W£
-'-
THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD VOLUME TEN 1918-19
I
y*
,
THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD Editor-in-Chief Brigadier Peter
Young
Board Barker; Dr. John Bradley
Editorial
Lt.-Col. A. J.
Professor John Erickson; Lt.-Cdr. Peter
Kemp
John Keegan; Kenneth Macksey; S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard; Norman Stone Revision Editor
Mark Dartford Archbishop Mitty High School Media Center
5000
Mitty
Way
San Jose, CA 95129 CO
O
MARSHALL CAVENDISH NEW YORK, LONDON, TORONTO
Editorial Staff Young
Editor
Brigadier Peter
Deputy Editor
Kenneth Macksey
Co-ordinating Panel
Lt.-Col. A. J. Barker Dr. John Bradley Prof. John Erickson Lt.-Cdr. Peter Kemp
Reference Edition Published 1984 Published by Marshall Cavendish Corporation 147 West Merrick Road
Long
Freeport,
John Keegan S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard
Island
N.Y. 11520 Printed and
Bound
in Italy
by L.E.G.O. S.p.a. Vicenza.
No part of this book may be reproduced or any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the copyright holders. All rights reserved. utilized in
Norman Stone E £
Military Consultants
Capt. Sir Basil Liddell-Hart
Marshall Cavendish Limited 1984 B.P.C. Publishing 1970 now a Division of Macdonald and
Company
(Publishers) Limited/B.P.C.C.
Barrie Pitt
Executive Editor
Patrick Scrivenor
Assistant Editors
Chris Chant
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under
Carolyn Rutherford Bruce French Rose Thomson Margaret Burnley
The Marshall Cavendish encyclopedia of World War One. Bibliography: Includes index. 1.
Design Consultants
Peter
title:
Dunbar Associates
World War, 1914-1918— Chronology.
D522.5.M39
Liam
Butler
Art Editor
Brigit
Webb
Cartographers
Gatrell
Dunbar, Harison Alan Robertson
86307 191 British Library
&
Rees
John Batchelor
Picture Director
Robert Hunt
Edition Staff
Revision Editor
Mark Dartford
Editorial Consultants
Randal Gray David Rosser-Owen
Project Executive
Robert Paulley
Designer
Trevor Vertigan
Indexers
F
Production Manager
Dennis Hovell
Production Assistant
Richard Churchill
&K
Gill
83-20879
(set)
vol
Cataloguing
Dartford,
940.3
Mark
D521
ISBN 0-86307-181-3
New
Marshall
in Publication
Data
The Marshall Cavendish illustrated encyclopedia of World War One. 1. World War, 1914-1918 II. Pitt, Barrie I. Young, Peter, 1915III.
Technical Artist
940.3
1984
ISBN 0-86307-181-3
Art Director
I.
Cavendish Corporation.
86307 191
(set)
vol
12884
1918 SEPT
OCT
NOV
Army
13
U.S. First
14
Franco-Serbian armies move into Serbia.
26
Final Allied assault
27
Hindenburg Line broken.
29
Bulgaria signs armistice.
24
Battle of Vittoria Veneto.
27
Ludendorf
28
German
captures St Mihiel.
on Hindenburg Line.
resigns.
naval mutinies High Seas Fleet.
30
Turks sign armistice.
31
Turkish resistance
in
at
Wilhelmshaven and
in
Mesopotamia ends.
1
Serbians recapture Belgrade.
3
Austrians accept Serbian terms. French and
American forces drive Germans from the MeuseArgonne. Austria surrenders. 4
Austrians sign armistice with
Italy.
Revolt spreads
throughout Germany. 7
21
German
armistice commission meets Foch. Armistice signed at 5 am. Firing ceased 1 1.00 hrs.
German High
Seas Fleet surrenders to British
Scapa Flow.
DEC
4 14
Kingdom of Yugoslavia
created.
Portuguese President Paes assassinated.
at
Contents of Volume 10 2945 The Breaking of the Hindenburg Line
3010 Arab Revolt Major-General
Major-General H. Essame 2960 Americans at St Mihiel J. W. Stock
3018 The Bombing of Constantinople John Vader
2969 Pershing S.
L.
Mayer
2970 Crossing the Canal du Nord
Deneys Rietz 2973 The Influenza Pandemic D. R. Shermer 2979 Defeat of Bulgaria
Alan Palmer 2988 Billy Mitchell and the US Air Force Thomas G. Miller Jr 2997 Wilson's Search for Peace
Thomas Keiser 3001 The Battle of Megiddo Brigadier Peter Young
J.
3021 The Collapse of
Lunt
Germany
H. W. Koch 3024 Prince
Max
of Baden
Mayer 3029 The Rumanian Imbroglio S.
L.
Michael Kitch 3040 America's Offensive: The Argonne Philip Warner 3050 The Collapse of Turkey David Walder 3057 The Last Sortie of the High Seas J.
Fleet
Paul Kennedy 3064 Vittorio Veneto Franco Valsecchi
3072 The Sinking of the Szent Istvan Paul Kennedy
3076 Latin America and the Joseph S. Tulchin
War
3080 Germany Accepts the 14 Points
H. W. Koch 3085 Austria-Hungary Concedes Defeat Z. A. B. Zeman 3093 The Sambre Crossings Douglas Orgill 3101
Return to
Mons
John Keegan
3161 Revolution in Bavaria
3169 The Spartacus Revolt Angela Raspin 3179 Rosa Luxembourg Bruce French 3180 Karl Liebknecht Bruce French 3181 The Freikorps
H. W. Koch 3190 Blockade: The Stranglehold Continues
3102 Wilson's Electoral Defeat Charles E. Neu 3107 Lettow-Vorbeck's Bitter Triumph Major R. J. Sibley 3113 The Kiel Mutiny Dieter Groh
Marion Siney 3197 The Paris Peace Conference A.
J.
P. Taylor
3206 The President and the Paris Peace Conference Michael Dunne
3116 Revolution in Germany Andreas Hillgruber
3210 'Archie': Anti-aircraft Guns
3128 The Flight of the Kaiser Michael Balfour
Mayer 3217 The Weimar Republic Margaret Rooke
3132 Ebert: Leader of the Andreas Hillgruber
New Germany
3133 The Armistice Jacques Meyer
3142 Demobilisation
John Keegan 3148 The Coupon Election Robert Bunselmeyer 3153 The War Horses Brigadier Peter Young 3160 Kurt Eisner
H. W. Koch
3212 Wilson's Tour of Europe S.
L.
3225 Lloyd George at Paris A. J. P. Taylor
3230 Oddities of the Sea War 3232 Clemenceau at Paris J. B. Duroselle 3235 Wilson's American Debacle Thomas Keiser 3238 The Poetry and the Pity
Ronald Lewin 3248 Alsace-Lorraine S.
L.
Mayer
a
Ike l>l C«\kll\2 ol Ike
lliiwloixl/i v±
According to Ludendorff, 'August 8 was the black day of the German army in the history of the war ... It put the decline of our fighting power beyond doubt.' The Germans, as they Haig, Pershing and Petain when they met on July 24 at Foch's Headquarters at the Chateau of Bombon near Melun, 25 miles south-east of Paris, quickly sensed an atmosphere of pronounced goodwill — sharp contrast to the gloom and suspicion which had characterised their conferences in May and June. Foch opened the proceedings by summing up the general situation with which, in fact, they were already familiar. There could be no doubt
now that the fifth German offensive of the year had been checked by Gouraud on the Marne and that the Allied counter-offenunder Mangin, in which eight American divisions were taking part, was going well. Every effort should now be made to retain the initiative — a sentiment with which all present were heartily in agreement. At last, it seemed, Foch's doctrine of Voffensif a I'outrance was the right answer to all the Allies' problems. They had as many divisions as the Germans and more aeroplanes and tanks. The Americans were now pouring in at the rate of 250,000 a month and this would be maintained. There were strong indications that many of the German divisions were tired and under strength. They must be attacked all along the line in a series of devastating blows and given no respite. The immediate need, Foch went on to say, was to straighten out the great salients created by the German spring offensives, sive
Right:Jhe 15-inch monster gun of Chuignolles, used from July until August 9. 1918 for the bombardment of Amiens, then disabled by its gun crew Taken by the 3rd Australian Battalion on August 23, 1918,
I
live
withdrew, did everything possible to hinder the Allied advance, but it went on. The Hindenburg line had been broken before. Could it now be shattered? Major--General H. Essame.
and the salient at St Mihiel, freeing the railways on which the logistic framework of the Allied armies depended. He therefore gave to Petain the task of continuing the counteroffensive on the Marne which had started on July 18, the strategic aim of which was to free the Paris-Verdun railway. He ordered Haig to implement as soon as possible the attack east and southeast of Amiens with the British Fourth and French First Armies, the plans for which were already far advanced. This would remove the German threat to the Paris-Amiens railway. Finally, Foch agreed to accept Pershing's plan for the reduction of the St Mihiel salient so that the use of the Paris-Nancy railway south of Verdun might be regained, and confirmed that in addition to the American First Army Pershing would be given the II Colonial Corps. After these three major operations, Foch continued, would come others designed to liberate the coal mining area in the north and to drive the Germans from the neighbourhood of Calais and Dunkirk. For the time being he was not prepared to look further into the future. This general directive in fact would govern the strategy of the Allies for the next two months. By August 6 the Franco-American AisneMarne offensive, known as the Second Battle of the Marne, had virtually eliminated the huge salient east and west of
Rheims with the Germans pushed back to the heights north of Soissons and the line of the River Vesle. Two days later Haig's great attack with the British Fourth and French First Armies east of Amiens, the main effort of which was executed by the Australian and Canadian corps, resulted in one of the most complete and effective surprises of the war — an advance of about 12 miles at its farthest point to the Lihons ridge south of the Somme, with the capture of 30,000 prisoners and over 400 guns. By the afternoon of the 11th, however, it had become evident that the offensive had for the time being lost its impetus. The victory, triumph though it was, particularly for the Australians, Canadians and the Tank Corps, had fallen short of complete success. There had been lack of co-ordination between the French First and British Fourth Armies. The failure of the III Corps north of the Somme to take the Chipilly spur had caused the Australians much embarrassment. Furthermore, although their line-holding divisions had been virtually annihilated, the Germans had been quick to recover from the initial surprise. By the 10th they had fed into the battle no less than ten fresh divisions and many more guns. On the third day of the battle only one tenth of the 400 tanks with which the British had started were still operational; casualties were rising; the reinforcement situation
was
the largest gun capthe war. It was 70 feet long, with a range of 24 miles, and weighed 500 tons. A gun like this, powerful as it was. could only be a liability during a retreat it
tured
in
2945
-e for anxiety
and
finally
it
had
found possible to get forward the irtillery
and
red. In
its
ammunition. The
some
cases, the stalls,
accustomed only to the slow tempo of trench warfare, had broken down. There was much traffic congestion. Headquarters and forward troops were out of touch. It was now clear that it had been a mistake to place the two Whippet tank battalions under the command of the Cavalry Corps.
As a
result the exploitation ordered as far as the line of the Somme south of Peronne had not been achieved. The forward troops were now held up on the western edge of the area devastated by the Somme battle of 1916, the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line of April 1917 and the German offensive of March 1918. The conditions of trench warfare had thus been recreated. Rawlinson therefore, with Haig's concurrence, decided to suspend operations for the time being.
German morale crumbling significance of the Battle of Amiens more in the sphere of morale than in ground gained, numbers of prisoners taken and guns captured. Many of the prisoners on arrival at the cages openly expressed
The lies
their delight at being captured. New arrivals were greeted with cheers. Interrogation revealed that the majority, both
and
men, were convinced that could not now win the war. An order issued by von der Marwitz, the Commander of the Second Army, about this time, gives an illuminating picture of the state of morale behind the German lines. Extraordinary rumours have been spread about behind the front in the past few days. People with anxious temperaments see squadrons of tanks, masses of cavalry and dense lines of enemy infantry everywhere. It is time our battle-tried soldiers spoke officers
Germany
seriously to these cowards and weaklings and told them of the deeds that are achieved
1
.
9k
e/ow.'A British Mark Male tank engaged by a German flamethrower. Tanks are no bogey for front line troops
tV
who have artillery close support.' Right: A tank routing out a German machine gun post near Lihons. After four years of war there in
were
still
fields
behind the Hindenburg Line. Below right: Palisades
arranged so that advancing tanks running on to them would detonate mines
Jfr*
rsrc
3*3
7>J^ vV**
4 *
i J.J
c
,mM
'/-"'
tw
llfrv
-*"1—"^^""-^^
-
rRllNT LINE AUGUST" RONT LINE AUGUST BY: ADVANCES ALLIED AUG 11
GERMAN
20 21
22 23 20
27 29 30
SEPT
1
4 6 8
18 26
2948
in the front line. Tanks are no bogey for front line troops who have artillery in close support. For instance, a battery sergeantmajor with his gun destroyed four tanks; In anone battery destroyed fourteen. other instance a smart corporal climbed on a tank and put the crew out of action with his revolver firing through the aperture. With regard to the enemy infantry stress must be laid on the fact that in most cases they have only received drafts of 18-year-old men. Reports of panic and of troops surrendering without a fight finally .
.
.
brought home to Ludendorff that the majority of the German infantry were no longer of the quality of the men who had fought with such tenacity in 1916 and 1917 and advanced to victory in the spring. Manpower resources were running out. Overworked, bad-tempered and frustrated, his confidence badly shaken by the loss of the Marne salient, Ludendorff temporarily lost his nerve. At Avesnes on August 11 he told the Kaiser that 'the balance had finally come to rest on the side of the Entente and that the war must be ended'. At the same time he offered his resignation.
was
refused. a platitude that the best stimulant to morale is success. Rawlinson had no doubt that the decisive factor in his victory had been the fighting spirit of the Australian divisions and of the Canadians, neither of whom had been bled white in the fighting of the spring. Unquestionably It
It is
the Australians had shown themselves to be the most formidable infantry on either side in the whole war, out-classing all others in courage, ingenuity, endurance,
and skill with their weapons. Their example from now on to some extent infected the British divisions which constituted the greater part of Haig's army. Over 50% of the British infantry now consisted of 18-year-olds. The most usual rank of the vast majority of the regimental officers was second lieutenant. Nothing like these troops had ever been seen before or would be seen again — a blend of iminitiative
mature,
partially
soldiers, led for the officers
trained,
adolescent
most part by junior
accustomed only
to static war,
who
had known disaster but never admitted defeat. They now faced, with all the valour of ignorance, conditions with which they were completely unfamiliar. Provided they were given tasks within their capacity all would now depend on the intelligence and sympathy with which they were committed to battle. Fortunately this was forthcoming. When, on the afternoon of August 10, Haig ordered Rawlinson to push on to the Somme and establish bridgeheads over it south of Peronne, the latter demurred. When told that this was the wish of Marshal Foch, he became almost insubordinate and replied: 'Are you commanding the British army or is Marshal Foch?' His opposition was in fact justified. Operations on his army front had ceased to pay a dividend; the momentum of the attack had run out, casualties were rising, German opposition was stiffening and the way ahead offered them every advantage. At long last two British commanders had realised that battles should be fought as economically as possible and that once the element of surprise had gone they should be suspended and a blow struck elsewhere. Rawlinson and Monash were of one mind: they had no intention of frittering away the superb Australian infantry merely to
The Fourth Army, in had reached the old front line of February 1917. This was a labyrinth of old
please the French. fact,
trenches in a sea of shell holes providing ideal machine gun nests for the enemy. The rusty remains of wire entanglements, a lot of them still uncut, spread in all directions. The whole area was covered with a rank growth of thistles and brambles. Further operations here would be costly, tedious and slow. It was, moreover, becoming increasingly evident that the Germans would now stage a slow withdrawal to the formidable Hindenburg defences some 30 miles ahead, to which they had previously fallen back, devastating the country as they went, in March 1917. The prospect, therefore, was one of frontal advance over country which had been the scene of the battles of the Somme of 1916, of the German retreat of 1917 and of the March Offensive of 1918. From
north to south it was straddled by the formidable obstacles of the Canal du Nord and that part of the Somme which runs due south from Peronne. Within this area many small features and localities gave the enemy ample scope for the concealment of men, guns and, above all, machine guns. The old trench systems provided a succession of defensive positions admirably suited to an enemy carrying out a series of delaying actions, a form of war in which the Germans had already shown themselves to be peculiarly adept.
Undeterred by mere tactical consideraFoch continued to press Haig to resume the offensive due eastwards on the Fourth Army front and sent him a direct order to attack the Roye-Chaulnes position on the 16th. This brought Haig in person on the 15th to Foch's advanced headquarters at Sarcus (20 miles south-west of Amiens) where he made it unequivocally clear to the Marshal that he had no intention of obeying his order on the grounds that it would involve excessive loss of life for small results. He pointed out that he was responsible to his government and his fellow countrymen for the tactical handling of his own army. In any case he was not prepared to accept a degree of subordination greater than that exercised by Foch over Petain, who only obeyed those orders which suited him. Instead, Haig undertook to extend the attack northwards on August 21 using the Third Army and later the First Army between Albert and Arras where the ground was more suitable for tanks. This thrust, he said, would turn the line of the Somme south of Peronne and force the Germans to fall back to the Hindenburg Line. He went on to point out that the Germans were in a salient already threatened from the south and did not seem prepared to meet an attack on its northern shoulder. Haig had all the obstinacy of the Lowland Scot; once he had made up his mind no one could force him to change it. Foch, realising that he had overcalled his hand, finally agreed to let him have his way. He did, however, show his high displeasure by withdrawing the French First Army from Haig's command and asking for his reasons in writing. Haig on his part did not hesitate to express the hope that in future he would get more assistance from Petain than he had received so far. A further nagging letter from Foch on the 20th telling Haig of the success of Mangin's Tenth Army on the 18th (they had advanced 2,000 yards) and tions
insisting that blows such as this should be repeated by Haig contributed nothing to the improvement of Anglo-French cooperation. / therefore count on the attack
of your Third Army, already postponed to the 21st, being launched that day WITH VIOLENCE, carrying forward with it the neighbouring divisions of the First Army and the whole of the Fourth Army. After your brilliant successes of the 8th, 9th and 10th any timidity on their part would hardly be justified in view of the enemy's situation and the moral ascendancy you have gained over him. It would be satisfying for the military theorists to be able to record that the operations of the next six weeks which ended on September 26 with the completion of the first stage of Foch's broad strategic plan and the lining up of the British armies opposite the main Hindenburg position were a triumph for the policy of indirect leverage, born of profound strategic insight and deftly executed by perfectly timed and well organised attacks all along the line, to keep the Germans guessing where the next blow was going to fall. The truth is that most of the advances were inspired at corps and even divisional level, and that all the commanders concerned were opportunists, determined to hit the Germans with all they had as hard as they could, with all the fire support they could get, and keep them on the run. For some the realisation that failure to get forward would result in the sack provided a powerful stimulant: to others the enemy's decision to fall back
on their particular front sometimes gave welcome relief. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Haig's grasp of the true military situation at this time was nearer the truth than that of Foch, Petain, and Pershing. When on August 21 Winston Churchill, the Minister of Munitions, came to discuss with him production plans for 1919, Haig assured him that the chances of finishing the war by the end of the year were good.
The advance continues The operations which now
followed lack
names which capture the imagination. They had, so far as the British were concerned, to be invented by a committee after the war. Allied unanimity in nomenclature
was never achieved. For the
British they are the battles of Albert, Arras, the Scarpe,
Peronne-Bapaume, Drocourt-Queant, Havrincourt and Epehy: for the French the battles of Picardy, Montdidier and Noyon: for the Americans St Mihiel. On the British front, where the greater part of the fighting took place, the highlights were the entry of the Third and First Armies into the fray on August 21, the capture of Mont St Quentin and Peronne by the Australian Corps which Rawlinson, the Army
Commander, considered
to be 'the finest
single feat of the whole war', the breaking of the Drocourt-Queant line by the Canadian Corps, the forcing of the Canal du Nord on September 4 and of the Somme on September 5, the elimination of the St Mihiel salient by the American First Army between September 12 and 15 and, finally, the penetration on the 18th of the old British front line of 1917 which the Germans had turned into a position of considerable strength. The technique employed by the Third Army in the Battle of Albert, which duly
2949
began on August
21, provides an excellent illustration of the difficulties which had to be surmounted and the methods used by the British for the rest of the campaign. On the front north of Albert three corps of three divisions each faced eight German divisions strongly entrenched across the
watershed between the Somme and the Scarpe. Much of this area was the old
Somme
battlefield of 1916.
The army was
supported by 828 eighteen-pounders and 4.5 howitzers and 466 heavy pieces. It also had two brigades of tanks. Under its command was the 111th Brigade RAF, brought up to ten squadrons by the addition of two American and four additional British squadrons. Of these one squadron was attached to each corps for low-flying attacks; another was at the disposal of
each tank brigade commander to carry out low-flying attacks on anti-tank guns. The artillery, now greatly aided by technical developments such as direction finding, flash spotting and air photography and interpretation had by now reached a comparatively high stage of efficiency. Their task was to provide the barrage which would not only prepare the way for the infantry but guide them to their objective as well. The tanks, like the infantry, were expected to follow the barrage closely and crush the enemy machine guns and wire. Thus the extreme range of the barrage formed the limit of the infantry advance. Using these tactics the two northernmost corps on the Third Army front on August 21 attacked soon after first light and, helped to some extent by the morning fog, carried all before them. A hot and sunny day followed. By nightfall all the objectives prescribed for the daj had bee taken except on the extreme right wh< the swamps along the Ancre, skilfully exploited by the Germans, brought V C< to a halt. Next day, however, the Fourth Army using III Corps entered the battle, obliterated the enemy salient between the
2950
Somme and
the Ancre and recaptured the ruins of Albert to find that the Leaning Virgin had fallen from the church tower. It had long been a superstition held by the whole of the British army that when this happened the war would be near its end. The news was passed all the way to Ypres and back to the base. Thus the stage was set for the general advance on August 23 on the whole front from Soissons to Arras. In fact the three French armies achieved little but on the Fourth Army front south of the Somme Monash thrust forward with the 32nd British and 1st Australian Divisions to drive the Germans out of the tangled valleys about Chuignes, the last stretch of habitable country in front of the devastated area of 1916. Fought in great heat, the battle proved a disaster for the Germans, who were no match for the Australian infiltration tactics nor for their peculiar propensity for fighting with the bayonet. Outfought, the Germans were forced to evacuate the bend of the Somme leaving behind them many prisoners and dead. Amongst the loot was the monster gun of 15-inch calibre which had shelled Amiens. This weighed 500 tons, had a range of 24 miles and a barrel 70 feet long. Each shell weighed a ton. This was the largest trophy captured by the Allies in the whole war. Surprisingly no one thought of transporting it to Australia: it would have made a fine memorial on Bondi beach. August 23 was a good day too for the Third Army north of Albert. Encouraged by the presence of Haig, Byng attacked numerically superior German forces on a front of seven divisions wiping out whole German regiments in a victorious advance
and taking many prisoners.
All objectives
Above: August 9, 1918. German troops captured during the Canadian advance waiting to entrain. From August 8 onwards German troops surrendered with increasing alacrity
were taken. Although the German machine gunners continued to resist with their normal courage and skill there were now signs of a continuing decline in German morale. Despite a break in the weather the advance continued on the 24th and 25th on the fronts of both armies. The Germans flung in a further eleven divisions to no avail. By the evening of the 25th the
'!•;,«; ;
i$4
was imminent was a great increase in artillery fire as their gunners used up their ammunition dumps. Actual withdrawals were covered by increased fire from highvelocity
Below:
Irles,
Somme; August
1918.
A
British
gun-carrier transports a 6-inch Howitzer. The
use of self-propelled, armoured weapons gave the Allies an advantage over the Germans.
Ten days previously Haig had instructed Home, the Commander of the First Army, plan for an attack south-east of Arras designed to pierce the Drocourt-Queant line and then swing south to threaten the rear of the Germans opposing the Third Army. He now ordered him to implement this plan. Accordingly on the 26th the Canadian Corps, consisting of the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions and the 51st Highland Division, attacked with great dash towards Monchy-le-Preux and brought off a spectacular advance of four miles. This attack and continued pressure by the Third and Fourth Armies and the three French armies to the south finally brought home to Ludendorff the fact that he must abandon Bapaume and the whole devastated area north and west of the Somme. That night, August 26/27, orders went out from his headquarters for a gradual withdrawal to a line behind the southern bend of the Somme from Peronne to Ham and thence south to Noyon. This still left him between 15 and 20 miles elbow room in front of the main Hindenburg defences except near Arras where the line already joined the to
main
Foch, serene in the calm atmosphere of chateau, now urged Haig to 'continue the pursuit' regardless of loss, flank protection and indeed commonsense, assuring him that the Germans were 'retreating in disorder'. This was not the case on the British front and on the French front they had no reason to do so. The picture during the next three days on the fronts of both British and French armies north of Soissons is rather one of a gradual withdrawal to the new line. In this type of operation the Germans continued to excel. The usual indication that withdrawal on their part his
Army was approaching Peronne; of the Somme the Third Army now
Fourth
north threatened Bapaume. Considering the lack of experience of mobile warfare on the part of both the troops and their commanders and staffs the progress made by the British divisions was good. It must be admitted, however, that many showed far less initiative than the Australians.
position.
guns
firing at long range. Single
gun detachments in woods and copses augmented the interlocking fire of well sited machine guns, leap-frogging backwards only when threatened by infantry envelopment. Behind them they left all habitable shelter booby-trapped and usually
fouled as well.
With true German
thoroughness they wasted nothing
to
make
their opponents' task as difficult as possible. Nonetheless, they were forced to abandon stores and equipment. It was in the rear, however, and in Germany that the real moral rot set in. Buoyed up by the dramatic advances of March, April and May, and the arrival in Germany of train loads of prisoners, the whole German nation had been certain of early victory. Then in June and early July with the checks in the battles of the Matz and Rheims doubts had arisen. Every day in
August had brought bad news from the This and the sight of the railway stations and lines choked with a neverending procession of hospital trains and cattle trucks packed with wounded evacuated from the hospitals of Northern France
front.
struck dread into the hearts of the German people and their masters. The Crown Prince returning to the front from sick leave wrote in his diary about this time: 'In Nuremberg an inscription on a troop train read "SLAUGHTER CATTLE FOR
WILHELM AND
SONS".' August 30 Monash's Australian Corps had closed with the angle of the Somme opposite Peronne and. E thanks to his foresight in insisting that both banks should be included within his i
By the evening
of
l
corps front, established his 3rd Divis; at | Clery on the north bank. Due south this » <
had two crossings of sorts at | Omiecourt and Buscourt. Opposite Per- I village he
2951
meandered through a yards wide; immediately west \ed a canal. All bridges had been .
ed.
Frontal attack, therefore, oppos-
Peronne was out of the question. One mile north of the town the feature known as Mont St Quentin, surrounded by several belts of thick wire and approachable only over glacis slopes destitute of cover, comdominated the east/ west and pletely e
north/south reaches of the
§
ments of no
less
than
five
Somme. German
Eledivi-
I sions held this apparently impregnable | defended area. When Monash told Rawlina son that he was prepared to take it by 5 storm, the latter was incredulous. E At 0500 hours on August 31, the 5th
Brigade of the 2nd Australian Division, only 70 officers and 1,250 men strong, which had been brought across from the far bank of the river by way of the crossing at Omiecourt, assaulted Mont St Quentin. There now followed four days of close infantry fighting of almost unprecedented ferocity. By nightfall on the first day the Australians had secured a foothold on the mountain. That night Monash passed over from the south bank the 5th Australian Division which finally, fighting every inch of the way, carried not only all the high ground but Peronne itself. Meanwhile the Australian 3rd Division on the northern flank had driven the few surviving Germans off the Bouchavesnes spur in equally
bitter fighting.
Unquestionably the Aus-
tralian victory at Peronne offers the finest example of successful infantry fighting in the war. No less than eight Victoria Crosses were won in three vital days. Posterity may well marvel at the toughness and cool courage of these Australian soldiers: for example, that of Private Curry who rushed a field gun firing at short range and holding up his battalion. Despite heavy machine gun fire from both flanks he killed the entire crew single-handed and captured the gun. Then there was Private Macatier who, alone and in broad, daylight, attacked a strongly held enemy trench, killed the entire machine gun garrison of eight men with his revolver and
bombs and flung the machine gun over the
Below: The capture of Albert. Ruins of the railway junction, August 22, 1918. Foch was anxious for the rail links to be restored. Below left: New Zealanders in a captured
parapet. Altogether within the hour he killed 15 men and took 30 prisoners. Meanwhile to the north astride the
i
German emplacement near
Grevilliers. The huge anti-tank rifles were in fact scaled-up infantry rifles. Below right: H. Dunns wash drawing of Sunday morning in the woods at Cunel. After four years, morale was a vital
Arras-Marquion road the Canadian Corps on September 2 had burst through defences almost as formidable as those at Mont St Quentin. These were the deep trenches, concrete emplacements and forests of barbed wire of the Drocourt-Queant switch, an outlying spur of the Hindenburg position sited in great depth partly on a forward and partly on a reverse slope. Of the 500 tanks which had started the renewed offensive on August 21 only 50 were now left to support the Canadians. Nonetheless, attacking at first light, they had by
factor for both sides
<4> •
*•
4
iiil
-s ^ST^m **ztr*-*j£&-*r \
5*«*""*p
H Bflv
1
.
•***$&£ .
v
•^rzwsm&sc
&
F*Ki
s
i
m¥ flP
*V^ *
•i
\
>%
^«a
**£***
^^*%.
ite severe losses, burst right igh the position and reached the open try beyond. This blow coming on top the Australian exploit at Peronne had mediate effect. Around 1400 hours Ludendorff acknowledged defeat and issued orders for general retirement in gradual stages to behind the Sensee and the Canal du Nord and, further south, to the Hindenburg Line. In other words the whole great salient won in March was to be abandoned. Furthermore all the gains made on the Lys in April were to be given up. The night of September 2/3 was exceptionally dark; not until several hours after dawn did it become evident that the Germans had started to withdraw on the front of the First and Third Armies. By 0900 hours however the forward infantry were on the move and, brushing aside comparatively light resistance, approached the Canal du Nord by the evening. Haig, fully aware of the fact that the attack on the main Hindenburg Line would inevitably involve heavy casualties and demand detailed preparation, therefore forbade his 1
1
P «?,
Below: British cavalry passing the ruins of Albert Church. It was •
9
»
*
said in the British that when the Leaning Virgin fell from the tower the war would be nearly over. Now the guns had shot it down. Inset
army
left: Highland troops fire warning shots into a German dugout. The sledge was used by the Germans to carry equipment and supplies through the mud.
Inset right: British motor transport
crossing a bridge over the Somme marshes. Lorries were increasingly
coming
into
general use
;
Mt limits
nders to undertake, for the deliberate operations on a is. Meanwhile they were merely to aain touch with the enemy. Furthermore as many as possible of the infantry were to be pulled back into reserve, rested and retrained: the staffs, engineers and services were to concentrate on repairs to roads, building bridges and bringing forward the vast quantities of ammunition and stores which would be needed to sustain the assault on the Hindenburg Line. It was a badly shaken German army, sing,
rapidly deteriorating owing to casualties, exposure and lack of sleep, which was now falling back before Haig's advanced guards towards the main Hindenburg defences. Since the start of the renewed British offensive on August 21 divisions had melted away; reinforcements could only be found by breaking up further divisions.
Nevertheless it was still being handled at the forward end with great professional skill, especially by the German non-
commissioned officers who in most cases were still prepared to fight if need be to the bitter end. With the troops and resources at his disposal it is doubtful whether at any time it was in Haig's power to exploit a breakthrough except locally with the Aus-
To some extent this was the price which had to be paid for the dispropor-
tralians.
tionate slaughter of
young British
officers
non-commissioned officers in the battles of 1917 and the losses of the spring. Nevertheless the advance had been a noteworthy achievement — approxi mately 14 miles on the front of three armies. 46,241 prisoners had been taken at a cost of approximately 89,000 British killed and wounded — a mere drop in the bucket compared with their losses in 1916, 1917 and the spring of 1918. Using 34 divisions Haig, by the first week in September, had defeated 66 German divisions, though admittedly some were of poor quality and under strength. German losses were estimated at about 115,600 and great quanti-
and
ties of material.
The Americans
clear St Mihiel Ever since his arrival in France in 1917 Pershing had made it clear that he must eventually have a separate and distinct American army with its own sector of the front. At the time of the British and French disasters in March, April, May, •June and July he had, with great magnanimity and at risk to his personal standing with his own army and government, allowed United States divisions to be put into battle under direct British and French command. At the end of August when Foch proposed that Pershing's forces should be split between the French Second and Fourth Armies for an advance on Mezieres he finally put his foot down. On August 31 he told Foch in a letter worded with all the dignity and deadliness of understatement, 'In your capacity as Allied Commander-in-Chief it is your province to decide as to the strategy of operations and I abide by your decisions. Finally, however, there is one thing which must not be done and that is to disperse the American Forces amongst the All it Armies; the danger of destroying by such dispersion the fine morale of the American soldier is too great, to say nothing of the results to be obtained by using the American Army as a whole. If you decide to utilise American forces in attacking in the direc1
2956
tion of Mezieres
I
accept this decision.'
Nothing could have been more unequivocally clear that this was his final word on a subject which had bedevilled inter-Allied relations throughout the spring and summer. Foch at last understood. The American First Army, which had been activated on August 10, accordingly went ahead with its own plans to eliminate the St Mihiel salient. It consisted of 16 divisions, each twice the size of an Allied or enemy division, organised as three corps and a reserve and the II French Colonial Corps. All its 3,000 guns were of British manufacture and of its 2,000 aircraft, 1,400 were British and 600 French. Also under its command were the British Independent
Bombing Squadrons under Trenchard.
Unknown
to the Americans, Ludendorff in fact ordered the evacuation of the salient on September 8 and on the 11th, when at first light in heavy fog the American attacks on both faces went in, the withdrawal of the heaviest guns had already started. Throughout the day the air forces operating under the command of Colonel William Mitchell provided substantial and effective support. Within 36 hours the salient had been cleared and
had
prisoners and 250 guns taken. American casualties were comparatively low — 7,000. On Foch's orders Pershing halted the advance on reaching the base of the salient. Thus in the space of 48 hours the last of the great German bulges in the Allied Front had been erased. In retrospect there is little doubt that if the Americans had been allowed to drive on as they wished either to Longuyon or towards Metz spectacular results could have been achieved. Meanwhile on the British front the slow and methodical withdrawal towards the main Hindenburg position continued. At night the sky was red with the flames of burning villages: the days were punctuated by the dull thuds of ammunition dumps being blown up behind the German lines. The need now was to penetrate the outlying defences of the great fortified belt and get general observation over its main features so that the grand attack between St
15,000
Quentin and Cambrai
for
which Foch had
directed Haig to plan could be mounted by the British First, Third and Fourth Armies. Accordingly on September 12 the New Zealand, 37th and 12th Divisions attacked at Havrincourt and gained possession of part of the Hindenburg system, killing many Germans in the process. Finally on September 18 near Epehy, the Third and Fourth Armies attacked on a seven-mile front north of St Quentin. Once more the Australian corps, despite the fact that its battalions were down to 350 or less, advanced three miles and ended the day looking down on the main German defences. In the process they took nearly 5,000 prisoners and 76 guns. The British corpson the flanks caught upwith them next day. Thus by the evening of September 19 Haig, in full knowledge that British manpower resources were running low, that failure would inevitably revive German morale and give Lloyd George the
excuse he had long sought to sack him, was able to tell Foch that he would be ready to assault the main Hindenburg defences on about September 26. Since August 8 the British armies had advanced on average nearly 25 miles on a 40-mile front over an area interlaced with
the trenches, shell holes and wire of old and new battlefields, at a cost of 180,000 casualties. When the fact is taken into consideration that in the Somme battles of 1916 it had taken four and a half months to advance eight miles at a cost of 420,000 men it is obvious that the British armies had staged a remarkable come-back since the reverses of the spring. In the process they had taken 50,000 prisoners and killed large numbers of Germans.
The main burden
of the Alliance
Judged from the standpoint of military academic theory the Allied main effort, carried out by the British armies, had been applied at the wrong place. The ParisAmiens railway was never in any danger. Most of the German forces were immediately west of Rheims where their communications ran east-west. A glance at the map makes it obvious that an all-out offensive here would theoretically have offered better prospects. Foch instead chose to attack on the British front, thus pushing the Germans back frontally along their lines of communication in the north, because Petain and some of his generals, with the notable exception of Mangin, either had no stomach for the fight or thought that the French had already had more than their fair share of the casualties and because the Americans were not ready until September 10 to operate as an army on their own. In the process he condemned the British to frontal attacks and a battle of attrition. His continued nagging of Haig to press on regardless of loss and the actual tactical situation can only be regarded as selfish, ill-timed and unjustifiable. Incidentally, in the actual operations the co-
operation given to Haig by the French, particularly Debeney, had been less than
whole-hearted.
Whether at any time the British forces could have achieved more than they actually did is open to question. Haig had hoped for a breakthrough by the Third Army to be followed by a thrust southwards with the help of the Cavalry Corps, designed to envelop the Germans facing the Fourth Army. In fact no horseman could have survived for long in the conditions of the Western Front at this time.
|
with every inch of which he was thoroughly familiar. In these circumstances
every
the only feasible tactics in the face of opposition were limited attacks in which the infantry followed an artillery barrage moving ahead of them. The success the infantry achieved must be partly attributed to the patience and courage of their junior officers and non-commissioned officers and to the greater attention to their welfare given by the High Command. At long last care was taken to see that where possible they were properly rested and fed between battles and that operations which had ceased to pay a dividend were promptly suspended. It remained to be seen whether the logistic system would be able to stand up to the strain of the grand assault and large-scale advances now contemplated. Haig never bore himself better than at this time, when his armies carried the main burden of the Alliance. Throughout he had
on a separate army under American command had had Haig's sympathy. Whilst recognising Foch's authority in matters of broad strategy, he had nevertheless resisted persistent French attempts to get control of British resources and to squander British life on operations for which he could see no tactical justification. He now faced with equanimity, despite the discouragement of Henry Wilson the CIGS, the grim prospect of launching his army in the attack on the immensely strong Hindenburg position — three distinct lines of defence roughly 3,000 to 5,000 yards apart, covered by the tank-proof obstacle of the Canal du Nord, well furnished with shellproof dugouts and underground communications, studded in great depth with concrete machine-gun posts and protected by veritable forests of barbed wire straddling
•
-
More intelligent use of the two battalions Whippet tanks for pursuit purposes
of
admittedly might have been made. Their numbers, however, were small and their mechanical efficiency was low. With the notable exception of the Australians and the New Zealanders, the infantry lacked the leaders, the training and the experience necessary for sustained mobile opera-
The problem of satisfactory intercommunication between the infantry and artillery and the ground forces generally and the air was still unsolved. What is remarkable is that with 50% of the infantry under the age of 19 they fought as well as they did against an enemy strong in machine guns and a past master in the art tions.
of conducting a withdrawal, deliberately booby-trapping and fouling all available shelter, over ground of his own choosing,
kept his headquarters train close to the headquarters of the army making the main effort at the time. He had thus been able to keep his finger on the pulse of the battle more effectively than he had ever done before. According to Monash, unquestionably the ablest Allied general of the war, Haig was a frequent caller at his corps headquarters and 'never departed without leaving a stimulating impression of his placid, hopeful and undaunted personality nor without generous recognition of the work which the Corps was doing'. He was certainly better advised by his Intelligence branch and better served by his staff than in any previous period of the war. Although he was understandably reluctant to release the American divisions training behind his front, his relations with Pershing had been frank and straightforward in
characterised by mutual
in successive belts.
it
Queant, captured on September 3, 1918. g Barbed wire defences show the strength of the S Hindenburg Line. Below: Australians advancing e in open order behind an Allied bombardment Left:
way and
respect. In principle Pershing's insistence
In the south, the
Americans and French too now stood ready to strike the other major blow in what would be, although few realised it, the final offensive of the
Further Reading Barclay, Brigadier C. (Dent, 1968) Barnett, Correlli, The (Penguin 1966)
war.
N.,
Armistice 1918
Swordbearers
Coffman, Edward M., The War to End all Wars (Oxford University Press 1968)
Edmonds, Brigadier-General
Sir
James
E.,
France and Belgium 1918, August 8-September 26 (Macmillan 1947) Monash, Major-General Sir John, The Australian Victories in France (Angus and Robertson, Military Operations,
Sydney 1936) Montgomery, Sir Archibald, The Story of the Fourth Army (Hodder & Stoughton 1926) Pershing, General J J., My Experiences in the World War (Hodder & Stoughton 1931) Terraine, John, Impacts of War (Hutchinson 1970)
[For Major-General H. Essame's biography, see
page 1185] 2957
Far right: A US artillery captain. Far right background: To the Victor belong the Spoils.' American soldiers with a prisoner collecting German equipment as trophies, in September 1918, drawn by George Harding. 1. The .30-inch Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR,, Model 1918. This has no bipod, unlike later models, weighed 16 pounds and used a 20-round, staggered row box magazine 2. Top: The US manufactured, Enfield designed, Mauser system, calibre .30-inch Model 1917 rifle, commonly known in Britain as the P17. In 1917, the Winchester and Remington companies were already producing Enfield rifles for British use. They were able to modify the design to take the standard US cartridge. It was a heavy and clumsy gun, but was one of the sturdiest military rifles ever produced. Bottom: The calibre 30-inch Model 1903 rifle, commonly known as the 03 Springfield. These were in short supply when the US entered the First World War. 3. Top. The calibre 45-inch Colt Model 1917 revolver. CenfrerThe calibre 45-inch Model 191 Browning automatic pistol, manufactured b Remington. It has a simple mechanism, alow velfr oping power. It is still the standard hand gun in use with the US Army Bottom: The calibre .45inch Smith & Wesson M^del 1917 revolver. 4. The calibre .30-inch Browning Model 1917 n gun. The tripod, though of the period, in standard use with model of the gun •
2958
s
v^
x
-'
Ifi
kV
life.
^
t-
".
v
\
*V
k
•#53 T^s-Wr^r
* I
0^'
~j\
i
\
W3P> \J
>^-
America, the daughter of Europe, crossed the ocean to wrest her mother '
.
.
.
.
.
.
from the
humiliation of thralldom and to save civilisation.'
J 9 59
For four years the size and position of the St Mihiel salient made its existence a serious handicap for the French. Its elimination was an essential preliminary to an offensive against Metz, which the Americans hoped to capture. It also provided the
first
opportunity for the
fresh American army to prove its effectiveness, and both sides would J.
2960
be anxiously watching the outcome. W. Stock. A^ue: Americans taking cover during the advance
SI
K Pi
and its effect on* the French conduct of the war in this area, the salient represented a considerable success to German arms, for in a war where a few yards of ground were often to be exchanged at the expense of thousands of casualties, the cost to the Germans had been ridiculously low; they had gained a large area of easily defensible countryside for the loss of
territorial gain
attempts to storm the French citadel of Verdun. This attack had been unsuccessful, for the defences held firm; though, like the incoming tide washing around a rock, the Germans had been able to advance a little further on the west side into the forest of the Argonne, capturing Varennes; whilst to the south a detachment had broken through the French line and nraiFnon:iir^»» o«t»iv bank of the Meuse. The salient whicl some 32 miles in t
^t
in the southern half of the Western Front to the south-west of the fortress town of Metz, it was the most pronounced of the many salients formed during four years of hard and bitter fighting. The salient had been formed in the late autumn of 1914 during one of the earlier
Situated
French communica since; lying athwart me rams w roaiwy railway, and forming an additional barrier to any attack into Lorraine. In terms of
'
a mere hundred men. Throughout the remainder of the war, the salient was to play an important role in the battles fought in the area. In 1916 especially, during the Verdun battles, the salient had posed such a threat to the French lines of communication, that a secondary road had to bear the great weight of munition and supply wagons so urgently needed in the grim struggle around the fortress, and the men engaged in con*" ally reinstating its crumbling f"
prestige,
•
e
I'd
Americans should
it.
American Comhad from the outset been
rshing, the hief,
determined that his troops should operate independently, preferably in an entirely American sector of the front, and although he allowed some of his divisions to fight under British and French command in the desperate emergency of the German Spring Offensive, when the crisis passed he de-
manded
the return of his units. On August Pershing formally took command
10, 1918,
of the
US
First
Army whose
staff
was
al-
enthusiastically planning the ready reduction of the St Mihiel salient. Vei\y early in the planning stage, his staff urged that the objective be extended beyond the base-line of the salient — reserve defence line known by the Germans as the Michel Stellung — and suggested that the attacking troops continue at least as far as the railway opposite the centre of the position, then perhaps bearing eastwards to assault the fortress of Metz. The plan laid down that both faces of the salient were to be driven in by simultaneous attacks whilst pressure was exerted on the tip— 15 American divisions being earmarked to strike at the sides while four French divisions were selected
to
fight
the
diversionary
action
at
the
western extremity. Both Pershing and Foch approved the plan. Foch went further and extravagantly increased the French contribution to ten divisions, at the same time suggesting that the frontage of the attack be widened until it was no longer a simple pinching out operation, but bore a close resemblance to the old familiar frontal attack, traditional
on the Western Front. It was at this point that Haig intervened. When Haig heard of the proposed American attack he at once objected to Foch that it was to be delivered against the wrong -l
part of the line. Haig had in mind a series of converging attacks for the forthcoming campaign launched along the length of the front from the Belgian coast to the River Meuse. The American plan did not, therefore,
conform
to his strategic
thinking at
that time, so he suggested that the strength of the Americans would be best used in an attack up through the Argonne, arguing that if the assault had as its objective Mezieres instead of Metz, then the ultimate aim of both operations would be the same — namely the cutting of the lateral
railway
which was such an important
feature of German cohesion. Moreover, the capture of Mezieres should prove easier
4#
#*«
*2
Oe
-
Left: A
German
gun with
wooded
its
naval
crew
country.
in
Guns
could take a heavy toll. Right: A
like this
camouflaged German 15-cm gun mounted on a ^arge. Allied troops called
its
shell
a crump'
X rti
*
J
than the taking of Metz which had been 'the with some justification,
called,
strongest
fortress
in
Europe'.
Having
reached Mezieres, the Americans would then be in a position to threaten the German concentration in the north by a swift advance down the Meuse. When consulted by Foch, Petain approved of Haig's proposals, so the suggestion was put to Pershing that the St Mihiel plan be shelved and the Argonne plan offered in its place. Pershing too was attracted to the idea, but at the same time became aware — yet again -that behind Foch's enthusiasm
American participation in a large scale battle lay the old desire to have American divisions fighting under French command. The American was adamant. He was prepared to limit the St Mihiel attack or even
for
to abandon it altogether on condition that his army fought independently. The argu-
ments were lengthy, but the salient still existed and Pershing earnestly desired an American operation. His First Army staff had cherished and worked upon the plan for the reduction of the salient in such a dedicated fashion that it was now decided to proceed with it, limiting its scope so that it would finish on the line of the Michel Stellung. The objective had to be gained quickly, for in the event of agreement on the use of US troops in the Argonne offensive, the full effort of First Army would have to be transferred to that sector in time to synchronise the American attack with those of her allies. Right: American troops waiting to advance at Hattonchatel, sketched by W. J. Aylward. Below: The reduction of the St Mihiel salient, September 12-16, 1918
2964
In the revised St Mihiel plan, six American divisions were to push in the southeastern face of the salient, whilst on the north-western face the 26th (Yankee) Division, together with the French 2nd and 15th Divisions, would break through and advance towards them. At the same time, three other French divisions would put sufficient pressure on the Germans in the 'nose' of the projection to keep them occupied while their retreat was cut off. The six divisions attacking from the south-east were to be divided into two corps — the US IV Corps commanded by General
Dickman and
consisting of the 1st, 42nd and 89th Divisions, and the US I Corps containing the 2nd, 5th and 90th Divisions under General Hunter Liggett. The combined French-American force on the northwestern side made up the V Corps; whilst the troops at the western tip of the salient would be the French II Colonial Corps. As an army, the US First was somewhat ill-balanced insofar as it lacked heavy support weapons in any number. During the heavy fighting of the German Spring Offensive, both the French and British had asked for American infantry and machine gun units to reinforce their hard-pressed troops and these had been shipped across
the Atlantic with the highest priority. As a consequence, American artillery was almost non-existent and most of the 3,000 guns which would provide support for the forthcoming attack were French. The 260 tanks would also be French though some were to be manned by American crews; while of the 1,500 aircraft available to Pershing, only 609 would be piloted by Americans; the remainder would be British, French, Italian and Portuguese. The date for the operation was September 12 and as the days of late August and early September went by, units gathered together from all over France to join the newly formed First Army. Elaborate attempts were made to conceal the buildup for the impending attack. Artillery
moved
into position with heavy-handed secrecy; while, in an attempt to dupe the defenders of the salient, letters intimating that attacks were about to be made in other sectors of the line were left lying about with studied carelessness. Unfortunately, the newspapers of Europe an-
nounced the approaching assault with the to forthcoming attractions at the theatre; one Swiss
same assurance they gave
journal going so far as to forecast the exact time and place of the American offensive. Despite this unwelcome publicity, the young American soldiers had confidence in themselves and in their ability to execute the plan so painstakingly formulated by their staff, whatever the state of preparedness of the German defenders. Numbers were certainly on the side of the Allies, for massed around the periphery of the salient
were some 48,000 Frenchmen and 216,000 Americans: the German commander, General Fuchs, had only 75,000 men. Although the St Mihiel operation could be termed the spring of the American offensive in Europe, the weather on the evening of September 11, 1918, was autumnal. A leaden sky wept over the salient obscuring the opposing lines of trenches and the shell-pocked countryside in which they lay. In the evening, the weak September daylight was easily extinguished by the low-hanging rain clouds, and night came early to the Western Front.
Under cover
of darkness, the laden in-
fantrymen moved up to the line, waterproofs gleaming on the hump-backed figures and rain dripping from the rims of their helmets. They were under orders to maintain silence on the march, although from the rear the sound of munition wagons and the squeak and clank of tank
movements
clearly could be heard. these seemingly superfluous orders, the soldiers exchanged only brief whispered remarks as they slipped and slithered through interminable muddy trenches on their way to the start-line of the attack. There was no sign of life from the German trenches, visible to the Americans in the eerie, pale radiance of the occasional
Obedient
Very
to
light as they settled into their pre-
attack positions. The trenches lay silent and brooding on the other side of No-Man's Land, whose torn and mutilated surface they must shortly cross. An hour after midnight the period of waiting, for the gunners at least, came to an end. All along the line the signal was
given simultaneously by artillery
officers,
so that at precisely 0100 hours on Sep-
tember 12, the darkness was lit by the muzzle flashes of the massed artillery and the watching troops saw the German lines erupt in a holocaust of bursting shells. The shorter-range guns concentrated on the trench lines and barbed-wire entanglements, while the mediums and heavies probed beyond, seeking to destroy German artillery positions, strong-points, or rest billets to the rear. The largest pieces sent their huge shells high above the earth's surface to fall, with a sound like buildings collapsing, on the railways around Metz. Lying in the rain and uncomfortable in their positions on the start-line, the American soldiers watched the heavy bombard-
ment and wondered
at its effect
on the
defending troops. It was reassuring to see great bursts of flame from the shells falling on such known strong-points as Mont Sec, a prominence honey-combed with tunnels and well fortified, which the men of Dickman's IV Corps were soon to storm. The barrage went on and on. The ground beneath the waiting infantrymen shook with the continuous firing of the guns; the air above their heads vibrated with the passage of the shells, and so complete did the destruction wrought on the German lines appear to be, that the start of the attack seemed preferable to lying out exposed to the steady rain.
The Germans withdraw At 0500 hours, the bombardment changed in character. It shortened and became a creeping barrage: a concentrated broom of shell-fire sweeping ahead of the infantry and tanks. The attack had begun. Tanks
and squeaked forward; the inand thrust out before them and bodies twisted instinc-
clanked
fantry, with bayonets fixed
tively to present a smaller target, skirting the still smoking shell holes, but maintaining their forward progress. In many places the wire still stood or at least presented a shell-torn barrier to the advance, but the Americans, learning from the experience of
their French allies, had supplemented their normal issue of wire clippers by making local purchases from hardware shops, and some of the men carried rolls of wire netting to throw over the barbed wire which survived the shelling. What wire remained
swiftly cut, climbed over, or, in some jumped over, moving a French watcher to observe, in his comments on the battle, that 'Americans were well suited to this sort of work as they have longer legs'. It all seemed very easy; when the leading elements of the attack reached the first line of German trenches they found out why. The Germans had gone. As the US First Army had been moving up to the attack, the German defenders within the salient had been withdrawn in order to shorten the length of the line they had to defend, with the result that many of the shells fired with such prodigality by thr massive
was
places,
assembly of artillery landed to no purpose on empty defences, though some of the retreating troops were caught by the longer-ranged projectiles on the roads leading out of the pocket. The Germans had miscalculated the timing of their withdrawal and the soldiers fighting the rearguard action had to do so without supporting fire from their artillery.
The American attack in the south went As the day progressed the weather
well.
started to improve until a watery sun put in an appearance — a happy augury of the outcome of the battle. German shelling was light. The guns had either been moved out or destroyed, and the few which did come into action were rapidly silenced by counter-battery fire directed from aircraft. Occasionally the advance was held up by isolated machine gun posts manned by
brave and determined men, which took their toll of casualties before being overrun by sheer weight of numbers. Prisoners started to trickle back through the first of attackers. The trickles became rivulets and the rivulets converged into streams, until a steady flow of doleful men
wave
made
its
way back towards
the prison
cages.
An Austro-Hungarian division made
little
attempt either to retreat in good
order or to put up a fight; it marched towards the advancing Americans, weapons slung, and swelled the flood of disconsolate prisoners-of-war by surrendering almost to a man. In one sector, the American commander, perhaps carried away by the ease of the advance, ordered a cavalry patrol forward to scout ahead of the infantry. It was quickly discouraged by machine gun fire, and broke off before being decimated, and the folly was not repeated. The operation continued to go well; a good hour before
midday found
I
Corps at their
final objective for that day,
and only a short
Liggett's
time later they arrived at the point selected for the end of the second day, for General Liggett, realising that his men were facing lighter opposition than had been expected, had speeded up his timetable.
Meanwhile, IV Corps under General Dickman, attacking on the left of I Corps, were also ahead of schedule and had made their first day's deadline with ease. As evening came, the forces which had assaulted the
south-eastern
side
of the
on a line Nonsard-PannesThiaucourt, and were still moving forward. Despite the speed of advance of most of the elements of I and IV Corps, the battle was not yet won. Although by the time darkness fell on September 12 the 1st salient
Division
lay
was
into the Bois de Vigneulles, a
gap about 10 kilometres wide still lay between it and the Yankee Division fighting its way down from the north-western flank of the salient, enabling the fleeing Ger-
2965
-•.t„Cs.;:;^
'With a new army it is possible to carry a formidable position, but not to carry out a plan or design/ — Napoleon Below: Young Americans
of the 132nd Infantry, 33rd Division, in a front line trench, awaiting attack on September 17, 1918. in sight of the Meuse valley. Far left: A more peaceful scene; American soldiers rest in the sun, with spades and pickaxes beside them in a shallow trench. In the background, the wire. Lett: American infantry crossing a stubble field to attack the German lines. The First Army was very short of artillery, and inexperienced troops felt particularly vulnerable in open country like this. Right: American lorries, a motor cycle combination and converted Model T Fords mix with horses in the main street of the village of Limey, September 13, 1918. The Ford Model T was one of the most widely used vehicles of the First World War, both by the British and the Americans
p
through
to safety.
General
progress of the ..ee Division, which with the French and 2nd Divisions composed V Corps, as being less satisfactory than that of I and IV Corps. The opposition met by the Yankee Division was considerable, and, with the exception of a battalion from the
ng
described
the
i
divisional reserve, it had been unable to reach its objective for the day. The Army Commander realised that the Germans were taking full advantage of the escape route between his forces, and
Generals Dickman and Liggett forward without delay. He himself took the telephone and called the commander of V Corps directing him to send forward at least one regiment towards the town of Vigneulles. General Clarence Edwards passed on the personally given directive from Pershing to the 102nd ordered
to press
Infantry Regiment of the 51st Brigade, and added the rider that he wanted them in Vigneulles before the vanguard of the 1st Division could make it. Firmly taking up the challenge, the 102nd Regiment set out with all despatch, not in combat formation but as a marching column; and so at 0215 hours On September 13 it entered Vigneulles in column of route, having captured an entire German ammunition train on the way, and immediately set about making dispositions to close the escape roads from the salient. At 0600 hours it was joined by the leading elements of the 1st Division advancing in a north-easterly direction. The St Mihiel salient, for so long a distinctive feature of the geography of the Western Front, had ceased to exist.
The advance stops During the remainder of the 13th the advance eastward was continued until all the corps were level with the most easterly point of General Liggett's I Corps; so that the Americans now held a line running through Haudiomont and Vandieres which represented the base-line of the former salient.
From
were able
their
new
positions observers
to see the defences of the
Michel
Stellung; defences which were clearly incomplete for they could see the Germans working feverishly, expecting the Americans to follow up their already considerable success with an advance towards Metz. To the men of the US First Army the way seemed clear for an unlimited advance eastward. Flushed with the successful conclusion of the St Mihiel operation, and seeing the German first line of defence in disarray before them, they could not under-
stand
why
they should be halted
when
the
of making a breakthrough seemed within their grasp: an advance into open country, the dream of every commander since the war had lapsed into stalemate in 1914, could for them become possibility
reality. Pershing himself later commented that an immediate advance on September 13 and after would have enabled the Americans to go beyond the Hindenburg Line and 'possibly into Metz' lowever, the arrangements made with the Supreme Allied Commander, Foch, were honoured and the front line congealed before the Michel Stellung. Whilst the major contribution to the success of the battle was made by the infantrymen fighting their way forward supported by artillery, aid to their more rapid progress was provided by tanks and airci During the St Mihiel battle aircraft I
2968
spotted targets for the guns and scout aeroplanes flew offensive patrols to prevent German scouts attacking the slower twoseater observation planes. It was on one of these offensive sorties that Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, who was to become the greatest American ace of the war, made his first contact with the highly successful and much feared Richthofen Circus. The encounter took place about four miles north of Pont-a-Mousson near the north-eastern corner of the salient, when Rickenbacker, flying a single-seat French-built machine, saw four German Fokkers trailing a group of American aircraft returning from a bombing raid over Metz. He manoeuvred until he had placed his aeroplane in the sun above and behind the German scouts. Selecting the last man in the formation, Rickenbacker dived and opened fire at 50 yards with his sights on the pilot's cockpit. The gaily-painted machine with the black Maltese crosses on its wings and fuselage slipped over onto its side, swooped wildly away from the formation and fell like a multi-coloured autumn leaf to the ground far below, its pilot dead at the controls. The three remaining Fokkers attacked the lone American with great skill and determination, and it was only Rickenbacker's superlative airmanship which enabled him to escape and return to his aerodrome. This was his sixth 'kill' and he was subsequently credited with 26 victories by the time the war ended. The Battle of St Mihiel ended on September 13, a little more than 30 hours after the attacking infantrymen had got up from their damp holes in the ground to follow the creeping barrage into the German lines. It was General Pershing's birthday, and for a present he had the successful con-
clusion
of
this
first
truly
independent
American operation on the Western Front. Because of the light resistance encountered by the assaulting troops, the battle has been referred to as 'the stroll at St Mihiel', or as 'the sector where the Americans relieved the Germans'; but these facile comments do the Americans less than justice, for they won a victory at St Mihiel and the ease with which a victory is achieved does not detract from its success. The scene presented to those watching the attack gave no indication that it would be anything other than a hard-fought action. General Pershing with a number of staff officers had climbed up to Fort Gironville, situated on high ground overlooking the battlefield from the south, and he described the effect of the artillery fire, both before and after dawn, as being at once 'picturesque and terrible'. He was unable to see the progress of his troops even from this vantage point, for as dawn broke his view was obscured by the drizzling rain and mist. Although the Commander was unable to follow the advance except as indicated by the barrage that preceded it, the thick weather helped to shroud the movement of the Americans from the defenders. Those envious of the American success sneered at the ease with which the salient was reduced, others perhaps overpraised the achievement -both President Poincareand premier Clemenceau visited the front to congratulate the victors, the former having a personal interest in making the visit since he owned a country house which had been liberated' by the advance; but it was a battle of considerable significance.
As far as Pershing and the American people were concerned, it justified the creation of an independent American army and proved the competence of their commanders and staff to handle a large military operation. A lesser man than Pershing might well have allowed the expeditionary force to become a huge manpower reserve for the other Allied armies which their commanders would have been only too pleased to accept. From a military point of view the operation's success cannot be gainsaid. It had reduced a salient, for long a thorn in the side of the French, 15,000 prisoners were taken and 450 guns captured. The American casualties numbered about 7,000, which by the standards of the Great War was very low, especially when measured against the large area of territory captured. Naturally there has been considerable speculation on the possible further successes which might have been won had the attack been allowed to continue and an assault made against the incomplete and weakly defended Michel Stellung. Such speculations are largely academic though it is possible to make an informed guess. Although it is certain that the Michel Stellung would have been breached, it is doubtful if the original strategic concept of the American planners would have been realised. There were few, if any, guns suitable for dealing with the formidable defences of Metz, and on the evidence of the unimpressive showing of the US transport during the subsequent Argonne offensive, it is by no means certain that it could have coped with a protracted advance over such poor quality roads as existed east of the Meuse. Although both Generals Pershing and Dickman claimed that, but for the limitations imposed by Foch, the Americans would have taken Metz, General Hunter
commented that, at the time, the Army was not the well-coordinated fighting machine it would have Liggett
US
First
leeded to be in order to achieve such a However much one may speculate upon such imponderables, the fact is that the Battle of St Mihiel initiated the Americans into large scale operations on the Western Front, and helped to create an army capable of successfully undertaking the bloody battles of the Argonne and after. success.
Further Reading Cruttwell, C. R. M. F., A History of the Great War (Oxford University Press 1934) Esposito, Vincent J. (ed), A Concise History of
World War I (Pall Mall Press, 1964) Fredericks, Pierce G., The Great Adventure (E. P. Dutton 1960) Liddell Hart, Through the Fog of War (FaberandFaber 1938) Pitt. Barrie, 1918: The Last Act (CasseW 1962) Werstein, Irving. Over Here and Over There (Norton 1968) J
W.
STOCK was educated
at
Bishop Wordsworth's
School, Salisbury He served in the Royal Corps of Signals until 1952, and then worked for ten years at the Atomic Weapons Research Station, Aldermaston. For many years he was a student of naval history, and became interested in the land battles of the First World War as a result of a study he carried out of the Zeebrugge raid For twelve years he has worked as a freelance adviser and was consultant to Barrie
War
Pitt
on Purnell's History of the Second World
.
John Joseph Pershing was born in Laclede, Missouri on September 13, 1860, to a family of modest means in the rural Middle West.
their own depleted ranks. Pershing insisted on training a separate American force and on keeping them aloof from the fighting until they were prepared to wage
He graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1886 as president of his class. His first active service was in the last series of Indian wars fought in the American West, when Pershing served in the cavalry. He received a Bachelor of Laws degree in 1893 while teaching at the University of Nebraska, and later taught military tactics at West Point. His academic career was interrupted by the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in
1898, when Pershing went to Cuba and won a Silver Star. Soon afterwards he was transferred to the Philippines where he joined the hard campaign the Americans waged against the Moros in Mindanao, winning the praise of the then-President Theodore Roosevelt. He was sent by Roosevelt to act as an observer in the RussoJapanese War of 1904-05. Roosevelt
rewarded him for his work in Manchuria by elevating Captain Pershing to the rank of brigadier-general in 1906 over the heads of hundreds of senior officers, an act which considerable bitterness against among his fellow officers for many years. After another tour in the Philippines Pershing was rushed back to the United States in 1916 to lead a military expedition into Mexico to pursue Pancho Villa, the Mexican revolutionary who had recently made a surprise attack on the town of Columbus, New Mexico. Arriving at El Paso, Texas, to join his troops, Pershing received the news that his wife and three small daughters had burned to death in San Francisco, his son, Warren, being the only survivor. Grimly Pershing led his punitive expedition across the border on March 15, 1916, and his troops plunged deep into Mexican territory. Although the Mexican troops which attempted to repel the Americans were easily swept aside, Pershing was unable to capture Villa after ten months of wandering through the hostile countryside of northern Mexico. But President Wilson appeared satisfied and made him a major-general. Pershing's expedition was recalled in February, 1917, and three months later, after the United States had entered the First World War, Pershing was sent to France with a hand-picked staff to command the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) which, at the time, did not yet exist. Pershing was given a free hand by Wilson to organise his forces, although he was cautioned by a Presidential directive to maintain his troops intact and not to allow them to be merged into a combined Allied unit. When he arrived in France Pershing discovered that the Allies wanted no untested American army; they preferred to have American manpower slowly fill created
Pershing
can no longer agree to any plan which involves the dispersion of our units. Briefly, our officers and
'I
.
.
soldiers alike are, after
one experience, no longer willing to be incorporated in other armies. The danger of destroying by such dispersion the fine morale of the American soldier is too great.' Pershing's refusal to allow further .
.
.
piecemeal deployment of the American forces and his persistence with the projected St Mihiel
were his chief contributions to the conduct of the war.
offensive
S. L. Mayer. Above: General Pershing as he appeared at the time of the St Mihiel offensive
an offensive. He was determined to prevent the Americans being dragged into the wastefulness of trench warfare, and envisioned an army of 1,000,000 men under his own command by spring 1918. Supported by the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, Pershing achieved his ends, much to the consternation of the Supreme War Council, composed of Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando. Severe pressure was put on the Americans by the Allies to relieve Pershing, but Baker protected him. When the German threat became increasingly serious during their massive offensive in 1918, Pershing volunteered some reinforcements to Foch, and American action at Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood stopped the Germans on the Marne and opened the eyes of both the Germans and the Allies to the combat readiness of the American divisions. In mid-August 1918 the newly-formed American First Army, with the approval of Foch, was concentrating on the St Mihiel offensive. At the last minute Foch called off the attack, arguing that American reinforcements were needed elsewhere along the front. Pershing refused to break up his unit, and the struggle between Foch and Pershing was settled only through the mediation of Marshal Petain. The AEF eliminated the St Mihiel salient and a few days
men were shifted to Meuse-Argonne area, where they advanced against fierce German opposition. later almost 600,000
the
47 days of continuous fighting the
In
American forces had pushed forward to Sedan, chewing up German divisions as fast as they were thrown in. The armistice came three days after the AEF reached the outskirts of Sedan.
Pershing's organisation of the American was one of the greatest World War. Starting
forces from scratch feats of the First
from nothing Pershing produced an armv of 2,000,000 men within 18 months. The entry of the Americans on the Western Front was decisive in the winning of the war. The iron discipline and stern military bearing which he maintained earned him the nickname of 'Black Jack', and he won respect, if not affection, from his
On September 3, 1919 Pershing was made general of the armies, a rank unique in American military history. He was made Chief-of-Staff in 1921, a post which he held until his retirement in 1924. He died in 1948 at the age of 88, honoured by most of the European nations as well as comrades.
own; his body National Cemetery. his
rests
at
Arlington
For S. L. Mayer's biography, see page 19.] I
2969
At 1 1 o'clock that night, Captain Gosling, the Brigade-Major, arrived. He brought with him the long-expected news that the Hindenburg Line was to be attacked on a 14-mile front at 0520 hours on the morning after next (September 27). Bissett called a COs' conference, and before long all officers that could be spared from duty came trooping down the stairway of the dug-out. The meeting remains in my mind as a very solemn occasion. We sat round a rough deal table, and by the nickering light of candles stuck against the walls, Captain Gosling went over the operation order, explaining with the help of trench maps the portion of the German front that was to be carried by our battalion. I watched the faces of the young officers as they listened in silence to instructions that, humanly speaking, meant death to
many
THE CANAL
DUNORD 'Every battalion was given a definite German trench sector, communication trench or redoubt which it was to capture, and beyond
of them.
After Captain Gosling had left, they remained quietly discussing the dispositions to be made. While we were at this, a runner brought a dispatch from Divisional (the 3rd Division) ordering the second-
HQ
in-command (myself) and one officer from each company to be held in reserve during the attack, as a nucleus for reconstituting the battalion in case of heavy losses. The fact that the Divisional Commander (Major-General C. J. Deverell) envisaged such a contingency added to the gravity that had fallen upon us, and one could not but think wistfully of these fine young men about to face death. There was shell-fire during the night, in the course of which we sustained casualties, and poor Bailey was smashed within a few hours of his first appearance in the front line.
Next morning the five of us who were remain out of the battle walked back
to to
our transport camp at Morchies. I procured a horse, and rode over to see General Fisher (commanding 8th Brigade, 3rd Division). He insisted on my obeying orders, but agreed to my request that I be allowed to take up some coign of vantage from which to witness the attack. I placed a liberal interpretation upon his consent. I returned to camp, and after midnight set off on foot to the front line. It was comparatively quiet, save for the usual
bomb-dropping, and once again there was a hum of activity on the roads, with infantry and tanks and guns moving up in the dark. When I got into the front line, every man of the RSF (1st Royal Scots Fusiliers) was on the firestep, from which they were to go over the top at dawn. I had no intention of breaking the letter of my instructions to remain in reserve, but I considered that the best spot for making use of the general's permission was from our parapet. The battle, we knew, was to be one of the biggest and most decisive of the war. Its outstanding feature was the strictly limited objective allotted to each attacking unit. Every battalion was given a definite German trench sector, communication trench or redoubt which it was to capture, and beyond which it was not to go. As soon as each particular goal had been attained, other battalions from the rear were to leap-frog through to the next line of resistance, and, in this manner, the battle was to be pressed home, until the final limit set for the day had been reached. The 1st RSF had to capture what was shown on the maps as Whitehall and Ryder
—
"-'
'
"H —IB I
sections of the Hindenburg Line, situated directly opposite us across No-Man's Land, so our share represented only an advance of 60 to 80 yards on a front of 300 yards.
The 7th Shropshire were then to pass through us to attack the next trench, after which the 2nd Royal Scots in turn would pass through them to reach a trench behind that again, which would carry our 8th Brigade some 800 yards forward. From other brigades held in readiness were to continue the thrust, until the Hindenburg Line was slashed in two. It was an ambitious programme, but it was to be amply justified by the result. there,
However limited the advance of the Scots Fusiliers looked on the map, it was a most important one, for on them fell the task of rushing the front trench of the great fortressed line, which was bound to be defended with more vigour than the subsequent, positions, and on their success depended that of the further attacks on the rear network of the German system. speak only of our own immediate task that covered little more than 300 yards of the German front, but all along the 14 miles on which the offensive was to be launched similar measures were ready, whereby the leading battalions were to I
1
bags at the given word, and along the whole 14 miles stood thousands upon thousands of other men ready to leap upon
An Eye-witness Account which it was not to go.' Deneys Rietz. Below: Infantry in the Canal du Nord waiting to go forward on September 27
the Germans. At zero plus ten minutes (0530 hours) the barrage moved forward, and the moment had come. Bissett dropped his arm as a signal, and the men swarmed over the parapet straight for the German line. Almost at once the German SOS barrage came down upon them, as they scrambled and stumbled over the wires, screwstakes and shell craters that obstructed every yard of the way. I have a confused memory of shells spurting and flashing, of men going down in great numbers, and, almost before there was time to think, 1 saw the German soldiers rise from behind their breastworks to meet the attackers, and then the Scots Fusiliers were clubbing and
bayoneting among them. The German gunners immediately drew in their fire to protect their next line of defence, and seeing that our men were on their objective, I rushed quickly across No-Man's Land and dropped down into the great Hindenburg Trench. Flushed with victory, the men were rounding up prisoners and shouting down the dug-out staircases for others to come up, a process which they expedited in places by flinging Mills grenades into the shaft openings. The trench was six feet wide by eight feet deep. Every few yards along the parapet stood a machine gun, and there were many trench mortars and anti-tank rifles. The German soldiers had done their duty manfully, for on the floor of the trench their dead and wounded lay thick, and beside almost every machine gun lay its crew, smitten down by the hurricane of the barrage.
By this time the British guns had lifted their range onto the next German trench, 400 yards up the slope, and already the 7th Shropshire were coming through us and deploying beyond. There was no excitement or hurry. They went forward at a walk behind the barrage, their rifles aslant, and we watched them reach and
break into the
first
trench, followed by
waves
of other assaulting troops coming on behind. The battle plan was on so huge a scale that the fortunes of a single battalion should be multiplied nearly 600
successive
times to obtain an adequate conception of its
entirety.
It
was 0300 hours by now. The men
sat
talking in undertones along the firestep, their bayoneted rifles in their hands, and some lay asleep on the duckboards, while Bissett and Captains Shaw and Keegan went up and down, consulting with the company officers, and making last-minute adjustments.
At 0400 hours the Germans began to trench-mortar us heavily, and a few men were wounded. Then a stillness fell over the line. A million men were facing each other on this battle front, but there was scarcely a sound, save for a rare shot loosed by some nervous sentry, and the tension became almost unendurable. As zero hour approached, whispered orders were passed, and the men stood to, and then, punctually at 0520 hours, the British barrage came down upon the
German
line with one stupendous roar. During the preliminary ten minutes the
Fusiliers stood ready to vault the sand-
enter the area of the German counterbarrage. Many fell, but the rest went steadily on, almost hidden in the smoke and dust of the shell-fire. The German SOS drew still farther back and, when the air cleared, we saw the Shropshire soldiers in possession of the next trench, and our men rose and cheered them. Then the 2nd Royal Scots came past, and behind them other reserve battalions, streaming forward to further attacks, while to right and left the battle thundered on its way. It was a marvellous spectacle, but now that our battalion had accomplished its task, and the battle was surging over the rise in front of us, we turned to count the cost. Bissett and I walked back across the area over which the RSF had advanced. The wounded were being carried away, but, as was the custom, the dead, being past succour, were left for future transport. We were sad to find how many of our men had fallen, for we counted over 100 officers and men lying dead in the small space between London Support and Whitehall. The poor fellows, alive a few minutes before,
some
now
lay in all
manner
hugging
their
of attitudes,
others horribly torn by shells, and others again in shell craters, as if they had crawled there to die. At one place we came on a heap of flesh and clothing so mangled that had it still
rifles,
297
two field-booted legs protrudthe awful mess, we could hardly e sworn that what lay there had been iiraan being. At first we could not determine whose remains they were, but seeing the rim of a steel hat beneath, I did some grisly work with a stick and got the helmet clear. I found the name of one of our young officers inside
it.
moment, must have felt someone walking over his grave, for he shivered and said: 'My God, I'm getting sick of this awful war'; and for the first time since I had known him, he fell silent and moody. In the meanwhile, the battle raged unabated. Overhead wheeled squadrons of aeroplanes, and a steady flow of infantry battalions was hurrying past us to the further attacks beyond the long rise, from which came the sound of heavy rifle and machine gun fire, and the bursting of shells. To our right, towards Flesquieres, a dozen or more tanks were going into action. As we looked, one of them stopped and burst into flames, and one stood still with a rent in its side, but the others went on until we lost them in the curtain of smoke that hung over the village. As Bissett and I were returning to our Bissett, at that
men holding the captured trench, British batteries from the rear began to come by, to take up fresh positions nearer the Germans. That they were able to cross the Canal du Nord so soon was due to the careful manner in which the battle had been
A bridge had been and the moment the
thought out beforehand. built
in
sections,
German barrage lifted that morning, the REs were seen coming down from Hermes with the bridge-lengths on wagons, and in a very short time had erected a trestleway from bank to bank, over which guns and ammunition limbers and ambulances were now pouring on to ground scarcely an hour before held by the Germans. By 0800 hours practically every British battery had moved up, and along the lip of the Hindenburg Trench the guns stood in unbroken line, firing as fast as they could load. Being so near to us, the roar of all these pieces was magnificent. General Fisher stood eagerly watching the guns belching forth, and he turned to us and cried: 'Men, do you remember Lloyd George's speech: "We will put the guns wheel to wheel, and pound home the lessons of democracy"?' He said we were privileged in being there that day, and indeed we were witnessing a great event, for the mighty Hindenburg Line was going at last.
Shortly afterwards an artillery officer, with whom I had fallen into conversation while watching his battery in action, invited me to breakfast, and we feasted on bacon and eggs, cooked on a Primus stove by his servant, within a few yards of where his guns were banging away. As we sat down to our meal we saw a German aeroplane dart into a flight of British observers, and in a moment one of
them began
to fall in flames.
The rear
occupant stood up and spreading wide his arms deliberately leaped into the void. I could see him whirling round and round as he gathered momentum. I stood thinking of the poor man's agony, but my host merely remarked, 'Hullo, there's a little man jumped out,' and stolidly continued his breakfast. The conditions were ideal for air fighting, as there
2972
in the sky, and a bright day. The air was alive with machines, and the casualties on both sides were heavy, for, as the morning wore on, I repeatedly saw planes shot down, and long before evening the wrecked planes scattered about were quite a feature of the landscape. I now had time to look round. The RSF had taken over 300 prisoners, and these were still standing about in batches, shaken and miserable, as well they might be after the terrible bombardment they
was not a cloud sun shone
all
had suffered. They belonged to the 97th Hanoverian Regiment, and, strangely enough, each man had the word 'Gibraltar' embroidered on his sleeve. When I asked one of their officers the meaning of this, he said with a grin that it was a British battle honour conferred on their regiment for having assisted the English at the siege of Gibraltar in 1705.
By now many walking wounded were coming back from the forward battle line, and they told us things were going well. Large numbers of prisoners were coming back, too, some under guard, others simply walking to the rear of their own accord, asking for the 'Englische Gefangenlager General Fisher had told us before he went that Bulgaria had just surrendered, and when I told a squad of captured officers this, one of them said 'Na! wenn dass so .
ist,
ist's
alles fertig'
and
(Well,
if that's
so,
thought they seemed relieved at the prospect of an early peace. Towards noon, Glossop fetched tables and chairs from a German dug-out, and, saying it was a pity to miss the sunshine, served an excellent lunch in the open. In spite of the glorious weather, it was a silent meal. Behind us the ground was strewn with our fallen, and along the parapet of the captured trench lay many German dead, so we sat with averted eyes. Presently Shaw drew our attention to the body of a dead man lying face downward close by. Bissett got up to see, and turned over the body. It was Captain Freeman, who two nights before had dropped down the dug-out stairs (to the COs' conference). He was shot through the heart. Later on, hearing from wounded men coming back that the British advance was being held up before Graincourt, a village this side of Cambrai, 1 decided to go forward to see what was happening, for nominally I was off duty, and therefore a it's
all over)
I
free agent. First I climbed the slope across
which
the Shropshire and the Royal Scots had attacked. They too had paid a heavy price, for numbers of their dead, and many dead German soldiers, lay stacked along the parapets of the trenches, from which they had been lifted. After a short halt to exchange views with Colonel Henderson, I bore away towards Flesquieres by way of the numerous rear trenches of the Hindenburg system. These had all been taken by the successive assaulting columns and each trench was occupied by the men who had
taken it. Everywhere lay hundreds of khaki -clad and field-grey dead, and everywhere improvised dressing-stations were dealing with the wounded. When I reached what was left of Flesquieres, the Germans began to shell it so heavily that I made haste to get away to a rise, accompanied by a dozen soldiers who had been sheltering in the ruins. From here the battle situation as far
as Bourlon our eyes.
Wood
stretched clear before
I could see the British firing line half a mile away, and German infantry 400 yards beyond. Both sides were in open country, and for the first time in four years of war they faced each other from behind such natural cover as they could turn to account, without trenches, or entanglements. The English were slowly advancing, and on the crest of a long grassy slope were
German
soldiers and machine gun crews. British shell-fire was no longer a barrage, but it was not negligible, and the
The
shrapnel was taking heavy toll from among the exposed German troops on the rise. About four miles back stood Cambrai. Through my glasses I could even see a group of German officers standing on the round tower of the brewery, and tall pillars of smoke were rising from among the houses, as though the city was being given to the flames. On the outskirts of Cambrai were black masses of German infantry in reserve, while their thinly-held line was fighting a desperate rear-guard action, chiefly with machine guns. Away to the left was the real trouble, for there the British advance was hung up before the village of Graincourt. It was being stubbornly defended, and the German garrison was inflicting heavy punishment on the British troops, whose dead lay thick before the ruins. Strong reinforcements of the Guards Brigade, however, were coming up, and I watched them attack afresh. They were well handled. The fire of several batteries was directed on the village, and the men went forward in artillery formation, until they had established a fire line, when they rose to their feet and charged. Many fell, but the attack was pushed home, and soon the men disappeared among the wrecked houses, after which the German machine guns fell silent, and batches of prisoners were marched out. Graincourt being captured, I went to the right. On my way I passed the German gun positions, from which they had fired their barrage that morning, and I counted
more than 50 abandoned field pieces standing in their emplacements. I went no nearer the firing-line. The British had by now bitten three miles into the German defensive system since dawn, and they had reached the final objective of the battle plan at practically every point. Owing to the rapid advance, the gunfire was thinning, and ahead of me there was pointblank fighting between Germans who were flinging stick grenades from shell craters, and isolated parties of British who were volleying at them from behind trees. Great numbers of wounded were being carried back, and, as rifle and machine gun bullets were whistling too freely, I took a last look at Cambrai, now fiercely burning, and at Bourlon Wood, in the hands of the British at last, and started back in the falling dusk, passing on my way more dead men of both sides than I had yet seen. On this day the British took 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns. On a 14-mile front, at a cost of nearly 80,000 men, they had blasted their way through the Hindenburg Line into the open country beyond, and from then onward the evil of the old trench warfare was a thing of the past, and a new phase had begun. [Reprinted from Trekking Rietz.]
On
by Deneys
The Influenza Pandemi *
In the spring of 1918 a worse catastrophe than any which had occurred during the four years of war hit the exhausted peoples of the world. In two major epidemics a particularly virulent strain of influenza killed off millions of people; more in India alone than died all over the world during the war. 'It came like a thief in the night', said one observer, and like a thief it was no respecter of persons. The young, the old, the rich, the poor, all were infected, with little warning and with an equally slim chance of recovery. Quacks and charlatans abounded and official medical advice was little
more effective. D. R. Shermer. and spray: sole preventives
Left:
The mask
2973
,>
Above: The Boche is beaten, flu is not', mask yourselves, one and all': official advice in Paris. Masks, the only preventive, were a reflection of medical helplessness. The Times (right) was full of advice: it prescribed a hot bath every evening and a glass of port at dinner - laughable suggestions to the poor
autumn of 1918, most of Europe and of the rest of the world were nearing the end of a long and bitter war. The general picture was one of limping and tattered exhaustion, of depletion in men, supplies and spiritual resources. Yet it was now that fate dealt the prostrate nations an ironic
c
\m
f.
INFLUENZA STILL SPREADING.
In the
much
PRECAUTIONS AGAINST INFECTION.
blow, for the same autumn saw the worldwide crescendo of a pandemic of influenza
and pneumonia. No one knows precisely where the great pandemic began. The French and others believed for a time that the malady originated in Spain, hence the popular term 'Spanish flu'. However, the Spanish maintained with equal vigour that la grippe had begun in France. Others said that viruses had spread outwards from China by land and sea, and especially through Chinese labourers in service behind the lines on the Western Front. Recently one writer has asserted the origin of the pandemic to be an overcrowded American army camp in Kansas, where on March 11, 1918, 107 soldiers were taken to hospital suffering from a particularly severe attack of the disease. From there, infected troops could have carried the illness to Europe.
Another explanation is that it appeared simultaneously in a number of different places because it had been germinating in several areas for a period of years. However the pandemic originated, one of its main breeding grounds was surely the rat and lice infested trenches of northern France. Another hotbed of influenza
was Bombay and
its
environs, where mil-
lions lived in conditions of indescribable
squalor.
In addition, the peoples of the world were in a state of acute susceptibility
any particularly virulent disease, for the public health was considerably run down after the privations of war. The influenza also severely affected neutral nations, for by 1918 many of these were in desperate straits because of food shortages owing to the economic blockade, as well as the cumulative effect of the stresses of war in neighbouring countries. The course of the disease ran roughly for a year, between spring 1918 and spring 1919. The height of the pandemic was reached in autumn 1918, in almost every to
2974
OFFICIAL ADVICE. Influenza continues to spread, and, in view of the serious extent of the epidemic, it is important that the public should understand what practical measures of protection can be taken. Official advice on the matter is given in a memorandum by Sir Arthur
Newsholme, Medical Officer to the Local Government Board, which is being circulated among local authoriDr. Newsholme emphasizes the fact that control over the disease can be secured only by the active cooperation of each member of the community. Even experts find difficulty in defining influenza, and the medical profession is ignorant as to the causes which lead to the occasional world-wide spread of the disease, such as is now being experienced. The only safe rule is to regard all catarrhal attacks and every illness associated with rise of temperature during the prevalence of influenza as infectious, and to adopt appropriate precautionary measures. In present circumstances, to quote official advice, " every patient who has a severe cold or fever should go to bed and 8tay there for three or four days." Unfortunately, one attack of influenza does not confer any considerable immunity against repeated attack. Frequently the patient does not realize the serious nature of his illness for several days, and it is probable, during the earlier stages, that inties.
fection
is
chiefly spread.
Compulsory
not regarded as likely to be circums truces.
notification
is
of practical use in present
the pandemic, the importance of these areas as incubation sites had already had
Deaths
INFLUENZA:
Britain
The terrible
its effect.
The influenza created havoc everywhere.
ANZAC
troops in Britain were so badly affected that special cemeteries on Salisbury Plain had to accommodate their In France, 70,000 American troops were hospitalised, and nearly one third of these died. In Switzerland, almost every single soldier was incapacitated. Those in high positions did not escape. The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, was fatalities.
cost
suddenly taken South Africa
was confined
to
ill
after the Armistice and for ten days in Man-
bed
chester Town Hall. Whole cities, towns and provinces were declared danger areas for months on end. In June, 1918, 160,000 Berliners were infected. That year, over 15,000 deaths from the pandemic occurred in London alone. In Philadelphia, 650 people died of influenza on a single day. In India and Africa, the extent of the malaise was such that no complete statistics of its ravages will ever be available.
Quacks and charlatans No effective remedy was India
6 000 000
found; the most measure appeared to be quarantine. Amid the mounting distress, quacks and charlatans played on the panic of the gullible. Doses of quinine and cinnamon oil were sometimes helpful to the general constitution, but apart from useful preventive
(possibly up to 16 000 000)
meticulous personal hygiene, the only genrecommended medical measure was the wearing of fine gauze masks over the nose and mouth. In the more advanced nations, disinfectants and sprays were liberally used, and perhaps the dreadful toll would have been yet greater without them. Although the doctors urged complete rest as soon as flu-like symptoms appeared, this was a counsel of perfection in areas where large numbers of poor had to scratch out a living every day, or fall by the wayside. Doctors were agreed that the pandemic showed 'a remarkable uniformity of incidence and clinical character' throughout the world. It appeared in two different waves, the first and milder of these reaching its peak in June and July 1918, and the second and more deadly wave striking in October and November and recurring some three months later. The symptoms of the milder wave were typically of the 'three-day fever' type. A rapid onset of lassitude and utter prostration took place, accompanied by general aching and a quickly rising temperature. The patient generally had a slow, unstable pulse, a sore throat, headaches, loss of appetite, and sometimes fairly mild gastrointestinal symptoms. Recovery was rapid, erally
Europe
10
000 000
Total 27 000 000 Above:Jhe world-wide
(excluding Russia)
(conservative estimate)
toll 01
deaths from
many
countries, notably in India, the death rate was so high that no reliable statistics exist. But the virus did not just pick out the hungry and weak; for some reason the percentage of deaths in the age group 15-35 was particularly high influenza. In
country of the world. At the end of a year of
phenomenal
blood-letting,
at
least
27,000,000 additional casualties were the result of influenza and its complications, such as bronchial pneumonia. Uncounted others died sooner or later of tuberculosis, heart disease and other conditions aggravated by the pandemic. Although the majority of deaths were in India, Africa and China, hardly a community anywhere
remained unaffected. Everywhere a huge proportion of the population contracted the illness: at least 20,000,000 in the United States alone. The pandemic was peculiarly difficult to combat. Medical opinion was divided even as to the cause of the scourge. Some favoured the well-known Pfeiffer's bacillus, while
others believed the culprit was a filterable virus of some kind. Only in 1933 was the latter hypothesis proved largely correct. Vaccines were tried out, but at best they were only partly effective, not least because often the disease was not diagnosed until had progressed beyond the point of it medical remedy. Medical facilities everywhere were strained to their limit by the rapidity with which the virus spread and the sheer number of patients affected. In many places, modern civilisation and the mixed blessing of large populations had produced conditions ideal for the rapid spread of infection. In many areas, most notably in large cities, overcrowding resulted in insanitary living conditions and in large reservoirs of' harried, run-down people susceptible to contagion. Barracks
and schools, factories and offices, commuter and troop transports all provided opportunities for rapidly contracting the disease
from others. Although schools, music halls and other public places were frequently closed down during the worst excesses of
and
fatalities
were few.
The influenza appeared with frightening rapidity. In the midst of general good health, in a barracks or school, an isolated
case would give way within days or even hours to large numbers of people being stricken. One writer has thus described the scene: Barrack rooms which the day before had been full of bustle and life, would now be converted wholesale into one great sick room, the number of sick developing so rapidly that the hospitals were, within a day or two, so overfull that fresh admissions were impossible and the remainder of the sick had to be nursed and treated where they were. The characteristics of the second out-
2975
more severe. Four out of had a very drastic case fever'; the remaining fifth pulmonary complications. About a tenth of all influenza patients were desperately ill, and in these cases death occurred more often than recovery. Fatalrers
the second wave averaged 60 to 80 per 1,000 of population over wide areas. Such victims usually had not only a severe influenza infection, but also various other such as Friedlander's pneumobacilli ities in
bacillus.
A confusing aspect of the pandemic was that many ultimately fatal cases began in a mild way, thus often catching weary doctors off guard. Pulmonary complications could develop within a few hours. The patient then suffered from an acute infective inflammation which either developed into bronchial pneumonia or a virulent toxaemic or septicaemic blood poisoning. Twenty-four hours after progressing well, virulent complications could well have killed the patient. In some severe cases there were few physical signs of ill-being, though in others dullness and bronchial wheezing occurred, or else signs of haemorrhage, abscesses and general collapse. The normal pneumonia was rare during the pandemic. Usually there was pain, headache 'behind the eyes', ear-ache, coughing, a high rate of respiration and variable fever. Typically the complications developed after one or two days of influenza. When the pulmonary stage was reached, the patient generally complained of chest pains and a feeling of being 'raw inside'. Sometimes coughing was severe enough to cause loss of blood. The rate of breathing rapidly accelerated, and often the whole body was profusely perspiring. The worst cases were those of heliotrope cyanosis, a term used to describe the bluish condition of the sufferer; 95% of these patients died. The dreaded heliotrope colour might suddenly appear in an outwardly healthy person, a patient 'who was taking his liquid nourishment well, was taking an intelligent interest in his surroundings, answering questions promptly and clearly, and in no way — except by his colour — indicating that by the next day or the day after he would almost certainly be dead'. Anoxhaemia, or the reduction in the amount of oxygen in the blood, was a contributing factor to this gruesome death. As a doctor noted, 'big strong men would be fully conscious ... to within half-an-hour of death; often not realising in the least how dire their condition was'. .
.
.
High quota of youthful victims The single most remarkable feature of the pandemic was its high quota of youthful victims. In making general calculations on a worldwide basis, one can say that of deaths from influenza and related causes in the 1918/19 period, 25% were among children of 15 and under; 45% among persons from 15 to 35; about 18% among the 35/55 age group; and only 10% among persons from 55 to 75 and 2% among those of 75 and over. This tragic slaughter of youth cannot be accounted for by the transient immunity v/hich their elders may have received as a result of the earlier epidemic. It was most probably due to the crowding together of soldiers at the front and on transports, and the mobilisation of young women in factories. Yet this explanation is incomplete,
2976
more advanced nations sprays and diswere used on public transport and in
for a similar age-distribution of influenza
D> In the
victims occurred in neutral countries. In retrospect it seems that the pandemic had been gathering strength for several years. It seems that the virulence of the disease was increased by its passage among patients, and it may be that not until 1918 was the crucial interaction between large numbers of contagious organisms and tired people reached. The virus was contained in a fine spray which was produced from coughing, sneezing or loud talking, and in this manner the contagion spread. In Great Britain the earliest indications of the influenza epidemic appeared in April and May, when the disease was noted in the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow. About the same time, the Western Front was affected, and there may have been a kind of crossfertilisation of bacilli between the two areas. In May a few influenza victims
infectants
appeared in Glasgow. Suddenly, in June 1918, a massive outbreak of influenza was reported throughout the country, and succeeding waves did not finally disappear until the following spring. By then, 150,000 Britons, including 10,000 soldiers, had died from the pandemic. This was the highest mortality rate in relation to the size of the population for any epidemic since the cholera outbreak of 1849. Often the viruses proved unresponsive to sanitary precautions. Nor were they respectful of social position. The death rate per 1,000 population in the wealthy London borough of Westminster was 10.8 that autumn, but the poor of Bethnal Green were not significantly worse off, their mortality rate being 14.6. Though in well-heeled Hampstead the rate was only 8.3, in the dingier borough of Wandsworth it was only 9.5. In crowded Birmingham the rate was only 8.5, and in Manchester, 10.1. It is true that in Bournemouth, a traditionally healthy town, the rate was only 5.1, but the spa town of Bath recorded marginally higher than that of 8.8,
Birmingham.
By mid-July almost 700 Londoners a week were dying of influenza and complications. Miners were laid off in Northumberland and Durham. Several schools were closed in Birmingham, Northampton, Duband other areas. Conditions were mild, however, compared with that autumn, when over 18,000 Londoners died from the lin
pandemic, about 6,800 of them in the last two weeks of October. In October, conditions at Portsmouth became so bad that a public
order was issued 'forbidding the
admission of children under 16 to places of
amusement and directing that there shall be an interval of at least two hours between performances to secure adequate ventilation'. Meanwhile, The Times's advice for maintaining general good health was of little use to the poor. The paper advised its readers to 'drink half a bottle of light wine or a glass of port at dinner' and 'take a hot bath each evening'. Influenza statistics for Sweden are quite accurate, since the law obliges all Swedes to notify the medical authorities of contagious diseases. As in many other countries, Swedish influenza rates had been abnormally high for the preceding five years.
