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THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

WORLD VOLUME NINE 1917-18

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THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

WORLD Editor-in-Chief Brigadier Peter

Young

Board Barker; Dr. John Bradley

Editorial

Lt.-Col. A. J.

Professor John Erickson; Lt.-Cdr. Peter Kemp John Keegan; Kenneth Macksey; S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard;

Norman Stone

Revision Editor

Mark Dartford Archbishop Mitty High School Media Center

5000

Mitty

Way

San Jose, CA 95129 00

MARSHALL CAVENDISH NEW YORK, LONDON, TORONTO

Editorial Staff Young

Editor

Brigadier Peter

Deputy Editor

Kenneth Macksey

Published by Marshall Cavendish Corporation 147 West Merrick Road

Co-ordinating Panel

Lt.-Col. A. J. Barker Dr. John Bradley Prof. John Erickson Lt.-Cdr. Peter Kemp

N.Y. 11520

Reference Edition Published 1984

Long

Freeport,

John Keegan S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard

Norman Stone Military Consultants

Printed and

Bound

in Italy

by L.E.G.O. S.p.a. Vicenza.

No part of this book may be reproduced or any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the copyright holders. All rights reserved. utilized in

© ©

Capt. Sir Basil Liddell-Hart

Island

Marshall Cavendish Limited 1984

B.P.C. Publishing 1970 now a Division of Macdonald and

Company

(Publishers) Limiled/B.P.C.C.

Barrie Pitt

Executive Editor

Patrick Scrivenor

Library of Congress Cataloging

Chris Chant

Assistant Editors

Main entry under

Carolyn Rutherford Bruce French Rose Thomson Margaret Burnley Peter

title:

Bibliography: Includes index.

Dunbar Associates

World War, 1914-1918— Chronology.

Butler

Art Editor

Brigit

Webb

Cartographers

Gatrell

Dunbar, Harison Alan Robertson

John Batchelor

Picture Director

Robert Hunt

British Library

&

Staff

Revision Editor

Mark Dartford

Editorial Consultants

Randal Gray David Rosser-Owen

Project Executive

Robert Paulley

Designer

Trevor Vertigan

Indexers

F

Production Manager

Dennis Hovell

Production Assistant

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Gill

83-20879

(set)

Rees

Cataloguing

in Publication

Data

The Marshall Cavendish illustrated encyclopedia of World War One. 1. World War, 1914-1918 I. Young, Peter, 1915II. Pitt, Barrie Dart ford,

940.3

Mark

D521

ISBN 0-86307-181-3

New Edition

Marshall

86307 190 2 vol

III.

Technical Artist

940.3

1984

ISBN 0-86307-181-3

Liam

I.

Cavendish Corporation.

D522.5.M39

Art Director

Publication Data

The Marshall Cavendish encyclopedia of World War One.

1.

Design Consultants

in

(set)

86307 190 2 vol

12

1918 FEB

MAR

10

Trotsky refuses to negotiate with Germans.

18

Germany renews

3

hostilities against Russia.

Soviets sign peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk.

21

Operation 'Michael' (Germany) to divide French and

23

27

Germans drive past Saint-Quentin towards the Somme. Paris shelled. Germans capture Montdidier, 32 miles from Paris.

14

Marshal Foch appointed Supreme Allied

British forces.

APR

Commander. 23

British naval forces raid

U-boat bases

at

Zeebrugge

and Ostend.

MAY

JUN

JUL

9

British scuttle

H.M.S.

Vindictive in Zeebrugge canal.

27

3rd German offensive in the Aisne. reach Marne by end of May.

28

Americans capture Cantigny.

German

forces

Chateau Thierry.

2

Battle of

6

Battle of Bellau

Wood.

15

Battle of the Piave.

15

2nd Battle of the Marne.

18

Allies counterattack.

German Aisne-Marne

salient

pushed back.

AUG SEPT

OCT

8

Battle of

Amiens.

Army

13

U.S.

14

Franco-Serbian armies

move

26

Final Allied assault on

Hindenburg Line.

27

Hindenburg Line broken.

29

Bulgaria signs armistice.

24

Battle of Vittoria Veneto.

First

captures St Mihiel.

27

Ludendorf

28

German

30

Turks sign armistice.

31

Turkish resistance

into Serbia.

resigns.

naval mutinies High Seas Fleet.

in

at

Wilhelmshaven and

Mesopotamia ends.

in

8-8 3

Contents of Volume 9 2637 The 'Ludendorff Offensive': Phase

I

Barrie Pitt

Hubert Gough John Keegan 2656 'Ludendorff Offensive': the Air 2644 Genera!

Sir

Battle

Thomas C. Miller Jr 2662 The Doullens Conference John Keegan 2665 Russia: the Outbreak of

Civil

War

Nikolai Tolstoy

2676 Creation of the Czechoslovak Corps William V. Wallace 2684 The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Sir John Wheeler-Bennett 2694 The Battle of the Lys

John Keegan 2701 The Air Battle over the Lys

Thomas G.

Miller Jr

2703 'Big Bertha' Jean Hallade

2710 The Capture of Jerusalem Brigadier Peter

Young

2716 1918: The French Home Front Professor J. B. Duroselle 2721 Zeebrugge and Ostend Barrie Pitt ~--.-=

2738

RAF: The Third Andrew Boyle

Service

2742 Dazzle Painting Peter Mitchell

2746 The Maurice Affair Arthur Marwick 2749 Villers-Bretonneux John Vader 2756 Mesopotamia: Victorious Finale Leslie Missen 2766 Dunsterforce Leslie Missen 2773 Home Front Britain 1918

Asa Briggs

2777 The 'Ludendorff Offensive': The Aisne Richard Holmes

2789 Air Battle over the Aisne Thomas G. Miller Jr 2794 The Fruits of Brest-Litovsk Norman Stone 2805 The 'Ludendorff Offensive': the

Matz

2889 Russia in Revolution Gerard Walter 2896 The End of the Romanovs Count Nikolai Tolstoy 2902 America: Home Front 1918 Charles

Neu

2912 The American Negro

in the First

World War Thomas Keiser

Major-General H. Essame

2816 Belleau Wood: enter the Marines

US

Germany's Black Day Young

2928 The Battle of Montdidier

Marc air

2833 The Piave: Austria's Kurt Peball

war

last

throw

2839 The Piave: Italian counterattack Philip

8, 1918:

Brigadier Peter

2818 Air Observation Christopher Chant

2828 Mesopotamia: the Sir Miles Thomas

2917 August

Warner

2848 Strategic Bombing

Douglas Robinson 2858 The Labour Conference Marvin Swartz 2861 2nd Marne: 1. The German Attack Jacques Mordal 2872 2nd Marne: 2. The Allied Counter John Keegan 2882 Women's Suffrage Rose Thomson

Neuville

2938 The Czech Legion in Russia Dr J. F. Bradley

N

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T

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At the start of the great spring offensiye of

March 1918 new German tactics

I

allied

with

sustained artillery*bombardment forced a British retreat into chaos. But Lu^endorff, while attempting to sever the British and French forces, in fact alerted thefMTWUie urgent need for a united Allied command! BarHePitt. Above: * Stormtroops sweep through British defences

Just before 0500 hours on the morning of Thursday, March 21, 1918, began the most concentrated artillery bombardment the world had yet known. Nearly 6,000 German guns opened^, fire almost simultaneously along a 40-mile front between the River Sensee and the Oise, and when the 2,500 guns of the British artillery answered, the additional noise was hardly noticeable even to the men who fired them. Tons of steel and high explosive fell with shattering force upon the forward positions and the battle zone. As the men crouched deafened in their trenches or staggered dazedly towards control points, the ground heaved under them, the surrounding fog swirled, then suddenly sweetened with the taint of lethal and lachrymatory gas. In the battle zone, gun positions, battery and brigade headquarters, telephone exchanges and road junctions collapsed or split apart under the weight and volume of fire. Ammunition dumps blew up in towering mushrooms of flame and destruction, the laboriously laid signal wires were ripped apart, and cannon were pounded into unrecognisable masses of metal— some before they had fired their first rounds. Soon a pattern emerged. Trench mortars only were bombarding the front trenches and after 20 minutes their fire slackened — but never ceased. The guns plastered the battle zone and were to do so for two hours. Heavy shells crashed on to the camps, the

artillery horse-lines, the billets and casualty clearing stations of the rear areas; howitzers and the lighter field guns pounded the redoubts, the wireless and powerbuzzer installations and the communication trenches. It was evident that the Germans had marked down their targets with considerable accuracy. Everywhere gas drenched wide areas, and lines of coughing, vomiting and blinded men congregated at the first aid posts. At times the fire grew so intense that the air vibrated with shock, black layers danced in the fog, fixed objects flickered to and fro, and in the light of mounting flame and fire the mist became a crimson, yellow-shot effervescence. Then, after 50 minutes, the barrage shifted abruptly to the front line and the known infantry positions were systematically swept for ten minutes. Trenches caved

machine gun posts were obliterated, wire belts blown apart and men blown to fragments. Ten minutes later the main weight of fire was switched back on to the battle zone and once again the destruction of communication and control centres began, and the systematic gassing of artillery and reserve formations. This continued until 0640 hours, then it slackened as onethird of the German howitzers and field guns fired again in turn upon the British in,

front line infantry.

By now daylight was growing, adding to visibility for the fog was still

little

March 21 -a 40-mile holocaust of 'the most concentrated artillery bombardment the world has yet known' dense.

In front, the British lay in the

remains of their trenches or in shell holes, watching for signs of German movement. At isolated places along the front, German infantry appeared out of the smoke, and bitter hand-to-hand fighting took place, generally in No-Man's Land with the bom-

bardment a fitting backcloth. But these attacks were exceptional — mostly the infantry of both armies lay waiting for the moment of mass assault. The main weight of the barrage, which had fallen behind the front line up to now, was gradually concentrating along the forward edge of the battle zone and began creeping back across the intermediate area towards those crouching in the front. It was all done systematically and accurately. By 0820 hours all German guns, with the exception of the long range and counterbombardment batteries, were firing on the British front line infantry positions on the entire length of Fifth Army front north of the Oise, and along that part of Third Army front which extended from the northern flank of the Flesquieres Salient up to the River Sensee. The salient itself was at this time almost an oasis of peace within the holocaust - for Ludendorff's plan was to pinch it out, not to annihilate it. For 80 minutes this bombardment on the forward positions continued, rising to a climax at 0935 hours when every trench mortar along the German line came into massed action again and German engineers fired the charges they had laid in the tattered remnants of the British wire. At 0930 hours the German infantry rose to their feet and stormed forward. The main assault troops moved fast, as they had been trained to do. Generally they raced ahead with their rifles slung — relying for effect upon ample supplies of the stick-bombs they all carried, and upon the light machine

guns

and flamethrowers which accompanied each section. Aided by the fog, they passed quickly through the forward positions, evading the known isolated posts 2638

German artillery played a major part in the offensive: the closely-packed front lines of British infantry formed a perfect target for their 6,000 guns. Left: {bottom) 10-cm Langrphrgeschutze and {top) a field-gun battery bombard British front lines. The havoc they caused was quickly followed up by waves of stormtroopers. Above and right: Attempts, varying in efficiency, were made to camouflage

heavy

artillery

from

aircraft flying

overhead

and redoubts, jumping across the trenches to them, finding their way by compass and memory of well-conned maps or often of the ground itself when they had fought across it before. Behind them, the second and third attack waves mopped up — sometimes by merely directing dazed and injured prisoners to the rear, sometimes completing the havoc of the guns with bayonet and rifle butt. Where

when they came

organised resistance remained, they encircled it, but if its reduction proved too difficult or too lengthy, the task was handed over to the follow-up divisions and the artillery. Then the attack waves followed the storm troops on into the battle zone.

'The last man, the last bullet' of the. Germans on Fifth Army's front varied inversely with their distance from the Oise, and the resultant density of the concealing fog; for it was in the valley of this river that the fog was thickest and so the slowest to disperse. It

The success

did not do so here until the early afternoon, and by this time the storm troops had fought their way under its cloak deep into the battle zone, and in one place south of St Quentin were practically through it. Around St Quentin, however, and to the v north, the British were holding on to the forward edge of the battle zone for some miles. This was in part owing to the earlier clearing of the fog which allowed the emplaced machine guns to fire upon the advancing Germans before they were actually close enough to bayonet the crews, and in part to the tenacity of the front line battalions, some of which were still fighting in forward redoubts and were to continue to do so until early evening. Some idea of their ordeal may be gathered fram the fact that of the eight battalions in the front line of XVIII Corps, only 50 men survived to retire to the battle zone (and half of them quickly became casualties there), and no indication of the fate of two battalions of the King's Royal Rifle Corps

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CV-.:

Dreadful evidence of the day's slaughter: 'entire platoons wiped out in seconds, felled by the flying men fragments of their friends' bodies, buried in collapsing trenches, and trodden to death' .

i

I I

!

.

.

.

.

.

21 -cm howitzers (top) firing from trenches. The black smoke produced by the exploding shell earned them the nickname Jack Johnsons' after the prewar

Far

left:

the

German

negro prizefighter. German 25-cm trench mortars (bottom) maintained a crippling

bombardment of British front lines. Left: A German 15-cm L/40 navy gun, originally designed as a secondary armament for predreadnought battleships. Total weight: lb. Weight of barrel: 10,300 lb. Length of barrel: 19% ft. Elevation: -8° to +32°. Traverse: 27° left and right. There were two 25,400

types of shells, with maximum ranges of 14,000 yds and 19,000 yds

was found until months later, when a few survivors were found recovering from their wounds in German hospitals. But this happened in many places along the fronts, especially where bombardment had sealed the avenues of escape or the exhortations by the staff to fight on to the last man and the last bullet had been obeyed tenaciously. Fortunately this did not happen everywhere, for some of the front line commanders were quick to realise that the Germans were following methods of attack similar to those they had themselves been urging upon the staff for several years. With all the communications to the rear now cut, these men gathered together what forces remained to them, and either struck overland in a series of flank attacks against the German waves, or raced back through the winding communication trenches towards the strongpoints of the battle zone. Often they came across the deserted or annihilated remains of their own battalion or brigade headquarters; sometimes they engaged in bloody hand-to-hand clashes with the overtaken storm troops. Further north still, up towards the Flesquieres Salient and the point of juncture of Fifth and Third Armies, some penetration of the battle zone had occurred where the fog had persisted in dense pockets In the Omignon valley. Two miles north of the valley, however, a redoubt had been formed around the ruins of a village named Le Verguier, and into it had retreated the survivors of the 3rd Rifle Brigade and the 8th Queens, which had been holding forward positions during the bombardment. The survivors had, moreover, brought their Lewis guns back with them, and when, shortly after their arrival between 1030 and 1100 hours, the sun broke through and the mist dispersed, they saw in front of them and well within their fields of fire,

German troops swarming towards the battle zone. Few of the Germans reached it. Once visibility was granted to Fifth Army defenders, no training or tactics by the attackers availed: they were mown down in hundreds. From this position northwards, the British were fighting in trenches which had been

own responsibility for a considerably longer period than those to the south. They were better dug, better sited and better protected — and this was as well, for here was delivered the main Michael 2 attack of the German Second Army under General von der Marwitz. It was designed to cut deep across the line south of the Flesquieres Salient, join hands with the Michael 1 attack smashing down from the north — thus cutting off the British divisions facing Cambrai and Marcoing as a first objective their

— then

to

sweep westwards

Bapaume preparatory

to

Peronne and

the wheel up through Albert to the north. Immediately south of the salient, Scottish and South African divisions clung to the forward edge of the battle zone from morning till night with grim determination. They had been forced back out of Gauche Wood by a combination of bombardment and infiltration, but, attacked from the rear, the Springboks had retreated rapidly from a position obviously soon to become untenable to a redoubt on the heights of Quentin Ridge. From there they were not dislodged— indeed early attempts by the Germans to storm the redoubt proved so costly to them that the assault waves, true to their training, quickly turned elsewhere to probe for easier penetration. But not to the Flesquieres Salient Here, the Royal Naval Division (63rd) — to

composed originally of seamen for whom no ships were immediately available, but later established as a permanent division

— and

immediate neighbours of the Army had beaten off early morning attacks, and had then been subjected to a heavy bombardment of mustard gas shells which caused many casualties and extreme discomfort for those who survived. But no main attacks smashed through the positions of the forward zone — although the outposts were withdrawn — and for the whole of the first day the salient formed the hinge upon which the British their

southern corps of Third

front to the south slowly turned, as it was pressed back at its farther edge in the Oise valley, opposite Le Fere. So in the late

afternoon, the

Hawke, the Drake and the

Royal Marine Battalions were

still holding the support trenches of the front line and listening with some bewilderment to the sounds of gigantic conflict on each side. It was not until midnight that some inkling of the situations there reached them, and they received orders to retire to their intermediate zone and hold themselves in readiness for further and speedy withdrawal to their battle zone in case of

necessity.

For immediately to the north, Below's storm troops of the Michael 1 offensive had smashed through the front of the 51st Highland Division on each side of the main

Cambrai-Bapaume road, encircled the main redoubts and reached the rear edge of the battle zone. In the afternoon their support divisions swept up with artillery, while additional assault sections mopped up with their light machine guns and flamethrowers. Small parties of Seaforth and Gordon Highlanders, of the Argyll and Sutherland, and the Black Watch, bitterly defended isolated positions; but they had suffered severely in the opening bombardment and the German infantry fought with a fierce determination equal to their own. (Continued on page 2645.) 2643

GENERAL SIR

HUBERT GOUGH Fifth Army, facing the bulk of the German onslaught, was still

commanded by Gough,

despite his long record of

incompetence. John Keegan. Right: The darling of the cavalry clique' in 1917 Hubert de la Poer Gough, KCB, KCVO GCB and GCMG), GOC Fifth Army in March 1918, was the youngest British full general. He was notable besides as the central figure in the Curragh Incident which had rocked the country in 1914. Gough was born in 1870 of an AngloIrish Protestant family, fiercely anti-Home Rule in temper, which had produced some of the most gallant soldiers of the 19th Century. His grandfather's cousin was the Lord Gough who had commanded during the Sikh Wars and, in the Peninsula, had led the 87th (Royal Irish Fusiliers) Sir

(later

with the cry of 'Faugh-a-Ballagh' — 'Clear the Way', later adopted as the regimental and family motto. His father and uncle, brother Indian cavalrymen, had both won the VC in the Mutiny, as his brother John was to do in Somaliland in 1903. It was therefore natural that Gough should go from Eton to Sandhurst and thence in 1889 to the 16th Lancers. He spent the next ten years in India, taking part in the Tirah Campaign in 1897, and in 1899 entered the Staff College. His course, however, was cut short by the outbreak of the Boer War, in which he led a column of irregular cavalry in the Relief of Ladysmith and later, unawares, into Boer hands. Despite that slip, on his release he was appointed Brigade Major of 2nd Cavalry Brigade, then Instructor at the Staff College and, in 1907, Commanding Officer of the 16th Lancers at Aldershot, where he also acted as chief staff officer to Douglas Haig, then Inspector-General of Cavalry. In 1911 he was promoted to BrigadierGeneral and Commander of 3rd Cavalry Brigade at the Curragh, Ireland's Aidershot. It was a time of tension in AngloIrish relations, which reached crisis in early 1914 when the Liberal government

announced Irish

of

Home

its

intention to implement the

Rule Act, against the wishes

most of the Protestant

Irish minority.

The Ulster Protestants had armed and now threatened to resist Home Rule by force. The government nevertheless declared itself resolved, but foolishly hedged by offering officers of the Irish garrison whose homes were in Ulster the chance to 'disappear' before any move was made against the Ulstermen. Alarmed and confused, 3rd Cavalry Brigade officers, who were most affected, looked to Gough for leadership,

2644

which he supplied in full measure. Detecting irresolution among the Liberals in London, he warned the War Office that his officers would resign wholesale if 'ordered north'. Amid much bluster, the government shelved its plans for Home Rule. Gough might well have expected to suffer reprisals. But, always the darling of the cavalry clique, he was now the Tories' hero of the moment. His military connections, moreover, had always been impeccable, and his brother was currently serving as a brigadier-general on Haig's staff at Aidershot. He therefore remained in post and in August led his brigade to France where

fought at Mons and covered the rear of Haig's corps during the retreat. He was promoted by Haig in April 1915 to command 7th Division, in July to command I Corps and in May 1916, by which time Haig had secured command of the BEF, to command the new Reserve (Fifth) Army. It played a minor part in the Battle of the Somme, none at Arras, but for Passchendaele was allotted the principal role. It

it

suffered

enormous

losses,

many

allegedly

planning and administrative incompetence of Gough's staff. Philip Gibbs, doyen of war correspondents, recorded this exchange in the autumn of 1917: 'You must be glad to leave Flanders', I said to a group of officers trekking towards the Cambrai salient. One of them answered violently, 'God be thanked we

due

to the faulty

are leaving the Fifth Army area'. Yet, despite his own failure and the disgruntlement of his soldiers, Gough was still in command of Fifth Army next spring.

[For John

Keegan 's biography, see page 96.

Left: General von Hutier (nearside). His 18th Army, well-trained in the new tactics, crossed the Crozat Canal, and pressed the British back to the Somme. Below left: General Petain, C-in-C of the French armies. He foresaw the breakup of the Allied front and the withdrawal of French forces to cover Paris. Bottom left: General von der Marwitz, commander of 2nd Army in the main Michael 2 offensive, with members of his staff. His men encountered stubborn resistance from the British. Below left: FieldMarshal Sir Douglas Haig, C-in-C of the British

whom the continuity of the Allied sacrosanct'. Above: General von Below. Under his command the storm troops of the Michael 1 offensive tore open the front line and poured into the battle zone, only to stick there

force, to line

was

The

tactics of infiltration In the centre of Third Army's front, too, storm troops reached the last line of the battle zone, shouldering their way forward on an ever-widening front. Here most of all their tactics paid, for the corps commanders of the British Third Army had been tempted by the strength of their own forward defensive positions into packing them too tightly. There had been, for instance, 21 battalions in the front line on the ten miles across which Michael 1 had been delivered (against 11 battalions on a similar length of Fifth Army's front) and although this offered in theory an immensely strong protective shield to the corps area, in practice it had merely provided densely packed targets for the Ger-

man bombardment. In the forward posts and the front line, the slaughter during the opening hours of the offensive had been horrific. Entire platoons had been wiped out in seconds, men had been felled by the flying fragments of their friends' bodies, buried in collapsing trenches and trodden to death by those seeking shelter. And not only had there been more troops compressed into the forward zone, but the reserve battalions had been held far back, and there were relatively few battalions holding the main battle zone.

Thus, once the storm troops broke through the corps' fronts, they faced a far easier task than their compatriots to the south. Still infiltrating past centres of resistance, they struck deep into the battle zone, while behind them their support waves tore open gaps in the forward positions, and widened them to let through the full flood of the German Seventeenth Army.

2645

On

Even thes ^m,

mk

-Li«uter

tactics of "hyp

around behind the day's fighting runners dispatched to battaliog^flEtiviiiojnal headquarters found them already in German hands, gun crews were attacked from the rear and fought hand-to-hand with German infantry under the barrels of their own guns. During that afternoon — for the first time for many months — artillery duels took place between batteries which could see each other. As the few battalions in the battle zone were outflanked or pressed back by the weight of the German attack, a number of unlikely place holders found themselves forced to learn again the arts of infanteering which they had fondly hoped they had put behind them. Mess waiters, cooks, quartermasters and office clerks fought — and fought well, too -to beat. off the German attack upon the last line of the battle zone; a Special Duties Gas Unit of the Royal Engineers literally raced a platoon of storm troops across open ground for possession of an unoccupied section of trench, and the instructors and pupils of a Divisional Bombing School aided a counterattack in the Hirondelle valley, during which legend recounts that a pupil was heard remarking aggrievedly to an NCO, 'I thought you told us yesterday that so long as we did as you said, we wouldn't come to no harm on this course?' i

2646

had riddjdi&klfjjJfr ISfluiAandos again*? the British 16 years before- was now commanding a battalion of the Royal Scots Fusiliers. Despite their casualties during the bombardment, despite the fact that he himself was twice badly, gassed the battalion held the crest through the entire day and lent support to the battalion on their left flank to such effect that between them they formed the left flank of the British defence. There was no encroachment north of them, and Arras was therefore never — during the first day — in danger. As dusk fell, the fighting died. Each side licked its wounds and made what preparations it could for the morrow. For the German army commanders it was mostly a question of moving up their reserves and endeavouring to ensure that they were in the most advantageous positions for the next stage of the attack: for the British commanders, it was a question of discovering what they had left, for there were virt ually no reserves available. Gough telephoned (illQ and was answered with sympathetic reassurance by the Chief-of-otaff, To Gough's assertion that Fifth Army had done magnificently to hold the Germans along the front of the battle zone, with the exception of two breaches in the valleys of the Cologne and the Omignon and the wider and more serious penetration south of St Quentin and in 1

,

the Oise valley. Lawrence answered with enthusiastic agreement and the suggestion that they would certainly do even better tomorrow. But when Gough pointed out that there was always the possibility that the Germans instead might do better tomorrow, he was assured that after the severe losses suffered that day, they would be far too busy clearing the battlefield and treating their wounded, even to consider another attempt at an advance. Sir Hubert wrote later, 'to get the full gravity of the situation understood.' He persevered however, and in due course obtained permission to withdraw his severely mauled right flank back during the night behind the protection of the Crozat Canal, and also to reinforce it with some units from the 2nd Cavalry Division. The left flank of this withdrawal would be connected along the line of the St Quentin Canal with the troops still in the battle zone. He also made adjustments to buttress the flanks of the two breaches in the more northern valleys, and he was forced to order the retreat of the South African Brigade in order to conform with the withdrawal to the intermediate zone of 'I

found

it

difficult',

The Iron Cross with Golden Rays Other — sometimes almost incredible — movements of troops took place during that Under cover of night, along the whole length of the line won that day by the Germans, parties of British infantry night.

crept out from shell holes, from dugouts and sections of blown-in trenches, to begin filtering back towards their own lines. Platoons — or their survivors — sections, individual men, all moving quietly across the eratered surface, listening for German voices, for the grate of the sentry's rifle on the parapet. Sometimes they were caught or killed, sometimes they had to fight their way through German positions — preferably with bayonet or club. More often they avoided them. Sometimes, inevitably, they completed their journeys only to be shot by their own compatriots holding the fore-

e

|

J

| -5

| I

2647

KWVrrt* •"

positions, taut with expectancy for the renewal of attack. ra) places the British artillerymen returned to the guns they had abandoned during the day, connected up the gun limbers, and dragged the guns out. One such episode took place near Velu: / had given strict orders as to silence, and from now on all instructions were given in whispers and every effort was made to keep horses and limbers clear of anything that might make a noise. In silence I led » three teams forward to the three right guns* and in almost complete quiet we limbered them up and then moved back about 50 yards. There I had to leave them whilst Ogilvie and I took teams to the other two guns 400 yards away from the main posiYet tions over the hill to the left. hated to leave them where they were?® every moment I expected a burst of macm ' gun fire or shelling, and to either of these9

ithe .

.

.

.

I

.

.

they would be entirely exposed. But during the hour we were in the position everything

remained wrapped in complete Office, which was made even more intense by the deadening effect of the heavy mist; no gunfire, no rifle-fire; all was as peaceful as a I

l I

I

night on Salisbury Plain, and it was in very strange contrast to the tremendous noises of the day just past. When dawn came there was another thick mist to blind the machine gunners of the defenders, and to cloak the movements and intentions of those storm troops who had survived the ordeal of the first day. After hearing the official report of the progress of his armies on the opening day of the offensive, the Kaiser ordered an immediate award of the Iron Cross with Golden Rays to Hindenburg. As the last occasion of this award had been to Bliicher in 1814, it can be seen that the Kaiser took a sanguine view of the results of the battler but it does not seem that his enthusiasm was shared by any of his more responsible officers.' Ludendorff maintained an aloof silence^Kuhl contented himself with the

2H4 X

V

-

observation that British obstinacy was proving, for the moment, a most useful ally. They both watched the lines on the staff maps of the northern area with peculiar intentness, and despite news of success elsewhere, became more and more concerned at the lack of progress of the Michael 1 attack against the suddenly solidifying front of the British Third Army. For Below's Seventeenth Army, after its successes on the first day, on the second ran into the apparently impenetrable wall of Third Army's reserve battalions. Nothing the German infantry could do availed, for they could not retrieve a partial failure on the part of their artillery. Whereas in the previous day's bombardment the German gunners had known exactly where the British front line lay relation to their

own guns and were

not inconvenienced by the fog. on the morning of March 22 they lacked this knowledge, and until. the fog lifted were firing by guesswork. Often their guesses were based on sound surmise, but the confidence of certainty was mis ng and thus the targets could not be pinpointed. When the mists dispersed (before 1000 hours along the^ whole of the Third Army Front) the storm troops therefore found themselves attacking the well-entrenched positions of the rear line of the battle zone, still strongly held by troops whose morale had not been shaken nor their ranks decimated by the pulverising bombardment. All day long the battle raged, from the positions north of the Sensee, where Lieutenant-Colonel Reitz's battalion still held the ridge, southwards in a 12-mile sweep to the Cambrai-Bapaume road and the Flesquieres Saliej^^By^nd. It was as though the Arras de^M j^ above and the salient below were iron^spikes driven into the ground, anchoring at each end a

and slightly elastic cable: and MijHMtt could not break it. As so often ^' e in ^ machine gun dominated he field,^ma all the valour and sacrifice of flexible

^W^^^^

t

the attackers

was

to little effect against

entrenched defenders. It was not, however, entirely in vain. Soon after 1500 hours, there was an

enormous massing of German attack waves in Vaulx Wood and along the Hirondelle valley, which culminated in a crushing attack on the British holding the ruins of Vraucourt. British reinforcement battalions digging defence lines further back 'downed tools' and moved up in support — but now they were moving into a position partly held by the Germans, and inevitably their ranks were quickly thinned. The British were driven back by sheer weight of numbers and by 1830 hours the Germans were in sole possession. Thus an indentation was made in the line, necessitating

withdrawal on either flank. And by direct orders from Ludendorff the drive along the Cambrai-Bapaume road was intensified and the northern haunch of the Flesquieres Salient eroded even further, regardless of cost. Early in the afternoon it became obvious that the whole of Third Army's V Corps, including the Royal Naval Division, must come back deep into the battle zone: the southern anchor-point was shifting under the inexorable pressure. South of the salient, the situation was much more serious for the British. As a result of the withdrawal behind the Crozat Canal during the night, the length of Fifth Army's front had been increased by some five miles, and owing to their casualties Above

right: At the start of the offensive the British artHiery was ranged out along a 40mile front. Byswitching the focal point of

the barrage the guns not only wiped out whole batteries but also completely disrupted British

communication systems.

with the tog, made attempts useless, and retreating infaf overtook the fast-moving stc

This, together

tc rally

almost

ppposite: Wounded were ofter ?to the rear only to find clearing^aiHlBi

maa^^H

Below: Fresh teams were out abandoned guns under cover of darkness apart pull

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228 Div

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XVIII

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.

during the previous day it was all extremely thinly held. Moreover, with the sometimes total loss of battalions holding the front line when the offensive began went a large number of Lewis and heavy machine guns, whose loss was to be keenly felt during the days which followed.

'Swamped by panic-stricken British troops' Below: Disorientation of communications that the French reserves were flung, illequipped, right into the line of fire, with British survivors straggling confusedly through them

meant

'Something very close to panic' On the right flank, the Crozat Canal offered some protection, but its vapours also contributed to the fog in the Oise valley which blindfolded the defenders. Under its cover, Hutier's storm troops moved up close to the east bank of the canal and as soon as the fog lifted, without waiting for support from their artillery, they laid down a short and furious barrage from trench mortars and

machine guns. By noon they had crossed the canal on the debris of an inefficiently destroyed road bridge in the extreme south, and were fighting through the remains of the village of Tergnier against troops

whose confidence was wilting under many rude shocks. During the morning a British subaltern went mad and tried to shoot the horses of a battery of artillery taking up new positions, under the impression that they were Uhlans. Twice a London battalion had reason to believe it was being shelled by its own artillery, and as more and more Germans poured over the canal and into Tergnier something very close to panic seized the hard-pressed and harassed British infantry. They were eventually

rallied on a line some mile and a half in the rear, their flank bending back to the canal north of yet another village which had fallen into German hands as a result of only partial demolition of a bridge. By evening, therefore, the whole line of the Crozat Canal was in danger of being turned from the south, and its tired de-

fenders cannot have been much heartened by a message which reached them from General Gough, reading: 'In the event of serious hostile attack, corps will fight rearguard actions back to the forward line of

the Rear Zone (Green Line and if necessary to the rear line of Rear Zone.' They were already behind the first, and whatever the illusions of their army commander the troops knew quite well that, in their area at least, the second was nothing more than a line drawn on a map. But it was to the north of the Crozat Canal that utter disaster threatened, for the troops which had yesterday fought their )

2651

*

i

*tt

%

6

'

'

out of the shambles of the forward zone were finding that the defences even of the battle zone were either unmanned or moreover, renonexistent. They had, ceived little training in the techniques of steady and controlled retreat — this as a matter of staff policy. ('It is undesirable to train troops for retirement, as such a movement is not envisaged and it would affect troops' aggressive spirit adversely.') Once withdrawal began, therefore, they quickly lost contact with units on either side. They had lived and fought in line for almost the whole of their military experience, and to the vast majority the new conditions were a psychological shock. At Roupy, for instance, a battalion of the Green Howards were holding a redoubt, but the second-in-command was in grievous uncertainty as to the tactical situation:

way back

Again the morning was thickly misty. Our own artillery fire was desultory and useless.

massed

Under cover of the

mist, the enemy in battle formation, and the third

commenced about 0700

attack

hours.

We

left: The mist, already to the Germans' advantage, was thickened by clouds of lethal and lachrymatory gas. The attackers wore gas masks, but it created havoc in the British lines and incapacitated hundreds of 'coughing, vomiting, and blinded men Below left: German cavalry, equipped with lances, was useless in trench and machine-gun warfare. It was kept

Above

.

at

the rear, once the British front line

only heard a babel in the mist. Now our artillery was firing short among our men in the redoubt.

About 1000 hours the enemy left flank, presumably in

penetrated our

gap between us and the battlion on our Machine gun fire began to harass us from that direction, somewhere in the

the

left.

.

.

.

ruins of the village. We never heard from the battalion on our right, and a runner I sent there did not return. Altogether, they

were attacked seven times during the day, and the onslaught at 1600 hours was obviously intended to be conclusive. We like maniacs. Every round of ammunition had been distributed. The Lewis guns jammed; rifle bolts grew stiff and unworkable with the expansion of heat. In the height of this attack, while my heart was heavy with anxiety, I received a message from brigade. Surely reinforcements were coming to our aid? Or was I at length given permission to withdraw? Neither: it was a rhetorical appeal to hold on to the last man. It was an appeal which fell, fortunately for the Green Howards, on ears which became in time deafened by the clamour of the attack. Another hour passed. The enemy pressed on relentlessly with a determined, insidious energy, reckless of cost. Our position was now appallingly precarious. I therefore resolved to act independently, as perhaps I should have done hours earlier. I ordered the organization of a withdrawal. This message disfired

.

.

.

patched, I lay on

my

and

belly in the grass

watched through my field glasses every minute trickling of the enemy's progress. Gradually they made way round the rim of the redoubt, bombing along the traverses. And now we only held it as lips might touch the rim of a saucer. I could see the heads of my men, very dense and in a little space. And on either side, incredibly active, gathered the grey helmets of the Boches. It was like a long bow-string along the horizon, and our diminished forces the arrow to be shot into a void. A great many hostile machine guns had now been brought up, and the plain was sprayed with hissing bullets. They impinged and spluttered about the little pit in which I crouched. I saw men crawl out of the trenches, and lie flat on the parados, still firing at the enemy. Then, after a little while the arrow

was launched. I saw a piteous band of men from the ground, and run rapidly towards me. A great shout went up from the Germans: a cry of mingled triumph and horror. 'Halt Englischf they cried, and for a moment were too amazed to fire; as rise

though aghast at the folly of men who could plunge into such a storm of death. But the first silent gasp of horror expended, then broke the crackling storm. I don't remember in the whole war an intenser taste of hell.

My men came along spreading rapidly to a line of some 200 yards length, but bunched here and there. On the left the enemy .

.

.

The German Eighteenth Army's Artillery Fireplan devised by Oberstleutnant Bruchmiiller First Period 120 minutes, commencing 0440 hours: General surprise fire on the British batteries, trench mortars, commandposts, telephone exchanges, billets and bivouacs, starting very sharply, with all batteries and trench mortars firing (mixed gas and HE shell) The trench mortars ceased firing after 20 minutes. At 0530 hours, all except the superheavy batteries opened up for ten minutes of surprise fire on the infantry positions {HE shell only on the First and Intermediate Positions, and mixed gas shell, lethal and lachrymatory, on the Second Position). There was no counterbattery work during this ten

The

Army

divided between four corps' fronts.

Each corps command was further divided into: 1 Feka - groups of long range and flanking batteries 2. Aka -counterbatteries 2 or 3 groupsforengaging infantry defences 3. Ika These last were further subdivided into 4 subgroups Ika a usually made up of trench mortars & howitzers Ika b of howitzers and super-heavy howitzers Ikac . .. .. of * ,eld 9uns Ikad .

-

minure period.

Second, Third and Fourth Periods each

artillery of the Eighteenth

was

of ten minutes

I

commencing 0640 hours:

J

During each ten minute period, a proportion of the batteries attached to each German infantry group ranged on their assigned British trench lines, while the rest continued to fire on other

Thus

a

rapid order could be issued to all or half

of the field

guns by calling Ika

c

and

d or Ika c.

targets.

Fifth Period 70 minutes, commencing 0710 hours: While counterbattery units Aka and long range batteries Feka continued to fire on their normal targets, the batteries dealing with the British infantry defences Ika bombarded their assigned areas. After 30 minutes fire, some of the howitzers in each group Ika a turned their attention to the ground between the trenches of the First Position for 1 5 minutes. The rest of the howitzers Ika b shelled specified centres of resistance for ten minutes and then swept backwards Meanwhile, the field guns Ika c swept the ground between the Second and Intermediate Positions with HE and lachrymatory shell for ten minutes

Sixth Period 75 minutes, commencing 1825 hours: The same

fire as in the Fifth Period, with small variations of target for the long range batteries. All guns fired on the same special targets as in the Fifth Period after 30 minutes' fire, but again with slight variations of target.

Seventh Period All

5 minutes.

Commencing 0935 hours:

the howitzers fired as near to the front line of the

endanger German infantry. The light and medium trench mortars engaged targets immediately behind these, with the field guns engaging targets still further behind the British front, both types of artillery firing HE shell only. Beyond them again, the super-heavy guns flanking batteries and heavy mortars fired on the second line of the First Position. Those long range guns not in the flanking batteries and those guns not designated for use in the creeping barrage fired on the Second Position. The rest of the guns continued with counterbattery woik. British First Position as possible, taking care not to

the

The Assault commencing

0940:

Successive waves of infantry attacked. Storm Troops

first,

with

infiltrating tactics.

The Creeping Barrage: was fired by

the field artillery, the 5.9-inch howitzers mortars for the most part. It proceeded in for the first jump, subsequent ones 200 yards for the field artillery and 400 for the heavy artillery. After the first jump the field artillery halted its barrage for three minutes, the heavy artillery for two, and after the

This

and

light trench

large jumps,

300 yards

subsequent jumps

and eight minutes respectively. It might be necessary to lift the barrage times, so it was arranged that the front line troops could signal for the barrage to be advanced by 200 yards at a time by firing green rockets and small flame projectors. There was no provision for halting the

was

realised that

for four

it

beyond the ordained ranges and

barrage.

^

GERMAN

POSITION

BOUNDARIES OF IKA 1-13 IN THE BRITISH LINES TARGETS OF: C^ZD MEDIUM AND HEAVY TRENCH MORTARS OF IKA atffc THE BATTERIES OF IKA a

Cr^lKAb C^=JlKAc

dT>IKAd FEKA (ENFILAOE BATTERIES) 3 MILES

Fargniers

Oise

2653

Along the line c ut them off. falling swiftly as the bullets hit them. Each second they fell, now one crumpling up, now two or three at once. I saw men stop to pick up their wounded mates, and as they carried them along, themselves get hit and fall with their inert burdens. Now they were near me, so I

men were

rushed out of

my

pit

and ran with them

to

the line of trenches some 300 yards behind. It seemed to take a long time to race across heart beat those few hundred yards.

My

nervously, and I felt infinitely weary. The bullets hissed about me, and I thought: then this is the moment of death. But I had no emotions. I remembered having read how in battle men are hit, and never feel the hurt till later, and I wondered if I

had yet been hit. Then I reached enormously

the line. I stood petrified, aghast. The trench had not

been dug, and no reinforcements occupied It was as we had passed it on the morning of the 21st, the sods dug off the surface, leaving an immaculately patterned mock it.

trench.

The Great Retreat had begun Such bitter disillusionments occurred a hundred times along the front tenuously held by XVIII and XIX Corps of Fifth Army, and as the day wore on, the battalions — now down to company or even platoon strength — retreated further and further, reaching out blindly

all

the time for con-

With the weight of the attack, the disruption of communication systems and the chaos of unrehearsed tacts

on either

side.

retreat, disappeared all form of organisation or command at higher than battalion and often company level. German aircraft

hovered over the men as they hurriedly dug temporary defences, their menace often enough to cause abandonment of the positions even before German guns sent over their high explosive. The contact flares used by the storm troops had a similar effect, rising and falling often in lines curved around the defenders, like horseshoes with their points miles to the rear. As confidence evaporated, discipline weakened and sometimes naked force was used to strengthen it again. Groups of fleeing men were rounded up by military police and herded into isolated and improvised redoubts, already held by men kept in position by officers with drawn revolvers standing behind them. This was not always necessary and many posts were held to the last with utmost gallantry -but nothing could serve to halt the German advance. By dusk the entire battle zone of Fifth Army had been lost, and during the night the remnants of three army corps -XVIII, XIX and XII -fell wearily and tragically back to what derisory defences their commanders could devise for them. In the south, XVIII Corps had lost the line of the St Quentin Canal and gone right back behind the Somme, with the exception of a tiny bridgehead around Ham: in the centre, a yawning invitation to the Germans stretched for four miles up to the Omignon valley, and from there a thinly held, forlorn horseshoe curved around to the Cologne valley. Here lay an exposed flank pointing towards the Germans, for the valley was occupied for nearly two miles as far forward as Tincourt, where the survivors of the 6th Connaught Rangers — the headquarters company and 34 riflemen -under com-

2654

mand

of their sole remaining officer, held extremity of VII Corps Green Line. / must say I had hoped to find some fresh troops there, but there were none. Indeed the trench was practically

was no sign of any effort having been made to save these treasures, so rapid, apparently, had been the owner's exit. Lastly, and to our great satisfaction, there were two camp beds and a mattress of the

empty

softest

the

southern

.

.

.

(wrote

Lieutenant-Colonel

Fielding). / made my Headquarters for the night in an exceedingly comfortable threeroomed hut in Tincourt Wood, formerly the abode of an officer of the Divisional Staff, whose Headquarters had been here until the proximity of the enemy during the last two days had driven them further back. Having in my mind the heroic exhorta-

which of late had been coming so unsparingly, addressed to us in the front line from this wood, I confess I was not prepared for the aspect of sudden abandonment which the hut presented. Its appearance suggested that some sudden and deadly cataclysm had overcome the occupant while he was having his breakfast, the remains of which, together with one or two half-finished cups of tea, still littered the table. The walls were hung with bookshelves and maps (of which latter I have annexed a useful specimen): the floor had a carpet: expensive oil lamps, crockery, and a profusion of knick-knacks lay about: but tions

there

down. Think of the exhausting hours through which we had passed, and you will under-

stand that I shall not easily forget that night's rest, the only pity being that we did not get enough of it, and that the few hours we did have were spasmodic and disturbed. And from Tincourt, the Green Line — held everywhere in similar insubstantiality — covered the front of VII Corps up to the edge of Fifth Army area, where it met the flank of Third Army's V Corps, still jutting forward into the battle zone of the Flesquieres Salient, and increasingly sensitive to threats of encirclement. All through the next day — Saturday, March 23 — the pressure continued, and under it the defences crumbled, Fifth Army slowly but surely disintegrated. Reeling with weakness and fatigue, the troops fought until they were killed or retreated until they dropped unconscious

evitably contact with the

was

lost.

army

— and

to the

in-

north

At 0700 hours on Sunday, March

24, the battalion commanders of the Royal Naval Division — in the absence of any form of direction from higher command — decided that their position had become untenable, and that in order to avoid capture or annihilation, they must withdraw. The Flesquieres Salient was evacuated: the iron spike wrenched from the ground. The six

Great Retreat had begun.

This reinforcement was delayed for a few hours upon receipt of a courteous note from Haig thanking the French for their offer but intimating that it would not be necessary, but was expedited and indeed doubled shortly afterwards in response to a second message from Haig dispatched after his realisation that the southern corps of Fifth Army was being pressed right back to the line of the Somme.

By March

The French close the gap accordance with the agreement for mutual support which had been made between the two Commanders-in-Chief (thus avoiding the necessity of complying with the directive of the Versailles Council to place a reserve force under General Foch), on the evening of March 21 Petain had ordered the three divisions of French V Corps to be ready to move, and a few hours later he instructed them to begin concentration in the Noyon area, some 12/15 miles behind Gough's right flank. In

Below: British guns, abandoned amid the carnage caused by German shells. Artillery duels took place between gun crews who could actually see each other, and retreat was sudden

23,

six

French divisions —

which had been considered the limit of assistance Haig might need — were moving into position, but although this aid was prompt, it was ineffective for a reason whicb had not been foreseen. The speed given to Hutier's advance by the new tac-

plus the enormous advantages conferred upon the Germans by the fog, had wrecked all estimates of time and movement. As the first French divisions came up, they therefore found themselves — instead of manning or digging positions in rear — first swamped by groups of shaken, uncoordinated, bitter and sometimes panicstricken British troops retreating through them, and then themselves subjected to the same fierce attack which had caused this near-rout. As the British right flank swung back like the edge of an opening door, the last three French divisions to be sent were flung into the gap so hastily that they were compelled to leave their artillery behind, and rush their infantry and cavalry forward tics,

with only the ammunition which each man could carry. It was extremely fortunate for them that, for the moment, Hutier was interested only in smashing back the British, and had as yet no designs for a breakout to the south. And as the British retreated further, more troops were needed: late on March 23, Petain ordered yet another six divisions into the breach. But if the French managed by superhuman efforts to close the gap, they never managed around behind Gough's fastto get disintegrating army in order to support it. This essential function, as Ludendorff and his advisers had shrewdly divined, would have to be performed by British troops brought down from the norA — and they could not arrive for some days. All day long on Sunday, March 24, the respective Commanders-in-Chief listened to the reports coming in and watched their maps. With the anchor-point in the Flesquieres Salient gone, the line of the British retreat straightened, hinging in the north now from the defences in front of Arras and Vimy Ridge: as the remnants of Fifth Army went back and back, the right flank of Third Army stretched out and backwards too, groping for contact with their sorely-pressed neighbours. By evening General Petain's logical mind had forced him to certain conclusions and he set out for Dury to meet Sir Douglas Haig and place these before him. They met at 2300 hours. Petain struck me as very much upset, almost unbalanced and most anxious, Haig later wrote in his diary. / explained my plans and asked him to concentrate as large a force as pos.

.

.

sible about Amiens astride the Somme to cooperate on my right (sic). He said he ex| pected every moment to be attacked in | Champagne and he did not believe that the s main Herman blow had yet been delivered. | He said he would give Fayolle (who was to « command all British and French troops of the Somme) all his available g. south £ troops. He also. told me that he had seen

the latter today at Montdidier where the French reserves are now collecting and had

him

directed

in the event of the

German

advance being pressed still further to fall back southwest wards towards Beauvais in order

to

cover Paris.

What

Petain had also said, in justification of his attitude, was, 'If you withdraw your hand in proportion as I'm stretching out mine towards you, contact between our two armies will be broken in the end; your army then risks being cornered in open country, while I shall be reduced to covering Paris.' One cannot feel that this was an unreasonable picture of the developing situation, but in Sir Douglas Haig's view the continuity of the Allied line was sacrosanct, and Petain's proposal would break it. This meant the end of the private arrangement for mutual assistance which, in all fairness, was never envisaged to bear such an enormous strain as that to which it was now subject. It also opened Haig's eyes to certain benefits which could accrue to his command under a scheme which he had long spurned: if in the past he had seen little point in a Supreme Command which held British divisions in reserve to assist the French, he could now well appreciate the advantages of one which held French divisions in reserve to assist him. Bidding Petain a rather cold farewell, he hurried back to and sent urgent signals to London requesting the immediate presence of Lord Milner (a member of the War Cabinet) and his own military bete noire, the CIGS, Sir Henry Wilson. So far as the former was concerned, Haig had been anticipated, for Lloyd George had already dispatched Milner to France during that afternoon, feeling that at such a critical time he should have a representative on the scene of action. Milner, however, was at that moment en route for Versailles (having called at GHQ during Haig's absence) for consultation with the British representative on the Council, Sir Henry Rawlinson, and later with the French Premier, Clemenceau. Sir Henry Wilson arrived at Haig's headquarters at 1100 hours on the following

GHQ

day (Monday. March 25), to listen with sympathy to the Commander-in-Chief's troubles and with great interest to his suggestions. Beneath his charming and affable exterior, there must have been a certain element of sardonic satisfaction,

many months in partial eclipse, seemed as though Sir Henry's star might

for after it

be in the ascendant again, much as a result of Haig's own actions. And in this Sir Henry could rejoice, despite the catastrophe whicb brought it about. During the late afternoon, he joined Milner and Rawlinson at Versailles, and in the evening arrangements were finalised for a joint AngloFrench Conference on the following dayFurther Reading Gough, Sir Hubert, Stoughton 1931)

Fifth

Army (Hodder &

Jerrold, D., The Royal Naval Division

(Hutchinson 1923) Moore, W., See How They Ran — The British Retreat of 1918 (Leo Cooper 1970) Official History of the War, Military Operations; France & Belgium 1918 Vols 1 & 2 (Macmillan 1935/7) Pitt,

Barrie,

1918-The

Last Act (Cassell 1962)

Shaw-Sparrow, W.. The Fifth Army 1918 (Bodley Head 1921)

in

March,

[For Barrie Pitt's biography, see page 31.]

2655

"LUDENDORFF OFFENSIVE"

j

•

*Vi#i*

v

#

THE AIR BATTLE of Ludendorff 's offensive were accompanied and by intense air activity. preluded was matched against daring strategy Careful individualism, aggressive and a heavy toll and

The

first

phases

of British aircraft against a disproportionate lowering of German morale. Thomas G. Miller, Jr. Below: RFC pilot ready for take-off in an RE 8 artillery observation aircraft

I

I

1

Below: The British Aircraft Manufacturing Company de Havilland DH 4, the best day bomber of the First World War. This was used in every British theatre of war, and also by the air force of the American Expeditionary Force in France. Its one major fault was the distance separating the pilot and the observer, which made communication very difficult. Engine: BHP or Rolls-Royce Eagle inlines, 230-375 hp. (The following performance figures are for a machine powered by the 250-hp Eagle III.) Armament: one or two fixed Vickers and one or two free Lewis 303-inch machine guns, plus up to 460 lbs of bombs. Speed: 1 19 mph at 3,000 feet. Climb: 16 minutes 25 seconds to 10,000 feet. Ceiling: 16,000 feet. Endurance: 3V2 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 2,303/3,313 lbs. Span: 42 feet 45/8 inches. Length: 29 feet 8 inches. Bottom: A Hannover CL Ilia over the Western Front in spring 1918

In

summer 1917

the

German

Luftstreit-

on a major programme of expansion as part of Ludendorffs plan to defeat the Allies on the battlefield before the power of America could be deployed. AmerikaproSardonically dubbed the gramm', the expansion resulted in a field strength by March, 1918 of 153 Fliegerabteilungen, 38 Schlachtstaffeln, 80 Jagdand seven Bombengeschwader staffeln, totalling 24 Staffeln. Hoeppner and von General leutnant Oberstleutnant Thomsen planned aviation's participation in the coming spring offenkrdfte started

'

sives with great thoroughness. By early March the stealthy buildup of German air in Second, Seventeenth and strength

Eighteenth Armies was complete. Ever since the Battle of the Somme in 1916 the Germans had kept the bulk of their air forces facing the RFC which they considered to be far more skilful and aggressive than the numerically superior French. But for almost the first time the Germans would have numerical superiority over the British. Incorporated into the three attacking armies were no less than 49 Fliegerabteilungen 27 Schlachtstaffeln', 35 Jagdstaffeln and four Bombengeschwader. As was true of German aviation dur,

ing most of the war, these units operated a wide variety of aircraft makes and models. The Jastas were mostly equipped with the Albatros DV and DVa, by now obsolescent, but some also had the Fokker DrI, the Pfalz Dili and D Ilia and the Roland D Via. The Schlachtstaffeln were equipped with the excellent Hannoveraner C II and Halberstadt CL II, and the Fliegerabteilungen a motley of LVG, DFW, Rumpler, Junkers and Albatros models. The Royal Flying Corps had a total of 60 squadrons on the Western Front in March, and 31 of these were with Third and Fifth Armies. The III Brigade had four squadrons of RE 8's, one each of DH 4's and FE 2b's, and seven fighter squadrons, three operating SE 5a's, three Camels and one Bristol Fighter. The V Brigade's Corps Wing had five

observation

squadrons;

the

Army

Wing had two bombing squadrons (DH4 and FE 2b), two of SE 5a's, and one each and Bristols. The Ninth Wing, normally attached to HQ, RFC as a general reserve, had been moved up behind

of Camels, Spads

Fifth Army front in early March in accurate anticipation of the German offensive. Its six squadrons included two of

DH 4's, two of Camels, one of Bristols and one with the new Sopwith Dolphin. In all,

579 serviceable British aircraft, of which 261 were single-seater fighters, faced 730 German, 326 of which were fighters.

Outnumbered and outfought The RFC was thoroughly prepared for the time and place of the German offensive, if not its scale. Instructions had been drawn up in detail as early as January specifying the basic tactics to be followed by each squadron. A number of the fighter squadrons were assigned to fly low level bombing missions against specific targets, mostly bridges and roads that would be used by the advancing German infantry. Early in March the British began to organise bombing attacks against German airfields opposite Third and Fifth Army fronts. The bombing missions were supplemented by offensive fighter patrols which started the air battles over a week before the German ground offensive actually began. These culminated on March 18 in one of the largest air battles of the First World War, the 'Battle of Le Cateau'. From the German side, virtually every fighter squadron on the front of Second Army rose to meet a British force of five bombers and 24 fighters. Manfred von Richthofen led a formation of some 30 Fokker Triplanes, Below: The German Hannover CL Ilia escort fighter and ground attack aircraft. This compact and manoeuvrable two-seater was introduced in 1918, and was often, and disastrously, taken for a single-seater. The biplane tail was adopted so that tail surfaces of a sufficient area could be packed into as small a space as possible, to give the gunner an excellent field of fire. Engine: Argus As III inline, 180 hp. Armament: one fixed Spandau and one free Parabellum machine gun. Speed: 103 mph at 16,400 feet. Climb: 5 minutes 18 seconds to 3,280 feet. Ceiling: 24,600 feet. Endurance: 3 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 1,577/2,378 lbs. Span: 38 feet 43/4 inches. Length: 24 feet 10 /2 inches 1

2659

Left:

Soon

to depart the

scene-the

last

photograph of Richthofen, with his dog § Moritz. Above: A German fighter passes over § the troops it is supporting. Below: The 2 inevitable conclusion — the remains of a | hopelessly obsolete BE 2e, which should have 5 been replaced by the end of 1916. Right: A £ Hannover CL Ilia (foreground), one of E Germany's best strafing aircraft

*.

V

*

>* /

.

*''"'

f

+«*n

<

Albatros and Pfalz of Jagdgeschwader I; eight other Staffeln also took part. The RFC was outnumbered and outfought. Five of No 54 Squadron's Camels were shot down, plus two SE 5's and two of the bombers. The total loss to the Germans was one Albatros. The air preliminaries to the German offensive are most instructive in retrospect. The RFC undertook an aggressive policy, as was its wont, evidently with the expectation that the results necessarily would be favourable. They most certainly were not. Several British squadrons were severely mauled at a trifling cost to the Germans. The RFC genuinely believed it

outfought its opponent upon almost every occasion they met, or at least its High Command behaved as if they did, for the strategy followed by the RFC was apparently based on implicit assumptions of individual superiority. The outcome unfortunately failed to support the assumption. Once again, intelligent defensive tactics, professionally overseen, carried the day, and the British suffered unnecessarily high losses to no good purpose. Air fighting subsided after Le Cateau. The next event of note came early in the morning of March 21 when the German onslaught was unleashed on Fifth Army. Fog throughout the morning prevented the carefully-rehearsed air attacks of both the Germans and the defending British, but shortly after noon the aircraft of both sides took off. There was intense and chaotic air fighting, and great numbers of aircraft flying low altitude bombing and strafing missions. On Fifth Army front such attacks were made by Nos 23, 24, 48, 54 and 84 Squadrons while the 27 German Schlachtstaffeln were all in action ahead of their advancing infantry. Although the RFC Corps aircraft suffered losses at the hands of the German fighters, most of the latter were flying patrols high above the front and did very little to impede the British low-level attacks, a fact upon which German regimental histories comment with some asperity. Despite the scale of the air activity, losses were

moderate: the Germans and the RFC seven.

lost eight aircraft

Intense air activity

The gallantry and intense

activity of the

RFC

squadrons against the German advance were of course of little avail. Aircraft weakly armed with a few small bombs and machine guns were capable at best of exercising sharp but essentially transient material impact upon widely scattered units of infantry; on the other hand the effect on morale of such attacks was cumulative and doubtless considerable. Nevertheless, the German onrush was inexorable. Early in the afternoon, No 5 Naval Squadron was shelled out of its aerodrome and Major Sholto Douglas, OC of No 84, took his squadron out only hours its field was overrun. By that night was obvious that all Fifth Army squadrons and some of Third Army's would have to fall back, and the necessary orders were

before it

issued.

The morning of the 22nd was almost exactly like that of the previous day, thick fog and no flying until around 1300 hours, after which intense air activity started. Fifth Army's squadrons were pulled back to airfields further behind the lines that afternoon, the pilots taking off from the old field, flying their patrols and landing at the new one. Virtually all the air activity was at low altitudes, most of it consisting of attacks on the retreating British and advancing German infantry. At the end of the day the RFC had lost 19 aircraft and

Germans 11. The weather improved considerably on March 23 and air activity was almost

the

continuous during the daylight hours from then to March 28. The aircraft of both sides concentrated on low-level bombing

and strafing attacks. The German Schlachtstaffeln, although ubiquitous, were not particularly effective; their Halberstadts and Hannoveraners normally flew at around 200 feet and their principal weapons

were 7.62-mm machine guns and 'potatomasher' hand grenades. The logic for so weak an armament apparently was

that aircraft attacking infantry required nothing more than infantry weapons, but in so doing they failed to avail themselves of the ability of aircraft to carry and deliver more lethal payloads. The RFC fighter pilots, being unencumbered by any tactical doctrine, generally attacked from very low altitudes; indeed one Ger-

man company commander was run over by strafing Camel even though he had thrown himself flat on the ground! As a

a

result of this superb daring, commented upon many times in German regimental histories, the British pilots exacted a mental toll from the Germans out of proportion to their slight material impact. Throughout March 24, squadrons sup-

porting Third Army attacked German troops advancing against the BapaumePeronne road. Air fighting greatly increased, almost all of it taking place over

Bapaume below

feet. By t*he morning Army's front had begun to crumble between Montauban and Urvillers, and Major-General Salmond sent

5,000

of the 25th, Third

the following order to the OC 9th Wing (Lieutenant-Colonel Wilfred Freeman): '. send out your scout squadrons and those of No 27, No 25 and No 62 Squadrons that are available on to the line GrevillersMartinpuich-Maricourt. These Squadrons will bomb and shoot up everything they Very low flying is essential. can see. All risks to be taken. Urgent.' .

.

.

.

.

Further Reading K., Jagd in Flanderns Himmel (Verlag Knorr & Hirth 1935) Hoeppner, Gen. E. von, Deutschlands

Bodenschatz,

Krieg in der Luft (Koehler 1921) Kirtleside,

Lord Douglas

of,

Combat and

Command Volume (Collins 1963) Martel, R., L Aviation Francaise de 1

Bombardment (Paul Hartmann 1939) Raleigh, Sir Walter, & Jones, H.A., The War in the Air Volumes l-VI (OUP 1922/23) Voisin, Gen., La Doctrine de L Aviation Francaise de Combat, 1915-1918 (Berger-Levrault 1932)

[For

Thomas

G. Miller Jr's biography, see

page 2 179.]

2661

1

CONFERENCE 'Strategic caution, national pride or personal pique' — factors which, throughout the four years of war, had combined to frustrate any chance of forming an Allied

command united under a central authority. But after the calamitous events of March 21 to 26 all such objections

were thrown aside, and a meeting hastily called at the little

town of Doullens to

discuss just that possibility.

John Keegan. Nothing divided Britain and France more sharply during the First World War than the issue of 'Unity of Command' — the investmentin a single commander of authority over both their armies on the Western Front. So obvious and rational was such an arrangement that it might seem perverse of the two governments not to have implemented it from the outset. But there were powerful factors — strategic caution, national pride or personal pique, acting in turn or in unison — which worked to frustrate its acceptance until the very last months of the war, until indeed the military partnership was literally at breaking point. Then on March 26, 1918, at a conference of Allied leaders hastily summoned to the little town of Doullens, the objections to 'Unity of Command' were found suddenly to have evaporated and, in the half hour between opening the meeting and dispersing for lunch, Foch was empowered to co-ordinate the operations of the Allied armies on the Western Front. From there it was only a short step, but briefly delayed, to appointing him Allied Commander-inChief. Why this sudden reversal of attitudes? Principally and immediately because the British had been struck by the panic realisation that unless they accepted unity of command, the French would leave them to be overwhelmed by the advancing Germans; curiously, it was precisely the opposite reasoning to that which had impelled them to resist unity of command in August 1914. Then it had been the fear that Joffre mig treat the BEF as expendable in a crisis t.he same fashion as he might hav one of his own armies -which had the cabinet to insist on Sir Jo retaining the right to rej ct any I of Joffre's which put hi Very under1

I

:

standably to fact rather small •Joffre's

2662

five

armi<

BEF was

in

Largest of

could — as

some thought handled

by

it

his

ought to — have been General Headquarters

(given the presence of some bilingual staff was Britain's only firstline force and hence too precious to be consigned to foreign control. By the beginning of 1915, however, the front had been settled, and with it the danger of the BEF being engulfed in some sudden catastrophe. That argument against unity of command thus disappeared. Indeed, since the Allies were now faced by a Germany on the defensive, they could themselves think of going back onto the offensive which unity of command officers) it

would much facilitate. But contributing significantly to their restored confidence was the growth in strength of the BEF which was planned to reach 60 divisions, or nearly two thirds that of the French army. This cast a new light on the question of unity of command. The British, having begun as the very junior partners of the French, were now well on the way to becoming their equals. It remained unthinkable (and probably unconstitutional) that anyone but a Frenchman should act as supreme director of operations on the national territory. Would it

not also prove politically unacceptable

to the British people (even if no longer militarily objectionable to their govern-

ment) that an army of the size they were building, at an unprecedented emotional

and material

cost,

be subordinated to a

foreigner?

The question was not one that the Liberal Cabinet of 1915 cared to put to the test. Its replacement of Sir John French by Douglas Haig in December was to deprive it finally of the chance. For Haig, who enjoyed the patronage of the King and possessed both a capacity for intrigue and a lack of scruple in resorting to it which would have equipped him to survive as a Byzantine courtier, rapidly established so complete an ascendancy over the politicians that none dared raise the issue of

Above

left:

Haig welcomes French Prime

Minister Clemenceau at the little station of Doullens, near Amiens, and (right) they set off for the fateful meeting. Despite Clemenceau's dislike of Foch he saw the urgent need for a supreme commander who would stop Haig from withdrawing to the Channel ports and force Petain to co-operate. Foch (below) seemed to derive little satisfaction from his appointment: 'a fine present' he remarked

diminishing his military authority. Since he regarded all Frenchmen as his social inferiors and believed that God directly guided his generalship, he was disposed to see no virtue in unity of command himself and to view those who did as guilty both of blasphemy and of a breach of good

manners.

The failure of his generalship on the Somme, however, was to bring to power a David Lloyd George, who shared none of Haig's assumptions about the social politician,

God or the military caste system, who favoured radical solutions on principle and who was deeply disturbed both by the

order,

strategy of the British generals in France and by the autonomy they had won for themselves. 'Blood and mud, mud and blood, can they think of nothing else?' was the questioning refrain of his first months in power. He had already espoused the cause of the unity of command and was, in the bitter end, to see Haig bow to it. But his espousal was motivated by the desire to reestablish political control over the generals and, in his first attempt to promote a Frenchman over Haig, haste drove him to pick a weak candidate. Nivelle had little to recommend him except a fluent command of English and a way with politicians, and his fall almost killed the cause. It lay

moribund after

the

until November 1917 when, Italian debacle at Caporetto,

Lloyd George found the opportunity to revive it again through the creation of an inter- Allied council.

Much of the opposition to unity of command had always stemmed, of course, from the blunt assumption that it could be exercised only by one army's general staff issuing orders to the other's; that had been one of the repugnant features of the scheme negotiated by Lloyd George with Nivelle.

He had now been brought to see, however, chiefly through the advocacy of General Sir Harry Wilson, that unity of command could be

made

palatable, or at least a good

deal more difficult to resist, by subordinating both armies to a separate international staff, which moreover might initially be brought into being as a consultative body. The Allied Chiefs-of-Staff had indeed proposed something of the sort at a meeting in Paris in July. At Rapallo in November, where the Allied Prime Ministers met to consider the lessons of Caporetto and to constitute themselves into a Supreme War Council, they accordingly decided to appoint a board of Military Representatives to advise them on the conduct of the war. Its existence meant, to Lloyd George, the chance of restraining Haig's zeal for the offensive. Still nursing the fingers burnt in the Nivelle affair, he was not thinking of subordinating him to a superior military mind. Wilson, however, was. So too were the French, whose influence in the alliance had been much diminished by the springtime mutinies and who saw in the existence of the Military Representative system the chance to reinstate their strategic primacy. For with Foch, their Chief of Staff, and Wilson his friend and collaborator of the prewar days, established at the Supreme War Council's at Versailles, they were ensured of controlling the military advice it received.

HQ

'Living on Petain's charity'? They, and Lloyd George and Wilson had reckoned, however, without the possibility that Haig and Petain, the commanders in the field, might combine against the Military Representatives and, by combining, successfully resist their advice. But so it turned out. When in February 1918 they requested that the field armies contribute divisions to form a General Reserve, Petain offered half the number asked and Haig refused outright. Neither was prepared, in the face of an impending German offensive of mammoth proportions, to entrust the safety of his front to a Council of War, and perhaps understandably so. Instead, they

privately agreed each to come to the other's assistance if and when danger pressed. Had Wilson remained at Versailles, he might well have found means to bring Haig at least to heel. But, following Lloyd George's dismissal in February of the CIGS, 'Wully' Robertson, Haig's staunch ally and opponent of every plan to diminish his power, Wilson had been recalled to take his place. Once installed in the War Office, Wilson's support for the Military Representatives, now known as the Executive Board, declined. He continued nevertheless to

warn Haig against refusing to contribute to the General Reserve, which would mean living, he said on March 6, 'on Petain's charity — and you will find it very cold

He was to be proved right. Had Clemenceau, now French Prime

charity'.

Minister, cared to assist, Petain might have been brought to offer the contributions to the General Reserve for which he had been asked. But since Haig had refused, and since the Chairmanship of the Executive Board had been given to Foch, with whom Clemenceau was on bad terms, he did not press the point. Indeed when, at the Supreme War Council's fourth meeting in London on March 14, Foch protested

against its acquiescence in the collapse of the General Reserve, Clemenceau ordered, 'Silence! I am the representative of France.' Foch, protesting, swept out of the session and returned to Paris, oppressed with a sense of powerlessness. Hence on the morning of March 21, when the German spring offensive struck the 14 tired and weakly entrenched divisions of Gough's Fifth Army on the Somme, at the point of junction of the BEF and the French (which it was the object of the attack to sever), the only effective provision for mutual support existing between the two armies was the unofficial arrangement agreed by Petain and Haig a month earlier. But the latter was unworried. Since his own offensives had never made anything

2663

bu t the most painfully slow progress, he expected the Germans to do no better and, though Petain alerted the reserves he had earmarked on the first evening of the attack, he did so on his own initiative. It was not until the morning of March 23, when Haig awoke to the realisation that Fifth Army had given way along its whole front, that he recognised how urgently and on what a scale he needed help. When Petain visited him that afternoon at 1600 hours, he asked for 20 divisions to be deployed astride the Somme immediately. He was now about to learn how cold Petain's charity could be. That pessimistic man was already moving to the conclusion that Fifth Army's front was beyond salvation, and, though abiding by his undertaking to move reserves towards the threatened area, had begun to consider how to act if he should lose touch with the BEF. On the afternoon of Sunday March 24, Haig glimpsed how Petain's thoughts were developing. Badly rattled, he telegraphed London to ask Wilson and the War Minister, Derby, to come to France. Later that evening, having met Petain again at the advanced HQ at Dury, where his worst fears were confirmed, he telegraphed again to ask Milner, the strong man of the War Cabinet, to come also. But Lloyd'George, alerted by Wilson the day before to the 'mystery of the Fifth Army' and alarmed by it, had already despatched Milner who, landing on the afternoon of March 24 at Boulogne, where he was picked up by Amery of the British delegation at Versailles, had motored through Montreuil, missing Haig who was at Dury, and gone on to Versailles. Wilson, arriving next day after having spoken by telephone to Foch and agreeing that 'someone must catch hold', caught Haig at Montreuil and, by his own account, hauled him over the coals. He claims to have told him that he was suffering the consequences of killing the General Reserve and also to have won his agreement to accept Foch as inter-Allied commander. After this very satisfactory interview, he took Haig on with him to Abbeville where he expected

meet Foch and possibly Clemenceau. Instead he discovered Weygand, Foch's right hand, bearing the message that the missing pair, with Milner and President Poincare, had gone instead to confer with Petain at Compiegne. Conscious that he was not at the centre of events, Wilson pressed on to Versailles, gathered that nothing had been settled at to

Compiegne and motored through to Paris, where he made rendezvous with Foch at his flat in the Avenue de Saxe at 10.30 pm. Foch quickly and testily dismissed Wilson's opening proposition: that Clemenceau act as co-ordinator of operations with he as his technical adviser. 'That won't work', he said, 'Clemenceau knows nothing of directing battles ... he will say "I agree with Haig and Petain". But it is not a matter of agreeing with them. He must command.' Better, he suggested, that Wilson ask that the two governments confer authority on him to bring about a better union between the British and French troops. So it was agreed. Both already knew that all were to meet next morning at Doullens, near Amiens, where Haig had already arranged to interview his army

commanders. In the car on the longjourney next mornWilson and Milner compared notes and

ing,

2664

conferred. Both accepted that, if Haig were to be allowed to draw further on French reserves, he would have to accept some check on his independence. It was Wilson, as Milner generously makes clear in his memorandum of events, who urged him that Foch be commissioned to co-ordinate Haig's operations with Petain's. He presumably also assured him that Haig's

agreement

to this

arrangement had been

secured.

Haig eats humble pie They were late arriving. Haig was already in conference with his army commanders when Clemenceau and Poincare had appeared at 11 am (not having been informed of a change of time). Foch arrived shortly afterwards, surrounded by officers and protesting in his sharp voice, 'You aren't fighting? I would fight witbout a break. I would fight in front of Amiens behind Amiens. I would fight in Amiens .

.

.

.

.

.

the time.' Petain, looking as aloof as always, arrived last. While they waited for the British, and because 'it was rather General Mordacq recorded, 'we cold', walked about in little groups in the square in front of the mairie, these little groups meeting now and then to talk together'. It was a strange scene. German shells were falling within earshot, tanks had been posted on the western approaches to the town and along the highway which ran through the centre of the square, 'British troops were retiring sedately, without showing the least trace of emotion of any kind', a demonstration, in Mordacq's view, 'of British imperturbability in the fullest acceptance of the word'. It was not a state of mind which Petain shared. 'The British', he told Clemenceau, 'are about to be beaten in the open field. We shall be likewise in a fortnight.' Outraged and shocked, Clemenceau reported this statement to Poincare, asking a little superfluously whether he thought a soldier ought to speak in such terms. At 12.05 pm Wilson and Milner drove up. Clemenceau at once took the minister aside to ask if he had heard that Haig was planning to fall back on the Channel ports, abandoning Amiens and leaving the left flank of the French army hanging in the air. Milner assured him that there must have been a misunderstanding and asked for a moment to confer with Haig. He, who had sent the day before via Weygand a note which seemed to threaten exactly what Clemenceau had related, denied to Milner any intention of so acting and assured him of his resolve to stick it out where he stood, a sentiment echoed by his three army commanders. Privately he also confided to Milner that he would accept subordination to Foch. Much comforted, Milner returned to reassure Clemenceau, and at 2.20 pm in the mayor's office, recently vacated by Haig's army commanders, the ten members of the conference sat down round the oval table. Poincare took the chair; the others present were Milner, Clemenceau, Loucheur, the French Armaments Minister, Foch, Haig, Petain, Wilson, Lawrence, Haig's CGS, and General A. A. Montgomery of the Vergil les secretariat (some accounts state that all

1

Weygand was

also present). of the discussion which followed is difficult to reconstruct, since no minutes were taken and those who wrote descriptions later often appear guilty of exaggera-

The form

seems, however, that with the very necessary object, doubtless urged by Milner, of dispelling the impression, created by his letter of the previous day, that he intended to fall back on the Channel ports. On the contrary, he insisted, he intended to fight where he stood north of the Somme. But south of the Somme he asked for Petain's help. The French commander then spoke. He had somewhat increased the number of divisions which he had claimed to have at his disposal the day before at Compiegne, from 15 to 24, but he could not promise their early arrival. His tone was

ting their role.

Haig spoke

It

first

cold, discouraging, defeatist.

All accounts agree that the impression by Petain's speech was decisive. But while the British Official History claims left

it provoked Foch to an outburst which drew from Haig the offer to accept his instructions, Milner flatly states that Foch kept silent and that he, Milner, asked Clemenceau to come aside. (Mordacq, who was in the square outside, describes 'an interval of silence and embarrassment', ended by Clemenceau beckoning to Milner.) The two, at whoever's prompting, drew aside and Milner proposed that Foch be nominated to co-ordinate the actions of the two armies. They separated to speak privately to the commanders, after which Clemenceau penned a short formula. Its wording was slightly altered at Haig's suggestion, after which it was again read out: 'General Foch is charged by the British and French governments to co-

that

ordinate the actions of the Allied armies on the Western Front. He will work to this end with the Generals-in-Chief who are asked to furnish him with all necessary information.' There was a murmur of agreement which all note was genuinely cordial,

then

Milner

and

Clemenceau

signed, and the parties dispersed for lunch. 'Well, you've got what you wanted', Clemenceau remarked to Foch. 'A fine present', was the retort, 'you give me a lost battle

and tell me to win it.' Still on edgy terms, they lunched separately. Milner and Wilson lunched in a local hotel. Haig noted gloomily in his diary, 'lunched from lunch box'; humble pie was on the menu. The Doullens conference did not, of course, establish unity of command. The authority it conferred on Foch was very limited and, even when extended by the resolution of the Beauvais conference on April 3 to include 'the strategic direction of operations', and finally consolidated on April 14 by his appointment as Allied Commander-in-Chief, it made him, in his

own who

words, little more than 'a conductor beat time well'. But Doullens had ended the selfish and dangerous independence of the national Commanders-inChief, and put new heart into their political chiefs. The war was a little nearer won in consequence. Further Reading Blake, R., The Private Papers of Douglas Haig (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1952) Clemenceau, Georges, Grandeur and Misery ol Victory (Harcourt, Brace 1930) Cooper, Duff, Haig (Doubleday, Doran 1936) Liddell Hart, Captain B. H., Foch (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1931) Terrains, J., Douglas Haig (Hutchinson 1965)

\For

John Keegan's biography,

page 96.

1

see

'

j.

the

outbreak of Civil

War

Bolsheviks' writ ran only as far as they could assert their control by force of arms. In the winter of 1917/18 the champions of Old Russia —

former army their

officers

— made

way to the south of Russia

to organise and launch a concerted military challenge to Soviet power. Nikolai Tolstoy.

Above:

Armed workers in Red Square, Moscow 2665

When the Bolsheviks seized power from the Provisional Government in November 1917, it seemed, despite their numerical weakness in relation to the total population, that their position was remarkably secure. At virtually the only free election held in Russian history, that for the Constituent Assembly in November, the Bolsheviks polled only 25% of the votes, the rest being cast chiefly for the moderate Socialist Revolutionaries. Yet, as the whole history of the two Russian revolutions of 1917 showed, the liberal moderates were wholly incapable of providing effective leadership for their stricken country. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, possessed vigorous and energetic leaders of the calibre of Trotsky and Lenin, and a straightforward and very popular platform: that of an immediate end to the war, and the dividing of the land amongst the peasants. Geographically, the key points of the country fell swiftly under the Bolsheviks' control. Petrograd itself was, of course, their initial stronghold, and Moscow was soon ruled by a Military Revolutionary Committee. Significantly, however, the ancient capital did not fall without a brief struggle. Red Guards had to storm the Kremlin in the face of stubborn resistance on the part of an anti-Bolshevik Committee of Public Safety, composed chiefly of officers, 'junkers' (officer-cadets), students, and other volunteers. Nearly everywhere else the picture was the same. Mutinous soldiers and Bolshevik industrial workers took over in factory towns such as Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Vladimir, Kazan and Saratov; whilst more remote non-industrial centres from Simbirsk Tashkent succumbed during November and December. Where the Bolsheviks held

to

a majority in the local Soviet (workers' power was naturally transcouncil), ferred with little trouble to the new government. Most important of all, perhaps, was the largely pro-Bolshevik attitude of the army at the front. The dual appeal of Lenin's programme struck responsive chords in the hearts of the peasant-soldiery, who had long become disillusioned with the war, and at the same time felt that at the front they were in danger of losing their share in any division of the land in their home provinces. At Pskov, headquarters of the Northern Front (that nearest to Petrograd), a Military Revolutionary Committee had been set up. Yet, despite these successes, a civil war fought between supporters and opponents of the new regime was to be maintained with bitter ferocity until 1921. Who were the enemies of the Soviets, and from where did they draw their power? It must at once be said that virtually no effective opposition came from the Liberal or Social Democrat parties, their leaders, or supporters. Not merely had the Russian liberals proved themselves to be as hopelessly vacillating and incompetent as their emotional, impractical leader, Kerensky; but they had during their brief period of rule since the March Revolution succeeded in weakening those forces that made for order in the state, and so bolstering the increasing power of the ever-vigilant Bolsheviks.

Army

had been virtually desinfamous Order Number March 1917 by the Petrowhich 'democratised' the

discipline

troyed by the One, issued in

grad Soviet, army, and included

2666

provisions

abolish-

Opposite page: Trotsky, creator with Lenin March 1918 Trotsky was appointed People's Commissar of the Bolshevik Revolution. In

for War and Chairman of the Supreme War Council. A man of extreme administrative ability

as well as ruthless political

dynamism,

he was set the task of creating a disciplined army to protect the revolution from its enemies. Below: Lenin the statesman and Lenin the demagogue. By following Lenin's policy of a totalitarian dictatorship the Bolsheviks forced

many moderates to make common cause with the right-wing Whites and swelled the ranks of the anti-Bolshevik armies

ing saluting officers out of service, and the forbidding of the issue of arms to officers! The dictates of military strategy were interfered with by Military Committees and Commissars, with predictably disastrous results. General Denikin tells how the 'Committee of one of the Cavalry Depots on my Front decided that horses should be watered only once a day, so most of the horses were lost'. Despite continual protests by the High Command, the Kerensky government's interference with military discipline merely increased. For example, in March it abolished capital punishment — only to restore it in July. The whole army was soon in a state of hopeless disorder, to the amusement and contempt of the German High Command; and the June offensive ended next month in terrible slaughter and defeat for the Russians. And when, in September, the Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov, attempted in desperation to overthrow the well-meaning but disas-

trously incompetent regime of Kerensky, the latter averted the threat by throwing himself into the arms of the Bolsheviks and other left-wing parties. In this way the last vestiges of military authority were dispelled, whilst the party of Revolution was exalted. Within three days of the arrest of General Kornilov, Trotsky was being released by the Provisional Government.

The Bolshevik threat Thus, at the time of the October Revolution, the Provisional

Government had

suc-

ceeded in depriving Russia of the one force capable of maintaining order in face of the Bolshevik threat. For, apart from the army, there was no solid and effective body interested in the maintenance of law, property, and other civilised institutions. In western Europe, of course, the two strongest pillars of resistance to revolution have been a strongly entrenched middle class and a conservative propertied

peasantry. In Russia,

still in the transition period of her industrial revolution, the middle class was weak in numbers and self-confidence. Moreover, much of Russia's capital and industrial enterprises was in the hands

whilst in any case small proportion of Russia's

ivestors,

worked in any sort of The overwhelming majority

ions 11.

peasants, despite the reforms of Stolypin in 1907-10, without sufficient stake in the land to feel any great interest in maintaining the existing order. Of other likely to oppose violent social forces changes, the monarchy was overthrown and largely discredited, the nobility was a

body

small

in

numbers

and

political

significance.

Thus, in November 1917, the only effechope of resistance to the single-minded and able Bolshevik dictatorship of the proletariat lay in the Russian army. And yet that army had by this stage become virtually an anarchic rabble, an object of contempt to the German and Austrian High tive

Commands, and of shame to its own officers. Nevertheless, it was from that army that was

to .come the

most potent threat

to Bol-

years of power. Already, under the Provisional Government, there had been the attempt of General Kornilov to seize power. This had failed miserably because of the unexpected unity of the parties of the Left, and the lack of support amongst his own followers for an overthrow of the March Revolution, which still seemed to many the promise of better things. Though the four generals commanding at the front supported Kornilov, they were powerless to move their undisciplined troops to help him; and at Berdichev the most actively anti-revolutionary of these, Denikin, was arrested by his local army committee. Kornilov issued, on August 28, a declaration that illustrated at once the weakness and the virtue of the conservative opposition. After protesting against slanders issued by his enemies, he ended: 'I, General Kornilov, son of a peasant Cossack, announce to all and everyone that I personally desire nothing save the preservation of our great Russia, and vow to lead the people, through victory over our enemies, to a Constituent Assembly, when they themselves will settle their fate and select the form of our new national life. I cannot betray Russia into the hands of her ancient enemy — the German race! — and make the Russian people German slaves. And I prefer to die honourably on the field of battle, that I may not see the shame and degradation of our Russian land. People of Russia, in your hands lies the life of your native land!' This appeal, though simple, honourable, logical and patriotic, contained no reference or satisfactory answer to the problems exercising the minds of the mass of workers and peasants. As a result, even those units Kornilov felt he could most count upon just would not fight when they met Kerensky and Lenin's hastily-raised forces on the outskirts of Petrograd. Of the conspirators, General Krymov committed suicide, and Kornilov with his fellow-generals Lukomsky and Romanovsky were arrested at the Stavka (Army Headquarters) at Mogilev. Thence they were transferred to Bykhov, where they were joined by Denikin and some of his fellowofficers, who had narrowly escaped being lynched by the mob of revolutionary soldiers at Berdichev. Kerensky had saved himself temporarily, but even he was able to see that, in turning to Lenin for assistance against Korni-

shevism in

2668

its first

lov,

Above

before.

viewed with the greatest horror the destruction of the army. The colossal size of the Russian army, together with the fact that comparable social institutions were

he was now in greater danger than Accordingly, Kornilov and his fellows were treated leniently, being sub-

jected

to

a

leisurely

investigation.

But

Kerensky's own time was running out and, not being the wisest of men, he found himself no longer capable of mastering the art of sitting on two stools — particularly as it was he who had kicked one of them away. Within a few weeks the Bolsheviks had stormed the Winter Palace, and the unhappy Kerensky was himself desperately searching for troops capable of restoring him to power. At Pskov, Headquarters of the Northern Front, he persuaded General Peter Krasnov (later a distinguished emigre novelist) to advance on Petrograd. Krasnov was an ardent monarchist and traditionalist, and consequently no friend to the deposed Prime Minister; but he was an even more determined foe of Bolshevism. With 700 Cossacks, he occupied Tsarskoye Selo, driving out the Red Guards and holding in check 16,000 soldiers of the garrison. This revealed what regular troops might have achieved had any been available in real force: it revealed equally that pitifully few could be persuaded to fight against the

new government

yet

fighting for

tem,

re-

placed Kornilov after the failure of the coup) remained loyal to the Provisional

Government. But army discipline had virtually come to an end, and the troops i stationed near the Headquarters failed bar the way to the Bolshevik Krylenk appointed Commander-in-Chief by Leni He entered the town with a band of ruffia who dragged Dukhonin from his car and beat him to death. A Provisional Revolutionary Committee now took control, with Krylenko at the head, and the whole army

began

to dissolve in confusion.

The indignation and despair

of the officer be imagined. Insulted, disobeyed, and on frequent occasions beaten or even murdered, they saw the old Holy Russia, its religion and institutions, being torn apart by a ferocious mob led by men it was widely believed were German agents.

class

may

let

monarchy.

Anarchy, violence, hunger

where General Dukhonin (who had

their

infancy,

meant that the

Russia bore a size, influence and importance unparalleled in the west. All the other props of the old regime, the monarchy, nobility, civil service, and Church, had virtually collapsed; all that was left as a guarantee of order and civilised values was the army. And of course Russia was at war! The White armies in Russia were not

of the

the country. Now that the Reds' control of the capital, the former capital, and other vital centre! was confirmed, they began to prosecutl? energetic measures for extending their rule throughout Russia. The most obvious threat came from the Stavka at Mogilev,'

in

must be stressed that they

it

officer class in

Soviets.

General Krasnov's appeal to his troops was even more picturesque than Kornilov's — and as little availing. 'Citizen soldiers, valiant Cossacks of the Don, the Kuban, the Trans-Baykal, the Ussuri, the Amur and the Yenisey, all you who have remained true to your soldiers' oath, you who have sworn to keep the Cossack vow strong and inviolate, — to you I turn with an appeal to go and save Petrograd from anarchy, violence and hunger, and Russia from the indelible mark of shame which has been thrown on it by a dark handful of ignorant men, led by the will and the money of Emperor Wilhelm.' The appeal included references to Cossack victories over the Poles in 1612; but alas, amongst the Cossacks indifference and even revolutionary principles were widespread. Krasnov's advance collapsed, he himself was taken prisoner to Petrograd, and Kerensky fled

all,

-JLl '

any particular

alone

Many

political sys-

the restoration of the individual officers, such

.

Red Army receive Below: Recruits instruction in the use of the machine gun. A decree of January 28, 1918, established the Red Army. In October 1917 the Red Guards in Petrograd had been about 4,000 strong and in Moscow about 3,000. Two and a half years later the 'Workers' and Peasants' Red Army' had 5,000,000 men under arms. Conscription, distasteful to many Bolsheviks, was introduced in

after

the

stormy party debate

in April

1918

as Krasnov,

had positive views on

this

and other points; but the publicly declared aims of the Whites were the restoration of army discipline, an end to anarchy, and the destruction of the power of the Bolsheviks. Rather as an afterthought, they urged the reconvening of the Constituent

Assembly (dismissed by the Bolsheviks in January 1918), so that the Russian people might decide on its future government. All this was very well, but with the collapse of the army, to

whom

could the malcontent generals turn for assistance? The minds of all turned at once to that unfailing bastion of the old Empire, the formidable Cossacks of the Don, Orenburg, and Kuban. And at Rostov, capital of the Don Cossack lands, General Kaledin,

Ataman

of the Don Cossacks, declared the independence of his region.

The

generals

imprisoned

Bykhov

at

since the collapse of Kornilov's coup, decided to escape and flee south to Kaledin. There they could form the nucleus of an army dedicated to restoring Russia to her old greatness. There was no difficulty in leaving Bykhov, as of course their guards had been appointed by the Provisional

Government, and felt little sympathy with Krylenko and his Bolsheviks.

From Bykhov Kornilov

set out to

march

Russia, accompanied only by his personal bodyguard, a regiment of Tekinese tribesmen from Turkestan. They were devoted to the General, who spoke their language and knew their customs. They fought their way across 281 miles through repeated right

across

Bolshevik

southern

ambushes and

attacks, until clear that the advance of so large a body in hostile territory was imit

became

practical.

Kornilov pushed on alone by

train, disguised as a peasant.

Denikin and the other

officers

Meanwhile, imprisoned

their way independently Don, in disguise and with forged documents. At Novocherkassk in the Don territory

at

Bykhov made

to the

highly distinguished and somewhat improbable body of leaders appeared, dedicated to forming a solid resistance to Bolshevism in the south-east. Already the former Commander-in-Chief, Alexeyev, had arrived and set about raising an army. He was joined now by the Bykhov fugitives, which included another ex-Commander-inGhief (Kornilov), the Commander-in-Chief the South-Western Front (Denikin), his tef-of-Staff (Markov), the chief of the GHQ Staff (Lukomsky), and the QuarterTfTaster-General at GHQ (Romanovsky). a

Decline of the Cossacks

The

first impression was one of intense disappointment. Though the Ataman Kaledin was a staunch supporter of the new arrivals, his authority over his own Cossacks was more than precarious. For the -"..iCo&3,acks were no longer what they were. Many of the best elements had perished in the retreat from Poland or the conquest of Galicia, and the traditional ways had been severely weakened. Bolshevik doc-

trines had permeated amongst especially the younger Cossacks;

many, and of the Don, there were

those returning to numbers disinclined

to

fight

a

Soviet

government which had cynically promised 'to maintain the immunity of Cossack

Then again, the non-Cossack peasant population of the Don and Kuban territories, long excluded from such rights, looked on the arrival of Soviet power as the opportunity they had long desired. Thus, the sincere welcome given by Kaledin to the new arrivals had a hollow ing. Many Red Cossacks wished only for rights'.

their destruction; others more indifferent eared that their presence would draw on he whole territory the vengeance of

Bolsheviks, and consequently were anxious to see the backs of the defecting generally and even those Cossacks who were determinedly anti-Soviet included many who wished to maintain the independence of Cossack territory, without extending the coming struggle into a general war against the new government. It was with a truly quixotic spirit, therefore, that General Alexevev and his fellowthe

2669

<

.

2670

^ Arkhangelsk

THE RUSSIAN! REVOLUTION:

TOWNS

IN

WHICH DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OCCURRED.

T

BOLSHEVIK ORGANISATIONS REPRESENTED AT THE 6th CONGRESS.

IMPORTANT CENTRES IN WHICH THE BOLSHEVIKS TOOK OVER THE SOVIETS ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION. Ryazan PRINCIPAL CENTRES OF THE RED GUARD ORGANISATION.

THE NORTHERN AND WESTERN FRONTS & THE BALTIC WHERE THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF SOLQIERS & SAILORS WAS ON THE SIDE OF THE BOLSHEVIKS.

FLEET.

DEFEAT OF KORNILOVS COUNTER-REVOLUTION (SEPT

7-12).

PLAN FOR THE CONCENTRATION OF REVOLUTIONARY TROOPS & SHIPS FOR THE ARMED INSURRECTION,

i—

THE MILITARY REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE (OF THE PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS & THE SOLDItRS' REPRESENTATIVES).

DATE OF THE INSTITUTION OF SOVIET GOVERNMENT. 15.11.17

ARMED ACTION BY PEACEFUL MEANS

SOVIET SUCCESS BY

a

*

b

D

Vladivostok

12.12.17

2671

Above: Red Guards, a worker and a sailor, on a 1917 poster. The Bolsheviks rested great hopes on popular' forces but soon found they had to organise an army. Right: Kornilovsaviour of Russia from shame and degradation?

generals began the formation of the Volunteer Army. Without funds and resources, and virtually without manpower, they began to organise the gradually increasing trickle of refugee officers and soldiers into the semblance of military organisation. As General Denikin picturesquely put it: 'All trekked to the Don without the least

knowledge of what awaited them there; they pushed blindly on through the close darkness of the Bolshevik night, to where the names of leaders whom popular legend linked with the Don shone as a beacon amid the surrounding gloom.' The remains of Kornilov's own regiment, the Kornilovsky, made its way in small parties to Novocherkassk. This helped to swell the numbers to a few hundreds; but so pathetically short of tions were they, that it

arms and muniwas hailed as a

major triumph when they succeeded in stealing two field guns from the demoralised 39th Division at Stavropol! Two more were obtained from the Don artillery depot — borrowed for the purpose of firing a salute at an officer's funeral, and afterwards 'lost'. Another battery was bought from some drunken Cossacks for 5,000 roubles. Munitions remained intolerably scarce, and by the beginning of February the en» tire Volunteer Army consisted of two infantry regiments, three officers' and one cadet battalion, a regiment of schoolboys, two cavalry detachments, and their scanty artillery with very little ammunition. Kornilov now became the leader of this forlorn force, as Alexeyev was old and ill. The latter assisted with administration, and by his presence kept up morale. Korni-

2672

Below left: Kaledin (centre), Ataman of the Don Cossacks, with Rodzyanko (left), Chairman of the Duma, during the summer of 1917. Above: A squadron of Kalmyk cavalry in the White army in southern Russia, 1918 lov was greatly beloved and respected by his fellow-officers and troops. In many ways he was ideally qualified to lead such a forman of indomitable lorn hope as this. courage and deep, if simple, convictions, he was most at home directing his troops under a hail of fire. Completely at sea in

A

the complexities of revolutionary politics, no one was better at restoring morale

amongst

outnumbered

and

outgunned

troops, or at keeping spirits at the highest level during the march into the wilderness. But what did the leaders of this pitiful

disowned even in the land had sought refuge, hope to achieve against the government of the Bolsheviks, little

force,

where

it

rtow in control of virtually all the industrial and key towns of Russia? In Rostov alone flew the tricolour of old Russia, and

Ukraine (though opposition to the Bolshevik government was their only common bond), Kaledin and the Volunteer Army rightly being regarded as the more pressing danger. The main strength of the Bolsheviks lay in the local Red Guards and partisans rather than Antonov's 'army', which was low in numbers, morale, and the

materiel.

Nevertheless, by the time the Red Army arrived on the banks of the Don, the government of Ataman Kaledin was in a state of hopeless division. A number of Cossack regiments had elected a Military

Revolutionary Committee, and war broke out between the rebels and those Cossacks still loyal to Kaledin. Chernetsov, the most dashing and able of his lieutenants, was, after a number of victories gained over the Bolsheviks, captured and put to death by the revolutionary Cossack Golubov (who had fought in the Russo-Turkish War of

disorder.

The Red plan

of

Antonov-Ovseyenko

campaign was

to divide the

for

Don from

the tiny column.

As old General Alexeyev wrote: 'We are plunging into the steppes. We can return only by God's mercy. But a torch must be lit, so that at least one speck of light will shine amid the darkness which has engulfed Russia.' Across the frozen Don and the endless snow-fields moved the pathetic remnant of the old Russian army. General Alexeyev, who when at the Stavka had commanded an army of millions, drove on in a cart with the army's financial resources packed in suitcase. Short of ammunition and horses, their request to General Popov, a leader of anti-Bolshevik Cossacks who had also fled from Rostov, that his force should unite with theirs, was turned down. Where was there left for them to retreat in all

an old

1877).

Russia?

Driven to despair The tiny Volunteer Army formed a

south, to the Cossack territory of Kuban, on the shores of the Black Sea. There the Kuban Cossacks had, in common with their fellows of the Don, declared their independence. It was hoped that they

At

(fentres

on December 13 Lenin ordered the Red General Antonov-Ovseyenko to destroy Kaledin and his supporters. This threat, however, was more formidable in appearance than in fact. The whole country was in a state of flux following the Red takeover, and Russia seemed to be on the point of breaking up into her component parts. In the Caucasus and Finland independence movements sprang up, and in Kiev the Ukrainians declared their state authority, the Central Rada, to be the government of the Ukraine. However, the Soviets set up their own Ukrainian government at Kharkov, and by the end of 1917 the Bolshevik commander Muraviev was driving the Rada's forces westward in

at first little idea of where they were going. To the east lay the open steppes, and slowly and sadly towards them marched

protective screen before Rostov, but with the collapse of effective Cossack support and the overwhelming superiority in numbers possessed by the Bolsheviks, it was clear

that the city could not be defended much longer. Driven to despair, Kaledin made a dramatic speech to the Krug (Cossack Assembly), and then retired to a private room where he shot himself. Shocked by this dramatic gesture, some Cossacks rallied to the cause. But it was

last

it

was decided

to

make

for the

would make common cause with the Volunteer Army. In order to arrive at Yekaterinodar, the capital of the Kuban, the desperate army of Kornilov had to cross miles of desolate steppe country. The cold was fearful, the railways were in the hands of the

Bolsheviks,

the

local

Cossacks

re-

and Rostov was clearly doomed.

mained cautiously neutral, and the army had to fight its way from village to village.

Kornilov, after prolonged and fierce fighting against the Red forces under Sievers, gave the order to cross the Don and begin that remarkable retreat that was to become one of the most heroic episodes in Russian history. Surrounded by what Denikin called 'a dense Bolshevik sea', they had

New recruits gained by the way hardly balanced soldiers lost in the fighting. Still, their spirits undaunted, the little force struggled through to the Kuban territory where at long last they reached Korenovskaya, near the capital Yekaterinodar. Throughout their journey, as Denikin

too late,

2673

Above: Red Army parade

in Red Square, 1918. cavalry review in Moscow. Below right: Russian anti-Bolshevik cartoon- Bolshevik agitator portrayed as the paid agent of Germany

Right: Trotsky at a

Red

Yekaterinodar began to assume a semi-mystic symbol of success; probably not so much that it really did represent the last fragile hope of the Whites, but because it provided an immediate and apparently attainable goal to buoy up their morale. Now at Korenovskaya they learned that General Pokrovsky, head of the separatist

relates,

Kuban government, and his forces had been forced to retire from the capital across the Kuban river. Yekaterinodar was in the hands of the Bolsheviks! The disappointment of the Volunteer force may be imagined, but they remained undaunted. must be personnel opposition proportion It

remembered that

in general the

were the pick of the national

Bolshevism, that a very high were officers, and that many of them had had terrible atrocities committed by the Reds on their families or friends. Kornilov did not hesitate, accordingly, to

but set off as before, fighting his way through the stanitsas and auls (villages) of the Cossacks and Caucasus tribesmen, until on March 27, 1918 he came into contact with Pokrovsky's force. The numbers of troops involved were pitifully small considered in relation to the" size and population of the country, but the accession of some 3,000 Kuban troops, together with artillery, was of the utmost value to Kornilov. He now proposed that Pokrovsky and his forces should unite with the Volunteer Army. After some hesitation Pokrovsky agreed, and the reinforced Volunteer Army, now numbering about 9,000 men, made an incredibly hazardous crossing of the Kuban river under fire. They were now determined to undertake the postponed

2674

Above: German troops in the Ukraine. Germany invaded the Ukraine in February 1918 and occupied it until November. But no attempt was made to destroy Bolshevik power in the Russian heartlands

attack on Yekaterinodar: an objective that united the parochial outlook of the Kuban Cossacks with the wider aims of the original Volunteers. The task must have appeared hopeless, as the town was defended by 30,000 Red troops under two dissident Cossack officers, Avtonomov and Sorokin. The Bolsheviks were well-equipped with smallarms and artillery, and four days' ferocious fighting brought the Whites only temporary successes. Though they had covered

themselves with glory, and inflicted far more severe casualties than they had received, losses

had been heavy and

their

scanty ammunition was running low.

A

stray shell Nevertheless, in his headquarters (held in a farmhouse well within the firing line), Kornilov insisted on a general assault at dawn the following day (April 13). All was prepared, despite the reluctance of the other generals, when a stray shell fired from the town exploded in Kornilov's farmhouse. The General was killed instantly, and his lieutenants, overcome with despondency, began once again to march off into the wilderness. The command had devolved upon General Denikin, an able and loyal admirer of his late chief. This winter's march, with its continuous fighting, terrible

weather conditions, and

frequent disastrous disappointments and bad luck, had tried but not found wanting the spirit of the Volunteer Army. In 80 days (during more than half of which they had been fighting), they had covered 700 miles and increased their numbers overall

by 1,000 men. Now, however, with the death of Kornilov and failure of the attack on Yekaterinodar, they seemed to have come to the end of the road. It was at this critical point that at last heartening news reached them. The Soviet regime in the Don Cossack territory was tottering! Atrocities committed by roving Red Guards had alienated many, and a number of the Cossack leaders (such as old Golubov) had become disillusioned with Red rule: Golubov himself was shot by the suspicious Bolsheviks. General Popov, who had refused to join Denikin in his march across the steppes, and a Colonel Fetisov,

now led forays of the anti-Bolshevik Cossacks into Soviet-controlled territory. At the same time, the Don Soviet Republic found itself threatened from the west by an even more formidable enemy. The Bolshevik government at Petrograd had been obliged to subscribe the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers, at which sweeping concessions had been extorted from the Red leaders by the Germans and Austrians. The latter made a treaty of alliance with the separatist government in the Ukraine, the Rada, and German troops occupied Kiev and pressed on eastwards. By May 1 they were in Taganrog. Meanwhile, a Colonel Drozdovsky had performed a feat as amazing as that of the Volunteer Army. With a small antiBolshevik force, very like that of Kornilov in its composition, he had marched from the Rumanian Front to the Don (some 700 miles), and joined in the attack launched by the Germans and Cossacks against the Soviets in Rostov. On May 8 the combined forces of the Germans, Denikin and Drozdovsky entered Rostov. The Cossacks chose as their new Ataman General

Krasnov

(who

had

led

Kerensky's illand he now

fated attack on Petrograd),

entered into a somewhat uneasy alliance with Denikin and the Volunteer Army. Thus, in the chaotic condition of things in Russia by mid-1918, it seemed to observers that almost anything might happen. Certainly a total victory of the Soviets must have seemed improbable. White armies were victorious in the Don territory and Finland (the Red Finnish army had surrendered the day after the fall of Rostov), German armies bad overrun the whole of the Ukraine (including the Crimea), the British were preparing to intervene at Archangel and the Caucasus, and the pro-Allied Czech Legion in Siberia had started its formidable revolt against the Bolsheviks. But the further successes and ultimate failure of General Denikin and the Volunteer Army is another story. The world is prone to ridicule and denigrate failures. But the march of the Volun-

Army to Yekaterinodar was a feat of which the supporters of the old Russia might well feel proud. And even their enemies might concede that their courage, faith and endurance had earned them the decoration awarded to all who took part in that epic: a crown of thorns pierced by a teer

sword. Further Reading

Bunyan, James (Ed), The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918 (Stanford 1934) Chamberlin, W. H., The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921 (New York 1935) Denikin, General A., The Russian Turmoil (London 1922) Idem, The White Army (London 1930) Kenez. Peter, Civil War in South Russia. 1918 (Los Angeles 1971) Stewart, D., The White Armies of Russia: A Chronicle of Counter-Revolution and Allied Intervention (New York 1933)

[For Count Tolstoy's biography, see page 2144.}

CENT** ARCHBISHOP MITTY HIGH SCHOOL MEDIA 93129 SAN JOSE. CALIFORNIA

2675

J

9

>

/•

•

9X

2

^

% *

In November 1917 there were some 30,000 Czechoslovaks in the Russian army. They had been recruited and organised to fight alongside the Allies and give weight to the call for a Czechoslovak state. But when the Bolsheviks seized power and made peace with the Central Powers the Czechoslovak Army Corps in Russia became an embarrassment and subsequently a threat to their rule.

William V. Wallace. Above: Czech troops in the Urals

v;»

OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK

CORPS

By May 1918 the Czechoslovak Army Corps was strung out along the Trans-Siberian Railway on its way from European Russia to the Pacific port of Vladivostok. The legionaries were becoming increasingly irked by Bolshevik propaganda and suspicious of the intentions of the Bolsheviks towards them— as indeed the Bolsheviks were suspicious of what the Czechoslovaks might do. On May 14 a minor incident occurred which turned their frustration into a full-scale revolt. Two trains, carrying Czechoslovaks eastwards and Hungarian POWs westwards, pulled into the Siberian town of Chelyabinsk. A crowbar was thrown and a Czech was killed. A Hungarian

was murdered

in retaliation.

The Czechs

responsible were arrested by the Chelyabinsk Soviet. A delegation sent to negotiate the men's release was also arrested. The trainload of legionaries then arrested the Soviet and took over the town. The delicate relationship between the Czechoslovak Legion and the Bolshevik government immediately collapsed. Trotsky ordered the complete disarming of the Legion by local Soviets. The legionaries resisted and by the end of June had gained control of nearly the whole length of the railway and the towns along it. Below: A Czechoslovak legionary, wearing mainly Russian uniform but with the cap distinctive to the Legion. The rifle is a Japanese Asaka, as supplied in large quantities to Russia in 1914.

Below right: Armoured

by Czechoslovaks

in

train

manned

Siberia, 1918

*

*s -Tip

2678

r

^:>*

,

The Czechoslovak Army Corps in Russia did not suddenly emerge in 1917. Czechoslovaks were fighting on the Eastern Front as early as October 1914. Nor did the Corps disappear from history at the end of the

From 1918 to 1920 the Czechoslovak Legion was a centre of international atten-

war.

made

way

across Siberia through the Russian Civil War. One development followed naturally upon another. Nonetheless, the exploits of the Czechoslovaks in Russia up to 1918 form a distinct chapter in the history of the war and of Czechoslovakia. They made their contribution to the Allied victory and helped create a new state. When war broke out in 1914, there were perhaps 100,000 Czechoslovaks living in Russia. The majority were peasants farming in Volhynia, but there were bankers and traders, craftsmen and teachers in all parts of European Russia. The most important urban centre of Czechoslovak settlement was Kiev, but there were colonies to be found in other big towns from Moscow to Warsaw. In comparative terms the immigrants were few in number, but insofar as they kept together they had tion

as

it

its

some importance. Like the Russians themselves, they were moved to enthusiasm by the declaration of war. It was not that they felt Russian, but rather that they saw the war as a means of

helping their homeland. Like all exiles, they were more patriotic than their brethren at home. By 1914 the Czechs in Austria were a nation in spirit, if not yet in law, but, a few individuals apart, they did not immediately regard the war as their long-awaited opportunity to win national independence. The more repressed Slovaks of Hungary lagged still further behind. However, to many of the Czechoslovaks in Russia the war was an act of providence. Russia was the Slav brother who would liberate their country from the Austrian and Hungarian yoke. Petitions were submitted to the Ministry of War, which agreed in the middle of August to the recruitment of a Czechoslovak unit in the Russian army. There was also an outburst of political activity. There were declarations of aim, interviews with the Tsar, and a unifying conference. The unit grew to about 1,000, three-quarters of whom were Czechoslovak; and in October 1914 it set off for the Galician front. It was perhaps a little surprising that not more volunteers came forward. The peasants of Volhynia had been in Russia a longish time; they were also less emotional than the educated youths living in the towns and feeding on ideas of progress and revolution. Of course, not all those who volunteered were idealists. For some it was a means of escaping internment as enemy aliens. The Czechoslovak ranks

were supplemented by Russian irregulars and volunteers from other nationalities. Only 11 of the officers were of Czecho-

slovak birth. Nonetheless, the four companies that set out under a banner on which was emblazoned the crown of St Wenceslas were the founders of the Czechoslovak army and even of the Czechoslovak state.

The

little

battles.

Yet

unit its

was far too small to win soldiers built themselves

a reputation for courage and

skill.

They

were employed predominantly on reconnaissance duties. Their feeling for the terrain and their knowledge of the various languages of the Austro-Hungarian army made them a natural choice for such activities. They were particularly skilled in persuading groups of Czechs and Slovaks to desert. A number of them began to create legends around their own names. Lieutenant Stanislav Cecek, formerly a motor car salesman in Russia and subsequently a general in the Czechoslovak army, won his fame for bringing in batches of deserters and prisoners, whatever the conditions, more or less to order. 1914/15 was a hard winter but a useful one. In 1915 things went less well than had been hoped. The unit found it virtually impossible to swell its numbers from among

Czechoslovak POWs. Some local Russian commanders favoured the idea, but the Tsarist government was lukewarm or openly hostile. Prisoners were needed to build the railway to Murmansk, to work in the factories of Taganrog, or to bring in the harvest in the Ukraine. In any case, as the war progressed, the government showed less and less ability to determine where its true interests lay. Rather than employ the Czechoslovaks, it began to distrust them. Petty disputes among the leaders of the different Czechoslovak

to help. Despite repeated requests, the Tsarist government declined to proclaim its support for the dependence, and idea of Czechos' Czechoslovak prisoners showed little inclination to return to the front and risk their lives on behalf of Russia. By December 1915, the unit had added to its reputation. In consequence, it had even been upgraded to become the Czechoslovak Rifle Regiment. It had grown from four to eight companies, supported by a trench-mortar

communities did nothing

company. Yet it still numbered no more than 1,600 men. In 1916 matters fared both better and worse. The Brusilov Offensive brought the Czechoslovak soldiers back to AustroHungarian soil. It was then that young Czech officers like Jan Syrovy, a former bank clerk in Warsaw and later Commander-in-Chief of the Czechoslovak army, won their spurs in battle. Yet by the end of the year, with the virtual collapse of Rumania, the military outlook for the Russians was worse than ever. The Regiment acquired several hundred recruits from the Czechoslovak remnants of the Serbian Brigade that had fought with the Russians on the Rumanian front. But although in October permission was given to raise the Regiment to divisional size, it was very quickly withdrawn. The Tsarist government could still not agree to growth on this scale because of the possible repercussions on its own weakening multi-national structure. It was abetted in its attitude by one faction among the Czechoslovaks themselves that favoured a sycophantic pro-Russian line,

m

right: Czechs guarding wagons at Kurgan, 155 miles east of Chelyabinsk, winter

Above

1918/19. Right: Czechoslovak artillery unit near Kungar on the western edge of the Urals The Legion supported anti-Bolshevik governments in Omsk and Samara and in 1919 was running its own state along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Below: Legionaries on the TransSiberian Railway just east of Omsk

/

*

*.

.

i

promoted conversions to Orthodoxy, and generally encouraged the xenophobic elements in Russia to resist the idea of building up any large non-Russian military Similar factors militated against an official declaration in favour of Czechoslovak independence at the end of the war. As 1916 wore on, therefore, morale among the Czechoslovak soldiers began to fall. They were fighting on the losing side. All too often they were still called on to act as scouts rather than as a single fighting unit; and just as often they were not called into battle at alP Relations between Czechoslovak soldiers and Russian officers inevitably worsened in the face of political dissatisfaction. Young Czechoslovak officers, denied promotion in a Russian-dominated unit, became as disgruntled as their men. In general, too, there was a vast educational gulf between the Czechoslovak volunteers and the Russians, regular or conscript. And all the time the great mass of Czechoslovak reserves in the prison camps went virtually unused, or died of typhoid by the thousand. force.

A

Czechoslovak army

Indeed, but for developments outside Russia, there would perhaps have been no

Czechoslovak Army Corps at all. The first really effective Czechoslovak action against the Central Powers was that organised in Russia. For many reasons, however, the centre of the Czechoslovak effort shifted •to the west, like the centre of the war itself.

Thomas Masaryk, emerging

in

1915

as the leader of the national independence movement, was quick to realise the value of an army to the Czechoslovak cause. A new Czechoslovak state could not be created at the end of the war unless Germany and Austria-Hungary were thoroughly beaten. For this purpose a Czechoslovak military contribution would be useful. More important, the Allies had to be convinced of the virtues of redrawing

the map of Central Europe. This could be achieved partly by presenting a moral case based on self-determination. The argument of force, however, would be at least as strong. If the exiled politicians in Paris, Rome and London could provide reinforcements for the hard-pressed western armies, then their case would be made. They would also have the nucleus of an army to protect the new state after the war. It was little wonder that in the course of 1916 Masaryk and his colleagues gave more and more of their attention to the task of organising a Czechoslovak armed force.

Their main aim was to collect an army the west. There were Czechoslovak POWs in France and Italy; there was a Czechoslovak colony in Britain and large settlements of Czechoslovak immigrants in the United States. So there was no lack of possible volunteers. The real problem was to persuade the governments concerned to permit recruiting to an independent military force. Despite the straits the Allies were in by the middle of the war, it was an uphill task and took till the very close of 1917. Many arguments weighed in the in

Allied decision. Not least among them was the prospect of fresh troops. Connected with this was the possible use that might be made of the Czechoslovak soldiers and prisoners in Russia.

