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THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

WORLD WAR II Volume 10 1945-1946

Archbishop Mitty Hi^h School Media Center

5000

Mitty

Way

San Jose, CA 95129

THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

WORLD WAR II An objective,

chronological and comprehensive history of the Second

World War.

Authoritative text by Eddy Bauer.

Lt. Colonel

Consultant Editor Brigadier General James L. Collins, Jr., U.S.A., Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Editor-in-Chief

M.C., M.A., F.S.A. Formerly head of Military History Department at the Royal Military Academy,

Brigadier Peter Young, D.S.O.,

Sandhurst.

Revision Editor Ashley Brown

New

Reference Editor

Mark

Dartford

Marshall Cavendish York London Toronto

Editorial Staff Brigadier Peter Young Editor-in-Chief Brigadier-General James L. Collins, J Consultant Editor Editorial Consultant Corelli Barnet

Drjohn Roberts

Editorial Consultant

Christopher Chant William Fowler

Assistant Editor

\'anessa Rigby

Assistant Editor

Jennv ShawMalcolm MacGregor Pierre Turner

Assistant Editor

Editor

Art Illustrator

Art Illustrator

Revision Staff Ashley Brown

Revision Editor Reference Editor Art Editor Editorial Consultant

Mark Dartford Graham Beehag Randal Gray Julia

Wood

Editorial Assistant

Robert Paulley Creation

Production Consultant

DPM Services

Reference Edition Published 1985 Published by Marshall Cavendish Corporation 147 West Merrick Road, Freeport,

NY.

©Orbis Publishing Ltd. 1984, 1980, ©1966Jaspard Polus, Monaco

11520

1979, 1978, 1972

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any lorm or by any means electronic or mechanical, includmg photocopying, recording, or by an information storage and retrieval systein. without All rights reserved

permission from the copyright holders.

Printed in Great Britain by Artisan Press

Bound

in Italy

bv L E.G O.

Spa.

Vicenza

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main

entry under

title:

The Marshall Cavendish World War II. Bibliography:

illustrated

encyclopedia of

v.

Includes index.

World War, 1939-1945 - Chronology, I. Bauer, Eddy. III. Young Peter James Lawton, 1917IV. Marshall Cavendish Corporation. V. Title: World War VI. Title: World War Two. D743.M37 1985 1.

II.

Collins,

940.53'02'02

.

85-151

ISBN 0-85685-948-6

2.

(set)

ISBN 0-85685-958-J (volume British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Marshall Cavendish Encyclopedia of World

World War, 1939-1945— Dictionaries I. Young, Peter, 1915940.53'03'21 D740 1.

War

II.

10)

12871

Foreword

Forty years ago the greatest seen

was

reached

at its height. It

was

war which a

the

war whose

world has yet ramifications

ends of the earth and affected in some

to the

-

way

or

contribution

to

Now

final victory.

War from

masterly account of the whole

The

neutral: a Swiss.

at last

we have

the

a

pen of a

author, a professional soldier, has

of the Second World

War

produced

the first general history

slaughtering about thirty million of them. Thousands of

which

completely uninfluenced by the mythology of any

authors have given us their views on the events of the years

of the combatant nations. After thirty-five years, the story

1939 - 1945,

of the

another practically all

in

its

inhabitants

books ranging from the official histories

through the memoirs oj generals,

and

vanquished,

quite apart from

the adventure stories

in

and

both victorious

of various

warriors of lowlier rank.

is

War had become shrouded

nations

and individuals have

nearly all were written by people who, though they

may

have been trained historians, had themselves been through

striven to

in the

most favourable possible

Bauer

cuts through the

light.

of legends, and

show

Lieutenant-Colonel

web with a sharp sword. Here

professional soldier with an acute, analytical broad,

by both

their actions

is

based on deep study, and told by a

first class narrative,

All these works bear the signs of bias and prejudice, for

in a mist

human sympathy

to

comprehend

the

mind but

the

problems faced

side';

the events described, or at least belonged to one or other of the belligerent nations. it

IS

However fairminded one may

practically impossible for such an author to be

absolutely impartial. the B. E. F. at

landings,

as

He may find that having been

Dunkirk, well

as

Normandy and Burma,

in several raids

campaigns helped very

atmosphere of the war days. conceivably

lead

him

to

On

in

much

with

and a number of Sicily, to

the other

over-emphasise

Italy,

conjure up the

hand the

it

The Second World War

be,

may

British

even those is in

Here

who were

a sense

to

still affects

not born in 1 945.

run the risk that

at last is the

chance

to

were the

to

and

is free

from

may

To

ignore

all

happen again.

its

story

read the unvarnished truth

written with the authority of one in his study,

it

every one of us,

who was

deeply interested

the least taint of bias. Ifyou

be allowed to read only one account of the history of

Second World War, then

it

Brigadier Peter D.S.O.,M.C.,M.A. Editor-in-Chief

should be Colonel Bauer 's.

Young

Editorial Brigadier Peter

Young

Board Monniouih School

studied at

and Trinity College, Oxford before becoming 2nd Lieut in ihc Hodfortishire and Hertfordshire Regt, British Army in 1939. During World War II he served throughout the Dunkirk campaign and although wounded in 1940 BEF Dunkirk went on with Commando raids on Guernsey, the Lofoten Islands, V'aagso and Dieppe, the landings in Sicily and Italy, 1943, the battle of Termoli, Normandy, the last Arakan campaign, commanding no. 3 Commando and the

Commando

Brigade. After the war he commanded the Arab Legion before becoming Head of the Military History Department at the RMA Sandhurst. He 1st

9th Regt

has written over thirty books on military subjects.

He was

Spectator and given talks on the BBC. He is a member of the UK/US Education committee and the Royal Historical Society.

Chris Chant was born in Macclesfield, England and educated at The Kings School, Canterbury and Oriel College, Oxford where he obtained an M.A. in Literae humaniores. In his early career he worked as assistant editor on Purnell's History of the First World War and the History of the Second World War. He was also an editor on the Encyclopedia of World War One. Since then he has dedicated most of his time to full-time writing, specializing in the history of military aviation. Included amongst the many

War Army Historical Research Chamber's Encyclopedia and other academic Journal, publications. He is also a founder member and Capitaine Generall of the Sealed Knot Society of Cavaliers and Roundheads, a British Civil War re-enactment group.

he has written are Ground Attack, Great Battles of Airborne World War Aircraft, How Weapons Work and recently Air Forces of the World, Naval Forces of the World. He is at

Corelli Barnet was educated at Exeter College, Oxford. Between 1945 and 1948 he served in the British Army

Lieutenant-Colonel Eddy Bauer was born and spent most of his life in Switzerland, where he excelled both in an academic career - as Professor of History and then Rector of Neuchatel University - and as an officer in the Swiss Army. A major interest in modern warfare began from his first hand experience as a news correspondent in the Spanish Civil War. W'ith this practical and academic training he was well qualified for his appointment as head of the Swiss Second Division's Intelligence Service at the outbreak of World War Two, and it was from this neutral and privileged vantage point that he was able to write a detailed impartial account of the war, week by week, for a military diary of a Swiss newspaper. After the war he continued to use his great wealth of experience on the

also Editor in Ch'iei of Purnell 's History of the First World

and contributes regularly

to the

Intelligence Corps, then took a Masters degree, 1954. After

many

years as a very successful general and military

and author Barnet was awarded the Leverhulme Research Fellowship in 1976. In 1977 he was made Keeper of the Archives and a Fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge where since 1980 he has been a teaching Fellow in Defense Studies. In 1982 he gave the Winston Churchill historian

Memorial Lecture, Switzerland.

Among

his

many books

Barnet has written:

receiving high acclaim, Corelli

The Battle oj Alamein, and Britain and Her Army for which he won the Royal 77?^ Desert Generals,

Society of Literature as

author

an

and

Award

in 1971. Corelli

historical

consultant

Barnet worked

on

an

epic

documentary series for BBC television entitled 77!^ Great War and two other notable series, The Lost Peace 1918 - 33 and The Commandos. He won the 1964 Screen Writers' Guild Award for the best British television documentary

titles

U

Forces,

present working on the third book of the trilogy published by Collins, England - Land Forces of the World, plus a

Dictionary of World Aircraft.

military,

political

and media aspects of war, regularly

contributing to a variety of journals and writing numerous books, including a study of armoured warfare and a history of Secret Services, which was his final and uncompleted

work.

He

died in 1972.

script.

He

is

Elected

a

member of the Royal

Member of the

Society of Literature and an

Royal United Services

Institute.

Dr. John Roberts is a well-known historian educated at Taunton and Keble College, Oxford, where in 1948 he received an M.A. In 1953 he got his D.Phil, and became a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. In the same year he went to the United States as a Commonwealth Fund Fellow at Princeton and Yale. He later became a Member of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton (1960 - 61) and visiting professor at the University of South Carolina and Columbia. Merton College, Oxford, appointed him Fellow and tutor in Modern History, then Honorary Fellow in 1980. John Roberts has written and published several major historical works, including Europe 1880 - 1945 and Hutchinson's History oJ the World.

He

also edited PurnelTs

and the Larousse Encyclopedia Since 1967 he has been joint-editor of the

History of the Twentieth Century

of Modern History.

English Historical Review, contributed to journals such as the

Times Literary Supplement,

the

New

Statesman and the

Brigadier-General James L. Collins Jnr., was commissioned into the United States Army as 2nd Lt. in 1939 after obtaining a B.Sc at the U.S. Military Academy, Vancouver where he received his M.A. before doing postgraduate studies at the Naval War College, the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army War College. Brig. Gen. Collins is a former Chief of Military History, US Dept. of the Army and Commander of the Center for Military History, Washington. He has held a variety of other distinguished posts including Director of the Defense

and Director of the US Commission for and editor on military subjects whose major published works include The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese 1950 - 72 and Allied Participation in Vietnam. He was Chief Editorial Adviser, War in Peace, 1984 a major partwork magazine in England, the Editor of Mernoires of my service in the World War George Marshall and contributes regularly to

Language Military.

Institute

He

is

a professional author

professional journals.

Notable Contributors Martin Blumcnson was educated at Bucknell Harvard Universities. He served with the US Army in and Hurope during World War II, and later in Korea and Lt. Col.

subsequently Joined the Historian,

the

at

Army

Reserve. Former Senior the Chief of Military

Army's Office of

History and visiting Professor of Military and Strategic at Arcadia University, he has also held important

Studies

posts at the Naval W^ar College,

The

Citadel and the

Army

War

College. Blumenson has been a prolific writer and is acknowledged as one of the world's authorities on the Italian campaign. His books include: The US Army in World War II: break out and pursuit, Rommel's last victory, Sicily: whose victory? and Eisenhower.

Andrew Mollo military uniforms.

end ol World War II. He later raised and commanded the 22nd Air Service Regiment in Malaya. Qualified as a military historian and renowned as an authority on jungle warfare he went on to write such books as Fighting Mad, Prisoners of Hope, Chindits - a long penetration. Slim and in

has also assembled one of the largest

and photographs. He is the author of over a dozen books, among them Army Uniforms of the SS, Army Uniforms of World War II and Army Uniforms of World War I. Apart from writing Andrew Mollo has worked in film and television, as technical adviser on productions such as Night of the Generals and The Spy who came in from the

Cold,

Here

and co-directing the -

the

latter

Jacques Nobecourt

Caen

He

films Winstanley

and

//

happened

being an imaginary occupation of

England by the Germans is

in

World War

II.

a well-known French military

studied at the Lycee Saint Louis, Paris and

University, France. After serving in the 2nd

World

War

he worked as editor of foreign affairs for the journal Combat following which he worked on various other newspapers eventually joining Mo«<5?^ as Rome correspondent before becoming. its deputy chief. He is also a regular contributor to journals such as La Stampa and Corriere della .S^rra. Jacques Nobecourt's published titles include Hitler's Last Gamble: the Battle of the Ardennes.

He

Historia in 1963 and the Prix Citta di

received the Prix

Roma

in 1974.

Remy

O.B.E., alias Renault, one of the world's on the French Resistance joined the Free French Forces in London in 1940 under General de Gaulle, and in the same year founded the Notre Dame Brotherhood. Col Remy has written many books specialising on the Resistance and secret service, including Col.

1979 co-edited Dictionary of Battles, 1715-1815.

a military historian specialising in

(ollections of insignia, militaria

historian.

Brigadier Michael Calvert D.S.O. Nicknamed Mad Mike, he has had a distinguished career as a fighting soldier, attaining the rank of Brigadier at the early age of 31 and, after serving with Wingate in Burma, returned to command the Special Air Service Brigade in Europe at the

is

He

best authorities

Will Fowler

on a wide range of

a notable writer

is

Army Editor for College and Trinity College, Cambridge he received an M.A. in 1970 before taking a Diploma in Journalism Studies. During his career he has and

military subjects

Defence.

Educated

at

present

is

the

at Clifton

worked for a number of specialist military publishers and the Royal United Services Institute. As an author his most recent books Rve Battle for the Falklands - Land Forces (1982) and Royal Marines since i 556 (1984).

Memoires of a

secret agent

Portrait of a spy

of Free France,

and Ten

steps

to

published works include Thirty years

The Silent Company, His most recent

hope.

after:

1974 and Sedan, which was published

6 June

1 944/6 June

in 1980.

Richard Humble studied at Oriel College Oxford, specialising in Military and Naval History following which he worked for about eight years in illustrated publishing both as editor and contributor on works including

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, retired from US Marine Corps. Born 1921, New Jersey he graduated in 1942 from Lehigh University, going on to attend the Amphibious Warfare School, the National War College and Ohio State University for postgraduate studies.

Churchill's History of English-Speaking People, The Explorers in the Time-Life series 'The Sea Farers', Purnell's History of

USMC.

Richard Humble is author of at least twenty books. Hitler's High Seas Fleet. Hitler 's Generals, fapanese High Seas Fleet, Naval Warfare, Battleships and battlecruisers and United States Navy Fleet Carriers of World War II. Eraser of North Cape published in 1983 is a highly acclaimed biography of Lord Fraser. the

Second World War,

and

History of the 20th Century.

Captain Donald Maclntyre served in the Fleet Air Arm and during World War II in the Royal Navy as a Commander of destroyers and convoy escort groups in the North Atlantic. Since his retirement in 1954 he has written numerous books on Naval history including Narvik, Battle as a pilot

for the Pacific Aircraft Carriers, Leyte Gulf, Battle of the Atlantic ,

1939-45

and

contributed

77?^

to

Twentieth Century

1977.

the

Naval

war

against

publications

and Time

Hitler.

Purnells

Life Books'

He

History

World War

also of the

series in

the

In the

meantime Simmons commanded

the

2nd Battalion

At the time of Inchon operation and Chosin Reservoir campaign, he, as major commanded weapons company 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. Amongst his many decorations are the D.S.M., Silver Star, and Legion of Merit with two gold stars. Brigadier General Edwin Simmons USMC (retired), is now director of History and Museums at the US Marine Corps Headquarters and holds a similar position for other military foundations. Widely published, he has contributed to numerous books, encyclopedias, magazines and annuals. He was the Managing Editor for The Marine Corps Gazette, and senior editor for the Publishing Group, Marine Corps Schools and in 1974 published The United States Marines. He served with distinction in Korea.

Contents of Volume Ten

Arakan campaigns Wingate's Dream: the 1st Chindit operation Burma:

the

The Allies in Burma The 2nd Chindit Operation Logistics: supplying the British Fighting

Man

Imphal and Kohima Victory in

Burma

The Japanese fighting man The last invasion? Russia's war against Japan

Hiroshima Japan surrenders Japan in defeat Britain and America

in victory

The War Trials The SS Generals The SS at war Volunteers from France

.

.

.

and from Denmark

Norway's contribution The Dutch SS

From

the Steppes of Russia

Herrenvolk

.

.

.

and

their victims

2593 2612 2621 2625 2653 2665 2689 2717 2723 2733 2748 2756 2759 2770 2785 2805 2808 2814 2821 2822 2824 2832

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By May the

The following chapters on the war in Burma have been written by Brigadier Michael Calvert who com-

manded Chindit forces during the campaigns there. His narrative is, therefore, written from an intimate knowledge of the theatre, and from experience of the

fighting

itself.

Other

authors-Ronald Lewin, for example, in Slim: The Standardbcarer

(Leo

Cooper,

1976) -have

offered alternative interpretations of these campaigns, particularly concerning the role of

Field-Marshal Slim and the of importance relative Chindit operations.

1942, the Japanese had reached limits they had set themselves in

South-East Asia. They had driven the British from Burma and now prepared to go over to the defensive. The British forces under General Wavell, the Commander-in-Chief in India, took this opportunity to attack, and a series of

campaigns began brought about the

which eventually final Japanese sur-

fighting in Burma often seemed isolated from the rest of the war, for it had its own momentum, set by the monsoon rains and enormous supply problems. It was on September 17, 1942, that Wavell despatched from India an operation instruction to the G.O.C.-in-C. Eastern

render.

The

Army, Lieutenant-General N. M. S. Irwin, which gave the objects for the army in the 1942-1943 dry season (October-May): first to develop communications for the purpose of reconquering Burma and opening

Roa(i' and second to bring the Japanese to battle in order to use up their strength, especially in the air. Wavell gave ^^^^ objectives as his immediate intentipn in order to attain these

the

Burma

ends: 1.

to capture

Akyab and reoccupy

the

upper ArakaP' 2.

to strengthei"^ British positions in the

3.

to

Chin hills; occupy Kalewa and Sittaung on the Chindwin ar^^ thence to raid Japanese lines of com^^^nication (Wavell had already givei"^ Brigadier Orde Wingate orders to rai?® and train a Long Range •

Penetration Brigade for this purpose);

and 4.

administrative arallow for a rapid advance rangements t^ lower Burma should into upper P^ to

make necessary

opportunity pner. We are here immediately concerned with the first objective, the British attempt to capture Aky^b in the dry season 194243. Throughout ^l^i^ narrative it is important to remember that the Japanese forces in the Abakan were seasoned victorious soldiers, whereas their British and Indian opponent^ were raw, inexperienced troops, often ne*^ recruits.

The Japanese 213th Regiment in the Arakan under ^^^ command of Colonel K. Miyawaki aP^ consisting of two battalions (II/213th and III/213th), had moved into Akyab du/ing the summer of 1942 after chasing t^^ British/Indian forces

from Yenangya^i^g' Myingan, Monywa, Shwegyin, and finally Kalewa, which it had captured on May 11. The 33rd Division, of which it formed a part, had

advanced from Siam

for the initial in-

vasion of Burmji' ^^^ the 213th Regiment had been left i^ Siam and had not redivision until after the fall of Rangoon. It wa^' therefore, the freshest regiment and h.ad had the fewest casualties in the conquest of Burma and was

joined

its

full of fight.

As the British/Indian 14th Division southward advance from Chittagong to Cox's Bazar and beyond, Miyawaki in mid-October sent his II/213th battalion up the Mayu river by launch to occupy the line Buthidaung- "Tunnels" Road-Maungdaw, where first contact was made with the l/15th Punjab battalion on October 23. The "Tunnels" Road was the only all-weather road in the started

its

area in 1942. 21 Lieutenant-General ordered the 14th Indian Divi-

On Septembei Irwin had

Page 2593: Having pushed down the slopes of the Mayu Ridge, south of the Maungdaw-

Buthidaung road on

the

Arakan

men

of a British battalion consolidate their position.

front,

< < Men of the Tripura Rifles cross a stream in the Arakan. This regiment had just completed months of guerrilla warfare in

six

the

<

Kaladan

valley.

This photograph amply

illustrates the difficult terrain

that troops

had

to

cope with

throughout the Burma campaign. A Lieutenant-General Shojiro lida, the Japanese commander in

Burma.

V

Colonel Tni Koba led the Force, part of "Sakurai"

"Koba"

Column.

2595

sion,

commanded by Major-General W.

L.

Lloyd, to move towards Akyab to forestall the Japanese arrival on the Buthidaung-

Maungdaw

line.

Earlierintheyearthe 14th Division had been earmarked for operations in Burma, but the fall of Rangoon had prevented its arrival. After the British defeat in

A Lieutenant-General

Tadashi

Hanava.

V

The disastrous Arakan.

first

campaign

in the

Burma

a special committee had reported that one of the reasons for this defeat was the overmodernisation of Indian divisions. Certain divisions were, therefore, reorganised to become "light divisions" with their transport mainly on a jeep and animal basis. The 14th Division, which had recently been responsible for the defence of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, was not so reorganised. This division consisted of four brigades (47th, 55th, 88th, and 123rd), with two British and ten Indian battalions plus one British field regiment and one Indian mountain regiment of artillery. The Indian battalions came mainly from the dry

\^toChittagor\g 14 Indian Div. begins counter-attack k(Sept. 21,1942>-

> > >z.

•..

Cox's Bazar

X

scratch collection of steamboats, launches, and sampans, to help the units across and down the rivers and to supply them. The Arakan, on Burma's north-west coast, is a country of steep, denselyforested hill ranges up to 2,000 feet high, running parallel from north to south, separated by narrow cultivated valleys filled with rice fields, mangroves, and tidal creeks. The coastal strip from Maungdaw to the tip of the Mayu peninsula, Foul Point, opposite Akyab Island, is 45 miles long and ten miles wide in the north but tapers down to a few hundred yards wide

Foul Point. To the east winds the Mayu river (called the Kalapanzin in its upper reaches), flanked by swamps of elephant grass and bamboo, and divided by knife-edged limeat

stone ridges, 150 feet high. East of the Mayu valley rises the great jumbled mass of the Arakan Tracts, reaching as far as the Kaladan river valley, and 2,500 feet high. Further east again are the Arakan Yomas. In the dry season, fair-weather tracks for wheeled vehicles can be made over the dry paddy fields and along the coastal

BURMA

INDIA

>O -\ en

Tumbru

areas of the Punjab, Baluchistan, and Rajputana and were unused to the hot, steamy, malarial swamps of the Arakan. Later another brigade joined the division. For this role the 14th Division was supported by a special reconnaissance force ("V" Force) hidden, with its wireless sets, in the hills, and No. 2000 Flotilla, a

•

1.

strip at g Bazar

Wabyin

\ I

unne^ Teknaf,

I "Soutcol" (flank guard)

Buthidaung

I

ARAKAN

Maungdaw

delightful.

123 Indian Bde.

Zehkaung

Bay of Bengal

Mi yaw

Htizwe nahashi

Column'

oiunut

Rathedaung

ON DECEMBER 31, 1942 JANUARY 31 -END OF FEBRUARY, 943 MAY 28, 194 3

DonbaikV

1

Foul Point

ATTACKS BY JAPANESE 213REGT.AND55DIV. (MARCH 4-MAY 4, 1943) ;

25 MILES

2596

Akyab

•

Jap. 55 Div. from Prome (end of Feb. 1943)

As it advanced, the 14th Division's line of communication from railhead was by sea from Chittagong to Cox's Bazar, motor transport to Tumbru, sampans on the Naf river to Bawli Bazar, and pack transport onwards. In spite of reinforcements of motor launches, landing craft, and three paddlesteamers given to him, Major-General Lloyd by November 17 could still guarantee the maintenance of only four battalions to attack the Japanese. Being able to apply superior strength was always a problem for the British in the Arakan. The Japanese, although outnumbered,

47 and 55 Indian Bdes. 14 INDIAN DIVISION'S POSITIONS

low tide. From mid-May to October

the annual 200-inch rainfall is almost unceasing, with malaria and other tropical diseases hyperendemic. In the dry season from November to March the weather is

%^

.^

were much better trained in watermanship and were thus able to take full

advantage of

types of river transport, especially as Akyab Island was at the hub of the river system running north. Thus their water communication could easily be switched from one valley to another, whereas the British lines of approach were divided by virtually inaccessible all

ridges.

In December 1942, the Japanese air situation in the south-west Pacific had become so grave that two Japanese air brigades were despatched from Burma, leaving the 5th Air Division with only about 50 fighters and 90 medium bombers available for the whole of the Burma front -to meet a growing Allied air strength. No. 224 Group, R.A.F., consisting of six

Hawker Hurricane squadrons, two

light

bomber squadrons of Bristol Blenheims and Bisleys, and one Beaufighter squadron (totalling about 120 aircraft), was ordered to support the 14th Division's advance. But at that time these squadrons had not been trained in close air support, the Hurricanes were not fitted with bomb racks, and there were no ground controllers with the brigades, so the group's efforts were initially of little value to the infantry (especially in comparison with

later operations).

Thus the group's

air-

were used chiefly for interdiction along the sparse Japanese supply routes, including the sea-lanes to Akyab. In fact, during the first year the R.A.F. had very little effect on the ground campaign apart from moral support by the sound of the engines. Except at high altitude the Hurricane was no match for the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, and the R.A.F. had no craft

A During the tense days of February 1944, when the British front-line divisions were isolated from each other by the Japanese counter-attack: two men of the 1st Punjab Regiment a Sepoy behind the Bren gun and Lance-Naik Ghulam Ali- lie up in a forward position overlooking the 7th Indian Division 's "Admin. Box".

long-range fighters available to sustain an offensive against the Japanese air bases. In spite of this the R.A.F. did slowly begin to win air superiority, which

made

efficient close air support, as well as

vital air supply, possible later.

All these administrative and training shortcomings of the British forces must be remembered, as otherwise it is difficult to understand how Colonel Miyawaki, with a maximum of only two battalions on the mainland, could hold up 12 battalions of infantry supported by six batteries of artillery for a period of 13 weeks from first contact on October 23 to January 22 1943, when the first detachments of the 55th Division started to arrive in the Akyab area. The difficulty Lloyd had was to apply his strength. Irwin's original plan was for a sea-

2597

^^

borne landing on Akyab accompanied by a land advance down the Mayu peninsula to Foul Point. But by the end of October Wavell came to the conclusion that a direct seaborne attack in which transport and warships would be exposed to heavy air attack for a minimum of three days

was no longer

A Major-General

F. W.

Messervy, commander of the 7th Indian Division. V As they pierced the Japanese lines deeper and deeper, sniper patrols were used on all sides to cover the main body of troops.

>>

The road to Buthidaung. By December 1944 British patrols were active south of the road, probing the strength of Japanese forward positions.

practicable.

Irwin therefore decided to use the 6th Infantry Brigade Group from the British 2nd Division to land on Akyab Island with the help of five motor launches, 72 landing craft, and three paddle-steamers which Admiral Sir James Somerville had placed at his disposal, as soon as Lloyd had advanced to Foul Point. The speed of the overland advance was therefore vital. However, Irwin postponed Lloyd's advance to the attack in order to give him time to improve his communications, so that he could bring an extra brigade to bear. This delayed Lloyd by three weeks so that just when he was about to attack,

Miyawaki withdrew his II/213th battalion facing Lloyd to a general line GwedaukKondon, thus drawing Lloyd further away from his base. Lloyd finally made contact again on December 22, when he attacked on either side of the Mayu range and also detached one battalion to the Kaladan river. The Japanese repulsed all attacks but the wide front forced Miyiwaki to commit his only other battalion, the III/213th, on December 29. Further British attacks were repulsed. The confident Japanese, having now got a measure of their enemy, started to harass Lloyd's two forward brigades by small patrol attacks at night and sudden bombardments from mortars, which startled these inexperienced troops and led them to believe that there were many more Japanese opposing them than just two battalions. Miyawaki, however, during this period took the risk of leaving the defence of Akyab Island to his antiaircraft gunners, supported by administrative personnel. During a visit with Wavell to the Donbaik front on December 10, Irwin criticised Lloyd for dispersing his force so widely that he had insufficient strength on the coast. He ordered Lloyd to concen-

and break through at Donbaik. However, two more attacks by the 14th Division on their two objectives, Rathedaung and Donbaik, during the first two weeks in January, again failed. Repeated attacks by fresh troops on January 18 and 19 also failed with comparatively heavy trate

losses.

2598

But

early

in

General Shojiro

January, lida,

Lieutenant-

commanding the

15th Army, realising the importance of, and threat to, Akyab ordered LieutenantGeneral Takishi Koga to move his 55th Division to hold Akyab. The 55th Division was a battle-trained formation which had

fought in China and then advanced from Siam to Burma in 1942. During the previous year, it had fought through from Moulmein in the south via Pegu, Toungoo, and Mandalay to Bhamo and the Chinese frontier.

Koga ordered a rapid overland advance Pakokku to the Kaladan valley on the

via

one hand, whilst at the same time opening up an administrative sea route from Toungup to Akyab. He ordered Miyawaki's 213th Regiment to hold the Rathe-

daung-Laungchaung-Donbaik line at all costs. On January 22 No. 224 Group R.A.F. attacked the Japanese columns on the Pakokku trail. Irwin reinforced Lloyd with two fresh brigades, artillery, and eight Valentine

On February 1, after a heavy but badly co-ordinated R.A.F. bombardment, these fresh troops with the Valentines attacked the Japanese dug-in position at Donbaik, but after repeated assaults and heavy casualties over two days, were thrown back. Two days later similar frontal attacks on Rathedaung also failed. The Japanese had won the race to Akyab, for by the end of February Koga tanks.

had assembled the whole of the 55th Division, less one battalion, in that area. lida expected Koga to consolidate, but the latter saw the six British/Indian brigades under Lloyd split up by rivers and ranges into three quite separate identities, with his own forces holding a central position at the confluence of the Arakan rivers. Koga saw an excellent opportunity to counter-attack these tired brigades and destroy them piecemeal. Koga laid a three-phase plan. First, the enemy forces in the Kaladan valley were to be overwhelmed by the "Miyawaki" Column (one infantry battalion and one mountain artillery battalion). Then the brigade east of the Mayu river was to be encircled by the "Tanahashi" Column (two infantry battalions and one mountain regiment) operating from Rathedaung and supported by a flank advance by Miyawaki from the Kaladan. Finally, the combined forces of this right hook, resupplied by launches moving up the Mayu, would cross the river and the Mayu

range to seize Indin. This would ciit off" the British/Indian brigades threatening the Donbaik-Laungchaung line. Koga left one battalion to hold Akyab and three battalions ("Uno" Column) to hold the Mayu peninsula. Meanwhile, Lloyd was reorganising for another attack on Donbaik, but Irwin, aware of supply difficulties and danger from the east flank, ordered him to withdraw, intending to replace his division with the 26th. However, Wavell, egged on by Churchill, felt that it was essential for the morale of the whole Indian Army to score some sort of victory, rather than ignominiously retreat after suffering, by European standards, quite minor casualties. On February 26 Wavell directed Irwin to order Lloyd to attack Donbaik again with two brigades and to destroy "the numerically insignificant opposition". Irwin delayed the attack but also the withdrawal. At this time Irwin sent

XV

Slim, then commanding Corps in India, to visit the front and report on the situation. He later told Irwin that Lloyd's

command was now far too large for a single divisional headquarters, and that Lloyd's tactics were too obviously frontal (a reflection on Irwin's own instructions). But Irwin did not place Slim in command of operations, nor heed his advice. By February 21 the first phase of Koga's plan started.

By March

"Miyawaki" Column had cleared the Kaladan valley as far as 7 thp

2599

-"v^-^r'^s-i:

^%^

/^i

\/4^'

•^

«2jj*r

r<«*^

.i.Aisii%r:;i

Kyauktaw, and "Tanahashi" Column had captured Rathedaung. The British/Indian 6th Brigade, with six battalions, obeyed Wavell's orders and carried out a deliberate attack on March 18 on the "Uno" Column dug in at Donbaik, but fell back after receiving only 300 casualties out of the 6,000-strong attacking force. With the

"Miyawaki" and "Tanahashi" Columns poised on the east bank of the Mayu river, and the "Uno" Column as the anvil,

now

having withstood the British attack at Donbaik, Koga launched the third phase of his attack, starting on the night March

He

called for and was given all available air support from the 5th Air Division. Tanahashi sent one battalion northwest, which cut the coastal road at Gyindaw, whilst he, with the remaining two battalions of his force, advanced on Indin. In spite of a strenuous counter-attack and exhortations from their commanders, the brigades of the 14th Division on the coastal plain were unable to stop Tanahashi, who occupied Indin on April 6, thus cutting off 11 British/Indian battalions and attached troops south of that point. After an attack by a third brigade 24-25.

from the north had failed to remove this block, the 6th Brigade managed to escape with its transport along the beach at low 2600

but the 47th Brigade had to leave all transport and guns and retreat in small dispersal groups through the jungle. Lieutenant-General Koga had completed his three-phase encirclement of the British/Indian brigades in one calendar month, exactly according to plan, and had inflicted severe casualties on a much larger force. With seven battalions and one pack regiment of artillery he had temporarily destroyed the 47th Brigade and defeated the 4th, 6th, and 71st Brigades with their three regiments of artillery (totalling seven British and ten Indian tide, its

battalions).

With the arrival of his fresh II/214th battalion, which completed the strength of his division, Koga, who saw his enemy reeling, asked lida if he could continue to attack until the monsoon. lida, who trusted Koga, gave him carte blanche. Meanwhile, Lloyd had been replaced by Major-General C. E. N. Lomax and his 26th Division headquarters. LieutenantGeneral Slim, commander of XV Indian Corps, whose duties during the past seven months had been to suppress the vicious insurgency campaign in Bengal led by the Indian Congress Party, which had stated categorically that they would prefer Japanese to British rule, was placed in overall command of the Arakan front on April 5.

Slim had been in active

command

of the British/Indian forces in their 1,000-mile retreat from Burma the previous year and, as was his wont, had learnt much from his victorious, pugnacious enemy, who was trained to expect to fight against all odds. Slim found a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. Most of the units now under command of the 26th Division had had their morale lowered by abortive attacks on Rathedaung and

Donbaik, and then had been eased out of their own defensive positions by the Japanese capacity for manoeuvres, flank attacks, and ability to bring all their

weapons and troops, however

inferior in

numbers, to bear at a decisive point. All units, especially the Indian ones, were frustrated and bewildered and, as the British official history states, "the morale of the troops was generally poor and in some units very low". Slim ordered Lomax to hold the Maung-

daw-"Tunnels"-Buthidaung

line.

He

re-

inforced Lomax's four brigades (4th, 6th, 55th, and 71st) with the 36th Brigade, bringing the force to a total of 19 battalions including seven British, 11 Indian,

and one Gurkha. Meanwhile, General Koga had eight battalions available for attack. He left one battalion to contain the British forces on the coastal strip, and one battalion with a mountain artillery regiment ("Miyawaki" Column) to hold his enemy east of the Mayu river. He divided his remaining six battalions, each supported by pack artillery, into "Uno" and

"Tanahashi" Columns, and gave them the task of seizing Buthidaung and the Tunnels line and then wheeling left to capture Maungdaw. At this juncture the "Miyawaki" Column, east of the Mayu, would advance due north and capture Taung Bazar. The Japanese started their advance on April 23. The "Uno" Column met with stubborn resistance at Kanthe, so the "Tanahashi"

A < The effect of a smoke grenade thrown by Garhwali troops against a Japanese bunker in

Maungdaw.

< < Major-General H. Stockwell,

C.

commander of the 82nd

West African Division, keeps his With an offshore H.Q. on Stella, such trips to and from a waiting dinghy were frequent. A Brigadier Cotterill-Hill, 71st Indian Brigade, wades ashore during the invasion of Ramree

feet dry.

Island.

<

The second Arakan campaign.

2601

with orders to prepare a counter-attack to retake Maungdaw by surprise. British operations in the Arakan ended in May 1943 with their forces back on their start-line and the stubborn and mistaken Irwin, who had wished to sack Slim, being sacked himself. By May 11 General Koga had again won a striking victory over superior

The partial failure of the British demolition plan, and the disappearance in panic of all the civilian labour on which the British/Indian forces relied overmuch, resulted in very large quantities of booty falling into his hands. In view of the depth of the British retreat and the arrival of the monsoon, Koga decided to take up a defensive position on the general line Buthidaung-Maungdaw with five battalions and a regiment of artillery and forces.

withdraw the remainder of his division to Akyab for rest and recuperation. In 16 weeks he had caused his enemy to suffer over 5,000 battle casualties.

The news of the British failure in the Arakan, resulting in the loss of Buthidaung and Maungdaw, reached Washington just

when

the "Trident" Conference, to decide on future

which had been called

A Typical of Arakan country a heavily-wooded steep hill that made

the going really tough for

the troops.

> A Men of the 81st West African Division watch their supplies being dropped. They hold a captured position west of Paletiva in the Kaladan valley, taken as they moved to outflank the Japanese. >>

Wounded.

Column by-passed Kanthe by advancing along the razor beak Mayu range and seized Point 551 overlooking the Tunnels area of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung Road. Lomax cleverly formed an open box to trap the advancing Japanese between his 4th and 6th Brigades to the west, 55th Brigade to the east, and 71st Brigade to the north, forming the lid. The Japanese, however, launched their northward drive in earnest on May 2 and, by May 3, the sides of the box had crumbled and the lid had opened "without adequate reason". The plan was a good one, but the training and morale of the British/Indian troops inevitably led to its failure. As Buthidaung and the Tunnels area fell to the Japanese, Slim, realising how badly his superior forces had once again been defeated in the jungle, wanted to retreat 60 miles back to Cox's Bazar, with the intention of luring the Japanese forces into open country where his troops could oppose them on ground more suitable to their training and armament, and at the same time stretch and expose the enemy's

communications. Irwin, however, opposed this plan and ordered Slim to hold the line Bawli Bazar -Goppe Bazar-Taung Bazar, only 20 miles north of the line Maungdaw-Buthidaung, and gave Lomax a sixth brigade,

2602

Allied policy in South-East Asia, was taking place. General Wavell, the Indian Army commander, and the commanders in the Arakan all came under most severe criticism. Churchill ordered that new

commanders must be found and battalions whose morale had broken should be severely disciplined. If, he said, Indian Army troops were incapable of fighting in the jungle, commando formations should be formed as a prototype and an example

show them how

Answers from India were that the Indian Army had been grossly over-expanded since Pearl Harbor and the best Indian units were in the Middle East, leaving a "second class army" to oppose the Japanese. Jungle to

to fight.

fighting required, above all, good infantry but the infantry had also been milked of its best and most intelligent men to form

technical corps like the expanded Indian artillery, previously manned wholly by the British. Indian troops had had their loyalty undermined by subversion from the newly formed Indian Independence League with its Indian National Army fighting alongside the Japanese. British officers drafted into the Indian Army had not had time to learn the language and get to know their men. Reinforcements to replace battle and malarial casualties had arrived piecemeal and many of them half-

trained.

Some

units had been left in the

line for many months without Congress-sponsored riots in August and September 1942, accompanied by mal-

front

relief.

distribution of food as a result of their depredations and destruction of communications, resulted in widespread fam-

which

jT

had died, and this led to a disaffection amongst reinforcements moving through these areas to the ine in

4 million

battle line, so that they spread subversion amongst the forward troops.

Wavell was only too well aware that the Arakan, following as it did the disastrous campaigns in Malaya and Burma, had dealt the army in India a severe shock. Yet he knew that the Japanese were not "invincible" and had shown grave weaknesses of which advantage could be taken by a better trained army reinforced with self-confidence and self-respect. One undoubted advantage gained by the British was that during the year the R.A.F. had begun to attain air superiority throughout the whole front. failure in the

made into a battleThe success of the first

This in itself could be

winning

factor.

Chindit operation, with

on

its total

reliance

air supply, offset the failures in the

Arakan and pointed the way

to victory in

the future.

Wavell appointed a special committee S to report on the readiness for war of British and Indian infantry battalions in I ^India, and to make recommendations for improvement.

/

A new command

set-up

was created.

Wavell was promoted Viceroy of India to look after the civil side and to see that the population would support its armed forces.

^rfiCc;r.'iUi;a

General Sir Claude Auchinleck was recalled from the Middle East to be C.-in-C. India and to make the Indian sub-continent into an efficient administrative and training base from which the fighting forces could draw their strength. He eventually created a self-confident new model Indian Army which had become one of the best fighting machines in the

world by 1945. Lord Louis Mountbatten, who had previously been head of Combined Operations in Britain, was now appointed Allied Supreme Commander, South-East Asia Command, with his headquarters in Ceylon. Under him was a new 11th Army Group (General Sir George Gififard), and

under Giffard a new 14th Army (Lieutenant-General Slim) responsible for operations in Burma. Additionally XV Corps, under Lieutenant-General A. F. P. Christison, operating in the Arakan, came

V

under Slim's command. Brigades were to be formed of one British, one Indian, and one Gurkha

The third Arakan campaign.

Operation "Talon"

Xy Corps

^

(Chnstison)

^

81

West African oiv.

7-

Seikpyu<

Mauogda'

Donbaik

74 Bd

Jap. 28th (Sakurai)

(25 Indian Div.)

Army

>

>An 71

Ngape

Much more reliance was to be placed on the redoubtable Gurkhas, who had been represented by only one battalion in the Arakan debacle. After the first Chindit operation had proved the reliability of air supply, this form of support would be developed and taught to all units so that they need never retreat or disintegrate if the Japanese got behind them. The R.A.F. was persuaded to co-operate more fully in developing more reliable and accurate close air support for the army involving more intimate mutual signal arrangements and co-operation so that aircraft could take the place of artillery where necessary in the deep jungle. All ranks were given more jungle, river, and night training in order that these seemingly hostile circumstances could be used to the men's positive advantage rather than handicapping them as in the past. Rations and methods of cooking in the forward areas were improved so that detachments could fend for themselves for many weeks, and special rations were issued during training to build up men before operations so that they were capable of enduring long periods of duress. Malaria, which was causing a hundred times more casualties than bullets or shells, was tackled by mepacrine, strict anti-malarial measures, and forward malarial treatment centres so that men needing treatment were not evacuated to base areas but remained in the line as a reserve to protect communications. This reform was one of the most effective means of ensuring that battalions in the line maintained their strength. An illustration of the disproportionate losses from diseases is the British XXXIII Corps' casualty figures for June to Novbattalion.

1944, which were typical formations in this theatre:

ember

Bde

(25 Indian Div.) Jap. 54 Div.

Battle casualties

Sickness

Bay of Bengal

tSane

Kyaukpyu

RAMREE ISLAND

\

tLetpan

Mayin •

Ramree

•Taungup

CHEDUBA ISLAND

of all

3,289 47,098 (including 20,430

malaria cases). These remedial actions have been emphasised because they were to turn the scales in the Arakan in 1944 when the Japanese for a third time launched their short range penetration forces with again, it must be added, numerically very much inferior forces. Also it must be remembered that if the Japanese had had air superiority and as good air support, air supply, and intercommunication as the British were to enjoy, the outcome might

25

2604

50 MILES

have been very

different.

New advance During the summer of 1943, British and Commonwealth forces in the Arakan were huilt up and re-organised. The material superiority of the Allies was reflected in this theatre as in others. XV Corps in November 1943 consisted of the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions with

West African Division (less one brigade) in the Kaladan. No. 224 Group, with headquarters at Chittagong, consisted of 14 fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons made up of Hurricanes, Spitfires, Beaufighters, and Vengeances, totalling 200 aircraft. At call were the U.S.A.A.F.and R. A. F. Strategic Air Force and Brigadier-General W. D. Old's U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F. Troop Carrier Command. During this phase of the 81st

XV

Corps was reinforced by No. 3 Special Service Brigade (two, later four, commandos), 25th and 26th Indian, and British 36th Divisions,

Arakan

fighting,

making

A

a total of 64 divisions. large engineer contingent

was employed in improving communications and

building airfields, whilst flotillas of small V Keeping a look-out on a 40-mm boats from the Royal Navy, the Royal Bofors anti-aircraft gun on a mounting. Engineers, and the Service Corps supple- self-propelled mented the supply lines. Opposing this formidable force was the Japanese 55th Division (Lieutenant-General T. Hanaya) and a depleted 5th Air Division (maximum 80 aircraft) which was responsible for the defence of all Burma. The 54th Division was moving to protect the coast-line south of Akyab but took no part in the Arakan operation. Hanaya's fragile communications were by track across the Arakan Yomas to Pakokku on the Irrawaddy; from Prome to Taungup

and thence by launch to Akyab. During the post-monsoon months of 1943 Christison had advanced his forces methodically down the Mayu peninsula so that by mid-January 1944 he was poised to attack the heavily-fortified Japanese

Maungdaw-Buthidaung line. Meanwhile the Japanese high command, realising from the exploits of the Chindits in the previous year that neither the jungles nor the hills of Burma were impassable to determined troops, and seeing the British forces in Assam hanging down on a 300-mile-long stalk from the

main stem on the Brahmaputra like a bunch of grapes ripe for plucking, had decided that the best means for the defence of Burma was attack. Their main plan for 1944 was to attack west over the Chindwin hills, to cut the lines of communication of IV Corps at Imphal and destroy the Allied forces in that area. As a diversion to draw away as many divisions as possible over the other side of the first use penetration tactics to attack and destroy the

Arakan Yomas they would

Allied forces in the Arakan. This named the ''HA-GO'' offensive and

planned to start on February

was was

3.

By that date the 5th Division, supported by tanks, was attacking the Japanese in the Tunnels area with three brigades up; the 7th Division in the Mayu valley was attacking Buthidaung, and the 81st West African Division was far away on the Kaladan river, where it achieved very little effect on the campaign apart from being a drain on the Allied air supply

resources. Also behind these forward divisions were the 26th and 36th Divisions. Hanaya divided his division into four. Two battalions would hold Akyab. One battalion could guard the coast of the Mayu peninsula. Two battalions ("Doi"

Column) could hold the redoubts between the Mayu river and the sea which was being attacked by the six brigades (with tanks) of the 5th and 7th Divisions. He entrusted his reconnaissance regiment to screen off the West Africans in the Kala-

dan

valley.

This

left

Hanaya

five

bat-

talions and an engineer regiment (about 5,000 strong) for his penetration force

under Major-General T. Sakurai. The role of the "Sakurai" Column was to pass straight through the 7th Indian Division on the night of February 3-4, seize Taung Bazar, turn left, cross the Mayu river, and cut the communications of both the 5th and 7th Divisions. Meanwhile, the "Doi" Column, manning the redoubts, would attack from the south.

i4t^nmSL

Previous page: An R.A.F. forward airstrip, photographed in December 1944. Ground crews service a row of Republic P-47 Thunderbolts while overhead three more of the fighters come in to land.

A Men of the 22nd East African Brigade come ashore at Ruywa, just north of Letpan in central Arakan.

2608

All at first

Column.

went well

Sixteen

for the ''Sakurai"

abreast

they

strode along the flat paddy fields, through the heart of the 7th Division at midnight and occupied Taung Bazar 12 miles away by morning. Within an hour one battalion had crossed the Mayu river in captured boats. By noon on February 5 the whole force was behind the 5th Division and one detachment had seized Briasco Bridge on the coast road whilst the remainder overran the 5th Division's headquarters and started attacking the Administrative Area, at Sinzweya. Here Slim's new training instructions and orders started to take effect. The Administrative Area, the capture of which the Japanese depended on for their supplies, closed up like a box. All brigades stood firm. Air supply was made available to the two forward divisions. They fought on, improvising where necessary. Giffard ordered the 36th Division to move south from Chittagong. Hanaya reinforced "Doi" Column and urged it to attack north all the harder to help Sakurai. The 7th Division cut Sakurai's tenuous lines of communication running through the area. Sakurai's code book with wireless

frequencies was captured and with it his signals communication list of call signs with the result that his powers of command and control of the battles started to fail. The Administrative Box held out, all ranks of whatever arm taking part in its defence. Christison at one point wavered, believing his 7th Division overrun, and ordered the 5th Division to move back across the Mayu range. But the more experienced Slim countermanded this order and exhorted the 26th and 36th Divisions to hasten forward to destroy the Japanese penetration forces. As long as the ''Admin. Box" at Sinzweya held out, the Japanese could get no supplies and their offensive was doomed. It held from February 6 to 24, when the Ngakyedauk Pass was reopened. The Japanese put their whole air strength into the battle and flew 350 bomber sorties. But the R.A.F. counterattacked and, although losing some transport aircraft shot down, Troop Carrier Command succeeded in delivering 2,710 tons of supplies to the Sinzweya box and the two forward divisions. On February 24, with the approval of

The Japanese Nakajima

Ki-43-ll

KAI Hayabusa ("Oscar") fighter

Engine: one Army Type 1 (Nakajima Ha-115) radial, 1 ,1 50-hp at take-off. Armament: two 12.7-mm Type 1 (Ho-103) machine guns and two 66-lb or 551 -lb bombs. Speed 329 mph at 1 3,1 25 feet. Climb: 5 minutes 49 seconds to :

16,405 feet. Ceiling: 36,750 feet. Range: 1,990 miles with drop tanks. Weight empty/loaded: 4,211/6,450 lbs.

Span: 35 feet 6| inches. Length: 29 feet 3^ inches. Height: 10

feet

8| inches.

2609

his

army

head^ferrtefs,

doned the ''HA-G(y'

Hanaya abanwas

offensive. This

thojend. Th5r5ap£inese withdrew uneventCorps had suffered 3,506 casual-

fully.

ties

XV

but had held its ground, thus giving a

tremendous the

army

political,

rv

morale throughout an event of which the psychological, and propaganda fillip

to

in India,

sections made the maximum use. But the Japanese in the Arakan had ^achieved the object given to them. One lese division had thrown two diviinto temporary disarray, and tied total of 65 divisions. The actual rD^' offensive was carried out by fe^jjt battalions totalling not more ^._, _^^pops. Twenty-seven Indian, 18 Brijish,^Wen West African, and five Gurkha batwiBoiis, accompanied by a total of 26 regn^it^ of artillery, were brought against tt^ba. It was no fault of the jJapanese soldiH^that, owing to Allied technical superi^B^j^pany of these battalions and regimenfi^kild be and wer^lpuickly switched by ai^^jhe Imphal

I

to give

an impression of strength during

the next four weeks, so as to hold the British in the area before he withdrew to

•froflt to restore the situation there. -Meanwhile, during the ''HA-GO'' offensive, the Japanese 28th Army had relieved Hanaya of responsibility for the Kaladan front and had on February 18 formed the "Koba" Force, under Colonel T. Koba, which consisted of a regimental headquarters, the 55th Reconnaissance Regiment, plus the equivalent of three infantry battalions, to face Major-General C. G. Woolner's 81st West African Division.

monsoon positions. By using false identity badges and other deception methods, he

made

British Intelligence believe that the 54th Division had moved into the area. Koga, in the Kaladan, followed suit so successfully that the West Africans were thrown right out of the Kaladan valley and ceased to be a threat to the Japanese flank. Christison's forces, however, obtained possession of Maungdaw and the

much fought

Woolner underestimated the Japanese strength. Koba, by manoeuvre, ambush, and outflanking movement, but never by frontal attack, drove the West Africans 40 miles back from Kyauktaw and started to ooze them out of the Kaladan valley. The attack on Imphal had now started, and Giffard wanted to transfer the 5th and 7th Divisions by air to that front as

over Point 551, which he thought would be a good starting line for the post-monsoon offensive. But Giffard realised that the Arakan was a bad area in which to fight the Japanese. Having inflicted over 3,500 casualties on the British in the ''HA-GO'' offensive, the Japanese had caused a further 3,360 casualties in the period before the monsoon, and this excludes

soon as possible. He allowed Christison time for the 7th Division to capture Buthidaung and 5th Division Razabil, before they were relieved by the 26th Indian and British 36th Divisions on March 22. The 25th Indian Division was also moved forward and relieved the 36th Division, which was to come under General Stilwell's command in north Burma to relieve the Chindits. Hanaya ordered all his forward units to attack and harass the British forces from all directions and

casualties from sickness, which were always high. So Giffard, on July 14, 1944, recommended that any idea of an offensive in Arakan in the dry season of 1944-45 should be abandoned. In fact, however, this had been, in its own way, a true British victory-a moral turning point which destroyed the myth of Japanese invincibility and gave the Commonwealth and Indian forces new confidence. The last Arakan campaign will be dealt with in a later chapter.

< In one of a whole series of amphibious operations along the Burma

coast,

codenamed

Operation "Talon", commandos wade ashore onto the Myebon peninsula from Royal Indian Navy landing craft. Inset: Four Japanese, killed by one mortar shell.

Jt

A group of Chindits, sporting the beards they were permitted to

A

grow

Their operations were a source of good

CHAPTEKieS

in the jungle.

propaganda for the British forces and the home front, who had seen the Japanese drive through the British Asian Empire in a series of apparently effortless victories.

A>A

by Brigadier Michael Calvert

radio operator with his

bulky and heavy equipment, which had to be carried on 'mules. The jungle-covered hills, with deep valleys and fierce electric storms, difficult

made signalling a and exhausting job,

to

which was added the problem of encoding messages for security.

> > Armed

with the two

essentials of his trade, a rifle and a spade, a Chindit soldier strides

through the jungle. His battered bush hat betrays the multitude of uses to which it has been put, keeping off sun and rain, and acting as a pillow at night.

2612

Wingate's Dream: the 1st Chindit operation In January 1942, when the Japanese invaded Burma, the British War Office offered General Wavell. Commander-inChief India, the services of LieutenantColonel Orde Wingate, D.S.O. and bar, who had previously carried out guerrilla operations in Palestine and Abyssinia with conspicuous success. WavelL under whom Wingate had served, recognised his excellent if unorthodox qualities, saw a role for him in Burma, and accepted this offer.

On

Wingate's arrival in India after the fall of Rangoon. Wavell sent him to carry out a reconnaissance in north Burma,

which he thought might be suitable Wingate flew in and was conducted around north Burma by the commandant of the Bush Warfare School at Maymyo, Major J. M. Calvert, who was later to join him. Calvert also motored Wingate south some hundreds of miles to Prome to meet Lieutenantterrain for guerrillas.

General Slim, commander of I Burma Corps. This corps had only just been formed, after the fall of Rangoon. After a detailed reconnaissance and after discussing the matter with many people, including Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking, Wingate returned to India.

He

reported to Wavell that at that juncture there were neither time nor troops available to form a pattern of guerrilla warfare in north Burma, but he did recommend forming and training a special force of brigade strength, which could penetrate behind the Japanese forces and destroy their communications and perhaps manoeuvre them out of the area.