The most important Swedish metropolis the capital, Stockholm, which in 1918 had over 400,000 inhabitants. Next is the is
city of Goteborg,
with a population of
al-
most 200,000. Interestingly enough, the be-
communal
buildings, but these rudimentary precautions were of little use. It was not until 1933 that the nature of the virus was discovered and any effective antidote produced
haviour of the epidemic was very different in the two cities. In Stockholm, the fatality rate was higher, while in Goteborg nearly four times as many attacks of the disease were reported, with an average mortality rate less than 10% of that in the capital. No satisfactory explanation exists for these discrepancies. La grippe was noted in France as early as April 1918, when the disease appeared in places as far apart as Paris and Marseilles. A year before this, a form of bronchial illness was prevalent in French military hospitals, and this may have been caused by a strain of the Virus in an intermediate stage of its development. By the end of September 1918, the second wave of the illness was causing considerable distress. In the last week of October, the Paris death rate was 46.1 per 1,000 inhabitants, or over 2,500 that week. Over 1,900 of these were victims of the pandemic. Even this mortality rate was probably incomplete, for the London press reported that between October 1918 and March 1919 nearly 20,000 Parisians died of the malady. The epidemic was country-wide. Marseilles, Lyons, Bordeaux, St Etienne and Nantes were among the thousands of afflicted communities. Nearly 4,000 soldiers were attacked in the Marseilles district;
almost 10% died. That autumn
the British Expeditionary Force in France suffered 3,000 deaths among its 50,000 influenza cases. In the American Expeditionary Force, the arrival of fresh troops, unexposed to the same 'virus pool' as their comrades at the front, but having been subjected to the sickness rife on troop transports and trains, added the heaviest percentage of infected men per strength, and also the highest percentage of complicating illnesses. The areas of worst infection were the base ports, the depot divisions and some training areas.
Theatres and music-halls closed For some years influenza had appeared prominently in the Spanish mortality rates. In February 1918 it is said to have been present at the north-western seaport and resort of San Sebastian, a town of some 50,000 people. By May, the disease had become epidemic in proportions. There were rumours that the prevalence of influenza in San Sebastian was concealed lest the summer tourist season be affected, but the authorities were insistent that the wave of influenza which swept through
Spain
in
May and June was
imported from
France. They pointed out that San Sebastian is only 11 miles from the French border; but this argument could be stood on its head to 'prove' that the grippe was imported into France from Spain. Up to 8,000,000 Spaniards (40% of the population) were affected, but at first only mildly; about 30% of Madrid's 650,000 people contracted the illness, including King Alfonso and several of his Cabinet Ministers. Some government offices had to be closed for lack of sufficient healthy staff, and the municipal tram services were suspended. At first many sections of the population were extremely fearful as to the cause of the malady. Some had said that the illness
•-
9H9H
hv; v
V^
"
m t
.-•
mm '
:
M
P
H
THE*
or sandfly fever; others the epidemic was a plague us fever. The Ministry of the Inior implied that the development of the disease in Madrid was at least partly owing to the large number of visitors in the city. The second and severe autumn strain of influenza caused public dances to be for-
many
theatres, music halls and restaurants to be closed. Eucalyptus, creosote and other inhalants, disinfectants and germicides were freely used. Coffins were in such great demand that they were
bidden and
almost unobtainable. Between September and November, about 127,000 Spaniards died of influenza and complications. In order of decreasing severity, the cities worst hit were Oviedo, Viscaya, Murcia, and Barcelona, Saragossa, Valencia, Madrid. Perhaps the lower mortality rate of the largest cities was partly due to better preventive nursing facilities there. A peculiarly distressing aspect of the pandemic was observed in Spain. Among pregnant women attacked by the virus, spontaneous abortion or premature delivery was common, owing to haemorrhaging from the congested state of the uterus. Russia was one of the countries in which influenza was endemic. Some doctors believe that Central China was one of the original homes of the disease, and that the influenza was carried westward until it reached nomadic Kirghiz tribes who spread the disease into Russia. The Kirghiz themselves call the illness 'Chinese fever'. Whatever its origin, influenza was raging in Russia in the second half of 1918. The infection was particularly severe in the Ukraine; in Odessa there were over 70,000 cases among the 500,000 inhabitants of that port. As one doctor reported, the appalling conditions of poverty, privation, cruelty, and bloodshed in Russia during 1918, with the cessation of all sanitary administration, especially in the larger towns, the flight of thousands of terrified people from their homes, and the exposure to the rigours of winter without food or shelter, have afforded opportunities for the spread of epidemic influenza and the development of its many fatal complications.
Certain
German
military authorities reported that influenza was prevalent on the Eastern Front in summer and autumn 1917, and that the infection had probably reached German troops from Asia via European Russia. As in other countries, the illness assumed epidemic proportions during 1918. One instance of the rapid spread of the infection may be given. In July 1918 a German battalion, already succumbing to influenza, fought an action at close quarters with an American detachment, which was also infected. Other German battalions sent in to relieve the first fell
victim to the influenza one after the other, almost as soon as they arrived at the front and came in contact with men already ill themselves. Meanwhile, German civilian deaths from the pandemic had reached 400,000 by the end of the year. In Berlin, nearly 3,000 of the city's population of over 2,000,000 died of the grippe in October. In the last week of October, the epidemic reached its height simultaneously in Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Leipzig, Dresden, DukscIdorf, Chemnitz (Karlmarxstadt), Stettin (Szczecin), Breslau (Wroclaw), and Nurem-
2978
berg (Niirnberg). Mortality rates ranged from 41.2 per 1,000 in Berlin to 72.5 in Breslau. of the statistics for the American are not reliable, since in many areas notification of the disease was not made obligatory until the very height of the pandemic. During April and May 1918, fevers of an undetermined kind were reported in Virginia, Louisiana and several other states. Influenza as such had appeared in the army during February and March. In mid-March, an outbreak at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, coincided with infections among British, American and French troops and civilians. By September a virulent strain began to sweep America, mainly from east to west, causing considerable mortality. First to be attacked was the Atlantic coastal area. Less than a month later, the disease was epidemic in all but the most isolated reaches of the country, and even these areas were affected a few weeks later. By early December about 450,000 Americans had died of the disease. In the week ending October 12, over 2,600
Some
outbreak of influenza
were recorded in Philadelphia (population over 1,700,000). The highest mortality rates were recorded among poorer, male wage-earners. It seems likely that the virulence of the American experience of the pandemic was increased by cross-contacts from passengers and crews of ocean liners arriving at New York and other ports, and from returning troop ships. fatalities
South America and Africa In October 1918 an epidemic of influenza surged throughout the Argentinian capital,
About two-thirds of the city's population of over 1,000,000 were attacked. In the last week of October and the first week of November, nearly 2,000 influenza deaths were recorded. Extensive quarantine measures were attempted, and a sanitary cordon was placed on the Chilean frontier. Even so, the infection spread to Buenos
all
Aires.
parts of the country.
For some months prior to the outbreak of epidemic influenza in South Africa, ships arriving at Durban and Cape Town had many cases of that illness on board. It seems that the infection may have been introduced to South Africa from both Europe and Asia simultaneously, and also from Sierra Leone, where the disease was rife. In any event, by mid-September an epidemic had arisen in Durban, and from there it spread to the Rand area and thence to all parts. Bantu labourers in the mines were very badly affected. By December the malady had infected 2,600,000 people, about 500,000 of them Europeans. About one-third of the Europeans and almost half of the Bantu were affected at one time or another. Between August and December nearly 140,000 deaths (almost 12,000 of them among Europeans) were attributed to the disease.
As The Times
correspondent in Cape Town reported: 'The town is noticeably empty, the medical and nursing services are crippled, and even the food supplies are presenting difficulties. The morgues are full.' Later, he wired: 'The ordinary business of Cape Town is practically at a standstill The tramway, postal and telephone services are disorganised.' The South African authorities maintained that the railways were a principal means of spreading the .
.
.
illness. Early in October a vaccine was introduced, but there is no statistical proof that it was very effective. Conditions in Morocco may be summarised by the dispatch of The Times reporter in the international area of Tangier. In mid-October he reported: '. the Moorish inhabitants of the Marsan quarter petitioned that their roads might be drained of the liquid sewage with which they have long been flooded by the unrepaired .
.
.
and
totally
.
.
inadequate drainage system
the filthy state of their roads renders them impassable for the funerals of the many victims of the epidemic'. .
.
.
India worst hit reports agree that no part of the world suffered as severely from the pan-
All
demic as did India. By December 1918, at least 5,000,000 Indians had died of the disease in British India and 1,000,000 or more in the Native States. Such was the havoc wreaked that the exact number of deaths will never be known; one estimate was of 16,000,000 fatalities by mid-1919. The presence of an epidemic disease of an unusual type was first noted in Bombay in June 1918. Other outbreaks occurred in Karachi and Madras. In September the virulent wave attacked with great force and on October 6 nearly 800 deaths from the grippe were recorded in Bombay alone — and how many went unrecorded? By December, at least 800,000 influenza deaths were noted in the Central Provinces and Berar, and another 800,000 in the Punjab, 900,000 in Bombay, nearly 1,100,000 in the United Provinces, but 'only' 60,000 in Burma and 23,000 in Delhi, for reasons
unknown. The epidemic struck India at a time when the country was particularly unprepared to cope with such a calamity. War demands largely
had depleted the ranks of skilled personnel; and the effects of the almost total failure of the monsoon practically throughout the country were even more serious. In remote villages it was almost impossible to do anything to relieve the suffering, but in some provinces travelling dispensaries were of help. In 1919 nearly 1,500,000 cubic centimetres of vaccine "were used, but nevertheless the disease had a decimating effect on the subcontinent. Thus it was that in 1918/19, the miseries of war were exacerbated by a rapacious pandemic of influenza. It has been said with truth that the grippe was 'the gleaner of the war's harvest'. As one doctor noted fatalistically: 'The disease simply had its way. It came like a thief in the night and stole treasure.' Such a hoard of human treasure was stolen that in India alone, more people died of influenza than were killed all over the world during the entire First
World War.
Further Reading Marwick, A., The Deluge (Bodley Head 1965) Nature, October 24, 1918, pp. 146/7, 'Epidemic Influenza' (R. T. Hewlett)
Report on the Pandemic of Influenza, 19181919 (HMSO 1920) Science (New York), October 25, 1918, Vol XLVIII.no. 1243, pp. 412/13 The Lancet, July 8, 1933, pp. 66/8, 'A Virus Obtained from Influenza Patients', Dr Wilson Smith et al The Times, June 1918/March 1919
[For
R.
I).
page 407.
|
ShermerJ8
biography,
sec
ince General Sarrail's failed
spring offensi^ ofJ917 the Allied troops stationed in he Balkans had stagnated: their inaction the target of music-hall jokes and their usceptible ,
.
What was
urgently needed was anew leader, one who could command the confidence of the polyglot 'army of the Orient' and* ensive against the Bulga lally, an Li. T1S_
answer was four
n
mi
and then with
Fr;
trey
11
a
— 'desperate Faj
Alan Palmer.
Left:
A lonely and
agonised death for a Bulgarian
weekend of August 18 to 19, i the whole of the centre of Salonika /as destroyed by a disastrous fire which began accidentally in the oldest quarter of the city and spread rapidly down to the
'
"
M
waterfront. Although it left 80,000 people homeless, the fire caused relatively few casualties; but it destroyed British base headquarters and gutted an ordnance store and a depot for medical supplies. The French and Italian military establishments escaped with slight damage and the port facilities were not seriously affected. The fire swept away such amenities as the city possessed. Salonika had always had a certain tawdry gaiety for men snatching a few days of leave from the front line along the River Struma or the mountains around Lake Dojransko. Now the city had become an empty shell, as desolate as the barren
Balkan highlands in which the campaign was being fought. The 'Great Fire' of Salonika seemed almost symptomatic of the malaise which had settled over the Macedonian theatre of operations ever since the failure of Sarrail's offensive in the spring of 1917. It
Above: Serbian soldiers under attack by gas in the Moglenitsa Mountains. The technical problems of fighting under high-altitude conditions were easily surmounted by d'Esperey; under his competent leadership the Serbs, by attacking in such an unlikely place, took the Bulgarian and German defenders completely by surprise. Left: General Sarrail and(right) General d'Esperey, his successor. Following
com-
plaints of Sarrail's high-handedness, political ambition and inability to unite the
armies under his command the French were obliged to withdraw him from Macedonia: his eventual successor was the energetic Franchet d'Esperey. expect from you savage vigour', he told his men. Below: British artillery unit firing a 60-pounder gun. The Anglo-Greek force round Lake Dojran suffered from confusion as great as that in the Crimea I
Franchet d'Esperey — personal magnetism and a touch of
showmanship had been a trying summer, with the threat of mutiny pervading the Russian, Serbian and French contingents and with little military activity apart from the clash of patrols along the Struma. Back in Britain music hall comics were even making cheap jokes about the Salonika Army and its failure to go over to the attack. The men who were serving in Macedonia, sweltering in the gullies south of Dojran and the malarial swamps of the Struma, bitterly
resented such treatment. There was general desire that autumn to give the
a lie
by launching an offensive on the Bulgarian positions. It was felt that a combined effort by all five national contingents would achieve victory, provided
to their critics
that the polyglot 'Armies of the Orient' could work together undei nanderin whom the French, British, S i, Greek
and Italian units all had confic Yet so long as General C-in-C in Salonika there was
was
I
of achieving effective unity. Th( had complained of his high-handednc;
ans
preoccupation
with
many months
before their two brigades
2980
political
ohjin-i
succumbed
to revolutionary agitation. In the Italians refused to send any more troops to Macedonia as long as he remained in command. The Prime Ministers of Britain and Serbia urged his recall on the French in July 1917 and their representations were supported by Venizelos, the real master of Greece. But while the Radical Socialist Party was in power in France, Sarrail's political connections were sufficiently strong in Paris to save him from disgrace. Once, however, the Clemenceau ministry was established in November 1917, it was clear that Sarrail's days in Macedonia were numbered; for the new French premier had no use for an ambitious general who showed all the independence of a proconsul. Sarrail was peremptorily recalled and General Guillaumat, who had commanded Second Army at Verdun, was sent to Salonika as his successor. The new Commander was instructed to make plans for an eventual offensive in the summer of 1918. Guillaumat reached Salonika on December 22, 1917, a few hours before Sarrail
Rome
sailed for home. He remained in Macedonia for only six months. Outwardly there was little about his work to capture the headlines of the press: some successes for the French and Italians in south-eastern Albania; a sharp action by the British XVI
Corps on the Struma; and a remarkable assault by the Greeks and the French on rocky Bulgarian positions in a salient known as the Skra di Legen. But the real worth of Guillaumat's achievement was much greater than this record of events suggests. He improved the system of command within the French units beyond all recognition and won complete confidence from the British, Serbian and Greek commanders; only the Italians continued to view French activity with political suspicion. Much work was done on opening up new roads and light railways to the front. Preparations were well advanced for an offensive when, in June, German pressure in France made Clemenceau recall Guillaumat to help defend Paris. It was left to Franchet the new C-in-C General d'Esperey, to reap the harvest of victory which Guillaumat had sown. Yet it should be noted that Guillaumat's presence in France in the late summer and autumn of 1918 was of inestimable value to the men in Macedonia, for at last they had a champion in Allied counsels
who knew
their
problems and who had every certainty in their ability to overcome them.
other high-ranking Frenchman, for he had undertaken enterprising journeys before the war in the Danubian lands and the Balkans. His first remark on landing at Salonika in the first week of June 1918, set the tone for the following three months: 'I expect from you savage vigour', he told the group of officers assembled on the quay to greet him. His British subordinates, struggling with a long and unfamiliar
surname, promptly began
to refer to their
new Commander as 'Desperate Frankie'. was an apt comment on his personality.
It
Franchet d'Esperey at once studied old an offensive and the papers prepared by Guillaumat's staff. He did not, however, like any of the proposals placed before him. All of them assumed projects of Sarrail's for
that the only way of penetrating the Bulgarian positions was by a frontal assault up the valley of the River Vardar. This, d'Esperey thought, was the very type of manoeuvre which the Bulgarians would expect and it would inevitably cast the bulk of the attacking forces against the strongest defensive positions. He had arrived in Salonika ahead of his operational orders from Paris. He knew only that he was expected to continue Guillaumat's preparations for a limited offensive. But this was not good enough for Franchet d'Esperey. He found that the Serbian leaders, Prince-Regent Alexander and General Misic, and the Commander of the British Salonika Army, General Milne, were all confident that a sustained attack on the Bulgars would speedily crack their will to resist and take Bulgaria out of the war. There seemed no point in limiting operations to a merely local victory if it was possible to strike down one of Germany's partners by persistence. Without waiting for a detailed directive from Paris, Franchet d'Esperey set out to inspect the positions held by the French and the Serbs in the mountains; and it was there that he found a point where the Serbs were confident that a surprise attack would break the Bulgarian line. Within three weeks of arriving in Macedonia, Franchet d'Esperey's remarkably propellent energy had produced the basic plans for an offensive which he was convinced would lead to the defeat of Bulgaria and would also carry the war back to the Danube, more than 300 miles to the north. launching his offensive, But before d'Esperey had to win approval from the Supreme War Council, the body of military and civilian leaders responsible for co-
ordinating the efforts of the Allied armies,
'Desperate Frankie' There could have been no better choice than Franchet d'Esperey for Allied generalissimo in the Balkans. Ever since the first battles of 1914 he had shown himself to be a remarkable commander in the field, with a Napoleonic instinct for attack and the broad strategic sweep of a mind never content with local successes. He believed in a fast-moving campaign rather than a war of attrition, and he remained loyal to the cavalry tradition in which he had been reared. Although he had a volcanic temper and an impulsive sense of independent command, he also possessed a personal magnetism and a touch of showmanship which could lift the spirit of a downcast army. Above all, he was an 'Easterner' rather than a 'Westerner' by strategic conviction and he' knew central and south-eastern Europe better than any
and
this
was a
difficult task.
The
council,
attended by Lloyd George and Clemenceau
and their principal military advisers, considered his proposals at its session on July 3 in Versailles. The plan came under attack both from the die-hard Westerners, who were opposed to any commitment which would draw troops away from France, and from Lloyd George who was anxious to transfer two divisions from Milne's command to assist Allenby in Palestine. The project was referred to a sub-committee of inter-Allied military representatives who spent a month considering whether or not a major offensive in the Balkans was desirable. On August 3 the sub-committee reported in favour of an attack, provided that Franchet d'Esperey's requirements did not interfere with operations on the Western Front nor cause any rerouting of shipping in the Mediterranean.
Even with these safeguards for Foch and Allenby, the British government withheld consent, largely because the CIGS, Sir Henry Wilson, was strongly opposed to all Balkan enterprises. It was only after Guillaumat had travelled from Paris to London in order to win over Lloyd George that, on September 4, the Prime Minister gave official British approval to the offensive in Macedonia, overruling the objections of the CIGS. As soon as Guillaumat returned to Paris, he was sent off on a second mission, this time to Rome to gain Italian consent. At last, on September 10, Franchet d'Esperey received authority from Clemenceau on behalf of the Allied governments to commence operations as soon as he judged the moment propitious for a sustained offensive. Laconically he noted in his diary: Jour J — 15 Septembre.'
A
triumph for the French sappers Fortunately he had not waited for official approval of his plans before ordering preparations to begin. By the end of the first week in August hundreds of labourers were at work opening up the routes from the supply bases around Salonika to the Moglenitsa Mountains. Every effort was made to keep this activity hidden from the Bulgarians, notably by elaborate use of camouflage nets. In earlier years it had been notoriously difficult to prevent information reaching the Bulgars, partly because Macedonia was riddled with spies and partly because of the excellent reconnaissance missions undertaken by German 'planes attached to the Bulgarian Second Army; but on this occasion the Bulgars were taken by surprise for, although there was ample evidence that an autumn offensive was pending, it seemed to them impossible for an attack to be launched in the terrain which Franchet d'Esperey had selected for the principal Allied effort. Ninety miles north-west of Salonika the Moglenitsa Mountains form a line of bare summits, some 7,000 feet high, which marked the frontier between Serbia and Greece. One of these peaks, the Kajmakcalan,
had been successfully stormed by
Serbs in September 1916; but the Bulgars had continued to base their defences upon a line of mountains further to the north-east. Their key position was a peak known as the Sokol ('Falcon') which was linked to a twin peak, the Ventrenik ('Wind-Swept One') by a formless and broken ridge six miles in extent, the Dobropolje. Three miles farther northwards the Bulgarian second line of defence ran through a slightly higher mountain, the Kozyak. There were two grave objections to an attack in this sector of the front: the problem of bringing an adequate concentration of heavy guns up into the high land facing the triangular defensive position; and the difficulty of prising the Bulgars out of the concrete emplacements on the mountain slopes. On the other hand, an attack at this point would take the Bulgars by surprise and, once the Allies had established themselves after the initial assault, they would find the valleys and ridges beyond the Kozyak running towards the upper Vardar along the natural line of advance, whereas to the east or west of the Kozyak the ridges tended to run across it. Provided that the Bulgars were speedily overwhelmed on the crest of the Moglenitsa there was a good prospect of striking up the Vardar and thus the
2981
Bulgarian position in i
him
^ d
this consideration
and mted Franchet d'Esperey awean such on to concentrate
the French had obstacles. major overcome one of their 155-mm and 105-mm guns were
eSTof August
TweWe
tractors and tackle hoisted up by means of 7,700 feet above seasome positions into Dobropolje defences^ evel dominating the guns were Two more batteries of heavy to another on methods similar hauled by commanding the peak almost as high and the Kozyak. around defence, of line second to get the guns effort of fortnight t took a because of the care that in position, partly the all movements from shield to was taken posts. It was an observation Bulgarian cunning, patience operation which required was in vtselt a success and and restraint; sappers French the for
f
thorough triumph and pioneers. relied priWhile Franchet d'Esperey to make the vital Serbs the on marily he inbreakthrough on the Dobropolje take to contingents tended all five national French, Serbs The offensive. the part in were to move and the Italian 35th Division front from forward along an 80-mile on SepVardar the to Monastir (Bitola) XVI Corps, tember 15. The British XII and divisions, were supported bv two Greek First Army Bulgarian engage the to to prevent the as so Dojran Lake around to the right transfer of Bulgarian units timing of bank of the Vardar. The precise not specified was attack Anglo-Greek the launched original orders: it would be i
in the
s
had made
the offensive in the centre Franchet d Esperey a certain progress'. of operations to the left the detailed plan contingents, national the of commanders on acceptance ot the im-
when
merely insisting
was to be no portant principle that there assault. initial the up delay in following no opporThe Bulgarians must be given any threatened tunity to deploy reserves in significant strategic sector This was a war, development in the Balkan theatre of failure to disastrous a been for there had in the support early tactical successes offensive of 1916 and the spring
autumn
offensive of 1917.
the 1 two battalions oi and Gloucesters (2nd Division British 27th assault on a 10th Hampshires) made an of the Bulgarian salient on the right bank
On September
\
,
which Vardar, close to the Skra di Legen late spring. the Greeks had stormed in Bulgars This action helped to convince the be conthat the expected offensive would into centrated on the two main routes through and valley; Vardar Serbia- up the to the west the Monastir Gap, 80 miles defence ot the for responsibility Overall of the sothis region was in the hands German Eleventh Army, comcalled manded by General von Steuben with headquarters at Prilep In reality Eleventh Army was almost exclusively Bulgarian in composition, although the staff officers ning oi were German and there was a ith this personnel specialised 1
'
force
was
(General
the
Bul|
Nerezovi with head
Dedeli, eight miles north wesl
Both
Nerezov
and
Steuben
ordinate to General von Sc1k.Ii/ in Skopj< more than 60 miles to the north Scholtz (a distinguished veteran oi bergl who ultimately had the tasl 2 982
J&?
ing central Europe to Franchet d'Esperey's armies. On the morning of September 14, 500 guns opened up along the mountains and ravines between Monastir and the Vardar. The Germans were amazed at this concentration of firepower which, although slight by the standards of the Western Front, approached a ferocity unknown in the Balkan zone of operations. It was, General Dietrich wrote later in a semi-official German monograph, 'an iron storm' of shells; and, by ten in the morning 'it approached hurricane force'. Yet, although surprised by this dramatic opening of the offensive, Scholtz's staff were not unduly disturbed by the news which reached them. While the bombardment was at its height the Germans gave orders for a Bulgarian regiment and a Saxon Jdger battalion to be sent from Prilep to cover the slopes north of Monastir, where it was assumed the French would attack as soon as the bombardment died down. This region was more than 20 miles west of the Dobropolje and it was only after dark on September 14, when Scholtz first heard of unusual patrol activity south of the Sokol, that he realised where the main assault would come. By then it was too late for counter action; and in the initial fighting the Bulgars and
Germans in this sector remained outnumbered by three to one. The Serbs, supported on the Dobropolje by the French and by four battalions of Senegalese, went forward at 0530 hours on September 15. The fighting was extremely tough, for the artillery barrage had made little impression on the machine gun eyries
embedded in the limestone of the Vetrenik, nor had it destroyed the counterfire of the Bulgarian batteries. The Serbs took eight hours to storm the Vetrenik, scrambling up the sheer rock face of the eastern glacis as though scaling a cliff and finding little cover on its south-western slopes, where there are goat tracks which form narrow paths to the summit. On the Dobropolje the French 17th Colonial Division had to repel five Bulgarian counterattacks and were forced to use flamethrowers against the machine gun nests. The Sokol held out until after dusk and fighting continued throughout the night as the Serbs and French moved forward against the second line of Bulgarian defences. On the Kozyak the Bulgars threw back attack after attack until the early evening of September 16, when the Serbs at last reached the summit. Even then they found a German battalion holding a ridge on the northern slopes of the mountain, covering the withdrawal of the Bulgars to new positions. It was hard to keep up the momentum of attack.
By the morning of September 17 the reports reaching Franchet d'Esperey were favourable. A salient six miles deep and 20 miles broad had been driven into the Bulgarian line around the Dobropolje, and the Germans were withdrawing units farther to the west in order to prevent them from being cut off in the loop of the River Crna. It was time to put pressure on the
'
£
Left: Bulgarian leaders consult maps in a temporary camp. The Bulgarians had, since the collapse of their powerful medieval empire, been held together by cultural traditions rather than by frontiers. In trying to establish themselves as an independent nation they had joined forces first with the Russians and then with the Germans, but in each case the state failed to retain its freedom from foreign dominance
fcs-Vmthv +iflfH RJf OI ...
2983
£
r
and pointing directly up the River Crna towards the Vardar and the supply depot at Gradsko. If Gradsko fell, the whole of the Germano-Bulgarian defensive system would be split in two; and, at the present rate of progress, it seemed to Scholtz that Gradsko would be seriously
of the old front line
Salonika: the total cost Allies Central
Powers
total casualties 165
800 76 729 (known)
Britain Bulgaria ,.«
MMMM MMMMMMMMMM ISM
ww
France i
Ji-'MMJiMiMiM Ml Italy
MMMMMMiw »«
iCl DI3 M\ W5Vl 13™ ^lUllj£
Germany & Turkey (No Separate
figures available)
45 000
•
it ir
rfw
'f'ftM
i
Greece 5
(Missing & Prisoners
1
Hindenburg could ill spare men for the Balkan Front at such a time of crisis in the 2984
Dead
TlTl if
II hi
If
Missing
&
Prisoner
(Each symbol = approx
000)
Bulgars in the Dojran sector as well; and Franchet d'Esperey ordered Milne to launch the Anglo-Greek offensive at dawn on the following day, September 18. Meanwhile, in Skopje, Scholtz had become seriously alarmed. He knew that, although the Bulgarian front line troops were of high quality, morale in the reserve detachments was poor and the country as a whole was war weary. He despatched General von Reuter to the front with instructions to halt the retreat on the Bulgarian third line of defence; and he also sent an urgent appeal to Hindenburg for a German division to be sent immediately to the Balkans in case the Bulgarian retreat should become a rout. The message was not given the urgency it warranted, for
second attack was ordered for September This time the brunt of the fighting fell on the 77th (Scottish) Brigade of the 26th Division (12th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 8th Royal Scots Fusiliers, 11th Scottish Rifles), and they suffered from battle confusion as grim as in the days of the Crimea. Orders not to attack arrived too late; British troops were caught in their own artillery barrage; a French Zouave regiment failed to understand its task; messengers perished in the murk of the conflict. During six hours of fighting no trenches were won and retained. After two days the only gains were those secured around Dojran town on the first morning. British casualties were heavy — twice as great as those suffered by the Serbs and the French on the first two days of the battle for the Dobropolje-and the Bulgarian bastion on the Grand Couronne remained unassailed. Technically the their Anglo-Greek attacks achieved strategic purpose: not one Bulgarian unit was moved westward from the Dojran sector. Yet it may be legitimately asked if 19.
lf¥n Dead, Missing & Prisoner
000
three of the attackers succeeded in regaining the cover of the ravines from which they had scrambled forward at dawn. On the other side of the lake a Cretan division was more successful but was prevented from exploiting initial gains by a curtain of flames which shot up from the long grass, dry in the summer heat and easily ignited by the misfortunes of battle.
A
mmmmmmn M II W
heavy crossfire from machine gun on Pip Ridge. By the end of the morning it was clear that, although the Greeks had entered Dojran town, the initial assault had failed; and only one in
The Crimea repeated?
Iff iff ft ill
82 535
Dojran. The triple humps of these hills — the Petit Couronne, the Grand Couronne, and Pip Ridge as they were called — had formed distant and unattainable objectives in the two attacks of spring 1917. Now once again the British sought in vain to storm these sinister heights. The 11th Royal Welch Fusiliers, the 7th South Wales Borderers, the 12th Cheshires and the 8th King's Own Shropshire Light Infantry sustained heavy casualties on the slopes of the hills above the lake, and a battalion of the South Lancashires ran into nests
Mi
2 841
(Figures include those of 1915 operations)
.3...
threatened within three days. The second stage of the offensive opened on September 18 with an attack by the British 22nd Division, supported by the Greek Seres Division, on the complicated network of emplacements and dugouts dominating the high land around Lake
I
000)
west. Scholtz was left with a prospect of aid from the Austrians and the immediate task of improvising a defence with such troops as he already possessed. By nightfall on September 17 Scholtz had come to doubt his ability to halt the FrancoSerbian advance. On two occasions the Bulgarian 2nd Division had fallen back, rather than wait to be attacked; and each
time
it
had
left
gaps nearly
five
miles wide
Germans. On the left flank of the 2nd Division two regiments of the Bulgarian 3rd Division were in a state of mutiny. During the night of September 17/18 Scholtz accordingly ordered a further withdrawal in the hope of shortening his line, but he remained pessimistic. The maps showed clearly what was happening. The Franco-Serbian attacks formed an to the east of Reuter's
arrowhead, at
its
apex 15 miles north-east
feints and harassment would not, in this respect, have accomplished as much as an all-out attack against such formidable positions. By the morning of September 20 several of the British infantry battalions could raise only a quarter of their nominal strength. The cost was far too high. General Nerezov, in command of the First Army, was pleased at the manner in which his troops had repulsed the first Anfjlo-Greek attack. He was also conscious of the relative weakness of the British divisions in his sector. On Septemher 1!)
Opposite page: Total losses in the Salonika campaign. Serbia was the country to suffer most Right: A Bulgarian machine gun eyrie
he therefore proposed a daring plan to the acting Bulgarian C-in-C, General Todorov: First Army at Dojran and the Bulgarian Second Army on the River Struma would launch a counteroffensive against the British and the Greeks aimed at taking Salonika itself while Franchet d'Esperey's principal force was deep in the mountains west of the Vardar. All that Nerezov required was support from Eleventh Army around Monastir. Todorov informed the Germans of Nerezov's proposal at a conference in Steuben's HQ at Prilep on 19. The Germans rejected the plan as far too dangerous: there was not the transport available to support the Bulgars once they attacked away from
September
As an alternative, Steuben proposed to tempt the French and Serbs deeper into the mountains by an their fortified positions.
orderly retreat. When the Allied force had overstretched its supply line Eleventh Army and the Bulgarian 3rd Division would fall on its flanks, cutting off tired and hungry troops in the inhospitable terrain. Todorov accepted Steuben's plan without himself visiting the Bulgarian units in the Crna; he failed to appreciate that the plan presupposed a sense of discipline in the 3rd Division which did not correspond with the facts. In the small hours of September 20 all German and Bulgarian troops from the Crna to Dojran were ordered to prepare to fall back to new positions. First Army, on the Grand Couronne, received the news with what a Bulgarian survivor described as 'a stunned silence'. The Bulgars could not understand why they were evacuating an almost impregnable defensive system from which they had, on four occasions in 18 months, repulsed determined attacks. But that night they began to abandon the Dojran complex. Next day British patrols found the outposts on Pip Ridge deserted and the Greeks of the Seres Division occupied the concrete encasements of the Grand Couronne without resistance. It was two DH 9's of 47 Squadron, RAF, who first discovered that Nerezov's men were retreating down the Strumica Road into Bulgaria itself. British bombers thereupon caught the unfortunate Bulgars in the rocky ravines. The morale of First Army, so high only a few days before, now broke under the impact of swooping planes. Soon twisted lorries, abandoned field pieces, falling rock and mutilated bodies of horses blocked the road. The men abandoned guns, stores and supplies. True to their Balkan heritage they took to the hills, seeking escape over mountain paths, a rabble rather than an army. Meanwhile all continued well in the central sector. There was never any real prospect of the Germans being able to carry out the plan which had looked good on the conference table at Prilep. By noon on September 22 the Serbs had reached the Vardar, near Negotin, and the French with Italian and Greek support were advancing north-eastwards from Monastir. Franchet d'Esperey issued a general order for 'unceasing and resolute pursuit': 'the cavalry, whose hour is come, should precede the infantry columns and open the way for them', he said. The Derbyshire Yeomanry followed the Bulgars along the road to-
wards
Strumica; the Serbian cavalry forward in the direction of Gradsko (which it entered on September 25); but the main cavalry force was a French colonial unit known from the name of its commander as the 'Brigade JouinotGambetta' and consisting of 1st and 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique, six squadrons of Moroccan Spahis, and a section of armoured cars. On September 23 the brigade set out from Novak down the Crna valley to seize Prilep. As they were resting at Dobrusevo that morning, Franchet d'Esperey himself visited them and ordered Jouinot-Gambetta to advance not merely to Prilep but to Skopje, 60 miles farther north across some of the roughest country in the Balkans. Thus began one of the most remarkable cavalry marches of modern times. At first the brigade made deceptively easy propressed
gress; Prilep fell and the Spahis reached the summit of the Babuna Pass before encountering serious resistance. But JouinotGambetta found it impossible to force his way through to Veles. If Franchet d'Esperey wished to enter Skopje by the end of the week, it was necessary to abandon all attempts at riding the horses along recognised routes and to seek paths across the sprawling woodland, more than 5,000 feet up in the wild mountains of the Golesnica Planina. For three days and nights the brigade travelled northwards, completely out of contact with the Bulgarians or with French HQ. Packhorses carried light 37-mm guns along the narrow and precipitous paths. At last, in the late afternoon of September 28, the Moroccans crept down through forested slopes to the Vardar valley seven miles south of Skopje.
2985
A stunned silence
LXII
greeted the order for
Corps
(Genlt Fleck)
ALLIED SITUATION
SEPTEMBER 30 1918
First Array to retreat.
NOVEMBER
But the unfortunate Bulgars were caught by British bombers on the Strumica Road. With the road blocked
11
1918
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
RUMANIA
• Buchaiesl
Ik
f MOfTENEBfiO
they took to the hills, a rabble rather than an army' ?
FRENCH ARMY OF THE EAST (Gen Henrys)
A
private in the Serbian army. After the and virtual annihilation of the Serbian army in 1915 the survivors had fled to Left:
retreat
Corfu. There they were gradually reassembled and provided with French equipment, their
uniforms a combination of French and traditional Serbian cut. The Horizon Blue
worn by the French army was manufactured in vast quantities and many of the newly-equipped, subsidiary armies were dressed in uniforms of this colour. This soldier is equipped with a Mauser rifle but there were two other rifles issued to the Serbs: the 8-mm Lebel and the 8-mm Mannlicher Berthier. Right. A comprehensive survey of the Allied advance in the Balkans during the material
latter part of 1918.
The
large
from September 15 leading
map shows events
to the Armistice
with the Bulgarians, with, inset, the advance up until the German Armistice
.
There they found the vital railway linking central Europe to the battle zone unguarded by patrols. They spent that night in open country south of tbe town, which was shrouded in autumn mist. Scholtz and his staff in Skopje itself of thought the vanguard Franchet d'Esperey's forces was still at least 20 miles
down the valley; but the Bulgarian garrison was full of rumours. When next morning the Bulgars saw three squadrons of Moroccans riding for the town, it seemed if even the more far-fetched stones were true: they offered little resistance. There was, however, a sharp encounter with the Germans, who were supported by an armoured train, but, by ()!)()() hours on September 29 Skopje was in French hands, and several hundred German and Bulas
garian prisoners with it. The .Jouinot(iambefta Brigade had taken the second largest city in Serbia at a time when the troops advancing up the Vardar were still more than a day's march to the south.
The Bulgars had by now ceased 2986
to offer
-~-\
AKIW bMUUT
VUIM
bUIUUl FIRST
ARMY
SECOND
ARMY
(Genlukovl
Gkl Corps (Gen Pavaskeropoulos)
BRITISH SALONIKA Aegean Sea
serious resistance in
any sector of the
front.
There were antiwar riots in four Bulgarian towns and local Soviets sprang up, on the Russian model. The British XVI Corps advanced circumspectly across the Bulgarian frontier on September 25. There were still 130 miles between them and the Bulgarian capital, and five ranges of mountains ran across the line of advance. But the Bulgars had lost all will to fight. On the morning of September 26 a troop of the Derbyshire Yeomanry was surprised to see a staff car with a huge white flag beside the driver's seat coming down the Strumica
Road north
of Kosturino. Armistice talks began in Salonika on
September 28. The Bulgars played for time, hoping that they might be spared the full rigours of occupation. But on the evening of September 29 news of the fall of Skopje was confirmed in Salonika. Franchet d'Esperey's attitude hardened: he insisted on the right to occupy strategic points in Bulgaria and to use the country's railways so as to
move
troops forward against the
ARMY
(Gen Milne)
Germans, Austrians and Turks. The Bulgars saw that they could prevaricate no longer. The Armistice was signed that night. Hostilities between Bulgaria and the Allies ceased at noon on September 30. Thus the junior partner in the German
d'Esperey, who possessed a strong sense of history, proudly reported to Paris on October 19 that French guns had been heard on the Danube for the first time in 109 years. Belgrade was liberated on November
coalition collapsed only 16 days after the
march on Berlin by way of Budapest. Vienna. Prague and Dresden but the war
first
bombardment heralded the opening
of the battle on the Dobropolje and within four weeks of Guillaumat's winning British
approval for the offensive. Once the Bulgarian Armistice was signed, the 'Armies of the Orient' fanned out for a grand finale to the war in Eastern Europe. The British entered Sofia and sent advance units northwards to Ruse, on the lower Danube. The main force of the British Salonika Army was, however, deployed against Turkey, poised to march on Constantinople from the north and the west if the Ottoman Empire survived Allenbv's hammer blows in Palestine. The French and the Serbs continued to pursue German and Austro-Hungarian units northwestwards into central Europe. Franchet
1,
and Franchet d'Esperey prepared
to
ended while his troops were still in the plains of southern Hungary. In seven weeks they had advanced over 400 miles. Further Reading
C. Military Operations, Macedonia, Vol 2 (London 1935) Jones, H. A., Over the Balkans and South Russia (London 1923) Larcher. M.. La Grande Guerre dans les Balkans (Paris 1929) Nedeff. B.. Les Operations en Macedoine. I'Epopee de Doiran (Sofia 1927) Packer, C Return to Salonika (London 1965) Palmer. A., The Gardeners of Salonika (London 1965) Falls.
.
{For Alan Palmer's biography, see
page 60.
J
2987
Billy Mitchell
and the
US Air Force
*
*
WH
0t
*W*
mr"
J
itffc
i>m*
+**
SLd
r
^ jf
%
i
-
f***^
It was a strange irony that the Americans, the inventors of the aeroplane, should when they joined the war in 1917 have become so conditioned by their isolation that they had only 55 operational aircraft, of which '51 were obsolete and the other four obsolescent'. But 4,500 fully operational aircraft were needed on the Western Front in less than a year. T. G. Miller. Below: French
Caudron, with Anzani engine
$**j* **
'*V-
*%%
...
w
'
i3£s* M i II
I98§
e United States' declaration of war came during the first week of 'Bloody April' 1917 when many hundreds of British, French and German aircraft joined combat every day over the Western Front. The war was over two-and-a-half years old, and although it had been less than 14 years since the first aircraft had flown, the newest warplanes of the day, powered by engines of 200 hp, could fly at 120 mph, reach altitudes of 20,000 feet and carry two synchronised machine guns with 1,000 rounds of ammunition. But so pacifist was American society and so technically backward had the inventors of the aeroplane become that the US Army had only 55 operational aircraft, on which the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics commented, in a famous phrase, '51 were obsolete and the
other four obsolescent'. Its personnel, who formed part of the Signal Corps, numbered about 65 officers and 1,100 men, none of whom had ever set eyes on a modern combat aircraft, much less flown one. No
2990
plans whatsoever existed for the developof an air force and its transport to Europe, nor was anyone in the army qualified by experience or outlook to undertake planning for such a contingency. The army, casting about for some conceptual framework for the development of a vastly expanded military air service, received unexpected assistance from no less a personage than the Premier of France, Paul Ribot. Late in April, Ribot sent a cable to the US authorities in which he urged the United States to form a force of 4,500 aircraft for service on the front during the campaign of 191 8 -in other words, this huge force was to be ready for combat by spring 1918, less than a year away. Ribot's cable noted that such a programme would require 5,000 pilots and 50,000 mechanics, as well as the production in American factories of 2,000 aircraft
ment
Left and above: An American squadron on way over the lines. Inset, opposite page: A
its
line-up of 26 Nieuport fighters, used by the Americans as advanced fighter trainers, on the huge training field at Issoudun in May 1918
Presumably Ribot did not pull his numbers out of the air but used those
origins.
and 4,000 engines per month. This was asked in all seriousness of a nation whose total experience of military aviation to date consisted of the unsuccessful use of a few unsatisfactory training aircraft on an expedition against Mexican bandits and
which had only one aircraft manufacturer (Curtiss) worthy of the name! Incredibly ambitious as it was, the proproposed by Ribot was at least a basis upon which to start planning, and the floundering army grasped the proffered straw. The Aviation Section of the Signal Corps and the newly formed Air-
gramme
Board adopted it and it was shortly approved by the War Department General Staff. It subsequently became the basis for the entire development of American military aviation in the First World War. In view of the key importance of the Ribot cable to all that came later, it craft Production
is
interesting to look into
its
rather cloudy
provided by advisers. His chief civilian air adviser, the Secretary of Aviation, was the dynamic Daniel Vincent. And apparently Vincent got his numbers from conversations held with and at the initiative of a junior US army officer whose precise status was that of military observer in Spain. This officer was a Major Mitchell.
William Landrum Mitchell, called 'Billy" by his army contemporaries, was the handsome, active son of a former US Senator from the State of Wisconsin. Billy Mitchell had enlisted in a Wisconsin National Guard regiment upon the outbreak of the SpanishAmerican War in 1898, but his outraged father directed him to accept immediately the commission he had no trouble in obtaining for him. After the war he had remained in the army as an officer in the Signal Corps. Along with the young Lieutenant Douglas MacArthur he was a military observer with the Japanese army during the Russo-Japanese War: later he undertook military survey of the Territory of | Alaska. In 1914 he was on the War Depart- | a
ment General Staff as a mere Captain— ^ its youngest member. During the next two <« 2991
v olved in the affairs of on. At 36 Mitchell was attend the army's flying school San Diego; typically he learned to do so at his own expense at weekends, commuting between Washington and Norfolk, Virginia by steamship. When, just before the American declaration of war, it was decided to send three officers to Europe to act as observers of aviation matters, Mitchell was one of them. Thus it was that this brilliant, intensely ambitious, impulsive and erratic man found himself, with a grand total of 15 flying hours and no practical experience whatsoever in military aviation, the US army's Senior Aviation Officer in Europe. ,
'Charm and unadulterated- gall' Upon receiving word of the US declaration of war against the Central Powers, immediately left Spain, where he had been assigned, for France. Between April 10 and 20 he conferred on his own initiative with Vincent and his staff, from which discussions the programme proposed by Ribot apparently came. Mitchell recognised that no US aircraft and engine production was possible in time to contribute to the 1918 battles, and asked Vincent to accelerate French production to accommodate American requirements. Vincent, evidently much impressed by Mitchell's drive and intelligence, agreed to do so. Following these discussions, Mitchell made a whirlwind ten-day tour of the French front, opened a US army aviation office in quarters provided by the American Radiator Company on the Boulevard Haussmann, and then paid a two-day visit to General Trenchard at RFC Headquarters. His combination of charm and unadulterated gall apparently won over the formidable 'Boom' too, and Mitchell, in his turn, came away impressed by the evolving RFC views on strategic air Mitchell
operations.
General Pershing was nominated as Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in May and arrived in France with a small staff in June. Mitchell, by now a temporary Lieutenant-Colonel, easily convinced Pershing that he
knew
more about aviation matters than anyone else, and was immediately appointed aviation officer on his staff, displacing the man originally given this job. Mitchell's staff then planned for an Air Service of 59 squadrons, basing this figure on the proposed number of US ground troops. Only after this plan was approved by Pershing did the AEF staff discover that the War Department in Washington was committed to the Ribot programme, which called for a force of 260 squadrons! A second plan was then drawn up to provide for the raising and employment of this huge force. Apparently Mitchell had been unaware of the precise outcome of his discussions with Daniel Vincent. Further confusion now was introduced by the independent efforts of the Aircraft Production Board in the United States to determine what kinds of aircraft should be built where. The Board sent an aeronautical mission to Europe in June under the charge of Major Raymond Boiling, and it made a thorough survey of the Allied production situation and the suitability of specific models for the Air Service, AEF. The confusion arose because no one involved in planning for this same Air Ser'
r
>92
vice
even knew the Boiling Commission
was
in Europe.
Nevertheless
its
findings
were sound and sensible. It recommended that the British de Havilland DH 4, Bristol F 2 and Handley Page 0/400 and the Italian Caproni bomber be produced in the United States, but recognised, as had Mitchell, that no achievable production in the United States could possibly furnish the aircraft that would be needed for the 1918 campaign, and that they could be obtained only from the French. A contract was therefore prepared and signed on August 30, 1917 by the French Air Ministry and General Pershing, providing that the French government would deliver a total of 5,000 aircraft and 8,500 engines to the Air Service, AEF, by July 1, 1918. The contract further stated that the French obligation was contingent on the United States furnishing certain specified tools and raw materials, but that the part of the
number of aircraft due by February 1, 1918 would be supplied even should the United States prove unable to deliver its quota of materials and tools. This agreement formed the basis for the AEF Air Service's programme of training and putting squadrons into the field. It was obvious from the first that as total
much as possible of the pilot training required for the high American programme would have to be carried out in the United States. On the other hand, only preliminary training could be carried out there, because there were no aircraft in the United States suitable for advanced training, nor any pilots qualified to give such instruction. Plainly, therefore, advanced and specialised training had to be conducted on the European side of the Atlantic. The French offered a site near the town of Issoudun, almost exactly in the middle of France, and a large instruction centre was planned. This eventually grew into a complex of ten airfields. However, things got off to a slow start. Initially the barracks
and hangars were crude tarpaper shacks, mud was universal, and virtually no tools or supplies were available. When the first flying cadets started to arrive from the United States in the autumn of 1917, several months later than planned, the limited capacity of French flying schools — only the small centre at Tours was available — and increasingly poor weather meant that large numbers of them had nothing to do. Since the completion of Issoudun was absolutely vital to the AEF's aviation programme, the unemployed cadets, virtually all university graduates desperately keen to fly, found themselves digging latrines in the mud of central France. This depressed morale and stimulated a cynicism about the intelligence of the army aviation authorities that lasted a long time. There is no doubt that the handling of the cadets was a command failure.
and bickering Meanwhile the relationships
Intrigue
of personalthe highest echelons of the Air Service grew daily more complicated. Mitchell, promoted again to temporary Colonel, was far more interested in leading a large air force in combat than in the administrative drudgery required to create it in the first place. Following the completion of the work of the Boiling Commission in July, Boiling himself, having become so familiar with questions of production and supply, was placed in command ities
in
of the Air Service in what the army called the 'Zone of the Interior', or all areas other than combat zones, while Mitchell headed it in the 'Zone of Advance'. This division of responsibility was predictably unworkable and in September, Pershing installed an artillery general, William M. Kenly, over both men as Chief Aviation Officer of the AEF. Kenly, knowing nothing of aviation, proved unequal to the task of controlling two such skilled and ambitious politicians as Mitchell and Boiling. In November 1917, BrigadierGeneral B. D. Foulois, sent for by Pershing, arrived in France with a sizeable staff and was placed in charge of all Air Service activities in the AEF — the fourth officer to hold this post in six months. Boiling, who had been found too obstreperous, was removed and assigned a sinecure at which his ability and keenness rebelled; he sought and finally won an operational job, but was killed before he could take it
up in a chance encounter with German troops while inspecting the British front. Foulois was the most experienced and senior aviator in the US army, having been taught to fly by the Wright Brothers in 1911. He had commanded the 1st Aero Squadron, which had accompanied Pershing's 1916 cavalry expedition into Mexico.
He had been commissioned from
Above: The Sopwith Camels of the US 148th Aero Squadron on August 8, 1918. Left: ItalianAmerican co-operation- part of a production line for Liberty-engined Caproni bombers in the United States. This form of co-operation, European know-how and American resources, would have been very useful in 1919. In fact only five Capronis were finished in time in the US
ranks after valiant combat service during the Philippine insurrections. A tiny, cheerful, affable man, he possessed the
far more common sense and administrative ability than Billy Mitchell, but lacked the latter's brilliance and charismatic leadership ability. 'Benny' Foulois was correctly perceived by Mitchell to be a personal threat. Junior to him in the old army, Foulois now outranked him, and, further-
more, was a rated military aviator while Mitchell had never undergone army pilot training. Mitchell undertook a systematic
campaign of far-from-passive resistance to his superior, accompanied by the most blatant sort of personal denigration and backbiting. Foulois was appalled at
what he found. had almost no airfields, and those they did have were sodden quagmires in regions of notoriously poor climate. Some training was underway in French schools, notably Avord, which
The Americans
still
co-operated loyally with their ally as far
2993
as their limited capacity permitted. The schools at Tours and Clermont-Ferrand were taken over completely and began in
November
to
conduct preliminary flight
training and bombardment training respectively. Several hundred cadets and officers received preliminary training in the Italian school at Foggia, but the Italian Farmans differed so much from the aircraft which most of them thereafter flew in advanced training back in France that they virtually had to learn their flight basics once again. Some 200 cadets originally destined for flight training in Italy were diverted to Britain, where they were trained by the RFC. Only about 300 aircraft had been delivered by the British and French to the AEF by the end of November, all of them training types. To top everything off, it became evident toward the end of the year that the French were going to be unable to honour the terms of their contract of August 30, having greatly overestimated the ability of their manufacturers to produce aircraft.
2994
It
took Foulois the
first
four
months of
1918 to negotiate a new production agreement, which was finally signed in early May. By this time most of the American raw materials and machine tools promised under the terms of the original contract had finally arrived. The Air Service eventually had reasonable assurance of getting
combat
aircraft for the large scale operations contemplated by July 1. supply organisation was created to handle the large amounts of spare parts required, with a huge depot at Colombey-les-Belles and an aircraft assembly centre at Romorantin. Gradually the huge complex of Issoudun
A
began to turn out trained pilots. While Foulois soldiered on, laboriously insuring that all the mundane things that to be done actually got done, Mitchell was constantly in Pershing's office pointing out errors here and defects there. This took no particular degree of discernment, and, indeed, some of the defects might fairly be attributed to Mitchell's own errors of commission or omission.
needed
the twoTop.The Packard-Le Pere LUSAC 1 seater fighter that would have been the US equivalent of the Bristol F2B had the war continued into 1919. It was designed by an officer with the French mission to the US to utilise the US Liberty motor, which was to prove the type's most serious difficulty. Thirty were built and 3,495 cancelled. Engine: Liberty 12A, 400 hp. Armament: two fixed Marlin and two flexible Lewis guns. Speed: 132 mph at 2,000 feet. Climb: 9 minutes 48 seconds to 10,000 feet. Ceiling: 20,000 feet. Range: 320 miles. Weight empty/loaded: 2,466/3,746 lbs. Span. 41 feet 7 inches. Length: 25 feet 6 inches. ,
Above: The Thomas-Morse S-4C advanced fighter trainer. This machine was designed in 1917 as a fighter to use low-powered rotary engines built under licence in the US, but when it emerged its performance was too low for a combat machine, so it became a trainer. Engine: Le Rhdne rotary, 80 hp Speed: 95 mph at sea level. Climb: 22 minutes to 10,000 feet. Ceiling: 15,000 feet. Weight empty/ loaded: 964/ 1 ,374 lbs. Span: 26 feet 6 nches. Length: 19 feet 10 inches. Right: An American i
recruiting poster. Despite its early start, the US air force had fallen far behind
Vast resources ready to be tapped, if the knowledges and skills
of Europe could first be brought into play
JOIN THE,
AID 5TOVICE and SERVE
'Black Jack' Pershing was a most astute judge of ability: he recognised Mitchell for the ambitious intriguer he was, but apparently sensed intuitively that he would be
an excellent battle commander. Foulois possessed an integrity and gentility inadequate to cope with Mitchell and lacked the divine spark — or perhaps the luck — necessary for a combat leader. But he was a capable executive and was badly needed to handle the detailed running of the Air Service. Exasperated by the lack of progress in his Air Service, which was in reality attributable to factors beyond the control of either Foulois or Mitchell, and by the incessant wrangling of the two men, Pershing brought in a West Point classmate, Major-General Mason Patrick of the Army Engineers, to head the Air Service, AEF. 'There are a lot of good men down there running around in circles', he told Patrick. The right man finally had been found to put an end to the bickering and keep the headquarters airmen on the straight and narrow.
The
first
American
air
combat units
Meanwhile the first American air combat units began to be organised in early 1918. The 1st Aero Squadron had arrived in France from its base in Texas in December 1917, and its pilots received 'advanced' training at the French school at Avord on such antiques as Nieuport 12's and Sopwith 1^-Strutters. It was then sent to Amanty, where it was joined in April by the 12th and 88th Aero Squadrons, and the three squadrons were organised as the 1st Corps Observation Group. The group's equipment showed the serious shortage of modern aircraft in the AEF: the 1st flew Spad IPs, withdrawn from French service because they were so underpowered as to be unsafe; the 12th got Dorand AR I's, huge graceful machines, but slow and warweary (the 12th's pilots said that AR stood for 'antique rattletrap'), and the 88th got French-built Sopwith lj-Strutters, splendid machines in early 1916. None of the pilots had seen any service at the front, but almost all the observers had flown with French squadrons. The group was assigned to the operational control of a French corps in the quiet Toul sector, which was to be the nursery for the young American Air Service.
The United States had had a fighter squadron on the front since the autumn of 1917, the 103rd, which was serving with the French Fourth Army in Flanders. This unit, of course, Lafayette, N124,
was the
old Escadrille
which had been organised and manned by American volunteers in April 1916. They were followed by over 100 other Americans who were serving in many French fighter Escadrilles at the
time their
own country
finally entered the
was
not until October 1917, five months after the US declaration of war, that anyone got around to thinking of using their accumulated experience in the AEF. A board was set up to examine the pilots, several of whom were found medically unfit for service by the overly rigid US standards, but eventually all were offered American commissions. A few elected to remain with the French, and a number, offended by the insensitivities of Army bureaucracy, went into the US navy, but most took the proffered Army Air Service commissions. It was a fortunate, if belated, decision for the AEF. Three of the four conflict. It
2995
Left, top: Billy Mitchell.
A self-taught
pilot,
he argued and cajoled his way to the post of Senior Observation Officer to the US Army with only 15 hours' flying experience. Below: French Prime Minister Ribot. His production targets for
US
flight
power were (unknown
him) based on figures originating from Mitchell, then a junior military observer
US
pursuit groups that
saw
in
m
to
Spain
service at the
were commanded by ex-Lafayette Flying Corps men, from whose ranks also came eight squadron commanders and front
many The
flight leaders.
two US-organised fighter (or, nomenclature, 'pursuit') squadrons were the 94th and 95th, which first arrived at Toul in March. Upon arrival it was suddenly discovered that someone had forgotten to give the 95th any gunnery training, a faux pas made more bearable by the fact that their Nieuport 28's had no machine guns! The 95th was hastily sent back to gunnery school and the Nieuports fitted with US-built Marlin guns. These two units, the nucleus of the 1st Pursuit Group, were ready for combat early in April. Two additional squadrons were assigned at the end of May: the 27th and 147th, both commanded by experienced ex-RFC pilots. Two additional squadrons comprised the founding membership of the Air Service, AEF: the 91st and 96th. The former was a long-range reconnaissance, or army observation, unit, equipped with the excellent French Salmson 2A 2, heavily armed and fast enough to give a good account of itself even against German fighters. The 96th in
first
US
was a day bombing
unit, its
equipment
Breguet 14A2's, splendid machines, but this particular batch were former school aircraft and correspondingly battered. Both squadrons were ready for operations in the Toul sector by early June. Toward late spring 1918 the Air Service
programme had
settled
down
to rational,
organised and rapid growth to meet the requirements of the projected AEF ground strength of two field armies in the line by September. It was planned to have each army supported by a pursuit wing of three four-squadron pursuit groups plus a four-
bombardment group. A three-squadron group of army observation
squadron (i.e.,
day
strategic
reconnaissance)
aircraft
would also be assigned to each army. Each corps would have a three- or four-squadron Corps Observation Group assigned, with each squadron providing artillery-spotting and short-range reconnaissance services
A
for a particular division in the corps. sizeable night bombing force was projected. In organisation, the Air Service closely paralleled the French, which was not strange, given the predominance of ex-
Lafayette pilots in operating jobs and the fact that virtually all aircraft used by the AEF were French. The necessity to rely largely on French production of course narrowed the choice of aircraft that the AEF could fly. The Spad 13 was the standard fighter, fast and rugged, but not as manoeuvrable as the German Fokker D VII, and cursed with an unreliable geared engine. The year-old decision to manufacture the de Havilland DM 4, re-engined with the 400-hp Liberty, and considerations of national pride, dictated that these aircraft be used, and it was planned to equip the day bombing and about half the corps observation squadrons with them. The army observation units and the remainder of the corps observation '!)')(,
squadrons were to have the light and easily manoeuvrable Salmsons. The replacement of Foulois by Patrick as Chief of Air Service freed the former from 'running construction projects', as he put it, and he was intent on getting an operational command. At his request, Patrick made him Chief of Air Service, First Army, which job was then held by Mitchell. Foulois burst into the unsuspecting Mitchell's office at Toul three days later and sacked him out of hand. Stunned, the emotional Mitchell first burst into tears,
then petulantly refused to impart any information to his relief. Foulois assigned him as Chief of Air Service, I Corps, but in a long letter to Pershing describing the
recommended his impossible subordinate be sent back to the United States. This Pershing would not do, recognising that the time was' now approaching when Mitchell's abilities would be needed. Foulois, urged to 'meet Colonel Mitchell more than halfway', manfully agreed, then began, albeit reluctantly, to be impressed by Mitchell's obvious competence as an organiser and planner of combat operations. He backed his junior completely in a successful fight to take operational control of the corps observation squadrons away from ground units, and was persuaded by Mitchell's theories about the employment of aircraft with ground forces. He decided in mid-June to create a new organisation called the Brigade, 1st Air Service, placed Mitchell in command and assigned to it virtually all First Army's combat-ready squadrons, principally the 1st Pursuit Group and 1st Corps Observation Group. Mitchell had no aviation experience (he got himself designated an army aviator in September 1917 through some process that probably would not bear investigation) but he was a trained general staff officer. He, Colonel 'Tommy' Milling, a pioneer army incident,
pilot, and Captain Philip Roosevelt, his brilliant Operations Officer, quickly and efficiently prepared plans to shift the 1st Air Brigade from the quiet Toul sector to
the threatened Marne front near ChateauThierry where the last great German offensive blow was expected at any moment. The American squadrons had enjoyed some success in minor skirmishes with the few
German
air units in their sector in the spring, and acquired some confidence, but were innocently unaware that they were shortly to be flung into a major campaign. The Air Service, AEF, was going into battle, whether ready or not.
Further Reading Final Report of the Chief of Air Service, AEF (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1921) Foulois and Gline, From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts, the Memoirs of Major-
General Benjamin D. Foulois (McGraw-Hill 1968) B., Ideas and Press 1953)
Holley,
I.
Mitchell,
Weapons
(Hale University
Brig-Gen W., Memoirs of World War
I
(Random House
1960) Patrick, Maj-Gen M. M., The United States in the Air (Doubleday Doran 1928) Toulmin, H. A., Air Service, AEF, 1918 (Van Nostrand 1927)
World War I Organisation Records and Air Service
AEF History (National
Archives,
Washington) \For
Thomas
page 2179.]
O. Miller, Jr's biography, see
.
common interest of all'. The reception of the speech was ominous for Wilson if he were to play the role of impartial peace negotiator at a later time. The audience applauded in the wrong places, and the New York press focused attention on passages in Wilson's address which called for sternness towards Germany. This interpretation may merely have been a reflection of New York provincialism, but it nevertheless unsettled Wilson's advisers. On September 30 the German Chancellor, Georg von Hertling, resigned and on October 4 Prince Max of Baden replaced him. The path to peace was open. Whether or not anyone in New York understood Wilson, there were Germans who did, for Prince Max immediately dispatched a note to Wilson accepting, 'as a basis for the peace negotiations', the Fourteen Points and Wilson's address at the Metropolitan Opera House of September 27. Prince Max asked the President to bring about 'a general armistice on land, on water, and in the air'. However, the German note of October 4 was not all it seemed to be. Although some Germans undoubtedly wanted peace, not all did, and the General Staff wanted only a temporary 'general armistice' in order to give the army time to regroup on more favourable ground. The General Staff knew the British and French would refuse their request, and they hoped that the apparently naive Wilson would be lured into a trap. As it turned out, they misjudged the man and destroyed themselves sooner than the Allies could have destroyed them. Sunday, October 6, was a 'gasless Sunday' in Washington, and the President dutifully observed it, taking a ride in a surrey as secret service men on bicycles escorted him. Prince Max's note fell upon this tranquil scene. Returning to the White House, Wilson immediately called Colonel House for advice. The Colonel advised no direct reply to the Germans. He also thought the Allies should share any responsibility if a reply were made. The President wrote a trial draft on his now famous Hammond portable typewriter the following morning and showed it to House and to Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State, that night. House objected that the country would think it too mild. There was evidence to show that House might be right. Some newspapers, senators and Theodore Roosevelt reacted to Prince Max's note by calling for 'unconditional surrender'. The Cleveland Plain Dealer said: 'Our answer to the Hun's twaddle shall be more war'. Senator Miles Poindexter distrusted Wilson and said he would have more faith in diplomacy with the Germans if it were conducted by Georges Clemenceau and David Lloyd George, 'the seer of Wales'. Roosevelt, who intensely disliked Wilson, said: 'Let us dictate peace by the hammering of guns and not chat about peace to the accompaniment of the clicking of a typewriter'. Clearly, Wilson had to steer a course between what might be the Hun's deceptive 'twaddle' and American jingoism. He must also be mindful of Allied reaction if he should 'go it alone'. He could have referred the German note to the Allied Supreme Council. Like many Americans, some members of the Council preferred the destruction of Germany on German soil. But Wilson, not they, now had the initiative, and he was determined to keep it. Meanwhile, the President received a note from Austro-Hungary, similar to that of Prince Max's. Wilson sent the final draft of his first note to Germany on October 8. He moved with caution and called his note 'not a reply, but an inquiry'. The dispatch inquired if Prince Max was 'speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war'. Less inquisitively, Wilson declared that the 'good faith' of any discussion would depend upon German withdrawal from Belgium and France. He also made it clear that the Fourteen Points would be the basis of an armistice. Lloyd George and Clemenceau were in Paris watching the diplomacy develop. They cabled Wilson on October 9 that they had read his note 'with the greatest interest' and recognised its 'elevated sentiments' but warned him of German duplicity. Foch expressed the same fear to General John J. Pershing. Lloyd George intimated that he would be interested in a definition of the phrase 'freedom of the seas', and the President was asked to send a representative to Paris to explain American policy. The Prime Minister betrayed both wariness of Wilson and wounded pride, consistent with the
Wilson's
search for
Peace
The Armistice, the terms of which were grandly assumed to further 'the establishment ofjust democracy throughout the world', was a personal, as well as public, triumph for its perpetrator, that 'visionary in the White House', Woodrow Wilson. During five weeks of painstaking diplomacy he had persevered with his own highprincipled basis for peace; but with Germany finally in acceptance he had then to convince the Allies — a much more difficult task. Thomas Reiser. Above: 'Well, Tumulty, the war's over' — Wilson smiles and doffs his hat. Applause, in the end, was loud and long Herbert Hoover said that Woodrow Wilson's diplomacy in autumn 1918, which brought about the Armistice on November 11, was the 'greatest drama of intellectual leadership in all history'. Whether or not Hoover overstated his case, Wilson, the supposed idealist, exhibited a boldness then which the most cynical advocate
might envy. At the Metropolitan Opera House in New York on September 27, Wilson delivered one of his great wartime addresses. He attempted to commit the American public and Allies to the spirit of the
of real politik
Fourteen Points. He said the price of peace was 'impartial justice, no matter whose interest is crossed', and that 'no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not
and later in his War Memoirs made them manifest: 'President Wilson was sitting on them [the German and Austrian notes], despite the request in the German note that he should "acquaint all belligerent States with this request". He decided to frame and dispatch his own reply without any consultation with his associates in the
common
enterprise'.
12, Prince Max replied to Wilson's He assured the President that he spoke 'in the name of German Government and of the German people' and that
Three days
later,
on October
note.
the
2997
thing we
Germany was prepared
deal with these ith a firm hand everyhave been fighting for
will be lost.'
to
evacuate
armies from Belgium
its
and France. However, there was a catch
in the last point. Prince
Max suggested a 'mixed commission' to arrange the evacuation. Wilson heard of the second German note in New York where he to celebrate Columbus Day. He had marched almost 70 blocks in a parade, smiling broadly and doffing his hat frequently. New York shop windows along the route exhibited paintings of German atrocities. His press secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, gave the President a 'dose of Tumulty' — admonitions of German perfidy. Back in Washington, and after another warning from Tumulty, Wilson reminded the press secretary that John Jay had been burned in effigy for making a treaty with Great Britain, but he concluded: 'If I think it is right to accept the German note, I shall do so regardless of the consequences. As for myself, I can go down in a cyclone cellar and write poetry the rest of my
had gone
House
days,
if
necessary'.
During the morning of October 14 Wilson drafted his reply. Colonel House saw him after breakfast and said he had never seen him more distraught. In the afternoon he tried out his draft on various advisers. A senator came and reported that his colleagues were bewildered and fearful that Wilson would commit the country to a premature peace. Wilson replied: 'Do they think that I am a damned fool?'. Lansing wondered about the political effect of Wilson's peace overtures on coming Congressional elections. House, who thought Lansing was 'stupid' and said Wilson thought so too, countered the Secretary by saying they could not work 'properly or worthily' if they thought of party politics. Wilson's second note was sent and then released to the public late at night on the 14th. Taking a strong line, the President not only refused Prince Max's proposal for a 'mixed commission' arrange evacuation but also demanded the reduction of German arms. The process .of evacuation 'must be left to the judgment and advice' of military advisers of the American and Allied governments, and the 'arbitrary power' of Germany must be virtual impotency'. Also the 'illegal and reduced to 'at least inhumane' practice of submarine warfare must cease. When the Germans left Belgium and France they must not destroy villages look upon [such acts] or plunder. 'The nations associated with horror and burning hearts.' Wilson's hard line in his second note received a favourable press. Even Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was 'genuinely pleased'. Lloyd George and Clemenceau might feel less unsure about that 'visionary' in the White House. They could also take some comfort, though probably not much, in another of Wilson's decisions on October 14. Wilson ordered Colonel House to Paris as his personal representative on the Supreme Council. The offer to confer with the mighty spurred in House an ambition which was 'so great that it seemed futile to try to satisfy it'. Wilson, whose relationship with House has been called the 'strangest in history', gave the Colonel no instructions. 'I have not given you any instructions', said Wilson, 'because I feel you will know what to do.' Events justified the to
.
.
.
.
.
.
President's confidence.
Germany answered Wilson's second note on October 20. It was more an evasion than an answer. Although Prince Max assured Wilson that the German government represented the overwhelming majority of the German people, the note protested Wilson's charges of inhumanity and destruction. It also held out hope that the procedure of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice would be 'left to the judgement of the military advisers'.
Not an inquiry, but a demand The President's advisers met in the White House on October 23 to consider the German note. One of them favoured an unconditional surrender and an occupation of Berlin. Herbert Hoover, however, said he wanted a quick end to the war and could do
jj
Top: Henry Cabot Lodge, chief opponent of Wilson's premise for peace and the League of Nations Wilson suspected that his opposition sprang from a determination to sabotage Democrat policies to Republican advantage. Above: Clemenceau: he wanted time for a detailed analysis
'998
without a triumphal march down the Unter den Linden. Wilson favoured Hoover's approach. Realising his strong position, Wilson's note of the 23rd was a demand: 'inquiries' were a thing of the past. He said that the German armies must be reduced, the military terms of the Armistice be formulated by the Allies, and militarist control of Germany removed. In other words, Wilson demanded unequivocal acceptance of his terms for peace. The President's audacity regarding the militarists and monarchy was remarkable. The note said that it 'does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out'. The 'military authorities' and the 'King of Prussia' still held power 'unimpaired' and were 'the masters of Germany' The 'President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what, may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy'. The government of the United Slates
would prefer to deal with representatives of the German people who had been assured a 'genuine constitutional' standing. 'If it must deal with the military masters and monarchical autocrats of Germany now ... it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid.' A German note of October 27 gave Wilson assurances of all he had asked. It insisted that the new government was in actual control. 'The military powers are also subject to this authority.' The German government, said the note, 'now awaits the proposals for an armistice'. On October 29 Austro-Hungary also accepted Wilson's terms.
The Central Powers had asked for an armistice during which they might negotiate a peace. Wilson wrenched from them a complete surrender. More, he had established his basis of peace
with them. Now he had to convince the Allies of his proposals an armistice. 'Foresight is better than immediate advantage', Wilson wrote to Colonel House, who had reached Paris. Wilson meant that Allied terms for an armistice should not be weighted against the Germans to such an extent that they would recoil and renew hostilities. And he thought that Allied acceptance of the Fourteen Points as a basis for the Armistice would preclude 'immediate advantage' and thus prevent a resumption of fighting. Again, Wilson achieved almost everything he desired. In 1918: The Last Act, Barrie Pitt says that both France and Britain had been too busy fighting and too eager to gain American support to raise much disagreement about the Fourteen Points. Clemenceau had not read them. But, suddenly, between the end of October and early November, 1918, the Points became matters of vital concern. Lloyd George and Clemenceau generally favoured the Fourteen Points as a weapon for disarming Germany, but they did not favour them as a platform for peace. The Allies had secret treaties among themselves, and, as Thomas A. Bailey says, they had no intention of giving up the 'prospective booty' just to please Wilson. But they could not deny Wilson publicly, for that might arouse Germany to a last-ditch struggle. Nor could they proclaim the secret aspirations for which they were fighting. Thus Lloyd George and Clemenceau did not raise too many objections to the Fourteen Points as a basis for the Armistice because Wilson still had the initiative. But the objections they raised lent drama to the last act. In Paris on October 30 Lloyd George and Clemenceau asked House for a detailed explanation of many of the Fourteen Points. Wilson cabled to say that such details should be reserved for discussion at a peace conference, not for an armistice. Lloyd George then told House that Britain could not accept Point Two, the freedom of the seas, without qualifications. Clemenceau had agreed to accept it but Lloyd George made a short speech which made him change his mind. 'We cannot accept this under any circumstances', said Clemenceau, 'it takes away from us the power of blockade.' He also said he wanted to study the 'character of the League of Nations first before I accept this proposition'. Colonel House replied that if Lloyd George and Clemenceau persisted in their views the consequences would be for Wilson to say to the Germans that the Allies could not agree on the conditions of peace and accordingly the negotiations would end. House went on to say that the President would then have to determine whether or not the United States 'should continue to fight for the principles laid down by the Allies'. House evidently made his point, for he cabled to Wilson that 'my statement had a very exciting effect upon those present'. But it was not sufficiently exciting to force Lloyd George to yield on Point Two or to dissuade Clemenceau from further study of the League of Nations. They, with the Italian Prime Minister, Vittorio E. Orlando, also proposed to confer among themselves about details of the terms of the Armistice. House offered to withdraw from the session so that they could freely discuss the details. The Prime Ministers objected to his leaving the room. 'They all stated that they had no secret from America', House said, 'and that they wished me to remain.'
for
Behind the facade of unity Later that day, the 30th, House again cabled Wilson to say that he had determined to continue his hard line with the Allies and that he thought he knew their weakness. 'The last thing they want is publicity.' They did not want it known that there was any difference of opinion between themselves and the Americans. House felt he could exploit this. 'Unless we deal with these people with a firm hand everything we have been fighting for will be lost.' House suggested another threat besides giving publicity to Allied differences. He thought Wilson should check the flow of American troops from America to France and give as an excuse the prevalence of influenza or 'any other reason but the real one'. Wilson might also consider turning off the supply of money, food and raw materials to the Allies. Wilson replied that the British would have to accept Point Two because America was pledged to fight to do away not only with 'Prussian militarism' but with 'militarism everywhere'. He also said he would not participate in a settlement that did not include the League of Nations. Then using the threat of publicity which House had armed him with, the President said to House: 'I hope I shall not be obliged to make this decision public'. Still later the same day,
Colonel' House, presidential representative in Europe Given carte blanche by Wilson he took a strong line on Allied procrastination
L
October 30, Lloyd George and Clemenceau tentatively accepted the Fourteen Points as the basis of peace, but the former still insisted upon reservations regarding freedom of the seas, and the latter now urged compensation from
2Q99
lage done to the civilian population of the operty. Lloyd George said freedom of the seas discussed at the peace conference if Britain pon the basis of peace. Thus House was not much
than he had been in the morning. And then Clemenceau was also preparing an elaborate brief ig forth French objections to the Fourteen Points. Angered, House said again that Wilson might ask Congress to determine whether or not America should remain in the war. 'As soon as I had said this,' House cabled, '[Lloyd] George and Clemenceau looked at each other significantly.' Clemenceau immediately abandoned the project of preparing an elaborate brief on the Fourteen Points. House then telegraphed Wilson to say that he thought the President should accept the terms even with the British reservations about freedom of the seas and the French claim for compensation. Wilson conceded that the blockade was sstice
ied
that
a thing that needed 'redefinition' in view of the 'new circumstances' of warfare, meaning the submarine. This concession helped to clear the way for a final settlement. On November 3 House argued Point II once more with Lloyd George. Clemenceau said to the Colonel: 'We accepted the principle of the freedom of the seas,' and then, turning to Lloyd George, said: 'You do, also, do you not?' 'No,' he said. 'It has got associated in the public mind with the blockade. It's no good saying I accept the principle.' He said that if he did it would only mean that in a
week's time 'a new Prime Minister would be here' who would say that he could not accept the principle. 'The English people will not look at it. On this point the nation is absolutely solid.' But, he said, Britain was willing to discuss the freedom of the seas in the light of the 'new conditions' which had arisen during the war. 'Why do you not say so?' asked House. 'I am perfectly willing to say that to the President and I will instruct the British Ambassador in Washington to so inform the President,' said Lloyd George. T would prefer to have you so inform me and I will inform the President.' Lloyd George later that day so informed House. In his letter he added the sentence: 'In our judgement this most important subject [freedom of the seas] can only be dealt with satisfactorily through the freest debate and the most liberal exchange of views.' The basis of the Armistice, then, was the Fourteen Points, with the reservation about the freedom of the seas and with compensation for damages to the civilian population. On November 5 Wilson informed the Germans of the two changes in the basis of the terms of peace and that Marshal Foch had been authorised by the American and Allied governments to receive properly accredited representatives of the German government and to communicate to them the terms. 'Well,
Tumulty, the war's over'
On November
8 a
German
delegation arrived in the Forest of
Compiegne where Foch awaited them. 'What do you want, gentlemen?' asked Foch. 'Your proposals for an armistice,' they replied. 'Oh, we're not making any proposals for an armistice,' said Foch. 'We are quite happy to go on fighting.' The German delegates looked at one another. 'But we must have terms,' they said. 'We cannot continue the conflict.' 'Ah!' said Foch, 'you come to ask for an armistice? That is a different thing!'
On November
9 Prince Max resigned as Chancellor and the Holland. At breakfast on November 11 Wilson received word of the Armistice — five weeks after he had read Prince Max's first note. He called Lansing immediately and told him not to reveal the terms until he addressed Congress. He took a pencil and wrote a short note: 'The Armistice was signed this morning. Everything for which America fought has been accomplished. It will now be our fortunate duty to assist by example, by sober, friendly counsel and material aid in the establishment of just democracy throughout the world.' He ordered that government employees should have a holiday, and then he retired to his study to work on his address to Congress. His wife, family and friends left for the Capitol after noon and he followed them 15 minutes later, taking with him among others Homer S. Cummings of the Democratic National Committee. They arrived ahead of schedule and waited in the ante-room of the House Chamber. Cummings said that the real difficulties were just beginning. Wilson said Cummings was absolutely correct. The difficulty now was holding together the best sentiment of the world while the process of 're-establishment could go
Kaiser
to
fled
forward'. 'He spoke,' Cummings said, 'with apprehension about conditions in Europe and the tremendous responsibility which rested upon the United States to see that the world did not fall into .' When Wilson entered the Chamber he was greeted chaos. with prolonged cheering. He shook hands with the Speaker and have Vice-President, and then said: 'The German authorities The war thus comes accepted and signed the terms of armistice. to an end; for, having accepted these terms ... it will be impossible for the German command to renew it.' It was not a 'gasless Sunday', and in the afternoon Wilson and his wife drove through the streets. Crowds surged around his car, overwhelming the secret service men. Soldiers locked arms and escorted the car back to the White House. Tumulty, the Press Secretary, later remembered how happy he thought the President looked. Wilson said to him: 'Well, Tumulty, the war's over.' .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Further Reading Bailey, T. A.,
Baker, R.
S.,
Woodrow Woodrow
Wilson and the Lost Peace (Macmillan 1944) Wilson: Lite and Letters, vol VIII (William
Heinemann 1939) Hoover, H., The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (McGraw-Hill 1958) Lloyd George, D., War Memoirs, vol (Odhams 1933) Pitt, B., 1 91 8: The Last Act (CasseW 1962) Seymour, C., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. IV (Houghton II
Mifflin 1928)
Lansing, US Secretary of State. His fears for Democrat popularity were tossed aside by House, who rebuked him for considering party politics
3000
Tumulty, J. P., Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him (William Heinemann 1922) Walworth, A., Woodrow Wilson, vol II (Longmans 1958)
[For
Thomas
Keiser's biography, see page 291 6.
\
To the Turks' 402 guns and
Allenby, it will be recalled, had taken Jerusalem on December 9, 1917. In March 1918 he was reinforced by two Indian divisions from Mesopotamia, and it was hoped that he could strike a blow that would compel Turkey to sue for peace, and thus weaken Germany's position. This was not realised, because two of Allenby's divisions, and the equivalent in numbers of three more were withdrawn to the Western Front in consequence of the Ludendorff offensives. These troops were eventually replaced by two excellent Indian cavalry divisions from France and a number of units from India, including 32 battalions, many of which were incompletely trained and short of specialists, signallers and so on. During the spring and summer Allenby could do little except make raids on Es Salt and Amman, whilst he reorganised his
their
army
Even so, to quote the Official History: It is an extraordinary and little-known fact
for his final offensive.
The
British
enjoyed a great superiority in numbers. This was of the utmost importance, not only because they were going to take the offensive, but because the success of Allenby's plan depended on speed, and his numerical advantage brought its attainment within the bounds of possibility. Allenby had four cavalry and the equivalents eight infantry divisions. He was opposed by the Turkish Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Armies. From the interrogation of prisoners and deserters he could make a very accurate estimate of
fighting
strength.
3,000 sabres, 26,000
rifles,
600 heavy machine guns, Allenby fielded 12,000 sabres, 57,000 rifles, 540 guns and 350 heavy machine guns. In addition the Turks had some 6,000 troops in garrisons along the Hejaz railway. The Turkish strength included reserves as far north as Haifa and Nazareth. The Turkish troops, doughty fighters though they were, were
outnumbered, half-starved, verminous and ill-clad. They enjoyed none of the elementary comforts bestowed upon the British, German and even French troops of those days. Malaria and dysentery were widespread: cholera and typhus, though checked by efficient German doctors, were not unknown. Despite patrols with machine guns mounted in lorries there were actually more deserters than men under arms!
that, while the total British ration strength, including troops as far distant as Solium, and over 80,000 unattested natives in the Camel Transport and Labour Corps, was approximately 340,000, that of the Turks, including the Seventh Army, the Hejaz Expeditionary Force, and (presumably) also native workmen, was 247,000. It was less man-power that failed the enemy than
Liman von Sanders had at
Nazareth. His
Army. The Turkish communications diverged at Der'a Junction, where the railway feeding the Seventh and Eighth Armies left the Hejaz railway, which supplied the Fourth. The point is that the line of communication of the two Turkish armies west of the Jordan ran practically parallel with their front. A glance at the map suffices to show the strategic importance of Afula, Beyt Shean and Der'a. On September 9, 1918, Allenby issued
Force Order No. 68. The opening para-
organisation. ters
Mediterranean Sea and the Syrian Desert was held by Eighth, Seventh and Fourth Armies, commanded by Djevad Pasha, Mustapha Kemal and Djemal the Lesser respectively. Eighth Army, with its HQ at Tulkarm, had an approximate strength of 10,000 men and 157 guns and held a 20-mile front from the coast to Furqa. Kemal, with 7,000 men and 111 guns, had his HQ at Nablus and his front stretched from Furqa to the Jordan Valley. Fourth Army with 8,000 men and 74 guns had its HQ at Amman. The Turkish general reserve contained 3,000 men and 30 guns. The ration strength of Turkish and German formations south of Damascus was over 100,000. Most of the German troops were in the Asia Korps (Eighth Army), but 146th Regiment was in Fourth
his Headquarline between the
graph
reads:
The
Commander-in-Chief Army,
intends to take the offensive. The
3001
|
§
5
| ^ | e
nositions in the Jordan on the front between I east of El Mughaiyir the sea with the object of inflicting a decisive defeat on the enemy and driving him from the line Nablus-Samaria-Tul't:k
.
.
.
karm-Caesarea. XXI Corps (five divisions plus Colonel de Piepape's Detachement Francais) was to attack the Turkish right, in the plain. As soon as the crossings over the Nahr el Faliq and the marshes to the east have been cleared of the enemy by the advance of the XXI Corps, the Desert Mounted Corps passing round the left of the XXI Corps, will advance to Afula and Beyt Shean to cut the enemy's railway communications and to block his retreat in a northerly and .
.
.
north-easterly direction.
XX
The
will Corps [two divisions] the Nablus road to gain possession of a line south of Nablus from which it will be in a position to co-operate with XXI Corps and to advance to the high ground north and north-east of Nablus. Much was expected of the Desert Mounted Corps (three divisions). 'Every effort will be made to prevent the escape of Turkish rolling-stock by cutting the railway lines from Jenin and Haifa to Afula at the earliest possible moment.' The DMC was also to 'push on to close the roads which converge on Beyt Shean from the Jordan Valley and Nablus.' Chaytor's Force on which the army was to pivot during the operations was responsi-
attack
.
.
.
astride
ble for the defence of the Jericho front from the north end of the Dead Sea to En
Nejme.
XXI Corps' Order No. 42 emphasises the importance of time. The whole of the success of these operations depends on the rapidity of movement of the infantry, in order to allow no time for the enemy to meet our onslaught. All commanders must carefully guard against embarking on side issues
.
.
.
The
operations call for self-sacrifice, determination and endurance of a high order, but if the total destruction of the enemy's forces in front of us can be achieved by 48 hours' concentrated exertion, the result will
more than repay any hardships
endured.
The Corps Commander therefore expects commanders to take risks and act with the utmost boldness with their leading troops, relying on their reserves to meet unexpected eventualities. Lieutenant-General Bulfin's Operation Order was clear and realistic and the troops responded to the spirit of his instructions.
Arab co-operation To the Emir
Feisal and his Arabs Allenby allotted the role of cutting Turkish com-
munications north and west of Der'a, with the object of preventing their armies from being reinforced from the north. It was thought possible that their operations might draw off Turkish reserves from the Nazareth-Afula-Haifa area and so weaken the resistance to the ride of the Desert Mounted Corps. The Arabs were to begin their attack two days before the main British offensive. Feisal concentrated at the oasis of Azraq, 50 miles east of Amman. His regular army
under Jafar Pasha was some 8,000 strong and consisted for the most part of exprisoners taken from the Turks. When the Imperial Camel Corps was broken up
3002
Allenby had given Feisal 2,000 camels with which he had formed a mobile column from his regulars. This was supported by British armoured cars, Indian machine gunners and Algerian artillerymen. In addition there were countless Bedouin tribesmen from the desert, their numbers quite unpredictable. In August Feisal's preparations were threatened when the Turks assembled for an offensive from Amman. To delay them the last battalion of the Imperial Camel Corps was lent to Feisal for a month and made a diversion south of Ma'an, which had the effect of focusing Turkish attention in the wrong direction. The camels were only watered 12 times in 41 days, during which the battalion covered 920 miles! As in Rawlinson's great attack on the Western Front on August 8 the keynote of Allenby's plan was secrecy. It was essential that his force should concentrate on the coast without arousing enemy suspicions, and the strictest instructions were issued on the subject. Brigade and regimental commanders were not told their actual objectives until two or three days before the offensive was to begin, when Sir
Edmund Allenby himself visited each division and briefed commanding officers, a procedure which made a profound impression upon them. Elaborate measures were taken to prevent the discovery of preliminary movements. All tents were left standing in the Jordan Valley, and a quantity of old and unserviceable tents pitched there, to make it appear that the number of troops had been increased rather than diminished. Outside the valley no fresh tentage was put horses of canvas took the place up. of the real horses of the Desert Mounted Corps when it moved west. All movement westward took place by night; any eastward by day, and a great parade was made of the movement of a few battalions down to the Jordan Valley. Sleighs drawn by mules raised huge clouds of dust about Jericho. Rumours were spread of a concentration near Jerusalem, new billets marked commanout, and the principal hotel deered for GHQ. A race-meeting was announced, to be held near Jaffa on the 19th September. The fact that the front was not continuous and that spies could slip through to give information to the enemy was thus made of service instead of being a disadvantage. (Official History). New bivouacs were carefully concealed. In the daytime horses were only watered between noon and 2 pm a period during which the RAF guaranteed to keep off
Dummy .
.
.
.
.
.
any enemy aircraft. No fires were allowed and any cooking necessary was done by solidified alcohol. Emplacements were photographed from the air and if their camouflage left something to be desired it was either improved or the gun was moved. Fortunately the RAF had the upper hand by this time for
its
part in these prelimin-
A Turkish intellicaptured at Nazareth on September 17 shows that they placed the Desert Mounted headquarters at Tal'at ed Damm; suspected that the 4th Cavalry Division was at -Jericho, put the Australian aries
was a
gence
map
vital one.
Mounted Division in the Jordan Valley, and the 60th Division east of the Nablus toad. As to any concentration on the coast: nothing.
the eve of receiving one of the most devastating surprises of the whole war. Ironically enough when an Indian deserter taken on September 17 gave warning that a great assault was impending, Liman von Sanders came to the conclusion that this was a 'plant' by British Intelligence. General Jevad Pasha (Eighth Army) and Colonel Revet Bey (XXII Corps) wanted to withdraw so that the British bombardment would batter empty trenches, but Sanders would have none of this. On the eve of the battle Allenby had massed the bulk of his army on his left on a 15-mile front: 35,000 infantry, 9,000 cavalry and 383 guns faced a force of 8,000 Turkish infantry with 130 guns. On the remaining 45 miles of Allenby's front the situation was very different: 24,000 Turkish infantry with 270 guns faced 22,000 British infantry and 3,000 cavalry with 157 guns. In the words of Colonel A. P. Wavell, 'The battle was practically won before a shot was fired.' On September 16 the RAF made heavy and destructive attacks on Der'a which had not been bombed previously, and whose garrison was unprepared. On the same day T. E. Lawrence cut the railway between Der'a and Amman. The next day he cut the railway between Der'a and
Damascus. Liman von Sanders now deto send reserves, including some German troops, from Haifa towards Der'a. The 18th was a hot and airless day. Allenby had completed his concentration. That night (18th/19th) the preliminary cided
began. Two brigades of 53rd Corps) crossed the steep Wadi es Sarnieh and gained a foothold on the main watershed of the Judaean Hills. All objectives were taken except one
operation Division
(XX
redoubt.
At 0430 hours artillery, mortars and machine guns opened fire on XXI Corps front. There was one gun to every 50 yards — 1,000 shells a minute fell on the Turkish lines. Now the infantry began to advance. Meanwhile the RAF bombed Nablus and Tulkarm (headquarters of Seventh and Eighth Armies) and the telephone and telegraph exchange at Afula. By 0700 hours communication between Nazareth and Tulkarm had ceased. 'The action of the Corps was exactly that of opening a wide door, the French contingent at Rafat forming the hinge and the 60th Division the handle'. (Wavell). The first infantry pletely successful.
assault was comThe French and 54th
Division met
stiff opposition but soon over3rd, 75th and 7th Divisions took the Turkish front line at the first rush. The Turks, dismayed by the speed of the advance, made little resistance: many prisoners were taken. Now 3rd Division faced right and took JiJjiliya and Qalqiliya.
came
it.
75th Division pushed on to Et Tireh where there was severe fighting. 7th Division cleared the plain up to the coastal marshes and then wheeled right into the foothills north of Et Tireh 60th Division, with 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade Oil its
made for Tulkarm. About 0900 hours Sanders learned that his coast sector had been pierced and h.it British cavalry were advancing north wards. At midday remnants of Eighth left,
t
One cannot say tary plan which
ment of surprise is a bad plan. The First World War was full of them. But Allenby was not the man to err in this respect. The Turks, thoroughly deceived, were on
too often that any milidoes not contain an ele-
Left: Liman von Sanders, German Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish forces in Palestine. So complete was the surprise achieved by Allenby that he narrowly escaped being captured by the 13th Brigade when it entered Nazareth. Above: Turkish troops in bivouac. The Turks were capable of bold, disciplined fighting, but their morale had by now sunk very low
Pioneers, to occupy El Lajjun at the mouth of the Musmus pass with six companies
and 12 machine guns. On September 20, at 0530 hours, 13th Cavalry Brigade, led by Brigadier Kelly, a Arabic scholar, found its way to Nazareth and surprised Liman von Sanders' GHQ. His German staff and clerks fought desperately. After sharp street fighting Sanders escaped and the brigade withdrew with 1,500 prisoners. At 0800 hours 4th Cavalry Division and 14th Brigade (5th Cavalry Division) reached fluent
Army were
retreating
in
confusion
on
Tulkarm and up the valley to Mas'udiye Junction. The RAF bombed and machinegunned the road which became blocked. 5th Brigade moving round Tulkarm completed the rout, and took many prisoners, later cutting the
Mas'udiye-Jenin railway.
At 1700 hours Tulkarm station was captured by 60th Division. The Turkish right wing was now destroyed and 7,000 prisoners and 100 guns had been taken. At 1830 hours Colonel von Oppen (Asia Korps) withdrew his headquarters to El Funduq. Half an hour after midnight Sanders ordered Major Frey, Inspector General of
Afula, capturing three aeroplanes, much rolling stock and large quantities of medical and other stores. Another aeroplane landed and was captured. The previous night 4th Cavalry Division had passed the Musmus Defile and reached El Lajjun by dawn surprising the advanced guard of the Turkish force sent to block the pass. In a few minutes the 2nd Lancers had speared 46 Turks and taken 500. At 1100 hours the Australian Mounted Division, having crossed the Carmel Range, reached El Lajjun. In the afternoon, 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade surprised Jenin, charging into the town with the sword and capturing the demoralised garrison. At 1600 hours 4th Cavalry Division captured Beyt Shean with little resistance, having covered 85 miles in 34 hours. By the evening, the coastal plain was clear of the enemy and the British cavalry was firmly established across the main Turkish lines of retreat. Enemy rearguards in the Judaean Hills, however, were still offering
stubborn resistance to XX Corps. During the night of September 20/21 the 19th Lancers (4th Cavalry Division) pushed on 12, miles and took the Jisr Majamie, a railway bridge over the River Jordan. Remnants of Eighth Army were retreating from Nablus down the Wadi Far'a making for Beyt Shean. Early the next morning, the RAF began a four-hour attack on the Turkish column in the Wadi Far'a, blocking the gorge. The Turks abandoned 90 guns, 50 lorries and about 1,000 other vehicles. During the morning it was apparent that the Turkish rearguards were collapsing. This was the last day of serious infantry fighting of the campaign. The 13th Cavalr\ Brigade reoccupied Nazareth and at noon the 10th Division reached Nablus from the south and the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade reached it from the west. By this time most of Eighth Army had been captured. At midnight a Turkish battalion from Haifa attacked the 18th Lancers (5th Cavalry Division) on the Acre road, but it was routed losing 30 killed and 300 r
prisoners.
On
the next day Chaytor's forces took the ed Darniya, thus blocking another Turkish escape route, and in the morning over 4,000 Turks wandered into Beyt Shean (including the musicians of a regimental band with their instruments!' and
Jisr
were rounded up. On September 23 13th Cavalry Brigade took Acre capturing 200 Turks and two guns. Two regiments of 15th Cavalry
3003
3004
Brigade, the Mysore and Jodhpore Lancers, plus a squadron of the Sherwood Rangers, supported by a battery and machine guns, attacked Haifa. The position was naturally formidable with a precipitous hill and an impassable river on either side of a defile; it was held by a well armed force about a thousand strong which had not yet been engaged, though doubtless in some degree affected by news of the general rout; it was taken in a few hours by a cavalry brigade of two weak regiments and a single 13-pdr. battery. Undoubtedly only the boldness and dash of the cavalry, combined with the skilful flanking movements, made success possible, and there is little likelihood that a dismounted attack by a force of this strength would have had equal fortune. The check on the river bank, which might well have been disastrous, was nullified by the speed and good order in which the leading squadron of the Jodhpore Lancers
changed direction and charged the enemy on the slopes of Carmel. Machine-gun bullets over and over again failed to stop the galloping horses, even though many of succumbed afterwards to their these
\ Ifas'A
;;i
-
,pr r ,
l&i
i
B f
i-
i Cavalry passing through the streets of Haifa, which was captured on September 23, 1918, by the Mysore and Jodhpore Lancers. 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade. Indian troops made an important contribution to the taking of Haifa. The former Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade was incorporated into the 5th Division during the reorganisation of early 1918
injuries. (Official History).