When in 1916 Masaryk and Edward Benes, his right-hand man, first approached the French government on the subject, they discovered that the French General Staff were already trying to borrow Russian troops to fight in the west. Seizing their opportunity, they suggested that any force coming from Russia ought to include the Czechoslovaks. The French became interested, and two different missions that went from the so-called Czechoslovak National Council in Paris to appeal to the Tsar enjoyed their blessing. Both failed. On the eve of the Revolution the Tsarist

government had reached the point of total indecision; and anyway, the leaders of the two missions were at odds. Nevertheless, the idea that the Czechoslovak Rifle Regiment should be expanded and transported to fight in the west had been firmly planted in the minds of the French. With the March Revolution there was a change in the official Russian view. The Provisional Government was not particularly efficient. However, it did wish to prosecute the war, and to that end it was prepared to accept help where it could get it. In addition, although it remained annexationist as far as Russia was concerned it was willing to sanction the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and the creation of an independent Czechoslovak state. Awareness of French support for the Czechoslovaks was crucial. In April, 1917, therefore, it authorised the recruitment of POWs to expand the Rifle Regiment into the Czechoslovak Army Corps. It also accepted that Czechoslovaks on Russian soil, civilians and soldiers alike, could acknowledge Masaryk as their leader and his Council in Paris as their government. What it would not agree to at this stage was the transfer of the new Corps to the French front; it was needed in Russia. Nonetheless, the Czechoslovaks in Russia had at last been given the go-ahead to raise an army and get into battle. They were not concerned with the twists and turns of Russia's domestic politics; their one wish was to help defeat the Central Powers, and the way to do that was in armed action against them. Nor were they specially anxious to move to France; it was action, not its location, that was important. Their task now was to use their freedom and collect a large force for the front.

They nearly failed. In spite of the March Revolution in Petrograd, the Russian Army Command remained Tsarist in outlook and unwilling to accept the political conse-

quences of a fully-fledged Czechoslovak Permission to recruit was rescinded mth and, even when it was renewed, ting itself was much hampered. The toslovak Army Corps that went into action in July 1917 was not the greatly expanded force that had been hoped for. When it joined the Russian Eleventh Army, it numbered only about 7,000 men. Despite its low numbers, it acquitted itself remarkably well. The great 'Kerensky Offensive', on which the Provisional Government placed so much hope, ended in force.

a virtual rout that led indirectly to the

triumph of the Bolsheviks three months later. But the Czechoslovak Army Corps was among the few units to score success. About half its strength, comprising companies of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Regiments, occupied a four-mile sector of the front to the west of the village of Zborov in Galicia. The task of the Eleventh Army was to make a diversionary attack while the main weight of the assault was thrown against the line centred on Lvov. Within the Eleventh Army the chief role was assigned to the 4th and 6th Finnish Divisions to the north and south of the Czechoslovak Army Corps. In the event, the main assault was a failure, though General Kornilov and his Eighth Army breached the Austrian lines and won a notable victory. In the diversionary attack the Finnish divisions made little ground, but the Czechoslovak Army Corps, ignoring their failure, overran the Austrian positions and took more than 3,000 prisoners and large quantities of arms. In the statistics of the war on the Eastern Front a breach of four miles in the enemy's lines and the capture of 3,000 of his men may seem barely worth comment. If the incident had been repeated a hundred times over a year or two before, the outcome of the war — and the history of Russia — might perhaps have been different. The Czechoslovak Army Corps showed an elan completely lacking in the unwilling conscripts that the Russian army, poorly led, drove to their futile deaths between 1914 •

and 1917. But in

the

it

had

been no more outmoded Tsarist

really

nature of an

government to make early use of volunteers than to create a 20th-century army.

The Czechoslovak mini-victory was meaningless for the Russia of 1917. For the history of Czechoslovakia, however, it

was important.

From 7,000 to 30,000 In the course of the battle two Austrian regiments, the 35th and the 75th, whose rank-and-file came mainly from Bohemia, crossed over to fight with the Czechoslovak Army Corps. An enhanced reputation was the equal of a recruiting sergeant. In the retreat to Tarnopol that followed, the Corps enhanced its reputation still further. The 1st Regiment fought a successful rearguard action at Jezerna, the 3rd Regiment at Domamorycz; the 2nd Regiment cut its way out of a German encircling movement at Volosuvky. Czechoslovak officers, too, continued to add to the fame surrounding their names. Lieutenant Rudolf Gajda, who had joined the Corps from the former Serbian Brigade and was later to win fame as a young general in command of Whites in Siberia, was the officer who led the 2nd Regiment out of a seemingly inescapable trap. Lieutenant Syrovy lost an eye leading the assault at 2682

Right: Jan Syrovy, a lieutenant in the Czechoslovak Legion. Far right: A coaster at Vladivostok carrying legionaries across to to be transported back to Europe. Evacuation of the Czechs only began in 1920

Japan

Zborov but, within three days, he was back at the front, his black patch symbolising his courage and determination. The success of the Corps had its effect on the Russian Command. So had the success of one or two other groups, notably the Czechoslovaks who volunteered for Kornilov's 'Storm Battalion'. The barriers to recruitment were removed, and by October 1917 the Czechoslovak Army Corps had grown from 7,000 to 30,000 men, organised in two divisions.

On the eve of revolution This sudden expansion

of the Corps would have been impossible without the triumph at Zborov. It also owed much to Masaryk's presence in Russia during the summer and autumn of 1917. He had valu-

able

acquaintances

Government. He from his political London. He had sending telegrams

in

the

Provisional

had prestige deriving standing in Paris and

a publicist's skill in at the right moment and a diplomat's skill in making demarches in the right quarters, these two qualities being particularly useful in persuading the

Russian Command. The Corps was still by a Russian general, but the language of command was to be Czech

to be led

and the actual commander had first to win Masaryk's approval. At Masaryk's insistence it was also agreed that the Corps should be used not to fight internal battles, but only against the common enemy. Masaryk achieved another object. He went to Petrograd in May with British as well as French support for the idea of transferring the Czechoslovaks to the west. By patient work during the summer he persuaded the Russian Command to give it at least qualified support; a first instalment of 30,000 should go at once, to

POWs

be followed ultimately by the whole Czechoslovak Army Corps. At the same time, the French government promised more than 1,000,000 roubles for the use of the Corps in Russia. Finally, Masaryk secured Russian agreement both to the introduction of French military discipline and the attachment of French liaison officers.

On the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution the Corps was in a transitory position. By general agreement it was not to get involved in Russia's internal politics; its function was to help to defeat Germany and Austria-Hungary and create Czechoslovakia. With the Russian retreat, however, the war in the east had almost come to a halt and it seemed unlikely that the Corps would see much more action there. In any case, agreement had also been reached that it should sooner or later transfer to the'Western Front; it had taken the first steps towards aligning itself with the French army; and in November the first small batch of Czechoslovak ex-prisoners Archangel on their way to France. Like Russia itself, the Czechoslovak Army Corps was neither quite out set

off

for

of the war in the east, nor quite poised to move to the west.

in. It

was

The Bolshevik Revolution ought to have its transfer. The Bolsheviks wanted foreign troops off their soil; they facilitated

supported

national

self-determination.

The Czechoslovaks should have been able to slip away and liberate their homeland. It was not to be. Immediately after the coup d'etat, Russia was in an even more chaotic condition than before, and the chaos turned into civil war. This in itself was a severe test for the Corps. In battle

morale had been high. In inactivity

it

its

grew

and less certain of its ultimate aim. Before Zborov some of its older members had just drifted away; now some of its newer members were less highly motivated, simply anxious to escape the misery of prison camps. Masaryk himself had spent most of August in the Ukraine, trying to raise its morale and, with his tremendous personality, succeeding admirrestless

ably.

The

inactivity remained, however,

and November added confusion. There were Czechoslovaks who felt their loyalty was to the Russian army and therefore to the deposed government; there were others who had been influenced by the slogans of the Bolsheviks. There were many who sympathised with the separatism of the Ukraine; if the Czechoslovaks were to become a nation, why not also the Ukrainians? In Kiev, near which most of the Corps was stationed, the National Rada seemed anxious to _ continue the war, in obvious contrast to the Soviet in Kharkov. Throughout November a number of individuals and units were inevitably involved in semi-political local incidents. It began to look as if the Czechoslovak Army Corps would never see the Western Front for

eastern diversions.

Masaryk, still in Russia, succeeded in reimposing neutrality on his soldiers, but for a time he too became diverted by other possibilities than a move to France. Even before the Bolsheviks entered into negotiations with the Germans in December 1917, it was obvious they wanted peace. It had proved difficult to send more than a token force to the west through Archangel; the

only remaining route was the long slow haul across Siberia and thence by sea. There was still something to be said for fighting the war in the east. Masaryk had discussions with the Ukrainian Rada and with Polish representatives in Russia with just this purpose in mind. It was also not at all certain that the Bolsheviks could get acceptable peace terms, so that the entire war might be renewed. The same idea occurred to the Allied governments, the British especially. Masaryk very soon found himself under pressure to put the Czechoslovak Army Corps at the disposal of a line of separatist states from the Ukraine to the Caucasus, backed by the Western Powers and ready to tackle the Central Powers. He also found himself under severe French pressure to send the

Corps south to Rumania to

stiffen

what

re-

of its resistance. He actually visited the Rumanian front but concluded correctly that resistance would not last. By mid-

mained

December Rumania, too, had sued for peace. The following month the Ukraine followed suit, and nothing remained in Masaryk's view but to direct the Corps eastwards towards Vladivostok.

Vladivostok next stop The Allied governments did not so readily discard their attempt to maintain a front against the Germans in the east. It was the late spring of 1918 before the British would authorise the evacuation of a second small Czechoslovak contingent from Murmansk to the Western Front. Knowledge of this delay made Masaryk all the more determined to get his soldiers off to Vladivostok. In January and February 1918 both sides in the Ukraine showed themselves anxious to secure the armed assistance of the Czechoslovak Corps. This, too, strengthened Masaryk's resolve, and he got both sides to accept the Corps' neutrality and to agree to its withdrawal. His determination

was strengthened in another way. The French government appeared to be in doubt about precisely where and how the Corps should be used, but since the Bolshevik Revolution it had moved very rapidly towards defining its status. It was too valuable a French asset to be left running loose in Russia. A Presidential Decree of December 16, 1917, amplified by a general instruction of February 7, 1918, Czechoslovak army in established a France of which the Corps in Russia was to form an integral part. The new army was to be employed by the French Command, but it was otherwise to be autonomous. It was the symbol of a Czechoslovak state shortly to be created. For Masaryk, therefore, it was extremely urgent to transport the Corps from Russia to France. With Russia on the verge of Brest-Litovsk, the war would be won and the peace made in the west; a full-strength Czechoslovak army must be there on the spot. On March 26, shortly after Masaryk himself started for Vladivostok, agreement was reached with the Soviet government that the Czechoslovak Army Corps could leave unmolested, and make its way back to Europe via Siberia and the Far East. The one condition laid down was that it should surrender part of its arms and equipment. This was reasonable and had in fact already been met. Soviet Russia was at peace with the Central Powers and it did not want Czechoslovak complications. The Corps was in any case heading east and had fought its last battle. This took place at Bakhmach in the second week of March. It was a symbolic occasion, a series of skirmishes near the railway junction east of Kiev. The German army failed to do serious damage to the Czechoslovak Corps which achieved its objective of escaping to Kursk, Penza and the Trans-Siberian Railway. If the Central Powers were to destroy Czechoslovakia's

chances, they would have to do so in the west. If the Czechoslovak Army Corps was to help create Czechoslovakia, it would have to get to the west. The war in the east was over. In the last analysis, the Czechoslovak Army Corps in Russia contributed little militarily to the Allied victory, the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia nothing. Yet the war was won in 1918 partly by an accumulation of threats, and the Czechoslovaks could be counted as among the minor ones, whether as an isolated Corps in Russia or as several divisions about to join the developing Czechoslovak army in the west. Certainly they did help to shape the peace settlement. Even the Legion, marooned in Russia, was an argument Masaryk was able to employ at Versailles in favour of an independent Czechoslovakia. So whatever else the Czechoslovaks in Russia did, they undoubtedly won their own war, though not quite in the way that they and everyone else had expected.

Further Reading

March of the Seventy Thousand (London, Leonard Parsons 1926) Benes, E., My War Memoirs (London, Allen and Baerlein, H., The

Unwin1928) J. F. N., La Legion Tchecoslovaque en Russie 1914-1920 (Paris, Centre National de

Bradley,

Recherche Scientifique 1965) The Making of a State (London, T. G Allen and Unwin 1927) Wallace, W. V., The Czechoslovak Legion', la

Masaryk,

,

History of the 20th Century (London, Purnell 1968)

WILLIAM

New

V,

WALLACE

is

Professor of History

University of Ulster at Coleraine

He has

in

the

written

numerous articles on Czechoslovak history, and has held a number of university appointments in the universities of Pittsburgh, London, Aberdeen and Durham.

2683

THE TREATY OF BREST-

>'.

LITOVSK

On

gaining power Lenin had called on all the belligerents to negotiate peace. Only the Central Powers heeded the call — but they wanted peace only with Russia. It was a great windfall for them, since it

would leave Germany free to concentrate on winning victory in the west. The Bolsheviks needed peace, at almost any price, to consolidate their

>

| I

I

power. Indeed, Germany, with the whip-hand, was determined to exact a very high price. Sir John Wheeler-Bennett. Left: Peace negotiators for the Central Powers: (foreground, left to right) Hoffmann, Czernin, Talaat Pasha, Kiihlmann. Above: Leopold of Bavaria, German C-in-C on the Eastern Front 2685

ago, on March 3, 1918, the treaty of peace between belligerent parties in the First World War was signed by the Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia at Brest-Litovsk. Few then appreciated the full significance of the event. At the moment it appeared to mark the complete victory of German arms on the Eastern Front, and, for Russia, the greatest humiliation in her diplomatic and military history. But though these results were of grave importance in themselves, the more far-reaching effects of the treaty could not be guessed at. In retrospect, however, it is

Some 53 years first

2686

possible to say that, with the exception of the Treaty of Versailles, the Peace Treaties of Brest-Litovsk with Russia and the Ukraine and the complementary Treaty of Bucharest with Rumania had consequences and results more important than any other peace settlement since the Congress of Vienna.

The final Russian offensive of July 1917 had collapsed from exhaustion after its early momentum, and the counterthrust of the enemy had carried the German armies to Dvinsk and Riga. The Russian soldier, exhausted and war-weary, had 'voted for

peace with his legs', in Lenin's phrase. Capitalising the deep-felt longing of the Russian masses for peace, Lenin at once declared the end of hostilities, and thus it came about that, after some vicissitudes, and the murder of the Russian Chief of the General Staff, there sat down on December 20, at the Brest-Litovsk Headquarters of Prince Leopold of Bavaria, one of the strangest gatherings in the history of diplomacy. Fate had decreed that the representatives of the most revolutionary regime ever known should sit at the same table with the representatives of the most

reactionary military caste among the then ruling classes, that a Bavarian nobleman, a Knight of the Golden Fleece, and a Prussian major-general should negotiate on equal terms with a group of Bolshevik leaders but lately returned from exile. The two groups were as widely separated in ideology as in social standing. The representatives of the Central Powers spoke the ancient language of diplomacy. They thought in terms of strategic lines, of provinces ceded, of economic advantages to be gained. Not so the Bolsheviks. Their parlance was not one of frontiers and con-

they were not concerned with geographical expressions. They aimed by cessions;

propaganda

upon

war-weary

European

socialism to achieve what they knew could not be achieved by arms, namely world revolution and the replacement of military imperialism by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

They were prepared to abandon

whole provinces

to the victors if by so doing they could arouse the working classes of the Central Powers to a realisation of the evils of military dictatorship. 'He is no Socialist,' wrote Lenin in his open letter to the American working men in 1918,

'who will not sacrifice his fatherland for the triumph of the social revolution.' So fundamental a difference in approach necessarily resulted in equally different techniques in negotiation. For both parties the time factor was vital. For Germany it was essential to concentrate all available troops on the Western Front as soon as possible in order to ensure the success of the spring offensive against the Allies on which the High Command had staked their all. Hindenburg and Ludendorff therefore demanded a speedy conclusion of the negotiations. Russia was at

Opposite page: Adolf Joffe

(left), leader of the Soviet delegation to Brest-Litovsk, with Lev Karakhan, a member of the delegation, and a German officer. Inset: The Soviet delegation after Trotsky's arrival at the conference in January: (standing, left to right) Lipsky. Stuchka, Trotsky, Karakhan; (seated, left to right) Kamenev, Joffe, Bitsenko. Above: Kuhlmann, one of the shrewdest diplomats of Imperial Germany-he differed with the military over the manner rather than the matter of the treaty. Below: Hoffmann, OHL representative at the conference

first

2687

the mercy of Germany, they urged; no further resistance was possible; and a victor's peace should crown a victor's war. Here at last was a chance to extend the frontiers of Germany to include the Russian Courland, Livonia, and of provinces Estonia, where both the aristocracy of the Baltic Barons and the middle class were largely of German origin, and also Lithuania. There opened before their eyes, too, the opportunity to exploit the rich black soil of the Ukraine whence grain could be exported to feed the army and population of Germany, brought near starvation by the Allied blockade. A dream of achieving great strategic advantages CI need them for the manoeuvring of my left wing in the next war,' Hindenburg had said of the Baltic States), of reducing the former Russian Empire to a series of partitioned States, each dependent upon Germany as economic and political protectorates, began to take hold upon the imagination of the General Staff. But in any case speed was the essence of the contract. If the Bolsheviks would not accept the terms offered by the Central Powers immediately, then the offensive must be resumed and peace dictated at Petrograd instead of Brest-

A cordon sanitaire round the Bolshevik contagion

in Germany and Austria had momentarily encouraged Bolshevik hopes but they had proved a false dawn. The Bolsheviks needed to be able to concentrate

strikes

home to consolidate the Revolution and to defend it against the counter-revolutionary forces of the Right and Centre, now organising in the north, south, and east. New tactics were necessary. On February 10, then, Trotsky made his historic gesture of 'no war — no peace'. Refusing to accept the German terms, he declared the state of war at an end and retired to Petrograd in the belief that the Central Powers were so anxious for peace that they would accept the position despite its anomalies. This gesture, dramatic and original though it was, had merely the effect of handing the game to the Supreme Command. Against the vehement protests of Kuhlmann and Czernin and the weaker opposition of Chancellor Georg von Hertling, Hindenburg and Ludendorff forced the Kaiser to agree to a resumption of hostilities. A rapid advance conducted by Hoffmann brought the German troops to within air-raiding distance of Petrograd. The remnant of the Russian army, already their full energies at

Litovsk.

The Imperial German Government, and Baron Richard von Kuhlmann, opposed this in particular the Foreign Secretary,

policy because of its crudeness and because, with greater political sagacity, they did not share the illusions of the General Staff. Even at that date Kuhlmann doubted the possibility of a complete victory in the field for German arms. A negotiated peace was the best that could be hoped. Like the generals, he was anxious to obtain as great territorial gains as possible in the east, but only in order to hold them as bargaining factors when negotiations for a general peace finally became a possibility. He hoped to avoid making territorial sacrifices in the west by displaying a readiness to surrender conquered territory in the east. Moreover, he was anxious to arrive at a settlement with the Russians peacefully in order to facilitate the course of future negotiations with the other Allied and Associated Powers. To this end the Central Powers accepted the formula of 'no annexations, no indemnities and the principle of self-determination', which the Bolsheviks put forward as the basis for negotiation of a general peace by all belligerent parties. When, however, it became evident that the remainder of the Entente Powers would not accept the invitation to Brest-Litovsk and that, as the Germans had always supposed, the Bolsheviks had to negotiate alone, the Central Powers flung off the mask of 'no annexations' and, under pressure from the German High Command, pursued a policy of unstinted imperialism. But, while the German generals demanded a speedy showdown, the Bolsheviks desired exactly the opposite. The longer the negotiations were drawn out the greater the opportunity for propaganda. If the workers and peasants in the countries both of the Entente and the Central Powers

were

to realise fully

what had happened

in

Russia, and were to wish to copy it, a certain interval was nec< during which the intentions and p< he new Soviet State might becoi To the vast annoyance of the eneral Staff, the Bolsheviks w mposing their policy of pn he peace i

2688

social-democratic government. The agreement provided for the exportation to Germany and Austria-Hungary of 1,000,000 tons of foodstuffs and placed the newly created State under the virtual 'protection' of the Central Powers. Outflanked from the south and disappointed that the toiling masses in Europe had failed to respond to the glowing prospect of a proletarian paradise portrayed for them in an endless flood of propagandist word-pictures, the Russians were forced to abandon their policy of delay. The January

undermined A German Landsturm

patrol in Estonia. The Germans' renewed advance brought them to

within 80 miles of Petrograd

They carried out delaying with masterly skill and for six weeks the conference was little more than a debating society. Trotsky discovered in Kuhlmann an adversary who was his equal in dialectics and the two indulged in what the irate Czernin later described as 'spiritual wrestling matches'. The German Secretary of State was trying to persuade his opponent to accept the fate of the occupied Baltic Provinces as already settled. Trotsky maintained with a wealth of verbiage that their so-called 'selfexpressed desire' for union with Germany was nothing but a veiled militarist annexation. As neither would abandon his viewpoint a complete deadlock ensued and remained unbroken despite the protests of the representative of the Supreme Command, General Max Hoffmann, and the pleadings of the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Ottokar von Czernin, who was aware that the sands of life for the Dual Monarchy were running out. The Supreme discussions.

tactics

Command wanted

troops and Austriaas long as Kiihlmann and Trotsky remained locked in rhetorical combat, neither was forth-

Hungary needed bread:

coming.

February 10, 1918 saw the end. On the previous day the Central Powers had signed a separate treaty of peace with the Ukraine which had proclaimed its independence from Russia under a form of

in discipline

and morale by

subversive propaganda, broke 'like thin clouds before a Biscay gale'. There was virtually no resistance. If the Revolution was to be saved, a 'breathing space' was essential. After a bitter internal struggle the Bolsheviks sued for peace. The German reply

was an ultimatum

setting forth con-

which three days were allowed, while the treaty once signed must be ratified within two weeks. With no othec course open to them, the Bolsheviks accepted the inevitable, and on March 3, 1918 the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed. This treaty, together with the supplementary agreements of the following August, required Russia to renounce sovereignty in favour of Germany and Austria-Hungary over Russian Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, Estonia, and the Islands of the Moon Sound. To Turkey she had to cede Ardahan, Kars, and Batum. In addition she was forced to recognise the independence of Finland, the Ukraine, and Georgia, and to agree to ditions, for the discussion of

reparation payments to the amount of 6,000 million marks in goods, bonds, and gold, on which she actually paid instalments totalling 120 million gold roubles (£12,000,000). Russia lost 34% of her population, 32% of her agricultural land, 859! of her beet-sugar land, 54'/; of her industrial undertakings, and 89% of her coal mines. European Russia was dismembered; she was cut off from the Black Sea and very nearly from the Baltic also. Such was the result of negotiations origno inally undertaken on the basis of annexations, no indemnities, and the principle of self-determination'.

Such was

the peace of which the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung could write: The significance of the treaty with Russia lies in the fact that the German Government has worked only for a peace of understanding and conciliation'. Having thus disposed of prostrate Russia the Central Powers turned their attention to her smaller ally to the south-west. Rumania had entered the war on the side of the Allies in August 1916 and had had some initial successes. But the Russian collapse in 1917 had removed all hope of continued resistance by the Rumanian army whose defences could now be very easily turned.

The Rumanian Government

at

Jassy and the High Command, therefore, entered into negotiations with Field Mar-

August von Mackensen, which shal resulted in the conclusion of the armistice of Foscani on December 9, 1917.

Kuhlmann, Czernin, and Talaat Pasha to Brest-Litovsk after the negotiations by Trotsky on February 10. After visiting their respective capitals they foregathered towards the end of the month with their Bulgarian colleague and the Rumanian representatives at Prince Stirbey's Castle of Buftea, and the preliminary negotiations began. For Rumania peace at the hands of the Central Powers was only less painful than complete conquest. The alternative to the acceptance of a dictated treaty was obliteration from the map — complete partitionment between the States of the Quadruple

had not returned

rupture

Alliance.

of

liminary, and there followed eight weeks of subsequent negotiations during which the Rumanian Prime Minister, Marghiloman, tried desperately to obtain some mitigation of the terms. All in vain: when the Peace of Bucharest was finally signed on May 7 it was found to be even more Draconian than its predecessor.

The Central Powers condemned Rumania economic servitude and reduced her sovereignty to a farce. The whole line of the Carpathians went to Hungary. The Dobrudja was divided between Bulgaria in the south and an Austro-German condominium in the north. Rumania was cut off from the sea, being merely conceded the use of Constanza as a free port. The Austrians took as a pledge the port of TurnuSeverin, and the Germans that of Giurgiu. Completely disregarding the international conventions regarding the freedom of transit and navigation on the Danube, the Central Powers and Rumania agreed that the river below Braila should be placed under a new commission consisting of only those States bordering on the Danube or on the European coast of the Black Sea, which in effect meant that the control of the whole river passed into the hands of the Teutonic Powers. Finally, the Rumanto

'A model of the peace to be imposed on all our enemies'

Austria-Hungary and Germany

entertained a bitter hatred for this State which had abandoned her treaty of alliance with them, and added to this was a scathing contempt for a defeated enemy, while Bulgaria nursed a long-cherished revenge for her own defeat at the hands of Rumania in 1913.

The German Emperor and the German High Command favoured the deposition of Hohenzollerns from the throne, and the substitution of some loyal German Prince, but this was the

quate to the occasion'. But the Treaty of Buftea was only a pre-

'traitor'

Rumanian

opposed both by Mackensen and Czernin on the grounds that it would constitute too great a blow to the monarchical principle. King Ferdinand was, however, forced to meet Czernin in Bucharest at the end of February and to hear such direct and outspoken reproaches as can seldom fall to the lot of any sovereign. The preliminaries of peace were signed at Buftea on March 5, 1918 and were in keeping with the tenor of negotiation set at Brest-Litovsk. Rumania was as incapable of resistance as Russia had beeri~and the terms were in accordance with her condition and with the bitterness of the hatred of the Central Powers. The whole of the Dobrudja was ceded to the Quadruple Alliance for subsequent partition among themselves. Hungary received substantial territorial concessions along the whole length of the Carpathian border, which placed her in a dominant strategic position vis-a-vis Rumania. The Rumanian army was to be reduced to a bare skeleton, all enemy territory occupied by it was to be evacuated, and the transportation of Austro-Hungarian and German troops was to be facilitated through Moldavia and Bessarabia in their advance on the Ukraine. All officers of the Entente military missions were to be dismissed. In addition, Rumania accepted 'in principle' all economic measures considered 'ade-

ians were compelled to agree to work for years to feed Germany and her allies at fixed prices, and her oil wells were leased to Germany for a term of 99 years. An army of occupation was to be maintained in the country in order to enforce the terms of the treaty, and evacuation was only to take place 'at times later to be agreed upon'. One sole concession was made to Rumania. She was to receive a free hand in securing from Russia the province of Bessarabia. The all-embracing scope of the Peace of Bucharest is indicative of the powerful influence exercised by German industrialists and military leaders at that moment, and the voluminous treaties which constitute the whole agreement are, perhaps more even than those signed at Brest-Litovsk — since the Peace of Bucharest provided indirectly for enormous war indemnities — the most convincing evidence of what a victorious Germany would have been. Its negotiators, and particularly Baron Burian,successor to Czernin, professed to regard it as 'moderate and just', and the Miinchener Post described it as 'a model of the peace to be imposed on all our enemies'. But its true interpretation was given by a German staff officer in reply to the protests of a Rumanian diplomatist. 'A harsh peace,'

'You call it a harsh peace? Just you see what we are preparing for France and England.' The Peace of Brest-Litovsk — and, in a minor degree, the Peace of Bucharest — was a milestone in modern history. For Russia and for Germany it obviously had

he

said.

wait

till

results of incalculable importance; but for the Allied and Associated Powers its significance was also very great. The course of world history was changed on March 3, 1918.

For the Bolsheviks, peace on the Eastern Front, even such, a peace as that exacted by Germany, spelt salvation. By a gigantic sacrifice Lenin had purchased a 'breathing space' during which he might discipline his followers, eliminate the remainder of the bourgeois parties, and organise the defence of the Soviet Power against the attack of the Russian Whites. With the shattering of their early hopes of a widespread revolt by the European proletariat, the Bolsheviks began concentrating their energies on the consolidation of the Revolution in Russia. They could do this effectively only after hostilities had oeased to engage their attention. Lenin's stern adherence to the policy of natibnal immolation caused wide dissent among his followers, but it gained that modicum of time necessary for the organisation of the Red Army on the ruins of the Tsarist military machine. Moreover, at the back of his mind was the firm conviction that some day all that had been sacrificed at Brest-Litovsk would be won back with interest by a victorious revolutionary Russia. It was this conviction which, some quarter of a century later, was to have so catastrophic an influence on the history of the world when transmuted by Stalin into the Soviet foreign policy of the Second World War.

own

At the time these sacrifices appeared quixotic and unduly pusillanimous, but their wisdom was displayed when the victory of Kazan over the counter-revolutionaries bore witness to the growth of the new Soviet military formations. Without the 'breathing space' the Bolsheviks might — probably would — have perished at the hands of the advancing Germans, or of the White counter-revolutionary forces or by the intrigues of the Cadets and the SocialRevolutionaries of the Right and the Left.

The world might then have never witnessed the vast experimentation of the victorious Soviet Power nor endured the attentions of the Third International. The potential 'ifs' of the question do not cease there; they extend in an unending and roseate vista into limbo, for if there had been no Comintern, would not Fascism and National Socialism have been deprived of -their primary raison d'etre? And, though the particular brand of extreme disgruntled nationalism which they represent might well have found some other outlet, it probably would not have manifested itself in the form of totalitarianism. Thus Ludendorff was the involuntary saviour of Bolshevism for Europe. By the same reasoning he was the godfather of that National Socialist movement which later he espoused; for if Adolf Hitler is the putative child of the Treaty of Versailles, he also is the offspring of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. For Germany both the issues and the results were more complicated than for Russia. Yet, in the case of Germany, the importance of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest was very great. At the outset it appeared as if the Supreme Command was on the eve of the realisation of its wildest dreams. The psychological effect on the jaded civilian population, close to starvation, was to refresh its war enthusiasm and to rekindle the Siegeswille (will to victory) which had burned low in the dark days of 1917. And, indeed, the material achievements of the Supreme Command were very alluring. Within their grasp were the occupied provinces of the Baltic, ready to be erected

2689

semi-independent States subject to Before them stretched the fertile lands of the Ukraine, whence grain and meat would be forthcoming for hungry populations and horses for hardpressed armies. The puppet government of the Rada, completely dependent upon German bayonets for its existence, could be — and ultimately was — overthrown by the pressing of a button to make way for an even more subservient successor. In addition, the treaties made by the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest gave them access to the oil wells of Azerinto

German domination.

had not been foreseen that a year later a Soviet Ambassador (Joffe), with full diplomatic privileges and immunities, would be

Brest-Litovsk gave the new Russia time to gather strength

resident in Berlin, providing a rallyingpoint and source of monetary support for the revolutionary elements of extreme German Socialism. Though there is some debate as to whether Lenin received any assistance from the German financial government or Supreme Command on his return to Russia, it is an established fact that members of the Spartacist (Communist) Party and the Independent Socialist Party were provided with money from the Soviet Embassy for revolutionary purposes and when, in October, Joffe was finally expelled for his activities, it was too late. Apart from this official contact of the Soviet government with the revolutionary elements in Berlin, there were thousands of unofficial emissaries who brought with them the seed of subversive propaganda. German POWs had been subjected to the full force of Bolshevik wiles. They had seen the Russian army crumble away under its influence, and on their return to Germany they brought with them the new political plague. Added to these were the troops on the Eastern Front themselves who, by the Armistice Agreement of Brest-Litovsk, had been permitted to fraternise with the

baijan and Rumania. The bulk of the fighting having been done by Germany, the lion's share of the spoils fell to her. Already she was the dominant partner in the Quadruple Alliance; now her position was vastly strengthened, for she held nominal Sway over the Ukraine and Rumania, while her influence extended through the Trans-Caucasus and to the farther boundaries of the Don Basin.

The way

lay open for

an intensification of

the anti-British activities then being carried on in Persia and for propaganda in British India. But the ambitions of the Supreme Command vaulted still higher. They embraced not only a string of satellite States along the Russian border but a Russia, surrounded by German depend-

Russians in No-Man's Land and had re-

itself

become,

a

German

ceived from them copies of the Fackel and other Bolshevik revolutionary material

But neither the possible nor the impossible ideas of the Supreme Command were

specially prepared for German consumption. Thus each division transferred from east to west brought infection with it. 'We

encies, for

which in time would

all

practical

purposes,

satellite.

destined to be fulfilled. The deliveries of food and grain from the Ukraine fell far short of the promised 1,000,000 tons, and of these the greater part went to AustriaHungary. The same was true of the expected oil and grain to be procured from Rumania. Attempts to obtain foodstuffs by force and against the will of the population failed utterly. Brest-Litovsk proved a will-o'-the-wisp, luring the Supreme Command ever farther and farther in pursuit. And the Supreme Command was an all-too-willing follower. The paranoia of Ludendorff had now become Napoleonic.

Quartermaster-General saw First himself, bathed in the sunlight of victory, creating and distributing kingdoms as had the Emperor of the French after the Peace of Tilsit. He kept a garrison in the Baltic States, where grand-ducal governments were in process of creation; an army of

The

occupation was maintained in Rumania; an expeditionary force was dispatched to Finland to crush a Bolshevik rising; another expedition penetrated to Baku; a third occupied the Crimean ports, and the German colonists in the Crimea were urged to appeal to the Kaiser for annexation. Ludendorff's conception of Deutschturn CGermandom') had become all-embracing. 'German prestige demands that

we should

hold a strong protective hand, German citizens, but over all Germans', he was writing at that moment (June 1918) to the Imperial Chancellor. In addition, the problems of the Polish Regency demanded constant care and supervision, and in the Ukraine the maintenance of a succession of unpopular regimes proved more of a liability than an not only over

reached the point,' admitted Hoffmann, 'where we did not dare to transfer certain of our eastern divisions to the west.'

'Stab in the back' Not only did the Peace of Brest-Litovsk save the Revolution in Russia, it also materially contributed to the outbreak of the Revolution in Germany; and such 'stabbing-in-the-back' as was done is

Kaiser: This is the doormat of our new premises.' Emperor Karl: 'Are you sure it is quite dead?'

The

attributable

with which it had begun the negotiations. It had sought to free its hands in the east in order to concentrate its reserves of manpower in the west. Yet 1,000,000 men immobilised in the East was the price of

German aggrandisement, and half that number might well have turned the scale in the early stages of the German offensive in France. According to both French and British military authorities, only a few cavalry divisions were necessary in March and April 1918 to widen the gap in the Allied line so that a general retreat would have been inevitable. These were not availto the Supreme Command on the Western Front; but at the moment three German cavalry divisions were held virtually idle in the Ukraine. Only in the late

able

summer

of 1918,

when

the

German

losses

had attained fantastic figures, were troops transferred from the east. But they came a few at a time and too. late. Ludendorff the Politician had defeated Ludendorff the General.

A victor's peace must be enforced, and in enforcing the terms of the treaties of

Nor was this all. The seed sown at Brest-Litovsk brought forth not only Dead Sea Apples but also poisoned fruits. Too late were the Germans to realise that they themselves were not immune to the virus which they had helped to inject into the body politic in Russia. Through different channels Bolshevik propaganda flowed

Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest the Supreme Command lost sight of the primary object

back into Germany. sent across Europe

asset.

2690

When Lenin had

been

in a 'sealed coach',

it

itself,

to

for they

the Supreme Command had supplied the original

daggers. To the Allied and Associated Powers the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest were of almost as great significance as to the contracting parties. The disclosure of the naked and brutal policy of annexation as practised by a victorious militarism proved a salutary deterrent to the activities of

well-meaning but misguided paci-

the countries of the Entente. These, discouraged by the dark days of 1917, had been preaching a 'peace of understanding'. The attitude of the German Supreme Command towards Russia, Rumania, and the Ukraine showed clearly what might be expected in the way of 'understanding' from the adherents of the Machtpolitik, and the effect on the peoples of Great Britain, France, Italy and their smaller allies was a stiffening of the ranks, a locking of shields, a determination to fight on to the end and to destroy the militarist power in Germany. in

fists

was this renewed spirit of resistance which enabled the civilian populations to remain calm in the face of the early disasters which followed the launching of the It

great

and

German

offensive on

March

to retain their confidence

21, 1918,

throughout

that fearful spring and early summer mil il the Allied counter-offensive on -July 18 wrested the initiative from the German armies for the last time.

In addition to this psychological effect, the Peace of Brest-Litovsk had other unforeseen repercussions in the -Allied camp. It was responsible for the arrival of Japanese troops for the third time in history upon the mainland of Asia. Terrified by the prospect of German penetration into Asiatic Russia, the British and French governments, in direct opposition to the views of their advisers in Moscow and despite very great reluctance on the part of the United States, countenanced the dispatch to Siberia of an inter-Allied expeditionary force in which the Japanese contingent was much the largest numerically. Though the Allied and American troops were withdrawn soon after the conclusion of peace with Germany, the Japanese divisions were not evacuated until after the Washington Conference of 1922, and this period of occupation undoubtedly whetted the appetite of Japan for further territorial acquisitions in Asia. In the United States the effect of the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest was even more apparent. During the first year of American participation in the war there had seemed to the Allies a certain President lukewarmness in Wilson's pursuit of his policies. 'War upon German imperialism, peace with German liberalism' had been the essence of his speeches since April 1917. The emphasis had been laid on the profit which the liberal elements in Germany could acquire by divorcing themselves from the domination of the Supreme Command and accepting the terms which the President would persuade the Allies to offer. It was largely in this spirit that Mr Wilson had enunciated

Fourteen Points in January 1918. In formulating that programme he had hoped, on the one hand, to encourage the Russians to refrain from making a separate peace, and, on the other, to divide the German people from their rulers. The unsatisfactory reply of the German government to the Fourteen Points, followed by the barefaced brutality of the terms dictated at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest and their ratification by the Reichstag almost without protest, convinced the President that there was but one Germany to be conquered, the Germany of the Supreme Command, and that the soundest political strategy was to reiterate again and again the impossibility of peace with the kind of government that had imposed the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. This change in policy, a change so vital that to it may be attributed in large measure the final and speedy victory of the Allied cause, was made public in President Wilson's speech at Baltimore on April 16, 1918, in which he frankly admitted his recent change of heart and new resoluteness of purpose: I am ready, he declared, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely proposed — a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer. I accept the challenge. Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether Justice and Peace shall reign in the affairs of men. There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Force which shall make Right the his

law of the world, and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust. This amounted to no less than a pledge of the last man and gun and dollar in America to the Allied cause. Unanimity between the United States and the nations of the Entente had at last been achieved and victory was assured, for once the American man-power was made available, there could be no doubt of the outcome. The artificer of this compact was Ludendorff and the background of its forging was Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. The German Supreme Command by its policy of aggrandisement had contributed to the Allied cause that final and essential degree of co-operation and oneness of purpose necessary for victory. Indeed, they did more, for they had forever deprived themselves of the ability to use the Fourteen Points as a basis of negotiation. When the idea was suggested by Germany in their first Armistice Note of October 4, it was met with a blank refusal on the part of the Allies: 'The pronouncements of President Wilson were a statement of attitude made before the Brest-Litovsk Treaty,' ran the official British memorandum of that time. 'They

Germany had meted out savage terms to Russia. Could she expect leniency from the victorious Allies? cannot, therefore, be understood as a full recitation of the conditions of peace.' In the interpretation of the Fourteen Points which occurred during the pre-Armistice negotiations it was made clear that no vestige of Germany's conquests in the east could be retained by her. 'In any case the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest must be cancelled as palpably fraudulent,' stated the official commentary prepared by Colonel House's commission. 'Provision must be made for the withdrawal of all German troops in Russia.' And it was in accordance with this view that the treaties were abrogated in the Armistice Agreement of November 11, and formally annulled by the Treaty of Versailles. It was this attitude of the Allied and Associated Powers towards the dictated Peace of Brest-Litovsk which strongly influenced the German Social Democrats in finally accepting what they regarded as the dictated Peace of Versailles. They were persuaded that reaction against the harshness of the peace terms granted to Germany would inevitably occur in the Allied countries and that this would result in a revision of the Treaty. It is a matter of historical fact that the over-all pattern of German-Russian relations over the past 200 years has been one of alternating bitter estrangements and warm rapprochements. This was true of the policies of Frederick the Great, but it became more clearly defined with the re-emergence of Prussia in the 1860's as a dynamic force in Europe. There then appeared within her counsels two warring schools: one thought of Russia as the

natural ally of Prussia in the coming struggle with France and Austria; the other thought in terms of a Greater Germany which included Austria and her traditional hostility to Russia. Between the two the upper echelons of the Foreign Office and the General Staff were divided; sometimes one was in the ascendant, sometimes the other. It was the triumph of the Greater Germany School during the First World War which found its ultimate expression in the predatory Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, by which it was intended to eliminate Russia as a political factor

European

in

affairs.

Further Reading Churchill, Sir Winston, The Aftermath (London 1929) Czernin, Count Ottokar von, In the World War

(London 1919) Fischer, Louis, The Soviets in World Affairs (London 1930) Hoffmann, Major-General Max, War Diaries and Other Papers (London 1929) Lockhart, Sir Robert Bruce, Memoirs of a British Agent (London 1932) Ludendorff, Lieutenant-General Erich, My War Memories 191 4-1 91 8 (London 1919) Magnus, Judah

P.,

Russia and Germany at

Brest-Litovsk (New Haven 1919) Reed, John, Ten Days that Shook the World (New York 1919) Rosenburg, Arthur, The Birth of the German Republic (London 1931) Trotsky, Leon, The History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk (London 1919) Volkwart, John, Brest-Litovsk, Verhandlungen und Friedensvertroge im Osten 1917 (Stuttgart 1937) Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John, Brest-Litovsk, the

Forgotten Peace March 1918 (London, revised edition, 1966)

Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John, The Treaty of BrestLitovsk and Germany's Eastern Policy (Oxford 1929) SIR

JOHN WHEELER-BENNETT, KCVO, CMG,

OBE, FRSL, was born on October 13, 1902 Educated at Malvern College, he became a dedicated historian at an early age. Working through the League of Nations Union, the Information Service on International Affairs which, with its fortnightly Bulletin, he founded, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, he travelled widely in Europe, the United States and the Orient, at the same time writing a series of books on the interrelated subjects of Security, Disarmament and Arbitration. Having been an active observer of the post-war German political scene and the rise of the Nazi Party, he published in 1935 Hindenburg the Wooden Titan, to be followed in 1938 by BrestLitovsk, the Forgotten Peace During the Second World War he served first in Washington, at the British Embassy, and in New York, and later in London in the political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, of which he became Assistant Director-General, and SHAEF After the war he was attached to the British prosecution team at the trial of the major war criminals at Nuremberg and also served as first British Editor-in-Chief in the international project for the publication of the German Foreign Ministry Archives In the post-war years he taught at Oxford and at various American universities. He was an original Fellow of St Antony's College and later an Honorary Fellow. The University of Oxford awarded him an Hon DCL in 1961. In this same period he returned to historical and biographical writing Munich, Prologue to Tragedy (1948), 7ne Nemesis of Power, the German Army in Politics (1953), King George VI, his Life and Reign (1958) and John Anderson, Viscount Waverley (1962) He was knighted in 1959 and appointed Historical Adviser. Royal Archives He died in 1975.

2691

Leon Trotsky,

until recently an exiled revolutionary in America, arrives in Brest-Litovsk as Chief Soviet Delegate

and Commissar

for

War.

In spite of throwing already 100 Divisions irto the buttle and enduring the reckless sacrifice of human life, he has as yet made little progress towards his goals.

We

me

owe this to the determined fighting and self-sacrifice of our troops. to express the admiration which I feel for the splendid resistance offered

Army under the most trying circumstances Many amongst us now are tired. To those I would The French Army side which holds out the longest

most

Words by

all

fail

ranks

of our

the

say thnt Victory will belong to is

moving rapidly nnd

in great

force to our support.

There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held With our backs to the wall and believing to the last man: there must be no retirement. The safety of our in the justice of our cause each one of us must fight on to the end. homes and the Freedom of mankind alike depend upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical

moment.

U^l'

4

T^

'

LUDENDORFF OFFENSIVE

PHASE 2

Hard on the heels of the Michael and Mars offensives came Georgette. Mounted on a weary and thinly-defended British front, its initial success led Haig to issue his famous 'Backs to the Wall' order. 'What bloody wall?' came the cry from the ranks. John Keegan

The diminishing success

of Michael

and

the unmistakable failure of Mars (the abortive attack at Arras on March 28) forced OHL on April 1 to turn again to the list of strategic options it had drawn up before the opening of the spring offensives. Those options had been numerous, but among the most attractive was an attack on the British line in Flanders, where the Germans' possession of the commanding ground and the closeness of the Channel coast to the trenches put the defenders at a considerable disadvantage. To Ludendorff, who opposed making the first, effort against the French (though the weaker of the two A bad originally seemed a b on which to attack the British Somme, for a comparatively si mce might cut off a .

I

sizeable

British

surrender.

2694

It

woul

compel it to he necessary

Channel: the capture of the strategic railway junction of Hazebrouck, twenty miles east of Armentieres, would isolate the British Second Army and the Belgians and bring about a collapse of resistance from Bethune northwards. to penetrate to the

But objections were found to this 'northern operation'. As Ludendorff had pointed out to General von Kuhl, Chief-of-Staff to Army Group Prince Rupprecht, the success of an attack in the Flanders plain depended upon clement weather, as the British had proved to themselves at much cost the autumn before; and that same battle (Third Ypres) had left the plain littered with obstacles which might easily hold up a breakthrough. LieutenantColonel Wetzell, Ludendorff's strategic adviser, had consequently taken the view that the operation, codenamed .Si* George, should not he the major effort but a 'second

act' to the Michael offensive. Crown Prince Rupprecht's staff accordingly began work on a variety of plans, some designed to achieve major strategic results on the Flanders front, and others with less ambitious aims. Eventually the following list was drawn up: George I was a drive between Armentieres and the La Bassee canal, aimed at Hazebrouck; it might be combined with a converging thrust nearer Ypres to be called George II. George II consisted of three subordinate thrusts: Wood Feast, intended to penetrate the defences of the Ypres salient from the northeast and to reach Poperinge; Hare Drue, also aimed at Poperinge, but from the south-east via Mount Kemmel (the highest and point of 'Flemish Switzerland'!; Flanders 3, which was designed to cut off the Belgians between Dixmude and the coast. Detailed planning was delegated by Prince Rupprecht to the staffs of his two subordinate armies, which would have to (airy out the operations: Fourth Army, which held the sector between Ypres and the coast, and Sixth Army, to its south, whose other flank rested in the Lens coalfields Both proposed schemes which de manded more force than could be made available to them. Their own '|x )Slll(,H divisions — those actually holding the front

SalS^I

7

— were spread

ed that a task force of high grade attack

206 heavy batteries and"*^24 super-heavy batteries. And it had finally fixed its allotment of attack infantry divisions at 14, of which all but one came from resting and none had taken part in the

divisions would have to reinforce their fronts beforehand. Unfortunately Sixth

would suggest that on average they were

out too thinly to be- capable

mounting a serious attack themselves and in any case were of too low a quality to be worth using. It was, therefore, accept-

of

Army's scheme would have required 25. Quast, the commander, was told that no more than 20 could be made available — later reduced to ten — and that he must restrict his aims accordingly. On March 24 the two armies were told that St George could be mounted only in a modified form, to consist of the drives towards Hazebrouck by Sixth Army and to Mount Kemmel by Fourth Army, the ensemble to be known as Georgette. Its exact timing would depend upon how swiftly the siegetrain of heavy and super-heavy guns could

be brought north from the Somme. On April 8, having organised two days earlier a diversionary offensive against the French near La Fere, called Archangel, OHL ordered that Georgette was to begin the following day; Fourth Army's attack following that of Sixth Army's at an interval of 24 hours. In the end OHL had managed to be rather more generous with Sixth Army than had previously been thought possible. In artillery, it supplied 105 field

batteries,

March

offensive.

To

offset that, analysis

not equal in quality to the divisions that

had attacked on the Somme on March 21. Only three were rated first-class formations by Allied Intelligence, four secondclass, while seven were rated third-class. Most had been fairly recently engaged on the Flanders front and were weary of fighting, unlike those which had come to the

Somme

from Russia, spoiling

for

a

The only exception, 43rd Reserve, though originally an elite division, had declined in quality and was now rated no fight.

better than third-class. Because the Allies had assigned categories to the German divisions, it should not be thought that they could pinpoint their whereabouts, still less that they had foreknowledge of the German High Command's intentions. Indeed, Allied Intelligence's appreciation of German plans during the diminuendo phase of the Michael offensive on the Somme was vague, or, to be more accurate, was fairly precise but unsound. The judgement of Haig's Intelligence sec-

tion, placed before

— quite

him on April 6, was Germans were

correctly — that the

still intent on incapacitating the and that their effort- would probably take the form of a two-pronged attack on Vimy Ridge, an assault at Arras as a continuation of the Mars attack which had failed on March 28, and another further north, near Lens. This last operation was, in fact, under preparation, codenamed

probably

British,

Valkyrie. As a diversion to this offensive, the Intelligence section thought it possible that the Germans might launch a surprise attack with three or four divisions against the short length of front held by the Portuguese near Neuve Chapelle. The disposable reserve was estimated at between 25 to in all, which Intelligence accurately located in the rear area between Arras and Bethune. The Intelligence section did not attempt to forecast the timing of the coming German offensive, but judged, safely enough, that it could not be long delayed. The initial success of Michael had led the Germans into a large salient on the Somme, and the southern flank of

30 divisions

was dangerously exposed to French counterstroke. The Germans could not have failed to notice that Petain, at Foch's request, was assembling his main reserves near La Fere, the most convenient this salient

a

2695

area for launching such a counterstroke. Indeed, on April 6 six divisions of German Seventh Army mounted a successful attack on this sector of the front and drove the French out of their bridgehead on the northern bank of the River Ailette. It was a reasonable supposition therefore that they would shortly assault the British — assuming, of course, that their whole strategy was now geared to achieving victory before the trickle of American reinforcements became a flood. On the basis of this supposition, Haig at once sent an envoy to Foch's headquarters to persuade him of the urgency of the danger in which the British front stood and to prevail on him to lend assistance. He suggested that any of the following moves might be practicable: a counterattack on a large scale by the French in order to draw off German reserves from the British sector; the relief of the British line as far north as the Somme, thus relieving British divisions for use as reinforcements further north; or the transfer of a sizeable body of the French strategic reserve to the northern front, in order to stand behind the threatened British divisions opposite Vimy Ridge. Foch made it clear to Haig's emissary that he could not concur in any of these suggestions, an attitude he maintained at a meeting with Haig the following day and in correspondence with Wilson, the CIGS, who attempted to argue the same case. Foch's mind was made up. He was determined to maintain the integrity of the Allied line at all costs — which meant keeping the bulk of his reserves near Amiens, the point of junction between British and French fronts, and the principal rail centre for the northern wing. The Germans had already reached uncomfortably close to Amiens, and had the station under intermittent long-range shellfire. His immediate plan therefore was to clear them away from Amiens by a limited counteroffensive, in which he expected the remnants of the British Fifth (now renumbered Fourth) Army to take part; less urgently, he had in preparation a French attack to recover ground at the southern base of the Somme salient, near

Montdidier. He refused to place much credence in the probability of a German attack in the north — a contingency which he confusingly alluded to as the 'battle of Arras', but announced that if it came about he would avert the danger by moving the reserve — amounting to four infantry and three cavalry divisions — which was planned to stay west of Amiens, northwards.

unused to the extreme winter climate of northern Europe, had no understanding of the reason for Portugal's quarrel with Germany and no feeling of hostility towards the German soldiers opposite them: Germany', a German interrogation of some Portuguese prisoners read, 'was strange to them and why they should fight against her was incomprehensible'. In January 30 Portuguese soldiers, in the absence of their officer, had signalled to the Germans opposite them to come over and had told them that they had had enough 'the notion of

of the war. In particular they resented the attitude of the English, who were mistrustful of their powers of resistance. The British were indeed very doubtful of the Portuguese divisions' fighting worth. This doubt was based in part on a judgement of their morale — which was not improved by the practice of allowing the

home on leave but not the men — but on an objective calculation of their 'trench strength', which was low. The Portuguese 2nd Division was 7,000 below establishment on March 30 and it was therefore shortly afterwards arranged between the British and the Portuguese general staff that the two divisions were to be amalgamated into one strong division, holding the same length of front. Nevertheless, independent observers still thought officers

also

across their rear, was to be garrisoned by British troops. The XI Corps Cyclist Battalion and the corps cavalry regiment (King Edward's Horse) were detailed to

intervene immediately and had rehearsed the move; they were to be relieved by the 50th and 51st Divisions, which would take a little longer to arrive. What had prompted the formation of this plan was the unusually early cessation of the winter rains, with the result that the more or less impassable ground that the Portuguese were defending had dried out. The same develop-

ment had been an important

factor

creasingly difficult for the Germans to hide the signs of their impending attack. On that morning an airman, spiralling down through the low-lying fog, saw 'what

appeared to be the

sides

piles of road

of the

metal along roads approaching the

Portuguese front' and an air photograph taken later in the day revealed that footbridges had been positioned on the banks of adjacent streams. The commander of First Army, General Home, convinced

April 8 at a conference of corps commanders of First and Second Armies, but it was not scheduled to take place until the night of April 9. Until then, an existing plan remained in force: in the event of the Portuguese front giving way, the line of the Lys and its tributary, the Lawe, which ran

himself that he was about to be attacked and told Haig so. Haig made another appeal to Foch for the French to assist by taking over an area of six divisions in the line and was again refused. First Army would therefore have to ride out the coming storm alone, except for whatever help GHQ and Second Army could send it. Its own resources — nine divisions including the Portuguese — were stretched to the limit. Fortunately the army front, which the British had occupied for almost the whole of the war and which had been the scene of only minor operations, was well fortified — much better than that out of which the Fifth Army had been hustled in March — and proved readily adaptable to the new defensive doctrine. This divided the defended area into a forward zone and a battle zone, of which only the latter was to be held in strength. The fashion at this stage of the war was no longer to hold a line continuously but by mutually supporting, separated strongpoints. Wire was laid so as to herd attackers along con-

Above: A French armoured car, part of reinforcements eventually brought up by Foch. Opposite page: Some of the 6,000 Portuguese prisoners (above) taken on April 9. Illiterate and ill cared-for, they had little incentive to fight. They were described

as a bait to the German troops' and, as predicted, the assault opened on their front. Below: The shell of the village of Kemmel. The loss of this area by fresh French troops considerably worsened the already bad relations between the Allies

length too great for the division's strength and General Haking, commanding XV Corps to the immediate north, complained to Haig on April 8 that 'the position of the Portuguese troops in the line there was a bait to the German troops'. Indeed the Germans had long had their eyes on the Portuguese sector and one of the reasons why Ludendorff so hastened the preparation of Georgette in the this

aftermath of Michael was his fear, shared by Rupprecht, that the British might soon relieve the Portuguese and replace them with more resolute defenders. Just such a relief was confirmed on

The Portuguese: a poor force Foch's strategic appreciation thus took no account of any threat to the line further north than Arras. But Arras was the southerly limit of the sector over which Haig fell apprehension. The northerly limit of Haig's area of anxiety lay to the south of the front which the Germans had in fact picked for their new effort. That lay on the Lys, one of the sluggish streams of the Flemish plain. And the sector in which they hoped particularly to make rapid progress was that at Neuve Chapelle, held by he Portuguese Coi Portugal's involvement, in the First World War was difl to explain, not least to the soldi' ituguese divisions which had be< 1917. These illit< ired-for conscripts, besides be t

I

i

2696

in

determining the German intentions, although these had so far been successfully concealed from the British. From April 8 onwards, however, it proved in-

which were covered by hidmachine guns, and the individual platoons were taught to mount an immediate counterattack should any part of the

stricted lanes

den

battle zone defences be overrun. The morning of April 9 dawned misty. But before first light a hurricane bombardment of gas and high explosive, all too

intensity to those British sent to this 'quiet' sector to rest after their ordeal in the March battle, began to fall in the back Corps. The bombardareas of XI and ment began at 0415 hours; by 0600 hours the Army Command felt certain enough that this presaged an immediate attack to send word for the bridges to be prepared for demolition. But by that time it was impossible to reach the bridges, so heavy and accurate was the fire that the Germans were directing on to their approaches. At 0700 hours the weight of

familiar in soldiers

its

who had been

XV

the

German

fire

was

shifted to the trenches

and strongpoints. And

at

0845 hours the

assault was launched. On the Portuguese front the leading waves of the four attack-

along the line of the Lawe, the and cavalry of XI Corps reached the emergency stop line in good time and were not attacked by the advancing Germans until about midday. At this point, however, the pressure against them grew until it became overwhelming and from 1730 hours onwards they were forced slowly backwards towards the Lawe, which by then the Highlanders of 51st Division had begun to put into a state of defence. At 2000 hours the cyclists and horsemen retired across the river. Their casualties had been terribly heavy: 386 out of 780. As a result of their self-sacrifice in the centre and the stout defence of the 55th Division on the southern flank, the collapse of the Portuguese had led to a less spectacular German success than Ludendorff had hoped for. But on the northern sector, held by 40th Division, confusion had led to a dangerous breach of the river line. Following the flight of the Portuguese the right hand brigade of the 40th Division had been left with its flank in the air and the Germans had profited from the mist to infiltrate past it. They were seen now and then but their field grey was mistaken for the uniforms of the Portuguese and they were not fired upon. By the time the mistake had been discovered most of the damage had been done. At about 1600 hours a regiment of the 10th Ersatz Division filtered across an undemolished Lys bridge at Bac sector,

cyclists

ing

German divisions found the defensive positions for the most part already evacu-

mission of holding a line of fortified villages a little to the east of the Lawe until

ated. Here and there brave men put up a hopeless resistance for a few minutes. Elsewhere the battlefield was found deserted. Many of the Portuguese had begun to move rearward before the German infantry had appeared, those from the rear first, on whom the opening German bombardment fell, then the forward infantry. The gunners also abandoned their positions, but fortunately not their guns, which they took with them. The Germans met no resistance for the first three miles of their advance — an astonishing distance to cover in the early hours of a trench offensive — and there was indeed no one to offer resistance until the line of the Lys and the Lawe was reached. There the Germans encountered three separate forces: in the north, near Estaires, the 40th Division; in the south, in front of Bethune, the 55th Division; in the centre, the XI Corps 'fire brigade' of the 11th Cyclist Battalion and the 1st King Edward's Horse. These last two units, which could scarcely muster 700 men between them, had the strictly limited

the 50th (Northumberland) Division and the 51st (Highland) Division could come up from reserve. The other two, 55th and 40th, had orders both to hold their original positions and to extend their inward flanks so as to narrow the gap in the front which it had been expected the Portuguese might leave. Three divisions, 4th Ersatz, 43rd Reserve and 18th Reserve, attacked the 55th, aided by 1st and 8th Bavarian Reserve, whose advance turned the division's left flank. Yet although it was in a desperate and tenuous position, this West Lancashire division succeeded in yielding very little

ground and on

inflicting

heavy

losses

on its attackers; it was even able to take 750 prisoners on the morning of April 9, infiltrators rounded up behind the lines in the persistent mist. Their number included a regimental band which was to have played the Germans into Bethune. This was the opening of a defensive action described by the Australian official historian as 'one of the finest made by British troops during the war'. On the central

St Maur, between Estaires and ArmenThis success unhinged the 40th Division's defence of the northern flank of the break-in and forced the retirement of its stoutest-hearted unit, the 12th Suffolks, which had been holding the village of Fleurbaix against attacks from three sides. tieres.

'Backs to the wall' The situation at the end

of the day was therefore distinctly disquieting for Haig and Home. The whole of the Portuguese Corps had disintegrated (6,000 had become prisoners, and 13,000 were eventually rounded up in the rear areas). The gap their flight had left had been only partly narrowed by the actions of 55th and 40th Divisions, and was only covered by a screen in the centre, where the leading brigades of 50th and 51st Divisions had just begun to arrive towards the end of the day; the

2697

make good the line the brighter side, the Germans had got across the Lys at a single point only, Bac St Maur, and the LysLawe line was elsewhere intact. The Germans themselves were disappointed by the progress made and put the blame on the difficulty experienced in getting guns forward to support the advance. So while Haig brought down two uncommitted but tired divisions, 29th and 49th, from Second Army in the Ypres salient, and appealed once again, unavailingly, to Foch for help, Rupprecht's attention now turned to the reserves available to

were not

2698

to

hand.

On

other side of Armentieres, where Fourth to attack the following morning. North of Armentieres the line was held for ten miles by XI Corps, of Second Army, only three divisions strong, all of which had been sent from the Somme to recuperate after the March battle and were still very deficient in numbers and equipment. They were particularly short of heavy guns and so almost unable to reply to the bom-

Army was

bardment which began

to fall into their positions at 0245 hours. At 0515 hours, in mist thickened by gas and smoke, four German divisions, with two more in sup-

and two in reserve, assaulted towards Messines and Armentieres. By 1000 hours Armentieres, which the attack of the day before had left exposed to the south, had been transformed into an untenable salient and GHQ ordered its evacuation. Meanwhile the XV Corps of First Army, which had let the Germans across the Lys at Bac St Maur the day before, was forced to give ground further, yielding more of the line of Lys to Sixth Army and opening a dangerous salient towards Bailleul. Haig found the situation intensely worrying. He dared not bring divisions from the Somme port

y

Left: A Portuguese infantryman at the time of the Battle of the Lys. It is often stated that the Portuguese Expeditionary Force initially wore a lightweight khaki uniform in France, but it is more likely that this was intended for use in Africa, and that the Portuguese wore the blue grey uniform illustrated. Certainly by the time of the Lys, they were wearing blue grey, with British 08 webbing for ammunition, bayonet, gasmask and 303-inch SMLE rifle. The pack and waterbottle were of indigenous Portuguese design. Aeroplanes, top to bottom: One of the machines that began to bomb Paris again in 1918 after an interval of three years, the Friedrichshafen G III. Although better known as builders of a superb series of seaplanes, the Friedrichshafen concern also produced a series of good long range bombers, of which the G III and Ilia, the former's twin-tailed version, were the best. Crew: 2 or 3. Engines: Two Mercedes D IVa inlines, 260 hp each. Armament: Two or three Parabellum machine guns and up to 3,300 lbs of bombs. Speed: 87 1/2 mph at 3,280 feet. Ceiling: 14,800 feet. Endurance: 5 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 5,929/8,646 lbs. Span: 77 feet 9% inches.

$

Length: 42 feet. Next, the extraordinary allmetal Junkers J armoured close support aircraft. Although underpowered and therefore slow and tricky at take off and landing, the J soon endeared itself to its crews by virtue of its extreme strength and the ample protection of the armoured crew area. A last unusual feature I

I

was the lift

in

cantilever structure of the thick, highsection wings. The type was very successful 1918. Crew: 2. Engine: One Benz Bz IV

200 hp. Armament: Two fixed Spandau and one flexible Parabellum machine gun. Speed: 97 mph at sea level. Climb: 32 minutes to 6,560 feet. Endurance: 2 hours. Weight empty/ loaded: 3,885/4,787 lbs. Span: 52 feet 6 inches. Length: 29 feet 10 3 s inches. Lastly, the British Armstrong Whitworth FK 8 light bomber and reconnaissance machine, nicknamed Big Ack' to distinguish it from the FK 3. The FK 8 was an excellent combat type. Crew: 2. Engine: One Beardmore inline, 120 or 160 hp. Armament: One fixed Vickers and one flexible Lewis machine gun. Speed: 98 2 mph. Climb: 1 1 minutes to 5,000 feet. Endurance: 3 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 1,916/2,811 lbs. Span: 43V2 feet. Length: 31 feet inline,

1

2699

] j

i

!

Allied communication system). Divisions also arrived from Italy, Palestine and

had

Egypt. General Plumer had been put in charge of the whole battlefront. On April 17, following a short pause in the offensive, it was renewed by the German Fourth and Sixth Armies along the whole front from Dixmude to Bethune. But the fighting neither on this nor the next day brought them any territorial gain and on the night of April 18 the first relief of the exhausted British troops in the line was judged a safe manoeuvre, three French divisions taking over from IX Corps in the sector

between Mount Kemmel and

Meteren. A pronounced lull of six days, from April 19 to 24 followed. Two more French divisions arrived in Flanders, with a cavalry corps, the whole formed into an army under de Mitry. Plumer was

German troops took the area surrounding Mount Kemmel with unexpected ease, but to little advanA marshy plain, littered with the debris of successive armies, was wide open to attack

tage.

it

while the Germans remained so close to Amiens in such strength, and he could not extract assistance from Foch. After the latter had been to see him that night, bringing the doubtfully comforting news that the four infantry and three cavalry divisions of General de Maistre's Tenth Army, which he had spoken of earlier, would assemble behind Amiens on April 12, Haig confided to his diary, 'I have come to the conclusion that Foch is afraid to put any French divisions into the battle, and

that he won't do so until force of circumstances, as a last resort, compel him.' In this he did Foch an injustice, though an injustice determined by his parochial view of the battle. Foch's anxieties were for the whole Allied front, for the maintenance of unity between the French and British armies and for the safety of Paris. All of these were still threatened by a German army whose power the Allies could not match. Little wonder that Foch was prepared if necessary to sacrifice the Channel ports and northern Flanders, perhaps even the Belgians and one of the British armies, if the alternative was to risk defeat under the walls of the capital. But it was equally understandable that Haig, whose responsibility was the preservation of the British army (and for whom Ypres and the Flanders front had a personal importance

amounting

to an obsession), should have himself misunderstood and threatened with abandonment. His anxieties were further heightened the following day, April 11, by a sudden German gain of ground along the boundary between IX and XV Corps which put Hazebrouck seriously at risk. It was this perhaps which prompted him to issue his famous 'Backs to the Wall' order of the day. 'There is no other course open to us but to fight it out,' it read, 'every position must be held to the last man. There must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause each one must fight on to the end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind alike depend upon the conduct of each 0! th -critical

felt

moment.' Banal though

lay (and

I

ribald the interp

put upon it), it the time, almost

2700

i

a

Italians on at jut as at

home. And the following day near Meteren, directly in the path of the German drive to Hazebrouck, an action was begun by a small reinforcement unit, which might well have been directly inspired by the speech. This unit was the machine gun battalion of the 33rd Division, released by Haig from his tiny reserve. The battalion found its way to the front impeded by masses of infantry in open retreat and was only able to reach the threatened spot in time by commandeering a column of Army Service Corps lorries, whose obstructionist

commander

the

colonel hit over the

battalion

lieutenant-

head with his revolver.

For the next three days it was to provide the backbone of the defence across the most critical gap in the British line, supported only by such driblets of infantry as the staff could send forward and the formidable battalion commander could round up from straggler parties. To his immediate south another officer of 'outstanding energy and devotion',

Lieutenant-Colonel

commanding the

Forbes-

Border Regiment, was conducting a similar singlehanded passage of arms, blocking the approaches to Hazebrouck from the south for most of two days. He was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross, earned in part by the unusual feat, for a First World War infantry officer, of having twice had his horse shot under him. The period April 12 to 14 may now be seen as the crisis of the battle, though it was to run on for several days more. It opened with voluntary withdrawal by the British from much of the ground east of Ypres which had been won at such cost in the Passchendaele battle. It ended with the Robertson,

1st

of the German Sixth Army regarding the offensive as a stalemate, only to be revived by a success north of Ypres. In the interval, Foch had relented suffi-

commander

ciently to direct two French infantry divisions towards Ypres, but he insisted nevertheless, at an inter- Allied conference called on April 14, that 'the Battle of Hazebrouck is finished'. British prospects had by then certainly very much improved. The 1st Australian division had been brought north

Hazebrouck from Amiens (where it had been shelled by German long-range artillery, an unpleasant indication of how close the Germans were to dominating the to

accordingly able to withdraw more tired British divisions, making six in all which had been relieved. Many were down to a strength of three thousand infantry; 250,000 British casualties had occurred since the opening of the offensives on March 21. Here the battle should have ended. The evidence of diminishing returns to the German High Command. Ludendorff nevertheless decided upon a final attempt to cut off the British in Ypres and the Belgians from the rest of the Allied line by a brisk attack against Mount Kemmel with seven fresh divisions of Fourth Army. The decision was a peculiar one for the position was held by the French divisions newly arrived from reserve and was one of great natural strength. But by some amazing combination of luck, German determination and French irresolution Kemmel was carried by the storm troopers of Fourth Army in their first rush. Over 6,000 French prisoners were taken and Allied anxieties again seriously aroused. However, de Mitry and Plumer were able to organise a counterattack which blunted the advance of the German divisions intended to exploit their initial success. On the morning of April 29 a small German surprise attack captured the minor height of the Scherpenberg, between Kemmel and Ypres, but shortly afterwards Ludendorff decided that the offensive had irrevocably lost impetus and ordered that it should be closed down. Its results had been disappointing. Very heavy losses had been inflicted on the British but nowhere had their resistance collapsed as it had on the Somme in March. Hazebrouck had been brought within range of indirect artillery fire but Allied rail communication with the northern front had not been interrupted. The Germans, moreover, had suffered terribly. 'The Fourth and Sixth Armies,'

was strong

the

German

official

historian wrote, 'had

exhausted their offensive powers. No great strategic movement had become possible and the Channel Ports had not been reached. The second offensive had not brought the hoped-for decision'. .

.

.

Further Reading Blake, Robert (Ed), The Private Papers of

Douglas Haig, 1914-1919 (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1952) Bruckmuller, Colonel Georg, Die Artillerie beim Angriff im Stellungskrieg (Verlag Offene Worte' 1926) Ludendorff, Erich,

My War Memories

1914-18

(Hutchinson 1919)

\ForJohn Keegan's biography, see page 96.

\

The Air Battle

over Us During the Battle of the Lys, the German ground support tactics were further refined. All was overshadowed by the death of Richthofen, however. Thomas G. Miller. Below: A Halberstadt CL II is 'bombed up'

Ten squadrons from I Brigade, five of them corps observation units, plus two from V Brigade augmented the efforts of Freeman's wing and III Brigade. Salmond shortly lost communication with all but one of his brigades, and the battle now devolved onto the squadron commanders and pilots, who flew so low and in such numbers over the threatened portion of the front that the danger of collision was almost constant.

SE

even lumbering

RE

Camels, Dolphins, and 'Ack W's' were in action continuously through the daylight hours. By the early dawn of March 26, 37 of the 60 RFC squadrons on the Western Front were flying support for Third Army to the west of Bapaume. This crisis was effectively at an end by the afternoon of 5's,

8's

the 26th, but a new threat arose as the redirected the weight of Michael back to Fifth Army front towards Roye and Montdidier. This thrust in turn became the centre of gravity of the air

Germans

1%

on the 27th, although low-level air were continued on Third Army front through the day. RFC losses were extremely severe, witb 13 aircraft missing and 26 shot down or wrecked. Jagdgeschwader 1, patrolling the skies over effort

attacks

down 13 British aircraft withThe Schlachtstaffeln of Second

Albert, shot

out

loss.

Army

also were active during the day, attacking Vaux, Vaire, Morcourt and Bouzincourt. However, they had suffered considerable losses from British ground fire

since

March

21,

losing five aircraft

on the 26th, and by now the pace of the German advance had placed their airfields far from the action. The attitude of the senior German staffs toward their flying forces appeared to be 'out of sight, out of mind'. Communications were intermittent, few definite orders were sent out and even those attacks ordered were poorly coordinated with the ground action. By contrast,

the

RFC

daily

became

more

'

s

offensive, the rapid pace of the ground battle apparently bewildered staffs grown slow-thinking in almost four years of siege

warfare,

and hitherto unaccustomed

to

thinking in terms of close co-ordination

between ground and air. The German squadrons found themselves miles behind the front, seemingly forgotten. Communications with higher headquarters were poor and orders, when they came, bore relation

little

battlefield.

current

to

needs

of the

The infantrymen, who then

(and have ever since) regarded aviators as light-hearted swaggerers, understandably perceived the failure of their own staffs as the failure of the air force. The critical day for Georgette came on April 12. For the first time since the offensive began, the morning dawned fine and clear and the RAF began a maximum effort to

German rush

help stem the

ward Hazebrouck. One hundred and seven aircraft from

I

to-

thirty-

Brigade attacked

German

of long range bombing on the Western Front here, the Friedrichshafen G III. Note the later pattern of

The brunt

although

active, and, it

secured

command

its losses

were heavy,

of the air from the

Germans and kept it. The Michael offensive as such effectively came to an end with the German assault on Arras on March 28. The weary, horribly dangerous routine of low-level attacks continued throughout the day, at a cost to the RFC of 17 aircraft missing and 35 wrecked; seven German aircraft were shot down. The attack was a complete failure, and following this severe rebuff, Ludendorff realised his chance of breaking through

Somme had

gone. The air fighting slowly lost its intensity and the huge concentration of aircraft put together for Michael now began to be dispersed. One further event on the Somme front must be recorded, the death on April 21 of Manfred von Richthofen. Although remembered as the foremost air fighter of the First World War, he was even more valuable to the Germans as an inspiration to the Luftstreitkrafte and the people and as a tactical leader of large fighter units.

on the

The manner

of his death will never be fully Conflicting claims were made by several Lewis gunners of an Australian machine gun battery and by Captain A. R. Brown of No 209 Squadron. The latter claim obviously was more acceptable to the settled.

RAF

(the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service were combined into the Royal Air Force on April 1 the former was preferred by the army and, incidentally, the Germans. The preponderance of evi);

dence carefully compiled in recent years suggests that Richthofen in fact was killed by ground fire. Almost alone among the famous pilots of the First World War his name is still widely familiar more than half a century later. The German preparations for the Georgette attack on the Lys were quite similar to those for Michael. Local air superiority for the period of the initial assault and

breakthrough was assured by a heavy concentration of aircraft. Fourth and Sixth Armies had 25 Jagdstaffeln, 17 Schlachtstaffeln, 28 Flic u.ngen, and two Bombengeschwader, totalling 492 aircraft. Thirty-eight RAF squadrons of I, II and IX Brigades op units, 17 of which were singl< s, four daybombing, three naissance, (

I

2702

was borne by Gothas and the type markings

illustrated

two night-bombing and 12 corps observation. It is a measure of the extent to which Michael strained the Luftstreitkrafte' resources that

many

of the Staffeln assign-

ed to Georgette were borrowed from the armies actively engaged on the Somme.

Grounded by fog air fighting in April was uncannily like that of the previous month. Even the

The

day was almost an exact replica of March 21. The thick fog that on the mornfirst

ing of April 9 shielded the shattering assault on the Portuguese 2nd Division also effectively kept both sides from flying until the early afternoon. After 1400 hours the Camels of 203 and 210 Squadrons and

No 40 Squadron's SE

5's carried out intermittent bombing and strafing attacks against the Germans. Air opposition was light, both sides concentrating on lowlevel work. As in March, hasty evacuation

of

many

British airfields

was made

neces-

sary by the speed of the German advance, and the commanding officer of No 208 Squadron, unable to fly his aircraft out in the fog, burned 18 Camels in the middle of his airfield and evacuated the squadron's personnel by motor transport. The next day the battle spread to cover most of the region between Ypres and Bethune. Once again fog kept the aircraft on the ground until the afternoon, when both the RFC and the Germans were out in

force.

On

First

Army's

front,

Nos

Australian, 210, 19, 40 and 18 Squadrons carried out extensive attacks against German infantry advancing in front of Merville, while the SE 5's of No 1 carried almost the entire burden for Second Army. Losses, which on the previous day had been only one British and four German aircraft, now began to mount, as a result of machine gun fire from the ground for the most part; four RAF aircraft and seven German were shot down on April 10. The same weather and air combat patterns were repeated on the 11th, with the losses on both sides (five British, four German) also about the same as previously. However, this was the last day on which the Germans were able to use their Schlachtstaffeln and low-flying fighters to assist the advance of their infantry. As had been the case in the Michael 203,

4

troops and transport around the important junction of Merville between 0600 and 1900 hours. They were joined by the tireless No 1 Squadron and two daybomber squadrons of II Brigade. Air fight-

ing was continuous and

were

encountered

at

German

all

aircraft altitudes; ten

British aircraft were shot down during the day for the loss of five German. Perhaps the climax was an attack at 1305

hours by Nos 210 and 40 Squadrons on German balloons near Merville, five of which were shot down. Four days after the

German attack started, the RAF was in disputed but firm control of the air. So weak was the effect of air control in those days, though, that the Germans took no notice of the fact. Although the 12th was the last day of heavy air activity along the Lys, the German ground advance continued until the 18th. Then it too was held, just short of Hazebrouck. But the last had not yet been heard of Georgette. The main thrust gradually shifted from Sixth Army to Fourth Army and this organisation built up a strong concentration of aircraft for the assault on Kemmel Hill. Fourteen Jagdstaffeln under the tactical command of Oberleutnant Bruno

Kommandeur

Loerzer,

geschwader

III,

were

of Jagd-

to provide air, cover

over the battlefield, while four Schlacht-

geschwader and three Jagdstaffeln were assigned to direct support of the three attacking corps. Twelve Fliegerabteilungen handled artillery spotting and reconnaissance for the attacking army. At 0600 hours on April 25 the assault on Kemmel Hill marked the first large scale use of tactical aircraft from the outset of an offensive battle. The attacking German divisions were preceded by 16 Schlachtstaffeln flying in a long sawtooth formation that swept over No-Man's Land like a mowing machine. These 96 aircraft fired over 60,000 rounds of machine gun ammunition and dropped 700 bombs; they then split up into units of two or three aircraft which proceeded independently, attacking targets of opportunity behind the British Staffeln

and French lines. Loerzer's fighter maintained absolute control over

down four British aircraft for no losses of their own. Indeed only one Fourth Army aircraft was lost the battlefield, shooting

during the entire day. \For p.

Thomas

21 79.

|

(!.

Miller's

biography, see

1

3

\

9

BERTHA

BOMBARDS PARI

%

Designed to coincide with Ludendorff 's spring offensive on the Somme, Germany's engineers fulfilled a remarkable briefing: the creation of a colossal gun with a range of nearly 75 miles — aimed on Paris. Jean Hallade. Below: 'Big Bertha' under construction in the Krupp artillery department

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In spring 1916, while the battle of

Verdun

culmination, an important meeting was held in Berlin in the presence of General Ludendorff, Head of the Supreme War Council. The naval commanding the heavy-calibre officers

was reaching

its

guns on the Western Front asked him if he would approve the costs and expenditure

and personnel necessary for the construction of a gun with a range of 62.1 miles (100 kms). Ludendorff has often been depicted as a reserved and cold personality, with no great liking for advanced technical ideas. And yet the general reacted to this idea immediately. At that time, the front passed within 55.9 miles (90 kms) of Paris, and Ludendorff must have grasped the importance of this project. To be able to damage the morale of the people in the rear areas with a giant cannon, co-ordinated with a large scale offensive, would give striking proof to the world both of German technical capabilities, and of her ability to continue the war. The project passed rapidly to a practical stage and the navy obtained the utmost cooperation from the Krupp Works' Artillery Department management. At the beginning of the war, Krupps had already astonished the world when the 420-mm mortars built in its foundries demolished the concrete masonry of the forts of Liege and Maubeuge. But between a 420-mm mortar, firing at a maximum range of under 9.3 miles (15 kms), and a piece whose of material

calibre

could

Line had been decided by the

German High

increasing the distance from Paris to the front by 12.4 miles. These new technical problems provoked intense activity at Krupps and soon a model designed by Professor Rausenberger, Director of the Artillery Department, fulfilled all requirements. There now remained only to build the gun. Immediately the project was given a name. It was called Wilhelm Geschutz, 'William's Gun', in honour of the Kaiser. Sometimes it was called 'Long Max', but

Command,

muzzle of the original gun. The forward part of the gun was then reinforced with a barrel-sleeve. Finally — and this was a great innovation — they screwed on a chase (smooth tube) 19 feet 8 inches (six metres) long at the end of the gun. This chase was not rifled and its perfectly smooth internal bore prolonged exactly the bottom surface of the rifling in the main tube. The gun had a total length of 112 feet (34 metres)

and an overall weight of 138 tons. Once the gun had been made, they had to devise a special powder for it. It had to Opposite: left to right: The 8.26-inch calibre shell Zusatzkartusche (auxiliary) and Vorkartusche (main) cordite charges, both wrapped in silk: and Hulsenkartusche, encased in brass

still to be determined, which a projectile a distance of 62.1

was fire

miles, many problems still remained to be solved. Gradually, in silence and secrecy, the navy's Artillery Direction, in collaboration with Krupp, pushed the project to a

very advanced stage of studies allowing the construction of the supercannon. Nine months had elapsed since the Berlin meeting in which the study of this fantastic cannon had been authorised, when a brief telegram arrived from Ludendorff: 'In subsequent work on very long range pieces, please take as your basis a range of 74.5 miles (120 kms) instead of 62.1 miles.' This astounded all those engaged on the project. There was colossal work involved in resuming the study taking into account these extra 12.4 miles (20 kms). Everything already calculated had to be recalculated from scratch. What was the reason for this modification of the range demanded in Ludendorff's telegram? It was due to the fact that a withdrawal to the Hindenburg

Parisians later christened it 'Big Bertha'. To produce their curious device, the Krupps engineers used two calibres: a 15inch (381-mm) barrel and an 8.3-inch (210mm) barrel. They calculated, according to their preliminary studies, that it was necessary to nearly double the initial velocity of existing shells. To gain time, or simply

because

it

fulfilled

all

requirements per-

the basis of the giant gun was a 15-inch barrel measuring 55 feet 10 inches (17 metres) in length. First of all they increased the internal diameter of the 15-inch barrel, into which they introduced a new 8.3-inch barrel which projected 36 feet 1 inch (11 metres) forward of the fectly,

<>

weight. During its railway journey, the tube had a length of only 91 feet 1\ inches (28 metres), the smooth extension being mounted later in the firing position. An enormous truck-mounting comprising 18 axles carried the rifled and nondismantable section whose overall weight was 256 tons. The assembly of the 19-foot 8-inch (six metres) smooth tube took place near the spot which the gun was to occupy. This

operation was complicated and delicate. The smooth tube was screwed on to the rifled tube with the help of a dismantable gantry moving on two parallel railway lines to the right and left of the main railway line on which the truck-mounting lay. A platform was necessary to receive the truck-mounting. It consisted of a ringshaped casing, which could be dismantled into six sections for purposes of transportation, on which was laid a turntable mounted on ball bearings. The lot rested on a solid concrete foundation. be absolutely perfect, as each round required about 550 lbs 250 kgs) of powder packed into a chamber nearly 16 feet 5 inches (five metres) long. And then there remained to make a shell. With such a powder charge, erosion was considerable inside the tube every time a round was fired, and the artillery specialists rightly considered that the gun would wear out rapidly. In that case, accuracy of aim and range would decrease as the firing went on. They calculated that the gun could fire only 65 times, after which it would have to be rebored. They thus achieved the astonishing solution of numbering each round from one to 65 and increasing the weight of the shell by 33 lbs (15 kgs) between the first and the 65th round. With little hesitation, they decided on railway transportation. It was not a simple business to move a piece of this size and (

The incredible had happened: William's Gun', or Big Bertha' as she was unlovingly called by Parisians, could bombard Paris from 74 /2 miles away. Here a first model is being tested 1

'Tomorrow, open

fire

on

Paris'

During the long truce of winter 1917/1918, and despite tentative peace proposals, the Germans did not remain inactive, and they continued with their great project for an offensive along the entire front, supported by long range artillery fire aimed at demoralising the French. The place chosen to install the gun in battery was the forest of Crepy-en-Laonnois near Laon. The railway station of Crepy-en-Laonnois lies on the railway between Laon and La Fere. That is where they sent waggon loads of

timber and munitions which were unloaded by French civilian prisoners. Hidden

among the trees and copses, men set to work. Trees were felled and immediately cut into logs, while efforts were made to conceal the destruction. Tracks were cut through the copses, sleepers laid, and the lengthening railway lines were immediately covered with camouflage netting to ward off spotting from the air. The earth was dug up in several places. At three points, the construction of concrete platforms was begun. All the areas laid bare by these gun emplacements were covered with wire mesh fitted to the tops of trees and overlaid with a net. Once the trees started to bud, the whole lot would be covered with foliage. This work was begun in November 1917 and continued actively in January and February of the last year of war. Once the work had been completed, each gun was in position at the end of a railway

spur laid just beyond the place where the railway line cut the road leading from Crepy to Couvron. There remained only to point each gun in the direction of Paris at an angle of 52 degrees and fire the projectile. After a three-and-a-half minute journey, it would land in the middle of the French capital. Such was the formidable German arrangement designed to demoralise Paris the day after the start of the great offensive on March 21. On the evening of March 22, an order from the General Staff was transmitted to the command post situated in the Crepy-en-Laonnois forest: 'Tomorrow morning, open fire

on

Paris'.

was 0715 hours on the morning of March 23. Feverish activity had been in progress for several hours on the wooded eastern slope of the Mont de Joie. It was chilly that morning, and a thick fog covered the plateau and its vicinity. The sound of It

the guns could be heard from nearly all directions, and especially from the southwest. Two days previously at dawn, the formidable German offensive had been launched. Hidden in the middle of the Mont de Joie forest, an enormous tube lifted its muzzle to the sky. Brief orders were given and everyone got out of sight, sheltering in huge concrete shelters or in well equipped trenches close by. It was just after 0716 hours when a tremendous explosion shook the atmosphere, and the guns firing in the distance seemed to redouble in intensity as

though in echo.

was

cold in the early morning March 23. For some Parisians — and also some Parisiennes, for in the factories women were replacing the men who were at the front — it was time to go to work. The night had been quiet, no Gotha bom-

In Paris

it

of

ber had flown over the capital, and the last alert dated from the previous evening. At 0720 hours an explosion shook the 19th arrondissement. In front of No 6, Quai de la Seine, there was a hole in the roadway, some windows were broken and the walls in the vicinity had received splinters. Even though it passed practically unobserved, this explosion was a fantastic event: a shell fired over 74.12 miles away had just struck the capital. For just under three years, Paris had been untroubled by daylight E bombardment. The few people who believed \ it was an attack thought it was an air raid, J probably a single aircraft flying above the s fog and dropping a bomb, without an alert ? = being sounded. Twenty-five minutes later, at 0745 hours, f

-i f\

i'

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t

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a second missile fell, this time in the 10th arrondissement, striking a building in the Gare de l'Est. Now, people seriously believed it to be an air attack, but why had

no alert been sounded? At last, at 0915 hours, the sirens sounded, warning the population to seek shelter. Three more projectiles had dropped and this time there

were

The

fatalities.

casualties At 0815 hours at No 15, Rue Charles V, in the 4th arrondissement, a man had been killed — the first victim of this long range run. A quarter of an hour later, again in the 4th arrondissement, Rue Miron, four people had been wounded. It was, however, at 0845, Boulevard de Strasbourg, the part facing the Gare de l'Est, that the greatest disaster of the day occurred: a shell killed eight people and wounded 13. As soon as first

serious

this

even

though

incident had occurred, and continued to sightseers

scrutinise the sky looking for German airthe trams of the Gare de l'Est-Mon-

craft,

trouge line refused to take on any more passengers and returned to their depots. A few minutes later, the alert was sounded. Public services were no longer functioning, people sought refuge, the shops closed and the streets became deserted. Gradually, anxiety grew. People started asking questions about these strange detonations which were occurring practically every quarter of an hour, and the end of the alert was very long in coming. To complete the people's disarray, the official services of the War Ministry, which by 1000 hours still did not know what it was all about, or refused to recognise the truth, issued a communique which did not improve the situation. 'At 0820 hours, a few enemy aircraft flying at very high altitudes succeeded in crossing the lines and attacking Paris. They were immediately engaged by our fighter aircraft, both those from the entrenched camp and those from the front. Bombs are reported as having been dropped at several points and there are some

The

trajectory of a shell from the 8.26-inch gun at Laon fired at Paris

casualties.' It was true that fighter aircraft had indeed taken off, but the explosions continued to take place every quarter of an hour.

After the fourth explosion, the rate of

one shell every 15 minutes was maintained up to 1345 hours when the 21st round fell once again in the 19th arrondissement, at 57 Rue Riquet, without causing any casualties. Why was there a one-hour interval between the 21st and the 22nd and last round? A mystery! Possibly there may have been a technical difficulty with the

gun

or in the ammunition supply. After midday, the thick fog which covered the Crepy-en-Laonnois region, began to disperse, its marvellous camouflage being replaced by the first rays of the sun, and consequently firing was interrupted because in the distance French observation 'sausage' balloons were rising on their cables, and it was unwise to divulge the site of the battery which must already

have been approximately marked by sound The last round was fired towards 1441 hours to burst at 1445 hours in the suburbs near Pantin

The bombardment of Paris was not restricted to guns alone: after an interval of three years,

German bombers once again flew over the capital of France.

Below: A statistical resume of the German aerial effort over Paris.

Bottom: The

incredible velocity and trajectory of the shells fired by the original Paris gun

T

despite every precaution.

On the slopes of Mont de Joie, the long tube which had been protruding into the sky since the morning returned to its horizontal resting position. What was the opinion of the official services in the various ministries early that afternoon? The advocates of an air attack, as against shelling, were fast losing ground. It was 1430 hours when the telephone rang in the editorial office of the paper Le Temps which was due to be run off the presses within a few minutes. It was requested that publication should be delayed for a few minutes because an official communique was being prepared at the War Ministry. At 1500 hours — barely a quarter of an hour after the last shell had arrived — the telephone rang once again at the paper. The editor heard the duty officer tell him: 'Are you sitting down? Yes? Well, hold on to the table because the station.

news

is

sensational!'

And then he

Took

JANUARY

off

mm

Lost

30

30

1

MARCH

8

60

1

MARCH

11

70

4

MARCH

24

198

267 31460

18

41

92

173 132

2

1

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21

1

APRIL

11

1

27

72

MAY

22

1

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12

MAY

23

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MAY

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15

JUNE

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MAY 30 6 31

W eight (lbs)

No.

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MAY

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28

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5

3

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3

7

9

990

6

660

18

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85

dictated

24 miles altitude reached in 90 seconds. Velocity 2,250 feet per second

The

shell lands in Paris

after a flight of 92 miles in

176 seconds,

speed

at

an impact

per second, after being slowed by the increasing of 2,200 feet

density of the air

12 miles altitude reached in 25 seconds./ Velocity 3,000 feet / per second /

\<—

+/ /

\12 miles \

/

maximum

.

/

.

/ Muzzle velocity /

altitude again.

Velocity 3,000 feet per second, \quicxly rising to 3,075 leef » per second, the velocity on the downward part of the trajectory

5,260 feet

per second

PARIS The range round the earth's curvature from gun

The range

in a straight line

to target: 67.6 miles

from gun to target: 67.1 miles

this

communique: The enemy has

fired on

Paris with a long range gun. Since 0800 hours this morning, every quarter of an hour, 9.5-inch (241 -mm) shells struck the capital and its suburban area. There are

about ten dead and 15 wounded. Measures to counter the enemy piece are now in course of execution. Thus was the fantastic exploit officially recognised. There was an error in this communique. The calibre of the shell was actually 8.3-inches (210-mm). As for the paper Le Temps, it thought it advisable to reassure its readers and avoid panic by adding that the front was still 62.1 miles (100 kms) away. Twenty-two shells fell on this first day, 18 on Paris and four on its suburbs. They

The centre of showing the which German

in the 2nd arrondissement. These two rounds, only three minutes apart, could not have been fired from the same gun. From that moment, it had to be considered that there was not just one long range gun, but at least two. On that Sunday March 24, 1918 — Palm Sunday — a shell that dropped

and injured 29. The following day, to the surprise of the Parisians who believed the gun had already been destroyed, firing was resumed and a first shell fell at 0645 hours in the Rue de Meaux (19th arrondissement), killing one person and injuring 14, most of them slightly. Twenty-two shells fell on Paris and its suburbs on that day, the last one (which wounded two people) at 1300 hours at Pre-Saint-Gervais.

at 1145 hours near Blanc-Mesnil Church, killed four and injured seven churchgoers leaving after Mass. On Monday March 25, only six shells were fired on Paris, five

Were there two guns?

between 0649 hours and 0740 hours and the sixth in the afternoon (at 1548 hours

This day was marked by a new event: shells started falling at very short intervals. For instance, it was noted that one shell fell at Pantin at 0917 hours and the next one at 0920 hours in Rue de la Lune

in the Pere-Lachaise cemetery). For some unknown reason, firing stqpped for three days. No shells were fired on March 26, 27 or 28. Once again legends began to circulate among the Parisians

killed 16 people

Right:

Paris,

places

in

shells landed in 1918

« SHELLS FIRED FROM GERMAN LONG RANGE GUNS

MARCH23-AUGUST9. PARIS SHELLED 44 TIMES (367 ROUNDS USED)

(12) NUMBERS OF

ARRONDISSEMENTS

Left and below: The German Paris gun.

original 8 26-inch calibre

It

is

shown mounted on

the

carriage used at the naval gun-proving grounds in Germany. The weight of the shell

by the 8.26-inch gun rose from 229 to 262 lbs with a 15 /2 lbs charge, and that of the later 9.13-inch gun from 273 to 307 lbs with an explosive charge 19V4 lbs in weight

fired

1

2707

establishment of the concrete platform on the slopes of Mont de Joie had required over seven weeks, the entirely metal one which the Germans had just built for firing in all directions gave them the opportunity of rapidly mounting a firing emplacement for their giant cannon very close to Paris and only 58 miles (93 kms) from the capital. The site was found in the wood of Chatel, not far from the Oulchy-le-Chateau — Chateau-Thierry highway, six miles (ten kms) to the north of the latter. When the gun arrived in the environs of Fere-en-

Tardenois, the French artillery was already pounding the region. This was to be the third series of firings which lasted two days. On July 15, 15 shells exploded in Paris. They killed three and wounded four. The next day, July 16, firing was

resumed

about the gun exploding or its destruction by French artillery, because it was true that the French artillery had begun firing in its turn in the direction of the Crepy-enLaonnois forest, less than 30 hours after the firing of the

first

round.

On Friday March 29 — Good Friday - only were fired by 'Bertha', and only on Paris, but with dire results. On that day, a considerable crowd filled the old Church of Saint-Gervais, Rue Miron. There were no longer any seats, and many were the women and children who had come to four shells

one

fell

pray for those falling in the terrible battle in progress for the past ten days. It was exactly 1633 hours, a priest who had given a short sermon had just descended from the pulpit and a concert given by the Petits

Chanteurs a la Croix de Bois was going to end the ceremony, when suddenly, in an unnerving silence, the air was shaken by a dull explosion. A frightful shock followed by an appalling noise shook the church. A vast surface of the vaulted roof and part of the left hand side of the nave collapsed. Cries and shrieks of pain soon rose from the pile of. rubble and masonry that entombed what remained of the congregation. A shell had just struck the church; there were 75 dead and 90 injured, some of whom subsequently died. An enormous crowd gathered -outside and was with great difficulty pushed away from the building by a police cordon. This single shell accounted for more victims than any other day. The firing continued with more or less intensity during April. The bad weather helped the Germans, as the French reconnaissance planes were greatly handicapped by a month of execrable weather. In the whole 30 days only April 12 was sunny.

On May

1

the shelling of Paris stopped:

Opposite page: Ruins of the church of Saintin Paris, where 75 people died on Good

Gervais

Friday 1918. Inset: Strict attention to detail marked the installation of the Berthas'. This site, in the forest of Crepy-en-Laonnois, was heavily camouflaged by netting tied across the treetops: in spring leaves would spread over the netting, and mask the activity underneath. This page: The platform of the first gun. It consisted of a circular casing, mounted by a turntable on which the gun could traverse

French French

guns were causing casualties. artillery continued its firing until

May 3.

For 26 days 'Bertha' was silent. Before dawn on May 27, the Crown Prince launched his divisions towards the Chemin des Dames in a southerly direction. In less than ten days, on June 4, the Germans found themselves at Chateau-Thierry, and an advanced spearhead crossed the Marne. This was to be their last victorious offensive. While the German infantry overran the French positions on the dawn of May 27, a first shell fell on Paris at 0630 hours. Fifteen shells, seven for Paris, and eight for the suburbs, the last one of which fell at 1828 hours, fell on the Paris region killing four and injuring 20. The 'Bertha' was back, and the 'psychological' firing was resumed at the same time as the new offensive was launched, but another mystery appeared: the shells were no longer coming from the Crepy-enLaonnois forest but from much further to the west and slightly to the south, from the wood of Corbie, near Beaumont-enBeine, 68.3 miles (110 kms) from Paris, giving an appreciable improvement in the wear and tear of the tubes. Another

emerged with this resumed bombardment. The splinters picked up showed the calibre had been changed. It was no longer 8.3-inch shells that were falling on Paris but shells of a calibre of 9.5 inches. It has been suggested that during this period, the Beaumont-en-Beine gun was not the only one, but that a remaining piece on the Crepy-en-Laonnois slopes had also fired. Five weeks were to elapse without a single shell dropping on Paris. It is certain that the wearing out of the guns was rapid and as soon as they could the Germans endeavoured to bring their pieces closer in order to reduce the powder charge. They had already gained 9.3 miles (15 kms) by installing their 'Parisian cannon' near Beaumont-en-Beine. Since their last lightning offensive, the Germans were on the Marne at Chateaufact

Thierry. Why not place a giant cannon further to the south, especially since very great progress had been made in the field of installing platforms which allowed a relatively rapid erection? While the

at

1030 hours and ended

at

1720

hours, but in seven hours only four shells were fired. The position was too untenable because of the French artillery, and the Germans evacuated their position to return to their original one. For three weeks, since July 16, the 'Berthas' had been silent, when suddenly on August 5 at 1005 hours at No 19 Rue Danton in Vanves, a shell killed two and injured eight. The fourth and last series of firings lasted five days. The last shell of the 17 fired that day fell at 1930 hours in Avenue de la Grande Armee. From the rate of firing, it would seem that a single piece alone was in action, as the shells kept arriving in Paris every 15 to 20 minutes from the departure base in the wood of Corbie near Beaumont-en-Beine which the French artillery once again started to plaster. The next day, August 6, Paris and its suburbs received 18 rounds, the first one at 0857 hours, the last one at 1850 hours. On August 7, 12 shells were fired, killing five and injuring 40, while on August 8, six more shells were despatched, one man being reported killed. But the end was near. On August 9, the first shell fell at 0916 hours in a field near Dugny. Ten other shells followed. They killed three and injured seven. On Friday August 9, 1918, the 367th and last shell fell in Rue Saint-Denis at Aubervilliers. It was over. The advance of the Allied troops had overtaken the German gun, and it had returned home. The last of the giant

cannons which killed 256 and wounded 620 had fallen silent for ever. No Allied Armistice Commission was ever able to find any trace in Germany of these guns. Everything had been demolished with oxy-acetylene cutting torches.

Further Reading Gies,

J.,

Crisis 1918: the leading actors, strategies

and events victory

in

the

German gamble

for total

on the Western Front (New York: Norton

1974) Hallade, J., Mysterieux canons dans I'Aisne (Paris 1968) Poirrier, Jules, Les bombardements de Paris (Paris 1930) Thierry, M., Paris bombarde par avions, Zeppelins et canons (Paris 1920)

JEAN HALLADE was born in 1 922 and

studied at the Saint-Charles in Chauny. In 1943 he pined the Resistance and, after the Liberation, he volunteered for the army. He is passionately interested in history, especially in the naval and air aspects of the two world wars, and his publications include articles in specialised papers and three books, Wings in the Storm, Mysterious Guns on the Aisne and The Resistance was at the Rendezvous. Institution

2709

The Capture of Jerusalem The capture of Jerusalem on December 9, 1917 by Allenby's Egyptian Expeditionary Force, was not just a strategical success. A brief campaign in a country notoriously difficult for large armies to conquer had forced the Turkish armies into retreat, after a 400-year occupation. Sacred city for many religions, Jerusalem's capture was a morale-raising triumph both on the battlefield and on the Home Front.

Brigadier Peter Young. Below: Allenby enters by the Jaffa Gate

Allenby was not so modest a man that when planning his Gaza-Beersheba battle he had contemplated a reverse. Himself a cavalryman, he had at his disposal a powerful mounted arm. It would have been strange indeed had he not looked forward to a vigorous pursuit through the plain of Philistia. But in fact he hoped for still more: he believed it possible to intercept a considerable part of the Turkish force and to prevent its escape. Although such a success was perhaps possible during November 7 and 8 1917, it was to prove but a fleeting chance. As things turned out, the right wing — largely owing to the shortage of water — failed to cut off the retreating Turks. The Turks were, however, steadily pressed back along their whole front, their Seventh

Army

in the Judean hills falling back rather more slowly than Eighth Army in the coastal plain. This pursuit phase lasted from November 7/16 when the New Zealand Brigade occupied Jaffa (Yafo). There had been some hard fighting and in these nine days Allenby's army suffered over 6,000 casualties. The operation was enlivened by two magnificent cavalry charges. The Turkish rearguard was established on a commanding ridge, its aim being to cover the evacuation of Eighth Army Headquarters and the destruction of stores and

ammunition dumps. The Turks had two infantry battalions, an Austrian battery, a mountain battery and machine guns. General Shea, a former cavalry officer, had been advancing all day with his 60th (London) Division and overcoming successive rearguards. At about 1400 hours they had come under heavy and accurate artillery fire from the direction of Huj which was still about 2,500 yards ahead. General Shea was up with his advanced guard reconnoitring in an armoured car which the Desert Mounted Corps had lent him. He appreciated that a frontal attack across the

open would be slow and costly for his infantry and he decided to ask the 5th Mounted Brigade of the Australian Division, which was operating on his right flank, to co-operate by turning the Turkish position and silencing the guns. The cavalry available consisted of one and a half squadrons of the Warwickshire Yeomanry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cheape and one and a half squadrons of the Worcestershire Yeomanry, under Major Wiggin; a total of ten troops. There was no covering fire available because the RHA batteries with their 18-pounders had not managed to keep up, and the pack horses with the Hotchkiss guns of the Brigade Machine Gun Squadron had been sent to water early in the

morning and had not yet returned.

The cavalry's sword-charge The Austrian battery could not actually be seen, but its general location was deduced and the cavalry was able to get within 1,000 yards of its left flank, under the cover cf a low ridge. The Yeomanry made a brief halt before separating but, coming under fire from the Turkish infantry, a squadron of the Worcestershires charged, scattering its escort, wheeled left and rode into the battery from the flank of the guns. At the

same time, the Warwickshire squadron with two troops of the Worcestershires in support, charged the Austrian guns and the machine guns which were supposed to be covering them. The direction of the charge was such that the machine gunners

were masked by the battery during most of the charge. The Warwickshire squadron had to charge down a steep slope, across

the valley and then for 100/150 yards, up a steep hill. They came under a very heavy fire from guns, machine guns and rifles as soon as they appeared over the ridge. Nevertheless, all the Yeomanry troops charged home. Colonel Cheape saw some Turkish troops withdrawing and attacked them in the flank with the remaining two troops of the Warwickshires, capturing a

15-cm battery.

The cavalry took 11 guns in all, including the mountain battery which was abandoned by its personnel. The Austrians stuck to their guns and were killed. About 70 prisoners were taken and also four machine guns which had done a good deal of damage. Thus a force of 170 cavalry turned the Turkish rearguard of at least two battalions and three batteries out of a strong

was a remarkable feat, for the Yeomanry had not even the advantage of complete surprise. The absence of any position. It

obstacle — such as barbed wire — permitted the galloping horsemen to get in with the sword. The cost in casualties was not light. The Yeomanry had three officers killed and six wounded out of a total of 12. Twentysix other ranks were killed and 40 wounded out of 158. Of 170 horses, only 70 survived. But if the 60th Division had stormed the position by a frontal attack across two miles of open country, their losses, even had they not been brought to a standstill, must to many hundreds. After Grant's charge at Beersheba, the cavalry of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force were thirsting for further opportunities to prove the value of the arme blanche. Morale was high, but at Huj the defenders were no demoralised rabble. Stiffened by Germans and Austrians, they had been holding up the 60th Division and no doubt considered themselves strongly ensconced. In the event, the Turkish infantry proved less resolute than the Austrian gunners, but despite Colonel Cheape's clever use of ground, the outcome was by no means a foregone conclusion. Lieutenant W. B. Mercer (Warwickshires), the only officer of his squadron who was not hit, wrote: Machine guns and rifles opened on us the moment we topped the rise

have amounted

behind which we had formed up.

member thinking

that the

I

re-

sound of

the

crackling bullets was just like a hailstorm on an iron-roofed building, so you may guess what the fusilade was. ... A whole heap of men and horses went down 20 or 30 yards from the muzzles of the guns. The squadron broke into a few scattered horsemen at the guns and then seemed to melt away completely. For a time I, at any rate, had the impression that I was the only man left alive. I was amazed to discover we were the victors. It is ironical that before Allenby came out, the British High Command were thinking of withdrawing the swords from the Yeomanry regiments, so as to lighten the weight on their horses.

A chorus of view

halloas! 13 Allenby launched his attack on the Turkish force, some 20,000 strong, which was attempting to save Junction Station and the branch railway

On November

to

Jerusalem. The advance began at 0700

hours, and met with little opposition for the first three hours but was eventually halted by Turks holding the villages of

El Qubeibe, Zernuqa, El Maghar and Qatra. Major-Generals Hill (52nd Division) and Barrow (Yeomanry Mounted Division) conferred at about 1430 hours, Hill requesting support on his left flank. Barrow had already ordered 6th Mounted Brigade (Brigadier-General C. A. C. Godwin) to advance on El Maghar, and the Camel Brigade to take El Qubeibe and Zernuqa. This done, the 22nd Mounted Brigade was to pass through and take Aqir. The Berks Battery RHA unlimbered under cover of a group of trees and began to bombard El Maghar at a range of 3,000 yards. The CO of the Bucks Hussars, Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable F. H. Cripps, sent Lieutenant C. H. Perkins to find out if the Wadi Shellal el Ghor would afford cover for the machine gun squadron. Perkins cantered up and down under a hail '

of machine gun fire which 'followed him as the spotlight follows a dancer on the stage'. He got back safely to report that the wadi was a good position for the supporting

machine guns. General Godwin gave out Wadi Jamus. 'The Bucks and Dorset Yeomanry were to advance simultaneously in column of squadrons, extending to five paces, the Bucks directed on the ridge about 1,000 yards north of El Maghar; the Berks Yeomanry to push forward to the Wadi Jamus as soon as the Bucks Hussars quitted it. The machine gun squadron, except for one subsection which went forward with each of the leading regiments, was massed in the Wadi Shellal el Ghor to the right of the line of advance, and was able to support the his orders in the

attack until the charge closely approached the ridge.' (Official History.) The Bucks Hussars and the Dorset Yeomanry 'went over the top' at 1500 hours, scrambling up the steep side of the Wadi Jamus. They had some 3,000 yards to go — in full view of the Turks all the way. They started off at a trot and after they had covered about a mile came under heavy, but mostly plunging, machine gun fire. The pace quickened and the last 1,000 yards was covered at a gallop. The left squadron of the Dorset Yeomanry reached the ridge with its horses blown, dismounted and pushed on on foot. A fox got up in front of the Bucks Hussars and was greeted with a chorus of view halloas! The cavalry swept on up the ridge and as they reached the crest many of the Turks fled. Others, seeing that the Yeomanry had lost many men and more horses on the summit, got into position on their flanks and opened fire. But the Hotchkiss sections, which by a happy inspiration BrigadierGeneral Godwin had sent into the charge, were able to consolidate the captured position which was made completely secure by the arrival of the supporting squadrons. Some of the 12 captured machine guns were turned on their departing crews and on the village of El Maghar which still held out. Godwin now ordered the Berks Yeomanry to take it. The Yeomanry had drawn the Turkish fire from the front of 155th Brigade and Brigadier-General PollockM'Call was quick to seize the fleeting opportunity; 'Picking up a rifle, he ran out into the open and signalled to the Borderers to follow him. They dashed across the 500 or 600 yards of open ground which separated them from the gardens, and by the time the Yeomanry reached the crest beyond El Maghar, had hacked for themselves gaps in the hedges and were closing

2711

in on the village.' (Official History). Small parties of Turks held out, but the majority fled, 'and after some wild shooting the

Borderers captured El Maghar, meeting the Berks Yeomanry in its northern skirts' and adding 400 prisoners to the hundreds taken by Godwin's brigade. The Scots waited for the prearranged Fusiliers bombardment before attacking at 1545 hours. In 15 minutes Qatra was in their hands with another 400 prisoners. 'Aqir: the only failure

The incident that ended this day was not in the least dramatic. The 22nd Mounted Brigade (Brigadier-General F. A. B. Fryer) cantered forward in extended order about 30 minutes after the 6th began its charge. Reaching the crest of the El Maghar Ridge the East Riding Yeomanry saw the farther slope covered by hundreds of

Turks converging on 'Aqir. Meanwhile, Refet Bey (Turkish XXII Corps) seeing that

was collapsing, collected the and men of his HQ, about the equivalent of an infantry company, in a wadi near his command post at Ekron CEqron). A little before sunset two parties of the East Riding Yeomanry, attempting to take 'Aqir and cut off the fugitives, approached. The larger party, a squadron strong, was stopped and turned back by the heavy fire of Refet Bey's men. The smaller, 15 men of A Squadron under Major J. F. M. Robinson, 'scrambled and his

front

officers

in single file down a water-course, spread out on the lower ground, and raced for 'Aqir, cutting down a number of fugitives as they rode'. They drove the Turks out of 'Aqir and, dismounting behind a ridge, opened an effective fire on a retreating column at a range of 1,000 yards. The major tried to call up reinforcements by helio but got no response to his signals. He could make out Refet Bey, gallantly riding up and down on his white horse, marshalling his improvised rearguard. The Turkish commander evidently bore a charmed life for he survived the marksmanship of the Yeomen. He deserved to, for if anyone had saved the remnants of XXII Corps it was its commander. Finding himself unsupported in the failing light, Robinson fell back to the ridge, which as it turned out Brigadier-General Fryer had decided to hold for the night. slid

The battle was over. It had cost the Turks more than 400 dead and 1,000 prisoners. They also lost two field guns and 14 machine guns. The British casualties totalled 616. The cavalry brigade had 265 horses hit, its losses amounting to 16% of personnel and 33% of the horses. The squadron of the Dorsets which attacked dismounted lost more horses than the others, which charged the whole way mounted. Thanks to the covering fire of artillery and machine guns, the cavalry casualties were comparatively far less severe than at Huj. The only failure in an attack pressed home with real offensive and confidence was that of 22nd Mounted Brigade, which as Major Robinson's exploit shows, would have met little opposition had it on to 'Aqir as it should have dene. On the evening of November 13 the Ti themselves to be faced by 'i disaster', but spirit

]

11

as it turned on! until 0600 houi which time m<

had escaped

2712

to

Ran

occupied 'Horning, by rig

Turks

The capture of Junction Station and the advance to Jaffa and Ramie split the two Turkish armies. Seventh Army defending Jerusalem now drew its supplies either from Nablus — 40 miles to the north — or from 'Amman on the Hijaz (Hejaz) Railway— 50 miles to the west. In each case supplies had to come by road. Nor was there any good lateral communication with Eighth Army which now had its HQ at Tul Keram (Tulkarm). Eighth Army could still draw its supplies by railway. Allenby's original intention had been to halt when he got to Jaffa and build up his communications until his supply services could maintain his whole fighting force in the front line. But, with the Turks in evident disarray he now decided to attack Jerusalem. The hill country of Judea is notoriously difficult for the attacker, as Assyrians, Romans and Crusaders had each discovered in turn. Adam Smith's description still holds, 'Everything conspires to give the few inhabitants easy means of defence against large armies. It is a country of ambushes, entanglements, surprises, where large armies have no room to fight and the defenders can remain hidden; where the essentials for war are nimbleness and the sure foot, the power of scramble and of rush.' The central spine of the hills runs north and south with ridges running outwards, rather in the manner of a fish's skeleton. This means that the attacker is wise to move from east to west or west to east, otherwise he will continually have to be crossing valleys and offering his opponent a series of good defensive positions. Allenby's decision to press on was a courageous one, for the War Cabinet, remembering Townsend's disasters in Mesopotamia two years earlier, was torn between fear of a forward policy and its desire to give the British public a victory as a Christmas present. Moreover, the Cabinet knew that it might be necessary in 1918 to take British forces from Palestine to the Western Front. The advance began on November 18 and the fighting lasted until December 9 when Jerusalem fell. The rains came early that year and the troops in their thin cotton khaki without greatcoats and with few blankets suffered terribly from the wet and the cold. In the Palestine of those days a donkey track was considered a good road, and supply, even by camels, was immensely difficult. Still, 75th Division, which included Ghurka and Indian units with experience of warfare on the North-West Frontier, thrust through the Bab-El-Wad (Gate of the Valley) which strategically speaking is the western entrance to the Jerusalem area. On November 21 75th Division took Nabi Samweil, a village on a commanding height which is the key to Jerusalem. It is said to be the point from which King Richard I (Coeur de Lion) obtained his only glimpse of the Holy City. In recognition of their feat, the 75th Division took a key as their divisional badge. During the next few days the Turks counterattacked furiously and fruitlessly, while at the same time their garrison in the village of El Jib defied the efforts of XXI Corps. Allenby now decided to consolidate the ground gained and to reinforce his front line before making his final attack on Jerusalem. A lull of a fortnight ensued. During this time, XX Corps relieved XXI Corps and the Turkish storm troops made

numerous counterattacks against the British line with varying success. There was a curious incident on November 30 when some 80 men of 74th Division, owing to a faulty map, got to Beit Ur El Foka behind the Turkish lines, and bluffed 450 of them into surrendering, bringing back 300 prisoners. On December 1 a battalion of the Turkish 19th Division attacked an Australian post at El Burj. A battalion of 52nd Division, which was on its way to rest, came on the scene somewhat providentially, and despite its determination the entire Turkish storm battalion was wiped out, losing more than 100 killed and 172 prisoners. It was afterwards learned from deserters that the Turks were greatly puzzled by the way in which this unit completely vanished. The British casualties were less than 60. There were further Turkish counterattacks during the early days of December which, as it turned out, served no useful purpose but caused them heavy casualties among their comparatively few good troops. There was another brief lull before, on December 8, General Sir Philip Chetwode

(XX Corps) began his final advance. Once more the main difficulties were the rain, which fell incessantly on November 7 and 8, and the supply problem. As far as Gaza, supplies could come from Egypt on the broad gauge railway and the somewhat in-

adequate Turkish line from Deir Sineid. Thereafter lorries and animal transport were employed. The camels did not like the cold and wet but 2,000 Egyptian donkeys did useful work in the hills. The Turkish-made road through Bab-El-Wad

was rapidly

deteriorating.