The

first

Chindits

This experimental force became the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, made up of the 13th King's (Liverpool) Regiment; 3rd/ 2nd Gurkha Rifles; British 142nd Com-

mando Company;

a

Burma Rifle battalion,

which was detachments amongst each column; as well as skilled signal and R.A.F. sections attached to each column. In addition there was a small tactical Brigade Headquarters which General Wingate took into the field. Behind this, in the rear areas, was a supply organisation which remained at base and which looked after all the administrative and supply arrangements of the columns in split into

the field. This rear headquarters looked large to those who saw it in India. But it must be remembered that all those who would normally be attached to a battalion to look after its administration and would normally accompany it into battle, were extracted from the columns in the field and carried out their supply and administrative duties from a distance through the medium of aircraft and radio.

Rigorous training This force was trained most rigorously by Wingate in the sparse jungles of the Central Provinces. The men forming the force had nothing very special about them. There was a small nucleus of officers and men from the Bush Warfare School in Maymyo, which in itself was a cover name for a special mission to China. But apart from these men and a draft from the Commandos in the Middle East, which helped form No. 142 Commando (which never numbered more than 100 men), the remainder of the infantry forming this brigade came from second or third line troops who had not had much training. The Burma Rifles turned out to be very good in reconnaissance and in their

»

'^ knowledge of the country, which helped the column forward. Their officers, largely ex-forestry officers, were excellent. Most of the officers and other ranks of the battalion were not picked men and it is all to their credit that they did so well. The fact that they were not picked men made all other units in the Burma Army realise after the operation that if these men could do it, they too could do it. Wingate himself trained cadres of officers and N.C.O.s in every little detail of column and bivouac life, including quick reaction to alarm and taking offensive action. He taught men how to cook in the jungle, the use of machine guns, mortars, camouflage, navigation through the jungle, how to look after mules, how to cross rivers, and so on. He himself was tireless in his attention to detail. He then expected his officers to follow his example and teach their men. He stressed that total reliance was to be placed on mulepack transport for all weapons, ammunition, signals, and medical supplies, supplemented by direct air supply to each column in the field at the request of the R.A.F. officers accompanying the column. Mules would feed on

bamboo shoots collected by the mule leaders and augmented by grain, free dropped from the air. Wingate made up a ration of nuts, raisins, biscuits, tea, salt, and sugar, which was to be augmented by the purchase of rice and buffalo meat

whenever

possible.

Calvert's adjutant at the Bush Warfare School, Major Peter Lord, who had once been secretary of the International Club at Tientsin, set up and organised the

2614

.:%

#

whole

air supply system,

assisted

and

advised by Squadron-Leader Longmore

and Squadron-Leader R. Thompson. This force was named the "Chindits". which was an anglicised version of the

name

the mythical griffon, the "Chinthe", the protector of the Burma pagodas. of

Wavell's dilemma, and his final decision

Originally the raid planned for the seven Chindit columns, each of about 400 men and 100 mules with two 3-inch mortars and two medium machine guns, was to be supported by a general offensive by IV Corps from Imphal. But IV Corps' (Scoones) communications were not ready, and so it was reluctant to advance across the Chindwin in any strength. Wavell, however, was determined that this experimental brigade should test out not only the Japanese but these new means of operating in the deep jungle. Wavell came forward to Imphal, inspected the

77th Brigade and, after deep thought, directed it into the attack alone. Wavell had had to consider whether the risk of losing all or part of this brigade on a mission of little strategic value, in order to attempt to burst the bubble of Japanese invincibility, would be balanced by the experience gained and the loss of technical surprise when such tactics had to be used later to support a general offensive. He finally decided that it was worth the risk, because the operation would help raise morale in the army in India, by showing that Allied forces could operate in jungle terrain and need not feel inferior to the Japanese in fighting along unconventional lines.

A
supply drop in progress.

The lessons learned about re-supply from the air were acted upon during the second Chindit expedition in 1944. < < A dispatcher's view of a supply drop. Some unbreakable stores were dropped without parachutes, and while this saved

and parachute cord, it could be dangerous for the collecting party. Some men suffered serious injuries when they were hit by silk

free-falling panniers,

and

in

one

disastrous drop the bottom came out of a bag of 5.000 rupees. A Chindits move off the track for a break during the march. Japanese search parties worked up the waterways when they were looking for Chindit bivouacs, so the latter took care not to camp close to streams.

Gurkhas move into action

On February

and three British and four Gurkha columns 14 the headquarters

of the 77th Brigade successfully crossed the Chindwin and advanced secretly on a broad front through the jungle-covered

2615

A Lance-Corporal James Rogerson, a Gurkha private, and Private Jack Wilson after their tour behind the enemy lines. The men carried a 72-pound pack, which included seven days' and bayonet, a dah or kukri (machete or Gurkha knife), three grenades, groundrations, a rifle

sheet, spare shirt and trousers, four spare pairs of socks, balaclava helmet, jack-knife, rubber shoes, housewife, toggle-rope, canvas life-jacket, mess tin, ration-bags, water bottle, and a chagal (canvas water bottle), besides other items of personal kit. Blankets and Bren guns were carried by mules.

Burma. Their objective was the main north-south Burma railway between Mandalay and Mogaung. The hills into central

distance from their starting point to the railway direct was about 140 miles. Major Dunlop's No. 1 (Gurkha) Column was the first to reach the railway on March 3 when it destroyed railway bridges near Kyaikthin. No. 3 (Gurkha) Column (Calvert) did the same 40 miles north at Nankan on the night March 5-6. No. 5 (King's) Column (Fergusson) on the same night brought down an avalanche of rock onto the railway in the Bongyaung (Bonchaung) Gorge. The forces taking part in this operation totalled about 3,000 men and 800 mules. The Japanese 18th and 33rd divisions of the 15th Army, under LieutenantGeneral lida, were the formations most affected by this raid, and for a while they were bewildered by it. They did not take the situation seriously until Dunlop (Royal Scots) blew the railway on March 3. Then lida ordered three regiments,

each of three battalions, to round up the raiders.

Wingate, however, exalted by this first success, ordered his columns to cross the 1,000-yard wide Irrawaddy. He envisaged

2616

forming a base in the friendly Kachin Hills to the north-east, from where he could operate with his back to the Chinese during the next few months. But he also ordered Calvert and Fergusson to attack the

Burma Road

in the

Maymyo

area, where the Japanese headquarters were situated and therefore where the maximum reaction to the raid would result.

First defeat But one of the Gurkha columns had already met with disaster when approaching the railway, and had been dispersed. The news of this spread to the other Gurkha columns and it became more difficult to keep up their morale. It should be explained that whilst the Gurkhas, when properly trained and with officers who speak their language, are magnificent troops, they naturally cannot so easily change the tactics and methods taught them at their depots at short notice as can, for example, British troops, who understood the language in which the new concepts of such tactics are

The Gurkha battalion given to for this operation was woefully short of experienced officers and men, and only about one officer in each column taught.

Wingate

spoke Gurkhali well. In Calvert's column, for instance, only one British officer with the Gurkha company was over the age of 19. It is all the more remarkable that these young officers led their fine young men, assisted by excellent Gurkhali warrant officers and N.C.O.s, through nearly three months of operations in the jungle without cracking. The crossing of the Irrawaddy was not easy and more than one column was attacked whilst carrying out this difficult manoeuvre. Perhaps the crossing was a mistake. After their initial rapid march and successful demolitions, the Chindits found themselves hemmed in between the Irrawaddy and the Shweli rivers in a dry inhospitable area with no nearby targets to attack and at the extreme range of their wireless sets and air supply communications.

The Japanese used regiments from

three (18th, 33rd, 56th) of their four divisions in Burma at that time to try to surround and destroy the Chindits. Many small actions were fought until the time came when Wingate, after radio

consultation with IV Corps, decided to withdraw his force. He ordered his column commanders to try to bring back their columns complete into India or to take them on to China. He gave them the alternative option of splitting into dispersal groups as taught in training, so that they might infiltrate between the strands of the Japanese net which was

now surrounding them. One

King's col-

umn (Gilkes) chose the longer, more arduous, but safer route to China. Another King's column, under Scott, who had been a Royal Engineer, chose to make an airstrip in an open space in the jungle and be flown out from the other side of the Irrawaddy. The remainder recrossed the Irrawaddy either in dispersal groups or columns and made their way back to the Chindwin. Unfortunately many of them thought they were safe on reaching the Chindwin, but IV Corps had withdrawn from it and the Japanese were now using A Major Bernard Fergusson, it as a stop line to catch the Chindit Black Watch, who led Number 5 columns in that area. The result was that Column. In 1944 Stilwell many prisoners were taken on the Chind- described him in a letter of win itself, when the dispersal group introduction, "Help this man, he looks like a dude, but I think he's thought that it had reached safe harbour a soldier." "On the whole I liked and had relaxed. Of the 3,000 men and 800 mules which

commented Fergusson. The first Chindit expedition.

it,"

V

2617

had crossed the Chindwin, about 2,182 men and two mules returned, having covered between 1,000 and 1,500 miles in enemy-dominated territory. The remainder had been killed, captured, or if mules, eaten. But those who returned, although suffering from malaria, dysentery, jungle sores, and malnutrition, were in high spirits and proud of their achievement. Sent on leave and supported by a welldirected public relations campaign in the press, they had a startling effect on the raising of morale of all ranks throughout India, especially at that time when the defeats in the Arakan had further depressed men's minds. There they were, ordinary second line battalions and any-

<^

thing but picked troops, but they had gone through Burma and "singed Tojo's moustache". So their comrades in units throughout India and Assam said "if that lot can run rings round the Japanese

we can do

better".

Japanese conclusions However, there was another unexpected reaction. General Mutaguchi, a man of strong personality who had been uniformly successful in battle since 1937, and who was the acknowledged "victor of Singapore", was commanding the 18th

-

i

#

_-t Ai

*»'

from the Japanese Army Air Force, V < < A party of Chindits Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo carrying wounded on an extemporised stretcher. agreed with Mutaguchi's plan -with the V < A rigger and radio operator proviso that it should be linked with a greeted by Major Walter P. Scott campaign by the newly formed Indian at an airfield in Burma. National Army to instigate an insurrec- V Rubber assault boats used tion in India, coupled with other sub- during the march into Burma.

Division during the Chindit operation. He had studied Wingate's tactics and use of ground closely and came to admire his

ally

methods. So when he was promoted to command of the 15th Army he wanted to emulate Wingate's methods and to improve on them. Initially he arranged a discussion group on the results of the first Wingate operation. He then ordered a reconnaissance to be made over the Chindwin and proposed a Chindit-type operation for the 1944 season against Imphal and Kohima, but on a much greater scale, with a force totalling three divisions relying mainly on pack transport. War games were held to test out his ideas and, with some misgivings, especi-

The Chindwin, and other rivers which flow from northern Burma

versive activities.

to the

Imphal idea born

mm N^.

'C-^Y

<• 1..*

the country

the small parties of Chindits the columns had broken up.

first

>L

Mi

and divide

also served as a stop line on to which they could drive some of

Chindit operation was the when direct begetter of Mutaguchi's "U-GO" offensive against the 14th Army at Imphal in March 1944. This operation, after

Thus the

sea

in half, were a major natural obstacle. For the Japanese they

effort should be put into offensive operations to achieve this object." In order to achieve this result the British Chiefs-of-Staff decided to form six

Long

Range Penetration Groups (L.R.P.G.), which would conduct operations as outlined by Brigadier Win gate and enable the Allies to seize sufficient of north Burma to open a road to China. These six L.R.P. brigades would each consist of four battalions and attached troops.

The

force,

which was known

variously as the Special Force, the 3rd Indian Infantry Division (as a cover name), or the Chindits, would consist of two Indian infantry brigades (77th and 111th) already in being; three brigades formed from the battle-experienced British 70th Division; and one brigade formed from the 81st West African Division. The three battalions of this African brigade would be available to this force to act as garrisons for the air bases formed in the jungle to support each brigade.

These bases, which Wingate called "strongholds", were what the modern tactician tends to call "pivots of manoeuvre".

To support China At the "Sextant" Conference held in Cairo in November 1943, which Chiang Kai-shek attended, the Combined Chiefsof-Staff ordered "the occupation of

Upper

Burma by

A One of six officers and men of the King's Regiment on the first expedition in 1943

is

decorated by Lord Wavell, Viceroy of India. Fergusson admitted that the Chindits had not achieved a great deal, though they had distracted the Japanese from some operations. However, they had "amassed experience on which a future has already begun to be built". Wingate went home and captured the imagination of

both Churchill

2620

and

Roosevelt.

achieving initial success, failed because Mutaguchi had apparently not understood that the vital necessity for such an operation was dominance of the air, and consequent reliable air supply and close air support in lieu of artillery. Much has been made of the divergencies of opinion amongst the Allies on how they should conduct the war against Japan, but one decision made in 1943 stands out plainly. At the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff "Quadrant" Conference in Quebec in August 1943, which Brigadier Wingate attended at Churchill's request, it was decided "To carry out operations for the capture of upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. Our main

the Allies to start in February 1944 in order to improve (a) the air and (b) the land routes to China. What was attempted elsewhere in Asia would be in support of this main effort." The main reason for the Allies giving this plan of operations top priority was the real fear that, unless the British and

Americans opened up even such tenuous communications to China in the manner projected, China would drop out of the war and thus allow the 26 Japanese divisions operating in China to be used elsewhere against the Allies. It is important that this agreed plan of action by the Allies should be borne in mind throughout all discussions on this campaign, because future operations by either side as the battlefield spread, tended to blur the horizon and deflect certain commanders' minds away from the maintenance of this objective which had been laid down by the inter-Allied high com-

mand.

The Allies in Burma Press publicity both during and since the war has obscured the fact that Britain had several

allies

in

Burma,

from

many

nations. They fought for her both as regular and as irregular forces with considerable success.

Their battlefield was a country scored from north to south by broad rivers and steep mountain

Road and rail links to India were cut or restricted at regular intervals by the monsoon. The monsoon lasts about five months and brings some 200 inches of rain. Vehicles bog down, roads are washed away, and men ridges.

live

in

miasma

a

of dripping

and mud. Malaria dominates the area. Men exhausted by the fighting leaves, leeches,

easy victim to its fevers. Casualties from disease, which included dysentery, swamp fever, and disorders carried by worms, fell

and lice were in an approximate ratio of 14 to one snails, flies,

man killed

in battle. Prophylactic

measures later lowered this ratio somewhat. Coupled with these natural hazards was an enemy who had a reputation of being master of the

jungle,

dedicated

to

con-

quest, and with an attitude to death in battle which was alien to Western troops. Life on earth was a mere staging post to a better world, and death for his Emperor would ensure him a

place in heaven

among

his ances-

tors.

In the

war

in

Burma, Britain's

included the Americans, with their wealth of equipment, expertise, and aircraft, and the Kachin tribesmen in north-east Burma, armed with 18th Century allies

flintlocks.

Kachins had remained loyal even in the grim days of the

The

General "Vinegar Joe" Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia. 1.

Stilwell with

Stilwell was a difficult subordinate, and at times could be very outspoken.

2621

Burma Rifles, they protected an emergency airstrip on the Hump route and then, under Stilwell's command, they covered the

build-

ing of the Ledo Road.

The Burmese were divided between the few who worked actively for the Japanese, about five per

cent of the population,

and the majority who remained loyal but neutral, awaitingtheout-

come Rifles

of the conflict.

The Burma

and Intelligence

Corps,

however, gave very valuable

ser-

vice for the Chindits and 14th Army. General Wingate said of the officers in the Burma Rifles that they "were the best set of officers, without exception, that he had met in any unit in the world". However, for the first two years of the war the Japanese listed the Chinese as the best troops they had to fight. In descending order came the Australians,

Americans, British, Gurkhas, and Indians. In due time each nation learned to live and fight in the jungle, and the order changed very radically.

The Chinese had been at war with Japan for seven years, and regarded war in a way which at first seemed extraordinary to the other Allies. They believed in subterfuge, encirclement and rather than an assault which

-. fL J^ Alexander, Wavell, and General Slim in 1942. At that time Slim was commander of I Corps -later he would

»a-.

2.

command

the 14th

Army.

Wavell and Stilwell. 4. Mountbatten with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese political and 3.

military leader.

General Alexander, G.O.C. in the early days of the Japanese offensive, with General Wavell, C.-in-C. India. 5.

Burma

Japanese invasion. They rallied to the old British frontier post at

Fort Hertz, and here, under Colonel O'Neill Ford, who had spent many years in Burma, they built up a garrison of 700 with a perimeter of sub-units in local villages.

With

their 16 British officers

they raided, harassed, and deceived the enemy. When the Japanese sent out an expeditionary force to destroy them, a skilful deception plan led the

Japanese to believe that a large British army based on the fort

was moving south

in

force to

attack them. Later,

2622

stiffened

with

some

be costly, for by their reckoning the war had lasted too long to be affected by some could

local operation.

Chinese troops under Stilwell operated in northern Burma. His was an unenviable task, for as Chiang Kai-shek's Chief-ofStaff and chief of Lend-Lease supplies to China, he was caught up in the politics of Chungking. His frustration boiled over in his

papers where he wrote:

"What

corruption, intrigue, obstruction, delay, double crossing, hate, jealousy, skullduggery, we have had to wade through. What a cesspool. What bigotry and

ignorance

and

black

in-

gratitude."

Taciturn and crusty, tactless critical, Stilwell also gave great assistance in the reconquest of Burma. Without his energy and leadership in the field, the campaign in northern Burma might well have proved

and

abortive.

Slim has said that "he had strange ideas of loyalty to his superiors whether they were American, British, or Chinese, and he fought too many people who were not his enemies; but I liked him. There was no one whom I would rather have had commanding the Chinese army that was to advance with mine. Under Stilwell it would advance." It was the Americans' ability to get

press

coverage

for

their

which did not help Allied relations. With the coming of Mountbatten in 1943, British readers began to hear more about the "Forgotten Army", but the U.S. heard little of the 14th Army. American readers thought that the British were dragging their feet in Burma, waiting for the Americans to recapture their activities

colonial empire. Stilwell's earlier well-publicised demands for an offensive simply added to this impression. Allied air co-operation, however, was efficient and impressive. Air supply of ammunition and supplies enabled the garrisons in Kohima and Imphal to stay fight-

ing though the Japanese had cut their land communications, win a crushing victory, and then drive

forward towards Mandalay and Meiktila.

The Air Commando of Colonel Cochran, U.S.A.A.F.. gave logistic and ground attack support to the Chindit columns deep in occupied Burma. Mustangs, Mitchell medium bombers, Dakotas, 100 light planes, and Waco gliders were used to put the

2623

with General

6. Stilwcll

Burma front.

Li-jen on the

Though

men down

Sun

Stilwell could respect

ments and positions.

the individual fighting man, he loathed the polities of the

Indian

Chinese high command, and their constant

in the jungle landing zones and provide flying artillery against Japanese troop move-

demands for more

equipment.

soldiers

fought

with

growing confidence during the Burma campaign. The Gurkhas and West Africans enhanced the warrior of their nations. Well-led, they emerged as some of the hardiest and most loyal Imperial allies in that theatre. The shortage of British officers meant that by the end

reputations

the war many Indian and Gurkha platoons and companies were commanded by officers of of

of the

indigenous origin. In a country and a climate which taxed the energy and willpower of Euro-

Chindit columns in Burma.

pean troops, the cheerful good

7. Mountbatten with MajorGeneral Orde Wingate, the

originator

and leader

Between them

is

an American

liaison officer.

humour of "Johnny Gurkha" was a constant and much needed tonic.

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CHAPTER

169

the2ndCliini

Operation

%l

^^1^

^:

lV )

'uid

1 -«c

*• ^•^

i

besides the execution of their duties, did much to maintain the morale and offensive spirit of all ranks in the columns to which they were attached.

The column formations were designed for movement through the jungle, for cutting communications, and for the general harassment of the rear areas of the Japanese forces facing the British,

American, and Chinese forces. But GenWingate felt that such a tough and seasoned enemy would not react sufficiently or withdraw his forces just because of this harassment alone. The Japanese would not just allow themselves to be manoeuvred out of a position without a fight. Therefore he emphasised to brigade commanders that these columns should be instructed and rehearsed in reforming into battalions and into brigades under their commanders, and thus be able to eral

A General Orde Wingate and Colonel Phil Cochran, U.S.A.A.F., brief American pilots. The air support for the second Chindit expedition, in both attack and support operations, was prompt, efficient, and plentiful. Previous page: With his large pack as a hat, a soldier pauses the harsh sunlight to enjoy a cigarette.

in

The four battalions in each L.R.P. brigade were split into and trained to move in eight columns of about 400 men each, comprising a four-platoon infantry company with two 3-inch mortars and two medium machine gun detachments, and supported by R.A.F., sapper, signaller, and medical detachments, all of which were based on mule transport and air supply. Each column had about 56 mules (much less than in the first operation as reliance on air supply was far greater) and each mule leader was interchangeable with men in the infantry company (and vice versa), thereby providing a source of reinforcement. The very important R.A.F. detachment, led by an active pilot officer, who had already flown in action in

Burma, was responsible

for the direction of close air support (in lieu of artillery), air supply, and the air evacuation of the

wounded. In those conditions and at that period of army/air liaison, it was considered preferable by the men on the ground to have nine officers piloting aircraft supporting them in the air and nine experienced officers on the ground who spoke the same language directing the pilots in the air, rather than 27 pilots in the air with no one on the ground in whom they had faith and confidence. These R.A.F. detachments uniformly proved themselves of a very high standard and,

2626

fight pitched battles of long duration in order to seize worthwhile targets or to destroy a sizable force sent against them. When that occurred, artillery and other essential support units would be flown in to convert the brigade into a hard-hitting formation. When that particular objective was overcome, Wingate envisaged more orthodox garrison units being flown in to hold that objective and the L.R.P. brigades dispersing again into columns in order to prepare the way for another attack. They would leave the artillery which had been flown into them to support the garrison troops they had left behind. Essential to the success of such operations was a base for each brigade in the jungle, centred around a fairweather airfield and garrisoned by one static and one mobile floater column. The floater column was designed to attack the enemy's rear when the latter assaulted the air base. Wingate, a gunner, believed in flying in sufficient calibre of artillery for the defence of the base to overcome and outgun anything the enemy could bring to bear overland in that terrain. Anti-aircraft artillery and a squadron or flight of aircraft might also be flown in so that they could, with radar coverage, help defend the base and also provide support to the brigades in the field. From these forward bases light aircraft would operate to the columns to evacuate the wounded who would otherwise encumber them, and bring in specialist reinforcements and generally act in liaison. From these bases transport aircraft would each night move the wounded in bulk to hospital in India.

man

could be wounded in battle find himself in a comfortable base hospital the same night. It must be emphasised that it was never intended that these well-trained, wellarmed columns would merely act in a pinpricking guerrilla, harassing, role, but would only do so temporarily, in order to produce a situation of which they could then take advantage by re-forming into a hard-hitting brigade and overcoming a contingent of the enemy. Tito in Yugoslavia, the Russian and Ukrainian partisans in 1944, and occasionally Mao Tse-tung's forces operated on similar lines, but the greatest and most successful exponent of this theory of operations since Wingate, although without air supply, has been General Giap in Vietnam. It was unfortunate that in the months before the campaign started Wingate was struck down by typhus, and he did not have sufficient time to train and inculcate his ideas deeply into the minds of some of his brigade commanders, so that a few of them never fully understood how Wingate wanted them to operate. This was not their fault, but it did affect operations later. General Marshall also sent an Ameri-

Thus

a

(luring the

day and

•< Lord Louis Mountbatten with Cochran. Despite his natural charm, Cochran was a firm leader. His Air Commando served as flying artillery, logistic

and ambulance service. The and L-5's of the Light Plane Force ferried wounded men to base hospitals, and the courage link,

L-l's

of their pilots earned the lasting respect of the men on the ground.

V Lieutenant-Colonel

Walter Brigadier J. M. Calvert, and Colonel John Alison, U.S.A.A.F., before the take-off for "Broadway" on the night of Scott,

March

6-7, 1944.

can brigade, later known as Merrill's

Marauders or "Galahad" Force, to train and operate with Wingate. But later General Stilwell found it was essential to have some American troops in the field to help his Chinese divisions forward, so Wingate lost the use of this fine force.

Wingate wanted six L.R.P. groups in order to ensure that there was a maximum of three of them operating whilst the others recuperated and then became available for relief. He estimated that an L.R.P. brigade could not continue to operate at its best advantage after it had been in the jungle behind the lines for more than about two months. But, as so often occurs in war, once the major forces of both sides are committed, all the reserves of both sides (including all the L.R.P. brigades) were also committed to battle. General Arnold, commanding the U.S. Army Air Forces, also allotted No. 1 Air Commando, under Colonel P. Cochran, to the theatre with the primary task of assisting Wingate's Chindits in their operations. This force consisted of 13 Dakotas (C-47), 225 Waco gliders, 100 Stinson L-5 light aircraft, a squadron of 12 Mitchell medium bombers (B-25), 30 Mustang fighter-bombers (P-51) and six experimental helicopters.

These air commandos were designed by 2627

The American Waco CG-4A transport glider

Capacity 1 6 men, or one jeep and 4 men, or one 75-mm howitzer and 3 men. :

Towing speed: 120 mph. Gliding speed: 75 mph Weight empty/loaded: 3,790/7,500 lbs.

Span 83 :

feet 8 inches.

Length: 48 Height: 12

2628

feet feet

3| inches. 7^ inches.

General Arnold to pep up and put

life

into

fiagginfi: campaigns which were becoming moribund, using the high morale and a higher grade of officer and man which air forces attracted, coupled with first class technical support, to act as a blood transfusion for "anaemic" troops on the ground, who through casualties had lost

their attacking spirit.

The Americans had already strongly recommended that Wingate should be made Supreme Commander in South-East Asia, but were willing to bow to the British objections when the latter produced Lord Louis Mountbatten as an alternative.

Balance offerees The Japanese had eight divisions, one (24th) Independent Mixed Brigade, one LN.A. (Indian National Army) brigade, and one (5th) Air Division, with one division (53rd) on its way from Formosa. This force was split up into three armies (15th. 28th, 33rd), under the Burma Area Army (Lieutenant-General commander M. Kawabe) at Maymyo. The 33rd Army (Lieutenant-General M. Honda) held the northern and eastern front with the 18th Division facing Stilwell's forces on the Ledo Road, and 56th Division opposing "Yoke" Force on the Salween. The 25th Army's (Lieutenant-General Sakurai) responsibility stretched along the coast from Akyab to Bassein in the Malay peninsula, with the 55th Division opposing XV Corps. The 54th Division was responsible for the coastline south of Akyab to Taungup, including Ramree Island. The 2nd Division covered the Irrawaddy delta and the coastline to the Malayan border. The 15th Army (Lieutenant-General R. Mutaguchi 15th, 31st, and 33rd Divisions) was preparing to launch its three-pronged "U-GO" offensive against IV Corps at :

Imphal and Kohima. Mutaguchi also had under his command the I.N. A. brigade for the exploitation of any revolt occurring in Bengal. He was relying on the 53rd Division, now on its way from Formosa via the Burma-Siam railway, to act as his reserve, although this division had never been assigned to him. However, General Kawabe was to divert this division against Wingate's airborne attack. His only other reserve were the four battalions (139th, 140th, 141st, 142nd)

of the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade (Major-General Hyashi). which were stretched out in an anti-airborne role along the railway from Tenasserim to

Mandalay.

The 5th Air Division consisted of about 200 aircraft, including five fighter regi-

ments (100 aircraft), two light bomber and two reconnaissance regiments (60 aircraft), and two heavy bomber regiments (30 aircraft). The Burma-Siam Railway had been opened on October 23, 1943, so that there was now a rail link from Rangoon to Bangkok. From Bangkok the Japanese supply lines stretched another 3,000 sea miles to Japan, across the U.S. submarine-infested South China Sea. Within Burma, Kawabe had the advantage of interior lines ofcommunication and could, if not interrupted by airborne forces, quickly move units from one front to another. Mutaguchi had built up a fiveday dump of ammunition and supplies at

Indaw

to support his offensive. Against this total of nine divisions, two independent brigades, and one air division, the Allies'

main superiority was

in

tanks (if they could be applied), and in numbers, but not in homogeneity. The Japanese units had had much greater battle experience than the British and Indian ones, and had recently been brought up to strength with reinforcements, but the new divisions such as the 53rd were mainly made up of older reservists and were not of the same calibre as, for instance, the 18th and 33rd Divithe

air, in

sions.

The Allied ground

Born

in 1903.

Orde Wingate

established a reputation as an original military thinker early in the war. Between January and late May 1941 guerrilla groups he led known as "Gideon Force" in Abyssinia. As the assistant to Emperor Haile Selassie and his nationalist forces he

employed tactics which

many

prisoners. In

he went to spected the

ground before The fol-

lowing

year

in

February,

eight groups of Chindits. men trained in long range penetration and supplied by aircraft,

crossed the River Chin-

dwin into occupied Burma. Until June they harassed Japanese communications, and when the survivors returned they showed that this type of operation was completely feasible. The publicity

The

operation,

ades of four battalions each (including Merrill's U.S. Marauders), one parachute

tended to break

training in India. It should be pointed out that initially each brigade in an Indian division had one British and two Indian or Gurkha battalions. Also, when war broke out, the divisional and corps artillery was British

1942

the British retreat.

254th), six long-range penetration brig-

and one commando brigade. There were also locally raised forces in the mountains, such as the Lushai Brigade south of Imphal and the Tripura Rifles in the Arakan Yomas. A second West African Division (82nd) was completing its

May

Burma and m-

forces consisted of 15 divisions (nine Indian, two British, one West African, one East African, and three Chinese) plus the 12 ill-equipped Chinese divisions of "Yoke" Force on the Salween front. Besides these formed divisions there were two tank brigades (50th and

brigade,

led

evacuation of a large number of positions by the Italians and the capture of to the

caught Churchill's attention and the second Chindit operation in 1944 had full air support. Two brigades were flown in and a third marched. cost-eflFectiveness of this

Japanese

which

was

in-

the main offensive against

the British in India, is still a matter of dispute among historians and soldiers. On

March 24 Wingate was killed when his aircraft flew into a mountain in Assam. He was a man who had dedicated friends, but also some strong Of Wingate. Chur"He was a man of genius who might well have become a man of destiny." critics.

chill said

He motion

twice

refused

pro-

to lieutenant-general.

2629

#**#%[

¥'

V

In a flurry of spray a Waco CG-4A glider lands in a wet paddy field at "Broadway".

V

<

•< A line up of Wacos before take-off. glider is towed into

V< A

position.

V V The end of the journey ; a Waco makes a dry landing at "Broadway". A consortium of 16 manufacturing plants built a total of 13,909 of these gliders

during the war years.

but the artillery was in process of being "Indianised". The engineers in the Indian divisions were all sappers and miners drawn from Madras, Bombay, and Bengal. These units at the beginning of March were distributed amongst: 1. XV Corps (Christison), consisting of the 5th, 7th, 25th, and 26th Indian Divisions, the British 36th Division, the 81st West African Division, the 3rd Special Service (Commando) Brigade; 2. IV Corps (Scoones), consisting of the 17th, 20th, and 23rd Indian Divisions and the 254th Indian Tank Brigade; 3. XXXIII Corps (Stopford), the Command Reserve, consisting of the British 2nd Division, the 19th Indian Division, the 50th Tank Brigade, and the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade; 4. Special Force "The Chindits" (Major-

5.

General Orde Wingate) (Mountbatten had offered to promote Wingate to Lieutenant-General but he had refused, asking that it might be granted when his force had achieved success); Northern Combat Area Command (Stilwell), consisting of the 2nd, 30th, and 38th Chinese Divisions, and the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), or, as it was more commonly known, Merrill's Marauders; and

Theatre Reserve, consisting of the 11th East African Division and the 99th Indian Brigade, both in Ceylon, and the 82nd West African Division, in India. The Chindit Force was composed of six brigades, the first three of which had been constituted from the 70th Division, an experienced formation which had seen active service in the Western Desert and 6.

.^

^'**'*'

c

»•

-

.

2632

..<

at

Tobruk:

a.

14th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier T. Brodie), consisting of the 1st Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment, the 7th Leicestershire Regiment, the 2nd

b.

Black Watch, and the 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment; 16th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier B. E. Fergusson),

consisting

of

51st/69th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, the 2nd Queen's Royal Regiment; the 2nd Leicestershire Regiment; and the 45th c.

d.

Reconnaissance Regiment; Infantry Brigade (Brigadier 23rd L. E. C. Perowne), consisting of the 60th Field Regiment, R.A., the 2nd Duke of Wellington's Regiment, the 4th Border Regiment, and the 1st Essex Regiment; 77th Indian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier J. M. Calvert), consisting of the 1st King's (Liverpool) Regiment, the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers, the 1st South Staffordshire Regiment, the 3/6th

Gurkha

Rifles,

and the 3/9th Gurkha

Rifles; e.

111st Indian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier W. D. A. Lentaigne), consisting of

the 2nd King's Own Royal Regiment, the 1st Cameronians, the 3/4th Gurkha Rifles, and the 4/9th Gurkha Rifles; and the f. 3rd West African Brigade (Brigadier A. H. Gillmore), consisting of the 6th Nigeria Regiment, the 7th Nigeria Regiment, and the 12th Nigeria Regiment. Each brigade was allocated one company of British/Indian or West African engineers, a detachment of Burma Rifles,

medical and R.A.F. detachments, plus troops of field (25-pounder) or light A. A. (Bofors) artillery from H.Q. Special Force as the circumstances required. Whilst the Japanese relied on interior lines of communication, mostly emanating from the Irrawaddy valley, the Allied forces were distributed in four quite distinct geographical zones, separated from each other by major physical features along a 2,000-mile reach of mountains. It was only by making use of the third dimension of air power that these four thrusts could be co-ordinated and reinforcements sent from one zone to another. A fifth thrust from the air (a fifth column), cutting the Japanese lines of communication and thus isolating each of their battlefields, would allow the Allies to advance over the major obstacles confronting them into the Burma plain and the dry open zone where their materiel superiority in tanks, artillery, and aircraft could be applied most effectively. As noted already, in March 1944 the Japanese had at most 200 operational aircraft in Burma. The Allies, on the other hand, had a minimum of 1,200 aircraft (including reserves, but excluding those employed in supplying China over the ''Hump"). This is calculated on the low figure of 15 aircraft per squadron. The Allied air forces were divided into six parts: 1. 3rd Tactical Air Force, consisting of 26 R.A.F. and seven U.S.A.A.F. fighter and' fighter-bomber squadrons; 2. Strategic Air Force, consisting of three R.A.F. and eight U.S.A.A.F. medium

and heavy bomber squadrons;

•< A glider on single tow by a C-47 Dakota over the 8,000-foot high Assam Hills. The maximum towing speed was 120 m.p.h. ; and though there were some accidents when tow lines parted, the scattered gliders served to confuse the Japanese about the

British intentions.

V •< •< A mule makes a reluctant passenger in a Dakota. These animals were invaluable on the expedition for carrying heavy equipment and the men grew to be very attached to them. V A bulldozer with a grader levels the landing ground at

<

"Broadway".

V

Before the heavy equipment arrived, troops levelled the paddy

SquadronLeader R. "Bobby" Thompson, the R.A.F. liaison officer, sent back a message to Cochran as the Dakotas began to land, "La Guardia has nothing on us. Can

fields for the airstrip.

take over 100 a night.

"

b' ^'

2633

3.

4.

Troop Carrier Command, consisting of four R.A.F. and two U.S. A. A. F.Dakota squadrons (with the exception of one R.A.F. squadron flying Hudsons); Three R.A.F. and three U.S.A.A.F. photographic reconnaissance squad-

5.

rons; Reserves, consisting of seven R.A.F. fighter and five R.A.F. and Royal

Netherlands Air Force Catalina flying boat squadrons; and 6. Non-operational squadrons, including 14 R.A.F. and Royal Indian Air Force and six U.S.A.A.F. ones. This gave the Allies a total of 67 operational and 20 non-operational squadrons.

The Chindit airborne assault The main object of the Chindit operation in March 1944, as laid down in the "Quadrant" and "Sextant" Conferences, was to cut the lines of communications to the Japanese forces facing Stilwell's advance down the Ledo Road and so assist his capture of Mogaung and Myitkyina, plus a belt of territory stretching at least 50 miles further south so that his eventual hold on these two towns would be secure. The original method designed by Wingate was to pass one L.R.P. brigade (the 16th under Fergusson) in by land and two (the 77th and 111th) by air to capture the communication centre and airfield of Indaw. Wingate then wanted the Allies to land an Indian division at Indaw to hold the airfield whilst the three brigades used Indaw as a base and a pivot of manoeuvre to harass the Japanese communications emanating out of that centre. Wingate hoped that when these original three brigades had operated for two or three months, which he considered was the limit of their operational ability, he could relieve them by his other three brigades which still required further training. However Mountbatten could not promise that such a division could be made available to hold Indaw. In fact the 3rd West African Brigade was allotted to

Wingate as an alternative for this airfield protection duty. Wingate felt that once his forces were "in the guts of the enemy", as he put it, he could then play it by ear, and besides cutting the Japanese 18th Division's communications he could also spare columns to do the same to the

2634

^fc'H^b.^H

&

Japanese communications feeding the divisions opposite IV Corps. The 16th Brigade started its arduous 360-mile march in from the Ledo Road on February

But by place.

^

'^^-

>r'^

'^'^^^H

A < A Gurkha into the jungle

K

column moves .

.

off

.

< and pulls off the track to take a break. .

.

.

A A mule loaded with bulky and heavy equipment. V A Japanese truck ambushed by the 7th Nigeria Regiment near Sepein. The Nigerians came new

to the

campaign and

their

enthusiasm and willingness to learn was a tonic to the Chindits.

5,

1944.

Fergusson had com-

pleted his crossing of the Chindwin by March 5. On March 16 two of his columns captured Lonkin for the benefit of General Stilwell and to encourage him to thrust forward, for it was no use cutting his enemy's communications unless his forces were applying pressure from outside. this time

two events had taken

The Chindit airborne operation

had been launched on the night of March 5-6 but Mutaguchi's three divisions had also crossed the Chindwin and were threatening IV Corps' communications. Calvert's 77th Brigade had been given the task of cutting all communications to the Japanese 18th Division leading north from Indaw. For this task he was given one extra Gurkha battalion, bringing his strength up to six battalions. He planned to place a block on the road and railway in the vicinity of Mawlu with three battalions, leaving two battalions to protect his air base and one battalion to attack the Bhamo-Myitkyina road the other side of the Irrawaddy, where they would co-operate with Colonel Herring's "Dah" Force and the Kachins in that area. Calvert had detailed Major David Monteith to operate along the Irrawaddy to prevent supplies taking that route. Originally Calvert planned that his brigade would land by glider on two open spaces in the jungle which he had named

"Broadway" and "Piccadilly". However, just beforehand, on the evening of March 5, it was found that "Piccadilly" was blocked by teak logs which elephants belonging to the Burma Forest Agency had dragged out to dry prior to their being floated down the Irrawaddy river. Calvert decided to land all his brigade at "Broadway" and be content with a slower build-up. The descriptions of that fly-in have appeared in several publications, so only a brief account will be given here. The fly-in started on the night of March 5-6. This change of plan at the last moment, and consequent reloading and re-directing of aircraft caused some confusion. As a result, many of the doubletow gliders were released too soon and went astray, and only about two-thirds of the first wave landed accurately. Log paths had indented the landing ground, causing further casualties to gliders on landing, but Calvert finally found that he

had enough engineers (mainly American) to complete the airstrip for the landing of transport aircraft. Colonel Alison, (Cochran's second-in-command) took control of the airfield and that night 60 Dakotas landed with their loads. This continued for four nights until 12,000 men and 3,000 mules, a troop of 25-pounders, and a troop of light anti-aircraft artillery had landed, complete with a reserve of stores, food, ammunition, and equipment. Just south of the Irrawaddy, Brigadier Lentaigne (111th Brigade) landed on the night of March 6-7 in another clearing (Chowringee) and also constructed an airstrip. Chowringee was found to be vulnerable to both air and ground attack and was given up, so the remainder of 111th Brigade landed at "Broadway". During that time there had been no air or ground opposition and both landings were unmolested. Leaving the 3/9th Gurkhas to garrison "Broadway" with the two King's columns as "floaters", Calvert moved his main force of three battalions straight to the railway to block it. After a short, sharp engagement in which Lieutenant Cairns of the South Staffords won the Victoria Cross, the block christened "White City" (because it later became festooned with supply parachutes) was installed across the railway on March 16 at Henu, about one mile north of Mawlu. The garrison of "White City" immediately got down to the task which it had rehearsed in detail whilst in India, of constructing bombproof dug-outs with the aid of sleepers, ballast, and railway lines from the railway, digging in their telephone lines, sighting their heavy weapons, and erecting a very large amount of barbed wire around platoon, company, and battalion positions, with a belt of wire of World War I dimensions round the entire garrison. Lentaigne, meanwhile, had managed to get only his brigade headquarters and one column of the 3/4th Gurkhas (30th Column) over the Irrawaddy before they were interrupted. It was decided therefore that the other column of 3/4th Gurkhas (40th Column Lieutenant-Colonel Morris) would come under the command of Calvert and operate on the

Bhamos-Myitkyina road. En route to its destination this column blew bridges on the

Bhamo

Si-u road and the Bhamo road. force later became known as

Namkham This

"Morris" Force and acted independently of 77th Brigade. Morris formed a safe base 2635

Kachin

from where (with their backs to the Chinese frontiers and protected by Colonel Herring's Kachin levies) his three columns (the 40th, 49th, and 94th) operated against the BhamoM yitkyina Road for the next three months until Myitkyina was captured. During in the

hills,

this period few, if any, stores in trucks reached Myitkyina by this route. It was

unfortunate, however, that Calvert had placed an insufficient block on the Irrawaddy so that stores reached the 18th Division by this water route. The Cameronians and the King's Own battalions of the 111th Brigade had landed at "Broadway" and were sent post-haste tojoin their commander, Lentaigne, south of Indaw. where his job was to cut the communications from the south to prevent reinforcements reaching Indaw before Fergusson's 16th Brigade attacked it. These two battalions arrived too late and by March 21 the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade (Hyashi) with three battalions (II/29th, II/51st, and 141st) and elements of the 4th Infantry Regiment had already taken up positions around Indaw. Within a few more days, and after repulsing Fergusson's brigade attack, Hyashi had assembled at Indaw nine bat-

2636

talions, the 138th, 139th, 140th, 141st (24th I.M.B.), I/4th, II/4th, II/29th (4th Infantry

Regiment), and III/114th and II/146th Battalions from the 18th and 56th Divisions respectively, complete with artillery

and engineers. Fergusson had marched down from Lonkin quickly, keeping west of the railway. At one period he was deflected towards "White City" when Calvert appeared to be in difficulties from a determined attack by the III/114th Battalion sent down from the 18th Division. This attack

was eventually repulsed with

heavy losses. Wingate did not allow Fergusson's brigade time to rest, recuperate, and reconnoitre after its 360-mile march, as he '>J^, ^•.. l\-'^-

-^^

^-

"'

knew

that there was a race for the possession of Indaw, Lentaigne having failed to block the route south. Lentaigne had been given a most difficult task because after landing east of the Irrawaddy he was confronted by the problem of crossing the 1,000-yard wide river with his whole brigade and then trying to form a block south of Indaw. This was impracticable and Lentaigne had done well to cross this huge obstacle with his brigade headquarters and one column.

V Sappers prepare a bridge for demolition at Henu, "White City". This was to fulfil part of the mission of the Chindits at "White City", which was

to cut

and railway link between Naba and Mogaung. In

the road

addition they were to cut the river links between Katha and Myitkyina and the road between Bhamo and Myitkyina.

March 9, the cancellation of Mutaguchi's attack on Imphal was considered. But Mutaguchi persuaded Kawabe not to cancel his attack as he was at that time in full flow crossing the Chindwin. Later he complained when one battalion was sent to join the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade to attack "White City", and when he found that the 5th Air Division was being employed to repulse the invaders rather than assist his own

Fergusson had left the 51st/69th Regiment, R.A., to protect his newly formed airbase at "Aberdeen", about 20 miles

due east of "White City", and directed his other three battalions (Leicesters, Queen's, and 45th Reconnaissance Regiment) against Indaw. One of the Queen's columns attacked from the south but the other, moving in from the west, was ambushed and had to withdraw. The Reconnaissance Regiment also hit serious opposition in a waterless zone and also withdrew. But the 2nd Leicesters (Wilkinson), on the other hand, advanced methodically from the north along a range of hills with their flank on the Indawgyi lake. When they met opposition, they dug in and maintained their position for three days against mounting odds before being ordered to break off the engagement. By this time the Cameronians and King's Own had joined Lentaigne, and the 111th Brigade had at last blown bridges on the railway south of Indaw. There were some major dividends from Fergusson's attack on Indaw besides the casualties the Leicesters in particular had caused. A patrol with an R.A.F. officer in it fortunately found concealed in dry jungle the huge dump of stores which was Mutaguchi's five-day supply reserve for his attack on Imphal and Kohima. Fergusson had the R.A.F. officer in question flown to Assam. From there he directed R.A.F. raids on to the dump until it was des-

AA

plane lands at "White The soldiers in the foreground are wearing the felt bush hats which the Japanese light

City".

took to be Australian.

V

The end of the railway bridge Henu. Track and railway ties were used to reinforce the bunker roofs at "White City". at

invasion. The II/146th Battalion from the 56th Division had been despatched to destroy the "Broadway" base, where the main landing had occurred, but Wingate's defence philosophy on the protection of an airbase proved itself. The Japanese were located early by a Burma Rifle reconnaissance patrol who attacked them at a river crossing and inflicted casualties. Colonel Rome, second-in-command of the 77th Brigade, was in command of "Broadway" with the 3/9th Gurkhas as garrison in a wired-in defensive position along a promontory of trees projecting out into the clearing which was the airfield. Rome's troop of 25-pounders had a field of fire across the flat open ground. He was in touch with the King's (Liver-

troyed.

The Japanese were now beginning to realise the seriousness of this attack on their communications. When the airborne landings had

first

been reported on AliCHBiSHOP MITTY HIGH SCHOOL MEDIA CENTBit «AN JOSK. CALIFORNIA 95120

2637

pool) floater column nearby. The Japanese crept around onto the perimeter wire and co-ordinated their attack with a bombardment from their two infantry guns

These guns were silenced within minutes by the 25-pounder troop. The Japanese penetrated the perimeter but were quickly ejected by a from across the

airfield.

counter-attack.

By

this time the King's

column was threatening the Japanese and counterattacks during the next few days and a final enveloping movement by the King's which cut off the Japanese and dispersed

rear. After further attacks

them, the II/146th Battalion, out of ammunition and supplies and having suffered 150 killed, withdrew carrying their wounded. "Broadway" was never attacked from the ground again. Earlier on, however, a flight of six R.A.F. Spitfires of No. 81 Squadron was flown in to operate from "Broadway". On March 13 "Broadway" was attacked by 20 "Oscars" (Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa). Warned by radar installed in the block, five of the Spitfires joined action. The sixth had become damaged on landing and was used to direct the operations of the five aircraft in the air. On this occasion at least four Oscars were shot down

V A Dakota unloads its supplies over a jungle dropping zone. The Chindit columns were almost entirely "teeth" units with their administrative "tail" in India. A radio link to the brigade headquarters, with a simple number code for the stores, meant that re-supply was quick and efficient.

Spitfires and one by the light antiaircraft Bofors gunners. One of the Spitfires was also shot down.

by the

The 5th Air Division attacked again on 18. There had been many false alarms meanwhile. Therefore only two Spitfires took off this time. One Japanese

March

formation of about nine aircraft engaged the two Spitfires whilst the remaining 18 Oscars destroyed the three on the ground and attacked other installations. Two Oscars were shot down. Surprisingly little damage had occurred on the groilnd but the headquarters of the 3rd Tactical Air Force decided to withdraw the re-

maining two

Spitfires

instead of rein-

them and sending in improved radar communications. At that time the R.A.F. had difficulty in seeking out and finding the Japanese Air Force and it might have been more opportune to augment this honeypot in the middle of the forcing

4

jungle to attract the Japanese air forces to an area where they could at least be engaged. A few days later the 5th Air Division attacked once again with 12 "Sally (Mitsubishi Ki-21) medium bombers and 20 Oscar fighters. The British light antiaircraft guns claimed at least six destroyed. Casualties amongst troops well '

dug-in were nil. but a number of light planes were damaged. Craters on the airfield

filled in

by a maintenance

team of bulldozers. Including one battalion from Mutaguchi's 33rd Division, the Japanese had

>

Dispatchers push out a load a drop on Easter Sunday. V Tuo views from circling supply aircraft. The dropping zone or landing ground has been marked out with strips of parachute material. The cords and cloth from parachutes were invaluable for sweat rags and as a tough, light-weight binding.

were soon

concentrated 11 battalions with artillery to counter the airborne operation. Practically every Chindit battalion flown in

during

had taken part

*:w

in a battle

and had been

"blooded". The Japanese Army Air Force had concentrated on this threat and had neglected the support of the "U-GO'^ offensive across the Chindwin. However, Mutaguchi's threat to Imphal and Kohima was developing. The only reserves trained and equipped to operate in the jungle were the remaining Chindit brigades (the 14th. 23rd. and 3rd West African). These were the brigades which Wingate wanted to keep in hand to relieve the three (the 16th, 77th, and 111th) fighting around Indaw. General Slim, commanding the 14th Army, had to decide whether to use these brigades trained by Wingate for the defence of Imphal and Kohima, or to maintain not only Wingate's offensive but the orders laid down by the Allied high command. Finally he decided that the 14th and 3rd West African Brigades would be flown in to central Burma but that the 23rd Brigade would operate with XXXIII Corps, as a kind of cavalry on its left flank as it advanced south from the

Brahmaputra valley and Imphal.

to relieve

Kohima

Promotion refused By

on the railway Calvert had decided that he needed more elbow room and had taken the offensive. He attacked and captured Mawlu. which was not well this time

defended, without difficulty. In Mawlu he found a vast amount of documents, which was an unexpected asset for this invasion.

Wingate, meanwhile, had visited all brigades at least twice, and then flew to "Aberdeen" to welcome the first elements of the 14th Brigade (Brodie) and the 3rd West African Brigade (Gillmore) which were in process of landing. From his point of view everything was going well. All enemy attacks had been repulsed and he had this force available in the centre of Burma.

Lord Mountbatten offered

to

promote him

to Lieutenant-General as he the equivalent of a corps

20,000 troops in the

2640

field,

commanded with

over

so that he might

The American North American B-25J Mitchell attack

aircraft

Engines: two Wright R-2600-29 radials, 1,850-hp each.

Cyclone

Armament:

eighteen 5-inch

Browning machine guns and up to. 3,000 lbs of bombs. Speed: 275 mph at 15,000 feet. Ceiling: 25,000 feet.

Range ,275 miles. Weight empty/loaded: 21,100/ 1

:

33,500

lbs.

Span: 67 feet 7 inches. Length: 52 feet 11 inches. Height 1 5 feet 9 inches. :

Crew:

6

MHKmPMiS

2641

2642

speak with more authority to his contemporaries, but Wingate modestly felt that he had not yet proved his hypothesis and so asked Mountbatten to defer the promotion to a later date when his methods of operations had been proved by victory and a withdrawal of the Japanese.

Wingate killed: the Japanese attack But it was not to be in his lifetime. Returning from "Broadway" in an American Mitchell bomber he touched down at Imphal for a conference with AirMarshal Sir John Baldwin, commander of the 3rd Tactical Air Force. After, the

conference they both took off, Wingate's plane leading. The last Baldwin saw of him was in the red evening light. Six minutes later the Mitchell bomber had unaccountably dived at cruising speed into the forward slopes of the Silchar

shells and the fire of Vickers machine guns trained along the wire. He attacked again before dawn but with no further

advance.

He lodged a company in the hills

on the north side of the block but in the morning Mustang fighter-bombers, diving again and again, bombed, strafed, and destroyed this force. Hyashi withdrew out of range and decided on his next move. In the meantime he was bombed repeatedly by both Mustangs and Mitchell medium bombers belonging to No. 1 Air Commando and directed from an observation post in "White City" which overlooked the plain. The following night Hyashi attacked again with fresh troops. These were armed with Bangalore torpedoes to burst their way through the wire, but all the torpedo teams were destroyed. A further attack later on in the night met with the same result. During the nights Dakotas replenished the block's ammunition and rations. The block itself was only 1,000 yards long by the railway and only 800 yards deep, but it consisted of a number of small hills up to 100 feet high, which made a series of defiles

where lay his destination. All within the block. aboard were killed. Wingate's death was a cruel blow to the operation. On March 12 General Kawabe, G.O.C.- Hyashi crushed in-C. Burma Area Army, had ordered Major-General Hyashi, commanding the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade, to clear This time Hyashi deployed two tanks in the length of the railway line of airborne front of Mawlu. which was his base, but troops. The 56th Division had also de- both tanks were hit by anti-tank 2tailed II/146th Battalion which attacked pounders from "White City". Hyashi "Broadway" and was defeated. The III/ attacked for the next three nights with 114th Battalion came from the 18th Divi- fresh troops, bringing all seven battalions sion and had already attacked "White into the attack, but to no avail. The rain of City" and had been severely repulsed. 2-inch and 3-inch mortar bombs, grenades, The II/51st from the 15th Division arrived and deadly Vickers machine gun fire would not allow his men to penetrate in time to take part in some of the fighting, to rejoin its own the block. Some 700,000 rounds of belted but was then sent back division as it advanced over the Chind- medium machine gun ammunition were win. Hyashi had therefore the equivalent delivered by air to the block during the of a division in strength. He had pre- period. During the day Hyashi's forming viously driven off Fergusson's 16th Brig- up and administrative areas were severely ade in its attempt to capture Indaw air- bombed two or three times by Mustangs. Mitchell bombers and, on occasion, Britfield. He now decided to attack and remove the "White City" block. On the ish Vultee Vengeance dive-bombers. Hyashi had one trump card: a 6-inch night of April 5-6, after a heavy bombardment, Hyashi launched his attack. The mortar, which only had a short range defenders of "White City" had a clear of 1,500 yards but whose large missile could penetrate some of the "White field of fire over paddy fields to the west and south, so Hyashi concentrated mainly City" dug-outs, which were heavily on the jungle-covered east and northern camouflaged. Some bombing by the 5th Air Division had achieved no other perimeters. He attacked initially with results than the fact that about eight three battalions. They were held up on the of the medium bombers were shot down wire, where they received heavy casualby the six Bofors anti-aircraft guns ties from a rain of up to 1,000 mortar plain,

A < < Maivlu after its capture. A < Colonel Gatey. Major Gaiiley, Wingate. ai^d

Lieuteriant-Colonel Walter Scott at "Bi'oadway".