The 15th Cavalry Brigade lost three men and 34 wounded; with 60 horses killed and 83 wounded. They captured 25 officers and 664 men (excluding sick in hospital), 16 guns and 10 machine guns. It was a most remarkable example of what cavalry could achieve by dash and skill. But, of course, they had no barbed wire to killed
contend with. Risaldur Badlu Singh, 14th Lancers (Indian Army) attached to 29th Lancers, won the Victoria Cross. His squadron charged a strong position and suffered casualties from 200 infantry with machine guns on a small hill to its left front. Badlu Singh with only six men charged the Turks, and compelled them to surrender, but was killed in doing so. His devotion saved his squadron heavy casualties. In the evening the New Zealand Mounted Brigade occupied Es Salt.
By September 24, except for a few hundred stragglers, the Seventh and Eighth Turkish armies had ceased to exist. Since had been rounded up between the Wadi Far'a and Beyt Shean by the Worcester Yeomanry (XX Corps) and the 22nd thousands
4th Cavalry Division. Just before dawn on the 25th, BrigadierGeneral W. Grant, who had led the famous
charge at Beersheba, attacked Samakh with part of 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade after a moonlit night march, charging an unreconnoitred position in the dark. Dismounting they took the railway station in fierce hand-to-hand fighting. The enemy lined a stout stone wall, fired automatic rifles from the windows, hurled bombs. Several parties had established themselves in engines and tenders in the sidings. The struggle raged a full hour, quarter being neither asked nor given, until every man of the defenders had been killed or
wounded.
.
.
.
As
they
made
their
way
through the captured buildings the Australians noted that there were numerous
empty
spirit bottles scattered about. (Official
History). In this sharp fight the Australians suffered 78 casualties, mostly after they had dismounted. Had they attacked in daylight, being without artillery support, they might have suffered far more heavily. About 100 dead Germans were found, and 364 prison-
ers were taken in the village where the fighting was less severe. The trophies in-
cluded an aeroplane, a field gun, seven machine guns and a number of railway trucks. The Australians were justly proud of this exploit, which meant that the enemy could not now hope to make a stand on the River Yarmuk. At 1630 hours Amman fell after a stiff rearguard action. On the next day the 1st Light Horse Brigade captured 105 Turks and a gun at Zarqa station, 12 miles north-east of Amman. And at Jenin, a corps commanders' conference was held. Allenby issued orders for the advance on Damascus and Beirut by the Desert Mounted Corps and two divisions of XXI Corps. MajorGeneral Barrow's 4th Cavalry Division was to move on Der'a via Irbid. In the event of his failing to intercept the Turkish Fourth Army he was to follow it up along the Hejaz railway. The Australian Division, followed bv Major-General MacAndrew's 5th Cavalry Division, whose units were concentrating near Nazareth, were to make for Damascus via El Quneitra. Divisions were to move light and live on the country, taking little transport save ammunition wagons and ambulances. 4th Division, with 140 miles to go, was given a day's start: the rest had 90 miles to cover. At 0800 hours 10th Cavalry Brigade marched on Irbid with orders to reach it that night and make contact with the Arabs. There was a confused fight with the rearguard of the Turkish Fourth Army some 5,000 strong at Irbid. The 2nd Lancers (Indian Army) tried to take the position by mounted action and lost 46 casualties and many horses. The Turks withdrew during the night. On the 27th the Australian Mounted Division, after a short rest by the Sea of Galilee, refreshing to man and beast, advanced from Tiberias, followed by 5th Cavalry Division. The Dorset Yeomanry
advanced on Ramtha which they captured by mounted action. On the Ramtha-Der'a road the Central India Horse surprised and charged a body of Turks, taking 150 prisoners and eight
machine guns. In Der'a itself
Arab irregulars and
local
inhabitants looted the abandoned station. Auda Abu Tayi captured a train and 200 prisoners at Ghazale Station. Talal took Izra, and the Anazeh broke into Der'a and spent an enjoyable night of slaughter, looting and arson. Meanwhile the main Arab forces intercepted the Turkish Fourth Army at Sheikh Saad and took many prisoners.
The 10th Cavalry Brigade advanced on Der'a the following morning. Everywhere there were dead Turks, but they were the fortunate; for the wounded lay scattered about, despoiled and in agony, amid a litter of packages, half looted, half burnt, of torn documents, and smashed machinery. A hospital train stood in the station; the driver and fireman were still in their cab, still alive, but mortally wounded; the sick and wounded in the train had been stripped of every rag of clothing. (Official History).
Chaytor's Force received the surrender of the Turkish // Corps 20 miles south of
Amman,
but the Turks were unwilling to give up their arms for fear of the Bedouin of the Beni Sakhr tribe. Br. -General Ryrie, after a conference with the Turkish officers at Ziza, placed parties of the 5th in position at intervals in the and 7th Turkish line. To the Australian troopers the grim humour of the situation appealed forcibly, and they sat round their bivouac fires greeting every burst of fire from the machine guns of the nervous Turks with cheers and laughter. In the morning the Turks were concentrated at the station, where the bolts were taken from their rifles. The two best battalions, of Anatolian Turks, were, however, ordered by Br.General Ryrie to keep their bolts and full bandoliers, in case of a Bedouin attack on the march. The arrival of these fine troops, fully armed, in Amman caused, as can well be imagined, no small sensation. (Official
ALU
History).
prisoners numbered 4,602 (534 14 guns, 35 machine guns. 3 engines, 25 trucks, and a quantity of stores. Chaytor had done remarkably well taking in all 10,322 prisoners, 57 guns. 132 machine guns, 11 engines. 106 railway trucks and carriages and huge stores of ammunition, at a cost of 139 casualties. On the next day rearguard action by 50
The
sick)
with
3005
by
implies the
to
manoeuvre
act with rapidity, and is the chief means of effecting surprise.' —Field
and
Service Regulations
On the Nablus-Beyt Shean road between Tubas and Nablus Troops« moving through narrow passes were vulnerable to rifle shots from the valley sides. The hilly ndges running east-west were a constant obstacle to the British attempt to push northwards
/Above:
U£
t
A
,JSm
&r$ C? ft
y?
-'
V *
^bove. Some of the 1,200 prisoners taken by the Desert Mounted Corpsl^ being escorted from Kerkur to Tul Keram by members of the 181st Brigade. 60th Division. Right: Rafet Pasha (right) with Mustapha Kemal Pasha, who had taken over command of the Seventh Army in August 1918
i
.1— JWW
'
Germans and 70 Turks with six machine guns held up the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade at Sa'sa, 20 miles beyond El Quneitra. Liman von Sanders transferred his headquarters to Ba'albek, and Mustapha Kemal Pasha, having reached Kiswe with the leading troops of the Seventh Army, was ordered to take over
command
at Riyaq.
On the 30th actions were fought Kau Kab and Kiswe, 10 miles south
at of
Damascus. The Australians blocked the Barada Gorge, finding an amazing target:
Some
struggled
through,
others
turned
back, while the Australians fired and fired till the road was littered with the bodies of men and animals and the wreckage of transport wagons. Four hundred dead were later found on the road, and it took several days to burn the vehicles in order to clear the pass. (Official History).
Lieutenant-Colonel
von
Hammerstein
and the 146th Regiment left Damascus, fired on from the houses, and took the Horns road. 1: While Damascus awaited capcommander of its defences was
October ture the
enjoying the hospitality of Major-General Barrow. General Ali Riza Pasha el Rikabi, a soldier of some 40 years' service in the Turkish army but of Arab birth, had galHe was in loped out to meet the British high spirits over his escape and the tricks he had played upon his masters. As the headquarters of the 4th Cavalry Division he sat down to breakfast at 2 am, laughed so heartily at his own story of how he had selected heavy-artillery positions which could not be occupied for lack of water that he tripped over the table in the darkness and upset the scrambled eggs and cocoa. The incident was typical enough of the spirit in which the Turks had been served by many of their Arab soldiers and .
.
.
.
.
.
officials. (Official
History).
At dawn the 3rd Australian Light Horse entered Damascus, followed soon after by Lawrence and his Arabs. The Turks were pursued towards Horns, losing 750 prisoners and a number of machine guns. There were soon 20,000 diseased and downcast prisoners to be fed in Damascus. Out of 100,000 men, some 17,000 Turks had survived the Battle of Megiddo, including perhaps 4,000 effective rifles. Sanders' armies had become a rabble without guns, transport or organisation. Towards evening the Meerut Division reached Haifa. The last Australian action of the campaign took place on October 2, when 3rd ALH Brigade rode down a Turkish column, capturing 1,500 with three guns and 26 machine guns, the Australian Mounted Division being left to secure Damascus. On October 8 the Meerut Division reached Beirut. Five days later the XXI Corps cavalry regiment and some armoured cars occupied Tripoli. And on October 16 the 5th Cavalry Division reached Horns. On the night of October 20 LieutenantGeneral Chauvel, commanding Desert Mounted Corps, ordered the postponement of all forward movement until further notice. Major-General MacAndrew telegraphed that he was on the move and proposed to go straight on to Aleppo. Chauvel therefore asked GHQ for a decision, and MacAndrew was supported by the Commander-in-Chief— 'Sir Edmund Allenby was not the man to balk a divisional commander in whom he had confidence,
and whose
accord
with
his
object was so fully in wishes.' (Official
own
History).
General MacAndrew summoned Aleppo on the 23rd. To this Mustapha Kemal's chief staff officer replied: The Commander of the Turkish Garrison of Aleppo does not find it necessary to reply to your note.' However, on the evening of the 25th Nasir's Arabs entered Aleppo and the garrison withdrew after some to surrender
street fighting.
The next day
1000 hours General Aleppo with his armoured cars. The day also saw action at Haritan. The Mysore and Jodhpore Lancers (15th Cavalry Brigade) charged a rearguard, some 3,000 strong, under Mustapha Kemal Pasha and were foiled until in the evening the Turks withdrew. Five days later on October 31 an armistice was concluded between the Allies and Turkey. Beyond question the most unusual fea-
MacAndrew
at
entered
ture of the campaign was the effective employment of cavalry. It is true that the country was not so waterless as that traversed after Third Gaza. The marches
5th Cavalry Division, under the masterful and vigorous General MacAndrew, were truly astonishing. In 38 days the division marched 550 miles. It lost 21% of its horses, but it fought four considerable actions at Nazareth, Haifa, Kiswe and Haritan. During its astonishing advance the Desert Mounted Corps at a cost of only 533 battle casualties (125 killed) had taken 47,000 prisoners, whilst 360 guns had fallen into the hands of the EEF along with the transport and equipment of three armies. When the pursuit began there were still some 40,000 Turkish troops in action. When it ended the enemy commanded little in the way of disciplined of the
3008
)
Above: Captain Maclntyre of the 7th Light Car Patrol leaving the Allied lines at 10
am on
October 23, 1918, with a letter demanding the surrender of Aleppo. Right: Sherif Nasir's troops marching through the streets of Aleppo. Below: A Gurkha soldier with his .303 SMLE rifle. The bayonet was worn on the left hip, the kukri on the right
and
effective troops, except
mans—the remnants
some 700 GerKorps —
of the Asia
under the resolute Colonel von Oppen, the 146th Regiment, and two small Turkish divisions hurriedly organised by Mustapha
Kemal. Allenby was well served both by his commanders and his soldiers, but the victory was his. He was a tremendous leader in the real old British tradition of Marlborough, Wellington and Roberts.
His
men saw him and
felt
they
knew him.
He
briefed commanders 'right down to lieutenant-colonels' as one Montgomery gracefully put it in a later war. 'He was constantly up and down his line, so that
there can have been few
modern warfare who were
commanders
so well to their troops.' (Official History).
in
known
winning great successes without heavy loss; so that when losses began to grow serious and there were prospects of their increasing, he was prepared, unless the enterprise seemed to him to be vital, to abandon it, and to fight another History).
day
in another way. (Official
strategic technique may be as surprise and the concentration of greatly superior force opposite his immediate objectives. He was known as the Bull, a cognomen not inappropriate to one so tough and determined, but which entirely ignores the power of a mind which drew from the deep wells of military history without for one moment deluding itself that one can find solutions for today's problems in the successes of times
Allenby's
summed up
past.
His army, it must be remembered, was British, Indian and Anzac. There were no better troops in the First World War than these last. 'His Australian troops were men of original and independent type, not nurtured in the traditions of .
.
.
British military discipline and inclined to
be impatient of them; yet their reliance
upon him was complete.' (Official History). Allenby, who was 57 at the time of his
— no great age in a fit man who prefers the horse to the automobile — and was 'blessed with strength and 'crowning glory'
endurance which made little of very long drives in intense heat and on dusty, boneshaking tracks', was able to communicate his driving-force to everyone in his army. 'In the advance on Nablus he was seen up in front in his car urging on tired men at a moment when his personal influence was the strongest stimulant they could have had', which illustrates a favourite precept of Marshal Foch 'that the carrying through of a plan is of even more importance than the plan itself. Sir Edmund left an impression of unflinching will on his formation and unit commanders. It was this impression that led that splendid, thrusting cavalryman, MacAndrew, to persist in his advance on Aleppo. Allenby was not the man to let hunger, thirst or exposure rob his operations of their momentum, but he had the tactical subtlety to realise when actual battle casualties should make him call a halt. Nebi Samwil (November 1917) and the raids on Es Salt in the spring of 1918 are ample proof of this. He recognised that with his superiority in numbers and resources Palestine afforded many opportunities for
The British army had its great men in the First World War as the Second. If French was a washout, Monash, Rawlinson, Haig, Robertson, Smith-Dorrien, Maxse, Plumer, Henry Wilson, and Monro, to name but a few, all had their great moments. But even granted that he was a cavalryman fighting, as it were, on his own ground, was not Sir Edmund Allenby the greatest of them all? Certainly he was a cavalryman to be named in the same breath as Seydlitz, Lasalle, Curelv, or J. E. B. Stuart! In 38 days the Egyptian Expeditionary Force had advanced more than 350 miles. The 75,000 prisoners included 200 German or Austrian officers and 3,500 soldiers. A host of 100,000 men and 400 guns had been ruined. A bold design, deftly executed, by splendid troops really well led had brought astonishing results. In the battles of Megiddo we see the last great victory, both strategic and tactical, of horsed cavalry, an arm whose finest hour seems have been its last. thou hast run with the footmen, and they have wearied thee, then how canst thou contend with horses?' (Jeremiah xii, 5. also to 'If
Further Reading
A
Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, July 1917 to October 1918 (compiled from Official Sources) Milnary Operations: Egypt and Palestine. From June 1917 to the End of the War. Part II
(HMSO) P., The Palestine Campaigns (Constable 1928)
Wavell. Col A.
[For Brigadier Peter Young's biography, see p. 155.]
3009
Few of the Arab troops were regulars. In actions against the more disciplined Turks, it was essential for their leaders to turn to advantage the pride and courage of the desert Arabs. Major-General hunt
Jerusalem was captured on December 9, 1917. This was a wonderful Christmas present for the Allies after a year of almost unrelieved misfortune. Allenby entered the city on December 11, walking at the head of his
staff,
in pleasing contrast to the
flamboyant entry of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1898, who was accompanied by a glittering cavalcade. Sir Mark Sykes is credited with having suggested this imaginative gesture
Lawrence was present at the fine-drawn after his Der'a experience, and decked out in borrowed to Allenby.
ceremony,
British uniform as temporary staff officer
Clayton. For Lawrence it was 'the supreme moment of the war'. He had been promoted major in order to be eligible for the award of Companion of the Bath (which he never wore), and was present at the
to
ceremonial luncheon held after Allenby's arrival in Jerusalem. During the meal he was delighted to hear Allenby rebuke Picot for offering to set
up
civil
government
within the city. Lawrence's sympathies for the French grew no warmer with time. Allenby discussed his future plans with Lawrence before sending him back to Aqaba. His troops had fought themselves to a standstill and for the time being he intended to stand fast on a line running from just north of Jaffa through Jerusalem to Jericho. The Turks still held Jericho but Allenby intended to dislodge them as soon as he was ready. He suggested that Feisal should now move north from Aqaba towards Tafila in Biblical Moab. This was the granary of southern Trans-Jordan and its seizure would cut off the Turkish grain supplies. Lawrence at once assented, proposing also that Feisal should move his base to -Jericho once that town was captured. He returned to Aqaba on Christmas Day 1917, in better spirits and health than he had been when he set off to report to Allenby. Alter obtaining Keisal's agreement Lawrence began organising the next phase of the Arab Revolt. But first he set aboul providing himself with a personal body-
guard, the need for which is obvious to anyone with experience of Arab tribesmen. The Turks had placed a substantial sum on his head and tbe desert Arab is a man of hasty temper, avaricious, and careless of
human
life.
A man
in Lawrence's position,
dispenser of gold and arms, as well as of patronage, was a natural target for the greedy or disaffected. It was, therefore, only prudent to form a bodyguard of men pledged to him alone, and this he did — mostly from the Ageyl — paying them well, mounting them on his own camels, and allowing them to trick themselves out as they fancied. They were to serve him well for the rest of the campaign. The corn-belt of southern Trans-Jordan lies between the eastern shores of the Dead Sea and the Hejaz railway; beyond the railway is the desert. The country is mountainous and scored by precipitous wadis, flowing westwards into the Dead Sea, or eastwards into the desert. The principal towns, or rather large villages, are Shaubak, Tafila, Karak with its Crusader castle and Madaba with its mainly Christian population. At one time the region was well-wooded but it was being rapidly deforested to provide fuel for the railway locomotives. The Turks were sensitive to any threat in this area because they drew from it most of their grain supplies for the troops south of Damascus. Maulud, the first of the Turkish-trained Arab officers to join the Sherif, had inflicted a sharp reverse on the Turks on October 27 outside Petra. The Turks retreated slowly to Ma'an and soon afterwards began to withdraw their outlying detachments to defend Ma'an itself These tactics did not differ
from Fakhri Pasha's
Medina and were equally unimaginative. As the Turks withdrew into then- defences in
they inevitably lost their hold on the surrounding countryside, while the Arabs intensified their raids on the railway and began moving north into the corn belt. Lawrence had recently discovered a new and better method for raiding the railway
Above: Arab mounted troops in the desert. Their fierceness and resilience made them ndispensable, but they were also very difficult to deal with. Below left: Colonel T. E. Lawrence (left) and the Emir Feisal knew their strength and weaknesses
This was the use of armoured cars, backed up by a section of mountain howitzers mounted on Talbot cars; they were far
more mobile than camels and packed a much heavier punch. Although Lawrence was quick to appreciate the value of mechanised warfare in the desert, he failed to obtain sufficient numbers of armoured cars to achieve his aim, which was now the paralysis of instead still
the
railway.
The
British
hankered after the capture of Medina and the elimination of the Hejaz campaign. They feared lest the Turks should heed the advice of their German advisers and withdraw their substantial forces in the Hejaz to reinforce Syria and Palestine. However, Turkish obstinacy, and also pride, made them reject German advice.
Feisal appointed his youngest brother,
command the operations against Before he could arrive on the scene a small force under Sherif Nasir, consisting of 300 Arab regulars under Nuri Said and some Beni Sakhr tribesmen, attacked and looted Jurf ed Darawlsh station, 30 miles north of Ma'an. The intense cold and deep snow then led to a temporary halt, but the news of Jurf ed Darawlsh travelled fast through the hills. The Arabs around Petra were emboldened to take Shaubak by surprise attack. This in turn encouraged Nasir to lead his tribesmen through the snowdrifts against Tafila. It was a bold move since Nuri Said and his regulars had to be left behind, while the Bedouin, although inured to one of the harshest climates in the world, stand up far less well to cold than to heat. Moreover, their camels slip badly in snow and rapidly lose condition. Nevertheless, and despite these difficulties, Tafila was captured on January 16, 1918, and 150 Turks were taken prisoner. Then the troubles began. Zeid, accompanied by Lawrence and Jafar Pasha, Commander of the Arab regular army, arrived in Tafila to find the occupying tribesmen at each other's throats. Old feuds had been resurrected and bloodshed seemed inZeid, to Tafila.
evitable.
Auda Abu
Tayi,
whose mere
appearance on the scene seems to have frightened the Turks into surrender, was persuaded to take his Abu Tayi back into the desert to divide their loot. Zeid and Lawrence then settled down to soothe the other factions. Plans were also made for a further advance on Karak, but it was difficult to persuade the Arabs, huddled in their cloaks in cold damp huts, to make a move. And while they sat and shivered and squabbled, the Turks for once acted with decision.
«
*
enveloped the enemy left wing. The final charge across the plain was almost a massacre but the Arabs were too tired, and
Turks beyond Wadi However they captured the 27
too cold, to follow the el
Hasa.
machine guns and the two mountain guns, as well as 200 prisoners. A further advantage was the precipitate abandonment of Karak by the Turks. Tafila in itself was only a minor action in a war which saw tens of thousands of men locked in battle, but it is of interest because it was the only 'set-piece' engagement in which Lawrence was able to display his tactical skill against an enemy that outnumbered and outgunned his own
Hamid Fakhri Pasha, Commander of the 48th Division, took alarm when the news of Tafila's fall reached him. Hurriedly collecting three weak battalions, about 100 force. Field-Marshal Wavell considered cavalry, two mountain howitzers and 27 Tafila to be a brilliant action, and presumably Allenby must have agreed since machine guns, he personally led them Lawrence was awarded the Distinguished against Tafila. Marching from Karak at dawn on January 23 he fell on the Arab Service Order for his part in it. The remarkable thing about Tafila is how outposts disposed along the great gorge of Wadi el Hasa, 10 miles north-east of Lawrence managed to combine the disparate elements of his force and produce Tafila, and sent them fleeing through at extremely short notice a co-ordinated the snow. It was a complete surprise, even tactical plan. This is even more surprising to Lawrence, who had never anticipated when one reflects that the bulk of his such a rapid Turkish reaction to the troops were undisciplined tribesmen and threat to Karak. It was as well, however, that Lawrence peasants more interested in loot than glory. was there to co-ordinate the defence of Well might he have repeated Wellington's Tafila. If Jafar Pasha had had his way, remark after Waterloo — 'By God! I don't he would have abandoned the town and its think it would have done if I had not inhabitants, and tried to hold up the been there!' Turks on the deep ravine south of Tafila. Zeid had actually given orders for this Setback at Ma'an withdrawal when Lawrence hastily colService with the Arabs is usually a matter lected some of the villagers and sent them of peaks and troughs, and after Tafila the forward to reinforce the Arabs who were 'usual reaction set in. The Arabs were still opposing the Turks' advance. He then paralysed by the cold and unwilling to venprepared to give battle on the plain northture far from their huts. The camels were east of Tafila, and by a combination of ruse sickening rapidly and had to be sent down and manoeuvre lured the Turks into a trap. from the hills to regain condition in the In this he was helped by the arrival on the desert, thereby immobilising the Arab scene of about 100 villagers from nearby force. Lawrence soon tired of sitting round El Eime. By careful positioning of his the coffee hearth gossiping in the Arab available machine guns, Lawrence was fashion, and decided to ride down to Aqaba able to take the Turks in enfilade, while to collect more gold. He would require this his 'cavalry' — 80 men mounted on horse, to buy support once the weather improved mule and camel — made a wide circle and and the campaign moved north. 3011
aid that Lawrence would •ved half as much as he the lavish supplies of gold available to him. This is probably true since the ordinary Arab is venal and prepared to sell his services to the highest bidder; but it is as well to remember,
before one becomes unduly critical, that the Bedouin are almost always hungry,
almost always ill-clad and almost always impoverished. It is no wonder that gold has such an attraction for them. But to criticise Lawrence for buying Arab support overlooks the fact that there would have been no continuing Arab Revolt without the co-operation of the tribes. The rebellion would have petered out in a succession of futile skirmishes in the Hejaz. As it was, Allenby kept Lawrence well supplied with
presumably to assrst his own campaign, and Lawrence made good use of it by keeping the Arabs in the field. On this occasion, however, even gold could not persuade the Arabs to move north. Lawrence quarrelled violently with Zeid, accusing him of dispensing the gold on false pretences; if the Arabs were not prepared to co-operate, he was finished with them. Sick in mind, as well as in body, a frustrated Lawrence rode 80 miles to Beersheba to offer Allenby his resignation. He arrived to be told of the capture of Jericho, while Clayton swept aside his request to resign the leadership of the Arab Revolt. There would be an even greater need of his services in the plan that was slowly taking shape in Allenby's mind. This was to be a push northwards, while the Arabs covered the eastern flank by tying down the Turkish Fourth Army which might otherwise be used to reinforce the Seventh and Eighth Armies in Palestine. If the Arabs were to co-operate it would mean concentrating their attacks on a particular sector — that between Amman and Ma'an — instead of continuing their mobile strategy over a wider area. It would entail the capture of Ma'an, compelling the Arabs to fight the Turks in a 'setpiece' battle in which Turkish discipline might well win the day, and it could result in the Arabs being caught in a pincer-like attack between Amman and Ma'an. However, Lawrence agreed to try, and as a first step the Arab army was to be moved from Aqaba to Aba el Lissan on the Ma'an plateau. At the same time the British were planning to cross the Jordan and assault the heights at Es Salt, east of the Jordan. It did not turn out very happily. Firstly, the Turks, irritated by their defeat at Tafila, dispatched most of the Amman garrison to reassert their authority in the hills. Zeid had to abandon Tafila on March 6, and Shaubak was nearly recaptured. Then the Turks, having uncovered Amman abruptly withdrew, and the Arabs were soon back in Tafila. Secondly, the British, having started to cross the Jordan on March 21, were held up by heavy rains. Although there were only about 1,000 Turks to oppose them, the 60th Division, Anzac Mounted Division and Imperial Camel Brigade did not occupy Es Salt until gold,
25, nor Amman until March 27. delay permitted Liman von Sanders, the German general commanding in Palestine, to rush doWn reinforcements from Damascus, and to bring the troops returning from the Tafila expedition into the battle. The British were in danger of being cut off and it was decided to with-
March
This
3012
draw. Most of the troops were back across
rence to guide them, played
the Jordan by April 1, having in more than four days' occupation done nothing to damage the railway which had been at their mercy. It was not one of Allenby's most successful actions. Thirdly, the Arabs, with Ma'an as their objective, had brushed aside Joyce's advice to avoid a direct assault. Maulud, Jafar and Nuri Said were regular officers bursting to prove to their erstwhile Turkish comrades that the Arab was as good a soldier as the Turk in conventional warfare. After capturing the railway stations north and south of Ma'an on April 11 and 12, they then tried a virtually direct and unsuccessful assault on Ma'an itself, in the course of which Maulud was wounded. Four days later Nuri Said led an attack on Ma'an station, supported by Pisani's French battery until it ran out of ammun-
part.
Nuri had then to
helped by Auda Abu Tayi, whose tribesmen did not relish that kind of warfare. Jafar tried on April 18 to persuade the Turks to capitulate, which they might have done had it not been for the unexpected arrival of ammunition and supplies from Amman. In fact the Arabs had not fought badly in the first real battle of the Arab regular army, but they had bought their experience dearly. Meanwhile the Turks still held Ma'an, although more as a beleaguered garrison than as anything else. Not everything was a failure. Between April 18 and 20 an Arab and Egyptian force under Dawnay raided the railway south of Ma'an. The raid was meticulously planned by Dawnay, a regular officer with a firstclass brain who understood the handling of Arabs. Although Lawrence doubted the wisdom of mixing Egyptians with Arabs, in the event all went well. Tell es Shahin station was demolished, a great quantity of booty captured which led to the almost immediate dispersal of the Bedouin to their tents and almost 80 miles of railway was wrecked. This was too large a stretch for the Turks to repair and consequently their Hejaz garrison was finally cut off from Damascus. Fakhri Pasha still held Medina but it was useless to the Turks. Upwards of 12,000 Turkish soldiers, whose presence on the Palestine front might well have made a significant difference to the course of events, were incarcerated in Medina where even their feeding placed no burden on the Allies. If there is any need for a vindication of Lawrence's strategy, it can surely be found here. ition.
retire, little
Diversion on the desert flank
What was to be the next step after the check at Ma'an? Lawrence was anxious to avoid further 'set-piece' attacks and wanted to revert to mobile operations. It was decided that part of the Arab regular army should be left to contain Ma'an while the remainder moved north to seize the station at Jurf ed DarawTsh, and thereafter to breach the railway by tearing up 80 miles of permanent way. Hardly had this plan been agreed than Lawrence learned that the British had launched another operation against Es Salt. Without reference to him, but relying on promises made by the Beni Sakhr tribe to co-operate, the British once again attacked up the steep escarpment. They were no more successful than previously, and on May 3 Allenby decided to cut his losses and withdraw. The Beni Sakhr, lacking Law-
However, this
positive results. British staff that their operations
Lawrence's
on
fiasco did
little or no produce two
It became clear to the any Arab contribution to was entirely dependent
presence
to
co-ordinate
and it helped convince Liman von Sanders and his staff that Allenby's main attack would probably be aimed east of the Jordan along the railway to Damascus.
Arab
efforts;
The
effects of the
German
spring offen-
were now being felt in Palestine. Allenby had had to dispatch some of his
sive
best divisions to bolster the British line in France, and until these could be replaced he was forced to remain on the defensive. This worried Lawrence who knew only too well that his Arabs must be kept in constant employment if they were not drift back to their tents. The Arabs were also committed to the containment of Ma'an, which the Turks would be free to
to
relieve to
if
Amman
they decided that the threat
had receded. It was essential view to isolate Ma'an by
in Lawrence's
destroying 'an unrepairable stretch of the railway. Allenby agreed, and he promised to keep up the threat to Amman by a series of deception measures. At the same time he conferred additional mobility on the Arabs by handing over nearly 4,000 camels from the recently dismounted Imperial Camel Brigade. This enabled Lawrence to continue his attacks on the railway while he began to prepare plans for an advance on Damascus by the Arabs
on their own. By now Feisal's army contained about 4,000 Arab regulars, some Egyptian sappers, Gurkha machine gunners and about 140 Algerian artillerymen; there were also five armoured cars and about 40 British. With these, and their Bedouin allies, Lawrence believed that an Arab advance on Damascus need not necessarily turn out to be a 'forlorn hope'. However, while all these plans were in the making, Lawrence deemed it wise to visit Hussein, who was extremely jealous of Feisal, and obtain his agreement to the plan. He also wanted to arrange the transfer of some of the Hejaz Arabs to the northern front where they would be more useful than in containing Medina. On his way to Jiddah he visited Allenby's headquarters where he was told of the plans for an autumn offensive with Damascus and Aleppo as the objectives. The Arabs would be needed to protect the British flank in Trans-Jordan and to disrupt the Turkish communications by attacking Der'a. This would have seemed to make Lawrence's visit to Hussein no longer necessary, and indeed it turned out to be so since Hussein refused to leave Mecca to meet Lawrence. Refusing to waste time trying to reason with the obstinate and unpredictable Sherif, Lawrence hastened back to Aqaba to find that things had gone badly during his absence. The Turks had managed to re-provision Ma'an and had bloodily defeated a too conventional attack on Jerdun station on July 21. Morale was so low that there was even talk of withdrawing from Aba el Lissan. This was unfortunate because Allenby's plans for the autumn offensive were well advanced. The intention was to deceive the Turks into believing that the main thrust was to be made inland from the
Jordan valley, whereas be
made along
in reality
it
was
to
the coast. After punching a
hole through the Turkish right wing, Alien-
The end
by, himself a cavalryman, intended to exploit his great superiority in that arm
Allenby's main attack was to begin on September 19. He wanted the Arabs to make diversionary attacks on Der'a on September 15, 16 and 17 in the hopes of beguiling the Turks into moving their reserves in the wrong direction. Lawrence planned first to cut the railway between Amman and Der'a, hoping to delude the Turks into believing that Amman was the objective, and also to prevent the reinforcement of Der'a from Amman. He then intended to cut the railway north of Der'a, and also in the Yarmuk gorge. Then, with Der'a isolated, and relying on air support in place of artillery fire, he hoped to take Der'a by direct assault. The Arab force marched out of El Azraq early on September 14. It was about 1,200 strong and headed for Umtaiye, five miles east of the railway and south of Der'a. Its departure had been preceded two days previously by Captain Peake's detachment of Egyptians and Gurkhas with orders to demolish the railway just north of Amman. Peake was headed off by a strong force of Bedouin paid by the Turks to protect the railway, and he received short shrift from Lawrence when he rejoined the
by sending the Desert Mounted Corps through the gap. They would then turn east, cutting the Turkish communications with Syria, while Chetwode's XX Corps attacking in the Judaean hills would pin the Turks in their trenches. In this fashion both the Turkish Seventh and Eighth Armies would be enveloped, leaving only the Fourth Army east of the Jordan. The plan was brilliant but the margin in both time and space was uncomfortably small; if the Turks suspected what was afoot they had only to withdraw and leave Allenby hitting at air. It was therefore vital that they should believe that the main attack was to be in the east, and to this end the Arab operations on the desert flank were an essential ingredient in the plan. It was also important to keep the Turkish troops in Trans-Jordan out of the battle until the envelopment was complete, and here again the Arabs had a vital part to play. As part of this deception raids continued on the railway. Lawrence also obtained the loan of two companies of British camelmounted troops, all that remained of the Imperial Camel Brigade, for a raid on the
railway near Amman. He has been criticised for introducing British forces into what was an entirely Arab area of operations, and it is true that Buxton's companies accomplished very little, but the news of their presence reached the Turks and provided just another piece of evidence that the main British effort was to come in the east, and not in the west. Meanwhile, thanks to the organisational abilities of Joyce and Young, Lawrence's regular second-in-command, quite substantial forces were moved across the desert to El Azraq, which had been chosen as the base for the attack on Der'a, and for the subsequent advance on Damascus. By early September Lawrence had at his disposal a detachment of Arab regulars, some Egyptian sappers, a handful of Gurkhas, two armoured cars and a French mountain battery. Two British aircraft were also based on El Azraq. But these were only the hard core, for there were in addition
from the Ruwalla, Beni Sakhr, Sirhan and Howeitat. Nuri Shalaan, leading sheikh of the Ruwalla, was also there; although still suspicious of British and French motives, he had cut his ties with the Turks and joined forces with Feisal.
tribal contingents
in Palestine
main body on September 15. Lawrence then proposed to cut the railway himself which Young considered to be 'quite mad'. However, Lawrence got his way. Accompanied by Joyce and Winterton, together with an escort of armoured cars, he set out on September 16 and demolished a bridge he had reconnoitred the previous day. He and his party got away unharmed, apart from a broken spring in one of the precious armoured cars, and raced back main body. As Young was to this was again the Lawwrite later — '. rence whose madness had taken Aqaba, and his madness on this occasion cut the Der'a-Amman railway' On September 17 the bridge at Tell Arar, north of Der'a, was demolished, stinging the Turks into a sudden spurt of air activity. Their planes from Der'a attacked the to join the
.
.
Arabs but caused few casualties. Lawrence then slipped away to catch up with Nuri Said who was making for Muzeirib station to the west of Der'a. By the time he caught up the station had been wrecked and the railway line damaged. Peasants from the surrounding countryside had joined in the looting. Der'a was now isolated and the Turkish communications south of Damascus were temporarily dis-
rupted. The Arabs had completed the mission given them by Allenby. They had given Liman von Sanders the impression that the expected British attack would be directed east of the River Jordan and he had even dispatched some of his precious reserves — the German garrison of Afula — to assist the Der'a garrison. The British offensive began at 0430 hours on September 19, and it took the Turks completely by surprise. They were pulverised by the British artillery and overwhelmed by their cavalry. Within 36 hours the 4th Cavalry Division (Barrow)
was in Beyt Shean, having ridden lwund the rear of the Turkish Seventh and Eighth Armies. Liman von Sanders had lost control over the Turkish forces in Palestine
who were now pouring northward and eastward
in disorderly
men and
vehicles
mobs.
A
collection of
was caught by British
made their way through the narrow defile leading from Nablus to the Jordan valley and the road became a aircraft as they
shambles. It was soon all over in Palestine save for the collection of prisoners. East of the Jordan there still remained the Fourth Army, relatively intact but strung out along the Hejaz railway. Its
aim was
to
withdraw
to
Damascus
before
Allenby could bar the way, but its ability to move quickly was limited by the breaks in the railway. Moreover, the Arabs lay
Amman and Damascus, and their numbers were swelling daily as the coun-
between tryside
flocked
to
join
them.
However,
the Arabs would be no match for the Turks if the latter kept their cohesion, and there was a risk that Lawrence's force might be trapped between the Turks withdrawing from Amman and the still substantial Turkish garrison in Der'a. Another problem for the Arabs was Turkish air activity which they were unable to combat; both the machines attached to the Arabs had been damaged. The daily bombing attacks of the Turks were beginning to affect morale, and Lawrence decided to fly down to Allenby and request air support. He saw Allenby on September 20, apparently unmoved by the magnitude of his victory and determined to turn the Turkish defeat into a rout. Chaytor and his New Zealanders were to take Amman; Barrow was to advance on Der'a; while Chauvel's Australian Mounted Division was to push on to Damascus via El Quneitra. The Arabs were required to assist by delaying the withdrawal of the Fourth Army, and
Lett: Feisal's sense of betrayal by the British and French made him desperate to assert his father's claims by capturing Damascus Above: Who got thc^e first? General Allenby enters Damascus on October 3,
1918, in the
wake
of the Allied cavalry
3013
were then to co-operate in the capture of Damascus. Allenby warned Lawrence against making an independent dash on Damascus, but he agreed to make aircraft available to deal with the Turkish planes
Right: A soldier of the Imperial
Camel Corps Brigade, which included British, Australian,
New
at Der'a.
Zealand and Indian troops There was a considerable degree of individualism in the dress and equip-
ment
of
members
of the Brigade,
who often used Arab items as well as British
,
3014
Lawrence returned to the desert to work out his plans. The Arabs had been bombed out of Umtaiye and were being constantly harried from the air. There was also news of the Turkish withdrawal from Amman. They were being attacked by the tribesmen and were delayed by the breaks in the railway but it was important that they should not link up with the still intact garrison in Der'a. Barrow was moving much more slowly than Lawrence had hoped and he therefore decided to move his Arab force north of Der'a to Sheikh Saad; the hilly country would give better protection against air attack, and the Arabs would be in a position to threaten Der'a from the north. Young, Lawrence's secondin-command, argued that it would be madness to move across the Turkish line of withdrawal with such a small force, but Lawrence overrode him. The Arabs were in Sheikh Saad by September 27, having taken more than 2,000 Turkish prisoners in the previous 24 hours. They entered Der'a the same evening, ahead of Barrow whose slow advance up the Jordan valley had lost him the opportunity of cutting off the Turkish retreat. By now the Fourth Army had virtually ceased to exist as an organised force. Footsore, thirsty and plagued continually by the swarms of Arabs hovering round
their flanks, the Turks thought only of escape. Only the small groups of German troops maintained their discipline amid this disorderly mass, evoking Lawrence's reluctant admiration as they withdraw in text-book fashion. It was as well that they did so for the Arabs were giving no quarter.
On September
29 Barrow moved on from
Der'a with the Arabs covering his desert flank. He was to reunite with Chauvel at Kiswe, ten miles south of Damascus, but he moved so cautiously that he lost the opportunity of destroying a Turkish column of more than 2,000 men. The Arabs did this for him, mostly Walud Ali tribesmen with Auda Abu Tayi at their head. By the night of September 30 it could be said that the Turkish Fourth Army had been destroyed, and the Arabs can justly claim the credit for this. Upwards of 5,000 Turks had been killed, 8,000 were prisoners and among the booty were 150 machine guns and about 30 guns.
Damascus and betrayal is still some dispute about who entered Damascus first — the Arabs or the Australians? Chauvel reported on October 1 that the Australian Mounted Division had entered the north-western suburbs the previous night, and thai tli«' city had been occupied by the Desert Mounted Corps and the Arab army Oil October 1. Lawrence claims that (lie Arabs under Sherif Nasir were the first to enter Damascus. Lawrence had been travelling with Barrow's headquarters but. he slipped and en away before dawn on October
There
I
run the city. They were suspected working for a French occupation of the city, but this seems to be very far-fetched. They were later disposed of, Abd el Kadr by shooting, but by then Lawrence had to help
of
left Syria.
Above: Arab regulars of the Hejaz Camel Corps dealing with Bedouin pillagers leaving Damascus; the administration of the city was handed over to the Hejaz authorities after its capture. There was often as much friction between the Arab regulars and the Bedouin tribesmen as between the Arabs and the enemy
tered Damascus just as the sun was rising over the city. It was understandably a moment of high emotion, and as he drove through the lanes in his armoured car he was greeted by a galloping Arab horseman who waved his headcloth and shouted — 'Good news: Damascus salutes you!' Damascus was in a state of confusion, as might have been expected. Crowds packed the streets, and Turkish sick and wounded packed the hospitals, deserted by their doctors. The governor had disappeared and his place had been taken by Shukri Pasha who had suffered much under the Turks. Lawrence was surprised to find the fanatical Algerians Mohammed Said and el Kadr at Shukri's side; Shukri told
Abd
Lawrence
they
had
until the very end,
been pro-Turkish but were now claiming
It was essential to restore law and order as quickly as possible. Lawrence confirmed Shukri as governor, although he had no authority to do so, and then with the help of Nuri Said and Nuri Shalaan proceeded to get the public utilities working again. By October 3 life was returning to normal in Damascus, largely as a result of Lawrence's prodigious efforts, backed up by his Arab and British assistants, but Chauvel claims that it was the ceremonial parade of his troops through the city on October 2, coupled with the activities of his military police, that restored order so quickly. It was probably a combination of both. Allenby arrived on October 3. He wished urgently to see Feisal who was planning to make his ceremonial entry later that same day. Allenby could not wait but sent his Rolls-Royce to bring Feisal to the conference table. 'He came, but not in the Rolls-Royce,' wrote Chauvel. 'He managed to dodge my emissaries somehow and arrived at the Hotel Victoria at a hard gallop followed by some forty or fifty Bedouin horsemen. As a triumphal entry, it fell a little flat as it was nearly an hour before the population expected him.' Maybe
was so, but it was keeping with the course that its leader should Damascus in Bedouin this
probably more in Arab Revolt have arrived in
of the
fashion,
and not
lolling back against the cushions of a Rolls-Royce. There are three versions of what transpired at Allenby's conference with Feisal — Allenby's, Lawrence's, and Chauvel's. Allenby was chiefly concerned to avoid politics and get on with the job of defeating the Turks. He told Feisal that he, Feisal, had nothing to do with the civil government but was to prepare his army for a further advance. Lawrence, too, says very little, other than to give the impression that all went well, and to say that the British had given the Arabs the status of belligerents. After Feisal's departure, Lawrence says he asked Allenby for leave to which Allenby reluctantly agreed — 'and
then at once
I
knew how much
I
was
sorry.'
However Chauvel, in his report, makes it it was not by any means all
clear that
sweetness and light. Allenby told Feisal that France was to be the Protecting Power over Syria and that a senior French liaison officer was to join Feisal. Feisal at once objected very strongly. He denied knowing anything about this arrangement and refused to accept it. When Allenby taxed Lawrence with having previously informed Feisal, Lawrence denied having done so. After further discussion, which presumably fairly acrimonious, Allenby concluded the meeting by reminding Feisal that he was still a lieutenant-general under Allenby's command and would have to orders. Further discussion of the matter would have to wait until the war was over. Feisal accepted this decision and left the
was
3015
¥olt: 1017. r
Nov II
•
Vabrud
•
Sliahba
#zah,e i
1918
Mediterranean Sea
The Battle of El
El'
Azraq
Tafila,
January 25 1918
Eime
Attack by El' Eime villagers 100 men and 3 auto rifles
Turkish 48 Division
(Hamid Fakri Pasha) 600 Infantry 100 Cavalry 2 mountain howitzers 23 machine guns and auto rifles
•
El
Quseima
Shaubak^-7
y ^
-v Petra
•
27 10 19.
f
I
4 Abu
el
Jerdun
__ *• 17 ^W /*__-^ ,/
BRITISH ATTACKS BRITISH FRONT LINE: SEPTEMBER 19 1918 SEPTEMBER 30 1918
a'an
3
ARAB ARMY MOVEMENTS LAWRENCE'S MOVEMENTS COMBINED MOVEMENTS OF LAWRENCE'S ARABS BEDOUIN MOVEMENTS TURKISH MOVEMENTS
Advance of Rasim's Cavalry 80 men and 5 auto rifles
•(*
RAILWAYS
MILES
I
Turks defeated near Petra on October 27 and withdraw
2
Arabs move north
3
Arab
4
Lawrence and Zeid
5
Turks rout the Arabs about Tafila on January 23.
6
Lawrence defeats the Turks
raid
into the
corn
to
Ma'an.
belt.
7
Turks abandon Karak.
8
Arabs refuse
to
move
on January
at Tafila
further north,
20.
on January
25.
and Lawrence rides
to
Beersheba
(February 24) to offer his resignation to Allenby after a quarrel with Zeid.
9
Turkish raid from Tafila
Allenby decides to break
16
Lawrence returns meantime.
17 18 19
Arab attack on Abu
20
Abortive British raid on the railway north of
21
Lawrence and Arabs move on Umtaiye on September
22
Lawrence cuts the railway north
23
British offensive
24
Lawrence and Arabs take Sheikh Saad and Der'a on September
on Jurf ed DarawTsh. arrive at Tatila
on March
Amman
towards Shaubak and
Tafila.
Zeid abandons
6.
off
the assault on Salt on
to
Aqaba on el
Jerdun defeated on July
Major Arab units moved
Lawrence arrives
in
21.
Azraq on August 22.
Amman
British attack Salt
and
12
Abortive Arab operations to take Ma'an between April 11 and 18.
25
Lawrenc
13
Mixed Arab/Egyptian between April 18 and
26
Lawrence and Arabs reach Damascus on October
raid
on the Hejaz Railway around
isolation of Turkish forces in the Hejaz.
3016
Shahin consequent
Tell es
on September
12.
14.
of Der'a.
II
20. 80 mites of track ruined, with the
GHQ
to Azraq.
Amman.
•
visiting
July 28, having been to Cairo in the
Turks pull back to
unsuccessfully.
3.
Lawrence goes to Jiddah to confer with Hussein (June 25), en route to discuss the Arab role in the autumn offensive.
10
Amman
May
14 15
opens on September
19.
and Arabs reach Kiswe on September
30. 1.
27.
to the
contribution made by the Arabs to his victorious campaign, while Wavell, who was in a position to judge, had this to say: When Allenby launched his decisive attack in 1918, half of the Turkish troops in the operational zone were pinned down in the Arab sector east of the Jordan — close on 50,000 Turks being there engaged and paralysed, by an Arab force of barely 3,000 men, while little more than 50,000 Turks were left to meet the assault by Allenby's army of 250,000 troops. These
into
figures,
meeting. Lawrence then told Allenby that he could not work with a French liaison He asked for his long overdue officer. leave and Allenby immediately assented. Thus the Arab Revolt ended in much the same state of confusion and crosspurpose as it had begun. The man who had had the vision to see Damascus as its goal
made
his
way back
to
Cairo,
and
thence to London, carrying with him the conviction that he had betrayed his trust
Arabs by handing them from Turkish French hands. The one Arab prince who had possessed the personality to inspire the Arabs, and the intelligence to appreciate the value of Lawrence's strategy, was left in Damascus, bitter and bewildered. And meanwhile, Allenby and Chauvel got on with the war.
The Arab Revolt and Lawrence
How
important was the Arab contribution and how valuable a part did the Arabs play in defeating the Turks? How much of the success of the Arab Revolt was due to Lawrence, and was he as brilliant a strategist as is sometimes suggested, or only a skilled amateur soldier with a flair for dealing with Arabs? Perhaps the first, if mainly negative, contribution of the Arabs was Sherif Hussein's refusal to endorse the call for a holy war. It is hard to say how effective such a call would have been, but in the worst case it could have had very serious to the Allied cause,
repercussions in North Africa, India and Egypt. Hussein may have been a difficult and tortuous ally but he served Britain and France well when he refused to endorse the Caliph's call for a jehad. The Arabs also contributed by compelling the Turks to disperse their war effort. The Turks, as Muslims, could not afford to ignore the Arab Revolt because it was taking place in the heartland of Islam. Moreover, the fact that there was a rebellion, and that it had begun in the Hejaz, inevitably had its repercussions among the large numbers of Arabs serving in the Turkish army. The Turks did not find it easy to replace these unreliable allies in the firing line, while the Arab officers remained throughout a fifth column within the gates. It is less easy to decide whether the Arabs played a significant part in the Turks' defeat. It has sometimes been said of the Arab campaign that it was 'a sideshow within a sideshow'. It is also argued that the Arabs almost invariably came off badly whenever they met the Turks in pitched battle, and that their only value was a nuisance one. The fact remains that they did tie down large numbers of trained Turkish soldiers in areas far removed from the main battlefront; and when, eventually, they were called upon to cut the Turkish line of communications at Der'a, as well as prevent the link-up of the Turkish Fourth Army with the battered remnants of the Seventh and Eighth Armies, they were completely successful in both these tasks. As General Glubb has written: 'To the student of war, the whole Arab campaign provides a remarkable illustration of the extraordinary results which can be achieved by guerrilla tactics. For the Arabs detained tens of thousands of Turkish regular troops with a force barely capable of engaging a brigade of infantry in pitched battle.'
Allenby recorded his appreciation of the
from the
official records,
form the
most striking testimony to Lawrence's strategy and its effect. Moreover, a further 150,000 Turkish troops — three- fifths of the total — were spread over the rest of the region in a futile effort to stem the tide of the Arab Revolt. It would scarcely seem necessary to add to this since it must be obvious that the immobilisation of such large numbers of the enemy is just as effective in the long run as killing them — and far less messy. General Liman von Sanders in his memoirs frequently refers to the disrupting effect of the Arab Revolt on his plans, while there can be no doubt that Arab activities east of the Jordan played a vital part in deluding the Turks into believing that the main British thrust was going to be made in that area. How far can Lawrence claim the credit for the success of the Arab Revolt, and what were his military abilities? He is one of the most complicated personalities in recent British military history, and is unfortunately capable of arousing either intense admiration or equally strong antipathy. He did this as a young subaltern at in Cairo in 1915 and he has been doing so ever since; and yet few of those who had close dealings with Lawrence were unaffected by his spell. Part of the trouble lies in the fact that the Seven Pillars of Wisdom, although magnificent literature, is hardly a statement sworn on oath. Lawrence admitted as much to his friend, Richard Meinertzhagen, but the facts contained in it have been allowed to overlay the fiction. But it cannot be denied that Lawrence, almost from the first, perceived the direction the Arab Revolt should take. Although young, junior in rank and inexperienced in war and high politics, he nevertheless succeeded in persuading his superiors, both British and Arab, that his views were the correct ones; and once he had found the proper instrument, in Feisal, he proceeded to direct the Revolt along the lines he had previously worked out in his mind. This in itself was a remarkable achievement, but even more so when one reflects that he was dealing mainly with Bedouin tribesmen, who are among the most volatile, unreliable and undisciplined people on this earth. He had to contend with the Arabs' crazy desire to take on the Turks on the Turks' terms — that is as regular
GHQ
soldiers
— which would have
led to disaster.
He was
constantly being urged to eliminate the campaign in the Hejaz, whereas he saw quite clearly that the best course of action was to keep Fakhri Pasha cooped up in Medina, doing little else but guard himself, thereby imposing an intolerable strain on the Turkish supply line. None of this
would have been possible
if
Law-
rence had not been a man of great quality, nor would he have been able to tarry the Arabs with him if he had lacked sympathy
them and their cause. Few people can impose such strains on nerves, patience and understanding as the Arabs, and yet these were the people guided by Lawrence from Yanbu' al Bahr to Damascus. It was a tremendous achievement. for
what of his strategy and tactics? latter are easily disposed of since he sought whenever possible to avoid a 'setpiece' battle. Only at Tafila was he forced to demonstrate his tactical skill in a conFinally,
The
ventional type of engagement, and Tafila was a minor masterpiece. But his aim was always to exploit the Arabs' advantage over the Turks — their mobility, their skill in the hit-and-run raid and their ability to fade away into the desert where the Turk could not follow. These had been Bedouin tactics throughout the ages, and
Lawrence knew
this.
He never underrated
the Turk as a fighting man, any more than he was bamboozled by the flamboyant attitudes of Auda Abu Tayi and his kind. He knew the tribesmen would not stand heavy casualties and he therefore sought to achieve his aim with the minimum of bloodshed. That he usually succeeded must be placed to his credit as a tactician. His strategy was abundantly justified by its results. He set out to tie down a much larger Turkish force by raiding its lifeline, the railway, and by allowing the Turks to keep it working, 'but only just'. He never lost sight of the eventual
Damascus, and his movements towards that goal were carefully planned and carried out. He had read much about war, and had thought much about it. When the opportunity came he was able to put his goal,
theories into practice. He understood the value of the new weapons being introduced onto the battlefield, and he was one of the first to appreciate the importance of mechanised warfare and the use of aircraft in the desert. Above all, however, he understood the men he had to lead. Lawrence was certainly much more than an inspired leader of guerrillas although he applied all the principles of guerrilla warfare to his operations. For he had the vision, as Sir Basil Liddell Hart has written, 'to anticipate the guerrilla trend of civilised warfare that arises from the growing dependence of nations on industrial resources'. Few, in the light of recent experience, would choose to quarrel with that verdict. Further Reading Antonius, G., The Arab Awakening (Hamish Hamilton 1938) Glubb, Lt-Gen. Sir John, Britain and the Arabs (Hodder&Stoughton 1959) Knightley, P. & Simpson, C, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia (Nelson 1969)
Wisdom
Lawrence, T. E., The Seven (Cape 1935)
Pillars of
Liddell Hart, Sir Basil.
Lawrence (Cape
T.
E.
1934)
Lloyd George,
D., The Truth about the Peace Conference (Gollancz 1938) Monroe, E., Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956 (Chatto & Windus 1963) Nutting. A., Lawrence of Arabia: The Man and the Motive (Hollis & Carter 1966)
Storrs, Sir Ronald. Orientations (Nicholson
& Watson 1943) H. W. V., History of the Peace Conference at Paris Watt, R. M., The Kings Depart (Weidenfeld &
Temperley,
Nicolson 1969)
[For Mqjor-General Lunt's biography, see p. 1525.]
3017
E
BOMBING OF
IONS I ANTINOMY Aircraft were still unpredictable and awkward to handle. Bombing raids seldom achieved a high degree of accuracy. The importance of the joint efforts of fighter and bomber squadrons in the Aegean area was in demonstrating the superiority of the British air force. John Vader In August 1918, when the Allies were going on the offensive on the Western Front, two wings of the newly-formed RAF were guarding the air space and patrolling the seas in front of the Dardanelles. The squadrons -Nos. 220, 221, 222 and 223 -were part of the Aegean Group which had stations on Imbros, Stavros, Thasos and Mudros, seaplane bases at Suda Bay (Crete) and Syra, and an airship station at Kassandra. Headquarters, Mudros, was under the command of the Rear-Admiral, Aegean; the ex-RNAS, now RAF, aircraft and personnel were under the control of a Colonel, RAF, and the squadrons continued to make operational reports under their former
RNAS
unit letters.
time in the war most of the operations in the Aegean sealanes were against enemy submarine attacks, so flying operations were almost entirely connected with the campaign against U-Boats: search patrols, direct attacks on the boats at sea, convoy patrols and raids on bases. Short and Sopwith seaplanes were supposed to do most of this work but as some of the planes could not take off from flat calm or rough seas the landplanes were extensively used. The seaplanes' mother ship, Ark Royal, named after a 16thcentury warship, was a converted oil carrier of 7,450 tons carrying sail on a mizzen mast to steady the steering — the only aircraft carrier ever to use sail — and containing a single hangar deck to hold ten seaplanes which were swung out or picked up by hoists. It was found that the best protection for convoys was not aircraft but kite balloons, flown from a destroyer or sloop escort, to spot periscopes. The seaplanes were in 63 Wing, the landplanes in 62 Wing, the latter's secondary operational role being to attack enemy ports and depots, and particularly submarine bases and lines of' communication. Earlier, the RNAS had flown a wide assortment of aircraft types but at this period the main strength comprised Sopwith Camel fighters. DH 4 and DH 9 bombers, and Sopwith '.-Strutters used for reconnaissance. The Strutters could be flown off the 130-foot launching platform of Ark Royal but in the Aegean she was merely a depot ship for assembly, repair and overhaul of seaplanes and engii The Camel was the Allies' most successful fighter and although tempi ramental to
At
this
HMS
1
fly, it
because of
was
in the
torque,
ii
Aegean
to
£U
German
or Turkish an Rumplers, Albatroses,
Gothas. The
though
Av
enemy wen
occasional
any
,ian
Ottomaj teilun^ aircraft, with white. square insignia, were encounter Turkish territory. The Ottoman a '
rab
Right: SMS Goeben, a Moltke-c\ass cruiser completed in 1912. She left Constantinople on January 19 with the Breslau and four destroyers, but sustained more damage from colliding with mines than from bomb attacks. Below right: HMS Ark Royal, the first vessel to be completed as an aircraft carrier, in 1914. She had previously served at Gallipoli, but by 1918 was used mainly as an aircraft transport and repair ship. The steam crane forward of the superstructure was used for lowering aircraft on to the water and bringing them inboard again. Bottom: One of the DH 4 'flying coffins'. They were notoriously dangerous in a crash, but as high-
speed,
medium weight
operated mainly against Lawrence's forces in eastern Palestine. Camels were limited to a 2|-hour endurance giving them an operational range of 150 miles, which meant that the bombers were unprotected on long flights. Singleengine, two-seater de Havilland bombers were received by 'C Squadron RNAS (later 220 Squadron RAF) late in 1917 and, in 1918, DH 9's were added to the force. 'Shocking death traps these DH 4's must be,' wrote a diary-addicted armourer. 'Consider it due to proximity of gravity tank in top wing. Too close to exhausts. They always fire in a crash One day saw a DH 4 take off, engine cut out and pilot tried to turn back instead of putting nose down ahead. Crash — instant fire. Horrible sight, my first contact with the Black Angel at close quarters.' The armourer was stationed on Stavros which he considered a 'cosy little 'drome — excellent huts — right on sea-shore — deep blue water — what ho for swimming Pleasant little war here. They only visit us rarely and singly at that.' When a German dropped an incendiary bomb and a weighted streamer with the message — 'Dear Gentlemen, I must apologise for disturbing your afterrtoon siesta, it is my duty' — the armourer wrote in his diary, 'Men like that can't be blackguards.' They were considered worse than that by the sailor/soldier/ airman pilots when, during a night raid on Gliki Air Station, Imbros, in early August, enemy high explosive and shrapnel bombs were dropped directly on a Bessonneau tent hangar and destroyed several Camels. Retaliation was surely expected .
.
.
.
.
general
utility
were among the best aeroplanes
.
.
machines day
of their
m '-
iomber. Engine: ^ent: one Vickers, d up to 460 lbs of .
iet
l
each carrying two 65-pound bombs — attacked, scoring a hit on Breslau, which
BHP
one
however was more
mph at 6,500 feet. Span: Length: 30 feet 6 inches
16
4% inches.
fatally
damaged when
she ran into a mine. Then ten Gotha seaplanes flew up and shot Johnston down in flames. When Peel's plane was hit and it looked as if he might have to fight all alone a Greek pilot, Commander Moraitinis, flew into the battle, diving his Camel into the fray and scaring off the Gothas. Breslau sank; Goeben hit one mine, then another, was grounded, refloated and managed to reach Constantinople. On July 7, five DH 9's attacked the city, hitting various targets including an
ammunition works where a fire was started; photographs were taken and observers reseeing ships, trains, transport in a barracks square and 200 soldiers drilling on a parade ground. On August 19, one bomber made the trip to drop bombs and leaflets and, two nights later, two bombers caused fires in the city before returning to base where one crashed on landing and the other fell into the sea near Imbros. The operations report for the 25th stated: 'A night bombing raid was carried out on Constantinople by DH 9 machines. Bombs were dropped straddling the War Office and causing slight fires in the vicinity. Bombs were also dropped on buildings near the railway station. A.A. ported
wagons
which
for
many
raids made on Camels and bombers months had been strafing and
as a result of the territory by
enemy
bombing everything from camel herds to the battle-cruiser Goeben— the German battle-cruiser that had precipitated Turkey's entry into the war.
Two Camels
took off the following mornenemy base suitably named Drama where, according to a 62 Wing report, 'Lieut Randell dived down to 500 feet from the ground and fired on a train going in to Drama station, he then silenced a machine gun with his guns and flew over Drama Aerodrome and fired into the
ing to attack an
hangars during which time another D III was observed taking off across wind; this was attacked and seen to bounce twice and fall on its nose, eventually crushing its right wing. Lieut. Randell then fired into a petrol dump after which he returned to Stavros as his engine was 'missing'. Two large two-seater machines and two Scouts were observed outside the hangars.' Since Constantinople was within range of British bombers, the enemy was anxious to destroy
as
many
To defend had sought more source.
as possible at their their capital, the Turks aircraft from their ally
but an order for 100 had been held up for over a year because of lack of payment. aircraft that did get to them — and to the Germans — were transported across neutral Bulgaria's railway, boxed in Red Cross and circus packing cases, some of Bulgaria's railway, boxed in Red Cross and
The
circus packing cases,
some
of
which wen
confiscated by the Bulgarians, immobile through lack of fuel, and the 'Wa Office', both popular targets, were hit and reports stated that explosions were seen on the battle-cruiser. There were two reasons for bombing the city — to hit factories and other military targets and to persuade the Turks to accept the futility of continued hostilities. For the populace, leaflets ('proclamations') were dropped in future raids: 'Cursed be Talaat, Enver and Hairi. If a Government does not act in accordance with the will of the nation, it deserves to die with all its sons the whole Turkish Empire is in the hands of the Government, who will surely bring about Turkey's end, and if Talaat and Enver, who sold the country, are allowed to .
3020
.
.
remain in power we shall have no course open to us but to shed our tears awaiting our last days.' It is doubtful whether such 'proclamation dropping' caused as much damage to the people's morale as the bombs did to military targets, even though that, according to the Turks, was slight. The de Havillands normally carried two 65-pounders and eight 16-pounders. Their bomb sight, which 'met requirements of bombing from height up to 18,000 feet', was a simple open sight fitted to the side of the aircraft. Height, air speed and bomb-and-tail angle could be set but foreand-aft and lateral levels were poor. Wind drift had to be discovered with the use of a simple adjustable wire — for accurate bombing runs could only be made up or down wind. Constantinople was an extremerange flight for the bombers so there was not much time allowed for manoeuvring around over the target area. One target attacked several times and thought to be worth the effort was the Seraskerat, the Turkish Ministry of War, easily identifiable because it was a large building that stood out in front of extensive grounds near the huge Mosque of Suleiman with its four tall minarets. Other prime targets were the arsenal, the San Tefano air station, barracks, shipping and warehouses. Imbros, east of the entrance to the Dardanelles, was the closest British base capital and it was from there that the raiders gathered for take-off", escorted by Camels past enemy fighter fields at Chanak and Galata; Camels would again become airborne to meet and escort the bombers on their way home. During the second half of 1918 raids on Constantinople increased. Actually, these air raids caused less damage than the RAF believed, but their presence and seeming immunity to antiaircraft fire demonstrated the superiority of the British air force. It is doubtful if enemy naval commanders considered the bombers to be much of a danger to their warships but when Goeben and Breslau broke out in January they were given Strong air cover. That proved to be a disastrous expedition: Goeben was the first to hit a mine though she was only slightly damaged and sailed on to sink two British monitors at Imbros. Lieutenants Pool and Johnston in Blackburn 'Baby' seaplanes
was persistent and accurate. Green rocket flares were inaccurate and seldom reached a height of 4,000 feet. The weather was misty. There were, apparently, no large ships in the War Basin. Pamphlets dropped.' On August 27, Constantinople was again raided and at the same time a raid was carried out by Camels and DH 9's on Galata, where bombs and bullets were spread through hangars and quarters, and on the airfield and seaplane sheds at Nagara. The raid on the city was made by three fire
bombers flying through heavy anti-aircraft fire and numerous 'green onions' to drop bombs towards a barracks and a customs house and along a run from the Palace to the Golden Horn, hits being observed near the arsenal and the searchlights. One optimistic pilot reported that despite poor visibility there were apparently good results on the War Ministry, barracks, arsenal and docks. On leaving Constantinople 'an object was seen to fall to earth from a height of 7,000 feet, believed to have been a hostile machine'. Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Bowhill, RAF Wing Commander, summed up the operations in his report: '. four night bombing raids were made on Constantinople with good results. At the same time numerous night raids were made on enemy seaplane .
.
bases and aerodromes and
AA
gun
posi-
tions by 'F' and 'C skill and dash. 'B'
some very
fine
Squadrons with great Squadron carried out attacks on enemy transports
with excellent results.'
Further Reading Cross and Cockade Journal (Society of
First
World War Aero Historians) Popular Flying, May 1938 Raleigh, Sir Walter, and Jones, in the Air,
Volume
VI
H. A., The War (Oxford University Press)
Saundby, Air Marshal Sir Robert, Air Bombardment (Chatto & Windus) The Times History of the War, Volume XIV (London 1918) [For John Voder's biography, aee
/>.
711.]
'Every German at home is ready, like every soldier at the front, to sacrifice everything for his country, if need be' The words of the President of the Reichstag by now bore little relation to the mood of the people, either at home or at the i II *•• BM* m\ *W*rMln' incapable of realising that the limits had been reached .
I f
I
•
I
I
I
began to dawn on Gerand military leaders that the war was nearing its end — with Germany as the loser. Yet for another four months they failed or refused to take any
From May 1918 many's
offensive on the Western Front was hound reperto have profound psychological cussions and practical consequences. Because of these, when Ludendorff in the late spring of 1918 was asked to evacuate exposed and vulnerable areas, he refused for explicitly political reasons. The complete failure of his offensive against Rheims, almost coinciding as it did with the massive breakthrough of a French tank attack south-west of Soissons, had completely deprived the German army in the west of any large-scale offensive capacity. The entire area taken from the French in May 1918 had been recaptured by the French in July. The German retreat took place in good order and the positions appeared to be consolidated again. But this
it
political
political or military action to deal with the situation. This failure was in part due to deliberate self-deception; official propaganda excelled itself in painting an exceedingly rosy view of Germany's situation. Partly it was also the result of the un-
willingness of the Allies, once they had mounted their counter-offensives and rapidly gained the upper hand, to be prepared to build 'golden bridges' for a negotiated settlement other than one based solely on their own terms. The end was now in sight; having identified their enemy with the devil, the Allies had to go on to clear out hell.
Ludendorff showed his
Germany's
first
impression was completely shattered on August 8, with the renewed British offensive on the Somme. Again tanks proved to be the decisive weapon. The Germans lost 50,000 men, 30,000 of them taken prisoner. More important, for the first time the morale of the German troops disintegrated,
doubts about
final victory early in
May
after
the failure of his second offensive in Flanders, when he expressed the opinion that only if Germany could supply another 200,000 'usable' replacements for the losses sustained would there be a chance of concluding the war victoriously. Germany could not. Also the change from the offensive to the defensive, which handed the initiative to the Allies, was one considered with great misgivings from the military as well as the political point of view. Considering the hopes stimulated at home as well as among Germany's allies, the failure of the
entire units abandoned their positions and, panic-stricken, made for the rear. It seems to have been an insight inspired by the benefit of hindsight when Ludendorff in his memoirs records this day as 'the black day' which convinced him of the need to end the war. The actual policy he pur-
sued subsequently hardly bears this out. German losses during August alone were appalling. 228,000 men were lost while
Right: Kaiser Wilhelm. Below: A British convoy passing destroyed German lorries. By this stage in the war, industry lacked the resources to replace machinery and equipment
9***
IK!
H.W.Koch
I .
•*.:
••A
:i 130,000 men. considered drafting boys as well as introducing conscription in the Ukraine and the ICrimea. In point of fact one of the first to face reality — without, however, having the will power to compel his military leaders to (carry out a corresponding policy — was Kaiser Wilhelm himself who at the time declared to Ludendorff, 'I realise we have to draw the balance sheet. We have reached the limits of our physical endurance. The war must be ended.' The Kaiser's conclusion had also been influenced by a memorandum submitted to him as well as to Ludendorff less than a fortnight before I
the 'black day'. Its author was Crown Prince Wilhelm and in it -he rejected any annexationist policies — on behalf of which he had previously been such a prominent spokesman — and counselled that Germany should even be prepared to make territorial sacrifices if peace could be obtained I
in return.
Unfortunately the Crown Council, conIvened by the Kaiser for August 14, concluded on a note not in accordance with the insights previously professed. Ludendorff, out of the blue, stridently asserted that the army could hold northern France and Belgium long enough to serve as a lever by which Germany could impose its 'will' upon the Allies. This 'imposition' was to be brought about by the deployment of all the tools of diplomacy which were to produce Ludendorff 's idea of a negotiated peace. At home, where the public since the early months of 1918 had been led to believe that victory was just around the corner, the War Press Office — a department of the OHL set up in 1915 and in complete
I
I
control of all
war news — was
to intensify
propaganda campaign which was to be supplemented by a campaign of public speeches delivered by 'prominent patriotic politicians'. This, it was hoped, would suffice until the suitable moment would arrive 'when we can come to an arrangement with the enemy'. The Chancellor, Count von Hertling, understood this to its
mean
'after our next victory in France'. This policy completely ignored military
hhb realities, it ignored the desperate situation of Germany's allies, it ignored the situation inside Germany as well. In March 1918 the strength of a German infantry battalion in France had consisted of 800 seasoned front-line soldiers and 700 recruits; this had fallen by August to 650 soldiers and 350 recruits. Numerous divisions had a combat strength below 600 men per battalion. Gaps torn into the German front by Allied attacks could no longer be filled in depth, at best they could be
covered by a screening force. The OHL's insistence upon holding territory irrespective of cost further drained existing manpower; it did not prevent its loss in any case, but it did prevent the establishment of a relatively secure and much shortened line of defence just west of Germany's
Winston Churchill's judgment some 40 years ago still holds true: The liberation of the soil of France was the frontiers.
of
dominating impulse which held the French people to the war. The rescue of Belgium
was
still
British fore
the
war
main
rallying point of the
Had Germany
therethese motives, had in her hands on the
resolve.
removed
both
she stood with arms threshold of her own land ready to make a defeated peace, to cede territory, to make reparation; ready also if all negotiation were refused to defend herself to the utmost, and capable of inflicting two million casualties upon the invader, it seemed, and seems, almost certain that she would not have been put to the test. Germany's line of defence in the west was all the more vulnerable because the increasing deployment of tanks by the Allies had virtually revolutionised warfare. No longer was it necessary to precede an attack with days of concentrated artillery fire. Static warfare was changing into a war of movement. No longer could the Ger-
mans
predict precisely at which sector an
attack would be launched. This allowed the Allied High Command to conAllied
centrate its forces at points of its own choice without fear of risking German counterattacks which would disrupt the build-up, or attacks at points where troops had been reduced to strengthen the forces
i
.;.
,
MsJ*
1
/
M. .
•
<
•
of an
impending offensive.
Ludendorff and his staff operated more and more in the dark; they expected a major attack in Lorraine where the French were nearest to German territory. Such reserves as could be scraped together were concentrated there. Foch on the other hand planned three main thrusts between Ver-
dun and the Channel coast. The first was to aim at the penetration by British and French troops of the Siegfried (Hindenburg) Line in the region of Cambrai, St Quentin and Laon. The second thrust conducted by French and American forces between Rheims and Verdun aimed at capturing the important railway line between Montmedy and Mezieres which had allowed the
Germans the
rapid
movement
of reserves
behind their lines. The third and northernmost thrust was to be made by the British in Flanders, the objective being to capture the German submarine bases along the
Channel coast. The Allied attack in the Rheims-Verdun sector began on the night of September 2526. On the 27th the attack against the Siegfried Line began, followed the next day by the offensive in Flanders. Within three days a 30-mile-wide sector of the Siegfried Line had been captured, and generally along the entire front between the Channel and Verdun the Germans had been pushed back. September brought further German losses of 230,000 men; meanwhile German reserves were concentrated in Lorraine, ready to repel an attack which never came. However, in spite of the surprise element in favour of the Allies, the German front was nowhere decisively broken. German defence apart, this was due to the still limited operational range of the tanks as well as to a systematic policy of destruction of all means of communication by the retreating Germans. Nevertheless the overall effect of the Allied attack cast a deep sense of gloom upon the and compelled it ultimately to make that re-appraisal of its policy which had been needed since the spring. A change of policy was imperative especially because of the desperate military and political position of her allies.
OHL
Germany's tottering
days to see whether
allies
Austro-Hungarian armies to break through the Italian positions in Venetia in June 1918 had glaringly
The
failure
of
the
revealed the fissures in the multi-national empire. Entire units of Croats and Czechs deserted to the Allies. Between July 1 and the end of August 1918 her forces in this vital sector dwindled to about one half of their original strength. One of the scapegoats was Conrad von Hotzendorf, the Commander-in-Chief of the south Tyrolean front who was removed from his post. Inside the empire the food situation was very bad and there were frequent strikes. Germany's failure to send any reinforcements, a failure caused by Germany's own lack of manpower, increased the feeling of hopelessness among the leaders of the empire which was given free rein when Emperor Charles and his Foreign Minister Count Burian visited Kaiser Wilhelm on August 14-15. They came determined to
end the war before it was too late for the Habsburg dynasty. The atmosphere at the meeting between the two allies was tense, debate strained. Though both Germans and Austrians agreed over the end, namely to bring the war to a speedy conclusion, they differed over the means. Germany's 'tools of diplomacy' aiming at a negotiated peace were primarily a series of informal feelers — such as the approach to the Belgian government. The latter fearing further systematic destruction through the
German retreat seemed initially recepGerman approaches but later they were interpreted as a German attempt to a
tive to
up Anglo-Belgian solidarity and therefore had to be abandoned. Equally informal contacts existed with the USA. These, too, ultimately proved abortive. As break
a last resort a neutral country, such as the Netherlands, might be asked to act as mediator and as host country in which plenipotentiaries of the belligerent nations could discuss the terms of peace. The Germans submitted this last proposal to their Austrian allies during their visit. Burian responded rather sceptically. He gave it little chance and said that at the
most Austria-Hungary would give
it
ten
it
worked. Lengthy
negotiations via a neutral country would prolong the war unnecessarily, and time was running out for Vienna. Anyway, which of the powerful Allies would be prepared to listen to the voice of the government of a small neutral nation? Would that nation not also run the risk of incurring their serious displeasure? As an alternative Burian suggested following the Soviet example of December 1917 by issuing a proclamation to all belligerent nations to end the war and to negotiate terms. Paul von Hintze, Germany's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who replaced Kiihlmann early in July 1918, argued that any such public call would hardly be taken as anything other than an act of despair by the Central Powers. It would be more likely to succeed if a figure much respected on the international scene, such as the Queen of the
would appeal on her own powers to end the slaughter. But, Hintze added, it would be Netherlands,
initiative to the great
wrong to take this step at the present time. The enemy at the moment believed that he was on the threshold of victory and would require sobering up a little to become amenable and receptive to such an overture. The military position of the Central Powers was bound to improve, bringing the Allied offensives to a standstill. If the worst to the worst one could still take recourse to a general public proclamation. Hintze, like most of the German Foreign Ministry under the thumb of the OHL, was completely unaware that disaster was staring Germany in the face. The OHL, far from agreeing to Austrian requests for further military aid, actually asked them for additional troops for the Western Front in return for German supplies of grain. Austria-Hungary despatched four divisions, meant to fill the gaps in the German line, but when the Austrians arrived, half-starved and many of them barefoot, they were hardly a morale booster at a front where morale had been declining for some time. Austro-German negotiations continued in Berlin, Vienna and at Spa but all that Hintze could obtain was the post-
came
:
j
Below: The superiority, both in quality and numbers, of the Allied tanks could not be
matched by the German artillery. Right: Crown Prince Wilhelm was one of several group commanders who were at the mercy of their
%
subordinates. Staffs acquired a great deal of bureaucratic power, which was often abused
\
I
^,
ponement
of Austria-Hungary's
own peace
initiative.
yw/uwA
Prince Maximilian of Baden was born in 1867, the son of the Grand Duke Frederick's brother, Prince Wilhelm of Baden, and his wife, Princess Maria Maximilianovna Romanovska, of the Russian Imperial House. He married Marie Louise of Brunswick-Liineburg, a titular princess of Great Britain, in 1900. From 1907 onwards he was the heir to the Grand Duchy of Baden, one of the princely states of the German Empire, because his cousin, Frederick II, had no children. During the first part of his life he was relatively unknown outside his small state, living the comfortable, if perhaps boring, existence which a provincial court provided. When the First World War broke out he devoted himself to Red Cross activities and worked for the improvement of conditions in prisoner-ofwar camps on both sides of the Western Front. His leap from obscurity was as sudden as it was necessary. With the German armies melting before the Allied onslaught in the autumn of 1918, Max of Baden offered a programme which he felt would satisfy the Allies, and particularly the Americans, who were demanding the removal of the Kaiser and the dissolution of the German imperial system. The plan called for peace negotiations on the Western Front and a reorganisation of the Imperial Government along far more democratic lines. When the offer had first been made it was refused. When Prince Max was named Imperial Chancellor and Prime Minister of Prussia on October 3, 1918, replacing Georg Hertling, it was too late to institute these changes fully while the nation was on the brink of losing the war. As Prince Max said, 'I thought I should have arrived five minutes before the hour but I arrived five minutes after it.' Urging that the longer Germany postponed the inevitable defeat the more she would suffer, Prince Max advised Kaiser Wilhelm to accept defeat and negotiate. Shocked and dismayed, the Kaiser was forced to agree and accept the terms put to him by the majority party in the Reichstag, the Social Democrats: that the Chancellor be made responsible to the Reichstag, not the Kaiser himself as before, and that authority over the armed forces be transferred from the Kaiser to the ministers in the Cabinet, which Prince Max was to
%
t^
lead. dorff
While Ludendorff still demanded the defence of every inch of territory, the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, General Arz von Straussenberg, declared categorically on September 1, in a statement about army food supplies, 'It is no longer a question whether the breeding of livestock in Austro-Hungary is endangered or not, it is a question concerning the continued existence of the army in the field and therefore the existence of the monarchy. If both governments are not in a position to provision their armies, then
|
At Prince Max's insistence, Ludenwas allowed to resign, but he insisted
on refusing Hindenburg's resignation because of the effect the resignation of both Germany's greatest living military heroes would have had on the morale of the army.
As negotiations for an armistice continued, Prince Max became convinced that the Allies would accept nothing less than the Kaiser's abdication, a suggestion which, understandably, threw the Kaiser into a But when Austria-Hungary anfury. nounced its surrender, the Kaiser returned to his military headquarters at Spa to contemplate his future. The news reached him that the Allies had broken through the Siegfried Line, and on November 3 the crews of the High Seas Fleet, who had mutinied on being ordered to resume a naval offensive after two years' inaction, took over the town of Kiel. On November 7 Kurt Eisner declared a Workers' Republic in Bavaria. Prince Max's Socialist ministers informed him that if the Kaiser did not abdicate within twenty-four hours they would go instead. When Hindenburg reluctantly conceded that this was the only way to bring about a rapid armistice it was clear that the Kaiser must go. On November 9 revolution broke out in Berlin and the German Republic was proclaimed. Prince Max urged the Kaiser by telephone to resign immediately. While the Kaiser still hesitated Prince Max announced his abdication in Berlin and handed over his own position as Chancellor to the leader of the Social Democrat party, Friedrich Ebert. At last, realising his helplessness, the Kaiser quietly and unobtrusively left
Spa
for exile in Holland,
where he
later
signed formal papers of abdication. Prince Max continued to live in Baden until his death in 1929. More than anyone else he had attempted to reform the Second Reich and to smooth the uneasy path from near-absolute monarchy to the democratic republic on which the armistice depended, thereby averting the threat of an outright Bolshevist revolution. Ignored and unappreciated by his countrymen after the war, Prince Max of Baden had in fact saved Germany from even greater humiliation by helping to end the war more quickly as soon as that end became inevitable. S. L.
Mayer
the army can no longer continue the fight against the enemy. The occurrence of the same deplorable manifestations which have thrown Russia into her misfortune will then be inevitable.' The threat of a military collapse followed by an internal revolution was clear. When by September 14 nothing concrete had emerged from the deployment ofGermany's 'diplomatic tools' in bringing about a negotiated peace, the AustroHungarian government addressed a note to all belligerent countries asking all governments concerned to despatch envoys to meet in a neutral country to discuss without prejudice to existing obligations the preconditions necessary for the successful conduct of peace negotiations. Much to the German government's and the OHL's annoyance the note explicitly declared that Austria-Hungary's allies shared the views and sentiments expressed in it. Hintze's initial scepticism was fully borne out. There was no need for the Entente powers to take seriously a note which in the final analysis confirmed their own belief that their arms would triumph on the battlefield, nor was there any point in pursuing the matter since the main antagonist still refused to give a self-denying ordinance with regard to Belgium and occupied parts of France and instead continued to act as though they could be used as 'pawns' in a diplomatic game. On September 19, the German ambassador in Vienna reported to Berlin that the end of the Habsburg Empire was near, a report caused mainly by news of the rapid disintegration of the Balkan front. The
OHL
throughout 1917 and 1918 had
left
operations in Serbia and Greece in the hands of the Bulgarian ally. The successful defence of the Macedonian front was strategically imperative to the war effort of the Central Powers since the supplies of grain and crude oil from defeated Rumania were absolutely essential to their war effort. Should the Bulgarian defences be broken then the road to Rumania would be open and the latter's re-entry into the
war
possible.
But Bulgaria, too, was approaching exhaustion. She had been at war since 1912 and as her army was largely made up of peasants her agricultural output had declined; army and population alike were underfed; war-weariness was a general condition. Added to this was also political dissatisfaction. Bulgaria's arch enemy, Turkey, was a somewhat unwelcome ally, but a more substantial grievance resulted from the treaty of Bucharest in which Bulgaria did not get, as she had expected, the whole of the Dobrudja from Rumania, but only part of it. Reports multiplied in Berlin to the effect that Prime Minister Malinov's cabinet in
War fund posters. Left: An appeal on behalf of prisoners of
war and
civilian
prisoners— Let everyone give. They
PJaolSpenbe
are suffering for us!'
Centre: Fund for fur Ate
^•Sopi.-Scioiiunucn
U nP
U-Boat crews and
far anberc 9Harincanqcboriiie, bic
dhnlitbcn Acfahrcn au&gcfcftt
®*c3«6cr.ffebf6«afibira$!
finb.
dornbrn nrlimrn an: .
*«««ji4i4»»»>*«i lor'*"!'" e«cto.
Suben6orff=(5p«ji
V
theirfamilies. Right: Ludendorff s fund for the wardisabled. The General took a personal interest in the fund, started in May 1918. which raised over 150 million marks
contacts with the it was not at war, to bring about a negotiated settlement. In June 1918 the Allies, fully aware of the rapid decline of the Bulgarian army, prepared a massive offensive against the Bulgarian front. Ludendorff knew of the danger but could not spare any German troops. On September 14 the offensive opened and within a matter of days the Bulgarian forces holding the Macedonian The Bulgarian front disintegrated. cabinet authorised Malinov to negotiate an armistice irrespective of approval or disapproval by Vienna and Berlin. On September 29 an armistice was concluded and peace negotiations began. Allied forces obtained the right of transit through Bulgaria, the road to Rumania and Hungary was open. The defeat of the Central Powers, now deprived of corn and oil, was certain. And this was underlined by the events in ia
was using
its direct
USA, a country with which
destroy us, had a hopeless task.'
vr
I
Palestine. In spite of the fact that Turkish forces there were insufficiently supplied and faced an enemy three times their own number, Li man von Sanders had constantly painted an extremely favourable picture of the situation for the benefit of the OHL. Consequently, when after the Allied offensive of September 19 the Turkish front in Palestine cracked, this came as an unexpected piece of news to the at Spa.
OHL
Hardship and unrest Inside Germany the intensification
of the
propaganda campaign decided upon at the Crown Council of August 14 did not produce the desired results. This was hardly surprising since it coincided with a further cutting down of the already very reduced food rations. The deputy commander of the VII Army Corps at Munster, in a report dated September 17, stated that in the Munster area morale among the civilian population had markedly deteriorated and emphasised that this deterioration manifested itself not solely among the working classes but also among the middle classes and particularly among the intelligentsia. The consensus of opinion seemed to be that Germany had used up the last resources of her strength and that the war would be lost. Generally 'public opinion' reports of this kind underlined the damage done by the responsible authorities in having failed to inform the nation properly and inducing false hopes in a speedy victory. Dissatisfaction and pessimism were not the only features remarked upon in these reports. They also included warnings of potential revolution in Germany, pointing to the causal connection between military defeats and revolution as demonstrated in Russia. Among the troops offences against discipline were increasing and the German military administration found itself in a dilemma. If it punished cases of insubordination or even desertion mildly this might well be interpreted as the first sign of a weakening of the authoritarian edifice and thus open the floodgates of anarchy. If it punished them severely it would increase fear and dissatisfaction and thus engender further desertions. No reliable figures are ever likely to be available about the numbers of German deserters. In the actual front line this was less of a danger, some units simply fought no longer as doggedly as they had done previously. But cases of men not returning from home leave or deserting while stationed in rest areas were frequent. In Brussels the number of deserted German soldiers living in groups in cellars, attics
and
lofts
had assumed such proportions
summer of 1918 that German military police gave up their raids. Frontline soldiers and officers who for four years had not seen much else than the trenches were utterly taken aback when confronted by the
late
with this phenomenon. Heinrich Bruning, last chancellors of the Weimar Republic, and. in 1918 an infantry lieutenant, recorded his surprise when towards the end of the war he found that desertion did not occur as isolated incidents but was
one of the
mass phenomenon. Because of the acute shortage of food supplies and the absence of any sign of Mir a
Hindenburg
(left)
and Ludendorff, who could
neither see a solution nor accept defeat.
But both saw on September 28 that an armistice would have to
come
conclusion of hostilities, industrial unrest, which had reared its head late in L916 and early 1917 to abate somewhat thereafter, made itself felt again. Miners, munitions workers and workers in the metal industries went on strike. The strikes, based on
real economic grievances, were naturally politically exploited, especially by the socialist
extreme
left
wing, the Spartacus
group. Official reaction was repression, the arrest of agitators whenever they could be found. Ernst Meyer, a prominent Spartacus member, wrote to Lenin on September 5, 1918, 'In the army resistance is increasing, and among the workers the realisation is growing that the old methods of parliamentary opposition and demonstrative resistance are no longer sufficient.
The events
in Russia
have taught a
lesson and provided an example which cannot be overlooked.' The increasing activity of the Spartacus group, however, cannot hide the fact that it remained a forceful minority group, capable of stirring the embers of dissatisfaction, but not sufficiently strong to bring forth the full flame of revolution. The rank and file of the German working classes maintained their allegiance to the majority traditional socialists, the SPD under Friedrich Ebert. In spite of the peace resolution of July
1917 the Social Democrats on the whole continued to support the German war effort loyally. But as events unfolded during September 1918 even the SPD's right wing could not but be impressed by the imminence of catastrophe. Albert Sudekum, a leading SPD Reichstag deputy, and hitherto a supporter of the general party line,
memorandum on September 6. In he pointed to the unrest and the great disappointment which the change of the fortunes of war on the western theatre had caused among the German people. He indicated his own doubts as to the capability of the OHL to deal with the situation and stated that, looking at the position of the Central Powers in general, fissures in the alliance structure were widening. Howissued a it
Sudekum believed in the readiness of the Entente powers to conclude peace but doubted whether this would be possible with the present German government. Siidekum's views indicating the need for a change of government were shared by many members of the Centre Party, such as Erzberger, and the Liberals. It is not without significance that as yet it was not full parliamentary government which the Reichstag parties asked for but merely the removal of 'the tool of the OHL', Chancellor Hertling. During the meeting of the InterParty Committee of the Reichstag on September 12, Ebert insisted on the need to put an end to the war, since militarily it could no longer be won by Germany. But even at this late stage illusions had not entirely vanished. Ebert, too, said that Germany ought to get to the negotiating table 'once military stability has returned'. This illusion, of course, vanished the moment the news of the Austro-Hungarian peace note became known, followed by that of the disintegration of the Macedonian front and the beginning of the Allied offensives in the west. Quite rapidly the majority parties of the Reichstag added further demands, the most important of them being the introduction of a fully fledged parliamentary democracy and the abolition of the three-class franchise in Prussia. Representatives of the majority parties informed Chancellor Hertling of their demands before his departure, on September 28, to the momentous meeting at Spa. They insisted that, in order to negotiate with the Allies successfully, a government representative of the German ever,
people would have to
sit at
the negotiating
They were unaware that the decisions had already been made. table.
vital
Prominent representatives of German industry had also given the situation some thought. While Ludendorff until the last moment refused to face reality, some of his aides did not. Among them was Colonel Bauer, in charge of procurement of war equipment, who enjoyed good relationships with some of Germany's major industrialists. Probably acting on his own initiative, he informed Hugo Stinnes of the impending disaster during the middle of August 1918. For Bauer, with a keen eye for military as well as economic factors, the war could no longer be won from the moment the USA had entered it. However successfully individual offensives might be conducted, the balance of economic resources had decisively been tilted against Germany. It was vitally necessary to come to some form of arrangement with the western powers. Bauer's opinions and his balanced judgment were respected by those with whom he discussed the topic, among them, besides Stinnes, the German Crown Prince, Gustav Krupp and Carl Duisberg, one of the leaders of Germany's chemical industries. Hugo Stinnes, impressed by Bauer's views, contacted the Hamburg shipper Albert Ballin, a man whose counsel the Kaiser had frequently sought in the past. Ballin's notes of the conversation record the magnitude of Germany's military disaster as revealed by Stinnes. Stinnes made reference also to the increasing numbers of deserters, some 32,000 within three months. He said that while the Crown Prince was fully in the picture it remained now to inform the Kaiser. He suggested that a delegation of German industrialists seek an audience with him. Ballin did not think much of this idea and on September 5 went alone to visit the Kaiser at Schloss Wilhelmshohe near Kassel. In his audience with the Kaiser, Ballin argued that there would be little point in trying to negotiate directly with the British but that
a direct approach to President Wilson might yield better results. The Kaiser agreed in principle but thought it would be to Germany's advantage to wait until the autumn when the army in the west would be firmly entrenched again in the Hindenburg line. Then would be the time to negotiate. One of the assumptions of Ballin and other German industrialists was the existence of a common interest with the Entente powers, namely the recovery of the thousands of millions of pounds invested in Russia by Germany, Great Britain and France, and at the same time an interest in 'securing' Russia's minerals in the Donets basin and preserving 'the countries of Europe from the Bolshevik epidemic'. With regard to the territory occupied by Germany in the west, Ballin suggested putting to the Allies that, with the conclusion of an honourable peace and the formation of a League of Nations as suggested by Wilson, Germany would return it, thus saving the Allies the costly trouble of throwing the Germans out by force. Furthermore, in order to secure the continuity and stability of the monarchy it would be desirable to rest it on broader foundations, by the introduction of a fully
parliamentary system of government. Such considerations were to come up time and again over the next few weeks in the
Reichstag and especially dorff's aides at the
among Luden-
OHL.
Ludendorff, though himself realising that the war could no longer be won, was petrified
into
inactivity.
Even Hindenburg,
when
confronted with Ludendorff's admission of failure, commented that 'every day by which we shorten this war is a gain for us'. But he himself did nothing to shorten it. Nor could any initiative be expected from the government in Berlin, since the fall of Bethmann Hollweg a mere executive branch of the OHL. As late as September 9, Ludendorff, contrary to his better knowledge, assured Chancellor Hertling that 'we stay where we are' and minimised the events in the Balkans into insignificance. Hertling, who could not have failed to notice the pressures working for his replacement, placed his last hopes on the endeavours of the German Foreign Ministry to obtain a negotiated peace through the mediation of the Queen of the Netherlands, Germany's 'amendment', as it were, to the Austro-Hungarian peace note. The Dutch government responded favourably and on September 26, 1918, issued a note to the Entente powers offering the Dutch capital as host city for the negotiators of the belligerent powers. Queen Wilhelmina indicated also that she personally would be prepared to assist a settlement. Great Britain, unofficially, let it be known that she would consider this an unfriendly act. But irrespective of that, military events
had by this time made, and were still making, any thought of negotiated peace irrelevant—as long as on the German side it was based on Ludendorff's premise of treating the occupied territories as 'pawns'. True, the Allies had as yet a long way to go to deprive the Germans of them, but considering the advance made between July and September 1918 compared with the stalemate of the preceding four years the Allies were so optimistic as to think the crossing of the Rhine only a matter of weeks away. Those who looked at the situation more realistically still had the satisfaction of seeing the alliance structure of the Central Powers disintegrating, and realising that any fight in months to come would be against Germany alone and that if Germany chose to continue the fight, the final outcome could not under any circumstances be a German victory. On September 25, Ludendorff issued again the order to all army groups to hold fast and fight over every inch of ground. On the same day the news of Bulgaria's request for an armistice reached the OHL. Ludendorff's chief of operations, Colonel Heye, urged him to see the Kaiser and the Foreign Ministry in Berlin to urge them to take immediate steps to conclude an armistice. Ludendorff again evaded the issue.
Now their
his subordinates took the law into
own hands. Colonel Mertz von Quirn-
heim, a section chief of the operations department, noted in his diary that 'His Excellency is still desperate enough to fight but lacks the courage to put an end to it. He will not take the fence unless he is forced to'. Together with Heye, General von Bartenwerffer, the chief of the political department, talked to Kurt von Lersner, the Foreign Ministry representative at the OHL, and persuaded him to telephone Secretary of State Hintze to come to the OHL for what was to be a 'showdown'.