Turkish Seventh Army had only 15,500 men, hardly enough to defend Jerusalem or rather the ring of hills which are its outworks. The Turks had spent a great deal of trouble on their defences and in some cases had provided three tiers of fire trenches. With sufficient men of high morale the position might have

By

this time, the

still

proved practically impregnable, but the of disasters since Beersheba had shaken the Turks, who, as we have seen, had lost many of their best men during the

series

recent counterattacks. The British onslaught at dawn on December 8 was favoured by mist and rain, though it delayed the progress of 53rd Division. Although the fighting was indecisive in that they did not get across the Nablus Road, the Turks were discouraged when they found that some of their strongest defences, such as Deir Yesin, had fallen. In the evening they began to withdraw and by the morning of December 9, the Turks

had

left

Jerusalem — after 400 years.

Allenby takes the Holy City The actual surrender of Jerusalem was not without an element of humour. that the

It

seems

learn of the city's impending fall were Privates H. E. Church and R. W. J. Andrews of the 2/20th London Regiment. They had advanced into the outskirts to look for water and were told by civilians that the Turks had departed. first

to

About OHOO hours Sergeants Hurcomb and Sedgewick (2/19th London Regiment) met a flag of truce, and not long alter two Royal Artillery majors, W. Heck and K. R. Barry, appeared on the scene and had a conversation with the mayor. This escalation in rank of the British officers concerned continued. The gunner majors re

ported to Lieutenant-Colonel H. Bailey, DSO, who felt too junior to accept the surrender. A few minutes later BrigadierGeneral C. F. Watson, CMG, DSO (180th Brigade) rode up, and, after reassuring the mayor, transmitted the offer of surrender to

Major-General

DSO

J. S.

M. Shea, CB, CMG,

(60th Division) at Kuryet El Enab.

latter informed Chetwode, and about 1100 hours was authorised to accept the surrender. Meanwhile Brigadier-General Watson with a small mounted escort, followed by the mayor in his carriage, had ridden to the Jaffa Gate in order to reassure the populace, and he was the first British soldier to arrive there. Major-General Shea arrived somewhat later by car and, sending for the mayor and the chief of police, accepted the surrender in Allenby's name. Thus fell Jerusalem for, perhaps, the 34th time — but not, as we now know, for the last. And thus it came to pass that when the Prophet of the Lord (Allah en Nebi alias Allenby) caused the waters of the

The

Nile to flow, albeit by pipeline, to Palestine, an ancient prophecy was fulfilled and the Holy City was retaken from the Turks. On December 11 Allenby entered Jerusalem

Experienced in mountain warfare under difficult conditions, men of the 3/3rd Gurkha Rifles (above) were amongst those responsible for opening up the western approach to Jerusalem. Below: Turkish artillery was constantly out-manoeuvred into retreat, abandoning their guns

2714

on foot by the Jaffa Gate. From the steps of the Citadel in a simple, yet dignified ceremony, a proclamation was read in English, French, Arabic, Hebrew, Greek,

Russian and Italian:

To

the

Blessed

inhabitants of Jerusalem the the people dwelling in its

and

vicinity.

The defeat inflicted upon the Turks by under my command has resulted in the occupation of your city by my forces. the troops

and now proclaim it to be under martial law, under which form of administration it will remain so long as

I therefore here

military considerations

make

it

necessary.

However, lest any of you should be alarmed by reason of your experience at the hands of the enemy who has retired, I hereby inform you that it is my desire that every person should pursue his lawful without fear of interruption. business Furthermore, since your city is regarded with affection by adherents of three of the great religions of mankind, and its soil has been consecrated by the prayers and

pilgrimages of multitudes of devout people of these three religions for many centuries, therefore do I make known to you that every sacred building, monument, Holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer, of whatsoever form of the three religions, will be maintained and protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to whose faiths they are sacred. British casualties from November 25 to December 10 had totalled 1,667, a number exceeded by that of Turkish prisoners of war (1,800) alone. Since the end of October the British had had 10,000 animal casualties, half of them a dead loss: that is to say 11.5% of the force's horses, camels, mules and donkeys had succumbed to the rigours of the climate and the campaign. The brief Jerusalem campaign had been one of the most brilliant so far seen during the war. Turkish reserves had been eaten up, so that there was no longer any chance of a counterattack in Iraq against Baghdad. Lloyd George had got the Christmas present he wanted for the British people. The Arabs were encouraged in their guerrilla warfare which was already proving a drain on Turkish resources. Indeed, the effect on morale of the capture of Jerusalem was more important than any strategical significance.

The Turks had already

lost

the Holy Places of Mecca and Baghdad. The capture of Jerusalem, sacred to Arab, Christian and Jew alike, 'had still power to stir Christianity' (Wavell), and was, therefore, a stimulating success for Euro-

and American allies alike. The Germans, who had come to put some oil into the Turkish military machine, succeeded in putting grit in the works. At every point Allenby had succeeded in outmanoeuvring Falkenhayn. peans

Further Reading

Captain C, Military Operations, Egypt & Palestine, Volume (London 1930) Mack, J. E., A prince of our disorder (Boston Little, Brown 1975) Wavell, Colonel A. P., The Palestine Campaigns (London 1928) Falls,

I

[For Brigadier Peter Young's biography, see

page 155.] Top: Heaven s gate, built in Jerusalem's wall'. For this a succession of crusading arm.es had attacked the city. Allenby promised '.olerance

Sergeants Hurcomb and Sedgewick (above) with a White Flag party at 8 am on December 9. Three hours later the surrender was accepted

2715

During spring and summer 1917 a wave of pacifism swept through France, and for a while the desire for peace seemed to prevail over the desire for victory. In opposition to the 'bitter-enders' (jusqu'au boutistes) who wanted to continue the war until its victorious conclusion, and despite the efforts of the wartime censorship which did

k

Dat(d)

Berlin,

But

!l.

Btfttmttt

1!)17

best to suppress it, peace propaganda was spreading rapidly. Pacifist, and sometimes even 'defeatist', propaganda had developed under the Ribot ministry (March 19/September 7, 1917), its

continued under the Painleve ministry (September 13/November 13), and had then come to a sudden end under the firm hand of Georges Clemenceau after November 16, 1917. Ribot's most pressing problem had been the failure of the Nivelle offensive, and its immediate consequences: a mutiny in the army, quelled by the moderation and skill of General Petain, Nivelle's successor. Also, there was great agitation among the workers encouraged by the first Russian Revolution and the refusal of the Ribot government to grant the Socialists 'passports for Stockholm' where the Second International had planned to hold a vast congress which would discuss peace. Pacifism thrived among the bourgeoisie, and its recognised leader (though he denied it) was the former Prime Minister Joseph Caillaux, who had been out of politics since 1914 when his wife had murdered the editor of Le Figaro. Caillaux declared in a speech that he would agree to peace only if it included the return of AlsaceLorraine to France. But many pacifists supporting him would have resigned themselves to a 'white peace'. Some of them were even 'defeatists' who believed in a German victory. Occasionally, there were some real traitors paid by the Germans. Pacifists could be found in the salons, among the writers (Romain Rolland, Henri Barbusse, Henri Bataille, Victor Mar-

among some university men writing for the papers Le Pays or Le Bonnet Rouge, and also in certain financial cirguerite),

Jyranfrcirhc Sriiirmlicrr

In 1917 France's acute social, political and labour differences, buried at the outbreak of war, rose up once again in a wave of civil and military unrest. Defeatism nourished throughout the ministries of Ribot and Painleve, spurred on by the propaganda of self-motivated agitators. Espionage trials in which senior ministers were implicated led to the downfall and resignation of Ribot, and Painleve, irresolute and unsupported by his majority, was soon forced to follow. Undeniable cases of real treason considerably weakened the pacifist case, and when Clemenceau became Prime Minister, appointed by his old enemy, Poincare, he was greeted by a country exhausted by political vacillation and eager for his 'bitter-ender' policies. Professor J. B. Duroselle. Above: German caricature of Raymond Poincare as the blind tool of the British, leading a tattered and defenceless France to ruin 2716

A report from the Surete Generale dated July 12 disclosed that a dozen Radical and 'Caillautiste' papers had likewise received highly suspicious subsidies and that the Ministry of the Interior was trying to hush up the matter. That same day, Malvy ordered the suspension of Le Bonnet Rouge. Duval was arrested and charged for having dealings and commerce with the enemy. Leymarie

feared a British hegemony after war. The German financier Moritz Meyer, the former Paris representative of the Mannesmann concern, and the Manncles

who

1917.

the

heim banker Marx were endeavouring

to

make

contact with them. Pacifists could even be found in the army, including General Percin, a notorious Radical-Socialist, responsible for the loss of Lille in 1914. Attacked by Parliament meeting in 'secret session', surrounded by far too compliant ministers such as Painleve in the War Ministry and Malvy in the Interior, Ribot reacted too moderately in the eyes of the 'bitter-ender' majority. In addition to a growing number of Socialists, pacifism was making inroads in the ranks of the Radical-Socialist deputies loyal to Caillaux. Prefect Perrette drew up a list of assumed or real pacifists, the ultrasecret 'Red Book' (which Mile Marie Claire Roux found recently in the national

resigned. On August 7, Almereyda was arrested in his turn. Four days later, he was found dead in his cell in Fresnes prison. It is estimated that Duval had brought 400,000 francs (£16,000) from

Switzerland for Le Bonnet Rouge and for Landau and Goldsky's paper La Tranchee Republicaine.

'The Republic is in danger!' Almereyda's death eliminated an important witness. Monniot, the author of the book Le mystere de Fresnes (The Fresnes Mystery), throws suspicion on Malvy, claiming that he was vitally interested in this elimination. Needless to say, there is no proof of this. Following these dramatic

archives).

Ribot's ministry: wearing itself out As regards the mutinies — of which the Socialist Pierre Laval had already spoken on June 4 — President Poincare was accused of having rejected many appeals for mercy. The negro deputy from Senegal, Diagne, then accused General Mangin of having had the coloured troops mown down. Next there were complaints about the way the wounded had been treated. Abel Ferry and Captain Albert Lebrun — the future President of the Republic— joined the accusers. Painleve's defence was skilful and documented, reducing certain allegations to their right proportions, and raising his prestige considerably. Once again, Ribot received a vote of confidence from the Chamber of Deputies: 375 votes to 23. Yet the Ribot ministry was wearing itself out in these quarrels. At the 'secret session' held in the Senate from July 19 to 27, Clemenceau vigorously attacked Malvy. The Radical-Socialist Malvy had been the Minister of the Interior since June 1914. Clemenceau saw in him the man who had allowed pacifist propaganda to develop. On July 31, 1914, he had refused to arrest the militants listed in 'Carnet B' (Handbook B). He had not prosecuted the authors of anti-militarist tracts. Malvy had just arrested Almereyda, the possessor of a suspicious cheque which the police had confiscated. His real name being Bonnaventure Vigo, Almereyda was an adventurer, an habitual criminal, and a thug, as well as Caillaux' bodyguard during his

He had founded Le Bonnet 1913 and received subsidies from the Ministry of the Interior. Malvy stopped these subsidies in 1915 but Almereyda obtained private funds. At the end of 1916, he mounted a pacifist campaign. The police investigated and finally ascertained that through the instrumentality of two agents wife's

trial.

Rouge

in

-Marion and Duval — who paid frequent to Switzerland, Almereyda was receiving money from the German banker visits

Marx.

On May

15,

1917, at Bellegarde

Duval was arrested in possession of a cheque for 150,000 francs (over £6,100 at the 1914 exchange rate) drawn station,

by the Banque Federate Suisse of Geneva and payable by the Banque Suisse et Frangaise of Paris. Leymarie, Malvy's principal private secretary, took this cheque and handed it back to Almereyda. This incident was revealed at a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies held on July 7,

events, Malvy sent in his resignation to Ribot on August 31. Ribot nominated Steeg, another Radical-Socialist, to the Ministry of the Interior, and made an effort to reorganise his government. He failed in this, resigned on September 7, and tried in vain to reconstitute another government. The Socialists and the Radical-Caillautistes

reproached him for having dismissed Malvy. Le Pays mounted a campaign on the theme: 'The Republic is in danger!' Poincare then decided to call on Painleve who was better thought of by the Left. The Painleve ministry lasted only two months (September 13/November 13, 1917). The Socialists refused to take part in it because Painleve kept Ribot in the Foreign Ministry. This meant the end of the 'Sacred Union' which dated from

August 26, 1914. In fact, the internal was to double in intensity — at a time when the front was quiet — and the antipacifist campaign was to take on an increasingly more violent trend which was to bring Clemenceau to power. The Painleve ministry could do no more crisis

than 'linger on' while the anti-pacifists' counteroffensive developed. While the pacistill believed that peace could be signed in 1917, the 'bitter-enders' got wind of the thwarted peace-making attempts made during the year. What hamstrung the pacifists was the emergence of real cases of treason. On September 20, the government demanded the lifting of parliamentary immunity from Turmel, a Radical-Socialist deputy from the C6tes-du-Nord. He was continually travelling to Switzerland and Italy. The German Chancellor Michaelis had announced that he knew the details of the secret sessions held by the Chamber of Deputies from an eyewitness. Was it Turmel? He denied it as much as he could. But it was discovered that he and his wife had brought back a total of 300,000 francs (£12,000) from Switzerland. On October 7. 1917.

fists

Solo Pasha: Adventurer from the Marseilles underworld turned spy. His lavish style of

aroused suspicion and, charged with espionage, he found himself in the dock

living

Turmel was arrested. A Socialist deputy from the Yonne defended him, claiming it was all a police frame-up. He was wrong. Today we have proof from German documents that Turmel had indeed been in contact with the Germans from whom he had received money. He was to die in

Fresnes prison.

2717

and Daudet. Painleve ordered a search of the Action Frangaise offices which uncovered old fencing-foils and old pistols, but no proof of any subversive attempt against the Republic.

A second case blew up at the same time. This time, an extraordinary adventurer called Bolo Pasha was involved. Originating from Lyons, Bolo Pasha had received the title of 'Pasha' from the Khedive of Egypt, Abbas Hilmi (deposed by the British in 1914). He had been a member of the Marseilles underworld, subsequently becoming a stockbroker's clerk, a wine salesman and a shady businessman, making a fortune in the process. He had built up a vast network of connections. During the war, he lived in elegant and lavish style. The police were highly intrigued by this. But, mysteriously, investigations at the Surete Generate were hamstrung for six months. His secret was eventually revealed through the American government. A sum of $1,683,000 (over £365,000) had been deposited to the credit of Bolo's account in an American bank by the Deutsche Bank. Bolo was ar-

The Painleve ministry

rested on September 23, 1917. The First President of the Paris Court of Appeal, Monier, who had guaranteed his integrity, was dismissed from his post as a magistrate.

For what purpose was the German money apart from Bolo's lavish personal expenditure? The investigation proved that in July 1915 the paper he Journal, one used,

of the big-circulation Paris dailies — whose owner was Senator Charles Humbert — had been purchased by Pierre Lenoir and Guillaume Desouches for 10,000,000 francs (£400,000) in used notes originating from the part of France invaded by the Germans. The two men proposed a partnership contract to Charles Humbert. Le Journal had a patriotic appearance and constantly demanded 'more guns, more

munitions'. We know today from German documents that at least as early as 1915 Bolo was an agent on the German payroll, and that the classified advertisements section of Le Journal was used widely by

German espionage agents. It will be noted that both Lenoir and Bolo had introduced themselves as friends of Joseph Caillaux. Lenoir systematically developed an antiBritish campaign in Le Journal. In August 1915, Humbert repurchased the majority of the shareholding. But how did he get the money?

It

was Bolo Pasha who

offered

him

the 4,000,000/5,000,000 francs (£160,000/ £200,000) he lacked. President Monier of the Paris Court of Appeal served as go-

between.

It

was becoming

difficult to ac-

cept that Charles Humbert was unaware of all this. So he too was arrested on November 13, 1917. Another harsh blow

had been inflicted on Parliament. On October 4, Malvy, on the pretext of defending his honour, demanded from Painleve a reading of a letter sent to Poincare by Leon Daudet, the Director of Action Frangaise, a letter in which Daudet claimed: 'M. Malvy, the ex-Minister of the Interior, is a traitor', stating he could

U

furnish proof of this.

One can imagine

the resulting uproar. to the applause of the Radicals and the Socialist- Painleve intervened and obtained a vote of confidence with 341 votes against none on a

Malvy defended himself

motion asking him to 'put an end to campaigns of slander against the Republic'. Action Frangaise was - uspended for eight

U

days. But public opinion was stirred up and divided. It t that on October Painleve, 1 taoul Peret (the < -ived Keeper of the Seals h Maurras ;

i

2718

falls

But the unlucky Painleve was never to emerge from the hornets' nest. On October 15, Clemenceau's paper L'Homme Enchaine addressed itself to Ribot and asked him to supply information on an

The arrest of Bolo Pasha on September 23, 1917, uncovered a network of treasonable intrigue and let loose a flood of accusation and counter-accusation. It also resulted in his execution

five

of the firing

months later. Top: Approach squad, and (below) the end

'ignominious separate peace proposal' in which 'a high political personage' was supposed to have been involved. This was obviously a reference to the abortive BriandLancken negotiations. Briand, furious that he had been implicated, demanded the right to explain himself, and on October 16 there opened a 'secret session' which was to be the last one held in the war. Ribot gave an account of the Lancken affair which he presented as a German manoeuvre. He wanted, he said, 'to destroy the legend that serious, arguable and possibly acceptable proposals had been submitted to use indirectly, and that the government, by refusing to stoop to their examination, had accepted a dreadful responsibility, that it had perhaps had peace within its grasp, and that it had not wished to conclude it'. He said that the German proposals had been a trap laid for France and for Briand, because Lancken would not have returned Alsace-Lorraine. Briand considered that Ribot had disclosed a bit too much about his intentions and made a long speech to prove the 'correctness' of his attitude and the precautions he had taken. He accused the government of having allowed the censorship to authorise an article by Clemenceau, 'the sharp-eyed razor-beaked man'. As for the Socialists, they maintained that the government had been wrong not to enter into peace negotiations. Painleve obtained his vote of confidence with 313 votes against none, but with 187 abstentions, including nearly all the Socialists. Irresolute, unsupported by his majority, discredited with the public, Painleve considered resignation. He started off by dismissing Ribot from the Foreign Ministry, replacing him with Louis Barthou, Poincare's friend. This could satisfy no one, especially the Socialists who remembered that Barthou was the man responsible for the three-years' military service bill. At the same time, the Italians suffered a grave defeat at Caporetto. Immediately afterwards the Bolsheviks gained power in Russia. France was on the point of entering a difficult period after a few months of lull on the front. 'Have we got a government with authority?' asked Abel Ferry. 'So far as I am concerned, I do not believe so.' It was a minor incident that led to the fall of the already-expiring Painleve cabinet. Painleve assumed the defence of Accambray, a notorious pacifist, attacked by the Nationalist deputy Carnegaray. Confusion was unlimited, and when Painleve posed the question of confidence, it was rejected by 277 votes against 186. This was the first and only time during the whole war that a ministry was positively overthrown. predecessors — Painleve's Viviani, Briand, Ribot -had spontaneously submitted their resignation. When the result of the vote was announced, the Socialists shouted: 'Down with Clemenceau!

Long

live

the Republic!'

weakness, as without violence. All accused

Why

these shouts? The hostility of the Clemenceau since 1906/1909 was well known. But if they thus expressed it at the beginning of a ministerial crisis, it was because Clemenceau, thrust forward by a formidable movement of public opinion, had become indispensable. First of all order had been re-established in the army, and internationalist pacifism had achieved nothing. The Stockholm conference had not taken place. Annie Kriegel calls the year 1917 'the second defeat of internationalism' (as regards France, of course, and not as regards Russia). As for bourgeois pacifism, symbolised by Caillaux and Malvy, it had suffered repeated formidable blows between July and November, because real cases of treason had been revealed — Almereyda, Bolo, Lenoir — and the truth had emerged about the imprudent links between Caillaux and Malvy and the traitors. Who had inflicted these blows? L' Action Frangaise, of course, but with a partiality and a lack of accuracy often very close to slander. But mainly

court-martial.

No more

pacifist

campaigns, no more German machinations. Neither treason, nor half-treason: war, nothing but war. Our armies will not be caught between two fires. Justice is passing. The country will know it is being

The Socialists alone attacked him. The motion of confidence was voted by 418 votes against 65, of whom 64 were Socialists; 25 other Socialists abstained, as well as 15 Radical-Socialists, including Caillaux and Malvy. Up to the end of 1918, internal politics were, in effect, in abeyance while Parliament felt the iron hand of the executive. The only important events were the referring of Malvy to the High Court (that is to say the Senate) at' his own request on November 28, the dismissal and replacement of the Prefect of Police and the Director of the Surete appointed by Malvy, the request for the lifting of parliamentary immunity from Caillaux on December 11, the vote on this measure on December 22 after a speech in which Caillaux said: 'I may have sinned through frivolity, through a sort of disdainful aristocratism with which I am sometimes reproached, not without foundation, but even more through an excess of confidence and goodness.' Caillaux' arrest was ordered on January 14, 1918. He was brought to trial only in 1920. Bolo Pasha was sentenced to death on February 14, 1918, and executed. Clemenceau rarely intervened in Parliament, but when he did it was with extreme vigour. Repeatedly attacked by the defended.'

Clemenceau. He was perhaps an old man, but he was a terrible old man with a ferocious energy. He was the ardent patriot and the 'bitter-ender' for which the majority of the French people, after many vacillations, felt the need. The choice of the Prime Minister is the main prerogative of the President of the Republic. Poincare, we know, detested Clemenceau who, ever since the Presidential election of 1913, had constantly and bitterly attacked him. He was well aware that his prerogatives as President, and his moral influence, would be reduced to nearly nothing if Clemenceau came to power. But Poincare, likewise a patriot and

Socialists,

he would answer them bluntly:

'The working class is not your property, gentlemen.' The most famous of his speeches is dated March 8, 1918. 'My

'bitter-ender', had suffered enormously from the successive crises of the 'troubled year'. 'Clemenceau', said Poincare to Barthou on October 18, 'seems to me at this moment indicated by public opinion because he wishes to go on to the bitter end in the war and in those court cases. In these conditions, I have no right to leave him aside merely because of his personal attitude towards me.' Thus, when Painleve found himself voted out on November 13, 1917, Poincare did not hesitate. There was no preliminary negotiation. On November 14,* he sum-

moned the

face

to

Socialists to

foreign policy and my internal policy is all one', he said. 'Internal policy: I make war; foreign policy: I still make war.'

During the period of the great German and then, after July 18, 1918,

offensives,

during the period of the great Allied offenit was understandable that internal politics was relegated to second place. When, on June 4, 1918, an attempt was made in the Chamber of Deputies to indict Foch who had allowed himself to be surprised on May 27 at the Chemin des Dames, Clemenceau, in the midst of Social-

sive,

'Tiger'.

baying, refused to hold a 'secret session'. it is necessary in order to gain the approval of certain persons with hasty judgements, to abandon the leaders who have deserved well of the country, that is an act of dastardliness of which I am incapable.' He obtained his vote of confidence with 370 votes against 110 (85 Socialists and a few Radical-Socialists). Clemenceau's energy succeeded in obtaining the 'recuperation' for the front of over 100,000 embusques (dodgers or shirkers). Henceforth, the protestations of deputies and ministers were useless. The ist 'If

Clemenceau's iron hand The arrival in power of Georges Clemenceau had an immediate electrifying effect on French affairs. Suddenly, the French felt themselves commanded. Everywhere obedience and discipline were restored. He formed a left-wing government, but at the same time he knew that he was supported by the Right. L'Echo de Paris, Lc Figaro were

L 'Action Frangaise, reticent at rallied eventually. Among the largecirculation newspapers, he obtained the total support of Le Petit Parisien. Le Matin,

for

him.

first,

though loyal to Briand, was favourable to him. He assembled the Council of Ministers only once a week, governing by himself,

not hesitating to discipline any minis-

ter guilty of acting

without his agreement. His ministerial declaration (November 20, 1917) caused a sensation. It was brief and brutal: to the army 'we owe everything, without any reservation'. France must 'abdicate everything which is not the patr ie'. On the repression of treason — 'Weakness would be complicity. We shall be without

Top: Alexandre Ribot, twice premier of France. A man who faced many problems his

in

wartime ministry,

his failure to act strongly at the right time led to his

downfall. Below: Raymond Poincare, President throughout the war, and an ardent patriot

army knew it was

that

it.

The army was also aware commanded, and despite

well

an understandable lassitude, it would undergo no more crises of morale. It is more difficult to grasp the attitude of the civilians. What is certain is that the trials staged since the autumn of 1917 did not lead to any unrest, apart from a fairly general desire for severe penalties to be inflicted. When Lenoir was sentenced to death and Leymarie received two years'

imprisonment,

was

arrested,

when when,

Humbert August 1918, the

Charles in

2719

we have to stop by force.' The strike broke out on May 18 and spread throughout the whole basin. There were cries of 'Down with the war!' Processions with red flags and columns preventing conscripts from joining their depots proved clearly that this was not an ordinary strike. The government desputting an end to the war,

High Court absolved Malvy of having dealings with the enemy but sentenced him to five years' banishment for having, as Min-

it

ister of the Interior, 'disregarded, violated

and betrayed the duties of his post', the Of course, there remained some 'defeatists'. On three occasions — the end of March, the end of May, and July 15 — there was a certain amount of panic in Paris. However, all

Socialists alone protested. .

eyewitnesses agree that there was a 'stiffening', that 1918 bore no comparison to 1917. Beginning in August, the hope of coming victory could be felt. Georges Bonnefous has shown how this change occurred in Parliament. He had left it on August 1 and resumed attendance on September 5, 1918. 'The usual atmosphere of the Chamber was entirely changed,' said Bonnefous, an eyewitness of rare accuracy. for peace Union', one can include the bulk of the French people sym-

The workers strike In this new 'Sacred

^^ ^H j

tL

i

bolised by their two leaders — Clemenceau, the old atheist Radical-Socialist, and Foch, the Catholic Marshal, both of them

equally good patriots. And yet, a section of the French people, a minority, did not agree. Before the war there was 'another France', that of the industrial proletarians who ranged themselves under the banner of revolutionary syndicalism. The 'Sacred Union' of 1914 had appeared to smash all this. In fact, despite the failures of 1917, this 'other France' reconstituted itself, in an appreciably different fashion but with the same faith in revolution. It was a minority for whom the ideal of national victory was less important than the ideal of the triumphant revolution. For all the French who supported Clemenceau — the great majority — the Bolsheviks were traitors who had led the Entente to the edge of a chasm. But for the 'internationalists' the Bolsheviks were right to conclude an immediate peace, and at the cost of some territory, to transform totally the social organisation of Russia. The repression of the internationalists had begun before Clemenceau came to power. It redoubled under him. The public was kept informed of the treason trials. But it was given no inkling of the silent action against working class pacifists. Anarchists such as Sebastien Faure, schoolteachers such as Helene Brion, were arrested and received harsh sentences. Meanwhile, the great bulk of the workers' movement was, in Annie Kriegel's words, 'won over to centrism', which meant an attitude about half way between patriotism and defeatism. Right-wing members of the Socialist Party were defeated, but so was the extreme left which was often pro-Bolshevik. Besides, the Socialist Party's member-

ship losses were extremely distressing: 42,000 members in January 1914, 4,800 members in January 1918 (but rising to 35,000 members by December 31, 1918).

were hostile to Clemenceau. Within the General Confederation of tour (CGT), whose membership figures returned in 1918 to the 1914 figure (about 000), the Zimmerwaldian extreme left organised a violent strike in May 1918 in Loire industrial basin. Andrieu, (lie netal workers trade union All Socialists

I

nust the next of revoluincapai d

JL

patched several cavalry divisions, ordered the censorship to hush up the affair in order to prevent the movement from spreading and laid charges against 17 strikers. Deprived of their leaders, the workers gradually returned to work.

The failure of this strike was also due to the fact that, even among the 'minority' trade union members, there were plenty who were apprehensive about harming the national cause. And finally, the French workers' movement was in process of reorganising itself, in opposition to Clemenceau and the wide majority of the country. But the real revolutionaries, the extreme left, were to remain very weak so long as victory had not been achieved. Tracts were in circulation in munitions factories stating: 'Our bosses are more boche than the Boches. We are being lied to.' There were cases of sabotage between July 1917 and the Armistice (power lines cut, cases of arson), but their number declined after October 1917.

Clemenceau's moment of glory Despite a quarrel with Poincare at the very moment when the Germans asked for an armistice, Clemenceau was reaching the peak of his glory. He had already been wildly acclaimed when on November 6, 1918 he had come to the Chamber of Deputies to comment upon the Austrian armistice. The Socialists alone, in the person of Mayeras, made an attempt to stress the disagreements between Clemenceau and Wilson. The Mayeras motion was rejected by 406 votes (including 18 Socialists) against 59 (all of them Socialists).

On November 11, Clemenceau entered

before 4 pm, the Chamber of Deputies in the midst of acclamations. He read out the clauses of the Armistice, and added only a few more words: 'In this terrible, great and magnificent hour, my duty is done. In the name of the French people, in the name of the French Republic, I transmit the greetings of France, one and indivisible, to redeemed Alsace and Lorraine! (Loud, prolonged and unanimous applause. The Deputies rise and applaud just

at length.)

Top: The unlucky' Paul Painleve. While a brilliant mathematician, he was not the man France needed in 1917 and his ministry only lasted two months. Below: The Tiger' Clemenceau. Acting as a virtual dictator he nevertheless restored France's confidence in herself and in the war

'And then, honour to our great dead who have made this victory for us. As for the living, whom we shall welcome as they pass along our boulevards on the way to the Arc de Triomphe, let them be saluted in advance! We are expecting them for the great work of social reconstruction. Thanks to them, France, yesterday the soldier of God, today the soldier of Humanity, will always be the soldier of the ideal.' Further Reading Chastenet, J, Jours Inquiets et Jours Sanglants (Paris 1962)

Ducasse, Meyer and Perreux, Vie et Mort des Francais 1914-1918 (Paris 1959) Perreux, G., La Vie Quotidienne des Civils Pendant la Grande Guerre (Paris 1966) Renouvin, P., La Crise Europ6enne et la Premiere Guerre Mondiale (Paris 1962) Ribot, A Diary of Alexandre Ribot and unpublished conferences 1914-1922 (Paris ,

1936)

zi:i
ANII OS I !• xi> The port of Bruges lay some 300 miles nearer to Dover than I any of the German North Sea ports. Two U-Boats a day emerged J from it to ply their trade against Allied shipping. From 1914 | plans had been put up to halt this traffic. They had all been 1 The most recent proposal had been dismissed in the shot down. | expectation of a successful outcome of Haig's Flanders offensive of 1917. When it became clear that Haig's offensive had failed, however, an operation to seal off Bruges from the sea was given the go ahead. Barrie Pitt. Below: The blockships at Zeebrugge

2721

One haven from which Germany's U-Boats had been able to operate with conspicuous success almost since the onset of the U-Boat war lay safe from attack eight miles inland from the Belgian coast. The port of Bruges had facilities to harbour as many as 35 destroyers or torpedo craft plus some 30 U-Boats — these vessels reaching the sea through the eight-mile long ship canal with its exit at Zeebrugge, or, if of sufficiently shallow draught, threading their way through a series of minor canals to the coast at Ostend.

The vulnerable points of this system were obviously the canal mouth at Zeebrugge, with basin and lock lying some half mile inland, and the entrance to to be overcome in order to

Ostend harbour. But the

difficulties

mount an attack on them were not only geographical. The Germans had placed 26 batteries containing 229 guns, ranging in size from 15-inches to 3.5-inches, along the coast between Nieuport and Knokke. Ever since the German occupation of the Flanders ports,

schemes

for inflicting

damage on Zeebrugge and Ostend had been

proposed. They ranged from plans to smash the lock gates with heavy guns, favoured by Admiral Keyes's predecessor as commander of the Dover Patrol,. Admiral Bacon, to a variety of suggestions for military landings, of which Commodore Tyrwhitt had already produced two. One of his suggestions was that the lock gates inland from Zeebrugge should be destroyed by ramming a blockship against them, and a second was for storming the mole at Zeebrugge and then attacking along its length into the town itself. Within these two ideas, Keyes found the seeds of a practical plan of attack. Any military plan of attack must pay special attention to the ground over which the attack is to be launched if it is not to suffer severe strain from logistic factors alone. Zeebrugge lies 65 miles from the nearest point on the English coast and 73 miles from Dover. In addition to the unknown factor of German minefields, nature complicated an attack on the area by providing an everchanging barrier of sandbanks and tide-swept channels extending many miles out from the Belgian coast; and from this area the Germans had cannily removed all aids to navigation. The canal mouth at Zeebrugge, 116 yards wide where it meets the sea, was continued northward beyond the line of the coast by two piers about 270 yards long and 200 yards apart at their seaward end. There is no natural harbour along this part of the Belgian coast, and the entrance to the ship canal was protected from the fierce storms of the North Sea — and an artificial harbour thus created — by a long, solidly built mole which left the coast half a mile west of the canal-mouth and curved north-east in a mile-and-a-half long arc of approximately a mile radius. Its total length — of nearly one and two-thirds miles — was divided into four sections: first and abutting the coast, a 300-yard long causeway carrying a footway, a roadway and a double-track railway which all continued on to the second section, a steel viaduct also 300 yards long, which allowed a tidal flow to sluice through the Mole to scour out the artificial harbour and prevent it from silting up. The tbird section constituted the Mole proper, over a mile long and 81 yards wide with a 16-foot high wall ten

The defences on the Belgian coast. Left: A heavy gun of the Tirpitz battery just outside Ostend. Above: A machine gun post of a German marine artillery regiment on the sea wall between Ostend and Zeebrugge- ready to repel an Allied seaborne landing. Below: Heavy guns of the Freya battery on the dunes east of Zeebrugge. Note the wire defences on the beach

on its seaward side, the wall itself carrying a nine-foot wide parapet roadway protected in its turn by another four-foot high parapet. The last section consisted of a narrow pier or extension to the Mole, 360 yards long, terminating in a lighthouse and carrying a 15-foot wide roadway also protected by a parapet on its seaward side. Within the protective curve of the Mole lay a barge boom and net boom on either side of the dredged channel leading to the canal entrance. feet thick

The plan shapes up In order to reach the harbour of Zeebrugge at all in wartime conditions, navigation of a high order would be required — and to sail ships of the size needed to block the canal into position, without grounding on the shallows and sandbanks, would demand a degree of seamanship to rank with the highest the Royal Navy had ever achieved. Under fire from the guns mounted on shore and on the Mole covering the approaches to the canal, shrouded in the poor visibility needed to conceal the ships from the German gunners, the men aboard any blockship would face innumerable hazards.

much

for Keyes's indomitable optimism that he seems to granted the ability of the Royal Navy to surmount the natural perils of the enterprise, and he therefore concentrated instead on finding ways of neutralising the huge weight of shellfire which would greet attacking craft rounding the end of the Mole. His first decision was that the heavy shore batteries should be attacked by 15-inch monitors. These monitors could carry out bombardments on several nights before the operation, always commencing at the same time and continuing for a specific period, thus lulling the enemy into acceptance of a normal practice. This left the problem of the guns on the Mole itself. It was obviously a fundamental requirement that the Mole-end guns and the extension battery must be silenced before the blockships came into their sights. The best chance of attaining this appeared to be an assault by infantry upon the gun positions; such an attack should also add considerably to the chaos of battle and thus further distract the defenders from the possible threat to the canal mouth. It

says

have taken

for

But again, the attackers would face heavy odds. The Germans had erected strong defences to protect the Mole gun positions from attack from all sides, though they had neglected to protect them from above. If an assault ship could go alongside the Mole at the junction of the Mole extension with the Mole proper, and men could surmount the parapet and reach the parapet roadway, some of them could advance outwards along the extension and destroy the 4.1 and 3.5 guns, while others crossed

£?..

the roof of the adjacent living quarters, dropped down on to the Mole end and attacked the 5.9 guns covering the lighthouse approach. The assault troops would then be inside the fortified zone. From there they could attack the machine gun posts from the rear, possibly advancing through the barbed-wire in the area of strongpoints and on down the Mole, where they could sabotage the German dock installations and military buildings, thus creating further diversions from the approach of the blockships. An early and important decision to be made was therefore the selection of a suitable ship for landing the assault troops on the Mole. On the seaward side of the Mole, at the point chosen for the landing to take place, the distance between the surface of the water and the top of the parapet wall is 44 feet at low water; and this distance is decreased by only 15 feet at high water, so that even at the top of the tide the parapet to be gained by the attackers would be well above the deck of an ordinary warship. In an appreciation previously carried out, it had been suggested that some of the outdated light cruisers in the fleet could be used as blockships, and approval had been obtained from the First Sea Lord, Admiral Wemyss, for the use of Vindictive, Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia, Brilliant and Sirius. When Keyes was faced with the choice of a ship to carry the storming parties, Vindictive was lying in Chatham Dockyard awaiting a final decision as to her future; he went to Chatham, examined her, and decided that, with alterations, she would be suitable. Lieutenant-Commander R. Rosoman was appointed her First Lieutenant and instructed to take charge of her conversion, and at the same time he was told the reason for the alterations he must supervise. Even when converted, however, the old cruiser would have one grave handicap in her role as assault ship. There was a possibility that in the run to the Mole she might have to cross a shallow minefield, in which case her draught was against her; it was therefore essential to have supporting craft in attendance who could carry out her particular duty. Two Merseyside ferry-boats, the Iris and Daffodil, were chosen for this duty and sailed south for refitting. They were both stoutly built, totally reliable and, drawing about 11 feet of water, would safely cross any known minefields. Having double hulls they were also practically unsinkable. Steel plating was fitted to their sides, and internal partitions stripped out to provide greater space for men and equipment. The other five light cruisers were ordered to Chatham to be fitted out as blockships. With the ships chosen and the work of conversion in hand, it now became necessary to provide crews to man them and men for the assault on the Mole. This was not a difficult problem. Every man who could be spared from normal duties in the Dover Patrol would have a place in the operation, and volunteers streamed in from the Grand Fleet at Scapa and from the South Coast cornsoon as word got around that something special was soon became necessary to appoint a staff officer itive work and Commander A. B. F. ved under Keyes as navigating officer in ist of the Admiralty from his ply himself to his new job.

HMS

Above: The Mole dark section

at Zeebrugge on the morning after the attack. The the 300-yard long steel viaduct cut by the submarine. built by the Belgians between 1895 and 1907

is

The Mole was

With the immediate problems of men and material taken care it was time to set about the task of solving various technical difficulties to which answers had to be found if the expedition was to have any chance of success. The greatest danger for the blockships and the assault force as a whole would come during the last moments of the immediate approach to their targets. Somehow, a cloak of invisibility must be provided; with this in mind Keyes spent some time studying the current methods of making smoke. His conclusion was that these methods were both cumbersome and uncertain and that it would be foolhardy to attempt to carry out his plans without improved equipment. To provide this, he turned to the man who had already helped him by inventing the brilliant flares which had exposed the surfaced U-Boats attempting the passage of the Straits of Dover by night — Wing-Commander F. A. Brock, son of the head of the firework firm. With a party from the RNAS Experimental Base, Brock worked day and night to produce a smokescreen of such density that it would conceal the raiding ships until they were within a few feet of the Mole. Once the assault party had been landed on the Mole it was obvious that the Germans would rush reinforcements from the shore end to help the Mole garrison. In attempting to join the battle, these reinforcements would have to cross the viaduct — which was obviously the place to try to stop them. To this end it was suggested by Lieutenant Francis Sandford that two of of,

several old 'C'-class submarines lying at Portsmouth should have their bows packed with explosive and be jammed under the

supporting steelwork of the viaduct, preferably at full speed. One submarine would, in fact, be sufficient to do the job, but two would help ensure success in the event of breakdown or some other misfortune overtaking one of them. The submarine CI was commanded by Lieutenant A. C. Newbold and the command of C3 was given to Francis Sandford's younger brother; the originator of this scheme was to follow the two explosive-packed craft in a picket boat to pick up the crews after the explosion. Meanwhile at Chatham, Rosoman had been joined by an engineer, Lieutenant-Commander W. A. Bury, and a gunnery expert, Commander Seymour Osborne, who were to help with Vindictive's conversion to assault ship. While Osborne concentrated on replanning Vindictive's armament, the other two cooperated with the dockyard staff in providing a method of putting as many men as possible on to the parapet of the Mole at the same time. They built a false deck on the skid beams along Vindictive's port side from forecastle to quarterdeck, with three wide ramps leading up to it from the starboard side of the upper deck; eighteen 27-inch wide ramps were then hinged to the false deck and triced up, ready to be dropped on to the parapet, and since it was proposed to deliver the attack at high water, the parapet top would be at the most seven, and perhaps only four, feet above the level of the false deck. However, due to the construction of the Mole with its projecting 'toe' together with the continued on

prific

272 fi

The men

at

all

Zeebrugge. Eyewitness accounts of the fight for the Mole Lieutenant E. H. Young, RNVR, wa gunnery officer on board the Vindictive: The ship was stealing along in such profound silence, the sea all round was completely tranquil, the darkness was limitless and so empty, that it seemed as if we might go on thus for ever. So the minutes passed until now it was a quarter to twelve, and suddenly there came shock of conviction: 'We must be within a mile or two of the Mole, and we are holding our course; in ten minutes we shall

be into

it.'

From behind us and far away out to there came a dull thud! thud! It was the great monitors waking Zeebrugge with their enormous shells. The attack had begun. We steamed on until we were some hundred yards from the Mole, and had begun to turn to starboard in order to run alongside when the storm broke. A searchlight shone out from the end of the Mole, swung to left and right, and settled on the ship. At once the guns on the Mole opened fire. From our dark bay we could see their flashes on our port bow, and there was a faint popping in the sea all round the ship. More accustomed to the crash which a

four just

makes when

bursts ashore, I did not realise at the time that this was the noise of shells that had missed us and were bursting in the sea. At the next instant they began to hit. It was afterwards that I remembered the eruption of sparks where the shells struck, the crash of splintering steel, the cries, and that smell which must haunt the memory of anyone who has been in a sea-fight — the smell of blood and burning. shell

Commander of

it

the

Vindictive,

Captain

A.F.B. Carpenter: At one minute past midnight the ship actually arrived alongside the Mole, one minute late on schedule time, having steamed alongside at 16 knots speed. The

engines were immediately reversed at full speed and the ship bumped the Mole very gently on the specially constructed fender fitted on the port bow. The din had now reached a crescendo. Every gun that would bear appeared to be focused on our upper works, which were being hit every few seconds. Our guns in the fighting-top were pouring out a continuous hail of fire in reply. Lieut. -Commander B. F. Adams, leading a party of seamen, stormed the Mole immediately the gangways were placed. Adams's party were followed out in great style by the remainder of the seamen storming parties, led by their surviving officers, and then by the marines.

Our fighting-top was now coming in for the attention of most of the enemy guns. Presently a tremendous crash overhead, followed by a cessation of our fire, indicated that a heavy shell had made havoc with poor Rigby and his crew of eight men. matter of fact, that shell had wrecked the whole fighting-top, killed all the personnel except three gunners who were i

-

vounded, and dismounted one

of the gin

The only survivor who was not com-

— Sergeant Finch, R.M.A. ruggled out from the shambles somehow and, without a thought for his own wounds, examined the remaining gun. found it was still intact and continued the single-handed. Another survivor. fight Gunner Sutton, who had again been wounded, fired the remaining ammunition when Finch could no longer carry on; finally, a German shell completely destroyed the remains of this gun position. As soon as the ship had been securely anchored the howitzer guns manned by the R.M.A., in charge of Captain Reginald Dallas-Brooks. R.M.A., commenced to bombard the targets specially assigned to them. The German batteries on the mainland were shelling our position at the Mole for all they were worth. A few minutes alter the storming of the Mole had commenced a terrific explosion was seen away to the westward, and we guessed that the submarine party had attacked the viaduct. A seaman was standing near me at the time, and brought back to me an old remark of mine, when he asked, 'Was that it. sir?' The explosion presented a wonderful spectacle. The flames shot up to a great height — one mentally considered it at least a mile. Curiously enough, the noise of the explosion was not heard. At about 12.15 a.m. the blockships were expected to be close to the Mole, and a momentary glimpse of them was obtained as they passed close to the lighthouse on their way to the canal entrance. So far so good. Our primary object was, therefore, attained; the diversion had been of sufficient magnitude. At about half an hour after midnight the full force of the diversion had been developed. Although the ship was still being hit continuously and the inferno showed no sign of abatement, one can say that the conditions had become stabilized. Being somewhat anxious as to the state of things between decks, I took the opportunity of a hurried visit below. Every available space on the mess deck was occupied by casualties. Those who could do so were sitting on the mess stools, awaiting their turn for medical attention. Many were stretched at full length on the deck, the majority being severely wounded. Some had already collapsed and were in a state of coma. I fear many had already passed away. It was a sad spectacle, indeed. Somehow, amidst all the crashing and smashing on deck, one had not realised the sacrifice that was taking place. A return to the lower bridge showed little apparent change in the situation. Shell was still hitting us every few seconds and many casualties were being caused by flying splinters. Large pieces of the funnels and ventilators were being torn out and hurled in all directions -one wondered how much more of this battering the ship could stand. pletely disabled

Lieutenant Young describes the action of the storming parties: We could not see from the deck what was going on above us on the Mole, hut whenever for a moment the V indict ue was silent we listened to the firing ashore and tried to guess what was happening there. more than half expected a few survivors I

of our parties to come tumbling down the brows, followed by a rush of* Germans to hoard the ship. But the Germans n<

made any attend any sort or kind.

counterattack of

in Adams led alPthat was left of the seamen's landing-parties in a gallant it the lighthi attack on the ba end of the Mole. Those were the batte that had to be silenced in order to help the blockships to get in. Nearly half of the ;nen's parties were casualties before

the ship got alongside, and owing to the heavy swell the reinforcing parties* from the Iris and Daffodil could not get ashoi With numbers that were all too few to start with, and that dwindled rapidly under the fire of the numerous machine to him, Adams led rush after rush along the Mole, trying to get to the batteries and to destroy the guns. Harrison,

guns opposed

in command of this party, was wounded during the approach. When his wounds had been hound, he join-

who was rely

Adams and his men on the Mole, and was killed leading one of the rushes, a most glorious victor over pain and death. The attack of this gallant band died away ed

men to carry it on, but achieved its purpose. When the blockships passed they encountered a severe fire from the guns on the extension of the Mole, but the most dangerous battery — the big battery at the end of the Mole itself— was silent. 1 think it is probable that all the gunners had left the battery in order to resist Harrison's and Adams's for sheer lack of it

attack.

But meanwhile time had fled. We seemed have been alongside a few minutes only; we had been there an hour, and it was almost time to go. The order came that no more men were to land, that the Iris and Daffodil were to blow their sirens (our own had been shot away) in order to recall the landing-parties, and that then the Iris to

was to go. Recalled by the bellowing sirens, the landing-parties poured back on board of us over the two remaining brows and streamed down below. For good or ill our part was done. The Daffodil gave a snort, expressive of relief at being released from her long, hard shove, and of satisfaction at its complete success, and backed away, giving our bow a pull out as she did so. Helped by the set of the tide, our how-

began to swing away from the Mole, and in a minute we were clear. We stole on in deep silence. The* din of firing had wholly ceased: all but the guns' crew were below, the decks were empty, and there was nothing to hear now but the wash of the waves alongside. The ship seemed to be waiting with her guns ready and her attention strained for the crash of a striking shell. But the minutes were passing. When was it going to begin? By the biggest wonder of that night of wonders we repassed the batteries not only unsunk but unhit. Confused by our smokescreen and flurried, no doubt, by what had been happening on the Mole, the Germans dropped behind us every shot they fired, in a Furious and harmless bombardment of our wake We were making straight out for Thornton Ridge, so as to get out of range of the shore as quickly as possible; we had alt< course for Dover; we had passed the North Hinder; all was going well, and we should i

lover before nine.

2725

The exploit that singed the Kaiser's moustaches. Or did

it?

""•»,,

2726

HMS Vindictive, the Arrogant-c\ass protected cruiser after conversion to assault ship and her return from Zeebrugge. Completed in 1899, her original specifications were — Length: 342 feet. Beam: 57 /2 feet. Displacement: 5,750 tons. Power/speed: 10,000 hp/19 knots. Armament: 10 6-inch, nine 12-pounder and other smaller guns, three 18-inch torpedo tubes. Armour: Deck 3 inches. Crew: 480 men. Top: Captain Carpenter (with arm in sling), commander of the Vindictive, with Commander Osborne and some of the men who took part in the Zeebrugge raid, after their return. Above: Kapitanleutnant Schutte, commander of the Mole battery, with some of his officers Left:

1

2727

large fenders to protect Vindictive's hull, the distance to be spanned could be as much as 30 feet. Vindictive would have to be held firmly against the Mole to enable her assault parties to disembark, in the face of a fierce tideway plus the effect of the 'surge' which the ship would carry with her. Derricks were erected fore and aft, from which grappling irons were suspended to hook over the parapet, and as a number of people, including Keyes, thought this arrangement, inadequate, it was decided that Daffodil should sail under the orders of Vindictive's commanding officer and she would, if necessary, push the bigger ship into position with her bows and hold her there until

she was securely berthed.

Commander Osborne had added to Vindictive's primary armament an 11-inch howitzer on her quarterdeck, a 7.5-inch on her and another on the false deck, all primarily for dealing with the Mole batteries. The additions to the ship's secondary armament placed the emphasis on close-range infantry weapons; three pom-poms and six Lewis guns mounted in the foretop to fire over the Mole parapet and cover the assault, ten more Lewis guns mounted on the false deck between the ramps, and batteries of Stokes mortars set up fore and aft to lob their bombs over the top on to gun positions or on to German ships moored inside the Mole. Wing-Commander Brock and his pyrotechnic party installed his Flammenwerfers or flame-throwers in two special mattress-protected shelters, one abreast the forebridge, the other at the after end of the upper deck, while under the bridge the conning tower forecastle

was similarly swathed and buttressed with sandbags. Mainmast and foremast above the tops were removed, and the mainmast laid horizontally across the quarterdeck, the heel bedded in concrete and the end extending several feet beyond the ship's side to act as a bumkin to protect the port propeller. The alterations made to Iris and Daffodil were considerably less sophisticated. They were provided with armour plating and mattresses against bullets and shrapnel, and were fitted with grappling irons and with smoke apparatus for providing cover for their retreat after the action. Both ships carried scaling ladders long enough to reach the parapet top, but it was considered that in case of difficulties the men aboard the two small craft could reach the Mole by way of the Vindictive and her ramps.

Commander Valentine Gibbs was

appointed to

and Lieutenant Harold Campbell was appointed

command

Iris

to Daffodil.

The blocking operation So much for the Mole — but

it was the assault on the canal mouth which was the raison d'etre of the entire expedition. As blockships for Zeebrugge, Keyes had chosen Thetis, Intrepid and Iphigenia, commanded respectively by Commander F. Sneyd, Lieutenant S. W. Bonham-Carter, and during the training period, Lieutenant Ivan Franks. Unfortunately, shortly before the operation, Franks was taken ill with appendicitis and his place was taken by his

21-year-old second in command, Lieutenant E. W. Billyard-Leake. In converting the light cruisers into blockships, considerable

provide protection against possible marauding German light while 18 coastal motor boats — CMBs — faster and lighter craft than the MLs, were to be employed on attacking shipping moored in the harbours, laying close-in smokescreens and placing calcium buoys in position as navigational aids. The 4th Battalion of the Royal Marines was formed at Dover under Acting Lieutenant-Colonel B. H. Elliot, and practised attacking a model of the Mole laid out on King's Down. This they were told represented a German strongpoint just behind the lines in France. Two hundred Bluejackets formed the naval assault party and these were given an intensive course in close fighting with bomb and bayonet, Lewis gun and rifle. A specialist group was formed of 50 Bluejackets from the Grand Fleet, who received training in demolitions and learned exactly how much explosive would be needed to destroy the various guns, dredgers and cranes which were known to be on the Mole. The naval assault personnel were commanded by Captain H. C. Halahan, RN. To ensure the complete blockage of Bruges, it was also necessary to block the harbour entrance at Ostend, for unless this were done, light, shallow-draught craft would still be able to go in and out of the inland port. There was no Mole at Ostend, but there was, nevertheless, no shortage of hazards, both natural and man-made, for the attackers to overcome. The Friedrich, Irene and Ludendorjf batteries of 11-inch guns, and the Jacobynessen 15inch battery, were all mounted within 5,000 yards east of the canal mouth, while on the piers which continued the canal mouth into the sea a pair of Gatling guns were set. The two-mile long plage to the west was well provided with machine gun and searchlight craft,

Above

left:

HMS

Intrepid lying

in

the mouth of the Zeebrugge canal.

Zeebrugge. HMS Thetis lies 300 yards short of the canal mouth where she ran aground. Iphigenia is the ship in the middle. The Germans brought the canal back into service by removing the two piers and dredging the sides of the canal. Below: The hole in the Mole viaduct made by the blowing up of C 3 Above: The three blockships

at

care was needed in calculating the amount of concrete and rubble to be placed on board, so that the draught of the vessels was not increased to such an extent that they would be unable to manoeuvre in the restricted waters of their scuttling positions. This was especially true of the canal at Zeebrugge where considerable silting had taken place since the German occupation, and too deep a draught might well prevent the blockships from riding far enough up the silt-bank to provide an effective barrier. Additional conning and steering positions were provided, well protected with mattresses and fitted with duplicate controls, and the three guns remaining in each ship had half-inch thick steel shields fitted to

them. To

make

the blockships less conspicuous, masts were refitted to increase the chance of the crews getting away. Keyes insisted on all the crew members of the blockships being unmarried men, since it was obvious that it was going to be difficult to rescue them from under the noses of a thoroughly aroused and aggressive defence — for which purposes, nevertheless, motor launches were to follow the blockships into position. Other motor launches were to lay and maintain protective smokescreens or

moved and smoke-making apparatus was

positions.

Of the five light cruisers being prepared at Chatham as blockships, two, Brilliant, commanded by Commander A. E. Godsal, and Sirius, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander H. N. M. Hardy, were

themselves in the entrance to Ostend harbour. to hide the approach of the blockships in Wing-Commander Brock's dense smoke — and to provide supporting fire when the German shore-based artillery opened up. Apart from the desirability of putting the German gunners off their aim with accurate return fire, it was official policy to endeavour to avoid, as far as was practical, any suffering on the part of Belgian civilians. To achieve gunnery of such a high order, two experts, Captain H. P. Douglas of the Hydrographical Department of the Admiralty, and his assistant, Lieutenant-Commander Haselfoot, were loaned to Admiral Keyes. On the night of March 22, the monitor Terror, escorted by destroyers and with captain Douglas on board, fired 39 rounds at a range of 26,500 yards at the Ostend naval base and basin, and all 39 landed within the boundaries of the target. The next essential was to choose correct tide and weather conditions. Ideally the attack should take place in a period of no moon, and if the blockships were to sail into the canals at high water, this should be at a time which would allow the force to approach in darkness and leave before dawn. In each dark period there are only four or five nights when high tide occurs at a time which fulfils these conditions, and on the night chosen the weather should

Once again,

to sink it

would be essential

e— 2729

While Britain rejoiced a nagging doubt persisted in Whitehall -had the operation failed? Below: A German officer on board Iphigenia surveys the half-finished handiwork of the

Zeebrugge

raid

\

u

•*%#

jw

— be fair 'fair' meaning a light northerly breeze which would gently waft the all-important smokescreens in towards the Belgian coast keeping pace with the incoming squadron. On the morning of April 22 the forecasts promised reasonably well for the night's high tide, and Admiral Keyes's confidence that the operation could proceed was possibly reinforced when his wife reminded him that the following day would be St George's Day. 'St George,' said Mrs Keyes firmly, 'can be trusted to bring good fortune to England.' The raid begins The squadron sailed at 1700 hours, the main force coming down from the Swin to join Keyes aboard HMS Warwick and other light protective forces at a point seven miles east of Ramsgate. The voyage passed without major incident although Intrepid was unable to drop off her surplus steaming crew and continued for the canal mouth with a complement of 87 men instead of 54. The night, which had earlier been lit with the silver brilliance of the moon, became misty and darkened, and a thin, cold rain began to fall. Because of this, the Handley-Page bombers from England did not put in an appearance, and the bombardment from the monitors Erebus and Terror was 15 minutes late in starting since Captain Douglas could not be sure of his exact position until he picked up the Oost Gat light marking the limit of Dutch territorial waters. The Vindictive was due to reach the Mole at midnight — and as minute followed minute, the tension throughout the squadron mounted. Then at 2350 hours a star-shell suddenly burst to sea-

ward and searchlights poked their inquiring beams at them from ashore, as the Germans awoke to the danger. The small craft had already gone ahead to lay smoke and the choking, acrid fog of the smokescreen kept pace with the raiders, pushed gently towards the coast by the friendly north wind. Big shells were now crashing into the sea behind them as the by now thoroughly awakened and smoke-baffled defenders fired blindly out to sea, vainly trying to assess the powers which threatened them. Then at 2356 hours the wind suddenly changed sides and deserted the attackers; the CMBs, MLs and destroyers desperately tried to make good the tattered blanket of smoke which was now being pushed back out to sea by the fickle breeze, but to no avail; as a result, Vindictive suddenly found herself steaming at full speed towards the eager gunmen on the Mole end — a perfectly silhouetted target with a quarter of a mile still to run before reaching the shelter of the Mole. Carpenter, in the Flammenwerfer hut at the port end of Vindictive's bridge, saw that he was dead on course but had rapidly to adapt plans to meet the new situation. In order to get his ship into protection as quickly as possible, he swung to starboard and held speed — running the gauntlet of the full fury of the German guns. At one minute past midnight on St George's Day 1918, Vindictive bumped against the Mole at Zeebrugge. But although she was only one minute late, Vindictive was sadly out of position. She was nearly a quarter of a mile too far westward, but time was pressing and the landing parties must go ashore. Carpenter tried to manoeuvre her so that the landing

2731

brows could be dropped onto the parapet, but what with the effect of water disturbed by her too rapid approach to the Mole and the starboard anchor being jammed solid and useless, he had difficulty in getting her broadside on to the Mole. Just in time Iris and Daffodil arrived -and although Daffodil had received a direct hit on her bridge and her captain was wounded in the head and half blind, he quickly assessed the situation, manoeuvred the little ferry-boat's blunt bow against Vindictive's starboard side and nuzzled her up against the Mole. Only two landing brows had survived the shot and shell which had blanketed Vindictive during those fatal last few minutes of the approach; but these were dropped on to the parapet and the landing parties stormed ashore. These parties were all led by junior officers because of the casualties suffered during Vindictive's trial by gunfire, and the only detachment commander left was Lieutenant-Commander Bryan Adams who led the Bluejackets of 'A' Company across the wildly swinging brows and was the first man on to the Mole. Under his directions the first arrivals tried to secure the Mole anchors, while 100 yards further west Iris was also having difficulty coming alongside; she pitched and reared like a maddened horse and then it soon became obvious that the scaling ladders were too short. In this emergency, Lieutenant-Commander G. N. Bradford climbed the port anchor derrick and leapt ashore carrying the grapplinganchor with him — and as he hooked it into position he was cut down by a burst of machine gun fire. Adams's party now advanced eastwards along the parapet roadway towards the Mole extensions guns, but by the time they reached the fortified zone which they should have been attacking from inside, their numbers had been sadly depleted by the murderous fire of the well-positioned defenders reinforced by the efforts of the pom-poms and machine guns mounted on German destroyers moored inside the Mole. Adams returned to fetch Royal Marine reinforcements, and numbers 11 and 12 Platoons were soon fighting their way eastwards to strengthen the remnants of the Bluejacket force. The Royal Marines were badly affected by the position of Vindictive's landing, and with the whole of 'A' Company virtually marooned in Iris, Major Weller — upon whom command had now devolved — decided that the survivors of his force would be used to best effect in keeping open the lines of communication to Vindictive by securing the landward approaches, and having done that, in mounting an attack against the fortified position at the Mole end and along the Mole proper. But the defenders by this time had appreciated the pattern of the attack and were organising themselves with increasing efficiency; the Marines and Bluejackets on the Mole were beset on three sides and were forced on to the

on her own on the gently heaving sea. She had just passed through a moving smoke-cloud rolling rapidly northwards, when to the north-east the night sky erupted into vivid light and heavy gunfire boomed from shorewards. Vindictive had begun her dash for the Mole. C 3 was on a course designed to close the steel bridge at right angles to its length, and slipped unseen through the darkness. How long could she remain undetected? With a loud crack a star-shell burst above her conning-tower and bathed her in bright white light. Almost immediately two shells burst near her, one to port and one astern, then two more shells from the shore batteries exploded to port of her before the disturbed water of the first two detonations had subsided into the sea. C3 rolled, but maintained her course — and, incredibly, the shelling ceased. Lieutenant Sandford ordered a leading seaman forward to turn on the smoke canisters mounted on the casing, but as the smoke failed to hide the submarine and tended rather to obscure the viaduct, he soon ordered it to be turned off again. Silently the submarine ran on, her crew knowing they were observed and waiting for the shellfire mysteriously withheld. Then a flare burst inside the sweep of the Mole and, sinking down towards the surface of the water, silhouetted the steelwork of the viaduct looming up ever higher as they ran in towards the target. As the flare hissed into the water, two searchlights — one from each end of the viaduct — caught C 3 in their beams and were joined by a third from somewhere near the start of the causeway, and the submarine was illuminated like the centrepiece in some naval tableau. Still the Germans did not fire.

The abortive expedition against Ostend

compared

in

need of some major

relief.

Five tons of Amatol Midnight had found the submarine C 3 only one and a half miles from the viaduct. She had slipped her tow on time from the destroyer Trident but had seen nothing of her sister ship or the picketboat which was to pick up her crew, and so for some time had been

I


A total

operation. Opposite, above and below: The two blockships where they ran aground one mile east of Ostend harbourentranceHMS Brilliant with smoke still issuing from her bowels and HMS Sirius lying parallel to the shore. Below: HMS Brilliant being broken up by the Germans

defensive.

They were

of of 146 vessels took part with 76 vessels for the Zeebrugge

April 23.

v*

fh

I

:i 4,

ff

--Jf

J

The Ostend operation

Sandford made his last course correction only 100 yards short

aiming his command precisely midway between two piers. He ordered the crew up from below to join him on the small bridge so that nobody should be trapped within her hull, and they of the viaduct,

stood together, gripping the bridge rail in anticipation of the shock of impact. The web of steel forming the viaduct supports loomed above, and with a sudden shrill shriek of metal on metal, C3 smashed her way into the criss-cross of braces and stays at 9i knots, until her conning tower crashed into solid and immovable steel. Her bows jutted just beyond the far side of the viaduct into the Mole harbour and five tons of Amatol lay centrally 12

below the

feet

floor of the viaduct.

Crew members scrambled on

to the casing to release a motor-

hanging from spars lashed horizontally across the tower, the lashings were slipped, and the skiff bumped down heavily on the submarine's bulges and into the water. The crew piled aboard, Sandford set off the 12-minute fuse and slid down to join them, and the heavily-laden craft slipped out from under the viaduct into a veritable hail of small arms fire. Perfectly timed, C 3 blew up. The reinforcements hurrying to the aid of the garrison of the Mole would not now arrive. skiff

The main task after Vindictive had gone alongside the Mole drawing such a fury of gunfire upon herself, the three Zeebrugge blockships appeared off the lighthouse, with Thetis — Commander F. Sneyd — in the van. For a moment they appeared unnoticed, then the Mole extension guns opened fire at under 100 yards range and Thetis staggered under the weight of shellfire. Caught as well by the strong, east-setting tide, she missed the gap in the net defences, ploughed through the steel mesh, and carried on towards the canal entrance trailing the wreckage behind her. The nets entwining her propellers and dragging astern of her pulled the ship to port until she fetched up aground 300 yards short of the canal mouth, her engines wrecked and her riven hull weighted down with sea water. But if not in the canal mouth, Thetis had performed one vital function: she had hidden and protected Intrepid. Guided by a green light on Thetis's starboard quarter, Lieutenant S. S. Bonham-

Twenty minutes

command into the canal mouth virtually unmanoeuvred her into exactly the planned position, fired smoke canisters and ordered his crew into the boats prepara-

Carter took his scathed, his

tory to blowing the charges in the ship's bottom. Unfortunately, at this critical moment, much of his achievement was negated by Iphigenia looming up out of the thick smoke which now shrouded the canal entrance, and crashing into Intrepid's bows. BonhamCarter quickly blew his charges before his ship slid completely off the silt, but much of the effect of his careful manoeuvring was lost.

Lieutenant E. W. Billyard-Leake in Iphigenia had had a much rougher passage than Intrepid; his vision restricted by clouds of steam escaping from a severed pipe, he had nearly rammed the western pier, and only a hard turn to port brought his ship around

of

May

9/10. HMS Vindictive lies alongside the pier at the mouth of the canal entrance

into the canal. Here he immediately ran first into the blinding smoke from Intrepid's canisters, and then into Intrepid herself. Backing off— and furious at himself for what had happened —

Billyard-Leake repeated Bonham-Carter's manoeuvre, jockeying across the canal despite heavy fire from the German defenders until he had placed the old cruiser's bows into the silt of the eastern bank and her stern ashore on the other side. He then blew the charges, and ordered his men overboard. The crews of the sunken blockships were picked up by ML 282, in battle conditions which caused severe casualties amongst the men herded together on her decks, but incredibly did not sink — or even badly damage — the launch. Within two hours her captain had reported to Keyes aboard HMS Warwick, and the survivors had been taken aboard.

Withdrawal At 0050 hours aboard Vindictive, Carpenter decided that it was time to signal the withdrawal. The blockships had passed the Mole lighthouse half an hour before and should by this time be on the sea bottom, either by design or by enemy action, so there was little point in prolonging the fighting on the Mole. The signal was given, the remaining Bluejackets and Marines broke off their action and began to pour back down the landing brows, bearing with them as many of the dead and wounded as possible. They had been unable to silence the guns on the Mole or to achieve much in the way of sabotage of installations, but they had added greatly to the noise and fury of the battle, and by increasing the general confusion of the situation had made it more difficult for the Germans to decide the precise object of the attack. Some 15 minutes after the retirement signal was given, Daffodil reversed her engines and allowed Vindictive to move out from the Mole. tow was passed from the bigger ship's bows and Daffodil tugged — enough to get Vindictive' s head swinging round before the tow snapped — and with engines at full speed the assault ship com-

A

pleted the turn and, with her two ferry-boat consorts, headed away from the Mole. All three ships made smoke, thick rolling clouds of it, which this time the wind blew along with them to hide their retreat from the German gunners. And at this moment, Iris, who had suffered less casualties than the other two ships as she had been unable to put her assault parties ashore, was now hit by heavy shells, fired blind, as she steamed through the thick clouds of Brock smoke. The shells crashed through her decks, taking a heavy toll of the men crowded together in her hull, and the explosion set her on fire; incredibly, she was so robustly built that, with the fire controlled and the firstaid men aboard working overtime, she still managed to make

Dover under her own steam and entered harbour at 1445 hours that afternoon. The destroyers who provided the screen to protect the squadron from attack by larger German ships enjoyed, by comparison, a reasonably quiet night — though the destroyer North Star, on patrol off the Mole lighthouse, was hit by German shore batteries and sank despite her consort Phoebe's efforts to tow her away.

2735

Left: HMS Sirius-«een fraotOMS Brilliant. Below left: Germans inspect the wreckage of the Mole viaduct, April 23. Above: Ten of the 16 men of the assault force who were captured by the defenders of the Mole. The total number of men taking part in theZeebrugge raid was 1,784, of which 86 were officers. During the action 170 men were killed or mortally wounded and 400 were wounded. Eleven VCs were won in the

combined operation

of April

Ostend — two failures The blocking operation operation,

22/23-eight

at

of

Ostend was a

them atZeebrugge

failure.

The success of this

commanded by Commodore Lynes, had depended on

accurate navigation, and to help the navigators Captain Douglas and Lieutenant Commander Haselfoot had established exactly the positions of both the Stroombank Whistle buoy and a Bell buoy off Ostend beach. Using these two buoys as markers, they had worked out courses and speeds to take the blockships straight between the piers into the canal mouth. Unfortunately for them, late in the afternoon of the day of the attack, the Germans had moved the Stroombank Whistle buoy about li miles east of its plotted position, and withdrawn the Bell buoy completely. The Ostend squadron thus found it impossible to be sure of its exact position; the ubiquitous MLs and CMBs were dazzled by searchlights and flares as they strove to check their navigation by coastal features, while the blockships, Brilliant and Sirius, were blinded by the smoke laid by the small craft which the contrary wind pushed offshore into their faces. Commander Godsal in Brilliant, with Sirius close astern of him, took up his pre-determined course from the falsely placed Stroombank buoy and sailed through the seaward-drifting smokecloud straight into the white glare of flares and searchlights and concentrated shellfire from shore batteries. Unable to see where he was going, Godsal navigated by dead reckoning and Brilliant shortly ran aground on the sand. Immediately Godsal ordered both engines full astern, but before there was time for the threshing propellers to bite into the water, Sirius crashed hard into her port quarter and drove her further on to the bank. Godsal blew the bottom out of Brilliant and Lieutenant Commander Hardy did the same to Sirius though she was already hard-hit and in a sinking condition; the blockship crews were picked up by MLs. The degree of preparedness of the Ostend defences together with the moving of the buoys, pointed to the possibility of the Germans being forewarned, and since a had gone aground near Ostend during the abortive operation of April 11 with her young captain known to be carrying certain forbidden written material, it is not improbable that the Germans had deduced the British intention of attacking Ostend. If this hypothesis is correct, however, it is difficult to understand why the defences of Zeebrugge were not similarly alerted. Keyes hated the thought of leaving the operation incomplete, so another attempt was planned with the battered Vindictive to be used as blockship. The task of conversion was completed in record time at Dover, and another old cruiser, the Sappho, was similarly treated to supplement Commander Godsal's efforts, for it was he

CMB

who was appointed to command

Vindictive.

The second expedition sailed on May 9 and was dogged by illluck from the start. Sappho suffered engine trouble on the voyage and had to return to port with a very disappointed Lieutenant-

Commander Hardy on her bridge. The now familiar preliminaries

her; the by

attack went on without of coastal

bombardment

by monitors and an air-raid by Handley-Page bombers went ahead as planned, the smoke-screen was laid to the difficult pattern specified; but as Vindictive approached the canal she ran into thick fog together with an extremely heavy German barrage concentrated on the canal approaches. Despite the severely restricted visibility, Godsal managed to nose Vindictive into the canal mouth though he was very close to the western bank and thus had to manoeuvre her to get her across the channel. At the crucial moment he was killed by a shell, and command devolved upon Lieutenant Crutchley who, although still affected by the explosion which had killed his captain, tried to complete the manoeuvre. His recovery was a trifle too late, however, and the old cruiser ran aground clear of the central channel. Once again small craft came in through heavy fire to pick up the survivors from Vindictive's crew from under the noses of the defenders, and take them to the safety of the destroyers of the protective screen.

The final setback of the night came when HMS Warwick, with Admiral Keyes on board, hit a mine and broke her back 70 feet from her stern; towed by the destroyer Whirlwind, she was able to

make port.

Plans for a third attempt to block the canal at Ostend were abandoned when naval Intelligence decided that the additional advantages of such a blockage did not justify the risks involved. And so ended the attempts to seal off the port of Bruges. The Germans removed two piers on the western bank of the Zeebrugge canal, just abreast and southward of the sunken blockships, and cleared as deep a channel as was possible through the silt under their sterns, thus making it possible for small submarines to be warped past the obstruction at high tide; but since only small shallow-draught vessels could use the Ostend canal system, ocean-going submarines and destroyers which were caught in Bruges or the adjacent waterways were securely bottled up inside, and the use of the port's facilities was effectively denied to other shipping. As a raiser of the Allied nations' morale, the raid was an undoubted success; it smacked of the deeds of the Elizabethans and was in the great English tradition of raiding from the sea. As such it contrasted strongly with the muddy, bloody struggles of the Western Front with their endless casualty lists and no noticeable territorial gain. In assessing the effect of these raids, perhaps it can — best be left to the Official Historian to have the last word 'But above all, [those operations] brought about that prevision of victory which often in great conflicts appeared to be the deciding force — a prevision which is not confined to combatants, but comes to the whole attendant world as a revelation of the inevitable end.' Further Reading Keyes, Admiral Sir Roger, Naval Memoirs (Thornton Butterworth) Marder, Arthur J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 5, 79787979: Victory and Aftermath (Oxford University Press) Newbolt, Henry, The Official History of the War: Naval Operations, Vol. 5 (Longmans, Green) Pitt,

Barrie,

Zeebrugge

(Cassell)

[For Barrie Pitt's biography see p. 31.]

2737

After a slow start in recognising that aviahad any valid or useful part to play in waging war, Great Britain became the first nation on earth to create an air service wholly independent of the army and navy. The decision was implemented on April 1, 1918, when the new Royal Air Force officially came into being; but the making of that decision was neither smooth nor tidy. Indeed, the circumstances which led up to it constitute such a tale of confusion, miscalculation and incidental intrigue that no service can ever have begun life under less auspicious conditions. It was partly through the military accident of two successive air raids, carried out in broad daylight on a relatively defenceless London with negligible results, that the War Cabinet felt bound to contemplate drastic countermeasures. Since the bombing of Berlin, or even the industrial cities of the Ruhr, was quite impracticable in the high summer of 1917 with the machines then at the disposal of the War Office and Admiralty, the politicians' sense of impotence finally stiffened their resolve to produce long-range bombers and put them under the command of an air arm no longer subordinate to the older services. tion

The army and Royal Navy had gone to war in 1914 with small but already separwings of their own, despite the pretence that these wings were parts of a single, indivisible whole. For it was in November, 1911, that Lord Haldane, then Secretary of State for War, addressed a special session of the Committee of Imperial Defence, approving 'the creation of a British aeronautical service to be regarded as one, and to consist of a naval wing, a military wing and a Central Flying School'. Flying was still a novelty and few senior officers believed that aviation had any useful part to play in war; so that by the spring of 1914 a nominally unified Royal Flying Corps had split into two sickly and undernourished branches. The naval wing, under the stimulating guidance of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, was already forming its own 'flights of aeroplanes and seaplanes', while the military wing struggled to provide the army with enough machines and trained pilots to equip the four squadrons which accompanied the British Expeditionary Force to France at the end of August. ate

air

official

THE THIRD SERVICE Though slow to realise the importance of air power, Britain became, on April 1, 1918, the first country in the world to establish an air force entirely independent of the army and the navy. The factors leading to this were not, unfortunately, based on sound strategic or tactical thinking, but rather on the desire of the country to revenge itself on the Germans for the daylight Gotha raids of 1917. The committee set up under General Smuts to investigate means of retaliation had come to the erroneous conclusion that aircraft production was faster than it in fact was, and that a separate air force was required to utilise the anticipated great fleets of bombers. Andrew Boyle. Right: Lord Haldane, father of the RFC

The air services of France and Germany were better equipped than the RFC, largely because both came under the complete operational control of their army commanders on the Western Front. By conRFC, representing as it did only half of Britain's meagre air potential, was too small to have any real military effectiveness; for this reason alone, the British trast, the

Commander-in-Chief in France tended to keep his air arm on a looser rein. Under Sir Douglas Haig, from 1915 onwards, the RFC was thus able to develop a tactical flexibility in a fashion traditionally alien

French and German military minds. however, doubtful if this could have arisen without the close understanding which existed between Haig and his air commander, the pugnacious and singleminded Hugh Trenchard. Like the vast majority of his pilots, Trenchard had originally been an army officer; but his views on the correct application of air to the It is,

resources

to

the

fixed

battle

lines

of

Flanders and France were inspired as much by exceptional intuition as by hard

experience gained in action. Under Trenchard's direction, squadrons of often outmoded and primitively-armed aircraft evolved and gradually perfected techniques of reconnaissance flying which enabled army commanders, for the first time in modern warfare, to know what was happening 'on the other side of the hill'. Aerial photography, artillery spotting and direct air attacks,

sometimes by bombing

but more often in combats with opposing machines far beyond the German lines, converted the RFC by 1916 into a specialised army support wing of genuine tactical value. Since ^11 pilots in those formative days were volunteers, the morale of this corps d'elite remained high even in and while Trenchard gave adversity; priority at all times to the needs of the land forces, this did not exclude the systematic working out of a rudimentary doctrine of air warfare. As early as spring 1916, when the flower of the French army was being crushed at Verdun, the theories originally conceived by Trenchard were fully tested in the heat of a full scale battle by Commandant du Peuty, the local French air commander. That same summer, on the Somme, the Royal Flying Corps succeeded in vindicating these same policies. An important sorties

document, drawn up by Trenchard towards the end of the Somme offensive for the benefit of Haig, summed up what the French and British squadrons had learnt: Owing to the unlimited space in the air, the difficulty one machine has in seeing another, the accidents of wind and cloud, it is impossible for aeroplanes, however skilled and vigilant their pilots, however powerful their engines, however mobile their machines and however numerous their formations, to prevent hostile aircraft from crossing the line if they have the initiative and deter-

mination to do so. The aeroplane is not a defence against the aeroplane. But the opinion of those most competent to judge is that the aeroplane, as a weapon of attack, cannot be too highly estimated. signal instance of this fact is offered to us by the operations which took place in the air at

A

Verdun.

On tions

the British front,

during the opera-

which began with the battle of the that although the enemy

Somme, we know

has concentrated the greater part of his available forces in the air on the front, the work actually accomplished by their aeroplanes stands, compared with the work done by us, in the proportion of almost four to one hundred. From the accounts ofprisoners, we gather thajt the enemy's aeroplanes have received orders not to cross the lines over the French or British front unless the day is cloudy and a surprise attack can be made, presumably in order to avoid casualties. On the other hand, British aviation has been guided by a policy of relentless and incessant offensive. Our machines have continually attacked the enemy on his side of the line, bombed his aerodromes, besides carrying out attacks on places of importance far behind the lines. It would seem probable that this has had the effect of compelling him to keep back or to detail portions of his forces to the air for defensive purposes. The question which arises is this: supposing the enemy, under the influence of some drastic reformer or some energetic leader, were now to change his policy and follow the example of the English and

French. Should

we abandon our

offensive,

bring back our squadrons behind the lines defend places like Boulogne, St Omer,

to

Amiens and Abbeville, and protect our artillery and photographic machines with defensive escorts, or should we continue our offensive more vigorously than before? has been our experience in the past that when the Germans were doing only work done by our machines their mere presence over our lines produced an insistent and continuous demand for protective and defensive measures. If the Germans were once more to increase the degree of their activity, even up to what constitutes half the degree of our activity, it is certain such demands would be made again. On the other hand, it is equally certain that were such measures adopted they would prove ineffectual. Supposing we had an unlimited number of machines for defensive It

at a time half the

purposes, it would still be impossible to prevent hostile machines from crossing the line if they were determined to do so, simply because the sky is too large to defend. The Germans paid Trenchard the compliment of imitating his aggressive methods. They did so with a thoroughness which spread alarm in some sections of the War Office, of the press, and of Parliament. 'German machines are multiplying in these parts', the RFC leader wrote to his chief

supply officer in London. T want to beat the Boche in this war, not the next.' Flying Corps casualties now began to rise, though not disproportionately, because the Germans possessed in the Fokker Eindekker a fighting machine far superior to any yet produced by the British. Though it had no great advantage in performance, it did have the killing-power not yet possessed by the Allies, as a result of its synchronising gear, which enabled machine gun bullets to be fired through the propeller. Everything in war tends to be a compromise between progress and supply difficulties. On paper, in the new Vickers FB5, the RFC had its answer to the Fokker; but competing demands from the War Office and Admiralty for scarce materials and skilled craftsmen, as well as the

normal 'teething troubles' of development, kept British aviation at a distinct material disadvantage. Significantly, Trenchard's policy of the offensive helped to redress this dangerous imbalance. There were continual outcries at home against 'the murder' of British pilots through this paradoxical and costly use of machines and men. The most important result, however, was an official review of administrative shortcomings in supplying the rival wings of the army and the navy. An Air Board was appointed, with Lord Curzon as its first head; and its brief was to prevent 'overlapping between two great Depart-

ments of State'. Unfortunately, like many compromise bodies of the kind, before and since, the Air Board could advise but not order. It lacked executive power and authority. The British government in 1916 was not prepared to go any faster than public opinion or the military priorities would force it to do. In the words of Asquith, the then Prime Minister, 'the right way to get an Air Ministry — and an Air Ministry may come out of it — is to make some arrangement of this kind, to let it grow, and absorb more and more the work of the air services'. The cornerstone of Trenchard's creed was that command of the air could be won and held only if all aircraft, bombers, fighters

2739

and reconnaissance types, were under the control of a single air leader. When, therefore, in autumn 1916, the Admiralty proposed that a naval group of 200 bombers should be built and stationed in France with the purpose of knocking out German munitions centres, he protested strongly. So did Haig. And Curzon himself opposed the scheme in the name of his Air Board — without succeeding in scotching

it.

Cur-

annoyance and frustration was undoubtedly a factor in his decision to desert Asquith and join the discontented faction, led by Lloyd George, which sought a better co-ordinated and stronger direction zon's resulting

of the total war effort. The conspirators achieved their aim. But there was no marked improvement in supplying the growing needs of the RFC for several months after Lloyd George replaced Asquith in December 1916. The situation was further complicated by

new government's over-riding doubts about the costly strategy of attrition on land. It seemed in the early summer of 1917 that nothing could break the bloody deadlock along the Western Front from the Channel ports to the Alps. Throughout the previous six months the RFC had persistently striven, against increasing odds, to give its expected support to the ground forces, without forfeiting its vaunted command of the air above the battlefield, while the Air Board at home gradually began to clear bottlenecks in the supply of trained men and improved machines. It is worth recording that between March and May, 1917 (that is before, during and after the the

abortive Nivelle Offensive), 1,270 British aircraft failed to return to base. Fortunately for Trenchard, the production tide was at last turning in his favour. Both Lord

Cowdray, the new head of the Air Board, and Sir William Weir, the gifted Scots engineer who was his technical adviser, considered that they could now meet all Trenchard's requirements and still lay down machines for producing ten longrange bombing squadrons first requested by the RFC commander in 1916 as part of a composite force of 86 squadrons. Both men felt that the bomber might turn out to be Britain's answer to the German U-Boat, then taking a perilously heavy toll of Allied shipping. They were equally convinced that the task of striking at German industrial vitals was a function not of the largely inactive naval air wing but of the

overworked, highly-experienced RFC.

The last straw What obligingly stung

the

War Cabinet

into a sudden frenzy of activity on the whole question of warfare in the sky was not, however, the persuasions of Cowdray, Weir or Trenchard, but the accidental intervention of the Germans themselves. When a squadron of twin-engined Gothas circled over London, dropping bombs at random, on June 13, 1917, the political repercussions were considerable. Some 600 civilians were killed or injured, damage to

property proved slight, but the blow to public morale and national pride was much

more

George sent for Trenchard, demanded an immediate reprisal attack on Mannheim, but was lasting in its effects. Lloyd

ngly advised against a diversion of hich the RFC had no resources to luccesefully at that time. on open towns,' Trenchard e pugnant to British ideas but

we may be

forced to adopt them. It would be worse than useless to do so, however, unless we are determined that once adopted they will be carried through to the end. At present we are not prepared to carry out reprisals effectively, being unprovided with suitable machines.' When a second Gotha raid on London took place within three weeks, the psychological impact on a frustrated War Cabinet was redoubled and proved this time to be decisive. Lloyd George summoned his colleagues soon after the all-clear sounded. Their mood was one of dark recrimination: 'One would have thought the whole world was coming to an end', Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, commented in a letter to Haig. General Smuts was next deputed to conduct a searching enquiry into the air defences of London and into the woefully unco-ordinated control of the nation's air effort.

The Smuts committee

collected

evidence from many witnesses, hostile as well as friendly, before drafting an historic report, the main conclusion of which was that a single air service should forthwith be created under a separate Ministry of the Crown. A continued system of dual control under the Air Board, Smuts argued, would not guarantee the necessary simplicity of aim to eliminate the rivalries and wastefulness of the past three years of war. Despite the hesitations of the two service Ministers, Lord Derby at the War Office and Sir Eric Geddes at the Admiralty, and the equally cautious opinion of Cowdray at the Air Board that an Air Ministry should be set up only after Germany had been defeated, the War Cabinet gratefully accepted Smuts' contentious proposal. Trenchard at first opposed it, not as a matter of principle but on the practical grounds that an Air Ministry could hardly affect the course of air fighting in any positive sense at so critical a period in the Allies' military fortunes during that gloomy autumn of 1917. Haig accurately reflected the worries of the RFC's leader in an earlier diary note dated August 28: 'The War Cabinet have evidently decided on creating a new department to deal with air operations, on the lines of the War Office and Admiralty. Trenchard is much perturbed as to the result of this new departure just at a time when the Flying Corps was beginning to feel that it had become an important part of the army.' The risk of graver dislocations seemed too big to Trenchard. His experience of repeated failures to fulfil requirements made him mistrust the proposed new Air Ministry as deeply as he had formerly mistrusted the ineffectual Air Board. Smuts was peering much further ahead than that, declaring like a true visionary who stood above the immediate battle: Hitherto aircraft production has been insufficient to supply the demands of both army and navy, and the chief concern of the Air Board has been to satisfy (he necessary requirements of those services. But thai Next Spring phase is rapidly passing .

.

.

and Summer the position will army and navy will have all the required in connection with

be that the air services their opera

This means that the Air Board has already reached the stage where the settlement of future war policy in the air war has tions.

become necessary. The day may not be far

when aerial operations, with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction off

and population centres on a may become the principal opera-

A new service, born

which the older forms of military and naval operations may become

on April Fool's Day and soon beset by

of industrial vast scale,

tions of war, to

secondary and In the event Trenchard was right, Smuts wrong, in assessing the likely shortages of aircraft in 1918; but the South African statesman was correct in his basic strategic assumptions which coincided broadly with Trenchard's, as it happened. Smuts seemed bold to the point of rashness in recommending that an Air Ministry should be established forthwith by Act of Parliament. If Trenchard's narrower wish had been granted, or if the Smuts decision had been deferred in accordance with Cowdray's suggestion until peace came, there would almost certainly have been no Royal Air Force; and it is arguable whether the very fighting of the Battle of Britain in 1940 subordinate.

would have become possible, since one of the earliest capricious postwar ideas of Lloyd George in early 1919 was to wind up the recently created third service as an unnecessary peacetime luxury. Fortunately, Winston Churchill, by then Secretary of State for War, decided otherwise. He was much influenced in this judgement by the man he chose to recall as his Chief of the Air Staff, the former Flying Corps leader,

Hugh Trenchard. Profound misgivings When Trenchard was originally offered that new post in mid-December, 1917, he had accepted it with profound misgivings. For he realised that the War Cabinet grossly overrated the strategic importance of air power at its then relatively puny stage of development. He informed Lord Rothermere, the Air Minister-designate, that there was a limit to what could be expected of the combined resources of the RFC and the Royal Naval Air Service: the very business of merging them could take place only at the expense of vital operations on behalf of the army and navy. On returning to France for a brief leave-taking of his headquarters staff, Trenchard also saw Haig and told him that his new masters in London were 'quite off their heads as to the future possibilities of aeronautics for ending the war'. In the arduous weeks before the Royal Air Force received its birth-certificate, which by a piece of sublime irony was dated April 1, 1918, bitter conflict had erupted at the Air Ministry between Rothermere and Trenchard. The conflict, of course, concerned means rather than ends. Nobody had longer or more realistic experience than Trenchard of air operations. Naturally, then, he looked with distaste on any plans which were either wildly impracticable or in clear opposition to the tactical needs of Britain's land forces. Moreover, he disliked and distrusted Rothermere as a self-confessed political intriguer who had expressed, in Trenchard's own hearing, the intention of undermining the position of Haig as Commander-in-Chief. The incompatibility between Rothermere and Trenchard, in methods and outlook as well as temperament, thus resulted in a prolonged crisis of confidence which was bound to bring one or the other down. Both men in the end came to grief. Trenchard's resignation led to a brief period of political bickering inside the government, which in turn precipitated the resignation of Rothermere before the

the petty squabbles of the politicians Below

right: The first Air Minister. Lord Rothermere. Principally a newspaper owner and political intriguer, he saw his appointment as an opportunity to dethrone Sir Douglas Haig, to whom he was violently opposed. It was this avowed intention which first caused him to run foul of Sir Hugh Trenchard, the first service chief of the Royal Air Force. Photograph, opposite page: Lord Trenchard, as he later

became, the father

of the

RAF and

its

short-

lived first Chief of Air Staff

end of April 1918. Yet nothing now could alter the fact that an independent air force had been created, however weird and halfaccidental the circumstances. Weir, the technical expert of the old Air Board, was next appointed Secretary of State. He sent Trenchard to France in charge of longrange bombing operations against those few industrial cities of Germany within bare reach of the few squadrons of aircraft suitable for that purpose. The first sustained campaign of its kind in the history of warfare, Trenchard's bombing operations caused negligible destruction; but, as a portent of things to come, it amply foreshadowed the prescience of Smuts to whom history should not give more than a portion of the credit for creating the Royal Air Force. Britain's third service was surely the unwanted child of a shot-gun marriage between two reluctant partners, the army and the Royal Navy; all Smuts did was to make the child legitimate, for its true father was Trenchard. Further Reading Boyle, A., Trenchard (Collins 1962) Churchill, W. S., The World Crisis (Odhams 1932) Collier, B., Leader of the Few (Jarrolds 1957) Edmonds, Sir James, History of the Great War (HMSO 1949)

Lloyd George,

D.,

War Memoirs (Nicholson &

Watson) Macmillan, Captain Norman, The Royal Air Force in the Great War (Harrap 1950) Raleigh, Sir Walter and Jones, H. A., The War in the Air (OUP 1922-1937)

CJan

Christian Smuts (Cassell 1952) J. Sueter, M. F., Airmen or Noahs (Pitman 1928) Sykes, Sir Frederick, From Many Angles (Harrap 1942)

Smuts,

ANDREW BOYLE was

born between the two world at Blairs College and in Paris, where he specialised in philosophy. He escaped from France, while still a student, in 1940 He joined the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve in 1941, but spent most of his active war service in Military Intelligence and later, in the Far East, as a military correspondent attached to the army. Formerly an executive radio news programme editor with the BBC, he has made his name as a writer with his biographies of Lord Trenchard, Montague Norman, Lord Reith, Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, Brendan Bracken (1974 British Whitbread Prize winner) and Erskine Childers. His book Climate of Treason (1979) about Communist recruitment in the 1930's at Cambridge University and the spies Burgess, Maclean and Philby led to the eventual exposure of 'fourth man' Professor Blunt.

wars

in

Dundee and educated

2741

Dazzle-Painting From the beginning of the war schemes had been submitted to the Admiralty for camouflaging ships so that they would be invisible to their enemies at sea. From the bridge or lookout of another ship the camouflage seemed effective. But the U-Boat commander, scanning the sea for a victim, was not deceived. Through his periscope a ship stood out clearly, silhouetted against the sky. In any case the hydrophone nullified any attempt by a surface vessel to remain unseen and undetected. It was an artist, Norman Wilkinson, who turned the idea on its head by proposing that ships should be made conspicuous to the point of confusion. Wilkinson suggested that ships could be painted in such a way as to produce an optical illusion and mislead an enemy submaYi as to the course, speed and size of its quarry and as to the correct position to take up for the attack, system of ship camouflage became known as da^zle-palnting. Peter Mitchell. Above: SS War Shamrock HMS Celerol, an auxiliary oil tanker. BeloxJu right HMS Convolvulus, a Flower-class, Anc/^sq^ype Q-ship

274,

2743

HMS

Left: Argus, a short sea ship converted to aircraft carrier. A false anchor is painted on the stern to enhance the deception of the

dazzle-painting. Below left: HMS Kildangan, a Kil-class patrol gunboat. Like the 24-class sloop both ends of the single-funnel Kil-class gunboat were alike and a dummy bridge was constructed aft, making a plot of its course most difficult for an attacking U-Boat. Dazzlepainting added to the confusion. Below right: HMS Achilles, a Warr/or-class light cruiser.

Fewer warships than merchant

vessels were dazzled and their painting usually took the form of stripes and zig-zags. Bottom: HMS Commonwealth, a King Edwardclass pre-dreadnought

Following up Wilkinson's idea, the Admiralty found that by painting a ship in different colours certain parts of it could be made to seem invisible. So by using large simple areas of flat contrasting colours the accepted form and outline of a ship could be broken up visually. The design was continued over the superstructure since the bridge and funnels were important reckoning points for submarines. By October 1917 the Admiralty had begun to paint the whole of the mercantile marine and a number of warships. The designing of the dazzle patterns was carried out at the Royal Academy in Piccadilly and dazzle officers supervised the painting of the ships at port. There is no conclusive proof that dazzle-painting saved any ships from destruction, but its success at confusing the observer is borne out in the report of a convoy escort vessel: 'No 6 in the line was

:

"dazzle-painted" and appeared to me to be steering at least eight points different to the other ships in the line. So remarkable was this optical illusion that I sent for all my officers and asked their opinion as to the course of the ship. Not one officer agreed within four points. This optical illusion continued until the ship in question was past our beam when it was seen that she was steering the same course as the others.' (Peter Mitchell,

painted ships, of Art)

who also produced the drawings of dazzle-

is

a student ofgraphics at Hornsey College

2745

—

PREMIER —TO ASK HOUSE TC _

+

Mr. Lloyd George to Give Facts and Figures in Open Session To-morrow.

TO STAND OR FALL4 BY THE DECISION. Cabinet Not to Accept Mr. Asquith's Motion Calling for Select Committee Question of Confidence.

—

Tuesday

—

am

able to state (writes our lobby correspondent) that the Government will not accept Mr. Asquith's motion calling for a Select Committee instead of the proposed Court of Honour of two Judges to inquire into the allegations in the letter written by MajorGeneral Sir F. Maurice, late Director of Military Operations. The Prime Minister will treat the motion as a question of confidence and the Government will stand or fall by the decision Nig-ht.

I

of the House. Mr. Lloyd George will give the whole of the facts and figures in open session, and invite the House to pronounce judgment

upon them. The terms

of Mr. Asquith's motion are as follow: That a Select Committee of this House be appointed to inquire into the allegations incorrectness in certain statements of Ministers of the Crown in this House contained

the letter of Major-General Maurice, late Director of the Press on May 7.

The debate has been fixed for to-morrow. most memorable for many months.

the

Military Operations,

It

promises

to

published

of in in

be one of

The British armies in France were falling back before the German onslaught. In an attempt to lay the blame for the disaster on the generals, Lloyd George stirred up a political crisis which could have destroyed him. Arthur Marwick. Above: Daily Mirror headline of May 8 In the course of Britain's domestic history during the First World War there were two serious political crises resulting in a change of government. Both the advent of

the

first coalition

in

May

1915, and the

advent of the Lloyd George government in 1916, involved private conclaves enes discussions; neither

nought about by open parlia1918 there took place n parliamentary te — which could truction of the .

The

two clear! political po

'274K

racter of the

in 1917 and 1918, no formal opposition to the Lloyd George government, though undoubtedly the ousted Prime Minister, Asquith (to an indeterminate degree) and some of his closest associates (to a very determined degree) still entertained hopes of his return to the highest office. Lloyd George had the support of most of the Unionist Party, though some of its members still thoroughly detested him; he had the support of many Liberals, though others also hated him for what they regarded as his treachery to Asquith; much of the Labour Party and Trade Union movement supported him, though again a linority of left-wing and pacifist members > detested him. As is well known, Lloyd George was on extremely bad terms with

his

Commander-in-Chief

Sir

Douglas

c

Haig, and there were many in Conservative and military circles who held Lloyd j George accountable for what they believed I to be his disastrous meddling in affairs | which properly belonged to the military. » But how were dissidents to get rid of the disliked Prime Minister? More critically, given their disagreements among themselves, who were they to put in his place? The old two-party system was already in a state of disarray. The war exposed many traditional liheral doctrines as totally inadequate to the needs of the modem world. Whatever might be said of Lloyd George, few could seriously maintain that Asquith's fumbling attempt to maintain liberal principles had provided the country i

I

JUDGE MAURICE AFFAIR with efficient leadership. When Prime Minister Asquith had, on the whole, been happy to leave questions of strategy to the generals. Lloyd George had grave doubts about the policy of increasing concentration on the Western Front, and of would-be set-piece battles

which were so costly in

but although he was able to defeat Haig in various petty ways, he was never able to risk an open confrontation on basic strategic issues. For his part, Haig was only with the greatest reluctance pushed towards a position of accepting

human

life;

a unified Allied

command.

the military front the last months of 1917 were marked by the horrific slaughter of Passchendaele; on the domestic front the turn of the year was marked by bitter squabbling over the setting up in November 1917 of the Allied War Council, over the resignation in February 1918 of Sir William Robertson as CIGS and, above all, over the supply of reinforcements to the Western Front. There need not be any doubt about the genuineness of Lloyd George's revulsion against the slaughter of Passchendaele. It is doubtful whether he ever used the phrase about 'not wishing to be Haig's butcher'; but undoubtedly he had great reservations about entrusting more men to the generals for more abortive 'pushes'. According to Lord Riddell, Lloyd George 'had asked Petain how we could cut down our casualties. Petain, who is a blunt sort of man, replied: "by getting better generals'". Haig pressed his claims for more men in December 1917; the cabinet gave him a third of the numbers he required. Undoubtedly it was important to maintain essential services at home, but at the same time 100,000 men were retained in theatres far away from the Western

On

Front.

The immediate background to the Maurice Debate is provided by the great German breakthrough, beginning on

March 21, 1918, and the severe defeat of the British Fifth Army in Picardy which followed. Was this, indeed, because Haig had been starved of the necessary reinforcements? General Gough, Commander of the Fifth Army, was recalled by the British government; Lloyd George's aspersions on qualities of the military leadership were widely circulated; there were even rumours that Lloyd George was now about to dismiss Haig. To meet the new emergency, perhaps only to close the stable door after the horse had fled, a new Manpower Bill was hastily passed through the Commons: in the charming language of the time, it provided for a 'clean cut' — all civil servants under the age of 25 were to be immediately drafted into the army — and a 'comb out' of industry. At the same time, in other quarters, Lord Lansdowne's proposals for a negotiated peace were revived. Thus, in a time of very serious crisis, the political situation was complex, and not in any way reflected by traditional

the

party lines. Ultra-Tories,

and their daily

organ the Morning Post, wanted an end to political interference in military matters, and if possible an end to Lloyd George as well; some dreamed of a military dicta-

torship, and this was openly advocated by the tiny National Party, supported, among others, by the seamen's leader Havelock Wilson; they had, of course, no faith in Asquith and the 'old gang'. By one of the many paradoxes attendant upon old-style liberalism, Asquith, his supporters, and two of the liberal daily papers, the Daily

News and

the Daily Chronicle, had always a touching faith in the prerogatives of the military leaders. Asquith, of course, had been responsible for appointing both

shown

Haig and Robertson; he had come near to pressing opposition both to the setting up of the Allied War Council, and to the resignation of Sir William Robertson; on the other hand he had never spoken out against such apparently illiberal issues as, for example, the extension of conWhile most rank and file leftwingers and pacifists could only vaguely hope for a revolution or a miracle, certain older Labour and Liberal Members of Parliament had hopes that a government led by Lord Lansdowne, and including the Labour leader Arthur Henderson, might somehow emerge. The story begins with Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons on April 9, 1918, surveying the disasters of the Picardy battlefield. 'We have entered the most critical phase of this most terrible war. There is a lull in the storm, but the scription.

hurricane is not over. The fate of the Empire, the fate of Europe and the fate of liberty throughout the world, may depend on the success with which the very last of these attacks is resisted and countered.' Then, in a careful, but fairly obvious, attempt to lay the blame for the disasters away from his own government, and on the military leaders in France, Lloyd George asked the question: 'What was the position at the beginning of the battle?' Lloyd George answered his own question in the following way: 'Notwithstanding the heavy casualties in 1917, the army in France was considerably stronger on January 1, 1918,

than on January

1,

1917.'

While much of

the press — particularly the papers close to, and continuously favourable to, Lloyd George, The Times, the Daily Mail and the Daily Express — received this speech with great acclaim, there were mutterings in certain quarters, including the Morning Post, which quietly rejected the aspersions implicitly cast on the generals, and attacked Lloyd George's alleged attempts to divert resources away from the Western Front. Lloyd George's statement was not in fact accurate. In January 1917 there were 1,192,668 British combat troops in the western theatre; in January 1918 there were 1,097,906. Lloyd George had included in the 1918 figures the recent considerable influx of non-combatant troops in France. Not surprisingly, the matter was shortly raised again in the House of Commons, Sir Godfrey Baring asking the Prime Minister on April 18 whether in his figures for January 1918 he had included the labour battalions and other non-combatant units. More precisely, Sir Godfrey Baring demanded to know whether the combatant strength of the British army wae greater

or less at the beginning of 1918 than at the beginning of 1917. Figures were now hastily supplied by the War Office, but

these

somehow managed

to include

with

their total of combatant troops the British soldiers serving in Italy. Thus Mr Macpherson, Under-Secretary at the War Office, confidently replied that the combatant strength was greater in January 1918.

Quickly discovering the mistake, the

War

Office now supplied the government with a correction. What happened to that correction will be discussed in a moment.

Meantime, as far as the public was concerned, the matter rested there — till the entry into the arena of Sir Frederick Maurice.

Enter Sir Frederick General Sir Frederick Maurice was a distinguished soldier, son of a distinguished soldier and the grandson of F. D. Maurice the Christian socialist and friend of Charles Kingsley. He was a military historian of some distinction, and was described by the Manchester Guardian as 'the most dry, reserved and punctilious man in the War Office'. He had a high, intellectual forehead, and wore a monocle. He had been director of military operations at the War Office till his recent dismissal, upon the replacement of Sir William Robertson by Sir Henry Wilson. At the time of the crisis he was about to resume active service in France, where he could well have continued to advance a distinguished career. Although his own department had supplied both the erroneous figures, and the subsequent correction, he had not been directly involved in this, since he was in France at the time; nevertheless Lloyd George was able to make considerable play with the fact that the figures came from Maurice's own department. It seems clear that, whatever the unwisdom and illegitimacy of his action, Sir Frederick Maurice by May 1918 was seriously and honourably worried by the slurs being cast upon the army, by the effect this was having on morale in the armed forces and above all by the rumour that Lloyd George was proposing to sack Sir Douglas Haig. Accordingly Maurice, in direct breach of the King's Regulations, drafted a letter for publication in the various morning newspapers. He seems to have acted entirely on his own initiative and, although

through background and interests much closer to Asquith than most military leaders, he decided against his first inclination to consult Asquith; as he himself put it in a letter to Asquith, 'On second thoughts I came to the conclusion that, if I consulted you, it would be tantamount to asking you to take responsibility for the letter, and that I alone must take that responsibility'. The letter was delivered on the evening of May 6 to the Morning Post, the Daily News, the Daily Chronicle, The Times and the Daily Telegraph. Maurice's letter made three charges against the government. First, that just before the great batlle Haig had been forced by the Supreme War Council to

2747

extend his line in France, though this had been denied in the House of Commons by Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House, on April 23 (it was this denial on the part of Bonar

Law which was

specifically the subject of attack by Maurice). Secondly, and most crucially, Maurice controverted the statement about British forces in France being stronger on January 1, 1918, than on January 1, 1917. Thirdly, and less critically, though closely associated with this

second and main point, Maurice claimed that a further statement of Lloyd George's that there were only four white British divisions in the Middle East, a statement designed to show that he was not starving the Western Front, was in fact a lie. Probably, Maurice was correct on this last charge. On the first charge, he was quite certainly wrong. He made out that he had been present at the Supreme War Council when the question was discussed, but this was not so — though he had been at Versailles. Presumably, his information, or misinformation, came at second hand from Sir William Robertson. Actually, the extension to the line had already been agreed privately, though on Haig's part reluctantly, between Haig and Petain. It seems that there was at the Supreme Council a discussion of a further extension to the line; but this in fact never came about. There was, then, legitimate confusion on Maurice's part; but on the actual

matter of fact he was wrong. However, the really critical matter was the one about the numbers of British troops available when the big battle began. Here there was undoubtedly a case. Yet Maurice himself did nothing to follow it up; instead he disappeared into the country. Meantime the Maurice letter had caused a considerable furore, and Asquith raised the matter next day in the House of Commons. Replying for the government Bonar Law offered to set up a 'Committee of Honour' of two judges to investigate the allegations. Asquith, and others, maintained that the matter was one for the

House of Commons to determine. Much of the usual false indignation was expressed when Bonar Law, honestly but perhaps not wisely, remarked that it would be impossible to find a committee of the House of Commons not swayed by partisan sentiments. Bonar Law was prepared to allow Asquith to nominate the two judges; but Asquith rejected the suggestion. A fullscale debate was to be held on May 9. In general, reactions at this stage reflected the confused nature of political opinion. The Morning Post hailed the chivalry' of Sir Frederick Maurice who, it said, had 'been impelled by his knowledge of the facts of the injustice done to brave comrades to bear witness for the defence'. Lloyd George, it claimed, had acted foolishly in failing to keep the Western Front up to proper strength and now 'not even his Press will be able to save ,r;

culty for

theMorning

ight-wing Tories generally the crisis. declared: 'What a new rests of :

Wisti

new

respect for the integrity of General Maurice and accepted that, at the least, a judicial enquiry was called for. But the Daily Express and the Daily Mail were scathing about Maurice; and even more so, of course, about Asquith. On the eve of the as referdebate the Express quoted an ring to tomorrow's 'Maurice dance'. Remarking that 'faction makes strange bedfellows', it also presented a quite shrewd assessment of the significance of the Maurice crisis in the entire social development of the war period: 'Pacifists and placemen are reinforced by the ultra-Tories, who have not yet discovered that we are in the twentieth century and that the war has

MP

caused every social arrangement to suffer a sea change, and by the extreme mili-

who resent civilian control and would have us governed by a junta of

tarists,

generals.' Active left-wing members of the Labour and Trade Union movement had no sympathy for generals or ultraTories; nor did they have any for Lloyd George and for Asquith. More traditional Labour leaders, like Philip Snowden, still had some regard for Asquith, and were quite determined in their hatred of Lloyd George. But the bulk of the Labour and Trade Union movement was firmly behind Lloyd George and the government. A tele-

gram from workers

at Woolwich Arsenal to Lloyd George read: 'This public meeting of the workers in Woolwich Arsenal send are you hearty greetings. Hold fast. with you, because you are the people's Prime Minister and our symbol of victory. The Germans want you to go; the pro-

We

Germans want you to do not want you

go;

but we, the work-

Mud 2748

the correction received since the original statements. Lloyd George banked instead upon the usual magical Welsh peroration: 'I wonder whether it is worth my while to make another appeal to all sections of the House and to all sections of the country. These controversies are distracting, they are paralysing, they are rending, and I beg that they should come to an end. Days have been occupied in hunting up records and minutes and letters and proces-verbaux, in interviews and in raking up what happened during a whole 12 months in the War Cabinet. And at this moment! I have just come back from France. I really beg and implore, for our common country, the fate of which is in the balance now and the next few weeks, that there should be .

Lady Haig: 'Poor Maurice! how terrible to see the House of Commons so easily taken in by a claptrap speech by Lloyd

George.' Both The Times and Philip Snowden in the Labour Leader thought that the debate marked the beginnings of an organised opposition to the government. In fact, the debate finally and triumphantly

confirmed Lloyd George's control over the

England!'

as

The 'Maurice dance' Opening the debate, Asquith, 'mesmerised by his own integrity', as Tom Jones put it, insisted that he was not moving a vote of no confidence in the government, but was purely concerned with the procedural issue of whether a question of ministerial statements to the House of Commons should not be dealt with by a committee of MPs: 'As an old parliamentarian, I should be very jealous, if the question does arise, as unfortunately it has arisen, of the correctness and accuracy of such statements, of submitting it to any other tribunal than a parliamentary tribunal. What,' he continued, 'is the alternative?' 'Get on with the war,' bellowed a jingoistic miners' MP in reply. Lloyd George could not have counted on quite such a bumbling performance from Asquith. He had indeed carefully rehearsed his speech in front of his political friends. And he still did have the problem that the government had begun by saying that they would be prepared to have a judicial enquiry, whereas, given that there was some substance in the main Maurice allegation, Lloyd George no longer wished to have an enquiry of any sort. He got round this by arguing that 'the action of the press, which is egging on my Right Hon. friend, prodding him, and suggesting that he ought to do this, that and the other to embarrass the government' made it clear that 'no statement, no decision of any secret anal will ever be accepted The govitint has therefore decided to give the n public and to let the public judge.' loyd George, in fact, gave few facts. He .

.

.

to

war effort.

to go.

.

an end of this sniping.' Lloyd George got his majority by 293 votes to 106. While the Morning Post still hoped vainly that General Maurice might be called to the bar of the House to explain his allegations, the press as a whole accepted this as another great triumph for Lloyd George. Haig remarked in a letter

Your enemies are our enemies. Damn them all! God save

ers,

.

ring

simply reiterated that the figures he had used had been supplied by Maurice's own department; no mention at all was made of

What

of the actual rights and wrongs, between Lloyd George and General Maurice? Although Frances Stevenson, who was then one of Lloyd George's secretaries and who much later became his second wife, later declared that she and

Lloyd George's principal private secretary, T. Davies, had been responsible for destroying the correction sent by the War Office, without Lloyd George ever having seen it, it seems beyond belief that Lloyd George should not have been aware of the correction before he rose to speak on May 9. As happened often enough, then, Lloyd George had been guilty of a piece of dishonesty. On the other hand, Maurice handled his side of things very amateurishly; and since, after he was put on retirement pay, no further action was taken against him, it cannot be said that he J.

suffered

any drastic

reprisal.

The

real

question that has to be asked is, what would have happened if the vote in Parliament had gone against Lloyd George? Faced with this question, one sees the contradictions and absurdities of the opposition to Lloyd George. From the national point of view, it was as well that he should establish his control over the war effort; it was a pity, but not altogether unprecedented, that as well as being a great war leader he was something of a liar. Further Reading Beaverbrook, Lord, Men and Power 1917-1918 (Hutchinson 1956) Guinn, Paul, British Strategy and Politics 191418 (Oxford University Press 1965) Maurice, Sir Frederick, Intrigues of the War (Loxley Bros., London 1922)

Arthur page 575.]

