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THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD VOLUME SIX 1916-17
THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD Editor-in-Chief Brigadier Peter
Young
Board Barker; Dr. John Bradley
Editorial
Lt.-Col. A. J.
Professor John Erickson; Lt.-Cdr. Peter Kemp John Keegan; Kenneth Macksey; S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard;
Norman Stone
Revision Editor
Mark Dartford Archbishop Mitty High School Media Center
5000
Mitty
Way
San Jose, CA 95129
MARSHALL CAVENDISH NEW YORK, LONDON, TORONTO
Editorial Staff Young
Editor
Brigadier Peter
Deputy Editor
Kenneth Macksey
Co-ordinating Panel
Lt.-Col. A. J. Barker Dr. John Bradley Prof. John Erickson Lt.-Cdr. Peter Kemp
Reference Edition Published 1984 Published by Marshall Cavendish Corporation 147 West Merrick Road
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Freeport,
John Keegan S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard
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in Italy
by L.E.G.O. S.p.a. Vicenza.
No part of this book may be reproduced or any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the copyright holders. All rights reserved. utilized in
Norman Stone '?
;
Military Consultants
Capt. Sir Basil Liddell-Hart
Marshall Cavendish Limited 1984 B.P.C. Publishing 1970 now a Division of Macdonald and
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(Publishers) Limited/B.P.C.C.
Barrie Pitt
Executive Editor
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Carolyn Rutherford Bruce French Rose Thomson Margaret Burnley
The Marshall Cavendish encyclopedia of World War One. Bibliography: Includes index. 1.
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World War, 1914-1918— Chronology.
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Publication Data
The Marshall Cavendish illustrated encyclopedia of World War One. 1. World War, 1914-1918 II. Pitt, Barrie I. Young, Peter, 1915Dartford,
940.3
Mark
D521
ISBN 0-86307-181-3
New
Marshall
86307 187 2 vol
III.
Technical Artist
940.3
1984
ISBN 0-86307-181-3
Art Director
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Cavendish Corporation.
(set)
86307 187 2 vol
Contents of Volume 6 1657 The Italian Front Mounting Losses
— Few Gains and
1728 The Channel
War
1670
Front: Italy Franco Valsecchi
Paul Kennedy and Oskar Eckert 1736 Verdun: The End John Keegan 1740 Helmets
1675
Home
1741
Mario
Torsiello
Home
Front: Austria Z. A. B. Zeman
1680 Counterattack at Verdun
John Keegan 1685
The Somme
— The Last Phase
Lieutenant-Colonel John Baynes 1696 The 'Quiet' Sector Lieutenant-Colonel Jean Delmas 1101 French Home Front Philippe Masson 1713
The Bombing War Douglas Robinson
1149 Zeppelins: The Fighter Pilot's View 1750 Britain: Lloyd George takes over Professor Asa Briggs 1756 East Africa: Smuts versus Vorbeck Major R. Sibley
1764 Gunboats on Lake Tanganyika Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp
The Collapse of Rumania
1769 Blockade Runners Christopher Bowling
Norman Stone
1780 The Kut Garrison: Hardship and
1725 Operation Arson Terence Wise
Starvation
Colonel W. C. Spackman 1785 Turkey in Decline
David Walder 1792 Air Propaganda R. G. Auckland
1798 Peace Initiatives Marvin Swartz 1802
TheU-BoatWar
Gaddis Smith 1812 Mexico: The Comic Opera War Colonel Clarence C. Clendenen 1825 The Death of Franz Josef— The End of an Empire Dr J. F. N. Bradley 1828 Poland— A Foot in Both Camps Kam il Dzie wan o wski
"^
I
1836 The Rendezvous with Death
1914 Rasputin:
Ronald Lewin
1922 Western Front Winter 1916/1917
1853 Across the Sinai F.
Woodhouse
1860 Aircraft: Higher, Faster, Lighter D. B. Tubbs 1871
1917:
A New Year— New
Plans
Major-General Anthony FarrarHockley 1877 Belgium: Life under German Occupation Jacques Willequet 1881 Mesopotamia: Maude Takes Over Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Barker
John Keegan 1924 Winter on the Eastern Front Eugene Hinterhoff 1937 Revolution in Russia Dr Lionel Kochan
1948 Decline of the Tsarist Geoffrey Jukes 1958
F.
Woodho use
1900 Sixtus, Prince of Peace Marvin Swartz 1906 Events
in
or Peace: The Vital Decision S. L. Mayer
Dr 1965
New
J.
F.
Russia's
N. Bradley
Towards Baghdad Lieutenant-Colonel A.
J.
Barker
1974 The Fall of Baghdad
North-West Persia
Major D. G. Clark 1909 The Dismissal of Joffre Major C. A. Kinvig
War
Army
1963 Three Revolutionaries: Kerensky, Trotsky, Lenin
1890 Maude's Offensive
Major W.
or Miracle
Colin Wilson
1844 Trench Raiding Charles Messenger
Major W.
Madman
Worker?
Leslie Missen
1986 Into Palestine: The First Battle of Gaza Brigadier John Stephenson 1991
Kressenstein and
Murray
12880
1916 AUG
27
28
Romania Germany
enters the war.
declares war on Romania. Romania declares war on Austria-Hungary. Italy declares war
on Germany.
SEPT
1
Mackensen's Danube army invades Romania. Bulgaria declares war on Romania.
Somme.
15
British use tanks at the
20
Austro-Germans halt Russian advance. Russians and Romanians halt Germans.
OCT
24
Fort
NOV
18
Battle of the
DEC
6
Douaumont
recaptured.
Somme
ends.
Germans capture Bucharest and
12
Joffre replaced by Nivelle.
18
Battle of
21
British take El Arish.
Ploesti oilfields.
Verdun ends.
1917 JAN
31
British rail
and water
Germans announce from February
FEB
MAR
APR
Rafah complete.
1.
24
British retake Kut.
occupy Baghdad.
11
British
12
Russian revolution begins, Czar resigns.
26
1st Battle
6 9
MAY
lines to
unrestricted submarine warfare
of Gaza.
U.S. declares war on Germany. Battle of Arras.
Vimy Ridge
taken.
16
2nd Battle of the Aisne, Nivelle offensive.
17
2nd Battle of Gaza.
29
Mutinies
15
Petain replaces Nivelle as French Commander-inChief.
JUN
among French Army.
Allenby takes
command
of the British forces
in
Palestine.
7
22
Battle of Messines Ridge.
King Constantine of Greece abdicates. Venizelos takes over.
25
1st
American
soldiers reach France.
THE ITALIAN FRONT few and gains
mounting losses In the summer and autumn of 1916 the Itahans launched a series of attacks over nearly impossible terrain against well-placed Austrian positions. Only minor gains were achieved, but more important from the Allied point of view was the fact that huge Austrian reserves
were being tied down. Mario Torsiello. Above: A photograph from a contemporary Italian magazine, captioned 'How our Alpinis reach an almost inaccessible position'
^fiF,^
-:.-»? IfJ.'^K
^- v-^,y^>Su
When
they reaHsed that the force of the Austrian offensive (see
Volume 4, pages 1452-1460) had begun to expend itself, the Italian Supreme Command, with effect from June 2, 1916, ordered a counteroffensive to consolidate the front on the Asiago Plateau, and then to evict the Austrians from all their positions. At the start of the counteroffensive, on a front of about 30 miles from the head of the Vallarsa to the southern edge of the plateau, 177 battalions and 800 guns of the Italian First Army were opposed to 168 battalions and 680 guns of the Austro-Hungarian Third and Eleventh Armies. The greater strength of the Italians, a result of posting to their forces their units drawn from the Fifth Reserve Army, was offset by the fact that the Austrians had taken up positions of great natural strength. The counteroffensive's object (which was to regain the positions held before the Austrian offensive began) prevented the conduct of operations along the whole front with a superiority of forces: in fact, they had to be conducted within strict limits both of time and of forces available, as a result of the obligations assumed by Italy at the Chantilly Conference in France (December 6, 1915, and March 14, 1916) for common Allied action. It was therefore necessary to subordinate the limits of the proposed counteroffensive to the need not to compromise the offensive on the Isonzo which was to follow. The plan of the counteroffensive was simple and clear: it was to consist of an initial advance on both flanks, followed by an advance in the centre to get up to the boundary-line. But, until June 18, the final attacks of the enemy had to be met; and a number of difficulties hampered any rapid advance by the Italian forces. The action on the Asiago Plateau on the Italian right flank had as its objective the line Cima Portule — Monte Meata, an objective which was to be attained by means of a frontal breakthrough and a subsequent enveloping movement, thus forcing the enemy to retire. This action, though it encountered tenacious resistance, succeeded in penetrating the Austrian positions; but although the positions on the southern edge of the plateau were in fact retaken, this success could not be exploited. Between June 22 and 24, in Villarsa, there followed the attack on the left flank, which did not, however, breach the enemy's defences. The Austrians at this point decided to break off contact, and began to retreat on the night of June 25, justifying this by the
m Above left: The Italian campaign in the summer and autumn of 1916. Above right and below: Successive stages in an Italian infantry assault. the top picture the infantry wait for their artillery fire to lift. As it does so (centre and bottom pictures), the successive waves of infantry move forward, following the barrage up the hill. Only rarely could infantry attack over such unspoilt terrain. In
' .
a vast war of attrition along a wide front without any penetration in depth, but with .
.
heavy
losses
.' .
.
necessity to shorten the line, in order to free units for despatch to the Russian front. The retreat, which, it must be admitted, was silent, well-conducted, and undisturbed (despite occasional raids on the part of the Italians), ended on June 26 in positions to the rear which had been prepared in advance. As early as June 21, the Italian Supreme Command, foreseeing the retreat, had given orders that the forces of the Trentino should press the enemy with the utmost vigour. But the pursuit was hampered by the fact that contact was lost during the hours of darkness; and it was only resumed on June 27, after measures had been taken for the security of the Italian forces — measures which slowed down the speed of the advance. By then, the enemy was already occupying positions which had been solidly strengthened, and which were located on dominating heights. Fresh attempts at a counterofFensive on the flanks in Val Sugana, on the Asiago Plateau, in Val Posina, at Pasubio, and in Vallarsa did not attain their objectives, despite certain local successes. In particular, the attack begun by the left wing in the region of Pasubio, which was aimed at the recapture of Col Santo, penetrated deeply into the Austrian positions in Vallarsa, while it was vigorously opposed and held in the area of Pasubio. The fighting became furious, and it grew to a peak on July 2 as a result of the Austro-Hungarian counterattacks. These, however, failed on account of the bitter resistance put up by the Italians. The counterofFensive was resumed in Vallarsa, towards the Borcola Hills, in Val Posina, and on the Asiago Plateau. The operations had scarcely begun when, on July 9, the Italian Supreme Command, in view of the modest results so far obtained, warned HQ, First Army, that the last ten days of July would see the beginning of the transfer to the Isonzo front of artillery and reserves; and that this would mean that the operations would have to be restrained during this period. The attempts to break the enemy's line continued to be vain, except for some local successes. Despite all efforts, the counteroffensive had to be halted; and it was transformed into a vast war of attrition along a wide front without any penetration in depth, but with heavy losses. However, at all events, the attacks which had been launched on July 10 had tended in the direction of the Isonzo. Having suspended the general counteroffensive, the Italian Supreme Command authorised HQ, First Army, to put into effect, in conjunction with the left wing of Fourth Army, operations designed to straighten the line they held; but these were to be undertaken exclusively by their own forces, and therefore with limited means. Thus, by July 24, the counteroffensive had come to a halt. There was no lack of immediate and repeated attempts to crush the Austro-Hungarian resistance in its new positions; but these attempts met with only modest results as a result of a number of factors. These consisted of the extreme roughness of the mountain terrain; the intrinsic strength of the positions on to which the Austrians had withdrawn; and the physical impossibility of organising in time, and in sufficient detail, the mounting of the offensive (and especially the provision of heavy artillery in any quantity).
Fresh diversionary attacks While the counteroffensive of the Italian First Army in the Trentino was being launched, other operations were being conducted which were aimed at assisting it, either directly or indirectly, in the high valley of the Cordevole, in Cadore in Carnia, and on the Julian front — these last being intended to hinder the movement of the Austrian troops towards the Trentino. As they proceeded, the Fifth Army made one or two feints on the Isonzo. All these operations are interesting, both because they achieved their object of tying the enemy down, and also because of the difficulties encountered (and partly overcome) and the losses suffered. The principal operations were (from west to east): • Those conducted by I Corps of the Fourth Army in the sectors Boite-Cristallo and the Ansiei Valley (June 7-27); • the activities of the left wing of the same corps in Val Travignolo and San Pellegrino, in co-operation with the right wing of First Army (XVIIl Corps) on June 25, July 1, July 19-22, and July 26, which led to the capture of the Rolle Pass, of Cima Cavallazza, and of the Colbricon Pass; • and the operations undertaken by the XVIII Corps on the Cordevole Plateau during the last ten days of July. In addition, there were the operations undertaken in Cadore by IX Corps, which formed part of Fourth Army in the Val Costeana sector (July 9-11). These operations ended with the capture of several positions and also of Monte Castelletto, after a mine had been exploded. There were, moreover, the operations of July 9-31 in the valley of Travenanzes, and those in Carnia which were 1660
Opposite, top to bottom: Antonio Salandra, of Italy untilJune 1916; by that time Italy's initial enthusiasm for the war was being replaced by criticism of both the political and military leadership. Paolo Boselli, the near-octogenarian who succeeded Salandra and attempted the virtually impossible task of uniting the country behind the war. The Duke of Aosta, Commander of the Italian First Army which spearheaded the Italian counteroffensive on the Asiago Plateau in June 1916. General Boroevic, commander of the Austrian Fiftin Army on the Isonzo
Prime Minister
Right: Asphyxiating gas swirls around Italian troops as they test new protective devices: gas
was used on
this front
suffered from
on June 29-both sides
effects and the Austrians significant gain because the Italians its
made no promptly and successfully counterattacked Below
riglit:
WaWans attacking by night
carried out by XII Corps from June 27-29 for rectification of its positions. The Italian losses were 22 officers killed, 127 wounded, and 18 missing; and 368 other ranks killed, and 3,127 wounded. In conjunction with these, parallel operations were conducted by the Italian Third Army. They were intended to hinder the movement of enemy troops, and were undertaken by VII Corps in the Monfalcone sector on June 28, and on July 3 and 4. While these were in progress, the Austro-Hungarians, on June 29, launched an attack on Carso, in the sectors of San Martino and San Michele, against the front held by the Italian IX Corps, in order to free themselves from growing pressure exerted by this corps, and to hurl it back over the Isonzo. In this operation they used poison gas. The effects of the gas were rapid and violent, and they allowed the Austrians to gain some initial successes; but the immediate counterattack made by the survivors, and the intervention of new forces, stopped the breakthrough and made possible the recapture of the positions that had been lost. On both sides, the losses were serious: about 100 Italian officers and 2,600 other ranks were killed, and 3,900 wounded and asphyxiated; while the Austro-
1661
k
1662
Hungarians
lost
23
officers
and 1,549 other ranks
or asphyxiated, as well as 416
killed,
wounded
POWs
missing. Once it had been decided to suspend the counteroffensive in the Trentino, it was possible to put into effect the second stage of the strategic manoeuvre for the internal lines of the Italian forces; the switching of the reserves from the Trentino towards the Isonzo by means of reducing the numbers of troops on the front held by First Army (it must be remembered that, in the first stage, huge reserves had been transferred from the Isonzo in the direction of the Trentino). The Fifth Army, which had supplied out of its own resources the troops needed for the resistance and the counteroffensive on the Trentino front, was disbanded on July 2, to be reformed later as the Second Army on the Julian front. The manoeuvre, which had been planned by the Supreme Command on June 9, was originally implemented in two phases (from June 29 to July 26, and from July 27 to August 5 respectively). These were followed by a third phase (from August 6 to 20), which followed the start of the Sixth Battle of the Isonzo. It was an impressive movement, carried out in good order, speedily, secretly, and according to plan, and was effected chiefly by railway transport, supplemented by hundreds of journeys made by the motor transport available to the Supreme Command (about 350 lorries). The general decisions which had been taken at the beginning of 1916 now made themselves felt. The Chantilly agreements, in fact, had provided for combined actions to be undertaken more or less simultaneously by the members of the Entente. These actions, however, had been delayed both in France, as a result of the Battle of Verdun, and also in Italy, because of the Austro-
Hungarian
offensive.
For the Allies, the goal was clearly defined: it was to continue the wearing down of the enemy's forces; since, in general, time was on the side of the Entente, which was able to 'hold out' and to co-operate 'with alacrity in attempts to provide a speedy final solution in the field'. These operations could materialise only at the end of spring; and they were to include the Russian attack in Galicia (begun on June 4), the Battle of the Somme in France (begun on July 1), and the Italian offensive in Gorizia (begun on August 4). The idea underlying the proposed Italian action was to stop the enemy from being able to debouch onto the Venetian plain. The first directives, issued on November 25, 1915, and January 15, 1916, had to be modified as a result of the non-availability of forces. In the beginning, the capture of the right bank of the Isonzo was planned, with the possibility of pursuit beyond the river; but the occurrence of the enemy's offensive in the Trentino forced the plan to be modified to more reasonable proportions; and it was then decided to capture the positions between Monte Sabotino and Monte Podgora as far as the river, and to invest San Michele on the Carso. The basic plan of the manoeuvre provided for a feint by Third Army on the right wing, in the sector of Monfalcone, which was to begin two days beforehand. The main operations were to take place on the right flank against the bridgehead of Gorizia; and there was to be a subsidiary operation on the left of centre, in the sector San Michele— San Martino. Second Army was to undertake a subsidiary operation which was to consist purely of intervention by the artillery. The beginning of the operations in the San Michele-San Martino sector were fixed for August 4, and on the rest of the front for August 6. As a result of the experience gained in the preceding battles on the Isonzo, the preparations for the new offensive were intensive.
They included bringing up the necessary forces, preparing the means of destruction and getting them ready for use, the preparations for the logistic services, the provision of equipment for the troops and the stimulation of their morale, and those field works on the scene of action that were needed for the offensive. The enemy's defences were very strong, hinging upon the bridgeheads of Tolmino and Grorizia (between which jutted out the Plava salient) and upon the defence of the edge of the left bank of the river. They comprised a thick network of trenches and communication trenches, protected by barbed wire and artificial obstacles, and flanked by machine gun fire. The right wing of Third Army (VII Corps), together with the left wing of XI Corps, made a feint in the Monfalcone sector, in i. order to attract the greatest possible number of the enemy f This feint involved 29 battalions, 31 squadrons, 199 guns ar.- J6 mortars, to which were opposed the 22 battalions and 130 S'.uis of the Schenk Group. It began on the morning of August 4, with the help of the artillery of XI and XIII Corps; and it continued with
f
Here occupied by the Austrians, a former Italian barracks high up In the spectacular (but militarily gruelling) scenery in the Italian Alps
<]
1663
ferocity on the 5th. It came to an end on about August positions to the east of Monfalcone were occupied; but did not succeed in drawing away the enemy forces engaged on
tremendous 10, it
when
the Gorizian front. The main attack was on the left wing (Sabatino-Podgora) against the bridgehead of Gorizia, with supporting action in the centre. More than six divisions were allotted to VI Corps (General Capello). The aim was to push the Austrians back over the Isonzo and take firm possession of the outskirts of Gorizia, with vigorous action on the front Sabotino-Oslavia-Grafenburg-Podgora. On the Italian side, the following forces were employed: 74 battalions, four squadrons, 603 guns and 390 mortars, together with numerous machine guns, and mine-throwing detachments. On the Austrian side was the 58th Division of his XVI Corps, consisting of 18j battalions, 65 machine guns, and 42 pieces of artillery. The attack began at 1600 hours on August 6, the preparatory softeningup by the artillery having started at 0700 hours. The attack directed against Monte Sabotino broke the back of the resistance in only 45 minutes, and led to the capture of the summit. On the Podgora, once the crest had been surmounted by the wings, the Grafenburg was reached. That evening, and during the night of the 7th, counterattacks were very severe. Hill 240 of Monte Calvario, although surrounded, resisted tenaciously. In the centre the attack ran into strong obstacles, but it got past Oslavia and reached Peuma: some patrols succeeded in getting to the Isonzo. During the night of the 6th/7th, and throughout the day of the 7th, there came violent enemy reaction in the shape of counterattacks from the Sabotino to Podgora, all of which were vigorously repulsed. On the 8th, all the positions on the right bank were taken; and, having crossed the Isonzo, detachments of 12th Division were the first to enter Gorizia. Having determined upon breaking through the enemy positions on the right bank of the Isonzo, and upon the crossing of that river, the Italian Supreme Command modified its original plan, and ordered the immediate pursuit of the enemy, so as to harass him and prevent him from taking up positions to the east of Gorizia. There were necessarily some delays in the execution of these new orders, the chief reason being the unexpected speed with which the situation developed. Therefore, the exhausted troops pursued to the utmost of their ability, regaining contact on August 9. Attempts which were made with the light infantry and (during the course of the following days) with repeated and bloody attacks by the ihfantry of the line, did not result in any further progress, because of the lack of adequate preparation, and also because of the considerable amount of time which was needed for the reserves to come up. Furthermore, the bridges had been blown by the Austrians. One last resumption of the attack along the whole front, which began on the 14th after the substitution of the most experienced units, gave no positive results despite heavy losses. The enemy was by then in firm possession of previously prepared positions which, passing through Monte San Marco, joined up on the Carso at Volkovnjak. A lot of time would have been necessary for the preparation of a new attack; and therefore, on August 17, the Supreme Command ordered the suspension of the offensive. Subsidiary operations in the Monte San Michele sector, on the Carso, were entrusted to XI Corps (37 battalions, 217 guns and 210 mortars) against the Austro-Hungarian VII Corps (27 battalions and 178 guns). They began on August 6th. The four peaks of Monte San Michele and the hamlet of San Martino were captured at great cost and were held despite vigorous counterattacks during August 7 and 8. The operations continued on August 9, and got as far as the River Vippacco. This forced the enemy to withdraw on August 10, to new positions, which were breached, however, on August 12, thereby permitting the capture of Nad Logem and of Opacchiasella. The struggle was renewed from the 14th to the 16th. and marked f5rogress was made. Then, on August 17, it was suspended, following an order from the Supreme Command. This battle, crowned by the capture of formidable positions which had been assailed in vain during the five preceding battles of the Isonzo, had immense repercussions. The success was deeply felt by the Italian nation, in the international arena, and by the Central Powers. It is, in fact, particularly noteworthy how many troops the Austro-Hungarians were forced to recall from other fronts in order to contain the pressure of the Italian forces. The results of the battle were important in the field of strategy (the resumption of the initiative by the Italians and the elimination of a serious Austrian threat to Venice); in the tactical field (the Austrian front could no longer be considered impregnable in the face of a breakthrough operation of the classic type); in the field of morale, in respect of the spirit of the troops and of the
1664
Italian population; and in the political field, and in that of the general waging of the struggle, because it forced the Central Powers back on to the defensive. Moreover, in the same field, the victory was by no means the least important cause of Rumania's entry into the war on the side of the Allies, which took place on August 27 of the same year. When the Battle of Gorizia was about to start, the Supreme Command gave orders for an active defence on the rest of the front, which was to consolidate the positions already held, and also prevent the enemy from hindering, by partial offensive action, the despatch of reinforcements for the troops operating in the direction
and beyond. With the object of improving the disposition of the Italian forces to the east of Gorizia and on the Carso, the Supreme Command decided upon new offensives which were to threaten Trieste directly and to engage the Austrian forces to the utmost, in
of Gorizia
conjunction with the operations of the Rumanian forces. Both during and after the Battle of Gorizia, the Austro-Hun(XVI, garian forces were reinforced, bringing their Fifth Army ' VII and XXIII Corps) up to 101 battalions and 490 guns.
Dawn bombardment lines laid down for the resumption of the offensive provided for a resolute advance on the Carso Plateau by the Italian Third Army (XI, XIII and VII Corps in the line, with XXIV and XIV Corps and various units in reserve — a total of 185 battalions, 31 squadrons, 956 guns and 558 mortars). This advance was planned to reach the Trsteli-Hermada positions, with Second Army providing help in the form of feints by VI and XXVI Corps (in order to prevent the transfer of Austrian troops, and to neutralise their artillery), and a local offensive for the capture of Monte Rombon in the Plezzo Valley. Thus on September 14, at 1500 hours and preceded by an artillery preparation which commenced at dawn, there began the Seventh Battle of the Isonzo, which suddenly assumed the character of a battle of attrition as a result of the frenzied resistance of the enemy. The attack broke through the positions as far as two kilometres to the east of Opacchiasella, and captured San Grado di Merna and Hill 144. However, the worsening of the weather made it impossible to follow up this marked success. Second Army in its turn attacked and seized Monte Rombon on the 16th, but the troops were forced to withdraw. Since the results of the battle had to be proportional to the losses, the Supreme Command ordered the suspension of the attack, intending to resume it later. The causes of its lack of success were to be found in the fact that, owing to lack of time, the preparations were hurried; and also in the worsening of the weather. The operations on the Carso were resumed on October 10, with the same objectives as had been laid down for the Seventh Battle, but with an extension of the front of the attack to the high ground to the east of Gorizia and of the Vertojbica River, and with the adoption of new procedures. The operational plan provided for a breakthrough of the enemy's front in the direction of Nad LogemFajta by Third Army, flanked by Second Army to the east of the Vertojbica River. Second Army was to make a feint from Plava to Monte San Marco, and to attack in earnest from the latter as far as the Vippacco, and to engage in artillery action on the Gorizian
The general
front.
The opposing forces were reinforced with new units. Including their reserves, the Italian Second and Third Armies had 225 battalions, 26 dismounted squadrons, 1,305 guns and 883 mortars; while the Austro-Hungarian Fifth Army opposed them from Gorizia to the sea with 107 battalions and 538 guns. The artillery barrage began on October 9 on the Carso, and provoked lively enemy reaction. The attack was launched at 1450 hours on the 10th, and continued until the 12th. Enemy resistance was everywhere extremely fierce. The positions from the Vippacco to Hill 208 were captured, as were those of Nova Vas, the western slopes of the Pecinka, and the first houses of Loquizza and Boscomalo. On the right, Jamiano was also taken; but it had to be abandoned after a violent counterattack. In the region of Gorizia, the spur of Sober and the high ground near San Pietro were seized. On October 12, the Austrian forces were compelled to withdraw on to the line Veliki Hribach-Pecinka-Hill 202 — the villages of Loquizza and Boscomalo. That evening, the offensive came to a halt. It had achieved important gains of territory, and the capture of over 8,200 prisoners and a great quantity of arms. Because of the appalling weather conditions and the minimal visibility, this battle had to be postponed to November 1. It had the same aim as the Eighth Battle, namely, an attack from Monte San Marco to the sea. Third Army's objectives were the Austrian positions on the line Veliki Hribach-Hudilog-Hill 235 and Fajti-
Castagnevizza-Selo. Second Army's were the ridge to the east of the Vertojbica and to the north of Monte San Marco. Both armies were to have careful artillery preparation for their attacks. The preliminary artillery bombardment started on October 25, and continued until the 28th. It was resumed on the morning of November 1. The attack began that day at 1110 hours in the face of violent reaction by the Austrian artillery. The infantry, operating with great dash, soon pierced the front; and, on the Carso, Veliki Hribach and Pecinka were captured. So, on the following days, was the whole front from Monte Fajti to about 700 yards to the west of Castagnevizza. Another force stormed the crests of Volkovnjak and of Dosso Faiti, as well as positions as far as about 200 yards from Castagnevizza and furious counterattacks were repulsed. The gains achieved in the Gorizia sector were not so great, due to the bad weather and the existence of the marshes of Veroibizza. Nevertheless, Hill 171 of San Marco and other places were occupied. The advance penetrated to a depth of more than three miles from Vallone; but the attempt to reach Salone, in order to roll up the enemy's forces, proved a failure, and the operations were halted on the evening of November 4. This battle proved to be the most profitable of the autumn offensive. Thus ended the autumn offensive. It had been extremely costly, and, despite three successive pushes, it had not achieved the same results as the Battle of Gorizia. Nevertheless, the Austrians had been considerably weakened, although their defence proved on the whole to be both prompt and effective. The air forces of both sides were extremely active. That of the Italians (more than 300 aircraft and four airships) was employed in the spotting of the Austrian positions, their preparations for defence, their gun positions, and their troop movements: it also bombed railway installations and the arsenal at Trieste. The Austro-Hungarian Air Force was also extremely active, bombing a number of places and lines of communication, especially centres of habitation.
The operations on other
sectors of the front,
namely
in the Tren-
Cadore and Carnia, were of considerable importance; and they also had the aim of attracting Austrian forces, so as to prevent
tino,
their transfer to the Isonzo front.
In the Trentino, operations were conducted on the Pasubio in order to enlarge the area held by the Italians in that vicinity; and these were assisted by attacks in Vallarsa and Val Posina, which were entrusted to First Army (V Corps). The first attack (September 10-11) was continued until the 13th, despite vigorous enemy resistance; but it achieved no tangible results. Fresh attacks were made from October 9-12, assisted by local feints made on the flanks. These resulted in the capture of the Cosmagon Alps and of positions on the slopes of Monte Roite. The fighting, which was fierce and violent, deprived the Austrians of direct control over the Upper Vallarsa, and reduced the size of the AustroHungarian salient towards Pasubio. Three hundred and seventytwo prisoners and eight guns were captured.
A mountain mined The attack was resumed from October 18-20; but the Austrian counterattacks compelled the abandonment of some of the positions which had been captured. Meanwhile, mine warfare had been begun at Monte Cimone d'Arsiero, in the valley of the Astico. On September 23, the Austrians exploded a mine under the mountain, killing or burying all the defenders, as a result of which they recaptured the summit that they had lost on July 23. Activity in the Cadore area was very intensive. An attack launched by Fourth Army (XVIII Corps) in Val Vanoi and Val Travignolo to chase the Austrians from the Fassa Alp was begun on August 23. It led to the capture of the crests of Monte Cauriol (August 27) and Monte Cardinal (September 23). By brilliant scaling of the rock walls, Italian troops seized the crests of the Colbricon (October 2), of Costabella (October 5), and of Busa Alta (October 6), all of which were more than 6,000 feet in height. This gave possession of the mountain crest on the Avisio River, despite strong Austrian resistance. No review of the Italian situation in the second half of 1916 would be complete without mention of her naval forces. Throughout this period there was intense naval activity in the Adriatic, and much of this activity centred round a naval weapon that the Italians had virtually pioneered — the Motor Torpedo Boat. The incursions of Italian torpedo boats into Austrian waters were many and frequent, especially those on Pirano (June 24 aind <] Austrian mountaineers on the Avisio. The Italians soon found that the Austrians had selected good defensive sites on dominating heights
1665
left: An Italian shows his men the correct way to the
Top
officer
front in the Isonzo area
Top
One of many similar difficulties
right:
to which the Italians and Austrians responded with great energy — an Italian 75-mm mountain gun is hoisted to a
commanding
position
Below: Austrian storm troopers come under shell fire as they get
their feet
wet crossing the Isonzo
1666 •
- *
Top still
TheVetterIi Vitali M1871/87 10.4-mm. 2The Vetterii M1871/87 10.4-mm converted to6.5-mm. These two rifles were
left: 1
Vital!
in fairly
extensive use
at
the beginning of the Italian campaign.
The MannlicherCarcano M1891 G.S-mm. 4 The Mannlicher Carcano 91TS Carbine 6.5-mm. 5 The Mannlicher Carcano M1891 Carbine 6.5-mm with folding bayonet. The Mannlicher Carcano has a Mauser-type bolt action with a Mannlicher six-round magazine Top right: 6The 10.35-mm Glisenti M1891 revolver with folding trigger. 7 The 10.35-mm Glisenti revolver. 8The7.65-mm Beretta M1915 pistol. 9The9-mm Glisenti M1910 automatic pistol. 10 Flare pistol. 11 The 9-mm Beretta M1915 Glisenti pistol Left, below left and below right: The Villar Perosa 9-mm sub-machine gun, the first actual sub-machine gun used in military service. Originally 3
The
first
sub-machine gun to be used in mihtary service
aircraft, its light weight (14 lb 4 oz) made it useful for infantry fighting in mountainous regions. Each magazine held 25 rounds, and its two barrels could be fired individually. Here it is shown in a back pack with a container for cartridges (left), modified for infantry
designed for
use with a bipod (below use (below right)
left),
and with a mounting
for aircraft or bicycle
<] The Italian 65-mm mountain gun with shield. This piece broke down into six mule-pack loads, flange; 7,100 yards. Rate of fire: 10-20 roundsper-minute. f\/luzzle velocity; 1,100feet-per-second. Weight in firing position: 1,200 lb
I 1667
L
S-^"
fSJfr
w
July
An Austrian position
cloud level. Against such sound positions and with worsening weather, the Italian advance was inevitably slow at
24), Trieste (June 27 and August 15), Parenzo (July 9), Durazzo (July 24/25, August 2, and November 3/4), and on the Fasana Canal at Pola (November 1/2). Also, a close watch was kept on the enemy's coasts for the protection of merchant shipping in the Mediterranean, and of transports sailing to the Italian colonies and the islands of the Aegean. Coastal defences were strengthened especially in Libya and on the Adriatic, and armoured trains were introduced in these areas to counter the raids of enemy
ships.
Furthermore, we must also consider the occupation of coastal areas in Albania (Porto Palermo, August 24; Santi Quaranta, October 2/4); the raids carried out by the Fleet Air Arm; the guard duties, with particular emphasis on those undertaken for the erection and protection of the barrage on the Otranto Canal; the encounters with enemy naval units (July 9 and 14, and August 2/3); attacks on Austrian merchant convoys; and the laying of mines off Austria's coasts. Particular emphasis must be given to the operations undertaken to help the right wing of the army, with the use of floating batteries against the enemy's lines of communication; and to the organisation of the defence of various coastal areas, including Grado.
A battleship
sunk
Italian navy suffered the loss of a number of ships. On the night of July 14, while lurking off the Island of Lissa, the submarine Balilla was attacked and sunk after a sharp fight. On
The fi^-
July 19, the destroyer Impetuoso was sunk by a torpedo while she was cruising in the Otranto Canal; while on July 31 the submarine Pullino was lost as a result of running aground on the enemy coast of Galliola, near the Isle of Unie, while she was on her way to Pola. On August 2, the battleship Leonardo da Vinci sank at Taranto as a result of sabotage by enemy agents. Finally, on October 17, off Santi Quaranta (Albania), the destroyer Nembo was torpedoed and sunk, while escorting a steamer laden with troops.
The activity of the Austro-Hungarian navy consisted chiefly of the following: raids by small craft, and by its Fleet Air Arm, on the Italian Adriatic coast and on that of Albania, when merchant ships were torpedoed; repeated attacks made on the barrage
-^^A
A
on the Otranto Canal (of which the most important was that of July 9) where a submarine watch kept close to the Italian and Dalmatian coasts; and the close defence of their coasts. On July 8 and 10, near the barrage on the Otranto Canal, three submarines in succession ran into mines and sank. On August 2, off the little island of Galiola, the destroyer Magnet was torpedoed by the Italian submarine Salpa. With the suspension of the autumn offensive, the cycle of operations on the Italian Front in 1916 must be considered to have been brought to a close. During the year, the Italian forces had given a great deal of support to the attempts of the Allies to regain the initiative. The year ended satisfactorily; and Italy had made a large contribution of blood to the common cause. At the same time, efforts were made for a further increase in the armed forces; and, during that year, the army's establishment was raised to five armies, consisting of 20 army corps, 48 infantry divisions, four cavalry divisions, ten Alpine groups and 370 aeroplanes. Overseas, 38th Division was in Albania and 35th Division in Macedonia; while there were 37 battalions in Libya. The Italian navy was considerably enlarged in every respect. As far as naval construction is concerned, the following new vessels had been put into service since the war began: four corvettes: seven destroyers; four coastal torpedo-boats and a number of smaller ones; 17 submarines; 48 M.T.B.s; and a quantity of floating batteries, auxiliary vessels, guard-ships and escort vessels. The situation of the Austro-Hungarian army was quite different. Its heavy losses, coupled with the need to parry any threat coming from the Italian Front, had compelled it to spread out its troops along the whole width of the front. Its total potential increase was also small; and in 1917 Austria-Hungary would be compelled to ask for substantial help from Germany. Nor was the situation any better so far as the Austro-Hungarian navy was concerned; few new ships entered into service. The greater part of its losses was in respect of its light craft and submarines; for the bigger units remained at anchor in their harbours. A shortage of raw materials for industry prevented an adequate p:ogramme of naval construction from being implemented; while the mastery of the Adriatic lay more and more surely in the hands of the Italian navy operating from its straterijaliy placed
bases at the 'heel' of Italy. [For General Mario Torsiello's biography and Further Reading, see
page
885.]
1669
Italy's
enthusiasm
for the last
war did not
beyond
its first
year. The prewar differences between liberals, nationalists,
conservatives and socialists were quick to blossom again once the illusion of
a brief war with a rapid and easy victory had been exploded by the grim and bloody fighting against the Austrians. Amid bitter criticisms of both the military and political leadership Salandra's government fell, but still the factionalism continued.
The
troops' morale began to fall alarmingly, but still,
as on other
fronts, the tactic of
the massed frontal assault was rigidly maintained. To these problems was added the strain of harnessing Italy's
backward
peacetime economy to the demands of the war effort. During the war Italy entered the ranks of the great industrial
powers. In the process she paid a great price. Franco Valsecchi
1670
HOME
FRONT ITALY
The
Italian
propaganda
post-
card below warns Italy against the mistaken desire of the Russian (and some Italian) revolutionaries at the end of 1916: a premature peace which might be bought at the price of enslavement and death in the long run.
The truce between neutralists and interventionists which had followed Italy's declaration of in May 1915 was beginning break down by the end of 1916. The enthusiasm of the
war to
early days began to wane as the illusion of an 'heroic war' was shattered by the sad reality of the 'mole war' of the trenches. Before the war the interventionist movement had maintained a relatively united front, but once the decision to
intervene had been
movement began into its
made the
crumble various components. to
At the centre was the great body of opinion which harked back to the Risorgimento: the war was seen as the continua-
and conclusion of the struggle for unity and
tion
independence which began with the Risorgimento, against the ancient enemy, the Austrian Empire. Then there were the nationalists to whom the war was a welcome adventure necessary to stimulate the nation's heroic spirit. Directly opposed to this was the democratic current, for whom the war was a crusade for justice, liberty
and peace.
The interventionist agitation
had stemmed from a minority of the population belonging
above all to the lower middle class intelligentsia. The majority of the country was opposed to the war, but once it had been declared the war was accepted with resignation in the interests of national solidarity. However, the mood of
resignation did not long survive in the face of bloody deadlock on the Isonzo and Trentino Fronts. Soon criticism
of the military and political conduct of the war came to the surface, and in this backlash of
disappointment Salandra's government was the first major casualty. A vote of no confidence brought about his downfall, and Paolo Boselli formed a national union government which aimed to unite the country behind the war. But the new government originated no new policies and the morale of the nation, particularly of the troops, continued to suffer.
1671
1672
Mobilisation brought the
mass
of agricultural workers into
touch with a
new way of life The
Italian peasant
women
pictured left revetting trenches illustrates just one of the problems faced by Italy in her struggle to adjust to a wartime economy. Inevitably there were bottlenecks with intense economic activity and labour shortages, contrasting with pools of unemployment elsewhere as the demands of the war effort began to require
an immense redeployment of physical and human resources. The most immediate effect of
war was a powerful surge of industrial activity. In the forefront were the steel, engineering and electrical industries which were now freed from German competition. The industrial boom was accompanied by a rapid and confusing financial boom. All in all there was a profound lack of balance; some sectors stood still, and some the
problems were aggravated. There were correspondingly profound changes in Italy's social structure. Mobilisation
brought the mass of agricultural workers into touch with a new way of life, opening new horizons and awakening new needs, while the vastly increased demand for industrial labour made the urban working class more than ever aware of its important role in the economic life of the country. Yet there was growing dissatisfaction among both the industrial and agricultural workers, among the former because they felt they were bearing the economic burden of the war in the workshops, among the latter because they were bearing the military burden of the war in the trenches. The middle classes, especially those with fixed incomes, were hard hit by soaring inflation. Just as the war had its victims, so it also had its profiteers and beneficiaries; a new class of rich 'sharks' took advantage of the unforeseen opportunities which were thrown up by the economic dislocation, and a new middle class took its place beside the old. At last Italy was experiencing the painful throes of the industrial revolution.
1673
The postcards shown below and right were meant to boost morale in the General Cadorna (6e/ou;), Chief of Staff of the Italian army, met the morale crisis, with its Italy's flagging
latter part of 1916.
increasing incidence of insubordination and yielding in the
army, with an iron hand and launched a new series of offensives in the summer and autumn of 1916. His aim, like the Italian soldier in the postcard on the right, was to
move round the Adriatic and complete the work of the Risorgimento. However, Italy's soldiers did not so
overcome the armies of the Austrian Empire, and after more than a year and a half of bitter war there was no notable change in the positions of the two adversaries. easily
1674
By
HOME FRONT AUSTRIA Titled
The Habsburg
Nightmare', the cartoon below shows the basic dilemma of Austria-Hungary in the First
World War: composed of so
many different
national
minorities, she was particularly vulnerable to nationalist movements, the more so if the nationalists were encouraged
by powerful enemies
(or
friends).
The fluctuations of Austria's fortunes on the Eastern Front affected everybody in the Habsburg Empire, but not in the
same way. While political cohesion in Hungary was forged in face of the Russian danger, relations between
Budapest and Vienna were growing increasingly chilly. They mainly arose out of the trading relations between the two parts of the monarchy.
The prewar developments had on the whole confirmed the principle of economic independence of Hungary and Austria. After July 1914 Budapest started putting the principle into practice. The supplies of foodstuffs to Austria
were getting smaller and smaller. An Austrian politician remarked, later in the war, that he might forgive the Allies their economic blockade, but not the Hungarians.
And it was the bleak fact of the war itself which brought about a crisis in the Austrian part of the monarchy. The Grermans came to expect too much of the war; the restoration to them of the position of power they had lost before the war. In this hope they were encouraged by the alliance with the German Reich, while
1916, in the third
year of the war, the edifice of Austria's
empire was beginning to crack and expose a tangled mass of poUtical, social
above
and
national rivalries. Under the frozen surface of all
Austrian
politics,
against a background of starvation and political suppression in the towns of the Slav provinces, the
moves were made an antiHabsburg movement.
first
to organise
Difficulties over trade were poisoning
relations between Vienna and Budapest, while Vienna and Berlin were quarrelling
over the future of Poland. It was apparent that with such vast problems, Austria's ability to stay in the
war was fast disappearing. Z.
A.B.Zeman
beyond clear-cut German
hegemony
in Austria there
were opening new horizons of promise. Victor Naumann's Mitteleuropa, based on close cooperation between Berlin and Vienna, was published in 1915. Yet relations between Berlin and Vienna were rarely cordial. Co-operation between the allies
was
far
from smooth, and
there was no hint of the
Habsburgs sacrificing their interests for the sake of the alliance. Soon after the outbreak of the war a row flared up between the German and Austrian High Commands because the Austrians were convinced that they had been left in charge of too great a length of the Eastern Front, while the Germans sent most of their troops
and
all
their
modern equipment to the
most west.
1675
I
Dr Eduard Benes (above) was one of the leaders-in-exile of the growing Czech nationahst movement. He and Professor Thomas Masaryk estabUshed their Czechoslovak National Committee in Paris, but always insisted on the importance of keeping in touch with politicians at home, for which purpose they set up an underground organisation. Benes never tired of asserting that Austria-Hungary was merely a tool of the German military, without a will of her own, and that it was a prison for all the Slav people. IfiTfi
Another prominent Czech politician was Vaclav Klofac (above) who was arrested soon after the outbreak of the war.
The party which he
led in
Prague, the National Socialists, was one wing of the Slav anti-
Habsburg movement which looked to Russia for aid. But as time was to show, the belief in Russian power and its actual ineffectiveness vitiated the
pro-Russian movement: the Tsarist armies never arrived in Prague and the Pan-Slav Empire never had a chance of realisation.
The Slavs were
on their own.
Franz Josef left pictured in the last few months of his life. It was at this time that the wrangling over the Polish question brought Austro-
The execution of Serbians by Austrians (above left and right) was an inevitable con-
German relations to their
of the unification of Italy still fresh, saw Serbia as the Piedmont of the South Slavs. The leadership of the South Slav
i
I
lowest ebb. Once the offensive in the summer of 1915 had brought the whole of
Russian Poland under Austrian and German control, the ques-
was unavoidable: was there to be an independent Poland, or was it to be annexed by Austria or Germany? The Austro-Polish solution — the merger of Russian and Austrian Poland (but not Prussian Poland), linked with Vienna by a personal union — was assumed to be the best solution and the Austrians regarded the matter as settled. But early in 1916 the first indication of a change of German intentions reached Vienna, and when the Two
tion
Emperors' Manifesto was published on November 6, 1916 it was based on German proposals for a technically
independent Poland with close with Germany. The declaration of Franz Josef's intention to grant a higher degree of autonomy to Galicia followed hard on the publication of the Manifesto, to the
ties
great annoyance of Berlin.
comitant of a Slav nationalism which, with the recent example
revolutionary movement was recruited largely from Dalmatia on the Adriatic
The prewar terrorist movement in Bosnia-
coast.
Herzegovina had disappeared in the broader violence of the war, but many of the revolu-
had fled to Paris where they founded the South Slav Committee. It aimed
tionaries
to gain the support of the
South Slav immigrants in the Allied countries, recruit volunteers and convince the Allied governments that the Habsburg monarchy was
Count Stefan Tisza (above) was Prime Minister of Hungary at the outbreak of the war. In the eary days of the war the
Hungarians had been unable
doomed.
to conclude a political truce
They co-operated with the Serbian government and, in the first two years of the war, worked on their own, without regard to the political developments in the Habsburg Empire. They lived through the great disappointment of finding out, in the spring of 1915, that the Allies had promised the Italians
because Tisza and his Party of Work could not agree with the Coalition of National Parties.
parts of Dalmatia and Istria as their reward for joining them.
Tisza,
who refused to give up
the premiership, had opposed the war in the highest councils of state, while the Coalition and its leader, Albert Apponyi, were enthusiastic about its outbreak. Nevertheless, on the whole the war united Hungary.
Pictured above is the Austrian Prime Minister Count Karl von Stiirgkh. The long suspension of constitutional life, the arbitrary acts by the military and Stiirgkh's indolence drove Friedrich Adler, the son of Viktor, the leader of the
Austrian Social Democrats, to assassinate him. On October 21, 1916, after Stiirgkh had
finished his lunch at a hotel in the centre of Vienna. Adler walked up to his table and shot him dead. Unfortunately for Adler, the murder of Stiirgkh made little difference to the political situation in Austria.
1677
The resources of troops are nearly exhausted, and we should expect that next spring Austria will reach the limit of her military potential. The people in the suburbs of Vienna are starving; they are driven to despair by long queues'
Karel
Kramar
(top)
and Thomas
them could be traced to the
Masaryk
(above), two of the most important of the Czech leaders. Kramar, who was per-
pro-Russian agitation before the war. On September 22 and 23, 1914, the 8th and the 28th
haps the most prominent of the
Prague Regiments marched
pro-Russian poHticans in Prague before the war, was so confident of the strength of the Russian armed forces that he decided to wait in Prague for their arrival. He expected them to come within a few weeks of the start of the war. Of course they never came. Still less was there the muchhoped-for revolution in the Czech lands after the outbreak of the war. There were a few
the railway station, before leaving for the Russian front,
signs of unrest, and all of
1678
to
Many of the men were drunk, and accompanied by women and children;
in comic disorder.
they sang patriotic songs and wore the Czech colours on their Habsburg uniforms. Somebody carried a red flag with the inscription 'We are marching against the Russians and we don't know why'. The two regi-
ments were recruited in the working-class districts of
Prague where, before the war, the influence of the pro-Russian National Socialist Party was strong. In April 1915, after a battle near the Dukla Pass, only 20 officers and 236 troops gradually reassembled of the 28th Regiment. It had originally consisted of 2,000 officers and men, and its mass surrender provided the Austrian High Command with the most controversial topic of the war. Professor Thomas Masaryk was 64 years old when the war broke out. He was the only deputy of his small Realist Party in the Reichsrat, but his position in Czech political
life
was due more
to the strength of
his personality than to the power of his party. He had become, in 1882, the first professor of philosophy at the new Czech University of Prague; he spoke Czech which sounded like
Slovak (he had been born in eastern Moravia, in the Czechoslovak border country); he had
an American wife. He seemed to have no f)ersonal weaknesses: he was always busy, usually good-tempered. He was liked by his pupils; there were many South Slavs among them, and he convinced them of the need for the unity of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenesa
s
long time before the idea
became a part of common political currency. Masaryk was a radical in social questions without being a Marxist; he was greatly interested in Russia without being greatly impressed by her strength. Masaryk became involved in all the great controversies of his time. He was always to be found on the side of reason and
side of a Jew who was accused of ritual murder; he defended South Slav politicians against
the first symbolic victim of this rapidly growing mood, captured in this picture of a food
The people in the suburbs of Vienna are starving; they are
ill-founded accusations of treason. By the end of 1916 the desire of the Slav peoples for independence, as expressed covertly by their representatives within Austria-Hungary and proclaimed loudly by their leaders
queue in Prague (above), one of many such sights throughout Austria-Hungary in 1916. After the bad harvest of that year the German Ambassador to Vienna argued in one of his despatches
queues.'
enemies
in the process. He attacked the authenticity of Czech mediaeval manuscripts
had made but little impact on the attitude of the Allied governments to the Habsburg monarchy. In Austria-Hungary, however,
which had been manufactured
the
to strengthen the self-confidence
impatience had
of the chauvinists; he took the
selves
political sense,
and made many
in exile,
first stirrings
felt:
of unrest
and
made them-
Count Stiirgkh was
that the longer the war lasted the more strongly there came to the foreground the simple question whether AustriaHungary would be able to carry on the fight — 'The resources of troops are nearly exhausted, and we should expect that next spring Austria will reach the limit of her military potential.
driven to despair by long
Further Reading
Crankshaw,
House
of
E.,
The
Fall of the
Habsburg (Longmans)
A., The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy. 1914-1918
May,
(Pennsylvania 1966)
Zeman, Z. A. B.. The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire, 1914-1918 (OUP1961)
[For Z. A. B. Zeman' graphy, see page 107.
bio-
]
1679
1 of the Anglo-French attack on the Somme served notice of closure on the Germans' offensive at Verdun, as their High Command was quick to For, great though German recognise. strength was, it fell short of what was necessary to conduct large-scale operations on two widely separated sectors of the front; and the need to defend their lines on the Somme far outstripped in importance any that the capture of Verdun might once have had. By the beginning of July, moreover, most of the High Command was ready to welcome an excuse to abandon the exercise
The opening on July
in
self-flagellation
which
Verdun
had
become. Falkenhayn's concept of the battle as a 'bleeding-white' of the French army at virtually no cost to the German army had been proved unfeasible after the first few days; latterly, the Germans' daily losses had risen as high, perhaps even higher than those of the French. It was with perhaps almost therefore, resignation, with relief that Falkenhayn brought himself to order, after the failure of the last attack on Fort Souville on July 11, that
Crown Prince Wilhelm's armies would in future 'adopt a defensive posture'. Verdun was to be allowed to revert to the status of a 'quiet sector'.
takes two sides to make a quiet and the French commanders were not prepared to co-operate. Indeed, two less pacifically inclined generals than Nivelle, GOC Second Army, and his subordinate Mangin, GOC XI Corps, would have been hard to find. Nivelle, a cavalryman turned gunner but above all a devotee of the Grandmaison school of the offensive, whom two years of war had left uncon-
But
sector,
1680
it
€OIJNTKRATTA€K AT VKRIHJX By July 1916 the Franco-British offensive on the Somme was beginning to place a great strain on German resources, and Falkenhayn was ready to declare the Verdun sector a 'quiet zone'. But German gains had been such a blow to French pride that there was to be little respite. As autumn followed summer, the French launched repeated counterattacks, as if determined to follow the logic of attrition to its bitter conclusion. John Keegan. Below: In an advance trench, Nivelle's poj/ws await the signal to advance and retake Fort Douaumont vinced of any need to moderate his fundamental ideas, was bursting to find an opportunity of recapturing the ground yielded to the Germans since February. And Mangin, the trap-jawed colonial warrior, had a temperamental revulsion for defensive tactics. It was certain, therefore, that as soon as the Germans relaxed their efforts, Nivelle and Mangin would move over to the attack.
At what point on the perimeter they would do so was clear to all: it had to be in Mangin's XI Corps' sector, between the Mouse and Damloup, where the Germans had won their most important prizes — Fort
Douaumont, lost on February 25, and Fort Vaux, lost on June 7 — and had pushed their lines closest to Verdun. Indeed, if allowed as much as another inch on these slopes the Germans would have the city under observation and be able to direct fire onto the nerve centres of the French defence. Thiaumont and Fleury were therefore to be the scenes of some lively French counterattacks in the weeks following Falkenhayn's abandonment of the defensive — a decision at which the French could guess but of which they had not, of course, been informed and on the finality of which they could not therefore count.
The counterattacks of the following weeks were thus delivered with a frequency and ferocity better suited to a more desperate situation. On July 15/16, the 115th Regiment recaptured Battery C and Command Post 119 near Thiaumont: and on July 20 the adjoining powder-mill was retEiken. On August 1 both CP 119 and Battery C were overrun by the Germans again, but they were both recaptured next day. The village of Thiaumont was recaptured, as a result of and during the course of the same operation, on August 4. The Germans, however, defending stub-
bornly and even counterattacking frequently, retook Thiaumont on August 8 — the sixteenth time it had changed hands since their great push of June 23 — and it was not firmly secured by the French until August 18, after the splendid Regiment di d'Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc (Moroccan Colonials) had driven its German garrison out, this
time
for good.
The French
con-
tinued to make step-by-step advances, all very costly, between September 3 and 13. It was on that day that Poincare, the French President, arrived in Verdun, together with representatives of the major Allies, to decorate it with the Legion d'Honneur. Before an audience which included the four generals most responsible successful defence, Joffre, Petain, Nivelle and Mangin, he paid tribute to the inviolability of the place 'against whose walls', he proclaimed, 'the highest ambitions of Imperial Germany have broken'. Of far greater moment within the perimeter of Verdun itself, however, was an occurrence, a little over a week earlier, of which no word had been allowed to penefor its
trate to the outside world: the explosion in the Tavannes railway tunnel. This narrow-gauge tunnel, which carried the line from Verdun to Etain, in the plain of the Woevres, beneath the ridge known as the Cote St Michel, had naturally been adopted from early on in the siege as a place of refuge from bombardment, and eventually as the main staging point for reliefs and supply columns making their way forward to the sector of the line between Damloup and Fort Vaux. Besides these transients, it also provided permanent shelter for the headquarters of a brigade, two engineer battalions and three labour regiments, and the staff of four field whatever (including dressing stations wounded were under treatment). All these, amounting to a population of between 1,000 and 2,000 men, were accommodated in a string of shacks and platforms which had been built along the right-hand side of the tunnel, filling it to the roof (which was only 15 feet high) and leaving a gangway less than four feet wide on the left. The walls of the gangway were festooned with telephone wires and naked power cables carrying current from a (fortunately rather inadequate) generator. At the tunnel's mid-point, 500 yards into the hill, was situated a large store of grenades and Verey lights, which had to be restocked constantly as its contents were distributed to troops on the line. Minor accidents with explosives were frequent, though less concern was felt for that hazard than for those threatened by the indescribably filthy condition to which five months of continuous occupation had reduced the interior (it possessed only one source of water and a single ventilating shaft). And, in any case, small explosions within seemed to count for little in the scale of risk when measured against the constant racket of shellfire playing round the tunnel mouth. Late in the evening of September 4, however, one of these explosions, caused it has been suggested, but never definitely established, by a mule stumbling under its cargo of grenades, or by a member of a carrying party brushing a power cable with a rocket, or even by the detonation of one of the tunnel's demolition charges — set off a petrol fire, which in turn exploded other small stores of explosives and so on until, the shacks and platforms taking light, the interior of the tunnel was quickly turned into an inferno. Many, perhaps the majority of those inside at the time, were unable to reach an exit ahead of the flames and some who did were forced back by shellfire. When, after three days' helpless inactivity, rescue parties were at last able to penetrate within, they found, of the 1,000 who had perished, almost nothing recognisable as human remains. Beneath the single airshaft, it is true, the first rescuers saw a pile of what appeared to be bodies. But at a touch they fell into dust. The Tavannes tunnel disaster was a scarcely propitious omen for the attack which Nivelle had now begun to plan to recover ground in that sector. His intention was to recover a strip of territory four miles wide by one and a half deep, between Damloup on the right and the Cote de Poivre, the ridge the left of which abutted onto the Meuse above Verdun. It was a nightmare landscape which he planned to re>- capture, a wilderness of water-logged shell o holes so close together that the advancing
infantry would scarcely be able to find a way between. But it gave onto the two lost strongholds of the French defence (and symbols of French humiliation). Forts Douaumont and Vaux, which were Nivelle's real objectives. Moreover, the dreadful condition of the battlefield made it very unlikely that the Germans would have been able to organise anything but the most sketchy sort of positions in the semi-liquid soil, the condition of which was further to deteriorate during the heavy rains of early October.
4,000 tons per mile Whatever defences the Germans had constructed, Mangin counted on being able to destroy them with the very powerful artillery which Nivelle had allotted him for this attack: 289 field and 314 heavy guns, which included some 370-mm mortars and two 400-mm Schneider-Creusot railway guns, the heaviest yet produced by the French armament industry. Fifteen thousand tons of shells were being dumped to feed the batteries, nearly 4,000 tons for each mile of the front to be attacked. German artillery strength amounted to pieces, of which a far smaller proportion were of heavy calibre than in the French artillery. They
between 400 and 500
would thus be at a dangerous disadvantage in the gun duel preceding the assault. And that boded ill for the seven German divisions, all tired and understrength, in the line: the 13th and 25th Reserve, 34th, 54th, 9th, 33rd Reserve and 50th Divisions. Almost all had been at Verdun for long periods without relief and had suffered heavy losses. The 13th Reserve had taken part in the opening attack in February; the 54th had been at Verdun since May; the 25th Reserve since July; the 9th had been thereabouts, either at Verdun or at such equally wearing spots as Les Eparges or the Calonne Trench, since September 1914. Only one of the divisions could be rated as really first class, the 50th, a wartime formation but one composed of Active regiments of the peacetime army, one of which, the 158th Regiment, had captured Fort Vaux on June 4. It was still holding the same sector in October. Most of the divisions, moreover, were holding their fronts with only three battalions in line, the rest being in support and reserve; and while this was a perfectly safe method when support and reserve positions were strong, with good, secure communications to front and rear, the current condition of the Germans' defences made it distinctly dangerous. For Nivelle's 'creeping barrage', the artillery technique
which he had done so much
to perfect,
was
designed to cut sectors of the defence off from one another, allowing them to be dealt with in detail by the advancing infantry, enclosed within this moving curtain of shellfire.
The French attackers were, on paper, than the German defenders, for Nivelle had allotted only three divisions to the assault, the 38th, 133rd and 74th. All, however, were excellent fighting formations and had been heavily reinforced for this operation. The 38th, one of the two divisions raised in the French North African departements, was composed of the 4th Zouaves, a white regiment, the 8th Tirailleurs, a Moslem regiment, the 4th Mixte (Zouaves and Tirailleurs) and the Moroccan Colonial Infantry Regiment. They fewer
1681
to be reinforced for the occasion by the 11th Infantry Regiment. The two other divisions had had seven infantry regiments added to their strengths, a Senegalese battaUon, one of those raised on the West Coast of Africa, and nine battaHons of Chasseurs, the eHte Hght infantry units of the French army. In all, 29 battalions would jump off at zero hour. In the preparatory period, they were rehearsed over a fullscale model of the terrain, until they
in steady succession, these
were
knew
it
blindfold.
On the afternoon of October 22 every German gun on the front opened up to what looked like the first onrush of the French assault. It was in fact a carefully organised feint, designed to establish the position of all the German batteries which, in the two days remaining before the assault, were brought under a final quell
counterbombardment so heavy that, by French calculation, only 100 German guns remained operational by zero hour. Also bombarded with increasing severity during these days was the fortress of Douaumont itself Its interior, though badly damaged by an accidental explosion and fire, similar to that which had gutted the Tavannes tunnel, had never been penetrated by shellfire. Indeed it was believed by the garrison that its concrete and earthwork skin was impenetrable. Under the constant erosion of casual shellfire, however, the outer earthwork layer of the f'oits carapace had been reduced imperceptibly but significantly, and the new piojectiles of the French 400-mm guns liad sufficient terminal velocity to carve thiough the inner concrete layer. Exploding beneath the eight-foot concrete roofs.
enormous
manoeuvre, which it had been promised them they would be able to perform on
numerous occasions before, was for once a reality. Almost everywhere the Germans gave up or were found to have run away before the French appeared. This was to be true even of Douaumont. Abandoned by garrison, just as the French had in February, the handful of battlefield strays who had crept for protection into its cellars on the morning of its official
left it
abandoned
October 24 rendered up its ownership to the first French soldier who asked them for it. The urgent demand for reinforcements sent rearward bv the leadei- of the
:.x^:
-^|l»
shells
quickly reduced much of the interior to a shambles, killed many of the garrison and started a fire of threatening dimensions. On the night of October 23, the German commander of Fort Douaumont ordered it to be evacuated. Next morning dawned misty. Visibility was limited to 20 yards and the gunners were blinded, at least on the German side. In consequence their SOS barrages did not come down until 12 minutes after the attack had begun, and it was by then too late to try breaking up the French attacking waves, which had already crossed into the German lines. It was a desolation they found there. The ground had been harrowed by shellfire, a French officer who took part wrote, 'and its surface littered with broken relics; German haversacks, rifles, helmets, webbing, boots, human remains; an arm — a leg — a hand. Everything has been chopped to pieces.' Yet, he also recorded, the troops went forward with 'their rifles slung'. This
party, when he found the fort abandoned and the fire burnt out, had never been answered, perhaps never received. The Regiment d'Infanterie Coloniale du Maroc thus entered and took possession almost unopposed and unscathed. During the whole day the French had taken 6,000 prisoners, and most of the ground lost in the fighting of May and June.
On October 26 the Germans sent in four violent counterattacks, and another the day following, but despite these the Moroccan Colonials continued to advance their line, eventually consolidating a firm position 400 yards west of Fort Douaumont. Fort Vaux, heavily bombarded by the French from October 28 to November 2, was abandoned that evening by the Germans and reoccupied next morning by a company of the 298th Regiment. Nivelle, it seemed, had indeed hit upon a secret of tactical success. He was to have his next chance to prove it in December. Further Reading Falkenhayn, E. von, General Headquarters, 191 4-1 91 6 {London 1960) Price of Glory, Verdun 1916 (London 1962) Joffre, Marshal, The Memoirs of MarshalJoffre (London 1932) Palat, Gen B. E., La Grande Guerre sur le Front Occidental, Vols X-XII (Paris 1925) Retain, H., Verdun (London 1930) Romains, Jules, /Wen of Good Will, Vols. 15-16 (London 1926) Ryan, S Petain the Soldier (London 1969)
Home, A The ,
,
Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918, Vol. X-D/e Operationen des Jahres 1916
[For John Keegan's biography, see page 96.]S
>«-.:
-•'\-.^
•^•i»-
'^i^
i*^.
.^•.lam ' mntm-^f
,
^„
,
Douaumont recaptured
A The Rimailho 155-mm howitzer, the French equivalent of the German 5.9-inch German howitzer, and the only modern piece of heavy the French army at the outbreak of the war. It saw much use in the artillery duel at Verdun
artillery in
1683
The ground has been harrowed by shellfire. Everything has been chopped to pieces' French troops move up for the final assault on Fort Douaumont
From September 25 18, 1916, the
on the
to
November
French and British
Somme laboured for a
victory that
was never to be
reahsed. Individual actions gained them a few thousand yards of ground: in four months, the Allied line crept forward a few miles. In daunting conditions of rain and sleet and the first snowfalls of a hard winter, both sides manifested a sobering courage and determination, constantly unmatched by the scope of their achievements. LieutenantColonel John Baynes
SOMME riM Last Phase
To a reader, the last phase of the Somme battles from September 25 to November 18 1916 makes a confused and rather tedious story. To the men who fought through these two autumn months it was remembered as one of the most exhausting and dismal periods of the whole of the First World War. The mud of the Somme during the wet weather of October 1916 was never to be forgotten by those who struggled and suffered through
it.
Under the general title of the Battle of the Ancre, the final phase of fighting on the Somme is broken down in the official British record of the war into five separate battles:
• September 25 to 28: Battle of Morval. • September 26 to 28: Battle of Thiepval Ridge.
•
October
1
to 18: Battle of the
Transloy
Ridges.
•
October
1
to
November
11: Battle of the
Ancre Heights.
• November 13 to 18: Battle of the Ancre. The distinction between one battle and another is necessary to enable the course of events to be clearly followed, but it should not be imagined that those who actually fought in them were aware of such a neat pattern.
To understand the Battle of Morval it is important to look briefly at the operation which had preceded it, known as the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, and which took place
from September 15
to
22 in the southern
sector of the British front.
September 15 was a fine autumn day, but the ground was muddy after recent rains. After a small preliminary operation to clear out some Germans near Delville Wood, the assault was made at 0620 hours. In the end a belt of ground some 2,500 yards deep was gained on the whole front, the greatest penetration of over 3,500 yards being made, with the help of tanks, at Flers in the centre. The British infantry did not follow up quickly enough, and the crisis for the Germans was overcome by
the effective use of their reinforcements, with six more divisions arriving during the battle. The Germans fought very well on the first day, in spite of temporary local panic caused by the tanks, and the British suffered heavy casualties. This was the first occasion in which tanks were used in the war, and there has been much controversy since as to whether they were wisely employed or not. Fighting continued on September 16 and 17, and small areas of ground were gained. September 18 and 19 were very wet days, and on September 19 General Fayolle stated at a conference that owing to bad weather the French Sixth Army, which was to co-operate in further attacks, would not be ready until September 22. Due to heavy rain, the date was postponed until the 23rd, but the bad weather persisted, and no action took place on that day or on the 24th. At a conference held at Chantilly, Joffre and Robertson agreed that the offensive must go on, but the French were very short of ammunition, so D-Day had to be postponed until September 25. The aim of the planned attacks was to capture objectives on the front of the Fourth Army from around Gueudecourt to Morval, and for the Reserve Army to take Thiepval Ridge. In the case of the Fourth Army, the renewed effort was largely required to secure ground
Below and below right: Up and over: Canadian troops with fixed bayonets move in to make a raid
on German
trenches. Despite conditions
which made
'mere existence a severe trial
of
body and
spirit',
the Canadians v^^ere able to preserve their traditional elan
which had not been taken during the Battle of Flers-Courcelette, and was planned as an advance of 1,200 to 1,500 yards in three stages. First came the capture of Gueudecourt and ground either side of it; then the Combles-Gueudecourt road; and third, ground to the east of Morval and Lesboeufs. At the request of the French Sixth Army, zero hour was fixed at 1235 hours on September 25, though the bombardment was begun at 0700 hours on the previous day.
The French, however, did not assault
until
1600 hours on September 26, and then achieved very little. The fighting on September 25 on the British front took much the same course as on September 15: success came mostly in the early stages. The advance of XIV Corps to take Morval and Lesboeufs went smoothly, and by 1800 hours troops were dug in to the east of both villages, having penetrated the enemy front to about 2,000 yards on a front 3,000 yards wide. XV Corps, however, did not capture Gueudecourt, and to the north-east of Martinpuich III Corps were unable to advance against strong opposition. To the south of the British sector, the French were making extremely slow progress, and Foch
on Haig at 1000 hours on September 25 to ask if he could pass some French troops through Morval to attack one of his main objectives, the village of SaillySaillisel, from the west. His request was readily met, and it was agreed that the French should extend their left flank and take over some of the ground then held by called
the British.
On September 26 the Germans retired from Combles, which was taken over by the British and the French. A German withdrawal from Gueudecourt also took place, allowing members of XV Corps to move in. On September 27 and 28 the main activity involved handing over part of XIV Corps' sector to the French, which was carried out smoothly. The Battle of Morval died down on September 28. It had been moderately successful for the Allies: tanks had not been used much, though one was employed in a successful small action early on September 26 just south of Gueudecourt during the capture of the 'Gird' trenches. At 1235 hours on September 26, exactly 24 hours after the previous day's barrage had opened to the south, fire was brought down on the German trenches opposite the Canadians. During the afternoon and evening they advanced up to 1,000 yards, and at 1800 hours the Canadian Corps Commander told General Gough that 'on the whole' the situation was good, since the crest of the ridge had almost been reached. On II Corps' front, the main achievement was the seizing of Thiepval village, a mess of rubble and ruins, but strongly held by the Germans, who had made good use of the cellars which remained intact and which provided excellent cover. Mainly responsible for the success at Thiepval were the 12th Middlesex and 11th Royal Fusiliers of the 54th Infantry Brigade, supported by two tanks. During the next four days — September 27 to 30 — the Canadian Corps extended its territory to a depth of nearly 1,000 yards to the north-east of Courcelette, but made little progress west of the village. Troops of II Corps progressed several hundred yards north of Thiepval village, but on neither Corps' front was the main objective, the top of the Thiepval Ridge, reached. The Germans fought with great skill and determination, and although the British gained the top of the ridge in many places, they did not succeed in taking it.
Troops from Verdvm September was a difficult month
for the
Grermans, but in one area they had a relatively easy time: against the French, their Second Army was never severely pressed. As a result, most of the reinforcing divisions which were made available to the Germans at the end of the battle at Verdun were sent to their First Army, who were opposite the British. One effect of the Somme attacks during July and August had been to shake German confidence in their military leadership in the west, and thus to bring about the departure of Falkenhayn. The well-
known team
of
Hindenburg and Ludendorflf
then took over direction of the German war effort, and they made their first visit to the Western Front on September 8, when all
army commanders
and their chiefs-ofwere assembled at Cambrai to meet them. These commanders made it clear to staff
LudendorfF that they felt their position to be most precarious, and stressed the heavi-
ness of their casualties since July 1, 1916. He in his turn questioned some of their tactics, in particular their tendency to hold ground very closely without clear reasons for retaining it.
The new measures taken by Hindenburg and Ludendorff were threefold. First, they gave orders for preparation of a rear defensive line on the Western Front, which to become known as the 'HindenLine'; they then ordered the formation
was soon burg
Germany
supplementary divisions to reinforce the Western Front, and thirdly the 'Hindenburg Programme' was put forward for doubling ammunition output in in
German
of
11
factories, as well as trebling that
and machine guns. Agimunition demands were becoming enormous: on the of artillery
Somme
in
rounds of
September
field artillery
1916,
5,725,440
ammunition, and
the ridge beyond the Thilloy-Warlencourt Valley, and Loupart Wood, which lay between Thilloy and Irles. Reserve Army — southern sector. From
Loupart Wood westward through Irles to Miraumont. This attack was to be launched northwards from Thiepval Ridge. Reserve
Army — northern sector. The direc-
tion of Puisieux, with the troops on the right joining the other half of the Army at
Miraumont, cutting off enemy forces in the Ancre Valley. This attack was to be launched eastwards from the line Beau-
mont Hamel to Hebutene. Third Army: The spur south-east of Gommecourt to secure the left flank of the Reserve Army. Haig believed that these tasks were within the capabilities of the three armies concerned; but they were never achieved. Again and again attacks failed and operations were postponed or curtailed. The main cause of this lack of success was the terrible weather, which broke on October 2, and turned the ground into a sea of mud.
A 'severe To
trial'
understand the difficulties which the weather imposed on the Allied advance, it is necessary to grasp the nature of the 50 square miles of ground which three months' fighting had given them, across which lay the communications between the fully
front line
Left:
The
last
phase
Somme — the five
of the Battle of the actions which centred round
the River Ancrefrom September25 to November 18 1916. The battle had decided little; for a
more than a million casualties, a belt of ground 30 miles long had been won by the Allies. /Aboi/e; A railway wagon carries food for
total of
the trenches. Its cargo of shells destroyed, British soldiers pose in its bullet-riddled hulk a few miles from the front lines
1,302,000 rounds of heavy artillery ammunition, were consumed. The German difficulties were not unknown to their opponents. With Thiepval secure, and the assurance of his Intelligence staff that the Germans had already committed 70 divisions to battle since the start of the Somme offensive and had lost at least 370,000 men, Haig now felt that no relaxation of pressure was acceptable, and decided to increase the frontage of his offensive by bringing back part of the Third Army. He therefore ordered that preparation should be made for another great attack on October 12, and sent out instructions by letter to the commanders of the three armies under his control on September 29 1916, in which their objectives were given as follows: Fourth Army: Le Transloy, Beaulencourt,
and the
rear.
From
a position
such as the north end of High Wood, almost the whole British battleground was visible to the eye on a clear day. To reach this place from the old Allied front line of July 1, some four miles of bad roads had to be traversed. At the best they were mere country tracks, roughly made with no solid foundation. And they had to support traffic such as could never have been imagined by those who had made them. Ten or 12 horses were sometimes required to move an 18pounder field gun; ammunition had to be sent up by pack mule, and it was said that men died from the effort of trying to walk through the battlefield carrying verbal messages. The Somme mud could cling to the feet of a man to the size of a football. The Official History records that: By the middle of October conditions on and behind the battle front were so bad as to make mere existence a severe trial of body and spirit. Little could be seen from the air through the rain and mist, suffered and it
so
was
counterbattery work often impossible to
locate with accuracy the new German trenches and shell-hole positions. Objectives could not always be identified from ground level, so that it is no matter for surprise or censure that the British artillery sometimes fired short or placed its barrages too far ahead. The infantry, sometimes wet to the skin and almost exhausted before zero hour, were often condemned to struggle painfully forward through the mud under heavy fire against objectives vaguely defined
and difficult of recognition.
Had
they been able to see more of the would have been of great military value, but it would hardly have given cause for pleasure. John Buchan, who was a war correspondent at the front, wrote this description of the battle area: Let us assume that early in October we have taken our stand at the northern angle of High Wood. It is only a spectre of a wood, a horrible place of matted tree trunks, crumbling trench lines, full of mementoes of the dead and all the dreadful debris of area
it
1689
u
land ofPicardy. Look
east,
beyond our front
and the smoke puffs, across the Warlencourt and Gueudecourt Ridges, and on the line
sky-line there also appear unbroken woods, and here and there a church spire and the
smoke of villages. The German retirement in September was rapid, and we have
^^
Above: An ammunition wagon bogs down in the mud. In the prevailing conditions, 10 or 12 horses were often required to move even light loads: men actually died from the effort of walking battle. To reach it we have walked across two miles of what once must have been breezy downland, patched with little fields of roots and grain. It is now like a waste brickfield in a decaying suburb, pockmarked with shell holes, littered with cartridge clips, equipment, fragments of wire, and every kind of tin can. Over all the area hangs the curious, bitter, unwholesome smell of burning — an odour which will always recall to every soldier the immediate front of battle. Our own front is some thousands of yards off, close under that hillock which is the famous Butte de Warlencourt. Far on our left is the lift of the Thiepval Ridge, and nearer us, hidden by the slope, are the ruins of Martinpuich.
Le Sars and Eaucourt-V Abbaye are before us, Flers a little to the right, and beyond it Gueudecourt. On our extreme right rise the slopes of Sailly-Saillisel — one can see the shattered
trees
lining
the
Bapaume-
Peronne road — and, hidden by the fall of the ground, are Lesboeufs and Morval. Behind us are things like scarred patches on the hillsides. They are the remains of the Bazentin woods and the ominous wood of Delville. The whole confines of the British battleground lie open to the eye, from the Thiepval Ridge in the north to the downs which ring the site of Combles. Look west, and beyond the dreary country we have crossed, rise green downs set with woods untouched
by
shell — the
normal,
pleasant
reached the fringes of a land as yet little scarred by combat. We are looking at the boundaries of the battlefield. We have pushed the enemy right up to the edge of habitable and undevastated country, but we pay for our success in having behind us a strip of sheer desolation. General Rawlinson's plan for the battle of the Transloy Ridges was to start with an operation on October 1 1916 to straighten out his line in the area of Le Sars and Eaucourt I'Abbaye, before undertaking the major advance ordered by Haig. This first part of the plan went well, and by the evening of October 3 nearly all objectives had been taken. A slight dip in the line remained in the middle opposite the 47th Division, but after dark on October 5 it was able to extend its outposts to include the ruined mill north-west of EaucourtI'Abbaye. The stage was now set for the next phase, due to start two days later.
Water-logged The comparatively successful beginning was not to be followed up during the operations which followed. Between October 7 and 12, in appalling conditions, numerous assaults were made by III, XV, and XIV Corps. The only places where a little ground was gained were at Le Sars, by III Corps, and north of Gueudecourt, by XIV Corps. On the evening of October 12 Rawlinson was, as the Official History puts it, 'conscious that most of what he had planned to accomplish on October 5 still remained to do'. He decided to renew
Above: Congestion on a road to the front. Staff cars, mule limbers and ambulances mingle with marching infantry. Below: A shell bursts beyond the barbed wire entanglements near Flers his attack on October 18, and obtained the approval of Haig, who hoped to obtain the co-operation of the French. Orders went
out to Fourth Army on October 13, and the importance of preparing adequate assembly trenches, as well as improving communications to the front, was emphasised, as well they might be, since the plan was to assault in the darkness at 0340 hours, nearly two hours before sunrise. Under certain circumstances this would have been an excellent plan, but in the conditions which actually prevailed at that time on October 18 it was not a great success. The Official History describes
In
what happened: almost every brigade,
forming-up
positions had been taped out in front, and careful compass bearings taken of the direction of the advance. When the moment of assault arrived the British front positions and the approaches to them were a maze of water-logged shell holes and flooded- trenches. As the troops struggled forward through the darkness, officers and men stumbled and fell in the slippery ooze; rifles and Lewis guns became clogged with it so that bomb and bayonet were soon the only weapons. On Corps' front, two tanks were kept
XV
ready in Flers, to be used at dawn if the assault in darkness failed. One of them crossed the front-line at 0800 hours. For 20 minutes it fired at German positions,
:
considerable
with
success.
The
tank
got out and signalled for the nearby British infantry to take advantage of this breakthrough, but they were so exhausted, and there were so few surviving officers in the area, that nothing happened. Pushing the enemy
commander eventually
the tank went forward some distance towards Le Barque before turning and retreating the way it had come. This was the last chance: by the end of the following day all Allied efforts in the Fourth Army area had petered^ut. The tasks given to the Reserve Army for October had been to attack northwards from the Thiepval Ridge towards Tries and Miraumont, and eastwards towards Puisieux from the Beaumont Hamel-Hebutene line. In the northward attack, involving the Canadian Corps and II Corps, a continuous line of German trenches running from the notorious Schwaben Redoubt, north of Thiepval, was the target for capture. It ran for some 5,500 yards and for its first 1,500 yards was known as Stuff trench, and thereafter became Regina trench. In the early days of October great efforts were made, mainly by the Canadian Corps, to reach Regina trench from positions north of Courcelette. The heaviest fighting took place between October 7 and 10. At the end of this very costly and particularly gruelling period of fighting a belt of ground approximately 2,000 yards wide, and varying in depth between 200 and 500 yards had been taken, but this was only halfway to Regina trench. At the other end of the sector, in the area of Stuff trench, men of II Corps fought some fierce actions from October 11 to 14, eventually driving the Germans from their last hold on the redoubt. II Corps renewed the attack on October before
21,
it,
and
this
mans
felt
that an attack on a large scale
was physically impossible, especially an attack on a fortress which had so successfully repulsed British efforts when they had advanced with fresh troops and full impetus at the height of summer. But they did not realise that the area from Thiepval northward did not suffer from transport difficulties to the same degree as the ground on the southern Somme front. The British advance in the north sector would be launched from trenches that had been occupied at the beginning of the Somme battles in July. Here, the problem of crossing five or six miles of shell-torn roads, as in the areas where the greater gains had been made, did not exist. The topographical features of the new
battleground should be understood. North of the Schwaben Redoubt the British
time advanced to and cap-
was heavy. The proposed eastward advance did not take place during October. On V and XIII Corps' fronts there were many trench raids, and patrolling was constant, but the major battle was constantly postponed. Eventually, it turned into the final phase of the Somme offensive, the Battle of the Ancre. It was fought by the British Fifth Army, the former Reserve Army, under the command of General Gough.
No transport problems The Germans north of the Ancre valley were confident in their ability to hold a strong position. However, General Gough believed that his prepared attack against the Beaumont Hamel salient might just succeed. The slow progress of the Fourth Army during October had led the Germans to the conclusion that the British offensive had ceased for the winter. Because of the state of the ground, the Ger1692
November 13. By now Gough had
positioned 282 heavy guns in support of his Fifth Army — one gun for every 35 yards of front, and a 30,000-pound mine to be fired at zero hour under a stronghold near the tip of the salient. At Beaumont Hamel itself gas was to be used, and in order to secure surprise as to the date and hour of the attack, the sector had been shelled for an hour on successive mornings. At the last minute, on November 12, Haig arrived to assess the operation's
The road to captivity: a German prisoner, helmet askew, seems to be content with his lot
/Above;
front curved sharply to the north-west, crossing the Ancre 500 yards south of the hamlet of Saint Pierre Divion, and extending northwards along the foot of the slopes on which lay the villages of Beaumont Hamel and Serre. From the high ground north-west of the Ancre several clearly marked spurs descended to the upper valley of the stream. The main spur was a long ridge with Serre at its western extremity, and the village of Puisieux on the north. Beaucourt-sur- Ancre was on the south and Miraumont at the eastern end. South of this there was another feature running from a point 1,000 yards north of Beaumont Hamel to the village of Beaucourt. On the south-west side of the spur was a shallow depression up which ran the Beaucourt-Beaumont Hamel road, and it was defined on the north-east by the
Beaucourt-Serre road. The northern bank was thus marked by slopes On the south bank there was a stretch of flatfish ground under the Thiepval Ridge extending up the valley past Saint Pierre Divion to Grandcourt. On the night of Friday, November 10, of the Ancre and pockets.
chances of suc-
He was
not prepared to risk an unsuccessful attempt, but he went away satisfied that the prospects were good. Both Fifth Army's corps were involved in the Battle of the Ancre. V Corps now had four divisions in the line — 2nd, 3rd, 51st (Highland) and 63rd (Naval) Divisions, and one — the 37th Division — in reserve. II Corps comprised 18th, 19th, 39th, and 4th Canadian Divisions, with 32nd Division in reserve. The main attack was naturally to be undertaken by V Corps, not only because of the better state of the ground behind its lines, but because it had been much less used during the previous months, and was therefore readier for action than II Corps. The planned operation on V Corps' front was divided into three stages. The first required an advance of about half a mile from Beaucourt station up the Beaumont Hamel valley and round the eastern end of that village, then across Redan Ridge and the slopes in front of Serre. Three lines of German trenches had to be taken, and in places a fourth line as well. The .second objective, 600 to 1,000 yards further on, ran from the western edge of Beaucourt, along the eastern slope of Redan Ridge, then south of Serre, and finally round the eastern edge of that village. The final objective on the right was Beaucourt, down on the Ancre, while the left of the corps' front was to be positioned along the western slope of the valley. South of the Ancre, II Corps was to attempt to drive the Germans from the remains of their trench system between the Schwaben Redoubt and Saint Pierre Divion, then to clear the south bank of the river, and establish a line, facing roughly north-east, opposite Beaucourt. They were also given the task of securing the two principal bridges across the Ancre, the only points at which the river could be crossed. cess.
tured some 5,000 yards of German trenches. The last section of Regina trench was eventually taken by the 4th Canadian Division at midnight November 10. Using moonlight to see their way, and the cover of light mist, two battalions advanced as close as possible to the German line before zero hour. After an eight-minute barrage the Canadians stormed the trench before the enefny were ready: four machine guns and 87 prisoners were taken for a total of 200 Canadian casualties. Thus, after some six weeks the objectives given to the northward attack of the Reserve Army had been achieved, though the cost
there was still some doubt as to whether the ground had dried out enough to justify an attack, though there had been no rain since the 8th, and colder weather had set in. Gough discussed the situation with his corps commanders, and decided to launch his attack at 0545 hours on
All objectives achieved At 0545 hours on November
13, in
a wet
fog with visibility down to 30 yards, the attack took place as planned. The final
barrage came down, the great mine was fired, and the elements of the Fifth Army
committed
to the first stage of the battle into action. The results on II Corps' front were successful. By 0815 hours troops of the 19th Division had achieved their objectives at a cost of less than 200 casualties, while enemy losses were
moved
obviously heavy in killed and wounded and 150 prisoners had been captured. The 39th Division had been given three tanks
\
m
Killed
Indian
162
aO
279*
r046 2 879
905
4239
,189.
9600 29 414
67
7 793 16 330 /55
Territon
34 489
_^ m 474a B4 9U
67203/2I7L 101 873 32814ZIF
Regular
other Ranks
Oil
other Ranks Otjcers
Reguia;
6 851
U?88
23 080
4 774
9-964
15732
242f
3 685 1450
034 388 ^^ ^^
1
Australiar^^
Ne.'.
Zealan
South
J05 67
Africa'
1426 jf 356 190
^
*:
r
1
I
The front now had the aura of a decaying suburb
No-Mans Land British front line
I
Forwaril Observation Officers Post with telephone line
w-
(partly buried to battery),
FOO and to
movements
k
W
containing
signallers
observe enemy
m
W:
Average range 2000-5000 yards depending on
Gunlayer
ground to put
on range and angles
and sight aiming post.
Man
to
k
open and
W'
'^
k
close bteech after shell I
W-
and charge
M
are loaded and fired
Three men
to set
fuses and handle shells and charges
Guns camouflagm^^
as required
in
dip in ground
• ••
NCO in charge of gun He received and
•#T^
Signallers and Officer lj».^rge of guns,
acknowledged orders
giv^
by holding out his
^.^
right arm.
vocally
"'.»'">4ijJ|ngles,
TelifiRStne line '0
^^ii
and horse
Top: Resourcefulness in adversity. Royal Engineers build a makeshift bridge over the Ancre swamps near Aveluy. Rain had been falling for several weeks, breaking up the ground, and the infantrymen were often wet to the skin even before they went into battle. Left: The chart shows the layout and establishment of an 18-
fi. ~\
ilincs~slor(^
^
k^ .1
?3Biiin)iinitS;
s
:^gvei.igp -^.giii.s
10
.
irKlf,i.ijce1
'aw !tf-^0
/-A
pounder
fh
battery. Above: Exhaustion sets in: British troops sleep in their trenches near
Thiepval Ridge, This area was not as badly damaged as that south of the Somme, but rain and cold had seriously debilitated the troops
1694
it. but none of them was of much two never reached the front Hne, and the third crashed and turned on its side on reaching the German lines. However, by 0832 hours a message reached divisional headquarters that all objectives had been achieved: within three hours II Corps had done all it set out to do with
to help
use:
relatively light losses. Corps' front immediately north of On the Ancre was the 63rd Naval Division. composite force under Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Freyberg eventually got right up to the edge of Beaucourt, though on November 13 they could get no further. Six tanks had been allotted to the Naval
V
A
Division and were brought forward during the afternoon, but could not be brought into action until the following day. On the left of the Naval Division, the 51st Highland Division was faced by what was known as the Y Ravine salient, and by the fortified village of Beaumont Hamel. Both the two brigades committed to the initial assault began well, despite heavy fighting. Early in the afternoon, the left hand brigade entered Beaumont Hamel, but although German resistance began to weaken, it took most of the afternoon to get through the ruins of the village and establish a line on its eastern edge, which had been the preliminary objective. The 2nd Division made limited advances towards Redan Ridge on a front of some 1,000 yards but in the north the 3rd Division was totally unsuccessful in its advance towards Serre. The Official History explains why: Serre, on its little knoll, commands the whole of the slope to the west, and the fog was not so thick as to hide the British advance from the enemy. There was no question of a swift assault, the heavy loam that had crumbled under the incessant bombardments dried more slowly than the chalk surface further south, and the troops of the 3rd Division for
mud. mention must be made of
lost the battle in the
Finally,
at-
tacks by troops of XIII Corps, made on the left of the 3rd Division to assist its extension of its defensive flank. After a relatively successful start, the British were heavily counterattacked. At 1630 hours on November 13 Gough decided not to renew his efforts, after the failure of the 3rd Division's attempts to advance. XIII Corps decided to withdraw its men as well, and by 2130 hours the same night the 92nd Brigade was back where it started, but
had suffered 800
casualties.
Overall, the fighting on November 13 was a partial success for the Allies. II Corps had done all that was required; V Corps seemed to be in a position to make further advances at Beaucourt and Beaumont Hamel, though not yet at Serre. Therefore the Naval, Highland and 2nd Divisions were sent orders that night to
push ahead on November
14.
suffered on
November
13th.
records contain evidence of the utter misery of life on the Somme front at the end of 1916. They were not so well equipped nor so well fed as the British, and individuals spent longer stretches in the line without relief The weight of shelling and gas attacks which they endured was also heavier, but the devastation behind the front on their side was not comparable to that suffered by the British: when they were relieved in the line they could get away more quickly and had easier access to dry billets in villages. After an intense spell of artillery fire starting at 0600 hours on November 14, the infantry renewed their advance on the V Corps' front at 0620 hours. It was another cold and misty morning, but the weather cleared later, and allowed air reconnaissance to start again. The first
pockmarked with shell holes and .
.
.
littered
with rubbish
success of the day was marked up with the capture of Beaucourt by the Naval Division, which was reported at 1030 hours. For his part in the activities leading to this achievement Colonel Freyberg was awarded the Victoria Cross. 'Twice
wounded on November 13, he remained at his post, but was eventually severely wounded by a shell on November 14 and had to be evacuated from the front line. The attacks by the 51st Highland Division further north were less successful. Slight advances were made early on, but
much ground had to be given up later when members of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and 9th Royal Scots were shelled at 1100 hours by a British heavy battery, and were forced to withdraw from the enemy trenches which they had just occupied.
At mid-day General Gough visited
V
Corps' headquarters, where he found the Corps Commander in an optimistic mood, no doubt largely due to the capture of Beaucourt. Plans were quickly made for a combined attack by V and II Corps the following day; orders went out on the evening of November 14 from Gough, and a copy was sent to Haig in Paris. But a prompt telephone call from Haig followed, during which he stated that he did not wish Fifth Army to undertake any further operations on a large scale before his return. The next day's plans were accordingly reduced in scope to a small attack on the boundary between 51st and 2nd Divisions. Only a few troops were involved but they suffered heavy casualties and gained nothing. Haig's Chief-of-Staff visited Fifth Army
0900 hours on November 15, and exthe Commander-in-Chief's objections to a further offensive. After he had left, Gough spoke to his corps commanders, and they all agreed that they should try one more attack. Accordingly the Chief-of-Staff was contacted and asked at
Heavy blow The Germans had been shaken by the extent of the British attack on November 13, as there had been a general feeling that the weather had brought an end to such operations for the year. The success of the British troops fighting astride the Ancre was described by Ludendorff as 'a particularly heavy blow'. German losses on the whole of the Somme front from November 1 to 18 are given as 45,000 in all: nearly one quarter of these must have been
on November 17 showed that the Grermans had abandoned some trenches near late
German
Grandcourt, and orders were given for to be occupied that night. But on the whole, activity over the two days was
them
limited to 'tidying-up' operations, and to preparations for the attack on November 18. Both II Corps and V Corps were to be involved in this last attack, the aim of which was not entirely clear, though it was best described as an attempt to 'tidy up the line', using Grandcourt as a pivot. But not only was the aim unclear, the instructions were inadequate, containing 'hurried amendments to the orders of corps and lower formations, and eleventhhour preparations which, as previous experience had shown over and over again,
were
fatal to success.'
The
results of the attack on November which continued until November 19 in places, were more successful than might have been expected. South of the Ancre the 4th Canadian Division achieved all its objectives, and in doing so took a belt of ground 2,500 yards wide and about 1,000 deep. The 19th Division averaged an advance of 500 yards towards Grandcourt, but failed to reach it. North of the Ancre, the 37th Division, which had relieved the 63rd, and 51st Highland Division pushed on up to 1,000 yards beyond Beaucourt and Beaumont Hamel, encountering only weak opposition and being able to take trenches already vacated by the enemy. The Official History gives us an idea of the conditions endured by those taking part in these attacks, and of the reasons for their success: During the night the first snow of the winter had fallen, and at 0610 hours on November 18 the assault was delivered in whirling sleet which afterwards changed to rain. More abominable 18,
conditions for active warfare are hardly to be imagined: the infantry, dark figures only visible for a short distance against the white ground, groped their way forward as best they could through half-frozen mud that was soon to dissolve into chalky slime. Little wonder that direction was often lost and with it the precious barrage, while the objectives,
indeed air see
to
mantled in snow, were hard Observation from the
identify.
was impossible; ground observers could little
or nothing, so that the batteries,
almost as bad a plight as the infantry, were, for the most part, reduced to firing their prearranged programme, regardless of the fortunes of the advance. To the sheer in
determination,
self-sacrifice
and physical
endurance of the troops must be attributed such measure of success as was won. So at last on November 19, 1916, the Somme battles came to an end. During the four and a half months since July 1 the German casualties had been 660,000, and the British and French about 630.000. For more than a million casualties a belt of ground a few miles deep and little more than 30 miles wide had changed hands.
plained
to obtain Haig's permission for this final
the evening he saw Haig in reluctantly permission was
effort.
In
Paris,
and
Further Reading Buchan, John. A (Nelson 1933)
History
of
the
Great War
Churchill, W. S., Ttie World Crisis 1916-1918 (Butterworth 1927) Farrar-Hockley, A., Ttie Battle of the Somme (Batsford) Military Operations,
France and Belgium 1916
(Macmillan 1938)
granted.
On November was
cold,
16 and 17 the weather but clear. Aerial reconnaissance
[For Lieutent-Colonel John Baynes' graphy, see page 743.
bio-
]
ARCHerSHOP MITTY HIGH SCHOOL MEDIA CENTER
1695
fhe *Quict* Sectof On their front between the Somme and Verdun the French were learning at enormous cost a lesson they themselves had preached: that men cannot fight against heavy machines. In a series of aggressive, localised actions, the Germans harassed the French in sectors of the line where they were particularly vulnerable. As Joffre pondered the need for 'economies' and moved more and more troops to the Verdun sector, German artillery bombardments tore into the defences of the thinly held line. Lieutenant-Colonel Delmas. Below: After the bombardment, German infantry move in
An absence of any notable activity was characteristic of all fronts held by the French armies in the north-east in 1916, with the exception of the battlefields of Verdun and the Somme. Such a generalisation would no doubt be disputed by the survivors of units which occupied these sectors, but it is certainly true in relation to the long and costly battles which made Verdun and the Somme symbolic of a certain type of warfare. This relative lack of activity lasted throughout the whole of 1916, but was due to different reasons according to the time of year. Between January and February 1916, before the Verdun period, there was no action to speak of on the French front by tacit agreement of both adversaries. General Falkenhayn was preparing a trap which 'would
As
make mince-
on January 19 he declared to General Dubail, com-
meat
of France'.
for Joffre,
Above: Picturesque perhaps, but largely ineffective— an officer and men of a French cavalry regiment. Both sides knew that regiments like this had little part to play in a battle vi^here the emphasis was now on the heavy guns, but they were used just the same
/-
^ y^^^.
' •>'*f^
*^m^
The fire power that French industry laboured to produce; what could not be
made
at
home had to
be imported
Below. The French 270-mm mortar, model 1885. Length of barrel: 6 calibres. Elevation: 30 Range: 5 miles. Projectile weight: 204-384 lbs. Crew: 11 men. 1 The French 8-mm Hotchkiss .
machine gun, the
.
1fi98
principal
machine gun
of the
French army during the First World War. Although it was rather heavy (gun 55 lbs, tripod 60 lbs) it was very reliable. 2 The French 8-mm Chauchat light machine gun, model 1915. This gun was reputedly unreliable and the standard of its manufacture was poor, nevertheless it was used extensively during the First World War. Opposite page, top: The French 220-mm mortar, model 1901 (modified). Elevation: 40 Rate of fire: 1 round per minute. Range: 5 miles (approx). Projectile weight: 200 lbs. Crew: 4-5. 3 Top: The Lebel
8-mm
model 1886. Centre: Dandeteau model 1895 (not widely used). Bottom: Single shot rolling block Remington rifle, chambered for the 8-mm Lebei cartridge. Many of these obsolete rifles were purchased rifle,
6.5-mm
rifle,
by France during the early part of the war. 8-mm Modele d'Ordonnance 1892
4 Left:
revolver. Cenfre.The 11-mm revolver, model 1873. Right: A Spanish-made pistol poorly made but typical of many of the pistols
purchased by the French during the war. 5 Flare pistols — the top one is a modification of the 1886 model R35 carbine. 6 Left to right: Hair brush grenade', grenade projector. Top: Vivien Bessier' grenade, assault grenade Bottom: 37-mm cannon matic mortar
shell,
bomb for pneu-
1699
Infantry alone does not possess effective offensive
power against obstacles defended by gunfire' A German supply party carries billy-cans food up to the troops on tfie front line. g Below: French troops take over a former with I German strongpomt. They are equipped Right:
£ of
^
the Chauchat
8-mm
light
machme gun
with
I
its
g characteristic moonshaped magazine. In the ^ Lorraine sector a single French division was g. now spread over 17 to 20 miles of the front Ime - —about 1,000 men to every two or three miles
.V*»•
^ ^.
f^Tr
^•^-f^^
T<^ -A If^Vtf,'
-"v^^
vw_ -*#t'»v
»v'
7^
J
^.
v"
rryk ^.:^..^:\\
.
,V>,
,.
of the Eastern Army Group (GAE): 'We are obliged to try to economise for the moment. We shall take no serious step uniii next summer in conjunction with all our allies.' Thus the activity of the French armies was restricted primarily by reasons of economy. But even while preparing the great summer offensive which was to be launched on the Somme,
mander
was forced to respect the conditions agreed to at the Chantilly Conference, statement that the the particularly 'harassing of the enemy should be, from
Joffre
now on, undertaken by partial and local offensives, above all by those powers which still
have abundant resources of manpower'. had suggested four ways in which could be achieved: he cited minor
Joffre
this localised
operations, gas attacks, mine warfare, and prolonged gunfire. The instructions of the French Commander-in-Chief concerning these last two tactics stipulated that it was 'of supreme importance to lower the enemy's morale by means of our French artillery. To this end we must be careful to position our forces strategically, thus enabling us to seize the chance of utilising well-directed,
heavy In
fire'.
fact,
before the
German
offensive was the French troops
launched at Verdun, had neither the time nor the means to harass the enemy by the methods stipulated. Until now, mines had been used unsystematically and JofFre's hopes of their effective use had been thwarted by a lack
of technically
qualified troops
and
machinery. Furthermore, mines could not be used if the terrain was unsuitable to this kind of warfare, or if the opposing enemy lines were too far away. In the Champagne and above all in the Argonne, where mole-like warfare was being conducted, ideal conditions for the use of mines prevailed. But there were few sections of the Western Front that were suitable to the extensive use of mines. The use of gas as laid down by Joffre also posed more problems for the French than for the German troops when employed near inhabited areas. Thus the French Seventh Army, which held the front line position extending from Switzerland to Lorraine, was forced to give up the idea of a January gas attack, following the intervention of the President of the Republic, who had been advised of the attack by the inhabitants of the Thur Valley while paying a visit to the front.
Waiting game In fact the principal localised offensives along the French front line during these two months took place due to the initiative of the Germans. The activity of the GAE provides an adequate example of this. This group was drawn up between the FrancoSwiss frontier (in the region of DanneMarie-Porrentruy) and the Meuse (Saint Mihiel) after its retreat from the fortified area of Verdun. They were operating in a large semi-circle which comprised such differing terrain as the Belfort Gap, the Vosges and the Lorraine plateau. The action was mainly defensive, in reply to local German attacks, or took the form of reprisals against the bombardment of Belfort,
Nancy and Saint-Die by German from the air. The GAE also
artillery or
organised the barrage of the Belfort Gap in the event of a German violation of Swiss neutrality, and took part in several
minor manoeuvres. They were playing a waiting game, yet they were on the defensive. The defensive action could most clearly be seen in the susceptible sector around Hartmannsweillerkopf where the 66th Infantry Division (French Seventh Army) launched an attack on December 21 1915, with the intention of obtaining a foothold on the western slopes of the summit so as to put an end to the ebb and flow of enemy forces in this area. After an initial success, the 66th Infantry Division was violently counterattacked and was gradually pushed back to its starting point. The death of its Commander-in-Chief, General Serret, sounded the death-knell of an operation which had cost hundreds of lives, and was more than disappointing in its results.
From German
that time until the start of the offensive at Verdun, the GAE was unable to take the initiative in launching an attack. But although it had suffered defeat it did not remain inactive. Training for officers and men was organised in the
New Year
in an attempt to apply GQG's new directives drawn up from the lessons learnt from the battle in Champagne. The
schedule included instructions for offensive action undertaken by small units, directives for the use of heavy artillery, and directives issued on January 16 1916 reviewing the aims and conditions of a
combined
offensive.
Infantry alone, it was stressed, does not possess effective offensive power against obstacles defended by gunfire and equipped with supplementary means of defence. Thus no attack must be launched unless infantry is preceded and accompanied by adequate artillery action. Men do not fight against machines, artillery destroys, and infantry overwhelms. These instructions assumed the utmost co-operation between infantry and artillery, but they were, perhaps, over optimistic, in that liaison between different levels of a division was still poor. The stress laid on the use of gunfire by the French High Command was to be widely applied with unexpected force by the Germans at Verdun on February 21. This method of fighting had already made an appearance during the German raids at various points along the front line, raids instituted by Falkenhayn and aimed at diverting the attention of the French away from Verdun. From them, it could be clearly seen that among the different methods of attack was a marked tendency to use infantry sparingly. Attack was always preceded by a prolonged bombardment, ending with concentrated fire and sometimes accompanied by jets of flaming liquid, gas shells and mine explosions. The number of infantry taking part was relatively small (two battalions at Seppois), but always sufficient to overcome the preliminary defences. The infantry were so quick to gain the first of the French trenches that it was necessary to try to recapture them with the use of grenades.
'Moulded' lines
When
Germans launched their offenFebruary 21 on the right bank of the Meuse, Joffre realised, due to the inthe
sive on
bombardment that the enemy was making a particular effort in this sector. But for several days he could not tensity of the
dismiss the possibility of another attack in the sectors surrounding Verdun. In
Champagne, between Auberive and the Aisne, there were many reports of new offensive measures and there was a marked tendency for the German lines to 'mould themselves' round the French lines. To the east, in the sector occupied by the Lorraine Army Detachment (DAL) reports of a German offensive were particularly disquieting as the French units there were spread very thinly over a large distance. One division was spread over 17 to 20 miles of the front line which meant there were only about 1,000 men to every two or three miles. The same situation was to be found in sectors of the front line occupied by the Group of Armies of the North (GAN). Such sparse defences were thus at the mercy of the most minor attacks.
But Joffre's fears that the battle at Verdun would spread, diminished with the assurance of the Commander-in-Chief that the fighting was limited to the banks of
the
Meuse.
communicated
On February to
his
22,
Joffre
army commanders
his intention of sending all his available forces to the Verdun sector. He made it
however, that this must not prevent those forces not engaged in the battle from taking part in aggressive action in order to achieve certain aims: harassing the enemy, holding back enemy forcas, and preventing the transference of enemy troops to Verdun. To this end supplementary munitions were to be allotted and surprise attacks intensified with concentrated artillery action. In the main, these instructions were not implemented. Objections were raised to increasing the number of attacks. Taking into account the area covered by its forces, the French Sixth Army, for instance, did not believe it could gain anything by such action, and was already very sceptical of the solidarity of its front line. The continuing transfer of troops to Verdun worsened the situation to the extent that the French armies now envisaged only one aim — to stand up as best they could in the face of the Germans' spasmodic but aggressive attacks. German action outside Verdun was otherwise relatively limited. It was restricted to small localised operations, aimed at causing a diversion. During a period of several months, Falkenhayn launched only two attacks of any importance, one in Champagne, the other on the Aisne. In Champagne on February 27 the Germans launched an attack on the Navarin Ridge. They used the same method of attack, except on a smaller scale, as that employed in the Caures Wood; a prolonged bombardment was followed by an infantry attack. The Navarin Ridge, surrounded at a short distance by trench works, was bombarded for three days. More than 30 batteries were located from the air by the French. At 1630 hours on February 27, the assault was launched; the German troops rose simultaneously along 1,700 yards of the front line and moved forward through the communication trench, to several 'points of support' along the second line. For three days all the French counterattacks failed. Losses were heavy; more than 1,000 men of the 127th Division (of the 19th and 26th Infantry Divisions) were either killed or wounded and the ground lost was not regained. Joffre drew the conclusion that the defensive measures of Fourth Army (under General Gouraud) in Champagne were no longer suited to the new methods of attack used bv clear,
1701
1 S
2 I ra
^ ^
the Germans. General de Langle de Gary, who was still in command of the Group of Armies of the Centre (GAG), insisted that barrage fire be improved. As for Gouraud, he, too, stressed that the organisation of defences must be improved and insisted that it was necessai-y to defend the front lines to the very last in order not to lose ground under any circumstances. A large-scale attack took place on March 10 on the front lines of Fifth Army (General Franchet d'Esperey) in the sector held by the 55th Division (36th Army Corps) north of the Aisne. Again the same procedure was followed as in Caures Wood: from 0600 hours until 1600 hours violent and concentrated artillery fire was directed onto the defensive positions in Buttes Wood and at the crossings of the Aisne. At 1600 hours the assault was extended to the town of Bois. The front line
was speedily taken and defences outflanked. Towards 1730 hours, in face of the Germans' successful progress, the French commander put two battalions of
the Commander of the GAC to recall to the troops the principle of .defending their positions to the bitter end.
divisional reserves at the disposal of the brigade under attack, then sent in a battalion of army corps reserves and finally alerted his own army reserves. During the night and the morning of the 2nd, the
Divided attention
French counterattacked, but achieved
little
in the face of enemy fire. The battle continued until March 18; although the Germans did not succeed in exploiting their initial success, they nevertheless gained several important results: their attack served as a diversion, and they were able to seize several observation posts, the loss of which considerably hindered French communications across the Aisne. Following the incidents at Bonnet d'Eveque and Navarin, the loss of Buttes Wood stirred
General Franchet d'Esperey, not wishing on this failure, decided to mount a counterofFensive, but in preparing it he to dwell
came up against
all
the diflSculties inherent
in a lack of forces. Furthermore, the attention of Fifth Army's Commander was
between his intended counterand the important offensive measures being undertaken by the Germans in the area round Rheims. He was, therefore, unable to assign all the redivided
offensive
sources necessary to the retaking of Buttes
Wood, which, though not judged impossible, would have proved a very long operation. Added to this, the counterattack was not finally launched until April 25, more
i
?^:#,
than a month after the German offensive. Three battalions attacked at 1630 hours after an artillery barrage lasting eight hours. One attack gained its objective the next morning after many hovirs fighting with grenades, but both the others failed that night. The advancing troops were cut off on bad ground, their advance checked by enemy fire. General Mazel who had just replaced Franchet d'Esperey as Commander of Fifth Army decided to suspend the operation; he believed that it was doomed to failure as far too much time had elapsed between the German attack and the French attempts to counterattack. The Germans had been able to organise the defence of the ground they had captured and were thus adequately protected from the French artillery fire. More so even than the Champagne front, the Argonne front, held by General Hum-
T^ Above:
Snow and frost -enemies of both
tfie front.
Below: Flame throwers
in
sides. Here, pai i wi action near Belfort- useful'
bert's Third Army, was dependent upon the events taking place in the fortified region
of Verdun.
The whole of the right wing of the French Third Army, positioned on the eastern borders of the Argonne, was reinforced with two divisions of heavy artillery. La Butte de Vanquois became a strategic point where every inch of ground had to be fought for.
As soon as General Humbert was satisthat the battle of Verdun was not
fied
affecting his sector, he sought to launch an
attack in the Argonne region to ease the Petain's Second pressure on General Army. Operational plans for taking the Four de Paris salient and the high ground
commander of the French Army who held the Argonne front
General Humbert, Third
above Varennes were prepared with care, but they required so many men that on April 6 Joffre decided to suspend them. Thus the support given to Second Army by Third Army was limited to artillery action against Montfaucon and fighting on the flanks of the neighbouring units defending the left bank of the Meuse. For their part, the Germans continued using mine warfare in the forests, particularly along the Haute-Chevauchee road, and they sought above all to hinder the passage of reinforcements to Verdun by attacking stations at the rear and direc-
General Duball His Eastern Army Group had a new training period early in 1916
embarked on
1704
1
fire onto the railway between Chalons and Verdun. Thus the Verdun front relied for its supplies on the petit Meusien', the small narrow-gauge railway line connecting Bar-Ie-Duc and Verdun.
ting artillery
As for the GAE, was to be reduced
its
operational activity
little
by
little.
General
reinforced its left wing in order to maintain secure liaison with Verdun, and then studied the possibility of ease the pressure on to inter%-ening Second Army. But his plans were rejected sine die due to a lack of effective forces. In short, whether under the command of Dubail or his successor, Franchet d'Esperey who took over the command of the GAE from April 4, 1916, the principal action taken by the Group of Armies of the East was to replace the war-worn divisions leaving Verdun and try to maintain — and if possible improve — the defences of their
Dubail
own
first
front.
The gradual
on fronts other than Verdun was emphasised after July 1. the moment Joffre launched the Franco-British offensive on the Somme. Apart from these two sectors of activity, easing-off of tension
the action of the belligerents was also to be greatly limited on the Western Front.
The French Commander-in-Chief lated,
on
launching
the
battle
stipuof the
that the Germans must be prefrom taking any of the sectors attacked. This directive was to be little more than wishful thinking for many
Somme, vented
different
reasons.
Firstly,
so
much am-
munition was used at Verdun and on the Somme that unrealistic measures were taken to economise in other sectors. Secondly,
units posted to quiet sectors usually a large number of troops
comprised
withdrawn from Verdun. They guarded covering even greater distances, and did not wish to jeopardise the relative calm from which they were profiting. In fact, they frequently guarded these positions without ammunition. It is, sectors
therefore, not surprising that the easing of pressure on the quiet sectors in no way prevented the Germans from directing all their reserves to the Somme. By August 1916, the slowing down of
military action on the fronts being defended was even more marked. The amount of artillery was once again cut down and infantry used to the extreme. Furthermore, the Germans now took up a defensive position at Verdun in the direction of Souville.
Falkenhayn was relieved of his command and replaced by Hindenburg on August 28 and henceforward the Germans, too, maintained a defensive position. Exhaus-
ted, both sides respected a reciprocal easing of tension outside the battle areas of Ver-
dun and the Somme. On September 1, when Rumania entered the war on the side of the Allies, Joffre was able to suggest to his commanding officers in charge of the army groups that they should execute raids to establish whether the enemy was bringing in forces to reinforce the Western Front. Scarcely anyone obeyed liim. During the last quarter of 1916, action dwindled almost to nothing, except at Verdun where the troops under General Mangin were regaining ground lost since February 21. The year ended as it had begun with relative calm along the greater part of the French front, due to the total exhaustion of both sides.
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL JEAN DELMAS was
born
944 he enlisted in the French Army, e following a training course on mine warfare in the S British Army. He became an officer m the Engineer | Corps and took part in campaigns in Indo-Chma and ^ Algeria after the war. He is a Doctor of History of the 5 Paris Faculty of Arts, he has received a diploma from | the Paris Institute of Political Studies and is no"' g. ^ Professor of History at the Staff Coiieoe Pans in
1
925.
In
July
1
Allied troop convoy, vintage 1916. The size of vehicles carrying men to the front varied according to what was available
and
shape
m<^
r
.
1705
At the beginning of 1915, France, like most of the belhgerent countries, had begun to feel the strain of the long war. Nevertheless, the transition from the idea of a short, sharp war to a long, hard war was accomplished with surprising ease. For several months, the people basked in the
feeling of victory generated by events on the Marne. This success banished the spectre of the 1870/1871 disasters that had haunted the national imagination for almost half a century, and gave rise to a patriotic fervour that lasted throughout the first year of the war. It was not until 1916 that disappointments on the front and general weariness and confusion began to sap the nation's morale. It is always at a political level that wartime conditions first begin to make themselves felt. For almost five months, the 'National' Government (headed by Viviani and comprising all manner of diverse elements, with men such as Delcasse, Millerand, Briand and Ribot and the two socialists, Sembat and Jules Guesde) wielded an almost dictatorial power. However, at the end of December 1914 all the
instruments of government were assemin Paris, permanently abandoning Bordeaux. The parliamentary session of January 1915 marked the political reawakening with budgetary concessions. But parliamentary control was still limited by its ignorance of the current military operations and by its wish not to obstruct the government's freedom of movement. Furthermore, both deputies and senators knew only too well that neither parliament nor government were responsible
bled
for the present
wave of patriotism.
For the moment, the country's real head, the man to whom everybody was looking, was General Joffre, the 'victor of the Marne'. With his cool exterior, his serenity, 'Papa Joffre' inspired immense confidence and was the personification of the
From his HQ at Chantilly the Commander-in-Chief of the army directed all military operations without hindrance or constraint and co-ordinated all the economic, political and even diplomatic elements necessary to the war effort. In the absence of a unified government it was thus Joffre who determined France's relations with the Allies. The dictatorship of GQG, however, brought in its wake a cautious criticism of its policies which was soon strengthened by a series of disappointments at the front after the failure of the spring offen-
people's hopes.
sive.
Parliamentary
commissions — and
particularly the senators' Army Commission, directed by Clemenceau — criticised Joffre's 'omnipotence', implied his responsibility along with Millerand for the munitions crisis and demanded the right to dispatch supervisory missions to the rear and to the army zones, to inspect the arsenals, factories, food centres and hospitals. On June 24, 1915 a deputy, Accambray, had the courage to question the War
Minister in public. Millerand and Joffre refused to give way. The [generalissimo' did not wish to 'let himself be invaded by civil authorities', and the War Minister declared that there should be 'absolutely no confusion between parliamentary power
and military authority'. But in the autumn Bulgaria's entry into the war, followed by Serbia's collapse, provoked the first government crisis. Viviani resigned. The new cabinet, headed by 1706
The war, now in its second year, was bringing about fundamental changes in the social fabric of all Europe. But France, more than any of the belligerents, was undergoing a painful metamorphosis which affected every city and every rural community.
The popular image of 'Papa Joffre', smiling reassuringly from
IEniOHTI9l6 and postage stamps, no longer dispelled the country's her government, if it understood her problems, showed itself incapable of solving them. Philippe Masson. Below: By now a familiar sight in French towns — women substituting for the men at the front, here as railway workers posters
fears;
Aristide Briand, remained loyal to the principle of national unity, the Union Sacre, and the socialists, with Sembat and Guesde, remained loyal to the government. But the political life of the country was still dominated by the problem of relations between the civil authorities and the High Command. The new War Minister, General Gallieni, attempted to limit GQG's encroachments on the prerogatives of the government. But in the face of JoflFre's violent objections Briand abandoned Gallieni and replaced him by General Roques, a friend of the Commanderin-Chief.
Thus, in March 1916, the interdependence of Joffre and the government was still considerable. The General constantly benefited from an undisputed authority and from extremely wide powers which, at the time of the Verdun crisis, it seemed dangerous to question. Moreover, the unity of the country was not yet impaired. From the right-wing to the socialist left, all sectors of public opinion were still convinced that the battle should be fought right to the final victory, when the whole country would be liberated and AlsaceLorraine reclaimed. Despite the failures of 1915, the hope that the war might be won before the end of 1916 still persisted.
Economic disorder Apart from the vexing question of relations between the civil authorities and the High Command, the main problem influencing government policy was that of the war economy. In 1914 mobilisation (as
for the
majority of the belligerents)
it an almost total parthe nation's communications network. The railways had been completely monopolised by the army, and the majority of industrial and commercial firms had been forced either to close their doors or to slow down production, owing to the shortage of labour and raw materials. Even the public services — the postal service, public transport, the educational system — had been completely disrupted by the mobilisation of more than 3,000,000 young men. This total disorganisation of the economy was accompanied, moreover, by a disastrous rise in the numbers of unemployed, which rose from between four per cent and five per cent in July 1914 to forty-three per cent in August of the same year. But in the belief that the war would be a short one, the country planned to live off existing stocks until it was over and to set her economic machine in order before the end of the year — as soon as the conclusion of the war had been reached. Only one problem appeared really worrying: that of the harvest. From August 1914 onwards Viviani launched a fervent appeal to the wives and children of farmers away at the front to bring in the crops. The stabilisation of the front line, the gradual emergence of a static war, upset the country's plans. From September 1914, the army was short of weapons and in October General Baquet, chief of the artillery, made an emergency statement. Not only was there an acute shortage of shells, but equipment, too, was in short supply. It seemed that the factories were incapable of answering the demands of the new war. The needs of the army — clothes, boots, food — were constantly increasing and at the same time the demands of the rest of the countrv still
had brought with alysis
of
1707
to be met. The authorities thus found themselves confronted by a completely new and unlooked-for problem -that of economic mobilisation. All attempts to resolve the situation were immediately strangled by the shortage of raw material and of manpower. Invasion had placed France in a more difficult plight than that of all the other belligerents. The occupation of ten departements had brought with it the loss of over half the country's coal production and a large part of the steel production centred around Lorraine. The country was thus forced to fall back on the inferior coal stratas of the Massif Centrale and on the Normandy iron mines. The occupation of northern France involved the loss of more than 80% of the country's
had
steelworks and of particularly rich agricultural land that produced 20% of the country's wheat and over half her sugar beet. It was thus that in 1915 wheat production fell to 75 million hundredweight from 113 million hundredweight the year before; potato production from 135 million hundredweight to 94 million hundredweight. Imports, thanks to Allied domination of the seas, made up the deficiencies to a certain extent, but the labour shortage remained the most delicate problem,
with the need to maintain almost 5,000,000 men in the armed forces.
At a
cost of
enormous trouble and incon-
venience to the country, the situation slowly began to right itself during 1915 and stabilised considerably during the following year. Financial aid, given without large interest demands, made possible the conversion of old industries and the creation of new factories, especially in the centre of France and in the Paris area. One of the most typical examples of these new enterprises was the chain of Citroen works, created in 1915 solely for the fabrication of shells, which converted itself after the war to the construction of cars. The government was also forced to demobilise several hundred thousand workers, who were joined eventually by an army of foreign workers from the French colonies or from the Far East. The most unlooked-for aspect of economic mobilisation was the widespread introduction of women to the world of production. In August 1914 the working population already included 7,000,000 women, in a total of 21 million people, but they were mostly to be found in farming or in small businesses. With the advent of the war, they began to infiltrate into the realms of industry, transport, administration and, naturally, the health service. In August 1914, 41,475 industrial firms employed as few as 80,000 women; a year later, they were employing more than 350,000 and almost 500,000 by July 1916. By the end of the war, 600,000 women were employed in national defence and 424,000 in the armaments and aeronautical industries.
teachers
Women
also
who had been
began
to
replace
called up, postal
workers and clerks, and on the railways 6,700 women took the place of 11,000 men called to the front. In the metro, the North/ South Line, which in 1914 employed only
124 women among 4,000 employees, counted 3,000 women among its staff by the end of the war. The government did all it could to encourage this trend. In a circular issued on July 20, 1916 the Armaments Minister declared: 'With the purpose of bringing about
1708
more productive use of the military labour I have decided to forbid from now on the employment of drafted workers on
a
force,
projects which, in all their stages of completion, can be executed by women.' It was thus that women came to play an all-important role in the country's production, thereby justifying to a great extent Joffre's remark that 'if all the women factory workers stopped work for 20 minutes, the Allies would lose the war'. Finally, as nurses (and even as camp followers), they brought inestimable comfort to the fighting men. The balance sheet of industrial mobilisation was to be remarkable for a country
whose industrial development appeared to be less than brilliant on the eve of war. Nothing shows more clearly the extent of the advance than the monthly production of 75-mm shells, which rose from 10,000 in 1914 to 150,000 in 1915 and to 200,000 the following year. But this swift development brought with it a disturbing side effect in the decline of the country's economy. The national debt began to take on immense proportions, exports fell steadily to as little as 600 billion francs in 1915, whereas imports continued to rise and reached a peak of 1,300 billion francs in the
same
year. Coal production,
machine
oil,
metal,
and
produce were all affected. To fight this imbalance, the government mobilised the country's gold reserves. At the outbreak of hostilities, tools
the government had declared the enforced circulation of paper money and had encouraged individuals to hand over their precious metals. This appeal was extended, and by the end of 1915 the vaults of the Bank of France had received two and a half billion francs worth of gold. But it was soon apparent that this measure was
inadequate.
From
1915
onwards,
the
government was obliged to negotiate loans for almost two billion francs from American banks, and to borrow 7.5 billion francs at the end of 1916. In that year, the franc depreciated by 15 per cent against foreign exchange. The country was no longer able to depend on imports to finance her war effort. The 1914 balance of payments had shown a 5.7 billion franc deficit, but that of 1915 betrayed a deficit of 200 billion and 300 billion in 1916. From 1915, the government was obliged to resort to what is now termed 'inflation',
and from 1916
certain that the long
it had become war was not only
severing France from her demographic capital, but was also upsetting her exterior financial position
and seriously affecting
her national revenue. The rise in prices, which reached an average of 60 per cent in 1916, provides adequate proof of this, and was the starting point of a long series of financial crises which were to last for almost half a century. As well as the slump in the country's
economy, the war was bringing an im-
mense
social upheaval. It is impossible to ignore the enormous inequalities in the demands made on Frenchmen within the different social groups. The peasant class and the bourgeoisie — those men and women who constituted the solid base of the country before the war — were particularly affected. A large part of the French infantry was drawn from the peasant group, and it was they who suffered the greatest losses. Out of 1,400,000 men killed in the war, over 900,000 were
Thus the peasants, although they constituted only 40 per cent of France's population, bore 64 per cent of her casualties. On the farms, women, children and old people replaced the men in the fields,
rural workers.
bereavements and their with a stoic acceptance they had learned from a long-standing familiarity with hardship. The whole of France's rural life was disrupted by the conflict, but in spite of everything, the peasants benefited to a certain extent from the rise in prices and by the financial difficulties of their bourgeois landlords. During the war and the period immediately after the war an important transference of property took place. 'In our time,' wrote the editor of the Central Tribune, 'we are witnessing one of the most profound revolutions in the history of our country. In 1789, property was transferred from the feudal landlords to the bourgeoisie, today bourgeois property is becoming peasant property.' suffered
their
difficulties
Spirit of revenge their side, the bourgeoisie and the old aristocracy suffered the misfortunes of war, both financial and in loss of life. From their ranks were drawn the majority of officers of the reserve and certain families were literally decimated in the space of a few months. One young girl wrote to her brother: 'I have just heard that Charles and Lucien are dead and Eugene seriously wounded. As for Louis and Jean, they are dead too. Mother weeps. She tells me you are strong and that you will avenge them. They have taken us all. My dear brother,
On
do your duty.' An American journalist, writing in 1915, asked a Frenchwoman for news of her seven sons. She replied that 'it was fine for the country': six of her seven sons had been killed, the seventh was blind and mad. The children of the commanders were no less affected: General Castelnau lost all his three sons, Foch and Franchet d'Esperey their only sons.
Most of these families were forced
to find solace in patriotism or religion. The middle classes also suffered the serious effects of inflation and of the economic upheaval. Lawyers faced a period of stagnation, during which there was prac-
no work to be had. Of the 2,500 lawyers in Paris, 2,000 found themselves in a critical situation. Journalists, literary men, actors were reduced almost to poverty. Particularly affected were those people who had been used to living off unearned incomes; with the blocking of those incomes, they were forced to stand by and watch their standard of living fall. But the most seriously affected, perhaps, were the tically
landlords. A moratorium on rents inevitably gladdens the hearts of the tenant group who have never manifested the least sympathy for the 'parasite class', but landlords are frequently beggared in the process. Without receiving any of the rent due to them, even those who had been called up were obliged to pay taxes on the buildings they owned. The vast majority of employers and businessmen found their lives profoundly altered. Salaries were either frozen or rose almost imperceptibly. Throughout the war, a qualified professor received the equivalent of an apprentice's salary; a university don thus earned less than a non-skilled worker. The middle classes had become the upholders of the war economy — to their own disadvantage. In 1916 the Comedie
Frangaise staged a production of Fonson's
A six point lesson in hatredLeft:
Combattons rAIIemand et tout ce qui est
boche
The New Poor.
French 'instructive' stamps which appeared in 1916. By buying
!
the stamps, the
R«pp«!oat Mas ces«e leun crimes aiasi nous priserverona la France da relour cle« BaH>ares et de leurs produits. :
Francis, Fran^aises
!
c*ctl notre devoir
:
servons-nous tous de cette merveilleuse
arme de propagande quest
le
people of France
were the "shirkers', the 'petits jeunes gens' who, dressed up in fantastic uniforms,
believed they were helping to fight the German and all that is Boche'.
blood of our soldiers.' rigtit: 'Beware
lurked in the corridors of the ministries and who, under different pretexts, managed to stay away from the front. They became the object of jokes and of derisive public opinion. A post card — one example among the many — was sent to all the suspects on which was written the words: 'To die for one's country is a beautiful thing, to live
of their smiles. In
for
Top
left:
A warning
against buying German products. The
hands that made them are red with the
TIMBRE de RAYONNEMENT Les 6 Timbres:
0.15
Centimes
In all, these sacrifices were accepted willingly, but bitterness lurked beneath the surface. It was clear to most people that certain social groups were actually profitting from the conditions of war. There
Top
every
German
there
lurks a spy.' Centre
This stamp points out the futility of the soldiers' sacrifice if the Germans are to be allowed to run the country after the war. Centre righit: Joffre, brave and good -symbol of the French
it
is
nothing.'
But despite vigilant
methods, no government eliminate them completely.
was
able
to
/eff.-
Mcrie5-vous de leurs sourires: _
character'.
Bottom
left:
A second warning against German products. Should you be tempted, the stamp
remember the Frenchmen who have died by the German hand. Bottom rigtit: The
implies,
accusing finger: 'Never forget their crimes'
A
better
life
But the most important — and probably the most unlocked for— transformation within the social strata was the change that was taking place among the urban working class. In 1916, more than 500,000 workers, called back from the front, worked in the armaments industry. Urban working class losses at the front were less than 350,000 — one third of the losses suffiered by the peasant class whose overall number was scarcely larger. Because of the rent freeze and the rise in this salary bracket which more than compensated for the rise in prices, the working class saw, in the space of a few years, a spectacular rise in their standard of living. The rise in salaries was made possible by the fact that the bosses of the armaments industry were permanently assured of large profits and unlimited orders and that they needed to look after their employees when skilled labour was in such short supply. Government policy, anxious to avoid social discontent, also encouraged the rise in workers' wages. Never had the markets and the large stores done such good business. For the first time in their lives, the working class could be a little extravagant. They could buy luxury goods, decorate and furnish their homes. In the vicinity of the Citroen factory
alone
five
hairdressers'
salons
opened up in the space of a few months. On all levels, the workers tried to ape the habits and the manners of the bourgeois class: 'One can no longer distinguish the "ladies" from the others,' wrote a factory worker from Nantes, 'but they can be recognised as the ones who are the most simply dressed.' This urge to spend was made stronger by the prevailing feeling that the situation might not last and that hay should be made while the sun still shone. 'And why,' asked the anarchist, Gustave Herve, 'should one expect the workers to be more conscientious than their employers?' In the final analysis, those who gained most out of the war were the 'new rich'. whole strata of profiteers and 'sharp guys' were able, with the help of the state, to make considerable fortunes. On the lowest rung of the social ladder, there were the small time traders and retailers who made
A
II
faut
coller
k.
Timbres d«
luf vol lettres. vo$ cartes, vo*
Rayonnemenl
rnveloppe*. vos paquet », etc
comfortable profits merely on speculation on the actual or supposed scarcity of certain products. Butchers often made 50 to 100 per cent gains on their sales; peaches from the Rhone valley, sold on the spot for two francs a hundred kilos, were retailed in Paris for one franc per kilo. But the
1709
fortunes were collected by the middlemen — the suppliers of the armies, greatest
the industrialists.
The government's responsibility in this was paramount. The volume and the complexity of the
nation's affairs
naturally
brought with them a proliferation of middlemen. Returns were calculated in terms of the viability of each enterprise. It was thus possible for an enterprise worth 125,000 francs to realise two million francs in compensation in one year. These 'new rich' clamoured to put their
newly won fortunes into safe keeping. At and auctions art collections and of furniture fetched rock bottom prices. The Execution of Maximilian by Manet was redeemed for 23,000 francs by a dealer who had sold it for 150,000. An El Greco was knocked down for 80,000 francs. Jewellers concentrated on gold. And those who had made their profits sales pieces
hastily got rid of government bonds and paper money in exchange for solid assets: Here again, gold, furniture, property. because of the war, a removal and redistribution of wealth were slowly taking place. But a picture of France at war would not be complete if it contained no reference to the 'brutal' emancipation of women. At the time of mobilisation, despite their en-
look after the children, were to take the place of their men and make themselves felt in all sectors of the economy. In a few months, several million women came to hold in their hands the life of the whole country; an amazing promotion.
thusiasm, many men found it difficult to hide their anxiety: 'What was going to become of the women left alone in their homes?' Touching inscriptions appeared daubed on the buildings of Paris: 'Verin, who has left to join the 3rd Dragoons, places his wife and his children in the care of his neighbours.' It is true that everyone believed the separation would be a short one. In reality, almost overnight, women who until that moment had been bound by the Napoleonic code, considered often as minors, condemned to stay at home and
a
For many of them, the absence of their husbands, the worry, and the material difficulties they had to face made their task particularly
one.
