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War in peace
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<6
War In Peace
Volume 2
SAN ANSELMO PUBLIC LIBRARY
#ft"
Warm Peace The Marshall Cavendish
Illustrated Encyclopedia of
Postwar Conflict.
Editor-in-Chief
Ashley Brown Editorial
Board
Brig-Gen. James Collins Jr (USA Retd.) Vice-Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly KBE CB Ian V Hogg; David Floyd Professor Laurence Martin Air- Vice Marshal SWB Menaul CB CBE DFC AFC
MARSHALL CAVENDISH NEW YORK, LONDON, TORONTO
Reference Edition Published 1985 Published by Marshall Cavendish Corporation 147 West Merrick Road Freeport, Long Island N.Y. 11520
Printed and
Bound in
I
by L.E.G.O.
Italy
S.p.a. Vicenza.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the copyright holders. Marshall Cavendish Limited 1985 Orbis Publishing 1983, 1984
British Library Cataloguing in Publication
Data
Brown, Ashley
War in peace
:
the Marshall Cavendish
illustrated encyclopaedia of post-war conflict. 1.
History,
Modern— 1945-
2.
War— History
—20th century I.
Title
909.82
ISBN
II.
Dartford,
Mark
D842
0-86307-293-3
86307 295
X
vol.2
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under
title:
War in peace. Includes bibliographies and index. Military history. Modern— 20th century. 2. Military art and science— History— 20th century. 3. World politics— 1945I. Marshall Cavendish Corporation. U42.W373 1984 355'.009'04 84-19386 ISBN 0-86307-293-3 1.
86307 295
X
vol. 2
Reference Edition Staff
Editorial Staff Editor Editorial Director Editorial Manager Editorial Editors
Sub Editors Artwork Editor Artwork Buyer
Ashley Brown Brian Innes Clare Byatt
Sam Elder Adrian Gilbert Sue Leonard
Simon Innes Jonathan Reed Jean Morley
Picture Editor Picture Consultant
Carina Dvorak Robert Hunt
Design
EDC
Editor Designer Consultant Indexers Creation
Mark Dartford Graham Beehag Robert Paulley
F&
K Gill
DPM Services
Editorial
Board
Brigadier-General James L Collins Jr (USA at the US Military Rtd) received his and was a postgraduate at Va, Academy, both the Naval War College and the Armed Forces Staff College. Commissioned into the US Army as 2nd Lieutenant in 1939, General Collins has held a variety of distinguished posts, including Chief of Military History, US Department of the Army, Director of the Defense Language Institute and Commander of the Military History Center, Washington DC. He served with Military Assistance Command in
Vice Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly KBE OBE CB is Director-General of Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence in London. He was educated at the Royal Navy College, Dartmouth and served during World War II with the RNEC, and on Hood. His distinguished postings include Naval Attache to Washington DC, and Commander of the British Navy Staff. He is a member of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, and Deputy-Director of Marine Engineering,
commanded V Corps Artillery Germany. He was Director of the US
Air Vice Marshal SWB Menaul is Defence Consultant to the Institute for the Study of Conflict and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis at Cambridge, Mass. He was educated at the RAF College, Cranwell and served with Bomber Command from 1936—1940. During the latter part of the war he was an instructor, and also served with the famous Pathfinder squadron. He has held various senior posts in the UK and abroad, including Commander of British
MA
Vietnam, and in
Commission for Military History, American Institute and is a member of the Historical Association, and the US Army Association, His published works include, inter alia, The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army 1950—1972 (1975) and Allied Participation in Vietnam (1975). David Floyd was educated at Oxford, and began his career with the British RAF mission in Moscow during World War II. After the war he served in the diplomatic service in Romania and Yugoslavia, following which he joined the staff of the London Daily Telegraph. For more than 30 years he was the Telegraph's correspondent on Eastern European and Communist bloc affairs. He now works as a freelance journalist and translator, and is one of the most respected British commentators on the politics of the Soviet
Ian
Union.
V Hogg served for 27 years in the Royal
and retired in 1972 with the rank of Master Gunner. He has since devoted his time to writing and research, and is a wellknown expert on all aspects of gunnery, firearms and the history of fortifications. His many published works include A History of Artillery, Military Smallarms of the 20th Century, Coastal Defences of England and Wales and Pistols of the World. Artillery,
HMS
Trials Task Forces, Commandant Joint Staff College, and Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute. His
Atomic
recent published works include Soviet War Machine (1980) and Countdown: British Strategic nuclear forces (1980).
Dr John Pimlott was educated
at Leicester
University, studying History and the British Army. Since 1973 he has been a civilian lecturer in the Department of War Studies and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, where his teaching specialisations include the Middle East and post-1945 British Defence Policy. He has written a number of books, including B-29 Superfortress (1980), The Battle of the Bulge (1981), World War II in (1984), The Middle East Conflicts (1983) and Vietnam: The History and the Tactics (1982).
photographs
Contributors David Blue served with the CIA
in various
countries of Southeast Asia, including Laos, and is a writer on and a student of small wars.
Gordon Brook-Shepherd spent 15 years in Vienna, first as lieutenant-colonel on the staff of the British High Commission and then as a foreign correspondent for the Daily Telegraph. A graduate in history from Cambridge, he is currently Chief Assistant Editor of the Sunday Telegraph. Jeffrey
J.
Clarke
is
an expert on recent military
history, particularly the Vietnam War, and has written for the American Center of Military
History.
Major-General Richard Clutterbuck OBE has been Senior Lecturer in politics at Exeter University since his retirement from the army in 1972. His works include Protest and the Urban Guerrilla, Guerrillas
and Terrorists and Kidnap
and Ransom. S. Cochran Jr is a historian whose area of research is modern Indochinese affairs with particular reference to the war in Vietnam since 1945. He is at present working in the Southeast Asia Branch of the Center of Military History, Department of the Army.
served in Moscow in the British Military Mission and the British Embassy for six years during and after World War II. He was interpreter for the British Chiefs of Staff at the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences, and also interpreted for Churchill and Anthony Eden. He subsequently worked in the BBC External Services and is a former editor of Index on Censorship.
Hugh Lunghi
Charles Messenger retired from the army in 1980 to become a fulltime military writer after 21 years service in the Royal Tank Regiment. Over the past 10 years he has written several books on 20th century warfare, as well as contributing articles to a number of defence and historical journals. He is currently a Research Associate at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies in London. Billy C. Mossman is a well-known American writer and historian. He is currently working on
a volume on the Korean War for the Center of Military History.
US Army
Alexander
Colonel Peter M. Dunn is a serving officer in the USAF. His doctoral thesis is on the history of Indochina during the mid-1940s.
John B. Dwyer served both with the infantry and with armoured units in Vietnam. He was editor and publisher of the Vietnam veteran's newsletter Perimeter and has been a writer and correspondent for National Vietnam Veteran's Review for the past few years. His particular interest are Special Forces and Special Operations.
Brenda Ralph Lewis has specialised in political and military history since 1964. She s a regular contributor to military and historical magazines in both Britain and the United States.
Bryan Perrett served
in the
Royal Armoured
Corps from 1952 to 1971. He contributes regularly to a number of established military journals and acted as Defence Correspondent to the Liverpool Echo during the Falklands War. His recent books include Weapons of the Falklands Conflict and History of Blitzkrieg.
A
Chapman Pincher
is one of England's leading authorities on international espionage and counter-intelligence. He is the author of political novels and books on spying, the most recent of which is Their Trade is Treachery, which deals with the penetration of Britain's secret services by the Russian secret police.
Yehoshua Porath is a noted scholar at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He has made a special study of the Palestinian problem and is the author of two books on the subject, the most recent of which is The Palestinian Arab National Movement 1929—39, which was published in Britain in 1977.
Contributors Antony Preston
is Naval Editor of the military magazine Defence and author of numerous
publications including Battleships, Carriers and Submarines.
Aircraft
Brigadier-General Edwin H. Simmons, US Marine Corps, Retired, is the Director of Marine Corps History and Museums. At the time of the Inchon operation and the Chosin Reservoir campaign, he, as a major, commanded Weapons Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. Widely published, he is the author of The United States Marines.
Ronald Spector
is
an expert on Vietnam and has
recently completed a book on that subject for the Center of Military History in the United States.
Andres Suarez served in the Cuban ministry of education from 1948 — 1951, took part in the Cuban revolution, and served in the ministry of housing from 1959. From 1965, he has been
Professor of Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. Other publications include Cuba and the Sino — Soviet Rift. Sir Robert Thompson KBE, CMG, DSO, MC is a world authority on guerrilla warfare, on which he has written extensively. He was directly involved in the Emergency in Malaya in the 1950s and
become permanent Secretary for Defence. From 1961 to 1965 he headed the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam and since then he
rose to
has advised several governments, including the United States, on counter-insurgency operations Sir Robert Thompson is a Council member of the Institute for the Study of Conflict, London. His books include Defeating Communist Insurgency and Revolutionary War in World Strategy, 1945-69. Patrick Turnbull commanded 'D' Force, Burma during World War II. His 29 published works include a history of the Foreign Legion.
Contents of Volume
Counter insurgency Independence for Indonesia Attack from the hills Magsaysay's triumph
MarderMICV Korea: the beginning
The US Army Over the top Israeli
SPGs
Brotherhood of Arms
The Viet Minh
De Lattre's rain of fire F-15 Eagle Across the Yalu Hell at Chosin Chronology 1945-49 Fighting for Peace Attack Helicopters The dragon awaits Instrument of revolution Fall of the forbidden city
Attack on Quemoy
209 214 218 220 223 229 232 236 243 249 254 258 263 269 272 278 280 283 289 292 296 300
The Merkava The meatgrinder Platoon leader in Korea Glory at Imjin Defiant to the end The Chieftain Pt 1
Smashing the terrorist The British bomb Aiming to kill The Chieftain Pt 2
War from the sky The Battle
for
Tonkin
Dien Bien Phu: the beginning
The Mirage
III
Down Mig alley Stalemate and slaughter Behind the wire
US Nuclear carriers Dien Bien Phy Master of War Warriors from the
hills
T54/55&T62MBTs
303 309 314 316 320 323 329 336 340 343 349 354 359 363 369 376 380 383 389 398 400 403
••--*.
-rrrwmt
Counter insurgen The specialised forces used against guerrillas On
commander of the Algeria received information
10 January 1958, the French
Ain Beida sector
in
specifying exactly where a rebel force
would rest up from Tunisia. Orders were immediately given for the preparation of a combined helicopter and motorised infantry assault. At 1430 hours that same day the first sections of a parachute company were picked up by helicopter some 40km (30 miles) southeast of Djebel Tarf the spot where the rebels were concealed. The Djebel Tarf was an isolated mountain in the middle of miles of desert, not at as
it
moved
into Algeria
,
all
a difficult target for a military force to locate.
At 1455 hours a motorised unit some two comleft from a point 14km (10 miles) north of the mountain and made rapid headway to a predesignated point not far from the peak. As soon as the first parachute units were dropped by helicopter into the battle zone, they were immediately engaged by rebel contingents of surprising strength. However, awaiting the arrival of further French units, the paras simply held their positions while keeping the rebel units pinned down. Meanwhile two more companies ofparas were landed a mile north of the zone. By 1600 hours all motorised and airborne units of the French force had moved into the battle area and begun their assault on the rebel positions. By 1815 hours the operation was successfully concluded with all rebels panies in strength
killed or captured.
had taken
From
start to finish the
operation
more than three hours. This action was a typical example of modern counter-insurgency. Speed and accurate intelligence combined with the rapid deployment of troops had little
defeated an infiltrating guerrilla unit.
Since 1945, guerrilla armies fighting for national independence or left-wing political ideas have intro-
duced a new dimension into warfare. In order to combat these forces, conventional armies have been forced to develop tactics of counter-insurgency, and this
has led to the formation of specialised units
raised, trained his
and equipped to take on the guerrilla at
own level The tremendous advances in individual .
weapons systems combined with a highly advanced have meant that such units when
training programme
Avillageburnsfiercelyin Angola as government troops, armed with H & K G-3 rifles, look on. The civilian population almost always suffers at the hands of government operations against terrorists, due to the fact that they are assumed to be involved with them in one way or another.
,
put into the field, can operate with great flexibility and
y st carry with them devastating firepower. It is possible to reduce the various aspects of counter-insurgency tactics into a four-stage cycle.
The initial
stage
is
operations base.
to infiltrate an area
Once
specialised unit will
this
move
and establish an
base has been set up, a out into the country and
gather intelligence on the enemy's presence.
Then
other units will act on the intelligence reports and
engage rebel forces. The final stage of the cycle is to secure the area once it has been cleared of insurgent troops.
To fulfil all these tasks, soldiers of counterinsurgency units must have a wide variety of skills, and this is reflected in the various training courses which the soldier must undertake Each of the special.
ised units that
is
raised takes
its
recruits
units. All officers, potential officers,
from regular
NCOs and other
ranks are, even at the
first selection board, carefully screened in order to maintain a high standard of intake They are then sent on an extremely demanding .
209
; jtV'
V^
WMKr
! ^k.
V
m»
m
COUNTER-INSURGHNC
V
^ insurgency forces in the world was the Selous Scouts in Rhodesia. This Scout is travelling light carrying only an FN rifle, a knife and a water canteen. Left: A member of the
American special forces
in
Vietnam, armed with the ubiquitous rifle.
M16 assault
SAS unit discuss the area to be patrolled in Borneo. The fourth member of the patrol reloads the magazine of his 7.62mm SLR. Right: After an
effective counter-
terrorist units
have been
tracked down, their hideouts have to be
thoroughly cleared. Here troops fire into an
Y
.,
COUNTER-INSURGENCY training course.
certain
Although the
amount of experience
recruits will all
have a
in field operations,
it is
them
the
the structure of the course that will give
advanced skills they will need. The emphasis in training will be on intelligencegathering techniques and survival in the field. The soldier must be able to adapt quickly to his environment as he will be fighting an enemy who knows the country, knows the terrain and will have no problems living off the land. Thus each member of a unit must be efficient in radio procedures, languages, concealment and weapons systems. Each must be able to carry combat and survival loads over large distances
and at speed. Survival in the field- living off the land, foraging and, where necessary, stealing - is critical, and much of the training for the British SAS involves trapping, cooking and eating such delicacies as rabbit, rat and dog. As well as being able to track and snare animals, the Rhodesian Selous Scouts seem to have had an amazing ability to locate water-bearing roots. It is
his
the ability of the special unit soldier to adapt to
environment which enables him to
task
-
intelligence-gathering.
collected in
many ways:
fulfil his
key
Intelligence can be
using deep patrolling,
observation posts or infiltration of
enemy
units for
example. In areas of jungle, deep patrolling is extremely important to the counter-insurgency forces involved. By penetrating into the interior a patrol can establish the locations of the
enemy,
its
movements,
supply dumps and operations bases. Usually this where the course of information will be relayed to action, whether it be air strike, artillery barrage or infantry assault, will be decided. Generally, it is unusual for an intelligence-gathering patrol to engage
HQ
Above: Members of a
rebel units.
against rebel forces.
where a unit can maintain its position without the need for a supply drop (which could well
But such intense support is not always necessary. During operations in Borneo in the mid-1960s, although the British SAS adopted much the same initial tactics - spending long periods in the jungle and passing information on to Gurkha troops who would then set up ambushes - little use was made of
Similarly,
presence of the unit) observation posts can be maintained for a long period alert insurgent forces to the
and there can be a constant flow of information to HQ Such procedures are illustrated by Operation Nassau, launched by British forces in Malaya in December 1954. The area to be cleared, the south swamp of Kuala Langat, an area of some 260 square km (100 square miles), was penetrated by a battalion-sized force. Patrols were moved deep inside the area and intelligence reports began to flow back to HQ. It was three months before any positive information concerning rebel movements was received, but on 21 March 1955 an ambush, set up as a result of intelligence reports, registered its first kill of the operation with two terrorists dead and several wounded. As the flow of information steadily increased, ambushes began to give way to accurate air strikes and to mortar and artillery barrages. Although it took nine months to secure the area completely, 60,000 artillery shells, 30,000 mortar rounds and 2000 aircraft bombs had been used during the course of the operation. Then again, when SAS units were involved in the Radfan area of South Arabia during the fighting over Aden, most of their operations were purely intelligence-gathering. SAS teams would be dropped, with regular units, by helicopter and would then conceal themselves on hilltops where they would set up observation posts. In searing heat, with tunity for
movement and with
water, these units
212
barrage or air strike in this theatre.
British forces adopted a very low-profile as the
SAS units were often engaged in
'
and
illegal
The
in fact, '
border
crossing, they carried Armalite rifles (which were not
then British
Army
issue),
wore non-regulation boots
and had no personal identification on them. Apart from observation posts and deep patrolling, the infiltration of enemy units can be an extremely valuable way of obtaining intelligence. This method was much favoured by the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. In January 1 974 2 Troop Selous Scouts was deployed on an intelligence-gathering mission of some 20 days duration. Using coloured recruits, the units were quickly accepted by local contactmen and tribesmen as being genuine ZANLA terrorists. The initial stage of the operation was 'blown' by officers of the Rhodesian Special Branch, however, when they picked up all the contactmen that had been identified to them by the Selous Scouts The Special Branch officers by the ,
,
.
questions they asked, tifications
some of
made
it
clear
where the iden-
had come from and effectively eliminated from any future close-quarter
the Scouts
operations.
oppor-
The second part of the infiltration while not obtain-
limited supplies of
ing the depth of potential intelligence data that might
would remain
directing artillery fire
artillery
little
in situ for days,
and mobile infantry units
,
have been available from the great deal
more
successful.
initial
A
operation,
was
a
second group of 2
French paratroop unit
disembark from a helicopter during operations on the Ivory Coast. During counterinsurgency operations,
deployment of units by helicopter is often extremely successful in isolating and destroying rapid
terrorist right:
groups.
Above
A one day search and
destroy mission Vietnam.
Bottom
in
right: Friendly
Kalabit tribesmen look
on
as British soldiers unload a helicopter
in
Borneo. operations
British jungle
relied upon helicopter deployment in order to overcome the problems
presented to army units by the dense foliage of the interiorwhich severely inhibited fast
movement.
COUNTER-INSURGENCY Troop, operating in the Kandeya Tribal Trust Lands north of Mount Darwin, established themselves locally as a terrorist group and managed to get information back to base giving the exact location of a camp containing 12 terrorists. Colonel Reid Daly, CO of the Selous Scouts aimed to use radio contact to talk in an outside assault group onto the terrorist camp, thus maintaining their clandestine identities and so allowing them to continue operating in the area. The Rhodesian Light Infantry Fireforce was immediately briefed, embarked upon helicopters, and flown into the fire zone. The commander of the ,
Selous Scout unit on the spot, taking up a position overlooking the camp, established contact with the commander of the heliborne fireforce, briefed him in flight and successfully guided the force directly onto the terrorist camp. The end result of a limited engage-
ment was six terrorists killed and one captured. The Selous Scouts had managed to stage such a successful operation because they had a deep understanding of the local population and at no time underestimated the enemy. The relative lack of success of the US Special Forces in Vietnam can perhaps be put down to a failure to come to terms with these two factors. It was in late 1961 that the US Special Forces - often known as the 'Green Berets' and raised as a counter- insurgency unit - began operations in the Montagnard region of Vietnam. They were the only units of the US Army committed to persuading ethnic minorities to stand firm against any attempted infiltration by Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas and to take on the
VC
own
at their
level of small-scale operations.
Despite the undoubted expertise of the Americans all volunteers underwent rigorous training and were
communications, medicine, demoliweapons - they found that individual skill was not enough. At first they had success, and by the mid-1960s the US Special Forces had raised not only civil defence specialists in
tion, intelligence or
among the local population, but also units capable of going onto the offensive against the VC. Long range patrols and special mobile strike forces were set up. The civil defence concept - known units
officially as the Civilian Irregular Defence Group programme (CIDG) - enjoyed success around Ban Me Thuot from 1961 to 1965, and the combined
operations of the later seriously
However,
US
Special Forces and the
damaged
VC
CIDG
lines of infiltration.
the introduction of Vietnamisation in 1968
US attempts to maintain the concept as South Vietnam, distrustful of ethnic minorities, insisted that the CIDG be incorporated into the South Vietnamese Army. Thus a political decision hampered a tactically sound idea. When dealing with counter-insurgency, it is undeniable that the tactics of the specialised forces have to be placed within the context of a political programme that gives the populace as a whole the prospect of a safe and desirable future after the defeat of the guerrilla army This was achieved by the British in Malaya frustrated
.
for example but not by the ,
same army in Cyprus And .
yet, units trained to beat the guerrillas at their
own
have always had an important part to play within this political context - from Ramon Magsaysay's use of small groups of Rangers in the Philippines in the 1 950s to the British Army s use of the S AS in Northern Ireland in the 1980s. Perhaps the importance of such units is best shown by the problems the world's most powerful army, the Soviet Army has faced in Afghanistan The Russians have no specifically trained counter-insurgency force, and since their invasion of Afghanistan they have been unable to trap the rebel units (which have recorded, in view of their limited armoury, some surprising successes). Although the occupation of major centres of population has not proved too difficult for the well equipped Soviet Army, the hostile climate and difficult terrain of the country have meant that the invaders, despite their large presence, have inflicted relatively few casualties against their Simon Innes invisible enemy in the mountains. tactics
'
,
.
213
Independence for Indonesia Brutal fighting
One
War
as tpe Dutch were driven out
of the most significant consequences of World II was the dissolution of the overseas empires
over the centuries by the British, the French and the Dutch. Each of the imperial powers approached the problem of restoring relations with their overseas possessions in a different way. By the end of the war the British were more or less reconciled to the loss of much of their empire; but the French and the Dutch tried to hold on to their pre-war empires by sheer built
force.
In Indonesia
Indies
-
- then
also
known
as the
!
Above:
Dutch East
with infantry units in the search for guerrillas.
ence on 17 August 1945, only two days after the Japanese had surrendered. But their decision to break away was bitterly contested by the Dutch, who strove for the next three years to reassert control.
The
M4 Sherman
Medium tanks advance
the local nationalists proclaimed independ-
Although
hostilities
escalated after the Dutch return in 1946, the former
vast
distances involved, however, coupled with the post-
colonial authorities
war exhaustion and war-weariness of
believed they could still rule Indonesia using
the
Dutch
people and the disapproval of world opinion, forced the Netherlands government to give in. By the end of
military
means.
Indone
NGAPORE ORIAU
MOLUCCAS Q
SIBERU j;'
Palembang
v
O
6ANGKA
V
s*
O^^
WBELITUN
Djakarta
_MADURA SuTSfbaya
WETAR
^£!&a
214
£^WTOR
,
'
INDONESIA
1946-49
1949 Queen Juliana had signed a document transferring sovereignty over the former Dutch East Indies "unconditionally and irrevocably' to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, which was recognised as an independent and sovereign state. In the fighting that continued up to the end of 1 948 the Dutch armed forces could do little more than hold on to the towns and try to spread out from them, while the nationalists were free to move around the countryside and organise guerrilla warfare. When it came to direct confrontation the fighting
was marked by ex-
treme brutality and heavy loss of life. By the time British forces arrived in Djakarta in September 1945 they found that the Indonesian
by Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta, had already set up a republican government and civil service and were in the process of forming an Indonesian national army. Moreover, the new regime appeared to enjoy widespread support. American forces advancing through the Pacific concentrated on reaching Japan itself as speedily as nationalists, led
possible, so that responsibility for Indonesia
given to the British Southeast Asia
Lord Louis Mountbatten,
who was concerned
only two central tasks: to release
all
was
Command under with
Europeans taken
prisoner by the Japanese and to accept the Japanese surrender.
He was
not interested in reconquering
Indonesia for the Dutch and in any case did not have ,
,
do so. On 25 October 6000 British Indian troops arrived to release and evacuate the interned Europeans. But the Indonesians believed that the British were simply serving as a cover for the return of the Dutch with the result that serious fighting broke out in which the British troops, mainly Gurkhas, were hopelessly outnumbered. Apart from 20,000 Indonesian regular sufficient forces to
,
soldiers of the so-called People s Security Army there were about 120,000 irregular troops sympathetic to the independence cause. The situation was saved by the arrival in Surabaya of Sukarno and Hatta who appealed successfully for a ceasefire The British then brought in reinforcements evacuated the internees and proceeded to wreak vengeance on the city. Only after three weeks of '
.
backed up by air and naval bombardment, were the British able to bring the city under control. Far from discouraging the republican forces, however, the British victory had the opposite effect. As American historian Merle C. Riklefs has written: 'The republicans lost much manpower and many weapons in the battle of Surabaya, but their sacrificial resistance there created a symbol and rallying-cry for the revolution. It also convinced the British that wisdom lay on the side of neutrality in the revolution. The battle of Surabaya was a turning-point for the Dutch as well for it shocked many of them into facing reality. Many had quite genuinely believed that the republic represented only a gang of collaborators without popular support. No longer could any serious observer defend such a view. At the beginning of 1946 the Dutch took over East Indonesia from the Australians and occupied the islands of Bangka, Belitung and Riau. The British handed Bandung over to them in April, and inJuly the Southeast Asia Command recognised Dutch authority over the whole of Indonesia, except for Java and Sumatra. Before finally withdrawing from Indonesia altogether in November, the British succeeded in persuading the Dutch to recognise the republic as the defacto authority in Java, Madura and Sumatra. After talks in Linggajati the two sides, Dutch and republifighting,
,
Above: As a village is cleared by units of the Dutch Marines a machine-gunner covers possible escape routes. Below: Atypical clearing operation. Village huts are
and Dutch troops patrol the outskirts set ablaze
hoping to intercept fleeing guerrillas.
INDONESIA
1946-49
can, agreed to set up a Federal United States of Indonesia owing formal allegiance to the Dutch
sovereign.
Yet the Dutch, with 100,000 troops throughout Indonesia, continued to believe that they could regain control of the country by military means. Their main problem, however, was that they were committed to holding such key cities as Djakarta, Surabaya and Palembang whereas the Indonesians, well equipped with Japanese weapons that had been handed over to them by the Japanese when they had surrendered in October 1945, were free to move around the country and were not committed to static defence positions. Despite the strength of the Dutch occupation forces the Indonesians' flexibility of movement resulted in a great deal of frustration for the Dutch. Consequently, brutal
methods were often used
to eliminate entire
sections of the Indonesian population. One example of this was the employment of the notorious Captain 'Turk' Westerling to 'pacify' south Sulawesi. In the course of six weeks' fighting there 40,000 Indonesians
were killed.
The Dutch calculated that it would take them two weeks to recapture the cities held by the republicans and six months to gain control of all the territory in republican hands. They began their first 'police action' on 20 July 1947, sending heavily armed columns out from Djakarta, Bandung and Surabaya into the areas around Medan, Palembang and Padang. By the end of 1 947 they had extended considerably the areas under their control and were eager to press ahead and take Yogyakarta, the republican capital. But they had
badly underestimated the extent of support for the republican cause among the population and the in-
was to have on events. While the Dutch continued to believe that thev
fluence which world opinion
could restore their position as a colonial power in the East Indies only by the use of force, they could not afford to ignore the opinions of Britain, the United States and Australia, upon whom the Netherlands depended for postwar reconstruction Nor could they ignore the pressure being exerted by the recently formed United Nations which called for a ceasefire in Indonesia and provided a forum for the republican case. The ceasefire was accepted by both sides, but it did not prevent the Dutch from maintaining pressure on the republicans and continuing to set up new .
,
federal states.
At the beginning of 1948, with the ceasefire still nominally in force, political conflict developed among the Indonesians. Left-wing socialists and communists were spurred to action by the return to Indonesia from Russia of the communist leader, Musso. By the autumn of 1948 there was open armed conflict between the forces of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the republican army, and in Madiun the PKI staged a coup and announced the formation of a new National Front government. The conflict boiled
down
to a direct confrontation be-
tween Musso and Sukarno. Musso proclaimed his readiness to fight to the finish, but he underestimated the influence which Sukarno could exert over the Indonesian masses. Sukarno accepted the challenge and sent the Siliwangi Division, well-trained and equipped and led by Abdul Nasution, to suppress the rebellion. The rebels abandoned Madiun and fled into the countryside. The communist leaders Aidit and Lukman escaped to China; Musso was killed At least 8000 people were said to have died and some 35,000 were arrested. The Madiun affair discredited the communists and removed them as a major factor in political life for years to come. At the same time the republican government's success in putting down a communist revolt reassured the Americans at a time when communism appeared to be advancing on all sides. Dutch attempts to discredit the republic by alleging that it was communist-led no longer carried weight. Nevertheless the Dutch persisted in their determination to restore their rule by force of arms, and on 1 8 December 948 they launched their second 'police .
1
#8?
'
Left: Laden with ammunition belts, two
Indonesian terrorists are ledawayforquestioning. Right:
The fighting in Under
Djakarta. Bottom:
Ml
attack from Indonesian units, these Dutch Marines, with two casualties, take
V
cover.
The
light
machine
gun, having given intense covering fire, is being cooled with water.
action", a full-scale attack
on Yogyakarta and the
other republican-held towns in Java and Sumatra,
all
fell to the Dutch by the end of the year. The republican forces retreated into the countryside and
of which
prepared to fight a guerrilla war. The military successes achieved by the Dutch forces brought them no closer to regaining their East Indian empire. On the contrary, they marked the
beginning of the end of their attempt to continue as a colonial power. On a purely military level they found that their advance away from the cities served only to increase their problems and to expose them to guerrilla attacks.
ready to fight to the death for independence. In addition was the fact that the Dutch could find little support It
Terror from the Turk
Morale among the Dutch troops was not were
particularly high, while the republican forces
among the
was
population.
a very painful lesson for the Dutch, as
historian Ailsa Zainu'ddin has pointed out:
'The
compared with the opponents. The tragedy was
military victory proved hollow
When
the Dutch found
the native resistance a
in
it
impossible to
'pacify'
Indonesia they employed
commando force led by Captain Raymond Wes-
terling,
origins.
known as Turk' on account of his national He gained an unenviable reputation for
bloodthirsty brutality
which
his
Dutch masters
tried to conceal.
An American
,
George Kahin, has described the methods he used 'His most effective method was to have his troops round up village historian,
:
populations
in
the areas of principal resistance
and arbitrarily pull men out of the crowd and shoot them, continuing this process until he was satisfied that the assembled villagers had yielded sufficient information concerning which of their members had been active in the resistance and the whereabouts of resistance forces.' Kahin estimated that between 500 and 1000 Indonesians were killed in this manner. Westerling described Far
left:
An
Indonesian,
suspected of terrorist activities, is
pulled from his
hiding place. Left:
A
successful operation by
Dutch troops is completed with the surrender of two insurgents.
moral victory of their Dutch, who believed in their own propaganda, were most deeply hurt by the doubts cast upon their sincerity in the councils of the world. The very characteristics which had gained for them the reputation of being good colonisers, their paternalism, their concern for order and efficiency made them obstinate and inflexible in the face of change. Their close identity with their colony made their rejection first by the republic and later by the federalists, the harder to bear. They thought they understood the "native" mind; they discovered that they did not Their disillusionment was a bitter one At the beginning of 1949 the Dutch agreed to a ceasefire in Java and Sumatra following an appeal by the United Nations. Faced with a stalemate, increasing pressure from world opinion and a threat by the Americans that they would cease all economic aid to that the
in his
,
.
.
the Netherlands, the
Dutch
finally
abandoned
their
own memoirs how
efforts to rebuild their empire. In the spring they
he provoked quarrels among the native popula'I... proceeded to dictate a few violently insulting notes which were turned into the native tongue and delivered to the different bands, as if they had been sent to them by their rivals. ... In no time at all a lively civil warwas going on among the
entered into negotiations with the republicans and a
tion.
conference took place in The Hague in the autumn. The creation of a Republic of the United States of Indonesia was agreed, with Sukarno as President and Hatta as Prime Minister. At the end of December 1 949 the Netherlands formally surrendered sovereignty
guerrillas.'
over Indonesia.
Even after the military and political defeat of the Dutch, 'Turk' Westerling, with the collusion of opponents of the republic, made a last desperate effort to stage a coup d'etat With about 800 troops he captured key points in Bandung and when he was persuaded to withdraw, moved to Djakarta. But he and his force were driven out, and he fled the country in disguise. .
,
%fU
£> '
*
The republican success in forcing the Dutch to abandon Indonesia was not primarily a military victory, though the republican forces were well organised and equipped and skilfully led. Even if the Dutch force had been larger and more determined it is doubtful whether they could have gained effective control of their former possessions in the face of
almost total resistance by the local population and the active opposition of Western governments.
David Floyd 217
.
.,
Attack from the hills The Karen
revolt
Burma
in
As in other countries of Southeast Asia, invasion proved a major catalyst for Burmese nationalism, the Japanese granting 'independence' in August 1943 and sponsoring the Burma Independence (later National) Army (BIA/BNA) which had been formed
December 1941 by the 26-year-old Aung San. However, Japanese intervention also exacerbated divisions which had existed under British colonial rule between the 1 3 million Burmese and the minority hill tribes, of which the largest was the 2 million strong Karen that inhabited the plateau east of the Sittang River and parts of the Irrawaddy Delta. Like the Kachins and Chins, the Karens had been regarded by the British as a 'martial race' and extenin
sively recruited into the police
and the Burma Rifles
while also enjoying autonomy from the Burmese government established by the British in 1937. During
World War
II,
Karen
levies (12,000 in all)
were
recruited for use against the Japanese, and almost
inevitably clashed with the BIA until the latter switched allegiance to the Allied cause in March 1945. Relations were already strained, therefore,
when
negotiations for
after the
Burmese independence began
war, with Aung San pressing hard for an early
settlement. It
Ba
was clear that the Karens under their leader Saw Gyi, had no wish to join the federal union ,
U
envisaged and, indeed, they sent a delegation to London in July 1 946 to plead for the British to remain But in January 1 947 the British government agreed to independence for January 1948. In February 1947 ,
Aung San held a meeting of the hill tribes at Panglong gaining the cooperation of the Shans, Kachins and
Chins but not the Karens, who sent only observers. The Karens then boycotted the elections to the new constituent assembly in April and formed a Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) in July to protect their population in the civil war that had already erupted between Aung San's Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League and its erstwhile communist rivals The KNDO peacefully occupied Moulmein for two months and controlled the Twante canal Following Aung San's assassination in July 1947 his successor, U Nu, attempted to placate the Karens with a Regional Autonomy Commission in September 1948 but Karen militants led by Mahn Ba Zan .
demanding a separate would have embraced nearly all of southern Burma. KNDO units again occupied Moulmein and other towns and in December 1948 U Nu
forestalled
Karen
its
findings by
state that
authorised the raising of Sitwundans (territorial units)
mostly from former BNA troops in the People's Volunteer Organisation (PVO) and the socialists. On Christmas Eve 1948 Burmese members of one such unit
-
the Auxiliary
Union Military Police - mas-
sacred 80 Karen Christians in their churches at Palaw. Tension was increased by a government attempt to disarm Karen village guards and in January 1949
218
KAREN REVOLT The
revolts in
Rebel areas
in early
Burma 1949
Kachin, Chin and Karen Rifles. However, when the Karens also revolted the three Karen battalions mutinied as did some men of the 1st Kachin Rifles under their adjutant, Captain Naw Seng. In all there were possibly as many as 37,000 assorted insurgents in the field in 1 949 of whom some 10,000 were Karens. Fortunately for the government the rebels
were too diverse
to unite, the
communist
uprisings had already passed their worst and the
PVO
there
and the army mutineers opposed the Karens more than they did the government. Nevertheless, the fighting closed the main Rangoon-Mandalay railway for three years disrupted river traffic on the Irrawaddy for over a year and on the Sittang until 1955, and closed oil fields and mines. As far as the Karen revolt was concerned, the insurgents had immediate success in the north as the mutineers from the 1st Karen and 1st Kachin Rifles advanced from Toungoo to seize Meiktila on 20 February 1 949, forcing two pilots they found there to fly some on to Maymyo to release detained Karen servicemen. With communist assistance, Mandalay was taken from the PVO on 13 March. In the south, however, the attempt to seize Rangoon faltered. One column advancing from Toungoo was defeated by a loyal Chin battalion near Pegu. A second column consisting of the 2nd Karen Rifles and all their families embarked on some 20 buses and 1 86 trucks to advance from Prome. This unlikely force, led by a single armoured car, ran into an ambush by the 3rd Burma Rifles at Wetkaw bridge and the armoured car was immediately knocked out by a borrowed naval Bofors gun. This left about 1000 Karens occupying Insein without the reinforcements that might have enabled them to test the hastily improvised defences of the capital which consisted of an old armoured car, some old British tanks rescued from scrap heaps, a few artillery pieces firing homemade shells and an assorted force of soldiers, police and volunteers. A second Karen attempt to reinforce Insein by Naw Seng was defeated in a three day battle by the 2nd Burma Rifles at Nyaunglebin and government counter-attacks retook Meiktila, Maymyo and Mandalay in March and April 1949. A truce was arranged at Insein in April and amnesty terms offered which Saw Ba U Gyi was inclined to accept but they were rejected by his colleagues, Saw Hunter Thahmwe and Mahn Ba Zan, who preferred a separate state to an autonomous one. Hostilities resumed and Insein was retaken by government forces on 22 May 1949. The initiative now passed to the government as the
followed by
revolt subsided into guerrilla warfare. In the following
,
4
,
1
was a further massacre of 1 50 Karens at Taikkyi KNDO raids on the Insein armoury, the Maubin treasury, the Rangoon suburbs and Bassein. In retaliation the Karen quarter of Rangoon was burned down on 1 February 1949. The situation was greatly complicated by the fact that there were already several other revolts against the government. The Trotsky ite 'Red Flags' had launched a rising in February 1946 in conjunction with Muslim Mujahids in northern Arakan, while 'White Flag' communists launched a rising of their own around Pegu in March 1948. 'White Band' elements of the PVO who were dissatisfied with government policy after Aung San's death revolted in July 1948 and there were also mutinies in the Union Military Police and, in June and August 1948, mutinies in three battalions of the Burma Rifles around Prome The government was entirely dependent upon the three remaining Burmese battalions and the .
year the Karen 'capital' of Toungoo fell on 19 March and Saw Ba U Gyi was killed in an ambush in swamps near the Thai frontier in August. Government attempts to dispose of the Karens were frustrated for a time by the need to combat Kuomintang forces that
had crossed
into
Burma
in
1949
end of the occupy frontier
at the
Chinese Civil War. They continued to areas until 1954 while forming a loose alliance with between February 1952 and January 1954. the The capture of the Karen stronghold of Papun in
KNDO
ended the main danger posed by the revolt, although several thousand insurgents remained at large. These continued the struggle while also engaging in banditry and joined with other disaffected political groups during the 1960s and 1970s. Not until May 980 were government amnesty terms Ian Beckett finally accepted.
March 955 1
effectively
1
219
Magsaysay's triumph The defeat of the Huk rebels in the Philippines
!
Resistance to the Japanese occupation of the Philippines began even before the final surrender of American forces there in
May
1942. In particular, groups
Communist Party and Mount Arayat on 29 March to form the Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapon (People's Anti-Japanese Army) or, in its abbreviated form, the Hukbalahap. It was this alliance of a associated with the Philippine
peasant unions had met near
communist leadership in Manila and the peasants of the central Luzon plain that lay at the core of the Huk rebellion.
The four provinces of central Luzon - Tarlac, Pampanga, Bulacan and Nueva Ecija- had a tradition of rebellion and unrest dating from the late 19th century. This area of about 15,000 square
km (6000
square miles), surrounded on three sides by
moun-
and on the fourth by Manila, was a rice-growing region. It was, however, poor since half its 1.5 tains
worked plots of less than 2 hecmost of which were owned by absentee landlords. In theory the crop was shared on a 60:40 ratio between tenant and landlord but, in reality, the landlords' share was nearer half while population growth and progressive sub-division of the land left most tenants heavily in debt. million inhabitants
tares (5 acres)
,
The sense of grievance led to the Sakdal Rising of 1935 and the growth of peasant unions. The most significant was the General Workers' Union, which had close links with the Socialist Party. When the socialists merged with the Communist Party in 1938, urban-based communists became involved in rural grievances. Although the
Huk movement against the
Japanese was thus nominally led by the communists, it drew for support far more upon the peasant following of the General Workers' Union. In the three years after its foundation the Huk movement grew to between 10,000 and 12,000 men. They fought both the Japanese and their collaborators and came into occasional conflict with those guerrillas sponsored by the US Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE).
When US
forces returned to the Philippines in
Huks received little recognition for their war effort and there was an attempt to disarm them but not USAFFE guerrillas. Former landlords attempted to re-establish rights of ownership, sometimes employing armed civilian guards to do so. This revived old grievances among tenants. At the same time, a slump in agricultural prices combined with low wages and increasing unemployment on plantations resulted in the emergence of a National Peasants Union led by former Huks. With the approach of independence the 1945, the
,
Above: Government constabulary troops arrive at Batangas as Roxas' stern policies are put into action againstthe rebels. Below: Atypical agricultural holding in central Luzon.
HUK REVOLT Peasants Union and the Communist Party joined other
groups
in a loose coalition, the
to contest the elections
Democratic Alliance,
of April 1946.
The Philippines
AH six seats in
Luzon were won by Democratic candidates member of the communist politburo. In May, however, they were debarred on central
including Luis Taruc, a
the grounds of electoral fraud. Negotiations between Taruc and the new president of the republic, Manuel Roxas, failed in August 1946. By then violent clashes had occurred between former Huks on the one hand and civilian guards and police on the other. Taruc and his followers then took to the mountains. The Huk rebellion was never a purely communist insurrection because the communists initially opposed military action; but this policy changed with the emergence of the Lava brothers Jose and Jesus as leaders of the Communist Party in May 1948. Although Taruc as Huk commander-in-chief in the field advocated large-scale land redistribution, most peasants had more limited aims such as a larger share of the crop rather than actual land ownership Nor was there any real support outside central Luzon except for the two provinces immediately south of Manila. The Roxas government answered the uprising with stern policies. They moved companies of the Military Police Command into the rebellious areas to cooperate with municipal police and civilian guards. There was a tendency to regard every village as a haunt of the Huks and summary justice was widely dispensed. Brutal actions were commonplace and units such as the so-called 'Skull' Squadron were widely feared. Ample use was made of 75mm artillery or mortars with little regard for the safety of civilians. Curfews, passes and the collection of unofficial 'tolls' at road ,
,
.
blocks were equally resented.
As
who numbered between
a result the Huks,
,000 and 1 5 ,000 guerrillas by 1 950, could count on the active support of possibly as many as 150,000 1 1
people while others were certainly terrorised into cooperation. Food was acquired from night visits to villages, under which Huks sometimes hid by day in tunnels fashioned from copra kilns. The Huks sup-
plemented these supplies with food grown in the mountains; they also operated their own schools and collected their own taxes Further cash was obtained from robberies. An extensive network of Huk informants communicated by visual signals or by an improvised 'jungle telegraph' of oil drums. There was a predictability about government operations, preceded as they usually were by aerial bombardment by Mustang aircraft and artillery barrage, which invariably enabled the Huks to escape, even without the assistance of itinerant tradesmen such as the ice cream and soft drink vendors who forewarned the Huks of the intended operations by 2500 troops and police around Mount Arayat in March 1947. Although it had at its disposal some 25,000 to 30,000 troops and police, the government was unable either to defeat the Huks militarily or to undermine their popular following. Confidence in the government was low and by 1950 the Huks had reorganised from small 'squadrons' to battalion-sized field commands. In January 1950 the Communist Party de'
'
.
cided to intensify the campaign.
Now
renamed
the
Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People's Liberation Army, or HMB) the Huks launched a series of large-scale attacks on 29 March. The towns of San Mateo, San Simon, Los Banos and Montalban were all raided. On 26 August there were further attacks on
provincial capitals. Santa Cruz
was occupied
for a
night and 86,000 pesos looted from the treasury. In
September, however, Ramon Magsaysay was appointed Secretary for National Defence and this
marked a turning point. Magsaysay introduced wide-ranging policies intended to reduce support for the Huks and win over the population to the government's side. The Philippine
propaganda by the government claiming the death of Huk leader Luis Taruc, Taruc posed for the cameras reading a Manila newspaperto prove that he After
was very much
alive.
221
HUK REVOLT Constabulary (formerly the Military Police Command) was reduced in size and integrated into the army, while civilian guards received proper military training. Army pay was increased to discourage looting and some of its practices such as reconnaissance by fire and static roadblocks were halted. Peasants involved in tenancy disputes in the
new
agrarian
courts received legal assistance, tenants were assured
of 70 per cent of their crop and labourers of a minimum wage. Loans were extended to farmers and relief given to areas damaged by the Huks. A reward system was very successful and led to the betrayal and arrest of 105 top communists in October 1950. Some 250 former Huks and their families were resettled on Mindanao, each receiving 6 to 8 hectares (15 to 20 acres), a hut, a subsistence allowance
crops.
By
and a loan
these measures the basis of
Huk
for
support
was eroded and Magsaysay himself received 70 per cent of the votes in central Luzon when he successfully
contested the presidential election in 1953.
The Huks were also faced with a remodelled and more efficient Philippine army. With assistance from the Joint US Military Advisory Group, the army was reorganised into 26 self-sufficient Battalion Combat Teams each consisting of 1 047 men with artillery and supporting services. There was a new emphasis on ,
small-unit operations,
using
rifles
and carbines.
Guided by reconnaissance aircraft such as Piper Cubs and L-5s, the combat teams conducted hard-hitting mobile operations and long pursuits in difficult terrain Huks were located by Scout Ranger teams of 3 to 10 men each, with dog teams and even a squadron of cavalry was deployed. Areas were flooded with troops who were suddenly withdrawn - leaving behind small units in hiding to trap unwary Huks. Pseudo Huk units were formed and other members of the security forces manned decoy buses to lure the .
rebels into attempted robberies.
With the army now
in
vigorous pursuit, Huks were
forced onto the defensive and confined to the
moun-
and swamps. Food and cash were in short supply. Cold, hunger and thirst took a steady toll in
tains
By 1954 some 9695 1635 wounded and 4269 captured, while a total of 15,866 had surrendered. By 1957 Huk commands that had once mustered hundreds had dwindled to three or four fugitives. The army, which had suffered 1578 dead and 1416 wounded by 1954, returned to a conventional organisation in 1957, leaving only Scout Ranger teams to hunt down the few Huks that then remained. Luis Taruc ex-commander-in-chief of the Huks was tried for murder in 1958 and sentenced to four life terms of imprisonment. Ian Beckett terms of voluntary surrender.
Huks had been
,
killed,
,
Above: Magsaysay pursued the Huks ruthlessly. Here troops set up an observation post. Below: Closing in on a Huk hideout.
A unit of Manila
police surround a building
from which Hukguerrillas have tried to fight it out.
Key Weapons
The
MARDER MICV
.
.
KEY WEAPONS
The German Army has had long experience
in developing specialised armoured fighting vehicles, and
concept of combined tank- APC (armoured personnel carrier) combat teams has been widely established. During World War II it used a large variety of halftracks to accompany its Panzergrenadiers into battle, but, due to production priorities, the concept never received the fullest attention. Had it done so, more advanced APCs could probably have been developed. Since the end of World War II a growing debate over the function of armoured infantry vehicles has developed: should they be merely lightweight 'battle taxis' transporting the infantry to the combat zone to fight on foot, or should they be sufficiently well armoured to allow the soldier to fight from within them? Although the debate has yet to be resolved, the its
West German Army has favoured the latter approach The West German theory of armoured warfare envisages not merely tanks and accompanying infantrycarrying half-tracks but a real infantry combat vehicle, in which the soldier can fight mounted alongside the tanks.
The West German Marder was
the
first
well-
armoured infantry vehicle to come into service in the West and because of its greater weight and armament was designated an MICV (mechanised infantry combat vehicle) as opposed to an APC such as the
224
West German-built HS-30 Spz 12-13. The basic priorities of this design were mobility, armour protection and firepower - all integrated into the vehicle, allowing the widest possibilities for the easy development of subsequent variants Following a long period of design preparation the
Marder entered service in the West German Army in 1 97 1 and since then over 2000 have followed as armoured infantry support vehicles for West Germany's tank forces. The Marder has good overall mobility, due to its 600 horsepower six-cylinder diesel engine, and can reach a top road speed of 75km/h (46mph) and has cross-country ability equal to that of the Leopard MBT. The vehicle is armed with a turret-mounted 20mm cannon, a coaxial 7.62mm machine gun, and one 7.62mm machine gun mounted on the rear of the vehicle and fireable by remote control from within the vehicle. The external mounting of the main armament enables the Marder to operate from hull-down positions, with only the gun protruding. Although this should be a considerable advantage in bad concealment conditions, the resulting height addition on the first
is in sharp contrast with the exMICV. tremely low silhouette of the Soviet
overall silhouette
BMP
Offsetting this deficiency, however,
is
the excellent
performance of the quick-firing, belt-fed automatic gun, which has been improved by a selector device
Previous page: Forward view of the Marder on
Bundeswehr exercises in northern Germany. Above: The crowded Marder turret - 20mm cannon, six smoke launchers and an array of electronic
and
equipment.
optical
M ARDER MICV
enabling the gunner to choose high explosive or
eventually be overcome by including troop-carrying
armour piercing ammunition
APCs
Sophisticated
at will.
electro-optical
devices
for
the
already highly effective and extremely rapid targetacquisition system give a high rate of fire with a hit probability.
This system
is
assisted
by an
good
electro-
hydraulic laying drive which permits rapid turret
movement,
a most important factor during fast mobile actions. Six periscopes at the commander's and three at the gunner's stations give them a nearpanoramic view for quick target acquisition The high accuracy of fire, combined with a rate of up to 1000 rounds per minute, can compete successfully with all the gun systems of existing Soviet MIC Vs. The
Marder. Whatever the case, in contrast with other APC designs, most of which carry anything up to 20 fighting men, the Marder has extremely fast dismounting facilities. In keeping with West German concepts of armoured warfare the infantrymen inside the vehicle can fire their smallarms from within the vehicle. to integrate with the
Above: A Marder races over rough country. The two ball mountings for smallarms fire are positioned towards the rearof the hull. Below: Side view, revealing the remotecontrol rear-facing
machinegun.
.
gun is also an effective AA (anti-aircraft) weapon against low-flying attack aircraft and heli-
20mm
at ranges over 1500m (1640yds). If used effectively in concert with other weapons, especially tank-mounted AA machine guns, this type of fire can be effective in disrupting the attack of an
copter gunships
AA
enemy aircraft. The crew consists of 10 men, comprising the vehicle commander, turret gunner, rear gunner, driver and six infantrymen. The latter, down by two from the original requirement, has been criticised, its opponents arguing that this makes for insufficient dismounted infantry available for fighting in the close-confined areas of central Europe. This may
£
C'>0
V L\L 225
KEY WEAPONS Left:
The robust Marder
has excellent cross-country capabilities, an essential requirement for any
combat vehicles operating with tanks of the class of the Leopard II.
Left: Although the Marder does possess an anti-tank
capability following the
introduction of the Milan
ATGW, to stand a realistic chance of survival on the battlefield
it
would still
need the protection provided by specific anti-tank vehicles like the
Raketjagdpanzer armed with 20
HOT missiles. The
effective integration of
all
arms on the battlefield is arguably the single most important factor in military success at the tactical level.
MarderMICV Crew 4 plus 6 Dimensions Length 6.79m (22ft 3in); width 3.24m (10ft 8in); height 2.95m (9ft 8in) Weight 28,200kg (62,1701b)
Ground pressure 0.80kg/cm 2 (11.3lb/in 2 Engine
)
MTU MB 833 Ea-500 6-cylinder diesel
developing 600bhp
at
2200rpm
Maximum road speed 75km/h (47mph); range (road) 520km (323 miles); vertical
Performance
m
obstacle 1 (3ft 3in); trench 2.5m (8ft 2in); gradient 60 percent; fording 1 .50m (4ft 1 1 in), with kit 2.50m (8ft 2in)
through special mountings in the side of the hull As usual in Western designs particular attention is given to human engineering. The Marder' s vibration and noise suppression levels and steering facilities, as well as its improved crew compartment, are exem.
,
Armour Classified Armament One Rh 202 cannon; two 7.62mm MG3 machine guns-one coaxial with the main armament, the other mounted on the hull rear
low crew fatigue This is in sharp contrast to the cramped and badly ventilated crew compartments of Soviet designs. A subsequent development to the basic Marder was the introduction of the Milan anti-tank guided misplary, enabling sustained action with .
226
.
MARDER MICV
6500m
An interest-
sile four of which are mounted on the turret Capable of hitting a tank at 2000m (2200yds) the Milan
and
provides the Marder with increased battlefield punch
TAM tank which is built on a strengthened Marder chassis and has a more powerful engine and a 105mm main armament. Although critics claim that MICVs like the Marder prevent the infantry from doing their real job* of fighting on foot, it represents one of the most success-
.
An
.
upgraded Marder (the Al) has been introduced and features a number of minor improvements including a double-belt feed for the cannon and new image intensification equipment. A number of variants have been manufactured and include the mounting of the Roland 2 SAM system, allowing the Marder to engage enemy aircraft at heights of 5000m (16.400ft)
at
ranges of up to
(7100yds).
ing spin-off has been the development of the Argenti-
nian
such designs and, significantly, one that capable of further development. ful
is still
Above:
A Jagdpanzer
Kanone armed with a 90mm anti-tank gun is visible in the
background
as a Marder pushes
forward on manoeuvres designed to simulate the conditions of an armoured assault by the forces of the
Warsaw Pact.
227
KEY WEAPONS
Above: While providing the 20mm cannon with a
Below: Bedecked in pine-branch camouflage,
good field of fire, the
two Marders rumble
Marder's high turret has the disadvantage of a high
forward with crew
profile.
evidence.
228
members clearly in
.
Korea: the beginning The communists invade the South The Korean peninsula, which became a battle ground between the United Nations forces and the communist Chinese and North Koreans between 1950 and 1953, has a geographical unity that makes it a tragedy that it was divided at the end of World War II. To the north, adjoining the Yalu River and Manchuria, are the
mineral resources such as coal, iron, tungsten, copper, graphite and gold, with hydro-electric power for extraction and smelting. In the south are agricultural
resources - rice and barley In .
able to
1
950 South Korea was
export 100,000 tonnes of
.
rice to Japan,
before partition, these agricultural products
and
com-
plemented perfectly the coal, timber and electric power from the north
The peninsula
varies
between 145km and 322km
width and from
845km
966km
(90-200 miles) in (525-600 miles) in length. Running the length of the country is the Taebaek mountain chain which rises to 259 1 m (8500 feet) This high ground means that only 20 per cent of the land is arable and 70 per cent of the people practise intensive cultivation with elaborate terracing of the mountains. Their origins and religions are mixed; Confucians, Buddhists, Animists and Christians make up the population. The war of 1950-53 dates back to promises of independence made by the Allied leaders at Cairo and Potsdam during World War II. Korea had been occupied by the Japanese since their victory in the Russoto
Below: The crew of a halftrack-mounted 40mm anti-aircraft gun search the sky for enemy aircraft at the Air Base in Korea.
Taegu
.
229
-
.
KOREA
1950
War of 1904. It had been ruled as a colony, 942 it was made an integral part of Japan and its
Japanese but in
1
population was conscripted for second-line military
The invasion
of
South Korea
25 June -mid Sept 1950
service.
The Allied promises of independence were confused by a combination of the rapid attack by the Soviet Union through Manchuria in 1945, and by the equally fast surrender of the Japanese following the
two atomic bomb
CHINA
attacks on their mainland. After
Soviet troops entered northern Korea a hurried Allied
agreement on 15 August 1945 established the 38th degree of latitude as the limit of their advance, and the area that would be secured while taking the Japanese surrender.
US
troops
moved
into the area south of the 38th
and both nations took the Japanese surrenders. However, following these ceremonies, the USSR took the 38th parallel to be a political boundary and it was here that the Iron Curtain fell with the onset of the Cold War. parallel
Two
years passed, with the
the problem referred to the
US
attempting to get
newly formed United
Nations Organisation. The UN undertook to establish an independent Korean government after free nationwide elections but the Soviet Union refused to cooperate with the
On
arrangements.
15 August 1947 the Republic of (South) Korea
was established with Seoul
as
its
capital.
The USSR
declared this illegal and then sponsored the Democratic
People's Republic of North Korea with Pyongyang
as
its
capital
The elections that were held
in
South Korea, under
UN, had produced a right-wing headed by Syngman Rhee. Though 210
the auspices of the coalition
some 100 seats were members from the North. After the establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the representatives were elected,
ang-dong
kept vacant for
US forces withdrew. To
the north, the
USSR
had streamlined
politics
communist state and in elections to a Supreme People's Assembly, Kim II Sung took office as Premier. Kim had been groomed by the Soviet Union over many years and it was said he had fought for the USSR at Stalingrad in World War II. The North Korean People's Army (NKPA) had into a classic one-party
Straits of
Tsushima
.
.
.
.
KOREA
1950
good training from its Soviet advisers and by 1950 was estimated to have some 135,000 troops. It
received
had eight infantry divisions at full strength and a further two at half strength with a motorcycle reconnaissance regiment and an armoured brigade. The NKPA possessed some 150 Soviet-made T34 tanks and each division had a towed artillery regiment ( 1
22mm howitzers) and a self-propelled gun battalion
(76mm guns). The
air force had 1 80 Russian fighterbombers of World War II vintage. In addition to the regular units, which were given added strength from a hard core of some 25,000 veterans of the Chinese communist campaign in Manchuria, the NKPA could call on 100.000 trained reservists.
By contrast,
the
ROK Army was poorly equipped.
eight divisions held
Its
neither
100,000 men, but they had
medium nor heavy
reserves and only a small
tanks, combat aircraft or amount of artillery
Withdrawal and invasion December 1948 Soviet
In
forces left North Korea,
but this served only to signal a campaign to undermine the
South Korean government; cross-border raids,
sabotage and virulent propaganda were
all employed. Then, on 25 June 1950, the NKPA invaded South Korea. The precise reasoning behind the invasion is unclear, although almost certainly one factor in communist calculations was the lack of interest that the USA had shown in smaller-scale aggression across
the border.
Seven infantry divisions of the NKPA, with the tank brigade and supporting troops, crossed the border. Commanded by Marshal Choe Yong Gun, they advanced in two columns towards Seoul. An addi-
column moved along the eastern coast while one small unit thrust into an enclave on the western coast that was south of the 38th parallel. The NKPA attack came as a complete surprise to the South; there had been no forewarning and many soldiers were on tional
weekend leave. The four South Korean divisions in the path of the main NKPA attack were scattered and the NKPA quickly advanced across the Han River and pressed southwards. The North Korean and Soviet scheme was to complete the invasion quickly and then present the
world with a
fait
invasion of 25 June attacked
accompli - their excuse for the was that the ROK forces had
first.
On the day of the invasion, the Security Council of
UN went into emergency session and ordered the NKPA to cease its operations. Two days later the US
the
President, Harry
Truman, ordered General Douglas
Mac Arthur to report on the ROK's capability to resist
ROK
Army and to lend support to the with air and sea forces Mac Arthur had at his disposal
the invasion
.
US
Seventh Fleet and the Far East Air Force as well as ground forces in Japan composed of four understrength divisions with no support arms Equipment was at two thirds its normal strength. However, within five days of the invasion, American units began to move to Korea by sea and air. On 4 July an understrength battalion, with an artillery
the
.
battery in support,
onel Charles
The day
commanded by
Lieutenant-Col-
B Smith took over positions near Osan .
,
were attacked by an with 30 tanks. Surrounded, and deserted by adjoining forces they fought for seven hours before breaking out, abandoning their vehicles and war material after their arrival they
NKPA division
ROK
,
General William F. Dean, commanding the US 24th Division, committed his forces as soon as they became available Between 1 6 and 20 July he held off the NKPA advance at Taejon and then, as the North Koreans assaulted the positions along three axes, he took command of the rearguard as the survivors withdrew Dean was captured but his delay ing action had allowed the US 1st Cavalry Division to arrive from Japan, and as the 24th was withdrawn, the 1st Cavalry and 25th Divisions bolstered the ROK defences and slowed down the NKPA advance. On 7 July 1950 Mac Arthur was designated the commander-in-chief of the UN Command. The appointment, made by President Truman, was in response to a UN request for an overall commander for the forces in Korea. But by the end of July 1950, the ROK and US forces had been pushed back to the small perimeter of Pusan in the southeast corner of Korea. The US forces, now the Eighth Army commanded by Major-General Walton Walker, held a line along the Naktong River, about 1 45km (90 miles) north from the sea (the Straits of Tsushima), and thence about 97km (60 miles) towards the Sea of Japan. Within this perimeter was Pusan. the only deep-water harbour available. The ROK now fielded five re-equipped divisions and covered the north, while the US defended the west w lere the main weight of the NKPA attacks were directed. The US Seventh Fleet not only covered .
,
.
the
sea flanks,
but harassed
NKPA
Bottom
left:
A unit of M26
Pershing heavy tanks, armed with 90mm guns, prepare to engage enemy targets from a hilltop position.
Above: Members
of a South Korean
Community Protective Corps; armed only with sharpened bamboo canes they pose for a photograph priorto going on guard duty. Formed in 1948 the
Corps was raised to protect the local population from
communist harassment.
movements
with naval gunfire and carrier-borne air attacks while the Far East Air Force, with an Australian group,
attacked
NKPA lines of communication and logistic
centres.
Despite the increasing strength of the Uniited Nations Command forces as they continued their military build-up in Korea,
it
seemed unlikely that the units
that had already suffered defeats in the north, at the
NKPA,
could continue to withstand of the communist forces. But the relentless assaults units around the Pusan of NKPA the concentration
hands of the
perimeter had opened the way for MacArthur to launch an offensive in the communist rear. Pusan had to hold out in order that the daring landings at Inchon
could take place
William Fowler 231
The US Army Postwar planning and War II the United States had be the most powerful state in the world, to be in fact the first superpower. No other nation could approach it in wealth; and the Americans, besides possessing the only atomic weapons in the world, had the largest air force and navy. The United States Army was not as large in terms of numbers as the Red Army or the Chinese Army, but with over 8 million men and 89 divisions it was still a By
the
end of World
proven
itself to
formidable force. Furthermore there was no doubt it was the best equipped in the world; no other
that
force could
match
it
in
mobility and firepower.
This was the more remarkable because ber 1939 the
Even
in
US Army
actually
possessed just 34 divisions which, short of every sort of equipment and lacking
joined the war, trained
it
manpower,
still
really existed in
name
only.
men to be returned to their families without delay. By the
end of 1 945
,
less
the war, the army's
army
than four months after the end of
manpower had been
halved.
The
system to determine soldiers' release dates, based on length and type of service. However, when it tried to slow down the return of men to civilian life there was a public outcry in the United States and 'demonstrations' among troops stationed in China, the Philippines, Hawaii, Britain, France, Germany and even California. The army was obliged to release immediately everyone who had served for more than two years By July 1 946 army strength had fallen to 1,891,011, which included air force personnel. When manpower finally tried to establish a points
,
.
Septemmustered only 210,000 men. in
December 1941, when America
new responsibilities
The
speed with which the United States had mobilised and trained its army was impressive, but this was exceeded by the haste with which the whole process was
stabilised
a year later the
army numbered only
684,000 ground troops and 306,000
in the
Army Air
Force.
About half these troops were serving abroad and occupation duties were the army's first priority. American garrisons were maintained in Germany, Austria, Trieste, Japan and Korea.
Germany was
reversed.
divided into four zones of occupation between the
Although the United States government had no its pre-war policy of isolationism, the American public expected their fighting
Americans, British, French and Russians. The complete destruction of the Nazi government left the
intention of returning to
Allied armies responsible for the disarmament. de-
Dismantling the American
war machine: rows and rows of enginelessP-40s, part of a salvage pile of
more than 40,000 planes.
THE US ARMY and denazification of Germany. clear that the former Allies differed became soon It towards Germany. As the four policy their in widely powers were unable to agree how to rebuild Germany, and in particular what sort of government should be established, the country drifted into a partition which was recognised by the establishment of two German
militarisation
states in 1949.
The American garrison
was a rather mixed the
1st Infantry
force.
Its
only
Division, and
in
Germany
formation was included the US
field it
Constabulary, a mobile force with an internal security role.
In Austria the
problems were rather similar
to
Germany and were not solved until the Austrian State Treaty (May 1955) led to the withdrawal of all occupation forces. In Trieste the Allied garrison was concerned to protect Italy's claim to the city against Yugoslavia. In the Far East occupation duties were made rather easier by the fact that the garrisons were almost entirely American. In Japan there were four divisions under General Douglas MacArthur, with a small British Commonwealth force, but the Russians were not permitted to contribute. Korea was divided into Russian and American spheres and, as in Germany, this eventually led to the establishment of two states. Soviet and American forces then withdrew in 1949.
Clearly
it
was impossible
suffer such drastic reductions in
an army should manpower and that so
that
much of what remained should be employed on occupation duties without military efficiency declinend of 1947 the US Army was only a former strength; and a shortage of properly-trained maintenance troops led to a rapid deterioration in the army's equipment. ing.
By
the
shadow of
its
The authorities were naturally aware of these problems but their efforts to remedy them were hampered by lack of public support and by in-fighting between the services. The army had a long-standing ambition to establish a system of universal military training, with a comparatively small regular army and a large pool of trained manpower to be mobilised in wartime, but such ideas found little support in Congress or among the public. The army was the least popular of the armed services and public opinion seemed to consider ground troops obsolete in the atomic age. Congress would not even extend the wartime Selective Service Act beyond March 1947, and although a new Selective Service Act was passed in June 1948 it only increased the army's strength by 100,000.
Above: 'D' company of the 5th Regiment of US Marines mount an M26 tank to spearhead a patrol in search of guerrillas operating in the east of Korea.
.
THE US ARMY
In fact the army's scheme did not actually correspond to the realities of the late 1940s anyway. As the Cold War developed it became obvious that the army would need large forces in peacetime in order to meet its commitments. A trained reserve which could be mobilised for a total war would have been useful for the Americans in World Wars I or II, but such a structure was less useful when it was becoming obvious that the Americans' first priority was to prevent a world war from happening. The era of
deterrence and containment
demanded
large, well-
trained and well-equipped forces available in peace-
time. Early in 1948 General
wartime chief of
staff
George Marshall, the had made
whom Truman
Secretary of State, warned the National Security Council that 'we are playing with fire while we have nothing to put it out'. This was partly because the armed forces were arguing so much among themselves. The National Security Act of 1 947 al
was passed to establish a nation-
organisation for defence planning, but in
many
ways it only made the situation worse. The air force at last achieved full independence from the army, so there
were
now three
services fighting for their share
of the defence budget. The air force was arguing for a 70-group striking force, while the navy was seeking funds to build a class of 80,000-ton aircraft carriers.
The army's requirements were
easily lost to sight
during the very public argument between the other
two services
.
It
was not until 1 949 that an amendment
Act gave the Secretary of State real power to coordinate defence planning and brought the services together in one Department of Defense (which soon became known as the Pentagon, to the National Security
after the building
In the
1
it
occupied)
950 the National Security Council claimed that
Soviet
programme
Union's
would
match
conventional forces in order to counter the
Soviet strength. Such a policy could have been the
foundation for a far-reaching reorganisation of the army to prepare it for the challenges of the 1950s.
However, although the president supported the programme it was not implemented because of the costs involved.
A survey of the US Army in June 1950 would have shown it to be a force reduced by financial pressures to a strength of 59 1 ,000 that
was organised
into three
combat
arms - infantry, armour and artillery and 14 services. These services were the Adjutant General's Corps Army Medical Ser,
vice, Chaplain's Corps,
Chemical Corps, Corps of Engineers, Finance Corps, Inspector General's Corps, Judge Advocate General's Corps, Mili tary Police Corps,
Ordnance
Corps, Quartermaster's Corps, Signal Corps, Transportation Corps and Women's Army Corps. The field army consisted of 10 divisions, 9 regi
234
on board
street-car, clearing the
forthe
a
way
movement of
Japanese civilians, who, without the protection of the troops, ran the risk of lynchings by the Chinese. Below: A Sherman tank of the 1 5th Tank Company.
Shermans were easy to produce
in
large
numbers,
but were decidedly inferior to Soviet machines like the T34.
mental combat teams (brigade-sized units) and the European Constabulary. Five divisions served overseas, four in Japan and one in Germany. The remaining five were in the General Reserve in the United States and consisted of one armoured, two infantry and two airborne infantry divisions. This was not an impressive order of battle and only one division, the 1st Infantry in Germany, was at anything like full strength. The rest had been 'skeletonised' as part of the economy measures. Thus each division's three infantry regiments had only two battalions rather than three, and each battalion was short of a rifle company. The divisional artillery was at two-thirds of its required strength and most infantry divisions lacked their organic armoured battalion.