[For

Marwick's

biography,

see

'A *A

q £**t

As the failure of the Georgette operation in the north became more and more obvious, Ludendorff resolved to make one last attempt to gain control of the strategically-important town of Amiens in the south, by capturing the vantage point of Villers-Bretonneux, about ten miles to the east. An element of surprise was vital to the success of this last phase of the Michael offensive, and was provided by a detachment of 13 tanks: machines which the Germans had been unusually slow to manufacture since their appearance on the Somme in 1916. The result was the first tank 'duel' of the war. John Vader. Above: German infantry suffered heavily in this new form of warfare. Crude anti-tank defences i

i

'

ii iA

it

t~*

•

i

*

i

Tin

•

_

i

ij

r-\

liii*

i

wiped out.

THE FIRST TANK-TO-TANK ENCOUNTER Bv the end of March 1918 Ludendorfl" knew By knew that his offensive across the old Somme battlefield had failed. He had run out of -team: the Germans had outrun their communications and their fire power was insufficient to maintain the thrust. Amiens, however, remained as a valuable objective. The Germans' drive had brought them to within a few miles of the plateau south of the Somme, and from the edge of the plateau near Villers-Bretonneux they would be able to overlook Avre, Noye and the vital road and rail junctions of Amiens. Fini retreat — beaucoup australiens ici'. a Digger was reported to have informed a peasant woman during the retreat of Fifth Army, when the AIF 3rd Division was moving forward. 'You Australians think you can do anything.' said an artillery brigadier to Lieutenant-Colonel Lavarack. chief of

but you the divisional commander's stall, 'but haven't a chance of holding them.' The morale of the Australians was high, the opposite to what the Germans expected when Eighteenth Army issued the order: 'The enemy for the moment has only inferior or beaten troops opposite us.' The

Germans

too were dispirited, as Captain G. Goes later reported: The fighting during the closing days of March had left no doubt that the great offensive battle was threatening to become a battle of attrition on the largest scale. Eveiywhere along the front of nearly 120 miles the infantry had been compelled to have recourse to the spade, and saw the spectre of hated position warfare rising before it. The situation tens eery much more unfavourable than before March 21: no trenches, no dugouts, streaming rain for days, which had

turned the devastated ar breathing space, after the arrival of fresh divisions- and the replenishment of the ^ ammunition dumps, ihe thing could be J done.

K*

174

Brie

18Div 53Bde

Wr* D

=s

Bovesg.

FRENCH LINE RAILWAYS ROADS

YARDS METRES

"% .

4000j?Fouencarnps

3000

"*

French t3ipiv

''ill..

Above: The Australian defence of Amiens. Be/ow.j3ritfSfi Medium Mark A tank, later called the Whippet. Fast and lightly-armed it was designed to exploit breakthroughs. Crew: 3; Armament: 4 Hotchkiss machine guns; Engine: Two 45-hp Tylor, each driving one track; Armour: 5-mm/ 14-mei. Speed: Between 8 and 9 mph. Right: First used 4ci March 1918, Whippets caused about 40|Nnfantry caSCf**" alties in the first duel' between tSnks at Amiens in April

* 2750

=$

ii>*Mmv««fiwpMV

They benefited by fine weather during the first two days of April, but it began to rain on the 3rd, and the suspended attacks were renewed in the final offensive which began the following day. But the Allies had been forewarned by captured prisoners. Just before, dawn, shrapnel and gas shells were bombarded across the front line and the artillef^ and back areas, followed at first light by swarms of infantry from Eighteenth, Second and Seventeenth Armies. The British army too had had time to readjust its front. The" sector attacked was held by two understrength divisions, the 14th and 18th, the latter without its artillery. The Australian 9th Brigade was also in the area, and the centre ahead of

.

-

'

Villers-Bretonneux was held by its widely extended 35th Battalion, with the other three battalions behind the town in close reserve. They were to face the strongest attack yet made against Australians: five German divisions attacked under good cover across the valleys running parallel to the front. The fresh 9th Bavarian Reserve Division drove hard at the. Australian battalion

which stopped them with a heavy fire from machine guns andrjfjes, with good support from the guns. The 14th Division, to the north, suffered a particularly heavy bombardment and was driven hack, and the Germans were able to take Hamel and to swing south, threatening to envelop the Australians from that flank; they withdrew to a support position a mile east of VillersBretonneux. The AIF 33rd Battalion then moved up to extend the left of the 35th, and 6th Cavalry Brigade was used to fill gaps in the line. The AIF 15th Brigade, guard-

ing bridges, sent some of its men to help support the 18th Division, which managedto stand fast until a second attack, made in mid-afternoon, forced the line to retire. When the Germans reached the 1870 war monument on the outskirts of the town it looked as though the way to Amiens was about to be opened to them.

The Germans'

first tank attack The Germans' hopes were dashed by a remarkable charge by the reserve AIF 36th

Battalion, joined in its attack by several British infantrymen on its right, part of

35th Battalion on its left, and later by some Londoners and the cavalry. Attacking on the run with bayonets flashing, the unexpected reinforcements first stopped the Germans advancing from Monument Wood then drove them back to old trenches more than a mile from the town. The 15th Brigade was brought across the Somme to hold the vital heights north of the town, and the 33rd Battalion again went forward, protected on a flank by the mounted 17th Lancers and aided by a Canadian motor machine gun battery which dealt with German machine guns. By dusk the line east of Villers-Bretonneux was secure, and during the night the 9th Brigade made advances to gain ground which would improve its field of fire, a job which entangled the 34th in some stiff fighting before establishing itself in the old line that had been held by the 35th Battalion. South of Villers-Bretonneux the

Germans drove the French back two miles beyond the Avre and were in sight of; Amiens. The River Somme ran some five miles north of Villers Bretonneux. and the Germans, expecting that the Allied line in

:

:

;

J

2751

against Amiens: 'In my opinion, the proper course for the enemy to pursue now is as follows: place Amiens town and railway and junctions under his guns so as to deny all serious traffic, then mass an attack of 40 to 50 divisions against the British between Albert and the La Bassee canal.' During the first half of April, fighting raged all the way to the coast, both sides suffering catastrophic losses in several battles, before the Germans again became active at Villers-Bretonneux — disabling some 1,000 reserves behind the town with

front of the town would crumble, launched two divisions against the New Zealanders and Australians positioned north of the The Germans were thoroughly river. beaten here also. Further north, the

Australian 4th Division fought a vicious battle on April 5, this resulting in little change in the line at a cost of some 1,100 casualties among its two brigades. The AIF 9th Brigade's casualties at Villers-Bretonneux were 660. In a message to General Foch, Sir Henry

Wilson predicted further German moves

mustard gas shells. Before the Australians were relieved by two battleworn British divisions they witnessed the shooting down overhead of the German ace Richthofen. The change over by the divisions was barely completed when the Germans made their first big attack with tanks — 13 of them — which broke through the British lines manned, in many cases, by 'boy recruits'. The attack began at dawn on April 24 in the manner to be exemplified in the Second World War — infantry following the tanks and rolling up the line right and left. The tactic was used on either side of the town, across good tank terrain, and the attack was pressed on, regardless of an enormous barrage laid down by Allied

guns.

Villers-Bretonneux,

and Hangard Wood were

Above: The shattered bodies of German soldiers

accompanying the Australian recapture tank attack.

German A7V's

in

killed

during the hour-long

the field

artillery

bombardment

Below: Scene of the first German before Amiens, throwing up clouds of chalk dust

of Villers-Bretonneux.

Abbey

Wood

the Germans moved forward as far as the junction of the Avre and Luce. One factor in the German success was the presence of fog, which they thickened with smoke; another was that there were no tank defences so that when a tank straddled a trench it could fire on the defenders. The presence of the German tanks drew out British tanks, of which there were 20 in the area— 13 Mk IV's and seven Whippets. The 1st Section, 1st Battalion, went into action with one male, mounting two 6pounder guns, and two females, mounting machine guns, and although the male was disabled by a shell the crew brought a gun into action and knocked out one of the German tanks. Another surrendered when the concentrated fire from the 58th Machine Gun Battalion put it out of action by 'the splash of the bullets'. More tanks of the 1st and 3rd Tank Battalions assisted the 1st Sherwood Foresters in their counterattack, and a charge by light Whippet tanks lost as

scattered the German infantry across the plateau, causing at least 400 casualties as they made two runs through battalions of 77th Reserve Division. One Whippet was knocked out, three were disabled and three got back from this successful mission which originated when a scout plane

message that the German battalions were resting in a hollow in front of Cachy. It was to have been a tankdropped

a

assault but, when the 23rd Brigade was ordered to counterattack with armour it had no men available, and when infantry

the 8th Division cancelled the order the tanks were not informed. Lieutenant-General Butler of III Corps considered that the 8th Division was capable of dealing with the situation and decided not to accept the offer of the AIF Brigade's commander, 'Pompey' 15th Elliott, who was fuming to be allowed to strike. The brigade had been stationed about a mile north-west of the town, kept in reserve and ready to counterattack if the town were lost. While the formal messages were being passed, time was lost

and the Germans were allowed to dig into Abbey Wood and the heights that gave such an advantage over Amiens, good reasons for the 'tempestuous' Elliott to be 'fuming and petitioning' for themselves

action, as the AIF's historian observed. It was predictable, nevertheless, that the brigadier would get the job, along with another Australian brigade commander, Brigadier-General Glasgow of the 13th, which was given the task of forming the southern pincer; the 15th formed the northern. When the brigade commanders met Butler they were told that he wished the attack to be made by daylight from the

south northwards, and Glasgow said, 'If God Almighty gave the order we couldn't do it by daylight.' It was agreed, fortunthat an attack across an open plateau, in front of machine gun fire, could barely succeed, and that the Australians' plan to attack at night without previous bombardment spoiling the surprise would be a better plan. Rawlinson and Butler decided that the attack should begin at ately,

2200 hours when the moon would be giving some light to the field of action. The 15th Brigade was to advance southeast across the northern side of the town; the 13th Brigade was to move across the southern side of the town; and the 54th

One factor contributing to the early German successes near Amiens was the fog, thickened by smoke bombs. But the attacking tanks soon drew the British Mark IV" s and Whippets into action, and a 'duel', the first of the war, began. Above: A captured Mk IV advances past a flamethrower

Brigade was to move eastwards on the southern side of the 13th. The two Australian brigades were given the 2nd Northamptonshire and 22nd Durham battalions and three tanks to mop up when the town was recaptured. The artillery was to maintain a standing barrage on well defined targets until an hour after the initial attack began, then the heavy batteries were to lift 500 yards beyond the town while the field artillery lifted 300 yards.

2753

J

Before clouds covered the full mo^n there too much light: the 13th Brigade was seen assembling south of the woods, and

was

Germans opened fire with numerous machine guns as the Australian advance moved forward. The flank was stopped until Sergeant 'Charlie' Stokes urged his

the

platoon

commander

to attack the

Germans

in the woods - which was not part of the plan. The commander, Lieutenant Sadlier, and Stokes led their men in a bombing

attack which quickly destroyed six

German

posts, allowing the southern pincer movement to go forward, and earning for the platoon commander a Victoria Cross, for

the sergeant a DCM. As the brigade moved on it was joined by the Bedfordshire battalion of the 54th Brigade; its other two battalions - 9th London and 7th Royal West Kent -had lost touch, one forced to return to its start line, the Other stopped by machine gun fire from shell holes and was finally dug in about halfway to the objective.

The 13th Brigade did not quite reach its it was in a position to ensure the success of the pincer movement if the objective, but

15th did its job. After the holdup at the wood, the 13th's 51st Battalion suffered heavy casualties going through the wire at Cachy Switch, where it was enfiladed by German machine guns. After one gun was captured, Vickers were set up to keep the others occupied and the Australians moved on, occasioning 'a panic which could not be

overcome in time, as the reserves failed to come up quickly enough', as the Germans I later stated. There were many leaderless about who | Germans wandering aimlessly „ were killed or captured, but the opposition | became very strong; an attack from the § town endangered the 51st's flank until the e

|

A German flamethrower crew moves up support of one of Germany's few tanks

Right: in

Inset: Elfriede, the first

German tank

to

be

engaged and captured by British tank forces. Found overturned and abandoned in a sandpit she was minutely examined by Allied Intelligence

50th came up to drive them back. When these two battalions aligned themselves they were near a railway cutting south of the town, an exit which was eventually to allow some Germans to escape. The 15th Brigade was late getting away from its start line and there were the usual confusions associated with night operations. One company could not even find the assembly point. The actual start was almost two hours late, so the Germans described this move as a second attack. There was also some confusion about exactly where lay the objectives — the Hamelet road and Hamel road. The first was reached after an uneventful mile tramp, then the Germans, alerted by scouting activity,

began

to let fly their flares

and

The 59th was the leading battalion and when its CO yelled 'Charge!' the command was rapidly passed down the small

arms.

line so that a great yelling,

cheering rush

was made on the Germans, now

visible

under the lights of their flares and the glare of burning houses. In their panic, the Germans forgot to lower their sights as the Australians with fixed bayonets rushed the enemy trenches and machine gun nests. At 0130 hours they were at the Hamel road having lost fewer than 150 men. Two companies pushed on to make contact with the 13th Brigade which they expected to find near the old British front, but the 13th was not within sight or hearing and the 57th's companies returned to the road, where positions were dug facing Villers-Bretonneux. The mopping up battalions found that the town was still too strongly defended and their work was delayed. Not far away the French had prudently accumulated reserves in case the British could not handle the Villers-

I

Bretonneux situation, yet when General Debeney was informed of the plan to counterattack he promised to co-operate if it were postponed until the following day. When Rawlinson informed him that the action should take place that night he merely offered to send the Moroccan Division in to occupy the reserve line, freeing some of 58th Division's reserve. Before the artillery was directed on to the railway cutting escape route that lay in the 1,500 yards between the two pincer ends, the Australian brigades began to close in on the town, assisted by four British infantry battalions and three tanks. By noon the town was occupied and the mopping up was left to the Durhams and Northamptonshires. Because of considerable confusion in the German lines, a counterattack by the German divisions ordered for 0700 hours was postponed twice, and then finally abandoned through lack of fresh troops. Just before 1000 hours Glasgow sent in his reserve battalion to close the gap, an operation which met with such fierce resistance that it was post-

poned until that night, when it was carried out with few casualties. The original British front had not been recovered, but

Amiens was

secure.

Further Reading Bean, C. E. W., Official History of Australia the War (Canberra) Bean, C. E. W., The AIF in France, 1918 (Angus & Robertson)

in

Cutlack, F. M., The Australians: Final Campaign, 1918 (Low, Martson 1918) Monash, Gen. Sir John, The Australian Victories in France, 1918

[For

John Vader's biography,

page 1046.]

I

,k

2750

/

J

The campaign in Mesopotamia had been fought in conditions totally unfamiliar to the majority of its British com-

But despite the extreme climate and barren batants.

terrain the Turkish armistice of October 1918 terminated a eries of victorious engagements ,ona vastly -extended front.

Turkish

British

14814

I

51 386

(c.)

44 500 Wounded ,

Died of

12 807 13

Disease

494

45 000 pows 190 000 Total

92 501

(according to British figures)

Leslie>Misset%. Left:

1

Dead

Cavalry in Jabal Hamrin

SOPOTAMIA VICTORIOUS FINALE With Falkenhayn on the Euphrates preparing the Yilderim^orps for an advance, General Maude. Comru^gdtorfJhe Mesppotamian Force, was ^Bpus to secure at Ar Ramadl. Accordingly, in the third week of September 1917, in hot weather but with cooler nights, he moved General Brooking and 15th Division (12th, 42nd and 50th Brigades) together with Holland-Pryor's 6th Cavalry Brigade to Al Fallujahand Dhibban. On September 27/28 Brooking advanced to theTH&naid Ridge between Lake Habbanlyah and the Euphrates while HollandPryor's cavalry made a very wide detour to get to the Aleppo road out of Ar RamadT on the west side. While the cavalry was doing this 12th and 42nd Brigades attacked with great determination, and the Gurkhas and the Dorsets distinguished themselves. By 1600 hours the cavalry was in position and digging in — the Turks were surrounded. About 0300 hours, by the light of the moon, a column of Turks marched west right into the cavalry position and met with such heavy losses that they retired into Ar Ramadl. Early that morning 12th Brigade advanced and captured a vital bridge over a canal and 42nd Brigade were moving in to attack when white flags went up everywhere. The Turkish commander, Ahmed Bey, surrendered with 3,545 men, of whom 145 were officers. British casualties were 995. of whom a large proportion had been only slightly wounded by high bursting Turkish shrapnel. The excellent arrangement for water supply made a great contribution to this victory, no less than 14,000 gallons being conveyed on September 28 to the two brigades by the Mechanised Transport Companies in Ford vans. Two days later Brooking sent a mixed column forward to see if he could surprise the Turks at Hit, 32 miles further on, but unexpected difficulties of ground and his base

organisation resulted in a withdrawal. Maude's next move was to clear the Al MansurTvah-Jabal Hamrin area so as to control the traffic routes by which food went to the Turks from the Mandali-Qizil Ribat area, and the water courses which fed the cultivated areas from Mansuriyah. Well

and coordinated sweeps were October. 18, 19 and 20, but Ali Ihsan's troops, estimated at 540 cavalry, 1,100 rifles and 12 guns, retreated rapidly. The whole area east of the DE^'ala was cleared at a cost of only 37 casualties. At Narin Kopri, and holding the Sakaltutan Qaii J%ss, Ali had a further 3,200 "ftfles planned

«

made ©n

guns. On October 22, atjdaybreak, north of Samarra' clashed with advancing Turks. Later some 5,000/6,000 infantry were seen marching south. Air and otber information indicated that 51st and 52nd Divisions were coming down the right bank and 14th Division down the left; and by evening they had arrived near Huwaislat. Cobbe, commander of I Corps, arranged with Fane that 7th Division should attack them on October 24, but during the night of the 23rd the Turks hastily retired to entrenchments at Ad Dawr. Reconnaissance and Intelligence in the next few days showed about 4,500 Turks with* 20 guns at Ad Dawr, another 1,000 in rear at Auja, and a further 1,500 with 19 guns in strongly entrenched lines round TikrTt. Thirty miles north at Al Fathah, where the Tigris weaves through the Jabal Hamrin, there was another entrenched force of about 6,000 with 20 guns. Maude decided that Tikrit should be cleared and ordered an attack on Ad Dawr for November 2 by I Corps, the Cavalry Division and ten armoured cars. Following the usual plan of a carefully prepared frontal attacMfand a cavalry sweep to turn the Turks' right flank, the battle began at dawn on November 2 after lengthy approach marches of up to 30 miles. The 21st Brigade co-operated on the left bank. By 0930 hours two lines of trenches had been captured and the Turks were streaming back to Tikrit, but they held off the cavalry on their flank. Cobbe then drew off his troops for rest and reorganisation while he made the plan for an assault on Tiki'It, in some places defended by three lines of trenches on a seven-mile front which was designed to be unflankable. He decided again to night march and to attack at daylight on November 5 a sector of the defences to which approach could be made with some cover — as usual the Turks had prepared long clear fields of fire — and to place the cavalry and armoured cars three miles west of the extreme Turkish

ano^8

patrols

Supported by artillery with six 60-pounders and four 6-inch howitzers the attack was to be pressed hard everywhere. It was, and fierce fighting went on with two counterattacks by the Turks over a warren of trenches with which they were familiar. By afternoon the trenches were all captured, but points of resistance had still to be cleared, and in one area Captain S. O. Robinson of 'B' Squadron 13th Husright.

2757

>

] \

]

.

Onto Southern Kurdistan and the fall of town after town Qarah Tappah, Tuz, Kirkuk, and finally Mosul, in the autumn .

.

Right: The Sakaltutan pass, a main Turkish supply route, which was captured by British and Russian cavalry in early December

sars along with 'C Squadron charged through the cheering infantry at Turks massing about 1,000 yards away, wheeled and. charged back. Captain Robinson was killed. The Seaforths, the Manchesters, the Sikhs and Punjabis all distinguished themselves and by nightfall the retreating Turks were under shell fire as they moved north. Their losses were 1,500, including 300 killed and 217 taken prisoner. British losses were 1,800, of whom 161 were killed. On November 7 it became clear that the whole of XVIII Corps was back at Al Fathah. They had destroyed all their stores at Tikrlt. The Julnar, which had run the gauntlet so gallantly to put food into Kut, was found abandoned.

The death of General Maude On November 18 the Mesopotamian heard with dismay that Lieutenant-General Sir

its

F.

Force

commander, S. Maude,

plan to hit the Turks included first a new sweep to the north-east 'to block the Persian border', and then a further advance up the Euphrates to upset the Yilderim preparations while Allenby was keeping up the offensive in Palestine. Politically Marshall was under some pressure to take responsibility for the road to Hamadan via Pai-Taq, but he declined to go beyond Khanaqln. Baratov had sent a body of 1,000 Cossacks under Colonel Bicherakov to Qasr-e Shlrin where by agreement they came under Marshall for orders and rations. He included them in his next offensive.

KCB, CMG, DSO, had

died of cholera. Every officer and man was distressed by the news, but none more so than 13th Division

which he had commanded in Gallipoli and before Kut. To many of them he was known personally, and he had taken every opportunity to maintain contacts. The circumstances of his death were much debated at the time, and because of a rumour that he had been poisoned an enquiry was held. He had attended a concert the evening before he was taken ill, and along with members of his staff he drank some coffee. He was observed adding cold raw milk to his while some others drank theirs black. It was remarkable that he should do this because 'Orders' constantly reminded all ranks that milk and unchlorinated water were very dangerous. Moreover, General Maude had not been inoculated against cholera as he said a man of his age was immune, but he had insisted that

members of his staff should be. The verdict of history is that General Maude was a great leader of men and a genius in strategy and tactics, with remarkable gifts for organisation. He could energise, he could inspire, he had moral authority. He was always as near his men as he could be, 'seeing and hearing all that is going on at first hand', he wrote. So he handed awards for bravery to officers and men within sight of the places where they were won and was ever enquiring about health, food and other conditions. He was a 'Footslogger'

— a Guardsman who knew do. And his

what an infantryman could

men knew

that he knew. Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Marshall was appointed to the command after General Maude's death and Major-General Sir R. G. Egerton took command of III Corps, while Brigadier-General W. M. Thomson took 14th Division. Marshall's

2758

Russia drops out Khalil Pasha's Sixth Army HQ were at KifrT, with 1,000 rifles and eight guns, whilst Ali Ihsan's 2nd Division held the Jabal HamrTn from the Shatt-al Adhaim south-east to the Sakaltutan Dagi Pass and to the Diyala with 4,000 rifles and 14 guns. Between December 1 and 6 the Cavalry Division was unable to penetrate the Shatt-al Adhaim gorge, but the 13th and 14th Divisions with the Russians on their right at Kishuk captured the Sakaltutan Dagi Pass, Narin Kopri and Qarah Tappah. They then withdrew to a line from Sakaltutan Dagi to KhanaqTn. British losses were 29 killed and 199 wounded. Russian losses were nine wounded. About 100 dead Turks were buried and 255 taken prisoner with two guns which had come from Gallipoli. On December 6 Marshall was told of the Russian-Turkish armistice, and from that day Russian co-operation ceased. The Persian border was now blocked and it is at this point that the story of 'Dunsterforce' begins. Marshall became involved when General Dunsterville arrived in Baghdad in January 1918 and Colonel Bicherakov with his Cossacks (called partishanski) remained in the area. The story of Dunsterforce is our next article. Serge uniform had replaced khaki drill before December when a cold spell swept down from the snow-covered Persian mountains. There was 6.5 degrees of frost at Baghdad, and 12 degrees at Samarra'. Violent dust storms occurred at the end of November, one lasting 24 hours, and the first drops of rain fell since March. In the New Year came heavy thunderstorms and winter rains interspersed with fogs which immobilised everybody. Steel hel-

mets were worn by

all

ranks from Novemwhen rising tem-

ber 1917 to April 1918

peratures made them intolerable. In March the ground dried out and Marshall decided to start the Euphrates offensive to put an end to any Yilderim threat. On March 9 General Brooking's 15th Division moved on Hit and found it unoccupied. Here were the pitch wells which from ancient times (Herodotus mentions them) provided the caulking material for Arab boats of all kinds. The Turks were found in an entrenched position 22 miles upstream at Khan al Baghdad!. At Hit and Shahiliyah Brooking had assembled cavalry, 48 guns, three Light Armoured Motor Batteries (LAMB cars) and two air squadrons along with a mobile column of infantry in 300 Ford vans and two-and-ahalf brigades of his 15th Division. The Turkish 50th Division (two regiments) numbered 4,500 with 21 guns, of which 3,000 with 16 guns were known to be in the

Khan. Brooking sent Cassel's cavalry and the LAMB cars travelling by night and hiding by day on a circuitous route which brought them finally across the Aleppo road some six miles beyond Khan al Baghdad!. There they dug in on the evening of March 26 and cut the Turks' telephone wires. On the afternoon of the previous day Colonel J. E. Tennant, CO of the RFC in Mesopotamia, along with Major P. C. S. Hobart took a flight over Khan al Baghdad! and were shot down. They landed safely and were taken prisoner and brought to the Turkish divisional commander, Nazim Bey. Delighted with such an important 'bag' Nazim dispatched them under escort up the Aleppo road.

An ignominious surrender Brooking's advance began after dark on March 25 and patrols were soon in touch with the Turks. His main assault started immediately after sunrise and during the day the Turks were driven from one position to another until a stubborn hold-up about 1730 hours. A heavy bombardment of this position was followed by its capture before darkness fell, and over 1,000 prisoners were taken. About midnight a column of Turks attempted to get past Cassel's position on the Aleppo road. They received a rough handling and 1,000 surrendered, the rest retiring into the Khan. At 0600 hours next morning, March 27, the LAMB cars accepted the surrender of 2,000 Turks at the Wadi Hawran between

2759

7

1

The Mesopotamia Campaign, 1914-18: 1916

1914 October 23

British force

under Brig-Gen W.

S.

Delamain

January 6-8 January 19

arrives at

Bahrain. Russia declares war on Turkey. Great Britain formally declares war on Turkey. * British landing at Al Faw. Lt-Gen Sir A. A. Barrett assumes command of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force (Force 'D'). Occupation of Al Basrah. Occupation of Al Qurnah.

November 2 November 5 November 6 November 14 November 22 December 9

Action of Sheikh Sa'ad. Lt-Gen Sir P. H. N. Lake succeeds Gen Sir

January 21 February 10

First

Mesopotamia from the

April 6 April 9

22 29 July18 April

March 3

Ahvaz. Gen §ir J. E. Nixon succeeds Lt-Gen

Affair of

April 9

Barrett in April

12-14

Capitulation of Kut. Office assumes control of administrative matters, in addition to operation control, of Mesopotamia Force.

April

Affair of Shaiba.

War

Sir A.A.

August 28

command.

December 4-

Second action

May 31

of Al Qurnah. Occupation of Al 'Amarah. Occupation of An Nas, irTyah. Battle of Kut al Amara.

October 5

Pursuit arrested at Al 'AzTzTyah.

November 1 November 22-24 December 1 December 24

Advance from

Lt-Gen F. S. Maude succeeds Lt-Gen Sir P. H N. Lake in command. Advance to the Hai and the capture of the Khudhaira Bend. .

Battle of Shaiba.

June 3 July 25 September 28

of operations in

India Office.

Attack on the Dujaila Redoubt. Capture of the Hannah position. First attack on Sannaiyat. Second attack on Sannaiyat. Third attack on Sannaiyat.

April 5

1915

Nixon

attack on Hannah.

War Office takes over control

March 8

J. E.

command.

in

January19, 1917

IsKHHlmp

Al 'AzTzTyah starts.

Battle of Ctesiphon. Affair of

Umm-at-Tubul.

Repulse of the Turkish assault

•

P

at Kut.

u r

Altin Koprii

i

I

Kirkuk

May 7,1918 Mosul

TO Tne

Tuz Khurmatu April 29,

Qayyarah

Ash Sharqat

October 30,

October 28-30,

1918

1918

.>

APr

1918

ltd

December 3-6

lU°

DelliAbbas^

^A

5,

March 25-28,

March

Dawr

»Balad

•

April 24,

V

Li

1917

\*

^

Baghdad

Istabulat

1917

April 21-22,

I

October

March

Samarra'

A 'Azmyah^^^

19, 191

jf

4-

1917

L

1917

^

.

^,- 1915

tesiphon

j***»

t

Diyala*^ ^jMarch7-10.

Lajj

March

5,

1917

1917

Euphrates

1

AlHillah

iMl

W^

Indian cavalry

2760

move up

in

the Jabal Hamrin

1915 11.

Novemb^-24,

11.

•

*

5,

November

AlFallujah

Jj

»,i

•Ba'qubah

^

\J917^ KkJTJ*^*

November

i

^ktober 16-20

1917

April 18,

October 23-26.

into

1

Jabal Hamrin March 25, 1917

Adhaim.

Al Fathah

march

KulawaniT

1918

/

British

iHr!liuOT ^^B

IB ;lai:# Baghdad on March 11, 1917

w,-,B J.

August 4

/

Khan Baghdadi

•

March 26-27, 1918

March

19.

1917

Ar Ramadi 1 1, 1917 September 28-29

July

Hit

March

9,

1918

1 All

important P-class steamers on the Tigris

Hindiya

5

6

Triumph or wasted effort? 1918

1917 January 25February5 February 9-1 February 1 7-24 February 23-24 February 24 February 25-26 March 5

March 7-10 March 9-10 March 11 March 19 March 25 March 25-28 March 29 April

9-1

April

18

April 21 April April

Capture of the Hai Salient.

January 27

Capture of the Dahra Bend. Capture of Sannaiyat. Passage of the Tigris at the Shumran Bend. Capture of Kut. Operations against the Turkish rearguard.

March 9 March 26-27 April 29

May 7 August 4 August 4-

Affair of Lajj.

Passage of the Diyala. Operations on the Tigris' right bank.

September14 October 23-26 October 28-30 October 30

Occupation of Baghdad. Occupation of Al Fallujah. First action of the Jabal Hamrin. Cavalry operations about Delli Abbas. Affair of

October 31

Maj-Gen L

C. Dunsterville

July 11

September 28-29 1 6-20 November 5 November 18

October

Affair of

December 3-6

Sir F. S.

Zab

comes into force.

• Ahvaz

March

Action of Istulabat. Occupation of Samarra'. Action of the Adhaim. Attack on Ar Ramadi. Capture of Ar Ramadi. Second action of the Jabal Hamrin. Action of TikrTt.

Lt-GenSirW.

Little

Qayyarah.

Armistice with Turkey

Duqma.

Death of Lt-Gen

from

Battle of Sharqat.

on the Khalis Canal. Passage of the Adhaim.

24 30

start

Actions of the Al Fathah gorge and on the

Affairs

-22

and mission

Baghdad. Occupation of Hit. Action of Khan Baghdad!. Action of Tuz Khurmatu. Occupation of Kirkuk. Occupation of Baku. Defence of Baku.

3.

1915

British advances

E^9&> Turkish attacks

Maude.

R. Marshall

succeeds to command.

Persian

Third action of the Jabal Hamrin.

Gulf

Mohammerah •

ril

6.

AI'Amirat^ June

nnaiyat

3,

1915 Ezra's

1916

tomb

e 1. 1915

BastgT

November

nl9 ril

AlFaw Al

22,

November

6.

1914

•15

22

iruary 17

'

The

rail link

between

Al

Qurnah and Al 'Amarah

Ruins

in

the celebrated streets of KDt

2761

Khan. Cassel's up the Aleppo road some Turks who had slipped

line i

and

the

set off

others stationed at road posts,

had taken Alus and Al Hadl.vhere the Germans had burned the station); the commander of 50th Division, Nazim Bey, who with his staff officers had slipped out in the night and were trying to hide in the hills near Al Hadlthah; and 500 Turkish soldiers. At dawn on March 28 the LAMB cars under Captain D. Tod passed through 'Anah without opposition; and five miles beyond captured the Turkish commandant of 'Anah with 20 officers. A little further on they overtook another party of 150 Turks and learned that the captured Colonel Tennant and Major Hobart were only two hours ahead. About 32 miles beyond 'Anah 8th LAMB battery under Captain Tod skilfully and gallantly rescued them. He swept on 73 miles beyond 'Anah before turning back, having secured Herr Preusser, the head of the Euphrates Mission with his documents, a party of 'VIP' Arabs and a portable wireless transmitter. In 'Anah 4,000,000 rounds and 50,000 shells were found and destroyed. Some 6,000 prisoners had been

taken at a cost of 159 British casualties, of whom 36 were killed.

By skilful planning efficiently carried out Brooking had destroyed the main hope of the Yilderim attempt to regain Baghdad and any rising of the Arab tribes on the Euphrates, for which the Germans were offering gold. From then onwards the Euphrates ceased to be a 'front'. When Nazim Bey was visited by Tennant and Hobart he could not believe his eyes and 'was very depressed'. After a court of enquiry Tennant left for HQ in India and Hobart to the Palestine army. With the Euphrates door now shut and Allenby advancing rapidly in Palestine, the Imperial General Staff pressed Marshall to make a clearance of Kurdistan where Turks remained in varying numbers from Qarah Tappah to Kirkuk and in the SulaymanTyah, Penjwln and Rawandiz areas. Enver Pasha was trying to gain control of the southern Caucasus and of Persian Azerbaijan and to raise anti-British feeling in Persia and Afghanistan. The 2nd Division under Ali Ihsan had about 3,000 rifles and 23 guns in the KifrT-Kishuk area and Egerton was ordered to mop them up. For this purpose he had at his disposal 6th Cavalry Brigade under HollandPryor and three medium mixed columns which included motor transport for food and a motor Lewis gun section of 32 guns.

Above: At Tikrit the British force encountered pockets of stubborn resistance from the Turks, who were well-entrenched with a clear line of fire in front of them. However, after a combined assault by cavalry, artillery and armoured cars XVIII Corps was forced to fall back to Al Fathah, itself taken a year later. Below: Arab mounted police cross the bed of a disused canal, excellent natural cover in a flat country

r

>

s

1

# r

/

.*'

The country beyond the Jabal Hamrin 1,000 feet above sea-level with a more

lies

equable climate than that of the plains. Very well watered with deep gullies and some extremely broad-bedded torrents (up to a mile wide), it presented problems after rain. In April/May it was covered with vegetation and well cropped round the villages and towns — altogether a pleasant district except for the mosquitoes. Egerton planned to move in from the south and detain the Turks, while columns crossing the hills at the Adhaim, 'Ain Lai la and Sakaltutan Dagi passes were to catch him in flank and rear.

Victorious finale The weather during the assembly period was very thundery, and heavy rain caused delays, but the advance began on April 26/27. That night marching was easy by the light of an intense electrical storm, but the Turks were as usual already on the move. On April 27 one column entered Qarah Tappah unopposed and the Cavalry Brigade overtook the Turkish rearguard in shallow cover and nullahs just outside Kulawand. The North Stafford Lewis guns joined 13th Hussars in working round the Turkish right and at midday the brigade was ready to attack, 13th Hussars on the left, 21st Cavalry in centre and 22nd on the right. Behind a barrage from field guns, machine guns and Lewis guns as well as from two planes flying low, the brigade moved forward in lines at a trot for

tffc-

2764

about two miles and galloped the last 500 Some of the Turks quickly formed squares to repel the cavalry, but most were ridden over and many wounded by sword thrusts — one who was throwing bombs had his head taken 'clean off with one stroke (cut three to the right)'. Six hundred prisoners and three guns were taken, and cavalry casualties were 14 men and 36 horses. The Lewis guns and LAMB cars cleared the battlefield and pressed on towards Tuz Khurmatu while another column to the south found KifrT undefended and picked up stragglers. On April 29 Tuz was attacked and captured after a sharp yards.

LAMB

action in which infantry, cavalry, cars and Lewis gun columns all took part. Casualties incurred by the Lancashire regiments and the cavalry totalled 194; 1,300 Turks were taken prisoner with 12 guns. Some tried to escape to the north-east into the hills of the Naft Dagh but were rounded up; the North Stafford Lewis gun column captured a machine gun company of five officers, 62 men and four guns. Daquq was occupied on April 29 and the Lewis gun columns seized and held the bridge to the north-east over the Daquq Chai. Heavy rain and cold winds (snow re-

appeared on the nearby mountains) slowed

up the pursuit but Taza was taken on May 3 and Kirkuk on May 7. Before they left the Turks blew up the 4th-Century Christian church in which the Germans had buried their dead. Three damaged aeroplanes, ammunition and stores as well as

600 wounded and sick Turks were capThe cavalry under Holland-Pryor swept the country in the direction of Altun Kopru and then retired to Kirkuk. The additional 150 miles of supply line proved to be too great a strain on rationing and Marshall decided to leave Kirkuk on May 24 after 1,600 of the inhabitants who feared Turkish reprisals had been evacuated at their own request. He then established his advanced posts at Tuz and at Kifrl. These would stay to cover the Persian border and make it easier to assist the Dunsterforce. To clear all the Turks from the area round Rawandiz would mean pressing up the Tigris to Mosul. Marshall did not wish to do this until the end of the hot weather — September/October. The Turks anticipated such an advance and enlarged their Sixth Army adding 5th Division (about 3,000 rifles with 25 guns) to 14th Division on the Tigris (about 4,000 rifles and 60 guns) and appointing the redoubtable Ali Ihsan to command it. On October 1, Allenby entered Damascus and the War Office instructed Marshall to prepare to advance on Mosul. The Turks had been preparing their positions on the Al Fathah gorge for over a year and the distance from TikrTt was 32 miles. Some time had to be spent in building up supply dumps and Cobbe's I Corps (18th Division on left bank and 17th Division on right bank) with two cavalry brigades and LAMBs advanced on October 18 and by October 30 had captured 11,500 prisoners, tured.

51 guns, three river steamers and much war material. On October 30 the field commander, Ismail Hakki Bey, surrendered in person and Sixth Army ceased to exist. At noon on October 31 the Armistice signed by the Turks came into effect and

about 1,000. Though he argued skilfully about the terms of the Armistice, Marshall compelled him to withdraw with his troops to Nusaybin. He resigned and it was not until March 10 that Marshall took over the entire occupation of Mosul. The battles of Al Fathah and Ash Sharqat over a period of ten days leading to the

hostilities ceased.

Back in Mosul

Ali Ihsan

had a guard of

of Mosul will remain in military history as memorable as those preceding Baghdad. Cassel's and Norton's brilliant leadership Brigades, the of the Cavalry and fine marching endurance and courage of 17th and 18th Divisions, the remarkable success of the artillery in overcoming physical difficulties, and of the engineers in rapid road and bridge building; and the high standard of all the work of the Royal Air fall

LAMB

Force officers and men, contributed to the complete success of a major operation. •

British casualties were 1,886. So ended the last of the 'footslogging' campaigns. Many of the infantry had

9

AS/

rS ^Lf^ml

i

_L

Yi

|v

M£#

•

r

unL

'.

:

moved and fought 400 miles on Lot from Basra to Baghdad and beyond; a few the whole of the way, 700 miles from Basra to Mosul. All units of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force shared with those on other fronts the inevitable hardship and suffering of war, but no others lived and fought in such intolerable conditions of heat as they did. Further Reading Barker, Lt-Col A. Callwell,

Above:

Some of the

April 29. Total British casualties

194.

numbered

Below: Turks surrendering to men of 13th Kurdistan. The city was captured on May 7 but Marshall found the strain on the supply route too great and fell back to Tuz and Kifri a fortnight later

Division near Kirkuk

in

The Neglected

Maj-Gen. SirC.

Maude (Constable

1,300 Turkish prisoners

taken after the capture of Tuz Khurmatu on

J.,

War-

Mesopotamia 1914-18 (Faber 1967)

Candler, 1919)

E.,

E.,

Life of Sir Stanley

1920)

The Long Road

to

Bagdad

(Cassell

Mesopotamia Campaign 1914-1918, Vols & IV, Official History (HMSO 1925-27)

III

[For Leslie Missen's biography, see p. 1984.]

*v

.*

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I

.,'.'.*

•*

t


.

.4* 2 v

9

/?

-

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/*_

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2765

I

aikYSllKF

it come about that in August 1918 a British general, accompanied by a commodore of the Royal Navy, sailed the Caspian Sea under the Serbian flag, on board a Clyde-built Russian ship named after a former South African Boer enemy — President Kriiger — from a Persian port, to the relief of the Central Caspian Social Revolutionary Government — a body of Armenians and Russians in the oil port and city of Baku who were besieged by the Turkish

How did

Caucasus-Islam army? Described as 'A Quixotic. Expedition' by

force could not get

and was waiting

away

before the

snow

but a section of his force was mutinous and he could not keep order. At Kermanshah Colonel Bicherakov, a man of great personal courage and influence, commanded 10,000 men who had 'sworn to be faithful to the death to the person of their leader'. With him and with Baratov there for spring to arrive,

were British liaison officers. Within six months of the capture of Baghdad the line established from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea had been GEN DUNSTERVILLE TO BAKU

— O O

S

in

Turkestan of 100,000 Germans and who were to be organised into an

Austrians

army for the invasion of India. The first course of action suggested to the Imperial General Staff was to fill the places of the retreating Russians with British troops, from Mesopotamia to the Caspian. Such a line might prevent infiltration through Persia to India but it would not prevent Baku and the oilfields from falling into German hands; and in any case Marshall could not spare any more men, he said, as he had already been DEFENCE LINE BEFORE

ROUTE

AUG

6

DUNSTEREORCE'S ROUTE BORDERS TURKISH HELD

TOWN

GERMAN AND TURKISH HELD TOWN AREA OCCUPIED BYVrHX'TURKS'AND GERMANS AS A RESULT OF THE TREATY OF BREST-LITGVSK

ROADS RAILWAYS

U

Caspian Sea

• Sairt

KURD,S

™

^A

Lake

~\(\.

\&AZtfWJAN ^Miandowab

x!^ ^

Rawandiz^

"^•Jehri

HEIGHT IN FEET

OVER 12000 6000-12000 3000-6000 1200-3000

600-1200

BROW

600 \

Al Falluiah

one London daily paper, as 'Knight Errantry in Asia' by another, and as 'this mad enterprise' by Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Marshall, it was a gallant attempt against overwhelming odds to stem the tide of

Turko-German penetration

to the

east — to Turkestan, Afghanistan, and so to India — and to deny to the Germans the oilfields of Baku in the most vital period of the First World War. On March 15, 1917, the Tsar abdicated and a Provisional

Government was set up. The death penalty was abolished, the army salute ended, Soldiers' Committees were formed and disintegration began. Armenia was evacuated and the towns previously lost were reoccupied by the Turks who advanced to Batumi (Batum) and Van. Many Russian left Persia through Bandar-ePahlavi (Enzeli) but two parties remained. At Hamadan, Baratov with a substantial

troops

2766

and along the 800 miles from Mesopotamia to the Caucasus there were no points which a determined Turkish force could not pass. The situation looked most serious in the Caucasus. Three republics were to be placed under Turkish suzerainty — Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in accordance with Enver Pasha's Pan-Turanian plan. The Turks would then

ordered to give up a division for Allenby in Egypt. The second course suggested was to reenlist in British service and pay the Rus-

control the Batumi-Tbilisi-Baku railway, the valuable manganese mineral deposits of the western Caucasus and the oilfields of the east. Control of the Caspian would follow with further penetration along the

tied

broken,

railway from Krasnovodsk to Samarkand and Bokhara, and so to the frontiers of Afghanistan and India. Oil, rice, grain and cotton in great quantities would all be available to the Germans to counter the blockade in the west. There was special danger in the presence in the POW camps

sian forces remaining in Persia; and to supply Aga Petron and the Jehlus with arms and food and so to keep a tenuous line from Reza'Tyeh (Urmia) to Bandar -e-

PahlavT while Marshall in Mesopotamia down the main Turkish forces in the area of Mosul-Arbil and Rawandiz (Rowanduz). This course also could not be effective and subsequent experience showed that nothing would deter the main Russian force from returning home. The third course was the one adopted. On the assumptions (which proved to have been made incorrectly) that the inhabitants of the three embryo republics would defend their homes and fight the Turks to avoid massacre, and that there was available a

In January 1918 a British expeditionary force of an unusually quixonature set off for the Caspian port of Baku. Failure to hold the town would open up a supply route direct to blockaded Germany. Leslie Missen. Below: Dunsterville (left) and staff. Bottom: North Staffords on the road to Baku tic

wealth of abandoned arms, ammunition and equipment, it seemed possible that a large mission of officers, NCOs and instructors might reform and train sufficient units to prevent the Germans and Turks from conquering the Caucasus and gaining control of the Caspian area. 'The prospects were considerable and success would be out of all proportion to the numbers employed and the cost involved.' In December 1917 Marshall was informed by the Imperial General Staff that arrangements had been made for an armoured car

Dunsterville was a man of fine physique, great personal charm and persuasiveness, and a commanding personality. He was the original Stalky of Kipling's Stalky & Co and had shared a study at school with Kipling in 1878. After a year at Sandhurst he was commissioned in 1884 to the Royal Sussex Regiment, but when in India two years later (whither Kipling had preceded him on appointment to the Civil and Military Gazette at Lahore) he transferred to the Indian army — to the 24th Punjabis. He made a serious study of India and her

NCOs and

batmen, in 41 Ford vans advanced post was at Surkhadiza, 160 miles on the way. Beyond

four

and

cars. Marshall's

that Dunsterville had to fend for himself, but he was warned of possible hostility by local Persians who saw yet a third invasion of their country pending, and of trouble between Qazvfn and Bandar-e-PahlavT from the Jangalis (about 5,000 strong under Mirza Kuchik Khan) who, with the support of Turco-German infiltrators, including a German CO — von Passchen — had taken over the province of Gilan. Heavy rain at first and then snow and intense cold made travel over a very indifferent road tedious, but Dunsterville reached Kermanshah on February 3. The next 107 miles included the Asadabad Pass (8,000 feet) where very heavy snow again delayed the convoy, but

by February 11 all were safely in Hamadan (345 miles). Here he conferred with Baratov, previously C-in-C the Russian army in Persia but now finding it impossible to control even the units remaining near him.

The better-made Russian road made for quicker travelling and Qazvln was reached on February 16, where Sir Charles. Marling, British Ambassador to Tehran, awaited Dunsterville to tell him that the Jangalis had announced that they would stop the mission. Dunsterville decided to

goon. Leaving Qazvln the same day, he made for Rasht, the capital of Gilan province, passing through a gorge and 40 miles of deep forest. At Rasht the British and Russian consuls warned Dunsterville that Bandar was controlled by hostile Bolsheviks under orders from Baku. The party arrived in Bandar-e-PahlavT just before dusk.

detachment, and for officers and men for the Caucasus, to be sent to Baghdad en route fcr Bandar-e-PahlavI. On December 24, Major-General L. C. Dunsterville CB, CSI, then on the north-west frontier of India, was ordered to Delhi to hear the terms of his appointment as 'Chief of the British Mission to the Caucasus and British Representative in Tbilisi'. Dunsterville arrived at Baghdad on January 18 to command a force of which the first few were already assembled, ultimately to number 150 officers and 300 NCOs; supported by five squadrons each of eight armoured cars. Marshall was instructed to ensure the safe passage of the mission which was to proceed to Tbilisi as soon as possible by the only practicable route: Qasr-e ShTrTnPai Taq Pass — Surkhadiza, Kermanshah, Hamadan, Qazvln, ManjTl, Bandar-ePahlavT and Baku.

problems and passed the qualifying exams in Urdu, Punjabi, Pushtu and Persian. In 1896/97 he spent a year in Russia and on his return he qualified as interpreter in Russian. In 1901 he served with his unit in the Boxer Rising and afterwards qualified as interpreter in Chinese. With good French and German also he was well qualified to deal with the peoples of the Caucasus-Caspian area. His brief from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was to organise and maintain an effective force on the Caucasus Front to prevent Pan-Turanian designs; to cover Marshall's right flank over the Persian border by holding Turks on the Caucasus-Tabriz front; and to keep touch with the French who were to organise Russian forces north of the Caucasus. Hoping to get to Baku in about 12 days, Dunsterville set out on January 27, 1918, with 11 officers.

Dunsterville was called to meet Comrade Cheliapin, a shipping office clerk now President of the Bandar-e-PahlavT Bolshevik Committee, together with a sailor in uniform, who required him to attend the committee to answer questions. The meeting was deferred to the next morning. Dunsterville managed it with great skill. He was told that Russia had made peace with Germany, Turkey and Austria, that Great Britain was mistrusted. The regime in Baku had instructed them to stop Dunsterville and his party at all costs. Comrade Cheliapin helpfully suggested that written recognition of the Bolshevik government might enable him to send the party to Baku, but he was doubtful. Saying that he must get to Baku if he could, Dunsterville shook hands all round and left the committee. He then saw Cheliapin alone, congratulated him on his masterly control of a difficult stiuation and on the efficiency of his regime, and secured petrol to cover the journey back to Qazvln! Before dawn on February 20 the convoy left Bandar-ePahlavT safely and reached ManjTl at dusk. The same day Red Army soldiers arrived from Baku to arrest the mission.

The Commissar from Moscow The situation was now causing the Imperial General Staff some alarm. With Bicherakov at Hamadan till only the end of February, Dunsterville telegraphed that the line from Qasr-e Shirin to Bandar-e-PahlavT should be held and he considered that, in all, one infantry brigade, one cavalry regiment, one battery of mountain artillery and one armoured car battery with aeroplanes could do this effectively. On March 12 CIGS ordered Marshall to cover all military measures to check Turkish pene-

2767

through north-west Persia, with command under him. In March the Germans reached Odessa, seizing part of the Russian fleet and gaining control of the whole of the Black Sea. The way was then open to them along the main railway from Europe across the north Caucasus to Baku. Along with a division of Germans, the Turks occupied Batumi and Tbilisi; and by themselves they took Kars, Alexandropol and Yerevan (Erivan) and >on

erville in

With Malleson's force fully occupied on the eastern cordon and Sir Percy Sykes tied in Shlraz and south Persia, the government of India and the British War Cabinet were apprehensive about the thin line of posts from Khanaqln to Qazvln. The situation in the Caucasus was so confused as to defy descripion — between Christian and Muslim, Armenians and Azerbaijainees, Bolsheviks and Russians. At Baku the party which favoured British assistance seemed to be gaining in power but the Bolsheviks in Moscow had sent a commissar named Shaumian to take charge along with a contingent of Red Army troops. On June 1 the War Cabinet decided that Dunsterville might go to Baku with some officers, but only if he could keep the road from Qazvln to the Caspian open. Bicherakov and his Cossacks were now between Qazvln and ManjTl, and on June 12 he found the way barred by Kutchik Khan at Manjll Bridge where some 5,000 Jangalis under Passchen held a strong position. Bicherakov had about 1,000 of his own men, a squadron of the 14th Hussars, two armoured cars and two AFC planes flying from Qazvln. After some rifle fire Passchen advanced under a flag of truce and parleyed insolently with Bicherakov who tersely ordered him back. The whole force then attacked but the Jangalis soon broke and fled, leaving many dead and wounded. The Russians continued their advance and reached Rasht on June 18. Bicherakov then visited Baku, returning on June 22 to explain that he proposed to embark

all his force

Petrov, but they and their Red Army contingent (about 1,200) seized 13 ships, loaded them with the contents of the arsenal and sailed for Astrakhan. The Caspian fleet joined the new dictatorship and turned the convoy back to Baku where Shaumian and Petrov were then imprisoned. On July 30 and 31 Dunsterville heard from Baku that advance parties of Turks had appeared on the heights above the town within 3,000 yards of the harbour, but had suddenly and inexplicably withdrawn. Bicherakov had arrived at Alyaty Pristan', too late to stem the Turks' advance, and then sailed to Derbent, north of Baku, leaving only a section of Cossacks in Baku. He feared a siege in Baku and planned to relieve the city by advancing on the Turks from the north. Immediate action was required and

along with

armoured cars and some Dunsterforce officers, and sail to Alyaty Pristan', 35 miles southwest of Baku, to seize the only bridge over the River Kura, 150 miles to the west, and so block the 12,000 advancing Turks. Dunsterville himself took over Bandar-e-PahlavT on June 27 and Bicherakov sailed on July 3. The next move by the Jangalis was intended by Passchen to eliminate Colonel Matthews' column (about 400 strong) which was based on Rasht with responsibility for some 80 miles of road. The Jangalis massed about 2,500 (of this Matthews had warning) and attacked on July 20 at dawn. The battle lasted all day. At dusk the Jangalis drew off leaving over 100 dead and numerous prisoners, some of whom were Austrians. British casualties totalled 50. Eventually Kutchik Khan four

British

came

to

terms,

released

the

Political

Captain Noel, who had been in prison for four months, and gave no further trouble. The road from Khanaqln to Bandare-PahlavT was then clear, but the Turks occupying Tabriz now had an advance party 20 miles out. At Enzeli Dunsterville had now to deal with the committee consisting of Cheliapin (still chairman), Lazarev, a young shopkeeper aged about 30, and a youth of 19 named Babookh, formerly a trumpeter in a cavalry regiment. All three had been plotting with Kutchik Khan, and their letter congratulating him and Passchen on the Rasht battle fell into Dunsterville's hands. He promptly arrested them and Officer,

advanced by road through Dogubayazll to In May a military mission under Nuri Pasha (brother of Enver) appeared in Tabriz and settled in the Caucasus to organise the Caucasus-Islam army which was to fight Armenians and Bolsheviks and to occupy Persian Azerbaijan. The War Office informed Marshall that as soon as the Turks entered Persia the Persian government with the help of German agents would encourage a general rising

Jolfa.

against the British.

2768

sent

them

to Qazvln.

Coup d'etat

On

July 26 the expected coup d'etat took place in Baku. The new body, the Central Caspian Dictatorship, decided to arrest the Bolshevik

Commissars

Shaumian

and

Dunsterville despatched on August 3 a party of 44 officers and men of 1/4 Hampshire Regiment. They arrived on August 4. On that day the first party of 7th North Staffords (150) arrived at Bandar-e-PahlavI and embarked with a party of Dunsterforce officers and NCOs, and some machine gunners from the armoured cars, arriving at Baku on August 5. On August 6 the second party of Dunsterforce officers, two armoured cars and 130 North Staffords sailed with Colonel Keyworth, RA, who took command of the British force in Baku. Dunsterville had secured, and retained on payment, three steamers entirely for

British President Kriif>er service — the (1,000 tons), the Kursk and the Abo. Other small vessels (some old paddle steamers) were willing transports under charter, and small parties, supplies and equipment sailed almost daily.

The defence

of

Baku

rested upon those

units of 39th Brigade which reached Baku in time, and in particular on 7th North Staffords which bore the brunt of the fight-

Although Dunsterville had been authorised by, the War Cabinet to go to Baku on June 1, it was not until July 9 that Marshall ordered 39th Brigade to move. Time was vital but Marshall was apprehensive of the Turkish moves in north-west Persia, Tabriz having been occupied by them on June 14. He saw a risk of the line ing.

Bandar-e-PahlavI being broken and of an isolated British force in Baku which could not be rescued — another Kut. The 39th Brigade, consisting of 7th North Staffords and 7th Gloucesters, 9th Royal Warwicks and 9th Worcesters, all seriously below strength, was encamped near the Diyala north of Baghdad in a to

over the Khurkhur via Hassanabad (208 miles), the summit of the pass being 6,000 feet; then over the Kuh-e-Safid at 4,000 feet to Kermanshah (220 miles). Dunsterforce officers at Kermanshah reorganised the echelon which left on July 14 for Hamadan, 100 miles distant. At BTsotun they saw on the towering rock face of the mountain the carved panel, ten feet high by 18 feet wide, depicting Darius with eight captive kings bound and kneeling before him. Progress was again slow; after 60 miles dusk compelled a halt at Kangavar, 5,000 feet above sea level. The next day was the most difficult of the whole journey. Unloading and reloading at numerous unbridged streams and gullies caused a late approach to the formidable Asadabad pass over the Kuh-e-Alvand, rising hereabouts to 12,000 feet. The men

By camel and Ford van Further reorganisation of the echelon was now necessary because marching with camels for transport was the order for the next 150 miles to QazvTn. The Royal Warwicks remained at Hamadan together with all sick and those unfit to march 20 miles a day. Numbers were thereby reduced to about 500. No rations were carried for the column had to subsist on whatever the Dunsterforce staff had gathered at the posting stations. The camel escort found their task exhausting during the first day's march with a maximum shade temperature of over 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Thereafter the column marched by night. The Sultan

Bulak pass at 7,500 feet was a test for men and camels, but QazvTn was reached at dawn on July 31, in nine marches. As rapid movement was now urgent — an invitation Far left: Armoured cars

equipped with machine guns, played

(fop),

an important part

in

the defence of Baku. Lack of co-operation from the Bolshevik Inspector of Artillery' meant that heavy guns were seldom available when most needed. Bottom: A dramatic explosion in one of

Baku's precious oilCentre left: Armenian defenders man a4-inch Russian howitzer battery. Left, top: Armenian troops accounted for much of

fields.

the 6,000-strong defensive force. Unfortunately, they lacked military discipline

and

organisation, even

when

commanded

by officers of the Dunsterforce. Dunsterville always regretted that there was insufficient time

an offensive have been properly developed. Left, below: Baku, centre of TurkoGerman ambitions in the Caucasus, and the gateway to a muchcoveted supply route for

spirit to

shade temperature which had already reached 125 degrees Fahrenheit. The prospect of cooler weather on the high plateau

was

attractive. Motor lorries convey the first party as far as Hamadan, 350 miles away, and thereafter they would march. The first echelon left Ruz at dawn on July 11. By dusk they had covered 150 miles to

of

Persia

were ready

to

Pai Taq village. (2,000 feet) next the men had to

made the summit

The ascent

of the pass

day slowed progress,

march while the

for

lorries

in the seven-mile climb.

Halfway up they passed the arch of Alexander the Great commemorating his capture here of Darius in bc 331 after the battle of Arbela. Beyond Karand eight lorries developed engine trouble and one caught fire and was burned out. They were left with their passengers to guard tbem. A difficult journey on July 13 brought them

marched and reached the top

of the pass at 9,000 feet as darkness fell. It was impossible to sleep at this height in a severe frost and at first light on July 16 the lorries ran down the remaining 20 miles to Hamadan— completing the 350 miles in six

Hamadan's problem was starvation, and the bivouac was soon surrounded by pitiful, begging children. This was the result of the living off the land first by Baratov's army, then by Ali Ihsan's and then again by Baratov's. Instances of cannibalism were reported and the guilty parties had been stoned to death. The Dunsterforce staff working with the British and American consuls and the AngloPersian Bank manager had organised considerable relief by bribing the hoarders to release supplies and by paying enrolled Persian levies and road workers so that they could buy food. days.

send troops to Baku having reached Dunsterville on July 25 — Dunsterforce had assembled as many Ford vans and other

to

motor vehicles as were roadworthy — enough to carry two-and-a-half companies to Bandar-e-PahlavT. The remainder was left to march on and the column set off at once for Manjll. Ley's depleted echelon of 150 North Staffords arrived at Bandar-e-PahlavT on the afternoon of August 4 and embarked at once with a party of Dunsterforce artillery officers and NCOs, with two armoured

Baku on August 5. The North Staffords had covered 500 miles on wheels, 145 miles on foot and 200 miles by sea in under three weeks. With the Bolsheviks, Germans and Austrians in the town the reception was not exactly cordial. cars, arriving in

The

dictators expected that sufficient British troops would be sent to take over

2769

the whole of the defence. The safety of the British remained uncertain until August 13 when the remaining Bolsheviks were arrested and Commissars Shaumian and Petrov were imprisoned. Meanwhile, Keyworth, Stokes and Ley met the Baku army commander — General Duchuchaiev — a former Tsarist officer whose 'refined character was not suited to the position of Commander-in-Chief of a revolutionary army', nor was his age. Colonel Avetisov, another regular officer and an Armenian, was Chief-of-Staff. But he was very unwell. Neither of them could control the continual interference by committees and by the dictators, of whom there were five. These were young and appeared able, but the result of committees, discussions, disorganisation and indiscipline, was dilatoriness and procrastination. On August 7 the second party of 130 North Staffords arrived, and by August 16 the North Staffords were all in It

Diga was held by Warwicks. Dunsterville toured the defences and told Duchuchaiev that the battalions supposed to be in the line were not there and that plans for artillery support were ludicrous as batteries were controlled by committees and shells were too far away from the guns. At 1010 hours Hanbury-Sparrow reported 'enemy advancing in force' from west and north-west and cavalry issuing from Massajir. The Turks put down a

and

to

Staffords

their

right

and

barrage. A call to Balajari for the reserve battalion to come up was unanswered because it was not there. The two 6-inch howitzers opened fire, but the other batteries could not fire until the 'Inspector of Artillery' gave permission at about 1600 hours. The Staffords opened fire on the Turks at 1,000 yards and halted their

and the Turks gave way in some disorder and with casualties, but quickly reforming they assaulted the hill again. This time they were driven back with heavy losses and retired out of range. When news of the attack on Volchi Vorota reached the town two officers and 80 men of the Worcesters who had just arrived from Enzeli were moved to Balajari station along with a party of Warwicks and Staffords. The Staffords and Worcesters moved out to counterattack the Volcano while Ley took the Warwicks to high ground between Stafford Hill and Diga, henceforward named Warwick Castle. The counterattack on the Volcano was stopped by heavy fire from Turkish guns and rifles now at the foot of the Volcano, and the Staffords and Worcesters without artillery support had to retire to the railway line. At

Baku, 20 officers and 524 men. was eventually agreed by Keyworth

and the dictators that the British troops should take over the key positions in the 12-mile front line while Baku battalions with Dunsterforce liaison officers should hold the remainder and provide the reserves. Duchuchaiev decided to take the offensive at Diga, and Keyworth agreed. The Baku papers announced a 'grand offensive' on August 17! Colonel Stepanov with 600 Armenians would attack further to the north. The British under Lieutenant

Craig, MC, with 100 North Staffords and a small party of Warwicks, would follow through, capture Novkhani and so close the gap to the sea. Zero hour was agreed for 0700 hours. However, at 0630 hours Craig found the Armenians already advancing, but they halted under fire about 1,000 yards from Diga. Craig was then ordered to work round the Turks' right, and while he was doing so the Turks launched a counterattack before which the

Baku

force retired. The heavy rifle fire of Staffords and Warwicks halted the Turks, but Craig then found he had both flanks un-

guarded and was obliged to withdraw to a line 600 yards north of Diga. Meanwhile, Stepanov rallied about 100 of his original force and rejoined Craig before darkness fell. Seven Russians were killed; eight Russians and four North Staffords were wounded. There was no artillery support as 'the Inspector of Artillery' had not been warned! On August 19 Craig's position was reinforced by three officers and 100 men of the Warwicks, and his right flank was covered by a patrol of Dunsterforce armoured cars. This was a depressing start to cooperation with the Baku forces.

The main Turkish attack The two AFC aeroplanes which had operated from Qazvln arrived at Baku and flew daily to observe the increasing Turkish forces now estimated to be 12,500. A main assault was expected after Turkish guns had registered most of the line. It came on

August 26 against Volchi Vorota. Hanbury-Sparrow had 130 rifles, four Lewis guns and three Dunsterforce machine guns, entrenched in six posts, three on the Volcano and three on the slope to the south.

An Armenian

battalion held the line be-

tween them and Balajari another

Baku

battalion

station, where in reserve

was

beside the armoured train. On the Volcano right rear an Armenian battalion held Binagadi Hill under a Dunsterforce officer,

2770

advance at 600 yards. At 1115 hours and again at 1145 hours the Turks advanced, but were held by rifle and machine gun fire. Shortly after, infantry and cavalry were seen massing to the north from Massajir and heavy machine gun fire swept the posts from the right flank. At 1300 hours the crest of the Volcano disappeared in the dust and smoke from bursting shells and lines of Turkish infantry moved up in the final assault which captured the hill. During the attack on Volchi Vorota, Craig received orders to move from his position near Diga to support the Armenian battalion holding Binagadi Hill as this would next be attacked. When he arrived at 1430 hours he found the hill had been evacuated, and as he reached the crest he saw the lower slopes on the north side already occupied by the Turks who were preparing to advance.

He attacked

at once

British troops- Royal Warwicks and North Staffords -move up in an attempt to fill in the gaps left by retreating Armenians

Above:

the end of the day 8th Battery Royal Field Artillery came up to Balajari and placed some good salvos in the Turkish positions. Ley handed over the line through Stafford Hill, Warwick Castle and Diga to Colonel Faviell of the Worcesters. The action of Volchi Vorota was a considerable blow to the Turks. They intended to capture the railway station but their losses were so heavy that they were unable to advance beyond the Volcano. HanburySparrow and his small force had prevented a major collapse from which no one could have escaped. They had fought a force ten times (over 1,000) larger than themselves. n the day three officers of the North StafI

fords

and 48 men were

killed, five officers

men were wounded; two men were men of the Dunster machine guns were wounded and Major Haslam RE and 34

missing. Four

of Dunsterforce

was

killed.

On August 27 Ley moved some men from Wolfs Gap to patrol the cliff for five miles to Balajari station because the Baku

losses. A call to the Baku battalions reserve was answered, but too late. The Turks' final assault at 0800 hours forced the survivors to retire towards War-

heavy

wick Castle.

The total strength of the Baku army was estimated at around 6,000 and

Dunsterville's dilemma The Turks next assaulted Warwick Castle at about 1000 hours. The Armenian battalion retired at once, in spite of the efforts of Major Engledue and the Dunsterforce NCOs to hold them, and by 1100 hours the castle was surrounded on three sides. Retirement was imperative and was effected with the help of No 5 Russian Battalion. Later in the day the Turks moved towards Diga and it was obvious that it could not hold out for long in

could have been a very tough opponent to the Turks. But the will to win, and the

isolation. Stepanov had two battalions there alongside the Warwicks and he was

units in the sector took leave of absence at will

and

left

major gaps in the

line.

and

was

Faviell reorganised his reinforced by the only

line

Baku

battalion (No 5) which distinguished itself as a unit. It was 150 strong, and consisted of former

Russian soldiers. The Warwicks at Diga on the right of the line had two Baku battalions in reserve, with Dunsterforce officers.

force to the final line along the saucer edge, and Mursal Pasha could make his final assault where and when he chose. The toughness of the British resistance and his heavy losses made him pause for rein-

in

forcements and careful preparation, thus giving the Baku army invaluable time. Dunsterville himself observed the fighting on Stafford Hill and Warwick Castle and concluded that unless a gigantic effort was made by the dictators and the Baku army he would not be justified in risking any more British lives. He wrote a letter to that effect in the afternoon and was summoned to meet all the committees, Duchuchaiev and the dictators in a 'Grand Council

of

War'

at

2000 hours. Dunsterville's

account of that meeting makes sad reading. It was still proceeding when he left at 0100 hours on September 1. The next day he invited the dictators to meet him at 1600 hours in the Hotel Europe. 'I am about to give orders,' he said, 'to withdraw my men from the firing line and I shall move them

from Baku tonight. I have invited you here to give you this warning so that you may be able to fill the gaps in the line caused by the withdrawal of my men.' He told them that he would not allow his men's lives to be thrown away and he advised them to send a flag of truce to the Turks to ask for terms of surrender. Dunsterville gave them one hour to make a decision. At the end of three hours there was still no decision and it was clear that nothing would be done that day. 'Under such conditions I could not in fairness to the town carry out immediate withdrawal of my troops,' said Dunsterville. But he addressed a final warning note to the dictators to which they replied that they would 'fight to the bitter end' and the British would be allowed to leave 'only at the same time as the Baku troops and on the same terms and only after the evacuation of the town by non-combatants'.

-».%

It was ironical that just then, the War Cabinet, having received via Baghdad a report dated August 22 on the situation in Baku, ordered Dunsterville to destroy the oilfields, embark his force and sail to Krasnovodsk. Dunsterville replied that it would be impossible to do this under the E guns of the Baku fleet (Commodore Norris Z having secured and armed only two ships | so far); that the Tartar oil workers would not stand idly by and watch the destruc? tion of their livelihood; and that with more r*. • . 5 troops there was a possibility of saving the e city. He had told the dictators he would remain with them to the end and would withdraw only if matters became hopeless. advised to retire to the south of the Salt Bicherakov had captured Petrovsk and Lake and the railway line, but he refused. would now send some help to Baku. Turkish patrols were active all night and Marshall replied that the order to withwhen dawn broke on September 1 the Turks appeared nearly all round. At 0600 hours draw still held good and that Dunsterville they advanced some 600 strong with trumwould get no more help. Dunsterville inpets and red artillery flags. The Russians formed his officers; and all ranks of 39th Brigade were then told that the position and Armenians held firm until 0700 hours when they began to retire without first was now 'backs to the wall'. warning the Warwicks who held on a little Between September 1 and 13 the Turks longer. Then, with both flanks exposed, made no attack but patrolled vigorously while their artillery registered many points they commenced a rearguard action to along the line and shelled the city. The cover the three miles back to the railway. Before they reached it unfortunately their Kriiqer and Kursk were obliged to stand ammunition was exhausted and they were off in the bay — the Abo sailed to Bandaroverrun by cavalry. Finally about 1200 e-PahlavT with all wounded and sick and hours the survivors arrived at the railway then returned. The artillery officers were under covering fire from Baku guns and certain that even with large scale maps of the town the Turks could not have regisrifles, but four officers, including the tered as they did and then fired salvos Medical Officer, and 67 men were missing. The Turks had now driven the defence with deadly accuracy, without observers is

i

organisation, were not there. force in the 12-mile line on

The British August 30

numbered 900

rifles and 33 officers, the 8th Field Battery, RFA, three armoured cars and the machine gun section of Dunsterforce; and the two aeroplanes. The Baku artillery, with Colonel Rawlinson's help, now had 40 guns in the field, some supervised by Dunsterforce officers. On August 28 and 29 the Turks shelled the city heavily. An attack upon Stafford

was anticipated. As dawn broke at about 0530 hours the North Staffords could see the Turks cutting the wire and opened fire at once. Shortly afterwards the attack came, preceded by bombardment. About 500 Turks in close order charged up the hill with trumpets blowing and carrying red artillery flags. The assault was halted by rifle fire and the good shooting of 8th Battery's guns which caused the Turks Hill

2771

lephonic communication with them, by spies at night was easy. In the [ays respite from attack much was done to improve the defence. The seriousness of the situation made the Baku forces more amenable to British guidance 'and advice. The two AFC planes, joined by two Russian seaplanes, made observation nights whenever dust storms and high winds allowed, reporting a steady increase flic

now estimated to total 14,000 infantry and 500 cavalry with 40 guns. The arrival of 600 men from Bicherakov's force, including some Cossacks, added to the prevailing optimism. Dunsterville always felt that given time the mixed Baku force could have developed an offensive spirit and the will to win. On September 12 an Arab officer from the Turkish 10th Division deserted to Baku and from information he gave it seemed certain that a grand assault would be made on September 14. He suggested that the main blow might fall on the Baku left, but there were other vital points along the 12-mile line. During the night of August 13/14 Turkish patrols were active and firing broke out in the small hours. About 0430 hours the Armenians north of Wolf's Gap repelled a bombing attack by Turks who had climbed the cliff. This was a pointer to the Turks' main plan of attack — to break through directly to the west of the town and cut off the troops to the north and south. A sea mist obscured the whole front until 0630 hours. When it lifted line upon line of Turks in open order were seen crossing the valley. of Turkish forces

The end — defeat and withdrawal The high ground south of Wolf's Gap was heavily shelled and a determined climb brought the Turks to the western edge about 0900 hours. Bollington was in danger of being cut off and moved rapidly round to join Ley in reserve. Together then, and with some of the Armenian reserves they counterattacked and drove the Turks off the high ground. It was a key position for observation and commanded a clear view of the whole of the city and harbour. At Wolf's Gap, Turkington reported a Turkish penetration to his north which obliged him to swing his line round. He was then attacked in his left flank and obliged to retire

towards Ley on Cemetery

Hill.

Con-

tinuing north the Turks scaled the cliffs and obliged Bicherakov's men to throw back their left flank. They then poured through the gap to cut off the Balajari area, and Faviell ordered Bushell and the Warwick reserves to counterattack. Kazarov sent three Armenian companies and 100 of Bicherakov's men to help. Under heavy shell fire the Armenian companies broke, but Bicherakov's men and the Warwicks attacked gallantly at 1030 hours and drove the Turks back until heavy casualties caused a halt. The position was still very serious and Faviell ordered Havelock to counterattack while he extricated the troops heavily engaged along the Balajari-Salt Lake line. Havelock's party attacked so vigorously that the Turks were driven right back to the cliff edge, and Bicherakov's men, the Worcesters and the Warwicks, along with Kazarov's right wing, were able to take up new positions nearer the town. Meanwhile the pressure on Cemetery Hill increased and after midday Ley was forced back; but with Bollington's and Turkington's parties he counter-

2772

attacked and kept the Turks off the highest ground. The Turks then brought guns up the road at Wolf's Gap and deployed them to shell the rear of the right wing. A counterattack by 1,000 trained troops could have saved the situation, but there were only Armenian battalions in reserve. Keyworth advised Dunsterville at 1500 hours that there was no choice between annihilation or capture unless retreat to the ships in harbour could be effected. Dunsterville found Duchuchaiev in agreement and informed the dictators who raised no objection at the time. An order for evacuation was issued at 1600 hours and the Abo sailed with as many wounded as could be carried to the quay. Faviell and Kazarov were notified, and a slow and orderly retirement began while the Turks were held off. The city now came under

heavy shell fire. At 1600 hours Ley's party had to sustain a heavy bombardment, howitzer shells wrecking the cemetery monuments and blowing coffins out of the ground. The Turks then attacked again and bombing at close quarters followed in this macabre setting. The North Staffords gave ground and reformed lower down, joined by some Armenians. At 1830 hours Ley received a written order to 'hold on at all costs until 2030 hours' to cover the retirement to the ships. Cemetery Hill quietened down. The unhurried withdrawal of Ley's party was carried out without incident and the descent from the hill to the harbour was made by 2200 hours with the wounded walking or carried. They boarded the Kursk where they found the other North survivors. The main body of Warwicks and Worcesters with Dunsterville and HQ staff were on the Kriiger, and 500 yards away Rawlinson had the Armenian (200 tons) under armed guard as his men had filled it with arms, ammunition and explosives from the arsenal. Shortly after 2000 hours two of the dictators arrived on the quay with the written order of the Baku government to Dunster-

Stafford

return at once to the line. Dunsterrecapitulated the situation quietly and firmly and said he was about to sail. 'Then the fleet will open fire on you and sink your ships,' they said, and left. The scattered anchorage of the fleet delayed the receipt of the order, but the guard ships at Nargin Island were on the telephone. Commodore Norris gave orders to cast off, without lights, in the order Kursk, Kriiger, Armenian. The Kursk sailed at 2305 hours and passed the guardships unchallenged. The Kriiger had to return to her pier twice to pick up wives of the crew who arrived late. Then as she approached Nargin Island one of the crew switched on the lights. A challenge came, 'Anchor at once' but the captain, Ivanovitch Feodorov, went 'full speed' ahead and the shells from the guardship passed overhead and astern. On the Armenian the crew heard the gunfire ahead and sent the chairman of the ship's committee to order the captain to turn about. Rawlinson was on the bridge covering the captain with his pistol and had with him a guard of four men who promptly 'downed' the chairman. The ville, to

ville

guardship challenged and opened fire. The slow-moving Armenian made an easier target and seven shells burst on her superstructure, but they were 'common' shells — charged with gunpowder. If the charge had been high explosive the ship would have

blown

been

to

The Kursk and

pieces.

Kriiger arrived at Bandar-e-PahlavT the following evening and the Armenian at dawn the day after. Casualties on September 14 had been lighter than expected; three officers of the Staffords and two of Dunsterforce were killed; several officers wounded and over 150 other ranks killed and wounded. It was inevitable that the North Staffords should record the highest casualties in Baku. Of the 20 officers and 480 men who fought there, eight officers and 63 men were killed,

and 80 men were wounded, and 19 men subsequently Persia. Forty men had been evacua-

five officers

two

officers

died in ted sick

Bandar-e-Pahlavi

to

before

September 14. On the Turkish side Mursal Pasha admitted 2,000 casualties. On September 16 Dunsterville was reto Baghdad by- Marshall. Before leaving he addressed officers and men assembled on the beach, and concluded by reading a written petition which had been presented to him by the crew of the Kursk.

called

The

petition read:

We, the Committee and the crew of the SS Kursk have witnessed with intense admiration the heroic conduct of your brave British soldiers in the defence of Baku. We have seen them suffering wounds and death bravely in the defence of our town which our own people were too feeble to defend. It is wonderful to us that these fine fellows from that distant island of the North Sea should have come all this way to the Caspian Sea and have given up their lives in the cause of honour and glory. We are so much impressed by their bearing and valour and by the whole episode of the British endeavours to save Baku from the Turks that we wish to be taken over as a body and granted British nationality. No oil and no supplies from Baku got beyond Tbilisi before the Turks signed an Armistice on October 31, and the Germans

on November 11. Orders then came to reoccupy Baku and to eject Nuri Pasha, Mursal Pasha and their army. On November 16 a British general again sailed the Caspian Sea escorted by gunboats under Captain B. G. Washington. With Thomson were Bicherakov and his Cossacks, the 39th Brigade HQ and the North Staffords. This convoy of 20 ships passed the guardships by Nargin Island on the morning of November 17 and entered Baku harbour, headed by Kriiger flying the flags of Great Britain, France, the USA and Russia, greeted by bands playing on the pier from which she had sailed on the night of September 14. Further Reading Bailey, Col. F. M., Mission to Tashkent

(Cape

1946) Barker, Col. A.

J., The Neglected War, Mesopotamia 1914-1918 (Faber 1967) Donohue, M. H., With the Persian Expedition (Edward Arnold 1919) Dunsterville, Maj-Gen. L. C, The Adventures of Dunsterforce (Edward Arnold 1920) Ellis, Col. C. H., The Transcaspian Episode

(Hutchinson 1963) French, Col. J. F. J.,

From

Caspian (Odhams 1921) Mesopotamia Campaign, Vol History of the

War (HMSO

Whitehall to the IV,

The

Official

1927)

Rawlinson, Col. A, Adventures East (Andrew Melrose 1923)

in the

Near

\For Leslie Afissen's biography, see page 1984.]

IHCME TO'CNT OPITaVIN

by the Bolshevik power in November and the

of being spread thinly on butter, as in prewar days.' In a cartoon entitled 'David in

beginning of armistice negotiations be-

Rhonddaland', the Prime Minister is shown arguing with the 'Mad Grocer' in the shape of Lord Rhondda: the caption

lowed

dramatically

seizure

of

tween the Soviets and the Germans. Certainly, events in Russia had bigger domestic repercussions, particularly on organised labour on whom the war effort in all countries ultimately depended. Only once did bells ring out in London to celebrate a victory — in November 1917 after British tanks had broken through the German defences in front of Cambrai and reached open country beyond — yet within ten days the Germans had more than recovered all the ground they had lost. Meanwhile, some of the worst German bombing raids of the war took place in the summer and autumn of 1917. 'We know that the nation is in a natural and legitimate sense war-weary,' wrote the Spectator, which was soon to become sharply of Lloyd George's leadership, in 1918. 'Nothing else could be expected after three and a half years of unexampled effort — but the symptoms of physical weariness indicate not the remotest intention of calling off the fight.' War-weariness was not simply a byproduct of what was happening in France. critical

January

There

mm By 1918

'business as usual' had closed up shop. Prices were up, supplies down, and labour stirred uneasily. AsaBriggs. Above: Food controller Rhondda conjures up a rabbit for l/9d.

In a memorable passage in his bulky War Memoirs Lloyd George referred comprehensively to the change in public mood at the beginning of 1918. 'The war fever,'

he wrote in retrospect, 'had burnt itself out long ago in all the warring countries. Enthusiasms had cooled down. Ours was the only country where antiwar organisations were allowed to pursue their activities and organise public meetings. The struggle was kept going by that stubborn determination not to turn tail which keeps brave animals fighting as long as they can stand.' If this was the mood at the time — and there is ample evidence that it was — part of the reason lay in the events of the year 1917, a year of strains, setbacks and disappointments. The failure of the military offensives and the heavy toll at sea would have been bad enough in themselves. As it was, political bickering and conflict be-

tween soldiers and politicians, much of it serious, added to the difficulties. In the international context the entry of the United States into the war in April 1917 seemed less significant than the Russian Revolution of a month earlier, to be fol-

is little doubt that for civilians, increasingly distant in mood from soldiers across the Channel, 1917 was the worst year of the whole war. The crucial decision to create new machinery of economic control in the autumn of 1916 — through a series of 'decisive steps' in the extension of the powers of the State — was not followed by immediate gains. In 1917 there were obvious shortages of food and fuel, often magnified in the public mind by rumour and panic. Punch put the matter more cheerfully than most people would have chosen to do even among the educated middle classes which it was addressing:

O Matthew Arnold! You were right: We need more Sweetness and more Light; For till we break the brutal foe, Our sugar's short, our lights are low. Lord Devonport, an incompetent and unconvincing Food Controller, asked his fellow citizens in May 1917 to curtail their consumption of bread by one quarter — he also introduced a short-lived system of meatless days — and at the end of May he was replaced by Lord Rhondda, regarded by different people as the hero or the villain of the Welsh coalfields. Devonport's resignation is said to have been greeted with equanimity, and Rhondda himself moved cautiously towards more organised conceptions of rationing. Although he secured immediate Cabinet approval for sugar registration and rationing by card, a national scheme was not put into operation until towards the end of the year. Exhortation remained more common than organisation, although some of the statutory Food Control Committees, created throughout the country in the summer of 1917, soon developed their own rationing schemes. In February 1918 meat rationing by coupon was introduced in London, to be followed in April throughout the country. Universal rationing of tea and butter (by registration card, not by coupon) was in force by the end of the war. Throughout the whole period Punch continued to proliferate non-working class jokes. 'More bread is being eaten than ever, according to the Food Controller,' it remarked in December 1917, 'but >t appears that the stuff is now eaten by itself instead

reads:

David: I'm often away from home. I get sugar?

The

Mad

Grocer:

You

don't:

you

How fill

do

up a

form.

David: But

The

Mad

I

have

Grocer:

up a form. Then you fill up another

filled

form.

The perils of bureaucracy were stressed more than the merits of fair shares for all.

Food queues and profiteering was during 1917 that the queue became a national institution. In April 1917 the Observer was describing 'the usual weekend potato and coal scenes' in London. 'At Edmonton,' it went on, '131 vehicles were lined up at the gates of a coal depot at nine o'clock in the morning, while the crowd numbered several hundreds. There were also bread and potato queues of such a length that the police had to regulate them, and newcomers had to inquire which was the particular queue they wanted.' While some cities, like Birmingham, made a serious local effort to reduce queuing by pooling supplies, co-ordinating transport and distributing scarce commodities according to plan, others allowed the poorest to suffer. Two weeks before Christmas 1917 The Times reported that 'the food queues continue to grow. Outside the dairy shops of certain multiple firms in some parts of London women begin to line up for margarine as early as five o'clock It

on Saturday morning, some with infants in their arms, and others with children at their skirts. Over a thousand people waited for margarine at a shop in New Broad Street in the heart of the city, and in Walworth Road in the southeastern side of London the queue was estimated to number about 3,000. Two hours later 1,000 of these were sent away unsupplied.' Shortages must be related to wages and prices. Taking the war as a whole — and few people could take it as a whole until after the armistice was signed in November 1918 — money wages doubled. Yet the cost of living, checked in 1917 and early 1918, rose, according to one estimate, by 125%. In 1918 an official committee reporting on the working class cost of living estimated that 'families of unskilled workmen' were being 'slightly better fed' in 1918 than in 1914, but the picture as far as working class families as a whole were concerned was very patchy. Wages sometimes lagged

behind prices and families with few wage earners were badly hit. Bread prices were subsidised from September 1917 onwards, and potato prices from November, but all other prices reflected the mounting pressure on resources both of materials and

manpower. The prices of newspapers, for example — and newspapers as well as news-

much during the February 1917. For Lord Northcliffe, controlling both The Times and the Daily Mail, it was an article of faith in early 1917 that, to use his own words, 'the independent newspaper' would paper lords counted for

war — doubled

in

be 'one of the future forms of government'. There was some check in 1917 on ostentatious consumption — rationing by weight was introduced into restaurants, for example, in April — but sales of dresses were

2773

1917 than in 1915. Domestic lght be in short supply, but there parts of the country where old tracheal styles of life were scarcely touched. Profiteering certainly did not disappear following the governmental reorganisation of December 1916, and there was commodity speculation as well as large industrial profitmaking. Before turning in more detail to the reactions of organised labour to the long war it is interesting to note a passage in the diary of Colonel Repington, The Times' military correspondent. Lady in

Ridley and I, he wrote in July 1917, discussed what posterity would think of us in England. We agreed that we should be considered rather callous to go on with our usual life when we were reading of 3,000 to 4,000 casualties a day. But she said that people could not keep themselves elevated permanently on some plane above the normal, and she supposed that things around us explained the French Revolution and the behaviour of the French nobility. It was a significant discussion to take place in the year of the Bolshevik revolution. The attitudes of working class people during the years 1917 and 1918 were conditioned more by their experience of the facts of everyday existence than by the of what was happening in distant Russia. It was these facts, indeed, which provided the main items in the agenda of the War Emergency Workers' National Committee which met throughout the war and brought together different sections of the divided labour movement. Yet as far as the labour leadership was concerned— along with significant sections of the rank

news

and file — what was happening in Russia played an important part not only in the immediate political story but in the shaping of the long-term future. A special conference held at Leeds in June 1917 and attended by over a thousand delegates from independent Labour Party and British Socialist Party branches, local trade councils and national trade unions expressed enthusiastic approval for the overthrow of Tsarism and urged the establishment of Soldiers' and Workmen's Councils in Britain on the Soviet model. From the standpoint of the Labour Party this was an unofficial conference, yet the tone of the message from Leeds was unmistakeable, a tone of increasing militancy. Demands for the 'conscription of wealth' were increasingly strong throughout 1917 — with Philip Snowden prominent in the campaign—and with the Co-operative movement, directly connected as it was with the distribution of food to working class families, veering sharply to the left. As for the trade unions, they were forced to take account of obvious unrest. The continuing 'dilution' of skilled labour and the calling up of skilled workers for military service never ceased to disturb both leaders and rank and file, and among the rank and file there was almost continuous, if highly localised, pressure for 'unofficial' action. May 1917 was a month of unofficial strikes, and the government had to give way and drop charges against eight strike leaders charged under the Defence of the Realm Act. It decided in June to set up a series of

Commissions of Enquiry into Industrial

Unrest, and the reports of the Commissioners, collected with a great sense of urgency and published in July, dwelt not only on economic but on psychological factors. It was plain from the Reports that while

2774

most working men fully supported the war they were disturbed not only by the fact that there seemed to be too many 'inequalities of sacrifice' in the winning of it, but also by all presuppositions that once it was won there could be any return to the uneasy status quo of 1914. Their aspirations for the future were rising. From Wales and Monmouth, for instance, there was evidence of concern for something far more profound than food prices and shortages. 'The workers,' the Commissioners stated, 'feel deeply discontented with their housing accommodation and with their unwholesome and unattractive environeffort

ment

generally.'

'A touch of revolutionary malaria' Lloyd George's reaction to the Russian Revolution of March 1917 was to send Arthur Henderson, Labour representative in his small War Cabinet, on a special mission to Russia to try to keep her in the war. Henderson's talks with the Russian leadership in May 1917 — and it was soon to be overthrown — seemed to be of even more significance than A. J. Balfour's addressing of the United States House of Representatives in the same month. Yet Henderson returned convinced that the best way to keep Russia in touch with the western Allies was to explore with them the terms of a negotiated peace. He also favoured sending Labour delegates to a proposed International Socialist Conference in Stockholm which it was hoped would also include a German Socialist delegation. A Special Conference of the Labour Party expressed its agreement, but the whole idea was anathema to all his Liberal and Conservative cabinet colleagues. Lloyd George believed that Henderson had returned from Russia 'with more than a touch of revolutionary malaria' and on hearing of the Stockholm plans sided with the rest of the Cabinet. He rebuked Henderson sharply, and Henderson resigned in August 1917. It was not merely the difference in political outlook between Henderson and his colleagues which was historically significant: equally significant

was the manner

of his treat-

ment. He was kept waiting outside the Cabinet room for the best part of an hour while Lloyd George and his colleagues discussed his position and his future in his absence. This 'door-mat incident', not revealed to the general public until a fortnight later, seemed to have been settled reasonably when Lloyd George replaced Henderson by another Labour Party leader, G. N. Barnes, and introduced a second Labour

second conference enthusiastically accepted a manifesto called Labour and the New Social Order. Lloyd George might still feel that he had the support of all 'patriotic' working men and that he could rally trade union leaders to his side by eloquent speeches, as he did in February 1918, but the balance of power had shifted. There would have doubtless been a new Labour Party constitution in 1918 even if Henderson had stayed in Lloyd George's cabinet, yet A. J. P. Taylor is right to claim that 'August 1917 marked the real parting of the ways between Lloyd George and "the people". Labour then gave notice to quit: a notice, like so many others, deferred for the duration.' Lloyd George was always sensitive to the need for giving the people what they wanted, but behind his manoeuvring he had always worked on the comfortable assumption that organised labour was only one 'interest', albeit a major one, which needed to be propitiated and on occasion flattered. He certainly did not see the writing on the wall for the Liberal Party in 1917 and 1918. Supported as he was by his zealous team of personal advisers — his 'Garden Suburb' as it was christened — he remained alienated from most of the As-

even from many who had supported Asquith. The most bitter of

quithites and aloof Liberal sympathisers

him against

the fights with Asquith was to be fought May 1918 in the debates centring on Sir Frederick Maurice, the Director of Military Operations, who had been dismissed by Milner, Lloyd George's new Minister of War, a few weeks earlier. Lloyd George won this fight, but he had always to keep one eye throughout 1917 and 1918 on his other flank, conciliating the Conservative members of his cabinet and fending off any possible political alliances, however unlikely, against him. In July 1917 he made a number of Cabinet all

in

changes which must have seemed far more important to him than the replacement of Henderson by Barnes. Carson was kicked upstairs into the Cabinet and Churchill returned to office as Minister of Munitions. Paradoxically, therefore,

it

was Churchill,

one of the most outspoken critics of the Russian Revolution, who had most to do with organised labour during the remaining months of 1917. In October 1917 he granted a bonus of 121% on total earnings to selected groups of skilled munition workers, but it was a sign of the times that

and bargaining the offer had to be extended to other groups of workers as well. after considerable confusion

MP into his government. Yet this was far from the end of the affair. Henderson was secretary of the Labour Party, and a man

A new

who

was grappling in a new post with the problems of 'reconstruction', one of the most overworked words of 1917 and 1918, yet a word which by its very popularity indicated that the war was beginning to seem tolerable for many only if it paved

inspired great trust.

From August

1917 onwards he used his considerable abilities and influence to reorganise the Labour Party's constitution and machinery. He had the help in this of the Fabian Sidney Webb, and the new party which emerged was based on the closest ties

between trade unionists and

socialists. It

appealed openly to 'workers by hand and brain' to 'beware of patchwork' and to set out to reshape 'not this or that Government Department, or this or that piece of social machinery, but society itself. The constitution of the party was adopted in February 1 91 H with only one amendment of any consequence, and four months later a .

.

.

era dawning? Meanwhile, Christopher Addison, who had preceded Churchill at the Munitions Minis-

try,

the way for a rosier future. Addison's Ministry of Reconstruction replaced two earlier Reconstruction Committees, the probably the more first of which — and effective — had been appointed by Asquith. 1917 In addressing officials id March Lloyd George did not stint his own enthusiasm or sense of urgency: No such opportunity has ever been given to any nation before — not even by the French

Far left: A khaki-uniformed member of the Women's Auxiliary Army Corps By the end of 1916 many para-military organisations had sprung up. providing hitherto-undreamed of opportunities for adventurous women These organisations were brought together as the WAAC at the beginning of 1917 and the WRENs and WRAFs soon followed. Centre: Rationing under the auspices of the ineffectual

Lord Devonport resembled a gigantic music-hall act

.

In

May

1917 he was replaced by Lord

-

~ji*~

*

Rhondda, who came from his Welsh collieries to form part of Lloyd George's businessmen s

\

4fe*

cabinet Rhondda pioneered an elementary form of rationing for .

1 {•<•

1

1

sugar, and to a certain extent managed to fix prices and stop speculation. Bread, the staple diet of the poor, caused much distress: by 1917 a loaf cost a shilling, double its prewar price Rhondda fixed the price at ninepence, backed by a government subsidy. Left: A VAD (member of Voluntary Aid Detach-

ments) Nursing had been made respectable' half a century earlier by Florence Nightingale: there were 45,000 nurses by July 1917. Below: A painting by John Northcote Nash, who was commissioned by the Imperial War Museum to paint scenes during the war. This one shows a Red Cross convoy arriving at Charing Cross from France

Sf\ tiififi

i^nf^

-%.;

2775

ution.

The nation now was in a molten was malleable now and would

been defeated in the field that they had lost the war only through British propaganda. In March 1918, when the Germans opened their long-advertised and amazingly suc-

lition; it

continue to be so for a short time after the war but not for long. It was for the Committee to advise the Government on the way to give the nation a shape which would endure to the advantage both of the nation

cessful offensive, it certainly did not seem that an Allied victory would ever be possible in 1918. Punch referred to the 'darkest hours of the War', and there was more uneasiness in the country — not only in working class circles — than there had been at any earlier stage of the war. To add to the

and of the whole Empire. The officials responded. No one can doubt, one of them wrote, that we are at a turning-point in our national history. A new era has come itself

upon

us.

We

cannot stand

still.

We

cannot

return to the old ways, the old abuses, It is in our power the old stupidities. to make the new era one of such progress as to repay us even for the immeasurable cost, the price in lives lost, in manhood crippled, and in homes desolated. Some of the proposals of the Reconstruction Committees and the Reconstruction Ministry — and there was. some continuity between them — were to provide the basis for postwar social legislation, notably in housing, and in one field of social policy, education, an important national measure was actually passed before war ended. H. A. L. Fisher, brought into central government by Lloyd George from aca.

.

.

demic life much to his surprise, introduced in August 1918 the bill which raised the school leaving age to 14. Yet other reconstruction proposals met with a less happy fate. The Machinery of Government Committee, serving under the able chairmanship of Lord Haldane, was hailed as a 'treasury of good counsel' and its Report treated from the start as a major historical document, but the counsel was not taken and the Report was ignored. Nor was all the work on industrial relations put to good account. As early as March 1918, before postwar disillusionment set in, the New Statesman claimed that 'the record of the Reconstruction Ministry up to date can be accurately expressed as 0'. Reason was not the predominant quality in 1918 as the war reached its unexpected climax. Indeed, there was as much evidence of hate as of hope. Not all the animal behaviour apparent in the country (as in other war-torn countries) had much to do with the desperate courage which Lloyd George applauded even in retrospect. It is true that women's suffrage — or at least suffrage for women over the safe and respectable age of 30 — was conceded with the minimum of fuss in June 1918 in a measure which added, in all, more voters to the electoral register than all previous reform bills put together. Yet the reason why women were given the vote was that they had not only proved themselves indispensable to the winning of the economic war but that through most of their leaders they had done their best, often a crude best, to stir popular enthusiasm for the war at every stage. On the whole it was the demagogues who had a field day in 1918, with Lloyd George himself sometimes joining their ranks. The most vociferous of them simplified every issue and vulgarised every emotion. 'The war,' one of them thundered, 'is becoming a holy war — a war of right against wrong, of Heaven against Hell'. 'Slackers' were pilloried almost as much as 'aliens', and there were disgracefully and scenes of prejudice ill-regulated passion in the House of Commons as well as in the streets. Pemberton Billing, an independent Member of Parliament, made a mockery of the Courts as well as the

Commons, while Horatio Bottomley, 2776

'the

into prominence insensitive backbenchers, decided to apply the principle of compulsory military service there. Although Bonar Law, his Conservative colleague, promised that the government would bring a Home Rule measure into operation simultaneously with the enforcement of conscription, the Irish Nation-

Ireland burst

troubles,

England was beastly

1918' but not to pngoists Horatio Bottomley (below) or Pemberton Billing {above). It was a 'field day for demagogues'

soldier's friend',

in

was even more vulgar in John Bull than he

print in the pages of was on the platform.

Almost every note that he struck sounds false across the years, not least his cri de coeur (in response to a heckler) 'Would to God it were my privilege to shoulder a rifle and take my place beside the brave boys in the trenches'.

when Lloyd George, goaded by

alist MPs were not impressed, withdrew en bloc from the House of Commons, and went over to Ireland to join the Sinn Fein and Irish Labour leaders in a campaign of protest. The Irish situation was as turbulent, therefore, when the long war ended as it had been when it began. Victory in Europe, when it came, was something of a surprise. Lloyd George was unwilling, even in retrospect, to admit that it owed very much to British military leadership. The bickering was to continue in the history books. Yet the newspapers, still preoccupied with the struggle against 'slackers' and 'aliens', began to display more startling victory headlines in August 1918 and on the last day of the month The Times' headline read at last 'The Flowing Tide'. The military machine, if not the ship of state, was no longer quite lost in the fog. Events moved rapidly in October and November. The German fleet mutinied; the Kaiser (whom large numbers

of enraged

Englishmen wanted

to

hang)

Holland; all the seven German kings gave up their thrones, while in many parts of Germany soldiers' and workers' councils fled to

were coming into existence; and on Novem-

'England was beastly in 1918'

ber 8 a

Everyone who refused to echo current prejudices was in danger in 1918 and was

terms

treated with unconcealed hostility. 'England was beastly in 1918', wrote Charles Edwards, a soldier returning from the Western Front to serve at home in the last year of the war. 'Envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness, fear and cruelty born of fear, seemed the dominant passions. Only in the trenches (on both sides of No-Man's Land) were chivalry and sweet .

.

.

reasonableness to be found.' What was lacking above all else was perspective, but this was obviously the fault above all else of the war itself. 'Looking at this war from the perspectives of the future historian', a writer in a journal wrote in March 1918, 'what seems to us a strong welter of waste and woe would be seen to be a tortuous stream of cause and effect carrying us on a definite course to a determinate conclusion. But as yet we have no such "perspective glass" and our ship of state drifts down through the fog of war like a hulk loose from its moorings.' The Ministry of Information, created in February 1918, the last wartime ministry to come into existence, did not even try to offer a 'perspective glass': rather it made

the most of the iniquities of the Huns, carrying on a shrill war of words which had no practical consequences except to persuade some Germans after they had

German

delegation was given the surrender in a railway carriage in the forest of Compiegne. That the Peace would be difficult was clear for unconditional

almost at once. There was an immense gap between Lloyd George's rhetoric

and the real facts of the case. When the Coupon Election further 'cheapened' Britain in December 1918 'the Prime Minister and his principal colleagues', in Winston Churchill's phrases, 'were astonished and some extent overborne by the passions they encountered in the constituencies. The brave people whom nothing had daunted had suffered too much. Their unpent feelings were lashed by the popular Press into fury.' Yet Lloyd George won the to

election without difficulty and his task to try to win the Peace.

it

was now

Further Reading

Johnson,

P. B.,

Land Fit for Heroes (Chicago

University Press 1968)

Lloyd George (OUP 1951) A Short History of the Labour Party (Macmillan 1961) Symons, J Horatio Bottomley (Cresset Press Jones,

T.,

Pelling, H.,

,

1955) Taylor, A. J. P., Lloyd George, Rise and Fall (Leslie Stephen Lecture, CUP 1961) Terraine, J., Impacts of War, 1914 and 1918 (Hutchinson 1970)

\For Professor

page 111]

Asa Briggs' biography,

see

THE "LUDENDORFF OFFENSIVE"

PHASE 3

IE

4ISNE

In spite of his success on the Somme and the Lys, the situation that faced LudendorfFin late April and May was far from encouraging. The Allies had not been broken, and no decisive strategic gain had been made. Nonetheless his attack across the Chemins des Dames towards the Aisne was a devastating success. Richard Holmes. Below: The Bruchmuller recipe succeeds again. German artillery hammers French and British positions on the Chemins des Dames

sss

1

m

% eighteenth army

SEVENTH ARMY

(Gen von Hutier)

(Gen von Bbhn)

'

XXXVIII Res Corps

VII

Corps

202 Div

IV

jCorps

(Gruppe Larisch) / Corps (Gruppe

34 Div

84 0iv

XXV Res

/ VII Res

LIV Corps

(Gruppfrfrarfcois)

(Gruppe Hofmann)

(Gruppe Schmettow)

[(Gruppe |Winckler)

Wichura) 51 Div

223Div_

LXV Corps

Res Corps

(Gruppe Conta)

Samoussy 47 Res Div

14 Div '45

53 Div I

72 Div I

Corps

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38Di

L

V

19 Div 24?

y

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Div

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ana

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12 Div

8 Djv

Craonne

XV Corps

Serry-auBac

^-

33 Res Div (Gruppe Brimont) "aizy

Viel Arcy

TENTH ARMY (Gen Maistre)

oivre

~*W

(Gefde Maud'huy)

\

213 Div

21 Div,

157 Div 2b Upv

39 Div

42 Div '

IX Corps

_Ba?oches^,

/

45 Div VII

t-Gen^4i44?«Brtw^

(June 2) (June

~s

6)

I*

Champigny

Div

Rheims 3 Colonial

Dravegny I

A

<

238 Div

Colonial Corps 2 Colonial

Div

FIFTH AflnifYQ (Gen Michetefj (June 2)

e

P p /p & © Q Q a

163 Div

IV Corps

FOURTH ARMY

<

54 Div

SIXTH

203 Div

DTv^

Fere enTardenois

Jaulgonne

Res Corps

(Gruppe Rheims)

134

t

\

ARMY

(Gen von Below)

Gemici

XIC|rps

FIRST

50 Div

<

u

ft'*/

'Vi030h 86 Div

Ji5il_^22 Div

Conde

Rethel

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231 Divy

1?

Chemindes Dames

Me

1

en Gouraud)

ARMY

I

(Gen Duchene

Cav Corps

(May 29) XXXVIII Corps (Junel)

FRENCH FRONT LINE

ARMY BOUNDARIES CORPS BOUNDARIES

CHEMINDE DAMES ROAD RAILWAYS

AM AM 3 AM 4 AM 6 AM 11AM 12 AM 13AM

JUNE

1

2

5

MILES

Strasborg

On Thursday, March 21, 1918, the Western Front erupted into the thunder of Ludendorffs St Michael offensive. This attack achieved spectacular success; in 15 days some 1,200 square miles of territory, together with upwards of 90,000 prisoners and over 1,000 guns, fell into German hands. Despite these remarkable gains, the March offensive ground slowly to a halt. On April 10 the Germans once more lunged into the attack, this time in the Georgette assault on the River Lys. German gains were again substantial; Ludendorff, however, found little cause for rejoicing in his two impressive victories.

German successes in March and April were purely tactical. British forces had been badly mauled, and were emphatically, on the defensive; the French, too, had not survived unscathed. Yet the victories of March and April had produced no strategic result; they had brought an outright German victory no nearer. Worse still, American forces in France grew steadily. Six American divisions — each double the size of a British or French division — had arrived in France. At the height of the April crisis General Pershing even consented to place his troops at the disposal of General Foch, the newly-appointed

2778

IBWWIWI

<

Allied Commander-in-Chief. Although in practice Pershing retained a firm control over his troops, rarely allowing them to be used except as complete divisions, his gesture gave a much-needed boost to flagging Allied morale. The American build-up gave Ludendorff cause for acute depression. His brilliant, though costly, offensives

had

future

A

an immediate stratewithin the foreseeable strength would most

failed to produce

gic conclusion

— and

American

The attack by the German Seventh Army on the French Sixth Army. By evening of the first day the ridge and the river had been crossed

likely

make such

many

at least, unobtainable.

a conclusion, for Ger-

The situation facing the Allied High scarcely more encouraging than that which faced Ludendorff. The British army had been cruelly battered, and its strength had decreased sharply, despite reinforcements from England and

Command was

from other theatres of war. Pershing, having done little to implement his offer of assistance, was proving far from easy with. The Germans retained fresh divisions, while the majority of Allied reserves had been containing the in German absorbed attacks. Foch was convinced of the urgent necessity of building up a General Reserve. to

deal

numerous

To accomplish

this,

he suggested a system would

of roulement. Tired British divisions be used to replace French divisions

were holding quiet sectors of the

woods,

providing

ideal

cover

German batteries, as well limited number of troops. Further

as for north,

scattered for the

which

front, re-

leasing the latter formations for the General Reserve. Foch and Haig agreed, on April 23, upon a roulement of, initially, four divisions. The 8th, 21st, 25th and 50th Divisions were selected, and the 19th Division was added later. These formations had suffered

heavily in the fighting of March and April. The great majority of experienced officers and NCOs had become casualties, and the divisions had been brought only partially up to strength by drafts of semi-trained recruits. The first four divisions were to be moved into the Aisne sector, held by the French Sixth Army under General Duchene. They would be controlled by Lieutenant-General Sir A. H. Gordon's IX Corps headquarters, which, on April 26th, set up its temporary base at Fere-en-Tardenois. The remaining British division, the 19th, was ordered to St-Germain-la-Ville, seven miles south-east of Chalons in the French

Army area. sector into which the four weary divisions of IX Corps were despatched was recognised as a quiet one. So peaceful was the sector that the Chemin des Dames ridge, its main feature, was known to its German occupants as 'the sanatorium of the West'. General de Maistre's infantry had seized the ridge in October 1917, and there had been relatively little action in the area since then. The lack of activity on the Chemin des Dames front was partially due to the fact that French positions were, on the face of things, imposing. The Sixth Army held a sector some 55 miles in length, from Noyon in the west to a point three miles north of Fourth

The

Rheims in the east. General Duchene's area of responsibility had initially been much narrower, but had more than doubled as a result of redeployment following the disasters of March and April. The augmented frontage was matched by an increase in the troops under Duchene's command. During April and May the corps comprising the Sixth Army changed occasionally, though Duchene always had between 15 and 17 divisions at his disposal. The centre of the Sixth Army's sector was dominated by the Chemin des Dames ridge. The ridge itself stretches for almost 24 miles from the Californie plateau, near Craonne, towards Compiegne. It is narrow and stark, with a flat top between 300 and 400 yards wide. Along the ridge's northern front flows the River Ailette, canalised west of Chevrigny. North of the Ailette the ground sweeps upwards towards Laon. In 1918 this slope was covered with

a the large forests of Samoussy and Coucy offered covered concentration areas for larger quantities of men and equipment. The northern face of the ridge is a serious military obstacle, being extremely steep in many places. The ridge's southern flank is less steep, and is scored by several sharp valleys, separated by long, wooded spurs. The numerous small villages on both sides of the ridge were largely ruined, and the woods on or near the crest had been reduced to a tangle of shattered tree-stumps. The River Aisne flows some four miles to the south of the crest of the Chemin des Dames ridge, with a canal running alongside it as far west as Conde. Just southwest of the junction of the Aisne and this canal is the confluence of the Aisne and the River Vesle. The latter river rises near

Rheims, and flows more or less parallel with the Aisne until, near Bazoches, it swings sharply north-west. Between the Aisne and the Vesle lies the Vesle ridge, as impressive a feature as its northern counterpart, and in many ways better suited for defence. For, imposing though the Chemin des Dames ridge is, it is far from being an ideal defensive position; nor, in the spring of 1918, was it adequately prepared for defence.

Poor defences Lieutenant-General Gordon's men were not slow to note the flaws in the ridge's defences. Three of IX Corps' divisions went into the line between May 6 and May 15, relieving General Piarron de Mondesir's XXXVIII Corps, which moved into reserve

with

the

Tenth Army. The remaining

division of IX Corps, the 25th, remained in reserve behind the bulk of the corps, just south of the eastern end of the ridge. Morale in IX Corps was, initially, high. The pleasant countryside of Champagne

compared favourably with the bleak terrain of Flanders, and German activity seemed low. The British sector ran from a point just north of the village of Loivre, not far from Rheims, up on to the ridge itself, and included the Californie plateau. The divisional sectors were all over 8,000 yards wide, and the field of view afforded by the ridge was surprisingly poor. Less than two miles behind the cramped front position, in which front, support and rear lines were crammed into less than 500 yards, lay the battle zone, with a third position, known to the British as the Green Line, a further two miles to the rear. Although the trenches comprising the front position were quite well dug and adequately wired, the battle zone and the Green Line left much to be desired. The battle zone was based upon strongpoints, and relied for defence largely upon the interlocking fire of machine guns. The Green Line was similarly organised, but consisted mainly of old trench systems left over from earlier fighting. Neither the trenches nor the wire in the latter two lines were in good order, and, in the Green Line at least, no continuous defensive network really existed. This disturbing situation was true not only in the sector held by IX Corps, but for almost the entire

Sixth

The far

Army

British divisional

from

took

front.

up.

commanders were

with the positions they Major-General Campbell, com-

satisfied

manding the 21st Division, remarked to the French commander he relieved that he doubted if the position could be held for 24 hours. To this the Frenchman replied unhelpfully that he had held it for two years. Gordon protested to Duchene both that the frontage entrusted to his weak divisions was too wide, and that the trenches themselves were in poor condition. This produced no reaction from the army commander. Duchene himself was a tough, determined individual; admirable though these qualities may have been in battle, they could not fail to make life extremely difficult for his subordinates. Duchene's gruff self-confidence was exemplified in his attitude to the defensive battle — an attitude which was, in the context of 1918, unusual to say the least. Petain's 'Instruction on defensive actions' and 'Directive No. 4' of December 20 and 22, 1917, dictated that the front position was to be thinly held; the battle zone would be the main line of resistance. Duchene, however, clung to the somewhat outmoded view that the maximum possible resistance should be offered in the front position. The terrain in his sector, he argued, made it imperative to station the bulk of the infantry as far forward as possible. The alternative to this, claimed Duchene, was simply to make a present to the Germans of the Chemin des Dames, which had been won at the cost of so much French blood the previous year. Petain reluctantly decided to let Duchene have his way, and thus all along the Sixth Army front troops were concentrated well forward, most of them in the already cramped front position. IX Corps held the eastern end of the Chemin des Dames. On the British right, the low ground running towards Rheims and the Sixth Army's boundary with the Fourth Army was in the hands of the French 45th Division, a North African formation. Along the ridge to the left of Gordon's men lay General de Maud'huy's XI Corps, flanked in its turn by General Chretien's XXX Corps, linking up with the Third Army just south of Noyon. General Degoutte's XXI Corps of the Oise groupement lay to the left rear of the Sixth Army, partially in Duchene's sector. The Sixth Army front was acknowledged to be a quiet one, and Duchene saw little reason to doubt his ability to hold it. But the British veterans of the March and April offensives were less convinced. As May wore on, there were all too familiar signs that something unpleasant was brewing among the scattered woods and scarred villages north of the Chemin des Dames.