When
finally the
news arrived that
for an armisbut was ready to conclude a separate peace this proved decisive and at long last changed Ludendorff" s attitude. He approved post facto the invitation for Hintze to visit the OHL. He was now ready to 'take the fence'. Ludendorff's personal failure provided Hintze with an opportunity and he made the most of it. Within a matter of hours he had drafted his own programme. Sensing correctly the mood of the Reichstag he suggested the resignation of Hertling and the appointment of a new chancellor, the formation of a government on a broad basis which implied the inclusion of Social Democrats, the introduction of parliamentary government and the abolition of the three-class franchise in Prussia. Revolution from above would absorb the threat of revolution from below. He considered the change of government imperative since the present government was considered both at home and abroad to be the tool of the OHL. A newly constituted government could then approach the United States of America to obtain an armistice and negotiate a peace on the basis of President Wilson's fourteen points. Hintze never even bothered to consult Hertling and with his programme ready he arrived at Spa, followed by an anxious
^aria was not merely asking tice
Above: Colonel Bauer,
in
charge
of
equipping
saw that the war could not be won. Below: German prisoners-of-war. German .troops suffered more casualties than they
the army,
inflicted in the 1918 spring offensives; in the autumn campaigns vast numbers were taken prisoner, and thousands were deserting every month. The myth of the stab in the back' —the idea that those at home were doing less than they might to support the men at the front— was an indication of the depth to
which morale had sunk <*$
"y^tufffi
3
%
Hertling, and, after
some reluctance, by
On the morning of Sunday 29, 1918, Hintze outlined his proposals to the and much to his surprise Hindenburg and Ludendorff endorsed them. The decision, therefore, to end the war was not, as has frequently been alleged, made by Ludendorff with Hindenburg's approval but was forced upon them by the direct independent action of their subordinates in conjunction with Hintze and, at first sight at least, was fully in accord with the views expressed earlier on by Stinnes, Ballin and their colleagues. Later in the morning of that Sunday the the Kaiser.
September
OHL
Kaiser arrived and it was left to Hindenburg to present him with the conclusions reached. Wilhelm II took the news calmly and assented to the proposals, but in the evening he commentediThe war is finished, though differently than we had thought.'
Further Reading Brooke-Shepherd, G., November 1918: the last act of the Great War (Collins 1981) Feldman, G. D., Army, Industry and Labor 19141918 (Princeton University Press) Lutz, R. H., The Causes of the German Collapse in 1918 (Stanford University Press, 1934)
Zeman, Z. A. B., The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire 1914-1918 (Oxford University Press) [For Dr Koch's biography, see page 39.]
Upon returning from Petrograd in May 1917, Ion Bratianu, the Rumanian premier, remarked: 'revolution is inevitable in Russia where it will open a Pandora's box with all its evils and none of its hopes.' His concern was not for the fate of Russia, but for that of Rumania which was indissolubly bound to it. And he had genuine cause for concern. For with the Bolshevik seizure of power, Russia's war effort, and with it the Eastern Front, collapsed, leaving an already broken and dispirited Rumania isolated from its allies and exposed to its enemies. Further resistance to the Central Powers on Rumanian soil was no longer practicable. But Rumania's claims to Austro-Hungarian lands — Tran-
Bukovina and the Banat — rested upon its fulfilling the alliance of 1916 which forbade separate treaties of peace. And the Allies insisted Rumania honour sylvania,
the alliance or forego its rewards, urging Bratianu to evacuate Moldavia for Russia where resistance could be continued. As winter drew on, two equally unenviable and mutually irreconcilable alternatives seemed to face Bratianu. Either he could
abandon Rumania's territory entirely to the Central Powers while chancing its government to the protection of revolutionary Russia, or he might seek an agreement with the Central Powers, disturbing Rumania's partnership with the Allies and jeopardising the aspirations dependent upon it. Rejecting the first outright, Bratianu determined to try the second, but consequences. Rumanian political circumstances offered some hope for the success of this stratAfter Rumania's initial military egy. defeat, the capital was moved from occupied Bucharest to Ia§i. Here Bratianu reigned supreme. The ruling coalition itself was an uneasy one. Bratianu's domination of the Liberal Party was complete, but the avoid
its
Conservative-Democrats were a troublesome element, liable to defect at the first sign of weakening resolve to prosecute the war. But Bratianu drew his strength not from his party, and even less from the cabinet, but from his relationship with the king. Under Rumania's constitution
the
crown
possessed
immense
political
authority. Because King Ferdinand, from the moment of his accession, had been in
IMBROGLIO So far Rumania's entry into the war had ended only in disaster. With 'triumphant foolishness' she had marched into Transylvania only to be smartly repelled and chased back to Moldavia by the
Germans. Twelve months withdrawal from the war under the
later Russia's
Bolsheviks left Rumania alone to face the Central Powers, a menace she could not possibly withstand. If
any of Rumania's territorial ambitions were to be realised the time had come to look for a solution achieved other than by force of arms, and primed with this reasoning the Rumanian government, under the leadership of Bratianu, embarked upon a career of diplomatic double-dealing and political intrigue unique even in the welter of personal and patriotic ambition prevalent in the Eastern Europe of 1918. J. Michael
Kitch.
Rumanian cavalry
(below)
— remnants of a powerless army
Bratianu's power, the monarch's authority lay effectively with his chief minister. His position so assured, Bratianu was able to direct Rumanian policy, sheltered from political storms brewing round him. Those Rumanian politicians, now gathered at Bucharest, who had aligned themselves with the Central Powers, posed no threat to Bratianu's supremacy. Most of these were conservatives who threw their loyalty to Alexandru Marghiloman when the party split in 1915, giving him a preeminent position at Bucharest. Petre Carp, a political maverick, and Constantine Stere, a renegade Liberal, were ready to jettison the reigning dynasty and accept political union with Germany, but each had little support. Marghiloman refused to go so far in conciliating the Central Powers, but enjoyed their favour because of his larger following among Rumanians. Far from threatening Bratianu's policy, Marghiloman was a potentially useful
instrument
for
its
firmly hitched his
pursuit,
wagon
as
he had
to the Central
star. So long as the Central Powers held the upper hand Marghiloman could play a valuable role, and once they lost it, as Bratianu reckoned they would, he could easily be dispensed with. With these considerations in mind, Bratianu
Powers'
took his
first
halting steps.
He began by concluding an
armistice Central Powers. The threemonth ceasefire, signed at Foc§ani on December 9, 1917, was not to be taken as a separate peace or as a prelude to one by either party. All the same, the Allies expressed sharp disapproval. But, by representing the armistice as no more than a temporary expedient dictated by necessity and designed to win time, Bratianu managed to secure their acquiescence. To enhance the desired impression, Bratianu shunned an invitation to participate in the negotiations soon to begin at BrestLitovsk. His behaviour was not especially disingenuous, for Rumania's plight was much as he portrayed it and his govern-
with
the
»»?
V-
W®
Av>
-^A£» *^m**
ritted to
making
Bratianu now anxious reserve, year brought fresh troubles. First, the Allies questioned the the
alliance
upon which Rumanian
policy
was
founded. Earlier, on December 4, Wilson, asking for a declaration of war against Austria-Hungary, told Congress he did not mean to 'impair or rearrange' the em-
This had been enough to make up Bratianu's mind about an armistice. But the Allied peace overtures in January 1918 went much further towards undermining Rumanian war aims. On January 5 Lloyd George contradicted all previous assurances to Rumania by declaring that the Allies wanted not to dismember Austriapire.
Hungary, but to reform -it. Clemenceau endorsed his statement at once. And on
January 8, Wilson, in his '14 Points' speech, denounced the secret diplomacy by which the alliance was made and advocated national autonomy, not self-deterthe
peoples of AustriaHungary. This apparent reversal of Allied policy stunned Bratianu. In one breath the Allies demanded he fulfil the alliance or relinquish its rewards, while in the next they withdrew those rewards. Secondly, a conflict arose between Rumania and Russia over Bessarabia. A Rumanian na-
mination,
for
tional movement emerged in Bessarabia shortly after the February Revolution,
centred on the National Democratic Party. The party's stand for national autonomy was challenged by both the Ukrainian regime at Kiev and the Bolshevik government at Petrograd. The Sfatul Tarei ('Provincial Council'),
convoked in Novem-
ber 1917, was from the outset dominated by the Rumanian element. On December 2, 1917 the Sfat proclaimed Bessarabia the 'Democratic Moldavian Federal Republic', asserting its autonomy within an envisioned federal Russia. Threatened from outside by Ukrainian and Soviet forces and from inside by revolutionary agitators, the Sfat soon appealed to Rumania for military protection. Bratianu saw an opportunity to recover a lost Rumanian province and check the spread of revolution at a single stroke. Encouraged by the Allied envoys, he ordered a Rumanian division to occupy Bessarabia on January 26, 1918. The Soviet regime immediately severed diplomatic relations with Rumania, confiscating the national treasure and arresting the ambassador. In Soviet Russia, Rumania and the Central Powers had found a common antagonist. Finally, the Central Powers demanded that Rumania open negotiations for a separate and lasting peace. On January 20 Mackensen warned that unless talks began in earnest by February 10 an offensive would be launched against Moldavia. Bratianu sounded the Allies,
who urged him
to call Mackensen's bluff and attack his army in Wallachia. But, given the acute shortages of men and supplies on the Western Front, there was little reason to believe Mackensen was bluffing.
First negotiations for peace
By February events had
forced Bratianu take an initiative, if he intended to proceed along the course upon which he had embarked. As Russia could not be regarded as a sanctuary and an invasion of Moldavia could not be resisted, Bratianu saw no alternative but to engage in negotiations with the Central Powers. In coming to this to
3030
had several prospects in view. negotiations had to be dragged out as long as possible. In the meantime, decision, he
Above
all,
Rumania might win time and garner
re-
sources sufficient to tighten its grip on Bessarabia and restore internal stability. There was even a chance that while the talks went on, the military balance might shift against the Central Powers, removing the pressure on Rumania to surrender. But, if surrender he must, Bratianu nurtured the hope that a peace settlement might prove less draconian than once supposed. He began to believe that, apart from minor frontier changes in the Dobruja and along Carpathians, Rumania's territory the would be left intact. Moreover, he assumed the Central Powers would grant Rumania a free hand in Bessarabia. And, by protracting the peace negotiations and submitting only under duress, Rumania might still retain its place among the Allies. Bratianu put his views to the cabinet on
February 7. They touched off a ministerial crisis. The Conservative-Democrats refused to countenance even insincere negotiations with the Central Powers and implored Bratianu to soldier on in the Allied ranks. When he declined they resigned, bringing down the government. At Bratianu's suggestion,
General Alexandru Averescu formed a government, charged with non-party carrying out the scheme proposed by Bratianu. After vainly seeking Allied sanction for the policy, Averescu met with Kuhlmann and Czernin to discuss peace terms. These turned out much harsher than anticipated. The entire Dobruja and unspecified Carpathian passes were to be ceded. King Ferdinand personally intervened, without success. But Czernin gave him to understand that were Marghiloman called to power, more lenient terms might be arranged. A Crown Council was summoned on March 1 to assess the situation and consider Czernin's intimation. The situation was bleak. Averescu stressed the inability of the army to offer effective resistance, the failure of the Allies to suggest practical alternatives and the danger of mounting domestic discontent.
Bratianu merely repeated that two choices were open to Rumania. Either the Central Powers could be rebuffed and resistance maintained, or peace terms could be discussed under protest and accepted on compulsion. Then he added that if Averescu rejected solutions Marghiloman both should replace him, in the hope of securing better terms. The Conservative-Democrats again called for resistance, but were overruled by the King on the grounds that the army refused to fight in the Ukraine. In the end the majority reaffirmed Bratianu's original plan, with the condition that should Averescu fail either to protract the negotiations or to obtain satisfactory terms, Marghiloman would be summoned to office.
Averescu returned to the negotiating table and asked for revision of the stated terms. Czernin, seeing through the ploy, flatly refused to prolong discussion; 'take it or leave it', he replied, threatening to reopen hostilities on March 5, if Rumania did not comply. Once again the
Crown Council was convened. Despite the continued insistence of the ConservativeDemocrats, there was no question of spurning this latest ultimatum. News that the Soviet government had just conclude i
treaty at Brest-Litovsk and hints that the Central Powers would not prevent Rumania's annexation of Bessarabia, decided the meeting in favour of peace. Bratianu again urged that Marghiloman be placed in charge of the negotiations, but for the moment his advice was shelved. On March 5 Averescu signed a preliminary treaty of peace at Buftea, outside Bucharest. Having just eliminated Russia from the war, Kuhlmann and Czernin were content for the time being to prevent
Rumania from resuming hostilities and hindering occupation of the Ukraine. But the treaty contained a mutual guarantee that a definitive settlement would be concluded once the Central Powers established themselves in the Ukraine. Meanwhile, Rumania agreed in principle to transfer the entire Dobruja to a condominium of the four Central Powers and to accept still
unspecified frontier rectifications along the Carpathians to the advantage of Austria-
Hungary. Furthermore, Rumania undertook to demobilise eight divisions of its army, assist the passage of German and Austro-Hungarian forces across its territory and expel all Allied military personnel from the country. Finally, Rumania was obliged to comply with whatever economic measures the Central Powers might deem appropriate and necessary. Eager to gain access to the economic resources of the Ukraine, the Central Powers also prodded Averescu into settling Rumania's dispute with Russia in order to ease their troop movements. In an agreement signed at
Odessa on March 9, Rumania and Russia agreed to withdraw their military forces from Bessarabia. Pressed into this engagement by the Central Powers, neither party had the slightest intention of honouring it.
Indeed, the Buftea treaty allowed Rumania keep a sizable force under arms, with the unspoken understanding that they would be used in Bessarabia. to
Bratianu 'retires' The outcome of the Buftea negotiations was well-suited to Bratianu's purposes. By its very nature, the preliminary treaty afforded Rumania an opportunity to draw out talks towards a final settlement. Yet Bratianu still pressed for Marghiloman's appointment. Two considerations guided his choice. If the Allies won the war Marghiloman and the Conservatives, who had consistently co-operated with the Left: Rumanian telephone outpost in the hectic times before Russia's capitulation. Below: Russian and Rumanian prisoners of war When Russia withdrew Rumania was left helpless
3031
j
be discredited and And, if the Cenproved victorious, Marghiloaione was capable of securing Rumania a viable place in the new order. This time Ferdinand accepted Bratianu's advice. As soon as he did and Marghiloman agreed to serve, Bratianu, counting on an Allied victory, announced his retirement from politics. Bratianu's strategy made it imperative that he appear to have nothing to do with Marghiloman's appointment or policies; to do so might queer his pitch with the Allies. Marghiloman took office on March 18. Unofficially he had played a significant part in Rumania's dealings with the Central Powers before and after the armistice. When peace terms were under deliberation, he managed to dissuade the Central Powers from deposing the Rumanian dynasty while persuading them to grant Rumania freedom of action in Bessarabia. If it had not been for his intervention, the Buftea settlement might have been harsher still. Marghiloman firmly believed that Rumania's future lay in close association with the Central Powers, particularly Germany. But he realised, when others did not, that for this association to be viable, it must be genuinely advantageous and honourable for Rumania. Although remarkably insenlid
sitive
to
Rumanian
realities,
' FRONTIERS 1914
ited.
ALLIED SALONIKA FRONT JULY 1916 1916mm
\
TCMTQAI POWERS CENTRAL DnillEDOl
/
(OCCUPIED BY CENTRAL POWERS BY 1917 I
ALLIES
RUMANIA AFTER THE WAR
RUSSIA
Marghilo-
man was
not altogether lacking in either tactical skills or political principles.
Marghiloman hoped to bind
Rumania
that, by promising tightly to the Central
Powers, they would ameliorate the terms of the preliminary treaty. This was a false hope, for the Central Powers had no intention of bargaining seriously with Rumania. Since the autumn of 1917, the final disposition of Rumania had been a constant source of tension among the Central Powers themselves. Their failure to reach agreement accounted for the desultory nature of negotiations. The preponderant economic role foreseen for
Rumania by Germany
in
the vision of Mitteleurope proved incomwith the extensive territorial patible
ed
decision to join the Allies. In 1917 his attitudes towards Russia hardened, driving him squarely into the arms of the Central Powers. Appearing before the assembled Sfat, Stere delivered an impassioned plea for the union of Bessarabia and Rumania. On April 8, 1918 the Sfat, by public vote, resolved to unite Bessarabia with Rumania by a majority of 86 to 3 with 36 abstentions. A number of conditions were attached to the resolution. The Sfat was to continue its existence in order to draft and promulgate an agrarian reform law. Bessarabia was to be granted a wide measure of administrative autonomy, the Sfat constituting a provincial parliament and the zemstvo organisations forming units of local government. Two Bessarabian ministers, selected by the Sfat, were to hold permanent seats in the Rumanian government. The freedom of individuals, the press, speech, assembly and religion was to be constitutionally guaranteed. These conditions reflected the revolutionary mood prevalent in Bessarabia, with
once exiled to Siberia for his part in radical agrarian politics. He developed an abiding hatred for Russian autocracy and imperialism which led him to oppose Rum.i ia's
which Rumanian politicians had little sympathy. Once unification was achieved measures were set afoot to dampen this radical spirit and restore the status quo, albeit under Rumanian authority.
acquisitions desired by Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. Austria-Hungary laid claim to large parts of Western Wallachia, well
beyond the Carpathians.
demanded the
And Bulgaria Germany
entire Dobruja.
thought these demands would sap Rumania's economic strength and erode its own predominance in the country. Turkey then used Bulgaria's claim as an occasion to seek aggrandisement in Western Thrace and even in the Caucasus. While the Central Powers bickered among themselves, Marghiloman turned to furthering Rumania's aspirations in Bessarabia.
Bessarabia gained, independence lost
On February
6, soon after the Rumanian occupation, the Sfat proclaimed Bessarabia an independent republic. But, increasingly menaced by the Bolsheviks and Ukrainians, the chances of maintaining independence were slight. Again the Sfat appealed to the Rumanian government. In April
Above: Soldiers from different areas of Rumania. Above right: Rumania's frontiers and territorial aspirations before and after the war. By political freebootery during 1918 she achieved many of her original ambitions
3032
Marghiloman, accompanied by Stere, visitKishinev. Stere was a Bessarabian Rumanian who, as a Russian subject, was
Lengthy deliberations over the final peace settlement ended with the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest on May 7, 1918. As early as March 26 Marghiloman was summoned to initial a second preliminary treaty defining the territorial settlement, but over a month passed before the economic clauses were formulated. The treaty was a compromise which left all the Cen-
Powers
tral
dissatisfied
without
signifi-
cantly conciliating Rumania. The treaty compelled Rumania to give up an area of over 10,000 square miles containing a population of more than 800,000. Bulgaria recovered that portion of the Dobruja lost in 1913, while the rest was transferred to a condominium of the Central Powers. Austria-Hungary's claims to the oil-fields at Cimpina and Bacau, and the salt-mines at Slanic,
Prahova, Turny Severin and in
the Jiu valley were rejected, but the Carpathian frontier was redrawn in its favour. The new frontier placed the strategic
watersheds
Hungarian
in
hands
and
created a Hungarian ethnic barrier between the Rumanian populations on either side of the Carpathians. The treaty, in a separate annex, subjected Rumania's econ-
omy
to
thoroughgoing
Austro-German
domination. Although indemnities were expressly repudiated, Rumanian finances were adjusted to compensate the Central Powers for the costs of their campaigns and occupation. A nine-year monopoly was established over all Rumanian agricultural production, an Austro-German consortium being set up to determine the annual sur-
and manage its export. deposits were leased to an Austro-German monopoly for a 30year period, renewable for two further plus, fix its price
All
Rumanian
30-year
oil
periods.
Shipping
at
Giurgiu
was given over to a German monopoly at a nominal sum and Austria-Hungary received similar advantages at Turny Severin.
An army
strong,
was
turned
tc
of occupation, eight divisions
to be maintained at Rumania's expense until the European war ended. By a separate political article, Rumania re-
the ranks of the Central Powers.
The alliance of 1883 was revived and broadened to include Bulgaria and Turkey. Not only had Rumania left the war, it had also defected to the enemy. When Marghiloman lamented the severity of the treaty, a German officer quipped: 'A harsh peace? Just wait till you see what we have in store for France and England!' For all save Marghiloman and his coterie, the very severity of the treaty was its chief virtue. It provided the Allies with dramatic proof of Rumania's impotence in the face of the might and rapacity of the Central Powers. And Marghiloman's willingness to assume full responsibility for the treaty, together with his efforts to discredit Bratianu and the Liberals, enabled Bratianu to disassociate himself and his party from the separate peace. The Liberals were excluded from the parliamentary elections, driven from government service and even charged with high treason. Consequently, the Allied envoys advised their governments to exonerate Bratianu from all responsibility and disregard the treaty itself. The Allies quickly declared those terms of the treaty contrary to the alliance of 1916 'null and void', pledging themselves to undo the settlement and maintain the alliance. The Allied statements seemed to preserve the alliance in principle, but they did not remove the
lingering
doubts
surrounding
its
terri-
torial clauses.
Curiously, the Treaty of Bucharest was never formally ratified. A Rumanian parliament, from which the Liberal and Conservative-Democrat opposition was excluded, did ratify the text, the Chamber on June 28 and the Senate on July 4. The Reichstag also ratified the treaty on July 4. But these ratifications were never exchanged, nor did King Ferdinand sign the treaty as the constitution required. None of the other signatories ratified the treaty at all. In fact, it was against the interests of both Rumania and the Central Powers to proceed to formal ratification. Once the treaty had the force of law, Rumania was obliged to demobilise its entire army. Marghiloman wanted to keep a force under arms to counter domestic unrest and guard against Russia, and he probably appreciated that a time might come for general remobilisation. Likewise, if the treaty came into force, the Central Powers lost their rights of occupation, requisition and passage upon which their eastern policy depended. Thus the Treaty of Bucharest never became legally binding on any of those party to it.
Ionescu: 'Ambassador' to the Allies
With
the
conclusion
Rumanian diplomacy
of
peace,
official
ceased. Marghiloman set about fulfilling the military and economic stipulations of the treaty. Bratianu kept
effectively
up the studied pose
of the retired statesman. But Rumania's interests were not allowed to languish. The task of presenting Rumania's case to the Allies was taken up by a growing emigration abroad. Bratianu had recognised the value of propaganda earlier,
sending missions to North America and Western Europe in 1917 and 1918. In both Britain and France prominent politicians and publicists gave voice to Rumanian aspirations and liaised between Rumanians and their governments. Six Rumanian delegates took part in the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities at Rome in April 1918. In the summer of 1918 these diffuse activities were brought under the aegis of the Rumanian National Council at Paris. The Council's executive committee included Rumanians from the Old Kingdom, Transylvania, Bukovina, the Banat and Bessarabia. Although Bratianu sponsored the Council's activities and was named its honorary president, real leadership was exercised by Take Ionescu. The staunchest champion of the Allies in Rumanian political circles, Ionescu, as chief of the Conservative-Democrats, had exhausted his possibilities at Ia§i. In June 1918 he was allowed to leave Rumania with many others of like sympathies. He made his way to Paris where he became president of the National Council. Ionescu's prestige and reputation were invaluable assets. Known and respected in Allied capitals, Ionescu was well suited to direct what could only be an unofficial policy towards the Allies. Despite public declarations to the contrary, Ionescu suspected the Allies might still question the validity of the Rumanian alliance. Discussions with Allied officials soon confirmed his suspicions. He quickly realised that the Allies considered the separate peace a violation of the alliance and that Rumania must win back its position in the Entente. Moreover, he got the impression that even were the problem of
the alliance overcome, Rumania's maximum territorial demands were unlikely to be met. Ionescu's soundings led him to marshal the Council's resources towards surmounting these obstacles. Further, he linked the Rumanian effort to that of other national movements pressing for the dissolution of Austria-Hungary and the creation of nation-states. With the assistance of sympathetic individuals in the Allied camp, these groups acted as a powerful and effective lobby on Allied governments. Although the Council's efforts failed to obtain any written assurances from the Allies, they did succeed in putting Rumania's case before a wide public and getting it heard in high places. At a time when a vigorous policy was essential, but impossible through official channels, the Council performed a vital role. By the autumn the Allies appeared near victory, and Bratianu prepared to resume control of Rumanian policy. He conferred with the Allied envoys for the first time in eight months on October 7. Telling them that he would soon return to power, he indicated that Rumania would take up arms against the Central Powers whenever the Allied Commander at Salonika gave the signal. The Central Powers feared just such a turnabout, but lacked sufficient forces to forestall it. Instead they appealed to Marghiloman to exchange ratifications of the Treaty of Bucharest. In return they offered to restore the entire Dobruja, revise the Carpathian frontier, recognise the annexation of Bessarabia, restitute war damages and reconsider + he economic arrangements. Getting wind of this overture, Bratianu seized it for his own advantage. He informed the Allies that they must make a counteroffer at once, reaffirming the terms of the alliance, so that he could recapture sufficient popularity to wrest power from Marghiloman. When the Allies hesitated, Bratianu held out, restraining the King from ordering a resumption of hostilities. On November 5 the United States issued a circumspect statement assuring Rumania of America's sympathy and support for its national aspirations. It was not all Bratianu wanted, but it was enough. The very next day Marghiloman was dismissed and a caretaker government under General
Constantine Coanda sworn in. An Allied force crossed the Danube into Wallachia on November 9. Bratianu, the King and the Allied envoys met and decided to give the Austro-German command 24 hours to surrender its army of occupation. Mackensen ignored the ultimatum. On November 10 Rumania went to war for the second time. The Rumanian armies encountered no opposition as they swept into Wallachia and crossed the Carpathians.
Resurgence of nationalism By this time, the Rumanian communities Austria-Hungary had already taken matters well in hand. After the withdrawal of the Rumanian armies in 1916 to 1917, the Austro-Hungarian authorities placed of
strict controls life
on
all
in the empire.
aspects of
Rumanian was
Political activity
severely suppressed. Magyarisation poliwere stepped up with a vengeance. Hungarian colonies were even planted in
cies
predominantly Rumanian regions. By 1918 the Rumanians of Austria-Hungary too were either reduced to political passivity or forced to go abroad. The Rumanians !
3033
•
iV-- »-~.r*-* r
Rumania suffered intqSB dissension as wel as threats from outside, nare the leaders of a military spy ring areatrioied of their rank
3035
autumn all ....
The executive
Rumanian National Party Transylvania and Hungary gathered at .
of
as
to pieces
nittee of the
Oradea on October
12.
Here they drafted
a resolution invoking the right of selfdetermination for the Rumanians of Hungary, repudiating any Hungarian claims to represent the Rumanian population at the Peace Conference, and refusing to acknowledge any decisions of the Hungarian government as legally binding upon the Rumanians. On October 18 Alexandru Vaida Voevod read this proclamation in the Hungarian Diet at Buda Pest amid scenes of high emotion. Only a day before Count Tisza, former Hungarian Prime Minister, had admitted: 'we
have lost the war'. Meanwhile, Iuliu Maniu, the presiding genius and spirit of Rumanian nationalism in Austria-Hungary, returned from the Italian Front to take command. The National Party first drew together the various local groups by establishing a Rumanian National Council for Hungary and Transylvania at Arad. On October 31 the ancien regime at Buda Pest fell to the radicals grouped round Count Mihaly Karolyi who proclaimed Hungary an independent republic. The Rumanian National Council, not yet ready to turn its back on the new government, informed Buda Pest, on November 10, that it was assuming power in 33 Rumanian-inhabited comitats and in parts of three others. In an effort to preserve something of Hungary's territorial and political integrity,
Karolyi instructed his
Oscar Jaszi, open negotiations with the National Council. At meetings between Jaszi and minister
of
nationalities,
to
Rumanian were
leaders a variety of possibilities explored, ranging from an auto-
nomous Transylvania within Hungary
to
an independent Transylvania as part of
Danubian Confederation. But, at the news that Karolyi had concluded an armistice with the Allies, the Rumanians broke
a
off the talks.
A
convenient loophole armistice with Austria-Hungary had been signed at Padua on November 3, but
An
Karolyi, eager for Allied recognition of the republic, sought a separate armistice from General Franchet d'Esperey, Supreme Commander of the Allied Army of the Orient, now at Belgrade. Rumania, being then still at peace, had not been party to the original Austro-Hungarian armistice, nor was it invited to join the negotiations with Karolyi. D'Esperey drove a hard bargain, and after a great deal of haggling, Karolyi came to terms on November 13. Hungary was compelled to accept Allied occupation of extensive areas in the south and east of the country. Submission was ensured by requiring Hungary to demobilise the bulk of its armed forces and assent to overall Allied supervision. The same day, Bratianu demanded that Hungary withdraw from Transylvania and recognise Rumania's annexation of the province. Meanwhile, after a plan formed by General Berthelot and approved by d'Esperey, the Rumanian army was prepared for the occupation of Transylvania. Rumania was not a party to any armistice, but none of them expressly forbade its military assistance. With the encouragement of Berthelot and d'Esperey, Bratianu took advantage of
'036
and occupied Eastern Transylvania and Bukovina, where a Rumanian council had appealed for protection against this loophole
Ukrainian encroachments.
The Rumanian occupation spurred the Rumanians of Austria-Hungary to more extreme action. Shunning further approaches from the Karolyi government, the National Council announced the secession of Transylvania and certain other
from Hungary. Then it arranged assembly to take place at Alba Iulia on December 1 to sanction the union of all Rumanians in a single state. Prior to the assembly, the executive committee framed a set of conditions to govern the act of unification. The National Council itself claimed the right to govern the Rumanian regions of Hungary until a constituent assembly completed a new constitution for the enlarged Rumanian
state.
•
Among
the other conditions were: peoples regardless of
full liberty for all
nationality; the right of all peoples to be represented in the Rumanian parliament; • the right of all peoples to use their own language in education, administration and
•
justice;
•
complete
autonomy
for
all
religious
creeds;
districts
for a national
The Rumanian advance into Transylvania in August 1916 had been sharply rebuffed by the Germans, who marched into Rumania, occupying Bucharest. The Rumanian army was forced to retreat (right) to Moldavia where it held out for a further 12 months. Below: Signing the Treaty of Bucharest on May 7, 1918. Seated,
with the Treaty before him, Kuhlmann, the German Foreign Secretary; on his right, Burian, the Austro-Hungarran Foreign Minister; on his left Radoslavov, Bulgarian Premier
•
purely democratic regime in all 'a branches of public life'; • universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage; 'free propagation of human thoughts', including absolute freedom of press,
•
assembly and association; radical agrarian reform on the principle
•
of 'social levelling duction'; • just treatment of 'as
and increased industrial
pro-
workers
secured to them by law in the most
advanced industrial
states'.
Further, the National Council accorded the peace conference the right to delimit the final frontiers of Rumania and declared that the treatment of non-Rumanian citizens in Rumania would follow the principles enunciated by Woodrow Wilson. Over 1,200 delegates took part in the proceedings, joined by untold numbers of Rumanians from all parts of what had been Austria-Hungary. The resolutions were adopted with great rejoicing and endless acclamations. The assembly appointed a Consiliul Dirigent ('Directing Council') of 15 under Maniu's presidency as a provisional government. Its first act was to send a mission to Bucharest to effect the union and request military forces to ensure it. In Czernowitz, capital of Bukovina, a similar gathering of Rumanians resolved upon unconditional union with the kingdom on November 28, in the presence of Rumanian occupation forces. Within a month of the war's' end, Rumania controlled much of the territory it stood to gain by the alliance of 1916. And the Rumanians of these lands had clearly expressed their desire for national unification. Furthermore, the fortunes of war had enabled Rumania to acquire Bessarabia as well. By an extraordinary mixture of diplomatic aplomb, political ability and plain good luck, Bratianu could agree with President Wilson that: '. the solutions of war are born from the nature and circumstances of war itself; all statesmen or assemblies can do is realise or betray them'. .
.
Further Reading Goldberg, G The peace to end peace the Pans Peace Conference of 1919 (New York Harcourt 1969) Seton-Watson, R. W., A History of the Rumanians (Cambridge University Press 1934) Spector, Sherman D., Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference (Bookman Associates 1962) Sainte-Aulaire, Comte de, Confession d'un vieux diplomate (Flammarion 1953) Marghiloman, Alexandru, Note Politice, 1897,
1924
(Institutul
de arte grafice 'Eminescu'
1927)
Moroianu, Georges, Les luttes dss roumains transylvains pour la liberte et /'opinion europeenne (Gamber 1933)
Popovici, Aurel, The Political Status of Bessarabia (Ransdell 1931)
Prokopowitsch, Erich, Die Rumanische Nationalbewegung in der Bukowina und der Dako-Romanismus (Bohlau 1965) J
MICHAEL KITCH was
m
1
born in Baltimore, Maryland 94 1 After reading history at Duke University and at Indiana University he left the United States in 1965 For three years he studied Rumania and the First World War at St Antony's College. Oxford. Since 1968 he has lived in London, where he teaches European History and Political Thought at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies of the University of
London
3037
^
n 1917
While the Great Powers
December 9
Armistice signed at Foc§anij
1918 January 20
Mackensen threatens
February
hesitated
January 26
Rumania's
February 7
leaders pursued their dream — the
union of all
Rumanians
<\
-**!
HUHOBBD
10.
Rumanian division occupies Bessarabia.
March 5 March 9
Bratianu government is brought down, but the new one, under Averescu, is under Bratianu's control. Negotiations are opened with the Central Powers. Treaty of Buftea signed. Rumania and Russia agree
withdraw their forces from Bessarabia. Averescu government is replaced by Marghiloman's. Bessarabian Sfat votes for unification with Rumania. to
March 18 April 8
**r%
to
invade Rumania unless peace talks are started by
*<£*
*
May
Treaty of Bucharest signed. Bratianu meets Allied envoys and offers to turn the country against the Central Powers.
7
October 7
October 12
Rumanians
in
Hungary
draft a self-determination resolution.
October 18
November 6 November 9
Resolution read to
Hungarian Diet. Marghiloman government replaced by Coanda's. Allies cross the Danube into Wallachia.
November 10 Rumania declares war on
Germany for the second (Rumanians in Hungary take control of Rumanian areas.) November 28 Bukovinan Rumanians vote time.
for unity
December
1
with Rumania.
A Provisional Government appointed.
The manipulators of events in Rumania during 1918. Opposite page. Top
left:
General Crainicianu.
Top centre: King Ferdinand. Top General Popovici. Centre General Averescu. Below left: General lliescu. Below centre: Alexandru Marghiloman. Below right: General
right: left:
Zottu. Chief of Staff. This
page. Top
left: General Georgescu. Top centre: Richard von Kuhlmann, German Foreign Secretary. Top
right: Petrache Carp, a political maverick' eagerfor union with the Central Powers. Right: Count Czernin, Austria-Hungary's Minister of Foreign Affairs. Below left: General Presan. Below centre: General d'Esperey, Rumania's ally. Below right: Ion Bratianu, dominant figure in
French
Rumanian
politics
successful sally into the war •ershing's First Army moved up natural 11 against the impregnable defences of the Argonne. To every-
AMERICAS
i's
and man-made
OFFENSIVE
one's surprise, not least their own, the Americans continued their resolute advance. Philip Warner
'
'
V •
^
•i
-*%*^.
**'
A if
JAf
f
JL
\*M
**
h
>:v
\m
f*r%* >.
i
**
r
>.
**•
fl i*.
r,
'
f
.*
/* -
K+ /
r
K
«
i
ft •
%
v
*/
m «
?
>#
« *
•
•cufllr
K
<
* -
i
THE
ARGON HE
"J&-
It is
often thought that because the end of
war was near the battles of late 1918 must have been easy by comparison with
the
the earlier bloodbaths. This assumption is unfair both to the Allies who won those battles and to the doggedness of the German resistance. Another natural assumption is that the Allies would have learnt
Below: Small FT17 tanks, heavily camouflaged against German aircraft,
await the
offensive. In fact tanks
were useless in the ravines and dense forests of the Argonne
m
*F 51 tftMP
m
i^7 .<-
-
fth.
•-:
r\
k
x
^^*^ *
/.eft: An American Balloon Company mov S to the front. Aerial observation was not, how| ever, very helpful, for the German defences * were easily concealed in the dense underI growth
Bottom: Renault lbs.
37-mm tank.
Weight: 14,300
Armament: 37-mm gun, with 237 rounds
of
ammunition. Dimensions: Length 16 ft 5 ins; 1 ft 7 /2 ins; height 7 ft. Engine: 35 bhp. Speed: Cross-country 2.2 mph: on roads 4.8 mph.'ftange: 22 miles. Armour: Front 16-mm; sides 8-mm; top 8-mm; belly 6-mm. Turret: Either round (22-mm) or panelled (16-mm). Crew: 2 men. Below: A column of Renaults at Suvigney width 5
next day the Belgian army and the British Second Army would set off with the object of liberating Bruges and Brussels, and on September 29 the British Fourth and the French First Armies would be committed in the centre. Allied morale was higher than it had been for years. This was not so much due to the possibility that the end of the war was in sight — for some had been anticipating that since 1914— but to the fact fhat the wave of major offensives .launched by the Germans earlier in the year had been checked and countered. In contrast, German morale should have been
.
•
low but, as experience has often shown, the troops were driven back to feel that they were defending their homeland and as a result they fought with quite unexpected Undetermination. doggedness and doubtedly German spirit had been dampened by the inadequacy of reinforcements, and the gloomy news from home and other fronts, but balancing this was the greater expertise they had developed in defensive technique. This was highly sophisticated, and varied according to the nature of the ground. Sometimes the assault would be contained by elastic yielding, with appropriate counterattacks; at other times there would be hard resistance at selected points so that the attack could slide by and be enfiladed. In the Argonne sector the Germans had had four years to prepare a defence with meticulous care. This was the area assigned to the American First Army,
whose objective was to reach what was known as the Buzancy line. Once accomplished, the Germans would be prevented from outflanking the French Fourth Army. On the face of it this task seems relatively simple: in fact it was of great importance as it would stop the Germans from splitting the Allied offensive, and of enormous difficulty because of the nature of the ground.
Immediately behind the Americans were the battlefields of Verdun, which can have been little help to morale. The devastation of this and other areas made the provision of supplies extremely difficult, for roads, villages and drainage had been systematically destroyed in the bombardments of past. Furthermore, the Argonne
the
which lie between the Aire and the upper Aisne: it would be difficult to find less inviting counforest is spread over the ridges
-k'
try fox#an invader.
Even without
shell fire
a
would have been
difficult
enough
the forest was subjected to prenary bombardment it became almost impenetrable. The effect of bombing and shelling ahead of advancing infantry is intended to soften up the opposition, but on numerous occasions, when applied at random, it will hinder the advance more than help it. This is what happened on the Argonne. The Germans laid down further obstacles by filling the forest with wire and netting, which could not be removed by shelling, or pushed aside by tanks. The latter were of limited use in this region — although the Americans had 189 of them — for the forest was full of deep ravines. c
when
'Scorched earth' policy There were other hazards; inside and outside the forest. The bulk of the American forces were, in fact, east of the Argonne forest, and the Germans had made every effort to make them as unwelcome in that area as in the forest itself. They did this by following a normal routine of the type which later became known as the 'scorched earth' policy. Towns and villages were set on fire, all road and railway bridges demolished, embankments and cuttings were destroyed by explosives, and crossroads were blown up. Wells and water supplies were polluted. There was also an elaborate array of booby traps. These measures were designed to be much more than merely vindictive; they had the considerable military value of delaying the allied advance. The troops had to proceed so cautiously, treating the most innocentlooking installations — such as an abandoned dugout or sniper's platform — with such extreme care, that progress was much slower than commanders had expected. The front assigned to the American army was 22 miles wide. The First Army, which
was commanded by General Pershing, incorporated 15 infantry divisions and one cavalry division. Nine of these were in the front line, three were in immediate reserve and the remainder were in Army reserve. Each American division was nearly twice the size of a British or French division but this was not, in the event, an unqualified advantage. There were only two usable roads in the area of the advance, one on each flank, and both were exposed to constant German artillery fire. Constructing roads and repairing bridges for the advance of a large army is difficult enough at the best of times but the nature of the countryside - not forgetting the attentions of the Germans — made it particularly difficult. But a drive forward in this area was absolutely essential if the war was to be over by the end of the year; if it could not be made, the whole programme would be put back six months. Whatever the casualties of an all-out attack in the autumn they could hardly fail to be surpassed by the continual drain caused by bombardment and illness, followed by a spring offensive against positions which would have had months to perfect their defences. Nevertheless Pershing must have had considerable doubts about committing inexperi-
enced American troops. In reaching his decision he had to weigh very carefully whether the advantage of using fresh keen
who would acquire heavy casualties through inexperience was justified when six months later they would be vastly more sophisticated militarily, but lack some of the drive they had earlier possessed. troops
3044
Top: Rudimentary communications. Information recorded and orders retailed through a loud hailer. Gas masks were obligatory
is
Above: An American Field Hospital at Neuvilly, improvised in the ruins of a church. Casualties among the doughboys' were high
The first stage went very well. The main body of the First Army, to the east of the forest, advanced seven miles in the first two days, but in the following eleven days it gained no more than two miles. This slow progress was partly due to dogged German resistance but probably owed more to supply problems. Approximately 300,000 troops were engaged in the battle from 0530 hours onwards on the opening day, September 26. Some had been in position for several days, others had only come into the line during the night to the somewhat awesome sound, for new troops, of 2,700 guns delivering a preliminary three-hour barrage. During the First World War large scale attacks were usually preceded by barrages which sometimes went on for days on end. These were intended to destroy all strong points, and
morale as well, although in practice this
was not always the case. Nevertheless, on this occasion they were essential, because of the enormous care with which the German positions were protected by lines of barbed wire, machine gun nests, concrete bunkers, and enfilading trench systems. At this stage in the war miracles could not be expected — in any sector. British, Commonwealth, French, and Belgian troops had all fought long and exhausting campaigns, had been decimated and had been rebuilt, were highly skilled and professional, but could not be expected to produce the wild dash of the earlier years. By contrast the Americans lacked the professionalism which comes from battle experience, although full enough of energy and verve. Yet in these last bitter months there were many surprises. The Allied armies which had fought through three and a half years of the most gruelling campaigns the world
has
ever
known,
suddenly produced a
speed, dash, and alacrity which no one — least of all themselves — could ever have
dreamed of. The Americans who already had the St Mihiel offensive on their hands could not reasonably be expected to move half a million men and their equipment in secret by night into a new sector — and then fight like demons in one of the most disheartening areas of the war. Yet they did. Right in the middle of their area was the strongly-fortified town of Montfaucon which Foch had not thought they would capture until early 1919; instead they bypassed it on the first day and occupied it on the morning of the second. Montfaucon,
which was on a hill, was considered to be impregnable to an infantry attack. The cost of its capture was high — even after it had been bypassed — for the Germans had established numerous camouflaged machine gun posts on platforms in the trees. Remains of similar platforms may still be seen in the woods of northern France, and some may well contain booby-traps — much rusted but still lethal. The only surviving building at the time of its capture was a chateau which Crown Prince Rupprecht had used as an observatory in 1916. From the basement 30 feet below ground he watched the attacks on Verdun through a periscope which, in turn, was protected by a concrete cylinder. The periscope was captured by the US Signal Corps and is now in the museum at West Point. The weather throughout the attack was particularly bad. The Americans were in action for 47 days between the opening of the Argonne attack and the end of the war and it rained on 40 days out of that 47. Not only did men
have
to shuffle along from one hold-up to another on the inadequate roads but conditions were at times so bad that rations could not reach them at all. Continuous rain beating steadily on a steel helmet produces an irritation peculiarly its own even without the nagging headache which it
invariably leads to. To the men moving in the battle area the whole panorama of men, machines and horses must have seemed one of unrelieved chaos. In parts indeed it was — and took days to sort out — but that overall it was an operational success was largely due to the skill of Colonel G. C. Marshall, Assistant Chief of Staff (Opera-
Army. Another name which becoming prominent was that of George S. Patton. At this stage he was a Colonel and was wounded in the early stages of the Argonne fighting, for which he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. His views about war were aptly summarised by his remark that 'no one ever won a war by dying for his country but only by making some poor bastard die for
tions) First
was
but his appeal as a leader probably lay in the fact that in the armies he subsehis,'
quently commanded, the least was his own.
life
he valued
LudendorfT: under pressure The Argonne campaign not only upset
cal-
culations by the results it achieved, but by the rapidity with which they were accomplished. Foch — Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies by this time — had expected very small gains and did not anticipate a successful end to the war until well into the following year. The initial successes on all fronts — especially on that of the Americans—made him rapidly revise his timetable. Ludendorff, while realising that pressure was mounting against him, had by no means decided the war was lost. On the contrary, in spite of being jolted back on several fronts he still believed he could regroup his forces into a tight defensive perimeter of which the various sectors had such daunting names as the Siegfried,
Hundung,
Brunhilde, Kriemhilde and Michel positions. On some of them he was prepared to give way — if necessary — and retire to equally strong positions behind, but the cumulative effective would be to hold the Allies off German territory till the following spring. By that time the Allies would be as anxious for peace as the Germans, and the terms should be correspondingly more favourable. The Argonne, however, was not one of the areas in which Ludendorff was prepared to give ground; he was as surprised as Foch at the events which took place there. Although the Kriemhilde position lay behind the Argonne, and the incomplete Freya position (second-line defence with the Hagen and Hermann positions) lay between the Kriemhilde and Sedan, this was too vulnerable an area for any loss of territory to be accepted without misgiving. Although the Americans gained three miles in the first two days they soon found the going tougher, partly because Ludendorff now began switching other divisions to this sector. Ultimately 40 German vital divisions were in the field against some 630,000 American troops. The initial American gains were by no means even. The thrust that had penetrated three miles into the German position within the first two days barely managed to advance two miles in the next ten,
because of the supply problem. The ingenuity of German delaying tactics now increased. One road had a vast crater in it. Railways were liable to produce surprises, for when the broken track had been repaired, and the first train ran, mines under apparently intact stretches would send not only the track but also the trains skywards. Troops advancing on the left of the American sector came under flanking fire from the forest; and it became obvious that the forest could not be bypassed, as had been hoped, but would have to be cleared The best way of accomplishing that was thought to be by penetrating from the sides. But in places it turned out to be a matter of fighting from tree to tree. There were three main problems: the area was so full of precipitous unclimbable slopes that an orderly advance was impossible, the nature of the terrain, combined with rain and occasional fog, made it impossible for units to keep in proper communication with each other, and the wire, some of it laid much earlier in the war, was concealed in the dense undergrowth.
The 'Lost Battalion' One of the most remarkable
episodes of the
campaign was that of the 'Lost Battalion'. The battalion was never in fact lost — as its approximate position was known — but it was completely surrounded by Germans in the forest, and was fortunate to survive at all. The battalion, which belonged to the 77th Division, consisted of nine companies and was commanded by Major Charles W. Whittlesey. Its total strength was 550 men. On October 2 General Pershing had decided there was nothing to be gained by units trying to maintain communications in the forest, and that the best policy was to drive straight ahead. Positions which were captured would be held. By this process the Americans would establish a strategic network of strongpoints throughout the forest, and so fully occupy its German inhabitants that they would be distracted from their attacks on the flank of the advancing American main force. When the order to push ahead to indicated points was given, Whittlesey had already experienced its possible effects. The battalion had already been cut off from September 28 to October 1, although on that occasion some contact had been maintained. On October 2 it set off again towards the Charlevaux valley. Opposition was lighter than expected and they reached their objective and dug in. As they had been hampered very little by the Germans they had soon lost touch with flanking units, which presumably had found the going harder. Whittlesey had some misgivings about the battalion's
isolation
despite
his
orders.
However, any suspicions he had about the vulnerability of his position changed to certainties when one of his pickets reported hearing German voices behind them. With limited ammunition, no rations, and very little chance of making contact with the rest of the division the battalion's position began to look dangerous. The most important question was how serious the
German
opposition
was
likely
This uncertainty was soon resolved. Patrols soon discovered there were Germans on all sides, and that those behind had run up a barbed wire screen dotted with machine guns. As Whittlesey took stock of his position the Germans began to straddle the area with artillery and to be.
3045
is of digging adebattalion was fully took the Gero to realise what a splenfallen into their hands — no I
did prize had
than a complete battalion. At first they assumed that a detachment, perhaps of company strength, had ranged too far ahead, which could be mortared into subless
mission
without
serious
fighting,
from
lack of food and ammunition. When they realised that a full battalion had fallen into their potential grasp they saw no need to change their tactics; all they did was to increase the volume of their mortar and artillery fire. In case Whittlesey should decide to break out to the rear of the position they put up some more barbed wire and sited a few more guns. They need not have troubled. Whittlesey's orders had
been
to capture
ground and hold
it;
there
was no question in his mind of not obeying them to the letter. Whittlesey had not, up to this point, had much chance of showing his worth. He was a lawyer,
not a professional soldier; he
was not over-communicative, and he was His troops, thinking he looked like a crane, nicknamed him 'Bird
short-sighted.
legs'; later this
nickname was used with
that affection and respect only given to commanders who have been through the mill along with their men. Whittlesey's battalion had markers to indicate his position to friendly aircraft but these were of little value in the thick forest. In any case the rest of the division knew where he was — the problem was how to reach him. Supplies were dropped from the air but fell outside the battalion's narrow perimeter. Nine men ventured out — without permission—to recover the supplies, but all were killed or captured. One was blindfolded and sent back with a note demanding the battalion's surrender. Whittlesey, a man of few words, wasted none on this occasion; he ignored the demand. At first he had tried to get runners through the German lines to let headquarters know exactly where he was, but these were all killed. It was essential that the division should know not only exactly where he was, but also the straits he was in. Having set out with iron rations a week before the battalion was
now living on dew, grass, and leaves. The wounded were dying and all ranks were suffering from exposure. But he could not be sure that the rest of the division was aware of this. For all they knew he might have captured a cache of supplies.
'Cher Ami': pigeon hero Whittlesey had four carrier pigeons, and with these he tried to send back details of his exact position. Unfortunately for him — and them — three were shot down by observant German marksmen. The fourth was carrying the most serious news of all: because the division did not know the exact position of the unit, the 'Lost Battalion' was coming under its own artillery fire. This last pigeon was called 'Cher Ami'. In spite of its name it was a British pigeon which had been one of a consignment of 600 sent by British pigeon fanciers to the American army. When the United States
came them
into the
war
it
was impossible for equipment
to provide all necessary
from their own resources immediately. Apart from tanks and guns and aircraft there were other, less military but equally essential, supplies. Among them were
3046
pigeons, which could often get a message through when all other communication aids had failed. There were already 20,000 carrier pigeons in service with the American army, of which 5,000 were overseas. 'Cher Ami' set off with the last message. The watching Americans saw it rise in the air, then set off in purposeful flight to its loft 25 miles away. But the German marksmen were watching too. As it crossed their positions it met a storm of fire. One bullet broke its leg — the leg which held the vital message capsule — another damaged its wing, and a third broke its breastbone. It stopped as if jerked by a wire and then, to the dismay of the battalion, it began to spiral downwards. Just before it reached
the trees it made a last effort and, to the joy of the almost incredulous watchers,
came back into flight and set off on its long journey home. The barrage was lifted. 'Cher Ami' became something of a national hero. He was taken back to the United States and given full VIP treatment, but only survived a year. After his death he was stuffed and put on display in the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, DC. But the lifting of the barrage was not the end of the battalion's troubles. The Germans, finding that siege tactics would take too long, now turned to infantry assaults. Below: In the Argonne— a forbidding prospect any attacker and quite impassable for tanks
for
Some
of the most pressing occurred on the right flank, which was held by Captain
Holderman with one company. Holderman had already been wounded twice but was still in command. At one point he crawled out and helped to bring in some wounded; at another he sallied out and shot a German carrying a flame-thrower. But there were many others who also deserved commendation, among them Captain McMurwho was twice wounded, and two pilots, Goettler and Bleckley, who were shot down in a vain attempt to locate the battalion position by flying at tree-top try,
°>
height. The difficulty of pinpointing the exact position of the battalion stemmed from the nature of the terrain. The Argonne ridges are up to 750 feet high; one looks very much like another, and there are no reliable landmarks. Although the approximate position of the battalion was known, it had already been shown that a more accurate reference was needed if artillery fire was not to wipe out friend and foe alike. Furthermore, the Germans had not failed to provide against relief by infantry attack. In the circumstances a detailed map of the battalion's position was essential to headquarters if it was to rescue Whittlesey's men before they were exterminated by American or German fire. The battalion
to accept the
German
A number of runners had
already been sent out to contact Division, but all had been killed and it seemed suicidal to send another. Nevertheless, when Whittlesey asked for a volunteer he got one immediately; Private Abraham Krotoshinsky. Krotoshinsky was, of course, in no shape to set off on a difficult and dangerous mission through the German lines. He was weak from exposure and lack of sleep, and he had had no proper food for a week. At one point he was so close to being discovered that he was actually trodden on under a covering of leaves. However, he slipped through, and after a hurried meal led the first relief party back. When the rescue had been accomplished, and the attack was rolling forward again, Whittlesey was much embarrassed by the attentions of the Press. He disavowed making any defiant remarks; he had merely ignored the invitation to surrender, and he insisted that any credit was due to his men and not himself. He was believed on the first two points but not on the third. But the relief of one small battalion did not mean that the forest was cleared. There was much heavy fighting still to do. The 327th regiment of 28th Division swam the Aire in early morning fog and similar Below: The ORBAT of an American division, showing its organisation and establishments
Left: Gunners search out pockets of German defence, meticulously prepared over fouryears
Breakdown
was determined not offer of surrender.
of an American Division 27 144)
(Total number of men:
Divisional
Headquarters
164
Divisional
Machine
Gun Battalion
(4
Companies)
768
3
Infantry
Infantry
Brigade
Brigade
8210
8210
Infantry
Infantry
Machine Gun
Regiment
Regiment
Battalion
000
Rifles
3
000
Regimental
Infantry
Infantry
Infantry
Battalion
Battalion
Battalion
I
000
I
Brigade
5
060
Field Artillery
Field Artillery
Field Artillery
Trench Mortar
Regiment
Regiment
Regiment
Battery
(3 Companies)
Rifles
Machine Gun
Company
Field Artillery
000
I
Supply
H.Q. Company
Company
000
Infantry
Infantry
Infantry
Infantry
Company
Company
Company
Company
250
250
250
250
Engineering
Ammunition
Sanitary
Train
Train
Train
Military Police
84
962
949
337
Field Hospital
Field Hospital
Field Hospital
Field Hospital
Company
Company
Company
Company
Train H.Q.
Ambulance Company
&
Regiment
Field Signal
of Engineers
Battery
Train
262
472
I
Ambulance Company
666
Ambulance
Company
Supply
Ambulance Company
3047
GERMAN THIRD ARMY' (Gen Ob yon Einem)
MoaagCTM
5
October
Sedan
Sedan
ALLIED FRONTLINE:
(Gen von Gallwitz) .Montmedy
. -at
\ \X \
:=
SEPTEMBER AM
26
PM
26
GERMAN FIFTHV\RMY OCTOBER
NOVEMBER AM PM
3 1 1
3
ARMISTICE LINE
n
l»'
NOVEMBER
11
ARMY BOUNDARIES MILES
10
^'•Vpntfa
ARMISTICE LINE
NOVEMBER
FRENCJt^fflJRTH ARMY ( Gen Gouraud )
11
'
\P Q~~-'
US SECOND ARMY (Gen Bullard)
(Gen Pershing)
St Menehould V
CORPS BOUNDARIES ARMY BOUNDARIES MILES
^pVck US FIRST ARMY \APP P P P)
3
h KILPMtTRES
V
^
Ju — ..^
V
ARMY GROUP CROWN
—-J
PRINCE WILHELM /ARMY GROUP GALLWITf%
•
*<
Buzancy)
THIRD ARMY
FIFTHABMY
(Gen Ob von Einem) 10 divisions line
& 4
in
in
(Gen von Gallwitz)
the
7>fivisions in the
reserve
tne
&
3 in reserve
Longwy
FR EYA STELLUNG I
Res Corps
Gdko 58
**>
/
V Res Corps XXI Corps
I C U nel Brieulles
:
ppp,;» I
jt
r
'"
9 Div
74Div
92 Div V PP oopp PPPPPP:'
XXVIII Corps
FRENCH FOURTH ARMY (Gen Gouraud)
'3048
N
PP
*l
fcorp's (Liggett)
[£>£>£>£
£P
\?
QQ&QQQ PPP
'•
ICAN
IT
ARMY
(
Gen
C\
"''
'-
p p p p p
V Corps (Ca
',
J.
Pershing, then
Maj-Gen H Liggett from October 12)
!
Bois Cofrtenvoye ft in
ii
-*y
\ 5Sl
I
XVIII
Corps
Army was constituted, with headquarters at Toul. Command of First Army was given to Lieutenant-General Hunter
determination was shown by other units.
But casualties were high. Two other remarkable individual
Second
feats
Liggett, and command of Second Army to The Major-General Robert Bullard. Americans, although making numerous mistakes and often incurring unnecessary casualties, continued to push forward, to
took place at this time. The first was that of Corporal Alvin C. York, of the 328th Regiment of 82nd Division. York was not a professional soldier; in fact he belonged to a religious group which strongly emphasised the commandment 'Thou shalt not kill'. When he was called up by the army it required the joint efforts of the chaplain and the commanding officer to dissuade him from being a conscientious objector: a discussion consisted largely of lengthy quotations from the scriptures. However, once his doubts were resolved York soon showed he had all the attributes of a firstclass soldier; as he had been brought up in Wolf River Valley, Tennessee he had little to learn about marksmanship or fieldcraft. On October 8, 1918, when York's platoon was advancing towards the Decauville railway, they were checked by heavy
own surprise and gratification as as that of their allies. The Germans, even more surprised, nevertheless took a heavy toll. On October 14 the Kriemhilde line was attacked; three days later, after their
much
it was breached. But even the penetration of this formidable position did not bring a respite to the now battleweary Americans. There were yet more trenches to be taken, more guns to be silenced, and more strongpoints to be captured. Romagne and St Juvin were succeeded by Barricourt, Bois Consenvoye, Etrayes, and Haumont. The Germans were beaten but not broken; it was necessary to keep the attack rolling forward in order to prevent the Germans from regrouping and stabilising their position. The final thrust was launched on November 1 after a brief but heavy bombardment. On November 3 the Lille-Metz railway was severed and three days later the Americans were closing in on Sedan. For diplomatic reasons it was decided that the relief of Sedan should be left to the French (although in the event there was some confusion over this). First Army set off in the direction of Longwy and Second Army towards Briey, but the Armistice was declared before they
bitter fighting,
machine gun fire from all sides. Sixteen men, including York, were at once detached to work around to the left and to try to outflank the posts. Stealthily, the detachment moved round, sometimes crawling, to the rear of the German positions. There, to their considerable pleasure, they captured with one volley the German battalion only. However, the noise was sufficient to alert the machine gun posts and the guns were quickly trained on to the Americans; six were killed and three seriously wounded; of those left York was the most senior. York's idea of command was to detail the surviving members of the platoon to guard the prisoners while he himself went out hunting round the battalion's forward positions. For a man of his upbringing and skill it was not too difficult; every time a German raised his head to take aim he received a bullet. Eventually, the Germans, goaded into desperation by losing man
HQ
after
man
man
reached them. The Americans, although arriving late on the scene, had done more and better than anyone had expected. Compared with other nations their time in action was short, but it was not for that reason unimportant. In fact, it probably shortened the war by at least six months. The cost in lives was proportionately high: their total casualties were 264,092. The Americans had a greater variety of weapons than any other army for in the early stages they had to rely heavily on their allies. They had
to this imperturbable frontiersfound it 'easier'n shooting tried a charge, led by a lieu-
who
turkeys', tenant; York dropped them one by one with German shots from his Service revolver. major, not realising that all the shots were
A
coming from one man, decided there was no alternative to surrender, which he offered for all the detachments in his area. York
The major, with York's pistol in his back, took him round the positions. Occasionally York had to fire a round to encourage the stubborn but had soon amassed what turned out to be a total of 132 men: members of a Prussian Guards accepted.
regiment. When he returned to his own lines an astonished officer asked how many there were: 'Sorry, lieutenant,' he said, 'I ain't counted them properly yet.' York proved a great disappointment to those who tried to lionise him. He refused to appear in a film, he refused to make speeches, and he refused a lecture tour, for
which he was offered enormous fees. He merely said: 'It's over; let's forget it.' Another notable feat at this time was that of Sergeant Woodfill, of the 60th Infantry, during the attack on Cunel. Like York, he was an expert marksman, and had killed so many German machine gunners while pressing home the attack that he was described by General Pershall
of
ing as 'the greatest heroes of the war'. In in other theatres of recognized — as York
have been quick to
of all the American fairness to other men
war it must be and Woodfill would acknowledge — that the the
Opposite page: The progress of the Argonne September 26 to the Armistice. Above: One of several unwilling heroes to emerge from the Argonne fighting, Corporal
offensive from
Alvin C. York. Finding himself the senior survivor of an ambushed detachment he set out to fight the German army single-handed and his marksmanship, learnt in the Tennessee backwoods, deceived part of a Prussian Guards regiment into surrendering. With unsophisticated naivety he shrugged off attempts to exploit the incident-It's over: let's forget it,' he protested
nature of the country helped them considerably.
The first week of the Meuse-Argonne campaign — tough though it was — was fast and successful compared with the days which followed. By this time Ludendorff was fully alert to the dangers of the situation on this front and was pouring in reinforcements. Apart from the frontal opposition there was the constant menace of flanking fire, on the left from the Argonne forest, and on the right from the Meuse heights. By October 10 there were over a million Americans in the battle area, nearly all of whom were actively engaged. On that day, precisely two months after the formation of First Army, the American
French 75's, 155 howitzers and cannons, Chauchat automatic rifles, and Hotchkiss machine guns, and they had British Stokes 3-inch mortars, Newton 6-inch mortars, 8-inch howitzers and Enfield rifles. Eventually they produced excellent weapons of their own in the shape of Browning machine
guns and automatic rifles, and Springfields. However, many of the foreign weapons they used had been built under licence in American factories. In the best traditions of a nation which had produced such notable weapons as Gatlings, Maxims, and Colt revolvers, the best light machine gun of the war was the invention of an American—Colonel I. N. Lewis. Up above the battlefields Americans were flying French, British, and Italian aircraft; twelve of their 48 squadrons were equipped with American built De Havillands. Nowadays, when so many of the armies, navies and air forces of the world are using American equip-
ment it is interesting to recall these figures. Further Reading Pitt. Barrie, 7978: The Last Act (Cassell 1962) Genthe, C V., American war narratives, 1917-1918 a study and a bibliography (New York: Lewis 1969) Liggett, Major-General Hunter, A.E.F. (Dodd Mead 1928) [For Philip Warner's biography, see page 213.}
3049
ih officer killed at
unfinished letter, aed up his country's save chosen the wrong friends'. Despite the repulse of the Allies at Gallipoli,
which was evacuated by January
1916, and the surrender of the British at Kut four months later, it was becoming painfully obvious that the Turks, unaided, were not going to win their war. The original ambitions of Enver Pasha for in-
dependent conquest were far from realisa-
The Ottoman Empire had not engulfed British-controlled Egypt nor had the Suez Canal been captured. The road to India had not been opened up with the co-operation of fellow Moslems anxious to join the Sultan's jehad against the Russian and British infidels. On the Russian border itself, General Yudenich constantly outmanoeuvred and defeated a succession of tion.
Turkish opponents. In Mesopotamia, after Kut, the British under Lieutenant-General Maude once again began to advance up the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates, this time with well-equipped and numerically superior forces. With the advantage of hindsight it is possible to say that by 1916 the initiative had passed from Turkey to her enemies. However, there were a number of factors which disguised Turkey's military bankruptcy from the outside world. Troops released from Gallipoli were transferred to reinforce the divisions facing the Russians so that Yudenich was never really able to win an all-out victory. The military skill and daring of General Kress von Kressenstein commanding a 15,000 strong Turkish army, strengthened by
German-directed artillery and machine gun companies, led the British to overestimate wildly the danger to the Suez
After the Arabs in the Hejaz under Sherif Hussein had assumed control of Mecca and caused the Turkish garrison at Taif, 70 miles away, to surrender, little more seemed likely to be accomplished.
Canal.
The Arab Revolt seemed
to be petering out for lack of military leadership and modern equipment. Overall, because of the demands of the main European fronts, the Allies — British, French and Russians — were unwilling to spare men and material in the quantities necessary to defeat an undoubtedly courageous foe who also had on his side the advantages of geography and natural conditions. For example, to take the offensive against the Turks in Palestine the British had to have the means of crossing the waterless Sinai desert and the will to escalate the conflict against a secondary enemy. For. the Russians actually to have invaded Turkey they would
THE COLLAPSE OF TURKEY Throughout the war Palestine had occupied the status of a 'sideshow' but Lloyd George, as Prime Minister, had more ambitious plans. Allenby began a campaign that was to 'knock away the props' from under the Central Powers and hasten the end of the 600-year-old Ottoman dynasty. David Walder. Below: The Allied fleet in the Bosporus. Right: A regiment at Chanak presents arms while Allied warships pass by
- I iOSO
have had to give Yudenich many more men than were necessary to carry out his holding operations, and such reinforcements could not be spared from the German and Austro-Hungarian fronts. All in all
tive
the climate of opinion among the Allies in the middle of the war was not in favour of second fronts, or 'sideshows' as they came to be called by their opponents. Those who needed an example to reinforce their argument could always point to Salonika
tirely in isolation, those
Greek Macedonia where British, French and some Russian forces seemed committed in
to a curious stalemate. Originally these forces had been landed to give aid to the
but they had long since been crushed by Austrian, German and Bulgarian armies working in unison. The Allied force remained, however, to become embroiled with the Greeks, who were Serbs,
divided in loyalties between their co-opera-
ex-Prime Minister Venizelos and their seemingly pro-German King Constantine. Although, of course, it was never possible for the Allied political and military leaders to consider any theatre of operations enthe
who
believed that
main task must always be the defeat
Germany were right. Tbere were in fact no short cuts. The war could not be won in the Caucasus, in the Balkans, or in Arabia or Palestine. It could, however, be very easily lost, in a very short time, on the Western Front. Nevertheless, in early 1917 the British began the first moves in the hotting up of the war against Turkey. There were two principal reasons why this was so. First, the British were more concerned with Turkey as a possible menace to her imperial possessions and her occupation of Egypt, and in any event tended to think much more in terms of a global maritime of
strategy than either the French or the Russians. Secondly, and even more important, there had been a change of government in December 1916. David Lloyd George, apart from being incomparably more energetic than his predecessor, Asquith, had at all times been anxious for some way round the deadlock of the Western Front, more so after the most recent carnage of the Somme. He sought some method of 'knocking away the props' from under the Central Powers. As Prime Minister he wanted if possible to put his own view of strategy into action: 'my constant wish to strike the enemy where he was weakest'. He was also anxious for a victory as a boost to the morale of the British public which had borne stoically for three years defeats, retreats and everlengthening casualty lists. At first Lloyd George approached the
f |
2
| « «
E
yy
The Bull':
striking
rror into bureaucratic staff officers;
sending home inactive
generals for 'health reasons' Below: General von Falkenhayn (left), German Commander of the Turkish armies. Backed by German arms, equipment and staff, the Turks could not easily withdraw from the war, even though their armies were depleted by disease and desertion. Right: General Gouraud (left), French C-in-C in the Levant, with Allenby in Egypt. Conflict was soon to arise
between French and British interests, particularly in Damascus, where Gouraud eventually ousted the British-founded Sherifian regime and forced acceptance of a French mandate. Far right, top: A member of the Turkish Red Cross tends a wounded soldier. Far right, below: T. E. Lawrence (left), with members of the British staff in Egypt. Allenby and Lawrence, despite widely airfering aims and temperaments, achieved a bond of mutual assistance, Allenby supplying the Arabs with arms and equipment, Lawrence co-operating in the task of defeating the Turks
South African General Smuts as his chosen instrument with which to hammer the Turks, but Smuts finally refused the opportunity on May 31, 1917. Accordingly, in the early summer the mantle fell upon a simpler, less cautious and less political man, Sir Edmund Allenby, a tough, resolute cavalry general known to the Army, not without reason, as 'the Bull'. With his appointment to command in Cairo the British entered into their third period in Egypt. Under Sir John Maxwell the country had been garrisoned and protected on almost a peacetime basis. Sir Archibald Murray, his successor, had taken as his task the defence of the Suez Canal and the creation of a firm battle line in the Sinai desert. Nevertheless, the British had been held and defeated at Gaza and Murray's had remained in Cairo. Under 'the Bull' the British were to attack; on his appointment the Prime Minister had told him that he expected 'Jerusalem before Christmas'. Overall, Lloyd George's strategic thinking can be summarised as follows. The British should advance to Aleppo thus cutting Turkey's communications
HQ
with Mesopotamia. (Baghdad had fallen on
March
was not
11, 1917.) If that
possible
then at least the whole of Palestine could be occupied. The Turks had already suffered vast losses in battle and from disease and desertion. Russia had been deprived by the Bolshevik Revolution and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of all her former claims to Turkish territory. In this combination of circumstances might the Turks not sue for a separate peace? With the Turks out, might the Bulgarians not follow .? Such was the .
.
Prime Minister's optimistic theory. The military were, predictably, less sanguine. Sir William Robertson, the CIGS, and admittedly a convinced opponent of 'sideshows', put his views in a memorandum to the War Cabinet on December 26, 1917. 'It
would seem to be very difficult for Turkey to shake off the German grip — even if she wished to do so. The Turkish General Staff and War Office are largely in the hands of the Germans.' Lieutenant-Colonel Wavell, who was in 1917 liaison officer between the War Office and Allenby's HQ, expressed 'grave doubts' about the possibility of a separate peace. However, at about the same time as Allenby was taking up his command in Egypt, striking terror into bureaucratic staff officers and sending home inactive generals and brigadiers 'for health reasons', in Syria the Turkish Seventh
Army was also receiving a new commander. He
was to be known to posterity. He was a 'strong' general and, in reasonable circumstances, an optimist, but in September General Mustapha Kemal Pasha belied his previous reputation and reported that his army was in very poor too
too
condition indeed, only equalled by that of the country in general. In October he gave up his command in disgust and returned to Constantinople. Although Kemal was to return to military duty his impetuous action showed that Lloyd George had good reason for his assessment of Turkey's ultimate chances of success. Nevertheless the actual military defeat of Turkish soldiers in the field was still some way off.
Lawrence: gifted amateur The first news Allenby received on his arrival in Cairo was of the capture of Aqaba by Lawrence and the Arabs he inspired and led. Henceforth the Arab revolt 3052
was
to shift its centre of operations north-
wards and to the direct assistance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The Hejaz, the scene of the original uprising in 1916, was to decline into a backwater; indeed, Medina was still in Turkish hands at the end of the war. Surprisingly perhaps, considering their very different personalities,
Allenby and Lawrence did manage to coNo doubt mainly because Allenby, by no means the typical conventional soldier, was not offended, as others were, by Lawrence's pretensions, his vanity and his romanticism, so long as this gifted amateur helped him in his task of defeating the Turks. In fact, Allenby took a far more balanced view of Lawrence's activities than many before or since. Therefore Lawrence was supplied with money and arms in order that he could successfully pin down Turks in the defence of the Hejaz railway (running from Medina north to Aleppo and thence branching east to Mosul and west to Smyrna: so forming their main line of communications). With Lawrence's political views, Allenby, a military commander in the middle of a war, was not at operate.
the
moment concerned.
So the
far as his
coming
more conventional forces for were concerned,
offensive
Allenby assembled them with meticulous paying particular attention to the bugbear of any desert general: supply. Lloyd George had promised him greater care,
|
strength to carry out his task and so, reinforced with artillery and nights of the RFC, Allenby began his attack at the end of October with a feint at Gaza and a direct attack on Beersheba. Numerically his army, particularly strong in large contingents of Australian, New Zealand, and Indian cavalry and British yeomanry regiments, outnumbered the enemy and was undoubtedly more mobile. However, the Turks — Group F or Jilderim ('Lightning')— were commanded by General von Falkenhayn, a former Chief of the General Staff; they also had the advantage of superb defensive positions in the Judean hills. It was certainly no walkover for the British, and a great deal depended upon Allenby's combination of forcefulness and tactical guile. On December 9, 1917, the Mayor of Jerusalem handed over the keys of Jerusalem to the British; the Turks, military and civilian, having evacuated the Holy City but a day before. Allenby made his formal entry, on foot, two days later. It was 40 days since he had begun his offensive at Beersheba and four centuries since the Turks had first ruled the city. In February 1918, Allenby resumed operations in the Jordan Valley and moved onwards towards the capture of Jericho. In the same month General Smuts had appeared on the scene again, admittedly somewhat to the irritation of Allenby. This time his mission was to report to the Prime Minister on the future conduct of the campaign. As it turned out his recommendations were entirely agreeable to the commander on the spot. The army in Mesopotamia should revert to a defensive holding role while transferring to Allenby all troops thus released. As a result the army with which Allenby launched his final
offensive after Jericho, beginning on s September' 19, consisted of ten infantry | divisions, three mounted divisions, an & Indian cavalry division from France, and S an extra cavalry brigade from MesopoE tamia. Against this force, high in morale, Si
3053
A Turkish unit (left) prepares a position in the desert. Information obtained with the aid of the stereotelescope is relayed to the rear. A column of Turkish reinforcements (below) leave their encampment in the Judean hills for the Anatolian railway. Prior to Allenby
•M 30f>£f
British commanders had fought shy of conducting a campaign in such hostile conditions, where supply was a constant problem. Turkish casualties (right). Blanks are left where no figures are available. Approximate figures are preceded by c'
Collapse of Dead
Turkey
Wounded
Missing
& Deserters
Prisoner
Salonika Palestine
Mesopotamia 200 000 Caucasus Eastern Front
000 80 000 C4S 000
C
30 000
in all
I
60 000
86 692* 164617* Total 325 000 400 000
Gallipoli
250 000
cl
500 000
both probably considerably underestimated
Overall Total
2 475
OOO
3055
-
for
the most part
al-
uccessful in battle, the little resistance. There
longer be any reasonable hope that their German allies would win a great victory in the west. Indeed, Turko-German relations were worsening under the stress of defeat.
Mustapha Kemal, who had
re-
turned to command the Seventh Army, wrote 'the Germans should not be given the opportunity to prolong this war to the point of reducing Turkey to the position of a colony in disguise'. There was no longer any overall direction of Turkey's war effort. Falkenhayn had been replaced by Liman von Sanders, who narrowly avoided capture with his whole HQ when Allenby's conquering troops swept into Nazareth.
Even
at this last
moment Enver was
still
mount an attack against the Russians in the Caucasus who had them-
trying to
selves disintegrated in the
grips of the
Mustapha Kemal fought vainly and disorganised army he retreated northwards. In Damascus
Revolution.
to control a beaten
as
he found a situation he could no longer Already there were flags out in the
control.
streets to welcome the Emir Feisal and the city was indefensible. Kemal retreated, and Feisal, preceded by Lawrence, entered
Damascus behind him. Collapse of the Ottoman Empire Eventually what remained of the Turkish army came to rest, but no longer as a fighting force, in the Aleppo area in the extreme northern corner of Syria. Meanwhile the Mesopotamian Force, although very much in second gear, had almost reached the outskirts of Mosul. Talaat, now Grand Vizier, returned from Germany to learn from Enver that the Bulgarian front had
British
collapsed and that King Ferdinand was trying to sue for an armistice. In consequence the Allied forces in Salonika were now in a position to sweep round eastwards and menace Constantinople. The triumvirate, Enver, Talaat and Djavid, which had brought Turkey into the war in 1914, fled across the Black Sea in a German warship. At Constantinople, caught in a vacuum, Izzet Pasha formed a makeshift Cabinet which had only one policy — to make peace. In London the War Cabinet received reports of Turkish emissaries making approaches to British diplomats in neutral countries. Already the terms of an armistice had been drafted and approved on October 7 by the Prime Ministers of Britain, France and Italy, at Versailles. On October 13 the Turkish charge d'affaires in Madrid asked the Spanish government to invite the US President to take upon himself the task of establishing peace. However, before Woodrow Wilson could consult his allies the Turkish Cabinet had initiated another approach. On October 20 Major-General Sir Charles Townshend, the unsuccessful defender of Kut and up till now a prisoner of war, came aboard Agamemnon, the flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Somerset Gough-Calthorpe, the C-in-C in the Mediterranean, at Mitilini. Townshend had been released by his captors to ask for terms on their behalf. In fact his presence contributed nothing, but the negotiations did continue on a rather informal basis. The Admiral was authorised by the Cabinet to receive representatives and on October 26 they arrived on Lemnos: Rauf Bey, the Minister of Marine, Reshid Bey, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
HMS
3056 ~~ -•
-
-
and Colonel Sadullah Bey of the General It took them five days with the Admiral and his staff to agree to the sign-
Staff.
ing
away of the Ottoman Empire.
October 30 on board the Agamemnon the Armistice was signed 'to take effect from noon local time on Thursday, October 31, 1918'. So informal had the probeen that Admiral Goughceedings Calthorpe forgot to ask the senior French admiral to sign as well. His omission was
On
officially regretted. The Mudros Agreement was in fact a military agreement setting out the terms on which hostilities should cease. The Allies were to occupy the Dardanelles and Bosporus forts and the Dardanelles was to be cleared
subsequently
of mines, giving free access to the Black Sea. All Turkish war vessels were to be surrendered and all troops were to be de-
tradicted by a previous promise made by Sir Edward Grey to the Greeks. For on January 10, 1915 he, along with the Russians and the French, had offered Venizelos his price for Greek participation in the war, 'important territorial concessions on the coast of Asia Minor' including Smyrna and its hinterland. As it turned out it was only the over-
ambitious Venizelos who both could and would take up his option after the war. Accordingly, on May 15, 1919, Smyrna was occupied by three Greek divisions, landing under the protection of the guns of their own and the British and French fleets. The Smyrna Greeks, former subjects of the Ottoman Empire, naturally enough welcomed their compatriot liberators. Equally naturally the native Turks did not. Incidents occurred, violence increased and
were
The
news
mobilised except for the few required to
atrocities
maintain law and order. Ammunition and equipment were to be handed over, prisoners of war released and at the same time all former allied personnel, German and Austrian, were to be evacuated from Turkey. Outside Turkey the Ottoman Empire was
spread like wildfire through Turkey. As a result Mustapha Kemal, now appointed Inspector General in Anatolia by the Sultan, was able to gather round him the nucleus of a resistance movement. At Erzerum, the capital of Eastern Turkey, a National Pact was produced under his guidance. It set out the bounds and the constitution for a new nationalist Turkey, independent of the old Empire. Kemal was now the head of a revolutionary government opposed to the Sultan and his fellow puppets in Constantinople. Hoping to solve the dilemma the Allies determined to offer to the Turks, as to other nations, the right of self-determination. On November 9, in their first ever General Election the Turks voted over-
to disappear. Much of it was already in Allied hands: Mecca, Baghdad, Jerusalem and Damascus were all occupied. Garrisons in the Hejaz, the Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia were to surrender to the nearest Allied Commander. The implementing of these terms went incredibly smoothly. British, French, Italian and Greek contingents marched into Constantinople watched by seemingly almost friendly Turkish crowds. The situation was, however, deceptive. This was merely a military occupation. Both in Turkey and the territories of the Empire the Allied generals exercised control and under them the Turks carried on their lives much as before. The Sultan himself was still in his villa on the Bosporus and his ministers remained in office, but the final peace terms were yet to come. Incredibly, these were not made clear until nearly a year and a half from the ending of actual hostilities, by which time they were not worth the paper they were written on. For the Treaty of Sevres, of May 13, 1920, was far from being a durable pro-
position.
The Arab lands were lost; that was inevitable. The French were to have Syria, and the British to administer mandates in Palestine and Mesopotamia. The Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles were to be, in some vague way, internationally controlled. That again was to be expected. It was what was to happen to Turkey itself which made the Treaty unacceptable to the Turks. Indeed it was what had already happened since October 1918 which made the Treaty of Sevres such a useless piece of paper: for the Allies at the
end of the war with Turkey had been the prisoners of their own wartime diplomacy. Originally, on May 18, 1915, Britain had promised Constantinople and the Straits to Russia. On April 26, 1915 Italy had been given her price for entering the war, vague concessions in Asia Minor and the right of occupying Adalia. Later the Italians were enraged by the Sykes-Picot Agreement which seemed to give the future spoils to Britain and France. So the Italians had to be given a better price in 1917: 70,000 square miles of Turkish Asia Minor including Smyrna. Unfortunately, however, the British promise to the Italians was con-
perpetrated.
whelmingly Nationalist, and therefore in favour of Kemal. By the beginning of 1920 the Allies were beginning to realise that they no longer controlled Turkey even though they occupied Constantinople. By the Treaty of Sevres the capital was eventually to be returned to Turkey. The rest of the treaty which dismembered Anatolia and confirmed the Greek occupation and British, French and Italian spheres of influence was being defied by Kemal, who had now formed his Turkish Grand National
Assembly in Ankara and was well on his to becoming the true leader of the new
way
Turkish nation. For the Allies the situation was summarised by Churchill: 'At last, peace with Turkey: and to ratify it, war with Turkey!' From that stark logic the British, French and Italian governments, officially at least, recoiled. Not so the Greek Prime Minister, Eleutherios Venizelos. Privately encouraged by Lloyd George he determined on action. On June 22, 1920 the Greek army embarked on a general advance into Anatolia. With hardly any respite the Turks were again at war, not this time in the interests of Empire, but to defend their homeland. Further Reading
Winston S., The World Crisis: the Aftermath (Butterworth 1929) Gardner, Brian, Allenby (Cassell 1965) Kinross, Lord, Ataturk: the Rebirth of a Nation (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1964) Lawrence, T. E., The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Jonathan Cape 1935) Lloyd George, D., The Truth about the Peace Treaties (Gollancz 1938) Wavell, A. P., The Palestine Campaigns (Constable 1928) Churchill,
\For
David Walder's biography,
1786.]
see
page
THE LAST SORTIE OF THE HIGH SEAS FLEET
Beatty had long been waiting for an opportunity to engage the HSF in favourable circumstances. But when Scheer made what was to be the German navy's 'last throw of all', inadequate information on both sides and the breakdown of the Moltke caused the operation to founder. Paul Kennedy. Below: Battleships Royal Sovereign, Resolution and Revenge Ever since the battle of Jutland in May 1916, a strategic stalemate had existed between the British and German surface forces, broken only by destroyer battles in the English Channel area and by a few tentative sweeps by the respective battlefleets in the North Sea. The latter had not led to any decisive results, even when contact between the opposing forces had been made, partly because of tactical mistakes and confusion during the actual engagements, but chiefly because of the reluctance of the respective commanders-in-chief to fight unless the circumstances were favourable to their own vessels. But, of course, what was suitable for one side could not be so for the other, and therefore the prospects for a decisive 'Trafalgar' in these waters were not at all promising at this stage in the war.
To the German Commander, Scheer, there could be no question an all-out battle with the Grand Fleet. His vessels had had a narrow escape at Jutland, and he was now well aware that he could employ only 19 dreadnoughts and 5 battle cruisers against Beatty's 34 and 9 respectively. In any case, the submarines necessary for reconnaissance work for the High Seas Fleet could not be diverted from their crucial campaign against Britain's sea of
lanes. Finally, the Kaiser still opposed any risky sorties involving his precious battleships. As ever, therefore, Scheer's basic policy was to plan for the isolation and destruction of part of the British battlefleet, which would change the entire strategic situation immediately. Only if the Grand Fleet ventured close to the German coast, where it could be reduced first of all by submarines, torpedo-boats and mines, would it be engaged in close combat by the High Seas Fleet. However, there was absolutely no chance of the British undertaking so risky an operation, eager though they were to get to grips with the German fleet. Ever since the alarming action of August 19, 1916 the Grand Fleet had been instructed to avoid going further south than the Fame Islands and further east than 4°E unless the need were 'very pressing', such was the fear of
3057
ieetf*
BRITISH APRIL 22 APRIL 23 APRIL 24
CONVOY
GRAND FLEET
GERMANS APRIL 23 APRIL 24 1ST SCOUTING GROUP HIGH SEAS FLEET
Right: HMS Glorious, one of the outrageous class of British light battle cruisers built as part of a plan, never implemented, to capture a base in the Frisian Islands from which to penetrate the Baltic These ships had a very shallow draught, 25-26 feet (which could be reduced to 22 feet), achieved at the cost of most of the normal armour-plating and several heavy guns. With only four 15-inch guns, the Glorious had 14 21-inch torpedo tubes, 12 of them in triple mountings on deck. She had a speed of 31-33 knots. Below:
SMS
Baden. The Germans, having developed at the same time as the Baden and the Bayern in the Queen Elizabeth' class
the 15-inch
gun
British, built the
answer
to battleships, but they were slower (22 1/4 knots) and coal-fired The British alrea dozen 15-inch gun ships in servi time the Germans received thei only, two
.3058
German submarine attacks. Moreover, Beatty was extremely worried about the structural weaknesses of the British battleships, the inefficiency of the shells, and, most important of all, his chronic shortage of destroyers. The latter were being continually detached for anti-submarine duties, leaving the Commander-in-Chief with insufficient numbers with which to protect his capital ships from submarines and mines. In view of all this, Beatty had argued in an important memorandum of January 9, 1918 that 'the correct strategy of the Grand Fleet is no longer to endeavour to bring the enemy to action at any cost, but rather to contain him in his bases until the situation becomes more favourable to us'. Although this did not exclude minelaying ventures and operations by British forces in the Channel, and although it was stated to be a purely temporary measure until the destroyer shortage was surmounted, the conclusion about the employment of the battlefleet was one towards which Beatty had been moving ever since he had assumed his post. Moreover, his arguments were accepted in full by the Admiralty and the War Cabinet. Scheer's fond hopes of a British sortie into the Heligoland Bight were, therefore, not likely to be realised. However, by the spring of 1918 there was considerable pressure upon the German navy to take the initiative in breaking this deadlock. On March 21 Ludendorff's big offensive in the west began, throwing the navy's inactivity into even greater contrast than before: surely something could be done to boost the name of the High Seas Fleet at home and to assist this great land struggle by diverting the enemy's attention? It was also possible that aggressive sorties into tbe North Sea would, as the German official history puts it, 'effectively ease the strain on the U-Boats operating in the Channel and around England'. The most obvious way of achieving these aims, Scheer realised, was a successful attack upon a Scandinavian convoy and its escorting force. This traffic had been twice interrupted by small German forces in the previous year, for it was not very difficult to steam swiftly under cover of darkness from Wilhelmshaven to the waters between Scotland and Norway, strike at the merchantmen, and retreat before more powerful British vessels arrived on the scene. Following the attack of December 12, during which an entire convoy and an escorting destroyer had been sunk by the German raiders, the British had decided that in future an entire battle squadron should accompany the merchantmen. But this counter-action, far from deterring Scheer, prompted him to consider taking his whole fleet into the northern North Sea to interrupt this traffic. It was a risky venture, but a successful mission would kill many birds with one stone: not only would the destruction of a convoy stop the Scandinavian trade, divert British attention from the Channel and be warmly applauded at home, but there was a distinct chance that the High Seas Fleet might be able to trap and sink the escorting British battle squadron, thereby altering the whole strategic balance. It was, Scheer reckoned, a risk worth running, provided that the Grand Fleet itself was not at sea. All would depend upon keeping secret the movement of the High Seas Fleet. This self-same thought had been worrying Beatty also. It would not be difficult for the enemy to discover that the Scandinavian convoys sailed at regular 4-day intervals, and that they were nearly always escorted by a force of battleships. Unknown to Scheer, the Grand Fleet was now based upon Rosyth instead of Scapa Flow, but unless it was kept at sea or at least in a state of continual readiness to sail, it would be unable to prevent a surprise attack on the escort by superior forces unless the Admiralty was forewarned by its own intelligence services in Room 40. By this stage of the war, however, the Germans had become suspicious that their wireless messages were being deciphered by their foes, and had severely restricted this method of communication. In this case, the risks were so great that Scheer virtually banned the use of the wireless. He also did without airship reconnaissance and advance minesweeping, which were normally two other indications to the British that a sortie was under way.
Bold and well contrived Having assembled the High Seas Fleet
in the Schillig Roads on the evening of April 22 on the pretext of large-scale exercises, therefore, Scheer led out his vessels at 0500 hours on the following morning. His plan was to let Hipper's battle cruisers and escorts attack a Scandinavian convoy on the 24th while the High Seas Fleet (three battle squadrons and escorts) cruised some 60 miles to the south-south-west, ready if need be to support the raiders if they met up with the British battle squadron. The only thing wrong with this bold and well-contrived scheme was that the German Naval Staff were mistaken in believing that a British convoy would be midway between Scotland and Norway on that day. Had they bothered to obtain information on this from their
consuls in Norway instead of relying solely upon U-Boat reports, this error might have been avoided; and had the sortie been advanced or postponed by one day, the Germans would most probably have sighted one of the convoys. All this Scheer was not to know until later and throughout April 23 his ships steamed northwards in pursuit of their imaginary prey. Secrecy had been complete, and the operation was assisted by a thick haze. His luck held even when the High Seas Fleet was sighted by the British submarine J6 at 2000 hours; for that vessel's commanding officer for some unaccountable reason believed that this was a British force and did not send any report to Beatty. Had he done so, the entire story might have been different. As it was, the German forces made uninterrupted progress northwards until 0510 on the 24th, when the battle cruiser Moltke suddenly broke down. By that time, Hipper's advance force was only 40 miles west-south-west of Stavanger and was searching in vain for the Bergen-Methil convoy, which was then steaming into the Firth of Forth. The Moltke's breakdown was a serious one, for a propeller had dropped off and a gear wheel had disintegrated, sending pieces into the condenser. Unwilling to abandon the operation because of this mishap, Hipper merely ordered the slowly-moving vessel to retire towards the battlefleet. But the trouble got worse and at 0643 hours Moltke reported by wireless that her speed was only 4 knots; at 0845 hours she was forced to inform Scheer and Hipper that she was out of control. About two hours later, the High Seas Fleet came upon the stricken battle cruiser, which was taken in tow by the battleship Oldenburg. Since his vessels were now at a latitude slightly north of John o' Groats and would be hampered in any action by the presence of this cripple, Scheer ordered that the battlefleet should return to base, escorting the Moltke. Nevertheless, he coolly decided that the expected British convoy should still be attacked and he instructed Hipper's forces, which had steered south to within sight of the main force, to press ahead again with the search. Carrying out this order, the German battle cruisers reconnoitred to almost 60" N, Hipper's eagerness being increased by wireless reports from the German Naval Staff that a convoy of 30 ships should be in the area. In fact, the accompanying German light cruiser force went within sight of the Norwegian coast but all to no avail. The incoming British convoy was now docked at Methil, while an outward-bound one was still hugging the Scottish coast as it proceeded northwards. Therefore, at 1410 on the 24th Hipper's ships turned south and worked up speed to regain contact with the main force, which was making a steady 10 knots back to Wilhelmshaven (the Moltke's port engines were still working). By midnight on the 24th/25th they had rejoined the High Seas Fleet by then in the middle of the North Sea and 150 miles to the east of the Grand Fleet, which had eventually realised that
something was up. It was the Moltke's wireless calls of distress, picked up by the British directional stations, which had alerted the Admiralty in London about this operation, although it was already generally on its toes because of the Zeebrugge raid (April 22/23) and because of certain wireless messages to the German minesweepers in the Heligoland Bight. Realising that large enemy forces were right up to the northern entrance to the North Sea, further from base than they had ever been before, Beatty was galvanised into action. Clearly, this daring raid by the High Seas Fleet was an example of the 'favourable opportunities' for which the Commander-inChief had been waiting so long, and the reservations upon a fleet action which he had expressed in his memorandum of January 9 no longer applied. After strengthening the Methil-Bergen convoy and warning Scapa Flow against a surprise attack, he led out the Grand Fleet in the early afternoon in the hope of blocking the German vessels from their return to Wilhelmshaven. A pea-soup fog obscured what must have been a splendid sight — 31 battleships, 4 battle cruisers, 2 heavy cruisers, 24 light cruisers and 85 destroyers setting out at full speed from the Firth of Forth into the North Sea. Four of the battleships were American, under RearAdmiral Rodman and now tactically integrated with the Royal Navy. It was to be the last time in the duration of the war that the entire Grand Fleet was to go to sea.
Only a miracle was also, incidentally, the
first time that this force had been despatched in such strength since the disappointing operation of August 19, 1916; and although Beatty was not to have such a harrowing time of it as Jellicoe did then, his mission was to prove equally fruitless. By midnight the Grand Fleet was 90 miles out from May Island and steering east, but both Scheer and Hipper's vessels were past this line of advance and moving steadily southwards. In order to have interrupted the High Seas Fleet that day,
It
3059
d Karlsruhe II uth of the Jade 'orces to iielmshaven and attack jnvoys with impunity. Inset right: :
S 65 37 class. Both types carried 6 19.7-inch torpedo tubes and 24 mines, but the S 53s had larger guns. Far
German destroyers (right)
right:
and
(left)
at Heligoland,
one
of the
SMS Moitke, the
G
battle cruiser
whose
mechanical failure disrupted the German attack on the Bergen-Methil convoy and who, by reporting her accident, broke the radio silence which had shrouded the operation. Below left: The Revenge leading the Resolution and the Royal Sovereign (nearest the camera). five 'Rs', the second class of British battleships to be built with 15-inch guns, were massive and powerful, but slower than the Queen Elizabeths'
The
,
'
f\l
the British force would have needed to have left Rosyth some 12 hours earlier. As it was, only a miracle could now prevent the Germans from escaping, especially since Beatty did not realise until the following morning that the enemy had evaded him. Only a few British submarines on patrol duty in the North Sea had the chance to delay Scheer's retreat. At 0400 hours on the 25th, the hapless J6 once again sighted various squadrons of the High Seas Fleet but it did not attack and only sent out a message 2i hours later, when these ships had disappeared from view. That evening, however, the submarine E42, which had been steaming at full speed to reach the entrance to one of the main minefield channels into the Bight, spotted the Moltke slowly steering southwards about 40 miles north of Heligoland. By this time the battle cruiser had been repaired enough to cast off the Oldenburg's towline and was under its own steam, though still presenting an ideal target. The commander of E42, Lieutenant C. H. Allen, let off four 18-inch torpedoes as the Moltke turned into the channel
down which the
rest of Scheer's battleships had already gone, and he then had the satisfaction of hearing a distant explosion. More he could not do, for his submarine was subjected to depth-charge attacks by German destroyers for another hour before he got clear. In fact, the Moltke had been hit near the port engine-room, took in 1,800 tons of water and was out of control for a while; but she later managed to put herself right and to rejoin the High Seas Fleet in the Jade Estuary during the night.