AAA captured Japanese gun. A Japanese

trucks caught in an

ambush by


the 7th Nigeria Rgt. signaller with an antenna

slung between the

trees.

Besides

calling for supplies, the radio link enabled the Chindits to give targets for the fighters and bombers of the Air Commando.

2643

Fort Hertz"

Ledo February 4. 1944'' 16 L.R P. Bde. begigfe march to Indaw ai%a

October 1943 CA.I.

pTagap

&5307Regt.'

(StJIwell)

kChin38Div. y'-^'

INDIA

Hkalak

\Sharawga Shine

MILES

nyang lingam igam

Feb. 21, 1944

,5307 Regt. assembles

3^karr^^^^_-'>v Sumprabum''

Chi

KILOME^ES

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^^

kMaingkJran Mar. 6

Taro Jan. 30

Walawbun Mar. 7

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1

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i-i» C.A.I. (CHINESE

(^

I

.

WINGATE'S LONG RANGE PENETRATION COLUMNS

V\

\

^Myitkyina

ug.4

Lake

^>

.Tapaw r

^

#

WINGATE'S CHINDITSi^x' MARCH 5/AUGUST-6

/ Night March 23/24 14 L.R.P. Bde. flown '"a

'Aberdeen

, I

Taungle* Manhton

ID/

.

i^:jr

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nemg

May/17

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Indawgyi

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(CHINDITS)

(STRONGHOLDS) AREA OF OPERATION

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ARMY IN INDIA)

- - 5307 REGT. (MERRILL'S MARAUDERS)

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Kadu«^r, ^ MBroadway^

,,jy/ i.. Mar. 11 / /

_

(St (Stilwell)

/March

Road

5

77L.R.PP. Bde. make; „i:j„. u glider-borne landingl : followed by 11 L.R.P. Bde.:

.Namii

CHINA Yunnan

^City' ilawlu

'Piccadilly'

>Pinwe

March

26,

Attack on Indaw repulsed. occupied ApriMS

JAP 1.5TH AFT.-V/ i-****j MUrAGUCHllTAfJAKAtATER

4~^

Bhamo

Indaw Katha Div- (Taked^

f

Jap 53

A The second Chindit operation, with the U.S., Chinese, and British drive from the north that was the reason for the Chindits' continued activities.

2644

1

4-

Chowringhee

field

which had been introduced into the block the night before the attack began. The troop of 25-pounders in the block faced carried out coLinter-battery fire which reduced the effectiveness of Hyashi's own artillery. On April 10. Major-General Lentaigne. who was Wingate's successor, flew into "White City". He gave orders that Calvert should form a counter-attack force to attack the Japanese base from outside the block. Brigadier Gillmore became commander of the "White City" block, still under Calvert's command. Inside the block 'the garrison would continue to be the 1st South Staffords. the 6th Nigeria Regiment, and one column and all the mortars and machine guns of the Lancashire Fusiliers. Calvert formed his new force, about 2,600 strong and consisting of the 3/6th Gurkhas, 1st Reconnaissance Regiment (from the 16th Brigade), and the 7th Nigerians, plus one column of Lancashire Fusiliers. At about 0400 hours

Mawlu and

on April 8 Calvert attacked Mawlu and Sepein. Hyashi put in his two reserve battalions, but not before Calvert had captured Mawlu station and Sepein, and overrun a number of his headquarters, including the artillery one. However, the British forces were spread out too widely and lost momentum. They withdrew after dark. Hyashi continued his offensive against "White City" that night. The next day Hyashi heard reports that his communications with Indaw had been cut by a Nigerian regiment. The following day his rear area was attacked in strength by the 3/6th Gurkhas and the Reconnaissance Regiment. His administrative areas and headquarters were overrun and severe fighting broke out in the jungle south-east of Mawlu. This carried on throughout the day in spite of improvised counter-attacks. Hyashi was uncertain of the strength of these attacks and continued his attack against "White City". The following day his administrative areas and gun positions were further penetrated from the south and he found himself jammed between the barbed wire of "White City" and the counter-attacking force in his rear. He led one last desperate charge in which he himself was killed. His forces were counter-attacked by the 6th Nigerians from "White City" and attacked again and again by the Gurkhas and the Reconnaissance Regiment. The finale occurred just after 1300 hours when the remains of the Independent Mixed Brigade and the 4th Infantry Regiment were preparing a banzai counter-attack. At this moment 27 Mustangs were directed on to them when they were in close order in flat jungle. Very great casualties resulted, which caused the Japanese to start a withdrawal, but the 77th Brigade did not follow up. All that evening the forces of the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade withdrew towards their base at Indaw, being harassed en route by small units of the Lancashire Fusiliers and the 7th Leicestershire Regiment. The previous night the lorry park at Tonlong had been severely attacked by the Leicesters and over 80 trucks had been destroyed. By April 17 the remains of the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade had withdrawn to Indaw. So, to

sum

up, this force of divisional

strength had by April 18 been severely defeated by British forces consisting of four British battalions, one Gurkha battalion, and two Nigerian battalions, well supported from the air.

A

change of plan

While the Chindits were heavily engaged around "White City", the 111th Brigade had destroyed enemy supply dumps near Banmauk and 14th Brigade had destroyed the main railway bridge over the Bonchaung Gorge as well as several other bridges on the way to Indaw. Lentaigne had ordered a further attack on Indaw. The 16th Brigade advanced and overran

Indaw West

airfield,

destroying installa-

tions and other materiel. Between April 22 and 27, the 14th Brigade destroyed 21 dumps of supplies and ammunition, and 15,000 gallons of petrol, and cut the railway south of the town in 16 places, whilst leaving mines and booby traps through-

out the area. This severely damaged the lines of communication to the Japanese 31st Division attacking Kohima and the 15th Division attacking Imphal. East of the Irrawaddy, "Morris" Force had achieved a series of successes against the Bhamo-Myitkyina road, including destroying the main road over the Taping river at Myothit and capturing and destroying Nalong. These Gurkhas were tireless over the next few weeks, in spite of a shortage of explosives and supplies, in attacking and repeatedly destroying bridges and convoys on this road. South-East Asia Command now decided that the Chindit forces should cease to operate against the lines of communication leading to Mutaguchi's forces attacking Imphal and Kohima, and concentrate on assisting Stilwell's forces in capturing the objectives laid down in the "Quadrant" and "Sextant" Conferences, i.e. Mogaung and Myitkyina and an area south of it. To achieve this result it was decided that with the approach of the

monsoon, "Aberdeen", "White City", and "Broadway" would be given up and a block placed on the railway and road nearer Stilwell's forces by a reconstituted 111th Brigade under Major (later Brigadier) Masters, General Lentaigne's original brigade major. The 77th Brigade, consisting of the South Staffords, the Lancashire Fusiliers, and the 3/6th Gurkhas, should move north to protect this block from the east. The 14th Brigade should take over "White City" and carry out its evacuation, and the 3rd West African Brigade should move north to protect this new block, which was to be named "Blackpool", from the west. The 16th Brigade

would be flown out. The 111th Brigade would consist of its two original British battalions and the 30th Column Gurkha Rifles, but in addition would be reinforced by the 3/9th Gurkhas, and the King's (Liverpool) Regiment from the 77th Brigade.

Chindit problems This plan did not work. Masters had not seen "White City", nor had his force been trained to install a defensive block with barbed wire, artillery, airfields, and anti-aircraft defences. The area chosen did not cover the railway line or road, but instead was placed on a jungle-covered spur jutting out into the valley, open to artillery

bombardment. Soon

after

it

was

installed with inadequate wire, the block was overrun with severe casualties. The 77th Brigade, from the opposite side of the flooded valley, was unable to assist,

whilst the West African Brigade had been diverted to Lake Indawgyi to protect the area whilst Catalina flying boats flew out many sick and wounded. The 14th Brigade, which had taken over the "White City" block and cleverly evacuated it before the forward elements of the 53rd Division attacked it, marched north and operated meanwhile in different areas in the hills west of the railway. In fact, apart from a brisk action at Kyusunlai Pass, the 14th Brigade and the West African Brigade eventually got stuck down in the malarial areas of Lake Indawgyi. There, seeing their comrades being flown out, many succumbed to temptation and a large exodus of sick occurred, greater than was warrantable under the rules for evacuation laid down by Wingate. As a result, for nearly six weeks these two brigades took almost no offensive action. At the fall of "Blackpool", Stilwell was naturally very annoyed as the way was now open for reinforcements from the

south to reach

A Major-General W. D. A. "Joe" Lentaigne, who began the expedition commanding the 111th Brigade, but on Wingate 's death took overall command of the Special Force. Though an excellent leader, he did not have the unorthodox genius of the original creator and leader of the Chindits.

Mogaung and Myitkyina.

a coup-de-main, Merrill's Marauders and a Chinese regiment had seized Myitkyina airfield on May 17. This coup-demain changed the whole face of the war in north Burma. Calvert's 77th Brigade was ordered forward to attack Mogaung,

By

whilst Stilwell flew in 30,000 reinforcements to Myitkyina airfield to capture the town. Meanwhile "Morris" Force, on the east bank of the Irrawaddy, was asked to do all it could to attack all the Japanese garrisons on the eastern bank.

2645

The Japanese 53rd Division (Lieutenant-General K. Takeda) had reached the Indaw area early in May and assumed

command over

of secrecy that Takeda actually launched his attack to find nothing but booby traps opposing him. During this operation the Black Watch carried out a most successful ambush in the area east of "White City" Kawabe now placed the 53rd Division under the command of the 33rd Army

"White City". He brought up two regiments supported by a strong force of

(Lieutenant-General Honda), which had assumed command of 18th and 56th Division in the Hukawng valley and Salween fronts respectively. He left the remains of the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade to hold the Indaw area under the direct con-

the remains of the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade, the 4th Infantry Regiment, the II/29th Battalion, and all other units in that area which had been defeated by the Chindits. Takeda was ordered to launch a further attack on

artillery, but (as related) the 14th Brigade (Brodie) side-stepped with such a degree

A P-51 strip at

Mustangs roar over the "Broadway". Like the

Mitchell beneath them, they are

marked with

the five-stripes insignia of the Air Gmmmando. < A B-25 attacks a Japanese store

>

and supply

depot.

Cochran with Captain John

irkett

and

a British officer.

Army. Takeda, on finding "White City" evacuated, moved quickly up the railway line in time to prevent the

trol of the 33rd

installation of the 111th Brigade's "Blackpool" block. In the destruction of "Blackpool" the 53rd Division suffered some 500 casualties.

At this time the 18th Division (Tanaka) was holding Kamaing against Stilwell's Chinese regiment cut its communications and after a long battle the 18th Division was forced to withdraw. The 12 Chinese divisions on the Salween forces, but a

were

still

quiescent, so that

when

the

Marauders struck Myitkyina, the 56th Division was able to send General Mizukami with a battalion and other units to hold Myitkyina at all costs. Mizukami, with about 3,000 men, held out in Myitkyina for 76 days although outnumbered by about 15 to

1.

Honda (33rd Army) had planned to use the 53rd Division (Takeda) to relieve the 18th Division (Tanaka) but Tanaka asked to stay where he was. Honda therefore despatched the 53rd Division to retake

•i-

m: %.. *>f^

m^ mm %4l^

»~>y||wi.

'^•^i^ll

V

Elephants

W

charge of cross the

in the

Burmese mahouts Chindwin river.

Part of a Bren light machine

gun team.

V> .As

Wellington had proved Peninsular War, appearance does not necessarily in the

quality of the soldier. The jungle, like the desert, was no place for "bull" but it

reflect the

produced war-winning soldiers. V > > Calvert, Major F. Shaw, and Major L. R. Lumley, Bart., in

Mogaung.

V>>>

Chindits move up through a shattered Burmese village.

Myitkyina. But just at that time at the beginning of June, the 77th Brigade (Calvert) started its attack on Mogaung, the base for which had been brilliantly seized by Calvert's second-in-command. Colonel Rome. The distance between his base in the hills and Mogaung town proper, with the big railway bridge over the Mogaung river, was only about 5,000 yards. But this whole area consists mainly of mangrove

swamps and

flooded paddy fields before the elevated ground around the town proper is reached. Calvert protected his rear by seizing Tapaw and asked an American O.S.S. agent. Lieutenant Davis, to organise a screen of scouts on his flanks. He then started his attack with 2,000 men and no artillery, monsoon conditions precluding the construction of an

He had

orders to take Mogaung at all costs. Initially things went well and a large hospital and ordnance area were overrun, yielding some 50 prisoners. Calvert was then faced with the crossing of the sluggish, deep stream called the Wetthauk Chaung. A direct attack on the bridge at Pinhmi failed with heavy casualties, but fortunately the 3/6th Gurkhas found a ford and Calvert struck at night across this ford and cut the road behind the Pinhmi garrison. The Gurkhas were then launched into the attack from the rear and soon overcame the defences of the bridge. However, it will be remembered that the 53rd Division had been ordered to recapture Myitkyina. But the appearance of the 77th Brigade so close to Mogaung airfield.

caused General Honda once again to review his plan. He immediately ordered the headquarters of the 128th Regiment into

Mogaung and told Takeda to abandon

the contemplated attack on Myitkyina and to concentrate his division for the defence of Mogaung. Calvert's depleted forces were now encountering very heavy artillery concentrations, which they had some difficulty in avoiding by digging into that flooded area. However, he was close to American air force bases and air support was excellent. From observation on the 1,100foot Umantaung Hill his R.A.F. adviser,

Squadron-Leader Thompson, and his men could observe the artillery fire emanating from in and around Mogaung and direct the U.S.A.A.F. Mustangs down onto their

targets.

Where the distance was within

mortar range these targets would be indicated by mortar smoke. Calvert quickly obtained some 4.2-inch and 81-mm mortars which, from Pinhmi, could bombard Mogaung and bring down harassing fire all night. This air superiority was so effective that the Japanese were chary of firing during the day-time. On one occasion a battalion of the 53rd Division was advancing out of the town for its first action since leaving Formosa when Squadron-Leader Thompson was able to bring down 27 Mustangs on to it and catch the troops in the open, destroying most of them. Mogaung, between the Mogaung river and the flooded Namyin Chaung, became a bomb trap for the Japanese 53rd Division.

•b

V

v.«4

In the meantime, StilwelFs Chinese had not been idle and, with a second right hook behind the redoubtable 18th Division, succeeded in destroying most of the

18th Division's artillery. In fact the 18th Division had been reduced to a strength of about 3,000 all ranks and was told to take to the hills and concentrate in the area of

Sahmaw. This was between June 7 and 22. The 77th Brigade's attack on Mogaung developed further until the 3/6th Gurkhas and the South Staffords faced Mogaung across 200 yards of paddy, with the remains of the Lancashire Fusiliers and a

attack by the Lancashire Fusiliers and a Bladet detachment of flame-throwers to destroy the redoubi which had been the cause of most of the casualties that day. The following day, and the next, Calvert used all his reserves, including his brigade headquarters and animal transport company, to maintain the offensive until

Mogaung was taken on June 26. The Chinese 2/114th Battalion had occupied Loilaw and, in the latter stages, had cooperated with Calvert's attack, suffering three casualties. The 77th Brigade had suffered about 1,500 casualties in its attack on Mogaung, and a commission of British and American doctors calculated that there were only 300 fit men left in the brigade. General Lentaigne had urged the 111th Brigade to attack west of the railway. In that area all three brigades (111th, 14th, and 3rd West African) had suffered severely from cerebral malaria and tick typhus, which had lowered morale. Masters reformed his brigade into one large company and attacked Japanese positions on the tops of hills in the Padiga area, and then held these against counter-attack. During one attack Major Blaker, M.C., of the Highland Light Infantry, attached to the 3/9th Gurkhas, gained a posthumous Victoria Cross. This was the fourth Victoria Cross won by the Chindits. Two more

were gained by Lieutenant Michael Almand and Rifleman Tulbahadur Pun, both of the 3/6th Gurkha Rifles, during the final assault on Mogaung.

AA

Japanese bunker

at

Mogaung. The town became a death trap for the Japanese, who came under accurate and deadly attacks by the Mustangs of the Air

Commando

directed onto

their targets by the Chindit

forward air

controllers.

^

portion of the King's Regiment in reserve. As a result of casualties and sickness. Calvert's attacking strength^ was now under 1,000. At this time Calvert sent a patrol to make 'contact with the Chinese forces moving south from Kamaing. The Chinese 114th Regiment was contacted and with the aid of 77th Brigade's ranger boats it crossed the river on June 17 and took up po^ition^ on Calvert's left. The addition -of its 25-pounder battery was very Welcome to the British brigade. Calvert agreed with Colonel Li to attack the following day. After good air support the previous night, the 77th Brigade, laid down a barrage of 1,500 rounds of mortar ammunition at 0230 hours, and the attack started.

The Gurkhas and South

Staffords

achieved their objective but the Chinese had not advanced. It took a hard counterC50

Stilwell was still pressing his forces forward. Myitkyina had not yet been taken. After ordering a medical investigation. Lord Louis Mountbatten gave direct orders to Stilwell to evacuate the 77th and 111th Brigades at once, accusing him of keeping these two brigades in action for far too long. The 14th and the 3rd West African Brigades were directed on to the railway town of Taugni south of Mogaung, which they occupied on August 12. The 3rd West African Brigade had taken over

Sahmaw on August 9. All brigades were flown out, but the left behind as transport for the 36th British Division (Festing) to take over. However, this division improvised jeep transport on the railway line which

mules were

advance south to Indaw. 1, Mizukami, in command of the Myitkyina garrison, ordered Colonel Maruyama to withdraw the remnants of his regiment from Myitkyina. Mizukami himself then committed suicide. Stilwell it

used in

its

On August

had now achieved all his objectives. Myitkyina and Mogaung were captured and both the road and a safe air route to China were now open. An oil pipeline was soon pushed through to Kunming. Stilwell continued to advance with his forces in a three-pronged offensive south from Myitkyina and Mogaung. The 36th Division was directed to secure the IndawKatha area, the Chindits' old hunting ground. The Chinese 22nd Division crossed the Irrawaddy near "Broadway" and the Chinese 38th Division was directed on to Bhamo. The Japanese 53rd

«0m

RECT OF ARmURV

CORPS

OF

ffOTIL

COBB

2m OKKS

Qt

hf i Pr.

SKWU

Iti

..^N'

ROYAL RfC r

KWCS

V

The colours of the Old Comrades Association. The actions fought on the two expeditions are displayed on either side of the figure of the Chinthe, or mythical dragon, which guards Burmese temples

and from whose name Wingate coined the

^\

K CT

BtC T

r

KH h HERTS RECT

R R0\

l«T

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3/6 GliRKHA RIFLES a/S CLiRKHA RIFLES 4/9 GDRKMA RIFLES

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BORDER REC r

K BURMA 1942-1944

|

W

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RIFLES

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THE BOLDEST MEASURES ARE THE SAFEST 142

2w BURMA

RWAf^

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LOCESTERSMRE RECT

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Chindits.

MP

R C

Jim lEKESTERSHlPt REGt' Sj**

title

RASC

CHINDITS

DONEEK

h , HUGS gHK ROYAL

Overleaf: British soldiers return

from the interior of Burma.

Che

45 RECCE RECT

ROYAL

Division and remnants of the 18th Division had not much fight left in them and withdrew, leaving only small rearguards to slow down their enemy. The Chinese "Yoke" Force on the Salween had at last taken action and linked up with Stilwell's forces at Bhamo. By December 1 the 36th Division, having swept through the old Chindit areas, had captured Indaw and Wuntho and had made patrol contact with the 14th Army, which had not yet crossed the Chindwin in force. And so ended the second Chindit operation.

RWAff

HOt^KONG

VOLUNTEERS

ROYAL

FORCE

AIR

COMMANDO

aO COMRADES

ASSOCIATION

2651

:.

^ \^

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If

supplying the British Fighting Jokes about "tooth" and "tail" arms have been cracked in the British Army ever since the days that it first began to spawn large administrative and support units. Yet the prestige of being one of the tooth arms (the Infantry, Cavalry, and Royal Artillery) has been eroded by the developments of modern war. One commentator has suggested that the invaluable tail arms should be redesignated "gums", for without their support the teeth will not be held in position when they sink into the enemy. The mobile operations at the beginning and end of World War I saw the drafting of administrativetroopsinto temporary front line service. Deep penetration by me-

chanised forces in World

War

Mnn

again forced clerks, cooks, and technicians to take up rifles and face elite enemy forces which had ruptured the Allied front. II

In France in 1940 Lord Gort formed ad hoc "forces" out of men of the Royal Engineers and Royal Army Service Corps. Stiffened with as much artillery and infantry as could be spared, the spirited defence of the Canal Line by these units, many of which took their name from that of their commanding officer, slowed down Rundstedt long enough for Gort to bring up stronger forces for its defence. A year later the New Zealand Divisional Petrol Company fought off attacks by

Production was the first stage in the logistic chain. Britain

was second only to Russia in her mobilisation of women in industry.

V Women

in a Ministry of

Supply steel works in the north of England. They are preparing to shovel waste material from the ladle.

German paratroop and mountain

troops

in Crete.

Though support and administrative troops might argue that they were not meant to be expended as infantrymen, the war sometimes spilled into the routine of their work. One truck driver in Burma proudly showed a Japanese sword to an officer and explained that he had "swiped it

off a

Jap when a bunch

tried to

ambush

us".

Despite these martial episodes, the real of logistic forces was the supply and support of the front line units. Logistics (the word comes from the Greek logistikos: "skilled in calculating") have been called the third science, which complements strategy and tactics. Baron Antoine Henri Jomini in his Precis de I'art de la guerre, published in 1836, describes them as "the practical art of moving armies". In World War II and the post-war years the word has been widely used and has thus lost some of its meaning. Strictly, the logistic chain begins at the factory where the food, vehicles, ammunition, weapons, or clothing are manufactured, and ends with the soldier who uses or expends the product. These supplies enable him to advance or hold his ground. There are, however, some corps and arms whose work takes them into the front line but yet does not involve them in direct confrontation with the enemy. Engineers, signallers, and men of the medical services are sometimes subject to greater risks than the front line infantry. For official purposes, however, these men are classified as part of the logistic chain. Logistics have often been likened to the "military element in a nation's economy and the economic element in its military operations". So there is an interaction between the military and the civilian realms, one demanding and the other producing the three essentials of an army at war. These are the means to live (food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical services), to move (vehicles, transport animals, fuel, and forage), and to fight (weapons, defence stores, and expendables of ammunition). Some of these items can be used and reissued again. The bulk of the resupply and replacement needs are made up of food and fuel. When the United States entered the war, Britain tried to persuade them to adopt the existing British system, which calculated requirements theatre by theatre on the basis of projected deployment

work

2654

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^^^ijji^^ttMtt AM

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W

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•.;a..*'v

i

1

A

"^

Manufacturing respirator

haversacks. Tii^o women, who have given up jobs as a waitress and as a belt maker, and one who is the mother of two daughters work on

A

the finer points of the turret of a Matilda tank.

<<

In Short

's

factory in Belfast

girls assist in the riveting

wing of a Sunderland flying-boat. < The Mills family doing war work at Enfield. The picture shows the seven daughters ; their mother was in an adjoining of the skin of a

iron foundry.

2655

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After the war General Patrick Tansey, head ofthe American Operations Division, War Department Logistics Group, agreed that the British system was superior to that adopted by the U.S. Army. In 1942 the British had committed the bulk of their forces abroad and so knew

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and predicted intensity of combat in each area. If the Americans had accepted this system the Allies could have administered their supply systems with a joint staff. The United States, however, feared that the British would be tempted to use the system to syphon off supplies to existing British and Empire units, and starve the American armies which were still being formed.

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the strengths of their forces in various theatres, but the Americans were still building their army. Any predictions as to the timing, scale, and direction of its eventual overseas deployment might not fit in with American strategic plans yet to be formulated. The British, however, enjoyed the fruits of American resources and mass production of weapons. Churchill said that U.S. aid enabled the British to fight as though they were a nation of 58 million instead of 48 million. In 1942, 20 to 25 per cent ofthe materiel procured by the U.S. Army was assigned to or put aside for Allied armies.

A

"^

Mrs Florence Edgar

inspects a Merlin engine at the

Rolls-Royce factory at Hillington

Glasgow.

<

Shells are spewed hot from

the lathe.

P.L.U.T.O. or Pipe Line Under The Ocean: The pipe in storage in

AA>

three-quarter mile lengths. The picture shows some 200 miles of pipe.

> The

massive

the pipe

was

drum from which

laid.

The

sailor

with the boat-hook on the

left

gives an idea of scale.

> Tugs drum

tow and unwind the

laying the lead-jacketed pipe across the Channel.

2656

Power, mobility, range A military unit, be it a patrol of a dozen men, or an army group plunging through a continent, is restricted by three elements -power, mobility, and range. The patrol can carry most of its shortterm needs, but a larger group must have depots and bases. If there is a steady supply from these bases the group will achieve

three elements. II each theatre had its own special administrative problems, but over all there was the dominating presence of Churchill. In North Africa his desire to see the war fully prosecuted meant that the 8th Army came under pressure to go onto the offensive once it had accumulated supplies and received new armament. Montgomery resisted pressure from Whitehall to open the El Alamein offensive In

in

all

World War

September

received his

1942.

By October he had

new tanks, including the first

Shermans, their crews had been trained, and the accompanying infantry rehearsed. When the 8th Army reached Tripoli, its logistics passed from G.H.Q. Middle East in Cairo to Allied Force Headquarters. "We were very short of many essential needs," recalls Montgomery, "and when we unloaded the first ship that reached us under the auspices of A.F.H.Q. we found that it contained 10,000 dust bins! We thought, in our arrogant way. that they probably needed them more than we did."

He explained that the only successful way to run administration in battle is for the headquarters to have full confidence in the requests from lower formations and send up, where possible and without argument, what is demanded from the .

-^^j^itjmia^

front.

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Confidence in the front line units by their rear echelons was essential in the aerial re-supply system employed by the

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"Chindits". It was based on a numerical code in which each number corresponded to an item of stores. Among the items requested were gold and silver coinage to pay the Burmese and hill men who assisted the columns. Later the Chindits had bales of cloth flown in, for the local population had been without new clothing since the Japanese invasion.

"«»'.'*-*

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Burma and

the

British employed mules to transport bulky pieces of equipment. Hardy animals, these could in

Italy

2657

Argentan

Pipelines Lateral routes

Main through routes

^

Southampton

London

North Sea

St Catherines Point

BRITAIN

Dungeness ,

Amslerdar

Hague Zu. English Channel -

Boulogne^

Calais

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Bridges erected 6 June 44 to 8

May 45

Maastricht

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2658

Aachen (Aix

la

Chapelle)

browse off scrub and grass, which made them ideal pack animals in remote areas. Their handlers developed a strong

affec-

tion for the tough and obstinate beasts, and asserted that their obstinacy showed persistence and strength of character. The final link of the logistic chain often depended on manpower to bring rations and ammunition to men at the front. In Italy the mountains were impassable to vehicles, and later, in north-west Europe,

mud and poor roads stopped even tracked carriers. It fell to the Quartermaster, or

"Q" to the soldiers, to collect volunteers to manhandle heavy food containers to the front.

Food

Used For Operations

5

West Europe 1944/45

In North

Flensburg

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Canal Kiel**

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In the fighting on the Dutch border in 1944, the British 43rd (Wessex) Division was amazed that its neighbours, the U.S. 84th Division, were "expected to exist on packets of odd items such as eggs and bacon compressed into tablets, gum and candy with nothing hot to drink. Men fight with greater cheerfulness on the cheapest form of pig's belly of transatlantic origin masquerading as bacon, if hot, or bully beef and tea and biscuits which maintained the British." An officer of the 15th (Scottish) Division, however, recalls a short tour with an American unit in October 1944: "they would not hear of us eating our rations. Try theirs, they invited us. So we lived on their food and had pineapple juice and waffles for breakfast, while they, inexplicably, fell upon our tins of stew and rice pudding and proclaimed them vastly superior to their own rations." Behind the cartons of rations which .

.

.

were unloaded at company cook-houses there was a system which reached back to the depots in England. The Rear Maintenance Area in France was linked to Army H.Q., roadheads, railheads, and airheads; from here the stores went forward to the Corps Maintenance Centres; men from the Divisional Administrative Areas and Delivery Points forwarded the stores to the units in the field.

Dortmund

f ?

Helmstedt

Mulberry" and P.L.U.T.O.

.3

Cologne

Bailey Bridges Erected In North

West Europe 1944/45

A

vital

part

of the

"Mulberry" harbours

system was the Laurent on

at St.

2659

"Omaha" Beach and Amhiila7}ces cross a "Beetle" oating causeway. The adjustable "Whale" pier-heads, which could be operated at low and high tide.

y7

at

Arromanches on

"Gold" Beach. Sailing Directions, the sailors' Bible, says that "weather in the English Channel is seldom calm". Added to this, the beaches on the Normandy coast are very flat and any ships which are laden have to anchor five miles offshore. The "Mulberry" harbours were conceived as a sort of insurance policy. With landing pierheads and breakwaters the Allies could guarantee that some stores would come ashore whatever the weather conditions. Indeed, during the three-day storm which began on June 19, the British were able to land 800 tons of vital artillery

ammunition. After the Dieppe Raid in

1942

the

Germans had evolved a strategy based on Hitler's maxim "If we hold the ports, we hold Europe". The British, too, had learned that assault on a fortified port is expensive and time-consuming. The Mulberry harbours and the blockship breakwaters (called "Gooseberries") to shelter smaller craft were developed to make the Allies independent of port facilities. The "Beetle" floating causeway linked the land with the "Whale" pierheads. The Whales were designed to be adjustable to the rise and fall of the Channel tides. The Mulberries at St. Laurent on

"Omaha" Beach and Arromanches on "Gold" Beach were each designed to be as large as Dover harbour. But whereas Dover was built in seven years, the Mulberries were to be sunk in position and operating after two weeks. It required some 200 tugs collected from the U.S.A. and Britain to tow over the 600 major units of the artificial harbour. to be used for 90 delay in the capture of with the but days, Antwerp they served until November 1944. Their average rate of discharge was 9,000 tons more than their designated capacity. By the end of August 1944 a million tons had been handled by the British, of which half had come through

They were intended

Mulberry

B.

which came as a nasty surprise to the Germans, was a wise precaution. When the Americans captured Cherbourg they discovered that it was a "masterpiece of demolition". Cranes had been blown into the docks, the quays cratered, and the waterways blocked with sunken ships or clogged with every variety of naval mine available. The only way to cross the harbour was in a rubber dinghy with muffled oars. Mulberry,

2660

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^.

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f J,

#xi ii

I

had been cleared and repaired, Cherbourg was able to handle 10,000 tons per day, but the Allies were still dependent on the Mulberries. It was not until late November 1944, after Antwerp had been captured intact by After

it

Armoured Division, that the Allies at last possessed a major port. Their 300-mile supply linesfrom Normandy the 11th

were reduced; so was their dependence on trucks, for the Belgian railway system was largely intact. Antwerp could handle 40,000 tons per day. In addition to prefabricated harbours, the Allies used a variety of pipelines for fuel. The best known is "P.L.U.T.O.", the

"Pipe Line Under The Ocean", which reached from pumping stations in the Isle of Wight to depots at Rouen. Further pipelines were laid from Boulogne to the Rhine. After the Rhine had been crossed these pipes were extended to depots 10 miles east of the river. Yet even before the Mulberries were in position, British planners calculated that for the assault they would need to preload landing-craft with 37,000 trucks and vehicles, and 287,000 men would land on the open beaches. In the first 30 days of the invasion the Allied armies would

disembark 1,100,000 British and American soldiers.

To

fight the static battle in

and follow

this

Normandy

with a rapid 400-mile

advance, the British had to amass 200,000 vehicles and 750,000 tons of stores in one month. In the opening stages of the invasion these stores were sent to field depots, but once a substantial area had been liberated they were concentrated into the

The logistics of invasion: Landing craft had to be loaded with the stores and equipment which would be needed on the beach-head in the crucial opening hours of the invasion. A Anzio: a destroyer lays a smokescreen as a landing ship approaches the Italian coast. Visible on deck are a variety of trucks, jeeps, armoured cars, and signals vehicles.

Rear Maintenance Area or Advanced Base.

Movements and Transportation were responsible for the maintenance of the bridges, roads, rail and waterway communications. These had either been damaged or destroyed by the retreating enemy or by Allied air attacks. The roads, particularly in winter, deteriorated under the tracks and tyres of the armies. It was thus a constant struggle by the Royal Engineers, Pioneer Corps, and civilian labourers to keep the communications

open and

effective.

In Burma the road links from the narrow gauge railhead at Chittagong up the Surma valley to Sylhet, which connected

the British forces with their bases in India, were perhaps the most difficult lines of communication experienced by the

2661

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British during the war. Not only were they affected by the heavy rain of the monsoon, but they were further disrupted by an earthquake. It took a truck 12 days to do the trip to and from the front. Allowing for fuel consumption it required an estimated 18 trucks to deliver one truck load of materiel to the front per day.

Air Transport A

transport aircraft, however, could carry three tons and deliver three loads a day, which amounts to the work of 54 trucks. On the return flight the aircraft could take up to 60 casualties. During the Imphal operations, aircraft moved in two and half divisions with their artillery and

evacuated some 30,000 wounded. Air transport destroyed the Japanese

army which had relied on cutting the communication and capturing forward supply dumps during their attack in Burma. A Gurkha officer recalls "We had been taught how to use such moves as opportunities to cut off the Japanese who made them, to surround and kill them while they starved and ran British lines of

out of ammunition, and while our supplies rained down upon us from the heavens." In all theatres air transport became an important part of the return journey from the front for wounded men. It allowed men to be taken quickly to a secure and wellequipped base hospital far in the rear without long and bumpy journeys by road

and rail. Blood transfusion and plasma units were available close to the front, and with them came surgical teams and nursing sisters.

Montgomery cancelled the order

< < The

torpedo tubes of a A sophisticated and expensive weapon, a torpedo could cripple or sink all but the largest enemy vessel. < Heavy calibre naval gun barrels. In 1941, when this picture was taken, the Admiralty requested that it should not destroyer.

be published since

it

gave

some indication of the future fire-power of the Royal Navy. V Submarines of the 3rd Submarine Flotilla alongside the Forth in Holy Loch in June 1943. The Forth was a depot ship built to carry stores and ammunition and to maintain smaller

flotilla craft.

Soldiers become sailors on

A the

Chindwin

river in

Burma

February 1945. The D. U.K. W. amphibious trucks they are crewing were an item of Lend-Lease equipment which saw wide service.

2664

in

that forbade nurses working in the forward areas when he came to North Africa in 1942 and later explained that "their presence comforted and calmed the nerves of many seriously wounded men, who knew they would be properly nursed". In Normandy the Field Surgical Units operating near the front were able to ensure recovery for two out of every three stomach wound cases they treated. Preventive medicine played an important part in keeping men fit. The antimalaria Mepacrine tablet ("the yellow peril") and the spraying and oiling of swampy areas of the jungle helped to cut down some of the instances of the disease in Burma. At one point the Japanese radio in Saigon accused the British of waging chemical warfare when they used aircraft to spray pesticides to clear areas in the path of the advancing 14th Army but which were still held by the enemy. In Europe the use of D.D.T. powder meant that of all the soldiers who came in contact with typhus cases only 25 contracted the disease and none died. Montgomery recalls Churchill's anger when he heard of several dentist's chairs being landed over the beaches during the early days in Normandy. He added: "We

had learnt since 1914-1918 war that by caring for a man's teeth, we keep him in battle."

After the war he reported that "the doctors were prepared to lay 15 to one that once a man got into their hands, whatever his injury they could save his life and restore him to health." There is a temptation to describe the whole logistic chain as a "pipe-line". In fact the system did not provide a steady flow of supplies or movement of men, but rather stock-piled them as far forward as was safe and practicable. When a major attack was in the offing these stocks would be increased.

So when XXX Corps was preparing for the Rhine crossing it accumulated a dump of 30,000 tons of engineering material to enable its sappers to build nine bridges over the Maas and four over the Rhine. In addition there were 60,000 tons of ammunition and 28,000 tons of rations and other stores. Eisenhower paid tribute to the men of the logistic arms when he said at the end of the war: " The spectacular nature of the advance was due in as great a measure to the men who drove the supply trucks as to those who drove the tanks."

CHAPItRITO

.->;»,„

-jv-.af^.'i!

Imphal and Kohima %'^

s^%V^^

Previous page: The winding road to Tamu. To the left is the hill known as "Crete West", on the south-west perimeter around the strategically vital

town of

Imphal, besieged by the Japanese 15th and 33rd Divisions. A Naga tribesmen at work road clearing in the

Imphal-Kohima

area.

A> A

British tank patrols the before the Japanese complete the investment of the Imphal area. V > The Imphal-Kohima road, cut when the Japanese 15th Division reached Kanglatongi

Imphal-Ukhrul road just

on March

29.

The

so-called

"March on

Delhi",

the

Japanese offensive against the British IV Corps on the Tiddim-Imphal-Kohima front rolling when LieutenantG, Yanagida's 33rd Division crossed the Chindwin in force on the night of March 7-8, was the brainchild of

which started General

Lieutenant-General Kenya Mutaguchi, aged 55. To the Japanese it was known as the

"U-GO"

offensive and its limited objective was to forestall a British offensive by attacking and destroying the British base at Imphal, thus strengthening the Japanese defence of Burma. A subsidiary objective was, with the use of the Indian National Army division raised and commanded by the plausible and resourceful Subhas Chandra Bhose, to "exercise political control over India". This was to be achieved by encouraging and supporting dissident anti-British elements, who had in the previous year created a most serious situation in Bengal and Bihar by their widespread sabotage of bridges, communications, and airfields.

happened Chandra Bhose stayed comfortably in Rangoon and the I.N. A. division, which had the strength of only a brigade (totalling about 7,000 men), had

As

2666

it

little effect

on either the battle or the

political situation.

of the "U-GO" offensive was timed to phase in with the successful outcome of Major-General T. Sakurai's "HA-GO" offensive in the Arakan. The latter's purpose was to draw off the Allied reserve divisions to the Arakan prior to Mutaguchi's attack on Imphal.

The date

This task Sakurai's 55th Division had successfully achieved for, by the end of

February 1944, six divisions (5th, 7th, 25th, 26th, 36th, and 81st West African), a parachute brigade, and a special service (commando) brigade, had been drawn into that theatre. This concentration, coupled with the extensive use of air supply, had certainly foiled Sakurai's raid after three weeks of hard fighting. But Mutaguchi should have crossed the Chindwin in mid-February as planned in order to take the maximum advantage of Sakurai's feint.

Unfortunately Lieutenant-General M.

Yamauchi's 15th Division, which Mutaguchi intended to use for the direct assault on Imphal, had become stuck in Siam. It was not until February 11, after Mutaguchi himself had signalled Field-Marshal Count Terauchi, command-

^^'-

^**^

>_:

2667

er of the Southern Army at Singapore, that the 15th Division started to concentrate in Burma, arriving ill-equipped, ill-fed, and ill-tempered. This division had been training in northern Siam and some of its units had been improving the Chiengmai-Toungoo road as an alternative route to the much bombed Burma-Siam railway. Assisted by

of

ten motor transport companies, it had marched the 700-mile long road from Chiengmai to Shwebo via Kentung and Mandalay in order to toughen itself up and prepare itself for its task ahead. D-day for the "U-GO" offensive was fixed for March 15, by which time the 15th Division must not only be re-equipped but have moved to its start line between Paungbyin and Sittaung on the Chindwin, as well as organising its communications forward from Indaw and Wuntho on the

V The Japanese 15th Army's advance on Imphal and Kohima.

railway via Pinlebu. The other two divisions in Mutaguchi's 15th Army were in a much better state.

A Major-General D.D.

Gracey,

commander

of the 20th Indian Division, part of the garrison

Imphal with the 23rd Indian and 17th Light Indian Divisions.

2668

The 33rd Division had operated for many years in China and had taken part from the start in the conquest of Burma as well as combatting the first Chindit operation in 1943. This division, advancing initially along comparatively good roads, would carry with it all the armour and heavy artillery (4th Tank Regiment, 1st AntiTank Battalion, 3rd and 18th Heavy Field Artillery Regiments) that the Japanese could muster for this attack. The 31st Division (Lieutenant-General K. Sato), whose task was the unenviable one of advancing from Homalin and Tamanthi on the upper reaches of the Chindwin river, and then over a series of parallel ridges (reaching a height of over 7,000 feet) to Jessami and Kohima, had previously operated only in China, although some of its units had been stationed on islands in the Pacific. It had arrived in Burma between June and September 1943 and had immediately been sent to the Chindwin front, where it had crossed swords with the battle-experienced 20th Indian Division (Major-General D.D. Gracey). The 31st Division had had, therefore, plenty of time to get inured to the conditions in that area. It would operate on a mule and horse transport basis, trusting on a tenuous 100-mile long line of communications from Mawlu and Indaw on the railway to Tamanthi and Homalin, supported by a three-week reserve of food, ammunition, and fodder built up on the line of the Chindwin. Mutaguchi, "the victor of Singapore", had previously commanded the 18th Division in north Burma and had been most impressed by the activities of the Chindits and their leader. Brigadier Wingate, whom he held in high regard. Mutaguchi had, with some difficulty, sold his plan to knock out IV Corps by a three-pronged, three-divisional thrust against the 200mile road leading down from the Brahmaputra valley parallel to the Chindwin. Prime Minister Tojo and Count Terauchi agreed to this gamble only because they needed some offensive success to offset the disasters which had been occurring in the Pacific. They then agreed only with the proviso that it should be combined with an attempt to start widespread insurrection in East India with the cooperation of Subhas Chandra Bhose's Indian National Army, on which they placed great hopes of success. Lieutenant-General M. Kawabe, commanding the Burma Area Army, was sceptical of the whole plan and had

orders to prevent Mutaguchi from over-

reaching himself. Lieutenant-General Tazoe, commanding the 5th Air Division, had no faith in Mutaguchi's plan whatsoever. He was apprehensive of what the Allied airborne forces (the Chindits) would do, for his reconnaissance aircraft had shown they were ready to be sent in again. He pointed out to Mutaguchi that he would be totally incapable of helping him with air supply once he had crossed the Chindwin. Mutaguchi's plan was for the 33rd Division, with the bulk of his armour and artillery, to

at

advance from

its

bridgehead

Kalewa and to attack and surround the

17th Indian Division (Major-General D.T.

Cowan)

at Tiddim and Tongzang. Leaving a small containing force, the 33rd Division would push forward with all speed northwards to the Imphal plain, where it would also cut the Bishenpur Track running west to Silchar. One regiment,

underMajor-GeneralT.Yamamoto, would meanwhile advance north from Kalemyo up the Kabaw valley and open a road through to support the 15th Division, bringing most of the wheeled and track vehicles with it. The 33rd Division would start its advance one week before D-day, when the 15th and 31st Divisions would cross the

A A Bren gun team of the R.A.F. Regiment in position above an airfield in the Imphal valley. Airfield defence was of primary importance in the Imphal campaign, for without it the

besieged defenders could not have received the supplies needed for their 88-day defence.

Chindwin.

The 15th Division's task was to cross the Chindwin near Thaungdut and advance on tracks via Ukhrul to cut the Dimapur road north of Imphal near Kanglatongbi. It would also detail one column to contain the 20th Division (Gracey) east of Palel. With the 33rd Division, its final objective was to overrun the rich Imphal plain, destroy IV Corps, and capture the airfields and a vast quantity of supplies. The 31st Division had the more arduous task of advancing 70 to 100 miles along

2669

y."

Ancient and modern in an ox cart crosses an w in front of a

'

Hurribomber" being prepared

for a sortie.

7 > The town of Kohima, mauled by the Japanese

severely siege.

Overleaf: Allied troops move up the "Chocolate Staircase" en route to Tiddini Village, south of

Imphal.

footpaths from the riverine villages of Tamanthi and Homalin, through the Naga Hills, and over a series of bare mountain ranges to capture Kohima, a small, obscure village and staging post on a 4,000-foot pass on the DimapurImphal road. Whether it would exploit its success from there by attacking the undefended railhead at Dimapur depended on circumstances. Mutaguchi hoped that the whole operation would be resolved within three weeks, by which time he also hoped to

have road communications functioning from Kalewa via Palel to Imphal and north to Kohima.

The command set-up in Burma as far as Army was concerned was rather top heavy. The Supreme Commander, Lord 14th

Louis Mountbatten, gave his orders to General Giffard, commanding 11th Army Group, who commanded only one army, Lieutenant-General Slim's 14th Army. 14th

Army

XV

Corps

initially

Christison)

—

'•

-

-

r^^

had under command

(Lieutenant-General the

in

f^r/L.

-

*

•J

A.F.P.

Arakan, IV Corps

(Lieutenant-General G.A.P. Scoones), the

Northern Combat Area

Command

(Lieu-

tenant-General J.W. Stilwell), and Special Force (Major-General O.C. Wingate). Later XXXIII Corps (Lieutenant-General M.G.N. Stopford) was formed in the Brahmaputra valley to counter the Japanese advance, and XV Corps came under the direct command of General Sir George Giffard's 11th Army Group. Slim had not been deceived by the violence of Sakurai's Arakan attack and his countering the threat by the fly-in of

overwhelming numbers, coupled with strict orders that all units

his

should stand

communications were cut and await supply by air, had converted what might have been a disaster in the firm

if

Arakan

their

to a morale-raising victory.

Slim realised from Intelligence reports that IV Corps might suffer similar longrange penetration attacks, but he thought that these could not be in a strength greater than two regiments. He made his plans accordingly. On the night of March 5-6 he allowed the Chindit airborne operation to start its fly-in across the Chindwin to block the Japanese communications facing General Stilwell's forces (N.C.A.C.), in accordance with the orders of the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff. IV Corps consisted of three divisions (17th. 20th, and 23rd) and the 254th Indian Tank Brigade (with Shermans and Grants). The 17th Division, after its retreat from Burma in 1942, had stayed for two years patrolling in the 7,000-foot Tiddim Hills, 100 miles south of Imphal. This light division consisted of two, mainly Gurkha, brigades on a mule/jeep transport basis. The 20th Division was based on Palel and Tamu south-east of Imphal and patrolled towards the Chindwin. The 23rd Division (Major-General O.L. Roberts) was in reserve at Imphal. Lieutenant-General Scoones, who had commanded IV Corps since its formation, was a clever, quiet, forceful personality who achieved results through efficiency

and attention to

than by flamboyant leadership. With him his subordinates would know that everything would be in its place and up to detail rather

strength.

Scoones' plan, which had been approved by Slim, was, on being attacked, to withdraw his two forward divisions back to the wide open Imphal plain, where he would be able to bring to bear his superiority in tanks heavy artillery, and close air support, which could outgun and destroy anything that the Japanese could bring over the hills and across the Chindwin against them. He would then have three divisions, with a promise of a fourth to be flown in, to combat the Japanese raid. The vital factor in his plan was when to give the order for the 17th Division to start its 100-mile retirement back from Tiddim to Imphal.

Slim planned to fly in the 5th Indian Division (Major '"l^eneral H.R. Briggs) soon as news of an from the Arakan i-:

2672

attack in strength was confirmed. The 50th Parachute Brigade (Brigadier M.R.J. Hope-Thompson) was due to be flown into Imphal and directed towards Ukhrul. Scoones planned to fly out all unnecessary administrative personnel and the very large number of engineers and their

working force who were engaged on improving communications and airfields within the Imphal area. In fact over 40,000 "unwanted mouths" were flown civilian

out as the battle progressed. IV Corps consisted eventually of the 5th, 17th, 20th, and 23rd Indian Divisions, the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, and the 254th Indian Tank Brigade (Shermans and Grants), comprising 49 infantry battalions (nine British, 24 Indian, and 16 Gurkha), and 120 tanks. Besides this,

IV Corps had the 8th Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery, with 5.5-inch guns, as well as the usual complement of divisional artillery and engineers. In all there were about 120,000 men, excluding constructional engineers and Royal Air Force. The strength of the Japanese 15th

Army which

crossed the Chindwin was 84,280 Japanese and 7,000 Indians. A further 4,000 reinforcements arrived during operations. The Japanese divided each division into three columns of varying size and composition, according to their tasks, but the total number of units which can be compared with those of IV Corps were as follows: nine infantry regiments, totalling 26 battalions (one battalion of the 15th Division had been sent back to deal with the landing of the airborne forces, but was later returned to the 15th Division during its attack on Imphal); two heavy artillery regiments; and one tank regiment. Besides these there were divisional artillery, with much of it on a light mountain pack basis, and three engineer regiments, which were often used as infantry. The British

XXXIII Corps at its maxistrength consisted of two divisions (British 2nd and 7th Indian, under MajorGenerals J.M.L. Grover and F.W. Messervy respectively), the 149th Regiment, Royal Armoured Corps, the 23rd (L.R.P.) Brigade (Brigadier L.E.C.M. Perowne), the 3rd Special Service (Commando) Brigade (Brigadier W.I. Nonweiler), and the Lushai Brigade (Brigadier P. C.Marindin), totalling about 75,000 troops, including 34 infantry battalions (20 British, 11 Indian, and three Gurkha). Yanagida started his advance to attack

mum

2673

I

Previous page: Gurkha advance. A The District Commissioner's

Bungalow, destroyed in the heavy fighting for Kohima.

on the night of March 7-8. The 215th Regiment went up the high mountains to Fort White and crossed the Manipur river to get into a position west of the 17th Indian Division's position at Tiddim

and Tongzang. The 214th Regiment marched northwest and advanced directly on Tongzang. Both regiments formed blocks across the Tiddim-Imphal road. Cowan, commanding the 17th Indian Division, had not told his brigadiers that there were plans for withdrawal, so on March 13, when he got Scoones's order to withdraw, his brigades had to have time to see that the orders reached every man. This meant a 24-hour delay. This particular division, consisting of a preponderance of Gurkhas, was well trained and had great confidence in itself and its quiet commander. Withdrawal continued according to plan and at each road-block the Gurkhas put into operation plans they had rehearsed and the Japanese blocks were removed without great difficulty, but with considerable loss to the Japanese.

2674

However, Scoones was apprehensive of how successfully the 17th Division would be able to carry out this 100-mile long

withdrawal on a road through high hills and where there were ambush positions every few hundred yards. So he committed

some of his reserve division, the 23rd, which he had moved to Torbung. The 37th and 49th Brigades, with a squadron of tanks, were moved forward to Milestone 100.

Yanagida pressed on, but his troops were losing their momentum and after the fourth block across the road had been successfully removed by the British forces, Yanagida became depressed. On the night of

March 23,

after receiving

many casual-

ties, Yanagida sent a rather panicky signal to Mutaguchi implying that his position was hopeless. Yanagida had been appalled at the success of the Sherman and Grant medium tanks, against which neither his artillery nor his anti-tank guns seemed to have any affect. After an exchange of furious signals Mutaguchi decided to remove Yanagida

Moving further north, Yamauchi's 15th Division crossed the Chindwin on the night of March 15-16 and moved quickly up the

hills

towards Ukhrul. According detachment to make

to plan he also sent a

contact with Yamamoto's column on the Palel Road. By March 21 Yamamoto was in contact with the 50th Parachute Brigade at Ukhrul, where it had taken over from the 23rd Division's 49th Brigade, which in turn had been moved to assist the 17th Division. All this time it must be remembered that Mutaguchi was in Maymyo, 200 miles to the east, the pleasant

V The Tennis Court

area just

west of the District

Commissioner's Bungalow, also destroyed in the short, savage fight for

Kohima.

and sent for a successor. It must be emphasised that this took place at the beginning of the campaign and affected the command and consequently the morale of the division on which the success of the whole operation depended. Major-General Yamamoto's column which, it will be remembered, had the preponderance of Japanese armour, advanced quickly and surely up the Kabaw valley until by March 11 it had reached a position at Maw on the right flank of Gracey's 20th Indian Division. Gracey had taken his brigade commanders into his confidence about what action the division would take when Scoones gave the order to withdraw. So his brigades knew exactly what to do when he ordered them to destroy unnecessary stores, disengage, move back, and reform on the

Shenam Heights

just east of Palel. This

withdrawal took place in good order and without a hitch, but was followed up by Yamamoto. Heavy fighting soon took place on the Palel road at a point that

became known as Nippon

Hill,

2675

The Japanese Mitsubishi

Ki-46-ll

"Dinah" reconnaissance

aircraft

Engines: two Army Type 1 (Mitsubishi Ha-102) radials, 1,080-hp each

at take-off.

Armament: one 7.7-mm Type 89 machine gun. Speed 375 mph at 1 9,030 feet. Climb: 17 minutes 58 seconds to 26,250 feet. Ceiling: 35,1 70 feet. :

Range: 1,537 miles. Weight empty/loaded: 7,194/ 12,787

lbs.

Span 48 :

feet

Length: 36 Height: 12

Crew:

2676

2.

2| inches.

feet

1

feet

8| inches.

inch.

^:-^:..

'^

hill station in

which he had

set

up

his

headquarters. It was from this viewpoint that he sent signals exhorting his three divisional commanders to greater effort. The 15th Division's orders were to bypass Ukhrul and move towards the hills north of the Imphal plain to seize Kangla-

XXXIII Corps, he unfortunately withdrew Brigadier Warren from Kohima to protect Dimapur itself, where there were 60,000 after the stores

move

left

Kohima

virtually unprotected.

