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THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD VOLUME SEVEN 1916-17
««0BAv»'
$
"
THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD Editor-in-Chief Brigadier Peter
Young
Board Barker; Dr. John Bradley
Editorial
Lt.-Col. A. J.
Professor John Erickson; Lt.-Cdr. Peter
John Keegan; Kenneth Macksey; Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard;
S. L.
Kemp
Mayer
Norman Stone
Revision Editor
Mark Dartford Archbishop Mitty High Schoof Media Center 5000 Mitty Way San Jose. CA 95129
MARSHALL CAVENDISH NEW YORK, LONDON, TORONTO
Editorial Staff Young
Editor
Brigadier Peter
Deputy Editor
Kenneth Macksey
Co-ordinating Panel
Lt.-Col. A. J. Barker Dr. John Bradley Prof. John Erickson Lt.-Cdr. Peter Kemp
Reference Edition Published 1984 Published by Marshall Cavendish Corporation 147 West Merrick Road
Long
Freeport,
John Keegan S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard
Island
N.Y. 11520 Printed and
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in Italy
by L.E.G.O. S.p.a. Vicenza.
No part of this book may be reproduced or any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the copyright holders. All rights reserved. utilized in
Norman Stone '?'
Cl
Military Consultants
Capt. Sir Basil Liddell-Hart
Marshall Cavendish Limited 1984 B.P.C. Publishing 1970 now a Division of Macdonald and
Company
(Publishers) Limited/B.P.C.C.
Barrie Pitt
Executive Editor
Patrick Scrivenor
Assistant Editors
Chris Chant
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under
Carolyn Rutherford Bruce French Rose Thomson Margaret Burnley
The Marshall Cavendish encyclopedia of World War One. Bibliography: Includes index. 1.
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Peter
title:
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World War, 1914-1918— Chronology.
D522.5.M39
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86307 188 British Library
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Cataloguing
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940.3
Mark
D521
ISBN 0-86307-181-3
New
Marshall
in
Publication Data
The Marshall Cavendish illustrated encyclopedia of World War One. 1. World War, 1914-1918 II. Pitt, Barrie I. Young, Peter, 1915III.
Technical Artist
940.3
1984
ISBN 0-86307-181-3
Art Director
I.
Cavendish Corporation.
86307 188
(set)
vol
12881 Contents of Volume 7 1993 America Votes for Peace Charles E. Neu
2001
Thomas Woodrow Wilson
Arthur S. Link 2002 America's Armed Forces Martin Blumenson 2008 America's Choice: Guns or Butter?
Edward M. Coffman 2012 America Goes to Arthur S. Link
War
2021 The Nivelle Plan
John Keegan 2028 Retreat to the Siegfriedstellung
Leo Kahn 2038 The Fall of Bethmann-Hollweg H. W. Koch 2044 Trench Communications Charles Messenger
2049 Breakthrough at Arras Kenneth Macksey 2068 Canadian Onslaught at Vimy Richard Holmes 2076 A Canadian at Vimy
Gus Sivertz 2077 The Submarine War Germany
— First Round to
Vize-admiral Friedrich
2092 The Submarine
Ruge
War— A
U-Boat
Commander's View Ruge 2094 Jellicoe and the Convoy Controversy Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp Vize-admiral Friedrich
2101
War in the Baltic David Woodward Naval
2105 The Nivelle Offensive Jean Delmas 2115 The French Tank Force Richard M. Orgorkiewicz 2122 Bloody April D. B. Tubbs
2130 The Parachute Story Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Gould Lee 2133 The French Mutinies J.
B. Duroselle
2142 'Revolution' on the Western Front Count Nikolai Tolstoy
2146 Bullecourt Michael Dewar 2154 Czechoslovakia Otto Pick 2161 Strategic Bombing
Dr Douglas Robinson
2168 The Aces Thomas G. Miller Jr 2180 Meeting the Bombing Threat 2182 The Making of a Pilot C.
M. Chant
2189 The Battle of the Scarpe Captain A. D. Baker
—
2204 Pacifism Conscience on Trial Lord Fenner Brockway 2212 The Trial of Sir Roger Casement Patrick Scrivenor
2217 With the Red Baron Ernst Udet
2246 Greece Joins the Allies Michael Llewellyn Smith 2254 Salonika: Sarrail's Spring Offensive
Alan Palmer 2266 The Otranto Barrage Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp 2273 Tragedy at any Price: the Italian Trentino Offensive Kurt Peball
2282 Prelude to Passchendaele Major-General Anthony Farrar-
Hockley
2219 Aras from the Air William Bishop 2222 The Lone Hunter's Day Cecil Lewis 2226 Death of an Ace Rothesay Stuart- Wortley
2294 Passchendaele
2232 Camel Scrap Norman Macmillan
2312 Naval Aviation Captain Donald Macintyre 2318 East Africa 1917
2234 The Silent Raid 2238 Bombs by Night Paul Bewsher 2242 The Calculating Ace
Rene Fonck
John Keegan 2301 The Dover Patrol Paul Kennedy 2308 The Eclipse of the Q-Ships Bryan McLean Ranft
Major R. Sibley 2324 L 59— The First Inter-Continental Flight
Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Skrine
1917 JAN
British rail
31
and water
Germans announce from February
lines to
Rafah complete.
unrestricted submarine warfare
1.
FEB
24
British retake Kut.
MAR
11
British
12
Russian revolution begins, Czar resigns.
26
1st
APR
MAY
occupy Baghdad.
Battle of Gaza.
6
U.S. declares war on Germany.
9
Battle of Arras.
Vimy Ridge
taken.
16
2nd Battle of the Aisne, Nivelle offensive.
17
2nd Battle of Gaza.
29
Mutinies
15
Petain replaces Nivelle as French Commander-inChief.
JUN
among French Army.
Allenby takes
command
of the British forces
in
Palestine.
7
22
Battle of Messines Ridge.
King Constantine of Greece abdicates. Venizelos takes over.
25
JUL
OCT
NOV
American
soldiers reach France.
1
Russian offensive
2
Greece declares war on the Central Powers.
in Galicia.
31
3rd Battle of Ypres.
24
Battle of Caporetto (12th Battle of Isonzo).
31
Beersheba taken by British forces.
6
Bolsheviks take over in Russia. 3rd Battle of Ypres ends. Canadians take Passchendaele Ridge.
7
British win 3rd Battle of Gaza. Supreme Allied Council formed.
20
DEC
1st
7
9
Battle of
War
Cambrai.
U.S. declares war on Austria-Hungary.
Romania
signs armistice with
Germany.
British take
Jerusalem. 22
Trotsky begins peace negotiations
at
Brest-Litovsk. .
cN^P
Ttt*
November 1916 saw a
vital presidential election in the United States:
by the third year of the world war the actions of the major belligerents were straining American neutrality and the electorate was coming under
7"HAN
great pressure to choose between war and peace. Charles E. Neu. Left/right: Campaign buttons for the candidates
Wilson and Hughes
President Woodrow Wilson and his advisers faced the presidential campaign of 1916 with grave forebodings. Elected in 1912 with only 42% of the popular vote, Wilson was the first Democrat in the White House since Grover Cleveland's triumph in 1888. He inherited a weak, disunited party, one
neutral commerce, but he drew a sharp distinction between attacks on property as opposed to attacks on human life. Wilson placed the German U-Boat campaign in a separate category and refused to link his claims against Germany with those against Great Britain. As long as Germany refused to impose the rules of cruiser
for too long.
warfare
which had been without power Many prominent Republicans felt, as former President William Howard Taft put it, that the Democrats represented 'the organised incompetency' of the nation. During his first four years in office
Wilson had laboured to transform his party and its image. Capitalising upon ample majorities in both the House and the Senate and upon the eagerness of Democratic leaders to prove their effectiveness, he imposed unity and direction upon a fragmented organisation. The results in 1913 and 1914 were a series of outstanding legislative achievements, including tariff reduction, banking and currency reform, anti-trust legislation and a new commission regulating business enterprise. Wilson's ideological scruples prevented his advocacy of more advanced progressive programmes such as rural credits and the regulation of child labour. He had, nonetheless, proved that the Democratic Party could rule the nation and had become the foremost spokesman for progressive reform. Wilson's eloquence, his moral fervour and his faith in democracy awed many Americans. Despite domestic successes, however, the Democrats did poorly in the 1914 congressional elections and it was by no means certain that Wilson could overcome the traditional Republican majority in November 1916. Wilson's record in foreign affairs further clouded his political future. He
took office determined to break with what seemed the materialistic and selfish policies of his Republican predecessors. But Wilson lacked experience in foreign policy and found it difficult to translate his exalted ideals into effective action. His frequent interventions in the Caribbean — largely a continuation of Republican policy — aroused little opposition. In dealing with Mexico, however, Wilson encountered endless complexities. Unable, like most Americans, to comprehend the profound revolutionary upheaval in that nation, Wilson drove an unsavoury dictator, General Victoriano Huerta, from office, only to be caught in the baffling crosscurrents of the revolution. So, too, were Americans who lived and worked in Mexico. The vari-
upon
its
U-Boat
commanders,
successive crises were sure to come. Beginning with the sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915 German-American relations were in a state of constant tension, punctuated by demands and counter-demands. Many questions about the acceptable limits of U-Boat warfare remained unsolved when in March 1916 the French channel steamer Sussex was torpedoed.
ous Mexican governments lacked the strength to protect them, and Wilson came to feel increasingly that, despite the
dam-
age to American interests, 'Mexico must struggle through long processes of blood and terror before she finds herself and returns to the paths of peace and order.' Powerful groups in the United States criticised Wilson's patience with Mexico bitterly. For a time in the spring and early summer of 1916 it looked as if Wilson's critics would be vindicated. Pancho Villa's raid on Columbus, New Mexico, created an uproar in the United States, one which forced Wilson to act. Soon General John J. Pershing led 6,000 troops into Mexico in a futile search for Villa and his raiders. Though Wilson's decisiveness temporarily disarmed his Republican critics, it created inevitable tensions with the Mexican government. In late June the two nations stood at the brink of war, but Wilson and President Carranza were able to agree on a mixed Mexican/American commission which began meetings in New London, Connecticut on September 6, 1916.
A major diplomatic victory The situation in Mexico, then, was
a major
preoccupation of the Wilson administration and its critics throughout 1916. But the issues stemming from the First World War drew even more heavily upon the energy and ingenuity of the President. From the start of the war Wilson had grappled with the problems of applying traditional concepts of neutrality to the new conGradually certain ditions of warfare. clear lines of policy emerged. The President objected to British restrictions upon
Four Americans were injured. Now Wilson insisted that U-Boats follow the traditional rules of visit and search in attacking belligerent passenger liners and merchantmen. Much to Wilson's surprise, Germany agreed to these strict terms and temporarily suspended U-Boat operations. Despite the truculent tone and conditional nature of the German reply, Wilson had won a major diplomatic victory, one which contributed to an increasing sense of national power and pride. It was a victory which also solidified his domestic political base. Wilson's policy of firmness and patience towards Germany had always been a mixture of deeply-felt principles and sensitivity to domestic political currents. Attacked by both interventionists and pacifists, he had to steer a tenuous middle course, always conscious of maintaining both peace and the nation's honour. The difficulties of Wilson's position were illustrated by congressional revolts against his leadership in the early months 1916. Before Congress convened it seemed that the popular drift was toward chauvinism; afterwards Wilson found himself engaged in an emotional struggle over military preparedness with agrarian radicals, pacifist progressives and socialists. Soon after the First World War began, eastern conservatives, fearful that the United States might eventually be drawn in, initiated a campaign to strengthen the nation's military and naval forces. Wilson dismissed this early agitation for preparedness as 'good mental exercise', but after the Lusitania crisis in May 1915 the possibility of involvement seemed far greater of
and many Americans became concerned about the nation's weakness. Republicans threatened to dominate the whole move-
1993
j
]
]
i
J
ment. Sensing the political danger, Wilson also realised the precariousness of American neutrality and the need for measures which would ensure the nation's security. In the mid-summer of 1915 he began to reverse his earlier position and in early November presented a moderate preparedness programme to the nation. Opposition soon began to mount, particularly in the
west and south where the prewar peace its deepest roots. In these regions many Americans were suspicious of eastern financiers and of European nations and looked to Wilson's former Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, for leadership. Bryan had resigned in June 1915 because of the strength of Wilson's Lusitania notes. He preferred to see the nation endure almost any humiliation rather than be involved in the war. Like those who followed him, Bryan possessed a passive sense of the nation's mission, believing that American
movement had made
principles would one day triumph through a kind of radiance. 'America,' Bryan once remarked, 'shakes thrones and dissolves aristocracies by its silent example and gives light and inspiration to those who sit in darkness.' His crusade against preparedness indicated the strength of pacifist feeling and threatened Democratic unity.
The nadir of Wilson's power By early 1916 congressional opposition to preparedness became so intense that the President temporarily lost control of the House. His own majority leader joined the revolt. Attempting to break the stalemate, Wilson embarked on a westward tour to create national enthusiasm for his proposals. This strategy failed, and in February 1916 he accepted the resignation of his Secretary of War and abandoned a part of his programme to appease the foes of preparedness. The legislation which eventually passed the Congress created bitter disappointment among many preparedness advocates. It authorised huge naval increases but raised the size of the regular army to only slightly under 220,000 men. The struggle over preparedness was one sign of the strength of neutralist feeling in the Congress and nation. Another materialised in February when many House and Senate Democrats became alarmed by the danger of a confrontation with Germany over the right of Americans to travel on armed belligerent vessels. Representative Jeff McLemore of Texas and Senator Thomas P. Gore of Oklahoma introduced resolutions to keep Americans off these ships. Confronted with a serious challenge to his leadership, Wilson had to employ all of his presidential powers to smash the revolt. It seemed possible that a major crisis might swing a large body of public opinion not from neutralism to nationalism but from neutralism to pacifism. The uncer-
tainties of public opinion
made
it all
the
more necessary for Wilson to evolve poliwhich would coalesce a large group of moderate Americans behind them. But it was difficult to strike a balance which would isolate extremists on both ends of cies
the political spectrum. By the early summer of 1916 it seemed that the President had succeeded in doing just this. Compromises on preparedness, along with the Sussex victory, satisfied many pacifists within his own party. Moreover, Germany's concessions had demonstrated the effectiveness of Wilson's policy
1994
and weakened critics who attacked his vacillation and dilatoriness. The President seemed more confident of victory than
November. In the summer of 1916 he successfully committed his administration to a series of progressive measures, in-
earlier in the year despite the uncertainties of the forthcoming campaign. In firm control of his party and encouraged by his triumph in the Sussex crisis, Wilson moved to strengthen his hold upon the peace vote in a speech before the League to
cluding Federal Farm Loan Banks, a child labour law, a model workingmen's compensation law for federal employees, and a measure providing substantial autonomy for the Philippine Islands. In August, when faced with the possibility of a railway strike, the President boldly intervened. Failing in his mediation attempts between the Railway Brotherhoods and their employers, Wilson pushed through the Congress a law imposing an eight-hour day upon the railroad industry. Swiftly and shrewdly Wilson had given special concessions to farmers, organised labour and independent progressives. He also sought to ensure businessmen of his desire to co-operate and pushed a series of pro-business measures through the Congress to prove his point. By the end of the summer the President was weary from his intensive labours, but he had forged a coalition based upon progressivism and peace that might, with good fortune, achieve victory in November. Partisan animosity among Republicans toward the Wilson Administration had grown intense well before 1916. Accustomed to two decades of national rule, it was only natural that Republican leaders should feel hostility toward a new Democratic administration, particularly one so dominated by southerners. Conservative Republicans such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and former Secretary of State Elihu Root objected to much of Wilson's domestic programme. It was the President's foreign policy, however, which aroused the deepest Republican anger. Where Wilson saw firmness and patience, Republicans saw weakness and vacillation. Few possessed Wilson's sympathy for Mexico's troubles or his willingness to sustain prolonged negotiations with Germany. Theodore Roosevelt was particularly bellicose. He wanted American intervention in the war to preserve Anglo-French hegemony over Europe. His savageness toward Wilson, whom he described as an physically 'astute, unprincipled and cowardly demagogue', knew few bounds.
Enforce Peace on May 27. The President declared that 'we are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world', and urged the American people to join a universal association of nations after the end of the war. Wilson was concerned both with an expanded world role for the United States and with the domestic unity of the American people. Conscious of the large
number
of recent
immigrants and their
emotional attachment to one or another of the belligerents, he feared a domestic divisiveness so deep that it would paralyse the nation's diplomacy. The corollary, tnen, of service to the world was American unity of thought and action. Thus Wilson planned to make the key plank of the Democratic Party platform and the key theme of the Democratic convention 'the fine gold of untainted Americanism'. When the Democrats met in St Louis, Missouri, on June 14 the delegates dutifully sang 'The Star-Spangled Banner' and 'America', while President Wilson, back in Washington, led a huge Flag Day parade. It was, however, appeals for peace, not for Americanism, which drove the delegates into frenzied demonstrations. In delivering the keynote address, former governor Martin H. Glynn of New York cited a series of historical precedents justifying Wilson's patience and restraint. Glynn attempted to pass on to another subject, only to find that the delegates would not let him. Sensing the extraordinary excitement of his audience, Glynn backtracked and listed case after case in which the United States had refused under provocation to go to war. Each time the convention would roar, 'What did we do? What did we do'? And Glynn would shout back, 'We didn't go to war, we didn't go to war'. As the great demonstration continued there could be no question but that the delegates had expressed what would become the central theme of the campaign. As if to remove any doubt of the convention's mood, the next day Senator Ollie M. James of Kentucky, in his address as permanent chairman, aroused the convention to new emotional heights when he claimed that President Wilson, 'without orphaning a single American child, without widowing a single American mother, without firing a single gun, without the shedding of a single drop of blood [had] wrung from the most militant spirit that ever brooded above a battlefield an acknow-
ledgement of American rights and an agreement to American demands'. The strength of the pacifist upheaval alarmed some party professionals; most shrewdly acquiesced and soon the phrase 'He kept us out of war' appeared in the platform. \
Progressivism and peace Wilson and his advisers realised that their peace appeal would draw into the Democratic ranks many who had followed Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Party in 1912. Given the minority status of the Democratic Party, more support was needed to carry Wilson to victory in
The immediate reaction (right) to the torpedoing of the Sussex in March 1916 when four Americans were injured, and a later reaction (above) to Wilson's careful diplomacy. The electorate was enraged at America's powerlessness (short of declaring war) in the faceof such provocations
i
,
PACES
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FROM
11
EDITION
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OR.
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* JUJEliCUS M IMtl TIE tttta
LIST
CANYON;
ON
NEAR CAPTURE
AXM1TACI.
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BY V1LLISTAS
Sachs
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D. Htm r-*.
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BALDWIN MKS.
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BY SUBMARINE
.
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Off Chance to Reach
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TO REPORT
FAIL
= AFTER AHACK
TRAM SHOT UP iimpbiack
* TBICE FIVE CENTS.
ON SUSSEX MISSING
U.S.
BARES
HQUIRY
VOILDSCiHTEST HEWSfAPSl .MARCH 20. 101G.
TBI
DeatB List Mat Total 50;
MWrn An
Four
the Mountains.
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Carranza Troops Save a
*.
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r«ra
Box
CIS GOOD WORKERS.
Car
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BAND SPLIT
of
HAMDL. COMA S.. »_ f«i HAMDt\ ULUAM D 5^ *—
IN FLIGHT.
imu. u>«4. *«.
Americans. nit lampblack
I
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-
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of
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th*
in
,
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in sraaob-
<<
Tub Tmei *e from Dr
Tha
'
bandits
sighted
by
Alhmmr,
HUXLEY,
IDWAttD H
Nmm
EDWARD
HAKSHALL.
Juvenile Theater
••a *ad
i
om
full
"
PLJN RELIEF SHIP TO GO AFTER LIEUT. SHACKLET0N.
TaurtBB Raad it. It af tiwialr infarmalien and
tha flavor of •prtnf aod tb* pint of tha op«B read. i
to
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PVo«a«*«-.
WAHKEX. CCXTKUDE W.
El,.. or.
St.
March 13
man
•
fmni tinder Can.
Mlfferlns.
-anitar
admitted to Hi"
'
.