The lost opportunity Even before the E42 had attacked, the Grand Fleet was on its way back to Rosyth, it being clear from J6's signal that morning that the enemy had eluded them once again. As ever, Beatty was disappointed and annoyed, and he insisted to the First Sea Lord that 'we must reconsider the outlook which permits apparently considerable forces, indeed the High Seas Fleet, to get out without our knowledge — otherwise we might meet with a disaster of some magnitude over this cursed co,.voy supporting force.' Nevertheless, there was little that could be done to improve Room 40's powers of detecting when the German fleet was on the move. Scheer was now restricting his ships' wireless transmissions very severely, and indications of an impending sortie had to be gleaned instead either from cryptic messages to U-Boats returning from patrol into the North Sea or from activities such as minesweeping and Zeppelin patrols; but the former were most erratic, and the absence of the latter could never be a sure guide that all was well, since Scheer was in the last resort prepared to do without them to maintain secrecy. As it was, therefore, the Scandinavian traffic continued, as did the deployment of a battle squadron to cover each sailing of the outward and homeward convoys. To withdraw this protecting force, even though it ran the risk of being overwhelmed by the High Seas Fleet, was impossible: yet to keep the Grand Fleet constantly at sea was both physically exhausting and dangerous, in view of enemy sub-
3062
marines and mines. Luckily, Scheer never again attempted interrupt the shipping route between Scotland and Norway.
to
Despite Beatty's disappointment, the overall strategy in the
North Sea had not been altered by this incident. Britain still controlled the southern and northern exits to the Atlantic, and the Royal Navy maintained in battleships a comfortable lead over its enemy; and while this situation remained, Beatty had no incentive to put his supremacy at risk by rash ventures into the eastern and southern zones of the mine and submarine-ridden North Sea. Scheer could still not afford to face the Grand Fleet in a toe-to-toe battle, and yet he was aware that, while Britain could not lose by this strategic stalemate, Germany could not win by it. Though he was constantly to seek ways of destroying a portion of the British battlefleet, numbers, geography, and Beatty's caution were to prevent him from ever achieving this aim. On the German side generally, the sortie of April 22-25 was not seen in the grave light in which Beatty viewed it, chiefly because it was not realised that the Grand Fleet was now based upon Rosyth instead of Scapa Flow, and that the British had had a good chance, given earlier notification of the German moves, of cutting off the High Seas Fleet from its base. Scheer's bold sortie, which was the farthest yet undertaken by the German battlefleet, had been skilfully planned and executed. The only blunder, apart from the completely unforeseen breakdown of the Moltke, was the failure of the German naval staff to calculate the correct sailing dates of the Scandinavian convoys. If, as mentioned earlier, the operation had been carried out one day earlier or later, Scheer would Have most likely succeeded in finding and destroying a convoy and its escorts. As it was, the raid turned out to be somewhat of an anticlimax. In retrospect, it was more than that. The April sortie of the High Seas Fleet and the Grand Fleet was the last time in which those two great forces were engaged, even if they did not meet each other. Thereafter, much as Scheer might plot and Beatty impatiently fret, there was to be no further opportunity of a naval Armageddon in the North Sea. Instead, while the Royal Navy retained its command of the sea and beat off the U-Boat challenge, the German battlefleet was to remain in harbour, with serious consequences for the morale of the crews. The next time the High Seas Fleet was to emerge from Wilhelmshaven in any strength would be on November 21, 1918. Further Reading Gladisch, Admiral Walther, Der Krieg in der Nordsee, Vol 7 (German Official Naval History; E. S. Mittler & Sohn, Berlin 1965) Marder, A. J From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol 5, Victory and Atlermath (OUP; London 1970) Newbolt, Sir Henry, Naval Operations, Vol 5 (Official Naval History; Longmans, Green & Co, London 1931) Scheer, Admiral Reinhard, Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War (Cassell & Co; London 1920) ,
^_
[For Paul Kennedy's biography, see page
6.'i.'i.
I
HMS
Iron Duke in a heavy swell. The Iron Duke' class were the first large British ships to be built with anti-aircraft guns. Right: Admiral Scheer risked a great deal to maintain the secrecy of the operation, but his chief mistake was in relying on information Left:
obtained from U-Boat patrols for his picture convoy movements. Far right: HM King George V with Admiral Sir David Beatty on board the flagship, Queen Elizabeth Below: Admiral Rodman's flagship, the USS New York, one of the US battleships which served as the Sixth Battle Squadron with the Grand Fleet in 1917-18, giving the British of the Allied
overwhelming superiority. After initial British and Americans reached a high co-operation
friction, level of
roRio
Vittorio Veneto forced on the Austrians the painful realisation that they had lost the war. The country over which the
campaign was fought was a natural obstacle course, in one part mountains cut by rough roads and passes, in the other, broad torrents. The weather conditions were at times appalling. Both sides were using out-dated equipment. While the prospects of continuing the war faded at home, the Austrians maintained a heroic resistance for six days. Then retreat turned to rout. Was it a victory for Italy, or simply defeat for the Austrians? Franco Valsecchi Above: An American rifleman of the 332nd Regiment, who fought with the Italian 31st C vision Above top right: King Vittorio Emmanuele III. Above right: General Diaz, forced by political circumstances to push his armies into an operation for which they were ill-prepared. Opposite: German troops in Italy. Initially their presence helped to sustain morale and discipline, but once the retreat started there was nothing they could do to check it
3064
for whom the name of Vittorio Veneto evoked a living memory has, by now, almost passed away. The strength of past emotions and passions is ebhing, with distance and the succession of events. At a distance of more than fifty years, Vittorio Veneto has taken on an historical aspect. However, the questions raised by the arguments of the past still remain. Was Vittorio Veneto a brilliant victory? Or was it not, rather, a hard-won success? Was it really a great battle, or a military exercise
The generation
against an defeat? Was
enemy already
resigned
to
a decisive battle, or a simple, almost mechanical, conclusion to the course of the war? The questions are still to be answered. But no longer in over-simplified and it
peremptory
terms.
Now
the
outlook
is
more detached and articulate, more complex; research and criticism have provided the basis for an assessment, no
broader,
longer polemical, but historical.
During August and September 1918 on Western Front, a series of sledgehammer blows were delivered against the German lines: an Anglo-French offensive on the Somme, a French offensive on the Aisne, a British offensive at Cambrai, in August, and the German retreat to the Hindenburg line at the beginning of September. There followed an American offensive at St Mihiel, a combined Allied offensive in Flanders, a French offensive in Champagne, another British offensive on the Somme and an American offensive in the Argonne. the
And Italy? It had proved impossible to exploit the June victory by taking advantage of the failure of the enemy attack on the Piave: there were neither the reserves nor the means for a large-scale action. At the insistence of the Allies, Diaz had replied by asking that Italy, too, should receive her share of American aid. And he gave the same reply now to the increasing pressure for Italy, too, to make her contribution to the common cause. The Italian army was able, in fact, to bear — as was said — 'an aggressive stance'; preparations for an attack on the Altipiani went ahead. Diaz did not believe that the war would be soon settled; he thought that the decisive round would be fought in the spring of 1919. He wanted to be ready tc throw his strength into the balance when the right
moment came: he
did not
want
consume He had and on still more
to
his strength by premature efforts. said this clearly to Marshal Foch:
September 17 he repeated it to the Italian Prime Minister, Orlando, who repeated the arguments of
clearly
the Allied
Commander. Despite the
efforts
made, and the repeated offensives, he had warned, the position on the Western Front was still not clear. Total commitment on the part of Italy would have constituted a serious imprudence. 'Should the Allied attack be brought to a decisive halt, I recognise neither the usefulness nor the convenience of carrying through a concerted attack; and what is more, we should seriously consider the eventuality, which has already been suggested by the English press, of a full-scale Austro-
3065 1"!
,.'
But,
in
An
hypothesis
ighly probable: the o concentrate his efforts lought was the weakest point. the meantime, a new factor
still uncertain on the Western Front, was no longer so on the Eastern Front. The offensive begun by Franchet d'Esperey, in Macedonia, in the middle of September, quickly bore fruit:
emerged: the situation,
on September 26 Bulgaria asked for an armistice. This time success had come in an area which closely concerned Italy: the Balkans and the Danube. Orlando hastened to the General Headquarters, but Diaz was not yet wholly convinced. Admittedly he had, already, on September 25, given orders for an attack to be prepared; no longer, this time, on the Altipiani, but on the Piave. But they were merely preparatory orders: they gave no details of a definite plan, nor the intention of putting it into action without delay. Diaz was not yet ready to assume the responsibility of an irrevocable decision: he awaited the outcome of events. There was not long to wait. On October 4
Germany and Austria
applied to Wilson: they accepted the Fourteen Points and asked for an armistice. Italy ran the risk of finding herself faced with the suspension of hostilities with her arms laid aside and the enemy within her gates. The possible political consequences of military inaction were incalculable.
this
at any rate, was what Orlando thought and he communicated it to Diaz in a dramatic telegram. 'Of inaction and defeat, I would prefer defeat. Act at once!' But not everyone, even in the heart of the government itself, was of the same opinion. The Minister of the Treasury, Nitti. thought differently. He considered that the decision should be left to the General Headquarters; that the basis for judgement should be military rather than political. 'If I have reason to believe that there has been the least prevalence of non-military criteria', he wrote to Diaz, T shall leave the govern-
This,
have less dead at the end than the others and a larger labour force.' dated October 14; Nitti's dated 21st and 23rd. Day by day
Ojetti's letter is letters are
Austro-Hungarian Empire was disintegrating. On October 6, in Zagabria, the Serbo-Croats and the Slovenes proclaimed a united Yugoslavia; on October 14 the Czechs formed a temporary national government; on October 21, in a national the
assembly, the Germans of Austria declared their intention of forming an independent Hungary was, by now, shifting state.
The proclamation by the EmCharles of a federal constitution on October 17 seemed no more than a belated expedient. On October 19 Wilson had refused the request for an armistice; a final decisive blow to the hopes of the Empire. On October 24 the Emperor made a last desperate appeal to the Pope. Diaz's anxiety not to venture too soon but to reserve enough strength for the future increasingly lost its validity: the prevalent fear was rather that of arriving for herself.
peror
too late. Besides, at the end of September, the leader of the Operations Office, Colonel Cavallero, had already been asked to undertake the elaboration of a clearly defined plan for an attack on the central Piave. Further battle orders on October 12,
18,
and 21 gradually extended the
original plan. The attack on the plain (on the Piave) was to be accompanied by a parallel attack in the mountains, on the Grappa. It was not to be an isolated
defeat,
action to wear down the enemy, like that originally planned for the Altipiani, but a large-scale, co-ordinated offensive on mountain and river alike, aimed at the total annihilation of the enemy forces. The last battle order, that of October 21, was explicit: 'Our offensive manoeuvre is intended to achieve the following ends: by action beginning in the Brenta-Piave sector, to separate the Austrian forces on the Trentino from those on the Piave; by action beginning from the central Piave, to separate the two Austrian armies, the Fifth and the Sixth, concentrating the maximum effort on the juncture between the two; to cut off the communications of the Austrian Sixth Army, thus making defence and retreat impossible; to exploit all possible consequences of these actions.'
and
It
ment at once, and boldly face up to any struggle. I would set myself against everything, even our institutions, if I saw the being stupidly sacrificed.' And again: 'At the point things have reached a victory would change very little; but a
country
even on a small scale, would be ruinous and would pave the way for a terrifying revolution.' He feared defeat inevitable partner, revolution. The idea of risking the country's fate in what he considered to be a questionable venture was repugnant to him. But these were not the only factors involved. It was the situation of the country that worried Nitti; the dangers of a tense and difficult internal situation and the political, economic, and its
instability which had to be protected from shocks of too great a violence. social
Those in the know asked each other if the General Headquarters was pursuing a definite policy, or if it was merely trying to preserve the balance between the opposing influences. 'During the last few days,' writes Ugo Ojetti to Luigi Albertini, 'I have had the impression that the General Headquarters is playing a double game.
When Orlando comes and demands action there are promises, orders, troop movements; when Nitti comes — and he came on purpose — there is great joy at hearing that it is better to do nothing, save our men,
3066
Sedition and defection was, for the General
much
But
lost.
if
the Imperial
maintaining
in
were,
in
enemy
in
its
Army succeeded — and they
positions
spite of everything, positions territory — the peace might
not be wholly lost. Avoiding military ruin meant the possibility of minimising political ruin, the hope of initiating peacetalks, of putting forward conditions — in short of salvaging everything possible from the wreck. To stop, at all costs, the Italian offensive, was the last desperate bid of the Austrians. On October 23, on the eve of the Italian attack, the Emperor Charles made a last appeal to his soldiers. 'It is a dark hour and the situation is grave. But your duty, my soldiers, is as clear and simple as the oath you topk in the name of the Most High God. There is no place for doubt or uncertainty. The people of the Monarchy have always found their country in her army; it is for this reason that our arms have been able to achieve the great and glorious exploits of the past. Our army will know how to face the dangers which threaten us with the same spirit with which it entered the war — calm and serene, with honour and loyalty, as the safeguard of all the peoples of the Empire.' That these were more than mere words was proved, in the days that followed, by the tenacious resistance at the Grappa and the resolution in the face of great odds shown by the initial resistance on the Piave. During those days the army of the Austrian monarchy wrote pages worthy of their great tradition. On the eve of the offensive, the alternatives open to the Austrians were, to the Italians, an unknown quantity. The Italians could boast no decisive superiority. The Austrian forces, over the entire front, on the eve of the battle, included between 60 and 63 divisions, with 1,050 guns, opposed to which, on the Italian side, were 57 divisions (of which three were British, two French and one Czechoslovak) and an American regiment, with 7,720 guns. The Italians were better armed and had an air force of more than 600 aircraft as opposed to the Austrians' 564. But numerically the Italian forces were sharply inferior, particularly as the Austrian divisions had a greater number of regiments, and the regiments a greater number of
companies.
Headquarters,
feared and long deferred decision to risk everything. A decision which Diaz had decided to make only under the pressure of events. A move which, from the political point of view, he was obliged to make, but which, from the military point of view, was full of unknown quantities. Under normal conditions — in the opinion of one of the central figures, Caviglia — 'the operation could appear foolhardy'. The Austrians could have retaliated with a counter-attack on the Altipiani and on the Grappa, threatening from the rear the Italian forces concentrated on the Piave. Were the Austrians in a fit condition to do so? What was the true state of the Austrian army? Sedition and defection were clearly in evidence on the Austrian home front, in the ferment of the dissolution of the Empire; but the nearer one got to the front lines the less they were in evidence. And
the
at the top, at the headquarters in Vienna, it had been decided to hold out to the very last possible moment. True, the war was
Diaz's reasons, in September, against Allied pressure valid a month later; there were necessary for a large-scale
out
for
holding
were still no reserves
operation; preparations were inadequate; provisions for troop movements and the organisation of
equipment had been too hasty.
The battle orders of October 21 had laid down that 'the offensive on the Grappa should precede the action on the Piave. will take part in the first action, the Twelfth, Kighth and Tenth in the second action. Thus the Twelfth will constitute the point of articulation.' The Fourth Army was to begin operations on the Grappa. Twelve hours later the Eighth was to follow suit on the Piave, flanked on the right by the Tenth (two Italian divisions and two British under the command of the Karl of Cavan),
The Fourth and Twelfth Armies
Opposite: Victory of the red, white and Italy tramples on the Imperial eagle
green.
'
•^>
i«*«»s
*
3?-
9m
'
,;
'"
o front.
Italian soldiers
alian troops
and mule
the ruined town of Asiago, med by the Austrians on October 28, and entered by the1/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, 48th Division, in
on October
••
'
31, 1918
w
T*
-J
-
J*>
.*-
f\
H^i
# *<•;
V Srt*
/^
TV
r »
1* ^^»
^-#^
-«•
V
;
-
+
'4?
*
1
,1,
.
•
• i»
*
-,
^1
*>
t
l
1 **
* #/ r**
-
> •^< C
Below: The Austro-Hungarian Skoda 7.5-cm M15 mountain gun. Calibre: 7.5-cm. Barrel length: 15 calibres. Weight in firing position: 1,330 pounds. Shell: HE (13.5 pounds), shrapnel (14.3 pounds). Elevation: -9° to +50°. Traverse: 7°. Muzzle velocity: 1 180 feet per second (HE) and 800 feet per second (shrapnel). Range: 7,700 yards. Opposite: Italians surrounded by shell damage on the Monte di Val Bella, Asiago ,
and on the left by the Twelfth (three Italian divisions and one French, under the command of a Frenchman, Graziani), which was to serve as the link with the action on the Grappa and constitute — as the orders said — 'the point of articulation'. At 0500 hours on the morning of October 24 the artillery bombardment began. At 0700 hours the infantry went into the attack along a front of 13 miles. 11 Italian divisions with 1,402 pieces of artillery faced 12 Austrian divisions, with 1,385 pieces. In this section as everywhere else the Italians were better armed, but this
3070
was balanced by their numerical inferiority and neutralised by the fact that the Austrians were exceptionally well-endowed with machine-guns: 3,130, or one every seven yards! The unforeseeable and unforeseen flooding of the Piave had forced the General Headquarters to postpone the parallel action on the plain which should have followed shortly after. The army on the Grappa was, for several days, alone in the offensive. It carried the whole weight. It was a heavy load to bear. On October 24, 25 and 26 one attack followed another;
enormous sacrifices were made with little show for them. On the 27th a violent Austrian counter-attack was repulsed at to
great cost: it lasted until the following day. On the 29th, deadlock: attacks and counter-attacks, in nightmare conditions of fog, rain and sleet. So bad was the weather that the General Headquarters was induced to suspend operations. The focal point of the battle had moved to the Piave; as soon as the state of the river allowed the first bridges were put across. The Grappa action had, by now, lost its significance. Conceived as a parallel
action to that of the Piave, it had, in the end, taken on a complementary function. As the General Headquarters' report put 'not having been able, in terms of it: land, to reach the final objective it had been assigned, it succeeded by its tenacity in wearing down the reserves which the enemy had in the Feltre basin and hindering them from being thrown in to fill the
breach made by the Eighth, Tenth and Twelfth Armies.' A diversion for which a heavy price was paid: 24,500 men dead,
wounded or missing. The decisive struggle was
to take place
the opening and laboured. On the evening of October 26 the Eighth Army
on
the
Piave.
moves were
Here,
too,
difficult
attempted to cross the river but was only partially successful. The first to put their feet firmly on the opposite bank were the two flanking Armies, the Tenth and the Twelfth. Not until October 28 were the Eighth, at the centre of the deployment, able to throw their preponderant weight into the battle. It was the beginning of the end. In the two days which followed, under the pressure of an ever-widening attack, the Austrian line, which at first had held fast, began, at an ever-increasing rate, to give way, to break up, to disintegrate. 'To the east of the Piave our armies continue their swift and resolute advance, sweeping before them the enemy who seek in vain to stem the advance', thus the bulletin of the evening of October 30 triumphantly pro-
And on the morning of the 31st: 'The success of our armies is taking wonderful shape. We have routed the enemy to the east of the Piave, and on the mountainous front he is with difficulty holding back the advance of our hard-pressing troops. The enemy hordes are making their way tumultuously into the mountain valleys and seeking to reach the passes on the Tagliamento.' claims.
Complete dissolution The islands of resistance, which still remained as a testimony to the tenacious vitality of 'what had been one of the most powerful armies in the world', were overthrown one by one. At the beginning of November (in the words of the General Headquarters' report) 'the Austro-Hungarian army was in a state of complete dissolution along the entire front from Stelvio to the sea: its columns were in pursued in every direction, overtaken and blocked by our swift vanguard.' In Vienna, right from the beginning of the Italian offensive, they had sought to anticipate the foreseeable and foreseen consequences of the battle with a timely peace move. The Emperor Charles had flight,
communicated
to
his
German
ally
determination, his need to lay his arms before it was too late. 'It
his
down is
my
painful duty to inform you', he wrote to the Kaiser, 'that my people have neither the will nor the strength to
continue the war.
Order, the Monarchy, run a serious risk if we do not put an immediate end to the fight. Thus I communicate to you that I have taken the irrevocable decision to ask, within 24 hours, for a separate peace and an immediate armistice.' To separate his own destiny from that of his ally and to get the better of Italy, the obstacle most to be feared, the closest and most implacable enemy — this was the last desperate bid of the Emperor. On October 28
wounded
he addressed Wilson, the arbiter, the peace-
casualties, dead,
maker who was outside the contest: he asked him to intervene on behalf of an armistice
haa lasted
tween 24,000 and 25,000 were lost from the army on the Grappa; between 12,000 and 13,000 lost from the armies on the Piave. The Austrians had 30,000 dead and wounded and 427,000 taken prisoner. Far from 'breaking down an open door' the offensive had come up against fierce resistance. Until October 28 there had been no sign of weakening in the Austrian army on the Grappa; and very little on the Piave. Then the sudden and unexpected yielding. At that point the battle did indeed become something of a military exercise: after October 30 the offensive turned into a triumphal march which, growing faster day by day, crossed the crumbling enemy lines, with no obstacle other than that of
men were
the multitude in flight.
without procrastination, 'without waiting for the outcome of other peace talks', without waiting for negotiations with
Germany
or
the conditions which Italy
would lay down. It was too late.
On that very day, October 28, the fortunes of war were decided: Austrian resistance on the Piave was crumbling. It was necessary to negotiate directly with the victor. At eight o'clock in the morning on October 29, an officer of the Austrian General Staff appeared at Serravalle, in the Val Lagarina, in front of the Italian lines, bearing a white flag. The for
battle of Vittorio Veneto days. Nearly 40,000
six
or missing: be-
3071
The
First World War, as far as the great battlefleets of the combatants were concerned, was one of anticlimax and dis-
appointment. In the North Sea, because of the numerical and geographical advantages on the British side, the High Seas Fleet was virtually reduced to the role of a 'fleet in being', the only direct confrontation between the two forces in full strength being the confused encounter at Jutland. Yet the position of the Austro-Hungarian Navy in the Mediterranean was, if anything, even more unfavourable than that of its German counterpart in the north. Austro-Hungarian surface ships operated only from ports bordering the narrow waters of the Adriatic Sea, and any sortie
more open Mediterranean involved lengthy passage through the 'funnel' between southern Italy and Albania. Even when Italy was neutral, such an operation would have been immensely risky against the French and British fleets; but when Rome finally decided to throw itself on to the side of the Allies in May 1915, the situation became impossible. The AustroHungarian navy, with only four modern dreadnoughts and a medley of smaller craft, simply did not possess the force to into the
a
its strategical and numerical disadvantages and to challenge the Allied fleets for control of the Mediterranean. The Austro-Hungarian naval policy,
overcome
therefore,
like
that of
Germany
in
the
North Sea, was based upon the hope of catching and destroying part of the enemy fleet whilst keeping up a certain momentum of action through occasional destroyer sweeps and coastal bombardments. As time wore on, however, more and more emphasis was placed upon submarine warfare, with the surface vessels being reduced to a supporting role — again like Germany. In this new situation, the advantages were reversed, for the Austro-Hungarian and German submarines based at Cattaro and Pola found it an easy matter to prey upon Allied merchant shipping in the Mediterranean and then to avoid pursuit by hiding in the narrow channels and among the many small islands. Despite strenuous efforts by the Allies from 1915 onwards to block the southern exit from the Adriatic, the U-Boats continued to get out and to take a heavy toll; in January 1918, for example, 54 Allied merchantmen totalling 148,444 tons were sunk. So alarming were these figures that, at an Inter-Allied Naval
THE SINKING
OFTHE SZENT ISTVAN The firm Allied reaction to U-Boat activity in the Mediterranean compelled the Austro-Hungarian navy to strike out to avoid being effectively imprisoned in its own bases on the Adriatic. The fate of the Szentlstvdn showed that, in this war of great forces, there was still a place for personal courage and daring. Paul Keftnedy I
E
3072
Council meeting in Rome on February 8-9, it was decided to step up considerably the anti-submarine patrols whilst at the same time re-creating the fixed defences of the Otranto barrage which had been destroyed by bad weather in the previous year. On April 15 these measures began to be implemented and, although they did not immediately lead to the destruction of any U-Boats, they certainly produced an increased number of sightings and attacks upon the German and Austro-Hungarian In May one U-Boat was actually destroyed by the barrage patrol force while another four were sunk in other parts of the Mediterranean. Merchant vessels, it is argued in the Admiralty's Mediterranean Staff Paper 1917118, can be protected either by the defensive method of 'increasing convoy escorts or by the more offensive strategy of preventing the enemy U-Boats from ever reaching the open sea. The latter method, besides being better for morale, has another important advantage: it may force an enemy's surface vessels out to break the U-Boat harrier, thus providing the chance for battle. This in fact was what happened. Urged on by the German naval authorities, the High Command of the Austro-Hungarian navy decided upon a bold strike deep into the southern Adriatic to destroy the Otranto fixed barrage and the mobile patrols. Already on April 22, five AustroHungarian destroyers had attempted to interrupt these patrols but had been beaten off by British warships in an action in which the destroyer HMS Hornet was damaged. Now Vienna decided to employ the cream of its fleet in an effort to destroy craft.
The 20.000 ton Szent Istvan, one of the four modern dreadnoughts which, constructed for the Austro-Hungarian navy between 1910 and 1915, had dominated Allied naval strategy in the Mediterranean. They had a speed of 21 knots and mounted 12 12-inch guns in four triple turrets superimposed fore and aft
the Allied dominance of these waters and also to cripple the seaplane station at Otranto. A force of four light cruisers, four large and four small torpedo boats was to attack the barrage and patrols on the evening of June 11. Anticipating that this might provoke swift Allied counterattacks from nearby warships as heavy as armoured cruisers, it was also decided to send out to certain 'support positions' Austria-Hungary's four dreadnoughts and three of her pre-dreadnoughts, together with accompanying escorts, under the overall
command
of Rear-Admiral
Horthy
de Nagybanya. The whole operation was to be given as much assistance from U-
Boats and aircraft as possible, and to be carried out in its initial stages with great secrecy in case the Allies should learn of the plan and despatch their own battleships into the Adriatic. On the evening of June 9, while the attack forces and the first dreadnought support group were already at sea, the second group (dreadnoughts Szent Istvdn and Tegetthoff, escorted by seven torpedo boats) set out from Pola harbour and headed south. Though the sea was calm and the night clear, these ships were already dogged with troubles. As the force had prepared for sea, a shell exploded on the large torpedo boat Velebit and killed several of the crew: 'a dismal beginning to the enterprise', according to the AustroHungarian Official Naval History. Then the sea barricades of Pola harbour had failed to open and this had caused considerable delay, which was increased by turbine trouble on the Szent Istvdn. Its speed was reduced to 12j knots until the trouble was repaired and the entire group was able to steam hurriedly southwards through the night, keeping close to the string of islands scattered along the rugged Dalmatian coastline. Yet these troubles were only a small foretaste of
what was
On
to
come.
that same night, some distance to the south, two Italian motor boats were on patrol near the island of Premuda. These were tiny craft, with only sufficient buoyancy to carry their large engines and the dropping gear for two torpedoes; in fact, they were so small that they had been towed across the Adriatic from Ancona by larger torpedo boats and left there to
«-*
search for mines. The leading motor boat, MB15, was under Commander Luigi Rizzo,
one of the most daring small boat leaders of the war, who already possessed the Gold Medal for Military Valour for sinking the Austro-Hungarian coast defence battleship Wien inside the defences of Trieste harbour in the previous year. The second vessel, MB21, was commanded by Sub-Lieutenant Aonzo. Ironically, their small sweep which should already have been completed, had also been delayed: another of those accidental occurrences which dogged the movements of the second dreadnought group. By the early hours of June 10, the two MBs had already swept the channels around Premuda several times, and had started back to the rendezvous with the torpedo boats to be towed to Ancona. At 0315, as darkness gradually began to fade, Rizzo spotted smoke on the northern horizon. After waiting for a short while, he decided it could only be from enemy vessels and that they should be attacked. Despite the later realisation that the force included two heavily-armed battleships and the fact that the much larger escorting torpedo boats could steam far faster than his own 20 knots maximum, Rizzo and his companions did not hesitate. Moving slowly so that their bow waves would not be noticed, the two MBs crept nearer to the oncoming and unsuspecting AustroHungarian force. Passing across the latter's bows, they then swung around, increased speed and came at the dreadnoughts from the starboard side. Only when they were rushing through the torpedo boat screens were they finally spotted by the inefficient Austro-Hungarian lookouts. But by then it was too late for anything to be done. Racing to within about 200 yards of the first
battleship, Rizzo's craft fired its
Tegetthoff but one missed and the other ran faulty. Turning away to the starboard again, MB21 soon escaped into the morning gloom.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
so Rizzo. In the final stages of his attack upon the dreadnought, his small craft had been hotly pursued by an AustroHungarian torpedo boat, TB76, which was,
Not
i
Trieste
however, so close to MB 15 that its tracer shells sailed harmlessly over Rizzo's head. As the motor boat withdrew from the stricken Szent Istudn, the TB76 increased speed and drew even nearer, obviously intending to ram. Though his own vessel was much slower than the pursuer, Rizzo still did not lose his head. Waiting until the TB76 was only 100 yards behind him, he ordered his crew to release a depthcharge. To his horror it refused to explode, but a second depth-charge was dropped and caused a great explosion just under the bow of the TB76. With his vessel shaken and slightly damaged by this, and believing it to have been caused by a torpedo fired from another enemy boat, the commander of the TB76 promptly ordered a 90" turn to starboard, while Rizzo's ship steered off in the opposite direction. Within a few minutes, the Italian commander could see no other pursuers. Signalling to Aonzo's
Mediterranean Sea
MB21, which had also steamed westwards away from the scene of battle, the two small motor boats headed towards Ancona. At 0700 they were back in port, where they were given a tumultuous reception. The great concern on the Austro-Hungarian side was whether the Szent Istudn could be saved. The dreadnought was one of the navy's largest and most modern vessels, having only been completed in 1915 at a cost of approximately £2,500,000. Armed with 12 12-inch guns and many smaller ones, she displaced 20,000 tons and
two ^^|k
torpedoes and then swung away in the opposite direction. Unable to take avoiding action in time, the Szent Istudn was hit in the starboard boiler room, followed a moment afterwards by a second explosion further aft. At the same time, Aonzo's crew fired their torpedoes at the dreadnought
/
Above: Commander Luigi Rizzo. Right: The Szent IstvSn, hit by Rizzo's two torpedoes in the early morning of July 10, sinks at 0612 hours, after desperate captain and crew. The the Otranto operation, Hungarian Naval Staff it
efforts to save her by incident, by advertising
forced the Austro-
to abandon it, and with their last real chance of action in the war
3074 .&
had an armoured
belt of 11 inches. Yet her size and strength, the two torpedoes from Rizzo's midget craft had struck heavy blows. As soon as the explosions occurred, her commander Captain Seitz ordered the engines to halt until the extent of the damage was assessed; but so much water flooded into the starboard side that the battleship took a 10" list even before this inspection could take place, and Seitz was forced to counter-flood to reduce the list to about 7°. Learning that only the after boiler rooms were under water and that the engines were undamaged, Seitz ordered the Szent Istvdn to resume its original course at Ah knots. In the meantime, the escorting torpedo boats closed around the battleship and picked up those sailors who had been blown overboard or had jumped, following the explosion. Shortly afterwards, however, water began seeping into other parts of the vessel, despite the valiant attempts of the crew to stop the leaks and to pump the water overboard. Soon, the forward boiler rooms on the starboard side and the magazines were also flooded. Gradually the pumps began to fail, then the electric lights and power. The Szent
despite
Istvdn listed
still
starboard and Captain Seitz ordered his crew to cease stoking the boilers and to abandon the lower decks. Then an explosion was heard which burst several water-tight doors and forced the battleship into a steeper list: by this time, the water was abreast the starboard deck. At this stage, Seitz had no option but to instruct his crew to prepare to abandon ship. At about 0420, the dreadnought Tegetthoff, which had set off at top speed into the darkness as soon as the Italian attack had begun, cautiously returned to the scene with the intention of towing its ship to port. Just then, though, several of the gun crews of the Szent Istvdn fired at what they took to be a submarine periscope nearby, and at this the Tegetthoff again steered away at full speed. One hour later, it returned and took up. a tow-line while the torpedo boats sister
surrounded both vessels. There was still some hope of saving the battleship, even though the mouths of the 15-cm starboard
further and further to
were actually touching the water; but as soon as the tow was begun the Szent Istvdn took an even steeper list. By 0538 it was clearly sinking rapidly, and Seitz ordered his patient crew to abandon ship. At 0612 it disappeared beneath the surface of the waves. Loss of life amounted to four officers and 85 sailors, while another 29 men were wounded. This sinking, and the fact that as a result of it the operation against the Otranto barrage was no longer secret, caused the Austro-Hungarian Naval Staff to order the abandonment of the entire venture. The decision was probably a wise one, for the Allies had already by the morning of the 10th picked up enough enemy radio signals to let them know that a large-scale action was under way. Reinforcements were rushed to the Otranto barrage patrols, and the Italian battlefleet at Taranto was made ready for sea. In any full-scale battle, it seems probable that the depleted Austro-Hungarian forces would have suffered heavy losses. The operation of June 10 was the last great action of the Austro-Hungarian Thereafter, it remained in battlefleet. harbour until the end of the war, with the ships' crews becoming ever more sullen and discontented. Faced with large strategical and numerical disadvantages, it was destined to continue to play the role of a 'fleet in being' and to await the outcome of the war being decided in other theatres. batteries
Further Reading Hurd, A., Italian Seapower in the Great War (Constable 1918) Marder, A. J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Volume V: Victory and Aftermath 1918-19 (Oxford University Press 1970) Newbolt, Sir Henry, Naval Operations Volume V (Longmans, Green & Co. 1931) Sokol, Captain H. H., Oesterreich-Ungarns Seekrieg 1914-18 (Austro-Hungarian Official Naval History. Vienna: Amalthea-Verlag 1933) Usborne, Vice-Admiral C. V., Smoke on the Horizon. Mediterranean Fighting 1914-1918
(Hodder & Stoughton 1933) Winterhalder, Rear-Admiral T., Die osterreichungarische Kriegsmarine Im Weltkrieg (Munich: F. Lehmanns Verlag 1921)
//
|
£ 1
5
The nations of Latin America observed the gathering war clouds in Europe with apprehension. There was no thought of taking part in the impending hostilities, but there was a strong sense in all the capitals of the
MrmJi mi
that fighting between the armed camps of Europe would have unpleasant repercussions in America. When the war did begin, most of the Latin American nations immediately declared their neutrality and the rest assured German and British officials that they would maintain strict neutrality. Indeed, it was unthinkable that they should do otherwise, despite a widespread and strong sentiment in favour of the Allies. The overwhelming majority of Latin American intellectuals, men of letters and public figures — those most likely to speak out on the issues of the day — were sympathetic to the Allies, especially to France. For them, France was the paragon of culture, the centre of Latin civilisation. French was the second lan-
hemisphere
AMERICA
AND THEWAR The war represented a serious threat to Latin American trade. The European powers were too
guage for all educated Latin Americans and those who could afford it sent their sons to France to finish their education. While
preoccupied with military events to expend much energy on the running battle for spheres of influence, and gradually the United States took over. Joseph S. Tulchin. Below: Transporting wool in Argentina — part of the flourishing textile industry
in the first days of the war political leaders throughout the hemisphere did not hesito declare their sympathy for Allies, they were quick to insist that
tate
the they
would remain officially neutral. The outbreak of war in Europe sent violent shock waves throughout Latin America. The stock markets of Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro and Santiago de Chile closed. After consulting with government authorities, the banks followed suit. By August 3 or 4, once cabinets had had a
chance to meet, the governments declared moratoria on international transactions, suspended servicing of their international obligations, and put a stop to all move-
ments of specie. International trade came to a standstill. Great Britain announced that, bona fide contracts notwithstanding, would prohibit exports of coal until the government was satisfied that its stocks were adequate to the needs of the nation. it
The prospect and without
of doing without British coal British ships, together with frozen foreign exchange and suddenly inconvertible paper currencies put fear into the hearts of merchants. Trains carrying farm products to the Argentine ports stopped in their tracks. Coffee shipments in Brazil were halted; nitrate mining operations in Chile were suspended temporarily; and the same was true in every exporting country in 'the hemisphere. Major cities were without supplies; prices soared and speculation was rife.
Fortunately, the crisis began to ease almost as soon as it had started, and international trade resumed with a resurgence of demand by the Allies. By the end of the war, Latin American exports were worth twice what they had been before. The initial panic demonstrated conclusively that Latin America was part of a world market and that its fortunes were very much at stake in the struggle being waged in Europe. In fact, all the nations in the hemisphere were touched by what was truly a world war. However, there were no prolonged efforts to cope with the disruption on a multilateral basis, although the
i-
*<*
-
3076
-•> ^»;i-
m
the Argentine market. Latin nations of the Individually, America took advantage of the war to the extent that they were able. The Argentine textile industry flourished thanks to the flood of orders from France. Factories worked two and three shifts; local wool was processed in Argentina for the first time; and new kinds of cloth were produced. In Brazil, the textile industry went through a similar period of growth, and was matched by the exports of food, manganese, and rubber, while coffee exports declined. The prices of most export commodities were in a rising trend throughout the war, after a brief depression in 1914.
common problem
of neutral rights did serve to create a sense of community in the
hemisphere. The immediate crisis was handled by each nation as a domestic problem. In August 1914, the Peruvian government proposed that the American republics, through their representatives in Washington, work to secure an exact definition of their rights as neutrals and adopt a com-
mon
policy for protecting their
interests.
commercial
The Pan American Union
set
up
a neutrality committee to deal with the questions, but it got bogged down with first principles of international law and lost momentum as the United States be-
came increasingly preoccupied.
Determined intervention
Nitrate or neutrality
first two years of the war a pattern of international relations was evolving. Germany was put on the defensive by British naval dominance in the southern hemisphere, and hard pressed to continue its policy of making South America the special theatre and object of
prompted a measure of co-operation among the South American nations during 1914 and 1915 was the presence of a German naval squadron in the South Pacific and a large British naval force in the Falkland Islands. The one raised havoc with British mer-
Through the
chant shipping along the west coast, violating the territorial waters of Chile and Peru in the process, and the other instituted an effective blockade along the east coast against all shipping that was not British. A proposal was made by the Museo Social Argentino of Buenos Aires to ease tensions along both coasts by declaring that all commerce between American countries would be regarded as coastwise traffic, and the vessels engaged in this traffic would be considered neutrals, even when flying the flags of belligerent nations. Chile and Peru supported this proposal, even though it was clearly prejudicial to Germany. Peru used
commercial industry. German assets before the war had been the ability to adjust to the customers' needs, efficient
One
specific
problem
that
units of its navy to escort merchant vessels engaged in the coastal trade, even though
they flew the British flag. Chile went so far as to ship nitrate (a major source of government revenue) to Allied consignees in Chilean naval vessels, justifying this anti-German step by the need to avoid economic disaster. Thanks in part to the work of the German squadron, Chile did not recover as quickly as other Latin American nations from the initial shock at the outbreak of the war. Thousands of workers who had been employed in the extraction, elaboration and shipment of nitrate were out of work. The farmers of the central and southern regions were without markets for their products. The
merchants found their European credit withdrawn and the transmission of merchandise suspended. The value of Chilean currency declined dramatically in international terms and domestic prices rose. In the face of this threat, Chile and Peru co-operated with the British to eliminate the German squadron. On the east coast, the British precipitated a crisis at the end of 1915 by seizing the Argentine ship Presidente Mitre, a
German-owned vessel engaged in coastal traffic. The Brazilian government supported the Argentine protest and the backed down, returning the ship without resolving any of the basic issues at stake. Taking their cue from the Presidente Mitre case, the Argentine and Brazilian governments tried to co-ordinate their policies on neutral shipping. Argentina took the initiative also in trying to get Brazil to co-operate in forcing Great Britain to relax its application of the Blacklist. These efforts were broken off when the United States entered the war. British
new
German
Above: A herd of horses and mules being watered on the plains near San Juan, Argen-
The country's economy was heavily dependent on livestock. As well as horses, cattle and sheep were very important for the meat, hides and wool which were sold on the international market and Aigentina tina.
was anxious
that her trade should not be disrupted by the presence of ships of the belligerent nations in the waters off the coast
Once the initial crisis was behind them, the Latin American nations saw the war as a great opportunity to expand their markets and to modernise their economies by import substitution. Being cut off from Europe enabled them to develop the industry they needed to be free of dependence upon European capital and trade.
Expanding markets Chile was convinced that the
demand
for
nitrate was elastic. Brazil would be one excellent market. Brazilian coffee needed
more fertiliser and Chile would supply it. In April 1916, the Chilean Foreign Office sent a circular to all its agents in Latin America asking for reports on how Chile might take advantage of the war. A vocal group in Argentina, led by La Prensa, wanted to take advantage of the war by increasing production of foodstuffs, by expanding markets in Latin America, and by supporting the growth of local indusLike Chile, most of Argentina's tries. efforts to expand its non-traditional markets were directed at Brazil. But Brazil was not interested in multilateral trade measures or even in opening bilateral trade to new products. As early as October 1914, Brazil turned its back on Latin American co-operation by simultaneously trade granting tariff advantages to flour from the United States and dumping yerba mate on
organisation and determined intervention by the state. Working against the Germans were a lack of shipping and the fact that their trade, except in the electrical industry, was not supported by large capital investments. Almost in spite of itself, the United States reaped the greatest advantage from the changes wrought by the war. In the political and commercial spheres, the United States fell heir to and then asserted a position of leadership in the hemisphere. Europe and Latin America looked to Washington to speak on issues concerning the entire hemisphere. American merchants made their first appearances in Latin American markets; American banks moved overseas for the first time; and New York replaced London as the primary source of finance capital. President Woodrow Wilson tried to take the United States government out of the money market by denouncing the so-called 'dollar diplomacy', but he willingly assumed even greater responsibilities for the government by sponsoring the Pan American Pact, designed to preserve the peace of the hemisphere against attack from without and from disturbances from within. Democracy and territorial integrity were two cardinal elements in the scheme to protect the western hemisphere against the follies of the Old World. Chile was the main stumbling block in the preliminary talks on the Pact. The dispute with Peru arising out of the War of the Pacific (1879-188?) was still open and Peru made it clear that it would use the Pact to try to regain territory taken by Chile at that time. Chile adopted the very simple expedient of insisting on certain conditions precedent to entering formal negotiations over the Pan American Pact. When Wilson tried to circumvent Chile and win Argentine and Brazilian approval of formal talks, Chile brought all talks to a halt oy threatening to turn to Europe for support. Wilson was disappointed and had to content himself with exerting American influence in less formal ways. Another characteristic of the new pattern of international relations in the western hemisphere, even more prominent after the United States entered the war, was the
3077
Prices of Commodities Important in Latin American Export Trade
Minerals: Electrolytic Copper Manganese Ore Crude Petroleum Tin
UNIT
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
cents per lb
1550
1360
27 20
2720
2460
2500
48 33
63 62
1870 3306
078 3580
1730 1583 058
73
38 60
43 40
61 90
223 8530
220 6570
19 40
22 60
3710 1610 1440
2690 4420
33 40
2830 1350 1070
3820 8080 22 50
dollars per ton dollars per bbl cents per lb
94
4430
1
20
1
Pastoral Products: Cattle Hides
Raw Wool Lamb Beef
cents cents cents cents
per per per per
lb lb
lb lb
1970 3680 1270 860
19 30
2080
3090 8030 2620
1680
22 00
22 30
72 00
22 30
Agricultural Products: Barley Cacao Beans Coffee
Corn Brazilian Fair Cotton Peruvian Good Cotton Sugar
Wheat increasingly active role of the state. Critiand emergency conditions led governments to assume responsibility for or control over shipping, foreign exchange, exports, communications, and the exploitation of certain natural resources such as petroleum. Contracts and business deals in the private sector that had been free of government involvement before the war were now subject to surveillance by the state. Shipments of coal under private contract from Great Britain, for example, became after August 1914 the subject of government-to-government negotiations. To defend themselves, Latin American governments assumed control over their primary product exports in order to gain some bargaining leverage against the British government. In this way, too, cal shortages
economic dependence became official — facet of relations between governments and not merely an aspect of private international accounts. When the United States declared war on Germany on April 6, 1917, Latin American neutrality was called into question. Now all the rhetoric of hemispheric solidarity was turned to mean co-operation with the United States. The principles of solidarity, democracy, race and culture were invoked by the United States to encourage the nations of Latin America to follow their
example. The Uruguayan government responded to President Wilson's declaration of war with the following decree: 'No American state, which in defence of its own rights should find itself in a state of war with nations of other continents will be treated as a belligerent.' This marked the minimum level of unanimous support for the United States. Some states- Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Colombia, Venezuela, Salvador, and Mexico would go no further and remained neutral throughout the war. Five others — Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and the Domini
3078
dollars per
bu
cents per lb cents per lb dollars per
bu
cents per lb cents per lb cents per lb dollars per bu
065 1530 11 10
070 1500 1630 200 1
06
72
069
1300 820 070
1760
1700
750 079
9 20
11 60
1610 1660 330
2590 2680 440 224
12 40
260 1
57
1
75
can Republic — felt, as one Ecuadorean put it, that breaking relations was the minimum protest consistent with dignity. Peru announced that its foreign policy was based on Pan American solidarity which was derived from the principles of international justice proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson. Yet it predicated severance of diplomatic relations with Germany upon the sinking of the Peruvian bark Lorton by a German submarine. The same offence led Brazil to break relations with Germany on April 11, 1917, and, when it was repeated a short time later, to declare war (October 26, 1917). All the other nations that declared
war — Cuba, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua, and Haiti — were in the Caribbean Danger Zone, the sphere of special United States interest. The United States used more than rhetoric to win Latin American co-operation. Its most effective weapon was the 'Trading With The Enemy List', the famous Blacklist, designed to eliminate trade with Germany and to make sure that Germancontrolled firms were either driven out of business or forced to hold up remittances to Germany until the end of the war. The first Blacklist was published on December 5, 1917. It applied only to Latin America and had 1,524 names on it, with Brazil leading in terms of the number of firms or individuals proscribed. Revised versions, published on April 20, 1918 and early in 1919, included European nations and had 4,000 and 6,000 names respectively, half from Latin America. To supplement the Blacklist, the Department of State used the Alien Property Custodian in countries that had declared war on Germany to help Americans buy German properties. Germany tried to counteract this economic offensive by harping on the emasculating quality of United States hegemonj Tins ploy had but little success, mai [y in Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.
1
1
19
11
1
46
1290 930 1
63
1
04
1
45
1360
22 50
9 40
1790
1
62
1
59
47 80
46 90
48 40
5010 460 235
49 70
6210 510 215
420 2 40
Germany was not the only trading nation to be supplanted by United States advances in Latin America. Great Britain was
threatened by United States dominance in hemisphere and reacted strongly. Britain's share of Latin American imports fell during the war from 29% to 20%. At the same time, the United States' share of this total Latin American market increased from 18% to 42%. In the ten years after 1914, the United States' stake in Latin America increased nearly 350%, while Britain's increased only 18%. Even before the war had ended, the British government launched a campaign to recapture its position in the Latin American market. The Board of Trade dispatched a special mission under Sir Maurice de Bunsen to South America to remind the Latin Americans of their historic ties to Great Britain and to rally British traders in the various countries. At the same time, the British Embassy in Washington presented a series of complaints against unfair American trade practices in the hemisphere. The United States government decided not to join this campaign. They felt that any such aggressive action would offend the the
British and damage the war effort. Meanwhile, United States trade with Latin America continued to increase. To Great Britain and the United States, Latin America in 1918 was still a source of invaluable primary products and a lucrative market for trade and investment capital. The glitter of opportunity which the Latin Americans had seen in the war had turned into the dross of exacerbated external dependence. Their very success as suppliers of raw materials had converted them into the instruments of Allied policy.
Chile had hoped to become wealthy from the sale of nitrate, but the Allies handed together to pre-empt the market and dictate the terms under which ("bile could sell its nitrate. Not only did the Allies
Latin (Value
American Trade thousands of U.S. dollars)
in
1919
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
Argentina
468.999
338,777
541,532
527,045
533,665
777,358 1,000,036
Bolivia Brazil Chile
36,551
25,662
37,132
39,579
61,522
71,219
56,258
315.165
221,539
257,177
272,853
306,389
284,275
570,943
144.653
109,382
119,530
187.458
259,985
291,863
115,697
34.316
32,633
31,579
31.654
31,893
37,729
76,917
15.789
13,062
12,895
17,570
16,309
13,365
21,005
Exports South America:
Colombia Ecuador Paraguay Peru
5,462
4,447
8,624
8,190
11,364
11.058
14,372
44,410
42,611
68,638
80,390
90,607
97.067
130,731
Uruguay
65,142
54,516
76,222
71,074
96,217
120.249
153,182
Venezuela
29,484
21,521
23,404
22,707
23.165
19.813
49,923
10,433
10,979
9,972
11,121
11.382
9,624
17,749
9,929
10,796
10,564
11,605
16.050
17,360
16,745
10,638
7,810
11,319
22,419
Central America: Costa Rica Salvador
El
Guatemala Honduras
14,450
12,754
11,567
3,300
3,421
3,142
4,191
8,030
5,734
5,998
Nicaragua
West
7,712
4,955
4,567
5,285
5,975
7,755
12,409
Panama
5,383
3,801
3,423
5,507
5,624
2,900
3,757
Mexico
150,203
165.000
156,000
170,000
180,000
187,784
198,234
Indies:
Cuba
164,823
177,554
254,292
356,571
366,772
413,325
575,968
Dominican Republic
10,470
10,589
15,209
21,528
22,445
22,372
39,602
Haiti
11,316
11,000
13,000
12,000
7,220
6,276
21,460
Total Exports
1,547,989 1,274,997 1.658,469 1,866,967 2.062,424 2,408,444 3,103,406
Total Imports
1,326,640 <
907,841
809,926 1,040,662 1,367,239
1
,549,685 1,949,367
1913 Exchange rate: $4 8 to £1) Above and opposite: The charts show the erratic progress of trade in various commodities in the countries of South and Central America during the years of the First World War. Left: Brazilian workers gather coffee beans. Brazil spurned Latin American solidarity and turned to the United States instead
the market, they controlled most of the shipping necessary to transport the nitrate and enforced rigid restrictions on what Chile could buy with the foreign exchange earnings from the sale of nitrate. Pretty much the same thing happened to Argentina's wheat and meat and to Mexico's petroleum. The Latin American nations found that their trading rights as neutrals were defined less by the niceties of international law than by the requirements
nations committed only with the greatest reluctance. Even belligerent Brazil, not unwilling to seize the German ships, was coerced into giving the Allies final disposition of the tonnage. The Allies controlled the news that reached Latin America, indirectly through the Associated Press, United Press, Reuters, and France Presse, and directly through Allied censors who monitored the contents of news dispatches and all cables into and out of Latin America. To tell their side of the story, the Germans had to buy newspapers such as La Union of Buenos Aires and El Democrata of Mexico City. The crux of Latin America's economic
dependence was its need for manufactured goods. At the start of the war, the Latin American nations expected to take advantage
of their position as producers of strategically important primary products to increase their foreign exchange earnings and use those earnings to finance their own industrial development and the diversification of their economies. By the Armistice, their fondest dreams had been dashed. Even those nations which enjoyed rising prices for their products and whose exports in-
found that the machinery and industrial plant they required was not available at any price. In many cases, government revenues actually declined during the war because imports, the major source of government income, declined. In effect, the nations of Latin America reached the limits of self-sustained import subcreased
stitution.
When the war ended, Latin America had changed in two important ways. First, the United States had become dominant throughout the hemisphere and intruded into the destinies of every nation. Second, the fact of external dependence had been made painfully clear to the peoples and governments of Latin America and had produced as a reaction the first national-
movements whose objectives were to what they called the true independence of their nations. At the time of the Armistice these movements were still without major influence and their aims istic
establish
were not yet clearly focused. Still, the seeds of discontent and change had been planted during the First World War.
monopolise
of the Allies for materials deemed of strategic importance to the war effort. Brazil, bereft of any vital strategic materials, tried to create a position of strategic importance in political and geographical terms by means of a policy of overt friendship and co-operation with the US.
The war brought home to Latin America the lesson of political and economic dependence. The lack of shipping and the soaring cost of freight tied the Latin American exporters' hands. Further, it left their governments vulnerable to pressure by the United States to expropriate the German ships in their harbours and turn them over to the Allies, an un-neutral act which many of the Latin American
Further Reading Martin, P.
A.,
Latin
America and the War
(Baltimore 1925) Rocuant y Figueroa, Enrique, The Neutrality of Chile (Valparaiso 1919) Tulchin, Joseph S., The Aftermath of War: the Impact of World War I on the Latin American Policy of the United States, 1918-1925 (New York 1971) United States Tariff Commission, The Foreign Trade of Latin America (Washington 1940)
JOSEPH S TULCHIN has been
Professor of History North Carolina, Chapel Hill, since received his BA from Amherst College, Peterhouse, Cambridge, and earned his
at the University of
1976. He studied at
PhD at Harvard He combines work in the field of diplomatic history with the history of Latin America, and is now at work on a history of inter-American relations. In addition to the monograph cited in the bibliography, his publications include articles on United States foreign policy, inter-American relations, and the political and economic history of Argentina. He spent the academic year 1969/70 in Argentina completing research for a book on the rise of the Radical Party to power, and has many publications in English and Spanish on Argentina.
3079
npany around Kaiser ,it Wilson's message outlining the Fourteen have caused little or no
The
reference on record made by the Kaiser to Wilson's speech was a month later in the context of Wilson's demand to remove the Hohenzollern dynasty. The German High Command, too, did not take them seriously and dismissed them as a cloak behind which the United States and Great Britain were engineering Germany's economic destruction.
impression at
all.
first direct
GERMANY ACCEPTSTHE
The German Foreign Ministry under Kuhlmann took a different view. Kuhlmann, who much to the disgust of the OHL
would agree to them. Then, referring back to the German government's invitation to the western powers to participate in the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and their refusal to do so, Hertling declared that this had left the road open for separate hi lateral negobetween the Central Powers and Russia and that therefore Wilson's demand for the evacuation of German-occupied tiations
Russian
territory
was an undue
ference in questions
3080
now
inter-
the sole concern
of national self-determination in that area would produce just and equitable solutions.
As
to Poland he remarked that the Central Powers had liberated it from the 'Tsarist yoke' and that it should be left to them and to Poland to determine its future shape. Hertling had treated the problem of eastern Europe from the viewpoint of the OHL, the Belgian problem he treated likewise. While rejecting any imputation of German intentions to annex the country by force, he relegated the future of Belgium
to those questions left for discussion in peace negotiations. In other words, Belgium was a pawn on the diplomatic chessboard and the same applied to the German-
had been attempting
to obtain a negotiated settlement, considered Wilson's proposal at least as a basis for discussion. His influence is pronounced in Chancellor Hertling's public reply which was also meant to answer Lloyd George's speech before the Trade Union Congress held on January 5. Though Hertling did not quite share Kuhlmann's optimism, he thought Wilson's Fourteen Points represented a turn towards moderation which, once the military situation improved, could be exploited accordingly. Hence it would have been impolitic to cold-shoulder Wilson. The German press, particularly that of the Social Democrats and the Centre Party, gave the Fourteen Points considerable prominence and the German Chancellor dealt with them specifically in a speech of January 24. As far as safeguarding peace in the future was concerned, he thought the principle of treaties openly negotiated and arrived at was fully acceptable. As examples illustrating that it was already being implemented by the Central Powers he pointed to the publication in 1888 of the German-Austro-Hungarian Alliance and the negotiations between the Central Powers and Russia at Brest-Litovsk. He considered securing the freedom of the seas as one of the most important tasks of the future but added that, if established, the principle ought to be suspended whenever fully concerted international action was required to uphold international agreements. Hertling also asked for the abolition of fortified naval bases along internationally important shipping routes, such as maintained by Great Britain in Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hong Kong and the Falkland Isles. To the removal of economic barriers and the prohibition of economic warfare he agreed fully. Also the limitation of armaments was (in view of the financial burden the arms race had imposed upon the states of Europe) worth serious discussion. The creation of the League of Nations, too, based on complete equality of all partners, could be examined once all other outstanding questions had been settled. Hertling thought Wil iposals for the settlement of colonial disputes unrealistic since it was highly unlikely that Great Britain
and the Central Powers. But he hoped that the application of the principle
of Russia
io
occupied parts of France. However, he rejected firmly the return .of Alsace-Lorraine to France and judiciously evaded the issue of just how the application of the principle of self-determination would affect
Germany's
POINTS Since Germany's leaders could not face the reality of defeat, she had to acquire a government who would. Prince Max's impossible task, at the nadir of
Germany's fortunes, was to install a government stable enough to give credibility to the inevitable peace negotiaThe difficulty of getting them to agree, and the need for some form of dialogue with the Allies, forced Max to put his trust in Wilson's 14 Points, although their lack of formal status offered little security for a favourable settlement. H. W. Koch. Opposite: Pillars of the military establishment. Field-Marshal Hindenburg (centre) at the National War tions.
Memorial at Tannenberg, where he was later buried. With him are (left) Mackensen and Ludendorff, and (right) General von Seeckt
allies.
In conclusion, though, Hertling wondered just how sincere the Allied statesmen were in their desire for peace. They spoke like victors to the vanquished, an attitude which he asked them to abandon. After all, never before had the military situation been so favourable for Germany. That at least the British understood the meaning of Hertling's speech is born out by a remark of Lord Riddell that the speech is 'defiant in tone but pacific in intention' and Lloyd George agreed with him. In their actual substance President Wilson's Fourteen Points were a peace programme which, while excluding the more extreme war aims of America's 'co-belligerents' (the term 'ally' is misleading, since no alliance had been concluded), put Germany and her allies automatically into the position of the defeated in future peace negotiations. In spite of its very careful formulation the demand for the cession of AlsaceLorraine and the predominantly Polish parts of Eastern Germany were vital points to which the Germans would never agree unless forced to do so. Nor was the remainder cause for unqualified enthusiasm among the Central Powers. In short, Wilson's Fourteen Points were anything but a return to the status quo ante bellum, which was the minimum demand even for
moderates in Germany. Looking at the Fourteen Points from the perspective of November 1918, which cannot exclude the human suffering of the intervening months, one may well wonder whether Germany and her allies would not have been better advised had they accepted them and on the basis they provided offered a general peace. But on the surface Germany's military position had never been more advantageous. While her back in the east had been cleared a massive offensive designed to end the war was prepared in the west. There is no evidence to show that the Kaiser, Hertling, Hindenburg or Ludendorff saw beyond that point. Some subordinate officers in the
OHL
did, as did a of industrialists, but their counsel not taken until it, was too late and
number was
Germany had asked
for an armistice based on the Fourteen Points. Had the Germans, so Winston Churchill commented, instead of asking for an armistice sought a peace by negotiation and meanwhile [ought on, the interpretation placed on the Fourteen Points by them and each of the Allies might have been reduced to an exact and concrete
form. But their collapse was so rapid that they could only sue for an armistice, and in the mere process of the correspondence they became utterly prostrate and finally submitted to conditions which left them
they were at a total loss as to whom to suggest for Chancellor, and the choice of Prince Max of Baden as Chancellor was the product of a staggeringly embarrassing situation. Inside the Reichstag he was
This development helpless. henceforthwhich far transcended the highest expectations of the Allies, left the victors the sole judges of the interpretation which should be placed upon the Fourteen Points,
known for his moderate liberal views; to the German public as well as to the public
vanquished naturally construed them in their most helpful and generous while
sense.
What
'transcended the highest expectawas equally unexpected to most Germans. In the wake of military defeats and the total collapse of her allies, the new government under Prince Max of Baden recalled the Fourteen Points. It is indicative of the lack of political maturity of the Reichstag that at the very moment when what the majority of parties had demanded for decades was given to them, namely full parliamentartions of the Allies'
isation
and participation in government,
of the Entente Powers he
was
just another
Junker.
Nor did it help matters that when forming his government he was instantly subjected to Ludendorff's heavy pressure. LudendorfF was panic stricken; for months he had refused to consider the possibility of an armistice, now he could not get it quickly enough. During the course of October 1, telegrams from the OHL arrived hourly in Berlin demanding that peace offers ought to be made instantly. The new Chancellor put up a spirited resistance which rested on the argument that thorough -going political domestic reforms would have to precede any peace offer in order to make it credible. Moreover, he
was
still
busy selecting his cabinet.
Ludendorff refused to give in; although he gave the categoric assurance to Prince Max
German army
could well protect frontiers until the spring of 1919, he insisted upon the implementation of his demand that an offer of an armistice that the
Germany's
be sent out immediately. At long last during the night of October 3/4, a German note was addressed to President Wilson asking his offices to restore peace on the basis of his Fourteen Points. It was the new government's first official action in the realm of Foreign policy. Ever since the summer of 1918 the Ger-
man public had become aware of the growing discrepancy between the official picture offered by the War Press Office and the grim reality. Yet the publication of the note to President Wilson nevertheless came as an unexpected shock. It revealed the essential weakness of a political and military leadership which hitherto had prided itself on its invincibility. Had the official propaganda policy at least prepared slowly for the change the
3081
ght perhaps have the publicaPress Office outV 'rumours concerning the collapse of our fronts'. Its representative briefing the journalists of Germany's leading dailies and news agencies asked for the suppression of Allied news which reported 'breakthroughs and the pursuit of the enemy along the Western Front'. Nor was the German public officially informed of the full implications of the acceptance of the Fourteen Points. Within a few days of publication of the note Walther Rathenau, head of Germany's biggest electrical combine, the AEG, published an article in the influential Berlin Vossische Zeitung. In it he severely criticised the new government's policy. He immediately pointed to the obvious consequences which the acceptance of Wilson's Fourteen Points implied: the handing over of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the formation of a Polish state with access to the sea which in turn would mean the cession of East Prussia to Poland. Furthermore Germany would have to pay reparations for the entire war damage in France and in Belgium. Should Germany in the face of these conditions give up and agree to what would amount to a German capitulation and unconditional surrender? Or would it not be more appropriate, if the enemy held fast to these conditions, for the entire nation to rise in order to defend the fatherland? This was the question which during the next few weeks stood at the centre of the debate between the German government and the German Army High Command, a debate that ended with the final acceptance of Wilson's hardening conditions and the fall of Ludendorff. In spite of his panic, Ludendorff did not want a German capitulation. His objective was to obtain some breathing space for the exhausted German troops and to effect what he should have done three months before, a large scale withdrawal of the German armies to Germany's western frontier, ready to fight again, if necessary, to avoid the conclusion of a 'shameful peace'. But until he had carried out his systematic retreat Ludendorff constantly faced the threat of a massive breakthrough of the Allied forces. As the full text of President Wilson's Fourteen Points was not available at the OHL they requested it from the Foreign i
Ministry. When Hindenburg was asked if he was aware that their acceptance would
mean
substantial losses of German territory including the German colonies Ludendorff answered on his behalf: Germany would not hand over an inch of her territory by accepting the Fourteen Points and it would be up to Germany's politicians and negotiators to represent Germany's interests successfully. Ludendorff was already engaged in moving the responsibility for future events into the lap of the political leadership of the Reich. But many of them cherished similar illusions, like the Centre Party deputy of the Reichstag and Secretary of State without Portfolio Matthias Erzberger, the very man who a month later was to sign the Armistice. President Wilson's reply of October 8 reached Berlin the following day and necessitated a meeting between the Cabinet and the Army High Command. Wilson's note at this stage did not force a decision; it simply asked the German
3082
government whether
it
was prepared
to
accept the Fourteen Points without reservation, and demanded the evacuation of German-occupied territories in the west. Also the note asked in whose name the German government was actually speaking, in the name of the German people or in that of the old powers, an early indication that the domestic scene was taken seriously into consideration by President Wilson. The meeting between the cabinet and the OHL was opened by Ludendorff who as a preliminary to the question of how to react to the note gave a lengthy discourse in Germany's military position. He argued the case in favour of continuing the fight if Wilson's conditions were too for Germany to accept. What was important now was to obtain a rest period for the German army and to find replacements for its heavily depleted ranks. At present the German army could hold out until the spring of 1919. Ludendorff accepted the evacuation of the occupied territories provided all. the war materials could be dismantled and transported back. He envisaged the evacuation taking place in several stages and suggested the setting up of mixed commissions made up of personnel of the Central and the Allied Powers to make the necessary arrangements.
hard
Barbaric militarism The new Chancellor listened attentively and found himself pulled in the opposite direction. On the one hand he felt great reluctance to accept the idea of placing the future of Germany unreservedly into the hands of the American President, on the other he could get no clear-cut answer from Ludendorff as to what would actually be gained by continuing military resistance into the spring of 1919. Under the pressure of his Secretary of State for the Exterior, Solf, who had replaced Hintze, and of Erzberger and the Social Democrat Scheidemann, another Secretary of State without Portfolio, Prince Max decided not to spoil the opportunity of Wilson's mediation. But to keep aloof, he left the signature of the German note to Solf. The German reply to President Wilson stated the German government's basic willingness to accept the Fourteen Points. In answer to Wilson's last question, in whose name the German government was speaking, the German Foreign Ministry sent a separate memorandum detailing the constitutional changes that had already been made and those that were to be made. Unfortunately the arrival of the German reply in Washington coincided with that of the news that the British passenger steamer Leinster had been torpedoed by a German submarine. This touched President Wilson on one of his more sensitive spots and elicited from him a diatribe against the barbaric militarism of the
Germans. Of course, it was bound to affect the contents and phrasing of his reply. The Kaiser after September 29 could do little but watch. Like Ludendorff he was afraid of a military breakthrough of the Allies, and was personally rather depressed about the composition of the new
German
government as well as about the constitutional reforms introduced. He was equally pessimistic as to his own future and the circle around him quite openly discussed the possibility that the Kaiser's abdication and that of the Crown Prince might well be one of the Allied conditions of peace.
Wilson's note of October 8 caused a mild surprise by its business-like tone and its moderation but the Kaiser's optimism for his own future could hardly have been strengthened by the rumour that the Crown Prince had initiated a public relations campaign designed to project him as a man of 'liberal' views and a suitable successor to his father. The Kaiser's apprehensions about his own future appeared fully justified by the content of President Wilson's second note of October 14. In it Wilson stated that no armistice was possible without 'absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the Armies of the United States and of its Allies'. He rejected the idea of mixed commissions which Ludendorff had proposed and insisted instead that the terms and the details of the armistice must be settled by the Allied commanders. He accused Germany of the continuance of inhuman warfare, pointing to the activities of German U-Boats and the destruction which the Germans had
behind in the territories so far evacuThere could be no armistice before Germany had returned to the rules of war of civilised nations and finally, in terms kept deliberately vague, he called upon the German people to put an end to the powers of tyranny which had guided their destiny left
ated.
up to that time. Whether it was President Wilson's
in-
tention to incite the German people to remove the Hohenzollern dynasty is still not clear. Obviously Wilson was outraged by the sinking of the Leinster (though in order to demonstrate their good intentions the Germans had recalled German UBoats operating off the American coast in the Atlantic early in October) but Wilson had also to take into account the Entente Powers who were rather annoyed by his keeping the negotiations exclusively in his own hands. Nor could he ignore his own electorate who were about to cast their votes in the Congressional Elections of 1918. In October alone American forces on the Western Front had suffered casualties exceeding 100,000. The impact of Wilson's second note on the German government was shattering. For the first time the government and the German nation as a whole were confronted by the alternatives of humiliating submission or a fight to the bitter end. The OHL did not yet demand that the negotiations be broken off, but the idea of a final struggle moved more and more to the fore. In the cabinet meetings in which the government prepared its reply to Wilson, Ludendorff, with newly won confidence, emphasised that according to his own judgment the army could carry on the fight for some time to come. His confidence and arguments were based on the weakening strength of the Allied attacks and also the very favourable figure for replacements, supplied by the Minister of War, ranging around the 600,000 mark. Time and again he emphasised the need to restore morale at home and demanded the rejection of conditions which would prevent the German army from resuming the fight if negotiations proved futile. assertions about the
ments proved
When
Ludendorff 'a
number
of replace-
to lie within the
realms of
fantasy Prince Max's personal confidence in Ludendorff was irreparably destroyed. Among the Kaiser's entourage President
Wilson's second note had an equally dismal 'A black day. The morning papers feature Wilson's reply. All prospects of peace are annihilated. What remains is a struggle for life and death. Perhaps revolution,' records Admiral von Muller. However, for a day or two Ludendorff's sudden optimism also infected the Kaiser. He was elated by the prospect of the replacements and he agreed that it would be inadvisable to give up unrestricted submarine warfare in order to pacify Wilson. To Prince Max he wrote a letter describing Wilson's note as an 'unmitigated frivolous insolence' and told him to use it as a means with which to rally the entire German people to the defence 'of our most sacred values'. But how this defence was to be conducted, the Kaiser did not tell him. The politicians were quick to calm down. While not expressing doubt of Ludendorff's personal judgment, they thought it might be desirable to hear the opinions of other leading generals in the field. On October 16 Prince Max, after considerable heartsearching, rejected for the time being any governmental appeal to the nation to fight to the end. 'The desire to perish with honour may well occur to the individual,' he wrote, 'but the responsible statesmen must accept that the broad mass of the people has the right soberly to demand to live rather than to die in glory.' The OHL, however, opposed him; it accused the Chancellor of defeatism because of his refusal to prepare the German public for
?
effect.
A free, open-
minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all .' colonial claims — from the fifth of .
.
Wilson's 14 Points
mind
first
troops. Furthermore it emphasised that the German troops had strict instructions to respect private property and it also disputed that the German navy had intentionally sunk life boats and their crews. To clear up such disputed points the German government suggested the setting up of neutral investigating commissions, and at the same time informed the Presi-
dent that German submarines had been ordered not to torpedo passenger ships.
Turning
to Prince
Max's pungent arguments
wrong. Of course the cabinet realised this and consequently did their best to implicate Ludendorff in their decisions. He refused, and any reference to the consequences which the failure of the negotiations with
to
German
constitutional issues
the note drew the President's attention to the fundamental changes that had taken place in Germany during recent weeks such as the inclusion of leaders of the majority parties in the government, and the continuing constitutional reform by which the Chancellor would be subject exclusively to parliamentary control. Finally the note emphasised that the German offer of an armistice and peace was made by the government which enjoyed the overwhelming support of the German people. President Wilson's reply was not slow in coming. In his third note of October 23 he declared his basic readiness to take up the question of an armistice with his Allies. However, any armistice could only be one which would make resumption of the war by Germany impossible. The Allied powers would require extraordinary securities. The note then went on to express doubts as to the sincerity and duration of Germany's constitutional reforms, saying it seemed obvious that the German people had no means of ensuring the subordination of the military authorities to the political authorities, or of containing the influence 'of the King of Prussia' upon the conduct of German policy. If the Allies were compelled to negotiate with Germany's military rulers and monarchic autocrats then there would be only one way of ending the war, by Germany's
ever-vacillating monarch, refused, could not close his
backed by the threat of his resignation. He agreed. There now remained Ludendorff's agreement which for tactical political reasons it was important to obtain. Ludendorff was now playing a game in which saving his own reputation mattered more to him than the nation. Hence he tried to steer clear from making, or being part of, any political decision, leaving it to the politicians to take the blame if things went
politics.
drawing
opposed President Wilson's interference with Germany's domestic affairs and he rejected his charge of inhuman warfare. But he was prepared to abandon unrestricted submarine warfare. In this he was opposed by the Kaiser and, more formidably, by the OHL and the Admiralty, aided and abetted by the majority of his own cabinet members led by Vice-Chancellor von Payer of the Progressive People's Party, and by Erzberger. Prince Max found it necessary to convene a special cabinet meeting at which all available German ambassadors were present and they convinced the cabinet that German submarine warfare had become devoid of purpose and could hardly be reconciled with the negotiations with President Wilson. Having brought his cabinet into line the Chancellor now required the formal agreement of the
The
OHL, he
In its reply of October 20 to President Wilson's second note, the German government declared that with regard to the armistice it would put its trust in the President not to approve of any action irreconcilable with the honour of the German people and the conclusion of a just peace. It rejected the charge of inhuman warfare, referring existing interto national law which permitted destruction necessary for the protection of the with-
Ludendorff's face-saving The Chancellor, in contrast to his previous reluctance, now correctly gauged the warweary temper of the nation and the upsurge of revolution, and was determined to force mediation upon Wilson. Personally he
Kaiser.
over the military leadership? The argued, was no longer a political factor and although it disagreed over the question concerning the abandonment of unrestricted submarine warfare, it would clearly have to subordinate itself to the political directives of the government. The German army, so it seemed, had withdrawn political
from
a final struggle.
having at
Wilson would have left him cold. It was Major-General von Haeften, the liaison officer between the OHL and the government who ingenuously argued that, after all, since the Kaiser as 'Supreme War Lord' had already agreed to the government's decision, that of the OHL was no longer required. Besides, he added, what better occasion would there be than the present one to demonstrate the supremacy of the
capitulation.
Woodrow
Wilson, prophet of a new political philosophy, thought by many to be meddling in German affairs. Bottom: Prince Max of Baden, who resigned as Chancellor after only a month in office. A member of the Junker class, his views were liberal
Top:
The note hit the German government like a bombshell: it interpreted it as a continued attempt under the guise of negotiation to force capitulation upon Germany instead of an armistice. That the German army had not withdrawn from politics be-
3083
after
Haeften had
Wilson's note to October 24. It reacted ssuing an order of the day intended to go as far down as company level which stated that the capitulation demanded by Wilson was unacceptable and that his note as it stood was evidence that Germany's enemies paid only lip service to the conclusion of a just peace, a deliberate piece of deception by means of which Germany's power of resistance was to be broken. Ludendorff signed the order and on the following day, October 25, together with Hindenburg travelled to Berlin to persuade the Kaiser to have the government break off the negotiations. As in the months before, events had again overtaken the OHL. Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria had already argued that Ludendorff failed to see the desperate situation of the German army and that peace would have to be concluded before the enemy forced it upon Germany. On October 21 revolution had broken out in Vienna and a provisional German national assembly was formed there. Inside Germany the signs of political disintegration multiplied. The Kaiser's possible abdication had been the subject of newspaper speculation since early in the month. Now Wilson's note appeared to demand it by implication and thus sparked off the outright call for the Kaiser's abdication and the proclamation of a republic, particularly among left wing papers. The Kaiser himself, however, appeared to be unperturbed, even jovial. f
The Hohenzollerns have abdicated.
Take care, that this proud day be not Long besmirched .
live the
.
.
German
Republic!'
the SPD members of the government now demanded the abdication of Wilhelm II,
Acrimony and recriminations Upon their arrival in Berlin Hindenburg and Ludendorff were advised to refrain from interfering with the German reply to Wilson's latest note. This they rejected and instead insisted on the breaking off of the negotiations with Wilson. Vice-Chancellor Payer — the Chancellor himself was ill in bed — was determined to assert the supre-
macy
of the civil government over the military, especially because on the following day a further constitutional change
was
place which deprived the Kaiser of his functions as Commander-inChief and transferred responsibility for the
take
to
army Payer
Parliament and also reprimanded
to
its
government.
both
military to the
Commanders for issuing the order army on the preceding day without
previ-
ous consultation of the government. On the morning of October 26, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were summoned before the Kaiser who also chastised them for interfering in matters purely political — not that he had ever shown signs of caring before. This provoked an extremely acrimonious debate, full of recriminations, in the course of which Ludendorff lost control of himself and attacked both the Kaiser and Hindenburg. As a result, when he offered his resignation, it was accepted immediately. That submitted by Hindenburg was not. Ludendorff 's departure, far from causing an upheaval, as he had hoped, was generally greeted with a sigh of relief among the OHL and the government alike. Actually Ludendorff had merely anticipated a step the Kaiser and his Chancellor had intended to take. With Ludendorff out of the way the German reply to Wilson could now be drafted—a matter of some urgency as the news
had arrived that Austria-Hungary about to sue for a separate peace.
3084
was
asked the Chancellor to advise the Kaiser to abdicate. The Kaiser himself on October 31 decided to escape the revolutionary hothouse that Berlin had become and return to Spa. As he boarded the train to depart forever from Berlin further bad news reached him. Revolution had spread from Vienna throughout the Habsburg Empire, the former Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, had been murdered, and separate Czecho-Slovak, Yugoslav, Hungarian and German-Austrian states had been proclaimed. Turkey too had concluded a cease-fire. In Germany over the next few days revolution swept from Kiel to Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, to Brunswick, Thuringia and Saxony, and Munich, ending in an attempt at revolution in Berlin. On October 11, Max Weber had written in a letter on the question of the possible abdication of the Kaiser, 'If he abdicates now, free from external pressure, he will leave in honour and the chivalrous compassion of the nation will be with him. Above all, the position of the dynasty will remain untouched. If he stays vengeance for political errors will also inevitably turn against him.' This was now coming true. Under pressure from their own left wing,
Above: Kaiser Wilhelm II, persuaded by Prince Max to abdicate on November 9, 1918
On the whole there was not really much the Germans could say except to acknowledge Wilson's note and to draw the President's attention to the thoroughgoing constitutional changes in the course of which the German armed forces had been subjected to parliament. It concluded by saying that the German government now looked forward to suggestions for an armistice as a prelude to a just peace as outlined by the President in his previous speeches. The German government did not explicitly reject the possibility of a capitulation nor did it stipulate conditions for an armistice, a sign of Germany's domestic plight. On the day the note was despatched, October 27, Austria-Hungary officially sued for a separate peace. The following day mutiny broke out aboard a battleship of he German High Seas Fleet which in a matter of days infected most of the crews of the German surface navy. The crews were unwilling to serve as cannon fodder for one last desperate attempt against the Royal Navy. The news of the mutiny in Kiel spread rapidly and with it the call to do away with 'the warmonger-, and generals'. The Kaiser had now become the I
chief object of the attack, and
Scheidemann
though at this stage they still supported the maintenance of the monarchy. Into the midst of this chaos arrived President Wilson's fourth note of November 5 which declared that Marshal Foch would now be prepared to receive authorised German plenipotentiaries to inform them of the conditions for an armistice. The note also stated that the Allied governments accepted President Wilson's Fourteen Points as the basis for a peace settlement, excepting the principle of the freedom of the seas which they reserved for future discussion. On the surface this gave the impression of an important diplomatic victory gained by the Germans who now placed all their hopes on the implementation of Wilson's programme. The crisis in Germany reached its height on November 9 with the abdication of the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, the resignation of the cabinet of Prince Max of Baden and the proclamation — by accident — of a German republic. The new provisional government constituted on the same day on which Wilhelm II fled to Holland, immediately decided to accept President Wilson's offer and despatched its delegation to the forest of Compiegne to receive and, on November 11, accept, the terms of the Armistice. These left no doubt that what the Germans signed was an armistice as well as an unconditional surrender. There remained still the hope of ultimately concluding a peace based on President Wilson's Fourteen Points many of which, however, were vague and ambiguous. The Germans, so Winston Churchill argues, had a right to claim that they had surrendered and disarmed themselves on President Wilson's Fourteen Points and other speeches except in so far as these were modified by the former reservation of the Allies. They were not, however, accorded — nor were they in a position to request — any share in tin' interpretation. This left a latitude to the victors certainly wide enough misunderstandings in after years.
for
[For H. W. Koch's biography, see page
.7.9. ]
wmmnmm (WCEDES DEFEIT Like Russia, Austria-Hungary was defeated as
much by internal
collapse as by actual military reverses in the field. Increasingly throughout 1918 troops destined for the Italian Front had to be retained to keep order in the non-German provinces of the Empire. Z. A. B. Zeman. Below: The long road home. Austrian troops withdraw from Italy
mm*w**
In March 1918 the new Soviet state left the war. Nevertheless, the reduction of the war in the East and the West to a one-front engagement did not bring victory to the Central Powers. By the middle of the summer, the German offensive in the West had spent itself. The American presence in France now started making itself felt: US troops were arriving at French ports at the rate of a quarter of a million a month. At the end of August the Allied military realised that the final decision in the war could be made in the same year. The Allied attack launched on September 29 elicited a demand from Ludendorff that peace and armistice offers should be made to the Entente. This evidence of Germany's military weakness encouraged the defection of allies, and on September 14 the AustroHungarian Emperor published a peace
her
manifesto without consulting Berlin. No one took any notice of it. On the following
day, the Allied attack on the Bulgarian Front was opened, and the government in Sofia signed an armistice on September 29. On the Italian Front, where the majority of the Austro-Hungarian forces were concentrated, both sides were content to remain on the defensive. There were two short, sharp battles there in June and then again in October, but that was all. In September 1918 the battle-lines manned by Austro-Hungarian troops still cut across enemy territory, in Italy and Serbia, in Rumania and Albania, in Poland and the Ukraine. Yet the morale of the army was now declining fast. It is true that it had been protected against economic privations longer than the civilian population. But by the end of the summer it began to suffer from hunger as well as shortage of arms and ammunition. The number of deserters was growing: the 'human material' began to show signs of strain. And the High Command that the Germans were no longer in the position — as they had been before — to come to the rescue of the Habsburg army. In addition, internal security of the State had made heavy demands on the AustroHungarian army. Whereas the Germans
severe
knew
were able to transfer at least 40 divisions from the East to the West after the Russian army disintegrated during the revolution, seven Austro-Hungarian combat divisions from the Russian front were used to break
situations in his province. The Ministry of Defence usually tried to oblige the Ministry
the strikes in the Austrian industrial centres early in 1918. The demands of the civil and the military authorities came into a sharp conflict: the divisions were used on the home, rather than the Italian, front. Throughout 1918 requests for military assistance by the civil authorities continued to arrive at the Ministry of Defence. Early in February the Governor of Galicia wrote from Krakow to the Ministry of the Interior saying he had asked the Ministry of Defence for more troops: at least 8,000
This exchange of views on the respective merits of the home and the foreign fronts continued throughout the summer, until on July 8, 1918 General Arz ordered all combat divisions to go to the front. The Ministry of Defence countered this order by appealing to the Emperor. From this ceaseless dissension one thing clearly emerged: the struggle against the enemy at home had become quite as important as the military conduct of the war. At the same time, the Slav politicians in the Habsburg monarchy became aware of
soldiers
were needed
to
meet emergency
was countered by the High Command which protested against the way in which the soldiers were used.
of the Interior, but
the extent of the exiles' achievement in the Entente countries. Although some information concerning the activities of the Polish, Czech and South Slav emigres was published in the Austro-Hungarian press, and the Poles had a useful link witb the outside world in the emissaries of the Regents' Council in Warsaw, the underground channel between Prague and the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris was a very effective means of communication. It served not only the Czechs but, as the meetings of their politicians became more frequent in the course of the year 1918, all the Slavs of the Habsburg monBelow: The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 1918
BOUNDARIES 1914 CENTRAL POWERS AREAS GAINED BY AUSTRIA-HUNGARY DURING THE WAR TO BE CEDED UNDER ARMISTICE OF NOVEMBER 4
Adriatic
Sea s
Austria leaves the
War
Conditions of the Armistice concluded with Austria-Hungary on (to become effective on November 4) The immediate cessation of all hostilities. The demobilisation of the Austro-Hungarian army and its withdrawal from the fronts between the North Sea and Switzerland. A maximum prewar establishment to be maintained in the Austro-Hungarian homeland. Half the Austro-Hungarian artillery to be handed over to the Allies. The evacuation of all territories occupied by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of the war. All the evacuated territories to be occupied by the forces of the Allies. No sabotage to be done. The Allies to have freedom of movement within Austria-Hungary and the right to occupy strategic centres. All German troops to evacuate the Italian and Balkan Fronts, and AustriaHungary, within 15 days, on pain of internment. The evacuated territories to be administered by the Allies. All Allied prisoners-of-war and civilians evacuated from their homes during the course of the war to be repatriated immediately. Austro-Hungarian personnel too sick or wounded to be evacuated from the specified areas to be looked after by Austro-Hungarian personnel left behind for that purpose. military force of 20 divisions at
9
The location of all Austro-Hungarian warships to be made known to the Allies, and all Austro-Hungarian territorial waters to be made open to the vessels of the Allies.
10 The Austro-Hungarians
to surrender 15 submarines to the Allies, to the remainder and to intern any German submarines entering their waters. The Austro-Hungarians to surrender to the Allies three dreadnoughts, three light cruisers, nine destroyers, twelve torpedoboats, one minelayer and six Danube monitors. The rest of the Austro-Hungarian fleet to be paid off and disarmed in ports designated by the Allies.
disarm and pay II
|2 The ij
14 |
J
16 my
3086
off
Allies blockade of Austria-Hungary to remain in force. Austro-Hungarian naval aircraft to be handed over to the Allies and immobilised. The Austro-Hungarians to evacuate all Italian and other ports outside Austro-Hungarian national territory. The Allies to occupy all Austro-Hungarian land and sea fortifications, and the defences of Pola. All Allied merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary to be returned. No ships or naval material to be damaged before handing over to the All
Allies.
V;
November 3,1918
exchange of messages between Prague and Paris became more frequent and reliable: during the last four months of the war, at least 27 messages passed between the two cities. Eduard Benes, the Secretary of the Czechoslovak National Council, was becoming increasingly optimistic about recognition of the Czech and Slovak claims to independence by the Entente governments. On May 17 he reported to Prague that: Benes negotiated with Balfour and Robert Cecil. Both promised him absolute support Robert Cecil promised for our cause that he would speak publicly against Austria and for our independence. He did so on archy. In the spring of 1918 the
.
.
.
.
May 22 Benes Pichon
.
.
After his return from London had discussions with ministers .
.
.
and
Clemenceau.
Pichon
and the Serbs, a demand which had been made by the two peoples more than a year before; the plans of the Czechs and the Slovaks would have run into the same difficulty. The division of the state into the Austrian and the Hungarian parts was to be strictly observed: it was impossible now, as it had been at any time since the Austro-Hungarian compromise in 1867, to deal with the national problem in any other way. Burian von Rajecz and Doctor Wekerle, the two most influential Hungarian politicians at the end of the war, secured a guarantee from the Emperor as to the integrity of the Hungarian part of the monarchy, and turned down his suggestions that a similar manifesto should be published in Buda Pest. The proclamation on October 16 therefore,
cate-
gorically declared that France will now go most decisively and ruthlessly against Austria. He said: 'We want you to be free. to destroy Austria. You have done what you could, and we are expecting still more help from your people at home.
We want
Imminent proclamation At the end of the message to Prague Benes hinted that the proclamation of the Czechs' and Slovaks' right to independence was imminent and he added that 'after the declaration of independence a provisional government may be set up. Be prepared for it and do not publish a disavowal at any price and especially bear in mind unity with us. The provisional government will be regarded here as a delegation and as a part of the provisional government, the second half of which will be in Bohemia'. Benes knew that in Prague there were politicians, popular leaders of powerful parties, who would themselves aspire to high honours in the new state. He wanted to prepare them for Allied recognition of his and Masaryk's Paris Council as the provisional government of the future Czechoslovak state. At the same time, Benes revived an old plan of his for a meeting between the Prague politicians and the representatives of the National Council. Early in 1917 he had asked Prague to begin planning the meeting in a neutral country: in July 1918 he insisted it was essential. The Czechs had expected the Austrian government to make difficulties. But when the five Czech deputies to the Reichsrat, led by Karel Kramaf, the most eminent of the Czech politicians, applied for the passports, the government gladly issued them. The Chancellor, Hussarek, wanted no part in antagonising the Czechs. The delegation, with two financial experts added to
it,
finally
left
Vienna
for
Dr Alexander Wekerle. He secured a guarantee Hungary's continued integrity
of
Towards a 'Czechoslovak state' By this time the Habsburg civil service and the military were thoroughly confused as to the aims of their government. They were unable to resist the moves by the national
committees to gather power in their own hands. On October 28 demonstrations took place in Prague against the Habsburg state and dynasty; in the evening the national committee unanimously passed a 'law on the establishment of an independent Czechoslovak state'. The law neither defined the form the state was to take, nor its relations with Vienna. In practice it ruled out the possibility of an Austrian federa-
Geneva on
October 25. They were the last Czechs to carry Austro-Hungarian passports. By then, the Austrian rulers had lost their self-confidence and their right to govern. For weeks now, the Slav politicians
had been making the most outrageous speeches against the monarchy and the dynasty in the parliament, until they became bored with abusing a lethargic government. In October Hussarek made a last-minute bid to rally some Slav politicians behind his cabinet: the Imperial Manifesto of October 16, 1918, which had been in preparation for some time, was intended to satisfy the demand for selfdetermination of the Austro-Hungarian peoples, but it came too late and gave too little. It would have prevented, for instance, the unification in one state of the Croats
trian military authorities (according to an old Habsburg practice, the troops stationed on Czech territory were not Czech) the national committee in Prague had another concern. It was an institution dominated by middle-class parties and their aim was a peaceful transference of power and not a revolution, least of all a social revolution. On October 11, 1918, a member of the Prague committee wrote to Benes in Paris: 'We cannot even contemplate a revolution; it is quite likely that because of the general starvation it would soon acquire Bolshevik forms.' In the meantime the delegation from Prague arrived in Geneva: the. meeting took place between October 28 and 31, Benes was faced with a formidable group of men, all similar to him in age and political experience. But Benes held the trump card in his hand: his and Masaryk's policy, which they had pursued consistently since the beginning of the war, had proved successful, and had the backing of the victorious powers. He made his point: he secured an agreement that the politicians in Prague would do nothing without the approval of the National Council. While the elder Czech statesmen were negotiating with Benes in Geneva, the younger politicians were left in control in Prague. For a few days the national committee and the military observed each other's movements with some apprehension: on October 27 events took place which convinced the Czechs that the moment was suited for action. In Vienna, Professor Lammasch became the new Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister, Andrassy, made an offer of a separate peace to President Wilson. At the same time, Andrassy asked the President for an immediate armistice, implying the severance of Vienna's alliance with Germany and the rights of the Czechoslovaks and the Yugoslavs to independence. In addition, the Supreme Command asked the Czechs to send a delegation to the front lines which would try to convince the troops to remain at their posts until the armistice.
General Arz von Straussenberg, last AustroHungarian Chief of the General Staff
instead of pacifying the peoples of Austria and making them content to stay together in one state, opened the way to many forms of national separation. It made the transfer of political and administrative power into the hands of the national committees in the provincial capitals possible. In Prague, the national committee decided to assume power, preferably on the day of the armistice; an economic council was established, which was to prevent the export of coal, food and other products from Czech territory to other parts of the Empire. Apart from its desire not to come into a direct confrontation with the Aus-
tion. The events in Moravia followed the same pattern as in Bohemia. On October 29 members of the national committee
based on the capital, Brno, asked Heinold, the Governor, to hand over to them the administration of the country. They alleged that they were acting in the spirit of the manifesto on federation. (Their compatriots in Prague had used the same tactics.) Heinold handed over his office to one of his Czech subordinates. There were Czech troops stationed in Brno, and the committee had no difficulty in taking over the military command. The 'Czechoslovak state' was still far from being a political reality. The idea was of Czech origin; even at the end of the war, the thin crust of
3087
Slovak intelligentsia which thought in terms of a military Czech and Slovak state, did not have the solid popular support of a largely peasant population behind it. The Slovaks, who lived in the Hungarian part of the monarchy, faced a tougher and more resolute government than the Czechs. Outside the Habsburg monarchy, cooperation between the Czechs and the Slovaks had made some progress during the war. General Stefanik, a Slovak astronomer resident in France before 1914, became a member of the Paris National Council; Masaryk had concluded an agreement on the Czechoslovak state with the
'By the end of October every people of the Empire had abandoned the Habsburgs and had established its own national state; there remained the
Austro-Hungarian army, still defending itself in Italy' Top: Soldiers of the Austrian Kaiserjager, in the Tyrol. Right: A stormed Italian position in the Isonzo region of Italy. Below: Italian soldiers guard Austrian prisoners in Venetia. Opposite page: Austria-
entrenched
Hungary's casualties.
Slovak immigrants in America. Finally, the idea of such a state was symbolised in the person of Masaryk himself: he was born on the Moravian side of the Slovak border. His father was Slovak, and Masaryk spoke the kind of Czech which sounded more like Slovak. Inside the monarchy, Varro Srobar, leader of the Slovak National Party, went to Prague as soon as he was released from a Hungarian prison on October 20; he was the only Slovak who signed, on October 28, the law on the establishment of the Czechoslovak state. In the meantime, in Slovenia, the National Party began to organise a meeting. It took place on October 30; the delegates knew nothing about the events in Prague two days before. They set up a committee on which the national, socialist and clerical movements were represented and passed a resolution which described the Slovaks as being 'linguistically, culturally and historically
a part of the Czechoslovak nation'. Never-
government in Buda Pest was not prepared to renounce Slovenia as easily as Vienna gave up Bohemia and Moravia. In the following year, the country had to be won for the government in Prague by the force of arms. In addition to the Slovak situation, the committees in Prague and Brno had to contend with the problem of large German minorities in Bohemia and Moravia. Indeed, had the right to self-determination of the Germans in these territories been recognised by the peace conferences, Czechoslovakia would have lost some 1,700 square miles of territory and nearly 3,000,000 inhabitants. In October 1918, however, the politicians of the German minority demanded the right to self-determination: they were not as yet prepared to become a part of the Czechoslovak state. theless, the
Threat from the South The national revolution
in the
South Slav
and Dalmatia, was carried out in close co-operation with the Czechs: a national committee in
territories, in Slovenia, Croatia
Zagreb had been set up in August 1918, during a visit by Czech politicians. It ran on similar lines. A broadly-based political
movement led to the formation of a united front against the Habsburgs; national comin Zagreb, Ljubljana and Split taking over power, piecemeal, from the Austrian and Hungarian civil and
mittees
began
military authorities. Indeed, the gravest threat to the integrity of Hungarian territory came from the South. Late in be war the Hungarian government was confident of its ability to maintain control of Slovenia and Transylvania. It never entertained the same hopes in regard to Croatia. Here the Yugoslav revolution was given an added edge by the presence, south of be border of Hungary, of an Allied army under General I
I
3088
D'Esperey and of the Serb troops now returning to their home country. On October 5 and 6 all political parties in the South Slav provinces of both Austria and Hungary agreed to set up a united national committee which demanded the unification of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into an independent state. Old political differences in Croatia were pushed into the background for the time being, and the formation of a united national front facilitated resistance to Buda Pest. When, early in October, Wekerle's government decided, for instance, to replace the Governor of Croatia, the Croats simply sent the new official back to Buda Pest. The influence of the Hungarian government in Croatia continued to decline throughout the month of October, until, on October 29, the Zagreb Diet declared the cessation of constitutional ties of all the South Slav territories with the Dual Monarchy.
