(ls a compromise had been leaciied in tlie concept ol a 'hiyhlo\\ mix'. Thisenx isayed a licet ol cheap. sim|-)leand
robust ships
btiill
hiLih-technoloLiN
meant
to be
round
a smallci i^ioujiol
\essels,
embodicel
m
nia classes iespccti\el\
ihcsc
e\pensi\c.
philosophies
the ricoiulcroi'a and \ I
are iijji-
he hii:h costs ha\ e not been
cntiivK suppressed, as can be seen b\ the price the /,'( ('/(i/(r-'-(M)l SW.^d million.
lor
tai:
Certain similariliescan be seen runniiiL: thiornjh tliese classes,
tw nil
on
all
wilii
two
S.\,\l
launchers
isinL:le
e\cept the Belknap class and the
was
on
/
all
or
iiniini
Belknap hull he earliersiiips are all equipped w itlitlie Mark IDl launcher liriiiL; Standard missiles; m tlic Belknap class and the
(Ihe latter
built
a iiiodilied
Tni\iiin\hc launchers are dual purpose.
).
I
iKocap.ible
ISSS
0
KEY WI APONS AsiDc anti-submarine rockets. I'he Loni^ and the Leahy class have a These ships are presently with the Phalanx CIWS (close-in bcuiLi lilted weapons system tor protection against sea-
ol
linnti
Hem
It.
the lUiiiihnd^c
scp;iiaic .Asroc launcher.
)
skimming missiles like the Exoeet. as uell as lowri_\ ing aiicral't. The Belknap class, Ijnv^ Bcm h and Ti iiMun are all armed with 5in guns. I he Loiii^ Bccicli has two 5in guns in the Mark 30 mount, while the 7 r//.\7;»/andthe Belknap class ha\ e the 5m in the Mark 42 mount. All
ot these ships
have been
litted
since
building with the Harpi)on surlacc-to-surtace mis-
two quad-launchers. They also all cairy the Mark 32 ASW toipedo- the Loiii; Bench has two triple sets, as does the Leahy class, the Buinhndiic and the Belknap class. The Truxiiiii only carries four tubes. The Belknap class and the Tnixnm cairy an SH-2F helicopter. All of these ships have comprehensive radar, being provided with three-dimensional search radar (SPS 48 in all except the Bainhridge, which has the older SPS 52), air-search (SPS 49 in part of the Belknap class and the Long Beach, SPS 40 in the rest of the Belknap class and the Tntxtun, SPS 37 in the Leahy class and the Bainbridge) and surface-search SPS in all ships). The classes have different fire-control radar. The Belknaps, and the Leahys and the Tntxtun, are equipped with an SPG 35F and SPG 55B. The sile,
eight missiles to a ship in
,
TheUSS Truxtun's nuclear propulsion gives it great endurance, very useful forthe Pacific
Above:
Ocean.
(
Below: TheUSS Ticonderoga launches
1
a
Standard-MR missile from its Mark 26 launcher while on sea trials.
NATO CRUISERS n
SPCix^A. uhilctl j/
Bainhno. has tour ships ha
Heat h,
tl;.
and the Be. earner an Si.
:
:
In lkiuipnsch
The pmpuNi'
liar.
nap and the Lcah\ . geared turbines u iin
Vs
The Belk-
-lled b\ .'fs
t'.u
Th.
turbines are either
except class,
in the L SS// uhich uerc '
ships haxetuoshal;-
.
producingtopspeeds V. lii^ii kncits in the Leah\ class and .
I
.
.-'...^
.
knots in the Belk-
napsi.
The LdHi; Beach. Bainhrul'^e and Tntxtwi are aU The TriLXtiin was authorised as
nuclear-pov\ered.
nuclear-powered although orieinalK it ua^ iiieaiii lo ha\e been the tenth member ot the Belknap C t)ngress attached the condition that one ship must be nuclear-powered. All these ships ha\e pressurised u ater-cooled reactors, built b\ General hlectric in the case ot Bainhruii^e and TriLMun. while the Lano Beach has a W estiniihouse reactor. AW ha\e two geared turbines propellint: tuo shalts and all achie\ e a speed ot .^0 knots.
There uere no .American ^ruivcrs built between uhen the TriLMuii ua^ commissioned, and the doun ot the L SS ( aluonua in January 1970. 7 he t\\ o-shipCalitomiaclass and the tour-ship V irginia class are similar, the tormer'x mi: sli::iul\ longer and nan'ow er than the latter; uci^ihts are similar and both arc nuclear-propelled. The California class and the \ iriiinia class ditter mainK in minor details. .All six ot these ships arc armed u ith eiL'ht Harpoon SS.Ms in tour quad-launchers. lhe\ arc armed uith Stan1^67.
la\ uiij
dard-MR SA.M (the C-alitornia class uses the sin^ile launchers uhile the \ iri:inia elass has the Mark l.-i
tw in .Mark 26 launcherl and the missiles can be Asroc
Top left: The octagonal shapes are SPY 1 A paired arrays. Above left: The information centre of Aegis.
KHY WHAI'ONS
Above: The 20mm Phalanx
CIWS (close-in weapons system) now being retrofitted to many ships of the US Navy. Above right: Three ships of the Virginia ciassin lineabreast:
USS
Texas Hop), USS M/ss/ss/pp/ (centre) and
USS/1 r^ansas
(front).
the Virginias nhc CahlDrnia class lias a separate Mark 6 Asroe eight-tube laiiiieher) and tu o .Sin guns in single Mark 45 nnumiings. rhe\ both ha\e two triple Mark 32 torpedo lube nioimis The reactor in both tliesc ships is identical - pressuin
1
rised water-cooled
General HIecli
ic
l)2(i dri\
mg two
geared turbines. The Calilornias have hO.Dii) shp
two
propelling !()(),()()()
shafts
while
ihe
Xhp. Both classes travel
\ iiLMiiias
m
excess
ha\e 30
ol
knots.
almost identical. For3D have the .SPS 4S, h.r air-search the
The radar 111 both classes search the\
is
Cahloinias have the SI'.S 40 w liile the \ ir>:inias have the .SI'.S 40 and the .SI'S .^.S, ,SPS 10 radaMs used lor surtacc-searchin>;. while lire-conlrol
is
provided h\
SPG 5 the SPG 60 and SPQ Ma. I he Gahtornia's use the SQS 26CX bow-mounted sonar, while the Virginias are equipped w ith the SQS 53.A The ,\Iark
the
1
.
74 missile fire-control system is ui all ships, as is the Mark 86 gun and forward missile channel svsiem. ThedigitalMark I6.AS\\ liie-cntrol sv stem isused in the Virginias, Ihe \ iigimas have a helicopler hanger at't beneath the lan-lail lightdeck, \ telesco]v ing hatch cov ei and an eleclro-mecliaiiical elev ator is I
l
also provided.
Below: The
USS California
was named
in
honour of
President Nixon's home state. It serves in the Atlantic
Ocean as an escort
to the Nimitz-class carriers.
18X8
Two
PAMPS
,
(light airborne multi-
purpose system) SH-2 helicopters are carried.
The most modern
cruisers
m
the L S Heel are the
cuiTcnil
in scrv ice: /
v
WN
.
s\ sic
111
hv an
an seal eh and control.
ol
SPS 4M an
SPO
radar.
tv
1
sii|i|Memented
is
sui
lace-seaich
SUS
how
sonar, lour (Icncial Pleclric I.M2,-^00 gas turbines |-irov
shp propelling Iw o shafts and giv mga excess ol >0 knots, fw o A,MPS hehcopiei s
ideSII.OI )0
speed
111
1
are carried and also an All these
f
SOR
1
1
)
.
tow ed
s,.iiar
S cruisers are equipped wiih satellite
comnumic:ilioiis ei.|uipmenl and ihe Naval
Data Svsiem liie lallei is eompuleis. wiili displavs
which assess
laclical data
laclical
a combiiialioii ol digilal aikl
li
aiismission
links
Irom various sensors and
prov ide a dispkiv ol the Uiclical situation to the ship
commander along
with the dclciisive and olleiisive can be ti aiismitled among similai i> and also linked with ihe AW ACS the h-2 law kcveaircralt.
ec|iiippcd ships
U)X3. There are
his
1
SPS 0
-search radar.
M tiie-coiitrol radar and an
o|Hions,
.lanuarv
i
I
I
ricoinlcroga class; originally designetl as gLiided-
111
n. anil a
on a Spi uaiice-class luill. with a bow bulwark added lhe\ weigh ^)N)0 lonnes lullv loaded. Armed with two loui-lube Harpoon launchers and SS Standard PR ,\sroc missiles launched Ironi two (will.Mark 26 launchers. Uilure ships alter the lirsi live will also hav ecriiise-missiie laLinchers and the improved Mark liev aKocan v w o .'^m guns 41 mount loi the S in the Mark 4.S mounl. Iwo 20mm 7(i I'liaiaiu (dW S and two triple ,\Iaik ^2 lorpeilo lubes, tor ,\S\\ in paired Ticonden^gas caiiv llie SPY \ ladai ot the Aegis anav s. one lorwaid and one alt. as a
missilc destrovers. they were uprated to guided missile ciLiisers
and Ym kiow
('//(/(7V';v/
/(
lurliiercightaie |iresentl\ authorised. Thev have been built
carried
m
I
his data
I
IT
AttcrlhcciKlol thc()Lli)lxM-\\'jnn
^
s SclicLiia
I
Hcni\ Kissm-ci cmhaikcd on
Stale
ot
shuttle dipldiiiacN
'
dLsi>^iK'd Ic ac hic\c.
oV
a iouikI
on
a step
by
Middle liast scttlciiicnt. A shortdixcd I nitcd Nations backed conlcivnLC on the Middle luist in( iene\ a collapsed in )eeenibei and Iroin then on. Kissm-ei niana-ed t.> exekide the So\ let I ion entiieK ion he peace pn iccss. nuikiiii: thel SAthecenlialpiNotol M iddle asiei n diploma^c\ In .lanuaiA 1*^*74 he |xisuadcd l:\ pi and Israel to sionadisenLiauenientaureemenluherebx Israel withdrcu Ironi the west bank ol the Slic/ Canal (the Canal itsell was reopened in l')7.-s and Irom lie east hank to a distance ot 2()kin inilesi. w ith acc^ unpaiu ing lorce reductions on both Mdc^ Ic aNo proinoted a similar ayrecnicnt belueeii Sxiia and IsiacI on the Colan lleiLjhis, he piesteee ol ilie nited States m tlie Middle ast u as hiL'h, w ith Kissm-jcr accepted as a mediator b\ aii me Aiab stales inx^Kcd. and US asccndanc> appeared to be contirmed b\ President step basis, a conipiclicnsixc
I
'
II
1
I
1
1
I
.
I
i
(
>
I
I
I
I
l
Nixon's
truinii-ihal
tourol Ihc rc-ion in.lune l')74
KissniL-er's elloris to secure a turther chsenuaye-
Smai ucie latlier more timc-consummi:. Israel reluscd [o abandon the whole ol the peninsula ed on occup\ iiil' an importa leld and wo passes in the area. She alsculemanded the rnjht to
incnt
in
keep
.lev\
—
ish
had mo\ed
,
.
I
settlements
m
alter
m
\')<^l
these settlers
the Siiiai .
These proposals uere
reiecled b\ h.L'spt as inadequate. Despite his an'jcrat israel-s inliansi-cnce
round
pan-. J b\
Kissmsjcr embarked on a liesh m .Xueiisl \'r^ \..,,im-
diplomacx threats Irom I S
ol shuttle
PresKleiit
bold
I..
icdiKe
American support lor Israel uiiL-s she a-reed to eoncessums he actuall\ suspended weapons deliNcries to her loi
paeka-eol
a
lime
his elloris resulted
m
a
cements between Isiacl. L'\pt and the on Seplcmber pio\ ulme loi a lurthei Israeli withdrawal Irom pari ol llieSinai hcixickaee also provKled lor Ameriean civihan personnel, as a-i
L'nited States
stems m the two crucial passes. l,aige sums ot' American aid were promised to both Israel and Egypt US was now closely involved with the security s\
and the
ot both countries.
The Republican president and his secretary of state had been preoccupied with the aftermath of both the Watergate affair and of the Vietnam War: and although Kissinger's diplomacy had been very effective, a change of regime in Washington and Tel Aviv w as to produce far more spectacular results. In Janu-
new president, the Democrat Jimmy Caller, came to power in the US. while in May 977 the ailing Labour government was replaced by ary
1977. a
Above: The two national leaders
whose unlikely
agreement paved the way for peace between Israel and its most important Arab foe, Egypt, in 1979-
Menachem Begin (on left), who became prime minister of Israel in May 1977,
and Anwar Sadat, Egypt
effective ruler of
since
GamalAbdel
Nasser'sdeathin 1970.
1
Menachem
Begin's right-wing Likud coalition
in
men and new policies profound changes in the Middle Last. Begin's initial hawkish statements about the in\ ioiabilit_\ ol the lerrilories occupied in 1967 seemed to bode ill lor an\ lulurc negotiations, but the new Israeli prime minister possessed both the prestige and the political skills to force a settlement on his divided aiiel reluctant cabinet, lie recognised that Israel's lutui e seeui"it\ depended on the conclusion of peace w ith b.g\pt and that Lgypt might be so anxious for a settlement heiselt that she might be prepared, in the last resort, to ignore the demands of the Palestine iberation Organisation (PLO) for an independent Palestine In this coniecture Begin was correct: HgypIsrael.
w as
I
he combinatii)n of new
to lead to
l
lian
Piesulent
Anwar
le-esiablishment the SiiKii
ol
Satlat
lull
\a
anted to secure the
l,g\ptiaii
lie belie\cel that
sovereignty over
Kissinger's step by step
apinoaeh was loo cumbersome and that etTecting a peace tieat\ w ith Isiael would enable ligNpt to reduce llie si/e ol her mllatetl armed lorces. thus enabling ( "airo to conecnii ale ,g\ jn's resources on her rapitlly l
I
I
I
well as l'nited Nations lorces. to
man
earl\ warninii
Sadat recognised that he had to ensure that such a
woultlopen the way forthe pailicipation other Arab slates in the negotiations. Otherwise Lg\pt woLild be lell isolated in the Arab world: and jicaee tieaiN
ol the
1889
HGYI>T
WDISRAHl.
\
^)l}-79
al
isation that an
oLild ha\ e to
agreement
be linked to an
some of the aspii ations ol the Palcstmian Arabs on the West Bank of the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip. Here lay the sf\
sticking point, for
most
at
Israelis
least
were united
in their
opposition to any settlement which conceded the possibility of an independent Palestinian state.
stateuould. thc\
felt.
Such a
nienaLX- Israel'sxerx existence,
and would be dommated b\ the detested Palestine Liberation Organisation. Begin stated categorically in November 1977 that no Israeli delegation would "ever negotiate in any w ay with the so-called Palestine Liberation Organisation, u hether it is in Geneva, or Cairo or the moon." It was on this rock that the Carter-Sadat hope for a comprehensive Middle East-
register
any further progress
after
September 1975.
Carter therefore adopted a Soviet suggestion for a
pave w ay for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference and w hich called for a 'comprehensiN c" settle-
joint Soviet-United States statement designed to
the
ment of the Israel-Arab dispute, including an c\entual Israeli military withdrawal from the 1967 occupied and the satisfaction of the "legitimate rights
territories
of the Palestinian people". This statement caused an uproar in Israel and in the influential JewishAmerican lobby in the United States. Carter was forced to climb ditwn: m a speech at the United Nations General .Assembly on 4 October 977 and in private discussions with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan in New York, he denied that he in1
multilateral negotiations rather than
tended to impose a Palestine settlement on Israel and insisted that the future of the Palestinian people was a matter for negotiation betw een all the interested parties. This effectively ended Soviet-US collaboration
Kissini:er's personal
to
em settlement was to founder. In
1
977 Carter and his aides
v\
ere intent on reviving
on returning to diplomacs which had failed to
reopen the Geneva Conference and resulted
in the
Shuttle diplomacy, Henry
Kissinger style.
Above left:
Kissinger and President
Assad
of Syria. Kissinger
made the US the arbiter of Middle East and 1975,
i
politics in
1974
EGYPT AND ISRAEL
re\
i\ al
of high level
US
mediation to secure a direct
settlement of outstanding Israeli-Egyptian issues.
moved closer to the more fissures now opening in the
Thereafter the Soviet Union radical .Arab states
- the
.Middle Hast offered her the opportunity of regaining
her lost intluenee there.
he collapse of the multilateral approach to the Middle East paved the u ay for Sadat's dramatic visit Jerusalem in November 1977. He hoped that his I
to
visit
would remove the
"psychological
barrier"
which, he believed, impeded a settlement. (Jn arri\ al he demanded the withdrawal of Israel fR>m all the teiritories she had occupied in 967 and Israeli recognition of the right of the Palestinians to selfdetermination in return for Egyptian recognition of Israel and her removal from the ranks of Israel's enemies. While the visit caused a sensation at the time - Sadat addressed the Knesset, the Israeli parliament - little that was concrete emerged from the private talks. Begin had no intention of acceding to Egypt's far-reaching demands, and he envisaged Sadat's visit as the first stage in a long process of bargaining, whereas Sadat wanted a quick settlement. The two leaders agreed to meet at Ismailiya on 25 December, u here the atmosphere v\ as less cordial than it had been at Jerusalem. Begin rejected any notion of a Palestinian state based on the West Bank and Ga/a. bitterl\ attacked the PLO and would aeree onl\ to some form
of limited
home
rule for the Palestir,,.,,,
1973-70
two
;
up two committees ;'!itica! Jerusalem and a military committee in Cairo. Two days later Begin issued a memorandum which set out the maximum concessions any Israeli leader could offer the Palestinians and remain in leaders agreed to set
committee
.
;
in
power- "administrative autonomy' forthe West Bank and Gaza Arabs in the form of an elected municipaltype council based in Bethlehem, while Israeli troops, in number, would remain in the West Bank and Gaza to maintain public order and
although reduced security.
1
Above; Kissinger looks on as Israeli Premier Yitzhak Rabin signs an agreement concerning partial
withdrawal from Sinai in September 1975. Above
M60 tanks prepare to pull back as part right: Israeli
of the agreed withdrawal of
Below: Egyptian troops line the banks of the Suez Canal as it is reopened to shipping. Israeli forces.
Carter steps in The proposal was a long wa> from meeting the more ambitious plans for the area envisaged by Sadat and certainly stood no chance of acceptance by other Arab states. Then in January 1978 Carter intervened. He met Sadat at Aswan on the 4th and both men agreed on a formula which they hoped would satisfy Israeli fears by avoiding the use of the words selfdetermination' and "independence" for the Palestinians and offered
them instead
their right "to partici-
pate in the determination of their this
was too much
In
own
future."
Even
for Begin.
another attempt to resolve the deadlock Sadat
sent his Foreign .Minister
.Mohammed Kamel
salem on 15 Januarv. The
visit
was
to Jeru-
a disaster. Begin
\
\
WDISK
(,\V\
patronised the
\l
i^n
I
Kanicl and rejected outriLiht withdrawal Irom the oeeeupied
\oLilhti.il
his eall tor Israeh
and
aeeeptanee ol the 'national rights' ol the Palestinians. hereupon Sadal recalled the l-,L:\piian delei:ation on ihe poliiieal ei>niniittee tcriitoiies
lor the
I
and between the Israeli nunistei ot and more pLihIiel) at a I Ssponst)redeoi,Liv.iK.' Uiaeli. Kg\ |itian and L nited States foreign ministers m Kngland m .lul\ Increasingly impatient w ith Israel's nnw illingness to compromise and desperate to a\oid renewed warfare m the Middle Hast. Carter summoned Sadal and Begin to meet him at the presidential retreat at Camp Da\id on 5 September PHS, Alter mueh haggling Fruitless iKroliationsointmiieLldLirinL: the sprmi^
pii\ate
SLinimcr
in
det'ciico
and
Sadai
'
id
,ehai
,
il
cs
i
)
i
.
I
full
together with
I
l
of Israeh troops and settlers years and
imm
the
Smai o\er three
restoiaiion ol the peninsula to P.g\|it. \
ariou^
Jau^cs detailing troop reduc-
and United Nations sur\eillanee to satist\ the security reqriircnients oi' both sides. The second agreement called for negotiations between Israel. Jordan and "representatives of the Palestinian jieople' to settle the \e\eel question ol the Arabs on the W est Bank and Cia/a. \\ hile these negotiations weie proceeding a sell-go\erning Arab authorit\ would be set up lor li\e \ears. which would replace tite Israeli militar\ gosernment. Israeli lorces were to be reduced in n Limber and edepKw ed m securit\ /ones on the borders Begin insisted thai the\ wotild sta\ there even altera (mal settlement, tions
i
i
I
which Carter stibseol liie most Irustralmg lioih -ideha\e e\ei had in m\ hie' made signilieant concessions to the oiiiei Hcl'iii agreed tcnenuweall Israeli seltlemenMioin the Sinai and Sadat agreetl to postpone the West Bank-da/a During the negotiations
quentl)
described as 'one
experiences
ISO-'
I
latter
was
aspect
opposed
bitterl\
b\
Above: An afternoon to Gettysburg for the
.
Liberation Organisation whicli reiected an\ solution
independent
short ol a lull)
Amei
el us.
PLO
tlenounciiTj
it.
and ''^
:eie.IionM .\iah states.
laced hN
a
backeil
then intransigence b\ the So\
in
solid
Increasing
sti
:id
olaled
'^\
\
idai
omed agreement. Ihe e^adical Arab states in mthe Arab world
Saudi Ai. with the
Worse' iroin the
state
n p>
Lebanon
the
ile in
lel
Cmon, made the
ol stabihtx in the
m
Siixe September LJ7(). the Palestinian acti\
^'^S
1
and
Camp David 1978. US Jimmy Carter
advisers at the talks,
September
President
makes a point to Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat while Menachem Begin (left foreground* and Moshe Dayan (with eyepatchi look
.Middle Last inoblemalical
expelled liom .lordan had
iom
visit
politicians
hael also
piospecl isls
assembled
settlcil
m
the
-
Lebanon,
launched liequent terrorist raids into Isr.iel, hese prompted hea\\ Israeli retaliaIor\ air raids on the guerrilla bases. he situation became even more confused w hen ei\ il w ar broke out ^)7^ and S\rian loivc^ entered the 111 the Lebanon in coLintiA osteiisibl) to restore order Ni ael w as draw n l
guerrillas
there,
1
Ik- daimed he would .ut all aid to Israel and blandishments mueascd aid to Israel i. lorced Begin his consisted ot toagreetoa'Fa amework loi Peace' twoagrccments. he In st w asadrall ,g\ ptian-lsraeli peace treat) which provided loi a phased withdrawal
threats
the
the Palestine
settlement to an mdelniite luture. Predietabl\
I
\
war
into the
support ol her ClinsiKin allies
iiiiIialL in
southern Lebanon, and e\enlLiall\
111
nuaded
the countiA
to establish a
Israeli
lOkm
lorces
(si\-mile)
wide 'securitN /one' ll
Lebanon should
In spite ol all these
the
fact
that
the
Daxul acci>rds
dilTerences uniesobed. an treatx
was
signeel in
the occasion arise.
complkatioiis. and
Camp
PCo
in spite lelt
lsiaeli-Lg> plian
of
maior peace
L.gxpt had' secured the
returii ol the Sinai aiKl ace|Uiied a bieatliiiig s|iace to
enable her gtnernmeni to devote lesouiees to the appallini: lex
her
el ol
poxertx and to the model nisalioii ot
Israel had mana-ed to dispel the w.n on iwo honis ih.,i h.,d dominated
economx; while
nightmaieol
m ikc the u cation ol iliesi.ite. Ihepea.etieau set llic seal on Ki., el's rise to
Israeli mililaix ihinkin-
Inelle.
l.
ie-!oii,,ldoiniiiaii.e, loi \nlhl ing. Sxria alone liaidlx
\
pi
piesenled
oul ol
ilie
reckon-
a lealisiic threat.
Peace w itli L.gxjit was the suecevslul outcome ol lour deeadesof militars \ iett)r\ .Michael Dockrill .
Right:
Gunmenonthe
streets of Beirut,
with the Soviet
armed
AK series
smallarmsthat became ubiquitous during the in the Lebanon,
civil
wars
Private armies
were
formed by many of the religious and political groupings, the forces of the PLO were constantly present, while both Syria and Israel intervened from outside.
.
LEBANON
1975-78
2U chiuary 1975, a lai izc dLMiionstration look in the Lebanese pori oi Sulon as local fishermen, backed by Muslim Ict tiNis. protested against the planned kivaiion o\ a Christian-dominated fishing nuv ill- control ol' righl-w mi: Maronite inioun. It uasai\picall\ k\ cbanese (_)n
I
place
I
I
,M,iM.j all the
..oiuuiiic and
characicrised Lebanese tors niaivhed
jdieiits
iipi,
An
pc^l
tlic
of
uhieh
Mil
reli^.
deiiionslr;:
through the h
Lebanese Arm \ uhieh ihen wounding the ma\or ot Sidon. Tension beiuccn the dominant right-umg Marodor MedonimantK MunIiih leftist nite Christians and the predi unit of the
I
tatall\
•oumg steadiu. particularly opposition had been groui since the issue of Pall
nian miiitar\ acti\
it_\
against
from Lebanese bases had been added to underessentialK Lebanese quarrels during the l'960s. The Sidon incident, therefore, escalated immediately, and on 29 Februar\ a second demonstration ended in a pitched battle between Lebanese ^i\ troops and left-w ing militia groups, backed by ...ciTillas of some of the more extreme Palestinian resistance organisations. The amiw alarmed by the effectix cness of the opposition, subjected Sidon to a bnct artilleiA bombardment before concluding a ceasetire and w ithdraw ing its troops. The Sidon incident pro\ oked protests and demonstrations throughout Lebanon, with both moderate and radical .Muslim leaders demanding refomi of the ami) command, which they accused of acting as an Israel
Kinii.
instrument of the Maronites. nites of the
The
right-w ing
Maro-
Phalange and other groups demonstrated army, further con-
enthusiastically in support of the
vincing the .Muslims that garded as neutral.
The extent
w hich
it
could no longer be
the fragile
.
.At first the fighting
w as limited to more or less static gunmen of the left-w ing
positional battles betw een
Lebanon's tangled web
ence as
The foundation of the Lebanese state was based on an unwntten National Pact, agreed in 1943, which established a fixed political balance between the Lebanon's diverse communities. These groups, defined on religious lines and led by powerful patnar-
the Maronites by Sunni leader Rashid Karami
nis,
greatly complicate Lebanon's fundamental division between Muslims (some 60 per cent of the population by 1 975) and Chnstians, The Maronites, adherents of a Catholic sect, are by far the largest and most powerful of the Chnstian communities, with around 25 per cent of the Lebachal families,
non's total population. They are the traditionally
dominant group, both commercially and politically, a fact recognised under the 1 943 National Pact which allotted
them the presidency. The Maronites
tradi-
the West, rather than the Arab world, and support. Since the 1 930s, a prominent element in the Maronite community has been the Phalangist Party, onginally set up in imitation of European Fascist movements, and closely associtionally look to
for example
ated with the
Gemayel
family.
centre of Maronite influence
is in
The geographical East Beirut and the
re-
Lebanese constitutional balance had been undemiined was soon revealed. On Sunday 13 .April 1975. Phalangist gunmen ambushed a busload of Palestinians who had strayed into the Chnstian suburb of .Mn el-Roumaneh in Beirut. Twenty-se\en Palestinians, including women and children, were killed and 19 wounded. Within hours barricades had been erected throughout Beirut and the first shots were bemg exchanged. B\ the follow ing morning the first battles of the Lebanese civil war w ere under w ay to
radical
among
sentiments spread
so that attempts at a
the S..--
compromise
political
.-.
fa v
:
towin support in his community. The Shi'ites form the majority Muslim group, v\ tabout 30 per cent of Lebanon's population. As tre poorest element in the country, they have supported radical action, originally
Movement
of the
through
Imam Musa
Depnved, and
later
Sadr's
through the
Amal armed organisation. The Druze are a tight-knit community living in tne Chouf mountains. Their numbers are small - around seven per cent of the population - but their influence has been great. Belonging to a small, enclosed Muslim sect, they are regarded as heretics by most of their co-religionists. Their relations with other Muslims have not been close, and in Israel they have cooperated with the Jewish state, being the only Muslim group to participate in military ser\"ce Nevertheless, under the leadership of the Jun-b 3" family,
they
became engaged
in
struggle against the Chnstians
in
the
Lebanc
while always emphasising that theiraction was c ly
designed to promote their own Druze inte'-: -' opposed to any wider Arab or Palest v
northern mountains.
as
The Sunni Muslims are traditionally the dominant element of the Muslim population, but not the most numerous, with perhaps 20 percent of the country's population. Under the National Pact they were accorded the post of pnme minster for one of their traditional leaders. From the late 1960s, the con=;ervative community leaders lostmuchof theirinflu-
cause.
Other elements in the population include C--Orthodox Christians (who took the Muslim s cthe civil war), Chnstian Armenians, and of course Palestinians, who at the height of their presen : the 1970s
may have
totalled
the Lebanese population
almost 10 per
cc
Above:
A Christian priest
armed with an old Winchester in Zghorta, northern Lebanon. Zghorta was the base of President
the forefront c'
Frangieh
s private force,
the 'Zghorta Liberation
Army'. Top: Frangieh's openly partisan approach led to calls for his
resignation. Here,
•
bodyguards of Phalangist leader Pierre •
•
Gemayel wait
outside the Chamber of Deputies during a vote of
no confidence
in
Frangieh.
LEBANON
\
h \\! )N
l.l
7,S
mail
Right: Christian militiamen
M;ii
.
i.'(iiiimaiii.los.
li
suburb or n.-rnL'LX' cam l-h^htiiiL! \^as heaviest ardund iIk' I'ak'slinKui ca i|is oV al /aatar and Hori al-Barajn.li. uliich ucrc situated 111 predomiiiaiillv
round up Muslim non-combatants m the
.
Karantina
l
Christian aicas ol the
bvokc oui around the no minoi chishcs look place
was
suspected
\\idcl\
ilh
\
upon
fighting in Beirut,
dt
a
I'alesliniai
liie
district of Beirut.
have suffered
in
have indulged in mass murder forthe purposes of revenge orterrorisation.
il
I'hah
ihV
I
mteiil
oiilronlatioii
heavily
or Palestinian; both sides oujjlioul
admitted respiinsibilil\
mas
Civilians
whether Christian, Muslim
l';
IIk
en-
I'ah
.111
Hi
vipportei'
\iiiL^
Aralat,
I
bulk
tlie
tile
»
ithel'I.Oliadsi the
I
li;jiiliii;j.
m
ace id w
,
Tlie
llmarks ol
mas
rate attei ipt
;
ebore lu the
t
coni ronlation with the Lebanese
into direci
Pl,()
el-l^ouiiianeh
,\iii
Aralat"
ent mthealTair
iravoidiiiiienlaniilei Ol a ho-
ith
Christians, and. liieieloie. torcini:
arm\
llie
.
which
itliadaslighl .\luslmi mauirit} uasot'lieered
alllioui:li
predominaiitlx b\
.Maroiiites. to intervene direeth
The Maronite right would
against the Palestinians.
m
then be
position,
a
tVom
Palestinians
it
imagined, to expel the
Lebanon and mipiise
its
in\n
dominatuMi oxei'the .Muslim opposition.
Below
right:
A member
of a Nasserite militia with
an AK-47 taking cover
in
Below far right: Muslim checkpoint in
Beirut.
A
Beirut with children at play.
The Muslims ofgaiiisc That opposition came largel>
Inim the National
.\Io\ement. an alliance of the Dru/e Progressive
whose leader. Kamal Juniblatt was mam spokesman, a number ot Nasnationalist and Islamic groups, the two
The militias on both sides were numerous but many were small and insignificant.
Socialist Part\.
the .\lo\ement"s serite. .Arab
Lebanese ciimnuinist
parties, the Parti Populaire .Sy-
rienand the.Shi'ite \lo\ ement
Imam
ol the
Civil
war in the Lebanon
1975-77
Deprived, led by
.\Uisa Sadr. Closelv allied to the
more
militant
Palestinian resistance groups of the Rejection Front,
Movement was outraged b> the Ain el Roumaiieii massacre, and demanded the sacking of tvM) cabinet minisieis who v\ere members of the the National
I'halangist grouping,
.lumlikill
soon went further,
declaring that he would back no government which anv
incltided
Phalangist.
Tantamount
to an
open
declaration of w ar. this w as a direct repudiation of the 1^4.^ .National Pact
upon which
the
Lebanese con-
was based and persuaded the .VLironites that w hole position w as uiuier attack, helping torallv
siiiution ilieir
-Mppoit
loi
\\ iule
paied
lo
the
moivextieme Phalangists,
ihe Maronite communitv as a whole |iredefend its interests, the Phalangists retained
hope ol extracting some adv aiitage from thecrisis. and Used the National Movement's demands as a
the
precipitating a prolonged government withdrawing their ministers. .After a brief was renewed in mid-Mav this time with the Phalangist mihtia receivin>j support from the IS )iniei :sidei Camille Chai onal Liberal Partv and from fctllowers of the then iikiii Sulieiiian Frangieh arotmd the northern iiie iown of Zghorta. while the Palestinians l..ul iiime organised backing trom the smaller pretext
lor
crisis b> lull,
lighting
.
1
.v
anesc
leliist
announced
-iv-ups lliL
t.i!
On
23 NLiv President Franof a military govern.
Illation
example of Maronite iliil lliinkiiiL'. and three dav s later it was forced to jii he situation was deteriorating swiftly, and ling was spreatling ihrouL'hout the countrv. raisKars in I.ebanonN neighbour .Syria that the 1.
but this v\as iiK ielv an
I
Palestinian domination
main areas of Syrian military
presence
LEBANON
Is
LEBANON
1975-78
might be torn apart, in the process provoking diicci Israeli intervention on Syria's western flank. cDunii
N
Syrian pivssuiv. ahvady cxeiled against the military goxernment experiment, resulted in Presideni Frangieli ealliiig on Siinni Muslim politician Rashid
lovm a new government, which contained nor representatives of Kamal had the support of Chamoun. who was appointed minister of the interior: the go\ernmenl. therefore, retained the confidence ol the Maronites. It also represented the possibility of a political solution, as Prime Minister Karami also held the defence portfolio, in order to prevent the use ol the army by the Maronite right.
Karami
lo
neillu-i
Plialangists
luniblatt, but
The new
initiative
seemed successful
at first,
and a
degree of calm returned to the Lebanon during the early summer of 1^75. but beneath the veneer of peace the militias were arming and organising, convinced that the last w ord had not been said, nor the last shot fired.
By autumn
.
the
Maronite forces had grouped them-
selves into the Lebanese Front,
which included the 10,000-strong Phalangist militia, and the smaller Tigers and Zghorta Liberation Army, which together mustered a further 5000 men The Zghorta Liberation .
Amiy was in fact the private army of President Frangieh. commanded by his son Tony. This open partisanship by the theoretically impartial head of state contributed to the increase in tension, which
renewed fighting from the middle of September 1975. On 17 September, the Phalangist began an artillery bombardment of the predominantly Muslim districts of West Beirut, which in turn provoked the well organised Nasserite Mourabiresulted in
militia
toun militia, cooperating with the Palestinian PFLPGeneral Command, to escalate the war, taking the battle to the Phalangists
and clearing them from most
of West Beirut and the hotel district. The capture of several of the largest hotel tower blocks was particulady significant, as it gave the leftists command of large areas of central Beirut.
This setback seems to have convinced the Lebanese Front of the need to consolidate the territoiy it still held; in plain language this meant the elimination of all Muslim and Palestinian enclaves and
camps in the Christian-held area north of the Beirut-Damascus road. By January 1976, the Palesticamps of Tal Zataar and Jisr al-Pasha ere under siege, while the camp at Dbayyah fell to the Lebanese Front on 14 January. Four days later refugee
nian refugee
Phalangist gunmen captured the Muslim Beirut suburbs of Qarantina. Maslakh and Naba'a. massacring or expelling their inhabitants. In attacking the Palestinian camps the Maronites had ignored direct and
repeated warnings from the PLO leadership of Yassir Arafat. The bulk of the PLO forces had thus far kept out of what they regarded as a purely Lebanese dispute in which intervention could have only negative
consequences for the Palestinians. The Maronite PLO to act, however, and in doing the military balance decisively in favour of
attacks forced the
so
swung
the Muslim-leftist coalition.
The PLO had held its forces largely in the south to avoid involvement in the civil war, but now they swung north along the coast towards Beirut. The advancing Palestinians joined the National Movement's assault on Chamoun's Tigers in Damour. The town fell on 20 January, and much of the population was massacred.
LEBANON of Damour. the their mountain stronghold
The
Maronite base outside in northern Lebanon, and the intervention of the PLO suggested that the war would end with either a limited Maronite defeat,
Maronite mountain strongholds,
allowing them to set up a separate Christian state
intervention,
fall
last
in the
Syrians as potential sa\ iours. While the mobilised for a lu--ii;icli struggle Pierre
k
Phalang^st
the
.
and the establishment of a leftist/Palestinian-dominated Lebanese state. Either result would invite Israeli intervention, and therefore both provoked Syrian anxieties. On the day before the fall of Damour, Syria's President Hafez Assad had signalled his disquiet by
reaction, continue
despatching units of the Syrian-officered Palestinian Liberation Army to Lebanon, and on 21 January the Syrian foreign minister arrived in Beirut to arrange a
tant
north, or a total Maronite defeat,
ceasefire. This
was
to be
founded on a number of
called
i:
Yassir Arafat
to
..
Syria's lik.
military victory.
'inal
aiK:
L
direc^
for
olmd
y-iie
:
understood Syrian h Jumblatt and his
1975 78
in their turn v:v the
PLO '
leaders
\o restrain
allie
tinians
were being dragged
'heir
control toward a confi ontatii
i;
Arab ally. On June 1976, S\i Lebanon and began to move on Beiru, Syrian advance was slow and hesitant.
came up
1
i
Iin
.
against unexpectedly effective Palestinian
reforms, which the Syrians hoped would defuse the
resistance, especially around Sidon.
Muslims and Christians were to have equal parliamentary representation, and there was to be a
a ceasefire rather than risk large-scale fighting that
civil service. More importantly was to be confimied as an Arab was regarded as no more than a sop by the National Movement, but the reference to the Arab character of the Lebanon inflamed Maronite sensibilities. The Druze leader. Kamal Jumblatt. was also hesitant in accepting the Syrian compromise and while he vacillated the Lebanese Army, upon which
national political problems for him. Yet despite the
had originally placed such extravagant hopes, and which in spite of, or more accurately because of, its inactivity remained a vital factor in any plan for a new Lebanese political balance, dissolved
return to their
crisis.
reform
of the
perhaps. Lebanon country. All this
.
the Maronites
into
its
constituent, hostile parts.
A
young Sunni lieutenant, Ahmed Khatib, led a mutiny, setting up his own Army of Lebanon in the Beqaa Valley. By March, the process was well advanced, and Muslim units were ridding themselves of their Maronite officers and going over to Khatib. The reforms proposed by Syria were now a dead letter and Khatib, demanding the outright resignation of President Frangieh. marched on the presidential palace at Ba'abda. Finding his way barred by pro-Syrian PLA troops, he nevertheless forced Frangieh to flee, train-
ing his artillery
upon
the palace.
The peace plan had been shattered, and the army had disintegrated; fighting again became heavy, with Jumblatt calling for a total militarv' victory over the Maronites. For the Syrians. Jumblatt. rather than the Lebanese Front, was now seen as the main stumbling block to an acceptable settlement. They therefore exerted increasing pressure upon him, while at the same time attempting to find
a
compromise candidate The
to replace the discredited President Frangieh.
Maronites, unable to stem the advance of Palestinian/ leftist
forces that had captured the last Christian
positions in
West Beirut and were moving
into the
Assad opted
would have created immense domestic and
for
inter-
Syrian presence (which was soon supplemented by an
Arab peacekeeping force of Sudanese and Libyan war continued.
troops ) the civil
Massacre at Tal Zaatar The diversion of Palestinian
forces to
face the
Syrians had given the Maronites an opportunity to aim of eliminating the Palestinian
refugee camps in Christian areas, and pressure on Tal Zaatar and Jisr al-Pasha was stepped up. Towards the
end of June, a joint force of Phalangists, Chamoun's Tigers and former Maronite soldiers of the Lebanese Army took Jisr al-Pasha, and on 12 August Tal Zaatar fell after a 53-day siege. Many inhabitants of Tal
Zaatar were slaughtered by the Maronite gunmen, and survivors were expelled from Christian territory. Between July and September the Syrians fought to clear the Maronite heartland north of the Beirut-
Damascus road of Palestinian/leftist forces, and early in October Syrian troops began to advance from Sofar on Beirut. Heavy fighting took place at Bhamdoun on 13 October, prompting Saudi Arabia to propose a peace initiative in order to preserve Arab unity. The resulting agreement, reached at a summit in Riyadh on 16 October and ratified by the Arab League, apart from Iraq and Libya, at a conference in Cairo on 25 October provided for a predominantly Syrian peacekeeping force to be stationed in Lebanon, whose existence was to be preserved under the new president Ellas Sarkis. The Palestinians were to observe the 1969 Cairo Agreement, by which they had received legitimation for their military presence in Lebanon in return for observance of Lebanese sovereignty and authority.
On
14
November
Beirut as the guarantors of the
Syrian troops entered
new agreement.
Bitterness and tensions remained, howc\er. and
Main
picture; Beirut
was
devastated by the factional conflict; the Syrian intervention led to the creationof an Arab League
peacekeeping
force.
terrorist activity
continued to be a threat
to stability.
Accounts remained to be settled, and in March 1977 Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated in the Chouf mountains, the traditional Druze stronghold. His enraged supporters retaliated by massacring local Christian \illagerv though it was widely suspected that Syria had been responsible for his death. Syrian policy failure,
in
the
Lebanon was essentialK
however, and the countrv' remained not on
a I
" politically, but also geographically divided. Left:
KamalJumblatt,
assassinated 1977,
in
March
lies in state
surrounded by his mourning Druze followers.
Maronite mountains
a
virtually
within a state, and the south still ku the Lebanese Druze and Mu^lui' Palestinian allies.
imlc; L-
K<;i,iii(. i.n
1
a
ii
S99
)
The
Israelis
W
April 1975, the ancient hatreds between
hen,
\ Uisl
non
I
in
go into the Lebanon
m and Maronite Christian finally plunged Lebabloody cauldron of civil war. for those Ml the southern haltOf liie countr\ this uas an e \ tension (i| ti )u hies w hieli had heijLin w illi
nito the
liMni: iiiei
el\
tile
aiTi\al ot
l
ai iiied iinils ot
OrganisationtPlJ))
wakenl then
iiillie
Jordan during the battles
ihe Palestine Libeiation
oi
'
election Imin
Hhiek Se|itemlxT'
1
^*7(
PLO's \ ie\\ point the eiiloieed nune to Lebanon was not vMthout its ad\antages. Whereas F-roiii
the
other Arab states, including Syria, were able to keep its activities under strict control, the weak government of Lebanon unable to stop the grow ing violence w ithin its ow n frontiers, eouki impose leu restraints on ilsacti\ Hies, .\loieo\er. iheaxowed purposeol (he PLO uas uar against Israel aixl from Lebanon uas .
ii
uell placed to
ments
in
mount
attacks against .lewish settle
northern Galilee.
Lebanon had taken
part in the I94S war againsi and despite the lael that she u as not in\ cK ed in Six-Day W ai oi ihe ^ omKippiii W ai ilieie iuid always been Palesliman eiotips pivsenl u lio liad .arried out cross-hordei i.ud, Israel had pi.-leskd lepeatedly to noa\ai! md m llie end liad lesoiled lo series of punitive raid \ me ueiehl and i\ pe. uhichtheheaviesi.. u dn(ii,,n:s DcLeinhei |W(,n. lesiiitedmlhedesiMMiMiinl v\i ah-ou ned airhnei s lU init InleinaliniKil \i,|,m,i In squad ol iieheop hoiiK-eommaiidos. .Alter 1970. houever. the PLO presence m southIsrael,
itherthe
.
,i
\
,ii
.
I
.11
I
I
'Hit)
<\
ern Lebanon led lo an extension of the L'uernlla raids,
and
to further Israeli relahation
emment uas
I
he I.ebanese .jov-
toreed lo agree to the Pl.O deplo\ing
weapons m delenee of
eamps trom 197.^ on\\aids. and mereasing|\ elose relations hetueen the Pl.O and leftist groups uitliin Lebanon (notabl\ \ai ious Shi iie parties and the Di u/e Proghea\
\
its
leUigee
Below: The bodies of the victims are carried from the
wreckage ofthe bus
in
OPERATION LITANI armour roars Lebanon during
Left: Israeli
into
Operation effective
Litani.
Using
modern tanks
uas
inc\ ilahK caiii:ht
up
in
ihc liiihtinii.
For Lebanon's nci-Jihours. S>na and Israel, the Lehanese ei\il uai pro\ ided holii a prohleiii and an opportunit\ Neither eoiinir\ w ishcd to see a regime uiila\ourahle to iiselt estahhshcd in Lebanon, but at .
such as the Centurions shown here the Israelis
were
able to
sweep their
way to the Litani River, but the PLO forces retreated northwards or into the
same lime, eaeh eould
llie
see that the collapse
ol"
achieve some of
its
central control miL;hl eiiahle
long-term aims,
in the
to
it
tortuous course of the civil
war. ,S\riae\cntuall\ inter\ ened u
ith tacit
(
defensible enclaves of their
Irom
Israel
)
major camps, avoiding decisive
engagement.
ol
the
apprcnal
against the .Muslim leltisis and in
.\laroniie ("hiistiaiis;
engaged
loices were
look llieoppoi
in
the
suppon
but while Palestinian
more northern Hghting.
helpChristian militias in the south, under a cashiered lormcr major in the Israel
Lebanese
\rni\
iuiiit\ to
Saad Haddad. Haddad's forces,
.
with Isiaeii help, established ct)ntrol o\'er the pre-
diimmaiitK Shi'ite .Muslim population around and to the south ot the Litani Ri\ er.
security forces stormed the bus. but 35 civilians killed and X2 more were w ounded.
were
Under pressure to mount a punitive operation into Lebanon without delay, the Israeli General Staff w as faced with a number of difficult considerations, of w hich geography w as the most ob\ ious. From north to south. Lebanon is di\ided lengthwise into four zones: the coastal plain, which is comparatively naiTow: the Lebanon Range, with peaks risinii to 2()0()m (65(X)ft): the Beqaa Vallex w hich is a north.
ern continuation of the Jordan Valle\
;
and the Anti-
Lebanon Range, w hich includes Mount Hermon and ft>rms the frontier w ith S\ ria. Reasonable ixiads running from north to south exist only on the coastal plain and in the Beqaa V alley but the sole good lateral route is the Beirut-Uamascus road, which crosses both ranges on the bed of an old railw a\ Thus, the path of an in\ader entering Lebanon from the south is a .
.
one. furthercomplicated by the steep-banked Litani River, w hich tlow s into the sea some distance
difficult
Raids and retaliation B\
w
.
1
some lorm Below: The town of Nabathieh in southern Lebanon, wrecked by Israeliairand naval
bombardment on 18 March 1978. If PLO terrorist attacks
enraged
Israeli
public opinion, then the Israeli
attacks
(attacks in
in
which
the innocent suffered far
more than the guilty) were at best
an indiscriminate
revenge, that
m their turn
hardened Palestinian
)
substantial S_\ rian-run force keeping peace m the noilh and centre of Lebabegan tocontest Haddad"s position in
Ith a
ol
units
had some S\rian assistance Israel, m its turn, kept up support for its client, and in .SeiHember the Lebanese president. Lhas Sarkis, accused Israel of deploving tanks on Lebanese soil. In that moiilli. a ccaseliie was negotithe south; in this, they probably
LS
ated b\ the last,
on
Palestinian enclaves
Lebanon
non. PL(
PLO
\. but the
m
KracL and
raids ,nto
settlements
break
the liiihliivj did not
the
bombardment
ot
(iaiilee. continued as did Israeli while the lighting between the PLO and Haddad's miiitia soon restarted. in
-
retaliation
.A major clash was bound to occur sooner or later and the incident which ]iro\ oked this took place on I
.March
I'^'TS.
when
a
PLO
tein>rist
opinion against the state of
bus on the
Israel.
terroiisis siii\i\ed the resulting
I
el
A\
i\ -1
group hijacked
laifa coast road:
eun
I
a
north of Tyre.