B
-fj,.a*i-l
la
awtt
l**tr
that at kaaai
jou* l*tl: ill DXAt TV* dlaappcaLrajKc «f twaaw -a-cT tkw
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or
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toowa Cr««-»if-
was aoaX j efriaj a .r— faaara aad periaSwd waaw Ja
—«
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r. M. a.
rSaKarcs
raw
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Tn '» w 'b« first word that the Matias Ramos, who! An ric -"Ri-fd wu ell left San Padro immediately upon . 10 the VlllUta* -nd rrpuMi of .. . . a la ruvfrrrni-c I', nil If prnairffflve ,_ F '* ** learning the wires had been cot . .twila <* lb* wnlllai liar, " hrrnufe figbtiag were expntcd momeoBandit* are becoming more ag •*<• frVn.l "1.1 Dr CoOD Unly. section following "1 at wu ordered to admit the mas bf gmalv_ In th. tha arrival of courier* from Villa nr K,n » tba raadan here to Imitate IAjTCB n
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were sdlcd br rbe bUal or drwwaW lb • lea-ruflf lo ul'i j la iifrOoali aod oe ratta.
Sl
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waasssi
h*w suBj
but
h«mr i«ads«r
flftr
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^
fKMICIS.
HILTON, LDNA *.. Www raw*. HILTOH, DOROTHY (K, *«-
|
compelled to mors slowly. Tha attack of tha bandit* was foiled by tha prompt arrival of cavalry
ihp diselnMirei r*T*al*d
Htvkineltiallne, lnfn rael »r
other banda,
roa
f.
iV.
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rrcnlarlj cer-
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aarrke rmpLijCu.
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ifl.Niion
There was no fighting between' with a Urge tba bandiU and the United State* who rode force*, but tha Cirnniuui had for aararal ml lee from two brashes with
CARRANZA CAVALRY TO THE RESCUE.
Bin. •
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«,
.
tha train engaged
bandits
of
rubi '
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* running
,n
r. y«,
c.
cjtociCayt, c.
Carraiulatas near Namiquipa today got their first ughl of Vi|-
by a barrier of
iEJf.fi M
latnau
kaowa
[wftij-iir
W,
T.
^ i
to Santo Nino, wires porta to Gen. Pershing's hesdwere cot on both aide* and at- quarlen stated. Dr. ItobcrtMXM The pursuit was Tr-tlnten- was tempt* nude to bum the bridge*. continued in a snow storm.
ttsv anptrrollj, for
oat *»'*** Oian
car, protected
Tha guard oa number
health
BobartaoD,
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aBBX.
tad oa tha floor of a
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seariBBrtraUo*.
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to
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Mexico, via radio
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fj. ||., March **»*«*> «>»ny Uier., puMd 25. American troops engaged in ihrodgh ban tooif ht Tha wornan encompassing movement with
m^J^j^Z^J^TT. tK-r«*i
H. D. JACOB! roraw.p..e*.i
r^_
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Monterey, Mexico, Mirth 25.— A .p-U. ,,.0. T.rre... i. J Tbeodotw brittgiaf n>l» Wftmn .wr.nt.vn and *~A children _* of
rwoll of ao rnTtwrtcatlon Id Mail of tbo muror mad* by in. eitj if tbe
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naltiaa.
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Records Smashed
All
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THE LOSS OF THE
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MR CHARLES KLEIN. ADAPTER OF "POTASH AND PERLMUTTER FOR THE ENGLISH STAGE (MISSING'. COMMANDER J. FOSTER STACKHOUSE. ANTARCTIC
9.
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3 4.
EXPLORER (MISSING). MRS STEWART MASON (MISSING!. MR O. L. F. VERNON BROTHER IN LAW TO MISS RITA JOLIVF.T IMISS1NG).
5
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SIR HUGH LANE. THE FAMOUS ARTEXPERT IM ISSINOI. MISS KATHLEEN KAYE. WHO HELPED HOW A BOAT ISAVF.Dl.
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MISS HELEN SMITH ISAVED). MISS RITA JOLIVET. THE POPULAR ACTRESS (SAVED!.
10.
11. 12.
13 14.
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'
LUSITANIA". SAVED
OLIVER P BERNARD. SCENIC ARTIST, COVENT GARDEN OPERA (SAVEDI. MR ALFRED G VANDERBILT. THE AMERICAN MILLIONAIRE SPORTSMAN (MISSING! MR J. G COLFBROOK (SAVEDI. LADY MACKWORTH. IIAUGHTKR OF MR D A THOMAS (SAVED!. CAPTAIN TURNER. OF THE 'LUSITANIA' (SAVEDI MR CHARLES FROHMAN. THE WELL- KNOWN AMERICAN THEATRICAL MANAGER (LOST). MME PAPPADOPOULO (SAVEDI. MR E. M. COLLIN. MRS WOLFENDEN, MRS PLANK. MRS. LOHDEN. ELSIE l.OHDEN. MR F J Mil. FORD (SAVED) MR.
AND
MISSING.
17
MR JULIAN D AYALA. CONSUL GFNFRAI. FOR CUBA
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19
20
WELL KNOWN AMERICAN
FATHER MATUHIN A FAMOl S I'HI ACIIIH (IHIIA.MIi IN I89K BY CARDINAL VAUGHAN (MISSING! LADY ALLAN ISAVED HER TWO DAI us ARE MISSING!.
MH JACK ROPER. ONE OF THE CHEW WHO SAVED CAPTAIN TURNEH iSAVEDl K MH D A THOMAS. THE WELL KNOWN COAL OWM M
21.
(SAVEDI
Other prominent Republicans also conPresident. Lodge remarked that: 'I never expected to hate anyone in politics with the hatred I feel towards Wilson.' Taft, more sympathetic to Wilson's policy of neutrality than any other prominent Republican, came to feel that Wilson was 'perfectly ruthless and unscrupulous' and that the nation faced 'the most critical election we have had in half
demned the
a century'.
Republicans desperately wanted to deBut the wounds created by Roosevelt's bolt from the party in 1912 were healing slowly. Party professionals would not forgive Roosevelt for that act and were determined to deny him the nomination. They sensed, moreover, that his extreme position on the war would cost feat Wilson.
the party too many votes in November. A majority of Republican representatives had voted to keep Americans off belligerent ships. A series of elections in the spring of 1916 dramatically revealed anti-interventionist sentiment in the rank and file. Roosevelt wanted the nomination but would not suppress his own beliefs to win Driven by psychic demons he could it. not control, he had lost the political mastery of his presidential years. 'It would be a mistake to nominate me,' he wrote, 'unless the country has in its mood something of the heroic' Roosevelt did hope, however, to use the remnants of his Progressive Party to influence the choice of the Republican convention. Even here he failed, for he wanted victory too badly to threaten another third-party race. He had, therefore, little influence over the professionals who dominated the convention. Nor did he handle the Progressive Party wisely. As party professionals searched for a candidate, it became clear that anyone too closely associated with the split of 1912, such as William Howard Taft or Elihu Root, would not do. A variety of 'favourite sons', such as Senator Theodore E. Burton of Ohio, lacked the distinction to challenge Wilson. Many turned to a man who had been inactive in politics for six years, Supreme Court Justice Charles Evans Hughes. He was the only candidate who could bind together the party, win the election and end Wilson's blundering foreign policy. By the time of the Republican convention in Chicago, few doubted that Hughes would accept the nomination if given it. He won easily on the third ballot. Hughes was a formidable opponent. Rising to the top of the New York legal profession, he served as chief counsel for investigations into the utilities industry and the great life insurance companies. His methods of investigation were so bold and his findings so spectacular that he quickly
achieved political prominence. Repeatedly he appealed to the people, believing that, if only they understood the issues involved, they would rise to support his programmes. Hughes had so much in common with Wilson that it was difficult to establish a clear identity as a candidate. Both were
<]
Since the loss
of the Lusitania in
German-American
May 1915
relations were in a state of constant tension, reaching nearly breaking point with the Sussex crisis when Wilson scored a major diplomatic victory in getting the Germans to agree to the traditional rules of visit and search Shown here is a full page from the Illustrated London News, May 1915. American citizens are shown in colour
'
BOtt/*
BERLIN'S CANDIDATE. A cartoon
isolating
two
of the issues in the
campaign- Hughes's Dominant Americanism and
his
appeal to the hyphenated' (foreign-born) voters- and labelling Hughes as pro-German
sons of clergymen who had risen to the pinnacles of their respective professions before entering politics. Both were men of great intelligence and integrity who, as reform governors, had fought for progressive measures against entrenched political machines. Both, too, were men of vision and idealism who foresaw that America must participate more actively in world affairs. Hughes agreed with most of Wilson's domestic reforms and largely attacked the administration's record in foreign policy.
Here too, however, Wilson's position was strong. Hughes effectively criticised the President's sluggish conversion to military preparedness, but he was reluctant to be too specific in his comments on Wilson's policy toward the European belligerents. Both Hughes and the party managers were eager to court the vote of the 'hyphenated' Americans, particularly that of GermanAmericans. Criticism of Wilson's vacillaface of German aggression this purpose. More importantly, Hughes did not wish to limit his freedom of action as President. He did, however, feel that Wilson's foreign policy had been indecisive and that the President, through his neglect of preparedness, had encouraged the violation of American tion
in
the
would defeat
rights.
Yet from whatever angle he
criti-
cised the President's policies he inevitably appeared as the champion of measures which might lead to war.
Hughes began a vigorous, well-financed campaign in July but soon ran into a sea of troubles. He seemed unable to hit his stride, and began to grope for telling issues.
He
talked about Wilson's mistakes in Mexico, the consequences of his tardy advocacy of preparedness and his unprincipled sellout to organised labour in the railway
many of Hughes' friends were disappointed by his frequent preoccupation with secondary issues and his dispute. But even
excessive negativism, by his inability to develop a compelling vision in either foreign or domestic affairs. Moreover, Hughes' campaign was beset by factional disputes within the Republican Party. Caught between reformers and the old guard, Hughes could not advocate a programme without bold progressive offending powerful conservative and business leaders. Nor could he criticise effectively Wilson's neutrality policies without alienating influential German-American groups. His troubles wore exacerbated by the behaviour of Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt was far less interested in aiding Hughes than in striking out at various opponents. He denounced 'hyphenates', called for universal military training and implied that the United States should have gone to war over the sinking of the Lusitania. Hughes could only privately disapprove of Roosevelt's extreme rhetoric, for he needed to capitalise upon the former President's still potent appeal. But the
1
997
1
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*
more Roosevelt talked the more the Demobranded Hughes as a war candidate. Both the President and his advisers re-
crats
alised that the peace fever sweeping the country provided the main theme for their campaign. At Shadow Lawn on September 30 Wilson labelled the Republican Party the war party and predicted that its success would inevitably draw the United States into the European war and into fullscale military intervention in Mexico. Democrats incessantly exploited the peace issue. Throughout the west, where peace sentiment ran strong and women were voting in a Presidential election for the first time, Wilson's managers claimed that the election of Hughes meant war. William Jennings Bryan toured the west, proclaim-
Far left: Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Conserand strong critic of Wilson's
vative Republican
Left: The pugnacious and Teddy Roosevelt. His boisterous speeches were soon to be used against the Republicans to brand Hughes as a war candidate. He labelled Wilson as an 'astute, unprincipled and physically cowardly demagogue'. Above: Thomas Woodrow Wilson, the Demo-
domestic programme. patriotic
tm
ass*
cratic Party's 'peace with honour' candidate. Opposite top: A campaign poster details the
Progressive measures which Wilson shrewdly put through Congress in summer 1916, forging a coalition based on progressivism and peace. Opposite right: Former Secretary of State Elihu Root, one of the most prominent and influential of the Republicans. Opposite far left: The mercurial Democratic orator William Jennings Bryan; he toured the west proclaiming that Wilson would keep America out of the war
\
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t
ing that Wilson would continue to keep the nation out of war. The President himself implied as much in his speeches. In part, changes in Wilson's own feelings about the war justified, in his own mind, this peace rhetoric. For a long time Wilson had sympathised with the Allied cause and had allowed his policy of neutrality to reflect this sympathy. By the summer of 1916, however, tension between the United States and Britain had increased. Britain's rejection of Wilson's pro-Allied mediation effort, along with British interference with American mails and British blacklisting of American firms trading with Germany, had all created intense disillusionment and hostility in Washington. Late in the summer Wilson secured from the
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might disintegrate
at
any moment.
German espionage States
activities in the United continued to create friction, and
Wilson was quite aware of the U-Boat agitation in
Germany. As the campaign
drew
to a close ominous news came from Berlin. In mid-October the German govern-
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determined, once the campaign ended, to launch an independent mediation effort which might precipitate a crisis in AngloAmerican relations. Wilson's growing impartiality intensified his desire to avoid American involvement in the war. In the autumn of 1916 Wilson could hardly forget, however, that relations with Germany, though less tense than pre-
ment urged Wilson to make a peace move and warned that Germany would soon re-
PROSPERITY PEACE UNO
GREAT
Congress legislation authorising economic retaliation against the Allies, and he was
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Above: Wilson's women's wagon distributes campaign buttons, October 12, 1916 Opposite top: The results of the presidential election, November 1916. Wilson wins, but only narrowly because Hughes carries all of those states with a large immigrant hyphenated vote — and these are America's most populous states
Opposite below: Thomas portrait by Sir William
gain fare.
Boat
Woodrow
Wilson, a
Orpen
freedom of action in U-Boat warAt the same time it began a new U-
its
torpedoing numerous Allied Though the sinkings were all
effort,
vessels.
within the limits of cruiser warfare, American lives were lost and Wilson could not help but ponder the possibilities of a victory by U-Boat extremists. Wilson knew that, after the Sussex crisis, American prestige was bound up more than ever with holding Germany to its pledges. On the other hand, he was deeply affected by the fervent desire of the American people for peace and, for a time, his own views seemed to change. On November 2 he informed his intimate adviser, Colonel Edward M. House, that T do not believe the American people would wish to go to war no matter
how many Americans were
lost at sea.'
This proved to be a passing mood, for the campaign was hardly over before Wilson talked of the need for a new peace move to prevent an otherwise inevitable drift into war with Germany. He realised that the nation must uphold its neutral rights if it was to play a larger role in world affairs and have a hand in shaping the eventual peace settlement. Democratic hopes were high during the final weeks of the campaign. There had been a steady accession of independent
2000
newspapers,
periodicals
and
of
former
Progressive Party leaders to Wilson's banner. It was also clear that Wilson would be strong among organised labour and farmers and would benefit generally from wartime prosperity. The President had played upon nationalist sentiment by scorning the hyphenated vote. Hughes, on the other hand, had been hurt by the support he received from German-American and Irish-American organisations and the many other weaknesses of his campaign. But doubts about victory still remained in the minds of the President and his advisers. Hughes had a traditional Republican majority to draw upon, along with a well-financed campaign. He was obviously leading in the east. For a time it looked as if Wilson's fears were well-founded. By the evening of election day, November 7, it was evident that Hughes had carried the east. In Times Square a sign flashed the news of a great Hughes victory and some newspapers headlined his election. Gloom pervaded Democratic headquarters. Hughes went to bed
thinking it probable that he would be the next President. By the next day the tide began to turn as returns filtered in from the west and Wilson carried normally Republican states such as Kansas and Utah. Another anxious day followed, but by the evening of November 9 the outcome was certain. Wilson won 9,129,606 popular and 277 electoral votes; Hughes 8,638,221 popular and 254 electoral votes. Everywhere the President ran ahead of his party in a great personal triumph. It was the closest presidential election since the Cleveland-Harrison race of 1888. Wilson carried New Hampshire by 56
New Mexico by 2,530; North Dakota by 1,725; and California by 3,773. Though the Wilson coalition attracted significant urban support in the north-east, the President won because of his sweep of the south and west. Wilson had united a broad spectrum of progressives and had attracted women, organised labour, farmers and socialists to his cause. The combination of peace, progressivism and prosperity proved irresistible, even to many GermanAmericans. Wilson was elated with the outcome but further burdened with the responsibility of victory. He was committed more deeply than ever before to keeping the nation at peace; yet he perceived more clearly than ever before the precariousness of America's neutrality. votes;
Further Reading Baker, R. S., and Dodd, W. E., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy, two vols. (Harper& Brothers 1926) Burner, D., The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918-1932 (Alfred A. Knopf 1968) Harbaugh, W. H., Power and Responsibility: The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (Farrar, Strauss & Cudahy 1961)
Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1 91 6-1 91 7 (Princeton University Press 1965) Link, A. S., Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-191 7 (HarperS Brothers 1954) Moos, M., The Republicans: A History of Their Party (Random House 1956) Pringle, H. F., The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (Farrar & Rinehart 1939) Pusey, M. J Charles Evans Hughes, two vols. (Macmillan 1952) Link, A. S., Wilson:
,
\For
Charles
p. 1227.]
E.
Neu's
biography,
see
SQO OOO I
GERMAN AUSTRO HUNGARIAN
I
IRISH
BRITISH ITALIAN 400 000 I
The presidential election closest since 1888.
was
of 1916. the
'J00
CANADIAN SCANDINAVIAN
ooo
a peace' election.
Wilson's winning combination of peace. progressivism and prosperity
made
a
broad sweep of the South and West, and attracted significant urban support in the
North East. But
it
was
in this last
area.
containing the most populous states, that
the Republican Hughes did best His strong line against the Allies found favour with the
li
hyphenate' immigrant voters
who were most
thickly on the ground
there
America's 10.300.000
foreign-born
of in
1900. 6 300,000 lived
in
shown on the tight, and these states swung to Hughes.
the seven states all of
11
l.lulli
Minnesota
Numbers
Illinois
of
Mi
Wisconsin
Mid Michigan
immigrants
in
iimiM Pennsylvania
New
York
Massachusetts
1900
NEW HAMPSHIRE
4
VERMONT* RHODE ISLAND
— CONNECTICUT?
— NEW JERSEY DELAWARE
5
14
3
MARYLAND I WEST VIRGINIA HUGHES7 WILSON
1
1916 ELECTION
ELECTORAL VOTE
CJ
S31
WILSON 277
DEMOCRAT HUGHES 254 REPUBLICAN
US
STATES WITH HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF IMMIGRANTS
Presidential Election 1916
in
1886, Jessie
Woodrow
in
1887, and
Eleanor Randolph in 1889. Mrs Wilson died on August 6, 1914, and Wilson married Edith Boiling Gait on December 18, 1915. Wilson abandoned law practice after a year and studied political science, history, and economics at The Johns Hopkins University, from which he received the PhD degree in 1886. His doctoral dissertation, Congressional Government (1885), was also his most famous book. From 1885 to 1888, Wilson taught at Bryn Mawr College, and from 1888 to 1890 at Wesleyan University. In 1889 he published The State, the first textbook in comparative government in any language. Returning to Princeton in 1890 as Professor of Jurisprudence, he was
Thomas Woodrow Wilson, 28th President of the United States, was born at Staunton, Virginia, on December 29, 1856, the son of
Janet Woodrow Wilson and the Reverend Dr -Joseph Ruggles Wilson, a noted Presbyterian minister and theology professor. Woodrow Wilson grew up in Augusta, Georgia, and Columbia, S.C., and attended Princeton University from 1875 to 1879. There he exhibited many of the traits that were to characterise him in later life — precocity, a passion for debate, remarkable self-discipline, capacity for hard work, and deep religious faith. After studying law at the University of Virginia, Wilson opened an office in Atlanta, Georgia in 1883. There he fell in love with Ellen Louise Axson of Rome, Georgia. They were married in June 1885 and had three daughters — Margaret
able to concentrate his course work in jurisprudence, public law, constitutional law, and the history of law, and his work in these fields made him one of the leading legal publicists of the time. In the 1890's he also turned to historical writing, publishing a history of the United States from 1829 to 1889, in 1893; a biography of Washington in 1896; and the five-volume History of the American People in 1902. Wilson was elected President of Princeton in 1902 and within a few years transformed that institution from a somewhat
rundown college under clerical domination into a modern secular university. In the spring of 1906, he suffered a severe stroke that gravely affected his personality and leadership. For example, he fell into a bitter personal controversy with the Dean of the Graduate School over the location of a residential graduate college. Afflicted
by new strokes, Wilson fumbled and lost his leadership. In the spring of 1910, the trustees approved the Dean's proposal after
he had secured a large bequest for the graduate college. Wilson had meantime emerged as a prominent political speaker and publicist. Nominated for the governorship of New Jersey on the Democratic ticket in 1910, he won the governorship by a large majority. Success in New Jersey made Wilson a national figure, and he won the Democratic presidential nomination in 1912 and the presidency itself later that year. Inaugurated on March 4, 1913, Wilson set to work to reconstruct the political economy of the United States. His success in domestic reform was a significant reason for his re-election in 1916. However, the Germans forced the United States into the war on the Allied side on April 6, 1917, by
launching an all-out submarine campaign against American, as well as other, shipping. Wilson proved to be even more effective in war leadership than in leadership in domestic reform, mobilising the entire nation in a gigantic war effort within a year. Further Reading Baker, R. S., Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, 8 vols. (Doubleday, Page 1927-1939) Baker, R. S., Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, 3 vols. (Doubleday,
Page 1922)
A S., Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 9 vols, to date (Princeton University Press 1966) Link, A. S., Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography (World Publishing Co 1963) Link, A. S., Wilson. 5 vols. (Princeton University Press 1947-1965) Walworth, A., Woodrow Wilson, 2 vols. Link,
(Longmans, Green 1958) [For Arthur
S.