The US Army's tactical doctrine was basically unchanged since 1945. It looked back to the experience of the last war rather than tried to foretell the requirements of a future conflict.
It
is
therefore not surprising that the
forces would become increasingly significant. The Council argued that the United States should its
US Marines in
army weapons of
nuclear
America's by 1954. Once a nuclear stalemate was reached the Soviet Union's superiority in ground
build up
Above:
Tientsin, China,
was still equipped with the World War II. The Ml rifle and the Browning Automatic Rifle were the standard weapons of the -infantry squad. Most of the United States tank park sisted
still
con-
of Sherman tanks.
Three new tanks, light, medium and heavy, were under design but as a stop-gap
it
had been decided to modify some
2000
M26
Per-
heavy tanks. The
iling
.
new
tank,
known
as the
M46
Patton, appeared in
The pressures of the Korean War ensured that, to save time, the Americans continued to order in modify the M46 - producing the M47, M48 and eventually the M60 - rather than design a completely 1948.
new
«*
ftk
vehicle.
the North Korean Army crossed the 38th on 25 June 1950. therefore, the American formations sent to help the South Koreans were World War II units in organisation, tactics and equipment.
When
parallel
However they lacked
the
combat experience of
the
and soon experienced difficulties. The basic Sherman tank was no match for the Russian-built T34 used by the North Koreans. At first the American infantry were still equipped with the 75mm rocket launcher which could not penetrate the T34. even if the over- age rockets worked. With few or no anti-tank mines and little anti-tank ammunition for the 105mm gun. the Americans were ridiculously ill-equipped for the army of the world's richest economy. Furthermore the skeletonised formations divisions of 1945
proved to be tactically inept. der with just
two
A regimental comman-
battalions under
command
could
by compromising the effectiveness of his forward troops. Units outside Korea had to be cannibalised to bring the Korean divisions up to create a reserve only
strength.
War
awaken Congress to the which was increased overnight from S15 billion to S60 billion. A programme of universal military training was established and the army rose to a strength of 2.834.000 men with 20 divisions in its order of battle. Eight National Guard divisions were embodied for service In all eight army divisions were used in Korea and the US Army's strength in Germany rose to five divisions. In Korea the policy was to post men to the But the Korean
did
deficiencies of the defence budget,
.
country on a nine-month tour. There were arguments in
favour of this policy of troop rotation, but
it
did not
make for stability and continuity in combat units. The huge expansion of the army placed a great strain on its
PPH
The West Point class of 1950 graduated directly to combat duty in Korea and a high proportion became casualties. After President Dwight D. Eisenhower came to power, defence expenditure was once again cut. to
junior leadership.
achieve the
'maximum
deterrent at a bearable cost'.
meant greater reliance on nuclear weapons, not only strategically but on the battlefield as well. As tactical nuclear weapons became technically feasible they were welcomed as a way of saving expensive manpower. It was thought that smaller, more mobile armoured formations would be required on the nuclear battlefield, which gave rise to the pentomic' division built around five selfcontained battlegroups. Such a formation was only really suited to a European battlefield, but the United States was determined to avoid minor wars elsewhere. It was not until the late 950s that officers like Generals Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor forced the government to accept that a world role required forces for every eventuality, whatever the cost, and it was only after 1960 that the US Army began to prepare realistically for limited war roles. Michael Orr In practice this
UN infantry trudge through North Korean hill Above:
The biting winters and often difficultterrain posed many problems for
country.
foreign soldiers. Below:
American
Military Police
move in fast to disperse a crowd of protesters in Trieste, Italy.
1
235
the top lacArthur's lien a
then
j
rful
audacious landings at Inchon
army overwhelms
a
weaker enemy
ys a temptation for the victorious com-
mander to press
his
advantage
to the limit
by advanc-
ing as fast as he can go. Yet every kilometre of ground
covered in such an advance increases the length of the lines of communication and thus makes it ever more difficult to replenish the army as it advances. The North Korean advance southwards towards Pusan produced just such a situation as the logistic units struggled to keep the front line troops provided with arms, ammunition and supplies. The problem for the North Koreans was the scarcity of roads and railways in the Korean peninsula.
What communication routes there were ran north to south down the peninsula and, because of the rugged "mountains inland, they all passed through or close to the city of Seoul, the capital. Already, during his first visit to Korea after the invasion from the north. General Douglas Mac Arthur had realised the significance of the problem for the North Koreans. If the enemy lines of communication could be cut, their fighting capability would quickly diminish and the impetus of their advance would falter. This would take the pressure off the UN and South Korean forces to the south who were fighting desperately to bring the Northern forces to a halt. Where Mac Arthur s greatness came to the fore was not in his recognition of the gains to be had if the North's communications could be cut. but rather in his determination, against all odds, to mount an '
operation to do the cutting.
He made up
his
mind
to
y-
launch an amphibious
landing as early as 29 June
1 950, only four days after North Korean People's Army (NKPA) had crossed the 38th parallel and started the Korean War. On returning to Tokyo from Korea he began planning, on 4 July, for an amphibious landing of a division at Inchon. The code name was to be Operation Bluehearts. His intention was that the 1 st US Cavalry Division, part of the garrison in Japan and hastily brought to war strength, should carry out the landing. The enthusiasm and dash thus displayed by Mac Arthur was not, at this stage to pay dividends and his first attempt to seize the initiative was thwarted on two grounds. In the first place, and most importantly, the NKPA advanced so fast towards the southern tip of the peninsula that the few American formations available in Japan (and this included 1st Cavalry) simply had to be used to make a stand in the south around the harbour of Pusan. Secondly, MacArthur set 22 July as the day for the landing (he had little choice, as low tides precluded any other day in July) and this set his staff an impossible task. To plan a landing and assemble the necessary men, weapons, aircraft and ships in 1 8 days was just not feasible. Operation Bluehearts was cancelled on 10 July but from then on MacArthur made repeated demands for the men and war material he needed in order to mount the operation at a later date. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States conceded the need to begin a major mobilisation of resources and promised, on 3 July, to put a regiment of Marines at MacArthur's disposal. Soon after, on 20 July, they agreed to send two more regiments to make up a Marine division.
the
**
r:
r
.
8
KOREA
1950
^___^^_
Pusan
The Pusan perimeter
The North Korean People's Army (NKPA) that pushed the US forces ever southward from the 38th parallel in June 1950 had surprised its opponents with its combat ability and tactics which took the
NKPA troops to within 48km Pusan,
in
Kumchon uryongpo-ri
Kyongju
(30 miles) of the port of
the far southeast of the peninsula, by the
week of July 1950. On August, Lieutenant-General Walton Walker, the gifted commander of the Eighth US Army in last
1
Korea (EUSAK), ordered
all
in
August the
forced into an area north to south and
A t...
Bulge
fc
\
Yongsan
forces to withdraw
across the Naktong River to around Pusan. early
Naktong
UN Command
And so
forces had been
some 130km (80 miles) from 80km (50 miles) from east to
west. This was the Pusan perimeter.
United Nations Command
was clear to General Douglas MacArthur that Pusan was the key to Korea and should be held at all It
costs, not necessarily as the
front line positions
mid Sept 1950
base for renewed offen-
NKPA but because the concentration of N KPA troops in the area would leave the way sives against the
open for an amphibious landing further north. From 24 July 1950 onwards, therefore, reinforcements began to land at Pusan. With the arrival of reinforcements, Walker drew up plans for a massed counter-offensive aimed at driving the
Above: While tanks engaged targets at long range, troops such as these, firing a bazooka,
were
relied
upon to
eliminate close-quarter
NKPA northwards. Butthefirstattemptto
which had begun on 7 August, was rather unsuccessful, and Walker was soon under pressure from renewed NKPA offensives. To the west, the 4th Division of the NKPA crossed the Naktong and took the key territory of the Naktong Bulge. Walker quickly moved the Marines into this sector and by 1 August had driven the NKPA back across the Naktong. But at the same time in the north, five NKPA push
out,
divisions, with
armour, were attempting to break
the Taegu area.
Once
moving
targets.
through
to the
various regiments into the battle area Walker pre-
Below: Holding on Pusan perimeter, M4
Shermans prepare to bombard enemy positions.
in
again, by
vented a breakthrough, but only after large-scale tank battles, and the pressure in this area remained unaltered. Then, 1 9km (1 2 miles) west of Pohang-dong, the NKPA 5th Division pushed southwards and managed to trap the Republic of Korea (ROK) 3rd Division
and cause their immediate evacuation by sea to Kuryongpo-n - which was not completed until 17 August. Walker had to regroup the ROK 3rd and Capitol Divisions to force the NKPA back north west of Pohang-dong. After this failure to smash the perimeterdefences, the NKPA forward commard decided on a strategy of coordinated offensives against Walker's forces
and by the beginning of September was deploying some 98,000 ground troops along the front (UN forces at this time were approximately 1 80,000). On the night of 31 August 1950, the NKPA forces launched a mass offensive against the defenders in the Masan sector. At the same time in the Naktong Bulge sector two NKPA divisions with armoured support crossed the river and reached Yongsan late on 1 September. By 2 September, both in the Masan and Bulge sectors, the perimeter had been breached and by 6 September, Waegwan had been abandoned by the US forces defending it. On this same day Yongchon and Pohang-dong had once again been taken by the NKPA. The situation had become almost as bad as it had been in July. However Walker, with his skilful and rapid deployment of troops, forced the NKPA onto the defensive in all the areas where they had broken through and thus prevented them from exploiting their advantages - although as a precaution he did order EUSAK HQ to move to Pusan. It was now, when it had become clear 'hat Walker had won the perimeter battles, that the news of MacArthur's plans for Inchon seeped through.
MacArthur was obviously intent on breaking the Naktong deadlock; and by holding, through his brilliant defensive manoeuvres, the Pusan perimeter, Walker had helped to create the situation whereby, afterthe Inchon landings, the NKPA would be caught between the Eighth Army and the newly formed X Corps Alexander McNair- Wilson
KOREA
1950
st Marine Division to the taken by the Joint Chiefs of have been Far East may Staff but the problem of actually finding the men still remained. Successive cutbacks of US forces since World War II meant that reservists would have to be called up. President Harry Truman was persuaded to sign the necessary papers to mobilise the Marine Corps Reserve on 19 July; 5000 men were called up on 20 July and, by 4 August, a further 29,000 men
The decision to send the
1
received their orders to rejoin the colours.
With
a
major effort underway
to provide the
in the
United States
forces for the landing at Inchon,
preparations and planning for the operation,
now
codenamed Chromite, began with a flurry of activity at Mac Arthur's HQ in Japan. The problems to be overcome seemed at first-sight insurmountable and an officer on the planning staff said later 'we drew up a of every conceivable natural and geographic handicap and Inchon had 'em all'. The harbour was approached by a long narrow seaway called Flying Fish Channel which followed a twisting course and thus effectively prevented large ships from getting close to the port itself. The channel would thus create major difficulties for an invasion fleet and in particular the destroyers and cruisers whose task it would be to provide naval gunfire support for the landing. Pinpoint navigational accuracy would be vital as the channel was dotted with rocks, reefs and islands list
many of which were The
not charted.
were of critical importance. Inchon possesses one of the largest tidal ranges in the world with the difference between high and low tide rising periodically up to as much as 1 lm (36 feet). The landing and supporting ships would only be able to reach Inchon along Flying Fish Channel on the high tides of 15 September, 1 1 October and 3 November. When the tide fell away, even on those days, any shipping in the harbour would be stranded on the mud flats. With such tidal variations the current in the harbour and channel was extremely swift and mud banks were constantly shifted by the force of the variations in tide
water. In this respect, there
was no up-to-date
in-
formation available for Mac Arthur's staff to work on. The swift ebb and flow of the
meant that supporting naval ships would be forced to
tide also
dr.
>[)
anchor to maintain their
nation whilst carrying out
bombardments the
landings.
make them for enemy shore-based
in
support of
This would
sitting targets
gunfire
from
artillery.
In
any case, the shipping channel was so narrow that they would not be able to manoeuvre for fear of running aground on the adjacent mudbanks. Another factor to be taken into account was the small island of Wolmi-do which stood just off Inchon harbour and which was linked to the mainland by a causeway. The hills on the island dominated the approaches to the harbour and the harbour itself, which lay on the low coastal plain The .
island
was known
be
heavily
to
for-
and it would clearly have to be tified
neutralised before the
main landtook place. It was
ings
Below: The
moment of
- US Marines, ladders at the ready, prepare to go
truth
overthe top as their landing craft reaches the sea wall. Thewhole operation was so swiftly executed that casualties were keptto a minimum.
Timed almostto perfection, beachheads were quickly established (above) and men and war material were rapidly
disgorged onto the Inchon landing zone.
.
KOREA Blue Beach
Two
(APD-1
25).
I
1950
asked the bridge for instructions. A Navy
officer with a bull-horn pointed out the direction of
The 3rd Battalion,
1
st
Marines,
over Blue Beach Two, the Inchon. 'Beach'
was
a
was assigned to land beach, at
right flank
misnomer: there was a
12-
foot sea-wall where we were to land. had Weapons I
Company-
81mm
.30 calibre water-cooled
machine guns,
mortars, 3.5-inch rocket launchers, back-
packed flamethrowers, and demolitions. We were by scaling ladders left in place by the two assault rifle companies. was embarked, along with part of my company and the battalion command group, in LST 802, a well-rusted veteran of World War 'We were Wave 5. Our amphibian tractors plunged off the bow ramp at 1 630 hours. There was that dubious moment when you see nothing but water and you wonder if your tractor is going to sink orswim.Thenwegotclearand led my wave away. We had been told that a wave guide would pick us up and lead us to the line of departure. No wave guide appeared. Two LCVPs - landing craft - did come to get over the wall
'I
me
1
1
I
alongside. The first was filled with photographers. The second was loaded with Korean interpreters. Two of these were dumped into my LVT under the mistaken notion that was the battalion commander. Neither spoke English. I
'In the smoke and haze could see almost nothing and was feeling faintly desperate when we came up on a large grey shape. It looked like a destroyer that had been chopped off abaft the bridge so supposed it was the Blue Beach control vessel. USS Wantuck I
I
Green Beach
5th Marines land 1733 hours
The Inchon Landing 15 Sept
1950
Blue Beach
Two and we were on our way although
I
could see nothing but mustard-coloured haze and
smoke. broke out my map and asked my LVT if he had a compass. He looked at his instrument panel and said, "Search me; six weeks ago was driving a truck in San Francisco". got out my lensatic compass and, with no confidence in its accuracy within a steel hull, made a best guess as to black
I
driver
I
I
the azimuth of our approach lane.
The
became visible at about 200 yards. was nowabout 750and neither the assault platoons nor the first wave armoured amphibian tractors - LVT(A)s - were fully ashore. Smallarms fire was moderately heavy and there was sea-wall
H-hourwas 1 730.
It
1
the occasional plop of a mortarshell
Wave 5
a circle to
in
in
the water. led I
prevent further congestion at the
Three or four of the LVT(A)s crawled up
sea-wall.
through a drainage ditch that came down through the sea-wall.
I
followed with
my wave. We disembarked
from our tractors and found ourselves sandwiched
between the assault and support platoons of the lead rifle
companies.
'It
was getting
increasingly dark, complicating the
business of sorting out individuals
companies moved out light,
and
units.
The
for their objectives against
2030 the battalion had dug in for the night and
scattered resistance. By
reached
its
0-1
line.
We
waited forthe expected counterattack. Fortunately it Brigadier-General Edwin H. nevercame.'
Simmons,
USMC (Ret.)
.
KOREA
.
1950
Problems of command
manding general, Oliver
Command
for
had
Inchon
accommodate both American
to
inter-
service rivalries and international sensibilities.
Six countries were contribut-
ing forces, but
most
was American. A came late in August tion of Joint
of the
muscle solution
partial
with the activa-
Task Force Seven under
Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble. Struble's
command was,
Seventh
Fleet,
in
US
fact the
but designating
it
a
under the immediate control of General MacArthur as C-in-C, Far East and C-in-C,
joint task force
brought
it
UN Command. The command of the expeditionary was the sticky issue. MacArthur's own planners had assumed troops
that
command would go
to Lieute-
nant-General Lemuel C. Shepherd,
US Marine Corps. US Army doubts
Jr,
of Marine
Corps
endemic, however. Further, the very name of the 1 st Marine Division com-
pleasantness at Saipan
was
in
1
944 when
Lieutenant-General Holland M. ('Howlin'
Mad') Smith,
V Amphibious
USMC, commanding
Corps, relieved Major-
General Ralph C. Smith, USA, com-
manding 27th
How much
Infantry Division.
might have influnot clear and he decided in favour of an army corps headquarters. He activated X Corps this
enced MacArthur
is
on 26 August, giving
command
its
to
Major-General Edward M. Almond. Almond, aged 57, put off Smith, 56,
meeting by calling him and dismissing the amphibious
at their first
'Son'
as
assault
'purely
mechanical'.
Marine Corps chagrin at having Shepherd displaced by Almond was mollified by having Smith, as Landing Force Commander, report directly to
mander,
until after
Com-
the assault phase
was successfully concluded. Brigadier-General Edwin H.
Channel and the immediapproaches to the port might be mined, which would add immeasurably to the hazards faced by the ships associated with the operation. In the event, some mines had been laid but they caused little difficulty. A large supply of Russian mines was stacked on the quay but they still awaited their arming devices at the time of the landing. Lastly there were the anxieties concerning the location and suitability of beaches on which to make the landings. In fact, there were no beaches in the conventional sense of the word. The main assault would have to go in near the town of Inchon and be made against rocky sea walls constructed as defences against an ever encroaching sea. These walls would have to be scaled by the first troops ashore and breached almost immediately to allow the swift landing of tanks guns and vehicles To add to this problem the so-called beaches led straight from the waterside into the built-up harbour area of Inchon During the preparations for the landing major efforts were made to discover answers to all these problems causing grave anxiety to the planners. A need to keep secret the intention to land at Inchon precluded the possibility of detailed reconnaissance by air or sea which might have found an answer to also feared that Flying Fish ate
.
most questions. Instead, more cautious methods had be utilised. Some 200 Korean agents were infiltrated into the area to check on various questions ranging from strengths and dispositions of the enemy in the Inchon area to details of the sea walls One particularly daring escapade provided much needed information on the channel leading to the harbour and the port area itself. On 1 September a US naval lieutenant was landed on a small island in the outer reaches of the harbour and, operating from there using local Korean fishermen sympathetic to the UN cause, he succeeded in obtaining a great deal of data on enemy positions, tides, mud flats and the sea walls. to
Smith,
Admiral Doyle, the Attack Force
competence for high command were
,
P.
reminder to the army of an un-
a
Simmons,
USMC (Ret.)
His final achievement was to rekindle the ancient equipment of a lighthouse on Palmi-do island so that it went into operation on the night the landing fleet arrived and thus helped guide it into Flying Fish Channel itself. In order to distract the enemy's attention from the inevitable activities in the Inchon area many other raids, bombardments and air and sea reconnaissances were carried out at other locations both on the west and east coasts of the peninsula. The effort appeared to have paid off as nothing was done to increase the garrisons of Seoul or Inchon and it seems highly probable that the North Koreans were unaware that Inchon had been chosen until a few days before the operation
The
commenced.
detailed planning for Operation Chromite be-
gan on 12 August when the decision was finally taken to land at Inchon on 15 September. The task of planning the operation fell to the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) of MacArthur's Far Eastern Command HQ. A nucleus of officers within JSPOG was nominated to form the staff of X Corps
which was activated to be the formation to carry out The Corps was to be commanded by Major-General Edward Almond, MacArthur's chief of staff, and would comprise 1st US Marine Division and 7th US Infantry Division from the occupation the landing.
forces in Japan.
During the final stages of planning for the operation were many anxious moments. The officers of JSPOG were continually coming up against seemingly insurmountable stumbling blocks. It was not just that the conditions for the landing were so hazardous; there were also problems with regard to gathering together the necessary men, weapons, vehicles, landing ships and craft. The imperative demands of the Pusan perimeter as conditions there worsened caused many headaches and even in the last days prior to the landing, elements of 7th Infantry Division were held there
,
.
240 i
7
.
KOREA
S
on
call
to reinforce the troops
defending Pusan.
Despite superhuman efforts to gather together the Marines, the 7th Regiment arrived in Japan only on 1 September (two days after the landing went in) and initially a regiment of South Korean Marines pro-
vided the divisional reserve for the landing. The provision of Tank Landing Ships (LSTs) was
was calculated
that 47 were hands on only 17. In the end. the remaining 30 were provided from Japan where they had been used as inter-island ferries. These ships came complete with Japanese crews, one being commanded by an admiral and two by captains formerly of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Mac Arthur remained doggedly determined despite the doubts voiced by his staff. Not only was he assailed from below, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington also continued to have grave reservations as to the feasibility of the operation. On 23 August a major conference assembled in Tokyo. MacArthur and his senior staff were present but so were the Chief of the Army Staff, General Lawton Collins, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
another nightmare.
needed but the
It
US Navy could
lay
Forrest P. Sherman, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The push to Seoul
after the
successful Inchon
Three US Marines take cover (top) as they begin to clear Seoul of communistforces. Above: While a US Marine searches a captured North initiative.
Korean, a soldier of the
Army (armedwithaUSM1A1
South Korean
carbine) stands guard.
They had flown in specially to find out the exact The conference began with a
details of the enterprise.
general outline of the plans for the landing given by staff officers: MacArthur, meanwhile, sat quietly
corn-cob pipe. At the conclusion of the briefing Collins and Sherman asked various detailed questions and proffered one or two suggestions MacArthur then rose to his feet and, speaking for 45 minutes, he outlined his reasons for going for the assault on Inchon The capture of Seoul would strike a major blow at the North Korean offensive to the south but more important, it would be a psychological victory of great magnitude. He defended the choice of Inchon despite the seeming difficulties such a choice invited, by comparing it to the unexpected
smoking
his old
.
,
assault
on
the Heights of Abraham at
by General Wolfe when
Quebec
in
1950
1
759
the impossible nature of the
them as a likely claimed that MacArthur route of attack by the same light. Inchon in view would the NKPA his dropped statement he his of Coming to the end heights caused the French to ignore the British.
voice to barely a whisper and concluded: land at Inchon and I shall destroy them'.
'We
shall
The room
was wrapped in silence as he finished speaking and it was clear he had won everyone over. All had been carried along by his confidence and enthusiasm and. not a little, by his fervent oratory. The broad plan envisaged that a battalion landing team (BLT3) of the 5th Marines would land at Green Beach on Wolmi-do on the morning tide of 15 September. The remainder of the 5th Marines would land on the evening tide at Red Beach to the northwest of the town itself and. at the same time, the 1st Marines would land at Blue Beach to the south of the town.
The first ships en route for Inchon left Japan on 5 September and once the whole fleet was at sea, Admiral Arthur Struble, the naval commander, numbered 260 vessels in his fleet. At one moment, after the fleet had sailed, it looked as though the whole operation might be in jeopardy as an unexpected typhoon swept across the Yellow Sea. The armada rode out the storm, however, and continued undeterred northwards.
From 10 September air attacks were carried out Wolmi-do and Inchon with increasing feroc-
against
and for two days before the landing the navy the island of Wolmi-do and the area of Red and Blue Beaches on the mainland with naval gunfire supplemented with rockets, napalm and bombs from ity
pounded
carrier-based aircraft. Destroyers sailed close-in to
and brought a murderous fire to bear on enemy's gun emplacements and trenches. At the same time cruisers, relying on airborne observers,
their targets
the
241
(
should it come
morning) or, better still, be used advances at daylight. the south of the town the 1st Marines landed at in the
to support further
To
Blue Beach at exactly 730 hours but the landing was not as smoothly accomplished as that at Red Beach. Some landing craft ran aground on mud flats 450m (500 yards) from the shore and part of the reserve battalion landed in the wrong area. All this was, in part, because of the heavy smoke cloud which hung across the land completely obscuring it from the approaching landing craft. Navigation was, in such conditions, a matter of guesswork. Despite this unhappy start the st Marines had achieved their initial 1
Top:
Armed with
a .3in
Browning machinegun,a soldier of the South Korean
Army keeps a
lookout for
any possible communist attack. Note the tracer rounds (an aid to long-rangetarget acquisition) that occur in
every fifth round of the
ammunition link-chain. Above: General MacArthur by Colonel Lewis B. Puller and Major-General Oliver P. Smith, surveys the (centre), flanked
from his hilltop two days after the
battlefield
position,
success of the Inchon landings.
wrought havoc on targets further inland.
When the ships carrying BLT3 to Wolmi-do sailed on the early morning tide of 5 September the island was scarcely visible behind the pall of smoke which hung over it and the port to the east. The landing craft hit Green Beach at 0633 hours and were met with minimal resistance The main height of the island was scaled, the American flag broken there by 0655 hours and the whole island taken by 0800 hours. The tide had already turned as the Marines consolidated their positions on the island. They were then effectively marooned with no chance of assistance until late afternoon when the high water would return bringing with it the main forces for Red and Blue Beaches. They needn't have worried: the enemy made no attempt to counter-attack the island and, at 1430 hours, naval gunfire commenced to soften up the enemy in preparation for the evening landings. The troops landing at Red Beach reached the shore at 73 1 hours and after successfully negotiating the in
1
.
1
sea wall, with the help of assault ladders, they
made
town against limited and sporadic resistance. By midnight the 5th Marines had seized their objectives at Observatory Hill and Cemetery Hill. Eight LSTs had run ashore and were disgorging tanks, guns and vehicles which would all help to sustain the beachhead against counter-attack rapid progress into the
242
1
objectives by midnight.
By dawn
next morning, 16 September, the Marine
Division was ready to press on towards its final goals, Kimpo airfield and the capital, Seoul. The landings
had been achieved with remarkably few casualties: 20 killed in action, one died from wounds, one missing in action and 74 wounded. However, as was soon to be discovered, the NKPA may have been caught napping by the landing but they were certainly not going to allow the taking of Seoul to be a walk-over. The city was garrisoned by some 20,000 NKPA troops and they withstood successive batterings by the enormous firepower of the Americans until they were virtually annihilated. Marines were on the outskirts of Seoul by 20 September and it took them, notwithstanding their firepower, until 27 September 1
before they could claim the city as theirs. In the intervening period the slaughter and destruction had
been terrible. MacArthur' s gamble at Inchon had paid off. Against all the odds it was a success. Few would have imagined at the time, as MacArthur added to his laurels this "impossible victory' (as it came to be
known),
that
it
would be
his last.
Major F. A. Godfrey
Key Weapons
ISRAELI
SPGs
243
KEY WEAPONS Since World War II there has been a growing trend towards self-propelled artillery, a move reflected within the Israeli Army which has produced its own designs as well as importing SPGs (self-propelled guns) from France and America. Although more expensive than conventional artillery, SPGs possess a number of advantages that make them an invaluable element within the IDF (Israeli Defence Force) In the open terrain of the Arab-Israeli battlefields the ability of the SPG to carry on firing during counterbombardments is of great value, as is its ability to keep up with the advanced armoured formations that have played such a vital role in securing Israel victory over its Arab opponents. The first self-propelled artillery to be imported by Israel came from France in the 1 950s, the Mk 61 SPG, which consisted of a 105mm Model A howitzer .
mounted on an same time the
AMX-13 Israeli
light-tank chassis. At the arms industry was trying to
its own models, the first of these being the 155mm M50 SP howitzer which came into service in
develop
1963 after years of development. Utilising the trusty chassis (with its engine moved to the front right of the vehicle) it carried a French 1 55mm Model 50 howitzer. Far more powerful than the lightweight Mk 61, the M50 can lob a 43kg projectile to a maximum range of 17,000m (18,600yds) - in comparison to the 16kg and 15,000m of the M61. The armoured sides of the M50 were subsequently modified to give better protection and the powerplant upgraded with the introduction of the 460 horsepower
Sherman
Cummins diesel engine. Israeli interest in
developing the Sherman as a gun
platform was extended with the introduction of the
Previous page: US-built M109A1 SPGs of the Israeli Army pound Syrian positions during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Below: A forward view of the mobile M109A1 with its 155mm main
armament.
.
*—
L-33 SP gun/howitzer in 1 973 Armed with a 1 55mm M68 gun/howitzer, the L-33 soon saw action, playing its part in the Yom Kippur War in October of 1973. While powered by the same Cummins engine as the M50, the L-33 was generally a more advanced design, capable of faster and more sustained rates of fire. For crew protection a 7.62mm machine gun is mounted on the right-hand side of the L-33's roof and can be used against ground targets as well as acting in .
an anti-aircraft role.
The
private
arms company Soltam Limited have
produced a number of designs for the Israeli Army including a 160mm mortar mounted on a Sherman chassis. A simple design, cheap to manufacture, this motorised heavy mortar has a range of 9600km (10.500yds) and first saw action during the border fighting of 1968-70. More advanced is the 155mm
Soltam SP gun/howitzer. Unlike previous models this semi-experimental model uses a modified Centurion
- such as - could be employed. The Soltam
chassis, although other types
M60
the M48 or M68 gun is
and when the longer 39 calibre barrel gun has a range of 23 ,500m (25,1 50yds) fitted
is
used the
Above:
A battery of L-33s
prepares for action in forward positions in the Sinai Desert during the
Yom KippurWar.
Despite the Israelis' success in developing their models, they have been forced to rely on large
own
numbers of imported SPGs from the United States. The most important type is the 09 the most widely
M
1
,
used howitzer in service in the world. Turretmounted, the 155mm howitzer is capable of being traversed through a full 360 degrees and, powered by a turbocharged diesel engine, it can attain a top speed of 56km/h (35mph). In Israel this SPG is designated the Ml 09 AL and has been modified to carry extra ammunition.
An
L-33 on parade in The distinctive Sherman hull and chassis Left:
Israel.
can be easily discerned photograph.
in
this
245
KEY WEAPONS
"-'
;
-"
S^ Two successful
KEY ISRAELI SPGs Mk 61 SP Howitzer Crew 5 Weight 16,500kg (36,395lb) Performance Maximum road speed 60km/h (37mph); range (road) 350km (217miles) Armament One 1 05mm 61 -AU howitzer, HE range 15,000m (16,400yds)
M50SP Howitzer
SPG
long-serving
» *
M4 Sherman.
Opposite top An M 1 09 advances through deep sand in front of a pontoon bridge being towed towards the Suez Canal. :
-
w
Two M109A1s on
Crew 8
Right:
Weight 31 ,000kg (68,343lb) Performance Maximum road speed 42km/h (26mph); range (road) 160km (99 miles) Armament One 1 55mm 50-BF howitzer, HE range 20,000m (21,870yds)
artillery
L-33
Israeli
designs were the M50 (above left) and the Soltam 160mm mortar (above right). Both models were skilful adaptations of the
exercises
in
the
Negev Desert.
<—
SP Gun/Howitzer
^^i
Crew 8 Weight 41 ,500kg (91 ,500lb) Performance Maximum road speed 36km/h (22mph); range (road) 260km (162 miles)
Armament One 1 55mm Soltam M68 gun/howitzer, HE range 21,000m 7.62mm machinegun
(22,966yds);
one
M1 09 SP Howitzer Crew 6 Weight 23,786kg (52,440lb) Performance Maximum road speed 56km/h (35mph); range (road) 390km (242 miles) Armament One 155mm howitzer, HE range 14,700m (16,080yds); one 0.5in AA machine gun
M107SPGun Crew 5 plus 8 in support Weight 28,1 68kg (62,1001b) Performance Maximum road speed 56km/h (35mph); range (road) 725km (450 miles) Armament One 175mm howitzer, HE range 32,800m (34,996yds)
M110SPGun Crew 5 plus 8 in support Weight 26,534kg (58,480lb) Performance Maximum road speed 56km/h (35mph); range (road) 725km (450 miles) Armament One 203mm (8in) howitzer, HE range 16,800m (18,370yds)
J246
247
,
In the early 1970s the
Ml 09 was
fitted
with an
improved gun to become the M109A1 and a number were purchased by Israel. The new gun gives a better range so that when using an rocket-assisted
projectile)
HE RAP a
high-explosive
range
of.
M
24,000m (26,250yds) in
(
maximum
is possible. 109s were much evidence during the invasion of the Lebanon in
1982.
At the heavyweight end of
Israel's self-propelled
M107
MHO
SPGs and which employ a common chassis and are armed with 175mm and 203mm (8in) guns respectively. The long-barrelled high-velocity M107 has an excellent artillery are the
248
US-built
range of 32,700m (35,600yds) but suffers accordingly from high barrel wear and is able to fire only HE rounds. The Ml 10 is capable of firing a number of ammunition types including tactical nuclear and can fire HE RAP to a maximum range of 29,000m (3 1,700yds). Unlike the 107 andMl 10 109. both are unarmoured (except for the driver's compart-
M
ment) and
this lack
battery of
M107s
to
M
of protection caused a whole be destroyed during fighting
Nonetheless these types have proved their worth when, for instance, during the Yom Kippur War Ml 07s on the Golan Heights were able to shell Damascus some 32km (20 miles) distant. in 1973.
Top:
Israel's
heavy artillery
-a 203mm M1 10 in action, on Syrian positions during the Yom Kippur
firing
War. Above: The crew of an M109takea rest during a lull in thefighting on the Golan Heights in 1973. Empty ammunition cases are strewn around, an indication of the intensity of the fighting on this front.
.
rotherhood of arms JProud to
be professional -the French Foreign Legion
The French Foreign Legion
is
a unique fighting force.
Technically a mercenary body, the Legion has a devotion to duty
unprecedented
and loyalty
among such
to
its
shown
French paymaster
armies.
The
factor that
sustains the Legion is a fighting tradition that spans over 150 years of warfare; to be a member of the Foreign Legion is to be among the finest and toughest soldiers in the world. The Legion itself has always
image of brutal discipline and sacrificial combat, and when combined with the many real distinctions that the Legion has gained over the years its reputation has been such as to ensure a ready fostered an zeal in
,
stream of potential legionnaires.
Recruitment of the Legion;
is
its
one of the most distinctive aspects
old custom of anonymity has given
the reputation as a safe
law. This
is
were taken
after
still
haven from the agencies of the
true today, although fingerprints
World War I
to discourage
hardened
criminals Nevertheless the only real bar to entry .
.
it
is
a
highly rigorous physical examination and, once passed, the recruit
is
accepted as a legionnaire. The age
from 1 8 to 40 years and the term of service is which may be extended; after 15 years the leg onnaire qualifies for a pension. The main source of ecruits has been provided by the economically dispossessed, most especially unemployed exlimits are
five years,
soldiers unable to settle
down to civilian life.
Since the mid- 19th century there has been a steady flow of Germans joining the Legion, so much so that they were normally the largest single group within the 50 nationalities usually said to be serving in the ranks This German bias increased dramatically after World War II when the Legion was only too pleased to accept ex-Wehrmacht soldiers- including a number of Nazis and SS men on the run from Allied justice The Legion went so far as to recruit directly within the French occupation zone of Germany despite the disapproval of other Allied nations. A number of Italian fascists also joined as did former French collaborators anxious to avoid retribution. This influx of exservicemen did much to harden the Legion even further; many of the men had five or more years of .
,
Two legionnaires in summer parade dress stand
in
the turret of an
armoured car.
Distinctive
features are the regimental
fourragere worn round the left shoulder, the wide blue sash and the red and green epaulettes- red and green were the colours of the old Swiss guards while serving the French kings of the ancien regime, and in this respect the Legion considers itself to be carrying on the traditions of the Swiss. The figure on the left is a senior NCO, identifiable as such by the absence of the white kepi
coverworn by junior NCOs and private ranks.
249
FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION made generous offers to any legionnaire deserters. These promises were usually kept and in a number of instances deserters actually took up arms against their former comrades. In Indochina desertion was rife; the French authorities admitted to some 2000 desertions from 1945 to 1954 and it is considered that the actual figure could be more than double. (Even in the early 1980s, the desertion figure was estimated at 200 men per year.)
Following the defeat of Japan in 1945 the French began to return to Indochina to resume their former colonial rule To their surprise they were opposed by a well-organised, communist-inspired national liberation movement (the Viet Minh) under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, aided by his brilliant military planner. General Vo Nguyen Giap. The Viet Minh .
instigated a guerrilla series of skirmishes,
war against the French;
at first a
developed over time to
it
full-
scale warfare.
The Legion was called in to put down the revolt. The 2nd Regiment Etrangere d'Infanterie (RED landed in Tonkin in February 1946 and was later joined
combat experience. Another distinctive feature of the Legion that helped bind together its polygot nationalities was its emphasis on loyalty to the Legion and not to France.
From
the outset every
new
recruit
is
steeped in the
customs of the Legion, which go far beyond mere regimental pride and assume an aura of history and
To many of the legionnaires become their only home, and the
by three other infantry regiments, a cavalry regiment and two newly raised paratroop battalions. At any one time Legion strength in Indochina stood at between 20.000 and 30.000 men. The war between the Viet Minh and the French reached its climax at the battle of Dien Bien Phu and, characteristically, the Legion played a major role. Although only a small village on the Laos-Vietnam border. Dien Bien Phu was chosen by the French to act as a centre of resistance intended to deny Giap access to the valuable opium crop in Laos and also todraw the
Legion
itself
has adopted the motto of Legio patria
nostra (The Legion our fatherland) which has guaranits isolation as an institution both from France and from the French armed forces. In spite of its reputation, the Legion has always suffered from a severe desertion problem. In part, this has been a direct result of draconian discipline but, in the main, is caused by the type of recruit the Legion attracts. A number join for the 'wrong' reasons. Unable to fit in with society as a whole they find the austere and often dangerous life of the legionnaire intolerable and so quit at the first opportunity. The Legion's enemies have made good use of this weakness and both the Viet Minh and the Algerian FLN
teed
Kit
bag on
shoulder, this legionnaire prepares to go to war.
,
increasingly confident Viet
Minh
into a pitched battle
was thought that French superiority material would tell against them.
where
near religious sanctity. the Legion has
Above left:
it
Paratroops of the reformed
1st
in
war
Bataillon Etrangere
Parachutiste (BEP) were air-dropped into Dien Bien
November 1953 and
set about improving the and building up the position's defences. Over the next few weeks 12 battalions - seven of which were of the Legion - arrived to create a
Phu
in
local airstrip
series of defensive ly
entrenchments, eventual-
containing 16,000 men.
Below: Parachute elements of the Foreign Legion advance at speed against Viet Minh hilltop positions above the plains of Dien Bien Phu.
FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION Of the 4000 French troops killed 500 were legionnaires and a further 4000 legionnaires were wounded - many to die on the rious communists.
during the battle
1
'death march' into captivity.
The collapse of Dien Bien Phu
signalled the end of
the French occupation of Indochina and in July 1954
Geneva Agreement confirmed the loss of France's Far Eastern colony. Although the French had lost the war, the Legion looks back at the campaigns in Indochina with pride. The French people had had little interest in the conflict (no conscripts had been allowed to fight there) and political ambivalence towards military operations in the colony had helped make it a 'forgotten war' and yet the Legion (with the French regular and colonial units) had fought on doggedly to the end. The Legion lost more men in Indochina than in any other campaign in its history, 10,490 men and officers killed and some 30,000 the
;
wounded.
As the war in Indochina came to an end so a new war broke out in Algeria, the spiritual home of the Legion. The fight for Algeria represented the most bloody war of the many national independence conflicts which swept through North Africa after World War II The Algerian nationalists - the FLN - opened their campaign against the French with a series of .
skirmishes and terrorist actions.
The French coun-
tered this threat by employing low-grade conscripts in static
Above: Legionnaires on
In a sense
Kolwezi, Zaire,
Bottom
right:
in
into action
into
go
after
landing at Dien Bien 1954.
1
A Legion
soon
French had
seriously underestimated Viet
1978.
parachutist prepares to
to the bait, but the
Minh strength. A number of probing attacks were made by the Viet Minh in December 953 but it was in the following March that
the lookout for snipers
soon afterthe drop
Giap rose
Phu
in
major assault was made. Dien Bien Phu lay in a bowl-shaped valley and the 50.000 Viet Minh under Giap had hauled masses of artillery pieces to the battlefield. Sited on the hills around Dien Bien Phu they brought down a hail of well-directed fire on the isolated French position. In March and April 1954 a series of full-scale assaults was launched by the Viet Minh: throwing themselves at the barbed-wire entrenchments with great courage the Viet Minh were successfully held by the French defence Legion units held the key points of the position and casualties were high - in one night attack on 13 March the 13th Demi-Brigade Legion Etrangere (DBLE) suffered the
first
.
more than 400
casualties including the
commanding
officer.
After the failure of mass attacks on Dien Bien Phu their bombardment and develop their own trench system which inexorably sapped its way towards the French lines. The battlefield resembled that of World War I: trenches, barbed- wire entanglements, massive and repeated bombardments night raids by the legionnaires and vicious hand-to-hand fighting whenever a French
the Viet
began
Minh continued
to
.
outpost
was penetrated by the Viet Minh.
Realising the desperate plight of the men at Dien Bien Phu, Legion reinforcements were para-dropped
700 were volunteers from the 3rd
into the beleaguered site in April; besides the
strong 2nd
BEP
there
REI and 5th REI, who made
their first ever parachute
descent to help their comrades.
A valiant gesture,
it
however. The Viet Minh had the advantage of position, men and munitions, and they tightened their grip on Dien Bien Phu. At the beginning of May the final assault was launched: wave upon wave of Viet Minh attacks overwhelmed the French defences, and on May 8 the village fell to the victo-
came
to little,
defences and holding back elite units - predomi-
nantly the Paras and the Legion
-
as a hard-hitting
mobile reserve. Eventually the French got the measure of the FLN in the rough mountain terrain of Algeria and also defeated the nationalists in the casbahs of the major towns, where they had conducted a campaign of bombing and assassination against the French authorities.
The
un-mapped alleyways of the
FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION Deployment of the Legion since 1945 e
2 REP motorised company Legion casualties 8 dead
I
Below: The Legion jungle. During
in
the
deep
penetration patrol
men
Legion casualties
operations, time and
10,483 dead
were saved by using river canoes. These legionnaires have just landed during an in French Guiana. Bottom: For purposes of
exercise
secrecy, particularly in
operations deep behind enemy lines, water-borne units have the advantage of silence and can often be dropped from infiltration
e
2 RE (one company)
r
REC
(D squadron)
regiment Legion casualties 5 dead
vessels far off the coast.
casbah
in
Algiers proved a perfect hiding place for the
FLN. The French decided on
drastic action
and the
paratroops were sent in during 1957, spearheaded by the elite 1st
Regiment Etrangere Parachutiste (REP).
command
of General Jacques Massu they conducted a ruthless campaign against the FLN; the Arab population was cowed into submission and essential information was gained through the widespread use of torture. While the Paras' actions were widely criticised, they worked. By the end of the decade the FLN had been militarily beaten.
Under
the
Despite this success the newly elected President Charles de Gaulle decided in favour of Algerian independence. The army was outraged: having
fought and it
in
was
won a brutal war they were now being told
for nothing.
Supported by the French colonists
Algeria a number of dissatisfied officers (many of
FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION been involved in policing operations in Madagascar and Morocco, and these operations were to set the role for the Legion after 1962. Based at Aubagne, near Marseilles a reduced Legion has been responsible for protecting French lives and property in France's ,
scattered overseas possessions.
The 3rd REI was based in Madagascar from 1 963 to 1973 and then moved to garrison French Guiana, where it remains. The French nuclear testing station in and around Tahiti is guarded by elements of the old 5th REI, and Djibouti (formerly a French colony) is the base for the 13th DBLE which can be supported by other Legion units during times of crisis in this part of the world.
969 the government of Chad called for French major tribal revolt. The 2nd REP was flown in, and over a period of months fought a series of small fire-fights with the rebels before the revolt fizzled out. In 1978 the Legion again found itself in Chad, carrying out policing operations in support of the government. Apart from Djibouti, where it assists the 13th DBLE, the 2nd REP is based in Corsica where it is specially trained in commando-style operations including mountain and amphibious warfare as well as In
1
military assistance in suppressing a
airborne operations.
The regiment
particularly dis-
tinguished itself at Kolwezi in May 1978.
them from the Legion) planned
Above: Urban operations
to
overthrow the
forthe Legion. During the
French government. In April 1961 the 'Generals'
confusion of 1958, de Gaulleflewto Algeria. Legionnaires stand side-by-side with an enthusiastic crowd during the new French president's visitto Constantine in
coup' was put into action led by the 1st REP. Algiers was taken over by the rebels but the bulk of the army and the Legion remained loyal to the government.
June.
French quarrel' Realising the coup had failed, the 1st REP returned to barracks and surrendered to the authorities; as punishment the entire regiment was disbanded on 30 April 1961. On 24 October 1962, 700 legionnaires paraded for the last time at their headquarters in Sidi-bel-Abbes, and then left Algeria for good. Although the wars in Algeria and Indochina had involved the bulk of the Legion a number of units had
When requested to join the uprising Colonel Brothier, the
commander of the IstREI, replied, 'The Legion is
foreign by definition and will not intervene in a purely .
Below: Demonstrating advanced field skills, these legionnaires try to pick
up
the track of guerrilla units
Chad.
in
,
province of Shaba
The mining
Zaire had been overrun by
in
Katangese rebels and the 2nd REP was para-dropped into Kolwezi to defend the lives of the large European community in the town Although a number of Europeans were massacred in the revolt, the 2nd REP carried out a text-book operation which helped save the lives of 2000 civilians for the loss of five dead and a couple of dozen wounded. Despite all the many vicissitudes experienced by France and the Legion since 1945, the Legion continues to be one of the elite formations of the French armed forces. And if France continues to maintain overseas interests then it seems likely that the Legion will remain as its colonial guardians, and will continue to act as a rapid deployment force able to be flown to trouble spots at a moment's notice. Adrian Gilbert .
253
The Viet Minh Vo Nguyen Giap and the creation of a new kind of army The men who
inflicted a series of defeats on the French from 1950, culminating in the decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu, were the troops of the Viet Minh. Originally a group of poorly equipped guerrillas, despised by their French adversaries, they had become a formidable army by the 1 950s The support of the Chinese communists from 1949 was very important in their success; but they themselves had laid the groundwork for this in a painstaking expansion during the 1940s. For the success of the Viet Minh was not merely a military one. They became an important army, with deep roots in Vietnamese society, because they were well led and had taken account of many of the forces operating in that society. They were no mere band of terrorists, but a convinced and effective instrument of revolution .
The basis of their power lay
in the
changes that had
occurred in Vietnamese society since the French takeover.
Most Vietnamese (about 80 per cent)
lived
and the cultural and unity of 19th century Vietnam had rested
in fairly self-contained villages;
political
upon a Confucian-style bureaucracy, recruited at village level, and a traditionalist structure of authority within the villages. French conquest broke down much of this structure, creating tensions by introducing new ways of acquiring wealth and authority, and also frustrating the aspirations of those elements in village society that
might have expected to rise to high
positions in the Confucian bureaucracy.
Added
to these factors
society were nial rule,
some
destroying traditional rural
inevitable consequences of colo-
such as the creation of classes educated
in
European languages and philosophy and able to feel the attraction of revolutionary nationalism and communism. This process was accelerated during World War II, when the French, in an attempt to compensate for increasing Japanese political control, expanded the education system. Whereas in 1939 only 450,000 Vietnamese had been studying in a school or university, by 1944 there were 700.000. The results were, perhaps predictably, to rebound against the French in August 1945, for example, the University of Hanoi, which had been one of the main institutions to be expanded, called for a government of national unity under the Viet Minh. The achievement of the Viet Minh leadership was to turn this generalised discontent in the villages and educated classes into the basis of support for a communist-led party; for, on the face of it, any other nationalist coalition might have profited more, especially as the revolutionary social aims of communism were felt to be dangerous by many elements in society. But the Viet Minh leadership was pragmatic enough to apply its Marxist dogma only in the light of it did not make the mistake of underestimating any situation or any foe. And its first
existing circumstances;
254
.
THE VIET MINH Right: Well-equipped
North Vietnamese troops,
armed with Soviet 7.62mm
AK assault rifles, practise weaponsdrill.The changing styleof the Viet Minh army from a guerrilla force to a force that used conventional drill techniquesdid not dull their record of success.
was to capitalise on the situation World War II When, in 1943, Ho Chi Minh was chosen by the Chinese to gather intelligence for them from Vietnam, he used the support he was given to establish Vo Nguyen Giap as a guerrilla leader in the northern Vietnamese province of Cao Bang. Giap, aware of great achievement
the real heart of the party. This process
that existed late in
successful that
how
precarious his situation might be, established firm contact with Chu Van Than, the leader of rebel
groups of Tho hill-tribesmen. This enabled the communists to set up firm bases in this remote region, bases that were to serve them well over the next six years.
Giap's
first
guerrilla platoon
December 1944.
was not
Its
,
Left:
The early days of the
Viet Minh.
Armed only with
shotguns, a unit of this infantforce
Hanoi
in
1
moves through
946.
Above: The
successful completion of the war against the French. Viet
Minh troops on the
Hanoi in October 1954 prepare to form up priorto their outskirts of
victorious entry into the city.
sent into
34 men only had 2 revolvers. 17 rifles. 14 flintlocks and a light machine gun between them. But by March 1945, when the Japanese coup ousted the French. Giap had about 1000 men under arms. Giap instantly seized the opportunity afforded by this coup. The Japanese were not interested in the mountain provinces, and French authority had all but disappeared. By June 1945 six mountain provinces, known as the Viet Bac. were under some sort of Viet Minh control and with this as a symbol of their effectiveness, the guerrillas were provided with guns and supplies by the Americans. It was these that transformed the badly equipped guerrillas into something far more effective - enabling them to take control in the north after the Japanese surrender of August 1945 and to retain control there through the period of Chinese occupation until the French reconquered Hanoi in December 1946. Opportunism and pragmatism had, then, given the Viet Minh the chance to take over large areas of Vietnam in 945 and 1 946. And when they had taken over, they rapidly set up a structure of government that enabled them to expand their power base to village level. Committees of all kinds were set up in villages-committees of youth, of the old. of women, of farmers - and in industrial concerns. These committees were joined together in the Vietnamese League for National Salvation (Cuu Quoc), which was not ostensibly communist. Members of various classes were invited onto the main village committees, and a cellular organisation below this attempted to maximise support. The Viet Minh realised, however, that mass mobilisation was not enough. Intense efforts were made to expand the cadres of committed individuals that were action until
1
when
the French took
cember 1946 they found
that they
Hanoi
was so in
De-
could not root out
communism. Furthermore,
there was a solid core of providing the essential background to the Viet Minh operations even in those areas the French
activists
hoped to have made safe. So the Viet Minh leadership gave themselves a solid base of support by their policy towards village society and their recruitment of reliable cadres. And on top of this they created an army that was ruthless, dedicated and efficient. Giap had established a basic framework for recruitment into his army soon after his initial successes in the Viet Bac: each village was expected to organise a self-defence group of 2 men in addition to a guerrilla group of five men who were to operate outside the immediate area of the village. There were periodic recruiting drives, and many individuals must have joined the Viet Minh because 1
of their dedication to the cause of an independent, revolutionary Vietnam. Others were, no doubt, unwilling conscripts; but once part of Giap's machine,
they soon
became
French
any
mass
at
the disciplined fighters
rate,
seemed happy
who,
to the
to die in suicidal
attacks.
members of Giap's army were subject to the same fierce propaganda. About two hours per day would be spent on "ideological training'; all could All the
soon
recite
by heart the 10 commandments of the
Even leisure time was carefully used -the songs the soldiers sang were revolutionary songs. Life was spartan for these men with an unvarying diet of rice, little meat or fish and no alcohol; but this regime produced results. Peter Scholl-Latour, a German journalist, described communist forces thus: 'Rather to my surprise, I found myself thinking of the intellectual atmosphere of a seminary. The ideological commitment of the troops was almost religious in its intensity. The classes did more than teach the men their political catechism. They used the practice of Biblical exegis to explore and affirm the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. It struck me as being very much in the spirit of St Ignatius of Loyola.' revolutionary soldier.
The Viet Minh leadership were ruthless in pursuit of their aims. They used this well-disciplined force to enormous effect in terrorising those villages that were opposed to them, and spreading their influence throughout the rural population. Because of their
255
THE VIET MINH had good intelligence far better than the French; they knew when to solid, dedicated civilian cadres they
strike,
and
at
whom.
Minn and the and orgaintegrated. thoroughly were forces nised during the period from 1946 to 1949, when military operations were still at a relatively low level. By 1948, the whole of what became Vietnam had been divided into six 'inter-zones'. Each had its own political hierarchy, which was directly controlled from the northern base in the Viet Bac, and each The armed
areas controlled by the Viet
inter-zone raised
its
own guerrilla forces.
By
1949, Giap's armies were divided into three elements, closely corresponding to the way Mao
in China. At the most basic level were the militia. They were poorly armed, had only rudimentary military training, and were not expected to undertake large-scale actions; but they were in a very real sense the backbone of the VietMinh. By 1954 the militia was probably 350.000
Tse-tung had organised his armies
,
,
strong. level of Giap's army were the regional As with the militia, they were organised by the
The second troops.
inter- zone
committees.
Better trained and better
armed than the militia, they were a valuable source of intelligence. Based in their home locations, these regional forces used their knowledge of local geography and local feelings to harass the French forces. Left: As a reconnaissance plane flies overhead, well-camouflaged Viet Minh soldiers advance. Below: Conventional drill for a guerrilla army. Right: Peasants act as porters as the VietMinh move supplies through the
jungle.
/^*
Father of Vietnam
A
Minh was a
practical
Ho
life,
theoretician.
sooner
He
man, an organispossibly
realised,
Mao
than
Tse-tung,
that
Marxism had to be adapted to fit the needs of the peasant peoples of Asia. His achievement was to convince the people of Vietnam that he was
much
J
Chi
er and a conspirator, rather than a
as
v
professional revolutionary for the
greater part of his adult
was
a nationalist as he
a
communist.
Iv •1
Ho was born in 890 in the village of 1
Kim-lien
a
local
in
central Vietnam, the
schoolmaster.
His
son of
original
name was Nguyen
Tat Than, which he subsequently changed to Nguyen Ai Quoc ('Nguyen the Patriot'). He
became Ho
Chi
Minh ('He who en-
lightens') in 1942.
From 1 91 2 to 1 91 6 he worked as a seaman on British and French ships and later settled in France, where he
was present at the founding congress of the French
1920.
Communist
He represented
Party
in
the party at
In
1941
Ho took over the leadership
of the resistance to the
Japanese and
French
was
in
Indochina.
It
then that
he formed the League for the Independence of Vietnam, which came to be known as the Viet Minh. He became chairman of the Viet Minh and, in March 1946, the first president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Ho remained
president and prime
Communist
minister and unchallenged leader of
International in Moscow in 1924, and by 1930 he had organised a single
the Vietnamese Communist Party until his death in 1969. It was not until
the 5th Congress of the
Communist Indochina.
256
Party for the
whole
of
1975
that his
"*
cause -
communism
throughout Vietnam -was victorious.
4*
-* '
THE VIET MINH Vrietl Vlinh military structure - 1954 Ministry of National Defence
r 325
[
Infantry
308
Infantry
Division
Division
98
320
i
I
Infantry
Division
independent
independent
regiments
battalions
312 Infantry
304
Division
Division
Division
Infantry
174 Infantry
176 Infantry
Regiment
Regiment
r 151 Engineer
Regiment
1
i
twenty
316 Infantry
Regiment
i
twenty
Infantry
154 Independent Engineer Regiment
16 Transport
351 Heavy
Regiment
Division
980 Heavy Weapons
Aircraft
Battalion
battalion
Anti-
1
i
I
237
367
675
34 Artillery
45
Regiment
Regiment
Regiment
Aircraft
Regiment
36105mm
40 82mm
Regiment
24 75mm
howitzers
mortars
5012.7mm
howitzers
AAMGs 3637mm
20120mm
15
75mm
howitzers
Artillery
Artillery
20120mm mortars
Anti-
Artillery
mortars
A/A guns
They were
the silent killers
who would murder
French sentry, or an uncooperative village the saboteurs a
bomb
in a
a
headman;
who would mine a railway track or plant
Hanoi
restaurant.
They numbered about
75 ,000 by the time the French were defeated. Finally, the top level of military organisation
the regular force or
Chu Luc. This was
was
the relatively
well-equipped force that was painstakingly built up and trained in the northern base areas during the 1940s, and unleashed for action from 1950 onwards.
60 battalions were slotted into five divisions (four in the Viet Bac and one in the Red River Delta) Each division was conventionally organised with three infantry regiments and support weapons. By 1951 a sixth was in being; this was a 'heavy' division of two artillery regiments and one During 1950,
its
.
engineer regiment.
The Chu Luc was a
far better force than
nents had expected; but what gave
was
the logistics system that supported
its
oppo-
cutting edge
it its
it.
Just before
Ho
Chi Minh ordered between 1 8 and 45 in Viet Minh-controlled areas. These were the people who, as porters, provided the logistics system that so surprised the French Porters could carry loads of up to 25kg (551b) and in good country cover up to 25km (15 miles) per day. It took anything up to 50 ,000 porters to supply a division but with such vast numbers available the Viet Minh could do it. Although the Chu Luc had been carefully built up, Giap seemed unconcerned with husbanding it in battle. Perhaps, like his exemplar Napoleon (Giap always believed he was in the tradition of the great the offensives of
1950 began,
the general mobilisation of
all
adults
.
,
Corsican), the Viet
Minh
general
knew
exactly
how
many casualties per year he could expend. But the tactics of massed infantry attacks that he adopted were shockingly wasteful, especially where the French artillery support was well coordinated. Nevertheless, it was these tactics that ultimately won the day. That they could be borne by the illustrated
by
movement
as a
the continued expansion of the
whole
is
Chu Luc
during the early 1950s. By 1954, Giap probably had 125,000 men in his regular units, and a new division
was being formed.
Ashley Brown
257
After the loss of positions along the Chinese border in
1950, the French forces in Indochina were concentrated in the bastion of
Red River
French military strength, the formed a rough triangle
Delta. This area
with Hanoi at the apex, Haiphong as the eastern angle and the mouth of the Day River in the south The delta .
was not only a political target for the Viet its
M inh (due to
De Lattre'
concentration of population) but was also a
strategic target as links
it
contained the
vital
road and
between the main port and the northern
For the Viet Minh their successes
rail
capital.
The fight for the Red RiverDelta
seemed to herald the inevitable destruction of French power in Indochina; French morale was shattered and supply routes from China were now fully operative. The Viet Minh now began the switch from guerrilla operations to
open warfare
As
in the north
^
in the north.
December 1950, Vo Nguyen Giap deploy Viet Minh units to the north of the
early as
began
to
delta.
By
including
10 January he had amassed 81 battalions 12
heavy-weapons battalions and eight
engineer battalions. Giap was determined to initiate a set-piece battle which would ensure the capture of
Hanoi and an early victory. On the French side, following their withdrawal from the northern garrisons, changes in the high command had resulted in the introduction of General de Lattre de Tassigny as commander-in-chief with wide powers, both military and political. De Lattre arrived on 17 December 1950 and immediately set
fee;
\.#
a>
ft
•s
Above left: Units of French Dinassaut (soft-skinned assault craft)
move across
flooded fields
di
in
search of
communisttroops. The Dinassaut often mounted both heavy machine guns and mortar sections. Left: Viet Minh troops occupy a village set aflame by *y,-s,
retreating French troops in
1951.
As the French into the Red
withdrew
River Delta they attempted to destroy
behind.
I
all
that they
left
V
ain of fire
Fire In
from the sky
January 1951 the Viet Minh engaged the
French
in
a set-piece battle at
Vmh Yen
but
were
roundly defeated with the loss of 6000 dead. Viet
Minh
officer,
Ngo Van
A
Chieu, later described
the effects of French bombing. 'All of a sudden a sound can be heard in the sky and strange birds appear, getting larger and larger. Airplanes. order my men to take cover from the bombs and machine gun bullets. But the planes dived upon us without firing their guns. However, all of a sudden, hell opens in front of my eyes. Hell comes in the form of large, egg-shaped containers, dropping from the first plane, followed by other eggs from the second and third planes. Immense sheets of flames, extending over hundreds of metres, it seems, strike terror in I
the ranks of
which
falls
my soldiers.
from the
'Another plane
This
napalm, the
is
fire
skies.
swoops down behind us and bomb. The bomb falls
again drops a napalm closely behind us
touching fleeing
and
my whole
in all
I
feel
its
body. The
directions
fiery
men
breath
are
now
cannot hold them of holding out under this
and
I
no way which flows in all directions and burns everything on its passage.'
back. There
is
torrent of fire
Above: The aftermath of Giap's second attempt to breakthe French hold
in
the delta. Scattered bodies of
dead Viet Minh are
surveyed by French troops just outside the perimeter defences at Mao Khe in
March 1951. Top
right:
victim of the fighting
tended by
A
is
members of an
Algerian unit of the French forces.
about restructuring the army and the civilian dispositions.
The French Metropolitan and Colonial
units
were
organised into Groupements Mobiles (GM); some had a tank-truck mix while others were amphibious-
The units' commanders were nicknamed marechaux d 'empire (after Napoleon's harddriving generals). GM1 was an all African unit with airborne units.
Algerians and Senegalese;
GM3,
under Colonel
Vanuxem. included Muong mountain tribesmen: GM5 was another North African unit, while GM 00 was a largely French unit with men who had seen 1
1
action in Korea.
While all this reorganisation had been going on. Giap planned to advance along the line of the Red River (now called the Hong) and had deployed the
bulk of his troops with this in mind In fact Giap was so sure of French weakness that he did not make any serious attempt to draw French attention from his proposed assault-zone. This in turn allowed de Lattre to concentrate his forces against the imminent Viet .
Minh assaults.
On 13 January 1951 the communist attack began. Facing the advancing 308th and 312th Viet Minh Divisions in the Vinh Yen area were the North African GM1 and GM3 under Colonel Vanuxem. A major portion of the 308th Division struck out towards an outpost at Bao Chuc (held only by 50 Vietnamese and Senegalese) in an attempt to split the French units. GM3 was pushed northwards to aid the outpost, and though heavily ambushed at Dao Tu. where they lost a Senegalese battalion, artillery support from Vinh Yen 259
VIETNAM
1950-5
and
De
Lattre's strategy
De
Lattre
served friends
able
de Tassigny had a de-
among
reputation
both
and enemies as a formid-
military
Vo Nguyen
brain.
His adversary,
Giap, described
in
had thought that in de Lattre de Tassigny we would find a general enslaved by his background and training, incapable of adapting to a form of war not taught in imperialist military academies. But de Lattre professional
is,
in
fact,
soldier.
a
brilliant
The death
of
son [de Lattre's son died in 1951 at the battle of Ninh Binh] has hardly affected his aggressive spirit. Our forces, which are so superior in his
guerrilla
forth
actions,
engage in
De Firstly
must not hence-
full-scale battles.'
Lattre's strategy
he
was
was determined
the
four-fold.
to secure
hill-tribesmen
all
war
the
into
These three single elements were to meet with criticism from with-
the French military establishment; but de Lattre's strategy involved a combination of the secure defence and mobile striking forces in
Minh in 1951 during the attacks on the Red River Delta. All the elements were to be taken together, and underpinned
that so surprised the Viet
by the
aspect of
fourth, crucial
his
strategy.
For
mined
finally,
de
to strike a
Lattre
chord
was in
deter-
the hearts
Vietnamese themselves,
of the
cadets
he constructed the de Lattre line - a series of 1200 concrete emplacements stretching from the sea near Along Bay to Vinh Yen, and back to the sea near Phat Diem. It was manned by 20 infantry battalions. Supplementing these static positions were troops formed into mobile groups or parachute battalions. These were to be the force that would strike at Viet Minh concen-
specific
in
Saigon
on
in
to
for
an
evil
your war. insofar
It
who
fight bravely if
you are
patis
only involves
France
made
certain
has
promises towards Vietnam, and insofar as she is part of the defence of the free world.'
GM
relieve
By
1
,
GM3. 5 January
GM
1
had taken
Hill
1
57 and by
the
afternoon of the 16th Hills 101 and 210 were reoccupied. But as night fell, the 308th Division of the Viet
Minh army moved onto
the offensive. Using mobile groups with 3in mortars and heavy machine guns, they attacked French positions on Hill 47, Hill 101 and Hill 210. Suddenly the French were faced with wave upon wave of Viet Minh infantry throwing themselves relentlessly against the French defences. De Lattre, realising the possibility of envelopment through sheer mass of numbers, ordered all available fighter-bombers and any transport planes capable of being used as bombers, to launch a massive aerial fire
bombardment
bombing runs,
is
your country. This
as she
.
was
His address to
cause. But
riots, fight for
miles) At this point de Lattre decided to take personal charge of the battle, flew into Vinh Yen, ordered reserve battalions to be flown in from south Indochina, and mobilised with reserve ammunition, to 1
war;
war
like
individuals
Minh had pushed the French back and an area east of Vinh Yen was undefended along a gap of some 5km (3
This
the
men. What this implies is that if you are communists, join the Viet Minh. There are
many
support from French fighter-bombers allowed way back. By 14 January the Viet
to fight its
July 1952
into
this point:
you must act
air
GM3
against the Viet Minh concentrations. He specified the use of napalm. As the first of the waves of aeroplanes began their
them firmly against communism. bring
the Red River Delta, and to this end
trations.
Lattre
againstthe Viet Minh.
May
how 'we
1951
formed commando groups using a mix of French troops and Vietnamese forces to carry the war into the hills and bring
de
Next,
the effect of the napalm soon followed and the sickly-sweet odour of roasting flesh filled the air. Yet despite the magnitude of the aerial assault it did not appear to have broken the morale of the Viet Minh and by 1400 hours on the 17th, Hill 101 was retaken by the communists Without Hill 1 1 Hill 47 was untenable and the French units were ordered to withdraw. De Lattre committed his last reserves, two Moroccan battalions and a paratroop battalion from GM2. Although one battalion suffered heavy casualties after a suicide attack by the Viet Minh 312th Division, a further session with napalm and rapid forward movement from the French ground forces .
,
*
>:
VIETNAM drove the Viet Minh from the battle-zone.
Vinh Yen had cost the communists ipOOO dead and 500 captured. The most significant result of the defeat how ever, was that it illustrated that jthe Viet Minh was not ready, as a field army, for a
The defeat
at
1950-5
The Red River Delta 1951 312 Div
general counter-offensive.
After the defeat Giap withdrew his forces and, while the creation of the de Lattre line was pushed along, prepared to launch another offensive in order to pre-empt the consolidation of the French defences.
Giap moved three divisions
(the 308th,
312th and
316th) to the north, leaving the 304th and 320th Infantry Divisions in the northwest in order to attract
French reserve units. Viet
On
the night of 23
March
Minh commander-in-chief launched an Dong Trieu sector which, with a
sive in the
13-17 Jan1951
Minh 308 Div destroys French
Viet
postatBao-Chuc and makes massed attacks on French positions. GM1, 2 & 3 committed. Viet
Minh withdraw after
the
heavy
fighting.
offendeter-
would put his forces astride communications lines between Haiphong and Hanoi. By 26 March the outer ring of French defensive outposts mined
thrust,
had been taken and it w as only the timely intervention of five French naval vessels, which sustained a concentrated artillery barrage from their positions in the deep-water harbour off the Da Bac River, that prevented the Viet Minh from pushing straight on to
MaoKhe. However, by the evening of the 26th. Mao Khe was exposed and the communist 316th Division was poised for its final assault. In the early hours of 27 March, a barrage of 75mm and 57mm shells began to explode in and around the Mao Khe mine, an outpost
29May-18Jun1951 3-pronged assault made by 304, 308
& 320 Divs against French defences on the river. French reinforcements counter-attack and Viet Minh are forced to retreat.
Right: Intrinsictothe
security of an area total
was the
eradication of
possible operations bases for guerrilla units.
with
Armed
9mm sub-machine
guns these hardened Moroccan tirailleurs clear such a location.
Below: For both sides
bamboo was a convenient replacement for barbed in holding up an advance and preparing a 'killing zone', as these wire
victims of the
Day River
offensives show.