But
for the they had suddenly been liberated. Their sudden emancipation was accompanied by a new financial freedom as well as by a physical one. Wives of men who had been mobilised were given an allowance of 1.25 francs per day, plus half a franc for each child, and to this could be added national assistance and a weekly wage if they decided, as most of them did, to work. From this point on, women managed their own budgets and were freed from their dependence on men
.iiuliiU'
Top: Rene Viviani, head of the 1914 national' Government which wielde.' -r. ilmost dictatorial power during the first mont war.
tragic
majority of women,
it
was
as
if
I
^J^'
«*^-.^^ jtms.iif^''
i3
Cenfre. Aristide Briand, who iani after his resignation in 19 loyal to the
concept
-"^
of the Unio,
within the various political factic of a common enemy. Bottom: Mi, Minister under Viviani, replaced by
1710
from Viv-
uned
i
-.ity
G
In the Place de I'Opera in Paris citizens queue for their coal ration during the winter of 1916. German occupation of the coal-producing areas had cut the country's supply by half
who drank their wages or beat them. 'The saddest aspect of this provisional and relaemancipation of women,' wrote Lucien Descaves in 1916, 'is that they deserve a few months' respite from the country's troubles, and instead, out of our national war comes a precarious domestic peace.'
tive
Faithfulness to their husbands often lasted no longer than a few months. Without question, the war brought with it an upsurge of immorality, more pronounced among the working classes than in the bourgeoisie. If we are to believe that insceptic,
corrigible
Anatole
France,
the
immense majority of women rejoiced in their new situation and 'the woman's satisfaction
husband
is
in her separation from her one of the causes of the pro-
longation of the war'.
It
sudden mutation had 'Never 'will
again,'
was true that its
this
disadvantages:
wrote General Gambiez,
the children of these
women know
the
courtesy of the men of the Gracious Age and the feminine cult of which they were the most visible expression.'
'Imprint of greatness' In the final analysis, the rupture of the established social balance was accompanied by a crisis of conscience. Certainly, a whole section of the population — probably the majority — forced themselves to measure their own dignity against the sufferings of those who fought for them. For Maurice Barres, wartime Paris was 'a hearth where the lamps were dimmed, voices lowered and where a single heart was beating.' A Danish actress, travelling through the capital 1916, noted that 'the town bore the imprint of a greatness that had never been seen anywhere else. In the shops, one
m
women
working, and what women! lost their husbands, their sons, their fortunes, but they acted like
found
They had perhaps
Another foreigner spoke of the impression he had of 'entering a cathedral'. Sadly, this severe, withdrawn fagade hid royalty.'
a less edifying interior. Progressively, Paris and the large towns regained their normal appearance. Carriages, taxis, buses began to circulfite again. On May 12, 1916 — at exactly the same time as the worst phase of Verdun — Meline opened the Flower Show. From the end of 1915, all the theatres had reopened, and in November 1916, after the reopening of the Opera House, came the 'scandal of the bare shoulders'. The black-out made little impression on the night life of the city. All the 'night spots', theatres, cafes, restaurants, nightclubs, brothels were haunted by a newly rich clientele with money to burn. A whole section of the population experienced a veritable 'lust for life', and let themselves be caught up in the debauchery of the times. Paris, more than anywhere
Top: Georges Clemenceau, Radical Republican, the war and of Joff re's 'omnipotence'. His publication, L'Homme Enchaine was the pioneer of anti-war newspapers in France. He was also responsible for setting up the Army Commission which dispatched supervisory missions to the rear. Centre: Jules Guesde. With Marcel Sembat (bottom) he represented the Left wing in Viviani's government
critic of
1711
the rendezvous of all the soldiers, was intoxicated by the pursuit of pleasure. It was thus that a gulf opened up between those who fought the war and those who had regained the day-to-day habits of their lives at home. Because of the reticence of the press who were tied by the censor, those at home continued to nurture an outdated image of the war, full of cavalry charges and bayonet attacks and they began seriously to wonder when 'the soldiers would decide to chuck the Boches out.' At the rear, Sulphart wrote, no one is conscious of the war any more, no one thinks about it, except the old people whose children are at the front. You can go and
walk on the Champs-Elysees to stare at the rich people and you needn't worry, they're still there. For them, it is as if the war was in Madagascar or in China. They're not the least worried about the devastation of the countryside. Those who arrived home on leave, covered with the mud of the trenches, found it impossible to conceal their bitter-
'Haven't you any Germans? What on earth have you been doing then?' came the questions. 'Did you say you'd won the Croix de ness in front of civilians. killed
Guerre? That's marvellous! What for?' A young wife, writing to her husband who
was weary and buked him for
sick of life at the front, rehis depression: Your last letter gave us a great deal of pain. Surely soldiers shouldn't give in to their feelings
We have
the deputies' 'secret committees' and to the institution of a vague 'parliamentary control of the armies'. These concessions represented a turning point in the function of the wartime government. It is true that on the eve of the Somme offensive, the 'generalissimo' still retained most of his authority, but Parliament had re-established its prerogatives and the power of the government was thus weakened. It found itself blamed for the new military disappointments, and its
was rendered even more delicate by the emergence of a strong undercurrent position
of pacifist feeling.
The first flaw in the 'Sacred Union' did not stem from the socialist party, but from certain trade unionist groups. In August 1914 all the trade union leaders, with Jouhaux at their head, had adhered to the 'Sacred Union', and at the beginning of 1915 Millerand could vouch that there were 'no rights and no social laws outside the context of the war'. However, because of the development of the wartime economy, unrest began to manifest itself in the factories. In 1914 there had been no strikes, but in 1915 there were 98 and in 1916 314, though as yet the demands of the strikers were moderate. But Merzheim, the Secretary of the Federation of Metal Workers, and a close friend of Trotsky since September 1914, led a minority group of militants who de-
manded an end
to hostilities.
Their pam-
been attacked, it is absolutely right that we should defend our-
phlet The Voice (La Voix), soon suspended by the authorities and replaced by Notre
selves. Do you imagine that our lives are particularly pleasant? I'm lucky if I see my brother at mealtimes. And always the same question: 'Why haven't the Germans been flushed from their holes? What are
Parole (Our Word), found a readership among the Russian immigrant group and among certain of the working class. On May 1 1915, Merzheim, aided by Pericat, launched his first attacks; he evoked the spectre of 'an ignoble war in which French soldiers commit as many atrocities as the Germans' and he added that 'the German people merit the first place in the world because of their social qualities, both economic and hygienic!' These declarations did little more than provoke a scandal, and a motion put forward in congress by Merzheim was thrown out in favour of one by Jouhaux which demanded the preservation of the 'Sacred Union'. In fact, the French working class was still committed to the patriotic ideal. Even Merzheim admitted this on his return from the Zimmerwald conference of September 1915, where he had demanded an 'unconditional' peace, free from annexations and indemnities. 'If I had been arrested and shot,' he said, 'the people would not have revolted; they are too oppressed by the weight of the lies of the press and the preoccupations of the generals.' But a conflict had begun between Merzheim and Jouhaux, and both men had begun to court and try to retain the favour of the majority. However, from 1915 onwards, pacifist ideas gained little ground with the workers. From the first months of 1916, the anarchist, Faure, and Merzheim were free to preach encitements to civil disobedience, and the trade unionist was not afraid to voice his admiration once more for the Germans who 'have accomplished here, in the regions they have occupied, work which we should have done 40 years ago'. In April, Merzheim took part in the Kienthal conference, but this time three socialist deputies, Blanc, Brizon, and Raffin-Dugens, accompanied the trade unionists. In spite of the fact that it was
like that.
you waiting for?' During his leave, in April 1916, Captain Delvert summed up the attitude of those at home: The nation is completely adapted to the war; it could last 100 years. Paris is wonderful. Everyone goes about their own business, enjoys life. It is easy to understand why people at home are resigned to the war, but what is, in a sense, encouraging is that one is absolutely sure now that if one dies on the barbed wire, the world will not be greatly troubled by one's death. From Captain Lattre de Tassigny, a similar impression is gained: It is as if the country was making a colonial expedition. The winter offensive plays little part in the consciousness of a country which is making a new existence for itself. However, when a nation is- forced to
make
greater and greater sacrifices there to be a 'loss of balance', and after the summer of 1916 a crisis of morale began to manifest itself. Criticisms of the is
bound
government and of GQG became more frequent and began to take violent forms. The seeds of pacifism took root within the population. The first cracks in the 'Sacred Union' began to appear.
Turning point It
was
at the time of the
Verdun
crisis
that Parliament demanded the right to exercise an overall control and to receive precise information on the situation at the front. The President of the Co ncil remained loyal to Joffre and was not prepared to sacrifice 'the idol' because of public feeling. He refused to let members of the Army Commission inspect the armies as they had done in 1792, but he agreed to
1712
openly condemned by all the parties, including the socialist party, the Kienthal message found a considerable resonnance amongst the tired and confused people. Proof of this came in August 1916 at the Socialist congress when the minorities obtained 1,075 mandates as against 1,820 for the majorities — more than one third of the full complement. Henceforth, a large minority group among the working class came out against the war, and this attitude was to sow the seeds of the trouble between the army headquarters, the trade unions and the Socialist Party. Nevertheless, mainly because of their wish not to turn public feeling against them, the government refused to impose sanctions on minority groups. Their intervention was confined to forbidding publication of Notre Parole and expelling Trotsky from the country. Despite a certain contradiction which existed among the workers themselves — the principle of hostility towards the war juxtaposed with the advantages which it undoubtedly brought — the government was now forced to recognise the presence of a strong, trade union-orientated movement which, by the end of 1916, involved hundreds of thousands of workers. The pacifist movement was given voice by a new press which was able to dodge the censor. Clemenceau's L'Homme Enchaine now no longer held the monopoly of criticism of the war; it now had to compete with pamphlets whose style and approach were very different: with L'Oeuvre and Le Canard Enchaine which couched their comments in humour, with Le Populaire, founded by Longuet, the Socialist deputy, in direct opposition to the official party journal, L'Humanite which had remained loyal in its support of the war. But the magazine which had the most lasting success was La Vague, founded by Brizon. It devoted much of its space to soldiers' letters, thus allowing GQG to assess the morale of the troops. Thus, in the autumn of 1916, France was no longer the same place as she had been two years earlier. The demands of the long war had engendered a profound imbalance, both social and economic. French society never again achieved the unity it had enjoyed before the war and the wartime eco-
nomy had thrown
the country's finances disorder and burdened her with external debts. But the crisis of morale gave rise to the greatest anxiety; the seemingly endless ordeal had brought profound weariness and disorder. The upsurge of trade unionism brought with it the rise of pacifism and, beneath the surface, the desire for complete social upheaval. Finally, the powers of the government were brought into question and the authorities could no longer count on the loyalty and obedience of the people. Further military disasters were all that was needed to provoke a serious national crisis. into
Further Reading Chastenet, J., Jours Inqulets et Jours Sanglants (Paris 1962) Ducasse, Meyer and Perreux, Vie et Mort des FrariQais 1914-1918 (Pans 1959) Perreux, G., La Vie Ouotidlenne des CIvlls Pendant la Grande Guerre (Paris 1966) Renouvin, P., La Crise Europeene et la Premiere Guerre Mondiale (Pans 1962)
[For Philippe 116.]
Masson 's
biography, see page
ly
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first few successes. Rumania's armies had been held, and the Central Powers launched their own offensive from Hungary and Bulgaria. Badly led and outnumbered, the Rumanians were forced to fall back towards Russia, abandoning Bucharest and the prime parts of their country. Norman-, Stone. Above: The road to
After their
Collapse of
Rumania
captivity:
Rumanians on the way
Courage alone could not hait^he Central Powers'
to Austria.
mighty war machine 1713
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late September 1916 Rumania was in a sad state of disarray. She had intervened in the war against the Central Powers a month before, expecting her armies to sweep into Hungary. Instead, they had been checked not far from the borders and could make no further progress. A German counterattack, launched by the German
By
Ninth Army under Falkenhayn, was under way, gradually forcing the Rumanians from the positions they had seized. The Bulgarians had attacked from the south, had seized Tutracaia (Tutrakan), an important fortress on the Danube, and had invaded the Dobruja, on which Rumania depended for access to the sea. The capital, Bucharest, was bombed by German aircraft on several occasions. Rumania's allies showed no great willingness to help. The Russian General Zayonchovsky, sent to the Dobruja with a few divisions, told a complaining Frenchman: 'surely you don't suppose we'd fight for Rumanians, do you?'
The
forces in Salonika
promised action,
the time; and one of the French representatives remarked of Rumania that 'c'est un pays oil les hommes sont sans grandeur, les femmes sans pudeur, les fleurs sans odeur et les litres sans ualeur.' The British were scarcely involved in Rumania, though they sent money and some advisers. The country was regarded as a largely French concern, as the propertied classes spoke French, even among themselves, and were enthusiastic for the French cause. The King of Rumania, Ferdinand, was a Hohenzollern by descent, but his wife was a grand-daughter of Queen Victoria and a well-known Anglophile. Whatever the sympathies of its royal house and its propertied classes, Rumania was isolated. She depended for supplies on Russia, and the railways leading to Russia were very few — it took three days for a train from Kiev to reach Reni, on the Rumanian border, and the line as a whole could take only 16 trains a day, whereas a division needed 50. Thus reinforcements and supplies took a long time, even had the Russians, themselves hard-pressed, decided to be more generous to their ally. Militarily, also, the country was in a virtually impossible situation. With an army of some 500,000 men, she had to defend over 1,000 miles of frontier, all the way from Dorna Watra in the north-west to Or|ova on the Danube, and from there along the Danube to the southern Dobruja. There was a giant salient, 300 miles in length and over 100 in breadth, at whose base lay Bucharest, the capital, and the vital oil fields of Ploe|ti. This salient was formed by the great plains of Wallachia, protected in the north by the Transylvanian Alps and in the south by the Danube. The Rumanian General Staff had decided to hold on here at all costs, despite the obvious danger of having its troops cut off in the gigantic Wallachian pocket. As it was, by the end of September the Rumanians had nervously gone over to the defensive — a plan that could hardly work, as in these circumstances the initiative could not be left to the opposition. As it was, their forces were divided among four armies — the Fourth (Presan) along the frontier of Eastern Transylvania; the Second (Crainiceanu) in the area of Kronstadt (Braiov); the First (Curcel) along the southern frontier of Transylvania; and
but delayed
all
the Third (Averescu) along the Danube. A Russo-Rumanian force, under the Russian Zayonchovsky, guarded the Dobruja first as the Russian XLVll Corps, later as the Russian Dobruja Army. There was no reserve, and the railways were too sketchy to provide for one at short notice. Neither did anyone have much confidence in the quality of the Rumanian army. It had a bad reputation, and one of its first orders, after mobilisation, was said to have been that only officers above the rank of major were allowed to use make-up! The Russian representative in Bucharest, Colonel Tatarinov, remarked that the Rumanians had the worst qualities of the two races that made up their population — they had the lethargy of Slavs and the garrulity of Latins. The officer-class displayed a kind of degenerate Byzantinism that appalled western observers: this was said to be the most corrupt country in Europe. For instance, the commander of Tutracaia fled in early September from his command even before the Bulgarians had begun to besiege his fortress: he made his way across the Danube by boat, many of his troops being drowned in a hopeless attempt to escape. No evacuation had been planned, except that of the general. He was summoned to a court-martial, but before he could be condemned, the documents on his case were spirited away from the court-room, and he later got another command. Of course there were many exceptions: the Rumanians today celebrate General Eremia Grigorescu, who had a distinguished part in the war. But as a general rule the officer-corps lacked experience and integrity. On the other hand, the Rumanian soldier certainly deserved better. Time and again, as the Germans expected Rumania to collapse, she was upheld by the dogged courage of her peasant soldiers fighting in defence of their land. They took some time to adapt themselves to this war: in the early stages, they were not up to prolonged bombardment. Once they had some experience — won the hard way, since their officers had scarcely bothered to learn the facts of modern war — they were capable of stout defence. Several of the German commanders were impressed. At the same time, the army lacked equipment and training, and so was not really able to carry out an offensive. The war industries were very limited indeed — there was only one armament factory. The only heavy industry in the country was journalism. It was a weak and isolated country that the Central Powers were about to attack. In late September, the Germans had begun their counterofFensive designed to throw the Rumanians back to their own country. The German Ninth Army (Falkenhayn) had been set up to cover the southern side of Transylvania, while the eastern side was protected by the Austro-Hungarian First Army, under Arz von Straussenberg, himself a Transylvanian, whose forces were divided into two groups later designed as XXI and VI Corps. Against Arz stood more than four strong Rumanian divisions, the Fourth Army. On this front, the Rumanians in late September were still advancing, exploiting their numerical superiority (each division counted 20 battalions, whereas the Central Powers' divisions were usually of nine) against Arz' two and a half divisions, sonje of their units newly formed. The Austro-Hungarian
force was prepared to retire to a defensive line along the rivers Mure§ and
Tirnava CMaros-Kokel-Stellung') knowing that it could be easily beaten in open country. All that was expected from this ,
was that it should hold this line while the Germans concentrated further south. On the right of First Army stood a mixed force of three divisions under Morgen, a German general of proven capacity. He was to hold the link between First and Ninth Armies, and opposed the Rumanian Second Army north-west of Bra§ov. Finally, along the southern border, stood the German Ninth Army, designed to carry out the offensive against the Rumanian force
First
Army.
A
miracle of logistics At the same time, the Rumanians were trying to organise a counterstroke against the Bulgarians in the south. They knew that Wallachia would be indefensible unless they could set aside the Bulgarian menace, and with this in mind they hoped that the Salonika forces could help them. Under the influence of a French general, Berthelot, who had been sent to help them, they were preparing a double attack. The Bulgarian Third Army in the Dobruja had advanced some way between the Black Sea arid the Danube at Silistra. The Rumanians planned to pin the army down south of the
Constanta-Cernavoda line, and then to launch an attack into its rear over the Danube at Flamanda: the Rumanian Third Army, under Averescu, would cross the Danube and wheel south-east to trap the Bulgarians in the Dobruja. To carry this
Rumanians transferred fully a of their troops from the Transylvanian front to the Danube: a feat that, in view of the poor capacity of their railways, strained them to the uttermost.
out
the
third
In these circumstances, the eleven and a half divisions of the Transylvanian front stopped their attacks except occasionally on the eastern side, where they possessed numerical superiority. The various groups lay scattered in the border areas and beyond, unable to help each other effectively. In September they had passed through various defiles in the mountains, not linked by lateral roads. The passes, gener-
narrow and steeply-rising, were their principal supply-routes, and formed the best defence of the country. The Central ally
Powers' armies would have to pass through in order to invade Rumania, and this task would not be easy. Each of the Rumanian groups had the vital task of covering one of the passes. In the southwestern region, the passes were an easier target than elsewhere: the Vulcan and Surduc passes were short, fairly wide, and guarded only weakly; the Turnu Ro§u (Rotenturm) Pass was similarly flat and wide. All the others formed great obstacles. South of Bra§ov, the Predeal Pass and the lesser Bran Pass led to the plains by Ploe§ti and Bucharest, but they were little more then defiles through the mountains, an impossible obstacle in bad weather and a respectable obstacle even in good weather. The passes on the eastern side — Oituz, Ghime§ and Georgiu — were similar. Thus the only possible serious route for the Germans to take would be on the south-western side. It would clearly have been better to persist in attacking towards Bucharest, and thus to cut off the Rumanian for&es west of the capital.
them
1715
The Germans had collected a considerable force for use in Rumania; they had ruthlessly stripped divisions from their other fronts, and the Austro-Hungarian High Command had done likewise. It is fair to say that Hindenburg and Ludendorff displayed a much greater sense of realism than their predecessors ever did in conducting the war in the east. They
supply-trucks into the River Olt to clear a passage along the narrow road for their troops. In the end the Germans took 3,000 prisoners and 13 guns, the battle ending
on September 29. Falkenhayn's plan was
to turn east and destroy the Rumanian divisions operating west and north of Bra|ov — three of them, under Crainiceanu, commanding Second
understood its problems, and regarded the eastern front as vital, where earlier commanders had been content to let the AustroHungarians muddle through. They had
Army. These divisions had showed somewhat greater activity than the Sibiu force, and were moving west to help that force, causing anxious moments for Falkenhayn,
mustered two corps: / Reserve, under Morgen, in the south-east, and XXXIX Reserve, under Staabs, in the south-west, supported by the Germans' best mountain unit, the Alpenkorps under KrafFt von Dellmensingen. These forces were to include Austro-Hungarian divisions, whose performance turned out to be quite impressive— Falkenhayn recorded 'agreeable
who could thus be caught on his open flank. To counter this threat, Falkenhayn told Morgen to guard the flank while he reformed Staabs' line; but the terrain was too difficult for any rapid advance — frequent rain had turned much of the ground into a swamp, and there were very few
astonishment' at their efficiency. By mid-September the Germans organised a counter stroke. The Rumanians around Sibiu (Hermannstadt) — Popovici's I Corps — were the first target. They had committed grotesque blunders — for instance, they failed to take Sibiu although its mayor was begging them to do so and its defenders had retired to the west. The Rumanians remained throughout September besieging a tow^n that was not defending itself. Falkenhayn now gathered 35 battalions against 25, and deployed a crushing superiority in guns, with 54 batteries (13 of them heavy) to 16 (two of them heavy*. Staabs' corps f 187th, 51st Hungarian and 76th Reserve Divisions) lay north of Sibiu, Krafft's Alpenkorps south-west of Sibiu, attempting to take the Rumanian left and the Rotenturm Pass,
and
Graf von
Schmettow's
two
cavalry divisions east of Sibiu. Popovici was wholly isolated, and although the Germans' more extreme ambitions were not achieved, they none the less threw Popovici's force back over the pass towards the town of Caineni. The Rumanian retreat through the defile of the Olt was hectic — they had to throw many guns and
Sb
By
roads.
the 29th, as the Sibiu battle
an end, the three Rumanian divisions had done little more than graze the Germans' flank and Falkenhayn was
came
to
free to turn east against them. Elsewhere, things were improving for the Germans. Further west, in the area of Petro§ani,
the German 301st Division (Sunkel) retook the Vulcan Pass in a spectacular coup; to the north-east, Arz' First Army had been able to contain the Rumanian Fourth Army's advance on the Mure§.
Fourth
Army was now
in retreat (early
October) to the borders, and the AustroHungarians followed, on occasion wreaking vengeance on the local Rumanian nationalists who had been too prematurely enthusiastic about the Rumanian invasion. The Rumanian Second Army was overit was advancing west to help Army, which no longer needed help, and was thus removing itself from Fourth Army, which could have given protection. The Second Army had thus moved into
extended: First
a
pocket:
two
Morgen's
divisions
German
i
tr
(
),
in Bra§ov, the Germans had pushed Second Army back over the Bra§ov area, and had captured 43 guns — though,
fighting
only 1,200 prisoners, a sign that the Rumanians had fled leaving their guns, unable to stand the prolonged Gercuriously,
man
gunfire.
Thus, by October 8 the Rumanians had effectively been pushed out of southern Transylvania, and were in retreat virtually
everywhere on this front. The Germans had been able to defeat first one and then another Rumanian force. These battles had not ended in absolute annihilation of the Rumanian forces: the Rumanians had escaped too fast for a Tannenberg to be possible, and the Germans' supply difficulties, and perhaps also the inexperience of some of their troops, made any very ambitious scheme out of the question. However, the Rumanians, though greatly dismayed .by what had happened, nonetheless expected to recover their fortunes in the south. They intended to strike the Bulgarian Third Army in the Dobruja and at the same time cross the Danube to the west and surround this army by swinging south-east towards Varna, the Bulgarians' main port. In the Dobruja, all had been quiet since September 23, with a minor Russo-Rumanian success. The country here was not easy, being marshy and wooded, with deep, narrow valleys forming the only possible lines of advance. Neither side showed much anxiety to hazard advance in these circumstances, and both had constructed a strong line. The Dobruja fighting was one of the most multi-national actions of any front in the war. On the Central Powers' side, there were troops of every nation. Burning petrol storage tanks in Constanta. Rumania s only major port, evacuated on October 22
r
i
(the
89th and Austro-Hungarian 71stJ stood on its northern flank, while Staabs' corps held the centre and Krafft's corps the left. In early October there was a battle for Brasov. The Germans outnumbered and outgunned the Rumanians, who in the
first days of October fell back from the Olt towards the forest of Codlea Geisterwald a large forest guarding the western side of the Bra§ov area; in the forest, they lost their way and decided it could not be held; they retired in confusion onto the great plain of Bra|ov, the Burzenland, where the Germans were able to break them up by powerful bombardment. By October 7, after some desperate street-
1
1
J^ »
f
'
M '^'ij""" i?
*iyf
'
Toshev's Bulgarian Third Army stood in two groups — an eastern one covering Varna under Kantardiev with the 1st Cavalry, the CJerman 217th, a composite BulgarianGerman division and part of the Bulgarian 6th Division and a western group under Toshev himself with the Bulgarian 4th Division and the Turkish VI Corps, under Hamid Pasha, with the Bulgarian 1st Division on its left, covering the Danube. The front ran on a line Tajova-CobadinTuzla. On the opposite side, there was a
under Russo-Rumanian force mixed Zayontchkovsky, containing from west to east the Rumanian 2nd and 15th Divisions, the Russian 115th and 3rd Rifle Divisions, the Rumanian 9th and 19th Divisions, with, in reserve, the Rumanian 5th and the Russian 61st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, and a division of Serb volunteers recruited from prisoners of war. The Germans had intended to attack, but the Bulgarian railway system was extremely primitive, and Mackensen expected an attack in Macedonia. Further west, the Rumanians had gathered a force with which they intended to cross the
Danube. Their Third Army, under Valeanu
— the
10th (Vaitoianu), 21st (Lambru) and 22nd (Razu) — and three others in reserve in the Zimricea area with instructions to cross the river at Flamanda. All forces in the south — Zayontchkovsky 's and Valeanu's forces — were grouped under the Rumanians' best general, Averescu. Together, they contained 177 battalions, 55 squadrons of cavalry and 146 batteries, set three divisions
and faced 1 10, 28 and 72; the German 21 7th Division was, however, supposed to enter the line soon. At all events a considerable force had been mustered, and Averescu felt optimistic. The crossing of the Danube would be the most difficult part of the operation.
A
technical commission, headed by General Vaitoianu, studied the question: it decided to launch the offensive from Flamanda, below Giugiu, and occupy the little Bulgarian town of Rjahova opposite, which was lightly-defended. The crossing-area was a large, featureless plain: field roads had to be constructed along which the bridging material could be brought up. The Rumanians achieved surprise: the German commander of the Danube front, with only two divisions at his disposal, could not afford to watch every part of the front. The Rumanians were able to collect three divisions on their side without being noticed — the highly- wooded Danube islands concealed all movement on the opposite bank, and the weather prevented air reconnaissance. The local commander, Kosch, could collect only II5 battalions and 35 guns on this front — many of them untried Bulgarian or Turkish soldiers.
Attempted crossings It
turned out that the Rumanian crossing
had almost everything against it. The Germans were admittedly taken by surprise:
barges
landed
the
Rumanians
silently in Rjahova, but thereafter every-
thing went wrong. On October 1 the crossing began, and bridging was undertaken: almost at once a high wind whipped up the Danube, and broke the bridge three
Then someone had 'forgotten' to lay down mines to protect the bridge from times.
Austro-Hungarian gunboats, which controlled the
Danube
as far as Giurgiu: these
gunboats made an immediate appearance, and began to bombard the bridge, which collapsed on October 2. Faced with insuperable supply difficulties, the Rumanians that had actually gone across could not stay where they were, and in driving
many of their stores behind, they recrossed the river in confusion. In the Dobruja, there was to have been action to help the Danube crossing. This too was little more than a fiasco: the Rumanians were too inexperienced, the Russians too unwilling, to undertake anything serious. The Turkish VI Corps lost the village of Amzacea and seven guns to a Rumanian division, but managed to stabilise its line some few miles to the south. The Russian-held centre — the 61st Division under Simansky, with all the rain, leaving
available heavy guns and reserves — made no progress at all, and the Rumanians' initial success was therefore cancelled by October 3. The Averescu counteroffensive ended in complete confusion. Now the Rumanian High Command reversed its attitude once again: faced with the defeats in Transylvania, it decided to turn a third of the army north, once more, to stop the German invasion. Some of the
Dobruja and the Danube divisions were therefore diverted through Bucharest towards the passes along the frontier, now menaced by German divisions arriving from all the other fronts. The Germans" problem was not easy. They lacked, in reality, the force to destroy the Rumanian army utterly. They were numerically rather inferior, and even their crushing artillery superiority could be of limited application in the defiles of the Transylvanian Alps. The winter was coming on — in fact, there was snow in the first week of October, though it gave way for a time to fine autumn weather — and the supply difficulties were considerable. Railheads were 60 miles behind the front at Sighi§oara, and carts took almost a week to reach Bra§ov from there along the scant, muddy roads. In these circumstances, the Germans could hope only that they could defeat the Rumanians through higher morale: in reality, they would, in attacking through the passes, be as split up as the Rumanians had been before. Falkenhayn had a cautious, ascetic temperament: he disliked the policy of the grand stroke that people were urging on him. He knew that it was strategically
tempting to advance straight from Bra§ov to Bucharest and trap the Rumanians in the Wallachian pocket, between himself and Mackensen. Conrad, Ludendorff and Seeckt all felt that an ambitious scheme like this would be in keeping with the Germans' previous boldness on the Eastern Front. But facts were against the scheme:
supply was too difficult, roads too few. Nevertheless, Falkenhayn was virtually forced to try forcing the passes south of Bra§ov, and throughout October and early November he was involved in heavy, indecisive fighting as his subordinates tried to carry out an ambitious plan that would probably make their reputations. Thus, after the first week of October, with the various Rumanian units retreating over the mountains, the Germans and their
allies
attacked.
The Austro-Hun-
garian First Army had also been spurred on to break into Moldavia, principally over the Oituz Pass and along the Trotu§ valley. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, came to the front to witness proceedings; so, on the other side, did Crown Prince Carol of Rumania. The fighting along the frontier began on the 14th, as the Austro-Hungarian units came up to the new Rumanian line; they enjoyed no superiority, as they faced a strong force of four and a half divisions, well dug-in in the few possible crossing-points,
and a particularly resourceful Rumanian general, Grigorescu, made his reputation in throwing back all the Austro-Hungarian attacks. In the end, even the arrival of two German divisions — the Bavarian 8th and 10th— could not change the line here much. The fighting went on inconclusively until the end of the month. Things did not go much more easily elsewhere, though the story had variations. On the southern side, the Rumanians reached the frontier by October 9, the Germans,
struggling with supply troubles, coming up with difficulty a few days later. Essentially, the Germans' plan was to break through the main passes south of Sibiu and Bra§ov and march directly on Bucharest and Ploe§ti, with a subsidiary effort further west, through the Vulcan and Surduc passes towards Targu Jiu. The Germans were grouped in four — in southeastern Transylvania, stood Staabs' corps with three divisions designed to take the Predeal Pass; further west, Morgen's corps with two and a half divisions, supposed to push towards Campulung over the Torzburg Pass (Bran); further west, in the Rotenturm Pass, Kraffl's Alpenkorps with two Austro-Hungarian mountain brigades; and on the right of this force, two and a half mainly German divisions under Kneussl, commander of the Bavarian 11th Division, who had taken Przemysl in May 1915. This time he was to advance along the Jiu valley. In reality, all these forces were isolated: and the further they advanced, the more this was a problem. Throughout October they pushed at the Rumanian front, towards which increasing reserves now flowed as Averescu abandoned the Dobruja offensive. to their line
German miscalculation On Staabs' front, three divisions attempted passage of the Predeal. There was nothing for it but to move frontally along the passes in this region, already blocked by the divisions that had retreated from Bragov; and Rumanian troops from elsethe
spoils of war? Not worthwhile ones, judging by the enthusiasm with which this group of Germans is picking through a baggage train abandoned by the Rumanians outside Bucharest
The
where began
to arrive.
The main
battle
occurred in mid-October before the village of Predeal, where many of the upper-
Bucharest had their mountains. The Rumanian Prime Minister, Bratianu, had a large country house in this region. The Germans decided not to bother with slow outflanking movements; they counted on Rumanian demoralisation; and soon discovered their miscalculation. Predeal was class
families
summer
of
villas in the
severely bombarded for several days, the fine houses being destroyed: but the Rumanian 4th and 21st Divisions clung on in the ruins of the town, and prevented Staabs' force from making any but the
most
On
trivial progress.
Morgen's front further west the story
was much the same. Morgen was to move over the Bran Pass along the old trade route into Muntenia; he was to move along the old road, which forks towards Targovi§te and Campulung. Morgen's two and a half divisions were rather more cleverly used than Staabs' troops had been. They managed to outflank some of the Rumanian 22nd Division's mountain positions, the
Bran Pass was
forced,
and the 12th Bavar-
ian Division even managed to penetrate the rear in the valley of the Dambo Vi{a; but the Rumanian 12th Division (Gaiseanu) came to the aid of the 22nd (Razu) and eventually created a strong line by October 18 along the Mateia§ heights just south of the pass. Morgen ran into immense supply troubles; his losses were over 50%, and he decided to stop where he was. Further west again, in the valley of the Olt, fortunes were changeable. In this area — a conveniently flat pass with some good roads — KraflFt's Alpenkorps and an
Rumanian
Austro-Hungarian mountain brigade were moving over the Turnu Rosu Pass towards Caineni and Curtea de Arge|. The Rumanian troops here were those beaten at Sibiu in September; and their behaviour showed the particular strength that could be expected of Rumanian troops even in defeat. The two divisions stood in the Fagaras mountains on both sides of the Olt; a new division, the 20th, was coming into the front, but each of these divisions had no more than 2,500 men. These troops formed I Corps, and received a new commander, Praporgescu, who had been through the French cavalry school at Saumur. He was killed on a visit to the front, but his successor, Petala, showed great initiative. Guns were hauled up the mountains with a wire-rail used by foresters in the region. Krafft's force could not stand the fire and withdrew after penetrating to Caineni. By the 23rd, the Alpenkorps' off"ensive had also come to an end as winter came on. In the Jiu area further west, the Germans suffiered an outright disaster. Here the area was very easy in many ways -the Vulcan and
Surduc Passes were the strategically
least
easiest, though attractive, ways into
Wallachia. The mountains stepped down without complications, and the attacker would always have advantage for artillery; the area was also closely linked to the Hungarian railways. Unfortunately for the Germans, their forces here were too weak: only two and a half divisions under Kneussi, who underestimated the two rather strongdivisions under Anastasiu, before him, guarding Targu Jiu and Craiova. He began his attack in to the plains
1720
mid-month, advancing on the flanks of the passes rather than through them. This method gave him some kind of easy success, and by the 25th he had penetrated the mountains and was attacking Targu Jiu: Falkenhayn thought that at last the mountain breakthrough had been achieved. He turned out to be wrong. Rumanian re-
frontier fighting; and the Rumanians were not really interested in anything else. The great casualty in this was the Danube front: everyone was too interested in something else to think about this front. The only serious change in the situation in October came in the Dobruja. Russian
inforcements came up, attacked Kneussl's flank, and surrounded a German brigade, which had to surrender with 27 guns and 17 Rumanian ones that the Germans had taken. In this fight. Prince Heinrich of Bavaria was killed at the head of a Bavarian guards regiment. In these circumstances, by the end of October the Germans' plan of attacking directly on Bucharest had failed. Falkenhayn had to think again. Now the Rumanians were receiving serious reinforcement from their Russian allies. Alexeyev, though dragging his feet the whole way, liad finally agreed to send several corps — the XXVI, IV Siberian and XXXVI; the staff" of Eighth Army was sent to organise a new offensive on the north-eastern side of Transylvania. These troops arrived with a contemptuous warning from Alexeyev to Iliescu, the Rumanians' Chief-of-Staff, that he must hold out, being numerically superior to his opponents. If necessary, he could afford to pull out of Wallachia into Moldavia, where the line would be much shorter and where he could guard the pas-
to
The Rumanians, hampered by the non-co-operation of the Russians, who despised them utterly sage into southern Russia, for whose future the Russians were worrying. On the other hand, the French General Berthelot had other schemes. He felt strongly attached to this Latin country, sympathised with its aims, and wanted, by skilful advice, to attach it more firmly to France. His aim was nothing less than a Rumanian battle of the Marne: he himself had been attached to Joffre's staff" in September 1914, and the
Marne was one of his most vivid memories. He decided that the Rumanian pattern had already proceeded much as the Western Front had done in 1914; the Germans had won battles along the frontiers, and had then been defeated by skilful French use of a reserve force hitting their flank. Berthelot set about organising such a force: he took three divisions from each of the corps along the Transylvanian border, and trained them for a Rumanian Marne that would defeat the Germans just before Bucharest -if they ever got there. The Rumanians were puzzled at this conflicting advice. They saw no reason either to give up the capital for the sake of southern Russia, or to give up the mountain passes for the sake of Berthelot's strategic nostalgia. They decided for the moment to hold on; and the Rumanian front thereby acquired three diff"erent tasks, contradictory to each other: the Russian troops were interested only in holding Moldavia; the French staff was uninterested in the
Rumanian disillusion combined this front the area in which Allied
torpor and
make
relationships
were, despite severe comworst in the whole war. On October 19 Mackensen's forces attacked, with the aim of capturing Constanta, the petition,
Rumanians' chief port. The whole episode was of unrivalled futility. The RussoRumanian forces were in no way inferior; the Danube was guarded by a Rumanian flotilla under Admiral Negrescu; and the Black Sea side was equally well-guarded by the Russian Black Sea Fleet under Admiral Paton. Only the Rumanian troops fought with any tenacity, and that not much. The Russians merely fell back, pausing only to pillage the villages in the rear; their commanders showed no interest whatsoever in defending the Dobruja, which most of them probably
felt
should go to the Bulgarians
anyway. Bulgarian cavalry kept turning the flank by galloping along the very seashore, often in full view of the Russian ships, and thus captured Constanta almost without effort. The Black Sea Fleet alleged fear of submarines and steamed away — incidentally forgetting to destroy all of the vast quantities of grain and oil that were stored in Constanta: the commander of the Lieutenant Shestakov refused to do anything about this, feeling that within a few days he would be back into the port. By October 22 the Russo-Rumanians were in full retreat to a line north of the Cernavoda-Constanta, railway, which they were able to hold only because Mackensen diverted troops to the west. The great bridge at Cernavoda fell intact into the Germans' hands. Now the Russian commander, Zayontchkovsky, was replaced by Shcherbatchov, who ordered 'that this shameful flight should cease at once; we are here to fight, if not to win, and not to go in for a racing retreat.' This order apparently exhausted Shcherbatchov's energy; within a few days, he too had succumbed to the futile bickering that had already ruined this front. His archive on the Rumanian Front in the Hoover Institution bears the legend: 'This archive is open to all scholars except to Rumanians, who may not see it for 500 years.' Since early September, the Dobruja forces had lost 40,000 prisoners and 170 guns. Thus, if the Germans had failed to break through the Wallachian barrier, they had still won a very substantial victory in the south, and at the same time had kept up their end in eastern Transylvania and on the Russian Front. After a pause in which he brought up reinforcements, Falkenhayn now planned to move into Wallachia. He gave up the plan of striking through the Predeal Passes: it had already proved unproductive, except in the sense that it had attracted troops away from the Dobruja. He now planned to take the simplest route — that through the Vulcan and Surduc areas. This had all the advantages except ambition: it would result in driving the Rumanians out of Wallachia, not capturing them in it. This did not particularly worry Falkenhayn, who believed in attrition rather than bold strokes; and in this case, he was probably right: there was no other
to do it. He therefore sent extra divisions to the Vulcan area, and put the whole front under Kiihne, commanding LTV Reserve Corps: this force embraced four infantry divisions (the 11th Bavarian and 301st from before, and the new 41st and 109th) and two cavalry divisions under Schmettow. At the same time, Krafft's force was strengthened in the Rotenturm
way
Pass for a new plunge forward; and Morgen put his troops in order, receiving supplies for a month. Co-operation among these bodies would be possible only when the of the forests and mounonce they were out, it would be deadly to the Rumanians. In fact, Kiihne's attack had the virtue — rather unexpectedly — of surprise. The Rumanians felt that the Germans were not likely to attack here: Kneussl in late October had suffered a staggering reverse, and in any case the direction of the attack was not very productive. The French general, Berthelot, had been pressing Iliescu and Averescu to set up a "mass of manoeuvre' on the classic French pattern; the fact that its manoeuvres were likely to be backward did not worry him. All the other commanders refused to send much for this force; only the ones in the west could be bullied into it. The 11th and 17th Divisions had a third of their effectives removed. Kiihne thus developed a strong local superiority in the easiest way across the mountains — 33 battalions and 43 batteries, not counting the 48 squadrons and six batteries of Schmettow's cavalry, against 14 and, 12 on the Rumanian side. The Rumanian High Command did nothing to help, being gripped by its usual combination of resentment and megalomania. On November 11, Kiihne attacked, using his gigantic superiority in artillery to blow a hole through the Rumanian defences in the Surduc Pass; he did not bother with the fancy tactical experiments of the October oflFensive, merely relying all the time on crushing weight. By November 14 he had achieved serious results: he reached the plains of 'Little Wallachia' at Bumbe|ti Jiu, proceeding slowly so as to avoid the flanking blow that had ruined Kneussl's attack the previous month. On the 15th the German cavalry had been able to start moving, and took Targu Jiu: the Rumanians could only retreat. Even so, the breakthrough developed in slow motion. There was a snow storm on the 15th, which brought down cables and made the roads impassable; the troops had to push across frozen swampland. Still, the Germans were in fine shape — for a loss of under 800 men they had been able to take over 3,000 prisoners and a few guns. They had a new division — the 115th under Kleist — arriving in Targu Jiu, and the
Germans were out
tains;
Rumanians numbered
than 8,000. There could be no question of defeat. At the same time, Krafft had renewed his attacks in the Olt valley, and had taken Caineni with 6,000 prisoners and 12 guns by November 14; he was now pressing towards Curtea de Arge| and Ramniculess
Valcea. He faced three Rumanian divisions with equal numbers (33 battalions each).
The Germans now planned to have Kiihne turn west and move along the southern side of the Alps to unlock the Rumanian positions and let the other German groups out into the plains. Initially, Kiihne — with Schmettow's cavalry out in front — was to drive towards the line of the Olt, which
intersected the Wallachian salient and
was
likely to be used by the Rumanians as a last-ditch position. In reality the Rumanians were reckoned too weak to stop the advance on the Olt, and Schmettow
reached it easily enough by the 20th, taking a bridge near Slatina intact. Meanwhile, the Rumanians sent no more than the barely necessary to this front: under Berthelot's pressure, they established a reserve of three divisions near the capital. By November 23 the Germans' infantry was arriving on the Olt, guarded in front by the cavalry. The Olt has high, steep banks and here the Rumanians thought they could prepare their counter-stroke. However, this plan failed because Mackensen came into action on the other side. The Dobruja had long acted as a ball-andchain on Rumanian operations in Transylvania; and the southern front now hopelessly wrecked the Rumanian defence system there. Falkenhayn had seen that he could not defeat Rumania without calling in the Bulgarians; and now Mackensen was able to organise an offensive. In early November he suspended his attacks in the Dobruja and began to switch troops to the west; he gathered an impressive force at Svishtov on the Danube, opposite the Rumanian town of Zimricea. In July and August this area had been reckoned by German officers sent to inspect it as the best possible point for a crossing: the
Germans, Bulgarians and Austrians united in a common bond to deprive the
Rumanians of their oil and wheat southern bank dominated the northern one, and the area was well within the range of Austro-Hungarian monitors. Preparations dragged on for longer than they might because the communications in Bulgaria could not sustain rapid switching of troops; and Mackensen was not ready to cross until the 23rd. He assembled a force of 42 battalions and 64 batteries under Kosch, commanding the German Danube Army (Donau-ArmeeJ. The result was almost a mirror-image of the Rumanians' crossing at Flamanda the month before. The sappers were excellent — the best that the Austro-Hungarian army could give; and the bridge was put up in record time. Of course this was a multi-national force: there were eight German, one Austro-
Hungarian, 24 Bulgarian and nine Turkish the guns were rather more heavily German. The Bulgarian Crown Prince, Boris, played an essential role in ensuring harmonious co-operation between the Germans and their testy, fractious Secrecy was guarded, although allies. British pilots from Lemnos warned the Rumanians that they were about to be
battalions;
attacked. The Rumanians ignored this: they were sure the Bulgarians would be no better at crossing the Danube than they themselves had been in October. But the Rumanians' defence force was pathetic: groups of old territorials armed with outof-date weapons, lining the Danube at one man per 30 yards, and no reserves.
The crossing went off virtually without incident on the 23rd. Under cover of a fog, the Germans put their troops across in barges to the Rumanian side; they carefully did not fire their guns, so as to maintain secrecy. Zimricea, on the Rumanian side, was taken, a bridgehead set up, and the Austro-Hungarian sappers put to erecting a bridge: they did this in record time, and then put up a heavy railway bridge in some four days. By November 26, the Central Powers had put across their whole force — the German 217th Division, a combined German-Bulgarian cavalry division under von der Goltz, the Bulgarian 1st and 12th Divisions and the Turkish 26th Division. Against these there was only the Rumanian 18th Division and a largely illusory
'Danube Defence Group' under
lancovescu. Giurgiu was taken without incident by the Bulgarians, and then burnt; Kosch ordered a general advance on the River Vede, in the direction of Bucharest. The front now formed a huge salient from Curtea de Arge§ on Morgen's front to Giurgiu on the Danube, along the Olt. In reality, the Germans and their allies were in a disorganised state; as usual, supplies were difficult to arrange. Units were isolated, with some far ahead of the others, involved with pockets of resistance. The commanders were disunited and re-
Falkenhayn and Mackensen both sought overall control; their subordinate commanders were anxious to win complete glory for themselves by capturing Bucharest; and the junior ones were abandoning caution as well in the general mood. They advanced on Bucharest in a mood of joyous overconfidence over the Rumanians, and of acrimony towards each other. In the last days of November the various units advanced across the Wallachian plains towards Bucharest with their commanders only vaguely in control of them. Morgen pressed towards Curtea de Arges and Campulung; Schmettow's cavalry, far ahead of its supporting infantry, reached the River Glavacioc; Krafft almost reached the plains beyond Caineni and began to move east so as to help Morgen out of the mountains towards Sinaia and Ploesti; and Kiihne's four divisions moved across the Olt, with the 11th Bavarian Division on the right. Then there was a gap of 50 miles to the 217th Division, of Kosch's force, which stood at Prunaru, where it had taken 20 guns and 700 prisoners (the small number of prisoners may be taken as a sign of the Rumanians' state again: the men were no longer waiting to defend the guns); and the rest of Kosch's group was spread out in Bulgarian confusion — the inextricable divisions on the right, on the lower Arges and the Turks, with Goltz, straggling some 30 miles behind the 21 7th Division. sentful:
In these circumstances, the
Rumanians
were able to give a severe blow to the Germans, which might have turned the battle in a different way had it been luckier. Their positions along the Olt had been turned when Kosch crossed the Danube; they fell back on the Arges as basic line of defence. Two divisions from the Dobruja went to help the 18th hold the Bulgarians on the lower Arges; and the Russians promised troops for this task also. Berthelot set up a strong reserve force near Bucharest, with three combined divisions: the 2/5th under Socec, the 9/ 19th under Scarisoreanu and the 21st under Lambru. Berthelot could see that the Germans' weak point lay in the 1721
gap between Kosch and Kiihne; his reserve force was to strike at Kosch's open left flank, much as Gallieni had done during the Battle of the Marne, as a German army came marching towards Paris. Meanwhile, the forces that had retreated from the Jiu and from the Danube would continue to hold the line of the Arges as the reserve force attacked Kosch's flank. The ensuing battle took place in a region of many rivers, each flowing towards the
Danube: the three main regions were, from west to east, the Glavacioc, the Neajlov and the Arges. The Germans were moving towards the Arges and by the end of November had reached the Glavacioc,
some
of their forces far out ahead: thus the 217th Division under Gallwitz von Dreyling, had reached Mihailesti on the Arges, while Goltz' cavalry was two days' march in the rear, towards the west, at Naipu on the Glavacioc, and the Turkish 26th Division further back still. The Bulgarian divisions on the right flank were heavily engaged on the lower Arges with increas-
ing numbers of Russians; finally, the forces of Falkenhayn's army were scattered, and in any case heading due east, rather than south-east
to
help
Kosch.
Now, three
Rumanian
divisions were to come in to exploit the Germans' confusion: the 21st engaged the front of the 21 7th Division on the Arges; the 9/ 19th was coming over the Neajlov to engage its flank; and the 2/5th was coming down the Glavacioc into its rear, brushing aside the surprised and
exhausted cavalry guard that Goltz had set up. A great battle began for Bucharest: t'.e Rumanian High Command was keyed up,
knowing that this was its Berthelot exuded confidence.
last
throw.
Rumanian plans captured In fact, the coup failed as a result of a series of accidents and the courage of the 21 7th Division. The Rumanians' coup depended on surprise, speed and organisation. All three were increasingly thin. In the first place, the
Germans soon found out what
Berthelot intended to do. A staff" car, carrying officers who had full plans of the attack in their briefcases, drove by mistake right into the German lines on the middle Arges: the driver had mistaken his route in a fog. At once, Falkenhayn saw the danger to his right, and ordered three of Kiihne's divisions to swing south-east to help Kosch. The main one involved was the 11th Bavarian, which was two days' march away. Then, an aircraft bombed the headquarters of Socec's division, which was supposed to take the German rear: all the staff" were killed, except for Socec himself and a French liaison officer, Vaulchier. On top of this, the Germans resisted with extreme tenacity. The 21 7th Division was almost cut off"; it lost half its men and 20 guns; but throughout December 1 and 2 it warded off" Rumanian attacks between the Glavacioc and the Neajlov, around the village of Epuresti. Gallwitz von Dreyling himself was nearly captured on several occasions, but he refused to surrender; and reinforce-
ments were coming up to him from Ninth Army and from the Bulgarians on his right. Finally, the Rumanians urged the Russian commander on the lower Arges, Razvoy, to come to their aid by attacking Gallwitz' right flank. He refused to do so; urgent
representations were made; and a French asked him if he wanted to play the role of Grouchy at Waterloo. He answered T am not here to hear history lessons,' and did nothing. Thus the Rumanian counterattack collapsed on December 3, as the troops of Ninth Army came into the rear of Rumanian troops themselves in Kosch's rear. Several of the Rumanian units were captured, though in general the Germans were too exhausted to press the matter. The Rumanians retreated groggily towards Bucharest, losing an increasing number of men and guns. There could now be no question of retaining the capital. The Rumanians had made their last throw. They might have held out on the River Dambo Vita to protect the capital, but events had turned against staff" officer
them. As the Germans advanced through Wallachia, the situation of the troops defending the Rotenturm and Predeal Passes had worsened; they might be cut off". Morgen and Staabs had both received reinand supplies; throughout forcements November they had been carrying out an attrition of the Rumanians that resulted in great captures of men and guns which, surrounded in a mountain position, could do no other than surrender. Morgen in particular was now approaching Ploesti, the great centre of the oil industry; he took Targoviste just as the Arges battle was coming to an end, and the Rumanians had no alternative but to retire or they would be surrounded near Bucharest. Their
weary and dispirited troops made to regovernment fled from Bucharest, and took with it all the men of 16 and over, for future military service. They intended to retreat into Moldavia, where they hoped treat; the
to be able to reorganise the front.
Mackensen himself wrote to the commander of Bucharest on the 5th asking if he intended to stand siege. The letter was returned unopened; the military had left Bucharest, which was an open city. The first Germans entered it on December 6, Mackensen himself on the 7th. At the same time, Morgen's force, with some of the other troops of Ninth Army, swept towards Ploesti. Rumania's allies were worried that Rumanian oil would pass into the Germans' hands; they resolved to wreck the industry altogether. What they did is related in the next article. Thus, through the ruins of Wallachia, the Rumanian army fell back. There was no sense in stopping before the Danube and the Siret rivers: any other position would be too exposed, and the army badly needed a rest. There followed a month of retreat, almost accidental resistance, and renewed retreat, until the Rumanians reached the river Siret and safety. From this new line, there would be a chance of defending themselves; the unconquered half of the country would support a re-
^tJLjk
.
'What remained of the armies, which four months before had entered the war so full of hope, endured for many months privation and even famine, from which not only thousands of soldiers but far larger numbers of refugees perished lamentably.' — Churchill, The World Crisis
Above: General Erich von Falkenhayn {left), commander of the German Ninth Army. Below: A blown bridge. The retreating Rumanians were not always so thorough, however, with unfqrtunate results .
.
f '^r'
V
M
V^
1723
I
Above The defeat of Rumania, almost inevitable in view of the forces facing her, superior as they were in equipment and experience. Below left: Arz von Straussenberg. commander of the Austrian First Army. Below right: Krafft von Dellmensmgen. commander of the crack German Alpenkorps
organised army; and the Russians, once nearer their own country, would take a due share of the defence of Moldavia. This is in fact what happened. The Germans followed up as far as the River Siret, and both sides dug in there by early January. The Rumanians had suffered badly: 300,000 men were lost, half of them prisoners, and over 350 guns. The Germans also took 350,000 rifles. A balance sheet for losses was never drawn up on the Central Powers' side, in view of the multi-national forces involved. They had lost most heavily in the October fighting, and in the last phase before Bucharest; and Mackensen's Chief-of-Staff reckoned that the losses of all units involved in the Rumanian front were some 200,000,
though many of them were casualties of the weather. The Germans were content: the memoirs of Falkenhayn sound a smug enough note on the Rumanian campaign. Even so, the Rumanians had not been finished; and in fact by the middle of 1917, it was to become clear that they, like the Serbs, had been helped by defeat towards a national renaissance.
[For 465.
1724
1
Norman
Stone's biography, see page
Rumania, one of the major oil and grain producing countries, was of vital importance to Germany. But, despite the agreement she had made with the Allies, Rumania would not destroy her stocks of oil and grain. To prevent these falling into the hands of the Central Powers, drastic measures had to be taken, and the British sent out John Norton-Griffiths to destroy them. He did, and caused damage valued at
operation
Arson For the first two years of the war Rumania had remained neutral, seUing her annual output of 7,000,000 tons of grain and close on 2,000,000 tons of oil as impartially as possible to both sides. Offered Transylvania by the Allies, and encouraged by Serbian successes against Austria-Hungary, Rumania had entered the war on the side
of the
Allies
in
August 1916. At
her armies advanced into Transylvania with ease, but after the battle of Hermanstadt at the end of September they began to retreat, and by October 8 they were holding only the passes of the Transylvanian Alps. Beyond this last natural line of defence began a vast complex of oil fields. To blockaded Germany, desperate for oil, such a prize was not only desirable but essential. The Allies had already purchased the Rumanian corn harvest in secret, but the Rumanian government had promised to destroy it and also render the oil fields useless if the German advance became a first
real threat.
A Rumanian
commission
set
up to handle this task failed to take action and as the Germans closed in the Allies became uneasy. The British Military Attache reported that he was powerless: it was too late to send troops. On October 23, in a last desperate gamble, British Intelligence sent for John Norton-Griffiths, for Wednesbury in Staffordshire.
MP
£56,000,000. Terence Wise. Below:
Norton-Griffiths
was
45, tall, powerful
and capable of great physical endurance. As a young man he had prospected in Africa, taken part in the Jameson Raid and led a company of scouts during the Boer War. After mining gold on the Ivory Coast and building a railway in Angola he formed his own company and became one of the great contractors of that era. When war with Germany came he raised a regiment of horse and later took his tunnelling gangs to France to mine in the Ypres salient and elsewhere. While at the front Norton-Griffiths plotted the mining of Hill 60 and Messines Ridge. When planning was completed and the work well under way he was moved to the Ministry of Munitions. He had been there barely a week came from Whitehall.
when the summons
General McDonough, Director of Military Intelligence, speedily outlined the situation in Rumania and concluded: 'You are a skilled engineer, you will have men there, working for the oil companies, who will do the work, but you must direct it.' When Norton-Griffiths asked: 'What regiments do I take?' McDonough replied shatteringly: 'You go alone, but you may take your batman!' The following day Norton- Griffiths saw the Chancellor of the Exchequer and received authorisation to inform the Ru-
An oil field in Rumania
manian government that the British government would pay full compensation for the loss of oil and machinery. Then, accompanied only by his batman, NortonGriffiths set out for Rumania, first by destroyer to Bergen, then through Sweden into Finland and so to Russia. From Petrograd he went to Moscow, and from there by train 1,500 miles across the steppes to the Rumanian frontier, where he requisitioned a car and drove to Bucharest, arriving
on November 13. Bucharest was flooded with refugees, deserters and wounded. The Germans were only 100 miles from the capital and only brilliant rearguard actions by General Avarescu were preventing the loss of the
To Norton-Griffiths it was obvious the end was close, yet when he confronted the Prime Minister, Bratianu refused to listen to the offer of compensation. Attempts were also made by officials of the Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Companies oil fields.
to
buy
off"
Norton-Griffiths.
The next day Norton-Griffiths made his way to Ploesti, 36 miles north of Bucharest and in the centre of the oil fields. From here he travelled across country to the foot of the Carpathians, where on the 26th he met the commission at Targoviste. After a day of discussion, the commission made it plain that it wished to preserve the oil fields, even at the Allies' expense. Norton-
i
V
An unenviable and odious task the destruction of the major portions of the economy of one of the AlHed countries
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^
1 i
Above: John Norton-Griffiths.who destroyed the economy of Rumania. Below: Part of his ravages: blazing oil tanks on the coast. Right: Rumania's world importance in oil and grain
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.'SI
ffi*
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my'
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CEREALS :="
1913
w
Griffiths stalked out of the meeting. for delays— he
was no more time
now play the game
'
There would
his way.
Privately assured of the support of the Rumanian royal family, Norton-Griffiths set about organising the destruction of the oil fields against government orders. In the next week he ran into constant opposition, although he was moving too quickly fear official representation to be made. He stated afterwards that to fulfil his mission he ignored government orders as though they were dirt and in extreme cases brandished his revolver and exclaimed: 'I don't '—iwr blasted lemguage! My Chief
ar
Office; if
you want me
to stop,
cable them!' At Targovi§te were the British-owned Consolidated Oilfields. Here NortonGriffiths came to an agreement with the director and managers— they would destroy their refineries and wells and provide men to help him destroy others: in return he signed an assessment of the value of their plant on behalf of the British govern-
ment for the owners. Engulfed in flame The workers and their families were ordered to evacuate the area. Deep channels were dug to the refinery and flooded with petrol. Vitriol was poured into the boiler's to rot them. Trusting no one, NortonGriffiths personally set fire to the sea of petrol and in minutes the entire area was
engulfed in flame. By this time Campolung had fallen, opening up the mountain passes. The Rumanian
government fled to Jassy, to which it was followed by the royal family on December 2.
East of threatened Targovi§te, Norton-
and his men cut down the oil derricks and toppled them into the shafts. Pipelines, boreholes, derricks, refineries. Griffiths
destroyed. For a radius of 20 miles he
Several times he came close to death, once being hurled bodily from a building he had set alight, his hair ablaze. Snatching a few hours sleep in his car as he raced from spot to spot, obstructed by officials, pursued by government preventative measures, Norton-Griffiths bulldozed on, fully aware of the importance of his mission. On December 1 the (Germans reached the Dambo Vi{a valley. Here there were no good roads, movement was restricted, and the Germans turned their main thrust towards Bucharest, a decision that gave Norton-Griffiths the vital hours to carry on with his work. In the Dambo Vita, Prahova and Campina valleys the refineries were blown up with gelignite. Officials were mostly warded off with a wave of his revolver, but at Bana he was arrested by a member of the commission and forced to fight his way to freedom, fortunately without having to shoot. The Germans were now in Targovi§te and Titu, and their cavalry patrols cut behind Norton-Griffiths twice, only the speed of his car enabling him to escape. While the Rumanian army fought rear-
guard actions on all roads, Norton-Griffiths raced through the Doltana, Comarnic and Tzintea valleys, completing the destruction of refineries and wells there barely ahead of the advancing Germans. In Ploe§ti itself he found the town crowded with refugees and wounded, yet here were 50,000 tons of oil and the massive Steaua and Astrea refineries. Waiting impatiently till the town was cleared, Norton-Griffiths personally set explosives in the main machinery, flooded the area with petrol and ignited it. A great ball of fire exploded from the town, almost sucking him into the holocaust. The searing heat was so intense that a nearby encampment of gypsies was choked to death.
smashed and burnt. At one place he seized a sledgehammer to smash a main dynamo: the hammer was with him always after that and in the days that followed he became a familiar figure with his hammer.
Bucharest and turned towards Ploe§ti. They were too late. Wells were blocked, tanks ablaze and all plant and buildings systematically wrecked. Over an area of 200 square miles rose towering clouds of smoke, and the Rumanian armies retreated
umns
black as night.
all
of flame
and smoke, untiring,
in-
satiable, detonating, demolishing, destroying. Blackened by the fumes, exhausted by the work and lack of sleep, Norton-
and his men worked round the always falling back towards Ploe§ti.
^ Griffiths
clock,
Yet Norton-Griffiths' work was only half done. Millions of tons of grain had yet to be destroyed. Keeping pace with the retreating armies, he destroyed all the grain he could find until he came at last
Braila on the Danube. Connected to the Black Sea by the Sulina Channel, Braila held 54,000 tons of wheat in its granaries — at that time the largest in the world. By day these were covered by German guns but Norton-Griffiths worked by night and by the time the town was evacuated in mid-January the grain had to
been destroyed. His work was finished. Returning the way he had come, Norton^ Griffiths was invested with the Order of St Vladimir in Petrograd by the Tsar and on arrival in England was awarded a KCB. Yet to Norton-Griffiths the mission had been abhorrent and in later years he hated to talk of it. By instinct a creator, he had been given the task of destroying the life blood of Rumania. He wrote: Time alone can balance the gain against the loss and devastation into which it w£is the Mission's painful duty to lay waste the land.' assess accurately the Norton-Griffiths inflicted, mainly because the Germans put many wells out of commission again when they retreated, but it was in the region of £56,000,000, and there was a complete stoppage in production. It was many months before the fields came into production again and Falkenhayn admitted the loss of expected supplies was worse than a major defeat in the field. Certainly the economic effects It
is
difficult to
damage
on Germany were great. Just how much Norton-Griffiths actually achieved can best be shown by comparing his complete stoppage of oil production with the attempts made to destroy the same targets during the Second World
War. The Americans bombed Ploe§ti in 1942, inflicting slight damage, and again in August 1943, when 54 out of 177 airplant
was
used to make good the damage and
little
craft
failed
to
retvu-n.
Idle
i
which only halved oil production. Further Reading
A Popular History House 1933)
of the Great
(Hutchinson 1963) * The Engineer '^ The Times L '
1,
War (Fleetway
October 3, 1930> (London, March 5
[For Terence Wise's biography, see f
page 329.]
^i.^Sfe-is?
1728
N
HM Monitor Marshal Soult Displacement: 6,670 tons. Length: 355V4
Above:
Lett:
feet.
90i feet. Armament: Two 15-inch, eight two 3-inch and two 12-pounder guns. Armour: Deck 1 to 3 inches, and bulges on the waterline. Power/speed: 1,500 hp/5-7 knots. Crew: 228. Monitors were nothing more than floating artillery, so speed and protection were minimal, sea keeping qualities were poor but the beam to length ratio was smaller than in ordinary warships to give the gun platform greater stability in coastal waters
Beam:
4-inch,
HMS
Riviera,
seaplane carrier
Displacement: 1,675 tons. Length: 31 ^ feet. Beam: 40 feet. Armament: Two 4-inch and one 6-pounder gun. Speed: About 23 knots. Crew:
About 250. This was one
of six vessels
converted into seaplane carriers from cross-
Channel
ferries, the Riviera previously
belonging to the South Eastern and Chainam Railway. The seaplanes were housed in the specially built hangar on the stern and hoisted out onto the water, from which they took off and landed, to be hoisted in again
Top: HIVIS IVIohawl(, 'Tribal' class destroyer Displacement: 890 tons. Length: 270 feet. Beam: 25 feet. Armament: Five 12-pounders and two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Power/speed: 14,000 hp/36 knots. Crew: 60. The Tribal' class was the result of Lord Fishers demand for ocean-going destroyers. The orders were placed in 1905, and the builders were given great latitude to design ships within the given parameters, to try to find the best design, later to be adopted as standard. Mohawk was built by J. Samuel White's yard and finished in 1907
With the conquest of Belgium, the German navy acquired the important and strategically sited bases of Ostend and Zeebrugge. From here the Germans could send out their destroyers to harry British coastal trade and, more important, transports carrying supplies and reinforcements to the BEF in France. To guard against this threat, the British had to keep many cruisers and destroyers in the area, but it was a hopeless task to try to halt every lightning hit and run raid. All they could expect to do was inflict sufficient damage on the German destroyers to deter them from pressing their luck too often. Paul Kennedy and Oskar Eckert 1729
At the beginning of the war, the kernel of the Channel Fleet consisted of 19 of the older battleships, based upon Portland, whose function was to prevent a German exit to the south or a powerful attack by the High Seas Fleet upon Britain's sea communications with France. But the importance and strength of this force declined with the realisation that such an attack was unlikely to occur: the German battlefleet had nowhere to go should it burst through the Channel, while a raid upon the Dover area would probably bring the Grand Fleet down from Scapa to block its return journey to Wilhelmshaven. Consequently, by 1916 it was only the cruiser, destroyer and lighter forces in the Channel which really mattered, and which could be expected to be called upon for action. The Harwich vessels, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, consisted of the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron (five ships) and the 9th and 10th Destroyer Flotillas, which usually totalled around 36 destroyers with four flotilla leaders or light cruisers at their head. However, Tyrwhitt's force had many duties in the North Sea and he was usually only able to detach part of one flotilla to the Straits of Dover when the prospect of action arose there. The main burden for the maintenance of the control of the Channel therefore lay upon Vice-Admiral Bacon, commanding the Dover Patrol, which normally comprised two light cruisers or flotilla leaders, 24 destroyers, eight patrol or 'P' boats and 14 monitors. Destroyers and monitors from these two commands were detached to make up a smaller force, which operated from Dunkirk and patrolled the eastern side of the Channel. In addition, a miscellaneous group of drifters, trawlers and yachts undertook the arduous and unrewarding task of patrolling the Straits. The heterogeneous nature of these British Channel *brces was amply reflected by the miscellaneous nature of their operations in 1916. Tyrwhitt's flotillas were constantly being detached to cover the transportation of the troops across the Straits, while on January 18 they formed the escort for the seaplane carrier Vindex, which was to bomb the German bases at Hage on the Schleswig coast. Dense fog prevented this operation even before the Ems estuary had been reached, however, and the force withdrew. On January 29 a fresh attempt was made, but a submarine attack upon Tyrwhitt's flagship, Arethusa, wnose stern was grazed by a torpedo, forced him to order a further withdrawal. His vessels were again at sea during the action around the Dogger Bank on February 9/10. The sole result for the Commodore was the sinking of the Arethusa by a mine on his return to Harwich, which forced him to transfer his flag to the leader Lightfoot. The Dover Patrol forces were equally busy in the early months of 1916 and the mines laid by German submarines created much trouble for them, one liner being struck just outside Dover harbour while attempting to rescue another which had been similarly disabled. Moreover, aircraft from Flanders carried out bombing raids upon the English coast and on February 1 succeeded in sinking their first ship — a small coaster. Bacon was also engaged in offering support to Foch's troops along the Belgian coast and on January 6 he took command of a force of five heavy monitors, which pounded the Villa Scolaire batteries without provoking any reply. A few days later, these same vessels were engaged upon a quite different task, patrolling off" the mouth of the Thames to protect London against expected Zeppelin raids. Although this work proved fruitless, it illustrates the multifarious nature of the Dover Patrol's duties. In March its destroyers were again diverted from their normal patrols to search for the steamer Sussex which had been torpedoed, an act of greater importance for German-American relations than for the Channel forces.
HMS
HMS
HMS
Combined operations Later that month an extensive mining operation, aimed at closing the mid-sea approaches to the Thames and the Dover Straits, was carried out by four minelayers from Sheerness escorted by two divisions of Harwich destroyers. On the same day, March 20, an air raid by 50 Allied bombers and 15 fighters took place upon Houtlave aerodrome, near Zeebrugge, while the seaplane carriers HMS Riviera and Vindex launched attacks upon the German seaplane base on the Zeebrugge Mole. This ambitious plan achieved a fair amount of damage around Zeebrugge, while the only incident that occurred at sea was a short-lived attack by three German destroyers upon a division of the 9th Destroyer Flotilla, which was covering both the seaplane carriers and the minelayers. Although the destroyer HMS Lance suffered in this conflict, the German force was beaten off" and the minelaying operation was carried out without further trouble. Vice-Admiral Bacon, however, had even larger schemes to deny the Channel to the Germans, and particularly to their minelaying submarines. The Admiralty now allowed him to carry out his plan to close the passage between the Thornton Ridge shoal and the
1730
Commodore
Reginald Tyrwhitt, comHarwich Force throughout the war. Below: The after part of HIVIS Nubian (right) being towed home after her bows had been blown off. She was beached, and later joined to the forepart of HMS Zulu Right:
mlnder
of the
«MiMiMMilli»
Belgian coast by a double line of mines across the entrance to Zeebrugge and by a parallel line of mine nets. In the early morning of April 24, six divisions of net drifters, six mine-laying trawlers and four large minelayers were hard at work, covered by two monitors, the Flanders coast patrol fom Dunkirk and three divisions of destroyers from Harwich. In less than four hours the mines and nets, in lines approximately 15 miles long, were in place and the minelayers were returning to port. The drifters with their escort remained to watch the nets and were thus subjected to bombing raids from German seaplanes and, later, to an attack by three destroyers. This force was so hotly pursued by the four 'M' class destroyers escorting the drifters that the chase was not broken off until the German shore batteries had scored hits on every ship in the division, bringing HMS Melpomene to a halt with a shell in her engine-room. As she was being towed to shelter, the German destroyers resumed their attacks and were not finally driven off until two monitors joined in the battle. After that, the drifters were left in peace to claim, by wishful thinking, the destruction of two German submarines in the nets and a
two in the minefield. half of 1916, the Harwich Force had been particularly busy, not only in carrying out its tasks in the Channel and Thames estuary waters, but also in operating in conjunction with the Grand Fleet in the North Sea upon a number of occasions, although, on Admiralty orders, Tyrwhitt's vessels had been held back from the Jutland action in case the Germans attempted the blocking of the Channel ports with their older battleships. It was possibly because of these larger-scale operations on both sides that little of note occurred in the Channel area in the months following the minelaying expedition of April. After Jutland, however, things began to warm up: raids upon the Dover Patrol's communications, together with subrnarine warfare, became the only methods by which the German navy could act offensively and maintain its crews' morale and the people's confidence. The German destroyer force at Zeebrugge was again built up when, in possible further
During the
first
early June, a second German destroyer flotilla was despatched to Zeebrugge, a development which increased the British concern for their communications with France, Belgium and Holland. On June 8 the British fears were confirmed by the appearance of 12 German destroyers near Dunkirk. This force turned back before the monitor HMS Lord Clive and the 'Tribal' class destroyers on patrol could engage it, but the Admiralty was not slow to get the message and ordered Tyrwhitt to detach some vessels from Harwich as a permanent reinforcement for the Dover Patrol. The British warships operating from Harwich, Dover and Dunkirk were, technically speaking, still far superior to the German light
Channel and consisted of eight light cruisers, three 68 destroyers, eight 'P' boats and 14 monitors. But a large proportion of this total was often engaged upon other tasks and the German destroyers, which the Admiralty estimated forces in the
flotilla leaders,
as being as many as 22 in July 1916, enjoyed the incalculable advantage of being able to choose where and when to strike. The trade route to Holland remained particularly vulnerable to sorties from Zeebrugge, and Tyrwhitt was forced to allocate a permanent patrol of two light cruisers and from five to ten destroyers for it. The events of July 22/23 soon proved this to be a wise disposition, for the German destroyer flotilla in Flanders had decided to interrupt the merchant vessels sailing to and from the Hook of Holland on that night. On the evening of the 22nd, Tyrwhitt Carysfort flying his himself was at sea with the light cruiser flag and leading four 'M' class destroyers, while a second division, Canterbury, accompanied them of similar strength and led by from Harwich until the two groups separated along the patrol lines. At 0130 hours on the 23rd, Tyrwhitt's division spotted three German destroyers to the north and set off after them. This latter group, aware of the unfavourable odds, retreated eastwards and eluded the Commodore's ships during a sudden squall.
HMS
HMS
This manoeuvre,
however, brought the
German
destroyers
closer to the Canterbury's division, which had been patrolling some distance to the east. This division, commanded by Captain Royds,
had turned south-eastwards under Tyrwhitt's order towards the Schouwen Bank and, at 0145 hours spotted six German destroyers steaming swiftly towards Zeebrugge. Drawing to within 5,000 yards, Royds' division opened fire and was at once replied to. At this point the destroyer HMS Matchless, newly emerged from the dockyard, was unable to keep up the pace and fell back, being joined by her somewhat anxious consort, HMS Milne. The other two destroyers pressed ahead, followed at some distance by the Canterbury, and pursued the German vessels until they approached the minefield off Zeebrugge. Here they were recalled. This short engagement revealed the alertness of the British forces guarding the Dutch route, but also showed that the German warships, in
the words of the British Official History, 'Had none the less a great capacity for mischief, particularly as their sorties could not be detected in advance, as could those of the High Seas Fleet. It was this latter force which, by coming out on August 19, drew the I^arwich vessels away from the Channel area once again, to resume their second function of assisting the operations of the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. Since June, Scheer had been preoccupied in attempting to evolve an operational plan whereby he could 'show the world the unbroken strength of the German Fleet' (German Official History) but avoid running into the Grand Fleet without warning as had happened at Jutland. Yet the only solution appeared to be a morale-boosting bombardment of the east coast of England, together with a larger concentration of airships and submarines, patrolling in regions through which the British fleet would probably pass. It was, in fact, the original Jutland plan. Consequently, when the High Seas Fleet set forth with the object of bombarding Sunderland in the early morning of the 19th, Scheer had disposed two lines of submarines near the English East Coast and a further two lines north-north-west of Terschelling. In addition, four Zeppelins patrolled the area between Scotland and Norway, while a further six were stationed roughly parallel to the east coast. There was little chance this time of meeting up unawares with a superior force. These patrols, he reasoned, should not only be able to give him sufficient warning of an approach by the Grand Fleet, but successful torpedo attacks by the submarines might well be able to swing the ratio of capital ships strength more into Germany's favour. As the obsolete 2nd Battle Squadron had been discarded and three of the battle-cruisers were still under repair after Jutland, the High Seas Fleet totalled only 19 battleships and two battle-cruisers, together with the appropriate light forces. Yet although numbers dictated an avoidance of any full-scale conflict with Jellicoe's squadrons, Scheer still clung to his hope of being able to encounter and destroy a part of the British battlefleet — the only way by which he could even up the two opposing forces and thus be in a position to challenge the Royal Navy for the command of the seas.
The
British forewarned fleet preparations for this operation had not escaped the attention of the British Admiralty, who ordered the Grand Fleet to sea also. Thanks to the wireless-detection work of Room 40, it was speeding into the North Sea from Scapa Flow a few hours before Scheer's force left harbour. Twenty-nine dreadnoughts with accompanying escorts steamed steadily southwards early that morning to rendezvous first with their Commander-in-Chief (a rather tired Jellicoe had been recuperating at Dundee and rejoined his flagship by means of a fast cruiser), and then with the six battle-cruisers under Beatty, which had sailed from Rosyth and were cruising about 120 miles east of that point. In add-tion, 25 British submarines were sent out to patrol along the east coast of England and near the German and Dutch coasts. The Harwich Force (consisting of five light cruisers, a fiotilla leader and 19 destroyers) steamed towards an assembly point near Brown Ridge, about 50 miles east of Yarmouth. Since the British had moved so swiftly in this matter and had reached their rendezvous positions while the High Seas Fleet was only approaching the Dogger Bank, the chances of an interception seemed bright. Tyrwhitt's force was intended primarily to pick off damaged German dreadnoughts as they limped home, but it would also be in a position to join in a major battle should events demand it. However, the chief threat to Scheer was clearly Jellicoe's squadrons, steaming parallel to the east coast at 18 knots and preceded, 30 miles ahead, by Beatty's battle-cruisers. Ahead of these, in turn, were three squadrons of light cruisers. Dawn brought with it a great deal of haze and it was in these conditions that the light cruiser HMS Nottingham was suddenly torpedoed by the U 52 at 0557 hours, while zig-zagging about the latitude of the Farne Islands. Unprotected by destroyers, the stricken vessel was struck by a further torpedo from the same U 52, half an hour later. At 0710 hours, shrouded by fog and with her crew in small boats, the Nottingham sank. The news of this attack (reported as caused by a mine, with the possibility of a torpedo thrown in as an afterthought) did not reach Jellicoe until 0650 hours, only ten minutes before he received an Admiralty signal that the High Seas Fleet was still 170 miles east of the Flamborough Head. These two messages persuaded the Commander-in-Chief to order an abrupt about-turn by the Grand Fleet and for almost 120 minutes they steamed in a northward direction. It was a decision which was later much criticised, but the Admiral had his reasons. He was at this time developing a great unease, almost a fixation, about the menace posed by German submarines to his battleships. HMS Iron Duke, indeed.
The various
1731
had been narrowly missed by a torpedo earlier that morning as she steamed ahead of the fleet to pick up Jellicoe. Then came the news of the attack upon the Nottingham, and a further report of a submarine sighting, raising the fear that the Grand Fleet was perhaps steaming into a trap laid by Scheer. Finally the message that the German battlefleet was still far from the English coast convinced Jellicoe that he could afford to give away time while getting well clear of submarine-infested waters. The Admiralty's information about the position of the High Seas Fleet was baser" upon a radio mes je picked up from that point around 0600 hour:;: but, in fact, that pai Licular call had been sent by the German battleship SMS Westfalen, which had been hit by a torpedo from the Bnush submarine, the E 23, an hour earlier, and Scheer himself was man> miles nearer the English coast when Jellicoe first received news of the damaged dreadnought's signal. Incidentally, tne commander of the E 25 persisted for several hours more in his attempts to sink the Westfalen, but he was successfully kept at bay by her escorts, who got the battleship safely back to
Wilhelmshaven. Scheer, too, was misled by reports of his opponent's whereabouts. The Grand Fleet, as he was aware, was at sea; but a report received at 0950 hours from the Zeppelin L 31 indicated that it was steering north-eastwards — which was in fact true at the time of the sighting (0850 hours). A few hours earlier, the Zeppelin L 13 had discovered the Harwich Force near Brown Ridge, reporting that it was heading to the south-west — which was also true, since Tyrwhitt was now patrolling in the vicinity of his rendezvous. Scheer was totally mystified at the news that the British forces were steering away from him and away from each other, and pressed on towards Sunderland. Although the same Zeppelin, L 13, later (0845 hours) reported that the Harwich Force had turned to the north-east, the presence of these light cruisers and destroyers did
not bother the
What
i
German
admiral.
was a series of messages from the Zeppelin around noon, assuring him that a British force, which also included some battleships, was steering north-eastwards about 60 miles from Cromer. In fact, this group was none other than Tyrwhitt's vessels again, by then steaming quickly northwards to intercept the High Seas Fleet, believing Scheer to be much further to the east than he actually was. For the E 23, defeated in her attempts to finish off" the Westfalen, had wirelessed that the German battlefleet was only 70 miles north-west of the Ems at 0919 hours — actually it was 120 miles from Sunderland really excited Scheer
%
by that time. But if Tyrwhitt and Jellicoe (to whom Tyrwhitt passed on the E 23's message) were misled, Scheer was even more so. The repeated assurances of the L 13, whose pilot was incidentally a reservist and not well trained in reconnaissance work, that a small battleship group lay to the south-east, completely changed the picture. In the words of the British Ofl^cial History 'It seemed as though there were, within closing distance of him, a force so weak that it would stand no chance if he could meet it, and yet so important that its destruction would be a resounding victory.' Promptly forgetting about the bombardment of Sunderland, he swung his force to the south-east at 1300 hours.
A
cruel
blow
possibly the luckiest move Scheer ever made — and one of the cruellest strokes ever delivered to Jellicoe. For the Grand Fleet had been steaming steadily southwards since shortly after 0900 hours, making sure that it passed about 25 miles to the eastward of where the Nottingham had been torpedoed. Even so, the reports of submarine sightings further ahead were discomforting and Jellicoe had elected that his force would proceed southeastwards through the mine-free 'M' channel and not the 'L' channel, as originally intended. (These channels were swept areas pointing south-eastwards from the Forth approaches into the middle of the North Sea, like two fingers, 'M' 'finger' being nearer the English coast than the 'L' 'finger'.) Admiralty reports convinced him that the two battlefleets would cross each other at right-angles some time that afternoon and at 1415 hours he signalled to the Grand Fleet 'High Sea Fleet may be sighted at any moment. 1 look with entire confidence on the result.' In fact, Scheer was so far ahead of where the British reports placed him that, had he persisted in his course towards Sunderland, he would have been cut off from his base by the Grand Fleet in the late afternoon. Alas for British hopes, Scheer had turned away from their battlefleet and had been steering south-eastwards for over an hour when Jellicoe made his Nelson-like signal. It was soon the turn of the Germans to be disappointed. The Harwich force had been unable to find the High Seas Fleet and, concluding that the E 23's sighting was perhaps false, had also turned southwards, at 1245 hours. Consequently, after steaming south-eastwards for almost two hours, Scheer could still see no sign of the small group of British battleships reported by the L 13 and the High Seas Fleet was fast approaching the Humber minefields. Moreover, he had received an alarming report from the It
was
U 53 at 1415 hours that the Grand Fleet was only 65 miles to the north. Shortly after this, therefore, he ordered a return submarine to base.
Only gradually did Jellicoe learn, from Admiralty reports, that the Germans had once more eluded his grasp. Shortly before 1600 hours, he reluctantly ordered his battleship squadrons to reverse course, being then midway down 'M' channel and about the latitude of Whitby. That afternoon and evening, the Grand Fleet underwent a most harrowing time in passing through the German U-Boat lines positioned near the English coast. The light cruiser Falmouth was torpedoed at 1652 hours by the U 66, which attempted for a further two hours to finish off the damaged warship and was only forced away with great difficulty by light cruisers and destroyers. However, the Falmouth was later sighted and sunk by another submarine, the U 63, as she was being towed towards the Humber. Meanwhile the Grand Fleet was steaming hurriedly northwards in tightly packed order, unable to zig-zag in the narrow channel and experiencing repeated alarms as submarines were sighted. It was with great relief that Jellicoe and his force emerged into clear waters again, about 2030 hours. Most of these meetings with the U-Boats might have been avoided had the 'L' Channel been used, although Jellicoe was not to know that; but it is less easy to state with any certainty today, as several critics did at the time, that the use of 'L' Channel on the downward route would have ensured an interception of the High Seas Fleet. While this was going on, Tyrwhitt's vessels had turned northwards again in the hope of attacking the German battlefleet on its return to Wilhelmshaven. After searching throughout the late afternoon, contact was made just before 1800 hours and soon, through the dusk, the Harwich Force could pick out Scheer's battleships, steering eastwards and flanked by a strong force of destroyers to ward off any night assaults. Even though warned by Jellicoe that no support could be given by the Grand Fleet, Tyrwhitt attempted to get ahead of the High Seas Fleet and then to rush down upon it at high opposing speeds: for to attack a fastmoving battlefleet from the rear was a hazardous tactic, which would have exposed the light cruisers and destroyers to lengthy bombardment from the capital ships they were gradually overtaking. Yet so fast was Scheer's force steaming that it soon became apparent to Tyrwhitt that he could not get in front of the High Seas Fleet before the expected fine moonlight illuminated the whole area. Reluctantly, therefore, the attack was abandoned.
HMS
Scheer was afterwards satisfied at the clear run he had made at the losses inflicted by his U-Boats (he erroneously believed that the battle-cruiser HMS Inflexible had been damaged by a torpedo), Jellicoe was bitterly disappointed — and very alarmed. Once again the High Seas Fleet had eluded his grasp. Moreover, not only had his force been dogged by Zeppelins for much of the day while his information of the Germans' whereabouts had remained scanty, but the Grand Fleet had repeatedly sighted and been attacked by German submarines, against which, for the light cruisers at least, there was inadequate destroyer protection. Scheer had obviously attempted to lead the British battleships into a mine and U-Boat trap, he concluded. Backed up by Beatty, Jellicoe insisted that the Grand Fleet avoid going further south than Latitude 55° 30' North (the Fame Islands) and further than 4° East unless it had sufficient destroyers: only if 'the need were very pressing' should this rule be broken. In effect, Jellicoe was proposing to abandon most of the North Sea to the German forces, should they wish to occupy it. He also insisted that the Grand Fleet could not guarantee the east coast harbours against Scheer's 'tip-and-run' raids, a decision which, if known, would have greatly alarmed the British people. Unable If
and
meet the Commander-in-Chiefs demands for destroyers, the Admiralty accepted this policy on September 13. This revolutionary decision was also justified by the argument that 'it is impossible for our capital ships from the Northern bases to bring the enemy to action for some 16 to 30 hours after his ships have been reported off our coast', but this point cannot carry too much weight. Wireless indiscipline aboard the German warships in harbour usually gave the Admiralty a fair degree of notice of an impending sortie. After all, Jellicoe was much nearer to Sunderland than Scheer at 0700 hours on the morning of August 19, having set out before the High Seas Fleet sailed! It was the torpedoing of the Nottingham (due to the lack of destroyer escorts for the cruisers) which forced Jellicoe to lose four hour's valuable time by reversing course. This, and the harrowing return voyage up 'M' channel that same evening, were the deciding factors — not the inability to discover when the Germans would come out. On October 18, this calculated British policy of abstention was carried into effect. Despite the news that Scheer was about to make a further sortie that evening, only such local forces as the British submarine flotillas and Tyrwhitt's vessels were sent out: the Grand Fleet remained at Scapa under short notice for steam. As it was, Scheer's operation soon fizzled out and the High Seas to
German torpedoboats at sea. Once Michelsens flotilla had arrived from Wilhelmshaven, the Imperial German navy was in a strong position to wreak considerable havoc on cross-Channel traffic
7^
-
Above:
1734
HMS
Nottingham, torpedoed and sunk by the German U
52.
Below:
SMS
Kronprinz Wilhelm. torpedoed and severly damaged by the J
1
home before it reached the Dogger Bank. Rough knowledge that the British were aware of the sortie, and the lack of U-Boats were probably the chief reasons for this aboutturn. Moreover, the British submarine E 38 had dampened the German enthusiasm somewhat by torpedoing the light cruiser SMS Miinchen. Although the stricken vessel was towed safely home, this short cruise was not without significance. For, while Jellicoe chose not to move the Grand Fleet into the North Sea Fleet turned for seas,
without sufficient destroyers, Scheer, for his part, felt that the High Seas Fleet dare not venture forth without sufficient submarines, which served the vital dual purpose of spotting and crippling the superior battlefleet of his opponent. Indeed, in the August 19 operation, they had performed much better than the Zeppelins in their reconnaissance role. Now he was robbed of the use of this vital arm by the recent decision to employ the submarine force once again for the blockade of Britain's commerce; and, without the submarines, Scheer refused to move. The naval war in the North Sea, as far as the battlefleets were concerned, came to a standstill in the autumn of 1916. Seen in this light, the operation of August 19 could be rated as one of the most decisive in the history of the entire war. Given this stalemate in the North Sea with regard to the battlefleets, the focus of attention swiftly swung to the Channel once again, especially as more German destroyers were available for that region now that they were not required in attendance upon the High Seas Fleet. Besides, Scheer did not want fleet morale and public confidence in the German navy to sink, nor to leave the monopoly of action to the U-Boat branch. On the evening of October 23, the commodore of the High Seas Fleet flotillas, Captain Michelsen, left Wilhemshaven for Zeebrugge with a force of no less than 24 destroyers. Getting wind of the move, the Admiralty ordered Jellicoe to place the Grand Fleet under short notice for steam lest this be a harbinger to a venture by Scheer into the Dover Straits or Thames Estuary. In this case, not only would the need be 'pressing', but there would be a fair chance of cutting off" the High Seas Fleet on its return to base: thus the ruling of September 15 did not apply. The Harwich Force was also sent out, to the North Hinder lightship, but all these moves were in vain. Hugging the Dutch coast, Michelsen's destroyers reached
Zeebrugge without incident. Nevertheless, the Admiralty was greatly alarmed at this large reinforcement and the threat it posed, not only to the crossChannel troop transports and the sea-lines to Holland, but also to the mass of coastal shipping which collected every night in the Downs anchorage before steaming to the port of London. Bacon was warned of the possible dangers, and one cruiser and four destroyers were sent from the Harwich Force to join the Dover Patrol. Nevertheless, given the large numbers of tempting targets, the strategic advantage clearly lay with the Germans and they were not slow to seize their opportunity. In the pitch darkness of the night of October 26/27, Michelsen's two flotillas set out from Zeebrugge, one (the 3rd) to operate against the drifters watching the net barrage which stretched between the Goodwin Sands and Outer Ruytingen banks, the other (the 9th) to interrupt British traffic encountered between Dover and Calais. Believing the Belgian coast and the Downs to be the points most threatened by the German destroyer move to Zeebrugge, Bacon stationed eight of his destroyers in the former area and four in the latter. Six 'Tribal' class destroyers were kept ready at Dover, and another four formed a general reserve: two more, with two 'P' boats, patrolled near the barrage and Straits traffic. But, with no foreknowledge that a German raid was coming that evening, all these forces and the shipping they protected were very vulnerable to a sudden attack. Slipping unseen past one patrol and bluffing their way past a second, the German 9th Flotilla steamed quickly into the Straits. Meanwhile, a division of the barrage drifters was set upon by the 3rd Flotilla, which quickly sank three and set another on fire, and then sank the destroyer
HMS Flirt when
she came along to investigate the firing. As soon as the news of these actions reached Bacon, he despatched the 'Tribals' from Dover and also ordered HMS Laforey's
division out from Dunkirk. By that time, the German 9th Flotilla was scouring the Straits route but all there was to be found was the empty transport, the Queen, which was sunk after the crew had been allowed into their small boats. Meanwhile, the 3rd Flotilla was causing further havoc among the drifter divisions, sinking another four before they returned to Zeebrugge. Moreover, misunderstandings upon the British side had caused the 'Tribals' to get separated while Lawford's division left the Downs traffic undefended. Fortunately, that area was not disturbed and the British destroyers, although scattered, were all the central part of the Straits, towards which the 9th Flotilla was
HMS
m
steering on its return up the Channel. At 1240 hours they rushed past Nubian, setting her on fire and blowing off" her entire
HMS
HMS Amazon and Mohawk (though less severely), damaged a trawler and then raced clear to the Belgian coast. forepart, hit
Michelsen's
flotillas, possessing all the advantages of the had blown a large hole in Bacon's Channel defences, although the latter could well be forgiven for telling the Admiralty
attacker,
that 'It is as easy to stop a raid of express engines with all lights out at night, at Clapham Junction, as to stop a raid of 33-knot destroyers on a night as black as Erebus, in waters as wide as the Channel.' Perhaps the only consolation on the British side was the rescue of the latter half of the Nubian. Joined together later with the forepart of the destroyer HMS Zulu, which lost her stern by hitting a mine, this unique hybrid was commissioned and given the name of Zubian. The German destroyer raid led to some hostile criticism of the navy leadership, and the Admiralty's bland assurances did not ease the matter when Balfour was later forced to admit that the loss of the drifters had been omitted in the first communique. Moreover, the First Lord's promise that a repeat of such raids would be severely dealt with was a large pledge to give, in view of the professional opinion that it was extremely difficult to check the sudden intrusions of the German destroyer force. Neither the withdrawal of the third German flotilla from Zeebrugge, nor the decision to reinforce the Dover Patrol by three patrols from Harwich (that force receiving destroyers from Scapa) eased the strategic disadvantages of Bacon's command, although they obviously gave the British a better chance of success if a large scale destroyer conflict did develop. On the evening of November 23, 13 German destroyers set out from Zeebrugge towards the Downs in an attempt to emulate their previous feat. But this raid was much more timidly carried out and they headed for home as soon as they were challenged by the patrols: only one drifter was damaged. Nevertheless, the British Press gave it their full attention and reminded Balfour of his rash promise. Although small in itself, this second Channel raid played an important part in adding to the country's feeling that an offensive spirit was lacking in the navy's upper reaches. One further incident took place in the North Sea in the last two months of 1916. On November 3 two German submarines, U 20 and U 30, were stranded in the fog off" the west coast of Jutland, and Scheer sent out a half-flotilla of destroyers, covered by four dreadnoughts and the battle-cruisers SMS Moltke to rescue them. The U 30 alone was saved and, on the way back, the British submarine J 1 succeeded in torpedoing the battleships SMS Kronprinz Wilhelm and SMS Grosser KurfUrst. Both dreadnoughts reached harbour safely but were in dockyard hands for a considerable time, and Scheer was personally rebuked by the Kaiser for risking a division of battleships to save two U-Boats. The incident tended to confirm the Germans in the view that the battlefleet should be kept at home, because of the insecurity of the North Sea waters; and that the naval struggle against Great Britain should be waged, in the main, by the U-Boat arm. Scheer himself felt that "during the further progress of the submarine war (upon which, in my view, our whole naval policy will sooner or later be compelled to concentrate) the fleet will have to devote itself to the single task of bringing the submarines safely in and out of harbour.' It was a remarkable admission from the Commander-in-Chief of the second largest battlefleet in the world, and a tacit admission that control of the North Sea could not be wrested from the Grand Fleet by his dreadnought squadrons under the existing circumstances. If the overall strategic situation on both sides pointed towards a future stalemate in the North Sea, it did not promise the same for the Channel region, however. The German destroyer forces there were to assist the submarines based in Belgium in getting through the Straits, and to dislocate the British hold on the Dover-Calais region generally. In doing so they would convince the German people that their surface forces were still active while assisting the greater struggle of the U-Boat against British commerce. 'Clear in the North Sea, squally in the Channel' might well have been the forecast for the future development of the Anglo-German naval conflict as the year 1916 drew to a close.
HMS
Further Reading Corbett, Sir Julian, Naval Operations,
Volumes
3
and 4 (Longmans.
Green)
Der Krleg zur See 1914-1918 (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1925) Marder, A. J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Volumes and II
III
(OUP
1965)
[For the biographies of Paul
633 and
637.
Kennedy and Oskar Eckert,
see
page
]
1735
wmm
I
r
For months the convulsion around Verdun had continued, costing the Germans and the French the hves of hundreds of thousands of their troops. But now the end was at hand. Forts Vaux and Douaumont had been recaptured by the French. All that they now needed was the line of hills to the east of the city of Verdun, as these hills dominated the whole of the battle field and made French movement impossible, for the moment the Germans detected any activity below them, they caused a storm of shells to descend on the river valleys. Now in one last climacteric offensive, the French hurled the Germans off the heights with heavy losses in dead and prisoners. The mincing machine had finally ground to a halt. John Keegan. Right: A French machine gun team waits in one of the ruins which littered the Verdun area so liberally
In the aftermath of the offensive of October 24, which had restored Forts Douaumont
and Vaux to French possession, an outward calm descended on the ravaged slopes of the Meuse valley at Verdun. The Germans, on the defensive here since July, had neither the men nor the heart to attempt to recapture any of those 'points of major tactical importance' which it had cost them so dear to win in the spring and early
summer perately
The French, also desworn by the cumulative effort of
of the year.
two and a half years of war, were content for the
moment
to consolidate
what they
had regained and ravages which the
to repair some of the battle had wrought in
the rear areas of the
'fortified zone'.
The
of territorials — those over-age reservists who house-maided for the French army — now moved into the recaptured forts and began to clear them of debris and to repair their ventilation, lighting and communication systems. Further back they undertook the reconstruction of the rail network m:.'. \i supplement it, laid spurs to the 60"itimetre light railway tracks wh of such enormous assistance in .supplies forward over the shell-pockfc ad The French high Comm, Nivelle, whose 'victory' of October 2^. served to convince him more strongly .nan ever that he 'had the secret' and who, as commander of the Second Army, also had the
regiments
i
1736
power
dun
to decree local offensives in the Versector, and Mangin, his ferocious sub-
ordinate, commanding II Corps, responsible for the right bank of the Meuse — were neither of them wholly satisfied with the results of the battle in October. Though it
had won back much ground, it still left Germans in possession of an important circle of observation points from which they could overlook many of the French defended positions and approach routes. Most of these points were known by their elevation: Hills 378, 347 and 380. Besides these, the
the
Germans
also continued to control a
complex of small valleys and broken ground between the heights and the new French front line — the ravins des Houyers, de Fond-du-Loup, de Hassoule and du Helly — and by possessing these they kept the French under a constant threat of raiding and minor attack. Nivelle had therefore proposed to Joffre very soon after the conclusion of. the October battle that he be allowed to make one more effort in the same sector to drive the Germans further
away and
consolidate an easily defensible hi-rh ground the Germans at present occupied. On November 18, Joffre, overriding the ol ctions of his Operations Section, gave ais assent to this proposal. Nivelle at orice directed Mangin to complete deta:! >' planning. The sector t.' \ttacked was six miles in length and >; from the Meuse at line
on the
::,
J
Vacherauville, a riverside village which to be recaptured, to Damloup, just north-east of Fort Vaux. It was garrisoned by five German divisions in the front line, from left to right, the 14th Reserve 39th, 10th, 14th and 39th Bavarian Reserve, and four in support, the Guard Ersatz, 5th, 30th and 21st Reserve. This was a mixed bag. The 39th Bavarian Reserve was a formation of the lowest grade, composed of Landwehr regiments, which had not
was
previously been committed to an active sector of the front. The 39th Division was one of the four recruited in the Reichsland (occupied Alsace-Lorraine), and composed, therefore, of the rejects from other recruiting areas. The 10th was another 'colonial' division, recruited among the
Poles of Upper Silesia, and these fought with something less than a will. The 14th Reserve had been a good division, but having occupied the same sector on the Cote de Poivre since the first day of the battle in February, was now badly worn down in body and spirit. Only the 14th, a Rhineland division which had been on the
Verdun
front since
June was
really
fit
to
withstand a major French attack. The four divisions in support were of much higher quality, the 5th in particular, and could be counted upon to halt a breakthrough. But since the French aimed at no more than the seizure of ground, they might not be able to intervene quickly enough to aid their stricken comrades in the first line.
The French themselves were intending to employ five divisions in the first wave of the assault, the 22nd, 126th, 133rd and the 37th and 38th. The latter, forming XIX Corps, represented the contribution
made
by the French settlers in North Africa to the army of the Motherland — and also that of some of the subject peoples. These, the Tirailleurs indigenes or Turcos, and the their white brothers-in-arms, were among the finest fighting troops on the Allied side. They were to be supported, as on October 24, by an immensely powerful artillery element, including batteries of 220-mm
Zouaves,
and 370-mm mortars. These were unable to 'shoot in' onto their targets until later than planned in the fire programme, because of the execrable weather which made
observation impossible. On however, the skies cleared, aeroplanes were able to take off and the first shots were fired in the bombardment which would isolate the former German positions from sources of reinforcement and all
aerial
December
11,
resupply.
Flanks soon secured The attack began on December 15 at 0950 hours. The German positions were battered but fundamentally sound and, unlike those taken by the French in October, had been in German hands long enough for the latter to prepare them thoroughly; they were cleverly adapted to take advantage of the many corners of dead ground in that broken area of ravines and reverse slopes. The Germans were therefore ready for the French. Nevertheless, on both flanks the French quickly seized all their objectives: to the left the 126th Division took possession of Vacherauville — though failing to secure the Cote de Poivre, which remained in German hands until the following day — and beat off the counterattacks which the Germans immediately launched. The 38th Division, which
1738
had taken Douaumont
in
October, also got quickly onto its objectives, and 3,500 booty considerable took prisoners; but its most distant objective attained had to be evacuated after a bombardment from the French 155-mm guns had dropped short onto it. The division suffered few casualties, but among these was Nicolai, commander of the battalion of the Moroccan Colonials which had captured Douaumont fort itself and a genuine hero to his brother officers and men in the Verdun area. On the right, the 133rd Division, moving faultlessly behind the creeping barrage at a pace of 100 yards every four minutes, advanced steadily onto its assigned positions, though some of those were not wholly cleared of Germans until the following day. Nevertheless, its attack was generally successful and as planned. It was in the centre of this, and particularly on 38th Division's sector, that the Germans resistance. Consequently the advance was most costly in that area and the fighting most confused. A soldier of the 2nd Zouaves, Dufournay, has left this gripping and authentic memoir of the day's events: Day is beginning to break, and it is turning very cold. A crust forms on the surface of the mud and a thin sheet of ice on the puddles. There is an arctic wind from the north and big snow clouds are buildoffered
their
fiercest
ing up. The sergeant-major points out
to
me
on the right beyond the Germans' lines, the dark mass of the Bois D'Hardaumont silhouetted on the crest. 'Take a good look at it,' he said, 'we're advancing in that direction and the 5th Battalion have got to take that wood.'
Towards 0800 hours
the
bombardment
begins again, just as terrible as yesterday. I am thinking to myself that Fve been in this place for 100 years when the sound of voices makes me turn my head. It is some machine gunners looking for a hole. At that
moment
I realise that the
bombard-
ment has stopped. Behind us the slope which descends from Douaumont is covered by Zouaves who, line by line, halt and disappear into craters. An order is passed along the trench: '42nd Company, fix bayonets.' One wants to be brave, one wants to look calm, one is quite unable to stop shaking. I check that my grenade-cup is clean, slide a grenade in and out again. Everything all right? I am ready. '42nd Company, advance.' With an uncertain step,
we emerge. The company commander is already out. Sixty mud-covered bundles follow him, sliding and falling on the slope. Snow suddenly begins to fall, more heavily than before. The slope flattens, and we can pick out a slight scrape in the earth, running parallel to our line of advance. It must be the
German
front trench. shouts, 'The Baches are running away. They're scared, they're beating it.' We can just make out vague shapes disappearing through the curtain of smoke. 'Forward— we've got them.' It is just about at this moment that the first hostile fire reaches us. The note of a
Someone
machine gun lises violently. Slanting in from the right, bursts of fire strike us in a hail,
wave.
down half the assaulting We jump from shell-hole to shell-hole,
scything
our numb'
We
rs
growing smaller
at each leap.
arrive at the lip of the trench. But, by the worst of bad luck, it turns out to he only a shallow ditch, not much more than 15 inches deep. We flatten ourselves into it.
trying to be swallowed by the earth.
Another machine gun has joined in now. glimpse of the one in front. If I could throw a grenade I could just reach but from here it's impossible. A yard it, behind me there is a deep shell-hole. I chuck my rifle into it, and follow it in a bound. But when I try to put a grenade into I just catch a
it full of mud, wipe it out with my scarf, and finally discharge it. I follow the grenade with my eyes, and scorning the risk, rise to watch it fall. A puff of smoke billows in front of the machine gun post. Too short. I hastily let fly a second. Too long. I have now been observed and the gun concentrates its fire on me. I only just manage to get another grenade away. I don't see where it lands but the machine
the cup, I find
gun falls silent. Then all around me, there is a sudden rush and shouts of, 'Forward — this time we'll have them.' The right-hand machine gun has stopped firing. We push on for some yards and arrive at the German position. Large, round helmets emerge from the ground, arms wave in the air. 'Kamerad! Kamerad! Don't shoot.' The captain, left behind by the sudden-
ness of our charge, arrives whirling his cudgel. 'Don't kill them, don't kill them.' he shouts, hut too late. Several have already been knocked flat, their heads battered in. A great ox of a man, apparently an officer, rushes up and asks what troops we are. I haven't time to reply, for the captain is shouting, 'Come on, boys.' We leap across the captured trench. The bottom is full of empty cartridge cases. They had gone on firing until the last moment. The ground is rising. I pass close by the machine gun which I'd silenced. A man lies beside it. He is dead, his head resting on a heap of empty cartridge cases. Men without weapons emerge from every shell hole; comically, all show the same expression as they shout,
'Kamerad! Kamerad!'
We arrive on a plateau. The captain orders us to halt. The support companies are now going to pass through and continue the advance. Our part in the battle is over. In front of us the ground drops steeply into a ravine, the far slope of which is covered by the Bois D'Hardaumont. which is the other battalion's objective. The Bois d'Hardaumont was taken the following day according to plan. All in all, Mangin's men had captured 11.387 prisoners, 115 pieces of artillery. 44 trenchmortars and 107 machine guns. The new front which it had established had deprived the Germans of all their points of observation over the city and fortress of Verdun and restored the French tactical situation to a very satisfactory footing. Nivelle, who had waited only to see this final stage of his programme of limited offensives through, left Verdun on the evening of December 15 to 'take charge of the Armies of the North and the NorthWest', as the communiques put it but in fact to replace Joffre as Commander-inChief Mangin followed him on December 22 to take command of the Sixth Army. With their departure, the Battle of Verdun was brought to a close. It had cost both sides between 300.000 and 350,000 men each, while the lines themselves stood in December very much where they had done before the battle had begun in February.
[For John Keegan's biography, seepage 96.
]
J
An old idea, but new designs — steel helmets 1.
British leather
and chain mail tank helmet
to protect the wearer from injuring himself inside a tank. 2. British steel helmet with
second pattern visor, designed by Captain R. Cruise. 3. Portuguese mild steel helmet made in Britain. 4. Belgian 1917 helmet with visor, designed on the orders of the Queen of the Belgians. 5. French 1916 helmet with early pattern Polack visor. 6. French 1915 Adrian pattern helmet. Used by the Russians, Belgians and Italians also. 7. German standard pattern camouflaged helmet, 8. Turkish helmet as used on the Palestine Front. 9. German 1916/17 snipers face shield (weight 14^/2 pounds). 10. Italian 1917 helmet, used mostly by shock troops and made of chrome-nickel steel. 11. Franco-American 1917 Dunand helmet with visor
10
11
autumn
1916 the Zeppelin time in a significant role as a strategic bomber. Always in the forefront of the air war against England, the Imperial Navy's airship division was inspired by the advent of still larger craft, called 'super-Zeppelins' by the British, to mount a final offensive against London. In
the
appeared
The
of
for the last
first
of these
made her maiden
new flight
giants, L 30, had from Friedrichs-
May 28, 1916. With double the volume of the craft produced a year earlier, L 30 displaced 1,949,600 cubic feet and had a gross lift of 141,200 pounds. With better streamlining of the hull, and a total of six Maybach engines, the new Zeppelin was hafen on
faster than her predecessors, slightly achieving 62.2 mph on trials. Her combat ceiling, however, was still only about 13,000 feet. A useful lift of 61,600 pounds (improved in later ships of the class) allowed for a heavier bomb load in Englisli raids — L 31 on the night of September 23, 1916, carried 9,250 pounds of bombs to England, the largest amount in any attack of the war. L 31 herself was commissioned on July 14 by Heinrich Mathy, L 32 on August 7 by Werner Peterson, and L 33 on September 2 by Alois Bocker. Yet the Germans were unaware that their opponents were at this time equipping their aircraft with machine guns firing incendiary ammunition, which could turn the hydrogen-filled Zeppelins into blazing funeral pyres. Strasser, optimistic as ever, wrote to Admiral Scheer on August 10, after a few preliminary attacks on the north of England that 'the performance of the big air-
ships has reinforced my conviction that England can be overcome by means of airships, inasmuch as the country will be deprived of the means of existence through increasingly extensive destruction of cities, factory complexes, dockyards, and harbours'. Wishing to make a 'big effort' against England during the waning moon from August 20 to September 6, Strasser augmented the North Sea Zeppelins with two of the despised Schiitte-Lanz craft brought from the Baltic. Thus, 13 naval airships set out on August 24; but the only result was that Mathy, for the first time in ten
months, reached London, doing £130,000 worth of damage in a swift onslaught against Deptford, Plumstead and Eltham.
of 1916 marked a transition in strategic
The end
bombing: the vulnerable Zeppelins were bowing out and aircraft began to take over. Douglas Robinson. Below: The German naval airship L 32, one of the new 'super-Zeppelins'
THE
A
bad landing at Ahlhorn grounded until September 21; but on the night of September 2, 12 other naval airships set out for London, while four army craft joined them from sheds in the Rhineland.
Mathy
was the largest airship armada sent against England during the war, and the only time army and navy airships attacked the same target simultaneously. The military ships had the shortest journey, and were therefore the first to approach LonIt
LZ
coming up from Dungeness, her bombs on Gravesend in the belief that she was over the London docks. One of the three Royal Flying Corps officers patrolling at the time, SecondLieutenant William Leefe Robinson, sighted the Zeppelin, but she escaped into the clouds at 60 mph before he could attack. A second army Zeppelin, LZ 90, got no nearer to London than Haverhill, and accidentally dropped her sub-cloud car near Manningtree before going out to sea. A third military ship, the new Schiittedon.
98,
dropped
all
Lanz SL 11 under Hauptmann Schramm, came inland via the River Crouch and made a determined attempt to attack London from the north. At Finsbury Park,
Schramm turned back in the face heavy gunfire from the centre of
however, of very
London. Unknown to him, three aeroplanes were converging on the giant raider, lit up in the beams of searchlights, and Leefe Robinson was the first to arrive. Two drums of the new Brock and Pomeroy ammunition distributed along the airship's hull had no effect. The third, concentrated on one sfx)t aft, produced a bright glow within the
BOMBING UIAD MM
envelope and suddenly there was a monstrous burst of flame which illuminated the countryside for miles around. One of the naval Zeppelins, L 16, barely a mile distant, was revealed to one of the RFC pilots by the conflagration aboard SL 11, but the illumination gave out before he could close the range. The wooden-framed army ship fell burning at Cuffley; all 16 on board were killed. The fate of the Schiitte-Lanz ship understandably disheartened the personnel of the
;
I
!
i
i
j^
:
navy
ships,
still
making
their
ap-
proaches to London via Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire. Four of them, L 14, L 16, L21 and L32, saw the disaster to Schramm's ship from north of London and turned back, claiming later to have attacked the capital. Viktor Schiitze in Lll, over Harwich, witnessed the catastrophe from above the clouds 50 miles away. Three Zeppelins had been carried north by the wind and attacked targets in the Midlands. One, L 13, burned out three gas holders in East Retford near Nottingham. No important targets were bombed and the big attack was a failure, with only four dead and 12 injured, while the damage toll amounted to only £21,000. The credit was Leefe Robinson's, and in the opinion ol' the public, he thoroughly deserved the Victoria Cross which was awarded to him. Despite the lo.ss of the army SchiitteLanz, Strasser continued to be confident that his Zeppelins, particularly the big 'thirties', were still superior to the London defences, even though several of his commanders had seen an aeroplane attacking
1742
SL 11. On September 23, 1916, 12 ships were sent out in two groups — eight older ones via the North Sea, and four 'thirties' via the Rhineland and Belgium, to approach London with the south wind behind them. the
L 33 brought down L 30, commanded by
Buttlar, claimed an attack on London as early as 2235 hours, but no bombs fell on southern England at this early hour, and L 30's whereabouts cannot be traced. It was Bocker in L 33 who first reached London. Coming up the north side of the Thames Estuary, he was fired on, but blinded the searchlights by
dropping
magnesium
parachute
flares.
Between midnight and 0040 hours, L 33 released 'two bombs of 300-kg, eight of 100-kg, 32 of 50-kg, and 20 incendiaries' over the eastern end of London. These started serious fires in an oil depot and a timber yard, and demolished many dwellings, including a popular public house, the 'Black Swan'. But Bocker was exposing his ship to a heavy artillery barrage over the strongest portion of the London defences. One shell burst inside Cell 14 abaft the control car, destroying the cell. Other gas cells were riddled in many places
by shell splinters. Leaking hydrogen and sinking steadily, L 33 turned away from the capital, only to encounter SecondLieutenant Albert de Bathe Brandon, who had unsuccessfully attacked L 15 six months earlier. Again, Brandon failed to set the super-Zeppelin afire with his incendiary ammunition, but L 33 was too badly damaged to get home. At 0120
hours Bocker brought his damaged ship
down
Wigborough in The crew, march-
in a field at Little
Essex and set her on
fire.
ing to the coast to look for a boat, were 'taken in charge' by a special constable.
Next came Mathy in L 31. Coming down Channel from Belgium with L 32, he had aimed ten bombs at the Dungeness Lighthouse to lighten the ship for the attack on London. Beyond Tunbridge Wells he had confidently followed the railway from Eastbourne into Croydon. Here searchlights picked up his Zeppelin, but clever use of parachute flares blinded the searchlight crews as he dropped the bulk of his heavy cargo on Brixton and Streatham. Crossing the heart of the capital, Mathy dropped his last bombs on Lea Bridge Road and Leyton, and above a blanket of mist in the Lea Valley got away unscathed. How he missed bombing the City remains a mystery; his War Diary states that ten 128-pound bombs fell on it. Peterson in L 32 had circled near his landfall for over an hour, and then, heading towards London, deviated to the east. South of the Thames his ship was shrouded in mist, but on crossing the nver at Erith she came into clear air and was picked up by the searchlights and came under gunfire. A BE 2c biplane flown by Second-Lieutenant Frederick Sowrey overhauled L 32 at 13,000 feet and set her afire; the flaming wreck, shedding parts for miles, crashed to earth near Great Burstead. Of the ships that crossed the North Sea, L 17 did considerable damage in Nottingham. The others failed to reach the Mid-
land cities, and two of them saw L 32's fall, L 23 from 150 miles awaj" near Lincoln. The loss of two new supjer-Zeppelins, together
with
Peterson
and Bdcker — two
commanders who could not be adequately replaced — signalled the end of Strasser's of the quick and effective conquest
dream
of England" by his strategic bombers. Yet Strasser's only concession to the improved defences, when he sent out his raiders on the afternoon of September 25, was to order 'caution in case of clear w-eather'. Mathy was out that night, but finding a cloudless sky at Dungeness, he proceeded to bomb Portsmouth. His navigation as usual was impeccable and he reported dropping 8,000 pounds of bombs as he crossed the dockyard; but thev must have been released prematurely and were not traced by the British. Again, seven older craft headed for the Midlands via the North Sea. Martin Dietrich in L 22 caused some damage to the Sheffield armament works: others were frustrated by the blackout and by increased anti-aircraft defences in their attempt to bomb the
down the Channel
Midlands industrial centres. One week later, on the night of October 1, Heinrich Mathy "s L 31 returned to England with ten other Zeppelins. While most of them wandered over Lincolnshire and Norfolk, L 31 coming inland at Lowestoft, steered a straight course for London. At Ongar, with the searchlights of the London defences converging on him, Mathy turned aside, but not to give up the raid. Circling around to the north of the capital, Mathy ,
evidently intended to
make
a high-speed
Reconnoitring above a Helgoland class battleship, the L 3^, one of the giant Zeppelins introduced in autumn 1916. But the days of the super Zeppelins were soon over the Allies were equipping their aircraft with Left:
machine guns
firing
incendiary
ammunition, one round of which could turn the hydrogen-filled Zeppelins into funeral pyres
Top
right:
Manoeuvring a
Zeppelin into its hangar, northern France Above: Heinrich Mathy. the boldest and most successful airship commander of the war His L 31 was shot down on the night
October 1: Mathy jumped out and was still breathing when of
found, but died immediately Right: Werner Peterson. He was killed when his L 32 was shot
down on September
—i' '"-*
-*"'
12
,
run across the city with the stiff north wind behind him — his bomb sight was later found set for a ground speed of 89 mph. But as he opened up his engines for the run-up, four defence pilots started across London to attack him. Undoubtedly Mathy saw them closing in, for he dropped his bombs over Cheshunt and climbed away to the west. At this point Second-Lieutenant Wulstan J. Tempest dived on him and set L 31 afire at 12,700 feet. The wreckage fell at Potters Bar; Mathy, who had jumped out, was still breathing when found but died almost immediately. Such was the end of the boldest and most successful airship commander of the war,
admired by friend and foe alike: and such was the end of the last deliberate airship attack on London. The mood back in Ahlhorn and Nordholz was one of depression and discouragement, particularly among the ratings. Two months passed before the naval Zeppelins returned to England, and this time avoiding London, they went to the Midlands. The new super-Zeppelin L 34 was, however, promptly shot down in flames by an RFC pilot when she bombed West Hartlepool. Next morning, as dawn was breaking, L21. which had spent nine hours over England and had gone as far we.'^t a.s Newcastle-under-Lynie, was shot
down in flames ofi' Lowestoft. One of the first decisions
of Ernst von Hoeppner, appointed General Commanding the Luftstreitkrdfte, on October 8, 1916, was to downgrade the role of the Zeppelin as a strategic bomber, at least in the West, and to substitute heavier-than-air craft.
Following the shooting down in flames of SL 11 at Cuffley, no more army airships were sent to England. Having already been
the
forbidden to cross the Western Front, the only possible mission for the army airships in the west was to proceed down-Channel to attack pxjrts and bases in northern France, such as Rouen, Etaples and Boulogne. A few successes were claimed, but the final attack of this series, by LZ 107 on Boulogne on February 16, 1917, was actually the last successful raid by an army airship. Ironically, it was just at this time that the army finally received its first super-Zeppelins, LZ 113 and LZ 120\ they went to the Eastern Front. The army airship service's last attempt to intervene in the war was dui'ing the campaign against Rumania, which started with a declaration of war on August 27, 1916, and ended with the German occupation of Bucharest, the capital, on December 6. In preparation for the campaign, LZ 101 had replaced SL 10 in Jamholi on August and LZ S6 had been sent to Temesvar on August 24. Bucharest was their target as soon as war broke out, and LZ 101 made her first attack on the capital on the night of August 28 with 4,000 pounds of bombs. She was back over the city again on the nights of September 4 and 25. The Temesvar Zeppelin was slower off the mark, making her first attack on the oil refinery town of Ploe^ti on the night of September 4. Attempting to land next morning, she crashed at high speed outside her base and was wrecked, most of the crew being killed, including her commander, Oherieutnant .'3,
Wolflf. She was promptly replaced by LZ 81 but in her second attack on Bucharest on the night of September 26, this Zeppelin was so badly shot up by the defending artillery that she force-landed short of her base and had to be dismantled. LZ 97 replaced her, and .-^he and LZ 101 made .some attacks after the fall of Bucharest. In June 1917, Hoeppner decided to abolish the army airship service. The surviving
airships were
withdrawn
to
Germany and
July and August they were broken up at Jiiteborg, Schneidemiihl, Dresden and other bases. Only the two 'super-Zeppelins' LZ 113 and LZ 120 were turned over to the in
navy for service in the Baltic. For the Germans, a strategic aeroplane bombing force already existed in embryo, and required only improved and larger aircraft to have long range capability. In November, 1914, while the Western Front was still fluid, the Army High Command assembled some 36 aircraft, manned by the most experienced flight crews, at Ghistelles in Belgium under the camouflage designation 'Ostend Carrier Pigeon Section' (Brieftauben Abteilung Ostende). The mishowever, was strategic bombing raids on England, as soon as the German armies should have captured Calais. While awaiting tliis development, tiie BAO pi'actised with attacks on Dunkirk, Nieuport, Furnes and La Panne. When it became clear that Calais would not be available, the BAO was transferred early in 1915 to the Eastern Front. In any case, it would have accomplished little against England, for most of its aircraft were Aviatik B Is, unarmed sion,
two-seaters with 100 hp engines and able to carry only a few small bombs. For the next year and a half the BAO and a companion unit, the Brieftauben Ahteilung Metz, served as a mobile tactical bombing force, the fact that the entire unit was housed in railway trains making it easy to switch them from one front to another. Following the Battle of the Somme, the
BAO, now renamed Kampfgeschwader 1 at last received some big iBattle Wing 1 bombers — the twin-engined AEG G III — 1.
and
left for
Bulgaria to participate in the
Rumanian campaign. Before
its
departure,
however, as a result of a decision of Hoeppner's, it released three of its six squadrons, or Staffeln, to form the nucleus ot'Kampfgeschuader 3. Sent back to Belgium, the new wing trained and waited for the delivery of suitable aircraft to
— the famous Gothas —
commence operations against England. Whereas Germany's military leaders had
early appreciated the value of strategic bombing attacks on the Allies' industrial and transportation system, facilities French and British military men saw the bombing aeroplane as an extension of the artillery in the immediate zone of combat. Until forced to follow the German example, the Allied air forces carried out only sporadic strategic attacks under the influence of certain imaginative leaders who in the end were unable to prevail against the military system. This explains why the French, the first in the air with a strategic bombing plan, abandoned their first effort when the war was only a year old. But during the autumn of 1916 the Allies
Top
Photographed from directly above, a Fokker D fighter on the way to the front Right: The pilot of the RNAS No 3 Wing Sopwith 1^'2-Strutter poses beside his aircraft before raiding into Germany Below: The wreckage of the L 33. Badly damaged by shell fire while raiding London on September 12/ 13. L 33 limped out into the Essex countryside where her commander brought her down and set her on fire. The crew, marching to the sea to find a boat, were taken m charge by a special constable right:
II
four-engined bomber, the Russian Sikorsky RBVZ///a Mouromets {lM-G^). 170 hp each. Armament: five .303-inch Lewis guns and up to 1,500 lbs of bombs. Speed.- 74 mph. Endurance .six hours. Ce/V/ng; 14, 100 feet. Weight empty/loaded: 8.378/12, ^25 lbs. Span: 1 13.19 feet. Lengtti: 55.77 feet. Below: Britain's first effective bomber/fighter-bomber, the Sopwith IVz-Strutter, with forward and rearward firing machine guns. It was also the first British aircraft to have a variable incidence tailplane and air brakes- hinged on the inboard portions of the rear spars of the lower wings. Engine: Clerget rotary, 130 hp. Armament: one .303-inch Vickers and one .303-inch Lewis gun plus up to 224 lbs of bombs. Speed: 100 mph at 6,500 feet. Endurance: 4 hours. /4bo\/e;
Engines:
1746
The world's
first
Sunbeam Cossacks,
Ceiling: 15,000 feet. Weight empty/loaded: 1,305/2,150 lbs.
Span: 33 feet 6 incfies. Length: 25 feet. Bottom left: The French Breguet-Michelin 4 bomber. Engine: 220-hp Renault inline Armament: one 7.62-mm Hotchkiss machine gun and up to 640 lbs of bombs. Speed: 84 mph at sea level. Span: 61 feet 9 inches. Left centre: RFC uniforms. 1916. On the left is a pilot wearing typical flying clothing, and on the right a private. Below: An early German fighter, the G III. Engines: Mercedes D IV. 220 hp. Armament: two 7 92-mm Parabellum machine guns plus up to 660 lbs of bombs. Speed: 99
AEG
flange; 450 miles. Ceiling: 13, 100 feet. Weight empty/loaded: 4.268/6.633 6 inches. Length: 30 feet 2V4 inches. The type was too slow and ponderous at
sea
level,
lbs.
mph
Span. 60 feet
174'
staged a series of joint strategic bombing operations which culminated in a spectacular large-scale attack on October 12 on the Mauser Waffenfabrik at Oberndorf, which was the chief supplier of rifles for the German army.
A new weapon initiative for this operation came from the British Admiralty, which is said to have decided early in 1916 to mount a bombing campaign against the steel industry in the Saar to interfere with the production of raw materials for U-Boats. Captain W. L. Elder, RN, was ordered to
The
reactivate No 3 Wing RNAS, and since he had recently procured several hundred volunteers for naval flight training during a tour of Canada, he was instructed to use these Canadian trainees in his organisa-
A
new and advanced aircraft was selected to equip the wing- the Sopwith li Strutter, a two-seater biplane powered by the 110 hp Clerget rotary engine, and equipped for the first time with a syntion.
Vickers gun firing forward through the propeller, together with a Lewis on a revolving mount handled by the rear observer. Against contemporary chronised
German
aircraft
this
was a formidable
weapon. The majority of the Sopwiths of No 3 Wing were delivered, however, as single seaters, with cells for four 56-pound bombs taking the place of the observer's cockpit. The 49 aircraft on the establishment of the wing were intended to operate in flights of seven, and in each flight the five lead aircraft were to be single seater bombers, while the two in the rear would be two seaters acting as fighter escorts. Since they had fuel for four hours, the same as the bombers, they could accompany the
way to the target and back. The French, on their part, withdrew the 4eme Groiipe de Bombardement under Capitaine Happe from army control and sent them to a base at Luxeuil in the Vosges, some 65 miles south of Malzeville. Unfortunately the equipment of Happe's three squadrons was little better than the Voisins flown by de Goys a year earlier.
latter all the
Two squadrons were
again of
Farman
42s,
two-seater pushers, underpowered with only 130 hp engines, and possessing a top speed of about 85 mph. The third squadron, equipped with Breguet-Michelin 4 bombers, was even slower despite having 220 hp engines. Both types were completely defenceless against attack from the rear. The French, impressed with the performance of the new Sopwith 1^ Strutters, had
undertaken to manufacture them under licence, and 15 of the fighter version were available by October 1. The French bomber escadrilles started warming up with an attack on Karlsruhe on June 22, which killed 120 civilians and injured 150. The British 3rd Wing's build-
up was slow, many of its aircraft being handed over to the RFC to replace losses in the Somme fighting. Three Sopwith bortibers joined six French in an attack on Miilheim on July 30, but no further missions were attempted until the attack on Oberndorf Even then. No 3 Wing had only seven Sopwith fighters and 13 bombers on hand, and had to take over six Breguets from the French. The Oberndorf mission made unusual demands on the untried Canadian pilots of No 3 Wing. Over 100 miles east of Luxeuil, beyond the Rhine, then across the
1748
Black Forest to the valley of the Neckar, the round trip would take 2i hours for the Sopwiths, and longer for the slow French pushers. Furthermore, the Germans, after repeated Allied attacks on their cities, had set up anti-aircraft guns and fighter formations. One of these units was at Colmar, half-way between Luxeuil and Oberndorf on the direct route, and another was at Habsheim, a few miles south of Colmar. The squadrons were late in getting away, the first, one of the Farman formations, taking off" at 1315 hours. There followed the second Farman squadron, then the French Breguets. Escorting the French bombers were 12 French Sopwiths and four agile Nieuport 17 fighters of the newly formed Escadrille Americaine, not yet re-
named
the Escadrille Lafayette.
The
short-
ranged Nieuports could not go all the way to the target. Next came the British aircraft— 13 Sopwith bombers, seven Sopwith fighters and six Breguets. Several turned back for various reasons before reaching the lines, with the result that only nine French aircraft reached and bombed Obernnine of the British Sopwiths. English Breguets deviated to the south after crossing the lines and bombed Donaueschingen by mistake for Oberndorf. The German fighters had been alerted by ground observers at the front, and while the first squadron of Farmans got to the target and back, the fighters — Fokker E III dorf, as did
The
six
monoplanes and D
II
biplanes,
and twin-
pushers — had a field day with the succeeding formations. The leader of the second Farman squadron was shot down and killed with his observer near Colmar; another machine was shot down a few miles farther into Germany. Of the French Breguets, four never made it home.
boomed Ago C
I
Two were damaged and forced down by German fighters, and a third was shot down flames en route to the target, while another was shot down with the crew dead in
en route home.
The cumbersome
British
Breguets also had their losses, one being brought down by anti-aircraft fire and one by a German fighter, both crews being captured. Remarkably, only one Sopwith of the total of 32 participating was lost over
German lines — an RNAS bomber forced down on Freiburg aerodrome with its pilot shot through the neck. The Escadrille Americaine lost one of its original members when Norman Prince struck a power line landing at dusk and was fatally injured. the
Three of the four Nieuport victories over
German
pilots
aircraft,
claimed
and three
more were claimed by the other The Germans denied any losses.
escorts.
Senior ofl^cers at the time realised that the raid was a failure, in that a disproportionately small fraction of the force committed actually bombed the target. The Germans in Oberndorf counted only 153 bombs from 12 attacking aircraft. Several buildings in the rifle works were badly damaged and work was partially disrupted for two days. Numerous buildings in town were destroyed or damaged; five people were killed, two of them prisoners of war. The French discontinued daylight raids with the vulnerable and clumsy Farman and Breguet pushers, though continuing to bomb with them at night. The 3rd Wing made a few more attacks on Hagendingen, Volkingen and Dillingen with small numbers of aircraft. By early 1917 the British
bombing wing was disbanded and its pilots were transferred to single-seater fighter
squadrons on the British front in Northern France. The 4eme Groupe de Bombardement also reverted to tactical bombing in support of the armies. Italy, which declared war on AustriaHungary on May 24, 1915, already had a three-engined bomber prototype of native design, the Caproni 32. Underdevelopment since early 1914, this machine had three 100 hp Fiat engines and a crew of three. The first bombing unit equipped with this aircraft assembled at Pordenone, and made their first raid on August 20, 1915. Improved Caproni bombers with higher-
powered engines were developed, including the huge Ca 40 triplane, with a span of 98 feet and a bomb load of 3,000 pounds, which appeared in 1916. The Caproni squadrons however did not constitute a strategic bombing force in the sense that they attacked distant industrial centres of the Central Powers. Most of their bombing was in the Austrian Army's back areas and on cities around the head of the Adriatic — Trieste, Durazzo, Ljubljana. Last comes the Russian contribution to stragetic air warfare — the first fourengined aircraft in the world. This, the dream of Igor Sikorsky and named "The Grand', made its first flight on May 13, 1913. A larger version named 'Ilya Mourometz', with a span of 102 feet and four Argus 100 hp engines, was completed in January 1914 and on February 11 carried 16 passengers aloft for five hours. The Russo-Baltic Wagon Works received contracts for a military version after war broke out, and in December 1914 the 'Squadron of Flying Ships' was set up to operate the big bombers. Based at Jablonna in Eastern Poland, an "Ilya Mourometz' made the first raid on February 15, 1915, with 600 pounds of bombs. Seventy-three were built altogether, the 'C type being the first to have a gunner's cockpit at the rear of the fuselage behind the tail. Strongly built and defended, the Russian bombers were tough opponents and only one was shot down. Individual flights lasted up to 7 3 hours. 1916 had witnessed the eclipse of the airship as a strategic weapon and the tentative introduction of the aeroplane as its successor in this role. Its introduction had not progressed very smoothly, but what completely new weapon has ever entered service with no teething troubles at all, technical or operational? But the main lessons had been learnt, and the advocates of the strategic bomber looked forward into the future with high hopes. Further Reading Cross and Cockade Journal Volume 4
No
1,
Volume 4 No 2 and Volume 5 No 4 Cuneo, J. R The Air Weapon 1914-1916 .