Kohima

was

Slim's calculations had been that not more than one Japanese regiment could be maintained at Kohima. This was, in fact, the case and Sato's men were to suffer for it later. But in the meantime this attack by a whole division threw

his

left-hand

column

reached Ukhrul, where it made contact with Yamauchi's forces. Whilst Yamauchi pushed on, Sato's left-hand column, under the command of Major-General Shigesburo Miyazaki, made contact with the Indian Parachute Brigade at Sangshak near Ukhrul. After pushing out the paratroops, Miyazaki advanced northwest and set up a road block at Maram on March 27, a few miles south of Kohima. Meanwhile Sato's 58th and 124th Regiments advanced on Jessami. Jessami was weakly held by the Assam Regiment and was captured on April 1. Kohima itself had originally been defended by Brigadier D.F.W. Warren's 161st Brigade of the 5th Division, which had been flown up from the Arakan to Dimapur. When Lieutenant-General Stopford took command of the area with his

at

25.

Sato continued his advance and by April

Further north still, Sato's 31st Division which, having been in the area for many months, had had time to reconnoitre the routes over the hills, and done remarkably well. Crossing the Chindwin between Homalin and Tamanthi on the night 15-16,

gun position

and administration. This

15

March

British

unarmed rear echelon troops looking

tongbi.

of

A A

Lancaster Gate on June

itself

invested.

the British defence plans out of gear. The battles which followed centred around the sieges of Imphal and Kohima, but for the British, success depended also upon the co-ordination of forces in the whole of Burma, a formidable logistical problem. Scoones had mapped out a very sensible defence of the Imphal plain. He formed fortresses or "boxes" around each area where there were stores or airfields, and had detailed a commander with staff in charge of that area with a force to defend it. This worked well, but when pressure from the Japanese intensified he had to reduce the size of these areas and give up some of the stores, which then fell into

V Major-General Ouvry Roberts,

commander

L.

of the 23rd

Indian Division.

Japanese hands. By this time he had four divisions and the parachute brigade with the formidable 254th Medium Tank Brigade to fight his battle.

He

also

had 2677

A Garrison Hill, near the Tennis Court area in Kohima. After heavy fighting between May 4 and 7, the 6th and 33rd Brigades failed in their efforts to break past this point, and it was not until another major attack between the 11th and the 13th that the line of hills from the District Commissioner's Bungalow

to Jail Hill

from the Japanese.

was taken

squadrons of fighters and fighterbombers at short call to harass and destroy the Japanese, who were better targets now that they were emerging into the open plain. It must also be remembered that on the high ground the hills were bare and Sato's 31st Division suffered heavily from air attack when caught out in the open at Litan during its advance on Kohima. 27

Into the trap In the Brahmaputra valley XXXIII Corps, whose nucleus was the 2nd British Division (which had originally been the theatre reserve and had been training for operations in Sumatra or Malaya), was now forming fast. The 2nd Division had too many vehicles for the type of country, but as it advanced it soon learnt how to fight with only one road as its main axis. Stopford, realising his mistake in withdrawing Warren's 161st Brigade, sent them back to the Kohima area, where a tiny garrison of the Royal West Kents and Assam Rifles was holding out gallantly.

was now

weeks since Sato had crossed the Chindwin, and his supplies were beginning to dry up. He was faced It

five

by a series of problems: exceptionally difficult terrain, poor communications

and the 2678

activities of the Chindits

who

had

destroyed the Japanese railway supply lines and cut off 300 trucks from Sato. Sato signalled Mutaguchi that he was running out of supplies and was having to eat his mules. He suggested that he should start retiring whilst he still had some pack animalsieft. Mutaguchi wasappalled by this message and sent some extremely rude signals to the conscientious Sato. Meanwhile, the Chindit 23rd (L.R.P.) Brigade had been put under Stopford's command. He gave it the task of making a wide sweep to the east to get behind the Japanese 31st Division and to advance all the way to Ukhrul. The eight columns of the brigade pushed on along the footpaths over the high ridge with their mule transport and with supply by air. Many small actions were fought and although it was not possible in this country with its many paths to "cut" communications, the force threatened Sato's communications to such an extent that he told Mutaguchi that he must withdraw. Mutaguchi was going through a bad time. He had replaced Yanagida with Major-General N. Tanaka, who was a tough, resilient, earthy soldier who had fought in north China. Mutaguchi had no luck with the 15th Division either, as the divisional commander, Yamauchi, died of malaria. He was replaced by Lieutenant-General U. Shibata, a man, it was said, "with an ox-like presence".

«c

A Men

of the 3110th

Gurkha

Rifles (23rd Indian Division) on Scraggy Hill, a point dominating

the

Palel-Tamu road

south-east

of Imphal.

The

on July 24

at the cost of

Gurkha

< The little

hill

was taken 112

casualties.

desperate battle for the

town of Kohima.

2679

< Two Japanese

tanks knocked

out by Rifleman Ganju Lama of the 117th Gurkha Rifles. This action, part of the 17th Indian Division's struggle around Bishenpur against the Japanese

33rd Division, won

Lama

the

Victoria Cross.

> The

Garrison Hill battlefield

Kohima. V Gurkhas clear up Scraggy after the short, sharp action at

that

won

it

for the British.

Tokyo

The Japanese collapse As the fighting for Kohima went on, Mutaguchi was issuing orders of the day appealing to all ranks, saying that the throne of the Emperor depended on them and so on. But this did not move the intelligent and worldly-wise Sato. Mutaguchi sent staff officers to see him, but Sato took no notice of them. On April 30 Sato signalled again, pointing out the hopelessness of his position. These signals continued until on June 1 Sato signalled "Propose retreating from Kohima with rearguard." Mutaguchi replied "Retreat and I will court-marshal you." Sato replied "Do as you please I will bring you down with me." This gives some idea of the division and state of mind of the

Japanese force commanders, who were fighting against odds at Kohima and Imphal. Sato was quite adamant as he saw his men staggering back half naked, without ammunition and weapons, and relying on bamboo shoots and roots for their sustenance. 4e was determined that Mutaguchi shoult be brought back to 2682

for court-marshal for basic neglect

A

Troops wait on a forward

airfield in the

of administration.

Imphal

hills

One of Miyazaki with 750 of his best the most noteworthy features of and fittest men to form a rearguard the campaign was the way in south of Kohima, which had now been which Allied air superiority cleared by the 2nd Division, and re- allowed supplies and

Sato

before going into action.

left

treated.

The

rest

of his

division,

all

supplies having been stopped by the Chindits, ceased to exist and melted

away.

Around Imphal, however, very heavy fighting continued. With their two new divisional commanders, the 15th Division

and 33rd Divisions were attacking Scoones from all directions, and it was only as a result of the skill and high morale of his divisions, coupled with the technical superiority of his tanks, the R.A.F., and the 8th Medium Artillery Regiment, that he could keep at bay the fanatical assaults of these Japanese.

worth digressing here

to point out soldiers well-trained that defence against who are quite prepared to take part in suicidal attacks is quite different from defence against reasonable men who, when they see a situation is hopeless, will withdraw or surrender. This was one It is

reason

why commanders who came from

reinforcements to be flown

in.

the European theatre took some time to settle down to the new type of tactics. Their enemy in this theatre had not only to be outmanoeuvred, beaten, and have their weapons overcome, but they themselves had to be destroyed one by one. From a distance, in London and Washington, it appeared that IV Corps was not

making

sufficient effort to fight its

way

and some criticism was received on but IV Corps had also to expend and disperse men to protect airfields and stores against suicide attacks and so was not quite free to launch the strong offensive towards Ukhrul which it had been ordered to make. Both the 20th and 23rd Divisions had been ordered to capture Ukhrul, but both had made out,

this count,

A Lieutenant-General G.A.P. Scoones, commander of IV Corps in the

Imphal- Kohima

area.

> The battle of Imphal plain where, unlike the Japanese, the Allies

had

air support

the benefit of efficient and supply drops.

progress. The 2nd Division continued its advance down the road and on June 22 contact little

was made between the two corps

at

Milestone 109, just north of the Imphal plain. Stopford had advanced 70 miles

from Kohima but Scoones had fought less than ten miles uphill out of the plain. The monsoon was now in full spate, but Slim ordered the two corps to pursue. This was easier said than done. The Japanese 15th Division, suffering severely from disease and lack of supplies, as the Chindits had cut their communications east to the railway, was in a very bad way. But it managed to hold out at Ukhrul and had prevented the pincer movement which Slim had designed to cut it off. The 33rd Division, with its new commander, was in better shape and was fighting well on the roads running south to Kalemyo and Kalewa. The 19th Indian Division had joined the British 2nd Division in its advai:ice south so that the Allied forces had managed to collect the equivalent of nine divisions with overwhelming air superiority against the Japanese three divisions and the I.N. A. brigade. As the monsoon wore on, the Japanese defeat became more com-

2683

2684

plete as a result of disease and lack of supplies. The British have the reputation of not being good in pursuit, and there was undoubtedly a slackening in followup, but the British commanders felt that the monsoon was completing their victory. Chandra Bhose's I.N. A. melted away,

cluding 30,502 killed, missing, or dead of

returnflightsthetransportaircraft(R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F.) evacuated 13,000 casualties and 43,000 non-combatants. The total number of reinforcements carried is difficult to calculate, as space was always made available to take in extra men. But 1,540 sorties were flown to move the 5th Division, the 7th Division (33rd and 89th Brigades), and the 4th Brigade of the 2nd Division to the Central Front. The Lushai Brigade and the 23rd Brigade were wholly, and XXXIII Corps was partially, supplied by air during their advance. Between March 10 and July 30, R.A.F. fighters of the 3rd T.A.F. flew 18,860 sorties and those of the U.S.A.A.F. 10,800 sorties, losing 130 R.A.F. and 40 U.S. A.A.F. aircraft. The majority of these 29,660 sorties flown was for close air support of troops on the ground. During the same period the J. A.A.F. flew 1,750

disease.

sorties.

Victory at Kohima/Imphal would probably not have been possible without absolute air superiority, air supply, and

This gives some idea of the Allied dominance of the air and the importance of the construction of all-weather airfields on the ground in this campaign. In spite of their evident superiority in numbers, all ranks of the British and Indian units had fought hard and very well, and had learnt to trust each other.

Sato returned accusing Mutaguchi of negligence and incompetance, stating that his division had received no ammunition or supplies for six weeks. whilst

Mutaguchi had on May 15 moved his headquarters to Tamu, and it was only then when he saw the condition of his men and experienced the absolute dominance of the air by the R.A.F. that he realised the extent to which he was being defeated. Of the 88,000 Japanese (including reinforcements) who had crossed the Irrawaddy, 53,505 became casualties, in-

close air support. Deliveries to IV Corps on the Imphal plain between April 18 and June 30 totalled 18,824 tons of stores of all sorts and at least 12,561 personnel. On their

A a

Private

member

Reg Maycox

(left),

of a small patrol being

briefed by its company commander (with pipe).

< Men of the 5th Indian Division (Major-General H. R. Briggs) take the 8,000-foot Kennedy Peak on the Tiddim-Fort White road as the British push south

from Imphal.

2685

V Kohima after the bottle. "^ V ^aga hill people itjspect ment abandoned by the Japanese as they were forced off Garrison Hill. V > Mules are ferried across the swift Manipiir river on special rafts, which prevent the mules seeing the water and eqw':

panicking. Overleaf: the

A

Kohima

hands.

Japanese fox-hole area,

now

in

in

Allied

British and Indian casualties during the battles of Imphal and Kohima were just under 16,700, of which approximately a quarter were incurred at Kohima. In spite of strict medical and anti-malarial

precautions, sickness caused more than 12 times the number of battle casualties, although many of those who went sick could return to their units. After Imphal was relieved on June 22, Slim reformed his forces on that front. IV Corps, with the 17th and 20th Divisions

who had been holding years,

was withdrawn

the line for two

to India for a refit.

The 50th Parachute Brigade was also withdrawn. Slim moved his own headquarters into Imphal and ordered StopXXXIII Corps to continue the pursuit of the Japanese 33rd Division southwards. XXXIII Corps now consisted of the British 2nd, 5th and 20th Indian, and 11th East African Divisions. Movement through the mountains in the monsoon, coupled with extensive demolitions ford's

by the Japanese 33rd Division, slowed the British advance to a snail's pace, so that the Chindwin was not reached or crossed until early December, by which time Northern Combat Area Command's British 36th Division (Festing) had advanced down the railway from Mogaung to within 100 miles north of Mandalay. This "turned" the front of the Japanese facing XXXIII Corps so that the former swung back facing north, with their axis

on Kalewa,

The Japanese 15th Army had been beaten. The Allies were now on the dry plains of Burma where tanks, artillery, and aircraft could be used to the maximum effect. The time was ripe for the ejection of the Japanese from Burma. The orders given to the Supreme Commander, Lord Louis Mountbatten, by the Chiefshad been fulfilled. He now renew orders to drive the Japanese Burma completely, by advancing on Mandalay and then on Rangoon.

of-Staff

ceived out of

2688

Victory in Burma by Brigadier Michael Calvert

i^^-TL .^^S> a ^-^ r^^

1^ _.->i^

^

i'

••

-

^^M S;^" "^^Si^li^.'

i

Q'T

r^::

fo-

^

I

>*

^^ .•'V: JW***'*®*''^

!:'?>:*'*•''

Japanese divisions occupying eastern and central China. Whilst the operations described here were going on, the Japanese, incensed by American air attacks from China on shipping in the South China Sea and as far north as Japan itself, attacked and overran the Chinese provinces of Kwangsi and Hunan, an area about the size of France. It must also be

Previous page: Machine gunners on Pagoda Hill during the battle for Fort Dufferin,

Mandalay

This immensely strong fortress, which was surrounded by a moat 40 feet wide, had walls measuring 23 feet high and 30 feet thick (each one was a mile in

The 19th Indian Division began its assault on March 8, but the Japanese 60th Regiment held out under fierce length).

and almost constant bombardment until the 20th. A Advancing slowly southward through the Kaladan valley, a supply column of the 81st West African Division winds its way along a jungle track.

There has been a tendency among some historians of the Burma campaign to neglect the Allied fighting forces which operated on either side of their advance and give the impression that it was the 14th Army alone who confronted the Japanese armies when they advanced to Mandalay and Rangoon. This, of course, was not the case and it was the Northern Combat Area Command under Stilwell with his three and then five Chinese divisions, coupled with first the Chindit operations and then the

down from Imphal

operations of the British 36th Division which first penetrated the plains of north Burma and turned the flank of the Japanese 15th Army facing the 14th

Army. The ill-equipped 12 Chinese divisions on the River Salween have been denigrated for their lack of initiative and attacking spirit. But it must be remembered that these particular Chinese divisions each amounted to only a weak British brigade in strength, and from their point of view they were hundreds of miles away in a remote corner of China, facing one of the swiftest and most incalculable rivers in the world, the Salween, while the best armies and technical weapons available were being used to combat the 25

2690

remembered that the objectives given to Mountbatten and Stilwell for 1944, to which Stilwell stuck, was the capture of Mogaung and Myitkyina and an area south sufficient to protect those two towns, so that a road and petrol pipeline could be opened to China and help keep her in the war. Stilwell had responsibilities to China as well as South-East Asia. General Giffard had judged that the Arakan coastal terrain was an area in which it was uneconomic to operate and had, therefore, decided to stop any further attempt to advance there. But when Mountbatten, who was still without sufficient landing craft to capture Rangoon, was given permission to conquer Burma from the north, he found that he was faced with a big logistic problem. Once the 14th Army, with its 260,000 troops, crossed the Irrawaddy, their communications to a railhead and air bases in Assam lengthened to such an extent that they became uneconomic. It was, therefore, necessary to capture and develop airfields along the coast of easily

Burma which could

by

be supplied

sea, so that Slim's 14th

Army

could in turn be supplied from there by air. Thus plans were made to expand the port and airfields at Chittagong and to capture Akyab and Ramree Islands. The 14th Army had started to cross the Chindwin early in December 1944 and Major-General T. W. Rees's 19th Indian Division, which had never been in action before, quickly crossed the formidable Zibyu Taungdan Range and made contact at Wuntho on the railway with Festing's British 36th Division.

''Extended Capital Lieutenant-General Slim at

??

first

imagined

would hold a line from Kalewa along the Zibyu Taungdan Range, which was immediately in front of his 14th Army. But Rees's rapid advance and link-up with Festing gave him information that the Japanese were not going to hold any area in force east of that the Japanese

the Irrawaddy. Slim had made extensive plans for an operation which he had called "Capital", whose objective was to capture the area west of the Irrawaddy. As soon as he realised that the advance of Stilwell's forces had made the Japanese face two ways, Slim made a new plan. This new plan was called "Extended Capital". It must be realised here that each successive plan had not only to be devised and approved by both the 11th

Army Group and South-East Asia Command planners in Calcutta and Ceylon respectively, but also had to obtain the agreement of first the Chiefs-of-Staff in London and then the Combined Chiefsof-Staff in Washington, with the hope that Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking would also agree. This complicated planning procedure, although it was necessary to ensure that men, stores, weapons, and equipment were made available and that there would be some co-ordination between the four Supreme Commanders, Mountbatten, Chiang Kai-shek, MacArthur, and Nimitz, fighting the Japanese war, both tended to delay operations and often failed to catch up with events. So Slim carried on ahead of approval. "Extended Capital", in brief, entailed a

advance by Lieutenant-Gen- A Campaigning in the jungle eral M. G. N. Stopford's XXXIII Corps meant using whatever means were available - or capable of from Kalewa via Yeu and Monywa onto coping with conditions. Royal Mandalay, but included a left-hook with Welch Fusiliers are here crossing fairly direct

Rees's 19th Division crossing the Irra- the Nanyke Chaung with waddy and advancing down the left bank pack mules. on to the town of Mandalay itself. In this

their

way XXXIII Corps could keep

in touch with Stilwell's N.C.A.C. The second and most important part of "Extended Capital" was for IV Corps (Lieutenant-General F. W. Messervy) to move due south down the Gangaw valley towards Pauk and Pakokku below the confluence of the Chindwin and Irrawaddy, cross the Irrawaddy, and advance due east on to the rail, road, and air communications centre of Meiktila. This change of plan meant some swapping of divisions between XXXIII Corps and IV Corps, but this was quickly done on paper. The 14th Army would now, during the fine weather, be debouching into the dry zone of Burma where the "going" was good for armour and the air forces had good visibility for ground attack on troops and their communications. A 1,150-foot Bailey bridge was built over the Chindwin at Kalewa and XXXIII

Corps,

consisting

of

the

British

2nd 2691

H. Kimura replaced M. Kawabe as commander of the Burma Area Army. Lieutenant-General S. Katamura took over com-

Division, the 20th Indian Division, the 254th Indian Tank Brigade, and the 268th Indian Infantry Brigade, advanced with deliberation towards Yeu and Shwebo in the north and Mony wa and Myinmu in the south, with the 19th Division, also under command, crossing the Irrawaddy and causing the initial threat to Mandalay.

mand of the 15th Army from R. Mutaguchi, who was sent home in disgrace but, in martialled.

IV Corps under Messervy decided to make the 28th East African Brigade and the locally recruited "Lushai" Brigade be the vanguard of his corps down the Gangaw valley, with a cover plan that they were another Chindit-type penetration force moving around the Japanese S;4¥»* '*>: flanks. Behind them would move the hardhitting 7th and 17th Indian Divisions and

AA

moves up for the

final assault on Fort Duffer in in Mandalay.

>A

Two members of the Burma police interrogate villagers during the hunt for Japanese stragglers near Mandalay.

>VA

Bailey bridge being

assembled

in sections, later to be

floated to the crossing point for

W

Army. > 62nd Motorised Brigade advances along the Myingyanthe 14th

Meiktila road.

V

The advance

Mandalay

to

Tank Brigade.

the 255th Indian

British Stuart light tank

By February 1, 1944, XXXIII Corps was on the right bank of the Irrawaddy. By February 13, IV Corps was reaching its jumping-off positions along the Irrawaddy, south of Myinmu. Meanwhile it would be opportune to review how the Japanese saw the situation and how the operations taking place on both flanks of the 14th Army affected their advance. After the failure of the "HA-GO" offensive, some changes were made in the Japanese command. Lieutenant-General

Kimura's orders were to cover the strategic areas of Burma as his main job, but, without prejudice to this task, to try to interrupt if possible Allied communications with China. He still had three armies under command and, with the arrival of the 49th Division from Korea, these numbered a total often divisions and two independent mixed brigades. But these figures give no indication of the real strength of his force. For instance, the four divisions making up the 15th Army, which had been largely destroyed in north

Burma and Imphal, now numbered

included artillery regiments with less than half their complement of guns, and other ancillary units.

Against this 15th Army strength of 21,000 men, plus a few local reinforceMid July

36

Br.

Olv.

flown

in

}

Late June 3 W. Afr. Bde.

CAPITAL"

.

Myitkyina

NEW 1ST ARMY,. L

Br. 36 DIv. + Chinese artillery

3 .-S'-

c

Road (LIAOYUEH-

XXXItf Corps (Stbpford) ••

_ :

Ledo (Stilwell) jn

Chin. 20

•'

Army Group

SHANG)

Banmauk

Tengchung,

-

S?Dlv. j«u(v».

NEW 6TH ARMY

i Br.

CHINA

'(SUI^LI-JEJ{>«*

Indawgyi

'inbaw INDIA

3J.'***

CHIN. Y

FORCE

(WEIU-HUANO) Chin, 11 Army ^^ Group

qfv.

Lungling

Contact

4 ^# ^4e

Dec. 15

TIddIm

January 11 Kalemy(

^>.

\Unnan

:

• Mangshih

,*^ "^ •*

Nov 20

^ g5r?"«

W^tlng

19 DIv. establishes

bridgeheads

?p.V. ••*'

l*^

Mongyu

Contact Jan,

Corps

.

(Messervy) \

__

%

:

E. Afr.

Namhpakka

Kyaukmyaung *

%8

3t«*

u-r

Thabeikkyin Br. !V

only

21,400 men. This total was split up between the 53rd Division from Mogaung (4,500), 31st Division (7,000), 33rd Division (5,400), and 15th Division (4,500). These numbers

/To Myitkyina

OPERATION "EXTENDED

he was never court-

spite of Sato's threat,

"Singu

Bde. followed

by7and17lnd.

Div.

Gangaw ,Maymyo

Jan. 10 '9a'"e

BURMA _

un

FebAary

Tilin • 2(1 IN ARMY (SAKURAI)

.)AP

KILOMETRES

2692

Aval 21

Lashio

V

Mylngyan

f

^

Kyaukse

Afr.

Coritact Mar. 24

Bde.V

ALLIED ATTACKS, JUNE 1944/MARCH 1945

established

*,MyltcTie^

N Nyaungu

NORTHERN COMBAT AREA COMMAND ^-^ (STILWELL, SULTAN FROM OCTOBER 24) CHINESE Y FORCE BRITISH 14TH ARMY '^

•

•Chauk Meiktila

Thazi

60

.Mandalay Mar. 9/21

Pyawbwe 100

^*'- '

dgehead

Brlci

FeDruary14 Bridgehead

f

Selkpyu

MILES

Mandalay

established

7 and Ind. Divs. 's-

28 E.

•

MILES

KILOMETRES

80 120

ments and corps and army troops, Slim's 14th Army of six divisions, two independent brigades, plus the lines of communication troops east of the Chindwin and two tank brigades, totalled a ration strength of 260,000 men. With this overwhelming superiority, tactics were not so important for victory as the logistics of manoeuvring such a force into position when so far away from reliable bases. On the Northern and Salween fronts, Stilwell's five Chinese divisions (kept efficiently up to strength), the British 36th Division, "Mars" Force, (successors to Merrill's Marauders) and the 12 Chinese divisions in Yunnan, were faced by Lieutenant-General M. Honda's 33rd Army, consisting of the 18th, 56th, and 49th Divisions, and the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade. All these formations, except the 49th Division, were also now very much diminished by earlier opera-

The 49th Division was Burma Area Army's reserve, of which one regiment was sent to support the 15th Army on the Irrawaddy and the remaining two regitions.

ments were deployed behind the 33rd Army on the Burma Road near Maymyo. The 2nd Division, which had been guarding the coast of south Burma, had been ordered to move to Indo-China where the Japanese had decided to take over complete control from the French colonial government. Stilwell's forces at this time consisted of the Chinese New 1st Army (30th and 38th Division), the Chinese Now 6th Army (14th, 22nd, and 50th Divisions), the British 36th Division, and the "Mars" Task Force (American 475th Infantry and

124th Cavalry Regiments, Chinese 1st Regiment, and American 612th Field Artillery

Regiment

(Pack)), totalling about

140,000 troops. On the coast the Japanese 28th Army still had the 54th and 55th Divisions (reinforced by the 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade), whose task was to prevent Christison's XV Corps from ad-

vancing over the An and Taungup passes to attack the Japanese communications in the Irrawaddy valley in the rear of the Japanese armies facing north. Opposing these two depleted Japanese divisions were the 25th and 26th Indian Divisions, the 81st and 82nd West African Divisions, and an aggressive and efficient 3rd Commando Brigade, comprising Nos. 1, 5, 42, and 44 Commandos. In all, the forces totalled some 120,000 men. Later an East African brigade was added.

2693

'forking conditions for the Burma were usually

R.A.F. in

always casual. Armourers, dressed in typical Burma kit, bring up a rocket for loading onto a Hurricane based on an advanced aiistJip in difficult,

V

central

>

Burma.

Flight mechanics at work on a

Thunderbolt in November 1944. > > The results of their work: direct hits on road and railway bridges at Monywa on the Chindwin. A detour round the damaged bridge can be clearly seen.

^'^^-r-^^^ *>!il

«!r^!'^

^

The Allied administrative situation was that the 14th Army could still be supplied as far as the Irrawaddy as long as it was not more than the equivalent of seven divisions totalling 260,000 troops, but after that the numbers must be decreased to a strength of about five divisions. In the latter stages air supply must come from the coastal airfields and not from the

Imphal and Agatarla fields. As it happened Akyab was occupied on January 2 and Ramree Island was fully occupied by February 22. The Allies were again in a dominant position in the air at the beginning of 1945. They had a first-line strength of 48 fighter and bomber squadrons. These consisted of 17 fighter, 12 fighter-bomber, three fighter-reconnaissance, ten heavy bomber, five medium

January

bomber, and one light bomber squadrons. Together these totalled 4,464 R.A.F. and 186 U.S.A.A.F. aircraft. Air Command had four squadrons and 16 transport which four were R.A.F. and These were increased to squadrons in March and totalling a maximum of 500

troop carrier squadrons, of 12 U.S.A.A.F. 19 transport 20 in May, transport aircraft. Yet this air transport strength was

still

insufficient to

meet

all

demands, and

Arakan advance had later to be halted because of the amount of aircraft which the

had

to be diverted to the voracious 14th Army to keep it moving.

Against this air strength the Japanese

had a maximum of 66 aircraft, of which only 50 were serviceable by April 1. The Japanese were still using the same type of aircraft as in 1942-3, and their performance could not compare with the modern British and American aircraft of this period.

Command changes General Stilwell had agreed to serve under the 11th Army Group, but only with the stipulation that when he captured Kamaing he should come under direct command of the Supreme Commander himself. The result was that Mountbatten had now to deal with two army commanders. In order to regulate this position satisfactorily, Mountbatten asked the Chiefs-ofStaff to appoint a Commander-in-Chief Land Forces South-East Asia who had had experience of having satisfactorily commanded American forces in the field. So,

2696

November 1944, the 11th Army Group was abolished and a new headquarters Allied Land Forces South-East Asia (A.L.F.S.E.A.) was formed to command in

land operations against the Japanese Burma. This meant the departure of General Giffard, who had been the architect and prime mover of the victories in

Messervy's race for Meiktila

in

to this date. Lieutenant-General

Sir Oliver Leese,

8th

Army

in Italy,

who had commanded was appointed Com-

made

the 500-yard crossing

safely.

< V A column of men of the 11th East African Division trudges

all

Burma

< A Tied to a boat, two pack mules swim across the Irrawaddy. The entire train

Slim's plan was to destroy the Japanese 15th Army between the hammer of Stopford's

XXXIII Corps advancing on Man-

dalay and the armoured anvil of Messervy's IV Corps which was to capture

along the road to Kalewa. A Casualty Clearing Stations operating just behind the front line were a vital link in the chain of medical care for the wounded. After initial treatment, serious cases were flown out in light aircraft to rear areas. The total army casualties suffered by Britain and her Commonwealth

mander A.L.F.S.E.A.

Meiktila.

Shortly afterwards, Christison's XV Corps, which was mainly concerned in combined operations with the navy along the coast, was taken out of Slim's hands and came directly under the command of

This plan depended on the speed and secrecy of Messervy's 150-mile advance west of the Irrawaddy, whilst Stopford in Burma between 1942 and 1945 held the attention of XV Corps near were 947 officers killed, 1,837 Mandalay. Rees's 19th Division, to the wounded, and 303 missing, British other ranks 5,037, 10,687, north of Mandalay, was still the main and 2,507 ; Indian other ranks attraction for the Japanese. Stopford's 8,235, 28,873, and 8,786; African 20th Division started to cross the Irra- other ranks 858, 3,208, and 200; waddy at Myinmu on February 12 at a and Burmese other ranks 249, point about 30 miles downstream from 129, and 3,052. These give a

Leese, who had had much more experience of seaborne operations. At the same time Slim was relieved of the responsibility of his communications back to India so that he could get on with his tactical land battle without having to worry about administrative problems. It was felt that Slim could best serve the Allies by his undoubted great powers of command and example in the field though he had been largely responsible (with his R.A.F. opposite number) in developing the air supply system in Burma.

Mandalay. This immediately attracted the Japanese, who counter-attacked the bridgehead repeatedly for the next two

grand

total of 15,326 killed, 44,731 wounded, and 14,852 missing. Including the other

services, a total of 31.468 British

and Commonwealth men died in Stopford's British 2nd Division had to the war against Japan 12.4 per cent of the total British and wait for the boats and pontoon rafts used Commonwealth dead. by the 20th Division before they could start to cross on February 21 at Ngazun

weeks.

2697

• ::

In February 1944 the American 5307th Regiment left Ledo heading into northern Burma. Their aim was to disrupt

Japanese communications travelling through the jungle and living off the land.

Casual but tough, two men of the 3rd Battalion take a break.

1.

2.

A

typical "Merrill's

Marauder". 3. After an encounter with the Japanese: removing ammunition from the body of a dead comrade. 4. At Walabum the Marauders fought in conjunction with American and Chinese units of Stilwell's army. For many of them, this was the only occasion when they saw an Allied tank. 5. Emerging from the jungle after two weeks, Marauders meet their

Burmese. Replenishing the water supply. All drinking water was boiled or

first 6.

treated with chlorine tablets in

an 7.

effort to avoid dysentery. Brigadier-General Frank

who dreamed up and led Marauders. Unpacking a parachute

Merrill, the 8.

container of supplies. 9.

There were many such streams

to

be forded,

adding

to the

difficulties of jungle warfare.

10. Inspecting the enemy after an ambush: note the Marauders' Thompson .45 sub-machine guns. 11. In enemy territory: a well-spaced single column moves with guns at the ready.

°-»-3l^aawBji

10.

j^:i^JiP'::

}:

f^-'f

fM.m *><';•»<

A

Mule-power and man-power

bring supplies up from the east

bank of the Chindwin, after an unopposed crossing. > A Men of the 414th Royal Garrison Rifles and 2nd Royal Berkshire Regiment move around Fort Dufferin as the 8112th Frontier Force Regiment prepares to make a frontal attack. The fort was one of the last Japanese strongholds within

Mandalay.

> On the 36th Division 's front near Pinwe, men of a Chinese Heavy Mortar Regiment fuse bombs before

4.2-inch mortar

going into action.

>VA

Priest

105-mm

self-propelled howitzer

is

manned

in a hurry.

< The battles for Meiktila and Mandalay.

2700

from Mandalay. Unfortunately, many of the boats and pontoons had been inadvertently damaged by the 20th Division and the 2nd Division had a difficult crossing. However, these assault crossings achieved the desired at a point 15 miles

effect of attracting the full attention of the tiny Japanese 15th Army, so that when Messervy's 7th Division crossed 90 miles further south on February 13, there was little or no opposition. By the end of February Slim's 14th Army had crossed the 1,000-yard wide swiftflowing Irrawaddy in four places with his northern bridgeheads attracting a violent reaction from the Japanese.

strategic

up his bridgehead at he made his dash to Meiktila. By February 20 Messervy had Messervy

Nyangu

built

before

got his 17th Division and 255th Tank Brigade across the Irrawaddy into his

bridgehead at Nyangu, and was ready to start. Meiktila was 80 miles away across sandy scrub country, broken up by dry river beds. On February 21 Messervy's tanks began to roll. At the same time Major-General G. C. Evans's 7th Division, which had carried out the crossing, was ordered to capture the oil town of Chauk and lead on to Myingyan to the north east. Major-General D. T. Cowan's 17th Division, with its tank brigade, reached the outskirts of Meiktila by the end of February and on March 1, Cowan attacked. Meiktila fell the following day and its airfield on the eastern edge of the town,

which was

and the reinforcement of the defence, was captured on March 3. Cowan did not settle down vital for re-supply

but immediately sent out fighting patrols of tanks and infantry to seek out and find the enemy. At this vital juncture Slim flew in with Messervy to visit Cowan and was present to observe a quite severe Japanese counter-attack, in which the British tanks caused many casualties and dispersed the attackers. Two men in the army commander's party were wounded by Japanese artillery fire but Slim, Messervy, and Cowan stood unmoved on the hilltop like Old Testament prophets whilst their men below gained victory. After a new brigade was flown in Cowan withstood a series of local Japanese counter-attacks. Meanwhile to the north, Stopford, having seen his bridgeheads were secure, made plans for a deliberate advance to capture Mandalay. His plan was that the 19th Division would attack from the north. The 2nd Division would

2701

*•'»-•'

A From their vantage point high on Pagoda Hill, observers look down on the battle raging around Fort Duffer in.

advance through the old capital of Ava along the Irrawaddy from the west and the 20th Division would sweep round the south to attack Mandalay from the south and the south-east. The 19th Division soon penetrated the town but was held up by defences on Mandalay Hill and the battlements of Fort Dufferin. The 2nd Division was delayed amongst the pagodas of Ava, but the 20th Division made good progress around the south where the opposition was negligible. As soon as Slim realised that Mandalay was not held in strength, he ordered the 20th Division to send a column south towards Meiktila, leaving the British 2nd Division to surround it from the south.

What was left of the 15th Army in Mandalay was destroyed by heavy bomber attacks. Mandalay became a bomb trap. Meiktila had fallen on March 1 and Mandalay fell on March 20. At this time the Japanese Intelligence had become completely confused and they did not seem to know what was hitting them and from where. The battles for Meiktila and Mandalay were the death knell of the already depleted 15th Army. In mid-January the Yunnan Armies at

2702

began to advance across the Salween. were soon captured. By January 18 the American "Mars" Force was overlooking the Mandalay-Lashio road at Hsenwi and was last

Namkham and Wamting

carrying out guerrilla raids along it. On January 21 the Ledo Road to China via

Bhamo, Namkham, Muse, and Wamting was opened, followed by the first convoy to China, which arrived at Kunming on February

4.

This date, February 4, 1945, can be said, therefore, to be the date of the completion of the "Quadrant" plan. However, Chiang Kai-shek made this the occasion to start to withdraw his Yunnan armies back into China for the very sensible reason that he wanted now to retake the huge areas of China which the Japanese had recently overrun. This was naturally supported by the Americans, who required these areas for air bases to support their advance towards the invasion of Japan. But some of the more parochial commanders in A.L.F.S.E.A. tended to denigrate the Chinese for marching away from the "battlefields in Burma", perhaps forgetting that the Chinese had been fighting since 1937.

The

final stages

Mandalay may have

fallen,

but Stilwell's

forces were still active. By March 1 the Chinese 30th Division had occupied Hsenwi and the British 36th Division was crossing the Shweli at Myitson and

Mongmit against the now 3,000-strong 18th Division. The British received 360 casualties during this crossing.

On March 6 the Chinese 38th Division occupied Lashio and by March 24 the Burma Road from Mandalay to Lashio was in Allied hands. The British 36th Division, having captured the ruby mine town of Mogok on March 19, moved to Mandalay when the Northern Combat Area Command ceased to exist. The American "Mars" Force, the worthy successors of Merrill's Marauders, was moved to China to be dispersed into training cadres to rebuild the Chinese Army along the same lines as Stilwell's

Chinese New Armies. Thus ended the American army involvement in the war in Burma. It can be said with truth that the few representatives of the American army, Merrill's Marauders and "Mars" Force, gave a very good impression by their fighting capabilities and thrustful initiative to their Allies fighting in

Burma.

Parts of the Japanese 33rd Army had been moved from the Lashio Road at the end of the Meiktila battle in a vain attempt to save the town. But even with reinforcement, the last-minute this

No. 221 Group (Air Vice-Marshal S. F. Vincent) was in support throughout and attacks on

which

2,085 were Japanese positions or their

flew 4,360 sorties, of

communications, during which 1,560 tons of bombs were dropped.

The 14th Army was now all set for its dash to capture Rangoon and obtain a port before the monsoon. The opposition to its advance was now negligible from the

A < On the road to Mandalay, January 1945: British troops^dig in at the River

Mu

weir,'

anticipating a Japanese counter-attack. A Lieutenant-General Sir William Slim, commander of the 14th Army, stands inside Fort Dufferin.

V March flies

1945: the Union Jack

once more over Fort

Dufferin.

battered Japanese forces. The build-up of Allied naval forces resulted in the command of the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal being regained by the Allies by the beginning of 1945. This made possible not only the more rapid reinforcement of India because troopships were able to sail independently without escort, but amphibious operations could now be undertaken along the

outnumbered their enemy by about ten to one on the ground and about twenty to one in tanks. IV Corps casualties from the crossing of the Irrawaddy to the end of March were 835 killed, 3,174 wounded, and 90 missing. The high proportion of wounded was because in the Indian Army, anyone who British forces

incurred a wound obtained a pension, and so the smallest wounds were noted, whereas in the British units there was no point in worrying about or recording minor wounds. During these battles IV Corps had 26 tanks destroyed and 44

damaged. XXXIII Corps, in

capture of Mandaand 4,933 wounded, with 120 missing. It had one more division than IV Corps and was in action for six weeks before IV Corps had crossed the its

lay, lost 1,472 killed

Irrawaddy, casualties

is

that the proportion of comparable.

so

2703

A Though the end of the war found the Allies still in Burma, they nevertheless moved swiftly to take the surrender of Japanese troops elsewhere in South-East Asia. These officers from the

garrison in Kuala Lumpur, Malaya, are laying down their swords under the terms of the surrender. Vultee Vengeance dive-bomber returns to its base, a

>AA

forward

airfield, after a sortie against Japanese positions. > V After an attack by R.A.F. Beaufighters, steam pours from the wrecked engine of a Japanese

train in

Burma.

Burma without fear of heavy losses to submarines, and without the need for powerful naval covering forces. coast of

Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Christison was given two tasks to carry out.

When waddy

the 14th

Army

crossed the Irrain February 1945 their supply lines

to Assam had become uneconomic. It was therefore necessary to capture airfields along the coast of Arakan. from which the 14th Army could be re-supplied during

advance to Meiktila and south to Rangoon. Without these airfields and the its

necessary sea ports to land stores, the 14th Army could not advance south. Fortunately the Japanese, as a result of the pressure of the 81st West African Division east of them, had evacuated

Akyab on December

31 so that Christi-

XV

Corps landed unopposed on January 2. He immediately arranged to son's

re-open the port of Akyab for supplies. The total strength of the British portion of A.L.F.S.E.A. (that is not including the Americans and Chinese) was, by the beginning of 1945, 971,828 men, including 127,139 British troops, 581,548 Indians, 44,988 East Africans, 59,878 West Africans, and 158,275 civilian labourers.

2704

Of

these, 260,000 were in the 14th Army, including its line of communications troops. It was calculated, therefore, that in order to supply the 14th Army as well as Corps, whose secondary r61e was to try to contain all Japanese forces (in-

XV

cluding the 54th Division and remnants of the 55th Division) in the area and to try to prevent their being re-deployed in the Irrawaddy valley, it was necessary to

open two new ports. The first was at Akyab, and the second at Kyaukpyu on Ramree Island. From these two ports and from Chittagong the divisions of the 14th Army in central Burma, and the formations of XV Corps operating on the Arakan coast could be maintained if the ports could be built up to a capacity sufficient to handle the necessary sea lift tonnage required.

was calculated that the port of Akyab would have to maintain 46,000 men, as It

well as the construction stores required for two all-weather airfields and the tonnage necessary to build up a 20,000ton reserve for the 14th Army. This would require a maximum sea lift of 850 tons a

day in February and March

down

to 600 tons in

1945,

dropping

May when

the un-

2705

necessary formations of XV Corps, having achieved their object, were sent back to India.

In the same manner it was calculated that the port of Kyaukpyu must maintain 36,000 men from February to May and handle stores sufficient to construct two all-weather airfields and build up a stockpile of 22,000 tons for the 14th Army. The daily sealift required would be 450 tons in February, rising to 650 tons from March to

May.

Lieutenant-General M. Kawabe had ordered the 28th Army (Lieutenant-General S. Sakurai) to send its 2nd Division, with a large part of the army's motor transport, to the 33rd Army, which was facing the 14th Army, and to hold with his remaining two divisions (54th and 55th) the Irrawaddy delta and the Arakan coast up to 35 miles north of Kyaukpyu. Later the 2nd Division was to move to

Indo-China.

Sakurai was told to hold the offshore islands of Cheduba and Ramree for as long as possible. The removal of the Japanese 2nd Division (on its way to Indo-China), which had previously been responsible for the delta and the remainder of the Burmese coastline further south, meant that Sakurai had to withdraw his 55th Division to protect that area, leaving the 54th Division to face Christison's XV Corps. Lieutenant-General S. Miyazaki's 54th Division had received orders in December 1944 to protect the rear of the 15th Army in the Irrawaddy valley from any risks of XV Corps cutting their communications

between Meiktila and Rangoon. It will be remembered that Miyazaki had carried out the rear guard action of 33rd Division during its wholesale retreat from Kohima brilliantly.

To carry out to hold the

his orders,

Miyazaki had

An and Taungup

passes at

all

and then the 82nd West African Division advanced slowly down the Kaladan, Miyazaki decided that he would use a covering force to delay these two divisions for as long as possible whilst basing his main defence in the north at Kangaw, 40 miles east of Akyab. His other strongpoint would be at Taungup itself. Ten miles west of Kangaw lay costs.

As the

81st

the Myebon peninsula. Before Akyab had fallen Christison had already made plans to land on the Myebon peninsula. XV Corps consisted of the 25th and 26th Indian Divisions, the 81st and 82nd West

2706

African Divisions, and the 3rd Commando Brigade (which was to be increased to four Royal Marine and Army Commandos). Christison now had plenty of landing craft, reinforced with locally constructed craft. Now that the Royal Navy had regained command of the Bay of Bengal and possible for

Akyab had

fallen,

it

was

XV Corps to advance south. The Myebon peninsula and Ramree Island were held by Japanese outposts covering main defences on the mainland. On January 14, the joint force commanders (Rear-Admiral B. C. S. Martin [Flag Officer Force "W"], LieutenantGeneral Christison, and Air Vice-Marshal

the

The Earl

of Bandon) decided that the 26th Division would assault Ramree on January 21 and the 25th Division (MajorGeneral C. E. N. Lomax) and 3rd Commando Brigade (Brigadier C. R. Hardy) would occupy the Myebon peninsula and strike east towards Kangaw to cut the Japanese 54th Division's communications to the north. The 3rd Commando Brigade would spearhead the attack on Myebon with the 74th Brigade passing through. A reconnaissance of the beaches at

a special boating party found A -^ Improvised gun train in that a line of coconut stakes had been action, carrying a detachment of Rajput gunners escorted by men driven in just below the low-water mark of the West Yorkshire Regiment. about 300 yards offshore. So before the V
Myebon by

2707

Shortly afterwards No. 5 Commando landed and passed through No. 42 Commando to widen the beach-head. Nos. 1 and 44 (Royal Marine) Commandos also inadvertently landed on the same beach and pushed ahead. By this time the tanks belonging to the 19th Lancers were ashore. The Royal Marines of No. 42 Commando occupied Myebon village on the 13th and

A

Major-General Wynford Rees, commander of the 19th Indian Division.

the village of Kantha was also captured. At this stage the 74th Brigade (Brigadier J. E. Hirst) took up the advance and overcame the remaining opposition and the Commando Brigade was withdrawn to prepare for the Kangaw operation. By the 17th the whole of the Myebon peninsula was captured. The 82nd West African Division had relieved 81st Division, which was still in the Kaladan valley. The 82nd Division

was now commanded by Major-General H. C. Stockwell, who had previously

V

The drive

to

Rangoon.

commanded one

of the aggressive British

36th Division's two brigades. Advancing south, Stockwell occupied the ancient capital of Arakan, Myohaung, on January 25 and applied pressure on the Japanese facing him. Christison was anxious to cripple the 54th Division by cutting its

communications at Kangaw.

The joint force commanders rather over-insured in the force that they used to overcome opposition on Ramree and Cheduba Islands. But at this time of the war it was common policy for the Allies to deploy as much materiel strength as possible to save Allied lives if that materiel strength could be easily brought to bear without too much delay. The naval component of this combined operation included the battleship Queen Elizabeth, the cruiser Phoebe, the destroyers Rapid and Napier, the Royal Naval sloop Flamingo, and the R.I.N, sloop Kistna. No. 224 Group supported the attack with its Thunderbolts and Mitchells. Prior to the attack 85 Liberators of the Strategic Air Command bombarded the beaches and its surrounds. After the naval and air bombardment, the 71st Brigade (Brigadier R. C. CottrellHill), with a squadron of tanks, a regiof field artillery, and two companies of the Frontier Force machine gun bat-

ment

landed unopposed at 0942 on January 21 west of the town of Kyaukpyu. The leading motor launch and landing craft both struck mines and were blown up, causing some confusion, but the remainder of the landing proceeded withtalion,

out opposition or further delay. Next day the 4th Brigade (Brigadier J. F. R. Forman) took over the beachhead and the 71st Brigade moved south. On January 26 the Royal Marine Commandos landed unopposed on the neighbouring Cheduba Island. By January 31 Lomax had landed the remainder of his 25th Division on Ramree Island. The opposition from the Japanese outposts increased and the Indian brigades, with tanks, slowly and methodically cleared the island until Ramree town itself was occupied on June 9. On this day, under cover of an attack by the remains of the Japanese 5th Air Division, a Japanese destroyer (accompanied by 20 launches) rushed to the rescue of the Japanese and took off over 500 men. By January 17 resistance on the island ended. The 22nd East African Brigade, which

had come under Christison's command, arrived to garrison Ramree and Cheduba Islands so that the 26th Division would be 2708

available to land at Toungup. The fight at Kangaw turned out to be one of the bloodiest and most savage of the Burma campaign. But this fight succeeded in crippling a major part of Miyazaki's 54th Division, which was one of the few divisions in Burma at this time which had not suffered a defeat, was not too depleted, and was still full of fight. Major-General G. N. Wood's plan for the capture of Kangaw was for the 3rd Commando Brigade (Nos. 1, 5, 42, and 44 Commandos) to seize a bridgehead on the east bank of the Diangbon Chaung two miles south-west of Kangaw. Then his 51st Brigade would pass through the bridgehead and join forces with the 74th Brigade, which was advancing from Kantha across the Min Chaung from the Myebon peninsula. The Japanese would find themselves hemmed in between the two Indian brigades and the West African 82nd Division advancing from the north. Hardy, commanding the 3rd Commando Brigade, wished to go by the indirect route, which he had reconnoitred, and advance up the Diangbon Chaung from

Myebon

the south and not via the

peninsula, although this meant a trip of 27 miles by boat. On January 21, 50 vessels (including the R.I.N, sloop Narbada, a minesweeper, a Landing Craft Tank (carrying a bulldozer and R.E. equipment), four L.C.I.s, 22 L.C.A.s, and some "Z" craft carrying artillery, anchored off the southern entrance of the Diangbon Chaung. The "Z" craft were large but

manoeuvrable lighters whose decks had been strengthened with steel so that a troop of 25-pounders could fire from them. The Diangbon Chaung, as Hardy predicted, had not been mined and the Japanese did not see the approach of the V Patching a damaged bridge attack. The Royal Navy and R.I.N, bom- with a "scissors" section. Carried barded the beaches, supported by the on a turretless Covenanter or "Scissors medium bombers of No. 224 Group, which Valentine tank, this 1" Bridge, 30-foot, No. could also laid a smokescreen. Surprise was span a gap of 30 feet and bear a complete and No. 1 Commando pushed on weight of up to 30 tons. They to Hill 170 which was to be the scene of were widely used in the heavy fighting. By nightfall No. 5 Com- North-West European and mando had landed, with the next day Nos. Mediterranean theatres, and were 44 (R.M.) and 42 (R.M.) Commandos. The Japanese on the spot counter-

attacked fiercely and efforts to infiltrate

particularly useful in Burma, where they made a real contribution to the 14th Army's swift advance.

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2709

A Pathans of the Punjab Regiment move against Japanese positions during the 19th Indian Division's drive forward on March 1. > Some of the thousands of Japanese who died during their tenacious, bitterly-fought defence in

Burma. wounded prisoner

>> A

escorted by two of his Indian captors.

2710

the village of Kangaw were rebuffed. The Japanese heavily bombarded the beaches with field artillery on the 24th and 25th, but on the 26th the 51st Brigade (Brigadier R. A. Hutton) landed with a troop of medium tanks followed by the 53rd Brigade (Brigadier B. C. H. Gerty). As soon as he heard of the landing,

General Miyazaki ordered Major-General T. Koba, commanding the "Matsu" Detachment, to repel the invaders and keep open the road. Koba, as a colonel, had

commanded the two battalion column which had so successfully driven the 81st West African Division out of the Kaladan in March 1944. The "Matsu" Detachment consisted of the 54th Infantry Group, comprising three infantry battalions and an artillery battalion. Koba arrived on January 31 and immediately launched a heavy attack on Hill 170, which was held by Nos. 1 and 42 Royal Marine Commandos, commanded by Colonel Peter

Young, Hardy's second

in

command.

The Commandos, supported by three tanks, repulsed Koga's most determined Attack and counter-attack waged around Hill 170 for 36 hours. The "Matsu" Detachment finally launched a pole-charge tank hunting party of enassaults.

gineers.

They destroyed two tanks and

damaged the

third with a loss of 70 of

own men

killed. By this time the 74th Brigade was moving in from the north-west: but not before the Commandos had killed over 300 Japanese at a loss to themselves of 66 killed, 15 missing, and 259 wounded. Lieutenant Knowland, of No. 1 Commando, won a posthumous Victoria Cross for his part in the fighting. As soon as Miyazaki heard that Ramree Island had been occupied he feared that the 26th Division might land in his rear, so he ordered the "Matsu" Detachment to break off the engagement and withdraw to the An Pass, which was vital to the 54th Division's communications. By February 18, the 25th Indian Division had relieved the Commando brigade. Miyazaki had received heavy casualties but had skillfully avoided the destruction

their

of his force. It will be remembered that during February IV Corps and XXXIII Corps had crossed the Irrawaddy and by March 1 Meiktila had fallen. Also at this time the Chinese were asking for an air lift of their

forces in Burma to take part in the offensive to regain the two provinces that they had lost a few months previously. Transport aircraft, therefore, were at a premium and S.E.A.C. decided that .air supply to XV Corps must cease. Lieutenant-General Sir Oliver Leese (C.-in-C. A.L.F.S.E.A.) therefore decided to withdraw the 25th and 26th Divisions to India. The 26th Division was withdrawn to prepare for a landing at Rangoon. The

Commandos had

already been withdrawn to train for a landing on the coast of

Malaya. It is an opportune time to consider the effects of the Arakan campaign. Strangely enough, both sides achieved their main objects. The Japanese, with their depleted forces, prevented XV Corps from breaking into the Irrawaddy valley although this was never XV Corps' intention. On the other hand XV Corps captured Akyab without a shot being fired and Ramree Island with trifling loss, although again the Japanese never had any intention of defending them strongly. Without doubt Miyazaki had done very well against the equivalent of five divisions (25th and 26th Indian, 81st and 82nd West African, and 22nd East African Brigade and 3rd Commando Brigade), supported by overwhelming numbers of aircraft and naval ships. As so often occurred in this campaign, XV Corps' main enemy was geography and 2711

With the forces of XXXIII and Corps pushing rapidly southwards, the Japanese were forced back on Rangoon. Any hopes they may have had, either of making a last stand there or of evacuating their forces, were destroyed by Operation "Dracula" which landed the 26th Indian Division just south of Rangoon on May 2. On the 3rd the division occupied the

IV

city.

A A 25-pounder being brought up the steep and muddy bank of the Rangoon river during the landing.

the problem of how to apply their superior forces effectively against a skilful enemy in difficult terrain.

known

However,

it

is

now

Christison had a greater success than he first realised. Only four battalions of both the Japanese 54th and 55th Divisions arrived in time to assist the 33rd Army in its operations against 14th Army. The result was that the 14th Army had nothing but the remains of divisions which had already been virtually destroyed to oppose it in its advance south. During these operations XV Corps lost that

of which 1,138 were No. 224 Group (The Earl of Bandon) lost 78 aircraft, but claimed 63 Japanese aircraft destroyed. Fortunately there had never been any serious opposition to the seaborne landings, but during them the Royal Navy fired 23,000 rounds varying from 4-inch to 15-inch calibre. The Navy had landed in all 54,000 men, 800 animals, 5,089

casualties,

killed.