261
VIETNAM
1950-51
of the main village of Mao Khe. After waves of Viet Minh assaulted the the position but in savage hand-to-hand fighting the communists were repulsed; and, as daylight broke, flights slightly north initial
barrage,
of French B-26s and Hellcats saturated the Viet Minh positions with napalm and fragmentation bombs. At 1400 hours the 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion pushed along, parallel to the mine railtrack, in an
and the 42nd Independent Infantry Regiment (which had been infiltrated deep into French-held territory in the delta) which would move against French resupply units that had been mobilised to reinforce the French troops initially engaged at Phu Ly, Ninh Binh and Phat Diem. Throughout April the French were kept busy in the northwest by the communist 3 2th Division while the 304th and the 308th the 320th Division
1
,
Divisions trekked southwards to join the 320th in the
advance was halted. This move, however, distracted enemy troops and allowed the survivors of the Mao Khe mine to reach Mao Khe village At 0200 hours on the 28th, a communist barrage opened up against the French village positions. This was followed by an infantry assault as waves of screaming Viet Minh charged the village. The communists actually managed to breach the outer defences and fires soon raged throughout. But just before dawn French artillery from Dong Trieu opened up, laying down barrages almost on top of the position As dawn broke the Viet Minh were finally beaten off. After this second defeat, Giap changed his strategy from direct assault against Hanoi/Haiphong and switched the theatre of operations to the southwest, though he was keen to continue open warfare. The
The first attacks began at dawn on 29 May and took
.
,
plan was for three attacks within a general offensive. The 304th Division would attack Phu Ly, the 308th Ninh Binh, and the 320th would crush weak outposts between Ninh Binh
and the coast and take Phat Diem. Combined with this assault would be the offensives of the 64th Infantry
Regiment of
Minh became increasingly
,
attempt to reinforce the isolated outpost at the mine, but they came under accurate enemy fire and their
.
Below: As the fighting raged in the delta, the Viet
south delta base.
by complete surprise with the bulk of the 308th Division penetrating Ninh Binh and pinning down the French survivors. Smaller units of the 308th Division crossed the Day River and successfully annihilated a string of small French outposts. When the news of the offensive reached the French high command, counter-measures were quickly put into action. De Lattre sent artillery groups, three GMs, one armoured group and the 7th Colonial Paratroop Battalion into the battle-zone within 48 hours As well as these, further river craft were sent in and concen.
artillery
were ordered. Napalm,
strafing fire,
barrages and concentrated French infantry
counter-offensives cut Viet the
Day River and
Minh supply
lines across
forced the communists to retreat
back into the limestone hills whence they had come. By 18 June 1951 the last of Giap's units had disengaged and he had incurred a total of 1 1 ,000 casualties overall
.
failure of their offensives
and their inability to dislodge the French. Here
M4 Sherman, mounting 75mm gun, lumbers
an a
towards the front as infantry units rest in a
roadside ditch.
the French
trated air strikes
frustrated by the consistent
The battle
for the delta
was
lost.
For the French the victory was significant in that if they had not held onto the delta bastion they would have been effectively ejected from Indochina. For the communists the year 1951 had proved to be too early for victory although it had established a pattern of French response which was ultimately to prove fatal. William Fowler ,
Key Weapons
,
KEY WEAPONS
The
F-15
!
Eagle
single-seat,
all-weather
air-
manufactured by McDonnell Aircraft, a division of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, in St Louis, USA, and is considered by many to be Nato's most formidable fighter. The need for such an air-superiority aircraft had been realised by the US Air Force (USAF) in the early 1960s when American defence experts were already looking for a fighter to eventually succeed the F-4 Phantom. This requirement was further accentuated in July 1967 when the new MiG-23 variable-geometry fighter and the even more formidable MiG-25 interceptor were unveiled in the Soviet Union. In September 1968 the firms McDonnell Douglas, Fairchild and North American were commissioned to submit competitive superiority fighter
plans for a
new
is
fighter to redress the imbalance.
The
winning design, designated the F-15 Eagle, made its first flight in July 1 972 and the first squadron of F- 1 5s was declared operational in January 1976. The F-15 is powered by two Pratt & Whitney
F100-PW-100
afterburning turbofan engines with a
combined thrust of 2 1 ,300kg (47 ,0001bs) providing a rapid climb rate of 12,192m (40,000ft) per minute and a maximum speed of Mach 2 5 at high altitude In addition to its power the F-15 also has an extremely .
264
.
long range capability. Eagles delivered since mid1 979 designated the F- 1 5C and the F- 1 5D (a two-seat dual-control trainer variant) also provide for an additional
907kg (20001bs) of internal fuel and are capable
of carrying
FAST
(fuel
and sensor
tactical)
packs
attached to the side of the engine air-intake, thereby
almost trebling the internal fuel capacity to a
total
of
15,874kg (35,0001bs). An F-15 thus fuelled could make the flight from the USA to Europe without having to refuel. The FAST packs also greatly im5 prove the F- 1 s combat capabilities by accommodating a variety of avionics and electronic countermeasures including radar detection and jamming equipment, laser designators, low-light-level TV systems and reconnaissance cameras. In combat conditions the F-15 is a real fighter'
immense power combined with a wing surface area of 56.48 square metres (608 square feet) make it highly manoeuvrable and the bubble canopy gives the pilot the great advantage of all-round visibility. Combat visibility is also enhanced by the provision of an eye-level head-up display giving the pilot's aircraft. Its
pilot the essential flight
track and destroy
look
enemy
information necessary to without having to
aircraft
down at the cockpit instruments.
Previous page: The distinctive
shape of the
F-15 can be seen
in this
photograph of two Eagles. Top: A camouflaged F-15.
Armament consists of AIM-9L Sidewinder AAMs, Mk 82 bombs and a Pave Tack laser pod. Above left: The flight of an AIM-9L Sidewinder is caught in this eye-level display).
HUD (head-up HUD provides
The
the pilot with the essential flight information necessary to track down and destroy an enemy aircraft without having to look down at his cockpit instruments. Above right: The Eagle pilot is provided with 360 degree visibility thanks to the re-introduction of the
bubble canopy.
1
1
»
Although originally designed for interception and combat the F- 1 5 also has a secondary role as an air-to-surface strike aircraft and is capable of carrying a wide variety of bombs and missiles up to 7258kg 16,0001bs) on its five weapon stations. In its airsuperiority role the F-15's air-to-air weaponry con-
The F-15's deployment as part of the Nato central European defences requires a combined role. In the event of war with the Warsaw Pact countries the key to Nato's defence lies in quick response and incisive interdiction with air superiority in any given flying
of four AIM-7F Sparrow missiles, four AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles and one General Electric M6 1 A
exhibited
cannon with 940 rounds of ammunition. Originally the F-15 was to be armed with the Philco-Ford GAU-7A 25mm Gatling gun, but problems with development of the gun and its revolutionary caseless ammunition caused it to be abandoned. Further improvements have also provided for the addition of 30mm cannon pods.
and
air
sists
Above: An
F-1
5C at Luke
Air Force Base, belonging to the 33rd
TFW. A
,
conditions.
To this effect the F- 5E Strike Eagle,
at the
1
in
at
is
carried underthefuselage.
first
1980 Farnborough Air Show,
capable of long-range low-level penetration
650-gallon fuel tank
is
night
extremely bad weather conditions. With
its
high top speed and powerful air-to-air armament the
F-15 requires no fighter escort, and is the only USAF aircraft capable of carrying and delivering its bombload at supersonic speeds. A wide range of stores including Mk84 907kg (20001b) bombs, Maverick TV-guided missiles and Mk20 Rockeye dispenser
Below: Easy access to the F-1 5 is provided by a multiplicity of panels; gun, radar and avionics
maintenance is greatly by this design.
facilitated
265
-
The
F-1
'We took
5
in
combat armed
MiGs
for air-to-air
any moment. Over Sidon, we received orders to head north -enemy aircraft could run into
7
bombs can be carried. Once the stores are released the
Top: An Israeli Air Force Eagle returns to base. The large airbrake panelbeing deployed heremakes drag chutes unnecessary. Above left: The underside of an F-1 5,
F- 15 can revert to air superiority missions.
combat, to cover the attacking [Kfir] aircraft. We linked up with the Kfirs on the way and climbed up to 20,000 feet. We patrolled the length and breadth of the battle triangle, knowing all the time that we off, fully
5
at
were heading for us at 15,000 feet. The radar showed two MiG formations advancing on us one attacking, one covering. The MiGs were no more than ten miles from our strike aircraft. Hitting the afterburners, we swooped down on them; they tried to break away when they saw what we were up to but they never had much chance to do so: we had already locked onto most of them, splitting them up like wolves dividing their prey. "My" MiG was one of the second formation: wanted to make sure of my MiG and closed in, not waiting for him toapproach me. By the time got within firing range, three MiGs were already spiralling down. slowed down, aimed and fired a missile, and climbed I
I
I
above it so my aircraft wouldn't be inadvertently damaged. My Number 2 confirmed my kill.'
During prolonged engagements the aircraft's surand turn-round time between missions is of paramount importance to its effectiveness. The F-1 is provided with a wide range of advanced back-up systems and when necessary can have an engine changed in less than 30 minutes. At Bitburg airbase in
vivability
Germany the 36th Tactical Fighter Wing of the US AF launched 322 F- 1 5 missions in less than 24 hours and most of the Wing's 72 Eagles were ready to fly and fight on completion of the exercise. As part of its extensive and highly sophisticated electronics systems the F-1 5 carries an advanced Hughes APG-63 pulsed-Doppler radar. In mid- 1980 the Eagle's APG-63 was equipped with programmable signal processors which quadrupled computermemory capacity enabling further targets to be searched for whilst others are being tracked, as well as providing the capacity for individual identification of clustered targets. The APG-63 has a range of over 1
60km
( 1
00 miles) and will detect and track targets at The F-15's radar also features effective
all altitudes.
and missile guidance and is very effective when 'looking down', when most radar systems have difficulty distinguishing the target from the ground below it. In addition to its clutter- free lock-on, tracking
sophisticated target acquisition capability, the F-1
Squadron Leader of the Israeli Air Force operating an F-15overthe Lebanon, 27 June 1979
also carries various defensive radar warning systems
including the
ALQ
cover the blind spot
266
154 or 155 tail-warning radar to in the rear, an innovation owing
revealing
its
armament of
Sidewinder and Sparrow
AAMs. Above right: An F-1
5 releases
its
bomb
which is rated at a maximum weight of 7258kg (16,0001b) load,
considerably that of a
more than
World War
II
B-1
Flying Fortress. Opposite page: The original version
oftheF-15(top);anF-15E equipped with French Durandel bombs, AIM-9L Sidewinders and FAST packs (centre); a Sparrpw missile isfired against a
drone target during intercept trials (bottom).
F- 15
EAGLE
267
^iffi^'
much to the experience of the USAF in Vietnam.
F-15A Eagle
The various
and capabilities of the F-1 5 have been rigorously put to the test in both exercise and combat conditions. At Eglin Air Base in the USA
Type Single-seat, all-weather, air-superiority fighter
Dimensions Span 1 3.04m (42ft 1 0in); length 19.44m (63ft lOin); height 5.64m (18ft 6in) Weight Empty 12,247kg (27,000lb); maximum take off
25,402kg (56,000lb)
Powerplant Two
Pratt
& Whitney F1 00-PW-100
afterburning turbofans
F-1 5s
roles
successfully
(simulating
destroyed
MiG-25s) flying
drones 2.7 near
high-speed at
Mach
2 1 ,336m (70,000ft) and have been equally successful against low-flying manoeuvrable targets. The F-1 5s of the Israeli Air Force first saw combat in July 1979 over the Lebanon. Flying in support of Kfirs and F-4s
Performance
Maximum speed at high altitude Mach2.5or2655km/h (1650mph); maximum
on ground-attack missions, the F-1 5s engaged and destroyed several Syrian MiGs whilst suffering no
speed at sea level Mach 1 .23 or 1 506km/h (936mph); record breaking time-to-climb performance in February 1 975 30,000m (98,425ft) 207.80 seconds Range Tactical radius approximately 960km (600 miles); ferry range with maximum fuel 5955km
losses themselves. in
(3700 miles) Ceiling 19,203m (63,000ft)
Armament One 20mm M61AL cannon, four AIM-7F Sparrow and four AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles; five external
fora
The
maximum of 7258kg F-1
5E with
its
weapon hard points
(16,0001b) of stores
increased emphasis on ground
attack can carry stores including Maverick air-to-surface missiles,
HARM (high-speed
anti-radiation missiles),
plus a wide range of
Harpoon
anti-ship missiles
bombs including Mk 84 907kg
Mk82 227kg (5001b) BLU-27/B finned and unf inned firebombs, and a variety of dispenser bombs including the Mk 20 Rockeye (20001b),
268
The F-1 5
also
saw action
in the
1982 Israeli invasion of the Lebanon in which more than 80 Syrian aircraft were shot down, again without the loss of an F-1 5, while in June 1981 six Israeli F-1 5s escorted eight F-1 6 fighter bombers over 960km (600 miles) on the attack against the Iraqi nuclear powerplant at Tu-waitha. Apart from the Israeli Air Force, other foreign buyers of the F-1 5 are Saudi Arabia and Japan. In western Europe, the requirement for a large number of low-level, high-speed large-load-carrying aircraft has long been recognised and although this function is fulfilled by the European-built Tornado, four USAF F-1 5 squadrons are based in Germany as part of America's commitment to Nato. Arguably the most complex aircraft of the 1 980s the F- 1 5 is extremely expensive to build (at least $20 million per aircraft) and to maintain, but if only on the basis of the Israeli's destruction of the Syrian Air Force in 1982 it is also one of the most effective.
An Israeli F-1 5 claws its way skyward, with afterburners on at full blast. The ability of the F-1 5to
gain height with extreme rapidity is one of the aircraft's most valuable features when acting air superiority role.
in
an
Across the Yalu The Chinese
intervention
in
the Korean
Below: UN infantry trudge through North Korean hill
By 24 October 1950 an autumn offensive had carried allied forces of the United Nations Command (UNC)
The biting winters
deep into North Korea to a front slanting northeastward across the Korean peninsula from the mouth of the Chongchon River on the Yellow Sea to the town of I won on the Sea of Japan. At points in the west, the front lay scarcely 100km (62 miles) from Korea's Yalu River border with Manchuria, the final UNC
country.
and often difficult terrain posed problems for foreign soldiers. But while the
Eighth
Army advanced into
North Korea, Chu Teh, the Chinese commander, was preparing his offensive against the UN forces. Inset: Chu Teh receives a warm welcome in Peking as he prepares to launch the Chinese intervention in Korea.
objective.
The
UNC
mission originally had been limited to Korean invasion of South Korea. On the ground, this meant driving the North Korean Army back beyond the 38th parallel. But incentives for carrying the war into North Korea were strong, and they grew stronger as the autumn offensive took the UNC to the parallel by the end of September. Given the shattered state of the North Korean Army at that time, destroying it portended no heavy UNC costs. And, while achieving the long-standing American goal of unifying Korea never would be announced as an objective, the possibility of uniting Korea under a single, acceptable government was a powerful inducement to cross the parallel repelling the North
War
Against these incentives had to be balanced warncommunist China. The strongest had come on 2 October, the day after a South Korean corps entered North Korea along the east coast, when China's foreign minister, Chou En-lai, warned that if American forces crossed the 38th parallel China would enter the war. But the warnings were judged as attempts to discourage the UNC, not as genuine threats to intervene. On 27 September President Harry Truman authorised the UNC commander, General Douglas MacArthur, to cross the parallel; on 7 October the UN General Assembly voted for the restoration of peace and security throughout Korea, thereby giving tacit approval to the UNC's entry into North Korea; and on 9 October, as the first American forces crossed the parallel Truman authorised MacArthur to continue his advance, even if he encountered the Chinese, as long as he thought his forces had a reasonable chance of success. The outlook for the UNC in the last week of October was distinctly optimistic. Its larger ground arm, the Eighth Army commanded by General Walton H. Walker, had entered Korean provinces adjaings of intervention from
,
Y V * !•*
.
KOREA
.
1950
cent to Manchuria without discovering any battlefield
evidence that Chinese forces intended to engage it Its smaller arm, the separate X Corps under General .
Edward M. Almond, was aboard
ships off Wonsan,
Korea's major east coast port, preparing to join the clearance of northeastern Korea. Hoping to end operations before the onset of winter, Mac Arthur ordered his two ground commanders to advance to the northern border as rapidly as possible with all forces available.
In the west, General Walker sent the Eighth Army towards the Yalu in several columns, each free to proceed without regard to the progress of the others. Upon landing at Wonsan, General Almond attached the South Korean corps in the area to his X Corps and sent columns up the east coast and inland towards the Yalu River and the huge Chosin reservoir atop the axial
Taebaek Mountains
UNC forces moved easily along both coasts
and an South Korean regiment pushed reconnaissance troops to the Yalu at the town of Chosan on 26 October. But almost everywhere else the UNC columns met stiffening resistance and on 25 October discovered they were being opposed by Chinese. In the X Corps zone the Chinese stopped a South Korean column on the mountain road leading to the Chosin reservoir. The US 1st Marine Division relieved the interior
270
,
,
South Koreans and by 6 November drove through the few miles of the reservoir. At that point the Chinese broke contact. In the Eighth Army zone, the first Chinese soldier was discovered among captives taken on 25 October near the town of Unsan northwest of the Chongchon River. In the next eight days, Chinese attacks dispersed the South Korean regiment whose troops had reached the Yalu, severely punished a regiment of the US 1 st Cavalry Division when it moved into position near Unsan, and forced the retreat of a South Korean corps on the Eighth Army right. As General Walker fell back to regroup along the Chongchon the Chinese continued to attack until 6 November. Then, as in the X Corps sector, they abruptly broke contact. resistance within a
,
In a communique released on 7 November, the North Korean government announced that 'volunteer units formed by the Chinese people' were participating in operations. Four days later a spokesman for
China's minister of foreign affairs admitted that Chinese forces were fighting in Korea but denied official responsibility for their
presence
The voluntary disengagement on 6 November
is
perhaps evidence of how warily the Chinese entered the war. It suggests that either the commander of operations, Lin Piao, was reluctant to continue without reinforcement, or that the Chinese leadership
KOREA suspended operations until the UNC response to China's intervention could be ascertained. These considerations could have been restraints only briefly, since, reinforcements entered Korea by midNovember and it was soon clear that the UNC would limit its response to bombing Yalu River bridges. In any event, the Chinese high command concluded by the last week of November that its forces could operate successfully against the
UNC.
What the Chinese were counting on was their vaunted 'man-over- weapons' doctrine. While the forces sent to Korea were among the best in the People's Liberation Army, they were little more than a mass of poorly-equipped infantry. They had no tanks, no close air support, little artillery and only haphazard logistical support. Their strongest point was a high degree of morale and discipline achieved through effective political indoctrination and a complex political apparatus intertwined with the military organisation in which a commissar functioned as a
co-commander at each level of command. For the UNC it was difficult to judge the extent and ,
Above: A long column of Chinese troops enters Korea after UN forces had crossed the 38th parallel. Left: Using the advantage of forcing the enemy to attack uphill, Chinese troops, well dug in, prepare to defend their position.
purpose of the Chinese intervention. Intelligence estimated the Chinese strength involved in the recent engagement at five divisions, or about 50,000 troops. This small force and its voluntary disengagement were hardly evidence that China had decided to make an all-out effort. By the last week of November it was believed in Washington as well as at General Mac Arthur's headquarters that the Chinese forces in Korea were too weak to defeat a UNC advance. Mac Arthur s superiors as a result permitted him to continue towards the border, and the UNC opened a full resumption of its offensive on 24 November. In the X Corps zone in northeastern Korea, South Korean units pushed up the coast to the city of Chongjin; next inland, a regiment of the US 7th Division reached the Yalu on 26 November; and on the corps' west flank atop the high Taebaeks, the American Marines and two battalions of the 7th Division occupied the Chosin reservoir area. For two '
Below: Frightened
communist guerrillas are flushed from their village hideout by US troops.
,
,
1950
days the Eighth Army met little opposition as it drove west and north astride the Chongchon River. But during the night of 25 November strong Chinese forces struck the centre and right of the Eighth Army and on 27 November hit the X Corps units at the reservoir. Continued assaults on the 28th began to carry the Chinese around both the Eighth Army and X Corps. The UNC now had a truer measure of Chinese strength. The XIII Army Group with 18 divisions stood opposite the Eighth Army, and the IX Army Group with 12 divisions was in the Chosin reservoir area in the X Corps sector. Altogether, some 300,000 Chinese were in Korea. As General Mac Arthur notified Washington on 28 November, the UNC faced 'an entirely new war'
On 29 November, MacArthur ordered the Eighth Army to make whatever withdrawals were necessary enveloped by Chinese pushing hard through its eastern sector. He also directed X and deep Corps to pull into a beachhead around the port of Hungnam, north of Wonsan. In the Eighth Army's withdrawal from the Chongchon, a strong roadblock set below the town of Kunu-ri by Chinese attempting to envelop Walker's forces from the east, caught and severely punished the US 2nd Division, last away from the river. Thereafter, at each report of approaching enemy forces, General Walker ordered another withdrawal before any solid contact could be made. By 15 December, the Eighth Army was completely out of contact with the Chinese and was back at the 38th parallel, where Walker began to develop a coast-to-coast defence line. In the X Corps' withdrawal, General Almond's centre and rightmost units reached Hungnam with to escape being
little
But the forces retiring from the Chowhich now included a group of British
difficulty.
sin reservoir,
Marines, had to fight through Chinese-held territory. By the time these forces reached the coast on 1 December, MacArthur had ordered X Corps to withdraw by sea and proceed to South Korea to join the Eighth Army. On the 1 1th, Almond began contracting his Hungnam perimeter as he loaded troops and war material aboard ships in the harbour. The last of his troops left Hungnam on Christmas Eve. The main concern of the United States and its allies was the possibility that the large-scale Chinese intervention was a move toward global war. Washington officials, in any event, considered Korea no place to
become involved in a major war. The UNC, as a would not again attempt to reach Korea's
result,
border, and the Chinese thus quickly achieved their minimal goal. Slowly following the Eighth Army withdrawal to the 38th parallel, the Chinese XIII Army Group massed in the west by the end of December in order to try and drive the UNC out of Korea with a push on Seoul the South Korean capital The Chinese did take the city and force the Eighth Army to withdraw 65km (40 miles) below it. But in this and successive offensives they suffered huge casualties. No matter how highly motivated and disciplined they were, their poorly-equipped and poorly-supported forces simply could not operate successfully against the modern equipment, firepower and air power of the UNC. In the end the unwillingness of the UNC to attempt a military victory and the inability of the Chinese to achieve one would lead to a negotiated ceasefire with Korea divided essentially along the pre-war border.
northern
,
.
Billy C.Mossman
271
Hell at Chosin When
the 1st Marines carried out
At General Mac Arthur's headquarters in Tokyo they were saying that the war would be over by Christmas. Men of the US 1st Marine Division,
Blitz'
in
September, listened by short-wave communiques and
radio to these glowing
smiled sour,
derisive
smiles.
They were
1
Wonsan on Korea's east coast where, as a part of
(RCTs) were
to
November
Two regimental combe sent north to the
RCT-7 1 26km (78 miles) north to Hungnam and then to make a road march to Hagaru at the southern end of ,
where there was an important
hydroelectric plant.
272
end of the month Litzenberg -
corps), XIII Army Group, Fourth Field Army. The 124th had crossed the Yalu with a strength of about 1 2,000, but after a pounding
Above: As the
UN advance
continued into the winter, conditions deteriorated. Here US troops with M4 Sherman tanks in support, launch an assault against a
communist-held 'Litz the
Sixty-two Chinese pris-
Army (equivalent to a US
mands of the Patton-esque Almond (commander of X Corps) during the drive from Inchon to Seoul and, with considerable misgivings, on 28 October ordered his senior regimental commander, Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, to move his regimental combat team,
was brushed
oners were taken and their interrogation precisely identified the enemy as the 124th Division, 42nd
persed dispositions ordered for his division. Smith, cautious and deliberate, had chafed under the de-
the
Majon-dong
the Marines
A five-day battle ensued.
Wonsan. The Marine commander, Major-General Oliver P. Smith, was appalled, however, by the widely dis-
in reserve at
By
at
strength.
Hamhung-Hungnam area and one would remain
the Chosin reservoir
RCT-7
aside and by 4 had reached Chinhung-ni where they encountered Chinese forces dug-in in sistance near Sudong-ni
X Corps, they were to advance to the Yalu River, Korea' s border with China.
his
(60 miles) to the left rear. On 2 November Litzenberg 's force began its advance. Scattered re-
On 26 October 950 the Marines had been landed
bat teams
- had concentrated
97km
already taking Chinese prisoners of war. at
gallant retreat
and had begun the relief of the South Korean (ROK) 26th Regiment. The ROK troops had identified two Chinese communist regiments as being in front of them. Litzenberg had the Division Reconnaissance Company to screen his exposed left flank. Lieutenant-General Walton H. Walker's Eighth Army was
the instrument of Mac Arthur's great victory at
Inchon
a
North Korea.
hill in
by Marine air, artillery and infantry action, it was down to 3000 effectives retreating in haste towards Hagaru. While RCT-7 was fighting north of Chinhung-ni, Smith brought up RCT-5, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond L. Murray, to Hamhung, On 3 November Smith was ordered by Almond to move RCT-5 into Sinhung Valley. Smith, concerned because RCT-7 and RCT-5 were being sent on divergent routes and because his battalions were spread out over
KUKtA l^U
Above left: As winter set the Chinese troops were well prepared; the
in,
traditional quilted clothing
of northern China provided effective protection against
the cold. This was not the case for the US troops whose winter clothing was inferior to that of their
enemy. Above
right:
patrol clears the
A US
remains of
a burning village.
The
buildings had been used as storehouses.
Above: Supplies are dropped to the 1 st US Marine Division in the Chosin reservoir sector.
The problems of resupplying the forward units of the UN forces by
ground were caused more by the weather than the enemy.
some 275km (170 miles), met with Almond on 7 November and negotiated the release of RCT-5 from Sinhung Valley.
Two
days
later
Litzenberg sent a
battalion forward to secure Hills 1081
would allow
and 1457;
this
regiment to advance safely through Murray's lead battalion reached Chinhung-ni and Litzenberg 's regiment moved forward uneventfully to Koto-ri, about 5km (3 miles) beyond the lip of the Pass. Until now the weather had been cold but not bitter. The division had been issued cold weather gear mountain sleeping bags, parkas, wind-proof trousers, shoe-pacs, and heavy woollen socks - but there was not enough to go around and a quarter of the division went without. The parkas were Navy-type, heavy and long, better suited to watch-standing than long marches through frigid mountains. Even worse were the shoe-pacs, which were really duck-hunters' boots. On the night of 10 November the temperature dropped to between 10 and 20 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, accompanied by a 20 to 30 knot wind. Winter had set in with a vengeance To the west, the Eighth Army had recovered its balance and at X Corps Almond's usual ebullience his
Funchilin Pass.
returned.
On
11
November he ordered Smith to to the Yalu, a distance of some
resume the advance
240km (150 miles). Two days later Smith visited Litzenberg at Koto-ri. RCT-7's lead battalion had moved out that morning for Hagaru. In the frigid
weather and thin air S mith s helicopter could fly only as far as Chinhung-ni. He went the rest of the way by jeep. At a hairpin turn where the road clung to the southern face of Hill 1081 there was a narrow concrete bridge crossing over pipes coming out of an electric power sub-station. Smith marked the bridge in his ,
'
mind for further attention.
On
the
Smith did what for him was an
15th,
extraordinary thing: he wrote an out-of-channels
let-
Commandant of the Marine Corps detailing his situation and concluding, T have little confidence ter to the
judgment of the Corps or in the realism I believe a winter campaign in the mountains of North Korea is too much to ask of the American soldier or marine. He did gain Almond's permission to bring up RCT-1 (which had been in the tactical
of their planning
.
.
.
'
having hard fighting .of its own outside Wonsan) to take over the protection of the road from Chinhung-ni to Hagaru. He visited both Litzenberg and Murray at Hagaru on 16 November. The town looked like a Klondike gold camp. West of it was a flat open area where Smith's engineers told him an airstrip capable of handling twin-engined transports could be scraped into the frozen black loam. On 23 November Litzenberg pushed across Toktong Pass and by the 25th had occupied Yudam-ni.
Fox Company was dropped off at Toktong Pass. Meanwhile Murray 's RCT-5 on X Corps order, was moving up the east side of the reservoir. ,
,
On 24 November Walker' s Eighth Army launched an 'end-the-war' offensive but by the 25th the Chinese had crushed the ROK II Corps, forcing Walker to fall back. Despite this, Almond ordered Smith to attack to the west from Yudam-ni on 27 November. Smith, although realising that there were certainly much larger concentrations of Chinese in the Yudam-ni area than were
know
at first calculated,
did not
were in fact four corps-size armies. RCT-5, relieved by 7th Division elements east of the reservoir, joined RCT-7 at Yudam-ni on 26 November. RCT-1 arrived from Wonsan, dropping off battalions at Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri and Hagaru. Smith's secret hope was that now he had his that there
273
,.
79Div
/'
(
Retreat from the
Chosin Reservoir 1-11
Dec 1950
am-nj
regiments reasonably together, the Chinese would attack him before the division was strung out on the road to the Yalu. He got his wish; however, he did not anticipate the weight of the massive counter-
On The seizure of Hill 1081 9 Dec 1950
air strike
was about to fall on him. morning of 27 November, Litzenberg and
offensive that the
Murray
dutifully attacked to the west, advancing about 1600m (1 mile) against thickening resistance. That night the Chinese struck in great strength against all Marine positions from Yudam-ni south to Koto-ri
and against the three-battalion task force of the 7th Division east of the reservoir. The strengths of the 1st
Marine Division as the Chinese attack began were as follows: Yudam-ni, 8214; Toktong Pass, 218; Hagaru, 3692; Koto-ri, 2594; Chinhung-ni, 1689; Hamhung-Hungnam, 6185 - altogether some 22,000. US Army troops numbered about 251 1 east of the reservoir, 635 at Hagaru and 965 at Koto-ri. Five high ridges ringed Yudam-ni. The Chinese came against the north and northwest ridges with their 79th and 89th Divisions but in a wild night of fighting often hand-to-hand, they failed to break the Marine
A third Chinese division, the 59th, swung wide to cut the 23km ( 14 mile) stretch of road back to Hagaru. At Toktong Pass the night stayed quiet for Fox Company until 0230 hours; then the attack came. Fox Company lost a third of its men - 20 dead and 54 wounded - but at dawn, when it was time for Marine aircraft to come overhead, the Chinese broke off the
defences.
attack.
Litzenberg sent out his 1st Battalion to help Fox it was beaten back. That night Fox
Company but Company was
again assaulted, losing five more
kil-
29 more wounded But the Chinese main effort on the 28th came against Hagaru. With its supply dumps and nearly completed airstrip it had to be held, but of infantry in defence there was only the 3rd Battalion, 1 st Marines with one of its companies still at Koto-ri led
.
,
,
A 6km (4 mile) perimeter was pasted together, out with Marine and
army
filled
service troops; but on East
dominating the town, there was a critical gap, open for the arrival of George Company from Koto-ri. Smith had flown into Hagaru just that morning to open his command post there. The Chinese attack against Hagaru came in two prongs. One came across the open ground from the southwest and threatened the airstrip, the other came from the east against East Hill. The Marine perimeter held everywhere except on East Hill, where the Chinese pushed their way into the gap. At Yudam-ni, on Smith's orders, Litzenberg had put together a composite battalion and sent it south on the morning of the 29th to relieve Fox Company and open the road to Hagaru. It got only 400m ( A mile) before it was stopped. Smith then ordered Colonel Lewis B. Puller, commander of RCT-1, to push a force north from Koto-ri. A mixed bag of troops - a Marine rifle company, an Army infantry company, the Royal Marine 41 Independent Commando, and two companies of Marine tanks - had collected at Koto-ri. Puller put them together into a task force commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale. It numbered 922 men, 29 tanks and 141 vehicles. It began its advance on the afternoon of 29 November. Chinese units, waiting to attack the colHill, left
l
umn, allowed the
first
company of M26 tanks
to pass
and then engaged the soft-skinned vehicles. Drysdale was ordered to break through at all costs. This he did but the column was divided and those left behind were
274
KOREA what was
known
as 'Hellfire Valley'.
boxed
in
The
column reached Hagaru that George Company was sent up East Hill but
later
1950
front half of the
night.
failed to close the gap.
Almond arrived that day to meet with Smith and Major-General David G. Barr of the 7th Infantry Division. Almond had been called back to Tokyo where he was told that Eighth Army was in full retreat He announced that he had given up any idea of holding a winter defence line and that X Corps would withdraw
to
Hamhung
with
all
possible speed. Destruc-
equipment that would delay the march was authorised. Smith stiffly told Almond that he had no intention of destroying his equipment and that his rate of withdrawal would be governed by his capability to evacuate his wounded. There were fresh attacks against Hagaru that night, 30 November. By now the attackers had been identified as the 58th and 59th Divisions. The first of the survivors from the three army battalions east of the reservoir reached the Marine perimeter just before midnight, 1 December. Eventually there would be 1050 survivors, less than half their original strength, and of these only 385 would be sufficiently ablebodied to form a provisional battalion. At Yudam-ni the 5th and 7th Marines regrouped tion of any
south of the village as a drivers and seriously cles. All others
was assigned
first
'hills' in
enemy-
Company just
before noon on 2 December. Next day, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, leading the advance along the road,
On
met
4 December the two regiments reached Hagaru, some of the companies marching in cadence and singing 'The Marine Hymn'. Almond had flown in to meet them. He passed out a pocketful of medals including Distinguished Service Crosses for Smith, Litzenberg and Murray. The Marines from Yudam-ni had brought with them 1500 casualties. The airstrip at Hagaru, hacked out of the frozen ground in just 12 days, had become operational on 1 December. In five days, 3150 Marines and 1 1 37 soldiers were evacuated by Marine R4Ds and Air Force C-47s. During the same period 537 replacements were flown in, some of them fresh-
them
at
Toktong Pass.
in
new direction.'
ensure that close air support of the division would be
Marines. In an
succession, reaching Fox
a
We're just attacking
Only
epic action they 'ran the ridges*, taking three
held
in the press as, 'Retreat, Hell.
ride the vehi-
would march. Relief of Fox Company
to the 1st Battalion, 7th
'
Concentration of X Corps at Hungnam meant the evacuation of Wonsan. Marine Aircraft Group 12 with its gull-winged Corsairs moved up to Yonpo to
step to a breakout.
wounded would
recovered from wounds received in the Inchon-toSeoul fighting. Transports also brought press correspondents. A British reporter asked Smith whether it was a retreat' or 'retirement'. The scholarly Smith explained that 'retreat' was not the correct term. This got translated ly
continued. In addition to the four squadrons at po, there were two
Yon-
more on board the jeep carrier Bataan and Sicily were expected at any moment with more Marine squadrons. Fast car-
Badoeng
Strait.
Opposite: As the fighting
became more intense, contacts with the enemy increased. Here a Marine fires his bazooka against an
enemy position. Above:
US troops at Koto-ri after a successful engagement. Chinese prisoners are on the left.
Below:
Two GIs surrender
to Chinese soldiers.
Bottom: Chinese troops run for cover in orderto escape the fire zone as their convoy comes under heavy attack.
.
KOREA
.
1950
SMGs in Korea The Chinese Type 50 sub-machine gun is a robust and reliable weapon with a high rate of fire - hence its nickname the 'burp-gun'. First produced in late 1 950 it is based on the Soviet PPsh 41 SMG with modifications which include a box rather than drum magazine, a lighter stock and a two-range flip sight. The front end of the barrel sleeve
is
calibre 7.62mm length 858mm (33.75in) barrel 273mm (10.75in)
weight 3.63kg
(8lb) operation blowback feed 35 round box magazine mode of fire single shot,
automatic muzzle velocity 488m/sec (1600ft/sec) rate of fire (cyclic) 900 rounds/min
backward-sloped
compensator keeping the muzzle down, and the barrel interior is chromed. The selector lever placed
to act as a
US M3A1SMG
ffd
D)
((
calibre 45in length 757mm (29.8in) barrel 203mm (8in) weight
forward of the trigger allows for both burst and single shot usage. Con-
gauge stampings, the gun is easy and cheap to manufac-
3.70kg (8.151b) operation blowback feed 30 round box magazine mode
structed of heavy
ture.
Also designed for ease of pro-
duction and durability
M3A1
a
,
famous
1
is
the American
944 modified version of the 'greasegun'. The sim-
M3
A1 has a larger ejection openand a cocking slot which allows the bolt to be retracted with thefirer's plified
ing
finger,
thereby eliminating the retract-
i
J5L
ChineseTypeBOSMG
1945 a low cyclic
was
ing handle. In
flash hider
added.
rate, little recoil
Its
and climb compensated
of fire automatic only muzzle velocity 280m/sec (920ft/sec) rate of fire (cyclic)
for the gun's
lack of single shot accuracy.
350-450 rounds/min
A rugged
weapon, the M3A1 was well suited to the mud and snow of Korea and over 30,000 were manufactured during the war to supplement World War II
stocks. .
Forge, Philippine Sea and Prince-
to Koto-ri
had been blown and
ton would add another 100 or more navy attack sorties
to replace
it.
riers Leyte, Valley
a day. These would also bring
US
Australian fighter-bombers to add to
Air Force and
US medium and
heavy bomber interdiction. On 6 December the 7th Marines moved out for Koto-ri and the 5th Marines moved against East Hill. The two-day breakout, often slowed by ambush, was successful with only 103 dead, 506 wounded and 7 missing in action. Smith now had 14,000 men including
all
three of his infantry regiments
-
at
Koto-ri, but he had reason to fear that the Chinese
were saving
their
down
main
effort for the
16km (10
mile)
To
secure the
it
would be necessary
site the 1st Battalion, 1st
Marines, still at Chinhung-ni, were ordered to take Hill 1081. The 3rd Infantry Division took over the
Hamhung-Chinhung-ni road, Task Force Dog relieved the Marines at Chinhung-ni, and on 7 December four sections of steel bridging were dropped into Koto-ri On 8 December the 7th Marines advanced on Hill 1 328 and the 5th Marines on Hill 457 .
1
under cover of darkness and a swirling snowstorm, had begun a double envelopment of Hill 108 1 By noon on 9 December they had Puller's 1st Battalion,
.
the crest.
The precious bridge
sections
came
in the
the Funchilin Pass to Chinhung-ni.
opposite direction from Koto-ri and in three hours of
The bridge which had impressed Smith on his journey
herculean effort the engineers had them in place.
gauntlet
-«v %
9
Below left: As air strikes hit communist positions, Marines advance to clear
at
the routes for retreat. After fighting off a strong communist offensive and taking prisoners (below), seemed that the Marines
it
were poised to push the Chinese back. Suddenly they were ordered to retreat and, as they prepared to fight their way back, the narrow roads became heavily congested and vulnerable to enemy
assault
(right).
Bottom: The final preparations for evacuation as thousands of barrels of aviation fuel
lie
onthedockside. All that night and the following day, troops and
assembly areas
in the
Hamhung-Hungnam
sector.
down
Division losses for the four-day march from Koto-ri
had faded. A hundred unwanted, half-frozen, gangrenous, near-starving prisoners were picked up along the march. Puller s 1 st Marines deployed as a rear-guard unit
were 75 dead, 16 missing and 256 wounded. Smith thought that a winter line would be held around Hamhung-Hungnam, but Almond had received orders to re-deploy X Corps to the Pusan area of South Korea. More than 100,000 troops, as many or more Korean refugees, thousands of vehicles and mountains of supplies and equipment had to be evacuated. Almond advised Smith that the 1st Marine Division would embark immediately while the 7th and 3rd Infantry Divisions held the perimeter. Mac Arthur visited briefly on the 1 1th, giving his
vehicles poured southward over the bridge and the Pass. Chinese resistance
'
left
,
Koto-ri that afternoon, leap-frogging
its
com-
panies along the high ground on both sides of the road
Smith had ordered
his tanks, their
the bridge and fragile road, to
weight a threat to
come
out
last.
By
midnight 40 of them had gathered at the top of the Pass. They inched their way downward under the protection of the indomitable Division Reconnaissance Company, losing only five or six to the Chinese.
By nightfall on the
1
1th, all division units
were in their
blessing to the plan. Out-loading of the division got
underway the next day. Since landing atWonsan, the Marines had suffered 4418 battle casualties - 718 dead, 192 missing and 3508 wounded. There were also 7313 non-battle casualties, mostly cold-induced, of which a third soon returned to duty They had fought the 20th 26th 27th and 42nd Chinese Communist Armies, a total of at least 13 and probably 14 divisions. The Marines estimated Chinese losses at 25,000 dead and 12,500 wounded. Certainly the Chinese suffered terribly from the cold and exposure. The 26th Army reported: our soldiers frequently starve some had only a few potatoes .... They were unable to maintain the ,
.
'
.
.
.
.
.
.
physical strength for combat.
The 1 st Marine Division sailed from Hungnam on December, a total of 22,215 men embarked in 21 Navy ships and seven merchantmen. A wild, wishful rumour went through the convoy: they were on their way to warm, tropical Indochina to help the French. 15
Instead they were landed at Pusan and motor-marched
'Bean Patch' at Masan where they recovered and pneumonia, spent Christmas, got refitted and replacements, and with the New Year, moved out in an offensive to retake lost ground. Brigadier-General Edwin H. Simmons (Ret.) to the
from
frostbite
277
1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
,
.
.
.
.
.
.
Chronology 1945-49 EUROPE & NORTH AMERICA 1945 September
most votes.
February
coalition gain
4-11 Yalta conference Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt agree on establishment of United Nations Organisation future of Germany and postwar division of Europe. Stalin agrees to bring Russia into war
September
against Japan.
October 6 Eastern Europe Communist Information Bureau (the Cominform) is set up at a conference in Poland, linking communist parties of Soviet Union Poland Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria,
,
Greece Varkiza Agreement; ELAS to disband. 12 April United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt 12 dies; succeeded by Harry S. Truman.
World War II
27
Soviet and
US forces meet in
16
Yugoslavia Units of Yugoslav army threaten Trieste, demand cession; British and US troops
2 Indochina Ho Chi Minh proclaims Vietnam independent of France 29 Indonesia British and Dutch troops land in Java.
maintain positions there.
October
,
Yugoslavia, France and
November Indonesia Battle for Surabaya. 29 Indonesia Surabaya taken by
British.
Italy.
December
Europe.
Indonesia Fighting breaks out between Indo-
14
nesian 'people's army' and British and Dutch forces.
1946 March
bunker.
Greece Communists announce formation of Provisional Democratic Government, and attempt
May
capture of Konitsa but are repulsed
republic of Vietnam within the French Union.
Germany Hitler commits suicide in Berlin
30
World War II Red Army takes Berlin German
2
.
30
proclaimed a 'people's republic'
forces surrender in Italy.
World War II German officers sign
8
unconditional surrender at General Eisenhower's in
Romania King Michael abdicates; Romania
Rheims. Victory
in
HQ
Europe proclaimed.
June 26
United Nations Charter signed
July 16
in
San Francisco
World War II First US atom bomb exploded in
New Mexico. Potsdam
16- August 2
Allied control of Germany reparations for ,
war damage
and future frontiers of Poland. Britain General election returns Labour 26 government; Churchill replaced as prime minister by Clement Attlee.
November Yugoslavia Under Marshal Tito the country is
29
proclaimed a 'people's republic'
13
power.
Philippines
Albania Enver Hoxha declares the country a
Western Europe Brussels Treaty signed:
17
Belgium, Netherlands and
Luxembourg join
in military alliance.
Germany Russians walk out of Allied Control
20
Commission for Germany April-May Greece Operation Dawn clears central Greece of guerrillas.
Huk revolt begins
1947 January-February Indochina French relieve city of Hue
Winston has descended in ,
Europe.
Greece Communist guerrillas under General 26 Markos Vaphiadis occupy northern border regions. Czechoslovakia Communist leader Klement Gottwald becomes prime minister.
September Bulgaria Communists proclaim a people '
'
s
republic'.
October Greece Vaphiadis forms Democratic Army of Greece. Albania Corfu Channel incident. 22
July
Burma Karen National Defence Organisation established.
Indonesia Dutch begin offensive on Java.
November Thailand Military coup
9
to
Yugoslavia Resolution of the Cominform expels Communist Party and declares him
be a
in
1948 January February
Malaya Federation of Malaya established.
1
June
Grammos region.
17
Malaya State of Emergency proclaimed;
guerrilla warfare spreads through Federation.
August
January 18 Eastern Europe The Soviet Union and governments of eastern Europe organise a Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). April 4 North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington; it creates alliance of the United States, Canada and 10 countries of western Europe and provides for mutual
Burma Outbreak of Karen revolt. December 19
Indonesia Dutch capture Yogyakarta.
1949 January-February
Burma Karens approach Rangoon; government begins counter-offensive.
assistance in case of attack.
May 5 12
Burma proclaimed independent of Britain
4
traitor.
Western Europe Counc of Europe formed i 1
Germany Blockade of Berlin lifted. Germany German Federal Republic established
February 26 Thailand Insurrection;
Indonesia Dutch withdraw from Yogyakarta.
1947
23
with capital in Bonn.
November
August Soviet Union Russians explode their first atomic bomb. 28 Greece Final battles in civil war: Greek National Army clears Mount Grammos. Communists defeated. September 30 Germany Berlin airlift ended October 7 Germany Soviet occupation zone becomes
2
Socialist parties favouring close links
with USSR succeed in elections
March Western Europe Treaty of Dunkirk signed 4 between UK and France. Truman Doctrine United States commits itself 12 to giving military and economic aid to 'support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures' June 5 Marshall Plan United States offers massive economic aid to whole of Europe for postwar
German Democratic Republic. 16
Greece Civil war ends.
reconstruction.
7
Indonesia Netherlands grants
sovereignty
1946 July-October India Fierce fighting between Hindus and Moslems in Punjab.
1947 January-March India Hindu-Moslem rioting continues. August 15 India and Pakistan Independence of British
SOUTHEAST ASIA 1945
resulting in an estimated
offer.
August
millions of people displaced.
17 Indonesia Sukarno proclaims independence from Netherlands.
October
Hungary Elections see the communist-socialist
full
SOUTH ASIA
July Marshall Plan conference opens in Paris; under 12 Soviet pressure, governments of eastern Europe reject
August
fighting near Bangkok.
May
January 19 Poland
278
weeks of
Germany Airlift to Berlin begins
1949
May
31
after six
siege.
20
June 24 Germany Russians impose road and rail
August-September Greece Greek National Army mounts major offensive
March
15
December
blockade on Berlin.
'people's republic'.
Churchill says that an 'iron curtain'
Indonesia Cheribon Agreement; Dutch
March
Tito and Yugoslav
,
Philippines proclaimed a republic
recognise Indonesian Republic.
January
In a speech at Fulton Missouri
4
1948
26 28
5
July
February Czechoslovakia Communists take exclusive 27
1946 1
Indochina France recognises the independent
November
Britain, France,
conference Discussion of
6
rule proclaimed. Fierce fighting for six weeks, 1
million dead and
many
Kashmir Moslems revolt in protest at linking of state
CHRONOLOGY with India. Undeclared war between India and Pakistan.
October I China proclaimed a 'people's republic' with Mao Tse-tung as chairman,
1948
7
January India Mahatma Gandhi assassinated 30
in
as premier.
February Ceylon becomes independent 4 September
1945
through
UN
Yemen in loose association for joint action against the
1948
French in the Levant and the Jews
April 13-20 Costa Rica Rebels led by Colonel Jose Figueres overthrow dictatorship of President Picado.
in Palestine
November
mediation.
18 Iran Communist rebellion in Azerbaijan backed by Soviet troops.
June- July Kerala Anti-govemment riots suppressed by Indian
December
1
Nicaragua Pre sident Leonardo Arguello overthrown by General Anastasio Somoza. 26
,
,
January in force
1947 May
22 Arab League formed linking Egypt Iraq Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and the
1949 Kashmir Ceasefire
CENTRAL AMERICA MIDDLE EAST March
Army occupies state of Hyderabad.
April 3 Israel signs armistice with Jordan July 20 Israel signs armistice with Syria.
China Nationalists withdraw to Formosa
New
Delhi.
India
Chou En-lai
December
1945-49
Iran Government regains control in Azerbaijan
II
Armv.
December 12 Costa Rica Invasion by rebels from Nicaragua. El Salvador Revolt replaces President Castaneda Castro by revolutionary junta.
1946 February
1949
EAST ASIA
Palestine Jews attack Royal Air Force bases.
1945
July 22 Palestine Jewish extremists blow up King David
November 26 Panama National police stage coup and install
August Japan Hiroshima destroyed by first atomic bomb 6 Japan Soviet Union declares war on Japan 8 Japan Atomic bomb dropped over Nagasaki 9
Japan Unconditional surrender. China Communist armies advance into Manchuria. September World War II formally ends with official 2 15
ceremony of Japanese surrender on board
USS
Dr Arnulfo Arias as president.
hotel, Jerusalem.
SOUTH AMERICA 1947
1946
February Palestine British government announces decision to return
Mandate
to
United Nations.
March 31
Palestine Irgun set
fire to oil
July 17-21 Bolivia Revolution overthrows President Gualberto Villaroel and installs liberal government.
refinery at Haifa.
Missouri in Tokyo Bay.
November
1947
November
29
United Nations General Assembly votes for partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs and establishment of Jewish state.
March
China Nationalist offensive in Manchuria China Communist offensive in Shantung
15 30
Paraguay Civil war in which 30- August 20 President Higinio Morinigo defeats attempt to remove him.
1948
1946
|
January 14 China Truce agreed between communists and Nationalists.
March China Battle
10-15
for
Mukden, which falls to the
Nationalists.
China First battle of Szeping taken by
17
,
communists. April 16-May 20
China Second battle of Szeping; city recaptured by Nationalists.
July-November China Nationalist offensive into north.
1947 March 19 China Nationalists take Yenan. May-June
China Communists launch Sungari River offensive.
March 31-April 9 Palestine Fighting throughout Palestine between Arabs and Jews, concentrated at Kastel near Jerusalem. April 9 Palestine Massacre at Deir Yassin 25 Palestine Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan and Egypt agree to prepare for invasion of Jewish areas.
March-April China Communist offensive in Shensi. September China Communists launch Manchuria offensive. 9 Korea North Korea declared a people s republic' Kim II Sung made president. 14-24 China Battle of Tsinin; 80,000 Nationalists '
'
;
October 27-30
joint defence in Antarctic
communists rout three Nationalist armies.
December China Nationalists abandon Hsuchow.
Odria overthrows President Jose Bustamante.
November Venezuela Colonel Carlos Delgado Chalbaud is later assassinated and replaced by German Suarez Flamerich.
24
stages successful coup but
June 9-10
Israel
Second battle of Latrun comes into force lasts until 8 July
Israel Truce
July 9-12
,
Israel Lod,
Ramie offensives launched by
AFRICA 1945 May Algeria Anti-European
Israel.
9-18 14-18
Israel
riots in Algiers.
Second battle for Jerusalem.
1947
Israel Third battle of Latrun.
March
July
18-October 27
Israel
Second truce
Morocco Nationalist movement against the French,
in force
September Israel
officially
UN mediator Count Bernadotte
29
assassinated by Jewish terrorists.
China Battle of Mukden-Chinchow;
Argentina Agreement concluded with Chile for and Falkland Islands against British claims and occupation October 27-29 Peru Military junta led by General Manuel 4
14 Palestine End of British Mandate; British forces withdraw. Ben-Gurion proclaims new State of Israel. Israel Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi and Egyptian forces invade from north and south. 15-25 Israel Battle of Jerusalem: Arab Legion under General Glubb takes eastern and southern parts of New Jerusalem and occupies most of Old City 25-30 Israel First battle of Latrun for control of Tel Aviv- Jerusalem road.
17
killed.
1948 March
May
11
1948
August 23 Ecuador Colonel Carlos Mancheno seizes power from President Velasco Ibarra. September 1-3 Ecuador Colonel Mancheno overthrown by Carlos Monroy.
October Israel Israeli offensive leads 28 Galilee on 30th
supported by Sultan
Mohammed V.
Madagascar Nationalist uprisings against the
French, mostly on east coast. to recapture
of
September Kenya Government receives of Mau
first official
1949
1949
1949
January
January 10 China Communists win Huai-hai battle 23 China Peking falls to communists
3-5
April Algeria Ben Bella directs 5
April
February 24 Israel signs armistice with Egypt
20 China Communists cross Yangtze River and advance southwards, taking Nanking (April 23) and Shanghai (May 27).
Israel
Armoured unit spearheads 56km
(35 miles) into Egyptian territory. Peace talks follow.
May
7
8
Israel Ceasefire agreed
March 23
Israel signs armistice with Lebanon.
confirmation
Mau existence
FLN raid in Oran.
Algeria First major clash between nationalists and French; 88 French and 1000 Algerian deaths.
July 13 South Africa rejects Southwest Africa.
UN trusteeship of 279
Fighting for peace The formation
of the United Nations
Command
The involvement of the United Nations Organisation in the Korean War began with a phone call at 3 o'clock in the morning of 25 June 1 950 to Trygve Lie the UN Secretary-General. Lie was in bed in his home on the outskirts of New York. His caller was the United ,
States deputy representative to the United Nations
and his message was short and simple: the North Korean Army had crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. The United States government wanted the matter to be brought immediately to the attention of the Security Council as a serious threat to
world peace. The North Korean attack had begun at 1500 hours on 24 June Washington time (0400 hours 25 June Korean time), but it was not until the late evening of that day that the State Department in Washington received the news from the US ambassador in Seoul, the South Korean capital. The United Nations Organisation which had come into existence at the end of World War II and in which high hopes were placed as the guardian of world peace, had no experience of peace-keeping in 1950and no armed force at its disposal to deal with aggressors or breaches of international peace. But there was no doubting the organisation's responsibility: the UN Charter made the Security Council responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security and empowered it to take whatever steps ,
it
deemed necessary, including
military
action,
which committed a breach of the peace. Trygve Lie was obliged to accept the US government's request for a meeting of the Security against any state
* eU .n?iR r M _ T|CC AIR FORCES jU^^ *ND U.N.NW.NAVY P^ aND
THE CRUSADE OP
WORLD
Above: With
UN
involvement
in
Korea
irrevocably established,
General MacArthur meets the personal representative of the UN secretary-general, Colonel Katzin. Left: Following the declaration of UN intervention there was new hope forthe South Koreans asthis rather optimistic
banner suggests.
280
THE UN
IN
KOREA
members of the United Nations to give every assistance to see that the resolution was carried out. The resolution was passed with a vote of nine countries in favour. The Yugoslavs abstained; the Russians were missing.
Two days later the Security Council met again to hear a report from the Commission in Korea
UN
(UNCOK) which made it clear that the North Koreans were taking no notice of the council's
first
resolution.
They were also to consider a new resolution submitted by the United States which recommended that mem-
UN should 'furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the
bers of the
armed
attack and to restore international peace and
The resolution was passed with seven votes in favour (Britain, France, Nationalist China, Cuba, Ecuador and Norway), two abstentions (Egypt and India) and Yugoslavia voting against. It remained to create the military force which was to bring peace to Korea and to appoint a commander of the force. On 7 July the Security Council passed a security in the area'
Above: The meeting of the UN commission on Korea
Council. The organisation reacted to the crisis
November 1 950. This commission was set
By the early afternoon of 25 June, the Security Council was in session. It was usually made up of five permanent members (Britain, France, the Soviet Union, the United States and Nationalist China) and six non-permanent members. Policy decisions required an affirmative vote by seven members, including all the permanent members. Any one of the permanent members was thus able to veto any decision although mere abstention from voting was not counted as a veto. On 25 June 1950 this last point was crucial, because the Soviet delegate was missing from the meeting. On instructions from Moscow the head of the delegation, Jacob Malik, was boycotting the council as a sign of the Kremlin's displeasure at the
in
Tokyo,
upafterWorldWarllto workforthe unification and rehabilitation of Korea.
with
remarkable speed.
,
Below: Turkish soldiers equipped with US carbines
and Thompson sub-machine guns reflected the multinational
nature of the UN force. It was the first time that UN member countries had united underthe UN charterto oppose an aggressor.
China was still represented by a delegate from Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime on Formosa and not by one from the communist government fact that
in
Peking.
On 25 June the council had before it a resolution submitted by the American delegate declaring that the North Koreans had committed a breach of the peace and calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. The resolution also called upon
all
further resolution
.
recommending
that the military
forces and other assistance provided
should be put
by member
of a unified command under the United States and asking the United States to appoint the commander of the force. The command could use the flag as well as the flags of the various national contingents. The US states
at the disposal
UN
policy of 'containment' of communism and the effort to achieve 'collective security'
UN's
were thus fused
into one.
Fifty-three
member nations responded
favourably
recommendations, and only three the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland refused to take part in the action against North Korea. Among the nations which contributed to the UN Command were: Australia (two infantry battalions, some naval forces and a fighter squadron) Canada (an infantry brigade, some naval forces and a squadron of transport aircraft) and Britain (two infantry brigades, an armoured regiment, one and a half artillery regiments, one and a half combat engineer regiments; the Far Eastern Fleet; two Sunderland flying-boat squadrons). Other nations which participated were: Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxemto the council's
,
,
bourg, the Netherlands,
New
Zealand, the Philip-
Turkey and the Union of South Africa. Medical services were provided by Denmark, Italy, India, Norway and Sweden.
pines, Thailand,
By
far the largest contribution
was which
to the United Nations action
made by alone
the United States
contributed
300,000 out of
was for that reason an American commander was appointed. On 8 July 345 ,000 men.
President Harry
It
Truman appointed General of
Army Douglas MacArthur as commander-inchief. MacArthur was already in command of the US forces in the Far East and in fact continued to the
regard himself as primarily responsible to President
Truman throughout the hostilities. If the North Korean invasion took the governments of the West and the United Nations by surprise, the to the invasion seems to have quick reaction of the caught the Soviet government off balance. Alterna-
UN
?//
/^^'
may have
thought that the North Koreans South before the United Nations could be stirred into action. They
tively they
would complete
their occupation of the
281
'
THE UN
IN
KOREA
might so easily have been proved correct. In the event, the Soviet Union, in the person of Jacob Malik, could do little more than protest that the United Nations action was 'illegal'. He argued that his absence from the Security Council constituted a veto, but that argument was dismissed by reference to precedent. He also claimed that the Chinese Nationalist delegate had no right to vote; that was also refuted. It is by no means certain, however, that if Malik had been present at the crucial 25 June session and had put his veto on the US resolution, there would have been no collective UN action against the North Koreans. Had the Russians used the veto it would still have been possible for the governments opposing the aggression to have recourse to the General Assembly under Article 51, which confirms a nation's right of selfdefence in the event of an armed attack. It is unlikely, however, even if the worst had happened and the South Koreans had been completely defeated in June 1950, that there would have been no war. If the United Nations had been hamstrung by a Russian veto it is almost certain that the United States, Britain and many other non-communist states would still have supported South Korea in its resistance to communist aggression. President Truman wrote in his memoirs that there was general agreement that the Western powers had no choice but to take action. 'There was no suggestion from anyone that the United Nations or the United States could back away from it. Not to resist would only lead to further acts of aggression and ultimately to the end of the United
was put strongly by
for going to the defence of South
Korea
Prime Minister Clement House of Commons on 5 July
British
Attlee in a debate in the
when he dismissed the Soviet charge that the United Nations action was illegal. 'The ordinary principles of international law recognise that any State which is attacked has a right to defend itself, and that any other State has a right to assist the state which is the subject The broad principle is that all states of aggression may be endangered if the aggressor is allowed to get away with the fruits of aggression in any part of the
More than 30 years later Britain was to uphold same principle when Argentina invaded the Falk-
world. that
'
land Islands.
Under Mac Arthur's brilliant and daring leadership the
UN Command scored important successes, driv-
ing the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel
and to the very borders of China. But at the end of 1950 the Chinese joined in the fighting and forced the UN army back. By the end of March 1951 the opposing forces faced each other roughly along the original dividing line of the 38th parallel and negotiations for a ceasefire began.
signed until two years
The
later, in
armistice
was not
July 1953.
UN action in Korea remains unique in the UN peacekeeping. It was the only occasion
The
history of
when
the
member
states joined together
under the
UN
terms of the Charter to oppose an aggressor. The United Nations later became involved in many 'peacekeeping' operations - in the Middle East, the strict
Congo, West sub-continent
involved
Nations.
The case
,
.
neutral
Irian,
-
Cyprus, Kashmir and the Indian
but in no case
in direct hostilities: its
was
the
UN
force
was strictly David Floyd
function
As operations involving
UN forces got underway, huge convoys pushed forward into Korea's heartland. Here a Canadian contingent of M4
Shermans ('Easy Eights'), mounting 76mm guns, act as a convoy advance guard.
KeyW Attack Helic j
.,
rs
283
KEY WEAPONS
with fire support during counter-insurgency operations. This was necessary because these helicopters were vulnerable to ground fire when approaching and leaving
unguided rockets. In addition, both 'Hogs' and 'Slicks' carried door gunners armed with 7.62mm machine guns. Although the armed UH-1 certainly did not lack firepower, its use was only an interim measure pend-
Previous page: An AH-64 land armed with eight HellfireATGMs
zones and when on the ground. At other
ing the availability of a specialised attack helicopter.
anti-armourversion of the Cobra, the AH-1 S. A more powerful powerplant enables rapid acceleration
The attack helicopter was developed in the mid- 1 960s to provide troop-carrying assault helicopters
their landing
times assault helicopters could operate
at altitudes
above the effective range of infantry weapons, because man-portable SAMs such as the Soviet SA-7 Grail did not become available to guerrilla forces until the 1970s.
The problems of protecting assault helicopters from ground fire was first met by the French during from
their counter-insurgency operations in Algeria
1954-62. Various measures were introduced to deal
with the threat. The most obvious answer was to arm the assault helicopters themselves, so that they could provide their
was not
own
suppressive
entirely satisfactory,
lacked the speed and agility
fire.
This expedient
however, as machines to react to unexpected
and the need to provide fire support distracted them from their primary mission of delivering troops into the landing zone Consequently as well as arming their troop-carrying helicopters (CH-21 Shawnees were fitted with 68mm air-to-ground rockets and 7 .5mm machine guns) light scouting helicopters were also armed. One improvised gunship helicopter consisted simply of a soldier armed with an automatic weapon being carried on the casualty pansituations
,
.
,
OH- 13. An altogether more effective armed helicopter was the turbine-powered Alouette II, which was fitted with machine guns and rocket nier of a Bell
pods.
The Americans in South Vietnam encountered the same problems in suppressing enemy ground fire during helicopter assault operations During the early years of the US Army's involvement in the Vietnam 1 conflict ( 1 965-67) troop-carrying UHHogs were escorted by heavily-armed UH-1 'Slicks', which themselves carried no troops but were responsible for fire support. The armament of UH-1 'Slicks' could be .
,
'
'
Such a machine, the Bell AH-1G Huey Cobra, first flew in September 1965 and began to reach combat units in Vietnam two years later. It was the first helicopter to be designed from the outset for the attack mission and thus represents an important milestone in the development of military helicopters. The Huey Cobra made use of the powerplant, rotor and transmission system of the UH-1 combined with a new streamlined fuselage which accommodated a pilot and gunner seated in tandem with the latter in front. Powered by a 1400shp Lycoming T53-L-13 turboshaft, the
AH-1G
Early versions of the single
284
were armed with a
six-barrel,
rapid
fire
mm
scout.
Following the end of helicopter. This
40mm grenade launchers and pods of 2.75in
(a
,
7.62mm machine guns, 7.62mm minigun multi-barrel machine guns, 20mm cannon,
speed of
machine gun) mounted in a turret beneath the nose. However, this was soon replaced by a twin turret mounting. This could carry either two miniguns with 4000 rounds of ammunition each, or two 40mm grenade launchers with 400 rounds each, but more usually mounted one of each weapon. Additional armament, such as pod-mounted 2.75in air-toground rockets, 7.62mm machine guns or 20mm cannon could be carried beneath the helicopter' s stub wings. When laying down suppressive fire around a landing zone, the Cobras would fire rockets into any cover which could conceal an enemy ambush. The effects of a salvo of 2.75in rockets were considered to howitzer barrage. 'Pink be the equivalent of a 105 Teams', consisting of AH-IGs working with OH-6 Loach scout helicopters, would seek out the enemy, with the Cobras flying at 2000ft ready to engage any Viet Cong forces which opened fire on the low-flying
AH-1 was adapted
ing fixed, forward-firing
AH-1G
7.62mm minigun
varied to suit a particular mission the options includ,
maximum
reached a
352km/h(219mph).
hostilities in
for a
new
Vietnam, the
role as an anti-tank
measure was primarily intended
to
help redress the massive imbalance of Nato and
Warsaw Pact armour on the European Central Front.
comes into (anti-tank
guided missiles)
and a 30mm chain gun. Above: The uprated
- a vital
attribute for
an
attack helicopter, enabling it to escape from danger zones with the utmost
rapidity.
ATTACK HELICOPTERS
An initial batch of 92 AH- 1G Cobras was modified as interim anti-tank helicopters. Designated
AH-1Q.
these machines are fitted with launchers for eight
BGM-71
TOW
(tube-launched, optically-tracked,
wire-guided) anti-tank weapons - with a range of 3750m (4 1 00yds) - beneath the stub wings retaining ,
the turret
armament of the AH-1G.
Its
primary sight-
which gives view of the target Either crew member can designate a target by means of sights mounted on his helmet. The definitive anti-armour version of the Cobra is the AH- IS and the US Army plans to have 987 of these in service by 1984. The principal change introduced on this model is the fitting of a 1800shp Lycoming T-53-L-703 which gives the AH- 1 S Cobra sufficient reserves of power to accelerate from the ing system
is
the co-pilot/gunner's sight,
a x2 or x 1 3 magnified
.
,
hover to 150 knots in eleven seconds. Later AH- IS are fitted with a three-barrel 1 97 20mm cannon with a 750 rounds per minute rate of fire, in place of the earlier turret armament. The even more potent 30mm Hughes Chain Gun, with a 700 round per minute rate of fire, will be an alternative turret armament. Similarly the TOWs may be replaced by pods of 2.75in
M
rockets.
A
fire
control computer provides weapons-
release instructions for the rockets
and gunfire im-
which is projected onto the pilot's head-up display. The US Marine Corps has pursued its own line of development based on the original AH-1G. The AH-1J Sea Cobra, which entered service in 1971, is powered by a 1 800shp twin T400-CP-400 turboshaft and is armed with a 20mm Ml 97 cannon. The Marines insisted on two engines partly for additional safety especially when operating over the sea and also because of the AH- Us better performance with such a powerplant. The later AH- IT Sea Cobra has the even more powerful 2050shp T400- V-402 thus increasing the Sea Cobra's warload which can include Sidewinder air-to-air missiles as well as and Hellfire pact-point data,
,
W
Aboveleft:TheUS Marines' AH-1TSea Cobra two turboshaft engines which provide increased performance and allow a greater utilises
warload to be carried. Above: The avionic equipment carried by the latest Cobras is highly advanced; here the forward-looking infra-red receiver
is
augmented to
provide a night-firing capability.
,
TOW
anti-tank missiles.
An pean
anti-tank helicopter operating over the Euro-
battlefield will
be faced with a daunting array of
from radar-controlled AA guns surface-to-air missiles and anti-helicopter aircraft. It will seek to evade these by nap-of-the-earth flying, making the maximum use of ground cover. Passive defensive measures, such as the fitting of radar warning receivthreats
.
Below: A Westland Lynx hovers above a
dismounted Milan ATGM team while on a British Army exercise in Germany.
285
1
,
.
KEY WEAPONS Left:
A UH-60A Black Hawk
air-landed in Egypt during the Bright Star is
The most advanced variant of the exercise.
series, the Black
UH
Hawk is
designed to operate as a firstline utility
assault
helicopter, able to
transport both supplies and combat troops.
Left:
The lightweight
Scout helicopter an SS-1 1 ATGM. This model is being replaced by the more advanced and powerful Lynx. British
fires
ers to alert the
crew
ming beacons,
and IR and IR jam-
to hostile radar emissions
(infra-red) engine exhaust suppressors
will all help to neutralize
defences. Nevertheless, a
enemy
TOW-armed Cobra
will
have to break cover to aim and fire its missiles and the helicopter must remain in view of its target throughout the missile s flight if the is to be successfully '
TOW
guided.