The second consideration was
that since
tunate experience in Sue/ City during the
purWar. been
to
since
it
i\
the Israeli
its
unl(>r-
Yom
Kip-
Defence Forces" IDF) policy had (
a\oid costl\ street lighting if at all possible, lacked the manpow er resources to sustain this
pe of warfare. Therefore,
u hi le the operation w as to
form of a large-scale sweep from the borderto would by-pass Tyre and the it Rachidi\e refugee camp, both of which had been hea\ il\ fortified b\ the Palestinians. There was to be no pursuit bcNond the ri\ er. and the raid would be of t;ikc ihc
the
l
iiam River,
limited duration.
Operation Litani. as the raid was code-named, during the night of 14/15 March and
commenced
lasted for se\en da\s.
0\er
20. ()()() Israeli troops,
only tw o of the
supported b\ tanks, artillery and aircraft, crossed the
battie as Israeli
border, but there were no major engagements and
OPERATION LlTANl
Left;
Major Saad Haddad,
leader of the Christian forces that the Israelis used to try to establish a buffer
zone in southern Lebanon, Haddad's men refused to allowtheUNIFIL peacekeeping force to enter their enclaves, even after the ceasefire.
PLO
which did not retreat into their strongholds found safety beyond the Litani. hav ing thuse
units
followed the guerrilla principle of disengaging face of superior strength.
On
15
in the
March, an IDF was to
spokesman had claimed
that the intention
establish a 'security zone'
some 10km (6 miles) w ide,
Lebanon by ground forces was accompanied by heavy bombing of Palestinian camps further north. The use of cluster bombs in these air
but the attack into
ceased.
suppliers that these
weapons should not be em-
celebrating the withdrawal
ofthe
units enter their enclaves: in effect, therefore, the
Palestinians are Israelis in April 1978.
Haddad named
'independent free Lebanon').
US
1
group that attacked the Israeli forces from their base at Tyre. Here the
Christian forces (in 1979.
attacks, in defiance of an understanding with Israel's
ployed against civilian targets, lost the Israelis much international sympathy. The UN Security Council passed a resolution on 9 March calling for an end to the fighting, and on 22 March, the first unit of the United Nations Interim Force In the Lebanon (UNIFIL) arrived to take up position between the IDF and Lebanese forces. The IDF eventually withdrew completely in mid- April, but continued to give support to Haddad's militiamen, who refused to let UNIFIL
Below: Palestinian fighters, from a Nasserite
had achieved their security zone, in that a Christian-dominated corridor, stretching from Naqoura on the coast to the Syrian border southeast of Marjayoun. separated the Israeli forces from UNIFIL and the PLO forces to the north. In the final analysis. Operation Litani probably did Israel more harm than good, however. For in spite of the presence of UNIFIL and the buffer zone of Israelis
The
his region
PLO activities had
not
Palestinians simply returned to their
camps .jubilant not only because they had survived an encounter with the IDF. but also because the
was demonstrably
fallible.
Soon
latter
the Israeli settle-
by from inside the PLO bases. UNIFIL was and once again it became inevitable that Israel would retaliate in strength; and
ments
in northern Galilee
v\
ere being hit regularly
artillery fire
powerless
to stop this
when she did so, she would certainly take advantage of the lessons learned during Operation Litani. Brvan Perrett
1903
\ W
K\
I
AI'ONS
Northrop F-.^A Freedom isihtcr and its succesF-5E and F-2UA are litihiueiLiht. sint:le-seat combininj: supersonic peiiornicnice with a relati\cl\ low cost, ease ol mainleiiance and 1
Ik-
l
sors the
tactical fighters
Liood haiKlliiiL: qLialilics.
needs
are well suited to the
\
\\ ui Id nations and the Nalo alliance. Much ol the initial design and dexelopmenl work on the F->A tighter was undertaken h\ the Northrop Corporation as a pii\ate \enture. although the I S Department ol Defense helatedK tiinded the huilding ol three prolot\ pes in l'-).'^S: it w as a |xiiallel dexelopment w ith the -3SA I'alon supersonic trainer w hich entered sei \ ice with the USAF in 1961 as a replacement tor the 1)1
smaller
the an loiees nl
member
I
hird
states ol the
-
I
959 the prototype Freedom Fighter (Northrop Model N-156F) first flew and m P)(-i2 the F-5A was ordered into production torsuppl\ l.oekhced T-33. In July
1
United States under the MilitAssistance Program.
to nations allied to the
ar\
The
initial
F-5Asand
\
5
F-5 contract called lor 71 single-seat
F-5B two-seat
com crsion
two-seatcrs are generall\ similar
in
trainers.
The
perlonnance and
capability to the F-5As. but lack the lighter's nose-
nidunled armament of two 2()mm
M39
cannon. .A ihird variant, the RF-5A. carries four reconnaissance Pamelas in the nose in addition to the cannon armament. Powered by tw(^ (ieneial leeinc .lS.>-( d .- 3 turbojels. which each prodtiee IS.Sdkg !4()S()lb) ol -.sA can reach a lop thrust with alterburnmg. the .Oddin (36.(l()(llt). In air-lospeed of .Mach -4 at I
1
I
I
I
1
combat the F-^A is highl\ maiuieux rable at low and medium altitudes, but its w capons load is hunted to the built-m cannon and two \l.\l-') Sidewinder missiles mounted on the win
halxed. >
mid-
1
F-.sA
et witiiin its limitalioiis the
elleetne warplane. which
is still
is
widel\ used
a \er\
The
production delneiies
were made in 1964 to the raimng Squadron at I
L
SAI
ol s
I
.s.\s .nid
444
\\ illiams
I
si
Hs
C\)mbal
.AFH. .Arizona
(top): F-5E
NellisAFB
in
Nevada.
Previous page (bottom): The first prototype F-20A Tigershark
in a
quasi-
camouflage scheme with a General Electric logo on the engineairintake.Top: F-5A
Freedom in the
'JS( Is,
Inst
Previous page
Tiger lis of the 57th Tactical Training Wing based at
Fighters of the
US
Air Force; the projections
from the fuselage are in-flight refuelling probes indicating that these aircraft in
were probably used
Project Skoshi Tiger.
Above: An F-5Bof the Republicof Korea Air Force.
Left:
A Canadian Armed
Forces Canadair CF-5D prototype landing; now designated the CF- 11 6D, four of these are currently
rHEF-5/F-2() -this sqiiadrcin was rcsponsihlc tor trainiiiL' foreiLMi crews on tlic anvrall. I'.ai l\ in tlic tollou nvj \ car the
An loivc
Imperial Iranian
ivccivcJ
its
tiisi
-_SAs;
|
was c\entiiall\ to ojiciale a tola! ot 104 F-5Asand 23 -.^l5s. wlucli were supplied Liiuierthe
this service
l
Militarx Assislaiiee l'io;jiaiii or liou;jiit llirouyli tlie
Olhei
Foreii:n \lililar\ Sales I'lo.jrain.
Anierieaii huiil
ators ot
oper-
iiiaioi
-5As iiKlikled laiwan. Iuike\ and South
l
South Korea, the Philippines.
Vietnam. The desiLin was also nianutaetuiet! Netherlands Air Force:
C'ASA
b_\
Canadian Armed [-oives, the Royal oive and the Ro\al \'orwei:ian Air
C'anadair lor the
l
in
Spam assciiihlcd Noi throp-huilt An l-oicc .A lumibei ol the
aircrall tor the Spanisii
Nato to
F-.^
the
operators mtidduced special inodilications
basic dcsiL;n
or example,
l
Forces' CT-.'^As were
Armed
Orenda
(4.'MKIIb) thrust
1
Canadian
the
powered
.IS.S-CA,\-
b\
IMStiky
eiiLiines.
and
probes and ii\ro iiunsiLzhts; Norway's F-.^As had an arrester hook. pro\ ision tor rocket-assisted take-ott and eiiL'ine anti-ieiiii: equipment to suit them to local conditions; and the Netherhad
indliiiht retuellms:
lands improN'ed the F-.SAs alrcadx oeuvrabilit) >et turther b\
littiiiL:
man-
excellent
manoeu\
rmi:
Haps
totheirNF-.'^As.
Despite the F-.^A"s popularitx forces, the
USAF was uneoiiM need of the value otthe
Injhtweight lis:hter concept. as
I'H-ids.
with loreiLin an
the
Cmted
States
However, became
in the
mid-
inereasitiiiiy
Asia conlhct. the CSAF decided toe\ aluate the -.'sA Lindcr combat conditions in South Vietnam umler Proiect Skoshi Tpjci TweU e
unohed m
the Southeast l
F-5As. modilied by reluelliiig
October
littin;:
armour
plate anel m-llight
probes, were despatched to
I^Kx^.
Da Nang
in
ihcN earned out close air support.
and armed reconnaissance missions over South Vietnam and Faos. together with combat air patrols over North Vietnam. Although the aiieralt's payload, range characteristics were poor m compariinterdietuMi
son with other tactical
lighter airciatt.
F-.SA
the
Top:
An
F-5E Tiger
II
of the
US Air Force carrying
Northrop F-5A
Sidewinder missiles and
Paveway laser-guided bombs. Above: An F-5A Freedom Fighter, part of II
the US 4503rd Tactical Fighter Squadron, drops
ordnance on Viet
Cong
a suspected
position.
The
F-5A lacked the more conspicuous engine exhaust smoke of the Phantom.
was lound
because ol the -.SA s small si/e and lack ot conspieuous engine exhaust smoke it sul tered less damage Irom ground lire than other CSAI- attack aircrall lio\se \ er. as noenenn lighteis w eie encountered during sorties over North Vietnam, the -5As capabilities m air combat could not be put to the test. At the end ol the combat e\ akialion. F-.^s were assigned lo a squadron ol the IjSAI 's .^rd aelieal FighterWingatBienlloa. Nootheii -.^sweietoserve with a frontline USAF unit and plans to build i ->C lighters and F-.^D two-seaters tor that ser\ice were dropped. \ et the Skoshi iger exaluation had not that
(47ft 2in);
height 4
01m
(13ft2in)
Weight Empty 3667kg (80851b); maximum take-off 9379kg (20,6771b) Powerplant Two 1850kg (40801b) General Electric J85-GE-1 3 turbojets with afterburning
F-4
generall\ perlormed well in groLind attack missions, it
Type Single-seat, lightweight fighter Dimensions Span 77m (25ft 3in); length 14-38m
Performance Maximum speed Mach km/h (924mph) at 1 1 ,000m (36,000ft)
Range Combat range
in
1
-4
interceptor role
or 1488
314km
(195
miles)
l
Ceiling
15,390m
(50,500ft)
Armament Two 20mm M39 cannon with 280 rounds of ammunition per gun, plus up to 2700kg (60001b) of ordnance, including two wingtip mounted AIM-9 Sidewinder AAMs, four AGM-12 Bullpup ASIVlsand iron bombs
.
\
1
I
Below: ACF-5of the Canadian Armed Forces Air
Command;
it
is
armed
Northrop F-5E Tiger
II
with rocket pods as well as Its
internal
cannon.
Type Single-seat, lightweight fighter Dimensions Span 8-13m (26ft 8in); length 14-45m (47ft 4in);
height 4
06m
Weight Empty 441 0kg
(13ft 4in)
(97231b);
maximum
loaded
11,214kg (24,7221b)
Powerplant Two 2270kg (50001b) General J85-GE-21 turbojets with afterburning
Electric
Performance Maximum speed Mach 1.56, or 1705 km/h (1060mph) at 1 1,000m (36,000ft)
Range Combat
radius
in
interceptor role
1056km
(656 miles) Ceiling 15,790m (51,800ft)
Armament Two 20mm M39 cannon with 280 rounds per gun and up to 31 75kg (70001b) of ordnance, including rocket pods, iron bombs and cluster bomb units; two AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles on wing-tip launchers
KEY WEAPONS
Kl
.
WHAPONS
Y
rod by a single
7710k
Icctric F4()4-GH-I(i('
I
LMvcs the F-2()A a
Manoeuv
I
l7.()(K)lb| ihiLisI
(n
,1
n...
raliilii\
iIk-i
vMiij:lcaJii tlienosciiiiJ.
Ml
I
\
uhcii tlo
iiluali)
iliL' 1
I
\k- iisl
iiiispiiinal^lc
even
A
iiuicli
Us pciiomiaiicc.
liiiiiis Hi
inipio
f^Ti
V).
a iiuilti-nuKle
IS
J Um air-lo-air 'traek while
\aiiipk'.
It
can Jeteet and track up
lo
[s siniLillaiieoiisiy. l()(.liHercnnai>jeiss
I'he
oitii\pe
iijcrshaik
Despite
\'-)H2.
tails
l
its
Hew
lirst
in
Aui:iisi
impressi\e pertornianee. wlucii
midway between
the
F->H and
the tar \\\ow
e\pensi\ e F- 6A. no priKluetion orders have yet been 1
Once the F-2()A is beint: main lliud World air loivcs are
plaeed.
liLjhler
m
iehiti\el\
past
new w aiplane
Taiwan
.
iIk-
into production. In the
Northrop could have looked
\ letnani or
to bLi\
likel\
numbers; what is laekuiL' is which will justils the costs and
siii,ill
the laiye initial ordei'
risksol putting a
binlt in c|Liaiiiii\
han. South
to
for a substantial production con-
tract but for political
reasons these markets are now
closed. Other traditional customers
m
Furopeand
the
Middle Fast are now more interested in technologiadvanced - and e\pensi\e - warplanc class of the F- b. F- X and e\ en the F- 5 Theretor
callv
1
1
1
.
the lutuixH)t the lov\-cost. high-pertorm, in
doubt and the F-2().A could remain nothing
mc
than an interesting protot\ pe.
Northrop F-20A Type Single-seat, lightweight fighter Dimensions Span 8- 13m (26ft 8in): length 14-17m '46ft 6in); height 4-22m (13ft lOin) Weight Empty 5089kg (1 1 ,2201b), maximum take-off 12.474kg (27,5001b)
Powerplant One 7710kg (17,0001b) General
Electric
F404-GE-1 00 turbofan with afterburning
Performance Mach 2 above
1 1
,000m
(36,000ft)
Range Combat radius with maximum internal fuel, two external tanks and typical weapons load 713km (443 miles) Ceiling 16,765m (54,700ft)
Armament Two 20mm M39 cannon with 450 rounds per gun, plus up to 3765kg (83001b) of ordnance, including up to six AIM-9 Sidewinder laser, optical and radar guided ASMs,
AAMs,
30mm cannon pods and iron bombs
Reds
in rivalry I
Indochina 1975-78 On
in
Cambodian capital. Phnom communist Khmer Rouge forces;
17 April 1975. the
Penh,
fell to
the
1
Saigon, the capital of South \ ietnam. was the hands of the North \ letnamese Arm\ w hile in
davs
later
;
Laos, the Pathet
Lao had
supremacy by June of
effecti\ el> asserted militar\
that
success by establishing a
cember.
-All
\
and conrirmed
ear.
communist regime
in
their
De-
of former French IndcKhina uas now
under communist control, and the efforts of both the French and US mi!itar\ establishments had pro\ed unable to stem the tide the other nat ions of Southeast .Asia watched uneasil\ the formation of this seeming.
ly
monolithic bloc of re\olutionar> states - would
Thailand and .Malaysia feel an ine\ liable domino effect" in renewed communist insurgencx fuelled and supported from the Indochinese states?
hardship, especially for those most closely associated with the former regimes, in Vietnam, all former
go\
emment
officials and soldiers w ere compelled to w ith the authorities and prominent supporters w ere sent to re-education camps Cai Tao) where they were subject to a harsh
register
of President Thieu iTrai
regime of labour and indoctrination. It has been estimated that about 200.000 individuals were sent to these camps, although the government claimed that s« p>er cent had been released by spnng 1978. On other ie\els. the new regime imposed itself by making lite I
more
difficult for practising Catholics.
and the members of the syncretic
Buddhists,
sects, the
Hoa Hoa
andCao Dai. In December
1976. a Fi\e->ear Plan was announced w hich included the relocation of manv
dw ellers
Below: The crew of a
merchant ship rescues a family of Vietnamese boat people in the South China Sea. The refugees were predominantly ethnic Chinese, whose position in Vietnam had sharply deteriorated after 1975.
The perspecti\es of the rest of the world were \ er\ different four \ ears later, howexer. torthe triumphant
city
communism of 19~5 had
attendant distress), while in .March of that vear the
prepared to face pirates,
go\emment announced
typhoons and starvation
divided
b_\
1979.
re\ealed
itself as
deepl\
The imposition of re\olution upon
the societies of South \ letnam.
Laos and especially
Cambodia pro\ ed to be a horriric business for man_\ of the groups
invohed. while once the militar\
\
ictor\
had been won. traditional antagonisms in the region began to reassert themseUes - national and racial problems led to international contlict. Instead of the aggressive group of allied states that had been teared in 1975. Indochina presented the spectacle of an inward-looking region, locked in It
its
ow
n feuds.
was. perhaps, inevitable, that the transfonnation
of society after
communist
\ictor\
would
in\
oh
1
in the
countryside. Byeari\ 1978. about
.200. 000 people had been
moved w ith considerable (
that
it
intended
to
stop
"bourgeois trade". This measure affected, in particular,
the countp.
"s
population of ethnic Chinese,
w ho
Enormous numbers were in
a fleet of tiny boats, in the hope of a better life
who began to lea\e numbers from spring 978 onw ards.
elsewhere. The exodus increased tension between Hanoi and Peking, and worsened relations with
B\ the summer of 1979. it is estimated that 675. 0(X) people had tied the countrv .About 250.000 of these
Vietnam's Southeast Asian neighbours, who were
w ere Chinese w ho moved back across the border into communist China, but the remainder tried to escape b\ sea. with the open encouragement of the \'ietnamese authonlies. and became know n as the "boat
fearful of the effects of
numbered well oxer a million. These Chinese formed a great part of the refugees
\ ietnam in large
1
.
accepting large
numbers of
who might upsettheirown delicate
ethnic Chinese, racial balance.
1909
INDOCHINA
1975-78
people". Siittering the ravages
t)t
attack by pirates as
well as the dangers of bad weather, and the Irequenll)
inhospilable attitude of the countries
\n
which
tiie\
landed, the boat people were an indicator o\ the coiitiiunn;j niisli)rtunesofthe
population of Vietnam,
Laos. too. there were difficulties
III
ment
in the adjust-
communist rule, particularly among the hill w ho inhabited the mountainous areas in the east
to
tribes
of the country.
Many
ot these hill tribes,
notably the
Meo. had been employed by the Americans as a mercenary force deployed against the communists, and resistance to any centralised rule had always been traditional among them. The result was that the hill tribes found themselves in conflict with the communist government, and a small-scale guerrilla war was soon in progress. The problems in Laos were as nothing, however, compared to those in Cambodia, or Kampuchea as was renamed in December 975 This countr\ w hicli it
1
.
under the astute Prince Norodom Sihanouk, had managed to stay out of the wars of Indochma until the late 1960s, was the scene ofa mass tragedv during the 1970s. Immediately after their takeover, Pol Pot s Khmer Rouge decided to embark on a policy ot forcibly revolutionising the country by moving the population out of the towns, and especially by forcibly relocating the 2,500.000 inhabitants of Phnom Penh, many of whom were refugees from the fighting of the early 1970s. About four million people were made to set up "new villages' during the autumn of 975 Starvation and the rigorous new regime soon took their toll, accentuated by the brutal attitudes of the new rulers. Former members of the Lon Nol regime were systematically eliminated, and 'reeducation' was more intensive than even in Vietnam. Executions, starvation and disease led to hundreds of thousands of deaths. The barbaric regime in Kam1
.
Below:
A victim
of a
massacre of left-wing students at Bangkok University in 1977 is rescued by Thai soldiers. Thailand's vulnerability to pressure from her
communist neighbours after 1 975 provoked a wave of anti-communist hysteria, and the setting up of private armies such as the 'Red Gaurs' (below left), who operated in the Thai jungle against
communist gerrillas.
INDOCHINA was pailicularly severe on ethnic Vietnamese, of whom 170,000 had fled by the end of 1978, while piichea
tens of thousands of Khmers fled to Thailand
The
plight of the ethnic Chinese in
the ethnic
Vietnamese
in
Vietnam and of
Kampuchea was
indicative
of problems in Indochina wider than those of adjustment to revolution within a particular society. For national antagonisms that had been
masked during the
war against
the American-backed regimes of the area were now beginning to reveal themselves. The two most notable antagonisms concerned the Vietnamese - in their relations with Kampuchea and with China.
There was a long history of conflict between the Vietnamese and the Khmers: Vietnamese expansion si)uthwards into Indochina had been at the expense of Khmer states, and the area of the Mekong Delta had been annexed as recently as the 18th century. Viet-
namese attempts to eradicate Khmer culture in areas of Cambodia occupied during the 830s left a legacy of suspicion. Indeed, as late as 1970, when Lon Nol took over from the deposed Sihanouk in Cambodia, there were spontaneous anti-Vietnamese demonstrations that caused disquiet to the South Vietnamese government of President Thieu, whom Lon Nol was 1
Above: Children clear waste ground at a Vietnamese orphanage. Hanoi faced staggering internal problems in the
wake of decades of warfare. Below right: Khmer refugees, driven from their homes by fighting between the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese after the 1978 invasion. Even in Thai refugee
camps they
remained victims of Khmer Rouge terror and pawns in the diplomatic game.
puchean
1975-78
and accused the Vietnamese of plotting coups; on two occasions in 1977 (April and September) Khmer Rouge forces made assaults into Vietnam. In December of that yekr, Vietnamese forces carried out a retaliatory incursion, and then the Vietnamese offered to establish a buffer zone Vietnamese ambitions were almost certainly to territory,
establish themselves as undisputed
power brokers in Indochina, but with the minimum of force necessary; Hanoi politburo was also probably concerned at
the
the fate of the ethnic
come
Vietnamese and
of the savage attempts to reorder
society.
The Khmer Rouge, on
at
what might
Kampuchean
the other hand, were
genuinely concerned to assert their independence of Vietnam, while the state of paranoia and fear that was
rampant
in
Kampuchea no doubt
contributed to the
However unbalanced the new rulers of Kampuchea might be, they could see that in any forthcoming major clash with Vietnam they would need powerful support; and so, aggressive nature of their policy.
during 1978. they began drawing even closer to a move that served to bring into
communist China -
sharper relief the other major national antagonism of the region, the tension
between the Chinese and the
Vietnamese.
ostensibly supporting.
After the triple communist success of 1975. the to be treated as the dominant who had always been in a client position in relation to the North Vietnamese, were prepared to accept this. In July 1 977 they signed a Treaty of Friendship and Coopera-
Vietnamese expected
force in Indochina. In Laos, the Pathet Lao,
tion
that
bound
together. But the
the
two countries very closely
Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, would
not subscribe to such a subordinate position.
Khmer Rouge claimed
parts of
Vietnam
as
The
Kam-
Distrust and persecution Most of the states in Southeast Asia have good reasons for mistrusting China, in that they all contain substantial Chinese minorities which tend to form close-knit cultures within the dominant society, and could form the basis of an insurgent movement, as the Chinese did in Malaya during the Emergency. This has led to the persecution of such Chinese minorities in Indonesia during the 1960s and in Vietnam during the 1970s. In the Vietnamese case, there was an additional complication, however. Vietnam and China had been traditional enemies for hundreds of years with Vietnamese rulers accepting titular Chinese sovereignty, but resisting fiercely any form of direct rule. The communist Chinese forces that took over in China in 1949 supplied the Viet Minh, who defeated the French in the First Indochina War, with weapons and support, but by the late 1960s the relationship between communist Chinese and communist Vietnamese was wearing thin. The underlying reason for this was the Sino-Soviet split, and the gradual readjustment of world alliances. China's rapprochement with the US during the early 1970s was a source of concern to the Vietnamese communists, and Vietnam inevitably became closer to the Soviet Union. Frontier disputes, and common claims to the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea were but the small change of a deteriorating relationship that became more obviously antagonistic during 1978. In June, the Chinese cut off all aid to Vietnam and removed their technicians and diplomatic staff, while in November came the most dramatic illustration of the extent of disunity among the communists of Southeast Asia: Vietnam signed aTreaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union. Such a treaty at once put Vietnam in the Soviet camp so far as world communism was concerned, and in effect rendered the split between itselfand China irreconcilable. With border clashes between Vietnam and Kampuchea escalating, and with the ethnic Chinese of Vietnam
coming under severe government controls, the stage was set for a further round of warfare in the region. Ashley Brown 1911
Kampuchea Vietnamese invasion and Kilmer resistance The KhmerRoLige movement which controlled Kainpiichea (formerly Cambodia) from April \915 Liiilii January 1979 became a symbol of the modern subordination of humanity to ideology, and came to rank v\ith the Nazi SS as a byword for the systematic commission of atrocities upon the innocent. This image, reinforced b\ phdlnL-iaplis ot p\raniicis o\ human skulls, and the k-\c\\ uncss icsimion\ ol sur\ ivors. has been carefully and skiHuilN cullivaled by llic
Vietnamese, who encouraged toreign journalists visit the scene of Khmer Rouge atrocities in order dellect international criticism of their
interference in the affairs of a so\ creign state the internal character
Kampuchea
rapid deterioration of
to
in fact,
of the KIimilm kon'^c ivgiine
plaved only a minor role in\ade
lo
own armed
in the X ictnanicsc
decision to
December I'-JTS. Ii was the Kampuchean- Vietnamese rela-
in
tions, posing an implicit threat to
Vietnamese secur-
persuaded Hanoi to resort to armed force. Ditferences between the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists can be traced back to the period following the 1954 Geneva Conference, which formalised the division of the former French colon\ of Indochina into the independent states of Vietnam (North and South). Laos and Cambodia (renamed Kampuchea in 1975). The Indochinese Communist Party, founded by Ho Chi Minh in 19.^0. had been dissolved in 1951. and a separate Cambodian communist guerrilla movement formed, known as the Khmer Issarak. As part of the Geneva Agreement. he ity
.
that
I
Above: Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, strong-man ofthe post-1975
Khmer
Rouge regime and leader ofthe military resistance to the Vietnamese
occupation. Below: Khmer Rouge soldiers captured by the Vietnamese during
borderclashes
in
August which
1978, Thefighting,
had begun
in
1975,
became
increasingly severe,
provoked Hanoi
and
into the
invasion of
Kampuchea
December
1978. Right:
in
Vietnamese troops parade in
Phnom
Penh.
KAMPUCHEA letnaniesc Khniei h \ teliKiiii. u iilioiiK
>-\
bulk o\ the regriHi|vd
ground the
ii
.111
ori:;i
I^MK.
k-tl
Ix-hind inC
sarak huces .isMKill uiuler-
amhodia Dui
|in>-\ k'lnaiiK'se \Lieiaiis
I
luni
Part\ ledh\ I'olPol
.
u
lit
h.i
the
inL'
wlmv eh-
ainhodiaii Coiiimunisi
{
Iveaine
ils
i:eiieralsceietar\
Cambodian in 1%:. Lender I'ol I'ot's Icatlei ship the Communist l'art\ adopted an uicreasuigly hostile attitude to Piinee Sihanouk, tlie Cambodian head ot which hnu^jht it into eontlict with the Vietnamese eomnumisis. who regarded the war against Amerieaiis as paramount, and Sihanouk as a valuable. thoLi
state,
the
.
1
The Khmer Rouge (as the Cambodian coniniunisis had been renamed by Sihanouk) rejected this compromise as a betrayal and with
tlie
I
nited States.
stepped up the purge ol pro- Vietnamese Irom
its
ranks. u ncertam
Vietname'
tatus
the
rder aK,
Thepro-Ameriean Saigon gov ernment had laid claim to a group ol Cambodian islands in 1960. and there were disputes over the position of the land frontier at a
9 t-
Cambodianjontlict.
197S-X4
.
KAMPUCHEA
1975-84
number of points. Unable to reach a satisfacton, agreement with Saigon, and reali>ing the possibility of a communist victor.- in South \'ietnam. Sihanouk
By 3U December, Cambodian People"
attempted to negotiate a settlement of the border issue with the South \'ietnamese communist National Liberation Front in June 1964 and .August 1966. The NLF recognised Cambodian so\ereignty over the disputed islands, but refused to make funher conces-
days
sions requested
by Sihanouk.
Oil and water The Lon No! coup and the extension of American militar> operations to
Cambodia in 1 970 led to the fall
of Sihanouk, but also resulted in closer military cooperation between the Khmer Rouge and the \'iet-
namese communists. Though this cooperation greatly diminished after 973 it w as an important factor in 1
.
Khmer Rouge victor, of .April 1975. Within their capture of Phnom Penh. ho\\e\er. Khmer Rouge troops were involved in border clashes the
weeks of
the United Front "Voice of the
radio station was claiming the capture of large areas of Ratanakiri Province, and tw o later
casualties
announced the fallof Kratie. Khmer Rouge were heavy, and there were many defec-
Khmer Rouge
tions to the United Front
control of
disintegrated under the blow s of the Vietnamese .Army. .Many Khmer Rouge simpl> w ithdrew into the countr. side, however, and guerrilla attacks on Vietnamese forces began almost immediately. It was estimated by Western intelligence sources that some 100.000 \ letnameve troops, supported by 20.000 men of the United Front. ad\ anced into Kampuchea along several axes, entenng Phnom
the countr.
Penhon7 Januar, 1979. The X'ietnamese pursued the retreating Khmer Rouge easrv\ards along Routes 5 and 6. reaching the Thai border by mid-Januar. The Heng Samnn government, established in Phnom Penh on 8 January-, still faced the enormous task of establi'^hing :ts .
w ith the \"iemamese. and they seized the N'ietnamese island of Phu Quoc early in .May 1975. being driven
control over an almost derelict countr. wh..
out a few weeks later
bypassed by the rapid advance of the
b\-
a \igorous \'iemamese
counter-attack. Negotiations
between N'ietnam and
during May 1976. led to agreement that the land border betw een the tw o countries should be that defined b\- the pre- 1954
Kampuchea, held
in
Phnom Penh
French colonial authorities, but no formula w as found to resolve the problem of disputed territorial w aters, which since the discover.- of oil deposits in the area had taken on a new significance. B\- 1977 the situation was deteriorating rapidly, and Khmer Rouge units were conducting raids in depth into \'iemam. seizing strategic positions, massacring \"iemamese \ illagers and attempting to create a depopulated buffer zone along the X'iemamese side the border.
:
By
late
1977. several
Kampuchean
w ere operating permanently in the border and N'ietnamese territor. w as subject to regular >neiling by Khmer Rouge ani'llery-. The confrontation seemed to be far from universal1> popular within the ranks of the Khmer Rouge, nowever. and there were rumours of an attempted ;sions
;a.
.,:
jp against the Pol Pot leadership during April 1977. re\ olt w as ruthlessh suppressed and purges of iemamese intensified. Many of the \ ivors of these purges, along w ith large numbers refugees fleeing Khmer Rouge-st} le communism. -ght refuge in \'iemam. where an anti-Khmer
-
r
-.e
.-pected pro-\ :
Rouge movement w as being formed w encouragement. During the autumn of 1978. the
ith
Vietnamese
Khmer Rouge
stepped up their operations against \'ietnam's border taking advantage of severe flooding,
provinces,
which hampered the \'ietnamese .Army, to advance deep into X'ietnamese territor. Hanoi reacted by announcing the formation of a Khmer United Front for National Salvation, led by Heng Samrin. a 44 > ear-old former Khmer Rouge political officer. On 25 December 1978 the N'ietnamese struck: their troops entered Kampuchea, engaging the bulk of the Khmer Rouge forces, which was concentrated along the rder. mostly in the Parrot's Beak (Svay Rieng n ince) and Fish Hook (KompongChom) salients. .ese concentrations were encircled and destroyed .
:
the \'ietnamese during the early stages of the
_nting.
and :
,
;
and the subsequent advance along Routes supported by troops of Heng Samrin "s have been largely unopposed
7.
ted Front .seems to
tained large pockets of
Khmer Rouge
.
rev\
ie;:...
.
^
invasion.
Large areas along the frontier w ith Thailand remained under Khmer Rouge control, and a conference of Khmer Rouge leaders, held on 1-2 Februar. 1979. decided on a strateg\ of guerrilla w arfare and harassing attacks on the N'iemamese. The Khmer
Rouge w as
able to sustain
its
guerrilla campciign.
despite N'letnamese superiority, because of the international reaction to the 19~8 invasion.
KAMPUCHEA Although Vietnam, the Soviet Union and many pro-Moscow governments recognised the Heng Samregime, there was sufficient international opposiVietnamese invasion, and the perceived threat of increased Soviet influence in the region, for
Khmer Rouge
to retain
its
place
at the
United
Khmer Rouge came from China, but fears of Vietnam among the governments of the Association
of South East Asian Nations (Asean), and in particular in Thailand, provided China and the Khmer Rouge with a
number of local
Thailand,
allies.
in particular, felt
vulnerable to the threat
of Vietnamese expansion, and gave
tacit
support to
Khmer Rouge in the hope of forcing a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea and a return to its the
between Thailand and Vietnam. Supplies of Chinese equipment were transKhmer Rouge bases through Thailand, and the Thai Army turned a blind eye to Khmer Rouge use of refugee camps as recruiting grounds and military bases. Fighting continued throughout 1979-80, and though the Vietnamese/Heng Samrin forces were able to consolidate their control of most of the country the Khmer Rouge remained active particularly in traditional role as a buffer
ferred to
.
,
w estern prox
the I
incc-
he resistance to the Vietnamese
now
included
nght-umg Khmer Serei guerrillas as well as the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Serei included many former supporters of the Lon Nol government, and though strongly anti-communist, operated an informal and fragile truce agreement with the Khmer Rouge. Above: Thai soldiers
Pol Pot' s forces were by far the strongest opposition to
question Khmer Rouge seeking refuge in Thailand
the Vietnamese, with an estimated
offensive. Left: Right-wing
Khmer Serei guerrillas, armed with RPG-7 rocket launchers, at a
camp
in
Thailand. Thai support for
the
Khmer resistance was
20.000-35,000 men, while the Khmer Serei had a maximum of 6000 men, split between a number of competing factions. Prince Sihanouk, virtually exiled to China by the Khmer Rouge, re-emerged as a unifying symbolic leader of the Khmer resistance accepted by both the Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Serei, but without his own military base and dependent upon his undoubted diplomatic and political skills in his efforts to influ,
vital to its
survival against
the Vietnamese. Below:
The eternal victims of
modern Indochinese peasant refugees driven from their homes. history:
ence the course of events. In spite of a number of Vietnamese offensives which had pushed large numbers of Khmer Rouge guen illas across the border into Thailand, the Khmer
1975-84
Kampuchea;
70km (43 miles) of Phnom
Penh on 10 June 1980,
Terrorist attacks were also reported ih
tor the
Vietnamese
they attacked a train within
rin
Nations as the recognised government of Kampuchea. The main diplomatic and material backing
a
able to operate deep inside
tion to the
the
from
Rouge were
over 150 passengers. Phnom Penh undermining the claims of the Heng Samrin government to complete control of the country. During February 98 1 the Khmer Rouge launched an offensive aimed at disrupting elections being held to demonstrate support for the pro- Vietnamese government. The offensive forced the Vietnamese to killing
itself,
1
,
employ helicopters
to resupply their garrisons, isolated along the Thai frontier, and managed to close Routes 5 and 6 at several points. The Vietnamese and Phnom Penh forces launched their counter-attack in October, w ith the beginning of the dry season which allowed the Vietnamese to maximise their advantage in heavy equipment and armour. The Khmer Rouge guerrillas were subjected to bombing by Vietnamese aircraft, and Vietnamese troops were airlifted into the battle zones. The heaviest fighting took place in the north, where the Khmer Rouge military headquarters was situated near the Thai and Laotian borders, and in the area south of
Poipet. The Khmer Rouge headquarters fell to Vietnamese troops in December 1981 and though it was it remained subject heavy bombing from Vietnamese aircraft based Siem Reap.
retaken the following month,
to at
Thai support While the Khmer Rouge were able
to sustain a
serious guerrilla threat to the stability of the
Heng
Samrin government, and a constant danger to the occupying Vietnamese, it was clear that they relied heavily upon safe bases and supply routes on Thai territory, without which they would have been unable to sustain their campaign inside Kampuchea. Relations between Thailand and Vietnam were strained almost to breaking point, and there were a number of serious border incidents. In June 1980, for example, after Thailand had repatriated large numbers of refugees to areas of Kampuchea controlled by the Khmer Rouge, the Vietnamese crossed into Thailand
number of points, attacking Khmer Serei bases at Nong Makhoon and Nong Chan, before withdrawing
at a
in the face of a Thai counter-attack. Incidents involving Vietnamese shelling of Thai territory and hot pursuits of Khmer Rouge guerrillas across the border
became commonplace, and seemed designed
to per-
suade Thailand to recognise the Heng Samrin government and withdraw its support from the Khmer
Rouge. While the Khmer Rouge was reliant upon Chinese and Thai backing. Vietnam was forced to turn to the Soviet Union for military and economic assistance in order to sustain its expensive occupation of Kampuchea. In return for this aid. Moscow was able to number of military bases from
extract the use of a
Hanoi, which further convinced China that Vietnam was a tool of Soviet aggression and strengthened the China-Asean-Khmer Rouge axis. .
By 1984
the military situation
had
settled into a
stalemate in which the Vietnamese were able to maintain control of the administrative centres of
Kampuchea and remained in a position to mount against Khmer Rouge concentrations
offensives
wherever they posed a serious threat, but were unable to totally eliminate the
Khmer Rouge resistance Robin Corbett 1915
The dragon strikes China attacks Vietnam On
17 February
1979 China launched an in\asu)n
of northern Vietnam, foreseeing a brief puniti\c
would
"teach the Vietnamese a lesson' Army (PLA) u as lelkm communists a far tougher proposition than the Indian Army had been in 962. Hostility between China and Vietnam had built up overa long period before the 1979 invasion. Althougii China had provided Hanoi with extensive military aid during the Vietnam War, the rapprochement between China and the United States - US President Nixon paid an oflicial visit to Peking in 972 at the same time that the US Air Force was cariA iiig out lica\ \ raids on North Vietnam -led the VietiiamcsL' in dL-pciul nicnv andmoreexclusivelyontheSox \ci nioii hn sLipimri this trend Afterthe North Vietnamese \ lel.n \ m was conhrmed. Pro-( 'liiiiesi. elements in the Vietnamese politburo v\eie misled b\ their pro-Soviet
action that
But the Chinese People's Liberation
to lind
Its
1
1
I
I
opponents. The tougheniii'j
ieinamese socialism,
ot \
down on pii\ale i-iusmesses. was by 197S beginning to have a iimtound elleet on the country's large Chinese community (kiiouii as the Hoa) who formed most of the small business class. An exodus ol
cracking
Hoa
to
China
some
built up,
16().()0()
crossing the
border between April and July 197X. This further
exacerbated relations, and
remaining Chinese
all
advisers were withdrawn from Vietnam that
summer.
in November 197X the relationship between Vietnam and the Soviet Union v\as eemented b\ the
signing of a Soviet-Vietnamese
l
which was immediately lollov\ed Soviet advisers into Hanoi andol into
Cam Ranh
Ba\
iiendship
h\ a
was hound
s
threatening to the Chines
^\hoaliead\
In Soviet forces along
r
tl
long
lieat\
moxemeiit
Sm let na\ al to
lelt
boi-eier
m
ii
i
ol
essels
\
appeal
jnaeed •rlhern
Asia.
rhe Chinese were
power of Vietnam namese acKiseis eo
e to the spreading
al
tituted I
se
a
eoiild tlo
\ lel
nia|or presence little
uere able
n Us
to
about, hul
back
eonliontation
in
I'ol l'.)t's
\v itli
\
lake It
iiiilitai\
some IS
lel
inler\ eiition. hut tliey
action to help
likel\
Khmer
theivloie. that
.
uere keen
to
Rou'je resistance.
theChmese iinasion was
|iressiire on I'ol men. but it was ollieiall\ concerned with a X ielnamese long-siandmg border dispute llie claimed that when the Ireneh had delineated the border belween their likloehina em|iiie and China, they had ceded ten iloi\ wliieh uas nghtlulls part of N'lelnam. ension o\er the honlei line was exaceroxer the bated b\ teniloiKil disputes elsewhere I'aiaeeliskiiuls. s,i/edb\ ( 'liina horn South \ietnam 111 laiuiaiA l'»7 I. .indlheSpialK Maud group held In
partK designeel to relie\e mililaiA Pol's
1
\ leiiKiin hiiul, limed In ( lima.' DuriiiL] late l')7Sand eaiK l')7') hval elaslies belween \ leliiamese and Chinese loiees along the border became a daiK oeeuneiiee. heChmeselheietoiee\plieill\ jiistilied 1
then decision to
ni
niesc in\ aded Kam|nieliea in ig I'ol I'ot out ol I'hnom I'enli month, the Chinese hekl back Iro
Deeelilhei I'^/S, the lollowiiig
Indochina
hroughoiit
direct
m\
:lie\
s.ak'ski
suppoile I
lies.-
11
aiuiChii
J.
aile as a |niniti
\
e action, designee!
1.
1
he Chine-
1(1.(1(1(1
lacked
lesei
In
I
red S.S.IK Khiie
CHINA-VIETNAM
WAR
1979
the natural defensive positions with concrete
bunkers. Built in groups of three to five, connected by trenches and protected by minefields, they were located on vantage points oveiiookin| key strategic towns and highways linking the region with Hanoi. l25kni(X5 miles) to the south. At 0500 hours on 17 hebri'.ary. under cover of the Chinese crossed the border at
irtillery fire,
oints.
Left:
A rally in Hanoi to
Ainiics
protest at the Chinese
Pekint:
invasion of Vietnam's
ments
northern border provinces in February 1979.
seen
1)1
ihc PI. A
[iiilitar\
ol the
under the overall eomiiuind of headquarters provided the main ele-
attacking force.
The army had. however,
action over the last 25 years and the morale hccr corps had sLilTercd after the widespread
little
Sino-Vietnamese relations
ol Its ol
deteriorated sharply
puigesol ilicCultuial Revolution. For their part, the Vietiicimcsc. commanded by Van Tien Dong, had to rel\ on local regional and militiaunils.6().()()()strong, as much ol the regular arm\ was engaged in Kampuchea or stationed m the south of Vietnam. Never-
during the 1970s, and border clashes escalated to full-scale war.
Above:
EthnicChinese refugees Vietnam wait near the border for permission toenter China. fleeing
theless. man\ of the axailable forces had recent comhat experience, o assure success in the campaign the PLA would l
ha\ e to Ink! an cllcclix e ansv\ er to the difficult terrain Below: Chinese T59 tanks, closely supported by infantry, assault a hilltop
position.
Chinese
tactics
and equipment were badly outdated, and PLA casualties were severe during the 'punitive' expedition into Vietnam.
Below shells
A battery of 152mm howitzers
right:
Chinese
Vietnamese
positions.
Vietnam. The prospective hattlefiekl sprau ledo\erthreemilitar\ districts that included the
of northern
pio\ inces of Lai C'ao Bang.
C'liati.
Hoang Lien Son. HaTuyen.
Lang Son and Ouang Ninh. Haeh conmountain ranges separated by
sisted of iiiacccssihle
Many and
it
heavily, but effectively halted the invaders, claiming to
ha\e
inllicted
casualties and destroyed 80
3.S()()
tanks.
Small
.steps
southwuids
The Chinese had made some strategic gains. Lao Cai on the Yunnan ront was captured and I
Part of
several
villages held by units of the
Vietnamese .'^45th and 3I6A Divisions had fallen into their hands after heavy fighting. Advance elements were moving southwards on Cha Pa and the mines at Gam Dong. Ten villages around Cao Bang, detended by the 346th Division, had been captured and heavy casualties had been inflicted on the Vietnamese 246th Reiziment at Soc Giang the 677th at Cha Ling and the S.-sl st at Da Sha. The Chinese forces advancing on Lang Son. held by the Vietnamese 3rd and 327th Divisions, had also .
narrow \allc\s
lillcd with tributaries of the Clear. Black and Red Rncis Ihesc provinces would be
made some gains. Dong Dang 3km
nuncment. channelled along vulnerable \alle\ lloors. would be slow and attacks would have to be made uphill. o make the PLA's task more diflicLilt the Vietnamese hati strengthened
against Vietnamese bunkers on surrounding
dillicult to ca|itiiic as
I
26
crossings were purely diversionary
soon became clear that their main attention would focus on the provincial capitals of Lao Cai. Cao Bang and Lang Son. All were strategic access towns lying within easy grasp, and LaoCai and Lang Son both lay on railway routes between the two countries. After recovering from their initial shock the Vietnamese were able to put up stiff resistance against Chinese attempts to sei/.e villages dotted around the three towns. By the 2()th the PLA advance was bogged down and contained within lOkm (6 miles) of the border. The regional militia suffered iitacks
.
Friendship Pass,
fell
(
after successful
2 miles soLith of )
Chinese assaults hills.
The capture of Hill 379 and thecity's railway depot on the 23rd sealed the fate of the town.
Bv
the
end
ol the lirst
week
it
was
clear to Pekim.'
1917
3
CHl.\.\-\
II
TNAMW AK
lhat their puniti\ e action u as not going to be the shaip and effective lesson they had hoped for. In restricting their efforts to a Mmited offensive in the north of Vietnam the Chinese were trying to inflict a severe reversal on regular Vietnamese uii|fcvithout escalating the war. Instead the PLA had reen met by local troops who had fought well and contained its advances. The Chinese had to decide, at this stage, between a humiliating w ithdraw al or redoubling their efforts in spite of mounting casualties, limited territorial gains and growing international condemnation. In effect there was no choice: Peking decided to continue its offensive in all three battle zones but to concentrate the PLA's main energies on capturing Lang Son. As the site of a major Viet Minh victory in 1950. its capture would be a severe psychological blow to the Vietnamese people and. as the gatew ay to the Red River delta and Hanoi a concerted offensive might draw regular units into its defence. The battle for Lang Son began at 0800 hours on 27 February. Forthe next week heavy fighting took place on the hills that surround the town, as the Chinese attempted to cut off its defenders from Hanoi. Khou .Ma Son. 8km (5 miles) northwest of the town, was captured on the first day. and on the 28th. after the PLA had switched the focus for its attacks to the south, the village of Loc Binh fell. By 5 March the capture of highlands w est of Lang Son and Height 4 lying to the southwest had made the Vietnamese position untenable and the town was abandoned. The regional forces pulled out and moved southwards to join up with regular units that had moved up from Hanoi after the government issued orders for the full mobilisation of its armed forces. But the fall of Lang Son effectively signalled the end of the war. The Chinese announced their withdrawal on the night of 5/6 March and two weeks later had recrossed the border largely unhindered by the Vietnamese. .
1
Chinese checked Although the People's Daily of 6 .March reported to the Chinese people that the army was withdrawing after "achieving its goals with complete success" the PLA"s performance in the war highlighted major weaknesses in its command structure, tactics and training. Many of its officers had not seen action since the early 960s and continued to use outdated human wave tactics, believing that the Vietnamese defender•AMLild be overwhelmed. In fact they did not collapse .
1
Weapons
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
1923
.