11,000 vehicles,

The

final

and 14,000 tons of

stores.

seaborne operation of the

Burma war was

the assault on Rangoon, which started with an airborne attack on Elephant Point, which covered the entrance of the main navigable arm of the Irrawaddy river leading from the sea to Rangoon itself. The amphibious operation

2712

Rangoon was launched on April 27, while the 14th Army was held up at Prome and the Pegu river.

for the capture of

Two naval forces set sail to give long range protection to the large convoy during its voyage to the mouth of the Rangoon river and to intercept any fleeing Japanese. The first, under Vice-Admiral Walker, was directed against the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, covering Rangoon from the west. It consisted of the battleships Elizabeth and Richelieu, the cruisers Cumberland, Suffolk, Ceylon, and Tromp, the escort carriers Empress and Shah, six destroyers, and two resuppl}^ oil tankers. On the morning of April 30, Walker bombarded targets in the Nicobars and in the evening put in airstrikes

Queen

and naval bombardments on

to airfields,

docks, and shipping at Port Blair in the Andamans. Before leaving the area on May 7, Walker also attacked Victoria Point and Mergui near to the Malay border and returned for a second strike at Port Blair and the Nicobars. The second naval force consisted of three destroyers under Commodore A. L. Poland. On the night of April 29-30 Poland intercepted a convoy of small

men and stores Moulmoin. He sank ten

ships carrying about

from RaJigoon to

1

,000

up some survivors. At O^.'U) hours on May 1 a visual control post was dropped as a marker for a parachute landing. Thirty-eight Dakotas cral't

and

})icked

dropped a composite battalion of the 50th Gurkha Parachute Brigade at 0545 hours. There were five minor casualties. A further 32 casualties were caused amongst the Gurkhas when some Liberators, aiming at another target, dropped a stick of bombs on the paratroopers. The Gurkhas overcame a small force of 37 Japanese

holding Elephant Point itself. The way was then clear for landing craft carrying the assault troops to advance up the river as soon as any mines had been swept. Aircraft flying over Rangoon saw the words "Japs gone" and "Extract Digit" painted on the roof of Rangoon Jail. Wing-Commander A. E. Saunders (commanding No. 110 Squadron R. A.F.), seeing this well known R.A.F. slang and seeing no signs of the enemy, landed at Mingaladon Airfield, but unfortunately damaged his Mosquito in the craters on the runway. Saunders, having contacted the British prisoners-of-war in Rangoon Jail and hearing that the Japanese had evacuated Rangoon on April 29, went down to the docks and sailed down the Rangoon River in a motor launch to report that the Japanese had gone. Meanwhile, the brigades of the 26th Division moved up the Rangoon river in landing craft and soon occupied Rangoon. It was a tragedy that Colonel Dick Ward, who had been Commander Royal Engineers of the 17th Indian Division from its retreat from Moulmein in 1942 to India and had fought throughout the campaign, was killed when the landing craft in which he was travelling in the van to occupy Rangoon on May 2, 1945 struck a mine. The battles for Mandalay and Meiktila were over. The Japanese 15th Army which had attacked Kohima/Imphal, and the 33rd Army had both suffered a major defeat. The 33rd Army had been severely mauled by the Chinese and Stilwell's N.C.A.C. (including the British 36th Division). During their counter-attack to recapture Meiktila, their losses were again heavy. The 18th Division also had suffered 1,773 casualties, which was about onethird of its strength and lost about half of their 45 guns. The 49th Division, which

(being fairly new in Burma) started with a total strength of 10,000, suffered 6,500 casualties and lost all but three of its 48

guns. Casualties amongst the other divisions were of a similar order. As the official British history states of this period, the Burma Area Army had virtually ceased to exist as a fighting force. Already, by August 1944, the Southern Army had been told that it could expect no further reinforcements in men or materiel from Japan, and the divisions were now living on their own fat. The 28th Army, which was mainly concerned with defending the coast of Burma, had a small force (72nd Independent Mixed Brigade) in the Mount PopaChauk-Yenangyaung area but, as related, only four battalions of the 54th and 55th Divisions facing XV Corps were ever deployed in Central Burma to oppose the 14th Army.

General Leese had ordered Slim to reduce the strength of his army to four

A General Slim and Air Marshal Vincent at Government House,

Rangoon,

May

Allied assault of the

1945, after the

and occupation

city.

and two-thirds divisions, which was the

maximum number which

could be supplied by air during his drive south. XXXIII Corps (Stopford) was to advance down the Irrawaddy valley from Yenanyaung, via Magwe and Allanmyo to the railhead at Prome and on towards Rangoon if it had not already been captured. IV Corps (Messervy) was to use the main road route to Rangoon via Pyabwe, Pyinmana, Toungoo, and Pegu. Each corps would consist of two motorised infantry divisions and one armoured brigade. The plan was that each corps would move in bounds one division at a time passing through the other, from airfield

by air-landed stores at each point. Travelling with the divisions

to airfield, supplied

would be a large number of airfield construction engineers. As the left flank of Messerby's IV Corps would be in the air, Mountbatten decided to organise the loyal Karens in the hills flanking his advance into levies to protect his eastern flank. Over 3,000 of these fine guerrilla fighters were recruited, and Messervy had then no reason to worry about any unexpected attack from that direction as the Karens were only too glad of the chance to kill Japanese.

Each corps had a distance

of 350 miles to go to its objective. XXXIII Corps consisted of the 7th and 20th Indian Divisions

and the 268th Indian Infantry Brigade, plus the 254th Indian Tank Brigade. IV Corps consisted of the 5th and 17th Indian Divisions and the 255th Indian Tank Brigade. Each corps had its own artillery

component which included two

medium regiments with XXXIII Corps 2713

jfx^

2714

and one medium regiment with IV Corps. There was a special headquarters Royal Engineer Regiment to control the forward airfield engineers and bridging companies with each corps. A brigade from the 19th Indian Division accompanied IV Corps and garrisoned its communications as it advanced. Stopford was held up at Pyabwe by the fine defence of the remnants of the famous 18th Division (now only 2,000 strong) which had captured Singapore, had been one of the first divisions to conquer Burma, and had fought for so long on the northern front against Stilwell. Otherwise there were no hitches except those caused by geography and the weather. Messervy reached Pyinmana on April 19, Toungoo on the 22nd, and Pegu, within 50 miles of Rangoon, on May 1. At Pegu a Japanese improvised brigade, made up of training unit personnel and numbering 1,700 men, delayed his advance. Unseasonable heavy rain on May 2 stopped IV Corps' advance abruptly.

However, the engineers managed to clear r)()() mines and to throw a hridge across the Pegu river and at 09.'U) hours on May 4, IV Corps continued its advance. On May the l/7th Gurkhas met a column of the Lincolnshire Regiment from the 26th Division, which had advanced north-

()

wards from Rangoon. Meanwhile XXXIII Corps advanced down the Irrawaddy valley. Stopford captured Chauk on April 18 and Magwe and Yenangyaung on April 21, overcoming resistance from the 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade and some battalions from the 28th Army. Allanmyo on the Irrawaddy was captured on April 28 and Stopford entered Prome on May 3. A patrol from XV Corps, advancing from Taungup, contacted him shortly afterwards so that by that date all three corps of Leese's forces were in touch. The

Burma victory was now complete. On June 1, 1945, a 12th Army was formed under command of General Stopford to control mopping-up operations, including the re-establishment of civil government. The 12th Army consisted of IV Corps in the Sittaung valley and the 7th and 20th Indian Divisions and the 268th Brigade in the Irrawaddy valley. IV Corps consisted of the 5th, 17th, and

Indian Divisions, and the 255th Tank Brigade. So with the 7th and 20th Indian Divisions and 268th Brigade, Stopford had five divisions and two brigades under command, with the 26th Division awaiting transport for India. His air support was provided by No. 221 Group R.A.F., but now that the monsoon had broken the R.A.F. was not in a position to give good close support to the troops on the ground. Slim, now promoted General, replaced Leese as Commander Allied Land Forces, South East Asia, and on April 16 took up his command in Kandy, Ceylon. Stopford's main problem was the Japanese 28th Army which still totalled nearly 19th

30,000 troops. Sakurai, the army commander, had managed to get the remains of his 54th and 55th Divisions back from the coast and delta over the Irrawaddy and into the Pegu Yomas, a series of jungle-covered hills lying between the Irrawaddy valley on the one hand and the Sittang valley on the other, north of Rangoon. Sakurai's object was to break out and join the remains of the Burma Area Army, which was now regrouping east of the wide flowing and flooded Sittang River. At this time the Sittang was flooded as far north

As

their army's organisation

and their morale crumbled, more and more Japanese soldiers decided it was better to surrender to the enemy than die fighting for the Emperor. < The first organised party of disintegrated

Japanese

to

surrender.

Men

of

the 53rd Infantry Division crossed the Sittang river in

landing craft II 10th

to

surrender

to the

Gurkhas- who chose

the spot where, in 1942, their own division had been defeated by the

Japanese. < V Prisoners being brought in for interrogation.

V Men

of the Royal Garhwal Indian Division, searching a group of Japanese after the surrender in Malaya. Rifles, 26th

A S.E.A.C. chiefs draw up the surrender terms. From left to right: Slim, Wheeler,

Mountbatten, Power, Park, Browning. > Walking from their aircraft

to

meet their Allied victors Lieutenant-General Takazo Numato (with glasses) and Rear-Admiral Keigye Chudo. V The formal act of surrender took place in the throne room of Government House, Rangoon.

2716

as Shwegyin, a distance of nearly 50 miles upstream from the Gulf of Martaban. Sakurai decided therefore to advance on a wide 100-mile front between Toungoo and Nyaunglebin, just west of Shwegyin. It would be tedious here to attempt to describe the numerous small operations which occurred as Sakurai's 28th Army attempted to cross the road in dispersal groups during May and August, all the while being hunted by Stopford's Indian battalions, tanks, and armoured cars. These operations were carried out mainly by junior officers, and were very important to them. However, a brief resume of the casualties incurred at that time will indicate the intensity of the fighting and the miserable defeat of the remnants of a once fine army. On June 28, 1945 the strength of the 28th Army was stated to be 27,764. Three months later, on September 22, the 28th Army's reported strength to the Burma Area Army was as follows: present on duty 7,949; in hospital 1,919; and missing 3,822, some of whom were expected to return. IV Corps' losses over much the same period were 435 killed, 1,452 wounded, and 42 missing. Thus in effect ended the war in Burma, where an army of ten Japanese divisions, two Independent Mixed Brigades, and about two Indian National Army divisions were not only defeated, but to all intents and purposes, wiped out as a fighting force.

The Japanese fighting entered World War with her attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, very little was known of her armed forces. To many Westerners, the Japanese were technologically, physically and morally inferior These misconceptions people. were cruelly shattered by the

When Japan 11

string of Japanese victories that followed Pearl Harbor in the

spring of 1942. Indeed, the speed and seeming ease with which they inflicted these defeats on the Allies created a myth of Japanese invincibility. The reality lay in between the two extremes: the

Japanese soldier had many fine military virtues, the foremost of these being an inextinguishable fighting spirit, but this in turn led the fatal error of overto estimating the value of the martial

spirit

against the material

factors in war.

Bushido. the ancient code of the samurai, laid great stress on the fanatical loyalty of the vassal

to his lord. This became an integral part of the spiritual training of the armed forces after the

as a refusal to accept surrender regardless of circumstances. General Tojo laid down that any

Meiji restoration ushered in the period of Japan's modernisation at the end of the 19th Century. Oflficer training in the Japanese forces stressed the importance of

man taken prisoner and then retaken would be executed by his regiment. The Japanese had developed a more positive attitude towards death than in the West, so much so, that death in battle was seen as the culmination of the true samurai's career.

courage under

fire

more than

technical accomplishment. With the exception of those destined for the elite Staff College the Japanese officer corps did not constitute a fundamentally different group with skills not possessed by other ranks. There existed a close bond between officers and men in the sense that they were all warriors together. War was a test of faith, and the nation with the strongest faith, and not the strongest armaments, would be the victor. Because of their divinely ordained role this must inevitably be the Japanese. Self-sacrifice formed a central part of the concept oibushido. On the battlefield this was expressed

man

Soldiers who died in battle could be deified and their names inscribed in a national shrine. The warrior code, moreover, did not permit retreat. Unlike realistic Western military thought which recognises that retreat

may

well be a military necessity and that consequently it is desirable to prepare for it, Japanese doctrine refused to admit it as an admissable alternative. This refusal was to have disastrous

consequences, simply because

re-

treat is a legitimate and often necessary military action.

The

militarist attitudes of bu-

V

In the early 1930s Japanese were dominated by the army and navy. Modernisation of the armed forces soon followed, and this new military strength was first tested in the conflict with China in 1937-the culmination of years of tension between the two nations. Here a battery of light guns is seen in action during the

politics

attack on Tientsin.

I I

i

<

shido, although accepted by the Japanese soldier, were not in-

herent in the population as a whole; there were plenty of eligible young men who tried to avoid army service and who looked upon the samurai code as a relic of barbarism. Nonetheless, all able-bodied adult males were

by

other

armies

whenever

possible.

The

much

soldier's rations would be the same as those he would

compulsory military

eat at home: unpolished brown rice and bits of dried fish or beans,

Japan's military leaders welcomed the system of conscription because it gave them the opportunity to instil the principles of bushido into the male population, and each new recruit underwent a rigorous three-month course of indoctrination to turn him into a fanatical warrior. But physical training, too, was important, and the recruits were forced to undertake prodigious feats such as a 50mile route march with full pack followed by three circuits of a field at the run. During field exercises the new soldier would be shot at with live ammunition to

supplemented on occasions with chicken, pork, fruit and vegetables, and saki (rice wine) on

liable

for

service.

2718

ensure realism. He would also receive special training in night operations and in movement through thick jungle, since both of these were known to be avoided

special days. The basic infantryman's uni-

form was based on a pre-World I pattern, influenced by British and American designs. Puttees were still retained and although rather archaic they were well suited to jungle terrain. The steel helmet was constructed of a light gauge steel which only gave limited protection. A variety of other forms of head-gear were also worn, including two types of

War

topee and, commonest of

all,

the

tropical field cap with neckguard. Armaments tended to be obsolete by European standards, particularly towards the end of

the war. The infantryman's weapon was the Type 38 "Arisaka", based on Mauser designs and first introduced in 1905. Used through-

out the war, the rifle's calibre (only 6.5 mm) proved too light and carso a more powerful 7.7 tridge was developed for the new

mm

Type

99.

Uniquely

in

modern

warfare, the Japanese oflficer carried his sword into battle. If the oflficer was of samurai stock his sword might be a family heirloom, in some cases up to 600 years old. The sword was carried everywhere and often made its wearer an easy target for Allied Sharpshooters. Throughout his training the

Japanese soldier had been urged always to take the oflFensive and maintain it with speed and determination. This was, of course, in accordance with the spirit of

hiishido,

and

it

had worked well

during' the ton years oCfightinfi; in the thinly defended, open countryside of China. Whenever the Japanese sohlier caiiu' into conact with the enemy he was almost always successful. There was, t

therefore,

plicated

no

hattle

need

for

plans,

com-

althouf^h

he Japanese would try to envelop the enemy whenever possible by attacking the front with one column while sending another column stronger often and rear. hit at the flank to the around .\ double-pincer movement was also used. The unit headquarters was kept well to the front of the attack in order to direct the exploitation of weak points in the enemy's defences as soon as they developed. When the enemy had been defeated, the Japanese (

would immediately seize

all avail-

able transport and rush forward into enemy territory to maintain the momentum of attack. Surprise was one of the fa-

vourite Japanese ploys, and they

would sometimes attack with

inferior numbers and without reconnaissance in order to confuse and discourage the enemy. Similarly, they relied on deep penetration by individuals and small groups into the enemy's rear areas-a very effective tactic which often sapped enemy morale. These tactics were, of course, dangerous and the soldier was quite likely to be cut off; if this happened he would either make a suicide attack or lie in wait for a chance to use his grenades against the enemy before being picked off. Other ploys included night attacks and ambushes on jungle roads. As the war progressed, however, Japanese casualties be-

came proportionately higher as the Allies learned to deal with these vigorous offensive tactics. Once the Allies realised that the Japanese placed little reliance on armour or artillery support, but emphasised the fighting spirit of the infantryman instead, they were able to bring their own massive firepower to bear directly

on the attacking ground

As the

losses

mounted the

forces.

ideals

of bushido did not falter: if forced to occupy a defensive position, the soldier was still likely to charge forward with his bayonet before his position could be overrun. The Allied reply was simply to increase firepower. The inevitable result was an increase in

Japanese casualties. In the end, bushido failed to give the Japanese success. The blind fighting spirit of the warrior was no match for the massive material resources the Allies could bring to bear. But while the Japanese soldier may have lacked the tactical finesse so necessary in modern warfare, in terms of sheer fighting spirit he had few equals. One of Japan's most reFielddoubtable opponents, Marshal Slim, aptly summed up the courage of the Japanese fighting man: "Everyone talks about fighting to the last man and the last round, but only the Japanese actually do it."

<

Japanese infantry in a forward South China. < V The Great Wall of China presented no obstacle to the newly equipped Garrison ArmyJapan 's force permanently stationed on the Chinese mainland-in 1937. Here Japanese infantry march into Shanshi province in the shadow of the Great Wall. V Japanese dead at Iwo Jima. The tradition of fighting to death rather than surrendering led to some of the most vicious and bloody fighting of World War IIand thousands of casualties which Japan could ill afford.

position, in

2719

< Japanese marines being decorated- with due ceremony-for China in 1944. Type 89 tanks, seen here in 1942 with the Japanese Marine

their fighting in


Division.

V This Japanese soldier bayoneted himself to death rather than be taken prisoner in the Philippines.

VV

Japanese soldiers form a living bridge in the Malayan jungle.

>

Japanese soldiers leap from

their bicycles-and charge into battle at

>V A

Penang, Malaya.

stealthy advance through

a rubber plantation.

.

^V rr-

^ '

^\

"W^\ j^k.

.

>

Infantry pause to eat their rice armed with the "Arisaka"

ration,

Type 38

Rifle.

V A group

of Japanese soldiers

captured on Okinawa, June 1945, await questioning by U.S. Marines. By 1945, the Japanese tradition of fighting to the death was beginning to collapse as the

end loomed near.

2722

,vju.i.'«j«iuik>i;'.»j^'i.

CHAPTER 172

The last invasion? by Jenny •<

Shaw

General Douglas

Mac Arthur,

commander designate

of the U.S. forces for the invasion of the Japanese home islands.

V

Grenade practice for U.S. infantry. It was to be expected that the Japanese would defend their motherland with more than normal tenacity, and the Americans placed great

Army

reliance on their superiority in weapons to overcome their more

numerous opponents.

t?

,4

m wOii

^1

^v?:,

^,^

e^-

3^ v-..'i;j''

> Vice- Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, commander of the Japanese 3rd Fleet. Vice-Admiral Takeo Kurita.

>>

The defeat of Germany took precedence

good position to invade Japan

over that of Japan, but within the limits that this imposed, the overall Allied strategy with regard to Japan was to advance by way of the central and southwest Pacific to recapture the Philippines or Formosa with the objective of eventually blockading and possibly invading

considered necessary. General Curtis LeMay,

Japan

herself.

When American forces captured the Marianas in June 1944, they breached Japan's inner defence perimeter and brought the Japanese home-land within striking distance of long-range bomber aircraft. At this time too, the greater part of Japan's naval air arm was destroyed in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. On October 3, 1944, the American Chiefs-of-Staff decided on the strategy to be adopted for the remainder of 1944 and for the following year. MacArthur was ordered to invade Luzon, and Nimitz was to capture one island in the Bonins and one in the Ryukyus, the latter for development into an advanced naval and air base for the invasion of Japan contemplated for the autumn of 1945. Germany surrendered at the beginning of May 1945, and the American Chiefs-ofStaff turned their attention to ending the war against Japan as quickly as possible. With the end of resistance on Okinawa in June 1945, the American forces were in an even better position to blockade Japan, thus cutting her off from the Asian main-

and to step up their bombing of Japanese cities and so bring the economic life of Japan to a halt. They were also in a land,

2724

Bomber Command,

if

this

was

of the 21st thought that the war

could be ended without invading Japan. He was convinced that with an adequate supply of aircraft and bombs, air power on its own could bring about the Japanese surrender. His own command was due to be enlarged by reinforcements from Europe and India, and he therefore saw no difficulty in stepping up the weight of his offensive after April 1945. LeMay based his assumptions on the results of the five incendiary attacks on Japan in March 1945, and his programme for the defeat of Japan comprised attacks on aircraft facindustrial cities, oil refineries, storage plants, and in addition, minelaying to prevent the import to Japan of

tories,

food and raw materials from Manchuria, Korea, and China. The American Joint Chiefs, however, did not think that unconditional surrender could be obtained without a successful invasion of Japan. They saw the close sea blockade of Japan and the intensive bombing offensives from Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and the Marianas as preliminaries to the invasion attempt itself. By these means, Japan's industry and communications, and her people's will to resist, would all be considerably

weakened.

On April 3, 1945, the Joint Chiefs instructed General Douglas MacArthur (who would lead the invasion) to begin drawing up the plans for the invasion of

<<

Vice-Admiral Jessie B.

commander of the special strike force, consisting of the large cruisers Alaska and Oldendorf,

Guam, set up on July 1, 1945 to make fast surface sweeps through Japanese waters

in search of surface shipping. < Rear- Admiral Clifton A. F Sprague, who had distinguished himself in the Battle off Samar,

and continued escort-carrier

in

command

groups for the

of rest

of the war.

southern Kyushu in November 1945 to secure forward sea and air bases for the main invasion. This was to take place on the Tokyo plain of Honshu in March 1946. In readiness for the invasion, the command structure in the Pacific was reorganised. MacArthur was given command of all Army forces and resources, while Admiral Nimitz was to be naval commander. On July 10, a third command, the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force for the Pacific, under General Spaatz, was established to control the air forces involved in the invasion. There was to be no supreme commander in the Pacific, and much was to depend on the ability of MacArthur, Nimitz, and Spaatz to cooperate closely together. MacArthur's Nimitz's staffs and worked on the plans, and on May 25, Mac-

Arthur and Nimitz were officially ordered to undertake the invasion of Kyiishu (Operation "Olympic") on November 1, 1945, and of Honshu (Operation "Coronet") on March 1, 1946. When the Japanese capitulated in August 1945, planning for the invasion had reached an advanced stage.

Prior to the invasion, the Strategic Air Force, based on the Marianas and on Okinawa, would continue its offensive against Japanese industrial centres and lines of communication. To aid this pro-

gramme, Okinawa and

le

shima were

to

be developed into a massive air base for some 240 squadrons. Meanwhile, the Fast Carrier Force would make repeated attacks to destroy

Japanese naval and air forces and disrupt land and sea communications. The Far East Air Force was to neutralise the Japanese air forces in Japan itself and stationed on the Asiatic mainland, harass shipping routes between Asia and Japan, and destroy communications on Kyushu along with defence installations there.

Operation ''Olympic" Operation "Olympic" had to be undertaken with troops at hand. The bulk of the forces for the invasion of Japan were to be American, although three divisions from the Commonwealth -one from Britain, one from Canada, and one from Australia -were earmarked for later in the Honshu campaign. A small number of

Commonwealth

air

squadrons would par-

ticipate, in addition to the British Pacific Fleet.

The U.S. 6th Army, comprising some 500,000 men and commanded by General Walter Krueger, was chosen for the initial assault.

Before the actual invasion, a preliminary operation was to be carried out to occupy the islands lying to the west and south of Kyushu, so that air raid warning facilities, advanced naval anchorages, and sea-plane bases could be established before the landings on Kyushu. Three corps, each comprising three divisions, were to land on southern Kyushu

2725

OPERATION "OLYMPIC"

Sakhalin

Jap.ieth Area • Tsuno

Army

/

RUSSIA

Fukushima

KYUSHU KOSHIKI

RETTO

Kagoshima Oct

Jap. 5th Area

Miyakonojo

ikino

UJI

I

GUNTO

Kagoshima^

« 8ay

** U.S. XI

SHIMA

SHIMA

KUCHINOERABU SHIMA

TANEGA SHIMA

Sapporo

Corps

Bay^^ Safa Misaki * «« KURO KISAKA

^

Otaru

Kfnoya

I

A

ki-^t^

HOKKAIDO

L»Shubishi

2

hma Pen ^

Army

5 Infantry Divs

Hakodate

U.S. IX Corps (reserve)

SEAOf JAPAN

PACIFIC

k

OCEAN Hachinohe

v.-

YAKU SHIMA U.S.VAmphib. Corps

Oct. 27

40

Inf. Div.

MILES

Jap. 11th Area

Oct. 27 158Regtl.

Army

6 Infantry Divs. I

Cbt.Team

Akita <1>

60

POSSIBLE LANDINGS

I

KILOMETRES 80

^«

Jap. 12th Area I

(Suglyama)

Army :^

Sado

Jap. 13th Area

Army

H.Q.

iith,i2thand

13th Area Armies

18 infantry divs. 2 armoured divs

• Seoul

Jap. 1st General

Jap. 2nd General Army H.Q. (Hata) 5th. 15th and 16th Area Armies

Niigata

Army

6 infantry divs

KOREA Jap. 17th

Jap.lSth Area

Area Army

Jap. 36th

Army

and

8 infantry divs.

Air

Army

(reserve)

General Army

Tokyo •

Kobe

Shimonoseki Hiroshima

Str.

Jap.ieth 14 infantry divs.

U.S. 8th Army (Elchelberger)

armoured bdes.

X Corps (Sibert)

Area Army 2

U.S. 1st (C. H. III

armoured

Amphibious Corps

(Geiger) 3 Marine divs.

3 infantry divs. XIV Corps (Grisw/old) 3 infantry divs. XIII Corps (Gillem) 2

Army

Hodges)

XXIV Corps

(J.

R.Hodges)

3 infantry divs.

divs.

OPERATION "CORONET" tentatively scheduled for March

1,

1946 (Y-Day)

OPERATION "CORONET" Kumagaya.

U.S. V Amphib. Corps

(Schmidt) 2 Marine, 3 Marine and 5 Marine Divs.

U.S. Xi

Corps

(Hall) 1

Cav. (Armd) Div.

43 Inf. and Americal Divs.

77

25lnf..33lnf.

and

Army (Krueger)

Inf..

and 98

41 Inf. Divs.

OPERATION "OLYMPIC" scheduled November 1 U.S. 6th

U.S. IX CORPS (Rider)

U.S. Corps (Swift) I

83

Inf.

.•Koga

^

Armour to isolate Tokyo Kujikurihama

Beach

Inf.

Divs.

HONSU

(reserve corps) ,

1

945 (X-Day) Shizuoko U.S. 1st

« JAPANESE AREA ARMY HEADQUARTERS

U.S. 8th

Army

Army

Pre Y-Day landings

MILES

i KILOMETRES

300 500

2726

IBI

and establish bridgeheads.

I

Corps would

land in the Miya-zaki area, XI Corps in

Ariake wan (bay), and V Amphibious Corps in the bay to the south of Kushikino. Air attacks were planned to prevent the Japanese bringing up reinforcements to the battle area from the north by road or along the coasts. Within the bridgeheads, work was to begin straightaway on the construction of airfields and bases. Following this, additional areas were to be seized for airfields. The prime objective

Operation "Olympic" was Kagoshima wan, a 50-mile bay which was to be opened up to Allied shipping and through which would flow of

most of the men and supplies for the

Honshu invasion build-up. Kagoshima wan was also to serve as the navy's advance base. No advance beyond this would be made, the object of "Olympic" being to secure bases for Operation "Coronet". If

the 14 divisions allotted to the 6th

Army were unable to capture and hold southern Kyiashu, they could be reinforced from December by three divisions per month, intended for Honshii. The Navy's task in Operation "Olympic" would be to bring reinforcements and supplies to the 6th Army, to cover and support land operations in Kyushu, to establish a forward base at Kagoshima wan, and to hold island positions necessary for the security of lines of communication. For Operation "Olympic", Admiral Nimitz divided the American fleet into two -the 3rd and the 5th fleets. The 3rd Fleet, under Admiral William F. Halsey, consisted of a number of fast carrier groups plus supporting battleships, U.S.

and destroyers. Its two main components were Vice-Admiral John Towers's 2nd Carrier Task Force (T.F. 38) and Vice-Admiral H. Bernard Rawlings's British Carrier Task Force (T.F. 37). The 3rd Fleet was to operate against the Kuriles, Hokkaido, and Honshu. The 5th Fleet, commanded by Admiral cruisers,

Raymond

A. Spruance, contained 2,902

and its main components were the 1st Fast Carrier Force under Vice-Admiral F. C. Sherman (T.F. 58), the Amphibious Force under Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner (T.F. 40), which would land the troops, the Gunfire and Covering Force (T.F. 54) for bombardment and fire support, and T.F. 56, responsible for minesweeping operations. The naval bombardment was to begin eight days before the

invasion, and continue until after the launching of the assault. These were the plans which existed for Operation "Olympic". The second stage of the conquest of the Japanese home islands. Operation "Coronet" -the invasion of Honshu-would have involved even more troops.

vessels,

< < American plans for the seaborne assault on Japan. If the invasion had been launched, it would have been the largest amphibious attack of all time. A A and A Japanese civilians under training. In the event of an invasion, Imperial General Headquarters planned to call up most of the male population, arming them with bamboo spears.

Operation ''Coronet" According to the plans that had been drawn up, the troops were to be landed on the Kanto plain, east of Tokyo, a level area with good beaches, which would benefit Allied superiority in armour and 2727

A.4-

.i-

<<(in(l

<

Imuun^ for

American armour the big day.

As

would be considerably outnumbered, the Americans placed heavy reliance on their materia I superiority.

V MS armoured cars (called Greyhounds in British service) on manoeuvres. The type was characterised by superlative cross-country performance.

in

they

mm!r

mechanisation, and good harbours for the logistic support of the operation. The centre of Japanese political and industrial life was sited in this region, and the American planners felt certain that a defeat here would firmly convince the

Japanese that the war was lost. Only the general outlines of the plan for Operation "Coronet" were fixed when the Japanese capitulated. The final details had still to be settled. However, it is clear that two American armies under MacArthur's command were to take part -the U.S. 1st Army commanded by General Courtney H. Hodges, and comprising XXIV Corps (Lieutenant-General J. R. Hodge) and HI Amphibious Corps (MajorGeneral Roy Geiger); and the U.S. 8th Army under General R. L. Eichelberger, comprising X Corps (Major-General F. C. Sibert). XIV Corps (Major-General Oscar Griswold), and XIII Corps (Major-General Alvan Gillem jnr.). Air support was expected to come from 40 air groups based on Kyiishii, and from a similar force from fields in Iwo Jima, the Marianas, and the Ryukyus. General Eichelberger's 8th Army was to land in Sagami bay and strike north and east to clear the western shore of Tokyo bay as far north as Yokohama. Armoured forces would simultaneously drive north to cut off any Japanese reinforcements. Some of the armour would then be available to assist the 1st Army in the capture of Tokyo, should this prove necessary. At the same time, other divisions would be used to capture Yokohama.

?f

KETSU-GO"

'Tg^'^''

Plan which were all designated certain The most likely invasion areas, Kyushu (16th Area Army) and Tokyo (12th Area Army) were allotted 65 infantry divisions, two armoured divisions, 25 independent mixed brigades, three guards brigades, and seven tank zones,

army

In April 1945, Imperial General Headquarters of Japan concluded that Ameri-

can forces, already stationed in the Bonins and the Ryukyus, were quite likely to invade Kyushu with between 15 and 20 divisions in October 1945, and then to invade Honshu in March 1946 with up to 30 divisions. They expected the Americans

areas.

brigades - in

all,

well over half the total of

forces available.

Arrangements were made

to intensify incendiary bombing attacks and the close blockade in the summer

for one area to reinforce another if necessary, although it was realised that the individual islands might well be isolated

months, and then to concentrate on the destruction of the Japanese air forces. Consequently they decided it would be expedient to decentralise control. Imperial General H.Q. formulated a plan for the defence of Japan, namely "KETSU-GO", which divided Japan's home islands, plus Korea, into seven

from each other. Continuous defences were to be constructed on the probable landing sites, but out of reach of American naval bombardment. It was hoped that coastal defence divisions would contain the invaders in their beach-head, and that mobile assault divisions would then move up and eliminate the enemy.

2730

A A scene that would be all too frequent during the attack on Japan: kamikaze

attack.

to secret air bases throughout Japan. Obsolete aircraft were converted to kamikaze craft. By the end of June, Kawabe

hoped

to

have 2,000 kamikazes, and a

further 1,000 by August. To meet the invasion,

if

was estimated that, by August, Air General Army would have 800 fighter and bomber aircraft in addition to the kamikazes, and approxiit

mately 13 million gallons of fuel. With regard to the navy, there were merely 19 destroyers (with only 3,500 tons of fuel for each one) and 38 submarines to repel the invasion. The destroyers were to be kept in the Inland Sea and used within 180 miles of Kyushu and Shikoku, and the largest of the submarines were to attack the American advanced naval bases at Ulithi, Leyte, and Okinawa. Medium-sized submarines were to attack convoys on supply routes to the north while the small submarine craft patrolled

home

waters.

There was also a secondary fleet which, by July 1945, consisted of 3,294 vessels of various types including suicide boats, midget submarines, and human torpedoes. This fleet was organised into eight squadrons, and in deploying these, priority was given firstly to Kyushu, secondly to the Shikoku coastal area, and finally to the Tokyo coastal area. The naval air forces had the task of crushing any invasion force whilst it was still

.JU"S V

Cabbage

cultivation in the

centre of Tokyo, on sites of bomb-destroyed buildings.

"T-m^

•!•>

-.-.•

The plan emphasised the need for the government, the people, and the armed forces to be completely united and for the entire nation to be armed and ready to homeland. Where few regular troops were stationed, guerrilla forces were to be organised and trained. On April 8, 1945, Air General Army Headquarters were established under General M. Kawabe, to control air defences. Its tasks were to attempt to hamper the Americans' invasion preparations, to counter American air attacks on Japan, Korea, and the China coast, and also to build up the strength of the air force to counter losses already sustained. General Kawabe formed a number of special kamikaze units, as he felt these would be the most effective arm against the invaders. These units were dispersed fight for the

at sea.

By August

1,

1946,

it

was

estimated that the naval air arm would have approximately 5,145 aircraft. But there would be only two million gallons of fuel for them. Agreements defining the Ai-my and Navy areas of responsibility were drawn up in April, but the proposals were never enacted.

On June 6,

1945, the Chiefs of the

Services

laid

Council

a

before

memorandum

Fundamental Policy

Armed

Japan's Supreme entitled

The

be followed henceWar, calling for the Conduct forth in the of mass mobilisation. To support their proposed policy, they also submitted two subsidiary papers. Estimates of the World Situation and The Present State of National Power, and these gave no grounds for confidence that the fundamental policy outto

lined would succeed. The information in the memoranda indicated that Japan would probably not be able to continue the struggle beyond the autumn. As the Japanese correctly guessed American intentions, so U.S. Intelligence officers deduced Japanese strategy, and

American plans henceforth contained 2731

>

The Japanese heavy cruiser (eight 8-inch guns) under air attack in Kure harbour. She was sunk in this raid of July 24. 1945. by aircraft of Task Force 38. In strikes by Task Force 38 on

Tone

this date

and on

the 28th, three

battleships fHaruna. Ise, and Hyuga), tu'o heavy cruisers (Tone

and Aoba), and two

obsolete

cruisers were sunk. The light cruiser Kitagami, five destroyers, and many other craft were heavily damaged, and the new set on fire and The carriers Katsuragi and Ryuho were also put out of action. By the end of the war, virtually all the major units of the Japanese Navy had

carrier

Amagi was

later capsized.

been

lost.

elaborate provisions to counter kamikaze air attacks which could theoretically wipe out the invasion convoys. At Okinawa, overhead fighters had shot down some 60 per cent of attacking kamikazes, and antiaircraft fire accounted for a further 20 per cent. The remaining kamikazes, however, had wrought considerable havoc. It was therefore planned that, commencing eight days before the preliminary phase of

Operation "Olympic", American aircraft were to locate and attack concealed kamikaze bases. Bombing of all known kamikaze airstrips within 300 miles of the assault area was to take place in the hope of reducing the kamikaze threat by about one-fifth. B-24 and B-32 aircraft were to patrol selected areas containing known Japanese bases, so that early warning could be given of any impending kamikaze attack, and so that some aircraft could be destroyed on the ground. Close fighter cover would be provided for convoys to ward off kamikazes. Submarines were to give notice of attacks from Korean bases. By these means then, and by the antiaircraft fire from the ships themselves, it was hoped to reduce the damage done by kamikazes. In any case, as they were a wasting asset, the intensity of the attacks was expected to drop as the operation continued. And although the short distances the kamikazes would have to fly would

make them

difficult to intercept, the dis-

ruption of communications and the failure of the Japanese to establish a combined air headquarters would be factors working against their success. Also, at this point, the kamikaze pilots were no longer all volunteers, the available planes were not

2732

as suitable as earlier kamikaze craft, and was in short supply. As for the water-borne suicide craft, these had not proved highly effective at Okinawa, and with regard to the invasion of Japan, the "Olympic" plan included heavy attacks on their potential bases. fuel

And finally, the raising of the divisions to meet the invasion exhausted all Japan's manpower reserves. Many soldiers expected to fight and resist the invaders were poorly trained and badly equipped. In fact the Japanese encountered such difficulty in providing the Kyushu defenders with adequate weapons that their ability to resist a landing was imperilled. There was also a serious shortage of experienced officers, and most of the technical units were without experienced tradesmen. There were only enough reserve supplies for a limited period, and both fighting formations and lines of communication were short of transport; much of what was available was animal-drawn. Fuel was

in extremely

short supply. In comparison, the U.S. 6th Army comprised fully-equipped and experienced veteran formations. The Allied air forces

had air supremacy over Japan and would have had no difficulty in disrupting Japanese communications, and any attempts to

move

reserves.

However, the Americans realised that the invasion of Kyushu would quite likely result in such a resurgence of national spirit that the Japanese would be fanatical in their fight to the death to defend every inch of ground, as they had done at

Okinawa.

CHAPTER 173

Russia^ war against Japan by William Fowler

At midnight on August 8, 1945, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato, received the Soviet declaration of war. Ten minutes later, on the other side of the Soviet Union, 1,500,000 Russian

troops were launched on the last great offensive of the war. Together with 5,500 armoured vehicles and nearly 4,000 aircraft, these forces would give a spectacular demonstration of mobile war against the 1,040,000 men of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Throughout the war neither the Russians nor the Japanese had made any offensive moves -indeed Japan had taken great care to honour the Neutrality Pact of April 1941. On the strength of reports from their spy in Toyko, Richard Sorge, the Russian high command began to V Soviet T-34's and other vehicles roar over the Russo-

Japanese border of the

war

liaison aircraft

column.

at the

beginning

Far East. A banks over the

in the

men from the Far East as the war with Germany grew more intense.

transfer In

June 1941 the Russians had about 30

reasonably well equipped divisions in the Far East. Japanese Intelligence estimated that during the crucial period between June and December 1941, the Russians transferred 15 infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, 1,700 tanks,

and

1,500 aircraft to the

New

German

front.

units were mobilised to replace them, including nine infantry divisions and four brigades and an air army headquarters. By December 1941 the Japanese estimate, which was fairly accurate, was that Russian strength stood at about 800,000 men, 1,000 tanks, and 1,000 aircraft. In fact by the end of 1942, when the last major transfers ceased, the Soviet

n

order of battle stood at 19 infantry divisions, ten infantry brigades, 750,000 men, 1,000 tanks, and 1,000 aircraft -although of course these units were neither at a state of full readiness, nor completely trained.

These unit strengths remained about the same until the end of 1944. Training conditions were as harsh as the climate, and the armies had a low priority for re-equipment. In 1942, however, the garrisons in northern Sakhalin and Kamchatka were increased after the Japanese had captured Attu and Kiska. Just as the numbers and quality of the Russian troops stationed in the Far East reflected the fortunes of war in Europe, so too as the war swung against Japan, the Kwantung Army began to serve as a pool for reinforcements. Japanese strength in Manchuria reached its peak in January 1942, when the army stood at 1.1 million men. During 1942 and 1943 they were still able to equal at least 70 per cent of Soviet strength in the Far East. During 1944 many troops, including almost all the elite units, were gradually withdrawn to Japan. By July they were at their weakest, with only seven divisions in Manchuria.

These forces were increased and by August 9, 1945 there were 24 divisions and 11 brigades in Manchuria, seven divisions in Korea, and one brigade on Sakhalin and in the Kuriles. Total strength, including Manchukuan and Inner Mongolian satellite forces, stood at just over one million men, of which 787,600 were in the

Kwantung Army. The Japanese had 1,215 armoured vehicles, 1,800 aircraft, and 6,700 guns and mortars. However, this equipment was almost all obsolete, and the Kwantung Army was a shadow of the well trained veteran force which had existed early in 1942. All the

first line

equipment and trained troops had been posted to the Pacific, and the most seasoned unit had only been established in the spring of 1944.

The Kwantung Army was brought up to numerical strength about ten days before the Soviet attack, when in a hurried mobilisation eight of its 24 divisions and seven of the nine infantry brigades, that is over one-quarter of the total Japanese military manpower in Manchuria, were formed from all the remaining Japanese males in the area. Until then they had been exempt from military duty, being unfit or over-age. One of the two weak

tank brigades was formed in July 1945. Although the standard Japanese infantry division had about 23,000 men, the actual strengths of those in Manchuria

ranged between 11,000 and 15,000. Even divisions transferred from China were not complete: many had only one of the nine artillery companies prescribed per division.

Weapons too were inadequate: there was no artillery heavier than 75-mm, no modern anti-tank guns, and the tanks were very light, thinly-armoured, and under-armed. The 2nd Air Army had a front line strength of only 225 fighters, 40 bombers, 45 reconnaissance, and 20 kamikaze aircraft, with 640 training aircraft in reserve. Most of these aircraft, moreover, were obsolete.

There was a shortage of ammunition, and the number of medium and light machine guns with infantry units was less than half the authorised figure. The Japanese estimated that the average efficiency of each division was not greater than three-tenths of that of a pre-war first line division. The morale of both officers and men was low, particularly in the newly formed units.

Russia prepares 1943 the Western Allies had contained the Germans and Japanese and forced them on to the defensive. The Soviet Union and the United States began to discuss the possibility of Soviet entry into the war in the Far East. Stalin agreed in principle, and plans were made to enlarge the denuded armies in the east. Between the Teheran Conference and the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, the Soviet High Command, or Stavka, reorganised the two "fronts" in the area, the Transbaikal and the Far East. They were re-equipped with new tanks and guns, and stocks of ammunition, fuel, and supplies were moved up in great secrecy. From April to August the Russians moved 30 divisions, nine brigades, and other units from Europe. The Japanese estimated that the Russians had moved only 20 to 45 divisions and that the total strength of Soviet forces by the end of July 1945 was between 40 and 45 divisions. Japanese Intelligence expected the Russians to build up a force of 60 divisions

By

V The Transbaikal Front: motorised and cavalry units of the 53rd Army approach the foot-hills of the Hsingan range. V < A pontoon bridge erected by engineers of the 5th Army over the River Mudantsuan. V V Animal- and man-power

are mobilised to assist a cart across a wide and muddy arm of a river in northern Manchuria.

-*fe*

before attacking, and so they correctly concluded that the Russians would not be ready until early August. Soviet forces were divided between three Fronts, comprising 11 combinedarms armies, one tank army, and three air armies, in all 80 divisions, four tank and mechanised corps, 40 independent tank and mechanised brigades, and six infantry brigades. The total strength of the army and air force was 1,577,725 men (of whom 1,058,982 were front line troops), 26,137 guns and mortars, 3,704 tanks, and 1,852 self-propelled

guns (the Japanese

estimated 4,500 tanks), with 5,368 aircraft-including naval-of which 4,807

were combat aircraft (the Japanese estimated 6,300). The Russian superiority was qualitative as well as quantitative. They had sent four of their most experienced armies from the European theatre. The 5th and the 39th had been in action at Konigsberg in East Prussia and had a reputation for dealing with fixed defences and fortifications. The other two armies, the 6th Guards Tank Army and the 53rd Army, came from the 2nd Ukrainian Front, and were capable "Blitzkrieg" campaigners. With these veterans came experienced commanders. Head of the new Stavka for Soviet Forces in the Far East was Marshal Aleksandr M. Vasilevsky, recently Chief of the General Staff. Colonel-General S. P. Ivanov became chief-of-staff for the new

command. Of the three fronts. Marshal Rodion Ya. Malinovsky commanded the Transbaikal Front, Marshal Kyril A. Meretskov the 1st Far Eastern Front and General of the Army Maxim A. Purkaev the 2nd Far Eastern Front. Purkaev had 2736

been the Far Eastern commander through

much

of the

Pacific Fleet S.

Russo-German war. The came under Admiral Ivan

Yumashev.

This new leadership was necessary because most of the officers in the old Far East Army had only seen action in 1941 in disorganised rear-guard actions against the Germans. They were also inexperi-

enced in the tactics of massed armoured penetration with air support. The logistics of this operation had to be carefully organised, and in themselves were a triumph of planning. For three and a half months the transSiberian railway was used to its maximum capacity, as men from Europe made the long journey to their new assembly areas (anything from 4,000 to 7,000 miles). Nearly 750,000 men made the journey, and between May and July 136,000 truck loads of equipment were sent east. To save the railway, all motorised units of the Transbaikal Front moved independently from the Chita-Karymskaya sector to the concentration areas in eastern Mongolia, a distance of 625 to 750 miles, mostly over desert. Even the infantry of the 17th and 36th Armies marched the last 150 to 300 miles.

The 6th Guards Tank Army left its tanks and assault guns in Czechoslovakia for other units, and at Choibalsan in Mongolia collected over 600 new vehicles sent directly from the Ural armaments fact-

<

<

Soviet infantry watch start line as an artillery barrage softens up a defended village on the second <1

from their

day of the

<<

offensive.

from air advance in a cloud of dust and exhaust fumes. The Russians had not only a superiority in numbers, but also a qualitative advantage over the Japanese tanks. < Infantry assault a Japanese T-34's, secure

attack,

position. Despite their lack of equipment, the Japanese put up a spirited defence at

An

ingenious idea in principle, it caused some disruption because of the short time allocated to the tank crews to collect their vehicles from the depot. As with most Soviet operations, ammunition had priority in the build-up of reserves. Tank munitions topped the list, with artillery and mortar ammunition second and infantry ammunition third. Food for 15 days was stocked, but the petrol, oil, and lubricants amassed proved to be inadequate when the operation got under way. Water was a special problem, because troops of the Transbaikal Front would have to cross the Gobi Desert before they reached the Great Hsingan mountain range. Engineer battalions and other units dug some 635 wells in the concentration and staging areas. Vehicles were loaded with water, fuel, and spares for the journey across the desert. In view of the known prevalence of epidemic diseases in northern China, all Soviet troops were inoculated against plague and other ories.

ailments.

As its occupation of eastern Europe had demonstrated, the Soviet Union did not fight simply to defeat the enemy and end the war. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin came to a private agreement. Stalin would declare war on Japan three months after the end of the war in Europe, subject to the successful conclusion of a treaty with China; Soviet troops would operate in Chinese territory, Japanese-occupied Manchuria, and Jehol. In return for this, Stalin demanded American recognition of Soviet territorial claims in the Pacific: Russia was to have

many points.

the Kurile Islands, the southern part of Sakhalin Island, and the old Russian bases of Port Arthur and Dairen in south Manchuria. Stalin even persuaded Roosevelt to approach the Nationalist Chinese Government on his behalf to secure Chiang Kai-shek's acceptance of these conditions. When on July 21 President Truman remarked to Stalin at the Potsdam Conference that the Allies had a new weapon of special destructive force, the Soviet leader showed no real interest but said he hoped the Allies would make "good use of it against the Japanese". Whether Stalin realised the impact that the first atomic bomb would have on the Japanese is difficult to say. Vasilevsky confirmed, after the war, that September had been fixed for the start of the offensive. The general staff was troubled when it was told in May that August 8 would be D-day. Finally, in a telephone call from Potsdam, Stalin told Vasilevsky to push the date forward to August 1 The Marshal explained that the state of preparation did not permit this, and so the two leaders .

agreed on August 9. The troops may have been in position by August 9, but Japanese Intelligence had not been completely wrong when it predicted a later date for the offensive. Soviet logistic support was severely strained by the operation, and many tanks were halted by lack of fuel, which had to be flown in in an extemporised re-supply finally

operation. It

was probably

Stalin's military

and

which made him realwar would soon be over, with or without an atomic bomb, and that if political intuition

ise that the

2737

he wanted land

he would have to act fast. With this land he took nearly 600,000 Japanese prisoners-of-war, who were sent to the Soviet Union and Mongolia as forced labour. Between 1948 and 1950. 513.139 were repatriated. Despite the steady reduction of Japan's empire by land and air, culminating in the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Soviet historians claim that Japan surrendered because of Russia's entry into the war. Ignoring this assertion, let us examine the Red Army's contribution to the war in the Far East. in the east

Two-fold offensive The plans were

fairly simple, but some parts of the execution were complicated and bold. The two main thrusts would be made by the Transbaikal Front from the west, cutting through most of Manchuria to Ch'ang-ch'un and Mukden, and by the 1st Far Eastern Front from the east, breaking through the fortifications facing the Maritime Province and moving to

Kirin and on to Ch'ang-ch'un. The 2nd Far Eastern Front in the north would breach the Amur and make a thrust up the Sungari towards Harbin. The main weight of the Soviet forces was Malinovsky's Transbaikal Front, which was deployed mainly in Mongolia. Between May and July the Marshal, his staff, and the entire 6th Guards Tank and 53rd Armies had been transferred from Prague to the grim landscape of Siberia

and Mongolia. At the same time the 39th Army had been transferred from Insterburg. They joined the 36th and 17th Armies already garrisoned in Siberia. The Transbaikal Front comprised these five armies, with the supporting 12th Air

Army

(1,334 aircraft)

under Marshal of

Aviation S. A. Khudyakov, and a joint composite Russian and Mongolian "Cavalry-Mechanised Group", which was about six divisions of mostly horsed cavalry. Nearly half the Soviet strength in the Far East was assigned to this front, which was defended by light Japanese forces.

The Russian plans were based on the assumption, which subsequently proved to be correct, that the Japanese would not expect an attack to come across hundreds of miles of the Gobi Desert in Inner Mongolia and over the Great Hsingan moun2738

tain range. Indeed the Japanese forces were concentrated for a counter-attack in the Manchurian plain, and only small

garrisons had been placed in the towns around Hailar, near the Soviet border. It was not only the Japanese who thought that the plan was unlikely; long-serving officers from the Red Army in the East regarded a crossing of the Gobi in August

near suicidal. For their pessimism they were relegated to the posts of deputy as

commanders. In the Maritime Province, the 1st Far Eastern Front faced an equally daunting barrier, for here the Japanese expected an offensive. They had begun building permanent fortifications over 20 years earlier. The defences were from eight to 15 miles deep and set in difficult country

among mountains,

extinct volcanoes, steep river valleys, and patches of thick woodland. In the centre the 35th Army would have to cross the marshy valley of the Ussuri river, while to the south the 25th Army would tackle the formidable fortifications on the Manchurian border with Korea, notably the fortress area of

Dunnin. Meretskov decided to allocate most of his supporting artillery and armour to the 5th Army, under Colonel-General N. I. Krylov. Supported by the 1st Army on its right, its 12 divisions would plough into the Japanese defensive system around Mutan-chiang, north-west of Vladivostok. In conjunction with these land operations, the Pacific Fleet was instructed to disrupt Japanese maritime communications, prevent the use of the northern Korean ports, and assist the army in preventing any Japanese landings in the Soviet Union. Later it received the additional mission, which proved to be its most important, of mounting amphibious assaults on the Japanese ports in northern Korea, southern Sakhalin, and the northern Kurile Islands. The fleet consisted of two "Kirov"class cruisers, a destroyer leader with 10 destroyers, 19 destroyer escorts, 49 submarine chasers, 78 submarines, and 204 M.T.B.s. In addition there were 1,549 land-based aircraft of Fleet Aviation under Lieutenant-General Piotr N.

Lemeshko. Japanese forces consisted of one old light cruiser, one destroyer, 45 small patrol minesweepers, and 170 aircraft, most of which were to remain in the northern bases of the Japanese home islands.

A The the

citizens of of the 1st

men

Harbin greet Far Eastern

Front. The Japanese surrender city the horrors of street fighting, and saved the Russians from a protracted campaign in the east. After the surrender, the Manchurian campaign became a logistical operation to move men quickly into those areas which had ceased to be under Japanese control. Aircraft were used to transport ad hoc airborne units to capture towns in advance of the land forces.

spared the

I

which were known

The Transbaikal Front But

us return to the Transbaikal Front where Soviet forces were building up stocks of ammunition, and sweltering in the August sun. The 500 miles from Tamsag Bulag to the Kwantung Army headquarters at Ch'ang-ch'un, and on to Mukden, would be travelled without a break. The first task of the 6th Guards Tank Army was to cross the Great Hsingan range and reach the line Lu-pei-Li-chuan in five days. Emphasis was placed on the need to cross the mountains before the Japanese had time to react and deploy their reserves, let

to be some 200 to 250 miles from their western frontier. The 6th Guards Tank Army, under Colonel-General A. G. Kravchenko, would have the 39th Arm>, under Lieutenant-

General

I. I.

Lyudnikov, on

its left flank,

facing the fortifications at A-erh-shan; on the right the 17th Army, under LieutenantGeneral A. I. Danilov, would face the desert and mountains around Linh-sia and Chihfeng. The 53rd Army, under

Colonel-General I. M. Managarov, would be held in reserve. In the north the 36th Army, under Lieutenant-General A. A. Luchinsky, would make supporting attacks on Hailar and towards Tsitsihar, while in the south the Soviet-Mongolian

Cavalry-Mechanised

Group,

under 2739

A Japanese prisoners

in

Dunhua. h> A column of P.O.W.s moves

to its collecting

point in

Dunhua area. Many of the men who made up the Japanese Kwantung Army were unfit or

the

The Russians, however, used them as a pool of free labour to work on their over-aged.

industrial projects in the East. Estimates of the Japanese losses vary: their casualties were

between 20,000 and 80,000, and the 600,000 prisoners were 148 generals.

among

2740

Colonel-General I. A. Pliev, would thrust towards Ch'eng-te and Kalgan (Chiangchia-k'ou).