AH- 1 /TOW comovercome by the latest US Army attack helicopter, the AH-64 Apache and its laser-guided Hellfire anti-tank missiles. Because the Hellfire can home onto a target designated by a ground team's laser or one carried by a scout helicopter, the Apache can pop up from cover, fire its missiles and then quickly disappear from view. It can even remain behind cover and lob its missiles over the intervening terrain. The Apache's capabilities do not end there, however, as by virtue of its PN VS (pilot's night vision sensor) and the gunner's TADS (target-acquisition designation sight) the helicopter can fly and fight in virtually all weathers, by day or night. The PNVS This major shortcoming of the
bination
is
comprises a FLIR (forward-looking infra-red) sensor, which projects an image of the terrain ahead of the helicopter onto the pilot's monocle sight. The gunner similarly has an IR sight for use at night, in addition to direct-view optics for target acquisition in daylight and a laser target designator, tracker and rangefinder
Due in service in 1985, the AH-64 is powered by two General Electric T700-GE-70 1 turboshafts each ,
rated at 1690shp, giving the helicopter a
maximum
speed of over 150 knots, a rate of climb of 395m (1300ft) per minute and an endurance of over two hours. Armament can consist of up to 16 Hellfire missiles or 76 podded 2.75in rockets, or a combina-
286
under fuselage 30mm Hughes Chain Gun with 1200 rounds of ammunition. Numertion of the two, plus an
ous survivability features are built into the design, including armoured crew seats engine and fuel cells and IR suppressors on the engines. The AH-64 has a low profile which assists it in making use of natural cover for concealment and its rotor blades are considerably quieter than those of other helicopters. However, none of these advanced features is bought cheaply and, although the US Army plans to buy 446 Apaches at $9.5 million each, they will supplement rather than replace the Cobras. The armies of the United Kingdom, France and ,
West Germany all operate helicopters in the anti-tank role, although these are all
modified scout or
utility
helicopters rather than purpose-built attack helicopters.
The
British
Army Air Corps
is
currently replac-
ing its elderly Nord SS-1 1 armed Scouts with TOWarmed Lynxs. This helicopter carries eight missiles, has a maximum speed of 322km/h (200mph) and a
range of over 480km (300 miles). France's ALAT (Aviation Legere de l'Armee de Terre) operates the much lighter Gazelle, armed with four Euromissile
HOT
anti-tank missiles, or air-to-ground unguided
rockets,
7.62mm machine guns
or a
20mm
cannon.
West Germany's anti-tank helicopter is the Bo 105P armed with six 3960m (4333yds) range HOTs. France and West Germany may cooperate to produce a second-generation anti-tank helicopter, with all-weather capability and 'fire-and-forget' missiles. The United Kingdom is working on the Lynx 3 with more powerful engines, all-weather avionics and Hellfire missiles, but this is a private venture by the manufacturer rather than a development sponsored by the Army Air Corps. In contrast the Italian Army has
Top: The Italians have developed the successful
Augusta series of attack helicopters, including the
A109, displaying various rocket stores on its stub wings. Above: An SS-1 ATGM is loaded onto a Scout helicopter. Opposite page: One of the smallest attack helicopters, the
Hughes 500 M-D Defender fires a level.
TOW ATGM at low
The ability of
helicopters to fly fast at low altitudes- nap-of-the-earth
- is a cornerstone of modern helicoptertactical
flying
doctrine.
ATTACK HELICOPTERS
The
Hellfi re
Anti-Tank Missile System
The most powerful and
flexible
weapon
the anti-tank helicopter's armoury Hellfire missile. In tlefield
is
in
the
order to maximise bat-
effectiveness the Hellfire system
number of tactical options to be employed. The missile can either be fired allows a
directly
onto the target, or with the use of
an indirect laser guidance source fired indirectly, allowing
remain behind cover. of launch
mode
it
the helicopter to
Two
different types
are possible: the
(lock-on after launch)
can be
system
is
LOAL
the simpler
method whereby the the laser source
when
the
until
tracked by is hit,
is
while
(lock-on
used, the time the
spends over the perilous keptto a minimum.
helicopter is
is
more complex LOBL
before launch) system
zone
missile
the target
fire-
Direct Fire (LOAL) 1»
Direct Fire (LOBL)
cefsnptt^
287
KEY WEAPONS
funded development of a specialised anti-tank heliA 129 Mangusta, which is due to begin flight testing in 1983. Powered by two 915shp Rolls-Royce Gem turboshafts, the A129's top speed is estimated as 285km/h (177mph) and endurance as 2'/2 hours. Armament comprises eight or Hellcopter, the Agusta
missiles, plus
the
survivability features are also
Because helicopters are now so widely used on the ,
now
infra-red guided
Mangusta design.
battlefield the anti-helicopter role is likely to
serviced by its ground crew, top: The HOT-armed Gazelle is used by Egypt, Syria and Iraq as well as
being
fitted
with air-to-air missiles
(AAMs). The US Marine Corps has fitted Sidewinder
two air-to-ground rocket pods.
Many of the Apache's built into the
Above left: An AH-64 is
copters are
TOW
fire
an important duty of attack helicopters in the future.
Cannon armament can be used to good effect in air-to-air engagements and a number of attack heli-
become
US Army
AAMs to its AH- IT Sea Cobras and
has tested an
AAM
adaptation of the
*
ffll
S-,p
K_
An AH-65
Hellfi re
ATGM.Below:A three-quarters view of a
developments suggest that the attack helicopter will play an increasingly important role in the battles of the
fully
armed AH-64.
-
future.
—
-y
jyt
;
;
,*
A
.
deadly
Stinger man-portable surface-to-air missile. Such
*
1
France. Above: fires a
m
_ ^^00>-
"tflfcl
t
t
W^^^^^^
k^^A ^^^^^^^|
^1^^^^
1
*
^ A,
|Pi
^^
,
;
;'i
&
-
I^Kl
^^i^i^^P^ ^^H|-i-''
^k
m
*^dflfl
#
^^H
i •
3^teKS^&t^SSHl 1
J-
A
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1 I
1
288
*e
/
The dragon awakes The border wars and 'China
is
a sleeping dragon,' said Napoleon Bona-
parte, 'and
when
it
awakes
the world will begin to
tremble.' For the 150 years after the great French
military World War
II
expansion of Red China to the
Far East and the inclusion of
China as one of the major Allied powers meant that the Nationalist government emerged successful from
practises
was indeed
World War II. The problems
political
previous century soon reappeared, however, and
general
made his typically sweeping assertion, China asleep. It was prey to the commercial or aggrandisement of the Western nations in the
19th century, riven
by
internal feuds like the T'ai
Manchu
Mao Tse-tung in
Even
after the revolution of the
and the establishment seemed to have changed. The Japanese government used its military advantages to take control of Manchuria and then, from 1937, to early years of the 20th century
of a republic,
invade China
little
itself.
Once again a
great civilisation found itself under and unable to find an adequate response. The Kuomintang government of Chiang Kai-shek was notoriously corrupt, and central power, as had been the case for decades past, was diluted into the hands of generals and local warlords. The civil war against the communists, too, distracted Chiang's attention. But although the seat of government had to be moved to Chungking (now known as Chongqing), and the Japanese advance seemed inexorable, the spread of threat
had beset Chinese rulers for the
it
last
was overthrown by
before
dynasty.
that
Chiang's regime was to
P'ing rebellion and ruled by a corrupt and ineffectual
Dressed in typical shabby green uniforms, a unit of the modern Chinese Army
no more than four years the
communist forces of
1949.
weapons drill
with bayonets fixed. Note the folding spike bayonet fixture along the barrel of the rifle. The weapons they are using are 7.62mm Type
56 assault
rifles.
Within a year of taking over, Mao wrought a fundamental change in China's relations with the outside world when his troops crossed the Yalu River in 1950 to invade Korea and drive back the UN (mainly American) forces. From that date, China assumed a new international importance, and was unprepared to be the sick man of East Asia. The emergence of China as a great power after centuries of insularity and weakness has certainly caused a variety of wars since 1949. All the nations on her borders have felt the effects of the new, relatively efficient
communist administration as China has resome territories, intervened in
asserted claims to
and made clear her position as East Asia's most powerful nation.
others,
289
.
.
RED CHINA The intervention in Korea in 950 was the largest of The motives of 1
the Chinese military involvements.
China's leaders for committing their armies against the forces of the world's most technologically advanced nation were probably based on an estimation (correct as it turned out) that the US A would not attack China itself, and that even a stalemate would increase the
new regime's international prestige.
But Korea taught the Chinese Army some unpleasant lessons about the nature of modern war. Casualties were enormous, and the tactics of the civil war of the 1940s were seen to be inadequate when faced with coordinated artillery fire-support. As Chinese armies in the northeast were preparing to
advance into Korea, so on China's southwest
frontiers another military intervention
was taking
October 1950 communist forces invaded Tibet and swiftly made themselves masters of Lhasa. Tibet had once acknowledged Manchu overlordship but had been, in effect, an independent state since place. In
1913.
posts just off the mainland coast, were the point at
which the rivalry became violent, and in both 1954 and 1958 communist batteries opened an intense bombardment, seemingly the prelude to an invasion, until the crises were defused.
became the object of a war sudden, overwhelming attacks Chinese forces overran regions in Kashmir and Assam that had been part of the Manchu Empire. These attacks were extremely successful, and the Chinese were able to declare a unilateral ceasefire when they had consolidated their gains During the 1950s and 1960s, the communist world had been splitting apart, as Russian and Chinese ideas and motives came into conflict. It was a process accelerated by the Cultural Revolution of the mid1960s in China. In 1969, Soviet and Chinese forces clashed over the Soviet occupation of Damansky The
in
frontier with India
,
,
in
island in the Yalu River. Finally, in the south, traditional Sino- Vietnamese
combined with the fact that Vietnam (a close had successfully invaded Cambodia (which had looked to China as an ally) led to a punitive invasion of Vietnam in February 1979. hostility
Holding Tibet proved to be much harder than conquering it. In occupying a country of such inhospitable terrain the communist forces found themselves vulnerable to the same kind of guerrilla warfare that they had once practised. There was revolt in 1954, and more serious fighting in 1959 in Lhasa, while the Khamba people of east Tibet proved impossible to subdue completely. The island of Formosa (now called Taiwan), the bastion of Nationalist resistance was an affront to the communist leadership; and in their turn the Nationalists harboured dreams of returning to the mainland. The islands of Quemoy and Matsu, Nationalist out-
when
1962,
,
friend of the Soviet Union)
After a month, Chinese forces withdrew.
Around
all
her borders then, China has
and even those
made her
have not felt the direct sting of armed action have been affected. Burma and Laos, for example, were the recipients of fleeing Chinese Nationalist troops, and Pakistan has used China as a natural ally against India in the intrigues of South Asia. It is clear, then, that China's emergence as a world
While continuous infantry
power has
training (above)
presence
felt;
states that
affected international relations.
The direct
is
one
aspect of the Chinese Army the combination of firepower and mobility (below) is another.
V, -l_
The Chinese border wars 1950-83
2 Marclashes between Sovietand Chinese frontier guards. Soviet
SOVIETUNION
forces occupy
Damansky Island.
Dispute continues through 1970s
Oct1950 Chinese invade eastern
NORTh KOREA
regions. Mar1959 Lhasa revolt, Dalai Lama flees to India and rebellion flares up. Chinese forces suppress revolt. Tibetan casualties 100,000, refugees 80,000
Oct 1950 Chinese troops enter Korea and drive south of Seoul. Invasion repulsed
by Jan-May/1951 UN counterChinese casualties
CHINA
offensive.
900 000
VIETNAM Feb1979 Chinese invade northern Vietnam.
Mar1979Chmese withdraw. Chinese casualties
lETNAIvT'
results of the establishment of the
new regime
in
China are important enough; but perhaps equally profound has been Red China' s influence on the Third World as a whole. Mao's triumph was a powerful symbol for many nationalists in Africa and Asia, who found that his model of rural rather than urban revoluaccorded more closely with their own situation and their own needs than more traditional Marxist models. As a theorist of revolt, the Chinese leader has had thousands of disciples and has inspired dozens of tion
insurrections.
became
And when
Soviet-style
communism
discredited after the crushing of the
Hungarian revolt
in
1956 and the
re-
velations about the Stalinist system,
many Marxists pointed to China as an example of a benign communist state.
China's help to revolutionary movements has not been merely theoretical, however;
it
has
been practical, in the provision of arms, supplies and as a haven for discontented exiles. The Chinese contribution has generally been less than that of the Soviet Union, but in several cases it has given essential aid to a subversive movement - the prime example being in Vietnam, where the Viet Minh were strengthened by the arrival of Chinese arms in the 1 950s Yet, although the Chinese revolution has undoubtedly caused or abetted several wars, in many ways the new-found strength of China may contribute to stability in East Asia. China is the region's natural focus. While she was weak the temptation for outside powers - be they Russia. Japan or western European nations - to take advantage of this situation also
was very strong. The result was warfare. With a strong government there is less instability, and perhaps less likelihood of major conflict.
The resurgence of a nation as vast and populous as China was bound to have enormous impact; perhaps, however, the world should be grateful
that
China's
revolution did not throw up the kind of military
adventurer
who made
the sleeping dragon.
the prophetic statement about
A Chinese Napoleon, exporting
revolution by force over Asia, spectre to make the world tremble
would indeed be a Ashley Brown
.
20.000
From Dec 1954 sporadic bombardment of garrisons, aircraft and ships by Chinese mainland forces
Below: A mortar section of the Chinese Army hurry to take up positions during a
weapons practice.
.
Instrument of revolution The Chinese People's Liberation Army
The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) underwent dramatic change in the 1950s. The victorious guerrilla force of 1949, organised according to the
principles of Mao Tse-tung,
was tested to destruction
Korea a year later. After that salutary experience, Russian advice and help transformed the PLA into a poorly equipped imitation of the Soviet forces, but this regularisation was considered politically dangerous by the Maoists. Indeed, from 1956 Mao struggled hard to remove the effects of Soviet influence. In 1959 his assiduous disciple, Lin Piao, was made Minister of Defence with orders to restore the PLA's primary role as a radical instrument of socialist progress, a political elite fit to serve as an example to the rest of
r
Above: An infantryman sights his anti-tank
weapon. Chinese training reflects the doctrine of
man
versus machine.
in
society.
The PLA of 1949 was an intensely political army moulded by 22 years of guerrilla war and four years of more conventional operations against the Nationalists. The army was badly equipped, with no standardisation in smallarms and very few heavy weapons. Its organisation was democratic. The soldiers were expected to discipline themselves and to criticise their superiors. All military orders were carefully checked by political commissars to ensure that they were ideologically sound.
292
The formation of the People's Republic 1949 imposed new duties on the PLA.
October It was no
in
longer simply the violent servant of a revolutionary
movement;
was
also required to defend the nation guard the frontiers and to promote national interests. But before the PLA could be adapted to meet these new obligations it was drawn into the Korean War; for the first time it had to fight well equipped and properly organised enemies on unfamiliar ground.
and
state,
The war
it
to
in
Korea forced the
PLA
to reassess
its
own strengths and weaknesses and develop appropriand strategic doctrines. Because of the shortage of all forms of war material, official doctrine concentrated upon the supreme importance of the human factor in the conduct of war. Great care was taken to ensure that the soldiers were politically aware and reliable in order to reinforce their indoctrination The training in basic skills - mobility, field-craft and ate tactical
,
Top:
In
the Chinese Army,
advanced
infantry
techniques became intrinsic to the training of the ordinary soldier. Here, teamwork is the key
element in
anti-aircraft
combat methods. But in orderthat the soldier should not lose sight of his raison d'etre, political
study (above) has always played a major part in his military
life.
THE CHINESE ARMY minor tactics - was excellent. Commanders relied upon deception, surprise and superior numbers, not on firepower, to win. Elements of the PLA, disguised as 'Chinese People's Volunteers' (CPV), intervened in Korea in October 1950 when some 200,000 soldiers crossed the Yalu River undetected by the UN forces' aerial reconnaissance. This secret movement was accomplished by moving at night and staying under cover all day. The CPV had no mechanical transport but, by jogging, the infantry could go 40km (25 miles) a night. Their unexpected arrival in the theatre of operations provided a major strategic surprise for the UN forces, who were pushed back in confusion from the Sino-Korean frontier. Whole regiments of UN troops were caught in ambush and annihilated; corps were forced to retreat by flank attacks mounted through terrain they had considered to be impassable. The UN forces recovered and stabilised the front in the winter of 1950-5 1 Subsequent CPV attacks were more effectively contained as the UN command .
devised means to counter their tactics. Gradually the war congealed into a stalemate, with both sides
The CPV also suffered high casualties in battle. Despite their stamina, skill
content with 4.5kg (101b).
and ingenuity, they were firepower of the
UN
hit
hard by the superior
forces and were
hampered by
hardware. In 1950 they had no effective anti-tank guns, hardly any tanks and very little smallarms ammunition. They had no radios below brigade HQ level and transport in the field was by coolie. In sharp contrast to their experience in China during the civil war, the CPV could not rely upon a friendly local population to feed and assist them. Eventually the 'hardcore' system of control proved to be self-destructive. Many reliable soldiers were killed while setting an example of socialist heroism. By the spring of 195 1 their numbers were so reduced that morale and discipline collapsed under the pressure of a UN offensive their lack of basic military
The
CPV
preferred to attack
enemy
forces by
ambush, a method which made the most of their good intelligence, clandestine movement, deception, camouflage and surprise. Afterthe mobile phase of the war, they had to make formal attacks talents for
Putting theirtraining into
Chinese troops begin to advance, under practice,
from artillery and machine gun positions,
fire
against a Nationalistheld hilltop during the
communist invasion of Hainan Island
in
1950.
occupying strongly fortified lines. In order to maintain the discipline and morale of the CPV, the Chinese created a political 'hard core' within it. Every infantry section was divided into groups of three, of whom one was a political activist. These reliable men were expected to set an example to the rest and to monitor them for the company political officer.
The
political officer
was responsible
for all
and administrative work within the unit, and had the power to vet any order issued by the military commander. All orders and plans were usually discussed by all the soldiers in a company before and political
after
implementation; but
when
in action soldiers
were required to give absolute and instant obedience to seniors. Questions of discipline were dealt with by mass meetings, advised by the commissar. This system was known as 'individual responsibility under collective supervision'.
Effective measures to sustain morale
were essen-
because of the privations and hardships encountered. The soldiers were generally short of food and clothing because the CPV suffered from poor logistic support. Many soldiers died of starvation or exposure, and many more were sick because of vitamin deficiency. Whilst an American soldier needed 27kg (601b) of stores a day, a Chinese soldier was well tial
~J
THE CHINESE ARMY unusual for the CPV to attack merely to gain ground. The plan usually entailed a complete encirclement of the objective, with blocking or ambush forces deployed to isolate it from reinforcement. This technique required patience and employed a large number of troops, but the CPV had plenty of both. As the plan was being drawn up, the CPV commanders would assemble a force at least 10 times stronger than the enemy to be attacked and stockpile all necessary stores The plan was always very detailed and tied to a .
schedule because once the troops were moving it was difficult to keep in touch. To ensure that things went smoothly, the soldiers were thoroughly briefed and intensively rehearsed before going into action. In the ,
final
stages of preparation any available artillery
would range on the enemy positions but try to disguise their intention by firing shells at random over the lines.
When
all
was ready, small
fighting patrols
were
dispatched to wipe out observation posts and listening posts, to 'put out the eyes
the
same time, those
and ears of the enemy' At
reinforcements or cut off the While military education began to make its impression on the female population of the People's Republic (above), regular units of the PLA were
becoming increasingly well-equipped by the USSR. Below: Tank crews stand by theirT34/85 medium tanks before a parade.
294
against troops in prepared positions.
The
first
step in
infiltrate
.
ambush enemy's retreat would
soldiers assigned to
through the lines to their assembly areas. assault troops would move up to an assem-
mounting such an attack was the collection of as much
The main
intelligence as possible, using espionage, patrols,
bly point as close as possible to the objective During a
observation and raids.
CPV
reconnaissance patrols often spent days within a few metres of UN positions in order to observe them The next step was to analyse .
weak enemy position and then devise a plan to exploit them in such a way as to guarantee the complete destruction of the enemy force. It was most the intelligence obtained in order to find the
points in the
.
short but intense
bombardment by all available heavy
weapons, including any A A or anti-tank guns, the would go forward in companies in arrowhead formation. The final rush would comassault troops
mence just before the bombardment ceased It did not 'human sea' but of an incessant succession .
consist of a
of platoons
in
skirmish lines or
files,
each
man
THE CHINESE ARMY
Above: Carefully supervised by instructors, Chinese soldiers are trained in the use of flame-throwers.
striving to get within
The
before charging. all
(55 yards) of the
enemy
enemy perimeter so as to disperse
points of the
defensive
50m
infantry maintained pressure at
But
fire.
exerted against the
maximum
his
pressure could be
weak points, each of which would
two directions at once by massed infantry. These attacks were usually made at night, which
be stormed from
made
at least
effective defence difficult.
CPV
infantry sub-
dued the enemy by throwing grenades as they charged; it would have been unsafe to shoot in such a concentric attack, and wasteful, for rifle ammunition was scarce. Once on the enemy position, resistance was dealt with by bayonet. After an assault, an entirely fresh body of troops was brought in to consolidate and hold the position, or to deal with prisoners and foraging if the attack were a raid. In defence the
digging.
The
line
CPV showed
a great talent for
of resistance usually consisted of a
network of entrenched redoubts to hold high ground. These redoubts were connected by communication trenches or tunnels. Low ground was covered by mortars in daytime and intensively policed by aggressive patrols at night. Except at dawn and dusk, the fieldworks were usually very sparsely manned. Sentries, observers, snipers and mortar teams would be on duty while the bulk of the infantry were concealed in
bomb-proof accommodation tunnels or shell-proof
'cat holes'.
Special tunnels and bunkers were built to house artillery pieces
and tanks.
If
they were attacked, the
CPV would not waste ammunition by shooting at their assailants with smallarms.
They
relied
upon
their
mortars to disorganise and delay the enemy while they
remained safely
in their 'cat holes'.
came within 30m (27
An enemy
CPV
force
P'eng Te-huai (top) wanted
that
to maintain links with the
would be greeted with a shower of grenades then
USSR and create an elite Chinese Army, while Lin
subjected to the shock of a bayonet charge
Piao (above) believed that
China could maintain a politically
revolutionary
army without losing military efficiency. P'eng
was dismissed as
minister of defence in 1959; Lin Piao
succeeded him.
From 1 95 1 ment to the
the Soviet
PLA
.
yards) of a
trench
Union supplied heavy arma-
but not in sufficient quantity to bring
ceased to be a volunteer force and recruited by selective conscription. The recruitment and training of commanders became more formal, and soon they resembled Soviet officers. Discipline was no longer left to the soldiers; it became hierarchical, bureaucratic and strict. The position of the commissars was
undermined and political work was neglected. Fewer soldiers
became activists or party members The PLA .
concentrated on military training and technical proficiency to the exclusion of revolutionary functions.
Mao was deeply disturbed by these developments. He regarded
the obsession with technology as infanand the use of badges of rank as evidence of bourgeois militarism. As the Chinese became genertile
ally disillusioned with the Soviet
model of socialism,
Mao worked unceasingly to make the PLA an army of revolutionary peasants and not a military
elite.
In
956 there was a revival of political work in the army, to the neglect of military training. Officers were advised to spend one month a year in the ranks, in order to avoid becoming arrogant. The Militia, a popular force based on the peasantry, was revived, 1
enlarged, and given a closer association with the regular forces. Soldiers were sent into the countryside
of food, and to prepare for of 'the Great Leap Forward'. Mao even suggested that a well-armed mass militia backed up by nuclear forces might be able to defend China without help from a regular army. The rejection of Soviet methods brought Mao into direct conflict with P'eng Te-huai, the Minister of Defence, in 1959. P'eng believed that regular orto help with the production
the
commune movement
ganisation, strict discipline and
were
all
modern equipment
vital to military efficiency.
Mao
did not
was that an army such as P'eng wanted would be ideologically unsound, and it was more important for the army to be politically reliable than efficient. Mao won the argument. P'eng was
disagree; but his view
dismissed and vanished. His successor, Lin Piao, believed that the PLA could be both 'Red' and
Mao's
about a radical change in organisation and tactics until
'Expert', and that a careful study of
the Korean War was over. Many Chinese commanders were convinced by their experience in Korea that the PLA must be transformed into a regular modernised force if it was to be effective. After the armistice in 1953, Soviet influence grew. The PLA
would increase military efficiency. He set about such modernisation of equipment as China could afford, and such political rectification as he felt was necessary.
The
PLA was
in training
Revolution of the 1 960s
writings
for the Cultural
Nigel de Lee
295
,
Prior to the major social and political upheavals caused by the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, the country had enjoyed a unique lifestyle. Buddhism suffused all aspects of Tibet's culture. There were no passports and Tibetans travelled as and when they wished - a complete contrast to the position in China with which Tibet shared a common border. While the country was unified by a common religion, Tibet was effectively made up of two different peoples. In the west were the peaceful, settled Lhasean Tibetans. In the east, however, were the Khambas These were a race that for centuries had enjoyed a reputation for ferocity. No Khamba ever travelled without his sword, even as late as the 1950s. The Khambas were not a people who settled and they lived a highly nomadic life Their home was the wild land of the mountains and high plains, where the climate was severe. Their main form of transport was the horse, their home a tent of yak hair and their only form of communication was word of mouth. To the Khamba, banditry was part of life and they were extremely proud of their well-deserved martial reputation. Every male Khamba grew up to be a warrior. When the Chinese invaded, the force that they tackled was an army made up mostly of Lhasean recruits. At that time they had not experienced the fighting methods of the Khamba which, ironically, reflected the methods that Mao had used to gain victory over the Nationalist Chinese Army. For the Chinese the question of Tibetan sovereignty was a long-standing issue and even without historical considerations the occupation of Tibet would, in strategic terms, consolidate China's western border. Tibet had traditionally owed allegiance to the Manchu Empire, but from 1913 had been effectively independent. Chinese punitive expeditions in 1918 and 1928
Fall of the f How Tibet was conquered by Chai
.
.
,
A unit of the Chinese PI_A moves into Tibet (right). The Tibetan Army (below, on parade) offered little resistance.
invade Tibet.
On the border of Kham province in the
east, near Kanting,
bidden city i
was a force some 50,000 strong; in
the province of Chinghai another 40,000 troops
were
assembled; and 3200km (2000 miles) away in the province of Sinkiang, a force of 30,000 was grouped ready to advance across the Aksai Chin desert launching a surprise offensive against Tibet's western borders.
Mao's forces
With an army of only 8500 troops, effective militwas out of the question for Tibet. Prior to the invasion by the Chinese the only real role of the Tibetan Army was policing the country and ejecting undesirable travellers. This was reflected in the fact that the army was equipped with only 50 artillery pieces, 250 mortars and some 200 machine guns. When the order was given to advance against Tibet, General Wang immediately radioed from his headquarters to vanguard battalions along the eastern banks of the Yangtze. The plan was for the Chinese troops to cross the Yangtze in three groups. On the night of 6 October the first units crossed the Yangtze and moved against the small town of Denko which was defended by a Tibetan force of some 400 troops with only 12 Bren guns as their 'heavy' armament. Further south, just above the ferry crossing at Markham Druga, Chinese units crossed the river and successfully overcame the small garrison of 50 soldiers, not one of whom was able to escape and warn ary resistance
the large garrison at
land.
Once captured,
Rangsum 40km
(25 miles) in-
the ferry crossing
was used
to
transport thousands of Chinese troops across the river
and into Tibet. Meanwhile,
at a
point
200km (130
miles) to the
2000 Chinese soldiers crossed the Yangtze and split into two prongs, both aiming to reach Chamdo, the capital of eastern Tibet. The left prong pushed towards the Tibetan garrison at Markham Gartok. Although there was initial defence against the Chinese attack, in the face of overwhelming numbers the Tibetan commander ordered his 250-strong force to disengage and retreat. At this point, Khamba levies who had been raised in order to strengthen the garrison trained their \* eapons on the regular troops and forced them to defend the position south, a force of
Above: Lhasa, the forbidden city, occupied by Chinese troops in 1951.
The lack of highways forced the Chinese to use the vulnerable convoy system Right:
in
orderto resupply their
garrisons, while crossing
to the death. But, inevitably, the
Tibetan rivers (below right)
Chinese annihilated
Tibet's southernmost garrison stronghold.
posed problems for a mechanised army.
On 7 October the Chinese units which had captured the ferry had advanced as far as the garrison at
Rangsum and surprised the force of 300 Tibetan soldiers, who had evacuated the town and were withdrawing into the hills as far as the first high pass on the road to Chamdo, which was at a height of had failed to reassert control but the establishment of the new communist government in China in 1949 inevitably presaged a barrage of propaganda about China's historical claim to the mountainous country. The communists also gave their official support to the Panchen Lama, a rival to the Dalai Lama who was the political and religious head of the nation. Threats increased from January 1 950 onwards and on 6 October 1 950 General Wang commander of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PL A) forces on Tibet's eastern border, received orders to advance into Tibet. The plans for the invasion had been drawn up by Lin Piao, and the date for the invasion had been set after intelligence reports confirmed that no Western power would be likely to come to Tibet's aid. Three main groups of Chinese troops stood by to ,
,
,
297
TIBET 1950-54 4270m (14,000
feet).
By
8 October the
units of
first
the Chinese spearhead were advancing on the pass. The Tibetans had chosen their positions well and inflicted
many casualties, but sheer force of numbers,
combined with
the effects of Chinese artillery bar-
rages (and the lethal stone splinters that were shattered from the rockfaces by the shells), eventually
forced those Tibetans who were not dead or injured to disengage. At this time no word had reached Chamdo let
alone Lhasa, the national capital, Of the Chinese
invasion. It was not until 1 1 October that news of the invasion reached Chamdo, when it was brought by a messenger on horseback. When the news was received by the governor, Ngaboo, it was assumed that he would begin the organised resistance of the Tibetan people. However, Ngaboo immediately contacted Lhasa, applying for permission to capitulate to the Chinese.
Lhasa refused, relying on the hostile fighting capabilities of the
the invader.
terrain
and the
Khamba tribesmen to slow
The garrison at Denko continued to hold
and the Chinese crossed not until 17 October, when the Denko and attacked 32km miles) north of Yangtze (20 from mainland positions, were the Tibetans ordered to retreat to Chamdo. Ngaboo, despite the orders from Lhasa, had fled but was discovered by avanguard of Chinese and promptly surrendered Kham province, along with some 700 well-armed troops. Tibetan resistance had lasted just 10 days. The capture of Chamdo effectively convinced the the northernmost thrust of the Chinese advance,
central administration in Tibet that Peking's claims to
sovereignty could easily be enforced by overwhelm-
- Chamdo had simply been
ing military might
Above: When the Chinese advanced into Tibet faced by a small army of only some 8500 regulartroops, they appeared to have won an easy victory. However, they soon came up against
a
warning. After the surrender, further military operations
by
the Chinese
were suspended as negotiations
got under way. China promised both acknowledge-
ment of
Lama's political status and conby the occupying forces. 1951 an agreement was signed between
the Dalai
siderate behaviour
In
May
a far
China and Tibet. It provided for the gradual absorption of the Tibetan Army into the Chinese, the establishment of the military region of Tibet and the formation of a military and administrative committee as a form of government. As soon as the agreement was signed the troops deployed along Tibet's north-
The invasion of eastern Oct 1950
in
more formidable force
the shape of the
Khambas-a nomadic people of a warlike disposition
who lived in the
mountain regions of eastern Tibet. Here a small group of Khambas, armed with bows and arrows and rather antiquated firearms,
Kham
pose forthe camera.
SINKIANG
CHINA racial SinoTibetan boundary
clairnecfby Tibet in
1918
western frontier advanced into the country from Sinkiang province. By early 1952 these troops had reached Ngari province and a garrison of 750 troops was set up at Gartok. At the same time the Chinese advance from
which began in July 1951, went ahead unopposed and a garrison of some 20,000 Chinese troops was established at Lhasa. The Chinese grip on Tibet was apparently finalised. In reality, however, China's war with Tibet, or more specifically Kham province, was only just beginning. At first the Chinese employed effective methods of winning the 'hearts and minds' of the Khamba people. The Khambas had expected to be disarmed, jailed or killed. They had expected the victorious Chinese to loot, pillage and rape. Instead, the east,
the Chinese allowed the
Khambas
to continue living
TIBET 1950-54 This was a region of mountains with a harsh climate;
and the severity of the unstable weather conditions meant that for the unacclimatised Chinese troops prolonged periods of movement were totally exhausting. Consequently it was hard for the Chinese units to pursue guerrillas over any distance. This meant that the Khambas were a very difficult enemy to locate and engage, and the hit-and-run tactics expounded by Mao were well used by the Tibetan guerrillas. The Chinese garrisons also found re-supply a severe problem and local foraging was almost nonexistent as Chinese culinary tastes could not handle the local diet of yak meat, barley, tea and butter. Air supply was sporadic and rare as weather conditions often reduced visibility to zero feet. Those convoys which attempted to move along the winding, primitive roads rarely got through. Even when Chinese units did move against the guerrillas they often could not employ their wide range of armaments effectively Artillery pieces had to be manhandled across rocks the extreme altitude
.
in order to train
them against enemy
targets, but
no
sooner were they in position than the guerrillas moved out of range Air strikes were often equally as useless against the Khambas When planes could actually get airborne and fly over the occupied territory (weather permitting) the guerrilla units would simply disperse and disappear into caves, gulleys or camouflaged hideouts. By the beginning of 1952 the Chinese had discovered that they had won no war at all and were now trapped in a mountainous country fighting an enemy who could survive the climate, eat and fight efficiently and remain elusive. In many of their attacks against the Chinese, the guerrilla' s main weapon was his Tibetan sword, some 1 .5km (5 feet) long. The effect upon the Chinese of screaming Tibetans charging towards them brandishing their swords was undeniable. In many instances the Chinese would simply look away while still firing. The guerrillas also had the advantage of mobility. By using horses the Khambas could move across vast expanses of rough terrain at speed. Not so the Chinese whose only real chance of rapid deployment was by vehicle - and no vehicle could follow the guerrilla units into the high land. The Chinese, who had initially considered their 10-day war against Tibet as an unqualified success, thus found themselves dragged into a continuing and sometimes humiliating conflict. Large-scale revolts in 1954 and 1959 served only to prove that the Chinese had far from conquered Tibet. .
.
Below: Khambason horseback herding yak.
as before, paid for anything that they took It
was the vast expanses of land and the mobility of the
Tibetan horse-borne guerrillas that gave the Khambas the edge over the Chinese invaders, who were forced to rely upon the few roads in the country.
surprisingly courteous. But the
Khamba
and were tribesmen
were not susceptible to any form of central control, and dissension from the policies of the new regime quickly spread.
There was only one main road in Kham and that the Lhasa-Chamdo highway. Although the Chinese had relied on air re-supply during their brief campaign it was clear that, in order to maintain
was
new roads capable of allowing speedy transport and rapid deployment would have to be constructed. So it was that the Chinese began to create strongholds along these new supply routes and so fell into the trap of establishing themselves in garrisons within Tibet
static garrisons.
,
•
Although they were inferior in arms, ammunition and numbers, the Khambas were still a considerable force. The terrain was completely different from that over which the PL A had won their great victories.
,
Alexander McNair- Wilson
,
Attack on Quemoy The Formosa straits crisis of 1958 In the
summer of 1958 Peking Radio announced that
Army was preparing to seize Formosa (now called Taiwan) Land and air forces in Fukien (Fujian) province were reinforced and artillery units conducted intense bombardments of the islands in the Quemoy (Jinmen) group. But the comthe People's Liberation
.
munists never assembled any amphibious forces and when the crisis faded away in winter, the territorial status quo remained intact. The results of the crisis
were a number of shifts in the political and strategic between the main participants. These adjustments were achieved by the use of a judicious mixture of violence, shadowy threats of worse to come and bluff. Upon the collapse of the Nationalist armies on the mainland in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek had fled to Formosa. The communist forces cleared the mainland and occupied Hainan Island, but did not take Formosa, the Pescadores (P'eng-hu Lieh-tao), the Tachens, Quemoy or Matsu (Mazu). In the spring of 1950 the communist Third Field Army gathered 250,000 men and a fleet of junks and barges to carry them to Formosa. Before the invasion could be launched, however, the Korean War began and the United States sent the Seventh Fleet to secure Formosa. The US Navy not only prevented a communist assault on Formosa but also ensured Nationalist control of the offshore islands. These islands soon became a threat and an irritant to the communist authorities in southrelationships
ern China.
The most important were the Quemoy group - two 1 2 islets in Amoy (Xiamen) Bay, less than 2 miles) from the mainland and ideally placed to hinder access to the port of Amoy. The Matsu group, 19 islets 16km (10 miles) off Foochow (Fuzhou), was less strategically important but still a source of anxiety to the communists These archipelagoes were linked to Formosa by the Pescadores in the
islands and 1
8km
( 1
.
Formosa
Strait.
The
Nationalists
also
held the
Tachens, an isolated chain of islands off the coast of
Chekiang (Zhejiang) province. been concluded Korea, the Americans allowed Chiang to develop his plans to reconquer the mainland. The Nationalists reinforced the islands and used them as bases for In 1953, with an armistice having
in
The air force carried out aggressive reconnaissance the army conducted artillery duels with communist gunners and there were substantial comoperations.
,
mando raids. But these activities did not inspire a popular rising against the communists, as Chiang had hoped, and in 1954 the Peking government announced its intention to take Formosa. Quemoy and Matsu came under intense bombardment and naval craft blockaded the Tachens. The USA hastened to secure Formosa and restrain Chiang. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles hinted that the United States was prepared to use nuclear weapons to defeat a communist attack on Formosa and in the autumn of 1954 the USA and Formosa negotiated a
300
Mutual Defence Pact. The USA committed itself to defend Taiwan; in return Chiang was not to attempt an invasion of the mainland, or to reinforce the offshore
American consent. In order to make their new commitments more manageable the Americans persuaded Chiang to give up the Tachens early in 1955. In the face of these resolute American measures, the communists abandoned their plans for islands, without
,
an immediate offensive. In 1957 Mao Tse-tung turned again to the question of Formosa, the seizure of which now seemed urgent
Americans intended to base Matador missiles For these reasons the communists applied military, psychological and diplomatic pressures to as the
there.
the Nationalists in 1958.
Tension built up in the spring As the force levels on were increased, the Nationalists reinforced the garrisons of the offshore islands until they .
the mainland
Above: Using
large,
high-magnification binoculars, a Chinese Nationalist soldier on
Quemoy scans the horizon for signs of communist military activity.
numbered-200.000. The output of propaganda was intelWified. Communist and Nationalist ships and aircraft engaged in aggressive patrols and clashed frequently. Mutual exchanges of artillery fire proliferated.
The
struggle
became serious
in
August.
Above: Communist forces storm ashore on Hainan in 1950. In both 1954 and 1958 it was widely expected that these scenes would be repeated on Quemoy and Matsu.
On the 6th
emergency on Quemoy and Matsu. On the 23rd the communists began an intense bombardment of the main islands in the Quemoy group. For five days the batteries on the mainland delivered 60,000 shells per day, then ceased fire, having inflicted more than 1000 casualties on Great Quemoy alone. On 1 September the communist guns opened up again. Simultaneously, the communist Chinese Navy attempted to isolate the archipelago by MTB patrols. These actions led to skirmishes involving Nationalist ships and aircraft. On 4 September Dulles stated that the USA would the Nationalists declared a state of
help to defend the offshore islands. Peking retaliated by claiming a 17km (12 mile) territorial limit, which would envelop Quemoy and Matsu, and ordering foreign vessels to keep out. On the 6th Chou En-lai, the Chinese Defence Minister, issued a statement designed to drive a wedge between the USA and Formosa and induce the Americans to negotiate directly with Peking. The American response com-
bined diplomatic concessions with firm military action at the point of contact On 7 September, President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed that American and Chinese representatives should meet in Warsaw. The .
USA, he said, would defend the interests of Formosa.
US Navy
ships began to escort Nationalist supply
Quemoy. They ignored the communists' new territorial limit but observed the old one of 5km ( miles). Communist shelling of harbour areas dis-
convoys
to
rupted the unloading and distribution of supplies.
Quemoy and Matsu Matsu ^^j~o^
^
°
\Liarlf$ng
Foochow
CHINA
MATSU IS
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km
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7
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KWANGTUNG
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u
,
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SOUTH CHINA SEA H^INA^
301
QUEMOY AND MATSU Military action continued while negotiations pro-
ceeded. The Nationalist Air Force generally had the measure of the communists' MiGs and conducted intensive reconnaissance flights over the mainland.
The Nationalist Navy was able to hold its own against
MTBs. But the artillery on the mainland could effectively paralyse and isolate Quemoy By late September it was clear that neither side could gain a critical military advantage without the communists'
.
taking radical action that would entail
new risks. The
United States and the Chinese communists never considered such risks to be acceptable. Chiang did, but was suppressed by American threats to withdraw support. In
October the main actors began the delicate
process of disengagement without loss of face.
On the
6th the communists declared a unilateral ceasefire for
seven days. The Nationalists declared their own and the US Navy stopped escorting supply ships on the 8th. There were still aerial skirmishes but
ceasefire,
On
they did not impede negotiations.
piece above), but his forces suffered considerable losses in 1958 (bottom, a
The Sino-American discussions began in Warsaw on 14 September. As they continued, the Americans had to deal with pressures from both the Soviet Union and Formosa. On 19 September Premier Nikita Khrushchev accused the United States in a letter of
US Sabre jet brought down
interfering in the internal affairs of China, trying to
overthe mainland).
divide the Chinese people and bringing permanent
were not required to evacuate the offshore islands, as the communists refused to renounce the use of force in the future. But Chiang was warned that he must not provoke communist retaliation by aggressive actions. The communists insisted on having the last word, with an impressive show of firepower. They shelled the islands, mainly for propaganda purposes, on odd-numbered days. On 3 November, having given a day's warning, they landed 30,000 shells on Great Quemoy in 24 hours. The effective settlement was a compromise, and no-one could claim a clear victory. But there was one definite loser. Chiang Kai-shek had been deprived of freedom to prepare for a reconquest of the mainland. Nigel de Lee
Chiang Kai-shek (below)
was in
receipt of
much US
aid (such as the artillery
The Americans dealt by simply rejecting it, and continued to exclude the Russians from any effective say in the crisis. They found it more difficult to restrain the Nationalists, however. On the 29th Chiang began to advocate air attacks and commando raids on the mainland, but next day Dulles warned that the USA was not formally committed to defend the offshore islands. The massive increase in their garrisons had been foolish, he said, and in the event of a reliable ceasefire he would favour an evacuation of these troops. To the fury of Chiang, Eisenhower supported disorder to the whole of Asia.
with this
Dulles.
302
letter
communists extended
the 13th the
and three days reconnaissance over
their ceasefire
later the Nationalists halted air
the mainland.
The
crisis
Nationalists
petered
out
in
early
winter.
The
Key Weapons
The
MERKAVA
303
KEY WEAPONS
The concept, design and construction of the Israeli Merkava main battle tank (MBT) was the result of a complex combination of factors stemming from an by Israeli defence planners of the need for self sufficiency in major weapon systems. During the 1948 war the Israelis suffered from an immense shortage of armour, relying on a few hastily repaired, near-derelict M4 Shermans procured by the Haganah, a handful of Cromwell and Hotchkiss tanks and some locally manufactured 'sandwich' armourplated trucks. In 1949 Israel acquired a number of Shermans from scrap collections and ex-US Army dumps in Europe and these were modified for service with the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). During the 1950s most of Israel's armour was bought from France and the United Kingdom and included Shermans, AMX-13s and Centurions. Tank modification began to function in earnest in 1 955 with the introduc-
early recognition
304
tion of the Israeli-designated
M50
Sherman, an up-
gunned version of the M4A3 with a new engine. This was followed by the 'upgraded' Centurion, featuring a 105mm main gun and the Continental VI 2 engine, which was to see extensive combat experience in the 1973
YomKippur War.
October 1 966 two British Chieftain tanks arrived under a cloak of secrecy for extensive trials with the Israeli Army, with a view to future purchase. However, on the outbreak of the Six-Day War in June 1 967 the British withdrew their offer to supply Israel with the new MBT; Israel's only remaining source of supply was the USA from whom they were buying M48s, M60s and M60Als. The possibility of both Arab pressure on the US to curtail this vital supply and the fact that the Egyptians by the end of 1967 were amply restocked with T54s and T55s from the Soviet In
Union
led the Israelis to realise the necessity for a
Previous page: With
its
bazooka side plates
removed to avoid clogging, an IDF Merkava ploughs its way through heavy mud while on exercise on the Golan Heights. Top: The Merkava's low profile and uncluttered turret were key design features from the first experimental prototype (above) to its present-day active deployment with the IDF.
MERKAVA MBT Far left: The Merkava's unique rear hatch provides both a rapid escape route from the combat compartment and the
^^ IJM^'
TBI
w'**-V Bite*
r
c
^ s~
-
*^5 $&
\
-
kl
^Jt
i
ground. Left: The 105mm gun, fitted with a thermal
i^v
>fl *5v'-
capacity for carrying battlefield casualties and nfa ntry over fi re-covered
sleeve,
is
stowed for
transport.
great cost of tank crews in the early stages of the
Yom Kippur War. As a consequence of Israel
'
s
1
973
small
population and the time and finance needed to train men to the required standard, protection of the crew
emerged
most important design feature. Every had to play its part in this respect; firepower came second and mobility third. In comparison with the performance of other contemporary MBTs, the Merkava is slow and heavy, with a high combat weight of 56,000kg ( 1 23 ,4801b) Powered by a Teledyne Continental AVDS- 1 790-5 A V-12 diesel engine developing 900hp at 2400rpm, it achieves a maximum speed of only 46km/h (29mph) compared with the American Ml and the German Leopard II's 72km/h (45mph). The original Merkava as the
part of the tank
home-produced MBT if they were to maintain control over their military future Basic design work on a
new MBT began in 1967, was not until governmental sanction for the project was gained in 1 970 that work began in earnest on the detailed planning of the Merkava. General but
it
of the 1948 war, the 1956 Sinai campaign and the Six-Day War, headed the project. The variety of tanks deployed and the combat experience of the three conflicts were crucial in the design considerations for the new tank. Experience on the Golan Heights in the Six-Day War had proved that battlefield mobility was no substitute for armour protection a lesson that was to be learned again to the Israel Tal, veteran
.
Mark
IDF in 1979, has suspension and Centurion road wheels but is to be provided in the Mark 2 and Mark 3 developments with hydropneumatic suspension and a more powerful 1200hp engine, increasing both its power and mobility on the battlefield. 1,
first
delivered to the
coil-spring bogie-type
While the Merkava lacks top performance capabilit is unique in its layout and emphasis on crew survivability The turret and combat compartment are
ity,
.
situated towards the rear of the vehicle, while the
placed in the vulnerable spot at the forward is found elsewhere only in the Swedish 'S' tank and provides the crew with
engine
is
end. This design concept
considerable additional protection
.
The fighting corn-
Below: Inadditiontothe forward placement of the engine, crew protection is increased by the provision of detachable bazooka side plates.
2
Merkava Main
Battle Tank
Crew 4 Dimensions Length (gun included) 8.63m (28ft 4 /2in); width 3.7m (1 2ft 1 /2 in); height 2.64m (8ft 1
1
6V
2 in)
Weight Combat loaded 56,000kg (123,4801b) Engine Teledyne Continental AVDS-1 790-5A V-1 diesel developing 900hp at 2400rpm Performance
Maximum road speed 46km/h
(29mph); range (road) 500km (310 miles); vertical obstacle 1 (3ft 3in); trench 3m (9ft 10in); gradient 60 percent; fording 1m(3ft3in)
m
partment stretches the whole width of the vehicle, is air conditioned and comparatively spacious. Crew comfort is an important factor during prolonged engagements in climatic conditions such as those prevailing in the Sinai desert or
Golan Heights. With the
engine up front, the design provides for a rear door, making bailing-out a simple and protected manoeuvre which eliminates the hazards of a turret bailout under fire or the trauma of a seized hull-bottom
Above: Finished Merkava tanks
in
their units
machine gun co-axial with main armament; one or two 7.62mm machine guns mounted on commander's and loader's hatches; one 60mm roof-mounted mortar; smoke dischargers
escape hatch in a blazing combat compartment. The rear door also allows other knocked-out tank crews to be taken aboard on the battlefield, and the tank can also be used as an infantry transport or command post
The hull of the Merkava is constructed of cast and welded armour, manufactured after a long experimental and trial period at the Urdan factory near Netanya. The armour is spaced, providing the Merkava with increased protection against HEAT and
HESH
chemical action rounds, the spaced compart-
~^ " 5
'ZZ -
k*
f
ki
:
\
».
I
having
completed field tests. Below: Flying black and green ceremonial pennants on its antennae, a Merkava is put through its paces in open country.
with the main gun ammunition stowage rearranged.
Armour Conventional cast and spaced Armament One 105mm M64-L7gun; one7.62mm
the factory
grounds await delivery to
MERKAVA MBT
between the two layers of cast armour being filled with diesel fuel (not normally inflammable when hit). Additional armour protection is provided by side plates which help guard the tank' s suspension. Combat experience in the desert (where there is very little cover) emphasised the necessity for a tank design which offered the lowest possible target promerits
The Merkava has
wide, forward-sloping armour-plated glacis with a cast armour front, and has a flat turret with a small cross section and long file.
a
The low
and main gun angles of plus 20 degrees elevation and minus 10 degrees depression allows the Merkava to remain virtually hidden while using its main gun in a hull-
overhang
at the rear.
profile
Above: An Israeli paratroop squad training with a Merkava tank crew. In
combat conditions the
tank-infantry team
provides for mutual protection.
Up to six
foot-soldiers can be
transported
in
safety taking
up advance positions to protect the vehicle against potential tank-killers. Left:
Operating the fire control computer in the gunner's position.
down position. The main armament consists of a 105mm M64-L7 gun manufactured by Israeli Military In-
rifled tank
HEAT, HESH, APDS, APFSDS and phosphorous rounds Secondary armament includes a 7.62mm co-axial machine gun and one or two 7 62mm machine guns mounted on the commander' and loader's hatches, a 60mm roof-mounted mortar and smoke dischargers. Much emphasis is placed on the training of tank gunners and commanders in the IDF and the Merkava is designed for quick firing main armament with a high probability of a first round hit dustries, firing
.
I
.
The
turret turntable is located
on the
hull floor
plate supported by rollers so that they rotate together, ,
carrying the turret crew through 360 degrees either
with the aid of the hydraulic power pack or through
manual operation. The commander is provided with an access hatch and protective cover with his observation and aiming sights located close over the turret roof thereby allowing all-round observation with
full
The Merkava fire-control system features an American Cadillac Gage stabilising system with four positions (two for traverse and two for elevaprotection.
307
KEY WEAPONS
tion) a ,
modified digital-control
M
1
3 ballistic compu-
and a laser rangefinder. The commander is provided with a panoramic 360 degree periscope with magnification ranging from x4 to x20, coupled or uncoupled to the aiming system. The Merkava' s high
ter
vision instruments include the night-sight, a white
main
searchlight.
consists of three
commander's passive
and infra-red driving
and a system
light
The tank driver command main elements: a commander's
operating handle, an audio
command intercom and a
visual display unit at the driver's station.
During the Yom Kippur War many Israeli tank crews ran out of ammunition during prolonged engagements and thus the Merkava has been designed to carry more main gun ammunition than most contemporary MBTs in the stowage area at the rear of the
308
hull.
The main-gun rounds are stored in heat-resistant
containers, loaded
by the rear access doors
into
While 63 rounds is the standard load carried, the Merkava's full capacity is in excess of 85, almost double that of the Leopard II or the Soviet T72. The Merkava first saw combat service during the 1982 invasion of the Lebanon, where it performed well against the T55s, T62s and T72s of the Syrian Army Reports of future developments for the Merkava in the Mark 2 and Mark 3 variants suggest that, in addition to the installation of a more powerful engine and a superior suspension system, the Merkava may also exchange its combat-proven 105mm gun for a 120mm main armament. Without doubt the Merkava will remain the backbone of the Israeli armoured forces for many years to come. side-bins.
.
Top: Specifically designed for desert warfare, the
Merkava's wide sloping and low
glacis
hull-hugging main
armament make
it
particularly suited to
operating
in
the hull-down
Above: A company of Merkavas advances over rough terrain to take up a position.
defensive position
wood on the Golan Heights.
in
a
t Matthew Ridgway and the tactics of attrition The entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers into the Korean War in October 1950 led to the rout of the United Nations armies. The sudden and totally unexpected appearance of the Chinese, coupled with their
unorthodox fighting methods, unnerved the men of UN forces and in many units morale was broken. With scant regard for weapons and heavy equipments that were difficult to move, the erstwhile victorious forces of the UN turned and fled southwards as far and as fast as possible. There were, of course, many valiant stands made by units determined to stem the Chinese advance but the main emphasis was on the
retreat.
In December 1950 Lieutenant-General Walton Walker, commander of the US Eighth Army which controlled all the UN forces in Korea, was killed in a traffic accident just behind the front line. His successor was Lieutenant-General Matthew Ridgway. whose task it now was to put new life into the army and call a halt to the Chinese advance His job was far from enviable and in his autobiography he vividly describes the sort of scene he witnessed only too frequently on his arrival in the battle-torn peninsula: 'A few miles north of Seoul I ran head-on into that fleeing They were coming down the road in army. trucks. They had abandoned their heavy artillery, .Only a few had kept their their machine guns. rifles. Their only thought was to get away, to put miles between them and the fearful army that was at their .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
heels.'
In all. the retreat ran
then
.
on
for
440km (275
miles) but
some 65 to 80km 40 to 50 miles) south of Seoul (
Chinese advance suddenly ran out of steam. reliant on their superiority in manpower and the unconventional tactics that Mao Tse-tung had propounded, the communist soldiers were unable to sustain the war of movement that their victory had brought them. Their weak and antiquated logistic support system failed them: they ran out of ammunition, food and reinforcements. Probes forward by UN forces in the latter half of January 1951 showed that the enemy had indeed the
Always
called a halt: the respite that the ately ly.
needed was being granted
Ridgway seized
UN forces so desperto
them. Immediate-
the opportunity to stabilise the
whole front. The build-up of UN strength began swiftly as Ridgway planned his next move. His assessment of the situation brought an answer to the problem. Whereas the Chinese armies outnumbered the UN forces heavily, the UN forces were much more effectively armed and equipped. He knew that heavy casualties among the UN troops would not be accepted so they must make use of their technological situation along the
superiority.
For his new offensive. Ridgway determined to advance on a wide front across the whole peninsula, getting up into the mountains as well as along the coastal plains. Such a 'linear' advance would obviate
A
'
.
KOREA
1951 the possibility of Chinese encirclement of units, and
deployment would also prevent small groups of Chinese and North Koreans operating as guerrillas in the rear of the UN front line. To minimise casualties Ridgway determined to play his trump card: all UN advances would be preceded by intense artillery fire, mortar barrages and air strikes. The effect of these tactics when they were brought into use has been well illustrated by R. O. Holies in his book on the 'Glosters' in Korea, Now Thrive the Armourers: 'You began with the long-range artillery from 10 miles away enveloping the hills in tall columns of dust flung up by tons of high explosive, followed by the quicker shell-bursts from the more this
accurate lighter guns, at a shorter range.
You bom-
barded the positions further with tank guns, while swooping aircraft plastered them with napalm and rockets, and the infantrymen secure in their foxholes, let loose a murderous hail of staccato fire with rifles, machine guns and mortars. This lasted for the morning. In the afternoon the infantry crept up the slopes of the hills to find out
Above: briefs
A Korean officer
new arrivals at an
outpost overlooking the
Chorwon valley. Left: General Matthew Ridgway talks to wounded troops.
if anyone
was
left there.
25 January 95 1 the UN forces had all the war material they needed to counter the Chinese and, adopting Ridgway 's tactics, they moved northwards again. Thunderbolt was the codeword given to this first operation and it was to herald a series of advances which was to continue for the next three months. This first operation saw the 2nd US Division move forward
On
1
up to the Han River. On 2 February Inchon and Suwon fell and the advance in the western sector ground on. In a further battle in the same sector, which lasted from 5 to 9 February, the UN forces pressed on north of Suwon. During the course of these five days the new tactics demonstrably paid off. The UN forces suffered only 70 casualties whereas the effect of the massive bombardment preceding the advance resulted in the Chinese forces losing 4200 dead. The fire brought down on the Chinese from guns, mortars and aircraft was dramatically successful and the sights that met the UN troops as they advanced into the Chinese positions after the bombardment were horrifying. It
was little wonder that thereafter Ridgway 's new tactic was to be known as the 'meatgrinder'
Previous page: Despite severe weather conditions a 'Long Tom' continues to lay
down an artillery
barrage
in
support of an
infantry assault.
Sftk
310
KOREA February the western sector had advanced to and hold on to Inchon, Kimpo, (the airfield for Seoul) and the line of the Han River. On the central sector, however, things did not run so smoothly. After initially successful advances to capture the town of Hoengsong the Chinese mounted a counter-attack and managed to retake the town During this battle the Chinese introduced a new tactic to the fighting. Until then they had relied largely on surprise to achieve their objectives and rarely concentrated large numbers of troops together. Now, for the first time in the Korean War, they took the decision to counter the meatgrinder operation by flooding the battlefield with huge numbers of men. Hoengsong was retaken by a massed assault of thousands of soldiers who swarmed, wave upon wave, onto the UN positions. The effect of these new massed attacks on the UN troops was almost as devastating as the original surprise sorties which had been so successful in the previous autumn. However, on this occasion the UN nerve held and where positions were overrun and surrounded by Chinese troops they stood their ground until they were relieved by determined counterattacks launched by other units Ridgway's choice of codenames for further advances after Thunderbolt still induce a chilled feeling when they are recalled. On 21 February Operation Killer got under way, to be followed on 7 March by Operation Ripper, which led to the recapture of Seoul on 14 March. In the central sector, Chunchon in the heart of the peninsula and well north of Seoul was captured on 2 1 March and by then the whole of the Chinese front south of the great Han River had virtually collapsed Further over to the east where the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army was deployed, there was also much success to be reported. By the end of March ROK troops were back across the 38th parallel and claimed the honour
By
1
seize
UN counter-attack
The
25Jan-21ApriM951 /iPyonggang
of being the
make
their
first
UN
way back
\^TRIANGLE IRON
/
—
Chorwon/ 1
\
.
.
At
this stage
;~~~~
I
Kumhwa
/R
N^>^
it
seemed
Hwachon Reservoir
as though the Chinese
armies were exhausted and ripe to be driven back northwards across the Yalu River into China But then .
doubts began to be voiced. Was the enemy really beaten or was his hasty withdrawal before the meatgrinder simply a ploy to disengage his troops in order to try his hand at a counter offensive? Slowly but surely,
intelligence
seemed
to
indicate
that
the
Chinese armies were not, after all, a spent force. By mid- April it was clear that the Chinese had regrouped
Below: Using Forward Observation Officers to direct artillery fire, the crew ofthis8in howitzer can place accurate barrages onto enemy positions without any visual contact. The effect of accurate artillery 'air burst' shells
can be seen by the Chinese corpses (inset).
troops to into
North Korea.
9P&
V-
1951
mtSf
•
-**«•<«
P±k
.>
* their divisions
armies held
in
and could now muster a force of 19 readiness to launch a major spring
offensive.
UN
were more cautious as they continued their advance northwards. Operation Rugged was implemented on 5 April and was designed to allow Ridgway's forces to seize and hold the hills to the north of the 38th parallel along the phase line to be known as Kansas. In the west they established them-
The
forces
selves with leading elements across the Imjin River
and
in the centre in the general area
reservoir. that
it
The
of the
Hwachon
particular advantage of this line
was
ran across the peninsula at a very narrow point
and thus allowed the
UN
forces
to-
Above: Members of the
pened: there was renewed Chinese activity
Turkish Battalion of the UN forces in Korea, armed with
the front. That night in the light of a full
a
Browning
.3in
machine
gun, give covering fire to an infantry assault. Bottom As the UN forces pushed further north, the need to maintain front line troops with supplies :
necessitated massive airdrops into the battle-zone. Here a C-1 19 supply plane disgorges
war material.
shorten the fron-
tages allocated to corps and divisions, and this in turn
gave greater concentration of forces and effort. On 19 April phase line Utah (an extension of Kansas in the centre of the front) was reached and preparations to continue the advance were put in hand. From now onwards, however, any further advance would cause the Chinese grave problems as their main concentrations of troops were grouped just to the north in the area of what was known as the 'iron triangle' the northern tip of which coincided with the capital of North Korea, Pyongyang. At this moment, on 22 April, the expected hap,
Right: Chinese infantry,
faced with the daunting prospect of imminent
UN troops, keep grenades atthe ready as assault by
they take cover tunnel.
in
a hillside
all
along
moon
the
Chinese main forces struck. Waves of massed troops flowing closely behind their own artillery barrages advanced against the UN forward positions. The Chinese intention soon became clear: radio announcements from both Peking and Pyongyang declared that the aim of the offensive was to strike at the UN forces to the south and drive them back into the sea. The whole of Korea would then be united under the North Korean communist government. The very first intention was loudly publicised: to capture Seoul by 1 May in time for a victorious celebration of May Day. Among the first of the UN forces to experience the dogged determination of this new Chinese campaign
rvwivurv
was the
which formed part
British 29th Brigade
of the I US Corps and was deployed along the line of the Imjin River. The brigade consisted of the
Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, the Royal Ulster Rifles and the Gloucestershire Regiment together with a Belgian battalion and supporting arms. It was here that one of the very first enemy attacks was launched and it ultimately all but overwhelmed the brigade. It was here, too, that from 22 to 25 April the Glosters valiantly held up the enemy advance and deservedly added 'glorious' to their name. In the event, so stubbornly did the brigade withstand the
onslaught of successive waves of the enemy that the whole Chinese offensive in the west was blunted.
By 30
April the offensive
was over and
the
UN
forces had consolidated their positions preparatory to
a further advance In the course of their major attemp.
ted breakthrough the Chinese had advanced
56km
some
(35 miles) to the very gates of Seoul but
it
is
estimated that they suffered 70,000 casualties as against
7000 on the part of the
UN forces.
it quickly became apparent that the Chinese intended to persist with a
Despite these appalling losses
€^ •
was
most observers that this was one last desperate attempt to win a complete and conclusive victory in Korea. It started on 15 May in the eastern sector of the UN line where considerable gains were made. Leading units penetrated up to 50km (30 miles) into UN-held territory. Once again, the line was held after the initial setback and the position was stabilised. The ground troops were supported by an immensely powerful concentration of artillery. On one occasion, over five times the normal amount of artillery ammunition was used and on 18 May an American artillery battalion fired over 10.000 rounds (some 400 rounds per gun!) in support further offensive:
'
it
clear to
of troops in defensive positions.
The
thrust of the
enemy advance petered out on 20
May and once more the UN prepared to advance. By "3 Right:
workon maintaining communications, a South Korean and a US infantryman keep guard.
i
whole of South Korea was in forces were firmly established along the 38th parallel from the Imjin across to
UN
friendly hands and the the west coast.
The six months from January to June 95 1 had seen some of the most desperate fighting ever experienced 1
as both sides clung tenaciously to
ground
nents.
The
stakes were high and,
battlefield, politicians
were waging
away from their
the
sort of
There was division between the
UN allies over the
question of possible talks with the enemy. There had
been uncertainty and indecision within the American government over the same issue and also with regard to how, when and where to strike to counter and weaken the Chinese influence in the Korean War itself. Out of this latter problem there developed a confrontation between President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur. Mac Arthur argued for more forceful action, to be carried, if necessary, into China itself. Truman, on the other hand, adopted almost exactly the opposite view. The situation came to a climax in April 195 1 when the American president sacked MacArthur after the general had brought the issues out into the open through the press and radio. General Ridgway was appointed in Mac Arthur's stead and was thus plucked out of Korea to take over the headquarters in Japan on the eve of the first Chinese spring offensive. Ridgway had been in direct command of the UN forces in Korea for only four months, but they had been eventful months and he departed with a wealth of valuable experience. He was succeeded in command of the Eighth Army by Lieutenant-General James Van Fleet, who soon demonstrated that he too would seek to exploit the technical superiority of the UN war machine in order to neutralise the Chinese strength in numbers. Major F. A. Godfrey
\ .
^1 *fr^i
^b^H^4 :
.
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,
•
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m
own
'wars' as crisis followed crisis.
/
-«,#-
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K
that they
held and fought to wrest yet more from their oppo-
4
-
7J i
the beginning of June the
7
While two engineers
i
* jJT"
*
*
k
,
.
Platoon leader
Korea
in
Jessup received his commission as a regular almost at the very moment the North Koreans invaded South Korea. He was stationed at Fort Knox, Kentucky, as a first lieutenant in an armoured infantry company. He was 23 years old. He volunteered to go to Korea and was soon instructed to report to a port
John army
E.
officer
of aerial embarkation
66The
first
in California.
leg of the trip, to Japan,
was uneventful.
My stay at Camp Drake, outside Tokyo, was equally so except for the fact that
I
was getting the uncomfort-
able feeling that things were not going well in Korea.
This feeling was based more on rumours than on
we were told by the army. Indeed, we were little, and what we did hear only tended to confuse the picture that much more. Thus, with a minimum of fanfare and very little anything told very
orientation,
I
was ordered
to
assemble a draft of
personnel and to travel by train to Fukuoka, on the
where we were to be embarked for Korea. There were roughly 150 officers and men in the movement package and I as a first lieutenant was in charge. Of the officers on the train, I was the only one who had had any prior service. Furthermore, most of the enlisted men in that group were administrative personnel who had magically become infantrymen because of the inability to get qualified replacements. Thus, clerks and supply personnel in the island of Kyushu,
,
,
various headquarters of the occupation forces in Japan found themselves on their way to war as riflemen. If our trip to Fukuoka could be classified as having been without incident, no similar claim could be made for the shipboard crossing of the Korea Strait between Kyushu and Pusan, South Korea. First of all the ship we were loaded aboard was a disreputable coaster that flew the Japanese flag, appeared ready to sink at the slightest provocation and was, as it turned out, manned by a crew that might have been recruited by Blackbeard the Pirate. We were aboard that wretched ship for about 36 hours during which time one soldier was knocked unconscious by a female coal-stoker in the crew and three men suffered temporary blindness from imbibing some foul-smelling concoction that had been peddled by another, more enterprising, member of the ship's company. All of these men had recovered by the time we landed at Pusan. At that point, the packet was split up. One of the officers and several of the enlisted men accompanied me to RCT5, the Fifth Regimental Combat Team, and at least one of them - one of those who had drunk the bad booze- was killed within the first week. As I had served in combat in World War II and as I was relatively senior, I was appointed executive ,
,
,
officer of
Company
E, RCT-5.
I
was
also given the
additional duty of platoon leader of the second platoon.
314
The job of leading
a platoon was, obviously,
more important
XO hat - indeed
at this critical
time, so
I
my
put aside
never got a chance to try it on - and with great delight, prepared to join my platoon. We arrived in the platoon position on a small hill just before dusk. A mountain called Papasan lay before us and was held by the enemy. The nearest friendly unit was perched atop its own hill some 1500m (about a mile) away to our right and was beyond support range In the other direction there was nothing but the East China Sea. We were the south anchor of the Pusan perimeter. I had come near to collapse climbing the trail to the position so no one thought to wake me at dawn next morning to tell me that we were about to be attacked. Everyone else in the platoon was alerted, but not me. ,
I
.
My
war came when a .5m (5 feet) from the hole in which I lay asleep. Someone shouted 'Keep your head down lieutenant its only a small attack. At the time I thought how nice it was that they were first
indication that
I
was
mortar round went off about
in a
1
'
,
saving
The
me for bigger things last
week of July and
the
first
of August are a
PLATOON COMMAND IN KOREA Waegwan
to pass through the 1 st Cavalry Division and break out of the perimeter in conjunction with the Inchon landings. My mission was to secure Hill 301 which intelligence said was held by only a handful of enemy troops. The handful turned out to be about a battalion and we were in serious trouble from the beginning. Nothing worked right. Ammunition we received at the height of the battle proved to be mislabled and recoilless rifle rounds turned out to be 3. 5 in rockets when unpacked. Even more damaging was my inability to establish radio communications, as most of the channels were blocked by commanders complimenting each other on their great successes. I needed ammunition and fire support; we had been stopped dead in our tracks and were taking heavy casualties We finally had to be withdrawn and the job of taking Hill 301 given to another battalion from the 1st Cavalry. All of Company E had suffered because of the poor intelligence we had received. By dusk on 16 September 1950 more than threequarters of my platoon were dead or seriously wounded, and more than half of the seriously wounded were dead by morning, primarily because the medical evacuation system was inefficient. When we withdrew, there were only seven of us who could still function, and all seven of us had been wounded, some several times. We were heavily mortared that night, however, and two of the seven were killed. For all intents and purposes, the second platoon had ceased to exist. Of those killed earlier on the hill, two were the victims of friendly fire when a soldier from our own tank company opened up on us with a .50 calibre machine gun. We had to fire back at him to finally get .
the shooting stopped.