KEY WEAPONS TheendofW orldW ar II found air-detcnceaniller> its
zenith; ever\
combatant nation had lavished
ai
re-
search and manufacturing abilit\ on the provision of large numbers of gun> of e\ er\ calibre from 20mm to
I50mm. togetheru ith radarand tire-control systems, ammunition and all other rcle\ant equipment. However, the war had also generated the \\eapon which u as eventually to reduce this \ ast arm> of guns to a tenth of its wartime strength: the surt'ace-to-air missile (SAM). Under development in German> Britain and the United States. S.A.Ms were expected soon to replace the gun as the leading anti-aircratt weapon. Programmes to update air-defence artillery continued in the postwar period, however, especially as the running down of development budgets slowed missile programmes. In \944 the US .Army had initiated a totalis new concept w hen they specified a 75mm gun w ith automatic feed and w ith the radarand fire -control integral to the gun mounting. The idea of an automatic feed had been made pfossible by the development of the electronic pro\imit\ fuze: the major obstacle to rapid fire had lain in the need to set a time fuze before loading e\ ery shell to ensure that the shell would burst within range of its target, but the .
proximity fuze detected the presence of the target b\ radio and detonated the shell w hen it was in the most
advantageous position, w ithout requiring any sening before firing.
The US 75mm M51 Skysweeper did not appear mid- 950s. since development encountered more obstacles than had been anticipated. The gun w as fed by tw in rotating magazines and could achieve until the
1
rpm Alongside on the mounting, were a tracking radar, a computer and an optical tracker, so that the entire engagement of the target w as in the hands of the gun's crew and they had no need for external sources of data. Skysw eeper is still in senice with the armies of Greece. Turkey and Japan, but it was replaced in US ser\ ice in the early 960s by the Hav\ k a rate of fire of 45 rounds per minute
(
) .
the gun.
fire-control
1
missile. In general,
by the 1960s heav\
AA
euns of ~>mni
had been made obsolete by S.A.Ms. experimented w ith tw o heavier guns for
calibre or larger
The
British
high-altitude air defence in the 1950s, but the\ also
eventually adopted a S.A.M. the Bloodhound.
Some
A A guns were used in \ ietnam around Arab states in the .Middle East during the >''^' 'N. but w ith no great success. Tn. ;_: .:. _ an-. houe\ er. still had a useful serv ice I:ie. Lieh.L AA Liuns. generalK of 3^mm or -MJmm. uere common during W orld W ar II - e\ cry one had heard of the famous Bofors gun - but the increasing So\
iet
heavy
H.ir.oi j.r.d ^> '.
:
had left^them behind b> 1950^'. ~jy were incapable of -w inging fast
_raft
^
ground-attack aircraft
-
^ •.
'0-6<)()
improved U~() were nomialK used
their
nrc-control radar and.
1951. Such designs
riuxlel in in
conjunction with a central ith impro\ ements
combined w
:n -hL-!!- i-z'w't.-^ a ^-"e.:!^-- Je-triict!\o -
radius), in the -
.
-
ranse ::ow.^(")0
lease of .
^
-
.
:
.
_
,.
.,
:
Artillery
providing
protection for the airfield at
Baumholder. Above: Inspection of the linked ready-use ammunition of the Vulcan; a variety of
ammunition
is
available for
the Vulcan, including armour-piercing.
mm ing at
mph). so power operation
an add-on' to existing guns and a purpose-built design w hen Bofop. pnxluced
a- aaupicu. iiTst as
then in
Previous page: An M998 Sergeant York during trials in the western United States. Top An M 1 63 of the US 59th Air Defense
:.:att iiuns
Left: The M998 Sergeant York prototype. The radar has been developed from
on the F-16. the guns are Bofors 40mm L/70 and the chassis is from an M48A5tank: the prototype was produced by Ford to an army specification demanding that in use
mainly off-the-shelf componef^ts
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
w hich
jv. uekcd since the CiDh-DO: and the
~nini S-N).
'
m scr\ ice. Dunne W orld \\
are
aehie\e
them
a
Above
40mm
the
.
ar
II
there were iiian\ attempts to
higher nichilitx (it
tor
tanks
AA
m
eiins b\
transport
\
puttm;:
eludes.
thiisenablmL' them toaccompain armoLired cokmins. and Ml^) The LS Arnn replaced its uartime seit'-propelled AA euns u uh the \U2. \\ Inch entered service in 1952. This was armed with two 4()mm M2A cannon w hich has pvo\ ed et lecti\ e aeainst the armourofPT76 liijht tanks and ec|Lni^ped w itli a lead computing sight. ,A range-onl\ radar was e\perimentalK installed but no \eision i>l this was made. The \U2 served with the I S Arm\ until KJhO and remains m ser\ ice w ith the arm test other nations (
i
it
ida\
l%()s and I47()s made
it
place
small eiectrMmcde' ices intniiractica! sights, and also
onti' the chassis
1
m
mcorpo rate micro-computers and similar
tiiok
possible to
h,
still
allowed ladai the\
sets to
could be
easil_\
small gun mountings.
be greatl\ reduced
aeeommodated
One ot'the
first
in size until
relatively
in
vehicles to take
advantage of these developments was the West German Army's Gepard. introduced in 1971. Based on the hull of the Leopard tank, its turret carries
The Bofors L/70 gun, successor left:
famous Bofors m/36; this example has
to the
the Bofors Optronic Fire-control Instrument (BOFI)enabling night
operation. Above: of the
An
Lebanese Army
IVI42 in
Beirut.
1
surveillance radar, tracking radar, a fire-control
com-
puter, and two Oerlikon 35mm belt-fed automatic cannon. The surveillance radar scans all round the \ chicle and can detect targets up to 15km 10 miles) aw a\ as soon as it detects a target the crew is alerted and the bearing, range and elevation angle are displa\ed. together with an indication of whether the (
:
aircralt
is
triend or foe.
inlnrmation
is
if
it
is
hostile, then the
aiilomatiealK transfenvd to the track-
Below: One of the newest types of towed AA guns, the Artemis 30mm system, is
made by Hellenic Arms
Industries using
guns.
Mauser
.
Kl-;^
W AI'ONS I
kl,
laiL'el.
ih^-
hill M iiKiiH
leleasiiiL.'
lioiii
111
ihe hie ... nil..
I
which begins
Iront ol the lurrcl.
oil ilic
i.kI.ii
iii'j
II,
.
I
llie
he tiaekinii
whieh
.iiipiiler.
.
siir\
\
to
eHhiiiee radar to
m\ai
is
now
led to
also iiitonned ot
is
wiiul s|ieeil aiul diieelioii. leiiiperaline. barometric
piessuie and other laeL.rs
hese are
I
all
applied
t..
the
data, and Liiin eie\ atioii and beai iiil' are ealeiiand passed t.. llie p. .\s ei -o|X'i at iiil: hinetion u hieh sw inus the Uii rel and ele\ ates tile yuns At ihis point thee.)inmaiidei eaii. il he w ishes. takeo\ei the tai L'et in his o|itieal siylit. or he ean lea\e the tracking raiiai in cnlrol \Miiciie\er is in operation, u hen the target is w iihiii range ..I the gnns the gunner is gi \ en a \ isual signal to o|ieii lire. The lu in guns combine t(. HKI rpm and liring usualb, produce a rale ..l lire ..l begins u hen the target is about 4km (2.5 miles aw a\ so high, The level ol accuracy is e\tremel\ high indeed, that when the Belgian Arni\ took ( iepard into use the\ complained that it w as to.) accurate and had a compensating lactor entered into the computer u Inch distriliutes tile lire aDUiid the iDti.tnal p.>int ..I aim to introduce a s|-.iead ol shot and gi\ e a greater danger
tai Liet
laled
'
,
1
)
W
iien the
I
.S
came
Anii\
incorporated a radar into the ies ot this
\
chicle began
m
1
to replace
M Id.^
968 and
its
\U2.
it
\'ulcan. Deliverit
is still
produced Army and
it has seen action with the Israeli reportedK shot d.>w n a S\ rianSukhoi Su-7 during the 163 is an .M 13 1982 inv asion ot the Lebanon. The
tore\port:
M
armoured personnel turret,
cairiei
litted
1
with a one-man
incorporating a lead computing sight and a
range-only radar. Capable of tiring either KKH) or
3000 rpm. to a range of 600m 5200 feet the Vulcan proved unsatisfactory in service and work on a replacement began in 1977. 1
The
(
) .
Armv
introduced the Sergeant ^ ork DIair-defence system) m I9S3. This .M4S tank chassis w ith a turret carrv ing twin 4(lmm L 7(1 Bofors guns, search and tracking radars, optical sight w ith laser rangeriiuler. and tirecontrol computer. The engagement ol a target is almost entirely automated; the radar detects and in\
IS
ADS
L'S
(di\ isional
a modified
forms the fire-control computer which interrogates the target and computes the firing data, the open-fire range, type of ammunition, burst length and interval, and takes into account target manoeuvres, weather conditions and ban^el wear. When all the calculating is done the gunner merely grips his controls and the guns open lire at the computer's c.immand. Two t\ |ies ol ammunition are stored m maga/mes and can one shell is inipactIx- led t.i the guns as necessarv lu/ed. while the other is pro,\imit\ -fu/ed and tilled w itli high explosive and 640 pellets of tungsten alloy so as to give the optimum fragmentation pattern for ;
damage. While undoubtedly effective, Gepard and Sergeant York are extremely complex and expensive. They are
target
also large
--
47
anti
>4 tonnes respectively. The\ are
t.) be cHilincil t.) man>r armoured and smaller equi|-.ments are i\\|uired lor
therelore likelv l.imiali.'iis.
lesser duties. into pla\ l
iie
.
lere the smaller calibre cann.Mis
I
2()mm and
I-rench I'anhard
2.'^inm beiiii: the |-.relerred
M3
\'1)A
Ts
a
come t\
pes.
-ood example of
Ihisclassofweapon DAixehicLilededelenseantiaeiiennelis IhcM a I. .ur wheeled I'anliaid arnu.uie.l ivisonnel earner with a luiiel de\ ised b\ the lccli.)nu|ue .Serge Has
U
I
sault
1926
compain
.
The turret contains a search radar, an
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
Top
left:
A Czech M53/59 AA system
self-propelled
is armed with two 30mm M53 cannon. Above: The Panhard MS
in action.
It
VDA was first shown at the 1975 Satory Exhibition; 95 per cent of its mechanical
components are with those
identical
oftheAML Left: An
armoured car.
AMX30 self-propelled AA system advancing through swampy terrain; thetwin 30mm guns can fire up to 650 rounds per minute.
Farleft,top:ZSU-57son parade for May Day, 1 960. First seen in public in 1957, the ZSU-57 uses a heavily modified T54 chassis. Far left,
centre:
Considered by
someto be one of the finest self-propelled
AA systems
inthe world, the ZSU-23-4 suffers
from
a
tendency to
shoot while traversing after
two 2Umm cannon. The is snuill encuigh to be earned under a man's arm u hen ivmo\ ed Irom the turret, but powerful enough to detect taiycis at laivjcs up to 8km (5
electro-optical sis:ht. and
radar with a range of
search radar
targets
It IS also capable ot tracking a target while still scanning the surrounding area tor further targets. a target is detected the radar sounds an alarm,
miles).
Once
interrogates, and
it
hostile leeds the target range
ele\atioii to the optical sight,
.^t
the
and
same time it oncoming
aiitomaticalb slews the lunvt to lace the target,
and the gunner then begins
with his sight
The
until lie
to scan vertically
acquires the target optically.
lire-control coiiipiitci
.
ted with data
from the
radar, has calculated lead angles and othertiringdata.
and
now
this
displaces the
\
w
aiming mark. The gunner approaching target, and as
isLial
la\s his sight on the
soon as
uhm eiigagciiient
range a light flashes in and electric restraints on firing are then opens Inv manually while tracking the target, the guns firing at either 200 or 1000 rpm from each barrel. It
IS
his held ot \icw
switched
left,
below: The Soviet
based on the design
of the
Bofors40mmm/36. seen action
in
It has Vietnam and
during the Arab-Israeli
Wars, and
is
the Lebanon
shown here
in
lie
18km
in front
(
1
1
miles) and this displays
of the gunner.
A
It
also directs
camera detects the approaching target, locks on to it and begins tracking: a laser rangefinder then measures the range and continues to measure it. so establishing the target's speed. The computer calculates the firing angles and also evaluates the television
and determines the number of shots to be each burst to obtain optimum kill probability. as the target is within range, a signal is given and the gunner can open fire The reaction time of the system, from detecting an approaching target to being ready to open fire, is about six seconds. The Mauser 30mm gun is also employed in some of the latest towed equipment, such as the Greek-made Artemis target data fired in
As soon
.
and the It is
Italian
Breda Twin 30.
interesting to
compare
of these systems. The Soviet
the Soviet equivalents
Army
has used
self-
propelled air-defence guns since the early 1950s, long
in
before the Western armies began thinking about them, and there are two presently in service, the
modern armoured aircraft, and most designers ha\ e begun to move up to 25mm or 30mm weapons which produce a lethal effect but which are still com enient in si/c and cost. ( )ne of the newest s\stcms to be ollcrcd is the West (ierman Wildcat, a w heeled gun earner w ith a turret mininting two 3()mm Mauser cannon. Wildcat has a search
ZSLI-57 and the ZSU-23. The ZSU-57 uses a chassis based on 154 lank components, carrying a large turret armed with two 57mm guns. These guns arc the Soviet development of a design which originated in Germany in 1942 but which the Germans never completed. They are fed from four-round clips and have a rate of fire of no more than 70 rpm for each
20mm Far
37mm M1939AAgun was
ott-
on a screen
the electro-optical sight unit in the desired direction.
shells are
their etiect against
now thought
to
be marginal
1927
I\iikI
he siLjhlmi: s\sicni
I
si'jhl,
Liiiii|Miiin'j
suipiiMiiL'K
.
/SI
Ik-
JiasMN
:
Smm,-i
huiii
>luivL-.l
^allMIIL'
UlIK-1
.1
L.iiiiion liiiM'j
I.
.1
i)[)tical
primed
.iiiii
lie
.i[.|KMi- K.
II
r has^d
il
2m)III1
.lUliilll.llIC
h.urel
pel
.ibuiii ')()(iiiiiii
a
lank.
aiii|ihibi.uis
Ultll loUl ..I
have
iincsciAKc
I'I 7f,
iIk'
.lllllL-ll
.11
jikl
liisi
ni>nv cIIlxIi\c:
IN
^
.m
ilonc by a
Ix-iir.;
v^muikI
ix
Imkcs.
.111
iv.'iipli.iNfcloiii,,! I
\vIikIi
^7 lslu.u..^^ulL•u•d'llUKiu)|a
Ihc/Sl
W.'skTii
lliUMl In
sinipK
is
c>iiii|MiiiiiL'
ilic
cl
llicivisadual-puip..Nei.Kl,.i w Iik Ik .nuleieU
i.n
lvk
()Ult(>2()kni( l2iiiiliM.lliexL-.iieiliNpl.i\L-jMi,.,vuceii
Above:
A Gepard opens
fire with its 35mm guns; these can fire either single
and when
seleeled. the
is
tiaekine' incale. lh(tLii:h 1.
shots, in bursts or continuously. Left: The
..ne
11
'eel
isu
iiiiiii
aeiMiiputer w
liieli
the L^unner.
guns disappeared from
ean use an nplieal
u
lire
SAM but they are now
.md
being retrofitted to deal with the anti-ship missile
and low-flying left:
Swiss Air Force. Below left: Reloading of the automatic replenishers of the Oerlikon 35mm AA gun; rapid fire is of great imponance against jet aircraft. Below right: A West German Wildcat
which uses the Mauser 30mm AA gun mounted ontothechassisof a Transportpanzer Right:
The
latest
1.
Anglo-
French AA gun, the Chieftain-Sabre, uses
30mm AA guns and the AMX30'sOeilVert surveillance radar
he /SI -2
^
repki.ed
hi.it il still
lii
pmnis
l-liiis
lire.
lo
oiKe the
then led to
data and
ini:
his
is
pn
esenls
it
m aeeoidanee
altemali\el\ he
open /SI ->7.
siL'ht to aeqiiiie llie lai 'jel .iiid is it
more
elleeti\e IIkim
W
most
in
eunent
lalls shori ol
arsau \\
tlie
lorm.iiions.
I'.i.t
estern teehniqiies,
hi spite ol tile iiiissiie. liie .iii-deleiKe i^im
aircraft.
An Oerlikon 35mmGDF-001 of the Centre
I
h.is
llien
mloiiiiation .md opens
ilh this
ships with the advent of the
ealeulales
w he
t(i
liiis
miles )ran;ee. Data
.SkiiK,'^
25mm GBM-A01 naval mount; naval AA
Oerlikon
suildied
is
onl\ dd
eaii
it
i.idai
is siill
a
weapon. One reason, as alread\ explained, is the Liun inoiintinL; and siijlitiivj s\ stems h.i\ e heen
iisetLil tliat
\astl\ ini|iro\ed s:_\
;
i,liie
anotlier reason
is
to nioeiern eleetionie
simpl\
tlial
a "MInini
teehnoio-
e\plosi\e
shell will briiiL: eiow n an aireratt or helieopter
siiieK
.IS
.1
shoiildei-hred missile and
tlioLisandlli ol
m.i\ be
the eost
expensive
to
inlinilei\ eheapei" tlian
where
bu\
.
but
its
makes
|iist
as
about one
l'uii
s\steni
runnini^ eosis are
those ot a missile
the tareels ean be expected to
last, tills
.it
,\n air-delenee
s_\
eome
a great deal ot'dit'terenee.
stem, and lliiek
and
No area ot'the world
has escaped the intliience of the
superpower con 11 let between the I nited States and theSov let L nion. h\en in Atriea. u here neitherof the superpowers has traditional!) had any substantial interests, the 1970s and 980s saw a mounting tide of 1
superpower involvement, both military' and diplomaThe situation was complicated by the involvement of the tornier colonial powers - all part of the tic.
Western bloc but not necessarily identical in interests and policies with the United States - and of South Africa. officialK a pariah on the international stage, but often an important element in plans to promote
W estem interests. In the 1960s, the first decade of independence for most African states the superpowers played little part in the continent's affairs. The new African states chose an ideological optum. normally either clearly socialist or capitalist, and depending on their ideology reeened niilitar\ aid trom the West or the East. Apart from Eg_\ pt - marginal to African affairs - the Soviet Union found itself backing Algeria. Somalia. Guinea. Mali the Congo (ex-French Congo, not to be confused with the ex-Belgian Congo), and Benin by the end of the decade. With the exception of Algeria, this aid was very small-scale in military terms. Other .
,
independent countries remained largely tied to their former colonial power, receiving training and equipin continuity with colonial days. Soviet and combined - as Nigeria showed during the Biafra war - because Soviet policies did not involve any serious effort to dictate the
ment
ex-colonial aid could be
behaviour of its clients.
ex-Belgian Congo (now two superpowers confront one another, as the US backed General Mobutu (now .Mobutu Sese Seko) through the CIA. while the
Only
in the crisis in the
Zaire) from 1960-65 did the
Soviet Union
first
Uumumba and in the
countr>
Africa in the
Cold War Superpower involvement from Cairo to the Cape
supported Prime Minister Patrice
then aided his successors in rebellion
"s
eastern provinces. .Mobutu
won. and
inaintaining his rule o\er the \ast area of Zaire has
remained a fixed objecti\
e
of
US
polie\ since.
It is significant that this earh case of superpower invohement followed on the failure of the colonial power. Belgium, to control the independence pro-
was
the collapse of the Portuguese colonial 1974-7? that raised the le\ el of in\ (M\ enient It notonh brought three new states to the pro-Soviet camp in .Africa - .Angola. .Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau - but It also saw the an n al of
cess.
It
empire to a
in
new height.
some 20.000 Cuban troops on .Atnean soil. The motives of the Soviet Union in despatching the Cubans to Angola ha\e been much discussed, with far-ranging plans of domination in the region otten
mo\ e show cd the usual opportunism of either of the superpowers presented with a chance to extend its intluence. The Soviet decision was undoubtedly affected by the extreme willingness of Fidel Castro's government to become involved, and b\ the w ide support the intervention could expect through much of black Africa because of the presence of South .African troops on the other side alleged. In fact, the
The US response to the Angolan crisis showed considerable incoherence. Having backed the Portuguese against the guerrillas before'independence. and then chosen {o give CIA support to Holden Roberto's Zaire-based contenders for power in .Angola, the United Stales w nhdrew from the challenge w hen the Soviet Union upped the stakes. Secretar\ ot State
Henry Kissinger,
who had
previouslv guided
US
w hite supnow embarked on a
policy into a guarded encouragement for
remacy \
in
southern Africa,
igorous reshaping of the
tion with the set
US approach.
In collabora-
South African government. Kissinger
out to achieve settlements of the guerrilla wars in
Rhodesia and Namibia, fearing obviously that a guervictory might introduce still further pro-Soviet regimes to the region. In September 1976 this direct U.S dipliMiiatie interxention produced the attempt at an internal settlement' in Rhodesia, but both there and in Namibia guerrilla w ar continued rilla
.
Africa was
now
clearl\ established as a
policy priority, but the
US
foreign
new administration of Jimmy
Top: USAF F-lllsflyover Egypt during a Rapid
Deployment Force Above: A
exercise.
Soviet-supplied T34/85 on the streets of Luanda,
Angola. Both superpowers stepped up involvement in Africa from the mid-1970s, capital of
their
bringing a new Cold War to a continent already scarred by colonial
dimension
wars and by
racial
ethnic conflicts.
and
AFRICA l''MiM
Carter in
Above: US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (left) with South African Prime Ministers. J. Vorster. After the collapse of the
1
977
at first
sought to align
itself
more u
ith
pursuit of a liberal policy based on Leading administration figures proposed taking Africa out of the context of superpower confrontation. Andrew Young, the black US ambassador to the UN went so far as to describe the Cubans as "an element of stability and order" in Angola. Although this statement provoked much hostile comment in the United States, it addressed itself to a
black opinion in
"human
Portuguese colonial empire in 1974-75 had allowed Soviet influence to penetrate Angola and
its
rights".
.
Mozambique, Kissinger embarked on an active diplomatic campaign to
real aspect
of the African situation
\\
hich polic>
mak-
could not ignore namel y the o\ er\\ he m n g dc s re of Western economic interests for stabilit\ abm e all ers
prevent a repetition of these events elsewhere in southern Africa, working closely with the
.
I
i
i
Almost all black African countries were extremely weak economically, and more or less fully dependent on the W est for finance and the exploita-
tion of their resources. Ihus .Angola, for example, proved perfectly willing to cooperate u ith the toreign companies mining its diamonds and petroleum, and the companies in their turn found the regime, despite .Marxist idcolog\ and the Cuban presence, a quit. satislaetoiA partner. .Algeria u as a man>r lev ipient >
>:
Soviet amis, but this did not stop the Ameneans pursuing deals for imponant supplies oi natuial gas with its socialist government. In these and other cases, the
West had
a clear
economic
interest
in
maintaining the status quo. u hateverthe implications for the
superpower
strategic balance.
else.
South African government.
The Soviet/Cuban presence in the 1980s
The Russians rush in The unclear nature of the
interests involved influ-
enced the reaction to the next major demonstration of So\ let acti\ it\ on the continent - the rush of Cuban troops, equipment and .So\ let ad\ isers to Hthiopia in W~~. .As an independent state of long standing, u ith no ex-colonial power to look alter it. Hthiopia had become a recipient i>l Ameriean militar\ .nd But President Carter was hostile to aiding the .Marxist post-19~4 regime, uith its appalling hLiman rights record.
It
supplies
in
was
the
US
decision
cut off militar\-
ti^
Februarx l^"" which opened the door to The Russian decision to transfer
So\iet Union,
tlie
support from Somalia to Hthiopia was once more largelx a
SENEGAL^
demonstration of opportLinism. and it once sensiti\ it\ to .Af rican opinion - Soma-
more show ed a lia was giultx
GAMBIA'^' GUINEA^ BISSAU GUINEA
ot
trxmg
to
change Africa's sacred
post-enlonial boundaries.
he L nited States immediately took up the opportunitx to gain a position of intluence in Somalia, but I
SIERRA
LEONE
/
.oco.A^ LIBERIA ,
/
TOGO
refused to back the Somalis
^GABON'
COAST EQUATORIAL
Fthiopia. Fffecti\ el\
.
a
in
chance for
their a
in\asion of
Cold-War
style
confrontation, with the ultimate aim of forcing a
GUINEA
CONGO'
withdrawal trom Hthiopia b\ the Soviets and their allies, was diiAed Despite expressions of indignation o\er SoMel and Cuban actiMties. the dominant impiessuni gi\en was that the US .idministration was to sec tlie eonimunist forces iiin altogether son"\ takiivj on the u^sth and difticult business of holding Hthiopia together.'
MOZAMBIQUE ZIMBABWE SWAZILAND
Hut the temper of the Carter administration was hanging as the stor>' of the two Shaba crises in 1977 and lexcals. The first of these incursions into sl^uther^ /aire elicited only a token gesture of US support lor the .Mobutu regime, leaving France and Morocco tiulelend Mobutu In U)7S. bv contrast, the ^
.
AFRICA Mozambican leader Samora Machel shares a Left:
joke with a Chinese military adviser. Despite the hostility between China andtheSovietUnion, Machel was able to combine aid from both
communist
sources.
Below: Cuban soldiers
man a Soviet M-46 130mm field
gun during the
OgadenWarin 1977. The presence of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia was the most visible sign of Soviet influence in Africa.
The use of Cubans enabled the Russians to keep their
own forces free of com bat involvement.
second incursion provoked accusations of Cuban and Soviet involvement, and brought US diplomatic and logistical backing for French intervention. The need to block "Soviet expansionism" in Africa developed into a fixed plank of US foreign policy and certainly the evidence of Soviet penetration of a traditionally Western sphere of influence during the 1970s had been impressive. As well as countries already mentioned, Libya had become a major recipient of Soviet arms, helping make Russia the biggest single supplier of weaponry to the continent. It was easy to interpret Libyan and Algerian support for Polisario guerrillas in the Western Sahara, or Libyan backing for rebel forces in Chad, as extensions of
1960-84
gathered pace, with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 979 and the election of President
Morocco's main backer in its war against Polisario and was granted the use of military facilities in exchange. Libya became the object ef heavy .American pressure, even resulting in an air battle in the Gulf of Sirte in 1981 and the advance of Libyan forces in Chad in 983 met a stern US response, although it was the French who actually provided the troops to defend the West's perceived interests. In southern Africa, the Reagan administration committed itself to cooperation with the South Africans in an effort to retrieve some of the ground lost in the 1970s. The two countries worked out a common policy on Namibia, linking South African withdra\\ al from that territory with Cuban withdrawal from Angola. The fragility of both Angola and Mozambique in the face of South African destabilising techniques forced them into humiliating negotiations, since their Soviet backers were incapable or unwilling to
Ronald Reagan's hardline administration in 1980. the United States moved more positively into Africa. This was not only a counter to Soviet advances, but
guarantee their regimes against their enemies. The success of this aspect of US policy was tempered, however, by the adverse effect on black African
also a back-up to American policy in the Persian Gulf - Africa's eastern seaboard provided the best launch-
opinion of the close association between Americaand the white supremacist Pretoria regime. In terms of the superpower balance, the US could be well satisfied by the developments of the 1980s,
Soviet expansionist policy.
As what has been termed
"the
second Cold War'
1
pad for rapid intervention in the region. By 1984. Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya had all granted the Americans base facilities in return for economic and militan,
\
\
aid (although this specifically
excluded any support for Somali ambitions against territorial Ethiopia). In North Africa, the States United took o\er from 'sJH
,
1
although
it
seemed unlikely
that Soviet influence
could be rolled back in the foreseeable future. The relevance of the Cold War perspective to African affairs remains questionable, however. The conflicts that exist in Africa grow out of local ambitions, ideological commitments and ethnic divisions,
which
the superpowers can opportunistically exploit in pur-
of their global interests, but which remain essenR. G. Gran tialK apart trom then- concerns. suit
Prophet of revolution Colonel Gaddafi's Libya Libya attempted to block the readmission of Egypt to the Islamic Conference organisation. By February, however, Libyan policy had shifted to an acceptance of Egyptian readmission and by early March Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was even proposing the union of the two countries. Colonel Gaddafi announced that the Libyan-Egyptian border would be opened on 28 March and warned that this decision would be enforced, if necessary by a march on Cairo - in other words if the new friendliness were not accepted, it would be imposed by force. Libyan foreign policy since Colonel Gaddafi came to power in September 1969 has been littered with similar examples of apparently illogical, contradictory and frankly opportunistic behaviour, which has often invited the charge of adventurism. However, although Libyan behaviour since 1969 has not been untouched by imperial dreams and an element of megalomania, it nevertheless displays a fundamental consistency which has its roots in Libya's traditional position in the Arab world, in Gaddafi's Bedouin origins and in the nature of the society he has tried to In January 1984,
,
,
create.
Libya has traditionally been regarded with a degree of contempt by the rest of the Arab world. Its tiny population is seen as unsophisticated and its desert territory as remote and isolated. The tribal and colonial history of Libya makes it difficult for Libyans to regard themselves as a coherent nation, and they suffer from a sense of inferiority in regard to their neighbour, Egypt, which remains the intellectual and cultural powerhouse of the Arab world. The Arabs have been colonised and villified by Europe, which has totally underestimated their cultu-
Libya suffers doubly by its Middle Eastern neighbours same way as the Arab world generally regarded by the former colonial po ral heritage. In this respect,
being regarded by
much
the
This does not, however, pro duce a coherently unified Libyan ers.
response, but rather two contra dictory impulses, pulling
opposite directions.
On
the
one hand, Gaddafi seeks ognition and acceptance by the Arab nations he regards natural allies to support
important Libyan role gional and global affairs.
On
the other hand he regard ,
servative and powerful states,
Arab
such as Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, as having betrayed the
Arab cause through alliances of expediency with Western Europe and the United States Gaddafi sees himself as the heir of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's pan-Arabism. and
has therefore repeatedly sought to unite Libya Arab neighbours - so often that the whole idea
become debased and devalued, and fe such treaties seriously, or expect them to last. The September 1984 unity agreement with Morocco - a long-standing enemy- was adiplomatic coup forboth
than previous agreements with Egypt, Syria, Sudan
and Tunisia.
regarded as criminal whatever the laws of the country
and sent a political shock throughout the whole
region, but
Though
was not regarded
as likely to fare better
,
the motives for Gaddafi's pursuit of such
power were more Nasserite pan- Arab principles, he
purely based in
deadly agents
showed just as much concern with sheer survivand his primary aim was to prevent Libya's total regional isolation. The alliance with Morocco, for example, came after a year of growing rapprochement, but was given added impetus by the refusal of Tunisia and Algeria to allow Libyan accession to the treaty of fraternity and concord which they had signed in
March 1983.
Similarly, Gaddafi's sudden pursuit of friendship with Saudi Arabia was largely due to the weakening of his position within the Organization of African Unity and his desire for Saudi diplomatic support. The value
Gaddafi's revolutionary
receive short shrift.
of that rapprochement was indicated, in early 1984, when the Saudi embassy in London assumed responsibility for the representation of Libyan interests in Great Britain after London severed diplomatic relations with Tripoli, following the murder of Yvonne Fletcher in front of the Libyan People's
WPC
Bureau in St James s Square Gaddafi denounces countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt for failing to achieve Arab unity for failing to prosecute the struggle against Israel, and for their close ties with the West, but at the same time he realises that he has to live with them. Egypt is still by far the most important Arab nation, and Saudi Arabia ultimately controls the price of oil, which provides Libya's sole source of vital foreign exchange. Gaddafi's rage and frustration at being snubbed by his neighbours - for example, being excluded by President Anwar Sadat from the preparations for the 1973 Yom Kippur War - are tempered by realism and '
Main
picture: Colonel
,
Muammar Gaddafi, charismatic leader of the
Libyan 'Jamaharyia' ('state of the
masses'),
photographed as Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1982.
,
Unfortunately forGaddafi, a split in the
OAU
prevented the holding of the summit meeting he was to have chaired.
which the killings take place. Tripoli's indignation conviction and imprisonment of its
at the arrest,
al,
government demonstrate
in
alliances during his early years in
later
theirenthusiasmforthe regime. Officially Libya is run on the principle of 'direct democracy', but opponents of Gaddafi
upon Libyan foreign policy has which Colonel Gaddafi has attemj)-
standards Of that work, Libyan society has reached the state of perfection, and therefore all its acts are above blame and themselves perfect; thus Libya can act outside the norms of international behaviour. The liquidation of Libyan dissidents living abroad is not
sides,
Above: Youthful supporters of Colonel
ety
sincethe 1969 revolution, modelledi^n ntained in his own Green Book. By the
expediency.
is
therefore not entirely devoid of
sincerity.
Nor is the claim that the Libyan government should not be held responsible for the actions of such killers
Libya insists that these assassins are on orders from Tripoli, and indeed there is an element of truth in this. Gaddafi's Libya ostensibly operates on the Green Book principle of 'direct democracy' by which policies are determined by the people acting directly, and there is a convention that Colonel Gaddafi does not decide policy himself. Libya is ostensibly ruled by popular congresses which exist at both the local and totally insincere.
acting as individuals and not
national levels. Gaddafi
is
portrayed as simply the
charismatic figurehead of the revolution. In practice,
however, Gaddafi overrules any decisions which go against his own wishes, such as when he countermanded the rejection of universal military service by the General Popular Congress in February 1 984. Because, in theory at least, Gaddafi is not the sole arbitor of Libyan policy, there exists a certain room for manoeuvre for various factions, which vie for influence by operating abroad against political opponents. Individual bombings and killings may therefore be the work of such factions although they would nevertheless be in line with Gaddafi's own policy of killing dissident exiles - 'stray dogs' - announced in February 1 980. Growing internal and external Libyan ,
opposition has, since Gaddafi's 'stray dogs' speech,
focussed Libyan covert foreign policy on the elimination of dissidents. During the 1970s, however, Libya also provided assistance to terrorist organisations such as the IRA, the Italian Red Brigades and the Japanese Red Army. This support was motivated not only by sympathy for the revolutionary aims of these movements, but also by a desire to discomfort the great powers, whom Gaddafi saw as enemies of the
Arab people. Libyan relations with the United
States have de-
teriorated seriously since early 1980, for example.
American public opinion was enraged by Libyan public support for the Iranian seizure of American hostages in Tehran in November 1 979 and the Reagan administration quickly denounced Gaddafi as a terrorist; Libya was openly identified as a target for 'destabilisation' The dogfight over the Gulf of Sirte on 1 9 August 1 98 1 during which two Libyan fighters were shot down by two US carrier-based F-14 Tonicats, was proDaDiy a aenoeraie act or provocation oy the United States, motivated by a desire to 'tweak .
,
Gaddafi's nose'.
The incident prompted Libya to move even closer which had been courting Colonel Gaddafi for many years. This seemed to provide the United States with evidence that Gaddafi was merely a stooge of Moscow, but this was, in fact, completely false. Gaddafi had first approached Moscow for arms to the Soviet Union,
1933
ifi bdieves fliat of 16 and 54. Gaddafi thai a revolutionanpeopfemustbea 'peofrienianns'cqnbleofguaranteeing its o«>iisecimt}'. This is one reason nliy Libya is such a great consumer of anns: anodier. equally
inqKXtant. isdiatladtof adequate servicing produces
a high lateofequipmentfaUure and wastage. Libya procures weqions. howevCT. not simply for its own defence, but also in order to be able to pwsue an aggressive foreign polic\ From 1977. for exam{rfe, Libya provided aims and Libyan bocfyguards to die UgandanleaderldiAmin. andUbyan troops locA part in the fi^itii^ against die Tanzanian invasion of Ugandam 1979. Todie West. Amin was nomoredian a bloody dictator, but to Gaddafi he was bodi an anti-IsraeUMushm and die audientic voice of Mack Afirica, staunchly opposedtocokmialism. The Sahaian region of North Africa was die area of most active Libyan involvement, as Gaddafi sou0a to realise his dream of unity »idi die Arab states of the North African Ms^srdj as w^U as die broader and more ambitious aim of unit\ wiab die predcMninandy MusUm but ncMi-Arab states of die Sahel to die soudi. Gaddafi has sought by I s of difrfomacy. economic aid. military assistance, subversion and even opoimilitai)' intervention to estabhshdiebasisforaMnsUmSaharanrepubUcloinchide Chad. Soiegal. Niger. MaU and Gambia. Gaddafi's fimdamental impatience and advCTturism have beoi .
attemfiEd coups against King Hassan of Moraeb^ involvoleiit in die overthrow of die Diori goveaf^^ mentinM^in 1974: suspected support for the 1980 riots in nonhon Nigeria, as wdlasin\x)lvement indie
militarv
coup in Uj^Voltainlbe same year. During
1981 . die government of Gambia accused Libya of supporting an attem|jiaynD^ainst it.
Libya has been acd||H^|^olvement in coup atienqilsmSenegal,M^3H||liidan.andhasbeen one of die chief backers of die Pofisario guerrilla movement in its war against Morocco in die Wesierir Sahaia-Themainaieaof Libyan acti\it> has been in Chad, howevCT, and has included the outright annexation of die Aouzou strip in northern Chad, occufned by Libyan troops since 1973, backing for pro-Libyan factitms in Chad's endemic civil war, and ouiri^t mihtary intervodion during 1980-81 and again in 1983-84. The reasons for Libyan intent tion in
Oiad have been more conq^x. and have Aouzou strip.
inchided a long-standing clann to die
h neighbouring re undermined by simul-
assignedtoLibyaunderdieLaval-MussoUnitTeatyof 1935 wbkh was, however, never implemented. Libya is also ideiested in securiiig control of Chad's rich deposits of uranium as a gnaamee of continued independence wlien its own (h1 stocks run oitt. The presmt oil ghit has created new economic problems for Lib\ a. and her oil revenues have been cut from approximately S22 billion in 1981 to around S9-10 Inllion in 1984. Foreign exchange reserves dropped during the same period from some S9 Ullion to about $2 billion. Notonlym2^tiiebai]d^
taneous
Hi^Gndoa
mostcleariyshovviibyhisrapidandmaticaltmiation al
govemmaits
led. or progress
for attempts to
1,
for exanqde,
[Ms to
m
support for anti-govemment riots. Eailier Lib\\„ intofeieDce within the legiMi includes die puUic approval grv en by Gaddafi to the 1971 aiid -£l72
inqirove
I
U
Dogfight
The Gulf of Sirte incident, 1981 In 1981
.
the forces of the United States dealt a sharp
Colonel Gaddafi's Libya that the most was no substitute for technological superiont\ during a brief but decisi\ e air battle o\ er the Mediterranean Sea. In 1973. Gaddari had claimed the Gulf of Sine as Libyan territorial waters. Pre\ lousK considered international waters, the Gulf u as regularh u^ed b\ the US Sixth Fleet a training area. The Gulf is a large expanse of sea - some 240km 150 miles nonh to south and 45(ikni iZsd miles east to west - and US na\ai units continued use it during the late 19~0s; but during the crisis o\cr the detention of the US hostages in Tehran from .\o\ ember 19~9 President
reminder
to
intense re\oiutionar\ rhetoric
(
i
i
!'.">
Canerforbade the US Fleet to sail south of the 32"" 30' north parallel - the line of latitude Gaddafi had claimed as his maritime border. The Lib\an leader had publicly proclaimed his suppon for the actions of the Iranians; it was considered that he might ha\e close links w ith Iran's new regime and it was felt that nothing should be allow ed to exacerbate the situation
By the time that Ronald Reagan assumed ofnce as US president in January 198 howe\ er. the hostages were home and the US. ha\ ing been held to ransom and then humiliated during the fiasco of a failed rescue attempt, was in no mood ti^ endure turthorblow s to its pride from radical Middle Lastem regimes. In the 1
spring of 1981 \'ice-.Admiral
mander of
.
W
illiam
Bow den. com-
the Sixth Fleet, requested permission to
Ignore the Carter precedent and to penetrate south into
Gulf of Sine. The request, classihedas sensiti\e. was passed 'i:-! lo ttie US \a\_\'s commander-inthe
chief Eurthe
US
... ;
ciiic:
.
.
\ .iiiiingcn in '..;\al
W
est
operations
Gennan\ then
in
.
to
Washington and
on to tile v-hairman of the joint chiefs of staff .Air Force General Da\ id Jones. The idea was then lormallv placed before the National Securit\ Council (NSC). The proposal was well ivcei\ed b> the NSC nian^nt> agreement during a meeting in June and was reached that the Caner abstention should not be allowed to be seen b\ the Lib\ans as an accepted finall)
.i
precedent. Follow ing a funher meeting of the
US
14 July, the
NSC on
decision to stage a major naval
was taken with unanimous approval of President Reagan and
exercise in the disputed waters
the his
senior advisers.
Above: An Su-22 Fitter flight. This basic and
in
Rear- .Admiral James Service w as summoned to the Pentagon. He was briefed on the various confrontation risks that might arise iVom a US
somewhat primitive aircraft was widely
naval presence in the Gulf of Sine and w as fonnally
thoughout the world by the Soviet Union. Adapted from the Soviet Su-7, the
Three days
later.
were onl_\ to engage in selfdefence manoeuv res and on no account were the> to open tire unprovoked. Service then returned to Naples where he loined the fleet commander. .Admiral
warned
that his pilots
Bow den.
to
begin planning the fonhcoming opera-
tion.
On
17 .August IMSI
a naval force
.
cruisers and destrov ers and
comprising 14
two aircraft carriers. USS
and USS .\';/?!/7r carry ing about 50 aircraft between themi. sailed into the Gulf of Sine. During the first two da>s of the exercise the \iinii:. using a ti\e-radar computer-linked defence s_\stem with a range of 800km i500 miles i. spotted Libvan "intruders" 72 times. Despite a US warning that i\e ammunition would be Used during the exercise, the Lib_\an aircraft were intent on flying into airspace o\er the Gulf. Gi\en that the Gulf of Sine was. at the \ en
Forresiiil
1
i
I
least, international waters. Lib>a's action was not an unusual procedure for a countr\ with a large foreign
na\al presence It
nnoKed
seems. howe\er.
in
manoeu\res off its coast. Lib\ans were intent on
that the
disrupting the exercise, forcing the .Americans to desist risk
from the use of
li\e
ammunition through
the
of hitting a Lib\ an aircraft.
The US response lo the presence of Lib\ an aircratf was alwa\s the same. Fhjhters alread\ patrolling; or laun.hed'from the deck
Tomcat can reach
a
of
height ol
the
\//';/::
hOOOm
- an
F-
i20.0(H) teen
deck launch in under two minutes - would intercept the Lib\an aiivralt and force them away from the area after identit\ing themselves to the Libvans and noting down the Lib\an aircraft tighter from
a
suppliedtoairforces
Fitter has a lower-rated engine and less advanceo
avionics.
THE GULF OF SIRTE INCIDENT With a maximum speed of Mach !2517km/h - L'i64mph) the F-14 could
iMilikciv casualty. :
3
oiitmii
nmi,, ^\
!
an Atoll missile within
(5 miles),
-
arniN hi
enemy tion
8km
extremely sophisticated electronic del. hnotonly warns the pilot when an enem
-
.
.siles
auvraft
which
is
prior to firms:, hut will also predict
movements
:ittack
projected ontoa
American
informa-
"!a\infront
.;
of the pilot. Given these capabi,
!!
of the
'.ilts pilots and thi:: uku, ability and speed, the point iscd by military experts that the Americans e been luring the Libyans into a trap from w iiici. '.ould not hope to escape. It could not ha\ c eluded the notice of the Reagan administration that such an event could substantially decrease Gaddafi's international prestige. Following the strict regulations relating to offensive and defensive actions, the US pilots, once fired upon, were free to take action. With a 480km/h (300 mph) speed advantage over the Su-22s, the Tomcats had little difficulty in manoeuvring behind the Libyans who were already fleeing towards the coastline. Allowing just a little time for the Libyans to move away from the sun (which could affect the accuracy of heat-seeking missiles), the US pilots opened fire with Sidewinder missiles. One Su-22 erupted in flames. The second was also hit but the missile failed to detonate and the pilot ejected satcly. In the wake of the incident, diplomatic protests were launched by both sides. The attempted use of the Sixth Fleet to overawe Gaddafi served only to strengthen his wayward anti-Americanism and he lost no time in using the incident to enhance his selfproclaimed image as champion of the Third World. Conversely, for pro- Western countries the incident provided a comforting demonstration of American military presence. Whetherthey had in fact planned to provoke such an encounter or not. the US administra-
i
,
!
I
\
.
>
Above: The
US personnel,
both pilots and radar operators, directly involved
IntheGulf of Sirte incident, explain the
sequence of
events at a press conference held aboard the
USS Nimitz.
designations. Usually the Libyans responded by re-
turning to mainland airspace. On 19 August, however, the Libyan response was completely different. Shortly after 0700 hours, the /V/w/r-'^ radars locked onto and identified two Sovietbuilt Libyan Su-22s heading into the Gulf. The two fighters were also spotted by a US Hawkeye earlywarning reconnaissance aircraft patrolling above the Gulf at 2 .000m 70,000 feet). At the same time, two F-14 Tomcats from the Black Ace squadron (considered the best fighter group in the US Navy) which was based on the Nimitz, were on a routine patrol As the Su-22s closed, the Tomcats were ordered to intercept. With the two Tomcats heading straight towards them, the Libyans fired off one missile, passed underneath the Tomcats, banked steeply and fired another. The Libyan pilots should certainly have 1
(
.
Below:
Grumman
F-14
Tomcats of the crack Black Ace squadron on the flight deck of the Nimitz. The F-14, which first flew operationally in March 1974, is undoubtedly one of the world's most formidable multirole fighters. Itcan detect
attack targets
and
some 160km
(100 miles) distant a
and has
maximum speed of 2517
km/h(1564mph).
known
would not hit. In the first which the Su-22s were which could not possibly lock-on to an oncoming aircraft. Secondly, even if the US pilots allowed the Libyans to manthat their missiles
place, the Atoll missiles with
armed
are heat-seeking missiles
oeuvre into an attacking position behind them, the F-14"s extraordinary performance would iiuiKc it an
tion
was
clearly not displeased with the militar}'
success against one of their least favourite regimes.
Alexander McNair-Wilson
Polid The struggle for the Western Sahara Spain
liirniall)
tcrntoiA l\ini:
u lthdIcv^ bcluccn M
1
t
the northwest coast ol Atr
an action which was
loll
long-running
conflict
ramifications.
Both
\
Mon
the Spanish Sahara, a
ceo on
.
aiul
Mauritania on
2<^
ebi iuuA
l
1^76,
ed b\ a eonipiex and
,1
mleriiational
\Mi!e
1
and
.MaLiritaiiia
had
claims on the Spanish Sahara, while the territory offered Algeria a useful route to the Atlantic tor the iron ore mined at Gara Djebilet. Although it was sparsely populated, the area was of considerable economic importance because of the phosphates it contained. Morocco already controlled 40 per cent of the world's phosphate market, and possession of the Spanish Sahara would give her perhaps 20-25 percent more. If. however, the area became an independent state, as the Spanish planned, Morocco's share of the
jl
|
world market could be substantially reduced. It is also likely that the Moroccan government recognised that concentration on an external dispute might help re-
duce internal unrest. In 1974 Morocco and Mauritania had secretly agreed to partition the Spanish Sahara. The Spanish government, negotiating in the uneasy atmosphere accompanying Franco's last illness, concluded a secret agreement with the Algerian-backed guerrilla group Polisario - the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el Hanira and Rio de Oro - under the terms of v\ hich Polisario w ould take over follow ing Spain's withdrawal. A United Nations commission took a similar line, reporting that the population of the area
independence
favoured
rather
than
union
with
Morocco. Spanish resolve did not surv ive intense Moroccan pressure. In the "Green March' of November 1975.
some 350.000 unarmed Moroccans marched
across
and the follow ing government agreed that the teiritory should be divided between Morocco and Mauritania when Spain withdrew. As the Moroccans and
the border into the Spanish Sahara,
month
the Spanish
Mauritanians took over, much of the population departed to refugee camps in Algeria. Polisario claimed that this exodus w as \ oluntar\ and had .
involved most of the population, which it estimated at 150.000 people: the Moroccans maintamei! that it was provoked b>' Polisario. and that in an\ ease the some ".-^.(HK) according inaiontN ol the population to iheir'liL}uies
now known
aiea.
pleled
in
Aniil
had remained. The pariiiioii ot the as the Western Sahara, was eomhe Moioeeaiis look llie hon's I
r.
le
iiartitio
Mam ilanians
while
.outhern
cKiliarhia
si
.
the south ot
J
'
;
'
I
againstthe harsh weather of the Sahara, a Polisario
fightercradleshisFNFAL rifle.