Among
the
Slav
peoples
in
Austria-
fAMROMJMARIAS
"N
MILITMYCMALT1ES 191H918 The figures reproduced below are derived official sources dating back to the time of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. All mortality figures since the end of the First World War, however, have put the figures of Austro-Hungarian dead consistently about one-third higherthan those in this chart. This apparent discrepancy can possibly be explained by
from
the fact that the situation in AustriaHungary was so chaotic by the end of the
warthat it was virtually impossible to keep accurate casualty returns
Hungary, the Poles were in the strongest position: their claim to some kind of a united state had been recognised, on both the belligerent sides, early in the war. Towards the end, the subject of Poland could still arouse passions in Vienna and Berlin: it had been in abeyance for some time, since the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk early in 1918. There were signs in Vienna that the government had moved back, in September 1918, to its original position on Poland. It believed that the monarchy could be rejuvenated only by a union with Poland. The cabinet in Vienna took little notice of the fact that the political situation in the Polish territories had changed since 1916. The cession of the Kholm province to the Ukraine on the conclusion of peace in the East had enraged the Poles. They became convinced that they could expect nothing from the Central Powers. In the Reichsrat the club of the Polish deputies was split: nearly half of its members formed a united front with the Czechs and the South Slavs, and voted against the govern-
3353109
I
I
I
I
1
565 031
AREAS OF CASUALTIES RUSSIAN FRONT BALKAN FRONT ITALIAN FRONT FRANCE 909 011 TOTALS I
I
I
I
U
DEAD
9
WOUNDED
'j^
SICK
MISSING & PRISONER
ment whenever an opportunity presented The National Democrats, at a meeting in Krakow on September 30, stated that the club of Polish deputies was unsuited to
itself.
conduct the policy of the nation; the resolution of the party — it had been the leading political organisation in Russian Poland, now occupied by the forces of the Central Powers — demanded the 'restoration of full freedom, independence, and the unity of all Poland'. It was added that the National Democrats approved only of those national institutions that adhered to the same principle; the resolution recognised the Polish National Committee in Paris, and implied a condemnation of the Regents' Council — a body sponsored by the Central
728 546 14 39)
I
77112
Powers — in Warsaw. But even the Regents' Council soon abandoned the cause of Germany and Austria-Hungary. On October 7 the Aus-
33 221
representatives in Warsaw telegraphed Vienna that the peace note and the offer of armistice by Vienna had made a profound impression in Warsaw; on the same day, the Council published a note recognising the fourteen principles of President Wilson, and declaring its support for the creation of an independent Poland, including all the territories inhabited by the Poles, and with free access to the sea. The last defence of the AustroPolish solution — it advocated the union of trian
~26S 009 10
•
L
if
up to July '
Poland with Austria-Hungary — had fallen.
lli'i
ft
31 1915
499 210 deaths occurred
in
i i
if
f
up to July 3(1916 up to July
31 1917
U
the line or front line hospitals. 334 366 died in base hospitals. The latter deaths are
f
up to Sept 30
1918
numbered with wounded.
3089 I
19
itional committee which united all the
the exception of the conservatives who still :
parliament of Vienna had disappeared and that a 'Commission of Liquidation' should be set up which would take over the administration of the country. They also discussed the question of the recognition of the Polish National Committee in Paris as the representative of Poland abroad. They decided that such recognition should be given only after an agreement with the socialist parties in the Russian part of Poland. By the end of October 1918 the 'Commission of Liquidation' was in
Magyar peoples
land reform and the nationalisation of certain industries. On October 24, 1918, when the news of a revolt among Croatian officers in Rijeka reached Buda Pest, Hun-
Democrats saw an organisation based on solid mass support. Karolyi was tempera-
garian officers demonstrated in favour of peace and of a government led by Karolyi. The Independents, the Radicals and the Social Democrats formed a national committee, with Karolyi at its head, on the same day. Its programme was based on the recommendations of the Social Democrats: there was in it the contradiction between the principles of national self-determination and the integrity of the Hungarian
lem as
'the thieving desires of the Czechs'.
The following day, Wekerle, the Chancellor, relations with the nonin Hungary were solely the business of his government. But three political parties were opposed to the Magyar oligarchy, and were able to ride the wave of popular discontent. They were the Radical Party, Mihaly Karolyi's Independent Party, and the Social Democrats. Only the Independents sent some 24 deputies to the parliament: only the Social
declared
that
mentally unsuited for the role of a popular movement: by birth a claimant of an important position in the ruling group, he was a dissenter by preference. He alone
state.
Tisza assassinated: an end to oligarchy For a few days the committee existed
effective control of Western Galicia, Eastern Silesia, and the territory in Russian
Poland under Austro-Hungarian occupaBut in other regards the Poles were even less advanced than the Czechs on the way to the aims staked out in their public statements. Dmowski's National Com-
tion.
mittee in Paris had failed in its bid for recognition, by the Allies, as the government of Poland. The French in the end recognised it on November 15; the British
and
American governments refused
to
In Poland political opinion was divided: the National Democrats supported the Paris Committee, and maintained that the policy of close co-operation with the Entente should be pursued; the socialists, on the other hand, defended the principle of Poland's neutrality. Pilsudski, the Polish military leader, was still in a German prison late in October; he returned to Warsaw on the day of the Armistice, November 11, 1918, and at
follow
suit.
once nominated a government. The new cabinet and the Paris Committee — representing the two main streams of the Polish national revolution — were finally reconciled early in the following year.
There were other, more difficult problems which faced the Poles and which were largely outside their control. The departure of the German armies of occupation had to be settled: the territories of Galicia and of the former Russian Poland had to be defended against the ambitions of the Ukrainians. The fight of the Poles for a military state was longer and harder than that of the Czechs; their internal political differences were sharper. Nevertheless, all the Slav peoples in the Habsburg Empire opted for a national revolution. The main aim of their popular movements was national independence. Social change was implied in that process but it was neither its sole nor its most important purpose. The situation was quite different in the territories inhabited by Austrian Germans and by the Magyars. Because of their privileged position in the Habsburg state their political leaders did not put national ndependence at the top of their programme. Revolution in those parts of the Empire therefore assumed a more social than national form. The Hungarian oligarchy did not give up its positions without a hard struggle. Stefan Tisza, the former Premier, condemned in an uninhibited speech in Sarajevo, early in October, the plans of the South Slavs to form their own state; he described the principle of self-determination of nations as an 'empty phrase'. On October 17, in the Buda-Pest parliament, he described the Czechoslovak probi
3090
Top: The Emperor Karl. He abdicated on the day of the Armistice. Above: Archduke Josefmember of an aristocracy that had led the Austrian armies to their plight of late 1918
was capable of forming a revolutionary government when necessary. After the conclusion of a successful Allied offensive against Bulgaria, on October 8, 1918, the Social Democrats issued a proclamation to the Hungarian people, which denounced 'national oppression' and thereby anticipated the formation of the successor states. It demanded the resignation of the government, the dissolution of the
parliament, and the formation of a national assembly elected on the basis of universal and secret suffrage; it suggested a drastic
alongside the official government, until on October 31 Archduke Josef appointed Karolyi Premier in the Emperor's name. On the same day, Stefan Tisza, a symbol of the old regime,
was assassinated The Social Demo-
new government depended on
I
crat support: the party's representatives joined after some hesitation. The new system became identified with the evil con-
sequences of the war and soon gave way to the rule of the Soviet which, in turn, was stamped out by the men who had opBut even in posed Karlyi's policies.
I
the programme of this government the place of national self-determination was dubious. Vague offers of autonomy no longer satisfied the non-Magyar peoples of
Hungary. Only Milan Hodza, the Slovak politician who was in Buda Pest at the time of the revolution, showed some willingness to negotiate with the new government. He was soon recalled to Prague. The Rumanians in Transylvania had also decided, early in 1918, that a state united with the Rumanian kingdom and directly linked with the Habsburg crown would suit them best: in October, they dropped the second part of that plan. On October 18 Rumanian deputies stated their demands in the Buda Pest parliament and then they left the chamber, never to return.
that 'all German territories in Austria should be unified in one state'. The latter statement made co-operation between the Socialists and the middleclass parties possible, and the Germans in Austria were the first people to establish their own National Assembly. All their former Reichsrat deputies, including those from Bohemia and Moravia, were represented on it. In Berlin, the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire and the further decline in the political influence of the Austrian Germans in Central Europe caused concern. General Ludendorff on October 14 expressed the view — there was an ominously prophetic note about it — that the events of the last weeks direct our special attention
added
By
the end of October 1918 the Habsburg had ceased to exist. It had been destroyed by the war and the various national and social movements. The war did not create them but vastly accelerated them; towards the end of the war the national movements received valuable support from the Entente countries. The economic unity of the Empire and its prosperity had also been disrupted, and then destroyed by the war. It may be that the economic links tied together the many peoples of the Empire more strongly than the political and dynastic ties. Nevertheless, the Habsburg economy was seen to fail before the army or the civil service. By the end of 1917 widespread starvation had set in, especially in the industrial centres state
of Austria-Hungary.
Though the Habsburg Empire had ceased to exist its successor states
being finalised. The Slovakia to conquer and the
from
were still far Czechs had German min-
to integrate into their new state; the Poles had their political differences to settle and the integration of the administration and the territories which used to belong to the three Great Powers. The South Slavs had to decide on the form of their new state and agree on the position in it of the old Serbian kingdom. Everywhere in Central and Eastern Europe new frontiers had to be made and new economic arrangements worked out. The peacemakers had not yet assembled in Paris; the peace tactics were yet to be drafted. About noon on the day of the Armistice, November 11, 1918, the last Habsburg Emperor signed his abdication. It was an informal document of apology: Emperor Karl signed it in pencil. He wrote: since my accession to the throne I have increasingly tried to spare my nations the horrors of the war, for the outbreak of which I bear no responsibility. I have never hesitated to
ority
restore constitutional life, and I have opened the way for my nations to their independent political development. Since I filled now,
am
as before, by unchanging love for all nations, I will not place my person as obstacle to their free evolution .
.
my an
.
Emperor Karl then went on to express the hope that 'internal peace may heal the wounds inflicted by the war'. Such peace did not materialise. The men who
Left: Postwar Austria was as much troubled as everywhere else. Communists clash with police. Above: Crowds in Vienna demonstrate in favour
of the Republic,
In Vienna, as in Buda Pest, the Social Democrats were to play the decisive role in the last
weeks of the war. They alone
had faced the possibility of the Empire's disintegration and they had a programme for that eventuality.
class
parties, to grief,
after
The German middletheir policies had
come asked the Social Democrats whether they would be prepared to join a united national front. On October 3 the Socialists replied that they recognised the
right
to
self-determination
of the
Slav
and Latin peoples of Austria, and they
to
1918
The Supreme
Austria.
Command
is
concerned with the question because it is of a decisive importance for our military future. It is possible that soon we shall be in such a position that we shall have to render the Germans in Austria our military protection There can be no doubt that, sooner or later, the Anschluss of German territories will take place. This development might become a valuable compensation for the disappointments that the war has brought us in other fields, and we should not forget this. .
.
had devoted their political skills and energies to the task of destroying the Habsburg Empire had given but little thought to the hazards of the future in the area vacated by' the Habsburg power. The successor states were established at a time when both Germany and Russia — the two powers most immediately interested in that territory — had been defeated and withdrawn into themselves. After 20 years of unsettled, precarious existence, the new order in Central and Eastern Europe gave way to the greed of Hitler's Germany; after its defeat, Stalin was in a position to extend Russia's influence deep into Central Europe. Again and again the small nations living in the area of the former Habsburg Empire have been frustrated in their attempts to achieve more independence than they had possessed before 1918.
.
Further Reading Zeman, Z. A. B., The Breaking of the Habsburg Empire (Oxford University Press 1961)
[For
Z.
A.
B.
Zeman' s biography,
see
page 107.]
3091
Li The Allied advances of August and SeDtember 1918 had bv no means knocked the German armies out of the fight. But sud[»(^*U'^nmJiMftj«i:j<»;m«P>>:[»vi:jMi»ia<
the German armies started to crumble. Douglas Orgill. Above: Into battle 1918-style
As the month of October opened in 1918, the shadows were falling fast across the wnuie ui uie \jrei niciii war enui u let un wit Allied side of the lines, too, observers sensed a certain chill. The end of the war, to military eyes, was not yet clearly in sight; there were firm indications that the German armies were far from broken; and the dreadful possibility of a spring and
summer campaign in the
in 1919 was still heavy minds of the Allied staffs. In addition,
it
was now autumn, and not the season
which T ill
to fight a dragging, bloody
O i ocpiciuuci
Chief,
1
il
All'
J
O
in
campaign. 1
:
—
nic niucu v/uiniiiainati -inMarshal Ferdinand Foch, had plan-
ned a three-pronged offensive. In the south Americans, with Gouraud's French Fourth Army on their left, would attack towards Mezieres; the French centre would advance beyond the River Aisne; and in the north the British armies, supported by the French left, would drive forward to Camthe
and St Quentin. The forces available ambitious offensive were far from overwhelming, and at the British end of the front were barely adequate. Holding a line from St Quentin to Armentieres was Haig's group of four British armies. These were Rawlinson's Fourth Army, Byng's Third, Home's First, and Birdwood's Fifth. Between them, they comprised 52 divisions including two American divisions and all reserves) and three cavalry divisions. brai
for this
•
Opposing them were 63 German divisions, 30 of which were held in reserve — although the ratio in terms of man for man was not quite as high on the German side as it looked, since the prevalent influenza and heavy battle casualties had reduced some German nominal divisions to a shadow of their former strength. Further north still, holding the line from Armentieres to Ypres,
was King
Albert's Flanders army group, consisting of Plumer's Second British
Army
of 10 divisions, 12 Belgian divisions %
and 9 French reserve divisions. On the battlefield Plumer faced the bat- 5 tered countryside of Flanders, where the 3 tide of battle had ebbed and flowed for four years. This was a zone of deep devastation, which also embraced the front held by Haig's four armies. A senior officer who saw it that autumn reported later that from Vimy Ridge to the eastern outskirts of Amiens, and thence through St Quentin .
.
.
'ouai, in
Germany's bid to secure an armistice, but in terms which emphasised the value of a stern continuance of the present struggle. An order of the day from Wilhelm II on October 5 reminded his troops: For months past the enemy has been striving against your lines with powerful efforts, almost without a pause. You have had to resist by fighting for weeks on end, frequently without rest, and to show a front to a foe vastly superior in numbers. Therein lies the immensity of the task which has been given you, and you are fulfilling it
an
of
there was intact, no village gutted; the surface of torn and blasted by shellfire, the vegetation withered by poison gas, the roads had been destroyed, the railways torn up, and all the bridges over the many rivers and canals blown down. In addition, the autumn rain turned the whole area, Passchendaele-style, into a desolate sea of mud. Behind the French forces in Champagne, too, there was another stretch of .
,
.
Your front
destroyed roads and desolated countryside, while the Americans had at their rear the old battlefield of Verdun.
ammunition and stores: the delays inevitably entailed in the bid to rebuild an adequate communications system now made themselves felt on all the three fronts of Foch's offensive. As October opened, King Albert's army group was about two miles from Roulers, yet it would be a fortnight before the town finally fell. Cambrai, too, had been enveloped to north and south by the First and Third Armies, but the Germans still clung to the greater part of the town. Further down the line, Gouraud had made an initial
Foch: disappointed in the results of the American operations on the west bank of the Meuse
.
.
supply arrangements have broken down.
The divisions in the front line are really starving, and have had to be relieved in order to be brought to where the food is. Haig himself, however, was well aware of the need to press on, and Foch had no need to repeat his stern principle of 'attaquez, attaquez, tout le monde a la bataille'. The British Commander met Foch at his headquarters at Mouchy le Chatel at noon on October 6, and announced that, provided enough guns and ammunition could be
moved forward, he proposed to attack around Cambrai next day. He also asked for some more American troops to help push the assault along.
'I told F.', he said, 'that with three fresh American divisions it would be possible to reach Valenciennes in 48 hours.' Foch had already tried this
gambit on Pershing, however, asking him for troops from the stalled American offensive to reinforce French armies. The answer from the American commander had been a brusque, unequivocal 'No'. Pershing was going to work out his own problems, and his mind was fixed exclusively on the problem of the Argonne.
3094
.
will remain so. allies I have decided
Second Cambrai: another tank 'duel' At dawn on October 8, Byng and Rawlinson, with the Third and Fourth Armies respectively, launched the second battle of Cambrai, along an 18-mile front, and supported by 82 tanks. These were all the Tank Corps had managed to make fit for battle, after the extensive casualties and breakdowns which had somewhat inhibited its role since the great armoured stroke at Amiens on August 8. The troops had been skilfully assembled in the dark in difficult,
situation to sort itself out. These were disappointing days for Foch, as Haig was swift to note. Haig's diary entry for October 3 recorded that Foch's staff are terribly disappointed with the results of the American attacks on the west of the Meuse. The enemy is in no strength in their front, but the Americans cannot advance because their .
.
unbroken and
In agreement with my to offer peace once more to our enemies; but we will only stretch out our hands for an honourable peace. To any German soldier who read beyond the bombast, this message must have had alarming undertones. On the British front, Ludendorff was withdrawing grudgingly to a position partly along the line of the Selle which was known to the Germans as the Hermann position. In general, this line was intended to protect an area from the River Scheldt, south of Valenciennes, to the River Oise, just west of Guise, but it was very far from ready. Its chief strength had been given it by nature alone: the River Selle was an unpleasant obstacle for assaulting troops.
Armies need food,
advance of about six miles, but had achieved little progress during the first nine days of the month. The worst delay of all was on the right wing of the triple offensive, where Pershing's Americans, crowded on to a narrow front where the staffwork was not good enough to operate them properly, were hopelessly wedged in the forest of the Argonne. The transport problem here was so bad that vehicles piled up in masses, unable to move forward or back, and troops in the line were going hungry and short of ammunition. The two wings of Foch's great attack, in fact, were stalled, while in the centre the French — who, like every other combatant, were none too keen to incur heavy casualties in what might be the last weeks of the war — waited willingly for the
is
Generals Byng and Currie. Right: Allied attacks that brought the Germans to breaking point
Haig, however, had grasped what needed The Allied delay had given the retreating Germans a little breathing space. Moreover, Ludendorff, who had seemed to be broken forever by the September storming of the Hindenburg Line, was now slowly recovering his nerve. He was fighting intelligently to hold the Allied armies out of Germany at least until the following spring. This meant a long stand on the line of the Meuse. Thus the American standstill in the Argonne played into his hands while he slowly withdrew his right flank from Flanders. The threat to his plan would be a British advance to be done.
through Cambrai to Maubeuge, which would do much to cut off the rerman armies on both left and right flanks. This was precisely the advance which Haig now intended to make. Meanwhile, the German army was (
shell-smashed and trench-ridden country. Not without difficulty, however, and the XIII Corps, on the left of the Fourth Army line, were badly harassed by shelling and air attack as they formed up. When they advanced, however, it was to success: some indication of gradually deteriorating German morale was given by ordinary line infantry who fought only briefly before running away. The machine gunners, however, as always stuck to their task, firing until the last moment. One rare, noteworthy event marked the day. The Germans counterattacked with tanks — captured British Mark IVs — in groups of four or five. This happened on the left, near Awoingt, and two of the Germancrewed machines were knocked out — one by a 6-pounder shell fired by a British tank, and the other, appropriately, by a round fired from a captured German field gun laid by a British tank section commander. The other German tanks then turned back into their own lines. This was the second tank-versus-tank action of the war, the first having been fought in April near Cachy. The German command, however, was never able to use tanks on anything like the scale of the Allies. At no time during the war did the German tank force exceed 40 machines- 15 of their great slabsided A 7 Vs, and 25 captured British models. At no time, too, did hoy succeed in using more than 25 in a single operation. The British command was also unwilling to use tanks in an exploiting as well as a break-in role, though this, admittedly, might well have been beyond the inocli I
C
Antwerp \ ,
I
Dixmude
i^S
jhent
Belgian North
%Sf,i
Gn
BELGIAN
\
ARMY FRENCH SIXTH
'forp^ ' ARMY-_^g7 n\\Gdc a
"S )
II
"%h
'
outh Grou p
"~
J^Ypres
Roulers ° re s
Corps
XIX Corps
"%
X Corps^jf^ es
-
^
c
Courtjii
SECOND ARMYxvcorp^
^Audep/arde ComJinea^"
^
Corp\
2&. ii
J" Mo|scro(
Jp I ^~\j\f /"Vy J~// S/Jltt
S^es 5-fles Armentieres
rn^jL*.
^
>4
.
R enaix
f.
V.
Hanbourd
ll'Corps^l.
^<
rps
'^j^j
y-
\
,
Moustions
SIXTH
I
^^-
ARMY
Vitry le Francois
50 MILES
j^jLenzee^,
».
Tournai
80 KILOMETRES
pf Bauffe
5 1
4\e
0«"
Hourain
i%Mflffcourt
Loos,
FIFTH
% NederbrakeJ
LJI
/ '///\m
ARMY
W ?a >5
Corps
^oassecies
StambugesJL ^Prjrrta Venjis Lens
:x
s
Co'"
al
— =3*
SEVENT»a™
Ca" 3 '
Co"
V
du Centre
.
ARMY^
% Somain
\
i
t Arras
^^enainy
\
XXII Corp" XVIII Corps
ariafi
,
eld
/laraches
Can Corps
^Maubeuge_
Consoire
ARMY
FIRST
II
Corps Y^XIVRes Corps
k.Gkdo 54
Ba
WMY-
P^£.
XVI Corps
////////
Runutty
THIRD
>
>ECOND\lLeval
^^CarnVai
ARMY
vi
(
^
corps
jJKiA
—
/
Coudry
Corps
le
Chateau
LaadVcies—
^Avlsnesl
^t-^^y^r^
'
helAs^tf, IV
Soire
m
Liessies
H^^ilResLigny J^BeTtf VillersVorps utreaux
EIGHTEENTH FRONTLINE OCTOBER 8 LINE REACHED BY OCTOBER 9
XIII
Oisy
Estree
11
Am
^
2 Corps
IX Corps
Sequehart
16
,
Corps'
10
14
/ \
ARMY
FOURTH ARMY
/ /
||GkdoI>^
\
jK1^t»Fre^i5y ^^l\*?T
^/^'
l#3rand x
17
«
Hirsonl
^Guis
18
XV Corps
19
20
A»o
21
/.
23
Sains
24 St Quentin
29
NOVEMBER
6
/
9
10
ARMISTICE LINE
ALLIED
ARMY
V /
1
4
(NOVEMBER
SEVENTH
W
/
11)
/
Serre
ARMY
BOUNDARIES
Corps,
ALLIED CORPS
BOUNDARIES
,>
GERMAN ARMY XVIII Corps
FRENCH TENTH
SMILES I-
-I 8
III
Bav
Corps
BOUNDARIES GERMAN CORPS BOUNDARIES
KILOMETRES
ARMY
/ xxxviil
xxxvcorp.
Res
(LATER THIRD) ^Laon
3095
Top left: A road in the Somme area. Their advance left the Allies with the previous battle zone to their rear, complicating their supply problem. Above: Early mechanisation. A French tractor in the Meuse area. Left: Members of 1 10th Regiment in Varennes-enArgonne resources of the Tank Corps in 1918. All that was offered for exploitation was cavalry — and it had already been demonstrated many times that cavalry on a modern battlefield WciS doomed; an easy victim for the ubiquitous wire and machine guns, and inhibited by the simple fact that it could not lie down and take cover. No decisive cavalry charge, in fact, could be made until the last machine gun had been captured. This was a prerequisite which could never be achieved; the British Official History observes sombrely that 'every effort was made by the higher commanders to pass the cavalry through to play havoc with the enemy's communications; but only a few patrols got much farther than the inanical
October
fantry's front line
.' .
.
However, with the tanks helping
was now 3096
in
what
their traditional support role, the
American, and IX Corps of Fourth forward to within a mile of Le Cateau by nightfall, while the Germans in front of Third Army finally pulled out of the battered city of Cambrai. The disciplined retreat planned by Ludendorff began to exhibit signs of panic, as troops and lorries and horse-drawn wagons jammed the roads and bridges in front of the River XIII,
II
Army moved
Selle. German battalion accounts of the day's fighting sound a note of despair. Battalions, it was said, averaged only 150 officers and men, and in some of them only 'severe measures' had held the formations together in the line. Strong measures were also taken rather higher up the line of com-
mand. The German army group commander, Boehm, was abruptly sent on leave, and was later reduced to the command of a single army. The army group itself was broken up, the German Second
Army
going to Rupprecht's Gruppe based the north, and the Eighteenth to the Crown Prince's Gruppe to the south. 'The troops,' said one official account, 'were com.' pletely used up and burnt to cinders There was, too, increasing evidence of the infection of revolution in the German army: the men whom Ludendorff had earlier noted as shouting 'blacklegs' at reinforcements moving up into the line were steadily to
.
.
in numbers and influence. The next problem for the British command was to force the line of the Selle, the
growing
river on which the town of Le Cateau stood. Supply difficulties now dictated a pause in the onward movement: Rawlinson's Fourth Army, which was to make the assault, needed a week to establish its preparations on a proper footing. Rawlinson was covered on his right by Debeney's First French Army, and on his left by Byng's Third
Army, with Home's First Army on Byng's left. Between October 11 and 16 some small improvement was made in the British
positions.
Home,
in
particular,
way up
the Sensee Canal — an advance which was sure to inhibit the German defence of the Selle in the next few
battered his
days.
At 0530 hours on October
17,
Rawlin-
son struck again, in mist so thick that it reminded Fourth Army of its earlier triumph in the fog on Ludendorff's 'Black Day' of August 8. His attack was on a tenmile front, supported by almost 50 tanks. The programme set for Fourth Army took two days to achieve instead of the one which had been planned, for the Germans fought well, counterattacking at wellchosen points, and heavily shelling British
assembly areas. Le Cateau was emptied of Germans by the evening of October 17, but the American 27th and 30th Divisions,
attacking a hillcrest railway line south of the town, met an unexpectedly ferocious response, and it was not until October 19 that Rawlinson's right wing closed up to the line of the Sambre Canal, and then stopped — five miles beyond the Selle. On October 20, also against desperate resistance, seven divisions of the Third Army and one of the First crashed their way across the Selle west of Le Cateau. The advance of all three armies began again three days later, and 15 miles were gained between the Sambre Canal and the Scheldt. A breach six miles deep and 35 miles broad had been punched into the German front, and thousands of prisoners were streaming into the cages. It had been a stunning victory, achieved in a strangely unspectacular manner, though at high cost. In the struggle for the Selle, the 24 British and two American divisions en-
gaged had taken 20,000 prisoners from 31 f German divisions opposing them, and had § captured nearly 500 guns. About 50 men 5 from each British battalion in the assault | had been killed or wounded.
The strong German resistance had, noneHaig food for thought. He warned Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, that the Germans were not yet theless, given
done, recording in his diary on October 19: / visited the War Office soon after 10 am and saw Wilson. He gave me his views on conditions of armistice. He considers that the Germans should be ordered to lay down their arms and retire to the east of the Rhine. I gave my opinion that our attack on the 1 7th inst. met with considerable opposition, and that the enemy was not ready for unconditional surrender. In that case, there would be no armistice, and the war would continue for at least another year.
3097
jjj.
-
the le
Prime Minister,
ds considered Allied armies, sum-
army: worn out and has not been really fighting latterly. It has been freely said that 'the war is over' and 'we don't wish to lose our lives now that peace is in sight'. is not yet organised: it is ill-equipped, half-trained, with insufficient supply services. Experienced officers and NCOs are lacking.
American army:
British army: was never more efficient than it is today, but it has fought hard, and it lacks reinforcements. With diminishing effectives,
morale
is
bound to suffer.
yet Haig was too pessimistic. The Battle of the Selle had seen the end of Ludendorff. His policy of retiring to a shorter holding line was manifestly being eroded by events, and Wilhelm II knew it. Ludendorff put his own head on the block when, in an astonishing act of insubordination, he issued an order saying that President Wilson's armistice proposals were 'a demand for unconditional surrender,
And
A little before dawn on November 4, the Battle of the Sambre began. 17 divisions of the three British armies attacked, with six in reserve. It was significant evidence of the inroads made by battle upon the limited resources of the Tank Corps at this stage of the war that only 37 tanks were available to support this mass of infantry. Rawlinson, on the right of the British line (with Debeney on his own right), was confronted by the canal at a point where it was both wide and commanded by good German defensive positions on the other side. He attacked with two corps — the XIII on the left and the IX on the right. The more difficult part of the canal was allotted to Braithwaite's IX Corps, which put the 1st and 32nd Divisions into the assault, with the 46th in reserve. Each division was allotted three tanks of the 10th Tank Battalion — an armoured support which can only be described as derisory. The opening hours for Braithwaite's corps were grim. The assaulting battalion of the 1st Division was the 2nd Royal Sussex. Its
Above: German A 7 V tank. These were used alongside captured British Mark IV's. Below: Francois Flameng's painting of tank warfare
and thus unacceptable to us soldiers'. On October 26 he was summoned to the presence of the Kaiser. 'There followed,' Ludendorff recorded later, 'some of the bitterest moments of my life. I said respectfully to His Majesty that I had gained the impression that I no longer enjoyed his confidence, and I accordingly begged most humbly to be relieved of my office. His Majesty accepted my resignation.' General Wilhelm Groner, an expert on railway transport, replaced Ludendorff as First Quartermaster General. As the British command prepared for what was to be the last great British thrust, the German slide was accelerating. The First Army reached Valenciennes, and the Fifth brushed aside feeble German rearguards to reach the Scheldt Canal. Plumer's Second Army, under King Albert's overall command in Flanders, had crossed the River Lys on October 19, preparing for a new move forward to the Scheldt. The next combined offensive was to be a drive by four armies, over a 40-mile front from Guise to Conde. The forces to be employed were the British Fourth, Third and First Armies, and Debeney's First French Army on the right. They were ordered to 'resume the offensive on or after November 3 with a view to breaking the enemy's resistance south of the Conde Canal and advancing in the general direction Avesnes-MaubeugeMons'. This advance would threaten
Namur, the the
seizure of which would imperil
German armies
western Belgium. Taken in conjunction with a resumed American advance through the Argonne to Mezieres and Sedan, it would completely wreck any German attempt to establish a .secure line on the Meuse. If it succeeded, the path into Germany would be growing broader and more inviting. Nevertheless, the attack would be made over difficult country, with an especially unpleasant feature in the shape of the Sambre Canal. This obstacle was 70 feet wide over a good all
in
and at least six feet deep. the Germans had opened locks, flooding the low ground, though in general to a depth of only a few inches. Here the British Expeditionary Force had assembled four long years ago on its arrival in France. Mons was a charismatic word to every British soldier. deal of
its
length,
Along part of
3098
it
objective was a lock, with a group of houses on the far side, and a subsidiary stream a hundred yards short of the main canal. However, as the Royal Sussex battalion moved determinedly into the attack, a
major setback was discovered — apparently the planks and bridging used in rehearsal were in fact a little too short for the actual obstacle of the subsidiary stream. Meanwhile, as the main body of the battalion began to pile up on the near bank, the German gunners found the range, and salvo after salvo, laced with streams of machine gun bullets from the houses beside the lock, tore into the struggling infantry. With tremendous courage and determination, the commanding officer of the Royal Sussex, LieutenantColonel D. G. Johnson, led his infantry into the shell-storm to protect the bridge-carrying parties of the Royal Engineers, them-
selves commanded by Major G. de C. E. Findlay, of the 409th Field Company. While men dropped, hit and dying, into the stream, the bridges were eventually pushed and shoved into place, to be instantly crossed by the revengeful Royal Sussex, their machine gunners firing the heavy Lewis guns from the hip, cutting down German defenders running frantically from the houses beside the lock gate. Nearly 150 Royal Sussex and sappers lay dead or wounded behind them. For their part in this decisive action, Johnson and Findlay each received the Victoria Cross. The other assaulting battalion of the 1st Division, the 1st Cameron Highlanders, were more fortunate, getting bridges across the canal in the first few minutes, and closing with the Germans on the far side in bitter hand-to-hand actions in the early morning mist. The 32nd Division, on the
left
of the 1st Division,
had a bloody rebuff
from a resolute German defence at Ors, but
managed eventually to float a bridge across the canal on empty kerosene cans. The 32nd Division had lost 700 men in the morning's work; the 1st Division about 500. Further still to the left the XIII Corps, with the 25th Division, pushed across the Sambre on rafts, and seized a trestle bridge which was capable of supporting the transit of field artillery. The 8th Royal Warwickshires, attacking Landrecies on the far side, were held up briefly when a German officer galloped up on horseback and man-
Below: A Belgian soldier in the uniform adopted in 1917. Right: Plumer. His Second Army fought alongside the Belgians. Right:
German
losses
German
marching back to the cages. Further to the north, Byng and Third Army also had a day of success. Byng attacked with four corps in line, at slightly staggered times, so that his right-hand corps — Shute's V Corps — would be able to synchronise its attack with that of Fourth Army. Shute's corps and its next neighbour in line, Harper's IV Corps, had set an objective about five miles distant inside the Forest of Mormal. The forest itself imposed changes on the normal routine for attacking infantry. The usual protective barrage was kept 300 yards ahead of the infantry, since it was foreseen that shells striking the tops of high trees were liable to detonate in lethal airbursts hundreds of yards from where they had been intended to The Germans inside the forest land. fought with varying degrees of determination. The 13th Royal Welch Fusiliers picked up 60 prisoners without a shot being fired at Berlaimont, on the edge of the forest. On the other hand, in the corner of the forest near Englefontaine, the 9th Duke of Wellington's, of the 17th Division, ran into ground seamed with hedges and orchards, where the waiting German machine gunners cut loose wherever a glimpse of khaki was seen scrambling through the undergrowth. The battalion lost 13 of its 15 officers, and 226 out of 583 other ranks. In spite of this, the attacking battalions reached their objectives on time. On other parts of the Third Army front the battle was a steady trudge onwards, jnarked by sporadic affrays on the edges of orchards or village cemeteries rather than
& guns taken by the Allies and November II 1918
prisoners
between July
1 1
British itM itii lttt tt tti tmtttltitttltlt i itttm ttttttft ttttttttttMfttMtttttmttttHtMttttttttttttttM
nmmnmmnmmmmmmm
iss 700
2
840
I
880
I
421
french tttttttmtttmmtMHMttttmtttmmtttttttt ttttmtttMtttmmttjHNMNNiHMtfttfHttmmN 39 000 miitttiitltt l tt lti ti ltl ttt t tttl lt t t ti 1
American mmmmmmmmmmmmmmuiooo Belgian aged
mmnmm*
to detonate the
main bridge
14 500
charges under the
into the town, but soon suc-
ceeded in getting men across by two smaller wooden bridges, and by raft. They would have cleared the bank faster with more tanks: the three machines they had in support accounted for 40 machine guns during the morning, and only one of the tanks was knocked out. On the left of the corps line the 18th Division, fighting through a network of village houses, hedges, and orchards — each an ideal post for
an ambushing machine gun — had
struggle until noon before a
way
to
could be
cleared, but finally reached its objective inside the Forest of Mormal in the early afternoon. The Fourth Army bridgehead
over the Sambre Canal was now 15 miles long and more than two miles deep, and 8 the Mormal Forest had been penetrated. s Four thousand German prisoners were
474
by large set-piece actions on an epic scale. The author Stephen Graham, a private in the Scots Guards in Haldane's VI Corps,
remembered
later the night of November 4, his brigade was advancing on Amfroipet near the Belgian frontier: In the afternoon we marched into Villers Pol, and most men, after sweeping and cleaning the billets, lay down and rested a few hours before the march to the line. Hot suppers and rum rations were dished out after midnight, and then at 2 am, with all the fighting impedimenta of shovels and bombs and sandbags, and what not, the battalion marched cautiously on, scouts reconnoitring each stretch of country in front and reporting all clear before we crossed it. It was a dark and windy night, and crossing the scenes of the day's fighting, we remarked here and there in the dark the vague shapes of the dead.
when
3099
Graham ducking and fire from the I
i
>
(
Arnfroipet.
on I
The
Bermeries,
to
empty of more opposi-
to be already
Germans, and then ran into
This too was fairly quickly overcome.
tion.
Graham
describes this typical action: in the low An enemy line was located scrub alongside an orchard. At 1.30 pm a sharp encounter took place between one of .
.
.
our companies and a number of German machine gunners. The enemy was in deep his position cleverly hidden. It took about an hour to locate him certainly
slits,
and
so many had hoped for so long: 'Hostilities Troops will cease at 1100 hours today will stand fast on the line reached.' In Britain, New Zealand, South Africa and the other countries of the Empire, and in France and Belgium and Germany, too, the last telegrams were still going out, announcing on the very edge of joy that a father, a son, or a brother would never come home again. One of those who had scram.
.
.
bled to the assault on the Sambre on the morning of November 4 was the soldierpoet Wilfred Owen, whose Anthem for
Doomed Youth
still appears anthology of war poetry:
in
every
and dispose of him. Our men made a bayonet charge, and all the Germans were wounded, or taken prisoner The men wallowed in mud all night, and
either killed,
.
.
.
from the
line to-
headquarters; they were being brought back to Bermeries for a few hours' rest and were lighting cigarettes and chatting in little knots when two heavy shells
wards
Avesnes: Birdwood's Fifth Army the Scheldt, and Home's First Army was closing up to Mons. The Sarnbre was now 20 miles to the rear. Ahead lay, not so far away, die Rhine. It was time for
Above: Tanks again at Cambrai. Australian and American troops pass through the town in October 1918. Below: American troops using Renault tanks near Boureuilles, September, 1918
crossed
German command,
bells,
Nor any choirs, The shrill
voice
of mourning save the
demented choirs of wailing
shells;
And
bugles calling for them from sad
shires.
There was a bugle for Wilfred Owen, too. He was killed on the Sambre crossing. His parents received their telegram on November 12. It was midday and all the church bells were ringing.
V(HMSO
1947)
DOUGLAS ORGILL was born in 1922 and was educated at Queen Mary's School, Walsall, and Keble College, Oxford, where he took an honours degree in modern history. During the war he served in the Royal Armoured Corps, being commissioned into the Lothians and Border Horse, an armoured regiment in 6th Armoured Division. He commanded a troop of Sherman tanks in Italy, and after the war served for a year in the Arab Legion in Jordan and Palestine. Besides pursuing an active career in London's Fleet Street, he has published books on £ the 1944 Italian campaign, armoured warfare and I the history of cavalry.
at last, to call a
At 6.50 am on November 11, Haig's headquarters gave the message that
final halt.
*•»
•100
their hasty orisons. mockeries for them from prayers or
.
taken
the
Can patter out
No
.
.' 'Hostilities will cease The whole British front was now on the move, and prisoners were streaming back in thousands. Behind the German front the new Commander, General Groner, looked despairingly at the map. A Guards battalion, unopposed, took Maubeuge on November 9. On the 8th, the 32nd Division had .
die as
Only the monstrous anger of the guns. Only the stuttering rifles' rapid rattle
volume
in their midst, tore one man's face off, ripped up another's stomach, and the like
came
.
who
Further Reading Blake, Robert (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1952) Blaxland, Gregory, Amiens 1918 (Muller 1968) Goodspeed, D. J., Ludendorff (Hart-Davis 1966) Graham, Stephen, A Private in the Guards (Macmillan 1919) Pitt, Barrie, 7978: The Last Act (Cassell 1962) Terraine, John, Douglas Haig; the Educated Soldier (Hutchinson 1963) Military Operations: France and Belgium 1918.
and rained, never ceased raining. The German artillery was very active, .The last though firing largely at random men to fall in the war fell, as it were, by accident; strolling back
bells for these
cattle?
.
it
rained
.
What passing
y
£
was at Mons that the BEF had been first engaged against the German army in August 1914. The battle, though no more than a delaying action, had demonstrated the
the 42nd Battalion's pipe band played its way into the city and, according to the
It
of the British soldier and popular memory a semilegendary character, by no means dissipated today. It was therefore particularly appropriate that the British army's advance on the last day of the First World War should have carried it back to this historic little Belgian city. The recapture was actually effected by troops of the Canadian Corps, whose action is narrated here by their tactical expertise had assumed in
historian: of Mons lay within the 3rd Division's sector, and the task of entering
official
The whole
the city was assigned to the 7th Brigade. The difficulty facing both the RCR (Royal Canadian Regiment) and the 42nd Battalion was to force crossings over the almost continuous water barrier which the Canal de Centre and the Derivation de la Trouille formed around Mons, those watercourses having once constituted the moats of the ancient fortress. Enemy machine guns
the outlying houses covered all approaches and made an assault virtually impossible during daylight, for orders from Corps Headquarters expressly forbade any shelling of Mons, not excepting German machine-gun posts. Immediately south of the Conde Canal there was a break in the water barrier, and here the commander of the 42nd Battalion decided to attempt an entry. He planned to work his troops through the city and thus cut off troublesome machine guns, the majority of which were concentrated on his right flank. It was about 2300 hours on November 10 when platoons of the 42nd, crossing the railway yards under the covering fire of Lewis guns, entered the city and began clearing eastward. As German machine gunners on the southern edge of Mons fell back a second company of the 42nd with an attached RCR company crossed the Derivation Canal on a hastily improvised plank bridge and moved northward into the town. The third entry of the night was made at 0200 hours by a company of the RCR at the north-west corner of Mons. (A spirited controversy later developed between the RCR and the 42nd Battalion over who was first to reach the centre of Mons. In the city's Golden Book the signature of Lieutenant W. M. King, an officer of the RCR company attached to the 42nd, appears before those of the 42nd Battalion's Lieutenants L. H. Biggar and J. W. Cave. Biggar, however, disputed this evidance, averring that he signed well down on the page so that a suitable inscription could subsequently be inserted above. The weight of testimony by the Burgomaster of Mons and members of his council favours the RCR claimant.) Further north on the battalion left another RCR company, having cleared the village of Ghlin and a troublesome nearby mine dump, crossed the Canal du Centre to secure the suburbs sited
and Petit Nimy.
What German
troops were the last to oppose the Canadians? During the final few days of the campaign the remnants of the German divisions on the whole were retreating towards the Antwerp-Meuse line obliquely to the Canadian axis of advance. This divergence in direction, and the enemy's practice of retiring his divisions through one another, meant that the leading Canadian units were meeting a
'created
diary,
tremendous
He asked him
if
he would send a squadron
of the 5th Lancers quickly through the town, and seize and hold the high ground
commanded Mons
about St Denis, which
in
of Nimy
war
unit's
enthusiasm'. By eleven that morning the pursuit had carried forward some five miles to the north-east. In the 3rd Division's sector the 5th Lancers — a regiment which had fought at Mons in 1914 — reached St Denis, while on the right the infantry of the 2nd Division had entered Havre and cleared the Bois du Rapois. The commander of the Canadian Corps, General Currie, decided that it would be most appropriate to include a sauddron from the 5th Lancers in the operation to secure the town itself. The Lancer's war diary records that: At 0700 hours the Officer Commanding the 5th Lancers was sent for by the Officer Commanding the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, and was told by him that Mons had been taken by the leading battalion.
to the north-east. Thereupon, 'A'
Few of the men who fought at Mons in 1914 were alive when the town was recaptured in 1918. Above: An emotional moment. British troops re-enter Mons, November 1918 succession of rearguards from many German formations. At the beginning of the month the enemy picture was still fairly simple; during the period November 1-8 an average of 250 captives from each of seven German divisions were admitted to the Canadian Corps Prisoner of War Cage. But as the hour of the Armistice drew closer and fighting dwindled, admissions to the Corps Cage fell to an average of less than seven stragglers from each of 15 different divisions.
From
the scanty information about this available from German sources, and after eliminating a number of divisions known to have left the sector, it appears certain that German resistance south of Mons in the Hyon-Bois la Haut area was furnished by the rearguards of the 206th Infantry Division. The parting shots north of Mons were probably fired by elements of either the 28th Reserve Division or the 4th Ersatz Division. Withdrawing directly through the city itself were the 62nd and 63rd Regiments of the 12th Infantry Division. Early on the 10th these forces were thinned out to battalion strength, the 2nd Battalion, 62nd Regiperiod
ment taking over
its regimental sector. At midnight this battalion withdrew also, leaving behind 8th Company, which remained in the western part of Mons until dawn was approaching on November 11. By daybreak troops of both battalions of the 7th Brigade had freed Mons of any remaining Germans. At about seven o'clock
Squadron
of the
Regi-
ment, under Lieutenant Scott-Brown, was ordered to saddle up at once, and carry out this mission. The squadron moved off at 0745 hours and had to make a long detour owing to the bridges having been blown up over the canal, and the shell craters in the roads. Going through Mons, the cheering crowds were so great that they were hardly able to make headway. They were the first British troops to enter
Mons
since 1914.
Lieutenant Scott-Brown arrived at St Denis at 0945 hours and at once got into touch with the German patrols in the Bois de Vignette and Bois d'Haynon. Heavy firing could also be heard from Bois Taille des Vignes on the right rear. At 1045 hours Lieutenant Scott-Brown sent back his dispositions, by dispatch rider, and then handed over his posts to the Canadians. This was effected at 1700 hours and then 'A' Squadron, 5th Lancers, returned to billets at Jemappes. .
.
.
In the meantime, orders were received that hostilities would cease at 1100 hours and this was at once communicated to 'A' Squadron, 5th Lancers, as soon as their whereabouts was discovered, and troops were directed to occupy defensive positions on the line they had reached. Instructions were then given that the
advance guard brigade was to make an entry into Mons at 1030 hours. The 5th Lancers at once turned out an escort of 34 other ranks, and placed the pennons on their lances. One gun of the Royal Horse Artillery, which had been attached to the Regiment in the operations round Mons during August 1914, also went. This escort accompanied the officer commanding the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade on his official entry into the town, and was present at the reception by the Maire of Mons; being subsequently retained as escort to General Currie, the GOC Canadian Corps, on his entry into Mons during the afternoon. General Currie directed that the escort should march off the parade first. saying that it was due to 'the contemptible little British Army' that they were at Mons official
that day; and, as the escort was the representative there of the British Army which had fought at Mons in 1914, the place of honour should be taken by them.
3101
ON'S
ELECTORAL DEFEAT Republican attacks on the Wilson administration during 1917 and early 1918 had been halfhearted and largely abortive, but as the 1918 elections approached Republican forces gathered to launch an all-out assault, aware that Wilson was becoming increasingly detached from domestic affairs. The result was one of the closest electoral finishes in American history is described this week by Charles E. Neu
Wilson Beaten by the 'wheat' vote
in
and
the mid-west prairie provinces
World War in April 1917 temporarily stilled partisan politics. Leading Republicans rallied behind the President and applauded his eloquent war message. Long frustrated by the Democrat Wilson's patience in dealing with Germany's infringement of American rights, they were relieved that the nation had finally taken the plunge into war. Other Republicans struggled to overcome their intense personal dislike of the President and aid the nation's war effort. Distinguished elder statesmen of the party, such as former president William Howard Taft and former secretary of stat'» Elihu Root, for a time overcame then distaste of the administration and urged nonpartisan co-operation. But other Republicans, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, hated Wilson too much to heed such advice. Only two weeks afterWilson's war message Lodge wrote that: 'Wilson is a mean soul and the fact that he delivered a good message does not alter his character. If that message was right, everything he has done for two years and a half is fundamentally wrong.' Under the guise of 'constructive criticism' some Republicans soon began to attack nearly every aspect of the administration's war programme. These Republicans found ample scope for their activities in the Congress, where the problems posed by the war divided and confused both parties. The Democratic margin of control, especially in the House, was slim, and Democratic congressional leadership erratic. The administration's first major war measure — selective service bill -encountered heated bi-partisan opposition. In the Senate Democrat James A. Reed of Missouri predicted American entry
into the First
.
3102
.
.
bloody draft riots, and several Democratic leaders immediately deserted the President. Speaker Champ Clark claimed that 'in Missouri, conscripts and convicts were considered of the same class', while Majority Leader Claude Kitchen of North Carolina feared a tyrannical invasion of American rights. Some Republicans exploited this dissension in Democratic ranks to push Theodore Roosevelt's plan for a volunteer army of 100,000 men which he would lead. Roosevelt, who had long yearned for martial glory, developed an elaborate scheme to create a force whose officers would represent the most distinguished elements in American society. It was a plan which strongly appealed to those who opposed the draft and it was only by the narrowest of margins that the administration carried its programme.
Running the war effort: critics in Congress In the spring and summer of 1917 the Congress quarrelled over other issues as well. Republicans objected to comprehensive controls and strict press censorship and wished to finance the war through bond sales rather than heavy tax increases. In each case they picked up enough Democratic support to force the administration to compromise. They even went so far as to seek a Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, with unlimited powers, to inquire into all phases of war activity. Senator Lodge, the dominant figure among conservative senate Republicans, felt that his party should attack the administration to prevent it from winning all the credit for the prosecution of the war. Only in this way, Lodge reasoned, could the party keep alive its hope for the future. Hastily improvised executive agencies provided inviting targets for conservatives who saw them as forerunners of a planned economy and socialism. Congressional Republicans watched eagerly for signs of mismanagement and extravagance in the war effort. At first Republican critics of the administration had to tread cautiously, for they feared the President's great popularity and the stigma of unpatriotism. By the autumn of 1917, however, doubts began to spread about the adequacy of the nation's mobilisation. Russia's disintegration, along with the threatened collapse of the Allies, caused many Americans to realise that the outcome might" depend upon the speed with which American forces reached the western front. To many of both parties in Congress the war effort seemed leisurely and confused, plagued by waste and inexperience. Theodore Roosevelt dedicated himself to a one-man crusade to expose Wilson's failures as a war leader. Without drastic changes, he predicted total collapse and ignominious defeat. Other Republicans began to follow Roosevelt's lead and when Congress reconvened in December 1917 it was clear that Wilson could expect trouble. The President made few concessions to his critics. Given to strong personal animosities, he relied in his management of the war upon those men he could trust implicitly. Most were Democrats. He greeted the Congress with a State of the Union Message that expressed confidence in the sanctity of the Allied cause and in the measures being taken to crush the foe. The voices of humanity, Wilson asserted, drowned the carpings of critics and the fears of men of little faith. He bitingly dismissed the mounting clamour at home of the 'noisily thoughtless and troublesome' and sweepingly reaffirmed the inevitability of an Allied triumph. Wilson's address lifted the public's spirits but failed to silence congressional critics. The Senate quickly launched five major investigations probing the alleged failures of the American war effort. They revealed considerable bureaucratic short-sightedness in the War Department and shortages of arms and ammunition. Congressional investigators dwelt on the fact that some recruits trained with broomsticks and wooden artillery pieces and were particularly incensed by conditions in the cantonments into which recruits poured. These hastily-constructed camps functioned as long as mild weather prevailed; with the coming of one of the coldest winters on record, however, water pipes froze, sewage disposal systems ceased to operate, hospital facilities broke down and the incidence of disease increased at an alarming rate. Worried parents wrote to their congressmen and the nation seemed aroused over the unnecessary suffering of its soldiers. The Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, attempted to quiet the discontent by touring southern camps, but congressional critics would not be mollified. The Democratic Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, George E. Chamberlain of Oregon, charged that the war effort had collapsed and that only 'heroic measures' could save the nation. Republicans proposed several anti-administration measures. One proposed a Secretary of Munitions to unify supply 'unctions and, in the process, bypass two of Wilson's most contrc isial cabinet officers; the other called for a War Cabinet of thre nen to take over the direction of the domestic mobilisation and in effect, drastically reduce the powers of the President. i
enter the congressional elections of 1918 at a disadvantage, possibly tainted by captious opposition to the war effort. There were, however, several hopeful developments. The new chairman of the Republican National Committee, Will H. Hays of Indiana, was a shrewd and agile manager of men. He travelled throughout the nation inspiring the party's state and local leaders and bringing together dissident elements. He was acutely aware of the division within the party between extremists who wanted an allout assault on Wilson's policies and moderates who were more hesitant to criticise the administration. Hays skilfully exploited partisanship without letting it get out of hand. By restraining the extremists, he quickened the alienation of moderates such as William Howard Taft from the administration. In May Taft and Roosevelt met for the first time in eight years, signalling a reconciliation which indicated that the Republicans were closing ranks for the coming elections. All segments of the party were beginning to realise
how much was
at stake.
Hitting back at the Democrats Wilson, too, had no illusions about the importance of controlling the next Congress. Part of the task involved eliminating Democrats who had not faithfully supported the administration's war programmes. Wilson struck out at many of these men. One of the most gifted demagogues of his time, Senator James K. Vardaman of Mississippi, had challenged the government's authority to enforce the selective service act and had encouraged his poor white Roosevelt:
Mr Wilson has no authority
Many Democrats were gloomy
to
speak for the American people'
about the management of the war
and even Colonel Edward M. House, the President's intimate adviser, agreed that Secretary of War Baker should be removed. But Wilson stood firm. Although tightening the organisation of the war effort, the President refused to sacrifice Baker and found, in fact, that the Secretary of War was a nimble witness before hostile Senate committees. Generally the President ignored his critics. Occasionally, however, he lashed out at congressmen who had become particularly offensive. He turned on Senator Chamberlain with cold ferocity, accusing him of an 'astonishing and absolutely unjustifiable distortion of the truth'. He claimed senatorial critics were spreading confusion and misunderstanding and vigorously defended Baker. The President's impassioned defence of his administration and his sweeping denial of grave blunders drew wide public support and blunted the attacks of the opposition. Congressional mail indicated that many Americans felt the Congress was obstructing preparations for war. Even bitter Republican partisans realised by February 1918 that attacks must be put off until a more opportune time. The mood of the Congress was obviously not shared by the American people. Republicans, then, were discouraged by the spring of 1918. Scattered elections of the previous year had indicated no trend against the administration and it seemed that the party would House. Impatient with the details of domestic politics
followers to resist the draft. The administration's candidate upset Vardaman in the Georgia primary, but generally the President's intervention against incumbent Democrats met with mixed success. Nevertheless, Wilson was deeply involved in party policy and strategy and determined to wage a vigorous campaign. He caused an uproar by convincing Henry Ford that he should enter the senatorial race in Michigan, although Ford had been an ardent
prewar
pacifist.
But Wilson was convinced Ford would support
his peace efforts. The President also took a strong interest in a special senate election held in Wisconsin in April to fill the vacancy left by the death of the Democratic incumbent. Wisconsin contained a vocal pacifist and pro-German element and national attention focused on the contest as the first significant test of
Chamberlain. Urged 'heroic measures' to save a collapsing war effort
popular sentiment toward Wilson and the war. Wilson questioned the loyalty of the Republican candidate and despatched VicePresident Thomas R. Marshall to Wisconsin to carry the administration's case to the people. Marshall castigated the Republican Party as the principal ally of Germany and accused the Republican candidate of bidding for the vote of the pro-German, the traitor, the pacifist and the Wilson-hater. Republicans welcomed this 'sewage vote' to help them win the election. In a close contest, Republicans won and quickly pointed to the result as a harbinger of success in the autumn. Democrats could find some solace in the fact that their candidate had polled the largest vote ever given any Democrat except Wilson. In fact, the outcome was ambiguous. Republicans would not, however, forget the rhetoric of the administration's spokesmen. By the early summer of 1918 the atmosphere
3103
southern Democrats in the Senate blocked its passage and women suffrage leaders blamed the President and his party. The administration never devised a system of price fixing which went beyond the control of commodities purchased by the government. In other areas profiteering flourished, the cost of living soared and much public irritation developed. But agricultural policy was the administration's greatest failing. The government raised the cost of shipping grain, unsettled the wool market, and, worst of all, set a price for wheat while refusing to do so for cotton. Despite desperate pleas from wheat-state Democrats, Wilson would not raise the ceiling on wheat in the summer of 1918 or impose price controls upon cotton. Throughout the war years the cotton bloc fought off every effort to fix the price of cotton or tax the large profits of cotton growers. Southern planters had ignored Food Administrator Herbert Hoover's pleas to use a part of their land for food crops and by June 1918 they had produced the third largest cotton crop on record. Democratic leaders in Washington — including the President — seemed oblivious to this issue. Apparently Wilson sympathised with the southern viewpoint and was reluctant to offend powerful southern Democrats whose votes he needed for an essential war revenue measure. Whatever the President's reasons, his action inflamed sectional animosities and convinced many wheat farmers that the administration had betrayed their interests. They were receptive to Republican reminders of Wilson's own southern heritage and angered by southern dominance of the cabinet and congressional committees. The southern bias of the
I
Hays. Did
much
to revive flagging
in the partisan
Republican
spirits
and unite the party
arena was intense.
Despite the President's popularity and the continuing public confidence in the administration's management of the war, it entered the congressional elections of 1918 with serious handicaps. During the Wilson years the Democrats had enjoyed a political success disproportionate to their basic political resources. They were, after all, a minority party, and having closed ranks after their split of 1912, the Republicans began to restore their normal congressional strength. After the 1916 elections Democrats remained in control of the House only with the votes of independent members. Victory in 1916 signified the voters' approval of particular measures and personalities rather than the development of durable and persistent Democratic power. In other words, there had been no basic shift in party alignments and in the normal course of events the Republicans would pick up congressional seats in an off-year election. Even Democratic campaign managers knew that the party might lose control of the House, although they did expect to maintain their hold on the Senate. Even here, however, the death of eight Democratic senators during the war sessions of the 65th Congress darkened Democratic hopes. Moreover, the Wilson administration had weakened itself by mishandling certain domestic issues. Wilson belatedly favoured a constitutional amendment giving women the right to vote, but
Henry Ford. An ardent prewar
pacifist,
stood as a Democrat
in
1918
administration had been a minor issue in the 1916 campaign;
became a major one
it
in 1918.
Republicans understood the importance of these sectional and economic issues and exploited them fully. They attempted to capitalise on the discontent of wheat farmers in the mid-western, central and western states and to play upon the sectional issue in a more general way. They portrayed the selfishness and greed of the cotton bloc and described the southerners in congress as eleventhhour patriots, dilatorily attending to essential war measures while serving narrow economic interests. It was easy to impugn the patriotism of these men since many had been against prewar preparedness and the selective service act. In the east Republican strategists based their appeal on a promise of vigorous prosecution of the war and a harsh peace, but they had little hope of cutting into Democratic strength in eastern industrial centres, where the war boom and government sponsorship of collective bargaining had brought prosperity to organised labour. They did, however, seek to influence labour, and all Americans, by claiming that Wilson intended to destroy the protective tariff, the basis of American prosperity.
Taft.
3104
An unexpected rapprochement
v "
memy
Roosevelt
14 Points: a 'poisonous peace'? Republicans had also planned to renew their criticism of the administration's management of the war. But the rapid shift in the tide of battle in August and September forced the party to drop this issue. Now that the war was nearly won, few Americans cared about the slowness of the Quartermaster Corps in providing army
da',
had
to accomplish through negotiations what she failed to accomplish on the battlefield. Lodge believed that
would attempt
Germany must be completely crushed and that the peace must be based on a league of victors. Roosevelt, too, cried out against a soft and idealistic peace, but in September most Republican spokesmen remained more cautious. Late in the month Wilson's uncompromising statement of his principles of peace met with widespread public approval and indicated, once again, that most Americans remained devoted to his leadership. The German peace note of October 3, and Wilson's receptive reply, infuriated Republicans and aroused their deepest fears over the President's intentions. Claiming that the German overture was a ruse, they called loudly for unconditional surrender and a dictated peace. In Congress resojutions appeared opposing a cessation of hostilities until Germany had been disarmed, and attempting to prevent any American official from talking peace with Germany prior to an unconditional surrender. Theodore Roosevelt's daughter, Alice Roosevelt Longworth. remembered that 'we of the "war-to-a-finish" party were fairly jumping up and down with suspicion and fury about what we considered the inconclusive character of Wilson's negotiations and notes'. Her father's bitterness toward Wilson reached a new height. Blind in one eye and failing in health, embittered by the President's refusal to let him fight in France and saddened by the death in battle of his youngest son, Roosevelt lashed out at Wilson unmercifully. In an unconditional surrender rally at Carnegie Hall in New York he Lansing.
Wanted
the
German note
to
be aimed
at electorate
as well
recruits with blankets during the previous winter. With the conflict drawing to a close, the question of peace terms and the shape of the postwar international order assumed far greater prominence. Many Republicans had long been hostile to the President's approach to these subjects. Before American entry they had disliked his mediation efforts and talk of peace without victory; after April 1917 they had objected — rather quietly — to the 14 Points. Although some favoured a League of Nations, most took a more gradualist approach than Wilson and envisaged a more traditional, nationally-oriented postwar world. Moreover, Republicans saw a connection between domestic and international reform. If Wilson radically restructured international relations, such a triumph would surely renew his mandate for economic and social reform at home. In other nations those groups favouring a Wilsonian peace were on the left of the political spectrum. Party spokesmen claimed that only Republican control of Congress would insure a complete victory abroad and sound domestic reconstruction. At the Indiana Republican convention in mid-May the keynote speaker asserted that the postwar settlement 'must not be left to the dreamers, the social uplifters, the pacifists, and the bolshevists who appear prominently among the President's chief advisers'. In the late summer Lodge attacked the 14 Points and warned that Germany, through a 'poisonous peace propagan.
.
.
Lodge. Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Baker. Wilson's controversial Secretary of
War
delivered the last major address of his life. With his jaw thrust forward and manuscript waving in the air, he celebrated 'the triumph of the war spirit in America' and demanded that the armistice 'be obtained by machine guns and not typewriters'. Republican orators poured out their suspicions and resentments and party leaders seemed to feel that they had found an issue which would appeal to all Americans. The administration's own propaganda agencies had done their work too well. A spirit of intolerance and brutality had entered the fibre of the people and Democratic leaders worried about the wisdom of the President's course in the armistice negotiations. Wilson himself was not unaware of these political perils, but he had to think of much more than just the outcome of the congressional elections. The President had to worry about the impact of his moves upon his followers in Allied nations and felt a compelling duty to end the fighting. So he steered cautiously through the armistice negotiations, avoiding a delay of peace through excessive harshness or a sacrifice of strategic advantage through his desire for an early peace. On October 20 Germany accepted Wilson's conditions and it remained only for the Allies to agree upon the final terms. The bitter partisan attacks upon the armistice negotiations had further hardened Wilson's feelings toward the Republican opposition. Since the middle of the summer Wilson had pondered an appeal to the voters to elect a Democratic Congress and. in September, he picked up the idea once again. Democratic candidates, hoping tc cling to the President's coat tails, clamoured for support. 'You are the only one', wrote the chairman of the congressional
3105
lit, i
sers
'who can give the candidates
them
across the line winners.'
approved the project, and on
d a blanket endorsement of Demolenying that either party had a monalled for the undivided support of and claimed that the Republican party, although anti-administration. In Europe a Republican victory pro-v. would be interpreted 'as a repudiation' of his leadership and he asked the people to return a Democratic majority in both the (
Senate and the House. Wilson's partisan appeal delighted Republicans. Roosevelt confided to Lodge that: 'I am glad Wilson has come out in the open; I fear Judas most when he can cloak his activities behind a treacherous make-believe of non-partisanship.' Party spokesmen quickly stepped up their own attacks and expressed outrage at the President's denigration of their patriotism. National Chairman Hays remarked that 'a more ungracious, more unjust, more wanton, more mendacious accusation was never made by the most reckless stump orator, much less by the President of the United States for partisan purposes'. Republican congressional leaders now insisted. that terms of surrender be left to the generals and suggested the Senate's role was equal to that of the President in the making of the peace treaty. Other Republicans argued that the nation's social and economic future hinged on the outcome of the elections .and painted a frightening picture of the Democratic reconstruction of America along socialist lines. By late October the Republican opposition seemed thriving and self-confident; the President's supporters somewhat defensive and uncertain. Faced with a vigorous Republican assault, many Democrats began to waver and doubt the appropriateness of Wilson's appeal. Nevertheless, the Democratic campaign organisation fought back, citing historical precedents for the President's action. On election day Democrats ran full-page newspaper ads openly matching Wilson's prestige with that of Roosevelt and Lodge. The choice, Democrats claimed, was between 'a peace of Liberalism and Justice, or a peace of Imperialism, Standpatism and Militarism'. Wilson was the leader of liberal forces everywhere and must be sustained. Party strategists hoped events would favour Democratic candidates, for by early November Germany had accepted Wilson's terms, the Allies had agreed to the 14 Points with what seemed only minor reservations and it was clear that an armistice would soon be signed. For all the partisan bickering over the war effort, the Allies had won far sooner than anyone had expected. Although Democratic campaign managers were far from confident of the result, they calculated that Wilson's successful leadership would carry the party to victory. In contrast to 1916, however, Democratic luck ran out in 1918. As Wilson and House congratulated themselves over the triumph of Wilsonian principles in the armistice negotiations, Republicans won a narrow victory on November 5. They captured both houses of Congress with a margin of 237 to 193 in one and 49 to 47 in the other. The first represented a gain of about 22 seats; the second seven. Although the Republicans proclaimed a great victory, in fact the elections were extremely close. The Democratic loss of seats was less than the average loss by the party in power in offyear elections, while in certain key states only a few thousand votes decided senatorial races. If Democrats had won only one more Senate seat they would have retained control of that body and have given the President a more sympathetic chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee than Henry Cabot Lodge.
Loss of the wheat states Republicans read great significance into the election returns. their victory represented a popular endorsement of their peace plans and a repudiation of Wilson's leadership and foreign policy. Wh< ther it was true or not, Wilson's critics could say, as Roosevelt did in late November, that 'our allies and our enemies and Mr Wilson himself should all understand that Mr Wilson has no authority whatever to speak for the American people at this time. His leadership has just been emphatically repudiated by them'. Republican leaders and much of the nation's press felt that the President had brought on his own downfall through his appeal for a Democratic Congress. Fn fact, however, the President's appeal probably won more votes than it losi may have provided the margin of victory in several tighl Se contests. And the appeal, though it unwisely imperilled Wilson's own prestige, was certainly understandable within the context of a bitter, partisan campaign. An analysis of the election returns indicates that it was a defection of the agricultural interior that caused the Democratic defeat. The Democrats had simply antagonised too many farmers, par-
They claimed
3106
ticularly those who grew wheat. Republicans gained in wheat areas in strikingly close proportion, district by district, to the extent of wheat acreage. In the ten states that led in wheat production Democrats failed to win a single congressional district that the Republicans carried in 1916, while Republicans won in 21 that had gone Democratic in 1916. Republican gains in 1918 came not from their denunciation of Wilsonian peace aims but from their successful exploitation of sectional and economic issues. Outside of wheat districts, the 1918 elections showed persisting Democratic strength, for Democrats did surprisingly well in the north-east and far west. They won, for example, the governorship of New York and defeated Senator John W. Weeks of Massachusetts, one of the President's most caustic critics. Wartime prosperity worked to the advantage of Democrats, as did the continuing public trust in Wilson's leadership. While grievances
had accumulated against the Wilson administration during the war, the normal postwar disillusionment had not yet had time to set in. Americans were grateful for the defeat of Germany and most interest groups were about as satisfied in 1918 as in 1916. In other words, when most Americans cast their votes they did not think in terms of putting Republicans in a position to nullify Wilson's peace programme. That programme was still general enough to draw wide public support. Voters rejected Democrat candidates for local or economic or sectional considerations, or sometimes because of their feeling that the Democrat-controlled Congress had been irresponsible and obstructionist. Wilson himself was not blind to the faults of the Democrats in Congress and felt that they had often failed to sustain him. One weakness of his appeal was the fact that congressional Republicans had supported his war measures as often as Democrats. Wilson's key mistake was not his appeal but his failure to recognise the public's disenchantment with some of his domestic policies. He assumed too readily that the people shared his own perspective and were equally involved in international events. To the President and many of his closest advisers, the end of the war and the forthcoming peace settlement overshadowed seemingly minor domestic concerns such as the price of wheat. Throughout the last phases of the congressional campaign international events continually distracted them. This emerged clearly in the behaviour of Colonel House, who was so absorbed in world affairs that he resented the intrusion of domestic politics. When Wilson spoke to House in late September about a possible appeal to the people, his closest adviser made no reply. He wanted to move on to more important subjects. In mid-October, when Secretary of State Robert Lansing observed that the elections ought to be kept in mind in drafting a note to the German government. House 'replied to this with some, heat, saying if we had such a thought in mind while trying to write the note we could not do it properly or worthily. I thought the elections were not to be considered in thinking of the settlement of this great world tragedy'. The administration was sure to pay a price for such exalted indifference to the domestic sources of its political power. Neither the President nor House caught the full significance of the setback in the congressional elections of 1918. Those elections represented the first sign of the breakup of the fragile Wilson coalition of 1916; much might have been done to repair the damage and strengthen the party's position for the presidential election of 1920. Instead, the absorption of the President and House in the world crisis grew deeper and they continued to lose touch with domestic political currents. The elections did, to be sure, disturb Wilson because of the obstacles Republican dominance of Congress might create, but he retained a 'faith in Divine Providence' and was certain 'that by one means or another the great thing we have to do will work itself out'. Whatever the domestic and international damage to his prestige, he knew that he could still tap a vast reservoir of sympathy inside and beyond the Democratic Party. What he did not know, of course, was how difficult it would be to translate this broad popular sympathy into politically effective support.
Further Reading Arnett, Alex M., Claude Kitchen and the Wilson War Policies
(Little,
Brown 1937) Bailey, Thomas A., Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (Macmillan 1944) Blum, John A., Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era (Houghton Mifflin 1951) Burner, David, The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918-1932 (Knopf 1968) Garraty, John A., Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography (Knopf 1953) Longworth, Alice Roosevelt, Crowded Hours (Scribner's Sons 1933) Morison, Elting E. (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, volume 8 (Harvard University Press 1954)
[For ('hark-.*
E
Neu's biography, see page 1227.
1
-
rBiMMfc
f
:
Lettow-Vorbecks
BitterTriumph indeed for a commander who has not been beaten in the field to have to surrender. After so many narrow escapes and so much hard fighting, the Armistice caught up with Lettow-Vorbeck just as he reinvaded the colony from which he had been driven. Major R. J. Sibley. Above: In pursuit of the elusive German force. The KAR in Portuguese East. Left: Undefeated after four years of It is bitter
brilliant improvised fighting, General Paul von Lei;tow-Vorbeck 3107
[]
man
General von army of 3 00
and 3,000 Portuguese East general's long-term
:een to divert as much of >pean war effort to East Africa as ible— and even now, in spite of losing the German colony, he was still determined
pursue this aim even if it meant taking fighting into Portuguese territory. Thus the invasion of Portuguese East Africa was the task which now lay before the Allies, but before the pursuit of LettowVorbeck could begin, General van Deventer had to reorganise the forces remaining at his disposal. Fortunately the rainy season was about to begin and this provided the necessary respite for this, reorganisation to be carried out. All Indian troops were sent home so that the bulk of the reorganised contingent was made up of African soldiers. The King's African Rifles had stood alone against the German forces in 1914, and now, at the end of the campaign, they were to be the only troops capable of continuing the struggle against the determined German Commander. The task confronting General van Deventer was to construct a plan of campaign which would bring to a close the war in Portuguese East Africa. This was no easy task in country covered with thick brush, in which two forces could easily be undetected within a few miles of one to
the
another.
The
skilful use of the
by the German
rearguard
Commander
could hold up vastly superior forces for a long time. Deventer wisely appreciated that LettowVorbeck's problem would be food supplies. Once crops had been used up in Portuguese East Africa, it was conceivable that the
German Commander would attempt
to
return into his old territory. To follow the German Commander by using only one column would obviously give him the initiative as to the direction — so with these thoughts in mind the Allied Commander made his plan on the following lines: • To prevent the German Commander
German East Africa; give battle whenever possible so as to keep up the pressure on the German force; • To attack from various directions; and • To stop the Germans invading Nyasaland. A force under the command of Colonel Fitzgerald was formed from 1/3, 2/3, 3/3 and named Kartrecol. Its task was to prevent the Germans from re-entering their old territory. The offensive plan was to be carried out by a force called Rosecol which was to invade and occupy Port Amelia, and, again, this force was composed of King's African Rifles together with the Gold Coast Regiment. As the number of troops in Port Amelia was expanded, the force became known as from coming back into
• To
KAR
it was put under the comBrigadier-General W. F. S.
Pamforce and
mand
of
Edwards.
Having crossed the border, Lettow-Vorbeck went very quickly on to the offensive. A sharp engagement at Negomano against Portuguese Askaris was a success, and the Germans were able to capture rifles, ammunition and medical stores. This meant that they were able to rearm most of their Askaris with the superior Portuguese rifles — as Lettow-Vorbeck remarked, 'It was really a perfect miracle that these troops should have arrived so opportunely as to make the capture of the place so profitable to us. With one blow we had freed ourselves of a great part of our difficulties'. But the problem of food supplies was again becoming acute and Lettow-Vorbeck's original intentions of keeping his force together had to be changed. General
Wahle and his detachment pushed westwards whilst Lettow-Vorbeck and the main column marched further up the River Lugenda. Any Portuguese resistance that was encountered was soon dealt with and supplies of food were also captured which eased, at least temporarily, their most immediate problem. While LettowVorbeck's force was divided into various General Edwards' troops had landed at Port Amelia and had moved inland. By March 1918 they had reached Medo and made contact with Koehl's detachments, but Medo was well defended by the German detachment and 2/2 KAR attacked from an unfavourable position. Soon, ammunition began to run low and all groups,
./
ik
I '„
/
.
*
-^0^%
r+» near* 7
Mr
*> -
jf
««r»M|
JfllH
.*
ILI
country around the town favoured the defender — the bush being very thick and flanked by precipitous heights. A narrow gorge containing a dried-up river bed ran through the area for two miles, and a cleverly-placed defensive position could hold up an attacker for a long time. The Germans took advantage of this and the advancing KAR columns were engaged in a fierce fight. Eventually the KARs succeeded in dislodging the Germans but not before sustaining considerable casualties. However, the British had not concentrated
enough of their forces on Korewa and General Edwards was unable to bring enough pressure to bear to make the engagement decisive. The KAR Official History comments: 'had the King's African Rifles Mounted Infantry, who were hampered by inaccurate maps and ignorance of
attempts to get fresh supplies failed. At this stage, bayonets were fixed and a hand-tohand encounter followed. The predicted counterattack was developed and numerous attempts were made to break into the KAR positions, but the new KAR recruits fought well and remained steady in the face of strong German opposition. The position was a difficult one, for in places the Askaris were knee-deep in water; some companies had to dig their weapon pits out of mud. Eventually the Gold Coast Regiment linked up with 2/2 KAR, and the Germans,
under cover of darkness, withdrew. After Medo the British campaign was continued with such vigour that LettowVorbeck, supremely conscious of being forced to fight on ground not of his own choosing, gathered together his column at Nanungu, and prepared to move southwards. From the British point of view it seemed that the thrust coming from the north, west and east might trap the German Commander and his small army, and Deventer saw a good opportunity of defeating Lettow-Vorbeck at Korewa. The
the country, arrived in time to close the gap, Edwards might have achieved his object and practically ended the campaign at Korewa.' The Germans, while also sustaining considerable casualties, lost valuable ammunition, a serious setback at this stage of the campaign. So ended the first phase of the campaign
Portuguese East Africa. Lettow-Vorbeck had escaped again and continued his march southwards; by sheer force of personality, allied with an outstanding professional in
ability, the
German Commander
could
still
inspire his exhausted force to further effort and achievement even after three months
Supplies — the recurrent nightmare of both Commanders Above: Nigerian troops cross the boundary between Tanganyika and Portuguese East Africa. Below: Landing supplies at Port Amelia, a difficult and unsatisfactory base
3ij^u:
of arduous campaigning.
While the Ger-
man column pushed southwards
to
the
region near the River Lurio, an advance guard went ahead to Malema and a small rearguard did its best to force the British to deploy, in order to gain valuable time for the main body. Captain Miiller's detachment captured Malema and found fertile
plentiful supplies of food — in fact the area
so fertile that Lettow-Vorbeck could the best possible use of the foodstuffs available. He was determined to
was not
make
push on to the Alto Molocue which he knew from captured maps was a Portuguese administrative centre possibly containing ammunition and medical supplies. The Germans' rapid move southwards forced General van Deventer to move his base from Port Amelia to Mozambique. The Quelimane region was also threatened, so as soon as he had moved headquarters Deventer turned his attention to its reinforcement during the last part of June. Meanwhile, Captain Miiller, with the German advance guard, seized Alto Molocue, but the expected supplies did not materialise,
so
Lettow-Verbeck
deter-
mined to push on southwards, where he had reason to believe that vast supplies of ammunition and medical stores existed. Miiller was at this time given considerable freedom of action, and although LettowVorbeck commanded the main body, Miiller dictated the course of the campaign. Lettow-Vorbeck had the utmost faith in the tactical judgement of his subordinate and was consequently prepared to delegate his command even at such a critical period of the campaign.
The towns of Kokosani and Namacurra were continually recurring in the Intelligence reports and it became clear to Lettow-Vorbeck that they must be the site of the ammunition stores that he so badlj needed. Eventually it was discovered that these two names were in fact the same place, so Lettow-Vorbeck moved the main force forward as quickly as possible. Captain Miiller made contact with the Portuguese and a sharp engagement followed in which the three Portuguese companies were soundly defeated near the Namacurra factory area. During the course of the engagement Miiller captured various rifles, and two field guns and their ammunition, but failed to locate the British companies defending the area or the vast supplies of ammunition which were concealed somewhere in this region. By this time Lettow-Vorbeck had arrived and he
KAR
3110
concentrated on finding this these supplies commandeered, he could continue the war indefinitely. It seemed unlikely that the ammunition would be near the factory area but closer to the railway or its southern terminal, and with characteristic intensity he forced his tired troops southwards again towards the end of. the railway line. Near the railway station they came under well-aimed small arms fire, so Lettow-Vorbeck decided to maintain contact and attack on the following day — July 3. By then Miiller had got all the captured Portuguese artillery working and as soon as the German artillery bombardment started, the Portuguese defence quickly crumbled, those in the forward trenches moving back rapidly to the rear. The Germans, realising that this was the critical moment in the battle, rushed forward, the weight of their attack falling on the two KAR companies. But the young African Askaris had been affected by the unsoldierly display shown by the Portuguese and the retirement became a rout. Major Gore-Browne, the KAR Commander on the spot, took the only course open to him and withdrew along the river — unfortunately a fast-flowing stream about 100 yards wide. The Commander and many Askaris were drowned, and the remainder were shot by the Germans. More important than the tactical victory he had achieved, LettowVorbeck now had at his disposal vast stores at
once
ammunition — with
and clothing, arms and ammunition. The critical supply problem was solved for the time being; the Askaris were reclothed and the porters were loaded with sufficient food to last many weeks. Three hundred and fifty modern English and Portuguese rifles were captured together with stocks of ammunition which would last for the fore-
of food
seeable future.
Lettow-Vorbeck: tireless and invincible The German Commander now made the unusual decision to march north-eastwards-he assumed that the Allied Commander would without doubt become alarmed
at*
striking at
the
possibility
Mozambique
of his
itself. It
force
was quite
some time before Lettow-Vorbeck's intenwere realised, and the situation became faintly ironical, with the Germans marching northwards, and the British coming southwards towards Quelimane. The two forces met at Namirrue where the British were taken completely by surprise. In the following engagement 3/3 King's tions
African Rifles was so decimated that it ceased to exist as a battalion. The German column moved on towards Chalaua; where informers had indicated, quite correctly, that the British forces were converging. Without hesitation Lettow-Vorbeck changed his direction and marched due westwards towards Nhamarroi. On August 24 this incredible force arrived at Nhamarroi only to be confronted by a British column — 2/4 KAR had been sent there to forestall the Germans. This, however, turned out to have been over-optimistic, and the Germans were able to seize 40,000 rounds of ammunition, two light machine
guns and large quantities of supplies in spite of them. At this juncture, LettowVorbeck had to decide whether to continue westwards or turn to the north. Any westward move would bring the German force
Lake Nyasa, and this, he realised, would give the British considerable advantages, since they controlled the lake and close to
could easily concentrate their forces by the intelligent use of steamers. With this in mind he decided to go northwards: 'A further march north seemed to be more practical, passing the lake on the east; it seemed probable that our return to German East Africa would be a complete surprise to the enemy.'
The German column moved northwards through Mtatere and Mpuera with the British pursuing force close on its heels. The advance had been taken over by 2/2 KAR and pressed home with determination; No 2 Company had some successes but unfortunately its Commander overreached himself and found he was in fact attacking the German main body, which counterattacked in strength. The results were disastrous for No 2 Company which lost all its officers and its company sergeantmajor,
only just
what was
left
managing to extricate company to join
of the
up with the remainder of the battalion.
Lettow-Vorbeck: his tireless
example
inspired his men to further achievement used to haul a General Sir Jacob van Deventer, a bear confronting a fox. Despite innumerable plans made by DevenFar
left:
African labour
is
British 5-inch howitzer. Left:
ter to cripple the
German
force, the elusive
Lettow-Vorbeck was always one step ahead. In his telegram informing Lettow-Vorbeck of the Armistice in November 1918 Deventer allowed the German force to retain their arms in consideration of their gallant fight'. Right:
Belgian and British troops (top) after Lettow-Vorbeck's re-emergence in German East Africa. Below right: The progress of the campaign in East Africa during 1918
But the Germans did not press home their victory — Lettow-Vorbeck 'considered whether I ought not to throw in all my reserves to inflict a decisive defeat on the 2nd King's African Rifles. I gave up the idea however. Time was very short for there was only an hour to darkness and I felt perfectly certain that very early next
morning fresh
hostile forces
on the scene.
If
we were
would appear to
achieve a
would certainly cost us appreciable losses, and I was anxious to avoid such losses in view of our small
decisive victory
it
numbers.' Nevertheless, this setback to the British forces brought the pursuit to a halt and Lettow-Vorbeck was not bothered again for some time. The enemy which attacked his soldiers came now in the guise of influenza; 'about half had bronchial catarrh, and from three to six men in each company had inflammation of the lungs; as it was only possible for 80 sick to be carried in the whole force, about 20 men suffering from slight inflammation of the lungs had to march at times'. But with a characteristically
superhuman
effort, Let-
tow-Vorbeck held his force together and on September 28, 1918 he reached the River Ruvuma at Nagwamira and there crossed back into German East Africa. In spite of all Allied efforts the initiative still lay with the German Commander. General van Deventer had to redeploy his entire force northwards and he formed another column called Cenforce. The old column Kartrecol, after a 1,600-mile pursuit through the forests and swamps of Portuguese East Africa, in the course of which 29 large rivers had been crossed and 32 engagements had been fought, was eventually disbanded. It is greatly to his credit that even now the German leader could dictate the future of the campaign despite overwhelming British superiority
men and equipment. The country around Songea was fertile and rich in cattle — this was to be the next stepping-stone in the Germans' move northwards. It was here that the German Askaris rested and replenished their food supplies and prepared themselves for the next phase of the camin
paign. On the British side the last part of the campaign fell upon two of the Uganda battalions: 1/4 and 2/4 KAR. The 2/4 KARs were embarked at Fort Johnston and sent by steamer to Mbamba Bay, although, as the Official History relates, the men were far from being in the best condition: 'The battalion had been marching and fighting continually since the previous
KAR
3111
don telegraph that clause 17 of armistice signed by German government provides for unconditional surrender of all German forces operating in East Africa within one
month from November 11. My conditions hand over all prisoners in your
are, first,
March; no issue of clothing had been made and the men were in a most disreputable state.' When they disembarked they joined forces with the Northern Rhodesia police and pursued Lettow-Vorbeck to the north. The German Commander had been forced to leave behind General Wahle, who had fallen sick. This gallant old officer had been visiting Dar-es-Salaam at the outbreak of war and, despite his retirement, had offered his services to Lettow-Vorbeck. He had served through all the successes, failures and permanent hardships of the German force and it was most unfortunate for him that he should fall sick within a month of the campaign's ending. The journey north between Brandt and Mbosi was through unknown territory. Lettow-Vorbeck pulled in his patrols and advance guard and as a result moved forward much more quickly — even if someTop: The plight of the wounded and sick in East Africa was hard indeed. Below: Some of Vorbeck's 1,168 Askaris, tough and experienced
what
blindly. Fife was to be the next objective, for here the British held valuable
stores. Reconnaissance patrols were sent out against the British position, which appeared to be well defended. The British positions had depth, mutual support and good fields of fire, and Lettow-Vorbeck therefore opened his attack with a mortar bombardment. This was not successful so the German leader — always anxious to avoid a pitched battle — called off the attack. Kasama was the next important objective,
hands, second, bring your forces to Abercorn without delay, third, hand over all your arms to my representative at Abercorn. I will, however, allow you and your officers and European ranks to retain their arms for the present in consideration of the gallant fight which you have made, provided that you bring your force to Abercorn without delay. The German General agreed to the surrender terms, and his army at the time, 155 Europeans, 1,168 Askaris and 3,000 other Africans, accepted their fate. They marched by short stages to Abercorn to surrender formally and on November 25, 1918 it was a proud German Schultstruppe which marched into Abercorn with General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck at the head of the column. A guard of honour was provided by the King's African Rifles and Brigadier-
General Edwards was on parade to receive the surrender. General von Lettow-Vorbeck formed his men into three ranks, saluted the British flag and read out his formal statement of surrender in German and English, which General Edwards accepted on behalf of King George V. This ended what must surely be one of the most un-
where food and ammunition were rumoured
usual and fascinating campaigns of the
— inaccurately as it turned out — to be stored. On November 13 the German
First
column moved south to Chambeshi and it was here that Lettow-Vorbeck received news of the Armistice in the form of a telegram from General van Deventer: Send following to General von LettowVorbeck under white
flag.
War
Office
Lon-
World War.
Further Reading Lettow-Vorbeck, General von, My Reminiscences of East Africa (Hurst & Blackett)
[For Major R. J. Sibley's biography, see page 360.
The men of the High Seas Fleet had languished in Kiel harbour for most of the war. They had suffered food shortages and bad conditions not shared by their officers.
Then they heard rumours of a
MUTINY
In the words of Ernst Troeltsch, the leaders of the Majority Social Democratic Party 'greeted the revolution, which they had not made and which they held to be misconceived, as a long lost child, in view of the effect it had on the masses'. Soon, however, there was no one willing to acknowledge the child's paternity, to say nothing of those to whom both the revolution now and Weimar later was and would be a misconception, and who were always ready with the accusation of a stab in the back of the soldiers at
the front.
By contemporaries German
the events in Kiel were regarded as 'the Revolution' and the leaders of the Majority Social Democratic Party were convinced that Kiel 'gave the signal for the German Revolution' (Hermann Muller). However, the Kiel mutiny was only able to have this effect against the background of the political mood of the masses and of the peace movement which in the course of October had seized whole sections of the population. Apart from Munich, a special case exhibiting no sign of being influenced by the events in Kiel, the Kiel uprising serves as a model for the German revolutionary movement in November 1918. For all its peculiar characteristics, Kiel was not just a local phenomenon. Since the High Seas Fleet had remained inactive in harbour for most of the war, the ships' crews had had immeasurably greater contact with the rest of the population. The inferior conditions on board had also to be taken into account, in particular the quarters source of the
being planned by the admirals. Dieter Groh. Below: Noske addresses the returned U-Boat crews at Kiel last desperate sortie
which the crews lived and the food they ate. Specially significant fact that the discrepancy between officers and men was considerably greater than in the army, or even among front line troops. As late as February 1918, while the men had had nothing more than potato bread for months past, every day rolls were baked for the officers of the cruiser Niirnberg, and on Sundays cakes. These were the facts behind the 1917 mutiny which had been suppressed by the military authorities. Two events were decisive in transforming the latent dissatisfaction of the crews into demands for peace. Firstly, the change of government on October 3 and, secondly, the return of the torpedo boats and the U-Boats, together with the dock workers, from the Belgian ports. However this confrontation with reality did not awaken the crews, already demoralised by the deteriorating climate of public opinion, by bad food, and by bad handling by their officers. Since October 27, two further processes could be numbered among the causes of the mutiny. Firstly, the changes that had taken place within the High Seas Fleet as a result of the institution of the High Command for the War at Sea and the commencement of Scheer's programme — increased U-Boat construction analogous to Hindenburg's programme for the army, with the result that almost half the ships' commanders and first officers were chosen. This fostered the vital lack of security, as far as naval leadership and moral leadership were concerned, during the months of greatest strain. Also, as a result of the continually in
was the
311
'Comrades and colleagues! Up till now you have shown that you are men .
.
1 and permission for a meeting for all the sailors refused on November 2. In its place, a public demonstration for workers and soldiers was arranged for November 3, a Sunday. The USPD took part and a leader of the Social Democratic Party addressed the demonstrators. Three thousand men and women demonstrated, a small number when one considers that at the time there were 15,000 marines stationed in Kiel, besides the sailors. At the close
ber
of the meeting, held in
sympathy
for the arrested sailors, a
march
formed which made its way towards the city centre. A patrol, led by an officer, blocked their path. When no one obeyed his order to disperse, he commanded his men to open fire. Eight demonstrators were killed and 29 wounded. The patrol withdrew at once, leaving the march to break up. During the night that followed, all was quiet. The inactivity of the military, together with fear of possible punishment, encouraged the demonstrators to flee, before anything else. But the events that followed transformed a pressure-group having as its aim the release of prisoners into a revolutionary movement that adopted far-reaching demands, and through its councils took on the outward appearance of revolution. During the night of November 4 and the early hours of the morning the sailors on board and in barracks formed councils. Red flags were hoisted on the ships, the officers were disarmed and the commanding officers deposed. Only a very few resisted. The sailors' demands were best made known by Number 1 Torpedo Division: # Abdication by the Hohenzollerns.
first
# The siege conditions to be raised.
# Release of the members of the Third Squadron.
October 1918, shortly before the mutiny, and watches the cutting of armour plates
The Kaiser
visits Kiel in
% Release
U-Boat war, the most important officer-cadres were numerically quite inadequate for maintaining contact with the crew and maintaining discipline. Secondly, there were the plans for an engagement between the British and German fleets, for 'a glorious end, even though it be a fight to the death' (Admiral von Trotha). Translating that from the officers' code of honour into the language of the crews, it meant that the commanders were planning a crazy 'suicide trip', which would cost the lives of thousands of men, at a time when peace was already within their grasp and a sea-battle, at the end of the war, could have no influence on the course of events. Rumour had it that the government of Prince Max knew nothing of the planned thrust, which was true. It can therefore be said that the sailors' rebellion was preceded by an 'admirals' rebellion'. The plans were that between October 28 and October 30 the whole fleet was to rendezvous at Schillig-Reede, the outmost entrance into the Jade Busen, near the island of Wangerooge. The men were informed that it was a fleet manoeuvre. This of course was not believed, since the men could conclude from the many signs and rumours that in fact the fleet commanders were planning increasing
'a fight to
demands
of the
On
the finish'.
October 27, as units of the
of all
comrade members of the
sailors'
# #
fleet left
Wilhelmshaven for Schillig-Reede, the passive resistance of the sailors commenced. It appeared that some of the technical personnel, and in particular the stokers, were not on board. Fires were extinguished, water-cocks opened and the capstans jammed, so that the anchors could not be weighed. By the evening of October 29 the movement had seized all the battleships and the small cruisers. Those units of the fleet that had gathered at Schillig-Reede by that time could not weigh anchor because of the resistance of their crews. On Thiiringen and Helgoland, both ships of the line, red flags were hoisted. During October 30 and 31 the order to lea/e port was given five times, but could not be carried out because of the sailors' opposition. More than a thousand men were arrested, after the
commanders had had drawn
called in the marines and the smaller units near, in readiness to shell the larger ships. Nonetheless, the sailors had achieved a considerable success: the
fleet
of the fleet
High Seas Fleet could were now so weak.
i
o longer put out to sea
Marines open fire The individual ages. The Third board, entered Kiel har!j< were rife, especially the belief A deputation of sailors der arrested men was rejected by
3114
w
because the crews
ordered to different anchorthan 25,000 sailors on October 31. Rumours ested would be shot. mmediate release of the
lore
(
t
officers
on Novem-
movement
of
1917 imprisoned at Celle. Release of all political prisoners. Introduction of universal and equal suffrage for both sexes. By the evening of November 4 all ships and barracks were in the hands of the insurgents and all sailors imprisoned in Kiel had been liberated. The sailors were completely in command, but were unable to organise themselves. Now the workers under the organisation of the Social Democrats took a hand and decided on a general strike for November 5. On the evening of November 4 Gustav Noske, a leading member of the SPD, had arrived in Kiel. He was unable to 'stifle a revolutionary movement', since there was no such phenomenon present in Kiel. On the contrary: through the sudden breakdown of the military powers, the sailors' up-
Kiel Canal, the link between the Baltic and the North Sea which enabled the German fleet to fight in both theatres
K
.
.
.
you have kept your dignity,
the eyes of many millions of fellow-countrymen are upon you.' rising
had become more and more aimless and disorientated. Thus movement fell to Noske without any effort
the leadership of the
on his
part.
was not only the leadership of the SPD which was caught unawares by the events in Kiel and the chain reaction set off thereby. It was the same for the leaders of the more left-wing party, the USPD. Wilhelm Dittmann, a member of the Council of People's It
Delegates, wrote later in his memoirs: 'No one among the Social Democrats thought it possible that the military could break down as suddenly and catastrophically as in fact happened, step by step, in October and November 1918.' Politically and administratively, both social democratic parties were in no way prepared for the uprising. Even the members of the Spartacus Group and the 'revolutionary elite' — the latter being the only ones to 'prepare for the revolution' — were caught unawares
by the mutiny on the coast and the rapid spread of the movement up to November 9. The revolutionary wave started from a point which nobody had expected and from a group which certainly nobody had expected. The government and the leadership of the army had failed to foresee the development just as utterly as the socialist parties and groups, which for years had longed for the existing power structure to be overthrown — admittedly with differing intensity and for strongly differing reasons.