A

plan for strategic victory As early as April 17, 1918, Ludendorff had issued a warning order to the German Army Group Crown Prince, urging it to prepare for an attack on the Chemin des Dames. Ludendorff's motivation was clear enough. A breakthrough in Flanders was impossible while French reserves remained free to contain it; he therefore sought 'a weak spot in the French front', which

would 'compel the French to bring their reserves to it from Flanders', thus facilitating a German breakthrough in the north. The OHL order of May 1 was quite specific. 'This attack,' it maintained, 'has the object of disturbing the present united front of

the Entente opposite Crown Prince Rupprecht's army group, and thereby creating the possibility of a victorious continuation

2779

of the offensive against the British.' Ludendorff was determined that in Blucher, as the Aisne offensive was called, he would not become a victim of his own tactical success as he had in St Michael and Georgette. This time the advancing troops were to be strictly controlled, and the plan of attack rigidly adhered to. The Blucher offensive was planned with

a thoroughness remarkable by even the exacting standards of the previous German assaults. Assault and reserve divisions were concentrated in the back areas of the Seventh Army (General von Bonn), and the First Army (General Fritz von Below). Elaborate measures were taken to

preserve secrecy. Unit identification signs were removed from all road and rail transport, as well as from billets and bivouacs. All movement to the front was undertaken at night; during the day the troops lay

concealed in woods. Officers going into the front line for reconnaissance covered their rank and unit badges. The units holding the line were told that tired divisions were being rested behind their front. Passes and documents were checked with increasing frequency, and meticulous care was taken of all the secret documents concerning the attack. Air surveillance was constantly employed to check the effectiveness of camouflage, and any necessary alterations were

rapidly made. To confuse Allied Intelligence, a deception plan was instituted in Flanders. Extra bivouac fires were lit, and troops marched about to give the impression of a great concentration in the north. In all, 41 divisions were massed in the areas of the Seventh and First Armies. Eleven of these were already in position; the remainder were supplied by OHL. The main responsibility for the attack lay With the Seventh Army. On the army's right, around Coucy-le-Chateau, lay General von Francois' VII Corps, facing the French Corps. To Francois' 151st Division of left the LIV Corps of General von Larisch stood opposite the French 61st Division of

Bottom left: German advance across

infantry

captured trenches

between Montdidier and Noyon. Right: Approaching the Aisne canal. Neither canal nor river posed much of an obstacle. Below: Machine gunners rush to take up a position on the banks of the canal

XXX

'

<*

*

**^

2781

ed back from their positions an isolated group of British lake a stand in front of the Aisne. The hapless British loved to the area for a rest, found themselves occupying that they regarded as untenable. Far right: General Duchene of the Sixth Army, deaf to the lessons of the war, insisted oncentrating his troops in inadequate first line trenches ;

2782

'

XI Corps. The 61st's right-hand neighbour, the French 21st Division, was opposed by General Wichura's VIII Reserve Corps. The next formation in the German

XXV

Reserve line, General von Winckler's Corps, stood ready to assault the western half of XI Corps' 22nd Division, whose eastern half, together with the entire frontage of the British 50th Division, was the responsibility of General von Conta's IV Reserve Corps. The British 8th Division was faced by the LXV Corps of General von Schmettow. The British 21st and the French 45th Divisions were to be dealt with by elements of Corps, a First Army formation. The main weight of the German attack was concentrated in the 'battering ram' formations of Winckler and Conta. The artillery was entrusted to the capable Colonel Bruchmuller; by May 27 Ludendorff's breakthrough specialist had 1,158 batteries — 3,719 guns — ready to fire in support of the assault. Well concealed though the German buildup was, it did not entirely escape the notice of Allied Intelligence. By mid-May the American 'Order of Battle' sub-section of Intelligence was able to provide a wellargued warning of a pending German attack on the Chemin des Dames. This information was scornfully disregarded by the French, partly, no doubt, as a result of the friction that existed between them and the Americans. As the month went on, though, reports from the Chemin des Dames became increasingly disquieting. Duchene obstinately refused to acknowledge growing evidence of the impending

XV

Gordon again complained about his inadequate defences and rigid dispositions at a corps commanders' conference on the 24th, but was brusquely overruled by Duchene. It was not until noon on the 26th that information was received which convinced even the headstrong commander of the Sixth Army. Maud'huy's XI Corps succeeded in capturing two prisoners. One of these unfortunates was an ensign, who attack.

revealed, after some skilful interrogation, that an attack would be launched during the early hours of the following day or the after that. At 1615 hours Duchene ordered his troops to occupy their battle positions; worried infantry moved up the face of the ridge into the already crowded positions along its crest, a tragically vulnerable target for the massed German

day

artillery.

A

massive breakthrough

Colonel Bruchmuller's fireplan was brilliantly conceived and scrupulously organised. At exactly 0100 hours on May 27 the German batteries shattered the moonless night on a 24 mile front from Berry-auBac to Chavignon. A less concentrated, though still very destructive, fire swept along the flanks of this line, so as to mislead Allied commanders as to the location of the main effort. For the first ten minutes all guns and mortars drenched the Sixth

Army's positions with gas, imposing upon all troops, as far back as divisional headquarters, the stifling necessity of fighting in gas masks. From 0110 to 0215 hours the

and medium guns concentrated with gas and high explosive upon the Allied battery positions, while the mortars dealt, with grim efficiency, with the front line and its protective wire. Long-range artillery, field

much

of

which was cleverly sited so as Aisne valley, mercilessly

to enfilade the

2784

searched out bridges, road and railway

command

and strongpoints. Between 0215 and 0335 hours selected groups of medium guns continued to batter

junctions,

posts

the Allied artillery, while the longrange pieces reached out as far as the line at

of the

Vesle.

The

rest

of the

artillery

downstream remained undamaged. Things were little better on the flanks of the main breakthrough. The British 8th

time, but most of those

Division, on the right of the decimated 50th, was roughly handled and pushed back towards the Aisne. On the division's

pounded the Allied infantry positions with

left flank,

a creeping barrage, hiding the surface of the Chemin des Dames beneath a seething mass of shellbursts. At 0335 hours all guns and mortars concentrated on the front line for five furious minutes, before switching to more distant targets. At 0340 hours, twenty minutes before first light, the German assault troops rose from their trenches and loped forward into the murk. The bombardment had proved so effective that in many places the only obstacle to the German advance was the lacerated surface of the ridge. The shaken remnants of the French 22nd and the British 50th Divisions fought as best they could, firing with wild-eyed desperation from the wreckage of their trenches. By 0530 hours, however, there was a gaping hole in the centre of the Sixth Army's front, and the eastern end of the ridge, including the important Californie plateau, was in German hands. Infiltration parties, well supplied with light machine guns, moved swiftly down the southern slopes of the ridge, pushing on through the widely dispersed redoubts in the battle zone. Shortly after 0900 hours several of these groups had reached the Aisne, and the larger units were not far behind. With the mass of German infantry flowing down the ridge towards the as yet intact bridges over the Aisne, the question of demolitions became crucial. The destruction of the bridges over the AisneMarne canal, the Aisne and its canal east of Gernicourt was in the hands of IX Corps; all other bridge demolitions were reserved to the Army Commander. In most instances the requisite charges were not in place, and the sappers feverishly striving to lay them fell victim to the advancing Germans. All the bridges in IX Corps sector, except that at Maizy, were blown in

resolutely in the Bois des Buttes, inflicting numerous casualties on the German 50th Division and severely delaying its advance. The British 21st Division, holding the flat ground south of the Aisne on the 8th Division's right, was speedily ejected from the ruins of its front position, but resisted stoutly from the battle zone, though its left was peeled back towards St Auboeuf. By noon, of the

2/Devonshire Regiment held out

\

*

-t

.

cwA r

>.-

**}

The race for the Aisne bridges

Below: Abandoned French positions testify to the efficacy of the BruchmtJIIer method. Bottom left: Where the bridges had been blown the Germans were able to extemporise without

much

difficulty or delay.

of the bridges

Bottom

right:

Many

over the Aisne and over the

canal were either blown ineffectively or not at all in Sixth Army's hurried retreat

the right-hand formation of Corps, had lost little ground, but was in danger of being rolled up by the 6th Bavarian Reserve and 6th Divisions of Larisch's LIV Corps. To the right, the resistance of the 45th Division freed Rheims from immediate danger. Duchene's reaction to the breakthrough was to throw what reserves he had available into the Green Line in an effort to stem the German advance. The 39th and

The Germans, well supplied

Division,

British

XXX

with information by air reconnaissance, were not slow to exploit this. Heavily outnumbered, the 157th Division was pushed across the Vesle, and the exposed flank of the British 25th Division was harried. The arrival, at about 1400, of the leading elements of Degoutte's XXI Corps to take over the right-hand portion of Maud'huy's sector, relieved the pressure slightly. By nightfall, though, the Germans were across the Green Line on a broad front between Vailly and St Auboeuf. There was a rent, 25 miles wide at its base, and 12 miles deep in the centre, in the Sixtb Army's front. The Chemin des Dames and, perhaps more important, the Vesle ridge behind it had been seized by the Germans. Four Allied divisions had been destroyed, and four more badly mangled.

157th Divisions, from army reserve, were put at Maud'huy's disposal. The latter formation arrived on the Green Line near Vieil Arcy only to discover that the Germans were across the Aisne in strength. The 157th Division was thrust aside, and a gap opened between the French right and

left.

Tactical victory At daybreak on May 28 the problem facing Duchene was serious in the extreme. There was no let-up in German attacks, and the divisions of the Sixth Army, already hardpressed, suffered an increasing toll of casualties. Duchene's troops were further handicapped by the fact that most of their light and medium machine guns had been in the front position or the battle zone, and were lost when the Germans broke through. The same was true of the bulk of the field and much of the medium artillery which, although further back, had

likewise been overrun by German infantry. the army's left, the 151st Division, which had hitherto been holding out well,

On

lost

de

ground after its commander, General Vallieres, was killed. The 2nd Dis-

mounted Cavalry Division edged over to the right to assist the 151st, and managed to sustain the flank against the determined attacks of Larisch's LIV Corps. XI Corps, now with only two divisions, the 74th and M 61st, under its command (the debris of | the 21st and 22nd had been placed under | XXI Corps on the afternoon of May 27), s suffered heavily and continued to give 9 ground. XXI Corps itself, opposed by S. the enthusiastic infantry of and IV

XXV

four divisions in IX Corps, only one, the 25th, remained even a semblance of its former self. Losses in the three forward divisions had been extremely heavy. The infantry in the front line had in most cases fallen victim to the crushing effects of the bombardment. Much of the field

had shared the same fate, being to shellfire which lifted only as German infantry came running in with bomb and bayonet. The gunners defended artillery

subjected

themselves with stern determination. The 5th Battery RFA (8th Divisional Artillery) fought on with rifles and Lewis guns until only one man was left. To the right of IX Corps, the Moroccans of 45th Division gave a good account of themselves, falling back slowly under heavy

XV

pressure from Corps. On the left of IX Corps, the French 22nd and 21st Divisions were in sad straits, being able to offer only scattered resistance. The condition of the 61st Division was equally grave. By 1100 hours the full seriousness of the situation was apparent even at Sixth Army headquarters. The French XI and the British IX Corps- had sustained crippling casualties, and the Germans were in some places across the Green Line. On the French left the 151st

2785

a "orps, was hurled back across the Fismes fell at about 0730 hours. The y Englishmen of IX Corps were also pushed across the Vesle during the course f the day, racing back on the left in an effort to maintain contact with XI Corps. The French 45th Division, on the army's right wing, fell back between Betheny and the Vesle, where it was relieved by I Colonial Corps from Fourth Army.

The desperate position of the Sixth Army was not aided by Duchene's poor handling of reserves. These formations were lamentably employed; 'instead of being used to form barrier positions behind the line of they were thrown in almost battle haphazard as they arrived, wherever there appeared to be a gap in the line ... It was on such an occasion that the higher com.

.

.

mand

should have taken a hand' (General Mordacq, chief of Clemenceau's Military Cabinet). The French High Command did indeed intervene on the 28th. At 0900 hours Petain issued a directive ordering d'Esperey's Army Group North to hold the line of the Vesle. This instruction was out of date even before Duchene received it, an hour later. At 1100 hours Petain produced a further directive. In this, he urged that the German advance should be checked by counterattacks on the flanks of the salient. To secure the right wing, the Montagne de Reims (the heights just south of Rheims) was to be strongly held. To the west, the so-called 'Paris Line', a largely illusory defensive line, was to be held north-west of Soissons to anchor the French left. Petain also promised to produce plentiful reserves, and for the release of these he appealed directly to Foch. The Allied Generalissimo was infinitely less eager to release reserves than the harassed Petain was to receive them. He had earlier expressed the view that 'the affair of the Chemin des Dames might very well only be a feint'. In this he was supported by Mordacq, who proclaimed that, 'From the strategic point of view the attack on the Chemin des Dames is not very easy to understand; it could not lead to any result of very great scope.' This appreciation was remarkably accurate. Foch was acutely aware of the danger that the Champagne battle would sap Allied reserves, leaving Flanders dangerously vulnerable to a renewal of the German offensive in the north. He was, therefore, inclined to watch the direction and weight

German thrust before serves from Flanders.

of the

moving

re-

Strategic blunder Ironically, Foch's view of the strategic objective of the offensive was a good deal

clearer than Ludendorff's. For the third

time in three months, the

German com-

mander tasted the heady wine

of tactical

victory, and, characteristically, allowed it blur his strategic insight. The very

to

reason for Bliicher was to 'draw off the enemy reserves. The old, main object, the defeat of the British, remained unaltered.' The success of the German assault, though, made adherence to this initial aim increasingly unlikely. Even in the planning stages the physical objectives of the attackers had been ill defined, despite Ludendorff's original intention to keep a tight rein on the advance. Faced with the tremendous gains of May 27 to 28, Ludendorff made the decision which only an iron will, or perhaps a flicker of genius, could have

2786

prevented. He reinforced his assaulting formations, and summoned up reserves. As his situation map marked the rapid continuance of the advance, Ludendorff thought increasingly of a new objective, one almost forgotten since the swirling days of August 1914 — Paris. It seemed to him that a drive on the French capital could not fail to produce the decisive result which had for so long eluded German arms. For Ludendorff, Bliicher became transmuted from an operation with limited objectives into a massive assault which would seize Paris and rock the Entente to its foundations. On May 29 the advance went on. XI Corps was forced across the Paris Line, and XXI Corps was driven ever further southwards. Degoutte's retreat endangered the flank of the newly arrived I Cavalry Corps, which in its turn was compelled to retire. Fere-en-Tardenois was lost, and the Germans crossed the Ourcq in strength. On the right, the Fifth Army took over responsibility for the front as far west as Dravegny, but repeated German attacks made some headway against the tatters of IX Corps and the intact I Colonial Corps. Throughout the battle Clemenceau had kept in close contact with Duchene. On the afternoon of the 29th he drove out to see the general, as he had done on the previous day, only to arrive in Fere-enTardenois from the south as the Germans entered it from the north. When Clemenceau and Duchene finally met, their conversation was uninspiring. Duchene had little confidence in his ability to contain the attack, and described his army as 'simply marching to the rear'. Generals de Maud'huy and Degoutte were of the same opinion. Petain, showing rather more spirit, admitted that his plans for attacking the flanks of the salient, and thus preventing any further advance, were no longer feasible. He did, however, order the preparation of a two-pronged counterattack, towards Soissons and Fismes — measure which inspired Duchene and his corps commanders with little confidence. At the same time, Petain moved all available units into line to form a defensive barrier.

Hoary

territorials,

staff

from

schools of instruction and reserve divisions released at last by Foch, moved into position along the Marne. On the fourth day of the offensive, May 30, it became obvious that Petain's hopes of mounting a counterattack were illusory. The Germans made considerable progress, particularly in the centre, where Conta's IV Reserve Corps reached the Marne and entered the northern fringe of ChateauThierry. One of IV Reserve Corps' formations, the 28th Division, even managed to open a precarious bridgehead on the southern bank of the Marne, south of Jaulgonne. On both flanks of the salient, though, the situation became more stable. North-east of Soissons, the 151st Division and 2nd Dismounted Cavalry Division, forming a groupement under General Hennocque, commander of the latter unit, yielded little ground. Around Rheims, I Colonial Corps hung on grimly. IX Corps, reduced to four composite battalions, was strengthened by the arrival of the 19th Division from the Chalons area. General Gordon's IX Corps was by now too reduced to hold its full sector of the line, and Gordon accordingly handed over his remaining troops to General Pelle of the French V

Corps, the line at

first

units of which arrived in the

about midday on the 30th.

Bliicher runs out of steam May 31 witnessed only a slight extension of German gains. Attempts to widen the frontage held along the Marne met with rather limited success. North-west of Chateau-Thierry XXI Corps lost some ground, as did XI Corps further north. On the following day a determined attempt by the First Army against Rheims was smashed by the guns of Fort de la Pompelle. There was fierce fighting in Chateau-Thierry, and renewed German gains north-west of the town, but German success was, on the whole, minor. The German effort was palpably running out of steam. Losses, particularly among the assault formations, had mounted steadily. There was also alarming evidence that discipline and morale were becoming frayed. As early as May 28 a German officer was chagrined to report 'regrettable excesses melancholy sights and serious drunkenness'. Many of the villages through which the Germans advanced had been little touched by the war, and had wellstocked cellars. The temptation often proved too much for men cooped up so long in dreary trenches or concentration areas. Although the same villages often provided food, ammunition was less easy to obtain. .

.

.

While German lines of communication grew longer, the French were thrust nearer their depots, and were able to profit by a situation which proved detrimental to their adversaries.

Finally, as the exdivisions battered at the line of the Marne, or tried to extend the flanks of the salient, fresh Allied divisions moved up, along crowded roads, to contain the dying struggles of Bliicher. Among the Allied reserves south of the Marne were two of Pershing's divisions. The American 2nd Division arrived at Meaux on the night of May 30-31, and moved forward into a second-line position covering the Paris road. The American 3rd Division took up position along the Marne on June 3, while its machine gun battalion distinguished itself at Chateau-Thierry, raking luckless Germans who were trying to cross the river. Petain pushed several more French formations into the front, both along the Marne and on the flanks. He also ordered General Maistre and the staff of the Tenth Army to take over the lefthand portion of the Sixth Army's sector, as from 0800 on June 2. The Tenth Army sector then stretched from Moulin, northwest of Soissons, to Faverolles, southeast of Villers-Cotterets, and included Corps. XI, I (arrived on 31 May) and Duchene retained control of the centre,

hausted

German

XXX

from Faverolles to Treloup on the Marne, with II Cavalry, VII and XXXVIII Corps (arrived 1 June), together with XXI Corps, under his command. The ground from Treloup to beyond Rheims was the responsiCavalry, Army, with and I Colonial Corps in contact with the Germans. It should be noted that many bility of the Fifth

1

V

of the corps in all three armies did not have their full complement of troops. Those which had originally been in the line along

Chemin des Dames were reduced to below divisional strength, while some of the newly arrived formations consisted of a corps headquarters and a few troops, with others on the way. After June 2 the fighting over most of the

Below: The German 1917 model 10-cm gun, the 'Screaming Lizzie'. Calibre: 10-cm. Barrel length:35 calibres. Weight of shell: 39.5 lbs. ftange.1 2,085. The shell had a higher than average velocity, and this resulted in the noise it produced in flight being higher in pitch than was usual Hence the nickname given to the gun by the British infantry

Below: Reminiscent of the Tipperary days' of 1914. French and British stragglers retreat towards Paris. With the Aisne crossed and Duchene's Sixth Army in full retreat, there seemed to be nothing to prevent the Germans reaching the Marne

the sweeping salient died away into mutual exhaustion. There were some German gains north-east of Villers-Cotterets, but on June 3 the Germans suffered a rebuff when their bridgehead at Jaulgonne was overrun with the loss of over 100 prisoners. German attacks on the 4th were halfhearted and achieved negligible results,

persuading General von Bonn to postpone any major renewal of the offensive by the Seventh Army. Two days later, the Crown Prince, acting on the advice of Colonel von der Schulenberg, his Chief-of-Staff, ordered the Seventh and First Armies to consolidate the line they held. The German

Aisne offensive was over; it remained to be seen if Ludendorff, with reserves at a dangerously low level, could hold the

ground which his offensive had so lingly won.

The ingredients

of

German

infantry well,

continued to work remarkably Allied units hypersensitive

making

from flank and rear. German success was also aided by mismanagement on the part of General Duchene. By 1918 the artillery on either side was capable of laying down bombardments of frightening lethalness. To concentrate troops within range of an enemy's massed guns and mortars was to invite casualties on an appalling scale. Duchene's defensive plan did just this, and added to the effectiveness of an already deadly German fireplan. Duchene also erred in the over-hasty committal of reserves, fighting the battle in a piecemeal and arbitrary fashion. The fighting redounded little to his credit, and on June 9 Duchene, de Maud'huy and Chretien were relieved of their commands. From the German viewpoint the Aisne offensive was, in tactical terms, brilliantly successful. Yet in a broader sense the to threats

start-

victory in the

Aisne battle were very much the same as the offensives of March and April. Preparation was thorough and surprise almost complete. The bombardment was in

tremendously

effective, greatly facilitating the task of the attacking infantry who found little opposition on the shell-swept slopes of the Chemin des Dames ridge. The infiltration tactics employed by the

cannot be measured simply lost. Ludendorff's original strategic objective, the removal of reserves from the northern sector of the Allied front, had become submerged by other less feasible, goals. So preoccupied did Ludendorff become with pressing on towards Paris that he employed reserves from the north — thus weakening the very offensive capability which Blucher was designed to strengthen. The Aisne attack was well planned and superbly executed, but, in the last analysis, it presented Ludendorff with a new example of the all too familiar problem of holding a bulging salient with troops of insufficient quantity battle's result

by territory won and

and declining quality. Further Reading

Edmonds, Brig-Gen.

Sir James, Military Operations in France and Belgium, 1918, Vol. 3 (London, 1939) Etat-Major de I'Armee, Service Historique, Les Armees francaises dans la Grande Guerre, Tome VI, Vol. 2. 3 Kuhl, General von, Entstehung, Durchfuhrung s und Zusammenbruch der Offensive von 1918 | Pitt, Barrie, 1918-The Last Act (London. 1962) =>

—

£

{For Richard Holmes' biography, see page

I 2074.]

2787

^'^'

<*&Xl-

sm mm* The Germans again used their well-tried ground attack formula during the Aisne offensive. At first they had things their own way as the heavily mauled Allied squadrons pulled back to regroup. But once the Allies threw these units back into the battle, the Germans were halted in savage fighting over the now worn-out infantry divisions below. Thomas G. Miller Jr. Below: A Halberstadt CL II about to set off on a mission. Note the grenades in the rack on the fuselage side and the signal gun cartridges over the fuselage's rear decking

-**'

—»v«^.*:

**: **£

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Mfib •

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2789

udendorff had succeeded in achievsurprise despite ample warning intentions, in furnishing which the had played a most creditable part. 2

third of his

hammer

blows now

fell

on a sector of the front where British aviation had very limited strength and The battle-shattered IX responsibility. Corps had only one squadron to fly its The French missions. reconnaissance Tenth Army had assigned to it 14 Escadrilles of fighters and observation aircraft, and the French Division Aerienne, a powerful strategic air reserve of 18 day-bombing and 24 fighter Escadrilles, was stationed around Clermont, behind the front of the neighbouring Third Army. The German Seventh Army had two of the crack 'flying circuses', Jagdgeschwader I (Reinhard) and /// (Loerzer), five additional Jagdstaffeln,

14 Schlachtstaffeln (organised into tbree Gruppen), 23 Fliegerabteilungen and two

Bombengeschwader. French air reconnaissance

failed to dis-

cover the concentration of assault units by Seventh Army and on May 27 its strength fell thunderously against the Chemin des Soissons. The Schlachtstaffeln flew in group strength, attacking the retreating British and French troops on all the roads behind the front. Continuous attacks by the grenades and machine guns of these low-flying aircraft prevented the evacuation or destruction

Dames between Rheims and

continued on p. 2793

Above: The Sopwith F Camel, the First World War's most successful fighter, with 1,294 airI

craft

downed

to

its

credit.

It

owed much

of

success to its phenomenal aerobatic capabilities, which were the result of its compact design, powerful controls and the fact that all the large weights were concentrated on or near the centre of gravity — in the first seven feet of the fuselage. The considerable torque of the rotary engine on the small frame was a vital factor in the Camel's lightning fast turn its

to the right, but it also meant that it was impossible to fly the Camel 'hands off. Because of this difficulty, the type got an undeserved reputation as a killer, but all that was needed was great care, especially at take off and landing. The Camel was the first British fighter to have twin Vickers guns. 1. Upper wing cutout for visibility. 2. Ring sight. 3. Vickers gun. 4. Ammunition tank. 5. Wooden propeller.

2790

6.

Aluminium cowling.

7.

Rotary engine.

8. Oil

tank. 9. Wing rib. 10. Aileron control wire. 11. Compression rib. 12 and 13. Wing bracing wires. 14. Main spars. 15. Aileron operating horn. 16. Aileron connecting wire 17. Bungee-

sprung wheel.

18.

Rudder

20. Fuel tank. 21. Control

bar. 19.

column.

Wicker

seat. 22. Wire-

braced wooden fuselage. 23. Tailplane structure. and rudder. 26. Bungee skid spring. 27. Throttle and mixture controls. 28. Instrument panel. 29. Flying wire. 30. Landing wire. 31. Incidence bracing wires. Engine: Clerget (130-hp), Le Rhone (11024. Iron-shod skid. 25. Fin

hp) or Bentley

1

(150-hp) rotaries.

Armament:

two Vickers guns. Speed: 122 mph at sea level. Climb: 16 minutes 50 seconds to 15,000 feet. Ceiling: 24,000 feet. Endurance: 2Vz hours. Weight empty/loaded: 889/1,422 lbs Span: 28 feet. Length: 18 feet 8 inches. Performance figures are as with the Le Rhone engine

V

1

Above: The Fokker D VII, Germany's best fighter of the war, designed by the little-known Reinhold Platz, who also designed the Dr Originally a welder, Platz began designing with little or no training. He possessed an enormous I.

for designing strong but light structures (the fuselage was of metal tube) and had a superb intuitive eye for line. The D VII was

flair

its great strength, good manoeuvrand excellent performance at altitude. It had the remarkable ability of being able to hang on its propeller and fire upwards. The aircraft illustrated is that of Georg von Hantelman of Jasta 15 of Jagdgeschwader II. or BMW III inlines, 160Engine: Mercedes D or 185-hp. Armament: two fixed Spandau machine guns. Speed: 1 16V2 mph at 3,280 feet. Climb: 16,400 feet in 31 /s minutes (Mercedes) or 16 minutes (BMW). Ceiling: 22,900 feet. Endurance: IV2 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 1 ,540/ 1 ,870 lbs. Span: 29 feet 3 /2 nches. Z_engfr?.'22feet 1 5/e inches. Below: The Blind Spot' by N. G. Arnold-A Camel closes up in the blind spot under a Hannoveraner's tailplane

noted for

ability

III

1

1

i

2791

i

i

I

*•

d

\

2792

Below: Crews board their Friedrichshafen G Ill's for a bombing mission. Left: A gunner tests his weapon. Bottom: A mixed fighter unit of Fokker D VII s, Dr Is and an Albatros D V

Magneux, near Fismes, and it was overrun on the 28th with all its aircraft, hangars and fuel of the French airfield at

Bombengeschwader 2's attacks on the marshalling yards at La Fere-en-Tardenois contributed further to the confusion of the Allied armies. There was relatively little air fighting for the first four days of the offensive, most of the 19 German aircraft lost having fallen victim to ground fire. On the 31st, however, the Division intact.

Aerienne was committed to battle and savage combats were fought in the vicinity of their objective of Fismes. Escadre 12's Breguets were twice intercepted by Jagdgeschwader I and five of them were lost, as

were two of the

pilots of that stout

German unit. The day's fighting cost 12 German and 17 French aircraft. On the last day of May the Germans reached the Marne at Chateau-Thierry. In reaching it the men of the Luftstreitkrdfte played their full part, and some of them remembered their parts well. Baron

Wolfram Von Richthofen was an apprentice fighter pilot in the unit once led by his

famous cousin, and a huge, bemonocled

Hauptmann named Hugo

Sperrle directed the air units of Seventh Army. Twentytwo years later both were to be made Field-Marshals for applying again the lessons learned in 1918 over the battlefields of the Somme, the Lys and the Marne. Many of their opposite numbers of course also rose to high command in the RAF. all

Further Reading

Bodenschatz, K., Jagd in Flanderns Himmel (Munich: Verlag Korr& Hirth, 1935) Die Deutschen Flieger in den Letzten Angriffsschlachten (Die Luftmacht. 1935) Hoeppner, Gen. E. von, Deutschlands Krieg in der Luft (Leipzig: J. F. Koehler, 1921) Raleigh, Sir Walter and Jones, H. A., The War in the Air (OUP, 1922-1936) Resume des Operations Aeriennes Octobre

1917-Novembre 1918

RFC- RAF HO War

Diary, March-May 1918 Voisin, General, La Doctrine de /'Aviation

Francaise de

Combat

(Paris:

Berger-

Levrault, 1932)

[For

Thomas

J.

Miller's

biography, see

p. 2179.]

2793

Che Fruits of Brest-Litousk: German occupation of Russia In the months that followed Brest-Litovsk the Germans, on one pretext or another, invaded and occupied an area of Russia almost as large as their conquests 25 years later. At first the chances of setting up pro-German states seemed good, but German tactlessness soon made enemies of potential friends. It was to cost them dear. Throughout 1918, when they were so vitally needed in the west, 40 German divisions were

down in their new eastern possessions. Norman Stone. Below: A Russian armoured train in the Ukraine. The Bolsheviks could bring little force to bear against the Germans when even their own countrymen were against them

tied

P B

Hd

I

r

.<*

t

*

:-'

'j

5-

«

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v^A - —.

*

.

i ^*"

1 yK .-»».

flE

i

i

row we are going to resume hostiliagainst the Bolsheviks. Otherwise these brutes will quietly get together and turn the whole of Europe into a pig-sty. The whole of Russia is just a huge swarm of maggots, a squalid, swarming mass,' wrote General Hoffmann, Chief-of-Staff of mid-February in Oberbefehlshaber-Ost, 1918. The German army moved into Russia almost unopposed. Russia had no means of ties

resisting. The Bolshevik government had to give way. On March 3, 1918, it accepted German peace terms at the Treaty of BrestLitovsk. This treaty has gone down in history as one of the most savage ex-

actions ever made in modern times by one state on another. Russia lost a gigantic amount of land agtd a third of her population; she lost mosl of her coal, her oil, her

railways, her iron. She was thrown back to the frontiers of 'pre-Petrine Muscovy', and might even, as some Germans were hoping, become 'a sort of Greater Siberia', neutralised by internal convulsions. In reality, much of the denunciation of this treaty was undeserved. No doubt it was dictated, as such treaties usually are, by considerations of security, revenge, and aggrandisement. But the Germans could also legitimately make out that they were doing good, even that their treaty would carry out the American President's programme of 'self-determination of peoples' more than the Bolsheviks would ever do. The populations lost to Russia were in fact non-Russian. In Tsarist times, they had been nationalistic; and, since 1914, had even had repr^fcntatives in Berlin

that the German government would look favourably on their separatist movements. Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians and Georgians all had their grievances against

who hoped

Russia; that the Germans exploited these grievances did not mean that the grievances were not genuine enough. Now, at the time of Brest-Litovsk, Germany encouraged these oppressed peoples to declare independence, and, by the treaty, forced the Russians to respect that in-

dependence. A German system was set up in eastern Europe, based to a limited extent on annexations, to a much greater one on

German-backed

among

nationalist

permanence of this pended on the degree

movements

many ways, German system

these peoples. In to

the de-

which these new

nations could take firm root. The Bolsheviks themselves were irremediably hostile to German imperialism: ,but there was a good chance that Germany could set up a kind of Germanic commonwealth in Russia if she set about it properly. The great test for this was to be the Ukraine. Here was the largest of the non-Russian peoples, 25 million strong, inhabiting a large and rich area from the Rumanian border to the Don. Ukrainian nationalism is not easy to assess. In Tsarist times it was quite strong; but in those days it stood for a social revolution. When the Russian Revolution occurred, many Ukrainian nationalists forgot their separatism and confined themselves to demands for autonomy. The poet Vinnichenko publicly remarked that, before

1917,

had made sense

it

to

demand

free-

dom from

a reactionary government; now it had become unnecessary. Russians and Ukrainians in fact got on well: the Russians, even in their most reactionary days, had never acquired the overbearing Herrenvolk attitude that made the Germans so detested in, say, Bohemia. There was a widespread feeling that the Ukraine should have federal status within Russia; few Ukrainians appeared to want independence, at least not as it was presented. The Ukrainian regime — the Rada, Ukrainian equivalent of 'Soviet' — was

composed

largely

of

nationalist

Below: German troops gaze at the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The majority of it was sunk to avoid capture. Bottom left: German troops inspect an armoured car (still wearing its Tsarist markings) captured from the Bolsheviks outside Rostov. Bottom right: In Finland, where German aid to Mannerheim's White Russians effective, prison camps like this for the large numbers of captured

was up

were set Red Guards

intel-

most of them well under thirty. In February the Germans had concluded a peace treaty with it, hoping that it would soon establish its power securely. The lectuals,

Aa

I

.

._*_ 1

*

WW

2797

Rada had

in fact little weight. Its orders inflation was uncon-

were disregarded; trolled; commercial

life

stopped; Kiev

•

— —

,

was

given over to robber bands. The Bolsheviks in the eastern Ukraine set up a rival regime, and seized Kiev, just before the Rada made its peace with the Germans in February. Pitifully, the Rada fled west to Zhitomir and appealed for German help. The first serious step in the German invasion of Russia came with the occupation of the Ukraine in response to this appeal. To start with, the Germans had hoped to control the land indirectly, through the Rada; some of them, notably in the Foreign Office, openly opposed any over-extension of German power in the east, on the grounds that the west was more important. But there was not much they could do: Germany needed the food and raw materials of the Ukraine for her war effort, and in any case did not want to see a resurgence of Russia. The army leaders entertained vast schemes of conquest; the nationalists had visions of a new Roman Empire; and

i

*%

Top: Punch's view of German exploitation of the Ukraine. Above: An armoured train operating against the Bolsheviks in Finland. Overall: A larger print of the same picture as on page 2578 the Kaiser with Ukrainian puppet dignitaries and German officials

shows

ff\ A

i
Jhs

'A

^^^p 1

It

-

ft

German huge

saw a chance of the end of February Thys-

industrialists

profits.

By

sen of the Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser

and Kirdorf of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerksgesellschaft had secured government support for their plans to exploit the coal of the Donbass and the Krivoy Rog, neither of which was in the area recognised as the Ukraine by the Central Powers at BrestLitovsk. The railways of the Ukraine were to be converted to the normal Central European gauge, their tariffs specially lowered to favour exports to Germany; the

Ukrainian government was to meet all costs of the occupation and in addition to pay 110 million marks a month to Ger-

A German

regime was established Ukraine, German forces spreading out all over the country, in an area larger than Germany. By stages, they took Kiev, reached nearly to Kursk, and invaded the Crimea; then they advanced to the Don and took Rostov after a sharp action with

many.

in the

the

Bolsheviks.

The German

military,

under Field-Marshal von Eichhorn, came to dominate the country, and German agents were the most powerful men in Kiev. Administration was carried on by the able General Groener, with Count Stolzenberg as military plenipotentiary. On the economic side, a Wirtschaftsstelle was established to exploit the country, under Wiedfeldt, a Krupp director, and Melchior, a banker, both responsible to Baron vom Stein, Reich Financial Secretary. The civilian side was represented von Schwarzenstein, by Baron accredited to the Ukrainian government as minister. He wrote of his isolation among the military that he felt himself 'a Robinson Crusoe on a desert island inhabited by savages'. Austria-Hungary also moved, with reluctance, into the area. She had no choice, for she would otherwise lose the grainsupplies of the Ukraine on which her starving towns depended. Her troops occupied four provinces of the Ukraine, and, after an undignified race with the Germans, the town of Odessa. Some Austrians entertained schemes for placing an Archduke on the Ukrainian throne; but AustriaHungary had too little power, and her own structure was too ramshackle to permit elaborate extensions of it. Despairing and grumbling, the Habsburg Monarchy followed German leads. It soon became obvious that Germany would get nowhere without a serious Ukrainian regime. The Rada had accepted German terms for co-operation, but could not meet its side of the bargain. The Germans in April 1918 demanded a million tons of foodstuffs, 400 million eggs, 50,000 cattle and 27,000 tons of potatoes. In practice, they secured little. The peasants detested the German occupation, and hid their grain underground; because of landgrabbing in 1917, the estates and productive small-holdings had ceased to give what they could. Eichhorn explained to Ludendorff: 'We have had a worse reception in the Ukraine than in an enemy country.' The Rada was no help: its proceedings looked like 'a student drinking party without the beer'. Groener said, 'If it were not for our bayonets, this homunculus government would collapse.' Even pro-Ukrainian Germans, such" as the journalist Rohrbach, confessed the unreality of the new state. Order was maintained only by the army, and by the end of April the Rada was in

Mumm

2800

total disarray.

The banker Dobry,

ating with the

collabor-

German

Wirtschaftsstelle, was kidnapped by revolutionaries; in the search for the culprits, German troops

invaded the Rada's council-chamber, shouting, 'Hande hoch!' while some of the ministers escaped through rear windows.

port from the peasants. These forces came together under a former Tsarist general,

Mannerheim. He appealed to Sweden for help, which was refused; and then turned to Germany, since the Western powers could do nothing to help. The Germans decided,

Crown Council in Schloss Bellevue, send help; and an Ostseedivision, under Baron von der Goltz, landed at Hango in early April. By this act, Finland became a German satellite. Erwin Hjelt, one of the prominent pro-German Finns, told Ludendorff that Finland would be 'the most northern member of the system of states that in Europe, will form a rampart against the East'. In October 1918 the Finns elected as their sovereign a German prince, Friedrich Karl of Hesse. after a

to

Comic-opera government To replace what Groener infants'

called

'these

on their 'ministerial high-chairs',

a new regime, rightcomposition. They accepted an offer from a former adjutant-general of the Tsar, Skoropadsky, to run things for them. This was a farcical government. Skoropadsky, whose name means 'quickly falling', was elected in a circus by a group of landowners; he could not speak Ukrainian; and his office, Hetman, was a sham title taken from the days of Taras Bulba. Skoropadsky set up a fabulous court, in which he gathered adherents of the old regime in Russia. The Germans' administration in the Ukraine thus passed from students' union to fancy-dress parade: the problem was still unsolved. A system of rigged elections, brutal requisitioning and forced labour began, in which the old landlords co-operated; and, at the expense of alienating the peasantry, the Germans were able to exact some of the promised food supplies. The Germans took over the railways, through an ostensibly private company in which the Reich government held most of the shares. The Germans' aim was described by their foreign undersecretary, von dem Bussche-Haddehausen: 'We must succeed in exploiting the East. There we must find the interest for our war-loans' — feelings no doubt echoed by the millions of Germans who had lost their savings, and their sons, in the war-effort. For a time, the Germans managed to make some return on their efforts. These were to prove vain. In the first place,

the

Germans invented

wing

in

German soldiers were contemptuous of Slavs, who responded by hating the Germans. A feeble attempt was made to recruit patriotic Ukrainians into a legion able to co-operate with Germany: only a few hundred volunteers emerged, were dressed in the usual Skoropadsky operetta uniforms, and did nothing in particular. The working classes hated the Germans and their profiteering satellites; at the end of July, Eichhorn himself was assassinated. All manner of sabotage was carried on, and Bolshevik agitators had much success. It was clear to everyone that Germany had failed to create a Ukrainian nation. When Germany lost in the West, her regime in the Ukraine easily collapsed, leaving scarcely a trace. She had acted, ordinary

not as midwife, but as abortionist. Elsewhere the Germans had rather more success. In Russia's former Baltic provinces conditions were very different from those in the Ukraine and there was far less

popular support for Bolshevism. The

most obvious case was Finland. Her subjection to Russia had always been enforced; and just after the Bolshevik Revolution,

tween

following direct negotiations beLenin and the Finnish leader

Svinhufvud,

Finnish

independence

was

declared. Thereupon a civil war broke out, on class lines. In January 1918 the Reds, with Bolshevik help, seized Helsinki and chased Svinhufvud to the north. There, a

White regime was formed, based on an armed middle-class militia and with sup-

On

the rest of the Baltic coast, things

were more complicated. The nationalist response in Estonia and Latvia was as strong as in Finland, though the middleclass element was less strong. It was not easy to set up puppet-regimes in these

Right and below: German troops make a dash across a railway line and take cover the other side of it near Helsingfors in Finland. By the end of October 1918 the Germans had retreated

from

all

their

occupied

territories

and in any case the Germans were divided in their attitude to them. The Kaiser hoped to join these states to Prussia, under his own personal rule; Reichstag men hoped to annex them not to countries;

Prussia but to the Reich as a whole, as a kind of reward to the German people for fighting the war; and a few enlightened Foreign Office men were for granting the states independence, under national bourgeois governments, in the expectation that these, out of fear of Russia, would naturally tend towards Germany. Things developed into a three-cornered quarrel, which had not been resolved by the end of the war. There were objections to each of these solutions. Annexation by Prussia risked a flouting of world public opinion, and alienation of the Baltic peoples themselves. Annexation by the Reich could easily mean creating a new Alsace: the Reich machinery had a way of creating

discontents

which

it

was not ruthless

Independence was a highly dangerous solution. There could be no doubt that the Baltic peoples were at least as much anti-German as anti-

enough

to suppress.

Russian. A great number of their inhabitants sympathised with Bolshevism; and, in the southern part, Kurland, the administrative methods of Oberbefehlshaber-Ost, which had been applied since the German army took over in 1915, had created a widespread hatred of the Germans. It was not surprising that Lettish soldiery formed the most reliable, and the most savage, of Lenin's supporters — experience, first of Tsarist Russia and then of Imperial Germany, was not likely to produce anything else. It would, therefore, be too dangerous to accept the 'natural' solution, independence, which enlightened diplomats were proposing. The Germans found no answer to these problems. To some extent, they could rely on the upper classes in the Baltic lands to postpone the question. These classes were largely German, the 'Baltic Barons' who occupy so large a place in Russian history. Their loyalty had been only to the Tsar, not to Russia proper. They feared the revolutionary upheavals in Russia, and faced their own Estonian or Lettish sub-

with fear. They set up Diets, and appealed to the Kaiser for help; they

jects

lobbied

German army commanders — who

were often their cousins. In February 1918,

Germans sent troops to 'police' the area, though they disclaimed any intention of annexing it. At Brest-Litovsk they failed to state that Russia would lose the Baltic coast; and thereafter set about organising this. The army, almost in a private way, made agreements with the leading 'Baltic the

Barons' — Ruhden-Maydoff, von der Ropp, and Manteuffel-Zoege — that Germany should take over the area permanently. The Diets should declare their independence, and then vote it away again in Germany's favour. Rival assemblies were to be dissolved by bayonet, as happened to the Estonian assembly in Reval. The German Foreign Office, unwilling to provoke Russia further than necessary, and sceptical of the value of the Baltic countries to Ger-

These protests were protested. ignored; and until the end of the war the German army was negotiating on what form German rule in the Baltic should take. Not until the end of the war did they seriously consult the natives. Much the same happened in another for-

many,

2801

territory, Lithuania. Here there was a ruthless German military governor, the Prinz zu Isenburg, whose actions hopelessly alienated the Lithuanians from Germany. The Lithuanians, Catholic peasants for the most part, wanted to declare independence; they set up a Council, the Taryba, and announced independence in December 1917. They had friends in Germany — Erzberger, leader of the Catholic Centre Party, and Monsignor von Hartmann, Cardinal-Archbishop of

merly Russian

Cologne — who, between them, managed to moderate the army's behaviour in Lithuania.

Even

so,

many Germans wanted

to

sure of the country, and there were secret plans to drive Lithuanians out of part of it and settle Germans in their place.

make

The country was to be bound hand-and-foot to the Gertnan economy and the army, but the Germans wanted to wait to the end of the war before deciding the fate of Lithuania. In July the Taryba tried to force the pace, and appointed the Duke of Urach as Grand Duke of Lithuania, with the title of Mindaugas II. This action annoyed the Germans, who hoped to place the Kaiser, or at least a Prussian, on this throne; and the Taryba was forced to withdraw. Lithuania remained a phantom state until October 1918, when the Germans, desperate

for

to

save

support,

recognised

her

un-

By

this time, it was too late Germany's position: rapacity,

reservedly.

myopia and arrogance had destroyed it beyond repair. Still, the Germans learned little from the hostility of their reception. They displayed, on the contrary, remarkable greed and a remarkable talent for alienating possible supporters. They, rather than the Bolsheviks, consistently violated the Diktatfrieden of Brest-Li tovsk, intervening in Finland and the Baltic states, technically still part of Russia. They also went far in the south as well. In April, they occupied the Donbass coalfields and tried to seize the Russian Black Sea Fleet (which was mostly sunk to avoid capture); they took an active interest in the Caucasus as well, and brought into existence a Germanorientated separate republic of Georgia. They took over the Baku oil wells; and their agent in Georgia, Wesendonck, talked of invading Persia: 'even the idea of a German land-route to China no longer belongs purely to a world of fantastic adventures'; and as usual trade, in its most repellent form, followed the flag, as agents of large German concerns arrived to pick up the wreckage of the Russian economy. In much the same way, Ludendorff pushed troops into the Crimea, although it, too, was technically still part of Russia, and manufactured a pro-German movement among the Crimean population. There was no doubt that, if Germany had won the war in the west, she would have tried to set up a great imperium germanicum, stretching far beyond the boundaries of even Brest-Litovsk, and relying mainly on force. All in all, it was clear to the more moderate, and even to the extremist Germans, that the German system was a failure in eastern Europe. Characteristically, the two groups reacted differently. The extremists, military and civilian, argued for more force: the Kaiser wrote: 'Peace with Russia can be kept only if she is afraid of us. The Russians fear and respect only those who beat them unmercifully.' More enlightened Germans recognised that some less direct

2802

means

of ruling should be discovered

—

though even they preferred the use of force to giving Russia back her former territories. They regretted what was being they

done;

knew

that the picture of a

robber-Germany that appeared in Allied propaganda was not far out; they found no alternative. German rule, direct or otherwise, could rely only on puppetgovernments made up of ancien-regime power maniacs or sauve-qui-peut profiteers. More and more, the Germans relied on force, and as a result 40 divisions were

down in the East which, it is generally agreed, could have turned the scales in France in the summer of 1918. In a sense, victory in the west was lost to Germany by imperialism in the east: a paradigm of the country's situation in this century. tied

An

alliance of convenience position in eastern Europe could have been salvaged if Germany had ever conducted a clear policy towards the Bolsheviks. It is conceivable, though not very likely, that a resolutely anti-Bolshevik stance on Germany's part could have won round the anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia, perhaps even in the west. There was no lack of such elements. In Russia, a 'White' movement, embracing the defeated parties of the Constituent Assembly of January 1918, began to form soon afterwards. In the Don, General Alexeyev formed a 'Volunteer Army'; the various moderate socialist groups set up provincial governments in Siberia and on the Volga. In the west, likewise, a number of influential people were arriving at a bitter anti-Bolshevism that transcended

The German

even

anti-Germanism.

their

The

Bol-

sheviks were partly responsible for this: they came out with blood-curdling phrases,

and were then,

characteristically,

annoyed

when

people took them at their word. The British Foreign Secretary, Balfour, described Bolshevism as 'this crazy system'. Lord Milner and Smuts felt that a compromise peace should be made with Germany, leaving Great Britain the seas, and Germany the task of cleaning up the

Russian

pest.

Right-wing Frenchmen were

often not far from taking the same line. This powerful card, anti-Bolshevism, the Germans failed to play. On the contrary, defiled themselves with Bolshevik pitch with an abandon that reveals the extreme clumsiness and blundering of their statesmen and generals. For Bolshevik friendship, they sacrificed everyone else's; and then failed to secure even that. Their policy in Russia seemed to have only one result: it deprived them of any support, from whatever source. The Germans had, of course, achieved their present success through the Bolshevik Revolution, assisted by themselves. The Bolsheviks had signed Brest-Litovsk,

they

which no other Russian government would have done. Besides, by the prevailing philosophy,

it

would be

was held that inefficient;

a socialist state

anti-socialists

had

proclaimed for years past that socialism

would mean the end of

now

civilisation.

They

victim to their own propaganda and supposed, as the Kaiser said, that 'the socialist state will be a place where no one does an honest day's work'. The Germans therefore regarded Bolshevik infell

efficiency and brutality as their best friends, and tried to maintain good relations with the Moscow government. Am-

bassadors were exchanged: Count Mirbach for the Germans, Joffe for the Russians. Joffe, in Berlin, did not present his credentials to the Kaiser, instead he visited the

German socialist leaders. Some historians believe that his activity was important in bringing about the German Revolution of November 1918: Bolshevism had a place in Germany. Certainly, from the beginning, many people hoped that the Germans would reverse their previous policy and expel the Bolsheviks. On the face of it, co-operation between Imperial Germany and Bolshevik Russia was unlikely: it was a strange spectacle, at Brest-Litovsk, to see be* medalled representatives of the old order negotiating with the uncouth fanatics of Trotsky's retinue. Relations were always uneasy: Mirbach in Moscow had to face constant insults, as for instance on the day of his arrival, when, at a military parade, goose-stepping German troops (Bolshevised prisoners of war) marched past him waving banners which read 'German soldiers, throw off your Kaiser as the Russians have thrown off their Tsar'. In Skoropadsky's Kiev, many of the ancienregime Russians had gathered. Even Milyukov, pro-Entente as he was, negotiated with Stresemann for a constitutional monarchy under German auspieces: Grand Duke Paul was proposed, and accepted. The Duke of Leuchtenberg, whose family

was German but who had taken Russian service, travelled to Avesnes in France to discuss the plan with Ludendorff; Kras-

nov, Hetman of the Don Cossacks, appealed to the Kaiser in the name of the Russian people, who had helped liberate Germany in 1813-15; in Moscow, Mirbach was often lobbied by anti -revolutionary groups to clear out the Bolsheviks. They all received a dusty answer: so long as the Bolsheviks had power, Germany preferred to deal with them, not their opponents. On a short-term view, this was the Germans' best course: only the Bolsheviks guaranteed peace with Germany. Lenin, with Stalin, Zinoviev and Sokolnikov, argued that, in view of the country's powerlessness, the collapse of its army, and the state of its finances, to wage war would be suicidal. The Revolution must be saved in Moscow and Petrograd, and it would be finished if the Germans were provoked into occupying these cities. Russia must wait until the Red Army was fully organised, or the Germans defeated in the west. Meantime, Russia could accept the loss of huge areas and raw materials; the Revolution counted for more, and in any case the way would be open for revision when Russia grew stronger or revolution over-

whelmed Germany and her was one thing

satellites.

It

Russians to accept such considerations in theory, another for them to put up with the daily humiliations which acceptance involved. Many Bolfor the

Radek and Bukharin among them, wanted to undertake a revolutionary war with Germany; the left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries, who had thrown in their lot with the Bolsheviks, agreed, while the right-wing ones wanted to co-operate with the Western Allies in defeating German imperialism. In many ways, it was Lenin's greatest feat to prevent his followers from indulging in this folly. Hut he had a difficult time. At the Seventh Party Congress in July 1918, with foreign repre sentatives in the box of the Bolshoi Theatre, sheviks, Joffe,

pandemonium broke out as Ukrainian peas-

and would have liked

ants denounced the German reign in the Ukraine and the Bolsheviks' share in prolonging it: The dictatorship of the proletariat has become a dictatorship of Count Mirbach sat imperturbable Mirbach.' through all this; his serene arrogance irritated the left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries, two of whom assassinated him shortly afterwards. For the moment, German re-

The Kaiser, with his strange and, in Germany, relatively unique inkling for reality

lations affected:

with the

the

were swallowed

Bolsheviks

Germans

unthe

murder, and even respected the way in which Lenin rounded up the left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks' Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin,

even invited the German army to go on to the White Sea to oppose British landings at Murmansk; but the partnership became increasingly uneasy.

Many Germans disliked this

partnership,

to find

an alternative.

seems to have guessed that the pro-Bolshevik course was wrong. He denounced the pro-Bolshevik Mirbach as 'Bolshevised'; he sent Stolzenberg from the Ukraine to the Crimea, where the surviving members of the Tsar's family had gathered, and offered the Dowager Tsaritsa safe-conduct to Denmark (Stolzenberg received the icy answer that the Dowager Tsaritsa would not entrust herself to the murderers of her son); he disliked the poson Germany of this partnership with Bolshevism. Ludendorff agreed with this, although the Foreign Office did not. Mirbach's successor, Helfferich, after a few days' residence in Moscow, returned to Germany and wrote, on August 1, a memorandum arguing for the overthrow of sible effects

the Bolsheviks. If Germany failed to do this, he said, a future, moderate government replacing the Bolsheviks would regard Germany 'with the deepest prejudice' as an accomplice to the Bolshevik bloodbath. The Kaiser minuted, 'Of course! That's what I've been saying for months!'

The High Command

offered six divisions

such an operation. A policy of this kind might, in some circumstances, have made sense. But Germany was caught by her own past. In the eyes of virtually everyone, Bolsheviks and German imperialism were in the same boat. The only alternatives to the Bolsheviks—apart from a small reactionary clique — were bitterly anti-German, and

for

Below: The German encroachments on Russian between February and October 1918. Almost a third of European Russia was occupied territory

2803

run, Germany would do herself harm by co-operating with the Bolsheviks; the generals might protest that the Bolsheviks were as dangerous as other Russians. In this matter the Foreign Office arguments prevailed — German imperialism would be best served by a Bolshevik Russia, to preserve which it was worth showing a limited amount of moderation. This policy was applied, in essence, until the end of the war. Brest-Litovsk turned out to be only the beginning of German expansion. Throughout the spring and summer, as German control was fixed over the Baltic, the Crimea and the northern Caucasus, negotiations went on between Bolsheviks and Germans in Berlin for a supplementary treaty (Zusatzvertrag) that would enable the Germans to take still more of Russia into their sphere of influence. The Baltic states were to be taken in, the Donets coal-mines and the main share of Baku oil. German industrialists worked out plans to exploit the conquered territories, and the ruined economy of rump-Russia. A Wirtschaftsstab, on the same lines as that in Kiev, was set up in Moscow to study the possibilities. In the Stahlhof, in Diisseldorf, fifteen representatives of heavy industry met in May 1918, guided by Thyssen, Kirdorf, Rochling, Stinnes and Hugenberg, and set up a syndicate for this exploitation. They made agreements with the Warburg and Discontogesellschaft banks, and received a promise from the government that two billion marks would be raised by loan and from public funds to cover the enterprise. The

Reich government also demanded from Russia 6,000 million gold roubles, as 'reparation for losses suffered by German citizens' — a fiction designed to disguise the fact that Germany had gone back on her promise at Brest-Litovsk not to demand 'contributions'. All this was forced on the Russians when the supplementary treaties were signed, on August 27 and 28. In return, the Bolsheviks were told that Germany would not go further into the country, would in fact withdraw to a small extent in the Caucasus and the Don area. The German Foreign Office expected the Bolsheviks to be grateful for this. In fact the Bolshevik negotiator, Joffe, regarded these terms as 'in essence, worse than Brest-Litovsk'.

by the time these new treaties took German armies in France were in retreat. By the end of September, Bulgaria and Turkey had collapsed; in October, the Germans themselves began to admit defeat and appealed to President Wilson for an armistice. The decision on eastern Europe began to pass to London, Paris and Washington; and in November, after futile Still,

effect,

Top: General Mannerheim, a former Tsarist general, is welcomed into Helsingfors with officers of the German division sent to his aid

Above: German field kitchens and supply trucks on the way to Helsingfors. The Red Guards were no match for experienced German veterans

would at least insist on the abrogation of Brest-Litovsk. Thus, if the Germans wished to preserve their empire in the east, they had to get on with the Bolsheviks. This was expressed, with brutal clarity, by Hintze, Kuhlmann's successor as Foreign Secretary. In a reply to Helfferich, he wrote: 'Socialist-Revolutionaries, Cadets, Octobrists, Monarchists, Cossacks, gendarmes, officials, and all the runningdogs of the Tsarist regime have all hoisted the banner, war with Germany. We have no cause to desire or carry out the overthrow of the Bolsheviks. They are no doubt

malicious and unpleasant, but this did not stop us from forcing Brest-Litovsk on them, and taking, over and above Brest-Litovsk, more and more land and population from them. Whether we like or dislike working with them is unimportant, so long as it is useful to us. After all, what we want in the east is the military paralysis of Russia: this the Bolsheviks can secure without its costing us a man or a mark.' These proved incontrovertible arguments. At least the Bolsheviks, unlike Germany's satellites,

2804

needed no divisions to keep them

The Kaiser might grouse

the

conciliatory gestures, the Germans retreated back to their own country, leaving behind them chaos and hatred. Perhaps there was a chance that democratic, nationalist regimes could have been successfully set up in 1918. In that sense, the German empire in eastern Europe marks one of the great might-have-beens of history. Further Reading: Reshetar; The Ukrainian Revolution 1917-1920 (Princeton 1952) J. W. Wheeler-Bennett: Brest-Litovsk J. S.

(Papermac 1963)

'friendly'.

[For

that, in the long

465.)

Norman

Stone's biography, see page

THE "UIMNDORFF OFFENSIVE"

THEMATZ

PHASE

The German successes on the Aisne had opened the gates of Paris to them, but to pass through these gates it was necessary to capture and control the railway that passed through Soissons. But the offensive launched on June 9 was not an unqualified success. At last the French applied the principles of defence in depth, and a brisk counterattack turned the German tide. Major-General Essame

When on the afternoon of June 1 1918 the Allied Supreme War Council met in the great hall of the palace at Versailles, the three Prime Ministers, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando, and their attendant generals and Pershing had no illusions: the outlook was black indeed. For the Allies this was the very nadir of the war. Four days previously the German Seventh Army, attacking with 17 divisions under cover of a fantastically heavy bombardment of high explosive and mustard gas on the Chemin des Dames, had swept the French Sixth Army off its feet, annihilating two French and one British corps in the process. All efforts by Duchene, tbe Army Commander, to stop the rot had come to nothing.

By May 30 the Germans had advanced nearly 40 miles in four days, crossed three rivers, captured over 50,000 prisoners, over 800 guns and vast quantities of stores, and had reached the Marne on a front of ten miles. Paris itself was under long-range bombardment from huge guns in the vicinity of Laon. Although the bastion of Rheims on the east flank of the German penetration still held firm, Soissons on the other had fallen. Although Petain, the Commander-in-Chief, had been quick to move 16 reserve divisions towards the collapsing front, the first to arrive had been swept aside in the general debacle. He now ordered the rest to dig in behind the Marne and along the wooded western flank of the new German salient. At this

moment Pershing had come to his aid and moved the American 2nd and 3rd Divisions, each numerically as strong as a French corps, to a position astride the road to Paris at Chateau Thierry. critical

moment

the French seemed to temporarily stabilised the front. was, however, worse to come: althere were unmistakable signs of a further thrust looming up on the front

For have There ready of

the

Third

Army between Noyon and Mont-

didier and obviously aimed down the valley of the Oise at Compiegne and indeed at Paris. An atmosphere closely akin to panic prevailed in the capital. Probably 1,000,000 of the citizens had departed since the spring: those who remained, including in-

fluential

government

officials,

pressed their fears that the

openly exof the

fall

was imminent. Plans had been made to move the government offices to Bordeaux,

city

and Pershing had provided trucks for the American and British Embassies in case a hurried departure became necessary. In the Chamber of Deputies the attacks on Foch, Petain, and the other generals rose to a crescendo; hysterical deputies screamed for the dismissal of Duchene and his defeated generals. Petain's own future trembled in the balance. There were rumours that the fall of Clemenceau's govern-

ment was imminent.

In later years, Pershing, looking back on these critical days, said that although the French regarded themselves as the very keystone of civilisation 'it might have been difficult to keep them in the war if Paris had fallen'. Some French officers were openly saying that the loss of Paris would overtbrow the government, which would then be replaced by a ministry in favour of peace no matter what the British and Americans might think.

Petain expendable In this crisis, three

men

kept their heads,

Clemenceau, Petain and Pershing. Clemenceau, whose personal example by appearing daily at the front had done much to slow down the pace of retreat, cynically provided the scapegoats which democratic governments always require when confronted by military disaster, by sacking

Duchene and two corps commanders. He arranged for the relief of General Guillaumat in Salonika by General Franchet d'Esperey on whose army group front the disaster had occurred, thus getting rid of a commander he could well spare and at the same time providing himself with a

also

available substitute for Petain should it prove necessary to throw him too to the wolves. For Guillaumat a highly convenient appointment was found as Commander of the Entrenched Camp of Paris. Petain, normally a pessimist, now found it expedient to radiate optimism, telling his staff that if they could hold out till the end of June the wastage of German reserves and the build-up of the Americans would turn the tide. When it was suggested readily

him that Foch should be sacked because he had kept the major reserves on Haig's front instead of Petain's, he replied that this was true but that Foch was more necessary for the ultimate victory than he was. He, Petain, was expendable: Foch to

was

not.

Pershing's shrewd appreciation of the technical military factors involved, of the state of morale of all the belligerents and of the practical help which was now within his power to give, undoubtedly helped to avert a complete collapse. At the final session of the Allied Council on June 2, after a prolonged argument with Milner who seemed more concerned with the evacuation of British stores than anything else, he threw caution to the winds and undertook to demand from the United States the transport across the Atlantic in British and American ships of 250,000 men per month in June and July and equally heavy shipments in succeeding months. Furthermore, he agreed to move the American troops training behind the British front to support the French. Despite their heated arguments there had grown up between him and Clemenceau a strong feeling of

understanding and respect. When Pershing him a few days later at a time when all reports left no room for doubt that another crushing German blow was imminent, he said: 'Mr President, it may not look encouraging just now but we are certain to win in the end.' Pershing went on to record: 'He clung to my hand and in a tone that showed the utmost solicitude, he replied: "Do you really think that? I am glad to hear you say it." This was the first and only time I ever sensed any miscalled on

givings in his mind.' It is in the light of the desperate plight of the French at this time that the wisdom of the decision to use the Marine Brigade of the 2nd United States Division to attack the death traps of Belleau Wood and Bouresches, starting on June 6, must be judged. On this day in two attacks they took Hill 142 west of the wood at a cost of 1,087 casualties. In the following 20 days' continuous battle the cost to the

Marines would rise to 5,200. The knowledge that American troops were fighting beside their

own put new

heart into the

2805

French. No longer could it be said that the Americans would fight to the last Frenchman. Furthermore the Americans had to get combat experience, and this has seldom been cheaply bought. Since May 30 indications of another German offensive in preparation between

Noyon and Montdidier became

so apparent

that the French Intelligence Branch seriously considered the possibility that they were deliberately designed to induce the Allies to make a false move with their reserves. Fortunately they decided that, as proved the case, they were due to inordinate haste to exploit the victory which had carried them to the Marne. Never was an offensive more blatantly advertised. The IX Brigade of the Royal Air Force, moved to the Beauvais area opposite the threatened front to operate under the direction of the air commander of the French Group of

Reserve Armies, found themselves opposed large formations of 25/40 German fighters over Roye, Montdidier and Noyon. Their eight squadrons flying daily over the area reported heavy traffic on the roads and

by

large troop concentrations. During June 7 and 8 prisoners declared that the attack would take place on June 10 at the latest. As usual before an offensive the number of deserters describing themselves as Alsatians showed a marked increase. Air photographs confirmed all these indications. Furthermore, it was obvious that if Ludendorff intended to continue his advance on Paris he must get control of the railway which ran through Soissons along the western edge of the Marne salient, and would therefore most likely make the line

Montdidier-Compiegne his first objective. There could be no doubt that a thrust across the Matz over the gently rolling country immediately west of the Oise towards Compiegne and Paris was imminent. The country destined to provide the setting of the coming battle reflected all the variety and charm of rural France in the

3W

of early summer. It fell into three distinct topographical sectors. The River Oise, flowing south-westwards from Chauny towards Compiegne to join the Seine north of Paris, provided the western boundary of the eastern sector. This was heavily wooded right up to the river. In the centre the little River Matz formed a great loop first flush

entering the Oise about eight miles south of Noyon and roughly the same distance from Compiegne. Here the French front line ran along the lower northern slopes of a wooded hilly region known as the Massif of Lassigny or Boulogne, as far as the upper reaches of the Matz. Within this loop there were many small farms, copses and hedges. The Matz itself was an insignificant stream in its lower course, never exceeding ten feet in width; nowhere was it more than three feet deep; everywhere it was overgrown with reeds and rushes. The western sector, however, was

much more open. Here gently-rolling open cornfields stretched as far northwards as the eye could reach: to the south lay fairly flat country relieved here and there by small woods and copses.

The road

to Paris

The French Third Army responsible

for this front had four corps in line on a front of 20 miles, and a further seven divisions in immediate reserve. It had occupied its existing dispositions since the last days of

March when

it

the

right

had

filled the gap between and the French left. Roughly, the French defences consisted of

British

a forward position of continuous trenches mainly on forward slopes but lacking in dugouts and communication trenches. Behind this a well-wired intermediate position had been only partially dug. About one-and-a-half miles further to the rear there was a second system similar in character. Finally, approximately a further two miles to the rear, there was a third position merely traced along the south

bank of the Aronde stream which joins the Oise just above Compiegne. Four miles further to the rear lay the advanced line of the Paris defences. Humbert, the commander of Third Army, on assuming responsibility for this part of the front in April had been told by Foch to organise it primarily as a jumping-off place for an offensive rather than as a defensive position. In early May, however, when Foch next visited him, he was ordered in the event of a German attack to defend it 'foot by foot'. Humbert therefore had concentrated all his efforts on strengthening the forward position and done little on the rear lines. That the disaster on the Chemin des Dames had been primarily owing to Duchene's insistence on piling up the majority of the defending troops in the forward defences to be caught under the hammer of the overwhelming German

opening bombardment was now abundantly clear circle.

— at

That

Foch and his had been in flagrant

least to all except it

also

defiance of Petain's policy of elastic defence in depth was also widely realised. It came as no surprise therefore when Petain on June 4 ordered Humbert drastically to reduce the strength of the infantry likely to be exposed to the fire of the German trench mortars and the withdrawal of the guns as far as possible from the front line as their range allowed. A heated argument now developed between Fayolle, commanding the Reserve Army Group, and Humbert and their respective staffs as to where the line of resistance was to be, culminating in Fayolle laying down that it must be sited outside the range of any opening German bombardment. Humbert therefore chose a position between 3,300

and 4,400 yards from the German trench mortars but in front of the second position. It would, he said, take eight days to complete the trenches in the second position, move back the guns, shift the ammunition dumps and relay the communications. Thus

it

came about that

it

was on the rear

line

of the first position and not on the second position that the battle would be fought. To add to the general confusion of thought Petain now insisted that the line of resist-

ance must be the second position. Finally on top of all these disputes came a directive from Foch himself, dated June 6, for circulation to all armies with instructions that it be widely promulgated. It reads like the effusion of a modern unblooded military theorist in full verbal spate: 'The road to Paris must be denied; possession must be kept of the northern ports and railways; there must be indissoluble liaison between the allied armies.' These ideals, the Generalissimo continued, could only be obtained by 'a foot-by-foot defence of the ground'. There followed a stream of platitude — the need for constant vigilance, for close supervision of subordinates, for the utmost energy, for the defence of every position to the very end, for the spirit of sacrifice, for firm decisions and for the radiation of confidence at all levels. There must be no question of falling back of free will or without permission. In the circumstances it is surprising that the morale of the subordinate commanders was not completely undermined. Foch did, however, make it clear that in the coming battle he personally and not Petain proposed to have the last word. All the Commanders directly concerned, Humbert, Fayolle and Mangin, were his men. Fortunately Foch was a better strategist than tactician. Petain, with only 12 fresh divisions in reserve to cover Paris, was clearly underinsured. Foch, therefore, now proceeded to assert his authority as Generalissimo and, backed by Clemenceau and Milner, ordered Haig to be ready to move all his reserves, should it prove necessary, to cover Paris and furthermore to thin out his front line so as to produce more reserves. Under protest Haig prepared to move the XXII Corps,

XIX Corps and

the Canadian Corps south

of the Somme. Further to strengthen Fayolle's army Foch handed over to him 11 groupes of 15 tanks each organised as four groupements. These were heavy tanks — Schneiders and Saint-Chamonds. Altogether there were 165 of them. Fayolle stationed £hem behind the westernmost corps of Humbert's army where the country was open and the going good. Behind the threatened front Foch had

already achieved an impressive build-up of aircraft. Altogether in the Beauvais area in addition to the 200 aircraft of the British IX Brigade of the RAF there were no less than five groupements each of 200. There were thus some 1,200 aircralt readily available. Of these some 600 were bombers. By June 6 the struggle for at least air parity over Roye, Montdidier and Noyon

had already begun.

Mangin — ruthless, dynamic In due course, when the Germans had shown

their

hand and the time was

Foch proposed

to regain the initiative

ripe,

with

a counterattack delivered with the maxipossible weight, dash and ferocity. To command it he had now brought forward, to wait at the headquarters of First Army immediately south of Amiens, the most dynamic and ruthless commander in the French army, Mangin. It was he who in the ghastly battle at Verdun had recaptured Fort Douaumont. In Nivelle's disastrous offensive of April 1917, Mangin's infantry had sustained over 60% casualties, and in the witch hunt which followed he had, in response to the demands of hysterical deputies and journalists, been relieved of his command. Thanks to Clemenceau's influence, he had been re-employed as a corps commander in December 1917.

mum

| S>

s

J «

| E

German troops advance across the Matz. The French first line of defence was lightly manned and the Germans broke through everywhere

&

/T *

out of St Cyr at the bottom, cord before 1914 had been one t continuous active service in the French Congo, Cochin China and Morocco. Not for him the baggy trousers and bulging belly of most of his fellow generals which scandalised the British: his turnout was impeccable. Like Marshal Ney and Murat, he lived in the grand manner accompanied always by his orderly, a gigantic Senegalese of ferocious appearance. A troop of captured German horses and many looted automobiles had made his HQ conspicuous since 1914. An incident during the retreat in 1914 illustrated the difference in style between him and Petain. Their respective divisional HQ had halted side by side about midday. Petain extracted from his haversack a bit of cold meat wrapped in a newspaper, some bread and a lump of cheese. Mangin's orderly then appeared and placed an improvised table in front of his master. On this he spread an immaculate cloth. Next appeared a large well grilled fillet steak, fried potatoes and a well-dressed salad plus a bottle of wine. 'Do you realise we are at war?' said Petain sarcastically. 'Yes,' came the prompt reply, 'that is precisely why I must be well fed. I have been at war all my life and I have never felt better than I do now. You have been at war for a fortnight and you look half-dead.'

Every night he wrote a letter to his wife and asked for news of their eight children. There was nothing of the academic military pedant about Mangin. His sphere was the battlefield itself, and the front end of it no matter what the cost in terms of human life and suffering, including his own. He would be well matched in the battle now imminent by no less a maestro than Hutier himself,

the

Army, who first

Commander

at Riga in

of Eighteenth

November 1917 had

tried out the technique

which since

March had carried the Germans to the gates of Amiens and now to the Marne, a bare 40 miles from Paris. Before the March offensive, Ludendorff 's grand strategic plan had been to strike his final decisive blow, known as Hagan, around Ypres and Hazebrouck, isolating the Belgians and driving the British into the sea. The purpose of the drive towards

Amiens had been away from

serves

to draw the Allied rethis vital area. When,

however, he had struck on the Lys in April, British resistance had for the time being stalled it. Nevertheless, in principle he still adhered to this original concept. To this end, therefore, he had designed the offensive which opened on the Aisne on May 27 primarily to attract the Allied reserves away from the vital northern front where he still continued to retain the buildup of the Crown Prince Rupprecht's Army Gruppe. His diversionary plan fell into parts; first the attack on the Chemin des Dames and then, as soon as possible afterwards, a thrust from the NoyonMontdidier front by Hutier's Eighteenth

two

Army

towards Compiegne. For this no definite date had been fixed or final objective laid down. In the event, the success of his attack on the Chemin des Dames had surprised Ludendorff almost as much as it had the French. Originally he had intended to halt after about a 12-mile advance on reaching the high ground above the Vesle. When, however, the French collapsed,

he had been unable to resist

the temptation to chase them back towards the Marne. He thus soon found himself in a deep and awkward salient, the prolonged western flank of which ran along the edge of a large belt of forest offering

1 w~

m**

2808

m

ws*-

—*

Vr?i

,

ideal cover to the Allies for a counteroffensive. Along this flank too ran the railway he needed to sustain his troops on the

The need, therefore, to mount Hutiei's attack, known as Gneisenau, with all possible speed had become apparent: accordingly he ordered him to thrust forward in one rush on a front of 15 divisions pivoting on Montdidier to the lower course of the Matz which runs from west to east. Next he was to drive forward to reach at least the line Montdidier-Compiegne six miles beyond the Matz on a front of 11 divisions, supported by a further seven. Thereafter anything might happen; the French might be forced to face the prospect of the fall of Paris; perhaps it might not be necessary to mount the final blow against Haig in the north after all. Ludendorff had originally hoped that it would be possible to open this new front on Marne.

June

7.

To support

it,

however,

it

Armies and the Crown Prince's Army Gruppe with a nightmare problem. Some artillery had to be left in the Marne salient to meet a possible counterattack from the west flank; men and horses were tired; reserves being moved southwards towards the Marne crossed columns of artillery and mortars moving west. The ammunition build-up was behind schedule. In the general haste, security precautions inevitably went by the board. It is not surprising, therefore, that indications of the arrival of hundreds of batteries on the 20mile front from Noyon to Montdidier were blatantly evident to both Foch and Petain, and, indeed, the press of Paris from May 30 onwards. Inevitably Hutier had to

^ **s £*.*u 1^ %f t A m v*'

*%^Mrmt «^^ "~

:

«

-••

«K^'^^

Rj£j^!j6S?

postpone the date to June 9. continued on p. 2813

was

move

a high proportion of the 600 batteries required to blast it in from the Chemin des Dames front. This presented the staffs of Seventh and Eighteenth

necessary to

Top: Two German A 7 Vs advance on a village. Above: A German trench mortar fires and troops seek shelter against possible retaliatory fire Below: A sequel to the picture on pages 2806/7, the advance continues

fife

k

2809

FIRST ARMY (Gen Debeney)

Opposite page: A painting of German infantry encountering the American Marines in Belleau Wood. This page. Top: The German offensive across the Matz, and Mangin's counte r attack. Left: A French truck brings back wounded. Above: General Guillaumat. brought back from Salonika and given the command of the Entrenched Camp of Paris. He was to act as a possible replacement for Petain, should Foch find it necessary to dismiss him

2811

A sudden increase in the number of German deserters on June 7 and 8 confirmed French suspicions that the attack was imminent: these men said it was fixed for the 10th. Finally a deserter on the night of 8/9 revealed that the preliminary bombardment was timed to open at midnight on the following night, that it would last 40 minutes longer than the opening bombardment on May 27 and that the infantry advance would start at 0320 hours. Accordingly the French opened up counterpreparation with their artillery at 2350 hours, thus anticipating the Germans by ten minutes. It is not surprising, therefore, that some of the attacking divisions were caught forming up and that they got off to a ragged start at various times between 0300 hours and 0430 hours. Nonetheless the hurricane of fire which descended on Third Army had all the characteristics of the Bruchmiiller technique at its most diabolical. For the first ten minutes, all guns and trench mortars using gas shells saturated all known infantry, gun and mortar positions within range with gas. This was designed to demoralise the French by forcing them to put on their gas masks in the dark. Then the 600 batteries switched their fire with gas and high explosive mixed on to the French artillery for about an hour while the trench mortars set about the destruction of the forward defences and their wire. The majority of the 300 French batteries were thus smothered. Simultaneously, all bridges, roads and tracks within the defences, all headquarters, telephone exchanges and reserve positions were kept under fire to paralyse any forward movement of reserves. For the next hour-and-a-half selected artillery groups switched their fire on to the surviving French batteries while the rest and all the trench mortars concentrated on the infantry positions, their barrages sweeping backwards and forwards like a red-hot rake. As on March 21 on the Somme and May 27 on the Aisne the effect was paralysing. All the communications were cut, all the forward trenches were obliterated, many men were buried, and those who survived staggered like drunken men. Top: Petain. For the first time on the Matz the French began to apply his doctrine of defence in depth. Centre left: General Humbert, whose Third Army bore the brunt of the German Matz offensive. Centre right: General von Hutier, Commander of the Eighteenth Army. The transfer of huge numbers of guns from the Aisne to his front without any concealment compromised the security of his offensive. Bottom left: General Fayolle, the French Army Group Commander. He made available the men and tanks for Mangin's counterattack. Bottom right: Mangin. Sacked after the Nivelle offensive, he was reinstated to the command of a corps at the insistence of Clemenceau. His counterattack on the Matz was a heartening success, and marked the turn of the tide of the Allies' misfortunes in 1918

As a

result of the order, counterorder

and disorder before the opening of the battle, the Commanders of the four French corps, the II, XVIII, XXIV and XXXV, in flagrant defiance of experience, had placed nearly half their infantry within 2,200 yards of the front line. In consequence the

German

assault met little resistance. position was soon overrun; the few men who resisted were bypassed to be mopped up later by reserves. By noon the position of resistance which Humbert had prescribed had been reached and passed apart from one or two places on the wings. In the centre the advance was particularly rapid; by the evening the Germans were over the Matz on a wide front south of Ressons, in possession of two-thirds of the second position and fanning out two or three miles beyond it. Here they were checked, at least for the moment, by Humbert's reserve of five infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions. In one day Hutier had advanced six miles, taken over 8,000 prisoners and virtually wiped out three French infantry divisions. He now ordered the pressure to be continued throughout the night by both his infantry and artillery. Although the advance had not been so deep as on the first day of the Chemin des Dames offensive a fortnight previously, all seemed to be

first

corps pulled back without more ado to the northern edge of the Foret de Laigue six miles in rear. Inevitably the plan for a counterattack on both sides of the German penetration must now be abandoned. The whole weight must now go in on the western flank alone.

The covering

going well. This time, however, there had been no loss of nerve on the part of the French Higher Command. Their Air Division and IX Brigade had intervened in the battle with conspicuous, if erratic, effect with lowflying attacks

on transport columns and

concentrations of reserves. Moreover, except among the luckless infantry caught by the opening bombardment, there had been no panic or loss of control. When troops had fallen back, they had done so in a steady manner and when ordered. Fayolle was quick to move three further divisions from the eastern flank of his army group

towards his broken front. When, however, Petain at 1930 hours demanded from Foch the immediate despatch of the British XXII Corps from Amiens to Estrees-St Denis some 12 miles immediately in rear of the German penetration, he was told that the situation on the British front did not yet permit its being deprived of this reserve. Foch did, however, move one division of this corps to Conty, 13 miles south of Amiens, to come into his own reserve. This, it was now clear, he had every right to do. Fayolle, Humbert and their staffs meanwhile started to plan a two-pronged counterattack on either side of the bulge in the centre of Third Army's front. Obviously before it could be delivered some sort of stability must be achieved. With the dawn of June 10 the Germans resumed the advance in the teeth of intense French artillery fire: despite this and local counterattacks, by the early afternoon they managed to get forward a further two miles on Humbert's western flank and south of Ressons on the Matz. An alarming situation now developed on the French right centre. The 53rd Infantry Division of the II Corps suddenly collapsed, dragging back with it the 72nd Infantry Division on its right, thus exposing to grave danger the whole right wing of Humbert's army immediately east of the Oise. Here the XVIII Corps, which so far had not been involved in the battle, now stood in a dangerous salient. Humbert's reaction was prompt and effective. Under his orders the whole

Mangin strikes back Fayolle, the Army Group Commander, had available in reserve three fresh infantry divisions and the four groupements of

Schneider and Saint-Chamond heavy tanks facing the open country in the western sector of Humbert's front. To these Petain added a further two infantry divisions which he had brought forward ir lorries. At 1600 hours Fayolle placed all these

XXXV

troops and the Corps, which was actually holding the line on the western flank, under the command of Mangin and ordered him to re-establish the situation by attacking the Germans in flank in the direction of Ressons. At this moment Foch himself appeared upon the scene and with true Gallic fervour stressed that it must be delivered 'like a thunderbolt' — the details

he left to Mangin. At the time when Foch appeared upon the scene only one of Mangin's five divisions was in its assembly area; the second was on its way closely followed by the third; the fourth could not arrive before midnight and the fifth till the early hours of the next morning. Their commanders had, however, come forward, so Mangin without further ado, in the presence of Foch, Fayolle and Humbert, forthwith and without hesitation proceeded to issue his orders to them. The attack, he said in a calm but firm voice, would take place on the morrow. To each he gave his separate task in unequivocal clarity and concise form. Some then protested that they were being asked to do more than could reasonably be expected; others asked for more time. Mangin listened patiently: then, in a low voice the tone of which was unequivocal and not without a hint of menace, he said: 'You will all do exactly what I have ordered you to do.' He went on: 'We will attack at 1100 hours. There will be no preliminary artillery bombardment. The attack will be ruthlessly pressed to the limit. This will be the end of the defensive battles we have fought for the past two months. From now on we

we must succeed. Go back men and tell them just this.' attack;

to

your

Fayolle would have liked to postpone Mangin's counterattack for 48 hours to

enable the artillery to locate the new positions of the German batteries and silence them in a preliminary bombardment, preplanned in minute detail. Foch, however, backed Mangin. The attack must go in at the time he had laid down. For once fortune favoured the French. At dawn a thick mist enveloped the front concealing the deployment of Mangin's troops. The Germans, who had already gained more than their first objective on the front selected for attack, remained quiescent and uninquisitive. The mist held till 1100 hours when it slowly began to lift. On the stroke of 1130 hours all the French guns opened

up and four of Mangin's divisions moved forward

preceded by a rolling barrage at the rate of 100 metres (3281 feet) in two minutes. Overhead fighter aircraft flying low fired ahead of the troops advancing against the German flank southwest of Ressons-sur-Matz. Other aircraft

moving

2813

Using the 'Bruchmuller recipe' and infantry

infiltration, Hutier's

set about destroying the line of German observation balloons above Montdidier and the long columns of reserves moving up towards the front. Mangin had prescribed that the infantry should 'advance as if there were no tanks'. In fact one groupement had been placed under command of each division, echeloned in depth behind the infantry, and had been given the same objectives. They had been ordered to remain concealed till the attack got under way, then to try to catch up the infantry, pass through them and run over any machine guns holding them up. Caught in the open the Germans were at first no match for the advancing infantry and tanks: the villages of Mery, Belloy and Fretoy and the wood of Genlis were carried in a rush at the point of the bayonet: such machine guns as resisted were squashed by the tanks. Over 1,000 prisoners were taken, and 19 guns. But now came a check. As Fayolle had feared, the Germans had massed batteries in the woods north of Belloy. From here too the Germans had excellent observation. This area had received insufficient attention in Mangin's fire plan. All these guns now opened up and by the early afternoon had pinned the infantry to the ground and, firing in some cases directly over their sights, had knocked out about half the tanks. On the French right wing, however, the XVIII Corps, profiting by Mangin's counterattack,

2814

troops advanced six miles

in

one day, wiping out three French divisions

not only halted all German attempts to advance east of the Oise but actually gained ground in two places before the short summer night descended on both sides. At first light next morning, June 12, both sides resumed the attack, the French on Mangin's front and the Germans on the other flank on the old Aisne battlefield south of the river. This was Hammerschlag, the second stage of the Gneisenau plan, a thrust by two corps of Seventh Army on a five divisional front due westwards from Soissons with the right directed on Compiegne. Delivered on the previous day, this attack might well have hamstrung Mangin's advance. There had, however, been delays, and when it eventually went in after a one-and-a-half hour preliminary bombardment it met withering artillery fire from guns which Petain and Fayolle had now fed into the battle in large numbers and from infantry encouraged by Mangin's success. By the late afternoon most of the attacking German divisions were back on their start lines. That night Ludendorff had to face the fact that his offensive on the Matz had shot its bolt.

On

He

therefore ordered

it

to end.

day Mangin had resumed the attack at first light after an opening bombardment of half an hour. So severe had been the tank losses on the previous day that they could not operate and without them and the benefit of surprise the inthis

fantry got nowhere. Undeterred, Mangin ordered renewal of the attack at 1700 hours. During the afternoon, however, it became apparent that, surprise having been lost, further operations would merely result in unjustifiable further sacrifice of life and this the French, with their reserves of manpower down to rock bottom, could

not afford. At last, even if they had only an advance of 3,200 yards at the most to their credit, they could claim to have halted the German advance on Paris and gained time to enable the arrival of American troops eventually to tip the strategic scale.

Mangin's victory unquestionably Clemenceau's government.

saved

Costly turning point It had been a costly battle. For the four days June 9 to 13, the French had lost 35,000 men and 70 of the 144 tanks engaged. Accurate figures for the same period for the

Germans

are not available. Despite

French claims to the contrary, however, in view of the huge concentrations of artillery achieved by both sides, it is reasonable to assume that German losses in killed and wounded were about the same. Weygand, Foch's Chief of Staff at the time, would later describe Mangin's counterattack as a masterpiece revealing to his fellow Allied generals what could be achieved by the exploitation of surprise and speed and the co-operation of Ml arms,

German

tained the reward might be very great. The Matz Battle outside French circles has received less attention than it deserves in the literature of the First World War. It did in fact constitute a turning point. For the first time since 1917 the French armies had shown that they could still turn to the attack with at least something of the elan of 1914. Those Frenchmen who in the teeth of military conservatism had pressed for tank production on a large scale were at last vindicated. The morale of the French nation as a whole, stimulated just before the battle by the news of the American attack at Belleau Wood, relatively small in scale though it was, now took an upward turn. The well publicised presence of the American divisions guarding the way to Paris at Chateau Thierry further stimu-

reserves carry up machine guns and ammunition

lated this revival.

The

victory, for victory

it

was, as Ludendorff admitted in his own autobiography, silenced the popular clamour against Clemenceau's government and left them free to get on with the war.

The

crisis

too,

and

its

successful out-

come, had strengthened the hand of Foch in his dealings with Petain who could see the situation from the point of view of France alone, pressing for the pooling of all Allied resources under French control and the move of the general reserve from behind Haig's front to cover Paris. In refusing to comply, Foch had asserted his rights as co-ordinator of the French, British and American armies and his ultimate authority over Petain within the French army. In Mangin he had found an army commander the flame of whose offensive spirit burnt at least as brightly as his own. In the first anxious days of June, the

French infantry counterattack supported by a Saint-Chamond tank

including the tanks and the air. Certainly in defence an answer had been found to the Hutier technique, even if it was belated. The French generals had taken an inordinately long time to grasp the implications of Petain's system of defence in depth. That controversy at any rate was settled once and for all. Never again must the bulk of the infantry be caught by the Germans' opening bombardment in the forward zone. The line of resistance must be out of range of the German guns and mortars used in the opening bombardment; after their initial break-in, the Germans must be forced to move forward the mass of their field artillery before tackling the line of resistance; reserves must be close to the places where they would most likely have to intervene. Mangin had shown that a large-scale counterattack, delivered with surprise and without preliminary bombardment, was a feasible and not necessarily costly operation, especially if delivered with the sup-

and low flying aircraft. In the actual fighting, closely watched by Pershing's own expert on armour, a certain Major Patton, the contribution of the tanks had been mainly moral; the port of tanks

Schneider and Saint-Chamond tanks were slow and their crosscountry performance had been mediocre. Their losses had been heavy. How many had fallen victim to direct artillery fire and how many had been caught in the German barrages no one was

able to ascertain after the battle.

They

did,

however, point a way to the future: quite in what way no one knew, but Patton at any

and others realised that Cambrai had been no mere flash in the pan and that their potential was great, provided their mechrate

anical efficiency could be improved. In the air it had been an intense and confused battle. The aircraft despatched at the outset to destroy the German observation balloons had found them protected by large formations of German fighters and had achieved little. There had been also unfortunate instances of British fighters firing on French troops and of French pilots shooting at British aircraft. One British pilot was wounded by a French two-seater which continued to fire at him when his aircraft was on the ground — this in British eyes, and indeed German too, constituted an act to which only a cad would descend. A British bomber formation, thinking they had spotted a German concentration, also bombed the French wounding eight French officers and killing 75 horses. The British

History of the War in the Air blandly records that in future pilots before taking the air when co-operating with the army should be provided with a map and be told where on the ground their own troops were. Even in these early days the Official

main

was

and continuous liaison between the ground and the air forces could be organised and mainlesson

there:

if

close

well advertised threat of the battle had strained Anglo-French relations to the limit, Haig, rightly as it turned out, insisting that Ludendorff planned to deliver the coup de grace on his front and that his attacks in the south were designed to draw the main Allied reserves away from it. Forty-eight hours before the battle a meeting in Paris between Milner, Henry Wilson,

Haig, Foch and Clemenceau had finally cleared the air. Both the British and the French had finally agreed that at all costs both armies must maintain contact and that they would cover not only Paris but the Channel ports as well. For the rest of the war the two nations would work together, if not in harmony, at least with goodwill. Both the Allies and the Germans now stood on the verge of the final phase of the war. French prestige had, at least partially, been restored. The hope of early American military intervention on a large scale henceforward would stimulate an upsurge in French, British and Italian morale. The foundations at least of a workable Allied command system had been laid. From now on French, British and Americans could go forward as a team under Foch's tactful direction. Further Reading

France & Belgium 1918. Vol3(Macmillan 1939) Persh ng, J. F., My Experiences in the World War (Hodder & Stoughton 1931)

Military Operations: l

Pitt,

1 91 8 -The Last Act (CasseW 1962) Petain the Soldier (A. S. Barnes & Co

Barrie,

Ryan,

S.,

1969)

[For Major-General H. Essame's biography, see page 1185.]

2815

a ' '

Ill ENTER THE

U.S. MARINES

June

6. Those were before the days of lavish maps, to which the American afterwards attained. There was one map to each company, exclusive property of the captain. Platoon commanders had a look at it. 'You're here. The objective is a square patch of woods a kilometre and a half north-east, about. See? — this. Form your platoons in four waves — the guide will be right. Third battalion is advancing their flank to conform. French on the .' left Platoons were formed in four waves, the attack formation taught by the French, a formation proved in trench warfare, where there was a short way to go, and you calculated on losing the first three waves and getting the fourth one to the objective. The Marines never used it again. It was a formation unadapted for open warfare, and incredibly vulnerable. It didn't take long to learn better, but there was a price to pay for the learning. The platoons came out of the woods as dawn was getting grey. The light was strong when they advanced into the open wheat, now all starred with dewy poppies, red as blood. To the east the sun appeared, immensely red and round, a handbreadth above the horizon; a German shell burst black across the face of it, just to the left of the line. Men turned their heads to see, and many there looked no more upon the sun forever. 'Boys, it's a fine, clear mornin'! Guess we get chow after we get done molestin' these here Heinies, hey?' — One old non-com — was it Jerry Finnegan of the 49th? — had out a can of salmon, hoarded somehow against hard times. He haggled .

.

open with his bayonet, and went forward eating chunks of goldfish from the point of that wicked knife. 'Finnegan' — his platoon commander, a young gentleman init

so,

had his was annoyed — 'when you

clined to peevishness before he'd

morning

coffee,

are quite through with your refreshments, you can — damn well fix that bayonet and get on with the war!' — 'Aye, aye, sir!' Finnegan was an old Haitian soldier, and had a breezy manner with young lieutenants— 'Th' lootenant want some?' — Two

2816

hours later Sergeant Jerry Finnegan lay dead across a Maxim gun with his bayonet in the body of the gunner It was a beautiful deployment, lines all dressed and guiding true. Such matters were of deep concern to this outfit. The day was without a cloud, promising heat later, but now it was pleasant in the wheat, and the woods around looked blue and cool. Pretty country, those rolling wheat-lands north-west of Chateau-Thierry, with copses of trees and little tidy forests where French sportsmen maintained hunting lodges and game preserves. Since the first Marne there had been no war here. The found it very different from the files mangled red terrain around Verdun, and much nicer to look at. 'Those poppies now. Right pretty, ain't they?' — a tall corporal picked one and stuck it in his helmet buckle, where it blazed against his leathery cheek. There was some shelling — not much, for few of the German guns had caught up, the French had lost all theirs and the .

American

artillery

was

.

.

arriving.

still

Across this wheat-field there were more woods, and in the edge of these woods the old Boche, lots of him, infantry and machine guns. Surely he had seen the platoons forming a few hundred yards away — it is possible that he did not believe his eyes. He let them come close before he

opened has his

fire.

The American

fighting

man

prone to many regrettable errors. But the sagacious enemy will never let him get close enough to see whom he is attacking. When he has seen the enemy, the American regular will come on in. To stop him you must kill him. And when he is properly trained and has somebody to say 'Come on!' to him, he will stand as much killing as anybody on earth. The platoons, assailed now by a fury of small arms fire, narrowed their eyes and inclined in

heavy

failings.

He

is

their bodies rain,

reinforced

the

forward, like

and went first,

on.

men

Second waves

fourth

waves the

third, as prescribed. Officers yelled 'Battlesight! fire at will!' — and the leaders,

making out green-grey, clumsy uniforms

On June 6,

1918 the Marine Brigade of the US 2nd Division attacked Belleau Wood. By nightfall they had captured their objective, but at the cost of 1,087 casualties. This account shows how and why

and round pot-helmets in the gloom of the woods, took it up with Springfields, aimed shots. Automatic riflemen brought their chaut-chauts into action from the hip — chaut-chaut is as accurate from the hip as it ever is — and wrangled furiously with their ammunition-carriers — 'Come on, kid

— bag o'clips' — 'Aw — I lent it to Ed to carry, — 'Yeh, and night — didn't think

—

last

'

Ed

lent it to a fence-post when he got tired — get me some off a casualty, before I very respectable volume of fire came from the advancing platoons. There was yelling and swearing in the wheat, and the lines, much thinned, got into the woods.

—

'

A

Some grenades went

off; there was screaming and a tumult, and the 'taka-taka-takataka' of the Maxim guns died down. 'Hi! Sergeant! — hold on! Major said he wanted — 'Well, sir, they looked some prisoners like they was gonna start somethin' — 'All right! All right! but you catch some — alive the next place, you hear? 'Quickly, now — get some kind of a line — 'Can't make four waves — 'Well, make two — an' put the chaut-chauts in the second — no use gettin' 'em bumped off beThe attack went on, fore we can use 'em platoons much smaller, sergeants and corporals commanding many of them. A spray of fugitive Boche went before the attack, holding where the ground offered cover, working his light machine guns with devilish skill, retiring, on the whole, commendably. He had not expected to fight a defensive battle here, and was not heavily entrenched, but the place was stiff with his troops, and he was in good quality, as Marine casualty lists were presently to show. There was more wheat, and more woods, and obscure savage fighting among individuals in a brushy ravine. The attack, especially the inboard platoons of the 49th and 67th Companies, burst from the trees upon a gentle slope of wheat that mounted to a crest of orderly pines, black against the sky. A three-cornered coppice this side of the pines commanded the slope; now it blazed with machine guns and rifles; the air was populous with wicked keening

—

— ——

'

'

—

—

'

'

Most of the front waves went down; hands, very sensibly, flung themselves — prone. 'Can't walk up to these babies 'No — won't be enough of us left to get on — 'Pass the word: crawl with the war forward, keepin' touch with the man on your right! Fire where you can That officer, a big man, who has picked up a noises.

—

all

—

'

—

German

light

'

'

machine gun somewhere,

with a vague idea of using it in a pinch, or, in any case, keeping it for a souvenir, received the attention of a heavy Maxim and went down with a dozen bullets through his chest.

Men

crawled forward; the wheat was and the Boche, directing his

agitated,

by observers in tree-tops, browned the slope industriously. Men were wounded, wounded again as the lines of fire swept fire

back and forth, and finally killed. It helped some to bag the feldwebels in the trees; there were men in that line who could hit at 750 yards, three times out of five. Sweating, hot and angry with a bleak, cold anger, the Marines worked forward. They were there, and the Germans, and there was nothing else in the clanging world. An officer, risking his head above the wheat, observed progress, and detached a corporal with his squad to get forward by the flank. 'Get far enough past that flank gun, now, close as you can, and rush it — we'll keep it busy.' Nothing sounds as mad as riflefire, staccato, furiousThe corporal judged that he was far enough, and rose with a yell, his squad leaping with him. He was not past the flank; two guns swung that way, and cut the squad down like a grasshook levels a clump of weeds They lay there for days, eight Marines in a dozen yards, face down on their rifles. But they had done their job. The men in the wheat were close enough to use the split-second .

.

.

—

.

.

.

interval in the firing. They got in, cursing and stabbing. Meanwhile, to the left a little group of men lay in the wheat under the very muzzle of a gun that clipped the stalks around their ears and riddled their combat packs — firing high by a matter of inches

A

man can stand just of that. Life presently ceases to be desirable; the only desirable thing is to and the mercy of God.

so

much

that gunner, kill him with your hands! of them, a corporal named Geer, said: 'By God, let's get him!' And they got him. One fellow seized the spitting muzzle and up-ended it on the gunner; he lost a hand in the matter. Bayonets flashed in, and a riflebutt rose and fell. The battle tore through the coppice. The machine gunners were brave men, and many of the Prussian infantry were brave men, and they died. A few streamed back through the brush, and hunters and hunted burst in a frantic medley on the open at the crest of the hill. Impartial machine guns, down the hill to the left, took toll of both. Presently the remnants of the assault companies were panting in the trees on the edge of the hill. It was the objective of the attack, but distance had ceased to have any meaning, time was not, and the country was full of square patches of woods. In the valley below were more Germans, and on the next hill. Most of the officers were down, and all hands kill

One

went on. They went down the brushy

slope, across

road where two heavy Maxims were caught sitting, and mopped up and up the next long, smooth a

little

run,

across

a

Some Marines branched off down that road and went into the town of Torcy. There slope.

was fighting

in Torcy,

and a French aero-

plane reported Americans in it, but they never came out again ... a handful of impudent fellows against a battalion of Then the men who Sturmtruppen mounted the slope found themselves in a cleared area, full of orderly French woodpiles, and apparently there was a machine gun to every wood-pile. Jerry Finnegan died here, sprawled across one of them. Lieutenant Somers died here. One lieutenant found himself behind a wood-pile, with a big auto-rifleman. Just across from them, very near, a machine gun behind another wood-pile was searching for them. The lieutenant, all his world narrowed to that little place, peered vainly for a loophole; .

.

.

Opposite page: Marines in the rolling wooded country around Belleau. Above left: The first Marine action in Europe. Above: Some of the 'Heinies' that the marines 'molested'. German prisoners are escorted back

the sticks were jumping and shaking as the

Maxim

flailed

them; bullets rang under his

helmet. 'Here, Morgan,' he said, 'I'll poke my tin hat around this side, and you watch and see if you can get the chaut-chaut on He stuck the helmet on his them bayonet, and thrust it out. Something struck it violently from the point, and the rifle made his fingers tingle. The chautchaut went off, once. In the same breath the there was an odd noise above him machine gun ... he looked up. Morgan's body was slumping down to its knees; it leaned forward against the wood, the chaut-chaut, still grasped in a clenched hand, coming to the ground butt first. The man's head was gone from the eyes up; his helmet slid stickily back over his combat 'My mother,' pack and lay on the ground reflected the lieutenant, 'will never find my grave in this place!' He picked up the chautchaut, and examined it professionally, noting a spatter of little thick red drops on the breech, and the fact that the slip showed one round expended. The charging handle was back. He got to his feet with deliberation, laid the gun across the woodthree Boche with very pile, and sighted red faces; their eyes looked pale under He gave them the their deep helmets. whole clip, and they appeared to wilt. Then he came away from there. Later he was in the little run at the foot of the hill with three men, all wounded. He never knew

—

'

.

.

.

.

It

.

.

.

.

how he got there.

.

.

.

.

just happened.

[Reprinted from Fix Bayonets by Captain

John W. Thomason, printed by Charles Scribner's Sons]

2817

~!3 + ~ %

OBSERVATION The military importance of air power is the freedom it confers to oversee, and harass, the dispositions and activities of an opponent. Around this core all the elaborations of air fighting have been built. Christopher Chant

For two generations now- -we have grown accustomed to the use of 'air power' as a strategic weapon, and it is consequently difficult to imagine that in the First World War there was no such thing as air power as an independent strategic force — it was only a tactical adjunct of the army and of the navy. That the air forces of the fighting powers should be relegated to a secondary position, albeit an important one with a decisive influence in the outcome of tactical aviation was too art to have developed machines capable of carrying a load sufficiently great to make the machines strategic offensive weapons in their own right. As tactical weapons, therefore, aircraft had to be geared to the needs of the forces they were supporting. In the First World War, the main use of aeroplanes supporting the armies was as a means of observation. This took the form of optical spotting for the artillery, or photographic and optical reconnaissance for army and affairs, is inevitable, as

new an

corps headquarters.

These two roles

fulfilled

by the air

forces,

then, were the prime raison d'etres of the

Royal

Flying Corps and

its

companion

services on both sides. Though more attention is given usually to the exploits of the fighter (or scout) pilots, as the legatees of the 'tradition of chivalry' and as the memorable individualists of the air war, this is

somewhat unfair

to the pilots

and

crews of artillery spotting and reconnaissance squadrons on two counts: their bravery was no less (indeed, it could be argued that it was greater as they flew

which were less combat-worthy in instances) and their utility to the ground forces was greater. Fighter pilots were cast in an essentially negative role, their purpose being to deny the enemy the benefit of the information that their reconaircraft

many

naissance and photographic machines could provide. Thus, although it was less 'glamorous' and less dangerous than engaging other single-seater machines, a fighter pilot could far more profitably employ himself in shooting down artillery and reconnaissance machines than fighters. (Of the 80 machines shot down by Manfred von Richthofen, 47 were of the artillery and reconnaissance variety.) It had been realised before the war by certain enthusiasts, notably in No 3 Squadron RFC, that aircraft would play an important part in the future conflict as eyes for the artillery, and a certain amount of work had been done in the development of means of communicating with the ground forces, principally by means of coloured lights fired from the aircraft and messages

2818

dropped near the guns. These were too inefficient to be practical, however, and the problem remained unsolved until the advent of wireless. This was at first clumsy and short in range, but the exigencies of war soon provided the stimulus to ensure

The first truly successful artillery-spotting flights took place during the Battle of the Aisne in September 1914, rapid progress.

when BE

2's

spotted for the

BEF.

It

is

worth noting here that throughout the war the Germans had less need for artillery-spotting aircraft than the RFC or the French air force as they held the higher ground for most of the length of the Western Front. In many places, forward observation officers were sufficient to spot the

fall

had

of shot. This

is

not to say that they

need for spotter aircraft balloons, but merely a lesser need. no

and

The practice of artillery spotting grew in scope and in sophistication throughout the war, but its principal elements had been decided by the beginning of 1915, and the only major changes were in the aircraft and the wireless equipment, which became lighter, more reliable and possessed of longer range. Though experiments with wireless telephony had proved fairly successful, the continuation of the war into 1919 would have seen little improvement in spotting. Let us, therefore, examine the techniques of spotting. The aim was for a particular aircraft to register the fire of one gun in a battery onto a specific target. When the aircraft could see the shells from this gun landing on the target, it could inform the battery commander that all his guns could now fire on the same laying as the registered one, hit the target and presumably destroy it. The target in most instances was a fixed one such as a hostile gun battery, strong point in the line, or, in the event of an offensive, the whole of the enemy's defence system. The recipients of the very heavy guns' attention were usually further behind the lines, targets such as supply and ammunition dumps and rail-

way junctions.

On

being ordered out, the aircraft would

and fly to the vicinity of the shoot, and there identify the battery for which it was to spot and the target upon which it was to register the guns. Having done

take

this,

off

the spotter aircraft's observer,

who

was responsible for the registering of the shoot, would identify his aircraft to the battery and order a shot to be fired at a designated moment. As this moment approached, the pilot, who throughout the shoot had to fly a course between the guns and the target, turned so that his observer could see the gun as it fired. As he saw it

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2'819

the observer started his stopwatch pilot to turn so that he observer) could see the target. As he knew the approximate range, and the ballistic characteristics of the gun for which he was spotting, he could glance at the stopwatch and predict the arrival of the shell in the vicinity of the target. The use of the watch was essential, for without it the observer might take the fall of shot of other batteries for his own and thus signal false corrections. After this first shot, the observer now had to correct the fire of the gun. Up until the early part of 1915, this had been done by signalling for the gun to vary its fire slightly around its original laying, until the target was hit, whereupon the observer would signal to this effect. Early in 1915, however, the 'clock code' was introduced. This marked the beginning of the day of scientific artillery spotting, economically much superior in shell and time over the earlier haphazard system. The clock code was virtually foolproof. It had as its two bases true north and the dial of a clock. The target was considered to be at the centre of the dial, and 12 o'clock due north of it, with the other hours in their standard positions relative to this. This part of the system, therefore, gave the direction from the target of the position where the shell had landed. Thus a shell that landed due east of the target was reported as having fallen at 3 o'clock. The other component of the system was of course range. Apart from knowing where, relative to the target, the shell had fallen, the battery commander needed to know how far in that direction from the target it had fallen. For this, the observer and the battery commander had to visualise a series of concentric circles around the target, at fixed intervals. These were at ranges of 10, 25, 50, 100, 200, 300, 400 and 500 yards from the target and were denoted by the letters Y, Z, A, B, C, D, E and F respectively. So if the shell landed 400 yards south-south-east of the target, the observer would transmit, in Morse, the code 'E 5'. The battery commander could then work out exactly where his shot had landed and make corrections to the laying of the gun accordingly. The process continued until the gun was firing in exactly the right direction and at exactly the right range, whereupon the rest of the guns in the battery would join in, firing on the

do

so,

and instructed the

same

laying.

Hazardous work Artillery observation was extremely hazardous work, for apart from the danger from hostile fighters, the need for the pilot to fly an even and regular course at a relatively low altitude in the vicinity of the front line made his aircraft a tempting and good target for AA guns. There was also the danger from one's own shells, for the aircraft flew at the height reached by howitzer shells at the top of their trajectories.

Several aircraft are

known

to

have been lost as a result of being hit by shells from their own side, and there are

many recorded instances of pilots catching sight of shells. Imagine flying at about 5,000 to 6,000 feet and suddenly hearing a sound 'like an express train' moving towards you, then sighting the ghostlike grey form of an enormous howitzer shell tumbling ever more slowly up towards you, jelling into crystal solidity for the brief moment it is stationary at the apex of its

2820

trajectory

and then tumbling away with

increasing speed into invisibility again and the ground. The other means of artillery spotting was

from balloons. The rows of these, about one every three miles along each side of the front, were one of the characteristic features of the Western Front. Intrinsically very vulnerable, as they were filled with hydrogen as their lifting agent, these were extraordinarily heavily defended with machine guns on the ground. As few aces were noted for their readiness to attack balloons, but most pilots gave them a wide berth — at the first sign of a hostile aircraft, the high-speed mooring winches for each balloon would haul down their charges, leaving the machine guns a clear and ranged field of fire in which to give the attacker a hot reception. The only real chance of success lay in using cloud cover to surprise the balloon crew. In an emergency situation such as this, the occupants of the balloon's basket, who had been equipped with parachutes from an early stage of the war, usually abandoned their craft.

The great advantage of using balloons was that they were stationary relative to the guns and their targets, and could communicate by telephone with the battery,

whereas aircraft were restricted to onewireless. The battery had to communicate with the aircraft by means of prearranged signals in the form of strips of cloth laid out on the ground. Britain had

way

entered

the

war with only man-lifting

which required a strong wind and were very unstable, and with spherical balloons, which were useless in any but the calmest weather. The French and Germans were much better off, with the Caquot and the Drachen types respectively (both used the term Drachen for tethered observation balloons), and the Italians also had a good balloon. The Italian type was adopted by the British, but this had been replaced by the French type by the end of the war. These balloons were able to fly and to give their occupants a stable enough platform in winds up to about 50 mph. The actual practice of artillery spotting did not differ very much from that used by aircraft, except inasmuch as the balloon was stationary. The other important tactical role fulfilled by aircraft in the First World War, as explained above, was that of reconnaissance. This fell into two parts: short range over the trenches for corps purposes and long range behind the lines for army purposes. Short-range reconnaissances were kites,

usually photographic, so that corps and divisional Intelligence officers could build up photographic maps of the front line for the purposes of planning attacks and raids.

gliding

Long-range reconnaissances were different, usually visual, the observer marking down on a map the positions of any items that might interest army Intelligence officers (items that might have long-term ramifications or show a major build-up in strength, portending a large-scale offensive. The Major difficulty in short-range reconnaissances lay in the fact that they were over the front line, the prowling ground of enemy fighters and the home of some of the heaviest anti-aircraft defences. Aircraft on such a mission had to fly straight and level for some distance to take the necessary overlapping series of photographs, and such aircraft were all the more easily surprised by fighters, as well as providing the AA guns with a good target. The difficulties of long-range reconnaissance machines, how-

naissance missions at the time of the Battle of the Somme speak for himself, and describe the sensation of being on a 'long reconnaissance'. The following extract is from An Airman's Outings by 'Contact',

AA

fire and fighters ever, were different. to be braved on the way out and back over the front lines, but more important was the problem of navigation and the reliability of the engine, both considerable factors in the still primitive days of the

had

World War.

A German machine

with engine trouble stood a better chance of First

over the lines than an Allied machine, however, as the prevailing wind

was usually a westerly one. But let one who flew long-range recon-

published by Blackwood: For 30 hours the flight had 'stood by' for a long reconnaissance. We were dragged from bed at 4.30 of dawn, only to return gratefully beneath the blankets threequarters of an hour later, when a slight but steady rain washed away all chance of an immediate job. The drizzle continued until after sundown, and our only occupations throughout the day were to wade from mess to aerodrome, aerodrome to mess, and to overhaul in detail machines, maps, guns, and consciences. Next morning again we dressed in the half-light, and again went back to bed in the daylight. This time the show had been postponed because of low clouds and a thick ground-mist that hung over the reeking earth. It was a depressing dawn — clammy, moist and sticky. But by early afternoon the mist had congealed, and the sheet of clouds was torn to rags by a strong south-west wind. The four craft detailed for the reconnaissance

were therefore lined outside their shed, while their crews waited for flying orders. I to be in the leading bus, for when C.'s death left vacant the command of A Flight, the good work of my pilot had brought him a flight-commandership, a three-pipped

was

tunic and a sense of responsibility which checked his tendency to over-recklessness. He now came from the squadron office with news of a changed course.

The plan 'To get the wind behind us,' he explained, 'we shall cross well to the south of Peronne. Next, we go to Boislens. After that we pass by Nimporte, over the Foret de Charbon to Siegecourt; then up to Le Recul and back by Princebourg, St Guillaume, and Toutpres. 'As regards the observers, don't forget to use your field-glasses on the rolling stock; don't forget the precise direction of trains and motor transport; don't forget the railways and roads on every side; don't forget the canals; and for the Lord's and everybody else's sake, don't be surprised by Hun aircraft. As regards the pilots — keep in close formation when possible; don't straggle and don't climb above the proper height.' The pilots ran their engines once more,

and the observers exchanged information about items such as Hun aerodromes and

number of railway stations at each large town. An air reconnaissance is essentially the observer's show; its main people at object being to supply the headquarters with private bulletins from the back of the German front. The collection of reconnaissance reports is work of a highly skilled nature, or ought to be. Spying out the land is much more than a search of railways, roads and the terrain generally. The experienced observer must know the German area over which he works rather better than he knows Salisbury Plain. The approximate position of railway junctions and stations, aerodromes, factories and depots should be familiar to him, so that he can without difficulty spot the

T

Balloons; stable observation plattorms, but vulnerable. Top: Instruction in aerial photography for the RFC. Above: Wireless tuition. Air to ground wireless was late in coming, but was vital to many observation tasks Left:

any new feature. Also he must be something of a sleuth, particularly when using smoke as a clue. In the early morning a thin layer of smoke above a wood may mean a bivouac. If it be but a few miles behind the lines, it can evidence heavy artillery. A narrow stream of smoke near a railway will make an observer scan the line closely for a stationary train, as the Boche engine-drivers usually try to avoid detection by shutting off steam. The Hun has many other dodges to avoid publicity. When Allied aircraft appear, motor and horse transport remain immobile at the roadside or under trees. Artillery and infantry are packed under cover; though, for that matter, the Germans very rarely move troops in the daytime, preferring the night or early morning, when there are no troublesome eyes in the air. To foil these attempts at concealment is the business of the observers, who gather information for Army Headquarters and GHQ. For observers on corps work the detective problems are somewhat different. This department deals with hidden saps and battery positions, and draws and photographs conclusions from clues such as a muzzle-blast, fresh tracks, or an artificial cluster of trees. All reconnaissance observers must carry out a simultaneous search of the earth for movement and the sky for foes, and in addition keep their guns ready for instant use. And should anything happen to their machines, and a forced landing seem likely, they must sit tight and carry on so long as there is the slightest hope of a safe return. A nos moutons. I made a long list in my note-book of the places where something useful was likely to be observed, and tried my gun by firing a few shots into the

ground. We hung around, impatient at the long delay. 'Get into your machines,' called the Squadron-Commander at last, when a telephone message had reported that the weather conditions toward the east were no longer unfavourable. We took to the air

and

set

off.

V. led his covey beyond Albert and well south of the river before he turned to the left. Then, with the strong wind behind us, we raced north-east and crossed the strip of trenches. The pilot of the emergency machine, which had come thus far to join the party if one of the other four dropped out, waved his hand in farewell and left for

home.

Archie barked at us immediately, but he caused small trouble, as most of his attention was already claimed by a party of French machines half a mile ahead. Anyhow we should have shaken him off quickly, for at this stage of the journey, with a 40-mile wind reinforcing our usual air speed of about 95 mph, our ground speed was sufficient to avoid lingering in any region made unhealthy by AA guns. The water-marked ribbon of trenches seemed altogether puny and absurd during the few seconds when it was within sight. The

winding Somme was dull and dirty as the desolation of its surrounding basin. Some 4,000 feet above the ground a few clouds moved restlessly at the bidding of the wind. Passing a few small woods, we arrived without interruption over the railwa\ junction of Boislens. With arms free of the machine to avoid unnecessary vibration, the observers trained their glasses on the station and estimated the amount of r

2821

A close search of the railway only revealed one train. I grabbed and note-book and wrote: 'Boislens, 5 P.M. 6 R.S., 1 train going S.W.' [Boislens, 3.05 pm, 6 Rolling Stock, 1 train stock.