Polisario guerrillas
have proved tough and self-reliant in their
against Morocco. left:
war Below
Supporters of Polisario
in exile in
Algeria
show the
movement's flag. fighters immediately began operations agamst the occupying forces, and Algerian support for Polisario produced at least one serious clash between Algerian and Moroccan regular troops at Amgala, leading to tears of war between Algeria and Morocco. Diploma-
pressure
tic
accompanied these military effoHs. The
govemment-in-exile of the Sahraoui Arab Democratic
(SADR) was set up in Algeria in March and by November 1980 the SADR had been
Republic
1976.
recognised by 27 states.
The Mauritanian Army, small and inexperienced, found the war increasingly costly, despite the fact that the Moroccans agreed, in May 1977, to send 9000 men to assist it. The Mauritanian economy was severely damaged by droughts, as well as by Polisario attacks on the extremely vulnerable ZouerateNouadhibou railway line, upon which Mauritania depended for the export of her iron ore. Many Mauritanians were closely related to the Sahraouis and had no enthusiasm for the war. They were, by contrast, extremely suspicious of the Moroccans, who had until quite recently claimed sovereignty over Mauritania, as well as over the Western Sahara. In July 978 there was a military coup in Mauritania, and Polisario immediately announced a unilateral cease1
Mauritania to Dakhla. The Moroccans
men -
half as
many
as Polisario
1
,
line to seal off
much
of the disputed territory against
Polisario incursions. In October 1979, for example,
Moroccans mounted Operation Uhud. in which some 6000 men. with airand artillery support, moved
the
I
into the
the
in
stage-managed
'Green March' of
November 1975. Morocco's takeover of the Western Sahara afterthe departure of the Spanish colonial power in 1976 was immensely popular with the Moroccan people.
II
the challenge of popular agitation but
opposition
also
officers
who
from right-wing attempted to
twice
assassinate him.
On
10 July 1971
about 1400 army cadets led by rebel
killing 90guests, including the Belgian ambassador, but Hassan escaped unscathed. In a second attempt, on 16 August 1972, four Royal Moroccan
I
Moroccans march Spanish Sahara carefully
Morocco's King Hassan has been a major benefician/ of the war in the Western Sahara, using it to bolster his sometimes perilous hold on power. In the early 1 970s he faced not only
Polisariocontinued unabated. France intervened with
were genuine indications of popular feeling, while Polisario claimed that they were manipulated b\ Moroccan agents. Both sides moved forces into the Tiris el Gharbia: on August there was a sharp battle at Bir En/aran. between advancing Polisario elements and a Moroccan column moving up from
Above: Carrying portraits of King Hassan II, unarmed
A royal survivor
officers attacked the royal palace dur-
cember 1978, operating from Dakar, Senegal. in August 1979 the Mauritanians agreed to withdraw from the Tiris el Gharbia, their sector of the Western Sahara, and thereby to end their war against Polisario. There were pro-Moroccan demonstrations in the area's only town, Dakhla (formeriy Villa Cisncros). The Moroccans maintained that these
75
The Moroccan armed forces, rising steadily in size from50,000in 1975 to 89 ,000 in 1978 and 16,000in 198! embarked upon the dual strategy of attacking Polisario bases and constructing a lengthy fortified
with the Mauritanians. A flurry of negotiations followed, but fighting between Moroccan forces and support for the Moroccans, deploying Jaguars and Breguet Atlantique reconnaissance aircraft in De-
1
their forces
occupied the area.
fire
air
about
lost
- and
ing the king's birthday celebrations,
Air
Force F-5s attacked the king's B-
727
jet
but failed to shoot
it
down.
Despite damage to two engines and a wing, the aircraft landed safely and the king
was spinted away before the
F-5s carried out a follow-up strike.
The
Spanish
Sahara
question
civilians into
the Sahara
Ever
since,
Hassan has enjoyed domestic support for his
almost
Hassan
Western Sahara
rally
both
right-wing
November
back only a few kilometres across the border, before confronting the Spanish forces mobilised to meet them.
offered an excellent opportunity for to
in
1975 was a brilliant publicity coup, even though the marchers turned
total
policy,
despite the
officers
heavy casualties and financial costs of
tion
the continuing war.
and the mass of the populaThe 'Green March' of unarmed
WHSTHRN SAHARA
I97()-S4
against Polisario strongholds in the Djebcl Ouarkziz. In the first half
of 1981 the Moroccans concentrated
on the building of the 500km (300-mile) bairier. running from Zag at the northeast end of the Djebel Ouarkziz to Boujdour on the coast, with particular attention being paid to the defence of the "useful
the phosphate-mining area around El Aaiun. Smara and Bou Craa. Polisario strove to disrupt the construction of this line, and there were a number of serious clashes which gave rise to the usual triangle",
backers reintorced American prejudices
consistently
blamed
for
en-
couraging Polisario, and, after Mauritanian withdrawal from the Tiris el Gharbia, Mauritania too was soon accused of supporting the guerrillas. In the summer of 980 Moroccan aircraft attacked targets inside both Algeria and Mauritania, and in March 1981 the latter complained that Morocco had supported an unsuccessful coup against the Mauritanian government. This was reorganised shortly afterwards, to include more members who favoured a policy of neutrality in the war in the Western Sahara, and no action was taken on a suggestion by Libya's Colonel Gaddafi that Mauritania and the SADR should be merged. In late 1981 and early 1982 Polisario launched a number of large-scale attacks on 1
Moroccan positions in the Western Saliaia. some ot he them very close to the Mauritanian holder Moroccan government accused Mauritaniaol permitting the atlaeks to Iv mounted from its territory, but 1
Mauritania steadlaslly denied these allegatK)ns. The Moroccans also tiiscerned Libyan involvement, and
mounted
a diplomatic
campaign against Libya.
By this stage the conflict had assumed far-reaching The Americans tended to Hassan II ol Morocco as a m iiortlusest AInea. and
international importance.
see Ihe iVL'inie ol po'-.ciliil
loree
the political
1940
KiiiL'
loi siahilit\
complexion
ol
I'olisano anti
its
nia|or
left:
Polisario
accustomed
Army was
guerrilla attacks.
making the best use of that Moroccan attacks on Algeria or Mauritania would escalate the war. The election of President Reagan was followed by promnot capable of
modem weapons
and warned
Western Sahara 1976 partition line
Algeria
Above
guerrillas are
Encouraging guerrilla action Morocco
n.
sional opposition to an
conflicting claims. Nevertheless, the fortifications
were completed in May 1982. and the phosphate mines at Bou Craa were reopened.
in this
was considerable congrc arms sale agreement in I98( which promised the Moroccans S23? million of milit ary hardware, including helicopters and aircraft Opponents of the deal argued that the Moroccan spect. Nevertheless, there
n
Canary Islands
to coping comfortably with
desert conditions. Above:
Moroccan armoured vehicles have frequently
proved vulnerableto
WESTERN SAHARA
Above: Amotorised
column
of the
Moroccan
Army prepares to set out on patrol from El Aaiun in August 1979. The presence
ZU-23 gun mounted
of a Soviet-built anti-aircraft
on the back ofthis Land Rover is a reminder that, although backed bythe West.the Moroccans still
employ some Soviet equipment. Below: The
ability of
Polisario to
shoot
Moroccan
aircraft
down showed
the sophistication of their
weaponry. Below
right:
Polisario leader
Mohammed Abdel Aziz (centre) with the
president
Edem
ises of further
M60
tanks.
May
arms supplies, including 180 King Hassan visited the United States in
1982. by which stage American military aid to
Morocco was running at some S30 million a year. United States policy was defined as being "aimed at limiting the
risks of escalation
and supporting a
Numerous American Morocco in 1982. and took pains to tull-scale Moroccan campaign against
militarx balance in the region'. officials
\
isiicd
point out that a
Mauritania might easily result in Mauritaniahaving to accept Soxiet aid. Thus, while the United States is prepared to support Morocco, she vent a widening of the conflict.
is
anxious to pre-
France, the former colonial power in North Africa, has continuing interests in the region. As well as carrying out air attacks on Polisario units which had raided French-manned mines in Mauritania. French military engineers helped the
OAU
essential
Kodjo.
takeover of the Tins
services
in
Dakhia el
Moroccans
to restore
after the
Moroccan
Gharbia. French instructors
1976-84
helped train the Mauritanians. and French equip-
AMX
ment, particularly 13 light tanks, and EBR-75. and AML-90 armoured cars, makes up an important segment of the Moroccan Army's inventor}'. However. France was understandably reluctant to alienate the African states which backed Polisario, inparticularAlgeria.andin 1982 she allowed Polisarwhen the io to open a bureau in Paris. In March 98 UN Human Rights Commission censured Morocco's 'persistent occupation" of the WestemSahara. France abstained from voting. France strove to maintain this policy of even-handedness by temporarily suspending the supply of arms in March 1982. though in January 1983 President Francois Mitterand visited Morocco and spoke in favour of a referendum amongst the people of the Western Sahara, a solution
AMX-10
1
1
.
generally favoured by Morocco. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has provided the backcloth against which many of the diplomatic moves in the dispute ha\ e been played out
1941
WESTHRN SAHARA
In
March 1979
I97()-S4
a rtve-man
commission
reported in favour of a cease fire
ot the
(
)
\
l
toUowedby arelcicn-
and at the Nairobi OAU summit in June 1981 King Hassan promised a referendum. The major obstacle confronting this, however, was his government's refusal to negotiate with Polisario. Another committee repeated the demand for a referendum, again without success. The SADR seemed, mean-
dum
while, to be gaining strength. ted to the its
It
was formally admit-
equipment and ha\e shown theniscKes capable of mounting large-scale operations, are unlikely to make much impression on Moroccan fortifications. Conversely, Polisario columns seem to enjoy a wide measure of freedom of movement to the southeast of the defensive line, and Western journalists who have accompanied them have reported that these tough, self-reliant fighters
on
in a
war which
delegation resulted in a walk-out by
seem perfectly prepared to fight ho quick or easy victories. Richard Holmes
offers
OAU in February 1982, though the arrival of
Above: Polisario troops guard Moroccans captured during the battle of Guelta
Zammour. A3000-strong Polisario
mechanised
unit,
supported by surface-to-air
engaged and defeated the Moroccan 4th Regiment. The action missiles
showed the scale of the challenge to Morocco.
Morocco and
many
of her supporters. However, the relative infrom February to July of that year probably reflects the fact that there was considerable hope for a negotiated settlement. But the question of negotiation between Morocco and the Polisario continued to be a stumbling-block, and the dispute had a damaging effect upon the cohesion of the OAU. A serious crisis was averted when, in June 1983. the SADR 'voluntarily and temporarily" decided not to participate in the OAU's 19th summit meeting. This body adopted a nine-point resolution advocating, amongst other tilings, a referendum under the auspices of the OAU and a request for a UN force to monitor a ceasefire. Bdih Morocco and Polisario hailed this as a victory.
activity of Polisario forces during the period
Morocco pointed tion the
SAOR
b\
io
maintained
demands
thai
fordiivci
This apparent
nai
Hk
m
j
cliplui
aiy sland-otfinthcWV-
dcspite the lact that
1942
)n
mounting
and of operating sophisticated equipment. On 13 October 1981, 3000 Polisario of
nnajor operations
between the two conflicting claims. Of particular importance was the acknowledged Moroccan loss of one C-1 30 transport plane and two Mirage
seemed
to
cans, for their part, admitted only the
inside
while Polisar-
00 men, and maintained that their crack 6th Regiment defeated the Polisano force on the following day. The fighting certainly went on for some days, and the truth probably lios
commanding Moroccan in the Western Sahara, announced that his forces had responded by bombing targets inside
its
wish
acknowledged lie
troops as guerrillas, they are capable
Moroccan 4th Regiment, suffered
men-
its
with Morocco. alcn
Zammour
we tend to think of Polisano
ver/ heavy casualties. The Moroc-
"citerated
ssible,
j
battle of Guelta
F-1 fighters, allegedly shot down by Soviet missiles manned by nonAfncan personnel. The Moroccans were disturbed by the appearance of the tanks and anti-aircraft missiles though whether these were SAM-6s, SAM-Ss or SAM-9s was never made clear - and by the fact that the attack
out that the resolution did not
haveareleicntluMi
The
Although
mirrors a milit-
I'olisanoloivcs.
fighters attacked the
Zannmour,
40km
town
of Guelta
(25 miles) from the
Mauritanian frontier, with 50 armoured personnel earners and 12 T54 tanks. Polisano sources claimed that the garnson,
loss of
1
the 2000-strong
Dlimi,
to
have been launched from General Ahmed
Mauntania. then
troops
Mauntania,
Key\ eapon^
ARMOURED CARS
1943
KEY WEAPONS is iwi onh the okksi \\pc ni uilh automotive arniouiwl ti;jlitini: \chkk- AIA hm also the one whicli lias Ic.isi sukl- ii uav conceived. At the cnJ ot Work! War I. Mkii Jcm-ii features as good ;ji(niiul ^ kMiaiu.' anJ Jnal . iI\ front-and-rearstcci iii'j Wvii- .ill ^si.ihtisiu'.l .mJ then the only impoii.iiii Jian-.^ sknniK^ expanding techniiluLi) uliicli lias pio\ idcd iinpimcd pciiormance and bcilcr aiiiiainent. However, the
The armoured car
i,
l
purpose-built anin)uied car inno\ati()n, the
first
is
a ci>mparatively recent
generation being tailored to
fit
commercial vehicle chassis; the first signibreakthrough was made in 1929 by Daimler-
existing ficant
Benz with an experimental vehicle known as ARW-MTW Achtradwagen-Mannschafts-
the
(
transportwagen. or eight-wheeled personnel earner) in
which each wheel was independently driven and
suspended.
The Daimler scout car and car,
which equipped the
armoured armoured car regim-
the Daimler
British
War 11 both ow ed a ARW-MTW. Work on the former, a 3048kg (67201b) four-wheel dri\e \ chicle with pre-selected transmission, began in 1937: nearl\ 7000 were built, being used for reconnaissance and liaison duties. The Daimler armoured car was a scaled-up version of the scout car weighing 7610kg (16,8001b) and mounted a turret armed with a 2pounder gun and a co-axial machine gun; the 2-
ents for several years after World
.
great deal to the turretless
pounder armour-piercing performance could be improved by fitting a Littlejohn adaptor, which applied squeeze to the shot, so causing it to accelerate beyond its normal muzzle velocity. During the period in which Great Britain granted independence to her former colonies, her armoured car troops were regularly employed on counterinsurgency tasks in various pans of the u orld notabl\ during the long but successful u ai aijaiiisi o>iiinuinist guerrillas in Malaya. In 194~the W ai )ttiLe. a^ it then was, issued a requirement for the Daimler scout car's .
(
named the Ferret, it entered ser\ ice in 1952 and was again manufactured bv the Daimler
replacement;
Previous page: A Ferret 2/3 in Northern Ireland. Ferret Mk 2/6
Mk
Above: A
fires a Vigilant
ATGW.
The flotation screen Mk4.
Right:
raised on a Ferret
Below
left:
A Saladin
exercising on Salisbury Plain.
Below
right:
A
Saladin of 1 7/21st Lancers on patrol in Cyprus.
ARMOURED CARS lumpanN
In
.
siinilartci its
uas
man>
respects the Ferret
predecessor, but
it
was
was
ver\
better protectcti
had a longer wheelbase and possessed
iar!:cr.
much supein)r cross-country pert'orniance. The Fci ret Mark I. like the original Daimler scout car. was turretless. but the Mark II and subsequent Marks u ere fitted with a turret mounting a single machine gun. and in the early y6()s some Mark lis were armed w ith I
ATGWs
(anti-tank guided Vickers Vigilant in launching racks on either side of the tuiTCt and two stowed in the hull. The later Mark IV. tour
weapons), two
weighing 5400kg (1 1, 9051b) possesses a flotation screen and the more recent Mark V has a redesigned armed with tour Swingfire ATGWs ready to
turret
and two reloads. The Ferret is still operational Army, and with many Commonsome other countries. It has proved highly suitable, not only tor its intended roles, but tor peacekeeping missions as well. tire,
with the British
wealth armies and
The WarOtficc alsciordered
the
car's replacement. thcSaladin. in
Daimlerarmoured 1947 but Alvis, the
manufacturers, did not go into quantity production 195X. The reason for this was that the Malayan Emergency diveiled those resources which had been until
earmarked for the Saladin into building the Saracen armoured personnel carrier, which employed the same six-wheel torsion bar suspension, and for which there was an urgent demand. The Saladin/Saracen suspension possessed steering on the leading tour wheels and could simultaneously lose one wheel on damage and still remain mobile.
each side to mine
trom which the a powerful 76mm gun Scorpion light tank's main armament was developed -and a co-axial machine gun, the Saladin served w ith distinction throughout the fighting in the Radian and the Aden Emergency, the Indonesian conlrontation
Armed with
with Malaysia, and the Nigerian civil war. It remains one of the most successful armoured car designs ever built and has been purchased by several Commonwealth and foreign armies as well as by the West
German
Border Police. It weighs ,59()kg is powered by a Rolls-Royce B8() engine 60 bhp, has a maximum speed of 72km/h (45mph), and is manned by a crew ot three. The most recent addition to the British armoured car fleet is the Fox scout car, which was intended to I
1
(25,5501b).
producing
1
replace the Ferret in the 1970s, although in fact the latter remains in service. While the layout of the two vehicles is very similar, the Fox has a two-man turret armed with a 30mm cannon; alternative versions, with a one-man turret, are armed with either a 25mm Hughes Chain Gun or the Milan ATGW system. Secondary armament consists of one 7 •62mm GPMG (general-purpose machine gun). Like the Scorpion series, the Fox is constructed w ith aluminium armour and employs the same Jaguar 4-2 litre engine. It weighs 6386kg (14.0801b). has a maximum speed of 105km/h(65mph). and is capable of operating w ithin a temperature variation of -25°C to +50T (-1 3"F to + I22°F). The vehicle was designed with airportability in mind and three can be carried aboard a C- 30 Hercules transport. After World War 11 the US Army continued to use the six-wheeled M8, armed with a 37mm gun and co-axial machine gun, until the early 1950s: used by the French, it saw much action in Vietnam. The US then lost interest in armoured cars, their duties being carried out by light tanks or small armed but unarmoured wheeled vehicles with a good cross1
—
"
I
—
armoured personnel carrier. The Commando can be fitted w ith a variety of turrets and weapon systems to suit Its user's requirements -reconnaissance, convoy escort, internal security, and soon, it is powered by a Chrysler 36 engine producing 200 bhp and has a top
M ruA adapted to carry the Milan
Training, v^enire.
ATGW. Above: The US M8 armoured car, made by the Ford Motor Company.
1
1945
.
KI;Y
\\
I
.
Al'ONS speed
XXkni h
ol
(.'S.'Sniph);
ben.
prepaialiun.
it
can also
s
piMpdlccI In i1r
ad ot J
its
own US
suth the
with the
uiiar
V I'Ml icet of BA i^t and it was 20 \ears later that the ie\i Russian despjiiappeared, his u as the aiiipiiihu i^BlR i()P.
\U
nut
id
llie
iiniil
,
t
l
ahiiosi
1
i
HRDM-
later redesi.jnated the (il
able w heels
control
in
on
en!.'a;jed s\
it
;
eonu
dillieult yoiniz, a eeiitral
stem, and
a sini:le
afloat
ins a
p^ IIS
the eentre o\ the ehassis
uhen
lor use \
1
iiiteiestinL' leatLires. iiieludiiiL:
(it
t\
h\dro|et propulsion unit
Se\cral t\pes ha\e been de-
.
7-62mm
uiih mountiii'js tor Snapper.
\:un. others
.Swatter and Sai:;jer
ivlract-
re-pressure
eloped, the standard model mountinij a
machine
lumiber
u hidi can be
AKiWs
The
BRUM-
1
has a
nia\muini speed o| SDkm h (.^(Imphi and a ereu of between two and Inc. depending on t_\pe. hi the early IMNis a replacement tor the BRDNI-I entered ser\ice.theBRI).\l-:ialsoknou n astheBTR-40 P2). It a more pouei lul eiiijine and a turret. Otherwise, it IS almost identical to the BRDM\\ hen the W est German Bundesu ehr u as ormed it was lorcedto relv exclusivelv on imported cquijiment tor se\ eral years before its o\\ n desiijns w ere ready to take the tield. \\ hen the\ did. se\eral ot them were comparable in appearance and concept to AfA s u ith which the German .Arms had ended World War II has
1
i
although, ot course, there was a marked improvement his w as especially true in the case ot in pertormance. amphibious Spahpan/er Luchs (l.vnx). which appeared in 915 and has a similar suspension to the I
the
\
SdKfz 234 armoured car series w Inch w as in turn descended from the original ARW -MIW. The Luchs weighs 14..S0()kg (4:.0g(l|b). IS manned b\ acrewof tour, and is dn\en h\ two large propellers when afloat. It IS armed with one 20mm cannon and a 7-h2mm machine gun in a ground air nuninting. the old
.
turret being designed b\ Rheinmetall. Despite its size and weight, the xehicle is remarkabK quiet on the mo\e. a most important consideration during recon-
The
\ar
I
rench
I
1
tor a
Army
w hile
Top left; The Commando V-150. Centre left: The
Commando Scout. Left: The Commando V-300. The Commando series of vehicles has proved to be
very popular with countries that wantan inexpensive
and flexible AFV on limited budget.
service with,
It
a
is in
among
others, the armies of Bolivia, Malaysia,
and Saudi Arabia
Turkey
tound itselt in a similar on [British and Amer-
relied
ARMOURED CARS ican
wheeled
own
a'>
iiad
AF\
s
and
sur\i\ed
in
sueli
pre-war designs
ot
its
hranee's eoliMiial territories,
the latter inekidin^: the rear-eiiL'iiied lour-u heel dri\ e
TS, uhidi dated In mi 1^)35 but whieh was iu~-tl\ re;-:aided as hem- adxaneed in its the period u as the da\ Another leinarkahle desi-n on whieh eight-wheel iln\e Panhard Model 2(11 Panhard Model
.
.|
.
.
work eonimeiieed m \')^^~ \i\ P'4(i a prototype existed: th;v was shipped to faeneh \oilh Atrica to pre\ent itseapture. and the plans were destroyed. The caritsell was lost m the Sahara bLit in 1M4.'> the ideas eontained in its design were re\i\ed in the Panhard .Model :i:. w hidi is betterknown as the EBR Engin Production of this symBlinde de Keeonnaissaiiee nietrieal design began in \^>?i). The vehicle can be driven tioni ideiiiieal posUhms at either end. and is powered b\ a l2-e\linder horizontally opposed Paniiaid 12 11 Ni(H) engine which is only 220mm housed under the floor of the (S-5ini high aiiel lighting eonipartmi it. The front and rear wheels are ntional pneumatic rubber tyres, but htted with eonxent
active service during the
e large metal discs, heavily flanged the centre tour are
AFC
(
i.
i
:riHisers. and can be raised when and with deep gn .ed roads Parly marks were armed rtinning on suitaee
with
a
~snini ^^in. II. niosi
same osullalmtank. but the
w
ith
Thi
\
a '^'Onini
|I
I
ele
-
eonimonlv mounted
Ml tunei as the
was up-gunned
n liring Im-stabilised
led
bO
a
AMX13
in the
light
in the late 196()s
ammunition,
maximum
speed
l()5km h (65mph).
ot
war
in
it
saw much
Algeria, as did an
EBT-ETT. The French
now producing a replacement for the Panhard EBR known as the AMX-IORC which uses manv of the same version, the
components
are
AMX-lOP mechanised infantrv weighs L5.000kg(33.()751b). hasa
as the
ctMiibat vehicle,
it
top speed ot X.'ikm/h (.^3mph) and
is
armed with
Above; The Spahpanzer Luchs demonstrates its wintertime cross-country performance. The crew comprises two drivers (one at the front, the other at the rear), a
commander and a
gunner.
a
lO.SmmMECAgun. Ihe French experience
crew of four and has a
Above
left:
m
APjena
led to the de-
The Panhard
AML with the H-90 turret. It
also
comes in three
variants with a
60mm 30mm
mortar, one with a
cannon, plus AAand anti-tank versions. right: in
Above EBR is
This Panhard
service with the
Moroccan Army; the EBR has steering on the front and rearwheels.
Left:
ABRDM-2onan A BRDM-l
exercise. Right:
withaPT76inthe background. The Soviet Army does not expect its reconnaissance units to fight
and therefore
provides them with small, lightly-armed and fast vehicles that try to avoid
combat.
PW7
KE^'
Be ow: Eland Mk 5s of the Soutr African Army in Nan^'biB. Boron^: A Brazilian E'^gesa Cascavel;
can be f ined with the French H-90 turret shown here O' other armaments. it
.:
U EAPONS \elopmentot the Auto-Mitrailleuse Legere. or AML Panhard Model 245. This lightarmouredcar is similar Bntish Ferret, with which it has competed ver> successfully in the arms markets of the world since 1961. With such sales potential in mind. Panhard have de\ eloped a variety of turrets and armament.s to to the
suit
their
customers"
needs,
includine
versions
, .
.
mounting a 90mm gun. a 60mm mortar. .^On.: automatic cannon and se\eral .ATGWs: a licence to produce the .A.ML has been granted to the South African compan\ Sandock-Austal Ltd \^ hich uses the name Eland for the vehicle. The ba^ic .AML v^eiiir5500kg 12.1251b). has a crew of three and a m^ imum speed of 100km h (62mphi: it is air-porta" and can be lifted by the larger helicopters. T.--.. .Argentine .Army shipped a squadron of 90mm .A.ML (
_
.Model
Cs
to the Falkland Islands
dunng
the 19>*:
conflict but these did not operate outside Port StaniL
and took linle or no part in the fighting. Other nations, including Belgium and Brazil, ha also produced theirow n armoured cars, but these tc to be variations on existing themes or designed soi
_
for internal security duties. In general, since 194.^
has been the formercolonial pow ers
« hich have m^ counu
the greatest use of the anrjoured car. in the
insurgency role where the use of tanks would ha
.
been uneconomic, if not undesirable. In this area, .r armoured car has a marked advantage over track^^ .AFA's of every kind since it denies the insurgents :r propaganda coup of claiming that the security for^>are using tanks' and therefore excessive force agai r the population - an important consideration of w h . the Soviet Union has failed to take adequate accouin its handling of disturbances among its allies. In r light. it is easy to understand w hy the armoured . has proved to be such a valued tool in the hand^ successive UN peacekeeping missions. .Again. be;r.cheaper to bu\ and maintain than tanks, armoured cars are the ideal .AF\"s for Third World nations w ith strictly limited defence budgets. .As to their use in any major conflict, they now possess greater mobility and firepower than e\er before, but the extent of their involvement will depend upon the nature of the ^
.
:
'
I
ji
The fall The
Iranian revolution
1978-79 The stroneinan o\' Iran and master of the mightiest mihtaiA maehine in the Gull leiiion. Shah Mohammed Re/a Pahlavi. owed his Peaeock throne twice
The
over to foreign inter\ention.
Inst time
ua^
1941 u hen British and So\ let troops had entered todeposehispro-A\istalher.Re/a.ShahPahla\i, .
li
I
in
an
he
second oeeasion was m P-^^.V when the Shall ujreturned to the throne lie had hastiK lied b\ .m American-inspired coup, which ousted his cnem\ the nationalist Iranian
Mossadegh. In the w ake
prime minister. DrMohamiik
ot the e\ ents ol
1
>
4S.v the badl\ shaken
to his omnipiesent seeiet SAVAK iSa/eman Htelaat \a Amiiiat Keshvar- State Seeuritx and Inloi niation Organisation which ruthlessK suppressed all open opposition, and pursued the Shah's enemies abroad as well as at home. By the late IM7()s. it was estimated that SAVAK empkned at least :(i,(i(i() people and controlled a network ot o\er iSO.OllO mtormers and which included the spies. SAV.-XK's methods, routine use iit torture and executions, gamed the Shah an unsa\(Uir\ reputation, and proxoked worldwide protests at Iranian human-rights \ lolations. Reforms introduced b\ the Shah m '-Ih including land reform, female emancipation and the secularisation of the state were designed lo promote the modernisation of Iran, and ceilainly helped impel the country into the 2()th centurx But at the same time,
Shah turned inereasingl_\
police.
i.
I
I
.
.
this
"White Revolution" alienated the powertui .Mus-
lim clergy,
who
not onl\
lost their
own
e.\tensi\c
denounced the reforms as The most pnMiiinent of these Muslim was the ,A\atollah Ruhallah Khomeini,
landholdings. but also anti-lslamic. traditionalists
who used his position as a respected teacher of Islamic theology as a propaganda plattorm against the Shah. The clash between the clergx and the Shah reached a
peak
in
196.'^.
when
the storming of
Qom
Khomeini 's
Guards trigand demonstrations. Khomeini was arrested and man\ demonstrators killed; the Shah denounced w hat he called an ailiaiice ot 'black reactionaries' (the .Muslim clerg\ and 'dark red forces" (the communist Tudeh Pan\ Khomeini continued actively to oppose the Shah alter his release in March 1964. but failed to mobilise mass support and became increasingly isolated. By November 1964. the Shah felt strong enough to order Khomeini's expulsion from Iran. After a brief period in Turkc\ Khomeini settled in Iraq, where he spent the tollow ing 4 \ cars as a political exile, denouncing the Shah and all hisv\orks, A second source of opposition to the Shah emerged
theological school in
gered off widespread
b\ Imperial
riots
)
).
.
1
in
\965., uith
the
foundation of the Sazeman-c-
Mujahidm-e-Khalq-e-lran Organisation
ol Iran)
by
Mujahidin group of left-wing
(People's
a small
Muslim graduates of Tehran University. Several had 1
949
.
%3 pro-Khomeini demonstrations,
taken part
in the
but later
moved beyond Khomeini's
I
conservative
comMarxism and the example of Third liberation movements. The Mujahi-
traditionalism to a radicalism derived from a bi
nation of Islam.
\N\)i Id
national
din soon developed close links with the Palestine
Liberation Organisation, in
whose camps
thc\
re-
ceived their first military training, and by 1971 thc\ were beginning to lay the foundations for an urban
movement. Their
guerrilla
the assassination of a senior er
operations included
first
American
military advis-
and of the Tehran chief of pol ice
target for
SAVAK.
and by
late
1
the I
number one
the eniiiv lead-
- b\ Ma\ 1972 thc\ had all been either executed or tortured to death. The blow was severe, but the Mujahidin simply went deeper underground, rebuilding their shattered organisation and gradually learning the dangerous lessons of urban guerrilla warfare. As the Mujahidin organisation grew it began to cooperate with the Marxist Fedayeen-e-Khalq in a series of terrorist operations aimed at showing that resistance to the Shah was possible, and that SAVAK v\as not nn incible. Both the Mujahidin and Feda\ een u ere able to tap the growing reservoir of discontent with the Shah's new Iran which was widespread not only among the urban poor and the growing working class, but also among the affluent and socially privileged middle class which was itself largely a product of the Shah's programme of modernisation. The corruption and ostentation of the Shah's c(»ui-t contrasted dramatical-
ership had been captured
ly
with the condition
ol the laiijc iiLimbeis ul iiiicin-
ployed urban poor, w ho had been draw n to the shant\ towns, such as those v\hich surrounded cliran. b\ the lure of work and a share in the prospcntN ol an increasingly remote and Westernised sociei\ Iscir 1
I
disilkisionnient expandiiii' i
concentiai.
w III
h.
I
.111
' I
I
,
:!
lull
iir
;
l-,
,.
Ill
the
Ml pp.
iri
all\ and arms supUnited States, after the election of .limm\
increasingly from her main
Caller to the
saw Iran as
liberalisation ol the Iranian
regime
W
hite
a test
loreign polie\
House
m
1976, President Cailer
which he hoped
to
tor the
initKile
United Slates. American pressure did persuade the to introduce a number ol liberalisini: measures,
including the announcement ol tiee elections to be held
in
'Ihe
the
wa\e ot protests which became cau,:^ht in the a
aijainst
the regime,
classic
dilemma of
modernismi: autocracies, which tind that each step towards hberalis.ition is seen as a sign of weakness, and each leasseriion ot aullioritv as a provocation to new protests and opposition. Ihe trigger for the protests was a go\ ernment-mspireil press attack on the A \ atoll all Khomeini w hicli appeared on 7 Januars I97n' Ihe attack lollowed shorth alter the m\steriousdeatlioi the \\ atolhili's eldest son. w hichman> attributed to SAN .\K. and led to demonstrations in Ihe religious venire ot Qom which were tired on b> troops, causing mam deaths. Ihe 4()-da\^ iiiourninij period laid down bv the Shi'ite religion was w ideK observed, and its end was marked bv a renewed round ot demoiisiiations .md ishcs bet we n im irit\ and ^ In .rs were either killed or labri/ r Kill del eenia-edciowd.ittacksMiibolsol the W ester1
o loiisiiucI
I
his aiili-
ispecl ol Ihe opposition
Shah V messages In
ikh weie being
tlisiribuleil
oiiiiti V
to the
I
\
..isselte le.oidiiigsol
.
calling:
illi'cillv
on the
swept
Iran during the winter of
power of the
Shah turned to ashes. Left-wing and fundamentalist opponents of the Shah united in huge mass demonstrations
which
summer ot 1979
American-inspired liberalisation, however,
unleashed
Previous page: Asthefires of Islamic revolution
1978-79, the
case lor the luinian-riLjhts orientated
Shah
oiiisulc ot the elite, but
ilkiialcil opiiihin h\ the brutalilN ol his
1
19.50
m
:
:
!
ot
and iiKliisiiial ilic pouci which lemaincd m iIk- hands ot ihe Shah,
.i.liiiiiiivtiative
!
middlecla
with the desiiv
ciMiibinetl
'
came
plier, the
The organisation quickly became
led to
bloody
confrontations with the Iranian
Army. Above:
A
first such clash Tehran on 4 September 1978. Top: The Jaleh Square massacre on the following day led to the deaths of 500 demonstrators and convinced many of the need to overthrow the Shah.
victim ofthe in
Top
right:
The austere
figure of the Ayatollah
Khomeini became the symbol of the
universal
opposition to the Shah.
The Shah responded by employing Right:
troops against unarmed demonstrators, but the willingness of many to accept martyrdom only demoralised the army and hastened the final collapse ofthe regime.
IRAN
faithful to rise
up against the Shah as
1978-79
their rehgious
duty.
The depths of the latent distrust and hatred which existed towards the Shah were most clearly illustrated after an arson attack upon the crowded Rex cinema in Abadan on 19 August 1978, during which some 600 people were burned to death. Although subsequent evidence pointed strongly to the responsibility of Islamic fundamentalists,
fanatical
many
Iranians
accepted without question the allegation that the attack
had been carried out by the Shah's agents
in
The Rex killings new wave of attacks on banks and cinemas, and protest demonstrations took on the character of
order to discredit the opposition. initiated a
fanatical confrontations with the security forces,
yielding
its
own
repeated 40-day
each
crop of martyrs, and the continually mourning periods were transformed
and propaganda, resultwhich the security forces
into a process of organisation
ing in ever larger protests
were increasingly powerless to prevent.
Demonstrations and death The
first mass demonstrations to be held in Tehran took place on 4 September 1978. when over 100.000 people took to the streets in an unprecedented chal-
lenge to the Shah. The government reacted by banall demonstrations, but was unable to prevent a second march on 7 September. The regime responded by placing the capital under martial law. and soldiers were ordered to shoot to kill.
ning
The following day. however, demonstrators again assembled in the Jaleh Square in south Tehran. The Tehran correspondent of the French newspaper Le Figaro described what followed, as the soldiers opened lire: "This is not a tight: this is a massacre. .A firing squad at work. The street one minute beforehand darkened with people, is strewn with bodies, shoes. luimpelled banners, the
wounded
eravKluiL'
towaide.idioiher.struL'L'liiiLM(.ie;telie;ieh(.thei
estimated sdOdeiiioiistiators had been sl;iu-lileivd
was
a turning point that
marked
An li
the liaiisition troiii
protest loie\okition.
Tehian nixersity. which reopened towards the end of Seplenilvr. became the organisational centre I
tor revoUuionaiA activity
.
and the virtually open base I9.'S|
of ihc Muiahidin
aiul
I
cclasci
onl\ hcl|x-d oii^aiiisc iL-iinMisl but also tiaiiicd McctiriLis,
^-v
people
iiuiii\
hihiiuuis aikl
i
HllMl
llic ]
Ol'
propaL\,i;Ja
into a blaiaiu
.
Ii.ilk-i
a iall\
LiniN
siiiik'iilv
sit\
llio
n
Noxciiihci (.'I
lianshuniL'd the unisciMlN
\\\M>
.a
Sliah
('^
Sllall\ kilk'd a
aul
naluMi\\
al
appointed as
aullionlN
1.
( )ii
4
sjiool aikl In
imils
Ml
llic
tkailOllvllMliMs
U-hiaii uiliicvscd Ihc
ikk-d .>ka
s
Miii.i
alLKki.\l
.
1^
aJ Ik
a lialt-hcartcd l;cs|uiv lo lllvIall^all^l^.
was removed from
ottice. and the Iranian lIikI oi General Azhari. took his plaee leliiaii I Diwas occupied b\ troops and control ol tlic campus became a ke\ issue in what uas iapkll\ becomniL; an aikoLii stiiiL:>jle lor power between the staff.
versity
Shah and the loose op]iosition eoalilion tliat laii^^ed from Islamic fundamentalists lo\al to A\aiollal] Khomeini, through moderate liberals ol ihe Naiion.il Front, to the more radical Mujuhidm and the pioMoscow ccMnmunists of the Tudeh Pari\ While a group ol lecturers occupied classrooms at the iini\eisit\. students staged a sit-in at the Ministr\
o\
Education Ironi 23 December, which escalated to massi\e demonstrations involving over 400.000 w hen troops shot and killed one of the student protesters on 26 December.
The flight of the Shah The martial law regime appeared increasing!) desperate as the various strands of the opposition united
behind the austere and intransigent tigure ot A\atollah Khomeini, now based in Pans. Isolated incidents of fraternisation between troops and demonstrators began to be reponed. and anti-Shah slogans were
chanted nightly from the roottops m a constant provocation to the arnn patrols in the streets below. General Azhari w ho had suffered a heait attack late in December, was replaced as prime minister b\ tormer opposition National Front politician Shapur Bakhtiar on 29 December, but the situation had alread> deteriorated far beyond cosmetic cabinet changes. On 13 January 1979. demonstrators marched on the occupied universit\ and took it o\er as the 'Central Fort of the Re\olution". Three da>s later the Shah and .
by
his wife left Iran
air forthe hnal exile.
Within hours the news of the Shah's departure had reached the streets of the capital, w here hundreds of thousands demonstrated their joy and relief. The Bakhtiar go\ ernment continued to oppose change b\ armed force. howe\er. and the runwa\ ol lehran airport was blocked b\ arnn tanks m order to prevent kehruar\ the much heralded return otkhonieini. B\ the lllll\^a\ harriers had been remo\ed. however, and the \>aloilah landed to the rapturous reception ot tlie people ol lehran. who lined the route of his triumphant eiur\ into the ca]iital m their nulhons. sted in Iran: that o authi isolated person o the Shah, repre^ ented f the I
I
Hakiitiai
lom
rsh.p
Ba/argan as
last
most
A\atollai
The uprising which sealed regime was
set in
motion
b_\
the fate ot the Shah's
events w hich occurred
al
an Iranian .Air Force base at Farahabad, in souih Tehran. A filmed report ol the an i\ al ol Khomeini in Tehran being shown on television was greeted bv a groupof airforce teehnKiaiis and cadets w ith chanted sloL'ans in support ol the \vatollah. Imperial Citiaids
uluhoapi^MntedMehdi
come
to
then
aid,
.iiid
lighting
part lo>al to the
A
final
f
agents of SAVAK, the Shah's hated secret police.
Above centre: The of
arrival
Khomeini at Tehran on 1 February 1979 welcome.
airport
to a rapturous
lx\ame genenil
throughout lehran as the revolutionaries cut ofl
units ol
the
moved
to
Imperial (iuards which were
nun ing to the support ol their comrades. The insurgents, armed with light automatic weapons and molotov cocktails, laced the t.mks ol the Iranian Armv btit the morale ol the L^overnment m>ops had alreadv been weakened bv the months of coni rontation with lanalieal unarmet.1 demoiisiratois
js remair Shah, how e\ :r.andtoi
he
Above: Left-wing guerrillas and armed supporters of the Ayatollah round up
loval to the Shah who were present attacked the airmen and laid siege lo them m their barracks .News ol the fighting al Farahabad spread lapidlv throughout the capital, and the airmen appealed lor help against the Imperial (iuards. .Armed .Muiahidin and Fedaveen rushed to the seene ol the lighlmg. and took up [-losnions to the rear ol the Imperial (iuards whosLiddenlv lound themselves under attack Horn all sides. Ihe airmen distributed weapons Iroiii iheir armoLirv to the large nunibeis ol civilians who had
.
barrier to a peaceful traiisuion.
1952
ot
prii 1
the
lat
the nr
resolution appeared ine\ itable.
w ho had welcomed martv idom in the light .igamsi the Shah. Resistance began lo crumble, and bv ebruI
I
l
Top
right:
The bodies
of
Iranian generals,
supporters of the Shah,
bythe firing squads thenewlslamic The Shah on 16 January 1979. Aftertaking refugem
killed
of
Republic. Right: flees Iran
a
number of countries,
including the United States, he finally died of
cancer 1980,
in
Egypt
in
July
.
IRAN
1978-79
und had begun to attack SA\ AK buildings, police stations and the capital's tive main militan bases. News of the insurrection had alread\ spread to the rest of Iran and fighting broke out
major cities. Late on
in ail
the counlr\"s
Februar\ the tall of Tehran to u as announced on radit) and tele\ ision of the Shah uas at an end. 1
1
the insurgents
The rule The triumphant Islamic re\okilion now turned to the grim business of \isiting ivtnbLiiuui upon the
who had been icsponMble tor propping up the Imperial regime an'd tor the blood\ suppression of opposition. Cieneral after general senior arm_\ officers
faced firing squads of the new Rev olutionar\ Guards w ho had taken o\ er responMbilit> tor sccLirit\ Lo\ al Asatollah Khomeini. the> were distinct from the guerrilla groups w hich had pia\ed such an acti\c part in the fighting, and pnn idedthc Mamie undamentalists w ith the means to impose their stamp on Iran. Divisions withm the anti-Shah coalition soon began to re-emerge when the Shah himself had been removed from power, i'hough the 1 udeh Pai1\ con.
to
f
tinued
support
to
the
violentl> nationalistic
public established
conser\ali\e
sociallx
but
and anti-\\ cstcrn Maiiiic Rew akc of the re\olution until
m the
i
the Muslim uni.lamcntalists thcmscK cs turned ini the communists and dcstro\ed thcmi. conllict with the Mujahidinand w ith Iran's \ arious national minorities soon exploded into open warfare. Ihc .Mujahidin. driv^;n once more underground, resorted lo terrorist l
tactics
m
a
\
iolent struggle
o\er the course
of the
Iranian revolution,
w hile national minorities, such as vvho had pla\ed an active part in the struggle against the Shah, found that their hopes of
the Kurds,
cquahlN and scll-deteniiination were to be shattered against thi'cvcn of Iran's
more aggressiv c Persian chau\ inisiii nc« Mamie rulers. The 974 rev okition had 1
substituted
autocracv
.1
dictatorship of
the
.Mullahs for the
Shah - a dictatorship w hich in man> respects was even more brutal than that w hich it had '^Pl^'-'^'«^l
ol ihe
Walter Hoffmann 195,^
.
.
.
Chronology 1976-80 EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA
killed
December United States announces resumption of
13
1976 January 5 Northern Ireland Ten Protestant textile workers by
terrorist
sroup
at
United Slates and Soviet Union
23
SALT talks end
I
v.i.iioii
loader L lrikc
Mcmhcit toLinddcadin hci .cll 28 United States e^Hieiiidcs iixmi\ v\ iih Soviet L'n;on on the control ot iinderyround nuelear explosions for non-militar\- purposes.
July 21 Eire British ambassador Christopher Ewart-Briggs assassinated.
Penh and ,
1979
set
up government under Heng Samrin
Fejijruary
March
1
22 Netherlands British ambassador assassinated b\ IRA. 30 Britain Airey Neave MP assassinated by INLA
Vietnam Chinese troops invade
7
MetnamSoN
23
litary
the northern
supplies aidifted to the
May 4 Britain Margaret Thatcher becomes first woman prime minister. 18 United States and Soviet Union Presidents Carter and Brezhnev sign SALT II treaty in Vienna.
November 1
Kampuchea.
Kampuchea Vietnamese troops occupy Phnom
7
West Germany Red Aiiin
into
1979 January
Whitccross. Armaiih.
May 9
December Vietnam sends troops
27
dipKuiuilK ieLinons\Mth China.
United States Jimmy Carter elected president.
5
ietnam Long San abandoned to Chinese forces
\
after herce lighting.
6
20
Vietnam Chinese begin withdrawal from Vietnam. N'ietnam Chinese w ithdrawal completed.
August
1977 January Northern Ireland Secretary of State Roy Mason 12
27 Ireland Eari Mountbatten killed by terrorist bomb at Mullaghmore in the Irish Republic; 8 British paras killed by terrorist bombs at Warrenpoint in Northern
announces the "Way Ahead" policy - 'Ulsterisation'
Ireland.
May
December Soviet Union
11
talks in
and United States begin SALT
II
Geneva.
1
6
SOUTH ASIA
Netherlands Dutch parliament
rejects
Nato plan
for stationing of cruise missiles in the Netherlands.
Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev becomes president as well as general secretary of Communist
16
Nato approves
12
stationing of 572 missiles in
Europe.
Nato agrees to a 3 per cent annual
rise in
Seychelles gains independence remaining .
1977
1980
Netherlands South Moluccan terrorists seize in train and school.
hostages
June
January
.\pril
United States President Carter recalls US 1 ambassador from Moscow following Soviet invasion
June
Pakistan Martial law imposed
21
Seychelles President
of Afghanistan. April
5
United States President Carter announces cancellation of B- bomber programme. July 7 United States President Carter reveals neutron
28 Europe European Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (END) founded. 30 Britain Iranian embassy seized by terrorists.
July 4 Pakistan
bomb in production.
4
Netherlands Dutch Marines and police release
1 1
hostages from South Moluccans.
30
1
September 5 West Germany
Industrialist
Dr Hanns-Martin
Yugoslavia President Tito dies
5 Britain SAS commandos storm Iranian embassy and release hostages. 19 Britain Government announces intention to deploy cruise missiles at Greenham Common and Molesworth.
prisoners.
West Germany GSG9 anti-terrorist squad
18
successfully assaults hijacked aircraft at Mogadishu. Three Baader-Meinhof leaders, including Andreas Baader. found dead in their cells. 19 West Germany Kidnapped industrialist Dr Schleyer found dead.
September 12 Turkey Demirel government overthrow n in military coup led by General Kenan Evren. October 24 Poland Independent trade union organisation Solidarity' recognised by government.