Link's biographv, see page
2020.]
2001 II
/I'
I
I
\
L. MIIII
»
W '«
'III *, '
III
In 1917 the Allies looked hopefully to America for a massive infusion of manpower, but what they got was little more than a promise, for on her entry into the war
America's air force was all but non-existent, her army was worthy of only a small state and her large navy was imbalanced. Martin Blumenson
America's armed forces on the eve of her entry into the First World War were hardly impressive in size, available equipment, training and experience in the kind of warfare they were about to undertake. The navy was ranked third in the world, behind Germany's naval might, but had
important deficiencies. The army, despite certain reforms instituted after the war with Spain, was worthy of only a small and insignificant nation, while the air force was distinguished by its virtual non-existence. The extensive sea coast of the United States and a relatively large overseas commerce had prompted a respectable navy in the 19th Century. A naval renaissance had arisen in the 1880's, but by 1900 the navy was still not up to the standards of excellence in the best European fleets. Demands for a Big Navy, championed by Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge
and other
political figures,
began
to find
popular support. Between 1898 and 1914,
United States policy was
to build a
navy
second only to Great Britain so that, in addition to commerce raiding and coastal defence, the US Navy could, if necessary, defeat the main forces of an enemy. The personal influence of Roosevelt, who was Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 189798 and President from 1901 to 1909, gave definition and direction to naval efforts for a large navy constantly on a war footing. The United States embarked on a programme of shipbuilding that saw, from
A William S. Benson, the
first Chief of the Naval Operations Department. He devoted his attention to preparing the navy for combat operations, but was greatly hampered by
chronic undermanning, particularly of officers <3 The USS Michigan firing a broadside in 1912. Between 1898 and 1914, American policy was to build a navy second only to Britain, and by 1917 it was ranked third in the world But it was lacking in specialised vessels of all kinds
1903, two capital ships laid down each year. Naval expenditures rose from 792 of total Federal spending in 1890 to 19'/, in 1914. Aa a result, the United States, so far as the number of battleships and armoured cruisers was concerned, climbed from fifth position in the world in 1904 to second in 1917 Yet in terms of a balanced fleet, Germany remained superior. Internal improvements in the navy's organisation included the creation of a General Board in 1900, a professional body to advise the Secretary of the Navy. In 1903, patterned on the German experience, he navy league was founded to lobby for a Big Navy and for naval works in general. Not until 1915 was the position of the Chief of Naval Operations established, a post that was charged with directing the operations of the fleet and the preparation of war plans. Rear-Admiral William S. Benson, the first Chief of Naval Operations, devoted his attention to preparing the navy for combat operations. He made the largely autonomous bureau chiefs who directed important areas of the navy's activities report on their preparations for war and thereby stimulated increased attention
hand. American officers comprised less than one third of the British line officers, about one half of the German, French, and Japanese officers on active duty. But what was particularly unfortunate was the imbalance of the American fleet. The major weakness of the fine building policy was the emphasis on capital ships and a consequent deficiency in specialised and auxiliary vessels of
all
sorts.
What was
in civilians
obvious on the eve of the American entry into the First World War was that the US Navy was not immediately prepared to develop its maximum potential in support of the Allied cause. Nor did the army appear able to make an immediate and significant impact on the war. The fact was that the army had been too busy with other concerns to prepare properly for a war in Europe. Since the Civil War, the army had been composed of scattered garrisons located for the most part on the frontier to maintain law and order. Now the army found itself stretched and overextended in the farflung possessions garnered from Spain. Guerrilla warfare raged in those far-off islands, engaging the efforts of the army for more than a decade and ultimately involving 60,000 troops. Although the insurrection was officially declared suppressed in 1902, combat continued. It was also necessary for the army to organise and train a native force friendly to the United States and to fortify and defend the islands against invasion. To these duties was added the task of occupying Cuba, which was in a deplorable state after years
the
of misrule, rebellion,
I
to
this objective.
He
provided for naval
inspection of merchant vessels to insure their capability to sail in combat zones. He improved radio communications throughout the fleet. He continued the pioneer
Sims to promote proHe was instrumental establishing a Consulting Board of
efforts of William S. ficiency in gunnery.
who Navy on
reported to the Secretary of the application of technological research and development to naval affairs, particularly in the field of antisubmarine warfare. As for the war in Europe, the US Navy saw it as a remote occurrence of little relevance to American policy. There was no formal programme of preparedness, and recommendations for increasing the power of the fleet were cut drastically by Congress and by Josephus Daniels, the Secretary of the Navy, for reasons of economy. The Naval Act of 1916 enlarged the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and established a Naval Flying Corps and a Naval Reserve Force. It also authorised a rather massive ship-building programme — ten battleships, six battle-cruisers, ten scout cruisers, 50 destroyers, nine fleet submarines, 58 coastal submarines, and 14 miscellaneous vessels, these to be constructed in three years; but the Secretary of the Navy, Daniels, resisted pressure to prepare for the possibility of war. Supporting President Woodrow Wilson's policy of neutrality, he refused to sanction the building of anti-submarine vessels, he resisted equipping and manning fully those ships in commission, and he opposed moves to put existing vessels into top condition.
Notoriously
undermanned
US Navy could transport millions of soldiers and their equipment and supplies across the Atlantic to the combat zone, could protect convoys from attack by German surface and underwater craft, could take direct action against a hostile fleet, could help tighten the Allied blockade choking the Central Powers, were moot questions. For the US Navy was notoriously undermanned. Fewer than half the officers needed to man the ships commissioned and in construction were on Whether the
2004
and armed conflict. headed a provisional government supported by an American military presence, and the army
An American army
officer
supervised general elections in 1902, when the occupation ended. But in 1906, 1912, and 1917, army forces again had to intervene to re-establish law and order. These assignments in Panama, the Philippines, and Cuba, plus involvement in China, the need to garrison Alaska, Hawaii, and the Canal Zone, to deal with turmoil in Mexico — at Vera Cruz and along the border — and to perform the normal tasks of an army in peacetime, strained an establishment that was widely dispersed at home and overseas; they prevented the army from organising, training, and exercising large forces in the largescale manoeuvres that were characteristic of the First World War. Immediately after the war with Spain. Congress authorised a peacetime regular army of 100,000 officers and men organised into 30 infantry and 15 cavalry regiments, plus a corps of artillery. Yet budgetary restrictions, popular uninterest in serving, and a chronic shortage of officers prevented the armj' from attaining this size. Because the active army remained too small to fulfil home defence requirements and commitments overseas, Congress turned to the militia for help.
The
a heritage retained from practice, had declined and decayed during the 19th Century, and had been replaced by Volunteer organisations of part-time soldiers. Yet they were militia,
British custom
individualistic
and
and mainly
social in their
composition and outlook. Now, at the beginning of the 20th Century, something different was needed — standard units that were geared to the regular army and that could, in time of crisis, augment and
reinforce the small, professional, active, existing force quickly and easily. Thus, Congress passed the Militia Act of 1903, sometimes called the Dick Bill after senator Dick of Ohio, a sponsor of the legislation. This transformed the older and outmoded system. It divided male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 into a standardised reserve force called the National Guard, and put the rest into the Reserve Militia, subject to call to active duty if needed. National Guard units were organised in the states under the aegis of the Governors. They fulfilled two missions: they could be called to active duty by, the Governor to reinforce police forces putting down civil disorders in the state; they could be called to active duty in the Federal service by the President. They were to be organised, equipped and armed according to the prescribed patterns in the regular army.
Badly disorganised 1916, Congress passed the National Defence Act. A landmark in American military affairs, this Act empowered the President, with Congressional authorisation, to call the* Guard into Federal service for an indefinite period of time — more specifically, for the duration of a national emergency. It also reasserted the principle that all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 45 were subject to military service—which made possible the subsequent passage, in May, 1917, of a system of compulsory conscription under the selective service law. The Act also increased the authorised strength of the regular army to about 288,000 men organised into 65 infantry, 25 cavalry, 21 artillery regiments, 91 coast artillery companies, and the service units required for their support. It also authorised a National Guard with a maximum strength of 425,000 men. But these increases were to be spread over a In
period of five years, obviously a provision that was scrapped less than a year later when the United States became a belligerent in the First World War. By far the most important military reform during this period was in the area of organisational structure. The war with Spain had displayed serious weaknesses and errors in the deployment, movement and nourishment of troops. Victory had been won less by efficiency than by the ineptitude of the opposition. If the United States was to assume increased international responsibilities and to manifest a serious military presence worthy of a great nation, certain shortcomings in the army establishment had to be rectified.
No one saw this more clearly than Elihu Root, Secretary of War. He was convinced that the army's organisation was faulty in its duality of command, which prompted a division of authority. The Commanding General of the Army exercised control over the troops in the field, while the Secretary of War handled administrative and fiscal matters through a powerful and largely autonomous group of bureau chiefs. This, Root believed, had led to the friction, confusion and chaos that had characterised the conduct of operations against Spain. Looking to European custom, Root urged the adoption first of a Chief of Staff to replace the Commanding General. The Chief of Staff, he proposed, was to be the top man in the army, but he was to function as the principal military adviser to the
1
The United States army in the Philippines 1898 Overextended in America s far-flung colonies, the army was unable to train in the large scale manoeuvres characteristic of the First World War I President, a duty he was to fulfil through < the Secretary of War; the Chief of Staff = was also to act as the executive agent of these civilian officials. Thus, the principle of civilian supremacy over the military would be reaffirmed, the President's role as Commander in Chief of the armed forces would be strengthened, and military policy
would be formulated and executed under and control. Congress passed legislation in February 1903, to institute this change, but it was not easy to transform a system hallowed by tradition. It took time not only to establish firmly the primacy of the Chief of Staff over recalcitrant subordinate bureau civilian direction
chiefs but also to define the proper scope of the duties to be handled by the new Chief of Staff. An internal struggle in the army to implement the new system lasted almost a decade.
Together with the creation of the Chief Staff, Root recommended forming a General Staff Corps, a group of selected officers who would devote their time to the formulation of policies and plans. Like the General Staff officers who had long been a part of the French and German establishments, the American General Staff members were to be planners, thinkers and specialised experts who were to keep the army abreast of scientific and technological developments in the world, to look ahead, anticipate and prepare to meet future problems of mobilisation, war planning and the like, and to handle the increasingly complex requirements of warfare in the 20th Century. Not least of all the factors affecting the army was the preparedness campaign. As early as 1913, when some prescient Americans warned of the approaching world conflict, Leonard Wood worked to establish summer camps for young men to prepare themselves for future leadership in the army. They played a large part in marshalling public support for the National Defence Act of 1916 and for the later selective service act. At the same time, of
they became a somewhat invisible reservoir of partially trained officers who would be invaluable in the early hectic days of the war. By that time, the US Army had probably the best rifle in the world, the 1913 improved bolt-action magazine-type Springfield that would remain standard for 40
The .45-calibre automatic pistol developed for short-range guerrilla combat in the Philippines was effective for close-in fighting. Troops were equipped and trained with Browning machine guns and automatic rifles. These weapons were excellent. The trouble was, there was only just enough to go around. There were no stockpiles of arms for an army that would have to be enlarged to unexpected dimensions. years.
Six planes and 16 pilots On the eve of America's entry into the First World War the US Army consisted of 5,000 officers and 123,000 men in the
regular forces, 8,500 part-time officers and 123,000 men in the National Guard — pittance compared to the Allied ground forces engaged in combat. As for the air component of the army, the War Department had subsidised the experiments of Samuel Langley as early as 1898, but discontinued financial support in 1903, when his aircraft crashed into the Potomac River. Orville and Wilbur Wright attempted, at first without success, to interest the military authorities in their aeroplane, but not until 1908 were they permitted to invention, which demonstrate their crashed and was wrecked. By 1913, although France, England, Russia and Germany were spending large sums annually on aviation — even Mexico spent $400,000 yearly — the United States was devoting only $125,000 per year to this promising new weapon. In 1914, the US Army had a grand total of six planes and 16 trained military pilots. In July, 1914, Congress authorised the creation of an Aviation Section in the Signal Corps, this to be staffed by 60 officers
and 260 enlisted men. But grudging and tardy support from military superiors and conspicuous uninterest on the part of Congress inhibited the work of these early air enthusiasts. When the United States stood at the threshold of entry into the First World War the army suddenly discovered that it lagged far behind startling advances in flight, advances developed as a matter of course by the European powers. The Americans, in astonishing contrast, were highly deficient in equipment, organisation and doctrine. Not a single Americanbuilt fighter plane would reach the Western Front before the Armistice; American pilots would have to learn to fight in foreign air-
craft and in accordance with a wellestablished foreign doctrine and manner of deployment. Naval aviation was also
embryonic.
America seemed to offer very little to its and almost exhausted allies. American naval might was imbalanced, air power was virtually non-existent, and the ground forces were small, scattered, inexperienced in large-scale operations, and embattled
lacking dependable mechanical transport. What the Allies needed, and needed immediately in 1917, was a massive infusion of manpower — Britain had instituted compulsory service the year before and was scraping the bottom of its manpower reserves; France and Russia were bled
white and Italy had also suffered badly. Millions of men were required both to make up the losses of almost three years of war and to sustain the Allied endeavour.
But the demand was for men trained and equipped to fight. In view of the lack of real preparedness of America for war, the only immediate
American entry into the war was the psychological effect of a promise — benefit of the
an expression of determination on the part of the United States to raise, train and equip an enormous fighting force and to send it safely across the Atlantic to join the Allied armies.
Further Reading Ft E., The Compact History of the United States Army (Hawthorn 1956) Huntington, S. P., The Soldier and the State (Harvard University Press 1957)
Dupuy.
ed American Military History (Government Printing Office 1969) Potter, E. E., and Nimitz, C W eds SeapoWer: A Naval History (Prentice Hall Matloff, M.,
,
,
.
1960)
The Compact History of the United States Navy (Hawthorn 1957) Weigley. R F History of the US Army (Macmillan 1967) Pratt, F.,
,
MARTIN BLUMENSON was educated at Bucknell Universities He served with the US Army during the Second World War and in Korea, and is now a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Reserve His and Harvard
publications include The Duel For France, Anzio The That Failed, Rommel's Last Victory
Gamble
Kassenne Pass, and
Sicily
Whose
Victory?
2005
John Batchelor
America's armed power — a hollow promise?
The American 4.7-inch field gun M1906. Range: 7,490 yards. Weight with limber: 3 tons 18 cwt. Muzzle velocity: 1,700 feet-per-second. Weight of shell: 60 lb. Crew: 6-8. Traverse: 4 degrees left and right
Doughboy— US Infantryman American infantry uniform, colour,
of 1917.
olive
The
green
in
was
double
of high quality, frequently with seams. The campaign hat with the
Montana peak shown here was replaced by the British steel helmet once in the European trenches. Web equipment was adopted in 1910.
On
the
web
waistbelt are attached cartridge
pouches and a small web pouch for field dressings. A blanket roll and greatcoat are carried over the top of the large canvas pack, and the standard rifle, the Springfield, is shown- M1913, .30 calibre
Above: Return of the Mayflower by B. F. Gribble — America's naval power returns to redress the balance of the old world. Below: The USS New Mexico. Launched only 17 days after America declared war in April 1917, she was a dreadnought of advanced design Like all American capital ships she has cage masts. Displacement: 32,000 tons. Length: 624 feet. Beam: 97 /2 feet. Armament: Twelve 14-inch, fourteen 5-inch, four3-inch, and two 21-inch torpedo tubes. Power/speed: 27,500 hp/2 1 knots. Armour: Belt 14 inches, turrets 1 1 inches Crew: 1,080 1
^•tSSrt*^"2006
America's Empire Always conscious of her own experience as a British colony,
America characterised herself as the
enemy
I
US Territory Indian lands lost
I
up to 1880 Indian Reservations
]
of 19th-century
European imperialism. Yet throughout the century she was one of the most consistent and successful of all the colonising powers, first following the frontier
1784-1894
US
Military Occupation
west to
subdue her own indigenous Red Indian population, and then,
DANISH VIRGIN ISLANDS purchased 1916
from mid-century, expanding into the Caribbean and the Pacific. By the early years of this century she was the possessor of a considerable Empire, and her army
had gained wide experience in guerrilla warfare
REGULAR ARMY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Officers
Men
5
000
123 000
NATIONAL GUARD Officers
Men
8 500 123 000
Total 259 500 Armed Forces when she went to war: 280 000 men (cf Bulgaria's
DUTCH EAST INDIES
o
BAKER 1857
°
HOWLAND
1857
JARVIS1857 o
SAMOA
1899
US Acquisitions
2007
In January 1915 The American Journal of Sociology published a symposium entitled 'What is Americanism?' The contributors were a diverse group and their views reflected their particular interests. These differences were disconcerting to the prominent essayist, Agnes Repplier, who pleaded for a 'noble nationalism' and a unity of dedicated purpose in an article in The Atlantic Monthly of March, 1916. Miss Repplier articulated a desire common to many of her fellow Americans, and she was to see the results of her ideals in 1917 and 1918 when rampant and intolerant nationalism demanded strict conformity. But the American people were diverse, mid-westerners did not agree with easterners on many issues and southerners had their own point of view. A sizeable minority were foreigners — more than 14,500,000 had come to this country since 1900 — and native Americans worried about these 'hyphenated' Americans almost as much as they did about the negroes, who represented approximately one tenth of the total population of some 100,000,000. At the social peak there was what
Arthur
Mizener
called
'the
close-knit,
intimate world of the American gentry'. Manners and money counted for much among these privileged few, but idealism mattered also. Although there were members of this class who lived throughout the country, the east and, for the younger set, the Ivy League set the pace Harvard, Yale and Princeton prepared students for the lives of gentlemen. At the other extreme of the social spectrum were the newly arrived immigrants and the negroes. Cities were a magnet for these people in the early 1900s. There, the immigrants found others of their nationality and menial jobs which they hoped would lead to a better life than that which they endured in the crowded, squalid tenements. Since 1900, almost three out of every four of the millions of these newcomers came from southern, central and eastern Europe. This so-called new immigration differed from that of the 19th Century when the English, Irish, and Germans dominated the tide of immigration. Negro communities were also developing in the north. Although 1915 is generally given as the beginning of the large scale migration of the southern rural negroes to northern cities, a few thousand had made the move each year since the Civil War. Economic opportunity attracted them just as it did the immigrants and, indeed, many rural whites. The disfranchisement of the negroes that took place at the turn of the century had also made it rather clear that the social future was as bleak as economic prospects on the cotton plantations and the small tenant farms of the south. This migration produced some striking changes in demography. In 1910, there were 17 negroes in Michigan; ten years later, 60,000 lived there. During the same period, more than 74,000 negroes left Mississippi. By 1917, New York, Chicago and Philadelphia had sizeable negro communities
and incidents of racial
The excitement generated by the exhibition of modern art held at the 69th Regiment Armoury in New York City early in 1913 did not reach most Americans. The culture as well as the ethics of the majority still rested on the foundation laid in the 19th Century by the McGuffey Eclectic Readers. These anthologies of literature stressed the virtues of hard work and patriotism and the dangers of sin. There was not much emphasis on education beyond the rudimentary level. Army tests administered in 1918 showed that 31% of the soldiers were illiterate. This included immigrants who were considered illiterate if they could not read English, and negroes whose educational needs had been largely ignored, but it remains a shocking figure. Even among
the comfortable middle class, a high school diploma was not considered particularly important. Strength of character and hard work were the basic prerequisites for success in life. McGuffey made the point and Horatio Alger emphasised it in his novels which sold some 200 million copies. Although the cities held out the most glittering prospect of economic success, many Americans firmly believed that the rural life offered a superior physical and moral existence. A nostalgia for the simpler life and a patriotic memory of the farmers who fought at Lexington and Concord in the Revolutionary War, and of the pioneers who settled the virgin land, as well as the rhetoric of William Jennings
Bryan were
probably involved in this comparison of
urban and rural life. For these people, the America was the farm or village. An incident in July, 1917 reflected this attitude in an ironic situation. A mountaineer, John Allen of Clay County, Kentucky, came to New York City to take back his draft -dodger son to Kentucky. A Federal judge heard Allen's appeal and his threat to shoot the boy in the village square if he real
did not register for the draft. According to the New York Times: 'The boy with tears in his eyes said he would register as quick as he could.' Then Judge Julius M. Mayer released the boy to the custody of the father and commented to a reporter: 'That old fellow is one of the kind that makes the country great. He is a real American.' In the summer of 1914, when Europe went to war, the news did not make much of an impact on Americans beyond the East Coast. The possibility of American intervention certainly seemed remote. The President's neutral stand toward the European war was popular. 'Let Europe stew in its own juice' was a common attitude. Nevertheless, Americans began to form opinions. The passionate accounts of the German invasion of Belgium by the famed war correspondent, Richard Harding Davis, helped create an image of the German army as a brutal, inhuman machine. In December 1914, when Davis wrote a preface to his book about the first months of the war, he made it clear that he did not agree with the President: 'When a mad dog runs amuck in a village it is the duty of
friction.