I

going south-west.] Just west of our old friend Mossy-Face [a wood] were two rows of flagrantly new trenches. As this is one of the points where the Germans made a stand after their 1917 spring retreat, it can be assumed that even as far back as last October they were preparing new lines of defence, Hindenburg or otherwise. Not far west of these defence works were two troublesome aerodromes at Bertincourt and Velu, both of which places have since been captured.

but the shots were all wide and we remained unworried. To judge by the quality of the AA shooting each time I called there, it seemed likely that half-trained AA gungers were allowed to cut their active service teeth on us at Siegecourt. Having squeezed Siegecourt of all movement, we headed for Le Recul. Here the intricate patchwork of railway kept the observers busy, and six more trains were bagged. Then, as this was the farthest point east to be touched, we turned to the

and travelled homeward. was soon afterwards that our engine went dud. Instead of a rhythmic and continuous hum there was at regular intervals a break, caused by one of the left

It

cylinders missing explosion at each turn

The

A

aerial 'Hun'

rotary engine. The rev counter showed that the number of revolutions per

of the

an aerodrome followed. V., who knew the neighbourhood well, having passed above it some two-score times, was quick to spot a group of hitherto unnoted sheds north of Boislens, towards Mossyhunt

for

minute had fallen off appreciably. Decreased revs meant less speed, and our only chance to keep with the others was to lose height continuously. We were then nearly 50 miles from the lines. I noticed the gap in the engine's drone as soon as it began. An airman is accustomed to the full roar of his engine, and it never distracts his attention, any more than the noise of a waterfall distracts those who live near it. But if the roar becomes noncontinuous and irregular he is acutely conscious of the sound. When the machine began to lose height I knew there was a chronic miss. V. looked round and smiled reassuringly, though he himself was far from reassured. He tried an alteration in the carburettor mixture, but this did not remedy matters. Next, thinking that the engine might have been

Face. He circled over them to let me plot the pin-point position on the map and sketch the aerodrome and its surroundings. The Hun pilots, with thoughts of a possible bomb-raid, began to take their machines into the air for safety. 'Got 'em all?' Thus V., shouting through the rubber speaking-tube, one end of which was fixed inside my flying-cap, so that it always rested against my ear. 'Correct. Get on with the good work.' The good work led us over a region for ever associated with British arms. Some of the towns brought bitter memories of that anxious August three years back. Thus Nimporte, which saw a desperate but successful stand on one flank of the contemptible little army to gain time for the main body; Ventregris, scene of a cavalry charge that was a glorious tragedy; Labas, where a battery of horse-gunners made for itself an imperishable name; Siegecourt, where the British might have retired into a trap but didn't; and Le Recul itself, whence they slipped away just in time. In the station at Nimporte a train was

waiting to move their

Both

off",

and two more were on

way

to the military base of Pluspres. attempted to hide their heads by

shutting off steam immediately the drone of our engines made itself heard; but we had spotted them from afar, and their presence was duly noted. The next item of interest was activity at a factory outside a little town. Black trails of smoke stretched away from the chimneys; and surely, as we approached a minute ago, a short column of lorries was passing along a road towards the factory. Yet when we reached the spot there was no sign of road transport. Nevertheless, I was certain I had seen some motor vehicles, and I entered the fact in my note-book. Like wise I took care to locate the factory site on my map, in case it deserved the honour of a bomb attack later. Our bus led the way across the huge unwieldy Foret de Charbon, patterned in rectangular fashion by intersecting roads, and we arrived at Siegecourt. This is at once a fortress and an industrial town. There are several railway stations around it, and these added greatly to the observers' collection of trains and trucks The Huns below, with unpleasant memories of former visits from British aircraft, probably expected to be bombed. They threw up at us a large quantity of high-explosive shells,

2822

Top: Final briefing-a German observation officer receives his last orders before ascending balloon. Above: Jack of all trades- the observer of a German reconnaissance machine, surrounded by the paraphernalia of his tasks, observation and self defence in his

choked, he cut off the petrol supply for a moment and put down the nose of the machine. The engine stopped, but picked up when the petrol was once more allowed to run. During the interval I thought the engine had ceased work altogether, and was about to stuff things into my pocket in readiness for a landing on hostile ground. We continued in a westerly direction, with the one cylinder still cutting out. To make matters worse, the strong wind that had been our friend on the outward journey was now an enemy, for it was drifting us to the north, so that we were obliged to steer almost dead into it to follow the set slightly

course.

As we passed along the straight canal Le Recul to Princebourg many barges were in evidence. Those at the side of the canal were taken to be moored up, and those in the middle to be moving, though the slowness of their speed made it impossible to decide on their direction, for from a height of 10,000 feet they seemed to be stationary. About a dozen Hun machines were rising from aerodromes at from

Passementerie, away to the left, but if they after us the attempt to reach our height in time was futile. Between Le Recul and Princebourg we dropped 1,500 feet below the three rear machines, which hovered above us. Though

were

I

was

far

from feeling at home,

it

was

necessary to sweep the surrounding country for transport of all kinds. This was done almost automatically, since I found myself unable to give a wholehearted attention to the job, while the infernal motif of the engine's ragtime drone dominated everything and invited speculation on how much lower we were than the others, and whether we were likely to reach a friendly landing-ground. And all the while a troublesome verse chose very inopportunely to race across the background of my mind, in time with the engine, each cut-out being the end of a line. Once or twice I caught myself murmuring: 'In that poor but honest 'ome, Where 'er sorrowin' parints live, They drink the shampyne wine she sends, But never, never can forgive.'

height

slightly

greater

than ours, but

some distance behind the bus that acted as rearguard to the party. Its speed must have been about 10 mph more than our own, for though the Hun pilot had probably throttled down, he was obliged to make his snake its way in short curves, so that should not come within dangerous range of our guns. At times he varied this method by lifting the machine almost to stalling point, letting her down again, and repeating the process. Once I saw some motor transport on a road. I leaned over the side to estimate their number, but gave up the task of doing so with accuracy under the double strain of watching the Hun scout and listening to the jerky voice of the craft it

engine.

As we continued to drop, the German evidently decided to finish us. He climbed a little and then rushed ahead. I fired at him in rapid bursts, but he kept to his course. He did not come near enough for a dive, however, as the rest of the party, 2,000 feet above, had watched his movements, and as soon as he began to move nearer two of them fell towards him. Seeing his game was spoiled the Boche went down steeply, and only flattened out when he was low enough to be safe from attack. Near St Guillaume an anti-aircraft battery opened fire. The Hun pilot then thought it better to leave Archie to deal with us, and he annoyed us no more. Some of the shell-bursts were quite near, and we could not afford to lose height in distancedodging, with our machine in a dubious condition 25 miles on the wrong side of the trenches. Toutpres, to the south-west, was to have been included in the list of towns covered, but under the adverse circumstances V. decided not to battle against the wind more than was necessary to get us home. He therefore veered to the right, and steered due west. The south-west wind cut across and drifted us, so that our actual course was north-west. Our ground speed was now a good deal greater than if we had travelled directly west, and there was no extra distance to be covered, because of a large eastward bend in the lines as they wound north. We skirted the ragged Foret de QuandMeme, and passed St Guillaume on our left.

The stalker

Top:

Ground crew prepare an Albatros

of

for a

Above: Bird's eye view of the Battle the Som me — information for the corps

sortie.

Slightly to the east of Princebourg, a new complication appeared in the shape of a small German machine. Seeing that our bus was in difficulties, it awaited an opportunity to pounce, and remained at a

The behaviour of the engine went from bad to worse, and the vibration became more and more intense. Once more I thought it would peter out before we were within gliding distance of British territory, and I therefore made ready to burn the

2823

machine — the

last

duty of an airman

in for the catastrophe of a landing

let

among

enemies. But the engine kept alive, obstinately and unevenly. V. held down the nose of the machine still farther, so as to gain the lines in the quickest possible time. Soon we were treated to a display by the family ghost of the clan Archibald, otherwise an immense pillar of grey-white smoky substance that appeared very suddenly to windward of us. It stretched up vertically from the ground to a height about level withours, which was then only 5,500 feet. We watched it curiously as it stood in an unbending rigidity similar to that of a giant waxwork, cold, unnatural, stupidly implacable, half unbelievable and wholly ridiculous. At the top it sprayed round, like a stick of asparagus. For two or three months similar apparitions had been exhibited to us at rare intervals, nearly always in the same, neighbourhood. At first sight the pillars of smoke seemed not to disperse, but after an interval they apparently faded away as mysteriously as they had appeared. What was meant to be

branch of frightfulness I cannot say. One rumour was that they were an experiment in aerial gassing, and another that they were of some phosphorus compound. All I know is that they entertained us from time to time, with no apparent damage. Archie quickly distracted our attention from the phantom pillar. We had been drifted to just south of Lille, possibly the hottest spot on the whole Western Front as regards anti-aircraft fire. Seeing one machine 4,000 to 5,000 feet below its companions, the gunners very naturally concentrated on it. A spasmodic chorus of barking coughs drowned the almost equally spasmodic roar of the engine. V. dodged steeply and then raced, full out, for the

report, elaborated the sketches of the new aerodromes, and drove in our unkempt

mist that might have made the work difficult. Then I thought of the cylinder that missed and the chunk of rudder that was missing, but decided that these little inconveniences were unofficial. And the legend I felt in duty bound to write was: 'Height 5,000-10,000 ft. Observation easy.'

state to Headquarters, there to discuss the reconnaissance with, spotlessly neat staff officers. At the end of the report one must give the height at which the job was done,

and say whether the conditions were favourable or otherwise for observation. I thought of the absence of thick clouds or

Further Reading Cuneo, J., The Air Weapon (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Co, 1947)

Lamberton, W.

Reconnaissance and 191 4-1 91 8 War

M.,

Bomber Aircraft of the

(Harleyford 1958) J.T. B.,F/Ve Years in the RFC (The Aeroplane & General Publishing Co) Neumann, G. P., The German Air Force in the Great WarfChivers 1969) Raleigh, Sir Walter, and Jones, H. A., The War in the Air (Oxford University Press) Saunders, H. St G., Per Ardua (Oxford University Press 1945)

McCudden,

[For Christopher Chant's biography, see p. 2188.]

their' particular

lines.

A

sight of the dirty

brown jig-saw

of trenches heartened us greatly. A few minutes later we were within gliding distance of the British front. When we realised

Above: A

British aircraft camera. Development cameras received an enormous extra impetus after the Western Front had stabilised. Right: A photograph taken over Nieuwe Stade in September 1917 showing shell damage

of aerial

if the engine lost all life we could reach safety, nothing else seemed to matter, not even the storm of shell-bursts. Suddenly the machine quivered, swung to the left, and nearly put itself in a flat

that even

large splinter of HE had sliced part of the rudder. V. banked to prevent an uncontrolled side-slip, righted the bus as far as possible, and dived for the lines. These we passed at a great pace, but we did not shake off Archie until well on the right side, for at our low altitude the high-angle guns had a large radius of action that could include us. However, the

spin.

>

•"N

A

\*

A

f

away

menacing coughs finally ceased to annoy, and our immediate troubles were over. The strain snapped, the air was an exhilarating tonic, the sun was warmly comforting, and everything seemed attractive, even the desolated jumble of waste ground below us. I opened a packet of chocolate and shared it with V., who was trying hard to fly evenly with an uneven rudder. I sang to

him down the speaking-tube, but

,'

,

2824

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his nerves

our engine recovered slightly now that recovery was not so important, and it behaved well until it seized up for better or worse when we had landed. From the aerodrome the pilots proceeded to tea and a bath, while we, the unfortunate observers, copied our notes into a detailed last,

-V

y

,,

.

.

1

had stood enough for the day, and he wriggled the machine from one side to the other until I became silent. Contrariwise to the its

^

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A

,,

'•

the British possessed fairly good maps for the areas in which they were fighting in Europe, the same could not be said for the Mesopotamian theatre. Consequently, maps of any description and provenance were invaluable. Above is a British sketch map based on a captured Turkish map, invaluable (as are all captured maps) for any military information in the way of dispositions or numbers. But, on the other hand, Intelligence officers in possession of captured material can never be sure that it is not 'planted' material rather than the genuine article on which they are basing their work. Therefore aerial confirmation of the information is vital, in addition to updating it and providing geographical knowledge as well

map making. Though important on the Western Front for strategic and tactical information, aerial reconnaissance had another areas such as Mesopotamia, that of surveying the terrain. Top: The Kit ri-Tauq area, a geographical map compiled from photographs in April 1918. Above: The Kulawand area, a simpler map showing the Turkish front line trenches in the area and the basic terrain

The

art of aerial

role to fulfil in

2825

>v

V

r

Two of the

best general purpose and reconnaissance aircraft to operate over the Western Front. Top: The French Salmson 2A 2. The two most notable features of this machine were the absence of any fixed fin or tailplane and the provision of a water-cooled radial engine. 3,200 of the type were built. Engine: SalmsonCanton-Unne radial, 260 hp. Armament: one fixed Vickers gun and two flexible Lewis guns. Speed: 115 mph at 6,560 feet. Ceiling: 20,500 feet. Endurance: 3 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 1,676/2,954 lbs. Span: 38 feet 8V2 inches. Length: 27 feet 10| inches. Crew: 2. Above: The German LVG C VI, a development of the CV, which had been hampered by inferior handling characteristics and visibility. The C VI was much improved in these. Engine: Benz Bz IV inline,

200 hp. Speed: 106 mph at sea-level. Climb: 15 minutes to 9,840 feet. Ceiling: 21,350 feet. Endurance: 3V2 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 2,046/3,058 lbs. Span: 42 feet 7% inches. Length: 24 feet 5Va inches. Crew: 2. Right: The ill-fated Bristol M 1C, one of the best fighters produced in Great Britain during the First World War, but relegated to service in the Middle East. It was not mass-produced as it was claimed that its landing speed was too high at 49 mph. It seems more likely, however, that it was suffering from the War Office's prewar prejudice against and ban on monoplanes. It was very fast and manoeuvrable, and would have made a significant difference to the RFC during 'Bloody April'. Engine: Le Rhone rotary, 110 hp. Armament: one fixed Vickers gun. Speed: 130 mph at sea-level. Climb: 10 minutes 25 seconds to 10,000 feet. Ceiling: 20,000 feet. Endurance: 1% hours. Weight empty/loaded: 896/1,348 lbs. Span: 30 feet 9 inches. Length: 20 feet 5 /2 inches 1

2826

r

Above: The Halberstadt CL

IV, in Turkish markings. This, like the LVG C VI on the opposite page, was a development of an earlier type, in this instance the CL II. The improvements achieved with the CL IV lay in the field of handling, rather than absolute performance. This was achieved by repositioning the wing,

"~\

shortening the fuselage and altering the size and shape of the tail surfaces extensively. After these modifications, the CL IV made an excellent escort and ground attack fighter in 1918. Engine: Mercedes D III, 160 hp. Armament: one or two fixed Spandau machine guns and one flexible Parabellum machine gun, plus

anti-personnel grenades and four or five 22-lb. bombs. Speed: 103 mph at 16,400 feet. Climb: 32 minutes to 16,400 feet. Ceiling: 16,700 feet. Endurance: 3 /2 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 1,602/2,350 lbs. Span: 35 feet 2 7/a inches. Length: 21 feet 5 /2 inches. Crew: 2. Crew 1

1

communications were especially good

2827

MESOPOTAMIA: THE AIR WAR Throughout the Mesopotamian campaign, the RFC played a vital role, but in the provision of supplies and replacements it was treated as being in an even less important backwater than the army. Despite this, morale was high, and the life useful and fascinating. Sir Miles Thomas describes what aerial warfare over the great rivers and the desert was like. Photograph: Desert patrol

"*Z&s.

Mesopotamia was ideal as a location for war in the air during the closing years of the First World War. The distances between the opposing armies were great; the air was generally clear so that the Yshaped configuration of the two great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, was a wonderful aid to navigation in an area where maps were notoriously inaccurate. Hapthe engines of the stick-and-string aeroplanes that I flew in those years were pily, too,

by and large sufficiently reliable to justify long, lone flights by single aircraft on reconnaissance of Turkish dispositions. In view of the great area covered and the small number of aircraft available this

was just as

well.

Naturally the main battles on the ground were concentrated near the river system. Armies could not be sustained in the waterless desert. Nonetheless, in view of the guerrilla nature of the land war and the

danger of sporadic forays of lightly-laden raiders, it was important that observation from the air be maintained at a high standard over the many thousands of square miles involved — some 200,000 in all. From Basra to Mosul, which was the main south-to-north line of advance up the Tigris, is about 400 miles. From Ar RamadI in the west to Bandar-e-PahlavT (Enzeli) in the east is 500 miles. These are not great distances in this age of jet aircraft, but in the First World War, when the aeroplanes we flew had top speeds of little more than 100 mph, they seemed great indeed. What is more, our aircraft were a motley lot, designed primarily for the close over the trench warfare in Europe, and had limited range and duration as dictated by fuel capacity. Nor were ours the latest models. The call for warplanes on the Western Front was so dein-fighting

manding that the forces in Mesopotamia did not obtain the latest designs from the factories. In that sense they were outdated, a factor accentuated by the long sea journeys in cargo vessels from the United Kingdom to the aircraft assembly parks, as they were called, at Basra and, later, Baghdad. In fairness, the Turks probably suffered the same disability in equipment, for none of the then latest German fighters that appeared on the Western Front were encountered by us even in 1917/18.

2828

I stress the heterogeneous nature of our equipment because that naturally made maintenance very much more difficult. For instance, in the squadron to which I was attached we had by 1918 six kinds of aeroplanes—the little-known Bristol Monoplane, the Sopwith Camel, the French SPAD, two de Havilland DH IV's, the British SE5a and, until the} were ground7

ed because of lack of spares, the Martinsyde G102 'Elephant'. With the exception, naturally, of the Bristol, all these were biplanes. The pilot sat in what was called the 'centre section', although in fact it was immediately behind the engine almost on a level with the wings. Thus the upper wing obstructed the upward view forward, the lower wing blanked a forward and downward outlook, so that to cover the sky one had to keep jerking from side to side as well as fore and aft. Ground observation was achieved by hanging one's head over the side, well into the buffeting slipstream. There were no automatic pilots, and trying to write notes on a thigh-pad while steadying the joystick between one's knees produced at times some remarkable attitudes. We flew not, as is colloquially known, by the 'seat of our pants', but by the feel of the wind on our cheeks and the sound of the engine.

The whole air war in Mesopotamia was quite different from that in France in that it was primarily a lone pilot's job. The idea of a squadron going out in formation was never dreamed of. More usually a sortie would consist of two reconnaissance aircraft— RE8's— escorted by two singleseater scouts, and if they remained in the air for more than two-and-a-half hours it was deemed to be a full day's work. 30 hours solo The average age of the pilots and observers who flew in the campaign was far lower than that of their counterparts in the Second World War. I had my 21st birthday at Kut-al-Amara in 1918 — the event signalised Tor anyway made memorable) by a minor earthquake. Several of my colleagues were at least two years younger. Most of them had deplorably few hours' experience in the air before they went 'over the line'. I was lucky, because after getting my wings in Egypt after only 30 hours' solo flying I had more than double that time as an instructor in 'stunt' flying. Some of the others in 72 Squadron, who came out direct from Britain, took the air in earnest with little more than 25 hours' experience. One RE8 pilot was known by no name other than 'Daddy'

Beswick because he was approaching the ripe age of nearly 30 years. There were notable characters in the RAF in Mesopotamia. One well-remembered officer was Major O. T. Boyd, Commanding Officer of No 72 Squadron. He

was ex-Indian Army, a

fine soldier,

and

in

the air a spirited leader. It was he who in the 1940's was landed by mistake in Italy when he was being ferried out to take command of the Royal Air Force in the Middle East. In the Royal Flying Corps in the early stages was Lieutenant Henry Spurrier, a 19-year-old pilot of great courage

and

initiative.

Maybe because we were

so young, our

general health was good. There was a little malaria, all drinking water had to be boiled, but rations were good with ample meat and beer from India. Local vegetables were plentiful and fresh. Our worst pest was a nasty little insect called a sand fly, which could penetrate any normal mosquito net and produce a quick but wholly debilitating fever. There were some balancing benefits in that arid plain.

Plumbing and running water we knew not, but a piping hot hip-bath was easily attained by leaving a canvas trough of water open to the rays of the afternoon sun while one took a siesta sweltering in a tent. We never flew in the middle of the day. The water-cooled engines boiled their radiators almost before they got off the ground, and in the air-cooled engines the oil became so hot that it ceased to lubricate with dire results. Even at the end of the build-up of the

RAF

the whole air effort was maintained with three squadrons, each with three flights of a nominal six aeroplanes each. No 63 Squadron of RE8's looked after the western flank. There was another RE8 squadron, No 30, at Ba'qubah and my squadron of fighters, or scouts, had a series of dispersed flights, the most easterly of which was on the River Diyala at a place then called Mirjana and which I find has disappeared completely as a name on any modern map. The total airworthy force could not have amounted at any one time to more than 50 aeroplanes all told, but on the whole the standard of maintenance was high because the war was distinctly seasonal: there was little or no action in the late spring or height of summer, during the intense heat. This gave time for work both by the 'fitters' —

engine

men — and

the 'riggers' — airframe

specialists.

This small called

upon

fleet of assorted aircraft

to

was

do an astonishing assort-

2829

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'--: .

*z?

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s

-

;

.

-i

2 A*

Indian troops

ment

man an AA Lewis

gun.

In

the background, their

of jobs. Prior to the fall of Kut-alto provision

Amara attempts were made

troops on the ground from the air. Unfortunately there were no sophisticated parachutes in existence in those days. Sheets and blankets tied at their four corners were tried, but sacks of flour attached to them incontinently burst when they hit the ground even when dropped from low level,

and much the same happened

to

water containers. Had there been more and better aircraft available the tragedy of Kut could have been averted. There were available only the open cockpit two-seater BE2c's and 2e's fitted with 80-hp engines. Had it been possible to provision the 6th Poona Division from the air with food during their four months' siege they might have held out longer. Nonetheless, we must have pioneered a

number

of

common we had

in aerial warfare.

practices

that

later

became

For example, very high standards of aerial photography and developed a map-making technique with extensive dark room equipment which suffered sadly through lack of cold water. There were certain periods of daylight when it was impossible to develop films because the emulsion smartly melted when they were put into the appropriate solution baths. We also did crude leaflet raids, informing recalcitrant Marsh Arabs that if they did not pay their taxes dire punishments would be inflicted. It was when returning from one of these leaflet raids, flying the then Political Officer for the region, the famous Colonel

2830

comrades hurry

for cover in their

slit

trenches as Turkish aircraft approach

A. T. Wilson as passenger, that the engine of the DH4 seized up through over-heating and I crash-landed in a mud patch in what afterwards transpired to be the alleged site of the Garden of Eden. Wilson and I were ignominiously towed up one of the numerous waterways that are to be found in the 'Garden of Eden' in a hollowed-out palm tree trunk that made shift as a canoe, and reached Baghdad after four days and being duly posted as missing. With regard to maintaining supremacy in the air, there was nothing in the nature of the dog-fights common to the Western Front. There were fights between our monoplanes and the Turks' Albatros and Halberstadts, but these were almost withsingle out exception duels between

machines

and

we

were

heartened

to

know

that our Bristol Monoplanes and later the Camels could turn inside the heavier German-built fighters, maintain height while doing tight turns in the hot thin air, and thus outclass them.

There were no ground communications, either for us or for the Turks, in those days. Wireless transmission was in its very early days and so an aerial sortie attacking either one of our troop concentrations or one of their aerodromes took the other very much by surprise. The result was, there being no standing patrols, when an enemy aircraft was sighted it meant that the defending pilot had to scramble into the air and try to gain height before the offensive aircraft got overhead and started letting go its comparatively

meagre supply

of bombs.

After one or two fights the supremacy of our much handier and more manoeuvrable aircraft asserted itself and, more often than not, when we made a raid consisting say of two RE8's — two-seater reconnaissance craft — escorted by two Bristol

Monoplanes, the performance took the shape of a sudden appearance to the Turks of our four machines overhead. The RE8's would get into position, make one or two quick circuits of the target, drop their bombs, and then make for home. By this time possibly the Turks' aircraft had taken off and climbed to our height — usually well under 10,000 feet, for we had no oxygen — and there would be a procession going back to our base consisting of the two RE8's, then a couple of Scouts throttled back to keep station, and then at a very respectful distance two, three or even four Turkish aircraft keeping station, occasionally letting fly a few pot shots at our tails. When they thought they were far enough away from home they would turn back. This made for considerable economy in aircraft and pilots. There was, of course, the inevitable engine failure. In those days, particularly with the rotary air-cooled engines that were fitted to our monoplanes and later the Sopwith Camels, it was not so much a question of

whether one would ever have an engine failure as when it would happen. We had hopes of the water-cooled engines the SE5's which came out during the last year of the war. Alas, they were high

fitted to

5

BE 2c general purpose machines.

In

the near absence of opposition, even these venerable types could operate with

only marginally better as regards engine reliability.

During that year the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service were combined to form the Royal Air Force. The change, on April 1, 1918, was not without its difficulties. On that particular night a storm of the kind locally known as a

where a the available aircraft were based. A strong whirlwind wrecked the whole encampment, standing the aeroplanes on their noses with propeller blades snapped off or on their sides with undercarriage struts buckled beyond local repair. The more sturdy little 'scout' single-seaters, such as the French-made SPADS, came off better. As soon as their hubbub sprang up

considerable

at Samarra',

number

of

had collected their shirts, uniforms and other belongings that had been liberally strewn over the desert lands when the marquee tents had been literally lifted from over their sleeping forms by the racing whirlwind, they had to make at least a token show of aerial reconnaissance. Indeed, for some weeks they carried the whole pilots

brunt of the air war in that area. It was called 'bush flying' The nature of the fighting in Mesopotamia changed during 1918, moving from what I would call the rivers war to a comparatively mountainous arena. It was not part of the plan of any General Officer

Commanding

in

those days to take the

troops or indeed the officers into his confidence as to the strategy of the campaign,

but the idea was to prevent the TurkoGerman forces rallying local support in Northern Persia and driving down southeastwards to link up with what could have been — to them — friendly forces on the North West Frontier of India. This meant that the main area of aerial warfare changed from the course of the Tigris to the more rugged areas in the Tbilisi (Tiflis),

QazvTn and Tehran direction. The of

moving troops

difficulty in these parts over the

badly-surfaced roads that ran defiles and passes of the mountains meant that action in the air became more and more valuable and so, because of their more agile performance, our little scouting planes actually did far more scouting and less escorting. Occasionally they were pressed into even

narrow,

between the

and I remember from the aerodrome at QazvTn

more extravagant taking

off

roles

in an SE5 with a couple of bombs in the cockpit on my knees. When I spotted a troop of Turkish cavalry coming southwards along a mountain road towards our infantry positions I solemnly took the safety pins out of the bombs and as accurately as I could dropped them over the side. If memory serves aright they were known as Cooper 20-lb bombs. They could not possibly have done much material damage, but they frightened quite a few horses. It was to put a defensive line across the south-east march of the Turkish forces — by this time they had managed to raise a number of local levies — that what was known as the Dunsterforce was sent up

little

to fear

from Baghdad through Pai-Taq, Hamadan and to Bandar-e-PahlavT on the Caspian Sea. There they took ship to Baku, joining up with the Russians in the defence of that Caspian Sea northern port. We pilots had a variety of duties. One day one would be doing a reconnaissance behind the lines, notepad on knee trying to count the number of horse-drawn transport vehicles, number of tents and other warlike objects in the Turkish territory. It did not need any hawklike powers of observation over wide ranges, because all military activity was very much confined to the few roads in the area. Another day one would be ferrying despatches, or even carrying bank notes, account books and suchlike for the Bank of Persia between Hamadan and QazvTn. It was on one of these trips in a 'Jumbo' Martinsyde that I had a petrol pipe break between the two carburettors that fed the

Beardmore engine. High over the Persian Alps three cylinders cut out completely, petrol first trickled and then spouted from the broken pipe, and I thought that the danger of fire was by no means remote. So I turned off all petrol. Luckily I was able to pull off a forced landing on a comparatively flat stretch of ground at the bottom of a valley through which ran both the river and the road. I did not find my night in a Persian caravanserai to which the natives took me was too uncomfortable, or the meal of grapes and presumably goat meat too unpalatable. Happily the natives were six-cylinder

2831

a

at the s

,.ugs h

Some

of

my

landings had

same could be

said

and other vermin that that

found otherwise

I

.aw night

air.

colleagues

who had

forced

much more uncomfortable

'Taffy' Flight-Lieutenant Williams, had an engine fail well behind the lines in the foothills of Persia — now prosperous oil district called Tuz Khurmatu. He did not crash badly on landing and kept his revolver with him. This apparently enabled him to persuade a native to provide him with Persian garb, including hat, and he gallantly walked through the Turkish lines and, which he reckoned as being very little more difficult, through our own lines, back to the outskirts of Baghdad, a distance of 75 miles. He was tragically killed after the armistice when a SPAD that he was test-flying round the aerodrome disintegrated on a tight turn. Stick and fabric construction did not stand up very well long-term to the climate of Mesopotamia. Other notable forced landings that I recall included a monoplane which came

times.

One,

down through engine

failure on a fairly piece of desert. Gallantly the pilot of the RE8 that was being escorted behind the

some distance above

flat

casualties were light.

line landed beside it. After firing a couple of revolver shots into the petrol tank and then a Verey light cartridge into the monoplane to set it ablaze, the scout pilot, Lieutenant A. G. Lees, clambered aboard the RE8 and, hanging on to the centre section struts, astride the shoulders of the

Further Reading Hennessy, M., The challenging heights (Hamish Hamilton 1983) Millar, R., Kut, the Death of an Army (Seeker &

rescuing pilot, was flown back to base after a very shaky take-off". It was called 'bush flying'. There had to be plenty of initiative. If a tyre burst on landing at an advanced base one simply hacked it off the wheel and took off on the rim. Improvisation and calculated hazards were the order of the day. The comparison between Second World War flying with telecommunication, parachutes and useful aids to navigation seems — at least to us old-timers — a sharp contrast. Bomb sights were crude crossed wire arrangements of doubtful accuracy. Formation flying was unknown. Indeed, there is one record of a machine being blown up in mid-air by a bomb that was dropped from another one

it.

But on the whole

Warburg 1969) Tennant, Lieut-Col.

Baghdad The Campaign

in

4Vols(HMSO SIR MILES

J. E.,

In the

Mesopotamia,

Clouds Above Official History,

1923/27)

THOMAS, DFC,

fought in the First World armoured car squadron, and then transferred to the RFC, flying in Mesopotamia, Persia and South Russia. Between the wars he worked in engineering and transport, notably in the Nuffield Organisation, and his experience there enabled him to play an important role in tank production in the Second World War. In 1948 he became chairman of BOAC, pulling the company

War

in

an

out of the red before resigning

in 1 956. Since then he important posts, and his autobiography, Our on a Wing, published in 1964,

has

filled

many

achieved wide popularity.

V

Heliopolis on the Nile seen from the air. The area's starkness greatly aided reconnaissance

ThePiave

Austria's last throw November

Since their victorious advance to the Piave in 1917 the Austrians had remained in static positions overlooking this formidable obstacle. The collapse of Russia and the success of the German offenin most cases only 40 to 50 men, whilst In the late spring of 1918 there were sive on the Western Front an Italian one consisted of 120 to 160 signs that the Central Powers were fighters. In the case of the Austrian threatened by a last and fatal military tempted the Austrians to crisis. It

was brought about by the

of the leadership to recognise

failure

immediately

the rapidly increasing decline of their own power since the beginning of the year, and to draw the obvious conclusions. This military shortcoming showed itself in strategic operations. As in the preceding years, the general staffs were determined to remain on the offensive at all cost. This rigidity of believing in 'offensives

Austrians with no other planning of strategic attacks but that of second or third-class at all cost' left the

role to play in the

'auxiliary corps' for the Germans. After almost four years of warfare the once proud

more than understandable that they did not accept this part in good grace, and certainly not willingly. Nonetheless the Austrians finally agreed, after Austrian

just

that,

armies were although it

initial hesitation, to

little

is

the

German

proposal

that they should mount a relief attack along the entire Italian Front with the aim of backing the great German spring offensive in Flanders planned for March, 1918. Yet, the Austrian leadership must surely have been aware that their condition hardly allowed such a move. In the first instance, the German Supreme Army Command would have preferred the Austrians to send the main body of their formations to participate in the offensive, as they had now become available, with the war in Russia finally at an end. The Chief of the Austrian General

Colonel-General Count Arthur Arz von Straussenburg, had repeatedly exchanged letters with Ludendorff in this matter as early as January 1918, and in an accommodating manner at that. To-day, it is interesting to ask whether the AusStaff,

trian

leaders might have done better if they had actually put the main body of their troops at the disposal of the German armies on the Western Front, instead of undertaking once again, just as in 1916, a 'punitive expedition' against Italy. But

make another onslaught on the Italians in June 1918, with disastrous results. Kurt Peball Above: Wreckage

in

a

town near the Piave

temptation to engage in such an 'expedition' was too great at the time. Superficially, and according to the principles of warfare, the opportunity to inflict a fatal blow on the Italians in the spring of 1918, appeared to be tempting, the

indeed, even compelling. It would appear that after the capitulation of Russia and Rumania the main body of the Austrian armies could simply be deployed in their entirety against Italy. There were still considerable numbers involved. In January, 1918 the Austrian army still counted 1,287,345 fighting men, and by June another 20,000 new recruits could be conscripted in addition to that number. Altogether this amounted to the considerable figure of about 83 divisions. 53 of these divisions were now to be sent into action along the Italian Front from Passo di Stelvio near the Swiss border to the Lago di Garda, then across the Sette Comuni to the Monte Grappa and along the eastern bank of the River Piave from the area of Montello to where the Piave joins the Adriatic Sea. The remaining divisions were tied down in the Ukraine and along the Salonika front, or they were needed as a so-called 'assistance force' for the maintenance of law and order on the home front against the increasing strikes and hunger riots of the civilian population, steadily growing si nee January 1918. Yet, behind the figures just mentioned, the striking force of those divisions which had enabled Austria to enter the war in 1914, was no longer alive. Their fighting spirit was a mere shadow of former times. Instead of 11,567 men, as there used to be, an infantry division now had only 5,000 to 8,000 men. An Austrian company had

artillery a third or at most half of the gun carriages were without horse teams, and the lack of horses had assumed enormous proportions. As early as August 1917 the Austrian army was short of one third of the usual stock of horses. This could not

made up by motorised vehicles. They, in turn, lacked the necessary fuel and spare parts. Moreover, the efficiency of the railway was steadily declining at the same be

Out of the existing approximately 14,000 engines, 5,000 were under repair. This led not only to grave difficulties in supplying the civilian population and the fighting forces, it also confronted the military command with practically insoluble problems where the transport of soldiers was concerned. The capacity of the railway had diminished to such a degree that, for example, the dispatch of a division now took 14 days instead of the usual four. On top of it all the soldiers were hungry. There were two meatless days in the week. Otherwise, every soldier got a weekly ration of not more than 220 grams of meat, and also 125 to 150 grams of fat per day, a little dehydrated vegetable and substitute coffee. The hunger of the soldiers was such that some units at the Italian Front begged their officers to be allowed to go on raiding parties, merely to snatch some food from the Italians. Clothing was of the poorest quality. Change of underwear was hardly possible. Even the quality of arms and time.

equipment had definitely deteriorated. All this was reflected in the mental state of the simple soldier who became aware of the futility of this war in which his only aim was to survive. Desertions to the enemy and disobedience became widespread. In Hungary alone the number of deserters in the homeland had risen to 200,000 men during the first months of the year 1918. At the Italian Front so many soldiers of Bohemian and Moravian origin had deserted to the enemy that the Italians could have raised a special division of them.

2833

pite of

the favourable strategic

was more than risky, if not irly senseless, to aim a decisive blow against Italy. The decision on the part of ,

it

the Austrian leadership to proceed with this plan can only be compared with Hitler's offensive in the Forest of the Ardennes in December 1944. They had built

on quicksands and were now about to squander their last assets. The plan of operations was in itself strange enough. Neither Conrad, nor Waldstatten, nor Boroevic, nor Arz could reach a common point of action governing their strategy. Each of them developed his own ideas in isolation. Tactically, the most fascinating

plan (which might even have met with some success under skilful implementation) was Conrad's old idea to thrust forward from the Lessinian Alps in the Trentino into the Venetian plain with a view to taking in flank the main body of the Italian troops. True though, it was this very plan which had failed in 1916. Admittedly, the Austrian starting point showed marked improvements now. The Austrian formations stood now in the centre and on the commanding heights of the plateaux of the Sette Comuni, and it was not by accident that just east of Asiago the Italian troops had been reinforced by one French and one English corps. Conrad, however, calculated, that he could break through the Italian Front with a strength of approximately 34 divisions, provided a vigorous relief attack were simultaneously launched near the Grappa, Montello and along the River Piave. But to deploy 34 divisions in the region of the Trentino would have been a risky undertaking, exceeding by far the strength the Austrian-Hungarian armed forces could muster. Still another scheme, which by no means lacked some prospect of success, was that of Major-General Waldstatten and some other officers of the army HQ staff. This envisaged two strong flanking attacks on the Sette Comuni and along the Piave. The main thrust, however, was to be made by three army corps between the rivers Brenta and Piave where the latter emerges from the mountains, over an area of no more than 6 kilometres wide. This would have obviated deployment on so wide a front as at the Sette Comuni. Field-Marshal Boroevic had certainly achieved great feats of defence in 11 battles on the River Isonzo, ever since 1915. But now he was averse to any kind of attack. His instinct prompted him not to cross the River Piave, a natural obstacle easy to defend. Considering the weakness of his own troops he would rather build strong entrenchments here, thus thwarting any attempts of the Italians to cross the river. It proved to be a disaster indeed that he could not impose his conviction upon the army HQ staff and the Emperor himself. As it happened, in the end he was misled by his ambition. In this particular case he made the most foolish of all suggestions for an attack, a frontal attack. Without having previously consulted with Conrad at all, he finally proposed on April 23, after an exchange of correspondence with the army HQ staff, to advance in a vigorous thrust towards Oderzo-Treviso, that is to say into the very centre of the Italian net of troop concentration. As the strength of this net was certainly not unknown to the Com-

2834

mander of the Austrian Piave front, Boroevic's plan as such was so absurd as to find its meagre logical justification only in the fact that the Austrian Piave front could be supplied by two railway lines better than the other previously mentioned sections of the front. The ultimate decision was to be left to Emperor Charles. He, unlike his late uncle, the Emperor Franz Josef, believed it his duty to take over the command himself and was, above all, convinced of his ability do so — an unfortunate self-deception. could never come to any decision of his own, and agreed now with one army commander and then with another. Thus it happened that these extraordinary conditions in the Supreme Command favoured the fact that during the June offensive fundamentally different conceptions as to the best direction of the main attack were implemented simultaneously, dispersing their strength in diversionary operations and giving every officer in command an opportunity of leading his own offensive. It was certainly not too difficult for the to

He

Italian Intelligence service to recognise the preparations for an Austrian offensive. This enabled them to take appropriate counter-measures in good time. They had

adopted their allies' elastic system of defence which had proved its value on the

French

battlefield.

Remarkably enough,

the most advanced front lines were only weakly manned. The main body of the front line troops and of the artillery stood outside the range of fire from the enemy's guns, ready to counter-attack at any time. Moreover, the Italians after their retreat across the Piave in the autumn of 1917, had the advantage of the 'inner line'. And they knew how to make the best use of it. The Venetian plain was easily accessible to transport and supply facilities. Any movement could, therefore, be executed quickly. If they chose to do so, they could move four reserve divisions to the mountain front or to the Piave front within four to eight hours. Even from the very arrears of the zone 12 divisions could be dispatched to the front by lorry or by rail within a period of six days. During the winter of 1917/18, the Italian army had recovered well from the catastrophes of the autumn of 1917, particularly in respect of their morale. Shortly before the Austrian attack, they had regained the figure of 59 divisions in fighting trim, the four British and French divisions included. They had consolidated their positions with an enormous number of machine guns, flame throwers and mortars. The whole of the front line was divided into an average of three lines of defence, interspersed with a large number of concrete strong points. In the course of discussions in the spring of 1918 the general staffs of the Entente had agreed that Italy was to assume the offensive on May 20 with a view to relieving the Allies in France. By that time the

army would have been fully prepared for an attack. But once the Intelligence service had supplied the certainty that a large-scale Austrian offensive was to be launched, the intention of an offensive of their own was relinquished. Orders were given immediately to change the positions of attack within the shortest possible time into a compact defence and counterattack system. This could be achieved within a week, and as from the beginning Italian

June the Italians to counterattack the

of

were ready and able Austrian offensive at

any time. In the meantime, Field-Marshal Conrad von Hotzendorf's plan had prevailed upon the Austrian side. During a decisive personal interview with the Emperor at the army HQ in Baden near Vienna on April 11, he had presented his project so convincingly that the Emperor had agreed in the end that the weight of the offensive should fall in the Sette Comuni. The main thrust was to be led by the strongly reinforced Eleventh Army, whilst the Army Group Boroevic was to support the attack from the Lessinian Alps by a strong flank operation.

The 'hunger

offensive' Originally, the offensive was to start on May 20. Lack of transport, however, and the few lines of communication with the front delayed its commencement over and over again. At long last June 15 was agreed upon, although the armies even at that time were far from completing all the necessary preparations. Understandably, therefore, the derisive nickname of the 'hunger offensive' which had been circulating the Austrian trenches for weeks, had assumed a macabre significance. The supply position, as far as food was concerned, was alarming. 'To-day flour stocks for only another 3t days' was the report on May 27 from the command of the Eleventh Army, which was to play so important a part. 'The army stores in the rear are empty. Army is in duty .

.

.

HQ

bound

emphatically once again that unless energetic steps are taken immediately the feeding of the Eleventh Army will be endangered within a very few days.' On the day of the actual attack this army was short of 15 batteries of artillery. All the Austrian forces detailed for the attack were short of gas shells, although only DA gas was required. There was none of the much more effective 'yellow cross' gas, because it had not been made available by the Germans. At the River Piave there were far too few heavy bridging stores because there were not enough horses to transport them. As so often during the preceding years, the success of a large-scale offensive depended solely on the courage and endurance of the Austrian soldiers at the Italian Front and on their willingness to fight to their last drop of blood, even in hopeless situations. The merits of the troops, however, were not matched by skill in the art of war on the part of their commanders. A diversionary attack was to be launched on June 13 at the Passo di Tonale, the westernmost flank of the Austrian front in Italy; this was to be done by two divisions who were to storm the pass and to stress

to Edolo. The code-name of this attack was 'Lawine' (avalanche). On June 15 the Eleventh Army (Colonel General Count Scheuchenstuel) was to start the main attack with six corps. They were to advance in a single, vigorous thrust from the plateaux of the Sette Comuni towards the south up to the line Schio-Thiene-Breganze-Marostica-BassanoAsolo-Cornuda. Moreover, the idea was to assault the heavily fortified forest zone south of Asiago in one fell swoop. It was the chief purpose of this thrust to establish an uninterrupted line between Monte Pasubio and Vicenza. With Milan

advance

Left:

The Duke

of Aosta, the Italian Third Army of Diaz' more capable

Commander, one

subordinates. Right, below, and bottom: Italian troops in defensive positions behind the Piave. During the winter of 1917/18 the morale of the Italian army had much recovered from the shattering blow of Caporetto, and they had been reinforced by a total of four Allied divisions. The line behind the Piave had been enormously strengthened, and the defence was organised in three lines with large numbers of machine guns and concrete emplacements. Austrian security was poor, and the Italians knew well in advance of the proposed Austrian offensive and altered their plans accordingly in

mind, which would then be within easy

reach, this enterprise was code-named 'Radetzky' in memory of 1848/9. On June 15, too, the formations of Army Group Boroevic were to cross the River Piave. Of their six corps the XVI (General of Infantry Kralicek), the TV (General of

Cavalry Prince Schbnburg-Hartenstein) and the VII Corps (General of Infantry Count Schariczer) were to cross the River Piave via the Isle of Papadopolos in the middle of the river, and push forward to the line of Postioma-Paese-Preganziol-Treviso. The XXIV Corps (Feldmarschalleutnant Ludwig Goiginger) and // Corps (General of Infantry Rudolf Krauss) were to lead a flank attack in the area of the Montello — where the River Piave emerges from the mountains — whilst the XXIII Corps (General of Infantry von Csicserics) was to do the

same

in

the region between San

into position there. A counter-attack launched in bad weather and in snow-storms by the Austrian Brigade of Major-General Ellison on June 12 with a view to retrieving this ridge from the Italians, miscarried. Feldmarschall Metzger then augmented the troops who were to attack on June 13 directly across the road onto the pass. But already after a few hours, this attack, too, proved to be senseless. The assaulting Austrian infantry broke down all along the line before the wire entanglements in the defensive fire of the Italians,

who

were well informed about the forthcoming

Dona

Piave up to the mouth of the river. In memory of the historic victory of 1866 by the Archduke Albrecht over the Italians, this enterprise was given the code-name of 'Albrecht'. For all that, the main target of the attack of Army Group Boroevic was to be the area along the River Adige north di

of Rovigo.

The venture which started on June 13 Passo di Tonale was a dismal failure. The two divisions led by Feldmarschalleutnant Metzger had started their attack from a difficult initial position. As early as May 25, Italian troops had assaulted a commanding ridge south of the pass and gradually moved approximately 200 guns at the

2835

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j

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lfcte?i?£

1

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„

•

^

/

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*

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y^

v vx 5 ^*

X^fe •

A

>"%., 'V^<

**.

Right: General Arz

von Straussenburg, the Austrian Chief of

General Staff. He admitted the failure of the Austrian attacks

on Asiago and on the Piave

Above: Austrian troops on the Asiago Plateau

engage Italian positions. Below left: Austrian troops cut barbed wire. It was the unexpected strength of the Italian defences as much as their own unpreparedness that brought the Austriansto a halt. Right: Austrian *

soldiers with Italian

prisoners at one of the points where their offensive

achieved

some success

i\

*

1

attack. In the early hours of the afternoon every Austrian attack had to cease. During the next few days events along the whole of the remaining front of the Austrian offensive in the Venetian theatre of operations tumbled over each other in rapid succession. On the Sette Comuni the offensive began with a vigour and a volume of men and material never before seen on the Italian mountain front. But accidents and faulty planning on the part

shortage of ammunition and started the offensive fire only on June 15 at 1500 hours. But they did not succeed even in putting the Italian guns out of action, least of all silencing them altogether. On the contrary, and as the Austrian brigade commander Colonel Maximilian Lauer recorded as an eye witness: 'Very soon the artillery of the enemy dominated the field to

such an extent that one was compelled to ask which of the artillery of the two

though it was with utmost valour and under heavy losses. In the evening, the attacking divisions had been pushed back into the positions from which they had set

Thus the operation at the Sette Comuni had already come to an end on the evening of June 16— it had proved impossible to pierce the Italian front. The Aus-

out.

trian plan of attack which had began as the 'June Battle in the Venito' was, due to this failure, gradually reduced to a single battle, the 'Battle of the Piave'. But at the River Piave, too, immense difficulties had to be faced when crossing the river on June 16. The northernmost assault troops — the XVI Corps — could not gain a foothold on the western bank of the Piave and suffered heavy casualties. The adjoining IV Corps in the south managed to establish two very small and isolated bridgeheads on the western bank of the river which, however, had to bear the heaviest bombardment, rendering their immediate fortune most problematical. Only the VII Corps succeeded in gaining so much ground on the western bank that they were able to throw a military bridge across the Piave. Almost surprisingly, the most striking successes were gained by the attack on the Montello and by the operations of the XXIII Corps west of San Dona di Piave. Near the Montello, the XXIV Corps led

by Feldmarschalleutnant Ludwig Goiginhad safely crossed the river and penetrated parts of the Italian front up to a depth of some two miles. ger,

Above: The Italian 305mm heavy gun. Calibre:

305-mm

(12-inches). Barrel length: 17 cals. Weight emplaced: 33.75

tons. Weight in travelling position: 47.7 tons. Weight of projectile: 772 pounds. Muzzle velocity: 1,790 feet per

second. Range:

19,200 yards, flare of fire: Five minutes per round. Elevation: —20° to +65°. Right: The Italian 149-mm gun. Calibre: 149-mm (5.9inches). Weight in action: 8 tons. Weight of shell: 92 lbs. Muzzle velocity: 2,200 feet per

second.

Range: 7,400 yards, flare of fire:

Two

rounds per minute. Elevation:

-

10° to

of the Austrian

+35°

command

contributed their failure follow failure. Austrian deserters — mostly of Bohemian and Moravian origin — had betrayed the exact

share to

make

time of the attack. The Italian telephone tapping and signal interception had confirmed the statements of the deserters. Accordingly, the battle of the Sette Comuni Italians four hours before the moment of attack as planned by the Austrians with a steadily increasing artillery drum fire, like a 'preparatory counter-attack' as it were. The Austrian artillery, on the other hand, stuck to the original plan of operation because of a

was opened by the

2838

forces concerned was actually attacking.' of the Italians were so well posi-

The guns

tioned that practically all Austrian signal and telegraphic communications with the headquarters in the rear had ceased, when the infantry — according to plan — stormed forward from their positions on a broad front at 0700 hours between the Val d'Astico and Fiume Brenta. After a few short hours, the stretch of forest south of Asiago dotted with camouflaged artillery positions and artificial and natural obstructions proved to be their undoing. In the early hours of the afternoon the attack came to a halt, fought

In spite of it all, it became evident as early as the evening of June 15 that the Austrian plan of a pincer-type operation in the Venito had foundered on the all too strong resistance at the Sette Comuni. This would have been the moment to call off the offensive. However, the successes achieved at the Piave front justified some hopes that the offensive might gain some more ground and thus provide the relief needed by the Germans. On June 16 the situation at the front was that the Austrian troops had established five bridgeheads, although isolated from each other, on the western bank of the Piave. Up to June 18 Army Group Boroevic tried to link these and to push them forward far enough to the west, to prevent the Italian army hindering the crossing of the river. This undertaking succeeded only in parts at the lower reaches of the Piave, where a coherent front of about 12 miles was established between the IV, VII and XXIII Corps. No further successes could be achieved in spite of superhuman efforts. The floods of the Piave which had been rising for some days and, above all, the Italian air superiority with its continuous air attacks began to destroy the Austrian bridges across the river. On June 18 all the bridges on the Isonzo front had been lost.

The Austrian Supreme Command was that the offensive had and these anxious questions became uppermost in their minds: When would the Italians begin the counterattack, and to what extent would their own troops be in a position to meet the forced

broken

to

realise

down,

Allies' assault?

[For Dr PebalVs biography, see page

.9.7.5.

|

The Piave ITMIAN CMNTERATTM LOFFENSJVA DELLA

SETE...

SUL PIAVE

PIOVE The footholds that the Austrians managed

to secure on the west bank of the Piave proved almost impossible to hold. Disorganisation in their own rear areas, the swollen state of the river, and Italian stubbornness in defence made their position precarious indeed. The time was ripe for Italy to go over to the offensive. Philip Warner

The Italian counterattack on the Piave in June 1918 is an occasion on which the Italians can look

back with justified pride.

was a triumph of

and morale, and — could have expected the Italian army to show much of either at that time. Caporetto had been more than a defeat; it had been a moraledestroying rout in which command, planning, leadership and supply had all been inadequate. Italian losses had been enormous; 10,000 had been killed, 30,000 wounded and 265,000 taken prisoner. 3,000 heavy guns, 5,000 machine guns and mortars and a huge quantity of other supplies had been captured by the enemy. In It

nobody — least of

skill

all its allies

circumstances a nation may take some comfort from the successes of its allies, which are a partial assurance that she may be on the winning side. But even this consolation was denied to the Italians who were constantly hearing of German successes in France, and — even more ominous—news that the Allied armies in that theatre were outnumbered. There could be no hope of reinforcements from that front. Although skilful a and ingenious such

nation industrially, Italy

was hopelessly

handicapped by the complete lack of coal and steel; every ounce of these vital materials had to be imported, and, needless to say, Italy had to pay approximately twice the correct price. For a country in such a position to lose huge quantities of vital equipment, and to have to rely on hard-pressed and not particularly understanding allies was a setback which might have deterred the boldest. Critics of Italian military achievement are a little too prone to underrate the immense difficulties with which Italy had to contend. After the disaster of Caporetto it would have been

natural for the Italians to mark time and hope that events elsewhere would take a turn for the better. Any shred of comfort which they might have received from the thought that they merely had Austrians to contend with in the Piave area was dispelled when they learnt — wrongly — that there would be German divisions in the

coming offensive. The Austrian offensive, and the battle of Asiago have already been described in these pages. The Piave battle concerned Austrian and Italian troops only and is therefore usually held to be a good basis for making an assessment of the qualities of the two armies. However, such comparisons are probably of greater value to the statistician than the political strategist. The Austrian armies under the command of Field-Marshal Boroevic consisted of the Sixth Army, under Generaloberst Archduke Josef, and the Isonzo Army, under Generaloberst Freiherr von Wurm. On his right was the Eleventh Army which came under the command of Field-Marshal Conrad von Hotzendorf. Opposing Boroevic was the Italian Eighth Army (facing the Austrian Sixth) and the Italian Third Army (facing the Austrian Isonzo). The

Army was commanded by Lieutenant-General Caviglia, and the Third Army by Lieutenant-General the Duke Italian Eighth

of Aosta.

The opening attack was timed

XXIV

for

June

Corps of the Sixth Army would cross the Piave on a three-mile front opposite the Montello, and the Isonzo Army would cross between Spresiano and S. Dona on a 20-mile front. The Italians, not knowing where the attacks would come, would have to cover the entire river bank; there was, of course, the possibility 15, 1918.

that the apparent direction of the initial attack might be a ruse and it would therefore be unwise to withdraw too many troops from unthreatened sectors in case they suddenly became the centre of the onslaught. Behind, the Italians had an extensive but not particularly well-planned series of trenches; and when the battle got under way some of these defences proved more of a handicap than a help for they slowed up the arrival of reinforcements.

A bridgehead established The Austrians began with a brisk bombardment at 0300 hours. It included a quantity of tear gas with a view to preventing the Italians from doing any flash-spotting. The Italians paid little attention to this open-

ing bombardment, which although impressively heavy, damaged very few important targets. They reserved their own fire for the actual crossing. However, when it came the valley was so full of smoke and fog that the Austrians were able to cross unseen. Had their boats and pontoons been caught by the Italian artillery they would have been in serious trouble for the Piave is between 6 and 10 feet deep at this poinU as well as being fast-flowing. However, although the initial part of the operation went extremely well and an advance of two miles gave them the eastern tip of the Montello they were soon in trouble from a combination of Italian artillery and British

bombing. The 20 lb bombs which the RAF dropped may seem ludicrously small by modern standards but they were effective enough against the Austrian pontoons. An attempt to reinforce the bridgehead with troops brought over by boats disintegrated under a low-level attack by the RAF. One enterprising aviator is said to have dropped

2839

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Far /eff: An Italian howitzer searches for Austrian positions on the other side of the hill'. Left: One of the many machine guns that stiffened the Italian defence. Above: The twin-barrelled Italian submachine gun, the Pistola Mitragliatrice, here shown on demonstration with carrying box and spare parts. Below: Preparing to counterattack

^*>*V

***

2842

his bombs then thrown all his tools and spare parts on the enemy below. As night fell on the 15th the Austrians were in the uneasy position of having troops all

across the river but not being able to reinforce them. Further down the river the Austrians had mixed fortunes. In the Papadopolos sector they met disaster, losing over 3,000 men from two divisions. In the next sector two Hungarian Honved divisions fared

Further down VII Corps manand capture Zenson but this success was balanced by failure to cross elsewhere. The best achievement of the entire Isonzo Army was on the lowest stretch of the river where two divisions little better.

aged

to cross

crossed

in

thick

fog

and established a

bridgehead of approximately eight square miles opposite Meolo. At this point both sides seemed equally happy: the Austrians, though mauled, felt that they had achieved enough to make further progress feasible; the Italians considered they had held the attack creditably and could confidently withstand the next assault. Curiously enough it does not seem to have occurred to anyone at this stage that it might be an opportune moment for brisk counterattacks to topple the Austrians back into the river again. The following day was almost completely wasted by both sides. It seems to have been one of those occasions when opposing commanders thought the next stage could be left to local initiative. The Austrians displayed more than the Italians but even that was not significant. Heavy rain made the passage of the Piave difficult and the attentions of the RAF made it highly dangerous. There is no doubt that the Italians missed a valuable opportunity. However, both sides took the opportunity to bring up reserves and to switch troops to the areas where it seemed they would be most useful. June 17 was a day of mixed fortune for the Austrians. Bad weather and heavy rain made the passage of the Piave highly speculative but at the same time put a stop to the air attacks. Although short of essential supplies the Austrian units went on to the offensive and enlarged their bridge% heads. XXIII Corps, which had done well = on the 15th without much opposition, now w proceeded to do equally well against wellconcealed machine guns; nevertheless it 1 was short of its objective Meolo, on the n River Meolo, when the push came to a halt. As the river rose and grew swifter the f | Austrians soon realised they had a worse ? enemy to contend with than the Italians. si

Top left: Fresh and unexhausted, Italian reserves wait to counterattack across the Piave. Top centre: Arditi', the Italian equivalent of Storm Troops, in camp behind the line on the Piave. Top right: Italian troops double across a pontoon over the Piave. Not a formidable looking obstacle, it was fast flowing and tricky. Left: Italian troops advance through the wire that had proved such an obstacle to the Austrians. Above: Italian troops wearing gas masks, rudimentary by comparison with those in use in France

As fast as they built or repaired bridges the turbulent river smashed them down with floating debris, and once a bridge or pontoon went it added to the destructive content of the river. To cross on a pontoon took over two hours. Nevertheless, the Austrian High Command was not flustered; it knew the river could fall as quickly as it had risen, and in the meantime gave instructions for the troops over the river to extend their bridgehead and reach their defined objectives. There seemed little alternative, although

if

they had

known

that the Italians were bringing up every available man to the front they might

have thought more about defending their bridgeheads than extending their fronts. However, those Italians they had already encountered had not shown much offensive

and as these were front-line troops seemed reasonable that those further back would be even less highly motivated. On the 18th, although the river was falling, the situation was not looking too spirit it

good for the Austrians, particularly in the

JS43

The balance of forces on the Piave in June 1918. Opposite page. Left, top to bottom: General Caviglia, Commander of the Italian Left:

ITALIAN AUSTRIAN

Corps. Field-Marshal Conrad von Hbtzendorf, the Eleventh and Tenth Armies. Temperamentally inclined towards the offensive, the attack of his Eleventh Army at Asiago was nonetheless a failure. Field-Marshal Boroevic, Commander of the Group comprising the Isonzo Army and the Sixth Army. By nature cautious, he favoured allowing the Germans to win the war, while Austria stood firm. General Freiherr von Wurm, Commander of the Isonzo Army. On the extreme left of the Austrian offensive his army made the only considerable lodgement on the western bank of the Piave. Far right: An Italian poster depicts a light infantryman with that all-important infantry weapon-the shovel VIII

Commander of the Army Group comprising

Divij .ions (19

in

reserve 15 in line)

44 SO

in line)

Montello sector. They were harassed by Italian attacks which, though not really successful, were exhausting. They were short of guns, ammunition and food; they had a number of men unfit for duty through wounds and other hazards, and they had a of prisoners who were a guard and feed. They needed more guns, men and food, and they needed them quickly and in quantity. They were poised exactly between glorious victory and humiliating withdrawal (possibly with defeat). That was XXIV Corps. XXIII Corps was proving a similar point, but rather more actively. It almost reached the Meola, only to be flung back to its start line by a counterattack. Around

large

number

problem

Mne 44

Gu L-^H 2866 SOOS Aerof »lanes 676 ISO 1

(539i n reserve 2329

( ,n

to

'"

reserve 6)

•

was do.

(

ln

lme 500s

in

reserve 0)

just what he should not be allowed The Commander-in-Chief seemed

have no better reason

for his decision

Commander of the Eleventh Army wished the Piave

to

than

defeated

the

that

to

offensive

to continue. Boroevic was asked what he proposed to do next; but at a subsequent conference it was made clear to all present,

including Boroevic and Kaiser Karl, not only that the forces across the river were in a desperate state but that the situation was little better behind the Austrian lines. Everywhere food, clothing, arms, ammunition

and manpower were running

unit

commanders

The and in

out.

listened gravely

then Boroevic repeated his request for permission to withdraw. Kaiser silence;

Campolunga

Karl hesitated.

to

He was still hesitating the following day. Boroevic had to continue the battle or have his armies destroyed piecemeal. Meanwhile Kaiser Karl was visiting the army and corps commanders, and obtaining varied views. As may be expected those who had had recent successes were in favour of continuing; those who were at the end of their resources of men, material or spirit, were not. Kaiser Karl knew very well that the shrewdest strategic brain on the Austrian side belonged to Field-Marshal Conrad, and if he thought the Piave attack should be continued at all costs, that was probably the vital decision. However, Kaiser Karl could well appreciate the enormous risks involved. By the time he had made up his own mind it was too late

it took 6,500 prisoners, but no avail for it no longer had the means for continuing the advance. In the centre VII Corps and IV Corps made gains but could not always hold them; like the others they had done all they could be expected to do but now found themselves on the wrong side of a swollen river facing an army which might well be poised for a crushing counter-blow.

was a moment

It

for the right decision.

Should Field-Marshal Boroevic stake everything on continuing the battle in the hope that reinforcements might come to hand, or should he withdraw and let slip an opportunity of great promise? Alternatively should he concentrate on withdrawing from an untenable position and try again later, or should he make a wild gamble on being able to find reinforcements which he had little hope of obtaining? His subordinates were divided in their views, some thought a swift thrust might produce substantial dividends — food, key points, and war material; others were doubtful whether the present gains were enough to maintain the offensive. It was an unfortunate time to make a request to the Chief-of-Staff for more troops and more equipment for the latter had just been asked by Ludendorff to send six good divisions and accompanying artillery to the Western Front. And if Ludendorff asked for something urgently, it would be unwise to refuse. Moreover the Eleventh Army had just been defeated and the entire strategy of the Italian front had been disrupted. Nevertheless Boroevic's message urgently requesting the necessary men and materials could not be ignored. Yet while it was being considered at Austrian he was already changing his mind and deciding to withdraw. But, unbelievably, Kaiser Karl, the Emperor-King and Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian armies decided that

GHQ

2844

to evacuate.

Caporetto avenged Meanwhile on the Italian side the situation was becoming increasingly clear to General Diaz;

Italy

offensive.

should

promptly

The numbers

take

the

of the opposing

forces were approximately equal but Diaz could not know whether Italian morale had recovered sufficiently since Caporetto to enable him to make the moves he wished. A false step might let the Austrians in. Nevertheless he made up his mind as early as the 18th, and on the 19th launched his attack. Montello was the first priority,

and it was allotted to General Pennella with the Italian Eighth Army. His troops were far from fresh, for two divisions (48th and 58th) had already had a good mauling from the Austrians in that area. Nevertheless with a reinforcement of eight divisions and supporting artillery he had a useful force.

But it was by no means easy. Alter a short bombardment the first attack (with two corps) went in. The Austrians in this sector had made a partial recovery; the

had dropped, three vital had been constructed and ammunition had been sent across. The invaders were not prepared to give up their gains lightly, and held repeated attacks; nevertheless the Italians made some ground on the right of their position. When in the late afternoon the 48th division from level of the Piave

bridges

VII Corps came over to reinforce them they succeeded in retaking Nervesa; only to lose again through an Austrian counterit attack the next morning. The Italians came back, but in the afternoon Pennella decided that better results would ensue if they held ground and let their artillery destroy the Austrian bridges over the Piave. That evening Kaiser Karl gave Boroevic the order to withdraw across the river. If the decision had come 24 hours earlier Boroevic would have been in a vastly happier position. He was now in a position of extreme danger and could only hope that the Italians did not realise how vulnerable he was. It was a vain hope. The movement was to be executed entirely at night in two phases; on the 21st/ 22nd all wounded and non-essential troops would cross and the remainder would retire on the 22nd/23rd. There would be no daylight movement, and no hint of what was really intended would be given to the troops before they actually began to move. Fortunately for the Austrians the Italian Commander, General Diaz, had decided that the Italians were too tired to turn the withdrawal into a rout and would do better when the Austrians decided to renew the offensive later. Boroevic's caution and secrecy paid a handsome dividend. The Italians did not realise what was afoot until the early morning of the 23rd; however, they managed to inflict a lot of casualties even at this late stage. Surprisingly enough the defending side had greater losses than the attacker, but the casualty lists include a large number of Italians who were taken prisoner. The exact figures are in some doubt but it seems that Italian losses totalled 85,000 while Austrian losses amounted to 70,000. Within these numbers must be reckoned

the Italian claim to have taken 25,000 Austrian prisoners and the Austrian claim to have captured 30,000 Italians. Casually figures are, of course, no indication of the result of a battle, and it was particularly so on the Piave. The great Austin Hun gari an offensive had been halted. A British force weakened by influenza bad checked the Eleventh Army, an Italian army that might have been demoralised bad fought st ubbornly on he Piave. I

GTWEPPE ZVCCA

V

DEL FANTE

DISEGNI

D!

BELLOT

DV

In the days following the Austrian retreat General Diaz was constantly looking for attempts to harass the enemy. There were two local gains of some importance; one was the capture of the Col del Rosso (in the Monte Grappe area), the other was the spirited drive in the area below S. Dona known as the Sile, which resulted in a useful territorial gain and the capture of nearly 1,000 prisoners. The results of the failure of the AustroHungarian offensive went well beyond expectation. It was clear that the Italians had now recovered from the disasters of

the Piave. But the chaos that ensued in rear areas as a result of the June defeat was never completely put straight. It was subsequently said that the failure of the Austrian army had shaken not only their own country's morale but even that of the

German High Command, which now had to face the fact that its potential reservoir of battle-trained troops was nearly empty and brackish. But perhaps the greatest

triumph was that Italian citizen who front-line infantry,

felt

by the ordinary

now knew that when properly

his led,

could fight with the best.

the previous year and would return blow for

blow with

interest. Their morale had restored. In contrast,

now been completely

the Austrians had disintegrated. Desertion became widespread, and what was worse some of these bands of hungry ex-soldiers began to raid their own stores along the line of communication. The war was by no means over, and the Austrians had not yet given up the idea of an offensive along

Further Reading Diaz (Toulmin 1935) Trevelyan, G. M., Scenes from Italy's War Balsini, A.,

(T.C.Jack 1919) The War on the

Villari, Luigi,

Italian

Front

(Cobden Sanderson 1932) {For Philip Warner's biography, see page 208.]

2845

Austrian

Swan Song: blast and

PHASE TWO AUSTRIAN FRONT LINE JUNE 15 AM JUNE 15 PM JUNE 17 PM ITALIAN FRONT LINE

JUNE

17

PM

MILES 1 r

1

KILOMETRES

20

counterblast on the Piave PHASE THREE AUSTRIAN FRONT LINE JUNE 19 AM JUNE 19 PM JUNE 20 PM ITALIAN FRONT LINE

JUNE 20 PM ADVANCE JULY 2-6

2846

NINTH

ARMY

upreme Command Gen Diaz 19 Divisions

2847

struggles on the witnessed Germany's last desperate Germans tried to force >und, so did it in the air as the by bombing their capital Britain and France out of the war however as the defences had cities. The effort was in vain, could muster. But 1918 caught up with the bombers-Germany ' augury for the contained a far more important event, an first truly independent future - the formation of the world's Force, KA* strategic bomber force, the Independent

s*

Douglas Robinson

.1

^a

•

IlJL*

^^^^_^

P

«

Below: The defences — searchlights on one of London's bridges Right: A Handley-Page V/1500. potentially the best bomber of the war

!

1

a eonosce* e voiutmo su Vie no*, jMtremnio lanciare ffoktifi: i tr« colon de

ru<3«r*t* -

bombe

<

a to

J

p>'dl» a tre

^HK'K'rra

ai

gov*r»o otnuM tSriBMihertHJJJnali. ni pace in* pn&t e

ivi

^gggo

iH« 4ottfl«. Noi fftcdtine I* f cO Uttordo crude La govern che

1

,

ENNESI! rouiformo pruuiana?

Che iparate « coma 3 pane

oicidio.

•iva

?

La

deli'

vin

r

,

Uct

asi. Svggliati

^ When

Italy declared

gary on isted

an

war on Austria-Hun-

May

24, 1915, there already exaircraft of Italian design well

suited to the long-range bombing role. The creation of Gianni Caproni, the Ca 1 exemplified the basic design of all the large Caproni aircraft of the war period. biplane with wings 72 feet 10 inches in span, it accommodated its crew in a central observer-bombardier-gunner nacelle — an right forward and two pilots side by side immediately behind him. At the rear of the nacelle was a 100-hp Fiat water-cooled engine. Two long 'outrigger' fuselages to right and left had Fiats in their noses, and at their after ends carried a broad horizontal tailplane on which were mounted three rudders. The maximum speed was 72 mph, the ceiling 13,100 feet with a load of approximately 1,000 lbs of bombs. One hundred and sixty-six of these aircraft were built. The later Ca 3 of 1917 was almost identical, but had three 150-hp Isotta-Fraschini engines. Some 250 of these were completed. Most impressive to the layman was the huge Ca 4 triplane, with a span of 98 feet and an all-up weight of 16,500 lbs including 3,000 lbs of bombs. The engines were Fiats, Isotta-Fraschinis or American Liberties of 200- to 400-hp. With all the struts and wires bracing the triplane wings, maximum speed was no more than 87-5 mph. Not more than 35

A

were built during 1918 (six of which wore the markings of the Royal Naval Air Service, but apparently never left Italy) and the type was used only for night bombing. Subsequently, Caproni returned to the biplane design, and the Ca5, of which 252 were built in 1918, had three Isotta-Fraschinis or Fiats of 200- to 250-hp. The Italians also used semi-rigid airships for bombing right to the end of the war. The 'M' class craft in use late in the war were 269 feet long, had a gas volume of 441,000 cubic feet of hydrogen, and were powered by two Itala Maybach engines of 225-hp. These craft could carry a ton of bombs, and could reach altitudes above 15,000 feet. High altitude night raids were made on depots and railway stations in the rear areas of the Austrian armies, and on occasion, across the Adriatic. The Capronis were similarly used for tactical bombing of railway stations and junctions, ammunition and supply depots, aerodromes and troop concentrations in the Austrian rear areas, and at no time during the war did the Italian army set aside any part of its bombing force for strategic

2850

The famous Gabriele d'Annunzio in the Farman in 1915. Right: The leaflet dropped on the Austrian capital, Vienna Left:

front cockpit of a

To the flamboyant soldier-poet Gabriele d'Annunzio, who was 52 years old on the outbreak of war, must go much of the credit for the long-range missions of the Italian bombing force. Passionately dedicated to the recovery of the 'lost territories', as early as July 1915 he was participating in flights intended to show the operations.

Italian

tricolour

to

fellow

countrymen

chafing under the Austrian yoke in Trieste, Trento (Trent), Zara (Zadar) and Pola. From these propaganda flights the next step was to carry bombs to Austrian cities. Massed behind the active front along the Isonzo, east of Venice, even the Capronis could not reach Vienna, 260 miles distant, or Buda-Pest, 340 miles away. But across the Adriatic, not much more than 100 miles distant, were a number of important Austrian cities and bases: Pola, the main base of the Austrian battle fleet; Trieste, the largest and busiest port of the Austro-

Hungarian Empire with the

steel mills

and

big Stabilimento

Tecnico shipyards; and Fiume (Rijeka), site of the Whitehead torpedo factory and of the Danubius shipyard. Cattaro (Kotor), farther south, was a fleet base and the home of the German U-Boats operating in the Mediterranean. The first Capronis to enter service at the front assembled in August 1915, at Pordenone. On August 20 they made their first bombing raid, on the Austrian flying field at Asiovizza. By the date of the Third Battle of the Isonzo, in October 1915, four

squadrons of Capronis were in service. The first long-distance mission was flown on February 18, 1916, when in reprisal for an Austrian attack on Milan nearly 4,000 lbs of bombs were dropped on Lai bach (Ljubljana). Four tons of bombs on the Whitehead torpedo factory in Fiume on August 1, 1916, caused extensive fires and damage. These long-range daylight attacks had been made in formation without escorts, but when 22 Capronis went to Trieste on September 13, 1916, they were escorted by two squadrons of Italian-built Nieuports. At the instigation of d'Annunzio a series of raids was made on Pola in 1917. In the first one, by 36 Capronis on the night of August 2/3, 1917, 20 aircraft reached the target; eight tons of bombs fell on the naval base. Ten aircraft were damaged by anti-aircraft fire, but all returned to their home fields. Twenty -eight Capronis

bomb

Pola on the night of Yet the strategic campaign against Pola had to give way a few days later to the requirements of the Ninth Battle of the Isonzo, in which 85 Capronis bombed the Austrian rear areas. An outstanding — but isolated — accomplishment was the raid on the naval base at Cattaro. Because the target was far to the south on the Dalmatian coast, two squadrons of Caproni Ca 3's based at Milan first flew south to Gioia del Colle in the province of Puglia on September 25. Fourteen aircraft set out from there for Cattaro on the night of October 4, but two turned back with engine trouble. The remainder made the 280-mile round trip across the open sea, claiming hits on the submarine base, the torpedo store, seaplane hangars and a petrol dump at Kumbor. With the Caporetto disaster in October and November 1917, such strategic missions became an unjustifiable luxury; while the Caproni squadrons, caught up in the turmoil of the retreat to the Piave, were able to make only 18 bombing attacks on the Central Powers' troop concentrations. Early in 1918 the emphasis still was on tactical operations, Austrian airfields being the prime target. In February 1918 a new aircraft came forward to participate in long-range missions—a fast single-seater, the SVA-5, which had been designed as a fighter but had been rejected because of lack of manoeuvrability. Its power and speed — 136 mph at sea level with a 220-hp SPA-6A water-cooled engine — made it ideal for

returned to

August

8/9.

long-range strategic reconnaissance. The 87th Squadriglia, 'La Serenissima', made the aircraft famous. On May 21, 1918 two of its pilots flew all the

way

to Friedrichs-

hafen and returned with photographs of the Zeppelin works, a round trip of 440 miles. It also made bombing raids on Zagreb, Bolzano and Innsbruck, all long distance flights over high mountains. The greatest day in the history of 'La Serenissima' squadron, and perhaps in the life of d'Annunzio, was on August 9, 191K, when the poet, a passenger in a two-sealer version of the SVA-5, was flown to Vienna escorted by seven single Beaters, a round trip of 625 miles. The aircraft were heavily loaded with fuel, and dropped only leaflets over the Austrian capital. For the Capronis, however, there were few long-range missions, as the 11 squadrons equipped with them bombed railway stations and junctions, important highways and enemy aero-

dromes

in preparation for the final victory

at Vittorio Veneto. Having turned to night

the

autumn

bombing raids in of 1917, the Gothas of the

Englandgeschwader, together with the Giant bombers based with them around Ghent, attempted to continue the campaign into the winter. On the night of October 1/2, 1917, 18 Gothas were sent out, but only eight reached London. Eighteen British aircraft ascended, but only one even saw any of the raiders. The antiaircraft guns fired 10,532 rounds with no successes, while one person was killed and 13 injured by fragments. On the night of October 31/November 1, 22 Gothas set out from Belgium. The weather was cloudy and most of the raiders scattered their bombs over Kent and Essex. Eighty-five bombs fell on London. Fifty defending aircraft ascended but no German machines were lost over England. One Gotha caught fire after landing in Belgium, and four more were damaged in crashes. In the first December raid, on the night of the 6/7th, the 19 Gothas participating had hopefully loaded 10,300 lbs of a new type of incendiary bomb, and only 870 lbs of explosives. The two Giants participating loaded 1,660 lbs of explosive and 2,430 lbs of incendiary bombs. Many of the aircraft, including at least one of the Giants, dropped their bombs on Sheerness, Ramsgate,

Margate and Dover. Between 4.30 and 5.30 am — an unusually late hour — six Gothas reached London, their incendiaries starting fires in Finsbury, Kennington and Whitechapel. The crews on their return, however, were very disappointed and reported that only a few fires had been seen. Two Gothas, damaged by anti-aircraft fire, made forced landings in England and were destroyed. A third went missing, probably at sea on the way home, while two Gothas, damaged by anti-aircraft fire, crash-landed outside their bases in Belgium. Still another was damaged in landing at its own aerodrome. In the next attack, on December 18/19, the 15 Gothas loaded only high explosive bombs. One Giant accompanied them, carrying 2,200 lbs of mixed bombs. Reaching London, one of its 660-pounders fell near Eaton Square and damaged many homes. As usual, many bombs fell in Kent, and only six Gothas reached London. Three Royal Flying Corps pilots found and attacked Gothas, and one, shot up by Cap-

W. Murlis-Green in a Camel, fell sea off Folkestone. Back in Belgium, one Gotha crashed and four were damaged, two of them in crash landings outside

tain G. in the

their bases.

Thus, only a meagre 13 Gothas were dispatched in the next raid on January 28/29, 1918, of which six reached England and only three arrived over London. One, attacked by two Camels, crashed in flames at Wickford. One Giant was out, carrying 2,420 lbs of explosive bombs, including two of 660 lbs — the R 39, commanded by the redoubtable Hauptmann von Bentivegni, the commanding officer of Reisenflugzeugabteilung 501. Shooting up a Bristol Fighter which dared to attack, the Giant arrived over London, where one of its 660-lb bombs caused a memorable tragedy. Piercing a street level pavement light, the bomb exploded in the basement of Messrs Odhams' Printing Works in Long Acre. This was jammed with more than

500 people using it as an air raid shelter. blast and subsequent fire killed 38 persons and injured 85. Four more Gothas were demolished in crash landings in Belgium, and because of the heavy losses, the Englandgeschwader was withdrawn for reorganisation, reequipment and training of new personnel. When it was ready once more in March, it found itself committed to the support of the great drive which started on the 21st of the month. In the interval it was the Giants of Rfa 501, totalling six at the most, which alone continued the raids on southern England. Four of the Giants were out on the night of January 29/30, and while they had

The bomb

little success against the capital, they demonstrated their ability to give and take punishment. Seventy-three British aircraft ascended, and one, a BE 12, encountered a Giant over Essex and stayed with it until it reached western London. Repeated attacks by the British pilot caused no apparent damage, while his own machine was badly riddled. The Giant's bombs fell on Kew, Brentford and Richmond; en route home it was attacked near Gravesend by another pilot who fired 100 rounds without effect. Another Giant was pursued by four aircraft which were unable to bring it down, though they forced it to dump its entire bomb load on Wanstead. Five Giants set out on the night of Febru-

ary 16/17. Bentivegni's R 39 was carrying for the first time a single 2,200-lb bomb, the largest used by either side in the war. Aiming at Victoria Station, the doughty Kommandeur instead blew up the North Pavilion of Chelsea Hospital. R 12 also reached the capital, and survived with little damage a hair-raising encounter with the cables of a balloon barrage extending between Woolwich Arsenal and the West India Docks. Suddenly brought up short, it fell 1,000 feet before the pilot could regain control. The Giant went on to drop two 660-pounders in Woolwich Arsenal. On the following night, R 25, flying alone, penetrated to the heart of the capital. The bulk of her bomb load was accurately aimed at St Pancras Station; here 20 were killed and 22 injured. One Camel pilot found the R 25 but was forced to break off the engagement after firing 50 rounds. The R-plane commander remarked on the fact that a single machine could arouse the defences over a large area; guns 20 miles away 'were firing blindly into the air'. Not until March 7 did the Giants return, all six of Rfa 501 's machines being sent out that night. Again R 39 was carrying a 2,200-lb bomb, which fell on Warrington Crescent, totally destroying four houses and damaging 140 to a greater or lesser degree. R27, after dropping its cargo in Battersea, had all four engines fail simultaneously en route home when water in the petrol froze in the fuel lines; it just managed to glide to the Belgian coast, where it crash-landed. Still another unidentified

Giant crashed in Belgium. Only three Giants took part in the last raid on England, on May 19/20. The bulk of the attacking force was 38 Gothas from

BOGOHL

3, whose commander had pleadhave this attack sandwiched in between raids across the Western Front. The consequences were disastrous, for the British night fighter pilots had many engagements, three of which were successful. Three more Gothas were shot down by anti-

ed

to

Nineteen Gothas were suphave reached London, along with one Giant, but the damage was not impressive. Bombs fell in Kent and Essex, particularly at Dover and Folkestone. More than the losses in this raid, the demands of the German offensives in France tied down both the Gothas and the Giants. Actually, as early as January 31, 1918, BOGOHLs 1 and 2 had opened a series of attacks on Paris, designed together with the bombardment by the long-range guns to cause a collapse of French morale behind the fighting line. Plans were drawn to attack both London and Paris with a diaaircraft posed to

fire.

bolically effective 'Elektron' or magnesium bomb weighing only 2-2 lb, but early in August the High Command deckled 'on political grounds' against any further attacks on the capitals. For the German navy's Zeppelins the last year of the war was marked by heavy losses. The last big raid, the 'Silent Raid', on October 19/20, 1917, resulted in most of the 11 participating airships being blown from the Midlands far into France by a 40-knot northerly gale above 15,000 feet. Four ships descended in France, another crash-landed in southern Germany. It was during this attack that one Zeppelin, L 45, found herself driving across London and released three 660-lb bombs which killed 33 people and wounded 49. Three months later, on January 5, 1918, four of the latest Zeppelins were destroyed at the Ahlorn base by a series of explosions which also demolished the four huge double hangars in which they were housed. Three raids were made on the Midlands in the spring of 1918 by four or five airships carrying over 6,000 lbs of bombs and

where they were Then came the raid of the war, on August 5, 1918.

flying last

20,000

at

immune

feet,

to the defences.

Five Zeppelins, led by Strasser in the new L 70, set out for the Midlands, with the possibility that London might be bombed by his express order. Instead, as the raiding squadron approached England in twilight at a mere 16,000 feet, L 70 was shot down in flames by a British aeroplane.

Bombing

the Reich

Strategic bombing by the British Royal Flying Corps, and later by the Royal Air Force, on German cities, industry and communications resulted directly from the desire of the War Cabinet to retaliate for the raids on London by German Gothas. That astute politician, David Lloyd George, knew that the public was thirsting for revenge; but he had to battle the opposition of senior commanders in France. Sir Douglas Haig insisted on having the maximum number of aircraft to co-operate with the army in the Passchendaele battles; while Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the future generalissimo, rejected strategic bombing in pursuit of his obsession with winning the war through ground attack alone. At the beginning of October 1917 Major-

Hugh Trenchard, then commanding the Royal Flying Corps in France, was instructed to commence attacks on German targets which could be reached from the area around Nancy in eastern Lorraine. Ochey was initially selected as the aeroGeneral

drome for this bombing force. From here, it was theoretically possible to bomb by day and night not only the towns of the Saar but also such important German cities as Karlsruhe, Mannheim-Ludwigs2851

the huge Badische Anilin factory. ufacturing poison gas, was always a

high priority target), Trier, Mainz, Coblenz and even such distant goals as Cologne, Frankfurt and Stuttgart, roughly 125 miles from Ochey. On October 11, Lieutenant-Colonel Cyril Newall was placed in command of the 41st Wing. The force under Newall's command was pitifully small. The day bombing squadron was No 55, equipped with de Havilland DH 4's with Rolls-Royce Eagle engines of 250-hp. No 55 had taken the first 'Fours' to France in March 1917, and had had much practice in flying day bombing missions above 14,000 feet far into the German rear areas. The second squadron, No 100, was equipped with FE 2b's, latticetailed pushers obsolete for the day-fighting role for which they had been designed; but the squadron had confe to France in March 1917, trained for night bombing

and ground strafing. The big punch at night was to come from the Handley-Pages of Naval 'A' Squadron (later numbered No 16 Naval). At the time the Admiralty possessed, in the Handley-Page 0/100, the only large multi-engined bomber in British service. Designed originally for daylight overseas patrols, the 0/100 had two Rolls-Royce Eagles, a span of 100 feet, a crew of three, and carried up to 16 112-lb bombs. By contrast, the DH 4's carried only four 112-lb bombs; but Trenchard favoured day attack, even with lighter bomb loads, for its greater accuracy and supposed morale effect. Initially the three units practised on nearby targets, the closest of which was the complex of railway junctions around Metz (Metz-Sablons, Metz-Woippy, Thionville. Longuyon), through which iron ore from the captured Lorraine fields passed daily to Germany. Not much farther were the Saar industrial towns — Saarbrucken, Pirmarsens, Bous, Volkingen, Dillingen and Merzig. The first daylight raid was by No 55 against the Burbach steel works near Saarbrucken. Four days later No 55 suffered its first loss when German fighters shot down one 4 during an attack on

DH

Bous. At this time home defence against daylight bombing attacks on the Reich was in the hands of scattered single seater formations known as Kestn (Kampfeinsitzer Staffeln) which neither in training nor equipment matched the fighter Jagdstaffeln on the Western Front. The first ni^ht raid was by nine Handley-Pages and 14 FE 2b's against the Burbach works on October 24/25. The weather was poor and two Handley-Pages and two FE's were lost. Weather continued poor in November and December and what attacks could be

made were on nearby

targets.

An ominous

sign for the future was two night bombing attacks bj German aircraft on Ochey

during November. strategic

bombing

In

time,

force

much

of the

would be diverted

attacks on German airfields at MetzFrescaty, Morhange, Buhl, Volpersweiler, Boulay and others. Here the FE's of No 100 Squadron were in their element. The first long-distance raid came on December 24, 1917, when ten de Havillands to

bombed

Mannheim

and

Ludwigshafen

from 13,000 feet. Minor attacks continued during the winter when the weather permitted, in conditions of ship for the flight crews. leather helmets, flying boots and gauntlets, the

2852

appalling hardDespite fur-lined coats, trousers, icy blast of the

100-mph slipstream in open cockpits chilled the body and froze faces, fingers and toes. Electrically-heated flight suits were provided but were unreliable. Oxygen was issued to the high-flying day bombers, but the masks were prone to freezing. Early in February, Newall's headquarters were given a new title — VIII Brigade. Several attacks were made on Trier during the month, the ideal of 'round the clock' bombing being attained on February 19, when the de Havillands bombed the town by day and the Handley-Pages followed by night. Nervous German civilians, and particularly their mayors, now began crying out in anguish and even urging that German air raids should stop — only to get short shrift from the Chief of the General Staff,

Feldmarschall von Hindenburg. With better weather in March, deeper raids were made by day — to Mainz on March 9, to Stuttgart on March 10, Coblenz on March 12, Freiburg on March 13, Mannheim on March 18, and again on March 24. Six de Havillands were lost to No 55 Squadron over Germany during these raids. Alarm was widespread, and the Germans added to the anti-aircraft guns around the threatened cities. The first attack on Cologne since October, 1914, was made on the night of March 24/25 by a Handley-Page. April was a month of high winds and fog, and strategic targets were not bombed.

May brought reinforcements for the thinly-spread day bombers — No 99 Squadron arriving on May 3, and No 104 on May 20. Unfortunately their aircraft were de Havilland DH 9's, modifications of the well-

DH 4, and supposed to be improvements on the earlier craft, but actually-

tried

to it in performance. The fault in the airframe, but in the engine. Supplies of the excellent Rolls-Royce Eagle were falling far short of demand, and the

inferior

was not

DH 9

was intended

to take a new massengine, the Siddeley Puma, originally expected to develop 300-hp, but de-rated after many failures to 230-hp. As a result of the unreliability of the Puma, the 9 squadrons were cursed with many aircraft falling out of formation before reaching the lines. Its low power limited the ceiling with bombs to about 12,000 feet, where the 'Nine' could

produced

DH

by German fighters. With the formation of the Royal Air Force

easily be overtaken

on April 1, 1918, the new Air Council decided to expand the strategic air war against Germany. Trenchard accepted on May 8 the command of the enlarged force, which was to be directly under the Air Ministry. The first members of the new organisation were of course the VIII Brigade squadrons. On June 6, 1918, they were again rechristened with the provocative title of Independent Force, RAF. The name grated on the ears of French generals, one of whom sarcastically posed the famous question, 'Independent of

whom? Of God?' Trenchard's first concern was to find space for a large number of additional squadrons in the region around Nancy; he had been promised a total of 40 by the end of August 1918. In fact, the Air Ministry's intentions embraced more than a solely British force, and its representatives had discussed before the Supreme War Council at Versailles the establishment of an Inter-Allied Independent Air Force which was to include at least one French Groupe de Bombardement; the Italian 18th Group, consisting of three Caproni squadrons, which arrived in France in February 1918; and whatever American squadrons might be established for the long distance bombing of Germany. The Inter-Allied Force never materialised (though many American officers were assigned to the British squadrons for operational training), nor did Trenchard's units exceed nine squadrons at the Armistice. The reason for this deficiency was the failure of engine

and

aircraft

manufacture

both in England and the United States to match extravagant expectations; but constant French army opposition to the whole concept of an 'independent' force occupying French soil played a more subtle role. Trenchard saw himself having a choice of 'a sustained and continuous attack on one large centre after another until each centre was dest roved', or 'to attack as many of the large industrial centres as it was possible to reach with the machines at my disposal'. He adopted the hitter alternative, as the former was not, attainable with the meagre forces at his disposal, while the moral effect of widespread bomb ing was much greater than concent rated attack on a few cities. Preferring day bombing, Trenchard sent out the untried 1)11!) squadrons together with the veterans of No 55. It was their misfortune to meet the augmented Acs///,

now employing a

fast-climbing intercepthe Siemens-Schuckert D III, along with the familiar Albatros D Va's and Pfalz D Ill's. In a raid on Karlsruhe on' June 26, No 104 lost two aircraft (one interned in Switzerland); four had dropped out before reaching the target, while five of No 99's had similarly aborted. Nine day bombers went missing during the month. In July the toll increased sharply. Bad weather frustrated many long range attempts in July, but raids were made on Coblenz (three times) and Stuttgart, once by night. Fifteen day bombers were lost in combat. A massed assault by 40 German fighters on No 99 Squadron on July 31 knocked it out of the war for two weeks. Twelve aircraft set out for Mainz, but three of them turned back before reaching the trenches with engine trouble. The remaining nine came under such heavy attack that the leader abandoned the raid on Mainz and decided to bomb Saarbriicken. Four of the 9's were shot down before reaching the town, and three more were shot down on the return to the lines, the squadron losing altogether five officers killed and nine prisoners. The same fate 9 squadron, was meted out to the other No 104, in a flight to Mannheim on August 22. Two bombers were shot down by fighters near Karlsruhe on the way in, and five more were destroyed after bombing the target. Clearly the day bombers, partor,

DH

DH

Opposite page top: Major E. Cadbury, who brought down the L 70. This page below left:

The Zeppelin

Below: The

L 70.

ill-fated

Peter Strasser, lost

on the

last

Zeppelin

raid over Britain in

the war.

Boffom.Aflightof Handley-Pagessets off at dusk for a night raid

on Germany

An experimental version of the Handley-Page 0/100 with four 200 h Hispano-Suiza engines. Above: The inferior DH 9 day bomber BelowThe monstrous Caproni Ca 4 triplane bomber. Bottom A Capron Ca equipped as a torpedo bomber. Above right: Great Britain's first successful multiengined bomber, the Handley-Page 0/100 Engines two Rolls-Royce Eagle inlines, 250/266-hp each. Armament: Ze flexible Lewis guns and up to 16 1 12-lb bombs. Speed: 85 mpn at sea level. Ce.lmg: 7,000 feet, flange: about 700 miles. Weight empty, Top:

II

2854 am

<

'

11—11

Sto

loaded. 8.300/ 14,000

lbs.

Span: 100

feet. Lengfr*:

62

feet 10V4 inches Below right: Italy's best heavy bomber of the war, the Caproni Ca 5 Engmes: three Fiat A 12 bis or Liberty inlines, 300- or 400 hp e P each R m hine 9UnS 3nd UP t0 2 'bs of b ombs. mophh Chmb: 5/2 min utes to 3,280 feet. 000 Ceilinq- 15 000 fe P t d I™ We '^ empty/loaded: 6,620/1 1,700 ffis'. Spfn 77 feet Length. 41 feet 4 inches. Crew: 2 for day- and 4 for night-bombina Performance with Liberty engines was superior to theabove^iguL

S^

sSToo LeZhTiT^

'

2855

OH 9 lid

with

its

lamentable

not reach the targets

500 feet to place their bombs accurately. Seven of the large bombers were lost in one night, however, on September 16/17, one force-landing in Holland after bombing Cologne, while others were shot down by fire

while

attacking

104

lost five of its

to

Ludwigshafen; but 110 flew to

DH 9's. No

Mannheim on September

ige fighter escort.

compensations. FrankfurtMain was reached for the first time by DH 4's of No 55 in an operation which saw 12 of the squadron's aircraft bombing the city from 14,000 feet. Twenty-five German fighters attacked the retreating day bombers near Mannheim but failed to break their tight formation; two German Albatroses were shot down, while all the 'Fours' made it back, one with a dead observer. The same crack squadron made the first attack on Darmstadt on August 16, with three aircraft lost to defending fighters en route home. Of the four squadrons joining the Independent Force in August, three (nos 97, 215 and 115) flew Handley-Pages, while No 100 at this time was being re-equipped with the same machine. The fourth squadron, No 110, had been equipped by the gift of the Nizam of Hyderabad with a worthy replacement for the Puma 'Nine', the DH 9a with American Liberty engine of 400-hp. Here was a near sister of the 'Four' with more power and the ability to carry two 230-lb bombs to 16,750 feet, where it could still attain 102 mph. On the night of August 25, two HandleyPages of No 215 made a daring attack on the Badische Anilin plant at Ludwigshafen; one descending to 200 feet, the other to re

anti-aircraft

Nos 99 and 104 went

Saar-

briicken and Trier.

During September, the Independent Force day squadrons, by order of Marshal Foch, were employed in tactical bombing in support of the American army's offensive at St Mihiel. Distant raids continued before and afterwards. On September 7,

16 for its first raid, bombing from 17,000 feet. It lost one aircraft, but in a raid on Frankfurt on September 25 this same squadron, attacked by 50 German fighters, lost four machines.

Bad weather during October hampered Heavy losses in a

the daylight raiders.

raid on Cologne on October 21 ended No 110's effectiveness for the remaining days 9a's which of the war. Four of the 11 crossed" the lines were shot down by defending fighters after the formation had broken up in heavy cloud, while others crash-landed on the Allied side of the

DH

lines.

The augmented Handley-Page squadmontb the 1,650-lb

rons began using this

SN

bomb, one of which on the night of October 21 demolished a munitions factory

in Kaiserslautern. Two nights later another of the huge bombs wrecked a whole street of houses in Wiesbaden.

Without doubt, the Independent Force would have been greatly augmented, with even more devastating effect on the towns of south-west Germany, had the war continued into 1919. At Bircham Newton in Norfolk, three giant bombers were secretly being prepared for the first attack on Berlin — Handley-Page V/1500's, with awing span of 126 feet, grossing more than 12 tons fully loaded, and powered by four RollsRoyce 375-hp Eagles. Up to 30 250-lb bombs could be carried. They were ready to go to Berlin on November 11, when the Armistice stopped them. More would have joined this force, and in addition, Trenchard had a 'shuttle bombing' scheme for the giants, whereby they would proceed from Norfolk via Berlin to Prague, and return via Essen

or Diisseldorf to England, or via Regensburg or Munich to the fields around Nancy. All the 9's would have been replaced by 9a's, and at the Armistice, the Independent Force was testing two fast twin-

DH

engined day bombers, the de Havilland DH 10 Amiens and the Vickers Vimy. Longrange Sopwith Snipe fighters would have escorted them, and later would have been supplemented by the 140-mph Martinsyde Buzzard. And more and more American squadrons, equipped with American-built DH 4's and Handley-Pages, would have flocked to the Inter-Allied Independent Air Force. During 13 months of strategic bombing, the Independent Force and its predeces-

665 tons of bombs on German hundred and twenty tons of this, however, fell on airfields. The Independent Force, after June 8, 1918, dropped 558 tons, 390 of them at night. Thus, the heaviest tonnage was transported by the night-flying Handley-Pages. It was the day bombers, however, which paid the price in blood — the four de Havilland squadrons losing 25 killed, 178 missing and 58 wounded, with 103 aircraft missing over the lines and 201 wrecked in crashes sors dropped targets. Two

The five night bombing squadrons had 87 killed or missing, and 11 wounded, while 34 aircraft were missing and 114 wrecked. The effect of the Independent Force's penetrations into Germany was moral rather than material. To the war-weary

in friendly territory.

and the Rhineland, from the skies was demoralising and undoubtedly war production suffered. Works managers, however, found the infrequent attacks with small bombs merely 'annoying'. The true significance of the Independent Force's operacivilians of the Saar the threat of death

tions was that they established a doctrine of defeating the enemy by aerial attack on his industrial base and civilian population, rather than by direct assault on his armies in the field, which had proved so costly and futile in the First World War. Further Reading Bulow, Hilmer von, Die Angriffe des Bomben geschwader 3 auf England (Die Luftwacht 1927) Caproni. Gianni, Gli Aeroplano Caproni (Museo Caproni 1935) Fredette, Raymond, The Sky on Fire (New York: Holt, Rhinehart& Winston 1966) Haddow. G. W. and Grosz. Peter. The German Giants (London: Putnam 1962) Jones, H. A., The War in the Air, Vol VI (Oxford Clarendon Press 1937) Morris, Alan, The First of the Many (London: Jarrolds 1968) Porro, Generale A. A. Felice, La Guerra nell Aria (Milan: Corbaccio £ [For Dr Douglas I see p. 991.]

Robinson's biography

Below: Damage to the railway marshalling yards atThionville on February 18, 1918 caused by bombers of the Independent Force. Right: A divided aim. A burning building in Paris after a Gotha raid. For a short period in 1918 the effort of the shorter ranged German bombers was switched to Paris to coincide with the

bombardment

of the Paris gun'

if

Britain's two major political parties dur-

fore the First World War Labour had been a small .vhich since 1900 had made limited but significant inces. As the Liberal Party faltered and failed to come to grips

the problems of the mass industrial society of the 20th CenLabour stood to replace it as the most important party of the political Left. The war accelerated the disintegration of the Liberal Party and the rise of Labour. The First World War shattered the Liberal Party into pieces that would never again be joined together. Liberals who firmly

THE LABOUR CONFERENCE

tury,

backed the war effort became identified with David Lloyd George's coalition government, which was largely dependent upon Conservative support. They thereby ceased to be distinctly Liberal. Many Liberals neither fully supported nor opposed the government's war effort. Although they detested war as a violation of their Liberal principles, they were unwilling to engage in antiwar activity when the survival of their country appeared to depend upon a united fight against an external enemy. Paralysed by their scrupulousness, these Liberals were ineffective, and they often abandoned political life altogether. Some Liberals — mainly from the left-wing, or radical, section of the party — who were determined to maintain their progressive principles and work for a moderate peace settlement, founded the Union of Democratic Control at the outbreak of the war. The group's chief organiser and secretary was E. D. Morel, who had become widely known for his pre-war agitation against atrocities in the Congo Free State. Other founders were Charles P. Trevelyan, Arthur Ponsonby, J. Ramsay MacDonald and Norman Angell. The participation of MacDonald, who had resigned as chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party at the beginning of the war but retained his position as treasurer of the Labour Party, was an indication of the desire of his radical colleagues to involve Labour in their movement. They hoped, in fact, to forge an alliance between Liberals and Labour which would become a powerful force working for peace and social reform. They did not argue that the war should be stopped immediately but that the British government should make every effort to end the fighting by negotiation with the Central Powers. During the first two and a half years of the war, the Union of Democratic Control co-operated closely with the Independent Labour Party, which was the most important policy-formulating and organising Labour body. In pamphlets, leaflets and public articulated ideas on foreign policy and the war speeches, the which the ILP came to accept as its own. The Labour Party as a whole continued to support the government until the end of 1917. Lloyd George, who had become Prime Minister in December 1916, fully appreciated the importance of the Labour movement. He later testified in his War Memoirs: 'In a modern industrial State, the vast bulk of the population consists of wage-earners and those dependent on them. Since Britain is the most highly industrialised State in the world, the contentment and co-operation of the wage-earners was our vital concern, and industrial unrest spelt a graver menace to our endurance and ultimate victory than even the military strength of

UDC

Ramsay MacDonald, of the

Union

of

treasurer of the Labour Party and founder member Democratic Control (UDC). Strongly anti-war

The inclusion of Henderson in the Coalition Government was a sop to the Labour movement, and his leaving it marked the end of the road that Labour had shared with the Liberals. Marvin Swartz Germany.' As a means of keeping Labour in check, Lloyd George included Arthur Henderson, the Secretary of the Labour Party (and a former member of the General Council of the UDC), in the War Cabinet when it was formed in December 1916. Labour discontent with the war and wartime conditions increased significantly during the third winter of the conflict, and the Russian Revolution of March 1917 heightened this dissatisfaction. Many Labourites began to look with more favour than formerly on UDC and ILP opposition to the' war. Henderson, aware of this unrest, wanted the government to demonstrate that it was not continuing the war for annexationist aims by allowing British Labour delegates to attend the proposed meeting of the Second International in Stockholm. The War Cabinet's opposition to this course forced Henderson to decide whether his primary loyalty was to Lloyd George or to Labour. The shabby treatment he received from his colleagues, who kept him waiting outside the Cabinet room while they discussed his actions within, helped him to make his decision. He left the government on August 11, 1917, determined, as Beatrice Webb later noted, 'to create an independent party capable of becoming HM Government'. To achieve this aim, Henderson had, first, to formulate a programme for the Labour Party and, second, to broaden the base of party membership. In both regards, he wished to provide Labour with an effective appeal to former middle-class Liberals as well as to the working class. The foreign policy of the Labour Party was contained in a document drawn up by a special subcommittee of the party executive. It consisted of two members of the UDC Executive Committee, Ramsay MacDonald and F. W. Jowett (chairman of the ILP), and a former Union member, Henderson himself, as well as two trade unionists, G. J. Wardle and G. H. Roberts, and a Fabian, Sidney Webb. The result of their deliberations reflected the strong influence exerted by the Union of Democratic Control, particularly by MacDonald. Entitled Memorandum on War Aims, it was approved by a special Labour conference at the Central Hall, Westminster, on December 28, 1917. The Memorandum began with an endorsement of the declaration of the Allied Socialist and Labour Parties of February 14, 1915, calling for the defeat of 'German imperialism' but not of the German people. It stated that 'whatever may have been the

Arthur Henderson, Labour Party Secretary, left Lloyd George's adminhim to attend the Stockholm conference

istration after the refusal to allow

causes of the outbreak of war, it is clear that the peoples of Europe, who are necessarily the chief sufferers from its horrors, had themselves no hand in it. Their common interest is now so to conduct the terrible struggle in which they find themselves engaged as to bring it, as soon as may be possible, to an issue in a secure and lasting Peace for the world'. According to the Memorandum, 'the fundamental purpose of the British Labour Movement in supporting the continuance of the struggle is that the world may henceforth be made safe for Democracy'. It continued: 'Of all the war aims, none is so important to the peoples of the world as that there should be henceforth on earth no more war. Whoever triumphs the peoples will have lost, unless some effective means of preventing war can be found.' To achieve this objective, the Memorandum demanded 'the democratisation of all countries', an end to 'secret diplomacy', a limitation on armaments and the establishment of a 'league of nations'. All these aims were similar to the cardinal points announced by the Union of Democratic Control as early as September 1914. The Memorandum on War Aims next discussed 'territorial adjustments', dealing specifically with Belgium, Alsace and Lorraine, the Balkans, Italy, Poland, 'the Jews and Palestine', the Turkish Empire and 'the colonies of tropical Africa'. It asked, in conclusion, that no economic war follow the end of fighting; that, to avoid famine and widespread unemployment, provision be made in advance for distribution of foodstuffs and for the effects of demobilisation; and that claims for compensation on both sides be fully and freely investigated. By its approval of the Memorandum on War Aims at the end of December 1917 the Labour movement took a giant stride towards making itself an opposition force in politics. In adopting a programme modelled on that of the Union of Democratic Control, Labour had discovered a foreign policy of its own with which to oppose the government's pursuit of the 'knock-out blow'. Charles Trevelyan, writing in the UDC journal in February 1918, proclaimed that 'the Labour Party, having largely adopted the standpoint of the ILP and UDC, became in effect an opposition to the Government'. Lloyd George's moderate war aims address of January 5, 1918, delivered, significantly, to a trades union conference, was intended to stem the rising Labour tide. It did so only momentarily. Arthur Ponsonby of the UDC declared a few months later: 'A change of Government means a change of policy and a change for the worse is impossible.' For many radicals like Trevelyan and Ponsonby Labour came to represent the alternative to the Lloyd George coalition; and Labour, in turn, became increasingly sympathetic to the Union of Democratic Control. For domestic as well as foreign affairs Labour formulated a new programme for 1918 under the guidance of Arthur Henderson. Labour and the New Social Order was its title. It was submitted to the party conference at Nottingham in January 1918 and finally adopted after another conference in June. It set four major objectives for the Labour movement, 'Four Pillars of the House that we propose to erect, resting upon the common foundation of the Democratic control of society in all its activities.' The first, 'the universal enforcement of a national minimum', called upon

Charles Trevelyan, also a

member of the UDC, thought

Labour Party as an opposition able

to

in

form a government

terms of a of

its

own

the state to assume responsibility for ensuring to every citizen 'all the requisites of healthy life and worthy citizenship'. The 'organisation of demobilisation' and 'securing employment for all' (with a minimum wage of 30 shillings per week and insurance against unemployment) were also to be tasks of the government. The second objective, 'the democratic control of industry', demanded the nationalisation of railways, mines and electricity production and other forms of public control over industry. The third objective was a 'revolution in national finance' which would insure a progressive income tax and excess profits and inheritance taxes that fell most heavily on the rich. Finally, in 'the surplus for the common good', Labour insisted that the profits of mine, land and industry should be used not to enrich a few individuals but to provide social welfare, education and other public benefits. Labour and the New Social Order attracted the attention not only of Labourites but also of Liberals who were dissatisfied with the laborious and piecemeal progressivism of their own party. Just as significant as Labour's articulation of its own foreign and domestic policies was its adoption of a new constitution on February 26, 1918. For the first time the Labour Party became in its own right a national party. Hitherto it had been a federation of trade unions, trades councils, socialist societies and local Labour parties; individuals did not join the Labour Party directly but by entering one of the federated bodies. This arrangement had bestowed enormous importance on the Independent Labour Party, which carried on much of the local political work of the Labour party through more than 600 branches. But the new constitution of 1918 announced that the party's object would be not only 'to organise and maintain in Parliament and in the country a political Labour Party' but also 'to ensure the establishment of a Local Labour Party in every County Constituency and in every Parliamentary Borough'. The Labour Party would hencefortb supply its own local organisation and no longer be dependent upon the ILP or any other group for that .function. Membership would now be open to 'individual members of a Local Labour Party' as well as to 'affiliated organisations'. This change assumed particular significance because only three weeks earlier, on February 6, 1918, the Representation of the People Act had enfranchised women for the first time and more than doubled the number of eligible voters. The Labour Party was now prepared to appeal to

mass electorate. The constitution contained another provision of the utmost import for the future of the Labour Party: 'To secure for the producers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry, and

this

the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry and service.' Here, as in Labour and the New Social Order, was a statement of the party's commitment to socialism, although that word itself was not used so as to avoid giving offence to more conservative trade unionists. Here, too, was Labour's announcement that its party was not for the working class alone but was open to all social classes, 'producers by hand or by brain'. In particular, Labour officially extended a welcome

Norman

Angell. The defection of Liberals like Angell to the Labour Party via the UDC tolled the knell of the old Liberal Party

idle-class formal Liberals who had broken, or might yet Dissolving its image as a merely 1 their old party. :iass party was essential to Labour's development into e

major participants in Britain's two-party system.

new constitution, with the Memorandum on War Aims and Labour and the New Social Order, gave direction to the Labour e

movement's growing opposition to government policies during 1918. To meet the manpower needs of the army in the fourth year of war the coalition government combed out industrial workers ever more finely, which increased labour unrest. To meet the German offensive in the spring of 1918, the government raised the age of liability to military service to 50 and tried to extend conscription to Ireland — a miscalculation that aggravated the already tense situation there. In June 1918 a Labour Party conference voted by a large majority to end the electoral truce, which since the beginning of the war had eliminated official contests for seats between the major parties. By 1,704,000 votes to 951,000 the Labour delegates accepted 'the recommendation of the Party Executive that the existence of the political truce be no longer recognised'. The Labour Party was from this time free to fight by-elections. Labour's assertiveness encouraged the Union of Democratic Control to undertake even stronger attacks on the government. In April 1918 it was effective in bringing Allied secret diplomacy to the attention of British Labour and further alienating it from the Lloyd George coalition. The Union published in a short book the secret treaties of the Allies, which the Bolsheviks had revealed upon coming to power in Russia five months earlier. The first edition of the book was quickly exhausted and a second appeared in

May

1918.

The workers

of Glasgow provided a demonstration of Labour's receptivity to ideas and, particularly, of its respect for the Union's secretary, E. D. Morel. A queue formed outside the Metropole Theatre there four hours before Morel was due to speak one June evening in 1918. 'By opening time there were sufficient gathered around the theatre,' according to a working-class leader who was present, 'to have filled it half a dozen times over. The

UDC

theatre was packed out and a huge overflow meeting was held in an open space across the way Morel confined himself to the inside meeting. But what a reception he got. Outside, across the way, we could hear cheering as though they wanted to lift the roof We admired Morel and we turned out in full strength to do off. him honour.' The efforts of Morel and the Union of Democratic Control helped to stimulate Labour interest in foreign affairs. Not only the Labour Party but also the traditionally conservative Trades Union Congress came to favour the ideas of the UDC. The Union sent speakers to local trades councils and Labour bodies, and they were received attentively and, often, enthusiastically. In June 1918, 174 Labour bodies, with a total membership of more than half a million, were affiliated to the Union of Democratic Control. When the Trades Union Congress celebrated its jubilee at Derby, during the first week in September 1918, few of the delegates were opposed to a negotiated peace. The Congress accepted a resolution calling for peace by negotiation .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

J

2860

.

H.

Thomas

(left)

and George Bernard Shaw

(right)

when Germany was out of France and Belgium. By the end of the war their common opposition to the government's war effort had bound Labour and the Union of Democratic Control together. For Liberals who switched their party allegiance to Labour, membership of the Union provided a convenient means of transition. E. D. Morel himself joined the ILP — and through it the Labour Party -in April 1918. Many of the other leaders of the had preceded him; others, among them Trevelyan, Ponsonby and Angell, followed, most of them by the end of 1918. By 1920 about 2,000 Liberals had entered the ILP. Thus Arthur Henderson succeeded in expanding the Labour Party, bringing in middleclass supporters and parliamentary candidates. Labour's gain was the Liberal Party's loss.

UDC

Into opposition

The Labour Party

finally asserted its complete independence three days after the signing of the Armistice with Germany. On November 14, 1918, a special Labour Party conference met in London to determine what attitude Labour should adopt towards the Lloyd George coalition. The Labour members of the government, including J. R. Clynes, argued that Labour ought to remain in the coalition in order to influence the making of the peace. They believed that Lloyd George would shortly call' for an election to take advantage of his popularity in the moment of victory and that to oppose him at the polls would lead to a disaster for the party. But J. H. Thomas and George Bernard Shaw, among others, held the view that Labour would be more effective outside the coalition. Shaw, in a memorable speech, chided Clynes for bringing no concessions from Lloyd George such as the Prime Minister had offered the Conservative Party. There was no guarantee, said Shaw, that Labour would benefit from remaining in the coalition: 'sympathetic consideration' was not good enough. 'Mr Clynes has come from Mr Lloyd George and done the best he can,' Shaw told the conference: 'I ask you to send Mr Clynes back to him with the message "Nothing doing!"' The delegates did as Shaw advised. They voted by 2,1 17,000 to 810,000 to leave the coalition. This decision was most significant. Allied with the Liberals before the war and tied to the other two parties since August 1914, Labour had finally issued its declaration of independence. It would stand on its own and succeed, or fail, by its own efforts. Labour, with its own foreign and domestic policies and a broader membership, was now an independent party of opposition.

Further Reading Brand, Carl F., The British Labour Party: A Short History (Stanford University Press, 1965) Cole, G. D. H., A History of the Labour Party from 1914 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948, 1969) Henderson, Arthur, The Aims of Labour (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1918) The Labour Party Year Book, 1919 (George Allen & Unwin, 1919) McKenzie, R. T., British Political Parties (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1964) Swartz, Marvin, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1971) :

[For Marvin Swartz' s biography see p. 704.