November 4
United States Ronald Reagan elected president
November 2
Soviet
Union President Brezhnev
1976 June
Britain Representative of PLO
in
London Said
February 17 Northern Ireland restaurant kills
1
24 30
Vietnam
1979 July Sri
Lanka State of emergencv
17
Bangkok headquarters
November 21
Pakistan
US embassy
in
Januar> 1
Afi-hanisian So\
ici
loiee of
October 20 Thailand Military coup.
16 Italy Aide Moro, five times prime minister, kidnapped by Red Brigades. Italy Body of Aldo Moro found. September
15
Britain Baader-Meinhof terrorist Astrid Proll
iirrcstcd in
London.
Islamabad burnt down.
December
1980 ai
May 9
response to Tamil
.Afghanistan Taraki ousted b\ Hatizullah Amin.
bomb at La Mon
2.
March
in
revolt.
September
to take his place.
officially reunified.
Thailand South East Asian Treaty Org;
(Seato) closes Fire
1978 April 27 .Afghanistan Daoud government overthrown in coup; Noor Mohammed Taraki conies to pow er at head
Afghanistan Soviet aircraft deliver combat troops to Kabul airport as five divisions mass on frontier. 27 .Afghanistan .Amin killed in Soviet assault on presidential palace. Babrak Kaniial How n in b\ Soviets
SOUTHEAST ASIA 1978 January
Hammami assassinated.
in
takeover under General Zia
24
offers to halt
nuclear testing.
4
Army
ul-Haq.
after long illness.
October
West Germany Lufthansa flight hijacked to
major cities.
May
June
Mogadishu, Somalia, by West German and Palestinian terrorists, demanding release of Baader-Meinhof
in
Mancham overthrown
bloodless coup.
Schleyer kidnapped by Baader-Meinhof group. 13
in
defence
spending.
23
29
Commonwealth.
Party.
17
1976 June
EAST ASIA
1978
1976
November 3
Vietnam and Soviet Union
Friendship
sicn a Treat v of
September 9 China Death
ot
Mao Tse
some 60,000 men
in
.
.
.
.
..
.
.
.
.
CHRONOLOGY March
1978 May China and Sov iet 11 Ussuri River.
Union Troops clash on
the
31
June S China halts aid to Vietnam. August China and Japan sign treaty of peace and 12
15
26 Egypt and Israel sign peace Washington.
Malta
MPLA in effective control of the country
April Iran declared an Islamic Republic. 1
23
United States Ex-Shah of Iran flown
to
New York
1979
Iran Students occupy the
US embassy and take the
staff hostage.
14
Iran United States freezes
all
Iranian assets.
begins official visit to the United States.
October 26 South Korea President Park assassinated.
Israel
16 South .Africa Rioting in black township of Soweto, Johannesburg. July 3-4 Uganda Israeli airborne troops rescue hostages from Entebbe airport.
February
their border.
September
July 3-4 Israel mounts a successful rescue mission to Entebbe, Uganda, where Israeli passengers on a hijacked Air France flight are being held hostage by
West German and Palestinian
4 Iran attacks Iraqi border villages in escalation of border clashes. 22 Iran Start of Gulf War as Iraq invades Iran. 23-25 Iran and Iraq launch crippling air strikes against each others' oil rehning installations
October 13 Iran Khorramshar besieged by land.
terrorists.
November 15 Lebanon Syrian troops enter Beirut
falls to Iraqi forces;
Abadan
fighting subsides.
1977 Libya and Egypt engage
21
in
22
Israeli
Knesset
in
Egypt addresses the
the
Trinidad and Tobago gain independer Commonwealth.
the south of the country
Lebanon
(
Operation Litani
)
UN peacekeeping force (UNIFIL)
13
Lebanon
withdraw from south
North Yemen President Ghashmi assassinated. South Yemen President Rubayi Ali deposed and executed by pro-Soviet opponents September 5-17 Egypt and Israel Camp David summit during which Prime Minister Begin. President Sadat and President Carter devise a 'framework for peace" 8 Iran Martial law declared in Tehran and 1 1 other 24 26
cities after
widespread demonstrations against the
Shah.
28
Israel
The Knesset approves the Camp David
agreement.
October 27 Egypt and
Israel Begin and Sadat
awarded Nobel
Honduras Military coup. September 1 1 Nicaragua Martial law imposed through much of 7
in the
Ogaden.
withdrawal from
July 10 Mauritania Coup brings Lieutenant-Colonel Salek to power. 30 Mozambique South African troops attack guerrilla bases.
August Namibia
on government of General Somoza.
30
November
SWAPO.
24
UN plan for Namibia accepted by
rejected
by South Africa.
Bolivia Military coup.
1979 April
Uganda Kampala occupied by force of Tanzanian Ugandan exiles; Amin overthrown.
1 1
4 El Salvador Guerrillas seize French and Costa Rican embassies. 17 Nicaragua President Somoza flees to the United
troops and
June 4
Ghana Flight-Lieutenant Rawlings takes power in
States leaving Sandinistas in control of the country
military coup.
October 17 El Salvador Colonels martial law.
September 5 Rhodesia launches ground and Mozambique.
November
20
1
seize power,
impose
air attacks into
Central African Republic France overthrow s 'Emperor' Bokassa and installs David Dacko as
Bolivia Military coup.
president.
November
December
Egypt suspended from the Arab League
December 20 Lebanon
total
invasion.
August
Peace Prize.
3
9 Somalia announces Ethiopian territory.
Angola Major incursion by South African troops. Zaire Second invasionof Shaba from Angola. 12 18-25 Zaire French legionnaires paradrop into to rescue white hostages and defeat Shaba
the country as Sandinista guerrillas increase pressure Israeli forces
Ethiopia launches major offensive
March
Kolwezi
1978
despatched to the south Lebanon
November
1
Cyprus Egyptian commandos unsuccessfully storm a hijacked aircraft at Lamaca. 19
22
Jijiga.
May
1977
June
Ethiopia Somali forces capture
12
October 18 Somalia Rescue of Lufthansa flight hostages at Mogadishu by West German GSG9.
1978
August
forces into
Ogaden area of Ethiopia. September
7
February
March 14 Lebanon Large-scale thrust by Israeli
10 Zaire Shaba Province invaded by Katangese gendarmes from Angola. July 24 Somalia launches full-scale invasion of the
February
Jerusalem
1978
March
1976 1
Israel President Sadat of
24
SOUTH AMERICA border clashes
November
Ethiopia Lieutenant-Colonel Mengistu Haile seizes power in palace coup. Ethiopia United States halts arms supplies
Mariam
4 South Africa UN security council imposes mandatory arms embargo. 26 Ethiopia Soviet airlift of Cuban troops and weapons to aid Ethiopia in the Ogaden War.
of an Arab peace agreement to end the civil war;
July
.id (>i
1977 and Egypt reopen
9 Lebanon Israeli troops move in. 24-25 Iran US Delta Force carries out abortive attempt to free the embassy hostages in Tehran (Operation Eaele Claw). July 27 Egypt Death of ex-Shah of Iran.
1976
h.
imposes sanctions.
3
MIDDLE EAST
.
Mohammed,
1980 January 27
April
Nigeria General Murtala
June
November January 28 China Deputy prime minister Deng Hsiao-ping
13
March 3 Mozambique closes border with Rhodesia,
October
4
force finally driven
from nonhem Angola by MPLA/Cuban advance;
treaty in
Final withdrawal of British Navy.
for cancer treatment.
friendship.
Angola FNLA/mercenary
1976-80
24 Israel attacks Palestinian bases.
Rhodesia Treaty on preparations for 21 independence signed at Lancaster House in London.
March El Salvador Archbishop Rot
altar in
San Salvador.
1980 1979 January 16 Iran The Shah leaves the country in the face of mass demonstrations. February Iran The ,\> aiollah Khomeini returns from exile. 1 relentless
16
Iran Pro-Shah k-cncrals executed.
March 4
AFRICA
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe's ZANU
party wins overall majority in elections.
1976 February 9 Angola MPLA/Cuban "capital'. Nova l.isboa
18 forces capture
UNITA
Zimbabwe becomes independent state.
June 16-19
South Africa Serious
rioting in
Soweto.
1955
Left; Militant Islamic
students burn the
American of the
flag
on the roof
US embassy
in
Tehran, November 1980 The students seized the embassy and took 66 US citizens hostage,
demanding the
return of
the Shah to face a revolutionary tribunal.
The
Iranian
hostage crisis
On Sunday.
4 November 1979 some 400 militant Islamic students occupied the United States embassy in Tehran, capital of Iran, and took 66 American citizens hostage. Three more US officials on a visit to the Iranian Foreign Ministry were also taken prisoner. The occupation appears to have surprised not only the Americans - who had not long before abandoned on grounds of cost a plan to 'harden" the embassy
compound - but
also the revolutionary leaders them-
selves. Nevertheless.
AyatoUah Khomeini and
his
Islamic Republican Party (IRP) were quick to back the action of the students, seizing the opportunity that it presented to undermine the liberal allies in the
government headed by Prime Minister Bazargan and push forward their project of institutionalising the power of the Islamic clergy. Anti-American fervour, fomented by the revolutionary clergy, had run high in Iran since the flight of the Shah and the collapse of the hated Pahlavi regime in the preceding February. Indeed, on 14 February, only three days after the fall of the Pahlavi government, the American embassy had been briefly occupied by Fedayeen-e-Khalq guerrillas. Since the end of the first occupation the American diplomats had been protected" by a contingent of Revolutionary Guards w ho were, houcx cr. disa\ owed by the government. On 22 October the aiimi: fugitive Shah was admitted to the L'nited States to receive medical treatment, and this provided the militant students uith their immediate pretext for the sei/uie ot the hosta-jes hi return for freeing them, the stiulents Jemaiuled tliat the
US
return the "treacherous Sliah' to Iran to stand
rejecting any possibilit\ ol iieL^otiatioii, The US government had mauitaiiied lelatioiis uith Buzurgan"s government throughout tins pei iod m the hope that it would be able to survive the piessuresol Islaniie trial,
fundamentalism, but in the attei inatli ol the oeetipaBazargan resigned and the ke\ olutioiiar\ Coun-
tion
I
an alliance of islamic factions, took over the government. The new government confirmed that
cil,
they were not prepared to negotiate the release ol the hostages; in theory at least the students occupying the
embassy were acting independently. The Americans were therefore obliged to try to negotiate with the students through intermediaries. US President Jimmy Carter had publicly rejected any notion of military intervention to free the hostages (reduced in number to 53 in the embassy compound by the release of 3 people by 20 November) but w ith the American public clamouring for a solution to the crisis, and the 1980 presidential election on the horizon, it is hardly surprising that he did in fact consider the military option from the very beginning of the crisis. The US naval presence in the Gulf of Oman w as stepped up and a special unit. Delta Force, under Colonel Charlie Beckwith. was charged with developing a plan to retake the embassy by force. In 962 Charlie Beckwith, as ayoung captain in the Green Berets, had been posted to Britain for a year to train with the SAS. He had been impressed with their counter-insurgency methods and on his return he had begun a campaign for a similar Aniei lean unit to be set up. After seeing active service in Vietnam. Beekuith continued to press for an SAS-type unit to he set up with a counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist role, until finally in 977 he was given command ot a new detachment of Special Forces: the 1st Special Forces 1
1
1
Operational Detachment - Delta. When the crisis broke in November 1979 Beckwith was given a
chance
new toi ee. Beekwith s men had been trained
to test his
Althe)u>jh
assault buildiiiLis oeeupied In terrorists and live civ
lo i-
noneol thisti aining had anticipated the immense problems presented b\ the situation in Iran Insteadof operating on IrieiuiK territor\ Delta 1-oree would have to mo\e deep into the iraiuan interior lian hostages,
.
.
IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS
1980
A refuelling stop in the desert would have to arranged. At each stage of the planning of the operation -
Tehran.
^ de-named Ojjeration Eagle Claw - nq^ difficulties emerged, and each solution made the operation more complex. To make matters uorse. there was a shor-
tage of good intelligence
.
When the crisis broke, there
had been no .American agents in Iran except those who u ere attached to the embassy and v, ere now among the hostages.
An ex-CIA
agent,
code-named "Bob",
uas quickly briefed and inserted into Iran, followed by four more Department of Defense agents. But there w as no time to train them properly and none of them was able to speak the main local language Farsi Nevertheless the quality of intelligence began to improNe and Delta Force v\ere able to build up a .
Above: The Arrerican hostages were subject to intense psychological
pressure,
and were often and displayed
blindfolded
before television
cameras
and anti-American crowds.
And any solution to the logistical dit'ticulties uould have to presene the element of surprise - once American forces w ere detected in Iran there could be no mistaking their objecti\ e. Early suggestions that Delta Force should parachute into Tehran or drive there in trucks from Turke) were dismissed as unrealistic. Helicopters would
needed to evacuate the hostages once the embass) had been taken, and so it u as decided to use them on the way in. Navai carrier-based RH-53D Sea certainly be
Below: The occupied embassy became the focus for violent anti-American demonstrations which swept Iran in the wake of the Islamic revolution.
Stallion
helicopters
capability, piloted
with a long-range heavy-lift
by Marines, could be launched
from the Gulf of Oman, but despite their long range the>
\'.
ould be unable to co\ er the u hole di^^tance to
detailed picture of the buildings in the
embassy com-
pound. Not until late in the planning, however, was it discovered that all the hostages were being held in the Chanceller> building. The American agents were also able to supply details of the dispositions of the Revolutionar\ Guards. When Delta Force deplo\ ed to Egypt on 2 April 1980. after months of training, the 72-man team that had been agreed on in December had expanded to o\ er .30. plus a detachment of Rangers to secure an airfield for the withdrawal. In addition to the Sea Stallion helicopters, eight in number, the operation involved C- 30 transports, tankers and gunships. and tu o C- 4 Stariifters with fighter cover for the final 1
1
1
1
1
c\acuation.
Delta Force and De.seitOne" The plan for Eagle Claw called for the Delta Force assault team to be landed at Desert One", a desert road 320 km 200 miles southeast of Tehran, by three troop-carn. ing .VIC- 30s accompanied by three EC130 fuel tankers. Thirty minutes later they would be (
j
1
met by eight Sea Stallions launched from the carrier The assault force of 8 men and their equipment would be loaded onto the helicopters, and after the refuelling was complete Delta Force would be llown on to a hide-site near Tehran, arriving before sunrise. The helicopters were then to be mo\ed to a second site and concealed to aw ait the call to evacuate the Force and the rescued hostages. It w as agreed that unless at least six of the Sea Stallions w ere available the operation would not be viable and w ould have to
Simiiz.
1
1
be aborted.
.Meanw hile. Beckw ith and his men w ould be led by tw o of the Department of Defense agents to a
some 8km
(5 milesj
w adi
from the landing zone and spend
the day in hiding After sunset two of the agents w ould .
return
w ith tw o \ ehicles. Six drivers from Delta Force
would drive and return
to
Tehran, pick up six .Mercedes trucks
to the
w adi w hile Beckw ith
carried out a
reconnaissance. Finally. Delta Force would divide into separate elements anddri\ e to Tehran by separate routes.
Sometime after 2300 hours the leading contingent would drive up to the embassy and take out two guard-posts with silenced handguns.
Two
elements
of Delta. Red and Blue, follow ing close behind, w ere tasked to climb over the embassy w alls, secure different sections of the compound and free the hostages, killing any armed Iranians they encountered. .Meanw hile. White Element w as to secure the outside of the
embassN and co\ er the w ithdraw al The assault on the buildings in the compound would be signalled by a .
1957
IK \\l
\\
HUM
(
KIMS gigantic explosion as the wall of the
compound ua^
blown up. At approximately the same time a special Vnian assault team would attack the Foreign MinisI
builduig and free the hostages there. H\ new. the Sea Stallion helicopters wcjuld he liny i
tr\
V.
11^
1
assault
teams
to .\lan/ari\
eh
airlicld.
55km
(.^v"^
miles
i
lothe sduth. w here a contingent ot L S Rangers would be dctcnding a llighi ot C'-I41 Starlifters waiting
to
e\cr\onc out ol Iran. The plan was almost Linbelic\ ably complex, and \ctc\cr\one in\ol\cd thought that it could work. The gn-ahcad w as given and Delta Force was air-littedto the i-land ot .\lasirah in the Gulf of Oman on Thursda\ 24 .April, .At 1^311 hours, dressed in LevTs and black ticld lackcts. Delta Force boarded the C-l.^0 transports. An hour and a half later the first aircraft took ott and set its course for Desert One. The first stage of the operation w ent smoothly The aircraft successfulh eluded the Iranian ground radar system and the leading transport landed at Desert One: the Ranger Road Watch Team deployed and secured the flanks of the site and Delta Force moved into position. Then, unexpectedly, a large civilian Mercedes bus ani\ed along the road with its headlights blazing. Blue Flement surrounded it as Beckw ith fired a shot at one o\ its t\ res. The passengers were ordered off. searched and placed under guard. .As a second Ranger Uirce w as depk)\ ing to the w est of
airlitt
.
.
Desert One. another civ
dro\e up. Anti-tank
ilian
\
ehicle. a petrol tanker.
One of the Rangers tired an .\I72 Light Weapon, and the tanker burst into tlames
| j
| |
l'
.
.
IRANIAN HOSTAGE CRISIS
A
truck drove
Sikorsky RH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters on the deck of USS Nimitz prepare
driver
to take part in the
Team
Lett:
hazardous mission to free the
up behind
hours preparations were complete. The C-130 pilots
jumped out of his hla/ing vehicle, got into the uas dn\en oll at speed. The Road Watch
had started to gun theirengines when the first helicopter lifted off. As the wind gusted around, the !i. Iicopter banked to the left slid backwards and hit the C ~ M) vviih Blue Element on board, before bursting into flames. A huge conflagration ensued with flames reaching far into the sky and Redeye missiles exploding in all directions. Miraculously, all of Blue Element managed to disembark as the C- 30 caught fire. Eight men crewing the C-130 and the Sea Stallion were killed. Boarding the remaining aircraft. Delta Force swiftly abandoned Desert One. leaving five helicopters intact on the ground. The failure of the mission was a humiliation for the United States and especially for President Carter. When the Shah died in July 980 the immediate issue behind the hostage-taking was resolved, but the re-
truck, and
tailed to stop U.
The remaining
US hostages. Below
Delta
and
led the
/
/
in a collision
the time this collision took place-killing eight men-
had already abandoned the hostage rescue bid. Below right: The hostages, released as Delta Force
the result of a negotiated in
January
1981, returnedtoa hero's
welcome
in
were due
down
to wait
They
to arrive in
30
minutes. After an hour there
/ was still no sign of them and / it was-clear that Delta would / be unable to reach the hide-site / before first light, which was / due at 0530 hours. After an hour / and a half the first helicopter ar/ rived; five more appeared during / the next 30 minutes. The last two / never arrived at all. The helicopters / had encountered appalling dust / storms, which had caused the delay. / The two that failed to anive suffered / mechanical and electrical failures. / There was now no margin for error:
with a Sea Stallion at 'Desert One' inside Iran. By
settlement
Force deployed
settled
for the helicopters.
wreckage of a C-1 30 destroyed
and "fuel-birds"
arrived one by one and
rescue operation. Main picture: The burnt-out
the United
States.
/ with only six helicopters, the operation
/ depended on every one of them. Although the risk ot discovery was mounting every iiiinuic. Beckwith decided to continue. The Sea .Stallions were refuelled and loaded. Delta was ready to move out of Desert One. and then, with the operation already ninety minutes behind schedule. Beckwith was told that only five of the helicopters were flyable. Eagle Claw / was doomed and Beckwith ordered a withdrawal The withdrawal plan was for everyone to offload and rejoin the C-130 transports. The five Sea Stallions would then tly back to the Nimitz. At 0230 ,
1
.
trt>op-transports
Colonel Charlie Beckwith, Delta Force left:
commander, who
1980
and the tanker
the tanker
1
1
volutionary students announced further conditions.
They sought the return of the Shah' s assets Iran
and a
series of humiliating apologies
takings on the part of the that President Carter
in
the
US to
and under-
US government - conditions
was unable
to
meet
Nevertheless, the crisis was finally resolved by
agreement w as reached between the US and Iran in Algiers. The hostages returned to the United States, to a hero"s welcome. So not only had the 'military solution' proved a disastrous failure - it had in the final analysis proved unnecessary. It is, of course, impossible to say with certainty if the operation could possibly have succeeded, but a plan of such complexity inevitably risks failure. In the event, it was the use of helicopters - notoriously unreliable aircraft at any time - in desert terrain where they were all the more likely to fail, that resulted in a disaster that probably cost Jimmy Carter the presidency. Barry Smith negotiation in January
1
98
1 .
after an
.
The
.
idea of a quick-reaction military force, capable of
worldwide deployment, had first been suggested b\ Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara during the Kennedy administration. McNamara had drawn the essential lesson of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis that advantage in sub-nuclear superpower confrontations went to the side which could deploy a decisive local conventional military superiority. Such a capability would also help prevent an escalation of such conIt
tive
was not
the
until
1977. however,
when
President
Carter issued a directi\e (Presidential Direc-
No. 18 - PDI81 first
practical
Jomt Chiefs of Staff, that steps ucre taken to create such a
force. In the general
to the
mood
of post-X
ieinaiii
establishment of a unified operational command aimed at the dev elopment of a orce read_\ to respond f
H\ ents
US
in the
1\
Its
interests there
b_\
militar_\ force
if
absdkite-
necessar_\
On
March 1980. the headquaners of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) w as set up at McDill air force base. Tampa. Florida, in bunkers 1
previously occupied by the Strategic Air
Command
McDill was also the headquarters of the US Readiness to which the RDJTF was
The first commanderof the RDJTF w as
subordinated.
Lieutenanl-General Paul X. Kelley of the US Marine Corps, latertocommand the United States contingent in Beirut.
depress-
was much opposition to this initiative, and progress was at lirst slow. The rapid deterioration of relations w ith the So\ iet Union during the late 1970s and the Iranian revolution of January 1979. which overthrew the United States" closest and most important all) in the Gulf region, provided the context tor a more active application ofPD 18. howe\cr In August 1979 the Joint Chiefs produced proposals for the ion there
lo threats to
securitN of the Gulf,
defend
Command (REDCOM)
frontations to the nuclear level
Jimmy
1980 contained a clear commitment to the and indicated a US readiness to
Januar\
interests in the Gulf.
region proceeded apace. The seizure
U S embassy hostages in Tehran on 4 November 1979 created a mood of extreme hostilit\ to Iran which swept the L'nited States during the winter of
A unilied command At
first
the
RDJTF w as little more than a skeleton HQ.
but by 10 October 1981
separate task orce f
w
it
had been transformed into a command and control of
ith joint
forces designated to
it.
and on
1^)83 the
Januar\
1
RDJTF became a separate unified command. Know n US Central Command (CHNTCO.M theoreti-
as the call\
).
eqLial
commands,
in
status to the
had
it
was responsible Southwest .Asian
From
the
a
Huropean and Pacific HQ organisation and
M77-strong
lor all
operations
militar\
in
the
theatre.
beginning, the
RDJTF
faced special
I97y-S(). The Siuict inter\ention m .Afghanistan in December I'-^M. added to the anti-.-\merican h\ steria
it had to fulfil. The problem was how to transport a sufficient highK trained, well equipped men from the continental United States where the> were based to Southwest .Asiarapidl \ eiioLigh ttuoLinteranx local
of Khomeini's Iran, svemcd to pose a direct threat to
or e\ternal threat to stahiiit\.
of the
Western
oil
supplies from the
(
iliH
and
to the stabilit_\
pro-W cstem cdLinlnes there. Presinion message on 21 dent Caller's State of the antl security o\
I
dilficulties inherent in the task
essential
number
of
I
he sheer distances
ilie magnitude of would ha\e defeated ain other United States l.ogisties were the mam
in\()l\ed in such an enterprise ami the resources required
nation than the
)
limitatuin to operations,
and therefore occupied
a
ing fuel,
ammunition and vehicles. Supplies wcic locations m the Middle East, on the
RDJTF planning. US Fiscal Year 1983. the US Military Airlift Command MAC and Tactical AirComniand (TAC
held
had some 3 2 C- 30 Hercules. 234 C- 4 Starlifters. 70 C-5 Galaxies and 12 KC-10 Extenders, to which
Indian Ocean.
central position in In
)
(
1
could be added aircraft
1
1
1
some 109 cargo and 215 passenger
of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). it w as still onl\ possible to airlift 30 per
Nevertheless,
at secret
tenitory of triendK countries as well as on a
L'ntil
1
MPS
was
cent of the
1986. Each
unit, the
supplies for a highly mechanised Marine
the
Brigade.
RD.ITF"s sole quick-reactum paratroop 82nd .AirKirne Di\ ision. at any one time to Gulf region, and that only if stopover facilities were available at some friendly base along the way. would not be capable of The total pa\ load of the transporting the RDJTF-assigned 24th Infantry Division m less than five weeks, and once in action that diMsion would need 1000 tonnes of supplies every
MAC
da\ to remain combat-effective.
The US sought
to
reduce these difficulties by
adopting a polic\ of prepositioning supplies in the region. read\ for
Kxal transportation and use. Pre-
positioning applied to
equipment of all kinds, includ-
Right:
US airborne troops
iumpfromaC-130 Hercules during Bright Star exercises
in
Egypt. Above:
Paratroops of the82nd Airborne Division prepare to board a C-1 30, Equipped with desert-camouflage uniforms and the new Kevlar helmet, they form the quick
spearhead
of the
RDJTF.
Left:AnMn3APC being dropped by parachute during desert exercises.
number
at Diego Garcia in the 1984 these ships constituted a Near-Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) of 18 vessels, but from 984 RDJTF planning provided for the establishment of a larger operation, comprising three Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) task forces by
of ships permanentl} based
Plans for the
task force
airlift
to carry sufficient
region, as well as the permanent pre-
sence of prepositioned material, demanded the a\ailahilit\ of local militar\ and na\al tacilities. By 1983. such facilities existed in Oman at Sib
on the Gulf of
Oman
and on Mazirah
number of points on the Saudi .Arabian Gulf coast, including Dharan; at the hgxptian Red Sea island; at a
Amphibious
of troops and equipment into the
lianas and in the Western Deseil; ni Ken\a; ami Heiivia and Molm The ke\ hase I.h the KDIll Somalia remained die Hi itisli-ou neil island ol Die-o )eeaii, liom uhieli lu-i oiiK Ciaieia m me Indian lask loues and -sels Inil also eaiiiei siippK ouldopeiaK' id H Sua!
[KMi at
k;is
I'l
Monihasa
m
dishn
(
.
W
and
Inle siiate,-ie
RD.n
would sLippK
aiiiill
1,
eombat troops and the MI'S
I-
\
task loiees
siiorl-teim.
term, the lons^-tei
iii
loL^istieal
m
the
medium
haek-iipliiopeialions
in
Soulhuest Asia uoiiid lia\e to oMiie Irom a eiealK enhaneed sealill eapahilil\ lonled aiound the ape ol (loodllope.anddeli\eiinLMnenandmaleriallioinllie \ Sealill Readiness ast C oast in some ;M)da\s I S I'ro-ramuasinilialedin M'^'k u liieli pio\ ided loi the L'ladiial leplaeemenl ol .ommeiualK lined xesseN uith puip.>se-lniill ships, to iiKkide roll on roll oil (
l
eoiitainer shi[is
and
and water tankers,
tiiel
would also pro\ide an
alternalixe
pi)rting troops to the Giiit
.
in
\
method
ol
Sealill
trans-
essels sueh as the SI. -7
Above; US Army Sikorsky
high-speed container ship.
UH-60A Black Hawk helicopters transporting jeepsduring Bright Star in
High-profile exercises Each stage in the development of the RDJTF was accompanied by extensive and exhaustive exercises to test the logistical system under operational conditions, and to train the designated troops in the special techniques of warfare demanded by Southwest Asian conditions. These exercises were seen by the United
the Egyptian desert. The RDJTF depends heavily
upon the cooperation allies in
of
the Middle East to
overcome logistical
its
anormous
problems.
States not only as a routine military training programme, but as a demonstration to both allies and potential enemies that the RDJTF was an effective military force. RDJTF exercises were therefore high-profile political occasions, as well as a military necessity.
The first exercise combined both political and exemplary degree. Within a month of President Carter's 1980 State of the Union message, a Marine Amphibious Task Force, including four vessels, led by the amphibious assault ship USS Okinawa and carrying some 800 men, left the Pacific for the Indian Ocean for manoeuvres with Can ier Task Force 70 on station in the Arabian Sea. Since then similar Marine Task Forces have been military aspects to an
1
Major forces available to the RDJTF
rotated to the Arabian Sea to maintain a permanent
us Army {XVIII
presence there. The operation was a clear signal of America's determination to defend its interests in the Gulf region by military force if necessary. Subsequent exercises have taken place in the
Airborne Corps)
82nd Airborne Division
Fort
lOlstAir Assault Division 24th Infantry Division (Mechanised) 6th Air Cavalry Brigade
Fort
9th Infantry Division
Bragg Fort Campbell Fort Stewart
Hood
United States - in the California desert (Gallant Eagle March 1982) and in Nevada Reforger series )and in the Middle East (Bright Star series and Jade
Fort Lewis
(
.
US Air Force (HQ 9th Air Force) Seven tactical fighter wings (TFW),
Tiger).
including
TFW (F-1 5 Eagles) 27th TFW (F-11 IDs) 49th TFW (F-1 5 Eagles) 347th TFW (F-4E Phantoms) 354th TFW (A- 0As) 366th TFW (F-1 11 As) 1st
1
LangleyAFB Cannon AFB Holloman AFB
AFB
Myrtle Beach
Home AFB
Mountain
SAC
1 1
one in
Indian
Ocean
Surface Action Group Amphibious Ready Group
Marine Amphibious Forces, including IstMarineDivision Amphibious Brigade (NTPF) 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing 1st Force Service Support Group
warfare, but the high visibility of such operations. v\
hile
demonstiating the seriousness of the American to the region, also increased political
pressures on Arab go\ eriimcnts cooperating w ith the Americans. US hacking lor Israel left pi\i-W estern
Diego Garcia
Arab governments
Camp Pendleton Camp Pendleton
providing the
MCASEIToro
powerlul
Camp Pendleton
RDJ
l
l-
(Fort
Bragg)
in\ (>l\ed in I'l-
all\
.
I
his
inriiienee
who
tools
problem has
legaul
RDJ TF
exereises ov
with base laeilities opcu to
eoneeiM Irom some
eotmtries.
JFK Center
RDJ
eiilieism as being
internal
Joint Warfare Task Force
Rangers and Special Forces
Oman.
RDJTF troops, and ironed out many problems arising from the adaptation of US equipment to the harsh conditions associated v\ith deseil
commitment
US Marine Corps 7th Marine
in
Middle East with friendly
forces immeasurably increased the combat
local
readiness of including
on-station
5 Squadrons (P-3 Orions) Near Team Prepositioning Force
November
1
Joint exercises in the
MinotAFB
US Navy 3 Carrier Battle Groups
Bright Star exercise in
while 1000 Marines were landed
Strategic Projection Force
57th Air Division,
first
1980 involved the deployment of 1400 troops of the 0 St Air Assault Division and of the 502nd lnfantr>' (24th Division) in Egypt for joint training with the Egyptian armed forces. Bright Star 82 saw the deployment of 6500 US troops in Egypt, and units of Rangers and Special Forces to Somalia and Sudan, 1
Moody AFB
The
it
upon an aliead\
ol
ol
Israel's
led to attacks
the lairopean
most on the Nato
as a Itirther destabilising liotibled region
Rol^in Corbi'tt
R
KBY WHAPONS nidW'ai ll.thc lulain.-nl.il cic
llMdcd h\
onimonK
IIKMIIS
lIlCII
ciiiploN
.cnii-acli\c lailai
i
(
s\
SAk
c\ha
In I
Ik
kI aiilia
I
scckci disci im main '11 and
niii^lil
lioinc
diili
>
Mm oi
(lie
olhcnnlcnsc Ikmi soiiixc msk-adiH llic !i iic lai were ivslnclcd It) tiniii: into the rear are ot an aeiciplane uhere the IR radiation generated by the (ai i:el s eivj nc exhausts was strongest. Current weapons lia\e been designed to overcome these hmitations; their seeker units respond only to the pattern ot IR wavelengths associated with aircralt. and their increased sensitivity enables them to be launched even from directly head-on to a target and still lock on to the radiations - this is known as aii\
I
Tlu' iiiissik s
'
I
i
all-aspect capability.
Missiles with SAR homing require a radar on the launching aircraft to illuminate the target with radio waves; they then locate the target using an internal radio receiver that generates steering commands
SAR weapon
.
The
has the advantage of an all-weather
capability and can
engage
targets
beyond
visual
range, but the need for the launching aircraft to have its
radar locked-on to the target throughout the mis-
sile's flight limits the
number of
targets that can be
engaged by one aeroplane. To surmount this problem, the newest generation of radar-guided missiles is provided with its own integral radar seeker: the launching aircraft directs the missile towards its target but .
own radar takes over. One of the most widely used IR air-to-air missiles is the American AIM-9 Sidewinder. Developed by the US Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, California, in the final stage the missile's
Sidewinder first entered service in May 956 and by 1983 a staggering total of 158,000 AIM-9s had been produced in 13 separate versions. The initial models, the AIM-9A and AIM-9B, were primitive by today's standards because of the poor sensitivity of their seeker units. Such missiles were the first AAMs to be used in combat, during clashes between Nationalist Chinese F-86s and communist Chinese MiG- 7s over the Formosa Strait during 958. The de\ elopnient of the Sidewinder may be seen in terms ol generations, each of which has improved the missile's pertormance. Following on from the initial models, the second generation comprised the A1M-9D to the AIM-9J and introduced a number of technical improvements on the original design; this generation achieved its highest degree of sophistication in the AIM-9H which brought solid-stale electronics to the seeker unit, double delta control sm laces that give improved manoeuvrability, and a Imuled the
1
1
1
all-weather capability. In 1977, the
AIM-9L
laun-
ched the third generation of the Sidewinder and probably represents the ultimate development of the type. The AIM-9L can be recognised by its pointed delta control surtaces and is the (irst all-aspect and all-weather
memberof the
family.
The type achieved
considerable attention during the
1964
Falklands
War
where it formed the primary armament of the Royal Navy's Sea Harriers and was responsible for the majority of the 25 kills credited to the aeroplane. The AIM-7 Sparrow is the dominant SAR missile in the air forces of the United States and its allies. Starting life as Project Hot Shot in 1946. the missile entered service during 1956. The first model, known as the AAM-N-2 Sparrow 1. used a "beam riding' guidance system, following the radar beam locked-on to the target by the launch aeroplane's radar. Sparrow I only saw limited service and it was with the Sparrow III that the AIM-7 came into wide-scale use. Sparrow III switched to SAR guidance and entered service as the AIM-7C during 958; the main production variant has been the AIM-7E, some 25,000 of which have been built. The AIM-7E has seen considerable combat service, notably in Vietnam, but has proved to be far from the ideal missile. The Sparrow has been found to be unreliable and of less value in a 1
Previous page: An AIM-9J Sidewinder on the pylon of an F-5E belonging to a USAF Aggressor' squadron. Top; An AIM-9E is loaded onto an F-8C Crusader on an aircraft carrier off Vietnam in 1967. Above: This F-15is carrying AIM-9Ls on its wingtips and AIM-7Fs underthefuselage.
Below: An F-15A of the 48th Fighter Interceptor
Squadron fires
its
last
AIM-7F. The AIM-7 Sparrow has not proved as successful as
hoped
actual combat.
in
AIK TO AIR MISSILES do^liuht than the Sidcw inder but despite ings
It
its
shortcom-
has been the subject of major development in
both the L'K and Europe. In the
UK.
British
Aerospace combined the AIM-
7E airframe u ith a nevi monopulse seeker unit to produce a more eftecti\e weapon. Development of the -UK Sparrow' began in 1969 and. as the Skv Flash, itentered service with the
American
ser\ ice the
RAFduring
A1M-7E w as
AIM-7Fduring 977. 1
but
it
197X. In
superseded b\ the
u as not
until
1
9X2
anil the
introduction ofthe.AI.\l-7.\l that the L S Air Force had a
Sparrow which could match
The other important
a
Sk\ Flash.
.AA.\1 to enter ser\ ice during
along with the Sparrow and Sidewinder, was the Hughes AI.Vl-4 Falcon. It entered ser\ ice m 1956 and was developed into eight versions, four of which employ SAR guidance and four IR. The basic design was further de\cloped as the .'\l.\l-26 Super Falcon, two models ot which were produced, the AIM-26A with nuclear warhead and the AIM-26B with a high explosive one. Both types were designed for the defence of the ct)ntinental United States but the AIM-26B was also supplied to Sw eden as the Rb27. The Hughes AI.\l-54 Phoenix, which entered service in 974 on the F- l4Asofthe US Navy, began life in I960 as a development of the Falcon. It is representative of the trend towards AAMs with greater range and less dependence on the launch aeroplane In order to achieve the required range and independence, the Phoenix uses SAR guidance until it is within 20km (12.5 miles) of its target, w hen it switches to an on-board active radar for the remainder of the flight. the 1950s,
1
.
When the AlM-54 is combined w ith the F- 4A and its 1
AN/AWG-9
fire-control system,
it
probably repre-
most complex AA.M system in service. Some of America's Nato allies have produced their own AAMs. The first British AAM was the Firestreak, developed by de Havilland Propellers in consents the
junction with various official agencies. Entering ser-
Royal Navy and the RAF in 1958. 23kg (501b) warhead and used a complicated IR system both for guidance and as a proximity fuze. During 1964, an improved Firestreak - Redtop - entered service combining an vice with the
Firestreak carried a
relatively
Right top:
A Swedish
Draken interceptor with
two Falcons underthe wing and two Super Falcons underthe fuselage (Swedish designations are
Rb28andRb27,
Left:
ATornadoADV (Air
respectively). Right centre:
Defence Variant) prototype
An AIM-54C Phoenix fired
carrying four Sky Flash
by an F-14; together, the
missiles.
Phoenix and the Tomcat are a formidable
Top
combination.
Above: The Red phased
missile will be
out of service with the Lightning.
KEY WHAI'ONS impi()\c(
AarlK'aii aiul
will rem:
oni|ik-lc
u
it
nil
druwii In
197-
dcvcl(M''i^ >iili
111.-
Ml
LiiuisW.ii .
Ilk-
Su,v
^u,
.aiki
iK
uIhIk-
wcsi missiles in service
Jc\cK.|VlI lioni the earlier
satislactor)
either IR
.itlKlk- \l
IS
orSAR
m scr\ ice
guidance.
unit installed, but the
Super
I'hc
Ii.
I
All
Matra R530 which is
the
>()
could use seeker
(.IcpciklmL' ^
^(
)
is
a
su kicd to
SAR
produced in two versions, the F and the D: the former entered service on the Mirage Fl in 1980 and the latter is scheduled for introduction on the Mirage 2000 in 1986. The R530 and the Super R5M) have done well in the export market and tlie R.^.'^O has been used operationally by guidance.
I
he -Super R.S.^O
is
Argentina. Iraq. Israel and Pakistan. Inaprogiamniesiniilartotlie British Sk\ Flash, the Italian firm of Selenia iiukisine
developed a homing, the Aspide, ate has
the
same
I
JeliioniLhe Associ-
nuilii-iMk- missile iismij .AIiIioliliIi ilie
SAR
coiihLJuralioii
is
as that ot the AI.\l-7. the .Aspide teatLiies a
new motor,
a
new
seeker unit and reconfigured nose,
and control surface geometry. The Aspide entered
Above: An Su- 15 armed with AA-3 missiles; it was this combination of aircraft and missile that shot of
down flight KAL 007
Korean
Right:
Air Lines in 1983.
TwoAA-6s
mounted on the wing pylonsof a Libyan MiG-25. Below:
Right:
A Mirage Fl
carrying
the R550 Magic on its wingtip and the Super
R530F on
its
wing pylons.
Below: An R550 flies away from the Mirage 2000 that has launched it. Inset: An R530 mounted on a French Navy F-8E Crusader
1
966
A
MiG-21MFcarrying AA-2 missiles on the outerwing pylonsand AA-8 missiles on the inner wing pylons.
AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES
service in 1978 and will replace the
AIM-7 on
the
04S and possihlx on the Tornado. The Soviet Union introduced its hist A AM in 938: it was dubbed the AA-1 Alkali by Nato analysts. Development work on the missile probably began during 1950 and the mature weapon was used to arm F-
1
1
MiG-17PFU and the MiG-19FM intercepThere has been some disagreement over the type guidance system used by the AA-1 but it is now general l\ bclicx cd to have used SAR or to have been a beam ikIci'; indeed, both systems may have been Liscd as tlx- wcipoii was developed in six separate models during its sci \ icc life and it is common So\ ict both [he tors.
ol
p|o\
litlcrcnt
Klanc>
>
IS v\
ithdraw n Irom trDnthnc
believed to be
still
m
1978 but it is training round by the
use as
Soviet Air Force.
The second gcnciatmn scrx icc about
AA-:
1*^)61
iin ict
ol
and cons
.A.AMs entered
led ol lliiee t\ix-s: the
AA-.VAnah. initial form the .\,\-2 was a sti ai>:htlorw ji d cop\ ot the American Al.M-^M^ Sidew mdcr but has lolh>w ed Atoll.thc
il
Its
own
MiG-21
path ot de\ elopmenl .
.
I
scd piiiiuiiiK
the Aloll has been built in \er\ large
bers and produced
in
1
967 a new variant was
as the
in
the
num-
both IR anil S.AR lorms. During
identified,
AA-2-2 Advanced
known in the West new genera-
Atoll, part of a
shaped and enlarged control surfaces: it also appears to have been developed in both IR and SAR forms. The Advanced Atoll is used on both late-model MiG-21s and a number of MiG-23 variants. As a whole, the AA-2 family is the most widely used Soviet and examples of both generations are in service with the air forces of at least 29 countries. he A \ .Anab was the Soviet Union's first longlaiiL^e. all-weather and has been used on the ^ ak-28F. the Suand the Su- 5. Both IR and SAR versions have been developed, the SAR models using continuous wave target illumination generated by the Skip Spin lire-control s\stem A second generation Anab. the A A- -: \d\ aneed Anab. was identified and is siill ihe pi iniaiA armament of the dm ing 70(1 Ol so Sii-lsx which remain in service with the ,S,.\iel \ir Detente force. he \ A ^ \sli IS a Soviet Air Defence Force-only weapon and is believed to have been developed tion of missiles using differently
AAM
.'^
I
known. Alkali was
.ice in
si.
the early 1970s. Hindustan Aeronautics began producing IR modelsof the weapon under licence in India and there are also reports of a Chinese version. In
AAM
1
1
1
I
I
speciticall>
lor
use with the
Tu-28P
interceptor.
1967
KHY W
\P()\S
I.
Outside .Nato and the Warsav, Pact, the major is Israel u hose Rafael .Armament l)e\clopment .'\u(hont\ produces the Shatni and Its suc.esso, the P\ thon, 'These IR AA.Ms have seen considerable operational scr\ice. The Shalrir. based on the design of the early Sidewinder, entered ser\ ice in 1969 and the Israeli Air Force has claimed 200 kills with the missile. In 1982 a development ol the Shal nr. the Python u as used operationally for the irst time during the invasion of the Lebanon; this new ueapon leatures u more sophisticated seeker and IS an all-aspect v\eapon. .Armscorof South Africa ha\e de\ eloped the \'3 Kukri vvhich has a helmetmounted sight to designate the target, while CTA proiUiLcrot indisjcnousdcsiiins
.
.
I
Above: TheShafrir's appearance demonstrates well its descent from the Sidewinder. Proven in combat, the Shafrir is fairly inexpensive in comparison with other missiles, costing only about S20,000. The Shafrir
is
carried
on
Mirages, Neshers onelandKfirs.
but by 1965 an IR
model uas introduced
Instituto
de
.AtiMdades
hspaciais
of
Bra/il
are
de\elopin>: the Piranha; both of the missiles are IR seekers.
to eoniple-
mcnt the radar ueapdiis and hcuh iiiodels renunn in \ er\ lar-e AA\1 was used to arm the models ol the MiCI-23 |-o\bat as uell as the
Developments in A.A.Ms in the 19S0s are tending touards ever more sophisticated and complex missiles. .Missile engineers are now aiming to produce
Tu-28.
'tire and forget' capability or 'look-down shoot-doun' capabilitv and preferably pre-programmed ineilial guidance lor the initial stages of llight and an active radar tor homing onto the target. Look-down shoot-down capahilitv is provided b_v installing missiles w ith radars w hi^h discern the Doppler eftect of an aeroplane at a lower altitude and also suppress static echoes troiii the ground. The AI.M-.S4 Phoenix is a look-down missile as is the Sparrow replacement, in development the Hughes AIM- 20A ); the Soviets now have an operational look-down missile - the AA-9 - and are developing the AA-X-IO; both ofi
serviee. This earliest
Israeli
(like this
Ash models used S.AR iiLiidaiicc. cmploMiii: Tu-28's Big Nose radar loi' taruct illLiiiuiuilion.
Initial
the
1
missiles with either a
The Soviet AA-6 Aerid entered ser\iee duniiL: 970 and like the AA-5 appears to ha\e been desiiined
exclusively tor a single aircraft
t_\
pe.
m
this
both. Fire and forget missiles have
ease the
MiG-25. The Acrid has been produced
in both IR and forms and has been supplied to Lib\a and possibly Algeria as well. The Acrid is nou beins: withdrawn in favour of the AA-7 on the neuest MiG-25. the Foxbat-E. The AA-7 uas de\ eloped between 1971 and 1974 and represents the third generation of Soviet A AM: it has been developed in both IR and SAR versions. The radar version has an unusual fixed external reception antenna array in
SAR
place of the
more usual
internal scanner.
most frequently seen on the lVIiG-23
The AA-7
in
(
1
these could be used against cruise missiles,
is
underdevelopment
Soviet and
in
the L nited States
.Alsoi
the \\)ught
is
'
AS.AT
allied air forces.
The AA-8 Aphid entered
service in
1976 as a
an F-15 against
replacement for the Atoll family. A very compact weapon, the Aphid appears to have been developed in both IR and SAR forms and has been carried b\ the
MiG-2
Nato
1
.
the .\1iG-23
and the Yak-36.\1P.
Range
Type
17.7km
AA-1
Length
Speed
AIM-9L Sidewinder
2.85m
Mach
2.5
(112in)
Sparrow
3.7m 3.7m
Mach4
2m
Firestreak
3.2m
Mach 4
4m
2.8
8km
3
8km
2.8m
3.7m 3.5m (139in)
AA-2 Atoll (SAR)
12km
Mach
5
200km 10km 100km
35km
Range 8km
Mach
2.5
6.5km
Mach 2.5
6.5km
2.8m 2.9m
4.1m
4m
(5 miles)
(4miles)
(4 miles)
AA-5 Ash
5.5m
Mach 2.5
19km
Mach 2.5
24km
Mach 3
21km
(12 miles)
(161in)
(15miles)
(158in) (IR)
(13miles)
(216in)
AA-5 Ash (SAR)
5.2m
Mach 3
55km
Mach 4
25km
Mach 4
80km
Mach 3
40km
(35 miles)
(204in)
AA-6 Acrid
(IR)
6.3m
(16miles)
(248in)
AA-6 Acrid (SAR)
(62 miles)
Mach 4.6
1
AA-3Anab(SAR)
(Smiles)
Mach 4
Mach
AA-3Anab(IR)
(124miles)
Mach 3
Speed
(114in)
(7.5 miles)
(Win) Super R530
these high-
1.9m
(llOin)
(5 miles)
Mach 3.2
(109in)
Aspide
AA-2Atoll(IR)
(5 miles)
(158in)
R550 Magic
.All
Length (74in)
miles)
Mach
(131in)
AIM-54A Phoenix
50km
Mach
(125in)
3.3m
44km
(31
(78in)
Red Top
Alkali
(28 miles)
(144in)
AIM-4A Falcon
satellites.
technology missiles seem very impressive, but during the Vietnam War the AIM-7 Sparrow had a kill rate of about 10 percent, and the Falcon could onlv achieve seven percent.