Some units like the 36th and 17th Armies were accustomed to the Far East, while the joint Cavalry-Mechanised Group had been locally raised. Other armies had a local Siberian motorised infantry division attached, except for the 6th Guards Tank Army, which had two. Since it would bear the full weight of the operation, the 6th Guards Tank Army was given more than the usual mechanised infantry complement. It had two reinforced mechanised infantry corps, one tank corps, two motorised infantry divisions, two assault gun brigades, and four independent tank brigades. Its total strength stood at 826 tanks and 193 assault guns; this included 615 late model T-34 tanks (the remainder were older T-26, BT-5, and BT-7 tanks), 188 armoured cars, 6,489 other vehicles, and 948 motorcycles. It was supported by 995 field guns and heavy mortars, 43 Katyusha rocketlaunchers, and 165 anti-aircraft guns. In all, it comprised some 44 motorised rifle and 25 tank battalions. Drawing on the experience of their own and German mechanised operations in Europe, the Russians arranged for motorcycle and air reconnaissance to cover the flanks and point of their armies. Aircraft covered the area from 30 to 60 miles ahead, while motorcycles operated between 45 to 50 miles in advance. Each of these reinforced motorcycle battalions carried powerful radio transmitters.

Flank reconnaissance covered points 15 miles out, an important provision since there would be gaps between the armies, and even within the 6th Guards Tank Army the two columns would be separated by nearly 50 miles. Opposite this carefully-balanced force stood the Japanese 3rd Area Army under General K. Ushiroku, consisting of the 30th and 44th Armies. Their task was to defend the Ch'ang-ch'un-Ssu-p'ing-chieh -Seoul, and the Mukden -Dairen railways with the industrial centres located along them. They had permission to retreat to the fortified lines in the T'ung-hua area. The 44th Army, under LieutenantGeneral Y. Hongo, with headquarters at Liaoyuan, had positioned its three divisions and one tank brigade to cover the Inner and Outer Mongolian borders from A-erh-shan in the north through Taonan to Tungliao in the south. The 30th Army, under Lieutenant-General S. lida (who had commanded the Japanese army which invaded Burma in 1942) had its headquarters at Mei-hok'ou, with four divisions covering Ch'ang-ch'un and the fortified zone.

Ushiroku retained one division, three independent mixed brigades, and a tank brigade in reserve near Mukden, and another at Jehol in south-west Manchuria. The 4th Army, under LieutenantGeneral M. Uemura, with headquarters at Tsitsihar, was composed of three divisions and four independent mixed brigades. Their task was to cover northern Manchuria. One division and an inde-

<

Russian style, in The thrust across the desert and mountains on the western border of Manchuria

RUSSIAN ADVANCE AUGUST 8/22, 1 945

RUSSIA

(KWANTUNG ARMY SURRENDERS AUGUST 18) Trans-Siberian /f,

TRANSBAIKAL FRONT

Blitzkrieg,

the

Far

East.

caught the Japanese unprepared and achieved the deepest

(MALINOVSKY)

penetrations.

SECOND FAR EASTERN FRONT (PURKAEV)

SAKHALIN Blagoveshchensk 2nd Army

•':

OUTER MONGOLIA

•

Aihun«i

Hailar

*"

16th

Army

<>,

-^

Sovetskaya ,

MANC

Gavan

UTO

Khabarovsk 39th, 53rd, 6th

FIRST FAR EASTERN FRONT (MERETSKOV)

Guards Tank, 17th Armies

GOBI DESERT

HOKKAIDO

INNER

MONG Mech.

Cav Grou

Hakodate •

•Peiping

SEA OF JAPAN

(Peking)

Chinese Peoples' 8th Army

Port Arthur ••

Aug. 22

Dairen

Pyongyang .38 Parallel

• Seoul

'^^^

CHINA

"^

17th Area

Tokyo •

Armies

MILES

500

KILOMETRES

800

JAPAN

KOREA pendent mixed brigade held positions in the Hailar area, a division and two independent mixed brigades were in the Heiho-Sunwu area, and one division was at Tsitsihar with a mixed brigade at

The 119th Infantry Division, which was at Hailar, was one of the best units in the Kwantung Army, but even then it was only rated 70 per cent effective. In the same area the 80th Independent Mixed Brigade was rated as the weakest Harbin.

unit, at 15 per cent effectiveness.

Against this opposition the 6th Guards Tank Army had been set a break-neck timetable. Two days were allocated to crossing the desert, making an average of 65 miles a day. During this move it was expected to seize suitable sites for building airstrips.

crossing ridge,

Three days were allowed for mountains, securing the

the

and moving down to the Lu-pei-

Li-chuan line, a distance of 50 miles a day; then within five days it was to take Mukden and Ch'ang-ch'un.

HONSHU

The war begins On August

8,

there

were no rolling

barrages to announce the attack in the east by the 6th Guards Tank Army, j ust the roar of massed tank engines. There was no

need for any preparatory fire, for the army met no opposition during the first four days.

The northern axis was led by VII Mechanised Corps, the southern by IX Mechanised Corps, with V Guards Tank Corps in the rear. The lack of opposition changed this formation, and in a spectacular advance which at times reached 25 mph, each of the two mechanised corps formed into six to eight parallel columns.

By

the time they reached the Great

Hsingan range on August 10, IX Mechanised Corps was low on fuel. V Guards Tank Corps moved up to make the crossing during the night. 2741

many had not had a hot meal for days. Aircraft flew 2,072 tons of fuel and oil to the 6th Guards Tank Army and 384 tons to other units on the front during the operation. But the aircraft were not designed for heavy bulk cargoes and it needed 1,755 sorties to bring in the fuel. In the north the 36th Army hit a fortified line near Man-chou-li, but this was soon overcome and the army advanced 25 miles in the first day. Hailar was by-passed and reduced slowly, falling on the 18th. It was a spectacular stand by the Japanese 80th Brigade which was attacked by the three rifle divisions and a tank brigade. The Japanese fought on, in ignorance of the capitulation on August 15. The 39th Army also fought with units of the Japanese 107th Division, which had not heard of the surrender, and Wang-yehmiao fell on the 21st. Though some 7,850 Japanese had surrendered by the 24th, some fought on until the end of August. The 17th Army met no resistance crossing the Hsingan mountains and reached Dabanshan on August 15. Ironically the horsemen of the mixed Mongolian and Russian cavalry force did better than their mechanised comrades. By August 20 they had pushed over the border into China, leaving the tanks and armoured cars of the 17th Army stranded for lack of fuel.

On August

A

Marines in an informal victory parade in Harbin. Soviet

These men may be part of the River Flotilla which entered the Sungari river and moved upwards to Harbin. The town was captured by an airborne unit.

Amur

The mountain road was a nightmare, with 30-degree turns and many defiles, and at places it had to be shored up by engineers. V Guards Tank Corps made the 25-mile crossing in seven hours. VII Mechanised Corps moved more slowly and completed it by the evening of August 11.

Over the mountains, the corps adopted battle formation, and with no roads, petrol and oil consumption increased. Behind the tanks the tail units bogged down in their trucks on the battered mountain roads. On August 10 the first fuel supplies were brought in by air. By the end of August 11 advanced units of V Guards Tank Corps had taken Lu-pei, and on the 12th, VII Mechanised Corps had taken Li-chuan. As yet they had made no real contact with the enemy. The first phase was now over. But now the incomplete logistic preparation caught up. For two days they waited: V Guards Tank Corps' fuel tanks were just over half empty, VII Mechanised Corps' were half empty, while IX Mechanised Corps' had no fuel at all left. Men as well as machines suffered; 2742

Marshal Malinovsky ordered the 6th Guards Tank Army and the 39th Army to give detachments of brigade strength the role that had previously been assigned to corps. These units were fully topped up with all the available fuel and ordered to press on with the advance. The rest of the corps would follow as fuel became available. As it developed, smaller advanced reconnaissance units forged ahead and fulfilled the corps and army objectives. The Motorcycle Battalion of IX Mechanised Corps operated more than 100 miles ahead of the main force between August 14 and 17. V Guards Tank Corps' reconnaissance detachment took the bridge and airfield at T'ung-liao and VII Mechanised Corps' reconnaissance detachment took Taonan. Larger advanced units followed on August 16, but the main forces only arrived on the 18th. 15

Despite its surrender, the Kwantung continued to retreat and so Malinovsky ordered the 6th Guards Tank Army to take Ch'ang-ch'un and Mukden, and after leaving a reinforced bri-gade in each town, to proceed as quickly as possible to Port Arthur and other ports.

Army

The pincers close As the Russian advance into western Manchuria continued during August 1945, (he Ii9th Army was ordered to liquidate (he A-erh-shan pocket and move to Ch'ang-ch'un and Ssu-p'ing. The 36th

Army was

to

mop up Haihir and move on

and An-kuang. The I. M. between fill the gap would Managarov) (he 6th Guards Tank Army and the 17th Army, and occupy K'ai-lu. On August 18 a company-size force composed of engineers and some ex(()

Tsitsihar, T'ai-hu,

'):Wd

Army (Lieutenant-General

{)erienced airborne troops air-landed at Harbin. A day later 225 men landed at

men at Ch'ang-ch'un; landing was also made at Kirin. These

Mukden and a

200

operations were launched to prevent the escape to Japan of valuable prisoners and the destruction of equipment and stores. On August 19, the 36th Army took Tsitsihar. A day later advanced units of V Guards Tank Corps occupied Mukden, on the 21st VII Mechanised Corps took Ch'ang-ch'un. Air landings were made at Port Arthur and Dairen by 250 men on

August 22. Tanks from V Guards Tank Corps were loaded on railway flat cars and sent from Mukden to Port Arthur, where they arrived on the 24th. From August 24 to 29 the main force of the 6th Guards Tank Army concentrated in Mukden, Dairen, and Port Arthur. It had moved over 700 miles and been halted only by lack of fuel. The 12th Air Army had flown 2,361 combat missions and 3,167 reconnaissance and supply missions. Bombers had dropped a modest 710.7 tons of explosive.

Ground forces had fired 14,746 shells and 42,134 bullets, according to Soviet sources. The Japanese had made little contact with them as a result of a breakdown in communications, and because they had deployed their forces well back from the frontier.

On

The anti-tank defences were

in-

A

Fraternisation with the men of a Russian tank unit sample Chinese food in Dalny near Port Arthur. They are part of the Transbaikal Front, which had a gruelling series of towns and physical features to capture in the natives:

opening days of the campaign.

miles.

Hu-t'ou and Tung-ning fell within the two days, and by August 11 Mu-leng and Hunchun had fallen. Some by-passed Japanese garrisons fought on until August first

At Sui-fe-ho, fierce fighting lasted until August 10. The key to the front was the town of Mu-tan-chiang, where the Japanese 5th

the other side of Manchuria, the 1st Far Eastern Front went into action on August 8. Although it faced fixed defences, these were manned by the Japanese 1st Area Army (under General S. Kita), which included three divisions and one brigade formed from over-age reservists

26.

with less than one month's training. None of the divisions was fully equipped or had

Tank Brigade

any combat experience, and the positions were short of artillery and ammunition.

also

complete. In a night attack, in driving rain, the Soviet 5th Army (Colonel-General N. I. Krylov) and the 1st Red Banner Army (Lieutenant-General A. P. Beloborodov) stormed the border fortifications. They were supported by 320 guns per mile of front, and each division was allocated a front of two miles. There was a brief but savage battle and by the end of the day the Russians had advanced about 7^

Army

(Lieutenant-General N. Shimizu)

had concentrated. It was attacked from the air and LIX Rifle Corps and the 75th of the 1st Army took Link'ou and cut the town off from the north. While XXVI Rifle Corps and the 257th Tank Brigade tightened this grip from the

2743

A Revenge for the humiliation of 1905. Soviet soldiers on the waterfront of Port Arthur. Except for units in Korea, this

was the most southern penetration by Soviet forces in the campaign.

north, the 5th Army ploughed ahead from the east. Fighting lasted from August 11 to 14, when XXVI Rifle Corps entered the town. On the 15th the Japanese regained control of the town and their rear defence line, in a counter-attack that pushed XXVI Corps back six to eight miles to the northeast. It was only on the 16th that Soviet forces finally captured the town in the last major battle in the east. When hostilities ceased, the 1st Area Army remained at about two-thirds of its effectiveness. Its 5th Army had sustained some heavy losses in the battle for Mu-tan-chiang, but the main forces were intact and falling back to the T'ung-hua

redoubt according to plan. In the Soviet 2nd Far Eastern Front, the smallest Russian forces faced the weakest enemy defences, for the Japanese had no plans to hold the salient of northeastern Manchuria. The Russians achieved an uncontested crossing of the Amur on August 9 and a day later the bulk of the 15th Army (Lieutenant-General S. K. Mamonov)

2744

was shipped Rifle Division

and

across.

Men

of the 361st

moved over the Sungari

hit Fu-chin,

where they encountered

the Japanese 134th Infantry Division. It was a hard fight lasting several days, and General Purkaev assumed personal command despite the fact that he was also responsible for the crossing at Blagoveshchensk and the landings on Sakhalin Island. Only on August 14 was the Japanese 134th Division forced to withdraw.

2nd Army advances The crossings at Blagoveshchensk were made on the night of August 9-10. Again the crossing was easy, but later the Russians

hit

fierce

resistance

at

Aihun,

where the Japanese 135th Brigade continued to fight until it learned of the capitulation on August 19. The island of Sakhalin had been divided almost equally between the Japanese and the Russians since 1905. The original

Soviet plans here had been to remain on the defensive, but following the initial

capitulation came in time, however, to spare the Russians a real taste of what the

Marshal

Americans had experienced throughout

Vasilevsky decided to take the southern section in an amphibious and land attack. There was a garrison of about 20,000 men in the south, but the Soviet forces

the south Pacific. In fact the Japanese capitulation came in time to spare all the Soviet forces in the Far East. Though the Transbaikal Front achieved a major victory, other fronts had encountered some characteristically fierce Japanese defensive fighting. A measure of the cost of this fighting is reflected in the Russian ammunition expenditure (361,079 shells and 1,023,697 bullets) and their casualties, which are

successes

in

Manchuria,

outnumbered

it in a ratio of 3.7 to 1 in infantry companies, 10 to 1 in artillery, and 4.3 to 1 in machine guns. The Russians had complete control of the air, and almost total control at sea. Despite this, the Japanese put up a stiff resistance to the landings on August 11, made by the Soviet 79th Rifle Division. On August 14 they counter-attacked and cut off the 179th Regiment of the 79th Division.

Landings were made by marines at Maoka on August 19 in an attempt to outflank the Japanese defences, and on the 20th the defence began to crumble. On the Kurile island chain there was almost parity in the strength of the opposing forces. Landings were made on Shumshu on August 18 but they were fiercely resisted by the Japanese. The

probably understated (8,219 killed and 22,264 wounded). Estimates of Japanese losses vary; the Russians claim 83,737 killed and 594,000 prisoners, though unofficial and perhaps incomplete Japanese sources give 21,000

Overleaf: Mother Russia exhorts to ever greater

her troops victories.

(Page 2747): Russian posters like the one shown here, urging the factory worker to increase production, were common throughout the war. Soviet industry harnessed the vast natural resources of the country to produce a massive amount of material theatre

firstly, for the

and

European

later for the

armies

ranged across three fronts in the Far East in the war against the

Kwantung Army

in

Manchuria.

killed.

Weapons captured from the Japanese were made

available

to

the

Chinese

Communist forces who used them in the Civil War, which ended in 1949. With its end, peace came to China after nearly 50 years of war.

2745

POAMHA-MATb 30BET!

rii>(i>uwi

Tjftouqi

c

Ibce Ann cdpohta!

flAAMM KPACHOH APMMH BOAbLUE TAHKDB,CAMDAETDB,OPyflHi^,nVAEMETOB, BMHTOBOK,CHAPPflOB, HATPOHOB! t-^

2747

argued that actual invasion was now unnecessary. Yet this factor was not

CHAPTERS

considered sufficient. One hope for enforcing a Japanese surrender, short of invasion, which was discussed at the White House on June 18, 1945, was a prediction of the highly

Hiroshima by

Dr.

Frank Futrell

secret U.S.

Army Manhattan Engineer

two atomic bombs would be available for operational employment by the end of July. The first of these revolutionary weapons would be District project that,

By the spring

of 1945 the Imperial Household, nerve centre of Government, was struggling to bring the war to an end.

Administered by the

Army and Navy-

the real rulers of Japan-the Imperial Household hoped that a negotiated peace would avoid Allied military occupation and preserve the centuries-old imperial

system

> The bomber's crew. Only Colonel Tibbets and Captain Parson (front row, 2nd and 3rd from right) knew the plane's destination.

>>

General L.R. Groves, the

director of the "Manhattan Project". Under him was a

team of brilliant and sometimes temperamental men whose work

was

so secret that even their wives thought they were part of a peaceful industrial establishment. A> "Little Boy", the first atomic weapon. With a diameter of 28 inches, a length of 120 inches, and a weight of 9,000 lbs the

bomb had

the

power

20,000 tons of T.N. T.

2748

of

itself.

Japan was clearly defeated: following failure to secure Russia's good offices for negotiations, the last hope for a conditional peace was the bitter proposal of the irrevocable Minister of War, General Korechika Anami, that Japan must fight to the end in defence of the home islands. Japan still had two million combat troops and 9,000 kamikaze aircraft. These forces could be expected to wreak, tremendous casualties upon American invaders, who. in the end, would negotiate a peace. American assessments of the situation were not vastly different from those of General Anami. Japan was defeated, besieged from the sea, and was being pulverised by U.S. Navy carrier aircraft and by U.S. Army Air Forces B-29 bombers that were flying from bases in the Marianas. At a meeting in the White House on June 18, 1945, U.S. Army Chief-of-Staff General George C. Marshall urged that Japan must be invaded in order to end the war, and President Harry S Truman gave a go-ahead for planned landings on Kyushu on November 1, 1945 (Operation "Olympic"), and five months later against Honshu (Operation "Coronet"). While Marshall supported invasion, he was concerned about potential American casualties, estimating that 69,000 Americans would be killed or

wounded

in

a

190,000-man

operation

against Kyushu. However, the question must be asked: was an invasion of the Japanese home islands necessary even without using the atomic bomb? The American submarines had brought the Japanese economy to a standstill and the home islands alone would not produce enough food to feed the home population. Thus, it can be

the

bomb

called the "Little Boy", a gun-

assembly weapon with an explosive Uranium-235 core-fissionable material that had been laboriously extracted at a giant Manhattan plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Atomic scientists were confident that the gun principle would work, that an explosive charge would drive a plug of U-235 into the U-235 core, establishing a critical mass and an explosion of gigantic dimensions. The scientists were less confident that the other type of bomb could be made to function. This was the "Fat Man", and it was an implosion weapon which used plutonium (Pu239) bred in nuclear reactors at Hanford,

Washington. The implosion weapon principle would require testing in mid-July at a proving ground near Alamogordo, New Mexico: and, if it worked, a "Fat Man" would be ready at the end of July. The United States Army Air Forces had already provided everything required to drop the atomic bombs when they were ready. The 509th Composite Group had been activated in December 1944 under the command of Colonel Paul W. Tibbets, Jr., and included the 393rd Bombardment Squadron with the most advanced model long-range B-29 bombers-the only American aircraft big enough to carry the first atomic weapons. Both in training

and

familiarisation flights to Japan, 509th Group had been dropping orange-painted 10,000-pound T.N.T.-filled bombs (quite naturally called "Pumpkin bombs" because of their shape and colour), which were similar in ballistic characteristics to the "Fat Man". There was a derisive song to the effect that the 509th was going to win the war, but no one knew exactly how, since only Colonel Tibbets and a few others in the group shared the atomic secret. A target committee of Manhattan Project and Army Air Forces representatives had nominated Kokura, Hiroshima, Niigata, and Kyoto for the first atomic strikes. Nagasaki was substituted for Kyoto when Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson forbade an attack against Kyoto because of its cultural antiquities. , in

the

American military leaders understood Japan's reluctance to surrender her ancient Tenno or imperial system, and they also reasoned that the Emperor would be the only authority that could enforce a capitulation of Japan's military

The military leaders were therefore inclined to clarify the Allied unconditional surrender terms enough to

forces.

permit Japan to retain her Emperor. This view was not accepted at the Allied heads of state "Terminal" conference in Potsdam. Instead, the Potsdam proclamation published on July 26 called for an unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, or else acceptance

"prompt and utter destruction". In the assessment of historian Robert J. C. Butow, the absence of mention of the Emperor in the Potsdam proclamation was "an invaluable trump card" offered to the Japanese militarists, and on July 28 Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki announced that his government would mokusatsu "kill" it the proclamation literally, "with silence", or more idiomatically "treat it with silent contempt". Suzuki favoured peace and may well have used the wrong word, but the response unleashed violent reactions. Events moved swiftly, and President Truman had learned of the world's first

of

aeo^'L^-

nuclear detonation at its occurrence at Alamogordo on July 16. The implosion principle whereby a core of plutonium was wrapped with T.N.T. blocks which when detonated simultaneously squeezed the core into a critical mass-had worked, and the "Fat Man" was practicable. In Washington, General Carl A. Spaatz, on his way to take command of the United States Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, was told of the atomic strike plans, and, after refusing to drop such bombs on oral directions, received written orders that the 509th Group would deliver its first "special bomb" as soon after about August 3 as weather would permit a visual attack against Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, or Nagasaki. The first bomb would be the reliable "Little Boy". The U.S. cruiser Indianapolis delivered most of the U-235 needed to arm it at Tinian on July 26 and headed on toward the Philippines. On August 2, the 20th Air Force mimeographed top secret operations orders for Special Bombing Mission No. 13; the primary target was Hiroshima, with Kokura the secondary and Nagasaki the tertiary. An advance B-29 weather observer aircraft would scout and report on each target. The strike mission included an atomic laden B-29 and two observer B-29's. of bad weather over Predictions southern Japan held off the attack until August 6, 1945, when at 0245 hours Colonel Tibbets lifted his B-29, named the "Enola Gay" after his mother, off the runway at North Field and was followed at two minute intervals by the observer planes. At take-off the "Enola Gay" grossed 65 tons in weight, eight tons over normal B-29 bombing weight, partly because of the fact that the "Little Boy" weighed 9,000 pounds. Since a crash of the plane while taking off might have blown one end off Tinian Island, Captain William S. ("Deac") Parsons, a U.S. Navy ordnance expert who accompanied Tibbets as weaponeer and bomb commander, armed the "Little Boy" during the flight toward Japan.

Hiroshima dies At 0715 hours on August 6, 1945, the weather scout B-29 over Hiroshima piloted by Major Claude Eatherly signalled that the target was open, thus sealing the fate of the city. As the weather 2749

population from 380,000 in 1942 to about 255,200 in 1945, but it remained Japan's seventh largest city.

The

"Little

Boy" was aimed

at a bridge

in almost the centre of the built-up part

and it detonated at an altitude of just below 2,000 feet, almost precisely on its mark, with a force later calculated to have been equivalent to 17,000 tons (or 17 kilotons) of T.N.T. By blast and by an of the city,

ensuing firestorm, approximately 4.7 square miles around the ground zero

A The devastation at Hiroshima. Sixty per cent of the city had been destroyed, with 86,000 inhabitants killed and 61,000 injured. On the right is the domed Agricultural Exhibition Hall which remains today as a ruin, a

memorial for the first an atomic attack.

victim of

2750

plane departed, the Hiroshima all-clear air defence signal was sounded at 0731. Until now the city had almost entirely escaped air attack, and few people took the appearance of a few high-flying planes seriously. Thus sightings at 0806 of two B-29's with a third in trail, all flying very high at an altitude of 31,600 feet, did not seem significant enough to call another defence alert. But those Japanese who watched the approaching planes (and who survived) noticed that the lead bombers suddenly separated in tight diving turns that carried them rapidly away from a point in space where something fell from the planes -the "Little Boy" from the "Enola Gay" and parachuted instruments from the observation plane. Exactly 17 seconds after 0815 hours an instant of pure, blinding, utterly intense bluish-white light cut across the sky, followed by searing heat, a thousand-fold crash of thunder, and finally an earthshaking blast that sent a mushroom cloud of dust and debris boiling up to 50,000 feet. This was the moment that survivors at Hiroshima would remember as the pikadon-ihe pika or "flash" followed by the don or "thunder". As a military objective, the city of Hiroshima was chiefly important as a port and the site of an army garrison. Located on seven finger-like deltaic islands where the mouth of the Ota river pushes out from the underside of Honshu into the Inland Sea, Hiroshima had been the point of embarkation for Japanese troops moving into China and to the South Seas. It was also the seat of the 2nd General Army, which was responsible for defence of the south-western section of the homeland. government-enforced and Volunteer evacuations had reduced the city's

(directly below the bomb burst) were completely destroyed. Approximately 60,000 out of 90,000 buildings within 9.5 square miles were destroyed or badly damaged. Very few people had taken shelter, and the full extent of personnel casualties at Hiroshima will never be known. The Japanese eventually inscribed the names of 61,443 known dead on the

cenotaph erected at ground zero. On the other hand, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey estimated that there were 139,402 casualties, including 71,379 known dead and missing (presumed to be dead)

and 68,023 injured, of

whom

19,691

were

known to be

seriously injured. The Bombing Survey estimated that over 20,000 of the killed and missing were school Ironically for a strategic children. bombing attack, most of Hiroshima's larger industrial factories were on the perimeter of the city, and these factories (and the workers who had already reported for duty) escaped destruction. The Bombing Survey concluded that only 26 per cent of Hiroshima's total production plant was destroyed in the atomic strike and

that the plants could have been kept in operation if the war had continued.

Nagasaki's turn the execution of the "Enola Gay" mission against Hiroshima was almost returned all crews flawless and immediately to Tinian, the 509th Composite Group's second mission, flown on August 9 with the more efficient "Fat

Where

Man" plutonium bomb, went much

less

smoothly. Again there were to be three planes in the striking force, an armed B-29 called "Bock's Car" piloted by Major Charles W. Sweeney and two observer

The city of Niigata was ruled out as too far distant for attack, leaving Kokura as the primary target and Nagasaki as the alternative. Kokura was aircraft.

important because

it

was the location

of a vast army arsenal on the northern tip of Kyushu. Nagasaki had a fine harbour of some commercial importance and four large Mitsubishi war production industrial plants. Unlike Hiroshima's

Hat

deltaic

Nagasaki's

topography was broken by hills and valleys, which promised to reduce destruction. Both Kokura and Nagasaki were to be

A A Japanese

caught atomic explosion. The bright light has burned her skin in the pattern of the kimono she was wearing at civilian

in the flash of the

the time of the attack. Many people who looked at the light which was "brighter than a

thousand suns" were permanently blinded.

terrain,

scouted in advance by weather B-29's. Prediction of weather over Kyushu dictated that the strike mission had to be flown on August 9, and since a storm was building up en route to Japan the strike B-29 and the two observer planes to accompany it were scheduled to fly northward individually and rendezvous over Yakoshima Island off the south coast of Kyushu before proceeding to their target.

There was considerable apprehension on Tinian as Major Sweeney launched the "Bock's Car" from North Field at 0349 hours on August 9. Another U.S. Navy ordnance expert. Commander Frederick L. Ashworth, was aboard as bomb commander and weaponeer, but the 10,000pound "Fat Man" had to be armed before take-off, greatly increasing the hazard of an atomic accident. Major Sweeney also discovered that 600 gallons of gasoline

could not be pumped from an auxiliary tank in his plane, and this substantially reduced his reserve fuel supply. Sweeney lost additional time and fuel circling Yakoshima Island awaiting one of the observer B-29's, and after 40 minutes he decided to go on without it. (This lircraft, which happened to carry the official scientist William and Group-Captain Leonard Cheshire, would arrive at the target a few minutes after the blast.) Apparently

British

observers,

Penney

clouds closed over Kokura, and after three runs over the city had failed to permit visual observation of the aiming point (but used up about 45 minutes additional time), the "Bock's

during the delay,

Car" strikeplanewasheadedfor Nagasaki. It too was hidden by clouds; and in the emergency, with fuel steadily dwindling.

Commander Ashworth authorised a radar drop. At the last moment a hole in the clouds permitted the bomb to be visually aimed and dropped at 1101 hours, but the "Fat Man" nevertheless missed the assigned aiming point by about three miles, a distance which placed the bomb over Nagasaki's industrial section rather than in its built-up commercial area.

After the drop, Major Sweeney headed to an emergency landing on Okinawa, where he landed with only a few gallons of fuel

left.

Only vague references to an "incendiary" attack at Hiroshima had appeared in Japanese newspapers, and the people at Nagasaki were little prepared for the atomic strike. The weather B-29 had touched off an air raid alert at 0748, but nothing had happened, and at 1101 only about 400 people were in the city's tunnel shelters, which could have accommodated a third of Nagasaki's 195,290 registered inhabitants. As at Hiroshima, the "Fat Man" at Nagasaki was detonated in the air and at an altitude of approximately 1,750 feet. Where the atomic scientists had estimated that the magnitude of the

plutonium bomb blast would range from 700 to 5,000 tons of T.N.T., the implosion principle of the "Fat Man" was much more efficient than that of the gun-type weapon, and the force of the "Fat Man" was estimated at 20 kilotons. With the

more powerful bomb, and surrounding concentrating the blast, the scale of destruction at Nagasaki was greater than at Hiroshima, but the area destroyed and personnel casualties were smaller because terrain afforded protection from radiant heat and ionizing radiations to about one-fourth of the population. The area of greatest destruction was oval-shaped inside the narrow Urakami valley, approximately 1.45 square miles in size, and intervening hills saved the central part of the city from destruction. (By comparison, in Hiroshima approximately 60 per cent of the population was within 1.2 miles of the centre of the explosion; and in Nagasaki only 30 per cent of the populahills

tion

was so

casualty

situated.) Official Japanese figures nevertheless include

23,753 killed, 1,927 missing, and 23,345 injured, and these statistics number only verified cases. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey believed that the casualties were actually in the order of 35,000 dead and somewhat more than that injured. There was no fire storm at

Nagasaki and less public panic. Since several of the large factories were in the area of maximum destruction, damage to industry in the Nagasaki strike was quite heavy; excluding the dockyard area (outside the radius of the bomb's effect) 68.3 per cent of the industrial productive area of the city was destroyed. After a detailed investigation of Japan's struggle to end the war, the United States 2751

:

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4

Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that "certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November

Japan would have surrendered even bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned UMf),

if

the atomic

On

the other hand, the atomic attack doubtless hastened the Soviet Union's belated declaration of or contemplated."

war upon Japan on August

8,

and

tainly provided a powerful catalyst

it

cer-

which

enabled Japan's peace leaders to bring about a surrender over the continuing objections of War Minister Anami and the Army and Navy chiefs-of-staff. After Hiroshima the Japanese militarists attempted alternately to obscure the nature of the nuclear explosion and argued privately that the United States could not possibly possess enough radioactive material to permit a continuation of such attacks. The effect of these arguments failed with the Nagasaki strike, and in a hurriedly-called Imperial Conference on the night of August 9, 1945 Emperor Hirohito-the god figure who had never before been able to act without a consensus of his advisers-bluntly told the militarists that "to continue the war means nothing but the destruction of the whole nation" and that "the time has come when we must bear the unbearable". By the early morning hours of August 10, cables were on their way to Japan's diplomatic representatives in Berne and Stockholm announcing the nation's acceptance of the Potsdam ultimatum, with the sole proviso that the Tenno system would be preserved. This was to be the acceptable condition for the war's end when it came officially

on September

2.

A-bombing: the after-effects

bursts called for over the Japanese cities would limit casualties for the most part to non-radioactive injuries; namely, those due to the force and the heat of the unprecedented explosions. But when the final results were known, it was apparent from the experience at Hiroshima and Nagasaki that even without the effects of blast and fire the number of deaths among people within a radius of one-half mile from ground zero would have been almost as great as the actual figures, and deaths among those within one mile would

have been only slightly less than they were. The cause was radiation sickness, which the Japanese called genshihaku-

<1 An atomic explosion in New Mexico. Observers were

nearly ten miles from the explosion, and even here they wore welder's dark glasses

against the fierce flash.

Though the blast and flash of an atomic weapon seemed immediately awesome to victims and observers alike, the effects of radiation were an insidious by-product of the bomb which lingered long after the war.

A Survivors of Hiroshima leave the devastated city. In the background a building burns, after being

caught in the

fierce

flash of the explosion.

dansho, or the "sickness of the originalchild bomb", among the hibak'sha, the "people who received the bomb". According to the Japanese, individuals very near to the centre of the atomic explosions, but who escaped flash burns or secondary injuries, died rather quickly, the majority within a week, autopsies showing almost complete absence of white blood cells and deterioration of bone

marrow. Most radiation cases, who were

show severe week to a month after the bombs, when sudden high fevers marked the often-fatal onset of radiation at greater distances, did not

In plans for the atomic strikes, Manhattan Engineer District scientists were knowledgeable about the potential effects of radiation emitted from nuclear explosions, although the exact effect of nuclear

radiation on human tissue was, and continues to be, incompletely explored. Nuclear radiation consists of alpha and beta particles and gamma rays, the latter being of great significance because of their long range and high penetrating character. It was expected that the air

symptoms

for a

again with dwindling white cell counts and disappearing bone marrow. The degree of the fever and the chance of survival bore a direct relation to the degree of exposure to radiation. Sperm counts done at Hiroshima revealed low counts or complete aspermia for as long as three months afterward among males who were within 5,000 feet of the sickness,

blood

2753

centre of the explosion. Two months after the explosion, Hiroshima's total incidence of miscarriages, abortions, and premature births was 27 per cent as compared with a normal rate of six per cent.

At both Hiroshima and Nagasaki immediate deaths from radiation peaked in three to four weeks and practically ceased after seven to eight weeks. Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were rebuilt and regained prosperity, the prosperity ironically initially incidental to defence

production undertaken for the United States military forces during the Korean War. As for the hibak'sha, the atomic casualty lists were never closed, since persons originally exposed have continued to die, apparently -although not completely conclusively -before their time. Fifteen years after the pikadon, for

example, Japanese physicians began to find abnormal incidence of thyroid cancer in people who were young children at the time of the bomb, and there has been an higher incidence of eye identified cataracts and leukaemia among the survivors of the A-bomb. The social trauma of keloid burn scars borne by many men and women immobilised these survivors in varying degrees. Many of these burn victims have expressed a belief that they have been discriminated against in gainful employment because of their disfigurements. Although children conceived by irradiated parents have appeared quite normal, some scientists continue to fear that one or two more generations born of atomic survivors must mature before the possibility of genetic mutations resulting from one day's exposure to gamma rays can be measured.

I

In a retrospective look at the A-bomb Lieutenant-General Leslie R. Groves, war-time director of the U.S.

strikes,

District, has summed up the American belief about the matter: "The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended World War II. There can be no doubt of that. While they brought death and destruction on a horrifying scale, they averted even greater lossesAmerican, English, and Japanese." On the other side, the taped Japanese description of the bombing that may be heard in the Peace Memorial Museum in Hiroshima is more ambiguous, for here it is said: ''When the Pacific War was finally about to end, at the stage where only a decisive battle on the mainland remained, the sudden disastrous event of Hiroshima was truly unfortunate to the people of Hiroshima, Japan and the whole world."

Army Manhattan


lone survivor in the

remains of Nagasaki, the city which was victim of "Fat Man", the second A-bomb, 132 inches long and 60 inches wide. V Hiroshima. The report from U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson stated: "Results clear cut successful in all respects. Visible effects greater than in

any

test.

Conditions normal in

aircraft following delivery."

On

the

ground people were

roasted, vaporised, or subjected to

massive doses of radiation which killed or crippled them, leaving slow-healing open wounds which remained as deep scars of rubbery pink tissue.

.

W*.

-

• 'r

*


1

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CHAPTER

17S

Japan surrenders by Lawson Nagel

May

Japanese Army high despondent. Germany had surrendered, and it was obvious that the British and Americans were planning to redeploy their military strength for a final assault on the Japanese homeland. Relations with the Soviet Union had grown steadily worse, and there were fears that the Soviets might break their non-aggression pact with Japan and join the Western Allies. The Americans had recently captured Okinawa, only 400 miles from Japan, making it even easier than before for the American bombers In

1945, the

command was

wreak havoc on Japanese cities. Haunted by the spectre of Allied invasion of the homeland, some members to

A General Takazo Numata surrenders in Rangoon.

of the high command privately suggested that it was time to consider negotiations.

The Navy had admitted in October 1944 that it no longer had enough strength to launch an offensive. In December of the same year, the Americans had completed the Leyte campaign in the Philippines -a campaign which the Japanese premier had said would be decisive. From a strategic standpoint, Japan had already Should not the nation surrender now, while retaining some strength and bargaining power, rather than risk total destruction in the invasion? These fears were not shared by the majority of the high command in May 1945. They agreed that diplomatic attempts to keep the Soviet Union out of the war should be stepped up, but they expressed confidence that any AngloAmerican invasion of the Japanese homeland could be repulsed. The main strength of the Army remained intact, and Japan's air force had been dispersed to many airfields to preserve it from destruction by American bombers. Plans to repulse the invaders called for the entire air force to attack the American transports and task forces in waves oi kamikaze assaults. Army operations would be concentrated on the elimination of the invaders at their debarkation sites. If these operations were not successful, Japanese volunteer reserves would continue operations lost the war.

V General Numata and his party arrive from Saigon, on August 26, for the signing of the preliminary agreement for the surrender of all forces in South East Asia.

Above all. Army leaders "what should be remembered in

further inland. said,

carrying out the general decisive battle is adherence to a vigorous spirit of attack"

2756

to "set the example for 100,000,000 compatriots". The high command felt that a single invasion could be defeated,

although they held out no such hope of victory if the Americans launched second or third assaults in quick succession. The Japanese economy was, in any case, in a state of almost complete collapse. American submarines had isolated the home islands; raw materials were in desperately short supply, and starvation threatened. Emperor Hirohito himself was soon convinced that it would be necessary to negotiate. His civilian advisers. told him that the military situation was hopeless and the war must be ended immediately. Early in July 1945, therefore, while the high command was planning to repulse the invaders and fight to the last man, the diplomats were appealing to the Soviet Union to act as mediator in order to end the war.

The Potsdam Declaration On

July 17, Stalin met with Truman and Churchill at Potsdam. He informed the Western leaders that the Japanese had approached him about peace talks, but seemed unprepared to accept the Allies' demand for unconditional surrender. Truman and Churchill, along with Chiang Kai-shek, issued the Potsdam Proclamation on July 26, reiterating the demand that surrender be unconditional. Otherwise, the proclamation declared, Japan

would face "prompt and utter destruction". It did not state that this destruction

would be brought about by a new weapon -the atomic bomb. The debate in top Japanese diplomatic and military circles now revolved around the meaning of the word "unconditional". Did this mean that the nation must surrender, as well as the armed forces? Did it mean that the Emperor would be deposed and the Imperial institution abolished? The Potsdam Proclamation had been silent on this point. Both the diplomats and the high command were determined to support the Emperor, and the generals knew that their men would never accept any agreement which abolished the

Imperial institution. In the words of one hi^h -ranking officer, "it would be useless for the people to survive the war if the structure of the State itself were to be even if the whole Japanese destroyed. race were all but wiped out, its determination to preserve the national policy would be forever recorded in the annals of history, but a people who sacrificed will upon the altar of physical existence could never rise again as a nation." In the midst of this debate, on August 6, the first atomic bomb was dropped on .

.

.

Hiroshima. Three days later a second atomic bomb devastated Nagasaki, and the Soviet Union finally declared war on Japan. A conference of the Emperor and his

and military advisers was hastily summoned, and met in an air-raid shelter in the grounds of the Imperial Palace in civilian

Tokyo shortly before midnight. In the light of the events of the past three days,

even the military authorities agreed now that a surrender was unavoidable. Unlike Foreign Minister Togo, however, who advised surrender on the single condition that the Emperor's rights be preserved, the military leaders asked for three other reservations. First, they wanted to avoid an Allied military occupation of Japan. Second, they wanted to

war criminals themselves. Third, they wanted to disarm their own troops rather than surrender directly to the Allies. War Minister Anami explained that this last proviso could be taken to mean that the Japanese armed forces were not actually defeated, but had decided to stop fighting voluntarily in order to preserve the Japanese land and people from further destruction. When the two sides had expressed their views, the conference was found to be deadlocked. Then the unprecedented happened. The Emperor's advisers actually asked him for his own opinion. Instead of acting according to his advisers' instructions, the Emperor was being asked to advise them. He was to shed the role of observer and puppet and make his own decision. Hirohito had already made up his mind, and he soon made it clear that he believed the Foreign Minister's proposal -with only the Emperor's position safeguarded -was more likely to lead to a quick peace settlement and should therefore be accepted. The conference unanimously endorsed the Emperor's decision, and cables were sent within a few hours announcing the Japanese terms. Later that same day, a reply was retry

ceived from U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes. This note explained that the Allies would not accept anything but an unconditional surrender, and that this meant that the Emperor would be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers. This statement produced another argument in the Japanese cabinet -what did "subject to" mean? At another meeting on the morning of August 14, it was pointed out that Byrnes' note indicated that the Imperial institution would not be abolished, and in any case the Japanese Emperors had often been "subject to" the power of the shoguns. Once again, Hirohito was asked for his own opinion, and once again he called for immediate acceptance of the Allied demand. The cabinet acceded to the Imperial will, and it was announced over the radio that Japan had surrendered. That night, the Emperor recorded a message to be broadcast at noon on

August

A The surrender signatories aboard the Missouri. They are (in the front row) Minister

Mamoru

Shigemitsu, to sign for and General

the Emperor,

Yoshijiro

Umezu

for the

Japanese General Headquarters. In the second row (in top hats) are Katauo Okazaki and Toshikazu Kase, with other service and government representatives behind.

calling for all Japanese to accept the surrender. They were warned especially to "beware strictly of any outbursts of emotion" that might create needless complications. In other words, they were to ignore any violent "fight15,

2757

to-the-finish" fanatics. But a small group of officers at the Army headquarters

V

General of the

Army Douglas

MacArthur, Supreme

Commander for

the Allied

Powers, signs the surrender document. Behind him are Lieutenant-General Jonathan Wainwright, who surrendered

at

Corregidor. and LieutenantGeneral A.E. Percival, who surrendered at Singapore. They attended the ceremonies on the

Missouri

at the

personal

invitation of General

2758

MacArthur.

were determined not to surrender, and decided to attempt a coup d'etat. The Emperor was to be separated from his peace-seeking advisers and persuaded to change his mind and continue the war. On the night of August 14, the conspirators approached General Mori, the commander of the Imperial Guards, at the palace. They asked him to join with them in the coup to preserve the honour of the Japanese nation. Mori listened to their arguments, then said that he would go to pray at the Meiji Shrine to help him make up his mind. The conspirators were unwilling to allow any delay, and one of them shot Mori on the spot. Then, using the dead general's seal, they forged orders for the Imperial Guards and began tracking down the Emperor's advisers and the record which was to be broadcast the following day. The whole plot ended in failure when the Eastern Army District

commander

arrived at the palace, refused to join the rebels, and persuaded them to give up. The officer who had shot

General Mori committed hara-kiri on the Imperial Plaza. When War Minister Anami heard of the attempted coup early in the morning of August 15, he also committed suicide. In the next few days, several other suicides occurred, but most Japanese accepted the Imperial decision calmly. On August 30, the first American occupaforces (including a small British contingent) landed at Yokosuka. Three days later, at nine o'clock in the morning, Japan's new Foreign Minister, Mamoru Shigemitsu, boarded the Missouri in Tokyo Bay. On behalf of the Emperor and the Japanese Government, he signed the official surrender document. General Douglas MacArthur accepted the surrender, a scratchy record of The StarSpangled Banner was played on the ship's speakers, and World War II was over. tion

CHAPTER 176

Japan in defeat by Richard Storry

the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people, it was not so much national defeat as the unconditional capitulation of their armed forces, required by the Potsdam Declaration, that came as a totally unexpected, virtually unimaginable, bolt from the blue. For the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Emperor's surrender broadcast on August 15, 1945 was a more devastating psychological shock than the atomic bombs. The mood throughout Japan in the F\)r

command

to the nation to lay down its arms. Fanatics of this kind might claim that his broadcast did not represent his true feelings, that his words had been put into his mouth by traitors and faint hearts in the government and supreme command.

In fact, the instances of disobedience,

though dramatic, were surprisingly few. On the night of August 14-15 there had been an abortive attempt by a group of young officers to prevent the surrender broadcast taking place.

It

was known that < James

Morris's watercolour of

the gutted remains of the

Imperial Japanese Headquarters in Tokyo. The building was more than the hub of Japanese military strategy -because of

Japan 's

constitution

it

was also

the heart of political activity.

aftermath of defeat was one of numbness and exhaustion mingled, as the days went by, with a sense of relief, an awareness of a providential escape from almost certain annihilation. There was also great uncertainty about the future. How would the

the Emperor had recorded the broadcast on the evening of August 14; and as one of the insurgent officers put it:"We decided that the peace faction should be overruled and a coup d'etat staged in order to prevail upon the

occupying forces conduct themselves? there be attacks on lives and property? What kind of vengeance would the American troops exact? People fled from the larger cities and took refuge with

Emperor to revoke his decision. The purpose of the projected coup d'etat was to separate the Emperor from his peaceseeking advisers and persuade him to change his mind and continue the war."

Nobody

The first aim of the insurgents was to destroy the recording of the Emperor's speech. This was hidden in the Imperial palace; but although the rebel officers had the palace grounds in their power they failed to discover the recording. The coup collapsed before dawn on August 15,

Would

relatives

in

the

countryside.

knew what to expect. The Japanese Government, was

worried

for its part,

primarily about the possibility of breaches of the peace by irreconcilable die-hards, superpatriots who might refuse to accept the Emperor's

2759

thanks to the intervention of the local

army commander. In the centre of Tokyo a band of extremists seized Atago hill. The police handled the situation with caution, waiting a week before mounting their assault, whereupon the desperadoes killed themselves with hand grenades. Two days after the Emperor's broadcast some signals troops from a town north of Tokyo entered the capital and took possession of the Ueno art gallery. This was soon dealt with by loyal troops.

The officers and the sur-

involved committed suicide, vivors returned to their barracks.

From

Atsugi airfield near Yokohama navy fliers dropped leaflets on Tokyo. These declared the surrender broadcast to be the work of

with the enemy's demands, on the part of the 3,300,000 Japanese fighting men distributed over the huge area that stretched from Korea and Manchuria to the islands of the South Seas. The great armies in China, for example, regarded themselves as unbeaten, perhaps unbeatable; and there were a great many formations -in much of Indonesia, in Thailand, Malaya, and French Indo-China, in the Pacific which had not been in action for a considerable time. They were in a sense fresh, confident, and eager for battle. But they obeyed the call from Tokyo to comply with the will of the enemy-as did the Japanese forces locked in combat with the Russians in Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin. The same applied to the Japanese soldiers in Burma, Borneo, New Guinea, and the Philippines. It was striking proof of the final authority of the Imperial house. Thorough indoctrination at home, at school, and in military training camps, had led the Japanese to fight literally to the death to the last man in many a hopeless battle-on Iwo Jima and Okinawa and in the Manchurian plain, not to mention the jungles of New Guinea, the Solomons, the Philippines, and Burma. Now the same indoctrination, compelling respect for the Emperor's will, enabled them to accept the unacceptable, or (in the Emperor's own words) "to bear the unbearable". In accordance with that injunction, few national leaders took their own lives, to atone for their failure to avert defeat. But Vice-Admiral Ohnishi, founder of the

A Still wearing their uniforms, demobilised Japanese soldiers shop for food. Most necessities were in short supply, partly because of the disruption caused by American bombing, but also because the majority of farmers and fishermen had been called up to prepare for the defence of the home islands.

2760

This instance of insubordination was quickly put down. It was a particular source of anxiety to the government, since Atsugi had been designated as the airfield at which the first occupying troops would land later in the month. Elsewhere, apart from one or two isolated incidents, things were quiet; although on August 14, when hostilities were supposed to have ceased, the commander of the 5th Navy Air Fleet led an unauthorised sortie from Kyiishii against enemy shipping in the Okinawa area. None of the 11 planes returned. More impressive even than the general acceptance of the surrender in the home islands was the remarkable volte-face, from fierce antagonism to co-operation traitors.

kamikaze squadrons, Lieutenant-General Anami, Minister of War, and FieldMarshal Sugiyama, commander of the 1st Army, committed suicide. One or two other senior officers at home and abroad followed the same road. Later, General Tojo tried to kill himself when he learned he was to be arrested as a suspected war criminal. In much the same circumstances another former Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, took a lethal dose of poison. But such cases were exceptional. On the whole, public men swallowed the bitterness of defeat and surrender, largely from respect for the Emperor who was ready himself to "bear the unbearable". In the interval of about two weeks between the Japanese surrender and the arrival of the Americans, there was considerable destruction of confidential documents at various ministries in Tokyo and the general staff headquarters of the

armed

services.

There was also a new

cabinet, headed by the Emperor's cousin,

Army General

main preoccupawas noted, the control of have tion, as we public order and, so far as this was feasible, the maintenance of national morale. The occupying forces started to arrive in the early hours of August 28. To the relief of all concerned, no untoward incidents occurred. The advance party of Americans was driven in Japanese lorries

reme command. The small Japanese party was in formal dress, the civilians in top hats and morning coats. Slender to the point of emaciation, the Japanese presented a contrast with the well-fed American generals and admirals lined up on the deck in khaki drill slacks and open-neck shirts. Above them, standing on the turrets, and perched along the barrels of the 16-inch guns, were the crew of the Missouri. Later one of the Japanese Shigemitsu's Foreign Ministry aide-was to record that for him the worst ordeal was the awareness of all the alien, watching eyes, that seemed to bore into his very soul. When the last signature had

l^incc^

Higashi-Kuni.

Its

with the wreckage of navy planes, to the devastated city of Yokohama, designated as the headquarters of the U.S. 8th Army. There were few spectators. At every intersection on the route a Japanese soldier, his rifle and bayonet at the ready, stood with his back to the convoy, on guard against any possible surprise attack on the Americans. It was a silent and dismal scene. Within the next four days large forces had landed not only at Atsugi but also at various seaports; and the U.S. 3rd Fleet, with the British Pacific Fleet, lay at anchor in Tokyo Bay. General MacArthur himself arrived at Atsugi in his special plane, "Bataan". The stage was set for the formal act of surrender on IVom Atsugi

airfield,

littered

Staff,

signed for the sup-

been inscribed (including those of Perci-

September 2. At this juncture the Japanese won a concession from the Americans, although it proved to be as advantageous to the latter as to the Japanese.

A

ministerial

delegation from Tokyo waited upon MacArthur at Yokohama after his arrival and persuaded him of the practicability of governing Japan through the established Japanese administrative organs rather than by direct military rule, as in Occupied Germany. Thus the occupation of Japan was not in a strict sense a "military government". The several departments of S.C.A.P. (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) were overlords supervising and working through the corresponding departments of the Japanese Government. But they were overlords whose will was not to be evaded, much less defied, and in fact a very notable feature of the occupation was the way in which Japanese officials at all levels co-operated.

val, the British commander at the fall of Singapore, and Wainwright, the American commander at the fall of Corregidor) MacArthur stepped forward, declaring, in the vibrant tones characteristic of him: "Let us pray that peace be now restored to the world and that God will preserve it always. These proceedings are now

A The U.S. victors parade past General MacArthur's headquarters in the Dai Ichi Life Insurance building. Despite the Americans' massive presence, the worst Japanese fears about them were soon put to rest.

closed."

Surrender on board The surrender ceremony took place on the American battleship Missouri. The Foreign Minister, Mamoru Shigemitsu, signed on behalf of the government. General Umezu, Chief of the

Japanese

The nation which the Americans with some help from Britain and certain countries of the Commonwealth -proceeded to occupy was in a state of economic collapse and moral confusion. Only two or three cities of any size, among them Kyoto, had escaped punishment from the air. The gigantic urban complex of Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama comprised 142 square 2761

which no less than 70 square miles were completely flattened and burnt

miles, of out.

From

a total of 1,454,000 buildings

nearly 863,000 had been destroyed. Approximately eight million people had inhabited the area, and of these 3.4 million had lost their homes. Ashes, charred wood, and rubble were all that could be seen over the 16 miles or more from the docks of Yokohama to the Marunouchi district of Tokyo, where many of the large office blocks were still standing (spared, so it was said, by the Americans with an eye to their use during the occupation). Similar waste lands were to be seen at Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, Shizuoka, Hamamatsu. More than 60 Japanese cities had at least 40 per cent of their built-up area destroyed. Industrial plant lay in ruins, or, where it survived, was silent due to lack of raw materials. The ferry-boats between the main islands had been sunk by air attack. Shipping of any kind amounted to little more than a total of a million tons (out of some ten million when the war began). There was practically no fuel -except some coal and charcoal. Malnutrition was general. Such items as soap, tobacco,

cooking luxuries.

and common medicines were Thousands of the homeless

oil,

squatted in shanties put together from scraps of timber salvaged from the rubble of the great air raids. Others slept out in the railway stations, either permanently or as part of the long wait for the few overcrowded trains that would take them to the countryside. For there was a constant traffic, which increased enormously with the coming of peace, of humanity from city to countryside and back to the city again. In order to stay alive many townsfolk bartered their possessions for such surplus food -rice and vegetables -as the farmers could provide. This activity was illegal, since an official rationing scheme was in operation throughout the land. But the old, the very young, and the weak in health could, and did, starve to death if the meagre official ration of food was not supplemented in some way. To perceive the impact of malnutrition on the population in 1945 one need only look at photographs taken in the course of that year. The shabby, patched clothing hangs on the shrunken body of cabinet minister, clerk, labourer, or housewife like a loose sack. (Much worse, of course, was the physique of the prisoners-of-war, who looked like skeletons. Liberated from camps in Japan, they

had been given even less food than the Japanese and had had no access to a rural black market.)

A

Demobilised Japanese troops

often had no means of livelihood. So these men, pressed into service to help

unload supplies

for the

American occupying

forces,

were among the lucky

ones.