One facet of Preparedness — the American Women's League for Self-Defence drilling in New York. Preparedness was an urban middle class movement which aimed at a spiritual
<]
o
regeneration of the nation, a super-Americanism easily chanelled into military training t> America's social elite- the Ivy League setcelebrate their own exclusiveness
2009
every farmer to get his gun and destroy it, not to lock himself indoors, and toward the dog and the men who face him preserve a neutral mind.' The 2,300,000 Germanhorn Americans and the Irish who retained a Ititter hatred toward the English would not agree with Davis. Nor would most other Americans even though, if pressed, they might show a mild favouritism for the Allies. It simply seemed not in the American interest to become involved.
'Preparedness' — a super-Americanism In the summer of 1916, hundreds of thousands of Americans, carrying small American flags, marched in the streets of the cities. Their cause was Preparedness. Prior to the autumn of 1915, the leader of this bipartisan movement was Theodore Roosevelt but then Woodrow Wilson adopted the cause and, in the Washington parade,
he marched with his little flae. Preparedness was an urban, middle class movement which began in the east. Its advocates had varied and overlapping motives. The most prevalent objective was a spiritual regeneration based on what Agnes Repplier termed 'a noble nationalism, purged of comfort-mongering, and of perverted sentiment'. Theodore Roosevelt, of course, led the way when it came to calling for a commitment to Americanism. The time was at hand for the foreign-born, the hyphenated Americans, to conform and to show iheir loyalty to their adopted country. Social and economic efficiency was another goal held by many Preparedness people. Ironically, some pointed to Germany as a model. Others hoped that social reforms might result from the movement. Finally, there was the desire to build up the nation's defences to repel an invasion. In part Preparedness was an outgrowth of the Progressive movement. For more than a decade, reformers had exposed and attempted to solve the nation's domestic problems. They had not always agreed as to what the problems were or on the solutions, but their efforts had brought about a patchwork of reforms. Social improvement and efficiency in government and in the economy were goals that would appeal to
many
Progressives. The methods of Preparedness were also familiar tools of the Progressives. They recognised the value of public opinion and attempted to manipulate it through their many articles in newspapers and periodicals. They also believed that effective organization and the advice of experts were prerequisites for any reform. The transition from Progres-
sivism to Preparedness was easy for many who looked to Theodore Roosevelt for leadership. After all he seemed to be adjusting his objectives to a new situation. If there was a panacea for the ills of the nation as well as a solution to the problems of military security, it seemed to be universal military training. In the Senate, the chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, George E. Chamberlain of Oregon, introduced a bill to give military training in the form of periodic drill sessions to all males from 12 to 23. This did not become a law but in New York the legislature did pass a bill which provided for weekly training for boys 16 to 19. Some women were also anxious to gain the benefits of military training. In Maryland 250 donned uniforms and attended a camp, while the New York members of the American Women's League for Self-Defence drilled regularly.
2010
While men, women and children learned
momentum
march
in step, other Preparedness supporters tried to prepare the economy for
to
Thomas
A. Edison chaired the Naval Consulting Board which advised the Secretary of the Navy of scientific and engineering aspects of Preparedness. A vice-president of the Hudson Motor Company, Howard E. Coffin, headed the Industrial Preparedness Committee which surveyed the industrial capacity of the nation. By the autumn of 1916 these businessmen, at their own expense, had accumulated records on more than 20,000 factories. Congress showed its interest in industrial mobilisation by creating a Council of National Defence consisting of six cabinet members and an advisory commission of representatives from various segments of
war.
the economy and society. Through this agency, the President presumably could co-ordinate the economy. Many Americans viewed the Preparedness cause with suspicion and fear. Opponents included people in the rural areas of the mid-west and the south, some urban Progressives, labourers generally and large segments of the German- American community and the socialist move-
ment. William Jennings Bryan, who in 1915 had resigned from the office of Secretary of State because of the President's sternness toward the Germans, was a powerful voice for peace. Wisconsin's famed Progressive senator, 'Fighting Bob' La Follette, also pointed out that many of those who supported Preparedness were
businessmen who would
profit
from an
Many civilians thought of soldiers as loafers and
freeloaders on the taxpayer armaments programme. In Congress, the House Majority Leader, Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, and other congressmen joined with several senators from the midwest and the south to give powerful support to the anti-Preparedness movement. These men were in a position to modify Preparedness legislation. Although many urban Progressives followed Theodore Roosevelt, others feared that a commitment to Preparedness meant a twisting of the Progressive fervour into a perverse channel away from domestic reform. To a social worker such as Lillian Wald, Preparedness meant militarism. The editor of the New York Evening Post,
Oswald Garrison
Villard, shared this view as he stated in a private letter his fear that universal military service meant 'the Prussianising of America'. Workers feared
that they would have to pay higher taxes and serve in the ranks. German- Americans recognized that their Fatherland was the most likely enemy if the United States went to war and many Socialists could not accept such a war as ideologically proper. Although the anti-Preparedness people in Congress were able to fight an effective rearguard action and did effect some compromises in legislation, the movement simply never stopped the generally
What
of the Preparedness
effect did the
Campaign.
Preparedness move-
ment have on the American role in the World War? Walter Millis, in Arms and Men, gave the best estimate: 'Preparedness laid the whole groundwork of ideas and conditioned the attitudes which were to make possible the American interFirst
vention. It did not prepare the nation or its military structure for that intervention.' To be sure, Congress voted sizeable increases in both the army and the navy in 1916 but the two services were far from being on a war footing in April 1917. Despite the Preparedness campaign,
many Americans maintained an antipathy towards the military. It was a part of American tradition that wars would be fought by citizens who would spring to arms at times of crisis. Many civilians thought of professional soldiers as loafers and freeloaders on the taxpayer, and the public's opinion of enlisted men was particularly low. National Guard officer wrote to a friend in December 1916: 'The man who goes into the regulars as a soldier is usually one who has failed in his civilian undertakings. very large percentage of the regular soldiers are given to excesses in the matter of liquor. Their laziness is proverbial.' These attitudes impressed foreign military observers as did the small size of the American military establish-
A
A
ment.
Although traditionally American soldiers were supposed to stay out of politics, MajorGeneral Leonard Wood, Chief of Staff 1910-1914 and close friend of Theodore Roosevelt, was far from a typical American officer. A dynamic, innovative leader and a master of public relations, Wood threw himself enthusiastically into the Preparedness movement. Even before the war began in Europe, he had instituted summer training camps for college students. Later these camps were opened to businessmen also. As the Preparedness agitation developed, Wood spoke and wrote constantly, exhorting support. His open criticism of the cautious administration policy brought him a reprimand from the Secretary of War but this only enhanced the admiration that many young officers felt for him. Although officers volunteered to instruct at the training camps and were pleased to see such a stirring of interest in the military, some, however, pondered the difficulty of making practical use of this interest. Universal military training would be a step in this direction but many also thought that a Federal controlled reserve was a necessity. An effort to gain the latter failed in early 1916 — in part because of the antiPreparedness bloc in Congress.
A
dress rehearsal for war?
call-up of the National Guard in the of 1916 gave fuel to the arguments for universal military training and a Federal reserve. In response to Pancho Villa's raid across the border, President Wilson dispatched a small expedition of regulars
The
summer
under Brigadier-General John
J.
Pershing
As relations deteriorated between the two nations, the army asked that the National Guard be sent to protect the border. More than 100,000 Guardsmen went. It was a sad spectacle. Numbers of Guardsmen failed the physical into northern Mexico.
examination, others simply refused to go, and recruits were relatively few and slow in joining.
Some
units were actually social
clubs with elected officers. It is not surprising that there were a few protest demonstrations in the Guard camps on the border. The War Department did not show up well either in its planning and conduct of the mobilisation. When relations improved and the Guard returned home, many embittered civilian-soldiers said that they would quit. As a dress rehearsal for war, the experience left much to oe desired in the minds of the Allies. Did Preparedness fail? It did succeed, as Millis said, in the realm of ideas and attitudes but it did not prepare the American military forces for the role that they would play in the First World War. After all, a dominant goal of Preparedness was to bring about moral and social reform, and although learning to drill and to live temporarily in a military organisation might help reform the attitudes of the individual, it did little to develop a 20thcentury army or navy.
I
Further Reading American Journal of Sociology. What is Americanism? (XX, 4, January 1915) Finnegan, J. P., Military Preparedness in the Progressive Era, 7977-7977(University of Wisconsin, unpublished Ph D Thesis, 1969) May, H. F., The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own Time (Alfred A. Knopf 1959) Osofsky, G., Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto — Negro New York 1890-1930 (New York 1963) Repplier, A., Americanism (The Atlantic Monthly, March 1916) Roosevelt. T Fear God and Take Your Own Part (George ri Doran 1916) ,
EDWARD M COFFMAN was
born in Kentucky in 929 He received bachelor's, master s and doctor's degrees from the University of Kentucky, and has served for two years (1951-1953) as an infantry lieutenant in the US Army From 1957 to 1961 he taught at Memphis State University and then went to the University of Wisconsin-Madison where he is 1
Professor of History His publications include several articles and two books The Hilt
Sword The Career of Peyton C March, and The War To End All Wars The American Military Experience m World War I I
ol the
Above
left: Maj-Gen Leonard Wood, one of the leaders of the Preparedness movement; he set
up summer training camps for business men. right: Brig-Gen John J. Pershing, leader of the American expeditionary force in Mexico in 1916. Below: The Texas National Guard in summer training camp-typical of Americas
Above
small, barely trained reserves
\
on a peace platform, Wilson's / peaceful intentions were undermined by the unrestricted U-Boat campaign. %
Returned
4
\ ^
to office
/
America's man of peace now
had to take his country to war. ArthurS. Link w
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v\
BOH
One
of
Germany's U-Boats
halts an
American steamer, and America
is
dragged one step nearer
to
war
Count Johann von Bernstorff, Imperial German Ambassador to the United States, telephoned to the State Department in the morning of January 31, 1917 to request an interview as soon as possible with the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing. When the at 4.10 pm, Lansing noticed that he did not walk with his usual cocky, springy step or break into his customary style. Sadly, almost reluctantly, he handed Lansing several communications from his government, saying plaintively as he did that he had always worked for peace between Germany and the United States and deeply regretted the step that his government was about to take. Lansing, who usually managed to suppress emotional responses, could not avoid a feeling of compassion for Bernstorff when his eyes filled with tears as he said goodbye. The first document was in the form of a letter from the German Ambassador to the Secretary of State. The Berlin government, it began, deeply appreciated President Wilson's recent efforts for peace and largely subscribed to the principles enunciated in his address to the Senate — the 'Peace without Victory' speech — of -January 22, 1917. Germany would gladly co-operate in all efforts to prevent future wars. She had no desire to destroy her enemies or to annex Belgium. However, the Allies had made clear their intention to dismember Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. 'To the wish of reconciliation they oppose the will of destruction. They desire a fight to the bitter end.' A new situation had thus been created which forced Germany to
Ambassador arrived
new decisions. The Imperial German Government could not justify before its own conscience, the German people, and history, the neglect of any means that might end the war. Its overtures for peace rudely spurned, it was now compelled to 'continue the fight for existence, again forced upon it, with the full employment of all the weapons which are at its disposal'. Bernstorff enclosed two memoranda with his letter. The first declared that the German authorities did not doubt that the Washington government would understand why — in view of the brutal methods of the Allies and their announced intention to destroy the Central Powers — Germany had to claim that freedom of action in submarine warfare reserved in the Sussex note to the United States of May 4, 1916. After February 1, 1917, German submarines would sink without warning all ships, belligerent and neutral, in a zone around Great Britain, France, and Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean. The German government was confident that this measure would result in that speedy restoration of peace which the United States government had so much at heart. The second memorandum drew the boundaries of the new war zones, gave certain guarantees to neutral merchantmen and unarmed enemy passenger ships during a period of grace, and granted permission to one American ship to sail weekly to and from Falmouth, England, provided the American government gave formal assurance that these ships carried no contraband and they were marked with alternating red and white stripes. After reading the notes, Lansing sent them by special courier to the White House. 'We are face to face with the gravest crisis presented since the war began,' he wrote in a covering letter to Wilson. 'I think that as soon as you have read these papers we should have a conference to determine the course to be taken.' At about the same time that Bernstorff called the State Department to request the conference with Lansing, he sent an aide to New York to deliver a special message to Colonel Edward M. House, Wilson's most intimate adviser on foreign affairs. This was a telegram from Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, Imperial German Chancellor, to Bernstorff with a personal message for the President of the United States. The Imperial German Government, the telegram read, thanked the President for his recent messages concerning peace, particularly his suggestion of an early peace conference. The German government would welcome presidential action looking toward a direct conference of the belligerents, but public disclosure of German peace terms was impossible in view of the recently-announced intention of the Allies to destroy and degrade Germany and her associates. However, the German government was willing to divulge, for the President's personal information, the terms that it would have laid before the Allies had they not rebuffed German peace offers. These terms included rectifications of the Franco-German border, the restitution of Belgium with guarantees of German security, return of captured German colonies and the transfer of other colonies to Germany, indemnification of Germans injured by the war, and a new eastern boundary that would guarantee security to Germany and Poland against Russia. The President's most recent message had come too late, Bethmann-Hollweg concluded, to prevent the launching of the unrestricted U-Boat campaign on schedule. However, Germany was 2014
always ready to do justice to the United States. 'We beg the President, in spite of all, to take up and continue his efforts; and we declare ourselves perfectly ready to discontinue the intensive U-Boat warfare as soon as we receive satisfactory assurances that the efforts of the President will lead to a peace
which would be acceptable to
us.'
Unlimited U-Boat warfare — why? The German decision to launch a submarine campaign of terror on the seas, even at the risk of war with the United States, had origin in events going all the way back to the outbreak of the war, for example (and perhaps most importantly) in the American government's decision in the autumn of 1914 to accept British blockade measures as essentially legal and therefore to be respected by American traders and shippers. However, the submarine question had been hotly debated between early 1915 and mid1916, and the Chancellor had always earlier succeeded in turning back the naval and military chieftains who had urged a submarine campaign without caution. A number of developments between the middle and the end of 1916 made the German decision to embark upon the perilous course of unlimited U-Boat warfare as inevitable as any decision of this sort ever is. First, the appointment of Hindenburg as Chief of the Army General Staff on August 29, 1916, together with the naming of Hindenburg's aggressive alter ego, Ludendorff, to the new post of Quartermaster General, signified a strong rightward shift in the axis of German decision-making. Heretofore, BethmannHollweg had been able to withstand the generals with the Kaiser's help. It would not be so easy to withstand the new commander, the hero of the entire German people, if he said that drastic measures were necessary for survival. Second, events of the summer and autumn of 1916 — the British offensive on the Somme, Rumania's entry into the war, the increasing strangulation of the Allied blockade, the spread of warits
on crisis with increasing and ominous rapidity Crisis followed
A cartoon the
in
the
New
York Herald depicts Count Johann von Bernstorff,
German Ambassador,
as the
Messenger
of
Death
weariness, and the growing unreliability of Germany's allies — convinced Germany's military leaders that they would lose the war unless some way were found to win it in 1917. Hence the Supreme Command approved when Bethmann-Hollweg, in October 1916, decided to invite the Allies to the peace table. Third, the prompt and unanimous rejection of BethmannHollweg's peace bid by the Allies was proof positive to German leaders that their enemies would never consent to a peace acceptable to Germany; indeed, that they were as much determined as ever to fight on until they had delivered Germany the knock-out blow', as David Lloyd George had said earlier. Fourth, President Wilson's note of December 18, 1916, asking the belligerents to state their terms as the first step in ending the war, was new evidence in German eyes of growing peril to the Reich, because it raised the threat of American intervention on the Allied side if Wilson's approach failed. On the day that Wilson's peace note was published, Secretary Lansing said that its dispatch had indicated the possibility that the United States would be forced into the war. German authorities had earlier encouraged Wilson to intervene to force the Allies to negotiate directly with Germany, without the President's presence and interference. Now, or so it seemed in Berlin, the President was not only pulling Allied chestnuts out of the fire but also acting covertly for his English friends. Wilson's note, the Kaiser said when he read it, had 'undoubtedly been prepared in collusion with England, so that the conference which we don't want and would be no good to us comes up again'. 'I believe,' Hindenburg agreed, 'that Wilson's proposal was evoked by England.'