The spreading revolt That no radical left-wing group and no revolutionary leader took part in the course of events is true not only of the events of October 27 to November 4 in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, but also of those of the days that followed. The movement gripped first of all the coastal towns, then spread to some inland towns and at last on November 9 reached Berlin. Only Munich and its surrounds remained unaffected, but whether this was due to the distance from the site of the mutiny remains in doubt. The reasons for the spread of the sailors' movement beyond Kiel were: the soldiers' and sailors' fear of being cut off in the fortress of Kiel; the desire to liberate soldiers and sailors imprisoned in other towns; and finally the wish to end the war. By the evening of November 6, the insurgent sailors had seized power in all the garrison towns of Schleswig-Holstein, and in Liibeck, Hamburg, Cuxhaven, Bremen, Bremerhaven, Wilhelmshaven and the surrounds. Everywhere, events followed the same
German warships
in the harbour at Hamburg under the red Mutiny quickly spread from Kiel to other major naval ports
flag.
pattern: insurgent sailors entered the town by sea or rail; they occupied the port and station; they released the arrested sailors and political prisoners; there was no, or else very slight, opposition from the officers and military authorities; ships and troops went over to the insurgents; soldiers' councils were formed, in which workers were included. At this point the local party organisations of the USPD and the SPD became involved in the movement. Above all, to 'prevent chaos' and to forestall a possible seizure of power by the radical left, for which the latter were in any event completely unprepared. Only in Bremen did the Social Democrats have to yield leadership to the radicals. It was to no avail that the authorities closed off rail traffic at Neumiinster, to prevent the spread of the insurrection. During the night of November 6-7 200 sailors succeeded in reaching Cologne. The next night they led a military coup, which again sparked off the insurrection, this time throughout the Rhineland. Events followed the usual course in Braunschweig, while in Hanover power fell to the soldiers and sailors more by chance: the stationmaster had held three sailors who were passing through from Kiel. At once other soldiers and sailors gathered around them. They disarmed the station guards and the troops that arrived joined their ranks. In Berlin on the other hand troops that arrived in the town were arrested by the sailors — 1,700 on November 7 alone. In all the towns in the possession of the insurgents by November 9, the insurrection followed the same pattern. The revolts began with the sailors, or soldiers, continued with the election of soldiers' councils and ended with the removal of the officers' authority to command. The leaders of the SPD and the USPD took part, not because they approved, but simply because the masses in the towns, and in particular the workers, greeted the actions of the soldiers with such enthusiasm. Support for the soldiers was strongest in the towns such as Bremen, Hamburg, Braunschweig and Leipzig, where the radical left was most deeply entrenched. Only after November, after the fall of the monarchy and of the Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, and the latter's replacement by Friedrich Ebert, is it possible to say that the leaders of the SPD voluntarily took their places in the revolutionary movement. Further Reading Huber, E. R., Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte (documents on constitutional history-Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 1966) lllustrierte Geschichte der deutschen Revolution (illustrated history of the Revolution — Berlin: Internationaler Arbeiterverlag 1929) Rausch, B., Am Spnngquell der Revolution (Kiel 1918)
GROH is Reader in Modern History at Heidelberg University. He has written numerous books and articles on intellectual history, Marxist theory and especially the history of German Social Democracy. DIETER
Kiel.
and
December
22; a demonstration by 20,000 petty officers warrant-officers against the removal of badges of rank
31
1
-m which the amended the (lerman ed from a cons.titu.re!/
!i
tmnal monarchy'
to a
parliamentary mon-
the ships crews of the High Seas Fleet 'disobeyed the orders of the Admiral of the Fleet, Admiral Scheer, to leave Wilhelmshaven and to proceed towards the mouth of the Thames in preparation for an attack. Scheer abandoned the hopeless enterprise, planned for the honour of the German fleet, and let the mutinying ships sail, to Kiel. There the mutineers joined the dockworkers. On November 3 a meeting of protest was held archy, section's
of.
on the drill-ground in Kiel, which more than 3,000 sailors, stokers, soldiers and workers attended. During the night of 4. sailors' and soldiers' councils were formed on the ships and in the barracks of Kiel and by midday some 20,000 men, half of the troops stationed in Kiel, had joined. The government of Prince Max of Baden sent to Kiel the SPD delegate Gustav Noske, who was promptly elected as Chairman of the Soldiers' Council and
November
who quickly managed tion in the
town under
to
bring the situa-
control.
Meanwhile,
however, the movement among the soldiers and workers had already spread to other coastal towns. Everywhere worker and soldier councils were formed. Councilthinking, which had played so large a part in Russia in 1905 and 1917, was foreign to the
more
German
Socialist parties
and even
Certainly party functionaries complied with the spontaneous movement in the towns, and were often elected as chairmen to the councils, but for the most part they regarded these councils as a transitory phenomenon. By November 7 the popular movement had reached the towns in west and south Germany. The end of the German Monarchy was approaching. On that day the Bavarian throne was the first to fall. In Munich, Kurt Eisner of the pacifist wing of the USPD, proclaimed the 'Bavarian Free State'. That the revolutionary movement should spread to the German capital, which lacked any sources of defence, was inevitable in the circumstances. In order to stem the expected wave in Berlin as far as possible, and to take the edge off the criticisms of the masses, the SPD faction of the Reichstag and the SPD Party leaders demanded the Kaiser's abdication and the Prince's renunciation of the throne by November 7. They threatened to withdraw their representatives from Prince Max's cabinet, but hesitated to carry out this threat on the following day because they were afraid that a government crisis would delay the signing of the truce. Thus the most important political party had not yet reached a decision when on the morning of November 9 the revolutionary wave reached Berlin. The SPD was therefore forced into action, as it did not want to be 'overrun' and hand over the initiative to the USPD and the Spartacists. The leader of the SPD, Friedrich Ebert, defined their aims with the words 'to seize the Government resolutely and energetically, as in Munich, but without bloodshed, if' possible'. During negotiations (the details of which cannot he reconen the Chancellor, Prince 'nan mi o('the„SI'l) to the trade unions.
i
Three unconstitutional acts set off the German Revolution of November 1918: the unauthorised proclamation of the Kaiser's abdication by the Chancellor, his transferring his own office to the Socialist, Ebert, and the proclamation of the German Republic. Andreas Hillgruber. Below: Berlin Palace,
December 1918
Braun, and two trusted business men, the conditions of government take-over were agreed upon. Even before this, Prince Max had seen fit to proclaim the Kaiser's abdication, the Crown Prince's renouncing of the throne and the appointment of a regent. He did this without Wilhelm IPs authority on learning from a publication by the 'Executive Committee of the Worker-Soldier Council' of the plans of a general strike, which in fact resulted in enormous demonstrations by the workers and soldiers through the streets of central Berlin. He further announced Ebert's nomination as Chancellor and a bill concerning the immediate endorsement of general elections for a constitutional national assembly. At the end of the talks at midday Prince Max handed over to Ebert the office of Chancellor, although Ebert could no longer give a positive reply to the question whether he would preserve the constitutional monarchy, because circumstances had altered since he had declared, only a few days previously, his intention to hold fast to the Monarchy, through a regent. That continuity was to be preserved as far as possible was obvious through statements made by Ebert. He wanted to avoid a break with their coalition partners in the 'Inter-
party Committee' and Prince Max's government, with the Centre and the Left Liberals, even though the centre of gravity of the new government was to lie primarily with the Social Democrats. It could not be
overlooked that formal participation of both coalition partners would be possible, since all civil parties had completely withdrawn at the beginning of the revolutionary movement, and only very occasionally did a Left Liberal seek to play a part in the Worker-Soldier Councils. At any rate Ebert strove to continue to work through the State Secretaries of the previous government without concerning himself whether they belonged to the Party or with their
However, his most important concept for the new government was the involvement of the USPD in Govpolitical points of view.
ernment responsibility. In his opinion, the SPD and USPD, who in this way were to share the responsibility, had to have a majority
among
the
members
of the
new
government. This cabinet, however, was to be only a temporary arrangement, a transitional solution with limited tasks, until the election of a constitutional National Assembly made it possible to form a new government which was democratically legitimate.
On the afternoon of November 9 Ebert appointed his Party friends Scheidemann and Otto Landsberg as the first ministers to the new government. Peace, order and law Meanwhile the scene in the city had changed considerably. Scheidemann had gone to the
Reichstag after the talks with Prince
Max. The delegates had returned home after the constitutional amendments on October 26. so that only a few of them remained in the capital on the 'day of revolution". On November 9 the Reichstag building was like an 'army camp' of soldiers and workers; in front of the building the masses crowded. Scheidemann addressed them from a window of the building. He proclaimed the abdication of the Hohenzollerns and announced the 'German Republic', and that Ebert had been nomi-
c
f
a ]
1 f %
&
<
•
.
m
t«#
Uf||t!UP
<
cwmswHrrnnrTOScmKrmr
ni-rllnrc Oolli^blolt. *•<
mi
Dei «
S
'
*4tamlh
e«hll
Pfm
\>i
!•«
r'
r
fl,,,,,,,
|,
'
Ubcn
,
ri(h
,„,!$[,,),„,,
i
(••<
rti
9,
h« Srmtl
limit,
1
m '
| (
,.,
ji.,|.,„,
.
,,,,,,
in Ztfaljltn fm irml,i,in l>or ( lil
'
inform
lunffljii
Mi
jj
utrhimbrnrn Mi (fnifnnitii,i
,i,
iriitrn ,,,
ijoditl
blr mil
ff» TVnlllhrn JiclaV
tfi
,„
'
l>rn
rl
„„(,,,
t'\ Oolhidlf icll"n, cnbaiilii^
3>tillr
,,
u
.
'
!
n
im
Uiuir
lo
I!
'ir.fiMietlidi
IV
f
'
»Hn
1
,„>*
|.;.
un» »ct
JH>«,-rii>ii.im
'•'"
mm
(,,„„,,-,.,, trll
i}, i(l(, ,„,
JlrnlMili
rnifa
i
"'•••mm
,
a
|t„,|,i
,l,*r,i
J?i
1
w
R,„i
"K,.
"*«« «n»
i|,(,(„„
not
1(lfn
f^i,
In,
t*lin,l,, ."ii-foni,,,, .>„,„,
r«r
i
hoi
l'.'aitflai
yi>rcn.
Trt
o
r.i|i,il5ru„
t>fi
bturidirn
TJolf
it,*«ai n»«"
iht
l»*i
mS.
Tloctti
T
*P
1
1
ii
i
IS oi
cm
19a»rn.
a; be *tr I*
n
)t;id<«f«1ftlft
(VSj"t
qn-,a4i
l)«l
•nV<"6""- *•* l '"
mrt»
'The Kaiser has abdicated!' Announced Forward, the Berlin people's news-sheet. ien the Kaiser telephoned the capital with of his own statement he was told tt it was already too late. Above: Showing
Le/f: t'oi n.n>i'»Ht«' tlrkrilir! *»l»nlfi' 3^lfn tinf' ho« JMrrmil>rrr rqlwfirt «v >" • tVr (•«'(iMeflrn 41MH Tolft nbfr«iianiiii ">'. u^-M-crl-mlf Tiki* " • bol>r»
in
f
» N"
C'l>li<
<
Imtt"
ti;
3]
f«*l
»<»
CrlKHm
«(|cfo>HI
ji>-,t«lkmi>>r«fif
VrkfMrr- «»v
•
le
31 18
red flag at the
Brandenburg Gate
3
IVt
»pa i
>
frfif
Tolffiuai
:onn.iK-,^. !>,„•!
in
Wn.onty.r m|H.
Nj'
Raifrr unt> JTirnpnuv hot*n dfrqcNiiitt' (*bM.„u| ct jtlOPttell nnt> tnlon m ? T>cciiFicii one «•»€ Xt.ilcniiut ju« Kinnfrn Mc !>.w "I'crtraucn ^f* idciTi Jli.jcn 1lrl!c« in JiaM „ r f t/anf !>v-r aclv.lt! nno 3«««fc>trn rMtxn. ih kit
^Vn»
,
m
Tom
lirfcr
<*r»«li
in dic
<>«*»( b»« t«»lff#
«Sr»l
•rmras. ,<
<*•« »tri«n«»»flfWnbf ^'iniiiixriaB.:.,, i-ti«flHc»# Srtxnlrr
irln
luioa.u vjoltmien
"Purart' TVr \2itd. &*« 1 rUr< n't rmina.cn ft barf n«fcj buret UnMainrnboir* ro!tbrt unr n<-ljhrN-t rwrtxn TPlrtftbofKlfSm un!> 1Vrt.it ;
1
mjilm nnrxbinq* 7
An assortment of protection troops of the Workers' and Soldiers' Council in Unter den Linden, Berlin. Right: Workers, Soldiers, Left:
Citizens!
The
free people s state
is
.
.
rtt>dffai
nvitv*
rsjm.i
r-ir
.^olqt aOtn 'BWUn^oi bet ntutn TMt'f'rrd.icn.aj. \JI« bonNrll in l«ln> tjn lint> ihtra 7VaafttJ«ltn rvrnfnmfit mil ben •Jlrb^tmi nnt) vjplfwim
£od? bic btntfd)tJttpvri>\\t
!
here!
The Kaiser and Crown Prince have abdicated! Long live the German Republic!' .
dufrrtfcf
r[!«t
i>rT
?pnta* bn virUjlNm*fTonr Dnfftfjrt?
ellor
nment
and commissioned to to which all Socialist
would belong. He appealed to keep peace, order and law. Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, the Spartacist leaders, had been released from prison only in October and the begin-
them
all to
ning of November respectively, but the support given by the Berlin workers to the eminent 'revolutionary leaders' who originated from their own trade unions, was considerably greater than that emanating from the Spartakusbund. From them, not from the Spartakusbund, came the most important impulse which was to accelerate the revolution. On the evening of November 9 a meeting of worker and military councils declared themselves the 'Provisional Worker and Soldier Council of Berlin' under the Chairmanship of Emil Barth. They announced their aim with the formation of councils everywhere in the factories during the course of the morning of November 10, and the meeting of all these councils during the afternoon of the same day in order to hold an election. The decisive question was whether and how the two developing factions — that of Ebert and his 'half-legal' government on the one hand, and the revolutionary one of Barth's on the other — should converge. Since the end of the talks with Prince Max at midday November 9, Ebert concerned himself with the formation of his Government. Negotiations with the USPD took longer than expected because their Chairman, Hugo Haase, did not return to Berlin from Kiel until late in the evening of November 9. But the Party Leaders had already previously discussed the construction of the intended joint government. To begin with the USPD wanted to appoint Liebknecht to the Cabinet, but their
demand
of 'All executive, all legislative, judical power over the Worker-Soldier Councils' was declined by the SPD leaders. Thereupon the USPD leaders gave up the idea of Liebknecht but demanded — the demand was later met by the SPD — that the joint government should be elected by the Worker-Soldier Councils in the assembly which had been called by Barth; and in consequence their rights of the revolution should be maintained. The coalition agreement, which had been perfected by midday on November 10, indicated on first glance considerable all
generosity on the part of the SPD to the USPD. The Worker-Soldier Councils, which had been 'called together from the whole country to a full-scale meeting', were recognised as a 'political power'. The question of convening a constitutional National Assembly, which the SPD wanted as soon as possible, was to be resolved 'only after conditions caused by the revolution had been consolidated'. The SPD also met the demands made by the USPD that no representatives of civil parties should be elected to the Government but should be represented exclusively and on parity by both Socialist parties. Meanwhile this ruling was not to apply to the State Secretaries as 'Departmental Ministers' who — it is said — are 'only technical assistants of the decision-making Cabinet This meant in fact -corresponding with Ebert's concept -that the civil representatives did share in the responsibility. seeable and calculated dependency of the Socialist Government on the departnn ministers somewhat reduced the conces•
3120
sions made by the SPD to the USPD in the text of the coalition agreements. If the SPD were to remain the decisive force, the essential condition was that the Government should prove itself master of the situation and not fall under the control of the Worker Council in Berlin, dominated by the 'Revolutionary Overseers'. When the plans of Barth's 'Provisional Worker and Military Council in Berlin' were made known, the SPD leaders sent the member of the executive committee, Otto Wels, and other representatives, to the barracks in order to win the support of the soldiers for the SPD which would provide a counterweight to the Worker Councils
set
up by the
lutionary
leaders'.
USPD
and the
Significant
'revo-
political
power was divided between the workers and the soldiers: even before the joint meeting of the 3,000 Workers' and Military Councils under the chairmanship of Barth in the Zirkus Busch on November 10, the delegates of the soldiers and workers held two separate meetings. While Wels addressed the soldiers, the delegates of the workers, Hugo Haase, Wilhelm Dittmann, and Emil Barth, were nominated as members of the new Government. The suggestion by the 'revolutionary leaders' was accepted, to allow an 'Executive Council of the Worker and Soldier Councils' for government control to be elected. The actual power was to be concentrated in this council and not in the Government. Its member-
Above: Seaman Tost addresses a meeting
of
fellow-workers at the burial of sailors killed in the fighting in December 1918. Below: Chancellor Ebert waves his top-hat in welcome to soldiers returning from the front. Right: The Reichstag building under occupation. The Workers' and Soldiers' Council canteen operating in splendid surroundings
ship was envisaged as exclusively from representatives of the Spartacists and of the 'revolutionary leaders', which would guarantee continued development on the same lines. The joint meeting was thus to be taken by surprise: only the names on the list of the 'Executive Council' could be voted for, and the work of the body of experts could not be discussed. This plan failed. The formation of the new government from a total of six members of both Socialist Parties in the so-called 'Council of the People's Delegates' was at first greeted with great enthusiasm, but when the 'Executive Council' was to be formed
and Liebknecht and Barth demanded repfrom the USPD only, they were shouted down. The soldiers forced parity between their representatives and those of the workers and these themselves were to be representatives of the SPD and USPD in equal numbers. The 'Executive Council' thus formed confined itself iniresentatives
tially to the
establishment of the Ebert -
of the various parts of the country had had no share in the process of the formation of the government. In this situation the strengthening of the authority of the Government by the support of (High Command) provided assistance to Ebert. Wilhelm II, yielding to
OHL
pressures by the Quartermaster, General Wilhelm Groner, and the representative of the Foreign Office at OHL, the former Secretary of State, Paul von Hintze, abdicated in the afternoon of November 9, and went into exile in the Netherlands on the following day. The Chief of General Staff, Field Marshal General Paul von Hindenburg, and the Quartermaster, General Groner, formally took the responsibility for the withdrawal of the army from the Western Front. An orderly ending to the war demanded an improvement in the relationship between the OHL and the new government in Berlin before the western army reached the German frontiers. This was brought about by a telephone call
made by Groner from
Haase Government.
Spa on a
Evolution or Revolution The SPD leaders had gained an important success here, but their ideas of forming a new government by the mandate of the last Imperial Chancellor, to be valid until the election of a constitutional National Assembly, had to give way to the formation of a revolutionary government. The position of the Government was uncertain despite the acclamation by the delegates in Zirkus Busch, since the people's mood was difficult to assess.
Any measure — whether
in the field of economics, administration, employment, even in the field of Foreign
Policy (for the Armistice had still not been signed) — could lead to a change of mood and a radical swing in the city, while the acceptance or non-acceptance of '.he Government by the Provinces rema ned doubtful for other reasons, since representatives ;
his Headquarters in direct line to Ebert in the Reichs-
chancellery on the evening of November 10. After enquiries of the situation on both sides Ebert and Groner came to an agreement on the basis that the OHL and the troops would be at the disposal of the Government and that the OHL would conduct the withdrawal of the army in accordance with the anticipated conditions demanded by the truce. In return Groner
demanded from Ebert in Berlin, and as far as possible throughout the whole country, an assurance of peace and order, to preserve the authority of the Government over the Councils, and to recognise the military discipline and power of command in the army over the Military Councils which sprung up everywhere, even among the armies in the field. The Ebert-Grbner 'pact', formed on the basis of an equalranking partnership, which Hindenburg
3121
sanctioned on
November
11,
was directed
towards what Groner later described as the 'battle against the Revolution, battle against Bolshevism'. What this generalisation meant was a defiance of all leftist powers. More specific was the expectation Groner expressed in his memoirs — 'to win some strength in the new State for the army and officer corps by our activity; if that succeeded then the best and strongest elements of old Prussia were saved for the new Germany despite the Revolution'. This objective was reached in December 1918 despite many crises. The core of the leadership of the old army remained intact. Even though the army leaders benefited (in the long run) from the 'Pact' with Ebert's government, both felt that their burdens had been lightened by this agreement. When the German delegates, under Matthias Erzberger, had signed the Armistice agreement on the morning of November 11, in the woods of Compiegne, and in accordance with the ultimatum given by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Foch, it meant that the OHL had to withdraw the Western Army within the limited period of 15 days from the north of France, Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, and within a further 10 days from the German areas on the left bark of the Rhine. The SoldierCouncils in the Western Army, who had
most
been given responsibility, in accordance with agreements made between Groner and Ebert, as advisers for internal order, but without any actual commanding powers, supported the army leaders in the successful execution of this task. On November 12, the 'Council of the People's Delegates', the new Government, in which Ebert and Haase shared the chairmanship with equal rights, published their programme. For the restoration of civil rights, curtailed during the war, it
made
provision for the lifting of the state and of censorship, an amnesty for all political offences, and the reintroduction of all regulations concerned with the protection of workers withdrawn at the beginning of the war. Although a proclamation to the German people announced such a programme which emphasised that 'the Government, which had grown out of the Revolution, and whose leaders are pure Socialist, had [set itself] the task of realising the Socialist programme', these changes in fact were restricted to the promise that all elections to public corporations would immediately be carried out 'with the same secret, direct, general electoral right on the basis of the proportional electoral sysof siege
for all men and women who were at least 20 years of age'; in other words, to introduce a system of elections by pro-
tem
portional representation (instead of the majority electoral system which would be injurious to the Socialists). The eight-hour
working day was to be introduced by January 1, 1919 'at the latest'. By resurrecting two old electoral and political claims of the SPD and by leaving all further resolutions the National to Assembly, the respresentatives of thi SPD had triumphed over those of the USPD who hud wanted to use the transitional phase for further Socialist changes (nationalisation of the
raw materials industries and 'democratisof the administration). Thus a fundamental decision was settled by the ation'
Revolution after only four days (as far as new Government was concerned). This was sanctioned in the socialist field by an the
3122
I
agreement signed by the trade unions. It established a 'Central Workers' Union' and 'Business Committee', known later as 'Business Councils' in all businesses with more than 50 employees. While the trade unions were officially recognised as appointed representatives of the workers, a
Tower to the WorkerSoldier Councils' Kurt Eisner, member of the pacifist of the USPD, who organised the Bavarian Revolution and proclaimed the
Far
left:
group
development which had already begun during the war, they themselves became dependent on a social system which continued to exist even after the revolution and had hardly been touched by reform. The trade unions were and remained the main obstacles to the Worker-Soldier Councils, and all efforts to retain the Coun-
Bavarian Free State'
in
Munich on November
1918. Left: Philipp Scheidemann, the people's delegate, speaking to workers from a window of the Reichstag building, proclaims the Hohenzollerns' abdication and the new 'German Republic'. Below left: Soldiers of the Revolution get a friendly reception from the people of Berlin. Below: A group of guards with a machine gun ensconced among the statuary of the Begas fountain outside the Berlin Palace. Karl Liebknecht predicted that never again would a Hohenzollern enter the Palace 7,
in the factories for a longer period of time failed. Alongside these tendencies aimed at consolidation was an increased agitation by the Spartacists during the second half of cils
November, who made constant demands, voiced in The Red Flag, for 'the whole power to the Worker-Soldier Councils' and for greater influence for themselves. On November 11 the Central Office of the Spartakusbund was formed in the Hotel Excelsior on the Anhalt Station, to which
•
belonged Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, Leo Jochiges, Franz Mehring, Paul Levi, August Thalheimer and Wilhelm Pieck, and others. The agitation from the Left, which the USPD had to take into consideration because of their membership, made co-operation difficult in the 'Council of the People's Delegates'. Both Chairmen, Friedrich Ebert and Hugo Haase, had to exert great skill and extraordinary tact in their dealings with such diverse personalities if they wanted to hold together their Cabinet. Of the SPD delegates Philipp Scheidemann was, apart from Ebert, the most important figure, and to a certain extent the two men
were rivals. Scheidemann, born in Kassel in 1865 into a working-class family, learnt the printing trade, and had been political editor of Socialist-Democratic news-sheets since' 1895. In the Reichstag since 1903 % he quickly gained recognition through the 5 quality of his speeches, and was elected f Vice-President of the Reichstag after the b SPD election victory in 1912. This appoint-
ment was never confirmed however. The Reichstag remained his chief concern, although he also worked in the administration. To the German public he was the most popular Social Democrat. When Haase left in mid-January 1916 an important section of the party leadership fell to him as a representative of the centre of the party. Even before this he had been consulted repeatedly by the Government, so that his appointment to Prince Max's 'War Cabinet' as Secretary of State without Portfolio was the logical conclusion of the developing 'great coalition' with the SPD, even though Scheidemann himself had opposed his own nomination at this late hour. His appointment to Max's government was a foregone conclusion because he had constantly struggled for peace negotiations since July 1917. While
this idea was scorned by his opponents, it was to become known to his friends as 'Scheidemann Peace'. His obvious un-
willingness to see the Revolution continued made enemies for Scheidemann on the Left. But even more despised on the left of the Government was the third representative of the Social Democratic majority, Otto Landsberg. One of Ebert's main objectives had been to appoint Landsberg, whose good reputation as a lawyer was necessary if he wanted to offer opposition to Haase in this field. Besides, Landsberg was Ebert's personal confidant. Born in Rybnik in Upper Silesia in 1869, the son of a doctor, he had studied law and joined the SPD while he was still a junior barrister. He
made
his first political appearance in 1903-1909 in Magdeburg as town councillor and in 1912 this respected lawyer
won the elections for the SPD in the Magdeburg district. Within the party he stood on the right. Despite his definite nationalistic leanings he did not at first want anything to do with Prince Max's government. He participated in all important consultations with the Party leaders during the autumn of 1918, so that his great professional knowledge was
ample reason for Although the
his appointment.
SPD representatives differed in detail, in their aims and conduct 3123
they were basically an homogeneous group. In contrast stood the USPD compromise for their choice of representatives. Since their party held widely differing views they were forced to send opposing personalities to the Cabinet. The Party Leader Hugo Haase, born in 1863 in Allenstein in East Prussia as the first of ten children (to a shoemaker), studied law in Konigsberg and there settled as a barrister in 1890. He joined the SPD as a student and was elected to the Reichstag in 1897. He represented the Konigsberg constituency until the end of the Empire, except for the years 1907-1911. Distinguishing himself as counsel for the defence in political proceedings, he made a name for himself within the SPD by his report to the Mannheim Party Conference in 1906 on 'criminal jurisdiction, criminal procedure and infliction of punishment'. .In the conflict between the orthodox Marxists and the revisionists and reformists he was decidedly against any deviation from the orthodox party line. On the death of Paul Singer he was elected in 1911 as co-chairman of the SPD on Bebel's recommendation. After Bebel's death in 1913 he took his place as Party Leader. During the previous year he had become Chairman of the party in the Reichstag. Although Haase had been one of the 14 members of the Reichstag who on August 3, 1914 had voted against the War Budget, he complied with the discipline of the Party and represented majority opinion in the Reichstag Assembly. Meanwhile his growing opposition to the party majority was becoming apparent. In December 1915 he gave up the Chairmanship of the SPD in the Reichstag and in the following year his office of Party Chairman. In April 1917 he became Chairman of the newly founded USPD. Basically Haase was a representative of the left of the centre, and not of the left wing of the old SPD, and sought to oppose the real dangers of a radical swing to the left by exposing his position and founding the new party. The withdrawal of the Spartacists from the USPD and the founding of the KPD on December 30, 1918 were a result of this moderate course steered by the USPD leaders left of centre. The other two representatives of the USPD in the Government, Wilhelm Dittmann and Emil Barth, were emergency appointments because Karl Liebknecht and the exponents of the radical wing of the USPD could not be persuaded to nominate the Co-Chairman, Georg Ledebour. Instead of Ledebour, who was in close co-operation with the 'revolutionary leaders' and would have united this group, they appointed their Chairman in Berlin, Barth, to the Cabinet. In contrast to the other Delegates he was quite unknown to the public outside Berlin because he had no Reichstag mandate. Born in 1879 in Heidelberg he had learnt the tin-smith's trade. He joined the SPD in 1906 and from the beginning opposed the ideals of the majority of the Party and those of the trade unions towards the war. From the beginning of 1918 he exerted greater political influence over the extreme revolutionaries and formed a closed group with them on the left wing of the USPD. In his document From the Workshop of the German Revolution, published in the summer 1919, he described the part he played in the revolution in a grossly exaggerated way.
3124
If wilful agitation within and outside the government was to be expected from Barth, then Haase found a vassal in Dittmann in the Cabinet. Wilhelm Dittmann, born in
wheelwright, joined the SPD in 1894 and became editor of Party newspapers in 1899. In 1912 he was elected to the Reichstag in the Remscheid-LennepMettmann constituency. In 1915 he joined the minority group of the SPD faction round Haase, in March 1916 the 'Social Democratic Workmen's Trade Union' and in April 1917 the USPD. Dittmann became known through complaints made against him by the parties on the right in the autumn of 1917, that he had been involved in the sailors' unrest, and by his sentence
Eutin in 1874 as son learnt
to a
the joinery trade.
He
of five years' imprisonment as a member of the strike leaders in the January Strike 1918, from which he was released in October 1918. Of the six members of the 'Council of the People's Delegates' Dittmann was certainly the most colourless figure, despite the way in which he became known. As 'strong man', with great authority far beyond his party, Gustav Noske was held in reserve by the SPD leaders and would become their leader should the necessity arise. During the November weeks Noske had become indispensable *in restoring order in Kiel. Born in Brandenburg-ander-Havel in 1868 the son of. a weaver he
joined the
SPD
as a 15-year-old basket-
maker. From 1893 he edited party newspapers. In 1906 he represented the Chemnitz constituency in the Reichstag after a by-election, a position he held during elections in 1907 and 1912. During the war he became one of the most energetic sup-
Order, and Health, Landsberg the Press and News system, and Barth Socialist Politics (on November 19 Landsberg and Scheidemann exchanged their posts of responsibility). This apportioning was not
intended as a replacement or subordination of the State Secretaries, but only as a division of work, as it was called for lack of a better word, within the Cabinet. The Council of the People's Delegates gave their attention to the proper functioning of the personnel and machinery of the Chancellery. In this, as in most other authorities, the officials of the Empire did their duty, in accordance with their professional ethics, although there could be no doubt about the mental reservations most of them had about the new rulers. In
government circles most officials regarded the SPD representatives as temporary confederates who would restore an orderly way of life and favoured them against their USPD counterparts, though in principle they rejected the SPD as well. If the leaders of the new government depended on the old apparatus, then this applied even more to the departmental ministers, the Secretaries of State. On the recommendation of the USPD leaders the Council of the People's Delegates had allocated a representative of both Socialist parties with equal rights to each department. These political officials, regarded as mere technical assistants to the civil State Secretaries, were on the whole trusted Reichstag delegates; but they could hardly control the large well-oiled administrative machines. Only in rare cases was the rela-
SPD, and distinguished himself repeatedly in the Reichstag by decidedly nationalistic arguments, even though he was a strong porters of the majority course of the
the Reichstag leaders. From the beginning of November 1918 he was Chairman of the Worker-Soldier Council; later he became town commander, and was finally made Governor of Kiel, to restore
critic of
order in the
city.
Six-headed Chancellor To begin with, the activities
of the 'Council of the People's Delegates' were surprisingly constructive. Their work was decided by the sharp separation of the political
leaders (the six Delegates) and the departmental ministers acting as State Secretaries. The political responsibility carried by the Chancellor until November 11 was transferred to the 'Council of the People's Delegates'. Government authority at the highest level, which had been divided between the Federal Council, the Reichstag, the Kaiser and the Chancellor, was now concentrated in the Council, though the authority of the new government was often restricted by their factions and not least by the Executive Council of Workers and Soldiers. (These latter consisted of 12 Soldier and 12 Worker Representatives, of which 6 belonged to the SPD, and 6 to the USPD.) Scheidemann's opinion, that the People's Delegates had been 'a six-headed Chancellor, so to speak', exactly hit the nail on the head. On November 12 the areas of work were divided among the People's Delegates. Ebert had secured for himself the Interior and Military spheres. Haase qualified for the External and the Colonies. Scheidemann received Finances, Dittmann Demobilisation, Public Law and
Above:
Berlin,
Unterden Linden, members
of
the Security Troops of the Soldiers' Council
handed over to him by Prince Max on November 9. He was regarded as leader of the government by the officials in the Chancellery. This was not only because of his
own way with the officials themselves, and also many sections of the people not affected by the revolutionary movement, but also because he made his position politically legal, even if it was not strictly constitutional, through the highestranking representatives of the old regime other than the Kaiser, the Chancellor, Prince Max and the Chief of OHL, Field Marshal General von Hindenburg. This made his authority superior and his position undisputed. The division of labour which secured him the Interior and Military spheres emphasised his position of leadership. The USPD representatives, on the other hand, could only lean on the revolutionary legality; the USPD had won no support whatsoever among the people not affected by the revolutionary movement. ability to get his
These
tionship between a Secretary of State and a political assistant as bad as between the Secretary of the Foreign Office, Wilhelm Solf, and the USPD deputy, Karl Kautsky.
The
conflict between Solf's resignation. He
Ulrich
ember
them ended with was succeeded by
von Brockdorff-Rantzau on Dec-
Like the Government the revolutionary ministries were dependent on the co-operation of the old officials. The same applied to the municipality. The Socialist parties tried to introduce their adherents into key positions of only a few Prussian ministries. There was simply a lack of personnel for a complete reshuffling, as well as a lack of willpower of the SPD. The greatest emphasis had to be given to the efficient running of the State, as far as possible under the circumstances, to preserve the German heritage in the face of the victorious powers. The Council of the People's Delegates met daily, sometimes twice a day, for consultations. Despite the tensions, especially between Barth and Landsberg, the Cabinet accomplished a great deal of essential legislative work during the weeks leading up to the crisis on December 28. This was due largely to Haase who gave up all claim to equality with Ebert, and was constantly 20.
concerned with
preventing conflicts be-
tween the coalition parties. The USPD were under constant pressure from their left wing, which threatened to spread via their chief representatives in the Executive
differences
were
(
beginning of January) which were caused by the new forces from the left; more specific were the results of the election to the National Assembly on January 19, 1919 which made the renewal alliance possible between the SPD, the Centre and the Liberal Left dating back to the InterParty Committee and the government of Prince Max and which now formed part
Ledebour and Ernst the three USPD Representatives in the Cabinet, and caused the eventual resignation of Haase, Dittmann
of the
and Barth on December 28. Although the rules were different. Ebert was able to maintain his position of leadership in a Government which had been
[For Andreas Hillgruber's biography, see page 2614.]
Council,
Daumig,
Top: The guard at the barricade of the naval headquarters examine a seaman's papers
fundamental
further complicated by the dissimilar intentions of the two Socialist parties and their leaders. Both sides tried to deal in their own way with the responsibilities arising from the military and political collapse and to expand the achievements of the Revolution. While the USPD felt committed 'to consolidate the revolutionary Socialist achievements', the SPD representatives wanted above all to prevent further trouble and save Germany from chaos. The SPD leaders around Ebert regarded themselves only as governors for a limited period of time. Although the SPD and USPD formed a joint government, the split which divided Germany into two unequal camps went right through the government: the SPD leaders formed an important, and indeed indispensable, part in a coalition for law and order, which comprised all politically relevant powers, with the exception of the conservatives, from the National Liberals to High Command. Their line of attack was directed against the Worker-Soldier Councils and all those groups left of the SPD involved in revolutionary activities. Although the majority of Worker-Soldier Councils consisted of SPD members, the SPD leaders and trade unions regarded these Councils as unsuitable and untraditional and refused to use them in the realisation of their aims. They placed all their confidence in the votes of electors in the forthcoming elections for the National Assembly. This course of action which the SPD pursued right from the beginning soon established a shift of political leadership in Germany from the Right to the Centre, though without the far-reaching socialist consequences which a complete overthrow had had in Russia. The development of the following weeks confirmed this despite the crises at the end of December and at the
George
to
Weimar
Coalition.
3125
vannying red flag drives
v .e Berlin Palace guard of the
ast a diers
and
Sailors'
Council. Opposite top: 'We died for you! Do you want to betray us?' The ghosts of
Worth Sea
U# Bru
men who fought for their country ask the people not to
lelmshaven
let them down. Opposite bottom: The
•[(Nw x
aven
^Jfc Hamburg
^Oldenburg^Bremerhaven
^Altona
Bremen
warn comrades that
revolutionaries their
disruption of
communications leads to
food shortages
i
Hanover
Berlin
Brunswick
HOLLAND
Magdeburg
•
Duisburg^
*
Dusseldorf
Landsberg
GERMA NY Leipzig
Cologne
••'
BELGIUM
Frankfurt
CZECHOSLOVAKIA NAVAL MUTINIES NOVEMBER 4-6
FRANCE
Stuttgart
SEIZED BY
BOLSHEVIK FREE STATE OF BAVARIA (NOV 7 1918) •Augsburg
MUTINOUS TROOPS WORKERS TAKEOVER GENERAL STRIKES |
MILES
3126
O
O O
-w
J3jr
Si
•
i Sffftnutat 1
t
Auns?j§net! <«c
I .-»
-
w
?*$ 3127
iiiiminiiiiii
ISfifiU
When sulting
LIGHT OF THE
KAISER How should the monarch of a great and historic empire be told that his services are no longer required? In the situation of November 1918, delicacy was impossible, and the Kaiser's political death was a bitter one. Michael Balfour
Kaiser Wilhelm Chancellor,
his
without conPrince Max of
II,
Baden, left Potsdam on October 29 for General Headquarters at Spa in Belgium, his intention was to go to a place where he would be protected by his soldiers against civilian pressure. 'Prince Max's Govsrnment,' he said on arrival, 'is trying to throw me out. At Berlin I should be less able to oppose them than among my generals.' To the Chancellor he also made the excuse, whispered into his ear by his discredited secretary Berg, that with an armistice just about to be negotiated, the High Command wanted to have him at hand. This was no more true than his assertion at Spa that the Minister of War could no longer answer for his safety in Berlin. The decisions ahead of him were political rather than military and, by deliberately putting himself out of range, he rendered himself unable to judge the political situation at first hand. He probably thereby avoided captivity and possibly saved his life but he certainly forfeited the throne not only for himself but for the whole of his family.
The Kaiser watches in despair as the sands of militarism run out. From Punch, November 1918
During the next 12 days two attitudes were to come into collision. One was the belief inculcated by the Allies that the
army was not only
Kaiser was the personification of the forces in Germany which had led to the war. This was not wholly true because the Kaiser followed opinion more often than he led it. But he had frequently claimed the opposite in public and could hardly therefore complain if people took him at his word. The Allies did not
make
the abdication of Wil-
helm a condition to be fulfilled before they would stop fighting; the Kaiser was not mentioned in the Armistice. But the idea spread in Germany that the Allies would treat the nation more leniently if they became convinced that it had genuinely changed its ways, and that the best evidence of such a change would be to put a different man at the top. The German people were sick of the war, especially now they realised that they had lost it, and wanted to get it stopped as quickly as possible on the easiest possible terms. The left-wing Socialists were already demanding the expulsion of the Hohenzollerns.
The more moderate
Social Democrats and Liberals not only inclined mildly towards a similar course but realised that their followers did so too and might well accept the leadership of the extremists unless
they themselves went some this
way
to satisfy
demand.
On
the other side stood the ruling classes German Empire, the men who had done much to bring on the war by their steady refusal to share their social influence with the sections of the population brought to political consciousness by Gerof the
many's industrialisation. The ability of these men to retain power had depended on the power of the German army and on its fidelity
to
its
Emperor
(or
better,
since
Prussia was five-eighths of the Empire, on the power of the Prussian army and on its fidelity to its King). They had seriously misjudged their strength and during the war had insisted on maintaining right up to the eleventh hour war aims so excessive as to rule out any chance of a compromise peace. This was no accident, for a compromise peace would have been a confession of failure and would thus have made it impossible for them thereafter to maintain
3128
their
position
intact.
In
November
1918 they refused to realise how close the to defeat in the field but also to mutiny. In their view — and there was truth in it — the effectiveness of the army rested on the oath of allegiance which all officers took to the Kaiser. If the Kaiser were to desert the army by abdicating, the army would disintegrate and Germany would fall into chaos with no organised force capable of maintaining order. When some Ministers in Berlin argued that the people could not be expected to continue the war unless the Kaiser went, officers in Spa replied that the army could not continue the war if the Kaiser went. The argument between these two views had to be conducted at long range, largely by telephone. The longer it went on, the more impatient became those who were demanding abdication, while the more unrealistic became those who were resisting it. The issue was decided when the popular leaders began to use force and the reactionary leaders found to their dismay that they had no force to use. But even after the decision, there were many who refused to accept that their judgement had been proved wrong and who went on arguing that if only Prince Max, Hindenburg and even the Kaiser himself had not weakened unnecessarily at the critical moment, the Monarchy could have been preserved and possibly even the Kaiser himself kept on his throne. This obduracy has led to discrepancies in accounts of what happened.
The
Kaiser's reaction Against this background, the inability of Prince Max to bring the Kaiser round to his view of the situation by written messages and telephone calls is hardly surprising.
Indeed, the continual procession of both probably did more harm than good. The Chancellor could not go to Spa himself for, apart from the fact that he was only just recovering from influenza (which the Kaiser was terrified of catching), things were happening so fast in Berlin that he dare noi leave. He sought frantically for emissaries but those whose word mighl have been convincing were unconvinced of the need to speak it. What happened when that word was spoken by someone
Pursued by the hounds of asks a
German
citizen to
justice',
the Kaiser
exchange clothes
who was not convincing is best shown by the Kaiser's own account of his interview with Drews, the Prussian Minister of the on November 1: said, 'How comes it that you, a Prussian
Interior,
/
General Grdner, to
who
go and get himself
official,
one of
my
rashly advised the Kaiser killed at the front
who have taken me, have the inappear before me
subjects
an oath of allegiance
to
solence and effrontery to with a request like this?' You should just have seen how that took the wind out of his
Exiled monarchs: Seen anything of William 9 He's somewhere behind. He'll join us later.'
'
was
the last thing he expected, he the spot. 'Very well then, supposing I did,' I said. 'What do you
sails. It
made a deep bow on
suppose would happen next, you, an administrative official? My sons have assured me that none of them will take my place. So the whole house of H. would go along with me.' You should have seen the fright that gave him, it was the last thing he'd expected. He and the whole of that smart govt, in Berlin. 'And who'd then take on the regency for a twelve-year-old child? My grandson? The Imperial Chancellor perhaps? I gather from Munich they haven't the least intention of recognising him down there. So what would happen?' 'Chaos,' he said, making another bow. You see, you have only to question such muddle-heads, and go on questioning them for all their confusion and empty- headedness to become obvious. 'All right then,' I said,
you the form chaos would
'let
me
tell
take. I abdicate.
All the dynasties fall along with me, the
army
is left
leaderless, the frontline troops
disband and stream over the Rhine. The disaffected gang up together, hang, murder and plunder— assisted by the enemy. That is why I have no intention of abdicating. The King of Prussia cannot betray Germany etc. I have no intention of quitting the throne because of a few hundred Jews and a thousand workmen. Tell that to your
When he was going, I Marshal and First Quartermaster General. Hindenburg told him the same thing bluntly and then Grdner who is a Swabian, in other words a South German, a jolly little chap, he went for Drews masters in Berlin 1
'
called the Field
Now
like a wild-cat, he fairly gave it to him. I may have ruled well or badly, that's not the point at the moment, most of it of course was bad! But I have lived for 60 years and
spent 30 of them on the throne. There is one thing you must allow me, experience.'
Who
is to
take
my
place?
The famous Max
of Baden?
The paradox of this account is that it was Groner, the jolly Swabian, who pricked the bubble. In the week following Drews' visit, he went both to Berlin and to the front. What he saw in the two places convinced him that the situation was unten-
'
The Chancellor, Prince Max
of Baden, leaving the Reichstag building with the Vice-Chancellor
and the Head
of the Chancellery, at the time Wilson for an armistice
of his request to
able.
The
troops inside
Germany were
not
prepared to go on fighting the Allies. His
3129
Kaiser Wilhelm, with embarrassed companions, waits impatiently on the station platform
advice was that the Kaiser should go to the front and try to die in battle. Such a melodramatic idea horrified everybody and in fact the Kaiser would probably have found great difficulty in getting killed; he was much more likely to have got captured by mutinous troops or the Allies. But Groner did impress on Hindenburg that, if the Kaiser's faith in the loyalty of the army were to prove misplaced, he would be in danger of suffering the fate of the Tsar in 1917. He must therefore go into exile and, in order to have any hope of being accepted in a neutral country, must abdicate before going. The Field-Marshal decided to check up on what the attitude of the army really was by ordering selected commanders from units all along the front to report at Spa on November 9. At about ten o'clock on that morning Hindenburg and Groner presented themselves at the villa which had been requisitioned for the Kaiser. They were received in a room overlooking the garden, heated inadequately by a log-fire. The day was damp and foggy and the Kaiser shivered as he leant against the mantelpiece. He asked the Field-Marshal for a report. But for once emotion got the better of that rocklike character. He asked leave to resign; he could not bring himself to say what his King had to be told. Groner stepped into the thankless breach and set out the facts as he saw them. They added up to the impossibility of relying any longer on the army which was not prepared to go on fighting. The Kaiser turned to Count von der Schulenburg, the Crown Prince's Chief-of-Staff, who disagreed, maintaining that a number of units could
be relied on. With them it would be possible to retake towns like Aachen and Verviers which were in the hands of mutineers, re-establish the army's lines of supply and thus bring the situation under control. Groner countered that it was too late for such measures. The army was so little to be relied on that the order 'Fight against the home front' would provoke bloodshed in its own ranks. The Kaiser stopped him short. He was not going to provoke civil war. He would wait till the Armistice was signed and then lead his army back in good order. still
Now
was
for Groner to shatter the 'The army will march back under its own generals in good order, it
final illusion.
home 3130
Eysden, on the Belgian-Dutch border, to hear whether he is to be allowed into Holland
at
^
A,
p
J*
^
Abdication of the Kaiser North Sea
Berlin
Potsdam Leaves Oct 29
.*
,
GERMANY
:
Eysden\:.: ; , Maastricht ;
V.
Brussels i.
Verviers
Spa «j
•
Abdicates Nov 10
FRANCE
i
MILES
200
; I
-'••.
The route
into exile taken by the Kaiser
but not under the Majesty.' The Kaiser's
eyes
leadership blazed.
of
Your
He moved
Groner and said incisively, 'I require that statement in writing. I want
towards
all the commanding generals to state in black-and-white that the army no longer stands behind its Supreme Commander. Has it not taken an oath on the colours?' Groner's reply that in such a situation oaths lose their meaning has often been misquoted by Monarchists as 'Oaths are things without meaning'. The cold realism of his actual answer brought his master finally face-to-face with the facts. What was worse, the Field-Marshal agreed about the troops.
Revolution in Berlin At this point Prince Max
(or
one of his
accounts differ) came on the telephone to confirm previous messages that revolution had broken out in Berlin. The garrison had joined the workers and the government was powerless. Only an immediate announcement of abdication could save the throne for the dynasty. The Kaiser however insisted on having the Chancellor's view confirmed by the garrison's commander before he made up his mind. In the meantime he and his staff went into the garden and stood talking in groups among the beds of withered flowers. At noon the Crown Prince arrived. He found his father's features distraught, his emaciated and sallow face trembling. When staff,
for
the Kaiser announced his intention of abdicating, his son protested and supported instead the suggestion of an adjutant that he should only abdicate as Emperor, not as King of Prussia. Swabians and the like might desert in the hour of crisis but the heirs of the Prussian military tradition would stand to- the end behind their monarch. Such feelings obscured completely the fact that the idea was politically absurd. A colonel arrived to report the upshot of the talks with the officers called to Spa from the front. The prevailing view was that, though the troops might still fight the Allies, they would not fight fellow-countrymen. A report came in that Prince Max wished to resign. The Berlin situation was such that, if abdication was put off any longer, the whole Monarchy and not just the Kaiser would be swept away. The Kaiser, his lips colourless, his face livid, looked to Hindenburg for help but received none. He instructed one of his staff to tell the Chancellor that he was abdicating as Emperor but not as King. Schulenburg protested that so momentous a decision should be put in writing before being despatched. Four officials were asked to draft a declaration while the rest of the party, for want of anything better, had lunch. It was not a lively meal. To quiet its incessant telephone demands, Berlin was told that an announcement was being formulated. At about two o'clock the document was ready; the Kaiser signed it and an official started to read it over the line. He was interrupted by the message 'Too late to be of any use. The Chancellor has already put out a telegram through the news agency to say that the Kaiser and Crown Prince have abdicated, that he himself has become Regent and Ebert Chancellor.' Much later controversy has centred round Prince Max's authority for thus taking things into his own hands. The arguments even involve the timetable of what happened. One version has it that there was a misunderstanding over the telephone. The message that an announcement was being formulated was taken to mean that the Kaiser had decided to abdicate completely. The Chancellor is then said to have considered himself justified, in view of the urgency of the situation, in not waiting for the actual text. But according to witnesses at Spa, the decision to abdicate was not taken till 1.30, and only then was the telephone message sent. But Prince Max later wrote that the news agency message became known on the Berlin streets 'about mid-day'. This has led some people to suppose that Prince Max in fact acted on reports of what Groner said before the Crown Prince arrived, judging that in the light of those remarks abdication was inevitable. Accounts favourable to the Chancellor tend to put the message early; those favourable to the Kaiser put it late. The point is of little importance except as illustrating how prejudices can affect facts.
Asylum in Holland One thing certain is that the news of Prince Max's announcement did not reach Spa about 2.30 when it roused the Kaiser to fury. He refused to accept it and sat for some time filling telegraph forms with messages of contradiction. He was set on staying at Spa with his troops. But at five o'clock Hindenburg, who had till
left
the imperial villa before lunch, reluct-
Dutch police on guard outside Amerongen Castle, near Maarn, where the Kaiser arrived antly returned to
had decided that
it.
He and
other officers
time being at least the Berlin declaration would have to be accepted since any public contradiction might precipitate a move of mutineers against Spa. Moreover they could not promise that such a move would not occur anyhow or that it could be resisted if it did.
for the
They therefore must advise
their
master to put himself out of reach of capture which he could only do by seeking asylum in Holland. Later there was to be controversy about
Some of the people Kaiser most faithfully subsequently blamed him for having run away. Such criticism hurt the ex-Kaiser and he sought to get from Hindenburg a public statement that the decision to go into exile had been taken on the advice of
this
interview
who had stuck
too.
to the
on November 11, 1918, after his flight trom Germany, to stay with Count Bentinck
The Kaiser (on the left) taking a walk the grounds of his place of exile
the High Command. This Hindenburg was willing to give but he would not accept Wilhelm's further contention that the sole object was to avoid civil war and secure better terms of peace. The decision to go was not made immediately though some of the diverging intentions which were announced during the next few hours may have had the deliberate object of creating confusion and thus securing an uninterrupted flight. The Kaiser kicked against the pricks. He played with the idea of staying at Spa 'until the Bolshevists actually attacked'. But at eight he went to dine on the royal train; this was in line with usual practice but he arranged to sleep there as well. Immediately after the meal, the Chief Adjutant told one of his juniors that the Kaiser was leaving next morning and news
of the
>n
intended departure had reached Brussels by 11 that night (whence a warning telegram was sent to The Hague).
The train slipped away at 5 am. But after ten minutes it stopped. The rail route to the frontier ran through Liege, which was in rebel hands and it had therefore been decided to complete the journey by car along back roads (which had been reconnoitred the previous afternoon). But there had been a muddle and when the Kaiser alighted, the cars were nowhere to be seen. A passing motorist was stopped and pressed into searching for the missing convoy which soon appeared. At 7.10 on a cheerless Sunday morning they presented themselves at the frontier post of Eysden, just south of Maastricht. At about the same time the
German Ambassador
at
The Hague was
being woken to read an urgent telegram. The Dutch government were taken by surprise. Moreover telephones could only be used during limited hours on Dutch Sundays! It was therefore nearly midnight before the Kaiser knew that he would be let in. He had spent the time sitting in his
walking down the village street and along the station platform until finally his train appeared from Liege to shelter him. Next morning, November 11, it started to move slowly through the Dutch countryside to Amerongen Castle near Maarn where Count Bentinck had agreed to put him up. During the journey, fighting came to an end all along the Western Front. car,
Further Reading Kurenberg, Joachim von, The Kaiser
(Cassell&Co. 1954) Balfour, Michael, The Kaiser (Cresset Press 1964)
and His Times
MICHAEL BALFOUR was educated
The Crown Prince leaving Germany on a Dutch steamer.
It
was
at his instigation that
the
Kaiser tried to retain the Kingdom of Prussia, while abdicating as Emperor of Gerrmny
at
Rugby and
College, Oxford. He taught at Oxford till 1939 and then worked for 27 years in the Government Information Services, including two years controlling all publicity media in the British Zone of Germany after 1945 He received the CBE in 1963- He went back to University life in 1 966 becoming Professor of European History in the University of East Anglia. His books include Sfafes and Mind. Four-Power Control m Germany 1945-6, The Kaiser and His Times and Balliol
West Germany.
During the decisive days of the revolutionary movement in Berlin from November 9-12, 1918, the leader of the SPD was a key figure whose decisions largely influen-
ced Germany's future political history and social order after her defeat in the First World War. The degree of firmness, upand clear-headedness which rightness would guide Ebert in making his decisions during the crisis could largely be anticipated in view of his career which was bound up 'in thought and deed with the traditions of the SPD. The axioms which guided him, the basic elements for these future decisions, were determined by the path which Ebert had trodden as a typical representative, in many respects, of the German Worker Movement during the Wilhelminian period. Friedrich Ebert was born on February 4, 1871 in Heidelberg. He was the son of a master tailor and learnt the trade of saddler. In 1889 he joined the Social Democrats in Mannheim, but at first occupied himself mainly with trade unions. His political career began in Bremen, where in 1894 he took over an inn and founded a family. In 1900 he became the Workers' Secretary and Representative of the Corporation of the Bremen Trade Union Cartel, where he was Chairman of the SPD party until 1905. As a recognised local party leader he was elected in 1904 beside Paul Singer as President of the SPD Party Conference in Bremen, and in this way he became more widely known. A year later he was elected at the Party Conference in Jena to be Chief Secretary of the Party Executive Committee. This meant a move to Berlin. After the death of August Bebel, Ebert was elected in September 1913 as Party Chairman together with Hugo Haase. Ebert was not elected to the Reichstag (German Parliament) until 1912. Although he was straight away in the party executive, he did not at first stand out. His rise to a position of leadership in the Reichstag began during the war. After Haase withdrew he became one of the three chairmen of the party in January 1916 (besides Scheidemann and the unimpressive Hermann Molkenbuhr). In the 'Inter-Party Committee' he grew in stature from July 1917 among his own faction as well as the coalition partners. And so he was elected in 1918 to be Chairman of the main committee of the Reichstag. Energetic and brilliant but more prudent, Ebert had
outstripped the more agile Scheidemann in influence and political standing within the SPD leadership. Ebert had always regarded himself as representative of the centre within the SPD, and was a keen advocate of the path chosen by the majority of the faction at
the beginning of the war, which supported the leaders of the Reich in their expectation of a 'New Orientation' after the war, which would abolish the Prussian three-class electoral system and bring about a German Parliament. In January 1918 he had stepped into the strike leadership in Berlin in order to end the mass strike of the munition workers as soon as possible. For Ebert, as for most other representatives of the SPD, the structure of society of Wilhelm's Reich was ready for reform; yet the Party which theoretically regarded itself as a member "of an international movement which would overturn the capitalist system had already become a national reform party in his, and many of his party friends' opinion: this no longer excluded close co-operation within the framework of the monarchy, if it renounced the prerogative of Wilhelm's constitutionalism. Even on November 6, 1918 he declared to Quartermaster General Groner, that he and his party would come to terms with a parliamentary monarchy for the sake of continued development in Germany, if the transition to a socialist state were assured. However, the Monarchy could only be saved by Wilhelm IPs abdication and by the Crown Prince's renouncing the throne. On November 9 he criticised the now scarcely unavoidable proclamation of the Republic by Scheidemann, as an arbitrary action. Already in October Ebert's promotion to Reich Chancellor had been considered by the government should Prince Max's regime miscarry. Thus the transfer of authority on November 9 from Max to Ebert corresponded exactly with the solution previously considered. Ebert's role as an 'Adviser to the People's Delegates', his contact with OHL and with the officials of the Kaiser's government, his repudiation — understandable in view of his SPD tradition — of the Worker-Soldier Councils in the political field during those decisive days and weeks, his unshakeable confidence in a parliamentary democracy and his severely legalistic bearing have earned him then and later the severest criticism from the Left. After his election on November 2, 1919 as Reichspresident by the National Assembly, Ebert's honour was also damaged by slanderous attacks from the Right, which threw doubt on his integrity during the war, especially during the munition workers' strike, and tried to discredit him as a traitor to his country. After six years as Reichspresident he died in Berlin, aged 54 years, having been overof so many internal and foreign political crises.
come by the pressures
[For Andreas Hillgruber's biography page 2614.]
see
What series of events led Germany — at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of the fifth year of war — to sign the armistice? It had appeared likely that the Germans would sign it ever since the Spa conference on April 13 and 14, and even more so after pressure brought to bear on them by the Emperor
on
September
28
which
was
In the two days preceding this date Foch's triple offensive had taken 40,000 German prisoners and Bulgaria's capitulation on September 28 'sealed the destiny of the Quadruple Alliance' — in decisive.
own words. By November 11 the
Ludendorff 's
Allied armies had freed only a very small part of Belgium and in France a corner of the Ardennes and the Moselle regions as well as almost the whole of Alsace-Lorraine were still in
German hands.
However,
the
German
seemingly unafraid to die. Since October 1917 more than a million men had disembarked and by the summer of 1918 there were 41 divisions each of 30,000 men. Despite their war weariness, the Allies could now count on certain victory. But it was not to come immediately. Foch had decided to launch a new offensive on November 14 on the right bank of the Moselle, and on October 5 Poincare chose to view the German demand for an armistice as a political manoeuvre. Thus Ludendorff, backed up by Hindenburg, estimated as from September 28 that an 'immediate armistice' was imperative. The evacuation of all occupied territory would permit them to 'take up the battle on the German frontier' if the Allies would not agree to their terms. On September 29 the Kaiser agreed to open negotiations with President Wilson on the basis of his famous 14 Points. To present a democratic facade he inaugurated a parliamentary regime in Germany and universal suffrage in Prussia. He replaced Chancellor Hertling by his cousin, Prince Max of Baden, who passed for a liberal. He in turn chose the catholic Erzberger — author of a peace resolution in 1917 -as Secretary of State. Von Hintze and Solf, both social democrats, were delegated to OHL and to take charge of the armistice negotiations respectively.
OHL's sang-froid appeared to desert them completely. Max of Baden was told that the armistice should be hurried through because 'the front can be broken from one minute to the next'. The Kaiser, in his
'that
at pains to tell the
he was not there
High Com-
to get in their
Wilson communicated this message
army had no reserves left and since August of that year had suffered a crisis of mutinies. Ludendorff was later to attribute this to the contagion of the Russian Revolution, exploited by subversive elements in the army, but the German army's exhaustion was real enough. The number of deserters had risen considerably, those soldiers on leave who didn't attempt to hide themselves went unwillingly and slowly back to the front. Their contacts with the interior, where people had been reduced almost to famine, could only weaken the morale of the troops. After the failure of the Friedensturm they had been withdrawing, leaving only pockets of resistance, and they had been convinced that defeat was inevitable. Opposite them, the Allies, too, had watched their plans crumble and their men die. But before their eyes the flow of Americans into France increased every day — young men, well equipped and
was
mand
way'. He exerted pressure on the civil authorities by presenting to them, on October 2, a delegate who had been given the task of explaining to the party leaders that if it was still possible to 'contain' the enemy, it was no longer possible to win the war. The times had gone against Germany who would now be forced to impose more and more severe conditions upon herself. The following day, during a cabinet meeting, Hindenburg conveyed a similar message, reinforced now by Bulgaria's capitulation: 'there is now no hope that we can impose a peace on the enemy'. On October 5, Max of Baden sent Wilson a note via a German minister in Switzerland asking him to 'take in hand the re-establishment of peace, and to conclude an immediate armistice on ground, sea and in the air'.
of Austria after a second conference on September 8. But it was the third Spa
episode
turn,
ARMISTICE 'Go with God's blessing and
much as you can for our homeland.' — Hindenburg's parting words to Erzberger, on his way to meet Foch. The Germans had hoped to be able to negotiate a peace from a position of strength, rather than to accept whatever demands the Allies saw fit to make. Now, with Germany on the brink of try to obtain as
insurrection, Prince Max was forced to sue for an armistice
on any terms he could
get.
The trail which
led the two side in the
trains side by forest of Compiegne
was
sufficiently long and depressing to bring home to Erzberger the reality of a situation in which his instructions were to get peace 'at any price'.
Jacques Meyer. Above: The car carrying the German delegates to the armistice meeting reaches the British lines
to
the Allies the following day. The period preceding the armistice was extended over five weeks and was marked by a series of discussions in opposition to Wilson — not only in Germany, but also among the Allies. In France the leaders even disagreed among themselves, with Poincare opposed to Clemenceau and Foch. In his reply to Max of Baden on October 8 Wilson insisted on the democratisation of Germany, but he insisted only on the liberation of territory that had been invaded, seriously neglecting the military risks that would accompany an armistice not followed by peace. Above all, he appeared willing enough to accept the role of arbiter that Germany had given him which led Max of Baden to declare on October 12 that he was ready to arrive at an armistice which conformed to Wilson's propositions. The other Allies listened to Lloyd George; they told Wilson that 'the conditions for an armistice cannot be fixed until after consultation with the military experts and taking into consideration the situation at the time when the negotiations are taking place'. Wilson agreed to these irrefutable arguments and his reply to Baden on October 14 took them into account: his government would not accept any arrangement which did not assure completely satisfying guarantees that the present military superiority held by the Allies would be maintained. He also insisted on putting an end to submarine warfare, which was accepted by the German government on October 20 — but this did not prevent the torpedoing of the Leinster, a transport ship which sank with 600 civilian passengers aboard, nor that of the cruiser Britannia which sank on November 9. But Berlin left Wilson to finalise the details and trusted him not to impose conditions 'irreconcilable with the honour of the German people and the establishment of a just peace'. Even Wilson was unable to accept this at its face value. On October 23 he refused to place confidence in a government that 'remains stubbornly nationalist', asked the Allies if they were ready to accept a peace founded on the basis of the 14 Points, and to work out with their military advisers conditions which would assure 'unlimited power with which to guarantee the peace Germany had
asked
for'.
The ground had,
in effect, been swept from under the Allies' feet. Opposition to the proposals began to grow in Germany.
3133
on ground, sea,
and in the
air'
Below: Americans in the Meuse-Argonne region. Soldiers of both Allied and German armies were exhausted and disillusioned, but the rate
which American troops were now pouring Europe meant that the Germans could not hope to survive for long. Below right: The relief of these surrendering Germans is unmistakeable. The disaffection of German troops was one of the factors which precipitated the at
into
armistice request of early October.
8; the three main points were to be 'the essential clauses of the armistice' — aj the liberation of all the occupied territory
including Alsace-Lorraine and the return of all refugees to their countries of origin, b) the setting up of military bases inside Germany (with their focal point on the Rhine) in case of another outbreak of war, c) a pledge of reparations by Germany (Allied occupation of the left bank of the
Rhine). The diplomatic and economic clauses relating directly to Wilson's propositions were to be made known later on. On October 23, following military progress on the Franco-Belgian front, Clemenceau asked Foch to establish with the Allied High Commands an armistice convention. The next day, Foch brought together Haig, Petain and Pershing at Senlis. The former, stressing the weakness of English resources, the exhaustion of the French army and the muddled state of the American army, agreed in principle with Foch's demands and made a further plea for the rolling-stock — on which restitution of Pershing Petain also insisted. point estimated however, that the collapse of Germany's morale justified the imposition of the severest conditions, including the return of all submarines to their bases. Foch, to conclude, demanded the complete occupation of the left bank of the Rhine with three bridgeheads at Cologne, Koblenz and Mainz and a 40-kilometre deep neutral zone on the right bank, and the immediate delivery of the following effects: 3,000 trench mortars, 30,000 machine guns, 5,000 heavy guns, 5,000 armoured cars, 2,000 aeroplanes, 10,000 lorries, 150 submarines and 150,000 wagons. The ports of Cuxhaven and Heligoland would be put out of action and the blockade maintained until these conditions had been met.
From October
17 Ludendorff continually reminded his war cabinet that they were not obliged to accept any proposal which made the resumption of hostilities im-
He
insisted that reinforcements be found and that if the compromise peace showed itself to be impossible all negotiations should be broken off and Germany would fight 'for her honour' to the last. Hindenburg made a proclamation to the troops on the 24th in which he supported this view, at the same time reassuring them that he fully appreciated the extent of their losses and their fatigue no less than the implications of the possible.
could
still
Turkey and Austria-Hungary which had followed that of Bulgaria. But the following day Ludendorff found himself opposed by the Vice-Chancellor who placed the famine of the civilian population in importance above military honour; no longer supported by the Emperor, Ludendorff was forced to resign and was replaced by General Groner, a man of
collapse of
cold reason, a specialist in the logistics of warfare who had spent a considerable
time on the Russian front and who fully appreciated the extent of the decline in the German army's morale. Max of Baden was thus led, by October 27, to accept all the conditions of the Allies, to whom he was forced to affirm that all the German military power would henceforth be subordinate to that of a government elected by the people. It was now time for the Allies to make known the military guarantees they had called for. Foch had outlined them in a note addressed to Clemenceau on October
3134
Conditions too rigorous? On October 25, Foch submitted his text to Clemenceau and Poincare. Poincare was opposed to an armistice which, in his opinion, would allow the Germans to re-establish themselves along a shortened front. Clemenceau, on the other hand, convinced as he was of the profound exhaustion of the French troops, feared that such rigorous conditions would merely lead the Germans to a refusal. Foch then promised that if this happened he would continue his 'victorious assault' that would assure the Allies the pledges they were asking for. But France still had to reach an agreement with her three major allies, Great Britain, the United States and Italy. Discussion between them had already begun at Versailles; the English found the military conditions too severe and the Americans feared that the humiliation of Germany would only lead, in the end, to a resurgence of German militarism. But having obtained the agreement of the English, the Americans then went on to announce their naval demands which Foch, in his turn, found 'unnecessarily humiliating'. The first meeting of government chiefs (Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando) together with House, Wilson's representative, took place on October 31. House asked Foch the crucial question: which did he believe to be in their best interests, the continuation of the war or the conclusion of an armistice? Foch's reply demonstrated his sense of responsibility: 'I do not make war simply to make war .
.
.
The aim having been achieved
(to
obtain
through an armistice the conditions we have imposed on the enemy) no one has the right to spill another drop of blood.' The capitulation of the Turks at Mudros and the imminent collapse of Austria reinforced the Allies in their demands. They decided that Marshal Foch, assisted by Admiral Wemyss, First Lord of the British Admiralty, would present the definitive text to the German parliament which would include Britain's naval conditions. The draft given to President Wilson was directly related to his 14 Points, but a British clause on the freedom of the seas had been inserted as well as a
war reparations. On 5 Wilson, who had raised no objections, notified the German Chancellor that if he was really seeking an armistice, Foch would let him know the terms. Meanwhile in Germany Max of Baden had been led to believe that the Allies would make no deal with the Hohenzollerns. On October 31, the Chancellor broached this question before the war cabinet. Wilhelm II had hoped to find a refuge at Spa. But after Hindenburg's loyalism prevented him from envisaging abdication, Groner dared to advise the Kaiser to 'go and kill himself at the head of his troops'. On November 7 Scheidemann, French clause on
on behalf of the
November
timatum
socialists,
gave an
ul-
Max
ment, announced his abdication in favour Crown Prince, but he knew that the King of Bavaria and other sovereigns had already abdicated and resigned himself,
of Baden: abdication of the Kaiser within 24 hours or their departure from the cabinet. Max of Baden
of the
implored his representatives at OHL to press for abdication while Groner organised a consultation of the generals, the result of which was communicated to the Kaiser on the 9th: the troops, loyal but exhausted, would not follow him; they wanted an armistice, rest and peace. 'Loyalty to the flag is now a fictional concept,' said Groner. Wilhelm, who had been advised against armed resistance by Hindenburg, was as yet ignorant of the fact that Max of Baden had, in the excite-
despite
to
his
anger,
to
abdication.
Hindenburg's advice, he agreed
to go
On and
live in Holland, where the Crown Prince would eventually join him. Before leaving, he had authorised the signing of an armistice the terms of which were un-
known to him. At Berlin, on November 9, 1918, Max of Baden, fearing that the extremists might seize power, resigned in favour of the Socialist, Ebert. Ebert transformed the government into a Council of People's
ger and Scheideo'clock on he dais of the the Kaiser's abdicaproclaim the republic. Arms were distributed to Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, following the line of the Russian ,vo
Soviets; the
Russian ambassador gave the
new government his full Meanwhile,
support.
disturbances
had
English admiral were only two
German
and
try to obtain as
much
as you can for
rank (Winterfeldt was only a divisional general) and two civilians who had no counterparts on the Allied side. As for Hindenburg, who saw Erzberger before he left, he estimated that OHL had nothing more to do and took his leave of Germany's representative with the admonition 'Go with God's blessing
our homeland'.
Above top: The delegates' journey to Rethond The convoy of cars with the German insignia
Above: In the forest of Compiegne Marshal Foch outside the armistice train His choice of location, made for reasons of security, made the crucial meeting seem more dramatic
officers of relatively inferior
The delegation left Spa on the 7th at about midday in five cars, of which two had to be abandoned en route. The group, apart from the delegates themselves, comprised an interpreter, Captain von Helldorff, an officer of the General Staff, two ADCs and a civilian domestic servant. The
broken
out at Kiel six days before. Some sailors had refused to obey orders to prepare for a sortie and had hoisted the red flag. This insurrection had sparked off others at Liibeck, Altona, Bremen, Ludwigshafen
and
Hamburg.
The
sailors'
movement
ignited the revolutionary spirit in the big cities, Cologne, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Leipzig, and the workers followed. At Munich, the independent socialist, Eisner, proclaimed the republic. On November 9 'Germany crumbled like a house of cards'. It is interesting to trace the reactions of the High Command up to this time. had at first envisaged a retreat along the Anvers-Brussels-Charleroi -Mezieres. li ne
OHL
Now,
it
seemed, they were to be turned
further to the south, would be forced to abandon an immense amount of material
and some 80,000 wounded men. They had also to fear the coming Allied offensive in Lorraine and the possibility of another attack by the Italian army, now being given support by the Anglo-French divisions that had returned from the Middle East. Some form of negotiation was now indispensable, but OHL preferred to let the burden rest on the shoulders of the authorities. It was thus Max of Baden, president of the war cabinet, who decided on November 5 that if Wilson's answer to the note of October 27 had not arrived by the 8th negotiations would then begin. In effect, the members of parliament, bearing the white flag, would, 'if it becomes necessary, capitulate'. Ever since Wilson's first note OHL had assembled a commission to study the terms of the armistice under the direction of General von Gundell; but he was only too happy to abandon his task to a politician. Erzberger let himself be pressed and designated Count Oberndorff as Foreign Affairs minister. At the same time, General von civil
Winterfeldt, previously Germany's military attache in Paris, joined the armistice commission at OHL. Meanwhile, Wilson's reply arrived and a copy was given to Erzberger. During the night of November 6 the government sent a dispatch to Marshal Foch in which were given the names of the plenipotentiaries 'including, at the head of the list, von Gundell) and which asked to be given a meeting place where they could confer with Foch. An hour later, Foch indicated that the Germans should present themselves at the outpost line (the ChimayFourmies-La Capelle-Guise road) from where they would be taken to an unknown meeting place. This message was radiotelegraphed from the Eiffel Tower on the 7th at 0230 hours. Erzberger, who had received only verbal instructions to conclude the armistice 'at any price' but who had an open letter signed by the Chancellor, arrived at Spa on November 7 at 0800 hours. Hintze, more or less conscious of the responsibility with which he was charging Erzberger, advised him against taking von Gundell. Thus, confronting the French marshal and the
and flying the white flag stops en route, watched by a crowd of interested soldiers
3136
.
retreating armies slowed up the procession of cars. At 1800 hours it arrived at Chimay and at 1930 hours at Trelon, the to the prepared route. nearest Staff At 2020 hours, as the front was crossed, a white flag was hoisted at the back of the car and a sub-lieutenant of the first German lancers stood on the running board blowing short blasts on a trumpet.
HQ
On
the Fourmies-La Capelle road the French soldiers appeared.
the result of delayed bombardment which had exploded the day before, some three weeks after the departure of the German troops. Bourbon-Busset did not miss the chance to point this out to Erzberger. With its curtains drawn, the train arrived at a clearing towards dawn and came to a stop next to another identical train. The clearing was known as the Rethondes clearing
Foch had decided against conducting the meeting at his HQ at Senlis in which place he would be very vulnerable; the complete isolation of the forest and the trees which hid the train from any enemy aircraft
North Sea
made
it
an ideal meeting
place.
C^>CP
chosen for the meeting with General Debeney's delegates. The French bugler, Corporal Sellier, who was to become the legendary 'herald of the armistice', replaced the German trumpeter on the running board. The French soldiers on the road, like the civilians in the village, surrounded the cars and began to ask the question that was haunting them: 'Are you going to end the war?' In the town, which had already been decked out with flags, shouting and singing was heard. Bourbon-Busset, head of Sixth Army's Intelligence Service, surrounded by other officers, received the German delegates. The introductions took place in a large room in which pride of place was taken by a large portrait of
Napoleon III. The Germans found themreminded that hostilities were still continuing. At 2200 hours, the cortege left La Capelle in silence and amid the flashing of magnesium flares from the press and newsreel photographers. At 2430 hours it arrived at the little village of Homblieres, which General Debeney had made his headquarters since early that morning. Here, a meal had been prepared, identical to the officers' popote. At the end of this rather gloomy supper Debeney entered the room and told the Germans that they would be taken immediately to Marshal Foch's headquarters. He would receive them, Debeney told Erzberger, at selves
the Hindenburg Line. The German delegation was driven to the station and boarded a train in which sleeping and eating facilities had been fitted. Next to the line was an enormous shell crater —
V
•Aachen •
Bruges •
Maipz*
Brussels
Darmstadt
BELGIUM .Ypres
^
•'
LUXEMBOURG
^k
• Arras
•Luxembourg
^^^^^ \ LORRAINE^ ^WFRANCE
»Metz
•VerdunW......
Strasbourg
^^*
.Rheims
fi
•
"*iiii&C\ALSACE'
LIBERATED BY THE ALLIES JULY-NOVEMBER 1918 FRONT LINE NOVEMBER 11 1918 WHEN ARMISTICE WAS SIGNED EVACUATED BY GERMANS AFTER THE ARMISTICE ZONES OF OCCUPATION BY THE ALLIES FROM NOVEMBER 1918: 2
FRENCH AMERICAN
3
BRITISH
4
BELGIAN
1
/
n
Mulouse
NEUTRAL ZONE 50 MILES
Conditions of the Armistice signed with
November 1
Hostilities to
end
Germany
1918
II
at 11
00 hours on
November 11,1918.
2 Germany to
evacuate immediately the occupied areas of Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Alsace-Lorraine, the evacuation to be completed within 1 5 days. The Allies to occupy areas as they are evacuated.
3
Repatriation of within 15 days.
4
The surrender by the German army
all
the inhabitants of the above mentioned countries to be completed
of:-
2,500 heavy guns, 2,500 field guns, 25,000 machine guns,
3,000 minenwerfer, 1,700 aeroplanes.
evacuation by the German army of the left bank of the Rhine, this area to be occupied by the Allies. Allied garrisons to be established in strategic places in this area, especially the crossings at Mainz, Coblenz and Cologne, where there were to be bridgeheads with a radius of 30 kilometres, (18-} miles) on the right bank. A neutral zone 10 kilometres (6j miles) beyond the river and occupied bridgeheads to be established on the right bank between the Dutch and Swiss borders. The Germans to evacuate these areas within 31 days.
5 The
6
No damage and
all
to
be done
to the
All
8
The German army
9
The
communications to be left unimpaired, the following handed over to the Allies: 5,000 locomotives (to be delivered within 31 days) 150/100 railway wagons (to be delivered within 31 days) 5,000 lorries (to be delivered within 36 days) The whole of the Alsace-Lorraine railway system (to be handed over within 31 days) All lighters taken over from the Allies to be returned. to reveal within 48 hours the whereabouts of all mines and devices with delayed-action fuses, as well as any other destruction measures. Allies to
have the
right of requisition in
areas to be charged to the
to
10 The II
persons or their property in the areas evacuated by the Germans, evacuated areas to be left intact.
military establishments in the
7
pleasure.
At 0130 hours on the morning of November 8 the cars reached Tergnier, a town that had been systematically destroyed by the Germans in 1917 during their retreat
GERMANY
Antwerp
warned not to fire on the who would arrive at During the day, German emissaries had come to inform the French Capelle, had been plenipotentiaries, about 2000 hours.
division of the delay of the German delegation and a cease-fire was thus effected all along their route. The Germans, who believed — or wanted to believe — that it was indefinite attempted to fraternise with the French. It was not until well after 2000 hours that a French lieutenant stopped the first car as it advanced with its headlights blazing. General Winterfeldt got out of the second car and introduced the members of the delegation. They were then ordered back into the cars to be taken to La Capelle, where the Villa Paques — one of the most beautiful houses in the town — had been
Duisburg
HOLLAND
General Debeney, Commander of the French Sixth Army in whose sector this road lay. From 1830 hours on November 7 the advance guard of the 166th Division, who held the eastern perimeter of La
own
by Foch.
first
Herald of the armistice At the same time as he had sent his reply to OHL, Foch had given his instructions to
his
Compiegne forest and the train that had already arrived was that occupied
in the
repatriation of
all
of troops in
these
Allied prisoners-of-war.
The sick and wounded left
occupied areas, and the upkeep
German government.
in areas evacuated by the Germans behind by the Germans for this purpose.
to
be looked
after
by personnel
3137
'You have saved the liberty of the world.' Captain von Geyer prepares to leave the Tergnier region for Spa with news of the armistice terms. Below left: The celebrations at the gate of Buckingham Palace, November 1f Left:
and in Paris (cenfre). An American and a Red Cross nurse with two British soldiers-and others. Right: Cease-fire order. The original, sent at 0650 hours, included the lines, 'Defensive precautions will be maintained. There will be no intercourse of any description with the enemy until receipt of instructions from GHQ.' Below right: Jubilation and a hero's welcome. Far right: The Allied armies enter Brussels on November 1918,
sailor
22, 1918. King Albert, with the Belgian royal family and the Duke of York, is followed
by General Plumer afid the Allied staffs
Inside the Marshal's train, as well as a restaurant, were compartments which
housed the French and English officers and their staff (telephonists, secretaries, ADCs and cooks), and an ancient restaurant car which had been converted into an office. This office comprised a long table, round which would be seated the four representatives of the two sides (the Allies, apart from Foch and Wemyss were represented by General Weygand and Rear-Admiral Hope) and their interpreters. On each side of the carriage were small tables which would be occupied by officers of the French and British General Staff. This was the famous armistice carriage. Over the muddy ground outside had been laid duckboards joining it to the German delegates' train.
At 0900 hours the delegates were told that Foch would see them. This meeting marked the beginning of discussions that continued until November 11 at 1730 — the precise moment when the armistice convention was signed by the four Germans and by Foch and Wemyss. The Americans had only been loosely associated with and took no direct part in the negotiations. After the introductions and the presentation of credentials which Foch examined and found to be in order, Foch, before he made known the conditions attaching to the armistice, feigned misunderstanding in order to get the German plenipotentiaries to specify that they were asking for an armistice. The dispatch from OHL had studiously avoided any direct request. It was only after this that the clauses of the
armistice convention were read out by General Weygand. They included all the naval and military demands that had been put forward during the preliminary Allied reunions. The naval clauses comprised, among other things, the disarmament followed by the internment of a
number
of German 10 cruisers,
surface
ships:
six
armoured cruisers, eight cruisers and 50 of the most recent destroyers. All other German war vessels, including the river boats, would be disarmed in German naval bases and guarded by the Allies. The coasts of Belgium and the Black Sea would have to be evacuated and all the German material and supplies there would be handed over. All German supply ships would be liable to capture and those Allied vessels that had been seized by the Germans would have to be handed back after complete repairs on them had battle
been completed. Neutral ships captured by Germany would have to be set free and henceforth the Germans would cease to transport goods or men under a neutral flag. In the territories to be given back, no evacuation of inhabitants or destruction of material or supplies would be permitted. In the territories to be occupied by the Allies their troops would hold the right to requisition anything they needed, and their expenses would be paid by the
Germans. All Allied prisoners of war as well as political prisoners and prisoners under sentence of death would have to be repatriated immediately and without repercussions. All the Austro-Hungarian, Rumanian and Russian lands currently under German occupation would be freed immediately and the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk would be annulled. Erzberger had been instructed to conclude an armistice 'at any price'. Despite the fact that Foch had clearly stated that there was no scope for discussion of the armistice conditions — that they would have to be accepted or rejected as a block
— Erzberger attempted, in vain, to insert clauses that would salvage the honour of his country. The German delegation was simply allowed to communicate the conditions of the armistice to OIIL, but even this had to be done by an envoy and not via the radio. Captain von llelldorff, who was given this task, was forbidden to cross the German lines lor 24 hours and he did not reach Spa until November 10. The Germans held a series of meetings during which their Chiefs of Staff tried to
R ^4h& A
Htr+AJdL&U jb-r-rvj'
-i*sh*,
URGENT
UjUI Cj^-^X^M •Qa^jOl
lr^/U
//•// /$'
Germany with
food throughout the duration of the armistice. On November 9 Clemenceau, who had begun to hear rumours of revolutionary disturbances in Germany, was anxious to know whether the delegates really rep-
resented
the
German Government and
whether the Government
itself was
capable
of assuring the execution of the armistice. Erzberger reassured him, while at the
same
time
asking
himself
these
very
questions. The same evening he learned of the Kaiser's abdication and the replacement of the Chancellor by a government of commissars led by Ebert. Foch was certain that the Germans would accept the Allied terms, but he was keeping his planned attack in Lorraine very much in mind and the following day sent word to his commanders to speed up the progress of their armies. This order led one French division to make successfully the difficult crossing over the Meuse.
'Suffering, but not dead' On the evening of November 10, at Rethondes, the Germans were reminded by Weygand that the time in which they could reply was almost up. The delegates had themselves received two replies from OHL authorising them to sign the armistice 'even without mitigating clauses'. One of these replies was signed by Hindenburg and gave his code number as proof of its authenticity. The other telegram, although it, too, came from OHL, was signed by 'the Chancellor' — a misnomer, in that Max of Baden was no longer in office and Ebert
did not hold this title. On the 11th, at 0205 hours, the Germans declared that they were ready to go into the meeting. For some three hours, Erzberger strove to obtain concessions on each article as it was discussed, but in vain. The last page of the text of the armistice was signed at 0510 hours. Hostilities would end six hours later along the line reached by the Allied armies. The duration of the armistice was fixed at 36 hours, renewable. Before German officers in tears, Erzberger read out a protestation which ended with the following reflection: 'A people of 70 million men are suffering, but they are not dead.' Foch's only comment was 'tres bien'. He then gave his armies his instructions, which included an interdiction to fraternise with the enemy, and left for Paris at 0700 hours, taking with him the original text of the armistice. With the agreement of Lloyd George and Wilson, the armistice convention would be communicated to parliament at 1600 hours. In all the Allied countries bells and cannons told the delirious crowds of the cease-fire. To the last French communique of the war on November 12 Petain added the phrase 'closed in view of victory'. Foch, in his order of the day to the Allied armies added in his own handwriting 'You have saved the liberty of the world'.
JACQUES MEYER
is a veteran of both world wars, holds the Croix de Guerre, and is a Commander of the Legion of Honour. He has written many books on historical subjects including one on the armistice of 1918.
obtain terms less harsh. Two themes lent weight to their demands: the need, even for the Allies, to maintain order in Europe in the face of Bolshevism, and the shortage of food that was threatening the whole continent. The Germans declared that if they were forced to hand over 30,000 machine guns 'there would not be enough if it became necessary to fire on their own
— in
this way they attempted to their demand for 5,000 more machine guns as well as 300 aeroplanes out of 2,000 requisitioned by the Allies and 5,000 lorries out of 10,000. On the question of the maintaining of the blockade, Erzberger declared that this wasn't 'fair', but succeeded only in angering the British admiral who reminded him of the indiscriminate sinking of Allied shipping. Erzberger managed to obtain a promise, people'
justify
however, that the Entente would supply
3139
,
^i
f
/-'
Vx ?
". i *flk 5^
'
lift*
*
^ %
t
v
^^^.
ai
> 31
\
Now
this bleedin'
war
is
over
.
.
.
No more
soldierin' for
me: remnants of the 9th East Surrey Regiment on the Western Front raise a cheer before downing arms as they are told of the Armistice, November 1918.
-i >wff
*^*i
m
r
/'* f
J£
hi; fT^ :.'-
V*.
*
^.
,
»
'
.
*
EMOBIUSATION
therefore, were to be the vanquished. But With the war over the armies on their territories, the machinery of of the world were suddenly demobilisation, in particular the railways, largely redundant. was now far less efficient than before the war, while the authority of the governSome, as in Austria-Hungary, ments themselves, in the dissolving centre simply melted into ethnic groups of Europe and in the Near East, either did
and made
for their
homeland.
not exist or was gravely inadequate to the very complicated administrative task of
But in Britain demobilisation followed a carefully-graded plan. John Keegan. Above:
demobilisation.
The Austro-Hungarian army had always been the most, indeed perhaps the only, truly 'imperial' institution of the Dual Monarchy, in that it alone most nearly
France-the heroes' return The armistices of September, October and November sounded ceasefire to over twenty million soldiers. The majority were men who had volunteered or been conscripted since the outbreak of war, but a few were survivors of the armies which had been mobilised in July and August, 1914. The smoothness of the arrangements which had carried them from their homes to the battlefronts had been the principal military wonder of that opening fortnight; and for those who wished to return again as swiftly as they had been brought — a group
which excluded almost nobody — it may have seemed that authority only needed to set the machinery into reverse in ord r to fulfil their desires. For a variety of f>
reasons, however, demobilisation could not and was not to be instantaneous, nor was it everywhere to be particularly orderly. For their part, the Allies were determined that the military resources of their enemies should be rapidly reduced and had made such a reduction a condition of the Armistice in several cases. But they themselves, partly for domestic economic reasons, and partly out of simple military prudence, were not anxious to run down their own forces at a rate similar to that which they had imposed upon or were expecting from the other side. The first to demobilise,
3142
succeeded in uniting the 11 peoples of the Empire into a single body. But, as with everything Habsburg, this unity was superficial, concealing deep divisions and grave inequalities. Two major components of the imperial military system — the Landwehr and the Honved — were instruments of German and Magyar domination over the subject peoples of the Crownlands and Great Hungary respectively. And even in the third component, the Joint Army, the regiments of which were organised on a 'national' (e.g. Czech, Polish, or SerboCroat) basis and run through the 'regi-
mental language', Germans and Magyars monopolised the higher ranks. The war — which at a purely military level the Empire had waged very ineptly — might therefore have been expected to crack the unity of the army at an early stage. Remarkably, it had held together well, only the Czechs, and to a lesser extent the Poles, showing any inclination to desert to the Allies for political reasons.
Defeat
and the imminent dissolution of the Empire, with which the army was brought face to face in the third week of October, produced, however, a sudden fragmentation of loyalties. On October 16, Karl proclaimed his Empire a federal state, in a desperate effort to avert its dissolution
under the terms of Wilson's 14 Points. Wilson's rejection of this solution as an inadequate implementation of the principle of self-determination, joined with his recognition of the new states of Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia), impelled the Vienna government to proclaim a similar recognition on October 27. The following day, this news reached the Italian Front, on which was engaged the bulk of the
Austro-Hungarian army. Already under heavy military pressure, as a result of a joint Anglo-Italian offensive which had begun on October 24, the army abandoned all
pretence of defending their positions
and at once began to fall back. Each national contingent, now realising that it had become the army in embryo of a new sovereign state, or the army in exile of a state with much irridenta to recover, was suddenly impelled homeward by the urge to secure or extend its unfrontiers. The Magyars in particular, doughtiest of fighters in defence of the Empire while it conferred such disproportionate privileges upon them, were now keenest to be home, well knowing
demarcated
how little of Great Hungary would be left them if its Rumanian, Slovak, Ukrainian and Croat subjects should get the chance to
The Czechs followed closely, though the news of the award of Hungarian Slovakia to the new Czech state soon led to violence between them on the wildly overcrowded trains which the soldiers commandeered. The Yugoslavs were much closer to their new fatherland, for which the Croats and Slovenes felt a good deal less enthusiasm than the Serbs. Towards
secede.
they nevertheless made their way, while the remnants of the Imperial Navy sailed into its ports in order to avoid internment by the Italians. The German-speaking regiments of the it
out was the experience of many servicemen. Designed to avert unemployment, the government scheme favoured those men First in, last
British
most recently right: British in Italy.
in civilian
employment. Below
troops awaiting demobilisation
Right:
Embarking
for
home
at
Cologne
army were the last to break contact with the advancing Italians. But once they recognised the impossibility of holding on alone, they too thought for their homes and set off, the Kaiserjager and the Kaiserschutzen for the nearby Tyrol, the others for the rest of 'German-Austria', rapidly disintegrating into a rash of local and temporary republics. Their last-ditch loyalty did them credit but also a grave disservice, for it left them, when the armistice was signed on November 3, still within grasp of the Italians who, by twisting its terms, were able to capture over 400,000 of them; a cheapjack revenge for Caporetto. From the other fronts, in Serbia, Rumania and the Ukraine, the armies retired as best they could, though in Albania, quite isolated from the outside world, General Pflanzer-Baltin's army celebrated the second anniversary of Karl's accession on November 21, unaware that he had lost his throne three weeks earlier.
Dubious loyalty Other soldiers who owed him more had served him less faithfully. On November 2, the new guard of the Royal Hungarian Noble Lifeguard did not report
for
duty
the Schonbrunn when the old stood down, while the sentries mounted by the Arcieren Lifeguard fell asleep at their posts waiting for reliefs who did not appear. The members of these two 'nearest' guards, landowners all, had left Vienna at the first sniff of revolution to safeguard their estates. For a time, the imperial family was left quite unprotected from any straying mob — mobs were already roaming the city — until a few cadets could be brought from the Wiener Neustadt Academy. Shortly afterwards, the family at
was smuggled into exile. The Vienna mobs, swelled by returning soldiers, were soon brought under control by others organised into a Volkswehr by the Socialist provisional government. These were socialists of the most conservative hue, however, so that nowhere in 'German-Austria' did 'red' revolution break out. That fate was reserved for Hungary through the foolishness of its new minister of war, Lindner, who, in the hope of passing off the Magyars as one of the subject peoples of the Empire, and so securing softer terms at the peace conference, ordered the Magyar regiments to disarm themselves even before they had recrossed the borders to Great Hungary. To speak of demobilisation in AustriaHungary is therefore inaccurate. The Habsburg army first fragmented along ethnic divisions and the fragments then sought their native lands. Once arrived, the individual soldiers either made their way home unbidden, as in 'German-Austria', or at the direction of the successor governments, as in Hungary, or found themselves ordered, as in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and reborn Poland, to swear allegiance to a
hew constitution and a new flag. The Bulgarians, under the terms
of the armistice signed at Salonika on September 29, were obliged to demobilise their whole army, except for four cavalry regiments and three infantry divisions, which were
3143
order to defend the eastern against the Bolsheviks and the against brigands. The rest of the army was demobilised under the supervision of British officers, one of whom has left a record, probably typical, of watching little parties of soldiers loading their few possessions on to donkeys and setting out for home, quite untroubled by administrative procedure of any sort, in the best Balkan tradition of governmental neglect. It was a principal condition of the Mudros Agreement, signed between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire on October 30, that the Turkish army be at once demobilised, 'with the exception of those troops necessary for the surveillance of the frontiers and the maintenance of internal order'. Little enough of the army remained to be demobilised, for of the 2,800,000 men who had served in its ranks during the war, 1,500,000 had already deserted or disappeared. The 35 divisions which still existed (many had been disbanded for want of numbers) could muster between them only 100,000 combatants. They were, moreover, scattered over five widely separated fronts: the Caucasus, Northern Mesopotamia, Syria, Southern Arabia and Thrace, with outposts in Tripolitania and reserves in Anatolia. On the signature of the Armistice, Marshal Izzet Pasha, the Sultan's new Grand Vizier, dissolved Gen-
Headquarters and ordered the armies disband as soon as they could reach the
eral to
nearest frontier of Turkey proper. Not all were able to do so. The Second and Fourth Armies disbanded in Syria, the Sixth in Mesopotamia, the Eighth at Damascus; but the Seventh reached South Turkey, the Fifth and Third disbanded in Turkish Thrace and the First in Turkey proper. The Ninth, which had been engaged on the Caucasus Front, did not disband. It fell back on Erzurum, the remotest corner of Anatolia, where, safe from Allied interference, it was to become the nucleus of Kemal's army in the coming war with Greece. Many of the soldiers discharged from the other armies were eventually to rejoin
it.
way back
Meanwhile they made
their
own
homes, unassisted and uncounted by the government, which lacked both the authority and the means to resettle them. The terms of the Armistice in the West obliged the German army to withdraw from France, Belgium, Luxembourg, AlsaceLorraine and the German Rhineland within one month of its signature. Hindenburg to their
protested that the 'technical execution of the terms is impossible' and that 'the army will collapse'. In the event, the return march was as striking a demonstration of the superiority of German staff work as the deployment had been in 1914. At the
outset, the Soldiers' Councils demanded the right to oversee and where necessary amend the plans of the Supreme Command; but their representatives were swiftly and
not untactfully shown that they quite lacked the skill to organise the evacuation. Thereafter the men of the western armies seemed content to obey their officers and the extremely precise orders which the Supreme Command, now transferred from Spa in Belgium to Kassel in Hesse, issued for the withdrawal. 'For each of these troops, the time is computed, the place is designated where he rests, where he eats, where he sleeps Never has a human clockwork functioned so ingeniously, so precisely.' The marching columns did not stop even at night, so vital was it to reach the railheads, most of which were beyond the Rhine, as quickly as possible. Once arrived, the units, which were still organised on a strictly regional basis, were returned to their mobilisation centres — transport exigencies permitting. But it was not the intention of the Supreme Command that they should yet be demobilised. The subordination of the soldiers during the withdrawal had led the .
.
.