)

Both attacked Labour's unconditional attachment to the Coalition

s

Four times already in 1918 Ludendorff had attacked on the Western Front. On March 21, he had tried to cut off the French from the British between the Oise and the Scarpe. He had not achieved his objective. Moving his main effort to Flanders, he had tried to drive back the Belgians and the British west of Dunkirk and to open the road to Calais. He had been forced to stop 37 miles short of his objective. These two battles had cost him over 400,000 men, but they had also cost the British 300,000

and the French 92,000. On May 27, attacking by surprise on the Chemin des Dames, he had leapt straight up to the Marne and it was with great difficulty that the offensive had been halted 37 miles from Paris. His fourth offensive, mounted on June 9 between Noyon and Montdidier, was halted on the Matz by Fayolle and Mangin's

The 2nd Battle of the Marne: 1.THE GERMAN

ATTACK

Was the German going to lose the initiative? It appeared not, because the Germans attacked once again on July 15. But

*

Command now

this

was

-

was the Friedensturm, the decisive assault to gain peace. Were they to win here, all they would have to do next would be to crush the British army in Flanders. That would be the job of the Gruppe commanded by the Crown

The

offensive, planned for July 12, had postponed to July 15 to allow preparations to be completed. Meanwhile, it was learnt that the French were preparing a powerful tank attack from the forest of Villers-Cotterets, but this did not greatly worry Ludendorff. That sector was manned by well-seasoned troops which the Spanish flu had not ravaged too greatly. The Gruppe commanded by the Imperial Crown Prince comprised about 40 divisions divided into three armies and 15 corps. East of Chateau-Thierry, Bonn's Seventh Army had been relieved by Ninth Army in the Tardenois district in order to attack along both banks of the Marne in the direction of Epernay (Operation Marneschutz). On to be

First

r*

it

Prince of Bavaria. On the Marne, the Imperial Crown Prince was in command. Ludendorff was confident: 'I informed the Kaiser that the army was concentrated and totally prepared for the greatest undertaking in its history.' There was only one cloud on the horizon: 20 American divisions were now in France, much more than Ludendorff would have believed possible, and the arrival of these fresh troops would henceforth offset the numerical superiority which he had enjoyed in the spring. Actually, there were 207 German divisions on the Western Front on July 15, against 203 Allied divisions, but in these 203 divisions there were 17 American divisions twice the size of European divisions, which fairly sharply altered the balance.

left,

and Third Armies were

time they enjoyed neither numerical superiority nor the effect of surprise, for the French High Command was fully alert. The logical and well argued interpretation of the possibilities available to the Germans and their probable intentions, the

to expect a

Among French historians, this offensive of July 15, 1918, is sometimes described as the Fourth Battle of Champagne, sometimes as the Second Battle of the Marne.

its

First Army's observation post on Hill 157 slightly to the west of Menil-Lepinois. While the German soldiers started out for this battle with full confidence, this

(GAC). Fayolle believed he had good reason new assault by the Germans on

^H

for the last time.

For the Germans,

soldiers expected would end their sufferings, the Kaiser had decided to attend in person the artillery softening-up which would precede the assault. He arrived for this purpose at 0100 hours on July 15 at

close observation of their preparations, the interrogation of prisoners, all dovetailed to produce perfect Intelligence. Th^ Chemin des Dames offensive had left a pocket whose western side was guarded by General Fayolle's Group of Reserve Armies, and whose southern side was guarded by General Maistre's Central Group of Armies

•

vigorous counterattacks.

High

man

to

attack on either side of Rheims and join up at Chalons-sur-Marne (Operation Rheims). Most of the forces engaged in the Friedensturm offensive had already taken part in the Chemin des Dames attack. But it had been deemed preferable to limit troop movements and allow Crown Prince Rupprecht's troops the time to recover completely in view of their forthcoming engagement in Flanders. To show his personal interest in this offensive, which all Ger-

i!

-

>

tfc

T

^

The Second Battle of the Marne brought to an end Ludendorff' series of major offensives, and with it his luck. His former tactical and numerical superiority outdone and his plans revealed by prisoners, it was hardly surprising that his Friedensturm, despite its optimistic codename, had only short-lived success against the well-primed Allied defences. And there was scarcely time to realise its failure before the French armies swept into a counterattack on the Marne salient — from now on it

was Ludendorff who would be on the defensive. Jacques Mordal. Above: An exploding shell increases the desolation of the Marne landscape

his Group in the direction of Paris. But Petain, the Commander-in-Chief of the French army, looking further ahead, believed that 'while aiming at the capital, the enemy, closely beset in the ChateauThierry pocket, could be tempted to demolish the salient formed by Rheims and the Mountain which constituted a threat to the left flank of the German armies

which would march on Paris while leaning on the Marne.' This logical deduction expressed by Petain a fortnight prior to the German attack was based on the copious stream of reports reaching GQG. It was known on June 28 via Fourth Army that 'the Germans are preparing the crossing of the Marne on a front of 15 kilometres between Chateau-Thierry and Epernay with two diversions, one to the south-west of Rheims, and the other in the direction of Paris'. The importance of the German preparations was such that the GQG 2eme Bureau (Intelligence Department) was able to report on July 7 that this offensive on the Marne would constitute the Germans'

main effort, and consequently that the Germans 'could mount on other parts of the front attacks of limited depth only'. On that same date, a cable in cypher from the General-in-Chief accurately described the Germans' plan: 'Firstly: Information received seems to confirm that the enemy offensive has as its objectives Rheims, Epernay, Chalons, involving the entire front of the Fifth Army, the right of the Sixth, the left of the Fourth. The attack east of the Suippe would then take on the .' nature of a diversion .

.

Counterattack But while taking

all necessary measures expected attack, Petain, in full agreement with Foch, did not forget that very often the offensive is the best form of defensive. Appropriately, there was under preparation in Fayolle's Group of Armies an attack which was to be executed by Tenth Army (General Mangin) emerging from west to east from the forest of Villers-Cotterets across the plateau of the Soissonnais in the direction of the SoissonsChateau-Thierry road to strangle the German pocket and cut off its supply lines. The date had been set for July 18. The expected German offensive did not require the countermanding of the French offensive —

on the

site of the

2861

a flame-thrower in the network of trenches had become riddled. Below left and right: h light machine guns, race forward between ';! man attack was as fierce and wellit was anticipated by information received from a the army felt, with good reason, that it had been I

:-.-&

.

ige: Artillery

bombardment

id (right)

as cover

(left) fills

the skyline

storm troops use shell holes

the French attack would even more favourable con-

iry,

in i

the forces of the Imperial

Crown

would be involved much more seriously on the southern face of the pocket; e

provided, of course, that the German pocket did not distend too greatly, for then it would be much more difficult to strangle it. In the Allied order of battle, it was General Degoutte's Sixth Army which occupied the left wing, though it was only its two right-hand corps which would be involved in the German offensive, General

Mondesir's XXXVIII Corps between Vaux and Courtemont, and General Le-

de

brun's III Corps between Courtemont and Vassieux. The left-hand corps of Degoutte's army would take part in Tenth Army's

The XXXVIII Army Corps comprised in the front line the French 39th Infantry Division (General Pougin) west of the Marne and the American 3rd facing Dickmann) (General Division Chateau-Thierry, with one brigade of the American 26th Division (General Muir) in reserve. The III Corps comprised two French divisions, the 125th (General Diebold) and the 51st (General Boulange), with in reserve the 2nd Brigade of the American 26th Division and the French 20th Infantry Division (General Desvoyes).

offensive.

Next came the sector of Fifth Army, which stretched from west of Dormans to Prunay and therefore included Rheims and the Heights of Rheims. It was in a rather delicate condition: its front had only just been stabilised and it had just received third commander in a period of six weeks, as General Buet (who had relieved its

General Micheler on June 12, 1918) had been appointed Major-General of the Armies on July 5, and General Berthelot had taken over from him. While the Sixth Army was Franco-American, Fifth Army included an Italian corps, General Albricci's II Corps. Consisting of two divisions, the 3rd and 8th Infantry Divisions, this corps had been sent to France on the suggestion of the government in Rome which was aware of the formidable effort undertaken by the Germans in Picardy and which was anxious to supply its own direct contribution to the British and French effort. The German attack on July 15 would find the two Italian divisions in line on either side of the Ardre between Hill 240 (south of Bligny) and Champlat: in the reserve, the French 120th Infantry Division (General Mordacq). With the French V Army Corps on its left (French 8th and 40th Infantry Divisions), it was the Italian corps which was going to bear the main weight of the drive by the German LXV Corps (General von Schmettow).

General Gouraud's French Fourth Army's sector stretched from Prunay to Tahure, with three corps in line: on the left the IV Corps (General Pont) from Prunay to Auberive-sur-Suippe; in the centre the XXI Corps (General Naulin),

from Auberive-sur-Suippe to Mesnil-lesHurlus. On Fourth Army's right, from Mesnil-les-Hurlus to La Harazee, the VIII Army Corps aligned one regiment of the 63rd Infantry Division, the dismounted 1st Cavalry Division and the 16th and 161st Infantry Divisions. The latter, which was to be the only one engulfed by the German attack, was commanded by General Lebouc. The corps was commanded by General Hely d'Oissel. Fourth Army had four divisions in reserve, including the Ameri-

2864

can 42nd Rainbow Division, commanded by General Chas. T. Menoher, whose Chiefof-Staff, Brigadier-General Douglas MacArthur, had already got himself noted for refusing to wear a steel helmet. Finally, it had been arranged that the British XXII Army Corps comprising two divisions and commanded by Lieutenant-General Godley, subsequently reinforced by two more British divisions, would hold itself ready to intervene in the region of Vitry-leFrangois. There was also a regiment of Polish Chasseurs (Light Infantry) as rein-

forcement in Fourth Army's sector, making a truly international formation. all, the Group of Armies of the Centre aligned 33 divisions either in line or in Furthermore, there were in reserve. (General general reserve Ninth Army's de Mitry), at Fere-Champenoise, and four army corps (including the previously mentioned British XXII Army Corps), which gave a grand total of 46 infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions for the defensive battle to be fought between the Argonne and the Marne, while for the offensive of the Fayolle Group of Armies between the Marne and the Aisne, 24 infantry divisions, including four American and three cavalry divisions, were preparing themselves. To counter the German tactic which consisted in smashing the it

In

HQ

front lines with minen fire and massing assault troops forward in order to protect them from counterfire, Petain had ordered two measures: • Evacuation of the first lines to a depth

enemy

of 1,600/2,100 yards to protect the defence troops from the effect of the minen, and • Shortening counterfire to hit very close in front of the French first line, if not on

the line itself. In every place where these orders were strictly observed, results proved to be excellent. However, it was not without great difficulty that Fourth Army finally consented to evacuate its front lines in the Champagne whose capture had cost it so much blood in 1917. As for Fifth Army, General Berthelot was unable to reverse General Buet's view that not an inch of ground must be lost. 'It will be necessary,' said the directives of Fifth Army, 'to defend at all costs the ground we now occupy and to regain immediately any ground lost, through counterattacks.' Berthelot endeavoured to conform with Petain's instructions, but nevertheless there remained departures from the General-in-Chief's directives which were subsequently to be regretted. What is certain is that it was in Fifth Army's sector that the Germans obtained their most striking successes. Leaving aside an)' strategical question, the Second Battle of the Marne shows two particularly interesting tactical features. The first feature is the ingeniousness shown by the Germans in getting their assault units across the Marne. 'Pontoons, rowing-boats, rafts, and even punts carried the infantrymen to the other bank; in a magnificent exploit, skeleton bridges were built, and the assailants fell upon the defenders, still stunned by the bombardment.' The second is the important part played by aircraft in this battle on both sides, but more particularly on the .

Allied side. spotted the

Intelligence

concentration

services had of German

fighter and bomber aircraft, but this was countered by even greater concentrations on the part of the Allies. There were on the

north-eastern front in the month of July 1918, 3,314 aircraft including 2,827 modern ones. The Group of Armies of the

Centre had under its own control No 11 French Air Force Wing, the Chabert and Villome groups as well as General Duval's Air Division comprising two mixed brigades of fighters and bombers, a reconnaissance group, the Bloch bomber group, plus the British IX Air Force Brigade. Furthermore, Fourth Army possessed 17 reconnaissance squadrons, eight fighter squadrons and nine companies of balloonists. Fifth Army possessed two combat groups including an Italian one, 12 reconnaissance squadrons and four companies of balloonists. Finally Sixth Army's XXXVIII and III Corps possessed five combat squadrons and four companies of balloonists, apart from the American 1st Pursuit Group (70 Nieuports and Spads available as from July 15). Never had air support been supplied on such a lavish scale. All the aces on both sides were there: Madon, Boyau, Nungesser, Fonck among the French, Mannock in the British 71st Squadron, the Belgian Willy Coppens; among the Germans, the famous Richthofen was dead, but his fighter group was now commanded by a pilot named Her-

mann Goring whose 20

victories

had

al-

ready been acknowledged by the Pour de Merite order. After having made a powerful contribution to the Intelligence side of the

Command

with

High

many photographs taken

at low altitude showing batteries set up in open fields, small munitions dumps and

minenwerfer, the Allied air force was now given the mission of taking the offensive against the German air force, as well as

bombing German columns and crossing points on the Marne between Dormans and Chateau-Thierry, while naturally keeping watch over the battlefield.

Captured Intelligence it is necessary to stress the importance of the information supplied to the Allies, quite involuntarily of course, by the Germans themselves. The American 3rd Infantry Division sent a few patrols across to the right bank of the Marne in order to capture prisoners. It also happened that, in utter disregard of formal orders, a German engineer officer swam across the river and got himself captured: 'As we were to become aware later on,' wrote Ludendorff, 'he was to open his mouth far too wide.' It was the same with an artillery reserve officer who fell into the hands of the Italians in the Ardre. Besides, in Germany itself, they were talking openly about this Friedensturm. Soldiers on leave could not be prevented from talking about it at home. In his memoirs, Ludendorff complains bitterly about the echoes of this loose talk that were reaching him from Germany. For all these different reasons, the Allied command was this time going to win the battle of secrecy. For several days now, the French GQG had been aware of the exact date of the offensive, and as from July 13, the general alert order had been issued. Now there remained only to learn the exact hour of the attack. For Ibis purpose, reneral Gouraud, the commander of Fourth Army, ordered for (lie evening of -July 14 a raid in depth whose objective would be to 'capture live prisoners al all costs, to gather documents and to seek mil

Finally,

(

known

spared. This first experience with gas a harsh trial for the young American soldiers who felt cruelly hampered by being forced to wear their gas masks for interminable hours. It was just as well that the weather was not very suitable for the effective use of gas — after an overcast and rainy day, a fresh breeze had sprung up which rapidly dispersed the waves of

communicated

phosgene and arsines.

clues about an offensive which

is

to Fourth Army's Intelligence Section (2eme Bureau) allowed all the necessary dispositions to be taken on the front of Gouraud's army. The

German

artillery

was

softening-up

to

begin at 0010 hours and was to be kept up for four hours.

The French High Command

decided to start its counterbattery fire at 2330 hours. The raiders received decorations and congratulations, and the government gave each man a considerable sum of money. Later on. President Raymond Poincare was to write that Darnand had been one of the artisans of victory.

German artillery bombardment, at the expected time, comprised a considerable proportion of gas shells intended to compel the opposing troops to wear gas masks for long hours. In The begun

the

Vaux-Monneaux region held by the

26th Infantry Division, an average of 1,000 gas shells per square kilometre was counted. It was the same nearly everywhere else, although the Germans were careful not to drench in mustard gas the sectors they wished to penetrate. That was why the Surmelin valley in the American 3rd Infantry Division's sector

American

Above: An undignified landing for a French Salmson 2A 2 aeroplane. These machines were light and superbly mobile, and they played a most important part in reconnaissance work before the battle began. They had the added advantage of being usable as ground attack aircraft. Below: Wreckage of a French munitions depot, destroyed by air attack

was was

imminent'. Departing at 1955 hours, the raiders returned at 2100 hours with 27 prisoners. Sergeant Joseph Darnand with his squad of grenadiers had pushed through up to the German fourth line where, after a savage fight with bayonets and knives, he had captured 18 of these prisoners. Within a few minutes, the information

all

to be

y
v

Sneezing-gas and tear-gas Let us now follow from west to east the actual attack which was unleashed at 0430 hours. In the Chateau-Thierry sector, General Dickmann's American 3rd Infantry Division had been in the line since

May

31.

Two

artillery brigades si'pported

them and the defence system had been carefully organised in depth from the banks of the Marne (where there were only isolated machine gun posts) to the second line of hills and the valley of the Surmelin. It was against these positions that General Kathen's German VIII Corps (Seventh

Army) conducted its attack for ten solid hours. The battle was very bitter and the losses heavy on both sides. In the American 30th Regiment, 50% casualties were recorded for the companies in the line and 25% overall. Nevertheless, the 30th lost only a few outposts and captured 200 prisoners. Its commanding officer, Colonel Stacey, recorded that this battle was not a cheerful experience: The men are absolutely worn out from being 10 solid hours under shell fire without having even a drink of

.

•

2865

water and the regiment ought to be relieved. We have been exposed to mustard gas, chlorine and chocolate gas and if a good many of our men don't get their clothes off we are going to have casualties from must-

ard gas.

men

It is

absolutely impossible for the

what was in cans, is spoiled from the gas. They are still there in the line and they will hold the line but they ought to be relieved and given the chance to clean up and get something to eat because we have been on the alert for 10 days in addition to this attack last night We have been in the front line since May 31. We wore gas masks for seven solid hours. The Germans attempted to cross the to get food, for all, except

.

.

.

Marne behind a smokescreen accompanied by sneezing-gas and tear-gas. Two of their attempts failed. The third one succeeded

Above: Francois Flameng's painting of an American attack at St Pierre. American vitality and sheer weight of numbers was a welcome addition to the exhausted Allied forces. Below: Germany's last offensive: their advance between July 15 and July 17. Ludendorff

had originally intended of

Rheims but

finally

to attack to the east

picked a position to the

city; from there it was hoped the army would penetrate to the Mountain of Rheims in a pincer movement which would force the Allies to withdraw automatically

west of the

after the extermination of the section defending the passage and of another which had rushed up in reyiforcement. But a third section intervened and drove back the grenadiers of the 5th Regiment, in the German 36th Division. Having been very roughly handled, this regiment was not to reappear on the battlefield. On the whole, the 3rd Infantry Division had held firm, and if on its right wing the 38th Infantry

1

Above: The Nieuport 28 fighter, used mostly by the American air force as the French were committed to the Spad XIII. Engine: Gnome Monosoupape, 160-hp. Armament: two Vickers guns. Speed: 122 mph at 6,560 feet. Climb: minutes. Ceiling: 17,000 feet. Endurance: IV2 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 1,172/1,625 lbs. Span: 26V4 feet. Length: 20^ feet 10,000 feet

in

1

1

/2

2867

5

| s o

#3 ^<*lP*w

-

<#

* 1

'

*' f j

H {

i

\

%rfr :

*

*—

m

WSiSHIIffHfflPICTBPIllSH!^ Opposite page: As a boost to morale Kaiser Wilhelm (/eft) atte early phases of the assault in person He, like everyone else, exp the battle to point the

way to

a decisive victory Right:

The

pitted

wasteland over which much of the action on the Marne was fought This page, left: Captured tanks were used to bolster the forces of their captors. Here an English Mark IV is used by the Germans. Below right:

A cumbersome

^PB^P^gW

agin

i?ji
British field aftillery unit is

moved up to the front

-.

Hi

\
'* *-**

^jSai

-

*

#&&&< timmtfVMiimim*

lines

bit of

First

drawn up by the historian of the German Army was clearly disenchanted: The general impression prevailed in the

region, British

125th Infantry Division, the left-hand division of the French III Corps where

evening of this day of battle that the enemy, in expectancy of our attack which had been communicated to him by prisoners to the very day and hour, had organised both his

would be from Fayolle that a sacrifice had to be demanded in order to restore the situation in the Epernay region. He rang him up at 0930 hours to

Regiment had been compelled to give up a ground, this was actually owing to the fact that it had been left uncovered by the considerable withdrawal of the French

things were going

much

less well.

Rightly

proud of this success, which came on top of those achieved in the fighting on May 31 and June 1, the American 3rd Infantry Division has since then borne the flattering name of 'Rock of the Marne'. In Fifth Army's sector, it was against the Italian corps and against the French V Corps that the German Seventh Army exerted its main effort between the Heights of Bligny and the Marne. The attack started at 0400 hours: tanks were reported in the Ardre valley. Six to eight German divisions flung themselves forward on a front of 3 to 16 miles. They belonged to Schmettow's LXV Corps and Borne's VI Reserve Corps. The Italian 8th Infantry Division and the left wing of the 3rd (General Pittaluga) were very vigorously attacked, and, shortly after 0600 hours, the Germans outflanked the woods of Eclisse, penetrated into Chaumuzy and into the woods of Courton, cutting off around La Neuville-aux-Larres the Italian II Corps from the French V Corps. The decimated Italian 8th Infantry Division lost its positions and was compelled to fall back on the second line where it was received by the French 120th Infantry Division. Because of this, the Italian 3rd Infantry Division was placed in a delicate position north of the Ardre. Things were scarcely better with the French V Corps. The covering troops of the 40th Infantry Division were encircled (eight companies) and the assailants pushed in the direction of Fleury-la-Riviere in the heart of the Heights of Rheims. As regards the French 8th Infantry Division (General Aldebert), their position had been attacked very strongly at 0630 hours, but the Germans had been repelled. South of the Marne, the Germans encountered very lively resistance from elements of the 10th Colonial Infantry Division, but the situation was rather worrying as overall Fifth Army had lost ground over a front of about five miles. General Berthelot did not conceal his anxiety from General Maistre. There were no longer any reserves behind Fifth Army's left wing. It was in Fourth Army that the tactics ordered by Petain, carefully applied despite certain initial reluctance, had given the results expected by the High Command.

The German First and Third Armies, making an all-out attack with artillery support averaging 25 batteries for every 1,000 yards over a 25-mile front stretching from Prunay to La Main de Massiges, obtained only insignificant results. While they had been able to bite into the French positions in a few points, nowhere had they broken through. The attack was a failure. By noon, the assaulting troops had been halted everywhere with severe losses. The defensive system had functioned in a satisfactory manner. The outposts had heroically fulfilled their mission, keeping up the fight until the exhaustion of their

ammunition. At some points, this fight was still going on at 1800 hours. Elsewhere, survivors had cleared their way with the bayonet and reached friendly lines in the afternoon or evening.

On 2870

the evening of that day, the report

infantry

and

artillery in depth,

had

pre-

pared a deep outpost area and shifted his

main

line

of resistance

to

the positions

Roman

Road. Captured orders and statements of prisoners confirmed this. Our batteries, which after the first infantry penetration followed up promptly, came under a strong enemy artillery fire when crossing the shell crater area situation on the open high ground of the Champagne hills. These batteries were compelled to unlimber under unfavourable conditions and suffered heavy losses. This deprived the infantry of adequate artillery support with along the

the result that it stopped in front of the hostile position along the Roman Road, the wire obstacles of which had suffered little damage. Our gas attack on the hostile batteries during the preparation had little influence owing to the strong wind prevailing. Consequently, our infantry was compelled to attack from numerous old and new battery positions, while being exposed to most intense hostile fire, and prematurely exhausted its strength.

General Use's German XV Corps which engaged in front of Rheims itself the 213th and 242nd Divisions did not gain an inch of ground. The other three corps in the German First Army made only negligible gains. The same situation prevailed in the German Third in which General Endres' / Bavarian Corps collided against wellorganised defences. Only a few elements of the 15th Infantry Regiment (2nd Bavarian Division) succeeded in penetrating momentarily in the Souain cemetery, but they were ejected by a counterattack.

French Fifth Army — the weak link Despite this indisputable defensive success, Fifth Army and the right wing of Sixth Army were in difficulties. General Lebrun's very roughly handled III Corps had been unable to prevent the Germans from crossing the Marne, first on rafts and boats, and then on catwalks and bridges which their bridge-builders had rapidly flung over in great numbers. The 51st Infantry Division's line had been broken and the decimated division had found itself pushed back to the second position guarded by one brigade of the American 28th Infantry Division and by elements of the French 20th Infantry Division. Diebold's division, uncovered by the withdrawal of their right-hand neighbours, had been gradually pushed back, uncovering in their turn their neighbours on the left, that is the Americans of the 3rd Infantry Division. Thus, from Dormans to the Heights of Rheims, a dangerous salient was being created. General Maistre successively employed all his reserves. The 73rd Infantry Division was placed under the orders of General de Mondesi r for a counterattack in the direction of Mezy in the Jaulgonne bend. The 77th was given to General Lebrun to help him reduce the German salient south of the Marne; the 14th went to the aid of the Italians. Then, in response to the request of the Group of Armies of the Centre, Petain gave it the 18th Infantry Division which arrived north-east of Montmirail, the 131st in the Sainte Menehould

arrive.

Petain,

and the 1st Cavalry Corps. The XXII Corps was also expected to In

these

conditions,

thought

it

ask him for the 168th Infantry Division and the II Cavalry Corps which was in the Meaux area. An order was also issued to return to the American 2nd Infantry Division its brigade of artillery which had been sent the previous night to Tenth Army and to suspend temporarily the preparation of the Mangin offensive. Petain was perfectly aware that by doing so he was going to delay and weaken the offensive planned in the Tardenois region. But, on the other hand, in order for this operation to bear the fruits expected of it, it was indispensable to preserve the Heights of Rheims. A telegram sent at 1215 hours confirmed these telephone instructions. Even before it was despatched, General Foch, dropping in at General Fayolle's HQ in Noailles, had been informed of the instructions given by Petain. His reaction was immediate. He was absolutely determined that in no case would the Mangin offensive be delayed. Consequently preparations for it were to continue, and there would be no further levies on Fayolle's reserves except in case of absolute necessity of which he, Foch, was to be informed immediately. Petain asked only to be convinced. Was he not the main advocate of this offensive which in

a note written as late as July 8 to the Comof the Group of Reserve Armies he presented as the best possible counter to German plans of attack? At 1300 hours, he had another message telephoned to Fayolle rectifying his telegram of 1215 hours and which ended as follows: 4. General Mangin will continue, furthermore, to prepare his attack in the prescribed

mander

conditions.

Continue to ensure the most rigorous secrecy by severe discipline among staffs and services and among troops on the march and in camp. Better still, limiting his levies to the 168th Infantry Division alone, Petain decided to leave the II Cavalry Corps at the disposal of the Group of Reserve Armies. After which, he drove to Montmort at the of Fifth Army whose situation had 5.

HQ

meanwhile not improved and which remained the main black spot. It now remained for Foch to settle with Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig the delicate question of the British reserves which

he had requested should be moved behind the French front, four divisions in all. The British C-in-C had already agreed to put on the move the two divisions of the XXII Corps; about the others he was more reluctant. His government was worried to see the British reserves being sent to eastern France while the Crown Prince of Bavaria was keeping considerable forces opposite the British front. It reminded the Field-Marshal that he could not allow the security of his forces to be compromised. And yet, the Germans had just shown their hand in Champagne while the British

Army Intelligence was announcing an offensive in Flanders. This was already reassuring for Haig. He explained to the C-in-C the reasons why he not want to release his reserves so long as, to his knowledge, Prince Rupinter- Allied

did

precht had not sent his own to another Foch declared his agreement but explained that above all the German offensive now in progress had to be stopped. The British divisions would constitute a reserve only in the case of urgent necessity and would remain ready to be instantly sent back to the British front if it were threatened. Haig showed himself understanding. He handed over these two divisions which, in any case, did not have to intervene. While these questions were being settled at High Command level, the battle continued on the ground. The defensive success of Fourth Army was confirmed, but General Gouraud believed that the Germans, after the failure of their rushed attack, would now begin a struggle of front.

He demanded heavy artillery and asked that his reserves should be reconstituted. On the other hand, on Fifth Army's front the breach had not attrition.

ceased to widen. And yet the Italians, helped by troops from the French 120th Infantry Division, had preserved their second line. It was on their left, on the V Corps' front, that the situation was especially bad. The French 8th Infantry Division lost ground and the Germans penetrated into Chatillon-sur-Marne. However, in front of the XXXVIII Corps the attack seemed to have less bite in it.

The French artillery successfully pounded the Marne crossings. The air force intervened. It had been. very active ever since the sky had cleared towards 1000 hours on July 15. To begin with, it had made a general attack on all German drachens (observation balloons), which as a result had been compelled to land. In the face of this Allied air attack, the German air force was noticeably less aggressive. The reports in this respect of the German Seventh Army are rather pessimistic: 'In the face of an enemy opposition consisting of French, American and British aircraft very greatly superior in numbers, control of the air cannot be permanently maintained despite repeated efforts by our fighter

aircraft.

Some squadrons have

taken off up to seven times!' Together with the effect of the

artillery,

this Allied air offensive against the bridges would prove decisive, making German traffic between the two banks increasingly difficult. General Degoutte prepared for July 16 a counterattack to be mounted by five divisions led by General Lebrun to reduce the German bridgehead south of the Marne. Thus the overall situation was excellent on Fourth Army's front, was in the process of stabilising itself on Sixth Army's front, and remained disquieting only on Fifth

Army's front — but

sufficiently so to

make

Petain think for the second time of delaying the Mangin offensive by 24 hours in order to keep handy the American 2nd Infantry Division which was due to be transferred to Tenth Army. In the event he finally gave up this idea, but this succession of orders and countermanding orders did not sweeten the temper of Major-General Harbord, the commander of the American 2nd Infantry Division who got his revenge by writing in his war memoirs that an order given by a French general should never be executed before waiting for a reasonable number of counter orders. After a quiet night over the whole of the front under attack, the German offensive

was resumed on July

16, but despite their they proved unable to dent seriously Fourth Army's positions, while in Sixth Army's sector. General Lebrun mounted a counteroffensive which, if it did not bring any appreciable gains of ground, at least prevented the Germans from efforts,

making further

progress.

Fifth

Army's

alone remained very disquieting. Exploiting their success of the previous day, the Germans made more appreciable gains in the Marne valley and in the Heights of Rheims, where they captured a considerable part of the second position pushing in the direction of Epernay. In order to reduce the burden on General Degoutte whose Sixth Army had simultaneously to participate in the defence of the Marne and the attack in the Soissonnais, Petain decided to introduce General de Mitry's Ninth Army HQ which would take under its command the XXXVIII and III Army Corps. However, at the end of the day it appeared that the German effort was slowing down. The crisis had passed its culminating point on the Champagne front. The cause clearly emerges in this report by General Conta's German IV Reserve Corps: Enemy resistance continued growing, powerful artillery fire lay especially on the sector of the 1st Guard Infantry Division and the 37th Infantry Division. Our attack had been betrayed to the enemy; by echeloning his infantry and artillery in depth and organising a strong defence of the south bank of the Marne and of his line east and west of Rheims, he had breasted our advance. As a continuation of the attack would have front

too heavy sacrifices and the Third Army east of Rheims had not progressed beyond the French first positions,

demanded

Command

ordered the offenthe Supreme sive stopped south of the Marne, while on the line north of the Marne the position was to be further improved by attack.

And

Petain

feared that the slowing down of the German attack was only the prelude to an offensive on another front. 'If the enemy seems to be halting the whole of his effort in Champagne, no doubt because of the losses he has suffered, especially in front of our Fourth Army, the German High Command will doubtless — if it has not already done so — take a decision over the use of the 2nd line reserves which were not engaged on ?' July 15. Where could it apply them Petain was also worried about Third Army's sector, on the left of Tenth Army, which was due to move in the next 36 hours. yet

still

.

.

more, two other British divisions should be brought up behind our Third Army in the region of Estrees-Saint-Denis in case the 15th and 34th Infantry Divisions whose use you have reserved for yourself should be engaged in the offensive of the Reserve Group of Armies. Acceding to this demand, General Foch decided that the two second-echelon divisions of the British XXII Corps which were then being transported towards the east should be offloaded in the region of the Oise instead of moving towards Champagne, and that they should hold themselves in reserve to take part, according to need, either in the Mangin offensive, or on Third Army's front. In point of fact for Ludendorff the question had already been settled in Champagne. He was already aware from the end of the first day of the battle that he would not reach his objectives on the ground, and that, even though Seventh Army were to make progress south of the Marne, neither the First nor the Third would succeed in forcing the defences of the Roman Road. In his opinion the main point had been achieved because now the French reserves were seriously committed to the front of the Group of Armies of the Centre. This being so, he could now, with a quiet mind, unleash on the British

Hagen

front that

offensive

which would

the decisive blow. Should the prolongation of Seventh Army's operations lead to the fall of Rheims and the Heights of Rheims, it would be a prestigious success. For the remainder, it was better to cut one's losses. In the course of the afternoon of the 17th, German let it be known that the ground captured south of the Marne would not be held for long. A few hours later, Ludendorff left Avesnes to go to Tournai to prepare with Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria for the final offensive. But, at dawn the next day, inflict

GHQ

after an approach march made under heavy rain, the assault waves of Tenth and Sixth Armies reached their start lines at the

double and, without even pausing, hurled themselves to the east, achieving total surprise.

The

Allies

had resumed the

Henceforth they would never

initiative. let it go.

.

On

our front, Third Army sector and the of Tenth Army remain sensitive and will remain even more so, inasmuch as from July 18 all our forces available will be engaged in General Mangin's offensive.

Further Reading Blake, R. (ed), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1952) Gambiez, Gen., and Suire, Col., Histoire de la

left

Tome IV (Fayard 1968) Kuhl, Gen. von, Enstehung, Durchfuhrung und Zusammenbruch der offensive von 1918

The enemy front opposite Third Army is equipped for a new attack. The enemy may be tempted to achieve what we are attempting to achieve ourselves with Tenth Army. This manoeuvre would be extremely dangerous for this army and for the direc-

Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre (Service Historique de I'Armee) Ludendorff, Erich, My War Memories (Hutchin-

tion of Paris. It is therefore necessary to guarantee the solidity of our front north of the Oise. I have consequently the honour of requesting that the British divisions now stationed

JACQUES MORDAl was

Somme should be brought closer to the front and positioned, one to the south of Amiens, the other towards

south of the

Breteuil

and

the North,

and

that, further-

Premier Guerre Mondiale,

son 1919) Pitt,

Barrie,

1

91 8 - The Last Act (CasseW 1962)

born of a family whose

members had served

with the French navy for three 1940, during operations at Dunkirk,

generations In he was shipwrecked twice and severely wounded. In 1942 he was with Admiral Auphan's staff, and after the Allied landings in North Africa he established an intelligence network along the Channel coast. M. Mordal is the author of 1 5 books, most of them about the Second World War: he is a

member

of the Institute ot Strategic Studies.

2871

Ml

m

Wt'3

1L '"A/

The 2nd of the 2.

Battle

Mar ne:

THE ALLIED

COUNTER ATTACK On July

18, 1918 Crown Prince ill-fated 'Peace Offensive' became the object

Wilhelm's

of a massive counterattack by the French armies. Its success brought Ludendorff flying back from Flanders, where his hopes of a further offensive had now to be abandoned. John Keegan. Below: US troops, powerful

adjuncts to the

main

force

-

2873

J

<

j

I

37-mm trench gun: a light weapon fired on wheels or a tripod. For carriage it broke up into three parts: two weighing 88 lbs each, and one weighing 61 lbs. Normal rate of fire: 10 rounds per minute (although this could be raised to 12 or 15 rounds per minute by a trained team). Maximum range: 2,600 yards; accuracy good at 1,300 yards. Muzzle velocity: Varying with type of shell between 1,148 and 1,312 feet per second. There were several types of ammunition: high-explosive; shrapnel shell; armour-piercing shell; 'message' shell, for conveying dispatches. The ammunition was supplied in boxes weighing 16 lbs. Below: Progress on the Marne

155-mm French howitzer, 1917 model. There were two types of shell: one an 1890 model, with a maximum range of 10,500 yards; the other a 1915 model, with a maximum range of 12,000 yards. Weight of shell: 95 lbs, both types. Rate of fire: Two rounds per minute, although this could not exceed the rate of 30 rounds per hour. Total weight: 3 tons, 7 cwt in action; 3 tons on the road. Traverse: 3 left to 3 right. When horse-drawn the gun could be moved at a speed of 3 mph; when motor-carried, at 7Vz mph. It took approximately quarter of an hour to prepare the gun for Right: Schneider

action or to withdraw

it.

French Puteaux

Left:

ALLIED FRONT LINE 18

(Gen von Eben)

(Gen von Bonn)

XXXIX Corps

XVII Corps

46 Res Div 14 Div

53 Res Div

VIII

Corps

Gruppe

Corps

l62Dj«^staabs

Vailly

llxX^ Res Corps)

Div

3S

Corps 153 Div

^

1

(Gen Mangin) Div

XX Corps US

58 Div

2

\"14

Div

127 Div

Villers Cotterets

Div

(X|M Co

Corey

»«

XI Corps

29

5

30

AUG

2

AM

3

MILES

8KMS

31

p,

ARMY

FIRST

,--=!*£.-

(Gen von Mudra) Gruppe Use

9 Div

(XV Corps)

VII

24 Div

XI Corps

4

62 DlV

US

242

Vesle

M =====

Gd Div

Bav Div

2

Fismes

US 4

US3

US 28

28 Res Div

4 Div

.1

213 Div

Div

dj v

54

usiii Corps

Rheims

Gruppe Borne (VI

"m

Divjlp

10 Div

I

Corps

Rest 3 Res Divi

Res Corps

29 Div

216 Div ,

47 Res Div

/

XIV Res Corps

Dlv

Braine

3

115 Div

300 FEET

19 Ersatz

H

I S^3rftesDiv

j

OivWm

48 1

^»

Corps

OVER 150 FEET

3 OVER

26 Div

Div

XXX

CORPS BOUNDARIES

18 Div

17 Div

\

Res Div

— = kb

____

Res Corps

VIII

68 Div

\_

24 27 28

LXV Corps

28 Div.

_______

Div

23

ARMY BOUNDARIES

25 Div

34 Div

\ V

|11 BavDiv

21

5 Div

50 Res Div

•

Mor

Div

.241

TENTH ARMY 09 Div

BavDiv

20

LINE

JULY 17

FINAL LINE AUG 7

76 Res

\l7&l*Divs

US1

"s#e

Jager Div

Soissons

>*

72 Div I

AM AM AM AM AM AM AM AM AM

SEVENTH ARMY

XXXVIII Res Corps

XVIII

GERMAN FRONT

JULY 17

NINTH ARMY

Res Corps)

86 Div

I

I

Oiv

1 50 Div

^p

Col Corps (

,rom

_July 22)

5 Div

41 Div II

33Div

Corps \

US 4 Div j

\

La Ferte

Milan •

ip^ Ou'"

Grup*

7 Div

(XXV "i,0 Bav

lt°' v

Witfckler

/

eS

\

(Gkdo 65) 10 Div

'"on

164

4 ErsaS^VIII Div^^^ ». \ ^^Z^^~

Gruppe

(IV

40 Div

Res Corps)

9 Div

Wichura

Corps)

10

Div

US 26 Div*

V US

I

Corps

Chateau /

1D .. Oiv

1

/%

Thierry,

US

3 Div

Bav Res Div

,13

Dl

%k* ^iiB*^ ^~

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5

S.

li

18Div\Div

I

II

Div

*

NINTH

ARMY

Maine 3

Col Divs

Epernay

Cav Corps

XIV Corps (July 20)

20 Div 4 Div

(up to July 24) (Gen de Mitry)

2874

II

37 Div

I

ARMY

(Gen Degoutte)

"

200

Gd\

39 Di

XXXVIII Corps

SIXTH

10 Col Div

SG Div

/ J,P'

V Corps

7 Div

ResJrV,

Corj \

167 Div"

120 Div 14 Div (Brit 51 Div July 20-31)

195

Gruppe I^Jt (XXIII Res

^\ Gruppe SchoeleN.

III

Corps

Corps

I

Gruppe Conta

Chezy»l\76ResDivV>

Clig,

1 31

12 Bav

[51 Res

\

Corps

(from July 20)

103 Div »

<

II

Brit XXII

Schmettow

iv

Corps

Ital

123 0/v

Div

Gruppe

Jsd VII

I

28 Res

(Gen von Bonn)

Div July 20-31)

I

Div

^^^

t

3ltal (Brit 62 Div

/

SEVENTH ARMY

i

-

FIFTH ARMY (Gen Berthelot)

Casualties,

March— July

1918

DEAD

WOUNDED MISSING & PRISONERS DEAD, DIED OF WOUNDS MISSING & PRISONERS

TOTALS EACH MONTH

totals for the five months

British

61642 271384 114895 447921

200 000

100000

March

May

April

June

July

French 200 OOO

—

wounded and evacuated to base areas

Severely

IOOOOO-

*) 7 A *W "

AAA www

22QOOO 490 OOO March

May

April

June

July

German X

200 OOO

963300 7

3

8

OOO

IOOOOO

100 400 12

The French counteroffensive on the Marne; movements between July 19 and August 3, showing the advance of Allied troops from their original position as far back as ChateauLeft:

Thierry to the eventual front line on August 3. The deep salient made by a succession of German offensives was replaced by a more or less straight front line stretching from Rheims to beyond Soissons. Although the attack was primarily carried out by the French Tenth and Sixth Armies, American, Italian, British and Dominion troops were also involved. It was essential that all available resources should be ploughed into producing a successful counterattack. Above: The heir to the Imperial throne, Crown Prince Wilhelm. As commander of the German armies on the Marne 'Little Willie' had at his disposal about 40 divisions, divided into three armies and 15 corps. Unfortunately for him few of these were first class troops. Right: A comparison of casualties between the three main combatants on the Western Front throughout Ludendorff's series of offensives. It includes results of the Marne action

March

May

April =1-

of the

Marne beginning on July

_

18, 1918

FRONTLINE MARCH 20

GERMAN Ypres

>

|

Straits

2

of Dover

'Calais

July

July figures include casualties sustained during the Allied offensive during the

Second Battle

\

June

4900

V*

Virny^^^ # Arras \

\

SOMME

DRIVES:

OFFENSIVE

MARCH

21-APRIL 4

3

LYS OFFENSIVE APRIL 9-29 AISNE OFFENSIVE MAY 27-JUNE 4

4

N0Y0N/M0NTDIDIER OFFENSIVE JUNE

9-13

^»y* ^W St.

MILES

jt,

300

flont

Blanc

Rheirns^rC*'

Querns

Marne Albert*

\

1

/Noyon •

y ^4

Somit"t Montdidier

\

Soissons

3

\«_^<

/

J

JJ

Chateau Thierry

2875

Ludendorff's strategic dilemma was becoming, by the mid-summer of 1918, highly acute. Within the last four months he had launched five major offensives against the Allied line. Two had won him wide swathes of ground and all had inflicted heavy losses on the British and French armies. But none had brought him a commanding success, and with every week which passed the margin of superiority with which he had begun the year was steadily worn down. Over 460,000

German

had been killed or woundthree offensives, almost as many as the collapse of Russian resistance had released from duty on the Eastern Front or from captivity in Tsarist camps. That source of reinforcements was naturally closed for good, and since the class of 1919, the 18-year-old conscripts who in peacetime would not have been called-up until their 20th birthdays, had already been enlisted, the only means of replacing casualties lay in hastening the return of wounded from the hospitals and intensifying the 'combing-out' of the rearward units. The numbers of recovered wounded and 'comb-outs' were diminishing, however, as were those of the army soldiers

ed in the

first

POW

Above: A French 75-mm battery firing at an objective north-east of Souain, on the Marne. Artillery

bombardment before

the attack began

early in the morning of July 18, paving the way for the assault troops of Tenth Army

Above: German infantry haul light artillery into retreat. Below: An aerial view of 400-mm French navy guns in transit. Mounted on specially-constructed cars these were moved on the railway network behind the lines

sW^""

'

.,.-*?*

iiWiMWIIii

m

"^w*w »"

and the rate of decline was naturally sharpest in the infantry battalions which now counted, as against an established strength of 1,000 men, a field strength of not much more than 700 and a trench strength even lower than that. The strength of the British and French armies, already sharply reduced by the spring offensive, was also following a generally downward trend, for they too as a whole,

had overdrawn their manpower reserves, but their rate of decline was slower than on the German side, and the numbers in their infantry battalions higher. Thus they stood to gain by the mere elapse of time, even if they were not reinforced. The point — one which never left Ludendorff's considerations — was, however, that the Allied army as a whole was growing weekly and sometimes daily in force, as the halftrained but vigorous and enormously selfconfident American divisions disembarked at the Atlantic ports and marched up to the front. Though the majority was good as yet for nothing but trench garrison duty in the quietest and least threatened sectors of the front, they were proving to be quick learners (they were not offered the option of learning slowly) and the

nucleus of battle-worthy American formawas growing at an appreciable rate: four were available for operations by the middle of June. The question which Ludendorff had to face and answer, therefore, was whether to press on with the programme of offensives, knowing as he did that his own attacks accelerated his army's rate of loss, or to accept that the opportunity for quick victory had passed and to settle down to the defensive. Given Ludendorff's violently aggressive temperament, it was unthinkable that he should have plumped for the defensive solution, even had there not been sound military reasons for rejecting it, as there were, or as he was able to argue with conviction. In the first place, it was only a matter of time before Germany's allies dropped out. This he, like Lloyd George, thought would result in the collapse of the German will to resist; secondly, the growing number of American divisions in France meant that more and more of the Allied line would be handed over to them, releasing battle-trained British and French divisions for a counteroffensive role; thirdly, he did not think the German army could stand up to another long drawn-out 'Materialschlacht' of the sort it had undergone in the west during 1916 and 1917, least of all now that all prospect of reinforcement from the east tions

had gone. Perhaps predictably therefore, but with rational arguments on his side, Ludendorff decided that the offensives

must continue. Where, when

and with what object though? Ludendorff's preference was still for attacking his strongest enemy, the British, and he had accordingly left the bulk of his fittest reserve divisions with the Army Group Prince Rupprecht in Flanders.

The codename

for the operation

Rupprecht had under preparation was Hagen and its objects were similar to those of Georgette, of which it was to be a much enlarged version. A precondition, however, was that the British and French should withdraw reserves from the sector. It had been hoped that the Chemin des Dames offensive would produce that effect, but since it had not, another diversionary offensive would have to be mounted.

to find to their cost. Moreover, it flew in the face of military logic, which prescribes that the right way to tackle trouble from a salient is by striking at the base or

flanks, not at the face. Perhaps the brute monotony of trench warfare, which had long made anything but frontal attacks

impossible, had deadened German thinking; more probably the officers at OHL preferred to discount the threat of a French flanking attack because it would make nonsense of their plans. It would also confuse the simplicity of their thinking about the Marne salient, inside which conditions for the German garrison were very difficult. Its defences were sketchy and it was supplied by only one singletrack railway which the French had under long-range artillery fire. As a result, OHL had reached the conclusion that the Marne salient must either be 'evacuated or enlarged; since the political situation made evacuation unthinkable, enlargement was the only solution' — an equation in which the intentions of the Allies

played no part. 'Enlargement' entailed a river crossing in the teeth of Allied opposition, an extremely risky enterprise. Moreover, OHL was aware that the Allies were now

becoming accustomed

to

German

offensive

techniques — short but intense bombardment aimed at 'neutralising' rather than destroying the defenders, followed by infantry infiltration — and would probably have worked out methods to reduce their effectiveness. After some debate, however, it was decided not to vary the formula (though how it could have been varied is difficult given that Germany to see, possessed almost no tanks). It was hoped that the very boldness of the operational conception would guarantee its initial success, which in turn would supply sufficient impetus to carry the leading divisions through to the French artillery before reinforcements could arrive. Inferior

The

German

final

troops

decision

for

the

attack

was

when it was fixed that the Army Group Crown Prince Wilhelm should attack on the Marne ('Operation Rheims — Marneschutz') on July 10, and taken on June

14,

Army Group False strategic premise The obvious — critics would say too obvious — sector for such an undertaking was in the Marne salient, created by the May attack on the Chemin des Dames. For there the proximity of the German lines to Paris ensured that the army attack would bring French, and it was also hoped British, troops racing pell-mell to head it off. It was further hoped that these troops would be drawn from the Flanders reserve. True, the French were known to have sizeable reserves much closer to hand on the west flank of the Marne salient, as it happened, along the line of the Ourcq, from which Maunoury's Sixth Army had launched the decisive counterattack during the Battle of the Marne in September 1914. But OHL did not expect a repetition of that manoeuvre. Instead it professed to anticipate that the French, at the hint of a renewed drive on Paris, would hurry their masse de manoeuvre around the perimeter of the salient and try to block the road to the capital by direct obstruction. This was a very rash assumption on the part of the German planners, as they were

Prince Rupprecht in Flanders ('Operation Hagen') on July 20. The necessary orders for Marneschutz were issued on June 18. They laid down that the offensive should be launched on two fronts, east and west of Rheims, that city and its protective bastion — the Montagne de Rheims — being judged too strong to be worth assaulting directly. From left to right, Seventh Army was to attack due southwards, seizing crossings over the

Marne, between Chateau-Thierry and Epernay; Third Army was to attack across the open plains to the east of Rheims, scene of so many disastrous French offensives in 1914 and 1915; First Army, holding the intervening sector, was to capture Rheims as soon as the advance of its neighbours had isolated the French defenders of the city. Most of these tasks would have to be fulfilled on the first day, the arrival of the Allied reserves being expected within 24 hours, when progress would be impossible if the French infantry and battery positions were not already overrun. So brisk an advance had been easily achieved during the earlier German offensives, when surprise had lain so much on

2877

and might well be achieved by troops of the first quality. The ny Group Crown Prince Wilhelm, however, was composed in the whole of side,

of the second or third rank; Ludendorff referred to these as being of 'a militia nature'. Only seven out of the 24 scheduled to attack in the first line

divisions

were rated by Allied Intelligence to the first class; of these all had already fought in one major offensive in 1918 and six in two. Only five divisions could be regarded as fresh and of these three were rated third-class by Allied Intelligence, the other two second-class. None, either from the best or the worst categories, were at full strength; the 1st Guard Division, paragon of Prussian formations, could muster only 750 men in each of its nine battalions (it had gone to war in 1914 with 12 battalions each 1,000 strong); the 123rd (Saxon) Division, numerically one of the strongest

German formations

(but rated third-class

Oberst von Lossberg, applied so successown defensive battles of 1917. Of graver consequence to the Germans

by Allied Intelligence), had only 800 men per battalion, though it had been in a

fully in their

quiet sector all year; battalion strengths in a fourth-class division which had seen action, the 86th, had fallen as low as 525. These, moreover, were the field strengths; trench strengths, which meant the number of soldiers who could be sent over the top, were even lower. And with the onset of Spanish flu (764 cases were reported in the 1st Guard Division in July), a killing disease among the undernourished, as many of the German soldiers were, none of the German commanders could be sure of what strength his unit would be on any given day — including the day of attack. Ludendorff's ambition was to get his battalion numbers up to 'British, or at least French levels', but that had been a vain hope for some time. There were grounds therefore for regarding with suspicion the fighting worth of Army Group Crown Prince Wilhelm. On the other hand, the number of divisions it was to employ was large: 25 were to attack in the first wave, ten in the second, eight in the third, with the centre of gravity on Seventh Army's front. Moreover the 'battering train' of super-heavy and heavy guns and the 'attack reinforcement' of

than this cancelling-out of tactical surprise, however, was the gradual revelation

would, it was estimated at assure the German infantry of that same superiority of fire support which had underlain their victories on the Somme and the Aisne. The total of batteries engaged was to be 609 heavy and super-heavy and 1,047 field. The fire plan, after much discussion, hardly differed from the earlier model: 10 minutes of 'general fire surprise'; 75 minutes counterbattery; 90 minutes destruction of infantry positions; 15 minutes return to counterbattery; 30 minutes again on the infantry positions, the last ten a preparation for the creeping barrage. If OHL had feared that the tactical novelty of their offensive method, from which so much of its success had stemmed, might now be wearing thin, they had good reason to do so. The French army commanders, aware of the danger looming on the Marne, and as a result of experience gained in the earlier battles of 1918, had decided to allot the larger proportion of their infantry to the second line of defence and to hold the first line with sentries and machine gunners alone. In doing so, of course, they aped the system the Germans had themselves, under the tutelage of field artillery

OHL,

2878

Allies of Ludendorff's strategic design. But, in truth, it was not by now difficult to catalogue his options. Foch did so in an incisive directive to Petain and

to

the

Haigon July

1.

Today, he wrote, the enemy has halted 18 miles from Dunkirk, 36 miles from Abbeville, 42 miles from Boulogne, 36 miles from Calais, 36 miles from Paris,

15 miles from Chalons. An advance of 24 miles towards Abbeville would cut the communications with the north of France and separate the British and the French armies an even smaller advance towards Paris would make a profound impression on public opinion, cause the evacuation of the capital under the menace of bombardment, and doubtless hamper the hands of the government Progress by the enemy towards any of the other objectives enumerated above cannot offer him any comparable result. His instructions, therefore, were for the .

.

.

.

.

.

British and French armies to concentrate on the defence of Abbeville and Paris

disposing respectively, accordingly; each should

gents to be if

made

their

reserves

earmark contin-

available to the other

danger pressed. But out of respect

British

(or

sitivity

to

for

more precisely Haig's) senany threat to Ypres, Foch

exempted the reserves on that sector from inclusion in this central pool, at the same time characterising a German attack on Ypres, should it come, as 'a diversion'.

Grudging co-operation This judgement cannot have pleased Haig, whose concern for Ypres approached the proportions of a neurotic obsession, but he replied to say that he was placing the Canadian Corps besides the XXII Corps on the Somme, near the Allied point of junction, and could send three more divisions and the Cavalry Corps if called upon. Petain's disposition of his divisions reflected the French concern for the safety of Paris: 18 of his French and three American divisions were already or would shortly be located against the western face of the great Marne salient. Originally, however, Foch and Petain had expected the weight of the German attack to fall to the east of Rheims, along the old Champagne battleline of 1915, now held by Gouraud's Fourth Army. Petain had accordingly allotted him a considerable proportion of his reserves.

But from June 28 onwards Mangin, of Tenth Army, had inaugurated a programme of minor attacks on the western

Marne salient, the success of which prompted him to urge on Petain a flank of the

of weight towards his front. Indeed, he now went so far as to argue that the 'feel' of the front promised well for a counterattack, to be launched simultaneously with or shortly after the onset of the German attack itself. Petain, abandoning his caution for once, signified his agreement on July 8 and ordered him to begin suitable preparations. On July 9, shifting

having meanwhile been assured by Degoutte of Sixth Army that he too felt ready to respond to the German attack by a counterstroke, Petain met Foch at Provins to agree

new plans.

Tenth and Fifth Armies to attack convergingly against the western and eastern flanks of the Marne salient, aided by the Sixth. Four days later, new Intelligence prompted them to reshape this plan into a more audacious form. They were now led to believe, accurately as things were to turn out, that the Germans intended to make their main attack west, not east of Rheims. As a result, Petain was instructed by Foch to remove his reserves to the west of the city, while Haig was asked to transfer four divisions, under a corps headquarters, to the French sector immediately, and to prepare another four These were

for

them shortly. In conformity with these instructions, Petain now began to insert extra divisions into his line, as well as assembling reserves to the rear around Epernay and Chateau-Thierry. In all he was to have 47 divisions in the first line of his four engaged armies (four of them American) and 19 in reserve (three of them American). A very important component of both Manto follow

and Degoutte's armies was to be armour: the former had been allotted 346 tanks, the latter 417, most of them the gin's

Opposite page, top: US doughboys' emerge from their shell holes during a brief lull in the fighting on the Marne. Bottom: A column of men and mules behind Allied lines, the

mules carrying wooden crates of ammunition. This page, above: A German A7V tank, with some of its crew, moves away from a railway siding. The full complement of crew was 18

light Renault which had proved the most successful of the French models. There were also three cavalry divisions available

Behind Tenth and Sixth Armies' front were assembling large reserves: between them, the two armies would attack with 24 divisions against 11 German. The former, moreover, were of the first quality, four being American with their gigantic complements — 17,000 rifles against an

Mangin. Ludendorff had very foolishly chosen the codename Friedensturm (Peace Offensive) for his new assault; foolishly, because he did not expect it to be decisive and yet allowed the codename to reach the ears of the soldiers, a deliberate attempt to raise their spirits. Some, as always, took the news of an impending attack as their cue to

to desert to the Allies,

and those whose

nerve cracked nearest zero-hour brought to the French fairly detailed information of the plan of attack on their own units' fronts. Aggressive French patrolling also gleaned useful information; a raid by some of Gouraud's men late on July 14 captured a German major with papers which revealed much of the plan of attack. But the news came too late to allow the French to change their plans, even had they wanted to. Berthelot and Degoutte might perhaps have thinned out their front lines, which were rather densely manned. Otherwise, events were to prove that Foch and Petain had anticipated the pattern of attack with remarkable prescience. The most important of their countermeasures in this initial stage was

bombardment

which the had been ordered to shoot some 25 minutes before the expected opening of the German fire programme. The course of the German offensive between July 15 and July 17 is detailed in the

spoiling

French

artillery

the preceding chapter. Meanwhile the French were completing their preparations for the counterstroke.

average of 7,000 in a

German

division —

and among the French being the formidable

Moroccan,

of the colonial divisions were, by the worst of bad luck for the Crown Prince, almost without exception, third- or fourthclass formations, as noted. Almost the whole of Seventh Army's right was composed of low grade divisions which had been divisions.

senior

The German

brought from Russia within the last few months, had seen no fighting on the Western Front and had heard of tanks only as a rumour. Ninth Army was at less of a disadvantage, with two first-class formations in its first line, but the three others on its threatened front were inferior; one had lost 50% of its infantry in the Battle of the Lys, another was straight from Rumania and the third, rated fourth class by Allied Intelligence, had been in both the Somme and the Chemin des

Dames offensives

already that year. to the Germans as the tanks now assembling in the Forests of Villers Cotterets and Retz was the mind and will of the commander who was to have the use of them. Mangin, in disfavour since the beginning of the previous year when he had commanded an army under Nivelle and shared in that ill-starred general's disgrace, was a fighter of the utmost ruthlessness and who was determined to make the coming battle a decisive success. His

As great

a

menace

2879

determination was not egotistic; he was simply the sort of soldier who could not settle for anything less than victory and who was at his happiest fighting. He was not moreover unused to suffering political displeasure. As Commander of Marchand's escort on the Fashoda expedition, he had returned to France a national hero, to discover that the anti-clerical government of the day would grant him, because of his Catholic background, any favour but that of serving on the staff, which was what he wanted to do. It was in connection with this official attitude towards him that he was later, as lieutenant-colonel, to thrash a senator in a corridor of the Palais du

Luxembourg. Thereafter he had served continuously outside France, returning in 1914 to command a brigade. A fellow brigadier was Petain, whose rise was far to outstrip his but who, by 1918, had lost, if he had ever really possessed, the warrior spirit. Mangin's, by contrast, seemed magnified by the very duration of the war and now burned brighter than ever. July 18 was to be his day of fulfilment. The French bombardment opened that morning on the Tenth and Sixth Armies' front

at

0435 hours. The morning was

misty and on Tenth Army's front, where preliminary attacks had cleared the ground of German defensive obstacles, the infantry and tanks moved forward simultaneously with the first bursts. The tanks had been attached in groups of 20 to each infantry division, with 150 in reserve. On Sixth Army's front, where obstacles were expected to be more numerous and fewer tanks were available, the bombardment played for three-quarters of an hour on the German positions before the assault waves

went forward. The attack achieved complete surprise. Two French deserters, whose failure of nerve drove them across No-Man's Land into German hands at 0315 hours, told their captors that there would be a general attack between 0400 and 0500. 'It was 0330 hours before the company commander in Dommiers heard the news; 0345 before reached the battalion; 0350, the regiment; 0400, the brigade; and 0410 before the division sent out the alarm, too late' (a nice illustration of the maddeningly slow pace of pre-wireless communications). it

As a result of this surprise, and of the enormous weight of attacking force that it concealed,

the

Germans

in the

path of

Tenth Army melted away before its onset. By quite early in the morning the support divisions had been engaged, not as they advanced to prop up the line but as the French and Americans bore down on them where they stood. At 1054 the German Crown Prince's headquarters, aware that something very nasty indeed was happening on its right flank and that it had nothing on hand with which to repair the ordered the organisation of a back line well to the rear of the front under attack, while stating that the position was not one on which the divisions under attack were to retire, but that if and when they did they must hold it to the last; and to emphasise its sincerity, it simultaneously ordered the organisation of an even further rearguard position. A little under an hour later, it ordered the divisions of Seventh Army still south of the Marne to evacuate the bridgehead forthwith. Meanwhile Ludendorff had left Flanders post-haste. situation,

2880

won by Mangin's July 18 was small: a little over four miles. The losses in tanks were extremely high, amounting to over 80%, most of them knocked out by artillery firing over open sights. The power of the attack on subsequent days was very much therefore. But the material lessened, weight of the assault did not now much The depth

Tenth

of advance

Army on

German High Command had reconciled itself to giving up the territory which the French coveted and it was only now a question of how quickly signify, since the

On July 19, Fifth (the latter an ad hoc formation) joined in the battle and on the same day two British divisions, the first of four extracted by Foch from Haig as his contribution to the counteroffensive, relieved the Italians west of Rheims. These two, one of them the 51st (Highland), found themselves pitchforked into a form of warfare unknown in the West since the first battle on the Marne three years and ten months earlier. The fixed front it

could be taken back.

and Ninth Armies

had been left behind, natural cover abounded and the most feared weapon was now no longer the howitzer but the machine gun, manned by resolutes of the 'sharpshooter detachments' who lay concealed in the standing corn. The artillery, brilliantly skilled in firing a timed barrage over known ground, had quite forgotten the techniques of engaging individual targets at estimated ranges and found considerable difficulty in piloting their teams across open country.

The infantry therefore more for want of artillery

suffered all the support. Nevertheless the attack proceeded from both flanks of the salient, steadily reducing its area, which was also being diminished by the action of the Fifth and Ninth Armies in a less dramatic way. Two more British and two more American divisions were ordered up on July 20, together with French reinforcements from quiet sectors. It was on this day that the German Crown Prince's headquarters took the irreversible decision that 'the time had come for the reduction of the salient according to plan'. A series of fall-back positions were plotted, the first of which was to be manned that evening and subsequent ones as it became necessary. The Second Battle of the Marne was to drag on in fits and starts until August 7, when the Allied armies were to recover the old line of May 27, but its outcome had been decided perhaps on its first, certainly by its third day. For on the evening of July Ludendorff telegraphed Rupprecht 20, that 'in view of the situation of the Army Group Crown Prince Wilhelm which, as far as can be seen, will absorb a still greater amount of troops, and in view of the possibility of a British offensive action,

the

Hagen operation

will

probably never

come

into execution'. In abandoning that concept, the last on which he had pinned his hopes for a decision, Ludendorff was

admitting to himself that victory had eluded Germany. The failure of the 'Peace Offensive' had already told the German soldier as

much.

Further Reading Official History of the

War, Military Operations: France and Belgium 1918 (Macmillan) Pitt. Barrie, 1918- The Last Act (Cassell 1962)

[For John

Keegan 's biography, seepage 96.

]

Above: An Italian artillery unit passes through the narrow streets of Hautvillers. The Italian government, anxious to participate in the Allied action on the Marne, had contributed their Corps to Fifth Army, under the command of General Albricci II

MET!

AaU&YKF, CES

VII

Mangin Below: French FT17 tanks move into the offensive. Confronting them, near Chateau-Thierry, were German troops only recently recalled from Russia. These men had had no experience of tank warfare and were quickly scattered by the light and easily manoeuvrable Renaults. Tanks were an important asset in Mangin and Degoutte's armies, although out of 746 used, only 20% returned in good condition

Born in. 1866, Charles Emmanuel Mangin graduated from St Cyr in 1888. For the next 26 years, in Asia and Africa, he was to see as much varied action as any European soldier of his generation. He was a member of the Marchand expedition, and raised the siege of Marakesh by the bandit Ben Guerir, a sort of French Mafeking. By 1914 he was probably the most experienced brigadier in the French army. He had a widespread reputation as a 'fire-eater', which was not dispelled by his dismissal after the disasters of the Nivelle Offensive. Reinstated to command of a corps by Clemenceau, his greatest feat was the arrest of von Hutier's advance at Noyon in 1918

2881

fru **>•*

|M 3*3

w I

'<•»

fi

*

of Britain, struggling in the face of humiliation and bigotry for equal rights with men, were ignored by the great suffrage bills of ...

the 19th century; in 1900 they still ranked with convicts and lunatics in their exclusion from the vote. But with the formation of the Women's Social and Political Union the 'Cause' exploded into a courageous and militant campaign -the British people, whether they liked it or not, were to be forced out of their apathy. Rose Thomson.

Above: 'Read The Suffragette' propaganda

f j

i

2883^

of the People Act, which became law in Britain in January 1918, gave all women over the age of 30 the right to vote. Despite the inequality still remaining -it would be another ten years before women of 21 were deemed responsible enough to record an honest vote -the passing of the Bill was a belated triumph for the women's suffrage movement. A year before the war, when suffragette militancy was at its most formidable, Asquith, who as Prime Minister had come in for much abuse from the band of obstinate women, remarked 'Let the women work out their own salvation'. By the end of 1917 it was his belief that patriotism had saved them. The same frenzied souls who had 'rushed' the House of Commons, chained themselves to the railings outside Buckingham Palace, and who had been bundled (leaving a pair of galoshes and a few hairpins behind them as evidence of the struggle) by rough policemen into black marias in Downing Street, the same who had harassed the Liberal Government from the moment it came to power, had meekly and miraculously exchanged the purple, white and green of the suffrage movement for the colours of the Union Jack. War had stopped their fight and the majority of them rallied instantly to the new cause. Even the amazing Mrs Emmeline Pankhurst, frail and battered as she was after successive imprisonments and hunger strikes, put down her banner and began making recruiting speeches; almost at once women everywhere began proving that, even if the law denied them men's rights, they could do men's work. Only Sylvia Pankhurst, the greatest realist among the suffragette leaders, quietly reiterated that war was a disaster and that women should continue to demand the vote and

The Representation

work

for peace.

the vision of thousands of working women grappling with unfamiliar machinery in munitions factories and engineshops struck a chord in the government's mind and led them to the pronouncement that women had 'worked out their salvation' during the three years of war. But the ability of the women of Britain to supplement a depleted labour force would not, on its own, have won them the vote. Here, indeed, was proof of 'human qualities ... as rare and precious as anything which a nation can possess', but for years the same independence of spirit had been channelled into a programme of violence unlike anything Britain had ever seen. It was hated and feared, it was repressed with all the punitive measures a state can enforce against the individual, but without it Asquith's conversion to women's suffrage would not have taken place. The 'suffragettes' (a term coined by men and which exactly reflects their initial attitude to these women — that of mild irritation coupled with amusement) are usually thought of as a 20thcentury phenomenon. Militancy, as used by the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU), dates from 1910 after the collapse of the government's Conciliation Bill, but the direct ancestors of the Pankhursts are the campaigners of the 1860s — the energetic Lydia Becker and her followers, and the implacable John Stuart Mill who championed the women's cause in Parliament.

No doubt

'A silent domestic revolution' On May 20 1867, Mill rose in the House of Commons to move an amendment to the Representation of the People Act currently before the Conservative Government. Stressing the unfairness of the absolute exclusion of women, he brought the attention of the House to the altered position of women in society: 'We talk of but we do not sufficiently attend to the fact that there has taken place around us a silent domestic revolution. Women and men are, for the first time in History, really each other's companions the two sexes must rise or sink together.' Mill's perceptive mind glimpsed changes that few were then aware of, but which would come to mark — as surely as the death of the ageing Queen — the succession of a new order over an old. Roger Fulford writes: 'The old assured world, built on the wise conventions of the Victorians, was slowly dissolving long before the German soldiers thundered into Belgium in August 1914.' Perhaps no single strata of society was struggling with so great an energy to cast the skin of its conventions as middle-class women. Sheltered, restricted, belittled by the monolith of Victorian respectability, having little dignity but that which reflected on to her from her husband (and, having no husband, forced to become a governess or to 'take in sewing') the Victorian lady was denied all passion, all anger, all ambition outside marriage political revolutions,

.

.

.

all permission to govern her own destiny. It is hardly surprising that women's voices, when they were finally raised in protest at the unfairness of a social system that kept them mute, were shrill and strident. They were the voices of a world in dissolution — the product of Victorian repression. Lydia Becker, from her headquarters in Manchester, carried on

and

an unrewarded struggle for women's rights for almost 30 years — between 1860 and 1890. This stage of the movement is a history of committee meetings, letters to MPs, the gradual formation of women's suffrage societies throughout the country, with Miss Becker's energetic but tidy mind charting every advance and every setback in the Women's Suffrage Journal. The whole of Miss Becker's strategy was concentrated on the House of Commons. In Jacob Bright, MP for the City of Manchester, she found a fervent supporter, but his was an almost isolated voice among a body of men who found the whole idea of giving women the vote perverse — and whose objections were founded hardly at all on logic and for the most part on prejudice. It was argued that to give women the vote would be to make them vulnerable to all the evils of the land — from bribery to the subversive utterances of the Roman Catholic Church. The movement was dismissed as the fantasy of a frustrated few — spinsters or widows, all — on which the married majority frowned in horror. Punch commented: 'The rights of Women who demand, women are but few, The greater part had rather stand Exactly as they do.

Those

Beauty has claims for which she fights At ease with winning arms, The women who want women's rights

Want

mostly,

Women's charms.'

As, with a guffaw of mindless laughter, the joke spread through the country that the human race now comprised three sexes — male, female and Miss Becker — the debate went on amid derision and antipathy. To Bright, to Richard Pankhurst (husband of Emmeline) and to a devoted band of Lydia Becker's followers, the exclusion of women from the vote was 'unjust in principle and inexpedient in practice'; to the majority, including Queen Victoria, the idea of such emancipation was 'mad, wicked folly'. But as Edward took at last — and early left — the throne, the signs that in all but this one respect (the vote) women were emancipating themselves began to appear. They were to be seen — working at starvation wages — in the inner sanctums of offices, they shortened their skirts, they played tennis and rode bicycles; feathers and silk gradually gave way to hard straw hats and starched collars. 'Woman, through her new awareness of the possibilities of an

abstract goal in life, was, in effect, suddenly aware of her longneglected masculinity,' writes George Dangerfield. The conse-

quences of this awareness were extreme. From the moment when, after her husband's death, Mrs Emmeline Pankhurst's nostrils 'scented battle from afar' and she took up with both hands the cause her husband had dallied with, the suffragette movement was never the same again. It was Mrs Pankhurst's passionate belief that existing suffrage societies were too polite, too cautious, too supplicatory in their approach to those in power. If there was a measure of self-interest in her desire to lead the movement into an era of sustained provocative action, there was also evidence that she had glimpsed the truth of the situation. Year after year, Private Members' Bills had been introduced in Parliament and had been denied a second reading; the powerful lobby against giving women the vote had successfully emasculated every new proposal. What was needed, Mrs Pankhurst believed, was to persuade one of the major parties to espouse the cause: only then might a Bill get through Parliament. Between 1903, when the WSPU was founded in Mrs Pankhurst's house in Manchester, and 1910 the movement made agitated progress. Groups of women, holding banners, invaded public meetings, stood immovable outside the Houses of Parliament, gathered, thousands strong, in Hyde Park to hear their leaders speak, chalked mottoes on the London pavements. Cabinet Ministers b'egan to appear on political platforms with a wary look, waiting for the familiar high-pitched voice to drown their oratory. Usually, the women were bundled unceremoniously into waiting police cars, but the spectacle of 'respectable' ladies skirmishing with burly policemen was no longer merely amusing: it was recognised as a symptom of a far-reaching current of change and as such was feared. Despite his distaste for the methods advocated by Mrs Pankhurst and her favourite daughter, Christabel, Mr Asquith was himself uneasily aware that their cause was one which Liberalism ought to uphold. The WSPU, if it had any political affiliations, Above: By the end of the war the numbers of women workers in munitions factories had more than quadrupled. To the government's satisfaction women welcomed the opportunity to break away from their traditional role and work for the war effort. By doing so they earned themselves the vote, and changed forever the society they were living in. Below: The coffin of the movement's first martyr: Emily Davison, who died after throwing herself in front of the King's horse on Derby Day, 1913 The coffin stands at Victoria Station

was Labour inclined. Labour politicians such as Keir Hardie and George Lansbury had remained faithful to it, but Mrs Pankhurst— and particularly Christabel — held an almost mystic belief that the women's struggle should be fought and won by women alone.

Men — especially

politicians

like

be trusted because in the end they would

Asquith — should never you down.

let

Street battles thus came as no surprise to Mrs Pankhurst that the Liberal Party's 1910 Conciliation Bill (designed to enfranchise about 1,000,000 women) was exiled into a political wilderness from which it would never be brought back for its third reading. But the Bill had brought a ray of hope. As this flickered into oblivion the disappointed ladies converged on their headquarters at Caxton Hall and rallied for action. On Friday November 18, 1910, small groups of women moved on the Houses of Parliament waving aloft slogans such as 'Women's WILL beats Asquith's WON'T'. They were met by a thick cordon of police, assembled there on the orders of Mr Churchill, and they were pushed back, gently at first, then, as they grew more determined, with anger and violence. As a hostile crowd looked on and jeered, the police brought out their truncheons and waded into the women. For six hours the battle raged; the protesters were hurled, bruised and bleeding, into the crowd, their faces were rubbed against the railings, their clothes were torn and their banners trampled into the ground. Only Mrs Pankhurst had been admitted to the House, but the Prime Minister made no attempt to see her. But on this occasion, much as he had underestimated Edward Carson and the Orangemen, he underestimated her. On the battlefield of Parliament Square the government claimed a 'victory' as evening descended on 'Black Friday', but Mrs Pankhurst had glimpsed the ecstasies of martyrdom and would use it henceforth as her most powerIt

and telling weapon. The following morning she marched to Downing Street, accompanied by Christabel and her other daughter, Sylvia, and a banner-waving posse. This time, the women were met only by a thin line of policemen (presumably the Home Secretary had doubted that another invasion would follow so quickly) and they pushed through into the street. More fighting ensued, more arrests were made and the street was cleared only by a mounted

ful

police division rushed in as reinforcements. George Dangerfield describes the scene which followed — a scene which, in the mind of Mrs Pankhurst, stigmatised Churchill as one of the most vicious opponents of her cause: 'Only one suffragette remained, leaning in utter exhaustion against a wall. Mr Churchill, as usual, was unable to resist the dramatic gesture. He beckoned a policeman. "Drive that woman away," he said; though he knew her perfectly well to be a Mrs Cobden-Sanderson, his hostess on

2885

s, and an intimate friend of his wife's family. The around London and made a bad impression, and a s later, when the Home Secretary was travelling by rail London to Bradford, a young man named Franklin very nearly got into his compartment with a horse-whip, and received six weeks' imprisonment for his pains.' The following May the Conciliation Bill was reintroduced and passed its first reading by 255 votes to 88. Content to wait until the next parliamentary session, in which the Bill would come up for its second reading, Mrs Pankhurst called a temporary truce. The demonstrations would cease, the one side to rest and recover, the other — she hoped — to recover its sense of justice and push the Bill through Parliament. But again her belief that male politicians were fickle and would betray her behind a mantle of false promises was reinforced. In November it was revealed that the government was planning to bring in a Franchise Bill. If this were introduced at such a time, it would effectively torpedo the Conciliation Bill. By such a move, the Prime Minister would create a situation in which his promises to the women would not have to be kept and yet none would be able to say that he had actually broken them. Would it not indeed be easy for him to promise to do his best to see that an amendment to include the women was tacked on to the Bill, in the full knowledge that such an amendment would bring about the Bill's withdrawal? Mrs Pankhurst snorted with disgust. The women's movement was divided as to its next step. The Pankhursts and Mr and Mrs Pethick Lawrence of the WSPU now considered that the Conciliation Bill was worthless and that they should fight for an equal rights measure; the elegant Mrs Despard of the Freedom League favoured a similar step, but other organisations stuck by the Bill and some even declared that it would be 'improper' to demand anything more. To Mrs Pankhurst, who received the news of Asquith's perfidy in America, there was but one course of action: 'Protest imperative' she cabled.

t

Arson and destruction But words and banners were no longer enough. Why should the government be fought openly, when they constantly tricked her into obedience with promises that were never to be fulfilled? If they could use so devious a weapon to cheat her of her rights, she would strike a blow at the one thing most dear to Liberal England: property. The following week, Mrs Pethick Lawrence placed a hammer and some dozen stones in her large handbag and, with other ladies similarly armed, smashed windows in 11 government buildings. 223 arrests were made and 150 women sent to prison, including a young woman called Emily Wilding Davison who was arrested in Parliament Street while in the process of stuffing a burning, petrol-soaked rag into a pillar box. On this occasion, Emily Davison's hand had been stayed before the pile of paper and sealing wax had gone up in flames, but within the movement a new fire had been lit and was burning well. 'The argument of the broken window pane', Mrs Pankhurst declared, 'is the most valuable argument in modern politics' and on March 1, 1912 she herself tossed four well-aimed stones through the windows of No 10 Downing Street. Arrest followed at once. The authorities in London were tense and determined: the women would pay a price for such acts of terrorism. But just as on 'Black Friday' Mrs Pankhurst had turned suffering into glory, so now the suffragettes went willingly, fervently to the cell. Their imprisonment was as vital a part of their campaign as their destruction of property. The courage which took them into country lanes in the early hours of the morning to gather stones for the next day's round of window breaking led them unafraid into solitary confinement, where they seemed only to gain strength for the next onslaught. It was at this stage of the movement, with Mrs Pankhurst and Mrs Pethick Lawrence in prison, that Christabel Pankhurst assumed a remote but powerful position as the guiding spirit of the militant faction. With a warrant for her arrest in the hands of the police, she donned a borrowed hat and in this flimsy disguise fled to Paris. Here, removed from the day-to-day struggle, she was content to let her mother's frail body bruise and batter itself against the authorities in Britain while she assumed the status of a goddess in the Paris sunshine, with a band of devoted followers to carry her decrees back and forth across the Channel. Christabel is, perhaps, the least likeable of the Pankhursts. It is certain that a measure of self-interest and ambition moved all three of them, but in Christabel this was magnified to a degree where she would admit of no contradiction and where the glories of leadership blinded her to the cause. Unlike her sister, Sylvia, who maintained that no suffrage movement would ever thrive

2886

without the support of working women, she saw her band of followers as a kind of high priesthood — a noble, cultured oligarchy, whose idealism would liberate them from the tyrannies of male domination. Christabel's driving force was her belief in the purity of the female spirit. That men had condemned women to an inferior role in society was proof enough to her that they were selfish and stupid and she loathed them. As high priestess she was immensely effective. The very name, Christabel, soon became a symbol in the minds of the devoted band for the fount of all inspiration, the lamp that shed on every struggle, every moment of suffering, an unworldly light. On May 15, 1912 Mrs Pankhurst and Mr and Mrs Pethick Lawrence were found guilty of 'conspiring to incite certain persons to commit malicious damage to property' and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment. Mrs Pankhurst was sent to Holloway Gaol and, because of her uncertain health, accorded First Division treatment. This (which gave her marginally greater comfort than to prisoners of the Second Division) was usually awarded to 'political' prisoners, but it was with dismay that she discovered that the other women committed with her languished in Second Division cells. Her appeal to the Home Secretary to give them the same treatment as herself was met with a cold refusal and she went on a hunger strike. News of her course of action spread quickly round the prison and the other women followed suit. Baffled by this form of obstinacy, the prison authorities retaliated with perhaps the most brutal manifestation of their power in the history of the movement — that of forcible feeding. Dangerfield describes this appalling process: First the victim's jaws had to Inopen, and gags thrust in — sometimes they were made of wood, hut often of steel which lacerated the gums cruelly; then, while she writhed on the bed in the grip of the wardresses, a feeding tube would — with infinite difficulty — be thrust down her throat, through which some nauseous fluid could find its way into her system. The victim's nerves, combined with a natural reaction to the tube, generally saw to it that this liquid food was immediately vomited up. Neither Mrs Pankhurst nor Mrs Pethick Lawrence were spared this final indignity, but both still refused to eat and were released

One

of

many demonstrations cells.

5, Mrs Pankhurst weakened to an almost critical condition. Annie Kenny, longtime friend and slave of the Pankhurst family, scurried across the Channel with news of this latest ordeal and waited for Christabel to pronounce. Inspired to eloquence by

on July

the latest chapter of suffering, she ordered the fight to proceed and her army in Britain formed ranks yet again. The new weapons were housebreaking tools and inflammable materials and the latest objective arson.

The unglamorous poor Christabel had, perhaps, foreseen that such a policy would alienate some few of her followers — notably the Pethick Lawrences. She arrived in England to witness their departure from the WSPU. (They would continue to work for the movement outside the Union and to edit the movement's journal, Votes for Women.) Christabel could not mourn the loss. For a long time it had distressed her to see a man (Frederick Pethick Lawrence) so near the leadership, and his resignation along with that of his wife gave her and her mother greater freedom to make the movement their own. However, the Pethick Lawrences' condemnation of Christabel's policy of fire raising was echoed by no less a person than her sister Sylvia. While Mrs Pankhurst had been urging the suffragettes to go forth and 'be militant, each in your own way', Sylvia had clung to her father's socialist principles and set up her own branch of the movement in the East End. Her premises were a disused baker's shop, her followers the women for whom — of all in Britain — the vote was most necessary, the working women of the soap factories and tanneries of Bow Road. But the days were gone when Emmeline and Christabel paid lip service to the ILP. Their branch of the movement, illogical as it may seem, took them with each step further in spirit from the majority of women in whose name they were fighting. They reacted to Sylvia's unglamorous work with and for the poorest women of London with irritation and disapproval. Nevertheless, on January 23, 1913, Sylvia's group formed part of a deputation of women drawn from every area in the country (the women were ordered by Christabel to don their 'local cos-

held by campaigners, usually ending in the Arrests were not always so orderly— women frequently encountered violence from both police and civilians

tumes' for the occasion) which would be received in orderly fashion by the Prime Minister. Led by 'General' Drummond (a formidable militant, so called because of her small but robust stature and bustling air), the deputation was received at the Treasury by Lloyd George and Sir Edward Grey, both proffering reassurances that they would support the Dickensen amendment to the forthcoming Male Suffrage Bill — thereby enfranchising some 5,000,000 women. For four hours, the faces of this vast crowd of women were allowed to smile in blissful contemplation of a battle nearly won. Then later the same afternoon, in the inner sanctum of the House of Commons, the Speaker nonchalantly announced that the Bill (due to enter its committee stage the next day) would have to be withdrawn altogether if such an amendment were passed. Well might Keir Hardie warn the government that such duplicity would be answered with 'real militant tactics'; Mrs Pankhurst now dismissed the Asquith Government as 'scoundrels of the worst kind'. In almost unbelievable succession, they had brought in a Conciliation Bill, made such a Bill unworkable by the sudden fashioning of a Male Suffrage Bill, and made sure that this in turn would be withdrawn by tagging on to it Women's Suffrage amendments they knew the House would never accept. Well, she would answer them. She believed that they valued property more highly than human life and she would strike and go on striking at this treasured bulwark of respectability and success until they killed her or gave her what she wanted. The militants now entered upon a campaign that showed both ingenuity and variety. Perched among passengers on the top deck of a bus, the daughter of a leading actor fired stones from a catapult at windows in Victoria Street; the slogan 'Votes for Women' was burned in acid on putting greens; the Tea Pavilion at Kew was set on fire; a gun, captured from the Russians during the Crimean War, was fired at Dudley in the middle of the night; bombs, placed in appropriate Liberal strongholds, inflicted hundreds of pounds of damage and earned the militants the nickname of 'Bombazines' in the Beaverbrook Press. In the Commons, urgent debates were held to increase the government's powers of retaliation. Sir Frederick Banbury, one of the most stately embodiments of Conservatism, advocated leaving the women to starve themselves to death, adding characteristically that 'nothing would happen. Only one or two would die.' Lord Robert Cecil urged deportation to St Helena. Another Conservative member sparked off ribald laughter when he suggested abandoning the

women on

the Isle of Muck. Between July and December 1913 Mrs Pankhurst was arrested six times; each time she endured a hunger strike and forcible feeding until released for health reasons. Weakened almost beyond recognition, she would appear at meetings in a wheel-chair, her

compelling voice urging her disciples to greater efforts. Many had no need of her urging. The logical extension of a belief in the nobility of suffering is a belief in the nobility of death. In the minds of many of the women who burned and destroyed in the

2887

i

\

which was embroidered: 'Thoughts have gone forth whose power can sleep no more. Victory. Victory.' Then followed hunger-strikers, the clergy, a standard-bearer with a banner: 'Greater love hath no man that this, that a man lay down his life for his friends,' personal friends, the body, relations, a standard-bearer and a banner 'Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori,' hunger-strikers, Mrs Pankhurst's carriage, a standard-bearer and banner: 'He that loseth his life shall find it.' Members of the Union, women doctors and women graduates and a double band closed the great procession. But even this solemn and highly emotional occasion was not without its touch of irony. As Mrs Pankhurst, her lined face shadowy behind the heavy mourning veil, was about to step into her carriage to follow the cortege, she was arrested. Fulford records that 'her empty carriage followed the hearse — rather in the Victorian fashion when eminent persons sent their carriages, with blinds drawn and no occupants, to join a funeral as a mark of respect to the deceased'. Her arrest on this occasion was made possible by the government's latest attempt at preventive legislation. Termed the Prisoners (Temporary Discharge for IllHealth) Bill, but unaffectionately known as the 'Cat and Mouse Bill', it was the brainchild of the new Home Secretary, Reginald McKenna. Under this Bill, hunger strikers (and Mrs Pankhurst had endured six strikes in as many months) were to be discharged as soon as their health became affected, but rearrested as soon as they had recovered, thus prolonging the term of their imprisonment indefinitely. Well might Bernard Shaw comment that 'McKenna should be examined at once by two doctors. He apparently believes himself to be the Tsar of all the Russias — a very common form of delusion'. The Bill was unnecessarily cruel — painful evidence that the government was growing desperate in its determination not to yield. A strong tide of 'liberal' opinion, led by such faithfuls as Keir Hardie and George Lansbury, turned on McKenna, but the majority in the House remained in favour of playing cat and mouse and the act was not repealed. The violence and the arrests continued. In February 1914, Sylvia Pankhurst was arrested and put in Holloway Gaol, where she began a hunger and thirst strike. The inevitable arrival of the wardresses and doctors with the feeding tube filled her with terror, but she endured their tortures until her nerves gave way. Gaunt eyed, she would pace her cell night and day without stopping—a spectacle which eventually frightened the authorities into releasing her.

Christabel and her mother believed that Sylvia's independence and her tendency to snatch the limelight from them was 'unacceptable'. From now on, they said, they would have nothing more to do with her and her East End crowd. With renewed and desperate energy, they charted their latest pattern of violence, determined on showing the government and the King and the Press and every man in Britain that the movement still belonged to them and that they alone would win. No person or property was safe: even the gates of Buckingham Palace thronged with shouting, pushing, stone-throwing women, some chained to the railings to resist arrest.

But it was to Sylvia that the last chapter — before the finally suffocated the militant spirit — belonged.

Above: Mrs Emmeline Pankhurst (left) with fellow convict: her vandalism touched on the Liberal government's weak spot Imprisoned in May 1912 she, already in ill health, was to endure many attempts at forcible feeding, an iniquitous practice for which Asquith was condemned by a male heckler to 'go dOwn in history as the man who tortured innocent women'

name of equality burned — to destroy themselves

the desire to

make

the ultimate gesture

Emily Wilding Davison was such a one. She had been chasing an elusive death for years, but each suicide attempt had failed -un f U the last and most spectacular of all. On Derby Day, June 4, 1913 Emily Davison elbowed her way to the front of a large crowd assembled at Tattenham Corner. As the horses thundered towards her, the King's horse in the lead, she scrambled under the rails and flung herself in front of the galloping hooves. Horse and jockey came crashing to the ground. To the King's relief, both survived; Emily Davison for their Idea.

died the following Sunday. The first real martyr of the movement, she was accorded a heroine's funeral. Roger Fulford describes the solemn cavalcade which accompanied her body from Victoria to King's Cross: Thousands of women took part marching in groups dressed in black, purple or white — those wearing black carried purple irises, those in purple, red peonies, and those in white, laurels. At the head of the procession were the usual mounted outriders immediately followed by a standard-bearer, with a banner on .

2888

.

.

war clouds

On June 20, 1914, disobeying the orders of her mother and Christabel, Sylvia sent off a small deputation of working women to see the Prime Minister. A month before, Asquith's promise to Sylvia that he would receive them had drawn from her emaciated body the triumphant whisper 'we are winning!' Now, by some unexpected quirk of fate, it seemed that this was no idle claim. Humble, courageous and proud, the East End women made a profound impression on Mr Asquith. Half an hour spent in their company extracted from him a promise for which years of destruction and suffering had paved the way. The following day, official reports in the Liberal Press confirmed that the Asquith Government had given up the struggle and would support a Women's Suffrage Bill. It

was

too late.

War was

only two months away.

Further Reading Anthony, S. B., and Stanton, E C, History of Women's Suffrage (New York 1881) Dangerfield, George, The Strange Death of Liberal England (Palladin 1970) Figes, Eva, Patriarchal Attitudes (Faber 1970) Fulford, Roger, Votes for Women (Faber 1970) Metcalfe, A. E., Women's Effort 1865-1914 (Blackwell 1917) Rover, Constance, Women's Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain

«

1866-1914 (Routledge 1967) Taylor, A. J. P., English History 1914-1945 (Clarendon Press 1965)

|

£

[For Rose Thomson's biography, see page 2496.

£

j>

q \

'

Russia in Revolution

1918

The decree adopted by the Congress of Soviets on the night of November 8/9 stated that the new government, the Council of People's Commissars, was only to hold power temporarily. Its mission was to end with the opening of the Constituent Assembly for which elections were to be held at the end of November. Ever since his return to Russia in April Lenin had called for elections to the Constituent Assembly. But now he could not but be aware that this organ of power was hardly compatible with the Soviet Re-

system of government. The soviet was the expression of a class government public's

structure, the only one allowing the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' to function. The Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage and expressing the will of all classes was its flagrant negation. In the elections the Socialist Revolutionary Party emerged the clear victor. The Bolsheviks polled only a quarter of the 40 million votes cast and won 175 seats in the Assembly to the Socialist Revolutionaries' 370. Lenin's worst fears

had been

realised.

However, he thought he

At the time of the Revolution, the Bolsheviks still maintained that theirs was a temporary regime pending the election of a Constituent Assembly. Time would tell. Gerard Walter

could remedy the situation by decreeing a right to recall the deputies elected. Unfortunately the local Soviets did not show any great eagerness to use this new right and despite a few eliminations the Socialist Revolutionaries were able to preserve their majority in the Assembly whose opening, due to take place on December 11, was awaited with feverish impatience by all the enemies of the Bolsheviks. Already the end of the 'nightmare' was being forecast.

There was immense disappointment therefore when it was learned on the 4th that the convening of the Assembly had been postponed to a later date. Kerensky and those of his ministers who, having gone underground, continued to regard themselves as the legal government, announced however that the Constituent Assembly was to meet on the date fixed. The non-Bolshevik parties, therefore, decided to hold a demonstration on the 1 1th. On that day a crowd of five to six thousand demonstrators marched to the Tauride Palace to the sound of the 'Marseillaise' together with the 45 deputies resolved to take up their duties en the date

by 'their' government. In front of the Palace entrance, the Mayor of Petrograd, an old Socialist Revolutionary, cried out: 'Let us swear to defend the Constituent Assembly to the last drop of our blood!' And everyone replied in unison: 'We swear it!' Next, forcing the guard posts, the crowd penetrated inside the Palace. The 45 deputies, taking possession of one of the Palace halls, declared themselves assembled in a 'private meeting' because of their small numbers, and broke up after agreeing to meet as soon as they could form a quorum. Their departure was without set

incident.

Lenin was furious when he learned what had happened. He issued a decree declaring the members of the Cadet Party 'enemies of the people' and ordering the immediate arrest of its leaders. No repressive measures were taken either against the Mensheviks or against the Socialist Revolutionaries. And yet it was they who had played the main part in the demonstration. But Lenin was not mistaken. It was indeed Milyukov's Cadet Party, possessing very considerable financial resources, which was

_>SSP

.

the game while keeping pruthe side-lines. s decree provoked strong discontent mong Lenin's new companions, the breakaway Left Socialist Revolutionaries, who had entered into coalition with the Bol>l'iing

ly to

sheviks.

They charged one

of their leaders,

the lawyer Steinberg, to deliver a strong protest at the next meeting of the Soviet Central Executive Committee, which was held on December 14. Their central corn-

mittee had decided to demand the immedithe Constituent convocation of ate Assembly. Lenin judged it necessary to give them satisfaction and it was agreed that the Assembly would meet on January 18, provided that at least 400 deputies presented themselves at the Tauride Palace on that day. A communique published in Pravda on December 19 announced this to the country. As the opening date of the Constituent Assembly approached, public opinion appeared to become increasingly more restless. Rumours were abroad that another revolution was about to take place, this time under the aegis of the Constituent Assembly, which would sweep away the Bolshevik government and restore a democratic regime. Kerensky, returning to Petrograd, was proposing — so it was said — to appear in front of the representatives of the Russian people elected by universal suffrage, in order solemnly to hand over to them the powers he held in his capacity of chairman of the legally appointed Provisional

Government. All 'republicans',

all

the 'true friends of freedom' were called upon to rise and take part in a mass demonstration that would go to the Tauride Palace on January 18 in order to protect the Assembly against any violence that the 'Bolshevik usurpers' could attempt against it. A few factories were success-

gained to this movement. The officercadets were holding themselves ready to fully

2890

take up arms. The bulk of the garrison troops appeared willing to respect a sort of neutrality in case of a possible conflict between the Constituent Assembly and the Bolshevik government. The session opened at four o'clock in the afternoon with the election of a chairman. The leader of the Right Socialist Revolutionaries, Chernov, was elected in the first round by 244 votes to 151. The balance of power was thus definitely established: the

Right Socialist Revolutionaries were masters of the Constituent Assembly. In the name of the Bolshevik Party, Sverdlov requested that the Assembly, before considering the agenda, should adopt a Declaration of Rights drawn up by Lenin. His proposal was rejected by 237 votes to 146. A second time, the Right Socialist Revolutionaries showed their opponents that it was useless to try to fight with them. Defeated, the government parties demanded and obtained a session adjournment. They went up to Lenin. 'He came up to us with a jovial air,' wrote Steinberg, 'telling us: "Well, you see. The situation is clear, and we can now separate ourselves from them." Finally, everyone was agreed. A Bolshevik, Raskolnikov, was instructed to return to the Assembly and read out the resolution adopted by his party. 'The counter-revolutionary majority of the Constituent Assembly,' it said, 'is ostensibly aiming at putting the Assembly and the workers' and peasants' government in opposition. We are leaving the Assembly because we do not wish to share for a single moment the responsibility for the crimes which the enemies of the people are in process of committing.' Someone asked Lenin: 'But what are they going to do once they are left by '

themselves?' 'They will carry on with their chatter,'

he replied.

'But for how long?' the too inquisitive delegate asked further. 'Until they have had enough,' announced Lenin moving towards the exit. 'As for us, we have nothing more to do here.' Towards half-past four in the morning, a seaman presented himself on behalf of the Palace Commander at the chairman's desk and announced to Chernov that it was time to leave the premises as the guard was very tired. Chernov argued for form's sake

for a

few moments and at twenty

to five

declared the session adjourned for twelve hours. The deputies' departure was without incident. The Constituent Assembly never met again. The Soviet Central Executive Committee declared its dissolution on January 18, and a guard was placed on the door of the Tauride Palace to prevent reassembly.

Trotsky and the 'dirty peace' The problem of war and peace required an urgent solution. The army had reached such an advanced stage of decomposition that with the first enemy attack the exasperated hordes of soldiers abandoning their positions would have surged to the bringing with them chaos and rear anarchy. A peace signed in the shortest possible time could alone avoid this danger to the Bolshevik regime. There was another matter: it was necessary to take advantage of the state of war which had set the two opposing camps of world imperialism at each other's throats. As they were busy fighting each other, they were not in a position, for the time being, to wage a struggle against the new proletarian state. Therefore by signing immediate peace the Bolsheviks would Inable to work for the consolidation of ben rule without being hindered by any foreign intervention. Such was Lenin's viewpoint. The overwhelming majority of leading party officials did not share his viewpoint I

Trotsky. He believed that the deter the German government from any incursions into a defenceless Russia. Left: Lenin. His energies during the period after the Revolution were devoted to opposing the call for a revolutionary war that came from some Bolsheviks, notably Bukharin. Below: Ukrainian cavalry in Kiev. In spite of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, the Germans entered the town on March 1, 1918

Below. Far

left:

German masses would

This idea found numerous supporters. With the Constituent Assembly just dissolved, Lenin announced that he wished to expound his point of view on the problem of peace. A party conference was arranged for

January

21.

He came armed,

as was his wont, with a They were aimed primarily the Bukharin group of advocates of a

set of 'theses'.

at

revolutionary war. Entering into a revolutionary war would

The party bureau

of the

Moscow region

headed this opposition. Its leadership was in the hands of a group of ardent and enthusiastic young people whose leader was Bukharin. On December 28, the Moscow bureau adopted a resolution stating that the party's Central Committee had lost its confidence. It demanded simultaneously the breaking off of peace negotiations with Germany and the resumption of hostilities in the form of a revolutionary war, by calling on the entire Russian people to rise against Germany. The slogan launched by the Muscovites 'Down with the Dirty Peace' became increasingly more widespread. The Petrograd party organisation, for its part, fully accepted the revolutionary war thesis. Trotsky had begun to play an infinitely subtle game. Neither Bukharin, nor Lenin. Neither revolutionary war, nor shameful peace. The German imperialist clique which would be flung a resounding would arouse formidable echoes throughout the entire world, negotiations would be broken off and the army demobilised, leaving Russia entirely defenceless. The enemy would not dare advance. His own proletariat would prevent him. If, nevertheless, he continued his offensive, peace would be signed in the end 'under the invader's boot', but in this way the prestige of the Bolshevik revolution would be preserved.

NO

mean risking the very existence of the Russian socialist revolution. No one had any right to launch such an adventure. On the other hand, by signing a separate and peasants' republic from the war and obtain the

peace, the workers'

would

retire

possibility of devoting itself to the construction of a new socialist order which

would make it strong and fearsome. The meeting was not convinced. Only 15 votes out of 73 were in favour of Lenin's theses. But this vote was of a purely indicative nature. That of the Central Committee which was to meet five days later would determine the party's position officially — it adopted Trotsky's views by nine votes to seven. Lenin's theses were thus rejected. As for Bukharin's — it gained only two votes. Therefore, when on February 10 Trotsky made his sensational statement to the German representatives at Brest-Litovsk, withdrawing the Russian delegation from the negotiations, he was not in the least committing an arbitrary act. Responsibility for the deplorable events which followed lay with those who, with their votes, had given official sanction to his proposal. Five days later, on February 16, the

German High Command informed Russian General Headquarters that the state of armistice would end at noon on the 18th. At the Central Committee meeting held on the 17th, Lenin tried to repeat his views: the Germans should be sent a telegram

stating Russian willingness to resume negotiations. Trotsky reassured the meeting: there was no need for panic; the German statement was probably a simple attempt at intimidation. Let us wait and see what happens on the 18th. Lenin's proposal was rejected. Thus, the following day was to bring about a decision. It was not necessary to wait till noon to ascertain that the Germans were not joking. During the morning

session of the Central Committee, it was Trotsky himself who, looking rather annoyed, announced that German aircraft were flying over Dvinsk and that Prince Leopold of Bavaria, Commander-in-Chief on the Eastern Front, had stated on the radio that Germany was going to assume the sacred mission of ridding the world of the Russian pestilence. Once again, Lenin repeated his proposal. Once again, Trotsky opposed it. 'It cannot be ruled out,' he said, 'that the offensive will provoke an explosion of popular indignation inside Germany. A revolution could result. Let us wait and see what effect the offensive has.' Again, Lenin's opinion was not heeded. At the stated hour, the German armies moved to the attack. The Russian troops immediately fell back in disorder without

putting up the slightest resistance. Towards the end of the afternoon, it was learned that the Germans had entered Dvinsk and were rapidly advancing in the direction of Pskov; in other words, they were marching on Petrograd. As for Trotsky's 'explosion' there was no news of that.

The Central Committee met once again in the evening. Trotsky persisted in his

aberration.

He

believed that

it

would

first

be necessary to 'sound out the Germans', and ask them what they wanted — as though their entry into Dvinsk and their march on Petrograd did not indicate it clearly enough! Lenin overwhelmed his opponent with brief crushing comments: 2891

'By playing at war, you are delivering the revolution to the Germans. ... At present, there is no longer time to exchange diplomatic notes. It is too late to "sound out" the Germans. We have to propose peace to

them

outright'.

Trotsky defended himself badly: 'There is no "playing at war". But we have to act in moral fashion. We have to attempt the experiment of asking the Germans this question.' Stalin, usually taciturn and reserved, suddenly burst out: 'This nonsense has to stop. Let Trotsky ask his question in the newspapers. As for us now, we have to say that the talks must be resumed.' The vote was taken. This time, Lenin's motion won by seven votes to six. From then on, things moved rapidly towards a solution. Lenin and Trotsky were instructed to draw up the text of the message on the spot. With a sure hand, Lenin wrote some lines: 'The Council of People's Commissars protests against the German army's advance ... It sees itself compelled, because of the situation thus created, to declare that it holds itself

2892

A

ready to sign peace according to the conditions laid down at Brest-Litovsk by the German government. It declares itself

of 6,000 million marks (£300 million). reply was to be given within 48 hours.

ready to examine the new proposals formulated by the German government and to give its answer within a period of 12 hours.' With a rapid and energetic gesture, he wrote down his signature and passed the paper to Trotsky who refused to sign, claiming that Lenin's signature was enough. Lenin cut short this last attempt at resist-

under such conditions was equivalent to political and moral suicide. The country would not accept this shame. The Central Committee met. Trotsky announced that the 48 hours laid down by the ultimatum would expire next day at seven o'clock in the morning. Lenin, trembling with rage: 'We are handing the revolution to the If you persist Germans if we don't sign with this policy, I submit my resig-

ance: 'No, the signature of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs is indispensable.' These words resounded like an order. Trotsky signed. The telegram was sent. The German reply came on the 23rd towards eleven o'clock in the morning. It caused the deepest consternation. Germany's demands exceeded all expectations:

The general opinion was that

.

nation

.

to

sign

.

.' .

.

she proposed to keep Poland, Lithuania and

Trotsky did not allow himself to lose his temper: 'Lenin's position is of a very subjective nature. I do not believe it is right. However, I do not wish to create any obstacle to party unity. But I do not wish to stay in office and bear personal respon-

part of White Russia. The Ukraine was to form an independent state. All Russian troops stationed on its territory were to be recalled immediately. Likewise for Finland and the Baltic states. The towns of Kars and Batum would go to Turkey. Russia would have to pay a war indemnity

sibility for the direction of foreign affaire. Therefore, unity within the party, a split within the government- that is how Trotsky understood the policy of understanding and conciliation he proposed to follow. The question formulated by Lenin was put to the vote: Must we immediately

1

I

Ml

#

^

,

*

The

inevitable

concomitant

of military

occupation. Germans execute suspected Bolsheviks in one of the areas of Russia occupied by their forces

accept the German conditions? They were accepted by seven votes to four with four abstentions. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets was called upon to give its verdict. Its plenary session opened at three o'clock in the morning. Time was pressing. Speakers were given set timelimits! Polling began. The 'Bukharinists' stole from the room. The vote gave 116 votes for acceptance and 85 against. Twenty-six abstentions were recorded. It was four-fifteen in the morning.

The message was despatched

at seven

o'clock in the morning.

Signed on March 3, peace was nounced to the country the next day.

an-

Fighting off famine Lenin had triumphed over his opponents. The Bolshevik regime had gained time

up

its strength for battles to proceed with the task of constructing the new socialist order. But the most urgent task was to restore the economic life of the country. Already another enemy — famine — was knocking

to

build

come and

to

the door. The overpopulated capital not alone in suffering from food shortages. Bread was short in most urban at

resistance

government

e

was

attempt to lay hands on their fortunes

%

centres. There was wheat available, and in adequate quantities, but the peasants refused to sell at the prices fixed by the

which for them consisted in huge reserves I of hoarded wheat, as in their eyes money | had lost all value. It was these powerful « crafty opponents had and that to be » attacked now. A new campaign was E

government.

Out of 15 million families, there were 10 million poor ones, three million in moderately comfortable circumstances, and only two million rich ones. This subdivision was accentuated in striking fashion. Having enriched themselves prodigiously thanks to the war, the so-called 'kulaks' were exercising a veritable tyranny on the poor families, many of whose able-bodied members, called up in the army, had been killed on the battlefields of Poland or Galicia. As for the 'middle peasants', they had only one ambition — that of gaining the good graces of village lords in order to do business with the money these would deign to lend them at usurious rates of interest. This is what allowed the kulaks to seize control of the majority of rural Soviets. They were ready to put up the most energetic

against

any

launched: a crusade against the kulaks.

They would have to be compelled to give up the wheat they had hoarded. All politically reliable workers were called upon to take part. The intention was to make use essentially of workers from famine-stricken cities to form these companies of 'crusaders', starting with Moscow and Petrograd. One by one, all factories in the new capital (on March 11, 1918, with the Germans uncomfortably close to Petrograd, the seat of the Soviet government

had been transferred to Moscow) were visited and the holy war was preached in them against kulaks, speculators and hoarders of all kinds. This propaganda campaign did not produce any appreciable results. The workers of Moscow, serious and reflective, were difficult to arouse. Mostly of peasant origin, they did not show 2893

desire to go and sow terror in ntryside where many of them had ves and friends. The Petrograd ;rs were the next group to be addressed. The Petrograd party committee received a draft proclamation to be posted

socialism, incorruptible, capable of forming iron phalanges to march against the

,

in

all

factories

which

stated:

kulaks. Otherwise,

'Comrade

not wait.' This appeal

workers! The revolution is in a critical situation. You alone can save it, and no one else. What we require is tens of thousands of elite workers, dedicated to

enough It was

to set

The signing

of the

in

Russian

Peasants (Jan 28) and the Red Navy (Feb

1

Finland

Area occupied by the Germans. Austro-Mungarians and Turks

in

Feb

(Jan-April 1918).

The

'Ice

the

first half of

March' of the sailors

Border

of

1

in

of the Baltic Fleet (Feb

of the Black

Sea Fleet on Lenin's orders

of Tsaritsyn (July-Nov).

Capture of the Black Sea and Caspian Sea fleets by the Allies (July-Aug). Minefield laid for the defence of Petrograd (Aug-Nov). Military activity in the second half of

1

918.

Murmansk (March) and

The

lasi

front line in the middle of August.

in Germany. > Actions of the Red Army against Admiral Kolchak's forces (from Nov 1918

Abrogation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk after the revolution

25— April

24).

•

and extending into Feb 1919). Formation of the Council of Defence of the Workers and Peasants (Nov 30).

area occupied by the Central Powers.

."•Areas of partisan activity.

(Nov) to organise Allied support.

American troops March 9

•Voroshilov's army (April 26— July 2).

South Urals partisan forces (July-Sept).

2894

6 7

2).

German Navy.

Arrival of British, French and

The sinking of the ships

91 8.

Consultations between the representatives of the Allies and those of the

Whites

4

©(to avoid their capture).

in

Frontier established by the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. Activities of the Imperial

was not

it

Dec 15.1917.

Defeat of the Germans near Narva and Pskov (Feb 23-March in

explosion' of the German masses in protest against the Imperial Government's policy towards Russia never materialised

'suppliers'.

Defence in

Defence positions

was heeded but this army of

up

8).

Red Guard during the revolution

violation of the armistice of

famine,

--+ The Taman Army (end of Aug-Sep 17).

affairs).

Decree which established the Red Army of workers and

'Area occupied by the Finnish

mean

will

also necessary to create the conditions in which it could accomplish its

Front held by the German, Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Forces on

Feb 18. 1918 (the beginning of foreign intervention

it

unemployment and the death of the revolution. Comrade workers, the fate of the revolution lies in your hands. Time does

Below: The progress of civil war in Russia, 1918. Right: Lenin addresses the Second AllRussian Congress of Soviets. His position was vastly strengthened when Trotsky's supposed

1

918.

Areas

in

which counter-revolutionary uprisings occurred. which Soviet Socialist Republics were proclaimed (1918

Place;

in

only).

Places

in

which counter-revolutionary governments were formed (1918).

Places where counter-revolutionary uprisings occurred (1918) only. 800 KILOMETRES

task usually in isolated rural communities

where

it

was

difficult to lay

hands on care-

hidden stores of grain. The government therefore turned to the poor peasants. The idea of grouping the rural proletariat fully

into particular organisations in order to

detach it from the bourgeois and petitbourgeois elements of the countryside had

been familiar to Lenin since well before the October Revolution. He now believed the time had come to implement it in the

thus that the countryside soon found itself prey to the horrors of a sort of civil war in which the kulaks were not alone in standing against the 'urban brigands'.

The Left Socialist Revolutionaries, who had left the government in protest against the signing of the peace treaty, judged then that the moment was propitious to stage a coup d'etat. They did not in the least intend to attack the Soviet regime itself. Their aim was to eliminate Lenin from the

broke through the enemy ring, after which their only thought was to flee precipitately in the direction of the road leading to Vladimir. They were pursued in fairly slack fashion. Only 300 of them were caught and taken prisoner.

The

failure

of

their

insurrectionary

attempt caused the Left Socialist Revolutionaries to alter their tactics. They returned to the instrument of individual terrorism which had long been Socialist

Revolutionary policy. Their combat organisation was instructed to draw up a full

programme

assassinations. It was not difficult to strike at him. He often attended meetings organised in factories. Nothing would be easier for a killer to nnngle with the crowds of workers milling round him.

Lenin's

of

political

name headed

the

list.

30, after a meeting organised by the workers of the former Mikhelson factory, just when Lenin was walking towards his motor car, a shot was fired, then a second one and then a third. Every-

Thus on August

fled, leaving Lenin collapsed on the ground. The would-be assassin, a young woman socialist, could have saved herself by mingling with the crowds had not some boys who had spotted her started pursuing her. Lenin lay wounded on the ground. He was helped up and he walked up to his

one

He had one bullet in his forearm and another one in the neck. For a fortnight he remained unable to move his neck and his right arm. But on October 22, he was able to speak at the meeting of the Soviet Central Executive Committee. On November 10, he learned of the collapse of the Prussian monarchy. The revolution was triumphing in Germany. The Russian proletariat was no longer alone in fighting against the capitalist world. It would be defeated through the joint efforts of the Russian and German proletariat. Lenin immediately decided to propose to the German people to collaborate with him car.

form of Poor People's Committees. These were created by decree on June 12, 1918. Required to support actively the government's agents in their struggle against the kulaks, the Poor People's Committees were also charged with distributing food and agricultural equipment among village inhabitants. The hopes which were placed on the Poor People's Committees were not realised. Insufficient account had been taken of the displacement of the centre of gravity that occurred within the peasantry following the enforcement of the decree of November 8, 1917, handing the land to the peasants. Henceforth a new majority was formed — that of the middle peasantry which grew considerably by incorporating a great number of poor peasants who had become smallholders. Furthermore, while the Tat kulaks' were crushed, the 'little kulaks' (because this environment too had its subdivisions) were clever enough to pass over to the category of middle peasants and adapt themselves to the new situation. The Poor People's Committees, destined to function as organs of support for the Soviet regime in the countryside, and comprised of economically unadaptable destitutes, proved to be clearly incompetent for their task. 23, 1918, absorbed

and

district

A

decree of November into the cantonal

them

committees

elected

by

all

village inhabitants.

These measures provoked fury among the Left Socialist Revolutionaries who considered themselves the authorised defenders of the peasant class. They made no between poor, middle and rich peasants. According to them, the Poor People's Committees were only inciting peasants against each other. And it was

distinction

government, to tear up the Treaty of BrestLitovsk and to resume the war against the Germans. At three o'clock in the afternoon of July 6, the German ambassador Count

Mirbach was assassinated. Immediately the vice-president of the (the secret police of the new regime) Alexandrovich, a Left Socialist Revolutionary, aided by the seaman Popov, commander of the Cheka militia, also a Left Socialist Revolutionary, arrested the head of the Cheka, Dzerzhinsky, and his assistant, the Latvian Lazys. Towards the end of the day, the outgoing Commissar for Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs, Prochian, another Left Socialist Revolutionary, at the head of a small group of afterwards,

Cheka

conspirators, seized the telegraph office and ordered that no more telegrams signed by Lenin, Trotsky or Sverdlov were to be transmitted. The country was informed that the Bolshevik government had just been overthrown and that the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party had seized power.