(Harrisburg, Pa: Military Service Publishing 1947) Gladisch. W., Der Krieg in der Nordsee Band VI (Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn 1937) Hoeppner, E. von, Deutschlands Kneg in der /.u/f (Leipzig Hase & Koehler 1921) Jones, H A., The War in the Air Volume III
(OUP 1931) Neumann, G P streitkrafte E. S. Mittler
Robinson,
D.
(ed ). Die deutschen Luftim Weltkrieg (Berlin: & Sohn 1920) H., The Zeppelin in Combat
(Foulis 1962) Sikorsky, The Story of the
Winged S (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co. 1943) I
,
[For Douglas Robinson's biography,
page
901.
]
see
I
ZEPPELINS These first hand accounts, taken from the pilots' combat reports, include Lieutenant W. L. Robinson's report of the first Zeppelin to be shot down over England, September 1916 — more than 18 months after the first of the Zeppelin raids. But this first 'kill' was soon followed by others, and by the end of 1916 the power of the fighter in air defence had been effectively demonstrated. The Zeppelin was now obsolete as a
major strategic striking force
THE FIGHTER PILOTS'
VIEW Zeppelin raids on England began in January 1915. Although the material effect of these raids was relatively small, they had a disturbing influence on civilian morale. British
countermeasures
—
anti-aircraft
guns, searchlights and figher patrols — were initially rewarded with little success. It was not until the night of September 2/3. 1916 that a Zeppelin was shot down over England This Zeppelin was destroyed by Lieutenant W. L. Robinson, whose patrol report gives an almost naively frank account of the action.
in this quarter, and the searchlights had difficulty in keeping on the aircraft. this time I had managed to climb to 12,000 feet, and I made in the direction of
some By
the Zeppelin which was being fired on by a few anti-aircraft guns — hoping to cut it off on its way eastward. I very slowly gained on it for about ten minutes — judged it to be about 800 feet below me, and I sacrificed my speed in order to keep the height. It went behind some clouds, avoided the searchlights, and I lost sight of it. After 15 minutes fruitless search I returned to
my
patrol.
managed
I
my
to pick
up and distinguish
flares again.
At about 0150 hours in north-east
I
noticed a red glow
London. Taking
it
to be
an
outbreak of fire I went in that direction. At 0105 hours a Zeppelin was picked up by the searchlights over north-north-east
London
(as far as
I
could judge).
Remembering my last failure I sacrificed height (I was still at 12,900 feet) for speed and made nose down in the direction of the Zeppelin. I saw shells bursting and night tracer shells bursting and flying around it. When I drew closer I noticed that the antiaircraft aim was too high or too low; also a good many some 800 feet behind — a few tracers went right over. I could hear the bursts when about 3,000 feet from the Zeppelin. I flew about 800 feet below it from bow to stern and distributed one drum [from his Lewis gun] along it (alternate New
Brock and Pomeroy). effect;
gave
I
it
It seemed to have no moved to one side and another drum distributed along its
therefore
— without
apparent effect. I then got behind it (by this time I was very close — 50 feet or less below) and concentrated one drum on one part (underneath rear). I was then at a height of 11,500 feet when attacking the Zeppelin. I hardly finished the drum before I saw the part fired at glow. In a few seconds the whole rear part was blazing. side
the third drum was fired there were no searchlights on the Zeppelin and no anti-aircraft guns were firing. I quickly got out of the way of the falling blazing Zeppelin and, being very excited, fired off a few red Very's lights and dropped a parachute flare. Having very little oil and petrol left I
Officer
HD
Commanding,
have the honour to make the following report on Night Patrol made by me on the night of the 2nd-.3rd instant. I went up at about 2308 hours with instructions to patrol between Suttons Farm and Joyce I
Green. I climbed to 10,000 feet in 53 minutes, and I counted what I thought were ten sets of flares — there were a few clouds below me but on the whole it was a beautifully clear night. I
landing
saw nothing
till
0110 hours when two
searchlights picked up a Zeppelin southeast of Woolwich. The clouds had collected
I
fired at
it.
two drums of ammunition had apparently no effect but the third one caused the envelope to catch on fire in several places; in the centre and front. All firing was traversing fire along the envelope. The drums were loaded with a mixture of Brock, Pomeroy and tracer ammunition. I watched the burning airship strike the ground and then proceeded to find
first
my
flares.
I
landed at Suttons
Farm
0140 hours, 24th instant. My machine was B.E.2.C. 4112. After seeing the Zeppelin had caught on fire, I fired a Red Veiy's light. have the honour to he. Sir,
at
1
Your obedient servant, (Sgd) F. Sowrey, Second-Lieutenant,
RFC
.
I
September 1916 was a bad month for the
Sir,
The
Zeppelin raid on London:
On
Squadron RFC.
Squadron*
beams.
hours.
the centre section, and had pierced the rear main spar several times. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant, (Sgd) W. L. Robinson, Lieutenant No 39
39
enemj' airship in a southerly direction. It appeared to be over Woolwich. I made for the airship at once, but before I could reach it, the searchlights lost it. I was at this time at 8,000 feet. There was a certain amount of gun fire but it was not intense. I continued to climb and reached a height of 13,000 feet. I was still patrolling between Suttons Farm and Joyce Green. At 0045 hours I noticed an enemy airship in an easterly direction. I at once made in this direction and manoeuvred into a position underneath. The airship was well lighted by searchlights but there was not a sign of any gun fire. I could distinctly see the propellers revolving and the airship was manoeuvring to avoid the searchlight
returned to Suttons Farm, landing at 0245
From:
The
my
These two actions effectively demonstrated the power of the fighter in air defence. The only other serious Zeppelin raid on London, carried out by the intrepid Kapitiinleutnant Mathy in L31, met with disaster at the hands of Second-Lieutenant Tempest. Tempest's curt combat H J. report describes the fiery end of the last
found I had shot away the machine gun wire guard, the rear part of
To:
have the honour to report the following action during the night of September 23/24, 1916. At 2325 hours I received orders to patrol between Suttons Farm and Joyce Green and at 2330 hours I left the aerodrome. The weather was clear with a few thin clouds at 3,000 feet. At 4,000 feet I passed another machine proceeding in a northerly direction. I was then flying due south. I continued climbing as hard as possible and at 0010 hours I noticed an I
on
When
Report of Night Patrol
Lieutenant Robinson, Suttons Farm.
Sir,
airship service. On the night of the 23124th the airship L 32 was shot down by a member of Robinson's flight,
German Naval
Second-Lieutenant F. Sowrey:
From: Second-Lieutenant Tempest, 'B' Flight,
No 39
HD
Squadron,
RFC
To:
Adjutant,
No 39
HD
Squadron.
Sir,
have the honour to report that on I October 1, at 2200 hours I left the ground in B.E.2.C. 4577 to patrol between Joyce Green and Hainault. Approximately at 2340 hours 1 first sighted a Zeppelin. immediatel> made for her and fired one drum which took effect at once and set her on fire at about 12,700 feet. I then proceeded to North Weald to land and wrecked the machine on the aerodrome without hurting myself at 0210 hours. I have the honour to be. Sir, 1
To: Officer
No 39
Commanding,
HD
Squadron, Royal Flying Corps, Woodford Green. From: Second-Lieutenant F. Sowrey, 'B' Flight, 39 HD Squadron, RFC Suttons Farm.
Your obedient servant, (Sgd) Second-Lieutenant
W.
J.
Tempest. 1749
and decades. Who does not feel that since August 1914 England has in many ways broken with her past and entered an entirely new epoch in her history marked by transformations of every kind, so that when the day of peace arrives, be it soon or late, we shall be confronted at home by an altogether altered
'The New Year,' Punch exclaimed at the beginning of 1916, 'brings us a mixed bag of tricks, good and bad.' By the end of the year it was abundantly clear that while there had been no shortage of tricks, there were legitimate grounds for a difference of opinion as to which had been good and which bad. There had been many surprises in a dark and difficult year, but the biggest political drama had been reserved for the very last month. On December 5 Lloyd George, who had been pressing behind the scenes for the creation of a small War Council to speed the way to victory, resigned from Asquith's cabinet. Two days later, after an involved set of manoeuvres, Asquith himself resigned and Lloyd
of years
George took his place as Prime Minister. To more than one historian this important change was the turning-point of the war. Yet it would be a mistake within the context of 1916 itself to regard the transformation as inevitable, the great climax towards which everything else was leading. As Lord Beaverbrook (then Max Aitken), the most detailed, if not always the most reliable, historian of the crisis, has remarked -'it must not be supposed that the growing unpopularity of the first Coalition Government [under Asquith) was so clear to every one at the time as it became on looking backward, or that most men would have predicted the fall of the Ministry'. During the early months of the year, indeed, it seemed unlikely that there was any alternative government to that of Asquith and his coalition colleagues, and it was taken for granted, until the political crisis itself, that there could be no general election in wartime.
back home to their mothers, wives or sweethearts that they expected that everything would be over by Christmas; politicians shared their expectations. It was only after there had been a massive slaughter in appalling conditions — with no strategic gains — that doubts began to set in, and even then there were optimists who argued that Britain would have no difficulty in
•savL
situation?'
The Somme — a disaster for Asquith On -July 1 Haie launclied his grt';il Somme
winning a war of attrition.
The Somme offensive was the bloody background against which Lloyd George rose to power. He had made his mark as Minister of Munitions in the new Coalition CJovernment which had been formed in November 1915, not only providing the means for the gigantic military offensive but proving in the process that dramatic action in wartime rested on a combination of leadership and organisation. When on June 5, 1916 Kitchener, the formidable, still legendary, Secretary of State for War, sailing to Russia
fe^^
LIOYD
GEORGE TAKES
T".;i
^^
•
^P >5tC
1^ w^.
After the crisis of December 1916 was over, there were many people, perhaps most, who were anxious to forget about it quickly 'There has been much talk of intrigue," Punch exclaimed, 'but John Bull doesn't care who leads the country so long as he leads it to victory. And as for Certain People Somewhere in France, we shall probably not be far wrong in interpreting their view of the present change as follows: Thank God, we've got no politicians here; Fighting's our game, not talking; all we ask Is men and means to face the coming year And consummate our task. The view that 'the fighting game' can never be safely left to the generals was overlooked in this kind of reaction: so, too, was the fact that finding 'men and means' involved difficult political It is understandable, however, that in the circumstances of 1916 there was a growing divide, psychological and social, between the men in the trenches and people back at home in 'dear old Blighty'. 'We have used violence to fight violence.' wrote the great journalist H. W. Massingham, 'and we have now to make sure that we are the masters of our weapon.' For all the human and political fascination inherent in the interplay of strangely assorted personalities during the short, sharp political crisis of December 1916, it is important not to concentrate on the personalities alone. This was the year when the full drama and terror of the Great War' became apparent to every one. 'We are living at a time,' wrote the historian W. H. Dawson, 'when days and weeks have the fullness and significance
1750
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ofTensive, the first
campaign by a British army oi'contineiital dimensions: Haig himself dreamed of a breakthrough; young subalterns wrote large-scale
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!§l5 in the cruiser Hampshire, was drowned with all the crew when the ship struck a mine on the high seas, it was Lloyd George who, after an ominous delay, took his place. Asquith's faltering in making this appointment was noted by everyone who believed that waging war demanded a new drive and determination. 'A man who has been beaten once can be beaten twice,' said Beaverbrook at the time. 'We are out: it can only be a question of time now when we shall have to leave Downing Street.' wrote Margot Asquith, more prescient than her husband, in her diary. After the start of the Somme offensive Lloyd George had no doubt about the outcome. In late August he was writing confidently that 'we are pressing the enemy back. He has lost his tide', and a month later he was still supporting the idea of delivering a 'knock-out blow'. His doubts multiplied in November at the same time as they were multiplying also inside the Conservative party. They were taken up by and ultimately magnified by the Press, an important element in the situation. 'Unless the Coalition Government shows more grip than it latterly has,' wrote the Liberal Daily Chronicle on November 29, 'it seems to us in serious danger of coming to grief, in spite of the absence of an alternative. Its arch defect is inability to make up its mind. It is not so much that it reaches wrong decisions, as that for weeks and even months it fails in crucial matter after crucial matter, to reach any decision at all.' The failures of the Allies in other parts of Europe added to the sense of danger. It was in these circumstances that Asquith fell from power. His son Raymond was one of the victims of the Somme.
In retrospect, it is not difficult to see that during' the late autumn of 1916 there was only one fundamental choice facing Britain, a choice which was never put squarely to the electorate or argued out rationally in the open — either a far tougher management of the war machine, which meant a tougher control both of the economy and of central administration, or peace by negotiation. The great majority favoured the former course, and when Lloyd George took over as Prime Minister in December the comment of the Economist was that under the Asquith regime 'the country was always ahead of the government'. It is possible to argue that the intriguers behind the scenes in November and December 1916 chose Lloyd George not so much because he seemed to them to have all the necessar>' gifts to lead the country to victory as because he was far and away the best intriguer. Yet as early as March 1916 one of Lloyd George's strongest Liberal supporters, Christopher Addison, was noting in his Diary that 'there appears to be a movement among the Conservatives to try and get LG to take a strong line and they aie even prepared to go to the length of recognising him as PM'. The minority who believed that if the war continued Britain would be ruined and civilisation as a whole destroyed never had much of a hearing in 1916 outside the columns of fringe weeklies, even though they included people as different as Lord Lansdov/ne, a minister and a former Conservative Foreign Secretary, and a handful of some of the most able Labour Members of Parliament, like Ramsay MacDonald. According to Lansdowne, the respon-
The British Home Front
in 1916
was dominated
Somme offensive. It was only after the Somme that the public became by the
effects of the
aware of the
horror of the war, and it of the Somme that Lloyd George intrigued his way into the Premiership. But there were other important events in 1916: the drama of Kitchener's death, the desperation of the Easter Rising and the fundamental social and economic changes which were revolutionising British society. By the end of 1916 the 'good old full
was against the background
days' were gone beyond recall
and massive
claims had been made on the future. Professor Asa Briggs. Left: A group of widows and next of kin wait to receive posthumous medals. The great slaughter on the Somme is in full swing, a generation is being sacrificed
sibility of those who protracted the war was as great as those who had provoked it: according to the Labour dissidents, international contacts between working men of different countries should be resumed immediately with a view to reviving the war-shattered Socialist International. Neither of these two 'pacifist' views had more than a strictly limited appeal. The argument in favour of peace talks in periodicals like the Nation, which stated pro-
May
Liberals whose views had been formed in the world before 1914. Change, as it came, therefore, was slow, unco-ordinated and incomplete. In the meantime, food prices were rising sharply and there were serious shortages. The tentative and cautious economic philosophy of the Asquith government was well expressed by Reginald McKenna, Chancellor of the Exchequer, who went as far as — in some respects, farther — than most Liberals would have dared to go in introducing new fiscal measures in a fundamentally inegalitarian society. In his 1916 budget speech, the shortest in 50 years, he announced that he was seeking a record revenue of £500 million. He raised the maximum rate of income tax to 5s in the £, but he did not raise surtax. At the same time he levied taxes on entrance tickets for theatres, cinemas, football matches and horse races. On the occasion of his first budget in 1915 he had alienated orthodox Free-Traders by imposing duties on imported luxuries, described by his enemies as a move towards Protectionism, but in 1916 he certainly made no gestures towards the supporters of 'war socialism' (a phrase used by Churchill). The Press noted that a Guildhall meeting which he addressed on March 1 brought out all the ironies of McKenna's position. He warned his audience that if they did not economise privately more would have to be raised publicly in the form of taxes. But outside the building there was
a stream of private carriages, motor cars and taxis, some of them driven by young men of military age. Under the McKenna regime, with Asquith as Prime Minister, the war was still being financed by borrowing at high rates of interest. The national debt was rising in spectacular fashion, and although the 'democratic' instrument of the War Savings Certificate (with individual holdings limited to 500) was introduced in 1916, savings never kept pace with commitments. The rich were often finding themselves growing richer even during the darkest days of the war, and had ample money to spend, while skilled workers, including women, were enjoying a higher standard of life — and of aspirations — than they ever had before. There was much talk of the 'diffusion of affluence', a curious theme for a wartime economy. Yet there were bitter and often well-documented attacks on 'profiteering', and there were perpetual grumbles even from well-to-do workers, employed on over-time, about the impact of high prices. Much was made in 1916, as we have seen, of the differences of ways of life in 'Blighty' and on the battlefronts. In addition, however, there were differences in conditions of life between different parts of Blighty itself Unemployment had gone and pauperism had diminished and health standards were said to be good (beer was weaker and there was far less drunkenness than there had been before 1914), but there was plenty to complain about as the year went by. The poor were suffering severely from high prices and wartime deprivation, and to emphasise the underlying social contrasts, three men died in November leaving publicised private estates of £733, 290, £431,448 and £1,000,000. The economic fortunes of the working classes in 1916 did much to influence their political attitudes then and later, although it was not until 1917 that open signs of uneasiness and new forms of political involvement became apparent. There remained, in fact, marked differences in 1916 between the attitudes and expectations of one labour group and another and between one part of the country and another. On militant Clydeside, which had been visited by Lloyd George, when he was Minister of Munitions, in December 1915, the Clyde Workers' Committee was broken up by April 1916 and its leaders deported or imprisoned. At the end of February, Sir William Beardmore, a patriarchal business
'the longer we fight Germany the become', never became a popular argument, even though those who put it forward looked around eagerly for every sign of public 'jumpiness' or depression. It was characteristic of the kind of reception meted out to 'pacifists' that a rally called together at Cardiff on November 11, 1916 under the chairmanship of James Winstone, the President of the South Wales Miners' Federation, under the auspices of the National Council of Civil Liberties, was roughly broken up and a pro-war crowd took charge of the proceedings. The move towards a far tougher control of the economy and of the central administration can be traced throughout the early months of 1916 when the demand for a fiercer economic war against Germany was a topic of discussion even inside Parliament. Leaving on one side the protracted debates on conscription, attention was being focussed on such matters as control of the coal mines, where there were serious labour disputes, food prices, a topic of immense public interest in the late months of 1916, and
figure, had revoked David Kirkwood's right as Convenor of Shop Stewards to move freely around the works. The strike which followed and lasted from March 17 to April 4 was later described in a Labour Party enquiry as 'a spontaneous outbreak of the general body of workmen employed there'. Yet it was suppressed ruthlessly. The government also used its emergency powers to prevent Press reporting of the strike until its last phases. In South V/ales, the situation which had been difficult throughout most of 1915 remained tense and at times disturbing. The government's policies of 'diluting' skilled union labour were disliked by most trade union officials, and the high cost of living was attacked by even the most resolute supporters of a more vigorous war. The National Union of Railwaymen, for example, held a big Hyde Park demonstration in August 1916, and a month later Harry Gosling, President of the TUC, told his annual conference, with 650 delegates present representing nearly 3,000,000 trade unionists, that positive action was necessary on the part of the State to protect the standard of life. 'Labour,' he said, 'has been
spending and taxation. The difficulty in advancing new policies was that they faced sharp resistance — or side-tracking — from
the personification of patriotism.' The corollary was that claims should be recognised.
vocatively in
more
like
1916 that
Germany we
its
just
1751
While the Labour leaders and rank-and-file struggled with facts that were certainly beyond their control, the Conservative party, the second great party in the State, which was to play such an important part in the political crisis of December 1916, was divided. A heterogeneous coalition of interests, some landed and some industrial, it had been under the titular leadership of Andrew Bonar Law since 1911. Law was a backbencher by spirit, although he was serving as Colonial Secretary under Asquith in 1916: the last thing he wanted was to be drawn into an intrigue against the Prime Minister, and he was deeply suspicious of Lloyd George, who was so different from him in background, ideas and temperament. The most exciting man in the Conservative party was Sir Edward Carson, a man who, in the words of a prominent Liberal journalist, had 'no reserves, no affectations, and loved the smoke of battle'. Carson was Asquith's most able opponent in the Conservative ranks, and he was able to talk to Lloyd George at critical moments right across the party lines: he was identified, above all. with the cause of Ulster, and his political attitudes were strongly influenced by the events of 1916 in Ireland itself
The Easter Rising in Dublin had burst across the newspaper headlines, dividing Conservatives, who were already divided on conscription, still further. When Lloyd George negotiated, at
The Easter Rising
first successfully, in June 1916 with both Carson and John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Home Rule Party, he showed that it was not impossible for him, however great the suspicions he engendered, to win a measure of influential Conservative support. Asquith's failure thereafter to secure an Irish settlement un-
doubtedly contributed to his eventual overthrow. It irritated Liberals as well as Conservatives, and was described by Addison, one of Asquith's most forceful Liberal critics in November and December, as the main factor determining opposition to the
Prime Minister. The month of November was
critical. It
began with Asquith
noting — his biographer says 'almost casually' — that there were "some six resignations looming'. It continued on November 8 with an angry debate on the marginal subject of the disposal of enemy property in Nigeria, a debate in which Law as Colonial Secretary, was sharply attacked by Carson. In a subsequent division 65 Conservatives and Unionists voted with Carson and 73 with Law: 148 were absent or abstained. It ended with growing pressure behind the scenes and in the Press for Asquith's resignation. One of the main figures in the story was Beaverbrook who believed that 'at all hazards' Lloyd George should be brought together with both Law and Carson. The first meeting between the three of them took place on November 20 in Beaverbrook's rooms in the Hyde Park Hotel. Lloyd George, enthusiastic about his demand for a small War Council, did not overplay his hand. Carson also was reasonable, not ruling out the possibility of serving under Asquith. Law was deeply suspicious both of Lloyd George and of Carson's relationship with him. Suspicion did not evaporate in further meetings of this unlikely 'triumvirate' or 'triple alliance', but very soon the three men had come to a substantial measure of agreement that a small War Council should be set up, without Asquith, consisting of Lloyd George, Carson and the Labour leader Arthur Henderson. On November 25 a written paper was drafted -still something of a compromise — which Law took to the Prime Minister. It took the form of a statement to be issued by Asquith himself: / have decided, therefore, to create what I regard as a civilian General Staff. This staff will consist of myself as President and of three other members of the Cabinet who have no portfolio and who will devote their whole time to the consideration day by day of the problems which arise in connection with the prosecution of the war. The three members who have undertaken to fulfil these duties are [here there was a blank] and I have invited Mr Lloyd George, and he has consented to act as chairman and to preside at any meeting which, owing to the pressure of other duties, I find it impossible to attend. I propose that the body shall have executive authority subject to this -that it shall rest with me to refer any questions to the decision of the Cabinet which I think should be brought before them. Asquith's first reaction was restrained. He expressed his lack of confidence in Carson as a minister, but did not rule out the idea of a small War Council as proposed. The following day, however, he prepared a more considered answer which Law received on November 27: it was designed 'for your eyes alone'. Asquith questioned the composition of the Council, the political wisdom of shutting out other figures from it and, above all, Lloyd George's own intended role. 'He has many qualities that would fit him for
1752
a first place,' he wrote in unforgettable words, 'but he lacks the one thing needful — he does not inspire trust. In short, the plan could not, in my opinion, be carried out without fatally impairing the confidence of loyal and valued colleagues, and undermining
my own
authority.'
left the triumvirate uncertain of what to do next, and went their own ways, with Carson seeking to increase newspaper pressure on the Prime Minister. (The Daily Chronicle article, already quoted, was of great importance in this campaign), and Northcliffe's Daily Mail appeared on December 2 with a leader headed 'The Limpets — a National Danger'. Law moved in private. On the afternoon of November 30 he somewhat belatedly called together his Unionist minister colleagues — Lansdowne, still very much an odd man out in his views, Curzon, Austen Chamberlain and Robert Cecil ('the three Cs'), Walter Long and F. E. Smith. It was an unpleasant meeting during which the different steps which Law had taken earlier were attacked and during which Cecil accused him of 'dragging the Conservative party at the coat-tails of Lloyd George'. The meeting broke up in disagi'eement. The following day initiative passed to Lloyd George who wrote directly to the Prime Minister setting out his proposals under five brief headings, with Asquith replying tersely almost at once that 'whatever changes are made in the composition or functions of the War Committee, the Prime Minister must be Chairman. He cannot be relegated to the position of an
The reply
at first they
arbiter in the background, or a referee to the Cabinet.' The details of the subsequent unfolding of this remarkable
drama, which ended in Lloyd George's triumph over Asquith, will be dealt with in a later article. Lloyd George took pride in having got rid of 'the Asquith incubus' as Asquith himself moved into the shadows. 'I have been through the hell of a time for the best part of a month,' wrote the outgoing Prime Minister, 'and almost for the first time I begin to feel older. In the end there was nothing else to be done, though it is hateful to give even the semblance of a score of our blackguardly Press.' It remains difficult to relate the political crisis of 1916 to movements of public opinion or to evaluate the influence of the Press on the shaping of public attitudes. The Daily Chronicle and the Daily Mail both had huge circulations, and Horatio Bottomley in the Sunday Pictorial had learnt how to appeal to the public by the written word before he addressed large crowds on the platform. The rhetoric was heavy. 'It is a long time since I prayed,' he wrote on the death of Kitchener. 'But let us all do so today. Kitchener is not dead, we have lent him to God.' Just before Asquith's resignation Evening News placards bore the words 'Bottomley Wanted', and Bottomley himself believed he might get a place in Lloyd George's government. Certainly, once in power, Lloyd George knew how to mobilise opinion and rout his enemies. Yet Punch may well have been right in suggesting that across the Channel the cry was 'Thank God, we've got no political
politicians here'. It would be interesting to collect opinions on this subject from surviving private letters. According to Post Office statistics, 7,500,000 letters were being sent to British troops each week with 5,000,000 censored letters coming back in return. It should be added — and for the troops this figure obviously meant even more than the first — that '700,000 parcels weighing 1,500 tons were also being delivered. Most of these letters and parcels arrived: in the great oceans of the world, however, 160,000 tons of merchant shipping were destroyed each month by German U-boats during the last four months of 1916. If the war was to be won by a new and superior kind of organisation, an answer to this problem had to be found as a matter of urgency. And the winter of 1916/17 was to prove the hardest for 20 years.
first year of Summer Time Looking back over the other events of the year 1916, it is obvious at once that everything else was overshadowed by the Somme. In February the government had decided to close museums and art galleries, which it was claimed were costing £300,000 a year (with an income of only £3,000). During the same month the Final Report on the Committee on Retrenchment proposed that all civil servants should work a minimum eight-hour day. During the summer Asquith made an eloquent plea for the suspension or abandonment of all holidays — and this was also the first year of Summer Time, introduced in May only after noisy protests from farmers everywhere and from munition workers in Sheffield. 'Sham time' was contrasted with 'real' time, but once again Punch found a neat link with the war by showing the Kaiser lying back in bed 'as his sainted Grandfather's clock strikes three' and saying 'The British are just putting their clocks back an hour. I wish I could put ours back about three years.'
The
EMPLOYMENT OF WCM4EN ^600.000
lOO.OOO
<
6 so
ssaooo.
000
-+§00.000
200,000. JUtV
psoooc
'
f
^^
NUMBER OF
WOMEN EMPLOYED
f
A woman tram driver in Lowestoft quite impossible,' wrote Punch in June 1916, to keep pace with all the new
Abo\/e.'
It
is
incarnations of
women
in
wartime'
Top left: A contemporary diagram of the massive increase in the employment of women during the war. Liberals and Conservatives were beginning to change their minds about women's emancipation, and by the end of 1916 only a few diehards remained unconvinced as to its worth. Even Asquith was relenting
K>o.ooo. Below left: All dressed up and nowhere to go -the Architectural Association's 'Air Raid
150.000
Section', believed to be the civil
defence body formed
practising
its first
first
in
uniformed
the war,
aid skills
fOO.OOO.
^
30.000.
NUMBER EMPLOYED
ON
GOVERNMENT
WQPK
Below: Punch's reaction to Lloyd George's take-over of December 1916. Punch said: 'There has been much talk of intrigue, but John Bull doesn't care who leads the country so long as he leads it to victory'
1753
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Asquith's Cabinet — the arena of Lloyd George's struggle for power column: Herbert Asquith (Lib), Prime Minister in the Coalition Government until December 1916. Lord Harcourt (Lib), First Commissioner of Work. Reginald McKenna (Lib), as Chancellor he was the exponent of an outdatea economic philosophy. Sir Herbert Samuel (Lib), Home Office. Second column: David Lloyd George (Lib), moved from the Ministry of First
Munitions to the War Office when Kitchener died. After much intrigue with the Conservatives, he resigned on December 5, 1916. Two days later Asquith resigned and Lloyd George took his place as Prime Minister. Third column: S\r Edward Grey (Lib), Foreign Office. Winston Churchill (Lib), Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Fourth column: Austen Chamberlain (C), India Office. Arthur Balfour (C), First Lord of the Admiralty. Arthur Henderson (Lab), PaymasterGeneral and Labour's main representative in the Coalition Government. Fifth column: Andrew Bonar Law (C), Secretary of State for the Colonies and leader of the Conservatives in the Commons. Lord Curzon (C), the 'most superior person' who was Lord Privy Seal. Lord Kitchener, at the War Office until his dramatic death by drowning in June, 1916
Punch could make fun of what it liked, and it made fun of Parliament almost as often as it did of the Kaiser. The idea of closing museums and art galleries was dealt with very tartly: 'it has been calculated that the annual expenses saved amount to about one-fifth of the public money spent on the salaries of Members of Parliament: Let Art and Science die, But give us still our old Loquacity.' There was one aspect of 1916 which was not fully clear to people at the time. It was during this year that talk of 'reconstruction'— preparing for change at the end of the war — became something more than mere talk. On March 18 Asquith minuted the setting up of 'a Committee over which I will preside, to consider and advise with the aid of sub-committees upon the problems that will arise on the conclusion of Peace, and to co-ordinate work which has already been done by the Departments in this direction'. By the beginning of December this 'Reconstruction Committee' of seven ministers, which included Law, Henderson and Runciman, had collected a large number of detailed suggestions from different departments of government, had held six meetings, launched nine sub-committees and produced five reports. The fruits of all this activity were not gathered until after the end of the war, but it is interesting to note that in the middle of the First World War, as was to be the case also in the Second, the dream of a better society sustained both soldiers and civilians in times of greatest trouble. No one could write long about the condition of England in 1916 without introducing the subject of women. 'It is quite impossible,' Punch wrote in June 1916, 'to keep pace with all the new incarnations of women in wartime — 'bus-conductress, ticket-collector, lift-girl, club waitress, post-woman, bank clerk, motor-driver, farm-labourer, guide, munition maker. There is nothing new in the function of ministering angel: the myriad nurses in hospital here or abroad are only carrying out, though in greater numbers than ever before, what has always been women's mission. But wherever he sees one of these new citizens, or hears fresh stories of their address and ability. Punch is proud and delighted.' He would not always have been so proud and delighted, as he admitted, and there were many other former staunch anti-Suffragettes who changed their minds in 1916. To take Punch's list, 'bus-conductresses were first employed in London in February 1916, and there was a great and continuing increase in all transport jobs for women throughout the war. Banking and finance were providing unprecedented opportunities for the new 'office girl', a key figure in society in the 1920s; agriculture, climbing out of its prewar doldrums, made the most that it could of its new female labour force, while the number of women employed in the biggest branch of female work — domestic service — actually decreased. Munition workers, the most important group of all, were left to the last in Punch's list. They were forced to dress more rationally than women had ever dressed before, and by working alongside men at the bench they lost much of the 'reserve' which even working-class girls had been expected to show before 1914. There was an increase of more than lOO^r in the number of women munition workers (up to 520,000) between July 1915 and July 1916. Their presence in the factories gave a stimulus to the formulation of 'welfare' policies on the part of management and government, and posed extra problems for the trade unions. Not surprisingly, also, they provided a stimulus to the movement of women's franchise. Liberals and Conservatives alike began to shift their pre-1914 positions, with only a few diehards totally unconvinced. On this issue, as on others, Asquith moved ponderously at a different pace from most of his fellowcountrymen, yet in August 1916 he put the leading question and answered it in Gladstonian language — 'Have not the women a special claim to be heard on the many questions that will arise directly affecting their interests? I cannot think that this House will deny that, and I say quite frankly that I cannot deny that claim.'
This was a year, therefore, not only of tricks but of claims, claims on the future. The war had begun with the cry 'Business as Usual'. It was clear by the autumn of 1916 that there could be no postwar 'return to normalcy'. The dear, dead days had
gone beyond
recall.
Further Reading Beaverbrook, Lord, Politicians and the War. 1914-1916 (Collins 1966) Jenkms, R., Asquith (Collins 1964)
Johnson. P B., Land Fit for Heroes (1968) Marwick. A., The Deluge (Bodley Head 1965) [For Lord Briggs biography, see page 111.] '
1755
EAST AFRICA
In their pursuit of the resourceful Lettow Vorbeck's German force in East Africa in 1916, the AlHes' numerical superiority was of little advantage. The German plan was simply to avoid capture and tie down as many Allied troops as possible. Inevitably the campaign became an exhausting duel between hunter and hunted. Roger Sibley. Below: The East African Mounted Rifles in action
SMUTS VORBECK
April 1. 1916 Lieutenant-General Smuts had reorganised the British force in East Africa into three divisions, and had established his GHQ at Old Moshi. 4,800 feet above sea level. With a guaranteed superiority of numbers, he began to plan the next phase of the campaign. The conquest of the Kilimanjaro and
to the
Arusha area
while simultaneous attacks would be made by the Belgians in the west, and General Northey in the south. This was the plan that Smuts adopted. It suffered from the obvious military failing of lack of concentration. The aim should have been to hit the Germans in a decisive encounter. Nevertheless Smuts had realised that it was essential to attack the German colony from other directions. Brigadier-General Sir Charles Crewe was despatched to link up with the Belgians who were commanded by Major-General Tombeur. His task was to see that a maximum degree of co-operation existed with the Belgian force in their planned attack from the west. BrigadierGeneral Northey's force on the Nyasaland-Rhodesian border was also to be co-ordinated into the overall plan envisaged by Smuts. In Smuts' own words: 'Merely to follow the enemy in his very mobile retreat might prove an endless game, with the additional danger that the
By
close to the borders of the
British Protectorate was the obvious initial phase. The next phase was not so simple. German East Africa was a vast territory
with poor roads and no major towns. On the other hand, the two railways were of immense strategical importance as shown in the battle of Tanga during 1914. So was the Tabora area which produced many German askaris. Colonel Meinertzhagen put it well in his diary: 'Smuts is irre-
drawn towards Lettow X'orhi'ck and he persists he will lose the initiative and the campaign will end in simply following Lettow \'orbeck about wherever he chooses to wander. He is more mobile than we are and is operating in his own country. But we have vastly superior forces and should force the pace and dictate operations, making him fight us where we will and not where he wishes.' The first couise open to Smuts was to advance inland by attacking Tanga and Dar es Salaam. This was rejected even though this policy had been a success in German South-West Africa — possibly the memory of the battle of Tanga still lurked in the commander's thoughts. The second possibility was to move south from Lake Victoria via Mwanza against Tabora. This would mean long exposed lines of communications but it would also be a direct threat sistibly if
main
Germans' best recruiting areas. objection to this course of action
engaged the Germans in one area only. The final course open was to attack southwards from Kilimanjaro with a twopronged assauh. one directed along the Usambara railway, the otlier towards the that
it
central railway via
Kondoa
Irangi.
Mean-
(General Manie Botha) and 3rd South African Infantry Brigade (General Berrange) which on April 3 began an advance to Kondoa Irangi. The mounted brigade pushed rapidly forward and located the first German position on the hill of Lolkisale — this was also the only source of water for miles. The South Africans, using the traditional Boer tactics of working uphill from boulder to boulder and firing at each puff of smoke, gained ground and seized the hill, but the real enemy was the severe thirst that both men and horses
Ifl
were beginning to suffer. At this point van Deventer despatched a squadron of the South African Horse on a flank-protecting mission to Madukani. The remainder of the mounted brigade moved forward in spite of the heavy loss of horses, while the infantry toiled along
behind through the mud and rain — the rains, which had come late this year, were to affect considerably the conduct of this campaign. The tragic loss of animals was
forces might split up into guerilla bands doubling back in all directions and
important, for up to this point li-lO horses and 60 mules had died. Resupply became almost impossible, lorries became bogged down, needing teams of mules to pull them out of the mud. The wireless had broken down, motor cycles could not get through the mud and the only means of communications were mounted orderlies posted at intervals of ten miles. The gallant South
rendering effective occupation of the country impossible. In view of the size of the country it was necessary to invade it from various points.' The plan was put into execution by General van Deventer's 2nd Division, comprising 1st South African Mounted Brigade
African Mounted Brigade now (April 12) e only 800 strong and having lost a further i 140 horses and 50 mules, pushed on I through impossible conditions and on April | 18 attacked Kondoa Irangi. ^ The Ciernian forces retreated and the 1st £ South African Brigade had achieved its
enemy
CT
S^
The was
X*^?* '"*^-
^
mission in record time, but with its strength now less than 600, it was completely immobilised. Meinertzhagen said: 'Our capture of Kondoa Irangi took the enemy by surprise. They never suspected we could move so quickly over bad roads in the rains. Neither did they credit Smuts with so bold a move. I doubt whether any British general with British troops could have planned and carried out the move in tropical Africa in the rains. Only South Africans born and bred to long distances and living on the country could have accomplished it.'
Smuts halted at Bwiko (Same) on May 31 — 'the rapidity of the advance had exceeded my best expectations. We had reached the Usambara in ten days covering a distance of about 130 miles over trackless country', he claimed. He now visited 2nd Division at Kondoa Irangi to discuss his plan with van Deventer. The aim was to gain Handeni, thereby driving a wedge between Lettow Vorbeck and Kraut. A dual advance to the central railway might then trap the German forces, bringing Lettow Vorbeck to a decisive battle.
The enemy 'Cunning as an old fox' Kondoa Irangi was situated on an
easily defensible position — the town itself was in a valley surrounded by small hills. So defensive positions were eventually built on the surrounding hills, the South Africans having a distinct reluctance to dig trenches. Lettow Vorbeck transferred a number of companies to the area to hold the British advance, and the Usambara area was thinned out. Meinertzhagen, the Intelligence Staff Officer at GHQ, in his intelligence appreciation realised this had been done, but his assessment was not accepted until too late. It is interesting to get Meinertzhagen's view of van Deven-
Van Deventer is calm and collected, divulging his plans to none, not even his staff. He is as cunning as an old fox and does not make up his mind till the last moment and then he acts like lightning; up to that moment he appears dense and slow. To him a decision is final; there is no swerving, no delay, no alternative plan. At moments he can he acutely acid. He ter:
experiences
some
difficulty
in
realising
the hunter and not the hunted, for during the Boer War he was accustomed to
he
is
the latter role. On May 9, as
was expected, Lettow Vorbeck attacked with 9th, 1 4th, 24th FeldKompanie (FK) commanded by Captain Otto, 15th, 19th FK by Colonel von Bock, and 18th, 22nd, 27th FK by Captain von Kornatzki — in all some 3,000 men. The attacks failed to achieve any objective — a night encounter with poor reconnaissance seldom succeeds — but Lettow Vorbeck got very close to giving van Deventer a lesson. The German attacks had been repulsed so it was not until mid-July that 2nd Division was able to continue the advance. The 'administrative
tail'
took months to catch up
with this rapid advance so the results of the magnificent thrust to Kondoa Irangi were not to be exploited. It is interesting to speculate what the results would have been had Smuts placed another division in reserve and made more logistic support available to van Deventer. By the middle of May the rains had slackened. Major Kraut, who commanded the Usambara forces, had despatched part of his force to Kondoa Irangi to halt 2nd Division's advance and was now reduced to 2,000 rifles. Smuts decided the time was now ripe to push down the Usambara rail-
way. He reorganised Lst and 3rd Divisions into three columns, which advanced without encountering much opposition. The conditions, however, were appalling. Sickness was taking a great toll of the men, the troops were on half rations, and the logistic backing had virtually broken down. Furthermore the division might well have run out of ammunition had heavy fightmg
been encountered. 1758
slips
away
Smuts decided to advance to Handeni with the overall aim of occupying the central railway at Morogoro and Dodoma. The move towards Korogwe went reasonably well apart from the difficult conditions and a few small dug-in German positions. Korogwe was seized after a fine attack on Zuganatto bridge by 3rd Battalion, The King's African Rifles. Smuts had said.that could march faster than the South the African Cavalry. He had already ordered units so the the raising of more strength by June was doubled to 380 officers and 8,100 men. The German with-
KAR
KAR
drawal proceeded unhindered and Smuts entered Handeni on June 18. Meinertzhagen comments: 'It is remarkable that on no single occasion have we won a fight and been able to reap the whole fruits of victory. The enemy always manages to slip away. The reason is not far to seek — over-cautiousness and failure to develop a real flank attack. On no single occasion has any effort been made to get astride the enemy's line of communication.' The advance towards Morogoro continued, while air reports had confirmed that Kraut had prepared defensive positions on the River Lukigura near Makinda. Smuts had now decided to form a flying column comprising the 25th Royal P'usiliers, 2nd Kashmir Rifles and the 5th/6th South African Infantry. It is interesting to note that because of sickness these regiments were down to 170-200 men each. The plan was that Sheppard's column
was to pin the enemy down frontally and the flying column to make a flanking move. The battle turned out to be a great success and the assault got home with the bayonet. This action, although small, was the most notable success achieved by 1st Division and proved that the outflanking move so often attempted could succeed. At this point the efforts of 1st and 3rd Divisions came to a standstill. In a month the columns had marched 200 miles but once again the logistic backing had ground to a halt. The results of the campaign so far were that Smuts' strategy had misled his opponent; an extensive tract of enemy territory was in British hands; at Makinda and Kondoa Irangi the British forces had been brought to a standstill by exhaustion, sickness, the tsetse fly and mosquito, and a logistic system that had ceased to function; and Lettow Vorbeck had suffered no tactical defeat of any importance, the morale of his force was still high. Moreover he had diverted from the European theatre of war British manpower and resources.
By the third week in July van Deventer was ready to resume his advance. Lettow Vorbeck had been forced to recall most of his troops from Kondoa Irangi to counteract Smuts' advance from Handeni. Van
Deventer was not only
to occupy the central railway but also to move his force eastwards so as to co-operate more closely with Smuts' force. The 2nd Division was split into various forces: the cavalry went in a south-easterly direction, the infantry immediately south and the two smaller columns cleared the right flank. Once again the German askaris withdrew skilfully and were not caught in van Deven-
Dodoma, on the central railway, was occupied on July 29. Van Deventer now had a stretch of 100 miles of the railway in his control; he concentrated his forces ready for a thrust eastwards to join up with Smuts. Smuts and 1st and 3rd Divisions were to have a harder advance to the railway, for they were faced by the Nguru Mountains and numerous streams. Smuts was still in personal command of the operation and the division had been reorganised. Throughout the period of inactivity, the Germans had pounded the British positions with the long-range Kbnigsberg guns which had so skilfully been removed when the Kbnigsberg was trapped in the Rufiji Delta. The problem of logistic backing had now been resolved and Smuts decided to advance. The overall plan envisaged was a wide flanking movement by 3rd Division while the 1st East African Brigade under Sheppard was to hold the enemy frontally. For ter's thrusts.
this type of attack to be successful, it was essential for the enemy to be held firm frontally while the flanking movement got under way. Sheppard's column did not make the holding action required, so the
ambitious nothing,
flanking
movement came
and the German
forces
to
again
L 'It I
expected too
may be said that
much of my men, and that
imposed too hard a task on them under the awful conditions of this tropical campaigning. I do not think so. General Smuts I
.
.
.'
Bottom: The 3rd King's African Rifles returning after action They were excellent soldiers, and General Smuts said they could march faster than the tough South African Cavalry could ride Below and below left: Lettow Vorbeck s African troops
slipped
away undefeated. Smuts was now
beginning to realise that von Lettow had no intention of standing and fighting on a prepared defensive position. To advance to ^lorogoro was to be the next objective of 1st and 3rd Divisions. Van Deventer's 2nd Division advanced along the railway towards Kilosa through some of the most difficult country encountered in the campaign, being shelled the whole time by another of the Konigsberg's guns. South of
Morogoro were the Uluguru Mountains, and Smuts attempted, by converging the attacks of 2nd Division and his own force, to trap Lettow Vorbeck with his back against the mountains. After the war Lettow Vorbeck expressed great surprise that Smuts could ever have imagined he would stand and allow himself to be squeezed between the two prongs of the British advance. On August 26 the Rhodesians and the Baluchis entered Morogoro. The German force, as was becoming all too familiar, had slipped away.
The British forces now held the central railway — this was the great "goal of Smuts' strategy and to achieve this result he had stretched his forces to the limit: It may be said that I expected too much of my men, and that I imposed too hard a task on them under the awful conditions of this tropical campaigning. I do not think so. I am sure it was not possible to conduct this campaign successfully in any other way. Hesitation in taking risks, slower moves, closer inspection of these auspices would only have meant the same disappearance of my men from fever and other tropical diseases, without any corresponding compensation.
1759
During 1915, while the British were on the defensive, the. Belgian desire for joint operations were not fulfilled, but in 1916 Smuts had sent Brigadier-General Sir Charles Crewe, a South African politician, to maintain close liaison with General Tombeur. The Belgians had raised a force of some 15,000 men and Sir Charles Crewe had under his command approximately 2,000 men, mainly KAR. The Belgians' plan was to move round Lake Tanganyika and seize the Ruanda-Urundi area of Ger-
man
East Africa. The German forces
of
the
colony.
The Belgians
advanced slowly in Ruanda and Captain Wintgens, the German commander, offered little resistance. It has been suggested that the Germans never had any intention of resisting the Belgians in Ruanda as they visualised that this would be their only incursion into German East Africa. The
further the Belgians advanced, the more isolated they became from their bases in the Congo. Nevertheless, the Belgian occupation of Ruanda was complete by the end of May. The logical next step in the campaign was the seizure of Mwanza, but
Tombeur had been ordered by his government to move against Kigoma and keep
1780
advancing towards Kigoma, and by the end of the month had captured the town.
in
Western Command, as it was known, were under command of Major-General Wahle, a retired officer who had been visiting Dar es Salaam at the outbreak of hostilities and had offered his services to Lettow Vorbeck. He established his HQ at Tabora and had approximately 5,000 men under his command. His aim was not to defend permanently his area against the Belgians and British, but to withdraw and link up with Kraiii and Lettow Vorbeck in the .south-east
his command independent. Crewe decided therefore also to act independently. Mwanza was evacuated by the Germans when they realised that there were two columns converging on the town. The British force was largely made up of the 4th Battalion King's African Rifles, who were in action for the first time as a battalion. The British Lake Force seized Mwanza on •July 14. Meanwhile the Belgians were
Victory for the Belgians of the two commanders in this area were becoming more independent as the campaign progressed. The absence of communications, and a clash of personalities between Tombeur and Crewe accentuated the problem further. The advance to the railway and Tabora was to become an unco-ordinated scramble by the Belgians advancing from Kigoma and the British from Mwanza. Crewe's force had to cover tough arid country and their progress
The operations
was, not unnaturally, painfully slow. The Belgian columns on the other hand had easier territory to cover, lived off the land, and were moi'c dedicated to winning the race to Tabora. They arrived in the outskirts
where Wahle and
a force,
which
included two of the Koni^sberf^'s guns, inflicted a sharp tactical defeat on the Belgians. The Germans then retired in three columns towards Iringa; the Belgians occupying the town on September 19 and Crewe's force arrived some six days later. The Belgians at this point had no further interest in following the Germans; they had achieved all that their government
Above: Brigadier-General Northey, commander of the 3,000-strong Nyasaland-Rhodesia Field Force which moved against Lettow Vorbeck from the south. Below: The destruction of the central railway by the retreating Germans Opposite top left: A mounted brigade under van Deventer moving south against the Germans. Opposite top right: General van Deventer, commander of 2nd Division. Opposite bottom: An Allied patrol contacts the German force and draws their fire
The Allied troops were exhausted by endless marching, and the campaign lost icquired
momentum ol
tlic'in.
In this rpilogue of the
scramble (or Africa, the Belgians had seized Ruanda-Urundi. 'No Belgian interest now existed which would justify further Belgian participation in the campaign.' It was left to Crewe to push eastwards and link up with van Deventer, which he did by the end of September. His force was then disbanded. This small sideshow, predominantly Belgian, had little military effect on the campaign as a whole but won a vast tract of territory for Belgium. The seizure of the railway was complete and the commander now had no worries about the northern part of German East Africa. The Nyasaland-Rhodesia Field Force commanded by Brigadier-General Northey consisted of 1st Battalion King's African Rifles, 1st and 2nd South African Rifles and companies of the BSA Police and Northern Rhodesia Police. This small force, fewer than 3,000 men striking into the south of the German colony, was to become 'the anvil of Smuts' hammer descending from the north', a difficult task for such a small force. The first phase of Northey's plan was to capture Neu Langenburg iMbeya), the German district HQ. His divided into four columns and advanced into German territory. The German forces withdrew and Neu Langenburg was seized. The next phase was to advance force
The 1st Battalion KAR into Iringa. marched over the cold windswept plateau picking up straggling porters and abandoned stores en route. Njombe was seized and during this phase detachments from the Konigsberg were captured, the sailors proving easy game for the askaris in the On July 24, Northey's small force
bush.
1761
•^^T^J
=—
-
0-650
RAILWAYS MILES
1762
Wolfingen and the German askaris, while yet again the Konigsberg's guns were used against the British to good effect. With Bagamoyo captured, preparations now began for the conquest of Dar es Salaam, the capital of German East Africa. Brigadier-General Edwards assembled a of about 2,000 and proceeded to advance in a double thrust supported by the Royal Navy. The town was entered on September 4 by the 129th Baluchis, the German defenders having withdrawn. In the Admiralty prize court, Dar es Salaam was adjudged to have been a naval capture force
and £100,000 prize money was awarded to the Royal Navy! As the German forces were withdrawing into the south-east of the colony Smuts realised that the seizure of the southern coastal ports was vital if the British supply routes were to be shortened. Smuts decided that the whole coastline was to be occupied and Kilwa was the first to be tackled. The
2nd West Indian Regiment landed without incident and the other ports were captured by a force commanded by Major Tyndall. Mikindani and Lindi fell without difiiculty and so the whole coastline was now in British hands. After reaching
Morogoro, despite the exhaustion of his troops and the skilful escape of the German forces, Smuts was determined to continue a dual advance round the Uluguru mountains. This was without doubt one of the most difficult operational areas of the whole campaign. Transport was ordered back to Morogoro and the South Africans forced their way south without blankets, greatcoats, food, porters or information. An extract from the diary of Lance-Corporal Hopper of the 25th Royal Fusiliers (Legion of Frontierstotal
Above: General Smuts,
Commander
of the
Allied forces in East Africa. Opposite top left: Allied native troops man a well-prepared
men!
is telling:
and Lettow Vorbeck was determined fighting as long as the war lasted
We are getting any amount of wild animals' flesh to eat but we don't want it — it is the other things we want. I took 12 jiggers out this morning— I think that is about the average each day! I think it is time they sent us on a sea trip (home) for the good of our health, I think all they are bothering about is seeing who can get the most honours and decorations amongst
came against a prepared defensive
the
Opposite top right: Native gun carriers swear loyalty to Britain on the Koran. Opposite bottom: The pursuit of Lettow Vorbeck's force in German East Africa. By the end of September the Allies were spent — they had taken large areas of territory but had trencfi.
not defeated the
Germans
in
a tactical battle, to go on
position at Malangali but the gallant action of the ensured success. Northey's men had gone so far into enemy territory' that their right flank was dangerously exposed. Of all the columns invading German territory,
KAR
Northey's was the only one which had any real cause to fear a counteroffensive. As Smuts neared Morogoro, it appeared that the German line of retreat would be towards Mahenge rather than Iringa. Nevertheless Northey's column pushed towards Iringa and entered it on August 29. He was now effectively contributing to the course of events in the north. By now his supply line from his base on Lake Nyasa was 150 miles long.
£100,000 prize
money
As Smuts' advance progressed logical operation to seize the
it
was a
major ports
on the coast of German East Africa — this to some extent would ease the critical supply problem. Bagamoyo was captured on August 15 by a combined naval and military force under the command of RearAdmiral Charlton, who landed a party of Marines and Zanzibar Rifles about 300 strong to seize the old Arab town. A stout defence was put up by Captain Bock von
South Africans. Meinertzhagen also
confirms this attitude in a rather humourous account of the awarding of Russian decorations. A large batch of Russian decorations arrived last mail for distribution. There is naturally much grumbling at the method employed in their distribution, for nearly every recipient is a South African. Old Van Deventer was given the plum, the order of St Vladimir. On receiving it he wired to Smuts in great indignation, as he had been told that St Vladimir ranked after St Anne. But on Smuts assuring him that St Vladimir was the prize and very distinguished, van Deventer wires 'Please convey my thanks to the Tsar'. Lance-Corporal Hopper continues in his own descriptive way: / do not care to grouse in this diary although I feel I would like to do so many a time, but we have to put up with things even after we have our grouse and I have not much space to spare — there are often items I would like to speak about which are very galling to us seeing we are all human beings. One part of our orders given to the Company Orderly Sergeant last night referring to the distribution of native carriers on trek (as we have no motors or wagons) reads
as follows:
20 British Officers - 4 porters each (80) 300 Rank and file - 96 porters (96) This allows one porter for three men. That allows the officers to live in luxury whereas we have all our equipment to carry and sometimes they give us two or three days' rations to carry on us to save carriers carrying them for us, and the officers carry nothing except a revolver and have white servants and cooks as well as black servants. The British forces succeeded in taking the Uluguru Mountains area and both columns which had gone round either side of the mountain linked up at Kisaki. By the end of September, the British forces could move no further — transport and supply difficulties had become insuperable, and the troops worn out by incessant hardship and disease could do no more — the British forces in East Africa had come to a standstill.
By the end of September 1916 the campaign, costly beyond all expectations in men, and materially disappointing in its total results, had made some progress before coming once more to a standstill. Lieutenant-General Smuts had gained the central railway, the German capital, a vast tract of German East Africa and all the sea ports. Yet he had failed to defeat the German forces in a tactical battle. Lettow Vorbeck was still at large and prepared to go on fighting. The German commander had maintained and succeeded
aim — the diversion of the maximum amount of British equipment and numbers from the European theatre to the less important East African campaign. Smuts had been anxious to avoid casualties and executed a series of turning movements in his
which
because of his overwhelming numerical superiority forced the enemy to withdraw. Never once did he inflict a tactical defeat on the German commander. The army had to be reshaped because, weakened by months of semi-starvation, exhausted by endless weeks of marching, the troops, the South Africans in particular, were falling sick in such numbers that the hospitals were overflowing and the field units were a mere skeleton force. Only the African askaris of the King's African Rifles were capable of fighting successfully in this type of war.
The campaign had lost all momentum. The army had to be reformed. South African and British battalions sent home system completely overhauled, and many new battalions of the King's African Rifles raised to form the spearhead of the next phase. Lettow for a rest, the logistic
Vorbeck had successfully withdrawn his force and he was determined to fight on for as long as the war lasted. If driven out of German East Africa, he could always invade Portuguese East Africa and from there carry on the struggle.
Further Reading
Crowe. Brig. J.. Smuts' Campaign in East Africa Gardener, B., German East (Cassell 1963) Meinertzhagen, Col., /Army D/ary 7899-7926 (Oliver 1960) Official History. Military
Africa, Vol
1
Moyse-Bartlett,
H., Ttie
(Gale&Polden
[For Major R.
page
360.
Operations
in
East
(HMSO) King's African Rifles
Ltd.)
J.
Sibley's biography, see
]
1763
GDNBOAlTS
ONLAKE lANGANYIKA Kigoma
Lake Tanganyika
In autumn 1915 there took place one of the more romantic episodes of the war: two specially
armed naval motor
boats were shipped from UGANDA
(
London to Cape Town, from where they made the hazardous 2,800-mile overland journey to
Lake Tanganyika, surmounting innumerable difficulties before they eventually cleared the lake of German craft. Peter Kemp. Left: The route to Lake Tanganyika. Right: Native women carry water from a stream eight miles away to the traction engines which pulled the gunboats overland. Inset (foreground) and Toutou in trials on the Thames
are
Mimi
Lake Tanganyika lies in Central Africa, a vast inland sea some 400 miles long and 47 miles across at its narrowest point. In August 1914 it formed the greater part of the western boundary between German East Africa and the Belgian Congo. To the north of German East Africa lay Uganda and Kenya, to the south Rhodesia and Portuguese East Africa. The eastern border was the Indian Ocean, and the total area thus enclosed was greater than that of the whole of Europe.
The German military commander in East Africa wa.'; General von Lettow Vorbeck, and he had two gunboats on Lake Tanganyika, with a third under construction. Within a few weeks of the outbreak of war he had destroyed the only British and Belgian ships which operated on the lake, and thus exercised undisputed control of its waters. This control put an effective stop on all military operations directed against German East Africa, as neither the British nor the Belgians could move for fear of German troops being put ashore in their rear by amphibious operations on the waters of the lake. This state of affairs was explained to the British First Sea Lord in London in April 1915 by a Mr John Lee, a big game hunter who had been prospecting in central Africa. He had been impressed by the ease with which Lettow Vorbeck had been influencing the native tribes in the areas by 17fi4
-
his successes in raiding operations in the
Belgian Congo and Rhodesia, and he feared a general uprising in favour of the Germans. He brought to the First Sea Lord a plan for taking out from England an armed motorboat with which the German gunboats could be engaged and sunk.
The
First
Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry
Jackson, was interested, and inquiries at the War Office and Colonial Office satisfied him that Lee's account of the situation was not exaggerated. As Lee explained to the First Sea Lord, there was no easy way of getting an armed motorboat to Lake Tanganyika, there being no direct rail link. But he had prospected an overland route which, though difficult, he thought might be possible. It involved dragging the boat over the Mitumba Mountains, but with the aid of traction engines, teams of oxen, and
rope tackles, this should not be too difficult. On the following day the First Sea Lord approved Lee's plan, with the exception that two motorboats were to be sent instead of only one. Sir Henry Jackson had proposed to give Lee naval rank and appoint him leader of the expedition, but was advised that a regular naval officer should be appointed, with Lee serving as secondin-command with the rank of LieutenantCommander RNVR. The regular officer selected
was Lieutenant-Commander G.
Spicer-Simson, perhaps not the wisest choice that could have been made for he was apt to be autocratic in his dealings. Two suitable motorboats were found, each 40 feet in length, eight feet across the beam, and with a speed of 15 knots. They were each provided with a 3-pounder gun mounted in the bows and a Maxim gun. and
were named Mimi and Toutou. After initial on the Thames they were taken to Tilbury and hoisted on board the Llanstephan Castle. On June 11 the ship sailed, with Spicer-Simson and a party of four officers and 24 seamen, reaching Capetown on July 2. Lee had gone on ahead to pretrials
pare the overland route. There were no difficulties over the rail journey to Fungurume, which was reached
on August 4. There Mimi and Toutou were unloaded and mounted on the fore carriages of ox wagons. Ten days later their two traction engines arrived by rail, and on the 18th the expedition set off on its 120-mile journey to Sankisia, where there was a rail link to Bukama on the Lualaba River. But by this time Spicer-Simson had already quarrelled with Lee and replaced him locally as second-in-command.
J 1765
The road journey took six weeks. One unforeseen difficulty was the shortage of fresh water, needed not only for drinking but also for the boilers of the traction engines. Added to the water shortage were the heat of the African sun, the dust of the road, and the annoyance of mosquitoes and other insects. The road, too, caused endless difficulties, in some places having to be widened, in others strengthened by bridges, of which more than 200 were built. Nevertheless, all difficulties, including the crossing of the Mitumba Mountains, were finally overcome, and on September 28 the expedition reached Sankisia intact. There the Mimi and Toutou were loaded onto rail trucks, and were brought two days later to Bukama and launched on the Lualaba. There was so little water in the river that the two boats could not use their
1766
engines for fear of damaging their propellers. Casks were therefore lashed undertheir bilges to reduce their draught, and teams of native paddlers engaged to take them through the shallows. It was not until October 21 that the two boats reached Kabalo, where the railway existed which was to take them on the last stage of their journey to Lukuga, on the western shore of Lake Tanganyika. They arrived there on October 28.
Secrecy and surprise
German East Africa there was as yet no knowledge of their arrival. Reports, carried by the tribesmen, of two motorboats being brought overland had indeed reached German East Africa, but the authorities there had looked at the map and decided that such a feat was quite impossible. They In
remained secure in their belief that they alone had warships on the lake. On the arrival of the Mimi and Toutou at Lukuga, arrangements were made with the Belgian authorities to build a small harbour under the guns of the fort to give them protection from the occasional storms
which swept Lake Tanganyika. Rock was blasted from the cliffs and in six weeks a breakwater had been constructed to enclose a small harbour which was named Kalemie. A camp for the seamen and their native helpers was built on top of the cliffs overlooking the harbour. As soon as the harbour was ready, the two motorboats were launched. They ran trials in the lake on December 24 and reached a speed of 13:1
knots.
The German base was
at Kigoma, on the opposite side of the lake. There they had
A three-month trek
three armed ships, the Graf von Gotson, Heduig von Wissmann. and Kingani. The
and fired, the force of the recoil would lift it from its mounting and deposit it over-
via sea, rail, ox-wagon, river
Graf von Gotson was a wooden steamer 200 armed with two 4-inch and two smaller gtins which had been brought overland from the wreck of the Konigsberg after she had been destroyed by British monitors in the Rufiji River. Her gun power was thus vastly greater than that of the Mimi and Toutou, but her maximum speed was thought to be only six knots. The Hedwig von Wissmann was a wooden steamer, length 70 feet and armed with two 6pounder guns both mounted in the bows, and a 37-mm Hotchkiss aft. She had a reputed sf)eed of ten knots. The Kingani had a length of 55 feet with a 37-mm Hotchkiss gun mounted in the forecastle. Her speed was no more than seven knots. During the morning of December 26 the
board.
and then
rail
again
Bottom: Preparing to put MImi on to a steamer on the River Lualaba. In parts the river was so shallow that neither Mimi nor Toutou would risk their propellers: instead casks were lashed to their bilges to reduce their draught and then teams of native paddlers took them through the shallows. Inset left: Mimi and Toutou crossing one of the 200 specially built bridges. Inset right: The gunboats prepare to attack the Kingani. one of the three German gunboats dominating Lake Tanganyika
feet long,
Belgian lookouts reported a German steamer coming down the lake from the direction of Kigoma. She was proceeding quite slowly, close in to the western, or Belgian, shore, and obviously engaged in a reconnaissance of the Belgian positions at
Lukuga. Spicer-Simson waited until she had passed Kalemie, and then put to sea so as to cut her off from her base at Kigoma. With the Mimi and Toutou he look with motorboat, manned by loaded with spare cans chase should prove to the enemy carried her only gun in her bows, he disposed his two armed motorboats one on each quarter, so that the enemy ship would have to turn to fire her gun.
him
a small Belgian British seamen, and of petrol in case the be a long one. Since
The
first kill
For some time the German ship, which was the Kingani. took no notice of the pursuing motorboats. confident that there was no other armed vessel on the lake except those of the German flotilla. It was only when she recognised the White Ensign being flown by the Mi mi and Toutou that she increased to her maximum speed and turned for home. But by now she had left it far too late to escape. The British boats were within 5.000 yards, and soon closed to 2,000. when they opened fire. Because of their frail construction they could fire only dead ahead: if the gun were trained abeam
The rate of fire was at first no more than one round per minute, but as the range shortened the Mimi's shells began to hit and she increased her rate of fire, loading with lyddite shell in place of the common shell with which she had begun the action. With the range down to 1,100 yards one of her shells exploded on the shield of the German's gun. killing the captain and a couple of the crew. A second hit killed the warrant officer, second-in-command, and some of the native crew dived overboard and made for the shore. The helmsman, though dazed b\' the explosions, continued to steer for Kigoma until the chief engineer stopped his engines, came on deck to take over command, hauled down the German
Ensign, and waved his white handkerchief as a signal that the ship was surrendering. The Toutou went alongside the prize and put on board a petty officer and a seaman to bring her in. She was making water through a shell hole in the port bunker. but just managed to reach the harbour at Kalemie and was run ashore in seven feet of water. Later in the day wires were passed under her hull and she was drawn ashore by gangs of native labourers. The shell hole in her hull was patched and a 12-pounder gun. part of the fixed Belgian defences of Lukuga. mounted in her bows. A spare 3-pounder was mounted astern in order to give her all-round fire. SpicerSimson renamed her as HMS Fifi. On January 14 a violent storm swept
Lake Tanganyika and did some damage to the British flotilla. The Toutou was driven ashore on the breakwater and her bows damaged. She sank shortly afterwards, but was easih' raised and beached for repairs. The Fifi. which dragged her anchor and was in danger of being blown ashore, fortunately had steam up and was able to get out into the lake where she lay to a sea anchor until the gale had blown itself out. Early in the morning of February- 9. one of the Belgian lookouts again reported a German ship proceeding slowly down the coast. Half an hour later she was identified as the Heduig von Wissmann. Orders were given to raise steam for full speed in the 1767
and the engines in the Mimi to be Toutou was out of action. SpicerSimson embarked in the Fifi and placed Lieutenant A. E. Wainwright, RNVR, in command of the Mimi. This time SpicerSimson did not wait until the German ship had worked down to the south of Kalemie, but sailed at once to meet her. When he left harbour at 0745 hours, the German ship was still some miles to the northward, with a clear run to her base at Kigoma. Fifi
tested; the
Ships in the sky was a strange day, overcast with cloud, a watery sun breaking through, and the water of the lake like a sheet of glass. This had the effect of producing mirages, and to It
the watchers in the shore camp above Kalemie the three ships appeared to be up in the sky and about four times their normal size. These conditions of mirage apparently explained the inability of the captain of the Hedwig von Wissmann to see the British vessels until they were within a distance of four miles. It may also be that, like the captain of the Kingani before him, he had no knowledge that British armed vessels were operating on the lake and he did not appreciate the danger. Even in spite of the loss of the Kingani, the Germans still had no inkling of the British presence. When she did not return on December 26, they had attributed her loss to the Belgian coastal guns which
were mounted at Lukuga.
As soon as the captain of the Hedwig von Wissmann realised what he was up against, he turned and made for Kigoma at full speed. Spicer-Simson opened fire with his 12-pounder gun, but it was really too large for the Fifi to carry, and the force of the recoil stopped the ship dead in the water. Both the Fifi and the Hedwig von
Wissmann
wood
piled
and drenched
it
with
into their boilers in order to raise pressure for their
oil
the maximum steam engines, but the Hedwig von Wissmann proved herself to be about one knot faster than the Fifi under these conditions, and gradually began to draw clear.
As this was happening, Wainwright in Mimi shot ahead of the Fifi and used
the
his speed to close the German ship, opening fire at a range of 3,000 yards, which was beyond the range of the stern-mounted Hotchkiss in the Hedwig von Wissmann. In order to bring her forward guns to bear, the German ship was forced to swing out to port. The Mimi dodged to starboard and
evaded the German shells, then closed again to renew her fire on the German ship. Each time the Hedwig von Wissmann altered course to bring her guns to bear, she lost distance on the Fifi which, by reason of these manoeuvres, was able to catch up and close the range.
She had been firing at the Hedwig von Wissmann all the time, but unable to see her target clearly because of the mirage, her shells had been falling well ahead of the enemy. When the range had been closed sufficiently the Mimi rejoined the Fifi and reported that her shots were well over. With the next round fired, the Fifi scored a hit, the shell landing on the enemy's deck and bursting in the engine room, blowing a large hole in the ship's side. On fire, and with her engines stopped and steering gear shot away, the Hedwig von
Wissmann swung
helplessly to starboard, sinking by the bow. The boat she lowered, damaged during the action, sank as soon
1768
as the survivors tried to get on board. In two groups they swam off from the sinking ship and were picked up by the Fifi and Mimi. Among the survivors was the Hedwig von Wissmann's captain, Leutnant-zurSee Odebrecht. In all, 12 Germans and eight native crew were picked up, the engineer officer being killed by the shell which burst in the boiler-room. The ship herself, burning furiously, went down about a quarter of an hour after her crew had abandoned her.
Refusal to engage
On the following day, the Graf von Gotson was sighted on a southerly course about two miles off shore. Compared with the British motorboats, and even with the German Kingani, she was a big ship, with a displacement of 800 tons. The Fifi had steam up, and the Mimi's engines were started up and tested. To everyone's surprise, Spicer-Simson made no move. Deaf take his two ships out engage the enemy, he returned to his hut in the camp and refused to embark in the Fifi. The Graf von Gotson steamed to all entreaties to to
slowly away into the distance. This refusal of Spicer-Simson to engage the enemy destroyed with one stroke the
high morale which had been built up throughout the expedition by the previous successful engagements against the Kingani and the Hedwig von Wissmann. Relations with the Belgians at Lukuga, never very cordial because of Spicer-Simson's overbearing vanity, deteriorated still further as a result of this refusal to take action. All further movements of the lake flotilla came to a standstill. Nevertheless, the sinking of the Hedwig von Wissmann had, in the eyes of the military, cleared the way for land operations against German East Africa. They had never heard of the Graf von Gotson, and considered that the lake was clear of German ships when the Hedwig von Wissmann was sunk. Advances against German East Africa were mounted both from the north and south by British and Colonial forces, and the north-west by Belgian troops. Shortly after his refusal to engage the Graf von Gotson, Spicer-Simson left Kalemie to try to find some other vessel which could be brought up to the lake in sections
any
and reassembled there. For this purpose he went to Leopoldville, where the British consul had an official steamer, the St. George. This he considered suitable for his purpose, and gave orders for her to be dismantled and transported to Kalemie for reassembly. During his absence. Lieutenant Wainwright took over the command of the flotilla. In April the flotilla was active in transporting stores for the construction of a seaplane base at Tongwe, about 20 miles north of Kalemie, from which the Belgians hoped
bomb the Graf von Gotson at Kigoma. Spicer-Simson returned in May, after an absence of three months, and once more relations with the Belgians flared up into to
some sort of agreement was patched up under which the small Belgian vessels, over which Spicer-Simson had claimed authority as Senior Naval Officer on the lake, were
The Mimi, Toutou, and Fifi arrived at Kituta in Northern Rhodesia on May 26, in time to support the advance against the fortress of Bismarckburg, and SpicerSimson was ordered to watch the entrance of the harbour to ensure that none of the German garrison should escape by sea. The flotilla arrived off the harbour to find five sailing dhows there — vessels of about 100 tons each and used extensively for the transport of troops — but once again, in spite of requests from his officers to be allowed to take the motorboats in and destroy the dhows, Spicer-Simson refused on the ground that they would come within range of the guns in the fortress. He withdrew the flotilla and returned to Kituta. Four days later, judging that the advancing troops should be reaching Bismarckburg by the following day, SpicerSimson returned with the flotilla. He was too late. Bismarckburg had been captured and the German garrison had escaped in the five dhows which had been seen in harbour earlier, and which Spicer-Simson had refused
to attack.
Ignominious ending was the end of the Lake Tanganyika flotilla, a venture which had been conIt
ceived in the faith and knowledge that British seamen could overcome any and every obstacle in their determination to find the enemy. They had surmounted all the difficulties of an incredible journey overland to reach the waters of the lake on which they were to operate. They had captured one and sunk one of the enemy's three vessels in brilliantly executed actions, and they had no doubts about achieving an equal success against the third, no matter what her size. It was at that point that the incapacity of their unstable commander had fully revealed itself, to bring the whole expedition to a sorry and ignominious ending. His overriding belief had been that he had done enough in his two victories to achieve his own personal fame, and that there was no call for him to prejudice this by taking any further risks. Such fame as he had achieved was partially preserved by the naval doctor who accompanied the expedition in recommending that he be invalided home on the grounds of acute nervous debility. As for the last German ship on the lake, the Graf von Gotson, she was eventually scuttled by the Germans themselves. The Belgian seaplanes from Tongwe attacked her on June 11 and reported hopefully that they had hit her with one bomb. Thus encouraged, the Belgians continued their advance down the east coast of the lake, and captured the German base at Kigoma on July 28. But the Graf von Gotson was not in harbour when they reached the place; only the tops of her masts were showing above water just outside the
harbour entrance, where the Germans had taken her and scuttled her, just before the Belgians arrived.
active quarrels. In the end,
returned to Belgian command, while the British vessels were to proceed to the southern extremity of the lake to assist the British and Rhodesian troops in their advance up the eastern shore.
Further Reading Newbolt, Sir H., Naval Operations, Vol 4
(Longmans, Green & Co 1928) Shankland,
P., Ttie
Phantom
Flotilla
(Collins 1968)
R Tanganytkan guerilla: East African campaign, 1914-18 (New York: Ballantine 1971)
Sibley, J
,
[For Peter Kemp's biography, see page 52.]
r>L()(:KA])E
lUINNEllS The
effectiveness of the British blockade during the first two years of the war left Germany bereft of surface raiders. But the German naval authorities were not lacking in resource, and in the last days of 1915 British masters who had assumed they had nothing more to fear from German raiders found themselves facing a new threat. Christopher Dowling
J
the middle of July 1915 the German surface raiders which had been at sea at the beginning of the war had all, in one way or another, been put out of action.
By
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Emden, Dresden, Niirnberg, Leipzig, Konigsberg, Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse and Cap Trafalgar had been sunk by the Royal Navy; Karlsruhe, after destroying over 70,000 tons of British shipping, had blown up in a mysterious accident; Kronprinz Wilhelm
and
Prinz Eitel Friedrich had been interned in the United States; only Goeben and Breslau were still operative, and they were bottled up in the Sea of Marmara. The last British merchant ship to fall to a German raider was the steamer Coleby, sunk off
Pernambuco by Kronprinz 27, 1915. With the
Wilhelm on March
clearing of the trade routes, the precautions which had hitherto been observed were relaxed. Merchant shipping once again moved freely across the oceans, except in the war zone, where submarines and mines made navigation hazardous. In spite of Admiralty warnings that the security of shipping on the high seas could not always be guaranteed, many British masters confidently assumed that they had nothing more to fear from Ger-
man commerce
raiders.
Only two routes Though the resumption
of British trade in colonial waters was galling to the German naval authorities, they had no immediate plans for a revival of cruiser warfare. The British blockade was so tight that the
chances of a surface ship breaking out into the Atlantic seemed remote. As the Dutch had learnt to their cost during the
wars of the 17th Century, Britain enjoyed an immense strategic advantage over a power with bases in the North Sea or the Baltic, for her geographical position enabled her to control the approaches to the
world's
seaways.
Germany's North Sea
coast, bounded to the west by the Dutch frontier and to the east by the Danish
peninsula, was hardly wider in extent than the stretch of coast between Portsmouth and Dover: consequently traffic entering or leaving Wilhelmshaven and other North Sea ports could be easily watched. There were two routes by which German ships could reach the Atlantic: they could pass through the 21 -mile-wide Straits of Dover into the English Channel or they could go north round Scotland. The Germans believed, with some justification, that the Dover Straits were so strongly defended as to be almost imjjenetrable to surface craft: even the U-Boats were having difficulty getting through. With the Straits virtually sealed, German commerce raiders were restricted to the much more circuitous northern route, thereby consuming a large quantity of precious coal before they could even begin operations. It was impossible for the British to close the upper exit from the North Sea, but an area of some 200,000 square miles between Iceland and Norway was patrolled summer and winter, in icy gales and mountainous seas, by the armed merchant cruisers of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. A few German ships had succeeded in running the blockade, but, apart from the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, which had dodged the British patrols shortly after the outbreak of the war, no German raider had made the attempt. In October 1914
1770
the minelayer Berlin, aided by a good deal of luck, had passed between Iceland and the Faroes and, after laying a minefield north-west coast of Ireland, had off" the returned through the Denmark Strait to Trondheim in Norway, where she was interned. A month later, while the Northern Patrol was being reconstituted, the supply ship Rio Negro, manned by the survivors of the Karlsruhe's crew, managed to reach Norway after an epic voyage from the West Indies. Finally, in February 1915, the captured British steamer Rubens left Wilhelmshaven disguised as a neutral, and, during the long hours of darkness, passed safely between Orkney and the Shetlands carrying supplies for the beleaguered Konigsberg. Since that time, however, the blockading forces had been greatly strengthened. By the spring of 1915 the 10th Cruiser Squadron consisted of 26 armed merchant cruisers,
arranged
in
five
patrol
lines.
could not risk being seen unless she was certain of making a capture. The war had shown that the fast passenger liner, on
whose performance such high hopes had been placed, was of little use as a commerce raider, yet the German Naval Staff" ruled out the employment of merchant auxiliaries because they lacked the speed which was considered essential for cruiser warfare. It seemed that the war on trade would have to be left to the U-Boats.
Saturday night mission
summer of 1915, however, an incident occurred which revealed that the much-despised cargo steamer might, after all, possess considerable possibilities as a commerce raider. In the small hours of Friday, August 6, the German minelayer Meteor, formerly the British merchant ship Vienna, which had already carried out a successful minelaying operation in the White Sea, stole out of Wilhelmshaven on In the
was stationed parallel to the Norwegian coast between latitudes 62 degrees and 64 degrees to intercept ships
a difficult and dangerous mission. Her commander. Captain von Knorr, had orders
attempting to escape north of Iceland. 'A' Patrol extended north of the Faroes, while "C Patrol extended north-west from the
Moray Filth. He had chosen this particular weekend for his enterprise because of the approaching new moon and because it
Hebrides. 'E" and 'F' Patrols were positioned close to the northern and southern coasts of Iceland respectively. The patrols were so arranged that any ship which passed through one line during the night was likely to run into another the following day. In the first six months of 1915 no fewer than 1,610 ships of various nationalities were intercepted by the 10th Cruiser Squadron — an average of over 60 a week. The problem which confronted the German naval authorities if cruiser warfare was to be resumed was that of finding a type of ship which combined the ability to run the formidable British blockade with the necessary qualities of a commerce raider. The Germans realised that a regular warship, though she might be able to fight her way through the British patrol lines, could not hope to elude the Allied navies for long, since, with her distinctive superstructure and all too obvious guns, it was impossible to conceal her identity. Once it was known she was out — and sooner or later her position would be reported — her destruction was inevitable. An auxiliary cruiser stood a better chance of escaping detection, but the results achieved by the four passenger liners that had been employed in this role had been disappointing. Passenger liners, especially the well known ships of the North German Lloyd, were almost as difficult to disguise as warships. They were too extravagant with fuel — the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse consumed 350 tons of coal a day at her normal speed — and too dependent on a complicated supply system to be suitable for cruiser work. The colliers and coaling bases which had been available at the beginning of the war no longer existed. The most successful of the auxiliarjcruisers, the Kronprinz Wilhelm. accounted for 55,939 tons of Allied and neutral shipping in a cruise lasting eight months, a good deal less than the total sunk over a period of three months by both the Emden and the Karlsruhe. On average, the Kronprinz Wilhelm sank only two ships a month. Much of her time at sea was wasted in coaling and provisioning, and she also had to spend a number of days in hiding, for she was always conscious that she
had been observed that British patrols tended to be less vigilant on Saturday
'G'
Patrol
to lay a minefield in the
entrance to the
nights. Meteor reached the Scottish coast as darkness fell on the evening of August 7. She was creeping back to Germany when, at daybreak on August 8, she was sighted and chased bj' the armed boarding steamer Ramsey, which in peacetime had carried
summer
trippers between Liverpool and of Man. The Ramsey ordered Meteor to stop and the boarding party prepared to leave the ship. The Meteor was flying the Russian flag and the British captain had no reason to suspect that she
the
Isle
was other than what she purported
to be, a
harmless tramp. But suddenly Meteor ran up the German ensign and opened a devastating fire at almost point-blank range. The Ramsey, taken completely by surprise, sank in less than four minutes in a pall of smoke, her destruction being completed by a well-placed torpedo, which blew off her stern. After picking up 43 survivors of the Ramsey's crew. Meteor continued on her rather leisurely voyage home. Knorr treated his prisoners with a courtesy reminiscent of earlier and more gentlemanly wars, plying them with cigarettes and cigars, and even holding a funeral service in memory of their dead shipmates. Confident that he was now out of danger, he stopped in the middle of the North Sea to sink a small Danish schooner laden with pitprops. Unknown to Knorr, however, some 14 British cruisers were racing to cut him off". The Meteor's minefield had been discovered early on the 8th. This, together with reports that a patrol yacht and a trawler had sighted suspicious lights, indicated that a surface minelayer had been at work. The Admiralty acted quickly. All the available light cruisers of the Harwich Force were ordered to proceed at full speed to Horn Reef. The 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons were sent from Rosyth in the same direction, while the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which was returning from a sweep off Norway, was dispatched towards the Skagerrak to block the Meteor's other escape route home. Knorr was warned by an airship at 0830 hours on August 9 that British cruisers
I
allowed vessel,
The German cargo steamer
were closing
in
Mowe
takes on board the crew of a British vessel she has just sunk
on him, but by then
it
was
the Germans sent out a powerful covering force they could have saved the Meteor and might at the same time have overwhelmed one of the British light cruiser squadrons; but the action in the Heligoland Bight on August 28, 1914, when the German light cruisers had gone out to drive off a British destroyer force and had been badlv knocked about bv Admiral too
One
late.
Had
that didn
t
get
away- the
British
had made the Commander-in-Chief cautious. As it was, Knorr had only a couple of Zeppelins and a U-Boat to support him. At 1300 hours the smoke of the British cruisers appeared on the horizon. Realising that his position was hopeless, Knorr hastily scuttled his ship and commandeered a Swedish fishing boat. After an argument, the survivors of the Romsev's crew were Beatty's
battle-cruisers,
German
Q-Ship Alcantara smks the German raider Greit
after fighting
to transfer to another neutral from which they were rescued by
one of the Harwich light cruisers. Before parting, Knorr insisted on lending the senior officer of the Ramsey seven pounds in English notes, and the British gave their German captors three cheers. Knorr and his crew reached Germany safely, after iving for days on a diet of 'raw mackerel, bi.scuits, potatoes and patriotic songs'. The lessons of the Meteor's cruise were closely studied by some of the younger and more imaginative German naval officers. The minelayer had been lost because the British had been able to block her only two possible routes back to Germany; in the broader expanses of the Atlantic it would not have been so easy to intercept her. A disguised merchant ship, carrying sufficient armament to deal with any patrol vessel she might encounter, stood a reasonable chance during the long nights of winter of slipping through the British, blockade. A cargo steamer with a speed of 12 or 13 knots would be capable of overhauling the majority of Allied merchantmen, and the relatively small coal consumption and large cargo capacity of such a ship would give her a wide radius of action. Her lack of speed would be offset by her endurance and her ability to deceive. These arguments, however, made little impression on the German Naval Staff, who continued to be sceptical about
employment of merchant auxiliaries. Meanwhile, Admiral von Pohl's staff were
the
m the
North Sea
1771
looking for a second Meteor. To command her they chose Count Nikolaus zu DohnaSchlodien, an experienced seaman, who had been navigation officer in the battleship Pofien. The Count was by no means satisfied with the limited nature of his mission. He succeeded in obtaining a ship, the Pungo, which was suitable for conversion into a commerce raider, and in having a clause authorising him to wage cruiser warfare written into his orders. The Pungo was a steamer of 4,788 tons, built in 1914 for the banana trade. She was faster than the average merchant ship, having a speed of 14 knots, and had the additional advantage of .being easily mis-
taken for a British vessel. She was commissioned as an auxiliary in November 1915 and re-christened Mowe (Seagull). At Count zu Dohna's insistence, the Mowe was given an armament at least as heavy as that carried by any British auxiliary cruiser, consisting of four 5.9-inch guns, one 4.1 -inch gun and four torpedo tubes.
also took on board 500 mines. As with the British Q-Ships, the Moire was fitted with false bulwarks and other ingenious devices, which enabled her to alter her
She
appearance at will. Dohna's orders were couched in very general terms. His first task was to lay mines in all or .some of the following areas: the Pentland Firth, North Minch, Lough Swilly. Bantry Bay, and the estuaries of
He was then, at carry on cruiser warfare. He was warned that he could expect no assistance from German naval headquarters, and it is clear that the Naval Staff did not expject the Mince to return. the Loire and Gironde. his
own
Mines
Mowe
discretion,
to
laid the Elbe under Swedish colours
on December 29 and in stormy weather headed out into the grey waters of the North Sea. Her crew gazed anxiously into the gloom as the Mowe steamed northwai^ds. but there was no sign of the enemy.
southwards through heavy seas. On January 9 she reached the Bay of Biscay and laid a second minefield off La Rochelle. Having got rid of all her mines, the Mowe. which still had a month's supply of coal in her bunkers, was free to prey on British
Dohna hugged the Norwegian
trade.
left
early
coast — the course normally followed by ships attempting to run the blockade — and, after passing thiough the British patrol line north of the Faroes, an-ived on New Year's Day off the western entrance of the Pentland Firth. There, on a night of wind and snow, E Mowe proceeded to lay 252 mines, fixing her position with the help of the Cape I Wrath and Sule Skerry lighthouses. Owing I to the demand for sloops and trawlers in 5 the Mediterranean, the patrols in the Cape g. Wrath area were unusually weak, and the ^ German raider was not detected. It was not S;
long before the Whiten Head Bank mineas the Germans called it, claimed Lis first victim. On January 6, 1916, the old battleship King Edward VII struck one of Mowe's mines and sank while on her way from Scapa Flow to Belfast for a refit. The minefield was not cleared until after the war, and warships bound to and from Scapa Flow had to be sent north of the Orkneys. In the meanwhile the Mowe had disappeared into the Atlantic and was battling field,
Dohna decided
to cruise
1
along the
great ocean highway between Cap Finistere and the Canaries, where traffic from the Pacific and from the ports of South America converged with traffic coming up the west coast of Africa from the Cape of Good Hope and the Indian Ocean. This important area had not been disturbed by a German raider for nearly a year. On the morning of January 11, when Mowe was about 150 miles west of Cap Finistere, one of her keen-eyed lookouts sighted a smudge of smoke on the starboard bow. Mowe altered course and wa^gi^du
-.:?
1
ally closing what appeared to be a British steamer of about her own size when a second vessel was sighted to port. In reply to the peremptory signal, 'What ship is
that?" the latter disclosed that she was the Farringford. To the astonishment of the British master, the Mince, which had been disguised as an Ellerman Line steamer, hoisted the German ensign and ordered the Farringford to stop and abandon ship.
The Farringford was unarmed and resistance was out of the question. She was carrying a cargo of copper ore, and, after her off, she was sunk by
crew had been taken shell-fire.
The Muue now set off in pursuit of the other steamer, which had become lost to view in a rain squall. Her mast^^r, however, had made the mistake of holding to his original course, and the fugitive ship was run down after a two-hour chase. She turned out to be the Corbridge. bound for Brazil with a cargo of Welsh coal, a prize too valuable to be sunk. She was dispatched with a German prize crew to a prearranged rendezvous off the coast of Brazil. In the course of the next few days Mowe sank Dromonby, Author, Trader and Ariadne, and captured the 7,781-ton Elder Dempster liner Appam. which included among her passengers the Governor of
Above Count Nikolaus zu Dohna-Schlodien on the bridge the limited nature of his mission Below The Meteor, sunk
of the
I
-»H ,S;.,
•%.
M f
Mowe He was not satisfied HMS Ramsey
after destroying
with
British
Danish
Argentine
Sent
|A|^ I7IO
in
Intercepted
Sent
in
Rumanian
Brazihan
I
Intercepted
Belgian
Greek
Dutch
AlC*
Russian
Spanish
Swedish
berman
-rench
American
8 3
300 606 90
264 17
1
346 67
_
256 27
144 154 51
Unequal contest
On
274 7
124 2
11
1
42
130
568
1
17
68
Victims of British vigilance- vessels intercepted and sent into port bv the 10th Cruiser Squadron.
Sierra Leone and the Administrator of Nigeria, as well as a group of German prisoners of war from the Cameroons. Count zu Dohna later discovered that in addition to a valuable cargo of rubber and copra, the Appam had on board about £50,000 in bullion. Though the liner mounted a 3-pounder gun, her master, out of consideration for his passengers, had refrained from using it. Dohna took the opportunity of transferring to the more spacious accommodation of the Appam the 150 prisoners who were crowded on board the Mowe. The Appam was placed in charge of a German prize crew and was ordered, for the time being, to remain in company. Because of the skill with which Dohna had concealed his traces, the Mowe's existence was still unknown to the British Admiralty. None of the vessels that had so far been intercepted had been fitted with wireless, apart from the Appam, and her signals for help had been jammed. Count zu Dohna was, however, venturing into dangerous waters. The Naval Staff had not been able to give him any information about the British forces in the Atlantic, but in the Madeira-Canaries area were the cruisers King Alfred and Essex, and the armed merchant cruisers Carmania and Ophir, under the command"of Rear- Admiral Sir Archibald Moore. To the south of this squadron were the cruiser Highflyer and the armed merchant cruiser Marmora, while stationed off the south-east coast of South America were the light cruisers Glasgow and Vindictive, and the armed merchant cruisers Macedonia and Orama.
the evening of January 16, about 120 miles south-west of Madeira, the Mowe met the Clan Mactavish, a defensivelyarmed ship of 5,816 tons. The master of the Clan Mactavish did not intend to surrender his ship tamely; on being ordered to stop he radioed for help and tried to escape. The Mowe opened fire, and the darkness was stabbed by the lurid flashes of shell-burst. The steamer replied, rather wildly, with her 6-pounder gun. Though shells rained down on her she maintained the uneqiial contest until 19 of her crew had been killed and her engines had been put out of action. When the master of the Clan Mactavish was brought before him. Count zu Dohna upbraided him for his folly in taking on a ship so much more powerful than his own. The Scottish skipper stoutly maintained •n regarded it as his duty to defend his vich the gun that had been provided to r.-^t purpose, whereupon the Count
shook hands with him and admitted that if he had been in his position he would probably have done the same. The distress signal which the Clan Mactavish managed to send out was picked up in the engine room of HMS Essex, but was not passed on to the decoding officer. But for this extraordinary piece of negligence on the part of a couple of ratings, the whole of Admiral Moore's squadron would have been hunting for the Mowe early next day. Although the Clan Mactavish was carrying a valuable cargo of wool, leather and other Australian commodities, she was too badly damaged to be worth preserving. Dohna accordingly sank her and continued on his course to the south-west. Shortly afterwards he detached the Appam with the crews of the seven ships he had captured, retaining on board the Mowe 54 British officers and naval ratings, as well as about 100 lascars. Appam's commander, Sub-Lieutenant Berg, was instructed to steer for an American port, the distance being great enough to prevent news of the Mowe being made known for days. The prisoners were warned that if they gave any trouble the ship would at once be blown up. The Appam reached Newport. News, Virginia, at the end of January 1916 after
an uneventful voyage. The Mowe was now running short of coal, and Dohna's immediate concern was to find Corbridge and replenish his bunkers. He had arranged to meet Corbridge off" the island of Maraca at the mouth of the Amazon, where Karlsruhe had coaled from Patagonia in August 1914. He was making for this isolated spot when, on the evening of February 22, he encountered and sank the beautiful three-masted barque Edinburgh, which was homeward-bound to Liverpool with a cargo of rice from Rangoon. Even the Germans were moved as the Edinburgh, with flames leaping up her rigging, slid gracefully, stern-first, beneath
the water. Five days later, Mowe picked up Corbridge and, in stifling heat, took on
board enough coal for another month's cruising. Corbridge was then scuttled. Count zu Dohna planned to begin the second half of his cruise by operating be-
tween Fernando Noronha and the Cape Verde Islands. This area, which was a focal point for the important South American trade, had been a fruitful hunting ground for Karlsruhe and Kronprinz Wilhelm. But the Mowe found the seas deserted.
The
Other vess
Itahan
166 212 54
"208 221
93
1
Fishing craft
reason, as
Dohna
rightly
surmised, was that the Appam had at last arrived in the United States, bringing with her the news that the Mowe was at large
In
1555
\
' ;
!
3
743 390 889
1915 an average of 60 a week were caught in the Atlantic.
The Admiralty had taken
immediate
counter-measures, sending cruisers to search for the raider and warning shipping to keep off the trade routes. After steaming for several days without sighting a single ship, the Mowe captured and sank the Belgian collier, Luxembourg, and on February 6 a British collier. Flamenco, fell into her clutches. From photographs found on her crew. Count zu Dohna discovered that the Flamenco had been stopped by HMS Glasgow only the day before. In fact, on the evening of February 5, Glasgow had passed almost within sight of the Mowe. Dohna altered the Mowe's appearance and moved towards St Paul Rocks, where, in quick succession, he captured Westburn, sailing from Cardiff" to Buenos Aires with a cargo of coal, and sank Horace, bound for the same destination with a general cargo, which included a
consignment of copper.
A
second batch of prisoners were sent in the Westburn with a small German prize crew under the command of Lieutenant Badewitz. Westburn eventually reached Santa Cruz in the Canaries, where she was scuttled. Badewitz managed to escape from Spanish internment and got back to Germany in time to join the Mowe on her second cruise. While the Mowe was transferring her prisoners to the Westburn she had another narrow escape, nearly being intercepted by HMS Highflyer, which had sunk the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse. After the Westburn's departure, the Mowe ploughed steadily northwards for about a fortnight without making any further captures. Dohna had by now decided to turn for home. His decision was prompted by a spell of rough weather in the middle of February, which made cruiser warfare impossible, and also by the fact that the Mowe's engines were beginning to show signs of wear. On February 24, when he was crossing the North American trade route north-west of Cap Finistere, he sank the French ship Maroni and on the following day picked up his last prize, the British
away
steamer Saxon Prince. As the Mowe approached the patrol zone the tension on board increased, for no German raider had ever attempted to run the blockade from outside. Dohna, who was determined to round off" his cruise by bringing his ship safely back to Germany, had intended to return north of Iceland, but a loss of speed caused by leaks in two of the
Mowe's
boilers forced
On February
him
to
abandon
Mowe was
this
100 miles south of Iceland. Intercepted wireless idea.
29 the
messages enabled Dohna to plot the approximate positions of the British patrols. Now, once again, rough seas and poor visibility helped to conceal his movements.
Making
as little
smoke
as possible, the
Mowe
broke through the patrol line between Iceland and the Faroes, and on March 3 came in sight of the coast of Norway. After narrowly avoiding a British squadron in the Skagerrak, she reached Horn Reef, where she was met by a detachment of the High Seas Fleet. At dawn on March 4, in spring-like weather, the Mowe, with the house-flags of her captured victims fluttering from her masthead, steamed into Wilhelmshaven to receive a hero's welcome.
Amazing luck The war at sea had not been going well, and German propagandists made the most
Like the British Q-Ships, the Mowe could alter her
appearance at will
Mowe's exploits. A medal was struck showing a seagull with a fish in its mouth flying triumphantly over a chain guarded by two ancient and somnolent sea lions. A
of the
grateful Kaiser conferred the Iron Cross, 2nd Class upon the entire crew, and
awarded Count zu Dohna Germany's highest decoration, the Pour le Merite. In the course of her two month's cruise, the Mowe had accounted for 15 ships totalling over 60,000 tons — more than had been achieved over the same period by all the U-Boats in the Mediterranean. Count zu Dohna had shown himself to be a skilful, daring and humane commander. Above all, he had been endowed with amazing luck, that essential attribute of the successful corsair. Had it not been necessary for him to land most of his prisoners before returning to Germany, his presence in the Atlantic might never have been discovered.
While the Mowe was of Iceland, another
still
some way south
German
raider 'put to
This was the Grez/CVulture), originally the Steamer Guben, which was fitted out sea.
as an auxiliary cruiser in January 1916. She was armed with four 5.9-inch guns and two torpedo tubes, and carried a crew of 307. Her commander had orders to raid British commerce in the Atlantic, but he was allowed to choose his own sphere of operations. The Greif left the Elbe at dawn on February 27 disguised as a Norwegian steamer. The weather was misty with flurries of snow, and the Greif soon lost contact with the submarine 70, which had been sent to reconnoitre ahead. About 70 miles west of Lindesnaes 70 sighted a British submarine, which may later have fallen in with the Greif and reported her position, for at 1200 hours on February 28 the
U
U
Below: One
of the
most daring raiders
of the
German cargo steamer Mowe with her armaments revealed. On each side were con-
war, the
cealed two torpedo tubes and two 15-cm guns. Mowe dodged the blockade to break out into the Atlantic, where she conducted a highly successful pirate campaign accounting for some 60,000 tons of Allied and neutral shipping
1775
Admiralty learnt that a disguised raider was coming out of the Skagerrak.
The German raider sailed straight into a carefully laid trap. At 0915 hours on February 29 she was intercepted northeast of the Shetlands by the armed merchant cruiser Alcantara, one of the best gunnery ships in the 10th Cruiser Squadron. Alcantara, which had another armed merchant cruiser, Ande.'i. in sight, had been warned that a raider might pass through the patrol line that day, and her commander. Captain T. E. Wardle. had cleared for action. In response to the Alcantara's signals, the dreif identified herself as the Rcna. sailing from La Plata to Trondheim.
Her appearance seemed
to
correspond with
the details gi\en in Lloyd's List, and Captain Wardle decided to put an armed guard on her before going to the assistance of the Ancles, which was chasing another vessel. The boarding boat was being hoisted out when the Ancles, which was about 14 miles away, signalled, 'This is the suspicious ship.' Almost simultaneously, the Greif unmasked her guns and opened fire at a range of little more than 1,200 yards. Her first few shots shattered Alcantara's boat and disabled her steering gear. But Alcantara, although out of control, soon began to hit back, wiecking the drclf's upper decks and setting hei' on fire amidships. One by one. the (ircif's guns were silenced: through the dense smoke that poured from her hull men could be seen taking to the boats. By now the A/ides had arrived on the scene, and the cruiser Comas and the destroyer Munster were coming up at full speed. However, the Alcantara, which may ha\e been hit iiy one of the Greif s torpedoes, had developed
Above. SS Clan H/lactavish and Below: The old British battleship. King Edward VII, born victims of the Moi/ves daring, the merchantman by gunfire and the battleship by mines
list to port, and at 1108 hours she turned over and sank. Andes, Comus and Munster stood by to pick up the survivors
a serious
and to finish off the Greif, which went down at 1300 hours with colours flying. Before she weighed anchor, the Greif had been inspected by the Kaiser's brother. Prince Henry of Prussia, and the Station Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bachman, and it is possible that the publicity which a kind inevitably attracted may responsible for the raider's downfall: certainly the Admiralty seem to have been remarkably well-informed of her movements. Whether or not the Greif was the victim of espionage, the Germans could hardly have chosen a more unfavourable moment to send her to sea, for the nights were getting shorter and, as a result of the visit of this
have
been
MoLve's activities, the British patrols were very much on the alert.
With the loss of the Greif. the first phase Germany's new policy of'cruisei' warfare came to an end. But no blockade, however of
can be made completely waterThe Mowe had demonstrated that it
efficient,
tight.
was
possible for a disguised auxiliary to pass from the North Sea into the Atlantic and return without being seen. By using a cargo steamer rather than a regular warship or a passenger liner the Germans had, to some extent, been able to overcome the problem of having no coaling bases. The damage inflicted on British trade had not been great, but the discovery that a German raider was once again loose in the shipping lanes had caused a good deal of public disquiet. There was, as the Admiralty were only too well aware, a danger that the Germans might launch a coordinated attack on the outer trade routes. In June, July and October there w-ere rumours that a raider was about to put to sea, and special precautions were adopted. Three cruiser squadrons were given standing orders to patrol all the exits from the North Sea as soon as news was received that a raider was out. It was not to be long before thesedispositions were put to the test. Further Reading Chatterton, E. K., The Sea Raiders (Hurst and Blackett 1930)
Dohna-Schlodien, Count N. zu, Der Mowe Fahten und Abenteuer (Fnednch Andreas Perthes 1927) Hurd, A., The Merchant Navy. Volume II (John Murray 1924) Mantey. E. von, Der Kreuzerkrieg, Volume
III
Mittler 1937)
For Chnstapher DoLcling's biography, see page 340.
17"s
THE KUT GARRISON Hardship and Starvation If deprivation and disease had been the lot of the British and Indian troops in the Kut garrison during the months of siege, surrender brought them a worse fate. In the searing heat of the Turkish summer, their captors marched them more than 1,000 miles over mountain and desert to POW camps in Anatolia — an ordeal which only one third of the British soldiers survived. W. C. Spackman. Left: On the edge of survival — Indian prisoners
Kut had
fallen at last, after a siege of almost five months. Relief had failed to get through and a successful sortie was
physically impossible. The progressively reduced British daily ration, including the pathetically small amount it had been possible to drop into the besieged area by aeroplane, had been finally exhausted. Weakened by starvation with its attendant menaces of deficiency diseases, beri-beri and scurvy, and by epidemics of malaria and dysenterv', the prospect was a bleak one for the British troops. On April 29, 1916. the day the garrison fell, 119f of the men were in hospital
and many more would need strengthening before they could be expected to face the long desert and mountain march ahead of them— 1,200 miles in the burning heat of May and June. In the event, of some 12,000 who went into captivitv under the Turks, at least 4,000 died. About 2,600 British officers and other ranks became prisoners of war and only 700 returned at the end of the war two and a half years later. But the 9,000 Indians fared rather better. They had been recruited from villages in India where food was simple and largely vegetarian, and where footwear was seldom worn, so that they adapted more easily to conditions prevailing on the appalling march which destroyed their British comrades. Many of the Indians unaccounted for after the war were thought to have been
Mohammedans who
found little difficulty in hiding as religious pilgrims in a land
where there were so many highly-revered Holy Places of Islam annually attracting large numbers of devout Moslems from India. Moreover, the Turks were naturally inclined
to
give preference to their cobut desirable
religionists where minor privileges were concerned.
Separation and repatriation stage of the British troops' march into captivity began on April 30, the day following their surrender, when they were moved to the Turkish camp at Shumran in a bend of the river Tigris eight miles above Kut. The Turks immediately separated the British and Indian officers from their
The
first
was continued therebeing that the men would be more amenable to Turkish discipline when deprived of support and guidance.
men, and
this policy
after, the idea
A
large proportion of the
men and
all
the officers were taken up to the Turkish the Turkish river steamei's Basra and Burhanieh; but, under orders from the local commander who pleaded shortage of
camp by
coal, a considerable
number
of
men from
the regimental units were made to march. Many failed to reach their destination, a few died on the track while others struggled into Shumran in a severely weakened condition. Within a week, 300 men died at Shumran from a form of starvation dysentery. But over a thousand prisoners
had been exchanged
for
fit
Turkish
prisoners and later, at Baghdad, a further 345 with several senior British doctors were sent down to get them off Turkish hands. The Turks were concerned to create the impression that a fit and strong British force had been beaten and captured. On arrival at Shumran camp a large issue of the notorious Turkish Army ration biscuits was given to the hungry prisoners.
These biscuits were round discs
five
inches across and three-quarters of an inch thick and composed of coarse wholemeal liberally diluted with husk and miscellaneous sweepings such as sawdust. They were as hard as boards and could only be eaten if broken into fragments or made into a nauseating gruel by prolonged boiling, but such was the hunger of the troops that they were greedily consumed washed down with draughts of dirty Tigris water. The result was an immediate outbreak of violent choleric dysentery affecting almost everybody and often remaining in a milder chronic form for weeks. This disease crippled hundreds of men during the onward marches, far beyond Baghdad and Mosul, over the Amanus and Taurus mountain camps in ranges to the ultimate Anatolia. At Shumran soldiers struggled out, often on hands and knees, to the trench latrines behind the lines. A few of them at this time had small bivouac tents but to add to their miseries, many of the troops had no shelter at all from the intense midday heat or the chilly nights.
POW
And, as always in camps in Mesopotamia, an intolerable plague of insatiable flies pestered the
men
all
day.
Throughout the 1,200-mile march into Anatolia and the settled camps the British officers suffered less severely than the ranks. During the siege their lot had been less severe: their messes had been able to maintain a small extra ration to supplement the official issue and they had possessed a certain amount of money, including a slightly higher share of that distributed at capitulation in rupees and gold from the Field Treasure Chest. The troops had had very little. In their army life they had been provided with all their basic needs and what monev they had they tend-
1779
ed to spend on the fancies and urges of the moment without regard for the desperate stresses ahead. It is known that at least one soldier, overcome by hunger and having run out of small change and negotiable items of kit, gave a golden sovereign to a village Arab for a couple of loaves and a hunk of dates. The question invariably asked of expri-soners of the Turks was: 'How did they treat you?' Many exaggerated stories have been told and the truth is elusive. Sandes, one of the prisonei's concerned, gives, perhaps, a fair estimate of the Turks' attitude to their charges: 'The utter neglect shown to us officers by the Turks may be traced, not to ill-will, but to absolute apathy, dislike of responsibility and incompetence. Our captors were not cruel to us nor even hostile but in most cases simply left us alone and neglected all appeals for assistance.' but there is also ample evidence to support the suggestion that the Turks were deliberately cruel. Soldiers in the ranks suffered incomparably worse than the officers, and there was little evidence in the Turks' treatment of them that they were being considered as 'Turkey's Honoured Guests' — a promise made by Enver Pasha after Kul's collapse, but remembered more often by the 'guests' than by the hosts. The only exception made by the Turks was in favour of General Townshend, the Garrison's Commander, who was sent forward to Constantinople travelling in VIP style to live in comparative comfort on an island in the Sea of Marmara. Self help To form a balanced judgment of the Turks' it undoubtedly helps to make a appraisal of Ihe war from the Turks" point of view. Almost immediately after their disastrous Balkan Wars, the Tui'ks found themselves fighting for their very existence against the British at Gallipoli, against Allenby in Palestine and Maude on the Tigris, and against the Russians on the Persian and Caucasian Fronts, with almost non-existent transport and immensely long lines of communication. Their crude oil supplies at Abadan in the Persian Gulf had heen cut off and their coal for the river steamers and rail-
behaviour realistic
way engines was almost finished. I myself remember an occasion during the Turkish evacuation of Baghdad, when I was aboard Turkish steamer that was raided by an armed party from an accompanying tug who removed at gun point most of our small stock of coal. All the passengers were put to gathering bundles of scrub Jungle and anything that would burn to keep up a head of steam. Under prevailing a
circumstances, the Allied troops could hard1\ have expected to be better treated than the hard-pressed and often ragged Turkish soldiers as regards transport and rations, although in the early days of their captivity even a short breakdown or any active ill-treatment by the Arab escort had disastrous effects on the debilitated troops marching north. They soon learnt that, because of confusion and incompetence, all internal organisation and most of the rationing had to be done by themselves. Rations would be dumped in bulk and distributed by the prisoners who bought individually from the Arabs as opportunity and funds offered. At Shunu'an camp during the week was there, a splenI
ITSO
and hospital supplies was shipped up the Tigris to us from the Relieving Force below Kiit, but by the time we had been allowed to take it over we were on the point of being marched off north and many of the troops who should have benefited were already dead or beyond recovery. At the larger military centres and at the final camps the prisoners received a standard issue of Turkish loaves, of variable quality, made free or at a very cheap rate. Local items of food were plentiful and good, the price sometimes depending on the avarice of the local guard or intermediary. The officers were issued at irregular intervals with pay at an official rate almost totally inadequate for ordinary needs. An average rate of pay for a lieutenant was seven Turkish pounds a month in paper money, that of a captain eight pounds. Supplementary cash from neutral diplomatic sources was often available, however, and trusting local merchants would sometimes cash cheques — made out did cargo of British rations
on scraps of paper at not too exorbitant rates of discount. These were all redeemed in due course in England. But the troops, British and Indian, received pay at a much lower rate and in view of the terrible conditions they encountered on the march difference often became a critical factor between death and survival. In addition to money there are other factors almost equally important for survival as a prisoner of war — language, adaptability and cunning — hut llie.se are of littli' u.se when physical condition has fallen below a ceitain point. Every prisonthis
er in every war has learnt the value — indeed the necessity — of being able to communicate with his captors. Senior officers, usually Turks, sometimes knew a little French, but their own language was not very difficult to learn and some study of it when opportunity offered enabled a prisoner to be helpful to his fellows and
was welcomed by Turkish
officials in facili-
tating ordinary business whether in transit or in camp.
• Smyrna 730
miles across the
Amanus
and Taurus mountains
via
Islahiye- mostly on foot-
ANATOLIA
to
The
camps
officers
in
Anatolia.
who
had been
Black Sea
TURKEY
better fed on the journey
were mostly and
able to survive
a far larger
of casualties
percentage
were
Railway.
troops.
Of 1200 British and Indian prisoners
who began
march 400
360 miles
the
died.
Heat, dust and stagnant water With these considerations in mind we can now trace in some detail the actual journey from Shumran north and west into Anatolia. It comprised the following sections: • Shumran to Baghdad 100 miles by river steamer or desert march. • Baghdad to Samarra 80 miles by the completed southern section of the Baghdad
via
Nisibin
• Samarra
Mosul and
toRas
el
The average day temperature was 100° but the temperature
fell
night to
sharply at
below 40°
Average rations per day per man:
1
handful of rice, 2chapattis. tea.
Nisibin
20 miles
to
Ras
el
men were crammed
into a cattle
iMl
the temperature reached 114° In the evening they were allowed down to the river
for a
80
wash
miles by Baghdad
railway to Samarra.
The prisoners were herded info huts while a band of donkeys was collected for the next stage.
100 miles by river steamer and desert march to Baghdad. At Baghdad officers and men were marched through the streets as a public spectacle.
40
miles to
Mosul) 380
Hk Hp
by donkey
shed which had no ventilation and where
(via
/^
across the desert to Takrit.
Here the
Ain
miles by desert march. • Ras el Ain via the Amanus and Taurus Mountain ranges to the various camps in Anatolia about 730 miles, chiefly by rail except for two long sections in the mountains where it was incomplete. Total about 1,200 miles. The first party was made up of 100 British and Indian officers with an allot-
Ain.
w
Shumran
Some went
by river steamer. the ma|ority marched in
temperatures At Shumran
of
300 men
90° died
of dysentery on arriva
and several hundred contracted choleric dysentery
ARABIA
after eating Turkish
army
ration biscuits.
The
staple diet of prisoners — army ration biscuits
™
washed down with draughts of dirty Tigris water Left: Victim not simply of war. but of Turkish apathy and incompetence. Prisoners who lived through the long march testified that the Turks were seldom cruel but in most cases simply left us alone and neglected all appeals for assistance Above: After Kut. the road to captivity.
At each resting place the officers fared better than the men. being given more comfortable quarters and at some places a little money with which they could buy food. Above right: General Melliss. VC He followed his men into captivity and spent all his money and energy on trying to relieve their sufferings. Right: Some of Kut s wounded are exchanged for Turkish prisoners
1781
merit of orderlies and mess servants and was sent up to Baghdad by river steamer. Each man was allowed at this stage to take 200 pounds of kit, but most of this was of necessity disposed of or discarded early in their journey for lack of transport. arrival at Baghdad they were marched as a public spectacle through the main streets and the great covered bazaar, but there was a noticeable lack of hostility from
On
the mixed crowds who watched them on their way to the empty cavalry barracks to the north of the town. The Indian and British officers then made a mutual agreement to live and feed in separate parts of the barracks. A local contractor supplied them twice a day with a meat and vegetable stew which they supplemented with items of food bought from hawkers at the gate. All such items were cheap and nutritious and the strength of the men gradually returned though it was weeks before their residual hunger abated. After their tobacco starvation the local Arab cigarettes found a brisk market. Before they left Baghdad two days later, tightly packed in closed railway carriages for the hot and dusty 80 miles to Samarra, the American Consul, Mr Brissel, helped each man with a small but invaluable amount of money in addition to the advance of pay he had received from the Turks. At Samarra they camped in what was to be the railway station, then consisting of a couple of buildings and an over-worked water stand pipe. In the distance to the east across the river lay the town of Samarra, magnified by the mirage and topped by the great mosque with its golden
dome, and
walls.
at Samarra for three days of dejected donkeys was
collected to take
The
mud
high
its
They halted while a band
them on the next
stage.
were the worst. By the following day, after marching all night, they faced overpowering heat. When the column halted, they flopped down with the donkey's rope tied to first
20 miles
to Takrit
their wrists to prevent his straying. The donkeys always walked into and fouled any stagnant water en route and only their uncontrollable thirst forced the men to drink it. When the last arrivals finally staggered into the village of Takrit, perched above the river, they were herded into the far end of a long narrow and stinking cattle shed that was unbearably hot and without any form of ventilation. Had they settled down there in their exhausted state many might have died of heat stroke and suffocation as they did in the Black Hole of Calcutta. But they got permission to lie down in a narrow band of shade under a mud wall after buying some drinking water from the villagers. In the evening they persuaded Elmi Bey, the leader of the column, to let them go down to the river for a wash and a drink which did much to restore morale. One of them had an
enamel
basin which yoghourt, eggs, date
wheat
(bulgar), all
they trisacle
filled
with
and boiled
mixed together.
Takrit was a tragic village for the following-up parties of troops and gained an evil reputation for the active heartlessness of
its
inhabitants.
many
In
that
same
cattle
unable to march further, lingered in illness, misery and exhaustion and died lonely and forsaken. Towards the end of May 1916 the column arrived at Mosul. From that time, large columns of troops passed through the town shed
1782
soldiers,
on their way north every few days. They were imprisoned in the ancient military caserne where the sanitary arrangements were appalling and where bed bugs plagued them. After a protest to Enver Pasha when he passed through the town, the sick were transported to the Military Hospital nearby where limited facilities for nursing and diet were available. A few of the patients had ulcers and sore feet from the march — their boots had worn out or been stolen and they kept going with puttees and rags bound round their feet — but the majority suffered from an intractable form of gastro-enteritis and were unable to assimilate even the good local food. Over a hundred died during the summer of 1916.
them
A
local Armenian priest buried in a spot near Mosul which was later
found by the
War Graves Commission and
tended. Many similar cemeteries of varying sizes were needed wherever British and Indian troops were interned in camps or employed on construction work on roads or railways. Columns of these troops, up to 2,000 in strength, continued on their way, the sick and exhausted men falling by the wayside. The morale of the survivors was remarkable and they stuck together and helped one another along. On the outskirts of a town they were formed into more orderly ranks to which they gallantly responded, often out of bravado singing their customary marching songs. Transportation of men no longer able to march on the desert stages usually presented an insoluble problem. If left behind on the track they quickly died or were even killed (or, reports said, the younger ones sexually assaulted) by Kurds or Arabs. An equally miserable fate befell them if abandoned in some village hovel with almost no chance of succour or rescue. On reaching the railway, ancient open or closed trucks ominously marked 'Quarante hommes ou huit chevaux' (40 men or eight horses) might be available, in which the men might be locked for hours at a time, resulting in terrible distress and numerous deaths. I once travelled all day in such a truck with a crowd of friendly, uncomplaining Turkish soldiers. The truck had recently been used for cattle, it was hot and stinking and was infested with bugs, lice, fleas and mosquitoes. Many hundreds of British and Indian NCOs and men were drafted direct from the marching columns or later recruited from the camps to work in gangs at Ras el Ain, in the mountains, or far into Anatolia on road or rail construction projects. The initial run-down condition of the troops and the severity of the climate with its extremes of heat and cold made worse the harsh conditions under which they worked, and mortality was very high. At some centres captured British doctors were available, though greatly frustrated by lack of drugs and equipment. Nursing aid was a rare luxury; it came mostly from devoted nuns. In all the camps the men worked from dawn to dusk and the standard of their treatment varied from camp to camp whether under arkish or German direction. Employed men were paid a small
POW
POW
"i
Right: Relics of a British tragedy: General the garrison in April 1916 and the medal given to those who survived the siege
Townshend who surrendered
m
daily rate. Sometimes by enviable craft or cunning they could gain advantages and luxuries for themselves and their fellows. Rations, firewood, soap, wine, tools and building materials could be purloined or diverted to be consumed, utilised or sold profitably to intermediaries. Officers, separated from their troops from the first, together with a few men detailed as orderlies, were settled in Anatolian
towns with no other employment than
what they could organise
for
themselves,
but, as always happens in such communities, a surprising variety of unsuspected talent revealed itself and blossomed: actors, artists and makers of almost anything appeared, even barbers and cobblers all of great value to their fellows. Accommodation in these towns was found in churches, schools, large houses or unused barracks and depots. Some of them were roughly furnished, others totally bare except for a small bench so that the first arrivals slept on bare boards. Heating in the severe winter depended on iron stoves burning wood or charcoal, needing constant
attention. Food was at first cheap and plentiful but became a serious problem later. Some camps employed caterers at first but soon preferred to organise things for themselves.
In each case, the character of the Turkcommandant was of great importance. The social structure of Turkish society and the traditional friendliness and military associations between Turkey and Britain in the past often worked against their German allies whose attempts to control and direct Turkish war policy were bitterly resented. The British prisoners took every opportunity that offered to foster this illfeeling, while at the same time appealing to the Germans on that terrible march to rescue their comrades in the name of ish
common humanity. The disaster that befell British prisoners in Turkey cannot really be blamed upon individuals. It stemmed from the inability of the Turkish High Command to foresee the inadequacy of their civil and military administration to feed and transport so large a body of men of whose deteriorated physical condition they had been warned.
Further Reading Barker. A. 1967)
J.,
Braddon.
R.,
Jones,
The Neglected War (Cassell
The Siege (Jonathan Cape 1969) The Road to Endor (Lane 1919) H.. Adventures in Turkey and Russia
E. H.,
Keeling, E.
(Murray 1924) Millar, R., Kut:
Death of an Army {Seeker &
Warburg 1969) Neave, Dorina, Remembering Kut (Barker 1937) Sandes. E. W. C. In Kut and Captivity (Murray 1919) Wilson, Sir 1930)
A.,
Loyalties:
Mesopotamia (OUP
W. C. SPACKMAN went out to Mesopotamia in October 1914 as Regimental
COLONEL
Medical Officer with an Indian battalion. He took part in the capture of Basra and was present at all the major engagements of General Townshend's
campaign. Wounded in the catastrophic battle of Ctesiphon and besieged in Kut till fell, he spent two and a half years as a prisoner of war in Turkey. He had been twice mentioned m despatches. it
Surviving the rigours of captivity he returned to service in India until retiring in 1945 as Honorary
Surgeon
to
King George
VI,
J 1783
THE DECLINE
OF TURKEY
At Constantinople Enver Pasha consolidated a virtual dictatorship of the vast, arid lands of the
Ottoman Empire. But even he was to prevent the disintegration of an empire whose
unable
ambitions far outweighed resources.
David Walder
its
Below: Traditional means of transport of a nation totally unprepared for modern warfare
under the Ottoman Sultan. Now that even the pretence was being abandoned, Arabs and Christians could see few reasons to tolerate a system designed to give preeminence only to Turks. So the Empire which entered the war in 1914 was already beginning to show something more than the usual signs of internal dissension. It was also an empire almost totally unprepared for modern war. Its only raw material was manpower, but even the considerable military qualities of the Turkish soldier had been dimmed somewhat by the recent defeats at the hands of Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars and Rumanians in the two Balkan Wars. Morale in the army was low and the navy had been almost totally neglected, starved of both money and serious overall, the still
a
interest. Even more Ottoman Empire was
backward country. Its vast acreage and semi-desert contributed little
of desert
A creaking government machinery, Goeben and Breslau had
started
it
all.
now
a captured French
In 1914 each belligerent entered the war in an atmosphere of high drama and knife-
edge decisions. Involved eyewitnesses in all the capitals testify to the words and actions of saddened ambassadors, reluctant statesmen, timetable-ridden generals and admirals and. when the decisions had been taken, the cheering crowds in the streets,
The Ottoman Empire was no exception the rule. In Constantinople the preliminaries, though lengthy, were dramatic enough, and acted out on the centre of the stage. The arrival of the fugitive German cruisers Goeben and Breslau on August 11, the consequent activities of the British, to
French, Russian and German ambassadors with their propositions and counter-proposals, and finally on October 28 the departure of the two warships and a few Turkish vessels, commanded by Admiral Souchon, encouraged by Enver Pasha, to bombard the Russian ports of Odessa, Sebastopol and Theodosia. Significantly, however, there were no cheering crowds in the streets of Constantinople. Berliners might shout, 'Nach Paris', and Parisian.'; chant, 'a Berlin', but the destination and purpose of the Turks remained beneath the surface. Turkey was something of a reluctant ally. The disillusion which had followed the realisation in
London and Paris that
Young Turks' were
'the
not liberal reformers but narrowly nationalistic reactionaries had meant that for the years preceding the war Turkey's only friend had been the Gerrnan Empire, a not entirely disinterested provider of cheap goods and technical assistance. This ever increasing dependence upon Germany certainly did not please all Turks, in more conservative circles there were still many who hankered after the old connection with Britain and France. Even on the brink of war the Cabinet had been divided, and the Chamber of Deputies, if it had been consulted, would have opted for neutrality. Unfortunately, however, the decision was taken out of the hands of the moderates in government and made bv Enver Pasha and a
1786
submarine gets a new name
the economy save subsistence agriculture. Such industry as existed depended on foreign management and capital. Com-
small clique of Young Turks, using the authority of Sultan Mehmed V as their ultimate justification. For, despite the outward forms, it was the Committee of Union and Progress which ruled Turkey and its
to
leaders were quite as ruthless and despotic as Abdul Hamid had ever been. Enver, Minister of War. was now the most powerful
spired improvements, was still totally inadequate for the empire as a whole. Education, save for a rich cosmopolitan minority, was dominated by outdated Moslem codes and practices, for the large mass of the people it was non-existent. The inert mass which called itself the Ottoman Empire had hardly been affected by the six years' rule of the Young Turks and the whole machinery of government still creaked at every turn, lubricated only by the time honoured oil of bribery and corruption that still prevailed. Yet this was the empire which Enver took to war against its traditional enemy, Russia, and its two ancient allies, Britain
man
pathetically patriotic and confident.
lubricated by the oil of bribery
in
Turkey and remained
.so
through-
out the war.
Consequently, for the Ottoman Empire, far more so than in the case of any other combatant, the fate of a nation was bound up inextricably with the character and ambitions of one man. his compatriots. Unfortunately lor Enver possessed all the qualities of leadership, courage, energy-, and determination save one, sound judgment. His period as a young man as military attache in Berlin had left him with an admiration for what he conceived to be the virtues of German militarism. This admiration went beyond the bounds of reason, for on his return from Berlin, Enver, his moustache now
and
strained into a flattering imitation of that Supreme War Lord himself, determined to convert his Turks into Prussians. Needless to say he failed, but he deluded himself into thinking he had succeeded. His two closest colleagues. Talaat and Djavid, were, like himself, both able and energetic as were many of the young, ambitious army oflicers attracted by the ideals of union and progress. This was, however, not enough. German assistance and advice had given many aspects of Ottoman life a thin veneer of modernisation but outside Constantinople, especially in the more distant provinces of the empire. Young Turk officers, officials and administrators were no more honest or efficient than their Hamidian predecessors. Further their 'pan-Turanian' racial philosophy which over-emphasised the so-called Turkish element in the empire did much to alienate intelligent and patriotic members of minority races and of the
religions.
Under Abdul Hamid. however in practice, there had
many times breached
always been the theory that all men of whatever race and religion were equal
munications were antiquated; the railway system, despite some recent German-in-
and France. Presumably, and one can only presume, Enver and his lieutenants had thought originally in terms of an immediate German victory in the west, but that possibility disappeared with Joffre's counteroffensive on the Marne. However it would have needed a very long sighted observer at that time to predict an ultimate Allied victory. The modified Schlieffen plan had failed, but Tannenberg followed in the east. So, undeterred and almost alone, Enver devised Turkey's own war aims. They were, to say the least, ambitious. In one direction the conquest of Egypt and the seizure of the Suez Canal. In the other, the domination of Persia and Transcaucasia and, as he confided to an apprehensive Liman von Sanders. Inspector General of the Turkish Army, eventually an assault on India through Afghanistan. All Enver's plans, however, were set at nought by the catastrophe that overtook his forces in Armenia at the hands of the Russians in the winter of 1914 see Volume 2, page 499). This was one of the most decisive, and at the time unremarked, defeats of the war. Henceforth Turkey was constantly on the defensive, the grandiose war aims had. of necessitv. to be abandoned i
One
of the
burdens
of
war— overburdened
lines of
and the initiative passed
to her enemies. This shift in the balance of Turkey's fortunes was not, however, immediately obvious in Turkey. Indeed for a period there
was an
illusion of success,
if
not of vic-
two assaults upon Ottoman territory were repulsed. In March 1915 with the Allied naval attack on the Dardanelles there began the Gallipoli campaign. A brilliant strategic concept which soon, for a hundred and one still argued reasons, degenerated into the same sort of war as was being waged on the Western Front. This unimaginative manconsuming slogging match over a few miles of territory continued until the whole operation, from the Allied point of view, stank of failure and incompetence. On December 19, 1915 the invaders began their withdrawal which was completed by January 8, 1916. For the Turks a victory, but at the cost of more lives even than the 46,000 sacrificed by the Allies. Russia was not to be relieved throughout the Straits, Turkey was not at one blow to be 'knocked out of the war', but neither had she advanced any nearer to the possibility of actually winning it. tory, as
An illusory victory Similar conclusions applied to the campaign in Mesopotamia. There the humiliation to the Allied cause was in a way even greater. The mixed British and Indian force which had been making its way up the Tigris from Basra to Baghdad was eventually enveloped at Kut, and after a lengthy siege forced to surrender on April 29, 1916. Nevertheless it was an illusory victory for the Turks. Major-General Townshend, the commander at Kut, was an incompetent, described by Haig as a semi-lunatic, and his men were ill-equipped for a desert campaign. More balanced and competent commanders were on the way leading better prepared troops, the Mesopotamian campaign would continue, the British had not been driven into the -Persian Gulf. Whatever the undoubted qualities of courage and endurance possessed by
communication
Jemal
Pasfia, flanked by guards, confers with
'Mehmedchik' Turkish 'Tommy (the which often did much to compensate for poor leadership, the Turks were still on the defensive. The difficulty for the Allied forces, mainly British, attacking the Ottoman Empire lay in supply and communications, but behind its natural barriers and the resistance of its soldiers the Empire was itself showing alarming signs of disintegration. In Constantinople Enver ruled as a dictator. Cabinet and Chamber of Deputies being ignored and vacant posts in the former remaining unfilled for months. More and more he depended upon a small committee ot party members which overAtkins'),
ruled ministers not of its own persuasion. Outside the capital, however, under the strain of war, administration was breaking down. Food shortages, sometimes approaching famine, and chronic deficiencies of the materials of both peace and war exacerbated the situation. Provincial governors were forced to take matters into their own hands and ignored the dictates of central government which became increasingly out of touch with the empire it still notionally rulfcd. As early as December 1915 Jemal Pasha, Governor of Syria and commander of the forces in Palestine, had entered into negotiations with the Ru.ssians to overthrow the Sultan's government,
and
set
up
a series of
autonomous
states
with himself as ruler of Asiatic Turkey. The reasons for the deterioration were as
much
psychological as physical.
The bur-
den of the actual fighting in the war had fallen mainly upon the Turks themselves. Other nationalities, from Arabs to Armenians, though regarded and treated as traitors to the Ottoman cause, were at the best lukewarm, at the worst actively hostile
to
the
war.
By
the
summer
of
1916 the Turks had gained nothing to show for their efforts, save ever-lengthening casualty lists. Even the army, the last bastion and embodiment of Ottoman rule, was beginning to falter. By the end of 1916 the figure for deserters was estimated to approach 300,000 men. Increasingly, intelligent Turks were be-
ginning
one
of the
to see that the
Arab princes
continuance of the
much upon their own actions as an eventual and decisive German victory. At the same time they Empire depended not
so
were growing rapidly, and
to
an extent
paradoxically, to resent the increasing German control of their war effort and their armies. As an example, the Turkish force in Palestine and Mesopotamia was commanded by a German general with a staff of 69 Germans and only nine Turks.
Mustapha Kemal, who emerged from Gallipoli a popular hero, was as much admired for his disobedience to his
German
iors as for his military prowess.
super-
The emer-
gence of Kemal, even
if he had not later become ruler and architect of postwar Turkey, was a portent for the future. By 1916 there were many who were thinking in terms of a future Turkey for the Turks alone. The burden of empire was becoming irksome. The outbreak of the Arab revolt in that year came to many as but confirma-
tion of their
own
disillusionment.