(11 miles)
(144in)
Sky Flash
enemy
which could be launched by
Soviet air-to-air missiles
air-to-air missiles
Type
AIIVI-7E
(.Anti-S.ATellite)
5.9m
(50 miles)
(232in)
AA-7 Apex (SAR)
(22 miles)
4.6m
(25 miles)
(181in)
AA-8 Aphid (IR)
2.2m (85in)
Mach 3
5.5km (3.5 miles)
Soviet influence
in
Afghanistan up to 1979
Backward and weak. At iihanistan was the cockpit of AnglivRussian rivalries inC'cnlial AsiathnHi;jhout the IMth ccntiiiN Twice iinaded b_\ British troops. ,
Afghanistan
huniihation of having her by the from 1880 until 1920. when she was able to take advantage of the Bolshevik rexolution and the consequent disruption of the balance of pow er in Asia to win back her independence. Fhioughout the inter-war period, from the 1921 Russo-Afghan Treatx ()f Friendship onward. Kabul sought to preserx e her independence by balancing the Sin let L nion and Britain against each other. The post-World War 11 Cold War provided a particularly siiifcici,! tlie
less reliance
upon the West, also negotiated
Five- Year Plan, and in training
newl\
independent
l^.^ds to reintorce
Third
her
World
own
states during the
position. Atghanistan
.American pressure to join the Baghdad Pact (Cento I. even though Washington had made conresisted
tinued arms delixcries dependent
upon
a
more pro-
Western policN in Kahul. In consequence. .Alghanistaii turned to the Soviet L nion and C/echos|o\ akia lor arms supplies. The government o| (ieneral .Mohammed Daoud Khan, a cousin of Alghanistan's King Zahir Shah, who had become prime minister andministerofdefenccaftera militar\
coup
in
19.^3.
signed a S25 million arms
a
million Soviet loan to finance Afghanistan's
British \ iceioN ol India
economic aid trom the American and Russian rivals, f.xploiting the emergence ot an Linaiigned group of
who
favoured a programme of economic development and
foreign rckitions. sueh as they were, controlled
rew aiding context for the continuation of this Afghan balancing act. with Kabul coaxing large amounts of
1956. Daoud.
contract with the Kremlin in
$100 first
1961 established military
programmes with
the Soviet
Union and
Czechoslovakia. A border crisis with Pakistan led to the fall of Daoud in 1963, however, and in 1964 a new liberal constitution was introduced which provided for an elected parliament and a free press, both conditions which stimulated the formation of a number of new political parties. Among these was the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), founded on January 1965 under the leadership of Noor Moham1
med Taraki, a self-educated nomad family who had become the 1930s while
PDPA
working
as a
temporarily united a
groups, but
split in
intellectual
from
A Soviet soldier stands guard over traffic on a mountain road in Afghanistan. The Above:
weakness of the pro-Moscow regime in Kabul, and its inability to contain the Mujahidin
insurgency which had already seized control of large areas of the Afghan countryside, convinced the Soviet Union that direct intervention was vital to
prevent the emergence of a hostile,
pro-Western
government on
its
southern border.
a
communist during clerk in Bombay. The number of left-wing a
July 1967 as bitter rivalry de-
veloped between Taraki and the younger Babrak Karmal, a student leader. While Taraki bragged of his Inimble origins, Karmal was the son of a genei al. and hail connections here was also an with the Afghan royal lamii\. I
element of ethnic conllicl behiiulllie faction,
named
Fcoplci.
was
supporters, iBdiiiu'i
i.
altei the
PDPA
split
the Taraki
new ^paperA/M/
Karmars named atteranother new spaper. Pdrchain come from the Tajik and other essentiail>
Pusliiuii.
while
tended to
1969
.
AFGHANISTAN
non-Pushlun ethnic groups. More fundameniall\
MoharrmedDs:.-
Karmal rejected Taraki's uncompromising radicalism, and favoured a gradualist approach to the problem of revolution in backw ard Afghanistan. The late 1960s and earh 1970s saw the rapid government in destabilisation of parliamentan
(above ralone . fami
On
Daoud seized power in a coup carried out largelx by young Soviet-trained officers and supported b> the Parcham group. He declared Afghanistan a republic and became the countr\ "s first president: the fact that he was himself a member of die ro\ al family tended to blunt ro\ alist opposition. At first, the Daoud regime appeared inno\ati\e and reforming: a number of Parchami ministers u ere appointed and land-reform w as instituted. Soon, however. Daoud packed off his leftwing suppxjrters to the pro\ inces and began to mo\ e tow ards a more conserx ative and dictatorial regime. In Juh 975 freedom of the press w as suppressed and Afghanistan.
17 July 1973
1
with
it
.
all
opportunitv for opsn political dissent.
Disenchanted with their former reunited
-
•
1956-"'
w ith the Khalq
ally, the
faction in July
1
Parchamis
.'.
;e
-
•
.
Peop
e
ledb.'. i v Taran ^ _ : overt- -e.. during ^ _ t ofApri "z'l ~c-iKhalq faction soon dominated the :
•
.
'
-
r :
:
i
government and armed power
forces, but real
gradually fell
irrto
the
handsof Hafizullah Amin (above), v^ho had Taraki arrested and murdered in the autumn of 1979. The overthrow of Taraki probably decided the Kremlin to put into operation
its
plan for
military intervention in
Afghanistan.
977.
A fragile alliance The
reconstituted
PDP.A
remained
alliance of tw o distinct factions,
a
fragile
how ever. As prepa-
coup adxanced during the w inter of 977-78. Hafizullah .Amin. a former schoolteacher w ho had become a .Marxist w hile studying in the United States in 1958. was entrusted with the establishment of an underground organisation w ithin the armed forces, but he ensured that the officers he recruited would be loyal to his own Khalq faction. There w ere political assassinations and rumours of plots throughout the latter half of 1977. and on 17 -April 1978 .Mir .Akbar Khyber. a leading Parchami theoretician and writer, was assassinated in Kabul. Though the killers were never identified, the PDP.A was quick to blame the CLA. and .Akbar' s funeral tw o rations for a left-wing 1
days
later
w as transformed
tion outside the
into an angr\ demonstra-
US embassy.
Daoud was alarmed to decapitate the
b> these protests, and sought
Parcham and Khalq groups b\ 26 April.
arresting their leaders during the night of
But Amin. w ho had alread\
1970
laid plans for a
coup, had
Right: Soviet mii'ta-. advisers sight-see
Kabul. Even unoeXheA^C^c' 5 ^ had be-
—
-
Zn^z
-
eQuz'after:-
-
the Sc. . v increasec -'£~a:.oaM,. Opposite: Supporters of the Marxist government ca rryi ng portra its of Ta ra k demonstrate in Kabul.
i
AFGHANISTAN
1956-79
i
i
own
tunc hcli'ic secret to
ancst to gixe the oi'der lor the
members of the PDPA within the armed forces e into action. The coup itself, which began at hours on 2"^ April 1978. was led by Colonel
mo\
()6(K)
Abdul Qadcr. deput\ commander-in-chief of the Afghan Air Force, and met only brief, if fierce, resistance from units loyal to Daoud. The president was killed, along uith at least 17 members of his famih and a number of senior officers and ministers, when the presidential palace was stormed by armoured units led b\ Khalqi officers. The PDP.A leaders, released from prison, were soon in control of the Saur revolution, as it was called, and dominated the Revolutionar\- Council which constituted the go\ ernmentof the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan proclaimed on 30 April. While the
PDPA mo\ed
swiftly to purge the administration of
suspected opponents, and began to place
members
its
own
most important positions within the ministries and armed forces, rivaln. between the Parcham and Khalq factions soon resurfaced. Though Karmal and .Amin w ere both deputN prime ministers in a government headed by Taraki. the Khalq is were far stronger w ithin the armed forces. As disagreements o\er the pace of political and social change bec ame more open, the tirstarrestsof Parchan.iis took piaceduringJune 1978. signallingtheendof the Paivhaiii Khalq coalition. On 5 July. Karmal and a number ot his supporters were demoted, and sent into \ iriual exile as ambassadors in Eastern Europe. There the\ remained under the protection of the SoMct L nion. whidi was e\idently critical of the Khalq radicalism that was rapidK alienating all support w ithin .AtL'hanistan. After the fall ot the Parchamis. the Khalqdominated go\ eminent pushed ahead with a number of radical and w idel\ unpopular retorms. w hich were imposed on the reluctant ciHintiy side b\ Khalqi militants backed b\ squads of soldiers. I sur\ was banned in order to lift the crippling burden of debt borne bv in the
large numbers of poor peasants, but no alternative v\ as pro\ ided. The peasants were unable to buy seed and tools, business confidence was undermined, and a fall in investment created an economic slump and unemployment. An attempt to regulate marriage, reducing the traditional bridal price to a token sum and setting minimum ages for marriage. pro\'ed totally unenforceable in the backward and suspicious country side. A decree published in November sought to break up all large landholdings in an attempt to mobilise the rural poor behind the Saur revolution, but in acountn. where approximately 60 per cent of land u as cultivated by its ow ners the
source of credit
reform merel\ pro\ oked resistance.
Out of control By mid- 1978 there were already several opposition groups based among the grow ing number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In Afghanistan itself, locally based armed opposition sprang up throughout the country-, and by the spring of 1979 large areas were be\ ond government control Insurgency spread to the cities in March 1979. when a demonstration of armed peasants escalated into a general uprising in the tow n of Herat. The rising was joined by elements of the Herat garrison and w as only crushed after the deploy ment of large numbers of tanks, helicopter gunships .
and Ilyushin-28 bombers, which pounded the city into submission, at the cost of over 5000 casualties. insurgents had themselves massacred several hundred Khalqi officers and officials, and tortured to death some 50 Soviet advisers and their families. Resistance spread to Kabul w hen a popular rising broke out in the city"s Shi"ia quarter on 23 June. Crushed by the Khalq-dominated garrison, the rising led to mass arrests of Shi"ites and other suspects. .A more serious event occurred on 5 August, when commando and tank units mutinied at the Bala Hissar
The
fort
in
Kabul
in
a suicidal
attempt to arrest the the Pal-c-Charkli
go\emment. Lo\al troops from
1971
AFGHANISTAN
barracks smashed
and tanks,
As
kiiliiiij
1956-79
ilic
rebels
w
ith
hclieoptci i:Linships
o\cr4ll().
intluence tothe
kist
more ruthless Amin, who took overas
prime minister and minister of defence reshuftle in
JuK 1979. The
conflict
in a
cabinet
between Taraki
Amin climaxed
in a bloody shootout in the on 16 September, after which Taraki disappeared It was first announced that he had retired from the presidency for health reasons, and later, on 6 October, that he had died. It was widely rumoured in Kabul, however, that Taraki had been arrested and strangled on Amin's orders. Though Amin sought to lay the blame for earlier excesses at the door of Taraki and some cone iatory gestures were made to opposition opinion the Kabul regime was by now totally isolated, and depended for its existence upon the massive Soviet military and economic aid that was pouring into the country. However, although Moscow continued to provide Amin with military equipment, advisers down to company level in the Afghan Army, and a contingent
and
presidential palace
.
,
i 1
.
1972
ol
combat troops who may have taken
tions against rebel forces,
the situation deteriorated Taraki rapidl>
tions lor intcr\ ention
W cstcrn militaiA
wake
it
is
part in opera-
probable that prepara979.
began as early as March
1
experts suggest that the hiL'h-lc\cl So\
let
mission which toured .AtLihanistan in the Herat rising drew up an operatioiiai pkm
ot the
for a possible intervention
under cover of a detailed
survey of the military assistance required b\ the Afghan armed forces to counter the mounting rebellion.
The
threat of
region in the
growing
wake of the
instabilitx
in
the (iulf
Iranian rexolution. coupled
Above: Mujahidm rebels
The radical Marxism of the post-1978 government offended at prayer.
many of Afghanistan's traditionalisttribesmen
Poorly armed and unorganised, the
Mujahidin nevertheless forced the Afghan Army
onto the defensive and
dominated much
of the
countryside.
with the possible spread of militant Islamic fun-
damentalism through Afghanistan into the Muslim Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union itsdl. sharpened the Kremlin's perceptions of a sccurit\ threat on its southern flank. The ev ident inabilit\ ol the Kabul regime to stabilise the situation led lo the preparation of contingency plans, but it was almost certainly the overthrow of Taraki which hnalK decided the Soviet Union to intervene. B\ earl\ December the wheels had already been set in motion. Robin Corhott
Below: Afghan
Army
soldiers advancing into a
Mujahidin-held area.
Although well-equipped, the
government troops
lacked initiative and morale
was low. Many deserted to the rebels, and the
government was unable to enforce conscription hostile countryside
ini
Takeover The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan October 1979. the head of Soviet Ground Forces. General Ivan Pavlovsky. and a team of 60 senior In
commanders
Soviet
visited Afghanistan to
conduct a
thorough tour of inspection of the war against the
which the Afghan Army was being extensively supported by Soviet advisers. It now appears, however, that this mission was at least partly used as cover for a detailed reconanti-govemment guerrillas
in
naissance in preparation for a possible Soviet military intervention.
Military
was not
intervention
the
Soviet Union's favourite option as a re-
sponse to the Afghan crisis. leaders
were determined
The Soviet
to ensure the
continued existence of a pro-Soviet reg-
Kabul and restore government con-
ime
in
trol
over the country, but they thought could be achieved by the
these goals
Afghan
Army
if
the
unpopular Prime could be re-
Amin
Minister Hafizullah
placed. Their hopes of establishing a
more
moderate government capable of winning back popular support collapsed, however, in
1979 when President Noor Taraki, on whom they were was killed by Amin. The Soviet Union had provided the Afghan
September
Mohammed counting,
Army
with massive military aid to counter
anti-govemment guerrillas; now they were forced to become more deeply involved. Two goals existed for intervention: to replace Amin by a ruler more acceptable both to the Russians themselves
and hopefully to Afghans, and to repress the anti-govemment by an effective use of military force. By November a forward headquarters had been established at the 40th Army HQ at Termez on the AfghanSoviet border, under Marshal Sergei L. Sokolov, Soviet first deputy minister of defence. It was comthe
rebellion
plete with a satellite
communications
station
which
maintained a direct link with the ministry of defence in
Moscow.
The final decision to intervene was almost certainly taken at the 26 November meeting of the Soviet Politburo. Three days later, units of the elite 105th
Guards Airborne Division began to arrive at Ferghana in the Soviet Central Asian republic of Uzbekistan, and by 6 Decemberthere were already three battalions concentrated there.
Meanwhile.
Moscow
still
attempted to persuade
Amin to cooperate in his own downfall. On 29 November Lieutenant-General Viktor Paputin flew to
Kabul
lor talks with
Amin, presumably
in
an effort
induce hiin to stand down in favour of the Soviet candidate forhcad of the Afghan govemment, Babrak to
Karmal (at that tmie living in exile protection), or possibly to secure his
under Soviet agreement to
invite Soviet troops into Afghanistan, under the terms of the Soviet-Afghan
Treaty of Friendship signed in December 1978. Evidently, Amin refused to cooperate, and his refusal sealed his fate.
By
10
December the Soviet Union
had moved a 600-strong armoured unit forward position at Ferghana, and between and 5 December a large force of transport aircraft was concentrated around Moscow and in Central Asia. Combat aircraft were moved to positions along the Afghan border and the 03rd Airbome Division based at Vitebsk, Byelorussia, and the 104th at Kirovabad, Azerbaijan, were placed on alert. Western diplomats reported sighting elements of a Soviet combat battalion in Kabul for the first time on 12 December, and the US State Department issued a warning to Moscow against any interference in to their
1
1
1
1
Afghan affairs. By mid-December,
the call-up of reservists in the
Military Districts bordering Afghanistan
was
in full
swing. The forces earmarked for the operation were
drawn mainly from
units stationed in the Central
Asian and Turkestan Military Districts, and though these units were initially far below combat strength, their mobilisation was rapid. In less than two weeks.
Top: Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev with his Afghan protege Babrai< Karmal. Moscow hoped to defuse the crisis in Afghanistan by installing the
moderate
Karmal in place of the dangerously independent radical Amin. Above centre: Soviet troops patrol
Kabul
in a
BMP APC
Above: The overall
commander of the operation to take over Afghanistan, Marshal Sergei L. Sokolov.
1973
AFGHANISTAN
1979-80 ()().(){)() troops from sex or al motor rifle ak'ivj uith their full complements of armour and amlleiA were concentrated at two key
an estimated
1
diMsioiis.
cro>sing points along the border.
terxentioii Lam.- onlx
Soviet garrisons were established in all the major
Afghan cities, and large amounts of equipment were flown in as the Soviet Army attempted to prop up the unpopular Kabul regime.
The invasion Dec 1979
alter
ill
Hut lull-scale ineompletion of the
se areas along the Deecniber .At 2.^0(1 hours on 24 Deeeniher. units ot the Sox let lo.-^th .Airborne Dixision began to land at Kabul
.Sox let
Below: A Soviet Antonov An-22 transport aircraft being unloaded at Kabul airport. Following the December 1979 invasion
ailxaii.
loi:isli.-al
AlL:han boidei on
aii
p(Ml
XX
bui'kl-up at 2
I
^
here thex established a bridgehead.
.At
the
same tinie. Sox let troops began to tlx into the airbase on the outskirts of Kabul at Bagrani xxhich xxas alieadx x muallx under the control of Sox let troops and adx isers stationed there They also llexx into bases at Shindand. lOOkni (65 miles) south of Herat, and at Kandahar, in southern .Afghanistan. Oxer the next txxo dax s. an almost continuous airlift. caiTied out b\
of Afghanistan
militar\' transports
.
.
USSR
military advisers in the
Afghan
capital,
who
pc:
suaded many Afghan units to which they vxc attached that the Sox iet build-up w as part of a large seale exercise, for tion, clleetixelx
xx
hich they issued blank
disarming
Afghan armoured
much
ammuni-
potential opposi-
were immobilised bx being eeaiied lorserx icing, or bx having their batteries reiiioxed. liese measures clearly shovx that the Sox lets were aware ol the probable strength of antiRussian leeling in the Alghan armed loices. but at the same time the Soxiet Union xxas supporting the .Afghan .Armx in its u ar against the Islamic guerrillas and therefore the arnx al of Scn iet troops at various locations occasioned little surprise. At |y(X) hours on 27 December Sox iet troops in Kabul xxent into action to take control of the political situation. Kex points were seized, including the .Afghan ministrx of the interior, xxhich housed the headquarters of .Amin"s much-feared secret police, the central telephone exchange and the .Makroxan housing distnct. xxhich xxas allotted to Soxiet advisers. .A column of B.\ID armoured personnel carriers APCs from Bagram. supported by ASU-85 assault guns. suiTounded the Darulaman Palace on the southern edge of Kabul, where Amin was defended by an tion
l
1
(
)
AtL'han tank resiment.
m
and Aerotlot plane^
i
On 20 December, the armoured unit based at Ferghana moved south to secure the strategic Salang Tunnel, north of Kabul, through uhich the bulk of So\iet supplies to tlic Aliih.iii iCL'inie passed, and i^cs assii:ned to the through which the main Sox let inxasion xxould liaxe i"
some 400
brought the number of Soviet combat troops in Kab to appro.ximately 5000. In addition, there were already some 1500 Sox
units
.
AFGHANISTAN d
(hat
Papu reqtiest
rthci
for
remain
the palace
at
l.iciilciiant-General
Amin
persuade
iijH to
niihtary intervention,
and
that
to
during
heated discussions one of Aniin's bod\ guaids shot Paputiii dead. What is certain is that the pakice was
stormed by Soviet paratroopers and in the ensuing ijL'iitight Amin was killed. This was a profound eiiihanassment to
Moscow,
since
it
made
a
mockery Afghan
of their claim to be acting in support of the
government. By 2300 hours on 28 December the centre of Kabul was firmly under Soviet control. It was announced that Babrak Karmal had been 'elected' secretarygeneral of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and would head an 1 1-man Revolutionary Council in place of the "traitor"
Amin, who
V as now accused of having been an agent of the CIA. and of having prepared a massacre of Soviet personnel in Kabul to be linked to an appeal for Western
nncrvention. In the light of continuing guerrilla activity.
Karmal requested
Moscow
to
render urgent poli-
moral, military and economic assistance. The new regime pledged to honour the Muslim faith and to tical,
bring the "executioners" of Amin's secret police,
who
were alleged to have murdered some 25.000 Afghans, to trial. As units of the 105th Division tightened their grip on Kabul by closing its international airport and sc\cring telephone links with the outside world, a further four Soviet divisions crossed the country"s northern border. The 66th and 357th Motor Rifle
c
apitals
1979-80
Kushka moved on the provincial of Hera' and Kandahar in the northwest and
Divisions based
at
south ot Afghai stan. Two others, the 201st and 360th. advanced iverthe kilometre-wide Amu Darya (Oxus River) outh of Tenrez by pontoon bridge. Their role was to link up with elements of the 105th
Bagram towards the Salang Tunnel. Both columns were accompanied by BTR-60 APCs. T54 and T62 tanks and artillery. Air cover was provided by MiG-23 fighter-bombers. Opposition to the invasion forces was. for the most Division pushing north from
Although there were reports ot Afghan units at Beshkar and Qargah military bases near Kabul refusing to obey Soviet advisers and of the 8th Division putting up a stiff resistance, estimates of 2000 casualties were probably exaggerated. However, in the following months up to 50 per cent of the army, some 40.000 men. are believed to have deserted. Although the majority fled to the security of part, insignificant.
their native villages,
many joined the guerrillas.
The occupation of several provincial
capitals
was
followed by a period of consolidation involving the of more troops and the building of armed
arrival
camps. The presence of the 16th and 54th Motorised Ritle Divisions brought the number of troops in the country up to 80,000. Tajbek Palace on the outskirts of Kabul became the headquarters of the 40th Army. Having insufficient troops to assure complete control of Afghanistan, the Soviets attempted to dominate urban areas and protect their lines of communication Divisional headquarters were established along the circuit of main roads that linked Kabul, Herat and Kandahar The 357th Division was based in Kabul.
Inset: A column of Afghan Army T62 tanks mounted
on transporters. Soviet strategy wasto maintain control of the main Afghan towns and roads, while employing Afghan forces forthebulkof counter-insurgency operations. Re-equipped
and reorganised, the Afghan Army nevertheless remained of doubtful military value.
AFGI' ANISTAN 1979-XO with clcnici
and Herat;
Kunduz.
II
stationed n
Hcrai; ihc 36()th in both Kandahar nd the l()lh in the lUHihcasi toun ol With and lOStli Divisions uciv also rat. but detached unils held Jalalabad
s in
andSI:^^
usually builtaroundmihtaryairlields,
iscs.
I
A up oLitside provincial
ui
ol uattalion or
company
towns, such as Doshi
capitals,
w hile outposis
strength protected siialcLJic
in the
northeast, or ke>
bi uIl^cs
and tunnels. The Soviets concentrated their el lorts at the Salang Pass, where a 3kni (5 mile) long tunnel the main supply route to the USSR - was recognised as being particularly vulnerable to guerrilla attack.
few weeks after the invasion the So\ iei tried to minimise its casualties and mainlow profile by using the Afghan Army against the Mujahidin. Most Soviet units stayed in their barracks and only emerged at night to patrol urban in the first
command tain a
areas.
tions
However, by February 1980 wholesale deserill-discipline in the Afghan Army forced an
and
On the 25th, as a precursor to the relegation of the Afghan Army to
escalation in the Soviet role.
garrison duties, both armies were placed under a unified
command. The arrival of BM-2
1
rocket laun-
chers and armoured Hind
Mi-24 helicopter gunships, improved for both ground and air heralded the start of a major spring offen-
as the weather activity,
sive In preparation for their use a large logistical base .
was under construction at Pol-e-Khomri, 60km 100 1
(
miles) north of Kabul. Helicopter facilities at Ghazni,
Jalalabad and in the capital were alsoexpanded, and a draft of all eligible male Afghans over 21 was de-
signed to free Soviet troops from garrison duties.
Hounding the gueirillas By March, elements of both armies were actively engaged against the guerrillas in three key areas: around Herat, near the border with Iran in the west; in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar, Paktia and Nuristan adjacent to Pakistan; and in the central Hazarajat region. All were well-established centres of resistance and, being mountainous with easy access to towns and roads, particularly suited to guerrilla operations. The offensive had two aims: first, the Mujahidin were to be pushed out of strategic valleys, such as the Panjsher and Kunar, from which many of their attacks were made, thus denying them the food and shelter afforded by local villages. Secondly. its Musiiin neighbours be patrolled to prevent the influx of supplies. until the beginning of June, the Soviets concentrated their efforts in the southern province of Nangarhar. A series of offensives were launched from Jalalabad and the garrison towns of Chaga-Sarei, Baricot and Asmar lying along the Kabul-Pakistan highway, against guerrilla strongholds in the Peck and Kunar valleys. Tanks and .APCs, supported by artillery, moved along the valley Hoors as helicopters strafed and MiG-23s napalmed us)icctcd rebel positions. Although the valleys were tcp.ipoi iiily cleared and several villages destroyed, the slow-moving army units were never able to deliver a knock-out blow. The guerrillas melted away into the mountains to prepare for further attacks. The arrival ol a large number of tribesmen in the mountains around Kabul during the first week of June
Afghanistan's borders with
were
to
From 29 February
'
forced the Soviets to svMtch their attention to the
countryside immediately surrounding the capital. To provide supplies the Soviet transport command Hew
1976
.
.
1
:
AFGHANISTAN 2 sorties a day into Bagrai of 200 armoured vehicles
;nd on 3 June a columi; nanned by Soviet and Afghan soldiers launched a three-day attack in the Kah Danan area. A week later the battle switched to the mountains running from the town of Pagman, 20km ( 2 miles) west of Kabul to Carikar. 50km (30 miles) to the north. About 1000 rebels werekilled and 200 wounded as troops recaptured Pagman, Chari-e1
1
,
Kari and Kalantar.
The
in the training
of the Soviet Army
.
major
Moun-
warfare against an elusive foe required close air support, good reconnaissance and a stamina that tain
many units were unable to provide Some 40 per cent of the invasion force, drawn from the Turkestan and Central Asian Military Districts, were of Muslim origin. Their reliability was questionable and reports of fraternisation with Afghans caused concern .
amongst senior commanders. The much-publicised withdrawal of 5000 men in June 980 appears to have been an attempt to give the occupation force a more reliable ethnic mix. There were also shortcomings in the Soviet command structure. The need for independent action by small groups placed a burden on junior officers and senior NCOs that their training made them ill-prepared to meet. 1
Ill-equipped for counter-insurgency Much of the equipment used in conventional warfare by motorised divisions proved unsuitable for counterinsurgency operations. Soviet tanks and APCs were prone to mechanical failure in harsh winter conditions; anti-aircraft batteries were established at airbases and convoys provided with ZSU-23 automatic AA cannon though there was virtually nodanger of air attack. It seems that Soviet operational planners failed initially to make sufficient allowance for the particular needs of troops fighting a guerrilla war.
and they
that until the disintegration
may have hoped
that
it,
of the Afghan
Army
rather than the Soviet
Army, would bear the brunt of the fighting. Afghan resistance to the occupying forces relied on traditional hit-and-run operations, with the guerrillas
periodically
moving out of their mountain positions to The Hazarajat
attack isolated outposts or convoys.
region, virtually inaccessible to ground forces and
occupying acentral position within the country's road network, contained many prime ambush sites. On 3 May, for example, a convoy on the road between Herat and Kandahar was hit. One fuel tanker was destroyed and 70 personnel captured Other areas also provided fruitful hunting grounds. One part of the road from Kabul to the Salang Tunnel was so danger.
it was dubbed 'death mile" Wherever attacks on convoys took place they in mountainous areas avalanches were started to block the road whilst elsewhere bridges were blown or mines laid, and as
ous that
followed a similar pattern:
Soviet troops
left
;
J
an
security
was
particularly tight
11pm curfew cleared the
in
urban
strcL'i
t-
not stifled. Nightly, cries of AlUi:
-
echoed defiance, and crudel\ .s//c. :./;;;(/ or night letters, posted up at street corn. urged unrest. A call for a general strike to begin on 2 February was answered solidh o\ the shopkeepers of Kabul's Old Bazaar. The next day saw uiass demon' strations and attacks on police statior rtial law was imposed and Soviet troops sealed sian embassy before attempting to restore ou.. lass arrests followed and up to civilians were killed in street battles. During the second aaiiiiversary of the 1978 April Revolution, anti-government derri'V tions led by schoolgirls were bloodily supn the Afghan Army. In-fighting between ti the ruling Parcham factions of the PDP.-X was ciaiui^ ing lOlivesaday by June. (ircat)
•
i
'
direct use of Soviet troops highlighted
weaknesses
!"'.(High
.
1979-80
the protection of their
APCs
they
were subjected to fire from the surrounding hillsides. Before any response could be organised the guen illas melted away. At night rebels wore down the morale of troops stationed in isolated outposts by constant sniping attacks. In towns, PDFA othcials were killed and their offices ransacked, and isolated soldiers on patrol were frequently stoned or knifed to death. Other incidents were more spectacular: at the end of May three Russian soldiers were killed in a grenade attack on the Makroyan housing complex in Kabul
I
.
:
-
,
The
,
•
Afghan resistance was also undermined by the lack of coordination The need for a well-organised military structure and commanders with the ability or prestige to provide leadership was at a premium. Yet long-standing tribal animosities and the tribesmen's fiercely guarded individuality worked against them, and their lack of discipline was often their undoing. In their desire for loot and w capons they often stayed too long at the scene of a successful ambush and fell prey to marauding helicopter gunships. Perhaps the Mujahidin's most serious weakness was the shortage of modem weapons. Many relied on 100-year-old muskets and the accurate, but outdated. British Lee Enfield ri fie .Soviet assault rifles taken from deserters or captured from convoys augmented their firepower, but ammunition remained in short supply. The Soviet use of helicopters from the spring of 980 highlighted the rebels' lack of heavy weapons. In retrospect, it appears that the Soviet military had effectiveness of
seriously
between
rival factions.
1
three operational priorities during the period im-
mediately after the Afghanistan invasion: the protec-
PDPA officials, the control of key urban areas and the destruction of guerrilla forces in the field. By June 1980 Moscow could realistically claim only partial success. Members of both the Parcham and Khalq parties remained guerrilla targets; the security of many urban areas could only be assured in daylight; and the Mujahidin. though suffering heavy casualties during the spring offensive, were far from destroyed as a fighting force. For their part, the rebels were too weak to force a Soviet withdrawal, and though they had caused an estimated 8000 Soviet casualties by June, their successes, often daring and spectacular, were isolated. Six months after the landings at Bagram both sides were faced with a stalemate that neither could resolve without escalating the war. tion of
The chief damage to the Soviet Union resulting from their military action was not any casualties or equipment losses the .Mujahidin could intlict. but the disastrous diplomatic consequences of the invasion. Moscow had hoped to pass off the action as nnlitary support to an ally against an armed rebellion - a relatively respectable activity for a
superpower. But
instead world opinion perceived the event as a naked example of military' aggression and expansionism Both the process of detente with the West and the Soviet Union's image in the Third World suffered as a consequence. A prolonged gueiTilla war was not to improve the Soviets' diplomatic standing in the years Ian Westwell ahead.
1977
The Cold War hd
The decline in superpower relations, 1975-84 The Soviet intervention in Atgiianistan in December 1979 marked for many observers the point at which the process of detente between the Soviet Union and
overthrow of Allende's Popular Unit\ Gcn ernnient
the United States finally collapsed into a
ated in Nixon's resignation m Auiiust U)74. was bound to create doubts in .Moseow as to the reiiabilitx and coherence of US forciLin polie\ Kissins^er had managed to distance himscll and the State l)epailrnent from involvement in Nixon's predicament, and when Nixon's succes.sor. Gerald R. Ford, confirmed Kissinger as his secrctar\ of state, he ensured that there wouldbecontmuitx m theeoiukiet ol US loieiLin relations. But detente sulleieil lurlhei set-haeks m 1975 when the deleal ol SoLith \'ietnani h\ the North Vietnamese .\i iii\ w as alti ihuted m the United St.ites
War. But although
it
became
new Cold
a constant target for
anti-Soviet rhetoric, the Afghanistan invasion
only one element
in a
was
general pattern of worsening
superpower relations - indeed, had relations not already deteriorated the Soviet action would not have provoked such an uproar of protest in the West. .
Detente
Ix-jun lo taltcr
hiid
in
1^)74.
While US
Secretar> nl State llciir\ Kissin>jcr hoped that American williUL^iicss loiK-iioliatc w ith thcStn ict Union on stralCL'ic \\L-a|iiiiis.
nadc and
>)tlici
issues
would en-
.S(i\ id ahsiention Irom mlci leicncc in Third VVoikl disputes, the Soviet Union ie|eeted any link^
couiajjc
ai:e bet\veeii tile
her
I
two .Mosecw
IukI V\ oild alhes.
insisted
on
supportiiiL'
,Slie noted that the United liei relations u itli Iran WashniL'ton had supported the
Chile
in
scandal, w hich culmin-
,
to the iieneroiis Soviet |iio\isioii ol
Manor not
North
\
who
aid lo
supplied the arms whieh allowed
leliiam to
make
a
mockei
\
the I'aiis ALiieeiiients'. \\ henei\il
ami suspected
Angola
I')7K
niilitaix
Kissin^ei eomplained bilterK that 'we shall
lopjel
States eontmueil to stieiiLitiien that
in
1973.
The prolonged Watergate
m
1^)7.^
siL^natuie
on
war broke out
in
ol
its
lollowini: the departure of the I'ortu-
Aboveleft: President Ronald Reagan addressing US troops during a visit to
South Korea
in April
1984.
The election of President Reagan in 1980 coincided with a serious deterioration in East-West relations.
guese. the Soviets supplied arms to the left-wing
public demonstration of American inconsistency and
Movimento
made
Popular de Libertagao de Angola while Cuba despatched troops to assist the
MPLA),
(
MPLA
in their struggle
against pro-Western guerril-
and the South Africans, The pro-Western forces American support when Congress, fearing involvement in another Vietnam, cut off all US aid to them. These events did not. however, spell the end of detente. In November 1974 at Vladivostock, the United States and the Soviet Union continued the SALT negotiating process when they agreed in principle to a maximum of 2400 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and long-range bombers each. Of the missiles 1320 could have Multiple Independentlyargetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs). However, SALT soon encountered criticism in the United States w hen ex-Governor Ronald Reagan of California, a contender for the 1976 Republican presidential nomination, attacked the entire SALT process as a means whereby the Soviet Union had been allowed to catch up with, and even overtake, the United States in missile production and deployment. He and his suplas
v\
cic deprived of
l
porters described current satellite verification procedures as inadequate to prevent the Soviet Union from
number of MIRVs it possessed in its Warsaw Pact superover Nato in conventional arms as evidence of the aggressive nature of Soviet policy, and loudly condemned Soviet intervention in the Third World. Not only did Kissinger prohibit the use of the word "detente" in official communications, but Ford decided to suspend further negotiations with the Soviet Union over SALT 11 until after the elections, so great was the outcry within his own party. cheating over the
arsenals, pointed to the massive
a firm stand for the figures agreed upon at Vladivostock to be honoured. Carter reluctantly gave
way. leading the Soviet
rulers to corf:lude that the
new
president was a lightweight figure who could not be taken seriously as a negotiator and who was
unlikely to adhere to his stated positions for very long.
The Soviets were further angered by public attacks by Carter and other US officials on their civil rights record. In 1978 Carter abandoned this stance as counter-productive, and began to suggest that he had not intended any linkage between human rights and SALT 11. but much damage and ill-will had been created by that time in East- West relations. While negotiations for SALT II had recommenced in Geneva in October 977. these soon became entangled in a long controversy as to whether a new generation of weapons being developed by the United States - the ICBM. the B-1 bomber, cruise missiles mobile and the neutron bomb - should be included in the agreement. The United States countered by pointing out that the Soviet Union was developing new ICBMs and a new long-range bomber. When in 1978 Carter cancelled the highly expensive B- and postponed the production of the neutron bomb although research on both weapons continued), he anticipated some counter-concession from Moscow, but none was forthcoming. 1
MX
1
(
iority
Aid and inteirention Relations between the two superpowers also de-
An administration divided
A new area of hostility opened in 1978 when the Soviets provided arms and Cuban in her war with Somalia over the disputed Ethiopian province of Ogaden. Carter had cut off US aid to Addis Ababa in protest at the regime's appalling human rights record and it seemed to his critics that the Soviet Union had taken advan-
rheelectionof Jimmy Carter as Democratic president
tage of this gesture in order to install herself in the
in November 976 led to a furtherperiod of delay and confusion as Carter and his new team worked out their policy towards the Soviet Union. Carter had been 1
elected on a platform which had promised a return to the traditional
theme of
liberal morality in
ings with the outside world rights, the
trade -
\\
polie\
(il
that
lie
-
a
US
deal-
concern for human
Third World and a reduction
in the
arms
Inch he contrasted tothee\ meal and immoral KissiiiLier
I
he new president also promised
uould personally oversee
foreign relations, unlike Ford,
leave foreign policy to Kissinger.
the conduct of
who had
US
tended to
However. Carter's
teriorated in Africa.
troops to assist Ethiopia
Horn of Africa. The growing was fed by the communist government in Afghanistan in April 978 which seemed to portend a Soviet forward move in Central Asia. Thus while a SALT II agreement was hammered out by the two superpowers in June 979 broadly on the lines agreed
strategically important
anti-Soviet hysteria in the United States seizure of
liner
who distrusted
the Soviet Union. Their conllict-
seeming inability to make a decisive choice between them gave rise to an impression of confusion and incoherence within the administration which baffled both allies and foes alike. Moscow's suspicions were kindled at the outset when, in March. ('\rus \ aiiee aiTi\ed in Moscow with a new SAL II [xiekaL'e uhieli proposed deeper cuts in strategic weapons than had been proposed at Vladivostock w hiie at ihc same time insisting that Furopean theatre nuclear weapons, which the .Soviets had deing advice and Carter's
I
manded should be included in SALT 11. should not be The Soviet Union was outraged bv this
discussed
a
1
1
to
in
the
,
Vladivostock accords, and without the
inclusion of theatre nuclear weapons in Europe,
was
it
much too late: Carter decided against submitting it to Congress for approval since the intensity of antiSoviet hostility there
made
its
rejection certain.
Carter suffered a further blow
two
principal advisers were bitterly divided in their approaches to foreign policy. Cyrus Vance, the secretaiA of state, represented the more liberal wing of Carter's foreign policy team, while National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski was a hard-
power by
in
January 1979
when a popular revolt overthrew the Shah of Iran, one of the most loyal supporters of the United States in the Gulf, and set up an Islamic fundamentalist govern-
ment which proceeded to demonstrate its antiAmerican credentials by seizing the personnel of the American embassy in Tehran and defying all Carter's verbal and military efforts to secure their release until January 1981 when they were freed in return for a large ransom. The despatch of Red Army forces to Kabul in December 1979. although designed to sustain a communist regime already in power, elicited the most vigorous US protests. It directly resulted in a .
US boycott ol \\
hich
deepK
App.ii
eiii
I
\
the ol
I
ilii
Olympic Games in Moscow in 980 ended the Soviet Union. eatened by Soviet expansionism and 1
Mushm kinaticism. the United States' position in the Thial World seemed to he extremely precarious. 1979
SUPHRPOVVHR RKLATIONS
1975-84 Left: President Jimmy Carter meeting Soviet
leader Leonid Brezhnev
in
June 1979forthe signing otthe Salt Treaty in Vienna. US-Soviet relations were already II
strained,
or perhaps because ol. Carter's wellmeaning efforts to improve relations with the more progressiveelementsinThird World societies. Under these pressures after 1978. Carter's polic\ had bcLiun to shilt a\\a\ Irom its earlier, more libcial. atinhutcs and Br/c/inski"s influence in the adiiimisiidtuMi liad increased. Defence expenditure rose a rapid dcplo\ ment force was set up which cmild be despatched to despite,
m
the Persian
Gulf
supplies and
more mone\ w
an\
cmcri^ciicx
allcciiii!:
oil
as n\ cstcd n outer-space i
i
weapons. Yet Carter's mcivasingly hard line towards the Soviet Union came too late to enable him to escape from his image m the e\es of many Americans as a weak and vacillating president. anti-satellite
Reagan. Republican presidential candidate in 1980. found a ready response from many electors when he who had allowed the Soviet Union to steal a march on the West in the Third World and whose reluctance to increase American defence expenditure had weakened VS power and
depicted Carter as a president
prestige abroad.
of the So\ arsenal as
however, and
tin
He could point to the rapid cxpansmn
and the grow ih ol examples o\ the threat
let licet
the .So\
icl
nuclcai
worldwide
to
I
S
interests.
Reagan's election
in
November 1980 was
a clear
repudiation ol the tattered remnants of detente. Dur-
campaign Reagan emphasised his determinaUS pow er and to vdi ess which he claimed had. under C'aiier. swung in favourof the Soviet Union lis adminisuation increased defence expenditure well be\ond Carand a urihei ter's levels- it rose by 3 percent m 17 percent in 1983. Reagan lexeised Carter's decision against deploying the M.\ 111 U*S|. announcing that 00 ofthem would replace the ageing and \ Lilnerable Titan and Minuteman missiles, although exaeiK how they would be depkned remained a mailer ol some controversy. He also authorised the pioduclion ing the
tion to reverse the decline of
i
the balance
I
1
I
I
1
of the B-1 bomber and the neutron bomb .More money was also devoted to expanding corn enlional
TTT
Left:
A US Pershing
II
nuclear missile, complete with warhead (right) and
launcher unit
(left)
manoeuvres
in
States.
the United
Nato plans
station Pershing
cruise missiles
on to
and Western
lis
in
Europe provoked considerable opposition, particularly in
West
Germany and
Britain.
R
POWER RHLATIONS
1975-84
430 300
If 1.
300 '
i
,
ft
162
162
± \¥ 138
BAPMAHT RO
BAPMAHT no HOCM-
Mnm
J
M 3AP51fl AM COKPAlUtHHl nOMlM
HOCMTEJI SIM
niilitaiA strciii:tli and I S iiaxal power. The militaiA space imiijraiiiiiK' was speeded up - Reagan demanded the establishnieiil ot a eoinplete US anti-missile s\ stem m spaee b\ the end ot the century. The new adiiii lustration was determined to achieve deeisixe mihiai\ superiority over the Soviet Union this entailed increasing budget deficits, high e\en interest rates and the consequent abandonment of premised tax cLits There was also much talk in US nilitaiy envies ot the possibility of "winning" a uelear e\ehan>:e with the Smiel Union, either by !esti o\ iiiL' Siw lel niieleai arsenals jnd command and (Mitiol centres w iih Aniei ica's incieasingly accurate il
iiissiles, iM
.Such talk, tile
h\ deteatiivj the
w hich alarn
United States, wa-
stralion.
sLiLjLiestiiiL:
as
States ol luidcai wea|
Red .\rmy
in
Europe.
d opinion inside and outside
ila\ed
down bv
Jid the tn Ills, l:
but
the admini-
st-usehy the United oh\ uHisK contri-
It
relations
between
the
two
elations helped b\ Rea;jan"s
public assaults on the evils of the Soviet system. For its
part, the Soviet
fall
behind
in the
Union announced that it would not arms race, no matter what the
financial sacrifices. In the event, talks on the limitation of both strategic and intermediate missiles (START and INF) in little hope of making any progress. The United States insisted on the reduction of land-based ICBMs to 850 each, which was totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union, since land-based ICBMs formed the largest component of her strategic nuclear forces. The United States also offered the so-called "zero option", whereby the United States would not place Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe if the Soviet Union would withdraw her SS-4. SS-5 and SS-20 intermediate range missiles from west of the Urals. This was equally unacceptable to Moscow,
Geneva had
since the offer ignored the existing
manned bombers
and land- and sea-based missiles at the disposal of Nato. The Soviet Union, after demanding in vain the Above: Soviet chief of general staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, at a press conference in Moscow on 5 December 1 983 where he presented figures which claimed to show that the
West was attempting
to
gain military superiority
over the Warsaw Pact.
Left:
President Reagan refers to
mapshowingthethreat posed to Western Europe a
by Soviet SS-20 missiles. In the 1980s the propaganda
Above; The controversial MX missile, which came up against strong opposition in the United States, where
battle between East and West took precedence over
genuine attempts
at
negotiations.
plans for its stationing on iand provoked public fears;
some experts argued that
it
served no useful military purpose.
1981
SUPERPOWER RELATIONS
1975-84
inclusion of
all "forward-based' s\vtc[!is hurope, broke off the talks in M^s
m
Western
^
The death ot Leonid Hrc/linc\ ot
Vun
made
.Andropov
little di
I
superpovsers,
m
jm'
hiN [iLkc hi
:
an_\thin>j ilic
i
Below: US Air Force F-lll bombers, capable of delivering nuclear
weapons against targets in Eastern Europe and the
western in
USSR from
bases
the United Kingdom.
As
East-West relations froze, the prospect of successfully limiting
nucleararms became more and more remote.
to try to reverse the relations.
i\
in the
(
Id
I
extent his anti-Soviet utterances, but
iiion
and
its
partners refused to participate
tuo
L nion ct sciKlinii aid to the left-wing guerrillas in Ei
c|'icssion ol dissidents
in the Soviet Union uas stcjipcd up alter he came lo power. His health was too poor and his time in ol tice was too short to allow any initiative b\ the Soviet
Union power
some
to
the S(
Reaijaii's supporters continued to accuse the Soviet
lereiicc tolhc ic lain mis [ictueen the II
douri
appointment \o\ ember 1982 ;hc
downu ard
The imposition of
trend
in
super-
martial law in
Poland in October 1981 and the crushing of the independent trade union movement Solidarity by the Polish Army prompted the United States to impose econoinic sanctions on the Soviet bloc - chietly in withholding further loans and banning exports of new technologv - but the effect of these sanctions was much reduced bv the retusal of the Western European countries to abandon the projected construction of a natural gas pipeline trt)m the Soviet Union to Western
Europe and by the angry protests of US Middle Western fanners at the possible loss of Soviet markets for their surplus grain.
During the election year of 1984 Reasan toned
)l\
nipif
Games
in
Los Angeles
Salvador, althoui;h since l^Kl
US
in the
summer.
military aid to
hird W orld pro-American slates, irrespective of the anti-democratic nature ol most ot their regimes, had been stepped-up. Reagan continued to insist that there I
would be no relaxation in the US dn\ e tor superiority. At Salt Lake City on 5 September 1984, while he arms treaties with the Soviet Union, the president made it clear that he would continue to modernise US armed forces and to push ahead with his "Star Wars' programme. "We have come a long way in restoring that margin of safety wehavecompletely reorientated American foreign policy, imbuing it with a new energy and moral purpose." The increasing rigidity of Soviet policy under the ailing and divided leadership of Konstantin Chemenko. combined with Reagan's re-
called for balanced and verifiable
.
fusal to little
.
.
compromise
his policy goals, suggested that
was in sight. Michael Dockrill
relaxation of East-West tension
1983
The
ASM
(air-to-surface missile)
is
essentially a
bomb with a rocket motor attached and is usually provided with an integral guidance system. ASMs serve in two roles: anti-shipping and ground attack.
Both categories of missiles make use of a wide range of guidance systems, the most popular being some form of radio control - the control of the missile \ la a radio link with the launch aeroplane - b\ either joystick or radar.
The
favourite form of guidance tor
the anti-shipping missile
is inerlial
control through
range when active radarhoming operates Semi-active and passive radar hom-
gyroscopes
until at close .
ing and electro-optical {a televisual link with the
launch aeroplane) guidance
is
also used.