Japan reorganised Upon this scene there descended the materially well equipped, confident, more than adequately nourished army of occupation. Very rapidly the best Japanese housing was commandeered for

billets,

while U.S. army engineers set to work erecting new barrack areas, P.X. stores, and all manner of other buildings for the use of the occupation. The best of the

2762

ai

example of Anglo-Saxon intrusion upon the native scene was the tall American M.P. in white helmet and white gloves directing traffic (nearly all of it nonJapanese); and, standing next to him, imitating every movement of his arms, the relatively diminutive figure of a

Japanese traffic policeman. Hobnailed boots on golden tatami ricestraw flooring; painting and varnishing of plain, chaste, wood surfaces; rich food and alcohol in abundance in the midst of semi-starvation; the heated, half empty, S.C.A.P. passenger coach (for occupation personnel only) pushing through the narrow shabby street, past the rare, overcrowded, battered, and painfully slow charcoal-burning Japanese bus; seduction by cigarette carton and candy packet: all these were endured, accepted indeed, as the inevitable price of surrender. The vital and redeeming feature of the whole situation was that on the whole the behaviour of the occupying forces was not inhumane. It was quickly discovered that the Americans were not addicted to looting, rape, and murder. To this general rule there were but rare exceptions. It is true that S.C.A.P. enforced a strict censorship on press reports reflecting adversely on the occupation. But in a society much given to rumour and gossip, tales of excesses would have been legion if serious misdemeanours and crimes by

surviving rolling stock on the railways was set aside for the exclusive and free use of the Americans. The Japanese were directed to supply servants for the American billets, and guards and caretakers for the larger installations; and the cost of their wages, like the upkeep of commandeered buildings and rolling stock, was debited to the Japanese authorities.

The Americans imposed

their

own

and avenues on the haphazard design of Japanese cities. Among the hotchpotch of telegraph poles and advertisement hoardings at big intersections notices began to proliferate in English, proclaiming "Avenue D" or "10th Street". A more striking logical, gridiron pattern of streets

the Americans had been other than few and far between. The truth in any case emerged after the occupation came to an end in 1952. With the lifting of all press restrictions there was a rash of stories, in newspapers and magazines, about the conduct of American troops in the occupation period. These were intended to be sensational. Nearly all were concerned with the immorality of the Japanese girls who attached themselves to G.I.s. What the Japanese had to bear was severe "culture shock". They were not called upon to endure the arrogance* and the

which their own servicemen had too often inflicted upon the Chinese

cruelties all

and other inhabitants of the war-time Co-Prosperity Sphere. Thus in a matter of weeks the worst fears were set at rest-the worst fears on both sides. The Americans, at first suspicious and very much on their guard, found that the Japanese intended to be friendly and co-operative. More than this, the civilian population looked to the Americans to set an example of democratic behaviour which the Japanese could

2763

follow.

Propaganda had

led the

Japanese

to regard their enemies aslittlebetterthan wild beasts. Close acquaintance after

August 1945 totally removed this misconception. The pendulum swung sharply the other way. During at least the first two years of the occupation, American-Japanese relations, at the personal level, were so cordial as to be a kind of honeymoon. For this there was of course a sound psychological basis. Faith in the traditional structure of state and society had been profoundly disturbed. Only the Imperial house seemed to remain solid among the ruins; and even this institution was now sharply attacked in many quarters. A people accustomed to receiving guidance and direction from on high now turned to the new power in the land.

figures alike, were arrested. The great zaibatsu, or financial combines, notably

Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, were split up into small companies. A thorough survey of Japanese educational institutions was put in hand, prior to a drastic reform, including decentralisation, of the whole educational system: meanwhile the teaching of history, with its stress on the patriotic myths of "the divine country", was suspended in schools throughout the land. Martial sports, such as kendo (fencing), were banned. Shinto was abolished as a state religion. The first programme of land reform, which would transform tenant farmers into owner-occupiers, was set in motion. In the New Year, 1946, the Emperor made a celebrated public announcement denying

^..

f

^4

m

HOUSES w^ i^x^ca ^-

^ r

>us^sThnT tf-^e/^ /nuij be peace

A Erected by Japanese and Americans working side by side, this sign speaks for itself.

A>

Though

the occupation

strict

non-

fraternisation orders, soon found they were

MacArthur

impossible to enforce effectively and so modified them by simply designating certain places "Off Limits". This left plenty of opportunity for boy to meet girl like these two couples by the moat of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo.

2764

project

^
f^f\

began with

HIROS.HIMA'

'

ill

|d

.

r T\

symbolised by General MacArthur and his energetic staff, determined course of reform.

upon

their

The reforms fell upon the country like an avalanche. The list of those introduced during the first six months of the occupation is impressive indeed. By the end of November 1945 the Imperial armed forces within Japanese territory were fully demobilised. Before November all Japanese laws restricting civil and religious liberties had been suspended, the secret police disbanded, and nationalist groups and organisations broken up and suppressed. In October there came the release of prisoners; political and Communist leaders emerged from the ordeal of many years in jail. Women were given the vote. War criminal suspects, major and minor

his special status, his so-called "divinity". And in January, too, was launched the "purge" of those, high and low, who had been engaged in notable ultra-nationalist activities. Those involved were excluded from further participation in public life, or government service, at any level. More important, at the end of January 1946

there was published the tentative draft of a new national constitution, modelled closely on the American pattern. These were only some of the noteworthy reforms carried out or begun on instructions from S.C.A.P. They amounted to a revolution, albeit a peaceful one; and they achieved changes in Japanese society as far-reaching as those that occurred in the last part of the 19th Century after the Meiji Restoration.

Japanese society: reform .

.

.

When discussing post-war Japan, it must be borne in mind that such concepts as democracy, the freedom of the individual, and the equality of the sexes were by no means novelties for the people of Japan. Like baseball and rugby, they had been known to, and to some degree practised by, the Japanese for years. Back in the 1920's such ideas had won a measure of official acclaim. An intellectually alive and literate population, that had pushed forward from technological backwardness to advanced industrialisation in the

could produce social revolution. As early as February 1945 Prince Konoye had warned the Emperor of this possibility. It was appreciated in some circles of big business and the higher bureaucracy that, provided the monarchy and the existing economic order survived, national surrender, however humiliating, ferable to revolution.

... or

was

pre-

revolution?

was the hope, perhaps the expectation, of the extreme Left that surrender would bring revolution in its train, that there It

would emerge from chaos and disillusionment a People's Republic of Japan. This

JAPANESE GUE5T5

NOT

_

/ALLOWED

space of 50 years, could not be prevented, even by careful police censorship and control, from acquiring a general knowledge of the trends of thought that moved the world beyond Japan. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the dominant, invincible trend of the 1930's appeared to be totalitarianism in its militarist, fascist guise. World events in 1945 showed that this was a misconception. For some Japanese the S.C.A.P. programme of reforms did not go far enough. Marxism, long driven underground, reappeared as an elite intellectual creed and one that had an appeal for a minority of the urban working class. The more perceptive among Japan's leading statesmen had foreseen that a continuation of a desperately fought and hopeless war

no doubt, would have been much enhanced had the occupation been a joint undertaking between the Americans and the Russians. The latter pressed strongly for an equal share in the demilitarisation and reshaping of Japan. Having taken possession of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, the Russians were poised to land in Hokkaido, Japan's northern main island, which seemed the logical area for possibility,

A

"^

The bombed-out residents of cities found whatever

Japan's

shelter they could, as in these

huge concrete sections for water conduits. A At the same time, many of the houses that were left standing

had been taken over by the occupation forces and, with fraternisation forbidden, notices to this effect were posted outside.

the establishment of a Soviet zone of occupation in a Japan divided among the war-time Allies. But Japan was not to suffer the fate of Germany. Proposals for a Russian-occupied zone

were resisted by General MacArthur, who was later backed by Washington. The Russians were invited, as were the Chinese,

to send a contingent of troops to

2765

his visitor. Demonstrated here was the style of a new Shogun, in whose hands

Japan, on condition that they were subordinate to MacArthur's headquarters. Neither the Russians nor the Chinese would stomach this. Thus the occupation

lay the fate of all Japanese, including Emperor Hirohito himself. Accordingly the Dai Ichi Building became a kind of popular shrine. Day after day at certain regular hours the new

remained solely an American affair- and in the last resort a one-man affair-for the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, concentrated in the Inland Sea area, had no role in the shaping of MacArthur's policy. This policy was indeed nominally subject to the overall authority of the Far Eastern Commission in Washington, an international body in which the United States played the dominant part. In reality Mac Arthur supported by a devoted and doting staff, had things very much his own way. Imperious and self-confident, he was to tolerate no interference from the Allied Council, an advisory body in Tokyo composed of representatives of the United States, British Commonwealth, Soviet Union, and China. As for the Far Eastern Commission, its powers on paper seemed impressive. Yet its influence on major policy decisions was very slight. The Commission had to accept the right of the American Government to issue so-

Shogun

passed

through

its

portals,

watched by a respectful and admiring crowd. The spectators were for the most part Japanese of alLages, but among them there would nearly always be a sprinkling of G.I.s with their cameras and blackeyed girl friends. The daily routine scarcely varied in six and a half years. MacArthur undertook no tours of his dominion. He left that to the Emperor, who was encouraged to travel among his

,

subjects-a venture in Western-style democratic practice that failed on the whole to be an unqualified success. The Supreme Commander remained notably aloof; and it is difficult to argue that this was a mistake. Indeed conservative Jap-

Moreover, MacArthur's headquarters remained the only authority charged with the implementation of any decisions reached in Washington.

anese, older men and women in particular, were impressed by his style. S.C.A.P. Headquarters was, after all, a military organisation, in which professional soldiers had more power than civilians or civilians in uniform. It was an order of precedence with which the Japanese were only too familiar.

MacArthur's power

The new pacifism

General MacArthur, then, was complete master in his own realm. The Japanese recognised this fact almost from the start. It was in any case sharply under-

On the other hand, "New Deal" was

called

interim

directives

to

S.C.A.P.

autumn of 1945, when the Emperor left his palace to pay a call on MacArthur at his office in the Dai Ichi Life Insurance Building. At the time the lined in the

Emperor's own future appeared uncertain, for he was more than half willing to abdicate in favour of his eldest son. When he met MacArthur, the Emperor declared that he himself, rather than any of his generals and ministers, should be held

The interview MacArthur was favourably

responsible for the war.

went

well;

impressed by his guest. A photograph, widely distributed by the press, was taken of the two men standing side by side in the Supreme Commander's office. There was no mistaking the balance of power. There was more than a touch of symbolism in the manner in which the older man, relaxed with hands on hips, towered over

2766

•^•^^

A A common enough

sight in the

aftermath of the war. Carrying the ashes of her father in a box covered with a white cloth, a young girl lands at Kagoshima from Okinawa where he was killed in the fighting.

She

bringing his remains to be buried near his parents.

is

in the early days the well represented in certain sections of the S.C.A.P. apparatus. New Dealers provided much of the enthusiasm and energy behind the reforms that were intended to turn Japanese politics and society upside down. S.C.A.P., then, displayed a mixed, even ambiguous, image. It was the power house, the exemplar, of the fashionable democratic way of life, to which the new Japan was committed. Everyone realised that it was thanks to S.C.A.P. that the new constitution, promulgated in October 1946, came into being; and it was known that MacArthur warmly approved of Article 9, the famous clause in the constitution that committed Japan to eternal pacifism. Nothing made the Japanese prouder-at a time when national pride was in the doldrums-than the feeling that their country, alone in the world, had forsworn an army and navy and the use of force to back up diplomacy. This

made Japan unique.

It

was, therefore,

almost universally welcome. Broadly speaking, "progressive" Japanese in the first year or two of the occupation expected much from S.C.A.P. as the agent of necessary change; and the Americans were admired as teachers filled with a missionary zeal, idealistic, and heavy with goodwill. Yet these teachers were for the most part in uniform; and the best facilities office blocks, houses, hotels-were reserved for their exclusive use. They might be democrats; but they took strong, sometimes arbitrary, measures against certain categories among the Japanese, not only war criminals and extremists of the old Right but also sympathisers with Russia or North Korea. As time went by it became evident that S.C.A.P. would not tolerate strikes in certain key areas of employment. As daily life improved, rising above a mere struggle to exist, the privileges enjoyed by the Americans (and their female dependants) began to seem tiresome. As the honeymoon started to fade, the inescapably military character of the occupation became oppressive. The change in the popular attitude developed slowly, and in some quarters was never complete. It was related to world events-the Berlin blockade, the Chinese revolution - which had their effect

on American

"Japan

For the Korean War the general economic

in Defeat".

boom created recovery that was to be the basis of Japan's astonishing industrial and commercial growth in the years ahead. But as early as 1947 MacArthur had let it be known that in his opinion the aims of the occupation had been achieved, that the time had arrived for the conclusion of a

and therefore on the policy of S.C.A.P. The Korean War, a godsend for the still depressed and demoralised Japanese economy, led to the first tentative measures of Japanese rearmament, instigated by S.C.A.P. This awakened old fears. There was a notable slowing down of pressure by S.C.A.P. for the execution of reform programmes. But a hard line was taken against the extreme Left. The emphasis after 1948 was very much on reconstruction rather than policy,

reform. Gratifying as this

was

to the old

guard among politicians, businessmen, and bureaucrats, the Japanese Left came to feel itself betrayed by the Americans; and by the time of the Korean War, MacArthur, with his dark glasses and corncob pipe, was in their eyes a baleful, even sinister, figure.

New horizons The Korean War, which broke out in the summer of 1950, may be taken to mark the end of the period that might be called

treaty of peace. MacArthur was given to rhetoric; yet there is no reason to doubt his sincerity when he declared that the Japanese had become a peace-loving people and that therefore the occupation had served it^ purpose. In the case of most countries, at most periods of history, there have been certain fairly predictable reactions to defeat, loss

A A Japanese woman and her son burn incense before an altar in their home for the repose of her elder son, killed in action. His portrait, draped with black ribbons, hangs above the altar.

2767

of territory, and

enemy occupation. How-

ever subservient to a foreign conqueror a vanquished people may have seemed there has usually been a movement for an eventual war of revenge, as part of a programme of national recovery. This applied to France after 1870, to Germany after 1919.

Nowadays, with the benefits of hindsight, we can see that in Japan, such reactions to defeat, in so far as they existed at all, were so rare as to count for very little. For this there were many reasons. First and foremost, there was the deep conviction that what was destroyed in 1945 could not be put together again. The old Tennosei- the Imperial

An Okinawa laundry girl: < communicating with a G.I., using schoolgirl English and a Japanese phrasebook ...

system bound up with military might and a sense of an invincible national missionwas often thought of as "a golden chalice" and in 1945 this was shattered, and the pieces could never be reassembled. This remains the belief of the generation that was adult during the Pacific War. Secondly, the apocalyptic horror of atomic attack provided a face-saving formula for extracting the nation from the war. Thus the Emperor's broadcast could be seen as a positive step, on behalf of humanity everywhere, towards a new and eternal peace, rather than as a negative act of capitulation; and this was fortified by Article 9, the pacifist clause, of the post-war constitution.

Thirdly, the actual fact of defeat in

combat on land and sea could not be disguised. If large forces in China and other areas remained unvanquished, there was no disguising the annihilation in conventional warfare that had taken place in the Pacific islands, Burma, the Philippines, Okinawa, Manchuria, and Sakhalin. Similar destruction had been the fate of the Imperial Navy. This great armada had amounted to some two and a quarter million tons when the blow was struck at Pearl Harbor. By August 1945 less

than 200,000 tons remained.

The Japanese do not make the same mistake twice. Therefore, complete decan be claimed, marked the end for ever of an attempt to expand national power by force of arms. And the stupendous economic growth of the 1960's may be seen as part of a process that began almost feat, it

a hundred years ago, in the late 1870's: a process of determined modernisation

through industrial development which

was

interrupted, or diverted, tragically by the period of aggressive militarism that reached its apogee in the first half of the 20th Century. Interpreted in this light, the obsession with military glory and the expansion of the empire can be regarded as a temporary, although appalling, aberration.

V

.

.

A

carrying the washing

.

home

.

.

.

.

and pressing

the clothes

with old-fashioned flat irons. Despite their rather primitive conditions, the family are well off by standards of the time.

CHAPTER 177

Britain

and America in victory by John Major

'H I 1.

Ill

'WfjtBTxithf

(mm 1 "III

II

III '

ijji

::i>?

As World

War

II

reached

its

climax in

Britain and the United States stood closer tofi^ether than at any moment since American independence. Their destinies had been interlocked since the fall of France in 1940, when it became clear that Nazi Germany could only be defeated by their combined efforts, and their military collaboration was to go far beyond their association in World War I. It was reinforced still further by the fact that, from their point of view. World War II19-15,

even more than World War I-had been fought "to make the world safe for democracy". As the world's two biggest democracies they had affirmed they would set an example of democracy in action, and take on the responsibility of protecting and promoting democracy in the post-war world. The questions which still had to be decided, however, were whether the British and the Americans were willing to make good their war-time in conditions of peace, and whether the circumstances of the peacetime world would allow them to do so. This article examines their reactions in the immediate aftermath of victory.

pledges

Let us take first the British political scene. Here the dominant event was the result of the July general election, which swept a Labour Government into power

with an overwhelming majority over all its opponents. Before the election the state of the parties had been: Conservatives 361; Labour 166; Liberals 18; Others 69. Afterwards it read: Labour 393; Conservatives 189; Liberals 12; Others 46. In terms of British political history this was the greatest upset since the Liberal landslide of 1906. Seventy-nine of the new Labour constituencies had never returned a Labour M.P. before, and no fewer than 13 Conservative ministers of cabinet rank

Wild scenes greeted the news of victory in Britain's capital.

<<

Trafalgar Square on V.E.

Day.

A A

beer lorry carrying a load

of soldiers -as well as beerdown Piccadilly.

< Cementing Anglo-American relations in Piccadilly

on

V.J. night.

V

Celebrating crowds throng

London's

streets

on V.J. Day.

went down to defeat. The basic reason for this dramatic and largely unexpected- shock was that the Labour Party had succeeded in identifying itself with the demands for a "brave new world" which had gathered force during the war. At the election which followed World War I in 1918, the public had opted for a return to what were supposed to be the "good old days" of pre-1914, and the war-time coalition was given a massive endorsement. In 1945 the situation was utterly different. For too many people "pre-war" meant the grim decade of the 1930's, marked by appeasement of dictatorships abroad and economic depression at home, and it had 2771

been a decade dominated by the Conservative Party. So the Conservatives were damned by the heritage of the recent past. Not even Winston Churchill could save them, even though he had been out of office in the 1930's and even though he had gone on to save his country in 1940

and lead

it

to victory five years later.

The

was

to his party and not to him personally did nothing to salve his bitterness. The Labour Party, by contrast, under the leadership of Clement Attlee, had convinced the country that it should take Britain into the post-war era, and the conviction was strengthened by the role Labour had played in Churchill's coalition, in which Attlee had been deputy premier. In its manifesto, Let Us Face The Future, it had promised large-scale economic and social reforms which would fact that the rebuff

L

build on the experience of the war. The war-time planning of the economy would underpinned by the be continued, nationalisation of key industries such as coal, steel, and inland transport. In the social field, a free national health service and national insurance scheme would come into being to implement the recommendations of the Beveridge Report of 1942. The Conservatives, too, broadly supported Beveridge's proposals and one of their leading figures, R. A. Butler, had

sponsored an important new Education Act in 1944. Their acceptance of the need for far-reaching change, however, was lukewarm as compared with Labour's, and so they were rejected. So too were the Liberals, who had adopted a moderate stance between the Big Two and who were now almost extinguished as a political force.

14

.t-JL^.

i/^

mf^ •

^^f.

.1

^f

-Jvil

.KM

J

t

Yet did Labour's revolution?

tidal

wave signal a

Many

Conservatives feared it did when they heard that the victors had sung The Red Flag at the first meeting of the new House of Commons, but they were wrong. Neither in terms of personalities nor policies was the Labour Government extremist. Attlee himself was a neutral figure who did not deserve the Churchillian gibe that he was "a modest little man with plenty to be modest about", but he was no towering apostle of socialism, and the balance of forces within his cabinet reflected the Party's overall moderation. True, it included two men -Sir Stafford Cripps and Aneurin Bevan-who to date had stood on the far left of the Labour movement, but Attlee's deputy, Herbert Morrison, was a machine politician who had made his reputation as leader of the London County Council,

mv^ W

A.-v.«.Li,'>i

Y^

V5

-.*>.

-^^

:^^--

& -»*f

'-H^

< H.M. The Queen (now Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother) meets repatriated prisoners-of-war. Over 1,100 British and Commonwealth

servicemen attended the garden party in the grounds of

Buckingham Palace. V The new Labour Government, elected by the British people in

July 1945. Seated, left to right: Lord Addison, Lord Jowitt, Sir Stafford Cripps, Arthur Greenwood, Ernest Bevin, Clement Attlee (the Prime Minister), Herbert Morrison,

Hugh

Dalton, A.V. Alexander, Chuter Ede, and Miss E. Wilkinson; standing: Aneurin Bevan, G. Isaacs, Lord Stansgate, G.H. Hall, Lord Pethick-Lawrence J.J. Lawson, J. Westwood, Emmanuel ,

Shinwell, and

Tom

Williams.

and the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, was a trade union boss equally distrustful of revolutionary socialism. As for the party programme, it is worth noting that it sanctioned nothing that had not a wartime precedent and that it left enormous of private activity untouched, including education, health, insurance, and land ownership.

sectors

Cautious start The moderation of the government again showed itself in the slow tempo of its action. There was to be no rush to pass controversial legislation in the first heady flush of victory. Far from cultivating an atmosphere of emergency and keeping the public at the high pitch of excitement reached during the election campaign, Attlee's preference was for measured advance on an orderly basis. So Parliament went into recess at the end of August and by the end of 1945 the only major item of the programme enacted was the nationalisation of the Bank of England. Labour's cautious debut was also dictated by necessity, however, for less than a week after the Japanese surrender it was suddenly made clear that the country might well not have the resources to put

through the promised reforms.

On August

21 President Truman notified Attlee that America was terminating the LendLease aid which had sustained the British war effort since March 1941. All told, the Americans had disbursed just over $27,000 million to Britain, and the cancellation of the aid immediately put the economy in a desperate position. As the government's chief financial adviser. Lord Keynes, put it, Britain faced "without exaggeration, and without implying that we should not recover from it, a financial Dunkirk". The disastrous impact of the cutting-off of Lend-Lease can only be appreciated against the background of the losses Britain had suffered as a result of the war. The loss in manpower was the least serious in economic terms -357,000 dead, or less than one per cent of the population (as opposed to the 11 per cent lost by

damaging Germany). Much more economically were the blows that had been delivered to Britain's vital international trade and finance. The merchant

was 30 per cent under its 1939 strength after the submarine war, and

fleet

2774

exports were running at only 40 per cent of the 1938 level. In the financial sphere, £1,118 million of foreign investments had been sold off, foreign debts had risen by £2,879 million, and gold and dollar reserves had dropped by £152 million. In 1946 a balance of payments deficit of some £750 million was forecast, and given the shattered state of the world economy on which Britain depended, only the United States could save the situation until Britain recovered its balance. If it did not extend more aid, British recovery would be doomed and so too would the Labour programme. In September, therefore, a British delegation led by Keynes went to Washington to beg for American help. At first they asked for an outright grant of $6,000 million to tide them over the next

few years, justifying themselves by citing Britain's war effort. The Americans, however, were interested in future prospects, not past performance, and they drove a hard bargain. A loan of $3,750 million was agreed on, repayable at two per cent interest by the year 2001. These were not unfavourable terms, and especially generous was the wiping out of all but $650 million of the outstanding LendLease debt of $21,000 million. But there were also severe conditions attached to the loan, particularly that British Empire preferences should be reduced and that by July 1947 sterling should be fully convertible into dollars in the world monetary market. These were crippling obligations for the British to accept, but they had no choice and by December 17, only ten days after Attlee's announcement of the settlement, it had been endorsed in both the Commons and the Lords.

Ratification by the U.S. Congress came more reluctantly. The deeply conservative majority of the House of Representatives in particular had strong reservations about lending vast sums of money to a government which they believed was well on the way to communism, and the agreement was not sanctioned until the following July. From this point on the British economy was to be tied to American policy to such an extent as to be ultimately dependent on decisions made in Washington. This was an unpalatable fact for governments in London to swallow, but there was no alternative in sight, for the short-term future at least.

-< •< Winston Churchill addresses a crowd of about 8,000

High Wycombe at the start of campaign tour. Despite his own immense popularity and prestige, in

his election

Churchill failed voters that his

to

was

convince the party

to

lead the country in the coming peace. < •< V Clement Attlee, leader of the Labour Party, chats to

workmen

in his

own

constituency of Lime ho use.

A "0 The fiery Aneurin Bevan was given the Ministry of Health. A Attlee and other successful candidates from London's East

End-

Wallie

Edwards

fat left),

M.P. for Whitechapel, and Phil Piratin (behind Attlee), the

Roosevelt's death a turning point

new Communist M.P.

for

Mile End.

The situation in the United States during same period presented a very different picture. There, the political event which controlled all others was the sudden death on April 12, 1945 of President Roosevelt and the swearing-in of his Vice-President, Harry S.Truman, as his successor. Truman was very much an

this

quantity. A Senator from Missouri, he had been nominated for Vice-President only in 1944, and he had no experience of executive office. He had

unknown

2775

r-ir

had hit America in 1929. For another he asked for equal job opportunities for Negroes. A little later he sent Congress proposals for a nationwide programme of health insurance and medical care. These and other measures added up to what Truman called the "Fair Deal" and as the new President saw it, they would give substance to the "economic bill of rights" which Roosevelt had called for in his State of the Union message in 1944. So Truman had made his position clear and he had inherited a comfortable Democratic majority in both houses of Congress: 242 to 190 Republicans in the House of Representatives and 56 to 38 Republicans in the Senate. The temper of the Congress, though, was intensely conservative and the "Fair Deal" suffered in consequence. The unemployment bill was drastically watered down and its provision for mandatory government spending to counteract a depression was cut out. The powers of the administration

Tying up the

loose ends of war. R.A.F. men from the West Indies disembark at Southampton. Their next stop

A

will be the demobilisation depot.

Many

men, however, chose

"demobbed"

to be

overseas.

> A sight for the curious -the surrendered German U-776 arriving at Westminster Pier in May 1945. It was on view to the public for two weeks.

A>

and

A>>

The millionth

serviceman to pass through the R.A.O.C.'s Civilian Clothing Depot at Inkerman Barracks, Woking. First, Corporal David

Moore

is

measured

jacket, then he

is

for his

shown leaving

the depot in his full civilian carrying his military

outfit,

policeman's uniform in a box.

not been made privy to any of the innermost secrets of policy, and he was stepping into the shoes of a political giant who had been President for longer than any other in American history. Small wonder that many people -perhaps even Truman himself-doubted his capacity for the job. Whatever his talents, however, Truman was to be President for the best part of four years at least, and it was important to know where he stood on the great issues of domestic and foreign policy. In the domestic field he had yet to make clear his relation to the reformist measures of the New Deal which Roosevelt had pushed through in the 1930's. Many members of the Democratic Party in Congress-especially from the South

on which Truman's state bordered-had revolted against the New Deal and formed a conservative alliance with right-wing Republicans. Would Truman give way to them or would he take up the plans which Roosevelt was believed to have been developing for an extension of the New Deal once the war was over? It was not until the end of the war that Truman was able to reveal his hand. On September 6 he outlined a programme to Congress which placed him squarely in the New Deal camp. For one thing, he proposed that the government should responsibility ultimate an accept employment if private to guarantee full enterprise ran into another depression comparable with the catastrophe which

2776

were restricted to reporting annually to Congress on the state of the economy through a three-man Council of Economic Advisers. This was undoubtedly a step forward, but much less than Truman had hoped for. As for the proposals for nonemployment and discrimination in medical care, these were to be blocked for some twenty years and were not carried until the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. The obstructionism in Congress reflected the mood of the country as a whole, however. In Britain, as we have seen, the end of the war was welcomed as the moment to bring in a whole series of reforms. In the United States the reaction

was quite

different.

Once again,

as in

1918, there was an overwhelming wish to return to what President Harding had described as "normalcy" and if 1946 had been a presidential election year, there is little doubt that a Republican would have been elected, as Harding was elected in the aftermath of World War I. The

yearning to get back to "normal" was, moreover, reinforced by the fact thatunlike Britain -America had recently undergone a considerable amount of reform in the shape of the New Deal and there was no sense of the need to make up for lost time. Thanks to the various securities provided by the New Deal, indeed, the American people could now afford to indulge in the luxury of reaching out

beyond

it

and demanding a full-blooded

return to the affluence they had last enjoyed in 1929. What is more, the economy was now in a position to gratify them, since the United States was far and away the richest country in the world. Gross national product per head of population in 1946, for instance, stood at just under $1,500 (as compared with $720 in Britain) and in terms of 1929 prices this represented an increase of 50 per cent over the peak attained in the year before the Great Crash. Clearly if America could get through the economic transition from war to peace without serious mishap, it was poised for the greatest boom in its history and one much more solidly based than the frenzied expansion of the 1920's. The great danger inherent in the situation was, of course, inflation. During the four years of war, most Americans had had high incomes but very little to spend them on. Now they were wild for consumer goods -clothes, cars, furniture, any kind of luxury -and their prices rocketed

2777

million. All major industries were affected: coal, oil, steel, electricity, auto-

'/if

mobiles, the railways. In all these industries workers were

ifft'tl

•Ml

\\^'jy

determined not to let their standard of living be undermined by post-war inflation, and to make up for wages lost in the cutback of overtime which accompanied the switch-over from war-time production. At the same time, many feared for their jobs as huge numbers of ex-servicemen flooded back from abroad no less than nine million were to be demobilised between June 1945 and June 1946.

l«

NGniASIOt

A

t'or the first time in

more than

three years, the lights go up on

Broadway, the heart of New York's theatreland.

n

accordingly. Truman and his administration were anxious to curb the increases by keeping the price controls introduced during the war which had kept the overall rise to 30 per cent above the level reached in December 1941. Congress, on the other hand, was determined to scrap controls, urged on by lobbies of producers and consumers. The tussle between the two sides ended in June 1946 with a decisive

The immediate was a rise in the wholesale price index of no less than 25 per cent during the first 16 days of July. This was in direct contrast with Britain, where the public Congressional victory.

result

still acquiesced in the many controls retained by Labour and where rationing

of most commodities was still strictly enforced. In America the only item rationed at the end of 1945 was sugar. Finally, Truman had to contend with another symptom of the economic turbulence of the reconversion from war to peace-an unprecedented wave of strikes. During the war the unions had taken a voluntary pledge not to strike, and the

government had been given powers to control wages and to act against strikes if they did take place. As a result, only 26 million man-days were lost in the three years 1942-44. In 1945, however, as the war came to a close and wage controls were slackened, the total shot up to 38 million, and in 1946 to a staggering 116 2778

After

the failure of a governmentsponsored conference between leaders of labour and management in November 1945, Truman sent a bill to Congress which gave the government authority to declare a strike illegal for a "coolingoff' period of 30 days pending an investigation of its causes. This, however, was not tough enough for the House of Representatives which put forward a rival measure so strongly anti-union that Truman vetoed it. His veto was upheld, but he himself had by then broken a railway strike by threatening, among other things, to call up into the armed forces everyone "on strike against their government". After this the strike movement subsided, but the long-term settlement of industrial conflict in America was still far out of sight.

Strong contrast The contrast between Britain and America on the domestic side was vivid: the one on the threshold of radical political

economy

innovations

but

with

an

half-crippled by the war; the

other rich as never before and with its own burst of reform apparently over. The differences on the international level were equally striking: the United States was now the most powerful nation in the world; Britain, though she retained pretensions to supreme international status, had been reduced to the second rank. During the war the two countries had forged an ironclad partnership, but could it survive in the very different environment of the post-war world?

American power was enormous. The United States had not been bombed or invaded, and their 405,000 dead represented a mere 0.3 per cent of the

population -as compared with at least 7.6 per cent for the Soviet Union. It had developed a war economy of astonishing potential, manufacturing one ship a day and one aircraft every five minutes, and in June 1945 it had no less than 12 million men and women in uniform, as compared with the five million mobilised by Britain. Its forces were stationed throughout Central Europe, in Germany, Austria, Italy, and Czechoslovakia, while in the Far East they had exclusive control over Japan and the Japanese Pacific islands, as well as troops in China and Korea. Above all, it possessed a monopoly of the atomic bomb which had obliterated the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in a matter of seconds. Britain, on the other hand, was a power in decline. The weakness of her post-war economy has been described, and her

dependence on American financial aid. In these reduced circumstances it was to prove impossible to maintain her old international position and in particular to hold on to the most obvious symbol of world status, the British Empire. At the close of the war it stood intact, with nearly a quarter of the entire world population united under the British flag, but its future was more limited than anyone could have guessed, and the Victory Parade in London in June 1946 was to be the last occasion on which its forces

marched together. Indeed, the British Empire was facing a rapid dissolution under the impact of colonial nationalism, and by the end of the war the balance had already begun to tilt decisively in the

A The Cunarder Queen Mary docks in New York with thousands of returning G.I.

's.

nationalists' favour. It was India which spearheaded the nationalist movement, appropriately enough in view of her huge population of over 400 million and her crucial strategic position at the pivot of the eastern hemisphere. India, in fact, was the linchpin of the whole imperial system, and her loss was to deprive the Empire of its raison d'etre. Even so, Britain could not withstand the forces of Indian nationalism and within a year after the war a British withdrawal was looming. The strain on Britain had begun to tell during the war. Under the threat of a Japanese invasion in 1942 independence had been promised once the war was over, but the Hindu majority, organised in the

Indian National Congress, had demanded it immediately while the Moslem League, representing the large Moslem minority, had insisted on having its own separate state of Pakistan. Both demands had been successfully resisted, but the writing was on the wall from that moment on. The accession of the Labour Government at once sent hopes of independence rising. Labour leaders had long been sympathetic to Indian feeling (in contrast

2779

On January

Churchill) and though the King's speech of August 15 spoke only of "the

to

26, 1946, the

Argentina sailed from Southampton carrying the

first

war brides

contingent of G.I.

to

the United States.

A A

cheerful farewell to family, and the camera.

friends,

A>

New

York on February 9, the G.I. brides were greeted not only by their Arriving in

husbands but by a band supplied by the Army as well.

A> > An enthusiastic welcome from U.S. Marine Francis M. Connolly, for his wife, the former Toni Lupino, a passenger on the Argentina.

early realisation of full self-government", no one could fail to be aware of how strongly the tide of nationalism was now running. Bitterness against Britain was intense. In November there were massive protests when members of the pro-

Japanese Indian National Army were court-martialled, and in February 1946 the Royal Indian Navy mutinied in Bom-

was highly reminiscent of the upsurge of nationalism after World War I, but Britain was not able to recover her balance as she had done in the 1920's. It was against this background that bay.

It

elections were held as the preliminary to drawing up a new Indian constitution. All they did, however, was to emphasise the deep split between Congress and the League, and it was beyond the British to get them to co-operate. In August 1946, weeks after a three-man Cabinet mission had drawn up a plan for a united India, communal riots in Calcutta resulted in the deaths of at least 5,000 people. Britain would not only have to "Quit India" as

Canal, to seize which the British had occupied the country in 1882. Although the occupation was over, Egypt was under effective British military control, exercised by a 1936 treaty. During the war the

Egyptians had bitterly resented being used as a Middle East strongpoint, and there can be little doubt that if Rommel's Afrika Korps had broken through to Cairo in 1942 they would have been welcomed with open arms. In December 1945, therefore, the Egyptian Government asked for a revision of the treaty which would entail the complete withdrawal of British troops, and the move was accompanied by large-scale

anti-British

riots.

Attlee's

surprising reply, given on May 7, 1946, was that Britain was ready to negotiate a complete military withdrawal, and talks began soon afterwards. They were to break down, however, over the Egyptian claim to the adjoining territory of the Sudan, which the British denied. So they were left in their Egyptian base but surrounded by a hostile and growing nationalist movement.

Congress had demanded. She would have

2780

to obey the League's summons to "Divide and Quit" and partition the sub-continent which she had forged into a single state.

The problem of Palestine

The coming disengagement from India inevitably had repercussions elsewhere. Second only in importance to India was Egypt, through which ran the vital imperial communications link of the Suez

In Egypt Britain was able to hold her own; in neighbouring Palestine her position was miuch more precarious. In 1917 the

promised Government had British a "national home" in Palestine for Zionist

Jews who wished to settle there, and the Zionists had every intention of turning this into a Jewish state. The Palestinian Arabs for their part understandably considered the land was theirs, and between 1936 and 1939 there had been a revolt against the British. It was inevitable that trouble would start up again in 1945 especially since hundreds of thousands of the Jewish survivors of the Nazi holocaust were desperate to make their home on Palestinian soil. If they were admitted, this would decisively tilt the population balance against the Arabs, who then outnumbered the Jews by roughly two to one. The British reaction was significantly influenced by the pro-Zionism of the

American Government and

it

was

in

response to pressure from Washington that an Anglo-American commission of inquiry examined the problem early in 1946. Its advice was to admit 100,000 Jews, and this Britain accepted in July, in spite of the recent bomb attack on British military headquarters in Jerusalem by Jewish terrorists. But the entry of the 100,000 depended on agreement to a plan which would have left Palestine in British hands, and it was clear that neither Arabs nor Jews would submit to that. It was equally clear that the British could not hold out in Palestine much longer. Given her relative poverty and given the fact that she was now on the defensive

in the Empire, Britain

had to consider her

foreign policy options carefully. Several appeared to lie open. One was a continuation of the war-time "special relationship" with America. Another was the development of a close association with the Soviet Union, an idea attractive to the left wing likewise of the Labour Party and grounded in the comradeship of 1941-45. Alternatively, some Labour members argued, Britain should develop a "Third Force" of countries standing apart from either Russia or America, and consisting of the most progressive states of the British Commonwealth and Europe. Finally, Britain could try to stand alone, drawing on the still considerable resources of the Empire, aloof from Europe

and America alike. America too had not yet fixed her course in the post-war world. After World War I the Senate had repudiated the commitments taken up by President Wilson, and though Roosevelt had affirmed there would be no return to isolation this time, the doubts about Washington's intentions persisted. Perhaps the most solid guarantee of United States policy was their sponsorship of the United Nations, set up to replace the defunct League of Nations which the Senate had refused to join in 1920. Without the strong initiatives which America put behind its development, it is doubtful whether the U.N. would have come into existence. The Charter, signed in San Francisco in 2781

June 1945, bore the imprint of the American vision of a liberal post-war world, and vast sums of money were pledged to ensure that it should work: $2,700 million to the U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, $2,750 million to the International Monetary Fund, and $3,175 million

to

the International

Bank

for

Reconstruction and Development. On the other hand, Roosevelt had not anticipated that American forces would stay in Europe for more than two years after the war. and the rate of demobilisation in the armed forces -which were cut from 12 million in June 1945 to only three million a year later -did not suggest that America wished to play a permanent role as guardian of world security. What was also unresolved as yet was the broad attitude which the United States was to adopt towards two of the main political forces of the post-war era,

communism and

anti-colonialism.

The

question was even more intriguing since America's two war-time allies, Britain and the Soviet Union, were identified with these forces, directly and indirectly. Russia was the world's foremost communist state and Britain was the world's largest imperial power against which the

of British policy in India and elsewhere. Anti-colonial pressure had been kept up during the drafting of the U.N. Charter (with enthusiastic Russian support), and the Americans had managed to have written into it a declaration on colonies aimed at exerting some pressure on colonialist member-states to move their

anti-colonial movement was principally directed. So America's reaction towards these phenomena would effectively determine her policies towards Moscow and

London, and ultimately compel the American government to choose between them. In the perspective of the Cold War there would seem to have been no choice, but at the time the situation was not so clear-cut. Although the United States had a strong anti-communist tradition and although they were themselves completely identified with the capitalism which communism sought to destroy, during the war a certain affinity had developed between Stalin and Roosevelt, based on a mutual recognition of each other's power. Indeed, in 1945 it was apparent that in spite of Russia's devastation, this was the only state in the world which could compare with America as a "super-power". Between them they straddled the world, and several members of the Truman administration believed that international affairs would best be governed by their continued co-operation. At the same time, Americans had long been hostile to British imperialism. They owed their very independence to a successful struggle against it, and during the war there had been forceful criticism

2782

^ .

iiri i

^

A

disabled ex-Marine unable to resume his pre-war occupation. V Students demonstrate in support of strikers at Warner Brother's studio, Hollywood.

UCLA 3>'/>r^.

^ mm mm

PICKiTS

The transition from wartime to a peace-time economy was not always achieved smoothly. A A one-man protest by a

,

JW^0'mfilfj

basis of international power, but for some time to come American policies went on being influenced by the views of the past. This came out forcefully in the wrangle

over atomic energy which soured relations in the early part of 1946. During the war British scientists had collaborated with the Americans in developing the

bombs which annihilated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Churchill had secured a pledge from Roosevelt that the teamwork would go on after the war. In November 1945 Attlee believed he had been given a similar promise by Truman which pro-

A Post-election tension in Tennessee, where the G.I. Independent Party ousted the Democrats and feared an attempt to regain control by force. V Trouble at a Pratt & Whitney plant as non-union workers try to break the picket line. The strike lasted over eight weeks.

towards independence. Therefore as Britain and other colonial powers attempted to come to grips with their problems after 1945 they did so without American sympathy or support. In taking this attitude, Americans seriously overestimated British strength. As we have seen, the Empire was no longer a secure territories

vided for "full and effective co-operation in the field of atomic energy" between America, Britain, and Canada. In April 1946, however, when Attlee asked for detailed information on atomic energy plants, Truman refused. Part of the reason was that the Americans did not trust British security (with good reason), but the information had also been denied to make it that much more difficult for Britain to develop as an atomic power in her own right.

No

threat from Britain

What

began

to

change

American

suspicions of Britain as a rival force in world affairs was the dawning realisation that Britain could not in fact present a real threat to American interests. Russia, on the other hand, could and did challenge the United States' global position, and there was a growing body of opinion within the Truman administration which was not only prepared to take this challenge up, but even to support the imperialist interests of Britain in the broader concern to counter Soviet policies.

make itself In March 1946, example, when Churchill made his

The change took time felt in American thinking. for

to

famous "Iron Curtain" speech, claiming that Russia was a dangerous expansionist power, Washington took care not to associate itself with the view, although Truman sat next to Churchill on the platform. Six months later, however, the leading American advocate of SovietAmerican collaboration, Henry Wallace, was dismissed by Truman for making a speech in which he called for a recognition of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and named Britain as the greatest impediment to progress through-

2783

By

the terms of a

common

agreement, although Germany was divided into four occupation zones, there was an obligation to treat it as a single economic unit. Therefore the predominantly industrial British and American zones were required to send the Russians industrial products and equipment as reparations, while the primarily agricultural Soviet zone was obliged to send in foodstuffs in return. The Russians, however, were not keeping their end of the bargain, and the British and American occupation commands were having to import food on a large scale. During 1946 this was to place an extra burden of no less than £80 million on the already overstrained British economy, and so Britain welcomed the

American proposal, made in July, to fuse its zone with any other. The load was spread and Anglo-American co-operation began to take firm shape. Porters at New York's Grand Central Station idle their time away during the massive railroad strike which gripped the United States in May 1946. Only

A

hospital, milk,

and

troop trains were kept running during the dispute.

out the world. shift in

By

the end of the year the

American policy was practically

complete.

To some degree it was a reflection of the of American conservatism

revival

For both Britain and the United States,

immediately after the war, a perhaps inevitable reaction against the long reign of Roosevelt and the New Deal. Anti-

first 12 months or so after the war were a time of hope. Hope in Britain that a more just society could-this timeemerge from the bleakness of total war. Hope in America that the ghost of depression had finally been laid and that happy days really were here again, and to stay. Nothing could have been more different than these two approaches to the future, the high-minded austerity of social democracy and the rush towards affluence in its liberal counterpart, and the divergences did not augur well for Anglo-American co-operation; nor did

communism was a natural ingredient of new mood and it was to prove a vote-

this

winner right through the first post-war decade. But Soviet policies also played their part, even if only in reaffirming a basic conviction that the U.S.S.R. was America's obvious enemy. Already in 1945, for instance, the Russians had begun to encroach on the Middle East by attempting to extend their influence in Iran, and they were suspected (wrongly) of giving military aid to the

Turkey and

communist partisan forces in the Greek war. In the case of Turkey and Iran, the American reaction was a prompt and civil

unequivocal

rejection of the Soviet claims. In the case of Greece, Washington could still rely on Britain, which had been holding the ring since the end of 1944, but in view of British economic it was doubtful how long this could go on. So America was gradually assuming a commitment to resist Russian penetration which Britain had held since the end of the 18th Century. In Germany, too, Soviet policies helped to make it impossible for the Americans to withdraw from Europe, and here again Soviet actions pushed Britain and the United States together.

weakness

2784

A time of hope the

the several clashes of national interest Zionism, atomic and opinion -over weapons, colonialism, the position of sterling. And yet co-operation was reviving in spite of the differences because of a sense of common danger emanating from Stalinist Russia. This feeling may have been misplaced, but it would have been asking too much of any government to ignore it. To base policy on distrust of the Soviet Union was, of course, to accept that three-power unity had not survived the war. But it also meant that two of those powers were united, and that the expectations of a new world need not be abandoned. Had Britain and America gone their separate ways, as they did a quarter of a century before, then such

hopes would have been in vain.

CHAPTER 178

TheWarTrials The decision to bring Axis "war criminals" to justice was taken by the Allies quite early in World War II. With the Nazi conquest of western European countries in 1940, and of Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941 came reports of millions of men and women being forced to work in German factories and mines, and of occupation regimes relying on taking and executing hostages to maintain order. Later came the story of the Nazis' "final solution to the

Jewish

problem", or the mass extermination of Jews. Churchill and Roosevelt made simultaneous statements on October 25,

warning that retribution would certainly follow in the wake of such war 1941,

crimes. The governments-in-exile in London joined in this protest, and on January 13, 1942, representatives of these nine

governments -Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the Free French National Committee, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, andYugoslavia- adopted the Declaration of St. James, in which the signatories declared that among their principal war aims was the punishment, through organised channels, firstly of those responsible for instituting in occupied countries a regime characterised by imprisonment, mass expulsion, execution

of hostages, and massacres; and secondly of those guilty of perpetrating or participating in such atrocities. On January

Chinese Government accepted the principles of the declaration, and in October of that year, the U.S.S.R. also

9,

1942, the

subscribed.

A

Just after his capture,

Goring gives a press conference for Western journalists. Despite his resplendent uniform, giving

an air of authority, the former Deputy Filhrer was at this time a virtual wreck-both mentally and physically To start with, he was a drug addict-"a simpering slob", according to the prison commander. But proper medical treatment and the strict regime of prison life soon brought about a remarkable .

On October 7, 1942, with the support of the U.S.. Great Britain, and 15 other Allied governments, the United Nations War Crimes Commission was established in London. Its main function was to gather information regarding war crimes and suspects, and to formulate rules of procedure for the courts where the criminals would be tried. The Commission began regular work in January 1944, and in addition, carried out extensive investigations on the theory of law. At the Yalta Conference, the Allies stated their intention to bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment, and at Potsdam, they talked of "stern

recovery.

justice".

On August

8,

1945, the four

major

vic-

torious powers U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Britain, and France signed the London Agreement setting up the International Military Tribunal (I. M.T.) in Nuremberg, which was to try the major war criminals of the

2785

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\

European Axis. The trial, which began in November 1945 and lasted almost ten months, was a monumental undertaking by all legal standards. The defendants were the military, political, and economic leaders of the vanquished Nazi Reich, namely Goring,

Joachim von Ribbentrop was Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1938 onwards. For two years before that he had been in London, where he formed the opinion that Britain would not honour her guarantees to Poland. He was an early, and close, adherent of

Ambassador

Hitler's-who, in turn, was impressed by Ribbentrop's social graces. His influence waned throughout the war and by the end this "vain and

incompetent" man was thoroughly disgraced. Hanged.

Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frank, Frick, Rosenberg, Streicher, Sauckel, Jodl, Seyss-Inquart, Hess, Funk, Raeder, Schirach, Speer, Neurath, Donitz, Schacht, Papen, and Fritzsche. The trial was conducted in four languages simultaneously- English, German, Russian, and French. The tribunal held 403 open sessions, with 33 witnesses appearing for the prosecution, which also submitted 4,000 documents in evidence. Sixty-one witnesses appearedforthedefence, in addition to 19 of the defendants. Reported evidence in the trial comprises 24 printed volumes and 17 additional volumes of documents. Eleven of the accused received death sentences.

There were a further 12 international Nuremberg. Basic policy for the trial and punishment of Japanese war criminals was the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese

trials held at

Potsdam Declaration. An International Military Tribunal was established at Tokyo, and 28 defendants were tried. The tribunal was composed of members from 11 nations, namely the United Kingdom, the U.S.A., China, to as the

the U.S.S.R., France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippines. The tribunal sentenced seven defendants to death by hanging. As well as these international trials, there were also the orthodox military channels of justice. For example, in Europe, the United States Army judge advocate was responsible for the prosecution of crimes against American troops, and in Nazi concentration camps liberated by American forces. Army military commissions and courts tried some 1,600 German war criminals and sentenced over 250 defendants to death. The same numbers were tried by the British, the French, and by countries which had suffered Nazi occupation. There are no figures available for courts held in Russia or China, and in West Germany the numbers are incomplete as war criminals are still pursued today

and brought

to trial.

The war crimes trials led to a flood of Su rrender of July 26, 1945, usually referred controversy over what constituted a war

2786

pra

crime and a warcriminal, and over whether

were legal or not. There according to which the (Ireadliil atrocities which took place could be considered crimes. At the Nuremberg trial, the defendants were charged on the following counts: the crime of being party in fact the trials

was no law

in 1939

common

plan or conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, or crimes against peace; war crimes; and crimes against humanity. What precedent was there for to a

such a trial? The charges were based partly on the ancient code of conduct in war whereby although it is recognised that war consists largely of acts that would be considered criminal in times of peace, for example, killing people and destroying property, it is not acceptable, even in war, to inflict suffering for

its

own

sake, or for revenge.

American example This principle was given explicit written form for the first time in 1863 in the U.S. War Department's Instructions for the government of armies of the United States in the field, which covered crimes against

inhabitants of hostile countries, and prisoners-of-war, for example. Further formalisation of these laws of war and their embodiment in international agreements was called for after the FrancoPrussian War. Consequently, The Hague and Geneva Conventions were made, the most important of these being the 4th Hague Convention of 1907, and the Geneva Prisoners-of-War and Red Cross Conventions of 1929.

The Fourth Hague Convention sets forth requirements and limitations with regard to the conduct of hostilities, treatment of prisoners-of-war, and the exercise of authority over occupied territory of a hostile state. Accordingly, enemy soldiers

who surrender must not be killed, but must be taken prisoner; captured cities must not be pillaged, nor undefended places bombarded. Arms calculated to cause unnecessary suffering are forbidden. The convention stated that war is not a freefor-all, and that only members of the armed forces can be protected by the laws of war. An army in occupied territory must respect family rights, people's lives, and also their religious convictions. The Geneva and Red Cross Conventions gave ruling on the treatment of P.O.W.s,

Rudolf Hess, Deputy Fiihrer 1933-1941, had taken part in the 1923 abortive Munich Putsch. Completely loyal, Hess believed he was interpreting Hitler's wishes when he flew to Scotland on a peace mission. But Hitler disowned him and the British treated him as a P.O.W. The question of his sanity has never been settled. Life imprisonment. <1 The courtroom at Nuremberg. At the tables are, from left to right, the British, U.S., and Russian prosecution teams. V Hess with Colonel John Amen, interrogation chief at Nuremberg.

•«r

4

Franz von Papen was appointed Reich Chancellor (briefly) in 1932

and was

subsequently Vice-Chancellor in Hitler's government for a short time. He was later given

a series of unimportant diplomatic posts. Acquitted.

Representatives on the War Crimes Commission. From left: Professor Trainin and General Nikitchenko (U.S.S.R.); Lord Jowitt (U.K.); Mr. Justice Robert Jackson (U.S.A.); and M. Falco (France).

A

and on the relief of the sick and wounded. There were no agreements at this time on naval warfare in general, although the Ninth Hague Convention prohibited the bombardment of undefended ports, and the London Naval Treaty of 1930 outlawed the sinking of merchant ships by submarines unless the passengers and crew were first moved out of harm's way. These, then, were the laws of warprinciples which found written expression in these treaties and agreements, embodiments of an ancient, established code of conduct, which had developed through custom and practice. Indeed, many countries, including the United States, Britain, France, and Germany, absorbed the laws of war into their military laws, and the military organisation of the 18th Century had led to the establishment of military courts to enforce these laws, and to try

who

transgressed. The trial of Sir Peter of Hagenbach in 1474 is a very early example of a war crimes trial. In 1469, Duke Charles of Burgundy forced the Archduke of Austria to pledge to him his possessions on the upper Rhine. Hagenbach wasmade governor of Breisach on the upper Rhine, where he instituted a

those

regime of terror. His crimes were unique

in their savagery,

times.

When

even in those dangerous

the area

Hagenbach was

was recaptured,

tried in Breisach for his

crimes by order of the Archduke of Austria. His judges were from Austria and allied cities. Hagenbach pleaded that he acted in conformity with his orders, but he was sentenced to death, and beheaded in the market place. It is important to note here that Hagenbach was accused only of murder, and that he had committed his crimes before the beginning of the war. The case of Napoleon, banished to St. Helena, is a precedent of international action for the treatment of a defeated

enemy.

World War

I

After World War I, the Allied "Commission on the responsibility of the authors ofthe war and on enforcement of penalties" met on January 25, 1919, to recommend the necessary action to be taken against enemy nationals accused of having committed war crimes. This meeting resembled the London Conference ofthe four major victorious powers in August 1945, as in Continued on page 2793

2788

Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner was chief of the Reich Main Security Office from 1943 onwards,

following Heydrich's assassination. This "tough, callous ox" was earlier appointed Austrian Minister of Security. As Himmler's deputy in the R.S.H.A. and head of the Abwehr he controlled all the security and terror organisations in the Reich. It was said that even Himmler feared him. He denied all knowledge of mass murders, but the evidence against him was

overwhelming. Hanged.