Sparked off by anticipatory Turkish countermeasures the revolt began on June 10 in Mecca under the leadership of Sherif Hussein. On October 5 he proclaimed himself King of Arabia and in December was recognised by the British as independent ruler of the Hejaz. Hussein's action was not the result of any sudden decision. As early as 1914, along with his rivals Ibn Saud of central Arabia and the Imam of the Yemen, he had been in tentative negotiation with Britain. Indeed the fact, if not the details, of the negotiations had long been suspected by the Turks. Nevertheless that by 1916 the Arabs had decided that the time was ripe actually to take up arms against their masters was yet another pessimistic comment upon the Turks' ultimate chances of success. A few weeks before August 1914 Hussein had advised both the Sultan and Enver to remain neutral and his advice had been ignored. Now, two years later, he had decided to throw in his lot with Turkey's enemies. Leaving aside the actual military value of the rebellion, which has often been
exaggerated by romantics from T. E. Law-
1787
>K
V.
r^
''
rence onwards, this was an informed and self-interested judgment upon the future of the Ottoman Empire.
;^|
N
Years later in his memoirs Field Marshal von Hindenburg was to write: 'For Turkey her entry into the war was a question of to be or not to be, far more than for us others." If Hindenburg be taken as referring only to the Ottoman Empire he was right. The Empire had been staked by Enver and by the middle of the war had been lost both in concept and substance. For Turkey itself there was a future, but the pattern of that
'A^i
future as a separate nation state was to mean a complete severance from her past.
^
..'f
"" :%
.#^p>
in
•»ft
.ijj-
-^^.
1 DAVID WALDER
is a Member of Parliament and was born in 1928 From 1961-1966 he represented the High Peak Division of Derbyshire He read history at Oxford and then qualified and practised as a barrister As a National Service officer and a reservist he served v*/ith the 4th Hussars and the Queens Royal Irish Hussars in fvlalaya, Arabia, Borofco and Germany He is author of four novels and numerous articles and reviews on politics and military history He has published The Chanak Affair, a study of the Anglo-Turkish crisis of 1922 and a
history of the
Russo-Japanese War
Turks in action at Gallipoli The Ottoman Empire s mam raw material was manpower, but by 1916 the desertion rate was disturbingly high rop.Talaat Pasha on a reconnaissance flight
1789
\
as an assault on the morale of the other side. Now in 1914 the belligerents could drop propaganda material behind enemy lines. R. G. Auckland
Rumour had long been used by warring armies Shortly after midday on August 30, 1914, people in Paris were surprised to hear an aeroplane above them. They crowded into the streets to look for it and to make guesses about its type, naturally assuming that it must be French, for no German aircraft had yet dared to intrude so deep into France. After flying across the city for half an hour the aircraft showed its true identity by dropping four small bombs which fell in the 10th arrondissement between the Gare du Nord and the Gare de I'Est. These were followed by a weighted bag attached to a long pennant bearing the German colours. When this was opened, it was found to contain a number of copies of a leaflet saying 'The German army is at the gates of Paris, it only remains for you to surrender — Leutnant von Hiddessen'. The aircraft which made this first propaganda raid was a Taube of the 11th Air Group attached to the German First Army. It had taken off" from Saint Quentin just before 1100 hours, having been delayed for some hours by mist which had been slow to clear, and was piloted by a young lieutenant, Hiddessen, who was an experienced airman, having taken part in several prewar air displays at Darmstadt, FrankMainz, furt-am-Main, Offenbach and Worms. At his briefing the day before, Hiddessen had been told that the main eff"ect of the raid was to be psychological: the bombs had been chosen because they were noisy rather than powerful, and it was hoped that the raid would terrify the civilian population enough to persuade them to force the government to declare Paris an open city. Unfortunately, the civilians refused to be impressed, and the leaflets, which had been intended to explain the meaning of the flight, were not removed from the bag before dropping, so they were seen by very few people. However, despite its inauspicious beginning, this was the first step in
1700
the development of what was to become a powerful new weapon in war. Rumour has
always been used by warring armies to try break the morale of the other side: opposing troops would shout insults at each other, besieging forces would sometimes bombard their targets with messages warning them of the horrors to come, and armies would parade in their finery or battleships and gunboats be sent to try and overawe an enemy. However, it had always been difficult to spread ideas very widely, and it was inevitable that once the aeroplane had given man the power to fly over his enemy, he should use it not only to drop destruction on him but to spread his own opinions. But early German aerial propaganda was sporadic; undertaken on the initiative of to
the pilots who actually flew the aircraft and using material written by them. It was not until the end of October 1914 that a large number of leaflets were dropped as part of a widespread and co-ordinated campaign. During the early months of the war, the British War Office would not allow journalists to go anywhere near the front line. All news about the fighting came from the official correspondent with the British Expeditionary Force, Colonel Ernest Swinton. Swinton was a regular oflficer, who had shown considerable talent for writing before the war — in 1903 he had written. TAe Defence of Duffers Drift which had become a classic but unofficial comment on British tactics in the Boer War. In his position as official spokesman for the BEF, Swinton had access to a great variety of Intelligence reports and other material. Quite soon, he was struck by the way in which a large number of the reports on the interrogation of German prisoners showed that the majority of them were utterly convinced of the justice of the cause of the Central Powers. For them, Germany and Austria-Hungary were fighting a just war against a ring of enemies who had first sur-
rounded them, and then attempted to destroy them. This belief in the 'encirclement' of Germany and Austria-Hungary had grown up long before the war had begun, and had been carefully encouraged by the government. Now it was firmly held by all ranks of the army and by most civilians. Once Swinton realised this, he began to look for ways in which its effects could be fought. He had naturally heard of the rather haphazard attempts by the Germans to drop leaflets on French towns, and saw the possibility of using a similar method to put material attacking the German view of the causes of the war into the hands of Centred Powers' troops. He wrote a leaflet in which he put forward the traditional Allied argument — that the war had been caused by the aggressiveness of Germany and Austria-
Hungary — and he also attempted to refute some of the other beliefs which were widespread among enemy troops — that the French army had been decisively beaten, that the Germans would shortly be entering Paris, and that the Allies maltreated their prisoners. The leaflet ended: 'You au-e fighting to satisfy the ambitious war lust of the militarists at the cost of the true interests of the Fatherland. The whole business is vile and has already led to the death of more than 70,000 of your comrades on the Eastern Front.'
Colonel Swinton arranged for more than 25,000 copies of the leaflet, which was known as Bekannt-max:hung, eine Aufmachung fur Deutsche Soldaten (Notice, an explanation for German soldiers) to be printed at his own expense on the presses of the continental Daily Mail in Paris and dropped over the front by the aircraft of the Royal Flying Corps. A report of his activities was sent to the War Office, but since no one was prepared to authorise the drop, Swinton was forced to turn his attention to other matters.
,
1
(Scinitfirfje
brufft.
.3!ltet
3i^«^f
Sf'^ung angefii^rt finb, murteu luorttidj au^ bcutfdieu ^fi^ung^n abge-
wetcf^e in blefer
;
!Datuni
'-Blatter nnt)
ber
3m
Nr. 13.
genau angegeben,
fint)
jebev "Deieii 9tid}tigfcit
3?o1f ffinen 5tnteil
9tnm. Solgenttv
bem ©evgeanten
UnteioffTi(icv,
Bfrfa§t,
eiucm
uoii
ajftfiigung
•
©crgtant
SBolftSfdjutlc^rer, iinb Vtie fo
ouggcf)pto(!^cncr
tin
ab, wtil
ftc
franjoflfcf^en
fe^r
bic
unb unS
iiberfeftt ift
jiiv
gttebcnSjeiten
in
btucfen fefne 9tr6tit gcvnc
(Stimmung
tt)iebergi6t, trelc^e in bev
be3
5ortfe|ung
auf bie
grelbgrauen
biefe cetniinftigen SBorte lefen;
ftan^iJiifcf^fn
feinev franjaftfc^en J?ol(egen
Sit
tnfcejug
beutfd^en
cinfin
rterben
mit
i»o^I
fte
nid)t tvie bie
SRii^en
ber
fnnn
SSer
eg
toitjen?
^dngt finjig unb aflein ab. eg
2Bir benjunbcrtx
ung
tut
benn mir be^anbetn
SSoU,
ffiir
beffen
35ic
3)auer
beg
^tiegeS
^uc^, beutfc^en ©olbaten,
Guren ^ut, (Sure ^ugbauer; 6uc^ big aufg 9lu§erf^c
^ie ©efangenen ftc
alg ^anteraben
^egen feincrtei
^Itur
^af
\Dir fcf)d^en.
njiffen eg a>o^I>
unb
ben
fiir
©inna^me 9Barfd)aug,
"nb ^cgt,
hjirb,
roic
fo
bamatg,
2Bei^nac^ten, ober nac^
ober
nadi
gemelbeten Capitulation 9}?ontencgrog
^a^xe bauern,
nietl fie
2Bonn man Qnd)
@ud) cine Umwaf^r^eit, genan
fdnH)ft.
,
3itnfi'r^
cinem 3a^rc beenbigt fein
(5u(^ ben ^vteben
^e^^n
9)Zi(itdr-
geriffon f)at.
]i6.)
^reufjcii nU ®f(aDen ber
algiDiirbige
SSelgien
flc^^t,
jebcr
ifl
nod>
ber
fdlfc^lid^
bauern fotangc beutfc^eg
einjigeg
ein
5)er
»erf).ira(i^.
crttjirb
^ricben
unmoglic^.
SBoflt
fd)on bie griebengber^anbtungen 3f>r, ba^ morgen beginnen? 3)ag ^dngt bon 6u^ adein ab; jc longer
3br burc^^alten tuerbet, [t beffcr 3^r fdm^jfen rocrbct, umfo Ungcr iuirb ber Cricg bauern. 2Btr fonnen im Crieg no^ 15 3ia^rc aug^alten; wir
gegcn bag bcutfc^e
^aben
2Bir fu^ren ^rieg
fangcn ctgentUd) je^t
in which your enemy could be fought- with words. This letter to the German soldiers was dropped by plane over the German front lines, with the hope that its message would touch a vulnerable spot in the minds of the troops. The duration of the war, it states, rests in their hands. Despite their courage and tenacity, they are slaves to the Prussian government but could end the war at any time by refusing to go on fighting for a power-hungry militarist faction that represents
Above: One of the ways
ber
Saiib
S3ataiflonin ^ranfreic^, in 8crbien, in 5poIen, unb in
?eib, ba§ n)tv
befcimpfen muiJen.
@egner.
toon
man
^rieg fann
lange toirb bet ^rieg baiiern?
Sf^'^^fi'^f'^^'flt
an
^anb
^'iiropag miiffen .trieg fuf>ren
Jlrieg in
fagt mail
3I;r SGBic
uein
bag
nid}t (Siter
tjertcibigf
a.lJi(itdvbi'fpoten (ebcn luoilcn.
ba^ bev
J^riegco
jfbem 9lationalitdten^o§ aBfoIut fern.
—
.ft'ultur,
3)ie *-Po(fcr
afg
fie^en jebem (S^au»int8mii3,
dnre
tttelc^er
gan^ in bei
\ue(rf)e
fliingel, ber bio ^errfc^aft
...ten SttfantcrtcrDieginunt
33...
mond^e
(Sojiattp.
gtnau
9ltmee
2)if
^frrf^t.
com
'3...
s8iigat»e;5)olmftj'cf^fr
2)er
gcfleUt.
won
wiivct
5(uf|'rt|
nid^t
f)at,
liegt; '^i)x
9)?ilitdrgeit)a(t
bcutfd)cn ©olbatcn.
bie
Qltt
nad^pnifen fnnn.
gegeu bie ^reu§ifd}=bcutfd}e ^fegierung, an
1916.
2T?ar;5
ba^
fo
Slfleg,
ioag
toir erfl
brauc^cn.
an
2)ie
Sngldnber
mit iJriegfu^rcn ;
jc^t
neither their culture nor their best interests. Furthermore, they have been continually deluded as to their chances of victory and the possibility of ending the war, the letter insists. The war can last
ten years, for as long as there is a German battalion in France, Serbia, Poland or Belgium, peace is impossible. The rest of the news-sheet is filled with extracts from newspapers reflecting dissatisfaction with the war and a socialist-inspired demand for universal peace
,
VORTEX GAUDIER-BRZESKA. (WrtttMi from tin Trtnchu).
1
*
H*VE BEER FICHTINC FOB TWO MONTHS Md
isKuliy
1
tU
*-• •««•
of UI>.
RUMAN MASSES ima U< HORSES
»/t •orn
em
»»»«.
vt
lo tlui» •••ii.
«Hlr«)*d
«•
Md
tnp up
H"'"*
*» 't- ro»d»l««.
M» dwtiOMd. "d olh»Tl tooi» ilonj. WITH ALL THE DESTRUCTtON SAI CHANCED, EVEN SU PEBFICIALL Y Lift 1> THE I THE MOWING ACENT THAT PERMITS THE SMALL ASSERT HIMSELF DOCS
««Od*r.
THE BUBSTINC SHELLS th* ehtai af balU* DO
moion. iba
nil]
II
*e
art baairtioi
A ion
aoUai*.
THE LEAST. PARTRIDGES Kuttlaal «
baler
UTTLE WORKS OF OOBSSERVES AS A FORCE TO OVERTHIS PALTRY MECHANISM. WHICH NDMERODS HUMANITY THIS WAR IS A GREAT REMEDY I. IT
SELF-ESTEEM. FRIDE THE INDIVIDOAL IT KILLS ARROGANCE. TAKES AWAY FRO» THE MASSES """«"\"^;,",,"°",;^:',
^" """'^
were
letters
AMID THESE WOOLD BE FOILT TO SEEK ARTISTIC EMOTIONS
WHOSE OF 0NU.PORTANT UNITS,
Quite soon, from various South America com-
prepared by the Foreign
"Ira anianxlaBiao
.LTEfl IN .1
for propaganda purposes had already been shown in November 1914 -before the DSI was .set up. It had been noticed that a large amount of printed material was being sent from Germany to South America on board neutral ships. One package was opened and found to contain a large amount of anti-Allied propaganda material. It was quickly decided that here was an opportunity to indulge in some counter-propaganda, and so the original material was destroyed and replaced by leaflets specially
'"""^
SHOWN CRISES HAVE ""^.'"s AS THE RECENT TRADE REMAIN ABSOLUTELY THESAMEMY VIEWS ON SCULPTURE BEGINS. THAI DECISION. OF iTiTia^ VORTEX OF WiJl
NOnOOS
War, the great destroyer of arrogance and pride — a German view imposed on the Allied troops
Because the idea of using organised propaganda as an assault on enemy morale had
German agents
in
plaining about the curious choice of material that was being sent to them for distribution. Postal censorship offered excellent opportunities for finding suitable themes on which propaganda might be based. Once
DSI had officially been had encouraged one of the
again, before the set up, Cockerill
censors, Harry Melville, to begin indexing every subject which might be usefully exploited as anti-German propaganda.
At
material prepared from these
first,
hardly been thought of before the First
OFFENER BRIEF
World War, none of the combatants had a department available to prepare material
DEUTSCHEN KRIEGSGEFAKGENEN
EI.NES
or co-ordinate its distribution. In the British War Office the only department which was remotely concerned with this sort of work before 1914 Intelligence Section. This
was the Special had a few small
branches which were concerned with counter-espionage and the interception and assessment of postal material and telegrams. But the outbreak of war had brought a rapid increase in the amount of work to be handled by the Special Intelligence Section (SIS). It had to oversee all censorship, particularly the checking of telegrams passing overseas from Europe via British controlled cables, it was responsible for the reading of postal material on neutral ships intercepted by the navy,
and for the preparation of'economic' Intelligence—the assessment of the enemy s economic and political situation from newspapers and other written material.
Office.
intercepted
biU
.ch
'
i-iiDmman. Zuatti
•ndFrruod'o InDf^i, Bntr* nod OM ae
.l.t
l..n
ued
.,' Ibr
^^alIr^.
da i
1.
,
',.
.ir
II.
>'.b
bM
ValcHaod
io
.
dau
lai,
and
• If daoiali fol ubarirugl
Balniuogtkncg tagco. Fraodig eod
ii'ditraaaodtrrlinaitbdir Slaio.e; icb ,.,
Jabm
All(. ragnllicb
oiaio
mvrdtdta 78.
Rag. lugdedl, Wir logce du/cb dia Mnaualatae
Inl,
Sulla uod Uarfta Balgiaot (Call oiega OMloa Hcittai dau mao uot da> aatur. aia «ia jeoae
di.ot baaabrtn,
aagatao babaa 11,
lalralia
,
.
)
am KbiauLab
Wil/jdavRaiaii. eaehdaoi Haio
Ragimaat ubaara Vtrlafta aiiltte balle, SabuUaagnbio 10 Uoabao. Ao 18, Dajaoibar avada aoaao SuUoOf too dir
fraoawacbao
Arliliana
ealar
Faoar
gaaooatao.
lab-tr baaabiiigl aad wba-ad^b aaobart Itb -la glaiib
From one German Allied
.
ao dar S(huMlu..^l'.i
aaoo
icb
Atnlto
uo.l
v^ir: i(S ibit
Slaochc X^rilft
1).
aa dia Kntgihaba dar ban.a(TaliTaa Pnaia
ID
dco lauiao iabrea dacbta, ao dan olGciallaD palneliacbco Fniinibal
bai
u,
I,
dco
aielao
Heodarijibrfeiam.
an
die
ood pleubcba Varmabreng uniarar Anoac
kriagtatcuar
«, Uiar ua L>gar aurda a, loir durtb dao caiogali-
aoddanb dao
Du1o)alt(b'r armoglicbt,
dia aeiacbiadaoao diplaiDaliathaa
Buabecto l«an. walabt
icbaoCaiilliebaD.
dia daoliaba
gabeo babaa.
aod aacb Fraakraiali hiotio.
Saptambtr moialffi inr aioan bonao Rocbieg .
uflJ nic
far
Aagual leUlrn
,:n^.a uad ubartallao wanJae
'iiitn
Rnmi.daonioTinareodaao
•
>l
':. a,
ur,l
.,
10
SLidl. >urd> i'h •en truil.
jm Beleo kreua i:afn.5l
^
fnmt
d.T
r
KAMERADE>
Laolaaot Iaefaog, durrh dinalba Ctaoait. *a1clia uoMro loiai*. aei Obmahcnid. eod donb noeo SinirKbua, tn irt 8(uU Kharr lata.iniH aerdfo, ood wunit ga-
ee-idolasliclito Wil.rhr.i rallialUo lied.
SEtA'E
A!(
uod eataaraiabiiabe Krgianiflgao baraoaga-
om
eioa Racbdartigung lu aanatbao.
Aucb
daotaeba. io daa Sebaaii gednicbu Biicbar. aalaba •ebl, io
Daulaablaad larbolao liod. babao auf ouab groutn
Eiodiock gaoiaabl; mil gabddalao ood balaaaoao Uilge. (aogaocs baba iab diaaa Fraga baaproabao^ leb baba ooo dia
Wababail tabaool. ood balla
ai
fiir
mciaa haibga
PIbabl. daeaa sagiicbat oiaiaen Kamaaadas milaalailaa.
soldier to others'' Praise for
humanitarianism and efficiency
Overworked department soon became olivious that the department had completely outgrown its original organisational structure and that some It
sort of separation of functions should take place. Naturally, this led to considerable
internal discussion, but in April 1915, the suggestion of Colonel George Cockerill, who was head of a subsection of the SIS, was accepted by the Treasury and the Army Council, and a new Directorate of Special Intelligence (DSI) was set up to co-ordinate all censorship and trade Intelligence activities. Cockerill was promoted to Brigadier-General and given the^rand title of Sub-Director of Military Intelligence and Director of Special Intelligence. He was now able to report directly to the Secretary of State for War, and to contact other Secretaries of State and, if necessary, the Prime Minister himself without having to go through the head of the Special Intelligence Section. Within a short time of its establishment, the new department had grown to 29 sections employing about 115 staff and seconded officers, and 4,170 civilian translators, clerks
One
of the
ways
and censors. which censorshij)
in
could be used positively to provide material
r92
sources was sent by 'diplomatic' methods, using neutral countries — such as Switzerland or Holland as bases from which the propaganda could be smuggled over the border or carried in by travellers. But it was natural that more direct and reliable methods of distribution should be sought, and soon interest in the use of aircraft was
went to France to attend an Anglo-French conference at which a first attempt was made to pool Allied information on useful propaganda themes and to co-ordinate the use of material. By the beginning of 1916 British propaganda began to take on a
more permanent air. There was still considerable opposition to it from officers who felt that mere bits of paper would do little to help defeat the enemy and that any time spent on preparing material was time wasted. But the work of one branch of the Military Intelligence Department known as MI7B, under the direction of MajorGeneral G. M. W. Macdonagh, was almost completely devoted to the production of propaganda material in close collaboration with the DSI. Leaflets were being produced regularly and they were beginning to develop certain themes which had been found to be particularly effective. One of the most common of the leaflets produced during 1916 was a series which was prompted by the reluctance of German troops to surrender or desert even when their situation was desperate. Partly this was due to their high morale which had not yet been broken by the stalemate of trench warfare and the hardships caused by the British blockade, but it was also due to the persistence of the belief that the Allies maltreated their prisoners. To destroy this belief, leaflets were produced by the Allies in which appeared letters written by German prisoners themselves which implied that imprisonment might be a better way out than death. The leaflets were printed by a method which reproduced the original handwriting, then scattered over the enemy lines in the hope that not only would the soldiers read them and be influenced by their message, but that they would also send them home so that the civilians could learn that even the prisoners of the British enjoyed better living conditions than themselves. This theme was also used on reproductions of postcards often accompanied l)\ photographs of the men as they were when captured — usually suitably tired and dishevelled — and as they were now, enjoying the comparative ease of a British prison camp. Wherever possible, similar use would be made of letters to prisoners from relatives who complained of the worsening conditions in Germanv. It is difficult to believe that
uVo"'l;:^''"%s
again being shown.
Same old themes After March 1915, leaflets were being printed and then sent to France where they were dropped behind the lines by aircraft or balloon, or fired into the enemy trenches by specially adapted mortars. The small amount of this early British material that has survived indicates that it was all relatively unsophisticated and based on a few themes which were emphasised over and over again. It was also being
';:£F;x~:'3:,r
produced on a completely unofficial basis, and the Royal Flying Corps refused to allow
its
aircraft to
make
special flights to
drop leaflets so that they could only be distributed by aircraft undertaking routine patrols or raids.
However,
in
September 1915, Cockerill
Reliable communication- report on the state of fronts to those who waited in the trenches
all
many
of these slipped through the censors, but some were probably found concealed in food or gift parcels, and the fullest use would be made of them. Other leaflets dropped in fairly large quantities sought to undermine German morale by working on the latent hostility between men from the various regions of the country. Conflicts and jealousies between the states, particularly the larger ones such as Prussia and Bavaria, were still very strong, and it is this type of leaflet that was particularly effective in creating tension between units and individuals as German morale began to decline at the time of Verdun and the .Somme.
and made no attempt
to understand the psychology of those to whom it was meant to appeal. Before the war. Waltz had been strongly anti-German, and had written and illustrated several books under the pseudonym of 'Hansi'. He had in fact been forced to flee to France since the German authorities in Alsace had learnt of his activities and were preparing to arrest him. With his considerable first-hand knowledge of the Germans, Waltz began to think about ways in which German morale might be attacked in a more systematic way. Like Swinton before him, he learned from his discussions with captured German troops that the morale of German
soldiers
Effective weapon Thus, by the end of 1916 the British had established a regular propaganda operation against Germany. But it was still in its infancy and had not begun to have much effect on the minds of the enemy troops at whom the bulk of its material was directed. The scale of the British efforts in no way compared with that of the French who had been far quicker to realise that here was a weapon which could be used to strike directly at the enemy's will to continue fighting. Following the first German leaflet drops in the autumn of 1914. individual units of the French forces had begun to reply, writing and distributing their own material. By the beginning of 1915 a special section was set up at Army HQ in Paris under Colonel Dupuis Wetterle and Etienne Fournel to supervise all such material, and none was allowed to be dropped until it had been approved. However, this section did not prevent the disclosure of military secrets, and it made no attempt to co-ordinate the distribution of material nor to lay down common policies. Early in 1915, -J. J. Waltz, a refugee from German-occupied Alsace who had been serving with a front line unit and was now acting as an interrogator oi German prisoners, was shown one of the early leaflets and realised at once that it contained all the faults and errors which propaganda should not commit". Not only was the whole basis of the arguments being propounded very weak — there was little point in pretending to the Germans that they were on the brink of defeat — but it was also written in very awkward language Fran^ais! Uoemmt
Vca ariitenr^ mn mojtn de
de boalws. ont t
(cmna «t cnfvits, data c« detni AUtbukm- Rwb <)« kiffanlic. le 22 J-jjn
agma
n
it dTils. bornmcs, dfl
frwic
cfl
I»16. on
4S mom. Fnlmirg le
eotaite
lunni lesqudLs 30 silitiu tiinnemu. SJulllieiR) Tut Uombanlc le 23 jtun. tifjiullet. Kxn'lem. Ilolzen « Ma|>[adi k ITjuiU^ lltilenlidin. ptis FribcaiT;. « MuUlMiin Ic 22 JuUlrt. Ukm io*iln aiMqw* on k tn ti drjiUjter d<9 \SniBies,
m
lint en IBOI15 qn'oi
blenn.
T.'in o~, riKlnnU n'ont pAs
U
muiiMire im[»irt3iice >u
d« me militniir. commo eliaam. mrine n'ai^iit lueiiiie iwtioii miliiairc [wuvoir i«n rendrc eow\dr «i jcuiit un roiip d',nl »ir uik- «fir,
fioini
d,>ii
fiO nmRund«ia'itt miltisiir alUmaiH] a i.^it iralM.r>l hnitr a cnMn- que le ffmrenicmetit rraocac, ct le t^irraliwiroc t-(ainit cnjcl-U.. dc >* rviittre efiu|alil«i d'un i«] actf ile hatfnric. qni n'a n
I
rginl, (j'jiU ini
pa,
trrMoj,'.^
I'u Ii3
r.^m,., gar TOTdra cxpres dc eotr
iii
Cast vetn president Poin«ar< lui-mteic qui
o si:9t^r« ccl crtire
B'a fat hofllc d^avoir friti rsrctUc i la boaae instjsaticn dcs Anjlcis.
dwrchcr on moren pour adircr
Y paiiildes les
avaivil pour cela one meilletire
ei.droiis
OM
roti^u
le
Kli
Odan
Vodi
le
plan
L'AUemagne eiTile. auz
oifaouo. miliUUT^ I.e i«v.
tel
tait
quTl ful
b
cone
** a'oobliez
pna que e'e« un plan anglai,^'
pierre auz annrcs rnneqiMa. elle no In fait [Ma a la poana ntttuts. Elle rspete que ecs esplic
tcniinra et
CMadrea fiantotfev de nouv^Iea
poor emptier de
la port dea
En raa aembkbl^ a£n de
de r«-idive lAllriaagne ie verroit oUnj-e Je ptenUie
tm Benre.
Maa
ae
nuna
Toua
TiUea, loin en
Reproach
to
ati>'|ii'
>
baibaro, de ui's
meMiro
dcfnuln. alon. Fnuicao. que c«t
Pclu CJ i d, aeia reapoosable de tmns In borbone aivlaiae qui nooa aura
inside
bail
eie loola. ae £t
poUlion
oa
villea
lam. pwir >rn,cr k **
plan dia)«li>{ue de &ire l-.tnlanler Karl-riLr e* d'ami,.)
paiNblea loin do lemi«re d«a
OilJdBTdlllii
aonel
nunNie que de laur lufnlonler vus
par de, ear^drca d~a,'ia'Hin aUrmandi?
An^laja
amcre do
csdav* de TAnglctnTC, Mcnslcar
r^n.lu p*/ d" ol 'Iiges
a
victiinea iuiioeeiitra.
appuner
la dcsiiucn/iu e( le
n
.^uc
eK
deud daua
(root.
French
pilots for civilian
deaths balloon
Germany— message dropped by
and
DEUTSCHE SOLDATEN
ACHTUNG
!
!
!
70,000 EURER KAMERADEN,
LEBEN JETZT IN WOHLSTAND ERSPAREN GELD FUR IHRE FAHILIEN
EURE OFFIZIERE
GEFANGENEN UMBRINGEN. SIE
civilians rested to a consider-
able degree on the firm belief that they were fighting, quitejustifiably. to save their country from encirclement and destruction. He also saw that the Germans would immediately distrust and disbelieve statements that had obviously been written by the Allies: some means would have to be found of disguising information in such a way that it would seem to come from the
!
!
!
LiJGEN
!
!
OUT BEHANDELT UND GUT VERPFLECT, LAiUhdtrn durlo ui
B«i din
IHREM ZIVIL BERUF FOLGEN UOdj
ARBEIT
ihtt
wird
BEZAHLT"
CUTE KOST UND WARHE KLEIOUNC.
German
soldiers!
by the English
Your comrades taken prisoner and save money!
live well
annexe of the War Ministry in the Boulevard Saint Germain. On his arrival there
Germans themselves.
he was astonished to find a lieutenant at work correcting the proofs of a miniature edition of J'accuse.
was Tonnelat was
The
officer
whose name
a former professor of
German
literature, and he explained that they had been successful in reducing the 400-page book to an edition weighing only one and three quarter ounces. Following an agreement between GQG and the War Ministry, it was decided in .August 1915 that Sen ice de la Propagande Aerienne Aerial Propaganda Service) should be set up with Tonnelat and Waltz as its creative officers. Its duty was to co-ordinate the preparation, organisation, and distribution of all aerial propaganda material — both in French and German — beyond the enemy lines. All material had still, however, to be sent for approval to the War Ministry. As in Great Britain, the new propaganda department was generally ignored by the government and regarded with suspicion by professional officers, the latter tending to feel that the Germans only understood brute force and that any attempt to use reason or subtlety was a waste of time. However, the SPA was encouraged by Captain Ledoux, the head of the War Ministry department to which it was attached, and General Valentin, the deputy Chief-of-Staff, and they managed to smooth out many of the difficulties which Waltz and Tonnelat experienced at the beginning •
A 432-page attemp; beliefs
about the
to dispel prevailing
real
German
causes of the war
Waltz found the material he was looking in a book which he was sent from
for
Switzerland called J'accuse (I accuse). It had been written by a German exile named Richard Grelling and had been banned in his native country, for it was a powerful criticism of the prevailing German beliefs about the causes of the war. The author put forward a well-argued and well-documented case that it was Germany's aggressive and expansionist policies which had caused the war, and that the fighting would not cease until other countries felt that
they were no longer threatened. Using the diary of an NCO of the German 78th Infantry Regiment who had been captured al \'iliy-Les Rheims on December 28, 1914, to provide authentic detail. Waltz prepared a letter in which the NCO gave details of his capture and expressed surprise at finding himself being well treated, and then went on to say that he had discovered a copy of J'accuse in the camp library and had been extremely impressed by its arguments. Waltz sent a copy of this leaflet and the book to the War Ministry in Paris. Weeks later, he received orders to report to an
of their
propaganda
activities.
Letter to his friends Despite the many difficulties, within a month the SPA was able to produce a fourpage leaflet based on the material which Waltz had sent in called Ojf'ener Brief
Deutschen Kriegsgefangenen an seinem Kameradcn )An open letter from eines a
German
prisoner of
war
to his friends)
and about 50,000 copies were printed and distributed by aircraft over the German lines during October. More than 20,000 copies of the miniature edition of J'accuse. which had been in production when the SPA was set up, were dropped over the lines during the last two months of 1915, and early in 1916. Printed on bible paper, the miniature volume had 432 pages, was less than an inch thick and 1793
measured about four by three inches. Despite the small size the text was perfectly readable. So that the books would not be spoilt if they were not found for some time, each copy was put in a strong envelope boldly marked with a wide black, red and white band and labelled Die Wahrheit (The Truth). During the early months of 1916, the dropping of this book began to bear fruit; was widely discussed in intellectual it
Germany which had not previously been able to read it, and the authorities had to launch a widespread search to round up copies, and try to discover the identity of the author. Encouraged by this reaction, the French undertook the production of a number of similar publications, all books which had been written by German authors and which had been banned in their homeland. Amongst them was a defence of J'accuse entitled Because I am a German, written by an ex-director of Krupps named Muelhon, the memoirs of Prince Lichnowsky, the former German circles in
Ambassador critical
of
in London, the policy
who was extremely of
the
Imperial
government, Why I have left Germany, a book written by Professor Nicolai on his arrival in Denmark, and two books by Dr Rosemeier the former publisher of the Berlin newspaper Morgenpost, People of Germany Awake and A History of the
Prewar Years. These were the first of a long series of leaflets and other material which were produced by the SPA. Within weeks it began to publish a newspaper called Die Feld Post (The Field Post) which ran for 12 numbers. It was so successful in arousing the German authorities to track down and destroy all copies that the name was changed at the 13th issue to Kriegsbldtter fiir das Deutsche Volk (War News-sheet for the German People). These newspapers illustrated the determination of the French propagandists not to send anything to the Germans which had not been written by a German or at least by a neutral author who would not be suspect automatically. Most of the articles were of a highly political nature, designed to encourage the reader to question his beliefs and lead him to doubt the actions of the Imperial government. All of them had already appeared in the neutral press. Although the approach was far more intellectual than that of contemporary British propaganda, it does seem to have had a considerable effect among the more intelligent Germans, for the appearance of the leaflets was followed by a series of German newspaper articles, which warned readers to be on their guard against these subversive tracts and attempted to refute some of the arguments they contained. The tone of the French leaflets changed considerably as the war continued; they were reasonable and unsensational at first, seeking only to put forward ideas which the reader might not have thought of before, but they later became openly revolutionary in tone, encouraging the people to get rid of the Emperor and set up a democratic government so that peace could be made. Considerable ingenuity was used to ensure that material would get past all attempts to stop it and into the hands of the soldiers or civilians. False newspapers were produced and smuggled into Germany from Holland or Switzerland as well
1794
as being dropped by aircraft; safe-conduct passes were concealed inside phials disguised as rolls of sausage-meat and dropped as far into Germany as possible — the theory being that the friends and relations of soldiers might send them to the frontline
and thus encourage desertion.
Bribing the troops the beginning of 1916, the amount of airborne material being distributed by the French had reached such proportions that the German authorities were forced to take action. They had told the troops that they were honour bound to hand over all leaflets they discovered to a superior officer without reading them, but this appeal to duty went, for the most part, unheeded, and so a monetary reward had to be offered. All personnel were ordered to hand in their leaflets to the Company Sergeant's oflJice; for every surrendered leaflet the soldier received up to 30 pfennig (about fourpence) and up to two marks (about two shillings for a magazine or book, depending on its contents and rarity. The
By
I
same rewards were
offered to all civilians
and near the fighting area who turned in their finds to the local commandant's HQ. When the lines had settled down after the Battle of the Marne, large areas of France had been left in German hands and another of the SPA's important tasks was to provide newspapers and magazines in
counteract material being distributed by the Germans. For the Germans had been very quick to set up their own newspaper to
in
the occupied
areas.
The Gazette des
Ardennes was printed at Charlesville with its editorial content strictly controlled by the German General Staff. The Gazette had three editions: an ordinary newspaper appeared daily, and there was also a weekly resume of the news and an illustrated edition which was published at irregular intervals. It was claimed that the daily version had a circulation of about 175,000. By the end of 1914 the Germans had decided to start sending the Gazette to unoccupied areas of France. Copies were smuggled in through neutral countries, and others were sent by balloon or by aircraft direct to individual trenches. Before September 1915, French reaction to it was minimal. Occasionally, newspapers were smuggled across the lines, or troops would buy newspapers and arrange for them to be dropped in the course of routine flights, but there was no official attempt to bolster the morale of civilians in the occupied areas. Unfortunately, as soon as the decision had been taken that a regular supply of material should be sent, major arguments broke out as to what sort it should be. Politicians fought to ensure that newspapers representing their own opinions were included on the official list, and it seemed that the problems raised might be resolved in total inactivity. The impasse was solved when the Echo de Paris, Journal, Matin, Petit-Journal and Petit Parisien offered copies free to the SPA. The Ministry which had been unable
make up its own mind officially allowed the newspapers to be accepted, and the problem was solved unofficially. However, the weight of ordinary newspapers raised considerable problems of distribution; the aircraft could only carry a certain load, and crews preferred to leave out the newspapers and carry bombs instead. The SPA could begin by delivering to
only a few hundred copies a day to an eager readership of several million, and it was natural that ways should be sought to increase the numbers which could be distributed regularly. Technicians were soon at work producing a lighter newsprint and early in October 1915 the first copy of La Voix du Pays (The Voice of the Country) was published. This was a fortnightly newsheet which weighed only an eighth of an ounce. About 100,000 copies were printed of each edition and half were distributed by air and half by balloon. The winds in northern France are generally westerly, and it was found that balloons carrying several hundred copies of the news-sheet could be flown across the occupied territories. The leaflets were made up into bundles which were attached by thread to a slow-burning fuse. This was lit just before the balloon was released, and at intervals, as the flame reached them, the bundles of leaflets would fall off to be scattered across the countryside. La Voix du Pays, edited by Emile Devaux, set out to be a complete survey of current events. It gave a resume of the military situation on all fronts, and of the political scene and, most important of all, it gave details from all the various refugee committees which had been set up in Paris to look after fugitives from the occupied areas. Sometimes lists were published of the people who had managed to escape successfully across the front line. Shortly after it began La Voix du Pays came under attack by various politicians who claimed that their views were not adequately represented. The Under Secretary of State for War announced at one stage that the news-sheet would be brought under his control and be written by his own staff. But after production of the paper had been held up for a month, the Minister had second thoughts, and matters were allowed to continue as before. Another newspaper for the occupied areas began early in 1916. This was Lettres d tous les Frangais (Letters to all Frenchmen), an intellectual news-sheet edited by a committee of professors and lecturers from various French universities. Naturally, ridicule was a particularly potent weapon for use in the occupied territories, and the propaganda services
soon began to produce counterfeit editions Gazette des Ardennes. This not only provided an easy method of pouring scorn on the actions of the German authorities, but also enabled the population to read the news with less risk of being found out. The Germans soon discovered what of the
was happening and changed the their
own
version,
style of but as soon as they
had done so, the French followed. The French were particularly ready to take advantage of any German shortsightedness.
On
one particularly unfortunate occasion, Germans printed a photograph of a German soldier feeding a small French child. Soon after a French newspaper had published a cartoon which showed a similar photograph being taken, with the caption: 'Little do they know that I have just killed the mother and father!' The cartoon and the German photograph were printed side by side, with a sad little note saying how unfortunate it was that people should have seen through this attempt to prove that the Germans were not really so territhe
ble,
several
happened.
months before
it
actually
!
At the end of 1915, the Germans had pubhshed a book. Ou etit la place de l' AlsaceLorraine^ En Allemagne Where does Alsace-Lorraine belong? In Germany), which was claimed to have been written i
DEAR TOMMY,
a number of authors living in the occupied territories. Naturally, this challenge could not be left unanswered, and a few months later the SPA began to drop a reply, Ou est la place de VAlsace-Lorraine^ En France, written by Joseph Riber. This was followed by other articles which developed the same theme, most of them taken from neutral papers or magazines.
by
Flood of material By the end of 1916. the French had major propaganda operation
in action
a
both
to the occupied territories and to enemy troops and civilians. Theirs was by far the largest of the operations on either side of the front, and it could be said that the flood of material being produced was so great that the only limit was imposed by the availability of aircraft to distribute it. The French material was also often used for distribution by air in Belgium, and the British arranged for a considerable amount of material to be smuggled in from neutral Holland. Much of the material sent in by the French was prepared by Belgian officers attached to the SPA and the most widelyused piece of material was a newspaper. La Lettre du Soldat. which was similar in style to the French La Voix du Pays. Despite the speed with which they had organised the printing and distribution of La Gazette des Ardennes, the Germans never established a really eff"ective and coordinated propaganda effort against the Allies, and their material was extremely sporadic. That which was produced was based on the sensible principle that the most effective way to weaken the alliance against Germany was to increase the suspicions and jealousies between its members, and to work on existing divisions within the people of each country. German leaflets played on the latent hostility between the French and the British, between the various members of the British Dominion and Colonial forces, and their European allies. They also tried to exploit the jealousy of the front line soldier for the staff" officers, and the fears which all soldiers had of what might be happening at home in their absence.
But one small example will show how and lack of research were allowed to ruin what might have been promising campaigns. During 1915, the Germans dropped a series of leaflets to the basic mistakes
Indian
troops
fighting
for
the
British.
persuade them to mutiny against their leaders by pointing out that they had no reason to be fighting so far from their homes against a people who only
These tried
to
help them regain their independence. But the leaflets were written in Hindu and dropped to men who could only speak Urdu, and even if there had been Hindus able to understand them, they would have found that the message was primarily intended for muslims and was of little interest to Hindus. Soon after Italy declared war on the Central Powers in May 1915, her leaders decided that the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with its multitude of barely suppressed nationalist movements, was ripie for a campaign for subversion, and this would be undertaken using all types of
wanted
to
i
YOU ARE QUITE WELCOME TO WHAT. WE ARE LEAVING. WHEN WE STOP WE SHALL STOP, AND STOP YOU IN A MANNER YOU WONT APPRECIATE. FRITZ.
material, including aerial leaflets. Little is known about the organisation which was
up
this, and few examples have survived; but they were usually produced in several languages,
set
to
produce
OEFFNEN
of the leaflets
!
with the text altered to the particular
LESEN UND EUREN
nationality concerned. On one occasion, in the spring of 1916, a young Slovak pilot named Stefanik, who was serving with the French air force on the Italian front, dropped a series of proclamations to Czech soldiers serving in the
Austro-Hungarian army. These proclamations were made by Professor Masaryk, a national leader in exile, and they urged the need for a break from Austrian rule and the independence of the two states, Bohemia and Moravia. Shortly afterwards, on June 17 1916, a leaflet in Ruthenian, Polish and Croatian was dropped. The Ruthenian and Polish messages had a similar appeal: 'Why do you still fight and die for the hated Austrians?' The Croatian version had a different message: 'Why are you fighting us? We are the allies of your Imperial Mother.' As the German grip on Austria-Hungary tightened during 1916, so Italian propaganda increased its efforts to divide the two countries by exacerbating the jealousy of the Austrians. It argued that if Austria really wanted peace, why did it follow Germany who was out to get foreign lands for herself?
The tories.
FREUNDEN
ZEIGEN.
$el6poftl?Qrte.
::^^'^^
\?
iimrj
f'-'^^H I'MMA^ ^*i^
7l^y>y
Top When the Germans retreated to the Hindenburg Line they destroyed everything that could be of value to Allied troops reoccupymg the ground. Messages such as this were found scattered over the burnt fields. Above: To be read and passed on. Postcards which praised their treatment of prisoners were copied by the French and British and disseminated along the
German
lines
had their occupied terriNot only had the Austrian advance
Italians too
after the Battle of Caporetto given them a large amount of territory, but there were areas such as Venice which had never been liberated, and which the Italians considered to be part of their country. To the population of these areas the Italians sent regular leaflets promising their liberation. There was virtually no aerial propaganda
on the Eastern Front during the two years of the war. The Germans occasionally printed messages and dropped them on the Russian troops, and the Rusactivity first
sians replied with leaflets printed in German. But the main activity in the development of aerial propaganda until the end of 1916 was on the Western Front, due primarily to the fact that here the lines were static and the distribution of material relatively simple.
Further Reading Cockerill, Sir George, What Fools Lasswell, H
D
.
We Were Propaganda Technique in the
World War (Macmillan) and E., A
Tonnelat. H. Ennemief!
Travers
les
Lignes
H G AUCKLAND was educated at State primary and secondary schools He volunteered for service in the Royal Navy during the Second World War, after which he became interested in the history of aerial propaganda leaflets and has pursued this subject ever since His collection Includes informaon 7.000 leaflets disseminated by plane, shell, mortar and balloon from the First World War to the present He has written many articles on the subject for magazines throughout the world, he is cofounder of the Psywar Society and editor of the Society's magazine. The Falling Leaf. tion
1795
A
Hampshire Regiment corporal estimating the route propaganda leaflets by direction and velocity of wind, and the intervals between each batch of leaflets attached to a length of burning fuse. The soldier of
cuts a slit in the neck of the balloon with his penknife to allow the gas to escape as it expands.
I \ \ 1^90'
7-
f
#
i
'^i^HiiMriH
\\
In 1916 Wilson continued his peace offensive — idealism
would brook no
obstacle.
But
the Allies did not yet want peace. Marvin Sivartz
PEACE
INITIATIVES
Many diplomatic attempts were made to end the First World War between March 1916 and P'ebruary 1917, The leader in these
efforts
was the President of the
United States, Woodrow Wilson. His hopes lor a nef^'otiated peace, bright at first,
faded both the Allies and Central Powers revealed war aims which they could achieve only by military victory. On March 5, 1916, the President's adviser. Colonel p]. M. House, returned from a Euiopean ti'ip on which he had visited leaders of Britain, France and Germany in the hope of securing an agreement to American mediation that would end the war. The only tangible result of his journey was a memorandum upon which he and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, had agreed on February 22, 1916. According to this document, 'President Wilson was ready, on hearing from France and England that the moment was oppoitune, to propose that a Conference should be summoned to put an end to the war.' Although Wilson and House set great store by this so-called House-Giey Memorandum, the Allied governments did not. As Grey knew, the French, with the German army on their soil, were unwilling to entertain the idea of a negotiated peace, especially with the great battle of Verdun as
under way during February 1916. They wanted to regain Alsace-Lorraine, extract reparations from the Germans, secure guarantees against any future invasion, and perhaps cripple or even destroy Germany as a Great Power. Indeed, French opinion considered Wilson's mediation attempts as a domestic political manoeuvre in a presidential election year. Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London, expres.sed a general .sentiment when he wrote: 'Wilson, puritan, professor, disinterested, detached from everything in appearance, is, in sum, only a candidate, and all his policy consists of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds in order not to lose a vote.' In England also the war spirit was too strong to allow Asquith's government to contemplate any settlement short of outright
victory.
Parliamentary and public
pressure forced Asquith, despite his Above: The ever-optimistic President Wilson, still naively pressing for peace against the wishes and intentions of the belligerents
Below
left:
Colonel House,
and many of his colleagues' far
too ready to
believe any claim to peaceful intentions
Below: The level-headed
Sir
Edward Grey
ciples,
to
own
liberal prin-
adopt military conscription be-
tween January and
May
1916: and officials
in various ministries, as well as
powerful
were pressing for colonial acquisitions and the destruction of German trade and naval rivalry. Neither 'jingoist"
newspapers,
the British nor the P'rench could achieve their war aims if Wilson intervened to end the conflict on terms that would be acceptable to all the belligerents. They, therefore, never intended him to mediate. At the same time that the President, misled by House's optimism, waited anxiously for a summons froin the Allies, the domestic political situation in the United States did not help to make him a credible mediator. Divisions of opinion over the policy of neutrality in country, congress and cabinet weakened Wilson's international bargaining position. They militated against his making a diplomatic move for peace that might, if I'ejected by one or the other set of belligerents, involve his country in the war — especially at a time when General John J. Pershing's pursuit of Pancho Villa threatened to precipitate a conflict with Mexico. Yet Wilson con-
1798
tinued to hope that he could assume the role of peacemaker in Europe. To do so successfully would improve his chances at the polls in November and eliminate the danger that the actions of one of the belligerents might plunge him into a war crisis witli a deeply divided nation.
counted on a positive response from Germany, but he was 'deeply discouraged' by the British liberal government's rejection
Wilson — idealist or hypocrite? Whatever practical considerations he had
erents to any attempt at mediation, the United States finally rejected a Spanish proposal for joint good ofl^ices on August 23. 1916. Lansing explained to the Ambassador in Spain that the President had delayed his reply to Alfonso XIII's proposal of May 11. 1916, 'in the hope that at a later time the suggestion by a neutral power to consider terms of peace would be less objectionable to the enemies of Germany'. The President now felt, however, that the Entente governments had not changed their attitude, 'and that to make proposals, with knowledge that they would certainly be rejected and would in all probability cause irritation toward the government or governments making them, would jeopardise the future usefulness of the proposers as agents in peace negotia-
mind, the President undoubtedly believed in his mission as peacemaker. His liberal idealism, held in suspicion by conservatives and nationalists, fired the enthusiasm of countless millions of men and women throughout the world, thus giving him a powerful political lever which he in
attempted to use against the established governments of both belligerent sides. Wilson's liberalism was also a handicap. Unwilling or unable to separate the rhetoric of his ideals from calculations of military or economic strength, he often appeared to be a hvpocriie or a fool. Practical considerations and idealism were inextricably mixed in Wilson's mind and in his public pronouncements. To halt the conflict in Europe, to prevent American involvement in the war and to strengthen his own political position. Wilson waited in March 1916 for a call from the Allies.
On March
House advised Grey that the President was ready to act: 'It is now squarely up to you to make the next move.' Two weeks later a German submarine torpedoed the Channel steamer Sussex with American citizens aboard, straining German-.\merican relations al10, 1916.
most
to the breaking point. Wilson authorised House on April 6, 1916, to suggest to Grey 'that if you had any thought of acting at an early date on the plan we agreed upon you might wish now to consult with your allies with a view to acting immediately." Grey did nothing. He did not intend to invite the President's inter-
vention for a negotiated peace simply to help Wilson avert a confrontation with Germany that might culminate in America's entering the war on the Allied side. After the passing of the Sussex crisis, Wilson continued to press himself as a mediator. Meeting with no encouragement, he decided on a public appeal. Following closely a draft proposed by House, the President on May 27, 1916, proclaimed his desire for peace to a meeting of the League to Enforce Peace, an American organisation that favoured the formation of a league of nations and the submission of disputes between nations to an international court or council. Although the President tried in his speech to convince both sets of belligerents that he would be a good mediator, he succeeded only in increasing their suspicions of him.
The belligerent governments did not answer Wilson's plea for peace. According to the American Ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page, the British believed that the President did not 'in the least understand the war and was speaking only to the gallery filled with peace cranks'. On June 7, 1916. the German Foreign Secretary. Gottlieb von Jagow. in writing to his Ambassador in Washington. Count Johann von Bernstorif, expressed scepticism of Wilson's mediation attempts and added that 'if the progress of the war were to continue favourable for us, a peace founded on the absolute status quo ante would be unacceptable'. Wilson had not .
.
.
of his proffered services. He seemed to recognise finally that neither side was prepared in the spring of 1916 to talk seriously about peace. Fully realising the hostility of the bellig-
tions offier
when an opportune time comes
to
friendly offices to the warring nations'.
President
Wilson
continued
to
avoid
making any peace initiative during the summer and autumn of 1916. He preferred on the presidential election, in which, it appeared, he might well be defeated by his Republican opponent. He also recognised that the war situation during most of 1916 was too uncertain to enable either side to respond favourably to an offer of mediation: the Germans hammered aw-ay at Verdun, the Allies attacked on the Somme and on the Isonzo. and in Galicia and Bukovina Rumania joined the Allies only to face swift defeat by the Central Powers. The British Secretary of State for War. David Lloyd George, had in fact deliberately tried to dissuade Wilson from intervening by anto concentrate his attention
nouncing in a newspaper interview on September 29, 1916: 'The fight must be to a finish — to a knock-out. The whole world
— including neutrals of the highest purposes and humanitarians with the best of motives — must know that there can be no outside interference at this stage.' At this very time pressure upon Wilson for a peace move came from Germany.
would consider no peace that gave away those advantages. In these circumstances the conclusion of a genuine compromise peace was impossible. The German government hoped, nonetheless, that the pressure of the military situation and of domestic opposition to continued wartime sacrifices would force one or more of the Allies to respond favourably to an offer of peace. Once any enemy grasped at the chance of peace, the German policy makers believed, it would be unable to rally its people again for the all-out effort required by total war. In addition, if one of the Allies accepted an offer to discuss peace terms and subsequently broke off discussions because it refused to meet the demands of the Central Powers, the German government felt that it could then convince its own people to fight to the bitter end against an enemy who chose to make war rather than peace. German diplomatic efforts to gain a victorious peace were unsuccessful because major emphasis remained on military victory, which many Germans still considered possible at the end of 1916, and because they were unrealistic, that is, they aimed uncompromisingly at obtaining more than Germany's situation made feasible. For Britain, France and Russia were determined not to recognise a German supremacy in Europe and to realise their own war aims of annexation and aggrandisement. In the autumn of 1916 Bethmann-Hollweg decided to make a strong diplomatic attempt to obtain peace. He felt that this opportunity might well be his last not only to save Germany from defeat but to preserve his own political position. Public opinion and military advice insistently urged the launching of unrestricted sub-
marine warfare against England. Bethmann-Hollweg feared that the adoption of this policy would lead not to quick victory, as the advocates of the U-Boat rashly promised, but to war with the United ultimate German defeat. States — and Hindenburg and Ludendorff. the real power in the German army after the end of August 1916. were prepared to oppose him on this issue. Their unbounded prestige guaranteed the military men victory in any open conflict with the Chancellor, who was threatened also by opposition in the Reichstag and country. A successful peace offensive seemed to Bethmann-Hollbest means of avoiding military defeat for Germany and political defeat for himself Through Bernstorff. he encouraged President Wilson to call the belligerents to the conference table. Wilson, even after his re-election on November 7, 1916, was unco-operative, for he knew that the Allies would be hostile to a peace attempt.
Peace — an impossibility
in 1916 Ever since the failure of the offensive against France in September and October 1914 the German government had sought to break up the Entente by diplomatic as well as military means. In November 1914 the Chief of the General Staff. General Erich von Falkenhayn. recommended the
weg the
conclusion of a separate peace with Russia to enable the army to crush the Allies in the West. At about the same time, through a Danish intermediary, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg sounded the British about peace. Although the German government continued to extend peace feelers, especially to Russia, during the next year and a half— and set up contacts as well with some members of the political opposition in France — it could not destroy the Allied front. None of the Allied governments would willingly conclude a peace that allowed Germany to retain the
Because Wilson hesitated, BethmannHollweg decided to act himself, as he rightly
territorial,
economic and strategic advan-
tages which she had won by her military victories early in the war. Yet Germany
circumstances of early to be crucial. After the death of Franz Josef on November 21. 1916, and the accession to the throne of Karl, who was related by marriage to pro-French Bourbon royalty, BethmannHollweg was anxious to prevent a possible separate peace initiative by AustriaHungary. He believed that, after the fall of Bucharest to a German army on December 6, 1916. the Central Powers could make a peace offer without an implication of defeat. He probably also hoped that if the peace move were unsuccessful its failure could be blamed on the Allies, considered
the
December 1916
1799
allowing
Germany
to begin
unrestricted
submarine warfare, for which strong public and military pressure was building up, without bringing the United States into the war. These considerations augmented his more obvious aims: to bring the Allies to a conference where the Central Powers, already occupying enemy territory, would hold the whip hand; to intensify anti-war feeling within the Allied nations; and to solidify the German home front for a continuing war effort. After consulting his allies, the Chancellor made his peace move. On December 12, 1916, the Central Powers requested that the United States and other neutral governments communicate to the Allies an offer to enter into peace negotiations. In a speech to the Reichstag on the same day BethmannHollweg demonstrated that the offer was an attempt to place responsibility for continuation of the war, and unrestricted submarine warfare, on Germany's enemies and to boost morale at home. The peace note itself stated no concrete terms on which Germany and her allies would be willing to cease hostilities. It boasted of the Central Powers' successes in the war and warned: 'If notwithstanding this offer of peace and conciliation the struggle should continue, the four Allied powers are resolved to carry it on to a victorious end, while solemnly disclaiming any responsibility before
mankind and
history.'
Immediate, though unofficial, reactions came from the leaders of the Allied Powers. The French President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand, told the Chamber of Deputies, on December 13, 1916, in words laden with contempt, bitterness and pride: 'This invitation is in vague and obscure terms, in high-sounding words to mislead the minds, to stir the conscience, and to trouble the hearts of peoples who mourn for their countless dead. The circumstances in which these proposals are made are such that I have the right to denounce them as a crafty move, a clumsy
Two days later, on December 15, the Russian Duma, after listening to a denunciation of the peace offer by the new
snare.'
Foreign Minister, Nicolas Pokrovsky, resolved 'unanimously in favour of a categorical refusal by the Allied governments enter under present conditions into any peace negotiations whatever.'
to
In Italy the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Baron Sidney Sonnino, gave a stern warning in the Chamber of Deputies on December 18, 1916: 'The tone of boasting and insincerity characterising the preamble to the enemy notes inspires no confidence in the proposals of the Central Empires.' The Chamber gave Sonnino an ovation and an overwhelming vote of confidence. The new British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, quoted words of Abraham Lincoln to the House of Commons: 'We accepted this war for an object, a worthy object, and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God I hope it will never end until that time.' Lloyd George stressed that the German government had put forward no specific peace terms: 'To enter, on the invitation of Germany, proclaiming herself victorious, without any knowledge of the proposals she proposes to make, into a conference is to put our heads into a noose with the ropeend in the hands of Germany.' The individual responses of the Allied statesmen foreshadowed the collective
1800
as
mad
reply to the invitation of the CenPowers to discuss peace which was issued on December 30, 1916. The Allies refused the offer and reaffirmed their de-
as hell'. replies to Wilson reflected the differing attitudes of the two belligerent sides towards the United States. Ger-
make peace separately. insisted that the peace proposal was designed to influence public opinion: to disturb it in the Allied countries, strengthen it in the Central Powers and intimidate it in neutral states. They also accused Germany of striving 'to justify new crimes in advance before the eyes of the world':
many and
her allies, aiming at direct negotiations with their enemies, feared that the intervention of Wilson, although he had disavowed any desire to mediate, might help the Entente Powers, to whom they believed him to be partial. On December 26, 1916, Zimmermann handed the German government's brief reply to the
unrestricted submarine warfare; forced labour and deportation (which had been applied in Belgium); and the 'enlistment of nationals against their own country' (referring to Germany's attempt to recruit Poles into the German army). The Allied governments refused 'to entertain a proposal without sincerity and without import'. At the same time, they were considering more seriously another overture, this one from the United States.
American Ambassador in Berlin, ft tersely rejected any interference by Wilson and reiterated Germany's demand for 'a direct exchange of views' between the belligerents themselves. Germany's allies, AustriaHungary and Turkey, issued similar notes on the same day and Bulgaria, four days later, on December 30, 1916. The Allies made a joint reply to the President on January 10, 1917. Because of the
official
tral
termination not to
They
Wilson's last overture
On December
18, 1916, President
Wilson
had called upon the belligerents to state the terms upon which they would be willing to conclude peace. He had prepared a draft of this note weeks earlier. The peace proposal of the Central Powers forced him to come forward with his own, although as Lansing admitted in circulating the President's suggestion, 'He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by the recent overtures of the Central Powers'. Wilson acted now because he feared that the Allies might so sharply reject the Central Powers' offer as to prevent any further attempt to end the conflict. The President declared in his note that the avowed objects of statesmen on both sides in the war were 'virtually the same", to safeguard small states as well as large against aggression and to prevent any recurrence of war in the future. Yet, he complained, both sides had failed to define 'the precise objects
which
would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out'. Wilson, trying to avoid in advance an adverse reaction by the belligerents to his intervention, argued that, although his services would be available if solicited, he was neither 'proposing peace' nor 'offering mediation' but asking for statements of terms as a basis for peace discussions. Mixed reactions greeted Wilson's message of December 18. Opinion in neutral countries was favourable. Among the belligerents the initial response of the Central Powers was less hostile than that of the Allies. Arthur Zimmermann, who had become German Foreign Secretary at the end of November 1916, told the American charge d'affaires, Joseph C. Grew, that he appreciated Wilson's 'wise and
high-minded
action'.
The moderate and
left-wing press in Germany also welcomed the President's note, although strongly
newspapers denounced to save England from defeat. In France, Italy and England the pro-annexationist it
as
The
official
non-annexationist of liberal pressure opinion and dependence upon American aid in money and materials, their response was better calculated to please Wilson than had been the brief messages of the Central Powers. The Allies asserted that German and Austrian aggression was responsible for the war. They explained that 'their objects in the war will not be made known in detail with all the equitable compenand indemnities for damages sations suffered until the hour of negotiations'. But unlike the Central Powers, the Allies gave some indication of their peace terms: the restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro, with indemnities; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, Russia and Rumania, with reparation for damages; guarantees for the future security of Europe; the restitution of territories 'wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations, the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Rumanians and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination'; and the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from Europe. The phrasing of this statement in terms of liberal principles could not effectively mask the selfish war aims of the Allies. They had failed to mention their designs on the German colonies. They applied the principle of national self-determination only to the detriment of the Central Powers, while disregarding it when it suited their purposes, for instance, in the secret Treaty of London (April 26, 1915) which brought Italy into the war by promising her, among other things, not only the Italian Trentino but also the German South Tyrol and parts of Istria and Dalmatia, which would be detrimental to any 'liberation of Slavs'. The Allies could not achieve their aims without a military victory. The Central Powers would never negotiate on the basis of terms which would break up both the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and involve for Germany the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and possibly of the provinces of West Prussia and
Posen as
well.
The end
of
an attempt
foreign
regretted that Wilson's initiative h?d followed so closely upon the German offer as to prove an embarrassment. Outspoken opposition came from the press and public in Allied countries; the newspaper magnate Lord Northcliffe, for example, informed the American Ambassador in London that 'the people are offices
American neutrality?
Not only through Bernstorff but also in a speech to the United States Senate on January 22, 1917 — in which he called for 'peace without victory' — Wilson encouraged the German government to reveal the terms on which it would negotiate. Bethmann-HoUweg, under pressure also from the Social Democrats and his Austro-
— Hungarian
ally not to end all possibility discussion, instructed Bernstorff on January 29. 1917. to inform Wilson confidentially of the terms on which Germany would be willing to make peace: Restitution of the part of upper Alsace occupied by the French: gaining of a frontier which would protect Germany and Poland economically and strategically against Russia": restitution of German colonies: restitution of those parts of France occupied by Germany under resei-\ation of strategical and economic changes of the frontier and financial compensations: restoration of Belgium under special guaranty for the safety of Germany which would have to be
of
decided on by negotiations with Belgium":
economic compensation for territories exchanged and for German business concerns and private persons who suffered by the war"; also, abandonment of all economic agieements and measures which would form an obstacle to normal commerce and intercourse after the conclusion of peace: the freedom of the seas." Based on a draft proposal drawn up by the Chancellor nearly four weeks before, these terms hardly disguised Germany's expansionist war aims. On January 31. 1917. Bernstorff transmitted the terms to House.
Both Bethmann-Hollweg and his
Am-
j
bassador in Washington knew, however. ± that the time for negotiation had passed, i -At a meeting of the Crown Council at i Pless on January 9. 1917. the Chancellor i
-giving in
to
Hindenburg and Ludendorff.
who were now
~
the real rulers of Germany had conceded that Germany must try her ultimate military' means of achieving victory, unrestricted submarine warfare. He could only hope that this decision, once implemented, would not cause the United States to declare war. On the same day that Bernstorff gave House Germanys negotiating terms he delivered to Lansing a note and two memoranda announcing the opening of the submarine campaign, to commence the next day. February 1. 1917. Blaming the failure of diplomatic moves for peace on the Allies, the ambassador explained the new German move in the.se words: 'The Imperial Government could not justify before its own conscience, before the German people, and before history the neglect of any means destined to bring about the end of the war.' Thus ended the diplomatic search for ^ peace which Wilson had carried on from 5 the beginning of the war and with re- = newed efforts since March 1916. He now had to reconsider whether the United States couJd remain neutral.
Above
left: Jagow. the German Foreign Secretary at the beginning of 1916- Above: David Lloyd George, whose attitude should have made it clear to Wilson that the Allies would never accept a negotiated peace Left: Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg. the German Chancellor. Below left: Zimmermann. Jagows replacement as Foreign Secretary. Below: Count von Bernstorff. the controversial German Ambassador to the United S»3tes
Further Reading Birndaur^ K E Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy towards the United States. April 18. 1916-January 9, 1917 (Stokholm: Almqvist &Wiksell. 1958) Gatzke. H. W.. Germany's Drive to the West:
A Study of Germany s Western War Aims during the First World War (Johns Hopkins 1950 Link. A. S.. Wilson: Confusions and Crises. 1915-1916 (Princeton University Press 1964) May. E R
The World War and American 1914-1917 {Harvard University
.
Isolation.
Press 1959)
B ed.. Off icial Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals. December 1916
Scott. J
.
to November 1918 (Carnegie for International Peace 1921)
\Fnr
Dr Marvin
page 704.
Endowment
Suartz's biography, see
\
ISO]
Although the first submarine offensive launched by Germany had been called off for political and diplomatic reasons, the German navy was still convinced that in the U-Boat it had a war- winning weapon. But the opposition of the rest of the High Command was inflexible — it was not worth running the risk of American intervention. However, the changing fortunes of the German field armies gradually brought about a change in the thinking of Falkenhayn, and with this new powerful ally, the navy renewed its pressure for an all-out U-Boat campaign. It declared that the U-Boats could bring the Allies to their knees before the Americans could make their weight felt. The Kaiser was finally persuaded. Gaddis Smith. Right: The men and the weapon for the new policy Had
the submarine been simply another weapon — Uke a new machine gun — it could have been tested without
field piece or
restriction in battle. Its effectiveness would then have been proved or disproved, and the emotional fervour about its use dissipated. But the submarine could not yet be used effectively against other warships. The three British cruisers HMS Hogue, Aboukir and Cressy had fallen prey through the stupidity of their commanding officers. Only aided by great luck could a submarine expect to sink a fast, modern warship employing proper defensive tactics. The one vulnerable class of target for the submarine was the merchant vessel, and it had already been shown that the merchant ship was very vulnerable indeed. Therein lay the problem. Accepted rules of cruiser warfare required an attacking vessel to provide for the safety of noncombatants aboard merchant vessels which were about to be taken prize or destroyed. Surface commerce raiders had no reason to fear retaliation, for their victims were not powerful enough to fight back, but a fragile submarine abiding by accepted rules of cruiser warfare could be destroyed by ramming or by a single shot from a small calibre deck gun. On the other hand, if a submarine launched a torpedo from a submerged position without warning, there was a virtual certainty of heavy loss of life among passengers and crew in the ship attacked. Another difficulty arose from the impossibility of distinguishing through a periscope between a neutral and belligerent vessel — especially if, as was the case, belligerents flew neutral flags as a ruse. A submarine, to be fully effective and in the interest of its own safety, had to attack all merchant vessels and to do so without warning. Thus, the possible gains from the use of the submarine had to be balanced at all times against the cost of antagonising neutrals or even converting them into enemies. Until Germany made the final decision in 1917 the calculation of this gain and loss was the crux of the argument. Merely 'sentimental' considerations of morality and adherence to international law never weighed significantly in the balance. As long as the use of the submarine was held under restrictions, the advocates of ruthless use had an advantage in the argument. Their claims could not be disproved. In the U-Boat offensive of 1915, the U-Boats sank far fewer ships than the optimistic admirals and their supporters had predicted, unless the attacking craft was submerged. Normally, each U-Boat spent two weeks out of every five in port. Two weeks out of every three-week cruise were spent getting to and from the combat station on the western approaches. This meant that five submarines were required to keep one continuously on station. It began to look as if the claims of the U-Boat enthusiasts were vastly exaggerated. The enthusiasm for the weapon in the Navy and in the Reichstag, however, especially among parties of the right and centre, was unabated. But as long as the number-o submarines capable of operating at long range remained limited, the enthusiasts could not prevail. Bethmarin-Hollweg, supported by General Erich von Falkenhayn, the Army Chief-of-Staff, argued effectively that the costs of unrestri-^+ed submarine warfare remained prohibitive and would rem ntil the naval^uthori ties could guarantee victory. But ^ new submar commissioned and with each additic lonth of frustr, i
military stalemate, Bethmann-Hollweg osition became difficult to maintain. The U-Boat supporter^; could not yet gua tee victory, but neither could Bethmann-Hollweg promi the refusal to use the U-Boat would lead to success,-
1802
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In January 1916 Bethmann-Hollweg lost Falkenhayn's support. Overcome by a wave of pessimism, Falkenhayn argued that
military blows on land could not end the war. He doubted that Germany's economic resources could sustain the war into 1917, and he feared the morale of the people might collapse if the war continued for more than another year. But, said the General, the obstacles to the use of the U-Boat no longer existed. The situation in the Balkans was secure with the conquest of Serbia and the accession of Bulgaria to the side of the Gential Powers. The navy could promise that Britain would be destroyed within two months after the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. Germany could easily sustain the commercial and moral effects of the entry of the United States into the war, an event which Falkenhayn admitted would probably follow. Tirpitz shared Falkenhayn's irrational optimism and said the Navy had more than enough U-Boats for the task, although he was extraordinarily evasive about the actual number of craft in various stages of readiness for operations. Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, the new chief of the Admn-al Staff, was a little more cautious than Falkenhayn and Tirpitz. He believed that four months, not two, would be required for Britain's defeat. Holtzendorff complained petulantly that Germany's military successes had not had the political effect on the enemy to which they were entitled — in other words, the enemy was too stubborn to realise it had been defeated. Therefore, any new major offensive against France or Russia might not succeed and would be too costly for Germany. An attack on the Suez Canal and Egypt was an attractive idea, lor it would strike at the commercial underpinnings of the British Empire, but it was also too risky. Britain, argued Holtzendorff. was the 'soul of our opposition'. She was paying for the war. If her financial power were crippled, the war must stop. Her financial power was dependent on the free movement of goods and the supply of food. Already the U-Boat. operating under the existing restrictions, had wrought great injury, to judge by the shortage of cargo space and the drastic increase in freight rates which British shippers had to pay. Tirpitz and Holtzendorff both belittled the effect of American belligerency by saying that the United States was already de facto waging economic war against Germany. Formal belligerency would make no difference, because with the U-Boat the war would soon be won. Without the U-Boat the war might be lost anyway — no matter what the United States did. Even if the United States declared war on Germany, her ability to transmit power would be limited to her available cargo space. Financial support was of no use if the material purchased could not be transported. In short the certainty of bringing Britain quickly to her knees could not be weighed against the merepo.s.s/^/V/A' of complications with neutrals resulting from unrestricted U-Boat warfare. Bethmann-Hollweg was not convinced. He agreed to an intensi-
U-Boat warfare whereby commanders were permitted belligerent merchant vessels without warning, but he believed more certainly than ever that the lifting of all restrictions would bring the United States into the war. and would herald Germany's defeat. He launched a direct attack on the Falkenhayn-Tirpitz-Holtzendorff contentions by challenging the accuracy of their figures on current British tonnage and expected losses from submarine attack. Bethmann-Hollweg was right. The navy's predictions were based on dubious assumptions that every U-Boat would operate at maximum capacity, that no new defensive tactics would be developed by the British, and that little or no replacement tonnage would be built. Bethmann-Hollweg also argued that the U-Boat advocates ignored the psychological impact of their weapon: 'before England is brought to a state of capitulation — and this is the real point at issue — she will leave no stone unturned in an effort to overcome her difficulties.' She could do much through better organisation, rationing, convoying and other techniques to impi'ove her situation, and would 'sacrifice the last man and the last penny' before admitting that her supremacy on the seas had been destroyed. fication of
to attack
armed
The
vital calculation — Could the
U-Boats win before the United States could tip the balance of forces in the Allies' favour?
j^gtmal^mmMamrndtimSi^t^
Top: The U 95, of the U 93 class, with increased torpedo armament. Length: 235; feet Beam: 20' feet Displacement: 838/ 1 .000 tons. Power/ speed: 2.400 and 1.200 hp/16-8 and 8.6 knots. Armament: six 19,7-inch torpedo tubes and one 4 1-inch or 3 4-inch gun. Crew: 39 Above: A U 81 class boat, of 1916 vintage, still basically the same design as the prewar boats, Lengtti: 230 feet Beam: 203 feet Displacement: 808/946 tons Power/speed, 2,400 and 1.200 hp/ 16 8 and 9 1 Wr\o\s Armament: four 19, 7- inch torpedo tubes (two bow, two stern). one4,1-inchandone 34-inchgun Crew 39 Below The L/ 35, of the L/ 37 class, a similar but improved version of the U 26. Lengtti: 2123 feet. Beam: 20i feet. Displacement: 675/878 Ions. Power/speed. 1.850 and 1,200hp/16,4 and 9.7 knots. Armament: four 19 7-inch torpedo tubes (two bow. two stern), one or two 3,4-inch or 4, 1-inch guns. Crew: 39, Bottom: The UB 1 forerunner of the small coastal type of U-Boat. easily maintained and crewed Length: 921 feet. Beam: 94 feet. Displacement: 127/142 tons. Power/speed: 60 (heavy oil) and 120 hp/6,5 and 5,5 knots. Armament: two 19,7-inch torpedo tubes (both bow). Crew: 14, This class was designed to be built m large numbers from prefabricated parts for use in the coastal waters around the Belgian coast and the British Isles, The type dived too slowly and the oil engines were a drawback .
Fanciful statistics
The Chancellor disagreed most vehemently with his opponents on the question of the importance of American entry into the war. He pointed to the enormous moral boost to Germany's enemies that would flow from American entry. 'The confidence in a victorious termination of the war would be revived, and the will to endure would be strengthened.' Unlike the admirals who were bemused by fanciful .statistics of theoretical tonnage which the U-Boat fleet could sink. Bethmann-Hollweg realised that men act on the basis of expectations rather than present reality. From every angle Bethmann-Hollweg saw liabilities in the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. Germany's own 1805
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Admiral (irpitz, tat tier ot ttie Imperial German Navy, and perhaps the staunchest advocate of strong and decisive U-Boat warfare He had no executive power to order this offensive, however allies
thus,
— Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria — were opposed; the move would weaken the coalition. Rumania would
probably take the opportunity to join Germany's enemies. The Netherlands and Denmark could also injure (lermany by abandoning neutrality. All the financial problems of the Allies would be over once the United States was on their side. Germany's food problems would be increased, because a belligerent United States would no longer send food relief to German-occupied Belgium and northern France. He ridiculed the military authorities for ignoring the military potential of the United States, although he also dismissed the formal armed forces of the United States as negligible. The real threat, he believed, would come from volunteers. 'No one who is acquainted with American conditions will entertain any doubt that the American sporting spirit, based upon its English prototype, would result in bringing over to our opponents volunteer contingents which one can surely ventui'e to estimate at a few hundred thousands.' The ultimate question in Bethmann-Hollweg's mind was whether Germany's position was so desperate that she must gamble everything for the chance to bring Great Britain to her knees. 'The question is to be answered unqualifiedly in the negative.' Carry on U-Boat warfare, yes; but always in a manner to avoid bringing the United States into the war. Once again Bethmann-HolKveg carried the Kaiser with him. On March 3, 1916, Wilhelm decided that there would be no resumption of unrestricted U-Boat warfare. His decision may have been influenced by personal pique against Tirpitz for the way in which the old admiral was carrying on a clandestine press campaign in favour of the U-Boat. The Kaiser ordered that all discussion of U-Boats i)e censored and that the press bureau of the navy be removed from Tirpitz' authority. The old admiral, as desired, resigned. Once again, however, the pressure against Bethmann-Hollweg and in favour of unrestricted warfare increased. In August 1916, with the war in its third year, the final crisis over the submarine began. All the arguments outlined above were employed on both sides, but now Bethmann-Hollweg had to contend with even higher levels of military and popular frustration over the internnnable war. The blood of every dead German soldier could be laid to the Chancellor's timid refusal to use the one weapon which could win the war. Falkenhayn was replaced by Fcia in the final week of A. marschall Paul von Hindt g and General Erich Ludendorlf m command of the army. In .. major civil-military conlerence at Pless on August 31, the navy again demanded a decision in favour of unrestricted U-lioat warfare. Admiral Holtzendortf rebutted
1806
Top: The UC 94. a UC III class coastal mineLength: 1855 feet Beam: 18.1 feet Displacement: 49M57) tons Power/speed; 600 and 740 hp/1 15 and 6.6 knots Armament three 19 7-inch torpedo tubes and 14 mines Crew 32 Above centre: The UC 5, a UC minelayer. Length: 1 1 1V? feet Beam: 10', feet. Displacement: 168/ 183 tons. Power/speed: 90 (heavy oil) and 175 hp/6'''2 and 51-4 knots. Armament: 12 layer.
I
mines Crew:
16. /Aftoue
The (7
minelayer. Length: 186^
feet.
UE 7 ocean Beam: 19j feet
80. a
atfin
Admiral von Schroder,
commander
of the Naval
Corps, with part of his
The German naval High Command was continually searching for means of persuading the government to adopt all-out U-Boat warfare
staff.
the argument about the necessity of keeping the United States neutral by saying that the United States could scarcely inflict more damage on Germany than she was already doing through the supply of munitions to the Allies. Admiral Eduard von Capelle, the Navy Minister, said that even if U-Boat warfare failed, the situation could be no worse than at present. Hindenburg. however, believed there were too many uncertainties to permit an immediate decision. A decision was again postponed. During the August 31 conference Admiral Holtzendorff asked Bethmann-Hollweg if he had any alternative to U-Boat warfare. The one alternative was a negotiated peace and the best approach to that objective was through President Wilson. BethmannHollweg on October 1 accordingly instructed the German Ambassador in Washington, Bernstoi^ff. to ask the President if he would issue a general appeal for peace. Wilson had been thinking independently of such a move, but now was inhibited from acting by the appioaching Presidential election. D/sp/acemenf. 755/830 tons. Power/speed. 900 and 900 hp/ 10 and 7 9 knots Armament two 19.7-inch torpedo tubes, 32 mines and one 3 4 or 4. 1-inch gun. Crew: 39 Below. The UB 122. a UB III class coastal submarine The UB III class was the most numerous coastal type. Length 182 feet Beam: 19 feet Displacement: 520/650 tons. Armament: five 19.7-inch torpedo tubes (four bow, one stern) Power/speed: 1.100 and 788 hp/13. 5 and 7.5 knots Crew 34.
This type
was much used
for coastal
work
Meanwhile. Bethmann-Hollweg and his opponents continued to marshal arguments and supportei's. Karl Helff'erich. Interior Secretary, agreed with Bethmann-Hollweg that the military authorities had seriously underestimated the power of the United States. He noted that the annual steel production of the United States was 40.0()U,00U tons compared to Germany's 14,OO0,UOO tons. As for the military capability of the United States, the example of the American Civil War 'shows what can be accomplished by such unschooled forces at a time of crisis'. Helfferich concluded that unrestricted U-Boat warfare should be undertaken only if the naval authorities could guarantee victory before the full power of the United Slates could be brought to bear. from Washington Ambassador Bernstorff and his staH' confirmed Bethmann-Hollweg's pessimistic conclusions. American opinion would turn hysterically anti-German in the event of unrestricted U-Boat warfare. No party or government could stand against it. No help could be expected from the German-American element in the United States. 'They would not be able, nor would they attempt, to bear the brunt of such a national tempest.' The Embassy also observed that 'England attributes much less importance to the dangers of unrestricted U-Boat warfare than she does to the advantages of drawing America over to the side of the Allies. This should certainly give us something to think about. From this viewpoint it certainly looks as if. by reverting to unrestricted U-Boat war, we were pla,\ ing into our enemies' hands.' Karl Albert, head of the German propaganda effort in the United Slates, made similar ob.servations from New York. The results of American entry into the war would be 'serious beyond expression'. He saw the entire American people being 'carried along on a tidal
1807
wave
of hysterical patriotism' with German-Americans heing first proclaim their loyalty. Albert doubted, as did virtually everyone in the CJerman government, that the direct military contiibution of the United States would be significant, although he believed the United States would provide some destroyers for the war against submarines. His great concern was American industrial capacity which, he believed, had barely been tapped. His firm conclusion was that a resumption of U-Boat warfare would lead to
to a
German
defeat.
By December 1916 Hindenburg and Ludendorfi', well supplied with arguments from the navy, had been completely converted to resumption — sooner rather than later. HoltzendorflT had now settled on six months as the time required to complete Britain's defeat — provided the U-Boat war began on February 1, 1917.
Above: Admiral von Pohl, Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet in early 1916 and a not very enthusiastic supporter of a U-Boat offensive Se/oiArJGeneral Ludendorff. commander of the German armies in the East, and from late 1916 the effective commander of all the German field forces and a supporter of all-out submarine war Right: U-Boat rendezvous in the Mediterranean, Note the folded radio aerial on the nearer boat. Communications were always a problem
Delay would permit the British Isles to be replenished with food from the 1917 North American harvest. Peace negotiations were Bethmann-Hollweg's only hope of averting the fateful decision. But in that direction he had no room for manoeuvre. Any German offer of peace which did not reward the nation for its great sacrifices in blood and treasure by sizeable additions of territory and security, particularly with German control over Belgium, would have been unthinkable. Anything less than a settlement which reduced German power and territory and dismembered the territory of her allies would have been unacceptable to Britain and France. Indeed, in London where the ni'w Llo>d George government had just been formed, the 'knockout blow' spirit
was as strong as
ever.
Given these circumstances it is easy to charge BethmannHollweg with hypocrisy for his public appeal for a peace conference issued on December 12, 1916, and to say that he was merely trying to mask the impending resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare. It is true that Bethmann-Hollweg had little hope of a successful negotiation and also true that he saw little use in a peace move on the eve of U-Boat warfare — nevertheless, he was sincere. Peace was a slim hope, but not so slim as to be abandoned altogether. Six da\s after Germany's appeal. Pi'esident Wilson issued an appeal of his own which called for all belligei'ents to state their aims. The Allies replied to the German appeal with a scathing denunciation — although not with an outright rejection — and to Wilson's appeal with a fairly specific list of objectives which, from the (ierman point of view, constituted a humiliating defeat. Germany replied to Wilson with a set of vague generalities. By the beginning of 1917 the peace flurry was over. Both sides were more convinced than ever that the other intended its complete destruction and therefore that victory was the only way to end the war. Bethmann-Hollweg was weary after two years of struggle over the submarine issue. He had played his last card. The Kaiser now listened to the military authorities and made the final decision at Pless on -January 9, 1917. Here is how one participant described the scene: EiTryoiw stood around a lar^e table, on which the Kaiser, pcde and excited, leaned his hand. Holtzendorff spoke first, and. from the standpoint of the navy, both well and. above all, in confidence of victory. England will lie on the ground in at most six months, before a single American has set foot on the continent: the American danger does not disturb him at all. Hindenburg spoke very briefly, observing only that from the measure a reduction in American munitions exports had to be expected. Bethmann-Hollweg finally, with a visible inner excitement, .^et forth once again the rca.sv)/;.s that had led him in the past to cast an opposing vote against a U-Boat war beyond the limits of cruiser warfare, namely concern about the prompt entry of America into the ranks of our enemies. ivith all the ensuing consequences, but he closed by .^iaying that in view of the recently altered stand of the Supreme Command and the categorical declarations of the admirals as to the success of the measure, he wished to withdraw his opposition. The Kaiser followed his statements with every sign of impatience and opposition and declared that unrestricted U-Boat war ivas therefore decided. Unrestricted U-Boat warfare was resumed on February 1. 1917. Two months later the United States declared war. Although Germany still had enormous power to inflict injury, and the U-Boats sank almost as much tonnage as the admirals predicted, this move was not destined to bring the Allies to their knees, but it was to have the most dire consequences for Germany. Further Reading
Birnbaum.
Karl.
Peace
and U-Boat Warfare (Uppsala 1958) War Aims in First World War (Chatto &
t\/loves
Fischer, Fritz. Germany's Windus 1968)
May. Ernest, Ttie World War and American Isolation. 1914-17 (Cambridge, Mass 1959)
{For (laddis Smith's biography.
1808
,s'('('
page 701.
^
The U-Boats, Germany's ace
in
the hole. Could they turn the tide in a situation where the Allies' superiority in manpower and productive capacity was now felt
beginning to make itself against the dwindling resources of the Central Powers?
Above: The l/C 26, representative of the UC II Germany's most numerous coastal mine-
class,
laying type. Length: 173 feet. Beam: 17 feet. Displacement: 434/51 1 tons. Power/speed: 600 (diesel) and 620 hp/12 and 7.4 knots. Armament: 18 mines in six obliquely mounted bow tubes, three 19.7-inch torpedo tubes (one stern and two bow, above water) and one 3.4inch gun. Crew: 28. Key to diagram: ^. Aft torpedo tube. 2. Living quarters. 3. Engine room 4. Control room 5. Mines and mine tubes. 6. Forward torpedo tubes. Left: The deployment of a German submarine-laid mine. In Allied mines, the mine and the smker (the part which rested on the bottom and anchored the mine) separated almost immediately after they had been dropped, the sinker towing the mine down to a predetermined depth above the sea floor after the correct length of cable connecting the two had been unreeled. In the German mine, however, the complete mine/sinker combination went to the bottom together. There the dis-
solution of a solvable plug permitted the mine to float towards the surface until a hydrostatic device was activated at the desired depth below the surface, which gave better results in service. Here the line was snubbed automatically. This system had much to commend it, principally in that the mines could be laid much more accurately, but it also had two inherent drawbacks: the mine partially air-filled
Ip.'
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•v:i: ••••••
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ISIO
1
was connected
to the sinker by two lines, and meant that it was more prone to swaying, and therefore altering its depth, in strong currents, and the soluble release device tended to dissolve as soon as the mine was released, which meant thatthe mine might come up under the laying submarine and explode. The sinker was stabilised on the bottom by four arms, held flush with the sides of the whole package until it reached the bottom, where the arms swung out. Below: The two types of minelaying submarine used by Germany: U 117 (bottom), a stern-laying type (42 mines and 18 torpedoes), and UC 16 (top), a bow-laying type (18 mines and fewer torpedoes). The former was safer, as the submarine had time to get away before the mine and sinker separated. Right: The German this
'Egg' mine. 1. Hertz horn (lead tube containing sulphuric acid in a glass container. Impact with a ship breaks the glass, allowing acid to flow onto carbon and zinc elements, thus producing an electric current to fire the detonator). 2. Mine casing. 3. Detonating charge (allowed to fall to detonating mechanism by deactivating of safety device). 4. Safety device (deactivated as mine is laid) and electric firing mechanism. 5. Blocks of explosive. 6.. Wooden chocks. 7. Electrically controlled firing-pin mechanism. 8. Hydrostatic depth setter. 9. Mooring line in horizontal drum. 10. Mine sinker (acts as anchor when mine is operational)
1811
'
MEXICO
U
k
When the Mexican civil war started spilHng the United States, the latter felt expedt^iiyil^ver the border t^put'an end to the dissidents' inroads. But rtW^^figis the golden opportunity looked for by GeriM'Vyfc.to htum^cr ^^n^iprica's imminent war effort^jkeproroy iK^,- the US in a war far
*. "oyer into
P||-*'oWiged to
s
1
mount an
removed
iVgni
Germany hoped
^hcnj^n
tfe^atj-es 6f conflict,
to uivcjier B^-Boats
to beat the All
Clarence
i
more time
^mt to no avail.
ndenen
!-C»»li
^tt. A war as unlike
that on the Western Front as one could possibly be heavity-munitioned • irregulars in the street fighting for the town of Juarez Top: US troops of the force whic^ took and held Veracruz after a party of US sailors had been arrested and held there illegally Above: US troops on their way into Mexico after the harassment by bandits from across the border
M^Tcan
had become intolerable
1813
31, 1917, while a long column States soldiers was marching northward after eight months in Mexico, orders from Berlin unleashed German sub-
On January of United
marines in an all-out war on shipping in what the Germans hoped would be a whirlwind campaign to bring Great Britain and France to their knees. At that time few people saw any connection between the soldiers of Brigadier-General John Pershing's force and the reopening of German submarine fury on the Atlantic Ocean, but the connection, although imponderable in many respects and impossible tired J.
was The centenary
of delineation,
real.
Mexican independ1910, found Mexico under the iron of
ence, in dictatorship of General Porfirio Diaz, a dictatorship which had lasted for over 30 years. Most of the world believed that
the
Diaz
regime
was
benevolent
and
beneficial for the country, but under the surface the discontent of the Mexican
people was deep and dangerous. Behind the fagade of economic development and the stern maintenance of law and order, the Diaz regime was as brutal, ruthless and corrupt as any dictatorship in the world. A small class of immensely wealthy landowners held the greater part of the country; vast numbers of peasants lived in a state of peonage, which was simply slavery in everything but name. Diaz maintained himself in power by a combination of force, fear, cajolery and outright corruption. The corps of R urates, an elite police force originally recruited from captured bandits who were given an option between the firing squad or joining the force, suppressed opposition candidates and captured run-^ away peons. Often the Rurales did not bother to take prisoners. The ley fuga was never questioned: 'The accused resisted arrest', or 'He attempted to escape'. In 1908 Diaz announced through an American journalist that he would not be a candidate for re-election in 1910, and that Mexico was now mature enough for an opposition party. In 1910, however, he
changed his mind and it became obvious that he could be overthrown only by force — revolution. The revolution broke in the autumn of 1910, sparked by a most unlikely leader, Francisco I. Madero, an idealist, a visionary and a son of a great landowner of the State of Coahuila. Madero named as commanding general of the revolutionary forces Pascual Orozco, a militant shopkeeper of the city of Chihuahua, and as a colonel in the revolutionary army a man who was already well known to the Diaz regime, which had placed a price on his head. Christened as Doroteo Arango, he had taken the alias of Francisco (Pancho) Villa. While still a mere boy he had killed a young member of the landed aristocracy and was thus forced into the life of an outlaw. His intelligence and force of character soon made him legendary among the bandits and outlaws of northern Mexico and his numerous brushes with the Rurales and the Federal army proved that he was a master guerrilla fighter. During the first few months the cause of the insurgents seemed hopeless, but after numerous defeats the rebels, led directly by Villa, made a surprise thrust into the border city of Ciudad Juarez and captured it almost before the Federals were aware
what was happening. Meanwhile, Diaz had been unable to concentrate sufficient of
force against the rebels to destroy them;
ISM
his army, because of the widespread disorders throughout Mexico, was too small, and it was far smaller than supposed because of the corruption and graft of the numerous generals who had to be kept contented and quiet. The dictatorship collapsed and Diaz was escorted to Veracruz to take ship for Europe and exile by a stony-faced general of pure Indian blood, named Victoriano Huerta. A few days after the capture of Ciudad Juarez, Orozco, using a detachment of Villa's men, attempted to arrest Madero and seize power. Madero's cool courage aroused Villa's unstinted admiration and
made him Madero's most devoted follower. At the same time, believing that Orozco had used him as a cat's-paw. Villa conhatred for Orozco — and men who incurred Pancho Villa's hatred usually had later cause to regret it. In due course Madero was elected President of Mexico. Orozco was made commanding general in the State of Chihuahua, to his disgust, as he had hoped to become Madero's Minister of War. Villa returned to civil life and one of the few peaceful ceived
a
bitter
interludes in his life. He became engaged in the meat business in the city of Chihuahua. It has been alleged that his profits were enormous, because the cattle he slaughtered cost him nothing; they all bore the brand of the immense Terrazas ranch (some 7,000,000 acres). Madero did not find the presidency easy. The country still seethed. In the State of Morelos the revolutionary leader, Emiliano Zapata, continued the revolt he had started against Diaz against Madero. General Bernardo Reyes and General Felix Diaz (a nephew of the dictator) tried to start revolts, but both were captured. Under
Diaz both would have been promptly shot, but Madero was humane; he ordered their confinement in the military prison in Mexico City, where they lived in comfort, accessible to their friends and relatives. In February 1912, Pascual Orozco, disgruntled at what he considered inadequate rewards for his previous services, threw off the mask of loyalty and 'pronounced'
against Madero. Villa, who had been watching Orozco closely, immediately vanished from the city with a few followers. Within a few days his band grew to several hundred men, and he opened war against Orozco. The rebels gained some initial victories, but on May 23, 1912, they were so thoroughly smashed by a Federal army under Victoriano Huerta that the campaign was virtually over. During the campaign Villa and his irregulars came under Huerta's command, but from the start there was a clash of personalities between the two. It reached a climax when Huerta accused Villa of insubordination and, after a court-martial, ordered his immediate execution. Villa was actually standing before the firing squad when an order from the President arrived, transferring him to the same military prison that housed Reyes
and Felix Diaz. And Huerta was added the
list
to
of Villa's mortal enemies.
Revolution again remain a prisoner long. In a few weeks he walked out in broad daylight, Villa did not
disguised only by a pair of dark glasses. While in prison he became aware of a plot to release Reyes and Diaz and start a revolution against Madero. As soon as he reached the safety of the United States he
Perpetual dissension for the leadership of
Mexico between
the impractical idealists and the
power-hungry generals forwarded
full
information to his trusted
Abran Gonzalez, the Governor of Chihuahua. On the morning of February 9,
friend,
1913, a disaffected battalion in Mexico City opened the military prison and, led by Reyes and Diaz, attacked the National Palace. Reyes was killed early in the fight, and General Lauro Villar, commanding the defence, was badly wounded. The President tendered the command to General Victoriano Huerta. For ten days the battle seesawed back and forth through the capital. Artillery, machine guns and rifle fire turned the city into a shambles, with hundreds of dead, many of them non-combatants, sprawled, unburied, in the streets. But late in the day, February 18, Huerta coolly announced that he had arrested the President and Vice-President and had assumed the presidency himself A few days later President Madero and VicePresident Pino Suarez were killed, under circumstances that placed the responsi-
squarely upon Huerta. Early in March 1913, Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated as President of the United States. He was shocked at Huerta's coup d'etat and horrified by the murder of Madero. He let it be known that under no conceivable circumstances would he recognise Huerta as President of Mexico. In the State of Coahuila Governor Venustiano Carranza denounced Huerta and proclaimed that Coahuila would not acknowledge any official or law of the Huerta government. In the State of Sonora Alvaro Obregon and Plutarco Calles, respectively a small rancher and a schoolmaster, organised bands of guerrillas and opened war against the Huertista garrisons. And in El Paso, Texas, Pancho Villa, having obtained funds to purchase a few weapons, and having acquired some horses by highly irregular means (not for the first time in his life), vanished across the Rio Grande on a dark night, with eight followers. The various anti-Huerta forces were actually independent of each other and any central authority. A semblance of revobility
lutionary unity was attained
when
all
of
them, including Villa, were persuaded to recognise Carranza as the 'First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army and Depositary of the Executive Power of the Republic of Mexico'. The band of eight lowed Villa across the Rio
men who
fol-
Grande soon expanded, in a few months reaching more than 10,000 men. He armed them by various means, smuggling from the United States and capturing Huertista garrisons. To attempt to follow the complex events of the next year would be pointless. Sufficient
to
say that the Constitutionalists
Right: President Diaz and his wife.
It
was the
obvious affluence of the ruling class, plus the manifest injustices of the social system, that roused Mexico to revolt
li
(meaning, in this instance, General Francisco Villa) were in firm possession of most of northern Mexico. President Wilson had lifted the embargo on shipments of weapons and munitions to the Constitutionalists forbidding shipments to Huerta. to be so much the head and spearpoint of the revolution that often First Chief Carranza was forgotten. And Villa seemed to be thoroughly co-operative with the United States, while Carranza was so filled with the traditional Mexican distrust and fear of the United States that it was almost impossible for the United States to deal with him. Early in April 1914, the Constitutionalists were pressing southward toward Mexico City and eastward against the oil port of Tampico. On the morning of April 9 a boat was sent from USS Dolphin to Tampico to pick up some supplies that had been purchased there for the ship. The American sailors and the officer in command were seized by Huertista soldiers, who stamped aboard the boat, flying the American flag, to make the arrest, and then paraded the prisoners through the streets of the town. Although they were released immediately, the incident brought a diplomatic crisis which quickly merged with something still more serious. On April 21, 1914, the American consul at Veracruz cabled that the German SS Ypiranga would dock next morning with a large cargo of weapons and munitions for Huerta. President Wilson immediately ordered the seizure of the Veracruz customs house. A few hours later, at daybreak on April 21, 1914, landing parties from the American ships stormed ashore, and after severe fighting were in full possession of the city by the next evening. The traditional Mexican dislike of and suspicion toward the United
while
still
Villa
seemed
:^ •18-!i
States caused a strong movement among the Mexican revolutionists to unite with Huerta to resist the invader and avenge the 'insult' to national sovereignty. Carranza wavered: dislike of the United States was so ingrained in him that he might have yielded but for a positive dictum from Pancho Villa: 'It is Huerta's bull that is being gored.' He let it be known that he would not take part in a war against the United States, and he sent a personal message to President Wilson, disavowing Carranza's embittered protest. The American occupation of Veracruz lasted for several months, much longer than was originally anticipated, mostly because of Carranza's truculence and intransigence. Many historians have held that the seizure of Veracruz was a fruitless gesture, but they overlook the fact that it cut off" Huerta's only source of revenue, and that scarcely ten weeks after the Americans landed he resigned and, like Diaz, betook himself to
access to the United States. He had the almost fanatical loyalty of his troops and the prestige of an almost unbroken chain of victories. Early in the campaign against Carranza he formed an alliance with Emiliano Zapata, leader of the land-hungry peasants of Morelos, and together they
Mexico City. Carranza was forced to establish his capital at Veracruz, and his deep suspicion of the motives of the
occupied
several
United States led to one diplomatic impasse after another. But in spite of his initial successes and his spectacular tactics. Villa's eff'orts were unavailing in the long run. Obregon's less spectacular but more systematic methods resulted in a stunning defeat for Villa in April 1915, followed by another battle that was a disaster. The legend of Villa's invincibility was shattered. Through the remainder of 1915 the war surged savagely back and forth across northern Mexico, with Villa gradually losing ground. President Wilson, meanwhile, with his attention necessarily fixed upon Europe, was endeavouring to do anything possible to bring peace to the distracted country to the south. A long series of conferences between Secretary of State Robert Lansing and the diplomatic representatives of several leading Latin American countries resulted in the conclusion, late in 1915, that Carranza was the leader most likely to be able to establish a firm government in Mexico. Accordingly, on October 9, 1915, Carranza's government was formally recognised as the de facto government of Mexico.
uneasy peace, in November 1914, broke openly with the First Chief and opened another phase of the Mexican Revolution. The initial advantages were with Villa. He held most of the border areas, with
organising his army, accumulating supplies and planning his next step. It was an open secret that he intended to move westward and capture Agua Prieta in Sonora Province, adjacent to Douglas, Arizona. For
exile in Europe.
With Huerta driven from the Mexican it quickly became apparent that there was friction between Villa and his nominal superior, Carranza. The coldly aloof, wealthy hacendado (ranch owner) and the ebullient ex-bandit had nothing in common except a mutual hatred for Huerta. Carranza saw in Villa a possible rival for power; Villa was resentful of the First Chief's obvious efforts to keep the Division of the North in the background and his failure to acknowledge its unpolitical scene,
doubted
months
achievements.
of Villa
After
Villa,
meanwhile, was at Chihuahua
re-
Mexico — home of the monumentally rich and abject poor, where dismal communications in a vast land area could let rebels rise and flourish unimpeded by the central government until the day of reckoning came. But as often as not, this day came too late — the rebels were too strong right: General Victoriano Huerta. the Indian general won to the allegiance of Francisco Madero. the successor of Porfino Diaz. Below: Brigadier-General John Pershing, whom the Mexican campaign set on the road to world fame Below right: Venustiano Carranza (seated, with rifle) who denounced the government of Huerta after the latter had overthrown the newlyestablished regime of Madero m the most cold-blooded way by murdering the new President and his Vice-President, Soffom. The most famous name of the Mexican civil war— Pancho (Francisco) Villa. He commanded enormous and fanatical support in Mexico s northern provinces
Above
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1818
Antagonists in Mexico — the disciplined and better equipped troops of the United States against the irregular cavalry of Mexico, divided as much against each other as against the invading Americans left: An American cavalry trooper. Left above: A Mexican border raider. By their very nature the raiders were independent of any central authority, and were as much trouble to the various Mexican governments as to the United States. Left below: Pascual Grozco, Madero's former chief general and a bitter enemy of Villa. Below: The celebrated Pancho Villa (holding the Hotchkiss machine gun) with one of his followers. Right: Another famous figure — Emiliano Zapata, from Mexico's southern province
Far
1819
Golden 100 his most loyal and devoted followers. Tfie legend on \he banner reads 'A los traidores se castiga' - The traitors will get theirs The identity of traitors' changed considerably as the somewhat fluid political situation developed Part of Villa s
,
,
US
perseverance v Mexican experience the
some
of his commanders. Note ammunition carried by each man. essential If each was to be free to roam at will over northern Mexico
Left: Villa with
amount
of
or alive', as newspapers reported it. The force consisted of several cavalry regiments, two infantry regiments, batteries of light artillery, necessary auxiliary troops
and the
several years Agua Prieta had been a Carranzista enclave in Villa territory. But. as he had recognised Carranza. President Wilson could not allow Villa to defeat him. Agua Prieta was cut off from Carranza territory, and could be reinforced only through the United States. For several days a succession of railway trains carried men, munitions and supplies over American railways into the city. Villa's army debouched from the mountains on October 30, 1915, and Villa learned for the first time that the United States had recognised his enemy. By the time Villa arrived, Agua Prieta had been turned into a powerful fortress. with deep entrenchments, broad aprons of barbed wire, machine guns and masses of artillery. Villa launched his attack late at night, November 1. It was delivered in the determined, slashing style that had won victories in earlier battles, but this time the result was disaster. But the worst was yet to come. Defeated at Agua Prieta, Villa bypassed the town and marched for Hermosillo. the capital of Sonora. At Hermosillo. he delivered a desperate attack in broad daylight, but not even the suicidal courage of his troops could overcome the Carranzista defences. The slaughter was even more gruesome than at Agua Prieta. Decimated, demoralised, hungry and disorganised, the tattered remnants of Villa's
army streamed northward toward Nogales, which was still held by Villista partisans. Losing all semblance of discipline as they fled northward. Villa's men became a dangerous mob, looting, ravaging and murdering, at the same time building up a bitter hatred of the United States, the source of their
troubles, as they
came
to
believe.
When
they arrived at the international boundary they were inclined to vent their hatred by firing into the United States, but the accuracy of the returning American rifle fire quicklv discouraged such efforts. Within a few days Villa and his 300 or 400 men had vanished into the vast spaces of northern Mexico. Villa's whereabouts remained unknown for weeks, but there was soon grim evidence that his movement was still alive
and that
his followers would stop at nothing in their hatred of Americans. Assured by the Carranza government that it was
now
safe to reopen the mines, a party of
American mining engineers and other key employees, en route to a mine in Chihhuahua, were dragged off their train at Santa Ysabel and shot down in cold blood by a gang of Villistas led by a Colonel Pablo Lopez. death. There
One man escaped by was an outcry
feigning
in the
United
States, but President Wilson refused to be forced into military action. In February 1916, it became known that Villa had come out of hiding and was moving slowly
northward with a band estimated at some 400 men. There were strong rumours that he intended to take sanctuary in the United States and abandon Mexico. Ever since the Mexican Revolution started there had been sporadic raids by 'bandits' from Mexico into the United States, with numerous small fights between
American troops and bands The greater part of the mobile
of invaders. forces available in the United States were thinly spread along the border to protect the small
towns and scattered ranches along it, but with very strict orders against any movement into Mexico, even by individuals. The headquarters of the 13th Cavalry, together with a part of the regiment, was at Columbus, New Mexico. Colonel Herbert Slocum, the regimental commander, was
aware that Villa was somewhere
in north-
ern Chihuahua, but he lacked exact information, and had no way of obtaining any. He took such precautions as were practicable — but several hours before dawn on March 9, 1916, Villa's band erupted simultaneously into the little town and Camp Furlong, where the rest of the 13th Cavalry was quartered. But in spite of being caught off guard, the 13th Cavalry reacted promptly and violently, and after a savage fight lasting two or three hours the invaders were driven out, with a loss of at least 100 men. A small pursuing force hastily organised by Major Frank Tompkins 'chivvied' the Villistas deep into Mexico, inflicting additional heavy losses, and breaking off the pursuit only after running out of ammunition. A few days later, a force commanded by Brigadier-General John J.Pershing crossed into Mexico with orders to disperse and destroy the brigand band that had invaded the United States — not to 'take Villa dead
1st
Aero Squadron.
It
was assumed
that the Carranzistas would welcome help in destroying their most dangerous enemy, but instead the Carranzistas bitterly resented what they insisted was an unjustifiable affront to Mexican sovereignty. Most historians have assumed that the Punitive Expedition (as the force was officially named) was a failure because it did not capture or kill Villa himself. Nevertheless, within a few weeks, small, swiftly moving forces of American cavalry had destroyed all of the major Villista bands and had killed all of Villa's principal generals — and in every encounter the Villistas were surprised. But the hostility of the Carranzistas was a complicating factor. Carranza placed such restrictions upon the use of the railroads that Pershing was unable to obtain supplies over them. In April, a small squadron of the 13th Cavalry entered the city of Parral for the purpose of purchasing supplies and was attacked by a howling mob, egged on by a German woman whose husband was a prominent Villista supporter.
The squadron commander
extri-
cated his command from the city without loss, but once outside, he was attacked by the troops of the Carranzista garrison. But the Americans, who had refrained from firing on the mob in the city, inflicted such losses that the attack was broken ott'. On June 16, Pershing received an extraordinary note from General Jacinto B. Treviho, the Carranzista commander in the State of Chihuahua. The Americans, Trevino said, would be permitted thereafter to ment in
move northward
only. Any moveany other direction would be re-
Pershing replied tersely that he took orders only from his own government. Less than a week later, on June 21, 1916, two small troops of the 10th Cavalry, totalling only three officers, two civilian guides and '79 soldiers, collided with the garrison of the small town of Carrizal. The fight was short and sharp, and was definitely a defeat for the Americans. Early in the fight two of the American officers were killed and the third was wounded. Most of the non-commissioned officers were killed or wounded. But if the American losses were severe, the Mexican casualties were even heavier. General Felix U. Gomez, the Mexican commander, was killed instantly by the first American fire. Deprived of leadership and surrounded by superior numbers, a few of the Negro soldiers ithe 10th Cavalry was a Negro regiment* were captured, but most of them shot their way to safety: the attackers found that even in defeat the little groups of three or four men were dangerous. Although the forgotten little fight at Carrizal was a tactical victory for the Carranzistas. it was a Pyrrhic victory. The Mexicans' admitted losses exceeded the total strength of the sisted.
1821
Below: US sailors on board USS Michigan off Veracruz, where the war had started Note the field gun, unusual armamen|for a-dreadnought! Right: The theatre of war. The United States were able to whittle down Villas numbers anetprevent his getting, supplies and reinforcerfients while, at the same time, avoiding warwrth the central government. Farrt^MfStreeffi^tlrtg in Ciudad Juarez, during the campaign which brought Madero to power and Villa to fame. Below right: General Alvaro Obregon, whose defeatof Villa m 1915 shattered foreverthe myth of the * latters invincibility and started his final downfall .•%.
,
American
force.
Carrizal brought a diplomatic crisis. War was in the air. In the United States a vociferous minority demanded a full scale intervention in Mexico, but in spite of his critics and political enemies, President Wilson was determined to avoid war in Mexico. The war in Europe and the possibility that the United States would become involved engaged more and more of his thought. He remarked to his trusted private secretary: 'It begins to look as if
war with Germany is inevitable. If it should come — I pray God it may not — I do not wish America's energies and forces divided, for we shall need every ounce of reserve we have to lick Germany.' From the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1914, the sympathies of the great majority of Americans lay with the Allies, although most Americans regarded the war as none of their business. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany had been touchy ever since the sinking of the Lusitania and the Sussex, and it was largely pressure from Washington that caused Germany to modify her submarine campaign in 1915, to the chag-
and disgust of Germany's military and naval leaders. And Germans were resentful because the firm control of the sea by the Royal Navy made the factories and markets of the United States freely available to the Allies while denying them to Germany. To put a stop to this traffic berin
came
a prime
German
objective.
German
and German newspapers watched the dispute between the United States and the Carranza government with close attention and obvious pleasure. In spite of the tremendous battles in Europe, Berlin newspapers found space for lengthy
officials
accounts of the Carrizal fight (most of them highly erroneous) and for screaming headlines such as 'Der amerikanische-mexikanische Konflikt' It was taken for granted that the dispute had reached such a stage that war was inevitable, and Germans were very happy about the prospect. This belief was a corollary to German contempt for the military power and potential of the English-speaking countries. The remark attributed to the Kaiser in which he referred to the British Expeditionary Force as a 'contemptible little army' is illustrative, and the Germans were even more contemptuous about the United States. At the height of the crisis after Carrizal, the American Chief-of-Staff, .
Major-General
mended
that
Hugh the
L.
recomorder the
Scott,
President
National Guard (the Organized Militia, which is under the authority of the states in time of peace) into Federal service, a measure which had been authorised by Congress less than two weeks before. The mobilisation of the Guard on such short notice, with only a few days for planning and preparation, was necessarily accompanied with some confusion and disorder. German scorn for American military power was heightened. The Germans had learned nothing from the speed with which Great Britain had organised a huge national
army — as far as they could see all of the military resources of the United States were now committed, and the United States was proved to be so feeble that Germany had nothing to fear. Colonel Friedrich Immanuel, a 'noted military critic and wr: olemnly advised the United S' and strictly on the defensive
because the small Regular Army and the half-trained and poorly equipped National Guard would be no match for the more warlike and better trained Mexicans.
On August
31, 1916, the military and and the principal cabinet German Empire conferred at Pless Castle on ways and means of bringing the war to a victorious end. They agreed that the only way was by the unrestricted
naval
chiefs officers of the
use of submarines. As for the possibility that the United States might enter the General von Chief-of-Staff, the war, Falkenhayn had previously assured the Imperial Chancellor that American hostility would make no difference at all to Germany. The Pless Conference did not reach a final conclusion, but it was the consensus of opinion that the United States was powerless and that an army improvised from 'cowboys and roughriders' could never face German soldiers. If anything, a declaration of war by the United States would really help Germany because the munitions going to the Allies would be diverted
American use. The final decision to resume submarine warfare was made on January 9, 1917, but for
in the interim German diplomats were trying to make sure that the United States would be so deeply involved in Mexico as to be unable to intervene in Europe. The German minister at Mexico City, Eckhardt, happily reported to Berlin that Carranza was strongly pro-German and was quite willing to allow German submarine bases in Mexico and to cut off the supply of oil from Tampico for the Royal Navy. On January 16, 1917, the Foreign Minister, Zimmermann, dispatched the famous message to Mexico City via Washington, proposing an alliance between
Mexico and Germany. Mexico would cover the
'lost
territory in
Kansas
re-
[sic],
New
Mexico and Arizona' and would mediate between Germany and Japan with a view to persuading Japan to switch sides and join Germany. Zimmermann's message, intercepted and deciphered by British Naval Intelligence, was discreetly 'leaked', and although most Americans were at first doubtful as to its authenticity, they were quickly convinced by Zimmermann's outraged screams. The submarines were unleashed at midnight, January 31, 1917. The American ambassador in Berlin was given only six hours' notice, and on the same evening Admiral von Capelle gave the Finance Committee of the Reichstag the comforting assurance that 'From a military point of view America is a nothing. I am convinced that almost no American will volunteer for war service. That is shown by the lack of volunteers for the conflict with Mexico.'
optimistic belief in the utter powerlessness of the United States. He realised fully that with the Royal Navy and the United States Navy between Mexico and any possible help from Germany, Mexico would not stand a chance.
But with Mexican hatred
for the United at boiling point, during 1917 and 1918 it was necessary to keep large numbers of American troops in the border
States
still
regions where a continuous small-scale guerrilla war continued. In August 1918, at Nogales, Arizona-Sonora, an Unexplained i/icident developed into a full battle within a few minutes. When the firing stopped several hours later, the Americans were in full possession of most of the Mexican neighbour-city. Among the corpses buried the next day, according to information received by American Intelligence officers, were several with blond hair and blue eyes. But the war between the United States and Mexico never developed, in spite of German encouragement and (probably) German gold. The extent to which German influence may have caused Villa's raid and Carranza's intransigence cannot be definitely established, but it may be noted that Villa's authorised agent in the United States, one Felix Sommerfeld, has recently been shown to have been a German operative, and a high officer on Carranza's staff was a German. Regardless of the extent to which Mexican hostility for the United States may have been influenced by Germany, German misinterpretation of American unwillingness to go to war in Mexico and German misunderstanding of American military potential from that same misinterpretation were definite factors in German decision to wage unrestricted submarine warfare. Thus, in a somewhat indirect but very real way, the Mexican revolution was a cause of the American entry into the First World War.
Further Reading
Clendenen, C. C, The United States and Pancho Villa. A Study in Unconstitutional Diplomacy (American Historical Association 1961) Clendenen, C. C, Blood on the Border. The United States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (New York 1969) Cumberland, C. C, Mexico. The Struggle for Modernity {Uew York 1968) James, Adm. Sir William, The Eyes of the Navy: A Biographical Study of Admiral Sir Reginald Hall
(London 1953) Mexican Militarism. The
Lieuwen, E Rise
,
and Fall of
Political
the Revolutionary Army,
mark. No call for volunteers for 'the conflict with Mexico' was ever issued.
1910-1940 (Albuquerque 1968) Obregon, General Alvaro, Ocho Mil Kilometros en Campana (Mexico City 1959) Salmas Carranza, General Alberto, La Expedicion Punitiva (Mexico City 1936) Tuchman, B. W., The Zimmermann Telegram (New York 1958)
War
COLONEL CU\RENCE C CLENDENEN was
The almost unbelievable ignorance of the United States on the part of Germany's higher leaders
is
epitomised in this re-
declared
President Wilson promptly severed diplomatic relations with Germany upon the resumption of submarine warfare and the revelation of the Zimmermann telegram, and on April 6, 1917, the United States formally declared war against Germany. Germany did not give uo hope that there would be a major war between the United States and Mexico, but Carranza lost his enthusiasm. He did not share Germany's
born
in
1899 and graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, in 1920. He served in the army up to his retirement in 1954, mostly as an instructor and a staff officer. He gained his MA degree in 1953 and his PhD in 1959, and was an instructor in History at Stanford University, 1959-60 From 1961 to 1966 he was a Research Associate and Curator of Military Collections at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. He is the author of several books and numerous articles, most of them on the subject of the American Civil War.
The End of an Empire
THE DEATH OF FRANZ JOSEF For many years
it has been fashionable person of the Emperor Franz Josef as the only unifying factor in the disintegrating Austro-Hungarian Empire. In fact, after the outbreak of war he became very much a figurehead, and the country was run by the generals and the politicians. Nonetheless the immense length of his reign gave the empire a sense of continuity, and his death at
to see the
a crucial moment in the war was a blow that it could not easily withstand. J. F. N. Bradley. Above: A postcard in mourning commemorates the Emperor's
death
Throughout the war the aged Emperor Franz Josef (he was 84 when the war started) continued relentlessly his customary imj)erial existence, as if nothing had happened. He still got up at 4.30 am, held innumerable audiences, worked steadily at his desk during the day and went to bed late at night after all the documents had been read, commented on and instructions drawn up for soldiers, politicians and diplomats. Though the control of the war evolved more onto his fellow-monarch and ally, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Franz Josef continued to rule and control most conscientiously what was left of his war-weary empire. After Franz Josef had given in to the belligerent party which drove the monarchy into war, he in reality abdicated most of his powers. It was the army High Command and a few Pan-German politicians who seized power and launched a reign of terror within the monarchy. The initial repression conducted by the army in Poland, Ruthenia, Serbia and Croatia spread even to Moravia when it came under army jurisdiction. But this repression was consequent on war hysteria. Then in 1915 political repression followed. Czech, Slovene, Croat and other politicians were -rounded up, arraigned before judges who were almost to a man Pan-Germans, and heavily sentenced. Many were simply arrested and interned: Dr. Kramar, an old servant of the Emperor, was sentenced to death. The Emperor, for once, shook off the apathy from which he seemed to suffer and saved Kramaf's life by pardoning him. With defeat at the front, the Austrian armies were increasingly coming under the tutelage of their powerful ally, Germany. Though close liaison had been maintained from the start, by 1915 the Austrian High Command was simply given orders more or less tactfully. Austrian operations were taken over by the German High Command and all the fronts were stiffened by German units. Even the Heir-Apparent was given a top German staff officer and the German commanding pair, Hindenburg and LudendorfiF, began to prepare political solutions for their AustroHungarian ally as well. This was hardly necessary, for the Pan-Germans, who really wielded power, wanted to become more than the allies of Germany. Although the Kaiser still insisted on treating Franz Josef as a sovereign and independent monarch, Franz Josef himself was prepared to give up these privileges. While on the one hand the two Emperors issued the joint declaration on Poland, the Austrian Foreign Minister was prepared to give up national interests for the benefit of Germany. It became obvious that the Austrian dilemma would be resolved according to the outcome of the war: if Germany proved victorious, the monarch}- would be well-nigh annexed: if Germany lost, Austria-Hungary would be saved and would remain sovereign. The question was: could it hold together after a defeat? As it was, just before the death of Franz Josef in 1916, the military position of his empire was still far from hopeless. The Russian offensive had been stopped and the Russians were turned back.
The
Italian front
still
resounded with Austrian victories and the
new enemy, Rumania, was being humbled. However, AustriaHungary itself was exhausted. The war had failed to subdue nationalist and social strife and on October 21, 1916 the Prime Minister, Stiirgh, was assassinated. It was obvious that the instability on the front was reaching the rear, but while the Emperor lived, chaos would not engulf Austria-Hungary. Then suddenly early in November 1916 the 86-year-old Emperor fell ill. Though at first there appeared no cause for alarm, the doctors, in view of the patient's age, told the immediate family to prepare for the worst. The Heir- Apparent was called to Vienna from the faraway headquarters of the First Army at Szekely Udvarhely. Only when the Emperor lost his usually hearty appetite and his bronchial catarrh grew worse did the doctors and the family begin to feel anxious. The old man himself resisted death remarkably well. Despite his cough he continued to smoke his usually large number of strong cigars and continued to occupy himself with his bureaucratic duties. He still read state papers, commented on memoranda and gave many audiences. There was a slight improvement in his health on November 19, but next day he developed a high temperature and everyone could feel that the real crisis was approaching. The general weakening in his condition still did not prevent the Emperor from receiving his Commander-in-Chief, Archduke Frederick, with whom he discussed militar>' matters for almost an hour. Archduke Charles and his wife Zita stayed with the Emperor for over an hour: similarly all the members of the imperial family were summoned as if to take leave of the grand old man. On November 2 Franz Josef rose as usual at 4.30 am and began his work at the desk. He felt weak and asked for an armchair so that he could sit down more comfortablv from time to time. At
1825
'-M^
t
eight o'clock Bishop Seydl, the court chaplain, arrived with the apostolic blessing from the Pope, said mass and gave the Emperor holy communion. At 11.30 am the Emperor ceremonially received Archduke Charles and Archduchess Zita and agreed to sit down in the Archduchess's presence only after long arguments. When he
was asked how he felt, he replied: 'I shall soon be well; I have no time to be ill.' In the afternoon he felt weaker and alternated between the armchair and his desk; after 4 pm he was forced to stop working: he was too weak and sleepy. He decided on going to bed earlier than was his custom, and could not say his prayers kneeling down. On the way to the bedroom he complained that he had not finished his daily duties and left orders to be woken at 3.30 am next day.
He was obviously fading away and his sleep was interrupted at pm when the court chaplain administered extreme unction.
8.30
The doctors attending him declared
their impotence and prayers were said instead. At 9.5 pm the Emperor's heart ceased to beat and his grand nephew, Charles I, became Emperor of the AustroHungarian monarchy.
Though the news was known in the capital very quickly, it move the exhausted city. A small crowd gathered near the Schonbrunn and a special edition of the Wiener Zeitung was failed to
snatched up, but otherwise there were no demonstrations of either grief over the death or joy over the succession. Despite the war and exhaustion the old Emperor was to be buried with due pomp and circumstance. The body lay in state in the Schonbrunn and for several days the Viennese filed past, paying their last respects. On November 28, 1916, Kaiser Wilhelm arrived from the German GHQ, but did not stay for the funeral. On November 30, 1916, the coffin of the Emperor Franz Josef was taken to the city along the Ringstrasse, first to the cathedral of St Steven. The funeral procession consisted of many crowned monarchs of Europe: the Kings of Bulgaria, Bavaria and Saxony, the Crown Princes of Germany, Turkey and Sweden, together with the members of the Habsburg family, accompanied the dead from St Steven's to the family crypt in the Capuchin church in the Neuermarkt, a few hundred yards away from the cathedral. This was the last time that Europe's royalty gathered in Vienna: within a year and a half most of them were refugees or exiles from their countries.
1826
This page. Top: Franz Josef s body lies in state in the Hofburg Chapel Bottom: Franz Josef and the Kaiser in 1889 on the occasion of the Kaiser's first visit to Austria. With his usual tact, the Kaiser referred to Franz Josef as a 'brilliant second', announcing at an early stage their future relationship. Opposite page. Top left: Count Clam-Martinic, the new Emperor's first Premier. Top right: Professor Lammasch, his successor. Centre: The body of the old Emperor lies in state. Soffom. The King is dead! Long live the King!' Austrian officers cheer Franz Josef s successor, Charles I
extremely hard. One of his aide-de-camps left this picture of the young Emperor: 'As a rule our duties begin at 7.15 am in the morning, at which time the Emperor had already breakfasted, heard mass and on most days received the Holy Communion. When we went by car to the headquarters at Baden, the drive would be used for going through memoranda left over from the previous day in the adjutant's portfolio. If these ran short, the young Emperor took almost a childlike joy in the small incidents of the drive.' Throughout the day the Emperor worked in the Kaiserhaus at Baden giving audiences to all sorts of people, many of whom the old Emperor would not have received. Five aide-decamps worked with him in shifts of 12 days and they were all utterly exhausted, but the Emperor worked all day and every day for the same hours without a respite. His was a youthful zeal, but after some time it became obvious that he had taken on too much to be really effective. He was with his ministers controlling their ministries; he was fighting famines; controlling treaties and tariffs, ubiquitous and invincible. He had brought with him his. own, younger men and placed them in key positions at all levels of the state machine; they were also full of energy. Nonetheless, the state machine of Austria-Hungary began to creak very soon. The young man, despite his zeal and good intentions, simply lacked the experience and above all the personality of the old Emperor. Needless to say he lacked the devotion and loyalty of his subjects which his predecessor had commanded. The old Emperor was perhaps fortunate not to have a wife who meddled in the affairs of state. However, the young Emperor had a wife who, however intelligent, conceived of power in the narrowest family terms. Her particular initiative — negotiations in view of separate peace with the Allies through the intermediary of her brother. Prince Sixte de Bourbon-Parma — proved an utter fiasco which discredited the Emperor in everybody's eyes, friend or foe. Foreign Minister Count Czernin was not even consulted and never forgave the Empress this humiliation. As a result the Emperor lost the most able of his friends in international affairs and was left with well-meaning nonentities. The Emperor was even less successful in the choice of his closest advisors, his prime ministers. Charles's first choice was Count Clam-Martinic who was a
capable administrator and shrewd tactician, but whose character was so cautious as to preclude any innovation or reform. His successor, Dr von Seidl, slightly less aristocratic, was equally reactionary and reluctant to initiate any change. Since reform and change became imperative, especially after the Russian Revolution in March 1917, the Emperor had to turn to more daring servants and found them in the two university professot-s Redlich and Lammasch. They seemed to him both daring and cautious at the same time. Their daring was limited to fascinating, but impracticable, schemes for the federal arrangements in the Habs-
burg monarchy.
was obvious that
this was the last chance for the old courFranz Josef to strut about. Already the young Emperor had broken etiquette and tradition by leading Katharina Schratt, an actress and old friend of the Emperor, to pay her last respects. Now the ancient Court Chamberlain, Prince Montenuovo, knocked on the gates of the Capuchin church asking for 'His Apostolic It
tiers of
Majesty, the Emperor Franz' to be admitted. Symbolically the Capuchin friar refused admission until the haughty, medieval prince begged for the admission of 'Your brother Franz, a miserable sinner': the ceremony played itself out and the body of the old man, as well as his courtiers, disappeared for ever.
The new Emperor Together with the monarchy the youthful Charles I inherited also the two problems of the previous rule: the war and the tremendous task of keeping the monarchy together. Charles, who was not perhaps a man of the greatest intellect, thought that by imitating his illustrious predecessor in his devotion to duty he would also be able to keep the empire as it was. He worked
In the military sphere it was no better. To break the military hold on the political life of the monarchy, the Emperor dismissed the reactionary and tough Archduke Frederick and himself assumed supreme command. A vigorous purge at the headquarters, however, replaced one set of politically incompetent officers by another set of military incompetent ones. Thus practically all the servants and advisors that the hapless Emperor chose to work with him proved hopeless, incapable and academic. It was a small wonder that all the reforms and measures he had tried to carry out backfired or came to nothing. His diplomatic manoeuvres, apart from achieving nothing, brought only humiliation and charges of treachery. His conciliation of nationalities brought about their final alienation from each other and from himself. Though the young Emperor succeeded in humbling the old Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, and drove him from office, he did nothing else in that part of the monarchy which needed reform most. Hungarian nationalist policies continued even without Tisza, and constitutional reforms were postponed; the Serbs, Slovaks and Rumanians, the dissatisfied minorities, once again were left to their fate. By now, however, they each found champions in the Austrian part o£ the monarchy or elsewhere. The death of the old Ernperor, Franz Josef I, was indeed a great divide. The British historian, A. J. P. Taylor, characterised it succinctly: 'Now a pebble was removed and an avalanche started. With Franz Josef there went the last fragment of Habsburg core, long dead, but still hard; there remained at the centre echoes, ghosts, emptiness.' Further Reading Taylor, A.
Fall of the House of Hapsburg (Longmans) Habsburg f^onarchy (Penguin 1964) The House of Hapsburg (Sidgwick & Jackson)
E.,
The
J. P.,
7^76
Crankshaw,
Wandruska,
A.,
[For J. F. N. Bradley's biography, see page 99.]
1827
POLAND
The war presented Poland
s
'^^.
nationalists with a unique opportunity to liberate their partitioned and repressed country, but it simultaneously
threw up a problem — would Poland's cause be better helped by courting Russia or the Central Powers? Kamil Dziewanowski. Right: A patrol of the Polish Legion, symbol of Poland's surge for unity under the aegis of Austria
•^-^-^
^k
V
f.^''
A FOOT IN BOTH CAMPS of the First World War the Polish people were torn between two camps: the Russian and the Austrian. The third partitioning power, Germany, had no significant group of supporters except for a few die-hard conservatives. The Kulturkampf and the policy of suppression and even extermination of the Polish element followed by Bismarck and his successors prevented the formation of any
At the beginning
pro-German movement. The National Democratic Party, led by Roman Dmowski, former chairman of the sizeable
Polish Circle at the Duma, called for a united front of all Poles against Germany as Poland's most .efficient and dangerous enemy. As a consequence of this stand, the
National Democrats advocated seeking support in Russia. They argued that Russia, allied with the Western democracies,
France and Britain, would defeat Germany and her ally, Austro-Hungary, and thus reunite all territories inhabited by the Poles under the sceptre of the Romanovs. Russia under the impact of the Western ideas and contacts, as Dmowski explained in 1908 in his hooky <^r many, Russia, and .the Polish Pro6/em,S,»fes
more ti»o
bound
to
become
Durij^^p
last years before this progfaiJ|Bie, forcefully pre-,
liberal.
war, by Dmowski hi^elf and Ity'iv group of%is co-workers, became iacreasif\gly popular throughout the divided country. The programme stressed the necessity of jted
'
unification before liberation. Even ifl Austrian Galicia, where the Poles enjoyeq
'.
1828
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a generous measure of political and cultural autonomy, the 'All Polish Movement'
gained
many
adherents.
Those who were in the Austrian camp, on the other hand, supported the Habsburg Monarchy as the most liberal of the partitioning powers. According to the supporters of this camp, Austria's victory over Russia would result in the incorporation of Congress Poland and the extension to it of all the blessings of a benevolent Habsburg rule. Dmowski objected to this view and pointed out the rapid loss of vitality of the Habsburg state and its increasing dependence upon Germany. The most that could be hoped for from Austria, he asserted, was the reunion of Galicia with the Congress Kingdom, while Pomerania, Posnania, and Silesia, (that is, the entire Western Poland or the cradle of the nation) would be left to the mercies of Prussia, bent on Germanising these lands. To this the supporters of the Austrian camp replied that Vienna would not only grant to the Congress Kingdom the liberties enjoyed by Galicia, but
1830
would probably transform Austro-Hungary into a trialist state. Such a solution would be generous enough to act as a magnet even on Prussian Poland and a deterrent to further
Germanisation:
the
Poles
of
the
Monarchy, as co-rulers of the state would be able to exercise a moderating influence on its German ally. The price of complete unification, on the other hand, would be extension to the whole of Poland of the reactionary Russian autocracy, only slightly mollified by the sham constitu-
Trialist
tional manifesto of October 1905. The main rival of Dmowski, Joseph Pilsudsk', while rejecting the pro- Russian views altogether, did not subscribe to the pro-Austrian programme without reservations. Although he was convinced that in view of the critical international situation Vienna was bound to conciliate her Polish subjects, he did not want to go too far in the
pro-Austrian direction. The too-far-reaching commitment to a cause which, in his opinion, was both alien and ultimately doomed, he considered as dangerous.