'America
is
nothing'
All evidence and considerations seemed to lead to only one possible decision -to launch the all-out submarine war which German naval leaders had been pressing for nearly two years and which
they were now saying would without doubt bring England to her knees within six months. The decision was made in an Imperial Conference at Pless Castle in Silesia on January 9, 1917 in the full knowledge that it would soon bring America into the war, and also in the belief that the conflict would be won long before the United States had time to mobilise. As Admiral Eduard von Capelle, the Naval Minister, told the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on January 31, 1917: 'I have always laid great stress on the importance of America's entrance into the war. But from a military point of view, her entrance means nothing. I repeat: from a military point of view America is as nothing.' Wilson played golf until late in the morning of January 31 and learned about the German decision for unlimited submarine warfare in the early afternoon from an Associated Press despatch. He closeted himself in his office, his mind ranging over all aspects of the crisis. He would have done nothing if the Germans had limited their unrestricted
campaign
to
armed
men—he had
Allied merchant-
given definite evidence of this fact very recently. He would probably have contemplated no radical change in policy if the Germans had confined their underseas campaign to Allied merchantmen, armed or unarmed. The American people, he had told Colonel House in November, did not want to go to war over the sinking of any Allied merchantmen. But what to do now, in the face of this threat against American lives on American ships 9 Lansing arrived at the White House at 8.45 pm. He strongly urged an immediate severance of relations with Germany, arguing that failure to take this step would cause a massive loss of national prestige. The President replied that he was not so sure. He was willing to go to almost any lengths to avoid belligerency. Nothing could induce him to break relations unless he was convinced that it was the wisest thing to do. However, he went on, Lansing should prepare a note severing relations. The Secretary departed at 10.30 pm. Colonel House, bearing Bethniann-Hollweg's personal message to the President, arrived early at the White House on the following morning, February 1. Lansing arrived at noon with his note, breaking relations. In response to the Secretary's argument that Prussian militarism was the implacable foe of democracy, the President said that he was not sure that it would be wise to destroy German power and the German nation. The question of severing relations was the sole subject of the Cabinet meeting that began at '2.30 in the afternoon of February 2. Some members favoured an immediate break. Early in the meeting Wilson said that he did not wish either side to win. After outbursts from Houston and Lansing, he said that 'probably greater justice would be done if the conflict ended in a draw'. Meanwhile, the publication of the German submarine decree in the morning newspapers on February had sent tremors of shock and excitement across the nation. Frank I. Cobb echoed 1
when he wrote in the New York World that the German announcement was in effect a declaration of war against the United States, that Germany had run amuck, and that the only possible response was an immediate break in diplomatic relations. German-American editors said that they hoped the President would acquiesce in the new German policy; several pacifist organisations and the Socialist Party implored Wilson to do nothing to imperil the German-American peace. Except for these voices, however, the country seemed to be united in the strong conviction that relations had to be broken at once. Wilson was always keenly sensitive to public opinion, but he was never its servant. Nor would he permit his mind to be made up by advisers. From what he said to them, we can only conclude that he was seriously considering making no immediate response to the submarine announcement and waiting to see what the Germans would do. If this was true, then the scales were tipped in his mind during a conference with 16 Democratic senators in the Capitol that began at 5.30 in the afternoon of February 2 (no Republican senators were present because none could be found on short notice). He had come to seek senatorial advice in this gravest crisis in American history, the President said, and he hoped that each man would speak his mind without reserve. Even though most of the senators came from the strongly neutralist South and Middle West, they almost all agreed that the President should break relations at once. The conference ended at 7 pm. Wilson made his decision to sever relations either during or just after the conference on Capitol Hill, for as soon as he returned to the White House he set to work on an address to a joint session of Congress, which he delivered in the afternoon of February 3. Reviewing the Sussex correspondence of 1916, he sa'd that the recent German announcement left him no alternative, and that he had instructed the Secretary of State to inform Bernstorff that relations between the United States and the German empire were severed. He refused to believe, Wilson went on, that the Germans would destroy American ships and lives in an editorialists in all areas
illegal
submarine campaign.
If
they did, he would ask Congress
and legitimate American commerce. Virtually every editor and public spokesman approved, even the German-American editors conceding that Wilson could not have done less without sacrifice of national honour. for authority to protect peaceful
Unanimous approval This nearly unanimous chorus of approval masked a deep fissure that was beginning to split public opinion by the time that Wilson appeared before the joint session. Heretofore, the great majority of Americans had been doggedly neutralist, probably opposed to belligerency even during the severe Lusitama and Sussex crises with Germany in 1915 and 1916. Open advocates of war had scarcely existed, at least had maintained a discreet silence. In earlier crises, Wilson had gone no further than to threaten to break diplomatic relations. These ties were now severed, and the American people for the first time faced the possibility or probability of war, depending upon German actions over which they had no control. There was, inevitably, a fierce discussion over peace and war, and a considerable polarisation of public opinion during the two weeks following the break in relations. It was evident on all sides that the interventionists were still a small minority, and that the great mass of people who had spokesmen stubbornly hoped for peace and, at the most, would approve armed neutrality to protect American shipping. All evidence indicates that the President agreed emphatically with the majority of his articulate fellow-countrymen. To be sure, the War and Navy Departments now intensified plans for fullscale mobilisation if it had to come, but Wilson made a point of avoiding any provocative action. Reports began flooding in of unwarned torpedoings of Allied ships as the submarines pressed their attack. A British armed passenger liner, California, was sunk without warning off Fastnet on February 7 with the loss of 41 lives. The United States, a White House-inspired report in the New York Times said, would ignore submarine attacks against belligerent ships, even when American lives were lost or endangered. The United States government would take action only if German submarines torpedoed American ships without warning. The only issue that generated much discussion in the press and among administration leaders during these weeks of watchful waiting was the question of the arming of American ships. All American shipping lines cancelled sailings to European waters alter publication of the submarine decree. When the president of the American Line, on February 6, asked the Navy Department for guns and crews for St Louis, Wilson and Lansing replied in a memorandum (which was published in the newspapers on February 8) saying only that private lines might put their own
2015
their ships. He would not put guns and crews on ships, Wilson told his cabinet on February 9 and 13, least not until Germany had forced his hand and he could go to Congress for new authority. The American people did not want precipitate action, and he would do nothing to give the Germans
armament on merchant 1
1
the impression that he wanted war. Reluctance to embark upon the dangerous course of armed neutrality until a majority of Americans obviously supported it was not the only reason for the President's refusal to take even the first steps. For one thing, receipt on February 7 of an extraordinary message from the new Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Ottokar Czernin, excited Wilson's hopes that he might resume his peace offensive. The Imperial and Royal Government, Czernin said, was ready to negotiate an honourable peace on a basis of peace without victory. It was now up to the President of the United States to persuade or compel the Allies to negotiate on this basis. 'Should the President follow this line of conduct,' Czernin concluded, 'not only the terror of the submarine war, but war in general would come to a sudden end and Mr Wilson's name will shine with everlasting letters in the history of mankind.'
Bombshell — the Zimmermann Telegram Wilson spent the evening of February 7 and a good part of the following day on a confidential message to the British government that he hoped would get actual peace talks under way. Relaying a copy of Czernin's communication, the President added that he knew that the Teutonic powers desired peace; that AustriaHungary might well make peace immediately if she were assured of the continued integrity of the Empire and did not fear radical dismemberment; and that he was eager to mediate between Austria-Hungary and the Allies on a basis of his 'Peace without Victory' speech. Mounting presidential hopes were dashed on February 11, when Lloyd George replied that the Allies were themselves already conducting secret negotiations with Vienna, and preferred to have Austria-Hungary remain in the war, because she was a heavy liability to Germany, and would neither receive a formal peace offer from Vienna at this time nor give any pledges against dismemberment. The greatest service that the United States could render mankind, Lloyd George concluded, would be to enter the war, because President Wilson would have a full opportunity to heal the wounds of the world and establish a just and lasting peace only if the United States was a full-fledged belligerent.
Another reason for Wilson's refusal to rush pell-mell into armed neutrality was the hope that the German government might be willing to give some guarantees for the protection of American ships in the war zones. Bernstorff, still in Washington, sent an urgent message to Berlin on about February 7 through the Swiss Minister, Dr Paul Ritter. American friends had implored him to tell his superiors, Bernstorff wrote, that the American people and government wanted peace, and Berlin could prevent hostilities by avoiding attacks against American ships while GermanAmerican negotiations over the submarine war could proceed. Like Bernstorff, Ritter thought that such negotiations might prove fruitful. There was some stir in Washington, because Wilson and Lansing through a misunderstanding thought that the German government had initiated this proposal. Messages from Arthur Zimmermann, Germany's Foreign Secretary, soon dispelled all misapprehension — and hopes. Germany, Zimmermann made clear, had made no overtures to the United States and would never relax the submarine blockade out of concern for the United States or any other neutral. Meanwhile, public demands that the government arm and protect American merchantmen mounted with growing intensity as most American ships kept to their safe berths, Allied sailings to the United States were severely curtailed, and goods began to pile high on wharves for want of bottoms. The crescendo of public demand, to say nothing of what seemed like sheer economic and military necessities, had brought the President by February 16 to the decision to go forthwith to Congress and request authority to institute armed neutrality. On February 20, he asked Lansing to prepare a memorandum on defensive armament for neutral merchant ships. The memorandum arrived from the Secretary late in the afternoon of February 21, and the President closeted himself and worked far into the night on a message to Congress. He read it to Lansing on February 22 and told him that he intended to deliver it to Congress on February 26. However, before that day could arrive, a new development had rocked the country and driven it far down the road to war. Saturday, February 24, was a quiet day at the State Department. At 8.30 in the evening a telegram marked 'For the President and Secretary of State' arrived from Ambassador Walter Page in 2016
London. Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, Page said, had just handed him the text of a cipher telegram that Foreign Secretary Zimmermann had sent to the German Minister in Mexico City, Heinrich von Eckhardt, by way of the German Embassy in Washington on January 16. It instructed Eckhardt, in the event that the all-out submarine campaign led to war between the United States and Germany, to propose an alliance to Mexico upon the following terms: 'Joint conduct of the war. Joint conclusion of peace. Ample financial support and an agreement on our part that Mexico shall gain back by conquest the territory lost by her at a prior period in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.' Eckhardt was further instructed to request the Mexican President, Venustiano Carranza, to request the Japanese government to join the
German-Mexican coalition at once. The British government, Page explained, had captured a copy
German diplomatic code early in the war. British Intelligence had obtained a copy of Zimmermann's telegram in Mexico City, not Washington, and the British Foreign Office had lost no time in communicating it to the American Embassy. The Zimmermann Telegram was the brainchild of one von Lemnitz, Latin American specialist in the German Foreign Office. War between the United States and Mexico had nearly broken out during the spring and summer of 1916 because Wilson had refused to withdraw the punitive expedition under General John J. Pershing that he had sent into Mexico in pursuit of 'Pancho' Villa, after that bandit had raided Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916. In November 1916, at a time of renewed Mexican-American tension, Carranza had proposed that Mexico and Germany co-operate militarily and had gone so far as to offer submarine bases to the Germans. Thus the idea of a Germanof the
Mexican alliance was not altogether farfetched, and Zimmermann seems to have adopted it eagerly when Lemnitz proposed it in late 1916 or early 1917. However, as he admitted to the Budget Committee on March 5, 1917, Zimmermann made the offer of alliance, not in good faith, but in the hope of using the Mexicans as pawns in the game. 'By holding up these American States as bait,' he explained, T would urge Mexico to invade the United States as quickly as possible and so keep the American army busy.' We know virtually nothing else about the origins of and discussions about the Zimmermann Telegram before its dispatch — such as, for example, whether the Chancellor, Kaiser, and Supreme Headquarters knew about it and approved. All evidence in the files of the Imperial Cabinet, the Foreign Command were carefully destroyed at the time or soon after the war. The Reichstag Commission of Inquiry, which in 1919 probed into the causes of American entrance into the war, asked not a single question about it of Bethmann-Hollweg, Zimmermann, and others. Finally, all German leaders joined in this conspiracy of silence in their memoirs. We can follow the Zimmermann Telegram completely after it went on its way from Wilhelmstrasse. The Foreign Office sent the telegram to Washington via wireless, by a circuitous BerlinStockholm-Buenos Aires- Washington telegraphic route, and over
relating to Office,
it
and the Supreme
the American State Department wire which ran through London. (Wilson had earlier permitted the Germans to use this line in order to facilitate peace negotiations.) Bernstorff relayed the message to Mexico City by Western Union telegraph. British monitors picked up the wireless dispatch. They obtained the other messages by tapping the Berlin-Stockholm wire in Copenhagen and the State Department line in London. Balfour waited to give a copy of the telegram until British Intelligence had obtained a copy in Mexico so that the American and German governments would not suspect that their wires were tapped. Lansing was on a brief vacation when the Zimmermann Telegram came into the State Department. As soon as it was decoded, at 6 pm on February 25, Counselor Frank L. Polk, Acting Secretary of State, took it to the White House. Stunned and angry, Wilson said that he would make the telegram public at once. Polk persuaded him to defer decision on publication until Lansing had returned. The President said no more to Polk, but we know that the Zimmermann Telegram caused him to lose all faith in the German government and to believe that the unscrupulous military masters of the Reich would stop at nothing in their mad ambitions. According to his plan, Wilson went back to Congress in the early afternoon of February 26. No sooner had he begun to speak than someone entered the chamber of the House of Representatives to report that a German submarine had just sunk tbe Cunard liner Laconia with loss of American life. This word spread quickly through the chamber. American commerce to Europe had been virtually paralysed by the fear of submarine attack, the President said. The United States had to defend its commerce, and the only possible defence might be armed neutrality. Since Congress was
was now requesting specific authority 'to supply our merchant ships with defensive arms, should that become necessary, and with the means of using them, and to employ any other instrumentalities or methods that may be necessary and adequate to protect our ships and our people in their legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the seas'. Such a course would lead to war, Wilson emphasised, only if the Germans to adjourn soon, he
wanted it. There was some excitement about the Laconia sinking and a great deal of editorial approval of the President's speech in the newspapers on February 27, but there were few demands for war, and the country seemed united in support of armed neutrality as a possible alternative to war. Armed ship bills, introduced in both houses of Congress, were seemingly on their way to a speedy passage, although the House Foreign Affairs Committee was dragging its feet about granting the President power to employ 'other instrumentalities or methods' apart from arming ships. Lansing returned to Washington on February 27 and went to the White House at 11.30 am to talk about the Zimmermann Telegram. As the Secretary explained how the German Foreign Office had sent the message over the State Department wire, Wilson exclaimed 'Good Lord! Good Lord!' They decided to defer publication until the State Department had completed verification of the document. However, this was soon done — at least to their satisfaction (and more definitively by March 1) — and the President, believing that the people had a right to know the facts, had Lansing give a copy to the Associated Press reporter at 6 pm on February 28 with instructions not to release it until 10 pm.
The American tanker SS Illinois is sunk by a U-Boat, March 18. Between March 16/18 three American ships were sunk by U-Boats, and within a few days there were war parades in Philadelphia and Chicago
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Published in the newspapers on the morning of March 1, the hit the American people like a bolt of lightning from the blue. No other event of the war, not even the German invasion of Belgium or the sinking of the Lusitania, so stunned and angered the American people. 'The obvious duty of the American government,' cried the Cleveland Plain Dealer,
Zimmermann Telegram
Germany
German- American spokesmen claimed that the telegram was a 'brazen forgery'. They were silenced, and American anger exacerbated, when Zimmermann coolly admitted on March 3 that he had indeed sent the telegram 'is
to strike at
forthwith.'
to Eckhardt.
Throughout the country, the main effect of the Zimmermann disclosure was to intensify anti-German sentiment and provoke the first significant sentiment for war. Excitement almost to the point of panic raged through the House of Representatives on March 1, and that body approved the aimed ship bill by a vote of 403 to 13. Senators, too, were pressing for a vote, even though it was widely acknowledged that armed neutrality would soon lead to full-fledged belligerency. However, the'session of Congress would expire by constitutional limitation at noon on March 4, and a small group of senators, led by Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin and George W. Norris of Nebraska, took advantage of the rule of unlimited debate to talk the armed ship bill to death. Wilson, the Senate, and most of the country were furious. On March 5 Woodrow Wilson was inaugurated in the office of President for a second time. The United States, Wilson said in his inaugural address, had grown more and more certain that its great objective was peace. The nation stood firm in armed neu-
The Zimmerman Telegram is
splashed over the headlines —
war is now inevitable With similar headlines, newspapers throughout America reflect Zimmermann Telegram. Below left: Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, is shown leaving as relations are broken off — a few weeks before the Zimmermann Telegram exploded in Germany's face
Top
left:
public fury at the
trality,
rights.
might even be forced to a more active assertion of its But nothing could alter the national purpose to remain
true to the principles of international peace. The question of arming merchantmen was more than ever the main business before the administration during the week following the President's second inauguration, particularly since the German Admiralty had announced on March 2 that the period of grace for neutral ships was over and that hereafter submarines would sink them without warning. The best constitutional authorities in Congress had said that the President possessed full power as Commander-in-Chief to arm merchantmen, with or without the explicit authorisation of Congress. The Secretary of State and Attorney General confirmed this view in written and oral advice to the President on March 6. Wilson made his own decision on March 8 and announced it to the nation on the following day. At the same time, he called Congress into special session on April 16. Naval crews installed guns on Manchuria of the Atlantic Transport Line on March 13, and work proceeded on other vessels immediately afterward. Algonquin, an American steamer, was sunk by submarine shellfire in British waters without loss of life on March 12 — the first case of a ruthless sinking of an American merchantman since the announcement of unlimited submarine warfare. The incident set off only a few calls for war; indeed, American opinion seemed to be almost quiescent. There was new excitement upon receipt of news on March 15 that a liberal group in the Russian Duma had deposed the Tsar, formed a provisional government, and promised to carry on the war for democratic aims. 'Not since August 1, 1914,' said the New York Evening Post on March 16, 'has anything come out of Europe to stir the pulse and fire imagination like the news from Russia.' The Russian Revolution, many American editors affirmed, had given a whole new meaning to the war. As the influential New York weekly, The Nation, put it: 'The preservation and extension of liberties so rapidly won in Russia are now inextricably bound up with the success of the Allies. A German victory now would mean the collapse of free Russia.' Wilson reacted at once by extending recognition to the new Russian regime on March 22. The Russian Revolution gave no measurable impetus to the still weak war movement in the United States. It did, however, make the American people more willing to join the Allies when other events began to push them toward hostilities.
The country was rocked on Sunday, March 18, by receipt of news that three American ships — City of Memphis, Illinois, and Vigilancia— had been sunk between March 16 and March 18, the latter without warning and heavy loss of life. Now, for the first time, the demand for war burgeoned rapidly into nation-wide proportions. Mass meetings
in
New York demanded
immediate
hostilities.
Virtually all the intellectual leaders of the Socialist Party, the one organization in the country most implacably dedicated to noninvolvement, supported the demand, as did the heretofore antiof Kansas. On March 31, thousands paraded for war Philadelphia and Chicago, while mass meetings in Boston, Denver, and elsewhere echoed the belligerent rhetoric that was sweeping the country. The excitement, intensified by Roosevelt's demand for an immediate declaration of war, was already at a high pitch when Secretary Lansing went to the White House during the morning of March 19 to discuss the crisis with the President. The Secretary argued that war was inevitable. The President replied that he did not see how the government could do more than it was already doing to protect American ships. Wilson told Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels that afternoon that he still hoped to avoid war and wanted no effort spared to protect American ships. It was the greatest crisis in Wilson's life to this point, and he was in some agony of spirit. After talking to Daniels, he returned to the White House to receive Frank Cobb, the man generally recognised as the administration's chief spokesman among newspaper editors. There was no alternative to armed neutrality but war, Wilson said, but what could he do? He had tried every way he knew to avoid war. He knew what war meant (he had himself been a child of the Civil War). Cobb replied that war had been forced upon him. Yes, Wilson said, but American entry would upset the balance of power, and Germany would be so badly beaten that there would be a dictated peace. Moreover, America would go war-mad and be unable to heal the wounds of the world. The American people would grow intolerant and brutal. A nation simply could not fight a modern war and keep its head. It had never been done. 'If there is any alternative, for God's sake, let's take it.' Cobb replied that he could see no other choice. All members of the cabinet gathered at the White House in the early afternoon of the following day, March 20. It was no ordinary meeting, and the President went quickly to the main business at hand. He needed advice, he said, on two questions: whether to summon Congress earlier than April 16, and what he should recommend once Congress met. One by one the Cabinet members, including those who heretofore had been the most ardent neutralists, said that the President should call Congress into session as rapidly as possible and ask for a declaration of war. 'When at last every Cabinet officer had spoken.' Lansing recorded in his diary, 'and all had expressed the opinion that war was inevitable and that Congress ought to be called in extraordinary session as soon as possible, the President [said] in his cool, unemotional way: "Well, gentlemen, I think that there is no doubt as to what your advice is. I thank you." Thus ended a Cabinet meeting the influence of which may change the course of history.'
war Governor in
Wilson decides The President made
his
own
decision for
war on March
20,
most
probably during or immediately after the Cabinet meeting. On the following day, he called Congress into special session on April 2, 'to receive a communication concerning grave matters of public policy'. On the next day, he began to work on his war message. At the same time, and during the following days, he took every step constitutionally available to him to speed mobilisation. Abundant evidence of the most intimate nature has enabled us to follow Wilson in his reluctant journey on the road to war from the break in relations with Germany, through the period of watchful waiting, to the decision for armed neutrality. We are also fortunately not without considerable evidence revealing why he made the ultimate decision on March 21. He went to war, first of all, because he had concluded that armed neutrality was not a sufficient response to Germany's attack against American honour and sovereignty and, technically, would not be adequate to protect American ships and lives on the high seas. He said this in several letters at this very time. Moreover, the Zimmermann Telegram, to say nothing of other events, had convinced him that the military party was in the saddle in Berlin, and there was no prospect of any successful negotiations to protect American shipping. These, surely, were the most important reasons for the President's decision. Supporting them was his belief that the war was in its final stages — Europe, he was sure, could not endure another year of agony — and that American entry would greatly hasten its conclusion. Finally, he had come increasingly to the conviction
2019
that he could have a decisive influence over the peace settlement only as a belligerent. It might be added that Wilson did not make the decision for war because he thought that the Allies were in danger of losing— neither he nor any other American leader had any such fears. Nor did he think that the Allies were fighting for noble objectives, nor was he pushed into his decision by public opinion, although the obvious eagerness of important segments of the population to fight did facilitate his decision. The days until the meeting of Congress on April 2 saw conflict between the forces demanding hostilities and the still-strong peace organisations. There were mass meetings and counter mass meetings throughout the country, appeals and counter-appeals, and to this day it is impossible to measure their relative weight. All that can be said is that, while the war movement gathered strength, opposition, sometimes very intense opposition, to involvement was widespread throughout the country. It would persist after the declaration of war and create grave problems when national mobilisation was necessary. Actually, it did not matter, for the President had made his decision and knew that a substantial majority would support it once it was announced. Colonel House, who came to the White House on March 27, found Wilson engrossed in his war message. 'As usual,' the Chief Clerk of the Executive Office wrote in his diary on March 31, 'the President is sitting before his own little
The zones
of
within a few
Germany's unrestricted U-Boat campaign after February 1 — weeks US shipping losses had risen to an intolerable level
typewriting machine, and slowly but accurately and neatly, typing a message which will probably be his greatest State paper.' He had completed it by the late evening of April 1 and sent it to the Public Printer before breakfast on the following morning.