Alfred Rosenberg, Minister Occupied Eastern

for the

was the main philosopher of the Nazi Party. His book, The Myth of the Twentieth Century, provided Hitler with a pseudo-scientific Territories,

basis for his Aryan fantasies and anti-Semitic rantings. Head of the Party's Foreign Affairs

from 1933, Rosenberg was appointed administrator of occupied Russia in 1941. His Einsatzstab Rosenberg unit removed art treasures from conquered territories. Hanged. Office

Baldur von Schirach was Leader of the Hitler Youth from 1931 and Reich Youth Leader from 1933 onwards. In 1940 he was appointed Gauleiter and Defence Commissioner of Vienna, a post he held until the end of the war. In his capacity as Youth Leader he was implicated in the forcible

moving of thousands

of

young

people from occupied

Germany; while Vienna he was responsible for deporting some 60,000 Jews to eastern Europe. Twenty

Albert Speer, Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production, was Hitler's close friend. His brilliant organisational ability meant that, despite air raids,

war

production actually increased during 1943 and early 1944. But as head of the Todt Organisation he was also held responsible for using slave labour. Twenty years' imprisonment.

territories into

in

years' imprisonment.

V Kaltenbrunner defends himself from the dock.

2789

V The cell where Robert Ley, former leader of the German Labour Front, hanged himself before the opening of the trial. He had, remarked Goring, "been drinking himself to death revitalised

the witness box.

Goring in

He conducted

a spirited defence, frequently scoring points off the

Semitism.

prosecution.

> V A chalk and wash sketch Dame Laura Knight, showing Goring, Hess, Ribbentrop, and Keitel.

She made several such

sketches during the course of the trial, as preliminaries for a large and comprehensive oil painting.

in the abortive

Munich Putsch.

He called himself the "Jewbaiter Number One", and as such owned and edited Der Stiirmer, which poured out a steady stream of scurrilous anti-

anyway".

> A A

Julius Streicher had taken part

by

He was appointed

Gauleiter of Franconia in 1925. He was a gross, coarse man with a conspicuously low I.Q., notable for his corruption even by Nazi Party standards. In 1940 he was dismissed for misappropriating confiscated Jewish property. Hanged.

Constantin von Neurath was Foreign Minister from 1932 to 1938 and Reichsprotektor of

Bohemia and Moravia until 1941. From 1901 he made his career in the foreign service but nevertheless made no objection to serving in Hitler's government. As Reichsprotektor he supervised the brutal supression of Czech resistance, but the court accepted that he had tried to restrain the work of the Gestapo. Later Neurath was involved in anti-Hitler plots. Fifteen years' imprisonment.

Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht was President of the Reichsbank from 1933 to 1939 and Minister of Economics 1935-37. This American-born

became Hitler's monetary adviser in 1930 but financial genius

never joined the Nazi party. He resigned both his posts after disagreements withHitler over economic matters and Germany's preparation for war. His anti-war views were well

known

to his

American contacts.

Arrested and imprisoned after the July 1944 plot. Acquitted.

i

Reichsmarschall Hermann Goring, C.-in-C. Luftwaffe and Air Minister, was Hitler's No. 2. Nazi hierachy. He joined the Party in 1922 and rose rapidly in the ranks to become one of the "inner circle". His rather coarse bonhomie made him perhaps the most popular of in the

Germany's leaders, but his drive and energy became increasingly dissipated by drug addiction and self-indulgence. At the trial he was revealed as a bullying, shrewd, and intelligent showman. Condemned to death, he committed suicide just before the execution.

"

III

i

iw

'

j

i

Colonel-General Alfred Jodl, was chief of Operations Section, O.K.W. from 1938 onwards. In this post he worked closely with Hitler and the Commanderin-Chief on all German campaigns. His task was to keep Hitler informed of the military situation, but all too often his

assessment was faulty. A clever man, Jodl managed to retain his position in the high command throughout the war while many other generals were sacked. At the trial he pleaded "soldier's obedience" to excuse the way he condoned illegal acts by the German armed forces. Hanged.

2791

As in other recently-liberated countries, the new-found and enthusiasm of the French found an outlet in

patriotism

revenge. People hit back at those whose collaboration had been

more than mere acquiescence. A The cabinet at Vichy, including Pierre Laval (5), Marshal Petain (8), and General

Weygand (10), all of whom were arrested and accused of collaboration after the war. The unfortunate Weygand (who had already been imprisoned by the Germans) was acquitted, but Laval and Petain were both sentenced to death. Laval was executed, Petain in view of his advanced age and previous service to

France-was

reprieved.

>

Laval speaks during his

for treason.

Wilhelm Keitel was O.K.W. Chief-of-Staff. A man of poor mental and moral calibre, he

trial

idolised Hitler,

him

as "a

man

who described with the brains

cinema usher". He had served with the artillery in World War I. He retained his position because Hitler did not care for a more able officer as Chief-of-Staff and partly because of the ability of his own Chief-ofStaff, Jodl. The perfect lackey, he earned the nickname Lakaitel or "Little Lackey". of a

Hanged.

2792

Karl Donitz was chief of the

Arthur von Seyss-Inquart was

German Navy, U-boat strategist, and Hitler's deputy. From

Reich Commissioner of the Netherlands. He employed a policy of which he said "We demand everything that is of use to the Reich and suppress everything that may harm the Reich." He expropriated works of art, deported Jews, and waged a savage war against the Resistance during his term of office from 1940 to 1944. He

experience in World War I he evolved the "Wolf Pack" U-boat tactics for operating against merchant convoys. He succeeded

Admiral Raeder as Naval C.-in-C. in January 1943. At the end of the war Hitler nominated him as successor, and though Donitz attempted to make peace with the West he eventually had to accept the unconditional surrender. Ten years'

sent 5 million men to work as labourers in the Reich. He was arrested by the Canadians in

imprisonment.

May

1945.

Hanged.

Continued from page 2788

1919 the violations for which the German leaders were considered liable were much the same as those included in the Nuremberg Charter. The Commission report after World War I stated that all enemy persons who had violated the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity should be liable to criminal prosecution, regardless of their rank or authority. The report stipulated that, under international law, a person could be tried by his captors for such

The Commission recommended up a High Tribunal to try the accused, and it is interesting to note that violations.

setting

while the majority of the Allied nations endorsed this recommendation, the American delegates objected to the creation of an international criminal court on the grounds that a precedent was lacking. Many recommendations made by the Commission were incorporated into the articles concerning punishment of war criminals in the Peace Treaty of Versailles, and on February 3, 1920, the Allied powers submitted to the German delegate at the peace conference a list of 896 names of persons to be handed over for trial. The German Government had no intention of turning over the accused and declared that they should stand trial by the Supreme Court of the Reich in Leipzig. The Allies finally consented to this, with the result that very few persons were actually convicted, and of those who were, several escaped from German prisons. And so ended the most important attempt prior to Nuremberg by several nations to institute judicial proceedings against nationals of a vanquished state for alleged war crimes. However, the Leipzig trials conducted by the German Supreme Court affirmed that violations of the laws of war are punishable offences.

Legal problems But as there

no international legiswar can have no statutory form, and nowhere are the means of enforcement or the penalties for violais

lature, the laws of

tion specified. The question is, is it satisfactory to say that international law, and in particular the laws of war, have evolved over time, through usage, in very much the same way as English common law develop-

ed in pre-Parliamentary times? Are these laws binding on states? The problem of laws evolving through

2793

was foreseen at the Fourth Hague Convention, whose preamble had this to practice

Wilhelm Frick was a long-term member of the Nazi Party, and had been

in Hitler's first cabinet.

In 1939 he

was Minister of the

Interior, but the police,

whom

he had nazified and centralised, were under the control of Himmler. In August 1943 he was removed from the central

government and made Protektor of Bohemia and Moravia. He was convicted of planning aggressive war and of committing crimes against humanity. Hanged. trial of Vidkun Quisling Norway, August 1945. He was

A The in

convicted of treason and executed in the same year.

2794

say on subjects not actually covered by this, or any other, convention: these questions should be resolved by "the principles of the law of nations, as they result from usages among civilized peoples, from the law of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience". The Nuremberg Tribunal, and the 12 subsequent military trials, all confirmed that it was quite proper for international law to evolve in this way. It is important to note that nations are regarded as bound by the laws of war whether or not they were signatories to the Hague and Geneva Conventions.

Individual status

tenance the infliction of suffering for its own sake or revenge. These latter actions would still rank as criminal even in wartime. a

The problem of superior orders was not new one at the war crimes trials following

World War II. Almost universally it has been ruled that if the accused was aware that the order called for the commission of a criminal act, then his obedience is punishable as a criminal offence. However, what was criminal and what was not was very hard to determine. A soldier regards his duty as obedience to his military superiors. If he does not obey, he could suffer heavy punishment or even death. To disobey, therefore, calls for a very high degree of moral courage. However, according to international law, he must obey only lawful orders.

Some

Following closely on from this question that of whether or not individuals are subject to international law. This is an important question, for nearly all indivi-

is

duals are nationals of a certain state, regarding obedience to that state's laws as their highest obligation. The underlying principle at the war crimes trials was that there are some standards of behaviour that transcend the duty of obedience to national laws. War is an obligation to kill for reasons of state, but it does not grant a licence to kill for personal reasons, and it does not coun-

orders are so atrocious that the subordinate must know that they should not be obeyed. It was the case in Nazi Germany, though, that some of the defendants at Nurembergobeyed the most horrific orders not fearfully and unwillingly, but often approvingly and with great enthusiasm. Relations between the leader and the led did not preclude individual responsibility if the followers knew Hitler's aim and co-operated in the achievement of that aim. Only top servicemen could be accused oiplanning an aggressive war, but others-Donitz for example-were tried for waging an aggressive war.

Hirohito, Emperor of Japan, whose full title was "Imperial Son of Heaven of Great Japan". Though the power to wage war, declare peace, and make treaties lay with him, it was exercised according to his ministers' advice. He lacked firmness when dealing with the war-mongering chiefs-of-staff.

He remained

in

the background during the early successes, but later Tojo tried to involve him. The people were reminded of his divine destiny and promised the ultimate victory. In August 1945 he began to urge peace. On the 15th, a day after the surrender, he broadcast to his people for the first time in Imperial history. Although named as a war criminal by China, New Zealand, and Australia, he was granted immunity since the major powers felt that responsibility for the war did not lie with him. He played an important part in the post-war reconstruction of Japan by offering the people an apolitical leadership.

Perhaps it is a different matter in the lower ranks, where unquestioning obedience to orders

a necessity of military a soldier is to give such obedience, perhaps he should be defended from charges of unlawful conduct. Besides, it is the responsibility of the superior officer to see that troops do not commit war crimes. The most notable case of a commander's failure to discharge this responsibility was tried by a United States military is

life. If

commission in Manila. The defendant was General Tomayuki Yamashita, Japanese

commander

the Philippines in the closing stages of the war. At this time, the conduct of Japanese troops on the Philippine Islands degenerated, and many priin

soners-of-war were massacred along with civilians, and arson and looting were rife. General Yamashita had not ordered this, and perhaps he did not even know about

He was judged not

have adequate control of his troops and he was sentenced to death by hanging in 1946. it.

to

Let us now consider the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg itself. Britain, the United States, Russia, and France conducted the trial, and the objection has been made that a tribunal need not be considered international and binding on states which were not contracting parties to the treaty or agreement that forms its basis. No German government subscribed to the Charter nor gave its

< A Japanese crowds bow

before

Japan was a nation which, though armed and

the Emperor's car.

equipped with the products of the 20th Century,

still

style of the 12th.

lived in the

For them the

Emperor was a divine being descended from the sun. In reality he was a shy introverted man whose chief interest was marine biology. He had written a book on shellfish based on specimens he had collected personally.

2795

General Sado Araki,

Alinister 1931 to 1934. An advocate of the Army's policy of

of

War from

domination

at

home and

aggression abroad, he was a general in 1933 and was prominent in the upper councils of the Army. He not only played an active role in the

campaigns

in

Manchuria and

Jehol. but did much to stimulate the warlike impulses in

Japanese youth. He was found guilty of waging an aggressive war against China. Life imprisonment.

Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, Navy Minister from October 1941, and privy to all the government decisions from the attack on Pearl Harbor onwards. The Tribunal held that he was

not responsible for the "disgraceful massacres and murders" of prisoners and the crews of torpedoed ships committed by the Navy. He was found guilty of participating in the planning and waging of an aggressive war between October 1941 and August 1944. Before then he had been employed solely on Naval duties. Life

imprisonment.

2796

consent to the Tribunal's jurisdiction over German nationals, and on these grounds, the I.M.T. was not legal. It has been contended that the I.M.T. was no more than an inter-Allied occupation tribunal, staffed exclusively with Allied personnel. Some of the judges had actually participated in drafting the I.M.T. Charter. The Allied captors hence created the law, prepared the indictments, produced the evidence, conducted the prosecution, and judged the defendants.

The criticism that the tribunal was composed entirely of nationals of victorious

powers is a serious moral one.

It is

thought

some neutral judges would have made for a fairer judgement, but which state in 1945 was a real neutral, and would such a state have welcomed involvement? The objection has also been raised that a Soviet judge was placed on the tribunal, when the Soviet Union was just as guilty as Germany in launching aggressive war against Poland. However, it is legally irrelevant whether or not war criminals existed in the Allied camp. It is never open to a murderer to object to his trial on the that

grounds that there are other untraced murderers at large. It is no defence to say that others have committed the crime for which he is being tried.

The charges The charges on which the defendants at Nuremberg were tried were waging aggressive war or crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. On the subject of waging aggressive war, the Allied commission after World War I concluded that the initiation of an aggressive war, while morally reprehensible, was not an act directly contrary to positive law. In the inter-war years, several treaties, including the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, prohibited wars of aggression and condemned war as an instrument of policy. This was accepted by the U.S.A., France, and 42 other nations, but did this pact mean that aggressive war was now unlawful? In 1944, the U.N. War Crimes Commission was divided on this question and could not come to a decision. The fact that the terms "aggression" and "international crime" were not defined did nothing to help clarify the situation. However, the parties to the Nuremberg Charter decided that aggression was a crime, and so rendered ineffective further arguments

2797

A Japanese war

criminals,

among them Hideki Tojo, enter the War Ministry building in Tokyo to be arraigned before the International War Crimes Tribunal. > > Captain George A. Furnese, defence counsel, addresses the court.

Previous page: Japanese war criminals awaiting trial in Changi Jail on Singapore Island. Some 700 men were detained as suspect war criminals.

The picture shows

men copying coloured pictures from magazines. Their brushes are made from human hair. Their jailers reported that detainees were extremely proficient.

many

.^i^Sk,

General Sheishiro Itagaki was War Minister from 1938 to 1940. He was an active member of the Army conspiracy which brought Japan into the war. From April 1945 he was commander of Japanese forces in Java, Sumatra, Malaya,

Borneo, and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Charged with crimes relating to death and maltreatment of prisoners of war

and civilian internees. Hanged.

Colonel Kingore Hashimoto, soldier and propagandist. Leader of the Sakura-kai or Cherry Society, he aimed to "purify the national life". Though he was an outspoken advocate of aggressive war there was no evidence to link him with the crimes contravening the laws and customs of war. He had become fascinated by dictatorship while in Europe. Life imprisonment.

General Kuniaki Koiso, Prime Minister. The Tribunal argued that during Koiso's office it had become public knowledge that troops were guilty of excesses in all theatres. In

duty"

2798

October

1944 his foreign minister said that Japanese treatment of Allied P.O.W.'s left "much to be desired". During his last six months of office conditions for prisoners did not improve. For "deliberate disregard of his life

imprisonment.

rai

2799

>

Tojo, Premier

and War

Minister of Japan, relaxes in his days of power. An authoritarian, his military dictatorship earned him the

nickname of the "Razor". > > Tojo makes his deposition against the prosecution on January 6, 1948. The defendants claimed that mistakes and misunderstandings had arisen from inadequate translation facilities.

whether the initiation or waging of wars of aggression were punish-

in court as to able.

The idea of prosecuting the Axis leaders for crimes against peace did not arise until

on in the war. Never before had engaging in aggressive warfare been the basis of a charge. Its inclusion was an important part of America's post-war late

General Hideki Tojo, Minister of War from July 1940 and Premier from October 1941. The Tribunal found that he bore

"major responsibility

for

Japan's criminal attacks on her neighbours" and that "the barbarous treatment of prisoners and internees was well known to Tojo". Up to the fall of his cabinet in 1944 he connived at ttu orders which stated that sick prisoners should not be fed, beca ise they could not work. He advt ated the use of prisoners to builc "he BurmaSiam railway and ignv ed the

high death rate. Hange

2800

policy to establish the criminal status in international law of aggressive war. This means that whenever a leader leads his country to war, he must not only consider that he may lose, but that if he does so, he and his top service personnel will be tried as criminals and probably executed. The question that arises at this point is that if waging aggressive war was not a crime at the outbreak of World War IL how could anybody be found guilty of it at this time? Can there be any crime without pre-existing laws which state that certain actions are criminal? Some say that there is no crime, while others contend that the existence of a law prohibiting some courses of action is a safeguard against injustice, a moral principle, but that it is not a rule of law, and an act may be punished as a crime if it was clearly illegal in character at the time it was committed. "Crimes against humanity" is another

vague concept. Victims of inhumane acts persecutions who are nationals of occupied territories are the victims of war crimes. But does this also apply to Hitler's persecution of the Jews inside Germany? Here, there was no "war", and hence no war crime. This is where the category of crimes against humanity becomes important. or

Definitions This leads us on to the question of tions.

defini-

How did the trials define war crimes,

and crimes against humanity? The Nuremberg Charter defines war crimes as violations of the laws of war, including murder, ill-treatment, or the deportation for slave labour or for any other purpose of the civilian population of an occupied territory; the murder or illtreatment of prisoners-of-war; the killing of hostages; plunder, wanton destruction ofcities, towns or villages; and devastation not justified by military necessity. Crimes against humanity included murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, andotherinhumaneactscommitted

against any civilians before or during war;

2801

Sk

(i

^

t 4

General Yoshijiro Umezu, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army from 1939 to July 1944, when he became Chief of the Army General Staff until the end of the war. No evidence was found to implicate him in any war crimes against P.O.W.s and internees. However, overwhelming evidence showed that he had conspired to wage aggressive war against China and the Western Powers. Appeared as a defence witness for

Yamashita. Life imprisonment.

2802

Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister from October 1941 to September 1942 and during the last few months before the surrender. At these periods he was able to influence Japanese

Government

policy.

The tribunal

found therefore that he was not responsible for any war crimes either of neglect or commission, but found him guilty of conspiring to wage an aggressive war. Sentenced to 20 years imprisonment with effect from May 3, 1946.

Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of the Navy General Staff. He

General Akira Muto, one time

urged the attack on Pearl Harbor after he realised that Japan was exhausting her fuel stocks. Resigned under pressure from Tojo in February 1944. He

Bureau and

retired to private life and only reappeared for the Tokyo trials

where he was charged with conspiring to wage an aggressive war. His death from a complex of infirmities in January 1947 while the trial was in progress caused headlines.

Chief of the Military Affairs in 1945 chief-of-staff

in the Philippines.

Commanded

the 2nd Imperial Guards Division from April 1942 to October 1944. He was held responsible for the starvation, torture, and murder of military and civilian detainees and for "gross breaches of the Laws of War." His claim of ignorance was described as "incredible". Partially responsible for the "Rape of Nanking". Hanged.

and the persecution on religious, racial, or political grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of" the trihunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. This last phrase has caused disquiet amongst critics of the trials, as it seemingnations the right to interfere, in certain circumstances, in the internal affairs of another state. The I.M.T. considered crimes such as the German persecution of the Jews as acts of such heinous character that they clearly violated those principles of justice recognised by all civilised nations, and that under circumstances such as these, joint action by a group of states would be acceptable. A further criticism of these definitions is that they were drawn up after the hostilities, by which time the Allies knew of what the Axis Powers were guilty. Others have criticised the trials as a legal front for the Allies' desire for vengeance. Victor Gollancz, the British publisher, went so far as to call the trials "a comeback to barbarian ideas". Apart from all the controversy as to whether or not the trials were legally ly gives

justified, there are

moral questions,

to consider. It certainly does not

too,

seem

right for the victors to sit in judgement over the vanquished, when the victors had certainly committed crimes similar to of those for which they were now trying the vanquished. The definition of war crimes includes, as we have seen, devastation not justified by military necessity. When thinking of this, the Allied bombing of Dresden comes to mind.

some

The

Allies right?

What

right had the Allies to punish only the defeated Axis war criminals? Does victory wipe the slate clean? It should be pointed out here that the I.M.T. did not consider aerial and submarine warfare. The court appears to have been convinced that German practices did not differ very greatly, from Allied action in these areas but it did not call them war crimes. This is illogical. All atrocities and horrors of war should have been dealt with, including the atom bombs dropped on Japan. Only the losers were .

.

.

< The courtroom scene in December 1946. The 28 leaders and alleged conspirators were described as "old" and "tired men". The trial lacked anyone of the colour of Goring, and was a curiously subdued affair. Only Tojo when he appeared in the dock had a "lynx-like, formidable face".

V Shinto priest offers prayers for the return of Japanese P.O.W.s in Russia. Relatives of

A

men had invaded the Russian Embassy in Tokyo.

these

A Late in 1952 two minor war criminals are released on parole. Yoshika Yagi (left), a former employed by the Japanese Army and sentenced to 15 years, and Toshio Tatakeyama, a former colonel, civilian

sentenced

Sugamo

to 12 years, leave Prison.

deemed guilty of waging aggressive war. war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The trials would have been better employed had they considered the course of the war as a whole, perhaps giving guidance on specific weapons and practices which should have been banned as inhumane and unlawful, regardless of their military value.

and the

trials

were therefore expected.

conscience demanded that the guilty be punished. The United Nations affirmed the principles applied at Nuremberg, and thereby expressed their endorsement of the ruling of the court. This is tangible evidence that the principles of the Charter, as well as those in the judgement of the Tribunal, Public

are valid in international law, and that

was justified. The United Nations also instructed the Committee on the Codification of International Law their application

Retribution

to

has been said that the trials had the sanction of the international community. Nineteennations subscribed to theLondon agreement in addition to the four major powers. Therefore it was probably right politically to take jurisdiction over the Axis war leaders at the time. "Retribution" had been talked of so much during the It

war, that justice for the enemy war criminals became a major objective of the war,

2804

codify

the principles

laid

down

Nuremberg. It is no doubt desirable that the

at

prin-

ciples should be absorbed into internatio-

nal law. Every attempt to mitigate the horrors of war is welcome. But in the future, international law must be applied to all combatants, not just the vanquished. It is morally wrong for one side to be the victor, prosecutor, judge, and executioner combined, as the Allies wereat Nuremberg.

Once war had been declared

in

1939, Himmler's determination to expand the S.S. ensured that the Waffen-S.S. grew into a

formidable fighting force. By the end of the war the Waffen-S.S. included whole corps and even armies within its organisation. As the S.S. expanded so too did its officer corps with the result that a number of S.S. generals were appointed during the war. Arguably the most famous of the S.S. generals was the Bavarian, Josef "Sepp" Dietrich. An early member of the Nazi party, he enjoyed Hitler's confidence throughout the war. Before Hitler became Chancellor, Dietrich had been his chauffeur and bodyguard and this association guaranteed Dietrich rapid advancement. He joined the S.S. in 1928, and reached the rank of major-general by 1933. As commander of the " Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" he was active in the western campaign of 1940, and was badly wounded at Esquebeck. After fighting in Greece and on the Eastern Front he was recalled to command S.S. troops in the West in an unsuccessful attempt to destroy the AngloAmerican bridgehead in Normandy. Later Dietrich was given command of the 6th S.S. Panzer Army in the ill-fated Ardennes offensive but he achieved little, his advance held up by deter-

mined American resistance and shortage

of

supplies.

His

last

campaign was a desperate attempt to stem the Russian advance into Hungary, but faced by overwhelming numbers he was forced back into Austria. Although a brutal man — he was prominent in the S.A. purge

—

of 1934 Dietrich was a good divisional general. Like most S.S. generals, his military skills were suited to the field of battle rather than to the finer points of

being fearless on the battlefield he was also a good organiser, and, unlike most other S.S. officers, he got on well with his Army counterparts who respec-

higher command and staff work. If Dietrich was the best known of the S.S. generals, the most Colonelaccomplished was General Paul Hausser. During the period leading up to the outbreak of war, Hausser was responsible for the training of

ted his professional ability. The most ruthless of the S.S.

the Waffen-S.S. and did much to the fighting qualities that became a characteristic of the force. As commander of the "Das Reich" Motorised Division, he was involved in the heavy fighting around the Yelnya bend in 1941 and was badly wounded instill

Borodino where he lost an eye and part of his jaw. At Kursk, Hausser commanded over 400 armoured vehicles and played a prominent part in the successes of the first phase of the battle. It was at Khar'kov, however, that his talents were best displayed. Refusing to obey at

Hitler's fanatical orders to deall positions to the last man, Hausser skilfully conducted a

fend

fighting retreat from the encircled city.

In Normandy Hausser commanded the II S.S. Panzer Corps,

complete Allied air suprevented his tanks from having any decisive effect. He was wounded again, being hit in the face by shrapnel during the breakout from the Falaise Gap. Hausser was popular with his men, and highly respected by his high ranking colleagues. Guderian considered him to be one of the most outstanding commanders of the war. Besides but

periority

A Sepp Dietrich halts his command vehicle during the campaign

in Greece.

was Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski who was given suppressing responsibility for partisan activities on the Eastern Front. A protege of Hitler, BachZelewski set about his tasks with an almost unparalleled brutality, leaving behind him a trail of destruction throughout Eastern Europe and the Balkans. During the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, he was called in to assist Jurgen Stroop, the S.S. Major-General generals

of Police, in putting down the insurrection. His ambition knew few bounds, and he is known to

have murdered both subordinates and superiors in order to achieve his ends.

Of the remaining S.S. generals, Kurt "Panzer" Meyer gained a considerable

reputation

as

a

tank commander. In 1944, at the age of 33 he became the youngest divisional general in the

German

Army. He was involved in the fierce fighting in Normandy, and his 12th S.S. Panzer Division was badly mauled at the Falaise Gap, losing some 80% of its total tank strength. A brave and resolute commander, Meyer was a fanatical admirer of Hitler and remained so after the war. As a group, the S.S. generals were characterised by their ruthlessness, their aggressive fighting spirit and a fervent loyalty to the Nazi cause. With the excep-

none of them were commanders of any real distinction, although most were good battlefield soldiers. tion of Hausser

2805

2806

A

General von

dem Bach-

Zelewski.

A>

The most able of the WaffenPaul Hausser. The commanders of the 12th

S.S. generals,

>

S.S. Division "Hitlerjugend": (left to right) Kurt Meyer,

and Max Wiinsche. < "Panzer" Meyer during the

Fritz Witt,

early stages of the invasion of Russia, summer 1941.

2807

2808

m.f^

0^

A

.^-

*».-^

Soldiers of the "Leibstandarte

Adolf Hitler" with Russian prisoners and their captured standards.

> A squad

of soldiers of the

"Leibstandarte" prepares to enter a village on the Eastern Front.
<
S.S. officer writes his

report, while a British

prisoner waits in the

background during the fighting in France in 1940.

< An

S.S. soldier stationed

in Holland.

2809

soldiers of an S.S. ri\i:iment on the Eastern Front take a rest durini^ the winter of 1944. V S.S. troops prepare to attaek a

>Well equipped

defended farm

in

France

in 1940.

W*'

«

1<

M/l-

-w*

< Pzkw IV tanks carry S.S. troops to counterattack during the retreat from the Ukraine in 1943.

V-^

An

S.S. detachment

armed

with the renowned M.G. 42 machine gun. V V < S.S. troops under cover on the Russian Front. V V A Waffen-S.S. volunteer attaches a rifle grenade to his

Mauser Kar 98. V The S.S. soldier on

the right

holds the superb StG.44 assault

rifle.

''•,>!'«»' .^-

~v

^y

h-,*v:<:

^ 5(1


.•

1^*'%

~ V

'S»-^'

p

< < An

S.S. motorcycle

combination drives through the burning ruins of a Soviet village.
V One of the more bizarre aspects of the S.S.: the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem visiting Muslim S.S. troops.

> In their distinctive camouflage smocks, S.S. troops march to the front.

2812

2813

Voluntee When

it

what was

came

to

really

meant by "Nor-

dic blood",

interpreting

Himmler's standards

were, to say the least, elastic.

They were made even more complicated by the decision to expand the

Waffen-S.S.

into

a

"New

European Army". And one of the foreign units which always got good press coverage in German publications such as Signal and Wehrmacht was the diminutive force recruited from Germany's ancient enemy, France. Gottlob BeVger, Chief-of-Staff of the Waffen-S.S., was quoted as saying: "As a soldier I feel with the soldiers of Europe. French volunteers wear the Iron Cross next to the Legion d'Honneur even when they have won it in

Germans.

fighting

Two proud

decorations of the two nations on the same breast -there you have the New Europe."

But

was an embarrassing "Charlemagne" Divi-

it

fact that the

sion, or to give

it

its full title,

Grenadier Division "Charlemagne" (Franzosisches Nr. 1), was not formed until the last two months of the war and was immolated in its only battle: Waffen

Berlin.

It

was made up of survivors

from the 33rd

Waffen Cavalry Division which had been slaughtered at Budapest. To remnants were added these elements from two original French volunteer units. The first of these was the

Wehrmacht French Volunteer Infantry Regiment No. 638 and the second was the "Legion Tricolore", which by 1944 had been built up to brigade strength with the title of "S.S. Freiwilligen

Sturmbrigade Nr. 6". These

'Charlemagne'

men wore

the tricolour shield of France on the right sleeves of their Germanpattern uniforms; but no grandiose title could disguise the fact that their numbers were vestigial. It was not until 1944 that they were reinforced to regimental strength, and the "Charlemagne" Division itself was little more than a brigade. The holocaust of Berlin was their first battle -and their last. < Recruiting poster for the

33rd "Charlemagne" French S.S. Grenadier Division.

> Men

of the 638th French Volunteer Infantry Regiment, transferred to the S.S. en bloc in

2814

August

1943.

r$

from France..

2815

and from Denmarh A

Three Danish brothers in S.S.

sports dress at a training depot in Alsace. They are members of 24th "Danmark" S.S.

Panzergrenadier Regiment "Danisch Nr. i". By the spring of 1943 several Germanic foreign S.S. contingents

had

been amalgamated with a cadre

from the 5th "Wiking" S.S. Panzergrenadier Division (formed in 1940 from Germanic volunteers) to form the 11th "Nordland" S.S. Freiwilligen Panzergrenadier Division. > Hauptsturmfiihrer (Captain) Frederik von Schalburg, commander of the "Freikorps Danmark" from February 1942 to his

death in action near

Demy'ansk on the following June 2. In 1943, the Danish branch, or "Germansk-Korps", of the Germanische-S.S. was renamed the "Schalburg-Korps" after the man Himmler had considered one of the best examples of S.S. material he had ever seen.

> > Danish poster.

2816

S.S. recruiting

The recruiting

of

Danish volun-

teers into the VTa/fen-S.S. followed two main streams. It began in

1940 when the 5th S.S. Panzergrenadier Division "Wiking" was formed. This was based on the former "Germanm" Regiment and included the first regiment of

Danish volunteers. These wore the Danish S.S. emblem-a white circular swastika -on their arm shields.

Next came

"Freikorps

Dan-

mark", one of the many non-

German

volunteer

initially trained

legions

under German

but later receiving officers and N.C.O.s of their own nationality. These men could be transferred to regular WaffenS.S. units; if so, they tended to reN.C.O.s,

tain their distinctive armshields. In 1943 the Waffen-S.S. underwent a new reorganisation which involved the re-grouping of the foreign legions. "Freikorps Danmark" became the 24th S.S. Pan-

Regiment "Danmark". The regiment soldiered on in Russia with the new WaffenS.S. Division "Nordland",iormed zergrenadier

early in 1943 from predominantly Scandinavian units. Finally came the 3rd Panzergrenadier Regi-

ment "Danmark", which formed part of the notorious "Totenkopf" Division. The veterans of "Freikorps Danmark" and "Nordland" fought their last battle at Berlin in 1945. Here it should be remembered that it was the foreign contingents of the Waffen-S.S. which did as much as anyone to establish the ferocious reputation of the force in general. Their status as

combatants was unorthodox and remained undefined throughout that war.

German

troops of the

Waffen-S.S., if captured, could expect to receive normal P.O.W.

treatment. But foreign WaffenS.S. men could end up with the death sentence as traitors. Hence

tendency -documented in fight with fanatical tenacity. It could even be claimed that these foreign troops, few though they were in number, were the only forces on which Hitler could rely in full by the last weeks of the war. their

many an action-to

^

MOD BOICHEVISMENf

2817

A Highly competitive sporting events were run at S.S. training depots to improve basic physical fitness, build up an esprit de corps, and develop teamwork.

A> A

17-year old volunteer

Norwegian gunner of the

S.S.

(by the wheel). Note the

camouflage smock and helmet cover, worn from the early days of the war by S.S. troops. Two Flemish S.S.

A>>

volunteers at work clearing a stoppage in their 34 machine gun. They too are wearing

MG

camouflage smocks and helmet and are probably

covers

members of the "Westland" S.S. Infantry Regiment, which was incorporated into the "Wiking" Division, the best foreign division in the S.S., in December 1940. > A The lighter side? volunteer whiles time painting.

> V A Dutch

away

An

S.S.

his spare

volunteer, lately

a clerk, learns a more exacting trade: that of the sniper.

>> A

lesson in tactical

reconnaissance at a training depot. The Waffen-S.S. were noted for the ruthlessness and aggression of their fighting more than for the finer points of the military art. > > > S.S. assault pioneers train at boatwork.

2818

MORDMENN

I

eOSLCL

< < An

S.S. recruiting poster

drum up

for

Norway, seeking

an

identity between the martial

to

Vikings and the latter-day S.S. trooper.

< Men of the "Germanske S.S. Norge" disembark in Germany. Members of the Norwegian S.S., they had volunteered to fight on the Eastern Front and joined the "Norge" S.S. Panzergrenadier Regiment on March 11, 1943, soon afterwards forming a national company within the regiment. Norway did not prove a particularly useful recruiting area for the S.S., membership standing at only 1,247 on September 30, 1944.

V Norwegian S.S. trooper the Eastern Front with his

on

Commander

of

A

MG

34 machine gun.

Norwegian company on the Eastern Front was Obersturmthe

fiihrer (1st Lieutenant)

Lindvig.

Norivau's contribution Norway was the only one of teers. This was the Norwegian Germany's neutral neighbours to Ski Jdger Battalion "Norge". produce a would-be puppet ruler It served with the 11th and 12th before being attacked, in the form S.S. Mountain Rifle Regiments of Vidkun Quisling; and there was ("Reinhard Heydrich" and a tendency for Himmler and "Michael Gassmair") in the 6th Heydrich to expect great things S.S. Mountain Division "Nord", of Norway once it had been which was stationed on the Finoccupied. They were soon to find nish front. Later it was transout how totally mistaken Quisling ferred south to the Ardennes. had been about the national "Norwegen" Foreign The mood of the country. But-as Legion was raised at the same with Denmark -they did get a time as "Freikorps Danmark", hard core of S.S. volunteers. after the Scandinavian campaign The first Norwegian (and of April-May 1940. They followed Danish) volunteers formed the the style of the other foreign "Nordland" S.S. Panzergrena- contingents, with Army-pattern dier Regiment, subsequently tunics and Legion arm shields. incorporated into the "Wiking" With the reorganisation of the Division. They wore the "NordWaffen-^.S. in early 1943, "Norland" cuff band and an arm wegen" became the 23rd Panzershield bearing the Norwegian grenadier Regiment "Norge", flag. Himmler's high hopes for grouped with its opposite number, Norway as a source of manpower 24th Panzergrenadier Regiment were reflected in the name of the "Danmark", to form the Panzerdivision; and argument still rages grenadier Division "Nordland", among the uniform experts of serving in Russia and then Berlin. World War II over whether or not With the Norwegian S.S. it was the unit wore a collar patch with basically the same story: nominal the prow of a Viking ship on it. divisions way under strength. Apart from these, there was a Altogether, about 6,000 Danes specialised unit of ski troops and Norwegians served in the made up from Norwegian volun- ranks of the Waffen-S.S.

Olaf

The Dutch SS Together with the Danes and Norwegians, the Dutch were officially regarded as "superin Himmler's Untermensch" crackpot hierarchy of racial

produced the 23rd Freiwilligen Division Panzergrenadier "Nederland", formed round two regiments: the 48th Volunteer

("General Panzergrenadier Seyffart") and the 49th ("De duced a champion crop of volun- Ruyter"). It had to wait until teers for the Waffen-S.S. which December 1944 before receiving has been put as high as 50,000. In official divisional status, and it Holland the Germans were able was typical of the tangled .story to call on the pro-Fascist of the Waffen-S.S. that it only got adherents of Mussert; in Belgium its number - 23 - when another there were the Flemish and Wal- 23 ("Kama") was disbanded. The loon followers of Leon Degrelle, 'Weder/anrf "Division served with who became a field commander Army Group "North" on the superiority. Certainly they pro-

Leningrad/Kurland front. Trapped in Kurland by the Russian advance, its survivors were Regiment "Nordwest", including evacuated by sea; they fought in both Dutch and Belgian the Stettin area, and a few were nationals. In addition there were lucky enough to escape to the the Belgian and Dutch Foreign American lines. The original Belgian foreign Legions, "Flandern" and "Niederlande". For the Dutch, the legion was the Legion "Wallonie". evolution from foreign legion to It was up-graded to divisional S.S. Panzergrenadier regiment status as the 28th Freiwilligen as well as a quisling leader. Recruiting from the Low Countries began with the Volunteer

2822

Panzergrenadier Division "Wallonie" and suffered murderous losses on the Eastern Front under the command of Leon Degrelle. It was wiped out in the massive Oder battle of 1945, trying to halt the Russian drive on Berlin.

The second Waffen-S.S. formation recruited from Belgian nationals was a paper tiger. This was the 27th S.S. Freiwilligen Panzergrenadier Division "Langemarck", which began as the 2nd S.S. Infantry Regiment (of the same name) attached to the "Das Reich" Division in Russia in 1942. The following year it was up-graded to brigade under the title "Langemarck Sturmbrigade". "Langemarck" ended the war as a nominal division; but it never status

exceeded

its basic brigade strength and, like its stable-mate "Wallonie", was ground to pieces on the Eastern Front.

t^

< A Flemish

poster.

From

S.S. recruiting early in the war

had been a Flemish volunteer legion serving with the

there

Germans, and in May 1943 this was expanded into a brigade under the title of the 6th

"Langemarck" Freiwilligen it was

Sturmbrigade. As such

heavily engaged in the Ukraine

and around Zhitomir between December 1943 and April 1944, when it was pulled out of the line for rest in Czechoslovakia.

was sent to Narva, was badly cut about. The brigade was again relieved in September and sent In July

where

it

it

back to the depot at Hammerstein. On the 18th of the

same month Himmler authorised the formation of a Flemish division, and the remnants of the

"Langemarck" Brigade were amalgamated with other Flemish units to form the 27th "Langemarck" S.S.

Freiwilligen Grenadier Division. The division was virtually wiped out in the last desperate battles for

Germany.

< A Dutch

recruiting poster for When the 11th "Nordland" Division was raised the Waffen-S.S.

from northern European volunteers early in 1943, the

Dutch asked for permission

to

own

national unit. The result was the 4th

raise their

"Nederland" S.S. Freiwilligen Panzergrenadier Brigade, an expansion of the earlier Freiwilligen Legion

"Niederlande". By autumn the brigade was 5,500 men strong

and was sent to Croatia on anti-partisan operations. From there it was sent to the Leningrad front early in 1944, its way back to Lithuania, which it reached in January 1945 after suffering very heavy losses. After a rest in Danzig, the brigade was redesignated the 23rd "Nederland" S.S. Freiwilligen

and then fought

Panzergrenadier Division, and was wiped out in the fighting

around Berlin

VOOR UW EER

EN GEWETEN OP.'-TEGEN HET BOLSJEWISME DE WAFFEN ROEPT U !

LL

<<

in

May.

Opperstormleider

(1st

Lieutenant) J. L. Jansonius, the Dutch S.S. chief-of-staff with a German S.S. officer (left), at a sports event at the S.S. school ,

at

Avegoor in August

1942.

2823

naai

mm

From the Steppes of Russia One of the most stupid things the Germans did in their attempt to conquer Soviet Russia was to alienate the vast majority of the population by their brutality. A careful policy of "divide and rule" with the national minorities in the Soviet Union would not only have eased the problem of diverting troops to hold down

occupied

territory,

but

would

certainly have added vastly to the manpower of the Wehrmacht and its co-belligerents on the Eastern Front. As it was, it took

nearly two years of fighting in Russia before it was decided to Neverrecruit troops there. theless, some of the results were impressive-on paper. The Baltic states- only recently occupied by the Red Army when Germany invaded the Soviet Union-were naturally the first to respond. By March 1943, 22,000 Latvians and Estonians had volunteered for service. They were formed into S.S. Volui eer

2824

Brigades and were subsequently

Then there were the attempts

raised to the status of Waffen Grenadier Divisionen (19th for the Latvians and 20th for the Estonians). Tough and ferocious fighters, they were cut off in the

to exploit nationalist sectarian

Kurland pocket

in 1945.

The

last

Baltic S.S. unit to see action in World War II had a different story. This was the 15th Waffen

Grenadier S.S. Division (1st Latvian), recruited from Latvian security police in 1943. Those who escaped the vicious fighting in the Baltic states and Pomerania were flung into the rag-bag garrison of Berlin, where they fought to the death. Despite the cruelty of the German occupation, some 100,000 volunteered. A Ukrainians division - the 14th Russian "Galizien" - was formed, but its history was short and sharp. The division was completely wiped out in the battle of the BrodyTarnov pocket in June 1944 (its first

major engagement).

in Yugoslavia, raising anti-Serb forces to fight against Tito's partisans. This produced the "Handschar" Division: the 13th Waffen Gebirgsdivision der S.S. This was a force of Croatian volunteers, raised in 1943 and "Bosnienoriginally entitled

groups

Herzegowina" A Moslem unit, its men wore the fez, complete .

with silver skull-and-crossbones

and

eagle.

France,

it

During

its

mutinied.

training in

When

put

work in Yugoslavia it did little damage to Tito's partisans but showed itself adept in dealing

to

out

enthusiastic

Yugoslav

brutality

civilians.

It

to

was

disbanded and reformed as a mountain regiment, retaining the same name. Even less effective were the Albanian S.S. volunteers, from whom the 21st Waffen Gebirgsdivision "Skanderbeg" was formed in 1944. Its chief problem was eventually

desertion,

which

finally necessi-

tated its disbandment. The same held true for the short-lived "Kama", a force of Croatians. Also raised in Russia were the

29th and 30th Waffen Grenadier Divisions (1st and 2nd Russian). The 29th barely saw the light of day; its personnel were almost immediately dispersed to the Russian unit being formed by the renegade General Vlassov: The R.O.A. or Russkaya Osuoboditelnaya Armiya ("Russian Army of Liberation"). The 30th inherited some of the former personnel of the 29th, plus "Schumabataillone" men - renegade Russian P.O.W.s raised by the S.S. and employed in field security duties. It was cut to pieces during the German retreat in France. Numerous Cossack cavalry units were also raised, and although not of any importance, they were encountered frequently by the Allies during the last months of the war.

I < Caucasian Cossack volunteer cavalry in 1942. Later, when the rigid ethnic qualifications for the S.S. were dropped as a result of the increasingly heavy losses suffered in the East, such units were transferred to the S.S. V Don Cossack cavalry take a rest in Russia.

--> .

*

V-^'rC t^.*

•""^^»^-^^ "'

^

"

'

V Men of the S.S.

3rd "Totenkopf Panzer Division during a

lull in the fighting for

Smolensk

in

September 1941.

Sf

^^i r

< < An S.S. grave. Note the non-Christian marker, an arrowhead pointing up to the sky. < An SdKfz 712 half-track, with a 3.7-cm Flak 36 gun, of the 1st "Leibstandarte" S.S. Panzer Division in Russia. V < An S.S. N.C.O. assault group leader takes a break from house-clearing in Khar'kov during March 1943. V V < S.S. 8.1-cm mortar crew in action.

V A

cold S.S. trooper with his 34 machine

tripod-mounted

gun

MG

in 1943.

V V S.S. 3.7-cm Flak crew. Note man at the left holding the

the

rangefinder.

> Men

o/"/ "Leibstandarte" S.S. Panzer Corps wait for Stukas to reduce a Russian strongpoint near Khar'kov in March 1943

before putting in the final assault. The corps was composed of three crack S.S. divisions 1st "Leibstandarte". 2nd "Das Reich", and 3rd "Totenkopf.

> > Men

of an S.S. police unit ride an electric train up into the mountains of Slovenia on anti-partisan operation in

an

Not members of men wear Gebirgsjager uniforms with

February

1944.

the Waffen-S.S., the

police insignia.

>>>

.4

of the 5th

Scandinavian volunteer

"Wiking"

S.S.

Division in action on the Russian

Front in 1943. V Sturmbannfiihrer (Major) Meyerdress (right), holder of the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, inspects

German defensive position in Russia. Meyerdress is wearing the black Panzer uniform. ^ > An anti-partisan patrol of S.S. mountain troops in Serbia during 1942. The men are

a

probably from the 7th "Prinz

Eugen" S.S. Gebirgsdivision. V > > The commander of a "Totenkopf Panzer unit gives his final instructions for an attack.

Herrenuolh

..and their uictims < Men

of the "Leibstandarte". left to right: Schiitze (private), Sturmann (lancecorporal), and Rottenfiihrer (corporal); bottom row:

Top row,

Unterscharfiihrer (senior corporal), Oberscharfiihrer

(colour sergeant),

and

Hauptscharfiihrer (sergeantmajor).

V The bodies of some of the inhabitants of the village of Oradour-sur-Glane, near Limoges. On June 10, as apart of "Das Reich" Panzer Division was moving up towards Normandy, the villagers of Oradour, some 652 in all, were herded into the square and told that explosives had been reported in the village. The men were locked in barns and the women and children in the church, after which the Germans fired the village.

As

the

men

were machine gunned. The church was then tried to flee they

burned down and those inside machine gunned. It was later established that 245 women, 207

and 190 men had been Twenty S.S. men were condemned to death for the massacre after the war, and two children,

killed.

were hanged.

< Another

iiiiwHwiHi)— ii«iiiiiiiiii«iiwiniwii
victim.

Will

A *3 Troopers of the Legion "Wallonie", a unit of Belgian volunteers.


7.5-cm

of

an

PaK 40 anti-tank

S.S. division.

A A Men of an S.S. mountain unit watch as an armoured column passes by

in

February

1945.

A S.S. troops with a rubber assault boat in Finnish Karelia. > S.S. troopers move out from their trench to support an armoured

A>>

assault.

S.S. tank riders, a

copied from the Russians. A> Men of the Legion "Wallonie" return from the tactic

front.

>>

Terek Cossacks of the S.S.

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W

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Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Stalin's

Times Company from The Eden Memoirs by the Rt Hon. the Earl of Avon. C I960 The First and the Last: Holt. Rinehart and Winston. Inc. for The First and the Last by General Adolf Galland, C 1955. The Foxes of the Desert: E P Dutton & Company, Inc for The Foxes of the Desert by Paul

War 1941-1945 by

(

Englewood Cliffs, N.J. The Longest Day: Simon

Inc for The

Krieg in Europa: Verlag Kiepenheuer und Witsch for Krieg in Europa by General Friednch von Senger und

Brandt.

(Editors).

The Coast Watchers: Angus

Roosevelt and Hopkins: Harper & Row, Publishers. Inc., for Roosevelt and Hopkins by Robert E. Sherwood, O 1948 and 1950 by Robert E. Sherwood. Russia at War 1941 1945: E P Dutton & Company, Inc. for

Company, Inc., for the Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim by Marshal Mannerheim, translated by Count Eric Lewenhaupt, C 1954 E.P. Dutton & Company, Inc.

C 1947.

Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan by Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, C 1955 by The United States Naval Institute. 73 North: Peter Janson-Smith for 73 North by Dudley Pope,

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz for

Eric Feldt

The Eden Memoirs:

reprinted

by permission of The

New York

C I960

Dutton

in the

English

Mervyn

Savill by

& Company.

Inc.

Story of Naval Action in

Brace Jovanovich, Inc for excerpts from The Rommel Papers. 1953 by Captain Basil Liddell Hart. The Stilwell Papers: William

C

Morrow & Co

Inc. for The Stilwell Papers by General Joseph Stilwell. 1949.

C

The Turn of the

Tide: Collins Publishers for The Turn of the Tide by Sir Arthur Bryant. Top Secret: Ralph Ingersoll for

Top Secret by Ralph Ingersoll, published by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, C 1946.

Triumph

in the West: Collins Publishers for Triumph in the West by Sir Arthur Bryant.

World War II: Prentice-Hall, Inc for The Great Sea War: The Story of Naval Action in World

Knew

War

Patton,

II by E.B. Potter

and Fleet

,

War As Mifflin

Knew

It:

Company

for

It

Houghton War As I by General George S I

C

1947.

Picture acknowledgements The Publishers would

like to

thank the following individuals and organisations:

New York/Alan; Burch. York/Grunder; Burch, New York/Summers; Brigadier J.M. Burch,

Paul Dispatch; FN.D.I.R.P.; Fox

New

Photos;

Acme; A.D.A.G.P. Jean Carlu; Aeroplane; Agence France-

Camera Press/Holmes-Lebel; Camera Press/Peter Anderson; Camera

Presse; Aircam; Allied Archives;

Press/Tjiss;

American Review, New York; A.P.N.; Archives du Musee de

Old Comrades Association; The

Calvert;

Library; Belga;

Beltrame/Cornere della Sera; Dr Alexander Bernfes; Bettman;

Publications; Eric

Borchert/Entscheidende Stunden; Jim Bridge; B.P.C. Picture Library; Bulldog. New York; Bundesarchiv, Koblenz;

Press;

Robert

Capa/Magmam la

Guerre; Associated Press; Associated Press/Novosti; Archiv Gerstenberg; Atlantic Press Bilderdierst; Bulgaria. Sofia; Bapty; Barnaby's Picture

Bibliothek fiir Zeitgeschichte/Konrad Adenauer; Bibliotheque de Nanterre; Bibliotheque d'Histoire Contemporaine; Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris; Black Star; Richard Blin; Blitz

Camera

Photos; Chindit

Christian Science Monitor; The Commando Association; Conway Maritime Press; Conway Picture Library; Daily Express, London; Daily Mail, London; Daily Mirror; Evan Davies; Brian Davies; Rene Dazy; George Demetrius; Denver Post; Detroit

Deutsches Museum, Munich; DO. Enterprises; Documentation Franfaise; La Domenica de Corriere; Pierre Dubure; Ellice Howe; E.N. A.; Star;

Etablissement

Cinematographique et Photographique des Armees; Eugeni Sacchi Armourey, Milan Italian Museum; The Evening Standard; The Evening News; Farabola; Fitzpatrick/St.

EOT

Library; Aldo

Fraccaroli; France Libre. London; Fujiphotos; La Gazzetta de Popolo. Turin; Goteborg Hand Tidning. Gothenburg;

Harnssiadis; John Hillelson Agency; John Hillelson Agency Robert Capa; H.M.S.O

;

Holmes-Lebel; Robert Hunt II

Travaso. Rome; Imperial War Museum; International News Photos; Italian War Museum, Rovereto; Kansas City Star, Keystone; Kladderadatsch; Krokodil; Kukryniksy; Jean Lemaire; Henri Le Masson; Charles Lenars; Library of Congress; London Star; Lords Gallery, London; David Lublin; Lustige Blatter, Berlin; Magnum; Masami Takoi; Nicole Marchand; Marc Aurelio. Rome; J. McClancy; A. Mollo; Musee

des deux Guerres Mondiales, Pans; Musee de la Guerre. Vincennes; Musee de la Radio;

New York

Public Library; Novosti; Orbis/Alan Rees;

Orbis/David Goodman; Orbis;Colin Watson; Orbis; Orion

Historical Research Unit; Library; Idees et Editions;

National Archives; National

Maritime Museum; Nebelspatter, Rorschach; News Chronicle; New York News; New York Post;

Press; P. Peral-Ziolo;

Photoworld; Pictorial Press; P.M.. New York; The Polish

Underground Movement (1939-1945) Study Trust; Popperfoto; Press Association;

Psywar; Punch, London; Radio Times Hulton Picture Library; Rapho; La Razon, Buenos Aires;

Red Army Museum, Moscow/C.W. Reichenbach; Mathilde Rieussec; H.M. Rigby; R.N.A.S. Yeovilton by courtesy of the Wardroom Committee; Le Rire, Pans; George Rodger/John Hillelson Agency; George Foliot;

Rodger/Magnum Viollet;

Chronicle; S.A.S.; Saturday Evening Posi/Norman Rockwell;

Sette .Anni di Guerre; Signal;

Archbishop Mitty High School Media Center

5000

Mitty

Way

San Jose, CA 95129 2836

Photos; Roger-

San Francisco

Sikorski Institute; Simplicissimus; Snark International; Sondagnisse Strix,

Stockholm; Spink & Son Louis Star Times/D.

Ltd.; St.

Gardiner; Staatsbibliothek, Berlin; Stato Maggiore dell'Escercito Italiano; Angus Steele; Stuttgart Library; Suddeutscher Verlag; Syndication International; Pierre Tilley; Time and Tide; Tate Gallery; Time-Life Inc.;

Time-Life/Hugo Jaegar; The Times; John Topham/Popperfoto; Topix; Toronto Star. Toronto; TransoceanGesellschaft; UUstein; Ullstein/Paul Carell; UUstein/A. Grimm; Ullstein/Wolff und Tritschler; United Press; U.P.I. U.S. Air Force; U.S. Army; U.S. Army Signal Corps; U.S. Coast Guard; U.S.I.S.; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Manne Corps/R.H.L.; U.S. Navy; U.S. National Archives; ;

Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Wolff

und

Tritschler; Zeitgeschtliches Bildarchiv; Weiner Librarv.

\