Moreover, the servile mentality of most of the pro-Habsburg coterie horrified him. In Austria and her ally Germany he saw not protectors of a future Polish state, but merely the means for struggling against Russia and for bringing about her disintegration and hence liberation of the largest segment of ethnographic Poland, the Congress Kingdom. His own conception of things to come was most sharply expressed in January 1914, in a lecture given at the Geographic Institute of Paris. A prominent leader of the Russian Social Revolutionary Party, V. M. Chernov, in his memcirs entitled Pered Buret (Before the Storm), reported the gist of Pilsudski's talk. Chernov was especially struck by the followers
conclusions which Pilsudski
made
at the
end of his
lecture: Pilsudski clearly prophesied an AustroRussian war for the Balkans in the near
He had no doubts that behind Austria will stand — and even now secretly stands — Germany. He further expressed conviction that France would not be allowed
future.
remain a passive spectator of the conflict: day ivhen Germany will openly side with Austria will be the eve of the day when tu
the
France, by virtue of her alliance, will intervene on the side of Russia. Finally, Great Britain, he thought, could not afford to leave France to her fate. Should the united forces of France and England be not sufficient they will, sooner or later, drag America into the war on their side. Analysing further the military potential of all these countries Pilsudski clearly stated the problem: how would the war develop, with whose
Top
left: Polish troops serving with the Central Powers entrain for the Eastern Front. Many Poles in the
Austro-Hungarian Empire felt that their cause was likely to be best served by a victory for the Central Powers. Top right: Many Poles who
German, or Austrian domination fought for the Allies on the Western Front, in this case in a Polish Legion fighting among French troops. Right: Two Poles in the Russian army. Russia controlled the majority of Poland at the outbreak of war, and although some would have accepted Austrian domination, none cared for the idea
relished neither Russian,
of
becoming German
subjects,
victory would it end? His answer was: Russia was bound to be beaten by Austria and Germany, and they in turn would be defeated by the Anglo-French (or AngloAmerican-French) coalition. This defeat of all the three Empires, insisted Pilsudski, would create in Poland and throughout Eastern Europe a momentarily chaotic situation that would permit reconstruction of an independent Polish state. To exploit this opportunity the Poles must build up at least the nucleus of an armed force. This idea was at the root of the Polish Legion which he organised in Galicia with Austrian assistance.
and
consequently fought for the Tsar
Poland seizes her opportunity The outbreak of the First World War created for the Poles a unique situation for which their poets and politicians had been vainly praying for three generations. For the first time the co-partitioning powers were fighting each other in all seriousness. As one of the main theatres of the contest was to extend across Poland and more than
1831
w.
•/ ^:'^'f
'
'J
Above: Josef Pilsudski, leader of tfiose Poles who looked to Austria for help In the cause of Polish nationalism
Above
Leaders of the Polish Legion. Pilsudski is seated in front of the dog Below: Sitting in the middle of a group of Russian officers is Lednicki, head of the Polish Liquidation Commission which was created by the new Russian Provisional Government to supervise the liberation of Russian Poland. The Provisional Government had unconditionally recognised Poland's right to full independence, and Lednicki was given a place in the Russian Cabinet right:
1,000,000 Poles were mobilised on opposite by the belligerent powers, it was evident from the beginning that the country was destined to play a considerable role on the military chessboard. On August 8, 1914, a spokesman of the largely National Democratic Polish Circle at the Duma offered the loyal co-operation of the Poles to help the Russian war effort. sides
Moreover, on August 14, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich, Commander-inChief of the Russian armed forces published a manifesto addressed to the Poles, promising them unification and self-government under the sceptre of the Romanovs, and exhorting them to join the all-Slavic crusade against the common Teutonic enemy. The manifesto as well as the declaration of the Polish Circle were considered to be successes of Dmowski's policy
and hence setbacks
for the
orientation. For a while,
pro-Austrian
Vienna was con-
templating a similar move but it never Hungarian materialised the because opposition to a Trialist solution was too
1832
activities from Petrograd to London and Switzerland and started intensive diplomatic and propaganda work on behalf of his country in the west. He submitted to leading western statesmen a series of comprehensive memoranda dealing not only with Poland, but with the future of
east central Europe in general. But until
the upheaval in Russia he found little active response among western statesmen. As long as the Tsarist Empire was a fighting ally of the Entente, the Polish question was taboo, a Russian domestic issue, much too dangerous a problem to be discussed openly by any Allied diplomat.
A citizen army While Dmowski was busy abroad, in Poland more attention was being focused on the only significant native fighting force, the Legions organized in Galicia. They comprised only three brigades which never numbered more than 20,000 men. Pilsudski actually commanded only the First Brigade, but it was this brigade which attracted most popular attention largely because of its military exploits, its internal structure and spirit and because of the striking personality of its leader. The First
Brigade was composed overwhelmingly of articulate, often highly literate volunteers,
permeated with a radical, democratic spirit. For instance, they would add the word 'citizen' to each title of rank, and all equal pay, while the difference was used for political work. At this early stage, the authoritarian tendencies of the later Pilsudskiates were not yet apparent, and a radical and even socialist spirit still lingered among its soldiers, many of whom came from the ranks of the leftist parties. The minute size of the officers received
Legions made them militarily insignificant in comparison with the mammoth armies of the major belligerent powers. And yet this tiny, semi-independent national armed force was important politically, as a symbol of the country's will not to remain a passive object in the great game that was going on.
While Dmowski and Pilsudski were pur-
Another success of the National Democratic grassroot propaganda was the fact that the call to arms to fight Russia alongside Austria, issued by Pilsudski from Galicia, found no significant response in the Congress Kingdom. This was of crucial importance to the Polish cause. The strong.
success of Pilsudski s appeal for a fullscale uprising in Russian Poland might at this critical stage of the war have spelled early German victory in France. We know what a vital role was played by the East Prussian offensive of Rennenkampff and Samsonov: although an operational failure, it diverted enough German troops from the Western Front to emasculate the Schlieffen plan and resulted in a strategic victory for the Entente. What would have been the outcome of the battle of the Marne had the Russians been compelled to use their soldiers to suppress a Polish uprising in Warsaw, Lodz, and Kalisz instead of throwing them into East Prussia? After Russia's setbacks in East Prussia in 1914 and her victories in Galicia in
1914-1915 came the success of Mackensen's offensive on the Galician front at Gorlice, followed by the German successes in Central Poland, including the capture of Warsaw and Vilna ViTnyus) by the close of the (
summer. Now the triumphant Central Powers were masters of a lion's share of Poland. The preponderant role played by the German and not by the Austrian forces in the military conquests had important political consequences. The Austro-Polish solution was now shelved. It was obvious that at this stage of the game Berlin, and not Vienna, would shape the immediate fate of Poland.
Thus, because of the Russian reverses of 1915 and because of Petrograd's passivity, the Russian camp, which had been favoured by the National Democratic Party and by most Poles at the outset of the conflict was now pushed somewhat into the background. Nevertheless, Dmowski continued his relentless behind-the-scenes diplomatic spadework. Early in the winter of 1916 he transferred the centre of his
suing their respective objectives, in Poland the situation was changing very rapidly. Although Bethmann-Hollweg declared in the Reichstag in April 1916 that in entering the war neither Austro-Hungary nor Germany had any intention of reopening the Polish Pandora's box, the course of the war was forcing forward the issue of Poland. Indeed the Allied blockade, the staggering casualties of the first two years, the protracted attrition, the battle of Verdun, the partially victorious Russian Brusilov offensive of 1916, the joining of the Entente by Rumania and its invasion of Transylvania, all this compelled Berlin and Vienna to court the favour of the largest nation of east central Europe. Consequently, pressure was brought about by Berlin and Vienna on the supporters of the Central Powers to launch a recruiting campaign. But most of them, including Pilsudski, refused to associate themselves with the action which, according to the calculations of the Central Powers, should give them about 1,000,000 Polish recruits. Nearly a year had elapsed since the troops of the Central Powers had driven the Russians out of Warsaw, declared Pilsudski in an open letter to the Rector of the University of Warsaw, yet no effective decision regard-
1833
ing the future of Poland had been taken, while the country was being treated like an occupied enemy territory. How could one explain to the people the phenomenon that no Polish government was established in the nation's capital? Thus, Pilsudski insisted upon political guarantees as a precondition of further commitment. Since they were not forthcoming, on July 25, 1916 he resigned his post as Commander of the First Brigade.
The turning point Seeing that no result could be achieved without at least some sort of political gesture, the Central Powers made a decision the ultimate consequences of which they could hardly anticipate. On November 5, 1916 they proclaimed the setting up of a semi-independent 'Polish kingdom', a sort of rump Poland under the protectorate of the two Emperors. For the time being, this Polish state was to consist only of a portion of its former Russian part. Of course, Paris and London as well as Petrograd protested against this move as a flagrant violation of international law. But
the Central Powers refused to be swayed from their objective and went on with their self-imposed task. From November 1916, the German Governor-General of Warsaw, Hans von Beseler, in whose hands were concentrated all the political threads, proceeded, with the collaboration of the Austrian Governor residing in Lublin, to implement the declaration of the two Emperors. On December 5, the two Governors instituted in Warsaw an advisory Provisional Council of State. The Council consisted of 25 members, appointed by the two Emperors; among them was Pilsudski, as head of the Council's Military Commission. The world was now treated to the strange spectacle of the two partitioning powers, each of which had refused to give up its share and had exploited the economic resources of Poland, yet unwittingly, step by step, proceeding to reconstruct a Polish state. Consequently, the declaration of the two Emperors — a hesitant, reluctant and modest tactical gesture — proved to be a turning point in the story of Poland's reappearance on the map of Europe. A few of the Poles who collaborated with the Central Powers were enthusiastic in their commitment. The crucial question of recruitment, for instance, was a subject of protracted discussions in the Council of State for weeks. The Poles were obviously in no hurry and kept on insisting on political concessions. In March 1917, the German and Austrian authorities demanded that the Council should adopt a special form of oath for the Polish soldiers, binding them to fidelity in arms with the Gferman and Austrian armies. Neither Pilsudski nor most of his soldiers had any intention of swearing such an allegiance. Their refusal was followed by the dissolution of the Polish Auxiliary Corps as the nucleus of the Polish army was now termed. These events almost coincided with the
Russia which swept as well as with the entry of the United States into the war. In Russia both of the rival revolutionary centres of power almost at once undertook what the fallen Tsarist regime had been unwilling to do. On March 27, 1917, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and two days later the Proliberal
upheaval
in
away the Romanov dynasty,
visional
Government,
issued
significant
statements concerning Poland. Both statements declared the partitions of Poland as null and void. Both emphatically stressed the right of the Polish people to free and independent existence. While the Provisional Government in its short proclamation no less than four times emphasised the necessity of concluding a Russo-Polish treaty of alliance under the banner of Slavdom, the statement of its rival, the Soviet, unconditionally recognised Poland's right to full independence and merely expressed a hope that the country would choose a republican form of government. Immediately after the declaration of the Provisional Government, a special ministry, called the Polish Liquidation Commission,
was
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its chairman Wadaw LedCadet politician of Polish nationawas given a seat at the cabinet. Soon
set nicki, a lity,
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up and
a fairly large separate Polish
armed
force,
composed of Russian soldiers of Polish nationality, was spontaneously created and organised into three army corps. At that 110 time, there were approximately generals, 20,000 officers, and about 700,000 soldiers of Polish extraction in the Russian armed forces. Although ethnographic Poland was entirely outside Russian control and the disputed borderlands were also quickly slipping out of their reach, the declaration of the Provisional Government had far-reaching political consequences. It finally freed the Entente from the necessity of treating the Polish question as a domestic Russian issue not to be mentioned in official diplomatic exchanges. Thus, the Russian Revolution made the Polish problem a vital international issue. By the spring of 1917 the Poles had already cadres of a national army, a nucleus of a state administration, as well as a small but highly vocal diplomatic representation in the west. Consequently, the two camps, although outwardly working at cross purposes were complementing each other.
r Germans I
I
r
iLithuanians
I
|
^_^^ ^^^H White Russians
Further Reading Conze, W., Polnische Nation Und Deutsche Polltik im Ersten Weltkriege (Gratz 1958) Dmowski, R., La Question Polonaise (Paris
Ukrainians
1909)
Dziewanowski, M.
K.,
Joseph
Pilsudsl
(Stanford 1969) Fischer, F., Griff Nach Der Weltmacht (Dusseldorf 1962)
Poland was greedily swallowed up by her large and powerful neighbours, Russia, Austria and Prussia, and disappeared from the map
Joseph Pilsudski, Memoirs of a Polish Revolutionary and Soldier (London 1931) Komarnicki, T., Rebirth of the Polish Republic (London 1957)
Gillie, D. R.,
PROFESSOR
M^
KAMIL DZIEWANOWSKI
the three partitions
between 1772 and 1795
is
of Europe.
Russification, Polish
nationalism had grown Into such a powerful and unstabilising force that Russia and the Central
Powers were forced to terms with
of
though born near Kiev, Ukraine^ He went to Warsaw University where he became Master of Laws in 1937, and in the same year he was awarded the Certificat du Droit Francais by the French University of Warsaw, During the war he escaped from two prison camps in Lithuania and
their loyalty,
come
it.
and not
surprisingly the
was
movement
split irreconcilably.
However, by 1917 Poland's nationalists had all but achieved their aims - it now only remained to be seen whether the promises would be kept when the war ended
fought for the Polish army
in France. At the age of 41 America and started a new career and a new life as a scholar He received an MA in 1 948 and a PhD in 1951 both from Harvard University, before becoming Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and an associate of the Russian Research Centre at Harvard His many publications include The Communist Party in Poland— An Outline History, Joseph Pilsudski. European Federalist and History of Soviet Russia
to
Both sides promised varying degrees of unity and independence to the nationalists in order to secure
Polish extraction,
he went
Yet by the time of the First World War. despite more than a century of repressive Germanisation and
to
,
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1834
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Boundary 1815 I
I
CONGRESS POLAND
annexed
Boundary 1772-17951914
GERMANY AUSTRIA-HUNGARY RUSSIA Front line 1916
1772-1908 1772-95
The
First,
Second and Third
Partitions of Poland.
In
three
quick moves, the BOO-year old Polish kingdom
is
swallowed up
1914 January
The Second Polish Revolution
Joseph Pilsudski, Dmowski's
fiussian reverses during 1915
main rival, outlines his Austrianbacked scheme for Polish
give the Central
liberation:
German high command takes
-
again crushed by Russia, this
time with Prussian support. Polish autonomy is abolished and the Russian language
by Russia, Austria and Prussia
obligatory
in
is
made
Polish schools.
July 25
Russification reigns supreme
and sets up the Grand Duchy of Warsaw as a French vassal
1908
state
Germany, Russia and the Polish Problem in which he stresses two
that
the Central Powers
The publishes
First
Poland
is a
pawn
necessity of unification before
August 14
liberation 2 the importance of
A Russian manifesto promises
Russian control, and the
the poles unification and self-government under the
protection of Russia. Austria and
gaming Russian aid against Germany, Poland's most dangerous and efficient enemy.
Prussia
Dmowski's National
success
Democrats spread
while Pilsudski's
1830-31
tentacles
first
while Dmowski continues his
governments
in
Commission and creates
London and
a large
^«&
join in the
proclamation of an
independent' Polish kingdom
council
Romanovs; for
this
is
considered a
Dmowski's
policy,
arms
call to
to
fight Russia alongside Austria
The First Palish Revolution. This
Legion attracts popular attention,
the
out their
to
and set up a council of state which adopts a constitution. Pilsudski has a seat on the
Polish nationalists:-
city of
Powers
sets uiTa Polish Liquidation
in
Grand Duchy of Warsaw becomes a kingdom under a free state under the
failure of the Central
March 30 The Russian provisional government declares in favour of an independent Poland,
separate Polish armed force
the conflict between Russia and
1815
Krakow
protest against the
of
s Polish
Switzerland
At the Congress of Vienna the
1
in
November 5 The German and Austrian
propaganda work
World War it is soon apparent
begins, and
mam
policies for Russophile
and the
almost complete control
July-August
Roman Dmowski
command
establish a Polish kingdom
the country. Pilsudski
Galicia with Austrian help
1807 Napoleon takes Prussian Poland
Pilsudski resigns from his
Powers the
lion's share of Poland,
He organises the Polish Legion in
1917
1916
1915
1863-64
finds no significant response
major stirring of Polish
nationalism
is
soon crushed by
August 16
Russia, and the policy of
Russification Poland
..jfe,.
:ri>
is
Pilsudski sets up the
inaugurated
Supreme
National Committee
in
in
Krakow
under Austrian protection
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1835
Rendezvous Opposite top: Guiilaume Apollinaire, France's supreme war poet. By 1916 he had seen the worst of the fighting and had received a terrible head wound. Opposite below: Charles Sorley, typical of many promising poets who rushed fromschool to warand aprematuredeath
T>eath Writers and painters, whether AlUed or Central Powers, went to war in 1914 as enthusiastically as any section of Europe's intelligentsia, yet more than
a permanent and moving record of a rapid
the others they
left
change of mood common to all their generation, a change from the euphoria of 1914 to the cynicism of 1916. Ronald Lewin. When
on June 16, 1915, a small volume of poems by Rupert Brooke was published, many people then and thereafter thought of him as the quintessence of what happened to the youth of Europe when the First World War began: 1914 and Other Poems, written by this beautiful boy who died en route to Gallipoli. Here, it seemed, was an intense expression of what Europe's charme^d and articulate intelligentsia felt as the lights went out. When Brooke died from a form of blood-poisoning on his voyage through the Mediterranean his death seemed to focus this feeling. Winston Churchill's moving obituary notice in The Times underlined this thought in a firm fashion; 'a voice had become audible, a note had been struck, more true, more thrilling, more able to do justice to the nobility of our youth in arms engaged in this present war than any other'. But, of course, even at the time it was a blown-up version of tne truth: even then Brooke was mourning the death in action of a French poet 'Peguy, the poet, is killed ... I .
.
This expanding 'credibility gap' was observable in all committed countries. The war started with elan; but by 1916 it presented the picture of a Europe covered by dead men rotting on barbed wire and embusques enriching themselves. In August 1914 the youth of Europe, in Britain, in France, in Germany, truly felt and reacted like Rupert Brooke: there were countless volunteers and conscripts who, when the call to arms went out, felt themselves to be 'like swimmers into cleanness leaping' — as Brooke had put it. But by 1916 things were not the same. One lived in filth on the Western Front and was by then sure that there was corruption at home. By 1916 London, Paris and Berlin were separated from the Ypres Salient and Verdun by an emotional gulf which could not be bridged. A study of the statistics of French (and German and Austrian and Russian) losses in that first winter make Rupert Brooke's sonnets seem somehow inopportune. Even in 1914, everywhere in Europe men were already dying in swathes. His poems are not, however, irrelevant, for they genuinely represent (in their optimism, their patriotism, their naivete) the spirit of so many who in the early days of the war followed the sound of the drum
and found themselves in Flanders — or some other Armageddon. Here is a famous one:
The Dead Blow out, 3'ou
bugles, over the rich Dead! There's none of these so lonely and poor of old
But, dying, has
made us
rarer gifts than
gold.
These
laid the
world away; poured out the
red
Sweet wine of youth; gave up the years
to,
be
Of work and joy, and that unhoped serene, That men call age; and those who would have been Their sons, they gave, their immortality.
.
am
envious of our good name.' Even then he had his doubts. It was a mood of euphoria which was not maintained. Rupert Brooke's exuberance in his 1914 sonnets during the opening •nonths of the First World War guttered A ti into the disillusion which followed ^1 nime. Between 1914 and 1916 a sigiii!' i! shift of opinion occurred, most •
Blow, bugles, blow! They brought us, for our dearth, Holmess, lacked so long, and Love, and Pain.
Honour has come back,
as a king, to earth,
And paid his subjects with a royal wage; And Nobleness walks in our ways again; And we have come into our heritage.
.
minKt'iily
among
but
and more distressing way civilians at home.
in
among 1836
different t.ie
the
frontline
soldiers,
[From 'Collected Poems of Rupert Brooke' reprinted by permission of Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd. 1
— then, even after those terrible engagements on the Somme and at Passchendaele, most of the millions were inarticulate. Those who could watch, and scribble and indicate were of infinite value, at the time to posterity. Voices crying amid wildernesses, perhaps: but something crept back to their countrymen, as the war went on, and without their testimony there would be a dimension lacking. They — and the war artists — captured by their sensitivity and their capacity to speak out at least something of what it meant to stand up and face the Juggernaut. Yet, the practical problem, in trying to reflect the reactions of the 'class of 1914-16', is that most of them were dead
and
Some time ago I reunion dinner at my college in Oxford. We were a group who had been undergraduates between 1932 and 1934. before they could utter.
went
All
to a
my
friends were there, alive.
We
had
survived a Second World War — not by absenteeism. I said to myself that had we been up at Oxford in, say 1912 or 1913, the room would have been virtually empty — most of us would have been dead by 1916. Here is a considerable difference. It is still painful to contemplate the holocaust of young and educated men all over Europe during these early years: they were the seed-bed of the future, and they were destroyed. There was a young man, Charles Sorley, the son of a professor of philosophy in Scotland, who had hardly matured as a schoolboy from Marlborough when he went out with his battalion of the Suffolk Regiment to France at the end of May 1915. He was killed in October at the battle of Loos. He just had time to watch, and scribble and indicate in some poems and prose passages which are of notable quality. One of his sonnets puts, it seems to me, most movingly what I have been trying to say:
them
like a cuttle-fish
pumping out
ink.
Almost certainly he was born out of wedlock; his mother was .some kind of Slav, and his father has been well described as a que.stion mark. Still, when the war broke out he was at the heart of the Parisian intelligentsia, the friend of Picasso, Vla-
minck, Braque and for a time the unhappy lover of the painter Marie Laurencin. Later I shall comment on the reactions of the Bloomsbury intelligentsia in London to the war which hit their world: Apollinaire's reactions were different. A brave and indeed romantic figure, he joined the French army: by 1916 'having faced some of the worst of the fighting), he emerged with a terrible wound in the head and a Croix de Guerre; he died a victim of the prevalent influenza. In the meantime he wrote some of the most exquisite poetry ever composed by a man at war: poetry which deeply reflected the French anguish. On January 1, 1915, the soldier-aesthete met on the train from Nice to Marseilles a girl called Madeleine Pages. An affinity was instantly established and correspondence continued between Corporal Guy de Kostrowitzky (his assumed name) of the 45th Battery of the 38th Artillery, and his Madeleine: correspondence so passionate on his part that subsequent publication has always been difficult. There was a strange and immediate relationship between the man in the front line and the pen friend: the point is that, apart from letters, Apollinaire sent her a series of poems composed in the trenches, among the bombardments and the raids and the star-shells at night. He could do the straightforward 'military' poem: As-tu connu
Guy au galop
Du temps qu'il etait militaire Guy au galop Du temps qu'il etait artiflot As-tu connu
If to some that might seem an exaggerated description of the 'Old Sweats' of the
Regular
Army who were
virtually obliter-
ated in the early battles of manoeuvre, it is still a completely honest statement of feelings shared by many in those innocent early days. The innocence could not endure. Even Brooke, the Golden Boy of 1914, was contorted as much as other writers and artists by the clash between what he saw he must do and what he wished to avoid. In a letter written before he joined the Royal Naval Division, which in 1915 transported him to his death in the Mediterranean and had to leave him in a grave on the Greek island of Skyros, he said, 'Half my heart is of England, the rest is looking for some home I haven't yet found. So, when this war broke, there was part of my nature and desires that said "Let me alone. What's all this bother? I want to work. I've got ends I desire to reach. If I'd wanted to be a soldier I should have been one. But I've found myself in different waysp;" That was also an honest statement, andf as a poet's should be, symptomatic. .;>^ijTi-" Millions of men were';rt6w in this situation. Millions o£ rn.en'i'had 'other dreams' — a wife, childrehjSiV:i:areer. All such hopes
came
to
an end in August 1914. Yet so
many who marched
into the front lines
were unable to speak for themselves. What they fumbled to express was never systematically studied until the latter stages of the war, when a careful study was instituted of letters from troops at the front. Even
Victor and vanquished are a-one in death: Coward and brave: friend, foe. Ghosts do not say "Come, what was your record when you drew breath?" But a big blot has hid each yesterday So poor, so manife.stly incomplete. And your bright Promise, withered long
and sped. Is
touched,
stirs, ri.ses,
sweet And blossoms and
is
opens and grows
you,
A la guerre But he also touched another note, deep and vibrant. There is one beautiful poem, which I once translated under the title Letter from the Front Line, in which he writes to Madeleine while all that went on during a frontline 'hate' was occurring, a winter poem composed amid snow. Here is a passage which illustrates his passion:
when you are love now means delight at night dream of your lips I dream of crystal
Your
dead.
[From 'Marlborough and other Poems' by
For
Charles Sorley, reprinted by permission of
I
the
Cambridge University
Press.
if
fountains
I
The thought would have produced something valuable but small in degree. There were others who offered themselves to Juggernaut, in that of which Rupert spirit of abnegation
Brooke was aware, who might have achieved larger aims, but were denied them by death in battle. Pre-eminently there was, on the English side, the poet Edward Thomas: on the French was the aesthete,
and art critic, Guillaume Apollinaire. Here was a most extraordinary jase of how
poet,
with a country not precisely your own could lead to the surrender of the bright promise for the sake of the same kind of duty that Rupert Brooke tried to analyse. self-identification
There was no formal reason why Apol-
Whatever he was, he was not a true-born Frenchman. His origins were obscure, and he concealed linaire should fight for France.
of your lips in a vision of roses
ends
Sorley's bright promise, had he survived, If
I
dream of your breasts the Paraclete
descends His dove upon their mountains And on my poet's tongue confusion sends
And O my love I
see your face a radiance of flowers
No panther's fierceness, all the gi'ace of flowers — And breathe your fragrance like the breath of flowers
For like a song of love The lily in your lyric beauty towers My words wing to your breast And there close-bosomed hold me in your East
'Wished you had never been born' Edward Thomas, it must at once be said, was a less super-heated, extravagant or various character than Apollinaire.
Still,
1837
in his way he too submitted to that destiny dominating the men of his time who said to themselves 'I've got ends I desire to reach' and subordinated their private desires to the mihtary necessity. A quiet personaHty, he had managed to survive for years on what might be described as distinguished hterary hack-work — books and articles made to order and for small returns, rather than anjrthing written from the heart. Until he was 36 he had written no poetry that was more than trivial. Then, suddenly, about the time of the war's outbreak — and some say under the impulsion of a kindred American poet, Robert Frost — it happened, and he burst into full song. He had two years before he was killed on the Western Front: his output in these months was unexampled, moving from a cool mirroring of Old England — the aborigines of the villages, the traditional country scenes, the essence of England — to a dispassionate, calm, and
what the him — a man who loved his
quite individual condensation of
war meant
to
wife Helen as passionately as ApollinaireKostrowitzky loved any of his ladies. It is the intensity of his composition which is so astonishing. We know the dates. One five days running in 1914 he wrote five striking poems. Here is part of one. The Sign-Post: a gentle voice speaking of
an England which seems to bear no relawhat was happening in Flanders — yet he would soon be there, and dead: tion to
The dim sea
glints chill.
The white sun
isfj
shy,
And the skeleton weeds and the
never-dry,
Rough, long grasses keep white with At the hill-top by the finger-post;
frost
The smoke of the traveller's-joy is puffed Over hawthorn berry and hazel tuft. I read the sign. Which way shall I go?
A voice says: You would not have doubted so
At twenty. Another voice gentle with scorn Says: At twenty you wished you had never been born. [From 'Collected Poems' ofEdward Thomas, reprinted by permission of Faber & Faber Ltd.]
One of Thomas's most perfect poems is entitled Lights Out, written because of his emotion as he heard, in an army camp, the bugles calling perhaps the most moving of their melodies: I have come to the borders of sleep, The unfathomable deep Forest, where all must lose Their way, however straight, Or winding, soon or late; They cannot choose.
i
[ibid.]
the English intelligentsia went to the front. Many objected to war on conscientious grounds. Among these was perhaps the most clear-headed man of his generation, Bertrand Russell. His line was firm from the first: he was against, and militantly against, the war. In the spring of 1916 the 'establishment', as we g would now say, fixed him. On April 10 of that year a conscientious objector called I I Ernest F. Everett was given two years s "hard labour' because he had disobeyed * ^ military orders. A leaflet was immediately organisation I issued by the anti-conscription E with which Russell was associated, and six
Not
"..
all
Above: Edward Thomas. Until 1914 his poetry was trivial, but the war pushed him on to greater things in a
magnificent outpouring,
moving from a cool mirroring of old England to a calm and individual condensation of what the war meant to him. The intensity of his composition is astonishing: in five days in 1914 he wrote five striking
poems. He was
killed in action early in
Left:
German
1917
wire, Thiepval
by Sir William Orpen.
1839
Rupert Brooke Rupert Brooke was born in 1887 and educated at Rugby and King's College, Cambridge. A brilliant undergraduate, he was made a fellow of his college, but his public fame was the result of his verse. Patriotic and youthful it epitomised the confidence with which went to war. He died in 1915 on Skyros on the way to Gallipoli
youth
in
The Leveller
Peace Now, God be thanked Who has matched us with His hour, And caught our youth, and wakened us from sleeping, With hand made sure, clear eye, and sharpened power, To turn, as swimmers into cleanness leaping. Glad from a world grown old and cold and weary. Leave the
Robert Graves 1895 and educated at Charterhouse and St John's College, Oxford, he joined The Royal Welch Fusiliers and served throughout the war in France. Reported dead of wounds on his 21st birthday but in fact survived the war
Born
sick hearts that
honour could not move,
And half-men, and their dirty songs and dreary. And all the little emptiness of love!
Near Martinpuich that night of hell
Two men were struck by the same shell, Together tumbling in one heap Senseless and limp like slaughtered sheep.
One was a pale eighteen-year-old. Blue-eyed and thin and not too bold. Pressed for the war not ten years too soon, The shame and pity of his
Oh! we, who have known shame, we have found release there. Where there's no ill, no grief, but sleep has mending, Naught broken save this body, lost but breath; Nothing to shake the laughing heart's long peace there But only agony, and that has ending; And the worst friend and enemy is but Death.
platoon.
The other came from far-off lands With bristling chin and whiskered hands. He had known death and hell before In Mexico and Ecuador. Yet in his death this cut-throat wild Groaned 'Mother! Mother!' like a child, While that poor innocent in man's clothes Died cursing Gk>d with brutal oaths. Old Sergeant Smith, kindest of men. Wrote out two copies there and then Of his accustomed funeral speech To cheer the womenfolk of each: — 'He died a hero's death:
and we
His comrades of "A" Company Deeply regret his death: we shall All deeply miss so true a pal.'
1840
J
Guillaume Apollinaire 1880 Apollinaire. though not by birth French, volunteered for service at the outbreak of war. Before the war he had been an outstanding figure in Parisian intellectual circles, and a leading member of a poetical group whose work was marked by experimentation, as in the concrete' form of the example shown below
Marlborough and Clare College, Cambridge. By far the most prolific and savage of the British war poets, Sassoon earned a reputation for rash daring in the trenches, being known as 'Mad Jack'
Cornflower
Prelude: the Troops
Born
in
^f'o>ft^
Young man of twenty
WTio have seen such terrible things WTiat do you think of the grown men of your childhood
You
You
have
know
seen death
Siegfried
Born
in
1886 and educated
Sassoon
at
Dim, gradual thinning of the shapeless gloom Shudders to drizzling daybreak that reveals Disconsolate men who stamp their sodden boots And turn dulled, sunken faces to the sky Haggard and hopeless. They, who have beaten down The stale despair of night, must now renew Their desolation in the truce of dawn. Murdering the livid hours that grope for peace.
bravery and cunning
face to
Yet these, who cling to life with stubborn hands. Can grin through storms of death and find a gap
face
more
In the clawed, cruel tangles of his defence. They march from safety, and the bird-sung joy Of grass-green thickets, to the land where all Is ruin, and nothing blossoms but the sky That hastens over them where they endure Sad, smoking, flat horizons, reeking woods, And foundered trench-lines volleying doom for doom.
than a
hundred times
Communicate your fearlessness
you do
To those who will come
not
know After you
what hfe is
Young man You are full of joy your memory is full of blood Your soul is also red With joy
You have absorbed the life of those who died close to you You have the quality of decision It is 1700 hrs. and vou would know how to
O my brave brown companions, when your souls Flock silently away, and the eyeless dead Shame the wild beast of battle on the ridge. Death will stand grieving in that field of war Since your unvanquished hardihood is spent. And through some mooned Valhalla there will pass Battalions and battalions, scarred from hell; The unreturning army that was youth; The
legions
who have
suffered
and are dust.
Die than your elders
If no better
At
least
more piously
For you know death better than O sweetness of other times
life
Immemorial slowness 1>^41
men were
arrested for distributing it. Russell without hesitation wrote to The Times a letter stating that he was the author: in consequence he was prosecuted, appeared before the Lord Mayor at the Mansion House, and was severely fined.
Later he was to be jailed in Brixton for six months because of an article he wrote in favour of accepting a peace offer from Germany. Here shone a moral courage which matched that of the soldiers in the front line.
Right: Over the Top by
John Nash Below: Gassed. 'In Arduis Fidelia' by Gilbert Rogers
The reaction of Ljdton Strachey (the son of the General) and of the rest of his set was perhaps predictable, and perhaps one must not quarrel with the dictates of their revulsion from in strange contrast with the general response of the comfortable class - to which they belonged. The many accounts available of the 'golden summer' of 1914, the junketings, the carefree enjoyment of wealth and property and possessions, the country-house weekends and the balls and the parties, tell one at once of a world
conscience.
Juggernaut
Still,
is
that has vanished — its luxury, its brilliance, its gaiety — and of a way of life from which the participants might not have willingly been separated. WTiat happened to this elite is captured most vividly and agonisingly in the Diaries of Cynthia Asquith, the daughter-in-law of the Prime Minister. She kept a full and daily record of all that happened to her circle. By the end of 1916 all her playfellows are gone. Her youngest brother Yvo Charteris rushed from Eton into the trenches and was dead in three weeks, leading his men over the top. Her eldest brother, Lord Elcho, heir of her father Lord i §
?
I c
I ~ Right:
Dead Germans
trench by Sir William Orpen. None of these paintings show the war as heroic or romantic. Nash's in a
soldiers are
stiff
and
numbed zombies, Orpen's dead German turns green
In
the frost,
and Rogers's gassed Briton
than
is little
mud and
more
water,
scarcely one of
Brooke's swimmers into cleanness leaping'
Wemyss, was
killed at Gallipoli.
The two
splendid sons of Lord' Desborough, Billy and the poet Julian Grenfell, were both dead. The Prime Minister's son, Raymond Asquith, one of the shining stars of the prewar Oxford generation, had died with the Guards on the Western Front. Her own husband Herbert Asquith (also a poet: his The Volunteer is often quoted) was steadily eroded by his service in the trenches. All of these men could have been found safe billets: C\mthia Asquith ticks off on her fingers their voluntary demise. Their spirit is best reflected by a letter she received from Billy Grenfell not many weeks before he died: Death selects our bravest and best; but the barrier between two worlds is so gallantly and lightheartedly crossed here by many every day, that one can hardly feel it as a separation, or even an interruption of their gallant and beautiful lives. Death is swallowed up in victory. We are a nation of foolish and courageous volunteers fighting against the luriest of professionals, and we are paying the price for it. [From 'Rupert Brooke', a biography by Christopher Hassall, reprinted by permission
ofFaber
& FaberLtd.]
1
is the point. It should be that, as compared with the conscript forces of France and Germany, all British troops in France were volunteers until the first stage of conscription was introduced in 1916. This explains why, as the gulf yawned wider and wider between the civilian and the front line soldier
i
—and by 1916
Volunteers: that
remembered
it
was very wide indeed —
I the British fighting
man felt a special sense
The poilu and the German had to be where they were: the British had I volunteered. Thus the profiteers and the ^ sheltered industrial workers and the raffish I s
of alienation.
London entertainment industry became more and more estranged from the soldier in the trench. Siegfried Sassoon was later to
make
the point:
was killed leading his company on the Meuse in September 1914. I think of the eye-witness account of the death during that same September of the poet Peguy
But other shells are waiting Across the Aegean Sea, Shrapnel and high explosive, Shells and hell for me.
who Rupert Brooke mourned: Someone 'Blighters'
The House
is
crammed:
tier
beyond
tier
they grin
And cackle
at the
Show, while prancing
ranks
Of harlots shrill the chorus, drunk with din;
'We're sure the Kaiser loves our dear old Tanks!' I'd like to see a
Tank come down the stalls.
Lurching to rag-time tunes, or 'Home, sweet Home', And there'd be no more jokes in Music-halls To mock the riddled corpses round
Bapaume. [From 'Collected Poems
1908-1956' by Siegfried Sassoon, reprinted by permission
ofFaber It
&
Faber
Ltd.]
was a noticeable
soldier — perhaps
fact that the frontline
armies — felt a greater kinship with his comrades (and even with his enemy across No-Man's Land) than with those at home. In the records of the time the anomaly is to be found again and again of the man on leave wanting to get back to the war. The ordinary soldier with his 'mate', the officer in the squalid companionship of a dugout mess, seemed to find a deeper human relationship than 'Blighty' could on"er. This point was made with a merciless claritv by an anonymous contributor to The Nation, October 21, 1916. (I think the anonymous contributor may have been R. H. Tawney, who typically served in the ranks — as a good democrat.) You seem ashamed, as if they were a kind of weakness, of tlie ideas which sent us to France, and for which thousands of sons and lovers have died. You calculate the profits to be derived from 'War after War' as though the unspeakable agonies of the Somme were an item in a commercial proposition. We see things which you can only imagine. We are strengthened by reflections which you have abandoned. Our minds differ from yours, both because they are more exposed to change, and because they are less changeable. While you seem — forgive me if I am rude — to have been surrendering your creeds with the nervous facility of a Tudor official, our foreground may be different hut our background is the same. It is that of August to November, 1914.
To be
in
all
volunteer, of course, did not necessaiily imply a greater ardour. No fiame burned more purely than in the heart of the French conscript who, because of the levee en masse, was often the educated equivalent of those young men from the British public schools and universities who swarmed to the colours. (It is a daunting thought that from one Oxford college alone, Christ Church, well over 200 graduates were killed in action.) Nor was the French regular soldier any less ardent than the original BEF; it is said that the 1914 class of the select military academy of St Cyr was soon virtually extinct. But I think particularly of the men of feeling swept up by the those schoolinevitable draft -of all masters who stiffened the non-commissioned ranks of the French army — of writers like Alain-Fournier, author of that magical novel Le Grand Meaulnes, who a
cried: 'We haven't get it in the neck.'
our packs; we shall
all
'Doesn'tmatter,' returned Peguy; 'I haven't a pack either. Go on. Keep on firing.' He drew himself up as if in challenge to the storm of bullets, as it were to summon the death he had glorified in his verse. At that
moment
a bullet pierced his noble forehead. hillside without a cry, having seen at last clearly that ultimate vision of the longed-for victory. When, some yards farther on, frantically leaping forward, I glanced behind me, I saw stretched on the hot dusty earth, among the broad green leaves, a black and scarlet stain in the midst of so many others, the body of our beloved
He
fell
on the
brave lieutenant. On the German side too there were the voices of civilisation, individuals who carried their future into the frontline and readily sacrificed on the barbed wire what might have been. There was a man called Otto Braun who wrote a poem for Christmas 1915. A soft and simple poem: bore arms My soul's invaded by strange fears. And melancholy's treacherous charms.
For the
first
time, since
I
hell of ships and cities, Hell of men like me. Fatal second Helen, Why must I follow thee?
came
Achilles
Was it so hard,
1
back this morning
will go
Stand in the trench, Achilles, Flame-capped, and shout for me.
But perhaps the absolute expression of the spirit of what I have called 'the class of 1914-16' is this poem by Wilfrid Gibson:
They ask me where I've been, And what I've done and seen. But what can I reply Who knows it wasn't I, But someone just like me. Who went across the sea with
Shall I fall on Danube's bank? Lie slain in Poland? What does it matter? If I fight as a horseman Ere they fetch my soul away.
Out
in the sunset's
glow
Two crows are flying — When will come Reaper Death Through our ranks scything? Nought to be sorry for Iflbut see our flag O'er Belgrade flying!
As I say, the innocent days. But as the war wore on, into 1915 and 1916, one heard diff'erent voices, as in this poem by Patrick Shaw-Stewart:
my head and hands
men
Though
Out on the meadow's edge two daws are perching —
Achilles,
From Imbros over the sea;
Killed
Driihen am Weisenrand hocken zwei Dohlen —
Troy land
So very hard to die? Thou knowest and I know not — So much the happier I.
And
On the German side, one must recognise the generous offering of youth — those reserve divisions who marched shoulder to shoulder in the face of the magnificent musketry of the Old Contemptibles and were mown down rank by rank. They too had a gay gallantry. Apollinaire's 'As-tu connu Guy au galop' has a counterpart, the song of the German cavalry in the early days of the war — the innocent days:
to
And I to Chersonese: He turned from wrath to battle And I from three days' peace.
in foreign lands
.
.
.
must bear the blame. Because he bore my name. {From 'Collected Poems' by Wilfrid Gibson, reprinted by permission of Macmillan & Co. Ltd.
I
]
add a coda in rememthose men, on all fronts, who between 1914 and 1916 stood 'in view of God and Eternity'. It is part of a poem written during these years by Alan Seeger: I
would
brance of
like to
all
have a rendezvous with Death At some disputed barricade, When Spring comes back with rustling shade I
And apple-blossoms
fill
the air —
have a rendezvous with Death When Spring brings back blue days and I
fair.
may be he shall take my hand And lead me into his dark land And clo.se my eyes and quench my shall pass him still. It may be It
breath —
1
I
have a rendezvous with Death
On some scarred slope of battered hill, When Spring comes round again this year And the first meadow-flowers appear. [From 'Poems' by Alan Seeger, reprinted by permission of Constable & Co. Ltd.] Further Reading
C Diaries 1915-1918 (Hutchinson 1968) Chapman. G Vain Glory (Cassell 1937) Collected Poems of Rupert Brooke (Sidgwick&Jacl^son 1918) Collected Poems of Edward Ttiomas (Faber 1949) Hassal. C, Rupert Brooke (Faber 1964) Panichas. G. A.. Promise of Greatness
Asquith, Lady
,
,
I
saw a man
this
morning
Who did not wish to die: I
ask,
and cannot answer.
If otherwise
with
I.
Fair broke the day this morning Against the Dardanelles; The breeze blew soft, the morn's cheeks
Were
cold as cold sea-shells.
(Cassell 1968)
Ronald Lewin's Volume 2, p. 861.]
[For
biography,
see
lS4n
.../^
perhaps a popular misconception that the fighting on the Western Front consisted of a series of bloody offensives interspersed with long periods of inactivity, during which both sides licked their wounds and attempted to combat the natural discomforts of living in trenches. There is no doubt that after 1914 there was a 'close season' during the months of December-March when weather conditions made major attacks impossible. However, these four months were extremely busy for all, from the higher headquarters, who were planning the next season's offensives, down to the front line troops who were involved in a number of activities. Much time, admittedly, was spent in keeping trenches habitable and defendable, and also in 'tidying up' the line, which often meant local attacks to pinch out unwelcome
ft is
enemy
was the ceaseNo-Man's Land. Linked
salients. Besides this
less patrolling of
with this was trench raiding. By November 1914 the First Battle of Ypres was at its height and elsewhere along the front in France both sides were firmly entrenched and drawing breath after the hectic battles of the first three months of the war. However it was felt that this was merely a pause in operations and that very shortly fighting would become open again. In the meantime there was a need to prepare for the attacks that lay ahead.
Both sides attempted
to improve their as possible in order to provide good "jump-off' places for the next offensives. Besides this there was the necessity to prevent each other from improving their positions. It was this need to hinder which brought about the first raid.
positions as
much
.
_
1
1 1
\
«,
\. m \
,»
Ik.
..>•.
^v
\,--T m.^
XK"
^pPlK*-,
^HhHHHhIHB^^^''
'
"^
[J J-d
In between major assaults on the Western Front, trench raiding was pursued with increasing intensity, especially by the British. But what was the real value of these small scale raids?
\'^ Above and inset: Two
of the
hazards of trench raiding - a German star
II»liHJMII«lliI;liU»lililiTiT»HiniHiTnin'l»
liVJItJwIiMliUI
^' y
.^^,
E
I
I I I I I
,
v-^
The Indian Corps had lately (October 1914) arrived in France to bolster the depleted BEF, and at the beginning of November the Garhwal Brigade found themselves in trenches in the La Bassee sector. The l/39th and 2/39th Garhwal Rifles were having trouble with a German trench which enfiladed their lines. Consequently on the night of November 9/10 two parties of 50 men each from the two battalions were ordered, under Major G. H. Taylor, to render this trench unfit to the enemy. They succeeded in entering it, but discovered that it was too deep and well constructed to make more than very temporarily inhabitable. Three nights later another attempt was made using, this time, six platoons of the 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles and 50 men from the 2/39th. This operation failed because the Germans were on the
-i-r
-:./>':
^^:^'
.jf-t^' JUSF'
alert;
Major Taylor was
killed.
_
la
These two
raids had, however, set a pattern of trench warfare for the Indian Corps. Surprisingly, it would appear that up until the end of the year only the Indian Corps were involved in raiding. Elsewhere fighting was limited to sniping and the occasional artillery barrage, when the limited ammunition supplies permitted. Thfe rest of the time was devoted to improving the trenches, wiring and patrolling. However, the night of January 2/3 witnessed the first raid by British as opposed to Indian troops. The 1st Worcesters were manning trenches at Pont Logy in the Neuve Chapelle sector and noticed that the Germans had managed to dig a trench to within 50 yards of them and it looked as though this was in preparation for an attack. Lieutenant F. C. Roberts and
_i&eofstormtrQO|!Jers
I Who were tf^med specifically in tl^ *:. art of raiding,' / and raided all parts^ *
of the British
and
French line like a travelling circus Above: A German raid, one of many such raids to secure domination of No-Man's Land
25 men attacked this trench and succeeded in bayoneting the Germans who were in it. They made the safety of their own lines with only two casualties. This dashing action was recognised by the immediate award of the DSO to Lieutenant Roberts,
who was later in the war to win both the VC and MC. At the beginning of February the Germans became very active around St Eloi with a series of raids against the 27th and 28th Divisions, who were new to the front. Raiding had become established. For the British the first indication that raiding had been put on an official footing was a memorandum OA 447, issued by GHQ on February 5, 1915, which read as follows: "For reasons known to you, we are for the moment acting on the defensive so far as serious operations are concerned, but this should not preclude the planning of local attacks on a comparatively small scale, with a view to gaining ground and taking advantage of any tactical and numerical inferiority on the part of the enemy.' It went on to say that attack was the best form of defence and that attacks should be 'based on a specific object' with reasonable chances of success which offset any losses likely to be suffered. Yet in this memorandum there is no distinction made between a minor attack, whose object was to capture ground and hold it, and a raid in which the enemy trenches were to be entered, casualties inflicted and prisoners captured before the raiders withdrew to the safety of their
own
lines.
The art develops With the opening of the 1915 campaign
in
March, raids started to be used for different reasons than just to inflict discomfort on the enemy. On the third day of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle (March 12) 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers launched a diversionary raid in the area of Bois Grenier to the north of the main battle with a party of three officers and 22 men. What was more unusual about this than the normal raid of the time was the use of artillery. Most raids relied entirely on stealth and sur-
The Canadians appear
to
have been
first
mark with a series of raids during November 1915. One carried out by the
off the
5th (Western Cavalry) and 7th (British Columbia Regiment) Infantry Battalions astride the River Douve on the night of November 16/17 is reputed to have excited the attention of Joffre, who circularised an account of the affair to the French armies. By Christmas the British were heavily involved in raiding and GHQ were encouraging the capture of prisoners for identification purposes. A definite pattern had emerged and raiding procedures were becoming standardised. Preparation was extremely important and the more thorough it was the better were the chances of success. Every man
must know his points settled,
to
be
role intimately.
attacked must
The
precise be carefully
and minutely examined through
binoculars as well as by small patrols (unobtrusively, to avoid arousing the enemy's suspicions). One must also consider: the best line of approach; the cutting of exit gaps in our wire after dark on the night of the venture; the time to be spent in the hostile trench; the signal to withdraw and the method; artillery and machine gun support; the commander's post; together with
many
other details. So wrote Brigadier of the Cameronians, who served the whole war on the Western Front as an infantry officer. Air photographs would also be examined and the raiders would rehearse several times over a replica of the ground marked with tapes. The first problem was to penetrate the enemy's wire and this was done either by means of an artillery barrage or by a small group which was pushed out ahead of the main body to cut the wire by hand. The main body was split into two groups, left and right, the plan being to enter the enemy trenches at two points or to enter at one place and fan out in two directions. The
James Jack
weapons used most were bombs (Mills on the British side and Stick on the German side) and bayonets. A support party with a preponderance of rifle and bayonet men had
prise to achieve their object, especially as
the twofold object of covering the with-
the munition crisis meant that there was no artillery to be spared. In this instance a barrage was used to protect the flanks of the operation in case of a possible counterattack by the Germans. Throughout the summer of 1915 raids continued to take place on both sides, but the emphasis was still on small parties of raiders, never more than company strength. It was not until after the Battle of Loos and the coming of the 'close season' 1915/1916 that the next stage of development took place. The munition crisis of the early part of the year had been largely solved by the autumn. At the same time the Germans were bent on conserving their artillery for the projected ^offensive at Verdun. Allied artillery hence became more active and the Germans began to hold their front line more thinly in order to prevent casualties
drawal of the raiders and producing fresh supplies of bombs if required. Artillery and trench mortars were used in support to shell the enemy's second line trenches in order to prevent reserves being brought up and counterattacks taking place. The tactics of the raiders once they were in the enemy trenches were simple. They fought from traverse to traverse, with the bombers first of all throwing grenades into the first traverse and the bayonet men following this up. Bombs were thrown through the entrance of any dugouts. Strict timings were the basis of any raid, and the raiders were given a precise period of time to remain in the opposing side's trenches.
by bombardment.
GHQ
The British were keen that the operations for the winter of 1915/16 should be of an active nature and hence a memorandum issued by Second Army on October 28, 1915, which stated that 'the forthcoming winter months are to be utilised not for passive defence but for exhausting the enemy's troops and for training all branches for future ojjerations'. This meant, among other things, encouraging raids.
1848
A battle in miniature Now that raids were becoming more elaborate affairs with other arms besides the infantry being used, they passed out of battalion control. Brigade and sometimes even Divisional Headquarters were doing the planning and issuing of orders. Not for nothing was the Medical Officer of the 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers writing in his diary for April 1916: 'The old notion of a raid was to enter the enemy's lines by stealth or surprise, to kill or capture, plunder or destroy, and to get away with no fighting or little. The new notion is a battle in miniature
all the preliminaries and accompaniments magnified often manifold.' By January 1916 planning for the joint Franco-British offensive on the Somme had commenced. As part of the preparations Joffre advocated wearing-down attacks at divisional level. Haig, who had by now replaced French as the commander of the
with
British armies in France, did not agree because he felt that this was not worth the casualties and the object could be achieved just as successfully through frequent raids. There is no doubt that the French had not really taken to raiding and certainly during the winter months believed in a policy of 'live and let live'. They held their trenches with second line Territorials
whilst their fighting troops were rested in the rear. Directives emanating from the British in the early summer of 1916 emphasised the importance of raiding. During the period December 19-May 30 the British made 63 raids (43 were deemed successful) in strengths varying from ten to 200 men. The Germans during the same period raided the British trenches 33 times of
GHQ
which 20 were successful. By 'success' was meant, on the British side, that they achieved what they had set out to do and, on the German, that they succeeded in taking prisoners. From June onwards British raids were stepped up as a result of
GHQ
a instruction, dated May 27, concerning the preparations for the forthcoming offensive. This ordered 'raids by night, of the strength of a company and upwards, on an extensive scale, into the enemy's front system of defences. These are to be prepared by intense artillery and trench mortar bombardments.'
The British contribution to the art of trench warfare Right:
The
killing of
enemy troops
(here
Germans), the most obvious reason
for trench raiding. Inset: Locating the target of the next raid — a British listening post
Raiding, however, took place not only in the impending battle area but also along the whole front. This was part of Haig's plan of deception to persuade the Germans that the offensive was going to take place elsewhere. In fact it was only Falkenhayn on the German side who was taken in by this. As regards the date (or in British parlance 'Z Day'), German raids, like that of the 91st Reserve Regiment north-east of Gommecourt on the night of June 23/24, through the capture of prisoners, did much to pinpoint it as July 1. During the last days of June no less than 38 British raids took place outside the Somme area as opposed to six German. Fourth Army's raids in the battle area itself brought back a variety of information as to the results of the preliminary bombardment. It was found that in some areas the German trenches were destroyed and deserted, whereas in others the raiders failed to enter because either the wire was not cut or the trenches were too strongly held.
During the battles that followed a new innovation was introduced, that of daylight raiding. In the battle area itself such raids were used largely to assist consolidation of
-»M
JM
'v^'S
^Sf-
newly captured
was the
positions.
An example
of
Corps' raids during the period September 16/22 to help consolidate the freshly captured Thiepval-Pozieres Road. Raiding on the rest of the British front increased and its aims were to tie down the maximum number of German troops away from the battle and also to keep track of the movement of divisions to and from the Somme. The Germans did the same, but to a more limited extent, only 73 raids against 310 during the months July-November. Besides the use of artillery and trench mortars, both sides employed the blowing of small mines, especially in the Cambrin sector. Provided one could get enough WEiming of a raid, artillery was found to be the most effective way of defeating it. The 2nd Rifle Brigade suffered heavily from this during a battalion raid on the German trenches in the Quarries sector (Vermelles) on September 3, 1916. The Germans had captured one of their patrols the night before and when the raiders entered the opposing trenches they were empty. The German this
II
artillery fire which was brought down caused 50% casualties. There was no doubt that too much preliminary preparation in the way of barrages meant loss of surprise, and the problem was to achieve the right balance. Either one made the preliminary bombardment short and concentrated on the sector to be raided, which meant that if the other side was on the alert he was able to bring down artillery fire on the raiders as they formed up in their own trenches, or else one planned an elaborate
series of feints,
which made
it
far
more
because of the added complications, that things would go wrong. likely,
A raid that failed Seigfried Sassoon has left us with a very graphic picture of what it w£is like to take part in a raid in his Memoirs of an Infantry Officer: Entering the other dugout I was
had forgotten that the raiders were to have blacked faces (to avoid the danger of their mistaking one another for Germans). Exchanging boisterous jokes, they were putting the finishing touches to slightly startled, for I
their makeup with bits of burnt cork. Showing the whites of their eyes and pretending
not to recognise one another, those 25 shiny-faced nigger minstrels might almost have been getting ready for a concert. Everyone seemed to expect the entertainment to be a roaring success. But there were no looking-glasses or banjos, and they were brandishing knobkerries, stuffing Mills bombs into their pockets and hatchets into their belts, and 'Who's for a Blighty one tonight?' was the stock joke (if such a wellworn wish could be called a joke). At 2230 hours there was a sudden silence, and Barton told me to take the party up to Battalion Headquarters. It surprises me when I remember that I set off without having had a drink, but I have always disliked the flavour of whisky, and in those days the helpfulness of alcohol in human affairs was a fact which had not yet been brought home to me. The raiders had been given only a small quantity, but it was enough to hearten them as they sploshed up the communication trench. None of us could
know how insignificant we were in the socalled 'Great Adventure' which was sending up its uneasy flares along the Western Front. No doubt we thought ourselves something very special. But what we thought never mattered; nor does it matter what sort of in-
British Sapping Party If the artiileiy had not successfully cut the wire the task was completed
by hand by a sma sapping party or by laying Bangalore torpedoes -six-foot lengths of piping filled with amnvonal which were placed under the wire and set off by a time fuse stealthily
t
Hanging on the old barbed wire'- a oead German after a futile raid on the British lines at Givenchy. There was much argumer^ about the value of trench raiding, and th^-^ debate
still
continues. Raiding
was necessary
to secure prisoners in order to identify opposing units, but the argument that-raids
were necessary to keep up morale was not so straightforward -a successful raid did much to raise morale, but an unsuccessful one had the opposite effect. Furthermore, raids led to the loss of many first class men, and retaliation which meant more casualties
/,
Raiding Party
With the wire cut the raid could take place The major objective was the capture of prisoners for the information they could give. Other objectives were to kill a&many of the enemy as possible, bomb
dugouts and mmeshafts. and destroy machine gun posts - and not least, to maintain the morale of the attacking side
O
Dugout
D
Mine Shaft Bangalore Torpeiio
-^
Machine Gun Post^
German Front
Line
^"i^
flated fool I was when I blundered into Kinjack's Headquarters at Maple Redoubt to report the presence of the raiders and I asked whether I might go across with them. 'Certainly not,' said the Colonel. 'Your job is to stop in our trench and count the men as they. come back.' He spoke with emphasis and he was not a man who expected to have to say a thing twice. We stared at one another for a moment; some freak of my brain made me remember that in peace time he had been an enthusiastic rose grower— had won prizes with his roses, in fact; for he was a married man and had lived in a little house near the barracks. My thought was nipped in the bud by his
peremptory voice telling Major Robson, his second-in-command, to push off with the party. We were about 400 yards from the front line, and Robson now led us across the open to a point in the support trench, from which a red electric torch winked to guide us. Then up a trench to the startingpoint, the men's feet clumping and drumming on the duck-boards. This noise, plus the clinking and drumming and creaking
of weapons and equipment, suggested to my strained expectancy that the enemy would be well warned of our arrival. Mansfield and his two confederates now loomed squally above us on the parapet; they had been laying a guiding line of lime across the craters. A gap had been cut in our wire, and it was believed that some sort of damage had been done to the German wire which had been 'strafed' by trench mortars during the day. The raiders were divided into four parties of five men; operation orders had optimisti-
assumed that the hostile trenches would be entered without difficulty; 'A' party would go to the left, 'B' party to the right, and so on and so forth. The object of the raid was to enter the enemy loop on the edge of the crater; to enter Kiel Trench at two points; to examine the portions of trench
cally
thus isolated, capture prisoners, outs,
and
party'
kill
(seven
Germans.
men
An
bomb dug'evacuating
carrying two ten-foot
and a red flash lamp) followed the others. The ladders were considered important, as the German front trench was believed to be deep and therefore difficult to ladders
get out of in a hurry. There were two mine craters a few yards from our parapet; these craters were about 50 yards in diameter and about 50 feet deep; their sides were steep and composed of soft soil; there was water at the bottom of them. Our men crossed by a narrow bridge of earth between the craters; the distance to the German wire was about 60 yards. It was now past midnight. The five parties had vanished into the darkness on all fours. It was raining quietly and persistently. I sat on the parapet waiting for something to happen. Except for two men at a sentry post nearby (they were now only spectators) there seemed to be no one about. 'They'll keep that — inside the trench', muttered the sentry to his mate and even at that tense moment I valued the compliment. Major Robson and the stretcher-bearers had been called away by a message. There must be some trouble further along, I thought, wondering what it could be, for I hadn't heard a
Now and again I looked at my luminous watch. Five, ten, 15 minutes passed in ominous silence. An occasional flare, never near our craters, revealed the streaming rain, blanched the tangles of sound.
wire that wound away into the gloom, and came to nothing, bringing down the night.
1852
Unable to remain inactive any longer, I crawled a little way out. As I went, a few shells began to drone across in their leisurely way. Our communication trench was being shelled. I joined the evacuating party; they were lying on the lip of the lefthand crater. A flare fizzed up, and I could see the rest of the men lying down, straight across the ridge, and was able. to exchange a grimace with one of the black-faced laddercarriers. Then some 'whizz-bangs' rushed over to our front trench; one or two fell on the craters; this
made
the obstinate silence
of Kiel Trench more menacing. Soon afterwards one of the bayonet men came crawling rapidly back. I followed him to our trench where he whispered his message. 'They can't get through the second belt of wire; O'Brien says it's a wash-out; they're all going to throw a bomb and retire.' I suppose I ought to have tried to get the ladder-carriers in before the trouble started; but the idea didn't strike me as I waited with bumping heart; and almost immediately the explosions began. A bomb burst in the water of the left-hand crater, sending up a phosphorescent spume. Then a concentration of angry flashes, thudding bangs, and cracking shots broke itself up in hubbub and scurry, groans and curses, and stamStumbling figures peding confusion. loomed up from below, scrambling clumsily over the parapet; black faces and whites of eyes showed grotesque in the antagonistic
shining of alarmed flares. Dodging to and counted 14 men in all; they all blundered away down the trench. I went out, found Mansfield badly hit, and left him with two others who soon got him in. Other wounded men were crawling back. Among them was a grey-haired Lance-Corporal, who had one of his feet almost blown off; I half carried him in and when he was sitting on the firestep he said, 'Thank God Almighty for this; I've been waiting 18 months for it and now I can go home.' I told him we'd get him away on a stretcher soon, and then he muttered 'Mick O'Brien's fro, I
somewhere down
in the craters.'
Sassoon, with the help of another man, managed, after a long struggle, to find and rescue O'Brien; unfortunately he was dead by the time they got him back in. The net result was that the raiders lost two killed and 12 wounded for little or no gain. It well illustrates an unsuccessful raid. The reason can be easily pinpointed as too much reliance on artillery to cut the German wire. This was the late spring of 1916 and during the following autumn a new method was introduced to cut wire. This was the Bangalore Torpedo, which consisted of a six-foot metal tube filled with ammonal, which could be set off by means of a fuse. Although it was not wholly reliable, it was an improvement, especially against thick wire.
Raiding for the sake of raiding With the closing down of the Somme battles in November 1916, raiding broke out with renewed vigour on both sides. The Germans
made
stormtroopers who were trained specifically in the art of raiding, and raided all parts of the line like some
use
of
travelling circus. The British made much more use of daylight raids, especially in the Loos area, which was the scene of several successes in January 1917.
Brigadier-General Edmonds, wTiting in the final volume of the British Official History of the War on the Western Front,
expresses a doubt as to the value of raids. He wrote 'A few were naturally required to take prisoners for "identifications". They were supposed to keep up the fighting spirit of the troops — the French, by inaction in the vdnter of 1917-18 as Marshal Foch recognised, suffered evident deterioration. Raids led to the loss of many first-class
and men, and retaliation which meant more casualties.' There is much in what he says. There is no doubt that a
officers
successful raid did much to boost the morale of the unit concerned, but an unsuccessful one, such as Sassoon's, had the opposite effect. Then again, many of the raiders, particularly the Other Ranks, were volunteers who tended to be the best and their loss could be ill afforded, especially after the bloodbaths on the Somme. Furthermore, higher formations did get carried away with raiding for the sake of raiding. It was perhaps fear of being seen to be inactive and also rivalry which were the causes. Captain Hitchcock of the 2nd Leinsters writes 'After a time these raids
became unpopular with regimental officers and the rank and file, for there grew up a feeling that to the
sometimes these expeditions
enemy trenches owed
their origin to rivalry between organisations higher than battalions. Rivalry between formations is excellent, but when overdone can be most dangerous. The rivalry that existed in France in 1916 and 1917 over raiding operations indeed had been carried to the
extreme limit.' Yet on the credit side raiding did much to maintain British domination of NoMan's Land. Whoever had this domination tended to retain the initiative; also morale
was
The Germans preferred to artillery and trench mortar but this was not successful and did better.
dominate by fire,
not discourage raiding on the British side. Intelligence was kept up to date from the steady stream of prisoners which were brought in. They enabled troops to gain confidence and experience in minor tactics, and, at the same time, learn to co-operate with other arms. Finally, they did much to
keep alive an offensive spirit, without which the major battles would have been even less successful than they were. During this middle period of the war in the west, trench raiding became a dominant feature of life in the British sector. The British army was the major user of this technique and it could be said that it w£is the British contribution to trench warfare. Further Reading
Anon, The War the Infantry Knew 1914-1919 (King 1938) Farrar-Hockley, Brig. A., The Somme (Batsford 1964) Edmonds, Brig-Gen. Sir J. E., Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1915 Vol 1916 Vols 1,2 Nicholson, Col. G. W. L., Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 (Queens Printer 1962)
1,
CHARLES MESSENGER was
born in 1941 and Marlborough College and the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and was commissioned into the Royal Tank Regiment After Sandhurst he read History at Oxford where he received his MA He served with his regiment in Libya and retired from the regular army as a Major in 1 980 He has written eight books, the most recent of which IS The Post Office Rifles, which is a history of He has this Territorial Army regiment in World War
educated
at
I.
just finished Rifles.
a regimental history of the 6th Gurkha
rijf m]i\\ In late July 1916 the Turks began preparations for a major attack on Allied troops near Romani.
General Murray, C-in-C of the British forces in Egypt, rightly assessed the direction from which it would come and his wise dispositioning of his regiments led to a convincing victory. But it was after this that the arduous pursuit of the Turks across the Sinai began. W. F. Woodhouse Below: The long walk; in the soft sand and searing heat of the Sinai desert the British advance
ffje-'
'%10^^^ 1853
~
On Febniary 15, 1916, General Murray advised General Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General StaflF, that the 'security of Egypt against an attack from the east is not best assured by the construction of a great defensive position in proximity to the Suez Canal.' In his assessment of the situation in the Middle East, he concluded that the best line on which to defend Egypt was that which ran from El Arish to El Kossaima, some 100 miles east of the Canal. Thus it was that by June 4, after an initial reverse at Qatia in April, a strong Allied position was being developed at Romani, its left flank on the sea and its right flank covering the full-gauge railhead, which by this time had been pushed forward from Qantara to Romani itself. pipeline, however, had only reached Pelusium Station, some seven
The water
miles to the west, and this meant that all the troops at Romani had to be supplied with water either by rail or camel-train
from the pipehead— a very
difficult task.
Into this arid area came the 52nd (Lowland) Division commanded by MajorGeneral Lawrence, with the task of establishing the main defensive position from Mahamdiya on the coast to Katib Gannit, a commanding feature just south of Romani. South of Katib Gannit the position was held by the 1st Light Horse Bri-
gade and south again the line from Hod el to Bir en Nuss was dominated by patrols from the New Zealand Mounted
Enna
An anxious time When
all this was reported to GHQ, Murray took immediate steps to reinforce Romani and on July 20 the 158th Infantry Brigade from the 53rd Division came under
Lawrence's
June and most
of July passed comparain Sinai, although the British continued to patrol actively despite the searing heat. In late July, however, the situation changed: enemy air activity
quietly
suddenly increased and Brigadier-General Chaytor, commanding the New Zealanders, discovered while on a personal air reconnaissance an enemy force estimated at 2,500 men in occupation of Bir Bayud,
command
while eleLancashire) Division were moved up to Qantara. By July 22 Lawrence had some 14,000 rifles at his disposal, together with 36 guns; the deployment of larger forces was limited by the inadequate water supply, and in order to increase fire-power at minimum cost in water, Murray moved forward two machine gun companies from 53rd and 54th Divisions. Meanwhile the Turks gradually pushed
ments
Rifle Brigade.
tively
about 18 miles east of Qatia; there seemed also to be a significant build-up of stores and troops at several other points in the area. It was clear that some sort of Turkish action was being prepared.
of
the
42nd
there,
(East
^^::'^Jf »-».'
.m
-y '
1^
Ji
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'4^^-
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towards Romani, their speed limited by their heavy artillery which could only be moved slowly across the soft sand; in some places they were forced to lay plank runways for the gun-carriages to forward
Kress von Kressenstein, the German Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish forces in Egypt
roll over. The Turks were also slowed up by the active patrolling of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division. For the British it was an anxious time, since Murray's plans were based on the expected attack taking place; if the assault did not materialise, Murray was anxious to attack in his ttu'n, before the Turks became too strong. However, the British fears were groundless, for by the morning of August 3 it was obvious that an attack was about to be launched, Turkish forward troops a. having by then reached a line from Lake S Bardawil to east of Qatia. T3 Murray was convinced that the Turks ^ would not assault his main defences north of Romani, but that they would make a feint in that area and put in their main
General Sir Archibald Murray. His initiative helped to overcome the problems of supply
Essential carrier of supplies— the Camel Trans- = port Corps, administered and led by Egyptians ?
1855
The Sinai — and overwhelming problems of water supply
Above: A water cart of the type used by Murray in his march into Palestine; for water his men depended on the worl< of the Egyptian Labour Corps who built and manned pumping stations along the route. Below: The diagram shows how Murray overcame the almost impossible problems of supply for his large force. Bottom: The advance from Romani to Rafah and the battles fought at each end of the journey
Port Said Genera) HospKal
Medilerranean Sea
Mahemdiya Stationary Hospital
lighl railway
"Wire" road (pegged out chicken wire partially installed El
^
Camel iranspotl
^Wam
f I
Cacelots were special
frames 2
accommodate
to
casualties pet camel
two versions
betwei
for sitting
^ Advanced
Dressing
^ Regimental~
Dressing
Aid Posts
Station
Slalion
I
ambulance
I
Field
I
Istalic section)
Field
ambulance
two-wheel sandcarts &
(mobile section)
y
sledges
Qantaraand Romani ,
Forward
^
troops
(horses only)
Supply/
Supply/artimunjtion
Supply/ammunition
depots Railway workshops
sub-depots
forward depots
Bir Salniana (Railhead.
tst line transport
by road
Roadhead) Supply/ammunition
Camel transport corps could move about 15 miles per day (22mph|
by Railway
replenishment points
»
'
for division 1st line
Walerhead 500 000 gallon reservoir Water stand-pipes
Genetal Hospital
for
Casually clearing
loading tank-
Standard gauge
rail
capacity 13 trams per day
transport
Filtration plant
Reinfoicements
but 6 tor rail
Water tanks
camel tram
^^m^m ^^^^^
^^
to all unit
station
}2 2 gallon fenatis on each camel
wagons
maintenance
Casualty evacuation
Supplies/ammunition Water Supply
Khan Y^nis«^
Mediterranean Sea
r
British
Lake baraawil Bardawil
Advance
Ann 1916 -Jan 1912 Bir el
Bir el
El
'Abd
PALESTINE
\
Mazar
Bir Lahfan*'?/'
Qantara
Bir el
Magdhaba*
^^
^trr83
Lake Bardawil
Rafaha lir
Abu Shunner EGYPT
Shellat
PALESTINE
a
10 miles
Wbrwick Yea Gloucester Yei^ El
Arish
ElMagr-unteKT^;^
60 miles
Worcester Yej .>\s^.
.BGubba^
\\«V'
"^m
Ml
NIMRBde SLHBde
SALHReg
Bir
en Nuss
5
^5MBdeJ26Bde {fNZ MBBde
3
^
ADVANCES AUG 4 —»" ATTACK AUG4 «<•>
(r
ALLIES
ROADS
;
RAILWAYS I
MILES
OKMS r 1856
/Hill2L
IrnoJ
^^^
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_____
ANZAC M'OTv ^CameTM)
TURKS BRITISH FRONT LINE AUG
M Bde^
==
JANUARY BRITISH
fr
ALLIES
ROADS
OKMS
KarmlbnMusleh*
HEIGHT IN FEET
TURKS MILES
^ \
9 1917 1
1
t
1
1
1
1
1
2
nvFR
.inn
200-300 100-200
0-ion
UN Bde
A
attack on the apparently lightly held British right, south of Katib Gannit. The defence of this area was carefully concealed in order to encourage just such an attack, the intention being to delay the Turks as long as possible with the 1st and 2nd
Light Horse Brigades under Major-General Chauvel; then, when the Turks were fully committed in the deep sand which lay south of Katib Gannit, their exposed left flank was to be attacked by the 5th Regiment Australian Light Horse and the 5th Mounted Brigade, coming up from Bir ed Dueidar. With the movement of 1st Light Horse Brigade into its position at dusk on August 3, preparations were complete. Additional fire support was available from naval monitors lying off Mahamdiyah, together with limited air support. By this time too, the 42nd Division had been moved to Gilbana Station, and in a siding at
Qantara an armoured train lay ready. Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, commanding the Turkish forces, noting the suspiciously regular Australian patrol activity, sent in a Turkish force to follow up a patrol as it withdrew at nightfall on August 3. However, just after midnight a sentry reported movement in front of him and
Lieutenant-Colonel Meredith, commanding the 1st Light Horse Brigade, immediately brought forward his 3rd Regiment from reserve and halted the Turkish advance. After an hour heavy fire broke out along the whole front and by 0200 hours the Australians and the Turks were engaged in fierce fighting. The main weight of the attack fell on Mount Meredith, a high dune in the centre of the position, and at 0230 hours the Turks launched a determined assault. But the attacking troops were clearly visible against the pale sand and accurate small arms fire drove them back down the slope in confusion. Nothing daunted, the Turks returned to the attack, on the flanks this time, and by 0300 hours the Australians had to abandon the dune. As dawn broke, it became clear that the Turks had followed precisely the plan of attack which Murray had anticipated, but the daylight also revealed just how precarious the situation on the right now was. In order to avoid a general attack by vastly superior forces, the 1st Light Horse Brigade had to withdraw again, this time to Wellington Ridge. The move was accomplished successfully, though it meant that the British right was now outflanked. At 0430 hours Chauvel ordered forward the 2nd Light Horse Brigade in support, but this reinforcement was unable to save Wellington Ridge, which by 0700 hours was in its turn given up. However, artillery fire kept the Turks off the ridge crest, which averted the immediate threat to the 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades, now concentrated near Etmaler Camp. Although checked at Wellington Ridge, the Turkish outflanking movement continued along the slopes of Mount Royston, about two miles west. This was observed by Major Turner, Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, from his reserve position at Pelu-
Turks from breaking into the position. Although the Turks continued to maintain some pressure against the divisional front, it was clear almost from the start that this was merely a holding operation. Meanwhile Lawrence, from his headquarters at Qantara, had reacted to the Turkish left flank attack and had ordered the 5th Mounted Brigade forward to Mount Royston, followed at about 0730 hours by the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade. While these reinforcements were en route, the fighting on 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades' front had died down and the line became more stabilised, with all six regiments of the two brigades strung out facing south from Etmaler Camp to Bir Abu Diyuk; D Squadron, Royal Gloucestershire Hussars, still held their position, so opportunely picked by Major Turner, on the right of 6th Regiment Australian Light Horse. As the Composite Regiment of the 5th Mounted Brigade came into position due west of Mount Royston, they engaged the Turks in enfilade and Chaytor's New Zealanders, seeing the action from Canterbury Hill, immediately moved to attack from the flank. However, they found the going slow in the soft sand and, after struggling forward for two hours under constant fire, the attack was brought almost to a standstill. It was not until 1700 hours that the capture of the southern spur of Mount Royston by a squadron of Gloucestershire Hussars and the Worcester Yeomanry under Lieutenant-Colonel Yorke decided the issue. By 1800 hours the whole feature was in the hands of the New Zealanders and the yeomanry, the only position now held in any strength by the Turks being Wellington Ridge; an attack against the ridge was mounted by the 156th Infantry Brigade at 1845 hours, but darkness was falling and although the 8th Scottish Rifles got to within 100 yards of the crest, they were checked there in the gathering gloom.
A
white flag As dawn broke on August
5 the 8th Scottish Rifles, together with the 5th Regiment
Australian Light Horse and the Wellington Regiment advanced again, supported by the 7th Scottish Rifles who were able to sweep with fire the ridge crest and reverse slopes. This was too much for the Turks, a white flag appeared and arms were raised all along the line; 1,500 Turks surrendered on Wellington Ridge alone. By 0630 hours it was clear that the Turks were in retreat and the battle of Romani was won. Any Turkish threat to the Suez Canal was now effectively removed and from now on it was
sium Station. Acting on his own initiative, he at once led his squadron forward and held a gap in the line for some three hours, effectively halting the Turkish advance. Meanwhile the Turks had been launch-
the British who retained the initiative. A pursuit of the retreating Turks was immediately ordered, under Chauvel's command. However, as many of the mounted troops had been operating in the dismounted role, gathering them together took some time and it was not until 1030 hours that the pursuit started. The infantry advance took even longer to arrange and it was 1200 hours before the 52nd Division was on the move, reaching Abu Hamra by dusk. Despite the late start, the mounted troops had an early success when the 9th Regiment, Australian Light Horse captured a Turkish force of some 425 men
ing frontal attacks on the main position at Romani and to the north, but accurate rifle fire and effective support from the 52nd Division's artillery prevented the
with seven machine guns near Hamisah. Further north, a reconnaissance had suggested that the Turks in Qatia were demoralised and that a quick attack
against the oasis could be decisive; it was decided that the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade with the 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades should mount a frontal attack while the 5th Mounted Brigade attacked the Turks' right. At 1530 hours the Light Horse advanced at the gallop with bayonets fixed, but near the oasis the ground became swampy and the regiments were forced to dismount and continue the action on foot. It was soon apparent that the Turks were not the least demoralised; their infantry and artillery directed a fierce and accurate fire on the advancing British. Ion Idriess, who took part in this action with the 5th Regiment Australian Light Horse, describes how 'We pressed slowly, but surely forward ever nearer the huge Qatia oasis, and the firing flamed to a roar, then to a pointblank crackling that rebounded among the trees. The cover saved us and the simple fact that we were shooting the Turks faster than they shot us.' The Turks held firm, despite all the efforts of the Light Horse, and at dusk Chauvel ordered their retirement to Romani; however, the Turks' forces too had been hard pressed and during the night they pulled back to Oghratina, about eight miles to the east.
Both sides were by now exhausted and August 6 found the 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades with their horses unfit for immediate operations. Nevertheless General Lawrence issued orders for the mounted troops to 'press forward vigorously' and at dawn the New Zealanders advanced against Oghratina, only to find it as well defended as Qatia had been the day before. The infantry had been ordered to move forward in support, with the 42nd Division on the right heading for the line Bir Qatia -Bir el Mamluk and the 52nd Division extending this line to the north. As the sun rose higher the infantry ploughed on through the sand, their numbers decreasing as men fell out through heat-exhaustion. The 42nd Division, new to the desert, was hit particularly hard, one brigade losing 800 men. Idriess again describes the scene: 'we met scattered Tommy infantry stumbling towards El Qatia. Many were already crazed with thirst, some were scratching in the salt pans for water, some were already vomiting through sunstroke.' Although the infantry reached their objectives by evening, it was clear that they could contribute little to the pursuit. The Turks managed to hold off their pursuers on August 7, but on August 8 they abandoned Oghratina and retired to a stronger position at Bir el Abd. Chauvel attacked these new positions on August 9. The attack started at 0500 hours, but met with fierce resistance and the Turks quickly counterattacked; they were held off, but at 0730 hours attacked again and by 1030 hours the British were at a standstill. At 1730 hours, after several more Turkish attacks, Chauvel ordered a general withdrawal back to Oghratina, the men sleeping in their saddles with exhaustion, leaving the 3rd Light Horse Brigade to watch Bir el Abd. Although the Turks had held Bir el Abd, and indeed forced their attackers back, this was only a delaying action and on August 12 they slipped away and withdrew to their original starting point at El Arish, 50 miles to the east. These determined Turkish rearguard actions had
1857
23
the
first
ship
was unloading
stores.
The capture
of El Arish marked the Allied transition from the deserts of Sinai to the cultivated land of Palestine and as the dawn came up after the night march of December 20, the tired troops were greeted by green patches of cultivation and the waving fronds of palm trees.
A
square of redoubts
On December
Turkish cavalry
in retreat^
By the beginning
of
1917 they had been driven out of the Sinai peninsula
enabled them to retire in good order and with their artillery virtually intact. Nevertheless, Turkish losses for the whole operation were substantial — 6,000 casualties and 4,000 prisoners; British casualties, on the other hand, were only 1,130, the brunt of which had been borne by the Australians
and New Zealanders. With the Turkish withdrawal to El Arish, operations on the Sinai front were for some weeks reduced to mounted reconnaissance, while the majority of the troops were rested. Murray, however, had not lost sight of his original aim to advance to El Arish, which had been approved by the War Committee in July, as a requirement for the effective defence of Egypt; he had already set in motion the administrative preparations for a further advance. The two key supply factors in
all
successful operations
were water and the railway; without them, the forward troops could not survive. The railway, which Murray had in Sinai
be full-gauge, was built and run by Royal Engineer railway companies, assisted by the Egyptian Labour Corps, much of the equipment coming from the Egyptian State Railways; railheads advanced 50 miles a month and the line carried 13 trains a day. The water pipeline reached Romani in November 1916 and was backed up by a filtration plant at Qantara, with pumping stations and reservoirs at key points. This too was largely built by the Egyptian Labour Corps and it had a capacity of 600,000 gallons a day. As the army reached out further and further from its Egyptian bases, water and the railway were only part of the enormous logistic effort needed to sustain the advance across the Sinai. Hutted camps sprang up in the rear areas and airfields and signal stations all helped to subdue the unfriendly desert. It was impracticable to build a metalled road right across the Sinai and in fact the metalling stopped at Gilbana Station, but an ingenious use of wire netting, laid out on the sand and pegged down, provided a reasonable surface for marching infantry and for light cars. Off this track the Camel Transport Corps was an invaluable carrier of supplies; about 35,000 camels, organised in companies of 2,000 under Egyptian drivers, were in use by 1917. The contribution made by Egypt towards insisted should
massive administrative effort should be underestimated. Apart from the supply of materials, it is hard to see how the advance across Sinai could have been this
not
1858
achieved without the aid of the Egyptian Labour Corps. By August 1916 this force was 25,000 strong, and worked loyally
under conditions that were often dangerous and unpleasant. During these preparations — described by Wavell as 'a typically British piece of work — slow, very expensive, immensely solid' — Murray moved his headquarters back from Ismailia to Cairo, leaving MajorGeneral Dobell in command in Sinai of what was thenceforward known as 'Eastern Force'. The merits of this change in
command
structure seemed doubtful, since meant that Murray became very remote from his troops in Sinai; on the other hand Sinai was not his only responsibility and he was finding that operations in the Western Desert, the Arab Revolt and even the it
internal affairs of Egypt herself were de•manding a great deal of attention. It was at this time, too, that the War Committee finally approved an Allied advance beyond
El Arish, provided it did not prejudice the defence of Egypt, even though Murray had only four of the five infantry divisions he needed; he did, however, have more mounted troops than he had originally asked for and El Arish and Rafah could thus be secured. But any advance beyond Rafah, Murray believed, would require six infantry divisions. By early December 1916 the British were almost ready. Active patrolling, including a large raid on Bir el Mazar and another on Bir el Maghara, had confirmed British domination of the desert and had established that El Arish held a garrison of about 1,600 Turks. The British advance was to be led by 'The Desert Column', consisting principally of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, the Imperial Camel Brigade and the 42nd and 52nd Divisions, plus supporting troops. The overall commander was LieutenantGeneral Sir Philip Chetwode. The Turkish position was thought to be a strong one which controlled all the water in the area, and consequently a large water reserve had to be collected. But just as the troops were ready to move, air reconnaissance reported that the Turks had evacuated the town, which was then occupied by Chetwode's force on December 21 without a shot being fired after a long night march. Kress had realised that he was too weak to defend the town, exposed as it was to sea assault as well as attack from the land. No time was lost in opening up El Arish, a pier was immediately constructed and on December
22 air reconnaissance reported the Turks to be in strength at Magdhaba, 20 miles south-east up the Wadi el Arish. Chauvel was ordered to move on the village with his mounted division and the Camel Brigade. Engineer reconnaissance had already found the wadi to be dry, so that water for the force had to be carried by camel-train; by the time this was arranged it was midnight on the 22nd. Nevertheless, the mounted troops covered the ground swiftly, coming in sight of the
camp
Turkish
December
23.
fires
at
0350 hours on
Dawn showed
that the posi-
shrouded in smoke from the dying fires, consisted of five redoubts formed in a rough square. The airmen reported that there were no Turkish reinforcements nearer than eight miles away at Ruafa, and few even there. Chauvel determined tion,
to attack at once.
The plan was for the 3rd Light Horse Brigade and the NewZealand Mounted Rifle Brigade, under Chaytor, supported by the Inverness and Somerset Batteries, the Royal Horse Artillery, and the Hong Kong Battery, to attack from the north-east, while the Camel Brigade delivered a frontal attack north of the El Arish track; the 1st Light Horse Brigade was to remain in reserve. By 0925 hours, Chaytor was in position north of Magdhaba and the 10th Regiment Australian Light Horse, who had been sent round to the south to cut off the enemy's retreat, arrived in time to capture some Turks in the wadi, apparently retiring prematurely. This incident, coupled with information from the aircraft that the Turks were withdrawing, led Chauvel to commit his reserve at about 1000 hours. The Canterbury and Wellington Regiments had also been committed from the north and the Camel Brigade, dismounted, was advancing slowly. The 1st Light Horse Brigade, advancing on Magdhaba at the gallop, came under shrapnel fire from a Turkish mountain battery and was then met with a storm of small arms fire. It was now evident that the Turks were not withdrawing and seemed determined to offer a stout resistance. The 1st Light Horse Brigade was now forced into a dismounted attack, and by 1150 hours was working up the wadi bed towards the village, with the New Zealanders deeply involved in the north, and the Camel Brigade still advancing directly on the village. Shortly after this, Chaytor ordered the 3rd Light Horse Brigade forward and, advancing at a gallop, they dismounted under fire and continued on foot. The Turkish fire was now very heavy and the camel troops were checked in open ground. At 1305 hours it was reported that the sappers, who were digging for water 14 miles up the El Arish track, at Bir Lahfan, had found none; Chauvel, remembering that his nearest water replenishment, apart from the supplies carried with the force, was at El Arish, reluctantly decided to break off the action and, at 1350 hours signalled Chetwode to
effect. Meanwhile the 3rd Regiment Austrahan Light Horse, working up the wadi, had made contact with the Camel Brigade and with tremendous dash two companies of the latter and the Light Horse successfully charged the Turkish trenches across a stretch of open ground. This was the turning point of the action, and when Chauvel heard of it he gave up his with-
that
drawal plan. Success followed swiftly when, at 1400 hours, the Turks began to abandon the village. By 1630 hours all resistance was ended and what remained
commander, Khadir Bey, surrendered. Leaving the Auckland Regiment to clear the battlefield, Chauvel withdrew the remainder of his exhausted troops, many of whom had been nearly 30 hours in the saddle without rest, the column being replenished with water from a convoy sent out from El Arish to meet them. As a result of the garrison, including its
Turks, wearing
of this defeat, together with the loss of
positions;
Arish, the Turks withdrew the remainder of their troops into Palestine and by January 1, 1917, Sinai was virtually free of them. But it proved impossible to exploit immediately the success gained at Magdhaba, since the railway and pipeline still lagged too far behind the forward troops. However, when air reconnaissance reported the
were
El
preparing the Rafah area for defence, Chetwode recommended a raid against them, to which the Commander-inChief agreed. On December 30, the 1st Light Horse Brigade had reconnoitred to Sheikh Zowaiid, only ten miles from Rafah, finding plentiful water and friendly inhabitants. The place was thus selected for the concentration of the raiding force,
Turks
to be
which was to consist of the mounted troops from the Desert Column, plus the 7th Light Car Patrol. The concentration was not completed till 2200 hours on January 8, 1917, but once arrived at Sheikh Zowaiid, no time was wasted and at 0100 hours January 9 the advance continued, leaving almost
all
the vehicles except the artillery
and light cars in the concentration area. The main defences covering Rafah were in fact about two miles to the southwest at El Magruntein, where the Turks had prepared very strong positions, covering all the approaches from south and west. The central feature, known as 'The Reduit', was about 200 feet higher than the surrounding country, with excellent fields of fire up to 2,000 yards in almost every direction. There was virtually no cover on any of the approaches and the position's only weakness lay in the lack of barbed wire, which the Turks had not had time to erect.
Almost surrounded The British advance from Sheikh Zowaiid swung south of El Magruntein towards Karm Ibn Musleh, which was reached at 0615 hours, when the Auckland Regiment crossed the frontier between Egypt and Palestine. Chetwode established his headquarters at Point 210, about four miles west of Karm Ibn Musleh, where he retained the 5th Mounted Brigade as a reserve. While the rest of the force assembled at Karm Ibn Musleh, Chauvel reconnoitred the Turkish defences and issued his orders. The artillery were ordered to open fire at 0930 hours and to continue for 30 minutes, after which the New Zealanders and the 1st Light Horse Brigade were to attack the eastern group of Turkish
Red Cross pyjamas, behind the barbed wire
the 3rd Light Horse Brigade remain as divisional reserve. The attack started as planned and by 0945 hours the assaulting troops, still mounted, were within 2,000 yards of their objective. At this point a camel-train was observed leaving Rafah, heading for Khan Yunis to the east. The Canterbury Regiment immediately headed for Rafah and captured to
the village with little difficulty, taking prisoner a motley collection of Turks, Germans and Bedouin. This regiment, supported by the Auckland and Wellington
Regiments, then dismounted and advanced due south towards Point 265, the eastern end of 'The Reduit'. Meanwhile the 1st Light Horse Brigade, advancing from the south-east, was held up by heavy shrapnel and machine gun fire. To the south, the Camel Brigade launched an attack against the Turks facing them, while at 1030 hours Chetwode ordered the 5th Mounted Brigade
make
a diversionary attack against the positions facing west; the Warwickshire Yeomanry and the Gloucestershire Hussars of this brigade dismounted 2,000 yards from the Turkish positions and immediately came under fire. In support of the 5th Mounted Brigade were the cars of the 7th Light Car Patrol and they were able to dash past the Turkish defences on the Rafah road and open fire with their machine guns from the flank at a range of 1,600 yards. The Turks were now almost surrounded. Nevertheless, there seemed to be no cover from the storm of bullets which swept every approach; the Allied advance became slower and slower, faltered, and by 1530 hours was at a standstill. Additional artillery support was demanded by the forward troops and the mistake of leaving the wheeled transport at Sheikh Zowaiid now became painfully apparent. Meanwhile, prisoners had revealed that the Turkish 160th Regiment was advancing from Shellal, ten miles to the east, to relieve Rafah. At 1615 hours, while the battle for 'The Reduit' was still raging, advanced elements of this unit were seen approaching, together with another 500 men from the direction of Khan Yunis. Hearing this disquieting news, Chetwode saw little prospect of capturing the position that day and at 1630 hours decided to withdraw. However, as at Magdhaba, the situation was saved at the very last minute: while Chetwode and Chauvel were actually discussing the withdrawal on the telephone, the New Zealanders mounted a final to
of a
makeshift prison
camp
assault on 'The Reduit', swept up the slope with bayonets fixed and, after a sharp hand-to-hand fight, secured the central position. The 1st Light Horse Brigade, who had had to give up some ground, advanced again on the New Zealanders' left and the attack was pressed home all along the line; by 1700 hours white flags were appearing everywhere. Although a few Turks escaped to the north-east, this action resulted in the capture of 35 Turkish officers (including the commander) and 1,600 other ranks, plus a number of guns.
British losses were 487. The battle over, a swift withdrawal was essential, detachments of the Wellington Regiment being already in action against the Turkish reinforcements. Arrangements were made to bring in the wounded and the bulk of the force withdrew to Sheikh Zowaiid that night. In fact, the Turks were
unable to reoccupy Rafah immediately and on January 10 the 3rd Light Horse Brigade and the 7th Light Car Patrol returned to the battlefield, where they discovered some Bedouin looting all the Turkish equipment they could find. The actions at Magdhaba and Rafah demonstrated the folly of leaving immobile detachments exposed to attack from an possessing well-trained mounted actions also showed the limitations of those same mounted troops — in both battles the dividing line between success and failure was narrow indeed, largely due to the difficulties of water supply. In addition, there was a lack of sufficient artillery to compensate for the limited rifle power of the mounted troops when fighting in the dismounted role, a high proportion of each regiment being left out of battle as horse holders. However, the engagement at Rafah had finally cleared the Turks from Egypt, the defence of which was now secure; future operations would be motivated by other considerations.
enemy
troops.
The
Further Reading Barker, Barrett and Gullett (Ed.), Australia in Palestine (Angus and Robertson) Fox, Frank, The Royal Gloucestershire Hussars Yeomanry (Philip Allen & Co.) Idriess, Ion
(Pacific
L.,
The Desert Column
Books 1965)
Robertson, John, With the Camellers
in
Palestine (A. H. and A. W. Reed 1938) Wavell, Colonel A. P., The Palestine Campaigns (Constable 1928)
[For
W.
page
783.]
F.
Woodhouse's biography, see
1859
The second half of 1916 witnessed an enormous stride in the development of aircraft. Designers and theoreticians had, of course, been working to their full capacity since the beginning of the war, and now their efforts were beginning to bear fruit. Though much still remained to be learned, the days of haphazard design and flimsy structures had gone. This advance took practical form in a dramatic increase in speeds and climb rates for jRghters, and sheer size for bombers. D. B. Tubbs. Below: An Albatros C X
,««*
V*
AIRCRAFT HIGHER FASTER
4*
W^^
I ii^
.-->»„«».^&>^
months between the opening of Somme and New Year's
The
six
the
Battle of the
Day 1917 can be viewed
as a kind of watershed in the history of aeroplane design, for while such archaisms as the Vickers
FB
5
Gun Bus were
still
operational,
many
of the war's most famous and advanced aircraft were also being flown, if only in prototype form. These included the Sopwith Triplane, the Sopwith Camel and the SE 5 single-seater fighters, advanced twoseat fighter/day-bombers such as the 4 and Bristol Fighter, heavy bombers from
DH
Handley Page, Gotha and Zeppelin Staaken and a variety of seaplanes and flying-boats. Equally striking was the range of engines. Simple rotaries still formed the basic motive power of most British fighters, while in
Germany an
intriguing 'bi-rotary'
was being tried by Siemens Halske, although cooling problems had largely killed the two-row engines developed by Gnome and Oberursel. Watercontra-rotating design
cooled engines also made great advances during the period. Little more had been heard of the Salmson/Canton-Unne watercooled radial developed by the French in the early days, but almost every other configuration was to be seen: straight six, eight-cylinder Vee, 12-cylinder Vee and even straight eights were tried, some with water cooling, others with air cooling, the more sophisticated having overhead camshafts to operate the valves, instead of the
more ponderous pushrod-and-rocker system. Rotational speeds were already high enough to require reduction-gearing between crankshaft and propeller, and one
constructor at least had taken advantage of the offset propeller thus provided to experiment with a cannon in the Vee between the cylinder-blocks, firing through the propeller hub. Growing use was being made of light alloys and two constructors (Hispano-Suiza and BHP) had gone over to 'wet liners' — steel sleeves screwed into an aluminium cylinder block, used in conjunction with light-alloy pistons. Cast-iron for pistons was still the rule, but steel was also being used for strength and lightness. As regards airframes, almost every
arrangement of single- and twin-engined machine was being tried, from monoplane to quadruplane, while the pusher layout (rendered necessary on the Allied side by the lack of gun-synchronising gears) was obsolescent but not quite dead. Structural methods and materials ranged from the conventional wire-braced wooden boxgirder covered with fabric, to Fokker's welded steel tubing and a couple of most interesting experimental all-metal designs, on the Allied side the Bristol 1, a sort Bristol aluminium-clad steel-tube of Fighter, and in Germany the Junkers 'Tin Donkey' types J 1 and J 2. A more promising material in the 1916 context was plywood, used either for reinforcement as in Britain and France, or as a means of fabricating a 'semi-monocoque' fuselage as used by Albatros and LFG Roland.
MR
The temporary supremacy earned for the Fokker monoplane was at an end. 'July and August 1916 were the
Germany by
blackest days in the history of German military aviation,' wrote Oswald Boelcke's biographer. 'Large formations of enemy aircraft disported themselves unhindered ,
A crashed 1862
Austrian-built Albatros
D
III.
Note the plywood fuselage ana sesquipiane wings
behind our
lines.
The enemy had gained
kr
^^r V3,
With the increase quantity:
above
is
in
quality
went increase
an RE 8 production
Ti
in
line
complete command of the air.' The Fokkers had been defeated by their own obsolescence. Even when armed with three machine guns (as on Max Immelmann's mount) and powered by a 160 hp Oberursel two-row rotary, the Fokker E IV was seen for what it was: a metal-built copy of a prewar Morane. A new generation of fighters was now taking the air and, what is more important, the Allied supply position had improved. On the British sector pusher aircraft still held sway, led by the Royal Aircraft Factory's FE 2b (six-cylinder Beardmore, 120 or 160 hp) and FE 2d (225 hp Vee-12 RollsRoyce Eagle) two-seaters and the Airco DH2 single-seater scout (80 hp Le Rhone). All these were formidable because of the unencumbered forward view from the bootlike nacelle and the quick rate of fire from their unsynchronised guns. Heavy escorts of these machines kept the Fokkers at bay while reconnaissance and artillery machines went about their work; a further pusher scout, the FE 8 (80 hp Le Rhone), an already obsolete Royal Aircraft Factory design, joined the RFC during the Somme. More formidable, because they were faster, were the French Nieuport and Spad tractor
In unconscious tribute to the old FB 5 Bus, the German air force referred to all British pushers as 'Vickers'. Thus:
Gun
Vickers single-seater biplane [DH 2J: Very manoeuvrable, ^lightly slower than the Albatros [D I and D II Loses height during combat, especially at high altitudes. Usual armament one machine gun movable in the vertical plane — can shoot obliquely upwards. Sometimes two parallel guns. Unprotected from rear, and pilot's view restricted. Best attacked from behind, preferably in a zoom from below. Vickers twoseater biplane [FE 2b and 2d]: Not so handy and fast. Two movable machine guns, one on a high telescopic mounting. Good field of fire forwards, sideways and upwards, blanketed only by the pusher propeller. Attack from behind on same level or slightly |.
below Both Vickers can take a lot of punishment because the crew are shielded by the engine. Nieuport Scout: Very man.
.
oeuvrable
power as
.
and fast. Armament and fireGerman single-seaters. Tends
in
height in combat, especially up high. preferably at short range. The main peculiarity of the new Nieuport 16 and 17 (110 hp Le Rhone), a peculiarity which they shared with the 13 square metre Bebe (Nieuf)ort 11), the French aces' mount at Verdun, was the sesquiplan (sesquiplane) layout. To improve the pilot's view the lower wing was reduced both in chord and span, to become little more than a fairing round the single wood box spar which formed the anchorage for a pair of Vee struts. The top wing had no dihedral and, as in the Moranes and the Fokker to lose
Get on
its tail,
single seaters.
'Bloody April' Before describing these and examining the new German scouts which brought about the rapid reversal of Allied fortunes which culminated in 'Bloody April' 1917, it is interesting to see what Captain Boelcke's Staffel had to say about the opposition in autumn 1916, shortly after the death, in a collision with one of his own men, of Oswald Boelcke himself.
A captured French Spad
VII.
The type's main
virtues
were
its
speec
extreme strength
1863
monoplanes, a balanced rudder was provided, but no fin. The Nieuport had no need of interrupter gear because a single Lewis gun was mounted above the upper plane, controlled by Bowden cable like the throttle and clutch of a motor cycle. A quadrant mounting devised by Sergeant Foster and Captain H. A. Cooper of 11 Squadron RFC allowed the gun to be pulled down for loading, and also for shooting almost vertically upwards, a method of attack used very successfully by Albert Ball against LFG Roland two-seaters. An optional extra on the Nieuport were electrically-fired Le Prieur rockets launched from the interplane struts. The rockets were intended for use against balloons. So successful was this scout that copies of the Nieuports were ordered from the
German
aircraft industry, resulting finally
famous 'Vee-strutter' Albatros, first the D III, then later the V and Va. The first generation of German biplane in the
scouts, produced in response to a recom-
mendation
from Boelcke, proved disappointing. Fokker tried two series, using modified Eindecker fuselages and warping two-bay wings, but neither with 100 or 160 hp Oberursel rotaries nor with 120 or 160 hp Mercedes stationary six-cylinders, was performance good enough; rather better were the Halberstadt Dll and Dili (120 hp Mercedes or Argus) two-bay scouts which impressed Allied pilots by their ability to dive steeply away from combat. More modern were the Albatros D 1 and very similar D 11 that had greeted Boelcke and his new Jasta 2 on his return to operations in September after the long leave and eastern tour upon which he had been sent following Immelmann's death in June. The Albatros, although not a pretty aeroplane, had a shark-like grace, thanks to the smoothly rounded semi-monocoque fusethe basis of which was f-inch ply formers with six spruce longerons, to which was pinned and screwed a plywood skin. With a span of just under 28 feet and singlebay wings this was a reasonably compact aeroplane, and powerful enough with its 150 hp Benz or 160 hp Mercedes engine to carry twin Spandau machine guns in the D II version, a formidable advance. The D III model followed quickly, using a highcompression Mercedes up-rated to 170 hp, and the sesquiplane wing arrangement of the Nieuport. lage,
These Albatros scouts make an interesting comparison with a trio of Sopwith scouts all of which saw the light, either operationally or experimentally, before Christmas 1916. The first was the Pup biplane, always described as one of the most delightful aeroplanes ever made. It certainly looked right. The span was a mere 26 feet 6 inches and although the engine
chord and stagger from a previous singleseater, the Tabloid. No sooner had the Pup begun scoring for the RNAS than a new Sopwith scout left the drawing-board, and this used the same datum lines again; but to improve the climb and give the pilot more visibility, triplane wings were adopted, with the same span as the Pup's, and with the same overall stagger — although naturally a narrower chord. A Clerget 130
hp rotary was
fitted, inherited from the successful two-seater Sopwith l^-Strutter fighter/bomber, slightly senior to the Pup, which gave the 'Tripehound', as it was
nicknamed, ample power. A third Sopwith, perhaps the most famous fighter of the war, the two-gun Sopwith Camel, designed by R. J. Ashfield, took the air just after Christmas. It would accept any of the more powerful rotaries — Le Rhone, Monosoupape, 130 hp Clerget and eventually the 150 hp BR 1 designed by W. O. Bentley of the navy. Oddly enough a machine which might have been the most successful scout of the period, and was certainly the fastest, never went into squadron service on the Western Front. This was Frank Barnwell's Bristol Monoplane 1, which was started in July and was flying by September 1916. The unexcelled pilot's view in all directions, a top speed of 128 mph at 5,400 feet and a climb to almost 10,000 feet in 10 minutes, would have put it far in front of all opposition. Such performance on a mere 110 hp Clerget was a tribute to clean design. Handling,
M
was delightful. The Allies, although
too,
largely committed
to rotary engines for their fighting scouts,
possessed one stationary water-cooled engine that was to have a great effect on war in the air. This was the Hispano-Suiza Vee-8 already mentioned as being made largely of aluminium, with wet liners and overhead camshafts. The result of this layout, as might be expected, was an excellent power to weight ratio. Figures published for the high-compression 200 hp Hispano, dimensionally the same as the early 140 hp, give the weight as 442 pounds. Contemporary straight sixes like the 160 hp Beardmore and 160 hp Mercedes weighed 600 pounds or more. The exotic name, already famous in motoring, meant 'Spanish-Swiss'; the company, now largely French, was based on Barcelona and its chief engineer, Birkigt, was Swiss. The first machine using Marc Birkigt's masterpiece was the Spad S VII designed by Bechereau for Louis Bleriot's Societe Pour I'Aviation et ses Derives (SPAD),
successors
weighed as much as a Pup fully laden. When it came to manoeuvring, wrote
Deperdussin. This biplane had first appeared late in 1915. On the Somme, the S VII, now fully developed, became the mount for Guynemer and Fonck, whose personal scores were advancing rapidly. The Spad looked as pugnacious as it was, having a hunched, muscular stance even on the ground, brought about by the design of the wings, which had little gap, no dihedral and no stagger — a French fashion evident also in the Morane biplanes, some of which were still in use by No 3 Squadron RFC. The wings were of one-bay construction with a light supplementary strut at the cable intersections, and the machine was famous
McCudden, the Pup
for its strength.
was no more than an 80 hp Le Rhone, which gave the Pup a military load of 80 pounds (one machine gun, ammunition and some Verey cartridges), its light wingloading made the Pup an excellent gun platform at high altitudes. It could also climb from ground level to 4,500 feet in the same time an Albatros D II took to reach 3,280 — but then the Albatros, empty,
'could turn twice to an Albatros' once'. Design methods in the days of wooden aircraft were often empirical. The Sopwith
Pup ,o4
inherited the fuselage profile, wing
to
One day Guynemer was 75-mm shell which
brought down by a
damaged
his radiator and stripped the from the port upper main plane. Hitting the ground at 100 mph, the Spad fabric
shed various bits, slewed through 45 degrees and finally planted itself in the ground like a post. Guynemer was unhurt, except for concussion, some delayed shock and a gash on the knee from the magneto. Every cockpit in those days was filled with such protuberances. Fireproof bulkheads,
had yet to be invented. Negotiations for purchase and licence to manufacture the Hispano in England started in 1915, but Anglo-Franco-Spanish
too,
talks
moved
slowly.
However, many aero-
planes were designed round the engine, in particular the SE 5 (Scouting Experimental 5) at Farnborough, prototypes of which were flying by the end of 1916 with 150 hp ungeared and 200 hp geared Hispanos. The world of two-seaters also saw many changes and much progress during these six months. The British at last acquired some tractor two-seaters designed, like the German C-Class, with the pilot in front
and the observer-gunner behind, although two RFC squadrons already enjoyed this advantage in their somewhat antiquated Moranes. In the li-Strutter (named from the appearance of its interplane struts) the Sopwith company had a winner, for it was defended behind by a Lewis and by a synchronised Vickers in front using either Sopwith-Kauper or ScarfF-Dibovsky interrupter gear. Production was hampered strikes, but eventually Ij-Strutters were built in huge quantities and made over to the French and other Allies for reconnaissance, fighting and day-bombing. They were delightful aeroplanes to fly and beautiful to look at, says Captain Norman Macmillan who flew them with 45 Squadron, but the 110 hp Clerget was overtaxed, and their maximum speed with full war load at 10,000-12,000 feet was a mere 80 mph. The family likeness between 14-Strut-
by
Top: A crashed Sopwith 1i-Strutter. The Sopwith was the mainstay of the British aerial forces of the time Above: A Sopwith Triplane. The arrangement of the wings gave good visibility, great climb rate and manoeuvrability and considerable strength. The idea was widely copied
ter
and Pup was unmistakable.
1865
Right:
Higher and faster, but there were still
many defects in the designs of some of the aircraft The Gnome Monosoupape
rotary, 80 hp model Advantages: Good power-to-weight and size-to power ratios and relative mechanical simplicity. Disadvantages: Fine tolerances required in maintenance, tendency to shed cylinders and no proper throttle (the only way of controlling the engine was by cutting the ignition to a
number of cylinders). Unlike more conventional engines, the rotary had a stationary crankshaft, around which rotated the cylinders and cranKcase, with the propeller bolted to their front. The crankshaft itself (1) is bolted to the aeroplane's structure. Into the crankshaft are led three inlets (only two are visible) (2) for air, fuel
and lubricant
(castor oil, which does not mix with petrol). three are taken to the crankcase(3), where the fuel and air are mixed and vaporised. The mixture is admitted to the cylinder through apertures in the sides of the piston and the base of the cylinder (4 and 5), which can only happen when the piston (6) is at the very bottom of its stroke. The mixture is compressed as the piston rises again and is detonated by the spark plug, which is fired by the magneto (7) when the cylinder is in the right place. This forces the engine round, and as it does, the chamber is cleared through the outlet valve (8) opened by a pushrod (9) operated from a cam (10) on the longitudinal axis of the engine All
IfaGb
The French Spad
VII fighter,
which
entered service in September 1916, was one of the war's most outstanding aircraft. It was flown by the air forces of nearly every Allied power. Advantages: Excellent speed, extreme strength and the adaptability to accept more powerful engines. Disadvantages: One machine only, reduced agility and a radiator the upper wing centre section (its water might scald the pilot if it were punctured). Eng/ne.Hispano-Suiza8 A, 180 hp. Armament: one .303-inch Vickers gun. lVe/g/7fempfy//oacyed.- 1,100/1,550 pounds. Span: 25 feet 8 inches. Length: 20 feet 3i inches. Height: 7 feet
gun in
Below: The British RE 8 artillet7 spotter and reconnaissance machine. The type was introduced late in 1916 and remained in service in large
numbers
until
the armistice despite
its
many shortcomings. Advantages: None. Disadvantages: The type was too stable, had weak upper wing extensions, was prone to spinning, and sometimes developed a dangerous
Above: The German LFG Roland C
'air
when landing. The engine was also when first introduced. Engine: 150 hp. Speed: 103 mph at 5,000 feet.
cushion'
unreliable
RAF 4a,
Armament: one .303-inch Vickers and one .303-inch Lewis gun plus up to 224 pounds bombs. Celling: 13,500 feet. Endurance: 41 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 1,803/2,869 Span; 42 ft 7 in. Length: 27 n lOiin.
of
lbs.
II
escort and reconnaissance machine. The type was marked by the very great care taken to ensure aerodynamic cleanliness. This care was reflected in the machine's good turn of speed. Advantages: A strong and capacious fuselage and an excellent view, particularly upwards as there was no wing above the crew to obstruct their view as in most biplanes. The view downward was also good as a result of the careful arrangement of the wing root cut-outs and the wings' stagger. Disadvantages: The wings were too thin and tended to distort in service, with the result that climb and ceiling were affected adversely. Engine: Mercedes D ill, 160 hp. Armament: one 7.92-mm Spandau for the pilot and one 7.92-mm Parabellum for the observer. Speed: 103
im
mph
at sea level. Climb: 12 minutes to 6,560 feet. Ce/V/ng; 13,100 feet. Endurance: 4 to 5 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 1,681/2,825 pounds. Span; 33 feet 9i inches. Length:25 feet 3z inches. Right: The development of
reconnaissance aircraft from 1914 to 1916 (BE 2a to Albatros C VII) and comparative fighter performance at the end of 1916. Note that although every other aspect of performance has improved, climb rate has stayed at the 1914 level. In the fighter performance part of the chart, note that very little divides the types in speed and ceiling, but that the difference in climb rate is marked.
1867
Far less graceful was the Royal Aircraft Factory's RE 8, in which, at last, the observer sat behind the pilot. Initially, many crashes were caused by inadequacies in the design of the tail, and the drag was such that observers were advised not to stand up while landing as the extra wind resistance of their bodies might cause a stall. The engine was the Factory's 150 hp
inTm
.^
'-•rr-j;;-.
Sfi!fr
.
'
>•'.,-
~""'^
*'•*•«
ibu^^^""^^'^^^^-fWI
i>»jfc.«.,
..^^
J
,,'
,
/;:
was to suffer heavy losses in 1917. Another Farnborough effort, the BE 12, a fixed-gun
-^i.-.
,,^
f
RAF 4a Vee-12 of Renault inspiration, an engine whose, air cooling in the RE 8 was assisted by an aerodynamically disastrous metal scoop. The RE 8, like the BE 2c before it, was put into mass production and
wings and
III
^
1
all,
chard,
commanding the RFC
write:
'I
realise
I
shall lose
in France, to
two squadrons
stop using the BE 12 but I cannot do anything else but to recommend that no more be sent to this country.' The BE 12, like the Martinsyde GlOO and G102 Elephant, another oversize single-seater, was quickly diverted from fighting to other duties. The most effective British twoseaters were still pushers — the FE 2d, especially when fitted with the watercooled Vee-12 Rolls-Royce of 225 hp, whose overhead-camshaft drive and welded steel water-jackets were inspired by prewar Mercedes automobile practice. This Eagle series was later developed to produce 360 hp, and a smaller Vee-12 the 190-250 hp Falcon proved the Hispano's most serious rival, being used in the Bristol F2B Fighter, flown experimentally during 1916. This was a biplane whose mid-gap location of the fuselage gave both pilot and gunner an excellent view, and which could be fought and stunted like a single-seater. if I
Top; The Zeppelin-Staaken R VI, the most famous type of German Giant' aircraft. The Germans devoted much effort to the development of 'Giant' types. Above: A Short Bomber, used mostly by No. 3 Wing, RNAS. Below: Albatros D Ills, Germany's fighter mainstay in 1917 and 1918
BE 2c, two-bay provoked General Tren-
single-seater based on the
||jf*\r<*
ftK"'
.
.
.
The Bristol two-seater fighter was matched in excellence by the de Havilland DH 4 day-bomber, a two-bay biplane which out-performed many contemporary singleseaters. The prototype was flying at Hendon in August 1916, powered by the new BHP (Beardmore-Halford-Pullinger) 220 hp engine that had its origins in the 160 hp Beardmore but differed from it in having a larger cylinder bore (145-mm instead of 143-mm), an aluminium block and wet Uners inspired by Hispano-Suiza, an overhead camshaft instead of pushrods and a piston stroke of 190-mm, this last factor
making the engine very
tall. This did not 4s, which were early production given the Rolls-Royce Eagle. Supplies reached the RFC early in 1917, and the Rolls-DH 4 was voted the finest machine of its kind on either side. Its qualities as a fighting machine were marred, however, by the long distance separating pilot and which made communication observer, virtually impossible. aflFect
DH
Better firepjower Various twin-engined and pusher aeroplanes contemplated in mid-1916 were shelved as synchronising gears had be-
come
available, and the tractor layout offered better performance, and the twinengined layout was too cumbersome. German reconnaissance machines, in marked contrast to the Factory's twoseaters, presented a clean and often fishlike appearance, spoilt only by clumsy exhaust manifolds and radiators in several instances. The majority employed one or other of the 150-160 hp vertical sixcylinder engines which the industry produced in such profusion, or, in later cases, the 200 hp Benz BzIV or the interesting
The pattern is set: Allied numbers and enterprise against German quality
but underdeveloped Mercedes
D IV
220 hp most advanced aeroplane on the Somme front was the LFG Roland C II, whose semi-monocoque fuselage earned it the nickname of straight-eight. Aesthetically the
Walfisch (Whale). Constructionally too it \vas interesting. Around the shape dictated by plywood formers and longerons a skin of thin plywood was wrapped in spiral strips pinned and glued in place, the whole structure then being covered with fabric and doped. The Roland's fuselage filled the entire gap between the sharply staggered upper and lower planes, which were joined by a single wide I-section strut on each side, faired to streamline form with two layers of plywood and connected to each wing by a ball-and-socket joint. The crew position was no less unorthodox than the rest. The pilot sat well forward, his eyes level with the top plane; his observer was immediately behind, with a commanding view all round. Downward vision was helped by cut-outs at the wing roots and by transparent panels in the sides of the fuselage. The observer was armed with a Parabellum machine gun on ring mounting, and later machines also carried a fixed gun firing through the propeller. Its thin wings tended to distort, however, and this aff"ected climb adversely. Rolands were met in large formations, photographic machines being escorted by others; Albert Ball's approach was to close on the Roland from below, unseen, and fire almost vertically at shortest range possible with his Foster-mounted Lewis. Perhaps because they proved easy, Ball described the Rolands as the best aeroplane the Germans had. Top speed, thanks to the clean shape,
was 103 mph. Larger, later and more orthodox
was the
Deutsche Flugzeug Werke
DFW
CV
(200
hp Benz Bz IV) introduced towards the end of 1916, a slab-sided but graceful two-bay biplane that was still fighting well a year later. In common with many German aeroplanes it had a wooden, plywood covered fuselage which could absorb a good deal of punishment. Albatros, after early disappointments with their C V/16 two-seater, developed it during the year into a comfortable, formidable aeroplane
with good
fly-
ing characteristics let down by the unreliability of the straight-eight Mercedes' crankshaft. It was then redesigned using the proven 200 Benz BzIV engine and embodying characteristics of both C V series. This model, designated C VII, proved very popular in 1916/17. Simultaneously a larger machine, the C X, with 47 feet li inches span (7 feet more than the C VII and with loaded weight increased from 3,410 pounds to 3,669 pounds) was being developed to accept a six-cylinder Mercedes replacement, the D IVa of 260 hp, the German equivalent of the Rolls-Royce Falcon as used in the Bristol Fighter. The role of heavy bomber is so familiar today that it is surprising to remember how little it was regarded during the first two years of the war. However, the Admiralty and RNAS with typical enterprise did during 1916 develop a Short Bomber based on the well-known Short 184 seaplane. Production Bombers resembled the seaplane in having three-bay wings with long overhang to the upper planes, braced from kingposts, and an extremely long fin. The undercarriage comprised an upward tilted four-wheeled chassis, and the engine could be either a 225 hp Sunbeam as fitted to 184 Seaplanes, or the 250 hp Rolls-Royce later known as the Eagle.
^ ';
I
of 85 feet this very large single-engined aeroplane had an all-up weight of 6,800 pounds and a maximum speed of 77 mph. The bomb load could be four 230-pound bombs or eight 112pounders, carried on racks under the wings. Four Short Bombers of No 7 Squadron RNAS, Coudekerque, took part in a raid on Ostend on the night of November 15, each dropping four 65-pound bombs.
With a wing span
and from 1916 onwards in the Zeppelin Sta£iken, at Staaken near Berlin. There can be no denying that these huge aircraft were prettier and more modern in appearance than the Handley Page, because the upper main planes had no overhang and their cabin and nacelles were neater. Development followed a logical pattern as more powerful engines became available. The original prototype, Ost,
Werke
known First British giant
tal)
the person of Commodore Murray F. Sueter, was also responsible for Britain's big twin-engined bomber. He told Frederick Handley Page to build a 'bloody paralyser'. The Handley Page 0/100 took shape during the course of
Admiralty
influence,
in
1916 after official trials at Eastchurch beginning in January, and deliveries to the RNAS began in September. The 0/100 was by far the largest aeroplane to go into action on the British side, having a wing span of 100 feet on the overhanging upper planes, braced, as in the Short, from kingposts. There were two sets of interplane struts outboard of the engines, which were mounted tractor-wise in nacelles supported on structures of steel tube. The streamlined nacelles also housed the main fuel tanks, but experiments with armour plating were discontinued. In planning the big bomber Handley Page and his assistant George Volkert put their faith in a so-far undeveloped engine; but a big (4-5" x 6-5" bore and stroke, 20j litre, 900 pound) Rolls-Royce Vee-12 had shown 300 hp on test at 2,000 rpm and derated to 250 hp and 1,600 rpm it gave promise of reliability — which was amply fulfilled. Two of these Rolls-Royce Eagle Mk II engines were installed, driving left- and right-handed airscrews. Built-up hollow wooden spars were used wherever possible to save weight, and for easier handling the fuselage was constructed in four sections and the wings were made to fold. A biplane tml was chosen for reduced span and to give the gunners a clearer field of fire. There were three machine gun positions: in the extreme nose and behind the wings, both above and below the fuselage. The aeroplane was supported on the ground by a massive but fairly orthodox twowheeled undercarriage below each engine nacelle, with a shock-absorber for each wheel. The work required of the four tyres was considerable. The 0/100 prototype weighed 8,480 pounds empty and 14,022 fully loaded: 2,830 pounds for fuel and oil, 760 pounds for crew, and almost 2,000 pounds for military load. Up to 16 112pound bombs could be carried. The first two 0/1 00s arrived safely at Dunkirk before Christmas, 1916. Twin-engined Gotha and Friedrichshafen day bombers appeared in autumn 1916, just in time to replace the vulnerable Zeppelin airships. Although differing in construction, both machines were biplanes of about 77 feet span, powered by a pair of pusher engines (Mercedes D IVa) giving 260 hp each, and able to operate at 15,000 feet — a ceiling which placed them beyond the range of any contemporary fighter sent specially to intercept. The normal bomb load for raids on England was six 50-kg (112-pound) bombs, but up to 1,120 pounds could be taken on shorter raids. Basic design for the giant multi-engined aeroplanes had been going on since 1915, first in the Grothaer Waggonfabrik, Gotha-
up
1870
as
VGO I
Gotha Ost)
(for
Versuchs (Experimen-
set the pattern, being of wood and fabric braced
orthodox box-girder construction. Three Maybach 240 hp Mb IV engines were used. One in the nose drove a tractor airscrew and there was a pusher engine in the rear half of each nacelle, the front of which housed a machine gunner. Then two more Maybachs were installed in each 'power egg', coupled in tandem to a pusher screw, fairly
making
five in all.
The gun emplacements
remained. Empty weight was now 16,390 pounds. Power was still lacking, as it took an hour to reach 10,000 feet; so next a machine was built with six 160 hp Mercedes D Ills, two in the nose and a pair in each nacelle: the weight empty of this VGO III was 18,920 pounds. The model known as R IV retained the two nose Mercedes but more powerful 220 hp BzIVs replaced
those
in
the
nacelles.
Empty
weight was 19,298 pounds. The RV reverted to a single nose engine, and there
was
a general cleaning up of design as well as increased efficiency through making the tandem engines drive tractor screws.
The machine gun
positions were transferred to the rear of the nacelles and an extra machine gunner installed in a plywood 'crow's nest' above the top wing. The production RVIs which raided London in the summer of 1917 (and were therefore building during the period of this article)
discarded the nose engine, and were fitted with a tandem pair of engines in each nacelle driving tractor and pusher propellers. They carried two pilots, a radio operator, a navigator, a mechanic and two gunners. A gun position was provided in the extreme nose, ahead of the spacious cabin, and the bomb-aiming gear was also in the nose. A large gunners' cockpit amidships allowed defenders to shoot both upwards and downwards, through a ventral slot. The huge biplane tail, which like that of the Handley Page had been called 'as big as a singleseater fighter', was unusual for the wide use of aluminium in its construction. An undercarriage to carry the loaded weight of 26,066 pounds — more than Hi tons — was a problem solved by placing four of the contemporary thin-section aircraft wheels and tyres on each hub of the two main vee undercarriages. An extra pair of wheels was located below the nose, making 18 wheels in all. Maximum speed was given as 84 mph, with climb to 3,000 metres (10,000 feet) in 43 minutes. Ceiling was 14,170 feet and endurance up to 10 hours.
improvement of 47 %. The jiontrast was equally striking among two-seaters: a BE 2c with RAF la 90 hp engine at 10,000 feet would do only 69 mph. The prototype DH 4 with a 220 hp BHP attained a speed at the same height, carrying bombs, of 109 mph, which means that a BE pilot who found himself posted to DH 4s would benefit from a 70% improvement in speed. Speed can be measured. Scientific progress is harder to assess, and wartime discoveries receive little publicity. However, the second half of 1916 was a time of lively experiment, especially in matters affecting controllability, and the controls themselves. The behaviour of balanced rudders and ailerons was being studied, and new, thicker aerofoil sections investigated. Sopwith patented a variable-incidence tail-
plane on the l^-Strutter, and this soon became a common feature. Cowlings for rotary engines were the subject of considerable experiment, although arrangements draught to the air-cooled cylinders of Factory aircraft seem to have been peculiarly haphazard, as was the manner in which extra equipment of all kinds was attached to service aircraft, with no regard for handling or aerofor directing a
dynamics. The Germans, especially, were a prey to complicated exhaust manifolds, although these grew simpler towards 1917. They also evolved progressively neater radiator installations, the Windhoff" 0/irenkuhler ('ear' radiator) on the side of the fuselage giving way, in later mEirks of Albatros D II scout, for instance, to a Teeves und Braun radiator of aerofoil shape let into the centre section. The Allies increasingly went over to the flat, car type of radiator, in the Spad, SE 5 and 4. Conical 'spinners' surrounding the airscrew hub were much used by German designers although seldom provided on Allied aeroplanes except by keen pilots intent on improving performance, as witness F. T. Courtenay's Bristol Scout D fitted with a Morane type spinner and McCudden's SE 5 which had the spinner from an LVG he had shot down. Throughout the period every factory accumulated 'know-how' in the handling of woods and metals. Mention may be made of the unbraced semi-monocoque construction in Germany, the use of built-up hollow spars by Handley Page, Sopwith's ingenious sockets and junction plates made from folded sheet metal, and a growing awareness that flat and circular sections, such as axles and bracing wires, should be made or adapted to a reasonably streamlined shape. The central months of the war were indeed a productive period. Perhaps never before or since the final six months of the year 1916 has aeroplane design proved so interestingly diverse.
DH
Further Reading Bruce, J. M., British Aeroplanes 1914-1918
(Putnam 1969) Gray, P. and Thetford, O.,
German
Aircraft of
World War (Putnam 1962) A., The War In the Air Volume
trie First
Great advances in performance
Jones, H.
From
(OUP) Lamberton, W. M., Fighter Aircraft of the 1914-1918 War (Harleyford 1961) Lamberton, W. M., Bomber and Reconnaissance Aircraft of the First World War
the R VI weighing almost 8 tons unladen to the Sopwith Pup's 746 pounds is a far cry indeed. Equally striking was the contrast in performance between elderly operational aircraft still in service during July 1916 and the powerful prototypes already on test at the end of the year. The Fokker-slaying DH 2 scout had a top speed at 10,000 feet of 77 mph; a Hispano SE 5 would do 114 mph at the same height, an
II
(Harleyford)
Penrose, H., British Aviation: The Great War and Armistice (Putnam 1969)
[For D. B. Tubbs' biography, see page 541.]
On August
1,
Minister for
War
General Roques, wrote to Joffre at Chantilly: Resolutions just passed by the Senate and Deputies indicate the intention of Parliament to exercise through its Commissions a control of all (military) services, whether at the front or in the 1916,
in Paris,
interior. Military operations are excluded;
but it is evident that the two Chambers are determined to assure themselves that every material precaution has been taken for the proper execution of our offensives. Joffre's reaction to this communication was one of dismay, particularly when, as continued, it became Roques' letter apparent that the minister intended to use the resolutions of the Assembly as a means of bringing Joffre and the armies he commanded more closely under ministerial control. Investigation at all levels by
parliamentary commissions would result in a series of questions to be answered by GQG — many necessarily to be answered by Joffre personally.
To
relieve
them
of this
burden, the inspectorate of the Ministry of War would be extended into every branch of the armies in the field so that all parliamentEiry questions relating to administration
and prepeirations
for offensives
could be answered by the Ministry without reference to GQG. In effect, every action taken by Joffre's officers would be assessed and reported to Paris. Now, in his magisterial style, the Commander-in-Chief replied, laying out his objections to the proposal which must encroach on his command of the field armies. He ended with the charge he had used once to crush governmental interference: Until now the government has given me its confidence; if it desires to continue it, I request that I should not be subjected to the constant and detailed tutelage of the Minister of War. On the other hand, if I no longer enjoy the full confidence of the government, I ask to be relieved of a responsibility which I can no longer fill under the new conditions proposed. In his jealousy and eagerness to bring Joffre to heel, Roques had overestimated his own strength, and underrated Joffre's shrewdness. Knowing that Monsieur Briand, the Prime Minister, was about to visit him, the Commander-in-Chief withheld this reply. At an opportiine moment, he read out to Briand what he had written and amplified his reasons. The Prime Minister accepted these views. When Roques came himself to Chantilly on August 4, he was told to cancel his plans for the extended inspectorate and "his ill
humour was
evident'.
But Roques had not abandoned tempts
to
master
He
Joffre.
his atexploited
Sarrail's difficulties in the Balkans, implying that they were due to lack of support at Chantilly. The government should recognise, Roques told his cabinet colleagues, that its policies were being deliberately disregarded by Joffre and the senior members of his staff. If they were
winning the war, he
said,
it
would not be
so serious, but all they had gained during the past year was a massive increase in expenditure and casualties.
Much the same view was in London by David Lloyd Secretary-of-State for War cabinet in place of Kitchener.
being uttered George, now in Asquith's
Haig's failure to break through the German line on the Somme, despite the provision of tanks, endorsed fears that the Allies were engaged
1917 Noiv Plan
jii
At the end of 1916, with the New Year in mind, AUied ministers met once again to pass new resolutions and to co-ordinate their plans. Few new ideas were put forward and dissatisfaction with the commanding generals was the main talking point.
Major-General Farrar-Hockley in a series of hopeless offensives on the Western Front. Yet in the hierarchy of the army, the belief prevailed that Germany could only be defeated in France. Hankey, Secretary to the War Committee of the cabinet, encouraged the view that 'the expedition to the Dardanelles had failed because the soldiers did not believe in it'. The Allied forces in Salonika 'would fail in exactly the same way unless he (Lloyd George) could induce the soldiers to see that it was the best course and to go for it hard'. The apprehensions for the future of both ministers and soldiers were formally stated in mid-November when two conferences were held. The first was for ministers from all the Allied governments and was to be held in Paris; the second was for the Allied military chiefs or their representatives and was to be held at Chantilly.
The Chantilly meeting opened on the morning of November 15. General Pelle — Joffre — read out an appreciation of the war situation to the delegates in which the conclusions suggested that they should persist in much the same strategy as that agreed at the end of 1915. That evening, Haig travelled to Paris to join Asquith and Lloyd George at a dinner given by the French government. He found them 'both in very good form. Mr Asquith was very pleased with our success, and said that it had made a very great difference to their relations with the French and the other Allies.' It is difficult to know to what success
on behalf of General
Asquith referred. No triumph had been sought or accomplished by Britain at Chantilly. The long months of fighting on the Somme had won only very limited successes, although it could fairly be said that the troops of Britain and her empire had, if nothing else, apparently obliged the (Germans to abate the onslaught at Verdun. Quite possibly, Asquith's congratulations were simply due to his habit of diplomacy. That same morning, Asquith and Lloyd George had arrived at the Quai d'Orsay in expectation of a full, formal opening to the
political
conference.
In the British
Prime Minister's hand was a speech which contained material contributed by Lloyd George, much of which Asquith disliked. When the British ministers were received.
they discovered only Briand and his Minister of Marine, Admiral Lacaze, awaiting them. It was to be an informal exchange of opinions between the principal Allies. Asquith's text was read in the absence of shorthand writers or indeed anyone to take notes, for the secretarial staff were left outside. Undoubtedly, this unexpected opportunity to deliver his speech in a most ineffective way appealed to Asquith's love of irony. Lloyd George may have felt less rewarded but was cheered by the fact that, as Hankey learned, 'they spent most of their time abusing the narrow-mindedness of the British and French generals.' This same theme was continued, though in more diplomatic language, when the full conference met: it was unanimously agreed that governments must take responsibility for — and give sanction to — grand strategy. Since there was a need for France and Britain to visit Russia to discuss the precise needs of the Tsar's armies for ordnance, it was agreed that a further conference should meet there to ratify the decisions of the Chantilly meeting. In fact, these decisions were given general approval before the ministers left Paris. Haig summarised them in his diary on November 16 1916: All are unanimously of opinion that the Western Theatre is the main one, and that
w
the resources employed in the other theatres should be reduced to the smallest possible.