Some When in action, the fighting
was usually hard
and fast leaving
little
for rest or food. This
infantryman
(left),
time
US
a
member of RCT-5 in managed to snatch a few minutes between operations. Above:
US
communist positions. The recoilless
troops shell rifle
gave
US infantry great
firepower while still allowing mobility and was a standard close-support weapon. Right: Every action has its casualties. With their M1 carbines hitched on their shoulders, two US soldiers help a wounded companion back to a field dressing station.
who had been wounded were
able to
return to the platoon and help in trying to rebuild it, but
ly whenever we were trying to eat one of our infrequent hot meals. We all had dysentery. For better or for worse, the men soon came to realise that I was there, that I was in charge and that I was just as much involved in our welfare as they were. I began to understand their individual strengths and weaknesses and, for the first time in my life, my own as well. Before long we were acting collectively and as a unit.
was never the same. One by one the old hands who Hill 301 became casualties until, at the beginning of October, I was hurt seriously enough to be evacuated to Japan. I eventually went back to Korea for another combat tour and subsequently over the next 30 years, served in numerous other infantry units. But none of these, in any way, ever measured up to those few months in 1950 when I was a rifle
was great! In mid-September my regiment was moved
platoon leader, and no part of
,
September 1 950, has
of us
We got mortared a lot, especial-
collage of memories.
It
it
had survived
,
my
etched
life is
in
so vividly
my memory.
"
north to the vicinity of
315
,
Battalion of the Gloucestershire ters), the
the
^M%,
1
st
1
st
Regiment
Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles
(the Glos-
( 1
st
RUR)
Battalion Royal Northumberland Fusiliers ( 1 st
RNF) and a Belgian battalion.
*f3R
Along the brigade's whole front the communists had avoided all contact and simply continued observation operations.
From
a defensive point of
view the brigade was not well placed; not only was it widely dispersed, but it occupied two passes that would, if taken, provide the Chinese with fast routes to the south and Seoul. The Belgian battalion occupied high ground just to the north of the Imjin's junction with the
Han
River, the 1st
RNF
was de-
ployed to the centre with the 1 st Glosters on its left (opposite the main Imjin River crossing) and the 1st RUR in reserve. Approaching the 29th Brigade's front was the crack 63rd Chinese Army, composed of
While the early part of April 195 1 saw the US Eighth Army continuing its drive forward hoping to gain
command
of strategic positions north of the 38th
parallel,
was becoming increasingly
it
,
316
launch massive counterattacks against the
clear that the
Chinese were preparing to launch substantial counteroffensive operations in order to halt the UN advance. Indeed, on 13 April 1951, General Peng Teh-Huai, commander of the Chinese First Field Army, gave orders for the beginning of an offensive against the advancing UN forces. Small units of communist troops were infiltrated behind the UN lines in order to study their strengths and positions The offensive was to be aimed at halting the UN advance, retaking Seoul and isolating and destroying those forces to the east of the South Korean capital. At this time the British 29th Brigade, operating under the command of the US I Corps, was deployed along a 15km (9 mile) stretch of the Imjin River. To the left of 29th Brigade was the 1st ROK (South Korean) Division and to the right were the 3rd Division and the 25th Division. The 29th Brigade itself consisted of the 1st .
As it became clearthat the Chinese were preparing to
UN
forces, a front was
established along the line of the Imjin River. This lonely forward post
(above) looks out over the countryside just north of the river.
KOREA
1951
Imjin River 22-25 Ann! 1951
22
April
Chinese forces cross
C and D companies 1 RUR advance and take Hill 398. B company left in reserve. 1 RUR and 1RNF stabilise front by nightfall. Under heavy attack, the Belgian battalion withdraws southwards from Hill 194 and takes up blocking position. Night 24/25 April 1 RUR faces renewed assault and on the morning 25 April 1RNF and 1 RUR are ordered to disengage and withdraw to the south. the Imjin River. A,
As the Chinese began their counter-offensives against the 29th Brigade's positions along the Imjin, units in
all
sectors
came
under attack. Above: The Glosters advancing to take up positions along the Imjin. Below: Members of the Belgian battalion
who
Hill
A
235 22 April 2000 hours Glosters engage leading elements of 187 Div. Night 22/23 April Chinese attack and in the morning A and D companies are forced to withdraw
put up a staunch resistance against the Chinese on the
to
Hill
235. B company withdraws
right flank.
to
Hill
314. Glosters hold positions
Chinese thrusts
throughout the day. Night 23/24 April 188 and 189 Divs launch assault on B and C companies who withdraw to Hill 235. Dawn 25 April Glosters surrounded and only D company breaks out.
UN
retreat
initial
UN
deployment
the 187th, 188th
By 22
April
it
and 189th Divisions.
was
clear that the
UN forces would
soon be forced onto the defensive. At 0945 hours on 22 April a patrol from the 1 st RNF made contact with enemy units only 1 .6km ( 1 mile) forward of the Imjin River. The contact so far south was unusual but reconnaissance reports confirmed enemy movement within 16km (10 miles) of the river southward from the Chorwon area. It was from the 25th Division, which was holding a front in the Yonchon sector, that an intelligence report arrived confirming an imminent offensive by the communist forces. At 2000 hours the Glosters' forward patrol engaged the first elements of the communist vanguard attempting to ford the 1 37m (150 yard) wide river. These troops were, in fact, the leading elements of the Chinese 187th Division. By 2 1 00 hours both the 1 st RNF and the Belgian battalion forward posts were engaging enemy units. As contacts increased, a battle patrol was rushed forward to prevent a communist breakthrough to the left flank of the Belgian battalion as Chinese units headed for 'Ulster Crossing', and to secure the bridges. But by the time the battle patrol reached the sector, the Chinese were deployed in strength and the patrol was forced to withdraw. Consequently the 1st RUR reserve units (less B Company) were ordered forward to help the 1st RNF clear the area. The situation, however, was almost irretrievable and C
Company RUR was recalled to stand with B Company, with orders to be prepared to move to the west to support the 1 st Glosters. At
this point, the 1st
movement towards the east of
its
RNF reported strong enemy
Hill 398, a
position.
It
was
prominent feature to
clear that the Chinese
were breaking through the front. Both A and D 1 st RUR were ordered to move to Hill 398 with a section of medium machine guns and prevent outflanking movements by the enemy. While D Company dug in, A Company swept forward of the position and by midday on 23 April after a few minor contacts, commanded a view across to Hill 257, then under enemy control. Later in the day both C Company and Tactical HQ moved up onto the Hill, the 29th Brigade's main HQ withdrawing southwards. By nightfall on 23 April the situation had been somewhat stabilised and a new front was established with the two remaining companies of the 1st RNF on a ridge to the west of Hill 398 where the 1 st RUR (less B Company) was dug in. The situation on the left flank of the 29th Brigade's front was not so stable. The gap of 3650m (4000 yards) between the 1 st RNF and the 1 st Glosters was being exploited by enemy flanking movements, and the Glosters were pinned down by a constant barrage of mortar and machine gun fire as they faced more than a complete regiment of Chinese troops. During
Companies of the
,
,
317
KOREA
1951
the night of 22 April, Chinese battalions had
infil-
trated between the forward platoons of the Glosters'
A
and D Companies and by the early hours of 23 April had established a machine-gun post to the rear of A Company. As dawn broke Lieutenant Phillip Curtis charged the Chinese machine-gun post and, despite being mortally wounded, reached the position and destroyed it with a well-placed grenade. For this action he was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross. At 0830 hours A Company now reduced to 53 men and one officer, withdrew to Gloster Hill (Hill 235). D Company, which had also been the subject of severe attacks, was also ordered back, and A and D Companies took up new positions on the eastern slopes of Gloster Hill. B Company was ordered to withdraw to Hill 314. This company had inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese but had received none itself. As it withdrew to Hill 314 - which it had to take from Chinese patrols occupying the summit - massive enemy movements could be seen towards Kamak-san Hill, completely outflanking the Glosters and pushing through between them and the 1 st RNF. The Chinese aimed to secure the routeway, which the Gloster companies were now deployed astride, as they could not hope to push southwards in any real strength without control of the routeways which would speed up both deployment and resupply. Throughout the day, despite lack of air support, the Forward Observation Officers were able to direct artillery fire onto the advancing Chinese units inflicting many casualties, while their own were evacuated by helicopter and road. However, by midday on 23 April the Chinese had blocked the road to the south of the battalion, thus effectively isolating it from resupply or reinforcement. Much later in the day, Brigade HQ informed Colonel James Carne, the Glosters' ,
commander, that an attempt to reinforce would be made on 24 April The position was to be held whether or not reinforcement succeeded; there was no discussion as to withdrawal.
To the east, the Belgian battalion,
after putting up a 94 fought its way eastwards across the river and began a southwards withdrawal. The 1st RUR was enjoying a relatively successful defence on Hill 398, continuously repulsing enemy assaults, and the only retreat was when C Company was withdrawn 730m (800 yards) to protect the
spirited
defence on Hill
1
,
battalion's southeast flank.
During the night of 23 April the Glosters came under sustained attack from the enemy. The Chinese 1 87th Division had received heavy casualties from its initial engagements with the Glosters and it was now replaced by the 1 88th and 189th Divisions. At 2230 hours Chinese units, which had moved Right: Infantry hitch rides
on tanks as they cross the Imjin River.
,
318
Righttop: Preparing to
defend yet another
.
Below: Chinese troops action against a position.
hill
in
position, Glosters who survived the Chinese attack dig fire trenches in anticipation of another offensive. Right below: Well padded against the
members of C and D Company of the Gloucester cold,
Regiment on one of the strongpointsthey defended.
KOREA
1951
Bugler Buss As dawn broke on 25 found
themselves
forces.
The
1951 the Glosters
surrounded
*
*»
Chinese
by
Glosters' official record of the battle
records that around.
April
'Chinese trumpets sounded
In retaliation
all
the adjutant suggested to
the colonel that the drum major might give them a
he did and being the man he was, he was not going to do this crouched in a slit trench. Standing up, "Drummie" Buss gave the Chinese the full repertoire: Long Reveille; Defaulters; Cookhouse; Officers Dress for Dinner; the Company calls - in fact everything except Retreat. Buss was a good player and the notes of his bugle echoed overthe Glosters' position.'
^y*.-^-
sR*
reply. This
L^W
•
tf^
"a^-* J^E
*S^js\<-
^J
^^^^^Si iNnf 1
..
forward onto the lower slopes of Hill 314, began their assault against B Company. Their initial assaults were disjointed and the well-prepared arcs of fire combined with artillery and mortar support took heavy toll of the advancing Chinese. But it was sheer weight of numbers that won the day and the Chinese soon began to overrun the Glosters' positions. The C Company position fell quickly and the company was ordered to withdraw along with the Battalion HQ and the mortar sections, to join A and D Companies. B Company, despite the massive Chinese assaults, was ordered to hold its position until dawn. As dawn broke, medium machine gun fire from Gloster Hill provided cover as B Company was ordered to disengage and rejoin the battalion; but due to heavy fire from Chinese units holding C Company's old position, only 20 men reached D Company's position. While the Chinese maintained their attacks against the Glosters, the rest of the brigade was equally committed. Throughout the day Hill 398 was under ,
constant attack from
communist
troops, but the 1st
RUR had managed to hold its positions. The
1st
RNF
engaged - though not cut off, as were the Glosters. It was clear that help for the Glosters would have to come from elsewhere Consequently, a
was
similarly
.
force of Filipino infantrymen with light tanks, sup-
ported by a squadron of the 8th King's Royal Irish
Hussars,
made a spirited attempt to reach the Glosters
was halted south of their position. The Glosters, low on ammunition and supplies and
but
down to 50 per cent battalion
strength,
were well and
Colonel Carne therefore decided to which would thus allow the Glosters to hold the position for another night. All companies were moved to the summit of Gloster Hill from which they could still command the northern truly isolated.
tighten his perimeter,
entrance to the pass.
To the east during the night the 1 st RUR (including in reserve) came under increasingly heavy attack from the enemy which, despite heavy casualties, managed to hold its position and keep the ,
B Company
It was early on the morning of 25 April that Major John Shaw, acting as second-in-command, was called to Brigade HQ and informed that enemy penetration was so deep in the western part of the sector that the brigade itself was threatened with encirclement. The brigade was to disengage and
pass open.
withdraw. 1 st RNF and the 1 st withdraw southwards through B Company
The specific orders were for the
RUR
to
block and on to the Uijongbu road, where transport would await them. The Belgians were already positioned, engaging the enemy, at the southern end of Gloster valley The withdrawal as far as the American block, 6.5km (4 miles) north of Tokchon, was completed by late afternoon, and although the withdrawing units had had to fight their way through enemy held positions and suffered heavy casualties, they .
made it to safety. As for the Glosters,
attacks throughout the night
had been successfully repulsed but by dawn the Chinese were established in strength on the upper slopes of Gloster Hill. The Glosters were surrounded at close-quarters. Although the Glosters knew of the 29th Brigade's withdrawal they could not, at this juncture do anything but fight it out. A Company was under most pressure as dawn broke, but a strong counter-attack prevented the position from being overrun. At 1030 hours Colonel Carne finally gave out orders to the effect that all companies should attempt to break out independently. All weapons and equipment were to be destroyed if not taken with them. Of the four companies of the 1st Glosters, three were captured or killed. Only D Company succeeded in getting through, and of this Company only 39 men ,
actually
made it to UN positions.
For three days four battalions had held the might of the 63rd Chinese Army. The Glosters had been virtually destroyed but had held their vital position. The time which had been granted by this action had not only broken the back of the Chinese advance but had allowed the rest of the US I Corps to withdraw and secure the Han River line, thus protecting Seoul. For his gallant actions and inspired leadership Colonel Carne received the Victoria Cross.
Alexander McNair- Wilson 319
s
Defiant to the end The sacking of General Douglas MacArthur When, on
1 1
April 1951
,
President Harry S.
Truman
Army Douglas MacArthur of command in the Far East and with
relieved General of the
from his posts them the responsibility for operations
in
Korea, he
unleashed a violent storm of public protest in the USA and a bitter debate over the control and conduct of
American security policy. Truman had relieved MacArthur for challenging the administration's instructions and, specifically, the orders of the presi-
dent and commander-in-chief of the United States
armed forces.
From the beginning of the Korean War, MacArthur had protested about restrictions placed on his authority. He was denied permission to pursue enemy aircraft into Chinese air space or attack industrial and strategic targets inside China. On 30 December 1950 he had recommended the reinforcement of the United Nations Command with Nationalist Chinese troops, the use of Nationalist Chinese forces on Formosa (Taiwan) in diversionary attacks against the Chinese mainland, and finally a blockade of China and the destruction of Chinese industrial capacity by naval and air attacks. These recommendations were rejected by the president and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and specific limitations were placed on MacArthur' freedom of action In particular, he was instructed not .
320
make unauthorised statements to the press, as the Truman administration knew from experience that to
these usually contained barely concealed criticism of policies over Korea. But in March 1951 Mac Arthur disobeyed the president's orders and, through a series of communiques and letters, appeared to challenge the administraits
tion's attempts to negotiate a settlement with the
communists. The main points of MacArthur' s objection to Truman's policy can be found in a letter of reply he wrote on 20 March to Congressman Joe Martin, House Republican Minority Leader: 'It seems strangely difficult,' wrote MacArthur, 'for some to realise that here in Asia is where the communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.' On 5 April Congressman Martin read MacArthur' s letter on the floor of the House of Representatives.
Undoubtedly, MacArthur' s personality and
dis-
General Douglas MacArthur, flanked by (left to right) Brigadier General E. K. Wright, Rear Admiral
H.Doyle and Major E. M. Almond, watches as his troops go ashore at Inchon.
J.
General
MACARTHUR AND KOREA
tinguished military career had deluded lieving that he could determine
US
him
into be-
policy in Korea.
Douglas MacArthur was an 'army brat', the son of Arthur MacArthur, a famous civil war soldier and later a general. MacArthur' s earliest memories were of army life and attendance at West Point seemed the natural thing During World War I MacArthur served ,
.
with distinction with the American Expeditionary
Force in France; he was promoted to major-general at the age of 38 and decorated nine times for heroism. After the war he received rapid advancement in the small peacetime army, becoming chief of staff in 1930. In 1935 he went to the Philippines to train the Philippine
marshal
Army and became
a Philippine field-
despised. In turn,
had already disobeyed him over Japan.
US
who
policy towards
Truman suspected MacArthur of being apoli-
tical soldier
who supported the Republicans and who
harboured presidential ambitions himself. But the conflict between Truman and MacArthur was only partly a question of personalities and style. It was fundamentally a question of civil versus military authority.
'
s
Top left: MacArthur receives the .congratulations of his chief of staff, General J.L.Collins, after his
appointment as commander-in-chief United Nations Command.
Top right: President Truman presents MacArthur with the Medal Honour at their meeting at Wake Island in October 1950, soon after the of
Whatever the rights and wrongs of the issues, there can be no doubt that Truman was ultimately right in dismissing MacArthur. As president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces Truman was MacArthur
.
Following the Japanese attack on the Philippines in 1941, MacArthur escaped to Australia, was appointed to command the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific and was promoted to five-star general in 1944. From 1942 to 1945 he fought a series of major engagements in the Southwest Pacific culminating in the liberation of the Philippines and his acceptance of the Japanese surrender. He was then appointed Supreme Commander Allied Powers in Japan where he became largely responsible for writing the Japanese constitution and rebuilding the country. But he also succeeded in ignoring or circumventing instructions from Washington, a precedent and frame of mind which would determine his attitude towards his responsibilities over Korea. From 1935 MacArthur' s professional stature and seniority, combined with his total commitment to the importance of the Far East to the USA, meant that frequently he challenged policy directives from Washington and fundamentally disagreed with strategic priorities Because of his magnetic personality and eloquence in speech and on paper he frequently attempted to appeal over the heads of President Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the American public, and his statements were eagerly seized upon by those Republican politicans who were looking for any opportunity to criticise President Roosevelt and who at times saw MacArthur as a potential Republican candidate for president. From the moment that Truman took office in 1 945 there was a mutual antipathy between him and MacArthur. To MacArthur, Truman appeared a rather grey politican whose political views he disagreed with and whose military views he probably
Truman regarded MacArthur with
suspicion as an overpowerful military proconsul
landings at Inchon.
superior officer, and MacArthur had defied him
time and time again.
It
was accepted that the ultimate
responsibility for military policy lay with the presi-
dent, his administration and Congress. If MacArthur
disagreed with policy he could either resign or obey. What he could not do was disobey the president's orders.
The main area of policy disagreement between MacArthur and the Truman administration was over the Korean War, and in particular the decision to fight a limited war. Like most American soldiers of his generation, MacArthur had been brought up to believe that once military action had begun then total victory was the sole aim. Until the Korean War the United States had followed that policy and had been successful. MacArthur' s objections to fighting rr ited
li-
wars highlighted the problems for America in a
Below: Finally relieved of his command by Truman,
MacArthur returned
home
to a hero's welcome despite the fact that officially
he had been
disgraced.
.
321
MACARTHUR AND KOREA planning and operations, reflecting a challenge to
by civilians. Such increased interference was, however, inevitable. The nature of limited war was such that military decisions down to a very low level had to be guided by political considerations; and modern communications had given politicians the ability to intervene whenever and wherever they wanted. Vietnam in the 1960s was probably the most extreme example of such problems coming to the fore, with Defense military expertise
Secretary Robert
McNamara's
relations with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff being especially strained over the
on the bombing of North Vietnam. Limited wars are far more easily executed by a totalitarian state than by a democracy. In both Korea and Vietnam the Americans used conscripted armies, the members of which found it increasingly difficult to understand what they were fighting and dying for, unlike their fathers and elder brothers in two world wars. MacArthur, as the great master warrior, understood this point and used it to reinforce his opinion that if you couldn't justify the war to the American people and couldn't win it then you shouldn't get involved in it. The British fought a successful war in the Falklands in 1 982 because among other things they had a clear objective, considerable public support and volunteer armed forces. Even under these circumstances there were traditional disputes over the control of operations and at times the ability of the prime minister to communicate quickly and directly with the Task Force Commander Sandy Woodward must have placed some restraint on his independence. Douglas MacArthur was a warrior and not a bureaucrat, a singularly independent field commander and military supremo who despised war by committees and leadership through administration. His concentration of experience in the Far East and his lack of insight into the wider problems of strategic planning and the relationship between politics and military power in a democracy meant that he was singularly ill equipped to play the unquestioning military commander in Korea or accept the concept of limited war. His dismissal brought a storm of protest down on the head of Truman and turned MacArthur into a national hero. But after all the hullaballoo of a ticker-tape welcome in New York and his address to Congress, the master of the field of battle found himself an amateur at domestic politics and within six months he was a very much retired, albeit distinguished. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Keith Simpson limits placed
world divided between the antagonisms of capitalism and communism. Many of Mac Arthur's military colleagues, whilst disagreeing with his defiance of
Truman, supported his objections to limited war. The problem was that neither political or military policy concerning Korea nor the use of American military power had been clearly thought out following the end of World Warn. In 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had forecast to Truman that conflict with the communists would take the form of general war, and they stated that Korea was not strategically important and could not be supported militarily because American forces would be needed in more important theatres. The Truman administration appeared publicly to indicate, by omission, that Korea did not lie within a United States defence area. Yet when the North Koreans attacked across the 38th parallel in 1950, Truman and his Secretary of State Dean Acheson immediately authorised the commitment of US forces under
Mac Arthur's command in Japan. Unfortunately, the administration had no clear objectives and as events unfolded
mined
it
became
deter-
of provoking the Chinese and the Russians into fighting a major war. MacArthur did not understand or approve of the concept of fighting a limited war, and his authority and prestige enabled him for the next year to ignore or challenge at first the rather vague and later the more specific instructions of the president and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The wounds and divisions that the three years of indecisive war in Korea had wrought within the military and between the political and military leadership went deep; in the short term it led many soldiers to resist any ground commitment in Asia. As the USA became more involved in Vietnam from 1954 there were disagreements among the military, not on whether intervention was considered desirable but rather what was considered necessary for successful intervention. In retrospect, it can be seen that successive
to limit the conflict for fear
American administrations were more enthusias-
about military intervention than the military, who realised that such a commitment would have to be
tic
total.
Both
in
Korea and Vietnam the
Joint Chiefs of
Staff sought to maintain the formal division
between
policy decisions, which they participated in only as advisers and pure military decisions over which they ,
What had alarmed MacArthur and American military commanders in Korea appeared to be the growth of interference with tactical
claimed authority other
322
.
While MacArthur may have found it difficult to accept orders from a civjl administration, the situation
today has
made
the chain of command even more complicated. The B-52 bomber (above) shedding its load during the Vietnam War may well
have had
its
targets
preselected by members at a cabinet meeting like the one below, including military chiefs (such as
General Creighton
Abrams,
US
commander-in-chief in Vietnam) and civilian politicians (such as Henry Kissinger, Spiro
Agnew
and Richard Nixon).
,
,
Key Weapons
The
CHIEFTAIN parti
323
Britain's Front-line
When proposals were first made in the early
1950s to
replace the Centurion tank which had entered service ,
with the British
Army
in
1945, the question of the
any armoured fighting vehicle again came under consid-
three conflicting priorities in the design of
eration.
The order of these
priorities
agreed for the
Centurion's successor, the Chieftain, remained as for its
predecessor: firepower, protection and mobility.
Experience during World
War
II
had underlined
MBT
long-range target engagement. Next, protection was essential for the crew,
immunity from the
and
that
effects of
had
to include relative
NBC (nuclear, biologi-
chemical) warfare as well as from shell-fire. Mobility was the third priority; restriction in mobility is the price inevitably paid for the insistence upon a high level of protection. A fourth and vital consideration - flexibility - is achieved in the Chieftain through cal,
its
comprehensive Clansman radio communications
the importance of a high-performance gun; and the
system, which enables
weapon to be the tank itself, with a powerful main armament capable of
combat platform on the battlefield. In 1 956 Leyland Motors produced three prototype
British considered the best anti-tank
324
it
to operate as a fast-reacting
Previous page:
A Chieftain
Tank Regiment based at Hohne in Germany, 40km (25 miles) from the Iron Curtain. Above: Chieftain main armament, the of the 4th Royal
formidable 120mm gun. Below: An ARV variant winches a stranded vehicle back to safety. When fitted with a dozer blade the ARV's capstan is capable of apullof90tonnes.
CHIEFTAIN
Above:
Two further
variants -the Assault
Vehicle Royal Engineers
(AVRE) prototype which never saw production (top) and the Mark 5 ARV(P) with an ATLA AK6000M crane developed forthe Iranian
Army. Above
right:
Combined tank and infantry exercises at
Bovington. Below: A Mark 3 has its L60 engine changed. Chieftain
tanks designed along the lines laid down by the General Staff, and this led to the requirement being issued,
two years
later, for the
FV4201 -
the Chief-
Main Battle Tank. Designed by the Fighting Vehicle Research and Development Establishment, this new vehicle resembled the Centurion to some extent, but had a lower silhouette, a newly-designed tain
turret
without a mantlet and a ,
1
20mm main gun
.
The
lower silhouette was the result of positioning the centrally-sited driver in a reclining position (though only adopted when the tank is 'closed down'), while the three remaining crew members were accommo-
MBT
dated in a turret whose profile afforded improved protection.
The P 1 prototype appeared in 1 959, to be followed by further prototypes which underwent an extensive series of trials, during which time engine and gearbox over-heating problems became apparent; extra strengthening of the transmission and lengthening of
compartment became necessary, unfortuThe hull was designed in three compartments consisting of cast sections welded together to form a driver's compartment, a central fighting compartment, and the rear the engine
nately incurring additional weight.
325
KEY WEAPONS Left:AChieftanFV4205 No. 8 Bridge with a span of 22.8m (74ft 10in). Constructed of light alloy weighing only
engine section. In May 1963 the Chieftain was accepted into British Army service and a number were provided for
12,000kg (26,896lb) the bridge can be laid in less than five minutes and when necessary can be recovered bythetankand reused.
in
AVLB laying a
and 5th Royal Tank Regiments for troop trials (British Army of the Rhine). In 1966 hot weather trials were successfully completed in Aden, and in 1967, in Germany, the first production Chieftains began to equip the 1 1th Hussars, the first regiment to receive them Some 800 are currently employed the
1
st
BAOR
.
in the British
BAOR
Army,
the majority in nine regiments in
in two United Kingdombased regiments. The tanks have been built at the Royal Ordnance Factory, Leeds (which has produced
and the remainder
f
Above: With turret-mounted
Chieftain
searchlights blazing, the Chieftain's main armament
Crew 4
is
put to the test on the
nightfiring ranges. lights indicate the
Red
use of
ammunition.
live
Mark 5
MBT
Dimensions Length (gun included) 10.79m (35ft 5in); width 3.66m (1 2ft); height 2.89m (9ft 6in) Weight Combat loaded 55,000kg (121,2501b) Ground pressure 0.9mg/cm 2 (14.2lb/in 2 Engine Leyland L60 Mk7A two-stroke multi-fuel six-cylinder engine with 1 2 opposed pistons developing 730bhp at 2250rpm )
Maximum road speed 48km/h (30mph); range (road) 450km (280 miles); vertical obstacle0.91m (3ft); trench 3.15m (10ft 4in); gradient 60 per cent; fording 1 .07m (3ft 6in) Performance
Left:
Loading the
Chieftain's cupola-
mounted 7.62mm machine gun. The gun can be aimed and fired from within the cupola while maintaining
NBC protection and automatically ceases firing
when five rounds remain in the
This allows the reload the on the battlefield
belt.
ranging machine gun (retrospectively being replaced by a laser rangefinder); two 7.62mm machine guns- one co-axial with the main armament, the other mounted on the commander's cupola; two six-barrel
commanderto
smoke-grenade dischargers, one on each side of
gun
the turret
without opening his hatch.
326
Armour Conventional, 1 50mm (5.91 in) maximum Armament One 120mm L11A5gun; one.5in
CHIEFTAIN MBT over 1900), and the Vickers factory at Elswick, Newcastle. The 120mm LI 1 A5 rifled tank gun provides the Chieftain's main armament. With the one-ton barrel encased in a thermal sleeve the gun is well capable of engaging and destroying any potential opponent at long range.
The
latest barrels
have an
MRS (muzzle
reference system) incorporating a mirror which enables the
gunner
to
check the alignment of
his sight
with the barrers axis from inside the vehicle, while
ESR
(electro-slag refined) steel barrels prolong bore
The gun can elevate to plus 20 degrees and depress to minus 10 degrees. The Chieftain's main types of ammunition are life.
APDS-T (armour
piercing discarding sabot tracer)
which propels a tungsten core projectile at 1 370 m/sec (4500 ft/sec) out to 3000m (3600 yds) and HESH (high explosive squash head), with slower muzzle velocity of 670 m/sec (2200 ft/sec) and a range of 8000m (8750 yds). Bagged charges - which save space in turret confines - are stored below turret-ring height in coolant-filled charge bins to minimise fire risk. Other ammunition types include canister, illuminating and smoke, while APFSDS (armour piercing fin stabilised discarding sabot) and HEAT (high explosive anti-tank) rounds are underdevelopment. The gunner and loader can provide a rate of fire of up to 10 rounds per minute for the first minute; thereafter a rate of six can be maintained. A Marconidesigned stabilised gun control system and various Marks of tank laser sight - now standard on all British Army Chieftains - allow the gun to remain stable while the tank is on the move and the target to be tracked through a ballistic graticule pattern and laserranged by gunner or commander to an accuracy of 10m ( 1 1 yds) even at the longest ranges. The Marconi Space and Defence System's 1FCS
-
Above: The driver's position, surrounded by batteries and main gun projectile stowage bins, is set in the front of the
Chieftain's hull.
tank
is
'closed
When the
down' the
driver lies prone but
is
provided with a driving hatch for use when not in combat.
This system has dispensed with the 0.5in Browngun of earlier Marks of the Chieftain, but
right of the Chieftain's
enemy
attack to the front, but the shallow
'V
hull
of the projectile leaving the individual barrel), all within a few seconds, and offers a systems accuracy of 90 per cent to a range of 5000m
(5470 yds).
pressure inside the tank
at
present being
retro-fitted to earlier British Chieftains
account (via
its
computer) vehicle
- takes
attitude,
into
weather
conditions, range, aim-off, and even fling (the up-
ward
flip
situated in the
position
secondary armament remains in the two 7.62mm machine guns, one on the commander's cupola and one mounted co-axially with the main armament. The turret, which can traverse through 360 degrees in 16 seconds, has smoke grenade dischargers fitted on each side. The Chieftain's high level of protection is provided by a combination of armour thickness, and turret and hull design. The sloped profile of the cast turret and the emphasis on frontal protection both there and on the glacis plate primarily ensure protection against an
and skirting plates for the track tops also play a part in the overall protection scheme. A three-stage NBC pack attached to the turret rear provides protection for the crew and obviates the need for respirators by providing air filtration, or ventilation in a non-NBC environment. The crew can continue to operate closed-down for 48 hours provided
(integrated fire-control system)
Above: The gunner's
ing ranging
profile
is
maintained.
On
earlier
turret.
is
The retrofitted fire
control system
which
includes laser rangefinding equipment replaces the .5in ranging
gun and virtually guarantees a first round
on
hit
a stationary target at
3000m
(3281 yds).
Below: Obscuration, the blinding effect of dust
thrown up by muzzle blast, is one of the problems of the Chieftain's
120mm
main armament.
It
can,
however, provide effective cover for rap'd movement in
very dry or desert
conditions.
327
KEY WEAPONS
marks an over-pressure system was used, but this is being replaced by a full filtration pack. IR (infra-red) detectors are fitted to the turret top to provide audible warning of enemy IR emissions. A Nato requirement introduced during the design stage of the Chieftain called for a multi-fuel engine which led to a redesigning of the engine compartment, and for the first decade of the tank's service with the British Army its engine was bedevilled with problems. Piston rings fractured, cracks and displacement occurred in rear gear case and cylinder liners, and cooling and air filter inadequacies became apparent. The early Leyland L60 engine - a 12cylinder two-stroke design
-
in the
Mark
1
version
provided a mere 585bhp, which fell considerably short of the specified figure of 750. The Mark 2 improved this to 650bhp at 2 lOOrpm, but an effective power-to-weight ratio was not achieved until the Mark 8 A with an output of 750bhp and which, with improved reliability, resulted in a satisfactory state of affairs.
Drive from the engine leads via the centrifugal clutch to the TN 12 epicyclic gearbox with a MerrittWilson differential steering system and electrohydraulic gear selector. There are six forward and two reverse gears.
The suspension
of the Horstmann type and consists of three units on each side of the tank which have dual road wheels. Three sets of horizontal is
springs are fitted, and the drive sprocket
The
is at
the rear.
manganese steel with detachable rubber pads which minimise damage to road tracks are of cast
surfaces in peacetime.
Above:
A pair of front-line
Chieftains operating in
Germany where current Warsaw Pact numerical superiority
The Chieftain is fitted with a comprehensive range of optical equipment. The driver's periscope can be replaced by a passive image intensification night-
in
AFVs
emphasises the crucial need for quick response and superior combat skill.
driving sight which
is undetectable and considerably improves the tank's chance of survival on the night
loader, too, has a periscope. The provided with 360 degree vision by nine episcopes, and an additional sight which enables him to override the gunner if necessary. An infra-red battlefield.
commander
The is
white-light searchlight for target illumination to the turret left-hand side but its active
is fitted
emissions are,
I
of course, detectable.
The Chieftain has run to 2 Marks in British Army most numerous are the Mark 3/3 and Mark 5; the latter Mark upped the 3/3's main armament ammunition storage capacity from 53 to 64 1
service, of which the
rounds in addition to other improvements to the engine and gearbox. Marks 9 to 1 2 are all IFCS-fitted versions. The Chieftain Mark 5 provided the basis for the ARV (armoured recovery vehicle) equipped with double capstan winches and dozer blade, and the A VLB (armoured vehicle launched bridge) provides the means of transportation for two types of tank bridge, which can span any gap between 12 and 22m (13 to 24yds).
Below: The low profile of a Chieftain
MBT emerges
stealthily
from the woods
while on exercise with the British Army of the Rhine.
r
-J&
V
jim
^ •*«*&&
Smashing the terror!
The defeat of the Malayan insurgents At the end of 1949 the situation in Malaya was grim. Although the government had responded to the communist insurgency with firmness, the Malayan Races Liberation
Army (MRLA)
and was capable of striking
still
retained the initiative
at will. In
these circumst-
ances the High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney
recognised the need for a
new departure. Determined
himself to confronting the communist challenge by working to develop social and economic policies to win over the people to the support of to dedicate
government, he asked for and got a Director of Operations whose job it would be to coordinate the activities of the government and security forces in the prosecution of the campaign against the
MRLA in the
jungle.
So it was that in April 1 950 Lieutenant-General
Sir
Harold Briggs came to Malaya. He had only just retired from the army and gone to live in Cyprus, but he was persuaded to take on the job of Director of Operations by his old friend and wartime commander
Hovering a few feet above ground unsuitable for a landing, a Westland-built Sikorsky S-55 ('Westland Whirlwind') disgorges an SAS unit, armed with US M1 Carbines, during jungle clearing operations in
Malaya
in
1953.
329
.
MALAYA
1951-60
who was now Chief
Field-Marshal Sir William Slim, of the Imperial General Staff. Briggs faced a difficult task.
He was responsible for armed services and the police and yet he did not have direct authority over them. It was his job to guide them and win them over to his ideas
the activities of the
and policies As a senior general albeit retired he had little difficulty in imposing his will on the army, even though the general officer commanding in Malaya retained right of access to the commander-in-chief in Singapore His authority with regard to the police, on the other hand was even more uncertain but in the end the lightness of his thinking and his obvious abilities won him support from that direction as well. As a matter of principle he never wore uniform while in Malaya and remained the model of an unbiased coordinator of the various elements of the security forces. He agreed to go to Malaya for at least a year and not more than 18 months; in the event he left in December 1 95 1 and died soon after going into retirement for a second time ,
.
,
.
,
On
arrival in
Malaya Briggs
on a lightning tour to get the
travelled the country
'feel'
.
i r
T
.^.y
Plan.
An
increase
in
army
strength
coincided with
Briggs' arrival in Malaya, and one of his
was
sions
He
thought that by applying really heavy securityon one comparatively small area the communist organisation there might be destroyed and allow him progressively to apply similar pressure in successive areas. The plan did not, however, work, for a variety of reasons, and Briggs took the decision force pressure
few months
go back
former policy of spreading out his forces evenly throughout Malaya. Now that the quick, easy solution had failed the Director of Operations concentrated his energies on bringing into effect a whole series of measures invol vafter a
to
to the
Below: The density of the Malayan jungle very often inhibited the success of anti-terrorist operations by infantry units.
Reconnaissance planes little help as the jungle canopy obscured the observer's view. Thus was often the case that an
offered
artillery unit
be occupied by terrorists. These troops are using a 25-pounder gun-howitzer.
* d >
L
*r ^^B 4mr v^^H^^H »
.
.
.M»;sr~
(such as the
areas of jungle believed to
/#**
•
it
one below) would saturate
r
..^^^J
i
330
deci-
force of troops in the southern states of the peninsula.
a*r *
i
•v
first
to use this 'bonus' to concentrate a large
"
>
<.""•
3BL
V%
of the situation.
Then, within two weeks, he set out his first impressions and suggestions in a document prepared for the High Commissioner. This statement highlighted virtually every point of weakness in the government's position and suggested lines of action to remedy the situation. Gradually these remedies were put into effect and together came to be known as the Briggs
MALAYA 1951-60 Aterrorist
is
photographed for prison records.
organisation to identify them in spite of their own security system
of cells and aliases. Apart from a mass of information from the general public assisted by a reward system (cash on the nail and
two main sources of intelligence are documents and surrendered or captured enemy
identity concealed), the
captured personnel.
There is, however, always a danger that the intelligence effort can become too widespread and diffuse. The third priority therefore is to select a particular intelligence target which will be the most rewarding. This target must be those individuals who provide the link between the underground supply organisation within the population and the guerrilla units outside. If an identity card system exists and if there are carefully imposed government control measures on the movement of people and supplies the link men will at some time break or attempt to evade these measures, thereby revealing their identity. By picking them up, leads will be obtained into the underground organisation as well as the guerrilla units. The techniques for establishing ,
agents are naturally sensitive, but one story will suffice.
Towards
end of the Emergency, with central Malaya completely cleared, the remaining guerrilla units in the north were seeking the sanctuary of the Thai border. Hor Lung, the communist political commissar in Johore, realised that his forces could not reach this area and were doomed. One day he decided to surrender at a remote police station. The sergeant had the good sense to ring the Head of Special Branch in Johore direct, and Hor Lung with his two bodyguards was quietly whisked away. The surrender could have been announced and much propaganda value obtained from it but it was decided, with Hor Lung's agreement, that he should be put back into the jungle with a good cover story and that he should go round all his units telling them to surrender. There was, however, the risk that Hor Lung might be shot by the security forces now operating with some success in the area. They were therefore ordered to cease operations. It was then realised that this might cause suspicion. The troops were therefore ordered to start operations again but were carefully fed intelligence to keep them out of the vital areas the
Intelligence gathering
Good intelligence was the key to the British and Malayan success The
was to build up a single based on the Police Special Branch. A police force is a static organisation with long experience of close contact with the local population and the 'undesirables' within it. The army does not have that experience and its units are, moreover, liable to constant redeployment. Any intelligence lines these units might have established are then uprooted. If there is a single Special Branch organisation the army intelligence branch can hook into it at any point to their mutual advantage. Good intelligence leads to more frequent and rapid contact rates by the army, and more contacts lead to more kills. These lead to greater confidence in the population, resultduring the Emergency.
first
priority
efficient intelligence organisation
ing in better intelligence.
The second priority is to identify the threat to the security of the country The threat arises entirely from the actions and intentions .
of individual
men and women, and
it
time.
at the right
The result was that all the guerrilla units, except
must be the aim of the
Sir
ing both civil government and the security forces. These measures were likely to bear fruit only in the long term and the Briggs Plan in its final form comprised all these new ideas which remained in force to the end of the Emergency in July 1960. Of crucial importance was the decision to define much more clearly the roles of the police and army. Until 1950 both had operated with disregard for the other's activities. Their efforts were scarcely ever coordinated and frequently led to unproductive competition. In future they
would work
few months. Robert Thompson
for a handful of individuals, surrendered within a
together.
The
on routine 'speculative' patrolling hoping
to discover
the guerrillas.
To
ensure that this
new
division of responsibility
and mutual cooperation worked, Briggs ordered that military and police commanders at all levels should share the same offices and work in the same operations room. Once fully implemented this scheme
worked exceptionally well and, incidentally, served as a model for combined police/military cooperation in
many other areas of the world thereafter. To coordinate further the efforts of all aspects
of
would be responsible for maintaining law and order in the towns and villages, wherever the population lived. This would lead to a greater feeling of security among the people which in turn would result
government
an increase in information supplied to the police about the A. The army, Briggs insisted, should leave the gathering of intelligence to the police and concentrate on the
wing, the MRL A. At the national level a Federal War Council (FWC) was created. It comprised the Director of Operations, the Chief Secretary of the government, the General Officer Commanding, the Air Officer Commanding, the Commissioner of Police and the Malayan Defence Secretary. The job of the FWC was to originate policy and provide the necessary resources for its implementation. At the next level down there were to be State or Settlement War
police
in
MRL
MRL A units and bringing With the police providing more and 'hard' intelligence the army would be increasingly able to go out into the jungle on specific
business of seeking out the
them more
to battle.
operations in clearly defined areas rather than relying
in the fight against terrorism the
Director
of Operations introduced a series of government
committees whose task
war against
the
it
was, as he put it, to wage Party and its military
Communist
331
MALAYA
1951-60
New village strategy The Briggs Plan involved the systematic resettlement of some 500,000 squatters into new villages to deny the Malayan communist guerrillas the essential flow of incoming recruits and supplies and thus
them
starve
into
new village was
submission. Each
carefully planned in advance
by qualified surveyors to accommodate dwellings, communications and social amenities and the squatters with all their possessions were methodically transported to the
ualaTrengannu
new
site in military vehicles, with police protection. Incoming families received building materials and $100 in cash and were given the title to their new property. On site building instructions were provided and checks made on the whereabouts and numbers
new intake. Many of the inconveniences of former jungle life were ironed out by the provision of schools, shops and a clinic close at hand. The villages were surrounded by a 7-foot barbed of the
their
wire fence and protected by a police post and locally recruited
Home
Guards. Curfews
were imposed
outside the village at night, and even within the
compound when Strict
security
food controls were
was
later
ate the supply of food from
particularly at risk.
introduced to elimin-
MRLA sympathisers
in
the villages to insurgents outside. To a large extent
was not memberof the MRLA to surrender, gun
these measures were successful and unusual fora in
hand,
starving.
$100
in
Many
of the villages are
his
it
Johore\
pocket but on the verge of
now
prosperous
SINGAPC
towns.
Executive Committees (SWEC):
at this
Federation of Malaya comprised
States and Settle-
1 1
ments. Each State and Settlement was into administrative districts District
War
time the
in turn
divided
and these would have
Executive Committees
(DWEC) com-
(DO), the Officer Commanding the Police District (OCPD) and the Commanding Officer (CO) of the battalion operating in the
prising the District Officer
area.
This lower level was vitally important as the
DO,
OCPD and CO were the men on the ground closest to both the people of Malaya and their enemies. There were occasionally clashes and frequently resentment
between
police and military officers at district
civil,
when
new system was first introduced but, over the months and years that followed, close cooperation developed with the three men living virtually in each other's pockets and confident of each other's level
the
specialised contribution to the overall task.
Another facet of the new plan directly concerned the
way
MRLA.
the
army
carried out operations against the
Until Briggs arrived
on the scene there had been a tendency to deploy large numbers of troops on single operations. These frequently took the form of cordoning off an area of jungle or remote rubber plantation which was then swept by a second unit. The theory was that, as in organised
men doing the
game
shooting, the
would drive the 'prey' before them onto the line of 'guns' which stood in wait. This might have seemed a good idea, but in practice in Malaya these large-scale exercises were almost always totally unproductive. So dense was the undergrowth in the jungle and so noisy were the large numbers of men involved that the terrorists were 332
'beating'
Right: General Sir Harold
Briggs who took over as Director of Operations
1950.
It
was
in
Briggs'
inspired plans which set up the resettlement villages (one of which is shown above).
MALAYA usually able to
sit
tight
1951-60
without being discovered, or
flee.
Frequently these operations embraced whole battaof troops and even brigades, and Briggs was
lions
* **
quick to sense the waste of manpower resources they involved. The decision was therefore taken to institute
much
± x .*^*iw^*
smaller-scale operations. Within a batta-
of operations companies would frequently be based many miles from battalion HQ, located in a small town or village next door to the local police station. From these bases platoons and even sections lion's area
of 12 to 15
men would be sent out on jungle patrols of
anything up to five days duration in search of the insurgents.
Bearing
in
mind
that
until
1952 the
\
MRLA tended to be banded together in groups of up to 100,
it
may be
thought that patrols of only section or would run considerable risks. This
platoon strength
was not the case, however. Normally, at the moment of contact in the jungle between an army patrol and a bandit group, neither side, because of the severely limited visibility, had any idea of the size of the enemy force opposing them. Rather than risk being overwhelmed by a superior army patrol the bandits would usually run for it and preserve themselves and their weapons. Small patrols were thus adequate under normal circumstances and patrol commanders were able, by methodical and silent movement, to find the enemy and catch them unawares. Nearly all successful actions in Malaya were the result of expert patrolling which located the enemy undetected and caught him by surprise. Perhaps the key element of the Briggs Plan concerned the resettlement of 'squatter' groups. Before World War II the Chinese in Malaya were not easily able to buy land. Many found that the only way they could farm was to move away from the more developed parts of the country right up to the jungle edge and there carve out from the jungle itself a smallholding on which to live and work. Remote from district centres, almost totally isolated, they were larselv left to their
own devices
S
J*' %
'IF
i
/*/**
»*+ 2
'«*
ygv*
Pi f
Deep-penetration operations in Malaya during the Emergency (below) were virtually the only effective method for cornering insurgent units.
During the Japanese occupation, many more Chinese fled from the towns to join those who had gone before the war and so when the Emergency was
Those terrorists that were
government, these people lived at subsistence level on the jungle fringes where they were an easy prey to the MRLA. Many of the squatters were sympathetic to the Communist Party's aims and many more were, by the use of strong-arm methods, forced to toe the
captured (above) faced the death penalty.
,
numbered someAlmost totally out of reach of
declared, the squatter population thing close to 500,000.
MRLA line.
The Min Yuen (People's Organisation) was based on the squatters. At its peak the Min Yuen numbered many thousands who were uniquely placed to carry out their allotted tasks: to gather intelligence
for the MRLA; to provide food and medical supplies; and to provide new recruits for the uniformed MRLA Their crucial role had to be neutralised and so the government took the decision to move all the squatter communities away from areas where they could make
MRLA. Earlier in the Emergency some isolated villages of great notoriety had been moved, but this was now greatly expanded. The contact with the
decision created
much
dissension within the govern-
ment and used up enormous resources in money and manpower, but it was accomplished and it marked the beginning of the end for the communist organisation, cut off as they then became from essential supplies of information, food and medicine. The Briggs Plan could only work in the long term, however; and at its inception, the insurgents were still a real threat. Indeed, the year 1951 marked the lowest point in the fortunes of the government and the security forces during the Emergency in Malaya. It culminated in the assassination of High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney in October and the departure of Sir Harold Briggs, the Director of Operations,
December in extreme
ill
in
health.
Luckily the government
in
Westminster
fully rec-
333
MALAYA 1951-60 Irregular forces
One
principle of the
Malayan gov-
ernment was that operations should be carried out by normal disciplined
army
and
police
more populated areas. This was not successful, however, partly because tribal customs tended to break down and many
the
units
properly
trained in the counter-insurgency
and it should be remembered most British battalions at this time were composed of national role;
that
succumbed to 'civilised' diseases to which they had no immunity. As soon as practicable it was decided to return them to their tribal areas and to protect them there by the establishment of jungle forts
STOL
at
points
servicemen. There were, however, three small
where a
groups of irregular forces. The first were the Sarawak Rangers, composed of Ibans from Sarawak recruited as jungle trackers. They did not operate themselves as a unit but
Clinics and schools were built and
were attached to army battalions companies and platoons
(short take-off
and
landing) aircraft strip could be built. trading posts set up for the sale of
jungle produce and the purchase of basic necessities.
This policy coincided with the
to
retreat of the guerrilla units back into
in
the jungle, but
base camps in remote areas. They were adept at following a trail, at assessing numbers and at judging how far ahead the enemy unit was.
now in small and demoralised groups of 1 or 20 quite incapable of attacking a jungle fort. Under the leadership of Richard Noone, the government's adviser on aborigines, the Senoi Pra'ak was formed and eventually numbered
Their jungle lore was invaluable to the units with which they served and
300 armed men. They were organised
helped to speed up contacts and reduce casualties. There were also small squads of
or platoons in each tribal area and
assist
following guerrilla units into the jungle and in finding their concealed
their skills
(SEP).
It
was
SEP, possibly felt
enemy
personnel
(though these
how many
used).
as a result of a deeply
grievance against their previous
leaders, after
were prepared immediately
surrender to guide security
force units straight back to where left their comrades. Some of them then volunteered to form small squads and, wearing their old uniforms, to operate, under a Spe-
they had
cial
Branch and
rubber
where there was
still
some support
contacts with guerrilla units or with
unsuspecting supply parties from the local population in all of which, thanks to surprise, the SEP came It
also caused support for
the real guerrillas to dry up; the
when knew who could be
suppliers stopped operating
they no longer trusted.
The
was composed of abor-
largest irregular force
the Senoi Pra ak '
,
iginal tribesmen
jungles running
from the mountain
down
spine of Malaya. During
of the security forces. cleared their live in
own
They
finally
areas and could
peace once again. Sir Robert Thompson
settled
Iban tracker
employed by the
British.
ognised the seriousness of the crisis and responded by taking the decision to appoint a new High Commissioner who would also be Director of Operations. They realised that what was needed was a firm hand at the top controlling
all
aspects of government and
above all, restoring the morale of government and security force officers who were floundering without a lead. The man chosen for the job was General (later Field-Marshal) Sir Gerald Templer. Acknowledged within the army as a tough and resourceful leader, he was little known to the general public when he arrived in Malaya in February 1952; but within two years he had established himself as one of the most able internal security policy and,
government sent him out with a direccommunist insurgency and guide Malaya along the road to full independence, and he put all his ruthlessness, energy and enthusiasm into both tasks. By the time he left Malaya in June 1954 both goals were well on the way to being achieved. Templer will be remembered, not so much for introducing new initiatives as for the dynamic leadership with which he inspired Malaya. He recognised
The
aborigines were compelled to supply food and were exploited as por-
Many of them
An
colonial administrators in British history.
the control of the guerrillas.
334
,
World War
and the early stages of the Emergency these areas were under
and were
last
few years of the Emergency this irregular force mainly by ambushes on jungle trails, accounted for more guerrillas than the whole of the rest
the central
II
ters.
operated with, the SAS. In the
plantations
for the guerrillas. This often led to
off best.
were undoubtedly trained by, and
Some were
officer similarly dis-
guised, in their former areas close to villages
were armed with rifles and shotguns rather than the traditional blowpipes
surprising
surrendered
in sections
fled as refugees
on the outskirts of
The
British
tive to defeat the
MALAYA
and strove to hasten its implementation by dint of persuasion, argument,
the efficacy of the Briggs Plan
threats and. occasionally, brute force.
Because of his background he value of intelligence and he
set great store on the worked diligently to build
up the efficiency of the Police Special Branch. In his 2'/2
years as High Commissioner the collecting,
and interpreting of information about the communist terrorist organisation developed into a finely tuned and responsive system which led to increasing success on the part of the security forces as the Emergency progressed. He also believed wholeheartedly in using psychology, both to win over the Malayan people to the government s side and to lower the morale of the terrorists in the jungle. On both counts his policies soon came to pay dividends. The policies capable of achieving victory in the Emergency may have been devised by General Briggs. but without Templer's fiery determination it is certain they would never have been fully and effectively implemented. When Templer returned to England the communist terrorists were on the run and it remained only necessary to keep up the pressure for final victory to be achieved Major F. A. Godfrey collating
1951-60
Above: One of the most important technological of the modern era has been the helicopter. Troops can now be dropped into an area and rapidly deployed,
developments
where previously the limitations of aircraft had denied armies thisfacility. Here, troops board
helicopters
in
pursuit of
guerrillas hiding in the
jungle.
'
.
Right: General Sir Gerald Templer, whose dynamic
and
realistic policies
soon
put renewed vigour into the counter-insurgency
programme.
335
.
The British
BOMB How the United Kingdom
.
At 1530 hours on 1 1 October 1956 a Vickers Valiant of No 49 Squadron, RAF Bomber Command, flew over desolate terrain around Maralinga, 480km (300 miles) west of Adelaide in Australia, and dropped a single atomic bomb. As the bomb detonated with a blinding flash, few people in Britain were aware that their country had entered a new phase in its history.
After
all,
tested in
the
British atomic device
first
October 1952
had been
Monte Bello Islands off
at the
the northwest coast of Australia, and the Maralinga
bomb seemed to be just one
in a series
of test detona-
which was to include the far more dramatic thermonuclear (H-bomb) weapon, scheduled for extions
plosion near Christmas Island in the central Pacific sometime in 1957.
What was significant about 11 October 1956, however, was that for the first time an atomic bomb had been dropped from a British jet bomber capable of intercontinental range. After 10 years of research,
shown that she possessed both the weapon and the delivery means to gain undisputed entry into the 'nuclear club' an exclusive establishment hitherto restricted to the United States and the Soviet Union Moreover, she had achieved this distinction on her Britain had
became an atomic power
,
own. The history of British interest in atomic weapons goes back to the early months of World War II, when two refugee German scientists, Peierls and Frisch, working at Birmingham University, published a memorandum which pointed confidently to the production of a 'uranium bomb' based upon the theories of nuclear fission propounded by Otto Hahn in 1938. British officials expressed interest and in April 1940 the so-called Maud Committee, chaired by Sir George Thomson, was set up to investigate 'the producing atomic bombs during the
possibilities of
war'.
The Committee submitted two
June and July
1
94 1 and ,
reports, dated
their overall conclusion
was
optimistic, predicting the eventual manufacture of
equivalent as regards uranium bomb 1 800 tons of TNT' Despite warnings that the necessary research would be time-consuming and costly, diverting scientific and financial resources away from projects of more immediate concern to Britain's wartime security, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, fearful that Nazi scientists were already following a similar path, gave his approval. A research programme, codenamed Tube Alloys, began immediately. 'an effective
.
.
.
destructive effect to
This programme did not last long in its original form, for as soon as the initial findings were relayed to the Americans they set in motion a much bigger and more promising enterprise. At first the British undoubtedly led the way, but after America entered the war in December 1941, her enormous funds and
almost
unlimited
scientific
facilities
effectively
swamped Tube
Alloys. In August 1942 the United States set up the mammoth Manhattan Project and British atomic scientists began to be moved across the Atlantic.
Thus
it
was
in
America
that the real
wartime
research took place, culminating on 16 July 1945 at Alamogordo in the New Mexico desert, when the first
atomic device was successfully tested. British scienwere deeply involved in nearly all aspects of the project, but collaboration at government level was never straightforward. Some Americans began to resent a free flow of information to a partner who was not sharing costs on an equal basis, and it was only tists
336
BRITAIN'S
ATOM BOMB
after private meetings between Churchill and PresidentF.D. Roosevelt -first in August 1943andthenin September 1944 - that a working arrangement was
hammered out. The fact that the eventual decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 was taken by President Harry Truman without such discussions should have warned London that all was not well But Churchill was no longer in office by that time and Truman, having assumed the presidency .
unexpectedly on the death of Roosevelt the previous April, was not aware of the earlier agreements. Even if he had been, he was coming under mounting pressure from within the United States to ease Britain out of atomic research.
Despite a last-ditch attempt by Clement Attlee, Churchill's successor, to secure continued collaboration British possession of atomic .
weapons was felt to
be unnecessarily provocative to the Soviet Union and certainly detrimental to American efforts to gain international control of atomic research through the
United Nations. The arrest of Alan Nunn May, a atomic physicist, in February 1946 and his subsequent trial on charges of spying for the RusBritish
was the final straw. On 1 August 1946 the Americans passed an Atomic Energy Act - more commonly known as the McMahon Act after its initiator - which prevented by law any collaboration with other powers on an atomic weapons project. The flow of information to Britain promptly ceased. It is against this background that the British decision to 'go it alone', taken by a Labour Cabinet sub-committee known as GEN 163 on 8 January 1947, must be seen. Atomic capability was the new symbol of power and prestige in the postwar world and once the Americans had closed the door to continued collaboration Britain had no choice but to initiate her own development programme if she was to retain 'Great Power" status. To have foresworn atomic weapons at this stage would have been to admit sians,
United States and. given time to the Soviet Union or any other state which decided to join the 'nuclear club'. No British politician of the late 1940s, basking in the glory of global victor)' against the Axis menace and mindful of his country's traditional pre-eminence in world politics and trade could afford to let that happen. Nor was this the only consideration, for if Britain was to allow the United States to monopolise the atomic bomb there was no firm guarantee that it would inferiority to the
,
,
Far left: Shockwaves and a tower of smoke, topped by a
mushroom cloud,
heralded Britain's entry into the world of atomic warfare when a land-detonation took place atthe Monte Bello Islands off the coast of northwest Australia in October 1952.
The
pattern in the sky was
made by rockets, in order to form a grid against
which the size of the fireball and mushroom cloud could be measured.
be used to safeguard British interests in a future war. In the period before Nato, America's commitment to European defence was questionable and her attitude towards imperialism ambivalent. If Britain was threatened in either area it was quite conceivable that America would not regard it as worthy of atomic response. In short, if Britain wanted atomic protection, to say nothing of the associated advantages of status and cheap energy, she had to provide it herself. Many of these arguments were apparent even before the passing of the McMahon Act and there is no doubt that the Labour government prepared the way for an independent British atomic programme well before the decision of 8 January 1947. As early as October 1945 Attlee set up an Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell in Oxfordshire, tasked to 'undertake a national research
Below: Dr William Penney and Rear Admiral A. Torlesse observe the 1952 explosion from the flagship of the expedition, HMS
Campania. Above: In 1958, an H-bomb explosion over Christmas Island demonstrated the effectiveness of an airburst detonation 0.6 to 1 5.2km (2000 to 15,000 feet) above tne ground.
and components
programme
be used in the production of fissile material'. One of the results of this was the establishment, in 1946, of a reactor programme, based at Risley in Lancashire, which was directed to produce a critical mass of refined plutonium, ostensibly for industrial purposes. Also in into the processes
to
946 an Atomic Energy Act was passed, to centralise and coordinate, under government control, all aspects of research. This meant that when the GEN 163 decision was made, there already existed an administrative framework, a research establishment 1
and
at least a potential for
making But actual
the production of
bomb-
material.
this
does not mean that the manufacture of an
bomb was
straightforward, for the practical
problems to be overcome were immense. Although a number of British scientists had returned from America with detailed knowledge about key aspects of the Manhattan Project, they had been excluded from research into ballistics: in other words, they knew how to create an atomic explosion but still
lacked the ability to contain the process within a ballistic shell suitable for testing or
development
into
bomb which
could be delivered to a chosen target. Thus when Dr William Penney, arguably Britain's most brilliant atomic scientist, was appointed in May 1947 to lead the research programme, he and his team of 34 physicists and engineers at Fort Halstead in Kent had to start virtually from scratch to produce such essential items as fuses and detonators. They were given five years - the time it would take for the Risley team to produce a critical mass of plutonium - to complete their task. The fact that this schedule was adhered to is a credit not just to Penney and his team but also to the host of a
337
.
other scientists and experts drawn into the programme
walks of British industry and research. The was a 'gadget' based upon the Nagasaki model of two sub-critical plutonium masses which would be compressed together by conventional high explosive
from
all
result
,
'gun barrel' to produce an atomic chain reaction, which was ready for testing by May 1952. It was Plym, loaded aboard an old Royal Navy frigate, in a
HMS
and transported to the Monte Bello Islands under the codename Hurricane On 3 October it was successful.
Above: Successfully tested on18May1951,theVickers Valiant was the first British
bomberto satisfy the requirements for an atomic-strike aircraft.
Penney an immediate and welldeserved knighthood and giving notice to the world that, despite the McMahon Act, Britain was determined and able to stay in the atomic race. It was a remarkable achievement. But this was only a 'gadget', lacking the ballistic characteristics of a bomb or the capabilities of a viable weapon It was to take another four years of sustained research to produce Blue Danube, which weighed-in at 22,000kg (10,0001b), most of which comprised the conventional high explosive needed to initiate the atomic reaction; it was capable of producing an explosion equivalent to 20,000 tonnes of TNT. By that time British scientists had progressed to the next stage of nuclear research and produced a thermonuclear or hydrogen device of theoretically limitless explosive potential, but it was Blue Danube which took its place in 1956 as Britain's first operational atomic bomb. No bomb can be effective, however, unless it can be delivered to its target so while Penney and his team were pursuing their research, equal efforts were being made to perfect an intercontinental delivery platform Given the state of technology at the end of World War ly detonated, earning
The
British 'V-Forc
Victor
BMkl
length 35.03m (114ft llin) span 33.53m (110ft) powerpla nt 4 Armstrong Siddeley Saphire 202/207 engines
maxspeed
mach0.9at12,192m (40,000ft)
combat range
4023km (2500 miles) ceiling16,765m (55,OOOft) armament nuclear stores or 35 454kg (10001b) conventional bombs crew 5
length 29.59m (97ft 1in) span 30.18m (99ft) powerplant 4 Bristol
Olympus101,102or104 engines max speed mach 0.86 at 12,192m (40,000ft) combat range 4828km (3000 miles) ceiling
.
,
II,
there
were two
16,765m (55,000ft)
armament nuclear stores
ficant
454kg (10001b) conventional bombs crew 5
or 21
- the ballistic missile - and both posed signi-
possibilities
or the jet-powered aircraft
problems for the
British.
was concerned, German
So
far as the missile
had shown its by developing the V2, over 4000 of which were fired against Allied targets in the closing months scientists
potential
of the war, but
when
British experts tested captured
examples in late 1 945 it was soon discovered that they lacked the range, pay load and accuracy needed for atomic delivery. The problems were not insurmountlength 32.99m (108ft 3in) span 34.85m (114ft 4in) powerplant 4 RollsRoyce Avon 201/204/205 engines maxspeed mach 0.82at12,192m (40,000ft) combat range 5550km (3450 miles) ceiling 14,935m (49,000ft) armament nuclear stores or 21 454kg (10001b) conventional bombs crew 5
338
Nevertheless once the GEN 1 63 decision had been made, the government had little choice but to authorise the development of a delivery means and, on balance, the jet aircraft seemed the logical answer. In ,
January 1947, therefore, Air Ministry Specification B. 35/46 was issued, calling for the production of a four-engined jet bomber capable of carrying a 22,000kg (10,0001b) bombload over a range of 5400km (3350 miles) at a cruising altitude of
13,700m (45,000 feet). Six aircraft firms submitted tenders and, in an unprecedented move, two of these - from Avro and Handley Page - were selected for simultaneous development, chiefly because so many new features were being offered that to have depended upon just one might have been to court disaster. As it was, neither could be expected to fly for at least five years
or to enter squadron service for a further five so a third ,
design had to be ordered as an interim measure. In August 1947 Specification B. 14/46 was issued to Above: The second arm of
new V-bomber was the delta-winged
Britain's
force
Vulcan which
first
August 1952.
It
is
flew
in
pictured
here with a 'Blue Steel' stand-off
bomb about to be
loaded.
Below: The Vulcan was shortly followed into
service by the crescent-
wingedJHandley Page Victor which completed a successful test flight in
December three types
1952.
were
By 1958 all in
front-line service.
would require a degree of scientific and financial commitment which Britain could not afford. The manned bomber seemed to be far more promisable, but
it had already provided a perfectly adequate platform for both the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. Moreover, the RAF was well-placed to take on such a delivery means, having amassed an enormous wealth of strategic bombing experience during World War II. But British airmen could achieve little with existing equipment. Despite the pioneering work of Sir Frank Whittle in jet-engine research, the RAF possessed no jet bombers in 1945, having to make do with piston-engined machines such as the Lancaster and its immediate successor the Lincoln, neither of which enjoyed the range for
ing, particularly as
intercontinental warfare.
A
specification for a twin-
engined jet design had been issued as early as 944, it was true, but this aircraft - to be known as the Canberra - would not be ready to enter squadron service until at least 1951 and, even then, would lack both range and pay load in an atomic context. Clearly, a whole new generation of purpose-built heavy bombers, incorporating the latest in aerodynamic and engine research, would have to be developed to coincide with the process of producing an atomic bomb. In the postwar atmosphere of economic restraint, characterised in defence matters by the imposition of a Ten Year Rule in 1947 which restricted the issue of new equipment to all three Services during a succeeding decade in which no major war was foreseen such a costly programme was sure to be unpopular. Because of the enormous technological problems 1
,
involved,
it
was also
likely to take time.
Short Brothers to produce, as quickly as possible, a four-engined jet bomber to replace the Lincoln.
Meanwhile, piston-engined aircraft would have to suffice -the Lincolns were joined in 1950 by 70B-29s (known to the RAF as Washingtons) on loan from the United States - although in the absence of a viable atomic bomb the problem was not severe.
The Short design, known
as the Sperrin,
was
produced - the prototype flew on 10 August 1951 but was never satisfactory This was apparent as early as April 1948 when yet another interim design, that submitted by Vickers in response to the original Spec B 35/46, was chosen for development on an accelerated time-scale. It proved to be a wise move, for the prototype Valiant, first flown on 18 May 1951, offered to satisfy the requirements for an atomic.
.
strike aircraft.
The government, temporarily free from financial Korean War rearmament programme, ordered full production and, rather belatedly cancelled the Sperrin. The first Valiants entered RAF constraint through the
service in
1
955
,
in
time for the Maralinga and Christ-
mas Island tests. The more sophisticated Avro design - the delta- wing Vulcan - first fie w in August 95 2 to 1
,
be followed before the end of the year by the crescentwinged Handley Page Victor. By 1958 all three types
were
in front-line service, giving
Bomber Command
the capability of delivering atomic or conventional
bombs anywhere
in the
world. The so-called 'V-
Force' produced by British efforts alone, eventually deployed 180 aircraft (including tankers and reconnaissance machines) and acted as Britain's indepen.
dent nuclear deterrent until the Polaris submarines assumed the role in 1 969 John Pimlott
339
Modern snipers and their weapons The sniper has been called the big-game hunter of the battlefield', and with good reason. For most soldiers '
battle is
an impersonal
affair, 'us' against
'them' but
for the sniper it is a one-to-one confrontation
forward alone, employing
all
,
.
He goes
the skills of a stalker to
simply lying
The
still
British
until
darkness comes.
Army's
official
recommendation on
the qualities to be sought in training a sniper during
World War
II
required that he be 'of above average
intelligence, strong
and
tireless,
have the makings of
get close to his chosen target or to select a concealed
a very good shot, have a liking for being alone and
which he can observe and pick out a to remain in place for hours, in any kind of weather, without making a movement which could betray him, before he is able to fire one shot. And after that he has to evade discovery, either by making his escape along some covered route or by
should, for preference, be a countryman'.
position from target.
He may have
The
viso that he should 'have the makings of a very shot'
may come
as a surprise to those
who
pro-
good
think the
first and foremost, be a supematurally good shot, but in fact any better-than-average shot is a
sniper must,
potential sniper.
Above: A soldier of the Israeli Defence Force selects his target using the Galil
7.62mm
semi-automatic sniper rifle which guarantees to hit a man at ranges of up to
900m
(985 yards).