The ASM is a development of two types of weapon saw widespread service in World War II: the guided bomb and the unguided rocket. The Azon bomb was successfully operated by the US Army Air Force and rockets such as Tiny Tim and Holy Moses were used in the Pacific and European theatres, as
on F-4 Phantoms and .A-IU Thunderbolt Us. U Maverick is designed to attack fortification armoured vehicles, parked aeroplanes radar sites and similar targets that require bombing ()nginall\ pn duced as an electro-opticalU guided missile, the lir
well as seeing action with Skyraiders and early jet
IIR (imaging infra-red
that
aircraft
during the Korean War.
It
was
a logical
progression to seek to combine guidance w ith rocket propulsion. Designs that were being tested at the end
War II were produced as research projects Gargoyle and the Gorgon for example - and it was from the experience gained in developing these that the foundations of the modem tactical ASM in the US armed services were laid. of World
i
US Navy
requested a weapon that
would combine
the destructive power of a 11 3kg with rocket propulsion and a guidance system. Martin Marietta produced to the navy's spe-
(2501b)
bomb
cifications the
AGM-12
Bullpup which entered
ser-
vice in 1959; manufactureofthe series ended in 1970.
The missile is guided by a switch on the control column of the launch aeroplane - the pilot steers the missile by keeping the tw in rear tracking flares on the
The Bullpup
missile aligned with the target
wa--
adoptedby the US An Force and \laruic Corps as \^ as the Navy and was j,L \tcnsi\ cK m \ ictnam :i
ThemajorASMn the 1980s
is
!
the A(i\i
deliveredthefirstrouiid-
Micl S Xu
foa.
ui
lluL'hcs Aii.iali 1.
i
.i
to the Tactical Air C'uiniiiaiid
1984
,11
-
\\
.
aiihceiklDl here the\ are earned
.MaxeriLk using an intra-rc
seeker to send an IR iniaLic to tiic launch aircraft cockpit displa\ was deluered to the L S Air Force
October
I'-'s;^
MarineCorps
and is
a lasci-guidcJ \crsion for the
tocnterser\ ice
the
In 1954. the
Previous page: A Harrier takes off from HMS Illustrious armed with a
.
Right:
An
F-111 with
imaging infra-red
(IIR)
Mavericks. Below: The image transmitted to the pilot's cockpit display
by
the infra-red camera in the nose of an IIR Maverick.
in
I
the L S
Sea
Eagle missile. The Bullpup Acan be carried by many types of aircraft such as the
Phantom i
U
Na\
test version of the
(top)
and the P-3
Orion (above): it was extensively used in the
Vietnam War.
6
AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSlLtS
Above: This F-105G is carrying Shrikes (outboard pylons) and Standards
to aek)pt the Mav cnck. The US Navy's Maverick programme is intended supplement its main air-launched anti-ship missile, the AGM-84A Harpoon. The Haipoon is perhaps more famous as an SSM (sui tacc-to-surtace missile) but It actually began as a [irojcci lor an air-launched
(inboard), both
missile.
Top
left:
A Harpoon
i,s
anti-ship missile
launched
from
Top
a P-3
Orion.
right:
AHARMonanA-7C.
anti-radiation missiles like
the
HARM, over Laos
1972.
in
als(.)
to
Development
ol
the air-launched version
was slower than tor the RGM-84A Haipoon SSM due to some difficulties with test missiles from 1975 onwards, but it is now in service with naval aircraft of the US. UK and Japanese armed forces. A more specialised class of air-to-surface missiles in
use with the
US armed
forces
is
Three l\pcs arc
in
(anti-
enemy radars.
AGM-45 Shrike, the AGM-88 HARM. The
service: the
A(i.\l-7S Standard and the
ARM
ARM
the
radiation missile), dcsignedtotakeout
operates by using an integral seeker unit to
lock-on to
enemy
radar emissions which then guide
the missile onto the target.
The Shrike and
dard have both been used operationally
and the Middle hast: the radiation missile
)
HARM
in
the Stan-
Vietnam
(high-speed anti-
cntcivd service in
1983 and
is
expected to replace both the Shrike and the Standard. The first ASM deployed by the Soviet Union known to Nato analysts was the AS-1 Kennel. Development of this large anti-ship missile was accelerated by using MiG-15 components. It employed either radio control or beam-riding (following the radar beam locked on to the target by the launch aircraft's radar) for initial guidance, making its linal
attack with a crude active radar-homing device. The
was withdrawn in the early 970s. were first displayed to the public on Day in 1961 - the AS-2 Kipper and the AS-4 Kitchen The Kipper is carried by the T.uBadger-C fitted with a nose radar: the missile is missile
1
Two ASMs
Soviet Aviation
1
.
thought to be a beam-rider with active radar-homing in the attack phase. The AS-4 Kitchen was originally
Tu-22 Blinder-B and since its introducbeen seen arming the Tu-26 Backtire-B The
carried by the tion has
.
Soviet armed forces appear to regard
weapon
as indicated
it
as a successful
by a new programme
to convert
Bear-C and Bear-D aeroplanes into Kitchen carriers, identified by Nato analysts as the Bear-G. Guidance is initially by an inertial system, followed by either active radar or infra-red homing.
ASM
The AS-5 Kelt was duced
in the late
introthe only Soviet 1960s, entering service about 1967.
Yom
Kippur War by Egyptian Tu-I6s against radar stations and supply dumps. Based on the AS- design, AS-5 uses a rocket motor in place of the AS-l's turbojet. The AS-5 may Kelts were used during the
1
be used against either shipping or land targets using an autopilot for for the
fliLilii
attack,
anti-radiation I
he
AS
shroudetl
7 III
appearance.
kci
iA
in\siei
radar-homing can also be used in an
ijuidaiicc antl acti\ e
AS
ilic
mode
^
iiijainst
radar stations.
ami other recent Soviet ASMs are Vei \ little is known about their
\
,
L'uidanee
and purpose, and what
is
generally aceeptetl should be treated with a certain
1985
KEY WEAPONS amount of suspicion
I
hc
AS-7
isdctinitelx an
ASM
in ilic laic Mriis; Naio aiial\sis earned on the Sli-:4 Fcikci and Al liisi iiuidaiKC uas possibly on the MiCi-I" thought [o !ic b\ radio cimiinand bui nou the idea that it is a bcain-ndcr iv iiainiiii; aecoptaiicc. but both seem rather dangerous to the deli\er> aeroplane uhi.h uouid be toreed to remain in the \ ieinit> ot the
and entered believe
it
sei^ icc
to be
i:'
target in order to
eonimand
the
iiiisMie
1:
.
:
^
Department ol Detense has identitied the As^ So\ iet \ ersion ot its o\\ n Helltire missile, earned or the Mi-24 Hiiid-D. There are also a number ot othe; ASMs in \ arious stages ot'development but e\ en lesis knou n about these, although one is suspected to be ..
an anti-radiation missile. In estern Europe, the largest producer of .ASMs is France, which has been designing them since the mid- 950s. One of the first to enter service was the AS anti-tank missile, which 12. a derivative of the AS is designed to operate in the anti-ship and antisubmarine role. .A wire-guided missile, steering is done by line-of-sight. using either a gyrostabilised sight or night- vision equipment. The AS 20 and AS 30 missiles are near contemporaries and fulfil a similar role, differing mainly in size. Radio command lineof-sight guidance was originally used but later models of the .AS 30 abandoned the joystick control, using instead an aeroplane-mounted IR seeker kept in align-
W
1
1
ment u ith
1
the target to generate steering
transmitted to the missile: this
commands
was known
as
TC.A
(telecommande automatique). The French Durandal is an unusual ueapon designed to crater runua\s. A \er\ light ueapon. Durandal is dropped from the aeroplane like an ordinar\
tree-falling
bomb,
but then a parachute
braking the bomb's
tail and pitching a rocket motor hres and propels the bomb forcefully onto its target, .As manv as 16 Durandals mav be carried bv the .\liraee 2000.
opens it
at the tail,
to at least a
20 degree angle: then
.An early .Anglo-French .\lartel .-\S.\1 that
came
armaments project u as the two variants; the AJ168
in
electro-optically guided missile produv.ed b\ British
.Aerospace and the AS 3"^ anti-radiation missile produced b\ Matra of France. The types have identical Left:
An AS
1
2 missile fitted
Westland Wasp. This combination severely
to a
damaged the Argentinian submarine Santa Fe during the operation to recapture South Georgia island in 1982. Below left: The AS 30 missile carried on the centre wing pylons isthe laser-guided version;
warhead
is
its
240kg (5291b) of
explosive with a choice of impact or delay fuzes. Below: The Martel AJ168 missile isthe British
contribution to an
Anglo-French project; it is TV-guided.
Above: The AS-4 Kitchen, carried under a Tu-22M Backfire, is sometimes equipped with a nuclear warhead. Above right: Durandal missiles were designed to be carried in large numbers by fighter-bombers like this experimental F-15. Right: A ru nway cratered by Durandals.
AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES
structure,
wings,
tins,
power system and
solid-
propellant boost motor and are carried on
caneers, Harriers. Atlantics. Jaguars and Mirage
The notorious
AM
39 Exocet
is
BucIlls.
also one of the
French family of ASMs. Lighter than the shiplaunched version, the 39 has a longer range and can be launched from either helicopters or aeroplanes. The 39 uses inertial mid-course guidance combined with active radar-homing for the attack. It has a European-made competitor in the Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm Kormoran. based on a Franco-German project of the early 1960s. These missiles aim to impact just above the waterline and have a special warhead designed to pierce the hull of the ship
AM
AM
before detonating.
The British Aerospace Sea Skua is a semi-active radar-homing anti-ship missile that equips the Lynx helicopters of the Royal Navy. The missile was designed with the intention of giving helicopterequipped ships a long-range defence against missilearmed fast attack craft. The Sea Skua saw action in the Falklands War v\ hen used in an attack on Argentinian
Top
An Exocet fired
right:
from
a
Super Frelon
helicopter of the French
Navy. Above: ATornado launches a West German
Kormoran
missile Right:
A
Sea Skua missile uemg from a Royal Navy
fired
Lynx. This
trio of anti-ship
missiles represents one of the most dangerous threats to warships available.
The Sea Skua
was used againstthe Argentinian patrol boats A/ferez Sobral and
Comodoro Somellara
in
1982, while the Exocet also
demonstrated
its
combat
capabilities to great effect
during the Falklands War,
1987
Left:
An experimental Sea on
Eagle,
used
a
Sea
Harrier,
to attack the target
HMS Devonshire.
Below: The Swedish Rb04 missiles on this Viggen are designed to attack
seaborne invaders.
patrol cratt. The Sea Eagle is a similar missile under development with British Aerospace: developed from the Martel, it is designed to be carried by Buccaneers and Sea Harriers. The French and the Italians are also working on new types of air-launched missiles, the AS 5 and the Marte respectively. The AS 15 is a wire-guided missile, a system which is no longer fashionable now that semi-active radar guidance is available. The Marte is a development of the ship-launched Sea Killer missile to be used by helicopters and is radiocontrolled by the helicopter's radar. Some non-aligned nations produce their own ASMs. Sweden produces two, the Rb04 and the Rb05, both of which are anti-ship missiles. The Rb04 uses inertial guidance with active radar-homing in the attack phase of flight, while the Rb05 is radiocontrolled. Argentina produces the Martin Pescador 1
ASM. The
("Kingfisher"), a radio-controlled bishi
Heavy
Industries
ASM-1
company
of Japan
is
Mitsu-
produc-
which uses inertial guidance with active radar-homing for the attack. The development of precision-guided munitions and guided ASMs increases both the lethality and expense of tactical attacks by aeroplanes. The spread of radar-homing in place of the previous radio control is more evidence of the increasing military use of electronics. However, it seems expense and complexity will not deter developments in this field. ing the
anti-ship missile
Air-to-Surface Missiles Type
Length
Speed
AGM-12BBullpup
3-2m
Mach 2-4
Range
AGM-65A Maverick
2-5m
Mach1-2
3.8m
Mach 0-75
(151in)
AGM-45A Shrike
3m 4-6m
AS-1 Kennel
8-2m
Mach 2 Mach 2-5
11
-Sm
Mach
1-2
Mach 3-5
8-6m not available
AS 30
40km 56km 160km
560km 460km
Mach
1-2
AJ168 Martel
230km 11km (6-8 miles)
6km
Mach
1-7
6-5km
Mach
1-5
2-6m
(Smiles)
3-9m
(4
3-9m
Mach
-9
AM39Exocet
4-7m
Kormoran
4-4m
Mach 0-9
70km
Mach
37km
(43.5 miles)
0.95
(23 miles)
(173in)
2-5m
Mach 0-9
15km
subsonic
32km
(99in)
R04
4-5m
(9
3-6m
supersonic
9km
Mach
9km
(5-5 miles)
(142in)
Martin Pescador
2-9m (116in)
miles)
(20 miles)
(175in)
ROSA
miles)
60km (37-2 miles)
(185in)
Sea Skua
miles)
11-3km (7
(153in)
(143miles)
Machi
Range
Mach 0-27
(153in)
(286 miles)
(339in)
AS-7 Kerry
92km
Speed
1-9m
(102in)
(350 miles)
(444in)
AS-5Kelt
AS 20
(100 miles)
(372in)
AS-4 Kitchen
16km
Length {74in)
(35 miles)
subsonic
(324in)
9-5m
AS 12
(25 miles)
(IBOin)
AS-2 Kipper
Type
(57 miles)
(120in)
AGM-78 Standard
3km
(10 miles)
(98in)
AGM-84A Harpoon
11
(7 miles)
(126in)
2-3
(5-5 miles)
.
Warrior^of Allah The Afghan guerrilla fighters Armed
resistance to the Marxist regime established
m
Ati;hamsian by the April 1978 Saur Revolution developed ra|-)idly during the winterof 1978-79. Indeed,
of any kind had never been wideK among the tribesmen and ethnic minorities what was one of the poorest and most backu ard countries in the world. The efforts of officials of the ruling Khaiq wing of the People's DennKi atic Part\ of Afghanistan PDPA) to impose unpopular rclorms and a programme of modern education and itcrac\ on the traditionalist villages offended the conscr\ati\c rural Mullahs, who encouraged resist;incc to what they saw as the godless comnuinisni w hicii w as being forced upon them. Backed up by squads of soldiers, the Khalqi othcials were soon resorting to summarx cxccLilions o\ local religious and village leaders in an cllorl u< suppress active opposition, but this mercl\ pioxukcd many of the peasant tribesmen, who |cai(>us|\ guarded their independence, to rebellion .Armed withancient muskets and -303 L.ee Hnfield boll acium rillcs. many of which were manulactuivxl Ironi poor central authority
accepted
ot
(
1
materials
m
m
small workshops across the bdidci
the
Northv\est Frontier Provinccof Pakistan, ihc .Mii|ahi-
were know n. soon controlled large areas ol the coliiiIi n side, and posed a serious threat to the Lun ernment ot Noor Mohammed 1 araki The Alghan Arniv. though well-ec|uipped and trained bv the Soviet linion. had itsell been deepK divided bv the ci)mmunist takeover, which main nationalist othcers opposed. Peasant conscripts were otten unwilling to fight the Mu)ahidin with whom manvot them identihed. and poor morale led to a hi'jh din. as the rebels
level ot desertion, often directh
Unable
to contain the
successor Hah/ullah assistance.
The
to the rebel side
msureencx both
araki aiul his
I
.
Anmi
relied totalK
clear identification ot
upon
,So\ let
the
PDP.A
government with the Soviet L'mon. at;Lira\ated b\ clumsy measures such as the substitution of the red Hag tor the traditional red. black and >:rcen Afiihan flag, led to Its further isolation and streuLithened the Mu)ahidin claim to be h-jhtm;: ahol\ w arof liberation
ditional rivalries with othercthnic groups, such as the
against a forei<:n-dominated re>:mie.
ties,
Mumo\e
Ethnic and political divisions piexented the
trom developing intoa unilietl iialioiuil The largest and traditionalK domigroup in Alghanistan w as the Pushtuns (or Pathans). most ol whom lived in the south of the country. Their close links to the Pushtun tribes of Pakistan had been a cause of conflict betu een the two countries for many years, and suecessixe Afiihan governments had supported Puslitun separatism m Pakistan. Tension over ihii issue had eontiibuted lahidin
ment, however. nant ethnic
greatly to the strong links whic'i
developed with the Soviet lJnu)ii pro-American policy of Pakistan. heavily represented amonast the
\i-jli:inist;in
oimiei lo i
in the
north and the
Tapks
in the
north and
As the w ar spread with government aircraft bomb.
and intlicting heavy civilian casualAtehans tied as refugees to the safety of Pakistan and Iran. Afghan opposition parties, dominated lelimous leaders and urban intellectuals, also ^hed themselves abroad, and many were based the eit\ ot Pesha' 1 the Pakistani Northwest IlL '\ eminent -which iiiii
rebel villages
mam
1
1
I
liiional nationalist
com-
ipposition to 1
aI n
:d
Ii;kI
th(
Islai
.
fun-
ition !:n)ups.
tlies,
Above: An Afglian fVlujahidin guerrilla looks out across the mountain valleys where the bitter war against Soviet forces has
been waged. The IVIujahidin first took up armsagainstthe Marxist
government
in
Kabul, but
after the
overthrow of
Amin
December 1979
in
and the occupation of the country by some 85,000 Soviet troops, they continuedtofightforan independent Islamic Afghanistan.
channels through which
Imancial
aiitl
military aid
contributed to the Mu|ahidin
ihi-
he n 'mis were Muiahidm in;' traI
l)/beks
northeast ot Atehanistan. proved hard to overcome.
nservativc Islamic states of the
.i
(
lulf antl
Saudi .Arabia
IS
bv the radical Libya
1989
AFGHANISTAN Mujahidin
197X-84
political
groups
Hizb-i-lslami (Islamic Party) Pushtji:, fundamentalist; led by
Gulbuddm Hek-
maiyji nationwide, ,
Hizb-i-lslami (Islamic Party)
Pushtun, fundamentalist; led by Yunis
based
in tfie
Kfialis;
Jalalabad area, Nangarhiar and Paktia
provinces.
Jamiat-i-lslami (Islamic Society)
Mainly non-Pushtun
ethinic
Burhanuddin Rabbani;
led by
minorities;
militan/ leaders include
Massoud; based in northeast and northern Tajik and Uzbek regions.
Afimed
Sfiah
(Afghan
Jabha-i-Nejat-i-Melii-Afghanistan National Liberation Front)
Loyal to the Mujaddidi family of traditional Islamic leaders, small'and ineffective; led
Mujaddidi; based
in
by Sibghatullah
the southeast.
Mahaz-i-Meili-lslamiye-Afghanistan (National Islamic Front)
Loyal to Gailani family, accepts need for compromise with USSR; led by Sayyid Ahmad Gailani; based in Paktia Province.
(Revolutionary
Harakat-i-lnqilab-i-lslami
mic Movement) Party of moderate
med
Nabi
Mullahs; led by
rural
Mohammadi; based
in
Isla-
MohamTop: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the fundamentalist
the northern
province of Fan/ab.
Above: Burhanuddin Rabbani, Hizb-i-lslami.
Sazman-i-Nasr (Organisation forVicton/) Shi'ite, pro-Iranian; based in the northwest.
leader of Jamiat-i-lslami,
whose most famous guerrilla commander was
Shu'la-i-Jawed (Eternal Flame) Tajik,
pro-Peking; based
in
Badakshan Province
Ahmed Shah Massoud,
Setem-i-Meli (Against National Oppression) Maoist, Tajik, based
ot
in
active in the important
Panjsher Valley.
Badakshan Province.
Cdloiicl (ukkhih aiul the iv\ okiIionai\
Iranian
Islamic Rcpuhlk ol .\\ aloliah Khoiiiciiii he Peshawar part ICS wciv llicivtoiv in a position to impose their own conditions upon the Mujahidin rebels who came to them for support, and while they made the wildest claims for their own efforts in the war against Kabul, made only a negative contribution by injecting their own divisions and rivalries into an already disorganised internal resistance movement. Though the Mujahidin resistance was unable to realise its full potential and remained uncoordinated and without clear leadership, it nevertheless was able to deprive the Kabul government of control of large I
areas.
The
inahilit\
ol
the
contain the msLii iichcn u as military
aimed
intervention
ol
.\niiii
a Jii l\
i
ijmcmment
Laiisc
(
il
the Son
to lel
uhich
Dcccnihei
government of national reconciliation under the more moderate Babrak Karmal for the isolated and almost universally hated Amin. The occupation of Afghanistan h\ up to Ss.ODO Soxiet troops only strengthened opn.iMiKm. hnwexei. and to substitute a
the failure of the polic\ oI coik ilumon
leli
Moscow
with no alternative but to acccin the nccessit\ ol a protracted counter-insurgenc\ war m Alglianistan while a strong central administration was s|owl\ constructed
in
Kabul.
While under Taraki and Amin 1990
brutal repression
had conlmed actix e opposition lai i:el\ to the eiuintiA So\ let interx ention led to strikes and demon-
side, the
strations
,-\rm\
deinoiisti alors
ellect
liie
.
hetween and sokhcis ol the Afghan upon aiin\ iiioiale was catas-
the cities, with blood\ clashes
111
unarmed
and Iroiii a ine-interx enlion peak ol SO. 1)00 it soon o'llaj-iscd to sonic .'M ).( lOO. nian\ ol w hom were pooil\ trained and unreliable conscripts, who desened to iIk- .Mujahidin i:; Hole Linits. Mutinies and desertions pro\ ided the Mujahidm notonl\ w iili iccniils. but also w iili modern wea[ions, tropliic.
men
^^
.\KM automatic assault rifle, w Inch soon supplemented the tradi-
such as"thcSo\ let-nuklc large
iiLiiiilx
tional
Lee
So\
let iiitei
i
s
ot
internal loiial opposition to the
l.nlield\
eiition
IclI
Irom abroad, though iarlx
111
the
captured
iioiili,
to an lueiease in
,So\ lei we;ip..iis oi
orsoldhx Alghaii
arms supplies
iiian\ Miiialiidni units, particu-
lemamed \riii\
upon upon wea|>oiis supplied Liil^cK deiiendenl
soKheis
C
and
liina
I
,g\ pt
.
m
supjilied lai>:e .iinounis ol So\iell\pe weapons, ineluduiL^assaull illes. / ; anli-aiicrall eaiiiioii, mines and Kl'(, ' hvket launelieis. and I'lesuleiil Rea-.m announeed llial llie niled .States would also he piepaied to pioxide :issisianee to the ,\lii|,iliidin 11 leiiKuned uikleai, howe\ei, to w iiat e\tcnt the .Aiiici leans were prepared to become m\ ()l\ ed Ml .Mghanistaii. ami I 'S assistance appeared to
parlieular,
i
^
I
I
AFGHANISTAN be limited to organising and linancing supplies from other sources.
valleys run.
Meanwhile, the Soviet forces had established conof the main towns and roads, and began to develop the infrastructure of occupation, with huge bases near the main towns in the seven militar\- zones which they had established. From these bases "search and desoperations were mounted against Mujahidin tro\ units w hich posed a threat to communications and the all-iniportant supply route from Soviet Central Asia to Kabul. While maintaining this minimum military objective of preventing the collapse of the Karmal government and the victory ©f the anti-communist Mujahidin. the Soviet Union pursued the long-term stiatci:} o\ reconstructing the Afghan armed forces iindLM a new pro-Soviet officer corps. The .Mujahidin were nevertheless able to capture a number of towns. Heavy fighting was reported around the southern city of Kandahar on several occasions, and even after heavy bombing and a large-scale Soviet-Afghan offensive in 1981. Mujahidin units remained active within the city. The control of the eastern town of Herat was also disputed, provoking a major Soviet offensive in the area during 98 -82. and the Mujahidin were able to seize control of Gulbahar. at the head of the strategicallv important ^
tions,
trol
.
Aoo^
e:
Craftsmen produce
copies of Lee Enfield in a
primitive
rifles
workshop
in
1
Pakistan's
Northwest Even
Frontier Province
weapons, the Mujahidin soon managed to gain control of much of Afghanistan's using such crude
mountainous countn/side. Left:
Rebel
far left)
their
commanders
Massoud (seated
such as
were able to arm
men with captured AK
assault rifles
and with
heavier weapons such as the Chinese-produced
Type 52
75mm recoilless
rifle (below). China, Egypt and the USall armed the
1
Panjsher Valley, during July 1981.
The Panjsher Valley,
to the north of
Kabul and Afghan
threatening the main supply-route to the
from So\
through the Salang Pass, was tlic scene ot eonimued fighting, and of a number ot niajor Soxiet ultensnes. The Mujahidin there ueie undei ilie emiiniand of Ahmed Shah Massoud. a hiL:hl\ ea|xible and popular guerrilla commander w ho had Liiiitied a numberof small bands into a well-organised and ettieient fighting force of some 2()()()-30O0 men. The fighting in the Panjsher \alle\. though more intense and coordinated than ciseu here, is typical of much of the war in Afghanis-
capital
iet
Central
.-Xsia
rebels after the Soviet
tan since the Soviet intervention.
intervention.
almost
125km (80
The
miles) long, and
is
1978-84
mountains through which a number of lesser
tiigh
The
terrain
ideal for guerrilla opera-
is
and would require an estimated four to n\e occupy effectively. In con^quence, ihe Mujahidin under Massoud have established a strong base in the valley which is secure enough for many Mujahidin to attend training courses there. During 1980-81 there were a number of Soviet-
divisions to
.
Afghan Army offensives
in the
Panjsher Valley, but
May 982 when the 5. The mouth of was sealed on 10 May, and a combined air and artiller)' bombardment was concentrated on sus-
the heaviest fighting occurred in
Soviet
command mounted
1
.
Panjsher
the valley
pected Mujahidin positions. battalion
was
On
17
May,
a Soviet
helicopter-lifted into the area betw eon
Khenj and Dasht-i-Rawat. Simultaneously, a strong ground force advanced up the valley w ith the aim of reaching the positions occupied by the heliborne troops.
Blocking Soviet progress Massoud's Mujahidin, however, inflicted heavy losses on the exposed heliborne battalion, and, forewarned of the Soviet advance by a forward reconnaissance unit, were able to block the progress of the 360 'Nevel-Polotsk" Motor Rifle Division and the Afghan 444 Commando Brigade. An armoured column of T62 tanks and BTR-60 PB armoured personnel carriers (APCs), advancing from Rokka. came under continuous attack and failed to deploy off the highway, falling victim to Mujahidin ambushes and minefields. The Soviet troops failed to exploit their superiority in equipment, and the Mujahidin were able to concentrate their inferior forces against the
is
head of the advancing column, inflicting heavy casualties and preventing the relief of the helicopterborne battalion. A second Soviet offensive in August 1982. codenamed Panjsher 6. showed that the Soviets had learned a number of lessons from the May disaster.
suirounded by
Greater attention was paid to the preparatory bom-
valley itself
bardment, which was carried out by Su-25s. MiG fighter-bombers and Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships. Coordination of the air support operation was conducted from airborne command posts in .An- 12 aircraft, whose presence overhead soon became a warning signal to the Mujahidin of an impending Soviet attack The main offensive commenced on 30 August, and Soviet troops advanced up the valley from Rokka. consolidating each stage of the operation by secondary attacks into the Panjsher" s side \ alleys, into which the Mujahidin w ithdrew. Soviet tactics still displayed a number of weaknesses, however. Infantry showed a marked unwillingness to advance from the protection of their APCs to engage the Mujahidin at close quarters, and tank commanders also seemed reluctant to deploy across country, therefore remaining dangerously dependent upon the narrow mountain roads where they w ere vulnerable to Mujahidin ambushes. While the Soviet Army was unable to eliminate the Mujahidin of Massoud. the 982 offensive had taken ihe w a into the heart of a previously secure rebel base area, md had prevented Massoud from expanding .
1
Ills
and threatening communications Salan- Pass By late 1982. both sides Imnid in their interests to conclude an trike. w lueh left the Panjsher in Mujahidin
operations
throudi
tlie
e\ideiiil\ tiiiollieial
it
hands, hut aiit>wed the So\
iet
and .Afghan .Armies
to
1991
r
AFC.IIANISTAN
l^)7S s
1
AFGHANISTAN
1978-84
1993
.
.
Hit and run A Mujahidin attack At about 17(X) hours on 6 August 1980. a small contingent of Mujahidin guerrillas prepared to move (Hit trr.m 'hew ^asc to launch an attack against the S n j.ilalabad. For tu o da> s the group. •
-.!
-:
•
-
-'.[Mil-. \
pro\ed
'1
'
a
Muiahidm
force ^onie 5tKl
men
'iL'upinthebuildiniZsotadesened
.M-.... -Vroni .lalalahad.
liljL^
f he
\
lUage had
to he a partuiilarl} u-etai staging point lorthe
pnniding protection troni aerial obser\amountain Kvation made it easil\ detenenem\ attack. During their time at the \ illage the guerrillas had caretulK gone o\er the plans of the fonhcoming operation. The\ had aNo spent a considerable amount of time on weapons guerrillas,
and
tion.
its
sible against an>
maintenance: their limited arsenal consisted mainl\ rifles and captured So\ iet .AK assault and rocket launchers.
of Lee Enfield rifles
The
first
stage of the operation
uas
to reach a sate
house where they could rest and eat before mo\ ing into Jalalabad during the hours of darkness The group descended from their mountain in typical hill tribesman fashion, darting from coverto cover. rareK ever presenting a target to a possible enem\ and employing the protection given by dead ground and natural co\ er to the full. The only major threat to the guerrillas during the daylight journey was that posed by the constant patrol of Soviet gunships. Whenever these passed nearby, scattering mines and antipersonnel de\ ices, the guerrillas would remain absolutely still. The speed of the helicopters made it quite difficult for pilots actuall\ to notice a man on the ground. .As dusk fell, the guerrillas reached their first safe house, that of a fanner, and auaited the arrival of a second group of .Mujahidin. Shortly after, the second group arrived - though the\ had been dela\ed and forced to take a far longer route because So\ let tn ii>ps had blown three important bridges the pre\ lous da> The assault force now numbered 23 men. .After the distnbution of arms and ammunition, the group s leader Engineer .\lahmoud (who had received training uith the .Afghan Army), gave the orders for
Above: An Afghan guerrilla fighter
proudly
displays a captured Soviet RPG-7. The rebels have
been able to augment their limited
arms supplies
through the capture of Soviet arms and ammunition. Right above: Mujahidin, armed with much-prized Soviet assault
scramble down a mountain pass. The harsh rifles,
terrain
has contributed
greatly to the military survival of the Mujahidin.
movement. As the group approached the outskirts of Jalalabad. Engineer .Mahmoud deployed 10 men from the group held a narrow iron bridge o\er a canal which the\ 1
ij
:
lUst
•v'.int
The detachment was
maintain
Right: Soviet vehicles,
surxeillance of the approaches to the bridge
victims of a successful
crossed.
to
Landmines, -1 from Soviet ammunition trucks, were to be jJ m a wide arc amund the bridgehead with particular concentration •a the mam approaches. .Members of the fire part> qui.kl\ acquainted themselves with the approximate pos ,uiing of the mines and established two routes whi^li he> would use to :i'
'Id it
until the fire part> returned.
-
-
'
return along in order to a\(Md scoring 'ow n giiaN'
As soon It
lO-man group had established itself Ensineer .Mahmoud mo\ edout w ith the
as the
the bridsze.
rebel ambush, lie burnt-out and abandoned at an isolated outpost north of
Kabul. The vulnerability of ambush, emphasised by the Russians' inflexible ground
vehicles to
strategy, was quickly exploited by the Mujahidm forces who were able to launch lightning attacks
and then disappear.
AFGHAMST.\N 1978-^ and pres>ci on into the suburbs o: ^ ibad. The group had ^-ranged to take a further ns break at the hou>e of a sympathiser and r.-ched the location undetected. Once there, food as distributed, prayers said and the final weapons checks were made, the .\K assault rifles carried by some members of the group were highly valued: the 30-round magazine and semi-automatic action compared ver> favourably with the bolt-action Lee Ennelds with which most of the guerrillas were armed, particulariy since the Lee Enfield only held a five-round magazine. The guerrillas had also learned a new trick from their Soviet enemy - the use of hollow-nosed rounds the effect of w hich w as literally to blow a man apart. Even if the round only hit your forearm it w ould be capable of remoxing the entire -.ss. lire party
.
.-r
a firefight there w as a high probabi!iT> that vo l: would die. .At about 2330 hours, the familiar saueaking ra~ble of tracked w heels signalled the apf*oacht)f either an APC or a tank. Engineer .Mahmoud placed his rocket launcher, an RPG-7 through a hole in the wall of the garden .As the vehicle crossed his sights he fired the round at point-blank range. The explosion was deafening. For a moment there was silence and then V ere hit in
.
.
the screams of the victims filled the air.
Immediately the group retreated
The tactics w ere standard guerrilla armed force with standby
stopped, turned and released a volley at their pur-
two guerr.iia up and ran down a street out into c^n
The Russians opened up with machine guns
and sent up
flares to illuminate the area.
retreating guerrillas
while
still
proved ver>
With automatic
fire filling
.
reluctant to follow the guerrillas into the country side awa\ from the safet\ of their garrison. Shortly afterw ards. the group recrossed the canal and made its w ay to the safet> of the farmhouse . w here the
seemed
guerrillas rested until
darkness they
.
the air. the fire party
rendez\oused w ith their support at the canal bndge. Engineer .Mahmoud quickly deployed his men. giving them new arcs of fire, and prepared to engage anv Soviet troops follow ing The Russians, how ever,
support deplo> ing into the heart of an urban area w here it could select a known target, destroy it and
:
But the
difficult targets and.
fleeing, returned sporadic bursts of fire.
practice: a small, lightly
melt aw ay into the countn side. .As the group w aited in the garden a two-man foot patrol stopped for a cigarene on the other side of the road. The guerrillas ~:aintained their positions and were unperturbed by ".e enemv presence They w ere not anxious to engage
speed through
suers. -At die gates of the garden the
fields.
Lea\ ing the safe house A: 2300"hours the assault group left the safe house and made its w ay tow ards a pre -selected ambush site: Engineer .Mahmoud carried a captured Soviet rocket launcher. The group reached its objective, a walled garden, and deployed quickly and quietly. Eight men remained by the entrance, w hile the rest moved along a bomb-damaged wall w hich overlooked a main road leading into the centre of Jalalabad. Several lorries passed along the road but the guerrillas w ere w aiting for a more substantial target, reluctant to waste valu-
at
the garden. Shots rang out as So\ iet troops pursued the attackers. .Almost in the same instant the guerrillas
sections joined
-houlder.
able ammunition.
Lack of medical facilities meantthat if yo^j
:roops.
made
Still
under cover of
way back
into the hills.
0300 hour^ their
.
Intense air activit\ immediately following dawn, from Soviet helicopter gunships. forced the rebels to
keep low but there w ere no ground troop mo\ ements. Engineer -Mahmoud's group had fulfilled its objective -one Soviet target for one RPG ro jrd Alexander McNair-Wilson .
an trap The Soviet Army's techniques in
Afghanistan
It IS
a long-established teatiire ot'the
u
artare that nulitan action
ated
pt'litkal
iji'aN
ill
niilitan iincKjiiicni has 1>
must be
So\
iel
attitude to
stricti)
subordin-
Atghaiiisian. the Soviet
^onscqucntK beencareful-
Kremhn's ^uneeption
limited b> the
ot' its
policy
objectives. Their wi'iinter-insurgencs etYort has not
attempted to esiabhsh >.oniiol o\er the whole of Afghanistan - in an\ ^asc an impossible goal - or to deter the guerrillas from continuing lighting by imposing a liigh le\ci ot casualties, mi the principle of the
L
S 'bod} -souiii'
committed
the
m
\
minimum
points - basicalh
ictnam
Instead, they have
t^Mce required to hold essen-
mam
towns and maior communications routes - while attempting to reci struct the Afghan Arm> and state into a selfsustaining entit_\ H\en in pursuing these limited objectives. houe\er. the .Sm let torees ha\e encountered enormous difticulties. The mam cause of the So\ieis" initial military set-backs m .Afghanistan uas their total unpreparedness for counter-insurgenc) uartare. PruM' to 1980 the training of the entire So\ let .Arnn \\ as based on the concept of either a war with .Nato in Hurope o contlicl with the Chinese m Asia. The\ were tial
.
1
the
.
.
AFGHANISTAN
Left:
Smoke billows over a
village in the
Panjsher
Valley during a strike
by Soviet
aircraft.
Afghan government forces relied heavily upon their total Soviet and
Mujahidin bases and villages which had strike at
and
first
many fled to the safety of refugee camps in Pakistan Iran.
position
Below left: A
s
ammunition capacity would not support a The effect on morale of a situation in which the only vehicles to survive an limited
protracted engagement.
ambush belong to the escort can well be imagined. The tanks were withdrawn many being shipped back to Russia, and their place was taken by armoured .
personnel carriers (APCs). the crews of which could make a mounted or dismounted response as the
demanded.
To cope with the demands of mountain warfare
,
the
Soviet Union turned to
which armament are
warfare techniques, including the different performance of weapons at high altitude, before taking their
low
.
domed
turret in
elevation and depression of the main strictly limited.
unable to
self-propelled anti-aircraft system, but the vehicle
This meant that tanks were often engage their attackers on the inaccessible
year arose from the use of tanks to escort conThe most serious flaw in Soviet tank design is
voys.
the continued use of a
Mujahidin fighter surveys theruinsof a village destroyed by an air attack.
sites. A more formidable response was provided by the quadruple cannon of Jhe ZSU-23-4
ambush
its mountain races, notably from the Caucasus. In the drastic re-examination of method which fol lowed the early set-backs men from such areas were drafted into the 104th and 105th Airborne Divisions, which serve by rotation in Afghanistan. These two divisions, upon whom much of the fighting fell, are now acknowledged to be mountain divisions in everything but name. Even the Motor Rifle divisions, which form the bulk of the Soviet garrison, now receive training in mountain
unimpressive, but the Soviets did slowly get to grips with the problem. Some of the worst casualties of the
aided the rebels. Civilian
and
mere administrative cogs. This. then, is the difficult background against which Russian efforts in Afghanistan should be seen.
The adaptation to the conditions of warfare in Afghanistan was a painful process for the Soviet Army, and much of its performance was decidedly
command of the air to
casualties were high,
high ground, a fact which the guerrillas quickly recognised and put to good use in their choice of
.
bombing
1979-84
unprepared for mountain warfare as they were for counter-insurgency. Also, some deeply-ingrained features of the Soviet Army made it a flawed instrument for its task. Good radio communications, the use of personal initiative and a high standard of junior leadership are all essential ingredients in any counterinsurgency strategy. Initially, therefore, the Russians' performance was merely a reflection of an army in which only senior officers have access to radio sets, maps are restricted documents issued to officers only subalterns are not permitted to exercise their judgement and sergeants, far from being the respected figures who form the backbone of Western armies are
.
turn.
down an airstrike As time went on, Soviet methods came in some ways to resemble American techniques used in Viet-
Calling
nam. This entailed, for example, a gradual improvement in communications which enabled embattled convoy commanders to request artillery fire support from within the fortified base camps, provided these were within range, or to call down an airstrike from the considerable air contingent present.
The
air
con-
is based mainly at Bagram, Kandahar, Shindand and Herat, and there is therefore nowhere inside the country that is more than a few minutes flying time from its airfields: if necessary, further strikes can be mounted from air bases across the Russian frontier. The Soviet fixed-wing ground attack strength within .Afghanistan itself is estimated as being 68 MiG-21 Fishbed light strike aircraft: 30 MiG-23 Flogger strike aircraft; 10 armed-reconnaissance versions of the MiG-25 Foxbat: and 65 Sukhoi Su-17 and Su-20 Fitter close-support attack aircraft. To this must be added the Afghan government's own air force which on the eve of the Soviet invasion was said to include 40 MiG-21s. 50 of the older MiG-17s. 24 Su-7BM close-support aircraft and 45 11-28 Beagle light bom-
tingent
A soldier's Story There
war
is
very
there.
little
glamour about the
Afghanistan for the young
in
Soviet citizen It
is
who
a nasty
is
drafted to serve
war
at
the best of
times, and the Russian soldier lives
in
constant fear of being picked off by an Afghan sniperor captured by a band of guerrilla fighters.
Soviet soldier
West
stop/ of
up
had
when he was From
just
Afghanistan.
Afghan Air
mediately captured by the Afghans.
tion
He was
controllers
he was sent to Omsk for training, 'It was tough and the food was verybad We were always hungry, 'he said. By the end of the year he was in Siberia
the
in
left
up Kansk
called
his birthplace in
known how much of
in
the army.
Vashchenko
Yuri
not
of ground support: senior air force officers locate their headquarters beside those of senior ground-troop commanders to ensure the closest possible coopera-
ways
school
is
But the atmosphere was altense, and no one trusted anyone else.' Yun decided one evening to go for a stroll round the town and was imforth.
in
It
the markets - jeans, radios and so
one the
in
bers.
Force remains operational Together, these aircraft deploy a formidable array of air-to-ground weaponry, yet the application of
it
gives an idea of the state of
morale
1982.
The
who ended
'Moraleamong the troops was ven/ low. They would talk only about where was safe to go, where there was shooting and what was on sale m
lucky not to be killed on the
spot - the usual fate for Russians
taken prisoner.
He was
eventually
taken to a Red Cross post inside Pakistan.
airpower in this way has not produced the desired results. There is nothing wrong w ith the Soviet theory
at
and tactical levels, while air ctodevise yet more efficient means of
the strategic striN
target indication. aircraft
among
demands little
The
difficulty
is
that flying fast jet
the mountains in uncertain weather
intense concentration
which leaves very
time available for identifying the precise area of which has been indicated, especially as the
the target
1997
AFGHANIS AN I
iy7^)-X4
.
.
AFGIIAMSI eueiTillas arc expert at lm
scqiientK
.
much
of the
sionall) a pilot uill
.
11}
addituni. in an attempt to isolate the juenillas tn local support
are
attacks.
and supplies, \illages
operaluii:
The
ra/cd b\
result ot this polic\ has
late entire \allc_\s.
swell the
are
in
been
to
depof
number ot refugees
m
Helicopters lonned pan ol the So\
let
ot
ord
.\Ii-S
Hip and the Mi-:4
Hind, joined ivcentK b\ the giant .\li-2h. all ot which can ser\ e either as troop earners or gunships mounting a xarietx of sensors and ground-attack weapon s\ stems. These ha\e gnen the Russians access to the high ground and ha\e enabled them to intlict losses on the Miijahidm where the\ ha\e piexuHisly
vital
in
Afghanistan
supply routes, but this proved a far from simple task.
Even under armoured
sug-
L'csts that
There
is
made an\
.
,^een Int.
.
no indication that the Sen
serious progress tow ards
its
of of
(.
mil
Afghan Arn,
torces to the delence of mai-
he
tirst
ti\e >ears
i.f
So\
let
;ib!e.
howe\er. '1
It
lo
the .\n
.
-
major operations against gnei 1
al
tor the gueiTillas re-
.rt
he Russians are
to the
'St
ground
1
L'nion has
w ithdraw
a stabilised .Afghanistan permitting the
SoNiet combat forces. .Supp.
let
political goal
nal
.
;
;
i
i.,
_i 'ii^
operations
m
.ciMiions. .Atghaiiis-
undoubtedb w iinesscdan immense impro\ ement in SoMct counter-insurgenc\ techniques, and there was siune e\idenee that the Russians were taking
tan
ad\antage of the situation to gi\e their forces real tor exanijile. imitating the combat experience .Americans" practice in \ letnam of rotating otiieers rcguiarh thus sacriticing et ticienc\ in the immediate .
counter-insurgeiKA campaign to the longer-term goal ot of ticer training
has been softened up. SimilarK durmg large-scale cordon-and-search operations in wild countr\ the use of helicopters as tlN ing command posts has enabled
the effect of the .Atghan conllict
senior officers to coordinate the
operations
.ui'.
:
forexample. aguenillagroup units w ill be lifted into blocking positions to cut off their retreat while others will be air-landed on a dropping /one trom which an assault can be launched after the objectn e so.
located in the hills
.
objective of Soviet
n S
rC!::
If.
is
was to keep open the main
.
when inertlyinc some machines at least
tlares
some Russian
been unable to do
Below: Trucks drive through the wreckage of an ambushed convoy. The single most important
opters
hel
t
Kittle
Afghanistan Irom the outset, but the .iilurc ot ground troops and tixed-uing aiicratt to ctnitain the gueiTillas has led to their use on an e\ er-mereasing scale. The \ersions emplo_\ed most trcquentK m in
ow
neliuling the Russians'
mains constant.
Pakistan.
.
more punish-
than most. The guenillas then acquired shouljs. ier-launched heat-seeking sart .i. j-to air n ;'K'nt
areas w
eonceiitiated
increase aiiti-Russian teeliPL: a
.Afghanistan are the .Mil
largel\ ineilevU
o\ iet designs are capable of absorbing
vratt straijjht into the
I:
.\Iu]jhidin. Scckinii ground, to the delight c betterrcsults.theSoMctsi and. allc-cdU. chemical which ccner a hilKide rather than a ^peatic area,
the\
was
sniallarms hre. but this
Coil-
p.
mo\ ements
ot their
troops as never before.
.Although the use of helicopters has produced results for the Russians, the stor\ has not been one of
unqualihed success. At high altitude, thin air and unexen themials can both proxe fatal, and machines ser\ ing in .Afghanistan have now been nnuiitied to cope with these conditions. Occasionall\ too. helicopters crash among the high peaks after being caught .
in a
deadh w hite-out" "
blizzard.
posed b\ rotocraft the Mujahidin
To counter the threat first
put up a barrage
under ^ombat conditions.
Diimkenness. dmg-taking and desertion I
hcre has also been a resemblance to \ letnam
in
on So\ let troops. morale and ef ticienc} pio\oked b> bad li\ing conditu>ns and disenchantment w ith the cause, which has manifested itself in a \ ariet\ of w a\ s. including drunkenness, drug-taking, desenion. w idcspread crime, the sale of arm\ propert\ toci\ ilians. and the murder ol unpopular otticers. In contrast, the Muiahidin ha\ e stitf ered no such crisis of morale and ha\e acquired a growing expeilise in I
here has been a decline
the use of the is
in
more sophisticated weapon s\ stems. It inxohmg \ct more divisions
cei1ainl_\ true that b\
the
Kremlin could leduce guerrilla
acceptable cost
IS
le\ el
.
but
how man_\
an open question.
to an
acti\it\
di\ ision-
and
at
w
hat
Br>an Perrett
The helicopter in counter-insurgency operations The
first
large-scale military use of helicopters took
War. where they were extenCasevac (casualty evacuation, also known as Medevac or medical evacuation) and
place during the Korean sively
employed
for
was highlighted by experience acquired
limited use of the helicop-
Son in South Vietnam. The employment of helicopters
the
against insurgents on a
port infrastructure and rugged jungle terrain se\ crel\
Insurgent forces often operated in forests, jungles,
limited infantry mobility in operations against the
mountains or swamps and it was realised that the helicopter would be a useful instrument in the surveillance of insurgents and the rapid deployment of
Malay communists, but
the arrival of troop-cany
Westland Whirlwinds
1953 provided an
troops onto their positions.
remote areas before w ord of their approach could be passed to the guerrillas. Although useful as a trans-
Initially,
a poor power-to-weight ratio that
left
very
spare lifting capacity imposed a serious limitaon the use of helicopters. This was due to the low horsepower of the an pooled radial engine, the lightest and therefore the t, siciiLiinc a\ailable. However, a major technical bi caktlirough w as achieved in 1955 b\ [he Slid lalion and Turbomeca companies of FiaiKc. uho produced the Alouette II helicopter
the helicopter
little
port,
tactical operations in
2000
in
iiig
in\ aluablc
increase in tactical reaction enabling soldiers to reach
tion
povNcrcd by a gas-turbine engine. Thereafter, turboshaft propulsion was universally adopted and this
Bell UH-IDs of the 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) landing troops near Bong
Above:
ter in the
time.
on
at this
militar\
US
The French Army made
foot
The
of the helicopter to operate over difficult
terrain previously accessible only to infantry
in
service.
counter-insurgency role in Indochina, but first major use of helicopters for counterinsurgency operations was by the British in Malaya during the Emergency in the 1950s. The poor trans-
also served in a limited role as troop transports. ability
speeded up the spread of helicopters
was
was
Vietnam War. Top
right:
Inside a helicopter gunship
over Vietnam; the gunship has proved highly effective in counter-insurgency operations.
not suited to large-scale
Malaya because its noise gave warning of approach, and good cover for the alerted guerrillas was given by the thick jungle growth. However, although the jungle hindered the landing of was lound thai a simple laiuliiii: /onc could be quickK cleared h\ either cliain-saws or helicopters, n
explosives.