Below: Austrian prisoners on the Italian front. Many Austrians who had remained loyal were captured in the Italian advance. Opposite page, top: As you return unvanquished' - Chancellor Ebert's
words
to
German troops
entering Berlin
I Above: A
last casualty. Austrian prisoners taken by the Italians on the Piave. Right: 'Bring the boys back home— after only 18 months in the field demobilisation for US troops. Repatriation was swift and flexible
3145
s to believe that their enthusiasm Soldiers' Councils had been a passing
one and that the army could now be used to put down revolution in the cities. This as the behaviour of the Berlin divisions proved. Brought into the city at the insistence of Hindenburg and Groner, on the pretext that the population should welcome their belief
was quite
ill-founded,
home (and
heroes
greeted by Ebert at the
Brandenburg Gate with the later to be regretted words, 'as you return unvanquished'), the soldiers did not wait for the second half of the military plan to be put into effect. Before they could be used to disarm the mutineers, as soon indeed as they reached their assigned barracks, (they) met with the Soldiers' Councils of the rear
Demobilisation by Industrial Groups up to noon,
May
12,
1920
638 016
Other Ranks 301 770 33 747 220 310
83
5 182
20 43 499
8 978 102 279
Officers
•
Agriculture Seamen and fishermen Coal and shale mining Other mining Slate mining and quarrying Quarrying other than slate and iron Food, drink and tobacco
7 495
Explosives
371 159
19031
Paper and printing Woollen and worsted Cotton
880 579
Textiles, dyeing etc. Other textile trades
254 499
Bootmaking
213 99 214
65 860 26 679 63 581 19 519 23 766 49 377 7 472 15 445
India
1
1
rubber
46
64 970 26 440 27 951 34 222 33 580 17 033 2 864
160
31 186
389 838
359 948 59 879 15 365
657 405
Clothing Sawmilling Furniture making
128 157
Coachbuilding and woodworking Shipbuilding Iron and steel manufacturing Tinplate manufacturing Iron founding and moulding Engineering Other metal trades
342 III
II
140 168
making
Brick and cement making Building trades (including navvies) Railway workers Dock and wharf labourers Carters Motor drivers Public authority employees General labourers
269 899 105 175
workers
Wharehousemen and porters
266
Domestic and personal staff Other manufacturers and industries Other occupations (excluding the two subsequent)
341
clerical
Professional
u
in all
3146
1
men
Students and teachers Soldiers extending service for two years or more Others Total for Army and Royal Air Force
8219
7 739
122 184 148 220 5 533 363 38 572
Commercial and
7215
701
Leather tanning Other leather trades
China, glass and pottery
2418
364
480 374 42 659 104 302 14 312
8 852
34614
740
26 988
25 577 148
41 330 1 16 952
21
1
39 445 135 746 102 312 133 041 131 179
45 734 86 207
4 031
913
3
413 092 845 706
and, in a matter of hours, became nothing but a mob of men dressed in field grey they did not wait for leave or demobilisation, they just walked out of the barracks and went home In a flash of belated .
.
.
.
.
.
perception, the officer corps realised that the 'discipline' which had sustained the field army in its evacuation from France and Belgium was nothing more than recognition by the soldiers that that was the easiest and quickest way to get home. One or two units held together nonetheless, and many of the self-demobilised shortly reappeared in uniform as members of one or other of the Freikorps which swiftly sprang up, either at the behest of the government or of their own leaders, in the
vacuum
left by the army. The most combatant of these groups emerged in the East, where terms different from those applying in the West were imposed by the Armistice. Frightened by the spectre of aggressive Bolshevism, France and Britain had made it a condition of the ceasefire that the German Army of Occupation in the Ukraine, in Poland and the Eighth Army in the Baltic states should not retire until so directed by the Allies. These armies of older men, however, were even more anxious to regain their homes than the fighting troops of the Western Front. Soon they too were demobilising themselves and taking the road to the West. But their departure, which was much hampered by the new Polish government's policy, left Germany's eastern frontier unprotected both against Russian depradations and Polish annexations. Hence the energy which the German republican government put into organising a frontier defence force out of the local
Freikorps, which recruited easily among returned soldiers who, though seeing no point in continuing the fight in the West, were determined that neither the despised Poles nor the detested Russians should seize an inch of historic German territory.
Allied plans
The United
States'
government began
to
plan for demobilisation only a month before the war ended, not having expected peace until 1919. Indeed, it showed a remarkable flexibility, in view of the allconsuming effort it had put into raising a mass army over the previous 18 months, in being able so soon to consider its disbandment. But the wish both of the army and of the people, as was made manifestly clear after the armistice, was to 'bring the boys back home' as swiftly as they had been sent. Unhappily, the French and British shipping which had been made so plentifully available to the Americans when defeat stared the Allies in the face was not to be had once the shooting stopped. The rate of repatriation achieved was nevertheless remarkable: beginning in December 1918, over 2,000,000 men had been returned to America by the following August, most via the port of Brest. The system of demobilisation adopted was that of disbanding whole units, though railway workers and anthracite miners were accorded priority. On arrival, soldiers were transported to whichever one of 33 centres was nearest their homes, paid a $H0 bonus, given a suit of clothes and helped to find a job. Given that the government's principal consideration in planning the demobilisation was to avoid flooding the labour market, and that besides the 2,000,000 soldiers brought back from France it also
released 3,000,000 home-based soldiers into the domestic economy, all within the space of a year, the absence of adverse effects
was remarkable. Since every able-bodied Frenchman's military obligation extended to his fortyeighth year, and was automatically invoked on the declaration of war, the soldiers of the Republic had no right to demobilisation until a peace had been signed with Germany. But they, and even more so their leaders, were very conscious of the temporary nature of the Armistice; and there was little dissent from the popular view that it was best guaranteed by maintaining the army at something near full strength until the Germans had been forced by treaty to disarm. Nevertheless, little was achieved by keeping with the colours the oldest classes, whose usefulness was chiefly in fulfilling
soldiers'
demonstrations on January 3-7,
10,000 soldiers re2,000 for France; demonstrated in Dover and 8,000 at Brighton; and on January 7 there were two separate demonstrations in Whitehall 1919: at Folkestone, fused to re-embark
by soldiers who had commandeered lorries and displayed placards reading: 'We won the war. Give us our tickets', 'We want
been imposed), were under 37 and had fewer than three wound stripes. It was a system based, in Churchill's words, on the principle that 'if anyone has to stay, it must be those who are not the oldest, nor those who came the earliest, not those who suffered the most'. If a surplus remained after those excluded had been released, the age limit for service would
Demobilisation: the decrease in the strength of the British Army (Regular Army and Territorial Force) on the first of each month
TROOPS
1914 (EXCLUDING INDIAN
STATIONED
IN INDIA)
1918 1919 1920
the enormously heavy demands for simple labouring and transport duties exacted by trench warfare. Between December 1918 and February 1919, about 1,200,000 men — those aged between 33 and 48, those
NOVEMBER
1
C C n
1918:
TOTAL STRENGTH OF ALL BRITISH
AND EMPIRE FORCES
5
735 387
FIGURES IN CHART REFER TO NUMBERS OF MEN LEFT IN THE ARMY
between 20 and 32 who had been medically downgraded, the fathers of four or more children and those who had had brothers killed,
plus a
number
of special cases —
to civilian life. It was made a legal obligation for their former employers to reinstate them, while the state continued to pay them soldiers' family allow-
were released
ances for six months. On the signature of peace, the same terms were extended to the 1,600,000 men of the classes 1907-16, all of whom were to be released by October 20, leaving only the classes of 1917-19 with the colours. Many of the men thus discharged had been continuously in uniform since their conscription in 1911. Italy implemented precipitate demobilisation, discharging 900,000 men by midJanuary 1919. No proper provision was made to reabsorb ex-servicemen into civil life, and the many who remained unemployed provided ready recruits to Mussolini's Fascisti.
The British had perhaps given more thought to the problems of demobilisation than any other government, having set up a cabinet sub-committee under Edwin Montagu in mid-1916 to study their solution. It laid down that the primary concern must be to avoid mass unemployment and proposed a scheme which would both stagger the discharge of soldiers (overwhelmingly the largest service) and progressively reconvert industry to peace production.
civvie suits'
The scheme demanded a
The
fivefold categor-
isation of men into: • 'demobilisers' themselves; • 'pivotal men', whose skills
were needed
labour-intensive industries which would employ the demobilised; • 'slip' men, so called from the slip of paper bearing the promise of a job that
to reactivate the
employers were solicited to issue; and • two categories of less important workers. The actual demobilisation terms were for paid leave of 28 days, clothing allowance, rail warrant, the promise of 20 weeks' unemployment benefit if needed and a war gratuity, the value of which varied on rank and length of service. There was no objection to the terms when they were announced on November 20, but a swelling tide of objection to the category system soon made itself felt. Dissatisfaction culminated in a series of
£
/ # i /
// / **
(4
040 921
officers
&
other ranks of the
and 'Get a move on, Geddes'. had been appointed director of demobilisation. Lloyd George appealed for patience on the following day, with some effect. But he, and the new War Minister, Winston Churchill, were well aware that the gradualist scheme had failed and would have to be replaced with something which implemented the spirit of 'First in, first It
last
out',
the soldiers'
was indeed
new popular
foolish ever to
cry.
have ex-
pected that a system which could demobilise short-service conscripts before longservice volunteers — and such an effect was inevitable — could ever command the soldiers'
co-operation.
On January
29,
Churchill announced a far more equitable arrangement. The army was to be reduced from a strength of 3,000,000 to 900,000 forthwith, and was to consist of those who
had enlisted
after
December
31,
Army & Royal
/
Air Force demobilised by
2>
/
noon May 26 1920)
be reduced until the required figure of 900,000 was reached.
There was some trouble in reconciling system with the Coupon Election promise of abolishing conscription — indeed,
this
could not be reconciled — but there was public concern that that should be so, since it was demobilisation that had become the overriding emotional issue. it
little
The new scheme worked excellently. By mid-April, only two and a half months after the new plan had been formulated, 78% of soldiers and 559c of officers had been discharged; by June, in round numbers, the figure had risen to nearly 3,000,000. By February of the following year the target was achieved; the services once more consisted almost exclusively of long-service volunteers.
1915
(a critical date, for after it conscription
had
[For John
Keegan 's biography, seepage 96.
]
3147
The Coupon Election In a campaign of tawdry slogans and jingoistic speeches the wartime coalition was re-elected to government in Britain, amenable candidates being favoured by a public letter from Lloyd George — the infamous 'coupon'. Robert Bunselmeyer. Below: Advisers on German reparations. Left to right: Australia's premier Hughes, Bonar Law, Lord Crewe, Sir George Foster
Of all the ration coupons which the British Government issued during the First World War, none was so curious or so well remembered as the 'coupon' of November 1918 which rationed not goods, but political candidates. This famous (some said infamous) coupon was in fact a public letter sent to candidates considered to be Government supporters in the general election of December 1918. It was signed by David Lloyd George, the Liberal Prime Minister, and by Andrew Bonar Law, the Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer. Since the Coalition Government which these men headed had just concluded a successful war effort, the 'coupon' was an asset to favoured candidates; likewise, it was a liability to those who were denied it. Not surprisingly, the letters of support were first scorned as 'coupons' by the leader of the opposition Liberals, Herbert Asquith, who had been ousted from 10 Downing Street in December 1916 by Lloyd George. Asquith was equally scornful of the Government's call for an election so soon after the signing of the Armistice. Although
3148
had ceased, the war would not be over, he said, until a peace was concluded with Germany. Neither the Government nor the country ought to bother with an election during the dangerous transition from war to peace. Also, the Coalition already had a majority of at least 90 in the House of Commons and could expect a tolerant opposition during the peace negotiations. Asquith believed that Lloyd George had chosen the moment of British triumph for a partisan purpose — the aggrandisement of his own Liberal faction and of his Conservative allies at the expense of independent Liberalism. These arguments aroused little sympathy. Polihostilities
tical
realists
asked whether any Prime
Minister would overlook so favourable an opportunity to improve his majority. And the Government advanced some appealing justifications: the last election had been held in December 1910 and the Commons, consequently, did not represent current feeling. Moreover, a new and larger electorate was waiting to express its opinion in 1918 — the Representation
of the People Act of that year had doubled the number of eligible voters, partly by enfranchising women over 30. In addition, the Government argued that the Peace Conference did not preclude an election but rather required one. Lloyd George explained: 'We must get the mandate immediately. Somebody will have to go to the Peace Conference with authority from
the
people of this country to speak in
their name.'
Lloyd George's emphasis on an 'immediate'
mandate
belied the careful election
planning that had already been carried out in secret by the Coalition. In July 1918, Coalition leaders had agreed on an election before the end of the year, apparently assuming that the military situation would soon permit a return to party politics. From August to October possible election dates were discussed until in early November the Armistice provided the obvious occasion Then on November 12, Lloyd George and Bonar Law won the consent of their parliamentary followers to an election. Two days later Lloyd George announced that Parlia-
ment would be dissolved on November 25 and that an election would be held on December 14, the ballots to be counted on December 28 to allow absentee voting by servicemen and war industry workers. The decision for an election argued a determination to extend the Coalition into peacetime. Members on both sides were hesitant about this, but Lloyd George and Bonar Law were determined on further co-operation. While the two party leaders were dissimilar in many ways, their differences were complementary. Lloyd George was the greatest orator of his day and the
most shrewd
political in-fighter.
Although
he had principles, they always appeared
Bonar Law, by contrast, and aptitude for public politics, but he was steady; he was a master in the House of Commons where Lloyd George was not comfortable; and he understood finance better than his Liberal counterpart. The two men had become a team by the end of the war. They also understood the electoral wisdom of their Coalition. Lloyd George was the most celebrated figure of the moment, in
new
had
patterns.
less affection
commanded no
extensive organisathe constituencies where most Asquith. associations followed Liberal Bonar Law headed a powerful and wellfinanced party organisation, but there was no Conservative who could provide the 'coat-tail' effect of a Lloyd George. Each side needed the other. The Conservatives, though, held the greater assets: Lloyd George's managers could not recruit nearly so many candidates as could the Conservatives. Thus 'coupons' were sent to 364 Conservatives but to only 159 'Lloyd George' Liberals. Another motive for maintaining the Coalition was the vague hope that it would evolve into a party of national unity. The war, it was but he tion
in
commonly
said, had rendered old political divisions useless; partisanship would interfere with the task of reconstructing Britain. 'When you have great, gigantic tasks you really do not want an opposition', said Lloyd George during the election .
.
.
campaign. The Armistice period seemed to some Coalition leaders an excellent time to establish a party that would represent all classes.
To that end, Lloyd George had tried to absorb the Liberal opposition in September 1918 by offering Asquith and his followers several ministries in the postwar Government. Asquith, however, had refused. He could not bring himself to trust Lloyd George or to give up the security and independence of the official Liberal organisation. Shortly thereafter, he and his party paid dearly for his choice. During the election campaign Lloyd George said the criterion for the 'coupon' was loyalty: those who were denied the 'coupon' had tried to undermine the Government during the war, especially by questioning the honesty of the Government's military figures in May 1918. The independent Liberals suffered from this explanation of the 'coupon', even though it was spurious. (As then suspected, and since proven, by historian Trevor Wilson, 'coupons' were sent according to the Conservative-Liberal bargain in constituencies, not according to loyalty.) Coalition overtures were also rejected by the Labour Party. Labour had held several ministries in the wartime Government and a Labour man had sat in Lloyd George's powerful, five-man War Cabinet. How-
was tension between Labour and the other Government parties over war aims. Also, in June 1918, the Party pledged itself to the 'common ownership of the
seemed concerned with the Coalition's vague promise of social reform which, according to Lloyd George, would 'make
means
of production'. This commitment to nationalisation made it very unlikely that Labour would join a postwar Government
Nor was there much excitement about the Government's commitments to limited
dominated by Conservatives. On the same day that Lloyd George announced his election, a Labour conference decided not to continue in the Government. George Bernard Shaw proclaimed: 'go back to Lloyd George and say: nothing doing'. Then Labour gathered 363 candidates pledged only to the Party programme. Most of these men and women were inexperienced and poorly financed. They were also weakened by the gibe of 'bolshevism' with which the Coalition repaid the decision of the Labour conference. Neverthetheir number and determination less, marked a great advance for Labour. However, a few Labourites did leave their Party and remain loyal to the Coalition.
excluding Ulster, and to the disestablishment of the Church of England in Wales (the Prime Minister's personal favourite). Labourites were also disappointed with the tepid response to their new programme. And the independent Liberal campaign — which adhered to traditional Liberalism, principally free trade, while railing fruitagainst the election itself— fell lessly almost completely flat.
ever, there
Their apostasy helped Coalition leaders establish a third affiliate, the National Democratic Party, commonly advertised as 'patriotic Labour'. While the National Democrats entered only 18 candidates, they gave the Coalition a slight claim to representing all classes. A seeming host of other minor parties also appeared in 1918: the right-wing National Party, a 'patriotic' Silver Badge Party, the National Federation of Discharged Soldiers and Sailors, the Cooperators, and the British Socialist Party. Altogether, these parties only elected two Members, but their many candidates added to the fractures in the major parties to make a very confusing situation. That was another reason why the Government wanted to distinguish its supporters with the 'coupon'. A further complication, although one irrelevant to the 'coupon', developed in Ireland. There the Irish Nationalists were being successfully challenged by Sinn Fein, 'ourselves alone', men who would soon take most of Ireland out of the United Kingdom. However, this important development received little attention in Britain. Nor did many British electors pay close attention to the contest, if there was one, in their own divisions. Many candidates, upon meeting their constituents in the last week of November, dis-
covered a prevalent apathy. Christopher Addison, the Coalition Minister of Reconstruction, wrote in his diary: T have never seen so much listlessness in connection with any election.' One cause of this was influenza. A terrible by-product of the war, influenza had killed more than 150,000 British subjects by January 1919 and was especially virulent during the election. The effect on campaign meetings was obvious: 'Those recovering from flu are afraid to go out,
and those who haven't had
afraid of meeting those plained one Liberal.
who
it
are
have', com-
There were other explanations for the apathy: weariness with national concerns after four years of war; the nuisance of absentee voting; the inefficiency of the new electoral registers; and, very important, the absence of a dramatic contest for national power — none of the opposition parties had a chance to displace the 'won-the-war' Coalition.
For these reasons the major parties found that their formal programmes did not arouse much interest. Few electors
Britain a
fit
country for heroes to live
tariff protection, to
Hang
home
in'.
rule for Ireland,
the Kaiser!
Almost the only
electoral platform
which
excited attention was that of the peace terms which electors appeared to want to be severe. The German leaders who had allegedly begun the war and waged it brutally should be tried as war criminals. Since Germany had started the war, she ought to pay a large portion of British war costs. German aliens in Britain, many of
whom had
been interned in camps during the war, should be excluded in peacetime. The anti-German temper of the public soon became the most emotional feature of the 1918 campaign. This temper was partly the result of the
wartime
publicity
'atrocities'
given
to
German
by the Ministry of Information
and related agencies. Though much of this was dubious propaganda, it was given credence by the
German
invasion of Bel-
by harsh German treatment Belgium and France, and by unrestricted submarine warfare. British anger at this last form of war had been revived as recently as October 10, 1918 when a German U-Boat needlessly attacked and sunk the mail packet Leinster in the Irish Sea with a loss of 451 lives, all civilians. Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour spoke the reaction of most Britons: 'Brutes they were when they began the war, and as far as we can judge, brutes they remain.' However, the most important cause of anti-German feeling at the end of the war was the condition in which Germany re-
gium
in 1914, of civilians in
leased
British
prisoners-of-war.
In
late
1918 about 60,000 British soldiers were held prisoner behind German lines where most of them performed hard labour without proper nourishment and often in dangerous conditions. When the war ended they were freed sporadically, without transportation or adequate clothing. As the men slowly made their way home, the newspapers fastened on to their plight. 'Prisoners' Agony. Skeletons Drag Their Way Into France. Many Dying on the Road', bemoaned the Daily Mail. The weekly Nation called the episode one of 'stupid
brutality'.
Politicians
naturally
shared the general resentment and gave
it
House of Commons, one Member had described his own
expression.
In the
after captivity, the Home Secretary, Sir George Cave, said of the Germans responsible: 'We have to take these people by the throat if
we can and let the punishment given them be an example for generations
to to
come.' Candidates for office either took notice of the prisoners or were reminded to do so by their constituents. One Conservative received a letter which included these searing lines: 'I have heard this morning
3149
trom all three of my sons — the one still a They all three tell me the prisoner most heart-rending descriptions of the prisoners they have seen ... I do venture to suggest that at every meeting you attend you make it clear that our Party will insist upon these ruffians paying to the very last penny.' The candidate complied by introducing anti-German references into his speeches. So did many other candidates, especially those of the Coalition. It was George Barnes, a National Democrat, who coined the most infamous slogan of the .
.
.
campaign at Netherton on November 29. have heard the Kaiser mentioned,' 'I Barnes replied to an interjection. 'Well, I am for hanging the Kaiser.' Sir Eric Geddes, the First Lord of the Admiralty, used another unfortunate phrase when he Cambridge Conservative the assured Association that 'the Germans, if this Government is returned, are going to pay every penny; they are going to be squeezed as a lemon is squeezed — until the pips squeak'. Even Winston Churchill, then a Coalition Liberal, departed from a generally moderate campaign to tell his audience
Dundee: 'Practically the whole German nation was guilty of the crime of aggressive war conducted by brutal and bestial means They were all in it and they must all at
.
.
.
suffer for
it.'
Meanwhile, most electors awaited the views of the foremost Coalitionist, Lloyd George. Here too, there was a noticeable transformation. In early November the Prime Minister called for a peace of reconciliation: 'let us have no vengeance, no trampling down of a fallen foe'. Then he chose social reconstruction as the theme for his first major campaign address on November 23. When a heckler raised the aliens issue, Lloyd George implied the question to be a 'stunt'. If the Prime Minister hoped that his first speeches would set the tone for the campaign, he must have been disappointed. In the week after November 23, newspapers everywhere noted the emergence of the anti-German issues. On November 28, the
Scotsman remarked: 'Germany must pay the full penalty Candidates will find that they can scarcely put the terms too high for the constituencies.' Meanwhile, several London newspapers began to chide Lloyd George for missing the popular mood, one of the few times he had encountered that particular criticism. It must have made him anxious. During his next major address, at Newcastle on November 29, he proclaimed: 'It must be a just peace, a sternly just peace (loud cheers), a relentlessly just peace (renewed cheers).' Lloyd George sensed that he had touched the right note and went on to pledge the exclusion of German aliens, the trial of those who had mistreated British prisoners, anH German payment of 'the costs of the war up to the limit of her capacity to do so (re.
.
.
newed cheers)'. The Observer commented that when the Prime Minister adopted his new tack, 'he suddenly found that deep was calling unto deep'. This was also noted by lesser candidates who, if they had not done so already, began making their own antiGerman gestures. But still some of Lloyd George's critics believed that he had not gone far enough. They disliked his qualifying phrase, 'the limit of her capacity'. That seemed the wrong way to begin negotiations, since it would give the Germans a chance to whittle
3150
their liability, perhaps to merely the physical damage done by their army and navy. Such a result would penalise the British Empire because their war costs,
down
estimated at more than six billion pounds, included only a small portion of direct, physical
damage.
Tn
particular,
British
taxpayers would continue to suffer high rates if Germany did not pay adequately. And, it was argued, there was no reason why Germany could not pay: her economic resources would, in time, suffice to pay the entire Allied cost of the war. These arguments were advanced by the right wing of the Conservative Party, by the Morning Post, by Lord Northcliffe and his Daily Mail, and by two powerful business organisations, the Associated Chambers of Commerce and the Federation of British Industries. The last two pressure groups feared that if Germany did not pay sufficiently, the British Government might adopt Labour's proposal for a levy on capital to pay for the war. Lloyd George tried to placate his critics by appointing an Imperial Committee on Indemnity, chaired by Prime Minister Hughes of Australia, another advocate of large German payments. Hughes and his committee, most of whom agreed with their chairman, met from November 26 until December 10, when they reported their belief that Germany could eventually pay the entire Allied cost of the war without side-effects harmful to Britain. Armed with this opinion, Lloyd George went to Bristol on the morning of December 11 for his last
major election speech.
The Prime Minister's main address at was an oratorical masterpiece.
Bristol
Alternately emphatic and humorous, interrupted often by cheers and laughter, Lloyd George explained where he stood on the indemnity. The Allies had 'an absolute right to demand the whole cost of the war from Germany', he said, and they proposed to do so. Of course, the payments must not be in a form which would damage the British economy, nor must they require a large army of occupation since that would impede demobilisation. However — and this is where the Prime Minister placed his emphasis — the Government's committee on indemnity believed full payment could be exacted without difficulty. This solemn revelation pleased the audience mightily. While Lloyd George professed a desire not to mislead the public in such a complicated matter, the tenor of his remarks encouraged hopes of a large indemnity. The Daily Mail said he had made 'his best speech of the campaign'. However, on the same day that Lloyd George was raising expectations at Bristol, Bonar Law was lowering them at Mile End. The Conservative leader was privately sceptical of the Hughes report; he was more impressed by the civil servants at the Treasury, including the young John Maynard Keynes, who doubted that Germany could pay more than two billion pounds. With this in mind Bonar Law told his London audience that there was little evidence that Germany could pay for more than physical damage. 'It would be holding out hopes which I do not believe if I say they could pay our whole war debt.' While the Coalition made political headway with the anti-German issues, the opposition parties faltered. Independent Liberals responded uncertainly to the issues of the day; many were forced to take them up by hecklers. One Liberal leader
wrote 'the Liberals are not thought as a party to be sufficiently venomous'. This was certainly the prevalent belief about Asquith himself. His allegedly weak prosecution of the war was also held against him and he lost his seat in East Fife to an undistinguished local Conservative, the most notable upset of the election.
Labour was more forthright in rejecting the anti-German excitement. Many Labourites claimed the indemnity and related issues to be Conservative diversions from social reform. This was perceptive: many Conservatives did win working-class divisions which in previous and succeeding elections voted Labour or Liberal. The Conservative exceptions of 1918 were largely the result of an unusual working-class interest in foreign policy issues. In such matters the Conservatives had a superior reputation and, in 1918, the most exciting slogans. These were Labour's principal obstacles in the 'coupon' election. The Liberal and Labour press also opposed the anti-German temper. C. P. Scott, the editor of the Manchester Guardian, constantly urged a peace that would mix generosity with justice. 'After conquest
must come
self-conquest', he warned.
When
the main election issues appeared he scorned them as 'paltry and vulgar'. The Nation and the New Statesman took similar
However, their comparatively sophisticated ideas had little effect on public opinion. Only one effective counterattack was discovered by the opposition: that a harsh peace would require occupation and prolong conscription. But it was not enough to stem the Coalition tide. When the votes were counted they showed that 87 c/c of those who had received 'coupons' were elected. Successful Coalitionists included 334 Conservatives, 127 Liberals, and 11 National Democrats. Together they gave the Government a new official majority of 237. Moreover, including 49 'independent' Conservatives who usually voted with the Government and excluding 73 Sinn Feiners who never took their seats, the new majority was 408. Within the Coalition, this new majority represented a Conservative victory. There would be 101 more Conservative Members in the new House of Commons than in the old. Most important, Conservatives alone would have a majority of 132 over all other parties, including the Coalition Liberals. This made Lloyd George even more depositions.
pendent on his Conservative
allies.
The 'Wee Frees': end of Liberal power The
victory of the 'coupon' and of the Conservatives meant disaster for the independent Liberals. They numbered only 34 in the new Commons, where they were dubbed the 'Wee Frees'. Labour weathered the storm better by electing 63 Members to become the chief opposition party. However a total opposition of 97 could hardly threaten the Government. This absence of a strong Opposition was to be one of the more unfortunate results of the election. Another was that the new Parliament was older and more mercantile than the previous one. Stanley Baldwin said of the new Members: 'They are a lot of hard-faced men who look as if they had done very well out of the war.' Most of the 'hard faces' were Conservatives; the transition of the Conservative Party from Land to Business was accelerated in 1918, and this plus the emergence of Labour gave the new House of
Punch cartoon (left) of November 27, 1918 shows Asquith left in the cold outside Coalition Lodge. Headed The Forlorn Appeal, reads: Mr Asquith: 'Coalition, ere we it
part, give,
O give me back my-er— party!'.
order to ensure a strong body of support for his coalition party, Lloyd George had sent coupons to many Liberal candidates, splitting up the party and leaving Asquith In
to
of independent Liberals, to the principle of Free Trade voluble opposition to the running of the
head a minority
whose adherence and
election gained
them
little
popular support
Commons
a ciass-conscious character. Lloyd George said that when he stood at the front bench he felt as if he was addressing a trade union with a chamber of commerce at his back. Such a House of Com-
mons was an
ironical result of an election called in the name of national unity. Nor did it portend a country 'fit for heroes'. Many who had hoped it would, especially
The Coupon Election 1918 Coalition
Opposition
young men, became discouraged with the 1919 the young diplo-
political system. In
mat Harold Nicolson
wrote: 'Of our wholly avoidable misfortunes the most dominant was democratic public opinion.' The 'coupon' election helped to initiate the cynicism of the inter-war years. It also reduced the chances for a truly negotiated peace in 1919. During the peace conference the Government was harassed by many of the new MPs, mostly Conservatives, who insisted that their 'mandate' from the electors be fulfilled. Lloyd George fought his backbench critics and urged a few concessions to Germany, but he could not move too far from the Conservative view of peace. In the end, the Treaty of Versailles included what many Conservatives wanted, provisions for a trial of German war criminals and a large indemnity for Germany's alleged responsibility for the war. At the same time, however, the antiGerman mood of the country itself was receding. During the peace negotiations more people became fearful of continued war and conscription. Also domestic issues regained their rightful place. In March 1919 the Round Table, a political quarterly, said of the election issues: 'Seen at a two-months interval these war-cries seem not only utterly unworthy of the situation in which the country then found itself, but also somewhat unreal.' This attitude was expressed in the first four by-elections of 1919: in three of these, independent Liberals displaced incumbent Conservatives. Rapid disenchantment with the tawdry slogans of 1918 showed that the election had not expressed the basic political instincts of the British people. Rather, as C. P. Scott said: 'It was due to a great wave of emotion thrown up by the war.' That could well be history's verdict on the 'coupon' election, one of the last misfortunes of the war.
Further Reading Blake, Robert, The Life
and Times
Unknown Prime Minister: Bonar Law (St Martin's
the
of
Press 1956)
The Roots of Appeasement (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1966) Jenkins, Roy, Asquith (Collins 1964) Jones, Tom, Lloyd George (Oxford University Press 1951) McCallum, R. B., Public Opinion and the Last Peace (Oxford University Press 1944) Gilbert, Martin,
McEwen, John M., 77?e Coupon Election of 191 8 and Unionist Members of Parliament (Journal of Modern History September 1962) Marwick, Arthur, The Deluge: British Society and the First World War (The Bodley Head 1965) Wilson, Trevor G., The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914-1935 (Collins 1966) Wilson, Trevor G. (ed), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott,
1911-1928 (Cornell University
Press)
Wngley, C, Lloyd George and the British Labour Movement in peace and war (Harvester Press 1976)
ROBERT BUNSELMEYER was born near Cora, Illinois, USA in 1939. He was educated at TOTAL: ELECTORATE 21 392 583 VOTES 10 766 583
VOTES
UNOPPOSED RETURNS
TURNOUT 58.9%
CANDIOATES
CANDIDATES 1625
MPS ELECTED UNOPP0SEO RETURNS
707 107
C C
MPS ELECTED
C
Washington University in St Louis, the University of Wisconsin, and at Yale University, where he obtained his PhD. He has taught World War history at New York's Fordham University and published a book on the effects of the war on the post-war I
economy PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL (32.4%) FIGURES
SHOWN
OPPOSITE
of Britain, following
England on 1914-1919.
British
history
extensive research in during the period
3151
Inset, top: British cavalry at.Jabal
Hamrin. Mounted trooped played an important part in the Mesopotamia campaign, though maintaining supplies of horses was a slant problem. Centre: Thousands of horses died in the gruelling cot 3*
was
little
artillery.
scope
Right:
for c
German pa
horses were vital to transport jrses used for reconnaissance
.
close of the First World War cavalry lost forever as a fighting force; it remained a fascinating anachronism in an age of armoured warfare. But the horse had served its time well. Brigadier Peter Young
With the its role
a.
-
%
tp
n
**>'
t
^r.r/A
*
,vt 'it-
Sfc
r »-•
fc
>* »
•»
i&)
;V^%wC%
<
.
<*.:
•
irely a after
twelvemonth
The seven days war that put the world to sleep,
Late in the evening the strange horses
came
.
.
A painting by Andre Fournier (right) shows a team of horses bringing up a heavy gun through the wreckage of Verdun. In the absence of cross-country vehicles, horses were used in large numbers on both sides, over one million in the British army alone
On August
4, 1914 the British Army owned approximately 25,000 horses. During the next twelve days a further 165,000 were impressed in the United Kingdom. Before 1918 it possessed something like 1,000,000 and this figure takes no account of casualties in the years between. Horses were purchased in America, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Motor transport was already of immense importance, but most units, not only cavalry, but infantry and artillery, still depended almost, entirely on
horse transport. In a big continental army young remounts were called up rather like young recruits, but in Britain, despite Lord Roberts' campaigning, there was as yet no conscription. In the Russian Army, for example, 65 depot squadrons existed in peacetime for training remounts, and after mobilisation these not only continued 'heir work but took on the tir.
3154
each depot being affiliated to a parcavalry regiment. The remount committees continued to purchase threeyear-olds which, as before the war, went through a long course of training. Horses between the ages of five and 12 were bought for immediate use, and trained as rapidly as possible by roughriders, who had been recalled from the army reserve. When they were ready they were formed into draft squadrons and taken to the front by well,
ticular
reservists.
The British Remount Commission bought the majority of its horses and mules in America. As early as October 1914 the first batch of animals reached England and thereafter the Commission tried to keep up a steady flow of from 10,000 to 25,000 animals a month. It dealt for the most part with big dealers in Chicago, St Louis, Kansas City, St Paul (Minnesota), Sioux City, Des Moines (Iowa), and, in the early
and Montreal. The states of Iowa and Illinois were the best sources. Three main types of horse were required: cavalry, heavy and light artillery horses. It was the latter category which the United stages, Toronto
States produced in thousands. The light horse required was from 15 hands, two inches to 16 hands, weighed about 1,200 lbs, was strong in the neck and quarters and short in the back and leg, and the heavy artillery horse weighed not less than 1,400 lbs. The predominating strains among the horses bought in America included the Percheron, Normandy, Shire, Clyde and Belgian. Big mules, 16 hands and more and weighing 1,300 lbs, were bought in Kansas and Missouri, while lighter mules for pack and draft could be found in Alabama, Georgia, Texas and Tennessee. Most of these American animals were eventually used in France. In the Desert Mounted Corps which perartillery
.
purchased in Australia, but owing to the shortage of shipping they could not be brought to the Middle East. In consequence, casualties had to be replaced by sick and wounded horses, reissued from remount hospitals once they were capable of further work. Captures from the Turks did little to ease the situation, for although some 1,500 Arab ponies and mules were taken in 1917, as well as a number of camels, nearly all of them, unfortunately, were in poor condition and suffering from galls. The British were able to make use of the camels, and a few of the stronger ponies were sent to the infantry as 'cobs', but most of the captured animals were sold in Jerusalem, after being properly fed and looked after for a few weeks. They fetched quite high prices. A small mule went for £40 and the average pony for £50. The 2,000 animals taken in Allenby's final advance in 1918 fetched even better prices in Syria and Lebanon. But that is by the way. The salient point is that by September 1918 Allenby's remount depots were empty.
Good horsemen — good horses By
the end of the war the standard of horsemanship in the Desert Mounted Corps was very high. It had not been so in the early days in Egypt. Nor is this strange for the corps did not consist of units or divisions of the Regular Army, but of Territorials and Australian Light Horse. The Australians were excellent horsemen and, though they were not used to riding the same animal day after day, soon got used to the idea that on active service the cavalry trooper must save his mount in every possible way, such as dismounting whenever there is a short halt and offsaddling at every opportunity. According to General Knox the Russian officers were very careful to see that their men dismounted as often as possible, and unsaddled whenever it was known that a halt would be an hour's duration or more. 'Among the English troops,' according to Colonel Preston, 'there was a large proportion in the mounted branches, both of officers
and men, who had had
little
previ-
ous experience of horses, and none at all under the severe conditions of active service.' But by the time Allenby arrived they had gained experience in the Western Desert and in the advance across Sinai and their horsemanship was good. As an indiat the end of each cation of this fact series of operations, there was hardly a sore back in the force. A striking contrast to this record was afforded by the French cavalry regiment which took part in the 1918 operations. On arrival at Damascus, nearly every horse in the regiment had a sore back. The Frenchmen carried an astonishing quantity of kit on their saddles; and though it was all put on in a very neat and soldierlike manner, the weight was undoubtedly far too great. Owing to the difficulty of removing the saddle without taking off all this kit, the horses were scarcely ever off-saddled. The men were, too, far too prone to remain mounted when halted. .
formed so magnifi cently under Allenby in Palestine the maj ority of the horses were 'walers', purchased in Australia. For many years past, wrot-s Colonel Preston, the Australians have been buying up the wellbred failures on the English Turf, and buying them cheap; not for racing purposes, but to breed saddltz horses for up-country stations. As a res ult of this policy, they have now got types of compact, well built, saddle and harness hordes that no other part of the world can show. Rather on the light side but hard as nails, and with beautifully clean legs and fe>;t, their record in this war places them far above the cavalry horses of any other nation The Australians' idea was 'that good blood will carry more weight than big bone'. T aking the average cavalryman's weight afj about 12 stone, and his equipment, saddle, ammunition, sword, rifle, clothes and accoutrements at least another nine an d a half, the charger had to .
.
.
carry about 21j stone, often without enough forage or water. In Palestine it was found that the waler stood up to these conditions better than the weight-carrying English hunter or the sort of light draft horse beloved of the Royal Artillery of those days. There were five based remount depots in France which during the war handled well over a quarter of a million horses and mules sent out from depots in the United Kingdom. They also received animals which had been in veterinary hospitals or convalescent horse depots and had recovered from sickness or wounds. One of these depots could accommodate as many as 3,000 horses. In Palestine veterinary work was of the utmost importance because the supply of remounts dried up more than a year before the end of the war. The last of those shipped to Egypt arrived in May and June 1917 — before the third battle of Gaza. A further 8,000 remounts had been
.
.
the warhorse on the Western Front up with more in the way of shellfire, mud and cold, in Palestine there were other hazards. Most of the diseases to which animals are subject — anthrax, glanders and lymphangitis to name but a few — were rife among the beasts of the local population. Nevertheless the horses of Allenby's army were remarkably healthy. 'Our imIf
had
to put
3155
We heard a distant tapping on the road,
A deepening drum-
It
-
i
w
ming; it stopped, went on again, And at the corner changed to hollow thunder. We saw the heads Like a wild wave charging and were afraid.'
Edwin Muir. The Horses
Top
right:
Watering Canadian
artillery
mounts.
Right: A German army horse receives dental treatment. With the constant drain on horse supplies animals had to be kept in good condition. Opposite page, top: A mule is caught by a splintering shell. In retreat sick animals often had to be shot. Below: Mule team at Arras
munity from these scourges may be attributed" to the facts that our horses were seldom camped for long in the same place; that they were never camped near villages if it could be avoided; and that no native animals were ever allowed in or near our camps, or to drink where our horses drank.'
Food and water: a problem everywhere Far more serious was the question of forage which was not only scanty but of poor quality. 'The food value of the whole daily ration (20 lbs in weight) was about 23% below that of an average horse in England doing the same work. The barley and tibben (chopped barley straw) being produced in Egypt were very dusty and contained a large proportion of earth and small stones.' operations the ration was 9 lbs of grain per day; so the unfortunate horses had to work much harder on half the rations they expected. Small wonder if they supple-
On
3156
'.
mented their diet with their rawhide head ropes, and by eating the woodwork of
wagon wheels when the picketing arrangements permitted! Water was an even worse problem than forage, and it is recorded that one battery marched for nine consecutive days during which period its horses were only watered three times. 'Even when water was obtainable, the difficulty of raising it from very deep wells, and the pressing need for haste,
often resulted in many horses being unable to drink their fill.' Experiments carried out by the Royal Army Veterinary Corps during the crossing of the Sinai Desert proved that horses did better when watered twice a day instead of three times, and this was accepted as the standard. Colonel Preston profited by the experience of an older genera still more arid country, the At the suggestion of Brigadieril Paul Kenna, late 21st Lancers, he .
used to carry tins of v,iater on the dashurly halt boards of his vehicles. A/ each used} the horses' mouths, nostr^ s and eyes dampmerel lot y to be wiped with a wet-i to refresh cloth, and this always itemed
™
>
symptoms greatly, and to reli$ ve the 4 lMle water thirst. , to distress due of °*f° was mixed with the feec(s and when the them
grain was crushed, or ifth^re was any bran wlnv available, it was found t,} at horses \ were off their feed due to exhaustion would wllh OtUU sma» often eat well if fed by ham l made of grain slightly \ moistened with water.
\
the Western Front, aH time w f, nt W' to the German cavalry we f e compelled HUch resort to all sorts of subst, 1,ut( fcods as freshly-mown oats and- oatstems sometimes mixed with clover >• 0ne expedient was the so-called sawdusij' cak(! for whlch any (n their chargers never maO '' eHt eo the thusiasm. On the Eastern Front
On
;
'
-
"
,
'
;
accessible water. Owing to the vigorous action of the armoured cars, the Turks had not had time to destroy the steam-pumping
plant there, and our engineers soon had rows of drinking troughs erected, and a steady stream of sweet clear water flowing into them. It was good to see the horses burying their heads in the water, and drinking their fill at last. Small details could
make a world of difference to the comfort of the horses under active service conditions. The Australian Light Horse never cut or pulled their horses' manes or tails, which, during operations, 'looked somewhat untidy; but there is no doubt that in a hot country it is preferable to let them grow freely. Not only does a mane assist the horse to rid itself of flies, but it appears to give some protection from the fierce rays of the sun; and a long thick tail is unquestionably a very great blessing to a horse in a fly country.' The Russians would have approved of the Australian way of treating their horses. 'As compared with our idea of grooming,' writes General Knox who was with General Erdeli (14th Cavalry Division), 'these horses received very poor attention, yet they thrived on it. Sore backs and such things were the exception These horses seem to be able to get along with much less care than the average American or European cavalry horse.' .
.
.
The horse: supplanted by the machine Invaluable though horses were for shuttling supplies forward from the dumps where motor transport had left them, the real backbone of the supply system was already mechanical transport. Supply was a tremendous problem. Every day rations, petrol and oil were required in order to
keep an army going. In September 1918 Egyptian Expeditionary Force consisted of 467,650 personnel, 159,900 animals and 5,905 motor vehicles. The the
wretched beasts were reduced to eating heather, twigs, bark and even the wood of their mangers. The thatch of a Polish or Lithuanian cottage, fungus, mould and all, tended to give them intestinal complaints. The Russians, who were experienced cavalrymen, fed their horses well — at least in 1914. According to General Knox: The horse ration during wartime was: 14\ pounds of oats; 15 pounds of hay; and four pounds of straw. During this campaign the horses received at least 11 pounds of oats a day and at least 12 pounds of hay. Straw was not used at all. Forage was purchased by the squadron commanders and paid for in cash whenever possible to do so. The horses were fed at least three times a day and whenever possible four times Barley was fed only when no oats were available. In Palestine the ability to sniff water from afar was of great use to both horse and man. Horses could certainly scent it when .
.
.
lying in large pools or rivers — though not in wel's. Astonishingly enough a few English-
men and many Australians,
of the 'bushmen'
notably
among the
Brigadier-General
Grant (4th Australian Light Horse Brigade), the hero of Beersheba and Samakh, 'had this useful sense highly developed'. It seems that the sense of smell is only one factor in the detection of water: the sensation is more one of a sudden freshness and sweetness of the atmosphere than a scent. It is noticeable particularly just after sunset, when the presence of water lying in pools may often be detected several miles away. Unfortunately, damp ground, from which water has recently evaporated, produces the same sensation, and frequently deceived horses as well as men. After so much evidence of hard work and starvation it is pleasant to know that there were exceptions. Junction Station was the first place where we found unlimited and
motorised transport required 5,000 gallons of petrol a day, and it is estimated that the daily tonnage of supplies moved by rail from Egypt to Palestine via Port Said was 1,732 tons. The problems of feeding cavalry divisions in Palestine were immense. In the raid on Es Salt and 'Amman in March 1918, 21 days' supplies for the Anzac Mounted Division were dumped at Jericho. Some 500 trucks were used to take supplies across the Jordan Valley and a constant stream of lorries was moving up and down the whole time. The roads were terrible and the round trip, at an average speed of no more than 7 mph, took about 15 hours,
averaging about 70 miles a day — an aggregate of some 720,000 miles in three weeks. Occasionally a cavalry force had to lorries
live off the country, as did the three divi-
sions launched towards Damascus in September 1918. Despite the fact that they moved through country long occupied by the Turks they were able to procure sufficient quantities of barley, butter, goats, millet and sheep, but on the
the backing for a motorised supply.
eggs,
whole
horsed division was
Better treatment for sick horses The Boer War had shown that the care of sick animals on a unit basis was wasteful. Between 1902 and 1914 the British overhauled their system, and when war broke out again had an organisation comprising field units, mobile veterinary sections and hospital units. The mobile warfare between
3157
Pack and riding animals the First
in
Horses & Mules landed in UK up to December 2 1918
World War
British Horse
& Mule establishment
Total cost:
£67 505 000
Disposal of British animals
Average prices fetched
November 11 191 8 March 31 1920
a.formeatin:
to
828 360
I
I
I
I
617
ISOLD FOR WORK ISOLD FOR MEAT
HORSES MULES TOTALS
206 729
M
/ J
UNITED KINGDOM
M
/ )
FRANCE
ITAIY
M
SALONIKA
534 951
/ ;
b.forwork
M 1
The purchase in
/ )
'I
HORSES
OXEN
of riding horses
the United Kingdom
J] j\
CAMELS
7)7)
MULES
Total: 174 665
Uli
British
Army
animal strengths 3 HORSES
French & British Horse wastage DIED.
Horse
DONKEYS
& Mule wastage
as percentages:
DESTROYED.
KILLED & MISSING 289 50
CASTING (Death
horse
of a
from internal injuries
caused by trying
to right
itself after falling into a difficult position)
The proportions
23830
66 86
of castings
to deaths:
FRENCH ARMY BRITISH
ARMY
1:1-7 I
:
7
18663
541 714 TOTALS
1006
5 81
1113 13 24
*
1
82
8 07
1236
A
1420
119 28 50
2424 1
IS
1177
UNITED KINGDOM
A'6
15
FRANCE 14 09
ITALY
EGYPT SALONIKA
1432
C
MESOPOTAMIA Oi'
EAST AFRICA' (Z
MONTH MONTHS MONTHS MONTHS MONTHS
'»
10-30
15 81
1
2
3 4 5
A • O
A
3
98
11 75
04,. 1914
1915
1916
'Losses mainly result of the tsetse
3158
1917
fly
1916
Left: 10th Australian Light
Horse
in
Palestine.
The Australians were excellent horsemen. They carried the minimum amount of equipment and regarded the comfort of their mounts as more important than high standards of grooming.
Below left: An explosion alarms horses
at
artillery
La Bassee on the Western Front
destroyed could be moved in the horsedrawn ambulances which, from 1915, were on the strength of the mobile veterinary evacuating sections. The veterinary stations were each provided with a motor ambulance, through the generosity of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Barges, however, were ideal for transporting sick animals. There was no vibration, and two men could look after about 30 animals. The wear and tear on the horses was immense. Colonel Boucherie, the historian of Sordet's Corps, noted: 'Statistics of I Cavalry Corps recently established that the resistance of the horses of 18 years was 71%; while that of the nine-year-olds was only 32%; and the 12-year-olds 19%; while the 13-year-olds climbed again to 31%. Somewhere about the age of 20 most horses became too old for active service. These as well as the incurably lame, sick and wounded had to be cast. But a horse that was not up to the work in the team of a GS Wagon might still have a few years' potential on the land, at a time when horse power was still much needed. These cast horses were branded with 'C on the near shoulder to show that the Government had resolved to dispense with their services. In France, by 1918, as much as £50,000 a month was being paid to the state for horses that had been sold, or had been destroyed, and their carcasses used for human food or some by-product. It was a sad end for so many horses, and if there is anything to be said for modern warfare it is that the horse is no longer needed. In 1870 a German officer remarked that the first fortnight of war purges an army of all its stock that is unfit for war. True or not, the exploits of the British in Palestine in 1918 compare very favourably with the performance of French cavalry in 1914. One
squadron commander, who had lost no more than 5 — 10% of his men in combat, recorded in his journal that by the end of October platoons which mobilised at a strength of 36 were down to an average of 16 horses.
He
to fatigue
and saddle
attributed
90%
of the losses one of his
sores. In
moments Earl Haig maintained that there was still a place for the wellbred horse in warfare. However that may be, the horse played a patient and courageous part on every front throughout the First World War. less farsighted
August and November 1914 severely tested the
new scheme.
It
was not
possible, for
example, during the rapid retreat from Mons for the mobile veterinary sections to collect and evacuate sick animals. Those that could not keep up had to be destroyed. Most had to be treated in their units. It had been hoped that civilian labour could be hired or impressed to assist the mobile sections, but this proved utterly impracticable. In consequence it was decided to
make the sections into divisional troops — small, self-contained units. This arrangement was an unqualified success. As a result of war experience another link in the chain was forged: the field veterinary detachment. They were army troops, allotted to corps as required, and located near the corps rail-head. They were necessary in France because of the large increase of animals in each corps, and in the Near East because of the great distances between
the front line and the veterinary hospitals. possible animals being evacuated were marched to the rear by road but, naturally, ambulances, barges and trains were used to supplement evacuation by road. Posts known as 'sick horse halts' were established at intervals of ten or 12 miles along the lines of communication. Here a NCO with a few men could provide
Where
rations, forage,
accommodation and
first-
evacuating sick horses by road it was possible with 'the moving picket line' to move 20 horses with as few as three men to look after them. The animals were attached down either side of a rope in pairs, with a soldier to guide the front, middle and rear pairs. Many of the casualties were due to injuries to the foot. For this reason ambulances to transport beasts unable to march to a barge or train were invaluable. Animals that would otherwise have had to be aid. In
Further Reading Galtrey, Captain Sidney, The Horse and the War
(London 1918) Animal Management (HMSO) Knox, Major-General Sir Alfred, With the Russian Army, 1914-1917 Preston, Lieutenant-Colonel R M P., The Desert Mounted Corps Teichman, Captain Oscar, The Diary of a Yeomanry Medical Officer Cavalry Combat (United States Cavalry Association 1937) Statistics of the Military Effort of the British
Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920
(HMSO
1922)
[For Brigadier Peter Young's biography, see p. 155.]
3159
EISNER
There is no complete and reliable account of Kurt Eisner's origins and early life; even his birthplace is in doubt. By his own account he was born on May 14, 1867 in Berlin, but other accounts maintain that he was born in Galicia and eventually moved to Berlin with his parents. In any case his father, Emanuel Eisner, was a reasonably affluent Jewish shopkeeper in Unter den Linden, one of Berlin's most respectable business avenues. At the Akademisches Gymnasium, a school whose curriculum emphasised the importance of the humanities, Kurt Eisner had as his classmates the sons of officers and prosperous businessmen. He obtained his matriculation in 1886 and entered the Friedrich Wilhelm Universitaet in Berlin reading philosophy and German. Within less than three years he opted out of university life and turned to journalism for which he had a natural talent. His style was characterised by a subtle irony, and even in his early writings he revealed in himself an incisive critic of Wilhelmine society. In 1892 he married Elisabeth Hendrich but soon abandoned his wife and middle-class domesticity for the roving life of a 'bohemian'. He took on a position with the Frankfurter Zeitung and began toying with the idea of joining the Social Democratic Party. During his sojourn in Frankfurt Eisner completed his first book, a study of the work and influence of Friedrich Nietzsche. He regarded it as an 'anti-Nietzsche' viewpoint, although it was more of a polemical than a philosophical discussion. From Frankfurt he moved on to Marburg where besides occupying an editorial post he wrote literary and political essays for Berlin journals. In Marburg he also acquired a taste for both Kant and Fichte, which was also to mark his writings. From there the step to Karl Marx seemed to Eisner one 'of natural evolution' Yet it would be as fallacious to see Eisner as a Marxist doctrinaire as it would be to see him as a socialist revisionist. Above all Eisner cannot be categorised — much to the frustration of Rosa Luxemburg, who could not make up her mind whether to laugh at him or consider him a highly dangerous influence on Marxist doctrine. Eisner observed with great interest and even
sympathy Friedrich Naumann's National Social Association, although he remained convinced that liberalism was on its way out. A rabid attack against Kaiser Wilhelm II, which brought Eisner his first prison sentence, virtually assured his
critic, ex-convict, philanderer and revolutionary, Kurt Eisner was a man torn between differing ideals. He brought Bavaria to revolution and ousted the monarchy, but then, with power securely in his hands, lacked the ability and the decisiveness to activate a successful political system. The failure of his vision of Bavaria as an Ordnungszelle, a durable example of a model state and an inspiration to the rest of Germany, was to have tragic and ironic consequences. Not only did it lead to his assassination, but also to the foundation of Bavaria as the centre of all those extremist factions most hostile to the
Theatre
Weimar Republic. H. W. Koch. Above: Kurt Eisner. His unkempt appearance was more than compensated for by his personal charisma
appointment
to the
editorial staff of the SPD newspaper Vorwaerts after his release in 1898. Eisner occupied a peculiar position in the following years: that of sitting on the fence while the struggle between the 'reformist' and the 'radical' wing of the Socialists raged. It rendered him something of the quality of an arbitrator, but also made him vulnerable to attack from all sides. With the death of Liebknecht Eisner's protection also departed and consequently he thought it advisable to leave Vorwaerts and look for new pastures, this time in Bavaria. He found Munich more congenial and tolerant of his erratic and philandering mode of life. Moreover, the censor there strict as in Prussia. But unlike Berlin, in Munich he never really managed to gain entry to the nerve centre of the SPD's leadership. So Eisner formed his own little circle of admirers. No doubt he considered himself the prophet of the new society which he outlined at public assemblies, although here his charisma often helped to cover up his faulty logic. At heart he was much more of a mid- 19th-century anarchist than a respectable
was not as
Social
Democrat of the
late
Wilhelmine
era.
A
good deal of his income was derived from his position as a theatre critic, and producers feared him for he could make or break an entire production. He soon became a familiar Munich figure: small, untidy, his sallow face covered by a scraggy unkempt beard and his head covered by a huge slouch hat. After the outbreak of war he was a supporter of the 'German cause against Tsarism' but during 1915 with no end to the war it became increasingly critical. More and more of his articles fell victim to the censor, while he himself became disillusioned with the Social Democrats. When in 1917 the USPD was founded he thought he had found his real political affiliation. While Ludendorff made preparations for his March
in sight his attitude to
1918 offensive Eisner agitated for a strike 'to overthrow the monarchy'. On January 28, 1918, 500,000 Berlin workers went on strike and under Eisner's leadership those in Munich followed suit. His arrest and imprisonment followed, although Ludwig III released
him
in
September 1918. With the November revolution
Eisner thought that power was at last in his hands, and so it was for a time. But he lacked the ability to use it to its fullest extent. Devoid of a clearly thought out programme he hoped to 'somehow' fuse parliamentary democracy with the rule of the councils. In trying to be a Kerensky and a Lenin rolled into one he ended up a
dead man, having failed to emulate either. The blood which covered the corner of Munich's Promenadeplatz was that of a man too naive to have been actively engaged in politics in the first place. 3160
With an armistice and the downfall of the Imperial regime in sight a wave of deep-seated unrest spread over Germany, fostered by dissident elements from both ends of the political spectrum. In Bavaria real or imagined grievances sparked off a series of bloody revolutions in which high ideals deteriorated into empty rhetoric and personal greed. H. W. Koch. Right: Gustav Landauer, a sincere Communist. Below, top row. Left: Max Levien, a founder of the Spartacist movement. Centre: Heila von Westarp, the only woman to be shot as a Communist hostage. Right: Tovia Axelrod, sent by Lenin to organise agitation in the press. Below, bottom row. Left: Eugen Levine, champagne while the starving population looked on. Centre: Ernst Toller, eleventh-hour break with 'the Russians'. Right: Erich Muehsam — 16-year sentence for his part in the revolution
,„.<•<•
«
'
...
QJ
3161
h
e
bells
pealed out across
had been signed and that
socialists thought that the onal frontiers would disintegrate :ind. Soldiers would emerge from for ma ancl a n< the trenches and former enemies would reach one another's open hand to grasp it in a gesture of fraternal solidarity. The proletariat of all nations would unite and establish once and for all the brotherhood of man. The question of victory or defeat was irrelevant—what was relevant was the abolition of all the institutions of the ancien regime in all sectors of the lives of European nations. At least this is how the world looked in the speeches and pamphlets of the Independent Socialists and Spartacists; the future as pro-
jected by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in Berlin, by Ernst Toller and Kurt Eisner in Munich. Alas, as the following weeks and months were to show, the mirage dissolved and what was left was a Germany prostrate and in a state of bloody anarchy. Between November 1918 and May 1919 the two main centres of internal upheaval inside the Reich were Berlin in the north and Munich in the south, although of course the events in either of these cities do not necessarily permit generalisations concerning the surrounding respective provinces. Within the second German Empire Bavaria had always occupied a position secondary only to Prussia. Having emerged as a kingdom from the Napoleonic wars it represented a relatively stable state based on a representative constitutional monarchic system, run by a bureaucracy which most of the time was reasonably efficient. Bismarck, first Chancellor of the Empire, had been only too ready to acknowledge Bavaria's 'special status': after all, by comparison, the Hohenzollerns were mere upstarts when contrasted with the ancient House of Wittelsbach. But the First World War was almost imperceptibly eroding this 'special status', and the predominantly
Roman
Catholic farming community found itself confronted by rapid industrialisation and the growth of heavy industry such as
Krupp branches and Kraus-Maffei
in
Munich, and
MAN (Maschin-
enfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg) in Augsburg and Nuremberg. Associated with it came demographic changes in the course of which an industrial proletariat, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labour recruited primarily from Saxony and the Ruhr, migrated to Bavaria making up the hard core of the Socialist vote in Bavaria in general and its urban centres in particular. The length of the war and the consequent heavy sacrifices made Bavarians, like most other Germans, tired and weary of the seemingly-unending conflict, as well as critically aware of the institution which, in the judgment of many outsiders at least, had in principle always been sacrosanct to them: the monarchy. To this alienation between monarch and subjects Ludwig III had contributed considerably by usurping the crown of the mentally-ill Otto I in 1913, instead of retaining the regency like his father Luitpold. This was a cardinal error, criticised at the time among the higher echelons of the civil service and the army, and among the professions. Nor did his somewhat comic and occasionally slovenly appearance command great respect from the population; his highhanded commitment to the annexationist dreams of his fellow German princes and the pan-Germans did nothing to endear him to moderates. The material hardships of the war hit the Bavarians as hard as any other German community. The inhabitants of towns and cities lacked food while the farmers resented the compulsory system of requisitioning. The first major industrial strikes in Munich in January 1918 could only be suppressed by the use of Rhenish troops - although the latter declared they would never fire on the workers. Ten months later, by November 1918, the limit of what seemed bearable appeared to have been reached. Bavarians had been accused of being politically passive, but in moments of spiritual or material need their temper could arise to the point of self-destruction. One of Bavaria's most prominent politicians in the years before 1933, Wilhelm Hoegner, had little good to say about the Bavarian character. The Bavarian people has not the gift to accept the inevitable with God's grace but grumbles about all and sundry, forever suspicious of any innovation and accustomed to react with emotion rather than reason. Respect for superior powers, save t v, it does not possess. Most of their politicians have come frc Bavaria and have frequently misused it. Whoever nuferously sharing their endemic grumbling a maS s following. This is a vast generalisation ons nevertheless contained a considerable Even before November ii 18, police reports indicated the danger of revolut io mg and govern<
I
i
'
ment shrugged
their shou reserve units of Bavarian
Munich were considered 3162
polil
ed do. The d
around
n
Ludwig
III was jeered from the windows of a Munich garrison, he just grinned and left it at that. Agitation among Munich's working classes was mainly conducted by members of the USPD, the Independent Socialists, condoned and even supported by the SPD, the Majority Socialists. Hardly any of the revolutionary agitators like Kurt Eisner, Erich Muehsam or Ernst Toller came from Bavaria; with a few exceptions they were Jewish intellectuals. Their headquarters in Munich were in Schwabing, Munich's artists' quarter, at the Cafe 'Stefanie', which became popularly known as 'Cafe Megalomania'. If strategy was made there, it was carried out in the beer halls, Bavaria's breeding grounds for revo-
lutionary political fervour. Eisner's outward scruffiness was more than balanced by his charisma and in his agitation he could count on the support of the radical wing of the anti-clerical Bavarian Farmers' Federation led by the brothers Ludwig and Karl Gandorfer. These men in fact represented but a minute fraction of the Bavarian farmers but feeding on the general feeling of war weariness they could claim for a short time to speak for 'the Bavarian farmer'. The help of the Gandorfers was essential to Eisner because they supplied him with considerable financial aid and promised, in the event of revolution, to keep Munich supplied with food.
Eisner gains his freedom: the revolution a leader While on September 22 the King could still attend the opening of the autumn races, Kurt Eisner, just released from prison for his part in the January strike, was in a by-election campaign a month later advocating revolution, culminating in the proclamation of a German Republic, including German Austria, based 'on the ideals of 1848'. Meanwhile a flu epidemic was raging through
Munich, causing hundreds of deaths; rumours circulated that Austria was about to collapse, that bands of marauding soldiers had entered Bavaria from across the Alps and that Bavaria itself was about to become a war zone. Eisner fully exploited existing anxieties and grievances, calling mass meeting after mass meeting until finally even the largest of the beer halls was too small and he had to move to the Theresienwiese, an open field which provides the site for Munich's annual Oktoberfest. There, on November 7, at 3 pm, he held a mass rally jointly with the SPD. On that Thursday, Munich's shops closed at lunch time. The Kiel mutiny in the north had already taken place, but as yet no German monarch had lost his throne. Organised workers carrying red flags and large boards with inscriptions supporting the action at Kiel as well as many people who were simply curious to see what was happening gathered on the field. The SPD speakers, headed by their leader Erhard Auer, whom Eisner always considered his rival, put forward their relatively moderate demands. They called neither for strike action nor revolution but merely constitutional reform, the abdication of the Kaiser and the German Crown Prince and a social welfare programme. They then formed an orderly 'protest
march' led by Auer and a massed brass band. What remained behind at the Theresienwiese were soldiers with red flags led by Eisner, his secretary Felix Fechenbach, and Ludwig Gandorfer.
Under the influence
of Eisner's rousing oratory they 'decided to They followed his call 'to spread out across Munich, occupy the barracks, requisition arms and ammunition, bring the other soldiers with you and make yourselves the masters of the government'. One by one Munich's military barracks followed his call. Surprisingly enough Eisner succeeded; the upholders of the existing order from the King downwards simply lacked the will and the power to resist. Government, army, bureaucrats, the middle class and most of the workers allowed a revolution to take place without so much as lifting a finger in resistance. Ludwig III at first thought the storm would blow over, once the pent-up emotions had run their course. Within a few hours he realised how wrong he was and together with his sick wife left the Munich royal residence rather hurriedly, carrying no other luggage under his arm than a box of cigars. Meanwhile armed mobs roamed the streets and opened the prisons, releasing the inmates as 'martyrs of tyranny', most of them criminals including a psychopathic sex murderer. Eisner in the meantime had adjourned to the Mathaeserbraeu, one of the less respectable Munich beer halls near the main railway station. Under his chairmanship he created Munich's first official Workers' and Soldiers' Council, the nucleus of the later Bavarian Revolutionary Central Committee. Having done that he formed the government of the 'Socialist Bavarian Republic' consisting of eight members. Bearing in mind the importance of the Majority liberate' the military barracks.
Socialists, the SPD members Auer, Timm, and Rosshaupter were offered and accepted the Ministries of the Interior, Justice and
Military Affairs respectively.
Of the Independent
Socialists the
I
Inset: Freikorps in Munich, May 1919: intent on sup|^bsing the Reds Above: Relief from anarchy. Many moderates welcomed Noske's troops
former locksmith Hans Unterleitner — an inflammatory public speaker — took on the Ministry of Labour; the former primary school teacher, Johannes Hoffmann, became Minister of Education and Dr Edgar Jaffe, regarded as a competent economist by some and as a crank by others, became Minister of Finance. Eisner had himself appointed Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. During the course of the following day, Friday, November 8, Eisner could formally declare the establishment of a 'Bavarian Republic' whose highest administrative and legislative organ was
'the^MBkers', Farmers' and Soldiers' Council' elected by the population. Ludwig III, the first German monarcl^to give up his crown, had left without a struggle, the army had become impotent and Eisner was well justified in saying that all the revolution had cost him was 18 Marks, the amount he had carried in his pocket the day before and spent on drink in the intervening 24 hours. Yet it would be a serious mistake to look at Eisner simply as an absurd, impractical pocket-size revolutionary. No doubt he lacked political insight and overestimated his own power and the strength of his actual position. He attracted many cranks, yet he also managed, for a time at least, to command the respect of such highly reputable figures as the well-known German pacifist Friedrich
3163
Wilhelm Foerster, Professor Luju von Brentano who advised him on economic matters, and Heinrich Mann, the writer, the brother
Thomas Mann. Nor does the often-repeated charge against Eisner, that of separatism, hold true either. As he saw it, under his guidance Bavaria would become an Ordnungszelle, a cell of law
confession of Germany's war guilt. That the suggestion originated from such an elated source nattered Eisner; it also appeared to uphold his vision of Bavaria as the model for a new Germany. Unfortunately for himself as well as for his cause he went too far. The series of documents he published was tampered with and falsified to the point of making it valueless. In the rest of Germany Eisner's action aroused a wave of indignation. However, he was determined to bring his native city of Berlin to its knees. At a general conference of German prime ministers held in Berlin on November 25, Eisner took the initiative in attacking Ebert and his provisional government, full
at bringing Saxony, Baden and Wurttemberg over to his To counter the threatened division of the Reich Ebert immedi-
wn
government within itsc public. In Munich's mai staged a festival of considt orchestra was conduct i
However, all this co Bavaria's economic problt pendent upon the supply of 3164
owing opposition
to his
limself directly to the e Nationaltheater, he istic quality. The
Walter. les,
least of all heavily de-
Saar was now
/ O^
t^P-^
11
Cav Div
Maj-Gen Haas
EAST FRONT
from
Gen Siebert
Furstenfeldbriick.
from MiihldoTf.
Seutter's
Detcbs: Denk
Wurttemburg
Schaaf. Oberland and Oberst
Detch,
Bogendorfer
Deetjen. plus
Detch.
Marine Bde &
from Landsberg
liitzow's Freikorps
Graters Wurttembun
Detch Starnberg
SOUTH FRONT Gen Hitter vonyEpp Bav Storm Troop Bde
Revolution
in
Bavaria
1918 November 7 Eisner holds a mass rally
in
the Theresienwiese to support the Kiel mutiny. After
the elements of the extreme
left seize the city of Munich. Eisner forms the Workers' and Soldiers' Council and the government of the 'Socialist Bavarian Government'.
this,
November 8 Eisner formally promulgates the 'Bavarian Republic'.
November 25 German prime ministers in Berlin, and attacks Ebert with a view to bringing Saxony, Baden and Wurttemberg over to his side. Eisner attends a conference of
Eisner
his friends. Eisner,
i;
!-ir~LJ~U~m~Lr*i /
14 Cav Div
November 26
revolution: Eisner assassinated The publication of falsified diplomatic documents together with his conduct of relations with Berlin seriously damaged Eisner's standing among those who had considered him essentially a moderate, though somewhat eccentric and misguided, idealist. The Majority Socialists began to disassociate themselves from his actions; even Foerster disavowed his support. Munich students tore down the red flag from the former royal residence in which Eisner had in the meantime established himself. Realising his growing unpopularity he deployed delaying tactics against the demand for the election of a Bavarian national assembly, but finally, under heavy pressure from the Majority Socialists who outvoted him in the cabinet, he had to agree to setting a firm date for the elections and publicly denounce the mob violence still a feature of Munich street life, carried on by various alleged representatives of the 'councils'. Meanwhile detachments of the revolutionary Kiel naval division had arrived in Munich which together with the 'red guards' of Erich Muehsam — a figure from Berlin's literary periphery who had made Munich his new home — strongly opposed Eisner's apparently conciliatory attitude to the Majority Socialists. The naval detachment was led by the former rating Rudolf Eglhofer. Eglhofer had volunteered for service in the Imperial Navy before the war but deserted twice, once in 1913 and once in 1917. He was distinguished by his flamboyant appearance and was popularly known as 'the sailor with the Tango hair-do', but behind this flamboyance lay the recklessness and unscrupulousness of the freebooter and the fanaticism of the revolutionary. During the night of December 7, Eglhofer and Muehsam attempted a coup d'etat but ? defeated by the 'republican guards' which adhered to Eisner' ional government. Reaction from the extreme Left was -ved by reaction from the extreme Right although this d into scurrilous pamphleteering; it made apon ewish origin of Eisner and
a
^
Div
WEST FRONT
side.
A second
Gd
1
aiming
ately proposed that a national constitutional assembly should convene at an early date. The suggestion was accepted — except by Bavaria. A day later, after his return to Munich, Eisner addressed an ultimatum to Berlin demanding the establishment of a 'directory' of south German states with himself at its head. Even before Ebert had a chance to reply Eisner decided to 'break off diplomatic relations with Berlin'.
D actlau
Gbrlitz' Freikorps
and order, an example for the whole of Germany. The example of Munich was emulated in most other industriaSoldiers' lised southern German centres. Workers', Farmers' and Councils, forming their own red militias, sprang up like mushrooms. Bavaria's middle class held back, petrified by the in-
the Bavarian envoy in Bern, reported back the extraordinary moral impact which Eisner's action had had among the Powers of the western alliance. Upon American instigation 'in order to convince President Wilson of the^sincerity of Bavarian revolutionary government' Eisner was asked to take the first steps towards a
Waldeck
from Augsburg.
of
credible spectacle unfolding before its eyes. Eisner himself quickly showered fell victim to the flattery which his immediate entourage upon him, and which could be suitably exploited. Notes and despatches directed to him were full of references to his political wisdom, sagacity and idealism. Foerster, whom Eisner appointed as
1">™ Seising. / Hessian-Thunngian Freikorps korps Fr
NORTH FRONT Lt-Gen von Fricdeburg
its
demands
the establishment of a South
German
Directory' with Bavaria at
head. Before Ebert can reply. Eisner decides to break
off
diplomatic relations
elements in Bavaria are by now disassociating themselves from Eisner, and force him to fix a date for the promised elections.
with Berlin. But the
more moderate
socialist
December 7 Eisner's forces manage to some 'Red Guard' units.
December 16 The Congress future of the
defeat an attempted
of Soldiers'
coup by mutineers from
and
and Workers' Councils in Berlin fails to remove the the hands of the German electorate, and
German Republic from
Bavaria entirely from the rest of the defeated by the Minister of the Interior, Auer, however.
Eisner considers separating Republic. He
Kiel
is
German
1919 January 26 Eisner suffers a crushing defeat
in
the free elections, winning only three of the
160 seats. The maintenance of law and order impossible.
in
Bavaria meanwhile grows almost
February 19 600 Bavarian sailors attempt to establish order, but are opposed by both Left and Right, and are crushed.
February 21 Eisner
is
A member of the Revolutionary Workers' Council fires wounds Auer. The Central Committee declares combined government of the left takes over power, under the
assassinated.
several shots and severely martial law.
Soon
name
Revolutionary Central Council of the Bavarian Republic.
of the
a
February 28 A motion to proclaim Communist group are
March
a Soviet
Republic
is
defeated, and the ringleaders of the
arrested, but soon released.
1
A new provisional government
is established under Hoffmann. This meets with the opposition of the Revolutionary Central Council, which presses for revolutionary action when urged on by Axelrod. The troops controlled by the Revolutionary
Council urge the establishment of a soviet republic allied to Russia and Hungary and divorced from the Weimar Republic. Hoffmann stalls for time.
to
April 7
A
Soviet Republic
flees to
is
proclaimed
in
Bavaria under Toller and Niekisch. Hoffmann
Bamberg.
April 13
countercoup by Hoffmann's supporters, the 2nd (Communist) declared under the dictatorship of Levine and Levien. The extravagances of the new regime completely alienate the rural areas and largo portions of the starving urban areas. The Weimar government decides to aid Hoffmann, and the 'counter revolutionary' forces are set into motion. After an abortive
Soviet Republic
May
is
1
The forces
of the Weimar Republic enter Munich and the revolution from the purges and the executions.
is
over, apart
under French control it could no longer fulfil Bavaria's needs. With the lack of coal industrial production came to a standstill and unemployment increased. On December 16 the Congress of Soldiers' and Workers' Councils opened in Berlin at which Bavaria was represented by the dynamic Ernst Toller, a poet of Polish
The result of the Congress's decisions was disappointing Eisner because it left the future of the German Republic in the hands of the German electorate. Eisner now considered a complete separation of the Bavarian Councils from those in Berlin and a total severance of the ties existing between Bavaria and the rest of Germany. Auer, still Minister of the Interior, repudiated this in a public speech which demanded that the power of the Councils be curbed. Although he caused a tumultuous scene, Auer carried the assembly. Eisner, who was present, felt that the reins were origin. to
slipping from his hands and tried to conciliate Auer as well as the councils. But ultimately there was only one conclusive way of reasserting his position — a way which so far he had circumvented: that of free elections. Held on January 15, 1919 they brought him a damning defeat: of 180 seats the Independent Socialists obtained only three. Eisner's personal position was further eroded by two factors. Firstly, when he had attended the Congress of the Second International in Bern early in February his confession there in public of Germany's sole war guilt found applause — but not among his fellow socialists at home or, for that matter, among the German population generally. Secondly, he had utterly failed to control and check mob violence. On February 19 some 600 sailors, predominantly Bavarians, attempted to take the law into their own hands and establish some semblance of order. Mistaken by one side as right-wing reactionaries and by the other as 'Prussian Spartacists' they came between two fires, and the coup ended in failure. It has been argued that Eisner on his way to reconvene the Bavarian Diet on February 21 was ready to resign his post, and that he carried his written resignation in his briefcase. That document has never been found and other evidence suggests that Eisner was toying with the idea of continuing in power by force, with the aid of the Councils and the revolutionary committee. Whatever Eisner's intentions they were never put to the test, for on that February morning Kurt Eisner was shot dead in the street by ex-Lieutenant Anton Count von Arco auf Valley, the grandson of the banker Eduard Salomon von Oppenheim. Within minutes the news of Eisner's assassination reached the reassembled Diet: the session was abruptly halted and all parliamentarians were searched for weapons. Curiously enough the public gallery was not searched. Then at precisely 11 am Auer, who was also the Diet's vice-president, re-opened the session by paying tribute to Eisner's idealism and offering the cabinet's resignation. At this moment the guarded doors to the chamber opened and a man with a pistol entered and fired several shots at the ministerial bench and into the deputies. Auer was seriously injured and two men who tried to cut off the assassin's retreat were shot down. Simultaneously shots were fired from the public gallery. The man who had fired the shots was a member of the Revolutionary Workers' Council, Alois Lindner, and in spite of the presence of guards he was able to leave the Diet unmolested. This was one of the reasons why the Weimar Republic's first Reichswehrminister (Minister of Defence) argued that the entire event had been planned by Eisner beforehand in order to overthrow the Majority Socialists and establish the rule of the revolutionary councils. Eisner had, so Noske argues, bribed the Republican Guards not to intervene and their passivity throughout lends some weight to Noske's point. However, direct evidence substantiating a conspiracy planned by Eisner has never been discovered. In any event, had Eisner intended to bring about a second revolution he succeeded even as a dead man. The Central Committee immediately declared a state of martial law throughout the whole of Bavaria; it announced a general strike, the closure of the university and all newspapers and issued orders for the arrest of hostages, mainly of the nobility, former officers and influential Munich citizens. For a short time Bavaria's urban proletariat was united. During the preceding weeks Eisner had been the target of public abuse and the object of general ridicule. Now that he was dead, Eisner the man disappeared, replaced by Eisner the myth. The place of his assassination in Munich's Promenadeplatz was decorated with masses of flowers and armed sailors forced every passerby to pay his respects. The masses attending his 'state funeral' attested his popularity as did the ringing of all church bells. The latter was enforced at gun point, and it can be argued that for the 'masses' at a time of a general strike and a sudden onset of warm weather it was as good a spectacle as any other. Mass attendance was also registered at the burial of Lindner's two
Above: Republican troops set up a field gun in the streets of Munich. Opposite page: Suppression of separatist revolution
in
Bavaria
victims, Major Paul Ritter von Jahreiss and Heinrich Osel. After Eisner's death the Majority Socialists, Independent Socialists and the newly founded Communists together called into being a joint Revolutionary Central Council of the Bavarian Republic which assumed governmental function and promised to maintain law and order. Judging by police reports of the time, the ransacking of villas, flats and general acts of looting increased in frequency. Furthermore the unity of the three groups within the Central
Council was short-lived. When on February 28, Erich Muehsam introduced a resolution to proclaim a 'Soviet Republic' it was defeated by 234 votes to 70. The Republican Guard, which by now had become Auer's instrument, attempted to arrest prominent Communists, among them Muehsam, Max Levien and Gustav Landauer, though they had to release them again soon afterwards. Landauer actually was one of the very few natives among the leading revolutionaries. Max Levien, however, had been born in Russia which he left with his parents under the impact of the Tsarist anti-Jewish pogroms. By 1919 he had become one of the founders of the Spartacist movement and of a German Red Army. Two events in particular now affected the political developments in Bavaria. One was the erection of a Soviet Republic in Hungary under Bela Kun, which in the context of revolutionary agitation in Austria raised the spectre of an Austro-Hungarian-Bavarian Soviet bloc. The other was the Spartacist rising in Berlin which Ebert's government had suppressed within a week at the cost of 1,200 dead and 10,000 wounded. Noske's units now represented the 'White Guards', and he was ready to quash revolutionary uprisings anywhere else in Germany.
world a meadow So far in Bavaria the forces of moderation were still holding the upper hand and on March 1, a new provisional government was appointed. When the Bavarian Diet reconvened for the first time since Eisner's death it elected Johannes Hoffmann as Prime Minister. But the Revolutionary Central Council was not prepared to give way — especially in view of the events in Berlin. In the councils, Toller, Ernst Niekisch, a schoolteacher, Muehsam, Levien and Eugen Levine— another refugee from Russia's antiJewish pogroms — became tired of forever passing ineffective resolutions and instead began to press for revolutionary action. In this they found the support of Tovia Axelrod, a Russian citizen and participant in the Russian Revolution sent by Lenin to Germany to organise agitation in the Press. Eisner had actually kept him in hiding outside Munich but after his death Axelrod claimed diplomatic status from the Hoffmann government. The revolutionaries had no difficulty in persuading the soldiers' councils not to protect the Bavarian Diet, and delegates from councils 'representative of all councils of Bavaria' demanded from Hoffmann the unlimited dictatorship of the proletariat, the setting up of a Red Army and an alliance with the Soviet Union and the Hungary of Bela Kun as well as complete separation from the All the
Weimar
Republic. Hoffmann stalled and unsuccessfully tried to play for time in the hope that some miracle would sweep away the entire spook. Finally, on April 7, the third revolution took place in Bavaria by the proclamation of the Soviet Republic of Bavaria, headed by a 'provisional Council of People's Deputies' under the
3165
hairmanship of Toller and Niekisch. Its first action was the in of the Bavarian diet and the creation of a Red Army. The Hoffmann government left Munich hurriedly for the comparative safety of Bamberg. Bavaria was now being flooded by revolutionary leaflets which promised heaven on earth and satisfied the appetite for black print but did nothing to fill the empty stomachs of the urban population who found little material comfort in Muehsam's slogan 'that the world must become a meadow covered with beautiful flowers, in which everyone can pick his own bunch'. Landauer, who was made responsible for education, decreed that every citizen above the age of 18 had the right to attend university. 'Instruction in history as conducted hitherto is hostile to culture and therefore strictly forbidden.' The Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Dr Lipp, formerly a member of the Political Department of the German General Staff, sent a telegram to Lenin: 'Proletariat of Upper Bavaria happily united Bamberg now the seat of the escaped Hoffmann who has re.'To the Commoved from ministry the key to the lavatory. missioner for Transport he-addressed a note: 'I have just declared war on Wurttemberg and Switzerland because those dogs will not loan me 60 locomotives. I am sure we shall be victorious. Besides I shall try to obtain the blessing of the Pope with whom I am well acquainted.' Informed of Lipp's escapades Toller quietly removed him, and finally he had to be taken to a lunatic asylum. For the trio Levine, Levien and Axelrod, the revolution still had not gone far enough. An abortive attempt by the Republican Guard to unseat the Soviets and restore the Hoffmann government played into their hands. Arguing that the cause of revolution required firmer hands the provisional Council was unseated and on April 13, the Second (Communist) Soviet Republic was proclaimed under the 'dictatorship of Eugen Levine and Max Levien. Rudolf Eglhofer was appointed Munich's City Commander and a few days later Commander of the Red Army, into which he recruited released Russian prisoners of war. 'The Russians' as Levien, Levine and Axelrod were generally known moved into the Wittelbach Palace and lived in style. Surrounded by a great number of 'secretaries', they commandeered whatever supplies of wine and champagne they could find and celebrated their orgies while the starving population gathered outside, watching and listening in silence. Idealistic and romantic revolutionaries like Landauer and Toller were pushed into the background. Eglhofer in person blasted the safe of the Reichsbank, securing for himself the major share of the loot and handing out 1,000 Mark bills to 'his personnel'. In fact the ranks of his Red Army rapidly increased to some 20,000 men with a private's pay being 750 Marks a month, and that of NCOs 1,000 Marks. The approximate cost of Eglhofer's Red Army has been calculated at 500,000 Marks spent daily and when the available funds ran out the printing presses were recklessly set into motion. While Munich's population watched the growing chaos in disbelief, resistance raised its head in the surrounding countryside where farmers organised themselves into 'self-defence units' against the marauding 'Reds'. They had suffered enough during the war, and in towns and countryside alike the number of those who wished for a return to the days of the Millibauer (a Bavarian slang expression for dairy farmer, a nickname given to Ludwig III who had run his own dairy farm) grew daily. East of Munich, in the region of Lake Chiemsee, farmers, most of them ex-servicemen just returned from the war, formed the Freikorps Chiemgau which successfully foiled an attempt by the revolutionary government in Munich to send an envoy to Bela Kun. In fact, without realising it, the fate of the Bavarian Soviet Republic was from day to day becoming more hopeless. North of the Danube it failed completely to gain any foothold and even in Southern Bavaria, its centre of power, its effectiveness was restricted to Munich and a few other industrial towns, all of them surrounded by a hostile countryside. Mean whi If the Hoffmann government tried to organise its own forces. The central government in Berlin was ready to provide forces for an intervention, but Hoffmann, bearing in mind the easily-roused partic sentiment in Bavaria, was still reluctant to accepi e preferred cash, arms and ammunition. His new Minis! iry Affairs, Ernst Schneppenhorst, a .
.
.
.
carpenter
\
of about 2,00' Levine had sent to spread discontei and Levien in a bm ich against the attack Toller was put
,,ian Freikorps. It consisted
nd badly .vn
led.
Red Guards irces
Moreover and
to enlist
moved south, Levine [to organise Mun-
nter-revolutionaries'.
f
Freising and Dachau. C sent to Schneppenhoi withdraw to a line north
3166
.
ront'
between
issai ies v of
his "White f at he lift tl
re
ade of Munich which had been in action for several days. What actually happened then is unclear; it cannot be ascertained whether Schneppenhorst, realising the weakness of his own forces, accepted both the conditions or only part of them. In any case as the result of an order, the origin of which has remained obscure, Communist artillery opened fire on Dachau, which Schneppenhorst's forces had reached. Toller and a battalion of selected volunteers took the initiative and by a frontal attack captured Dachau. The majority of Hoffmann's forces changed sides or were taken prisoner. Schneppenhorst himself just managed to escape on a locomotive. The 'Red Victory of Dachau' put an end to any hope of the Hoffmann government mastering the situation by themselves and whether they liked it or not, they had to accept Noske's military assistance. The government in Berlin declared a state of martial law for Bavaria and organised troops in Thuringia consisting finally of the following forces: the Reichscontingent comprising the Freikorps Liitzow and von Gorlitz, the 2nd Naval Brigade under Captain Ehrhardt, two divisions of Prussian guards and a cavalry rifle brigade, a Wurttemberg detachment, the Bavarian Rifle Corps under the Bavarian General voh Epp, Hoffmann's own formations and the Freikorps Swabia. In charge of the forces was Lieutenant-General von Oven, who later, in deference to Bavarian wishes, handed over the command to General von Moehl. They were supported by a Staffel (nine aircraft) of fighters and two armoured trains. All generals were subject to the orders of Noske's Reichswehr Ministry. The Bavarian government was completely isolated, and all orders were directly issued from Berlin, so that Bavaria finally lost the 'reserved rights' it had enjoyed since 1871. In Munich the victory of Maundy Thursday at Dachau was duly celebrated by the revolutionaries and although a general strike had been proclaimed ever since April 13, on Good Friday it was relaxed for the barbers so that the Red Army could get its hair cut for Easter. Arrests of hostages were now daily occurrences, and a detachment armed with grenades and machine guns forced its way into the residence of the Archbishop of Munich. Fortunately for him he was out. Equally recurring were clashes between gangs of the Red Army who accused one another of being 'Republicans'. In Munich's main railway station, the Hauptbahnhof, differences were settled with the aid of machine guns. On April 18 alone, incidents of this kind cost 14 lives in Munich. From day to day conditions grew steadily more chaotic in the city, where so-called 'law and order' was protected by the new Chief of Police Johann Dosch, a man with numerous convictions ranging from procuring, to black marketeering and bicycle theft; his deputy, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Workers' Council, had 21 previous convictions for criminal offences. Consequently the situation was hardly improved by demoting Dosch to deputy and promoting Koeberl, the deputy, to Chief of Police. But to keep the public amused throughout Easter Saturday massed bands played stirring German marches in most of Munich's public places. Amusement was necessary — the public was no longer able to obtain the food stuffs allocated on the ration cards. On that day also the first aircraft of the German government forces, which had entered Bavaria from Gotha, Erfurt and Saalfeld, appeared over Munich, dropping leaflets promising help to Munich's population — an appearance repeated on Easter Sunday. Eugen Levine interpreted the situation correctly. Together with his adjutant he boarded an aeroplane, with the aim of reaching Budapest in order 'to obtain financial support from Bela Kun'. The pilot, however, pretended engine failure, and landed the aircraft some 30 miles east of Munich. Easter Monday was a day of free beer in Munich's beer halls followed on the next day by a grand parade of the Red Army in Munich's Ludwigstrasse. Arrests of hostages continued. An army corporal by the name of Adolf Hitler, on the black list as a right-wing propagandist, met his would-be captors with a levelled rifle and they withdrew. By April 27 the government troops had reached the River Lech, 25 miles north-west of Munich, and they now began systematically to encircle the city. The number of their ranks were swelled by volunteers from the countryside and hastily organised Freikorps, like the Freikorps Oberland and Werdenfels. Inside Munich the existing fissures among the leadership widened with Levien, Levine and Axelrod on the one side, and Toller and his supporters on the other. Toller condemned outright the criminal actions of 'the Russians' and declared them 'disastrous for Munich's working population'. The news that 50 passports had been requisitioned, apparently for the use of 'the Russians' and their friends, further frayed tempers and Toller resigned his military command. On
Right: Anti-Communist election poster, 1919, for the People's Party
X
^ZkHk*
•0.
„
DffiWAHlSTlJBM FECT DIMHS IAND!
BAYRISCH WEIS5BIAU GEGEN DUSSISCH ROT!
BMBISCHEVOIKSPABIB 3167
April 28 Eglhofer proposed that all members of Munich's bourrounded up on the Theresienwiese and executed. The proposal was defeated by one vote. At the same time a telegram arrived from Lenin saluting the Bavarian Soviet Republic. By Wednesday, April 30 Noske's troops had reached Munich's outskirts. Axelrod and Levien attempted to escape to Austria, although not before Levien had ordered Eglhofer to begin the execution of the hostages. A unit of the First Infantry Regiment of the Red Army, which within its ranks contained former Russian POWs, proceeded to execute the hostages held in the LuitpoldGymnasium in Munich's Muellerstrasse, close to the municipal administrative centre. That those ten people executed were all members of an extreme right-wing society is a claim that cannot be substantiated. Actually only four belonged to the anti-communist and anti-semitic Thule society. In pairs the hostages were driven into the schoolyard and not merely shot but massacred and mutilated. Toller, who had received news of the execution order, rushed as fast as he could to the Luitpold-Gymnasium, and arrived there too late tot .save the first ten victims, but early enough to save the lives of the rest held in that and other cellars in Munich. The commander of the executioners, Fritz Seidel, although often described as a former officer, had in fact never worn uniform before. He had a previous conviction for embezzlement and had entered politics as a Spartacist agitator: he left it after the execution, taking with him 20,000 Marks, the entire payroll for his men. News of the murders produced two results. Inside Munich groups of former officers, soldiers and students abruptly formed their own commando units and quickly occupied many of the major key points of the city. The second result was that the Freikorps outside Munich, having heard the news — news which by then had become grossly exaggerated — disrupted the carefully prepared plan and broke formation, entering Munich on the evening of May 1. Retribution meted out to 'the Reds' was ruthless and vicious. Those, who like Eglhofer, were captured during the first few days were granted no mercy and generally shot out of hand. Others were condemned by drumhead court martials. Tempers were edgy, snipers active and when on the evening of Tuesday, May 6 an informer approached a Republican patrol, telling its leader of a nearby secret Spartacist meeting, the patrol immediately arrested the men, took them to their headquarters at the Pnnz-Georg-Palais and butchered 21 of them. Their protestations that they were members of the Roman Catholic St Joseph Journeymen's Association and not Spartacists were not believed. They happened to be true. Five months later a sergeant, Konstantin Makowski, said to have been responsible for the action, was sentenced to 14 years hard labour. But in Munich incidents of this kind were frequent during the first two weeks of May. Workers, Russian prisoners-of-war and many other individuals geoisie be
were executed on mere suspicion. From the end of May 1919 when, on the surface at least, peace settled over Munich and Bavaria, terrorism decreased and the judiciary reasserted itself. If they did not get a fair trial most of the prominent revolutionaries caught during the later part of May at least escaped with their lives. Levine and Landauer, caught like Eglhofer during the first few days, were executed! Levien escaped to Austria and disappeared without trace. Axelrod, sentenced to 15 years' hard labour, was exchanged with the Soviet Union where he became a victim of Stalin's purges. Niekisch sentenced to two years' detention in a fortress, but still managed to play a prominent part in the Weimar Republic as a 'National mI
Ernst Toller received five years; Erich Muehsam, who was finally murdered by the Nazis. Much speculation has surrounded the total number of victims, which is as frequently minimised as it is exaggerated. The most recent gation by the Municipal Archive of the City of Mumch, carried out in 1968, arrives at a figure of 719 dead, all klll ,fl h 7, 1919 and June 14, 1919, the day on which tin last death m connection with the Bavarian Revolution was can he figure is made up of 117 nonP ar,l "' " "'"lie journeymen, 12 Socialist '
.'
'
j:
,i
'
121
members of of-war who
I
government
troops,
380
58 Russian prisoners-
i
ha
fed Army. Thus ended
Eisner's visio
•
with Bavaria as th< Germany. Bj Bavaria remained hi nucleus of all those radic; Weimar Republic '
i
ion of
U
Iconic
for
Germany the rest of ,| that ag the Top: A Munich revolutionary captured by Noske's republican torces after occupation of the city in May 1919. Retribution was ruthless and often indiscriminate, based on suspicion rather than on proof. Above: The bodies of Munich Reds' after a scuffle with Republican soldiers
their
[For H. W. Koch
3168
s
hio/'!
'
SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei The Deutschlands, the German Social Democratic Party) was, at the beginning of the 20th Century, excluded from any part in government by the unparliamentary character of the Imperial Constitution, but was no longer revolutionary. Since the abortive Russian Revolution of 1905, a small group of dissidents
Socialists had no influence on policy. Imperial Germany would never feel secure
unless she could expand, and such security be illusory; only international socialist action could end the war and the only worthwhile security was in the international brotherhood of workers; this could only be gained through class war. The emphasis on revolution as the only end to the war was what distinguished the Spar(Unabhangige tacists from the USPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, the German Independent Social Democratic Party) whose members led by Hugo Haase pressed for an early conclusion of peace from 1915 on, and who formally left the SPD and formed the USPD in 1917.
would
around Rosa Luxemburg had
without success, to push the Socialists into a more active policy of opposition. The First World War caused a series of splits in the party over the attitude it should adopt to the war and over the party's ultimate aims. The Spartacists tried,
(called after Spartacus, the leader of the last and most serious slave revolt against the Romans) were the most extreme of the opposition groups. On July 25, 1914, after the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, Hugo Haase, the SPD co-chairman, in accordance with the policy of his party and of the Second International issued a manifesto which stated: 'The ruling classes who in peace-time oppress you, despise you, exploit you, want to see you as cannon-fodder. Everywhere the cry must ring in the despots' ears: "We don't
want war! Down with war! Long
live inter-
national brotherhood!" On July 30, after reports of the Russian mobilisation, the SPD executive issued a statement which indicated that war was inevitable and that the party would not initiate action against it. They were overcome by the speed of events, they shared the general upsurge of patriotic feeling and were afraid of losing their followers if they stood out against it and they thought of Russia as the aggressor and the principal enemy. The immediate problem was the vote for war credits by the Reichstag, in
which the Socialists were the largest party. As a matter of principle, and to show its attitude to the Wilhelmine state, the SPD had always abstained from voting on the budget. Meetings of the party executive and of the members in the Reichstag voted two to one to support the credits; among the opponents were Haase and Liebknecht. On August 4, in the interest of party solidarity, all the Socialists voted for the credits with the demand that the war be
ended: 'as soon as the goal of security is reached and our opponents are inclined
the
same day Rosa Luxemburg
called to discuss
meeting of her associates of opposition but failed to gain any support from local party officials. The first open sign of opposition within the party was a letter wbich appeared in two Swiss papers, to assure foreign comrades that we, a
means
and
The victory of Spartacus is
Socialist proletariat.' But it was not the same thing, and there was no victory.
character,
Democracy an entirely
certainly
many
other
German
Social
its
origins,
its
as well as the role of Social in the present situation, from different standpoint
which does not correspond
to that
and one of Com-
rades Sudekum and Fischer [the SPD spokesmen]. Martial law presently makes it impossible for us to enlarge upon our point of view publicly. Signed— Karl Liebknecht,
Dr Franz Mehring, Dr Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin. Karl Liebknecht was a member of the Reichstag. He had voted for war credits on August 4 with misgiving, and, after a visit to the Western Front in the autumn, he urged the SPD executive to adopt a critical
attitude
and
to
during the war was probably never more than a thousand. Most of them were in-
and members of the Socialist movement. The group had little contact with industrial workers and few members who were affiliated to any organised labour movement. The local groups were started by members of the inner circle in their home cities and were thus very unevenly distributed, there were stable groups in Stuttgart, Brunswick and Dusseldorf but none in Breslau, Cologne or Hamburg. The Spartacists were very loosely organised. There was no central machinery for deciding policy although on basic ideology they were consistent and the local groups were allowed complete youth
soldiers in Berlin
Democrats, regard the war,
mem