War
is declared Wilson waited impatiently all afternoon, Monday, April 2, for news that the two houses of Congress had completed their organisation and he could appear before them. The way was clear by late afternoon, and the President, accompanied by a troop of cavalry, left the White House at 8.20 and entered a packed and cheering chamber of the House of Representatives at 8.32 pm. Speaking in a conversational tone, he reviewed events since the break with Germany. It was now clear, he said, that the submarine war was a war against all mankind. Earlier he had thought that armed neutrality would suffice to protect American rights; now it was evident that it was ineffectual and would in any event lead to outright war. Then he spoke in graver tones: With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking, and of the grave responsibility which it involves, but in
unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defence but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.
2020
The entire body was on its feet, cheering wildly, before Wilson had finished this sentence. Once the pandemonium subsided, he went on to discuss the larger issues of the war and America's objectives. The nation would fight for the principles he had set forth in his speech to the Senate of January 22, 1917. It had no quarrel with the German people, only sympathy and friendship for them. The Prussian autocracy had given ample demonstration of hostility; the German government was the natural foe of liberty. 'The world,' he exclaimed, 'must be "made safe for democracy.' A few sentences more, and then the President concluded with words that have become immortal; It is a distressing and oppressive duty, Gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts— for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other. The applause, deafening in the House chamber, reverberated across the country and through the Allied world as men drank in these words. The country now awaited action by Congress. It was speeded by news on April 2 and April 5 of the ruthless sinkings of the armed American merchantman Aztec and of the unarmed Missourian. Majority Leader Thomas S. Martin of Virginia introduced a war resolution in the Senate on April 3. The session was prolonged into the night, but only because most senators wanted to avow their support and patriotism. Only a handful of opponents of war spoke — La Follette, from heavily GermanAmerican Wisconsin, for four hours, excoriating Wilson's alleged unneutrality; Norris of Nebraska, who said that the country was about to put the dollar sign on the American flag because it was fighting to protect war profiteers; William J. Stone of Missouri, in great agony of soul; and Asle J. Gronna of North Dakota and the fiery James K. Vardaman of Mississippi. All oratory exhausted, the Senate approved the war resolution by a vote of 82 to 6 at 11.11 pm. Debate began in the House on the following morning under a rule limiting speakers to 20 minutes each. Twenty congressmen, led by Majority Leader Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, spoke in opposition, but they were overwhelmed by more than 80 proponents of war, and the House approved the resolution by a vote of 373 to 50 at 3.12 am on Good Friday morning, April 6. The Speaker of the House of Representatives signed the resolution at once, the Vice President early the next afternoon. Wilson was at lunch when a messenger brought the document to the White House. He signed it in the lobby at 1.18 pm. Formal notice that the United States was at war went at once to all war vessels, naval stations, army posts, and diplomatic missions. Wilson signed a proclamation announcing a state of war and then, at 2.30 pm, went to a Cabinet meeting to discuss measures to speed the mobilisation already under way.
Further Reading
Birnbaum,
K. E.,
Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare (Almquist & Wiksell
1958)
AS., Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace (Princeton University Press 1965)
Link,
May, E. R., The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917 (Harvard University Press 1959) Spencer, S. R., The Decision for War, 1917 (Richard R Smith 1953) Tuchman, B., The Zimmermann Telegram (Viking Press 1958) S. LINK was born in Virginia in 1920 and grew up in North Carolina. He received bachelor's and doctor's degrees in history from the University of North Carolina in 1941 and 1945 respectively, and since then he has taught history at Princeton, Northwestern University and Oxford In 1965 he was appointed Edwards Professor of American History and in 1976 the George H Davis Professor of American History at Princeton University Besides editing The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Professor Link has written a five-volume biography of Wilson and many books and articles about the Wilson era He has twice won the Bancroft Prize for the best book on American history He lives in Princeton
ARTHUR
with his wife
and
their four children.
NIVEL
PLAN
Key to the trench deadlock or just another slogging match ?
By the end of 1916,
the omnipotence of 'Papa' Joffre was being questioned more and more, until it seemed that only the absence of an acceptable alternative maintained him in power. Against this backcloth a new star appeared in the ascendant — that of General Nivelle. He was convinced that he had the answer to the trench deadlock, and his confidence sold this idea not only to the French government, but also to Lloyd George, thus exploiting and widening the rift between Lloyd George and Haig. John Keegan. Above: Nivelle, man of vision?
2021
)
'The experiment has been conclusive. Our method has been proved. I can assure you that victory is certain. The enemy will learn this to his cost.' Thus Nivelle said to the Second Army, December 15, 1916, on taking his leave of it. What prompted such urging confidence? Was it in any sense justified? What was this 'method of which he boasted? And, whither was he bound in such evident high spirits? The answer to the last question comes first: he was on his way to assume command of the Armies of the North and North-East, meaning in effect that he had been chosen to succeed Joffre, the Commander-in-Chief, now promoted to be Technical Adviser to the French government—which did not want his advice and had created the post in order to be rid of him. It was an ungrateful act, motivated
Catholic, aristocratic — and too long associated with Joffre; Franchet d'Esperey was considered a political reactionary as well as being a Catholic; and, although Petain was not clerical, his obvious contempt for politicians repelled them.' It may be surprising that 'clericalism' (by which 'Republicans' meant the observance of Catholic practice, though sometimes only association with 'clericals' or membership of a 'clerical' family) should have been felt to constitute so overriding an objection to the promotion of otherwise admirably qualified soldiers at the height of a national life and death struggle. But political, which were also social, divisions went deep in France. Sarrail, the only avowedly 'Republican' (anti-clerical) of the senior generals, had been protected from the full consequences of his proven incompetence and flagrant insubordination precisely because his Republican friends in parliament would not accept the hurt to their pride which his dismissal would have caused. Joffre, though able to insist on Sarrail's removal from command in France, had thus had to accept his appointment to command in Salonika. But it was also part of Joffre's own strength that he was, if not 'Republican', at least not clerical either. How crucial was that factor in prolonging his term of command it
is
difficult to
judge but
it
is
a result of the latter's inexperience, he could continue to command the French armies, he was soon disabused. Nivelle quickly proved that he intended not only
command in his own right, brooking improper interference from no man, but that he intended to implement his own plans too, even if they should differ from those agreed by Joffre with the representatives of the Allies at the last Chantilly conference. There, on November 16, it had been decided, among much else, that the Anglo-French enterprise for the coming year should take the form of a joint offensive on the broad central stretch of Western Front from Vimy Ridge to the Oise, leaving unattacked only the worst of the line fought over during the Somme battle that summer; in terms of distance, the British and French would each assault on a 20/25 to
i
1 1
m
1 1
probable
that, failing the deliverance of a clear-cut victory on the Somme, he might have been replaced at any time from June 1916 onwards, had a politically suitable successor
emerged. None had done so. In late October, however, Nivelle's name began to buzz insistently around king-
making
and at Chantilly, where GQG, French General Headquarters, had for so long been located. The name was unfamiliar in the capital but res-
^^^^
1
by the French parliament's resentof the vast authority assumed and dispensed by Joffre in the 'Zone of the Armies' (a very considerable swathe of territory). The deputies resented his refusal to allow them entry to it without specific permission, which was rarely granted.
known about him?
ungrateful, the dismissal was not wholly unjustified. Joffre had long been a source of magisterial inspiration and continued to exercise calm and rational leadership. But, as was asked more and more frequently by observers of the interminable tragedy of trench warfare, was he a source of creative energy, of war-winning ideas? In influential places, the conclusion increasingly drawn was that he was not and the demand more and more insistently pressed was that he must go. In December, Briand, the Prime Minister, recognising that he could no longer maintain both his cabinet in power and Joffre in command, chose naturally to disembarrass himself of the victor of the Marne. In his place, he had decided to put but there had lain the difficulty. It was not that France lacked generals of proven ability. It was rather that her better generals did not, for reasons mostly political, commend themselves to the same men who would dismiss Joffre. 'Foch was in partial disgrace after the failure of his Somme hopes; Fayolie was too old and too Catholic; de Castelnau was also devoutly
His promotion to command of an army had been remarkably quick. Like Petain he had been in 1914 only a colonel, though of artillery, not infantry. He had handled his guns with great dash at the Aisne and later at Verdun in 1916 had succeeded in
"
-^™*'-
i\
fl
\
circles in Paris
pected at Chantilly as belonging to the of the Second Army which had recently (October 24) achieved a remarkable local victory on the right bank of the Meuse at Verdun, a victory which had reclaimed an appreciable slice of that bitterly contested sector at very small cost — microscopically small compared to that paid in its unavailing defence by the French during the spring. What else was
Kp 2*M
I
V 1
l^^J
5
commander chiefly
ment
But
if
.
2022
.
.
one difficult mission after another, culminating in the October counterattack. He was 'good-looking, smart, plausible and cool', according to General Spears, who observed him frequently from close quarters. He was half-English and spoke that language fluently. He was also a Protestant. This combination of qualities — religiously neutral, which guaranteed his acceptability to the Republicans; bilingual, which would commend him immediately to the British; victorious, which ensured his popularity with civilians; professionally effective and an innovator, which would impress soldiers (Joffre was one who had been impressed) — proved irresistible. By November Briand was conferring directly with Nivelle. In December he announced the succession. If Joffre
may have
believed, as it is thought he done, that through Nivelle, as
mile front, separated by a gap of about miles. The assaults were to be simultaneous, and supported by French diversions in Alsace and on the Aisne. There was also to be, by later agreement, a British attack in Flanders, designed to clear the Channel coast. (It would be the third battle of Ypres, if it came off. eight
Nivelle's earliest revelations of his intentions for 1917 were for something different in detail and entirely different in aim. They proposed widely separated fronts of attack for the British and the French, the British to attack between Arras and Bapaume, the French to make their main effort on the Aisne (a secondary front in the Joffre-Haig scheme) and a feint on the Oise. Far more strikingly, however, it laid down
far-reaching aims: 'In the offensive of 1917 the FrancoBritish armies must strive to destroy the main body of the enemy's armies on the Western Front. This result can be obtained only after a decisive battle, with superiority in numbers, considerable against all the available forces of the enemy. It is therefore necessary: to pin down as large a force as possible of the hostile forces; to break the enemy's front in such a manner that the rupture can be immediately exploited; to overcome all the reserves with which our adversary can oppose us; to exploit with all our resources the result of this decisive battle.' This was stirring stuff, of a sort un-
heard from a French general since 1914. it was also difficult to speak with conviction, or to hear with belief, for
But
rupture' and 'decisive 'breakthrough', were concepts which rang very hollow across the wastes of the Somme, Champagne and Artois. Not since September 1915 had a French commander committed himself to a promise of 'breakthrough'; and the failure of the French army in that battle made it difficult for another to do so again. But Nivelle, of course, had his 'method', or his 'formula' or 'secret' as he or members of his entourage sometimes called Of what did it consist? It had been it. tried out twice, on both occasions at Verdun, the first on October 24, 1916, the second on December 15. The numbers involved had been few — three divisions battle'
Nivelle's confidence
and enthusiasm offered success to politicians who had
given up hope Far left: General Mangin, Nivelle's subordinate at Verdun. This rough colonial officer, probably the greatest fire-eater among the French generals, was by his dash and enterprise largely responsible for the success of the last phase of the French counteroffensive at Verdun — success which allowed Nivelle to imagine that his tactics held the key to the trench deadlock. Left: General Mazel, commander of the French Fifth Army, one of the army commanders who had grave misgivings about Nivelle's proposed offensive. Right: Nivelle's plan, like so many plans good only on paper
on the
occasion, nine on the second. of attack had been narrow, about five miles, as also the depth of advance, about a mile and a half at each go. The duration, however, had been very short, in neither case exceeding two days, and the cost thus low. This had been due to the strength and precision of the artillery, which had directed a long bombardment onto the selected sector and turned its fire into a rolling barrage as soon as the attacking infantry had reached the German front line. It had also, by feints and ruses, forced the German counterbatteries to reveal their positions and then destroyed them before they could unleash their fire. This was the essence of the Nivelle 'method'. When practised on a larger scale, he planned to seize the German 'gun line' -the line of battery positions running parallel to the trenches at a distance of 1,000 to 3,000 yards behind -in the 'first bound' and thereafter, he felt certain, the infantry would progress, irresistibly, through the German support and reserve positions into open country. It was a splendid conception. But it was based on a falsely-drawn analogy. Since there was nothing scientific, in the strict sense, about the 'tests' which the 'method' had undergone at Verdun in October and December, there was no guarantee that he would be able to repeat his success in a large-scale offensive on a wide front. first
The frontage
Indeed, there were prima facie reasons for doubting the possibility, chiefly concerned again with artillery questions: if would, for example, be very difficult, without an
overwhelming superiority in heavy guns, which the French did not possess, to destroy the German counterbatteries on a major front by preparatory bombardment; and it would be very unlikely that the infantry would reach the gun-line in a 'single bound'.
These doubts, though in part prompted by hindsight, were felt by many at the time. Yet not with certainty, for Nivelle's plan embraced an undoubted truth: that it was the artillery which provided the backbone of the defence — 60% of all wounds, for example, were caused by shell blast or splinter — and if it could be knocked out of play, the infantry would be enormously assisted in working through the defended zone. It was, moreover, very difficult to replace from reserves and any front deprived of its artillery was hence rendered all the more vulnerable to any resumption of the offensive. Moreover,
old ex-ranker was blindly loyal to Haig, immovable in his defence, sensitive to the slightest hint of any attack on his authority and personally in awe of him.
In
Lloyd
George's
mind,
however,
had planted the germ immensely intriguing Lloyd George had always hated war
Nivelle's suggestion of a new and to him idea.
and,
by extension, disliked professional For unsuccessful generals he
soldiers.
naturally had, therefore, especially hostile feelings and the Haig breed, who organised battles in which hundreds of thousands were maimed or killed, he regarded, in spite, or rather because, of their insistence in representing such holocausts as victories, as murderous fools. He had not as yet
glimpsed any method by which Haig could be prevented from pursuing victories at such an enormous price. Haig had com-
there was the 'evidence' of the victories of
October and December with which to quell the fears of faint-hearts and the quibbles of critics and, above all, there was Nivelle's belief in himself, which was strong and consistent. His preoccupations were to be exclusively with securing the approval of all those whose co-operation would be necessary in order for his 'method' to be demonstrated on as large a scale as possible. The first of these was Haig, on whom he had succeeded in making a good initial impression. 'He was, I thought, a most straightforv/ard and soldierly man,' the Field-Marshal wrote in his diary for
December tion
20. The only matter tor contenbetween them that he perceived at
glance was 'relief — the taking over the British of more line from the French. The BEF had, of course, progressively extended its front southward and. in December 1916, held more line than it had ever done, but still less than a third of the total. Nivelle was anxious, as Joffre had been, that the British should take on another 20 to 25 miles south of the Somme, in order to release its French divisions for his 'masse de manoeuvre'. Haig was disposed to accommodate him, but caution prevented him from appearing to do so too quickly or completely. His first
by
answer to Nivelle, therefore, though couched in terms of general agreement, offered a relief of only eight miles of front. Nivelle's private reaction was nettled, leading him to set in train a sequence of
events which, whether foreseen by him or not, were to make amicable relations be-
tween him and Haig impossible, to leave Haig and Lloyd George on terms of open mistrust and to affect the Anglo-French alliance itself for the worst. The beginnings of the episode were in low key. Anxious that extra pressure be
bear on Haig over the question Nivelle suggested to Lyautey, the new War Minister, that a coming conference in London on December 26/27 would offer an excellent opportunity to lobby Lloyd George and Sir William Robertson, the CIGS, in this matter. In the event, Lyautey was able to win from them no firmer assurance than that they would put the point to the Field-Marshai. And in 'Wully' Robertson's case that was all he would think of doing. This gruff'
brought
to
of relief,
manded the BEF for over a year, enjoyed the King's, the people's, the soldiers', the Tories' and many of Lloyd George's fellow Liberals' confidence, while he had only just succeeded to the Premiership, and in an uneasy coalition government. Briand's treatment of Joffre had impressed him but he was realistic enough to recognise that he could not yet treat his own Commander-inChief likewise. Nor could he see any way to rescind or even to moderate his plans for future offensives, since he knew that Robertson and the General Staffs in Britain and France would unite with Haig to throw down a barrage of technical objections whenever he made counter proposals of his own — objections which he was too inexperienced to refute. Nivelle's appeal to the British government opened up, however, the possibility of using the French military authority to reinforce his own, a prospect all the more desirable since Nivelle's plan consigned the British to a secondary role in the coming battle, thus promising to spare the BEF, and Lloyd George's sensitivities, the sort of casualties it had suffered throughout the summer and autumn of 1916, while at the same time preventing Haig from undertaking the independent action at Ypres which he was known to be contemplating. These were as yet unconscious notions. Lloyd George had others in mind. One was to hamstring Haig's offensive capacities by lending troops and 2023
artillery
from the
BEF
to
Italy,
a pro-
posal he made at an inter-Allied Conference at Rome in early January 1917, much to the astonishment of his adviser's and the delighted surprise of the Italians. The project was not pleasing, however, to the French, who lived in terror of any diversion of effort from the 'principal front' (their owni. Among those coming forward to put their objections to Lloyd George was Nivelle himself, who had the Prime Minister's train stopped at a wayside halt on the return journey across France from Rome and presented himself, together with his plans. He lacked the
time
to
expound
but he was London.
in detail
in-
vited to do so shortly in London visit, on January Nivelle's 15/16, was an immense success, socially and politically. His charm and perfect
Whatever the quarrels of their commanders as to who should be under whose control, these French and British troops seem content to rest in the sun together. It was Nivelle's suggestion
2024
command
of English enraptured his His intelligence and pliancy delighted Lloyd George. Whether it was at this moment that they came to their understanding, with which they were very soon to astound Haig and his circle, remains unclear. Certainly between them they must have laid the groundwork. On Nivelle's return, he continued to deal courteously with Haig over their differences, appropriately enough since they concerned matters of detail rather than fundamental disagreements. On his own account, however, he was now working to take responsibility for such matters from Haig. Haig's principal concern in early February, after the settlement of the 'relief question on agreeable terms, lay with transport. The Germans' capture of many of the nodal points in the northern railway hostesses.
made with Lloyd George's approval, that the BEF should come under French command that poisoned permanently relations between Lloyd
George and Haig
system in 1914 had thrown a heavy strain on the working of those lines remaining in Allied hands, and the preparations for the British subsidiary offensive were threatening to raise it to breaking point. Haig's attempts to have the northern railways improved were not received as sympathetically as they might have been by French Headquarters, and he informed Robertson that in his view the differences could only be settled by conference between the Prime Ministers and Commanders-in-Chief. This was on February 14. Two days later Nivelle arrived at Montreuil witn proposals which quite mollified Haig. He was nevertheless informed by London that the conference to be held at Calais would take place all the same and he was provided with an
agenda mentioning only railways operations at Salonika as subjects.
and
It
was
swiftly
made
clear to
Haig when
he arrived there on February 26, to meet Lloyd George, Robertson, Briand, Lyautey
and Nivelle, that the horizons of the conference were to be drawn very much wider than he had expected. Within a brief time of its opening, and after the railway question had been summarily disposed of, Lloyd George announced that the moment had come for the frankest discussions of differences between the two Commandersin-Chief. Nivelle, asked to speak first, disclaimed any important disagreements but drew attention to Haig's unwillingness, already discussed between them, to attack on as wide a front as he had hoped. Haig, replying, explained that the French proposal would bring his assault up against the northern end of the Hindenburg Line (of the existence of which the Allies had
recently become aware), that he saw no prospect of breaking through that obstacle without a pause for preparation and that he therefore preferred to confine his front of attack to the Vimy Ridge sector. Lloyd George proposed that the disagreement be overcome by a settlement of command responsibilities and called on Nivelle to write a paper. The conference then dispersed temporarily. Haig and Robertson 'walked about till time to dress for dinner'. After the meal, which was convivial, Nivelle's paper was brought to Robertson. He did not know, since he had been deceived into absenting himself from the meeting of the War Cabinet at which its contents had been discussed, that it contained terms already approved by the two governments and that, in the form
shown
to
him,
it
had been brought
pre-
pared to Calais by Nivelle. Neither did he know that Lloyd George, through Robertson's own French liaison officer, had been dealing directly with Nivelle for ten days. What he immediately recognised from the brief
document was that the autonomy
of
Commander-in-Chief, which he had
the
done so much
to establish and was pledged was threatened with total demolition. The document proposed that from March 1 the French Commander-in-Chief was to have authority for all operational, supply and administrative matters over the BEF, which he would exercise through a British Chief-of-Staff and the Quartermaster-General, who would be transferred to French Headquarters. He would comto defend,
municate himself directly with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Haig would be left responsible for discipline. 'Wully's face' as he read, 'went the colour of mahogany, his eyes became perfectly round, his eyebrows slanted outwards like a forest of bayonets held at the charge — in fact, he
showed every sign
of having a fit. "Get .' 'Aig", he bellowed. Spears reports that, when Haig arrived, the two remained speechless for some time, .