Below:
A Parker-Hale
7.62mm
sniping
rifle
which
uses standard Nato rounds. Slightly heavier than the modern assault rifle, its makers claim a 99 per cent h it rate at 400m (437 yards).
Below:
A Yugoslavian
sniper rifle. Based on the Kalashnikov,this
semi-automatic M76 rifle uses the7. 92mm Mauser cartridge for greater
accuracy.
SNIPING
Heckler & Koch PSG-1 High-precision marksman's
7.62mm length 208mm (47.56in) length of 650mm (25.6in) weight (including 20 round
calibre barrel
rifle
1
magazine) 8.225kg (18.131b) operation recoil-operated roller-locked bolt system feed 5 or 20 round magazine mode of fire single shot bore profile polygonal rifling 4 groove, righthand twist sighting system telescopic sight6x42, rearsight No. 6 with reticule illumination. 6 sight settings 100-600m (annotated 1-6) trigger let-off point trigger with approx. 1.5kg (3.3lb) trigger pressure
luxury
allowed British
rail
to
mount precision tripod and a sling;
variable
width trigger provided by vertically adjustable trigger
shoe
was regarded as something of a peacetime and most of the world's armies
move Sooner or later somebody forgets and is killed, and the strain becomes even worse. The sniper,
down. The
moreover, does not waste his time and skill on worthless targets; he is a trained observer, skilled at determining who is a vital target. The sniper's second function, particularly today when the average infantry rifle is an assault rifle of limited range is to extend the influence of the forward infantry deeper into the enemy area. Once an enemy is 300-400m (330-435 yards) away from the front line he begins to feel safe since it is highly unlikely that he can be hit by normal rifle fire. But the sniper uses a weapon of greater power and reach, and therefore he gets closer to the enemy and is capable of making shots at much longer ranges. As a result, even troops in relatively rearward areas cannot feel entirely safe. The word 'sniping' has picked up some unfortunate connotations in recent years. Today anyone who conceals himself to shoot is liable to be called a sniper, even though he may have none of a sniper' s attributes News stories frequently tell of mentally deranged people who take to some roof-top with a rifle and begin shooting at all and sundry, and they are inevitably called snipers. Any terrorist or urban guerrilla
After 1945 sniping in
other features special system for silent and positive bolt closing action; adjustable length shoulder stock, vertically adjustable cheek-piece plus butt with angular adjustment to firer's shoulder; handguardwithT-way
their strength of snipers to run
Army was among
the
first
to realise that this
was a mistake, since the frequent brushes with guerrillas and nationalist fighters during the retreat from Empire soon showed
that the sniper
was
essential.
A
example, was road and warn the white across the tape simply to lay a would across it be shot rioting crowd that the first man sniper and skilled and to make good on this, a first-class shot had to be available. The Korean War brought sniping back into favour; the US Army and US Marines employed snipers in some numbers and the North Korean and Chinese forces used them to pick off UN troops. In all the major conflicts since then snipers have been employed - in particular the Americans found that sniping was a major occupation on both sides in Vietnam. standard riot-control technique, for
The function of
the military sniper
is
twofold.
he puts the enemy under considerable psychological strain. Living in an area known tobe dominated by a sniper means thinking carefully before every
Firstly
Heckler & Koch
.
,
Above and top: These pictures illustrate the adjustable butt plate and the adjustable cheek rest which are characteristic of
the modern sniper's rifle; these features allow the sniperto personalise his
weapon.
,
G3SG/1
is a variant of the famous H&K G3 7.62mm assault rifle modified to accommodate the
The G3SG/1
high-precision requirements of the sniper.
G3SG/1
The
provided with a 1. 5 to 6x telescopic sight adjustable for ranges from 100-600m (1093-6560yds). Asettrigger (right), developed specifically forthe sniper rifle, has been introduced and can be adjusted is
fortrigger pull of
between
0.9
and
1
.5kg (2
and
3.3lb), a
considerable reduction on the standard G3's 2.6kg (5.7lb). Other modifications include a cheek plate on the stock and a folding bipod. The G3SG/1 is currently in service with West German police forces.
341
.
SNIPING
who adopts a lone becomes
a sniper.
stance and fires at the forces of law
One
such, interviewed on
Amer-
ican television in the 1960s, confessed that he shot
only
at police,
'Not
at
firemen and National Guardsmen. the interviewer. 'No,
Army?' asked
the
never,' replied the sniper.
'Why
not?' he
was asked.
'They shoot back,' he replied. Today's military sniper is a highly trained specialist provided with some of the most sophisticated equipment available. His rifle will not be the standard infantry weapon In years gone by it was customary to select the best standard rifles at the time of their factory testing, put them to one side, fit them with telescopic sights, and issue them as sniping weapons. Today the standard rifle is a semi-automatic weapon designed for ease of production and robustness in .
service;
its
accuracy
soldier but rarely
more armies
are
is
sufficient for the front line
good enough for a sniper. More and
now
providing their snipers with
carefully manufactured bolt-action rifles with
heavy
barrels, adjustable stocks, adjustable cheekpieces,
adjustable triggers, telescopic sights incorporating
zoom
lenses and rangefinders, image-intensifying or
infra-red sights for night shooting,
and
in
some cases
Above: Technological developments originally designed to aid the sniper in the field, have now come into use with regulararmy
even selected batches of high-accuracy ammunition. The British Army's sniping rifle is a heavy-barrel
units.
weapon based on the action of the old Lee-Enfield and chambered for the 7.62mm Nato cartridge. The West German Army is testing the Heckler & Koch PSG- 1 a
Below: Urban guerrilla warfare has given a new definition to sniping which is far removed from the
semi-automatic of 7.62mm calibre which it is claimed is capable of putting 1 shots into
the regular sniper.
,
heavy-barrel ,
.
an 80mm (3 inch) circle at 300m (330 yards) range. This army currently uses a Mauser SP-66 bolt-action rifle which has a full range of adjustments on its stock that permit
it
to
be carefully
fitted to the individual
marksman. The French Army uses the Fusil a Repetition Modele F 1 another bolt-action design with fully adjustable stock, a bipod and a muzzle brake and flash hider. The Soviet Army uses the Dragunov semiautomatic which is chambered for the 7.62mm Mosin-Nagant cartridge dating from 89 old it may be, but it is still superior in accuracy to its more modern equivalent used in the Kalashnikov rifle. The argument about the relative merits of semiautomatic and bolt-action rifles will doubtless persist ,
f ieldcraft
and proficiency of
1
1
;
many soldiers who will never be convinced that an automatic weapon is as accurate as a bolt-action one. The practical advantage of the automatic weapon is that it ejects and re-loads without the sniper having to make any movement which might easily disclose his position. It is for this reason that left-handed men are rarely chosen as snipers, since most military rifles - and certainly all sniping rifles are designed for right-handed shots, and the armfor years since there are ,
thrashing that
goes on when a left-handed
man a right-handed bolt
operates
would soon give him away.
Similarly smokers are usually barred, as are
men
wearing spectacles and a cough or cold automatically disqualifies a sniper from duty until he is well again. In spite of the dangers and hardships, sniping is a task which most infantry soldiers train for and. to some degree, enjoy. Sniping is productive of stress, and a sniper who is exposed for too long can soon lose his fine edge of skill, so that it is preferable to have several men trained in the work and use them in turn. Sniper training adds skill to the basic soldier and makes him a better member of his company, and this raises the standard throughout the infantry unit. The attraction of being a sniper in war lies in the absence of routine and the feeling of independence which the sniper enjoys Once he goes out on a sniping patrol he is his own master; within broad limits he can go where he wants, and do what he wants His success ,
.
.
and his survival depend entirely upon his own abilities and skills. And in today's battlefield there are men to whom this degree of independence is worth any Ian V. Hogg sort of hardship and risk
342
Key Weapons
The
CHIEFTAIN
343
From Chieftain to Challenger Since
its
introduction into British
Army service in the
1960s the Chieftain has been acknowledged as one of the world's most powerful battle tanks. Heavily armoured and armed with a large and highly accurate 120mm main gun, the Chieftain has been well suited to its role as armoured guardian of Britain's forces in northern Germany. During the 1970s the tank's extensive engine and transmission problems were largely solved, and over a course of 12 Marks a comprehensive series of improvements ensured that the Chieftain would still be able to hold its own well into the next decade. late
While these developments were taking place plans were being drawn up for a successor to the Chieftain. Initially, ideas were put forward for an international ,
come to noown project, the come to fruition,
cooperative venture but this eventually thing and Britain went ahead with
MBT-80. The new
its
project did not
however, for two main reasons: firstly, the cost of the whole undertaking rose dramatically and, secondly, the drawn-out schedule of the MBT-80 programme meant that a new tank would not be ready to take the field by the mid-1980s, the date when it was considered that the Chieftain would be ready for replacement. Dramatic advances in Soviet tank technology which saw the introduction of the T64/T72 series in the 1970s made the need for a speedily updated MBT all
the more imperative. The MBT-80 programme was abandoned
in
in
favour of a faster solution albeit
of a less
at the cost
advanced design. The solution lay itself.
Whereas
the British
Army
in the
1980
Chieftain
Chieftains had
undergone a long series of improvements, they were in the main of a relatively minor nature; but those Chieftains destined for the export market had been radically overhauled and consequently they formed
FV4030/4 Challenger. number of countries in the Middle East had shown considerable interest in the hard-hitting Chief-
the basis for the
A
and orders were placed by Iran, Jordan, Oman and Kuwait. Iran was the largest purchaser: in 1971 orders were placed for (Continued on page 348) tain
''g'WIWPJPM
Previous page:
A modified
Mark V Chieftain on desert with the Iranian Army the mid-1 970s. Above: Although the Challenger with its improved trials in
powerplant and Chobham armourwill eventually replace the Chieftain service with
in
BAOR,
Chieftains such as these of the Queen's Royal Irish Hussars remain the
backbone of the British armoured forces in Germany. Left: A Chieftain of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment ploughs its way through a dust bowl at Fallingbostell in Germany.
\
344
*U«fc
CHIEFTAIN MBT
*
i.
2m»JS&*4
.<-->»*" "WW*;**-.
>«**.
.* The
political
Iran in
upheaval
in
1979sawthe
cancellation of the order forthe Shir 2 (top), a much improved version of the Chieftain (above) utilising
the distinctive Chobham armour but retaining the
combat proven 120mm L1 1 A5 main gun. Left: A prototype of the FA/4030/2 MBT. Fitted with the 1200hp Rolls-Royce diesel, Marconi IFCS and a Barr and Stroud tank laser sight, 278 Khalids went to equipthe Jordanian Army. or Khalid
345
5
.
Tank ammunition carried by a modern battle tank is highly varied, although its main function is to act against armour; the tank is still considered the best anti-tank weapon. There are two broad types of
The ammunition
energy - where a solid projectile is fired against armour as hard and fast as possible - and that using chemical energy, where an explosive charge is detonated directly against the armour. The kinetic energy round needs a very high missile velocity to have any effect against modern armour and so a large, long-barrelled high-velocity gun - such as the Chieftain's 120mm LI 1A5 -is called for. The AP (armour piercing) round itself is made of a very hard material such as tungsten or depleted uranium, capable of smashing its way through hardened steel plate. A number of AP rounds have a small high-explosive charge to increase destructive effect on hitting the target; this round is termed APHE. Despite the hardness of the AP round it tends to shatter on impact. To overcome this problem a penetrative cap is fitted over the nose of the shot ( APC - armour piercing capped) This acts as a cushion on impact and yet allows the shot to penetrate the armour. The APC round has a poor ballistic shape however ( it travels badly through the air), and so an APCBC (armour piercing capped, ballistic cap) round is employed which ensures the ammunition: that
utilising kinetic
,
essential high velocity
on
The most important
hitting the target.
kinetic energy
round
should have a small diameter in order to increase penetrative power. the
the
APDS round.
Chemical energy rounds work on a completely different principle and have an advantage over the kinetic energy round in that, as high velocity is not important, a smaller, lighter gun or projector can be used. The most simple type is HE (high explosive), which achieves its effect by detonating its charge on the side of the target. Although a very uncomfortable experience for tank crews,
HE
is
not particularly
it is mainly used as an anti-personnel weapon, or against soft
effective against sloped or thick armour;
HEAT
targets.
(high explosive anti-tank)
is
more
effective capable of penetrating a considerable thick,
ness of armour and yet needing only a relatively small
HE charge to do so. Able to be launched from a simple smooth-bore projector, its main disadvantage is that its 'lethality' is limited; even if a successful hit is made there is a good chance that the tank can survive. HESH (high explosive squash head) - called HEP (high explosive plastic) by the forces
-
is
American armed
a multi-purpose shell, capable of use
against a variety of other targets as well as armour.
HESH
round must have a low velocity to work when used against fast-moving targets at long range Another weakness is that unlike
The
and so
is
less effective
,
.
the is
its
The solution to this problem lies in
HEAT round,
it
is
useless
when employed against
spaced armour. Tanks using the
latest
Chobham and
APDS (armour piercing discarding sabot). Within the
other similar laminate armours are said to be virtually
breech itself a large bore is important so that a powerful charge can propel the round up the barrel at a high velocity; yet when the round hits the target it
immune from chemical action AT rounds. Thus the simpler AP rounds will be of increased importance in future tank and anti-tank warfare.
M
r.*\ • X
/ •
i
£•••1 1
/•
i
.
'
•
• t
F
r • l
1•\
m
'
"%-4
H—
APHE
1
Nose cap
Ballistic
1
Liner core
2
Liner core
Nose cap
2
High-explosive charge Detonator
3
High-explosive charge Driving band
Liner core
4
3 4 5
346
APC
band Fuse assembly Driving
cap
High-explosive charge
band Base fuse and tracer Driving
TANK AMMUNITION The APDS round consists of a small high-density AP core surrounded by a full-diameter envelope-the sabot. Once
3^
Wf&
the round has left the barrel the sabot disintegrates, leaving the sub-calibre AP core to continue its flight to the target at a very high velocity.
The HEAT round works on the shaped-charge principle:
when the round
hits its target the explodercharge is detonated, setting off the main charge which is 'funnelled' at extremely high velocity against the armour plate. Achieving a pressure of 200 tonnes per square inch, a jet of molten metal particles cuts its way through the armour.
When the HESH round hits the target the explosive charge 'squashed' against the armour plate, and as the charge detonated it sends out a series of shock waves which exceed the strength of the plate. A scab of metal on the inside of the armour breaks off at high velocity, causing damage to equipment and personnel within the tank. is
is
H4*<
HEAT
HE 1
Fuse
1
2
Body
2
3
4
Exploder High-explosive filling
5
Driving
3 4 5 6
band
Nose cap Diaphragm Conical steel liner High-explosivefilling
Explodercharge Igniter and tracer
HESH 1
High-explosivefilling
2 3 4 5
Base percussion fuse Driving band
Body
Tracer
347
,
KEY WEAPONS 750 Mark 3/3(P) and Mark 5/5(P) tanks which were delivered by 1978, to become the spearhead of Iran's armoured formations. The Shah of Iran's modernisation programme for his country was centred on the armed forces, and through its massive oil revenues Iran was able to afford the most advanced weapons from the West. In late 1974 Iran placed a further order worth £500 million for 93 improved Chieftains, 1 25 Shir (Lion) Iran 1 s and 1 225 Shir Iran 2s The Shir Iran 1 was based on the Chieftain but had an uprated power pack and the Shir 2 was an even more advanced model 1
.
that
made use of
the latest
Chobham armour,
a
revolutionary armour type thought to be constructed of layers of aluminium, titanium, ceramics and other unspecified materials.
The delivery of the improved
240 tanks was announced. Known as the Challenger, the first production FV4030/4 emerged in late 1981 and made
was nearing completion when,
in
February 1979,
the overthrow of the Shah's regime led to the ultimate cancellation of the remaining orders. Meanwhile, in 1975, Kuwait had ordered 143 Vickers-built Mark 5/5(K) versions of the Chieftain and in November 1 978 Jordan placed an order for 278 Khalid MBTs. The Khalid was in essence the Shir 1 equipped with a 12-cylinder Rolls-Royce engine, Marconi IFCS and a Pilkington PE Condor day/ passive night sight. Deliveries commenced in mid1981, and in the same year Oman received a small
appearance
public
following
The most important feature of the Challenger is
its
producing 1200bhp
at
2300rpm. This
will give the
tank a far more impressive performance, more in line with its American and German counterparts. In order
power a new Dunlop hydropneumatic suspension system has been fitted independently on each wheel thereby increasing mobility considerably. In line with these improvements, a TN37 transmission with torque converter has been to exploit this increased
,
fitted, as
has a
While the
new Howden cooling system. 120mm L11A5 rifled gun has been
it is probable that it will be replaced by a 'modern technology main armament which will have an improved performance and will utilise a new ammunition system including an APFSDS round. Chobham armour is used, which will make the Challenger virtually safe from most chemical anti-tank weapons such as HEAT and HESH, and consequently will provide the MBT with a new lease of life on the European battlefield. As only 240 Challenger MBTs have been ordered they will, in the first instance, augment rather than
retained,
'
BAOR.
number of ex-British Army Chieftains. The Shir 2 order was utilised by the British Army, being designated the FV4030. A number of pro-
replace the Chieftains in as
more Challengers
totypes were developed and in July 1980 an order for
ly
new MBT is manufactured.
348
the
12-cylinder Rolls-Royce diesel engine, capable of
Chieftains had taken place and the production of Shir 1
its
year.
Inevitably, though,
the Chieftain will be gradually phased out of service are produced, or
when a radical-
Below: A prototype of the new Challenger MBT on
Germany. Based on the Shir 2 and modified to meet British Army trials in
requirements, the first Challenger units are scheduled for formation the mid-1980s. The Challenger incorporates
in
theShir2andKhalid's
1200hpCV12TCAdiesel,a improvement on
radical
the troublesome
Leyland L60 engine fitted to earlier Chieftains. Its
increased power,
Chobham armour protection and NBC fit make the Challenger a formidable opponent on the modern battlefield.
During World
War from the sky
War
II
the advantages of parachuting
became obThe Germans employed paratroops successfully in Norway, the Low Countries, Greece and Crete before a demand for aircraft transports on the troops directly into the scene of battle vious.
Eastern Front caused a reduction in such operations. Despite the fact that the Russians, early leaders in the field, made very little use of paratroops, latecomers Great Britain and America found them extremely effective. This resulted in extensive paratroop operations on D-day, at Arnhem and during the Rhine crossings and the formation of an Allied Airborne
Army in August
1944.
The Allied view
at the
end of the war was
that
paratroops did have a role to play in limited exploita-
was muted Much of the problem lay in timing their commitment to battle For example, despite the planning of 20 operations after D-day, apart from the Rhine crossings only one, Operation Market-Garden at Arnhem, was executed. Sir John Slessor, former commander-in-chief of RAF forces in the Middle East, wrote in 1948: T believe it to be no exaggeration to say that, compared to that cost [of the Allied Airborne Army], the much publicised 500 million spent on the atomic bomb would not tion but enthusiasm for them ,
Paratroopers on the
modern
battlefield
.
.
appear a very formidable figure. Whether
all
that
expenditure of national effort here and in America
was
justified
by
whether equivalent or
results or
greater dividends might not have resulted from
investment on other kinds of force,
I
its
would not care to
have to say.' Thus, taking into account the aircraft, specialist equipment and training required, the question was whether paratroops were cost effective
The lessons of Korea During World War II the
British
much on the Americans for aircraft planes
was
,
had
relied very
so the shortage of
a particularly crucial factor for the
UK
Although, therefore, one regular and one territorial airborne division were kept going, the former, 6th Airborne, was sent firstly to Palestine and later to Germany purely in an infantry role. The Americans, in spite of threats from the Pentagon, managed to keep two divisions in existence, the 82nd of D-day and Nijmegen fame, and the 1 1th (later more aptly designated 101st), renowned for its defence of Bastogne during the German Ardennes offensive of Christmas 1944. They carried out a number of exercise drops and did much to develop new techniques. after the war.
was
Korea
Americans had the
first
opportunity to demonstrate in battle conditions
how
It
in
that the
had progressed in airborne operations. The scene was the advance to the Yalu River in 1 950 when far they
2900 men of the 187th Regimental Combat Team were dropped from C-l 19s and C-47s north of Pyongyang on 22 October. Although not a tactical success by the time the drop was made the ground troops were virtually up to the objectives - the impressive aspect was the dropping of heavy equipment, including 12 105mm howitzers, as well as nearly 600 tonnes of ammunition and supplies. This new ability meant that the glider, which had been the World War II method of landing support equipment was now obsolete The ,
same 1951,
unit carried out a similar operation in
.
March
when 3300 men were dropped. Very shortly war became static and the
afterwards, however, the
opportunities for airborne operations vanished. In the meantime, the British 6th Airborne Division had returned from Germany and was reduced to a
349
)
,
PARATROOPS aircraft; the Valettas
and Hastings used were obso-
They lacked boom doors and
lete.
the only
way
in
which heavy equipment could be carried was as underslung loads. Since both types of aircraft were about to be replaced by the Beverley, stocks of harness and dropping gear had been allowed to run down, and much hasty improvisation had to be carried out at the mounting base in Cyprus. Many vehicles were damaged on landing and the drop was scattered. The French, on the other hand, had selected a very tight drop zone (DZ) surrounded by buildings. Their first thought was of a heliborne assault which, considering the comparative infancy of the helicopter at the time,
was an imaginative and
However,
in
farsighted idea.
view of the reported heavy
anti-aircraft
defences, they eventually elected to parachute
in,
but
did so at 90m (300 feet) compared to the British 1 80m (600 feet) The result was a very accurate and success.
drop that demonstrated just how much they had learned from Indochina. (A fuller account of these two operations will appear in a later issue. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, had kept quiet over postwar views on military parachuting, despite her earlier involvement. The West was amazed therefore when in 1 957 the Russians unveiled a large and very modem airborne force. By the 1960s the force had further expanded and consisted of seven airborne divisions of 7500 men each and two Special Service (Special Forces) Brigades. Russian equipment had also vastly improved, and they matched the newly produced American C- 1 30 Hercules with their Antoful
( 1 6th Airborne Brigade) based at Aldershot as a strategic reserve. In 1951 it was deployed to Cyprus because of unrest in the area and it was there that many of its members had their
brigade of three battalions
,
first
opportunity to jump into action since 1945.
By
comparison, the French, involved in a protracted war in Indochina, continued using paratroops operationally, although seldom more than in company strength. Nevertheless, at least 156 parachute operations were mounted in Indochina during the period 1946 to 1954. The Suez crisis and the Arab-Israeli War of 1956 saw the next major employment of airborne forces. On the first night of the Israeli-Arab conflict the Israelis dropped a 400-man parachute battalion to block the vital Mitla Pass in Sinai Despite the fact that it did not have sufficient aircraft to drop its heavy equipment simultaneously, the battalion was suc-
,
,
,
Previous page: The moment of truth as a Warrant Officer 2nd Class prepares to make his static line descent. Above left: Travelling at an airspeed of
193km/h (120 mph) and aheightof244-366m
at
(800-1 200ft) a stick of paras
.
cessful in
its
makes a static line descent. Above: Russian paratroops work rapidly to
mission.
prepare an ASU57
Six days later it was the turn of the British and French, and there was a sharp contrast between the effectiveness of the
anti-tank gun,
57mm
which was
parachuted down with them, for action.
two drops. The French had had
plenty of operational experience in Indochina, but the British
had
not.
The objective
for the British 3rd
f
was Gamil Airport. Although eventually successful, it was an operation fraught with difficulty. The main problem was Battalion, the Parachute Regiment,
J
PARATROOPS itself, but the fact that the soldier, once he had landed, had to be prepared to fight against very superior odds and hold his ground until relieved by ground forces. Thus, entry standards were often exacting and parachute units in most armies were made up of volunteers. One example of the awareness among paratroops that they were once again an elite was the British Army s experience in Kuwait in 1 96 A British force had been deployed there, and it was
parachuting
'
1
it was vulnerable to tanks. therefore decided that 16th Parachute Bri-
realised that It
r nov An- 1 2 even to the extent of a very similar shape Another item which attracted much interest was the ASU-57, a 57mm self-propelled anti-tank gun. With a weight of only 5 5 tonnes it fitted comfortably inside an An- 1 2. Nato airborne forces, with their reliance on the 106mm towed recoilless gun, had nothing to match it. By the end of the 1 950s rfrariy countries particularly the newly-emergent nations of the Third World, were beginning to organise airborne forces. The paratrooper was regaining his wartime status as an elite soldier, and so airborne units were raised as a sign of enhanced prestige. It was recognised that the paratrooper had to possess attributes of both physical fitness and mental will-power above those in more conventional units This was not only due to the act of ,
.
^
,
.
Left: To the para, one of the most telling factors in the success of his jump is the nature of theterrain on
which he will
T
land. During the Emergency in Mala /a, paras were often dropped into the high canopy of the jungle and were equipped with ropes with which to descend from the treetops. This type of drop often
resulted in
many
casualties.
The conditions
shown
in this
photograph
are virtually perfect for these descending paras. Right: Having made a safe descent, these French paras (one bedecked with
ammunition
link-belts for
the 7.5mm Model 52 light machine gun beside him) make an immediate combat reconnaissance.
was
gade should include a squadron equipped with the Malkara anti-tank guided missile, to be mounted on the Hornet, a variant of the 1 -tonne Humber wheeled armoured personnel carrier. The squadron was to be formed from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment (2 RTR), but when it was made clear that, since it was still to be a squadron of the regiment, the squadron would continue to wear the black beret it had introduced into the British Army, the Parachute Brigade were aghast. In their eyes anyone who qualified for his parachute wings must wear the red beret, and hence initially almost all members of 2 RTR failed their preselection course. The problem was resolved and, in view of the difficulties of one regiment of 500 men finding sufficient suitable personnel for this squadron, it was later made open to all members of the Royal Armoured Corps, and became the Parachute Squadron RAC. They wore the RAC 'Mailed Fist' badge and the red beret and were proud to do so.
From Algeria to Indonesia Meanwhile, paratroops continued to be used operationally. The French, again drawing on their Indochina experience, employed them frequently in Algeria, particularly the parachute battalions of the
Foreign Legion. The French believed that quick deployment and the element of surprise made available by the use of paratroops was a vital factor in counter- insurgency operations. The Indonesians also
I
.
PARATROOPS attempted to use paratroops during the confrontation with Britain in Borneo in the mid-1960s. One operation which went very wrong for them occurred in September 1965 when the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles on the border spotted an Indonesian DZ marking party, which had crossed on foot. They allowed it to set up its markers and were rewarded 45 minutes later when a
C-130 began
to circle the area. Unfortunately for the
Gurkhas, the Indonesian anti-aircraft defences had clearly not been warned, and engaged their own aircraft, setting the starboard engines alight. The paratroops had to make a hasty exit and the aircraft managed to land at an airfield close to the border. The use of marking parties is crucial to the success of an airborne operation. In British parlance they are known as 'pathfinders' and they fly in before the main body in order to mark out the DZ and marshal the remainder as they land. The main problem in the employment of pathfinders is the danger of the operation being compromised by the enemy spotting them as they drop. However, in the late 1950s a new parachuting technique was developed which much reduced this risk. This was free-fall parachuting, and the pathfinders could now be dropped at very high altitudes and not release their parachutes until close to the ground It was also taken up as a means of inserting Special Force teams behind enemy lines The 1 960s was the decade of Vietnam and initially the Americans planned to use paratroops in much the same way as the French had done before them, and even went so far as to raise Vietnamese parachute battalions. However, in Algeria the French had turned away from the use of paratroops and made increasing use of the helicopter as a means of deploying troops quickly. It was to be the same in Vietnam. Yet, unlike Algeria, the introduction of the helicopter as the main means of lifting troops in .
,
Vietnam came as a deliberate policy decision. The
352
1st
Cavalry Division was formed as a complete helicopformation, employing observation, attack and
ter
transport varieties.
war
Although expensive
in
terms of
material, this formation quickly demonstrated
the superior flexibility
which
it
had over parachute
forces. Tactically, too, the manoeuvrability of heli-
Above: The skills of parachute display teams and those demonstrated in skydiving have contributed to the general expertise of
paratroop units. Below: While other members of
copters meant that they were less vulnerable than
his unit conceal their
fixed-wing transports, especially in that they were
'chutes, this para takes
able to use the ground as cover through nap-of-theearth flying. In addition,
combat troops required
much less training for heliborne than parachute operaThus it was decided in 1 968 to convert the 101st Division into an airmobile formation, leaving only
tions
the
.
82nd
in the traditional
parachute role.
point
in
orderto give cover.
Above right: A French para stands among the paraphernalia of war prior to embarkation. Below right: Military skydivers file out to their aircraft.
PARATROOPS The British also began to query whether paratroops had a viable role, especially after the 1967 White Paper which drastically reduced defence commitments overseas and put the main weight of defence still
policy into contributing to Nato's defence of Western
Europe. Although the Parachute Brigade tried to prove that its ability to drop into Germany provided a quick and valuable means of reinforcement to the British I Corps, it was thought that it was too lightly equipped for mechanised warfare and could only be employed in rear area security. Their use of muchneeded aircraft at a time of dramatic defence cuts was not felt to be justified Indeed at one time it seemed as though the Parachute Regiment might be disbanded. 16th Parachute Brigade itself was broken up in the early 1970s, and was succeeded by 8th Field Force (now 5th Infantry Brigade), which in war would be used for home defence but still had a role as a quick reaction force in peacetime. Based, like its predecessor, at Aldershot, it continued to have under com,
.
mand the bulk of the parachute units. Air mechanised units It became increasingly obvious
in the
warfare as they had been during
1970s that
modern World War II, and
parachute battalions were not as
vital to
compared to heliborne troops, along with the disadvantages of draining the regular army in order to create an elite force, could well have
their vulnerability
marked this
the death knell of military parachuting
did not happen.
trooper
still
The aura surrounding
held a strong attraction in
- but
the para-
many
armies,
and paratroop operations continued to be mounted. Perhaps a classic in the traditional mode was an operation involving the Indian 2nd Parachute Batta-
197 1 war with Pakistan. Dropped as a group, including supporting artillery and engineers, near the important communications centre of Tangail in Bangladesh on 11 December, it succeeded in severely disrupting the movement of Pakistani forces and was the first Indian unit into Dacca. In the 1980s, thoughts on both sides of the Iron Curtain are turning increasingly to what are termed 'air mechanised' units as the formations of the future for the European battlefield. This concept is very much that of the US airmobile division, but has been given more punch in the light of advancing military technology, especially in terms of helicopters. However, it is also realised that possible future conflicts will by no means be restricted to Europe, as indicated by Nato's growing awareness that the threat from the Warsaw Pact is as serious elsewhere in the world, particularly to the oil rich Middle East. The establishment of the US Rapid Deployment Force has been one result of this realisation. Here the ability to deploy troops quickly over long distances to a threatened area is paramount, and the French experience in Zaire in 1978 points to a continuing role for lion during the
paratroops in this context. Thus, the paratrooper
is
not yet obsolete as a
is likely to be combat rather intervention sudden of instrument more as an but battlefield, modern of the part than as an integral inserting means of viable still a the parachute is Special Force teams. The toughness and professionalism which are the hallmarks of the paratroop character were amply demonstrated by 2 and 3 Para in the Falklands and these traits make such a warrior the Charles Messenger ideal spearhead for any force
soldier. His role in the future
,
.
353
ThebatUe for Tonkin Minh attacks and the French response
Viet
During late 1951 and 1952, the French high command in Indochina tried desperately to wrest the initiative from the Viet Minh. The failure of Giap's attacks on the Red River Delta in 1951 had shown how the communist forces could be defeated if the conditions were right and so the French aim was to place the Viet Minh in a position where their relative lack of modern heavy weapons could be exposed. For his part, Vo Nguyen Giap envisaged a steady move towards northern Laos from the secure bases in the Viet Bac via the northern highlands and across the Red and Black Rivers (now known as the Hong and So .
Binh, he now saw the possibilities of repeating his devastating successes of 1950 (against the French strongholds along Route Coloniale 4) and ordered the 304th, 308th, and 3 12th Infantry Divisions, artillery,
engineers and even semi-regular units, to take up
Hoa Binh sector. While these units engage the Hoa Binh garrison directly, the 3 16th and 320th Infantry Divisions were to penetrate and disrupt the only two French supply routes: RC6 from Hanoi via Xom Pheo, and the Black River itself.
positions in the
were
to
RC6
had been devastated by both sides and not
,
Bong
respectively).
The
first
moves
in his strategy
September 1951, when the Viet Minh 312th Division crossed the Red River and attacked French garrisons on the Nghia Lo ridge. The 3 1 2th was driven back, but the scene was set for a year of heavy fighting in the area between the Red and were unfolded
in
Black Rivers. Sensing that here was an opportunity for forcing large-scale engagements, the French supreme commander, Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, decided to move into the area in strength by occupying Hoa Binh. This plan offered certain advantages. While it was not an offensive aimed directly at Viet
Minh
strongholds,
it
would put the French forces astride the road link which connected the Than Hoa sector (where the Viet Minh 320th Division was located) with northeastern communist strongholds whence large amounts of equipment were supplied. Although control of the Hoa Binh sector would not totally cut the supply line, it would certainly hamper it. A secondary reason for taking Hoa Binh was that the Muong tribe, who had remained fiercely loyal to the French, considered Hoa Binh as its capital; the psychological effect of capturing Hoa Binh would be considerable. A further, political, consideration behind this decision was the imminent vote in the French National Assembly on the budget for Indochina. On 14 November 1951, Ju-52s dropped three battalions of French paratroops into Hoa Binh. Synchronised with this airdrop was the advance through the Black River valley of 1 5 infantry battalions seven artillery battalions, two armoured groups, two dinassaut (soft-skinned water-borne artillery or mortar ,
with their own infantry assault groups) and some sapper units. By the afternoon of 15 November, the French force had taken Hoa Binh and encountered very little enemy resistance. But Giap, having realised the superiority of the advancing French force, had withdrawn his units from the Hoa Binh sector. The French had, in fact, captured very units, often
little
of value.
While Giap had allowed the French
354
to take
Hoa
repaired by either, while the Black River three times longer than the road
vulnerable to
was
a route
and was extremely
enemy attack.
In order to retain control of the supply routes, the
French needed to establish fortress-like strongholds astride both the Black River and RC6. As the French were soon to discover, not only was it difficult to resupply Hoa Binh, but the strongholds themselves rapidly became a liability. The main objective of the operation was soon lost in the desperate battles to resupply Tu Vu, Notre Dame Rock and Ap Da
Chong.
By
9 December 1951, three Viet
Minh regiments
were poised to assault Tu Vu. The French, hoping to pre-empt the imminent assault, launched their own offensive at dawn on 10 December using an infantry battalion supported by tanks, artillery and airstrikes.
Though they made contact with about five Viet Minh battalions, the enemy offensive was launched against Tu Vu at 2100 hours on the same day. The Tu Vu garrison, though reasonably strong (two Moroccan companies and two tank platoons) was divided into two forces by the Ngoi Lat River and as it was on the
Above centre: Using a
57mm recoilless cannon mounted with telescopic sights, a French infantry
engage a Above: A unit of Vietnamese troops advance at the double. They are using the cover of the tree-l ne to cross open unit prepare to
target.
i
ground.
INDOCHINA
1951-53
hours five Viet Minh battalions assaulted the northern force. Finally, the remainder of the garrison withdrew across the river in order to make a final stand As dawn .
broke the
enemy disengaged,
leaving 400 dead.
During December the Groupes Mobiles 1 4 and 7 plus the st Airborne Group were added to the French forces already in the Hoa Binh sector- but once again Giap withdrew his forces until January when they redeployed around the Hoa Binh pocket. French posts on the west bank of the Black River were withdrawn (except for the bridgehead at the Red River junction) and units of Viet Minh moved in - now having a complete front from which to assault river convoys. ,
1
Hoa Binh isolated On
12 January 1952, the
when
first
pincer of the
enemy
was The French then abandoned the Black River as a supply route and turned to RC6, manning it
offensive closed
wiped
a complete river convoy
out.
with one infantry battalion, one artillery battalion, two armoured battalions and an engineer group - all dispersed among 10 strongpoints. The road itself, little more than a rough track, was surrounded by
Above: An infantry unit
west bank of the Black River, reinforcement would
display their fieldcraft as
certainly prove difficult. After a concentrated mortar
they advance in staggered file along a dirt track. This method of advance gives a degree of protection, as possible ambush from either side is covered. These troops are armed with the 7.5mm 1936
barrage, the Viet
M
CR39 rifle.
Minh main
force advanced at
2200
hours. Despite the severe casualties inflicted on the
Viet Minh by French automatic fire, mines and barbed it was clear by 2340 hours that the southern half of the garrison could hold out no longer as wave upon wave of Viet Minh attacked
wire,
At 01 15 hours on 1 1 December the survivors were ordered to withdraw to the northern position At 0300 .
dense jungle and the Viet Minh occupied commanding heights to its south and around Hoa Binh. Poised to attack the small French force were the whole 304th Division and the 88th Regiment of the 308th Division. On the night of 8/9 January 1952 the 88th Regiment launched an offensive (from the northwest) against the French hill positions at Xom Pheo (defended by Foreign Legion units), and although the communist attack failed, with over 700 dead the 304th Division occupied hills overlooking Kem Pass and launched heavy assaults against a mobile battalion - virtually annihilating it. The second jaw of the pincer around Hoa Binh had closed.
355
'
INDOCHINA
1951-53
As attempts were made to break through to Hoa Binh, the French found that they were committing 12 infantry battalions, three artillery groups and much of their aerial capacity to supply five infantry battalions
isolated in a location of no strategic value whatsoever.
A convoy that reached Hoa Binh had taken
1 1
days to
cover a mere 40km (25 miles), sustaining heavy casualties en route Having committed one third of the elite mobile forces that had proved so successful in the Red River Delta in 195 1 the French found that these forces were unable to contribute any substantial firepower to the Hoa Binh operation. General Raoul Salan. de Lattre's successor (de Lattre had returned to Paris suffering from an ad.
,
vanced cancer in December 1951). decided to evacuate the Hoa Binh sector, releasing much-needed troops for operations in theT'ai Highlands and the Red River Delta
itself.
Operation Amaranth, the French withdrawal, be-
Christmas thunder (later General) Clement was in command two groupes mobiles (his own and that of Colonel Vanuxem) at Hoa Binh. His communications to the north were secured by the groupes
Colonel of
mobiles led by Colonel Blanckaert, straddling the Black River,
whose troops,
were the
first
to re-
ceive the attention of the Viet Minh. 'During
one
those
of
glorious
Christmas
'when the moon lights up the countryside as if it were day before sinking down nights,'
he
recalled,
about three or four in the morning, they attacked Tu Vu. How can describe the feeling of being a I
mere spectator during a combat of which we knew the inevitable outcome; of hearing the first grenade explosions, the thunder of artillery, the smallarms fire, all the heat of battle, without being able to send the slightest help to our comrades? Vanuxem had come up to my command post, and both of us, with lumps in ourthroats, lived through the events whose tragedy we could so easily imagine.
The
morning.
We could
fighting
grenade burst and
stopped about two
still
hear the odd
some
rifle
in
the
shot, or
explosions as the Viets
cleared the battlefield, finishing off the survivors.
Then Blanckaert radioed
in: "It's all
over."
gan on 22 February 1 952 at 1 900 hours and included a temporary opening of the Black River all the way to Hoa Binh. Throughout the night massive amounts of supplies were moved and as dawn broke, combat troops, under an umbrella of artillery and airstrikes, began to cross the river and fall back onto Xom Pheo. It was not until 0800 hours on the 23rd that Viet Minh units seemed to realise that the evacuation was taking place and from then on the withdrawal became one continuous and desperate battle By 24 February units of the 13th Foreign Legion demi-brigade fought their way out and crossed the delta line at Xuan Mai. Although no one action had resulted in insupportable casualties, continuous losses had made the Hoa Binh episode almost as costly as the operations along the Cao Bang ridge in 1950 - indeed the Hoa Binh offensive had been extremely reminiscent of the incidents of 1950. After the 'successful' French withdrawal from Hoa .
356
A heavy pall of smoke hangs over a Viet Minh
Top:
stronghold as French tanks cover an infantry advance. Left: Viet
cross
Minh porters
difficult terrain.
INDOCHINA
Hoa Binh 10
Dec 1951-24 Feb 1952
1951-53
and the position was quickly taken. After the collapse of Nghia Lo, the ridge positions to either side fell quickly. The French high command, realising the gave orders that the 6th Parachute Battalion should fight a rearguard action in order to allow the rest of the French troops to withdraw. The paras spread out in order to take on as much of the Viet Minh situation,
force as possible. The Viet Minh 312th Division disengaged from contact with this battalion, and then virtually destroyed the paratroops as they pulled back, during an action at Muon Chen on 20 October. This defensive action had, however, allowed the rest of the French evacuees to reach the Black River line. The Viet Minh advance stopped when the various divisions encamped, facing the final French defences protecting the Laotian border, in order to establish effective supply lines back to the Viet Bac. The 3 1 2th Division moved towards Dien Bien Phu, the 308th stopped just short of Na San, and the 3 16th halted near
BaLay. The French were now being inexorably forced onto Binh, which General Salan claimed had checked the advances of three Viet Minh divisions attempting to
Minh operations of any monsoon the French were mostly occupied with clearing Viet Minh infiltrations from behind their own lines. As the flow
plans for a counter-offensive which would both draw
substance. During the period of the
the Viet Minh units three
home ground,
midsummer 1952 he had raised some 1 10,000 regular troops, 75,000 regional troops and
protect the Laotian border. Further to this, the French
As
up
to
120,000
the rainy season
,
advance into Laos. On 1 1 October 1952 three Viet Minh divisions, the 308th, 312th and 316th, advanced in three columns along a 64km (40 mile) front and crossed the Red River towards the garrisons on the Nghia Lo ridge. While the 308th Division aimed for Nghia Lo itself, the 3 16th Division pushing towards Van Yen and the 3 1 2th towards Gia Hoi Using darkness and the dense canopy of the jungle foliage, the Viet Minh divisions advanced in secrecy, not alerting the French to the imminent offensive. Meanwhile, the 148th Regiment swept westward in an arc to the north of the Viet Minh front, and the 176th and 36th Regiments were left in .
reserve protecting passes at the
On
1
Red River.
5 October advance unit > of the 3 1 2th Division
surrounded the French garrison at Gia Hoi. The French reaction was immediate. Paratroops were dropped at the French post at Tu Le 24km (15 miles) northwest of Gia Hoi and moved down to the beleaguered garrison. They soon made contact with Viet Minh units but successfully forced their way through to the post. On the following day the garrison was evacuated to Tu Le. General Salan believed that this offensive was merely a diversionary attack designed to draw troops away from the delta defences he had no idea of the massed Viet Minh forces that were preparing to crush the French posts along the
positions.
away from the Laotian border and Minh territory. With of Giap's five infantry divisions away from
drive deep into the heart of Viet
Salan hoped that by advancing along would be able to cut their supply lines, reoccupy the Nghia Lo ridge, and
drew to an end the Viet Minh prepared to launch an attack which would hopefully bring them the strategic freedom to
determine enemy
and putting
effectively halted further Viet
active village militia.
wall as cover whilethey
command were desperate
pressure on the communists. General Salan drew up
of Chinese aid increased, Giap used the lull in the fighting to prepare for the future offensives. By
infantry use a paddyfield
and the high
to find a method of regaining the initiative
new rainy season
break into the delta, the onset of the
Above: Armed with a variety of weapons, French
the defensive,
Nghia Lo ridge. Salan was not
commander hoped
remain deceived for long.
a regiment of the 308th Division
1
On the
20mm mortar
moved
against
Nghia Lo. Successive waves were beaten back by the French defences, but when the perimeter was breached Viet Minh troops flooded in through the gap
that the destruction of stores,
workshops and supply dumps would destroy the local Viet Minh credibility. So, on 29 October Operation Lorraine was launched. The force of 30,000 troops was the largest yet mustered for an operation in It consisted of four groupes mobiles, a paratroop group, numerous detachments of armour,
Indochina. artillery
and dinnassaut. The force was
split into
two
spearheads with one setting up a bridgehead across the Red River and advancing towards Phu Tho, and the second setting out from near Viet Tn.
Operation Lorraine The plan was for the operation to take place in three stages With a bridgehead set up across the Red River, the force at Phu Tho would expand to link up with the force advancing from Viet Tri. The two forces would then advance along RC2 where they would link up with Airborne Group 1 They would then coordinate .
.
with dinnassaut units. By 7 November, despite opposition from the Viet
Minh, the two French forces had linked up on RC2. The next stage was the advance against Phu Doan and on 9 November paratroops were dropped into Phu Doan, taking it with little difficulty while the armoured units thundered up the RC2 in order to consolidate the position. The supplies that were discovered at Phu Doan were a considerable surprise to the French; not only were there large quantities of
captured American war material but also Russian anti-aircraft
to
night of 1 7 October, after a barrage of fire,
the line of the Clear River he
guns and Molotova trucks - though the
bulk of the supplies had already been evacuated.
Once the main base had been established at Phu Doan, armoured patrols then advanced further north towards Phu Yen Bink and Tuyen Quang, where blocking positions were set up in preparation for a possible Viet Minh counter-attack. Now, however. 357
INDOCHINA
1951-53
the problems. The operation had been based upon the assumption that Giap would panic when he saw the possible isolation of the three divisions moving on Laos But while Giap was not certain of the size
came
.
of the French force, he knew that its long thin line of communication was extremely vulnerable to ambush and guerrilla assaults. Thus, the Viet Minh commander decided to commit only two of his regular regim-
from the 316th Division and one from the 308th Division) to harrassing the French forces; the rest of the three advanced divisions were to remain in situ on the Black River. Further to this, Giap ordered ents (one
the 320th Division (to the south of the
Red River
Delta) and the 304th Division (to the north of the de
-
Lattre Line), to operate against French units in the
i
t
delta, in order to force Salan into a withdrawal.
The French advance, meanwhile, had been stopped at Phu Yen Bink and the problem of maintaining a force along a 1 60km ( 1 00 mile) front was beginning to tell. Combined with this was the fact that the most forward French units had encountered little enemy was proving both expensive and of no real value. By mid-November it was clear that Operation Lorraine had achieved no real success and on 14 November Salan ordered a withdrawal. On 17 November (when the two regular regiments of Viet Minh finally moved into position) Viet Minh troops ambushed a large part of the retreating French force at a pass known as Chan Muoung. Under a barrage of mortar fire, the French sustained heavy casualties and it was only later in the day that counter-attacks drove off the Viet Minh. Over the next week or so, a constant running battle between the withdrawing French and Viet Minh guerrilla groups developed. The end result was that by the time the force reached the relative security of the de Lattre Line, some 1200 casualties had been incurred. opposition; their captured territory
The composition and
size of the force
and the
intrinsic problems of keeping it supplied and in action had been an immense burden, while the logistical problems had been exacerbated by the foresight and strategic abilities of the Viet Minh leader Giap.
By the end of 952
therefore the French had failed Giap to battle on terms of their own choosing, while the Viet Minh commander had succeeded in moving troops towards (and even into) Laos. Other measures seemed to be called for if the French were not to surrender the initiative completely; and this was to lead to the decision to move into Dien Bien Phu. Alexander McNair-WHson 1
,
,
across their faces, captured Viet
Minh
guerrillas,
soaking wet from hiding
paddyf ields, are interrogated by a French officer.
to bring
VM automatic weapons
0930 hours k
V^Jhfantry attack
Viet
Trung
French withdrawal
French advance
de Lattre Line
Minh
attacks
^f^
|FI
"^
de
Lattre Line
-3
Operation Lorraine Operation Lorraine The advance
The withdrawal
¥
Above: With fear written
in
The planning for Operation Castor Marshal Alphonse Juin, one of the most distinguished French soldiers of his generation, was sent to Indochina on a fact-finding tour. His report, which was far from pessimistic, nevertheless drew the government's attention to the deteriorating situation in northern Laos, the fall of which would, he warned, have 'incalculable repercussions'. Furthermore, he suggested that any communist invasion of Laos would be followed by infiltration into Thailand, leading to the collapse of the Bangkok government 'like a house of cards' Laos at this time was still a member of the French Union, and Juin' s assessment of the threat to northern Laos was based on sound evidence. In October 1952 In February 1953
General
Vo Nguyen
Giap. the Viet Minh
comman-
had pushed three divisions across the Nghia Lo ridge, between the Red and Black Rivers. The French reinforced their three main posts in the area - Lai Chau, Son La and Na San. Nonetheless, the Viet Minh 312th Division bypassed Lai Chau and thrust down into Laos. On 30 November, under threat of an attack in overwhelming force, a mixed French and Laotian garrison was withdrawn from a small village on the Laos-Vietnam border, whose name was to loom large in the next 18 months: Dien Bien Phu. Giap correctly assessed that the time was not yet ripe for a major incursion into Laos. His supply service was overstretched and his field formations overextended. Furthermore, the bad weather of Octo-
der,
ber and early November had restricted the activities of the French Air Force which, as the weather cleared in
mid-November, once more began
to play
an active
Above: Counter-attack at NaSan. French paratroopers retake a
evacuated by Viet Minh during the night. Overpage below: hilltop position
part in the battle.
The experience of 1952 was, though, to prove The tribal inhabitants of northern
invaluable to Giap.
Laos had offered little resistance to the Viet Minh and the Laotian communist forces, the Pathet Lao, were growing in strength. The inhospitable terrain obstructed French forces far more than it did the Viet Minh, and although French airpower remained effective, weather permitting, operations over Laos took French aircraft far away from their bases in the Red RiverDelta. Finally, as Giap himself was to write, by concentrating their forces on the delta the French 'left many of [their] positions on other fronts insufficiently ,
The sky is filled with parachutes as the French iaunch a successful counter-attack against Viet
Minh units in Lang Son. Overpage above: Vietnamese irregulars, armed with French carbines, use the cover of a
low wall
in
orderto snipe at
communist units.
guarded, thus giving our forces the opportunity to step
up
their activities
and win
offensive into Laos
Red River
still
greater victories'.
An
would sidestep the defences of the
Delta, offering the enticing prospect of a
drive southwards towards the
The Viet Minh spent
late
Mekong Delta. 1952 and early 1953
preparing for a renewal of the invasion of Laos.
Although the severe losses inflicted on the 308th Division by the dogged defence of Na San in November-December delayed the Viet Minh concentration, three divisions - the 308th, 312th and 316th - remained in Laos, and Giap's supply service redoubled its efforts to move food, weapons and ammunition to
359
INDOCHINA
1951-53
Moc Chau, which was to serve as forward base for the invasion.
Marshal Juin completed his reporting mission
in
March 953 but scarcely had he left the Far East than the very threat of which he had warned materialised. 1
,
Giap struck on 9 April. His 308th Division, largely replaced, detached a regiment to
its
losses
mask Na San
main body made for the Nam Seng Valley; advanced crosscountry to Sam Neua, and the 312th set off from Dien Bien Phu towards the royal capital of Luang Prabang. Although the French had foreseen the invasion of Laos, there was little they could do to meet it. The Laotian Army was small, numbering some 6000 men in six infantry battalions, one parachute battalion, and 41 company-sized National Guard commando units. A unified kingdom of Laos had not been set up until August 1946, and local and tribal loyalties remained strong. Communist propaganda had been intensified, particularly in the north, masterminded by the socalled Red Prince, Prince Souphanouvong, who had while
its
the 316th Division
taken refuge in the Viet Bac. Indecision on the part of the French high
worsened
an
already
unpromising
command situation.
General Raoul Salan decided first to reinforce Sam Neua, then to relinquish it in favour of a new base at
Xieng Khouang, which was
itself
abandoned on 19
April in favour of an entrenched position on the Plain
of Jars,
known as Jars Camp. By the end of the month
the French held
Luang Prabang and
Jars
Camp
strength, together with the outpost of Muong
in
Khoua.
upon resupply by air. Having caught the French off-balance and thrown French strategic plans into turmoil, Giap quickly withdrew the bulk of his forces into Tonkin, leaving All were heavily dependent
detachments of the 308th Division to maintain pressure on the French and continue the recruitment of Laotian sympathisers. More useful experience had been gained, and confidence in the French on the part of many Laotians - particularly the T'ai tribesmen of the north - had been shaken. The French Air Force had been stretched to its limits, and the French high command had shown itself dangerously hesitant. Yet, ironically, Salan and his staff did not see the events of April-May 1953 as uniformly depressing. The defence of Na San had already encouraged the belief that French firepower would triumph in a pitched battle. The fact that Giap had fought a war of movement was interpreted as evidence that he was unwilling to risk a major battle, and the rapid reinforcement of the 'airheads' at Luang Prabang and Jars Camp contributed to overconfidence in air-supplied 'hedgehogs'.
The
lessons of the spring of 1953 were, then,
by both sides. Giap believed he could now invade Laos almost at will, capitalising on an improved supply situation and a strengthened local guerrilla organisation. The French, however, concluded that a renewed invasion could be blocked by air-supplied centres of resistance, before whose firepower the Viet Minh attack would wither and die. Salan also talked specifically of a counteroffensive into T'ai country, with the reoccupation of interpreted differently
that
Dien Bien Phu least
among
as
its first
step.
This project was not
the dangerous legacies bequeathed
by
Salan to his successor. On 28 May 1 953 Lieutenant-General Henri Navarre took over as commander-in-chief in Indochina. A
1^0
I
INDOCHINA
1951-53
Navarre's brief included orders to assess the situaand to recommend plans for future action, and he lost no time in travelling widely to gain evidence for his report. Significantly, he showed great interest in the airheads at Lai Chau and Na San, taking the commander of the latter post onto his operations staff. He also promoted 49-year-old Brigadier-General Rene Cogny, whose Resistance activities had earned
tion
him deportation
to
Germany
in
World War
II,
to
command the northern region as a major-general
Hedgehog or mooring-point? On 16 June Navarre discussed his
report with his
commanders. It seems clear that, while remaining convinced of the value of air-supplied 'hedgehogs', he had decided that Na San tied down more French troops than it did Viet Minh, without having the prestige of the provincial capitals of Lai Chau or Dien Bien Phu, both of which were also communication centres. Although Salan had discussed the occupation of Dien Bien Phu, it was probably Cogny who suggested it at the 16 June meeting. He envisaged it as a 'mooring-point', or large-scale patrol base, rather than as a 'hedgehog' in the manner of Na San. Lengthy and emotional postwar disputes between Navarre and Cogny have failed to settle the matter, but there can be little doubt that, at least from June 1 953 onwards, there was a serious lack of clarity within the French high command as to the real function of a garrison at Dien B ien Phu Navarre presented his report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 July. He discussed operations for the coming year and the planned increase in the size of the Vietnamese National Army, emphasising that he would require French reinforcements until such time as the Vietnamese could shoulder a greater share of the burden of war themselves. The Joint Chiefs recommended that France should encourage her allies, notably Britain and the United States, to apply diplomatic pressure to China in order to persuade her to discourage the Viet Minh from renewing their attack on Laos. If this failed, they suggested the defence of the Red River Delta, central and southern Vietnam. Furthermore, Laos should be defended with strictly limited forces, and then only south of the regional
55-year-old cavalry officer, Navarre had served in
Below: Planning the strategy at Dien Bien
Phu
Generals Gilles, Navarre and Cogny. Bottom Armed with a are (from
left)
both world wars and had commanded an armoured Germany in 1951-52. He was a believer in
division in
the offensive spirit
and
in
sweeping man-
fluid,
:
7.5mm M29 light machine gun, a French soldier prepares to give covering fire to an advance. The others carry 7.5mm rifles.
oeuvres. There was, or so his detractors claimed,
human warmth about him. His General
Rene
Cogny.
little
subordinate, Major-
described
conditioned', while writer Jules 'physically and morally a feline'
him
Roy
as
called
'air-
him
18th parallel.
The Committee of National Defence, which Navarre addressed on 24 July, considered both the general's report and the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs, but reached no firm conclusions It is probable that Navarre was, at most, put under no obligation to .
tl*
**•
ALT **i
^r
INDOCHINA
1951-53
and his staff wrote anxiously of a position which would devour battalions to no useful purpose. Cogny duly protested to Navarre, but Navarre decided to go ahead. Final operational orders were issued to Cogny and the French commander in Laos, Colonel Boucher de Crevecoeur, on 14 November. They stressed the
earlier,
importance of establishing a strong position, covering Laos, inside T'ai tribal territory. The Secretary of State for Associated States, then visiting Indochina, was briefed on 17 November. As Navarre's civilian superior he was in a position to raise objections if he thought it necessary. Not only did he not do so, but he did not even feel it worth informing Paris of the forthcoming operation. Three days later, shortly after 10.30 on the morning of 20 November, the first wave of French paratroopers jumped from their C-47s onto drop zone 'Natasha', just a few hundred metres northwest of the village of Dien Bien Phu.
Richard Holmes Far left: As the first French paratroopers moved away from the drop zone, their only initial artillery support
came from
recoilless
rifles.
the successful drop into the Dien Bien Phu area, Cogny congratulates Left: After
Gilles.
defend Laos. But a subsequent investigation revealed that
it
was not until
passed
1
3
November that the government
view on formally
this
to the Secretary
of State
- the minister responsible for - who forwarded it to Navarre. It reached
Below: Air supply
was essential to the operation. Here paras
unload one of the first consignments of war
for Associated States
material at the Dien Bien
Indochina
Phu
him on 4 December, by which time French troops Dien Bien Phu. Committee pursued its lengthy delievents in Indochina were moving with
were already
Even
in action at
as the
berations,
increasing speed.
On
25 July Navarre's
orders for the occupation of Dien Bien
staff issued
Phu as part of a
'preventive action' against a repeated Viet Minh drive
Na San was successfully on 12 August, making troops and available for use elsewhere and again contri-
into Laos.
The
evacuated by aircraft
garrison of
air
buting to French confidence in the flexibility conferred by air transport.
developments, too, contributed to the was to lead to disaster. On 22 October the French and Laotian governments signed a treaty which reaffirmed both the independence of Laos and its membership of the French Union. The treaty included a military convention with a common defence plan. Although there was no specific French liability for the defence of Laos, Navarre felt himself under a firm moral obligation not to abandon Laos unless he received a clear instruction to this effect from Paris. Even the directive of 13 November, which, as we have seen, did not reach Navarre until December, contained no such instruction. It merely told Navarre that he was not obliged to defend Laos, and in the general's mind, there was a considerable difference between this and an order to withdraw. The guidelines for Operation Castor, the occupation of Dien Bien Phu by French parachute forces, were laid down on 2 November. Overall command Political
inexorable logic which
was vested
in
Cogny, who was
to
employ up to six 1 December.
airborne battalions to secure the area by
Cogny recognised
that the operation, as
now
envis-
aged, bore no relation to that which he had suggested
362
airstrip.
Key Weapons
The
MIRAGE
363
KEY WEAPONS
Above: The two-seat version of the Mirage- a 5B
III remains one of most significant warplanes in the world today, more than 20 years after it first entered service with the Armee de 1' Air. Over 1 400 examples of this family of delta-winged fighters have been built and they serve with the air arms of 21 nations. The Mirage III has proved to be a versatile design which can undertake both air combat and ground-attack missions with equal facility. It has been successfully adapted as a two-seat conversion trainer and tactical reconnaissance aircraft and progressive improvements in the airframe, powerplant and avionics have helped it to
France's Dassault-Breguet Mirage
the
of the Belgian Air Force.
Two views of Swiss Mirages flying patrols over Left:
their
whilethethirdisa reconnaissance squadron. These Mirages can be armed with Falcon and Sidewinder air-to-air
adapt to the fast-changing conditions of modern air warfare.
It is
if
still
remain in production until the Mirage KING (Nouvelle export orders, its life may be
characteristics.
the latest
Generation) attracts
extended
missiles, and have improved short take-off
likely to
mid-1980s and,
home territory. The
Swiss Air Force has three Mirage squadrons: two act in an interceptor role
further.
The prototype Mirage
III-001
made
its first
flight
on 17 November 1956 and was followed by a preproduction batch of 10 Mirage III As. The first model to see front-line service was the Mirage IIIC, an all-weather interceptor with a limited ground-attack
Below: The interior of a Mirage cockpit- here with the gun sight yet to be assembled.
Only 95 Mirage IIICs were built for the Armee de l'Air, as the Mirage HIE longer-range, multi-purpose fighter became available in the mid1960s. A total of 1 85 Mirage IIIEs were delivered to capability.
the
Armee del 'Air.
The Mirage HIE is a single-seat tail-less delta- wing fighter, powered by an SNECMA Atar 9C turbojet which produces 6200kg (13,6701b) of thrust with afterburning. Spanning 8.2m (27ft) and with a length of 15m (49ft 3in), the Mirage HIE has a maximum take-off weight of 13,500kg (29,7601b). Its maximum level speed at 12,200m (40,000ft) altitude is Mach 2.1, ceiling is 17,000m (55,800ft) and tactical radius is 1200km (745 miles). An SEPR 884 rocket motor, producing 1500kg (33001b) of thrust, can be improve take-off performance and rate of climb. Armament consists of two 30mm DEFA cannon with a cyclical rate of fire of 1200 rounds per minute and ammunition capacity of 125 rounds per gun. Air-to-air missiles or ground attack ordnance can be carried on hardpoints beneath each wing, with a third beneath the fuselage. Options include one Matra R530 infra-red or radar-guided air-to-air missile (AAM). two AIM-9B Sidewinders or R550 fitted to
364
Previous page:
A French
above the clouds armed with an AS37 Martel radiation-homing Mirage
HIE flies
air-to-surface missile.
venture between Britain and France, the Martel has been made
A
joint
in
twoversions-the advanced British-made television guided missile and the simpler French anti-radiation version
which equips the Mirage.
MIRAGE III
Magic AAMs, one AS30 air-to-surface missile (ASM), 68mm air-to-ground rockets, bombs or auxiliary fuel tanks. The Mirage HIE can also carry tactical nuclear weapons and is fitted with a Cyrano II radar, navigation computer and Doppler radar to give an all-weather ground-attack capability.
The Mirage
IIIB
a two-seat operational trainer
is
while the IIIR and IIIRD serve in the reconnaissance role.
has,
The Mirage IIIR in
addition,
is
camera-equipped; the IIIRD sensors and Doppler
infra-red
navigation equipment. In
1972 a new
member of the Mirage III family Armee de 1' Air. This was the
entered service with the
Mirage 5F, 50 of which had been built for Israel as the Mirage 5J and then impounded by the French govern-
ment before
The Mirage 5 is essentially a HIE intended for the ground attack mission. Powered by the Atar 9C turbojet, the Mirage 5 has a greater range and bombload than the delivery.
simplified version of the
HIE, but lacks the latter' s advanced radar and avionics. The Mirage 5 has seven ordnance hardpoints and can lift a maximum weapons load of 3630kg (80001b). The new fighter retains the Mirage Ill's Mach 2-plus performance and, through advances in the miniaturisation of avionics over the past decade, its original simple ranging radar has been supplemented by inertial navigation, a navigation/ attack computer, pilot's head-up display and laser rangefinder. As a result, the latest Mirage 5s are very capable ground-attack aircraft but, unless
fitted
with a
Above: One of the 24 Mirage IIIEEs that make up the two Mirage squadrons of the Spanish Air Force. Spain is one of 14countries that have employed the Mirage III.
Below: Oneofthefirst Mirages to reach the Israeli Air Force, this INC
and
its
armament were placed on displayforthepublicand press.
365
KEY WEAPONS
Left: The Mirage was the great aerial success story of the Arab-Israeli wars. This Israeli NIC was responsible for destroying 1 1
Arab aircraft.
Israeli
victory in the air war did
much to boost sales of the Mirage with the air forces of other nations looking for a cost-effective supersonic aircraft.
A reconnaissance Mirage IIIR
of the French
I'Air,
based
in
Armee de
Strasbourg.
AMiragelllEPofthe5th
Squadron
of the Pakistan
Air Force.
AMiragelllEEofthe Egyptian Air Force. Egyptian Mirages first saw active service during the Yom Kippur War of 1 973.
366
MIRAGE III
multimode radar, they lack the Mirage IIIE's air-toair capability and can only carry short-range infra-red guided
A greatly improved version of the Mirage 5, desig9C
A Mirage IIICJ
swoops low in preparation an attack on enemy positions during the Yom KippurWar. TwoShafrir
for
AAMs.
nated Mirage 50, has been produced by replacing the
Mirage Fl's Atar 9K-50. The new powerplant produces 7200kg (15,8751b) of thrust with afterburning and considerably enhances Atar
Above:
turbojet with the
the fighter's take-off performance, rate of climb, rate
The Mirage 50 can carry any of the weapons which arm the Mirage III and 5 and avionics options include an Agave multi-mode radar, inertial navigation system and head-up display. Thus the Mirage 50 can combine the Mirage IIIE's multiof turn and endurance
.
mission capability with the Mirage 5's improved
pay load and range. The Mirage III and its derivatives have been widely exported. In Europe the air forces of Belgium, Spain and Switzerland fly various versions of the fighter.
Belgium operates the
5BA
missiles are carried,
in
addition to a drop tank slung under thefuselage.
Below:
A rare photograph
of a dogfight
in
progress:
Mirage pulls up and thereby breaks the opposing MiG 21 's attack an
Israeli
turn.
One of the earliest export customers for the Mirage was 96
which ordered 72 Mirage IIICJ fighters in These aircraft bore the brunt of the combat flying in the Six-Day War of June 1967. Mirage pilots claimed a total of 48 Arab aircraft shot down in air battles for the loss of one of their own fighters. The Mirages also took part in the highly successful air strikes against Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian airfields, six of them falling to groundfire in return for the virtual elimination of the Arab air forces. Compared with its main antagonist, the MiG-21, the Mirage III was rather less manoeuvrable, especially in a turning dogfight. Later models of the MiG-21, introduced after the Six-Day War, had a better thrustto-weight ratio than the Mirage and it was in order to overcome these shortcomings that the Israelis 1
Israel,
1
.
5BR 5BD conversion train-
attack fighter, the
reconnaissance aircraft and the
The Mirages entered service with the Belgians in 1970 and are due for replacement, most probably by F-16 Fighting Falcons, at the end of the 1980s.
er.
Spain's single wing of Mirage IIIEE interceptors
was
970, 24 single-seaters and six Mirage HIDE conversion trainers having been ordered from France in 1968. In Switzerland two squadrons of Mirage HIS inter-
also
formed
in
1
ceptors are assigned to the surveillance
wing
responsible for the defence of Swiss air space.
that is
A third
squadron operates the Mirage IIIRS in the tactical reconnaissance role and there are a few Mirage IIIBS
The Mirage HIS from the Mirage HIE in having a Hughes Taran radar with blind interception capability, groundmapping and terrain-avoidance modes. The HIS can carry Falcon AAMs and AS30 ASMs (not required for its present role) and has provision for jet-assisted operational conversion trainers. differs
take-off rockets.
367
KEY WEAPONS embarked on an improvement programme
that
was
As an
eventually to result in the Kfir C-2 fighter.
interim measure following the French arms embargo ,
in
1967, a 'pirated' version of the Mirage 5 was
produced as the Nesher. By the time of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, the Mirage had been succeeded by the F-4 Phantom as the Israeli Air Force's principal combat aircraft, but it nonetheless continued to perform well, especially in the air defence role. Two squadrons of Mirage Ills remain in Israeli service on the air defence role.
embargo on arms sales to number of Arab air forces acquired Mirages, among them Abu Dhabi, Lebanon and Libya, the latter of which ordered 1 10Mirage5sin 1971 and now After the 1967 French
Israel a
operates three squadrons in the strike/attack role, plus
an operational conversion unit and tactical reconnaissance flight. As few Libyans are qualified military jet pilots, the majority of these aircraft are flown by pilots seconded from the Pakistan Air Force Egypt has purchased 82 fighters and flies them in an air .
superiority role. In Asia, Pakistan
is
a major operator of the Mirage,
with over 100 Mirage Ills and 5s. The Mirage IIIO is the Royal Australian Air Force's standard interceptor fighter
Mirage
and South Africa flies a single squadron of III interceptors and tactical reconnaissance
versions. In South America France has found a particularly buoyant export market for the Mirage. Brazil flies Mirage IIIEBRs, Venezuela operates a mixed squadron of Mirage III and Mirage 5 interceptors, Colombia also has an interceptor squadron, Peru, has a two-squadron group of Mirage 5Ps and Chile has ordered 1 6 Mirage 50s to equip a single squadron.