W All
the Allies will continue to press the the winter as far as climatic conditions permit. Wif one of the Allies is attacked, the others will at once take the offensive to relieve the pressure elsewhere. With this object, all agreed to complete their offensive preparations early (by February) next year. If the enemy leaves the initiative to the Allies, the date of the general offensive will be settled later to meet the general situation. With this in view, Cs-in-C will arrange to keep in the closest touch.
enemy throughout
9
The following week, Haig came
to Lonto discuss the plans for the general offensive on the Western Front in 1917. Joffre's proposal was simply to renew their direct attacks on the German line on the most massive scale possible. If the British would agree to take over the trench lines to the north bank of the Somme — an addition of five miles — and to maintain a limited offensive along the Ancre during the winter,
don
keeping the Germans under pressure, the French army would 'husband resources on a scale greater than ever before and should expect to commit the greater number (of troops) to a spring offensive.' France woiild attack 'on an extensive front between the Somme and the Oise', and mount 'powerful' diversionary assaults on the Aisne and in upper Alsace. Britain should attack be-
tween Arras and Bapaume, also mounting a diversionary attack in a sector of its was this choice, as much as anything, that brought Haig to London. For some time, he had been anxious to clear the Germans from Flanders. This had been the principal alternative operation in his mind during the planning stage of the Somme campaign in the spring of 1916. Now he discussed it once more with Robertson and, since the capture of the German coastal bases of Ostend and Zeebrugge was involved, with their colleagues from the Admiralty. Next day, November 23, Asquith approved this and the whole British contribution to the offensive. choice. It
1871
1872
These matters being that
the
Allied
settled, it
strategy
for
seemed
1917 was
So indeed had it seemed that the 1916 was settled after the conferences at the end of 1915. But at that time, Falkenhayn's onslaught at Verdun had obliged France and Britain to change their aiTangements. Now, political events in Paris and London were to bring about settled.
strateg>' for
further
momentous changes.
Lloyd George said that he left the [Paris} conference feeling that after all nothing more would he done except to repeat the old fatuous tactics of hammering away with human flesh and sinews at the strongof the enemy. I was in favour of immediate resignation to rouse Allied opinion to the actualities of the position. It is doubtful whether the resignation of the British Minister for War would have had such an effect as Lloyd George's biography would have us suppose; but it would
some 20,000 below requirements, estimated that the total number of recruits for 1916 will be 95,000 short of the number which the Cabinet Committees agreed in February last could be placed at the disposal of the Army by the end of the recruits is
and
it is
year. For the year 1917 the following men are required: Infantry. Newly-trained men, exclusive of returned sick and wounded.
Category A. 584,000 Other Arms. Ditto 216,000 In additions for Categories Bl and CI about 140,000
est fortresses
certainly have strained, perhaps intolerably, Asquith's coalition government.
By the latter part of November it seemed that Lloyd George was determined on one of two options: either to obtain full power to direct the British war effort under the figurehead of Asquith or to become Prime Minister in his own right with all power in his hands. Chiefly through political intrigue, luck and the opportunist behaviour of Bonar Law, he achieved the second of these and succeeded Asquith on December 7, just three weeks after the Paris Conference.
When
Lloyd George described himself as 'the most miserable man on earth' immediately following his appointment as Prime Minister, it is probable that he became suddenly aware of the enormous burden of responsibility which rested on him. Not least among his problems was the fact that Britain's domestic situation was steadily —
if
slowly — deteriorating.
A loss of strength Shortages of shipping and manpower were at the root of most of Britain's problems
home and overseas. While Britain was no longer exporting its peacetime quantities of manufactured goods, ships were needed to carry coal, ordnance and soldiers to distant ports, and to return with raw at
materials for industry and food for the greater part of the populace. The demands of a war economy might have been met but for the attacks of German submarines which, year by year, were sinking more ships than British yards could replace. In 1915, for example, 1,103,000 gross tons were sunk and only 822,000 tons were built. In 1916, the figures were 1,498,000 tons lost, 544,000 tons replaced. Clearly, the shipbuilders needed greater resources in steel and construction workers. The first of these requirements was met by extensive reorganisation in the Ministry of Munitions. The second would best be met by full governmental control of manpower — total military and industrial conscription. Robertson had stated the need in an Army Council memorandum on November 28 which warned that: unless steps are taken at once by His Majesty's Government to introduce some better system of utilising the manhood of the nation, untrammelled by the conditions that in practice now nullify to a great extent the object of the Military Service Acts, it will be impossible after April next to keep the armies up to strength. At present the monthly intake of
Total
940,000
The Ministry of Munitions require a reinforcement of about 250,000 to 300,000 hands (all ages, including about 100,000 women) to enable them to complete the new programme (including steel, but excluding Admiralty and Board of Trade shipbuilding, and also Royal Naval Air Service requirements). There are still in civil life over two and a half million men of military age, exclusive of Ireland, and given therefore a proper organisation of the manpower of ths country, there appears to be no reason why the above 940,000 men should not be forthcoming. We suggest that the military age should be raised to 55 years and that all men up to that age should be utilised for such national service as Government deem to be essential to the effective prosecution of the war. The principles of the memorandum were agreed by Asquith's cabinet in the last days of its existence, but when Lloyd George became Prime Minister he was unwilling to put before Parliament a policy he had supported as Secretary-of-State for War. The consequence was that while the needs of the various industries for men were more closely scrutinised, recruitment of men for the forces — particularly for the army — continued to be inadequate. The French could not understand how a great nation like Britain should hang back from universal military service in the middle of a major war. The Germans wrongly assumed that it was Britain's deliberate policy to provide the weapons of war for the Allies while France and Russia took on the burden of the fighting. In Germany, due to the direct intervention of Ludendorff, the government had passed a new Labour Law, compelling all German males between the ages of 15 and
HM
60, and a number of women, into state service. The military authorities had similarly arranged for controls of foodstuffs,
raw materials and manufacturing indus-
POWs
were obliged to assist in Gerwork. Poles and Belgians were 'recruited' by armed parties and brought to Germany from their homelands. These severe measures alleviated the labour shortages at home and provided more than 1,000,000 recruits for the army and navy. Despite this, Ludendorff did not believe that Germany had the means of pursuing an offensive policy in the field during 1917. tries.
man war
He may have been tempted when Hoffman, successor as Chief-of-Staff on the Eastern Front, suggested that with a few additional divisions he could break open the Russian defences in the area of Zloczew and exploit towards Odessa, an operation which must force the Russians in the Carhis
pathians to withdraw. But the divisions which Hoffman asked could come only from the Western Front and Ludendorff could spare nothing from that line. Germany had to be content therefore with its for
modest triumph in Rumania.
A new German line Yet there was one military enterprise to which Ludendorff could apply his tireless intelligence: revision of the Western Front. The costly Allied encroachment on either side of the Somme had forced the German divisions back on to inferior ground, mostly under the direct observation of British and French posts. He thus decided to withdraw altogether from the shallow salient that remained in his hands and resited a new line — the Hindenburg Line — from Arras to the Aisne, retaining Cambrai and Saint Quentin. The new line would be shorter and hence require less men in its defence. It would be on ground chosen for its advantages and enhanced by immensely deep belts of obstacles covered by machine guns enclosed by reinforced concrete. Living quarters for troops and communications would be sunk deep into the France. Before Christmas, the line and its construction begun. Ludendorff's orders also contained special provisions concerning the need for secrecy in connection with the project. His aim was
soil of
was
sited
deny Joffre or Haig all knowledge of what was in hand. When the Supreme Command was ready, the divisions holding the old line would slip back into or behind to
the new positions, leaving a wasteland. For just as the work of construction would be undertaken with high professional efficiency, so the zone to be abandoned would be demolished, scorched or fouled to make wretched its occupation by the British and
French.
One other — and
greater — strategic
in-
remained open to Germany for 1917: unrestricted submarine warfare. Falkenhayn had considered abandonment of the customary usages of war at sea during his time as Chief of the General Staff, but had decided against it. He was conitiative
vinced that the political consequences would, on balance, outweigh the economic advantages to Germany. Now Ludendorff, looking forward into 1917, considered the option once more and warmed to it. Inevitably, the German navy was ardently in favour of removing all restrictions from its U-Boat captains who were ready with figures to support their view that, given the freedom of action they needed, they had the means and the ability to bring the Allies to the peace table. Bethmann-HoUweg, and the majority of officials in the Foreign Ministry were opposed to the policy; they had every reason to believe that unrestricted submarine warfare would bring the United States into the war on the side of the Allies. Ludendorff did not disbelieve them but, lacking the political acumen of his predecessor, he would not accept that America's enmit\' would be disastrous to the cause of the Central Powers. He argued that North American industry and shipping were already working for the Allies. The only other consequence of war with America would be the availability of her troops; but the regular army of the United States was too small and unprofessional in his view to be worth consideration. By the time the Americans had mobilised and trained forces to fight in
187.3
Europe, the Allies would be near capitulation. On the evening of January 19, 1917, Bethmann-Hollweg and Ludendorif stated their proposals to the Emperor at Pless. At the end of half an hour, the Chancellor was forced to admit that he was not able to challenge the Supreme Command on what constituted military necessity and, on this basis, the Emperor gave his decision that unrestricted submarine warfare would begi n on February 1 1917. ,
1874
The Allied politicians were in a stronger position. Fighting to retain power, Briand proved capable of removing Joffre from the command of the armies on the Western Front. When, despite his efforts, the f^overnment fell on December 8, the Prime Minister had still sufficient support to direct
a new administration. Roques was dism. sed, to be replaced by General Lyautej', the veteran conqueror and administrator of Morocco. At his insistence. fern-
was retired altogether. In London, Lloyd George would have liked to have replaced both Robertson and Haig but believed that he would lose his own position in the process. Still, he was determined to prevent a continuance of 'the old fatuous tactics' on the Western Front. With characteristic ingenuity, he fought his military
Joffre
chiefs indirectly. Immediately after Christmas, a
delegation
came
to
London
to
French discuss
1
Haig who were happier in expressing themselves on paper. The spring offensive was now a good deal modified: there would be three major attacks instead of the two devised by Joffre, and Nivelle wanted Haig to add yet another 25 miles to his front below the Somme. The British and French armies would assault simultaneously in the central sector as planned, while south again, on the Aisne, the third major thrust would be made across the Chemin des Dames. Nivelle planned to use again the
methods with which he had triumphed at Verdun. Anticipating a mighty breakthrough, he needed a large 'force of exploitation' and these he expected to find from a British relief of 25 miles of trench line.
But it was evident that neither Robertson nor Haig would agree to the extension of the British trench line. It suited the British Prime Minister to reserve his position. Meanwhile, he was in the process of creating strategic options outside France and Flanders. On January 1, he left London with a British delegation for Rome, having persuaded the Allies that they should meet there to look again at the opportunities in Italy and the Balkans. While at Rome, Robertson wrote, we talked of practically nothing else but Salonika and Greece, and at one time I be0an to fear that after all we should be sending two further divisions [there]. The French and Russians both fought hard for them and Briand held forth very eloquently for three quarters of an hour. The Prime Minister told me about this and when I expressed the hope that he would decline to send more divisions he did not give me a very definite answer. I therefore thought it necessary to warn him quite plainly that I could never consent to signing the necessary order for sending more. He was rather annoyed at this and described it as holding a pistol at his head. I did it for his benefit as I did not wish him to commit us in an International Conference to a promise which I myself had definitely decided I could have nothing to do with. Italy's burden British Prime Minister's eye continued to rove away from the Western Front. For almost two years as a member of the
The
government he had been suggesting the Balkans or the Near East as a suitable theatre in which to fight for a decision. The slaughter in the Dardanelles had not put him off; he believed that somewhere away from the Western Front there must be a battleground where victory could be won. At the moment of his arrival in Rome, he had had a scheme in mind to reinforce the Italians with a mass of heavy guns and a small number of troops, hoping — though he did not express it quite so bluntly — that the Italians might take on for a time the burden of fighting.
grand
strategy. Chief in France
who had
Their Xommander-inwas now General Ni-
come to notice due to the speed and economy with which he had recovered the ground lost earlier in the year at Verdun. A handsome, articulate man, Nivelle had the advantage of speaking fluent English — his mother was British. His confident, persuasive manner
velle,
recently
in debate contrasted well with the gruff and reserved speech of Robertson and
Robertson frustrated this plan. Immediately after settling into his rooms, he hastened to see Cadorna, Chief of the Italian General Staff. Could the Italians take on such a burden? he asked. 'What would your position be if, due to a crisis on the Western Front, we had suddenly to ask you to release our troops and guns or, more likely, were unable to keep up supplies of shells?' Cadorna had no doubt as to his opinion in this matter. Hankey arrived a little later 'to sound him as to whether he would receive Lloyd George's proposal favourably if made'. But Cadorna
Above, top: potent, but
omni was
Joffre, the unmistakable, the
more and more
his authority
being questioned. Centre: Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the War Committee of the Cabinet. He placed paramount importance on the morale of the fighting men. Above: David Lloyd George, now Secretary of State for War in Asquith's cabinet in place of Kitchener. Left: The German leaders who envisaged a new German line. From left to rigtit: General Hoffman (in glasses and fur collar), Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and (wearing Pickelhaubes) Hinden^urg and Ludendorff
1875
as enthusiastic as he ought have been; he made a number of technical difficulties, and it was clear that he felt he had been 'got at' by Robertson. Lloyd George had to be content therefore with a plan to send troops and guns as
was not nearly to
reinforcements if Italy should be pressed gravely by the Central Powers. His hope of exploiting the front in the Balkans was also frustrated: all else apart, the Allies had insufficient ships to support it. Once more, the Allied ministers were obliged to accept that the theatre of decision in 1917 must be France and Flanders. On his way back to London, Lloyd George received a message that General Nivelle wanted an interview as the train passed through Paris. It was assumed that he wished to press the extension of the British trench line. Hankey and Robertson advised that this could not be fairly discussed in the absence of Haig; and thus it came about that Nivelle and Haig were asked to come to London on January 15. On that day, Nivelle personally put forward his plans for the offensive to the British war cabinet. What attracted the British ministers was the promise of a brisk campaign — a series of short, sharp punches at the German defences which, if unsuccessful in a matter of days, would be stopped. Nivelle's confidence persuaded them that failure was unlikely. It was agreed that the only other major attack would be a simultaneous British assault in the Arras sector. Haig was instructed to take over the 25 miles of French trenches by the first week in March but was promised the five new divisions for which he had asked. Nivelle was to have overall command of the offensive but, if it should fail, he would support a British initiative in Flanders.
Nivelle gave this last assurance willHe had no doubt whatsoever that he was about to win the war. His letters and signals to Haig began to assume a critical ingly.
It
was true that British reinforcement and movement southward was
in France slow. The
the British plans and he complained that was deliberately prolonging relief of the French trenches below the Somme.
GHQ
French railways could not cope many roads were breaking up in the February thaw. Anxious that the French should recognise his good faith, and determined that Robertson and Haig should not balk Nivelle's offensive due to begin on April 1, Lloyd George arranged a co-ordinating conference at Calais on February 26. What Haig and Robert-
This page: Variations on a familiar tineme. By 1917 Britain still needed more men on the front, but her most pressing problem was her lack of
son did not know was that the British rime Minister had deliberately deceived em as to the future command arrangements on the Western Front. The conference was not simply to resolve the difficulties of transportation and their consequences but to enforce the decision that Nivelle should have full command of the British armies in France and Flanders. On the evening of February 26 in the Gare Maritime Hotel, the French delegation produced a draft proposal at Lloyd George's request setting out the relationship between Nivelle and Haig. The translation was handed to Robertson as he was at dinner. His reaction to it was violent: "Wully's face went the colour of mahogany,' wrote General Spears, 'his eyes became perfectly round, his eyebrows slanted outwards like a forest of bayonets at the charge — in fact he showed every sign of having a fit. "Get 'Aig!" he bellowed.' What Nivelle wanted and Lloyd George had in principle accepted was that Haig and his headquarters should be excluded altogether from the direction of operations, their only remaining functions being personnel administration and supply. Haig soon withdrew from the subsequent clash between Prime Minister and Chief of the Imperial General Staff. It was all left to Robertson, who was extraordinarily articulate and cogent in argument. For a while, Lloyd George was thrown on the defensive. He dared not do more than hint at the need for Haig to accept the terms or resign in default and sought to argue on the basis of 'legality'. His final instruction was that the British and French must reach agreement by 0800 hours next morning. Hankey breakfasted with Lloyd George and 'tried to frighten him by the probable results of Robertson's and Haig's resignations, and he was affected, though he swore he was not going to be beaten.' At last, Hankey and Maurice, the Director of Military Operations at the War Office, devised a compromise: Nivelle should be responsible for general direction; Haig should command the BEF and have freedom to appeal to the British government in the event of being given orders which, in his view, endangered his troops. In an atmosphere of grievance and mistrust, the French and British approached their opening offensive in 1917.
and
dictatorial tone; he found fault with
manpower to keep the factory wheels turning and the population housed, warmed and fed
THERE ARE
THREE TYPES or MEN Those wKo Rear the ceJl and obey
with the
traffic:
Further Reading Beaverbrook, Lord,
Those who delay
Crutwell, C. R. M.
1876
F.,
A
History of the Great
lVar(OUP1934) Hankey, Lord, Out of My
Ai\d— TheOthers
TO WHICH DO YOU BELONG?
Men and Power (1956)
Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg (Berlin 1921)
Make us as proud of you as we are of him I
Life (1920) Jenkins, Roy, Asquith (1964) Joffre, Marshal, /Wemo/rs (1932) Ludendorff, General E. von. My War Memoirs (1933) Valentini, Rudolph von. Kaiser und Kabinettscheff (Oldenburg 1931)
[For Major--Gener-a! Farrar-Hockley's graphy, see page 396.]
bio-
Life under
German occupation Occupation of a country is inevitably followed by the less glorious task of its administration. Themselves suffering from the stranglehold on essential supplies imposed by the blockade, the Germans soon realised the problems involved in keeping Belgium alive. They hoped to annex Belgium after the war and it was thus in their interest to keep her economy afloat and her people housed and fed, but their own resources were inadequate to this task and they were forced to accept and make concession to the voluntary relief organisations that were formed in the Allied camp. Jacques Willequet. Left: Cartoon exemplifying Germany's state of mind; she had broken Belgium's flag, now she needed to mend it The primary concern of the occupied population in Belgium was to live, in the materialistic sense. Their occustrangled by the Allied blockade, were incapable of feeding a country which was one of the most densely populated in the world, and which, in time of peace, had to import two-thirds of its wheat. Belgium's reserves were insufficient and greatly reduced by the requisitions. The local administrations and charities were doing their best: the industrialist, Solvay, created the Comite National de Secours et d' Alimentation whose task was to coordinate the action taken. But this action could only delay the famine. With the help of its promoter, the banker Francqui, the Committee then tried to buy food from neutral and Allied countries. But it was quite clear that the Allied governments would not agree to this kind of operation unless they obtained the assurance that these commodities would be exempt from all requisitions and that they would be strictly reserved for the civilian population—a promise that the committee, a private organisation, was unable to give. At this point three diplomats representing neutral countries, and who had remained in Brussels, intervened. They were BrandWhitlock, an American, Villalobar, a Spaniard, and Van Vollenhoven. a Dutchstrictest
piers,
1877
man. With Herbert Hoover, who was backed by the American government and by a
1914-1915 Chronology of Belgium 1914-1917
movement
of international solidarity, the for Relief in Belgium obtained the lifting of the blockade by the Allied forces. The Reich, pleased to be relieved of a problem it could not solve, guaranteed that it would not seize the imported
Commission
food,
Aug 4, 1914 Aug 17
sent to Belgium in four years.
Removal of Belgian government to Antwerp
This extraordinary work began at the end of October 1914 and continued until
Aug 20 -Oct 7 Defence of Antwerp. Oct 30
Rumours of atrocities grow Belgium now almost completely occupied. 11,355 square miles of territory and 6,500,000 people under German
regime Comite Nationale de Secours formed to relieve hunger by buying food from neutrals, under condition that it would not be requisitioned by the
Germans Nov
2
and goods worth £140,000,000 were
Germany invades Belgium
Two thirds of Belgium
put
under Gouvernement Generale under the direct control of a GovernorGeneral (General von der
Above: General von der Goltz, Belgium's first Governor-General. Below: Auxiliary German police carrying out one of their regular searches on civilian workers Bottom: The arrogance of conquest: German cavalry troops pass through the streets of Brussels
peace returned; 2,313 ships flew the CRB flag, indicating that the Commission for Relief in Belgium was recognised as a state by all the belligerents. The Commission bought and transported goods to Belgium, and the Committee distributed them. The sale of the goods enabled the Committee to finance an important programme to help those in need. The fact that it was a private organisation gave it an authority similar to that of an underground government. Problems with the occupation authorities arose continuously: the three ministerial protectors were forced to play the roles of benevolent intermediaries. In April 1915 Herbert Hoover obtained the extension of his CRB action to France, and distribution was carried out by a 'Comite d' Alimentation'. There too the population was guaranteed the required minimum amount of food.
Germany believed that Belgium would be annexed to her after the victory, and the means for the country's survival had to be found. In the economic sphere, as in the political, Berlin's policies were fluid and varied, but it is certain that confiscation of Belgian stocks, the dismantling of installations, and the requisition of labour became more and more frequent as the Wilhelmstrasse realised that its chances of Belgium indefinitely were creasing. Deprived of raw materials keeping
de-
and
unwilling to work for the occupation forces, Belgian industrialists gradually closed down their factories; in 1916 it is estimated that about one third of the population was without regular work. When the Hindenburg programme for the mobilisation of civilians was applied in Germany, occupied Belgium, one of the most densely populated countries in the world, constituted a vast reserve of unemployed workmen and uninstallations. Belgian used industrial activity was accordingly placed under guardianship; either Belgium would have to work for the Reich, or would not work at all. As for the industrial equipment, it would be taken away or destroyed for scrap metal. Machines, engines, boilers, steamhammers, rails, locomotives, trucks — everything that could be used again — was taken away: German industry gained further by thus annihilating a dangerous competitor.
German policy also involved the forced deportation of Belgian workmen to Germany. In principle, this measure only affected the unemployed who were trained and in good health, but as the Belgian administration refused to collaborate in this deportation, it was conducted blindly, unjustly and finally inefficiently. About 120,000 men, sometimes ill and always demoralised, were sent to Germany to do unimportant routine work. But the operation was a failure; it created universal indignation, including protests from the Pope and from the neutral powers. Finally the Kaiser cancelled his decision, and the 1878
were stopped after a few months. The moral reputation of the Reich had gained nothing from the policy. deportations
1915-1916 Goltz
till
November 1914,
General von Bissing April 1917).
One
till
third
governed by Etappengebeit
— direct military rule Nov 1914Aprl915
Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) formed by the Allies after American intervention on Belgium's behalf Allies agree to lift blockade to let supplies into
Apr 30
Belgium
for civilians
Herbert Hoover obtains extension of CRB to certain areas of France
April 1915
Jan 1917
Large scale removal of heavy industrial plant to
Germany
takes place.
By
mid-1916 one third of Belgian population without of Belgian workers to Germany increases. Beth-
Above: Herbert Hoover, Chairman of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium. Backed by the American government, the CRB obtained the lifting of the blockade for the passage of supplies to Belgium. Below. General von
mann-Hollweg introduces
Bissing with
regular work. Deportation
members
of his staff in Brussels
The 'Flemish Question' King Albert was on the front while his government was based at Le Havre, and a German civilian administration was organised in Brussels, to control the Belgian ministerial administration, which had remained there. The Governor-General in Belgium was the personal representative of the Kaiser and was therefore independent of the German chancellory. In principle, all Belgian laws were to remain in force, but in reality, deeper and deeper modifications were introduced, especially in the administrative and linguistic spheres. This calls for a word of explanation about the Flemish question. The Belgian State, founded in 1830, was a bourgeois state, whose language was French, since most of the bourgeoisie spoke this language. The democratisation which developed during the course of the century and which reached its peak with the changes brought to the constitution in 1893, led, in the Flemish part of the country, to a wish to be taught, judged and administered in Dutch. This was the basic demand of the Flaniingants and since the last quarter of the 19th Century the new laws had taken this into account. In 1914, the creation of a Flemish university and the use of Flemish as the predominant language in the Administration of Flanders were questions of the day. The German invasion raised the indignation of all Belgians and plunged them into deep distress, whether Flemish or Walloon, and both opposed it with the same spirit of patriotic resistance. For its part, the Reich had always ignored the Flemish problem and only discovered it towards the end of
1914 when it realised that it was a way to divide Belgium and diminish the French influence in the country. Bethmann-Hollweg was convinced that victory would never be attained in such a way as to make Belgium a German political, military and economic stronghold. But the possibility of weakening Belgium or partly controlling her remained. There were two ways in which this could be achieved: either by secret political meetings with King Albert or by the division of Belgium and the reinforcement of Flemish rights. Once the first policy had failed, Bethmann-Hollweg tried the second and it is interesting to note that every change he introduced in the legislation followed a diplomatic or military issue which was unfavourable to the Reich. In
way Ghent University became a Flemspeaking university, the Ministry of Education was divided, the Conseil de Flandres (a committee of activists for Flemish rights) was accepted as legal. In March 1917 Separation Administrative was introduced: Belgium would have two capitals, Brussels for Flanders and Namur this ish
for Wallonie.
In occupied France, the German military administration could only expect hatred and it did nothing to try to win over the population: 100,000 men were taken for forced labour or deportation, and numerous women suffered the same fate. However, in the Longwy-Briey region different and more protective measures were taken; for it was planned that the Reich would annexe this zone after the war. But in Belgium the war could not be
1879
considered as a new expression of the secular hostility between two populations but as the scandalous aggression of a friendly and often admired nation, with whom relations had always been amicable and who now appeared with a brutal and unrecognisable countenance. All Belgian
1917
had been based on freedom and individualism and a critical spirit even towards their own authorities. The new authority revealed itself as the embodiment of Prussian militarism already unbearable in itself, and which proceeded to bring in the most unpopular measures. Even in normal times it would have been impossible to govern the Belgians as if they had
legislation favourable to
Feb
25, 1917
traditions
Flemish minority
Berlin passes resolutions putting all Belgian activity under German guardianship. Almost all indus-
equipment confiscated by the Germans trial
Feb — March
Apr 1917
been Germans. The more moderate and
Separation Administrative introduced by the Germans. Brussels set up as capital for Flanders and Namur as capital for Wallonie
more lenient administration that the Germans tried to install in the zone du gouvernement general was ignored and several judicious reforms were cancelled and looked on suspiciously simply because they had been imposed by the Germans. The attitude of the Catholic Church also puzzled the Germans. In Germany, the clergy had always been an auxiliary to the state; in Belgium they constituted a power whose strength lay not only in their inde-
Falkenhausen replaces von Bissing as GovernorGeneral. Pressure on Belgian industry increases
Above: Falkenhausen, the third and last of Belgium's governor-generals. Below: German harbour police search a suspect'. He may have evaded his forced deportation to
Germany — the
fate of
many Belgian workers.
Bottom: Belgian worker registering
in
Ghent
pendence but also in their tendency
to play
a part in public life so that they could exercise a certain control on that life. It was thus with shocked amazement that the army of occupation heard Cardinal Mercier announce that their authority was illegitimate and that it deserved neither praise nor obedience, that the Belgian spirit remained free and unconquered and that victory would in the end be theirs. The Germans forbade the reading of the clerical letters and imprisoned those who circulated them, but they never dared to attack the Cardinal in person; with the Brussels
burgomaster, Adolphe Max (imprisoned in September 1914), he became the symbol of national resistance. The population suffered from the restrictions, listened
with anguish and hope
the noise of the canons which was carried by the west wind, and worried for those who were fighting on the front. Inside Belgium, political differences were forgotten. In normal times Belgium was an agglomeration of interests and of short term particularities, but it had become a nation passionately devoted to its King and Queen and who had become the symbol of law and justice in a world that had momentarily ignored both law and justice. for
Further Reading Gay, G. I., The Commission for Relief In Belglum (Stanford University Press 1925) Gay, G. I., Public Relations of the Commission for Relief In Belgium (Stanford University Press 1929) Gromaire, G., L'Occupatlon Allemande en France (1914-18) (Payot 1925) Henry. A., Etudes sur L'Occupatlon Allemande en Belglque (Office de Publicite 1920) Pirenne, H., La Belglque et la Guerre l\/londlale (Paris 1928) F Die belglsche Frage In der belglschen Polltik des ersten Weltkrieges
Wende,
.
(Verlag Eckart
Bohme
1969)
PROFESSOR JACQUES WILLEQUET was
born
1914. He spent his childhood in Luxembourg and Stuttgart and studied History at the University of Brussels from 1934 to 1938. Since 1947 he has been Historical Adviser to the Ministry in
of Foreign Affairs, and since 1961 Professor at the University of Brussels. He has published several books and articles on diplomatic history, 5^ covering subjects like the Belgian revolution of m 1830 and the troubles in the Congo.
1880
After the fall of Kut an uneasy peace reigned over the Tigris battlefields. A brief armistice, to enable the exchange of Townshend's sick and wounded for able Turkish prisoners, silenced the guns, and when this armistice expired, the guns re-
mained
silent.
The
British, sitting in their
trenches at Sannaiyat and dug in before Beit Aisa, waited for the Turks to make the next move. A few hundred yards away the Turks also waited. Neither side wanted to initiate any more of the slaughter of the last few months — or so it s.eemed. Only in the south, where the flanks of the two armies diverged into a vast No-Man's Land, was there any hostile activity, and this was largely confined to the activities of the human vultures whose country this was. At this time the Tigris Army consisted of four divisions. (The 7th Division was deployed on the left bank of the river; the 13th, 3rd and 14th on the right. In the autumn they were formed into two corps, I and III.) All four were under strength and
man
carried his own swarm, for they on every portion of his anatomy where a hand could not reach to brush them off". The sick and wounded, for whom there were no mosquito nets and very few tents, suffered most of all and only those who have known and suffered the vicious attentions of the Middle East fly may appreciate the torment. Only at night when the flies retired with the setting sun was there any relief But then their place was taken by sandflies and other nocturnal pests which sallied forth to take up the nauseating irri-
every
settled
tation
medical arrangements in Mesopotamia, General Lake had already
to investigate the
started to put right some of the more obvious muddles and deficiencies, and when Whitehall took over the direction of the campaign in July the War Office supplied further impetus. At long last a serious attempt was made to reorganise and build up not only the Tigris Army, but the whole administrative machine on which it depended. For the British, the success which followed the period in the doldrums was entirely due to this reorganisation.
when the flies left off".
A few hundred yards away, the Turks presumably suff'ered similar anguish even though, as relative locals, they were conditioned to flies and pests, and more able to adapt themselves than the Tommies' —
A new man
such things, after
have the greatest impact. In July, Gorringe, who had commanded the Tigris Corps since the abortive battle of Dujaila, was politely ordered back to Britain and Maude was appointed in his place. At the instigation
all, being regarded as part of their way of life. But unlike their opponents the Turks were not downhearted, for Townshend's surrender had been a great boost to their morale.
at the top
By far the most important developments stemmed directly from changes in the higher command, and of these the appointment of Major-General F. S. Maude was to
MESOPOTAMIA MaudeTakes Over At the root of the problems in which the British forces in Mesopotamia found themselves after the fall of Kut lay communications: the men at the front were at the end of their tether physically and in morale. This their new commander, Maude, set himself to rectify. River and
was greatly improved, and the troops were rested in rotation and reinforced. And time the medical arrangements were put on a proper footing. Lt-Col. A. J. Barker
rail transport
for the first
most of the men were
in a bad way. Sickness was rife; dysentery had followed the scurvy which had been the direct consequence of inadequate and poor quality rations; and at the beginning of May there
was an outbreak
of cholera. Shade temperatures of over 115' Fahrenheit were now common; the scorching wind, blowing like a furnace blast, rasped and burned skin unaccustomed to a tropical climate. (In July, at the peak of the hot weather, the Base Commandant at Al 'Amarah issued an order that 'During the hot weather corporal punishment will only be administered between 0600 hours and 0800 hours.' British soldiers were not flogged, but Arabs, Persians and Indians were, and the customary time for such floggings was noon.) Reinforcements fresh from England suff"ered most, and soon cases of severe sunburn — and worse still heatstroke — were added to the list of diseases. In the daytime plagues of flies, originating and breeding amongst the vast number of corpses in No-Man's Land, added to all the other miseries; apart from the diseases which these pests undoubtedly carried and spread, the discomfort of their presence was almost unbearable. Every dish, every cooking pot, every scrap of food was black with them; the air was filled with their buzzing and
Physically
debilitated,
the
men
of
General Lake's army were dispirited and despondent. Through field glasses they could see from their forward trenches the Crescent flag flying over Kut, and they brooded in the bitterness of defeat. During the attempts to break through the Turkish cordon they had been buoyed up by the hope that they would, somehow, succeed in bringing succour to the garrison of Kut. Now, in comparative quiet, the inevitable reaction set in. They remembered the privations they had endured and the losses they had suff'ered; they saw that the yawning gaps in the ranks were being filled up only slowly, and officers and men alike were aware that the medical arrangements fell far short of what soldiers had a right to expect. What had happened had obviously been due to 'mishandling', and there was a feeling that changes at the top were long overdue.
War Oflfice he was promoted yet again within a month to take over from Sir Percy Lake. Lake, who was over 60 years of age, had been feeling the strain of the past few months and the War Office considered he should go. For Maude it was a case of being the right man in the right place at the right time — something which seemed to have become almost a habit with him, since the war had brought him meteoric promotion. But he was appointed primarily because he enjoyed the confidence of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff", Sir William Robertson. Because of this Maude could demand and get nearly all he asked for; and he knew what he wanted. But though he was popular with his division, many of the old guard of the of the
lEF
'D'
— especially
the
staff"
in
Basra —
was,
regarded Maude's appointment as Army Commander with misgivings. Not only was he a cold, uncommunicative sort of man, he was also nearly the most junior majorgeneral in Mesopotamia. When he took over, Colonel Sir George Buchanan wrote that 'apart from his great qualifications as a soldier, Maude did not impress me'. Cayley replaced Brigadier-General
After the widespread indignation aroused by the disclosures of a commission set up
as divisional commander of the 13th Division, and when Maude left the Tigris Corps to become Commander-in-
Changes were in fact already taking The tragedy of Kut had forced the governments in Whitehall and Delhi to realise that the campaign in Mesopotamia had been 'ill-found' from the start — that it place.
in General Gorringe's graphic expression, 'a side-show, and no-man's child'.
Maude
1881
Chief of Force 'D', his place was taken by Major-General A. S. Cobbe VC. Meanwhile, some of General Lake's recommendations for revitahsing the Mesopotamian army were beginning to have their effect. In Basra the base organisation was starting to move on more rational and scientific lines than had been the case hitherto. Sir George Buchanan, an expert on ports, was sent out to plan the Basra port facilities and the river supply routes; arrangements were made for steamers to be built in Britain, and Indian rivers were
combed for others to fill the gap in the interval. (Generally, only the poorest were sent.) Some attempts were made to organise hospital steamers and what proved to be an arrangement was made with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for barges to be built at Abadan. Concurrently with this reorganisation, changes in the higher ineffective
An alarming and crippling shortage of all the necessities for survival: food,
water and adequate medical facilities A water convoy draws its supplies from the River Tigris. It was impossible to provide the fighting troops with clean water from wells, so the filthy water of the Tigris had to be drawn and purified as best it could be. The best was not enough, however, and dysentery carried off its thousands as a result
'
-•>
%Jf^
1882
^
echelons of command were putting younger, more able and more imaginative men into other seats of authority. Among the most important of these was the appointment of Major-General G. F. MacMunn as Inspector General of Communications and much of the future success of the Mesopotamia Expedition was due to the vigorous action taken by this new administrative king. Needless to say all did not go smoothly; the speed of the reorganisation militated against such an eventuality. Mistakes were made. In the case of the ships being built in Britain, for instance, as was to be expected when the design was undertaken by people unaware of the vagaries of the Tigris, the resultant products were bound to have faults. At different seasons, different types of craft are suited to navigation up the Tigris. In the flood season, from the end of March until the beginning of July, a
steamer faces a late
summer
channel
is
five
knot current; in the autumn, when the feet deep, anything
and. early
only five
drawing over four feet six inches is useless. At the same time the sinuous windings of an ever changing channel make navigation a nightmare. It took time for the correct design to emerge, but fortunately time was something that was not now the problem, for Whitehall had issued Maude with firm instructions that 'no fresh advance on Baghdad could be contemplated — at least for the time being.' Eventually a modified version of the paddle steamer which had
proved its worth with Messrs Lynch was decided upon. This vessel had a draft of only four feet and could carry 400 tons of cargo; from it the P-50 class steamer was eventually evolved. (As an indication of the mounting exjjenses of the campaign, it is worth noting that the cost of a single P-50
^
m
"*
^
A.4^'
m *«%
4P
a^
1883
Mesopotamia — 'a side-show, and no man's child' — at
was £75,000 in 1916.) By the end of the year P-50s were starting to arrive at Basra in quantity; the shoe-string days of the campaign were over. Apart from the problems of draught, associated with the depth and course of its channels, one of the prime difficulties with the Tigris as a lire of communication was the limitation on the number of vessels that
last received the
care and attention
move up and downstream at any one time. Between Ezra's Tomb and Al Amarah there was a stretch of 11 miles of narrows could
it
'
the British troops there into a formidable fighting force and a real thorn in the side of the Central Powers
where vessels could pass only if the upbound vessels ran into the bank to make way for those travelling downstream. The congestion in this stretch could only be removed by building a railway which would allow freight to be unloaded from the larger vessels at Qurna, carried through to Al 'Amarah and reloaded into steamers and barges above the narrows. This railway was one of the first attempts to rationalise a planned transport system, and when it came into being Adam and Eve's old home became a port for sea-going steamers. A continuous line between Basra and Al 'Amarah would have been more logical, but with the resources then at hand that was not feasible. For such a project, the Euphrates would have had to be bridged either at Qurna or at the main junction just above Basra, and no material for a bridge of this size was readily forthcoming. As it was, the disconnected railway was adequate and offered certain advantages, for when the bar at the mouth of the Euphrates channel was dredged, Qurna could take ocean-going ships of up to 14 feet draught while some of the smaller vessels from Bombay could discharge part of their stores at Basra, so lessening their draught, and then carry on to moor near the railway terminal. At the same time, by installing a telephone control and electric lights to illuminate the channel, the capacity of the narrows was increased, permitting ships to navigate the tortuous channel by night when previously they had been compelled to tie up.
needed to turn
march
forward and digging in. When it is unopposed, an advance of ten miles may appeEu- to be a substantial gain, even though the ground has little tactical advantage; the trouble was that this move added another ten miles to an already overstrained supply line, and providing transport and escorts for the ration and water convoys which had to travel up from Sheikh Sa'ad to Es Sinn taxed the resources of the Tigris Corps to the limit. Because of the heat, the convoys were compelled to move by night and at this time of the year the long crocodile formation of animals and men invariably raised blinding clouds of dust. Even with escorts of battalion
better rations. It also gave Maude's old division a much needed opportunity to retrain. Most of the units decimated by the earlier fighting were now made up of half-
1884
running
from
Maqasis
and debilitated British
The
latest tactics
Other
improvements were also being effected during the hot weather. After the divisions at the front had been formed into two corps, units were pulled out of the line for training. The lessons of the Western Front were studied, and considerable changes in tactics were introduced. In some formations the devastating effect of small arms fire in the flat open terrain was
new methods were evolved By now every kind of equipment
was pouring
suffering from heat-stroke — a sure indication of their physical debility and the effect of the hot weather. But the problem was not only in getting the men line of
Imam-al-Mansur to Dujaila. The new line was only ten miles further forward than the old position, but in the move up, no less than 10% of the troops fell out of the
line
to the tired
appreciated and
through
that the move was not some sort of trap, the decision was taken to close up on the new Turkish front line. In consequence the 3rd Division, in reserve behind the 13th, was brought up and pushed forward to a
haven troops.
for attack.
strength — and sometimes battalions could only produce about 100 men for the job because of the high proportion of sick — it was almost impossible to protect the columns adequately against the attacks of predatory Arabs. With the passage of time the number and severity of these attacks increased, and — as the Arabs grew bolder with their success — supplying the forward troops became more and more difficult. It was all a vicious circle, which began and ended with the increasing casualty returns of sick. With most of the men and all the animals in the forward area on short commons, bigger escorts and extra convoys were out of the question, and so by August — when over 30,000 sick had been evacuated—it was decided that drastic measures were needed and a complete reorganisation of the front was effected. The 13th Division and all the animals were pulled back to Sheikh Sa'ad and later to Al 'Amarah, where they could be more easily supplied. This left the 7th Division on the left bank, and the 3rd Division on the right bank, with the 14th Division in reserve. (During the summer the 14th changed places with the 3rd.) The reorganisation soon began to show beneficial effects. The reduction of numbers the front line to be fed and clothed made 1' possible for those who had to stay to get
Drastic measures Maude did not attempt to sort out the administrative muddle in Basra himself Once he was satisfied that the problems of the base were being handled by experts, he announced that he relied on those in Basra to do their best. He was a fighting man, he said, and it was his intention to move GHQ Mesopotamia nearer the front. And the fact was that there were more than enough pressing problems at the front to keep Maude's attention fully occupied. In Baghdad, Khalil Pasha, the Turkish army commander, had dreamed up a plan for a sweep through Persia which would enable him to fall on the flank of the British line of communications up to the front. But to raise a force for this purpose meant a redeployment and shortening of the line in front of Kut. The withdrawal was carried out skilfully, but patrols from Maude's 13th Division were able to discover what had taken place. As soon as it became clear
dr£ifts, and the front line was hardly the place to give initiates the instruction they needed. But back at Al 'Amarah, conditions could be — and were — made quite different. Supply was easy, decent living conditions and games were possible and even a canteen selling Japanese beer could be provided. Al 'Amareih was no holiday camp, but compared with conditions in front of Kut, it was a welcome
trained
m
into the country. Stocks of the type of grenades, Verey lights, machine guns, mortars and guns were all welcome additions to the Expeditionary Force's armoury — especially the medium guns and howitzers so essential to deal with the Turks' earthworks. Reserves of ammunition started to accumulate, and bridging material to eradicate one of the most severe handicaps that the Tigris Army had latest
been suffering from — freedom to manoeuvre — was also either collected or manufactured. Gas masks were also sent out from England and issued. (In the event, as the Turks never used gas, they were not necessary.) In May 1916, there were only antiquated aircraft available to Lake, the Turks, with modern German machines, had air superiority. Within three months they had lost it; and, by the end of the year, the British air force in Mesopotamia had 24 modern aeroplanes and all the latest bombing and aerial cameras to go with them. With the cameras it was now possible to make accurate maps, and this perhaps was the greatest blessing that the RFC could bestow. In other respects also the tide of British fortune in Mesopotamia was steadily rising. The withdrawal of the 13th Division had been dictated primarily by the insufficiency of land transport at the front, and to overcome this a light narrow-gauge railway was built to ensure the movement of supplies. From the advance supply base at Sheikh Sa'ad the railway ran to the Es Sinn position near the Dujaila Redoubt; for its protection from the marauding Arabs a barbed wire fence and blockhouses were erected while the lines were being laid. Once the trains were running, the supply problem was easier although the capacity of this tiny makeshift route was not enough to take all the supplies which the troops needed. Thousands of horses, mules, carts and subsequently Ford vans, still had to be kept forward to supplement its deliveries, and in a country where there was no grazing, no fodder to be bought locally and no fuel for the vehicles, their presence all added to the administrative headaches. But it was in Basra where the greatest changes took place. Order was not evolved out of chaos with the same ease as in the first chapter of the Book of Genesis, and it was a long time before what had been an five
and
,
Ancient and modern on the Tigris. Above: The British had to rely on requisitioned bellums, a type used on the Tigris for millennia, but still one of the handiest and mqst useful craft available. Below: HMS Sedgefly, a Fly class river gunboat. These boats were made in Britain, shipped to Mesopotamia in bits and erected in Abadan. They had a very shallow draught and were used as mobile artillery for the land forces
**Sr*-"5
^^
m^'
1885
Above: General Maude: an ex-Guards officer pushed to the top of the tree in Mesopotamia over the heads of more senior officers. The energy and devotion he brought to his new task endeared him to his men if not his immediate subordinates. Right: General Marshall, commander of the reorganised III Corps. Below: Turkish prisoners, escorted by Gurkhas, on their way down the line. The whole problem of supply was made more difficult by the necessity of guarding and feeding these men whose only use was that they were denied to the Turks
Administrative Backing for Maude's Offensive
and Maude's Order of Battle Organisation of the Tigris Front GHQ
Shatt-
Lt
Tigris
From
Sannaiyat
GenFSMinde
al-Hai III
Forward Troops tfl
Indian
Mai Gen
W
Army Corps R Marshall
Corps Signal!
(1
Lt
Covl
Army Corps GenASCobbe
Indian
1
6th Cavalry Brigade
7th Cavalry Brigade
BrigGen
Brig.
2
Inlantry Divisions
3
Iniantry
Oiv
HOOi.
Oi«
Siitish
iQS
Bdes
Pioneers
Engineers
Supply
Field
Field
qdn
Train
Ambulances
Ambulances
1
Corps Cavalry
1
S F
docker
Gen
L C
Forward Troops
Jones
Regt)
It fl Unit| Stores Aid Posts
r
I
Unit Stores Aid Posts
1
Signal
HODi.
Companv
Artillery
4
3
Indian
2
RHA
Bde MG Sqdn
Inlantry
Ammo
Battalions
4
Column
Field
;
Anillen Bdes (le-pdi)
Amm
Howilzer Baner.es
4
Bde MG Sgdn
Inlantry
Companies
Colon
3
Cavalry
Field
Field
Regis
Engineers
Ambulance
3
Battery (I3.pdi|
Field Eng
Army
Companies
Troops controlled by
(4-5')
GHQ
Cavalry
Sqdns
and
allocaied as needed
Engineers
Artillery
Refilling
Army
Signals
1
Pioneers
Refilling
Supply
Point
Point
Column
Howitzer
Heavy
Siege
AA
AA
Bde
Artillery
Battery
Battery
Seclron
Battel
Group
(6
(Updr)
(Updr)
(Stoke s)
(4-5
)
incli)
6
Morta
3
Budging
Signal
Wrreless
Trains
Company
Sqdn
2
MT
30 Sq n
Balloon
Companies
RFC
Section
RNAS
(60-pdi)
&
Administrative Installations
Units
~ Arab Village
Es Sinn Rdl Head
Adn
Adminislralive Units MT Company
Ammo
MT
Park
Con pany
inistralive Ins tallat ionsb Ur its
Advanced
Med
Stole
Advan ced
Remo ""
Depot
l/il3itit
Sedio
Wiler TiiDsputimJl
Sheikh Sa'ad Advanced Base Adminislrati velnstallation s 2
MT
b
Units
HQ
HQ Riveihead
Coys
Advanced Base
4 Casualty
2 Stationary
Advanced
Convalescent
2
dealing
Hospitals
Med
Depot
Sections
Military
Motor Ambulance Convoy
Stores
Saniiaiy
Depot
Stations
Advanced
Labour
Field Vet
Advanced
Signal
Corps
Section
Vet Stores
Railway
Depot
Coripany
Park
AI*Amarah| Administral ve Installation b Units Convalescen 1
4 General
3
Hospitals
Depcils
Hospital
Advanced Remount
Wireless
Advanced
Tioop
Med
2
Vel
Sections
Isolation
2
Sanitary
Stores
Depot
Section
Qurna Stalionai)
Ambulani
Hospital
Section
1
BASRA —^ Theatre
Mohammcrah 2
Inland Wate: Tianspoit (IWT)
1 Casualties brought back by stretchers and
O
unit transport. Supplies brought up by unit
tianspoit
2
(AT
carts and mules).
unit transport
7
4 Indian
Wireless
Base
Base Depots
Base Depots
Troop
Signal
Base
2
Vet Stores
Companies
Bullock
4
O As
2
Med
Isolation
Dflicets
Motor
General
Stores
Hospital
Hospital
Ambula
Hospitals
Depots
Convoy
in
MT Company
5
lorries.
Casualties earned by motor ambulance.
and GS
Depot
4 British
well as Inland Water Transports,
certain ocean-going ships
Supplies brought up
Corps
Reinforcements generally marched from Theatre Base to the front
Casualties earned by motor ambularfce and GS wagons. Supplies brought by Divisional
Supply Trams
Paik
MT
2 field
Vet
Sections
3
augmenting restricted nve
through The Narrows'.
Supplies
brought up by unit transport 3 Bnltsh
Hospital
Light railway traffic
Casualties taken back by motor
ambulance and
General
Convalesi
Depots
I
in
MT
company
lorries
wagons'along desert roads tracks
Supplies and reinlorcements earned
MT Compa'hy and tracks.
lorries along desert
in
roads
of
H
were capable
reaching Qurna.
River Tigris
Hi
Casualties from the front
^1
Supplies to the from
H
Reinforcements
to the froni
1887
I
1883
Oriental backwater in 1914 was turned into a modern port. But after Maude had assumed command, work on building
wharves, jetties and warehouses went ahead at an ever increasing rate, land was reclaimed and a labour force organised and assembled. The effect was reflected in the growing reserves of stores and munitions dumps. From Basra a metalled road was steadily pushed forward towards the front, and along its 250 miles rest camps and supply centres were set up at appropriate intervals. By the autumn columns of reinforcements were able to march up to the front and this helped to ease the strain on the river transport. By this time also, a crash programme for improving the river system was also bearing fruit. Barges and river steamers were beginning to arrive from India and Britain and more and more native craft had been taken into service to augment the river fleet. As more and more resources became available the medical situation also improved. The supply demands precluded steamers being spared solely for use as hospital ships, but a number of barges were fitted out to carry the sick and wounded back from the front. By the end of the year these barges had been supplemented by proper hospital steamers and specially equipped barges from Britain. Nurses came out to staff the base hospitals in Basra and
were established to deal with the tropical diseases which abounded in Mesopotamia. With these improvements in the medical field and better food, the troops' health began to improve. In consequence, by July the flow of reinforcements was more than coping with the flow of sick in the reverse direction, and this was a significant development indeed. special
clinics
Abject morale Thus it was that the appointment of Maude signified changes among the generals, changes in the system and changes in morale; there was even a change in the weather that summer. At the beginning of the hot season the morale of the British and Indian troops in Mesopotamia was at its lowest ebb. Numerically they had been superior to the Turks immediately opposed to them round Kut. But they had suffered casualties on an unprecedented scale, and the climate, inadequate rations and disease had afl!iicted their health to a dangerous degree. Bad communications, an in-
administrative organisation and a hopelessly inadequate transport system were the foundations of their suffering. In three months everj^thing started to change and the whole result was a remarkable transformation of the efficiency of the Tigris Army. By the autumn of 1916 an entire revolution in the army's position had taken place. The troops were well fed, fully equipped and properly accommodated. The efficient
medical arrangements were ample and in good working order, modern weapons of war had been provided, land transport was approaching the authorised scales and the lines of communication promised to be able to fulfil any demands made upon them. Undoubtedly much of the credit for the changes must go to Maude. A painstaking man of strong will and great self-reliance, he had an incredible capacity for work. Not until he was satisfied with the reorganisation and administration of his army was he prepared to move, and before he did take the offensive he carefully assessed the
administri.''ve
upon
factors
which
his
plans would depend.
On September 30 a new directive for the conduct of the war in Mesopotamia was issued by the CIGS, Robertson. The Mission of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, it read, is to protect the Oil Fields and Pipe Lines in the vicinity of the
Kariin
river,
maintain our occupation
to
and
control of the Basra Vilayet, and to deny hostile access to the Persian Gulf and Southern Persia. At present no fresh advance to Baghdad can be contemplated, but it is the desire of His Majesty's Government, if and when possible, to establish British influence in the Baghdad Vilayet. This further advance should not be undertaken unless and until sanction for it is No further reinforcements for the given force must be expected. On the contrary it may become necessary to withdraw the 13th Division which was sent to Mesopotamia in order to assist in the attempted .
.
.
With a covering Mesopotamia was a 'secondary' theatre of war and that any ideas regarding another advance on Baghdad were to be put out of the Army Commander's mind forthwith, Robertson's relief of Kut-al-Amara. letter emphasising that
instructions made it quite clear that so far as those in Whitehall were concerned it was once again a case of 'a safe game being
played in Mesopotamia'. No more rash dashes up the Tigris were to be entertained; indirectly, Maude had been assigned a defensive role and there was no word about destroying the Turks opposing him. For the time being Maude was prepared to go along with the directive. He realised, he said, 'that visions of Baghdad are beyond our sphere and that severe losses must not be incurred.' Nevertheless, in a cable to Robertson he stressed that an entirely .
.
.
passive attitude in Mesopotamia would not only be unprofitable but also bad for the troops. This point was grudgingly accepted, and by the end of September — when the effects of the reorganisation and build-up
were beginning
was seeking
to
have an
effect
— Maude
extend the terms of his instructions. He believed that his mission was to smash the Turk in Mesopotamia, and now was the time. His troops had recovered both physically and mentally, their tails were up; if he were to frustrate Khalil's designs, wipe out the slur of Kut and restore British prestige in the Middle East, there would have to be an offensive; nothing could be gained by the continued stalemate of trench warfare. With 150,000 men under his command (of these, only 72,000 could be concentrated on the main front: a fact which exemplifies the growing tail of a modern army), a seemingly adequate line of communication behind him and these inducements, Maude was resolved to attack before the winter rains set in
to
and made operations
difficult.
By this time Maude had established his headquarters close behind the front line; like Allenby — who shifted his command post from Cairo to the Gaza front before Palestine — Maude was hold all the strings and control the forthcoming battle personally. Remote control from Basra was not for him, he was going to make quite certain that the battle went his way. With a superiority of three to one over the Turks, the railway, the transport columns — which now included a company of lorries — and two brigades of cavalry, Maude was far his
offensive
determined
to
in
more able to manoeuvre than his opponent, Kiazim Karabekir. His troops could operate away from the river, while the Turks were tied to tactics
On
the other hai
.,
so far as
were concerned and tne
ability to
it.
apply this manoeuvrability, the courses to him were strictly limited. On the left bank, the Suwayqiyah Marsh prevented him from getting round the Turks' flank, and a frontal attack on their Sannaiyat trenches was out of the question if only because of the high cost in men's lives that was bound to be incurred. Even if a high casualty rate was acceptable, bitter experience had shown that a successful assault there was doubtful. In theory the defences at Sannaiyat could be hammered by the British guns from the right bank but, as the Turks had steadfastly sat through previous bombardments, any such theoretical weakness could hardly be assumed to be one which might be exploited. In view of these considerations an attack somewhere on the right bank seemed to be indicated and this is where Maude decided the blow should fall. Though it may seem to be a simple statement of the obvious, Maude's object seems to have been the destruction of the whole Turkish army on the Tigris front. Yet it does not appear to have been the one which was dominant in his mind when the offensive was launched. If it was, then he was flagrantly disregarding his directive. Obviously he was concerned with defeating the Turks but the plan evolved suggests that his initial object was not to surround Kiazim Karabekir's force completely prior to annihilating it but, rather less ambitiously, to manoeuvre it out of the trenches before Kut and to compel it to retreat. No doubt Robertson's strict injunction about casualties and his warning that no more reinforcements were available weighed heavily on Maude's mind while he was working out the plan. And, furthermore, the possibility of the 13th Division being taken away from him must also have influenced his decision to try a cautious and deliberate approach rather than a bold advance which might offer spectacular results but contained a strong
open
element of
risk.
With a certain amount of trepidation, Kiazim Karabekir had watched the British build-up in front of him throughout the summer months, and he was fully alive to the dangers of his position. But there was little he could do about it. He had 30 battalions — and little hope of getting any more, no matter how many troops his opponents concentrated against him — for his master, Khalil Pasha, remained contemptuous of British arms. In the light of
what was to follow his self-complacency and fixed ideas must have been worth at least another division to Maude at this time. All Kiazim could do was to strengthen his defences.
Further Reading Barker, A. 1967) Barker, A. 1967)
J.,
The Bastard War (Faber & Faber
J.,
The Neglected War (Faber & Faber
Sir George, The Tragedy of Mesopotamia (Blackwood 1938) Callwell, Maj-Gen. Sir 0. E., Life of Sir Stanley
Buchj.nr"
Maude (Constable
1920)
Mesopotamia Campaign Volumes (HMSO 1924 and 1925) [For A.
J.
II
and
III
Barker's biography, see page 464.]
1889
MAUDE'S OFFENSIVE With his men refreshed in body and restored in morale, Maude was ready to begin his advance. The first step was the recapture of Kut, and this Maude set in train in December 1916, with a slow and methodical advance on the Turkish positions on the right bank of the Tigris. Below: British infantry on the road back to Kut, to redeem earlier failure. W. F. Woodhouse
Once Maude had decided that an attack against the Turkish positions on the right bank of the Tigris was the correct course of action, he lost no time in putting his plan into effect; he was determined, if possible, to attack before the winter rains set in, rains which he knew would turn the desert into a quagmire. In early December 1916 the Turkish position at Kut was substantially what it had been during the hot weather, although it had considerably strengthened. On the left bank was the immensely strong Sannaiyat position, which Maude had alreadydiscarded as a point of attack because of his explicit instructions from London to keep the casualty rate down. The Turkish
Opposing the British on the Tigris were some 20,000 Turks with 70 guns, of whom 2,500 rifles and 15 guns were thought to be on the right bank. Ever mindful of the restrictions imposed on him from London, Maude's initial aim, as we have seen, seems to have been to compel a Turkish retreat from the Kut area by a wide outflanking movement to the south and west of the town. To achieve
was for the 7th Division to make a strong demonstration, supported by I Corps' artillery, against the Sannaiyat position — indeed the plans provided for an actual attack if the circumstances justified it. Meanwhile the 13th Division, from III Corps, and the Cavalry Division were to advance from the line of the Dujaila Depression, swinging northwestwards with the aim of clearing the line of the Shatt-al-Hai up as far as Kala Haji this the British plan
lines extended eastwards from Sannaiyat along the left bank to what was known to the British as the Khudhaira Bend: here the Turkish line crossed the Tigris and
spanned the bend on the right bank. From this point the line ran south of Kut and then formed what was known as the Hai Salient, which had its apex about two miles
down the
Shatt-al-Hai.
The
Fahan. Air support was to be provided in the form of a bombing attack on a Turkish bridge at Shumran, about five miles west of Kut; in addition, the Royal Flying Corps was to spot for the artillery and to fly reconnaissance sorties to give early warning of any Turkish movements. General Marshall, III Corps' commander, was flown personally over the Turkish trenches, to see for himself his opponents' dispositions. On December 6 came what Maude had feared — the rain; it poured down and in no time at all not only the trucks of the nev/ly-formed Motor Transport Company,
British line
time faced the Sannaiyat position directly and then crossed the Tigris to run along the right bank as far as Maqasis, from thence curving south-eastwards away from the river to the Dujaila Redoubt. at this
but also the horses and camels of the transport columns were in difficulties. Even the railway, which by now extended to Es Sinn, had problems in running trains. It seemed as if, once more, a British offensive was to be prejudiced by the weather. However, three days later the sun was shining again, the mud had dried out and at least the choking dust had been laid. The army was glad enough of this small blessing for, as Candler observes in The Long Road to
Baghdad,
'in
Mesopotamia ... an army
may
be immobilised in the rainy season by the mud, in the spring by inundations, in the summer by heat and in the early autumn by the sickness and exhaustion consequent upon the heat.' Despite the unsettled weather, on December 13 the offensive started as planned with a heavy bombardment of the Turkish lines at Sannaiyat. As part of the deception plan, all tents were left standing till after dark on December 13 and in addition a number of Royal Flying Corps BE 2c aircraft were standing by at Sheikh Sa'ad, ready to take off and deal with any Turkish aircraft reported by the gunner forward observation officers: in fact only one Turkish aircraft appeared and the pilot made off too quickly for the pursuing British aircraft to catch him. The other specific air task, that of destroying the bridge of boats at Shumran, was not so successfully carried out for, although the bridge was hit by at least
one 336-pound bomb
(in
1916 this
was certainly in the 'heavy' category), it was not destroyed. It was evident that the bombardment at
A&f
Sannaiyat achieved
its
purpose, because
•3W^
¥
:«vi •w**^
-^
!lii^^ ^1i^<*^ t-
"^CZPfw^^'
#r
SH^
Kiazim Karabekir, the Turkish commanimmediately deployed part of his reserve to meet the threat. Meanwhile, the night advance of the 13th Division and the der,
cavalry across the desert to the Shatt-alHai went smoothly and exactly to time; when they arrived on the banks of the river in the early hours of December 14, they had achieved almost complete surprise. The river was nearly dry and the cavalry crossed easily at Basrugiya while the 40th Brigade, having reached Atab, started to consolidate its position on the left bank of the Shatt-al-Hai. At the same time two pontoon bridges were rapidly thrown across the river just south of Atab and by 0730 hours O'Dowda's 38th Brigade had come up on the 40th Brigade's right, facing northwest towards Kut, with 37th Brigade from the 14th Division filling in the gap between 38th Brigade and the original British line. By 0715 hours the cavalry, having watered their horses, had started to work their way northwards up the right, or western, bank of the Shatt-al-Hai, the division's right flank being secured by elements of 40th Brigade, which had also crossed the river. The going was slow because" of a number of deep irrigation channels running into the river, but the cavalry was not seriously held up and by 1000 hours, despite a brush with some 50 Turkish horse, had reached Besouia. By 1430 hours it was at Kala Haji Fahan. From there the 6th Cavalry Brigade continued to move forward towards the bridge at Shumran until, about three miles west of Kut, it came under fire. Despite this, a squadron of the 14th Hussars pressed on towards the bridge until it was finally stopped by infantry about half a mile short of the Tigris. The cavalry had now far out-run its nearest infantry support — 39th Brigade
— which had managed to establish itself on the left bank of the Shatt-al-Hai upstream of Besouia and north-west of the
Umm
ford at as Saad; accordingly, as light began to fail, Crocker withdrew Cavalry Division to Atab to bivouac for night. In fact, with the exception of
the his
the the 39th Brigade's move, no net gain on the positions reached at 0730 hours that morning had been achieved; Maude seemed well satisfied with this and issued orders for III Corps to be ready to advance at 0900 hours on December 15. There followed a cold night of brilliant moonlight. While the infantry shivered in their trenches below, a Royal Flying Corps pilot flying a night reconnaissance sortie noticed that the Shumran bridge was being towed upstream in sections. The pilot at once attacked and, having dropped a full bomb load, returned to Sheikh Sa'ad for more. Sorties were flown throughout the night, 24 bombs in all being dropped and, although the bridge was not totally destroyed, the tug slipped its tow so often that by morning the bridge sections were scattered about on the river banks, leaving the Turks without a bridge across the Tigris. Furthermore, a new bridge was not built until December 17, the Turk.'^ in the meantime being reduced to a slow and tedious ferry service. At 0900 hours on December 15 the advance up the Shatt-al-Hai was resumed — 38th and 39th Brigades on the east bank of the river and 40th Brigade, now joined by 35th Brigade from the 14th Division, striking out to the north-west. The cavalry was ordered to move forward again to Kala
Haji Fahan, and once there, to push forward strong patrols to Shumran. As on the previous day, the move was supported by Corps' artillery and the naval flotilla I bombarding Sannaiyat. By 1300 hours the infantry on the east bank were about two miles south of Kut and, as air reconnaissance reported few Turks on the right bank of the Tigris, they were ordered to continue their advance. Although the operative instruction was to move 'rapidly', the order was qualified by a caution not to run the risk of heavy casualties. In Maude's view this somewhat ponderous advance was justified by the low casualty figures — only 200 on December 15. In any event, the
move forward by the 13th and 14th Diviwas checked during the afternoon when it became clear that the Turks were strongly entrenched across the Khudhaira Bend and in the Hai Salient; by dusk the British infantry was occupying a line from Maqasis to the Pointed Ruin, thence down sions
Umm
as Saad. the Shatt to the ford at As on the previous day the cavalry met little opposition from the Turks during its advance towards Shumran and it was able to establish that the western face of the Hai Salient was strongly held; after this reconnaissance the Cavalry Division withdrew to as Saad for the night. However, notwithstanding the Turkish inactivity, the Arabs in Hai town chose to make a show of force on this day, and a long
Umm
column of them was observed moving towards Shumran. As soon as the infantry's machine guns opened fire the column dispersed and reformed out of range.
A secret weapon? It
had become
clear to
Maude
that the
western flank offered the best opportunity of striking at the Turkish communications. He planned the first blow for December 20, the intervening four days being spent in consolidating the line already reached; after some reorganisation, this left III Corps astride and to the west of the Shatt-al-Hai, with I Corps to the northeast, extending back through Maqasis to Sannaiyat. One important aspect of the preparations for the offensive had been the reorganisation of the bridging trains. One of these. No 2, had been formed into a mobile train, independent of river transport; it was hoped that its existence had been kept secret from the Turks. Now came the opportunity to use it, and Maude's plan for December 20 was for a force of all arms, including No 2 Bridging Train, to make a crossing of the Tigris at the Brick Kilns, on the Husaini Bend about seven miles west of Shumran. The force, which apart from the sappers included the 7th Cavalry Brigade, 40th Infantry Brigade and a field battery, was to be commanded by General Crocker, the Cavalry Division's Commander; he had the task of securing the neck of the Brick Kiln re-entrant with his cavalry, and then attempting an infantry crossing of the river at the apex of the bend. The operation was to be supported by General Thomson with the 6th Cavalry Brigade and 35th Infantry Brigade, whose supporting howitzers had the particular task of neutralising the Shumran bridge. In reserve was the 37th Brigade under Egerton. Starting at 0500 hours on December 20, Crocker's force reached the Husainiya Canal without incident; however, the advanced guard of the 13th Lancers had been fired on from north of the Tigris before the
main body had arrived and although the Turkish guns were silenced to such good effect by the 5th Battery Royal Horse Artillery that they took no further part in the it was evident that surprise was Since the advance had been carried out in daylight, Crocker could hardly have expected to remain unobserved. Nevertheless the force closed up to the river and the infantry deployed to east and west of the Brick Kilns. Despite the evidence of strong Turkish defences on the opposite bank, in addition to the firm hold they retained on the Brick Kilns on the near bank, at about 1300 hours Crocker decided to attempt the crossing. The sappers had followed the infantry along the dry bed of the Husainiya Canal, taking advantage of the cover afforded by its high banks and the 15-foot high dam at its junction with the Tigris. A brave attempt was now made to launch a pontoon over the dam and into the river. Captain Witts, the bridging train commander, 19 of his sappers and a small party of South Wales Borderers managed to launch the pontoon successfully; immediately the Turks concentrated their fire on the unwieldy and unprotected craft and before they could pull away from their own bank, Witts and ten men were hit. The attempt was abandoned. While preparations were made for a second attempt at a crossing, at a site about a mile upstream of the Brick Kilns, Crocker, who had a radio link with Maude's headquarters, received a message saying 'withdraw ... to Besouia unless you have established yourself on river by the time you receive this wire.' This followed an earlier signal allowing Crocker discretion
action, lost.
withdraw if he met opposition, so at 1415 hours he decided to break off" the action. It was not until 1700 hours that the force was assembled and so Crocker withdrew some six miles into the desert to the south-east for the night, returning to Besouia the following morning. Maude's aim in this first attempt at a crossing is not entirely clear — presumably it was to persuade the Turks to withdraw without a battle, since there was no army to
reserve available to exploit the crossing had it been successful. In a 1927 article in The Army Quarterly Major Dewing discussed the attempt from the engineer aspect and stated that 'There is no indication that General Crocker knew anything of it before the 19th, and it is certain that the officer commanding the bridging train first heard of it when he received the actual order.' The surprise element of the operation seems to have been confined to those carrying it out, as the Turks had plenty of warning; also, as Dewing points out, there was no technical reconnaissance of the bridging site, so that it is clear that preparation was minimal. All this, plus Maude's cautious orders to Crocker, suggests that a major battle was not the
Army Commander's self
intention. Maude himremained more than usually reticent
about his real aim. It is related that when Marshall, the Corps Commander, who was well
aware of the
strict
instructions to
Crocker to withdraw if he was met by anything more than the lightest opposition, heai;d Maude commiserating with Crocker on his failure, he said 'But you never meant them to cross', to which Maude coldly replied 'Of course I did'. Nevertheless the troops had been confident enough; Lewin, commanding 40th Brigade, on be-
The Gurkhas saw red
A Gurkha Lewis-gunner. In this campaign, the Gurkhas further improved their already magnificent reputation in the grim trench fighting
and 200 Turkish dead were found ...
the well-designed and strongly-defended Turkish positions around the Khudhaira Bend in
next morning'
4.
^'^^yy
/^ <*.
J
ti«-.
^ \ •ijt
J. ,/'
t *
>
**«
.
mBL ^^^ A
\ I i
'894
Left:
The
first
phase
of
Maude's offensive.
down by the instructions of the War Office London. Maude was faced with the problem of
Tied in
justifying the existence of the
Mesopotamia
forces while incurring the minimum losses. This he managed to do by means of a slow and methodical advance on the right bank of the Tigris, which drove the Turks back and prepared the way for the next phase of Maude's offensive. Below left: The German (Turkish) Model 1904 12-cm field howitzer. In common with other early German pieces used by the Turks, this howitzer had completely inadequate sighting arrangements and a very low muzzle velocity. Below right: The Krupp (Turkish) 7.62-cm field gun had a muzzle velocity of 1.640 feet per second and a projectile weight of 14.3 pounds. The total length of the gun was 7.37 feet. Below: Desert opposition for the Turks: a British 18-poundergun in action
A1895
ing ordered to withdraw, was heard to exclaim 'I could have got over that bloody river sliding on
my
arse.'
Perhaps it was fortunate that the crossing failed, for during the next few days the rain poured down and brought ground operations to a standstill. Despite the bad weather, however, the Royal Flying Corps managed to maintain a sustained bombing offensive against camps and shipping, achieving on one day a record of one ton of bombs dropped. The bombardment of the Hai Salient and of Sannaiyat continued also and appeared to be inflicting real damage on the Turks, including the breaking of the bridge across the Shatt-al-Hai. With the first week of Maude's offensive at an end there followed a pause until early January 1917, while the position on the Shatt-al-Hai was properly consolidated.
Converging on a common opponent in the misery of Mesopotamia .
.
cost some 720 British casualties - not too high a price, Maude
The advance had
the ground gained- and the Turks, although they also had not suffered many
felt, for
casualties either, were evidently becoming unsettled by the constant bombardment of their positions, strung out as they were along the river from Sannaiyat to Shumran, and by the frequent air raids on their shipping and rear areas. (Jn December 26 an exchange of signals
between Maude and Robertson
in
London
resulted in Maude being told that in future 25% casualties would be acceptable. This gave him greater freedom of action to take the offensive as opportunity offered. In a long signal to London Maude stated his intention of securing the Hai position and of clearing the right bank of the Tigris as a preliminary to further operations. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff agreed to this, but reminded Maude that the '13th Division might have to be withdrawn in February 1917 as the supply of troops was still critical.
While
I
and
III
Corps were improving
their communications and gradually pushing their trenches nearer the Turks — by
December 25 the infantry forward trenches were right up to the river opposite Kut between the Hai Salient and Khudhaira Bend — it became clear that a strike against the Arabs was long overdue. The sniping and general harassment by the 'Buddhoos' was a constant problem, particularly in the rear, where transport columns had always to be escorted; constant vigilance against this second enemy was essential. It was decided to mount a surprise raid against Ghusab's Fort, which was about 15 miles south-east of Dujaila, and known to be an Arab stronghold. Swift action was needed to prevent the Arabs slipping away in their usual manner and the Cavalry Division, supported by artillery, was given the task. The force arrived at the fort at dawn on December 24, and surprise was achieved; however, by some oversight the cavalry did not surround the fort, so that when the artillery opened fire the Arabs quickly withdrew. Pursuit by the cavalry was ineffective because, although its horses were larger and faster than thost of the Arabs, the British were weighed down with some 250 pounds of equipment each; thus an opportunity was lost and the 'Buddhoos' got away once again. Neverthebefore returning to Sheikh Sa'ad, Crocker's men effectively destroyed the fort and the stores in it and the Arabs were thus deprived of their most important base; so part at least of the operation less,
^b'j
An English officer in desert clothing and equipment plus gasmask. This item must have been almost intolerable to wear, but'it proved superfluous, as the Turks never used gas in Mesopotamia
.
.
.
was successful, and raiding decreased. Meanwhile preparations for a resumption of the main offensive were in hand. On December 27 an Intelligence report estim-
the British from the west, and the Indians and Gurkhas from the east
ated the Turkish forces on the Tigris at a strength of 18,700 rifles and 300 sabres. This was made up of nine battalions, with 19 guns and six mortars, at Sannaiyat; three battalions, with 12 guns, strung out between Sannaiyat and Kut; six battalions, with 21 guns and four mortars, in Kut, the Hai Salient and in the Khudhaira Bend; and a further nine battalions, with 14 guns and three cavalry squadrons, between Kut and Bughaila to the west. Turkish morale was high, although Khalil Pasha, Commander of the Sixth Army, had been warned by his Corps Commander, Kiazim Karabekir Bey, that his forces opposing Maude were dangerously stretched. Khalil was advised that Sannaiyat, Kut and Shumran should all be evacuated in favour of prepared positions further upstream, but Khalil, who was contemptuous of the British, refused to contemplate a withdrawal and considered neither reinforcement nor redeployment necessary.
A
great defence complex in his turn, was convinced that his
Maude,
first task was to clear the right bank of the Tigris before undertaking any operation
against Kut
Accordingly he planned Turkish position in the Khudhaira Bend first of all. This position was virtually an outwork of the Kut defences since, as long as the Turks held it, the British guns were unable to enfilade the main Kut position. With both flanks resting on the river, the two main lines of trenches, together with a complex system of support trenches, made a formidable obstacle of the Khudhaira Bend, especially when held by a determined opponent; and the Turk in defence, as the British knew from itself.
to clear the strong
bitter
experience,
was certainly
deter-
mined. The Turkish front line was about a mile and a half long, with good fields of fire covering all the likely approaches and with well-sited machine guns on the flanks. There was good observation — for Mesopotamia — from the East Mounds at the western end of the position and from the town itself, while the guns in Kut commanded the whole of No-Man's Land in front of the first line. Varying from about 500 to 1,000 yards behind the first line came the second, the intervening space being filled with dry water-courses and brushwood. All this area was prepared for defence and although fields of fire between the two lines were limited, there was excellent cover from view. Finally, incorporating part of the southern end of the second line, came a short third line, which ran north-west along the river bank for about 500 yards, terminating in some low sandhills. In front of this line the Turks had cleared a good field of fire, leaving the ground very exposed. The first action against this unpleasant obstacle had already been taken on December 22, when the 1st Manchesters, of the 8th E Brigade, and the 1st Highland Light Infantry, of the 9th Brigade, had closed up to I I the East Mounds area — considered to be s the weakest part of the Turkish line — and
e"
An Indian infantryman
in
old pattern leather bandoliers
abandoned
minus
his rifle. Note that he is still wearing the in favour of webbing pouches in the British army
battle order but
had dug in there. From this position the line was gradually pushed forward over the next 15 days by the tedious process of 'sapping' — digging trenches outwards from the existing front line and then
1897
Turkish cavalry on the move. They were, however, wasted, as the Turkish
command
failed to
use them in the forward reconnaissance role, perhaps because they were outnumbered by Maude's horse
every few yards joining the forward ends of these 'saps' to form a new front Hne that much nearer the Turks. This was very exhausting work, carried out under fire and with the added discomfort of almost constant rain. However, the slow but sure advance had its reward in a total of only 350 casualties for the whole operation. Thus by January 6, 1917, 9th Brigade was well established close to the Turks' front line, with its left flank on the Tigris and to its right 8th Brigade, whose right rested on the Tigris also, thus sealing off" the bend. To achieve this situation no less than 25,000 yards of trenches had been dug. On January 6 Maude issued orders for the first part of the operation to clear the Khudhaira Bend — a break-in at the southern end of the defences. It was necessary, however, to divert Turkish attention from the point of attack and so on January 7/8 activity all along the line was increased. The Hai defences were bombarded, while a heavy raid was mounted against the Sannaiyat position — by this time faced by only two brigades from the 7th Division. This last proved to be a costly affair; four raiding parties were detailed, one each from the Leicesters, 53rd Sikhs, 56th Punjabi Rifles and the Royal Engineers, and from these all the officers were lost, together with most of the men. As a further diversion the Cavalry Division was ordered to raid Bughaila, out to the north-west, on January 9 — the day of the attack proper — but this operation was abandoned when the cavalry got lost in the mist. Also on January 9 a force was to be deployed before daybreak south of the Shumran Bend with the task of keeping the Turks in that area fully occupied.
Maude was becoming
in-
creasingly aware of the value of the air arm, and while all these considerable
preparations and diversions were going forward, the Royal Flying Corps was ordered to prevent Turkish air reconnaissance of the British trenches. For the main attack, the RFC was required to provide artillery spotters and to attack any large concen-
1898
trations of Turkish troops which it could detect. In addition there was always the possibility of Arab intervention from the
west and south and the airmen were given the task of providing early warning of any movement in that area. The attack itself was to be carried out by the 3rd Division's 8th and 9th Brigades, assaulting simultaneously. The 9th Brigade on the left was to attack on a front of 400 yards at the extreme southern end of the Turkish line, while 8th Brigade on the right had a 200-yard frontage to attack; the remainder of the Turkish line to the north being contained by a reserve battalion supported by machine guns. The main attack was supported by 56 guns and the assault force included sappers and pioneers to assist in consolidation of the ground gained. The first day's objective was defined as a dry water-course between the Turkish first and second lines, one end of which cut into the first line about halfway along and from there ran south-west, parallel to the second, into the Tigris. .' 'The Gurkhas saw red At 0730 hours on January 9 the British artillery bombardment opened on the Turkish positions and continued for an hour. After a 15-minute pause it reopened more intensely as a prelude to the assault, which went in at 0900 hours. The attackers were helped initially by the mist which lay over the battlefield, and the Turkish first .
.
was occupied, without many casualthe first few minutes. The Turks seemed dazed by the bombardment and had line
ties, in
apparently been taken by surprise, though on the left, after the first shock, some hard fighting developed as the 1/lst Gurkhas pressed forward towards their objective. 'The
Gurkhas saw red and
.
.
.
200 Turkish dead were found within a radius of 200 yards next morning,' says Candler; on one Turkish body a day or two later was found a message from Kiazim Karabekir to Ismail Hakki, commanding the 45th Division, congratu-
him on 'the steadfastness of the ... in face of the enemy's violent bombardment, and especially of our infantry who held their ground in spite of bloody losses during today's bombardment.' However, by 1100 hours 9th Brigade had gained a line a few hundred yards short of their final objective and bombing parties from the Highland Light Infantry were working their way along the Turkish line towards 8th Brigade on the right. The Manchesters, on the right, had lating troops
reached the Turkish lines without a shot being fired; they immediately started to reverse the parapet and to consolidate the captured trench, while one company felt its way forward in the mist, taking advantage of a water-course which ran towards the Turkish second line, and the bombers worked their way towards the Highland Light Infantry. At about 1000 hours a strong Tvu-kish counterattack 'loomed out of the mist like a football crowd'. They fell on the Manchesters' leading company and a savage fight ensued; the British stood their ground but, with their Lewis guns jammed by mud, almost all were killed. The counterattack swept on and caught another company of Manchesters and some of the 59th Rifles in the flank. More fierce hand-to-hand fighting followed, the Turks eventually being held, and even driven back a short way. Not, however, before five officers from the Manchesters, each taking over the command in turn, had been killed defending the block they had set up in a trench. The artillery was unable to assist because of the mist,
and
it
was not long before the
determined Turks came on once again; by 1500 hours, when the mist had cleared away, the Turks were seen to have recaptured part of their original front line, although the British had managed to retain some of the day's gains at the East Mounds. They were, however, far short of the day's objective. During the counterattack the telephone line back to 8th Brigade headquarters had
it was not until 1100 hours that the brigade commander, Edwardes, discovered that all was not well. Although the 59th Rifles were ordered to reform to restore the situation, the fighting was so confused that they were not committed. The situation became clearer at 1500 hours and an artillery bombardment started at 1630 hours and helped the Manchesters regain the ground they had lost. By dusk on January 9 the British had thus gained about 1,000 yards of the Turkish first line, including the important East Mounds. The cost to the British had been some 700 casualties, the Manchesters being the worst sufferers with 235, including 12 officers. The Turks, who had fought well after their initial surprise, had probably lost far more, although no figures are available; it was reported that in one short length of trench over 200 Turkish dead were counted. In addition, the British had captured seven officers and 155 other ranks. Against this, the Turks still held over half their original front line, running north to the Tigris, though the 47th Sikhs, watching this sector, reported no Turkish activity there. As night fell the captured ground was incorporated into the British trench system by the digging of fire and communication trenches between the original British line and the newly-won Turkish positions; patrols were sent forward to detect any signs of Turkish activity and the Manchesters and the 59th Rifles were relieved. The night of January 9/10 passed reasonably quietly and it was not until early on the morning of the 10th that 9th Brigade's patrols found that the Turks had evacuated all of their first line and, indeed, some of the difficult ground between the first and second lines. This enabled the 9th Brigade to reach its original objective, set for January 9, without opposition. By 1300 hours the brigade was established on this line and 8th Brigade had occupied the remainder of the Turkish first line up to the Tigris. The rest of the day was spent in active patrolling, and it was found that the Turks had also abandoned the northern part of their second line, so the 47th Sikhs moved in quickly to occupy it. However, patrols moving west from this area soon met Turkish fire and it was clear that these stubborn Ottoman soldiers were still prepared to put up a determined defence in the small triangle of land left to them.
been cut and
The
British driven back was decided to clear the Turks out of their last foothold in the Khudhaira Bend on January 11. At 0800 hours Keary, commanding the 3rd Division, issued the necessary orders to Colonel Anderson, commanding 9th Brigade. It was not until 1400 hours that the artillery was to start its preliminary bombardment, under cover of It
which the Highland Light Infantry were to advance to within about 200 yards of the Turks, covering the final stretch with a rush at 1430 hours. The British were under the impression that their opponents in the Khudhaira Bend were all but finished, and the projected attack was seen as a final clearing up operation, but the Turks still had a surprise in store. During the previous night they had replaced the tired troops in the bend with fresh battalions and were already preparing a counterattack to regain the lost ground. So when the Highland Light Infantry attacked as planned, they were under heavy and accur-
arms fire, even before their With their customary gallantry the Scotsmen pushed home their attack and managed to drive the Turks out of their trenches. The Turks counterattacked almost at once and the leading Highland Light Infantry companies fell back on their own support companies. The latter had themselves been under severe enfilade fire and were unable to restore the ate
small
final assault.
situation, so that by 1440 hours the British were back in their own front line, with the Turks close behind them. Despite this reverse, discipline prevailed and ac-
curate machine gun
halted the Turks, On the right a similar situation had arisen in 8th Brigade's area, where the 2/124th Baluchis had also been counterattacked. Flushed with success, the Turks evidently planned to drive the British even further back, and so started another attack from the thick brushwood to the northeast of their third line, on the river bank. Incredibly, the Turkish infantry emerged boldly from cover, formed up in line and started to advance. Such a target was too good to miss and the steady rifle fire of the Sikhs, plus some very effective artillery support, soon drove the Turks back under cover, with considerable loss. Once again the Turk had shown himself to be a stubborn and tenacious fighter in a defensive battle. These Turks were evidently some of their best troops, and with the Tigris at their backs they fought hard. They certainly left their mark on the British and Indian troops opposing them. After the action on January 11 the Highland Light Infantry had to be withdrawn to reorganise, having lost 15 officers and 197 other ranks. It now became apparent that the only way to clear the Turks from the Khudhaira Bend was to mount a series of short advances, strongly supported by artillery, aimed at gradually pushing the Turks into the river. This policy was successfully followed between January 11 and 18, involving the 3rd Division in some hard fighting; a final assault was planned for January 19. But, at last it seemed that the Turks had had enough, for during the night January 18/19 they evacuated their trenches and withdrew across the river. The Turks had fought well and their morale was high. They might say bitterly The English are not so brave as the Turks. They will only advance under the cover of 1,000 guns', but the fact remained that a real victory had been won; sheer guts was not enough against the quantities of modern equipment now available to the British. The way was now clear for the next phase in Maude's plan for clearing the right bank of the Tigris — an attack on the Hai Salient. An account of the first phase of the offensive would be incomplete without mentioning one more cavalry action, which took place to the south during the final days of the fighting for the Khudhaira Bend. Crocker's Cavalry Division had spent the period following the inconclusive attack on Ghusab's Fort inactive at Sheikh Sa'ad. It had not been possible to make full use of the division's mobility because of the water-logged state of much of the area; efforts to sweep round to the north of the Sannaiyat position were thwarted by the Suwayqlyah marsh, while to the west of the Shatt-al-Hai extensive flooding covered Turkish communications towards Bughaila. However, on January
who had
fire
to retire in their turn.
10, the day of comparative quiet following the first assault on the Khudhaira Bend, the Cavalry Division was ordered to scour the country to the south-east of Hai town, with the aim of finding out what supplies, if any, could be obtained locally. As the cavalry advanced, the fleeter-footed Arab horsemen melted away before them, turning away to harass the flanks and rear of Crocker's column. The opposition actually met was slight and on January 10 a fort about five miles north of Hai town was captured, and found to contain 15,000 rounds of British rifle ammunition. At about 1100 hours on January 11 the town itself was occupied, the troops receiving an apparently friendly welcome. The division remained in control of Hai town for the next three days, during which time some
Turkish arms and ammunition were discovered and confiscated. Arrangements were also made for the purchase of supplies — though how much confidence could be placed in the Arabs to honour the arrangement was another matter. Candler relates how 'Officers patronised the Turkish baths and spent hours curio-hunfing in the bazaar. Shops were emptied of rugs, samovars and antiquated arms and everything was sold in good humour.' On January 14, however, a change in the friendly atmosphere took place; Crocker had been ordered to return, bringing with him what grain he could carry, and the usual motley crowd had gathered to see the British leave. The Triendly' townsfolk had weapons concealed under their clothes and as the rear-guard withdrew the Arabs opened fire. As the day progressed the flanks of the division were repeatedly threatened by attacks from the villages on the route and it was not until 1600 hours that the 'Buddhoos' finally gave up, after causing the Cavalry Division to fight a rearguard action for some eight hours. Next day, in retaliation, the Royal Flying Corps bombed Hai town, but to little eff"ect; Candler, who, as a contemporary observer, was evidently incensed by the Arabs' .
.
.
double-dealing, clearly felt that more salutary action should have been taken. He points out that the Arabs publicised the British withdrawal as a victory for themselves, which the bombing attack did little to discount. Thus the cavalry action as a whole did nothing to discourage Arab raids against British communications. So the first phase of Maude's offensive ended, with the British having dealt the Turks a severe blow at Khudhaira Bend, in a situation which essentially favoured the Turks' fighting qualities. This gave the British new heart for the forthcoming attack on the Hai Salient, despite the disquieting Intelligence reports of further Turkish reinforcements approaching Baghdad from the Armenian front. Further Reading Barker, A. J., The Neglected War {Faber & Faber 1967) Candler, E., The Long Road to Baghdad (Cassell 1919) Dewing, R, H., Some Aspects of Maude's Campaign in Mesopotamia (Army Quarterly 1927) F. J., The Campaign in Mesopotamia (HMSO 1924) Oats, L. B., Proud i-leritage, Volume 3 (House
Moberly, Brig-Gen.
of
Grant 1961) Wylly, H. C, History of the Manchester Regiment {Forster Groom 1925)
[For Major W. F. see page 783. ]
Woodhouse 's biography,
1899
PRINCE OF PEACE? The war was punctuated with attempts to procure what hindsight shows to have been impossible: negotiated settlements. Such a one was the effort of Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, who was fighting on the Allied side, and his brother-in-law, the Emperor Karl of Austria-Hungary, to extricate the collapsing Dual Monarchy from the war that was destroying it. Marvin Swartz
After death had ended the nearly 70-year reign of the Austrian Emperor, Franz Josef, in November 1916, his successor, Karl, attempted, with the help of his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus of BourbonParma, to save the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary from destruction by arranging a negotiated peace settlement. That Karl could have resolved the difficulties, even in time of peace, doubtful; that he could have done so
Empire's is
while war ravaged Austria-Hungary and
Europe was impossible. He therefore focused much of his attention on obtaining a settlement. The new Emperor was a man of
some accomplishments. Reputedly he
could speak seven languages, was an able military commander, held high standards of personal conduct and had a pleasant, even charming, manner. During the
war when
his subjects queued for food, Karl ordered that no luxury, including white bread, should be set upon his own table. Unlike Franz Josef, he cared little for administrative
work and preferred
to
with people, hoping thereby to broaden support for the monarchy. Many of his subjects felt that his plans for reform, formulated perhaps by the various advisers of his uncle Franz Ferdinand whom Karl had made his own, might restore some measure of stability to the Empire shaken by war and differing deal
nationalistic conflicts.
Karl had some disabilities, however, and they outweighed his good qualities. In 1916, he was only 29 years old and untrained for his enormous task. Only two years before, with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand (whose own children, as the offspring of a morganatic marriage, were disqualified from the Habsburg succession), had he become the heir presumptive. Limited both in political experience and by his sense of the Habsburg traditions, he was unable to manoeuvre successfully among the dangerous obstacles of divergent nationalism and the growing tendencies towards mass democracy. His liberal and reformist leanings were of little use in wartime. He was not only open to persuasion but also swayed by flattery. Above all, Karl was unable to act decisively. This characteristic hindered his attempts to negotiate a peace, the most important bid for which he made through the agency of his brother-in-law, Sixtus. Sixtus' family had not ruled the small Italian state of Parma for more than half a century. Before 1860 the Bourbons !n Parma had depended upon Austrian power to keep at bay the growing forces of nationalism and democracy in Italy. The success of the movement for Italian unification drove out Sixtus' father, Duke Robert of Parma, 55 years before the outbreak of the First World War. Even so, the family still qualified as purveyors of
1900
marriage partners for European royalty. 1911 Prince Sixtus' sister. Princess Zita, had married Archduke Karl, of the House of Habsburg, little suspecting that five years later these two would become the rulers of Austria-Hungary. In
A
question of allegiance
Sixtus himself had lived for many years in Paris, and he considered that his allegiance was to France. He and his younger brother, Xavier, were visiting their mother at Schwarzau, the family estate in Austria, when the war began. Loyal to France, the two brothers — not without some difficulty — returned to Paris and sought to join up in the French army. But both the French, and later the British armies refused to enrol the Bourbon princes. However, through the intervention of a relative, the Queen of the Belgians, Sixtus and Xavier were able to serve in the Belgian army, becoming lieutenants in the artillery. Both were awarded the French Croix de Guerre in May 1916. After this period of military service, Sixtus had made known his views on the
war
in politically influential
He was
French
circles.
of the opinion that France's real
enemy was Prussia and
that France should regain the boundaries not merely of 1870 but of 1814. He argued that Germany should be broken down into its constituent parts — Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Hesse and the other states — and that Prussia's neighbours should receive sections of her territory. But while desiring to deprive the Hohenzollerns of leadership in Germany, the Prince hoped to preserve the Imperial crown of the Habsburgs. He felt that it was in France's best interests to keep AustriaHungary intact as an obstacle to Prussian expansion along the Danube and to Italian development in the Mediterranean. He wished to destroy 'Hungarian pre-eminence' but to include a reduced Hungary, Bohemia and the hereditary states of Austria, as well as the imperial leadership of Germany, in a personal union under the Habsburgs. Whether or not they were influenced by family considerations, Sixtus' ideas were contrary to many of the historical developments of the 19th Century; but they convinced members of the French government that his sentiments were sincerely pro-French and anti-Prussian. Sixtus was, therefore, in a position to play an important diplomatic role when, after the death of Franz Josef on November 21, 1916, his brother-in-law became Emperor. Karl wanted to conclude peace because he knew that if the war, and the unrest it caused within the Habsburg Empire, were to continue he might well lose much of his power, if nut his throne. In his first public message he said: 'I wish to do everything to banish, in the shortest possible time, the horrors and sacrifices of war and to give ,
back the vanished blessings of peace to my peoples,' adding with characteristic procrastination, "as soon as military honour, the vital interests of my States and of their faithful allies and the obstinacy of our enemies will permit.' Within a fortnight of this public declaration, the new Emperor, probably after some persuasion from his wife, asked his mother-in-law, the Duchess of Parma, to contact her sons, Sixtus and Xavier, in the hope that they might be of help in promoting peace negotiations. The Duchess then wrote to the Queen of the Belgians via Luxembourg's diplomatic service asking her and her husband to urge Sixtus and Xavier to go to see her. On January 23, 1917 the two princes left
the front. Having obtained the necessary diplomatic papers in Paris, they arrived in Neuchatel in Switzerland on January 29 for two days of meetings with their mother and sister Maria-Antonia, who were awaiting the princes' arrival incognito. The Duchess told her sons that the Emperor wished to discuss peace with them and that everything was arranged to conduct them secretly to Vienna. If they could not go, Karl was ready to send a special envoy to them in Switzerland. The brothers chose not to go to Austria, but Sixtus revealed to his mother what he believed to be the Entente's fundamental peace conditions: the return to France of Alsace and Lorraine, the re-establishment of the boundaries of
1814 with no compensation
for
Germany;
the restitution of Belgium and of Serbia and the cession of Constantinople to Russia. Significantly, he omitted any mention of Italian aims. After the princes had returned to Paris, Sixtus conferred with the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Jules Cambon, on February 11, 1917. The French government at the very highest level was now interested in the Austrian peace move.
An Austrian initiative In Neuchatel on February 13 the Emperor's messenger, his close and trusted friend Count Thomas Erdody, told Sixtus and Xavier that Karl desired to make peace. The Emperor, Erdody said, was willing to conclude a secret armistice with Russia and declare his disinterest in Constantinople,
return
Alsace-Lorraine to France,
Belgium and create a south Slav kingdom including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Albania and Montenegro. Although these terms were not entirely satisfactory, Sixtus felt that his brother-in-law had restore
plainly demonstrated his peaceful intenHe asked Erdody whether the Emperor would make a public statement in favour of peace or present concrete secret proposals. The Count left for Vienna. tions.
He returned
to Neuchatel on February 1917 with, among other documents, notes from the Austrian Foreign Minister,
21,
1901
Above: Le dejeuner sur I'herbe — Karl at an al fresco breakfast during army manoeuvres. Above right: Karl, accompanied by General DankI, one of Austria's more successful field commanders, saluting in a procession while fie was still heir. He realised that AustriaHungary faced dissolution, and so devoted
The Emperor cast only a dim ray of hope in his secret note, which was a brief commentary on five of his Foreign Minister's points: • We will help
Germany with
France and exert pressure on all our means (in reply to
the third point);
his energies to vain efforts to hold his multi-national empire together
all
• We
have the greatest sympathy for Belthat she has been treated unjustly. The Entente and we will make good her great losses Tto the fourth point); • We are absolutely not under German
gium and know Count Ottokar Czernin, and the Emperor Karl himself. Czernin's eight-point text
was harsh and uncompromising, providing indication of a genuine desire for a negotiated settlement. It stated that: • the alliance of Austria-Hungary, Ger-
thus against Germany's will we
little
control;
many, Turkey and Bulgaria was 'absolutely indissoluble' and no separate peace by any one ally was possible; • Austria-Hungary had 'never contem-
have not broken with America. It is the opinion here that France is completely under English influence (to the fifth point); • Also Germany (to the seventh point); and • Here there are no privileges for particular peoples; the Slavs have full equality of
plated the destruction of Serbia' with whom she intended to renew friendly relations, cemented by economic concessions, provided Serbia guarded against the recurrence of 'such political activities as led to the murder in Sarajevo'; • Austria-Hungary would not object, 'should Germany consent to relinquish Alsace-Lorraine' • Belgium should be restored with compensation from 'all the belligerents'; • Austria-Hungary was not politically subordinated to Germany, but Austro-Hungarian opinion held that France was 'completely under the influence of England'; • Austria-Hungary had no thought of destroying Rumania, but would retain that country as a pledge until she obtained a guarantee of the complete integrity of the
Monarchy; • Austria-Hungary was fighting only self-defence; • there was
in
and
no difference of privileges for the various national groups in Austria-Hungary, where the Slavs enjoyed the same rights as the Germans and were loyal to the Emperor and Empire. This wartime rhetoric offered no prospect of a settlement that would be acceptable to the Entente. And Czernin specifically stated that Austria-Hungary could not conclude peace separately from her allies, which was the very object at which the French were aiming. 1902
rights. All peoples are united to the
Our
Dynasty
sole
aim
(to
and
faithful
the eighth).
is to
maintain the Monarchy
in its present size.
Karl's additions in some respects merely reinforced the bad impression created by Czernin, for instance by the clumsy attempt (in point 5) to create ill-feeling between Britain and France. Nor was there any mention of Italy, the ally whose war aims included annexation of Austrian territory. The French government, anxious not to miss any chance of separating Austria-Hungary from Germany, was nevertheless attentive to Karl's overtures.
Hope for the future Prince Sixtus had a two-hour interview with the President of the French Republic, Raymond Poincare, on March 5, 1917. Poincare told the Prince that, as the head if a constitutional state, he must advise Aristide Briand, the Premier and Foreign Minister, of what was happening. Sixtus then described the course of the negotiations up to that time. Although Poincare found Czernin's note unsatisfactory, he felt that the Emperor's secret comments provided a basis for further dealings. He promised that he would communicate the Imperial proposals in the greatest secrecy 'our two principal allies', Russia and Britain. But he was concerned about comto
pensating Italy for having entered the war
on the Allied
side.
Poincare met Briand the following day. Briand had already received word of Karl's desire for peace from other sources, and on March 8, 1917 the President held a second interview with Sixtus. Poincare now declared that the sine qua non of any agreement was Austria's concession of the four points which Sixtus had presented to his mother at the end of January — those regarding Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium, Serbia and Constantinople. Austria would have to conclude an armistice on all fronts, not simply with France and Russia, as the Allies were anxious about an expected Austro-German offensive against Italy which 'could lead to a military and political disaster in Italy'. The President added that 'Italy undoubtedly will assert certain demands, but Austria will be fully compensated'— at German expense. He said that he would write to the King of the Belgians to request an extension of the Princes' leave from the Belgian army. Poincare also asked- whether Sixfus and Xavier would consent to travel to Russia for talks with the Tsar, with whom 'they would have a very great freedom of speech' and their words would have great weight. This plan was made abortive by the revolution in Russia, however. Sixtus wrote a letter intended for the Emperor on March 16, 1917, informing him that his chances for peace were good now that 'the liberal bourgeoisie of Moscow' was, at least for the moment, directing Russia and ready to follow where France and England led. He warned Karl that, if he allowed Germany to define the terms of peace with the Entente, 'she will prefer to pay off Russia, France and Italy at the expense of Turkey and Austria'. Sixtus advised his brother-in-law that AustriaHungary should avoid initiating an offensive against Italy, as France and England might be forced to send troops, thereby ipso facto dooming all hope of negotiation. Karl must act 'quickly and precisely', the Prince argued, while Poincare and Briand were in office in France and before Germany could intervene to prevent an Aus.
trian
move
for peace.
To accompany
.
.
this
PEACE FOR AUSTRIA
-GERMANY'S NIGHTMARE I
Austria-Hungary establishes
a
separate peace.
2 two: Germany to the north, Bulgaria and Turkey to the
The Central Powers
are cut
in
Bulgaria pinched between two advancing army groups, the Russians and
Allied
Rumanians from the north, the Salonika army from the south. As the Allies advance, part of their forces wheel to the east and invade Turkey from the west. Turkey and Bulgaria are forced to surrender or sue for peace.
6
10
With the Austrian peace, the war on the Italian Front comes to a halt. By the terms of the peace, Austria-Hungary is probably forced to give Italy Italia Irredenta, and to allow the establishment of a south-Slav confederation in the Balkans. Turkey is compelled to abandon her footholds in
The navies
Libya to the Italians. Italy in all probability drops out of the war, having obtained all she
wants from
it.
south.
7
3
the other Allies can persuade her to stay the war, Italy sends her land forces to the
of France and Italy, with the Austrian threat in the Mediterranean removed, can take their place with the Royal Navy in denying the Germans any chance of obtaining supplies from overseas, and in dealing with the German U-Boats.
II Germany, now weakened by the
Western
8
Concerted Allied advance on Turkey, Russians from Caucasus area and Persia, British from Palestine and up the Tigris.
can devote
Germany
is
now on their
in
in the vice of the Western and Eastern Fronts.
12 The
Front.
4
her
own and
the Allies
undivided energies to her
defeat.
Allies launch co-ordinated land offensives from West and East, and Germany is forced to surrender. There could also have been naval- backed landings on the north German coasts.
RUSSIA
AUSTRIA-HUNGAR-
FRANCE
effect of
three years of war, the lack of foreign raw materials and Rumanian wheat and oil, is
caught
If
Bulgaria and Turkey cut off from any German sources of munitions and reinforcements.
Large parts of the Allied forces previously involved in the war against Turkey and Bulgaria can be diverted to Russia to join the Russian armies on the Eastern Front, while the opening of the Straits allows the Allies to despatch to Russia by sea the munitions and modern equipment she so badly needs.
Tialia Irredenta
ITALY
'
^v^.
^
»
*» '
private apartments of the Emperor and Empress. Erdody and the captain waited on guard outside while Sixtus and Xavier went into their sister's salon, where
the
letter Sixtus drafted a note containing the four points which were to serve as the basis for an armistice:
• •
restitution of Alsace-Lorraine to France; re -establishment of Belgium
they found the imperial couple, whom they had not seen since August 1914. The reunion was affectionate, but Karl
complete
retaining its possessions in Africa, and without prejudice to the compensations for damages which she would receive; • re -establishment of Serbia under its present dynasty and wii.h access to the sea;
under
its
present dynasty,
and Zita were grave, even sad, with, already, some white hair at the temples. The greetings over, the Emperor opened the conversation by telling his brothers-inlaw: 'It is absolutely necessary to make peace; I want it at any price.' He was concerned that his German ally showed na desire for peace, but if the Germans continued to be obstinate over this issue, Austria could not 'continue to fight for the King of Prussia'. As the discussion proceeded, Karl seemed to agree with Sixtus' views regarding Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium and Serbia. Since he felt that the new revolutionary regime in Russia would not last long, he held back any response in regard to Constantinople. As for Italian
and between Austria-Hungary the former expressing disinterest in Constantinople and the latter withdrawing troops from territories of the
•
negotiation
and Russia, with
Empire at present occupied. agreed to these conditions, If Karl France and her allies would assist Austria-
Hungary
in case of German hostility.
Face to face meeting Armed with this letter and supplementary note, Sixtus and Xavier arrived in Geneva, where on March 19, 1917 they met Erdody, who insisted that instead of merely delivering their messages to the Emperor he would conduct them personally to Vienna. 'This time,' Erdody told the Princes, 'it is absolutely essential that you come to Vienna. The Emperor has told me: "With all these comings and goings between Vienna and Switzerland too much time is lost; it will end up by drawing attention, and we will wind up with no result. If we wish to be successful, we must hurry one hour of conversation between us will do more to advance peace than 20 letters over six months." The Emperor promised that Sixtus would have unhindered entrance to and departure from Austria and that complete secrecy would be maintained; the Prince would see only the Emperor himself, Zita and Count Czernin. Erdody reminded Sixtus of all the lives which would be sacrificed if peace was not concluded now. 'Come,' he urged, '1 have prepared everything and can guarantee you on my honour that there will be no difficulty.' As a final argument, Erdody showed the Prince a letter from his sister, the Empress, who begged him: 'Think of
Above: Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, who with his brother Xavier was unique in having an entree to the Central Powers' High Command while fighting for the Allies. Below: Alexandre Ribot, Briand's successor as premier of France. He opposed Lloyd George, who wanted to bring Italy into
demands, he would try to satisfy them only after France, England and Russia had decided to make peace with Austria. As the hour grew late, the Emperor said that his Foreign Minister must also join the talks.
the negotiations, but lost his forceful Prime Minister
argument with the
Czernin unco-operative
A
few minutes later Czernin entered. Tall and lean, he wore a frock coat. His manner was completely reserved. The conversation was formal and cold, despite Karl's efforts to introduce a warmer tone. Czernin was evasive and made no concrete proposals; he obviously had no enthusiasm for these peace discussions. Sixtus insisted on precise terms. 'I will give them to you to-
.
'
morrow
those unfortunates
who
put himself at Erdody's disposal, saw them pass. Arriving in Vienna on the night of March 22, the three men went to Erdody's house. The Princes remained there, while their host himself proceeded to deliver Sixtus' written messages to the Emperor at Laxenburg Castle some miles south of the city. At 6 pm the following evening Erdody conducted Sixtus and Xavier to Laxenburg. The night was dark and snow was falling, as it had done for the past two days. The car stopped in an outer courtyard. From there an old captain of the guard, who had served many years at the court and enjoyed the complete confidence of the Emperor, led them through the grounds. Upon receiving the password, the sentinels, their coat collars raised against the icy storm, let them pass. The Princes, Erdody and their guide entered the castle by a side door opening onto a staircase which led to
1904
Emperor
said finally,
an hour Czernin left. Karl accompanied him and returned shortly to say that Czernin would meet the princes at Erdody's house the next day, when, he trusted, the Foreign Minister's suspicions would give way to a more cordial attitude. The princes then left Laxenburg by the same way they had come. The storm was over; Vienna lay silent under a blanket of snow. On March 24, 1917 Czernin was somewhat more co-operative. He hesitated, however, to have Austria take the first step towards peace. His insistence upon maintaining secrecy was strong, for he feared
who live in the hell are dying there by' the hundreds every day, and come.' The next day, March 20, 1917, the two Princes told Erdody they would risk the venture. They left Geneva that evening. At the border only the commanding officer, under direct orders from the Emperor to all
of the trenches,
evening,' the
after taking his Foreign Minister aside After being in the room for less than half
I I ^
i
lest Germany discover Austria's bid for peace. Czernin had special cause for fear: he was scheduled to meet the German policy-makers in Berlin two days later. As Czernin departed, Erdody begged him not to waste time — 'you know better than I that we cannot hold out indefinitely'. He then told Sixtus that Czernin was convinced that peace was necessary. That evening, again in the greatest secrecy, Sixtus and Xavier returned to Laxenburg. The Emperor handed to Sixtus a letter he had written, saying: 'Here are the fuller particulars as promised.' They talked for some time. Afterwards, accompanied by Erdody, the princes left Austria for Switzerland. They arrived in France on March 30, 1917. That evening they had a letter advising them that Poincare wanted to see them the next morning. At that time Sixtus had his third meeting with the President of France, to whom he submitted the letter Karl had handed him at Laxenburg a week earlier. In this letter, written in his own hand, the Em-
peror addressed himself to each of the major points put to him by Sixtus. He promised to use all his influence to 'support the just claims of France in regard to Alsace-Lorraine. As for Belgium, she must be fully re-established in her sovereignty, retaining the whole of her African possessions, without prejudice to the compensations she may receive for the losses she has sustained.' Serbia, too, the Emperor continued, 'will be re-established in her sovereignty, and as a token of our good will we are willing to grant her a just and natural access to the Adriatic Sea, as well as liberal economic concessions.' AustriaHungary required, in return, 'that the Kingdom of Serbia shall for the future abandon all connection with and shall suppress every society or federation of which the political object is the disintegration of Monarchy, and particularly the the "Narodna Obrana" [the 'Black Hand', responsible for the assassination of Arch-
duke Franz Ferdinand on the question of the
in 1914]'. Finally,
Straits, the
Emperor,
using the March revolution as an excuse, was evasive: 'The events which have taken place in Russia compel me to withhold my ideas in regard to her until a legal and
compact government shall have been established there.'
Poincare and Jules Cambon — attending the meeting in the absence of Alexandre Ribot, who had replaced Briand as Premier and Foreign Minister — raised questions about the Emperor's attitude towards Russian claims to Constantinople. They also asked Sixtus for more precise information than Karl had supplied regarding France's recovery of the frontiers of 1814 and the compensations Belgium could expect. After receiving reassurances from the Prince, Poincare made clear that he was aiming not for an armistice but for a separate peace with Austria that would seriously weaken the Central Powers. On the whole, he found Karl's proposals favourable enough for transmission to Britain.
The question of
Italy April 11, 1917 Ribot met the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, at Folkestone and showed him the Emperor's letter. Lloyd George believed that Italy should be made aware of the possibility of peace with Austria. Ribot objected, stating that the negotiations with Karl should remain completely secret. Finally, he agreed that he and Lloyd George should arrange a meeting with the Italian Premier and Foreign Minister, Baron Sidney Sonnino, to discuss the question of peace, without actually mentioning Karl's offer. The next day Sixtus had his fourth secret interview with Poincare; this time Ribot was present. They reviewed the latter's talk with Lloyd George. Sixtus, aware of the intense hostility between Austria and Italy, insisted that his brother-in-law's proposals must not be revealed to the Italians, who might leak them to the Germans, thus endangering not only the peace negotiations but also, perhaps, the life of the Emperor. On his way to the Allied conference set for April 19, 1917, at St Jean de Maurienne, Lloyd George met Sixtus in Paris. The Prime Minister stressed the need to obtain Italian agreement to a separate peace with Austria. He urged the Prince to allow the British and French to inform the Italians of Karl's peace moves. Sixtus, fearing that
On
any further increase in the number of people who knew the secret might result in a leak, refiised. Lloyd George then suggested that soundings of the Italian attitude might be made by referring to the peace feelers being extended in Switzerland by Count Albert Mensdorff, former Austrian Ambassador to Britain. Sixtus favoured this approach, and he and Lloyd George agreed to meet again after the Allied gathering on the next day. At St Jean de Maurienne Lloyd George and Ribot cautiously brought up the possibility of peace negotiations with Austria. Sonnino was vehemently opposed course.
He wanted
territorial
to this
gains for
Trieste, Dalmatia Italy — the Trentino, and the Adriatic islands — which he knew
could be obtained only by a complete military victory; otherwise he could not justify his own role in bringing Italy into the war on the Allied side. He also feared, not without reason, that the Central Powers would use the peace proposals in an attempt to break up the Entente. Ribot and Lloyd George gave in to their obstinate ally. Regarding any approaches Austria might make, the three statesmen concluded, 'it would not be opportune to enter on a conversation which, in present circumstances, would be particularly dangerous and would risk weakening the close unity that exists between the Allies and is more than ever necessary.' This sounded the death knell of Sixtus' attempt to negotiate peace. Lloyd George described the St Jean de Maurienne meeting to the Prince on April 20, 1917. He warned Sixtus that Britain and France were bound not to make peace without Italy. He revealed Sonnino's demands and expressed the hope that the Emperor would see fit to meet them — before an Allied military victory brought even harsher ones. Sixtus doubted that Karl would agree to grant his Italian enemy in a peace settlement what the Italians
had been unable
to
win by force of
arms. Lloyd George, while acknowledging that negotiations at present were out of the question, emphasised that they might well be possible if Austria should prove willing to make concessions to Italy. Two days later Sixtus saw Jules Cambon, who delivered the French reply to the note which Karl had handed to his brother-in-
law at Laxenburg on March 24, 1917. The Prince wrote out Cambon's verbal message, which was summed up by the first sentence: 'No overtures of peace from Austria can be considered without an equal consideration of the views of the Italian government.'
proposals ignored which, as had been ascertained at St Jean de Maurienne, that power was 'not disposed to abandon'; therefore, Cambon continued, 'there is no good in our carrying on negotiations which can only end in a deadlock'. He then mentioned to Sixtus, as Lloyd George had, that Austria might in future secure a separate peace if she took into account 'the aspirations of Italy Karl, however, had declared, according to Czernin, that 'he would rather die than cede even a square metre of the Monarchy to Italy'. Although the Prince made further efforts, including a second trip to Vienna, hope of effective negotiation was now at an end. The Sixtus negotiations failed because each party involved had a different conception of what they should achieve. In Austria, the Emperor Karl and Czernin Karl's
Italy's claims,
.'
.
.
wanted a general peace between the Allied and Central Powers. As the adamancy of both Germany and the Allies made such a solution impossible, Karl was personally inclined towards making a separate peace in order to save the Habsburg Empire. Czernin was opposed to this idea and Karl himself was too indecisive to strike out boldly on a course that would rouse the hostility of Germany. Nor would he sacrifice Austrian territory on the altar of Italian ambition in order to extricate the Monarchy from the war (although Sixtus must bear some responsibility for not properly stressing the importance of Italian demands). Traditional AustroItalian enmity was not the only thing responsible for his reluctance. Karl felt that granting Italian demands, even in regard to Italian-speaking areas of Austria, might set a precedent which, if followed by all the subject nationalities, would spell doom for the Empire more surely than continued warfare. The British and French, for their part, were not anxious to conclude a separate it helped them war aims. The Allied governments feared that any talk of peace
peace with Austria unless to
realise
their
would lend support to left-wing critics of the war on the home front and strengthen agitation for an immediate end to the fighting — at the very time when American entry into the war seemed to assure
them
of ultimate
military
victory.
The
French
perhaps suspected also that if Italy secured her war aims in a separate peace with Austria, her principal enemy, she would not join battle with Germany, France's major foe. The change of French premiers in March 1917 was of some importance, for Ribot
than Briand
to
was
make
far peace.
more hesitant
The failure of negotiations was of special significance for Karl and Sixtus. They recognised that the continuance of war threatened the Austrian Empire with disruption. Karl rightly feared that he might lose his throne. Sixtus wanted not only to save his brother-in-law but also to buttress the older monarchical order of Europe against the new force of mass politics. Successful peace negotiations in 1917 might not have achieved these goals; unsuccessful ones certainly did not. Further Reading Kann. Robert A., The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform In the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1950) Lloyd George, David, War Memoirs (Ivor Nichol-
son & Watson 1934) May, Arthur J., The Passing of the Hapsburg Monarchy. 1914-1918 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966) Poincare, Raymond, Au Service de la France, IX, L'Annee trouble 1917 (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1932)
Scherer, Andre & Jacques Grunewald, L'Allemagne et les problemes de la palx pendant la
premiere guerre mondiale.
II
(Paris:
Presses
Universitairesde France, 1966) Sixte de Bourbon, L Off re de palx separee de TAutnche (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1920) Suarez, Georges, Briand: Sa vie — son oeuvre, IV. Le Pilote dans la tourmente. 1916-1918 (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1940) Zeman, Z. A. B., The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire, 1914-1918: AStudy in National and Social Revolution (Oxford University Press 1961)
[For Marvin Schwartz' biography, see page 704.]
1905
PERSIA THE NEUTRAL BATTLEGROUND While the British advanced on the Turks along the Tigris, the Russians were moving on them from the north — from neutral Persia. At first the Russian advance went well, but then the Turks counterattacked, and the war see-sawed across north-western Persia with no real advantage being gained by either side. Major D. G. Clark right: German aerial support for the Turks: a reconnaissance aeroplane is loaded onto a railway flatcar on its way to the front through the Taurus mountains. Far right: North-west Persia. In this neutral but strategically placed area the Turks and the Russians fought for the positions which could dominate the campaigns in the Caucasus and along the Tigris
Above
1916 marked a turning point for the Central Powers in their bid For nowhere and at no time were the divergent aims of Germany and Turkey more amply demon-
to gain control in Persia.
The same story held true for Britain and Russia. Whatever the First World War was being fought for elsewhere, the reasons for the conflict in Persia were specific to the area and represented national or at least governmental aspirations. The fighting contestants were Turkey and Russia. Certainly no battle was ever fought solely on behalf of Persia and there was every reason for the growth of virulent xenophobic feelings among the Persians. The country was governed by the last ineffectual and vacillating member of the Qajar dynasty assisted by a cabinet and majlis. The latter two embryos of democracy were really the result of the July 1909 uprising, but their hopes of better government were soon sunk in foreign debt and a sea of maladministration. In January 1916 the majlis, who had been in session for only a year after a 24 year suspension, were again dissolved. Cabinets had succeeded each other with alarming rapidity and were distinguishable one from the other only by their growing incompetence and the occasional breathtaking acts of concupiscence of their members. Persians themselves had no wish to fight a war that had little relevance to them, and the government had neither the power nor the resources to lead the country in battle to evict the foreigner. By the beginning of 1916 each combatant, and here are included Germany and Britain, had its supporters in the Persian government and among the more influential tribal chiefs — support which was more often bought than given from genuine conviction. Local levies of varying degrees of efficiency and loyalty took up arms spasmodically on behalf of the Central Powers and the Allies. Persia tottered along the path of neutrality terrified by the apparent might and invincibility of Turkey and Germany and cowed by the long established occupation by Russia and the provisions of the 1907 Anglostrated.
Russian Convention. In this chaotic situation, then, two events of significance occurred at the beginning of the year. Shah Ahmad, recovering from the threatened German-inspired coup of the previous November, finally decided to conclude an agreement with Britain and Russia on the proviso that the Russian operations then current against the Turks were successful. These operations, commenced in December 1915, did in fact achieve their aims. With the pressure of the Central Powers much reduced, a new Persian cabinet
1906
^^P' pro-British Farman Farma — previously Minister of the Interior — as Prime Minister. Although avaricious, Farman Farma was one of the very few members of the government prepared to take decisions and enforce them and to remain loyal to one side alone. The second event was the visit to the Turco-German positions inside Persia by Lieutenant-Colonel von Kiesling as von der Goltz' personal representative. Kiesling stayed in Persia from January 25 to February 6, 1916, after which he returned hurriedly to Baghdad to report to von der Goltz and Berlin the true state of affairs in Persia — in his eyes a sorry mess for the Central Powers. The report only confirmed von der Goltz' own thoughts on the so-called Persian campaign. These events are worth examining in some detail as they serve to outline the various conflicting motives of all four nations — motives which beset both sides with difficulties. For the Allied Powers the appointment of Farman Farma provided an immediate boon from the purely military viewpoint. The new Prime Minister made strenuous attempts to re-establish the authority of the Tehran government and to control the tribal chiefs. More important he dismissed the senior officers of the Swedish Gendarmerie who by 1916 were openly in revolt against the government and supporting German activities. In its place he agreed to increase, to some 10,000 men, the Persian Cossacks who were to be officered, equipped and maintained by Russia. More interesting was the opening of talks on January 16 between London, Petrograd and Tehran on the proposed new agreement with Persia. It quickly became clear that Russia was not really interested in the agreement. Her troops under Baratov — now reinforced to a total strength of 9,000 sabres, 10,000 rifles and 36 guns — continued to push the Central Powers back into Mesopotamia. Kangavar was occupied on January 13 to be followed by Sultanabad on January 21 and Kermanshah on February 25. Under these conditions Russia's hand was so strong that concessions to Persia seemed unnecessary. In Tehran a conspiracy forced Farman Farma to resign on March 2 to be replaced by Sipah Salar, a confirmed Russophile. The British Minister in Tehran — Marling — attempted to prevent the fall of Farman Farma but failed. British policy required a Persia sufficiently strong to remain neutral and thus prevent access by the Central Powers to India and to protect British commercial interests already established. For Britain the sapping effect that a Persian campaign would have on the Turks in Mesopotamia was a distinctly dubious bonus but one which the Turks gave the Allies no chance to reject. Russia's policy was otherwise, and it is worth examining it bearing in mind the ninth instruction in Peter the Great's purported will, thus: 'To approach as near as possible to Constantinople and India. Whoever governs there will be the true sovereign of the world. Consequently excite wars not only in Turkey but in Persia. And in the decadence of Persia penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf advance as far as India. Arrived at this point, we shall have no longer need of England's gold.' For Petrograd, opportunity seemed at last to have offered itself; a way round the restrictions of the 1907 Convention. Baratov's Russian force in north-west Persia was in effect a detached extension of the left
was formed with the
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Caspian
Sea
V^ Oazvin
flank of the main Caucasus Army. This army had commenced a general offensive against the Turks, which was to take them into eastern Anatolia, on January 16. Its left flank was based in Persian Azerbaijan facing Turkish forces across Lake Urmia with Baratov some 250 miles further south. From a Russian viewpoint Baratov protected this left flank and enabled the strong grip already established in Persian Azerbaijan and Gilan to be further enhanced. Russia's interest in a stable Persia was minimal and instructions to push ahead with the proposed new agreement were not issued to de Etter, the Russian Minister in Tehran, until mid-July when Baratov's position had become precarious. Even so the terms demanded and finally obtained by Russia were disadvantageous to Persia. Marling reported to the Foreign Office in August that a great opportunity had been lost for setting relations between the three countries on a new and practical basis. Returning to the second event, there is no doubt that Germany and Turkey looked on Persia with different eyes. Von der Goltz had originally been instructed to destroy Russian and British influence in Persia and to make Persia independent. This necessitated the formation of a pro-German army controlled by a government sympathetic to Germany's war aims. Persia would then become part of a German sponsored Islamic Federation hostile to the Allies. Under these circumstances Germany would have unrestricted access to Afghanistan — likewise to be persuaded into the Federation and encouraged specifically to embarrass British India. There can be little doubt that in destroying Allied influence in Persia, Germany also had eyes on the mineral wealth of both Persia and southern Russia. For these reasons von der Goltz had been given command of the whole motley collection of officers and expeditions sent from Germany and Turkey to Persia together with their extremely active military attaches and the numerous 'consuls' and quasi-diplomatic personnel infiltrated into the country. The latter spread propaganda, to the unlikely effect that the Kaiser had become a Moslem, and raised local levies to take control of the towns where they were ostensibly the consuls. In fact von der Goltz' own visit in December of the previous year together with the report prepared by Kiesling convinced the German Commander that such a grandiose aim was impractical at least at the outset of 1916. Payments to locals for support amounted to 2,000,000 marks per month for very little return. The General Staff in Berlin fondly believed that some 35,000 Persians were under arms in support of the Central Powers; the truth was nearer 5,000, of which 3,000 were the Swedish Gendarmerie. Further, the line of communication, bad enough between Constantinople and Baghdad, was even worse over the comparatively short distance from Baghdad to Kermanshah — the operational base inside Persia. To make serious inroads against the Russians in Persia more money, personnel and material were needed but all were then limited especially with the Kut operation reaching its climax. Worse, the pro-German Democrats in the majlis while demanding ever increasing subsidies seemed incapable of and uninterested in any activity more warlike than talking. Von der Goltz recommended a holding operation in Persia and even this would be straining his resources.
Turkish interests in Persia
in
1916 were openly and
critically
The Pan-Islamic dream of Abdul Hamid was dead and the Committee of Union and Progress had embarked on the theory of Pan-Turan — a single nation embracing all peoples of Turkish origin. In consequence their approach to Persia was one of undisguised aggrandisement. The success at the Dardanelles certainly contributed to this attitude. The friction between the respective staffs of the two Central Powers was partially checked by the personality of von der Goltz and the respect given to him as an undoubted brilliant soldier. His death and the victory of Khalil at Kut in April 1916 changed the situation radically. Khalil succeeded von der Goltz and the Turkish government with little different.
immediate threat
its attention on Chief-of-Staff— went unheeded as did Gleich himself in June. Enver, after a visit to Baghdad in May 1916, agreed to a reallocation of forces between Mesopotamia and Persia and declared that thenceforth Persia was to be the main theatre of war for the Sixth Army. The war then in north-west Persia was fought during 1916 against a background of these conflicting aims. Two types of fighting may be distinguished; first, the crucial and' continuous campaign along the traditional route from Baghdad to Tehran, and secondly, the series of spasmodic actions that occurred throughout the country against tribal levies supporting the Central Powers and acting in a role akin to guerrillas. A true front as in Europe or even Palestine did not exist. Baratov's winter offensive continued to drive back the Turco-
Persia.
to face
The counsels
on the Tigris turned
of Gleich
— Khalil's
German
forces towards Baghdad throughout February and March. Russian troops entered Karand on March 12, were dislodged five days later and then remained halted — short of supplies and handicapped by bad weather and poor communications. Nevertheless the influence of the Central Powers was so diminished by these reverses that the previously mutinous Wali of Posht-e Kuh gave assurances of his loyalty to the Tehran government. Elsewhere Russian forces had cleared Turks, Germans and their levies from E§fahan. This event served to strengthen the agreement that had just been made between Marling and the Bakhtiari khans for the protection of the route to the south, and the Anglo-Persian oil wells. The situation caused von der Goltz to inform Berlin, rather dispiritedly, that he would attempt to hold Qasri Shirin (the border town between the Baghdad vilayet and Persia) but he was unsure if this was possible.
1907
Kut had become critical and the requested Russian assistance in an attempt to draw Turkish forces away from the Tigris. In consequence Baratov was instructed in early April to resume his advance along the Baghdad route. Additionally the left flank of the Caucasus Army was to move from the Lake Urmia area down the road to Mosul - in this they could rely on the active support of the remainder of the Assyrian peoples, driven out of their own home by the Kurds, and encamped in the Urmia area. On reflection it is doubtful if the Allied Powers realised just how badly organised Turkey and Germany were at this stage. Baratov, although suffering from shortages due to the priority given by the Russians to their main theatre of war in Turkish Armenia and Anatolia, was still considerably stronger than the troops of the Central Powers barring his route on the Pai Taq Pass. The internal disarray of the Turkish and German staffs exacerbated by the death, on April 19, of von der Goltz seems to have remained unnoticed or incorrectly appreciated by the Allies. The Pai Taq Pass was held by some 6,000 Turkish infantry with 12 guns and some locally recruited Persians -all commanded by a Colonel Bopp who was von der Goltz' representative in Persia. Bopp was unhappy about the reliability of the Persians but at the vital moment, when attacked by the Russians on April 28, it was Bopp himself who panicked and ordered a withdrawal of his forces to Ba'qubak some 30 miles from Baghdad. By May 7 Baratov had occupied Qasri-Shirin and entrenched his forces eight miles west of the town facing the Turkish held town of Khanaqln. The Khanaqln position was commanded by Shevket Bey, previously a subordinate of Bopp, who had refused to join the latter's panic. Baratov was too weak to push further into Mesopotamia and in any case his attack came too late to save Kut from surrender. Further north, Chernozubov, commanding the left flank of the Caucasus Army, had captured Rawandiz on May 13 and his advance guard was close to Mosul by May 16. This stage marked the limit of the Russian offensive in north-west Persia in 1916. The fall of Kut allowed Khalil to despatch reinforcements to Khanaqln and they consisted of the greater part of the Turkish 2nd Division and a cavalry brigade. The threat to Baghdad was removed, Bopp was dismissed and the Persians who had retreated with him refused to return to the front. Into this situation came Enver, with his German advisers — the latter, based in Constantinople, had little idea of the difficulties of supporting a campaign in Persia. All disagreed with Gleich's advice and he requested permission to resign. Enver decided that the Sixth Army attack on Persia would be co-ordinated with a counteroffensive by the Second and Third Armies in the north. While in Baghdad Enver met Nizam as Sultanah, the renegade Persian Governor of Luristan, and reached agreement on Nizam's future role. Well satisfied, Enver departed for the At
this stage the situation at
British
capital on
May
25.
A heavy price By
the beginning of June most of the Turkish XIII Corps was concentrated at Khanaqln. Khalil's relations with his Chief-ofStaff had further deteriorated and the Turkish Commander had ordered the withdrawal of all German officers with Persian levies. Thenceforth German influence on the Persian campaign was minimal. It was at this time that the Russians tried to take Khanaqln. The attack was repulsed and the Turkish forces commanded by Ali Ishan Pasha started to drive the Russians back down the road they had so lately captured. Qasri Shirin fell on June 9 followed by Karand on June 26. On July 1 the Turks were once again established in Kermanshah and Saratov's position looked most precarious. Fortunately the Turks halted at Kermanshah. Some consequences of this bouleversement were foreseeable: Russia suddenly became more agreeable to negotiating a new treaty with Persia, the major tribes in the area were again infested with the agents of the Central Powers and Britain was asked by Russia for assistance in dealing with attacks by pro-
Turkish levies on their ines of communication. The treaty when finally concluded on August 7 was sufficiently unpopular to bring about the downfall of Sipah Salar and his replacement by the moderate but pro-Allied Vossuk-ud-Dowla. The treaty itself allowed for a monthly subsidy to Persia of 200,000 Tomans and the gradual establishment of a single paramilitary police force some 22,000 strong, with British and Russian instructors. In return Persia agreed to the supervision of the country's finances by a mixed commission — a heavy price indeed. After the July pause the Turkish forces commenced a new advance ;.nd occupied Hamadan on August 9 — forcing the Russians to take up a last ditch position across the Qazvin road at the Sultan Bulag Pass. The Commander-in-Chief in India asked the 1
1908
War Office for a Tigris offensive to draw back some of the Turkish troops from Persia, who in Indian eyes had nearly opened the route to Afghanistan. Lake in Mesopotamia countered the request saying that a move by the Indian Expeditionary Force was just not possible. The position was sufficiently desperate for Baratov to recommend a partial evacuation of Tehran. Allied predicament As with the situation in early April, the Turks, like the Russians earlier, seemed not to have been fully aware of the Allied predicament. The Turks attempted no formal move before October and by then the Allies had improved their position significantly. By mid-September Baratov's forces were rested and he had received some reinforcements from the Caucasus. During this second pause in the Turkish offensive the Allies were able to stabilise a potentially difficult situation in the E§fahan area. A concentration of Bakhtiari rebels were defeated by the Russian garrison and pursued with success by a levy of British officered Bakhtiaris. Further, Sir Percy Sykes reached E§fahan on September 1 1 with his column to support the Russians. Once more the differing interests of the contestants became apparent. Britain made it quite clear that the Turco-German Bakhtiari threat in the E§fahan area seemed the most dangerous, and that Sykes' column was to remain there to counteract it. The safety of the oilfields in the south was uppermost in the mind of the British government and it was emphasised that the British troops in E§fahan were not intended in any circumstances to become a part of Baratov's force. Turkish strength when they recommenced their advance at the end of October amounted to 18,000 men including 21 battalions of infantry and 50 guns. The Russians mustered some 23,000 troops spread from QazvTn to E§fahan. A little over half the Russian force faced the Turks in the Hamadan area. The Turkish attack was made with only 10 battalions and 16 guns. The attack was contained and thereafter to the end of the year little major activity occurred although Baratov succeeded in cutting the route north from Hamadan to Bljar. Much of the Turkish inactivity seems to have stemmed from their supply problem which had become so acute that the possibility of a withdrawal was mooted by Sixth Army Headquarters in order to shorten the route from the Baghdad base. The 250 miles of country from the border to Hamadan had been continuously fought over for some 18 months and in the second winter of the campaign famine conditions prevailed. The withdrawal suggestion was met with indignation by the Persian Democrats who threatened, and later engineered, attacks by local tribesmen on the retreating forces of the Central Powers. In fact no withdrawal took place in 1916, both sides attempting to replenish and build up their forces. Baratov prepared his columns for yet another offensive to coincide on this occasion with the main advance of the British up the Tigris with the intention of preventing the XIII Corps from returning to reinforce their compatriots in Baghdad. Further north the Russian grip in the Lake Urmia area had remained firm if static with Turks and their Kurdish levies still occupying parts of the territory between Saujbolagh (Mahabad) near the lake and Sinneh (Sanandaj) to the north of Kermanshah. A year of fighting then with what result? For Persia a disadvantageous agreement with her erstwhile protectors, famine, disruption and the doubtful honour of remaining the chosen battlefield of two adjacent voracious neighbours. For the Allies the Turco-German thrust had been contained but only just and there was still no guarantee of a pacified Persia in the following years. For the Central Powers the rift between German and Turkish military leaders had worsened to the point where Turkey had chosen to go it alone. The diversion of most of the Turkish XIII Corps to the Persian front had left the opposition on the Tigris to Maude seriously weakened but the Pan-Turanic dream remained strong in Enver's mind. Germany's hopes of an Islamic Federation were almost dead and the chances of a real revolt against RussoBritish influence a mere chimera. In all no one can have been satisfied. The only winners were the tribal chiefs accruing profits from nebulous promises of assistance to both sides and this perhaps was as it should have been. Unfortunately many more accrued only the diseases attendant upon starvation. Further Reading Fatemi, N. S., Diplomatic History of Persia (Russell Moore, New York 1952) Klesling, H. V.. Mit Feldmarschall von der Goltz (Dietrich 1922) Moberly, Brigadier General F. J., Official History of the War; Operations in Persia 1914-1919; Ttie Campaign m Mesopotamia (HMSO) Sykes, C, Wassmuss (Longmans 1936) Sykes, Sir Percy, History of Persia Vol II (Macmillan 1921)
[For Major Clarke's biography, see page 1347.]