.
dumb
with disbelief. Worse was to Lloyd George, when they at last confronted him, revealed that the Chiefof-Staff at Nivelle's headquarters was to be Sir Henry Wilson, the notorious francophile and Haig's nearest rival for power. Haig appeared to enter a state of shock. Robertson, whose career had inured him to hard knocks as no other general's, now began to recover and subjected Lloyd George to an interrogation which left ooth in a state of angry exhaustion and struck
follow.
the legitimacy of the proposals in doubt.
An
'odious proposal'
The debate was continued the following day, which began for Robertson with a disingenuous disavowal by Nivelle of any conception that the proposal was a surprise to Haig. A succession of meetings followed, at each of which Robertson grimly battled against the scheme, while Haig did little but looked pained. By the middle of the
morning Robertson had won back some ground and sensing that he would win no more, agreed to accept an amended draft. This omitted the odious proposal that a British Chief-of-Staff and the Quartermaster-General should transfer to French Headquarters and limited the duration of Haig's subordination to Nivelle to that of the coming battle. It also left intact his right of direct appeal to the War Cabinet, and allowed him some measure of operational control over his own forces. All present signed it. Haig appending to his own OOpy the words 'signed by me as a correct statement (of what had been agreed) but not as approving the arrangement'. The conference then dispersed, many of its members on as bad terms with each other as is possible, short ot violence, for men to be But the document had not really settled things. It could not of course compel Haig to willing subordination nor could it empower Nivelle to extract obedience from him. It yielded, in fact, continuing (and now exacerbated' disa:;:< aent, never fully dispelled even after the two commanders had been brou together again, in London on tory clauses.
By
that
March
time.
!.
sign clarifica-
. the drama
of
2025
Calais was about to be overshadowed by something altogether more spectacular: the fall of Briand's ministry and the swift erosion of Nivelle's authority over bis own generals. On March 14, General Lyautey was shouted down in the Chamber
Deputies enraged by his refusal to state secrets to them in open session. He immediately resigned. Within a week Briand was compelled to do likewise, being replaced by Ribot, with PainIf-vi % no admirer of Nivelle, as Minister of War. Immediately he was to be given material which would lend very solid weight to the mistrust he felt for Nivelle's
by
reveal
'method'.
By now, in the third week of March, not only had Nivelle had to postpone the opening of his offensive by nearly a month, because of inter-Allied and internal difficulties, but a situation had developed on the front itself which called into question the assumptions on which his plan was based. Beginning in the first week of March, the German forces on the front between Arras and Soissons had fallen back in stages onto the newly-constructed Hindenburg Line, of which an inspection suggested that it would defeat any casual attempt to breach it. And although Nivelle's main blow, that aimed at 'rupture', was planned to fall south of it, the subsidiary attack on the Oise and the British attack at Arras would both strike against it with part or all of their force. Moreover, the shortening of the front achieved by the Germans in so retreating had certainly yielded them a saving in divisions, which would be added to their counterattack reserve. (In fact it yielded 14, reducing Nivelle's superiority in divisions on the main front to five, a barely acceptable margin.) Faced with this situation, unspoken doubts long felt by some of the French army commanders began to be heard. The most important expression of misgivings came from a comparatively junior general, Messimy. He however was a Deputy, an ex-Minister of War, and in transmitting his statement directly to the Prime Minister, he made it clear that it conveyed the views of his own Army Group Commander, Micheler. Since it was his Group that was to attempt the 'rupture', misgivings on his part were important indeed and on the strength of them Ribot decided to call a
Infantry
Above: Petain, an obvious successor to Joffre, but unacceptable because of his outspoken manner. Right: Unity at the lowest level: the band of the 5th Australian Infantry Brigade is watched impartially by Indians, New Zea-
landers and British. Unity at a higher level to take longer to achieve. Below: The raw material of Nivelle's plan — the strength of the Allied armies on the Western Front, outnumbering the Germans but not by enough
was
British
French
Forces
Army Group
French Reserve
North
ArmyGroup Centre
51
27
25
5
2
5
French
French
ArmyGroup ArmyGroup 29
East
Total
29
161
2
14
Divisions
Cavalry Divisions
TENTH
Armies Corps
•6-
/ VIII
X IX II
Anzac
XI
XVII
V
XIV
XVIII
XIII
XI
1
IX
XXXI
1
VI
II
XV
XIV
XXXV
XX
V
XVII
XVI
Can Corps
VII
1
III
X
XXXIII
XXXVII
XXXII
XII
XV
VII
VIII
XVIII
Anzac
IV
1
Col
VI II
Col
XXXVIII
II
XXXIX XL
^
14
XXXIV XXI
XXX IV
2026
.,
Council of War, as provided for under the constitution of the Third Repuhlic. It met the day following Ri hot's receipt of Mesoimy's letter, on April 6, at Compiegne. The date now set for the opening of the Nivelle offensive was only ten days distant, a little near for the admission of second thoughts. Perhaps hecause time jogged so hard, the conference was extremely hadly conducted, no clear motion for discussion being put by either Ribot, Painleve or Poincare, the President of the Republic, to the assembled Army Group
definition, short of the gun line). Nivelle then offered to resign.
Commanders. Painleve merely explained again the factors he saw working against a
In so far as a final decision to launch the offensive was taken at all, it was taken at Compiegne. Thereafter, at any rate, neither the basis nor the details of the plan
for the offensive — the German withdrawal, the recent Russian Revolution
decision
and the prospect of American intervention.
He did not, however, call for its postponement or cancellation. The two Army Group Commanders involved, Petain and Micheler, being then asked to comment on Nivelle's plan, both revealed that they doubted if the attack could be passed beyond the German second position (by
All
present chorused their amazement at such a proposal and the politicians professed their support for him. On that note, the Council of War dispersed. 'The Army Group Commanders returned home, puzzled, and General Nivelle, assured of the government's complete confidence — which he had good cause to fear he did not actually possess — decided after some reflection not to press his intention to resign.'
were questioned. Nor were they significantly modified, and that despite the receipt of irrefutable evidence on April 7 that a fairly comprehensive outline of the operation had fallen into German hands three
therefore attack on April 9, on both sides of Arras, with ten divisions in line. The French Northern and Central Groups of Armies would also mount similar but not
simultaneous diversionary attacks on the
Somme and On April 12
in
Champagne
respectively.
(eventually postponed to the 14th, then the 16th) the GAR, Groupe des Armies de Reserve (but 'de Rupture' was the sycophantic thing to say in Nivelle's hearing), would launch its assault on the Chemin des Dames, that battle-torn ridge along whose crest Louis XV had once built a promenade for his daughters. Twenty divisions were scheduled to attack in the first wave, supported by 14 more and an enormous quantity of artillery. All that could be done by way of preparation had been done. Every man in the attacking force had been instructed in the 'method'. The only question which remained was: would it work?
days
earlier. After reflection, Nivelle affirmed his intention to proceed with things as laid down. The British would
[For John Keegan
's
biography, see page
96.
2027
.
Retreat to the
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2028
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.
During
2 to 1, by early 1917 the German armies in France were faced with the decision — withdraw to a shorter line, or continue to waste away in the same positions. The story of the masterly retreat
Outnumbered almost
to the
Hindenburg Line
Siegfriedstellung)
is
(or
told
by Leo Kahn
September,
Supreme Command
1916, of the
the German Army (OHL)
issued a series of orders for the planning and construction of strong defence positions behind the existing front in the West. This fortified belt was to run, in five sections, from the Belgian coast down to Pont-aMousson on the Moselle. The section between Arras and a point six miles to the East of Soissons, cutting off the large Noyon salient held by the army group of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, was considered the most important and the one to be completed as quickly as possible. Its German name was Siegfriedstellung; to the British it was to become known as the Hindenburg Line. The orders excited much anxious comment, and OHL was at pains to discourage speculations about an imminent retreat. To. provide against any possible emergency, it explained, was no more than prudence demanded, but they stressed that there was not the slightest reason to assume that such an emergency would actually arise. 'Just as we build fortresses in peacetime, we now build rear positions. Just as we have made ourselves independent of our fortresses, so we will keep away from these rear positions.' But at the time of Ludendorff's reassurances, the German war effort was at a critical stage; manpower, transport facilities, and building materials were already in precariously short supply and in such circumstances it seemed unlikely that Germany would contemplate a vast construction programme for the sake of a remote contingency. The scheme, in fact, signified the emergence of a fundamentally new outlook. Now for the first time Germany's war leaders were beginning to think in terms of 'strategic defence'. They were driven to this by the realities of the war situation, and they were able to do so in a creative manner because great progress had been made in working out new defence tactics to cope more effectively with the 'war of material' which the Allies
were waging. Most of the
credit
for
the
new
ideas
belonged to Colonel von Lossberg, who during the second half of 1916 was Chief of Staff of General von Below's Second Army- He had seen a great deal of active service, and twice — during the Champagne battles of 1915 and during the battle of the Somme in 1916 — he had been called in to reorganise and redirect the defence when the Allies had broken through the German lines. From this practical experience he had derived many far-reaching conclusions, of which the following are probably the most
• Massed lines
out, first
troops defending the foremost
were apt to suffer very heavily within most cases, being able to stem the tide of a determined assault. The front
zone, Lossberg decided, should be thinly garrisoned. The defenders, supported by
and machine gun barrages, should stand their ground, if possible; but failing this, it would be enough if they could break the initial impact of the attack and thus facilitate counterattacks from the rear before the enemy had time to consolidate. The strength of the resistance was to increase as the enemy, no longer fresh, moved forward. Instead of a rigid linear defence there was to be a defence in depth. • Related to the foregoing point was Lossberg's belief that the existing system of one, two or more supply trenches left the timing and direction of further advances to the initiative of the enemy and, again, entailed the risk of unnecessary heavy losses for the waiting defenders. Passive defence should be replaced by a mobile one. artillery
Lessons from the French While Lossberg had been making
his
experiments on the battlefield, a group of junior officers in the Operations
tactical
Section of OHL had elaborated a modern theory of defence from a few- principles contained in French Army instructions which
had
German hands
into
fallen
in
May,
some respects these
theorists went much farther than Lossberg considered sound, especially in their concept of elasticity in defence, but there was agreement about the desirable siting of positions and the basic principle of a mobile defence in depth. As long as the conservative Falkenhayn was in Supreme Command, the new ideas had no chance of official acceptance, but Ludendorff had a more flexible mind. He lent his name to a text book called Conduct of the Defensive Battle, which was. in fact, written by members of the group of officers mentioned, among them Colonel just Bauer, one of the most gifted of Germany's military thinkers. The text book, which was issued for use throughout the German
1915.
In
army on December
1916, contained the longer will the infantryman have to tell himself, here I stay and here I die.' The original Sieg-
telling
phrase:
1,
'No
planned on Below and the work under February 1917, and in-
friedstellung had still traditional lines, but Lossberg had visited
construction
in
been
alter
important:
on considerable extensions and improvements, the greater part of the Hindenburg Line was completed in strict accordance with the new methods of
• Defence
defensive warfare.
positions were usually sited on the forward slopes of hills or spurs, with art lien- observation posts placed on the crest. This had the obvious advantage that the enemy lines were in full sight, but it also exposed the defenders to the full force of a bombardment that would often cause crippling losses, demoralisation, and breakdowns in the communication between artillery observers and their batteries. As the i
weight of Allied bombardments and mine attacks increased, these disadvantages became decisive; and Lossberg realised that it would be better to deploy the defending forces on reverse slopes, the artillery observers being stationed well back, not far from their batteries. The German guns could then sweep the enemy lines as they advanced over the crest.
sisted
A typical Hindenburg position, as completed by March, 1917, was placed on a reverse slope in a depth of not less than 2,000 yards. The main line of resistance, or line trench system, lay about 600 first yards behind a front line of double sentry posts; these were allowed to fall back in the event of an enemy attack. The outpost zone (Vorpostenfeld) between the sentry line and the entrenchments was defended by a spaced line of piquets. Behind them, in support, small squads (StOSStrupps) in small dugouts of ferro-concrete called 'group nests', were ready to deliver immediate counterattacks. The outpost zone was thus rather thinly garrisoned; the battle was to be conducted, in the words o\' the text book instructions, 'not in a rigid
2029
manner by masses of men, but by an elastic defence by means of attacks using artillery, machine gun, rifle and trenchmortar though
fire
to the greatest extent'.
Even
it was not assumed that a really strong attack could be repulsed in the outpost zone, its impetus could be greatly diminished, and from then on the enemy would meet a second-stage defence on a very similar pattern, but on a much larger scale. Whereas in the outpost zone there had been thin lines of sentries and piquets supported by small assault squads, there were now the garrisons of the first and second trench, and the reserve battalions in the 'battle zone' extended some 1,500 yards behind the trenches, with corresponding functions. Miniature fortresses, the Widas, were placed chequerwise across the whole 'battle zone'; they had concrete
machine gun emplacements and were strong enough to hold out in isolation for a considerable time and harass an enemy advancing through the spaces between them. The attack, having lost its coherence, would then be exposed to the fire from the second line trenches or 'Artillery Protective -jne', and also to immediate counterattacks by the leading battalions of the counterattack divisions assembled close behind the second line. Moreover, by virtue of its
2030
would be concealed from the artillery observers of the attacksiting, the 'battle zone'
ing force, while the German observation posts, stationed 500 yards behind the front, would command a full view over the 'battle zone' and its approaches. After April, 1917; a 'rear zone' was added to the system, and later, when sufficient labour became available, a fourth zone, so that eventually the Hindenburg Line had a depth of 6,000 to 8,000 yards. The effort which had to be put into the construction of the new positions was prodigious. The Hindenburg Line, a little over 90 miles long and intended to accommodate 20 divisions, was scheduled to be completed within five months. This meant, in the first place, a very large labour force, which had to be housed, fed and kept
good health. Fifty thousand Russian prisoners of war did the rough work in the early stages, and 3,000 Belgian workers were employed in addition to the 12,000 in
German
soldiers and civilians working side by side in the labour companies. special network of light railways served the construction sites. The provision of enough rolling stock to transport building materials and machinery from all parts of Germany presented a particularly difficult problem. About 1,250 trains were used for
A
between the middle of Octo1916 to the middle of March, 1917. A large number of temporary workshops, goods depots, power stations and hospitals were erected behind the new positions.
this purpose ber,
Despite shortages, only the best materials for this building programme; the quality of the barbed-wire fences, for instance, was later to arouse the envious admiration of British soldiers. The most upto-date methods of standardisation and mass production were employed to prevent any waste of time, manpower or material. In short, the creation of the Hindenburg Line was, apart from its strategic significance, an obvious triumph of industrial skill and efficient organisation under military control, and this by itself did something to allay the anxieties which Germans felt in the absence of any spectacular successes in the field.
were used
Reluctant retreat
The work made good progress from the start, and soon there was no reason to doubt that it would be completed more or less within the set time limit, but the decision actually to withdraw into the new positions was taken only after some wavering and with great reluctance. The idea of a voluntary retreat went straight against
accepted doctrine, and it certainly did not suit Ludendorff' s aggressive temperament. Disengagement on so wide a front would be a difficult operation, involving the risk of an immediate, vigorous pursuit by the enemy. And there was also the danger that a retreat would completely demoralise the home front as well as the lower ranks of the army. It was Crown Prince Rupprecht, as commanding general of the army group directly involved,
Kuhl,
who were
and his Chief of Staff von the driving force behind
They finally summarised their arguments in a detailed memorandum which they submitted to OHL on January 28, 1917. The first response was still
the decision.
negative, but during the next few days, after several telephone conversations with Prince Rupprecht, Ludendorff changed his mind, and on February 4 the order for
',
carrying 'Operation Alberich' into effect was given: after a five weeks' period of preparation the withdrawal was to start on March 16. If in the end Hindenburg and Ludendorff overcame their deep aversion to the proposed retreat it was simply because they could not find an alternative strategy that held any promise of success. The decisive factor in the situation was the great numerical superiority of the Allied armies.
According to the careful calculations of the
German General Staff, the French commands would be
British and able to field 75 to 80 reserve divisions, not counting the Portuguese and colonial troops whicb
might be added. Against this, there were only 41 German reserve divisions available, including 13 freshly formed, as well as some divisions withdrawn, at some risk, from the Rumanian Front. A transfer of troops from the Russian Front was out of the question. It was also obvious by this time that the fighting quality of the German armies h;id reached a low ebb. Terrific demands had been made on them in the two and a half years' fighting on two major fronts, and the strain was beginning to tell. Of the highly skilled, professional junior officers
and NCOs only a few were left. 'The army on which we have to rely now,' Crown Prince Rupprecht declared bluntly, 'is no longer the old army; it is in urgent need of rest, reanimation, and training.' And there was another source of weakness: the stringent measures introduced by the military dictatorship in order to improve the sagging German war economy had as yet failed to reproduce the hoped-for results. It could be safely assumed that the Allies, aware of the balance of strength in their
favour, would try to force a major decision on the Western Front in the summer of 1917, but at the beginning of the year the German command still had no concrete knowledge of the Allied plan of campaign. In 1916 the Allies had concentrated their main offensive effort on the narrow front astride the Somme, making it possible for the Germans to call in reinforcements from the quiet sectors of the Western Front and thus to prevent a breakthrough. The mistake was not likely to be repeated: the Allies would probably attack several sectors at the same time, but it was impossible to predict which. To forestall Allied attacks by a big German offensive was the strategy which would have appealed most to the German leaders, and the possibility was thoroughly examined during the later months of 1916. But in the end the idea had to be abandoned. The available forces were not strong enough to make a major success reasonably certain, and anything less than a major success would only worsen an already dangerous situation. If large forces of both sides were committed in a drawn-out battle on one sector of the front, it would be the Allies with their greater reserves who could launch simultaneous attacks in other sectors and possibly achieve a break-
AWCHBISHOP MITTY HIGH SCHOOL MEDIA CENTS* SAN JOSE. CALIFORNIA 9512B
2031
through. The alternative of a series of local attacks with limited objectives was also idtred and rejected. There was the inevitable risk that any such operation would develop into something much larger than intended, and again it would be necessary to tie up more troops than could be spared for a diversionary purpose. Thus the Germans gradually resigned themselves to the fact that on the Western Front the initiative would have to be left to the Allies for some time to come; the only hope was thai the German defence would hold until the confidently expected success of the unrestricted U-Boat campaign would turn the tide again in Germany's favour. Once so much was admitted, Crown Prince Rupprecht's arguments for an early, voluntary withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line in preference to a rigid defence of the existing front line
became
irrefutable.