Mirage
in the
Argentina
Mirages
is
Falklands most recent nation
the
to
use
its
combat. Estimates vary of the numbers in service during the 1982 Falklands War, but it is known that a single fighter squadron was equipped with Mirage IIIEAs and two squadrons flew IAI Daggers (exported Israeli Neshers). Further Mirages are believed to have been supplied by Peru during the conflict. Whatever the numbers engaged, the Argentine Air Force failed to maintain the Mirage's hitherto impressive combat record, losing 27 and not claiming one British fighter in return. The main reason for this was that the Mirages, operating from Argentina's southernmost airfields, were some 740km (400 nautical miles) from the Falklands. With an operating radius of around 930km (500 nautical miles) the Mirages had insufficient fuel to fly to the area of operations, engage in combat (with the afterburner making heavy demands on fuel) and be reasonably certain of returning to base. And so the Argentinians adopted hit-and-run tactics, with little serious attempt to engage Britain's Sea Harriers in combat. After 20 years of front-line service the Mirage III design has been overtaken by fighters of a later generation and is now on the point of retirement from the sophisticated air arms of the developed nations. However, in the Third World it remains a highlyeffective warplane and to exploit this market the Mirage IIING has been developed. The Nouvelle Generation Mirage is powered by the Atar 9K-50 and is fitted with canard foreplanes to improve manoeuvrability. The Mirage III could therefore remain a fighter to be reckoned with until the year 2000. in
The varied armaments capable of being carried by the Mirage are clearly
shown
here:
30mm
cannon (and cannon pods), guided and unguided missiles and an assortment of 'iron' bombs. The operational
flexibility of
Mirage has allowed in
a
it
the
to act
number of roles
including single-seat interceptor, all-weather
fighter
bomber,
reconnaissance aircraft and ground-attack aircraft.
Dassault-Breguet Mirage 50 Type Multi-role fighter aircraft Dimensions Span 8.22m (27ft); (52ft);
length
1
5.84m
height 4.50m (14ft 9in)
Weight Empty 7200kg
(15,8751b);
maximum
loaded 13,700kg (30,2101b) Powerplant One 7200kg (1 5,8751b) static thrust, with afterburning, SNECMA Atar 9K-50 turbojet
Performance (36,000ft)
Maximum speed at 1,000m 1
Mach 2.2; maximum speed at low level
1390km/h (750 knots)
Range Combat radius, ground-attack mission 1300km (700 nautical miles) Ceiling 18,000m (60,000ft)
Armament Two 30mm DEFA cannon with
125 rounds per gun and up to 4000kg (88001b) of ordnance on four wing hardpoints and fuselage centreline, including Matra 550 Magic and Matra 530 air-to-air missiles, 400kg and 250kg bombs, 68mm rocket pods, 1300 litre (286 gallon), 500 litre (110 gallon) or 250 litre (55 gallon) auxiliary fuel tanks.
Down MiG all Aerial
combat over Korea
When the North Korean
People's
Army thrust across
South Korea on 25 June 1950 it was supported by a small air force comprising a fighter regiment and a ground attack regiment, backed up by a training regiment. This force had been trained and equipped by the Soviet Union. At the outbreak of hostilities it had a strength of 70 pistonengined fighters (Yak-3s, Yak-7s, Yak-9s and La7s). around 60 11-10 ground-attack aircraft and some 30 second-line trainers. The North Korean pilots, although for the most part young and inexperienced, were confident and aggressive. Their confidence was certainly justified insofar as South Korea's air arm was concerned: they were opposed by merely a dozen training and liaison aircraft. The nearest United States Air Force (USAF) combat units were based in Japan, where the Fifth Air Force had the primary mission of air defence. This task was carried out by three jet-fighter wings, equipped with the Lockheed F-80C Shooting Star. They were the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing at Itazuke, the 49th Fighter-Bomber Wing at Misawa and the 35th Fighter-Interceptor Wing at Yokota. Two AllWeather Fighter Squadrons (the 68th at Itazuke and the 359th at Yokota) flew piston-engined F-82 Twin the 38th parallel into
Mustangs and the 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron was equipped with RF-80As at Yokota. The 3rd Bombardment Wing operated two squadrons of twin-engined B-26 Invaders from Johnson Air Base near Tokyo and air transport was provided by the C-i 4s of the 374th Troop Carrier Wing at Tachikawa. Twd other subordinate commands supplemented the Fifth Air Force. They were the Twentieth Air Force based on Okinawa, which also controlled a wing of B-29 Superfortress bombers on Guam, and the Thirteenth Air Force which flew from the Philippines. The USAF's first task in South Korea was to provide cover for the merchant ships evacuating American civilians from Inchon and Seoul. Fighter patrols of F-82 Twin Mustangs operated in relays over the port of Inchon, because the F-80C jets had insufficient range for this duty when operating from their bases in Japan On 27 June, with North Korean troops nearing Seoul, an airlift evacuation was hastily mounted by C-54s and C-47s. The transport aircraft were escorted by F-82s. with F-80Cs flying top cover as their fuel consumption was not so great at high altitudes. It was the F-82s which first saw action that day, shooting down three North Korean Yak fighters which attempted to strafe Kimpo airfield Later in the
Aircrew stand by as these
F4U Corsairs of the US Marine Corps prepare to take off in an attack against the Korean mainland from the
USS Philippine Sea.
.
.
369
.
KOREA
.
1951-53
day the F-80Cs successfully intercepted a formation of eight II- 10s and shot down four of the enemy attack aircraft These fighter actions enabled 748 refugees to be evacuated by air, while a further 905 left by sea. In the meantime, President Harry Truman had decided to commit American air and naval forces in support of the South Koreans, a decision closely followed by a United Nations' resolution urging member nations to provide military aid for the South The only immediate assistance in prospect for the hard-pressed South Korean Army was the air support that could be provided by the US Far East Air Forces In an attempt to halt the North Korean advance on .
the line of the
Han River south of Seoul
the Fifth Air
,
Force's fighters and bombers were ordered to attack
enemy forces moving south from the 38th parallel. The F-80Cs were operating at extreme range and so carried no bombs or rockets underwing, yet their 0.5in machine guns proved to be effective against the
North Korean columns which crowded the roads heading south. The B-29 Superfortresses of the Guam-based 19th Bombardment Wing had moved forward to Okinawa and they directed their 9075kg (20,0001b) bomb loads against enemy troops and their supplies. The C-54 transports of the 374th Troop Carrier Wing airlifted urgently-needed ammunition to the South Korean Army, flying in some 200 tonnes per day until supplies began to arrive by sea. As well as attempting to slow down the North Korean Army's advance, the Far East Air Forces also had to deal with the enemy air force .This had made its presence
felt in
a series of attacks
on
airfields in the
On
28 June marauding Yaks had damaged a C-54 over Suwon and destroyed a second on the ground there, threatening to close the airfield to the USAF unless friendly fighter cover could be provided. As a result the Far East Air Forces were authorised to attack enemy airfields north of the 38th South.
parallel.
The first attack was mounted by B-26s of the 3rd Bombardment Wing on 29 June, which knocked out some 25 enemy aircraft on the ground at Pyongyang and shot down the only North Korean fighter which attempted to intercept. Air action against North Korean airfields continued throughout July the Fifth Air Force's attacks being supplemented by carrier strikes flown from USS Valley Forge and Triumph. By ,
HMS
the end of the
month
the North
Korean Air Force had
virtually ceased to exist, with
UN
pilots
claiming
more than 00 enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground 1
or in the
370
air.
Top left: Bombed-up and fuelled-up, two Vought F4U Corsairs await fina clearance before take-off.
Above: HMS Ocean speeds on her way to Korea.
A considerable part
of the United Nations in Korea was provided by Britain. Right: Naval airpowerwas extremely important to the UN forces. This Grumman F9F Panther jet is firmly secured to the deck of the
forces
USS Philippine Sea.
KOREA The
UN
British naval presence
call for assistance.
commit
The
was
in
1951-53
response to the
Fleet Air
Arm was
to
Sea Fury and Firefly piston-engined naval aircraft to the war, flying from the aircraft carriers HMS Glory, HMS Ocean, HMS Theseus and HMS Triumph. Similarly, Australia provided a fighter squadron for service in Korea - No 77 Squadron RAAF, which was initially equipped with pistonengined Mustangs and later flew twin-jet GToster Meteor fighters on air combat and ground-attack missions. South Africa assigned No 2 Squadron SAAF to the conflict, flying Mustangs and later F-86F Sabres. Although these allied air units - and also South Korean Mustang fighters - fought alongside the Americans, it was the combat squadrons of the USAF, the US Navy and US Marine Corps which Seafire,
bore the brunt of the air war. Air power alone could not stem the communist advance, however, and by the end of June the Han
River defences were breached and the North Korean
Army pressed on towards the strategic port of Pusan at Korean peninsula. It was at this American troops were committed to the conflict and the 374th Troop Carrier Wing began to fly the US Army's 24th Infantry Division into Pusan. Clearly air support of ground forces was going to be of vital importance and the Fifth Air Force began to rectify the shortcomings in its equipment and tactics the southeast tip of the
stage that
that the early operations
had revealed.
Problems with
airfields Since the outward and return flights from bases in Japan consumed so much fuel it was obviously worth ,
considering using airfields in South Korea either as
forward airfields where Japanese-based aircraft could land to refuel and rearm or as bases in their own right The problem was that the South Korean airfields had been built by the Japanese in World War II and, until ,
resurfaced by
US
aviation engineers, were totally
unsuitable for operations by jet fighters.
A short-term
was the introduction of the F-5 1 Mustang into the combat theatre. This piston-engined veteran of World War II had both the range and warload to operate effectively in the close air-support role. It was also capable of using the South Korean airfields, as was demonstrated by a small force of 10 F-5 Is which were pressed into service as close air-support aircraft at the end of June. A further 145 F-5 Is were withdrawn from Air National Guard units in the solution
Insettop: British Seafire
crowd the deck of Triumph as she
aircraft
HMS
makes herway through Korean waters. Above: The
most important moments priortoa mission are during the pre-flight briefing,
when flight
formations, strategy and targets are discussed in
United States and shipped out to Korea. By the beginning of August 1950 the ground battle for Pusan was underway and the fighter-bomber squadrons of the Fifth Air Force were heavily committed to close air support of the UN forces. Offshore the carriers of Task Force 77, USS Valley Forge and USS Philippine Sea, mounted close air-support and
Even the B-29 Superfortresses were thrown into the fray. By this time four US-based B-29 units had been transferred to the Far East and so 98 of these four-engined bombers could be put into the air on 15 August for a saturation bombing raid on North Korean troop concentrations near Pusan. The need to coordinate and control close airinterdiction missions.
full.
support missions led to the introduction of airborne
L-5 Sentinel liaison airequipped with VHF radios. It was soon discovered that the L-5s lacked the performance necessary for this demanding and dangerous role and so the task was taken over by faster T-6 Texan trainers. tactical coordinators, flying
craft
371
KOREA
1951-53
Code-named Mosquitoes these aircraft continued for the remainder of the war to coordinate armed,
reconnaissance and those battlefield-support strikes which could not be directed from the ground.
Many
of the problems of close air support and were resolved by the introduction of the
interdiction
F-84 Thunderjet into the combat theatre
in
December
1950. This versatile jet fighter-bomber combined good range characteristics - 1080km (670 miles)
when carrying wingtip tanks - with a heavy armament of six 5in machine guns plus up to 1 8 1 0kg (40001b) of bombs or rockets. This meant that the F-84s could carry out armed reconnaissance, close air-support or iterdiction missions with equal facility and they had range, firepower and manoeuvrability to fly bom.
missions.
iployment of B-29 bombers varied accordjyjgctical situation. Their use against North concentrations was somewhat conins probable that the mass attack
few enemy
icted i
casualties.
factor)' targets for the
One bom-
gic targets in North Korea,
var material were in Jnion, J-2 C)
napalm and
uicking.
With China the B-29s came undc tors
which the
Below: Air support works with ground forces as a Marine Corsair hits an enemy position with
when
in i
1
5 intercep-
Korea and were
operating
forced to switch to night ail
bombing techniques. As
October 1950,
MiG-
ected the
communist night de-
in efficiency, escorts of Marine F3D Skyknight and US AF F-94 Starfire night fighters wei provided and the B-29s began using electronic counSl
fences improved
I
pulls out.
By the end of the war the Superhad flown over 21,000 sorties and had dropped some 1 67 ,000 tonnes of bombs for the loss of 34 aircraft. Interdiction sorties which sought to destroy enemy reinforcements and supplies before they reached the battlefront had been an important element in the Far East Air Force's campaign to stem the North Korean advance on Pusan. Yet in early September this offensive had lost its momentum and the UN forces' breakout from Pusan, coupled with the amphibious landings at Inchon, had led to the virtual collapse of the North Korean Army. Thereafter the advance of the UN forces was rapid and by the end of October they had occupied most of North Korea. At this juncture the Chinese communists entered the war and their massed ground assaults drove the UN forces back into South Korea. The line then stabilised south of Suwon and Wonju and the conflict degenerated into a war of attrition. Under these circumstances air interdiction came into its own. The B-29 Superfortresses operated against targets deep in the North such as bridges, supply centres and troop concentrations. Road and rail traffic movtermeasures. fortresses
ing south, usually
KOREA Left:
US Air Force B-26
light
bombers release
1951-53
their quarter-ton
high-explosive
bombs
over communist targets North Korea.
in
Right: With noses pointed towards theirtargets, a flight of US Navy Sky Raiders, which were renowned for their heavy weapon loads and long endurance, release their wing rockets at North Korean field positions.
under cover of darkness, came under attack from B-26 Invaders. They had little in the way of specialised night-attack equipment, but could often use the headlights of enemy truck convoys as bomb-aiming points. Alternatively the target area could be illumin-
ated by flares dropped from 'Lightning Bug' C-47s. The flares usually ignited at about 1 675m (5500 feet)
down beneath their parachutes, they provided four to five minutes of brilliant illumination On Floating
.
the first occasion that they ist
were used,
thirty
trucks were claimed as destroyed or
commundamaged.
Finally, the tactical fighter-bombers took their toll of
enemy
troops and supplies. During five days of the communist Chinese advance southwards (1-5 January 1951), Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers, flying
armed reconnaissance missions behind the front line claimed 8000 communist troops as casualties. The total
number of
by air attack 40.000 troops.
casualties inflicted
during the advance was estimated
at
Red raids at night Communist attempts
to carry out air attacks
on
UN
Changes in the air
US B-29s over North Korea.
troops were limited to night-time nuisance raids by
'Bedcheck Charlies'. These were usually antiquated Polikarpov Po-2 biplanes armed with light bombs. Only occasionally were their attacks more than pinpricks, although on the night of 16/17 June 1951 two Po-2s did succeed in destroying one of the 4th FighterInterceptor
Wing's F-86 Sabres and damaged a
further eight.
The slow-flying biplanes operated
at
low level and were difficult to intercept by radarequipped night fighters. However, piston-engined F4U Corsair and F7F Tigercat night fighters of the US Marine Corps enjoyed some successes against them. Other types flown on night intruder missions included Yak- 1 8 trainers and La- 1 1 fighters. One of the most significant results of China's entry into the war was the resurgence of communist air power. MiG-15 jet fighters operating from airfields around Antung in Manchuria, which was off-limits to American air attack, quickly established an ascendancy over the piston-engined B-29 bombers flying daylight missions in northwestern Korea. The MiG-
The air war in Korea differed in several" respects from World War although
World War
II,
operations
II.
Extensive
were the
jet fighter
great innovation
similarities persisted of course. Pis-
of Korea, with jet-powered F-80s
ton-engined veterans of the earlier
F-84s undertaking close air-support
notably the F-51 Mustang, B-26 Invader and B-29 Superfortress, all served in Korea. Yet, apart from the
and
conflict,
Invader's
interdiction
which were out
similar to
in Italy in
War
It,
the
final
they were employed
different
in
a quite
manner.
for
close
air
support
World War
whereas
in
served
bomber
in
periority roles.
mand of the air. Unlike World
War
II,
Korea
II
was
a
limited war and all strategic and tactical
targets
ion
were
in
China and the Soviet Un-
off-limits to
UN
air attack.
Nevertheless, the battle for
The Mustangs were used principally
interdiction missions, while F-86
Sabres battled with MiG-1 5s for com-
operations,
those carried year of World
and
iority
was
quickly
won and
air
super-
a higher
Korea,
proportion of tactical aircraft could be
they had
allocated to close air support and inter-
in
escort and air suThe B-29s were used
diction targets than in
when
principally against interdiction targets
factor to
rather than strategic objectives as
1944.
in
World War
the Axis fighter force
be reckoned with
was
II,
a
until late in
373
.
KOREA
1951-53
15's bid for air superiority did not
go uncontested,
however. In November 1950 the F-86A Sabres of the USAF's 4th Fighter-Interceptor Wing left the United States for Japan aboard the aircraft carrier USS Cape Esperance. By mid-December the first F-86As were operating from Kimpo in South Korea and on 17 December Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce Hinton scored the first of nearly 800 victories over MiG- 15s which be claimed by Sabres during the war. The Sabre's combat record in Korea was by any
were
to
standards impressive.
claimed by
USAF
Of
900
the
aerial victories
pilots during the war,
792 were
MiG- 15s shot down by Sabres The MiGs in their turn managed to knock down only 78 Sabres. American .
fighter pilots thus established a ten-to-one kill/loss
This result was by no means were handicapped in several when compared with their opponents ways When operating over northwestern Korea, in an area soon to be christened 'MiG Alley', the Sabres were limited in their endurance. An F-86A with full internal fuel and two 545 litre ( 20 gallon) drop tanks was restricted to some 20 minutes over the Yalu River, whereas the MiG- 15s were within a few minutes' flying time of their bases in Manchuria. This situation worsened in January 1951 when the Chinese advance forced the 4th FIW's Sabres to evacuate Kimpo and withdraw to Japan. The Chinese Air Force did not fully exploit this temporary advantage, however, and by the end of the month the situation on the ground had stabilised sufficiently for the South ratio in their favour.
easily
won,
as the Sabres
1
Korean
be put back into operation ThereF-86s continued to operate from Suwon and Kimpo. Early in 1952 a second Sabre wing, the 51st airfields to
.
after, the
FIW commanded by the World War II ace Francis Gabreski, joined the air battles over the Yalu River. Apart from the Sabre's range problems, it was also inferior to the
MiG-
1
5 in various aspects of perform-
was generally considered to be the better aircraft. The MiG could outclimb the Sabre at all altitudes, whereas the latter ance, although on balance the F-86
was marginally
faster in level flight.
greater operational ceiling gave
The MiG-15's
advantage had a greater initial acceleration in a dive, the heavier Sabre had the advantage in a sustained dive. The MiG's zoom climb and
combat, yet although
in
it
an
initial
it
tight turning characteristics (except at
high speeds)
were valuable, but the fighter's good points were counterbalanced by such undesirable features as poor control at high speeds, a low rate of roll and directional instability at high altitudes. Its heavy armament (two 23mm and one 37mm cannon) was better suited to
bomber
interception than to fighter-versus-fighter
combat; but the Sabre's six 0.5in machine guns, while having a faster rate of fire lacked the range and hitting power necessary for jet combat. Sabres operating in "MiG Alley' faced large formations of 50 to 70 enemy fighters flying at heights of 15,250m (50,000 feet) or more which the American fighters could not match. This meant that the US fighter pilots had to evolve tactics to cope with a 'bounce' by fast flying MiGs diving down on them ,
'
MiG versus Sabre 'Zoom and sun'
'Hit and run'
o
^ 2.
3. 3.
As Sabres
give chase tothefirst
two MiGs the
MiGsmakeone
MiGs hiding
inthesunat
attacking pass and evade surviving
15,240m 50,000ft) spot Sabre formation and dive into the
Sabres by pulling up sharply and climbing back into the sun
remaining
attack
two swoop into the
attack from
behind
1.
^»ZZ/?
\JT F-86A-5 Sabre
1
ISAF Sabre formation
patrolling at
12,200m (40,000ft)
type si ngle-seat fighter ferry range 1693km
max speed at 10,670m 967km/h (601mph) maxrateof climb 2277m/min (7470ft/min) service ceiling 14,630m (48,000ft) armament 6 (1052 miles)
(35,000ft)
M3
machine guns, underwing 0.5in hardpointsfor 5in rockets, napalm tanks or up to 908kg (20001b) bombs
MiG-
type single-seat fighter ferry range 2000km
max speed at 1 2,200m (40,000ft)1076km/h(668mph) maxrateof climb 2760m/min (9055ft/min) service ceiling 15,550m (51,000ft) armament 2 23mm NS-23 cannon, 1 37mm N-37 cannon, underwing hardpointsfor up to (1250 miles)
500kg
374
(11001b) stores
1951-53
Left:
US Sabres on the
ground and
the
in
air.
They
arrived in Korea in 1952.
Above: The end for a MiG-1 5. These pictures were taken from the Sabre which shot it down.
from high altitude at a time and place of the enemy's choosing. The solution was the 'jet stream' of 16 Sabres divided into four-aircraft flights, each of
which entered 'MiG Alley' at five minute intervals and at different altitudes between 8200 and 10,050m (27,000 and 33,000 feet). The Sabres flew at high speed (typically Mach 0.87) so that as soon as one flight was engaged by the MiGs, the others could rapidly converge on the combat The flights adopted a 'fluid four' tactical formation, comprising two element leaders each covered by a wingman. So, .
Sabre ace The
tactical
in
skill,
Korea experience and per-
although operating
at a
considerable
initial
MiGs.
disadvan-
the mutually-
sonal qualities of individual fighter
tage against the high-flying
was an important factor in the Sabre-versus-MiG battles over the
supporting Sabre formations were able to meet the MiGs' 'bounce' with a vigorous counter-attack.
pilots
Yalu River.
If jet-versus-jet
The Korean War Sabre pilot was an 'old man' by the standards of World
War
1
1
fighter pilots, the average
age in
the earlier conflict being 23 to 25 while in
Korea
The
it
was 30.
wounded being
American ace of the Korean War, Captain Joseph McConnell, conformed to this trend. Aged 30 years and a former navigator on B-24 McConnell Liberators in World War joined the
Wing
in
51st Fighter-Interceptor
He of them
the autumn of 1952.
It's
called the "hit
four
and run".
A flight of
MiGs would break down
two elements wiih the diving
down on
overshooting.
first
into the
element
us and intentionally
we were
While
just
attempting to
five
enemy
the
on the first element, the second would come down and close rapidly on us from 6 o'clock. This time was sure it was a set up and followed. They lost their timing and jumped on the tail of one of them and really poured the fire to him. Smoke came ploughed right from his tail and
first
of
fighters,
1
becoming
USAF's 27th ace of the war. On 1953 his aircraft was damaged by anti-aircraft fire and McConnell 1
April
was forced to bale out over the Yellow Sea. He was quickly picked up by the 3rd Air Rescue Squadron and four
days later scored his ninth victory. McConnell's last three victories were gained during two sorties on 1
May
1
953.
He
recalled the final
kill
of
the day. '[The MiGs] tried to decoy me in
a neat trick, but their timing was off.
carried in panniers attached to the
pull into a firing position
I
I
I
I
The MiG [pilot] then pulled opened his speed brakes and
through up,
it.
baled out'
flying
in
shot
ky
to receive
down behind communist lines US Navy Sikors-
H03S
.
helicopters operating from carriers carried
out similar missions. Army and Marine Corps helicopters operated as airborne command posts and on
observation duties, and H-19 transport helicopters were used for troop and cargo transport.
When
Korean War ended on 27 July 1953 the air units of the USAF, US Navy, US Marine Corps and allied air forces had flown 1,040,708 sorties. They had succeeded in mastering the enemy air forces to such an extent that the UN ground forces had seldom come under air attack. Conversely communist troops were harassed night and day by allied air attacks ranging in scope from massed raids by B-29 bombers to strafing runs by fighter-bombers Tactical air power was therefore a key weapon in the Korean the
.
McConnell survived tour but
wound-
speedy medical attention at field hospitals and so reduced fatalities. USAF H-5 and Sikorsky H-19 helicopters were used for combat rescue missions, including the recovery of airmen
ed troops
6 kills (all MiG-1 5s) on 1 4 January 1 953. In over a month he destroyed scored the
combat was the most
sides of the helicopter fuselage. This enabled
leading
II,
fighter
dramatic innovation of the Korean air war, then the combat service of the helicopter in Korea was equally significant. Casualty evacuation was undertaken by Sikorsky H-5s, Bell OH- 13s and Hiller H-23s, the
1
954 was
his
killed
the F-86H Sabre.
combat
while test-
because it enabled the UN forces successfully to counter massed attacks by vastly more numerous Anthony Robinson communist ground forces conflict,
375
.
,
Stalemate and slaughter
The final The
first
battles of the
year of the war in Korea witnessed the most
violent and dramatic changes in fortune.
The
initial,
unheralded North Korean attack in June 1950 almost succeeded in swallowing up the whole of South Korea, but then, with the arrival of the first of the UN forces in July, the tables were turned. The North Korean People's Army (NKPA) was subsequently destroyed and its remnants driven back deep into
North Korea. There followed the headlong dash of the UN troops to reach the Yalu River which marked the frontier between Korea and China. This rapid advance was, in turn, stemmed by the entrance of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) to the conflict in October. The UN formations moved back in some disorder to well south of the 38th parallel where they eventually halted and began to advance again using such a weight of firepower that this phase of operations came to be known as the 'meatgrinder' Despite major CPV offensives aimed at halting the meatgrinder and destroying the UN armies, the latter advanced remorselessly onwards until, by June 1 95 1 they were in a position once again to cross the 38th parallel and finally to destroy the communist forces. The new commander of the UN forces in the field, Lieutenant-General James Van Fleet, certainly thought he could do so and had plans prepared which would, he thought, bring complete victory to the UN within a matter of months. Political decisions intervened, however, and he and his men were not granted the chance to prove themselves. President Truman had earlier sacked General MacArthur because he feared the consequences of his plan for all-out war against communist China, which might in turn lead to World War III. Truman was determined to pursue a policy of limited war designed not to destroy communism but rather to
376
Korean War
KOREA A US Marine prepares
Left:
hilltop
a
slit
1951-53
defences as he digs
trench.
background
In
battle for Pork
the
lies
an
Chop
18 April 1953
abandoned M4 Sherman. Below left: American and
Chinese attack 16 April
Greek troops relax after
US counter-attack 17 April US counter-attack 18 April
their successful offensive
against a Korean hilltop position. While C-rations litter
the side of the hill, a lookout is still maintained for a possible counter-
During the negotiations of 1953, hill battles along the MLR became a test of wills. Every hill won by the
offensive. Below:
South Koreans man a 0.3in Browning machine gun aboard a river patrol boat
communists made them more stubborn intheirdemandssothat Pork Chop assumed a wider political significance over and above the purely
on the Han
military.
River.
hill
On the night of 16 April the was held by two platoons of the
31st Regiment, 7th US Infantry Division. Despite a clear and starlit night, the Chinese surprised the US positions with their speed and stealth.
Before the alarm could be sounded they had swamped the defences and by 0200 hours Pork Chop had fallen. Attempts to relieve it during 17 April met with little success. The relief forces were pinned down and by evening the situation looked grim. The decision was made to counterattack. Two companies of the 17th US Infantry stormed the hill and by 0250 hours Pork Chop had been retaken.
Following page (left): A US Marine ducks as explosives destroy a North Korean bunker. Following page (right):
Colonel
James
Murray and Colonel Chang Chun San sign demarcation agreements during the ceasefire
in
July
1953.
The 38th parallel proved to be the end of the road for the UN forces. It was here that they would hold the
were later moved to Panmunjom At first hopes were high on the UN side that, with all parties seemingly in agreement, a resolution of the conflict might quickly
while the politicians strove to achieve a peace if this was not possible, at least an
be achieved. Unfortunately this was not to be. for there now ensued more than two years of talks.
contain
line
it
within
its
existing boundaries.
.
settlement or, armistice.
Having gained the 38th
Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered
Van
parallel the
Fleet to halt
US
where
he was and to carry out only very limited operations where he considered it necessary to seize dominant
ground features. These orders were not lost to either the Chinese or Soviet leadership and when the UN Secretary General called on both sides to seek a peaceful settlement of the war the response was almost immediate. On 23 June 1951 the Soviet delegate to the UN was heard on a radio broadcast
Union considered the time two sides in Korea to arrange a ceasefire. A few days later a broadcast from Peking confirmed that the Chinese were of the same mind. There soon followed the first indications that the US and its allies would welcome such a possibility. Discussions began on 10 July in Korea at the town of to say that the Soviet
was ripe
for the
Kaesong, just north of the UN front line; the meetings
,
KOREA
1951-53
Inevitably, as the weeks turned into months and months into years, disillusionment set in - and nowhere more forcefully than in the UN front line. While the talks stumbled forward in fits and starts the UN forces continued to wage war on the enemy, though always under very tight constraints. The fighting was fierce and often on a very large scale; and
enemy
yet the initiative could not be seized to deal the
a decisive blow. In
August 195 1 following an apparent impasse
in
,
the ceasefire talks
,
Van Fleet was authorised to mount
a limited offensive against the North and, as a result, were put under severe pressure the CPV and
NKPA
time since the negotiations had initially been mooted. In the next three months a major shift of forces was the front line favourable to the effected. Success was achieved only by dint of ferocious fighting in many areas along the whole length of for the
first
UN
the front.
By the end
of October, probably as a result of this some progress had been made in the talks. The North agreed that the ceasefire line should be along the actual point of contact of the opposing military pressure
,
forces rather than the 38th parallel as they had pre-
viously insisted.
communists was conwere they being put under pressure along the front line, they were also faced with attacks from various other sources. They had to
The
military threat to the
siderable, for not only
retain garrisons in coastal areas to the rear of their
where it was thought that the UN might launch amphibious operations. Further, the war was actively prosecuted at sea by the UN as its navies carried out front
bombardments against
Night encounter 'As dark
fell,
passed with
I
slowness of an action replay. am sure it happened like this. was on my knees, holding a second grenade in my right hand ready for throwing. My left hand was ing
my two
soldiers through the front trench of
the front platoon, out of the
last
I
'I
machine-gun post, and down through the gap in the wire to the track across
from
the minefield that led to no-man's-
where the
From the front platoon three men were detailed off to show us the way through the wire and the mines. We were half-way through the minefield, down the slope where our
pearl
land.
own people could no longer see, when the Chinese caught us. They must have moved in the night and removing the mines one by one, and lain there all day waiting for dusk and an unwary before, detecting
English fighting
in
patrol.
In
the dark
it
close-quarter
is
best to start by
throwing hand-grenades, since you can't fire a
gun without a
betrays your own position. patrol into the
flash that
As
I
led
my
ambush their first flight
my right shin and my scalp. Then theyfired, the groaning bursts of what we
of grenades cracked
slashed short
knew as burp guns, from yards off. My own first grenade went off between two of them, and they went 1
over.
The next
now,
in
378
part
my mind,
happens to
with the clear,
me glid-
reaching to this
remove the
grenade. only
In
light
safety-pin
the darkness,
came from
the
dusk above the trees and the
flash of gunfire,
I
sawa man in a British
helmet - one of my escorting party- aim and fire his Sten gun point steel
blank
at
my
chest.
My
left
arm
seemed caught in a hurricane of wind, a gust fluttered the arm away from my body, the man firing fell back, another man fell forward by me. .
.
.
'My escort had shot
a
Chinese
sol-
who was standing behind me about to fire at my head. Indoingsohe had also shot me across the chest,
dier
from which the flected by
bullets
were de-
my flak jacket into my arm.
Then somebody
in
turn shot him.
I
my knees, unable to walk because of my broken leg, with the grenade in my right hand, the safety-
was
pin still
still
on
place, and enemy soldiers moving where they had been be-
still in
fore.'
Harman, who served Korea as a 1 9-year-old conscript. Nicholas
range and,
when
the
coastal targets within their
moment seemed
opportune,
placed North Korea's major ports under blockade, thereby hindering supplies to the front-line troops. effort was in progress at this In the air a major
UN
The
was
North's lines of an attempt to halt resupply of the front. The bombing was pursued relentlessly but with little obvious success: the huge labour battalions in the North managed, using every
time.
intention
to attack the
communication, both road and
rail, in
ingenious device, to overcome the problems that and mangled railway lines presented to
pitted roads
them.
On
1
2 November 1951,
Van Fleet was told to cease
offensive operations and to concentrate on defending the front line
where
become known
(MLR)
was to Main Line of Resistance
his forces stood. This line
as the
MLR
and to His orders were to strengthen the attacks; he was allowed to establish outposts up to only 5000m (5470 yards) forward of his .
counter
enemy
main positions.
As a result of this order, issued simply for the purpose of pursuing the ceasefire negotiations, the pressure on the CPV and NKPA was much reduced and during the period November to December 1951 both sides settled down to the serious business of strengthening their positions The Chinese and North .
Koreans constructed an incredibly elaborate labybunkers and deep underground back from their forward troops to a depth of 22km ( 1 4 miles) The UN troops made similar preparations though their earthworks were much simpler. These systems introduced something almost resembling the trench warfare of World War I into Korea. It was said that the Chinese rinth of trenches,
shelters which, in places, stretched
.
in
KOREA artillery was so deeply entrenched that it could not have been brought out for an advance or withdrawal even if such a move had been contemplated. For the next 18 months this situation persisted as the armistice negotiations moved slowly forward. Most battles and there were many were for control of ,
,
by both sides. The fighting was nonetheless fierce and often involved large numbers. Most of the battles fought were linked to the names of the outposts over which they took place and thev continued right up to the end of the war
lions
One particular action was
,
withstand losses unacceptable in any other army.
So the war dragged mercilessly on to its close as the
it
developed,
importance. Pork
5?
••
•*
fought for a single small
it
Chop
Hill
fighting continued, with the hill changing hands again and again until the Americans finally seized it back and held on to it. In July, only two weeks before the armistice was signed, the Chinese launched a final assault. At one stage the Americans had five batta-
-
-»Sk
final details
Despite the
of the armistice were hammered out. nature of the previous two years of
static
fighting the toll in casualties had steadily mounted and
more were suffered by both
sides after the ceasefire
mobile warfare
that
preceded them
military significance and yet, as the
little
became of great symbolic was the name of the feature and normally it was manned by fewer than 1 00 men. In April 1953 the post was attacked by a Chinese unit and captured. During the next two days bitter battle for
full
seemed no end to the escalation and the US forces withdrew in the knowledge that when it came to casualties the Chinese seemed prepared to division. There
negotiations had started than during the year of
July 1953.
feature of
deployed on a feature suitable for one company,
while the Chinese were poised to attack with a
the outpost positions established
in
1951-53
Negotiating the There were three the two years of between the two
armistice main areas of dissension during peace sides
talks: the fixing
of a line
which would allow
for the
of a demilitarised zone after hostilities ceased; arrangements for putting a ceasefire and ultimately an armistice into effect, including agreecreation
ment on neutral states to supervise arrangements; and agreements on the repatriation of prisoners of war. The delineation of a demarcation line which allowed for a demilitarised zone after fighting stopped was finally agreed on 27 November 1951 soon after Van Fleet's surge of activity in September and October. Arrangements for a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission took much longer, however, and hinged on the obviously sensitive issues as to which nations should make up the commission and what freedom of movement their supervisory teams would have on both sides of the front line in North and South Korea. ,
At
first
the
communist delegation
insisted that the
Soviet Union should be a member of the commission,
and although no Russian troops were known to have been involved in the war the United States could hardly accept the suggestion. It was finally dropped and, following concessions by the Americans, the problem of how to supervise the truce was resolved on 25 May 1952. There now remained one major hurdle to be cleared: the arrangements for the exchange of prisoners after the cessation of hostilities. Both sides were intensely suspicious of each other's arguments on this question. The communists at first demanded compul-
war but the UN The problem was numbers of Chinese and North Korean
sory repatriation of
The armistice
all
prisoners of
delegation refused to accept this.
NORTH KOREA
27 July 1953
that large
had indicated forcefully
that
they did not wish for repatriation but preferred to
start
soldiers taken prisoner
Ji (JT
a new
•Pyonggang V
life
outside the
Accordingly the
communist world.
UN
delegation clung stubbornly
to the principle of voluntary repatriation / •
,
/
Chorwon
\o
A
•
Kumhwa
&
\
r
Y?
U
/J
\3>
regime, did not
J
\J
38
Kaesong >
for the
now wish to return to it. The dilemma
UN negotiators was that voluntary repatriation
was a double-edged weapon for, the communists had not returned
(fanm injom
\
which was
unacceptable to the communists, who could scarcely explain to the world how it was that many of their soldiers, having tasted life under a communist totally
if all
it
was found
that
UN men known
have been taken prisoner, they had little to counter communist argument that the shortfall arose because some did not wish to return to a capitalist society. In the end compromise was reached on this thorny matter on 8 June 1953 and this led the way to the signing, on 27 July 1953, of the full armistice agreement which at last brought the war to an end. to
/-/
VSS^
ff
Munsan
CxC
the
SOUTH KOREA Uijongbu
s^v
/^^^
Seoul
demarcation [
~J
line
demilitarised zone
Major F. A. Godfrey 379
'
The uncertain
.
status of prisoners of war
The welfare of prisoners of war (POW) - sometimes, indeed, their very survival - depends upon a series of international agreements
known
collectively as the
Geneva Convention. Originally drawn up
in
1929,
it
established a code of conduct for the safekeeping of
war captives by signatory
nations.
The agencies
responsible for overseeing the implementation are the International
Red Cross and
Power, a
the Protecting
neutral state agreeable to undertaking the responsibility.
The United
among
States,
Sweden and Switzerland
the nations that, at
are
one time or another, have
assumed In World War II the spirit of the Geneva Convention was reasonably well observed in western Europe However, on 18 October 1942 Hitler issued his notorious Kommandobefehl directive. The gist of it was that commandos and any other troops captured this role.
committing clandestine raids and acts of sabotage should be 'ruthlessly exterminated'. 'Should it prove advisable to spare one or two men for interrogation purposes,' the document went on, 'they are to be shot immediately after their interrogation.
The directive was quickly November 1942, 32 soldiers set
enforced. off in
two
On
19
gliders to
destroy the heavy-water plant used for nuclear research in the Telemark Mountains of Norway.
The
weather was bad; the pilots mistook their positions and crashed. Of the survivors, the injured were poisoned by the Gestapo as they lay in hospital. The rest spent nearly a month under interrogation. Then they were shot. Several other similar incidents took place. All the men had been wearing uniforms; all were recognisably members of the armed forces. They should have been protected by the Geneva Convention, which Germany had ratified.
380
.
So far as the Russian front was concerned, the Convention was regarded by both sides as an irrelevant scrap of paper. In the Far East, although Japanese representatives had attended the Geneva Conference of 1929, their government had never ratified its terms. Nor can their interest have been anything more than academic According to Japanese culture, a warrior had two alternatives: he could be victorious, or he could die in battle. To become a .
POW
was
the ultimate degredation. Accordingly,
contempt for their captives resulted in appalling cruelties and casualties: some from neglect, others from torture and execution. When the Burma-Siam railway was built by POWs, there was, somebody estimated, one dead European for every seven sleepers laid.
Brainwashing techniques
When
Korean War broke out in June 1950. Korea nor mainland China had signed the Geneva Convention. China did not rectify this until December 1956 and North Korea signed the the
neither North
following August. Nevertheless,
at the outset of the North Korean government said it would abide by the terms of the Convention. The commandant of the prison camp was more honest. He dismissed it as an instrument 'of bourgeois idealism which it is impractical to carry out His country he said had a
fighting, the
,
.
,
was known as the 'Lenient Policy' It was anything but lenient. The essence of this policy was brainwashing, an attempt to 'turn' prisonbetter system.
ers in
much
It
the
way
that a
spy
may change
sides in
The North Koreans did not imagine that entire camp communities would become infected. One or two men in each return for a reprieve
from the
firing squad.
Above: North Korean POWs stand around in the mud. The man on the right is having his head shaved in
orderto combat the
problem of infestation by lice. Bottom right: US paratroopers used gas to quell a communistinspired uprising in one of the POW camps.
POWs barrack
room would
suffice.
Their task would be to
inform, and to create doubts in their companions'
^*
***%&
minds.
The policy was based on a system of punishments and rewards, with a generous helping of propaganda thrown in. Captives were required to fill in questionnaires and comment on such topics as "Who is the unjust aggressor in Korea?" and "Say why the triumph of World Socialism is inevitable'. In each case, there was only one correct answer. When a United States officer noted that one question was not "worth the paper it is written on', he was removed to solitary confinement. He had not only 'made a hostile remark', he had also 'slandered the Chinese paper-
making
meant rather more than being temporarily isolated from society. The victim was required to stand to attention in a minute cell from 4.30am until 11pm. Whenever he moved, he was beaten. Nor was the short night-time respite free from interruption. He was awakened at frequent intervals by a sentry, 'to make sure you're still here'
A
frost.
A
party of
American
POWs
once and the men remained stuck there It was, said the guards, an opportun'reflect on crimes' at
many hours.
ity to
a
made excellent propaganda
material.
20 degrees
made to stand on the Buckets of water were poured over their feet. The
water froze for
in
was marched
barefooted to the Yalu River and ice.
communist parade. Such photographs part
particularly nasty refinement of standing to
attention took place during mid-winter in
of
m* 1
Above: Ex-US soldiers take
industry'.
'Solitary confinement'
\*
^WW Am Rb jR
iwlfl
A
.4 EL/
'
JL
'
Those who 'accepted' what their hosts called 'the were rewarded with medical attention, better food and generally more considerate treatment. About one-third of the Americans took advantage of this: only 21 refused repatriation at the war's end and defected to the communists. In South Korea, the government was no more humane than its counterpart in the North. Nor was brainwashing taboo in South Korean camps, though it went by the more respectable name of 'Rehabilitation Project of Prisoners of War' It was carried out by educationalists, businessmen and diplomats, who expounded on the Western way of life. It must have been effective for one of the stumbling blocks at the peace talks was the future of North Korean and Chinese prisoners, 50.000 of whom refused to return home. Discouraged by the behaviour of many captive servicemen in Korea. President Eisenhower approved a code of conduct for American POWs. Among its six articles, it stressed the need to continue resisting by attempting to escape; to supply the captors with no more than 'name, rank, service number, and date of birth' (in fact, the Geneva Convention had already accepted this); and a pledge that T will trust in my God and in the United States of America' Trusting in the United States of America may be quite valueless to some POWs, however. The sheer variety of war since peace was signed in Korea- wars of national liberation, urban guerrilla warfare, wars truth'
.
Below: Blood-spattered North Korean POWs, who had been rioting against transferto another camp, are led away.
fought over ideology or religion - often puts prisoners in an anomalous situation. Take two contrasting examples In the 1 960s although North Vietnam had .
.
,
.
POWs The Irish Republican Army (IRA), the tribesmen of Afghanistan, even the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) are not signatories to any convention Though the IRA may profess to organise itself into brigades and battalions it is not accounted an army by ,
,
the British
Government.
Its
members
are terrorists,
and terrorism is a crime punished by civil law. Consequently, those taken, tried and found quilty are detained in civil prisons.
For any treaty reciprocal fortunate
.
if
to
make
sense, clemency must be
A prisoner of the IRA might count himself he escaped with permanently demolished may have ceased to
kneecaps. Afghan guerrillas
encourage their women to dismember live captives during the hours after sunset. But, unless it suited some propaganda purpose a captured Soviet serviceman would be unlikely to survive. In an attempt to bring the Geneva Convention into ,
ComRed Cross held four sessions of a special conference at Geneva between 1974 and 1977. The line
with present-day warfare, the International
mittee of the
Above: The notorious Long Kesh detention centre
in
Northern Ireland
where prisoners can be interned indefinitely. For the British government the problem of IRA internees
and their status
is
a difficult
one. While the IRA claim to be POWs, the British government views them as little
more than civil
criminals.
signed the
Geneva Convention, America
declared war against Hanoi.
As a result,
at
no point
POWs were
not theoretically entitled to the clemency advocated by the Red Cross. They were described as 'criminals' and 'air pirates', and they were treated accordingly. The brutality of their guards and the squalor of their conditions have seldom been equalled. During the 1 982 conflict over the Falkland Islands
Great Britain never declared a state of war against Argentina. But this was an old-fashioned fight: no conflict of ideologies, but a straightforward hassle
members of the enemy hands were one pilot and about 90 Royal Marines. The Marines were returned to Britain commendably quickly - so quickly, indeed, that some were able to return to the South about a few pieces of land. The only British forces to fall into
Atlantic and
About ity
1
1
once the
resume the
delegates decided that, to be classed as a
against civilians.
Mercenaries, the conference agreed, should have no rights to POW status. In civil wars, its members had to admit, the difficulties were considerable. Any humane action by the International Red Cross would depend upon the goodwill of the authorities. The protocols drafted by the conference have yet to be ratified. If, as seems possible, the United States
may
well follow.
,000 Argentinians were taken into captiv-
Nevertheless, a lapse of eight years does not suggest
had ended. The problems were and accommodation, made
any sense of urgency. In any case, how do you reach an agreement with a fanatical terrorist organisation
hostilities
the classic ones of food
worse by the parlous state of the Argentinian Army's commissariat Very sensibly they were repatriated as quickly as possible. ,
.
that has neither the will to negotiate
nor the ability to
detain prisoners in adequate circumstances?
Richard Garrett
ess
Right:
US film actress Jane
Fonda, a notable opponent of American involvement in
Indochina, meets
captured US pilots during a visitto North Vietnam. These pilots, at the time of their capture,
:
ft
....
had no status
as POWs as there was no formal state of war between the USA and Vietnam.
r
1
382
all
.
takes this step in 1984, Britain
battle.
POW,
combatants should 'comply with the rules of international war applicable to armed combat'. They must 'carry arms openly during each military engagement' and 'while engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack' All of which rules out the eligibility of car bombers, planters of incendiary devices, kidnappers, and those who commit crimes
^88
r*
:
i
emb^
* .
a
*
wm
Key Weapons
US NUCLEAR CARRIERS
KEY WEAPONS
—
The commissioning of the world's first nuclearpowered attack carrier, the USS Enterprise (CVAN65), in October 1961 marked a turning point not only in
naval history but in the capability of the
The simple
fact that she
was able
refuelling for three or four years,
US Navy.
that her eight
reactors provided constant high-pressure steam gave
her the ability to range far and wide across the oceans, relying only
on outside support
for aviation fuel and
provisions.
The Enterprise powerplant
is
steam to drive four sets of geared steam turbines. The horsepower is 280,000 at the maximum speed of 35 knots; even the auxiliary electrical power totals 48 ,000 kilowatts The hangar accommodates up to 90 aircraft, and is 7.62m (25 feet) high; the aircraft are taken to the flight deck by four deck-edge elevators and can be launched from four steam catapults two on the angled deck and two at the forward end. Although approximately 16m (52 feet 6 inches) longer, lm (39 inches) wider in the beam and some 15,000 tonnes heavier than the contemporary Kitty Hawk (CVA-63) class conventionally-powered cartotal
.
to cruise without
and
*.-
a series of eight
reactors, connected to heat-exchaneers aeneratine
BEWARE
,
OF JET
BLA5L'
• f> •
l^"W
384
k
*
~
1
1
11 1*
*
;,
Previous page: The
nuclear-powered carrier
USS Enterprise makes her majestic way out of The size modern carrier can
harbour. Above: of the
be clearly seen of the
in this
shot
USS Carl Vinson.
Below: The four-seat
Grumman EA-6B Prowler isthefnte/yD/v'se's
electronic
countermeasures aircraft
US NUCLEAR CARRIERS Left:
An
aircraft carrier
interceptorteam.TwoF-14
Tomcat multi-role fighters escort an E-2 Hawkeye
AEW (airborne early warning)
aircraft; the latter able to operate its highly advanced radar equipment is
at altitudes
reaching
9145m
(30,000ft)
extend
its
and thus
radar range to a distance of up to 800km (500 miles).
Flight
crew stand by on
USS Nimitz, the world's largest warship.
The
number of men
required to
crew these massive floating platforms
is
considerable, despite the incorporation of many labour-saving devices.
the Enterprise design is basically similar; the air group is no bigger and speed is the same. The Enterprise needed more internal space for the eight Westinghouse A2W reactors and the 32 Foster- Wheeler heat-exchangers but dispensed with the stowage of nearly 8000 tonnes of furnace fuel oil The designers used the extra size to increase the ship's operational independence rather than to accommodate more aircraft, increasing aviation fuel capacity by 50 per cent over the 5882 tonnes in the Kitty Hawk class, and carrying ordnance and aircraft stores to permit up to 12 days of intensive flying operations. In spite of riers
,
.
Right: Keeping an aircraft carrier's highly
warplanes at
complex
battle
readiness entails extensive support facilities; here warplanes are 'bombed-up' while a
Hawkeye AEW aircraft stands on the deck in preparation for a reconnaissance patrol.
Left:
Some of the many
aircraft that constitute the
cutting
edge of the Nimitz's
military might. Inthe
foreground are VoughtA-7 Corsair lis, and behind them are A-6 Intruders and F-1 4 Tomcats.
Left:
The distinctively
square superstructure of the flight-operations tower
on USS Enterprise is
new type of now in operation.
typical of the carrier
This design allows further space for flight operations
ontheship'sflattop.
being nuclear-powered, the ship carries some oil fuel to allow her to replenish escorting warships. One of the less obvious advantages of nuclear power in an aircraft carrier is the elimination of funnel gases. Unlike earlier carriers, pilots landing on the flight deck of the Enterprise found no turbulence from the hot funnel gases. With no boiler uptakes to worry about, the designers could re-design the island as a square block. This was more convenient for the internal arrangement and also permitted the use of new planar radars, whose 'billboard' antennae could be placed on the flat faces of the island superstructure. The roof of the island supported a 'beehive' dome with circular arrays of aerials.
Missiles for the Enterprise Although originally planned to have a defensive armament of Terrier medium-range guided missiles, spiralling costs
Below: Bombs are loaded onto McDonnell Douglas A-4 Skyhawks in the hangar bay prior to their transfer to the flight deck for a night operation.
case the
caused
this
item to be deleted; in any
US Navy was no longer convinced that bulky
guided missile installations in carriers were worth the trouble. Not until 1967 did the world's largest warship receive her first armament, when a Sea Sparrow eight-cell missile system was installed to provide short-range defence against air attack. Later two more Sea Sparrow systems were added, and in 1981 three Vulcan Phalanx 20mm 'Gatling' guns appeared. After 18 years of strenuous service in the Atlantic Fleet and the Pacific Fleet, including frequent opera-
was docked at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard for a major overhaul and modernisation. The major external change was the
tions off Vietnam, the Enterprise
removal of the 'billboard' radar arrays and the 'beeSPS-32 and SPS-33 radars had proved difficult to maintain In their place have been installed hive', as the
.
more conventional set of radars, like those in later carriers. The overhaul will enable the ship to operate a
through to the end of the century. The success of the Enterprise led to a call for more nuclear carriers, but it was not until 1967 that funds
386
US NUCLEAR CARRIERS were available for a new prototype The cost had risen to $646 million as compared to $451 million for the Enterprise, and this put the new C V AN at the centre of a major political argument. The lead-ship, named Nimitz (her designation was changed from CVAN to CVN-68 by the time she was completed), was laid down in 1968 and came into service in May 1975. Although the basic design of the ship showed little change, the interval of 10 years had permitted great improvements in nuclear propulsion; the same power .
* Hl ^
fc,
^"y^BSK
as the Enterprise
was achieved with only two
A4W/
A G nuclear reactors 1
The square island was not repeated, and a more conventional type was substituted. All the experience of the previous years of operation was incorporated into the design, including stronger decks to limit the effect of semi-armour piercing bombs. In addition to longitudinal bulkheads, the hull is subdivided by 23 transverse bulkheads and 10 fire-wall bulkheads. firefighting equipment and pumping arrangements are provided; a 1 '/2-degree list can be corrected in only 20 minutes. In 1970 a second ship, Dwight D Eisenhower (CVN-69), was laid down, followed by the Carl Vinson (CVN-70) in 1975 and the Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-7 1) in 1982, with a fifth ship authorised. When all five are in commission the US Navy will have won back the five projected sisters of the Enterprise which had been deleted 20 years earlier. However, as the cost of the Carl Vinson has risen to $2000 million (not including the cost of her air group which could cost a similar amount), political opposition has become rampant. Opponents of the CVN claim that it is a 'sitting duck' for attack by submarines or anti-ship missiles. Its defenders point out that its large and variegated air group provides 'defence in depth' while its escorting destroyers and cruisers contribute a further inner ring of defence. For the foreseeable future the big carriers and their battle groups are the West's only surface offensive force capable of threatening the Soviet Navy. The immense array of electronics and weaponry mustered by the air group of a Nimitz class ship are a formidable barrier to penetrate.
Elaborate
,
Above: \JSS Nimitz viewed from astern. The aircraft carrier remains the single most important element in the US Navy's surface fleet despite the controversy surrounding its future role.
Right:
AGrummanA-6
claws
its
way skyward
following its launch from the decks of the Enterprise.
The A-6E variant is capable of carrying a
bomb load of
8165kg (18,0001b), a feat that earned it the title of the 'miniature B-52' during service in the war in
its
Vietnam.
387
-
USS Enterprise Type Multi-purpose nuclear-propelled aircraft carrier
(CVN)
Dimensions Length 335.9m
(1
102ft);
beam 40.5m
deck width 76.8m (252ft) maximum Main engines Four geared Westinghouse steam (133ft);
draught 10.9m
(35ft 8in); flight
turbines; 280,000shp; four shafts
Top: An atmospheric shot of an F-4B Phantom on the flight deck of the Enterprise as it prepares to undertake a night raid.
Enterprise
Above: The
in
a daylight
setting sails out for an
extended ocean tour. Right: For comparison
USS Enterprise of World War vintage sails the
'old'
II
underthe Brooklyn Bridge. Although one of the most powerful ships in the world in its
heyday, this
Enterprise would be totally outclassed by its
nuclear-powered successor.
388
Nuclear reactors Eight pressurised-water cooled
Westinghouse A2Ws
Speed 35 knots maximum Catapults Four steam (C1 3) Aircraft 90
maximum
Complement 31 02
(
1
62 officers, 2940 enlisted
men) plus 2527 assigned to air wing
Armament Three Nato Sea Sparrow launchers Mk 57; three Phalanx Mk 1 5 CIWS systems; two 40mm Mk saluting guns II
Typical air wing (1980) 24 F-14Tomcat fighters; 24 A-7 Corsair 2 attack aircraft; 10 A-6 Intruder all-weather attack aircraft; 4 KA-6D Intrudertanker
4 E-2 Hawkeye AEW aircraft; 4 EA-6B Prowler ECM aircraft; 1 S-3 Viking ASW aircraft; 6 SH-3 Sea King ASW helicopters; 3 R.F-8 Crusader reconnaissance aircraft aircraft;
Dien Bien Phu When France sacrificed an army and lost an empire village of Dien Bien Phu lay on the small Nam Yum River in an oak-leaf shaped valley just north of
The the
Vietnam-Laos border. Provincial Route 4 1 curled
away towards Tuan Giao
to the northeast, while the
Pavie track ran north to the T'ai tribal capital of Lai Chau, 80km (50 miles) away. The villages and hamlets in the valley were the homes of T'ai tribesmen,
whom acted as middle-men in the opium Around the valley lay thickly-wooded hills, rising to some 600m (2000 feet) above the river, inhabited by opium-growing Meo tribesmen. There was no denying the strategic importance of Dien Bien Phu. Not only did it lie on a likely invasion route into most of trade.
Laos, but
its
status as a provincial capital
political as well as military significance.
gave
it
Indeed, the
French had built an airstrip there in the 1 920s, and the Japanese had improved it in 1 945 Yet whatever the strategic desirability of occupying Dien Bien Phu, the tactical disadvantages of holding a position there were considerable. The villages and hamlets in the valley were within artillery range of the surrounding hills. Furthermore, rainfall in the valley was twice as high as that in other valleys in north Indochina, and a dry fog, the crachin, made flying difficult for much of the year. French pilots
nicknamed the valley
'the
chamber pot'
General Henri Navarre's
final
orders for Operation
November 1953, tasked MajorGeneral Rene Cogny with the occupation of Dien Castor, issued on 14
Bien Phu and the creation of an airhead which would provide support to French forces in northern Laos and buttress Lai staff set
Chau
until its evacuation.
As Cogny 's
about grouping troops and aircraft for the
operation,
it
became
clear that
Dien Bien Phu was
already held by the Viet Minn. Elements of the 148th
Regiment, together with a heavy weapons company, were in the valley, and the 316th Division, two of its regiments recruited from T'aispeaking tribesmen, was also in the area. Independent
A serious divergence of opinion existed within the French high command as to the role of Dien Bien Phu Cogny had initially envisaged it as a 'mooring point' for light forces; Navarre saw it, by mid-November, as an airhead on an altogether larger scale Whatever the advantages of the original Cogny scheme, neither the terrain of Dien Bien Phu nor the fact that Viet Minh forces were already in the area made it suitable for occupation on the scale intended by Navarre. The first wave of the assault consisted of Major Marcel Bigeard's 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion (6 BPC) and Major Jean Brechignac's 2nd Battalion, 1st .
Parachute Light Infantry (11/ 1 RCP), together with detachments of airborne engineers and artillery. Both battalions contained a substantial
namese
number of
Viet-
one of the striking facts about the battle for Dien Bien Phu was to be the large number of non-French soldiers - Vietnamese. T'ai. soldiers; indeed,
North African and, in the Foreign Legion, German and eastern European - who participated in it. The battalion commanders were briefed on 19 November. Bigeard was to land on dropping zone Natasha, 200m (220 yards) northwest of Dien Bien Phu and just west of the airstrip, while Brechignac was allocated Simone, 400m (440 yards) southeast of Dien Bien Phu, and on the other side of the river. Heavy equipment was to be dropped on Octavie, southwest of Dien Bien Phu, well away from the battalion dropping zones. The drop began at 1 035 hours on 20 November, the paratroopers jumping from C-47s. The Viet Minh
When the French were establishing themselves the Dien Bien Phu area, much of the operation
in
involved clearing Viet Minh units from the surrounding
countryside. Here
members of a patrol lie in One is
waitforthe enemy. armed with a. 45in
Thompson sub-machine gun.
389
— INDOCHINA
.
1954
many of whom were training on Natasha, fought back hard, and a confused battle followed as French parachutists tried to concentrate, unpack
troops,
heavy weapons and ammunition, and call in air strikes. By 1500 hours Natasha was secure enough to permit the dropping of Major Jean Souquet's 1st Colonial Parachute Battalion (1BPC), the remaining
i
1 st Airborne Battle Group ( 1 GAP) The first phase of Operation Castor had undoubtedly gone well. The French had secured the area at the cost of only 1 1 dead and 52 wounded and had killed at least 50 Viet Minh. The position was rapidly strengthened over the next few days. Brigadier-General
unit of
-1
,
Jean Gilles, commander of French airborne forces in Indochina, parachuted into the valley with his com-
The initial
'0'
deployment
Dominique and ibriell
30 March-1
April
Elic
1954
Dien Bien Phu March -7 May 1954 20 Nov1953 French forces parachute into Dien Bien Phu. Nov1953-Mar1954 Strongpoints are established and further men and equipment committed. 13
t.
Anne-Marie
a
landing
Huguette
13 Mar Viet Minh open a massive artillery bombardment on the French positions. Human wave assault swamps
strip/
Sparroi
djjppihj.
.
)ominique
hawk
Beatrice.
14/15
Natasha
Mar Viet Minh attack Gabrielle and, despite French
efforts to counter-attack, the strongpoint
Eliane u n
o BanOngPet
created.
30 Mar-1 April Viet Minh renew offensive on Dominique, Eliane
and Huguette.
Isa belle is isolated
-A^\\
Francoise/
is lost.
28 Mar Two new strongpoints, Sparrowhawk and Juno are
Dominique
landing strip
Claudim!
from main
positions.
O Ban Hong
10 April Bigeard counter-attacks on Eliane but French losses are extremely heavy.
,BanNaloi
tech Chang
2 May Viet Minh open artillery bombardment on Isabelle and by 7 May the position is evacuated. 6/7 May Viet Minh launch final bombardment and assault on central French positions. French surrender at 17 30 hours.
dropping
zone imohe
Eliane
Juno.
inNhonc
CHINA
auxiliary
French perimeter
Vietminhassiults
landing strip (
French counter-attacks \
Ban Hong CJ
frdht line
090(1 hours 30 Mar
front line
0400riours 1 April
IsabVlle
Ffpnch strong ppints
GULFOF
LAOS
14 March
TONKIN
Anne-Marie
Beatrice
13 March
£7
<
Huguette 1
.&;
landing strip
7
April
May
"T
)W
)omi
Francoise 30/31 Marc
E3 12Apri
Eliane
O 3J
*iv'
fienBii
**&-
Claudine" 12 April
390
luno
*%
INDOCHINA headquarters on 21 November.
mand
He
1954
landed
and was luckier than Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Langlais, commander of 2 GAP, who broke an ankle and had to be evacuated. Two of Langlais' battalions. 1 st Foreign Legion Parachute Battalion ( BEP) and 8th Parachute Assault Battalion (8 BPC), arrived on the 21st, and the remaining one, 5th Vietnamese Parachute Battalion (5 BPVN), arrived safely
,
the following day.
Cogny himself visited the valley on 22 November, flying in
on a Beaver
aircraft to the hastily-repaired
Work was
already in hand on strengthening and extending the airstrip with reinforced steel plates, airstrip.
and, in the words of Jules Roy, 'the atmosphere
was
one of a successful operation'. Even so, Gilles was not altogether happy and pressed Cogny to replace him as soon as possible. Not only did Operation Castor seem to be going well, but its twin. Operation Pollux - the evacuation of Lai Chau and the shift of the T'ai Federation government to Dien Bien Phu - also gave signs of early promise. Cogny visited the valley again on Sunday, 29 November. This time he was accompanied by Navarre himself, and during the journey the two officers discussed a permanent replacement for Gilles, Colthe joyful
Dominique
onel
Bastiani's Paratroop Operational
Command already having taken over on basis
.
a temporary
They agreed upon Colonel Christian de la Croix
de Castries, an elegant and well-connected cavalry officer with a brilliant record. Yet the mission en-
who
arrived on 7
December, was to differ in several key respects from that laid down in Navarre's directive of 14 November. On 30 November Cogny" s headquarters had trusted to de Castries,
ordered Bastiani to guarantee the safety of the airstrip by preparing for the sustained defence of Dien Bien Phu 'without thought of withdrawal'. Secondly, at least half the garrison was to be used for offensive sorties, causing losses to the Viet Minh and prevent-
them from laying siege to the main position. Finally, the garrison was to link up with Colonel de ing
Above
left:
Colonel de
Crevecoeur's forces in Laos and prepare to support
Castries with visiting
the evacuation of Lai Chau There was as events were
French Secretary of State Marc Jaquet, in relaxed mood. Such easy nonchalance was not destined to continue. Above: The first paras go in to Dien Bien Phu, the soft paddyfields providing a good drop zone. Despite
show an inherent conflict of priorities within these orders. If Dien Bien Phu was to be held indefinitely, the hasty field defences already dug had to be replaced by well-prepared strongpoints. Yet, if half the garrison was on patrol at any given time, there would be insufficient manpower available for the construction
heavy enemy fire, this early was a complete
operation success.
.
to
,
,
of these positions.
Constructing the strongpoints Several days before issuing these orders, Cogny had been warned by his intelligence staff that intercepted radio messages indicated that three Viet Minh infantry divisions, together with the powerful 35 1 st Heavy Division had been ordered to move to the area of Dien Bien Phu. Cogny passed this disturbing information on to Navarre The new orders issued by Cogny s staff on the 30th implied the continued defence of Dien Bien Phu against whatever Giap chose to throw ,
.
against
'
it.
Only a few days
later, on 3 December, Navarre himself gave orders which went even further, reveal-
ing just
how much his concept of the operation had T have decided,' he wrote, 'to accept battle
changed.
The commander-in-chief believed would have three phases. Firstly, the Viet Minh would take several weeks to concentrate. Secondly, there would be a six-to-ten day approach and reconnaissance phase, culminating in a general attack, which would last for several days, but 'which must end with the failure of the Viet Minh offensive' Navarre was convinced that Giap would be unable to sustain a lengthy attack on Dien Bien Phu, largely because he would be unable to supply the troops involved with enough food and ammunition for a long battle. There was no doubt in Navarre's mind that the battle would be fierce, but the Viet Minh assault would be ground down by French firepower while the in the northwest.'
that the battle
French
air force lacerated
Giap's line of supply.
To
ensure that his firepower was indeed superior. Navarre steadily increased the garrison of Dien Bien
of the airborne units of 2 GAP remained and the other parachute battalions were replaced by North African, Foreign Legion and T'ai units building up to a total of 1 2 battalions by the time the main battle commenced. There was. however, to be little in reserve, for on 12 December Navarre announced his intention of mounting a major offensive, Operation Atlante, in central Vietnam. This operation was to consume resources of both men and
Two
Phu.
there,
,
391
.
INDOCHINA
1954
Above: Surrounded by hills and deep forest which gave plenty of cover to advancing Viet Minh, the lonely outpost of Dien Bien
Phu was extremely vulnerableto artillery barrages as shells were lobbed into the garrison
encampment from well-concealed positions
by Viet Minh
artillery units.
Left: Under sporadic enemyfire,the French reinforcements parachute into the garrison. Note the maze of barbed wire in the foreground.
aircraft which
scrub for firewood, deprived the position of what little
Above: Supported by an
Nor was
natural cover
had possessed, and no were made to use camouflage nets.
M24 light tank, French paras counter-attack. Below: French troops rush out of their dugout to take
had been earmarked for Dien Bien Phu Navarre's plans presumed that Chinese aid to the Viet Minh would remain constant, while in fact the Korean armistice (July 1953) had enabled the Chinese to increase their help. For his this all.
Vo Nguyen
Giap, concluded that the scale of operations throughout Indochina would limit French reinforcements to Dien
part, Navarre's adversary,
On
7
it
real efforts
December Cogny decided to launch OperaChau was successfully evacuated on
tion Pollux. Lai
10 December, but
many
of the T'ai light companies
which had been ordered to make their way Bien Phu disappeared without trace.
to
Dien
Bien Phu and that he could bring overwhelming force ,
to bear
upon
The artillery duel
it.
The garrison of Dien Bien Phu, meanwhile, continued with its dual tasks of digging and patrolling. Most of the new strongpoints were given girls names: rumour had it that they were named after Colonel de Castries' mistresses. To the north and northeast, Gabrielle and Beatrice covered the Pavie track and Route 41 respectively. Anne-Marie and Huguette lay northwest of Dien Bien Phu, with the tiny Franchise and the larger Claudine to the west and southwest. East of the river lay Eliane and Dominique, while a final position, Isabelle, covered a new airstrip almost 6 km (3!/2 miles) south of Dien Bien Phu itself. In view of the fact that Dien Bien Phu was likely to become the scene of a set-piece battle, de Castries ordered all dugouts to be made proof against hits by
105mm
guns.
Even
after laborious wood-collecting
operations the garrison remained 30,000 tonnes short
of the minimum engineer stores needed to build defences to the required standard. The felling of all the trees in the valley, and the gleaning of bushes and
392
The garrison's officers,
losses to 15 February 1954 totalled 32
96NCOsand836men,
about 10 per cent of
the force's officer strength and 8 per cent of its
NCOs
and men. But, although the airstrip was now under sporadic artillery fire, and incoming and departing aircraft were engaged by anti-aircraft fire from the hills, it remained possible to fly wounded out and to bring reinforcements and equipment in. LieutenantColonel Langlais, his ankle in a plaster cast, arrived to resume command of 2 GAP. A squadron of 10 M-24 Chaffee light tanks was flown in. Two tank platoons remained in the central position and the third was sent
down to Isabelle. De Castries also received more artillery. His deputy commander was a one-armed gunner, Colonel Charles Piroth, who commanded an artillery force designed both to cripple the Viet Minh infantry and to destroy Giap's guns in counter-battery comprised two artillery groups, the 3rd of the 10th Colonial Artillery Regiment (III/ 10 RAC) and
assault fire. It
up firing
positions.
INDOCHINA
1954
3» mmmmu
Inset above: Bigeard discusses operations with
Charletand Dubouchet. Inset
above
right:
Casualties are evacuated
by helicopter.