*?•
ISSAL -1%
^•.
sjcmbol of *iQJ(i to. fight
and his own*
fe irdipfherye
i^Kig fa^Ji i^
'
^re«acimirat)le quaHties Jbut affe»>tw& years of
',
jgicfend Jaetieal.j^ajis^
IQ, tRe
-
j
j
.^
4 "^***i
.^j^
*i^
^
in November 1916, General Joffre presided over the great Inter-AUied Conference at his Chantilly headquarters, his prestige and authority seemed to all outward appearances as considerable as ever. He was, however, already more the symbol of power in France than its reality, for the control of war policy was slipping rapidly from his hands into those of a disturbed and divided National Assembly, and by the end of the year Joffre had been retired from the august isolation of his Grand Quartier General (GQG) to the obscurity of a makeshift office in Paris without a staff, without work and without power. But if the mechanics of his dismissal can be quickly described, the story of JoflFre's downfall stretches back for some time. Initially the National Assembly had been united behind the government and its
When,
Commander-in-Chief The German declaration of war had produced a remarkable reconciliation, not only nationally but also among the traditionally fractious parties of the Chamber of Deputies. A series of resolutions, passed without dissent, gave the government exceptional powers over the life of the nation and handed to General Joffre almost exclusive control of war policy. Such power in the hands of a single military leader would at any other time have been viewed with alarm, but in August 1914 it mattered little for the war was expected to be short. To this constitutional basis of Joffre's authority other elements were rapidly added. He soon gained vast prestige from the victory of the Marne, and his headquarters, the GQG, assumed the nature of a government in itself after the almost indecent haste of the National Assembly's flight to Bordeaux when, for a time at least, the repute of politicians fell to its lowest point for decades. As one officer later put it: 'After the victory of the Marne there was in reality only one power in France, that of Joffre and his staff.' What is more, the factor of political acceptability
which had
played such an important part in Joffre's initial apjjointment as Chief of the General Staff in 1911 served now to confirm his authority. He was the guileless 'ban bourgeois', the avowed Republican who would present no threat to the political
1910
supremacy of the civil power. But perhaps the most important element in Joffre's personal authority was his serene self-confidence and impenetrable calm. Rock-like and imperturbable, the squat person of the Generalissime was the comforting bastion around which the resistance of the French nation hardened. The progressive erosion of the power and prestige of the French Commander-in-
emptorily sacked after the reverses of 1914 and the similar number he had abruptly replaced in 1915, were some who did not scruple at carrying tales of the inefficiency of the High Command to the politicians of their choice in Paris. By these means Parliament was able to find out enough of what was going on at the front to be able to exercise a
modicum
of control
Chief, which finally culminated in his overthrow in December 1916, can be attributed
Joffre's reputation.
a variety of factors, but all of them relate to the central problem with which the French nation was confronted after the solidification of the trench lines on the Western Front. In October 1914 the German armies stood in occupation of ten of France's richest departements. From this territory they had to be ejected by force of arms, and this at a time when the nature of military technology lent immense power to the defence. The time that would be required to effect this military policy, and the appalling cost in French manhood that
Quenching fire with petrol One particular dismissal whose quences the French commander
to
execution would entail, were sufficient rend apart the 'sacred union', threaten the foundations of the Third Republic and topple Joffre from his command. There were in any case several cracks in the institutional armour with which Joffre attempted to clothe his conduct of operations. For a time he was able to keep the battlefront free from the prying eyes of parliamentary commissions, to control its
to
the publication of war reports in the Press and to shield President Poincare from the more brutal truths of the war through the mollifying personality of the presidential liaison officer. General Penelon, aptly nicknamed 'April Smiles'. He could not however control the comings and goings of the many soldier-deputies who, while serving on the front with the armies, still retained the legal right to return to the capital and speak in the Chamber. Among them, for instance, was the ex-Minister of War, Messimy, now a divisional general; but there were soon many others who had had first-hand experience of the limitations of the tactical resources and methods of
HQ
and who now began to voice complaints. In addition, among the many senior commanders whom Joffre had per-
Joffre's
and
to
begin the process of dulling the lustre of
consecould
have foreseen but which later returned to plague him, was that of General Maurice Sarrail. In 1914 Sarrail had served as an army commander with some distinction if, typically, with scant obedience. He had commanded the Third Army in the Verdun sector and when Joffre, perhaps mindful of the fate of Bazaine's army at Metz in 1870, permitted the abandonment of the fortress, Sarrail chose instead to defend it. Later local German successes and high French casualties bred discontent in the Third Army and finally, after an enquiry, Sarrail was 'put at the disposition of the minister'. By this bold stroke the Commander-in-Chief was not merely divesting himself of another inefficient commander, he was also throwing down the gauntlet to the Assembly and causing the government acute embarrassment; for Sarrail was the darling of the Left in the Chamber of Deputies, 'the only true Republican general' whose popular backing made him a disturbing element in the French body politic which the military machine found very difficult to assimilate. In the summer of 1915 and without consulting Joffre the scarcely
government sent Sarrail
to
command
in
Salonika, perhaps hoping thereby to put a couple of thousand miles between themselves and trouble. In view of the delicate political and alliance problems that beset the Balkan command and knowing Sarrail's fondness for intrigue, this decision was like trying to quench fire with petrol. Parliament saw Sarrail as the victim of bad luck and clerical malice and Joffre's share in his fate was a further contribution to the latter's eventual downfall.
Far left: Joffre witfi General Foch in 1914 This
was Joffre s hour— his
finest
leadership did much to restore the^haken fighting spirit of the French armies, and without him France might have lost the war by the end of the year Left: Joffre
and General
de Maud huy
In 1915^ His policy of attrition was soon to crush the
morale of It
showed
own army. Germans
his
the
that the French knew how to die, but this
was not enough Right: Joffre and Halg In April 1916, The massive slaughter which resulted from his decision to hold Verdun finally
destroyed
his reputation. it
was only
Now
a matter
of time before Papa Joffre was ousted
As the war continued with no sign of a decision, so the dissatisfaction of Parhament with its inabihty to affect war pohcy increased, particularly since the shortcomings of the staff were now very plain.
Minister of War by the veteran general Gallieni. If a closing of the military ranks was now to be expected between the two old comrades-in-arms from Madagascar
ruthlessness with which Joffre had dealt with inept formation commanders did not apparently extend to in-
politicians had welcomed the appointment of Joffre's old chief and recent rival for the glory of the Marne, hoping that it would at last restore the authority of the Ministry
Moreover,
the
members of his own staff; perhaps he was powerless to deal with them or possibly the worst errors of the HQ were concealed from him by the very nature of its bureaucratic structure, for few institutions connive at their own destrucefficient
tion.
Certainly the
GQG
increased the
antagonism of the Assembly by its cavalier treatment of all attempts to interfere with its self-sufficient and sovereign operation. In a sense the very isolation of the GQG, eqmdistant at Chantilly from both capital and battlefront, increased its vulnerability. Want of factual information provided the seed of rumour and soon the Paris Salons buzzed with tales of staff ineptitude and stories of the high and easy life enjoyed by the 500 officers who formed the core of Joffre's staff. These tales were in the main untrue for though the main headquarters was located in a former luxury hotel, its wartime inmates lived a monastic life and worked extremely hard. There is little doubt, however, that the GQG could be blamed for some of its commander's more serious mistakes, and the hostility it provoked in the country contributed largely to Joffre's final ruin. With the exception of the first gas attack at Ypres in April, 1915 saw the Germans on the defensive in France and it was Joffre who took the initiative. His offensives in Artois and Champagne were unsuccessful, and produced at the same time huge casualties for the attackers. Joffre's chosen description of this strategy was je les grignote' CI am nibbling at them'), and it was precisely this strategy which was crushing the morale of the French nation whose armies by the end of 1915 had suffered 2,000,000 casualties. Joffre had shown the Germans that the French knew how to die,
but was this enough?
In October 1915 the Viviani government fell, and Millerand, Joffre's faithful defender in the Chamber, was replaced as
days,
it
was not forthcoming. Indeed some
over Chantilly. They too were mistaken. Though Gallieni promised Joffre that he would support him and 'our heroic soldiers to the utmost', this did not necessarily indicate endorsement either of the Commander-in-Chief's particular strategy or of the existing military organisation it was applied. There were also personal reasons why their relationship might become strained. Joffre had shown no haste to offer Gallieni a more active command when operations passed out of the Paris war zone over which the latter held responsibility, and for some time a quarrel had been in progress between their staffs as to which general was the rightful wearer of the laurels of the Marne. The principals did not join the debate, but Gallieni disliked many of Joffre'^s collaborators and the two were soon engaged in acrimonious correspondence over the respective prerogatives of Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War. While manfully defending Joffre against the growing criticism within the Assembly, Gallieni sought to bring about changes in the administration of the forces, which was clearly defective, but which Joffre and the 'Young Turks' of his staff regarded as their incontestable concern. The medical and administrative sides of the military machine were particularly faulty and neither the unwillingness of the
through which
staff to provide information nor Joffre's efforts to discipline informers prevented the facts from being known. Gallieni thus found himself attacked for military shortcomings over which he had no control,
and he therefore determined
to carry out a drastic reorganisation in order to achieve a better co-ordination of the war effort. These changes, involving a clearer separation between strategic planning and logistics, Gallieni planned to effect by bringing Joffre back from Chantilly to Paris as
Commander-in-Chief with General de Castelnau taking executive command of the field armies on the Western Front. However, Briand and his cabinet shrank from the political crisis that this reorganisation would produce, for Joffre's position was too strong both in the country and with the Allies. Gallieni, in failing health, overall
The power struggle between Minister and General was thus resolved in the latter's favour, but the larger political battle of which it was only a part was gradually bringing slower but more certain victory for Parliament. Before Gallieni resigned in March 1916 he was compelled by the Chamber to re-establish Parliamentary Commissions of Control for the army. Since Joffre had not brought the expected victory in the field the deputies were determined to bring to heel an authority which, unlike the government, had hitherto escaped their scrutiny and control. Nevertheless, Gallieni's short period in office which, although it limited Joffre's authority in some respects, did extend it in others. Until the end of 1916 Joffre's command had been limited to the front in France, but in December of that year he was made 'Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies', and in one bound assumed the direction of French forces everywhere, including those under General Sarrail. One topic which brought the bitterest resigned.
exchanges
Joffre and Gallieni of Verdun, the scene of
between
was the question Sarrail's early
triumph and now to become of the Commander-in-
the instrument Chief's downfall.
Verdun — a storm of criticism The inadequacy
of the
Verdun defences had
been pointed out by one of those notorious soldier-deputies who were the bane of the GQG. Colonel Emile Driant, an extremely courageous and capable first
officer,
was both the commander of some
Chasseur battalions in the Verdun sector and also the deputy for a Verdun constituency in the Chamber. Exasperated by the complacent refusal of the GQG to provide sufficient reinforcements for his sector of the front, Driant took his complaint to the
parliamentary Army Commission. The contents of Driant's report reached Gallieni
1911
and the result was a heated clash with to know the identity soldier-deputy informant so that he could be disciplined. The GQG's attitude which continued until a month before the German attack was that the defences of Verdun were adequate and that it was not, in any case, likely to be attacked. Up to a few days before the onslaught began Joffre was still assuring Haig that it was Russia that the Germans were planning to attack. But it was on Verdun that the hammer-blow fell and the assault contin-
Joffre
who demanded
of the
ued until
late in
June, draining France of
reserves as her soldiers traded casualties with the Germans, losing 410,000 against the attackers' 245,000 in the first four months of the battle. Gallieni's resignation brought General Roques to the Ministry of War. Joffre and
Roques were old
friends, but this hardly increased the security of Joffre's position, for while the new Minister was confident
of his parliamentary abilities, his political acumen was minimal; his sole tactic seemed to be that of giving way on minor issues in the hope that the deputies would then leave alone the major ones. But they did not, for criticism of the High Command
and general war-weariness were now sweeping over the nation as a whole, mirroring and projecting the long-apparent discontent of the Assembly. The Press, particularly, was becoming increasingly hostile as Clemenceau, the cabinet- wrecker of old, thundered criticism in the pages of his paper L'Homme Enchaine, the censored successor to L'Homme Libre. Each day his leading article appeared as a censored blank and the suspicious Paris public, grown weary of hollow victories and accustomed to reading between the lines of journals which veiled their attacks on the
High Command more effectively than Clemenceau, wondered what fresh unpalatable truths a fearful government was hiding from them. Within the Ministry of War itself relations with the GQG worsened still further as Roques, bowing to the storm of criticism, authorised the rotation frontline duties of some of Joffre s hitherto invulnerable staff. As the violence of the Verdun fighting abated, the long-planned Somme offensive
to
1912
Above: Very well, carry on' says Napoleon to But although he may still have been a great force in the hearts of the French people at the end of 1916. to the cooler heads among the political and military leadership Joffre appeared to be the instigator of mistaken policies and the main stumbling block Joffre.
in the formation of new ones. It was, they thought, time for an infusion of new ideas
Opposite page: Top left: General Nivelle. the major contender for Joff res position as Commander of the Armies in the west Top right: Wilhelm cries. Joffre laughs' — a French postcard showing Joffre as the embodiment of French hopes and patriotism Se/ow; The Grand Old Man — a drawing of Joffre
of sustaining operations from the Aegean base were immense, but the situation was worse compounded for Joffre by the fact that Sarrail still commanded the enthusiastic support of a solid block of Leftwing deputies and at the same time oper-
Lyautey, the ex-governor of Morocco, now appointed under Briand's reorganisation to succeed Roques as Minister of War. The
ated an official French strategy' to which the British CIGS was "utterly opposed'. The Generalissime inflicted such petty annoyances as he could upon Sarrail while the latter replied by sniping at Joffre and GQG methods in various anonymous pamphlets and Left-wing newspapers. The British dislike of the whole Balkan involvement was particularly serious for Joffre since he had to rely increasingly on the goodwill of the Allies for the security of his position. Despite Sarrail's general military competence, his fondness for intrigue and his abrasive personal manner finally produced a command crisis which forced Joffre to the conclusion that an enquiry on the spot was necessary, something for which the British had long been clamouring. He received his first rebuff when the government turned down his nomination of the ultra-Catholic Castelnau to carry out the investigation; the Chamber of Deputies would never have accepted the 'monk in uniform' to report on its own particular military hero. His second defeat came with Briand's decision to send the Minister of War, Roques, intimating plainly that Joffre no longer had a free hand to deal with his own subordinates. The report which Roques delivered in late November completely exonerated Sarrail and was the final blow to the Commander-in-Chief. On November 29, against a background of violent attacks on Joffre in the Chamber, Briand made a late attempt to save his own Ministry by announcing a major reorganisation of the
was invested instead with the
High Command. 'Kicked upstairs'
Without Joffre France might well have lost the war in 1914 with him two years .
.
.
later she almost did was launched. This attack was the summit of Joffre's strategy, though the French forces, so weakened by Verdun, could now
play only a supporting role. The Somme, however, was just one more Allied failure, attended on this occasion by even greater casualties than the vain offensives of 1915. In June the first secret sessions of Parliament had revealed to the deputies the full measure of the High Command's neglect of the Verdun defences and all through the summer the rumbles against Joffre grew louder, for in the first ten months of 1916 the French army suffered casualties of 861,000 men and yet the trench line still lay doggedly immutable. Moreover, Joffre
could not recover his prestige by claiming credit for the later successes at Verdun;
own earlier mistakes were too wellknown and the particular contributions of his
Petain and Nivelle too obvious. During the autumn of 1916 the differences between Joffre, the government and Sarrail on the vexed Salonika question were also drawing to a head. The difficulties
Briand's reorganisation was essentially a compromise between the wishes of the Assembly for a root and branch reform of the GQG and the dismissal of Joffre, and his own desire to preserve some element of continuity in order to maintain the confidence of the Allies and to avoid the suggestion of his own acquiescence to military incompetence that too drastic a reform would imply. He planned to appoint Nivelle as Commander of the Armies in the West in place of Joffre, who w'as to move back to Paris as 'General-in-Chief of the French Armies' (the key word 'commanding' having disappeared from his title). But Briand's plan was too transparently a concession rather than a solution for the Chamber ever to accept it. In the words of one critic the reform would leave JofiFre as an 'unneeded extra cog', while another averred that the elevation of Joffre would do nothing to destroy the power of the GQG whose prisoner his successor would inevitably become: 'Unless we reorganise our High Command we are going to see the stubborn theory of the French General Staff" put into practice once more.' Briand reacted by chipping away further at Joffre's projected function, the proposal now being that he should have no executive powers but be merely 'Technical Adviser the Government'. This suggestion, to couched in language of studied ambiguity, left unanswered the vital questions of Joffre's relations with the government and with Nivelle. It also reckoned without the forthright views of his functions of General
result his old
a
new
was that Joffre, though relieved of command, never effectively received one, but by
way
of compensation title and dig-
nity of Marshal of France, the first to be created by the Third Republic. By this
means, on December 26, 1916 he was delicately hoisted into complete retirement, avoiding any demoralising public furore.
The
fall of
the Generalissime was a great
symbolic event.
He had outstayed two Ger-
man Commanders-in-Chief and chief
had lasted as
no Allied
The
responsilargest French forces ever raised had rested, for two long years, on the shoulders of a man whose only previous experience of active command had been of a battery of cannon in the great siege of Paris in 1870 and of a colonial expeditionary column to Timbuktu in 1894. Joffre was a man of no great intellectual calibre or strategic insight, but had been chosen originally for supreme command as a politically acceptable figurehead with whose uncritical support the worst excesses of the offensive a outrance were developed. His principal services to the French cause were neither in the field of strategy' nor tactics, but rather in those of psychology' and leadership, for he possessed utterly unshakeable nerves, an almost inhuman calm and abounding faith in his own ability. It was these qualities which were at such a premium after the disastrous reverses of bility
long.
for controlling the
August and September 1914 when the vaunted Plan 11 lay in ruins. Thereafter the moral, rather than the mental influence of Joffre did much to restore the shaken fighting spirit of the French armies, as he slowly effected the change to a defensive strategy, encouraging his commanders with his cool and reassuring presence at subordinate headquarters and, less expected perhaps, rooting out the host of
whom the German successes had revealed. After the Marne his position was unchallenged and his prestige was assured, yet the same com*placent confidence of Joffre's make-up, reflected and expanded by the sycophantic mediocrities who surrounded him in the GQG, brought France near to disaster at Verdun. Without Joffre France might well have lost the war in 1914, with him two years later she almost did. incompetent generals
Further Reading J. J., Tine Memoirs of Marslial Joffre (Bles 1932) King, J. C, Generals and Politicians (University of California Press 1951) Liddell Hart. Sir Basil. Reputations (Murray 1928) Recouly. R.. Joffre (Appleton & Co. 1931) Spears. Brig-Gen. E. L. Prelude to Victory (Jonathan Cape 1939) Watt, R M., Dare Call It Treason (Chatto & Windus 1964)
Joffre,
MAJOR C, A, KINVIG, a serving army officer, was educated at Durham University and later commissioned into the Royal Army Educational Corps His recent service has involved lecturing in Military History and War Studies in the United Kingdom and the Far East, and a years study at King's College. London. He is at present a lecturer in the Department of War Studies at RMA, Sandhurst.
On January
1917, temperatures in 1, Petrograd (St Petersburg) were sub-zero. From a bridge over the frozen River Neva, a few spectators watched a group of poUcemen who were standing around a hole in the ice. They were helping a diver scramble out of the water. When he was out, they heaved on a rope, and a body broke the surface. They dragged it on to the ice. It was a bearded man in his late forties; his face was battered and swollen. He was tied with ropes, but had managed to free one hand, which was raised to his chest, as if making the sign of the cross. He was wearing only one boot — the other was in the hands of a police inspector who stood by. It was this boot — found by a boy on the ice — that had led them to send divers down in this spot.
The inspector told one of the policemen: 'Go and telephone Makarov. Tell him we've found Rasputin. I'd say he's been shot.' Grigory Rasputin, who had been murdered three days before, had been for nearly a decade one of the most notorious figures in Petrograd. His murder was the result of a misunderstanding. He was known to be an intimate of the Tsarina Alexandra; many said he was her lover. She was known to interfere in the political decisions made by her husband, so it was generally assumed that Rasputin was the eminence grise behind the Russian throne, the man who was largely to blame for Russia's political chaos. Many people believed that both she and Rasputin were German spies. All this was nonsense. The political chaos was due largely to the weakness and vacillation of the Tsar Nicholas II. The Tsar had come to dislike and mistrust Rasputin — he put up with him only because he thought Rasputin was necessary to his wife's peace of mind. So Rasputin had little opportunity to interfere in politics, even if he had wanted to. His death made no difference whatever. The Revolution still came. Grigory Efimovitch Rasputin was born in Pokrovskoe, probably in 1870, a small village on the banks of the River Tura in Siberia, the son of a well-to-do peasant. Nothing much is known about his childhood, except that even at this time he was supposed to possess the gift of second sight. It is said that he was lying ill in a room where a group of peasants were discussing the theft of a horse. Suddenly, the boy pointed to one of the peasants and said 'That is the thief.' Rasputin's father explained hastily that the boy was in a fever, and the accused man calmed down. But 1914
RASPUTIN MADMAN
OR MIRACLE
WORKER?
Between 1907, when he
first exercised his powers of heaUng on the heir to the Russian throne, and the end of 1916, when he was sensationally murdered, Rasputin played an enigmatic role in the most powerful circles in Russia. There was, and still is, a plethora of lurid tales of orgies and political intrigue which depict Rasputin as a demonic madman, but they are based more on the imagination than on historical fact. Colin Wilson attempts to unravel the reality from the myth, showing the extent of his influence on Russian affairs and the real nature of his occult powers. Above: Rasputin. Without the hypnotic eyes which were often drawn on to photographs of him, Rasputin looks saintly
I
two of the peasants were sxispicious; they followed the man home, and watched him go into his barn and lead out the stolen horse and set it free. They beat him, and returned the horse to its owner. Tragedy pursued Rasputin's family; their mother died when Grigory was 12; his brother fell into the river and died after being dragged out; an epileptic sister also drowned when washing clothes at the river. Grigor>' had the wandering temperament; h°e worked for a contractor in Tobolsk as a carter, and drove all over the province. He was 16 when asked to drive a young novice to the monastery of Verkhotur'ye. On the way they talked religion, and when they arrived Grigory decided to stay on for a while. He ended by staying four months, and made such a good impression that he was presented with a sum of
money on
leaving. leave? Not because he disliked the religious life; on the contrary, religion satisfied a powerful inner craving. But he found chastity difficult. He liked women, and women liked him. His absence had caused less of a sensation than might be assumed. Pre-revolutionary Russia had one feature in conmion vdth India: there was nothing unusual in a man suddenly deciding to leave his family and become a monk or religious mendicant.
Why did he
So when Rasputin returned from Verkthere were no reproaches. He simply went back to work as a carter.
hotur'ye,
The beginning of the legend At 19 he married a girl who was
four
years his senior; but he continued to be a carter
and — like any travelling salesman —
continued to take advantage of peasant girls and farmers' daughters. The death of his son, at the age of six months, turned his thoughts back to religion. And one day, when he was ploughing, he claimed to have seen a vision of the Virgin in the sky, beckoning to him. He decided to go back to Verkhotur'ye to consult a hermit there. (His father was unimpressed; he remarked: 'Grigorv' has turned pilgrim out of laziness.') It was the end of his life as a respectable married man. The religious bug had bitten again. He was driven by an obscure craving, a desire to find a new kind of life in distant places. He walked the 2,000 miles to the monastery on Mount Athos, in Greece, then he went on to the Holy Land. In Kazan', on the way home, he again saw a vision of the Virgin, which confirmed his belief in his vocation. He arrived back home — two years and
10,000 miles later — and found that his pilgrimage had made him something of a celebrity. His wife had conceived a son in his absence, and she was soon pregnant with a daughter, Maria. But her husband had no intention of settling down again. He constructed an oratory in the back yard and spent much time there in prayer. His reputation grew, and he began to hold small services for groups of his followers. There can be no doubt that he remained as susceptible as ever to a pretty face, and this may be the reason that the village priest accused him of being a member of an heretical sect called the Khlysty, whose ceremonies were said to end in sexual orgies. Rasputin was not a member of the Khlysty, but for the sake of peace he decided to resume his travels. And at some point he discovered that he possessed natural powers of healing. Even today
much is known of thaumaturgy. All that seems certain is that a large number of people — it may be as many as 5% — have the power to cure illness by prayer and the laying on of hands. Rasputin possessed this power. And it was this that made him one of the most influential men in Russia. For Russia at this time was in the grip of a kind of 'occult mania'. Spiritualism had swept across from America in the 1870s, and the nothing
Da.niel Dunglas Home — often floated out of one window and in at another — was lionised at the Russian court. There was talk about Madame Blavatsky, the cousin of the Prime Minister Witte, and her 'hidden Masters' who were guiding mankind from the mountains of Tibet. Hypnotism — discovered a century earlier by a disciple of Anton Mesmer — was the latest popular fad among the bored aristocracy of Petrograd and Moscow. The Tsar's sister-in-law, the Grand Duchess Militsa, was an enthusiastic seeker of "occult' truth, and had introduced a hypnotist called Philippe Nizier-Vachot at court. It was 'Docteur Philippe' who was responsible for hypnotising the Tsarina into believing that she was pregnant with a boy.
amazing medium
who
But although her stomach swelled and she showed all the signs of approaching motherhood, it proved to be a phantom pregnancy; her reputation with her Russian subjects
sank
still
lower.
The royal favourite was at this point that the Grand Duchess Militsa, visiting a monastery in Kiev, came upon the tall, powerful figure of Grigory Rasputin, chopping wood in the courtyard It
to pay for his night's lodgings. One glance at Rasputin's hypnotic eyes convinced her
here was another miracle worker. She asked him to return with her to Petrograd, and the staretz (holy man) was agreeable. There she introduced him to her husband, the Grand Duke Peter, and to his brother, the Grand Duke Nicholas. that
Rasputin quickly established himself as a favourite with these members of the royal family by curing Nicholas's pet dog when it seemed to be on the point of death. This was probably late in the year 1903. The Grand Duke was so grateful that he paid for Rasputin's wife to come to a Petrograd clinic for an internal operation. Rasputin's usual method of healing seems to have been to pray devoutly at the bedside of the sick person. He also used the more orthodox method of laying his hands on the hand or forehead of the sick person, in which case he felt 'virtue' flow out of him. He made the acquaintance of the Tsar and Tsarina two years later, in November 1905, when the Tsar noted in his diary: 'We have got to know a man of God — Grigory — from the ToboPsk province.' By this time, the Tsarina had produced the much-desired heir to the throne; the boy Alexey was born on August 12, 1904. It was not until some time afterwards that they realised that he had inherited haemophilia — a hereditary disease in Queen Victoria's family (of which the 'Tsarina was a
member).
The crisis that turned Rasputin into the confidant and confessor of the Tsarina occurred some time in 1907 — the exact date is not recorded. The boy apparently fell and hurt himself: any bruise was enough to produce internal haemorrhage and high fever. Rasputin was already known to the Tsar and Tsarina; nothing natui'al than for them to send for the 'healer' on this occasion. His manners were blunt, honest, simple, and he was a delightful teller of fairy tales. With Rasputin around, an atmosphere of sanity and peace descended on the fevered royal household. Even without thaumaturgic powers, his influence on the sick boy was bound to be beneficial. This is how the Grand Duchess Olga described the occasion: The poor child lay in pain, dark patches under his eyes and his little body all
would be more
distorted and the legs terribly swollen. The doctors were just useless, more frightened than any of us. Alicky [the Tsar] sent a message to Rasputin. He reached the palace about midnight, or even later.' She did not see what followed, but records that the
1915
>3
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^ ,
^
J^
.'',;5^<** >-^^
H>--
A: «'
/•>
WV .
-«'
Rasputin arrived, and with him an atmosphere of sanity in the royal family Opposite page: Rasputin, peasant and fisherman. Left: Rasputin the peasant carter poses with his children. Below left: Tea with his family. Below right: The royal family. The
Tsarevitch Alexey (shown in his mother's arms), heir to the throne, was born on August 12, 1904. It was not until some time afterwards that they realised that he had inherited haemophilia, a hereditary disease in Queen Victorias family (of which the Tsarina was a member). Their dependence on Rasputin began in 1907 when he saved the Tsarevitch's ife. Bottom: Tea with some lady admirers
next morning, I just could not believe my The little boy was not just alive — but well. He was sitting up in bed, the fever gone, the eyes clear and bright. Later, I learned that Rasputin had not even touched the child, but merely stood at the foot of the bed and prayed. On a family so closely-knit, the effect of the incident can be imagined. The Tsarina was a shy, tense person, whose attachment to her husband and children was almost neurotically obsessive. Neither she nor her husband were really cut out to be Russia's reigning family; they would have been far happier as a bourgeois family in some small town. Rasputin became, in effect, a member of the family. He was welcome at Pushkin (Tsarsko Selo) — the country palace of the Tsar — whenever he chose to drop in — which was usually in the early evening, when the ceremony of putting the children to bed was a kind of religious observance. He joined in and told the children stories and played with the girls. Later, when his own daughters came to live with him in Petrograd, they were welcomed into the royal family in the same natural, easy way. eyes.
.9^ *^^M
ft*«iit .
«,/«iJiB^^^^^^^^H
1917
In 1905
he had hardly an enemy in the world; by 1909 he was the most hated man in Russia The Tsar accepted him, quite simply, as a holy man.. The Tsar's own spiritual adviser was the saintly — and reactionary — Father John of Kronstadt, who had been the confessor of Nicholas's father, Alexander III; and John of Kronstadt had the highest possible opinion of Rasputin — partly because, at this time, Rasputin was reactionary. The himself completely Archimandrite
Theophan,
another
fav-
was a supporter of Rasputin. So was Bishop Hermogen of Saratov, one of the most popular and revered men in Russia. And so was the
ourite of the Tsarina's,
monk
a fanatical preacher with of Savonarola about him, who believed, like Dostoevsky, that the Russian people were 'God bearers' who would save the world. Illiodor,
more than a touch
Holy man or drunken satyr?
Now
it was inevitable that this whole system — of choosing favourites arbitrarily
— should arouse furious resentment. The Tsar and Tsarina seldom went out into society, so they formed the most exclusive kind of clique. Even if Rasputin had been as genuinely saintly as John of Kronstadt or Theophan, he would have aroused envy and dislike. But he was a completely different kind of character; genuinely devout perhaps, and also generous and trusting; yet full of a kind of cheerful, pagan vitality. He liked squeezing attractive female disciples. He liked drinking sweet wine into the early hours of the morning and then flinging himself about in a Cossack dance. He felt that the flesh deserved its due. He was not a drunkard, and he was not a lecher: but his exuberant good humour and Whitmanesque
vitality could
easily be represented as the qualities of a drunken satyr by anybody who wanted to
slander him.
And many
did.
Why was
Rasputin so hated? The central reason was that the Tsarina was devoted to him. For her, he was a kind of father
and also a representative of the great Russian peasantry — which she feared figure,
and also idealised. She was perhaps .the most detested woman in Petrograd. If Rasputin was her favourite, it was enough to make him a thousand enemies immediately. In 1905, he had hardly an enemy in the world; by 1909, he was already on the
way The
to being the most hated man in Russia. liberals hated him because he repre-
sented everything they loathed — religious obscurantism, political reaction. The reactionaries hated him because they thought he was a charlatan who had gained
1918
Opposite page: Part of the mythicar Rasputin — caricature of an icon he is pictured as Rasputin the orgiast. Left: Another aspect of the myth- Rasputin the viper in the bosom of the Russian military hierarchy. Below left: Prince Yussupov. playboy, homosexual, exhibitionist and murderer of Rasputin. Below: The Tsar. Tsarina and the haemophiliac Tsarevitch Alexey carried by his ever-present servant In this
1919
Poisoned, shot in the back several times, beaten with an iron bar, kicked in the face, shot again, and then pushed through a hole in the ice into the River Neva the confidence of the Tsar by trickery. Most intelHgent people hated him because his adrairers
were gushing society women.
In 1908, he lost one of his most valuable supporters when John of Kronstadt died. By 1910, Hermogen, Theophan and Illiodor had all turned against him. Illiodor had invited Rasputin to look over the 'spiritual fortress' that he was building— with subscriptions from admirers — at Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad). Rasputin was apparently unaware that Illiodor was a homosexual; he joked with him about his ascetic attitude to women, and told stories of his own adulteries — in the days before he had seen the light. But when Illiodor went to Pokrovskoye with Rasputin, he became convinced that Rasputin still wallowed in the sins of the flesh. In his book The Holy Devil, Illiodor quotes Rasputin's wife as saying
'He has enough for Illiodor stories to
-^^^ti.
'X
all.'
back some of these Bishop Hermogen. At the same carried
time, the Prime Minister, Stolypin, told the Tsar that Rasputin led a life of debauchery, and that he made a habit of seducing his female disciples in the steam bath. The Tsar asked for proof, and Stolypin drew up a report based on the observations of police spies. The Tsar read it, then dropped it in a drawer. He was willing to believe it all, but determined that the Tsarina should not be disillus-
ioned because he was convinced it would shatter her. Stolypin decided to take matters into his own hands. He called on Rasputin, and told him that he had enough evidence to put him in gaol — on a charge of being a member of the Khlysty. Rasputin only stared at him in a penetrating way — which Stolypin assumed to be an attempt to hypnotise him. He ordered Rasputin to get out of Petrograd, on pain of arrest.
Another flash of second sight happened to suit Rasputin's own He was tiring of being spied on and attacked in the newspapers. He had always wanted to revisit the Holy Land, and now he could do it comfortably, financed by his disciples. So he went off— in March, 1911 — and when he returned, some months later, he went straight back to his home village, and lay low. He and the Tsarina had corresponded constantly. In early September, Rasputin and the Tsarina's friend, Anna Vyrubova, went to Kiev, where the Tsar was on a visit with Stolypin. As Rasputin saw Stolypin's carriage go past in the street, he had another of his strange flashes of second sight, and shoutThis
plans.
1920
^iX^'""^'
On June 27, 1914 by a half-crazed
the
first
attempt was made on Rasputin's life- he was stabbed in the stomach lay close to death for several weeks. Here he is shown recovering
woman and
.
.' He was right. That 'Death is after him. night, Stolypin was assassinated. Bishop Hermogen now had a try at bullying Rasputin. He sent for him, denounced him as a vile sinner, and ordered him to stay away from the Tsarina. Rasputin's response was to go to the Tsar with his own version of the story. As a result, Hermogen and Illiodor were banished. The Tsar was no longer so enthusiastic about Rasputin, but he was determined not to upset his wife. Besides, Rasputin continued to be the only one who could help the boy Alexey. This was demonstrated yet again in September 1912, when the Tsarevitch slipped and bruised himself as he sprang out of a boat. He began to haemorrhage, and went into a high fever. The doctors despaired of his life. Rasputin was in Pokrovskoye, more than 2,000 miles away, when he received a telegram about the boy's illness. He immediately telegraphed back 'The illness is not as dangerous as it seems.' As soon as the telegram arrived, .
.
the boy began to get better.
The
doctors
but had to admit that the cure with their ministrations. In 1915, Rasputin demonstrated his powers in front of the court doctors. Anna Vyrubova was involved in a railway accident that crushed her legs, and was obviously dying. Rasputin — in disgrace again at the time — was sent for. He went to the bedside, ignoring the Tsar and Tsarina, and took Anna Vyrubov's hand. She opened .' her eyes and said: 'Grigory, thank God. REisputin stood there, holding her hands and concentrating on her. Then he said: 'She will live,' and walked out of the room. Outside the door, he collapsed in a faint, exhausted. It was incidents like these that guaranteed his hold on the emotions of the Tsarina, no matter how his enemies raged. His luck was incredible. Every time the Tsar reached the end of his patience, some new crisis arose that made Rasputin seem indispensable. His luck began to run out on June 27, 1914 — the same day
were
baffled,
was nothing
to do
.
.
that Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated at Sarajevo. Rasputin was stabbed in the stomach by a half-mad womem, and lay close to death for several weeks.
Strangely enough, Rasputin was stabbed at precisely the same moment Ferdinand was shot. 'The two evpnts meant the beginning of the First World War — for Rasputin was in hospital during the critical weeks that led to war, and unable to use his influence to persuade the Tsar not to go to the aid of Serbia. It is by no means im-
probable that he would have averted the war; it is a matter of historical record that he had done so twice before, in 1908 and 1912, when trouble had blown up in the Balkans. He remained violently opposed to war after his recovery; but it was too late to use his influence against it. Historians of the period assert that Rasputin used his influence to make and unmake ministers between 1914 and 1917. When the Tsar was at the front, the Tsarina is supposed to have written him dozens of letters with such sentences as: 'Our friend Grigory thinks that Protopopov would make an admirable Minister of the Interior.' But there is no evidence of anything of the sort in the published correspondence between the Tsar and Tsarina.
Rasputin seems to have oifered occasional advice on the conduct of the war, but it was usually ignored. If we are to judge Rasputin by the historical evidence, and not by the Im-id myths that sprang up after his death,
we must
him of large-scale The worst that can
acquit
political interference.
be said of him he began to go behaviour was to boast about
during this period is that downhill as far as general concerned: to drink more, his acquaintance with the royal family, and get into brawls.
Poisoned, shot and drowned Towards the end of 1916, he began to experience strange forebodings. He had told the Tsar on several occasions that his throne would be secure so long as he was alive; now he became certain that his death was near. In the autumn of 1916, he went walking by the Neva, and suddenly declared that he saw it flowing with the blood of Grand Dukes. In December, he wrote a curious 'testament', which he handed to a friend, with instructions to deliver it to the Tsarina after his death. It began: 'I feel I shall leave life before January 1', and went on to say that if he was killed by peasants, the Tsar would continue to reign for many years; but that if he was killed by aristocrats, then 'none of your children or relations will remain alive for more than two years'. Sir Bernard Pares, perhaps the most eminent historian of the
period, is inclined to accept
it
as authentic.
Yet Rasputin did not suspect the designs of the young Prince Yussupov, when Yussupov invited him to his house at midnight on December 29, 1916. Yussupov was a playboy, a homosexual, and something of an exhibitionist. He declared later that he decided to kill Rasputin because he wanted to save Riissia, but in view of his
general character — as displayed in his books about the murder, and in later life — this may be doubted. (Shortly before his death, in 1968, he even asserted in a court of law that Rasputin was a German spy — a story he must have known to be preposterous.) At all events, Rasputin came to his house, although several friends had begged him not to go. Yussupov fed him cakes poisoned with cyanide, but Rasputin suffered from alcoholic gastritis, which prevented the poison being absorbed through the lining of his stomach. Yussupov waited until his back was turned, then shot him in the back several times. Rasputin tried to drag himself out into the courtyard. Yussupov beat him with an iron bar, while Purishkevich, another conspirator, kicked him in the face. They emptied more shots into him, tied him up, and drove him to the Neva, where they pushed him through a hole in the ice. A doctor who examined the body later found water in the lungs, which indicated that he had died of drowning. He was buried in the royal park, but the Bolsheviks dug up his body and burned it — so that it experienced earth, fire and water. The Tsarina was prostrated, but she soon had worries enough of her own as the Revolution descended, and Rasputin's prophecy was fulfilled. Less than two years later, they were all dead. Further Reading Fulop-Miller, R., Rasputin, the Holy Devil (Putnam 1928) Letters of the Tsar to the Tsarina (John Lane 1929) Letters of the Tsarina to the Tsar (John Lane 1923) K., Nicholas and Alexandra (Athenaeum 1967) Pares, Sir Bernard, The Fall of the Russian Monarchy {Cape 1939) Vyrubova, A., Memories of the Russian Court
Massie, R
(Macmillan 1923) Wilson, C, Rasputin and the Fall of the Romanovs (Barker 1964)
COLIN WILSON was born
in Leicester in 1924, the a boot and shoe worker. He left school at 16 and then worked as school laboratory assistant and in the civil service. After a year in the RAF, he spent the period 1949-51 wandering around Europe. Since publishing The Outsider in 1956 his publications have included ten novels, six volumes of existential philosophy, a biography of Bernard Shaw, a history of the occult and a play entitled Strindberg
son
of
1921
WESTERN
FRONT In a winter which was first exceptionally wet and then
unusually
cold,
both sides
were content to rest and recover from the massive slaughters of the
summer
months. John Keegan describes the
life
and the
I Constant rain in the last half of the month turned the front line into a quagmire, hampering the supply of stores and
ammunition and interfering
in the work After the bloodbaths of Verdun and the Somme, the French, British and Germans welcomed the onset of winter as a time of recuperation. No large offensives were planned.
of the artillery.
1922
The bad weather continued. What had been an hour's walk in the summer had now become a gruelling ordeal — men carrying ammunition boxes slipped and fell in the mud; men carrying food supplies failed to reach the front line because they had fallen up to their necks in ice-cold water. Germany's manpower resources were becoming very stretched, and in November she was forced to call up the class of 19f8 — those youths who were born in 1898. By this means, and through the reduction of establishments, Germany was able to bring about a 20% increase in the number of its divisions by the end of the year.
J
Jl
in the trenches state of morale
f
I
:i
Despite the continuing wet weather, the French General Nivelle had his 'last fling' at Verdun on December 15/16. But apart from this, the French tried to maintain a policy of inactivity along the whole front with the object of harbouring resources for a great offensive planned by Nivelle in the spring. Similarl}', the Germans were relatively inactive as regards military opera-
but otherwise they were extremely busy constructing the Siegfried Stellung (Hindenburg Line) in open country to the tions,
rear of the trenches.
Left: The German 13-cm field gun, a long range quick-firing gun which was introduced just prior to 1914 to replace the 15-cm long gun. Range:
15,748 yards. Weight of shell: 22.5 lbs. Weight In action: 5 tons 14 cwt. velocity: 2,280 feet-per-second
Muzzle
Above; The French 105-mm M 1913. Range: 13,400 yards. Weight of shell 35 lbs. Weight in action: 2 tons 6 cwt. Rate of fire: Q rounds-per-minute, 40 rounds-per-hour. Traverse: 3 degrees left — 3 degrees right Le^f; The German 10-cm M 1890. Range: 11,264 yards. Weight of she//.-
39.5
lbs.
On January
14 a frost at last hardened the sufficiently to restore comparative ease of movement over the battlefield, but
ground
did not dry the ground so that the shortest spell of warmer weather brought chaos again. The frost, though preferable, brought its own discomforts and difficulties. It froze the water supply and forced the men to melt ice from shell holes. Most dangerously, the frost damaged the cordite propellant of shells and caused them to drop short. Before the frost froze the wet ground the British made three raids between January 10/12, two of which were it
The
British continued small scale raiding There was a large night operation on the 17/ 18th on the north bank of the Ancre, but the Germans were alerted and laid dowrn heavy artillery fire. The British lost 2,700 officers and men and gained between 500 and 1,000 yards, while in simultaneous operations to the north of this Fourth Army won even less ground and lost 1,100 men. into February.
The Germans continued to increase the size of their army, raising the number of combat battalions on the Western Front from 1,289 in September 1916 to 1,422 in March 1917. Morale was still high, and the production of munitions had continued to rise. In the British sector the morale effects of the raids of the winter months were dubious, but the raids did reveal a new standard of skill in the divisions of the Kitchener armies. French morale was still holding up after a relatively quiet winter preparing for the Nivelle OflFensive in the spring of 1917.
successful.
1923
¥
\
WINTER ON THE ASTERN
rRwN Exhausted
after the Brusilov offensive,
Russia settled into a winter of recuperation and relative inaction, but in the far south, on the Rumanian Front, there was desperate and bloody fighting. Eugene Hinterhoff
The ©rttry of German troops RupiSnian capital, Bucharest, which thef took olTDecetnber 6, 1916 « « 4 into the
y^
1924
J <
Below left: Mackensen watches
his victorious
troops march by Opposite page. Left: Crowds in Bucharest demonstrate in favour of Rumania's entry into the war on the Allied side; within a few months their city was in the hands of the Central Powers. Right: Russian infantry in action, supported by an armoured car This page. Left: A German patrol in the streets of Bucharest. Above: Russian soldiers. Like so many, without weapons or equipment
The Brusilov Offensive during the summer and autumn of 1916 was, in the long run, a
«|fc!l,^S^
turning point in Russia's participation in the First World War. More immediately, it cast an ominous shadow over Russian strategy in the winter of 1916-17. Russia paid a heavy price in blood during the 27 days in June 1916: Brusilov's armies lost 375,000 men in that period, while during the operations which continued on a low key until the end of October total losses exceeded 1,000,000. In the course of operations, some Russian battalions were driven over the same ground and the inevitable huge losses resulted in a growing dissatisfaction among the soldiers, preparing the ground for a strong anti-war mood. In this respect it is interesting to quote General Knox's diary for late October: 'I heard whispers that the Russian infantry has lost heart, and that anti-war propaganda is rife in the ranks. It is little wonder that they are downhearted after being driven to be slaughtered over the same ground seven times in a month and every time taking trenches which their guns could not keep for them.' At the same time, General Knox writes that: 'several high ranking officers were expressing their criticism of the Allies, who, since Brusilov's offensive have allowed 18 German divi-
sions to leave the Western Front.' Brusilov's victorious offensive, which surprised the enemy as much as Russia's allies, resulted in an event which eventually was far from beneficial for the Russians from a strategic point of view — im-
pressed by Russian victories, Rumania, which had remained neutral for so long, decided to stake everything on the victory of the Entente and to join the band-wagon. Accordingly, on August 29 Rumania declared war on the Central Powers. Obviously, one of the first things for the Russians to do was to send as many rein-
forcements as possible: unfortunately, the number of troops was too small — two infantry divisions and one cavalry division under the command of General Zayonchovsky. Unfortunately, the quality of the Rumanian military leadership and of their
1927
was below any acceptable standard. Brusilov writes: 'The Rumanian High Command had no idea how to handle troops on active service. The men were poorly trained, knew only the parade-ground side of their business and had no notion whatsoever of such things as field fortifications, which are of such importance in a war of positions; the artillery could not shoot; they had practically no heavy guns and very little ammunition. In such conditions it is hardly to be wondered that they were rapidly defeated.' Rumania, instead of Consequently, being an asset, became a heavy liability: Brusilov had to abandon his Galician offensive, and all other Russian front commanders had to contribute their forces to the defence of their new ally. Brusilov's troops
had been extended by some 400 miles, causing serious logistical difficulties which were exacerbated by the onset of winter. As the oflicial German history of the war
front
points out: The centre of gravity as far as the Russian High Command was concerned, had shifted to the Rumanian front; the main task became defensive, requiring reinforcement at the expense of other fronts.' At the same time, when the Russians approached their western allies for their help, the Supreme Military Council, at its session in Paris on October 26, 1916, decided that the defence of Rumania should remain Russia's responsibility. Consequently the Russians were compelled to transfer to Rumania 55 infantry and 15 cavalry divisions in order to protect that vulnerable sector, stretching from the northern frontier of Rumania to the Black Sea. At the same time, several Russian attacks, of a diversionary nature, and conducted with a smaller number of troops, were executed in the late autumn months, but failed to deflect the German High Command from its determination to pursue operations in Rumania. In spite of the initial successes of Brusilov's offensive and of a shortlived euphoria resulting from the entry of Rumania into war, and, last but not least, of great Russian numerical superiority. General Ludendorff" could write 'after the end of Rumanian campaign, the general outcome of war in the Russian front in autumn 1916 was definitely in our favour'.
As a result of severe defeat suffered by Rumanians, General Alexieiev had good reasons to fear that the Germans, in the
their determination fully to exploit their success, could launch another push towards the lower reaches of the Danube towards Dobzudja, which, in case of success, could result in cutting off Rumania from Russia: what was worse, a German victory
could open the way to Bessarabia and to Southern Russia, threatening to envelop Brusilov's left flank and to create havoc in the rear area of his front. Consequently, all plans for major operations contemplated for late autumn by the
commanders
of
Western
and
Northern
Fronts had to be suspended. At the same time. General Alexieiev once again addressed an appeal to General Jcf^e, Allied Supreme Commander, to reinforce the French Expeditionary Force in Salonika under General Sarrail with the troops from western countries, including Italy and Portugal, in order to increase pressure upon Bulgaria, which was taking an active part, alongside the Germans in the Rum-
anian campaign.
1928
In spite of massive Russian involvement, fell on December 6, resulting in a further lowering of morale among Rumanian troops. The fall of Bucharest was preceded by another typical "relief offensive' by the Russians in the Carpathians, in the general direction of Transylvania, in order to halt the momentum of the German drive into Wallachia (part of Rumania), and which was launched by Brusilov's Ninth Army. The date of that operation had been moved forward in view of the reports about Mackensen's successful crossing of the Danube; unfortunately, owing to difficult mountain terrain to which Russian peasants were not accustomed, the results of the Russian offensive were rather meagre, and in any case had no impact upon the German offensives. In the meantime, in view of difficulties in co-operation between the Rumanian king, Ferdinand, and Brusilov, the Tsar decided to set up a new Army Group in the south, under the command of King Ferdinand with the Russian General Sakharov, formerly the very able Commander of Eleventh Army, as his Chief-of-Staff. This Army Group consisted of battered Rumanian divisions and of a newly formed
Bucharest
Russian Danube Army. In view of King Ferdinand's obstinate nature, any serious military co-operation
with Brusilov was very difficult. General Knox writes about his conversation with Brusilov, in which the latter complained, saying "her (Rumania's) intervention has weakened us'. At the same time, the Rumanians were also complaining — probably not without justification — at the Russian attitude and the behaviour of Russian troops in their country. General Knox writes about a conversation which he had on March 5, 1917 in Petrograd with the Rumanian Minister, Diamandi, who bitterly complained that 'his country was left to bear the main brunt of the German offensive, and that the promised French relief offensive from Salonika turned out be merely a demonstration'. Diamandi also complained that 'the Russians promised to deliver 200,000 sets of uniforms, which were allegedly despatched from Moscow in September, but so far only 20,000 have reached Rumania, the rest having been pilfered en route'. A few interesting details about the degree of pilfering and corruption are supplied by Brusilov in his book, quoting the complaints of the Minister for War, made at a session of War Council, that enormous quantities of boots were sold on the black market, and that the soldiers travelling from their depots to their frontline units, were selling their boots, knowing that they would receive new ones on their arrival. The Rumanian Minister was also complaining to General Knox that the Russians were living off the country, stealing, looting and raping, causing great resentment among the Rumanian population; above all, many Rumanians' real fears were expressed by a Rumanian commander of a division. Colonel Sturdza, who came over to the Germans, saying that he would like to set up a Rumanian Free Corps, in order to liberate his native land from the Russians. Colonel Sturdza's example was not followed by his countrymen, and nothing came out of his venture. As mentioned before, the main task entrusted to Rumania by the Russian High Command was to remain on the defensive;
Above: General Sakharov, Formerly commander Russian Eleventh Army, he was appointed Chief-of-Statf to the army group commanded by King Ferdinand of Rumania Below: General Brusilov, commander of the Russian South-Western Group of Armies which undertook a relief offensive to help the hardpressed Rumanians Opposite page: Eastern Front, winter 1916/17
of the
equally, the rest of the front, stretching from the Black Sea to the Baltic, as a result of worsening weather conditions and of great fatigue of the troops on both sides of the frontline, slowly froze into static warwith some variations, conditions fare; along the whole front, with the advent of late autumn and of winter, were becoming increasingly trying. Even in Rumania, there were heavy snowfalls, aggravated by strong winds. The troops on both sides of the frontline, exhausted by several months of severe fighting in conditions of mobile warfare, often suffering from the lack of protective clothing as well as of proper food, were prone to various diseases, especially to scurvy and to frostbite. As
1930
quotes extracts from the captured reports of Russian Ninth Army, concerning some 3,000 cases of severe frostbite, resulting in amputations and death. The writer of this
there were often and consequently both bread and meat rations were reduced by half, if not more. Scurvy was rampant, making the soldiers feel sick and weak; there were two days per week when meat was substituted by dried herrings; often lentils were given instead of traditional buckwheat porridge (kasha). As one could
who was a young Second-Lieutenant of Russian artillery, spent that winter in the trenches in the Pripet marshes and saw that dreadful conditions were prevailing. As the frontline was running across the marshes, it was impossible to dig deep trenches, for the soldiers would have been sitting knee deep in icy water; owing to
expect, such conditions did not fail to produce growing discontent. And yet, in spite of the general fatigue of the troops on both sides of the frontline, and of severe weather conditions, they were not allowed to enjoy their well-deserved r^t; frozen soil was considered by comdivisional level as suitable for
General Ludendorif in his book writes:
'We now urgently needed a rest. The army had been fought to a standstill and was utterly worn out.' The official German history of the war
article,
The field bakery of a Bavarian regimeimton the Rumanian Front "P ,
transport shortages
i
difficulties,
erf"
man^K^^
food,
raiding operations, which, on some occasions, escalated into bigger battles than was anticipated. Also plans were being made by both sides for operations during the coming spring. As General Knox writes, in late autumn, 1916, 11 new divisions were formed, partly from cadres detached from regular divisions, chiefly from depot units, and partly from Opolchenje (old age classes), of little value; of these 11, five divisions were formed on the Northern £ Front, and the remaining six on the S 2 Western Front. In January 1917, Stavka issued orders | for the formation of a large number of « additional divisions, as well as for the for- £ mation of various specialist units; it was I
•-<
'*•->
*\
> ^
^
/
,
(
Far left: Russian artillery in action, winter 1916. Leff, fop to bottom: General Zayonchovsky, who took two infantry divisions and one cavalry division to reinforce the Rumanian Front. General Ruzski, Commander of the Russian North Front, the most active sector of the Russian Front during the winter. General Alexieiev, Chief of the Russian General Staff; his problems were multiplied by the weakness of Rumania which
southern flank. General RadkoTwelfth Army which condangerous attack on the Germans near Riga in January. Below: A Russian infantryman in winter uniform; there was a great diversity of equipment owing to chronic shortages, especially of boots — corpses were stripped of boots, and soldiers leaving the frontline had them taken away
exposed and lengthened Dmitriev, ducted a
his
Commander of the Russian
calculated that this scheme would provide, by the middle of March 1917, 62 new divisions, or a total gain of 188 battahons to the four fronts on the Russian Western Front. No provision was made for the equipment of the new divisions with artillery—partly owing to lack of guns, partly owing to lack of horses. Apparently, the Russian High Command, in taking the decision for the formation of such divisions without artillery support, was probably thinking of using them as human cannon fodder, regardless of losses. In addition to old established cadet officer schools inside Russia, two ensign schools on the front were turning out 1,500 young subalterns every five months; their life span, while on active service, was usually no longer. In case, both Stavka and army commanders, in planning their offensives for the coming spring, knew that they would have plenty of manpower at their disposal. The depots inside Russia contained about 1,900,000 men, and 600,000 more of excellent material were joining from their homes. General Brusilov tells how in the middle of January he had summoned his Army Commanders to define the part to be played by each in the spring offensive; the principal blow was entrusted by him to Seventh Army, their shock troops to move north-west towards Lemberg; the Eleventh Army was to thrust due west, also against Lemberg; the Special Army and Third Army were to continue their previous operations with a view to capturing Vladimir-Wolynsk and Kovel. The shock troops of Eighth Army, which was along the Carpathians, were to play a purelj'
any
auxiliary role, and their action was designed to assist the right wing of the Rumanian army, when the latter made a forward movement. Brusilov was promised deliveries of considerable numbers of guns and of ample supplies of ammunition. He was sceptical about Stavka's decision to form new divisions without artillery, thinking that this was a serious mistake. In spite of the great fatigue of the troops and severe weather conditions, activities along
''..
Opposite page: Top
left:
A Rumanian cavalryman Top
right: In various
states of undress,
Rumanian prisoners take a bath outside an Austrian field hospital This page: Right:
Russian troops crawl under the wire in
Augustow forest
Se/oiv.'
A German
munitions train moves through the Carpathians
^*-
\Ji''K-.
9
»»
*?
k 5^
(j^-.-^^
>.-
H
Above: Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. Along his sector of the front the freezing of numerous marshes, lakes and rivers created favourable conditions for small attacks, conducted predominantly by special commando units. R;g/?f; Russian prisoners receive a bread supply from their German captors
the front did not come to a complete standPerhaps the most quiet part of the front was in the extreme south, where the Rumanians, who had suffered heavy casualties during the autumn fighting, were not too eager to fight again. This allowed the German High Command to transfer from Mackensen's sector four infantry and three cavalry divisions to the Western Front. Further north, in the Carpathians, especially in the mountains, difficult weather conditions were also prohibiting operations, with the result that German High Command was also able to transfer from this sector one division to the West. Yet, in January and February, the Russians were more active against the Austrian Army Group in the area of the Bukovina, north of the Carpathians, having some local successes; by the end of February, owing to a combined AustroGerman counterattack, the Russians were repulsed from their new positions, suffering heavy losses, and the situation was restored. This action put an end to the fighting in this sector. still.
battalions with 886 guns, compared with the weaker German force of 66 battalions and 568 guns. On January 5 strong detachments of Twelfth Army, starting from the Russian bridgehead on the outskirts of Riga, struck in the direction of Mittau
and Tuckum, threatening to roll up the left flank of the whole German front. During the first day of fighting the Russians had several local successes, breaking through fortified German positions. Yet as a result of a determined counterattack, for which all reserves were used, the Russians were repulsed and the situation was restored. The fighting was conducted in exceptionally severe conditions, with the temperature below freezing, and with strong gale force winds blowing from the sea. After five days' bitter fighting, German losses amounted to 3,500 men and the Russians had lost 23,000. Yet, this was not the end of the fighting. The German High Command decided to teach the Russians a lesson, and to dissuade them from further offensive activities. After careful preparations, the Ger-
mans launched on January 23 an
Shock troops Further north, along the German front, under the command of Prince Leopold of
Bavaria,
the
freezing
of
numerous
marshes, lakes and rivers created favourable conditions for small attacks, conducted predominantly by special commando units or shock troops. In this respect, greater activities took place on the northern flank of the whole front, near the Gulf of Riga, where a few German companies, having crossed, on foot, the frozen River Dvina, surprised and overran Russian positions on the island of Glaudon. This action resulted in a Russian counterattack in the region of Miadzolno, escalating into a big
The Germans were aware
of Genand preparations which had been made in the middle of December 1916, to take advantage of the frozen ground and to make a big push in battle.
eral Ruzski's intentions
the general direction of Mittau. He must have realised that his Ttvelfth Army, under General Radko-Dmitriev, would be much stronger than the enemy, having 186
1936
offen-
massive artillery support; strong German forces, under the command of General von Scholze, struck in the direction of Riga. This German offensive met with strong Russian resistance and several counterattacks; the operations conducted equally in appalling weather conditions, lasted till February 3, and there were heavy losses on both sides. In view of such heavy losses, and the rather meagre sive with
tactical results, the German High Command refused to comply with General
request for further reinforcements, and the battle slowly died out; in taking such a decision, the Germans showed a better understanding of the use of manpower resources than the Russians. An objective assessment of the fighting on the Russian Front during the whole year 1916 and during two months of 1917 is that of the German official history, according to which, in spite of territorial gains made by Brusilov during his five months' offensive the ultimate outcome could be described as 'a victory for the Scholze's
Central Powers in their defensive role on the Russian Front'. Yet, the price of this victory, without counting losses suffered in Rumania and Macedonia, were very heavy; 350,000 men for Germany, 1,000,000 for Austria-Hungary and about 10,000 for Turkey; some 500,000, including 30,000 Germans, and about 700 guns, fell into Russian hands. The Russian losses amounted to 1,500,000 men of whom about 100,000 were prisoners. On the eve of the Revolution the prospects for the 1917 campaign were brighter than they had been in March 1916 for the campaign of that year. It is true that the Russians had been forced by the temporary collapse of Rumania to add 400 kilometres to a front that
was already too
long, but the
French maintained that the Rumanians would soon take their share once more in the struggle — a forecast that was more than justified. The Russian infantry was tired but less tired than it had been 12 months earlier. It was evident that the Russian High Command must in future squander men less lavishly on the front. The stocks of arms, ammunition and technical equipment were larger than they had ever been — much larger than they were in the spring of 1915 and 1916, and for the first time supplies from overseas were arriving in appreciable quantities. Britain and France were sending much-needed aeroplanes, and the French were sending artillery experts. Also the lead was improving with every day. The army was sound at heart. The men in the rest of the winter months would have forgotten the trials of the past and would have attacked again with the elan of 1916. There can be no doubt that, if the national fabric in the rear had held together, or even granted the Revolution, if a man had been forthcoming to protect the troops from pacifist propaganda, the Russian army would have gained fresh laurels in the campaign of 1917, and in all possibility would have exercised a pressure which would have made possible an Allied victory by the end of that year.
\For Eugene Hinterhoff's
page 502.]
biography, see
,
By February 1917 the working class of Tsarist Russia had found a poHtical voice. In Petrograd, the enforced congrega-
demonstrations they posted revo-
REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA And
lutionary slogans. they could not be ignored. When the troops sent to suppress them began to disobey orders and virtual anarchy prevailed in the streets, the
IB.
tion of workers in huge industrial plants had made homogeneous action possible. The of a vor-
Tsar was warned
demands
new government would have
that a
acious war had forced these men together, and now they followed a policy of organised
to be formed at once. L. Kochan food riot in Left:
A
Petrograd
violence: they staged riots and
In the
of 1916 many signs pointed that an unprecedented crisis
autumn
to the fact
was approaching within the Russian EmPoUtically, the utmost mistrust characterised the relationship between the Tsar's government and virtually all sections of public opinion. But it was perhaps in the economic sphere that the gravest pire.
danger appeared. For example, the number of strikes in 1916 rose to heights that had not been reached hitherto in the war. It is true that this movement may not have had specifically political objectives; nonetheless it was an indication of the people's deepening dissatisfaction with the disruption of life and the manifold shortages of wartime. Two other factors helped to intensify the atmosphere of crisis. Real wages, for the first time since the outbreak of war, began to fall behind the rise in the cost of living. Secondly, food shortages began to make themselves felt, particularly in the urban areas. This was partly the result of the communications breakdown and partly of a bad harvest. In the streets of Petrograd observers noted 'long queues of ill-clad
for the
men and garrulous women waiting bread that never came'.
This mood of intense dissatisfaction was unknown to the authorities. In October 1916 the secret police had reported that the population of the capital was 'on the verge of despair', that the slightest pretext would be the cause of 'elemental riots'. 'The mass of industrial workers are in such a situation,' the same report added, 'that they are quite ready to involve themselves in the wildest excesses of a hunger riot.' The secret police found that the working masses were violently hostile to the authorities and 'protesting with all means and devices against a continuation of the war'. Leftwing and revolutionary circles, more selfconscious than the workers, were convinced that a revolution would begin very soon, that in fact its heralds had already appeared. 'The internal course of Russian state life is at present threatened by the unrelenting approach of a grave shock.' At the front it was. clear to the generals that the morale of their troops was rapidly declining. Inevitably the army reflects the moods and ideas and the disintegration of the home front, and there was nothing surprising in this. After all, by the end of not
is
answered with gunfire 1916, there loomed before the troops the prospect of a third winter in the trenches. There were not, however, as yet in any case, many examples of actual refusal to obey orders. Discipline continued to prevail and the number of deserters showed
no marked
rise.
In Petrograd, meanwhile, all the evidence goes to show that a truly revolutionary situation was in the process of formation. This was typified in remarks that Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador, made to the Tsar in January 1917 during his last audience with him. He warned the Tsar that the parting of the ways had come. 'The one way will lead you to victory and a glorious peace, the other to revolution and disaster.' The British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, was in Petrograd in the middle of February 1917; to him it was 'as certain as anything can be that the Emperor and Empress are riding for a fall.
merchants, ladies — talks openly of the absolute necessity of doing away with them.' No lead in resolving this atmosphere of tension came from the members of the Duma. All parties were incapable of acting in any constructive or dynamic way. A barrier had fallen between the Tsar and the protests, warnings and admonitions of those about him. It is true that in the winter of 1916/1917 a number of plots, intrigues and manoeuvres were devised in order to seize the Tsar, or perhaps the Tsarina, or perhaps both of them, and instal a regency. But in actual fact none of the plans, if they deserve the name, was carried out. The only remotely comparable event was the assassination of Rasputin by Prince Yussupov. This was a romantic and bizarre event but it was not, for all its popularity, a constructive political contribution to the solving of the crisis. It did nothing to calm a turbulent home front compounded of an urban populace suffering more than ever from price rises, food shortages, shortage of heating materials, as well as an unyielding Tsar determined, even in this extremity, to maintain his prerogatives, and a Duma whose members saw catastrophe approaching but who were too frightened to indulge in any overt political action to forestall it.
Everyone — officers,
This was the situation at the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917 when a hitherto inactive factor made its appearance. This was the eruption of the Petrograd populace into overt political action. Here we must take account of the changed composition of the working force in the capital where a very high proportion of Russian war industry was concentrated. Perhaps as many as one-fifth of the 250,000 workers in Petrograd moth plants,
were employed in five mameach employing more than
10,000 workers. This fact makes it easy understand why there was such homogeneous action on the part of the Vyborg area (the industrial area of Petrograd where the factories and working-class dwellings were concentrated). The authorities, as mentioned above, were not unaware of the mood in the capital. Their response was the traditional one of reinforcing the garrison with reliable troops and police. But the stage had now been passed when such measures could any longer prove adequate. This became manifest on February 26 when small-scale disorders broke out. Crowds of 500 people or so marched through the streets of Petrograd, broke shop windows, sang the French revolutionary song, the Marseillaise, and shouted all sorts of revolutionary or quasirevolutionary slogans — 'down with the police', 'shoot the speculators', 'down with the wars!' Within a week these crowds of demonstrators had grown larger and larger. Workers on strike from the factories began to add their weight to the disturbances. The Bolsheviks in the capital, decimated though they were, did their utmost to make their political influence felt. But it is more clear by far that the practical problems of daily life were uppermost in the minds of the demonstrators. The most significant feature of the demonstrations in those late February days was the fact that the authorities could no longer rely on the troops. On March 10 the Tsar ordered the Commandant of the Petrograd military garrison. General Khabalov, to use force to suppress the demonstrations. On that day there was indeed shooting and also on the morning of the next day. But soon a different story came from the garrison troops of Petrograd. On March 12 the reserve battalions of the to
1937
Volynsky Regiment mutinied. They killed their Commanding Officer, marched into the streets and made common cause with the demonstrators. General Khabalov was forced to confess to the Tsar that he could not carry out the order to re-establish security in the capital. 'Most of the units one by one have betrayed their duty, refusing to fight the rioters.' The mutiny
with unbelievable rapidity. The whole Petrograd garrison of 170,000 troops needed only three days before it was refusing to obey orders. When the mutinies first broke out, on March 11, Rodzyanko, president of the spread
/
Duma, telegraphed
the Tsar: 'Anarchy in the capital, government paralysed. Shooting in the streets. Supplies of food and fuel completely disrupted. There must be no delay in forming a new government enjoying the confidence of the country. Any hesitation would mean death.' The Tsar took no notice of this telegram and prorogued the Duma. But at least there was some sign that members of the Duma were prepared to defy the Tsar. At the very least, they did not obey him automatically. They discussed the situation on March 12. Were they to obey the Tsar? Were they to put themselves at the head of the popular
movement? Or was there some
third way? In the end, the majority of Duma members decided to disobey the Tsar. They would not disperse but would continue meeting in an unofficial capacity, and all deputies would remain at their posts. The Duma was assailed continuously by delegations of
and workers urging it to take power from a government that had lost all authority. It found itself caught up in the revolutionary crisis. Deputies had to take a decision at last, under tremendous pressure from the mutinous soldiers of the capital. But they were anxious not to make too drastic a break with the old regime. soldiei-s
•
In their extremity, the Duma leaders tried persuade the brother of the Tsar, Grand
to
Duke Michael Alexandrovich,
to
impose a
military dictatorship on Petrograd, to force the Tsar's government to resign and to demand of the Tsar a ministry responsible to the Duma. But the Grand Duke was slow to move and the moment was lost. The Duma now saw no choice before it
but to take power into its own hands — otherwise it ran the grave danger of being swept away altogether into what Trotsky called the 'the dustbin of history'. Thus the Duma did not take power eagerly. Rodzyanko wrote that it did so in order to 'try to curb the growing anarchy'. It would have preferred to receive power from above, not from below. It was in these circumstances that party leaders turned themselves into a Pro-
'
visional Committee and nominated a Provisional Gk)vernment with Prince George Lvov as its Premier and consisting mainly of Cadets and Octoberists. The most important personalities in the government
were Milyukov (Foreign kov (War). Kerensky,
Affairs)
as
Justice, represented the left old Duma.
and Guch-
Minister
of
wing of the
The Provisional Government made a sharp break with many of the policies of the Tsar. It proclaimed an immediate amnesty, enacted freedom of speech, press and assembly, abolished all restrictions based on class, religion and nationality, declared its intention to convoke a freely elected constituent assembly, and established a people's militia to replace the discredited police. Lastly, the new government gave an undertaking not to victimise the Petrograd troops. Two members of the Provisional Committee, Guchkov and Shulgin, both right-wingers, were successful in persuading the Tsar to abdicate. With his family he then entered a form of protective custody. Attempts to secure asylum in Britain, under the protection of his cousin.
King George V, failed. It must be concluded that the Provisional Government was effective only in a very limited way.
From
the start, the Govern-
ment had to share authority with the Petrograd Soviet. This was the sort of body that characterised the whole history of 1917. Indeed, it was precisely because of the prevalence of Soviets that the word itself — it means 'council' in Russian — came to be used to describe the revolution.
Favourable circumstances The Petrograd Soviet of March 1917 was
The power behind the Petrograd Soviet-the soldiers. They carried the message of the Revolution to the furthest villages of Russia
the rebirth of the St Petersburg Soviet of 1905 which had defied the Tsar's government in the very capital of the Empire. It had only lasted a few weeks in the autumn of 1905 before succumbing to counterrevolution. But circumstances were much
1939
g
|
| | ^ | £
more favourable now. This was not because the left-wingers in the capital were more prepared in 1917 than in 1905. On the contrary, no more than anyone else did they expect the Tsar to fall as swiftly and his machinery of government to crumble so thoroughly as proved to be the case. It was only in the afternoon of March 12 that some 30 radicals, of varying outlook, assembled to form what they called a Temporary Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. They met in the Tauride Palace (where the Duma also met),
hastily drafted an appeal to the inhabitants of Petrograd to elect deputies to the Soviet. They called for one deputy for every 1,000 workers per factory, one
and
deputy for each factory with less than 1,000 workers, and one soldier from every company of the regiments stationed in Petrograd. The Soviet held its first meeting on the evening of March 12. About 250 delegates were present, mostly soldiers, because of the mode of election. For its first few weeks of existence, the Soviet was a confused and disorganised body. Its Central Executive Committee worked almost round the clock. Few records were kept of the decisions taken, of the proceedings, or the minutiae of bureaucracy. Gradually, however, the Soviet began to develop certain organs of rule such as a bureau, or steering-committee, that prepared business for the plenary sessions. In terms of political support, the Soviet was dorninated by Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. In terms of membership, military deputies were in the vast majority. But in those early days there was very little thought among deputies of opposing the policy of the Provisional Government. On the contrary, the dominant parties and the soldier-deputies gave their support to the government in so far as it adhered to the policies proclaimed in its manifesto. Yet it is also true — and the implications of this were evident to Milyukov, for one, from the outset — that the Soviet represented an alternative fount of
authority
that
represented in the government. This became all the more true when the Soviet issued its famous Order No 1. By this it established its authority over the soldiers in the capital, and, by extension, over those outside it. to
Order No 1 called into existence elected committees in all military units from company level upwards which would be subordinate to the Soviet, would control all
arms and not issue them to officers; lastly, the orders of the Provisional Government were only to be obeyed by the troops so long as they did not conflict with the orders of the Soviet. This was the situation that drew from Guchkov, Minister for War, his famous cfy of despair: The Provisional Government has no real force at its disposal and its decrees are carried out only to the extent that is permitted by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies which has in its hands the most important elements of real power, such as the army, the railways, the post and telegraphs. It is possible to say that the Provisional Government flatly exists only as long as is allowed by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. In particular, it is now possible to give only these orders which do not radically conflict with the orders of the above-
named Soviet. In this way what came
1940
to be
known
as
"Dual Power'
changing views amongst the electorate,
of the
many
made its mark on the history Russian Revolution. This phrase meant that power was shared — between the newly established Provisional Government and the newly re-established Petrograd Soviet. But because there were these two different organisations it must not be assumed that they were mutually hostile. In fact, in those early days, the two organisations worked hand in hand, and, despite some suspicion in Soviet circles of the views of the Provisional Government, no question arose of seeking to challenge its authority. It was understood that Kerensky, Minister of Justice, would serve as the Soviet's watch-dog, as it were, in government circles. However, it is clear
enough that the understanding between the two bodies rested for the moment on a precarious basis. This was because the government had not yet begun in earnest to tackle the
Moreover,
it
problems that faced Russia.
was
difficult
to
see
what
common ground
there could be, over a period, between the members of a Duma, elected on the restricted franchise of 1907, and the soldiers and workers and peasants. This question-mark hung over the Revolution from its very first days. These were the halcyon days of the Revolution. Parading troops, on their way to the Duma to take an oath of allegiance to the new regime, the singing of revolutionary songs, lively demonstrations — all these gave colour and music to the scene. These glad tidings were carried to the villages and towns by soldiers from the garrison given special leave for this purpose.
Hiatus What was happening outside Petrograd,
when
the soldiers reached their villages?
Here two impressions were dominant. There was calmness, combined with the widespread breakdown of governmental authority. 'The old (governmental machine) had disappeared; the new was not yet established,' wrote Kerensky. During this hiatus in the exercise of power, with the police and local authorities shorn of their prestige, with the Provisional Government only dimly apprehended and its aims imperfectly understood, it is not surprising that a network of local village and municipal Soviets began to cover the land. What had happened in Petrograd was repeated outside the capital in a myriad of villages, townships and hamlets. Everywhere Soviets were elected into existence in order to assume authority in a milieu where authority had all but disappeared. They were not of course the only popular bodies
emerge spontaneously in this way. What happened was a proliferation of hitherto frustrated organisations both in town and countryside — trade unions, factory committees, co-operatives and cultural societies. To some extent they took the place that might otherwise have been taken by strong trade unions and political parties. But these, owing in part to the repressive to
policies of Tsarism,
simply did not exist. In their stead, Soviets, and all manner of locally representative bodies, assumed an impatience that became more and more marked as the year progressed. This 'network of revolution' was not everywhere uniform in operation. Thus, although the principle of election did prevail everywhere and although there was general provision for frequent re-election of members of Soviets to give effect io
details
varied:
the
electors to representatives
proportion of
was not always
equal and there was frequent disagree-
ment as to whether Soviets of workers and soldiers were to meet separately or jointly. It is also important to note that apart from the Petrograd Soviet and that in Moscow, party politics played a less important role in the composition of the smaller Soviets. Whereas Petrograd and Moscow were dominated by party-political intellectuals of specific allegiance, the lesser Soviets had a less distinctive political colouring. But if the collapse of authority and its assumption by Soviets was one aspect of life outside Petrograd, then another was the prevailing calmness. As in 1905, the pattern in 1917 was for the revolutionary ferment to spread only after some interval from the town to the countryside. Thus, in February and March the general tenor of rural life was calm. True, there was disruption and disregard of the law — a refusal to
pay taxes,
illegal distilling of spirits,
grazing of cattle on private land. But these did not greatly disturb the general tone of peoples' lives. "All revolutionary spirit seemed to be in the towns and in the army,' noted Breshko-Breshkovskaya, known as 'the grandmother of the Russian Revolution'. 'The peasants calmly gazed at their boundless fields thickly covered with wheat. At last the land was theirs. They quietly waited for the legal sanction.' This tranquillity is not difficult to understand. At this time there could be no certainty as to the extent of the decline of state authority. Secondly, the absence of the younger peasants from the fields must have been a contributory factor. However, the quietness was tinged with expectancy. None of the peasants' aspirations for more land had yet been appeased. The Stolypin reforms had lost their initial impetus and no permanent solution to the land problem had been arrived at. In these circumstances few expected the status quo to be anything but precarious. All in all, the swift and relatively painless downfall of Tsarism had not solved any of those problems of the Empire that had accumulated during previous years, except perhaps in a negative way. What the Tsar's downfall had done was create the climate in which a solution could be found. Now these problems were to become ever more challenging; not only those problems arising out of the war — food shortages, war-weariness, industrial dislocation, communications breakdown — but also major social problems involving the mass of the population in both town and countryside. Furthermore, the government was necessarily weak and faced a population roused to political consciousness and enjoying in the Soviets a ready vehicle for the free discussion of its situation. Lenin was not yet back in Russia but when he did return at the beginning of April he at once grasped this central fact. Russia was 'seething' he said. 'Millions and tens of millions of people who have been politically dormant for ten years and politically crushed have awakened and taken eagerly to politics.' Which way would these millions turn? This stood out from March onwards as the one question that dominated .
.
.
all others.
The government of Prince Lvov followed a pohcy that aimed to bring Russia politically into line with the western world. With-
in
two months
it
introduced trial by jury
for all offences, established
an independent
an end to all discrimination derived from criteria such as race, class or religion, introduced full liberty of con-
judiciary, put
science,
press,
}
worship and association,
1^
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separated church and state, gave civilian rights to the soldier and proclaimed a political amnesty. In the industrial sphere the eight-hour day was introduced in part.
7aS
\ 1
These were no mean achievements — all the more so as Russia was still at war (though the front was quiet at this time). But it must be asked whether these achievements were enough in the circumstances of the time. The answer is that they were not — and this applied particularly to land policy and policy relating to the constituent assembly. Both were vital matters, especially the first. The government overtly committed itself to land reform but its actions did not in any way suggest that the matter was soon to become urgent. Thus, a government statement of April 1 looked forward to the discussion in the constituent assembly of land reform. But pending the convocation of the assembly the statement warned that no attempt must be made to solve the land
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tries desperately to assure itself that Russia, though revolutionary, will stand by the Allies and continue the war
the
new
question by 'robbery and violence', and it emphasised the importance of collecting the necessary statistical data relating to the distribution of land, forms of land utilisation, and determining land reserves, all to be done by a Land Committee. But would there be time for what must necessarily be a laborious and protracted process? In March the number of districts aflFected by peasant disorders was 34; in April it was 174; and in May 236. A report from Tambov province makes the decline of law and order explicit: The old people, invalids and women who village
met the (March)
overturn calmly and explained it as a consequence of the irrational government of the country by the Tsar. It was possible
demand for a social overturn would not penetrate quickly into the countryside and would initially remain a demand of the army and the workers. However, the replacement of local government, the destruction of the police, of all the usual to expect that the
authorities in the countryside, the amnesty for criminals, accelerated the process of revolution. The approaching revolution from outside the village did not find here
any state
institutions.
1941
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status.
On
both counts they achieved a major success in Petrograd but elsewhere throughout the Empire — for instance in other industrialised areas such as Moscow and the Urals — these claims met with a certain amount of opposition. However, the factory committees did begin to form themselves into regional groupings and at the first conference of these groupings certain delegates demanded that workers' control over the activities of management be introduced. No acceptance of this demand for management was forthcoming, but the government, in the first half of May, did legalise the factory committees throughout the Empire. From the political point of view, the committees were dominated by Mensheviks
and Socialist-Revolutionaries. But this situation only lasted until mid- April. From then on it seems that the influence of the
From
his estate in Borisoglebsk, Prince
Volkonsky perceived a similar breakdown. In the first three weeks after the Tsar's abdication and the formation of the Pro-
Government there was not a single But in the second month trouble began 'and gradually all restraints were broken'. Illegal felling of trees by the peasants, damage caused by the illegal grazing of their cattle — this was the sort of thing that Volkonsky noticed and for which he was unable to secure any redress from the chairman of the local Zemstvo. The government's policy in the face of this incipient breakdown of order was a compound of coercion and procrastination. On April 21, Prince Lvov authorised provisional arrest.
vincial authorities to use troops to suppress any signs of disorder; and a fortnight later he established a network of local land com-
mittees at all levels working under the aegis of the Chief Land Committee. But their limited role contrasted very markedly with the radical aims of the peasant Soviets which frequently demanded the expropriation of all privately owned lands, cattle, and other property. In the towns, a somewhat similar role to that of the peasant Soviets was played by the new factory committees. This was a development that began very soon after the overthrow of the Tsar and by mid-April 1917 a factory-based movement had spread to almost every factory of any size throughout the Empire. The factory Soviets did not put forward political demands, although here and there they called for the arrest of the deposed Tsar. What they wanted was a recognition of the eight-hour day and the acknowledgement by manage-
Bolsheviks was beginning to become much more pronounced. In fact, it was the factory committees that gave the Bolsheviks entry into the battlefield between capital and labour. The factory committees, so far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, created a platform from which they could make political headway into a very sensitive area of the economy, and exploit to the uttermost all the grievances of the workers. For the Provisional Government this situation was dangerous enough. But it was, as it were, only a symptom of a much greater danger, arising from the very continuation of the war. So long as the government was determined to stay in the war, it must obey the requirements of the war: it had to fall in with the necessity to
maintain under arms an army of many millions of men. Therefore the agrarian
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1942
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had to be postponed because any expropriation of the land and division of the estates would have entailed the desertion inevitably of millions of peasant soldiers from the front, who were anxious to be on the spot when the land was divided. Secondly, the summoning of the constituent assembly had inevitably to be postponed because it was not thought that soldiers would be able to revolution, or reform at least,
Members
of the Provisional Government: standing) Schulgin, Dmitriudov, Engelhardt, Kerensky, Karalov. (Sitting) Prince Lvov, Schidiovsky, Rschewsky, Rodzianko. Above and rigfit: Kerensky, Minister of the Army and Navy. He replaced Lvov in July and continued to urge the vigorous prosecution of the war. Below: Gone for ever-autocratic pomp and circumstance. The Tsar review/s his troops Left:
(left to right,
The old had disappeared, the new was yet to come'
vote until at least six months had passed, that is until the usual autumn lull at the front (though there were also political motives for the delay). Thirdly, the maintenance of the front meant that such manufacturing capacity as continued to exist had to be devoted to ensuring priority supplies for the front of food, clothing, shoes, arms, and other material. This in its turn meant that the industrial and financial system of the country, seriously weakened after three years of war, must continue to undergo enormous strain. The position has been well summed up by a leading Menshevik, Theodore Dan: 'The continuation of the war, even if only for defensive purposes, was, in the last resort, the reason for the "timidity" of the first phase of the revolution, its fear of violent social upheavals, its inclination to remove all crises by a compromise solution.' It was even said by Sukhanov, the great diarist of 1917, that 'if the revolution did not finish the war, the war would strangle the revolution'. The position then, in the first phase of the revolution, was determined on the one
hand, by the government's adherence to the foreign policy of the Tsar and on the other by the strivings on the part of many millions of soldiers and peasants and workers, stirred into political life in a way they had never been before. They had not
yet received a lead, though they had manifested many signs of spontaneous aspirations. That lead, when it eventually came, was provided by Lenin and the Bolsheviks.
Lenin's return Lenin, like everybody
else, had not expected a revolution to break out as early as March. He was in Geneva at the time and as soon as the news reached him, he burned with desire to return to Russia. Hitherto, the Bolsheviks had played little part in determining the course of events. In fact they were seriously divided. Some argued that the Petrograd Soviet should declare itself a provisional government; others sought closer relationship with the Mensheviks; others feared the isolation of the Bolsheviks. When Lenin returned to Petrograd, however, these differences
1 i|
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"^
if not removed entirely, at least sufficiently resolved as to enable different
were,
htXKt
groups in the party to work together. Lenin returned to Russia with a policy in mind that owed something to what had taken place in Russia in 1905 and to his
analysis of the Paris Commune of 1871. Basically, he saw that the weakest point in the position of the Provisional Government was its relationship to the Soviets. It was at this weak point that he was determined to strike. Lenin gave the Soviets throughout Russia the task of serving as organs of revolutionary state power. He
put forward these views on the very evening of his arrival, when he spoke for two hours in the once-sumptuous villa thai had belonged to the prima ballerina Kshessinskaya, favourite of the ex-Tsar. Now it became what Trotsky truly called 'the laboratory'
of
history.
Sukhanov
was
present and he has left a graphic description of the inipression made by Lenin's dynamic programme of action: 'I declare that no one had expected anything similar,' noted Sukhanov. 'It seemed as though all the elements had risen from their lair,
1944
Workers and soldiers express
solidarity with the Petrograd Soviet-their
organ
of
power
and that the
spirit of universal destruction, seeing neither hindrances nor doubts, neither human difficulties nor human calculations, was hovering above the heads of the enthralled disciples.' Lenin's prolicy came to be known as 'the April theses'. He denounced any support for the Russian war eflfort. He argued that since war and capitalism were inseparably connected, it was only by overthrowing capitalism that the war could be brought to an end. Lenin argued that Russia at this time — in midApril— was in a transitional stage from the first stage of the revolution to the second stage which 'must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasantry'. The Soviets of workers' deputies, said Lenin, were 'the only possible form of revolutionary government'. The task of the Bolsheviks was to proclaim the utmost hostility to the Provisional Government and to work amongst the Soviets urging them to proclaim themselves the government of Russia. 'AH power to the Soviets' — this was the tumultuous slogan that Lenin voiced. In agrarian matters he argued that large
estates must be expropriated, all land must be nationalised, and that the local peasant Soviets must acquire the right to dispose of the land as they wished. Lenin was of course fully aware that the
Bolsheviks had for the moment only limited representation in the Soviets
dominated by Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. He expected, however, that if they were to follow ihe more radical policy he was now putting forward, power in the Soviets would naturally gravitate to the more radical parties amongst which of course the Bolsheviks were the most radical.
These views did not win complete acceptance amongst the members of the Bolshevik party who heard Lenin at Kshessinskaya's villa that night. Some argued that he had misread the course of the revolution, and that the Bolsheviks would be isolated; some feared that the Bolsheviks would degenerate into a group of communist propagandists. It was not until the first half of May that Lenin was able to push his argument through to acceptance. At this time, an all-Russian
Street barricade in Petrograd.
The Tsar's
overthrow had established only the
first
phase
the political reconstruction of Russia: the people now seethed with revolutionary fervour and in the months following the coup street disturbances steadily increased in
1945
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in
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killed in the rioting in Petrograd.
Revolutionary banners are held by the soldiers on the right
party conference adopted resolutions by an overwhelming majority that condemned the Provisional Government for continuing to participate in the imperialist war and
demanded
'the rapid transfer of all state into the hands of the Soviets of
power workers and soldiers deputies, or of other organs directly expressing the will of the
majority of the people'. Thus the Bolsheviks had by a large majority committed themselves to unremitting hostility towards the Provisional Government, in particular to its foreign policy and to its continuation of the war. They also wished to oust the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionaries from their control of the Soviets as a preliminary to making these the organs of seizing state power, to encouraging the peasants to seize the land in an organised way and to fostering the belief that only when the workers in all the belligerent countries had seized power could the war be brought to
an end.
The characteristic feature of this policy was its dynamism. Compare, for example, the Menshevik programme as enunciated by their representative spokesman, Axel-
The expropriation of large landholdings in favour of the peasant masses, the conclusion of a democratic peace and as a necessary presupposition both for the full and consistent realisation of these rod:
demands and for the affirmation and consolidation of all the conquests of the revolution—ensuring the convocation of a constituent assembly. Lenin's policy took full account of the inchoate strivings, hopes and ambitions that were simmering in Russia, suddenly released from Tsarism, and which had now risen to the surface of political life. What more, Bolshevik dynamism contrasted very markedly with the timidity of the Provisional Government. It must be emphasised once again that despite the generous tone of the Provisional Government's policy in respect of personal freedom, political freedom and all the other liberal measures that it had introduced, it still remained timid regarding the vast social problems to which a solution had to be found if a stable society was to emerge from the March upheaval. However, beis
1946
cause of the claims of the war the Provisional Gk)vernment was never able, and perhaps unwilling, to enunciate a pro-
gramme that would satisfy its supporters. The Bolsheviks were still a tiny minority but they were outspoken and ruthless in their efforts to exploit the social climate that had suddenly emerged. They were pitted against the rest of the left-wing parties, to say nothing of the Cadets, which body had become the sole representative of the right wing. But it was nothing new for Lenin to find himself in a minority. It did not deter him in the least. He saw it as a challenge. The great division in the Russian Revolution was between those who supported and those who opposed the war.
Division on foreign policy therefore not surprising that the clash between the Bolsheviks on the one hand and the Soviets and the Provisional Government on the other should take place on the field of foreign policy. Milyukov was Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government and in his first statement on foreign affairs he stressed his government's loyalty to "the international obligations contracted by the fallen regime' and emphasised Russia's resolve to fight the common foe to the end. The new Russia was bound by the oath of the former Tsar. Milyukov not only shared these objectives himself and committed the Provisional Government to their attainment, but he also believed that continuation of the war and the foreign policy associated with it would, paradoxically enough, have a stabilising effect on the Russian internal situation. So long £is the war continued there would be a tendency for all parties to rally round the new regime and to set aside their internal differences. At least that was his hope and expectation. In addition. Allied encouragement was brought to bear most vigorously on the new regime in the same sense. We must not forget that 1917, especially the spring of th.it year, w£is a crucial period for the Allies when it looked as though the war might be lost. There was therefore all the more need to maintain the Eastern Front. The Allies made their wishes felt in the form of intense financial, diplomatic and It
is
first
military pressure. In addition, French and British pro-war socialists were sent to Russia to bolster the Russian war effort with their claim of a common ideology. However, all these efforts could not overcome the two different Russian approaches to the war. Whereas the right-wing (represented by the government) pushed the slogan 'war on the front, peace at home', the left-wing (represented by the Petrograd Soviet) declaimed 'peace on the front, war at home'. Clearly in the face of this divergent outlook, there could be no
agreement between soviet and government. But for the first few weeks after the overthrow of the Tsar the Provisional Government was able to follow its foreign policy more or less unimpeded by the Petrograd Soviet. But towards the end of March differences over foreign policy caused ihe first break in the system of dual power. On March 27 the Soviet had issued a call to the peoples of the world in which it urged them 'to take into their own hands the decision of the question of war and peace'. This appeal included special words for the workers of Germany and Austria: Throw off the yoke of your semi-autocratic rule, as the Russian people have shaken off the Tsar's autocracy; refuse to serve as an instrument of conquest and violence in the hands of kings, landowners and bankers — and then by our united efforts, we will stop the horrible butchery which is dis-
gracing humanity. This was not an out and out pacifist appeal, but it did signify a break with the unqualified pursuit of the war by the Provisional Government. It also enjoyed the support of those few Bolsheviks in Petrograd at this time and of a number of other left-wing groupings in the capital. The Soviet followed its manifesto to the workers of the world with a denunciation of secret diplomacy and a very precise outline of those issues that separated it from the government. 'We do not aspire to conquer foreign lands', the Soviet declared. 'Our wish is to guarantee liberty to the peoples and primarily liberty to the peoples inhabiting Russia. We shall fight, arms in hand, against everything that stands in the way of this liberty.' It contrasted this appeal for liberty with the aims of the bourgeoisie which, in Russia, aimed to secure Constantinople, the Dardanelles, and parts of Poland; in Britain, to annex the German colonies and Mesopotamia; in France, to take Alsace Lorraine and parts of Germany; in Italy to secure the Tyrol and territories in the Balkans. 'It is obvious that our attitude towards the war is quite different from that of the bourgeoisie', the Soviet concluded. This challenge to the Provisional Government was not the only act of the Soviet. It also sought to coerce the government into revising its policy so as to renounce Russia's territorial and annexationist aims. Milyukov in the cabinet vehemently resisted this pressure. But he was not fully supported by his cabinet colleagues. Kerensky, for example, thought the dispute 'casuistical' and deplored the endless discussions 'which upset public morale'.
Reshuffle In the end the Provisional Grovernment and the Petrograd Soviet agreed on a compromise statement which reconciled the obligations of the regime towards the Allies with the view that it was not the
Russian aim to win domination over other nations or occupy foreign territories. But this did not altogether satisfy the Soviet's hope for a redefinition of Russia's war aims and on April 12 the first AllRussian Conference of Soviets urged the
government with
to
into negotiations the purpose of working
'enter
its allies for
out a general agreement' which would include an Allied renunciation of annexations and indemnities. The government reftised. for it was only too clear to Mih-ukov for example, that he was being asked to suggest to Russia's allies that they renounce their own war aims — which was plainly an unthinkable position. On May 1 Mihoikov sent Russia's allies a note which was a slap in the face of the Soviet. This note precipitated the fi.rst crisis of the Pro\asional Government, forced Milyukov's own resignation and led to a wholesale reshuffle of the government. The new regime lost much of its precarious stability.
The note offended the Soviet because it referred to 'a decisive victorv'', because it declared that the government considered itself committed to observe Russia's obligations towards the Allies and, lastly, because it referred to 'guarantees and sanctions which are required to prevent new bloody encounters in the future'. There were immediate repercussions on the streets of Petrograd. These were all the more animated because it was May Day and for the first time in Rtxssian history the holiday could be celebrated without fear of government repression. On May 4 and 5 the streets filled with demonstrators and counter-demonstrators, spontaneous political gatherings and crowds of
armed workers and
soldiers.
'Down with
Miljoikov, Mihtikov must gol' — these were the slogans carried by some of the workers
and soldiers. But if Milyukov personally bore the brunt of the popular hostility, it was the government as a whole that suffered. Not only did the demonstrations reveal the gulf that existed between the Soviet and the Provisional Government, but they also revealed a cleavage between the Soviet leaders and their followers. This gave the Bolsheviks an opening. They do not seem to have played any part in initiating the demonstrations but they certainly encouraged the crowds and used the opportunity to exploit the resentment of the
crowds in their own
political interest.
In the face of this
the governseek to broaden its political base. It therefore published an appeal calling for the co-operation of 'those active creative forces of the country' which had not previously participated in the government. Personal approaches to the Soviet were also made by Prince Lvov and Kerensky. The Soviet did not react in any uniform way to these appeals. Certain Menshevik leaders, such as Tseretelli, felt that the Soviet should identify itself with the government and thus help to end the crisis. Others were unsympathetic to the idea of sharing power openly with the middle class parties. Only Kamenev, the Bolshevik
ment's
first
move was
crisis,
to
spokesman, denounced unambiguously any support for the government. The Bolsheviks used their power, such as it was at this time, not to
strengthen the govern-
rpent but, on the contrarv', to strengthen the Soviets. The crucial Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet proved to be
Oath of allegiance: troops on the Carpathian front swear their loyalty to the trappings and the ceremony still echo the old regime
very evenly divided. There was a majority of only one 23-22 with eight abstentions) in refusing to allow representatives of the committee to participate in a coalition government with the middle-class Cadets. But the crisis went a stage further on May 14 when Guchkov, Minister of War and Navy, and one of the strongest personalities in the government, suddenly resigned. Conditions in the army and in the fleet were such that he could no longer 1
new
regime. The
contend only with the opposition of the small party of Bolsheviks. "The policy of the new coalition government paid more regard to the susceptibilities of the Soviet in reto
lation to foreign affairs. It hoped to preserve 'full unity with the Allies, on the basis of the self-determination of peoples without annexations on either side.' It would reorganise the army, regulate economic life, prepare the organised transfer of land to the peasants, create a system
conscientiously fulfil his duties, Guchkov declared. His former colleagues — Lvov,
of local
Kerensky and Tereshchenko Finance — felt that this new situation made it all the more
the moment the crisis was over. In retrospect it is clear that the May crisis and its temporary resolution through the formation of a coalition government denoted a momentous change in the politi-
)
i
urgent to associate the Soviet with the government. This would also mean that they could put an end to the anomaly of 'dual power'. The moderate members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet, frightened at the possibility of a complete governmental breakdown, now argued that all waverings must be abandoned and a decision taken in favotu- of a coalition. This view was held very strongly by the
Mensheviks in
particular. Finally, only a
handful of the extreme left such as the Bolsheviks and some of the Left SocialistRevolutionaries and a minor Menshevik grouping voted against accepting the government's invitation to participate in the formation of a new cabinet. This did not mean that the crisis was yet resolved. On the contrary, almost four days were spent in continuous nego-
amongst the left-wing parties in the Soviet and the cabinet before a coalition cabinet came into being. Mil>aikov left and was replaced as Foreign tiation
Minister by Tereshchenko, a Cadet and former Finance Minister. Lvov remained Premier, Kerensky became Minister of the Army and Navy, and five other socialists entered the cabinet. This solution was supported by the Mensheviks but opposed by the Bolsheviks. Lenin argued that 'a grave and fatal mistake' had been made by the Left
Socialist-Revolutionaries
and Men-
shevik leaders. But at this point the Bolsheviks were still relativ'ely uninfluential. The partisans of the right now hoped that a much stronger government had been formed, which would put an end to 'dual
power',
and
which
would
have
government and combine
all this
with a strong authority at the centre. For
cal
constellation.
It
caused
dissillusion
among
the leaders of the masses represented in the Soviet — disillusion that would soon be compounded when the coalition prepared an offensive against Germany. A condition was thus created which enabled the Bolsheviks to exploit the growing breach between the Soviet leaders and their followers. It is only in the light of the government's commitment to the war that the ultimate collapse of the March regime can be understood.
Further Reading Kantakuzen, J., Revolutionary days (New York: Arno 1970) Kochan, L. Russia in Revolution 1890-1918
(London 1967) Pares. B. The Fall of the Russian (London 1939) Robinson, G.
T.
Monarchy
Rural Russia under the Old
Regime (London
1932) History of the Bolshevik Revolution (London 1934 English Translation)
Trotsky,
L.
LIONEL KOCHAN was born in London in 1922. He was educated at the Hat>erdasher's Askes School in Hampstead and was later a scholar at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. During the Second World War he served in the Intelligence Corps and subsequently taught modern European and Russian History at the Universities of Edinburgh and East Anglia and was a reader in Jewish History at the University of Warwick. His publications include a wide range of works, both general and specialised. on 20th Century Europe, with a special emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe.
1947
DECLINE OF THE
TSARIST
ARMY autumn of 1916, conditions in Rusthrough the slaughter of her armies and the hardship suffered by her civilians
By
the
sia,
in both
town and country, had deteriorated which almost all observers
to the point at
regarded revolution as inevitable. By the time Brusilov's offensive petered out in the mud of the autumn rains, the army's losses since the beginning of the war (killed, wounded, captured or missing) had reached astronomical proportions. Because of the haphazard way in which records were kept, the estimates differ considerably, but on the latest available assessment those killed or wounded totalled 4,670,000 by the end of October 1916, while a further 2,078,000 were in prison camps in Germany, Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria, and over 1,000,000 were 'missing'. During 1916, it was evident that army morale was cfumbling. At Easter 1916 Brusilov found it necessary to issue an order sternly forbidding fraternisation with the enemy, after incidents of surrender and desertion in 40th Army Corps' sector. More serious incidents occurred during Brusilov's summer offensive. Despite its early successes, with their favourable effects on morale, about 60,000 men had disappeared without trace from units of the Russian South- Western Front between May 22 and July 21, 1916. Brusilov ordered heavy punishments, including the death penalty, for desertion, and instructed his subordinate commanders to publicise
all
such punishments in their
units. On August 2, 1916, an incident had occurred on French soil, where elements of the Russian 4th Special Infantry Regiment on their way to the Salonika Front mutinied and killed their Commanding Officer, for which eight soldiers were court-martialled and shot on August 21.
own
Further unrest among front-line units occurred in October 1916 in the 12th Siberian Rifle Division, and in the 22nd Infantry Division, in both cases involving refusal to attack, while censorship reports from Sixth Army on the South West Front '^18
referred both to the depressing effect of letters to the troops ('Almost every letter invariably mentions the serious situation at home and expresses a wish for the war to end as soon as possible'), and to the complaining tone of many of the troops' letters
home.
Disorders and mutinies Unquestionably,
the internal situation seriously affected the morale of the troops, as the report of the Petrograd Military
Censorship Commission acknowledged on November 27, 1916. It quoted soldiers' complaints about shortages of food, warm clothing and equipment, and added: It cannot but be observed that in letters from the army, just as in letters to the army, dissatisfaction begins to
show
itself
more
and more sharply about
the internal political situation of the country, in connection with the general disorganisation of the rear and the ever-increasing price of necessities. Rumours reach the army about disorders, strikes in the factories, and mutinies in rear military units, and these rumours, often exaggerated and embellished, cause a lowering of morale among the troops, and strong uneasiness about the fate of their families and relatives who have been left at home. Although the Allies had tended to look on Russia as an inexhaustible reservoir of manpower, they had failed to take into ac-
count the immense demands made on that manpower. For a long time Russia's leaders, too,
squandered men's
lives as if their
numbers were inexhaustible, but by September 1916, Stavka realised the gravity of the situation, and on the 11th of that month the Chief of General Staff, General Averyanov, wrote to the Duty General at Stavka: 'By August 1916 the field army was below establishment to the extent, in some divisions, of 50-60 per cent', and went on to say that he was terrified by 'the actual situation regarding available manpower reserves in Russia, as the reinforcement of the army with men has become positively
one of emergency we are close to complete exhaustion of the manpower reserve.' The Duty General in his turn compiled a report for the Chief of Staff to the Tsar, .
.
.
General Alexeyev, which was submitted on October 15. It estimated that against needs assessed as 300,000 men per month, the total reserves available after November 1, 1916 would be only 1.4 million, and that this figure could be achieved only by including second-class reservists aged 37-40 years (350,000), those not due for call-up until 1919 (700,000) and 200,000 'white ticket men' (those discharged or exempted as physically unfit). Alexeyev stressed that 'This is a totally insignificant number, and it will be hard to fight the war with it.' In short, it was clear by October 1916 that available reserves would suffice only for another five months of war, and that the army would begin to decline in numbers from the end of February 1917, even if it remained on the defensive. In October 1916 the first signs of serious cracks in military morale in the capital appeared, when two regiments of the Petrograd garrison, ordered to open fire on strikers, began to shoot at the police instead. On December 30, the British Am-
bassador (Buchanan) sought an audience with the Tsar, at which he told him: 'In the event of revolution, only a small part of the army can be counted on to defend the dynasty.' Eight days later, Rodzyanko, president of the Duma, delivered a similar warning. But the Tsar had nothing to add to the limited reconstruction of the government which he had undertaken on January 9, bringing a number of insignificant un-
knowns
into his cabinet.
At the beginning of March 1917, it became evident that Petrograd was on the verge of insurrection, and on March 8, food riots began. On the following day the crowds began sacking the bakeries, and the Cossacks, who were called out to disperse them, performed their duties with a notable lack of zeal.
On
the 11th, the Garrison
Commander, General Khabalov, forbade
As the war entered its
third winter, the
Russian army entered a period of dechne from which it was never to recover. The symptoms of its sickness had almost all been present from the first, optimistic weeks of the war — poor leadership, inadequate communications, appalling weather conditions — but the crisis of morale that it was now undergoing stemmed not so much from the privations the war had imposed on the fighting men as from their growing disillusion with the purposes for which it was being fought. The soldiers had greeted the overthrow of the Tsar with glee, but the loyalty of the vast majority of them was to the Petrograd Soviet; the more the Provisional Grovernment talked of rekindling the offensive spirit of the army, the tighter grew the tensions. Geoffrey Jukes. Far left: The moment of desertion: a loyal soldier raises his rifle against two fugitives. Left: 'Victory', the slogan (here painted on an armoured car) that few now believed. More and more the soldiers identified with the Bolshevik 'peace and bread' programme all
public
meetings, but the Pavlovsky
Regiment mutinied when ordered out to disperse crowds. The elite regiment of the Guards, the Preobrazhensky, was at that stage still loyal, and it disarmed the mutineers, but later that day the Volynsky regiment also mutinied, marched back to its barracks and locked itself in. The next morning, when it emerged, it was joined by a company of the Preobrazhensky, and General Khabalov's attempts to restore order failed, as, one after the other, the commanders of the remaining regiments of the garrison notified him that only a proportion of their troops still responded to discipline, and that they were not available for public duty because the unreliable elements would mutiny as soon as the loyal troops left barracks. By the same evening the Moscow Regiment of the Guard had also gone over to the rioters, and Khabalov's jurisdiction covered only a small part of the centre of the city.
'Spontaneous' Bolshevik and other revolutionary propagandists had been at work among the troops, but their activities were not crucial to the success of the uprising. It was a natural consequence of the events of the preceding years, and was spontaneous. There was no new regime ready to take up the reins of government from the faltering hands of the Tsar's ministers; the Duma had no plans to take over control, and only when it heard on March 12, that a crowd of 80,000 was approaching the building was a 'provisional committee' of
members
the
parties
But
of all except hastily set up.
right-wing there was
already an alternative source of power in the state — the Petrograd Soviet. During the unsuccessful revolution of 1905, a Soviet of Workers' Deputies
had been
set
up
to
impart some cen-
general strike. Now, under pressure of events, a similar Soviet was being set up by ad hoc means — mostly by shows of hands in the streets. tral direction to the
On March
13 both
it
and the 'Provisional
Committee' were functioning in the
Duma
building, while the Tsar's cabinet, still the legal government, dragged out the last moments of its existence, until its members fled or were arrested. The Soviet lost no time in asserting its
authority over the armed forces. On March 14 it issued 'Army Order Number 1', by which it turned itself into the 'Soviet of
Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies'. The Order decreed that representatives of the lower ranks of the armed forces should be elected to the Soviet. All fighting units which had not yet elected representatives were to choose them on a basis of one per company, and send them, with their credentials, to the Duma building by 10 a.m. the next day. In all political actions, the military units were under orders of the Soviet, and would obey orders from the Military Committee of the Duma only where they did not conflict with those of the Soviet. While strict military discipline was to be observed in the line or in the performing of military duties, ofiF-duty standing to attention and saluting were abolished, titles of respect to officers were to be replaced by 'Mr General ', 'Mr Colonel' and so on, and impolite behaviour by officers
was
to be reported to
company com-
mittees. The committees were to have control of all armaments, and in no circum-
stances were these to be given to officers. The preamble to the order made clear that it referred only to the Petrograd garrison, but copies of it reached the front line, and army discipline crumbled in its wake, notwithstanding the issue by the Soviet of Army Order Number Two, which
reiterated that it applied only to Petrograd. In April 1917 two members of the Duma, Maslennikov and Shmakov, visited the front, and concluded that though morale of the artillery and the Cossacks appeared to be intact, that of the cavalry was unknown, and much of the infantry appeared 'shaken'. In 1914 the Second Socialist International
had broken up when most of
its
member
parties decided to support their respective countries' war efforts. Among the Russian socialists, all
bar Lenin's Bolsheviks had
rejected his argument that the war should be turned into a class struggle by an appeal to the workers of all the belligerent countries to rise against their governments. Lenin had retired to exile in Switzerland, but the German G^eneral Staff" now saw an opportunity to weaken Russia's will to fight still further by facilitating his return to his country. They therefore provided a special train to convey him and a group of his followers across Germany, and they arrived in Petrograd on April 16, 1917. In the interests of a general revolution, Lenin preached fraternisation (on the grounds that it was not the troops who were enemies of each other but their governments who were their common enemies), immediate peace, and conversion of the war into a class struggle — a series of civil
wars between peoples and governments. These doctrines brought him into open army's loyalty to the Provisional Government, most of whose members believed that the only hope for perpetuation of 'their' revolution (that of February/March) was an Allied victory, and that a win for Germany was likely to lead at the least to the restoration of autocracy in Russia. They realised the importance of keeping the Russian front intact, to prevent the transfer of German and Austrian forces to the west, and wished to mount an offensive during the coming summer. This could only be a limited assault, as no reservists had been called up since the February/March revolution, and the persistent unrest among the rear units showed the dangers of further mobilisation. Up to the end of 1916, 14,648,000 men had been mobilised, and the burden had fallen particularly hard upon the peasantry— the rural census of 1916 was to show that 47.4 per cent of the male naral labour force had been mobilised into the army. conflict for the
Tension between the Provisional Govem-
1949
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lop: Russian guns captured by the Austrians
A similar model 1952
is still
used today
in
Vietnam
1915
1916
Above: The pattern of decline: Russian losses from death and desertion from 1914 to 1917
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JASON
1917 Right: Russian soldiers stand grim guard over the frozen bodies of their comrades
reinforcements, the army would have to remain inactive until the end of July. Here
he came into conflict with his Chief of Staif, General Denikin, who believed that to remain on the defensive would merely sap the country's will to fight and allow the poison of Bolshevik peace propaganda to sap morale further, whereas a successful offensive would restore it. In any event, the state of morale rendered it impossible for Russia to co-ordinate her offensive with that of Nivelle in the west. Although the leaders disagreed as to
the remedy, most were agreed that the army's symptoms showed it to be on the verge of disintegration, and on May 7, in his resignation statement, Guchkov justified his attempts to 'democratise' the army, but pointed out that there was 'a limit, beyond which disintegration is bound to begin'. On the following day Alexeyev and the front commanders testified at a joint meeting of the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet in much starker terms. Alexeyev said 'The army is on the very brink of ruin', and other generals gave instances of the impossibility of exercising authority over troops who took the Bolshevik call for a 'peace without annexations' to mean that they need no longer attack — even to retake Russian territory occupied by the Germans. Nothing
June 1917;
a
new regime
Is In
power but the exodus
of
young men
to the front
goes on
resulted from their representations; the Soviet refused to act, and the Provisional Government could not. However, tension between the cautious General Alexeyev, and the new Minister of War increased, so that on May 22 Kerensky demanded and received Alexeyev's resignation, appointing as the new Commander-in-Chief General Brusilov.
2,000,000 deserters While preparations for the offensive were going ahead, the army continued to disintegrate. Over 2,000,000 men deserted from the front during March and April, almost without replacement — against a requirement of 300,000 men per month, only 730,000 replacements were provided Above: Proof that the cap no longer fitted the Russian soldier? French helmets are worn here
Above: Russian soldiers in full flight-one way (punishable by death) of escaping from the war
tt
.
'^.^ ?• ''-1
-
\
-*^ "^
' 1
^ 3l
up to November 1917, most of them in January and February. The police had been 'aboUshed', and a wild proposal to send them to the front was considered, but
A number of the non-Christian minorities of Transcaucasia, Central Asia and Siberia, were not subject to call-up, but because about ten million of them were men of military age, mobilisation was considered, despite their backwardness and total lack of military training. However, rejected.
turn them into soldiers would have required many months, and time was not on Brusilov's side, nor on the side of the Provisional Government. Brusilov's plan was essentially a repetition of his offensive of the previous year, the main attack again being undertaken to
Below: Still behind barbed wire, but better fed and housed — Russians in a POW camp
on the Russian South-Western Front, aiming at Lvov (Lemberg). It would be carried out by the Seventh and Eleventh Armies, supported by subsidiary 'pinning-down' attacks on the Northern, Western and Rumanian Fronts, and followed by an attack further south, by General Kornilov's Eighth Army. Partly because of the reduced scale of the offensive, compared with 1916, and because the front had been inactive since October (the Germans, prefered to let revolutionary ferment work its way through Russia, and, rather than risk restoring national unity by a premature offensive, had remained quiescent), unprecedentedly large stocks of artillery and c ammunition had been built up. Further- | more, because of doubts about the
reli-
^
V
ability of the troops, Alexeyev had seen to the formation of a number of volunteer
shock battalions, made up of men who wished to continue fighting. It was argued by some that to form units of this kind weakened the army, by removing from other units such backbone as they still had, but in most cases the units from which the volunteers came were so demoralised that they not only lacked influence but were in some physical danger while they remained with them. During the period of preparation, Bolanti-war pamphlets circulated shevik among the troops, but eventually, on June 18, the South-Western Front's assault began. The shock battalions led the way with great spirit, but the remainder of the infantry were reluctant to advance, and after two days refused to go on. On their left. General Kornilov began his attack on June 23, against low-quality AustroHungarian forces which gave way easily to his shock battalions. Eighth Army took 7,000 prisoners on the first day, but as the shock battalions became casualties the regular infantry proved no more ready to advance than their comrades of Seventh and Eleventh Armies. By July 2 the Southwestern Front offensive had ended. Total losses, at 38,700 officers and men, were infinitesimal compared with those borne by the Russian armies in the previous three years, but they were more than those armies could now stand. The Germans and Austrians began to exert pressure, and on July 6 they duly counterattacked in limited strength, against the left flank of Eleventh Army, where with nine divisions they routed 20, driving the Russians back tq the line of the Seret River. So complete was the collapse of Eleventh Army that even its Soldiers' Committees were shocked into approving an order for the shooting of
But the rot was too far advanced any such measures to save the situa-
deserters. for
tion,
carry
because few troops could be found to
them
out.
The fiasco of the off'ensive had shown the depths to which the army morale had sunk, and on July 12 the Provisional Government reintroduced both capital punishment and courts-martial. Kornilov saw these measures as the essential prelude to a restoration of discipline. Kerensky had now become Prime Minister, but the Provisional
Government was
still competing with the Soviet for the loyalty of the armed forces, and had just survived a premature attempt by the Bolsheviks to seize power. Kerensky was therefore in no position to take the Draconian measures which Kornilov considered necessary, and as Kornilov could not get the co-operation he required from Kerensky, he began plotting against him to secure his downfall. The Cossacks looked to him for leadership, as one of them, and he enjoyed particular support from the Ataman (headman) of the Don Cossacks, General Kale-
din, who commanded Seventh Army. The Allies backed Kornilov because they saw in his efforts to restore army discipline
the only guarantee of continued Russian participation in the war, which they regarded as more important than ever after the failure of Nivelle's offiensive; and the right-wing and liberal politicians saw him as a defence against Bolshevik take-over. Kornilov therefore began to plan for assumption of power by himself He concentrated the Third Cavalry Corps (mostly Cossacks) near Petrograd, and arranged for about 2,000 'Kornilovist' officers to be posted to the capital. The takeover would be signalled by provoking a riot in Petrograd, and marching troops into the city on the pretext of protecting the government, while the 2,000 officers sent in would arrest the leaders of all the left-wing parties and seize the principal administrative buildings. The date of the coup was to be not later than September 1. Kornilov betrayed his intentions before the day, and Kerensky succeeded in obtaining a free hand from the Cabinet to deal
He ordered Kornilov to come to Petrograd, and when he began to move his troops proclaimed him a traitor. But Kerenwith him.
Gunpoint offensive The Russian Northern Front
off'ensive be-
gan on July 8 and ended on the 10th. Of the six divisions allocated to it, only two took part, and one of them (182nd) had to be forced into the line at gunpoint. The other (36th) was initially more willing, but after seizing two lines of German trenches it returned to its own positions. When the Western Front attempted to attack, using 138 battalions against positions held by 17 German battalions, the same thing happened. On the Rumanian Front, the position was
The Rumanian army had remained unaffected by the Russian revolution, so plans were made to use Ruma-
slightly better.
nian forces alongside the Russians. Their presence also made it less necessary to use volunteer shock battalions to lead, and they were employed behind the front line to suppress mutinies and apprehend would-be deserters. Consequently, when the assault began on July 10 it was attended with a fair degree of success. However, the failures elsewhere had caused the Provisional Government to lose confidence in Brusilov, and Kerensky decided to replace him with the Cossack General, Kornilov. His first act was to order the offensive to be stopped, and the Rumanian Front received orders to this effect on July 13, after a bare three days of fighting.
1956
sky had no real force at his command, and in fact it was the Petrograd Soviet which stopped Kornilov. It summoned and armed the workers (the Bolshevik Red Guards here obtained thousands of weapons which were to prove useful to them later), ordered the railwaymen to stop any attempt by Kornilov to bring in troops by train, and brought in sailors from the Kronstadt base of the Baltic Fleet. Representatives of the Soviet went out to meet Kornilov's advancing columns, which came to a halt on August 27 and agreed to move no further, in defiance of their officers. The Petrograd Soviet also notified the rest of the army of what was happening, with the result that many pro-Kornilov senior officers, including the Commander of South-Western Front, General Denikin, and all his army commanders, were arrested by their men. Kornilov's movement collapsed. The troops had shown themselves more ready to take their orders from the Petrograd Soviet than from their Commander-in-Chief, and it
was the Petrograd Soviet which gained
most from his attempt tary dictatorship.
to establish a milialso showed that the interest in the war — Riga It
army now had no fell to the Germans on August 21 —but the event attracted little attention in a country preoccupied with its own internal crisis.
The
failure of Kornilov's attempt to seize
power merely fragmented the army further. From then on, officers enjoyed even less authority than before. They were also regarded by their men as the chief obstacles to ending the war, and many of the moderate military committees found themselves replaced by bodies of a more left-wing stamp. Bolshevik and German propaganda played upon their war-weariness to even greater effect than hitherto, and by the time the Bolsheviks, with the support of most of the Petrograd garrison, seized power, on October 25, 1917, the army's attitude was characterised by the Stavka report for the second half of October as 'one of highly nervous expectancy. Now, as before, an irresistible thirst for peace, a universal desire to leave the front conthe main motives on which the attitude of most of our troops is based. The army is simply a huge, weary, shabby and ill-fed mob of angry men, united by their common thirst for peace and by common disappointment'. stitute
Little blood left It is clear that the decline of the Russian army during 1917 can be attributed to a
two which they owed German skill in fomenting
nurtiber of factors; to the existence of
contending bodies
to
allegiance; to revolution, by facilitating the return of Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders from Switzerland, so that they could conduct their anti-war campaign in Russia more effectively, and in their conduct of operations at the front, where they allowed fraternisation, the dissemination of propaganda, and abstention from active operations to assist erosion of the Russian will to fight. It was due also to the Provisional
Government's efforts to continue the war, and it's simultaneous refusal to give its until it was too late, the disciplinary powers which they needed; and to Bolshevik skill in fostering the belief that a peace 'without annexations or indemnities' was possible, so that Russia could hope for a painless exit from the war. But in the final analysis, these accidents of the situation only accelerated the inevitable, since it was already evident by October 1916 that Russia's manpower was almost exhausted. By then, her available reserves were officers,
less than enough for another five months of war, so that after February 1917 the Russian army would be living on borrowed time. It was the huge manpower losses of 1914rl6 which caused the decline of 1917; they in their turn were caused by the inability of the Tsar's government to withstand a modern war, in which good generalship had to be supported by immense quan-
and ammunition, backed by a sophisticated logistical system, and which not only had to feed and supply the armies in the field, but maintain the civilian population at reasonable standards of diet and morale. Too often the Russian infantryman had. been called on to retjike with blood what the German had taken with high explosive, and by the beginning of 1917 there was little blood left. The seeds of the revolution had been sown at Tannenberg, the Masurian Lakes, GorliceTarnow, and a score of lesser disasters, and by 1917 the only question to be resolved was: Who would reap the harvest? tities of artillery
\FoT Geoffrey Jukes' biography, see page 1472.]
7 '
THE GOOD JHE BAD AND THE UGLY TSARIST GENERALS 9 1
1
4- 1 9 1
8 Mikhail Alexeyev
Vladimir
Nikolai Nikolaievich
Yakov Jlllnsky
Nikolai Ivanov
Aleiei Brusilov
Nikolai
Jurlj
Born 1857
Sukhomlinov
(Grand Duke Nicholas)
Born 1853
Born 1851
Born 1853
Yanushkevich
Born 1866
Born 1848
Bom
1914: C-in-C
August 1914September 1915:C-in-C South-Western Front Replaced by Brusilov
1914: C-in-C Eighth
Born 1868
1908-1914:
1914: Appointed Chief
Quartermaster General 1914-1915: Deputy
1912:
GOC
XIII
Corps
1914: Chief-of-Staff
1908: Chief of the
South-Western Front March 1915;C-in-C
General Staff
North -Western Front August 1915: Chief of the General Staff at
War.
GHQ March 1917: Supreme
He was appointed to the War Ministry at a
Commander-in-Chief
time of chaos and he
He had worked
his
way
up from the ranks by
He was
19091915: Minister
of
1856
1905:President of
Warsaw
Council of National
district
Defence
August 1914; C-inC
August 1914 Supreme Commander-in-Chief August 1915 GovernorGeneral and Cin-C Caucasus :
June 1915: Dismissed
:
May
to
1915: Chief-of-Staff
Chief-of-Staff
Commander-in-Chief
Grand Duke Nicholas Replaced by Alexeyev
XXV Army
CS Northern Front C-in-C Fifth Army
1917: Supreme
big white beard,
beloved by his men with whom he had
He was undoubtedly
He had had no
service and had
generals.
commanded nothing
clear-thinking, strong
larger than a
situation and could
Supreme C-in-C pleased
generally unpopular
unpretentious
willed, decisive,
He behaved more
make decisions
the entire army and.
with his troops. He
rapidly,
Mentally superficial
for the job at the time.
moral courage and
and flippant, he made
He was
was
false statements to the
but he did
little to
Just as the Tsar
government
not the right
people think
make all was
to
in
best
totally
man
absorbed
official of the cut
knew
it
manner and reputedly allowed no wine at his
capable and efficient.
a courtier
He
soldier and his
he 'never attempted to
He was devoted to his work and loved the army: he was a stickler
be a courtier and
appointment as Chief the General Staff in
invariably told the Tsar
the spring of 1914
what thought, which clearly annoyed
as a surprise to the
stern disciplinarian and
other generals. Brusilov
an^
poor leader of troops in
(
the field.
Not
in
picture)
for detail but
lacked
said of himself that
exactly
I
and practice. He was
Commander-in-Chief.
buffoon by his enemies,
a strict but |ust
particulary intelligent.
m
Alexeyev was not the
he was a favourite of
disciplinarian and paid
Most
and said of
resisted
great attention to the
was out
He made
money through
— mainly
to
be his
guide and adviser. His personality
was not
the Tsar,
as a
who
his dismissal.
a lot of
the capacity to
of his
knowledge and he
him. 'He
was appalled
by the lack of efficiency the Russian army it
'after a
than a
appointment to be of fatal consequence. He
was known
to be an
year's fighting the
agreeable man. but was
needs file: everyone knew
regular trained army
irresolute and a very
decisive importance of
had melted away and
poor strategist. He
that his orders must
artillery fire in
modern
and our active troops
soon realised that he
was
rank and
of date
corruption
strengthen the
from secret armaments
be carried out. He
war. Due to reverses
were composed
vacillating will of his
deals.
inspired confidence
and
dunces.
and trust and his replacement was
nervous and
all
pessimistic.
his deputy. In his
more harm than good at
GHQ.
came
considered his
strong enough to
superior and he did
|ob of the actual Chief of
did not understand the
of the
disastrous.
The best brain and the hardest worker on the General Staff, He did his own job and the
table during the war.
a very
the role of
Known
like
Corps
work but was
make decisions and was not
well, both in theory
company.
September 1915: GOC
enjoyed bureaucratic
and loved his
profession and
in his
well.
man
field
the best of the Russian
strategist but he lacked
right
General Staff
He was simple and
was the
was man for
of the
considerable contact.
Brusilov's opinion,
often indecisive.
a
CinC
South-Western Front
and dried type who was
An
he
good
A fatherly man with
April 1915:
His appointment as
in
intelligent and a
North-Western Front September 16. 1914: Recalled and replaced by Alexeyev
Army
had a good grasp of the
improve things.
sheer merit.
Military
Danitov
ill
luck, he
was
of
not capable of
doing his job and
left
the work to Oanilov,
letters he admitted his
own
utter incapability.
of the
General Staff.
Yanushkevich. He was a dedicated soldier, a
exacting employer.
WAR OR PEACE THE NEW RUSSIA'S CRUCIAL Allied diplomacy during the first months after the first Russian Revolution of 1917 could hardly have been called successful for a number of reasons, not the least of which was the split the Allies helped to widen between the Provisional Government, which was recognised by Russia's Allies on March 24 (less than a fortnight after the Revolution), and the unrecognised but increasingly important Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. As the Allies continued to insist on a renewal of the war effort by the new Russian government, and while the Soviet, increasingly supported by wide elements of the population, continued to oppose Russia's participation in the war, the gap between the Provisional Government and the people weakened the new government's base of popular support. Echoing Wilson's 1916 call for a democratic peace 'without annexations or indemnities', the Soviet expressed a need felt not only by the Russian people, but by millions of Europeans on both sides of the fronts. The government of Prince Lvov and Foreign Minister Paul Milyukov were obliged to press the Allies for a joint restatement of war aims, which by now were muddled by the secret treaties already concluded among the Allied Powers as well as by the arrangements made between France and Russia's deposed Imperial Government for the acquisition of various territories by each country in the event of a German defeat. After all, practically on the eve of the Revolution France had been promised Russia's support for her acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine in exchange for Russian control of the Turkish-held Straits. Milyukov had no intention of relinquishing Russia's claims with respect to the Straits. When the Soviets reversed their position and agreed to participate, albeit to a limited extent, in the Provisional Government, they insisted upon the removal of Milyukov, who was succeeded by Tereshchenko, a wealthy sugar manufacturer who held more liberal views. Lvov remained Premier, but with even more limited powers than he held before. Alexander Kerensky, the socialist lawyer, took over the Ministry of War, and soon became the leading figure in the new Cabinet. The reconstruction of the Russian Cabinet forced the Allies to change their representation in Petrograd. The new Cabinet contained six socialists out of 16, and the Allied governments began to send their own prominent (and, incidentally, pro-war) socialists to Russia in order to encourage Russia to remain in the war. Although they carried the socialist label in their own countries, their version of socialism was well to the right of Russia's socialist spectrum by this time. Albert Thomas replaced the French Ambassador, Maurice Paleologue, who had been closely identified with the old regime and who was prominent in the negotiations of the Franco-Russian secret treaties which immediately preceded the Revolution. Britain replaced their distinguished Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, with Arthur Henderson. Lloyd George explained that although Buchanan had done an excellent job in cementing relations with the Imperial Government, it was for that very reason that the new Cabinet initially distrusted him. Actually, Buchanan warned the Tsar as late as January 1917 that unless he changed his policies and replaced his ministers with men who retained the people's confidence, his Empire had no future at all. Buchanan supported the Provisional Government when it was formed and in the early weeks he had considerable influence. But as the new regime moved leftwards, Buchanan had to go, and Henderson, a supporter of Britain's Labour Party, brought Buchanan's recall with him. Soon after his arrival, Henderson realised he was out of his depth in the complex revolutionary politics. All but the extreme left were soon of the opinion that Buchanan ought to remain, and so, in the end, he did. Henderson stayed on for another month, and the two British representatives agreed to co-operate with each other and, according to Buchanan, held the same views on many important questions.