The more open
large scale
characteristic of the
terrain in Algeria
pro\ided the
Right:
A British Westland
Wessex lowers a 105mm pack howitzer for a f irebase in
the Radfan. Helicopters
can
lift
heavy equipment to
regions other forms of transport cannot reach.
HELICOPTERS
IN
COUNTER-INSURGENCY
scene tor the Hrst use ot mass helicopter tactics. The Morice Line along the Algerian-Tunisian border,
by the French to prevent guemlla inliltration. had numerous sensory devices emplaced along it and when these detected the crossing of the line by guerrillas, paratroopers would be flown by Sikorsky S-55s to the vicinity of the infiltration in platoon or company units. The French also fitted every helicopter with a mounting to take a 20mm machine gun, to be used when the rotocraft was not carrying troops to provide mobile fire support of forces in the field. In the 1960s in the Radfan, north of Aden, and along the Malaysian-Indonesian frontier in Borneo, the helicopter and the British Army resumed their successful cooperation as in the recently-ended Malayan Emergency. Although the terrain was very different in the two cases, the helicopter played a similar role in both. As in Malaya, it was used to deposit troops close to the positions of enemy forces and to evacuate casualties. The extremely small numbers of troops involved in these conflicts kept the number of helicopters used on any single operation built
low.
The
arrival of helicopter gunships The American involvement in Vietnam saw
the
mass
tactical use of helicopters for counterinsurgency operations at its height. The 16,000-
strong First Cavalry Division (Airmobile entered the )
combat zone in August 1965 equipped with 428 helicopters, amounting to some 40 per cent of all American rotocraft operating in Vietnam; one of the lessons that the US Army drew from the French experience in Indochina was that movement of troops on the ground in vehicles was very vulnerable to the ambush tactics of the insurgents - hence the deployment of an enormous number of helicopters by the standards ofprevious counter-insurgency operations. Early actions revealed that helicopters were vulnerable to
r
fire
from the ground and the armyg-equested a
more heavily armoured and armed helicopter to give more firepower to airmobile operations. Two designs for helicopter gunships
Bell the
were produced and one, the the standard model for all
Huey Cobra, became
US armed services.
Helicopters were essential to the tactics of 'search and destroy" which the Americans employed. Search and destroy operations involved as a first step the location of guerrilla forces, either by sensory devices
or aerial observation, including the use of scout
Once the enemy was located, ground would inove in and seek to engage him and pin one position. Meanwhile, airlifted troops supported by helicopter gunships would be set down in landing zones around the enemy positions and would seek to complete an encirclement. The enemy would then theoretically be destroyed by firepower. Casevac remained an essential helicopter function during the Vietnam War. operating so efficiently that remarkably few soldiers died of their wounds, even when fighting far from their main base. The CH-47 Chinook played a vital role in the setting up of artillery firebases in otherwise inaccessible areas, and in maintaining supplies to far-flung units. It was also used to drop CS gas on known enemy strongholds the drums helicopters.
forces
him
to
,
bciiiL!
ot
rolled thnniijh the
hchcopicrs on
tlic
No use US effort in Vietnam
machine's rear door.
scale of the
has been allciiiptcd since.
The
Riioiiesian
Army became
possibly the most
2001
HELICOPTERS
IN
COUNTER-INSURGENCY
Below: A Rhodesian Fire Force 'stick' goes into action from an Alouette III.
Bottom A British Westland Whirlwind in Malaya; the Malayan "^mergency was :
thes.
e of the
first
eof helicopters
in
counter-insurgency operations.
cxpcnenccci tluriiiL'
In si,
111
1
4 \
i
>Hii)Ici-insui'ji.'nc\
cai M>HiL'hlin,iJay;iiiisi
Ilk-
I
y ')()s.
Ihc luiiiihci
mlensity ol operations, the Rhodesian
ineieasinLi
,
loiees implemented a ne\N
aiiiiLiI
I
|
.'1
lie
I
nices'.
,\
ire
I
helicopters,
capacil\ ol Ihc Rhoilcsiai
\eliiclc.
llicm; hclKoplci
troops
oil
l-orce
uould respond.
track ilow \\
as a
II
sti.-acl\
tlirouijluuit
s
sinipK
a
the insuri:cnls iiii.
tliL-
ivasL'
m
c(Hiiiti\
l'
icti\ il\ that
jicK
spread
strained the
II
inckiilinii
a
contact vsas
a
tactic involving
t\ ]-iiea!l\ comprised four ^unship and a command
loree
mlo RIkhIcsui was small
made u
iih
tzucrriilas the
the i.!rouiKl uoiild radio lor iielp I
the sjuerrillas' position aiKl the gunship
them while
the
and a
Fire
he helicopters would circle
would engage
commander ^ummoned
luither air
support The i:iduiid troops aboard the remaining two choppers would be deployed in such a w ay astocutoff the guerrillas" escape rx)utes and a fnelii;ht would then ensue which theoretically would destroy the guerrillas. These tactics proved a \cry ettective use of .
helicopters against insurgents.
The
ielati\el\ small-scale
Ulster in the
1
97()s
counter-insurgency opin the border areas of
Army
erations ol the British
and 9S()s biought 1
on the use of helicopters. As
showed
their
w orth
in
a f ui ther variant
other conllicts they
ground movewere \ ulnerable.
as an alternative lo
ment where even arnnturcd
patrols
Their speed of response w as exploited to bring troops rapidly to the scene ot an incident, and they were used to set
down and pick up foot patrols. Reconnaissance,
entrusted primarily to the lightweight .Sioux, was
gradually enhanced by the introductiim of improved sensors.
Given
the nature of the Northern Ireland
situation, however, there has never been any question of introducing helicopter gunships - they would be
provocative and in any case highly inappropriate to the low-level insurgency being faced.
Since 1979 the chief example of helicopter-borne counter-insurgency has been the So\ iet campaign in Afghanistan. The Sov iets gradually recognised their
need for an extensive use of helicopters
moun-
in the
Afghan terrain, where their armoured vehiproved extremely vulnerable to ambush and suffered great problems in achieving any crosscountry mobility. Using the Mi-4 Hound, the Mi-8 Hip and the Mi-24 Hind, they developed a by now standard range of counter-insurgency techniques, tainous cles
placing combat troops to the rear or flanks of guerrilla positions, using gunships to provide mobile fire sup-
port for troops on the ground, and exploiting the
strength of the helicopter as a reconnaissance
\
ehicle
-
its ability to achieve good ground observation. For heavy lifts the Soviets have employed the Mi-6 Hook, the Mi- 10 Harke and the lVli-26 Halo, currently the
largest helicopter in the world.
The
helicopter has clearly demonstrated
its
w orth
as an essential piece of counter-insLirgency equip-
ment, although high-technology
it
has yet lo pio\e
battletield.
itself
on the
Paul Szuscikievvicz
Key Weapon*^
LANDMINES
ff
.
KEY WEAPONS
.11: aikl c\pK'M\ c Ihli fuzing, a: both Allied cUkI AmsIoivc- laid cMcnsiv and their coimiuiiiiL' Li^L'ti.ilnc--v m u demonstrated as ivv.enii\ a^ !Ik- alkla during uhidi \\w XiLvniiiiMiis iaid mines on the islaiuN Landmines tall into two basie eategor and anti-personnel. All types usually comprise acasc. a fuze and an explosive charge. The fuze is normally I
I
mine generally detonating the response to pressure. The required acti\ at-
located at the top of the
device
in
.
ing pressure can vary greatly: 8-50kg
(
18-1 101b) for
an anti-personnel mine and 200-250kg (440-5501b) for an anti-tank mine. An anti-personnel mine usually has a charge of 75- 00 grams (2-6-3-5oz), compared 1
with a charge of 5- 10kg
-221b) for an anti-tank in shape, composition and size depending on the role the mine is intended to fulfil Anti-tank mines are usually laid in carefully chosen positions to channel attacking vehicles into areas where the defenders will have a good chance of destroN ing them, it is effective as an anti-tank weapon
mine. The case varies
2004
(
1
1
LANDMINES l>i
iMKinl)
parts
because
can strike aiiamst the two weakest vehicle: Ihc inaks ami the thinly-
the
o\
it
aniu>iirei.i uiiclcrsalL'
(or bell\
by the method
ckissilied
ol'
i,
British
Mk 7 anti-tank minO
Pressure plate spring
Aiiii-tank niincs are
copper and asbestos washer
atlackiniz the vehicle,
giving three distinct types: those which attack the tracks
steel
and roadwheels, those which attack the belly,
case or body
and the of f-route mine which attacks the tank from the side, like an automatic anti-tank gun. The tracks and running gear can be disrupted by any strong blast, but belly-attack
and off-route mines need
to use a
shaped
Of course, a damage a tank's
charge to penetrate the tank's armour. belly-attack
mine w
running gear
it
its
ill
also tend to
charge
is
large enough.
mine fuze also comes in a variety of The simplest is the single-impulse fuze, requiring only the correct amount of pressure to deton-
The
anti-tank
forms.
it; although it is vulnerable to simple countermeasures .its cheapness has made it the most common fuze on anti-tank mines in the world. Double-impulse
detonator assembly
ate
fuzes are
more complex and aim
at
defeating one ol
counter-measures, the mine-clearing roller fixed to the front of a tank. The first pressure of the roller fails to detonate the mine but the second pressure of the tank does; if the tank is without rollers the first roadwheel acts as the first impulse and further pressure detonates the mine. A special type of fuze for the belly-attack mine is the vertical tilt rod. This sticks upout of the mine, and, u hen broken or bent by a tank, will detonate after a shoil delay. Other types of fuzes are the influence lii/e. which uses thermal, magnetic, acoustic or seismic electronic sensors to detect the tank, and the simplest
The mine may employ an anti-disturbance fuze to counter being by hand or by an anti-mine plough. Examples of anti-tank mines include the British Bar Mine, the French Model 1952 MACI vertical tilt rod mine, the Soviet TM-46 and the American M- 9. The primary aim of the anti-personnel mine is to inflict casualties on infantry (it can also disrupt wheeled transport). Anti-personnel mines are deployed in a number of ways - in conjunction with anti-tank mines to prevent a crossing on foot, along routes likely to be used by an advancing enemy and to protect a prepared position. Mines are very effective at harassment when scattered about randomly in the path of the enemy.
Right: The Soviet PMD-57 anti-personnel mine is
made ofwood. The firing is placed through a hole the bottom half of the box. Wooden mines were
pin in
developed during World War first
II.
tripwires forthe off-route attack mine.
also
lifted either
Right:
The
interior of
an
Ml 8 Claymore comprises steel balls embedded
700
1
in a plastic matrix with C-4 plastic explosive behind the spheres.
.
Anti-personnel
minescome in twocategories: indiAs the name implies,
vidual-attack and mass-attack.
individual-attack mines are designed to injure
man and ha\c
a small blast radius.
They
one
are either
methodical l\ cmplaced on the ground or scattered by a dispenser on a vehicle or helicopter. The scatterable
mine
on the top of the ground, avoiding detection its very small size and through having camouflaged material attached. Mass-attack mines are modern equivalents of cannister and grapeshot. like them discharging hundreds of steel pellets or balls up to lOOiiK l()\ds)a\\a\ They are normally detonated about a iiictiv (one \aid) above the ground; to achicxclhisthcN at clmiIkt mounted on a stake or have a central section blow n into the air by a small charge lies
through
I
hcloiv ihc
mam
Below: The Ranger anti-personnel mine
is
made of polycarbonate it has a diameter of only 62mm (2-45in)anda thickness of 32mm (1-25in). plastic:
.
charge explodes. They are usually Some mass-
triggered h\ a tnpv\ire or foot switch. attack mines. sLich as the
American M-
1
8
Claymore,
are designed to propel the
fragments in a specific attempting to achieve an allround eticct. I.xamplcs ol anti-personnel mines include the British Ranger mme. the US M-.l and M- 14 direction ralhci
tliaii
2005
KEYW
I
AI'ONS The Ranger anti-personne! mine system uses a highly flexible, multi-barrelled
projector that can be
mounted on APCs
(left),
small boats (centre) and The projector holds
trucks.
72 disposable tubes each containing 18 mines that are fired up to a range of
100m
(330ft).
Bottom Laying mines by hand is a labour-intensive and time-consuming job. However, when the :
fighting
is
over, the
position of each precisely
mine
is
known for
clearing operations.
andllicS(>\icll'().\lZ-2.
and anti-tank iiinics aiv used world and improMiii: eounter-
Botli anti-pcisunncl
by most armies measures ha\e
m
the
demands tor more complex demands are toreinL' the eost iit'manulandmines a less economic way .An increasmi; number of the enem\ led to
ariants; these
\
taetiiriii'j tip.
harassiivj
ot
mines are rials 1
I
makiiii:
heiiiL:
.
constructed trom non-metallic mate-
plastic in the Israeli
MD-H
anti-tank and
hese are verv
No.
10,
wood
in the So\'iet
PMD-6 anti-personnel
dil ticult
mines.
to detect with electronic
dcMces. I
he manner ot laying inines
is
as varied as the types
mines themselves. Before and during World War minelay ing was done by hand - a time-consuming and tedious process. For larger minefields most armies now use some form of mechanical minelavine
ot 11
.
i
(
;1..\1.SS
able
).
1
tubes,
mounted on
he Ranger system consists ot 72 dispos-
each
containing
a special rack.
18
plastic
mines,
By using manual
tiring
each tube can be Hied independently and the mines,
scatterrandomlyoverthe ground; mines can be laid in just over one minute and the mines arm themselves automatically alter LS seconds on the ground. The is being developed for defensive mining at short range using the Dynamit Nobel AT2 hollow-charge mine: the launchers contain 100 mines and can be installed on a helicopter or on the M548 tracked carrier. The Valsella VS/MD system looks like a large crate suspended beneath a helicopter and cairies 1920 anti-personnel or 200 anti-tank mines, or a combination ol both. The MI2S GHMSS holds up to 800 dispersing a total
(it
in tlight. 1
2'')(i
MSM/MW
The Technovar DAT scatter-dropping mine system can drop either anti-tank or anti-personnel
mines froma height of 100m (330ft) and at a speed of 200km/h (125mph). The container (above) is slung below a helicopter (right).
Below: A Bar Mine layer operates in wintertime conditions. at the rear
The smoothers
cover over the
mines dropped down the chute.
KEYWEAI'ONS
?,()()S
Index
A
Afghan
forces 1972 Afghanistan (1956-79) 1969-1972
counter-insurgency in 2002 guerrillas 1989-1993. 1994-1995 and Pakistan 1989 Soviet Army techniques in 1996-1999 Soviet invasion of (1979-80) 1973-1977 Africa: chronology (1976-80) 1955 and Cold War (1960-84) 1929-1931 Western intervention in (1964-84) 1869, 1871 Africa (North), Libya and 1935 Africa (South), and Namibia 1929
and Rhodesia 1929 United States and 1931
AIR FORCE Afghan fixed-wing strength 1997
Canadian Canadian Armed Forces Air Command 1905 Egyptian 1861 Ethiopian 1862 Iranian 1905 Somali 1862 Soviet fixed- wing strength in Afghanistan 1997 United States
units available to RDJTF 1962 Military AirHft Command 1961 Strategic Air Command 1960 Tactical Air Command 1961.
1984 Strategic Projection Force
1962 Civil Reserve Air Fleet 1961 57th Air Division 1962 'Aggressor' squadrons 1906. 1907 48th FUght Interceptor Squadron 1964 4441st Combat Crew Training Squadron 1904-1905 4503rd Tactical Fighter Squadron 1905 1st Tactical Fighter Wing 1962 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing 1905 27th Tactical Fighter Wing
1962 49th Tactical Fighter Wing 1962 347th Tactical Fighter Wing 1962 354th Tactical Fighter Wing 1962 366th Tactical Fighter Wing 1962 see also United States forces airliners, terrorist attacks on 1810, 1810-1811 airstrikes (Soviet) in Afghanistan 1997. 1998, 1999 America (North): chronology (1976-80) 1954 America (South): chronology (1976-80) 1955 Andropov. Yuri 1982 Angola 1929-1931 Cuba and 1979 Soviet Union and 1978-1979 United States and 1979 and Zaire 1872 Arab- Israeli wars 1809 Arafat, Yassir 1809. 1811, 1896. 1899, 1900 arap Moi. Daniel 1879
ARMOURED CARS 1943-1948 flotation screen 1944
Argentinian Model C 1948 Brazilian
Engesa Cascavel 1948 British
Daimler scout car 1944 Ferret 1944-1945 Ferret Mk I 1945 Ferret Mk II 1945 Ferret Mk IV 1945 Ferret Mk V 1945 Ferret Mk 2/3 1943 Ferret Mk 2/6 1944 Ferret Mk 4 1944 Fox 1945. 1945 Saladini944. 1945
ARW-MTW 1944 Spahpanzer Luchs (Lynx) 1946, 1947
Moroccan
AML-90 1941 AMX-10 1941 EBR-75 1941 Panhard EBR i947 South Afcrican Eland 1948, 1948 Soviet
BRDM-1 BRDM-2
1946,1947 1946, 1947
BTR-40P see BRDM-1 BTR-40P2 see BRDM-2 United States
Commando Multi-Mission Vehicle 1945-1946
Commando Scout 1946 Commando V-150 1946 Commando V-300 1946
M8
1945, 1945
ARMOURED PERSONNEL CARRIERS British
Saracen 1945 Ethiopian BTR-60PB 1857
German
(West)
TPZ- 1 Eloka iS45 Soviet 1976
BTR-60PB 1991 United States Dragon 300 1843
MUS 1960-1961 ARMY Afghan 1989 morale of 1990 use of Soviets 1999 8th Division 1975 British 17/21st Lancers 30th Royal Signals
Regiment
1847 Special Air Services 1836,
French
AML 1947
1869-70
AMX-IORC
EBR
German
1947
EBT-ETT Panhard Panhard Panhard Panhard
SAS Air Service Counter Revolutionary Warfare
1947 1947
Model 178. 1947 Model 201 1947 Model 212 see EBR Model 245 1948
Team 1819 Chinese 41st
Army
1916-1917
42nd Army 1916-1917 Dubai
7
Royal Guard 1820 Dubai forces
360 Motorised Rifle Division
see also
1991
Dutch
Radio Direction-Finding
Royal Netherlands Indies Army 1836 Ethiopian strength of 1849, 1853 2nd Division 1851 3rd Division 1851 4th Division 1851 MxWtidi 1854-1855, 1855,1856 see also Ethiopian forces French Foreign legion 1871 2nd Regiment Etrangere
Parachutiste 1872-1877 see also French forces
Iranian Imperial
Guard 1952 Revolutionary Guard
1953,
1956 Israeli
Strategy 1901 Israeli Defence Forces 1901
Lebanese
Army of Lebanon
1899 Zghorta Liberation Army 1898 Mourabitoun mihtia 1898 Phalangist militia 1898 Tigers 1898, 1899
Moroccan 1939, 1940-1941, 1941 Philippines
numbers in 1839 Bangsa Moro Maoist
New
1839
People's
Army
1838, 1842,1842 see also Filipino forces
Soviet techniques in Afghanistan 1996-1999 training weaknesses 1977 40th Army 1973, 1975 Motor Rifle divisions 1997 16th Motorised Rifle Division
1975 54th Motorised Rifle Division 1975 66th Motorised Rifle Division 1975, 1976 103rd Airborne Division 1973 104th Airborne Division 1973, 1997 105th Guards Airborne Division 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1997 201st Division 1975 357th Motor Rifle Division
1975-1976 360th Division 1975, 1976
Zairean 3 1 1 th Parachute regiment Arnold, Corporal 1875
1
876
Company
1844 Radio-Electronic Combat Battalion 1844 Signals Interception Battalion 1844 Radio Interception Company 1844 Tanzanian 1881 Ugandan 1816 purge of 1879 Suicide Mechanised Revolutionary
Reconnaissance Regiment 1881 2nd Infantry Brigade 1880 Chui (Leopard) Battalion 1881 Simba (Lion) Battalion 1881 see also
see also, Iranian Forces
1
Ugandan
forces
United Nations United Nations Interim Force 1902 United States units available to RDJTF 1962 Central Command 1960 Readiness Command 1960-1962 XVIII Airborne Corps 1962 1st Cavalry (Airmobile) Division 2000, 2001 82nd Airborne Division 1844 6th Air Cavalry Brigade 1962 9th Infantry Division 1962 24th Infantry Division (Mechanised) 1961, 1962 59th Air Defense Artillery 1924 82nd Airborne Division 1961, 1961, 1962 101st Air Assault Division 1962 101st Airborne Division 1962 502nd Infantry Division 1962 Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 1960-1962, 1980, 1993 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment Delta 1956-1959
Ranger Road Watch Team 1958 see also United States forces Vietnamese (North) 1909
3rd Division 1917 316A Division 1917 345th Division 1917 346th Division 1917 377th Division 1917 246th Regiment 1917 677th Regiment 1917 851st Regiment 1917
ARTILLERY
AMX 30 1927 anti-aircraft 1923-1928
Bofors gun 1924 Bofors L/70 1924, 1924, 1925 OerlikonGBM-AOl 1928 Oerlikon GDF-002 1925 Anglo/French Chieftain-Sabre 1928 British
105mm pack howitzer 2001 Chinese
152mm howitzer 191 Czechoslovakian M53/59 i927 Eritrean
122mm
howitzer 1856
French Panhard 1927
German
M3 VDA
1926-1927.
(West)
Gepardl925,i92S Wildcat 1921,1928 Greek Artemis 30mm system 1925 Moroccan ZU-23 1941 Soviet 1927-1928
M1939 i927 S-60 1925
ZSU-23-4 i927, 1927-1928 ZSU-511926, 1927-1928 Swiss Oerlikon GDF-001 1928 United States M42 1925 M51 Skysweeper 1924 M163 1924
M198 155mm howitzer 2006 M998 Sergeant York 1924
M 163 Vulcan i924, Sergeant York
1926
DIVADS
1926
Asia: chronology (1976-80)
1954-1955 Asians, Ugandan 1880 Assad, Hafez 1890, 1899 Associacao Popular Democratica dos Timorenses 1832-1833 Association of South East Asian Nations 1830-1831 and Kampuchea 1915 Athens airport, attack at 181 Atlantic Conveyor 1868 Australia, and East Timor 1833-1834 Azhari, General 1952
B
chaff dispensers 1825
Alkan 1825
Baader-Meinhof 1810, 1812 and Entebbe raid 1814-1818 and Mogadishu hijacking
Barricade 1865
1819-1822
and Palestine terrorists 1814-1818, 1819-1822
1867
China, and Afghanistan 1990
United States Azon 1984 Bigeye 1922 neutron 1979 Paveway II 1905 Brezhnev, Leonid 1973, 1980 Brezezinski, Zbigniew 1979-1980
and terrorism
1819
Gambia
1870; in
Kenya
Malaya 2000, 2002; Tanganyika 1869, 1870; in
1869; in in
Mk33 Mod O
'Window' 1824
cluster 1855
phosphorus 1856
in the
Corvus 1865 Protean 1865, 1865 Shield 1864, 1865
BOMBS
British forces:
AN/ALE-24 1824 AN/ALE-27 1824 AN/ALE-29A 1825
Uganda 1869 Burundi, coup in 1869 Bush, George 1829 BZgas 1922
and Kampuchea 1916 and Khmer Rouge 1915 and United States 1916 and Vietnam 1831, 1911 China-Vietnam War (1979) 1916-1919
Chinese forces:
Vietnam
Communist parties Cambodian see Khmer Rouge Indochinese 1912 Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines 1842 Movement of the Deprived (Lebanese) 1895, 1896 (Lebanese) 1896 (Iranian) 1949,
1952,1953 Cuba, and Angola 1979 and Ethiopia 1862
C
Cuban
CANNON German 1927
Mujahidin ZU-23 1990
forces: in
Angola
1929-1931; in Ethiopia 1853, 1855, 1862, 1930, 1979; in the Ogaden 1931 Cynogen chloride 1920
Soviet
ZSU-23 1977 ZSU-23-4 1997 United States M2A1 1925 20mm M39 1908
Jimmy 1889-1892, 1892, 1930, 1936, 1950, 1956. 1959,
Carter,
1960 aims of 1979-1980, iSSO State of the Union message 1960 Casevac 2000, 2001 Castro, Fidel 1849 1855, 1929 Chad 1869 Libya and 1934, 1935 Chaff 1824 use at sea 1864 Dagaie 1865 EWS-900 1865 Hot Dog/Silver Dog 1865 'rapid bloom' 1864
Ethiopia (1974-84) 1849-1853 Soviet Union and 1979 United States and 1979 Ethiopian forces 1851 Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army 1851, 1853 Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party 1851-1852
Parti Populaire Syrien
Tudeh Party
30mm Mauser
in
1916-1919
Chrysler 361, 1945 De Laval turbine 1887 General Electric F404-GE-100 turbofan 1908 General Electric J85-GE-13 turbojet 1904 General Electric J85-21-1906, 1908 General Electric LM2500 turbine 1888 Jaguar 4.2 litre 1945 Orenda J85-CAN-15 1905 Panhard 12 H 6000 1947 Rolls Royce B80 1945 Engines (nuclear) 1887 General Electric D2G 1888 Westinghouse 1887 Entebbe, raid on 1812, 1814-1818
D
F
Falklands
War
1868
missiles in 1964
Fatah 1809 see also Black September French forces: in Algeria 2001;
in
Central African Republic 1870, 1870-1871; in Chad 1871; in Gabon 1870; in Katanga 1871; in Senegal 1870; in Zaire 1872-1877
DFgas
1922 Dibenoxazepine 1921 Dunn, James 1833 Dutch forces, and South Moluccans 1836-1837
G
Gabon, coup
in 1870 Gaddafi, Colonel M. 1810, 1814,
1840, 1882, 1932-1935,
E
Egypt, and Afghanistan 1990 and chemical warfare 1920 and Israel (1973-79) 1889-1892 and terrorism 1813 Egyptian forces 1890-1891 Engines CEM-Parsons turbine 1884
1936-1937, 1940 Great Britain, and Afghanistan 1969 and Africa (1964-84) 1869-1871 and electronic warfare 1825, 1847-1848, 1865 and Eritrea 1854 and Iran 1949 and terrorism 1819 and Uganda 1879
1
Guerrilla warfare, in Afghanistan 1976, 1976-1977 in Eritrea 1854-1857
Ethiopia 1851. 1853 Indonesia 1830 1950-1953 in Mauritania 1870 intheOgaden 1849 in Philippines 1830, 1838-1842 in
in
in Iran
Rhodesia 2002 in Uganda 1882 in Western Sahara 1938-1942 Guerrillas, East Timor 1832-1835 Philippines 1838-1842, South in
Moluccan 1836-1837
'
see also Fedayeen-e-Khalq;
Khmer
Serei,
Khmer Rouge;
Mujahidin; Polisario
1999, 2002 Mi-26 Halo 1999, 2002 United States and "search and destroy' 2001 use in Vietnam 2001 BellHuev Cobra 2001 Bell VH-ID 2000 C-130 gunship 1958, 1958-1959 C-141 Starlifter 1958 CH-47 Chinook 2001 UH-60A Black Hawk 1847, 1962
RH-53DSea Stallion
AN/ALQ-101 1825 AN/ALQ-131 1825 AN/ALQ-155 1824 ALQ-172 1824 AN/APQ-9 1828 AN/APT-2 1828 AN/APT-5 1828 EL/73 1825 ELT/460 1827 ELT/555 1827 Sky Shadow 1825, 1825
1957,
1958, 1958-1959
K
RV-1 Mohawk 1847 Sea Cobra 1825 SH-2 LAMPS 1888
Kamel,
SH-2F Seasprite 1885, 1886
Kampuchea
Mohammed
Katangese
H
use in counter-insurgency operations 2000-2002 as gunships 2001-2002 importance of 1999 British
use in Malaya 2000 use in Radfan 2001 use in Ulster 2002 1987, 1987
Sioux 2002
Wasp 1986 Wessex 2001 Whirlwind 2000, 2002 French use in Algeria 2001 use in Indochina 2000 Alouette II 2000 S-55 2001 Super Frelon 1987
Indonesian forces, in East Timor 1834 Iran, and Afghanistan 1990 hostage crisis (1980) 1956-1959, 1979 revolution in (1978-79) 1949-1953 Iranian forces, and demonstrations i950, 1951, 1951, 1952
and chemical warfare 1920 and Eritrea 1854 and terrorists 1810 Irish Republican Army, Libya and 1933 Islamic Republican Party 1956 Israel, and Egypt (1973-79) Iraq,
1889-1892
and electronic warfare 1848 and terrorism 1814-1819 and Uganda 1979 Israeli forces, at Entebbe 1814-1819 in
Italian
Lebanon 1900-1902
AB-212 1884 Rhodesian in
Soviet
Afghanistan 1998, 1999, 2002 Mi-4 Hound 1845, 2002 Mi-6 Hook 2002 Mi-8 Hip 1828, 1845, 1999, 2002 Mi-lOHarke 2002 Mi-24 Hind 1976, 1991, i998.
Khmer Rouge 1909, 1912-1913 and Kampuchea 1910-191 and Vietnam 1911 and Vietnamese invasion 1912-1915
Khomeini, AyatoUah Ruhallah 1949-1950, 1952-1953, 1953,
1956 Khyber, Mir Akbar 1970-1971 Kissinger, Henry 1889-1890, 1890, 1929,1930, 1978, 1979
Korean War, use 2000
of Helicopters in
Krocher-Tiedemann, Gabriele 1812, 1814, 1818
L
Landmines 2003-2008 Bar Mine layer 2007 Technovar DAT scatterdropping system 2007 Argentine 2004 British
Bar Mine 2005
Mark
counter-insurgency 2002,
2002 in
Kolwesi
Kaunda. Kenneth 1879
I
HELICOPTERS
use
forces, in
1872-1877
Hassan II, King 1939 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin 1990
Lynx
1891-1892
(1975-84) 1912-1915 relocation of people 1910
J
Jalalabad, attack on (1980) 1994-1995 Jaleh Square, massacre at 1950-1951, 1951
Jamming 1864 Jamming systems AN/ALQ-99 1828, iS2S ALQ-99E 1827
7
2005
Ranger 2005, 2005, 2006,
2006",
2007 French
Model 1952
MACI
2005
German (West) Dynamit Nobel AT2 2007
MSM/MW 2006, 2007 Israeli
No. 10 2006 Italian
Valsella VS/MD 2006, 2007 Palestine Liberation
Organisation 2003 TMN-46 2005 Soviet
Group 1962
TM-62P26)04 2006
United States M-3 2005 M-14 2005
M-18 Claymore 2005. 2005 M-19 2005 2006-2007. 2008
Yugoslav
Marine Division 1962 7th Marine Amphibious Brigade 1962 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing 1962 see also United States Forces Military coups, in Black Africa 1869 Iran 1949 Mauritania 1939 Uganda 1978
MISSILE BOATS
TMA-3 2004 battle for 1918
Laos, post-war 1910
Lebanese Front 1898
Lebanon (1975-78) 1893-1899 civil war in 1893-1899. 1900-1901
Egyptian 1864 Missile launchers
Asroc 1868 Missile transporters ZlL-151 1934-1935
MISSILES
Israel and 1900-1902 Palestinians and 1892 Syria and 1892
Lee Kuan Yew 1829 Libya (1969-84) 1932-1935 and Afghanistan 1989-1990 and Arab unity 1932-1933 and Chad 1934, 1935 and Egypt 1932 and Iran 1936 and Mauritania 1870 and Morocco 1933 and North Africa 1935 and Philippines 1840 and Saudi Arabia 1933 and Soviet Union 1933-1934 and terrorists 1810. 1933 and Tunisia 1935 United States and 1933. 1936-1937
air-to-air 1963-1968
air-to-surface 1983-1988 infra-red 1964
inter-continental 1979
radar homing 1964 sea-launched 1979
Anglo/French
AJ168Martel 1986,1986 AS 37 1986 Argentinian AM39 Exocet 1868 Mertin Pescador ('Kingfisher') 1988 R550 Magic 1966 Brazilian
Piranha 1968 British
AS12 1986 AS30 1986 Bloodhound 1924
in
Uganda 1881,
M
Machel. Samora 1930
MACHINE GUNS Ethiopian
DP 7.62mm 1856 Mujahidin \2. 1
MARINES
1st
TMN-46 2004
Libyan forces, 1882
anti-aircraft 1860-186j
units available to RDJTF 1962 1st Force Service Support
TMD-B
Lang Son,
i
ZPU-2
United States
PMD-6 2006 PMD-57 2005 POM2-2 2006 TM-46 2005
M80 2004 M128 GEMSS
Somali guerrillas)
mm DShK 1992
Firestreak 1965. 1968
Harpoon 1868 Milan 1945,1945
Red Top 1965, 1965-1966, 1968 Sea Eagle i 985 Sea Skua 1987, 1987, 1988, 1988 Sky Flash i965, 1968 Swingfire 1945 Vigilant i 944, 1945 Egyptian 1864 AS-5 Kelt 1864, 1985 SS-N-2 Styx 1864 French
AJ168M artel
ASH
1988
1986
AS12 1986, 1988 AS15 1988 AS20 1986, 1988 AS30 1986, 1988
, ' .
^
Durandal 1986, 1987 Exocet MM38 1884 Exocet AM39 1987. 1987, 1988
Masucra (MK2 Mod3) 1884 R550 Magic 1966. 1966, 1968 Super R530. 1966, 1968 Super R5S0f 1966
German (West) Kormoran 1987.
1987, 1988
Iraqi 1868
R550 Magic 1966 Israeli
Python 1968 Shafir 1968,1968 Italian
Aspide 1966-1967 Marte 1988 Sea Killer 1988 Standard-ER 1884 Terrier 1884 Japanese ASM-1 1988 Libyan AA-2 Atoll 1937 AA-6 1967 SA-3 Goa 1934-1935 Mujahidin 1999 SA-7 Grail 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 1968 Palestinian
RPG-2 1809 South African V3 Kukri 1968 Soviet 1968 policy on 1980-1981 AA-1 AlkaH 1967, 1968 AA-2 Atoll 1966, 1967. 1968 AA-2-2 Advanced Atoll 1967
AA-3 Anab 1967. 1968 AA-3-2 Advanced Anab 1967
AA-5 Ash 1967. 1968 AA-6 Acrid 1968 AA-8 Aphid i966. 1968 AA-9 1968 AA-X-10 1968 AS-1 AS-2 AS-4 AS-5 AS-7 AS-8
Kennel 1985. 1988 Kipper 1985. 1988 Kitchen 1985. 1986, 1988 Kelt 1985. 1988 Kerry 1985-1986. 1988 1986 Frog-7 1922 Sagger 1946
Skip Spin fire-control system 1967 Snapper 1946 SS-1 Scud 1922 SS-N-3 Shaddock 1922 Swatter 1946
Swedish Rb27 Super Falcon 1965, 1965
Rb28 Falcon 1965 Rb04 1988. 1988 Rb05 1988
AAM-N-2 Sparrow I 1964 AGM-12Bullpup 1984 Shrike 1985, 1985,
1988
AGM-65 Maverick
1984,
AGM-78 Standard
1985, 1985,
1988
AGM-84A Harpoon
1985, 1985,
1988
HARM
1985, 1985
AIM-4 Falcon 1965 1968
AIM-7 Sparrow 1964, 1968 AIM-7C 1964 AIM-7E 1964-1965, 1968
MU-IY 1964 AIM-9 Sidewinder
series 1904,
1905, 1937, 1964 AIM-9E 1964 AIM-9 J 7965, 1964
Am-9L 1906-1907,
1968
AIM-26 Super Falcon 1965
AIM-26A 1965 AIM-26B 1965 AIM-54 Phoenix 1968 AIM-54A 1968 AIM-54Ci96'5
AIM-120A 1968 Asroc 1886 Cruise 1979 Gargoyle 1984 Gorgon 1984
Army
NAVY units available to RDJTF 1962 Sixth Fleet 1936-1937
Fighter Weapons School 1906 Task Force 70 1962 Delta Force 1956-1959 Maritime Prepositioning Ship Task Force 1961 Near-Term Prepositioning Force 1961 Marine Amphibious Brigade 1961 Black Ace Squadron 1937 see also United States forces Nerve gas G-Agent 1920, 1921 incapacitants 1921 V-Agents 1921 see also Warfare, chemical NMgas 1922 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and electronic warfare 1845
and Western Sahara 1941-1942 Orly Airport, attack on 7809
P
Pakistan, and Afghanistan 1989 Palestine Liberation Organisation 1810-1811, 1813, 1889-1892, 1898-1899, 1900-1902, 1950 and Eritrea 1854 and Mogadishu hijacking 1819-1822 in
Uganda 1880
Palestinian forces 7902 Palestinian Liberation Army
1899 People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan 1989 People's Liberation Army (Chinese) 1916-1919 People's Mujahidin Organisation of Iran 1949 see also Mujahidin (Iranian) Phalangist Party (Lebanese)
1894,7895 Philippines, guerilla warfare in (1971-84) 1838-1842
United States and 1830
Phosgene 1920 Poland, Soviet Union and 1982
POLICE FORCES Ugandan Police Council 1879
Gambian Police Field Force 1870 Polisario 1870, 1931, 1938-1942 Pol Pot 1910,7.972, 1913
O
Obote, Milton 1878, 1879, 1882 Ogaden (1974-84) 1849-1853 Olympic Games, boycott 1980) 1979 hostages at (Munich) 1809 OPEC, kidnapping of ministers 1811-1812.7872 (
Harpoon 1886, 1887 Holy Moses 1984
MX
1896 National Resistance (Ugandan) 1882
Carrier
1984-1985, 1988
AGM-88
National Arab Youth Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine 1810-1811 National Liberation Front (South Vietnamese) 1914 National Movement (Lebanese)
United States
1984, 1988
AIM-4A
1881
1895, 1896 National Pact, 1943 (Lebanese)
United States Policy on 1980-1981
AGM-45
N
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1809-1810 and Entebbe raid 1814-1819 External Operations 1809. 1810-1811 Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el Hamra and Rio de
Oro see Polisario
1979,7980. 7.987
Pershing
II
7950
OPERATIONS
Sparrow III see AIM-7C Standard ER/Asroc 1888
Israeli
Standard-MR
Moroccan
1885, 1886-1887,
1887
Tiny Tim 1984 Vietnamese (North) SA-2 Guideline 1828 SA-6 1919 SA-7 1919
Litani 1900-1902
Uhud 1939-1940 United States Eagle Claw 1957-1959 Optronic Fire-control Instrument 7.925
Organization of African Unity
Q R
Qadar. Colonel A. 1971 QLgas 1922
Rabbani. Burhanuddin 7990
Radar systems and Doppler effect 1968
Side Globe 1866
SLQ-32 1866-1867
ALQ-71 1828 ALR-46 1824 ANiALQ-l 19 1826
SPG35F 1886 SPG 49 1887 SPG 51 1888 SPG 55A 1887 SPG 55B 1886
AN/AWG-9
SPG-60
for missiles
1964
Aegis 1887
1965 AN/MLQ-34 1845
AN/MSQ-103
TEAMPACK
1843, 1845, IS46. 1846
1866-1867, 1888
SPQ9 1888 SPQ 9a 1888 SPS-10
1863, 1866. 1886. 1888
SPS37 1886
anti-aircraft i
SPS 48
APG-63 1824
SPS-49 1866-1867, 1886. 1888
APG-67(V) 1908
SPS SPS
ELBITMN-53ESM
ELT
52 1886 55 1888
SPS-55B 7885 SPS-58(3-D) 7866 SPS 768 1884 SPW2 1887 SPY lA 1887, 1888 Susie 1865 TMV433 1865 Type 996 1 868 see also Counter-measures,
Jamming
systems; Radio systems.
Sonar
1848
ELT/ 156 7828 ELT/211 1865 ELT/311 1865 521 1865 1846
EXJAM
Fansong 1828 Guardrail 1847 Head Light B i86'6' Head Net C 1866 Lancer 1847
LN66 i86-6' Mark 74 1888 Mark 86 1888 Mark 116 1888 Matilda 7865 Mercury Grass 7848 Naval Tactical Data Svstem 1888 Newton 1865, 7867 Oeil Vert 7845. 7928 Quick Fix 1847 Quick Look 1847 RM416 1884 S373. 1847-1848 SCIMITAR 1865 seismic intrusion detector 7848 SENIT 1884
AKM
Ethiopian
SKS7.62mm rifle rifle
7857
Mauser
1832 rifle
7852
Lebanese
1886, 1888
electronic;
Eritrean (guerrilla) assault rifle 1854-1855
G3
SPS-40 7866, 1884, 1886, 1888
Barbican 1848.7848 Bee Hind 1826 Bell Clout ECM 1866 Big Nose 1968 Cutlass 1865 DRBC31 1884 DRBI lOD 1884 DRBR32C 1884 DRBR 51 1884 DRBV23C 1884 DRBV 50 1884 EK33 1845 EL/K7010 1848
SMALLARMS
Fretilin
AN/SLQ-17 1867 AN/SLQ-32 variants 1866-1867
APQ-153 1906 ARI18223i525, 1825 ARI18228 1825
Shultz, George 1835 'Shuttle diplomacy' 1889-1890
Radfan. use of helicopters in 2001 Radio systems SB-20-V 1844 SM-21-V 1844 SR-19-V 1844 SR-20-V 1844 SR-25-V 1844 SR-50-M 1844 TRC 743 terminal 7844 Rapid bloom' see Chaff Reagan, Ronald 1931. 7978. 1979. 1980-1982,7987, 1990 Rocket launchers BM-21 122. 1862. 1976 Harpoon 1888 Mark 13 1887 Mark 16 Asroc 1888 Mark 26 7885, 7886, 1887. 1888 Mark 101. 1885 Multiple Launch Rocket System 2006 RPG-7 7974. 1990, 1994, 7994
AK series rifle 7895
7897 Winchester rifle 1894-1895 Mujahidin (Afghan) 1977 .303 Lee Enfield 1989, 1990-1991, 1993, 1994, 1995
AK assault rifle 1990,
1994.
7994, 1995
Tvpe 52
75mm recoilless rifle
'7997
PhiHppines
(guerrilla)
Browning automatic Gar and rifle 7858
Ml
rifle
7840
carbine 7858
Polisario
FN FAL rifle 7958 Soviet
AKS-74 7997 United States M16A1 7920
Sonar
SQR
10 1888
SQS 23 1887 SQS 26 1887 SQS26CX 1888 SQS 53 1888 SQS53A 1888 SQS53C 1887 see also
Radar
Soviet forces: in Afghanistan
7975 1974-1977, 1989, 1991-1992, 1994-1995, 1996-1999, 2002; in Ethiopia
7969, 7970,
1853 Soviet Union, and Afghanistan 1960. 1969-1972 invasion of Afghanistan (1979-80) 1973-1977 and Algeria 1929 and Angola 1929, 1978-1979
and Benin 1929 and chemical warfare 1920-1921
S
Sabri al Banna see Abu Nidal Sadat, Anwar 1889. 7889.
1891-1892,7892
and the Congo 1929 and electronic warfare 1824, 1826, 1844-1845
and Ethiopia 1853, 1855. 1861-1862. 1930, 1979
and Guinea 1929
and and and and and and and and
Iran 1949 Arab-Israel dispute 1890 Libya 1931, 1933-1934 Mali 1929 Poland 1982
Red Sea 1853 Somalia 1852-1853, 1929 Southeast Asia (1971-84)
1831
and and and and
Uganda
1880, 1881 United States 1978-1982
Vietnam 1916 Zaire 1929
SUBMACHINE GUNS Eritrean
(militia)
PPS/PPSh 1854-1855 French
MAT-49 1809
SUBMARINES Soviet Golf class 1864 Suez Canal 1854, 1889, 1890-1891
T
TANKS Afghan T62 1975 Angolan T34/85 1929 Chinese
T591917 Cuban T55 1860-1861 Ethiopian M41 1860 T55 1862 T62 1862 French AMX30 1845 Israeli 1900
M60 1891 Moroccan
AMX13
1941 Soviet 1978 PT76 1947 T62 1991 United States M60 1960
Vietnamese (North) T62 1919
and Tanzania 1881 Tanzanian invasion of United States, and Afghanistan 1990-1991 and Angola 1929, 1979 and Cambodia 1913-1914 and chemical w£u-fEU"e 1920-1921 and China 1916 and electronic warfare 1825-1826, 1828, 1846-1847 and Ethiopia 1852, 1861, 1979
and Indochina 1909 and Iran 1950, 1960 and Iranian hostage
crisis
1956-1959 Libya 1933, 1936-1937 the Middle East 1889-1892 Morocco 1931, 1941 the Persian Gulf 1931
and and and and
1960-1962, 1980 Philippines 1838 Somalia 1861, 1930
and and and and
South Africa 1931 Southeast Asia (1971-84)
1829-1831
and Southwest Asia 1960 and Soviet Union 1960, 1978-1982
and Uganda 1881 and Zaire 1874, 1929 United States forces, and Iranian 1956-1959 in Egypt 1962; in Grenada 1844; in Korea 2000; in Oman 1962; in Somalia 1962; in Sudan 1962; in Vietnam 2000, 2001, 200i
hostage
Cruisers Colbert 1884, 1884 Israeli
1878-1882
crisis
Eliat 1864 Italian
Cruisers
Andrea Doria 1884 CaioDuilio 1884,
NATO Cruisers 1883-1888 Soviet Aircraft carriers Minsk 1831 United States Kidd class 1867 OUver Hazard Perry class 1867 Spruance class 1867 Aircraft carriers USS Forrestal 1936 USSMmiie 1936-1937, 1957 Assault ships USS Inchon 1864 USS Okinawa 1962 Cruisers 1884-1885 Bellknap class 1885, 1885 1886, 1887' California class 1885, 1887,
1888
Leahy
class 1884, 1884, 1886,
1887 Ticonderoga class 1885, 1888 Virginia class 1885, 1887, 1888,
1888 \]^^ Arkansas 1888 USS Bainbridge 1885, 1885, 1886, 1887 USS California 1887, 1888 VSS Halsey 1887 USS Leahy 1884
USS Long Beach
1885, 1885,
1886, 1887
V
Vietnam, China and 1831 Chinese invasion of (1979) 1916-1919
Soviet Union and 1831 Vietnamese (North) forces
USS Mississippi 1883, 1888 USS Reeves 1887 USS Richmond K. Turner 1885 USS Texas 1888 USS Ticonderoga 1885, 1888 USS Truxtun 1885, 1886, 1886, 1887
USS Yorktown
1888
1912-1913
W
Y
Yaacoub, Sheikh 1895
WARSHIPS
Mohammed
British
U
Uganda, coup in 1878 militarisation of 1879
niAS Invincible 1868 Sheffield 1868, 1868 Aircraft carriers
HMS
nUS Hermes French
1868
Z
Zaire (1960-65) 1869(1978) 1872-1877
and Iran 1949 Arab-Israel dispute 1890 d Libya 1931, 1933-1934 Mali 1929 oland 1982 d Sea 1853 nalia 1852-1853, 1929 ^' '-'St Asia (1971-84)
id
and Tanzania 1881 Tanzanian invasion o 1878-ir United f='
A'
wannpeacemarshal Obrow .vannpeacemaishalObrovv
WITHDRAWN No kMvgef t:
proporty of th9
Boston PubEk iWary.
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