2nd of
Regiment (11/4 American 105mm howitzers, and the 4th Artillery Group of the 4th Colonial Artillery Regiment (IV/4 RAC) with four 155mm guns. There were also three 120mm mortar companies, one on Claudine. one on AnneMarie and the third on Gabrielle. Piroth kept the bulk of his guns in the main position, deploying two batteries of III' 10 RAC to Isabelle, and sending the third there when fighting was in progress. On 12 March de Castries concluded his customary briefing by warning his senior officers that an attack was expected the following evening. His garrison - at 10,814 men a large command for a colonel - was now the
ii.nm*
-z
the 4th Colonial Artillery
RAC), each with
three batteries of four
Confusion Almost
until
in
the French
Command
the end, the senior French officers
responsible for Dien Bien Phu, Major-General
Cogny
in
Hanoi and General Navarre
in
Saigon,
consistently underestimated the capacity and
strength of the Viet
Minh
forces.
Soon
after the
on 13 and 14 March 1 954, Colonel de Castries was informed that Giap probably had supplies for an offensive of four or five days only. French intelligence calculated that the communists had only 60 105mm guns whereas Giap in fact deployed 300 in all. On 24 March Cogny told de Castries that the Viet Minh initial
large-scale attacks
divided into three sectors. Lieutenant-Colonel Trancart, garrison commander of Lai Chau, was responsi-
were
ble for Anne-Marie
and Gabrielle the former held by the 3rd T'ai Battalion (3BT) and the latter by the
strength again and
excellent 5th Battalion, 7th Algerian Tirailleurs (5/7
assault was launched six days
RTA). The
As things went from bad to worse, Navarre and Cogny began to disagree about how to save the situation. Cogny insisted that the Red River Delta must not be denuded of troops in order to rein-
central area, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Jules Gaucher, comprised Battalion,
,
Algerian
3rd
Eliane, held
by
Dominique, home of 3rd Tirailleurs
1st Battalion,
4th
(3/3
Moroccan
RTA), Tirail-
RTM)
and the 2nd T'ai Battalion (2 BT), Huguette, garrisoned by 1st Battalion, 2nd Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment (1/2 REI), Claudine, held by 1st Battalion, 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade (1/13 DBLE), and Beatrice, with the 13th's 3rd leurs (1/4
Battalion (3/13
DBLE). Lieutenant-Colonel Andre commanded Isabelle, with the
suffering very badly, could hardly attack
by the
rains.
As
it
in
would be severely hampered happened, another massive later.
force the garrison, but Navarre
wished
to sustain
the position for as long as possible; and Navarre
poured scorn on Cogny's plans to launch diversionary offensives
in
Viet
Minh
rear areas.
Such
blindness and discord at the topdid not augurwell for the fate of the garrison.
Lalande of the Legion
393
5
INDOCHINA
1954 scene for their eventual defeat Giap had concentrated 28 infantry battalions, with a rifle strength of 37,500, of the 304th, 308th, 321th and 316th Infantry Divisions, together with the reinforced 35 1 st Heavy Divi.
sion.
Gunner
officers in the garrison
reckoned
that
during the siege their positions were hit by over 130,000 shells, representing between 1300 and 1700 tons of ammunition delivered to the Viet Minh gunlines between December 1953 and May 1954. This bore eloquent testimony to the efforts of Giap's supply service.
Overwhelming assault On the heels of the bombardment came the Viet Minh infantry.
A human wave assault, launched with sup-
reme disregard for casualties swamped the defenders of Beatrice. The survivors of 3/13 DBLE took refuge in the jungle, emerging to enter Dominique after dawn on the 14th. A paratroop counter-attack force, supported by tanks, tried to regain Beatrice that morning, but its first attempt was stopped by heavy fire, and de Castries decided not to renew it. A brief ,
Dawn of destruction Erwan Bergot,
who
later
A French mortar crew in action.
became a was
leading French military historian,
in Dien Bien Phu as part of a hastily organised heavy mortar unit of the
Foreign
Legion.
He described the
scene on the morning 1
954, afterthe
first
as follows. 'Morning came. a hesitant dawn,
coming out.
to
sit
Viet
In I
of 14
Minh
March
barrage,
the weak
light of
remember
on the edge of
Roll
my dug-
He had grey hair. "We've aged 1 Day broke.
molished.
All
wandering
round,
silhouettes bore witness to the disas-
'We were made to move after commander of the 10th RAC
had inspected our eagle's nest, which had become a graveyard. We dug in at the
ed them by a local counter-attack but, as the night wore on, the Viet Minh, reinforced by fresh troops,
They were
uncovering
corpses,
carrying
wounded without a word, cry,
blackened,
broken,
quickly
same all smoke-
smashed,
de-
Vietnamese we would only draw enemy fire, and they would get their share of it, something their flimsy fortifications could not withstand.'
3rd Battalion, 3rd Foreign Legion Infantry (3/3 REI),
2nd Battalion, 1st Algerian Tirailleurs (2/1 RTA), two batteries of III/ 10 RAC and a platoon of tanks. Lalande was later to receive another battery and various detachments mauled in the fighting for the central strongpoints.
Eleven T'ai irregular companies, of rather patchy were distributed between Francoise and other positions. The two parachute battalions of 2 GAP, 1 BEP and 8 BPC, remained in reserve as a counterattack force, and the battle-group's third battalion, 5 BPVN, was available for dropping if required. In the very centre of the cluster of main strongpoints were the artillery positions, the armoured squadron headquarters, and de Castries' own com-
quality
,
mand post. On
the river
no
(Colonial Artillery Regiment),
paras begged us to leave;
we
uttering
ings.
foot of Eliane4. Botella's
the cataclysm, but
the
deaf and blind to their surround-
We thought we had been at the cenfound that things were the over. Everything was
wounded
Allioux,
ter.
years," he said with a grin.
tre of
truce enabled the French to recover eight
had cost 3/13 The DBLE 556 officers and men: the survivors were badly shocked, and several deserted. After this first crushing blow the attack on Gabrielle developed as de Castries had expected. Two Viet Minh regiments began to infiltrate the positions of 5/7 RTA under cover of very heavy artillery fire. The
digging the ground,
bank was the main
survivors from the wreckage
battle
.
,
tirailleurs, fighting
with great determination, check-
De Castries ordered Langlais, now commanding the central sector after the death of
continued to attack.
Gaucher, to launch a counter-attack. Langlais committed 5 BPVN (which had arrived on the 14th), a company of 1 B EP and some tanks at 05 30 hours on 1 March, but 5 BPVN ran into difficulties on its approach march and the attempt fizzled out. Some of
Below: Spattered with blood, French wounded lie in an underground shelter after a Viet
Right:
Minh
offensive.
A French soldier
takes cover behind a low ridge of mud as an enemy shell
explodes
in
front of
him.
hospital,
under Major Paul Grauwin with two Mobile Surgical Detachments. Three Parachute Surgical Teams were dropped in later. The central area also housed an assortment of logistic units and, interestingly enough, two field brothels. The main bombardment of Dien Bien Phu began at 1700 hours on 13 March 1954. The heavy and accurate fire that deluged the entire position blew in ,
dugouts, smashed trenches, knocked out howitzers, aircraft on the already damaged airThe effectiveness of this initial bombardment, after weeks of waiting, stunned the French and set the
and destroyed strip.
394
sw
INDOCHINA 5/7
RTA
1954
broke out to join the counter-attack force,
mid-morning Gabrielle was securely in communist hands. The loss of this, the most solid of all the strongpoints, with its fine garrison, nearly 500 of whom perished, shook the morale of the defence. Piroth who had been so confident that his guns would prevent this sort of reverse, took the blow particularly heavily. Unable to manage a pistol with his one hand, he took a grenade into his dugout and killed himself. but by
,
On
16
March
the garrison received another wel-
reinforcement, this time Bigeard's 6 BPC. Artillery and mortar ammunition also arrived to re-
come
plenish the severely depleted stocks.
The
disasters at
Beatrice and Gabrielle had dampened the enthusiasm
of many of the T' ai soldiers and desertions persuaded de Castries to abandon part of Anne-Marie, incorpor,
remaining elements within Huguette. Over the next few days it became apparent that, covered by artillery fire, the VietMinh infantry were steadily digging their way closer to the French posiating
tions.
its
As
the Viet
Minh
tightened their grip on Dien
Bien Phu, pressures within the garrison resulted, on
24 March,
in
what might best be termed a coup. De
Castries effectively relinquished command although ,
he remained nominally in charge. Decisions were now in the hands of the tough and direct Langlais and the 'parachute Mafia' of paratroop battalion commanders Langlais took personal command of Dominique and Eliane, the newly-arrived Lieutenant-Colonel Voinot took over the western sector from Trancart, and Major Seguin-Pazzis commanded 2 GAP. Bigeard was responsible for counter-attacks, all of which had to be cleared with Langlais. In late March the garrison faced two major problems: keeping open the route between Isabelle and the main position - an increasingly costly business - and suppressing the Viet Minh flak in an effort to make resupply by air less hazardous On 28 March Bigeard, with characteristic skill and panache, stormed a Viet .
.
Minh
anti-aircraft position
2.5km
(2 miles) to the
west of Claudine, although he lacked the troops to retain the captured ground. Within the French posi-
two new strongpoints were created. These were Sparrowhawk, between Dominique and Huguette, and Juno formerly part of Claudine The former was held by 8 BPC and the latter by a mixture of 1st Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment, some T'ais and air force personnel. Eliane was also reinforced, and tion,
,
.
Above: Armed with a French 7.5mm M29 light machinegun,this French para, accompanied by a tribesman, conceals himself in a
bamboo
thicket while
he waits for
movement orders.
containedthewholeofl/4RTM,6BPC,8BPC,2BT and elements of 5
BPVN (purged after earlier morale
difficulties).
men renewed
their attack in earnest on the March. Parts of Dominique and Eliane were overrun, but immediate counter-attacks regained some ground and a major effort on 3 1 March re-established the situation. By this time, however, the recaptured strongpoints were little more than piles of shell-torn debris littered with human bodies, and renewed Viet Minh assaults persuaded Bigeard to pull
Giap's
night of 30/3
1
his counter-attack force back, leaving sections of
Dominique and Eliane in Viet Minh hands There was also heavy fighting at Huguette, and 3/3 REI, supported by a tank platoon, failed to smash its way from Isabelle to Dien Bien Phu. From 3 1 March onwards, Isabelle was isolated. The garrison now urgently required both ammuni.
On
April a company of 1 was dropped in safely, but most of the artillery ammunition delivered that day fell into Viet Minh hands The remainder of 11/ 1 RCP arrived over the next two days, urgently needed in view of continuing attacks on Huguette. Various
tion
and fresh troops.
Brechignac's
11/ 1
RCP
.
were also parachuted in. His limited successes against Dominique, Eliane and Huguette encouraged Giap to continue with his specialists
395
INDOCHINA
1954 April
many of the garrison's senior officers received a
step in rank: de Castries
Langlais
became
a brigadier-general,
and Lalande colonels,
and Bigeard a
lieutenant-colonel.
In mid- April the Viet Minh steadily pecked away at Huguette, and on the 23rd 2 BEP failed in an attempt to recapture those parts of the position which had been It was not only the French, however, who were feeling the strain of this constant bitter fighting. Giap was later to acknowledge the appearance of a negative tendency among his men brought about by 'fear of casualties, losses, fatigue, difficulties and hardships, underestimation of the enemy, subjectivism and self-conceit'. It took strenuous efforts by his
overrun.
*
'
political officers to
,
maintain morale.
The final stages By early May seemed
it evident to most observers, both French and foreign that the fall of Dien Bien Phu was only a matter of time. French hopes that the garrison's perilous state would jolt the United States into giving direct military support flickered into a ,
code-named Operation Vulture, in which masAmerican air strikes would pound Viet Minh concentrations around Dien Bien Phu. Attempts to gain agreement on Operation Vulture failed on 18 plan, sive
Above: Afterthe fall of Dien BienPhu those that survived were marched
800km (500 miles) to prison camps on the Chinese border or in Than Hoa province. The march was known as the 'death march'. Below: The final hours. A unit of Viet Minh prepares to storm French positions.
policy of gnawing
away
at
the French position,
digging trenches steadily forward and slowly strangling the garrison to death.
By
early April the central
area contained five parachute battalions, four of them
badly under strength, two weak Legion battalions, and the remnants of the North African and T'ai units,
some 2600 men
in all. Isabelle was held by 3/3 REI both in reasonable strength, some 400 T'ai, together with some survivors of 5/7 RTA, three batteries and a tank platoon, a total of about 1600 men. The main perimeter was still almost 10km (6 miles) long, and within it lay not only the hospital, now pitifully full of wounded, but also over 2000
and
2/1
RTA,
prisoners of
war and
a large
number of deserters and
disarmed T'ai soldiers.
The fact that the garrison had retained its hold on most of Huguette and Eliane encouraged Cogny to
April, and other, purely French, projects to permit the
garrison to break out to the southwest were
some of the North African
soldiers in the strongpoint
began to waver. By 6 May only one of the 105mm guns remained intact, and on the next day de Castries authorised Lalande to break out with his garrison in the hope of linking up with friendly forces in Laos.
agree to the dispatch of another parachute battalion,
By this time the situation in the central position was
Major Hubert Liesenfelt's 2nd Foreign Legion Parachute Battalion (2 BEP). Its first elements arrived on 10 April, and knowledge that it was on its way encouraged Bigeard to mount a well-planned counter-attack on Eliane that day. This operation succeeded albeit at a dreadful price and was followed by another reorganisation within the garrison's com-
short of impossible. The onset of the monsoon had made the parachuting of men and supplies more than usually difficult, and Viet Minh artillery fire and
end of April only one tank remained operational, and over the next three days large chunks of Dominique, Eliane and Huguette were torn off by repeated
mand
attacks.
,
,
structure as Langlais divided the central area
each commanded by an officer he trusted. Bigeard remained responsible for counterattacks, and it was he who passed the command group's decisions on to the passive de Castries. On 16 into five sectors,
little
infantry assaults continued to take their
lion
( 1
toll.
By
the
A company of 1st Colonial Parachute BattaBPC) was dropped in on 3 May. but this was a
\ i
2s£
worked
A
brave attempt by French forces in Laos to open a path part of the way to Dien Bien Phu failed in late April: the French high command had effectively run out of options. The detached strongpoint of Isabelle came under heavy bombardment for the first time on 2 May, and the pattern of Viet Minh approach trenches, by now familiar in the attack on the main position, began to be repeated. Ammunition ran short, and the morale of
upon.
INDOCHINA batant troops. But
when Langlais
midday
1954
held a conference
became clear that, with perhaps only 1000 infantry still on their feet in the whole of the valley, this was not a practical possibility. The meeting decided to inform Giap, under a flag of truce, that firing would cease at 1730 hours. A last radio conversation between de Castries and Cogny established that there would be no white flag: firing would simply be allowed to die out on its own. The surviving members of the garrison destroyed shortly
after
it
and heavy weapons, and at 1750 hours communication from the main position announced: 'We're blowing up everything. Adieu.' De Castries' command bunker had fallen 20 minutes
their radio sets
the last radio
when the general surrendered to Captain Ta Quang Luat of the Viet Minh. previously,
The fall oflsabelle Isabelle,
however,
The Geneva settlement
Viet
Minh victory parade in Hanoi.
The Geneva Agreements of J uly 1 954 ended the first Indochina War.
over Vietnam. They were compelled to
Although the French had attempted
bodia
to devise a
new strategy, based upon
holding just Haiphong
redeploying
in
in
Tonkin and
Annam and
Cochin-
China, after the defeat at Dien Bien
Phu their position began to collapse all
negotiate a settlement. Laos and
received
full
Cam-
independence,
and Vietnam was divided along the 17th
parallel,
the communists taking
over the north and a western-style
re-
up in the south where Ngo Dinh Diem soon took power.
public being set
small compensation for the steady stream of French
which flooded into Major Grauwin's overcrowded hospital. The end came on 7 May. A savage bombardment, which included rockets fired by Soviet-made casualties
Katyusha multi-barrelled rocket-launchers, swamped the position on the evening of the 6th, and throughout the night repeated attacks gradually over-
Below: Overrun by Viet
Minh troops, de Castries'
command post displays enemy flags atop its roof.
held out. Lalande's
still
of
men
heavy equipment in the early evening, and at 2200 hours they began to move out to the southwest. A few did manage to break clear, and some of them, after hair-raising experiences, destroyed the
whelmed the defenders. By noon on the 7th the French retained a few hundred metres around the southern end of the airstrip. De Castries had spoken to Cogny on the radio in mid-morning, and had been authorised to break out with his unwounded com-
last
their
reached safety in Laos. The majority of Isabelle's garrison fell back on their bunkers and at 1 50 hours on the morning of 8 May a French aircraft picked up a ,
message announcing the fall oflsabelle. It announced more than merely the loss of a major battle: it signalled the end of the war in Indochina. The French survivors spent several days in the battle-scarred valley while their captors divided them into 50-man groups, selected on the basis of nationality and rank. Negotiations with a representative of the French high command enabled some of the wounded brief radio
to be airlifted out but many other wounded including ,
,
some who had undergone major surgery, shared with exhausted comrades the anguish of the 800km (500 mile) 'death march' to camps on the Chinese border or in Thanh Hoa province to the southeast. Until the last few days of the battle the garrison had suffered 8221 casualties, including 1293 known dead The final days probably cost the French a further 800 dead and as many wounded. Excluding the 885 wounded and medical personnel who were evacuated their
.
after the battle,
between 9100 and 9500 prisoners
started the death
march. Accurate figures are not
available, but
likely that over two-thirds of them
it is
died on the march or in captivity
later.
The Viet Minh
8000 dead and an estimated 15,000 wounded. Five hundred of the Viet Minh dead are buried in a lost
formal cemetery, but the remainder of the fallen lie in the ruins of their bunkers, in filled-in trenches or in hasty or unmarked graves Most of the French dead wrote Bernard Fall in his classic account of the battle ,
.
'
,
Hell in a Very Small Place, are like royalty swathed in silk shrouds. Parachute nylon, like courage, was '
,
one of the commonest items
at
,
Dien Bien Phu, and on
both sides.' battle of Dien Bien Phu did crippling damage both the French Army's prestige and selfconfidence and the French government's will to fight on. Talks on Indochina began at Geneva on 8 May and, although an armistice agreement was not signed until 21 July, the shadow of Dien Bien Phu hung heavily over the negotiations. In this context, Giap's
The
to
was as much political as it was military, and Dien Bien Phu may justly be described as one of the victory
decisive battles of the 20th century.
Richard Holmes 397
,
Master of War Vo Nguyen Giap: ruthless General
in
pursuit of victory
Vo Nguyen Giap, who started life as a school
teacher, has been deservedly recognised as one of the great military leaders of the
modern world. To defeat
one lifetime two of the world's major military powers - the French in the first Indochina War (1946-54) and the Americans in the second Indochina, or Vietnam, War (1964-75) - is an outstanding achievement. To assess Giap fully as a general is not, however, easy. There is little published material and it is in
unlikely that
memoirs
how
will ever appear.
Nor is
it
easy
any decisions were his alone, or were taken jointly by other members of the politburo, of which he was the fifth-ranking member under Ho Chi Minn. In his early days as a member of the Indochina Communist Party before 1941, Giap was given the responsibility of raising guerrilla units and thereafter was always regarded as the military member responsible for the Viet Minh armed forces and later the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). To him must therefore go the credit for building up a mere handful of to discover
far
peasant guerrillas into a formidable modern regular
army.
He was
responsible for training, indoctrina-
tion, discipline, leadership at all levels, administra-
tion and not least the remarkable logistics which enabled the army to fight intense sustained battles at the end of a supply line hundreds of miles long. Partly from the teaching and experience of Mao Tse-tung in China and partly from his own experience, Giap became a master of guerrilla warfare. He understood the importance of having a firm rear base in the Viet Bac - the mountainous area north of Hanoi stretching to the Chinese border - which the French could enter only at their peril and where their superior weaponry and firepower were of no avail against an elusive enemy. Control of this area was also essential to maintain his supply lines from China after Mao's victory there in 1949. From this secure base he was able, through thousands of guerrilla actions, to threaten the French everywhere and tie down the great majority of their forces in static defence posts throughout Vietnam. At the same time he was able to
398
build up a mobile force of six regular divisions larger than the French reserves of about three divisions. ,
This, and perhaps over-confidence led him into his ,
major error: the premature switch to conventional mobile war early in 195 1 In three major attacks in the Red River Delta he lost about a third of his effectives It was the aftermath of the defeats of 1 95 1 however, that showed Giap's true greatness. He had made a mistake, but he was still able to retain the strategic initiative. He realised where he had gone wrong, and unfolded a more long-term strategy of infiltration towards Laos. He reverted to guerrilla warfare and, by a brilliant campaign on the Black River and by threatening northern Laos, he induced the French late in 1953 to seize and hold the small post of Dien Bien Phu with a divisional-sized force of 12 first
.
.
battalions.
Giap spent three months preparing for this crucial by massing an invisible force of 40,000 men round the besieged French garrison and by digging in battle
,
^*
GENERAL GIAP Left: Arguably one of the greatest military leaders of the modern world, Vo
Giap. Below: Giap discusses the strategy for
Nguyen
Dien Bien Phu
at Viet
Minh
HQ.
to the reverse slopes of the hilly terrain artillery
innumerable
pieces newly received from China (and
Chinese-manned) together with vast quantities of ammunition. On 13 March 1954, the first day of the battle, this mass of artillery completely surprised the French and sealed their fate. They could neither be relieved nor evacuated by air. The outcome of this early artillery duel had opened the way for a comparatively cheap, if slow, victory; but that
was not Giap's
style. Moreover the Geneva conference to discuss both Korea and Indochina was about to open. From the bargaining point of view the politburo considered it essential to achieve a quick and crushing victory in order to break French will to continue the war. Pushing lines of trenches forward and using artil-
lery
bombardments and human wave
overwhelmed the May. The French Bottom The basis of :
Giap's success was the superbly flexible logistics system, using human labourto carry all the equipment needed by the front-line troops.
'
garrison, lost
2000
Minh
finally
which surrendered on 7 killed but the Viet
.
the fatherland.'
When hostilities against South Vietnam began in 1959 Giap had two main tasks - the build-up of the NVA to 15 divisions plus regimental units, and the organisation of replacements and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail. The whole of North Vietnam was coming overland from China and by sea from Russia. The lines to the the rear base, with supplies
southern fronts had to be built, maintained and protected.
NVA regular units entered the South in Octo-
ber 1964 and,
Nang
five
when American Marines landed
months
was
later, the stage
set for a
at
Da
new,
full-scale struggle. If the strategy
aim of encouraging a mass uprising.
From the military point of view it, and two later repeat attacks,
was a
costly defeat. But
effects desired
it produced several by Giap and the politburo. It achieved
a traumatic psychological victory within the United States.
It
led to President
Lyndon Johnson standing
down as a presidential candidate and to the opening of 'talks' in Paris, thereby bringing into play the communist maxim that 'fighting while negotiating is opening another front' war and, when the The war now became an North won, it would take over the South. There was to be no risk of a separate South Vietnam, not even a Viet Cong one. The new strategic lesson taught by Tet was that places are not necessarily attacked nor operations conducted for military objectives; often they are intended to achieve psychological and political
NVA
effects.
Minh
lost 8000. As the French prisoners marched out they had to cross a trench filled with Viet Minh dead. Giap who was standing there, is reputed to have said: 'You can walk over them now They have done their duty to
now
-4
attacks to pene-
the French positions, the Viet
trate
capitals with the
of protracted war was not devised by it very clearly. The
Giap alone, he certainly defined
Inevitable losses At about this time Giap admitted to a journalist that in the previous two years he had lost over half a million men. To a communist in a communist state this is a cost which is not of the same political account as it would be in the West, and even if the people knew, they could not do anything about it. Giap's disregard for casualties
came out very clearly during the Easter
invasion of 1 972 when he lost 1 30 .000 men This invasion was undertaken because having lost .
,
main Viet Cong forces in 1968, guerrilla warfare by the NVA in an alien environment was proving unsuccessful. Moreover, by 1972 nearly all US ground forces had been withdrawn and Giap was confident of defeating the South Vietnamese in conventional battles. After a tremendous logistic feat in getting his support weapons forward, however, Giap made the strategic error of attacking on three widely dispersed fronts and lost momentum on all of them. the
US
enemy will be caught in a dilemma he wrote He has to drag out the war in order to win it and does not
He
possess, on the other hand, the psychological and
a strategic role
political means to fight a long-drawn out war.
were inexperienced in the combined use of artillery, armour and infantry, and still relied on shock infantry
,
.
'
'
Giap is chiefly associated with three major events in the Vietnam War: the siege of the US Marines at Khe Sanh, the Tet offensive of 1968 and the Easter invasion of 1972.
The Tet offensive was a concerted penetration on Saigon, Hue and nearly 40 other provincial
attack
also miscalculated the effectiveness of
air
power, with the new 'smart' bombs and B-52s used in .
Moreover the NVA field commanders
assaults.
Although, therefore, Giap suffered a defeat in his one major conventional campaign, the 1972 offensive was by no means a total failure, for it had important political and psychological results that brought the North the main benefits from the settlement later reached in Paris. The ceasefire agreed in January 1973 enabled the North to recover and expand to 20 divisions with unlimited Russian aid while the South was immobilised by lack of ammunition and replacement of weapons from its ally. In the final NVA victory of 1975 Giap seems to have taken a back seat and General Dung led the NVA on his 'beautiful road to war'. But in a real sense, the unification of Vietnam under communist rule in 1 975 was Giap's triumph. He had proved himself a master at revolutionary and guerrilla warfare and at the logistics required to provide mobility even though he may have relied too much on set-piece attacks with artillery and mass infantry assaults irrespective of ,
casualties.
He
well understood that
if
he, at a cost
which was acceptable to him, could impose costs on his enemy which were not acceptable to them then he was winning the war. In this way he defeated the French and the Americans, although it cost him more Sir Robert Thompson than a million men 399
,
The irregulars who fought for the French in Indochina The use of indigenous troops by
colonial powers has always been a feature of empire, and Indochina, the imperial jewel which the French sought to retrieve after 1945, was no exception. In the years following
World War
II,
enthusiastic recruitment
among
the
Vietnamese by the French resulted in the raising of a force of some 6300 local troops by mid- 1946. By the end of that year the figure stood at 18,000. At the end of the war in 1954, some 300,000 Vietnamese were fighting under the French command. Some of the most useful of the indigenous troops recruited by the French came from the hill peoples the Montagnards - who were suspicious of their traditional enemy, the Vietnamese, with whom they had been in conflict for a thousand years. The hill peoples had always shown a strong loyalty to the colonial power. Such forces were most useful in the far north, near the heart of Viet Minh power. T'ai highland peoples, for example, straddled the borders of Vietnam Laos Thailand Burma and China Here the French were able to raise the 2nd and 3rd T'ai Battalions, the White T'ai Air Force Unit and the T'ai Irregular Light Companies. Those tribesmen recruited in the north came mostly from the Black T'ai and White T' ai whose homelands lay northwest of the Red River Delta in the Black River Valley. In the Black and White T'ai the French had won to their side two of the three distinct T'ai groupings of northern Vietnam, as well as numbers of Meo, Muong and Nung who lived interspersed among the ,
,
,
.
,
400
INDOCHINA
1945-54
The third and most numerous T'ai group, the Tho people who lived northeast of the Red River, had already been wooed away during World War II when T'ai.
the Japanese and the Vichy regime were still in charge of Indochina. At that time, the Tho Bac Son guerrillas who rose against the French were organised by communist cadres, and the alliance later expressed itself in close cooperation between the Viet Minh General
the Tho guerrilla leader Chu Van Tan. Because of this, the Tho country in the Viet Bac became the site of the Viet Minh guerrilla base in
Vo Nguyen Giap and
1945 and the early jumping-off point for Giap's troops.
By late 95 1
1
the French
-
to their native forces
behind Viet
Minh
had added another element GCMA, which operated
the
lines. Officially
designated
first
as
GCMA (Groupements de Commandos Mixtes AeroComposite Airborne Commando Groups), became Groupements Mixtes dTntervention or Composite Intervention Groups when, in December 1953, they were made responsible for both land and portes or
they
air-based operations behind
enemy lines.
Behind enemy lines The idea of creating these mobile groups to harass the Viet Minh was forced through with the support of General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in Indochina from 1950 to 1952. The GCMA were one of his radical innovations and were created in the image of the Allied long-range penetration groups of World War II - Wingate s Chindits Lay force or Merrill s Marauders - and they operated under the jurisdiction of the '
,
'
GCMA
French Central Intelligence Services. But the were not designed, as the Allied groups had been, to be 'raid-and-run' units. They were to remain permanently behind enemy lines where they would both gather intelligence and harass Viet Minh units. Operating without any of the safeguards of regular units and relying upon hidden airstrips buried deep in the jungle and difficult to reach, for the evacuation of were extremely vulnersick or wounded, the able - particularly to infiltration by Viet Minh intelligence spies. The constant fear of Viet Minh reprisals against families or villages was a major weakness and led to deserwithin the structure of the tions. Despite these difficulties, by 1954 personnel numbered some 15,000 men, who needed 300 tonnes of airlifted supplies per month. There was considerable opposition to these irregulars within the French high command, the argument ,
,
GCMA
GCMA
GCMA
being that they consumed scarce resources, in aircraft for example, without seriously affecting Viet Minh did fighting capability. But in the field, the have a value in tying down Viet Minh units. Shortly before the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, the Viet
Far in
GCMA
Minh were using 10 of their battalions
to hunt
left
GCMA
tribesmen
bottom: Locally
don military Top left: A friendly Nung tribesman. Top right: A Meo woman recruited T'ai
uniform.
down
Laos and northwest troops were occupying the
the groups, and in northeast
Vietnam 5000
left top: Hill
action for the French. Far
harvesting opium. Above:
Meo tribesmen wearing These
attentions of
traditional clothing.
commissar had confessed movement begins to worry us
tribesmen were extremely useful to the French and theirskill inthejunglewas unsurpassed. Below: Tribesmen bring back wounded after an
some 14 Viet Minh battalions. As early as the spring of 1 953 a Viet Minh communist politic,
al
of our forces
is
pinned down
to his superiors 'This
seriously. in
A large part
mopping-up opera-
tions against these rebels.
Six months after that 1
953, 600 T'ai and
was
written,
engagement with Viet Minh units.
on 3 October
Meo GCMA tribesmen took part
JT
* r
*& H»»:-r
*_
.
INDOCHINA
1945-54
on the Viet Minh supply centre at Lao Kay on the border with China. Supported by an airdrop of French paratroops and with support from B-26 bombers, the tribesmen attacked Lao Kay's twin city Coc Leu, where they destroyed storage depots and caused the Viet Minh 1 50 casualties During the Viet Minh move towards northern Laos from 1952, the T'ai found that their homeland was becoming a battlefield, and they were forced into the war whether they liked it or not. Those T'ai who had supported the French stood to lose everything During the evacuation of Lai Chau in December 1953 by 20 T'ai companies (each comprising 110 men), entire units vanished to destruction in the jungle and mere remnants ultimately reached Dien Bien Phu. Throughout the siege of Dien Bien Phu itself, T'ai forces saw considerable action. Although they failed to sever the vital Viet Minh supply line which ran 800km (500 miles) from Lang Son to Dien Bien Phu,
Ou
in a devastating raid
.
.
T'ais in
GCMA units did disrupt the direct route to the
highland capital from Lai Chau throughout the siege of 1953-54. While there were 2575 T'ais-72 percent of all native troops - at Dien Bien Phu, the forces also provided the screen and forward reconnaissance for Operation Condor, the desperate
GCMA
attempt to push a relief column through to the garrison. During Condor, the forces used included Alpha (300 men in northern Laos), the 650 men of
GCMA
GCMA Gamma
west of Muong Te in northwest Vietnam, and four groups situated between the Nam
River and Dien Bien Phu. They were given the codenames Grapefruit, Banana and Areca Tree Also present, closest to the Nam Ou River, were 820 Meo and Laotian tribesmen led by LieutenantColonel Mollat. The Condor plan was to use commandos as a curtain to help distract the Viet Minh north of the Nam Ou River and so allow the main relief force to move towards Dien Bien Phu through Muong Hep. In fact the French advance got little further than the Nam Ou by 3 May 1954, four days before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, after the in Areca Tree had been forced to abandon the proposed airdrop zone at Nga No Song on 2 May and the 5th Battalion of Laotian Chasseurs had been forced to retreat into the Banana screening area the following day As late as 6 May however, the Grapefruit was reporting projected Viet Minh troop movements, possibly from positions on the rim of the valley overlooking Dien Bien Phu. Later, these sheltered the handful of escapees from Dien Bien Phu - just 73 out of a garrison of 15,094. Ultimately, though, there was no escape for most of the native guerrillas themselves. After the ceasefire of July 1954, the French radioed orders to the units still behind enemy lines to make for Laos or the rapidly diminishing Haiphong respective
GCMA
,
.
Below: While irregular troops were used by the French, so were irregular modes of transport. Here an elephant patrol moves along the Laotian-Siamese border. Bottom aircraft
:
A light
unloads supplies
on the airstrips of a small outpost. Though this was the only certain method of maintaining contact with outposts, the French high command began to look on
as a waste of vital resources. it
GCMA
GCMA
GCMA
perimeter. But
many T'ai and Meo not already killed Minh refused to leave their
or captured by the Viet
families to the inevitable revenge of the victors and,
together with their French commanders, remained to
be progressively hunted down and cornered. The
GCMA radio message
still
operating sent out
for help as late as 1956. In
reports recorded 183
GCMA
its last
last
desperate
1957 communist
partisans killed and
another 300 captured between July 1954 and April 1956, with another 4366 persuaded to surrender. By then the last French troops had long left Indochina.
Brenda Ralph Lewis
402
Key Weapons
The
T54/55 &
T62MBTS
KEY WEAPONS
The Soviet Army's aggressive use of tanks during World War II laid the foundation for contemporary Soviet tactical thinking regarding the deployment of
ments have included stabilisation, the conditions under which the crew has to operate the gun and the fire control system are still far from ideal. While the
armour. Three of the present-day Soviet Tank Arm main battle tanks (MBTs) can trace their origins directly back to this period in the design of the T44, which was in turn a development from one of the most successful tanks ever built the T34 The design of the T44, however, left much to be desired. Despite the various inadequacies of the turret design and the cramping of the crew, the main problem was still the installation of the 1 00mm D-10T main armament. By 1 947 however, this had been ironed out and the result was the T54, a line of tanks destined to be produced in greater numbers than any other. Improvements on the
one-piece cast turret rotates, the floor of the fighting
T54 series led to the T55 and from there to the T62 of which will be in Warsaw Pact service in
target through the
,
.
,
,
all
the
mid-1980s.
The T54 has a welded hull divided into three compartments and carries a four man crew. The driver, commander and gunner are located on the left side of the vehicle while the loader occupies the right
T54's distinctive curved turret. The T54 is powered by a 12-cylinder water-cooled V-54 diesel engine (developing 520hp at 2000rpm) which inside of the
corporates a high percentage of alloy, thereby increasing the risk of
fire
particularly susceptible.
to
which the vehicle
The T54
is
is
tiring to drive
no hydraulic assistance is provided, the torsion bar suspension is bouncy, and the dead track tends to shed itself during violent manoeuvres. Crew space is extremely limited, which contributes to fatigue in combat, for the T54 is a compact vehicle otlenng a low silhouette and a small frontal target area. Main armament on the T54 is the 100mm D-10T, which began life as a naval gun and in early models was not stabilised. Although successive improvesince
404
compartment does not, which increases the risk of being crushed by the gun's breech block as the turret swings. Loading the long and heavy fixed-case ammunition is difficult and the loader has only three ready reloads available, the remainder being stored in the hull. The gun has to be elevated after each round has been fired for the case to be ejected which greatly ,
slows the
sequence. In comparison with the computer-assisted fire control systems of Western MBTs, the T54's fire control system is slow and inaccurate. Having identified the firing
TPK-1 binocular sight, the commander swings the turret into rough alignment and the gunner acquires the target through his TSh-22 telescopic sight. Ranging is accomplished using the commander's stadiametric rangefinder, after which ammunition type is selected and the target is engaged. Available ammunition on the T54 includes AP-T (armour piercing tracer), HE (high explosive), HEFragmentation, HEAT (high explosive anti-tank) and
HVAPDS-T (high velocity armour piercing discardarmament originally bow-mounted 7.62mm machine gun
ing sabot tracer). Secondary
consisted of a
(which was later deleted) and a 12.7mm DShK machine gun, for use against aircraft, mounted on the loader's cupola.
1955 a variant appeared and was designated the It had a D-10TG gun stabilised in the vertical plane and two years later it was followed by the T54B In
T54A.
its D-10TS gun stabilised laterally. Further improvements included infra-red sights for the commander and gunner and snorkelling equipment, which enabled the tank to ford rivers to a depth of over
with
Previous page: Soviet T55
crews parade
in
front of
their vehicles while taking
armoured vehicle Above: AT55 travels at speed during Warsaw Pact manoeuvres part in an
exercise.
in
Czechoslovakia. The
T54/55 series was the workhorse of the armoured forces of the Iron Curtain countries throughout the 1950s and 60s, and while no longer a front-line tank is still to be found on the battlefields of the Third
World.
it
T54/55&T62MBTs
4m
( 1
3 feet) an invaluable aid in an offensive
newly designated T55 appeared which incorporated still further improvements on the T54 model. The T55 was fitted with the V-55, a more powerful engine which increased the power output to 580hp at 2000rpm, and a rotating turret floor was added. Externally the T55 is virtually the same as the T54, with the exception of the removal of a circular ventilator in front of the loader's cupola. Further
improvements
to the design
T55A
in
Above:
A Soviet tank
were introduced
and an NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) warfare system which automatically closes all hatches and shuts the engine down to warn the crew of NBC detection. Since sealing is incomplete, the crew still has to operate in NBC suits. The T54's hull machine gun was removed to provide stowage for an additional six rounds of main gun ammunition, as was the 12.7mm machine gun, although this has subsequently been refitted to many tanks. A laser rangefinder is now fitted over the main armament and infra-red equipment includes the L-2G anti-radiation lining
,
In 1961 the
in the
1963. These included a plastic and lead
Above: The Israeli Army has always been ready to utilise captured weapons, including thisT55 re-equipped with a
new
engine and a 105mm L7A1 gun. Below: A forward view of a Syrian T54A, knocked out on the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War of 1967.
commander looks through the turret periscope on his T54tank. While adequate in most circumstances, the optics on Soviet tanks are not up to the standard
found on Western equivalents.
405
KEY WEAPONS OU-3GK
searchlight, the
sight for the
commander,
and periscopes for the driver, gunner and loader. This equipment has also been retrofitted into earlier T54s, as has the
NBC
fit.
Variants to the T54/T55 series include an ARV, bridgelayers and mine clearance vehicles, while the chassis provides the basis for the
ZSU-57-2
AA gun
and the SU- 1 30 assault gun. Since 1945 the T54 and T55 have seen considerable combat, notably in the hands of the Arab armies in the Middle East wars of 1967 and 1973. Some 400 tanks were captured by the Israelis and these have been modified by the installation of the Centurion
L7A1 gun. In addition to Warsaw Pact countries, many Third World nations have been equipped with them and they have seen action
T54/T55 Main
in
Vietnam. Iraq,
Battle Tank
Crew 4 Dimensions Length (gun included) 9m width 3.27m
2.4m
(10ft 9in);
(29ft 6in);
height (without AA
MG)
(7ft 10in)
Weight Combat loaded 36,000kg
(79,366lb)
Engine V-54 (V-55), V-1 2 water-cooled diesel developing 520hp at 2000rpm
Performance Maximum road speed 48km/h (30mph); range (road) 400km (249 miles); vertical obstacle 0.8m (2ft 8in); trench 2.74m (8ft 1 0in); gradient 60 per cent; fording 1 .4m (4ft 7in). 4.5m (1 4ft 9in) with snorkel
Armour Conventional, 20-203mm 3/»-8in) Armament One 100mm D-10Tgun; one 7.62mm (
machine gun co-axial with main armament; one 7.62mm machineguninbowoftank; one 12.7mm DShKM anti-aircraft machine gun on loader's cupola
Top: The interior of the T62 showing the racked rounds of AP
ammunition (left) and the large breech-block of the 115mm main armament (right). Above: Two views of the T62 turret,
with the cartridge
ejector
(left).
Left:
Manoeuvrability has always been rated as an importantfactorinthe design of Soviet tanks, and is
demonstrated by this
example crashing through thick mud.
406
T54/55&T62MBTS Egypt, Sudan, Angola, Uganda, the Ogaden, India and Pakistan. The Soviet Union still deploys them in the Naval Infantry, where they are standard equipment, and in some Tank and Motor Rifle Divisions. Soviet tank development has followed a linear progression and the T62 MBT, which appeared in
Below:
A T62 fords a water
obstacle with its distinctive snorkel in position. Few rivers in central
Europe
1965, is a further improved version of the T55. The T62 has an all-welded hull and a cast turret housing the 115mm U-5TS gun with a co-axially mounted 7.62mm PKT machine gun. As in the T55, three of the four crew members are aligned on the left side of the vehicle and crew conditions show little improve-
would allow such an easy
ment.
from the water as in this photograph, however. The T62 can
The T62's main armament of the smooth-bore U-5TS gun represents a considerable improvement over the D-10 series. Gun depression has not been
exit
shown
snorkel for a maximum distance of 1000m (
1 1
00yds) at a top speed of
2km/h(1.25mph).
improved beyond the minus four degrees of the T54/T55 which severely limits hull-down operation, but the ammunition provided has greatly improved its ,
fighting capability.
APFSDS will reach out to 1600m
(1750 yards) at a muzzle velocity of 1680m/sec (5510ft/sec) and will penetrate 300mm (11.8in) of armour at 1000m (1090 yards). HEAT and HE rounds are also carried by the T62 but the rate of fire still remains at about four rounds per minute. With this new gun and rangefinder the T62 can engage targets at longer ranges than the
T54
or
T55
but, despite
its
must stop before opening fire with its main armament. The T62 is powered by a 1 2-cylinder V-2-62 diesel engine developing 5 80hp at 2000rpm A compressedair start system is fitted to augment the battery and stabilisation system, the tank
.
pre-heating
is
available. Driving the tank remains a
Heat build-up in the driver' s compartment cannot be alleviated by opening the hatch since when it is open the turret will not revolve. Developments of the T62 include the T62A, which mounts a 12.7mm machine gun by the modified tiring business
.
*s
407
and the T62K. command tank with communications 'fit'. The T62K incorporates the T72's track and drive sprocket and there is also an ARV variant, the T62T.
Above: A Czech T54, equipped with a short
loader's hatch,
additional
Estimates of production figures for the T62 vary but likely that over 40,000 have been built in the
it is
T62 Main
Battle Tank
snorkel tube, enters the river crossing
Crew 4 Dimensions Length (gun included) 9.33m (30ft 7V2 in); width 3.3m (10ft 10in); height 2.39m (7ft
Weight Combat loaded 40,000kg
(88,1851b)
along the Sino-Soviet border. Foreign recipients include Afghanistan, Angola, Algeria, Cuba, Czechos-
Engine V-2-62, V-1 2 water-cooled developing 580hp at 2000rpm
diesel
It
lovakia, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Libya,
Mozambique,
Somalia, Syria, Vietnam, the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen and Israel (as war booty). Compared to contemporary Western MBTs such
Leopard or Abrams, the T62 is an unsophistiIt does, however, have the advantage of being cheap and easier to manufacture, and in the context of Soviet numerical superiority and massed tank assault doctrine the T54, T55 and T62 tanks have shown that the Soviet Union is one of the most effective of armoured vehicle manufacturers. as the
cated machine.
in
10in)
has seen action in the Middle East and
Soviet Union.
water on a Bohemia.
Performance
Maximum road speed 46km/h (29mph); range (road) 450km (280 miles); vertical
Below: T62As of the Afghan Army trundle
obstacle 0.8m (2ft 8in); trench 2.85m (9ft 4in); gradient 60 per cent; fording 1.4m (4ft 7in), 5.5m (18ft) with snorkel
through the streets of Kabul on a parade designed to show the
Armour Conventional 20-170mm 3/4-6 3/4in) Armament One 115mm U-5TSgun; one 7.62mm
and resolve of the government. The T62A differs from the standard T62 only in having a
population the strength (
machine gun co-axial with main armament; the 62A retains the 12.7mm DShKM anti-aircraft machine gun on the loader's cupola.
12.7mm anti-aircraft machinegun.
V T
inri it+
Index
A
Acheson, Dean 322 Afghan forces (Mujahideen) 382
Canberra 339 Seafire 371
Sperrin 339 Valiant Victor B Mk
BMk I
I
338-339
338
Australian No 77 Squadron 371
Vulcan B Mk I 338-339, 339 French Mirage III 363-368
British
Israeli
AIR FORCE
No 49 Squadron 336 'V-Force' 338, 339
Chinese 374
Egyptian aircraft markings 366 French (Armee de l'Air) T'ai Air Force Unit 400 aircraft markings 366 Korean, North 369, 370 Pakistan 5th Squadron markings 366 South African No. 2 Squadron 371 United States Fifth Air Force 369-370 Thirteenth Air Force 369 Twentieth Air Force 369 Far East Air Force 231
3rd Bombardment Wing 369, 370 4th Fighter— Interceptor Wing
373-374 8th Figher- Bomber Wing 369 19th Bombardment Wing 370 35 th Fighter— Interceptor Wing 369 36th Tactical Fighter Wing 266 49th Fighter— Bomber Wing 369 51st Fighter — Interceptor Wing 374 374th Troop Carrier Wing 369, 370, 371 8th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 369 68th All- Weather Fighter Squadron 369 359th All- Weather Fighter Squadron 369 Air Ministry Specifications, B. 14/46 (British) 339 B.35/46 (British) 339
AIRCRAFT Argentine
IAI Dagger 368 Mirage III 368 Belgian
Mirage 5B 364 British
F-4 Phantom 368 F-15 Eagle 266, 267, 267 Kfir C-2 368 Mirage III 365, 366,567,
367-368 Korean, North
MiG-15 374-375, 375 Soviet
Antonov An- 12 351
MiG
21 367,3(57
Spanish Mirage 1 1 IEE 365 Swiss Mirage III 367 United States B-26 372 B-29 372-373, 373 B-52 322 E-2 Hawkeye AE 385 F4U Corsair 369 F-14 Tomcat 385 F-15 Eagle 263-268 F-84 Thunderjet 372 Grumman A-6 387 Grumman EA-6B Prowler 384 Grumman F9F Panther 370 L-5 Sentinel 371 P-40 232 Sabre jet 302, 374-375,375 Sky Raiders 373
W
T-6 Texan
371-372
Vought F4U Corsair 370 Chronology of events (1945-49)279 Almond, Major-General E. M. Africa,
Arab— Israeli Wars 350 Six-Day War 367 in
Royal Northumberland Fusiliers 313 Royal Ulster Rifles 313 Special Sir Service 211, 212, 329 1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment (Glosters)
316-319 1st Battalion Royal
Northumberland
Fusiliers
316-319 1st Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles 316-319
3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment 350 I Corps 353 Army Air Corps 286 Royal Armoured Corps 351 Parachute Squadron RAC 351 see also MARINES; British forces
Burmese
Burma Independence (National) Army 218 Kachin Rifles 219 1st Karen Rifles 219 2nd Karen Rifles 219 Burma Rifles 219 3rd Burma Rifles 219 Chin Rifles 219 Auxiliary Union Military 1st
Police 218, 219 People's Volunteer
240, 270, 320
Angolan forces 209
Argentine forces, 368, 382
16th Parachute Brigade 351, 353 29th Brigade 313, 316-317, 319 2nd Royal Tank Regiment 351 2/6th Gurkha Rifles 352 3rd Royal Tank Regiment 344 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars 319 Gloucestershire Regiment 313, 319 Parachute Regiment 353 Queen's Royal Irish Hussars 344
Falklands
ARMY British
Southeast Asia Command 215 6th Airborne Division
349-350 8th Field Force (5th Infantry Brigade) 353 16th Airborne Brigade 350
Organisation 218-219
Sitwundans 218
(territorial units)
Chinese
42nd Army 272 Fourth Field Army 272 IX Army Group 271 XIII Army Group 271, 272 58th 59th 79th 89th
Division Division Division Division
275 274, 275
274 274
124th Division 272
Parachutiste 250, 390, 391,
see also Chinese forces Communist (Red) 289, 292-295
Army 277 Army 277 Army 277 42nd Army 277 63rd Army 316-317 First Field Army 316 Third Field Army 300 20th 26th 27th
187th Division 317, 318 188th Division 317 189th Division 317 French Aviation Legere de l'Armee de Terre 286 Paratroop Operational Command 391 1st Airborne Battle Group 355, 357, 390 2nd Airborne Battle Group
391-392,394-395 Composite Airborne Commando Groups 401—402 Foreign Legion 249-253, 355 13th Demi-Brigade Legion Etrangere 251, 356 3rd Battalion 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade 393, 394 1st Regiment Etrangere Parachutiste 252, 395 1st Battalion 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade 393
2nd Regiment Etrangere d'Infanterie 250, 253
3rd Battalion 3rd Foreign Legion Infantry 394, 395, 396 2nd Battalion 1st Algerian Tirailleurs 394, 396 5th Battalion 7th Algerian Tirailleurs 393, 396 2nd Battalion 1st Parachute Light Infantry 389, 395 1st Battalion 2nd Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment 393 2nd Artillery Group 4th Colonial Artillery Regiment
393 4th Artillery Group 4th Colonial Artillery
Regiment
393 3rd Artillery Group 10th Colonial Artillery Regiment
392-394 1st Battaillon Etrangere
396-397 2nd Foreign Legion Parachute Battalion 396
2nd T'ai Battalion 400 3rd T'ai Battalion 400 5th Battalion Laotian Chasseurs 402 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion 357, 389, 395 7th Colonial Parachute Battalion 262 8th Parachute Assault Battalion 391, 395 Groupements Mobiles 259 Groupes Mobile 1 259-260, 355
Groupes Groupes Groupes Groupes
Mobile Mobile Mobile Mobile
3 259-260 4 355 51 259
100
Irregular troops 400, 400-402, 401,
Japanese Army) 220-223 Squadron 221 Rhodesian Light Infantry Fireforce 213 Selous Scouts 221, 212 Selous Scouts 2 Troop 'Skull'
402
T'ai Irregular Light
Companies
400 Parachute Surgical Teams 394 Mobile Surgical Detachments 394 see also French forces Guerrilla
Tho Bac Son 401
212-213 South Vietnamese 3rd T'ai Battalion 393 5th Vietnamese Parachute Battalion 391, 394, 395 Civilian Irregular Defence Group 213 Soviet Special Service Brigades 350 Tibetan 296, 297 - 299, 298 United Nations 269-271,
273-277 composition of 281 Belgian Battalion 316 Turkish Battalion 312 see also United Nations forces United States 232-235 Armed Forces in the Far East 220 Eighth Army 231, 237,
272-273,316 Joint Strategic Plans and
Operations Group 240 Rapid Deployment Force 353 Special Forces ('Green Berets')
213
Indian
2nd Parachute Battalion 353 see also Indian forces Irish Republican Army 382 Korean, North 235, 236
North Korean People's Army 230-231,237,369,376 4th Division 237 5th Division 237 Korean, South 270 structure of 231 1st Division 317 3rd Division 237, 316 25th Division 316 Capitol Divisions 237 26th Regiment 272
South Korean Community Protective Corps 231 Laotian 360
Malayan Malayan Races Liberation Army 329-335 Irregular forces 334 Palestine Liberation Army 382 Philippines reorganisation of 222 Hukabalahap (People's Anti-
1st Cavalry Division 231, 236, 270, 352 1st Infantry Division 233
2nd Infantry Division 271, 310 3rd Infantry Division 276, 277 7 th Infantry Division
240-241,271,275,277 11th Airborne Division (101st) 349, 352 24th Infantry Division 231, 371 25th Division 231 82nd Airborne Division 349, 352 187th Regimental Combat Team 349
Regimental Combat
Team—
272-273 Regimental Combat
Team—
272-273 Division Reconnaissance
Company 272, 277 Task Force Dog 276 I
Corps 313, 316
X Corps 240, 272-275 Adjutant General's Corps 234 Chaplain's Corps 234
Chemical Corps 234 Corps of Engineers 234 Finance Corps 234 Inspector General's Corps 234
United Nations
Ludge Advocate General's
Asia, chronology of events
Corps 234 Marine Corps Reserve 238 Military Police Corps 234 Ordnance Corps 234 Quartermaster's Corps 234 Signal Corps 234 Transportation Corps 234 Women's Army Corps 234 Army Medical Service 234 Constabulary 233, 234
(1945-49)278-279 Atomic Energy Act (British) 337 Atomic Energy Act (United States) see McMahon Act Atomic Energy Research
8in howitzer 311
United States Philco-Ford
GAU-7A 25mm
Gatlinggun265
Establishment (British) 337 Attlee, Clement 282, 337 Aung San 218 Australian forces 231 Austrian State Treaty 233
Fox Company 273-275 George Company 274, 275 National Guard 235 see also MARINES; United States forces Viet Minh 304th Division 354, 355, 358,
394 308th Division 259-262, 354, 355,357,358,359,360,394 312th Division 259-262, 354, 357, 359, 360 316th Infantry Division 261, 354, 357, 358, 359, 340, 389,
394 320th Division 262, 354, 358 321st Infantry Division 394 351st Heavy Division 391, 394 36th Regiment 357 42nd Independent Infantry Regiment 262 64th Infantry Regiment 262 88th Regiment 355 148th Independent Regiment 357, 389 176th Regiment 357 see also Viet
Minh
ARTILLERY 'Long Tom' 309 Chinese Nationalist 302 French recoilless rifles 362 Israeli
B
Barr, Major-General D. G. 275 Bastiani, Colonel D. 391 Bigeard, Major M. 389, 395 Binoculars, high-magnification
40mm anti-aircraft 229
NATO 106mm recoilless 351 Soviet
100mm D-10T 404 ASU57 57mm anti-tank 350, 351
290,296,296-299 Chinese (Red) forces 312, in Korea
316-319 Choe Yong Gun, Marshal 231 Chosin, Korea (1950) 272-277 Chou En-lai 269, 301
Chu Teh, General 269 Winston S. 336 Cogny, Major-General R. C. 361, 361, 362, 389 Cold War, the 234 Collins, General J. L. 241. 321 Communist Party Indonesian 216 Churchill,
Malayan 331 Philippine 220
300 Blue Beach (Inchon) 239, 241, 242
Computer systems Marconi integrated fire-control
BOMBS
327 Counter-insurgency 209—213 Crevecoeur, Colonel Boucher de 362 Croix de Castries, Colonel C. de la 391 Cultural Revolution (Chinese) 290 Curtis, Lieutenant P. 318
French Durandel26Y
BOMBS, ATOMIC British
336-339
Brainwashing techniques
380-381 Brechignac, Major J. 389 Briggs, Lieutenant-General Sir H. 329-335,552 Briggs Plan (Malaya) 331,
333-335 British forces, in Aden 212, in Borneo 2ii, 212-213, 213, in Cyprus 350, in Falklands 382, in Indonesia 215, in Korea 349, 370-371, in Malaya 212, in Palestine 350 British forces, airborne 352, in Borneo, 352, in Kuwait 351 Brothier, Colonel 253
Dalai Lama 297 Daly, Colonel R. 213
Dean, General W.F. 231 Democratic Alliance, Philippine, 221 Department of Defense (United States) 234 Dien Bien Phu, battle for (1954) 250, 359-362, 389-397, Dlebel Tarf, action at 209 Drysdale, Lieutenant-Colonel D.B. 274 Dulles, John Foster 300, 302 Dutch East Indies see Indonesia Dutch forces, in Indonesia
C
CANNON
214-217, 214-215,217
German, West
20mm 228 United States General Electric
D
398-399
Bugler Buss 319 Burma (1947-55) 218-219
105mm L7A1 405 Korean
Carne, Colonel J. 318, 319 Central America, chronology of events (1945-49) 279 Chang Chun San, Colonel 379 Chiang Kai-shek 302, 302 China, Red see Red China Chinese forces 310, in India 290, in Korea 270-271, in Tibet
M61 Al
265
E
Gurney, Sir Henry 329, 333
Indochina (1945-54) 354-362,
H
Indonesia (1946-49) 214-217 Indonesian terrorists 216 Intelligence gathering 212 in Malaya 331 Israeli forces 350
400-402
Eisenhower, Dwight D. 301 Engines Atar 9K-50 367 General Electric T700-GE-701 286 Leyland L60 328 Lycoming T53-L- 13 284 Lycoming T-53-L-703 285 Lycoming T400-CP-400 285 Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-100 264 RR Gem 288 SNECMA Atar 9C tubojet 364 Teledyne Continental
AVDS-1790-5A305 Europe, chronology of events
(1945-49)278
Hatta,
Mohammed 215
Head-up display (HUD) 264
HELICOPTERS attack 283-288
importance of 335, 352, 375 British
F
German, West
Katzin, Colonel 280 Khambas (Tibet) 296, 298-299,
Italian
313,376-379 Formosa straits 300-302
crisis (1958)
French forces in Algeria 209, 351, in Indochina 350, 354, 354-362, 355, 357, 359, 360, 361,362,389,389-391, 392-393, 394, 396, 397, 400-402, in Ivory Coast 212, in Vietnam 258, 258, 259, 359 French forces, airborne 353, in Indochina 391, 392, 394, 395, in Palestine 350, 351, in Vietnam 352, 354, 360, 362
G
AgustaA109286 Agusta A129 Mangusta 288 United States AH-1G Cobra 284-285 AH-1 Cobra avionic equipment 285 AH-1J Sea Cobra 285, 285, 288
AH-1Q285 AH-1S2S4, 284-285 AH-64 Apache 283, 286, 288
AH-65 288 Alouette II 284
AH-1G Huey Cobra 284 BellOH-13 284,375 CH-21 Shawnee 284 HiUer H-23 375 Hughes 500 M-D Defender 287 OH-6 Loach 284 Sikorsky H-5 375 Bell
UH-1 'Hog' 284 UH-1 'Slick' 284
Gabreski, Francis, 374 Gaulle, General de 252 GEN 163 (British committee) 337, 339 'Generals' coup', Algeria (1961)
Hinton, Lieutenant-Colonel B.
374
Ho Chi Minh 250, 255, 256 Huk revolt, Philippines (1946-57)220-222
253
Geneva Agreement
(1954) 251,
397
Geneva Convention 380-382 Gilles,
Brigadier-General
J. 361,
390 Grauwin, Major P. 394 Greek forces, in Korea 376 Guerrilla warfare 209
Marshal A. 359-360
Juin,
B6105P286
Falkland Islands (1982) 368, 382 Fleet, Lieutenant-General J. Van
J
Scout 286 Sikorsky S-55 ('Westland Whirlwind') 329 Westland Lynx 285, 286 Egyptian Gazelle 288 UH-60A Black Hawk 286 French Gazelle 286
I Imjin, Korea (1951) 316- 319 Inchon (1950) 236-242 Inchon landings, Korea (1950)
236-242 Indian forces, in Pakistan 353
K
Karen National Defence Organisation 218
Karen revolt, Burma (1947 — 55) 218-219
299 Khrushchev, Nikita 302
Kommandobefehl directive 380 Korea (1950) 229-231, 235, 236-242, 269-277, (1951-53) 309-313, 316-319, 369-379, Platoon commander in 314-315, United Nations
in
280-282 Korean forces 240 Korean forces (North) 280-282, 378-379 Korean forces (South) 377 Korean War 280-282
L
Lalande, Lieutenant-Colonel A.
393-394 Langlais, Lieutenant-Colonel P.
391 Lattre de Tassigny, General de
258-262,354,356,401
LANDING CRAFT United States
Tank Landing Ships 241 Lava, Jesus 221 Lava, Jose 221 Lhasa 296 Lie, Trygve 280
Major J. 396 Lin Piao 270, 292, 295, 295 Litzenberg, Colonel H. L.
Liesenfelt,
272-275 Long Kesh detention
centre 382
M
French
AIM-9B Sidewinder 364 AS30 365, 367
MacArthur, General D. 231, 233, 236,238,240-242,242, 269-271,280,281,313, 320—321 and Korea 320-322 McConnell, Captain
375 McMahon Act 337, 338 McNamara, Robert 322 J.
MACHINE GUNS French
7.5mm Model 52 351 7.5mm M29 395 German, West remote-control 225 Korean, South 0.3in Browning 377 United States 30mm Hughes Chain 286 Madium affair 216
HOT 286
Matra R530 364 R550 Magic 365 German, West Milan anti-tank 226-227 Roland 2 227 United States AIM-7F Sparrow 265, 266 AIM-9L Sidewinder 264, 285, 288,265,267 BGM-71 285 FAST 267 for USS Enterprise 386 Hellfire 283, 285, 286, 287, 288 Mk20 Rockeye dispenser
265-266
Gun 283,
Magsaysay, Ramon 213,
221-222
MahnBaZan218, 219 Malaya (1951-60) 329-335 Malik, Jacob 282 Manhattan Project (United States) 336
Mao Tse-tung 289,
Euromissile Falcon 367
295, 300
MARINES British
Royal Marine 41 Independent Commando 274 United States 1st Division 236, 238, 240, 242, 270, 272-277 5th Regiment 233, 241, 242,
275-276 7th Regiment 241, 276 1st Battalion 1st Marines 276 1st Battalion 7th Marines 275 3rd Battalion 5th Marines 275 Aircraft Group 12 275 Marine Corps 288 Marshall, General G. 234 Massu, General J. 252 Maud Committe (British) 336 May, Alan Nunn 337 Middle East, chronology of events (1945-49) 279 Min Yuen, Malaya (People's Organisation) 333
MISSILES British
Malkara anti-tank 351 SS-11 ATGM 286
Maverick 265 Stinger man-portable 288 Mollat, Lietenant-Colonel 402
MORTARS Chinese 291 French 394 Mountbatten, Lord Louis 215 Murray, Colonel J. 379 Murray, Lieutenant-Colonel R. L.
272-274 Musso (Indonesian Communist leader)
216
Mutual Defence Pact (United States/Formosa) 300
O
OPERATIONS Allied
Market-Garden 349 British
Nassau 212 French
Amaranth 354-355 Atlante 391-392 Castor 359, 362, 389-391 Condor 402 Lorraine 357-358 Pollux 391, 392 Vulture 396 United Nations Ripper 311
Rugged 312 Thunderbolt 310-311 United States Bluehearts 236 Chromite 238, 240-242
P
Panchen Lama 297 Paratroops 349-353 Pave Tack laser pod 264 P'eng Te-huai, General 295, 295, 316 Penney, Dr William 337-338 Pentagon see Department of Defense (United States)
PERSONNEL CARRIERS British
N
National Security Act (United States) 234 Navarre, Lieutenant-General H.
360-362, 361, 389
NAVY
Hornet 351
Humber 351 Philippines (1946-57) 220-222 Pork Chop Hill, battle for (1953)
377,379 Prisoners of War 380-382 Puller, Colonel L. B. 274 Pusan Perimeter, Korea 237
British (Royal Navy) Fleet Air
Arm 371 Chinese 301 Chinese Nationalist 302 United States Task Force 77 371 Seventh Fleet 231, 300 Naw Seng, Captain 219 Netherlands, in Indonesia 214-217 Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (Korea) 379 Ngaboo, Governor 298
Q
Quemoy and Matsu, Formosa (1958)300-302
R
Radar
ALQ 154 tail-warning 266 Cyrano
II
365
T54 408 Dutch M4 Sherman 214
Korean
Doppler 365
M1A1
Hughes APG-63 266 Hughes Taran 367
carbine 240
NATO
on USS Enterprise 386 Radio communications
Parker-Hale rifle 340
7.62mm
sniper
M4 Sherman 262 German, West Jagdpanzer Kanone 227 Marder MICV 223-228
Rhodesian
British
FN rifle 211
Clansman 324 Red China 289-291
United States Browning automatic Ml rifle 234
'Red Flags' (Burmese) 219 Ridgway, General M. 235,
309-313,570 Roxas, Manuel 221
rifle
234
Soviet
Dragunov rifle
342
Yugoslavian M76 rifle 340
S
French
Iranian
Mark V Chieftain 343, 348 Shir Iran 1 348 Shir Iran 2 345, 348 Israeli
Centurian 304
M50 Sherman 304
Salan, General R. 356, 357, 360
Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. 231 Smith, Major-General O. P.
Security Council (United Nations) 281
272-277 Sniping 340-342
Jordanian
SELF-PROPELLED GUNS
Soviet
L-33 245, 245
Souphanouvong, Prince 360 Souquet, Major J. 390 South America, chronology of events (1945-49) 279 Soviet forces, in Afghanistan 213, in Korea 230-231
M50 244, 246 Mk61 244
Soviet forces, airborne 350, 350 Soviet Union, and China 295
United States Sherman 234
M107 248 M109 247 M109A1 243,
SUBMACHINE GUNS
M4 Sherman 236, 272
Chinese
M26 Pershing 230 M26 Sherman 233 M46 Patton 235 M47 235 M48 235 M60 235
French
Mk61244 243-248 155mm Soltam 245
Israeli
244, 247,
248
M109AL 245
United States M3A1 276 Suez Canal crisis 350 Sukarno, president 215, 216
MHO 248,248 Soltam M68 245 Sakdal Rising 220
SawBaUGyi218, 219 Saw Hunter Thahmwe 219
Slim, Field-Marshal Sir
W. 330
Tal, General
T44 404
T54/55MBT 403-408
T62MBT 403-408 Syrian
T54A 405
334-335,555
Ta Quang Luat, Captain 397
P. 241
FV4030/2 (Khalid) 345
Taruc, Luis 221, 222 Taylor, General M. 235 Templer, General Sir G.
T
Seguin-Pazzis, Major 395
Shaw, Major J. 319 Sherman, Admiral F.
Type 50 276
Merkava 303-308 T55 405
I.
305
Tibet (1950-54) 296-299 Tonkin, battle for (1950-52)
Skydivers 352, 353
Tank ammunition 346—347
SMALLARMS
TANK ARMOUR
Trancart, Lieutenant-Colonel 393
Angolan
British
Truman, Harry S. 231, 269, 313, 320-322,337,370,376 Turkish forces, in Korea 281
Chobham 344, 348,348
H&KG-3rifles209
TANKS
British
7.62mm SLR 211 Armalite French
rifle
Afghan
T62A 408
212
British
Fusil a Repetition Modele Fl
342
German, West Heckler
& Koch G3SG31 & Koch PSG-1
marksman's rifle 341, 342 Mauser SP-66 rifle 342 Israeli
Galil
Challenger 344, 348, 348 Chieftain 323-328, 343-345,
348 rifle
341
Heckler
354-358
7.62mm sniper rifle 340
Chieftain FV4205 bridgelaying 326
Canadian
M4 Sherman 282 Chinese (Red) T34/85 294 Czechoslovakian
U
UNu218 United Nations, and Korea
280-282 United Nations forces, in Korea 269, 270, 280-282, 309-313, 349,369-379,576,582 United States, chronology of events (1945-49) 278 United States forces in China 234,
Korea 231, 235, 235, 270-271, 271, 272-277, 313, Philippines 220, in Vietnam 210, 213, 213, 382 in
in
HMS Theseus 371 HMS Triumph 370, 371 Frigates
HMS P/ym 338 United States
V
Aircraft carriers nuclear 383-388
Viet Minh 250-251, 254-257,
258,354-362,556,558, 389-397,596,597 Vietnam (1950^51) 258-262 Vietnamese forces (South) 354 Vietnamese League for National Salvation (Cuu Quoe) 255 Vo Nguyen Giap, General 250, 255, 258, 354, 359, 360, 398,
398-399 Voinot, Lieutenant-Colonel 395
W
Walker, Major-General 231, 237,
W. H.
269-270, 272-273,
309
Wang, General 297
WARSHIPS British Aircraft Carriers
HMS Glory 371 HMS Ocean 370, 371
USS Bataan21b USS Cape Esperance 374 USS Carl Vinson 384, 387 USS DwightD Eisenhower 387 USS Enterprise 383, 384-387, 388
USS Enterprise (conventional) 388 Kitty Hawk class 384-385 USS Ley te 276
USS Nimitz 387, 387 USS Philippine Sea 276, 371 USS Princeton 276 USS Sicily 275 USS Theodore Roosevelt 387 USS Valley Forge 276, 370, 371 Jeep carrier
USS Badoeng Strait 275 Westerling, Captain 'Turk' 216,
217 'White Band' (Burmese) 219 'White Flags' (Burmese) 219 Wright, Brigadier-General E. K. 320, 321
&U\
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