1958
DECISION
One
point on which they agreed was that the Allied socialists, including the substantial British delegation, should attend the forthcoming Stockholm Conference of socialists from all the belligerent nations to discuss their war aims. Caught once more between the Petrograd Soviet and the presumed attitudes of the Allied governments, the Provisional Government was forced to try to convince the Russian population that it was in favour of the conference while at the same time assuring the Allied governments that it was opposed to it. Buchanan, despite his conservative views, believed that all the Allies, including Britain and
President Wilson; he mistook Russian radicalism for liberalism American and welcomed the Revolution
style,
Russia, ought to attend the conference in order to prevent the socialists from having a clear field at Stockholm. Buchanan realised that the Allies needed to convince Russia's extreme left that they were not only supporting Russia's remaining in the war for imperialist reasons, but for ethical and humanitarian reasons as well. The Allied governments did not support Buchanan's view, however, and were unanimously opposed to any manner of dealings with the German socialists. One immediate result was Henderson's ousting from the War Cabinet upon his return to England because of his public support for the conference. The collapse of the conference later in the summer further strengthened the hand of the Bolsheviks, as the Social Revolutionaries (SRs) and Mensheviks — Russia's moderate socialist parties — had placed great hopes in talks between Allied and German socialists. The Bolsheviks, who consistently scorned the project from the outset, won increasing support from the Russian public by advocating a fx)licy of 'bread and peace', not words. Forced by public opinion to move further to the left, the Provisional Government replaced Prince Lvov with Kerensky, who urged a summer offensive on a reluctant Cabinet in order to convince the Allies of his good faith in continuing the war. The
German
By the beginning of 1917
Britain and France had come to regard Russia as a poor relation in the AlUed camp. Only the declining strength of her principal adversary, Austria-Hungary, had saved her from total collapse, for her manpower was running out as fast as her material resources and the morale of her people was steadily breaking down: Nevertheless, when the Provisional Cjovernment took up the reins of power the Allies brought immediate pressure to bear on the new regime to remain in the war. A separate peace by Russia would, at this crucial period of the war, be followed at once by the massive removal of the Central Powers' forces from the Eastern to the Western Front, and it was this, above all, that the Allies wanted to forestall. They welcomed Russia's shift towards democracy: in President Wilson's words, her Revolution made her 'a fit partner for the league of honour', but by obstructing her left wing in its search for peace and insisting that Russia make plans for a new offensive they inadvertently opened the way for the Leninist programme calling for an end to the war. S. L. Mayer which began on July 1, ended in a rout and virtually destroyed what was left of the Russian army as a fighting force. This military collapse brought about a popular uprising, and although Kerensky met the challenge of the 'July Days', remaining in power, it became increasingly apparent, especially when Kerensky replaced Brusilov with General Lavr Kornilov as Commander-in-Chief that a dictatorship was in sight. Buchanan and the British placed their hopes on Kornilov to continue Russian participation in the war effort, but after his attempted coup to unseat the government failed in September, their hopes of inoffensive,
In
the event of a separate
peace by Russia
122^ German & AustfoHungarian Divisions available as leinforcements
Mttttttttt
Med/ter/aneSh Sea
Adriatic
The realities of a separate peace — a vastly strengthened adversary on the Western Front capable of strong offensive action against the Allies fluencing the increasingly radical Russian government were dashed. One of the few units which remained faithful to Kornilov's lost cause was a British armoured-car squadron under Commander Oliver Locker-Lampson, whose men were furnished with Russian uniforms for the occasion. Buchanan did not view Kornilov as a reactionary. He saw him as a patriot merely trying to continue Russia's participation in the war. Buchanan's postcoup mediations between Kerensky and Kornilov proved fruitless. The whole affair was a serious blow to the Allies, a view expressed by Lloyd George. Wilson and House in America began to view the Russian situation as a hopeless cause. Rather than strengthening the Provisional Government, British policy — and indeed. Allied policy in general, which tended to support the British position of insisting on Russia's remaining in the war — strengthened the hands of the Bolsheviks, particularly after Kornilov's attempted coup failed when all rail and road links into Petrograd were blocked against his advance. By September the Allies were resigned to losing Russia's support for the war. General Maude in Mesopotamia asked for reinforcements from India, as he had no faith in Russia any more. Neither did Lloyd George, who told Bernard Pares, an English Russian specialist
recently returned from Petrograd, that 'he had simply lost all interest in Russia as a working factor in the success of the Allies'. Worst of all from the Allied point of view was the appearance of German divisions, recently withdrawn from the Eastern Front because they were no longer needed, on the Western Front. British public opinion mirrored the attitude of their government. Initially supporting, however tentatively, the Provisional Government, British opinion hardened when it became apparent that British troops in France could expect no relief from a new Russian offensive in the east. The long and short of it was the fact that the Russian people had ceased to support the war, and no amount of Allied insistence and pressures on the Provisional Government could alter that fact. The American position was in some ways analogous to the
Anglo-French position, but differed in degree and manner for several reasons. Firstly, at the time of the outbreak of the First World War, Russo-American relations were in a mildly troubled state. This was due to three principal reasons. The American Jewish community had long resented the treatment of their coreligionists in Russia under the Tsar and, indeed, many of them had recently fled Tsarist pogroms to emigrate to America. Their longterm grievance, standing by itself would have had little effect upon the Wilson Government had it not been for the fact that certain commercial interests were upset after the Congress almost unanimously passed a resolution in 1911 stating that Russia had violated the old commercial treaty between the Tsarist Government and the United States, signed in 1832. The commercial treaty was terminated at the end of 1912, just before the Wilson Administration took office. Despite the abrogation of the treaty the modest trade which the United States enjoyed with Russia actually increased when the war broke out, so anti-Russian sentiment was already on the wane in commercial circles in August 1914. The third reason for American cautiousness toward Russia in 1914 was of a more general nature. Pro- Allied propagandists soon made a great deal of the fact that while the Central Powers were quasi-dictatorships and certainly monarchical and aristocratic, the Allies represented the interests of democracy and, in the case of France, republicanism — a principle dear to the hearts of Americans. Russia, prior to 1917, therefore, was an embarrassment to Allied propagandists in the United States. If Germany and Austria-Hungary were monarchical, aristocratic and, to a degree, undemocratic, then what could be said of Russia, which, by any standard, was even worse? By the time the Tsar was overthrown in March 1917, the situation had altered considerably. Most Americans, now swinging into opposition to the Central Powers, rejoiced at the news from Petrograd. Now Wilson's dream of 'making the world safe for democracy' rang truer if America was going to join liberal, democratic Britain and France and a reformed Russia to struggle against the reactionary Central Powers — or so the story went. To most Americans what was happening in Russia was a political upheaval in an old American tradition: republican, liberal, antimonarchical. When Woodrow Wilson went to Congress asking for war in April, he found it fitting to mention that the new Russian regime was 'fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a league of honour'. It was a pity that so few Americans understood the realities of the Russian situation: that Russia was becoming radical, not liberal; that democracy had very shallow roots in Russian soil, and, above all, that the Russian people wanted to quit the war that America was entering with such patriotic fervour. Big business, in its turn, was more sympathetic to Russia in 1917 than it had been at the time the commercial treaty was terminated. For one thing, the export figures, which had rvm at a modest $35 million per annum while the treaty was in effect.
1959
196t.'
i
began to climb rapidly once the war started. By the fiscal year ending in the summer of 1917, American exports to Russia totalled $558.9 million. This increase in direct trade was supplemented by a considerable increase in American investments in Russia by such large concerns as the Singer Sewing Machine Company, the International Harvester Company, some of the large American international banks and insurance companies. The result was that at the time of the Revolution, despite the lack of any commercial treaty, American interests were now deeply engaged, economically and financially, on the Russian scene. The American representative selected by Wilson to go to Petrograd in 1914 improved Russo- American relations before the revolution to the extent that this was to cause embarrassment once the Provisional Government had taken over. Following the denunciation of the commercial treaty in 1911 the United States was represented by only a charge d'affaires for about two years, but by 1914 the situation had improved to some extent, and President Wilson filled the vacant ambassadorial post with a Mr George T. Marye of San Francisco. Although America's feelings toward Russia were being eased because oi the commercial and political situation, Russian feelings were still hurt because of the 1911 affair. In fact, the position was bad enough for the Russian Ambassador to Washington to attempt to dissuade Marye from taking up his post, an unusual step to say the least. Marye proceeded to Petrograd despite the fact that the Foreign Office there informed the State Department that Marye's presence wasn't really necessary and that the Tsar would consent to see him when he arrived only if he happened to have the time, a prospect which was by no means certain. But Marye was received by Tsar Nicholas and served as Ambassador until March 1916. He built up a strong personal attachment to the imperial family and was accepted enthusiastically in court circles. His sudden request for a recall in February 1916 came as something of a shock. Ostensibly he asked to be recalled for reasons of ill health, but the real reasons are still obscure. According to his memoires, he withdrew out of political considerations at home. In any event, the Imperial Government took his withdrawal as an affront which did not make things easier for his successor, Mr David R. Francis of St Louis. Francis had already had a successful political career, having been at various times Mayor of St Louis, Governor of Missouri and Secretary of the Interior in the latter stages of Grover Cleveland's Second Administration. Although an important figure in the Democratic Party, his qualifications for an ambassadorial post in Russia seemed obscure. Francis' tastes and habits were the simple and robust ones of the Middle West at the turn of the 20th Century, and therefore bore little affinity to the refinements and nuances of diplomatic society. Stories of his portable cuspidor may be apocryphal, but those of him and his cronies sitting around the card table with some good cigars and good whisky were nt and the fact that he preferred to be called Governor, rather than Ambassador by his associates, despite the fact that he had not held that office since 1893, gives an insight into the man's personality. He was not unintelligent, but he was not up to the job, but once in Petrograd, he had to 'make do' with such qualities as he did possess. At least he was not as attached to the Tsarist regime as his predecessor and his British and French counterparts were when the Revolution took place.
Left foot forward
Now
that America was in the war, the Lvov and subsequently the Kerensky governments looked to the United States as well as the other Allies for military support. The Kerensky offensive was as much designed to gain American support as it was to gain the support of Britain and France. It took place just as the Root Mission made its appearance in Petrograd, and the oflFensive could be said to have been staged at that time in order to impress the Americans that Russia intended to remain in the war. If this was so, it had the opposite effect. Root, a distinguished American diplomat and cabinet official, who had served Theodore Roosevelt as Secretary of War and later, as Secretary of State, was the Republican that President Wilson sent to Russia in order to encourage the Russians to remain in the war. He was also sent to ascertain what the real situation was there, since the reports of Ambassador Francis were not wholly reliable. Like Britain and France the American government was anxious to put its left foot forward in an attempt to woo the Russians, and so Root took along with him the most left-wing associates he could find. Wilson had trouble in finding anyone who would own up to being a socialist and still have liberal enough views to be acceptable to American public opinion. He finally chose a mild socialist, Charles Edward Russell, and the aged vice-president of the American Federation of Labour, James Duncan.
IPfil
During the latter part of June and the beginning of July, the time that the Root Mission was in Petrograd, most of its time was taken up in an endless round of dinners and speeches. As experienced as Root was in diplomacy, there was nothing in his career which had prepared him for the perils he was facing in this mission. His attitude was simply: 'no %ht, no loan'. In his view the United States was not going to give good money to a government that was unwilling to persevere with the war effort. Since he was in Russia at the very time that the Kerensky offensive was in progress. Root gained the impression that everything was in order, that the Provisional Government was doing its best to stay in the war, and that American loans ought to be forthcoming in order to keep Russia in the war. The result was that when the Root Mission went home, its reports were all sweetness and light, muttering assurances and confidence. Although the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, questioned this optimism, it was enough to secure American support for Kerensky and the promise of financial aid to his regime. But with the collapse of the offensive and the attempted right-wing coup against Kerensky, his government was alienated from both left and right, and Lenin was forced into hiding, while many of the Bolshevik leaders were arrested. It was against this background that yet another American mission came to Petrograd. Following on the heels of the Root Mission and the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts, representatives of American big business, the American Red Cross Commission arrived in Petrograd on August 7, 1917. By this time both the Russian diplomatic community in Petrograd as well as the small American contingent led by Francis were tired of receiving American missions. The arrival of another almost immediately after the earlier ones had left, and this time with an even less justifiable reason for its presence (the Russians had no visible need for either medical or Red Cross personnel), aroused a good deal of impatience if not hostility. Yet the Red Cross Commission was probably the most interesting and perhaps the most important American mission to Russia in the period bridging the two revolutions of 1917. To start with, this was no ordinary Red Cross mission. Its members were not on the Red Cross payroll. Its expenses were not paid by the Red Cross. Within a few months it was completely liquidated by the Red Cross itself. But it was to have extraordinary influence in Russia while it was there. The nominal leader of the mission was Dr Frank G. Billings of Chicago, an eminent physician after whom the University of Chicago's hospital is named today. He accepted the assignment without really understanding the circumstances surrounding the origin of the mission or the nature of the role the real leader of the mission was to play. William Boyce Thompson was a financial promoter and a hugely successful copper magnate in the prewar years. By the time the war started he had acquired a huge fortune and was a leading figure in the New York financial world. When the Red Cross commission was established he was in on its founding, as well as Henry P. Dawson, head of the American Red Cross. Thompson no longer found finance fascinating; he was looking for new worlds to conquer. He was delighted when the Tsar was overthrown, and was convinced that if Russia held firm and stayed in the war, Germany would be broken. But if Russia left the war, the ending might be different. Thompson let it be known in Washington that he wanted to go to Russia in any capacity. It was essential for the United States to have a forceful personality working on its behalf in Petrograd. Ambassador Francis was certainly not the man. So Thompson was put on the Red Cross Commission with specific instructions to keep Kerensky in the war at all costs and to strengthen Kerensky's position. But there was another function for Thompson too. He was to be made liable for all the costs of the Commission in Russia out of his
own
pocket.
The Commission arrived in Petrograd in early August while the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts was still there. One of its members, George Gibbs of Milwaukee, remarked that the Red Cross delegation was nicknamed the 'Haitian Army', since it was composed entirely of military personnel of a high rank or former civilians, like Thompson, who held ranks such as Colonel or Major; no privates. Thompson began to throw large and expensive parties in the name of the Red Cross almost as soon as he had arrived. Two days after his arrival he personally subscribed to over 500,000 roubles worth of a new government loan. A couple of days later, at a luncheon given for Kerensky and Foreign Minister Tereshchenko, he surprised his guests by informing them that he was going to send a cable to New York 'offering to be one of a syndicate of ten to purchase Russian bonds to the tune of 1,000,000 roubles apiece'. But Thompson, unschooled in the niceties of diplomacy, went further. After Kerensky put him in contact with some of his friends in the Social Revolutionary
1962
Thompson drew on his personal account with J. P. Morgan and Company a sum of 1,000,000 dollars to help finance his new SR friends. Although a subject of considerable amusement in
Party,
Petrograd gossip (imagine the Social Revolutionaries supported by the financial barons of Wall Street) Thompson had involved the United States deeply in the internal affairs of their, ally, which was to cost them support later on. Fortunately for the American Ambassador, he was never fully informed of Thompson's financial intervention, although he probably heard some rumours. President Wilson, however, heard of it and was not amused. He blamed both Thompson and Francis for what he felt was a reckless manoeuvre. Billings was upset too. He soon became aware of the fact that he was being exploited as a front for clandestine activities over which he had no control and in mid-September, after little over a month in Petrograd, Dr Billings gave up his mission and returned to the United States, leaving Thompson in formal control. Thompson's personal secretary was more cruel in his description of the role of Billings. 'Poor Mr Billings,' he wrote; 'he believed he was in charge of a scientific mission for the relief of Russia. He was in reality nothing but a mask.' By the time Billings left, Thompson's flamboyant personality had made an impact on the feverish society of Petrograd. His muscular build, his ubiquitous half-smoked cigars, his great wealth, his suite in the Hotel d'Europe, his French limousine, his wolfhound — all of these made him a conspicuous object of local attention. He was hailed as 'the American Tsar' and was even put in the imperial box when he attended the opera. But, like everyone else, Thompson failed to see the real trend of events in Russia. The Thompson fiasco mirrored, in a sense, the failure of all three major Western Allies to influence the course of the Revolution in the way they wanted. Neither Buchanan's studied caution nor Thompson's flamboyance could persuade the Russians to continue as an active belligerent against Germany. The sad attempt on the part of the Allies to send western socialists to Russia convinced their Russian counterparts that they were unprincipled opportunists who had sold out to the western imperialists. There were, however, two important effects of these talks. While the western socialists and other diplomats tried to talk the Russians into staying in the war, they themselves became infected with the Russian Socialists' views of the war aims question. The French visitors, especially, were won over to the belief that the Allies had to make adjustments in their annexationist plans to meet the feelings set in motion all over the world by the Russian Revolution; that these extensive war aims were a burden on the Allies. As Albert Thomas said to Paleologue, 'we must jettison the ballast'. Many French Socialists found themselves supporting the moderate views of Buchanan rather than that of their own government, which helped weaken the ground under the already weak feet of Milyukov and, subsequently, Kerensky. Britain's subtle attempts to win the Russians over, on the other hand, weakened Kerensky's position too, because the Kerensky offensive and its failure, a show put on to impress the Allies, threw untold numbers of supporters into the Bolsheviks' camp. Finally, the antics of the American Red Cross Commission were a postscript to the more serious and equally ineffectual attempts of Francis and the Root Mission to salvage the Russian war effort. Public opinion in Britain, France and America supported their governments' stand. Although there was more support in America for the March Revolution than there was in Britain and France initially, by the summer of 1917 most people in the three major Allied countries were interested in only one thing: how to win the war quickly and how to keep Russia in the war to achieve that end. Although enthusiasm for the war among the three major Allies varied in degree, there was still sufficient public support for the war effort, sufficient patriotism, to keep them in the war as active and, in the case of the Americans, zealous belligerents. But for the Russians, the Revolution implied the end of their participation in the war. No amount of Allied cajoling could change that. But by trying to change it, the Allies weakened Kerensky's position to such an extent that he had little chance of remaining long in power. By trying to please left-socialist opinion and the Allies' war aims at the same time, Kerensky paved the way for the Bolshevik Revolution. Further Reading
Seton-Watson, Hugh. From Lenin to Khrushchev (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1960) Trotsky, Leon, The Russian Revolution, translated by Max Eastman and selected and edited by F. W. Dupee (Garden City, NY.: Doubleday and Co, 1959) Wheeler-Bennett, John W., Brest-Lltovsk: The Forgotten Peace, March 1918 (London: Macmlllan and Co., Ltd. 1963)
[For S. L. Mayer's biography, see page
19.
]
THREE REmUTIONARFES
KERENSKY TROTSKY Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) (18701924) was born in the provincial backwater of Simbirsk on the Volga. His father, Ilya Nikolayevich, was a school inspector in the region whose capital was Simbirsk. His mother was a descendant of German immigrants and owned a small estate further up the Volga at Kokushkino. The family consisted of four children who led a normal, quiet provincial existence until the sudden death of Lenin's father. This death meant that young Vladimir
pseudonym
expelled
LENIN
would work harder than ever. He found school work easy and always worked Ilyich
quickly and accurately. With the loss of his father Vladimir looked to his elder brother Alexander, and came to admire and depend on him. But another family disaster quickly followed his father's death. Alexander, then a student of science at the University of St Petersburg was implicated in the assassination of Alexander II and in 1887 was executed, together with several other conspirators. This tragedy
impressed Vladimir more than anything else in his previous life and made him an implacable enemy of the Tsarist system. Shortly after Alexander's execution, Vladimir himself went to the University of Kazan to study law. But the authorities
had marked him as a troublemaker and at the first sign of student unrest, he was arrested and expelled from the university. He was allowed to continue his studies privately and prepare for external examinations at the University of St Petersburg and in 1891 passed his final examinations. He was now a fully qualified lawyer and hoped, at the outset of his career, to earn a living in this profession.
He had
previously worked at Samara, a Marxist underground group there. Now he returned there to practise law. But while struggling to make his way in the legal profession, he gravitated steadily towards politics. His political consciousness was stirred particularly by one of the most terrible famines the country had ever suffered. Instead of organising relief, Vladimir Ilyich turned to the heart of the problem and became convinced that a system which cared so little for its people should not merely be reformed or made more human but should be completely destroyed. He set out for St Petersburg to implement
founding
his decision.
The years 1893-95 were spent in St Petersburg helping workers to organise themselves into action committees with a policy of mass agitation and the ultimate
Lenin He returned to Russia in April to move the Revolution towards its next stage
aim
moulding themselves into a revolutionary party. In 1895 Vladimir used his visit abroad for medical reasons to consult Russian emigre revolutionaries, like Plekhanov and Axelrod about his ideas. They were generally accepted and encouraged and Vladimir returned to Russia to continue his underground work; but within three months he was arrested, together with his fellow revolutionary, Martov, and spent the next two years in prison, awaiting
of
trial.
Though the time
in
prison
was not
wasted and Vladimir was allowed to read and write as much as he wanted, it did mean that his energies were unused and all personal contact with the work he had begun temporarily lost. But during his time in prison, he became the head of the League for the Liberation of Labour, and wrote and published two essays. The second of these discussed the aims of the Russian Social Democracy and was published under the
to
of 'Lenin'. In May 1897 he was Siberia into administrative
and was there joined by Nadezhda Krupskaya whom he married. Then in May 1900, when he was allowed back to Russia, he left for Germany, where he began to exile
publish Iskra, a social democratic newspaper, organ of the newly founded party. Thus in his 30th year, Lenin found himself in exile and with a short break in 1906 he would lead an emigre existence until his return to Russia in April 1917 after the fall of Tsarism. It was in exile that Lenin made his most significant study of politics, and political action in the form of revolution. Though the emigre existence was necessarily artificial, he nevertheless formulated his own political theories, acquired experience in factional struggle among the exiles and in political machination, put his hand to the organisation of his own faction, the Bolsheviks, and at the same time engaged in the direction of the political struggle inside Russia itself. Everywhere he and his wifesecretary lived, whether in Germany, England, France, Switzerland or Poland, their conditions of life were tough and truly proletarian. But they were completely absorbed by the struggle and cared little about external conditions. In 1906 when, after a hopeful start, Lenin saw the revolution crushed, his path was crossed by another revolutionary, L. D. Trotsky, the two men subsequently quarrelled and separated until 1917, but their political affinities and mutual attraction were strong. However, Lenin continued to hold on to his Bolshevik faction and refused to merge his organisation with
the other factions, the Mensheviks and the Bundists. In 1912 the Bolshevik faction met at a congress in Prague, formally recognised Lenin as its leader and decided to publish its own newspaper, Pravda. But the Bolsheviks were thoroughly penetrated by the Tsarist secret police and it transpired that the legal publisher of Pravda, the Bolshevik deputy of the Duma, Malinowski, was a double agent. The outbreak of the First World War meant that all Bolshevik activity was suspended, both at home and abroad, and Lenin was forced to escape from Poland to neutral Switzerland to avoid arrest and detention. The years 1914-1917 were spent in utter isolation and political inaction, but Lenin had plenty of time for reflection. As the destruction wrought by the war continued Lenin became con-
1963
vinced that the world war could be turned into a Russian civil >var; that because of the enfeeblement of the political regimes in the terrible struggle, he and his Bolsheviks could seize power on behalf of the proletariat. But a complete breakdown of the present regime was a prerequisite of the revolution Lenin planned and by 1917 he and other revolutionary exiles began to despair. Then in March 1917 came the collapse of Tsarism and within a month Lenin was back in Russia to put his theories and plans to the test. The Germans helped him to get to Russia from Switzerland; other among them Trotsky, revolutionaries, would help him to seize power. Lev Davidovich Bronstein (Trotsky) (1879-1940) was, like Lenin, a provincial. His parents were a Jewish couple who ran a farm in the South Russian province of Kherson. Trotsky soon tired of the farm and was therefore sent to his uncle's house to receive an education. He spent most of his school life at Odessa, where, as a gifted, undisciplined boy, he attended the local grammar school. Before going to university, he spent a year at Nikolayev, another provincial town in South Russia, and there, for the first time came in touch with revolutionaries. As a result of a quarrel with his father, Trotsky was sent to live with six other students in the care of a socialist householder. In that Nikolayev garden Trotsky and his fellow students formed the Southern Russian Workers' Union and became convinced Marxists. Trotsky's revolutionary activity was quickly noted by the authorities and, like Lenin, he was sent to prison. In 1900, he married a woman who was also a committed revolutionary, A. L. Sokolovskaya, and she followed him to exile in Siberia. Trotsky was depressed and frustrated by his political isolation and never accepted his exile. In 1902 he tried -and succeeded — to escape from Siberia, and made his way through Vienna and Zurich to London where he met Lenin for the first time. Trotsky then moved on to live in Paris where he met N. I. Sedova, who remained his companion for the rest of his life. In 1905 Trotsky returned to Russia and became involved in the revolutionary events there. He became President of the Petrograd Workers' Soviet and as such was arrested by the victorious Tsarist powers and sent once again to Siberia. But he was too experienced to remain there for long: he escaped again and made his way to western Europe. He rejoined the Mensheviks, but formed an internationalist wing of his own. Until the First World War his life consisted in eeking out a meagre living, writing propaganda articles and organising the internationalist faction in Vienna. With the outbreak of war Trotsky's life
travelled to New York. Here he associated with several radical socialist papers and journals and after earning a precarious living as a film extra, left for Canada, where he settled down for several months before his return to Russia. After the collapse of Tsarism in March 1917 Trotsky tried to get back to Russia as quickly as he could. But the British authorities had been well informed of Trotsky's anti-Allied activity during the war and intercepted him as his ship called in Newfoundland. He was unceremoniously bundled off to a concentration camp and would have remained there for the rest of the war, had it not been for Kerensky's intervention on his behalf. Once again Trotsky left in a hurry, and arrived in
decided to join a revolutionary circle of socialist leanings.
At the outbreak of war, Kerensky threw his weight behind the war effort. He used his influence to keep war industries rolling and in 1915 dissuaded workers from striking. But while he favoured defensive war, in which, he believed Russia was now engaged, he continued fervently to pursue peace. In 1915 Kerensky and the Trudoviki agreed with Chkheidze and the Mensheviks on a peace formula: democratic peace 'without annexations and indemnities'. They began to discuss and to propagate these ideas, and their combined
^
criticism in the
war by the
Ik
S^
'W'^
Rakovsky, intervened on and enabled him to leave the country. Trotsky settled in France where
1964
Duma of the conduct of the
tsarist
regime was instrumental
in bringing about its downfall. When in March 1917 Tsarism finally collapsed, Ker-
his behalf
unmolested.
land, but this neutral country refused to admit him and he was therefore allowed to cross to neutral Spain, from where he
down
all
socialist friend,
live
settled
Moscow and soon became
brilliant orator.
As an enemy alien Trotsky risked internment by the Austrian authorities, but his
Russian citizens could
Kerensky
well known as a political advocate at the bar. In 1912 he was also elected deputy of the Duma, (the Russian equivalent of a western parliament), and joined a small left-wing group, the Trudoviki (Labour Group) in the Duma. He consistently embarrassed the government by his criticism of their policies and at his insistence, an official enquiry into the shooting of strikers in the Lena gold mines was instigated. He undertook the defence of the accused at all the important political trials and was well known as a in
became exciting and dangerous again.
But Trotsky soon became involved in antiwar activity; he made frequent contributions to socialist-anarchist journals and when these journals were suppressed in 1916 Trotsky himself was expelled from France. He was to be deported to Switzer-
Russia shortly before Lenin. Lenin and Trotsky then combined their forces to destroy the man to whom they owed their safe return to Russia, the new Minister of Justice and future Premier, Kerensky. Alexander Fyodorovich Kerensky (18811970) was also born in the provinces, in faraway Tashkent. The paths of the future Prime Minister and the future dictator of Soviet Russia crossed at an early stage. Alexander's father was the headmaster of the local grammar school at Simbirsk attended by Lenin. The school inspector, Lenin's father, befriended this capable headmaster who was asked to be his son Vladimir's godfather. But this curious connection between the Ulyanovs and the Kerenskys occurred well before Alexander's birth. Kerensky's father was transferred to Central Asian Tashkent as director of education and Alexander was born there. He was educated there but went to study law at St Petersburg University. After graduating from the university he not only became a lawyer but also a politician, for while studying he had become acquainted with revolutionary ideas and
1
l?^i1
.:.JC-"
-^
--'-^r
-^r 2,
lop: Trotsky. Kerensky engineered his return Russia and lived to regret it bitterly. Above: Kerensky. He joined the Provisional Government and soon became its leading light
ensky benefited from his presence on the spot and became involved in the forming of the provisional committee of the Duma, which in fact took over the power the Tsar had relinquished. Kerensky was elected Deputy President of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and ultimately joined the Pro-
Government as Minister of Justice. As Minister of Justice he sent circulars round Russia and the rest of the world in which he asked for the release of all Russian political prisoners and thus brought back to their homeland all revolutionary exiles. The general amnesty which followed visional
enabled the revolutionaries to freely join the political struggle in Russia, and prepare the downfall of the very revolutionary who had released them and invited in
them
to participate in politics.
to
[For Dr Bradley 's biography, see page
99.
]
While General Maude was breaking down the Turks' obstinate resistance on the Tigris, important events elsewhere were shaping the future of the campaign in Mesopotamia. 1916 — about the time In December Maude's offensive began — a Coalition Government was formed in London and Lloyd George, as Prime Minister, became responsible for the direction and control of Britain's
war
policy.
A
confirmed believer by
in the theory that the war was to be won manoeuvre in the east rather than
by on the Western Front, Lloyd George was anxious to exploit any success in the Middle East theatres. Thus it was that from the moment he became Prime attrition
Minister the policy laid down for the conduct of the war in Mesopotamia and Egypt began to swing away from the strictly defensive objects which had been defined. Russia was also contemplating a new offensive against Turkey. In the Caucasus the Grand Duke Nicholas was planning an offensive against the Turkish Second Army and an advance south towards Mosul, Samarra' and Baghdad. In north-west Persia, General Baratov was preparing to attack the Turkish XIII Corps and to
advance through Kermanshah and Khanikin against the rear of XVIII Corps on the Tigris. It seemed therefore as if— when the snows of the winter left the mountain tracks and movement became possible — the Russians would attack the Turks in Mesopotamia from three converging directions. Under such circumstances it was reasonable to expect that Maude would be presented with a most favourable opportunity for an enterprising offensive. Aware of this, and of Lloyd George's inclinations, Sir William Robertson, the CIGS, cabled Maude on February 3 asking for the size of the force he thought he could maintain in Baghdad from April onwards. Caution was still the watchword, however, and Maude was clearly given to understand that the query did not imply any change in the policy for the conduct of the campaign in Mesopotamia. In retrospect it is clear that Maude had anticipated events and was preparing for the day when the restrictive clauses in his directive would be removed. Throughout January 1917 the rain teemed down, once again turning the Tigris battlefield into a sea of mud overlaid by floodwater which could not drain away. High winds blew, and the tawny Tigris rose eight feet in two weeks, its colour changing to a sickly yellow with the suspended sand it was carrying down from the upper reaches. Aircraft were grounded, and as in the previous year, the troops had to turn their hands to building bunds to prevent their trenches being flooded. Maude's men were poised on a narrow front where the ground was flat, devoid of cover and ideal for entrenched defences; the sinuous writhings of the Tigris imposed a series of natural ob-
and the stubborn Turks were strongly dug in. They were still clinging to Sannaiyat, and so, with the Khudhaira stacles,
clear, Maude turned his attention the Hai Salient — whose clearance could give him complete tactical freedom to manoeuvre on the right bank of the Tigris as far as the Shumran Bend. Typically, the method by which he proposed to clear it was a repetition of the tactics which had been used for the Mohammed Abdul Hassan position. The advance was to be
Bend to
By January
1917,
Maude was
TOWARDS BAGHDAD
ready to renew his assault on Kut. Again there was no frontal attack, but well co-ordinated flanking movements, and Kut fell once more. A. J. Barker. Above: Marshall and Maude
slow, each step taken was to be sure and deliberate, and because of the preponderance of British artillery, the outcome was almost inevitable. The intensity of the British barrages was such that flesh and blood must eventually yield and during this period of the fighting one of the factors which dismayed the Turks was the array of artillery observation ladders creeping forward day by day as the batteries advanced their positions during the hours of
bridgehead started, there was continual fighting until the whole of the right bank of the Tigris was clear of Turks. Two months passed while the British line was advanced to a position from which an assault could be made. Then came the bombardment, followed by an assault with the bayonet. As before, the Turks fought back with stubborn determination and for the British and Indian infantry it was far from being a walkover. Only in the last few days before they were finally eliminated on the right bank was the morale of the Turks broken. And by now the British troops were beginning to feel the strain; few were 'burning to be up and at the Turks' as those who read the newspapers in England were led to believe. If there had ever been any glamour in the war most of it had faded; for the fighting man the dead monotony of Mesopotamia and the constant repetition of attacking a series of ditches in an infinity of caked clay was a souldestroying experience. The method of attack was reduced to a drill. First there was the bombardment and then the limited assault under a thunderous barrage of guns, the waves of infantry sweeping on 40 or 50 yards behind the artillery screen to kill or capture such Turks as were left in the next line. Then came the consolidation phsise, bringing with it the expect-
darkness. By the third week in January, the preliminary work of pushing the trenches forward to a distance from which the assault could be launched was completed. As with the attack on the Mohammed Abdul Hassan position a diversionary move, intended to distract the Turks' attention from the point of attack,
was made
at this stage.
The
Cavalry Division crossed the river and moved off round the Suwayqlyah Marsh to threaten the Turks' communications on the left bank of the river. But because of the waterlogged nature of the featureless country, it did not get very far. As a diversion the manoeuvre was a failure. Men and horses covered a great deal of the countryside during these months but it cannot be said that they achieved much. After January 25, when the fighting for the elaborate trench system of the Hai
1965
ancy of counterattacks. The parados of the recently captured trenches had to be broken down, and fire-steps cut in their walls while machine guns were set up and blocks built at points where communication trenches led off back to the positions the Turks were still holding. Then new communication trenches had to be dug back to the old position and, at night, wire entanglements thrown across the front. So little seemed to be gained by so much effort that the ordinary soldier may be excused for feeling it was leading nowhere. When the battle for the Hai Salient started the Turkish garrison was estimated to be about 3,700. The first attack on January 25 was directed at both banks of the Hai and the two brigades involved -the 39th on the left and 40th on the right — each had a 900-yard front. (The attack was supported by the fire of 66 18-pounders, 28 4.5-inch howitzers, eight 60pounders and two 6-inch howitzers.) All went well at first and 1,800 yards of the Turkish front line were captured. Then under cover of the heavy fire from a large minenwerfer mortar, the Turks made four successive counterattacks and Turkish infantry, with no weapons or equipment other than their grenades, dashed across the open to bomb the men consolidating their newly captured trench. On the 39th Brigade's front, the North Staffords and Worcesters, who had led the attack, reeled back and the whole position was in danger of being rolled up until support from the Warwicks came in as, led by their com-
manding
officer,
(Henderson,
Colonel
Henderson
who was
killed in this action, posthumous for his
was awarded a VC gallantry as was the adjutant. Lieutenant Phillips, who attempted to rescue him), they charged into the melee. In their first charge the Turks had captured the assaulting troops' signalling flags and the artillery screens which marked the limits of the advance, and these were used to confiase the British forward observation officers. There was no option but to hold off the British artillery support, but the Turkish minenwerfer continued to lob bombs onto the front line in the interim. Believing that they were being shot up by their own gunners, the British infantry withdrew and the line was not recaptured until that night. What had been gained was now lost. The bitter day's fighting had cost 1,100 casualties, including the commanding officers of the three British battalions tak-
ing part. Seven of the eight British mortars had been knocked out, and three of the four machine guns set up in the trench during the consolidation phase had also been destroyed. (A fifth which had been brought up at the last minute was saved by a sergeant of the Machine Gun Company after its crew had been killed to a man;
carrying it out of action he also fell dead.) The attack was renewed next day, with the 14th Division taking over from the 13th on the west bank of the Hai. This time, after 12 hours of stubborn fighting, the 82nd and 26th Punjabis succeeded in retaking the line which had been captured and lost the day before and knocking out the deadly minenwerfer in the process. But success was only achieved at the cost of heavy punishment. Of the 82nd Punjabis, 240 of the 500 men who had climbed the parapet that morning were either killed or wounded. On the east bank it was the same story. Nevertheless, by the end of the month the whole Turkish front line system to a depth of 1,000 yards was in British hands.
trench were then blown up together. After February 3 the story of the operations in the Hai triangle is mostly one of 100 small affairs of outposts, pickets, patrols wiring and sapping up towards the Turks' position — all the operations which go under that ubiquitous term consolidation. Always there was the constant drain of casualties; even in the quietest periods a dozen or more wounded would drift back to the advanced dressing stations. In the three weeks before the end of January, the 40th Brigade alone dug seven and a half miles of trenches as well as wiring and consolidating four miles of captured line. But, as the days passed, the rate
i
Dead men, dead ground On February 1 a fresh attack was
launched with the object of completing the clearance, the 37th Brigade assaulting west of the Hai and the 40th along the east bank. Unhappily, events on the left bank were a repetition of January 25 and although the two battalions engaged — the 36th Sikhs on the left and 45th Sikhs on the right — fought with the most desperate gallantry, the Turks had concentrated to defend what they considered to be the most vital point in their defence system and the assault was flung back. Both Sikh regiments went over ,
the top at full strength cally annihilated, losing
men between them. Maude redistributed
and were practimore than 1,000
After this setback, his troops, the 8th
Brigade of the 3rd Division taking over on bank of the Hai. The attack was renewed on the morning of February 3 and this time it was successful — possibly because the Devons and Gurkhas who spearheaded the assault were able to take advantage of the cover afforded by piles of the Sikhs' corpses as they crossed the open ground. The Gurkhas, who behaved with their usual elan, swept on through the the east
Turks
like terriers, and the story is told of one being so excited that he followed his grenade into a Turkish trench before it had burst and both he and the Turks in the
ft|lffii«i
•<
M»'
k '•SBI^ .,,.
.
^
-^^t^iM: ...
.
\
of progress increased, the Turks' morale declined, and the ground was covered more rapidly. Between Febi-uary 9 and Febi-uary 13 the 'bombing" squads of the South Lancashire Regiment cleared over 5,500 yards of Turkish trenches and three strongpoints; these are only the statistics of a single battalion but many of the others of
the six brigades which took part are as equally impressive. Three thousand seven hundred casualties were incurred in these operations before the final phase of the clearance operation was reached. By February 5 the Turks had evacuated the Hai triangle and had taken up a new line running from Kut's Liquorice Factory
to the
Shumran Bend
at Yusifiya, and the usually referred to as 'the operations for the clearance of the Dahra Bend". On the morning of the 9th, in fine weather, the 38th Brigade launched an attack against the centre of the positions opposite the Liquorice Factory and after some hard fighting and several counterattacks, the Turkish front line was finally breached. Next day the Liquorice Factory was captured and in the ensuing four days the Turks were hemmed in and steadily forced further and further back towards their last line, across the curve of the river. Six days later Turkish resistance collapsed and although the Bend was not captured without fighting, for the first time since before Ctesiphon the Turks started to surrender en masse. After the first surrender the collapse was infectious; prisoners came forward all along the line waving white rags and for nearly an hour there was a continuous procession. The Turks on the other side of the river turned their guns onto these wTetches, but this only quickened the current. For the Turks in the Dahra Bend the war was over. 'We do not wish to counterattack,' one of the prisoners explained; like his comrades, he had had enough of the British artillery. And that was the end of that; Maude's nibbling operations had at last achieved their object. Whether or not he would have done as well by a full-scale surprise attack pressed on with vigour when the offensive opened in December is arguable, since the trench operations undoubtedly proved to be much more costly in men, as well as time, than he had ever anticipated. What the effect would have been if he had had a regiment of tanks under his command in the terrain of Mesopotamia is interesting to conjecture. Had the weather been right, except for the river, there would have been nothing to stop tanks and while they would have been conspicuous on the fiat ground it would seem, on the whole, that they would
fighting here
is
have had an overwhelming
effect.
The
value of artillery has of course been obvious; trench systems could not be taken without very strong artillery support, and the guns were Maude's greatest single battle-winning asset.
How the Turks managed to maintain the high morale that they did is one of the enigmas of this time; not until the very end did their spirit deteriorate. But soon after the final action, rain fell in torrents, flooding the trenches, and a captured Turkish
«»MP>w
—Jrs,"
officer
sadly recounted the Turkish point
of view: rain,"
come
he
'We have been praying for this two months. Now it has
said, 'for
too late."
Supply difficulties again By his success at Dahra, Maude could now manoeuvre freely on the right bank of the Tigris as far as the Shumran Bend. According to his Intelligence, only about 1,300 Turkish rifles, a couple of guns and a small amount of cavalry stood in front of III Corps now. But movement on this side of the river was difficult because of the floods. Moreover, so long as the British supply ships could not get up the river beyond Sannaiyat it was impossible for Maude to maintain any far-reaching advance on the right bank of the Tigris. In other words, although the British had complete freedom of manoeuvre on the right bank, they were unable to make full use of it. Whatever the situation on the south bank of the Tigris, it was on the left bank that the Turks would have to be brought to battle. The Dahra Bend operations had had the effect of compelling Kiazim Karabekir, the Turkish commander, to disperse his troops over some 25 miles of front, and it was obvious that on a front of such a length there must be weak spots. It was equally obvious that to attack them from across a
some 300 yards wide might be a hazardous and costly operation. The best chance of achieving a comparatively inexpensive success appeared to lie in simultaneous operations against two widely-separated points on the Turks' front — a course of action which should force flooded river
Kiazim Karabekir either to split his reserves or to reinforce one point at the expense of the other. Maude therefore decided to attack Sannaiyat, which obviously could not be held in such great strength as it had been when the Relief Force was trying to break through to TowTishend in Kut. At the same time It was also his intention to put the rest of his force across the Tigris somewhere near the Dahra Bend. But with the rain bucketing down and turning the countryside into a quagmire he reluctantly decided to abandon the operation on the right bank — at least for the time being. But the foreground, the remains of the Liquorice Factory and the shell-ravaged debris of the trenches the Turks had held so tenaciously: in the background, the object of the battle, the almost untouched town of Kut In
[*#^-V*
the assault on Sannaiyat was still feasible; the ground there was reasonably firm, everything had been arranged and orders for the operation were already issued. It would be better, Maude thought, to let it go on. It was an unfortunate decision. The regiments taking part in this attack and that which was staged a few days later were the same as those which had made the original attack on April 6, 1916; for nearly a year they had bled and sweated over the ground round Sannaiyat, and although the original division had been virtually reconstituted since the heavy losses of ten months before, it is reasonable to suppose that fresh troops might have done better — and indeed that these might have been better employed elsewhere. The fault was not that of the men concerned — they needed a change of scenery. 'D' day was fixed for February 17 and zero hour for 1200 hours, when the 21st Brigade was to make a surprise attack.
There was "to be no preliminary bombardment which might forewarn the Turks, and the attack was to be made with two battalions assaulting in line, despite the narrowness of the front— only 350 yards. When the first two lines of trenches had been captured, the 19th Brigade was to pass through the 21st Brigade and go on to capture the third line. Meanwhile, the third brigade of the division, the 28th Brigade, was to ensure that none of the Turks on the right of this narrow front interfered with the main operation. After the initial break-in, the 19th Brigade would have the support of all the artillery
which could be mustered -including the corps' heavy guns, which were sited to enfilade the Turks from across the river.
With such powerful support it was hoped that the defenders would be pulverised even before the infantry got to the third line. In spite of the assumption that the mud and rain had not materially affected the Sannaiyat position, the 21st Brigade was not ready to start the attack at noon. Men had been sliding about the slippery communication trenches for much longer than had been anticipated and conse1968
quently zero hour had to be put back until 1400 hours. However, once the brigade did go over the top the two Turkish trenches were quickly overrun and held for more than an hour and a half while the 19th Brigade was moving up. So far all had gone well. Then the Turks put in a counterattack along the river bank and their gunners directed a hail of accurately placed shells onto their old front line. Suddenly there was panic and by 1630 hours, considerably shaken and very disorganised, the remnants of the assaulting battalions were back in their old trenches. This excursion had cost over 500 casualties and, so far as Maude was concerned, nothing had been attained — or so it appeared.
Wilting morale But on this occasion appearances were deceptive; following so closely on the Dahra Bend operation, the attack on Sannaiyat had had a far greater effect than Maude could possibly have realised. The Turks around Kut were beginning to feel the strain and their morale was beginning to wilt. Apart from the morale factor of constant bombardments and much closequarter fighting, the Turks' ammunition was running low and their rations had been cut; behind the firing line desertions were on the increase. Meanwhile Khalil Pasha, engrossed in his plan to cut Maude's communications by a Napoleonic blow through Persia, had consistently refused to send reinforcements to Kiazim Karabekir. So far
as
Khalil was concerned, a British
breakthrough had not even been worth considering, and the result was that barely 10,000 men faced Maude's army round Kut, with perhaps another 3,000 in and around Baghdad. No plans had been made to cover Baghdad in the event of the front cracking: not even the five positions prepared in 1916 between Al 'AzTzTyah and Baghdad by the more far-sighted Nurud-Din had been maintained. However, the attack on Sannaiyat brought an end to Khalil's reveries, and for the time being the Persian scheme was shelved. The XIII Corps,
already
diverted
to
Persia
and facing Baratov's Russians, was ordered to Baghdad and simultaneously other reinforcements were hastily ordered up to the Tigris front. But by now snow in the mountains was impeding movement and
back
when XIII Corps did manage to disentangle itself and get back to Baghdad, it was too late to influence events. Unaware of the real plight of the Turks in front of him, Maude had returned to the
idea of crossing the Tigris
some way up
order to compel the Turks to abandon Sannaiyat. The Shumran Bend was selected as the most suitable area for the crossing in preference to the Dahra Bend. At Shumran the loop in the river would permit the artillery to give converging covering fire during the actual crossing and the river itself would secure the flanks of the bridgehead until it was extended to the top of the loop. There were other advantages too; Shumran was a long way from Sannaiyat, to which the Turks were tied, and the conformation of the ground here was such that effective observation from the ridges which overlooked the Dahra Bend was denied to them. In the event, all the benefits forecast for Shumran held good on the day of the assault. The plan was for General Marshall's III Corps to force the crossing on the morning of February 23, while General Cobbe's I Corps, on the other side of the river, renewed its attack on Sannaiyat. Various deception measures were taken in order to try and divert Turkish attention away from the area where the crossing would be made. But the attack on Sannaiyat was intended as the final diversionary piece de resistance to draw off and pin down Kiazim 's reserves so that they could not influence the main operation. Finally, becau-se it was obvious that the British were going to try to cross the Tigris sooner or later, a daring raid across the river had been made at Maqasis, four miles downstream from Kut, on the night of February 22. It was carried out by 40 men of the 27th Punjabis and completely mystified the Turks. At 1000 hours on the morning of Februriver,
in
Turkish of trench
form
uansTormation
New communica; -|- trench
dug back
-
to
captors' original line
Old communication trench blocked off
old parados which must be broken down becoming
lid
parapet
moving old parados Old
Berm (space
to rest
elbows for firing & for machine gun positions firing positions
New
firestep must be cut ici
original
back wa of trench
Old firestep must be
away to form new back wall
cut
Opposite: British medical arrangements, to be desired, were still superior to those of the Turks. The ride of wounded men in panniers on the back of a swaying camel must have been excruciatingly painful. Above: The consolidation of a captured trench, in this case a Turkish one taken by the British. Below: A British 13-pounder anti-
though leaving much
aircraft gun in action, at full recoil. The efficiency of the anti-aircraft guns and the fighters was more than enough to prevent the Turks getting any information from the air
^
^ *.
r
^
\*
k.-«
%
*
\
*^^ 1969
ary 22, spearheaded by the Seaforths and the 92nd Punjabis, the 19th Brigade of the 7th Division swept across No-Man's Land to assault Sannaiyat — the rock against which wave after wave of British troops had vainly flung themselves since April 1916 This time the waves were unbroken and by the evening, aftfr fairly severe fighting, 900 yards of the Turks' second line of trenches had been captured and were being consolidated. The attack cost the British 1,332 casualties and the Turks paid even more heavily as a result of the series of gallant counterattacks they put in through the thick shrapnel curtain which shrouded the British limits of advance. All was now set for the main operation, and Maude ordered his airmen to make certain that no Turkish aircraft flew over the Shumran area to see what was happening. Only two Martinsyde scouts were available for this task, but they took it in turn to circle the area. As they patrolled overhead, Marshall's guns took up position in the pits which had already been prepared for them and the 37th Brigade, followed by a cumbersome Bridging Train, moved up to the ferry points. By 0515 hours on the 23rd, all was ready, and a quarter of
an hour
later — when
it
was just possible
to see the opposite bank — the pontoons for the ferries were quietly launched into the river. Shortly afterwards the first flight
started to cross. Each ferry consisted of 13 pontoons manned by specially-trained oarsmen, whose task in a flooded river running at five or six miles an hour was not an easy one. The initial crossing took the Turks by surprise and it was not until 0630 hours that their gunners started to shell the river line. Nevertheless, at two
1970
of the three crossing points there was desperate resistance. At Nos 2 and 3 crossings the pontoons were caught by small arms fire and only a few of them were able to complete the journey, or, having completed it, to get back again for reinforcements. (At No 2 crossing point Major George Wheeler of the 2/9th Gurkhas won the Victoria Cross. He had arrived from India only the night before the attack, and as he was invalided back to India after the action and never returned to Mesopotamia he earned his award in a record time.) The fighting was fierce, and although the first flight hung on to their ground, Nos 2 and 3 ferries eventually had to cease working. By 0730 hours only No 1 was able to continue carrying troops across the river. Nevertheless, by 1400 hours all three battalions of the covering force (the Norfolks, 2/9th Gurkhas, and l/2nd Goorkhas) had established themselves on the left bank and three hours later they were established along a line running east and west across the peninsula about a mile fi-om its southern extremity. About 0730 hours. General Egerton, commanding the 14th Division (detailed to carry out the crossing), had ordered the construction of the pontoon bridge to go ahead. Within an hour considerable progress had been made at the shore end, ahd the specially armoured motor boats which were to tow the heavy pontoons into position against the raging current were ready to be launched. By 1630 hours the bridge — 295 yards long — was complete. Its construction in eight hours — under artillery fire and jeopardised by great baulks of timber let loose on the flood by the Turks — was a very creditable performance. By midnight on the night of February 23 the
whole of the 14th Division had crossed it, and General Cayley's 13th Division was closing up on the right bank bridgehead. The crossing of the Tigris was an accomplished fact — for only 350 casualties. Elsewhere success had attended the rest of Maude's plan. As he had anticipated, the Turks had been drawn to Sannaiyat by the successfiil assault made on the 22nd, with the result that at Shumran on the 23rd their forces were so thin on the ground that they could not undertake a proper counterattack against the bridgehead. To pin the Turks to the Sannaiyat front, Maude had ordered a resumption of I Corps' attack on the 23ra and it was hoped that a large proportion of the Turks would be cut off". Because no move was made until the early afternoon events did not work out as he had expected and during the morning considerable numbers of Turks were withdrawn. vA column of at four battalions moving away from Kut towards the Dahra Bend was spotted from the air during the afternoon.) They slipped away quietly and every credit is due to them for the skilful withdrawal. At least
1900 hours a patrol sent out to ascertain whether or not they were still holding their fourth line got a hot reception, but at midnight another patrol found only dead and dying in the trenches. The Turks had gone, and so far as the men of the 7th
Division were concerned that was all that mattered; the series of ft^itless battles for this tiny stretch of barren land was over
Below left: The balance of Allied and Turkish forces in January 1917. Below: February 24, and Kut once again hears the tread of British boots in its streets. Right: The final capture of Kut and the British pursuit of the routed Turks up the Tigris towards Baghdad
and they were delighted at it. The road to Kut and beyond was now open, and at dawn on the 24th Maude at last
issued his orders for the pursuit. What followed was a series of blunders, for the understanding of which it is necessary to go back to Shumran. Once across the river, the 14th Division had pressed on up the peninsula. That night the division was holding a line from bank to bank across the loop 1,000 yards inland from the original bridgehead, and soon after 0600 hours next morning the infantry swept forward again. Their next objective was the one- storied hutments of the Dahra Barracks, and for 3,000 yards the 36th and 37th Brigades advanced across the bare plain until they were checked by a Turkish rearguard dug in close by the barracks. In order to give the men pulling out of Sannaiyat time to get away along the road across the top of the Shumran loop, Kiazim Karabekir had ordered a delaying action to be fought out here. The 26th Brigade, advancing on the right towards the north-east comer of the peninsula, was stopped and the 37th Brigade, which was moving straight up the peninsula to cut the road, was counterattacked twice and also brought to a halt. But this was only a pause. As soon as Kiazim's rearguard had achieved its object and the tail of the treating column from Kut had passed it, it too started to fall back along the Baghdad road. While this situation was developing. General Crocker's Cavalry Division had been ordered 'to cross bridge immediately and take up vigorous pursuit along left bank in direction of Bughaila'. From the Dahra Barracks, Bughaila was about 20 miles up the Baghdad road and so Maude's instructions were quite explicit: Crocker was to get after the retiring Turks as fast as he could and head them off. Crocker's failure to do this was the first blunder, and the opportunity for the sort of cavalry action which only rarely occurs was missed. The two cavalry brigades started to cross over to the Shumran peninsula at about 0900 hours; Crocker's previous orders had told him to concentrate his force and wait at a rendezvous south of the bridge, so he can hardly be blamed for the late arrival at the bridge. But knowing that 'vigorous action' was required, his actions once he had got over to the far side are inexplicable. Instead of going off to the left, both brigades trotted off up the west bank of the
peninsula and were soon mixed up in 36th Brigade's infantry battle for the Dahra Barracks; only when the barracks had been captured two hours later were they able to get through. The 7th Cavalry Brigade, leading, continued on in a northerly direction for a couple of miles then wheeled off to the left; the 6th Brigade followed suit about a mile to the rear and, within a relatively short space of time, both were embroiled once more in the rearguard infantry battle. Columns of men and guns moving west across the top of the peninsula were a clear indication of the "Turks' retreat and with all this movement going on across his front it seems scarcely credible that Crocker should have made no attempt to make use of the one attribute his horses brought to the force: mobility. Still, no
determined attempt was made to push on round the Turkish flank either that day or the next — and after the 26th the opportunity had vanished. This then was the
Pontoon bridge erected between
^
^^.
Feb11-20
-^
#*V^
0730 & 1630
Feb 23
Feb 3
MILES
JKMS
'Jan 25 Jan 26-31
Jan 26-31
1971
first
blunder.
The
most unfortunate effect of the cavalry's performance was the delay that was imposed when Cayley's 13th Division eventually caught up with the Turkish rearguard at Sheikh Jaad, where the second blunder occurred. Finding the Turks
dug
in,
the leading British brigade drove in
their outposts but
came under heavy
was checked when it from the main Tur-
fire
kish position. Instead of pushing on round the Turkish flank with hi.'; two remaining brigades and throwing the whole weight of his division on to Kiazim's rearguard, Cayley hesitated. He hesitated because he was pinning his faith on the Cavalry Division making an outflanking movement which would force the T\irks to pull out and, as may be adduced from events so far, reliance on the cavalry was not altogether wise. Fortunately the corps' commander was quick to appraise the situation and as soon as Marshall learned what had happened, Cayley was ordered to attack with E every available man. Unfortunately, unwas unable to comI like Joshua, Cayley I mand the sun to stand still and by the time his troops were in a position to atI T5 tack, it was dark. Nevertheless, the attack went in and since it caused the Turkish E rearguard to abandon its positions, it could t>
be counted a success. But many of the Turks were able to slip away in the darkness and confusion when they might have been put in the bag. This was the last serious engagement between the two forces until the battle at the Diyala on March 7; several hundred Turkish prisoners were taken, losses on both sides were considerable but the Turks managed to get most of their guns away. Now came the final blunder, committed this time by the Royal Navy. Except for the fact that the sailors
managed its
to turn it into a brilliant success, consequences might have been most
serious; in the event, it was the action of the gunboats that finally converted the Turkish retreat into a rout. For 15 months the navy had been waiting for its chance to resume what it con-
From the locked up in Kut, the Tigris Fleet had been relegated to the task of a heavy battery in trench warfare; in this new phase it was to become cavalry and horse artillery combined, and it had been looking forward to the time when this opportunity should present itself. The day after the crossing at Shumran, the three gunboats waiting at Sheikh Sa'ad were off, steaming up the river as fast as they could go. All along their route sidered
to
be
its
proper
moment Townshend was
role.
the river banks hid the view and consequently from the decks of the ships it was only possible to get an occasional glimpse of the countryside, and then only a distant one. Believing that Marshall's columns were in hot pursuit the gunboats pushed on at full speed round the huge bends, getting only occasional glimpses of bodies
men moving in the direction of Baghdad. These they mistook for British troops. Suddenly, just beyond Bughaila, they ran slap into the Turkish rearguard and were received with heavy fire at point blank range from almost every class of weapon from 5.9-inch howitzers down to rifles. At the Nahr-al-Kalek bend the river turns back in a complete hairpin and here the vessels came under fire from three sides as a Turkish batteiy and machine guns dug in at the apex of the peninsula raked the fleet as it passed. Casualties were heavy, but miraculously, none of the three of
vesselsconcerned
— HMS7'ara/)?;//r7,A/a/i/?s
and Moth — was sunk, although they were holed time and time again. There could be no going back, and so with all guns blazing the three ships steamed on and in due course
their
gallantry
was
lewarded.
Swinging round the next bend where they were clear of the deadly fire, they reached a point where the road swung in towards
I ik^
/
the river, and here their machine guns were able to play havoc with the Turkish tiansport slogging back to Baghdad. Shortly afterwards the full benefit of running the gauntlet developed. What was left of the Turkish river fleet came into sight, running before them. Keeping up a a brisk fire at the troops on the river bank with their machine guns, they engaged the shipping with their heavier armament. The rearmost Turkish ship, one with a Britisli 4.7-inch gun captured at Kilt, was the first to sink; then the Basra was hit and ran herself ashore; then the Pioneer
was
set
on
fire
and ran aground;
finally
the gunboats were able to concentrate on the Firefly, lost by Townshend at Umm-Atin the retreat from Ctesiphon. The Firefly's crew, chastened no doubt by what had happened to the other ships, had soon had enough and as darkness fell they ran her nose ashore, landed, and escaped, leaving their vessel intact and under full steam. This was the end of the action, during which the Turks' fighting fleet had been reduced to two Thorneycroft patrol
Tubal
Final release artillery
from the terrors
of the British
bombardments: Turkish
POW on their
way to a long captivity. Though small in comparison with those on the Western Front, British
barrages greatly intimidated the Turks
boats carrying to spend the
pom-poms — and these were
summer
the
shallows somewhere above Tekiit. In one day the 'I\irks' river navy had been annihilated. The navy had done well. Apart from the ships, large numbers of prisoners had been taken, many of whom had come down to the river bank to surrender even while the ships were in hot pursuit. For many of them it was a choice between the mercy of the British and the vindictiveness of the Arabs. Together with those rounded up by the cavalry and the wounded who were collected, over 4,000 Turks were taken between the crossing of the Tigris on the 23rd and the evening of the fight at Nahral-Kalek on the 26th. The bag, and its mode of collection in this last lap of the ninning fight, was almost a repetition of Townshend's advance from Qurna to Al 'Amarah in June 1915. The pursuit had gone about as far as it could go, and when the cavalry rode into Al 'Aziziyah on the 27th and found that it was occupied this was the end of a phase. The Turks were in in
no real position to stay and fight; their retreat had become a rout and they were moving on a broad front as a disorganised rabble. Yet his supply problems precluded Maude from pressing his advantage. The 7th Division had eaten its emergency
X
rations; the
animals had no food
left at fortuitous arrival of a couple of motor launches and a camel convoy carrying sufficient food for half rations that saved the situation. The main difficulty was that it took eight hours to bring up supplies from Sheikh Sa'ad, all
and
it
was only by
along the winding Tigris, and complete the round trip back to the base supply dump at Shumran. On February 28 the cavalry division again reconnoitred Al 'AzTzTyah and this time found it unoccupied; yet once more — because of the supply situation -it was obliged to fall back temporarily on Nahr-al-Kaiek. Finally, it returned next day and the gunboats moved up to join it, and that was as far as the pursuit could be carried for the time being; Maude was reluctant to stop but he had no option until his extended line of communications could be reorganised. Further Reading Candler, E., The Long
Road toBaghdad
1919) Barker, A. J., The Neglected
Mesopotamia Campaign Volume
III
(HMSO
1925)
[Fur Lieu tenant-Colonel A. J. biography, see Volume l,p. 434. \
'^mKw
t
'-mm^m^
«rf*
r/
War (Faber & Faber
1967)
\h fii
(Cas-
sell
Barker's
•ALL OF
BAGHDAD
With Kut behind them, the British were once again ready to advance on Baghdad. The Turks, meanwhile, were striving desperately to improvise a defence for the city, a defence
which had been considered unnecessary, as the fall of Kut had not been expected. The Turks' efforts were in vain. The British did not attack Baghdad head on, but encircled it and cut it off, though most of the Turkish force managed to escape the British net. To hold Baghdad, the British now had to fan out in a wide semi-circle to the north and west and to repulse many wild but determined counterattacks. Leslie Missen. Right: Lonely vigil for an Indian sentry. The whole British effort up the Tigris depended on maintaining the tenuous river lines When
the Cavalry Division found on February 28 that the Turks had abandoned Al 'AzTzTyah, General Maude reluctantly called a halt to his pursuit of the broken Turks. His advanced troops were on half rations for the second day. General MacMunn, in charge of communications and supplies, found that Nahr-al-Kalek, 20 miles downstream, was the furthest point to which he could get the supply steamers by running a shuttle service from Sheikh Sa'ad. The course of the Tigris is so tortuous that any advance on land involved a supply journey at least twice as long as that by water. Al 'AzTzTyah was 144 miles from Sheikh Sa'ad and 110 from Baghdad,
and upon this river transport Maude depended for food, ammunition, and the evacuation of his wounded. General MacMunn now had to reorganise supply lines and steamers, and to defend the posts on the way and convoys against raiding Arabs. This he undertook to do in four dayc, giving Maude his guarantee of 'a sufficient and constant supply for as far as he wanted to go'. Maude then moved his Advanced Headquarters to Al 'AzTzTyah. The 13th and 14th Divisions reassembled and bivouacked along with the Cavalry Division and the Naval Flotilla. The 7th Division moved forward to Nahr-al-Kalek and the 3rd covered the river flank to the north and back to the Shumran crossing. The Royal Flying Corps established an air strip and workshop, and assembled 14 aeroplanes at Al 'AzTzTyah. The weather remained calm, warm by day and with frost at night. Regimental Diaries were written up, exact burial places of the dead were recorded and letters written to their relatives. Maude visited all the units of the 13th and 14th Divisions, talking with officers and men, and held parades for the presentation of immediate awards for bravery and distinguished service in the field. Losses in killed and wounded had been heavy and many of those of the 13th Division were well known to Maude as he had previously been their divisional general on Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia. But success is a powerful stimulant. The brilliant crossing of the Tigris at Shumran on February 23 and the sight of the Union Jack flying over Kut had dimmed the painful memory of disasters on the left bank and the surrender of Townshend and his garrison. Although, as Maude said, his troops were 'bristling with the offensive spirit' they were under no
1974
illusions about the difficulties to be faced. On March 4 the 'all clear' to an advance
on Baghdad was received from the Imperial General Staff: Maude might advance if he avoided any repetition of 'the old communication trouble, or, after a definite occupation of Baghdad being compelled to withdraw'. The Russians under General Baratov in Persia had been ordered to advance from Hamadan, which they had entered on March 2. But the capture of Baghdad, if it could be held securely, would add a third front on the Rivers Diyala and Shatt-al Adhaim (Nahr ai 'Uzaym) to those on the rivers Euphrates and Tigris. Some 10,000 or more Turks had withdrawn from Sannaiyat and Kut. Of these, many had been killed at Imam Mahdi, Bughaila and Nahr-al-Kalek, over 4,000 had been taken prisoner (with 39 guns) between February 23 and 26 and the rest had retreated in disorder, the halt at Al 'AzTzTyah alone preventing the total collapse of Kiazim Karabekir Bey's forces. Aerial observation and ground Intelligence reported Turks in the Ctesiphon area and along the Diyala river the XVIII Corps was said to be reinforced by two regiments; there were also some 3,000 rifles and two other regiments in Baghdad. Further reinforcements might be coming from the Euphrates, from Samarra' and from the nearest part of the Turkish XIII Corps under Ali Ishan Pasha in the Jabal HamrTn and on the upper Diyala.
Grandiose scheme.s
Muhammed Amin
says in his book Baghits Last Fall that Khalil Pasha, the commander of the Sixth Army, had regarded the Kut position as impregnable and that a successful crossing of the river was out of the question. He had envisaged a scheme in which he would defeat the Russians in Persia and then march a column from there to the southeast to debouch from the P*5nt-e Kuh into Mesopotamia below Kut, thus breaking
dad and
Maude's
the story of
lines of communication
and
secur-
the surrender of the entire British forces in the area! He had no plan for the defence of Baghdad and was therefore severely shaken oy the news of the loss of Kut; and had it not been for the inevitable halt at Al 'AzTzTyah, Baghdad would have fallen more easily than it did. Khalil decided at first to retreat in orderly fashion to Samarra', 90 miles upstream from Baghdad, where the ground offered scope for a ing
firm stand and where he could be joined by the XIII Corps under Ali Ishan Pasha, which would cover the KifrT-Kirkuk flank on the foothills and ward off any Russian advance from Persia. Then he had the vision of a great victory at Ctesiphon and a broken British force retreating, as Townshend had done in 1915. Muhammed Amin says that six days were wasted in digging at Ctesiphon but finally an order came from Enver Pasha, the Minister of War, that Baghdad must be defended stubbornly and the Diyala river held until Ali Ishan could join the XVIII Corps with his XIII Corps from Persia. Khalil was also to establish a line from the Tigris to Lake Aqarquf west of Baghdad and to flood as extensive an area as possible. Fortunately there was not enough time for him to do this but if he had acted earlier he could have made good use of water to protect his eastern and western
Turks. They drew swords and were moving at a trot through the dust when suddenly they came upon a line of Turkish infantry just ahead, some standing and some firing rapidly from a nullah. Colonel Richardson ordered a charge, and the Hussars swept in among the Turks, killing about 20 and rounding up some 40 prisoners. They could then discern another entrenched position ahead and to their left from which heavy machine gun and rifle fire, reinforced by
flanks. Khalil decided to transfer a portion of his force to the west bank of the
Hussars had reached the second line, where they were killed, wounded or captured. The rest of the brigade came up to support and extend the line, but as a result of the dust storm could not find the Turks' left flank. They did not then know that they were facing the Turkish rearguard of 16 guns and 2,500 men of the 51st Division, entrenched from Lajj to the north-east. As evening came on the wind dropped, visibility improved quickly and it was seen that the horses were within effiective range of the Turks and that it would be impossible to overrun such an extensi.ve position. The brigade therefore drew off" and watered on the river west of Zor. The brilliant charge of the 13th Hussars should go down in history as does the Charge of the Light Brigade in which they also took part. Their losses at Lajj were actually greater than their losses at Balaclava. But the Turks were thoroughly shaken and fearful of being surrounded, and so they abandoned the Lajj position in the night and retired to the Diyala, where they were joined by the XVIII Corps from Ctesiphon. Maude's staff" who inspected the Lajj position next day advised him that it would have taken three days of prepared infantry assault to capture it if the Turks had made a stubborn stand. At daybreak on March 6 the Cavalry Division advanced to Bustan and reconnoitred the Ctesiphon position. This was also found to have been abandoned. It then moved forward through Bawi to within three miles of
Tigris to prevent any encircling movement, as this might threaten the railway supply line from Samarra' to Baghdad station. line was dug (in part by Baghdad at Tubul sandcivilians) along the
A
Umm
running from Karada to the edge of the lake. Behind this was the Mahsudiya Canal, connecting Lake Aqarquf to the Tigris. This was spanned by an iron bridge for the light railway which ran to the Euphrates. A German staff" officer wanted a diff'erent line, but Kiazim condemned this idea. A German machine gun company was sent to the west bank south of Karada, and Khalil received some new German aeroplanes by rail; but not more than two or three of these took the air
hills
before Baghdad fell. Even so, the additional observation proved most helpful to him and he received some accurate reports of
movements. His effective forces amounted to 500 sabres, 10,000 rifles and British
50 guns.
On Monday, March
5,
the British ad-
vance was renewed. No information had reached General Maude while he was at Al 'AzTzTyah to cause him to alter his conclusion that the Turks would not defend Baghdad seriously but would fight rearguard actions to cover their retreat to Samarra'. Their skill and persistence in doing this was, however, to cost the attacking forces far more in casualties than was then anticipated. The Cavalry Division left Al 'AzTzTyah at 0430 hours and halted four hours later at Zor to water. The 13th and 14th Divisions marched at dawn. A hot and strong southerly wind began to blow almost at once and reached gale force by 1000 hours, by which time it had raised a dust storm to a height of 800 feet and cut ground visibility to a few hundred yards. The march of 18 miles was made in great discomfort and in places through dense prickly scrub reeds, but III Corps managed reach Zor before darkness fell. "Meanwhile the 7th Cavalry Brigade, the advanced guard, had come under shell fire about three miles to the north-west of Zor from the direction of Lajj. Advancing at first dismounted they soon sighted indistinctly to the north what appeared to be a Turkish convoy. Colonel J. J. Richardson, commanding the 13th Hussars, remounted all his squadrons and decided to attack with three of them while the fourth made a detour north-eastwards to outflank the
and sharp to
shrapnel, was inflicting casualties. Wheeling with great coolness to the right and again to the right the Hussars withdrew, dismounted and moved back to occupy the position they had charged, but were so reduced that they could not attack the
main position. Three officers and 25 men had been killed, six ofl!icers and 50 men wounded. Captain W. H. Eve had been killed fighting with his sword among the Turkish infantry, and a few individual
Diyala,
prisoner a number of The wind blew up again and
taking
stragglers.
dust reduced visibility to a few hundred yards. The 13th and 14th Divisions marched from Zor to Bustan, about 15 miles, and the 7th Division followed them up. From air and other reports Maude concluded that the Turks did not intend to make a serious stand at Diyala although the XVIII Corps could be seen along its right bank. But there was a general movement towards Baghdad and digging along the line Qarara-Tel Muhammad could be made That evening III Corps occupied out. the area at Ctesiphon in which Townshend had gained his Pyrrhic victory, some bivouacking by the Great Arch.
Surprise impossible
On March 7 the infantry advance continued and the Lancashire 38th Brigade (6th King's Own, 6th East Lancashire and 6th South Lancashire), under General O'Dowda, arrived about four miles south1975
east of Diyala village, together with a field
brigade and a bridging train, with orders to effect a crossing of the river. The two Turkish boat bridges had been removed during the night. The Cavalry Division reconnoitred the upstream area for seven miles or so and found Turks along the greater part of the right bank. The 38th Brigade's advanced party found the village and area 'held in some strength' and it was decided to wait for darkness before attempting to cross. The field artillery, and the Naval Flotilla (from_ a point below the junction of the Diyala with the Tigris) engaged the Turkish guns until dusk. During that afternoon and evening the 35th Brigade (14th Division) artillery
under General Thomson, with guns and sappers, was ferried over the Tigris, on the steamer P 51, at Bawi and began to move forward at 0130 hours on March 8. Thomson's force was to move up the right bank of the Tigris and threaten to turn the Turkish right flank on the Diyala. But as there was no means of communication he did not then know that the first attempt to cross the Diyala had failed. There had, of course, been no surprise, and, in the short time available, no preparation as there had been at Shumran. The bridging train commander had reconnoitred the river in the dusk and estimated its width at 120 yards, its current slow, and its banks very steep and over 20 feet high with ftirther spill banks at the foot — formidable and daunting situation. It was decided that the only point at which pontoons could be launched with any hope of success would be down the ramp which the Turks had used for their bridge, the very spot, of course, which they had already ranged and which they were watching in the moonlight of a clear night. O'Dowda sent up four pontoons to ferry over the 6th King's Own, who would then be the covering party for the bridge construction. Accurate and heavy fire stopped all movement around the first pontoon. Next, all four pontoons were prepared with crews and passengers ready to launch under an artillery barrage. But again devastating fire raked the ramp and although three pontoons were actually launched onto the water, practically every man in them was killed or wounded within moments. In one pontoon there was an unwounded signaller. Attaching his cable to the pontoon he swam ashore with it under heavy fire and so saved the lives of his wounded companions. For this gallant act he was awarded the Victoria Cross. There were 64 casualties (50 killed) and the attempt
was
called
On
off.
the morning of March 8, O'Dowda made fresh plans to cross the river that evening. Thomson, on the right bank of the Tigris, advanced several miles towards Sheikh Aswad, from where he could see, but not communicate with, the 13th Division's troops on the Diyala side. The engineers built a bridge at Bawi in just over four hours and in the afternoon the main body of the 7th and Cavalry Divisions began to cross to the right bank of the Tigris. On the Turkish side, Kiazim's 14th Division and 44th Regiment were preparing the Karada-Tel Muhammad 'sition, defending the Diyala crossing an^ A-atching the Tigris' left bank to see that Thomson did not cross behind them. On the right bank, Kiazim's 52nd Division and two other regiments were occupying the
1976
Umm
at Tubul sandhills, with a smaller force of cavalry and infantry at Tel Aswad. His 51st Division was in readiness to cross if necessary from the left to right bank over the Baghdad bridge. At midnight on March 8/9 the 38th Brigade made its second attempt to cross the Diyala at a point some 500 yards upstream from the first spot. This effort was entrusted to the 6th Loyal North Lancashires under Colonel J. S. N. Harrison. He planned four attack columns, each with one pontoon rowed by men from other regiments, to cross under cover of an artillery bombardment. Again the Turks were not surprised, but at three points a number of crossings were made in the light of Turkish star shells, and the British managed to secure about 300 yards of the right bank, at the price of heavy casualties. Captain O. A. Reid, commanding one of the parties of 60 — soon reduced to 15— joined up the other two and held a small lunette-shaped bend with 40 men and two machine guns. The Turks counterattacked no less than five times during the night under the command of their regimental commander and, as Muhammad Amin records, sustained 1,000 casualties. They then drew off and decided to attack again at dusk after a bombardment; but as a result of Thomson's pressure on the right bank of the Tigris, Kiazim had to transfer his 51st Division, and further attack on Captain Reid's party was cancelled. All attempts to get supplies and ammunition to him failed during the day but covering fire was given. However, the commander of the 44th Regiment decided on his own (so Amin says) to make a final assault and this he launched at 1930 hours. It was beaten off. One hundred Turkish dead were counted next morning, and the 44th Regiment
lost its remaining officers. Captain Reid's party was exhausted, had no water and was down to the last round of ammunition. There was a bombardment at midnight and at 0400 hours on the 10th, the crossings attempted met with little or no opposition and 200 Turks surrendered. By 1000 hours the whole of the 38th Brigade was across the river and had moved a mile forward to cover the engineers, who completed a bridge by 1200 hours. The 39th Brigade then crossed for the final attack on the line Qarara-Tel Muhammad, to which the Turks had retired with their reserves behind the Nazim Pasha embankment. A painful but very gallant episode was over. For his 'dauntless courage and gallant leadership' Reid of the King's Regiment (attached to the 6th Loyal North Lancashires) was awarded the Victoria Cross. The permanent bridge which was built later bears the name 'Lancashire
Bridge'.
advance from Bawi on March 8, with the expectation that the Cavalry Division at any rate would be near Baghdad next day. The attempt failed because of an unforeseen combination of natural and human problems. These included lack of communication both with Headquarters and between columns, extraordinarily difficult terrain and no maps, the lack of water for horses as well as for men, the skilfully prepared Turkish positions, the retention by Maude of control over the Cavalry Division and, finally, a very severe dust storm. On March 8 the 35th Brigade on the right bank of the Tigris moved slowly through a heavily cultivated area crisscrossed by water cuts and deep irrigation canals, mostly with steep sides so that ramps had to be cut before crossing. The Turks were awaiting attack in the advanced line between Shawa Khan and Aswad. On March 9/10 the 35th Brigade was on the right near the river and in theory able to enfilade the Turks defending the Diyala crossing. In fact Tel
was not practicable and it was the Turks, who feared that he intended to cross behind them, that fired on Thomson with guns well concealed in the palm this
groves.
Early on March 9, the Cavalry Division contact with the Tel Aswad line and the 28th Brigade of the 7th Division, just
made
south-east of Shawa Khan, sent the Leicestershire Regiment in to the attack. They got to within 400 yards of the Turks and then dug in to await reinforcements. At this point the horses of the Cavalry Division were so exhausted (they had not been watered in the 24 hours since the crossing at Bawi) that the division had to retire eight miles to the Tigris, leaving only a squadron on the left of the line. Meanwhile, the 19th Brigade moved up and the battle became a divisional one under General Fane. The Cavalry Division returned in the afternoon but, because of the heavy fire from the Turkish guns and the great heat, they failed to find the Turkish right flank and so retired to bivouac. Fane pressed the attack of his three brigades (the 19th, 21st and 28th) but their losses were heavy. The Turks, with about 3,000 rifles and 20 guns, had excellent defensive fields of fire, ranged beforehand, and were firing at walking targets. British losses were 768 killed and wounded while the Turks (according to Amin) lost only 95. A final assault with bayonets was out of the question for men exhausted for lack of food and water and suffering from the great heat. It was daybreak on the 10th before some of them at last got a drink. Towards dusk on the 9th, Khalil Pasha came to the bridge over the canal south-west of Baghdad and decided with Kiazim to retire to the at Tubul line and close the gap between the Tigris and Lake Aqarquf with the 52nd Division, the 51st behind it in reserve, in total about 6,000 rifles and 30 guns with numerous machine guns. The two commanders remained in a building by the bridge from the roof of which there was a long view of the battlefield. By 0500 hours on the 10th Fane was informed that patrols had found the Tel
Umm
Encirclement dreaded It was obvious that in any retreat from Baghdad the Turks would depend upon the railway to Samarra' for the removal of war material and for food, ammunition and reinforcements from the north. If the remaining Turkish army, about 10,000 rifles, 50 guns and many machine guns, was to be surrounded and captured (a constant dread of Kiazim, who was sure that the British cavalry would effect this) an encircling movement over some 24 miles must be made to capture the railway station on the right bank and outside the city. For this purpose Maude ordered an
Aswad line abandoned. An immediate advance was not possible — some units had still to get water and snatch a hasty meal — and the plan for the 25th, 28th and 19th Brigades, with their artillery, to attack the
The Turkish officer corps: weak on strategy, but strong
on tactics Turkish officer
POW taken in tfie advance on
and beyond the great
city of
Baghdad
^.
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TTl^Wfi'^
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1
Tii(l»«
Phase 2 BRITISH
Band-i-AdhaJtn
^/IARCH
13-22
MARCH 23-APRIL9 APRIL
APRIL
Samarra' Stn
April
23
10 00
Phase
1978
10-22 23-30
4l^t%*T
The operations to take and hold Baghdad. Above: The beginning of the encirclement of the Turkish forces holding Baghdad, a steam pinnace tows infantry-laden boats across the
Left:
Diyala. Right: A British infantryman in typical hot weather Mesopotamia gear. Below: 1917 witnessed the supply of adequate numbers of steamers, the P' class. These were invaluable because of their shallow draught and good load
carrying capabilities
1979
KaaCi- .jyij'^:i-;iites.:ixvf^
^Si Above: The Germans' Parthian shot? A graffito on a wall in Baghdad calls down the wrath of Zeppelin and U-Boat on the English conquerors
Below: A British officer interrogates two captured Turks. Frequently, though, the Turks were woefully ignorant of their own dispositions
next position had to be conveyed to the various unit commanders. The Cavalry Division, after watering, was ordered to encircle Baghdad from the west and north and the final assault by the infantry was timed for the afternoon. At 0900 hours the advancing troops came under Turkish gun fire and soon after-
wards under heavy machine gun and rifle fire. About the same time a hot southerly wind began to blow and landmarks along the front disappeared in a haze of dust. From their elevated view point (Amin says) Khalil and Kiazim could not tell whether distant movements were of cavalry or infantry. But having prepared their defensive position, they were able to keep under heavy fire at known distances all the points they regarded as of key importance. By 1200 hours the dust storm was intense and visibility had been reduced to less than 100 yards. The drying effect of the wind increased thirst and the dust irritated eyes and noses intensely. Anticipating a drop in the wind as evening approached. Fane postponed his afternoon assault to sometime after 1800 hours. But some of the Cavalry Division had by this time passed the Turkish right, and patrols of the 7th Brigade (at 1430 hours) were only five miles west of Baghdad. Turkish cavalry, some infantry and a 'host of Arabs' were engaged but steep banked nullahs and canals (in places nine feet deep) prevented further advance and in the height of the dust storm it was impossible to keep direction or to maintain touch. Horses began to collapse from exhaustion and a retirement to water was ordered; but some of the cavalry remained to cover the infantry's left.
A swirling dust storm On
the
bank, the 13th Division moved on a 4,000-yard front and at
left
forward once came under heavy shell fire. The distance separating them from the QararaTel Muhammad line was completely flat and devoid of vegetation — a perfect range for the marksman. By noon the dust storm had blotted out the Turkish line but guns and machine guns continued to play backwards and forwards on preranged areas and there was continuous rifle fire. The 39th and 40th Brigades moved forward at 1400 hours and casualties were incurred before orders came to dig in and wait for dusk. Meanwhile, the intensified cannonade indicated that the Turks were expending all their ammunition. Towards midnight the wind fell, and firing ceased. The air cleared and then on both sides of the river fires were visible and the rumble of explosions was heard. Khalil Pasha had given the order to retreat at 2000 hours, the right bank force to a point about 12 miles north of Baghdad and the left bank force (now cut off because the Tigris bridge had broken up in the fierce wind) up river some 19 miles. Amin Muhammed writes about the terrible confusion which reigned at the station, the demolition of the great wireless station which had begun
transmit only three days earlier, the destruction of German aircraft by their mechanics; all around were scattered stores, sick and the wounded, in the darkness, dust and confusion. The Army Headquarters left in one train with 700 wounded. One engine and 12 trucks only were to
left for
a second train. Kiazim had ordered man falling out should be shot at
that any
once. Hostile Arabs hovered around the Turks and in the city rioting and looting had begun. 'Most fortunately', says Amin, 'the attackers were entirely unaware of what was happening.' If there had been no dust storm, the British cavalry would undoubtedly have reached Baghdad station in the afternoon and the Turks on the right bank would have been surrounded. By 0200 hours on March 11 the infantry patrols on both fronts had reported the Turkish positions abandoned and at dawn the advance began. Just before 0600 hours a patrol of the 2nd Black Watch (21st Brigade) under Second-Lieutenant B. Houston occupied the station. The 35th Brigade under Thomson entered the city on the right bank at 0900 hours. The l/5th Buffs (East Kent Regiment) crossed
the river in gufars (ancient coracle-type boats) and Captain G. K. Harrison hoisted the Union Jack on the Citadel. The Brigade then took over the calming of the city. The 13th Division, sweeping forward on the east side, was ordered to march past the city and take up defensive positions to north and north-east at Es Salek. Maude in the P 53, proceeded by the Naval Flotilla, arrived at 1530 hours and landed quietly at the old British Residency, which the Turks had used as a hospital. The Cavalry Division moved up the right bank and occupied Kadhimain, north of the city, and the Naval Flotilla held on until it engaged the Turks 14 miles upstream. So after 300 years ended the Turkish occupation of Baghdad. Tidings of the capture
aroused enthusiasm throughout the Commonwealth and Allied countries. It was the first conspicuous and dramatic triumph achieved on land since the Battle of the Marne and its repercussions through the east were far-reaching. In the hot sunshine of that Sunday morning the domes and minarets of the mosques stood out amid the mud brown
houses whose
flat roofs
were crowded with
To the north the gold covered minarets and domes of the grand Shiah mosque at Kadhimain shone above the date palm groves. There was great disappointpeople.
ment in the 13th Division that there was no march through Baghdad, and many
who passed by
that day never entered the being killed or wounded in the actions which followed immediately afterwards. The 39th Brigade, however, assisted the 35th Brigade on March 12 to search parts of the city and the 7th North Staffordshires led off from Es Salek, entering the city by the Bab-el-Muadham and marching down Khalil Pasha street, a new street made to commemorate the capture of Townshend's force. Little was then known of the appalling procession of sick and emaciated men of that brave garrison who were beaten by the Turks along this same street in misery and agony some ten months earlier on their way to death or captivity; but the details came later from the American consul, who had done what he could to alleviate their distress. Now dense crowds lined the street clapping their Allah- il- Allah' and chanting hands — 'there is no God but God!' When a sharp shower fell many Baghdadis marched along holding their umbrellas over the outer files of the column. The house to house search went on amid squalor and stench, diseased dogs, emaciated beggars and a shocking number of people suffering from eye disease. Turkish city,
'
rifles, ammunition and even machine guns were collected. The ad hoc interpreters included a Baghdadi who had once been in business in Blackpool, and a Christian girl student whose excellent French had been learned at the Convent school. Most of the women were veiled and anonymous but some Christian Syrian and Armenian girls dressed in European style received complimentary remarks and wolf whistles. The conduct of the British troops received the highest praise and
deserters,
indeed
Amin Muhammed
wrote: 'though
this was the 30th time that Baghdad fallen to a conqueror, never before
had had
the
The
event
passed
off
so
quietly.'
weather was changing rapidly from cool to hot and the British winter serge uniforms were overpowering with rifle and kit, when midday shade temperatures were between 70° and SOT, 21° and 27°C. But they were to rise to 100 F, 38 C before cotton clothing arrived on May 8.
The restoration of order There was plenty of chlorinated water to drink and most troops bathed in the Tigris and cleaned up. A few eggs, small skinny chickens and limes were sold at high prices, but a steady reorganisation of law and order in the city and the restoration of confidence brought to the shops some tinned foods, which the Turks had not had time to confiscate. While Maude planned the next military operations he had also, as he was in political control of the country as well, to maintain government of the local population and to establish relations with the whole of the area he had freed from Turkish suzerainty. In this he was assisted by his chief political officer, Sir Percy Cox. The work included health measures, sanitation, food supplies, hospitals; and law order, police, traffic control, finance,
and
and trade. The country round Baghdad was food producing and could
shops
alleviate the
strain on the long supply
Water transport was augmented from Basra and light railways were planned for sections of the route, Basra-Qurna, QurnaAl 'Amarah and Kut-Baghdad. Militarily, Maude's first consideration was to secure Baghdad against flood and counterattack. He had therefore to press the Turks back as far as possible and prevent, or handicap, any formation of a Turkish army which could recapture Baghdad. The long period of trench warfare round Kut had been followed by a line.
series of actions necessarily within reach of water, which could be obtained only from the Tigris, and with one objective — the capture of Baghdad. The campaign now fanned out into the open on an arc of 135 degrees, on the west to the Euphrates, on the north up the Tigris and the Shatt-al Adhaim, on the north-east up the Diyala to the Jabal Hamrln foothills and on the east to MandalT and the Posht-e Kuh. In this
wide
field
Maude was now
to
show
his
great military skill. The immediate need was to contain the flood points on the Tigris and Euphrates because the snows of Asia Minor had begun to melt and these rivers would soon be in full flood. The 13th Division under General Cayley on March 13 advanced up the left bank of the Tigris to Kasirin, about 28 miles, and secured the river bund, with slight opposition from the 14th Division which appeared to the north and north-east. General
1981
Cobbe's corps, minus the 3rd Division and with the 7th Division under Fane, advanced on March 13th up the right bank of the Tigris to attack the 51st and 52nd Divisions, estimated at 5,000 to 6,000 rifles and 24 guns in the area of Hassaiwa to Khan al Mashahidah station, where
was an armoured tram. Kiazim Karabekir had planned a steady retreat to Istabulat-Samarra' to give time for the there
preparation of a strong defensive position and reorganisation. Khalil Pasha, however, ordered rearguard delaying actions all the way. Kiazim could not agree and he was replaced by Shef ket Pasha. After marcViing all night, the 7th Division found the Turks entrenched along a seven-mile line west from the Tigris and south of the station. On the afternoon of the 14th, two of the brigades made a full frontal attack while the third moved to attack the right flank from the west. In the battle the 2nd Black Watch made a memorable charge, and the l/7th Gurkhas and the 9th Bhopal Infantry fought with great gallantry. The Turks were driven from their position. At the end of a very hot and exhausting action, Colonel A. G. Wauchope with a few of the Black Watch and the Gurkhas, reinforced by two companies of the Seaforth Highlanders, made a further attack and captured the railway station at midnight, just as the train was leaving. They took 50 prisoners. The Turkish casualties were over 1,000 while those of the 7th Division were 518, which included 10 officers and 230 men of the
Black Watch — 43% of their strength. Fane asked that the cavalry might pursue the beaten Turks next day but the horses were still being rested at KaHhimain, so the Turks escaped again. This vital point on the river bund was put under guard and the rest of the division retired to Baghdad. On the Euphrates the vital flood control point was at Sakhlawiya. On March 18 a column which included one brigade of guns and cavalry left Baghdad and drove off the Turks at Nukhta. Next day it attacked an entrenched position at Fallujah, from which it drove the Turks in less than half an hour. It entered the town just in time to save the bridge from burning, but the Turks had already cut the bank of the canal and the flood was causing Lake Aqarquf to overflow towards Kadhimain. The engineers, however, had already made temporary defences there and the immediate danger was warded off. Some 2,000 Turks and two gunboats retreated from Fallujah to Ai Ramadi where there was known to be a force of 3,000 rifles and 22 guns.
A
successful crossing
The third front needing Maude's attention was on the Diyala. On March 12, Turks of the 14th Division, which had retreated on March 10/11, were found at Ba'qubah on the left bank of the Diyala about 30 miles from Baghdad. They had destroyed the bridge and they were a potential threat to the British lines further south. A column of the 8th Brigade and a bridging train, under General Edwardes, arrived there op March 18 and made a feint crossing above Ba'qubah while two battalions were ferried over at night four miles to the south. Here they captured the village of Buhriz at dawn and soon drove the Turks out of Ba'qubah The, 100-yard-wide river was then bridged successfully.
1982
Secure for the moment on all fronts took stock of the situation. News had already come in that Enver Pasha had ordered the recapture of Baghdad and had appointed General von Falkenhayn to command a Turco-German force of two Turkish divisions strengthened by some of the German Asiatic Corps with their guns and other equipment, to be called the 'Yilderim' or Thunderbolt Group. This was to assemble at Aleppo and advance down the Euphrates to co-operate with Khalil on the Tigris front. The news of the Russians was that Chernozubov with his force threatening Mosul was snowed up about 150 miles to the north-east and could be discounted altogether. Baratov was to be succeeded by Pavlov on the Kermanshah front and Raddatz with a few cossacks had come down the Pai Taq Pass to Qasri Shirin. They said their task would be completed when the Turks were out of Persia and they were not in a fit condition to carry out effective operations on a larger scale. Ali Ishan'f XIII Corps on crossing the Persian border might threaten Baghdad from the north-east, or crossing the Diyala effect a junction with Shefket on
Maude
the
Adhaim
river
and advance on Baghdad
with 12,000 rifles. Maude ordered Keary's column at Ba'qubah, about 4,500 strong with six guns, to prevent Ali Ishan from crossing the Diyala. Keary advanced and occupied Shahraban (Al Miqdadiyah) on March 23 and then found the Turks well placed in the Jabal Hamrln. Ali Ishan was covering the movement of his XIII Corps across the Diyala with 6,000 rifles and 24 guns. The foothills of the snow-covered Posht-e Kuh consist of sandstoiie, rock and gypsum, rising in a series of ridges which run northwest and south-east, to 800 feet, with intersecting gorges and ravines. Below, on the plain, numerous water-courses had to be crossed and finally the Ruz Canal, in full view of the Turks on higher ground. Keary's assault combined with a flanking movement, though carefully planned, was not successful, as the troops lost direction when crossing the various series of ridges.
The conditions were also
intolerable.
Under
a blazing sun (90°F, 32°C in the shade) and fighting uphill in winter clothing, in full view of a more numerous opponent, British losses were heavy and Keary was compelled to draw off" under heavy shell fire with some 1,200 casualties, of whom 300 were missing. Stretcher bearers were highly praised for their work in carrying the wounded back 4,000 yards under heavy fire. On the 27th and 28th the Cavalry Division, operating in the Diyala-Al Khalis Canal area, was attacked vigorously by 2,000 Turks supported by five guns and forced to retire. The Delli Abbas area was already strongly held by Ali Ishan's advanced guard. That there was a bridge 12 miles south-west of Khanaqln over which the Turks' crossing to the right bank was confirmed when the Turks opposite Keary withdrew on the 31st. They had carried out their task of protecting the main body of the XIII Corps now moving to Delli Abbas where they would be only 20 miles due east of the XVIII Corps. Meanwhile, Shefket had transferred most of his 51st and 52nd Divisions to the left bank of the Tigris and was advancing from the Adhaim to attack Sindiya with some 5,000 rifles and 24 guns and thus converge on the
On March 27, Shefket's force astride the old Nahrawan Canal, about five miles north of Sindiya, on a line extending north and facing the Marl Plain. This was an area of bare open plain as hard and smooth as concrete, reputedly the XIII Corps.
Necessity was the mother of invention, as always. A British officer holds home-made bombs abandoned by the German air unit in precipitate withdrawal from Baghdad
was
its
site
upon which Nebuchadnezzar
set
up
the Golden Image for the celebrations when he opened a new irrigation system. In the crystal clear atmosphere before the sun rose Shefket could see Ali Ishan's distant campfire smoke. Maude decided to attack Shefket first and ordered the 13th Division under
Cayley to do so at dawn on March 29. The 40th Brigade was to move along the canal from Khan Nahrawan; the 39th Brigade was to march after dark on the 28th from Abu Tamar about ten miles on a bearing of 340 degrees and then wheeling west outflank the Turks; and the 38th Brigade would defend the flank open to Ali Ishan who was only 20 miles away. The 39th Brigade's
night
march was carried out
mules
likely to bray being left behind. As a result several Turkish posts were surprised and taken. Soon after dawn the other two brigades advanced. The 40th met tough opposition and after driving in the Turks' first line they waited for the flank attack to develop. The 39th Brigade was driving in the Turks' remaining outposts when mirage conditions suddenly came on. Neither brigade could do anything then, as the effect was of a great lake in front of them in which objects were distorted and unrecognisable — a few birds momentarily resembling a line of infantry and then disappearing; islands appeared and disappeared; and then appeared to be moving upside down over the surface of the lake. The reflected light strained and hurt the unprotected eyes of the watchers. silently, all
The men
lay flat under fire and without cover, in the mtense heat of the sun. When the mirage died out at about 1500 hours
the Turks were found to have extended their line, so that outflanking was now impossible. Both brigades then advanced to make frontal attacks over open ground which they could cover only at a walking pace until within 200 or 300 yards of the Turks Sunstroke and heat-collapse increased the already considerable casual-
from rifle and machine gun fire, but enough men got through to capture the first line with bomb and bayonet. The Turks then left their other positions and retreated. Casualties totalled 514 killed and wounded, and nearly as many from heatcollapse. One hundred and eighty Turks were made prisoner and next day over 200 dead were counted. Shefket withdrew his force during the night and on the 30th they were all on tjie north of the Adhaim. ties
The first blow Maude had widened
the gap between Shefket and Ali, but ne decided to drive Shefket still fiirther away by crossing the Adhaim. General Marshall (III Corps) concentrated the 13th Division with a mixed force of four cavalry squadrons under Colonel R. A. Cassels. On the right bank of the Tigris, Fane with the 14th Division occupied Sumaika and Balad with little difficulty on April 8 and 9 and prepared to attack Istabulat. The Adhaim was to be crossed on April 11, but on the 10th Marshall found Ali Ishan, undeterred by Shefket's defeat, advancing in force from Delli Abbas. He decided to hit him first,
preferably in his right flank. The cavalry therefore continued to draw him on; and his force of 7,000 rifles and 35 guns passed Bint al Hassan and arrived at Chaliya on the Khalis Canal. The 39th and 40th Brigades marched on the night of the 10/1 1th from the Tigris to a point near Chaliya, about 15 miles, and made contactwith the Cavalry Division. Soon after dawn the Turks advanced to the attack in open order, supported fiirther back by
marching columns, unaware (it was afterwards discovered) that the 13th Division was in front of them and not only the cavalry. In the hot sun and after their long night march, the 39th and 40th Brigades, supported by the 55th Brigade RFA (16 guns), moved forward to secure some rising ground in the plain, which was also the Turkish objective. A head-on clash ensued, in which the speed of their advance brought the 39th and 40th Brigades on to their objective first. With a commanding field of fire and the support of the guns firing at 1,250 yards range they halted the Turkish advance. No fiirther move was made on account of the mirage and the heat (90°F, 32"C in the shade), many men dropping from heat exhaustion. (The 7th North Staffbrds, 400 strong, lost 60 men from sunstroke. Eight of these were still missing next morning.) The area was also swarming with locusts, travelling in myriads low over the ground. Overnight, drinking water was brought up six miles to the front line.
The Turks withdrew to Hassan and held
their position at Bint al
on through a dust storm on the 13th until the 14th, in spite of Marshall's continuous pressure, feint attacks and heavy shelling. Ali Ishan must then have decided that he could not get through and having evacuated his wounded — about 1,000 of them — retired on the night of the 14/15th through Delli Abbas into the Jabal by the light of a brilliant electrical storm. Three hundred Turkish dead were counted. British casualties were only 264. Marshall now ordered the 39th and 40th Brigades to hold their present positions while he turned his attention again to the River Adhaim. On the night of the 17/ 18th a skilfully devised crossing was made by the 35th and 38th Brigades and Cassels' cavalry. Shefket had placed about 2,000 riffes and four guns along the cliffs on the right bank, apparently expecting attack upon the left and centre. A feint attack on the Turks' left was made by the cavalry just before dawn on the 18th while the 6th North Lancashires waded through the three-foot deep stream just to the south and rushed the outposts on the cliff" top. Further south still and half a mile from the confluence of the Adhaim and Tigris, the 6th East Lancashires and 6th South Lancashires with a pontoon for each company crossed the river unobserved and threw back the surprised Turks to their reserve line. The engineers then put a bridge over and the infantry crossed, followed by the cavalry. The 38th Brigade attacked, and within the hour captured 400 Turks and three machine guns. The 35th Brigade then went through, the Turks were routed and the cavalry took up the pursuit 'with rapidity, skill and resohition' taking 800 more prisoners and three more machine guns. The Turks in reserve escaped with the four guns. British casualties were only 73. HMS Tarantula and HMS Waterfly co-operated with gxmfire from the river on the Turks' jx)sitions.
1983
Brigade under Thomson also right bank and on the 26th the 40th Brigade arrived to move up the left bank. The heat was intense and visibility bad, but water was available from 35th
On the right oank of the Tigris, Fane's column distracted Shefket's attention from the other bank on the 16th by moving up to the Median Wall, a rampart of great antiquity some 30 feet high, situated about
the
three miles south-east of Istabulat station. On the 18th Cobbe took over and Cassels' cavalry joined him on the 20th (a bridge had been put across the Tigris after the Adhaim victory on the 18th); the Turks' position was reconnoitred and, confirming aerial reports, was found to be a very strong one, as the Turks had expected to occupy it all the summer with a force of 7,000 rifles in the front line and 4,000 in reserve, supported by 47 guns. The attack was launched on April 21 and the fighting, which took place in great heat, a high wind and a dust storm, was very severe. The Black Watch, the Seaforths and the Gurkhas again distinguished themselves. During the night Shefket withdrew his whole force to a more compact and carefully prepared position, four miles back and north of the railway station. At noon the next day the attack was resumed, again in intense heat, wind and dust. The Leicesters and Sikhs, and indeed all three brigades of the 7th Division, distinguished themselves and the 32nd Lancers, about 40 strong, under Colonel W. W. G. Griffiths made a memorable charge into the Turkish infantry at a critical moment to turn the tide in a counterattack. Colonel Griffiths, two other officers and 22 Lancers were killed. The violence of the Turkish counterattacks showed that Shefket had restored the morale of his men and that he considered his position to be desperate. In one of these attacks Lieutenant J. R. M. Graham of the 136th Machine Gun Corps carried his gun from point to point with great gallantry though wounded four times. He was awarded the VC. At nightfall the fighting died down and at dawn on April 23 a further advance was made, without
the river. The Turks retired to the entrenched position across the river six miles south of Band-i-Adhaim, with clear fields of fire typical of the selections made by Ali Ishan. With less rifles (about 4,000) than the Turks (6,000) but with more guns (64 to 40), by the evening of the 29th the 40th Brigade, with the Cheshires and South Wales Borderers in front, was in position on the east bank of the river, while the 38th Brigade was extended to sweep in on the east flank. The 35th Brigade was on the west bank, with a cavalry brigade to sweep in from the west flank. Under a heavy artillery barrage all the fronts advanced at dawn on the 30th. The Cheshires and South Wales Borderers swept over the Turks' front positions, taking 300 men and a brigadier prisoner, and pushed on through the village. At the same time the 35th Brigade set the Turks in retreat on the west bank of the river and the 38th Brigade and the 7th Cavalry Brigade moved in a sweep from the east. Marshall's plan would have met with complete success but for a sand storm which within an hour reduced visibility to less than 50 yards so that supporting gun fire almost had to cease. The Cheshires and Borderers became disconnected and encumbered with
meeting any resistance. Samarra' Railway Station was reached at 1000 hours. Sixteen engines and 250 trucks with quantities of stores were there and the Black Watch secured the station bell. Colonel Cassels' cavalry pressed on and captured some Turks five miles north; the remainder had retreated into Tekrit. British losses totalled 2,228; those of the Turks were 3,700 killed and wounded with 700 taken prisoner. Four hundred and ninety Turkish dead were buried and 340 sick and wounded were found in Samarra'. Cobbe occupied Samarra' on the 24th.
Unexpected reinforcements Ali Ishan made one more bid to help Shefket and to join the XVIII Corps. Leaving a small offensive force near Delli Abbas he
marched quickly through the Jabal Hamvia Qarah Tappah and Umr-Maidan, unobserved and debouched through Bandi-Adhaim with his 14th Division (2,000
rln,
rifles) in advance, followed by the 2nd Division (4,000 rifles), the former arriving near Dahuba on the 23rd with the latter about seven miles behind. At dawn on April 24 the 38th Brigade under O'Dowda moved from the Adhaim-Tigris confluence against the I4th Division on the right bank while the 7th Cavalry Brigade made a wide sweeping movement to get behind them and ran into the advancing 2nd Division. As its line of retreat would be cut, the 14th Division broke off" and crossed the Adhaim to the left bank. On the 25th
1984
moved up the
prisoners, lost their commanding oflBcers and ran low in ammunition. At that moment Ali Ishan launched two counterattacks with all his reserves right across the front of the 38th Brigade which was blinded by the storm. Because of the dust the Turks moved in close order and over-
whelmed the Cheshires and Borderers by superior numbers, driving them out of the village. The arrival of the Wiltshires and Welsh Fusiliers re-established the line but no further advance could be made in the storm. The artillery duel recommenced after midday, when visibility improved, but the Turks held on to two key positions, the 'Boot' on the west flank and the "Mound' on the east, while their main force drew out to the north with strong shielding fire from their machine guns on either flank. By nightfall they were all in the Jabal again. British casualties were: 40th
Brigade 368, 38th Brigade 215 and 35th Brigade 82. They retained 365 of the 700 prisoners taken and next day buried 200 Turkish dead. A dust storm had again prevented complete victory. The Royal Flying Corps flew over the retreating Turks on May 1 and dropped bombs in the narrow defiles of the Jabal killing 50 Turks and doing much damage to their transport. Success on the Adhaim ended for a time the operations to make Baghdad secure. The great heat prevented any ftirther movement by either side. The shade temperature recorded by the RFC at the end of April was 110°F, 43°C. Early in May khaki drill uniforms arrived and all were freec from the torture of serge. Tented camp, were pitched as near water as possible, linly on the Tigris and Diyala. " accounted for many collapses Heat-s and dei ;ntil ice was distributed from a central pjant. Illness of various kinds, mosquitoes, sand flies, scorpions and vipers accounted for 37,000 men admitted to hospital from mid-March to the end of April. In June the sha le temperature rose
and it was astounding that a sally was made from Baghdad to Dhibban on the Euphrates to attack 1,000 Turks with six guns stationed in Ar Ramadi. The 7th Brigade was carried by night in Ford vans to Dhibban and kept under tents by day. But the advance on Ar Ramadi had to be made on foot at night in order to attack at dawn. The Turks fought stubbornly and gave no ground. Again dust storms caused dislocation in very difl!icult terrain and the temperatures registered that day, July 11, in Baghdad were 122°F, 50°C in shade and 160T, 71°C in sun. 'Great gallantry and magnificent endurance' did not prevent 566 casualties, 321 of them as a result of the heat. Some died of heat-stroke and some of thirst, while others went mad. The brigade could not withdraw until dusk and great bravery was shown by the Mechanical Transport Company in ferrying 2,000 gallons of water to the line and bringing back the casualties. This abortive action ended on July 13. A few officers of the North Staffbrdshires to 120°F, 49°C,
on directions from their Medical Officer kept a record in July of the daily intake of water, tea and other liquids and found it was about 16 pints each; but so great was their perspiration — which left their hands and faces encrusted with salt — that they urinated only twice a day. From July 11 to 21 the night temperature did not fall below 108 °F, 42°C, the shade temperature rose in camp to 133°F, 56°C, and the RFC registered 136°F, 58°C. A bathe in the Tigris at sundown helped to restore sanity and refreshed everyone, though the water temperature was 85°F, 29°C. Whirlwinds almost every day flattened tents and scattered belongings; and from the end of July to the end of August the Shamal (a northwest wind) blew strongly every day from 8 am to 4 pm, raising clouds of dust to a height of several hundred feet. Though the dust added to general discomfort the rapid movement of air was cooling and the nights
were more
tolerable.
Further Reading Barker, A. J., The Neglected War (Faber & Faber 1967) Callwell, Maj-Gen. Sir C. E., Life of Sir Stanley Maude (Constable 1920) Candler, E., The Long Road to Baghdad (Cassell 1919)
Mesopotamia Campaign 1914-1918 Volumes and IV (HMSO 1925-27) Nunn, Vice-Adm. W., Tigris Gunboats
III
(Melrose 1932) Tennant, Lt-Col J. E., In the Clouds above Baghdad {Pa\mer 1920) Wilson, Sir Arnold, Loyalties- Mesopotamia 1914-1917 (OUP 1930) Wilson, Sir Arnold, Mesopotamia 1917-1920
(OUP LESLIE
1931)
ROBERT MISSEN
served 91 5 to
in
the
North
and was with the 7th Battalion in IVIesopotamia, Persia and the Caucasus. He was made Captain and Adjutant Staffordshire
before
his
Regiment from
21st birthday.
Christ's College,
1
After
1
91
9,
graduating from
Cambridge, he spent 40 years
He was
in
Chief Education Officer of Wigan for six years and of East Suffolk for 26 years, and was a member of several t\/linisterial advisory committees. He undertook various educational missions in India, East Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Persia, Iraq, Syria and the Lebanon. His publications include the War History of the 7th North Staffordshire Regiment. the field of education.
The British ride in triumph into*one of the
Ottoman
Empire's greatest
cities
%fH4^f^djUil0»t^^d:i!k^iM^^4^
*
-'^--
^«
> tX V
fW«:^'
* V
J^-^ •»-*-
^ ^85
Cavalry Horses watering
INTO
at local wells
Infantry
PALESTINE The First Battle oF Gaza Mesopotamia, the Turks were also being threatened from another direction — from Egypt. From here Murray's forces were pressing on towards Palestine, though the advance was held back by the slow progress of the water pipe-line through the inadequately watered Sinai. When the line was sufficiently far advanced to allow a large-scale assault, Murray ordered an attack on Gaza. The attack was successful, but Murray was not informed, and he ordered his men to fall back. The second attack was a disaster. Brigadier John Stephenson. Right: Typical water distribution arrangements, here at Romani. Far right: The 1st and 2nd Battles of Gaza. Below: The staff of an ANZAC Division
As the British forces pushed on up the Tigris
in
T^T^T
mm
Camel convoys with drinking water
Railhead
>ttt
2000 Egyptian labourers
SALAMANA STATION storage tanks for
railborne from
«m
water
Romani
Infantry
Animals watering from local wells
BIR EL ABD 500 000 gal. reservoir
b
12
"
500 Egyptian labourers
1
^
pipeline
(under construction)
Q
Storage tanks for
*t*
p
Infantry
from Romani
fm
Animals watering from local wells
f
ROMANI STATION
water
railborne
[J
Infantry
500 Egyptian labourers
Pipehead
Standpipes
500 000
gal. reservoir
12" pipeline
for filling trucks
IP
S ^•\.
/
/
^f >
%
m^^^ft*
1987
i
Load capacity '(pounds)
/Iftove;
Daily waterings
Daily feed (pounds
Hi Wheat
|
[
Millet
|
j
Tibben (chopped barleystraw)
The water and food requirements, and the
loads, of the four animal types used by the Eastern Force, while still a
British forces in Palestine. Right: Sir Charles Dobell,
GOC
Major-General in Cameroon. 6e/ow.- A Turkish camel convoy bringing up food and medicine. a popular misconception that camels can go short on water — they quickly lose condition
It
British and Turks alike tied down by the desperate shortage of water. Attacks were successful if they captured waterholes,
doomed if they failed to do
so
is
-^5^^H
m ^^lO -^
General Sir Archibald Murray's instructions from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (dated January 11, 1917) stated he could expect no reinforcements because large-scale operations in Palestine were deferred until the autumn. He was, however, permitted to embark on such activities as he considered justified by the resources he had which were now to be reduced by one infantry division. Pressure on the Turks was, however, about to be renewed on all fronts; in this the War Cabinet expected him to take his share, and it was aware that he had in view an attack on Gaza. Eastern Force, the striking force commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Charles
now consisted of three divisions, the 52nd (Lowland), the 53rd (Welsh) and the 54th (East Anglian). In addition there were two mounted divisions, the ANZAC Mounted Division, and the Imperial Mounted Division, each recently reorganised with four brigades. There was also the Imperial Camel Brigade of three battalions. All the mounted troops were grouped into a formation known as Desert Column under the command of LieutenantGeneral Sir Philip Chetwode. The Column had hitherto acted as a kind of advance guard to Eastern Force. Desert Column had distinguished itself during the initial campaign in the desert, where it had developed great mobility and toughness. The Australians and New Zealanders had made themselves masters of the necessary techniques and the yeomanry brigades from Britain, which were part of the mounted divisions, were rapidly maturing. The 53rd Division, on which the brunt of the infantry fighting was to fall, had not been in action since the Gallipoli campaign. It had reached a high standard of training and the troops, after their winter in Sinai, were thoroughly fit and acclimatised. But none of the divisional artillery was up to strength, the third brigade of each division being to all intents of purposes ineffective. The force had only three heavy batteries (12 60-pounders). The ammunition supply was inadequate, as secondary theatres of war were still being pinched in this respect. Signalling equipment and personnel were also scarce, which was to have a serious effect on the location of headquarters and the control of operations. Eastern Force was now leaving the desert. From El 'Arish eastwards sand dunes are reduced to a minor strip along the coast, and inland for a depth of about 12 miles the going is firm enough for horses and men but it will not stand up Dobell,
to heavy motor transport. The first obstacle was the great Wadi Ghazze, a gorge
Gaza, after crossing the Wadi Ghazze, runs along a low ridge on the edge of the sand dunes. East of this, across a narrow valley rises a longer and higher ridge, the Es Sire ridge, which is a high feature east of Gaza running north-east to southwest continuing almost to the Ghazze. Parallel to this ridge and separated from it by a valley a mile broad is the Burjabye ridge. On the crown of this ridge, three miles south of Gaza, is a slight cliff-like ascent at Mansura. On the highest point, about half a mile south-east of Gaza and overlooking it by 300 feet, stands the shrine of Ali el Muntar. The ridges and the valleys between them were practically treeless and without cover. To the east of Gaza the ground rolls away in open downland, ideal for the employment of mounted troops. In 1917, however,
within 2,000 yards around the city the situation was very different. All round it lay olive groves, gardens and fields surrounded and intersected by a maze of cactus hedges, particularly formidable on the south side. They were of great height and thickness, as horrible an obstacle as any that the defenders could hope to construct. The artificial defences at this date were light; the strength of the position lay in its bare approaches without and the high hedges within. Infantry attacking from the south and south-east without the help of considerable artillery support would
have no easy task. The force opposing General Dobell, the Turkish VIII Corps, was in effect commanded by the Bavarian Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, who had already shown himself to be an energetic and skilled commander in the attacks on the Suez Canal and in the desert battles. He at once strengthened his line. By February the 16th and 27th Divisions and the 3rd Cavalry Division had been added to his force. He placed detachments in Gaza and Beersheba and held the bulk of his force in hand centrally at Tel esh Shiria and Jemmameh. After the middle of March, and almost on the eve of the coming battle, he strengthened the garrison of Gaza with a regiment of infantry and some batteries of artillery, making in all about 3,500 rifles and 20 guns. This last reinforcement was not known to Eastern Force. The 53rd Division, which had been retained at Jaffa to meet a possible landing, was also ordered south. As regards air capabilities the German airmen had recently received a number of new craft far superior to anything flown by the British, but in numbers they were inferior and they suffered much from a lack of spare parts and poor general
maintenance.
some 100-yards across and
40-feet deep which, when in spate, discharges into the sea six miles south of Gaza. In summer
has no running stream but there are valuable springs of which full use was to be made. East of the Wadi Ghazze, the ground rises gradually to a line of heights running from Gaza to Beersheba, 25 miles away, and forming a natural rampart against any invasion from Sinai. Gaza and Beersheba are the gateways of southern Palestine, the former by reason of its control of the coast road and the latter as the last water point to the east and south. Gaza is situated on a low hill about two miles from the sea and has a long history as a fortress since the time of Alexander the Great. The coast road to it
many
'Capture Gaza' Though the construction of the railway and pipeline now permitted the concentration of the whole of Eastern Force at Rafa or further forward, pack and motor transport was insufficient to allov/ operations far from the railhead, for they could carry only one day's supplies. But General Murray saw clearly that if he could seize the line of the Wadi Ghazze with its valuable springs, and better still capture Gaza,
thus turning the Turkish defence line, the proposed autumn offensive would get off to a much better start. Therefore, he gave to General Dobell, a thrusting and optimistic commander, three tasks: • to gain the line of the Wadi Ghazze to
cover the advance of the railway; • to prevent the Turks getting away unmolested; and • to capture Gaza by a coup de main. Dobell decided to delegate these tasks to Desert Column, allotting to it the 53rd Division plus a brigade of the 54th Division for the actual assault from the south. He kept under his own control the remainder of his force, the 52nd and 54th Divisions and the Imperial Camel Brigade. The force was to be assembled on March 25. Its mounted troops were to be clear of the Wadi Ghazze by 0500 hours on March 26, the ANZAC Division being directed to Beit Durdis to screen the north and northeast, the Imperial Mounted Division to Khirbet el Reseim to cover the east, the line being extended to the Wadi Ghazze by the Imperial Camel Brigade in the vicinity of El Mendur. The 54th Division, less one brigade, was to be in support on the Sheikh Abbas ridge facing east. There was to be a small detachment of one battalion and two squadrons to demonstrate against the Turks in the sandhills between Gaza and the sea. The 53rd Division was to cross the wadi hard on the heels of the mounted troops, the 158th Brigade being directed to Mansura on the Burjabye ridge on the right, with the 160th Brigade advancing up the Es Sire ridge on the left. The 159th Brigade was to be in reserve east of the crossing place at El Breij where the divisional headquarters was also located. The Commander-in-Chief established his headquarters in his train at El 'Arish. As he controlled no reserves he could contribute little but advice. The headquarters of Eastern Force and Desert Column were side by side at In Seirat. This was dictated largely by the shortage of signal communications. The essence of the operation was speed. Success before dark on March 26 was an indispensable condition, for as we have noted, the transport available could carry supplies sufficient for 24 hours only. If successfial there would be abundance of water in Gaza. But if Gaza did not fall the whole attacking force would have to withdraw to the Wadi Ghazze, more particularly the mounted screen, as no water for horses was known to exist in the battle area outside Gaza. The advances of the various formations to their battle positions made no great call on the troops' endurance except in the case of the 53rd Division which, from Deir el Balah, had to march 11 miles through the night, cross the Wadi Ghazze, and then traverse three miles of broken country to the start line of its attack. All moves to the prepared crossings of the wadi were carried out perfectlv except for the 158th Brigade of the 53rd Division, whose guide lost his way, and it arrived 50 minutes late at 0435 hours. At 0400 hours, after a cold and very dark night, thick fog rolled up from the sea and by 0500 hours visibility was less than 20 yards. A large proportion of the infantry had by this time crossed the wadi but the fog was the first factor in delaying an operation for which even,' moment of daylight was vital. The advance could not be stopped but General Dallas, commander of the 53rd Division, who had hoped to get forward early with his staff to reconnoitre for the attack, was delayed at the wadi. The fog lifted in most areas between 0730 and 0800 hours.
1989
The superb training and experience of mounted divisions, together with good guidance and a sense of direction, the two
overcame any delay that might have been caused by fog. By 0900 hours the leading elements of the ANZAC division had reached Beit Durdis and by 1030 hours had practically closed the cordon by the capture of Jebaliye. Half an hour later they reached the coast. On the way they had ridden down small Turkish parties met in the open and had cantered on in the best of spirits making the most of this perfect cavalry country. Among their captures was the commander and staff of the Turkish 53rd Division moving serenely to take command at Gaza. The remaining formations, the Imperial Mounted Division, the Camel Brigade and the 54th Division, all took up their positions according to plan, the mounted troops sending out patrols to watch for Turkish reinforcements from the north and east. Thus far, in spite of the fog, the screening operation had been entirely successful. It was now the turn of the assaulting infantry. The commanders of the leading brigades of the 53rd Division, the 150th and 160th, refused to be deterred by thfe fog any more than the ANZACs. Impressed with the importance of time they anticipated orders and pressed forward. By 0830 hours they were in touch on the Burjabye and Es Sire ridges, some two miles short of All el Muntar. So far so good, but General Dallas, now with 158th Brigade, did not start his reconnaissance or call up his brigadiers until 0900 hours, and they did not assemble until 1015 hours. The time taken to make
a plan and disseminate orders down to the troops took time and the attack could not be launched before noon. Though the brigades and units of the division were well trained and in excellent heart, the command and staff drill was clearly lacking that excellence which only constant practice can give. Exercises for headquarters had not then received the attention which later became regular. Meanwhile, General Chetwode, from his headquarters at In Seirat, sent message after message to hurry on the attack. The sun would set at 1800 hours and it would be dark by 1830 hours. By noon General Chetwode (who had received no reports from either air or ground of Turkish relieving columns) sent a warning order to his two mounted divisions to reconnoitre towards Gaza and be pre-
pared to assist the infantry by attacking the town from north and east. One hour later he ordered General Chauvel, Commander of the ANZAC Mounted Division, to attack with his own division, his place in the screen being taken over by the Imperial Mounted Division, which would move north, its place being taken over in turn by the Camel Brigade. This order took one hour to reach General Chauvel and because of the time taken to arrange the reliefs, the attack was not launched until 1600 hours. The northern and eastern sectors of the Gaza defences were not so strong either artificially or naturally as those on the south and southeast. But the fighting in the thick approaches was fierce and it was dusk before the outskirts were invested closely. Meanwhile, from 1600 hours onwards, reports
began
to
come
in
from the mounted
divi-
sions of the move westwards and southwards of Turkish relief columns. These were small, with the exception of one comprising some 3,000 infantry with some cavalry approaching from the direction of Huj. This party put in an attack and captured Hill 405 at 1715 hours. There it was held and made no attempt to follow up the advantage gained. There was also a weaker threat from the direction of Deir Sneid, north of Gaza, but it too halted at that place. The Turks made no further serious effort until the following morning. The advance of the leading brigades of the 53rd Division, at noon, was a model of precision and steadiness. Under shrapnel fire from the start they went forward with the utmost gallantry until slowed down by machine gun fire from the cactus hedges.
With
little artillery support but using superb infantry tactics they fought their way through the thick country until by 1830 hours the whole position was won and Turks were everywhere streaming back into Gaza. A little later men of the ANZAC Mounted Division made contact with the 53rd Division in the eastern streets. To
the troops now penetrating the town all seemed over and the surrender of the garrison in the morning appeared certain. The Turks could not escape. But to Generals Dobeli and Chetwode in their head-
A Turkish
cavalry bivouac in the Gaza area Turkish cavalry and infantry reinforcements failed to arrive in time to prevent the British from encircling Gaza, and the British retreat was caused by lack of water, not counterattack
-
Colonel Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein
Kress von Kressenstein
was a gallant, resolute and able soldier, whose professionalism quickly earned him the
respect of his British opponents in Palestine. The son of a Bavarian nobleman whose family had a long soldiering tradition, Kressenstein was born at Nuremberg in April 1870. Twenty yeeirs later he joined the Royal Bavarian Army as an artillery officer, and until he was nearly 44 his career was conventional and not specially distinguished. Early in 1914, however, he was seconded as a colonel to the German
Military Mission to the
Ottoman army —
command an artillery group, and when war broke out, as chief-of-staff
first to
then,
Djemal Kuchuk, commander of the Turkish VIII Corps. Like Kressenstein, Djemal was a good soldier but the brain behind the expedition against the Suez Canal in January 1915 was undoubtedly to
that of his Chief-of-Staff. As a staff officer, Kressenstein showed that he had a meticulous eye for detail as well as an unusual capacity for improvisation. But it was as a commander that he was to develop his qualities of tenacity and ingenuity, and until late 1917 -when he left Palestine both Murray and Allenby recognised him as a clever and enterprising adversary.
Sir Archibald
Murray
General Sir Archibald Murray was ten years older than Kress von Kressenstein, and by 1914 he had already shown in Zululand and South Africa that he was a courageous and capable commander. When war was declared he had almost reached the peacetime peak for a British officer, and in 1915 he succeeded temporarily to the British army's senior staff appointment. Chief of the Imperial General Staff. But Murray was ambitious, and he wanted to consummate his career with a senior command in the field. He also wanted to get away from the irksome atmosphere of Whitehall where most of his time was spent wrangling with politicians. Ever an individualist, like so many of the First World War generals he resented criticism and yearned for an appujintment where his undoubted talents for organisation and administration could be applied without
undue
interference.
His chance came in Janusiry 1916 when he was appointed by Lord Kitchener to command the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force which had been deployed in defence of the Suez Canal after its evacuation from Gallipoli. Under Murray's direction the whole defence of Egypt was put on a proper basis, and it was his foresight and strategic imagination, which laid the administrative foundations for his successor's brilliant run of successes. Because he wanted no competition and no competing
campaigns
in his theatre,
Murray was
at
averse to Lawrence's activities. But when he discovered that more Turkish troops were pinned down by the Arabs than fighting his own army, he decided that he had always favoured the Arab revolt. first
1991
quarters at In Seirat the situation did not appear so satisfactory. It was alarming. They had decided in the afternoon that if Gaza had not been captured by nightfall the fight should be broken off. This was partly for considerations of water supply ^ they did not know that some of the mounted troops had been able to water their horses - but more because of the threat of Turkish forces converging on Gaza. They could not rely on these forces coming to a halt and remaining halted during the night. A margin of space must be kept for the withdrawal of the mounted troops north of Gaza. As a precautionary measure, at 1730 hours the 54th Division at Sheikh Abbas was ordered to the Burjabye ridge so as to be nearer to the 53rd Division and protect its right flank. By a staff blunder which was to have the most serious consequences, the 53rd Division was not informed of this move and believed that the 54th Division was still in its position at Sheikh Abbas. Shortly after sunset the decision was taken to withdraw the mounted troops to the Wadi Ghazze. When the message got through the men could hardly believe their ears, and several commanders demanded their orders in writing. What, they wondered, were Force Headquarters up to? The battle was won; the Turks were fleeing;
the cordon was complete. It is said that General Chauvel protested angrily by Headquarters Force telephone. But thought differently. Even at the headquarters of the 53rd Division it was not certain if Ali el Muntar had been captured; to General Dobell the idea of leaving worn out troops fighting in the dark in the outskirts of the town with Turkish columns closing in on them was repugnant. The withdrawal of the mounted troops had left the right flank of the 53rd Division exposed, and to protect this the 54th Division, as already explained, had been ordered up from Sheikh Abbas. When General Dallas received orders to withdraw his right flank to make contact with the 54th Division he too protested strongly, but being overruled and at the same time ignorant of the move of the 54th Division to cover his flank, he ordered a complete withdrawal practically to his attack starting line of that morning. Not until midnight did he learn the true state of affairs. Meanwhile, shortly before midnight General Dobell had received via Cairo the intercepted and decoded wireless messages
timed about 1800 hours from Major Tiller, the German commandant in Gaza, reporting his desperate position, and his intention to surrender if further pressed. This vital message was criminally delayed in transmission and delivery. Shortly afterwards it was clear, from the unmolested return of the mounted troops, that the Turkish threat had halted, at least for the night.
might
still have been possible at complete the capture of the Gaza garrison had it not been for the confusion between the 53rd and 54th Divisions described above. General Chetwode did not learn the extent of Dallas's withdrawal until 0500 hours and he then promptly ordered the division to reoccupy Ali Muntar. It was a severe physical and moral test for troops which had been without rest for over 36 hours and had gallantly captured the position, penetrated Gaza and then been withdrawn from it. But they
It
dawn
1992
to
found the position unoccupied and for a time were able to hold it. But by now the Turks had taken heart as a result of their miraculous escape, had been reinforced, and were full of fight. A strong column had captured the uncovered Sheikh Abbas position and from there was shelling the 53rd Division from its right rear. General Dallas thought his precarious position could be maintained if Sheikh Abbas were retaken, but at 0930 hours a heavy counterattack developed on Ali el Muntar and the weary troops of 53rd Division were forced back. By this time General Dobell realised that to attempt to hold the line forward and to risk further heavy losses at Sheikh Abbas would prejudice future operations. At 1630 hours he ordered withdrawal and, without much interference, the exhausted retired across the Wadi Ghazze during the night. Thus ended a remarkable
troops
engagement and thus was
lost an opportunity never again to occur. British casualties were nearly 4,000, those of the Turks being about half that figure. Even at the risk of appearing wise after the event it is permissible to reflect on why victory was lost by a hair's breadth. Loss of time is claimed as the principal
cause and this is worth examining. The fog, as regards the moves of the troops, may be ruled out. It was dismaying, but the leading infantry took up their positions only half an hour behind programme and the mounted troops ignored the fog
But it may have affected General Chetwode's original intention to move his headquarters to Sheikh Abbas, and it did delay the moves of General Dallas and consequently the time the inaltogether.
fantry attacked. But we must look to causes other than the fog. The organisation of Eastern Force for the attack could
have been bettered. Chetwode was
in
com-
mand
not only of the mounted screen but also of the slow moving infantry attack. This also tended to keep him back, in fact almost to duplicate his headquarters with Dobell's — useful for consultation but a waste of command effort. Shortage of signal resources was given as the cause. There is all the more reason then for commanders themselves, or through the agency of liaison officers, to keep bodily touch with subordinates who have to work to precise timing. Had Dobell retained the 53rd Division under his own control he could have applied personal pressure; if Chetwode had been closer to his screen he would have known the water situation, the progress of the attack on Gaza, and the weight of the Turkish threat. Both generals were well mounted; both could have borrowed cars from the Light Car Patrols which careered over the battle area all day. Yet neither moved. It is certainly true that staffs of all formations were woefully undermanned and were lacking that practised skill necessary for a somewhat complicated operation. Skill is a great saver of time, but when a staff is too small for its functions the price is paid in battle in excessive strain, loss of sleep and liability to error. And staff errors did occur, as has been indicated. Planning was excellent and the preliminary moves were well handled. But of the battle itself it would be fair to comment that command and staff performance did not match the superb gallantry and skill of the troops. General Murray's first report to the War Office, dated March 28, said that he had
been heavily engaged east of Gaza and that Turkish casualties were between 6,000 and 7,000 including 900 prisoners. The troops, he reported, had behaved splendidly. There was no mention of the failure to capture Gaza. In his longer report, dated April 2, he still held that the operation
was 'most successful'. These somewhat complacent reports on the first battle were seized upon by the War Cabinet with enthusiasm. The Premier,
Lloyd
foresaw
George,
a
Turkish
collapse and caused a telegram to be sent to Murray indicating Jerusalem as an im-
mediate objective. With some misgiving and without the two additional divisions which he considered essential. General Murray, backed by the optimistic General set about his task which, for reasons of water and transportation, had to begin with a fresh assault on Gaza. Conditions were now vastly different. Surprise had been lost. Gaza had a garrison of a whole division and stretching eastwards to Tel esh Sheria was a line of mutually supporting redoubts well sited, wired and manned by a revived Turkish soldiery. There were no gaps; the attack would be frontal, carried out by troops inexperienced in siege warfare. General Dobell had a slight increase in artillery and had been allotted eight rather aged tanks and a number of gas shells. The plan was an attack on Gaza by three divisions, the 53rd to the west of the Rafah Gaza road, the 52nd and 54th to the east of it. Desert Column was to operate against the Turkish defences eastward and to be prepared to exploit any breakthrough. The 74th Division, without artillery, was in reserve. Attack lines were to be taken up on April 17 on the far side of the Wadi Ghazze. The assault was to go in on April 19. The battle does not call for long description. Though all attacks were pressed with the utmost gallantry the capture of the Turkish position never at any time appeared possible. The gas shells failed and the few tanks which did not break down were knocked out by artillery despite their superb handling. The infantry assault had a frontage of 15,000 yards and the guns in support weie no more than 150. The Turkish defence was vigorous and they never flinched from counterattack. By late afternoon failure was clear, and though General Dobell hoped to renew the attack on the following morning reports from his divisional commanders convinced him that he must advise the Commanderin-Chief to call off further attacks. This he did. British casualties were 6,500 men and over 2,000 animals. Turkish losses amounted to little over 2,000. Thus ended the second attempt to force an entry into
Dobell,
Palestine.
Eastern Force, somewhat dispirited and with the prospect before them of the long baking hot weather, now faced a triumphant and elated opponent. The future seemed gloomy. Further Reading Gullett, H. S., Australian Official History
Volume
VIII
McMunn,
Lt-Gen. Sir George and Falls, Gapt. Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine
(HMSO 1928) Wavell, Col. A. P., The Palestine [For Brigadier John graphy, see page 401. ]
C,
Campaigns
Stephenson's
bio-
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