Popov,

who had 2,000 men, began

tions for

prepara-

an attack on the Kremlin.

The Commander men's Division

of the

Lettish

Rifle-

former colonel in the Tsarist army who had entered the service of the Soviet government) was given the mission of liquidating the rising. The district in which the insurrectionary forces were entrenched was surrounded and the building in which they were stationed was

solemnly cancelled on November 13. The Red Army entered Pskov (November 20), Narva (November 28), Dvinsk (December 6), Minsk (December 14), and the 6,000 million marks due to the Germans no longer had to be paid. At the end of 1918 the Bolsheviks had survived in power for more than a year. 1919, they hoped, would be the year of world revolution, for it seemed impossible that Soviet Russia could long survive in isolation. Meanwhile, apart from attempting to foment revolution in the West, particularly in Germany, the revolution born in Russia should be nurtured, developed and defended against its enemies, now pressing in on all sides.

(a

subjected to heavy

fire.

The

rebels tried

by firing shells in the direction of the Kremlin. Some of them fell only just short of their target and burst in the courtyard facing the windows of the office used by Lenin. This artillery duel did not last long. The 2,000 Chekists drove forward and to reply

in waging a revolutionary war against the imperialist Allies. His offer was declined by the new leaders of Germany whose only tbought was to end the war at all costs. The ignoble Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was

GERARD WALTER was

a student at the Sorbonne Faculty of Law in Paris. In 1932 he became an assistant librarian at the Bibliotheque Nationale. In 1934 he began 35 years' work researching and cataloguing all material at the Bibliotheque Nationale relating to the French

and

at the

Revolution. biographies

of

works include published His Robespierre and Lenin as well as

Communism, the Russian Revolution, the English Revolution and the Jacobins He has also edited an encyclopaedia of Marxism-Leninism. histories of

2895

*

'i

*

1

1

,m

I

Perhaps jt is too much to suppose that any revolutionary regime could have left the Tsar alive, but the arbitrary and haphazard nature of his death cast the first cloud of suspicion over the Bolsheviks' motives and methods. The killing of his family and servants with him was seen by the world at large as a piece of gratuitous brutality. Count Nikolai Tolstoy. Right: The Tsar and his daughters in captivity at Tsarskoe Selo. Guards in the background

§

"

%i

/ .:::::-

,:,*:

r ii"

*z&tf&&'"

ik

I

t '/

*A

2fc97

.

Right: The Tsar, the last reigning member of a family that had ruled Russia for 300 years. Not even the most passionate anti-monarchist would saddle this inept and sad man with sole responsibility for his subjects' wrongs. Below: Anastasia, the youngest of the Tsar's daughters. Only 17 when she was killed, rumours of her survival and escape have proliferated. Several rival Anastasias' have made claims, but none has been verified

5. 0>

At 3 pm on March 15, 1917, at Pskov, the Tsar Nicholas II abdicated the throne of Russia. Bemused and numbed by this totally unanticipated step, forced on him by the inexorable pressure of events in the capital, he paid a last sad visit to the Army Headquarters at Moghilev, and then returned to his family at Tsarskoye Selo.

He was

who would hand them over

After much thought, Kerensky decided that the Tsar, his family and entourage should be transferred to Tobolsk. This was a small town in northern Siberia, which seemed ideal in every way from the government's point of view: it was far from the centres of Bolshevism, and at the same time had no industrial proletariat of its own; this remoteness would at the same time make any attempt at a monarchist rescue difficult; and the town had a reasonable climate, together with a suitable residence in the shape of the former Governor's house. On August 14, 1917, a special train disguised under the colours of the Japanese Red Cross Mission) left Tsarskoye Selo for the east. Aboard were the Tsar, the Tsarina, and their five children: the Grand Duchesses Olga, Tatiana, Marie, Anastasia, and the heir to the throne, the 13-year-old haemophiliac Alexei. With them travelled an extensive staff, and an

a prisoner of the new Provisional itself riding a very restive

horse.

At Tsarskoye, the ex-Tsar was for.

His court

in

summary

of his captives.

Government,

respects well cared

to the

Petrograd Soviet. Events were moving on, and even the ebullient Kerensky realised that he might not be able much longer to vouch for the safety of the

justice

many

officials

and servants continued to behave as if the abdication had not occurred, and his own huge personal fortune remained at his disposal. Kerensky and the leaders of the new government felt with reason that Nicholas was quite disinclined and incapable of attempting an imperialist coup, and their only concern was that the honour

new liberal Russia should not be besmirched by some horrible crime. For the hatred of the Bolsheviks and their allies for the Tsar was no secret, and the proximity of Tsarskoye Selo to the mutinous capital at Petrograd was a serious worry to Kerensky. At first it was hoped that the Tsar's family would be allowed to live in exile of the

300 soldiers under an honest officer, Colonel Kobylinsky. After a week's journey by rail and river, the cavalcade reached Tobolsk. ill-disciplined escort of

as a guest of the Tsar's first cousin King George V; but as a result of ferocious threats uttered by the Petrograd Soviet (through which city, of course, it would

have been necessary

Ominous

port),

was tolerable enough, though the Tsar and his family were forbidden to leave the building and its immediate surroundings. But with the October Revolution and the Bolshevik takeover, the situation naturally began to change. At first, indeed, despite the ominous news, life continued much as before. Tobolsk was far

to pass to reach a together with the British government's second thoughts, this plan had to be abandoned. As the summer passed on, the precarious nature of the new government's hold on the country was reflected in the increasingly truculent attitude of the troops guarding the royal prisoners. Influenced as so

many

were by agitators from Petrograd, it became more and more clear that so far from providing sure protection for the Tsar and his family, it might very well

2898

At

Retirement and exile

from

soldiers

be these semi-Bolshevised soldiers

in Britain

.

.

signs

first life

Petrograd

months

to

and

Moscow,

and

for

come the upright and honour-

able Kobylinsky continued to command the troops on guard. Ominous signs were not wanting, how-

Left: The Tsarina. A narrowly religious woman, she was politically reactionary to a degree unusual even in Tsarist Russia. Below: The Tsarevitch, Nicholas' 13-year-old haemophiliac son. Heir to the throne, and possible centre of a royalist counter-revolution, his death is more understandable than his sisters', but his illness and his youth captured the imagination of Tsarist sympathisers everywhere, and

did

ever. In

December 1917, the

coffee

Tsarina Alexandra (herself suffering from crippling rheumatism), and their 18-yearold daughter Marie, set off with Yakovlev to Tyumen on the Trans-Siberian railway. Marie's three sisters and sick brother were left alone at Tobolsk, with no knowledge of their parents' destination.

What Yakovlev intended

became prohibited

Meanwhile (March 3, 1918) the Bolsheviks had, in order to maintain their precarious hold on the country, signed away vast areas of the former Russian Empire to the conquering Germans at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The ex-Tsar, impotent and totally unambitious as he was, object of interest

and possible

On

the one hand, the Germans would have liked to have had the former Emperor's signature subscribed to the Treaty in the hope that this might add to its rather dubious validity; and on the other, they feared lest, with the revolt of the pro-Entente Czech forces in Siberia, Nicholas might become the focus of antiGerman forces arising anew in Russia. Much of this was apparent to the Bolshevik government, who realised the risks of a German 'rescue' or capture of their illustrious prisoner at Tobolsk. It was at once determined to transfer the Imperial family to a safer locality, with the probable sequel of a state trial and execution. On April 22 a Special Representative of the Moscow Central Executive Committee arrived with a cavalry escort at Tobolsk, and announced that the Tsar was to leave with him immediately. The Representative, a mysterious character named Yakovlev, had orders to bring him to Moscow, but to leave behind Alexei on account of the latter's severe illness (he had injured himself in an accident bringing on a painful haemorrhage — the result of his terrible

use to the invader.

that destina-

remains an intriguing mystery. Even now it is impossible to know whether he was simply interpreting the orders of his superior, Sverdlov, at Moscow; or whether in fact he had planned a daring rescue, for motives unknown, of the hapless former Tsar. For, instead of travelling westwards to Moscow as ordered, he began to move in the opposite direction towards Omsk. His ostensible, and possibly genuine, reason for doing this was to avoid the rabidly Bolshevik-dominated town of Ekaterinburg in the Urals. Yakovlev had come to fear, with good reason, that the Ekaterinburg Soviet would seize the Emperor and exact its own summary vengeance on him, whatever Moscow had ordered. By travelling to the junction of Omsk, and then turning back along the Southern line through Chelyabinsk and Ufa, the party could avoid tion to be

luxuries.

became an

to foster anti-Bolshevik feeling

hereditary disability). Protests were in vain, and the Tsar,

local Social-

Revolutionary Commissar Pankratov received an order to place the Romanov family in the local gaol. (He ignored it.) Then came an order for the officers, including the ex-Tsar himself, to remove their epaulettes; and soon after that (March 1) a demand that the whole family should be put on soldiers' rations. At once faithful servants had to be discharged with nowhere to go, and for those who remained

even butter and

much

the

hostile

environs

of

Ekaterinburg.

Whatever his motives, Yakovlev's change of plan was frustrated by its discovery by the local Soviet at Omsk. Ferociously suspicious, Commissar Kossirev reluctantly allowed Yakovlev to telephone Sverdlov (Chairman of the Republic of Soviets) at Moscow. After some consideration, Sverdlov ordered Yakovlev to proceed to Ekaterinburg, whatever the dangers.

or captivity in strifetorn Russia? ...

On May 30, 1918, the special train containing the Imperial prisoners arrived at Ekaterinburg. The Tsar knew from the newspapers of the furious hatred felt for him by the local Bolsheviks, and suffered an inescapable feeling of dread. The captives were taken to the large house of a 2899

in which the Royal Family was the middle of the night, they were told that an attack by counter-revolutionary forces was expected, and told to go down to the basement for their own safety

Right:

The room

killed.

Woken

in

merchant named Ippatiev, and in this gloomy retreat were to spend the last unhappy weeks of their lives. It was surrounded by a high fence thrown up by the Bolsheviks, guards were posted in the building night and day, and machine gun posts were established on a neighbouring church and other vantage-points. Three weeks later, Alexei being well enough to travel, he and the three young Grand Duchesses arrived from Tobolsk, and the family were reunited once more. Bullying and insults Here, without the protection of the gentlemanly Kobylinsky, the Tsar and his family began to suffer the full horror of being surrounded by vindictive enemies, to whom the prisoners' helplessness merely provided a further incentive for bullying and insults. It was a terrifying experience: the Tsar was alone with his defenceless family amongst these savage gaolers. The loyal sailor, Nagorny, was shot for attempting to prevent a Red Guard from stealing a gold chain (to which were attached holy images) from the ailing Tsarevitch. Avdeyev, leader of the inner guard, would jostle the Emperor at meals and snatch food from his plate, shouting insults as he did so. All the family were prevented from taking baths, despite the heat of the summer, and the Empress and Tsarevitch's sickness. A priest was admitted to say Mass, but during the service soldiers would enter the room to jeer and shout obscenities. The four young girls were often singled out for the guards' attentions, doubtless on account of antirevolutionary crimes they might have committed. Thus, the balcony at the rear of the house was adorned with obscene drawings and verses referring to the Grand Duchesses; and the guards took a particular delight in inscribing similar pornography (relating to the Empress) on the lavatory wall, to which they would draw attention with loud laughter when accompanying (as

2900

they took care to do) any of the girls thither.

Meanwhile, however, the Red Army's courage and chivalry were to be tested by other, even sterner, duties. For the victorious advance of the Czechs and Whites towards the Urals made it clear that Ekaterinburg itself was threatened by the forces of the Counter-Revolution. Proclamations appeared in the streets announcing that the Soviets would never leave Ekaterinburg, and a number of passers-by overheard suggesting that they might do so were taken and shot. At the same time the Bolshevik leaders were hastily sending away trainloads of gold and platinum. Far more urgent, of course, was the question of what to do with the prisoners in the Ippatievsky house. The Bolshevik Central Committee in Moscow, headed by Lenin and Trotsky, ordered that the Tsar should be brought to Moscow for trial. They were not primarily concerned with their own position uis-d-uis their former ruler. Soviet policy was being dictated in large part by the German High Command. Determined to hold onto the fruits of Brest-Litovsk, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were anxious above all that the Entente should not be able to re-establish the Eastern Front. Should the Czechs succeed in liberating the Tsar, with his known enthusiasm for the Alliance, then he might prove to be a dangerous figurehead. A German advance on Petrograd and Moscow was threatened, were the Czechs to succeed in advancing towards the Volga. The Bolshevik Government was naturally for its own motives not reluctant to respond to the requirements of its German taskmasters, and alongside the official order to bring the Tsar to trial, a deputy from the Ural Soviet (in which lay Ekaterinburg) was told privately by Sverdlov that the local party might take its own measures. The fate of the Emperor

was sealed.

On July 15, the members of the Committee of the Ural Soviet met at the Hotel Amerika in Ekaterinburg. All the Romanov family and their servants were sentenced to death. What were the crimes or liabilities of the children and servants was not considered. At once measures were put into effect by the Tsar's new gaoler, a fanatical Bolshevik named Yurovsky. To aid him in his task he had a squad of Lettish and Hungarian guards, native Russians not being considered trustworthy.

A point-blank volley In the middle of the night of July 16, 1918, Yurovsky came to the Tsar's room, told him to dress himself and his family and come below to the basement. The Czechs were expected to attack before dawn, he said, and this was a safety precaution. Suspecting nothing, the Tsar obeyed, and led the way downstairs. He was obliged to carry his crippled and drowsy son, and was followed by the Empress, the four girls, and the family doctor (Botkin), valet, cook, and the Tsarina's parlourmaid. Once in the gloomy room below Yurovsky ordered three chairs to be brought. The Tsar and Tsarina took one each, whilst the Tsar supported his son on the third. The rest of the party drew up behind, and Yurovsky's killers

assembled opposite.

The dank bare room was lightened only by guttering lamps and a lantern held by one of the soldiers, which shone on the pale faces of the victims. The sole decorations were the inevitable obscene drawings and graffiti on the walls. Yurovsky stepped forward and read out the sentence of death passed on 'Nikolai Romanov the Bloody'. The Emperor started up to protect his family, when Yurovsky drew a pistol and shot him through the forehead. At once the guards raised their revolvers and fired a volley at point-blank range amongst the victims. Most of the party fell dead at once, but the maid Demidova had survived

Left: The travels of the Tsar and his family from the time of his abdication until July 16, 1918. Below: The Tsar pictured at Tsarskoye Selo after his abdication. Later Kerensky

moved

the family to Siberia for greater safety

and the soldiers seized rifles with fixed bayonets from the next room. They pursued her along the wall, stabbing at her repeatedly with their bayonets, until she too fell dead, pierced by more than 30 wounds. The dying Alexei gave a groan from the floor; a soldier kicked in his skull, and Yurovsky emptied his revolver into the small body. Suddenly the 17-year-old Anastasia screamed from amongst the heap of corpses and the whole band turned on her, stabbing and hacking until the corpse was almost unrecognisable. A pet dog had its head smashed with a rifle butt.

A

bloodlust seemed to have seized the murderers, and the whole of one end of the room was scarred with bullet holes and

bayonet-thrusts. The bodies were taken secretly to a nearby forest, seared with sulphuric acid, burned, and thrown down a mineshaft. It was long before the Bolsheviks admitted to the outside world what had occurred. But it was naturally difficult to restrain their pride and gratitude at the accomplishment of the Ural Soviet. Yurovsky was awarded the Inspectorship of Life Insurance for Ekaterinburg Province, a pension and a large house within view of the Ippatievsky house. An open space in the town was renamed 'Square of the National Vengeance', and in due course the name of Ekaterinburg itself was changed to Sverdlovsk, in grateful memory of the Minister Jacob Sverdlov, who had arranged the whole delicate affair. Further Reading Alexandrov, V., The

End of

the

Romanovs

(London 1966) P. M., The Last Days of Tsardom (London 1934) Kerensky, A. and Bulygin, P., The Murder of the Romanovs (London 1935) Wilson. R., The Last Days of the Romanovs (London 1920)

Bykov,

$ [For Count Tolstoy's biography, see page & 2144.)

2901

I

1

When America went to war she did so with her customary thoroughness, drive and initiative. In under a year

America made an effort of organisation superior to

anything her allies had done in four years. But not without loss. Charles E. Neu. Left:

The 'Hun Hate'

crosses

the Atlantic The American people and government were largely unprepared for the nation's entry into the First World War. Numbed by the complex crises of the period of neutrality,

millions were bewildered by the suddenness of war and possessed little understanding of the nature of the struggle. They gave the declaration of war a mixed reception. In areas dominated by GermanAmericans or Irish-Americans or Scandinavians, President Wilson's war message encountered indifference or sullen hostility. Socialists and radical labour groups were outspokenly opposed. Most Americans passively accepted the government's decision but assumed that the Allies were winning and that the American contribution to the Allied cause would consist of naval support, credit and materials. So, too, did the government. Prewar preparedness had been so modest that in April 1917 the United States could not claim a single

organised division. Neither the people nor government realised the scale on which aid would have to be given; nor did they contemplate the dispatch of large numbers of troops. According to one report, when Thomas S. Martin of the Senate Finance Committee asked why the army needed three billion dollars, he was told: 'We might have to send an army to France, and in that case we should want it ready.' 'Good Lord!' the Senator replied. 'You aren't going to send soldiers over there, their

are you?' But the Allies had lost most of a generation during 32 months of fighting and desperately needed both men and money. Once informed of these needs, the Ameri-

can government began to plan for a massive effort, including a huge expeditionary force. The President, however, faced a formidable challenge in mobilising the vast resources of the nation. Wilson acted with characteristic boldness. He assumed that most of the troops sent to Europe would be draftees and quickly secured congressional legislation author-

ising conscription. There were no encouraging historical precedents for such action. The draft had been used once before in American history, during the Civil War, and then it had been introduced in the middle of the war as an emergency measure and had led to large-scale draft riots. And only during the Philippine campaign of the

Spanish-American

War had American

soldiers served outside the

Western Hemi-

sphere, and these were all volunteers. But the American people seemed willing to follow where the President led. On

June

5, 1917 every American male between the ages of 21 and 30 registered for the draft. The government transformed the event into a patriotic festival, with local political and civic leaders urging young men to respond to the nation's needs. In fact, as the American people moved from watchful waiting to willing participation, a mood of optimism and simple sentimentality spread across the land. The horrors of war seemed far away and, even to many draftees, the war seemed a grand, patriotic adventure. There was much singing as the great citizens' army poured into hastily constructed training camps. The songs reveal the mixture of sadness and lightheartedness with which the American people prepared for war. Of all these songs, the two most popular were 'Over There' and 'The Long, Long Trail'. The latter, with its gentle melancholy and suggestion of distant adventure, was a song which particularly appealed to soldiers about to cross the Atlantic: There's a long, long trail a' winding Into the land of my dreams, Where the nightingales are singing And a white moon beams; There's a long, long night of waiting Until my dreams all come true; Till the day when I'll be going down That long, long trail with you. 'Over There' was a more stirring, martial song: Over there, over there, Send the word, send the word over there, That the Yanks are coming, the Yanks are coming, the drums rum-tumming everywhere. So prepare, say a pray'r. Send the word, send the word to beware, We'll be over, we're coming over, and we won't come back till it's over over there. The government was determined, of course, to shape public opinion. Wilson realised the need to arouse the emotions of the American people and, starting with draft registration, the government employed organised propaganda to achieve this objective. It was used often during

the war — to sell Liberty Bonds, to compel business to accept the regulations of the War Industries Board or to convince the people to conserve vital food supplies. The genius of these efforts was George Creel, a progressive Denver journalist who became the chairman of the powerful Committee on Public Information. Controversial and militant, Creel sought to make the American people war conscious. He saw the Committee on Public Information as 'a plain publicity proposition, a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world's greatest adventure in advertising'. He created a far-flung organisation with local branches throughout the nation, one which drew upon the energies of thousands of Americans. Prominent university professors, famous illustrators and many others eagerly joined Creel's staff. As a result, CPI's programme was highly innovative, using films, posters and pamphlets to reach the American people. Perhaps its most ingenious creation was the 'Four Minute Men'. Eventually numbering 75,000, these amateur orators were, in Creel's words, 'carrying the flaming arrow into every corner of America'. They came to speak at almost every place where Ameri-

cans gathered for a communal purpose and were a nightly feature in virtually every American movie house. They advocated whatever happened to be the current drive — there were 36 throughout the war — and helped to saturate America with government propaganda.

'Clean plate' gospel Herbert Hoover became almost as important as George Creel in bringing the war to the American people. Hoover emerged from a humble background, trained as an engineer at Stanford University and in the years before the war acquired a fortune as an international mining engineer. He was a millionaire before he was 40. Hoover had lived a large part of his mature life on ocean liners and was associated with a score of business concerns on four continents. At the start of the war he was an obscure man, unknown to the public of any nation, living quietly in London. But he took on the job of aiding thousands of American tourists who were stranded in London, and performed so efficiently that he received the chairmanship of the Commission for Relief in Belgium. For four years Hoover struggled against the obstructions of the Germans and Allies to feed ten million people. He did so with such astonishing success that in 1917 Wilson named Hoover as head of the Food Administration, with powers to deal with

severe shortages in wheat, hogs and sugar. Only through a combination of exhortation and controls could he find enough food to carry the Allies through the winter of 1917/18. One important task, then, was to convince the American people to lower their consumption of critical foods.

The

Food Administration appealed to American pride and patriotism and gathered a corps volunteers who toured the country urging people to cut down on meat and bread consumption, to eat more corn and spinach and to observe 'the gospel of the of

clean plate'. Hoover popularised the term 'food conservation'. He urged mothers to serve no more than was necessary, girls to plant 'war gardens' and boys to work in the fields. His slogan 'Food Will Win the War.' was everywhere; eventually Hoover ordered wheatless Mondays and Wednesdays, meatless Tuesdays "and porkless Thursdays and Saturdays. Though forced to move away from purely voluntary efforts at control, his drive was a great success. Most Americans conscientiously and enthusiastically obeyed restrictions on the use of food and, in the process, Hoover became, next to Wilson, the most authentic hero to emerge on the American side during the war. His name became a household word. The efforts of Creel, Hoover and others soon brought a high level of popular involvement in the American war effort. Americans joined and supported private organisations such as the Red Cross and YMCA; Girl Scouts placed baskets on street

2904

corners to collect peach stones which, when reduced to charcoal powder, filtered the poison out of gas; and Americans joined in the search for draft dodgers or 'slackers' and even formed private organisations to aid federal officials. In the summer of 1918 federal agents and private citizens indiscriminately rounded up slackers, seizing suspects and detaining them until their local draft boards could verify their registration. The public watched with fascination while federal officials searched for Grover Cleveland Bergdoll, a wealthy playboy who became the most notorious draft evader. Bergdoll's capture and subsequent escape from an army prison caused public furore. As the nation rose up with purpose and zeal, most Americans responded to the slogan of 'doing your bit' and purchased War Savings Stamps and Liberty Bonds. Early in the war the American government decided to sell bonds through popular subscription rather than through bankers. The Treasury staged four Liberty Loan campaigns and one Victory Loan drive, all of which were oversubscribed. The government raised $23 billion through these drives — this from a population with an average total annual income of less

than $70 billion. Each campaign brought forth a massive propaganda effort. Thousands of Americans spoke before audiences at movies or street corners and volunteered to canvass their neighbourhoods. Posters were used with great effect. One bore the imprint of a bloody hand and the slogan:

'The Hun, His Mark. Blot it out with Liberty Bonds.' Another contained a pair of blood-stained boots and the words: 'Keep these off the United States.' Automobiles and street cars carried long strips of cloth bearing such inscriptions as: 'What do you think of the U-Boats?'; 'My boy, I backed you'; or 'Bonds buy Bullets'. Wilson wanted the American people to wage war with passion. 'Woe be to the man,' he warned, 'that seeks to stand in our way in this day of high resolution when every principle we hold dearest is to be vindicated and made secure.' Neither the President nor most other Americans were willing to tolerate those who attempted to obstruct the war effort or who, in one way or another, gave aid and comfort to the enemy. Congress passed espionage, sabotage and sedition acts that outlawed, among other things, 'disloyal, profane, scurrilous or abusive' language against the government. The Wilson administration did not hesitate to use this legislation and gradually extended its authority over thought

and utterance. The Postmaster General instituted a capricious censorship which banned many left-wing periodicals from the mails.

One

was kept contained an article criticising Samuel Gompers, the head of the American Federation of Labour, for co-operating with the administration's labour policies. Prominent radical spokesmen such as 'Big Bill' Haywood of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and Eugene V. Debs of the Socialist Party were issue of the Nation

from the mails because

it

sent to prison. To suppress radical labour unrest in several western states, the administration first used federal troops and later intensive federal prosecutions of I organisers and leaders.

WW

Patriotic excesses the excesses of the federal government, they were mild in comparison with those of many Americans. The war seemed a psychic release, an outlet for the people's crusading zeal. It allowed them to suppress troubling doubts about the nation's cohesiveness and provided an opportunity to reunite the nation and to

Whatever

reassert

traditional

American

values.

Theodore Roosevelt asserted that 'He who is not with us, absolutely and without reserve of any kind, is against us, and should be treated as an alien enemy,' while President Nicholas Murray Butler of

Columbia

University,

referring

to

Senator Robert La Follette of Wisconsin, told the American Bankers Association that 'you might just as well put poison in the food of every American boy that goes to his transport as to permit that man to talk as he does.' Americans disliked criticism of the war effort or a lack of Left:

A 'Slacker

Raid' in

New

York.

Men

without registration cards are rounded up. In America patriotism took even more extreme forms than it had in France and Britain. Below: Veterans of the Civil War, the only previous incident of conscription in America,

demonstrate

their solidarity with

One wonders about

the South

Uncle Sam.

patriotic behaviour. It became a wartime ritual to stand and look reverent whenever

the Star-Spangled Banner was played. Vigilantes invaded farmhouses to force farmers to buy their quota of bonds. If a farmer refused, they nailed a yellow placard to his house or splashed his home with yellow paint, or threatened violence. Men suspected of disloyalty were forced to kneel and to kiss the flag. In Butte, Montana, a crowd lynched an organiser, and in Bisbee, Arizona, citizens rounded up more than 1,000 IWW-led strikers, herded them into cattle cars and dumped them into the New Mexico desert without food or water. The enemy within took many forms, and some Americans became obsessed with the

IWW

danger from enemy spies. The Committee on Public Information encouraged these fears and asked for volunteers to collect gossip about alleged disloyalty and pass it along to the Department of Justice. One CPI advertisement on 'Spies and Lies' warned Americans that German agents were everywhere. 'Report the man,' it urged, 'who spreads pessimistic stories, divulges — or seeks — confidential military information, cries for peace, or belittles our efforts to win the war.' Americans worried about the sabotage of defence plants or the paralysis of New York City by enemy agents. Others worried about German submarines off the East Coast or spread rumours about uprisings in German-American centres such as Milwaukee, St Louis or Cincinnati. A minor epidemic

of diarrhoea proved to some that German spies had put germs in local water supplies,

and one Red Cross

official

warned

that spies had infiltrated the Red Cross to put ground glass in bandages. Once aroused, the people developed unreasoning fears which far exceeded those of their leaders.

Americans were particularly hostile to anything connected with Germany. They flocked to see a movie entitled 'The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin'. The famous evangelist Billy Sunday opened a prayer before the House of Representatives with these words (referring to Germany): 'Thou knowest, O Lord, that no nation so infamous, vile, greedy, sensuous, bloodthirsty ever disgraced the pages of history.' A nation-wide drive developed against everything German. School boards removed the German language from courses of study; public libraries withdrew German books from circulation; hotels, restaurants and insurance companies dropped German names; and governing bodies in many cities and towns adopted resolutions which drove German and pro-German publications from their news-stands. Some objected to the publication of newspapers, magazines or books in the German language, and the use of German in public aroused suspicion. In East Orange, New Jersey, the mayor refused to permit the violinist Fritz Kreisler, formerly a lieutenant in the Austrian navy, to give a concert; and in

Montana, Minnesota and Wisconsin

pri-

vate vigilante groups conducted a virtual

2905

:

•

I

'• • •

•

•

•

:

• •

«

'Ik

....

i » m

» •

"*

.

' t **

:::-:

*7*#?

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.

Chaplin and Douglas Fairbanks of Liberty Bonds, a gag' typical of the many produced by the imaginative Committee on Public Information Left: Charlie

promote the sales

German- Americans. Sauerkraut became 'liberty cabbage'. Americans were deeply affected by the new forms of organisation required for the mobilisation of their economy. As part of the preparedness legislation of 1916 Congress had established a Council of National defence, composed of six Cabinet members, along with an Advisory Commission made up of business and labour leaders. The Council and its Advisory Commission took an inventory of the nation's industrial plant and began to contemplate its conversion to a wartime footing. But it was reign of terror against

only after American entry into the war in April 1917 that the government began to grapple seriously with the problems of industrial mobilisation. It was moving, of course, into uncharted waters and through-

out 1917 the government's efforts were often inadequate and the performance of the economy uneven. Gradually the emphasis shifted from voluntarism to compulsion and a series of powerful federal boards emerged to regulate in unprecedented ways nearly every facet of the

American economy. The most important of these, the War Industries Board (WIB), appeared in the midsummer of 1917 to serve as a clearing house for government purchases, to allocate raw materials and control production and to supervise labour relations. Other boards followed — the Food Administration, the Fuel Administration, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the United States Shipping Board, the United States Railroad Administration and the War Labour Board. By late 1917 these emergency agencies had made much progress, but serious deficiencies remained, particularly because of the inability of the WIB to co-ordinate military purchases and impose priorities upon industry. In fact, by early 1918, it seemed to many that the war effort was collapsing. A severe winter and heavy snows brought a serious fuel shortage to the east, while railway transportation approached a breakdown. A congressional investigation into the mobilisation effort revealed, among other things, confusion in the War Department and a failure to provide soldiers in cantonments with adequate shelter and clothing. These exposures shocked the nation and led congressional Republicans to demand the creation of a war cabinet which would take control of the war effort out of the President's hands.

'Our minds have met' The crisis was never so seemed on the surface.

E

~

m I

m

serious as it Nevertheless, Wilson realised the need for bold, decisive action and quickly received from the Congress virtually unlimited power over the nation's resources. He vastly expanded the control of the WIB, giving it authority to conserve resources, advise purchasing agencies as to prices, make purchases for the Allies and determine priorities of production and distribution in industry. Wilson then chose as the new chairman of the WIB Bernard M. Baruch, a Wall Street broker who had impressed the President with his grasp of economic affairs. Baruch's choice surprised many. He was, after all, not a conventional businessn.an but a

speculator who had amassed huge sums betting on the rise and fall of stocks. Wil-

son and Baruch had met in 1912 and during the 1916 presidential campaign had formed a close friendship. Baruch idealised the President. Next to his father, he recalled, Wilson had the greatest influence on his life, and he believed that Wilson 'was one of the great war leaders of all time'. Wilson referred to Baruch as 'Dr Facts' and gave

him unwavering went

support.

Once Baruch

to the President to explain a course

had taken. Wilson stopped him and said: 'You don't have to explain. Our minds have met and I have the utmost confidence in your judgment.' Given this Presidential trust, Baruch possessed immense power over the economy. He was, by all accounts, well equipped to use it. Baruch possessed a computerlike mind and a detailed knowledge of the sources of strategic raw materials and the prevailing price structure; he knew the men who were in key industrial positions; and he had a master plan, a vision of of action he

voluntary co-operation within industry put the nation's needs above profits. He was, moreover, a facile and persuasive talker who radiated dedication and ability. Baruch rapidly assembled a large staff of

to

financiers and businessmen and created some 60 sections to control various industries. Because Baruch and his advisers understood American industry and shared the values of the men with

successful

whom

they dealt, they could generally rely upon the power of persuasion. Only rarely did Baruch encounter industrial

magnates who attempted to resist the priorities set by the WIB. The United States Steel Corporation was one such firm, insisting that it would only fix prices on purchases by the American government but not on those by other industries or Allies. In a dramatic confrontation with the corporation's leaders, Baruch threatened confiscation and won his point. He also had to threaten force to convince automobile manufacturers to curtail pas-

the

senger-car

production.

Baruch

let

them

he telephoned the railroad administrator and suspended train services to their plants. Next he called the Secretary of War and asked that the Army seize the car companies' stockpiles of steel. After his third call, the General Motors man stopped him and said, 'I quit.' The others listen as

followed suit.

The

war-making potential

of Ameripeak just as the war drew to a close. By then the WIB and other emergency agencies had broken through most bottlenecks. The Food Administration had successfully manipulated full

can industry reached

its

prices to stimulate the production of essenfoodstuffs; the Fuel Administration had rationed coal and electricity; and tial

government management had done wonders for the nation's railroads. The WIB had mobilised more than 350 industries, from asbestos through caskets to lumber and zinc. No steel, copper, cement, rubber other basic material could be used without its approval. In September 1918 it brought non-war construction under its supervision, which meant that no building costing more than $2,500 could be started without its consent. Moreover, by the autumn of 1918 the WIB was moving toward the control of a whole range of consumer goods. Its conservation division had already induced many manufacturers to or

2907

from 376 to 76; buggy wheels 2 to four; and the colours of shoes Steel even disappeared from ee. corsets. If the war had continued the con-

feared that the war would destroy previous reforms and result in the abridgement of civil liberties. Despite this initial scepticism, many were soon caught up in the feverish activity and enthusiasm of the

servation division intended to reduce clothing styles to a few simple patterns.

others joined

e

variety of their products. Plough

all

Prodigious industrial might Inevitably there were failures in such a massive, hurried industrial mobilisation. American industry never produced many ships, aeroplanes, or tanks or artillery pieces. In retrospect, however, it is the successes which stand in relief. The American output of most military supplies was prodigious; never before had the world witnessed such a display of industrial might. Nor had the American people ever experienced such extensive central control over their economy. Few complained at the time, and those reformers who had advocated a rationally planned economy found the war an exciting adventure; they hoped the wartime planning apparatus

would become permanent. 'Laissez-faire is dead,' one of them wrote. 'Long live social control: social control, not only to enable us to meet the rigorous demands of the war, but also as a foundation for the peace and brotherhood that is to come.' One of the most surprising results of the war was its impact upon social justice reformers. Most had opposed the preparedness movement and American entry into the war; once that decision was made, however, they went along with it. But they

2908

war

effort.

Some went

to

Washington,

YMCA

the Red Cross or and went to France. Edward T. Devine, the General Secretary of the New York

Organisation Society, wrote in of 1917 that 'Enthusiasm for social service is epidemic. A luxuriant crop of new agencies is springing up. We scurry back and forth to the national capital; we stock offices with typewriters and new letterheads; we telephone feverishly, regardless of expense, and resort to all the devices of efficient "publicity work". It all very exhilarating, stimulating, is Charity

the

summer

intoxicating.'

Unexpectedly, the war began to seem a climax of the prewar social reform movement as it brought promising changes on the home front. The Wilson administration, for example, realised the need to win the co-operation of organised labour. It was determined to organise efficiently the nation's labour force without depriving labour of rights or living standards previously won. In turn, the American Federation of Labour was convinced that workers must co-operate actively with federal agencies. The result was a process of accommodation which dealt with labour issues through mediation, conciliation and concession. Generally, the government threw its war powers on the side of labour

and, as a consequence, brought about impressive social gains. All the various administrative boards recognised and protected the right of workers to organise and bargain collectively; compelled the adoption of the eight hour day when they could do so without disrupting industrial operations; and sought to improve the conditions of labour and to prevent the exploitation of women and children. Despite substantial wartime inflation, the average annual real income of labourers was 20% above the prewar level in 1918, and the membership of the AFL increased from

2,000,000 in 1916 to more than 3,000,000 in 1920.

War

boosts reform Other federal policies also encouraged reformers. About one-third of the cost of the war was raised by new taxes, and the federal revenue bills of, 1917 and 1918 were both clearly progressive. The government used corporation taxes, a graduated war-profits levy and increased excises, as well as a personal income tax with rates of 4% at the bottom and 67% at the top. Because of federal tax policy and indirect price controls imposed by the WIB, it was Right: Even children were targets of the

propaganda machine of America's war effort. Below left: Bedecked with the flags of the Allied nations, Perth welcomes American troops. Below right: A sombre note is struck by members of the American 1st Division parading in America just after the war

Save Sugar, Children! Good bye fell

not a war in which the wealthy made large gains in real income. The war crisis stimulated much federal innovation. Federal agencies built or controlled dozens of housing projects and introduced imaginative design concepts borrowed from the English Garden City

The war brought federal insurance for servicemen and re-

Movement.

after the

social

newed

efforts for improved public health. even accelerated the woman suffrage movement, for women moved into hundreds of occupations formerly closed to them. Out of necessity they achieved a measure of equal rights. Most important, perhaps, was the extent to which progressive reformers took over army trainirg camps. The Commission on Training Camp ActiviIt

techniques of social work and community organisation to the problems of entertaining and protecting the American serviceman. It organised community singing and baseball, post exchanges and theatres and even provided ties applied the

university extension courses. It reached out into the communities near the military bases and in effect tried to create a massive settlement house around each army camp.

The

on Training Camp continued the prewar

Commission

Activities

also

crusades against alcohol and prostitution. Progressives believed that these reforms

would purify men and

A Penny liere

means a Bun "Over there*

A

set free vast, suppressed human potentialities. Their attitudes were written into the Military Draft Act, which prohibited the sale of liquor to men in uniform and gave the President

DIVISION »U"

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2909

"

A unique national

mood.' Uniquely nasty

the power to establish zones around all military camps where prostitution and alcohol would be outlawed. Reformers launched a major crusade to wipe out sin in the service; 'Fit to Fight' became their motto. As one progressive remarked, army training camps 'are national universities — training schools to which the flower of American youth is being sent'. 'When the boys go to France,' Secretary of War Newton Baker stated, 'I want them to have invisible armour to take with them.'

Progressives assumed that American serwould be improved by their experiences and that they would return home to help construct a better society. They assumed, too, that all the federal experiments in social action during the war years would lead to even greater accomplishments during the period of reconstruction. Some who had glimpsed the real horrors of the war or contemplated the hysteria against radicals, aliens and pacifists tempered their optimism. But most

vicemen

-.

GOOD BYE -WE RE

Top: Bernard M. Baruch, called Dr Facts' by President Wilson, was made chairman of the War Industries Board. In this position he enjoyed the President's trust, and wide powers over the economy. Above: Herbert Hoover, chairman of the Food Administration Board. Right: Send off day for the New York National Guard. Posters like these were part of a 'unique national mood' that included purity' campaigns, and extraordinary scenes of hysteria against aliens, radicals, pacifists, anyone in fact who seemed to be out of step with the war effort. Despite the speedy growth of war fervour, however, it took longer for industry to adapt itself to the new requirements, particularly the heavy ones

2910

I

looked confidently into the future and believed that the war had brought to a climax the crusade for social reform. The war nourished, then, extreme hopes and fears and brought them together in curious combinations. It created a unique popular mood as well as a series of unique governmental responses to unprecedented problems. Men at. the time did not perceive how transitory all of this was, and the promise of the war years soon seemed a cruel mockery as Americans confronted

the psychological and economic agonies of demobilisation. Further Reading Baruch, Bernard M., Baruch: The Public Years (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960) Clarkson, Grosvenor B., Industrial America in the World War (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1923) Johnson, Donald O., The Challenge to American Freedoms: World War I and the Rise of the American Civil Liberties Union (Lexington, Kentucky, University of Kentucky Press, 1963) Link, Arthur S., Ed., The Impact of World War I

(New York, Harper and Row, 1969) R., Words that Won the War

Mock, James

(Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1939) Paxson, Frederic L, America at War, 1917-1918 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1939) Preston, William, Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903-1933 (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963)

[For Charles Neu's biography, 1227.

see

page

1

2911

American Negro in r£H3 alts

the

First

World War

As the war checked the flow of European migrants, and simultaneously stimulated American

industry, a labour shortage developed in the cities of the North. Into this gap stepped the American Negroes, to whom the North, and Chicago in particular, became a sort of promised land of high wages and better social conditions. But the promised land was full of disappointments, and bitter-

ness and discrimination were to follow the Negroes north.

Thomas Reiser.

Left:

Marcus

Garvey, Negro extremist. Right: Negro units were segregated

2912

so remote an event as of Archduke Franz so profound an effect upon Negro. It contributed largely to one of the greatest migrations in the history of black people. From 200,000 to 350,000 Southern Negroes (some historians say 500,000) left the American South for the American North between 1915 and 1918, and the primary motive for the migration was economic. When the war checked the flow of European immigration, Northern industry turned to the South for labour. The number of foreign immigrants in 1914 was 1,218,480 and in 1918 just over 110,000. The numbers had to be made up, even more so after Americans went off to war. It was not only the chance of a decent wage that drove the Negro northward. The prospect of making $3 a day in Chicago instead of 75 cents in Mississippi was an inducement to migrate, but so were the lynchings, beatings, and injustices of the South. About 90% of American black people still lived in the South in 1920, but the great migration had begun. The North's need for labour spread throughout the old Confederate states by various means. The two social centres of Southern Negroes, the barber's shop and grocery store, passed the word. Letters from the first black pilgrims to the North were read here and the latest news of the exodus was first given out. Northern labour agents infiltrated the South and were in

forced to recruit furtively when Southern whites, seeing the effects of a diminished labour supply, reacted. An agent would walk through a group of Negroes without turning his head and say quietly, 'Anybody want to go to Chicago, see me.' Letters from the North were read in churches, and congregations broke into applause at the encouraging news. Southern police arrested a Methodist minister, who was later jailed, because he was said to have urged 50 of his flock to migrate to New

York. Mail was the most effective agency of recruitment. Letters told of job promotion, unsegregated schools, suffrage and dignity. One man concluded his letter to a friend: 'there

isn't

any "yes,

sir,

and

no, sir".

yes and no, and no, Sam, and Bill.' The Negro weekly newspaper, the Chicago Defender, was another persuasive recruiter. Copies distributed in the South sold out rapidly and were passed around until worn out. The Defender urged the Negroes northward and gave the migration its name — 'The Great Northern Drive'. It popularised the date of the first great 'Drive', May 15, 1917, and received letters from Southern Negroes asking confirmation of the day. A lady wrote: 'I am getting ready and, oh, so many others also, and we want to know is that true so we can be in the drive. So please answer at once. We are getting ready.' Another important date for a 'Drive' was August 15, 1917. 'Drive' days were usually set for Wednesday and Saturday nights, following pay days. The Chicago Defender was so popular that its circulation increased from 50,000 at the beginning of the movement to 125,000 in 1918. Old men in Laurel, Mississippi, who could not read bought the Defender because it was regarded as It's all

'

precious.

Chicago became the symbol of the North, 'Promised Land'. Chicago, or 'Chi'

the

2914

as it came to be called, was the only topic of discussion in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. 'The packing houses of Chicago for a while seemed to be everything,' said one Negro. 'You could not rest in your bed at night for Chicago.' Negroes asked about the weather in 'Chi' and were told that it was the same as in Hattiesburg. The Chicago Defender, however, attempted to correct the impression: 'To die from the bite of a frost is far more glorious than at the hands of a mob. I beg you, my brother, to leave the be-

nighted land.'

Negroes from Florida left for Pennsylvania as free passengers aboard the Pennsylvania and Erie Railroad in the summer of 1916. Connecticut attracted tobacco labourers and Massachusetts unskilled industrial workers from Florida and Georgia. Counties in Alabama lost a third of their working force. Mississippi Negroes flocked to Chicago, St Louis and Detroit. The Chicago Defender was held responsible for the virtual depopulation of Hattiesburg and Laurel, Mississippi. Texas, Louisiana and Arkansas lost great concentrations of Negroes to the Midwest. Southern whites reacted to the loss of part of their labour force with detention and intimidation or, failing that, with raising wages and granting fairer trials. The mayor of New Orleans asked the president of the Illinois Central Railway to stop carrying Negroes to the North. Other whites warned Negroes of terrible and strange diseases in the North. When these measures failed to check the 'Drive', wages were raised in some areas as much as 100% and a Negro received $800 in damages after filing suit against a railroad whose faulty schedule the court held responsible for the man missing his train. Once in the North 90% of the migrants who found jobs worked as unskilled labour: mould-setters, carpenters, bricklayers and cement workers. Many women worked as domestic servants at $2.50 a day — their weekly wage in the South. At least 10,000 Negroes got jobs in St Louis, and about 80% of the employees of the brickyards were black. Just across the Mississippi River in East St Louis, Illinois, 11,000 migrants settled, and in 1917 the Aluminum Ore Company in that city employed 1,900 persons, 500 of whom were black.

One thousand Negroes moved ford, Illinois in

into Rock1916 and 1917. They met

discrimination as blacks did in other cities; a restaurant displayed a sign: 'We do not cater to coloured trade.' But the Rockford Malleable Iron Company, which had never hired more than six Negroes, had 100 on its payroll in 1918 and, to relieve the congestion caused by the sudden influx, conducted two houses for the accommodation of its employees. The

company promoted Negroes and used them in every department of the shop. The mayor of Rockford fought a brave battle against bigotry, ordering the restaurant to take down its sign. If most towns and cities in the North had been like Rockford, the riots which were coming would not have occurred. Waukegan, Illinois, 30 miles from Chicago, managed its affairs well. The Wilder Tanning Company gave Negroes semiskilled work and paid them about $3 a day. Theatres began to discriminate but were stopped. Few restaurants refused to serve Negroes. The fact that there were

only 400 Negroes among a population of 22,000 no doubt kept the city fairly calm.

Between 1916 and 1918 Chicago collected 50,000 migrants, 10,000 of whom found skilled jobs. The Illinois Central Railway brought in hundreds free and paid some $125 a month to work for the railroad. The stockyards were a great draw; the Wilson Packing Company paid $3 a day. Negroes in 'Chi' from particular states organised clubs to look after their own state's migrants—the Alabama Club, Georgia Club, Club and so on. They met newcomers at the station and found homes and work for them. Various housing agenMississippi

formed

help the migrants find segregated South Side. Congestion mounted, and some landlords increased Negroes' rent from 5% to 50%. The 'Promised Land' was not as promising as advertised, but there was more freedom and opportunity than there had been in the South. Problems of congestion were developing in other large cities. In one Negro district in Cincinnati 54% of the houses were without bathrooms and 85% were fire traps. In Pittsburgh attics, cellars, sheds and warehouses served as migrant homes, and beds were made to do double duty, night shift workers using them during the day and day shift workers using them during the night. Philadelphia received thousands of migrants who were resented not only by whites but also by established and respected blacks whose status in the city was jeopardised by the misbehaviour of the newcomers whose criminal activity gradually led whites to impose segregation and discrimination in a city once proud of its race relations. cies

lodgings

in

to

the

Segregation then violence It was almost a rule that where there was congestion there was tension. And when Negroes tried to move out of their areas, tension erupted into violence as in the Kenwood and Hyde Park areas of Chicago. Real estate firms and white property owners organised to keep their neighbourhoods white. Whites bombed Negro homes and the property of owners who sold or rented homes to Negroes. It was this state of society to which Negro war veterans returned in 1919. Negroes in the United States Army in the First World War numbered 380,000. Two hundred thousand were sent to France, but only 42,000 were combat troops and they had to fight for the right to be repre-

segregated

sented at all among line troops. Among other prejudices which militated against them were rumours and doubts about their courage and fighting ability. Only 1,400 Negroes were commissioned in the army, and it took some time before the American military could be induced to make provisions for giving officers' training to black

men.

When America

first

entered the war,

Congress began to deal with the Negro as a soldier. Representative Frank Park of Georgia introduced a bill to make it unlawful to appoint Negroes as either noncommissioned or commissioned officers. This was in spite of the fact that American Negroes had served in both capacities in previous wars. In any case, the bill died in committee. But the black soldier's troubles were not over. The question then arose as to whether or not there should be separate camps for

Above: As Negroes drifted north to find work, racial tension spread, but lynching remained a Southern practice. Here a man is burnt by a St Louis lynch mob. Left: Units in the army were strictly segregated, and many impediments were put in the way of Negro promotion. The navy was more liberal. It would be difficult to segregate a ship's company

The debate was as furious Congress as inside. Reluctantly concluding that separate camps were better than no camps at all, the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) approved of the scheme, Negro

officers.

outside

and Negro college students acquiesced in the acceptance of the lesser of two evils. W. E. B. Du Bois, leader of the NAACP, urged Negroes to 'close ranks shoulder to shoulder with our white fellow-citizens. We make no ordinary sacrifice, but we make it gladly and willingly with our eyes lifted to the hills.' Negro officer candidates were trained for four months instead of the three required for whites. Negroes would need more time it was believed, and even then it said that they learned less. Therefore they could not serve as artillery officers due to an inability to master mathematics

to learn,

was

with sufficient rapidity. Having borne this military decision, Negroes then learned that blacks who had been commissioned as artillery officers before the war were no

2915

nee an oversight had and they were transdifferent units, on was as rigidly enforced in

army

as in Chicago and Philadelphia. But Northern Negro soldiers stationed in Southern cities such as Newport News, Virginia, and Spartanburg, South Carolina, refused to accept it. They were trans-

the

ferred overseas.

There were numerous clashes between Negroes and whites in service. In Houston, Texas, in 1917, a serious riot broke out which ended in the execution of 13 Negro soldiers. In Spartanburg a Negro soldier was beaten up while buying a newspaper in a hotel. The next night a group of white soldiers were stopped by a white officer from going to town to 'shoot it up'. Other white officers at different times during the war inflicted bodily punishment on Negro soldiers,

and when selecting blacks

promotion to non-commissioned they often promoted illiterate fellows' instead of

men

for

officers

'funny

of greater ability.

Harlem's Negro National Guard unit, the 'Fighting Fifteenth', fought in France as part of a division of Gouraud's French Fourth Army, and 367 men of 15th were buried there. The entire unit received the Croix de Guerre. The First Separate Battalion of Washington, DC also served in France; 25 of its 480 men were awarded the Croix de Guerre. When the soldiers came home in 1919 the riots began. One of them had begun before in Illinois in East St Louis on July 2, 1917. It was a sign of things to come. In May a black bank robber shot and wounded a white man. Rioting followed and six more people were shot, but none fatally. In June an old Negro man on a streetcar refused to give up his seat for a white woman, and a mob of whites beat him unconscious. On July 2 the town exploded. The savagery was remarkable. After Negroes were beaten and lay in the street, mob leaders came along and calmly shot and killed them. The mob set Negro homes aflame, beat a Negro woman and a small boy and then threw the latter into a burning shack. White prostitutes joined in, grabbed the hair and clothing of Negresses and beat their faces and breasts with fists, stones and sticks. Negroes were shot

running from their burning homes 'as one shoots running or cowering rabbits'. When it was over, nine whites were dead and about 39 Negroes. From 1910 to 1917 the East St Louis black community had grown from nearly 6,000 to perhaps as many as 13,000. The consequences of congestion and prejudice were taken to the extreme.

The Garvey Movement of 1918 was another sign of things to come and of Negro hatred of the white. Marcus Garvey, a West Indian full-blooded Negro, organised the first mass movement of Negroes. He renounced all hope of assistance or understanding from American whites and said that Americans might fight to save the world for democracy and to protect the rights of oppressed minorities in Europe, but they would continue to oppress their

own

minorities and particularly the in the South. They might condemn the 'scrap of paper' while at the same time they ignored their own Constitution. Garvey believed that racial prejudice was so ingrained in American society that it was futile to appeal to

Negroes

2916

Americans' sense of justice, and he urged Negroes to assert themselves against the whites.

Garvey denounced practically the whole Negro leadership, and succeeded in alienating almost all Negro intellectuals. Most Negro leaders in schools, churches, organisations and press mobilised against him. 'He heartily responded by naming them opportunists, liars, thieves, traitors and bastards.'

'Black

is

beautiful'

appealed to common Negroes, especially the darker ones. He exalted everything black. Black was beautiful. God and Jesus were black. The only hope for black Americans was to return to black Africa and build up a country of their own. An army would be needed, and so Garvey founded the Universal African Legion, the Universal African Motor Corps, The Black Eagle Flying Corps — all with uniforms

Garvey

and

officers.

The Garvey Movement soon collapsed. His various business ventures failed or involved him in legal tangles. He was tried for fraud and imprisoned in Atlanta, Georgia. Released, he was deported as an undesirable alien. In 1940 he died in London, poor and forgotten. Riots,

murders

and

racial

incidents

spread throughout America in 1919. The various scenes were New London (Connecticut), Bisbee (Arizona), Millen (Georgia), Coatsville and Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), Norfolk (Virginia), New Orleans (Louisiana), Syraeuse (New York), Baltimore (Maryland), and Wilmington (Delaware). The worst riots were in Washington, DC and Chicago. The Washington riot was not so much the result of migration, since there had been only a moderate influx, but rather the consequence of decades of discrimination. Matters were not improved when the return of white veterans was celebrated and that of the First Separate Battalion ignored. In the summer the Washington Post fanned the flames in a story of an 'attack' on a white girl by two Negroes, who had only jostled her and tried to take her umbrella. A riot broke out which lasted four days, leaving five Negroes dead and 11 whites. Washington Negroes retaliated, as the tell. Guns were issued to Negro veterans and other Negroes at 7th and T Streets, and they fired at whites from speeding cars. A week later, on July 27, 1919, Chicago had its riot, lasting a week. Negro leaders warned white authorities that returning black veterans would not endure segregation and discrimination. On a Sunday along the shore of Lake Michigan a gang of whites saw a Negro swimming and they began to throw stones at him. A hail of them struck and drowned the black boy. When a policeman refused to arrest anyone except a black man for a minor offence, Negroes mobbed the policeman. By nightfall Negroes and whites were fighting throughout the city, and at the end of the week 23 of the former were dead and 15 of the latter. It would at first seem perverse to assert that any advantage accrued to the American Negro as a consequence of the assassination of the Archduke. Yet black and white historians alike have marked the advance of the Negro because of the First World War. Ironically similar to the disastrous

casualties

results in Europe when railway trains concentrated thousands of soldiers in given areas in France, American trains unloaded

thousands of Negroes in Northern cities where congestion and immobility tragically cut many down. 'But not as much ground was lost as had been won.' Many survived. 'The First World War provided the Negro his first real opportunity as a worker in Northern industry, started the Great Migration out of the South, and began the "New Negro" movement.' In succeeding decades tens of thousands of Negroes poured out of the South in other 'Great Northern Drives', imitating the example of their race during the war. The war began a chain of developments which, said Rayford W. Logan of Howard University, 'more clearly than any even; since the American Civil War, made it increasingly difficult for die-hard Southerners and their Northern allies to "keep the

Negro

in his place".' It was a 'considerable gain' that the American Congress did not

enact laws to buttress segregation and discrimination, because if it had done so the subsequent passage of the 1957, 1960 and 1964 Civil Rights Laws would probably have been much more difficult since repeal is generally more difficult than enactment. In the 1920s there was a sign that not all had been in vain. A National Guard armoury was built for Harlem's 'Fighting Fifteenth' which was then called the 'Black Watch'. That was not significant in itself since it could simply mean the segregation of white and black Guardsmen. But some change was indicated by the fact that some white politicians claimed credit for the construction of the building. This certainly did not signify that blacks and whites had closed 'ranks shoulder to shoulder,' as Du Bois had urged, or even that Negroes, with 'eyes lifted to the hills', could see them. But the death of an archduke at least pointed the way to the foothills. A. J. P. Taylor says that Franz Ferdinand had only one redeeming feature — he loved his wife. But he may have

had two. Further Reading Barbeau, A. E. & Henri, F., The unknown soldiers: black American troops in World War I (Philadelphia: Temple UP 1974) Green, C. M., The Secret City (Princeton, University Press, 1967)

Jones, M. A., Fight for Fulfilment: American Negro since 1865 (MS to be published in

London, Batsford, 1972) Kennedy, L V., The Negro Peasant Turns Cityward (New York, Columbia University Press, 1930) R. W., The Betrayal of the Negro (New York, Collier Books, 1965)

Logan,

Myrdal, G., An American Dilemma (New York, Harper, 1944) Osofsky, G., Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto (New York, Harper, 1968) Rudwick, E. M., Race Riot at East St Louis July 2, 1917 (Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press, 1964) Scott, E. J., Negro Migration During the War (New York, Oxford University Press, 1920) Waskow, A. I., From Race Riot to Sit-in, 1919 and the 1960s (New York, Anchor Books, 1967)

THOMAS KEISER

is a Lecturer in History for the College, University of Maryland. He received his doctorate in history from the University of Reading. His thesis dealt with 'The English Press and the American Civil War' Dr Keiser is from Indiana and has a bachelor's degree from the University of Indiana

University

Over the familiar battleground of Amiens the British and French armies launched, on August 8, 1918, their first major offensive on the Western Front since the beginning of the war. For the Allies its initial success raised hopes that the end was at last in sight; for the Germans, their confidence already broken, the attack was a complete surprise and with thousands of men taken prisoner it was a very 'black day' indeed. Brigadier Peter Young. Below: Australian infantry occupying an enemy trench, full of German dead. The Australians shared with the Canadians the distinction, of being 'at the peak of their morale and training'; the Allied advance owed much to their strength and persistence

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number of shells per acre in each successive preparatory fire plan. By August 1918 Haig and Rawlinson had learned better. Secrecy was the opening section of Rawlinson's general instructions. As a means of emphasising that success depended mainly on surprise, he had a small notice

'As the sun set on the battlefield on August the greatest defeat which the German army had suffered since the beginning of the war was an accomplished fact.' So runs the official German report of the Battle of Amiens after the great attack made by General Sir Henry Rawlinson's Fourth Army, in conjunction with the French First Army under the command of

printed with the title Keep Your Mouth Shut. This was pasted into the pay-books carried by every officer and man. On the front where the offensive was to take place normal work was carried on. All

General Debeney.

On the Western Front the Allies had tasted no comparable victory since the glorious days of 1914 when Joffre turned back the German tide from before Paris in the battle of the Marne. August 8 was, moreover, by far the most successful single day's fighting the Allies had ever known. The British casualties were less than 9,000, which compares very favourably with, say, the first day of the battle of the Somme, when they lost 57,470 men for very small rewards. On August 8 the Australian and Canadian corps fiercely overran the German divisions on their front, and the progress made by the British and French corps on their flanks was by no means negligible. The Germans estimated their loss as 650 700 officers and 26,000 to 27,000 men, over 400 guns, and large quantities of machine guns, trench mortars and materiel: 15,000 of their casualties were prisoners in Allied hands. Not the least achievement of that day was that it undermined the confidence of General Erich von Ludendorff, the brains of the opposition. Indeed it was he who coined the phrase Der Schwdrze Tag ('the black day'). The chief factor of this great to

triumph lay

The

art of

in

its

war has

element of surprise. its rules, but since

Above: General Sir Henry Rawlinson (inset), of Fourth Army. Thought too clever by half by many colleagues, he nonetheless successfully organised the Amiens offensive in complete secrecy. Behind: George V with

commander

Allied top brass. Front row, left to right: Rawlinson, Fayolle, Foch, the King, Haig, Petain

surprise is one of them one might almost say that the victor is likely to be the man who is willing to. throw the rule book away: it is certain that any commander who sends his men to carry out a plan containing no element of surprise or deception is doomed to failure. Up until August 8, 1918 the planning on the Western Front had not been remarkable for its imaginative approach. It is true that new weapons — gas, flame and tanks — had been introduced, but for reasons discussed in earlier issues none of these had achieved the results their sponsors had hoped for. In March 1918 the Germans had introduced the novel tactics of infiltration, a decided improvement on the successive waves of men in extended order which had previously been in vogue. But in general both sides had sought a solution to the deadlock imposed by wi'-e and the machine gun by crudely increasing the

unusual movement was made by night. With admirable attention to detail the pave roads were sanded over so as to cut down noise. Whenever the offensive had to be spoken of the word raid was used. Not only were dumps camouflaged in the normal way but aircraft flew special missions in order to see whether anything unusual could be seen which might alert the Germans. In the rear areas a strong air-barrage discouraged enemy observaThe inhabitants of Amiens, except for a few who had to have special passes, had been evacuated during the March tion.

offensive.

The French gendarmerie

set

up

a series of posts to prevent civilians entering the forbidden battle zone. The Canadians, who were allotted a star part in the drama, were not allowed into the zone until the day before zero, and only relieved the three Australian battalions holding their front two hours before zero. Haig selected his two overseas army corps, the Canadians and the Australians, to make the main effort. It was a wise decision. They had not been involved in the retreats of March and April and for that reason were in better condition than the rest of the British forces. Moreover,

2919

e

g

I „ £

I

<*•'

*

lit

cv

•

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<"-

nuuve: inianiry ot iotn tsngaae, cioseiy supported by light artillery, streams up over a near Amiens in pursuit of the retreating Germans. With the element of surprise in their favour, as well as a light mist, they had captured their first objective with two hours to spare

c

hill

\

\ f f

Right: British 60-

pounde_rgun in aqjtton — August 8. Far right: A ustralian artillery

_nit lined

up

A.

at the

beginning of the offensive and (above) a battery at the end of a day's fighting. The Australian troops,

uninvolved in the degrading retreats earlier in the year, in much better condition, both

were

numerically and physically, than their British counterparts. Allotted a vital section of the line, the 'straight talking' and 'thoughtful handling' of their

commanders

paid off

at

Amiens

-***0

there is no doubt that Haig regarded these corps as picked, shock troops, both of which had successfully spearheaded attacks in the later phases of Third Ypres. The British Official History admits that: 'on the whole the leading of the Canadian

and Australian

officers

and NCO's was

superior to that of the British regimental cadres, and no doubt for the reason that they had been selected for their practical experience and power over men and not for theoretical proficiency and general education.' In defence they had vital portions of the line; the Canadians near Arras, and the Australians, from April onwards,

guarding Amiens and Hazebrouck. At the end of April, when a German attack north of Arras was expected, Haig had taken the Canadians out of the line, and kept them ready for a counteroffensive.

2922

It

was a great

relief to

him

to

have such

reserve — divisions practically intact sirfce Passchendaele. They still had four battalions to a brigade, and, moreover, they were backed by 10,000 reinforcements in the depots. The Australians were not so strong: 'constantly short of drafts and their depots half-empty. Their losses in the German Michael offensive had caused three brigades to be reduced to the threebattalion basis (previously forced upon British formations only), and having been active ever since, their battalions were again far below strength'. The Australians had their peculiarities. They clung to the voluntary recruiting system, and had no death penalty. If the rate of desertion and absence without leave was high, this was due to tiredness and war weariness rather than slack discipline. The 3rd Division,

a

which had incomparably the best disciplinary record, had been trained by General

Monash himself and

his system was 'a combination of thoughtful handling and

more severe methods'. He insisted on the men's welfare in terms of food and recreation. It is interesting to note, that at this very period Colonel du Teil, the French commandant at Arras, visited the commander of 9th Brigade (3rd Division), to congratulate him on the 'splendid conduct' of his troops whilst resting in that city. Monash had done much to cheer his

men and combat any

spirit of tiredness by visiting brigade after brigade. "The men appreciate this straight talking,' records 6th Brigade's Diary. And despite the policy of voluntary i- ecruitment the Australians managed to keep five infantry divisions

on the Western Front

to

Canada's

four.

me

Dominion troops were the of the British team. The T were nursed by their commanders, the exception of Foch, to an extent inconsistent with true cooperation. General Debeney (First Army) secretly ordered, on August 5, that XXXI Corps' Commanders should start the attack 45 minutes after the British zero hour, and the rest in succession from left to right. 'Thus he chose that his Army should become a flank guard, regardless of Foch's direction.' It was curious behaviour but Petain was not the man to prod Debeney into more vigorous action. It is charitable, however, to f presume that they knew their men and I what they could be expected to take after | their shattering experiences in the earlier ^ stages of the war. Nor was the morale of | the Germans what it had been. Ludendorff I d'elite

'

or seven divisions be described as corn-

3ix

had been completely The divisions of which he wrote were by no means as battleworthy as he asserted, and for this he had himself to thank: his own policy had greatly overstrained it (the as deluding himself.

German

garrison) especially on the lively

Australian fronts where it no sooner dug one outpost-line than this was seized and the tired troops, or fresh ones, were forced dig another. Australian experience to showed that not only 'trench divisions' but those rested for attack had been morally strained by Ludendorff's forcing of the 1918 offensive beyond the army's strength and by the commencement (on July 18) of the inevitable rebound. And this infantry was

attacked by dominion divisions of which even those that had been long in the line were at the peak of their morale and training.

Haig and Rawlinson had anxious hours before the great day came, but secrecy was in fact maintained; when the Fourth Army, with the surprise factor, tanks and a mist in their favour, went over the top at 0420 hours on August 8 it looked as if the Germans were in for a very rough time.

Contributory factors this stage of the war the Royal Artillery had plenty of ammunition, and from April 1918 onwards, whenever a German battery was located it was given 200 rounds

By

A German order of 24 advising the use of alternative emplacements refers to 'the occasional very

from 6-inch howitzers.

May

2924

losses of material through enemy "counter-battery work" '. This order was captured from Crown Prince Rupprecht's Group of Armies. Another of August 1 signed by LudendorfF himself admits the loss of approximately 13% of the German artillery in active operations on the Western Front, destroyed by the fire of the Allies during a single month. The Royal Air Force also made its contribution, puny by the standards of later wars, but at that time aerial bombardment was still enough of a novelty to have a damaging effect on German morale. An order of July 21 captured from XI Corps, astride the River Somme, mentions 'the bloody losses recently caused by enemy raids on billets and camps'. During the two weeks preceding the battle the RAF dropped 188 tons

did not advance at the same time. Still it had a narrow front and six field artillery brigades for its barrage, whereas the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions had only four each. Opposite the 1st Canadian Division was the 117th Division, which came under such heavy artillery fire that the Canadians overran the front battalion before the men could get out of their shelters. Two out of three regimental staffs were taken. Of the forward battalions only remnants got back. Battalions that had been at rest were thrown in piecemeal and, after con-

bombs by day and a total of 96 during ten different nights. On the German right opposite the 3rd Canadian Division was the 225th Division. 'Except for a local fight at Mezieres' its fate was sealed by 1000 hours. 'The entire artillery position was lost; of the front line and support battalions practically nothing had come back; and the resting battalions, thrown in piecemeal, had either been thrown back or had not got into action at all.' Two engineer companies, the Krause Group, sorely shaken, still held out southeast of Cayeux, and three companies of Reserve Regiment No 18 just north of Beaucourt, but 'between these yawned a gap, completely unoccupied'. The 3rd Canadian Division, with the 5th Tank Battalion attached, had done very well, for its task was not easy, and the French on its right

siderable losses, were assembled east of the

heavy

of

Below:

Life behind the lines. German prisoners are escorted back along a major route to the

front,

blocked by an overturned ammunition

wagon and a dead horse. Right: Grisly reminder that many men died unaccounted for — human and animal corpses

Wiencourt

valley.

left

unburied

Soon

after

0900 hours

they were attacked by tanks, aeroplanes and infantry, and took 'extraordinarily high losses' narrowly evading complete capture. Ammunition dumps in Rosieres and Marcelcave were blown up, guns were destroyed with hand grenades, but though batteries stayed in action till the last round, the entire divisional artillery does not appear to have been overrun. Still the division was nearly shrunk to nothing, barely any infantry left. The 2nd Canadian Division had the advantage of a magnificent barrage, but even so the 'general verdict was that the tanks had enabled a faster rate of progress to be achieved than would otherwise have been possible', and by 100 hours the Canadian Corps had taken the ,

I

whole of

its

second objective.

The German 41st Division Amiens-Chaulnes

railway

astride the in front of

Villers-Bretonneux was well hammered by the 2nd Canadian and 2nd Australian Divisions. The forward and support battalions were practically wiped out and of the divisional artillery only three guns escaped. Seven infantry and three machine gun companies were all that remained of the reserves. The 13thDivision, which sustained the onslaught of the 3rd Australian Division, got off to a bad start. The greater part of its defences existed only on paper and it was short of artillery, having only 27 instead of 36 field guns — and six of these were knocked out early on — and 12 instead of 36 heavy howitzers. The division had deployed 13 companies in the Forward Zone and 11 in support contrary to the

Division and reached the next ridge by 1230 hours, but it too was broken and withdrew, losing many prisoners, to the slopes of the valley between Proyart and Mericourt, where more reserve battalions of the 43rd Reserve Division were in position. The 13th Division apparently lost all its guns but received useful artillery support from Chipilly ridge. By 1030 hours the Australians were in the German reserves' camp, amongst shelter bivouacs, headquarter huts, horse standings and hospital tents. Over 200 prisoners fell to the 30th and 46th Battalions near Richmond Wood. At the end of the day the Canadian Corps had reached its final objective, the old Amiens defence line — everywhere, that is, except on its extreme right, where the French XXI and IX Corps, which had

its

momentum. The

front line

was soon out

heavy guns, and communications, depending largely on runners, cyclists and horsemen, were hopelessly inadequate. Moreover, there were commanders who expected an early counterattack by crack German divisions. Efforts to exploit the initial break-in by cavalry action met with some success, but were soon sealed off with fairly heavy losses, especially in horses, although 16 armoured cars had a field-day racing about the German lines and bowling over their transport. The original BEF of 1914 had only five cavalry brigades, but during most of the war the British maintained five cavalry divisions on the Western Front, t ,vo of them Indian. These last were sent to Palestine in March 1918. The French kept up two of range of even the

cavalry corps in six divisions. The Germans transformed all their cavalry on the Western Front into infantry, but the British commanders, French and Haig, were both cavalrymen and it was not to be expected that either of them would degrade their old arm to be mere 'footsloggers'. The maintenance of these cavalry divisions, involving remounts, shipping, transporting and storing fodder, watering, exercising and grooming, required a considerable effort in money and man hours. It may be questioned whether, at least on the Western Front, cavalry ever achieved anything to warrant this effort. It must, however, be remembered that the French cavalry remained loyal during the great mutinies and was active in containing them. By August 10 it was plain to Rawlinson that the offensive had lost its momentum. That afternoon Haig, he, and LieutenantGeneral Currie met at the new Canadian Corps' HQ in some dugouts near Demuin. Rawlinson was against any further attack

theory which made the front line the weakest. From two of the regiments only a handful escaped, the majority being captured. Some 50 of the third regiment got away. The fate of the three resting battalions illustrates

what happened

to units

that were thrown into the battle piecemeal. They were directed to the western slope of the valley leading from Harbonnieres to Morcourt. The first two arrived about

0830 hours and 0930 hours respectively, the position being under fire before they got there. By 1000 hours both their flanks had been turned and they were under air attack: 'the situation was hopeless the two battalions were broken and considerable parts surrounded and had to lay down their arms'. The third battalion, its numbers swollen by fugitives, employed men and a battalion of the 43rd Reserve .

.

.

.

.

.

moved off late and had not used their tanks, had not kept abreast. The Australian Corps reached most of its objectives before 1930 hours except on the left on the banks of the

Somme.

Ill

Corps,

its

plans dislocated

by an attack made at dawn on August 6 by the 27th (Wiirttemberg) Division, had only got as far as

its first objective.

Meanwhile the Germans were forming a

new line manned by five divisions from reserve and four of the ten divisions that had been in the line at the outset. Further reinforcements were on the way, and aircraft, including Captain Hermann Goring's squadron, were flown in from adjoining sectors until British air superiority vanished. Of the 414 tanks only 145 were still in action on the second day of the offensive, when a third of the survivors were put out of action. Already the attack was losing

on his front and when Haig said it was the wish of Marshal Foch, he replied: 'Are you commanding the British Army or is Marshal Foch?' The first phase of the great offensive ended on August 1 1, by which time British casualties were approximately 22,000. The French First and Third Armies lost 24,232 men between August 6 and 15, but the Germans lost more than 75,000, including 29,873 prisoners: 18,500 taken by the British and 11,373 by the French. On August 8 alone 281 German officers and 12,134 other ranks from 20 regiments belonging to eight divisions had fallen into British hands. The French had taken 150 officers and 3,200 other ranks from four regiments of three divisions. From August 12 to 20 there was a pause in the operations, enlivened by serious differences of opinion between Foch and Haig over the advisability of renewing the attack with Rawlinson's Army. But the offensive was eventually renewed on August 21 and the battles of Albert (August 21 to 31), the Scarpe (August 22 to 30), Bapaume (August 31 to September 3) and the Drocourt-Queant Line (September 2-3) carried the Allies forward to the

Hindenburg

Line. In the 50 days from August 8 to September 26 the British pushed forward an average of 25 miles on a 40-mile front. This was a tremendous improvement over the four and a half months it took to get forward some eight miles on a 12-mile front at the Somme. On the Somme the British casualties were something like 420,000, while in this 50-day offensive they were

2925

about 180,000. German losses had been very heavy and included vast hauls of mers. This meant that the Germans no longer had the men to rebuild their beaten divisions. Even so the battle of Amiens was not decisive in a strategic or tactical sense, for the Allies proved unable to exploit its success. However, with wireless and tanks in their infancy they cannot be altogether condemned for this. In the moral sphere the battle was quite decisive. It deprived not only Ludendorff but German soldiers at company level of all faith in final victory. It left Haig, and Foch, convinced that the war could be won -not in 1919 or 1920, but in 1918. \For Brigadier Peter Young's biography, page 155.

see

]

Opposite page: Grinning goodwill at the camera, Canadian wounded (inset) take a rest. Still up to full battalion strength the Canadians had little difficulty in reaching their final objective— the old Amiens defence line— by the evening of August 8. Bottom: A column of German prisoners is marched towards captivity. German losses were extremely high, 29,873

men

being taken prisoner by the Allies

German anti-tank gun (bottom), manufactured by Rheinmetall. Weight in 385 lbs, including 24 rounds of ammunition. Weight in travelling position: 1,020 lbs. Weight of shell: 1 lb. Barrel length: 2 1.5 calibres. Muzzle velocity: 1,125 ft. /sec; later 1,420 ft./sec. Range: 2,866 yds. Elevation: -6° to +9°. Traverse: 21°. Crew: 3 men. Centre picture: German prisoners march past British anti-aircraft guns: the RAF lost air superiority at an early stage. Be/ow:German anti-tank rifle, a model disliked by the troops because of its strong recoil and because the barrel quickly became unbearably hot. Weight: 35 lbs. Barrel lenght: 4 ft. 3 ins. Muzzle velocity: 2200 ft./sec. Maximum range: 70 yds. Calibre: 13-mm. This page: 3.7-cm.

firing position:

£l«*$-\ -s=\x»ui

viJ'StfoV

\oC

e ..!)

disturb-

by the Ger-

of the ?icardy lapse of German e and the abandoning of all hope victory in the field. In 1918, the Germans maintained their superiority only until the moment when American strength outclassed and outnumbered the German troops which had been transferred from the Eastern to the Western Front. Thus, the three offensives undertaken by the Germans during this time not only failed to achieve the hoped.;

for results,

but they effectively hastened

the decline of German resources. From this point, the Allied armies, finally united under Foch's command, were in a position to retake the initiative. Fear of defeat had at last been replaced by hope of victory.

AUGUST & 1918

The scene of bitter fighting throughout the war, Montdidier, the vantage point near Amiens which had changed hands on many occasions, was captured for the last time by Debeney's First Army in August 1918 — with surprisingly little resistance. Marc Neuville. Below: Bleak panorama of the French trenches This was the moment when, according to Liddell Hart's rather cruel judgment, technical advance would transform Foch's

conceive

illusions into reality and his faults into qualities. His clarity of vision, his obstinacy and his optimism allowed him to

Following the Germans' manoeuvre into a central position, which allowed their reserves to swing round quickly to exploit

a

strategy

adapted to the enemy, to the

means

that was skilfully to the terrain and

at his disposal.

the breakthrough, Foch established the bulk of his forces on an outer line, while using the front line to attack the Germans on the flanks of their salient. He was aware of the fatigue his armies were suffering, particularly the infantry, and consequently chose to rely on the extensive use of materiel, substituting strength for speed and being careful to achieve surprise. First, he had to regain freedom of movement for his units, and thus the essential preliminary to the major offensive was the securing of communications. This was clearly stressed in Foch's directive of July 24, which stated that his first objective would be the clearing of the network of railway lines surrounding Paris, thereby assuring communications between the northern and eastern sectors of the front. He stated that these operations

must surprise the Germans and that they should take place at short intervals to prevent the Germans bringing in their reserves. Considerable material support would be given to the operations. The first of Foch's objectives was achieved by the French counteroffensive of July 18, which, by August 3, had pressed the Germans back to the Aisne/Vesle line. The second operation — to disengage the railway complex round Amiens, thus simplifying transport between the British and French rear — was launched at the end of July, without waiting for the outcome of the first one. Logistically interesting, the second operation is also of psychological interest. That which constitutes the centre of gravity in a coalition is, according to Clausewitz, the community of interest of the two parties. Here, in 1918,

the Franco-British centre of gravity was a pocket of difficult ground between the Ancre and the Avre where, in March of the same year, a German attack had almost succeeded in separating the armies of Haig and Petain. By forcing a British and a French army, under command of the British Commander-in-Chief, to take up the offensive at the junction of the two fronts, the Generalissimo cemented the alliance and brought about a unity of purpose between the two armies that had never before been achieved. Haig and Petain rallied to Foch's designs, more by reason than by inclination. They did not share his sweeping and optimistic % views, but they showed themselves capable f of an exemplary intellectual discipline. & The pain and fatigue endured by their men I during four years of war was such thatm

.-

*

'

*«*)

v •

,

.»i*i"


"* .

painting by George Scott of an incident which occurred near Montdidier: a French armoured car races through a village, its guns flattening a column of German infantry against the walls

A

cept the idea that ntly so menacing, their resources and

On

July 28 Foch gave

command

of the

Franco-British offensive to Haig and laid out its objectives. It was hoped that the offensive would not only free the Paris/ Amiens railway, but, with the Germans' attention turned to the Aisne front, that it would shake their position between the Somme and the Avre and push them back towards Roye. General Debeney's First Army was given charge of this operation, in conjunction with General Rawlinson's Fourth Army. The movement of 27 US divisions into the line would release reinforcements for these two armies. On July 29, Haig spelled out his objectives: Firstly, to push the Germans back beyond

the line Morcourt-Hangest (this would represent a retreat of about seven miles) and then to pursue them in the direction of Chaulnes and Roye. It was thus an offensive of limited objectives, susceptible to further exploitation. While Haig pondered the possible extension of the offensive north of the Somme, Petain prepared Third

Army (Humbert) and Tenth Army (Mangin) to

move up to the front.

Morale: the critical factor Secrecy was carried to great lengths: Haig avoided any contact with Debeney; his orders were taken down in writing by a small group of officers and all telephonic communication was forbidden. The deployment of units took place only at night and the noise of tanks was covered by aeroplanes flying at low altitude. The

British, on their side, executed a series of manoeuvres to draw the Germans' attention towards Flanders.

The Commander of the French First Army, General Debeney, was a brilliant infantryman who had been an instructor at the Ecole de Guerre (as had Foch, Petain and Fayolle) before joining Joffre's General Staff. Since 1915, he had reached the highest echelons of the command structure and had been Commander of the First Army since December 1917. His immediate superior, General Fayolle, regarded him as a very honest man, intelligent, quick and exacting, but he reproached him for 'having a narrow view of things, while believing his vision is large'. Under his direction, the preparation for the offensive was threefold. The 'intellectual preparation' attempted to renew in his staff the spirit

J

of

manoeuvre and movement which had

died in the trenches, and to encourage initiative at every level. In fact, General Debeney hoped to see the French infantry emulate a tactic shown by the German infantry: an advance in depth sweeping aside all resistance, followed rapidly by the reserves. This, unhappily, was contrary to the habits and rules of infantry whose offensive spirit had gradually been lost in defensive actions. The 'morale preparation' sought to instil the combatants with confidence in the operation by persuading them of their superiority over the Germans. A series of preliminary actions by First Army between July 12 and August 3 forced the

Germans

to

abandon their bridgehead west and this local success was

of the Avre,

extremely good for morale.

It

also secured

an excellent starting point for the main attack and facilitated the movement of artillery. The 'material preparation' was impressive. On a front 21 miles wide, First Army deployed four army corps with ten divisions in the front line, three army corps in the second line with 90 tanks, and held two infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions in reserve. The artillery

75-mm

guns and 826 heavy guns. Finally, as well as 400 aeroplanes attached to First Army, General comprised 780

Duval's

Airborne

field

Division

(600

planes)

would provide additional support both on the ground and in the air if it were needed. The German Second Army (von der Marwitz) and Eighteenth Army (Hutier) joined forces opposite the French sector south of Moreuil. Against the French First Army they deployed eight divisions in the front

Below: A unit of French infantry, armed with Hotchkiss machine guns, slowly edges its way forward. Inset, left: Renault tanks moving up to the front. Centre: A French artillery unit. Right: A grenade is hurled in the direction of an unseen target

line

and

six in reserve, all of

which had

proved their reliability. Bearing in mind the lessons they had learnt during the French offensive of July 18, the Germans had replaced every division that had shown signs of lassitude; also, all the defensive installations had been reinforced in depth and a considerable concentration of artillery brought in to

what Ludendorff

called

the 'stormy corner' of the front. The terrain comprised the western edge of Santerre, a vast plateau covered with arable and dotted here and there with small villages. Two flat, marshy valleys cut through it, the valley of the Luce to the north and the valley of the Avre to the south. The front followed the line of the river Avre and its tributary the Trois Doms, whose deep channel presented a serious obstacle to the attackers. All

the roads in the area converged towards Roye, Montdidier and Amiens, with the Amiens-Roye road marking the edge of the Franco-British sector. To the north and south of their sector, Debeney's army held a series of narrow bridgeheads on the bank

and it

inlets.

Debeney's plan was a skilful one, but was perhaps too subtle to bring about a

rapid advance. The missions allotted to IV Corps took account of the terrain, the nature of the objectives and the link up with the British; but the co-ordination of these actions looked difficult enough on the map: in the heat and disorder of the battlefield they would be virtually impossible. It was planned that XXXI Corps, in the north, would liaise with the British along the Amiens-Roye road and move in a south-easterly direction to take

Moreuil from behind. In the centre, IX Corps would cross the Avre south of Moreuil and then join with X and XXXI south of Montdidier, Finally, Corps. XXXV Corps would attack north-eastwards to form the second branch of the pincer which would encircle Montdidier. To adjust all these manoeuvres to the time allowed, surprise would have to be sacrificed and this would constitute a serious handicap. The weather was on the side of the French. Constant rain had impeded the observation of German planes, moonless nights had hidden all activity from the Germans and at dawn the mist had done likewise.

The surprise works The Germans maintained absolute silence until 0420 hours on the morning of the 8th when the artillery bombardment began.

Above: French St Chamond 400-mm

rail gun, the largest land yun used in the First World War. Total traverse: 12 Elevation: - 15 to 73 Maximum range: 17,500 yards. It had three different types of shells, weighing 1,410 pounds, 1,960 pounds and 1,980 pounds respectively. .

.

Below: French Batignolles 320-mm rail gun. Muzzle velocity: 2,630 feet per second. Maximum range: 2,950 yards. There were several different types of shells, varying between 790 pounds and 1.100 pounds in weight

2934

The Canadians of Fourth Army moved forward behind a rolling barrage, but vital moments were lost in the French sector as useless precautions were taken against a possible counterbarrage. The Germans had, in fact, been taken completely by surprise and their artillery thrown into disorder. Despite German machine gunners who blocked the advance of certain units and forced them to make detours, the French advance was relatively rapid. It could, however, have been a great deal faster if the experience of a succession of failures had not taught those in command the need for excessive caution and a constant reliance on the guns. In XXXI Corps' sector, the excessive amount of attention to detail which had characterised the planning of the operation was to have unfortunate repercussions. The

Opposite page, inset: A wounded German soldier is evacuated from the hazards of the front line. German casualties during the first half of August were about 45,000 — over twice as many as those of the Allies. Right: A French rail gun, positioned on specially laid tracks,

booms

out over once peaceful countryside

artillery barrage, which was launched on schedule, took no account of the risks incurred by the infantry whose advance could not follow the rhythm of the big guns. Several units in the second line, impatient to get into the fight, moved forward without waiting for orders and merely added to the confusion. Furthermore, the artillery were unable to observe their targets; the target marking planes had been unable to take off because of the heavy mist. Behind XXXI Corps, the bridges of the River Luce proved to be too narrow for the two tank battalions, paralysing all further movement. Some of the tanks ran out of petrol before they came within sight of the battlefield. The 66th Division, whose task was to occupy Moreuil, completed its task with brilliance — due primarily to the swift movement of

infantry. Further to the south, IX Corps crossed the Avre after the attack had been started at 0820 hours, but no longer had surprise on its side, and without

the

artillery reinforcements had great difficulty in establishing a bridgehead during

morning. The intervention of the French Air Force enabled it to move forward once more during the afternoon. the

By

nightfall, the first of Haig's objec-

tives—the Morcourt/Hangest line — had not been reached in the French sector. However, Debeney's force had moved up some five or six miles and had captured 3,500 German prisoners. On the German side disorder reigned and the High Command began to envisage the possibility of a retreat should Allied pressure continue at the same strength. This, unfortunately for the Allies, could not be maintained,

but the initial success of the offensive had enabled Foch to take up dispositions south of the Oise, from which point Tenth Army would go into the attack. On August 9, despite reinforcements thrown hastily into the fighting, the Germans were unable to halt the Allied advance. First Army's right wing (X and XXXV Corps) then entered the battle and succeeded in encircling Montdidier to the south. The German Eighteenth Army was thus forced to retreat to its old position of 1914 on the River Matz. Following this retreat, on August 10 the French First and Third Armies pressed forward methodically over some seven miles and reoccupied Montdidier, which was now no more than a lifeless shell. Believing that the German reserves might block the Franco-British advance at Chaulnes and Roye, but hoping,

i

-

was on the French side and the confusion of the German infantry on the first day of the attack, the hoped-for extent of the advance was never realised and the German front line was never actually broken. The French victory was thus strategical

3elow: After the retr?at*wrecked German trans-

on the oiher hand, that the German sectors would be ordered Haig and Petal n to widen their

wagons and coraseffSfTio^se^lie abandoned in the muddy ^A/irons of aoattle area

port

respective fronts of attack. His calculations proved accurate. From August 11, the progress of First Army was seriously hampered and, like the British, it was subject to numerous counterattacks. It was planned to resume the offensive on August 20. The objectives were to progress as far as the Somme in the north and to take the Lassigny-Noyon line in the south, which would free the RoyeChauny section. If this were achieved, the Germans would be driven back to their starting point of March 21. At this poi: the French First Army would join up with General Fayolle's Army Group. Until August 20, First and Third Armies con centrated on reorganisation and the improvement of their positions. They the: resumed their forward movement and oi August 27 took Roye and Chauny, takinjK advantage of Tenth Army's attack on the \ .which forced the Germans even Line. ninaenuurg i^ine. us the me Hindenburg Ibftk towards Jnal inaf alWs, ,£he offensiye of\* lad been >en Vsuccessful from itg itlrehould Should be admitted st&mittdd lent of surprise which

rather than tactical. It is certain that the

exhausted by

five

German

infantry, of almost inces-

months

sant attacks, w^s also demoralised by the Eolitical situation within Germany and by lUdendorff'sypolicy of isolating the attack .

/

i\

ing units fv6m the units inside the sector. But the French infantry, although they had survivedM;he crisis of morale of 1917, thanksVmainly to Petain's wise measures, had Timer regained their initial /deter-

finatiA speed, ft

and

ability

manoeuvre

to

w£s on the support

kthat tiftv

had

relied,

and

it

at of the artillery

was

this,

with

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~ the additional support of tanks and aeroplanes, that had won them a victory. Their victory was to be found, not so much in their desire to win, as in the fact that their resources outnumbered those of the Germans. It was thus that of two equally exhausted armies, the one which was able to add to superior techniques and superior numbers the advantage of superior morale stepped at last on to the path of victory.

Further Reading Blake, R. (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1952)

Commandant, La Bataille de Montdidier (Berger Levrault 1922) Grasset, Col., Le 8 Aout a la 42e Division (Berger Levrault 1933) Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre, Tome VII (Imprimerie Nationale 1923) Daille,

\

%

,1

' '

H

Liddell Hart, Sir Basil, Reputations (Little,

Brown

1928)

Military Operations:

VollV(HMSO

France & Belgium 1918,

1947)

Barrie, 1918- The Last Act (Cassell 1962)

Pitt,

MARC NEUVILLE was

born

at

1928 His education was mainly

Rheims on

July 9,

literary, after

which

he did his military service in Algeria as an officer of the Reserve. Between 1949 and 1952 he followed various careers in the Arts until he returned to the army as a regular soldier. From 1955 to 1963 he served In North Africa with a Zouave unit and with a unit of Algerian Rifles. He then entered a tank battalion with which he served until he became Professor of History at the St Cyr Military Academy at Coetquidan.

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THE CZECH LEGION

IN RUSSIA Allied intervention in Russia was a confused affair. 'We persist in denying that the earth turns,' said France's intermediary with Trotsky, and the denial released a fortuitous scramble to sidestep the inevitable. DrJ. F. N. Bradley. Top: 'General Winter', Russia's ancient ally; one more obstacle for the Czechs. Above: Sir Charles Eliot, British High Commissioner to Siberia

On November

1917 the Bolsheviks 8, passed a decree on peace repudiating the Pact of London which had ruled out the possibility of a separate peace. In so doing they were giving moral and legal justification to an Allied intervention. However, the Allies hesitated to make an open rupture with the Bolsheviks while still at war with Germany, as many economic interests were involved as well as the safety of Allied nationals, troops and

equipment.

At first the most plausible way of thwarting the Bolsheviks seemed to be to challenge them indirectly by means of the opposition forces on the spot. Thus a dual policy towards the Bolsheviks was adopted by all the Allies, namely keeping in touch with both the Bolsheviks and the opposition, and helping the latter. This was preferable to an open intervention for which there was no precedent, except that of 11 Anglo-French divisions, rushed to Italy after the disaster of Caporetto in 1917. There was also a Russian brigade in France which fought on the Western Front alongside its allies. But these 'interventions' were undertaken by invitation. All four Allied Powers had military missions in Russia throughout the war, but compared with the French the other missions seemed insignificant. It was probably in late November that the French cabinet

decided to support the anti -Bolshevik opposition actively. On December 3, 1917 the British cabinet decided to support in

and his South Eastern (Cossack) Union, together with

principle General Kaledin

any other centre of opposition to the Bolsheviks. At the end of November, at the inter- Allied conference in Paris, there was no agreement on war aims and the Ameri-

cans refused to do anything practical in support of the Russian opposition. The only co-ordinated decision reached there was to send an unofficial Anglo-French military mission to the Don. On December 22 a discussion took place in Paris between Lord Milner, Lord Cecil, General Macdonogh and the French, the result of which was a convention allotting each other tasks for future eventualities. In the immediate future, the convention did not bring any result in the Don for the South Eastern Union had ceased to exist after the suicide of Kaledin, even before Captain Bordes arrived with 7,000,000 francs. In the Ukraine the situation seemed more promising. The Rada, the Ukrainian government, depended on the Czechoslovak and Polish Army Corps for the maintenance of order, but its position was made precarious by the northern Bolsheviks and the Germans. In case of renewed hostilities the Ukraine and Rumania were to be supplied via Persia and Siberia and for that purpose the Trans-Siberian Railway was to be put under Allied control, as was decided in a secret memorandum by the Supreme Allied Council on January 1, 1918. A French plan was divulged on January 20 which would be a test case for a limited reestablishment of the Eastern Front. General Tabouis, High Commissioner to the Rada, ordered the Czech Corps to move under line to the Vinnitsa-Mogilyov General Lafont's command. It would have on its right-wing the Polish Corps and on its left the Ukrainians, 2nd Polish Corps and the Rumanian Army. But the Allies could not enforce unity; neither could they have simple military orders obeyed. The Czechs refused to move and everything collapsed. On January 22 the declaration

Ukrainian independence was issued and the Ukrainians went to Brest-Litovsk to sue for peace. In March 1918 only the Bolsheviks were left opposing the Germans, and the Allies, disappointed with the non-Bolsheviks were now tentatively ready to turn to them, especially as the Bolsheviks, Trotsky foreof

most among them, were coming round

to

the Allied point of view that it would be impossible to satisfy German imperialism. By February 12, direct courting of the Bolsheviks was so advanced that even such a staunch opponent of theirs as French Ambassador Noulens lent himself to a collective demarche offering the Bolsheviks Allied aid in the case of a German attack. But the Germans refused to heed Allied 'paper tactics': on February 18 they denounced the armistice and launched an attack against the Bolsheviks, and before the Allies could come to their aid the Bolshevik bands were in full rout. By the end of February, Bolshevik power seemed to crumble; there was disagreement in the leadership on the crisis. The end seemed at hand; but suddenly the Germans, who had occupied all the territory they wanted, stopped their advance. On March 15, 1918 Lenin finally ratified the treaty of peace against vigorous opposition, during the Fourth Congress of the Soviets. Now the centre of Allied influence moved to the extreme north. With the Japanese landing in the Far East, shortly after the Brest Litovsk crisis, the question of direct intervention arose again. The first landing at Vladivostok on April 5 was of short duration, but on August 3 the Japanese 12th Infantry Division began to disembark at Vladivostok, and by November the Japanese had more than 70,000 troops in

tmammm Siberia.

They were not

3

i

an

intervening force of the western Allies against the Central Powers but as selfdeclared helpers of the Czech Corps, which was in difficulty after its revolt against the Bolsheviks in May 1918. All the same the Japanese were in Siberia by the grace of British diplomatic and French political initiative. The British were particularly interested in a Japanese intervention since Siberia and the Russian south found themselves in a power vacuum, and India might become threatened from the north.

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Japan's fait accompli The Japanese issued warnings that they were ready to take independent action in Siberia as soon as it became necessary, ignoring

Allied,

especially

American,

Thus a new formula had

public opinion.

to

be found by the Allies to cover this contingency. On January 26, 1918, Lord Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, sent out notes to all the Allied governments, asking them to recognise Japan as their mandatory in the Far East whose task would be to secure the war stores in Vladivostok and the Trans-Siberian Railway line. However, the Americans rejected the new formula, and continued to do so even after the Brest Litovsk treaty. They declared, through Admiral Knight at Vladivostok, that the idea of a direct intervention was premature, and that in any case it would have to be a joint venture. In April 1918, the Allied General Staffs were given orders to draw up special military memoranda for the American President arguing the necessity of an Allied intervention in Russia. On April 15, Colonel Robins and Robert Bruce-Lockhart, the American and the British Representatives in Russia, were asked to obtain Bolshevik invitations. The Japanese also put pressure on the Americans to decide either way; in any case they were ready to act unilaterally.

When

their intentions

became known

to the Bolsheviks, Trotsky suddenly announced his invitation to the Allies to intervene. Later on, he requested Allied proposals for the intervention. On May 4

the Bolsheviks

made

it

clear that they

were prepared to tolerate Allied troops if they were landed at Murmansk, Archangel and the Far East, provided the Allies gave guarantees that the troops were not to be used for the destruction of the Bolsheviks. 18 it became obvious that the invitation had been a manoeuvre to delay something that the Bolsheviks thought inevitable, when Trotsky declared that he had been waiting for concrete Allied proposals for over a month. After that the President's opposition to intervention in Russia crumbled and his European Allies started preparing a coup de grace. Lord Cecil, British Minister of State, told Viscount Chinda, Japanese Ambassador in London, that Japan would have to act without a Bolshevik invitation and act decisively, right up to Chelyabinsk. The Germans were at the time some 37 miles from Paris and the situation for the Allies seemed desperate. On June 9 MajorGeneral Knox came out strongly in favour of a Siberian intervention. The northern landing, according to him, was insufficient. On June 11 President Wilson was asked for three infantry battalions: after some delay caused by the United States Army objections to being under British command, they

On May

were sent

to

Northern Russia.

On June

*

20 a War Office memorandum claimed that there would be no victory without a Japanese intervention in Siberia. The situation had by then been completely changed by the involvement of the Czechoslovak Corps, which had started fighting the Bolsheviks on May 27, 1918. On July 10 the British, in order to stimulate the Americans, announced publicly that they would shortly transfer the 25th Battalion of the

immediately to supply the Czechs in Vladivostok with 20 machine guns and 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition, and 6 heavy guns with 100 rounds of ammunition.

Trotsky's laissez-passer The Czech revolt had been caused by the general belief in Bolshevik co-operation with the Germans, and suspicions raised by the enrolling of German, especially Austrian, POWs in the Red Guard, or

Middlesex Regiment from Hong Kong to it took a week for President Wilson to release an aide-memoire explaining the Siberian venture. On

Vladivostok. But

August 2 Japan issued its own declaration on the intervention. Next day the 12th Infantry Division disembarked at Vladivostok; within a week the Japanese were actively helping the hard-pressed Czechs in the Ussury and Amur regions. The Americans landed at Vladivostok on August 10 and remained there. In January 1918, when Balfour floated his mandatory idea, the French Ambassador in Tokyo, Regnault, asked the Japanese government to set up a joint commission to study problems connected with the protection of the Trans-Siberian Railway. This was an attempt to drag the Japanese into the war. Shortly afterwards, when the British switched their pressure from Japan to the United States, the French showed their impatience with this delay by starting new and vehement discussions with the Japanese. This time it was about a joint military action in Siberia to secure foodstuffs and war stores from the Germans. This initiative remained yet another diplomatic proposal. The French had no forces in the Far East and consequently any discussion of joint action was hypothetical. Then suddenly 'French' forces began to arrive. On March 21, 1918, while the Ukraine was overrun by the Qermans, General Foch gave his final order to the Czechoslovak Corps, an Allied force fighting in Russia, transferring it from the invaded territory to Vladivostok. As there was no shipping available to ,take the Czechoslovaks to France, new dispositions had to be made for them. It was at this time that the Corps became known as the Czechoslovak Legion. In April 1918 when the Japanese temporarily landed in Vladivostok, Trotsky stopped all the Czech trains en route to the Far East, but he rescinded his order after the Japanese withdrew from the city. On April 28 the French consul in Vladivostok reported to Paris that General Dieterichs, in command of the Czech Corps, and some 2,000 soldiers arrived with the first train in the city. The ultimate number of Czechs was to be in the region of 70,000. Only the Japanese were in a position to help with the transportation of such numbers, but they proved unco-operative. In June 1918 the Czech revolt then solved the shipping problem and everything else, but also exploded the idea of massive Allied intervention, changing it into an operation of rescue. It was only on July 2, 1918 that the French GHQ found out a little about the military position of the Czechs, who were nominally under its command. It was certain that the fighting which broke out in Russia isolated substantial Czech forces in western Siberia. To save them a massive drive from the Far East was required and only the Japanese could effect it. On July 7 the French reached an agreement with the latter

Opposite page: Czech reconnaissance party makes a temporary camp (top). Above centre: An armoured train, the Orlik, at Simbersk railway station. With so many conflicting interests and armies at war, heavy armour plating was a necessity. Below centre: Czechs in a permanent state of siege on board a camouflaged train. Bottom: The end of the rail-terminus of the Trans-Siberian railway Vladivostok. With its promise of transport to France, Vladivostok became for the Czechs the only constant in a bewildering situation. This page. Above: A painting by J. Riedl of a at

Czech volunteer in Siberia. Below: The Czechs launch Nadeznys at Vladivostok

(after March 1918) Red Army. On June 5 the unofficial British agent in Moscow, Bruce-Lockhart, sent off to London his appreciation of the situation: the Czech Corps, impatient at the delays en route to Vladivostok and France, were finally so enraged by German provocations that it started the revolt. From the start the Bolsheviks had been thought, by both the Allied representative in Russia and their Russian opponents, as somehow connected with Germany. Many of the Bolsheviks had German names and this helped to create wrong impressions; thus rather typically the Czechs made a mistake in May 1918 when they thought that the Russian adjutant, General von Rauch, who signed an order stopping their trains in Siberia, was in fact a German staff officer. Francis Lindley, the British Charge d 'Affaires in Russia, confirmed previous reports that the Bolsheviks were organising and arming large groups of POWs, especially in

western Siberia. The American Consul in Vladivostok, Caldwell, reported that a Bolshevik minority had seized power at Irkutsk, with the help of German POWs. During the two weeks preceding the Japanese landing in April 1918, numerous reports of increased Bolshevik activity among the POWs reached the Allies. An ad hoc investigation commission was provided with laissez-passer by Trotsky but could not find evidence of a German master plan for the control of Siberia. In fact the bulk of Trotsky's armed prisoners was in European Russia. However, these Allied suspicions further drew the attention of the Czechs to this problem. It needs to be stressed that the recruitment of foreign officers and troops was in the Russian military tradition; the Czech Corps itself was the result of such recruitment. More immediate reason for recruiting foreign soldiers into the Red Army was provided by their own spontaneous reRumanians living in Odessa, quests: Chinese labourers working in Russia, four Latvian regiments unable to return to Latvia. From February 1918, trained polimeetings tical agitators organised for recruitment. This bore fruit in April 1918 and when the Czechs noticed that, while moving east to Vladivostok, they were gradually disarmed by their erstwhile camp companions, they came to the conclusion that there had to be some

POW

between Germans and Bolsheviks. Furthermore the Czechs also knew of rumours, however unjustified, that Germany was preparing to take over Siberia. When in May 1918 the Czechs were told by the Allies that they were to be re-routed to the north, they thought it was a German plot and decided to shoot their own way east. When Captain Sadoul, who later became a communist leader, and had negotiated with Trotsky the free departure of the Czechs from Russia to France, heard the accusation that the revolt was a dress reconnexion

hearsal for Japanese intervention, he denied categorically that French officers had anything to do with it. But throughout the previous months both the French and the British had been increasingly concerned at the political unreliability of the Czech troops and wondering what to do with them while waiting for shipping to become available. It should be added that far from being bought by the French to revolt, as Lenin claimed at the time, throughout their slow progress to Vladivostok French financial help was of necessity erratic and the Czechs had to depend mostly on Soviet food and accommodation. On April 7 the French replied to a Foreign memorandum about using the Office Legion in Siberia by a compromise proposal: the Czechs should be shipped to France but might possibly help Atarman Semenov, a White leader in the Far East, while waiting for British ships. On April 9, 1918, General Lavergne, the French military attache, unwittingly complicated the position by suggesting that since the Czechs' movement to Vladivostok had in any case been stopped by Trotsky on account of the Japanese landing, they should be re-routed to Archangel. Two days later, he reported that Czech morale was excellent, so the French general staff suggested another compromise. If the British would consent to evacuate the Czechs to France by way of Archangel and Murmansk, the Czechs could in the meantime be used to guard the northern ports. Later in April, obviously with the object of delaying the operation, the British were

French demands: officers were to be put in charge of the Czech contingents going via Archangel and Bolshevik elements were to be excluded from the Corps. On April 28, 1918 Consul Andre reported from Vladivostok the arrival of the first Czech echelon; something concrete had to be done. On May 18 Lord Cecil wrote very frankly to the French Prime Minister, Clemenceau, that, since no ships were available for the Czechs (the British claimed that allocating ships to them would jeopardise their own interests in Mesopotamia and

making

additional

India) they should be used in Vladivostok.

He argued

that both governments wanted United States and Japan to intervene as well, and the Czechs could serve as an excellent pretext to bring this about. However, Clemenceau would have none of this, and on May 22, still unaware that the Czechs had taken their final decision to revolt against the Bolsheviks at the Chelyabinsk conference, he protested to Cecil that his proposal violated the Abbeville agreement: the British could not deprive France of Czech troops which were badly needed. to force the

Spontaneous decision The question of the role

of the Czech polileaders in the preparation of the revolt is easily resolved. After the war, when he was Foreign Minister, Benes resolutely denied that the Allies had ever asked him or the Czechs to intervene in Russia. He obviously meant an intervention against the Bolsheviks. For the Allies, above all the British, did ask him ral times about an Allied intervention in which the Czechs would take part. But it was intended against the Germans, not against the Bolsheviks, who it was thought tical

might even invite them

to take

such action.

Above: Tomas Masaryk (centre), Czechoslovak statesman and philosopher, with new recruits for the Czech contingent of the French Army. Masaryk left Russia in March 1918 to raise support for the Czech cause in the United States; he is photographed here at a camp in Connecticut. Right: Ko\chak. Once Vice-Admiral of the Black Sea Fleet, now a counterrevolutionary. In conjunction with the Czech Legion his 'White' government at Omsk held out against the Bolsheviks for over a year, but Kolchak was finally captured and executed in 1920. Below: Canadian troops parade through Vladivostok in November 1918. Despite the

'Hands Off Russia' movement Allied interbecame even more intricate after the Armistice. Opposite page: An overall picture of Allied intervention, both accidental and intentional, during 1918 and 1919 vention

Saratov*

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Orenburg

BEGINNING OF MOVE TO VLADIVOSTOK POSITION OF UNITS OF CZECH CORPS AT OUTSET OF THEIR MUTINY MAY 25 1918 CZECH LEGION & WHITE ACTIVITIES MAY-OCT 1918 SUPPRESSION OF CZECH LEGION'S MUTINY IN MIODLE VOLGA REGION AUGUST-OCTOBER 1918

Uralsk

\ Black Sea

_

2 The Battle of Penza,

May 28/29

3

X

The fighting

in

MILES

500

KILOMETRES

800

I

1

the Volga region, August-October 1918

1918

.•••

to.

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I——^1

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Benes agreed to the use ops in western Russia as part massive Allied intervention against the Germans, provided there was no interference in Russian internal affairs. When the revolt came, it was on the same lines: the Czech troops wanted to force their way to Vladivostok, without interfering in Russian affairs; it was a spontaneous de-

which surprised friend and foe alike. had, of course, been brought about by precarious conditions in Russia. the Professor Masaryk, who left Russia on March 7, 1918 to go to America, was well aware of difficulties ahead, but he put in

cision It

charge of Czech affairs in Russia two inexperienced young men, J. Klecanda and P. Maxa. During the evacuation from the Ukraine the politicians in the Czechoslovak National Council showed themincreasingly more incompetent, selves while the officers, only recently appointed, gradually gained courage and self-confidence. During the retreat the 1st and 2nd Divisions were involved in several skirmishes from which they emerged 'victorious'. On the other hand, the political representatives failed to secure an armistice with the Germans, who treated them with arrogance and later executed captured Czechs. Under these influences the Czech Army Corps was becoming daily more combative and would not accept orders from the Bolsheviks. To start with

Klecanda

in

Moscow and Maxa

at

Kursk

found the Bolsheviks quite amenable in 'surplus' although their discussions, machine guns and armoured cars had to be surrendered. But on March 22 the chairman of the Penza Soviet, Kurayev, issued an order by which all Czech trains were stopped and the troops had to be disarmed completely. On March 24, with the trains Podgayevsky, still, General standing Commander of the 2nd Division, and one of the few Russians remaining with the Legion, marched into Kurayev's office with an armed escort, to tell him that he would be hanged if the trains were not released. Tension and suspicions increased on both sides. In Moscow, Klecanda dared to threaten Trotsky, but without an armed escort his bluff was soon called. At Penza, the politician Maxa disagreed with Podgayevsky's action, and probably would have shared Klecanda's fate, prison, but the troops decided to act on the spot. In April 1918 another factor, beside the slowing and stoppages of trains, began to aggravate relations between the Corps and the Soviets. A party branch was founded at Penza, the main sorting station, and the 1st Czech International Regiment was formed there. At the station the Czech communist party had at its disposal a special propaganda-recruitment coach and public meetings were organised from which officers were excluded and the men were addressed by communist agitators. Though the effect of this activity was not remarkable, the National Council felt itself threatened enough to order the soldiers not to leave their trains at Penza. The agitators were then debarred from Czech trains. But the communists were pinning their hopes on the projected Czech Army Congress. However, the hopes were not going to be fulfilled. The mass of Czech soldiers were in fact turning against the Soviets whom they recognised as the cause of the delays. While the men waited endlessly in Godforsaken stations, they were preoccupied

with two thoughts: putting between themand the Germans as many miles as possible, and reaching Vladivostok as well armed as possible; for the journey through selves

Siberia,

whence many had come meant

passing by

many

POW camps, full of hostile

Germans and Hungarians. The Soviet demand for arms became alarming: Penza asked for the agreed arms, Samara for as many more to defend itself against some Cossacks; Omsk asked for machine guns permitted by Penza, while on arrival at Irkutsk the last remaining rifles were requested as a condition for the trains being let through. Rumours circulated, frequent incidents occurred showing that the Corps was getting out of control. 'Captain' Gajda, CO of the 7th Regiment fraudulently investigation for (under assuming his rank), talked of shooting one's way to the east with ever more urgency and had plans prepared for such a contingency. After Lavergne and Lockhart had successfully concluded negotiations with Trotsky about the Corps' re-routing, Chicherin, the Foreign Secretary, telegraphed on April 21 to stop the slowly moving Czech trains

we

the Japanese will; if the Japanese do, the United States will.' Balfour

'If

act,

The Czechs west of Omsk were to go They all refused to believe that the order came from the Allies. again.

to Archangel.

On May at

14, 1918 an incident occurred Chelyabinsk where the pre-congress con-

ference of the 1st Division was to take place. During a stop at the station, a Czech soldier was wounded by a piece of iron thrown out of a train repatriating some Hungarian POWs. The train was stopped and the culprit lynched; Czech reinforcements marched into the town and freed the imprisoned soldiers arrested by the Soviet after the lynching. At the same time arms were seized from the town arsenal. That was the last straw: Maxa was arrested in Moscow and forced to sign an appeal to the Corps to surrender all its arms to the Soviets. On May 23 the Chelyabinsk conference read an intercepted telegram by Commissar Aralov ordering the Soviets to disarm the Czechs. Two days later, Trotsky's telegram ordering the Soviets to disarm the Czechs or shoot them was read by various regimental commanders. That was the signal for the young officers Gajda, Cecek and Voytsekhovsky to take over. Gajda was the one who, animated by a blind hatred of the Germans, sparked off the revolt at Novonikolayevsk; he raided German trains, liquidated Lavrov's Hungarians and, taking no prisoners, fought his way through to Vladivostok. A momentary cohesion was achieved after the revolt by means of fear and the idee fixe, Vladivostok. There were no other aims, no common plan, no appreciation of political implications of the revolt. As could be anticipated, military necessity forced the Czechs to seek White support after they had deployed their forces all along the

POW

Trans-Siberian Railway. The

list

of

sum-

mary executions and

arrests all along the is impressive: at Petropavlovsk, the Soviet and 20 civilians (among them three Czechs) shot dead; at Omsk some 1,500; at Chelyabinsk, the whole Soviet, and so on. In June, after taking Samara, Cecek at last realised that the fighting was not for its own sake. The French sanctioned the revolt a few days later and a new aim was given to the

line of the

Czech advance

Czechs: the Corps was the advance guard They were to reconstitute the Eastern Front on the Volga against the Germans, and an Allied army from of the Allies.

Vyatka would come

to

their

aid.

Two

French officers were responsible for this new development which created nothing but confusion, Captains Buinet and Bordes. The former caused the Czechs to over-extend themselves to Ekaterinburg and Kazan by promising a relief Vyatka army which never came; the latter made the Czechs believe in this and other Allied armies, so that an anti-German front be re-constituted. By threatening an Allied boycott Guinet also foisted onto the White movement leaders acceptable to himself but not so much to the Russians. By August this new aim must have seemed illusory to all; Trotsky, after restoring

discipline

in

the

Red Army facing the

Czechs and Whites at Kazan, launched an offensive. The impact was devastating, Kazan fell and many other towns followed; from then on it became the young general's fight, not the men's. The Czech soldiers did not care about democracy in Russia which they were now supposed to defend, all they wanted was to get out of Russia and return home. To all appearances Allied intervention in Russia was a confused affair. It was hardly at all planned, utterly unco-ordinated,

and

in fact cancelled itself out. After

and diplomatic manoeuvring in the most haphazard way by the Czech Army Corps whose very presence in Russia was fortuitous. Thus the British and the Americans rushed a

it

lot of talking

was brought about

their forces (three battalions to start with) to Murmansk and Archangel to protect

war stores there and save the Czechs who were ten times more numerous than Allied

the rescuing force. In the Far East three Japanese divisions suddenly made a dash for Vladivostok, in order to protect Allied

stores and aid the Czechs. Shortly afterwards an American regiment landed there as well, to save the Czechs. British and French battalions (though only two) from the 'nearby' colonies were also on their way to rescue the poor Czechs from the Bolshevik peril. All these efforts were naturally useless, for the distances were against them, and the forces engaged in these efforts were pitiful driblets in the immense sea of Bolshevik Russia. It was all bound to collapse when the Czechs overextended themselves and by sheer attrition were forced to retire. But then in November 1918, with the Armistice in the west, Allied intervention was given a

war

new

lease of life.

Further Reading Silverlight, John, The Victor's Dilemma: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War (Barrie & Jenkins 1970) Masaryk, T. G., The Making of a State (Allen & Unwin 1927)

[For

Dr

page 97.

J. F. |

N. Bradlev's biography, see

I

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