13 divisions saved The memorandum
of January 28, 1917 vivid description of the
gives a terse, appalling conditions which prevailed in the positions occupied by the army group of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. Parapets and trench walls were crumbling; the drainage system was failing everywhere, and the men in the trenches stood up to their breasts in mud; only a very few of the dugouts in the front lines were still fit to be
2032
During the bad winter weather all attempts at repair work were extremely tiring and at the same time dispiriting, for they achieved little. The troops were worn out and miserable, and it could not be expected that in the forthcoming battles they would display anything like the same fighting spirit and resilience as they had shown in the summer of 1916. In the new, immeasurably safer, positions they would find some much-needed rest and, no doubt, regain their confidence. Even more compelling was the argument that a withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line would shorten the front by 25 miles. Taking into account that the new front sector would have to be less heavily garrisoned than the old-style trench system, the result would be a saving of 13 divisions, which could be used as reserves to be brought to any sector between the Belgian coast and Switzerland where they might be needed used.
for
an attack.
Some generals, Prince Rupprecht's own army commanders among them, still protested that a retreat would give too much
encouragement to the enemy and that it was bound to impair the German army's will to resist. The German soldier, they predicted, would not understand why the
positions for which his colleagues had sacrificed their lives in the battle of the
Somme fight.
should
now be given up without a
But Ludendorff was a
realist;
and
in
the long run he could not close his eyes to the truth that under the circumstances the likely advantages of a withdrawal decidely outweighed the risks. Hindenburg did not exactly approve, but as usual he made no difficulties: 'So it is to be retreat on the Western Front, instead of attack', was his
sad and simple comment. As already mentioned, the real risk involved was that an alerted enemy, pur-
suing promptly and energetically, could inflict heavy losses on the retreating forces. But the Germans made every effort to conceal their intentions, and they also had luck on their side. Towards the end of October 1916, the British learnt from different sources that construction work was being carried out in two places far behind the German lines, but the two items of information did not seem connected, and little attention was paid to them. During the following three months the interrogation of German deserters and Russian POWs escaped from the Germans gradually revealed that a new defensive position was being built, but information concerning its design, strength and precise course remained vague. Little could be learned by aerial reconnaissance. The exceptionally wet and foggy weather made observation and photographing from the air impossible
most of the time. Moreover, just at that period the Royal Flying Corps was at its weakest. The German planes were much superior in performance, and the British airmen, fighting against odds, concentrated their efforts on the three German reserve lines which lay between the front and the Siegfriedstellung, without being able to go further afield. Thus, by the middle of February 1917, not enough facts were known to suggest the possibility of a German retreat over a wide front, and events in the second half of the month did more to mislead than to enlighten the British GHQ. On the 17th and 18th, General Rawlinson's Fourth Army attacked the town of Miraumont in the Ancre sector, and although the action had but a for
limited success, continuing British pressure induced Prince Rupprecht to order, a few days later, a local withdrawal to the first reserve line (R 1). This was an improvised measure outside the Alberich programme, and it only confirmed the mistaken British belief that the Germans were contemplating a stage-by-stage retirement to their existing reserve lines. It was not before February 25 that the British gained a fairly accurate knowledge of the course of the Hindenburg Line opposite Fourth Army's front without being sure how far it reached into the sector. From then onwards, Intelligence work discovered more and more indications that the Germans were intend- | ing to withdraw to the new line in one S quick operation; but it was too late to 5
French
make adequate
preparations for an effec- g
tive interference.
«
Long before the German High Com- | mand had finally decided on the retreat, it I
British artillery horses cross an area flooded by the Germans. Unspoilt country like this acted
ike atonic on men accustomed to the
cratered mudscape of the battlefield
SuiiiHic <
I
&.
after September 1916, of the Hindenburg Line marked the emergence of a fundamental in the outlook of Germany's military leaders, a change to the concept of 'strategic defence' in response to the 'war of material' which was being waged by the Allies. typical Hindenburg
The planning, change
A
position was on a reverse slope, not less than 2,000 yards deep. First there was a front line of doub sentry posts, and then, 600 yards behind, the first line trench system (main line of resistance Between the sentry posts and the first line trench there Were squads in small ferro-concrete dugou The second line of defence was on a very similar pattern, but on a much large le. Later, third and fourth zones were added, producing a network of underground passages and shelte
had defined the measures it considered necessary to impede any pursuit by the in the event of a withdrawal. An older issued by Ludendorff on October 2, 1916, contains the following passage: 'It is also necessary to make thorough preparations for the complete destruction of all railways, roads, bridges, artificial waterways, towns and villages, and all the depots and installations that we shall not transport to the rear, but which might be of any use to the enemy. The enemy must find a completely devastated territory offering the greatest difficulties to his
enemy
movements.' These were extremely harsh measures. The Germans were well aware of it, but willing to suffer the opprobrium of a earth' policy for its real and presumed advantages. The programme did
'scorched
not only provide for the demolition of buildings and other objects of direct military significance, but also for such matters as the destruction of private dwellings, the cutting down of fruit trees, the pollution of wells, and — worst of all, perhaps — the wholesale removal of inhabitants. Crown Prince Rupprecht
protested sharply against some of the orders he considered excessive; at one stage he even threatened to resign. Any possible advantages, he thought, would be more than outweighed by their discouraging effect on all who were striving for a negotiated peace acceptable to both the warring sides. Even from the point of view of military expediency, some of the measures did not seem to him to be justified. Would not, for instance, empty ruins provide at least as good a shelter for the British and French troops as inhabited houses? He also feared that the discipline of the German soldiers would suffer; predicting— all too correctly, as it turned out — that very many of them would interpret the orders as a licence to destroy things for 'the sheer fun of it'. There were
undoubtedly
many Germans who
felt like
the Crown Prince of Bavaria, but he was the only one to speak out; and when a strong appeal was made to him in the name of patriotic unity, he, too, gave in. The evacuation of the inhabitants, eventually carried out very shortly before the retreat itself, added greatly to the problems of transport, food supplies and
housing. About 14,000 French civilians — people, children, invalids, and some women — were assembled in selected places exempt from the devastation orders and so left to be looked after by the Allied army administrations; over 125,000 of them who were fit to work had to be moved back bebehind the Hindenburg Line, where they were further embittered by living conditions of considerable hardship. The staff work on which Operation Alberich relied was all too efficient and impressive. The removal to the rear of installations, provisions and materiel of all sorts obviously required a large and complex organisation; in the parlous state of the German war economy nothing of any potential value to the army was to be destroyed or left behind. The necessary apparatus had been gradually built up since October, 1916, and during the five weeks of final preparations for the retreat it was able to accomplish its task in the old
evacuation zone with clockwork precision. Nearly a thousand trains were running day and night during those weeks; 20 pioneer companies and ten companies of engineers were needed for the dismantling of the railway installations alone after everything else had been removed. By the middle of March, as scheduled, the work was completed, and on the 16th, all the 35 divisions in the sector simultaneously started on their march back to the Hindenburg Line. This operation, too, went without a hitch. Within three days the whole army corps was established in the new positions. Was the British command in any way to blame for the fact that the German withdrawal succeeded so smoothly? In his history of the war General von Kuhl,
who directed the operation, states that the British pursuit was hesitant and not very skilful, while the French in their much smaller sector of the front exerted prompt and energetic pressure. The British Official History is less critical. It admits that the British were rather slow in appraising the situation, but points out that the army commanders had every reason to proceed cautiously. The evacuated German front zone had become a sea of mud during months of heavy shelling and long periods of incessant rain; the roads were hardly recognisable as such, so that it was impossible to bring up artillery and heavy supplies in support of a rapid advance, and behind this zone was the territory so thoroughly devastated by the Germans. In such conditions it was no easy task to deal with the German rearguards who, though comparatively few in number, were firmly entrenched in carefully selected positions. Moreover, the possibility that the Germans had prepared heavy counterattacks—as indeed for a time they had considered doing— had to be reckoned with.
The
Official
History suggests that:
might be argued that, had the British troops and staffs been less under the influence of trench warfare and more alert. they would have gained some local advantages over the enemy in the period of the first limited withdrawal. This is possible, though not certain; but it is 'It
Top
left:
Withdrawal
in
the face of a closely
scarcely possible that they could, in any case,
On of the
have accomplished more than the
German
side, there
damaging morale
effects
that.'
was no sign about which
the generals had been worrying so much. Their obsession with the question of prestige and territory lost or gained was no longer shared by the rank and file. On the contrary, after the long ordeal of a rigid defence in wretched conditions, the spirit of the troops rose at the prospect of mobile action. Besides, they still had great faith in the men who had taken over the supreme command half a year previously. The German soldiers did not know all the reasons which lay behind the momentous decision, but they were instinctively convinced that
Hindenburg and Ludendorff 'knew what they were doing'. On the Allied side, it is true, the news was at first greeted with joy as evidence of German weakness, but that mood soon evaporated when it was realised that the Germans had merely strengthened their position. For, in fact, the retreat achieved everything the OHL had intended it to achieve. It solved, at least for a time, the problem of inadequate reserves. It provided a tired-out army corps with the opportunity to recuperate and to be thoroughly instructed in the new techniques of defensive warfare. It could be assumed that the British would not try to attack the Hindenburg Line before they had restored the destroyed communications and established firm assault positions; and if they did, they would be walking into a
The withdrawal had actually more results than the Germans themselves realised. One would have to trap.
far-reaching
analyse in detail the Allied plans for 1917 and to anticipate later events in order to explain the full significance of the German move. But it can be stated briefly as a generally recognised fact that the retreat completely disrupted the Allied plans and was one of the main factors that made it possible for the Germans to survive a very critical year.
Inasmuch
as the art of strategy consists a large extent in responding in the best possible manner to situations as they arise, the creation of the Hindenburg Line and the retreat into it were undoubtedly to
a master-stroke on Ludendorff's part. He clearly foresaw the dangers which he would have to face in 1917 and prepared for them in time. He grasped the potentialities of the new tactics developed by Lossberg and others, and against his own natural inclination and that of most of his advisers he accepted Crown Prince Rupprecht's sound advice at the right moment. And once he had made decisions, he took full responsibility and backed them with all the forcefulness for which he was famous. But it must also be said that the story reveals his limitations. He had gained time, but he still had no idea how the war could be brought to a tolerable end. Further Reading Bauer, Major. Der Grosse Krieg in Feld und Heimat (Tubingen 921) Edmonds, Sir James E History of the Great War, Military Operations in France and Belgium 1916 (Macmillan 1940) Lossberg, Fritz von, Meme Tatigkeit im Welt,
krieg 1914-1918 (Berlin 1939)
engaged enemy, even when conducted as brilliantly as the German retreat, involves casualties. Here a wounded German is
Wynne, Captain G. C If Germany Attacks (Faber&Faber 1940)
carried to a Field Dressing Station. Left: Mopping up after the German retreat
[For Leo
.
Kahn 's
biography, see page 480.
]
l'0;;7
THE FALL OF BETHMANN-HOLLWEG Rising prices, static wages and the shortage of many basic imported raw materials conspired to make Germany in 1916 a very bleak place in which to live. The Chancellor, BethmannHollweg, found himself under fire from both left and right, and his dismissal could not be far away. H. W. Koch
OHL under Falkenhayn and his replacement by the victors of Tannenberg. Falkenhayn's failure to break through at
'Valentini (the head of the Kaiser's Civil Secretariat) tells me there is an intrigue originating from an unknown source whose objective it is to convince Hindenburg that
the second
the Chancellor is endeavouring to have Ludendorff removed from the High Command. Hindenburg responds with the intention of toppling the Chancellor without however knowing who could occupy his .' place This diary entry made on December 30, 1916 by Admiral von Mueller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet, is one of the early pointers to the emerging conflict between Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and the
with Austria-Hungary's Chief of the General Staff, Conrad von Hbtzendorff, over the question of German support in the Dolomites and along the Isonzo Front — which Falkenhayn had refused — were sufficient to mark him as a general without luck. This impression was underlined by the Russian Brusilov offensive in June 1916 under the impact of which the
.
High
.
Command
of
Hindenburg and Luden-
It was a bitterly ironical conflict since Bethmann-Hollweg had been one of the main forces bringing about the fall of
dorff.
2038
Verdun
in 1916, his deteriorating relations
Austro-Hungarian forces showed signs of The Russian capture of the Bukovina was the signal for Rumania's declaration of war on the Central Powers. The atmosphere of crisis was thickened by disintegration.
the initial success of the Allied Somme offensive, which aided the efforts in the Reichstag of the Catholic Centre Party deputy Mathias Erzberger who had already for some months been agitating in favour of the replacement of Falkenhayn by Hindenburg and Ludendorff, men whose reputain Germany had reached almost mythical proportions. News from Vienna reported memoranda circulating in 'official circles' in which the opinion was expressed that a victory of the Central Powers was, 'with mathematical certainty', impossible. What was proposed as the only feasible alternative was a compromise peace 'at a phase (of the war) militarily favourable for us'. The spectre of the estrangement of
tion
-
Germany's only major ally, military crises East and West, pressure from Germany's other ally, Bulgaria, for military assistance, and public agitation inside Germany ranging from the pan-Germans to in both
the
Socialists,
ultimately
led
a willing
Bethmann-Hollweg to give support to the demands for Falkenhayn's replacement as Chief of the OHL. Nor was the Kaiser inclined to support his luckless general and on August 29, 1916 the third OHL, under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, took up its task. The Verdun offensive was abandoned, the Allied Somme offensive was brought to a halt in the late autumn, while in the east the second and third Brusilov offensives failed and Rumania was defeated. Thus the apparent mastering of the crises on the major fronts added new laurels to the Hindenburg-Ludendorff team and this in turn gave further encouragement to the tendency of every military apparatus, which manifests itself when faced with weak political institutions — the tendency to
begin to
make
Germany's
political decisions.
institutional framework, the
primacy of the military over
politics, en-
Hindenburg-BethmannHollweg honeymoon was of only short duration. The first major issue which
sured
that
the
crystallised the military-political conflict was that of the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, a decision based on the implicit realisation that in spite of the stabilisation of the fronts no quick military decision could be expected on land. Bethmann-Hollweg was compelled to waive his objections, last but not least because he
could not meet the arguments put forward by the army and the navy that Germany's domestic situation necessitated a quick but victorious conclusion of hostilities.
While Bethmann-Hollweg had
still
been
able to declare before the Reichstag in December 1915 that Germany possessed sufficient food supplies to hold out for a
prolonged war, a year later Germany's prestockpiles had been completely exhausted. The harvest of 1915 had been satisfactory, but that of 1916 was a disaster, and the daily ration of flour was reduced to 200 grams (just under j lb) per head. Shortages in the potato crop led to shortages of fodder for livestock which in turn reduced the output of meat and dairy produce, especially milk and butter which by 1916 fell by one third as against the output of 1915. The supply of pork fell by 907, between 1915 and 1916. Food shortages seriously affected the German population for the first time early in 1916 when the absence of meat led to increasing reliance upon potatoes — to the extent that in the spring of that year these were rationed, the official daily ration being lb per person. During 1916 potato consumption increased, according to income group, to between two and two and a half times that of the prewar consumption. By the summer of 191 (^ potato rationing had become meaningless as potatoes were no longer available. Flour, 'enriched' by a wide variety of chemical substitutes, was supplied instead.
war
1
Naked
reality
Obviously those most seriously affected were those in the lower income groups who had virtually no meat in their diet. The possession of meat coupons was one thing, the availability of meat on the open market quite another; members of the lower
income groups could not afford to buy from the flourishing black market; -hunger for them was no longer a spectre but naked reality. Furthermore, as the number of workers in the armaments industries increased, particularly of women and children, so did the need for their proper nourishment, a need which remained on the whole unfulfilled; causing, slowly at first, a feeling of war weariness. Rationing had not guaranteed the supply )f foodstuffs, nor did it guarantee price stability. The price for 500 grams (about 1 lb) of beef doubled between November 1915 and April 1916. The introduction of maximum prices for various vital food commodities by governmental decree did not bring about price stabilisation but only the withdrawal of scarce commodities from the open market. Over the same period, the price of potatoes nearly doubled, that of butter more than doubled, while that of horsemeat quadrupled. An egg which cost seven pfennigs in 1914, cost 23 in 1916. The attempt to centralise food distribution in 1916 by the creation of the Kriegsernaehrungsamt, the wartime food supplies administration, achieved little, and the discrepancy between the food supplies needed and their actual availability remained. Neither rationing nor ceiling prices alleviated these serious conditions. On the contrary, the search for a remedy was soon given up and the authorities reverted to palliatives such as the planting of sunflowers along railway tracks to gain vegetable oil. The emphasis was placed upon the production of 'substitutes' and Germany's chemical industries flourished.
be sold publicly — and then only in return for meat coupons. By comparison, the front line soldier was better fed than the civilian population at home. But then it was a cardinal point of official policy to keep troops well fed even at the expense of the home front. However, this policy had at least two negative consequences. Firstly, soldiers returning from leave at home brought back demoralising stories of their experiences of starvation at home, and secondly it led to army supply depots becoming one of the major suppliers of enterprising black marketeers, many of
whom did not hesitate to travel as far as Brussels to return with a railway wagon full of choice meat and other scarcities. While industrial wages remained relatively stagnant, the cost of living index, taking 1913 with 100 as the base line, had risen to 329 by 1917. Naturally a situation such as this was to have serious repercussions upon the morale of the German civilian popula-
bound tion,
and
directly action.
its
growing war weariness
pressed for a decisive
in-
military
Bethmann-Hollweg's
manage and
failure to control the situation at home
handed the initiative to the army and the navy who argued that only the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare could force Great Britain to her knees and thus end the war. Bethmann-Hollweg could only oppose this with political arguments but not with any practical steps which would have lessened the pressure in favour of a quick decision.
'Turnip winter' Germany's food supplies reached a low ebb during the winter of 1916/17. The disastrous harvest of 1916 and the catastrophic-
Austria-Hungary was also undergoing grave problems which in turn affected Germany. Emperor Franz Josef had died in November 1916, and was succeeded by the 29-year-old Archduke Karl, a man of weak character, heavily dependent upon the advice of others, particularly on that
ally low yield of the potato crop affected
of his wife
population and livestock alike. In spite of
numerous government measures
to
in-
crease agricultural productivity, shortage of
manpower
initially
caused
it
to fall.
As
the manufacturing industries worked primarily for the war effort, shortage of agricultural implements, mechanised farming equipment and tractors became acute. Equally acute was the shortage of artificial fertilisers.
The winter of 1916/17 brought home the hardships of war to all sectors of the community in Germany. Potato rations were reduced in many areas of Germany to 3 lb per head weekly. As the potato became a rarity the turnip gained in prominence, and this particular winter was called 'turnip winter'. It was used as a substitute for potatoes, introduced into flour for baking bread and also used in the manufacture of jam. While during the prewar years the daily consumption of foodstuffs averaged 2,280 calories, by March 1917 it had sunk to a level of an average of 1,000 to 1.100 calories. Under such circumstances it is hardly surprising that flour was produced from hay ground to fine powder, jam from water, turnips, gelatine and colouring agents, and blancmange from various kinds of glue. Inedible and indigestible 'raw materials' also entered into the manufacture of foodstuffs, for instance plaster of Paris, sand and machine oil. The use of 'substitutes' in the manufacture of sausages was so great that in 1917 only 28 of 90 sausage brands submitted for official approval were allowed to
Empress Zita of the House of Bourbon-Parma and of Count Czernin, his Foreign Minister. The shortage of food-
Austria as hard as Germany but the centrifugal forces of a multi-national empire made their pressures increasingly felt. The fact that Germany — in order to find an additional ally in the east — had proclaimed an 'independent' Poland in November 1916 hardly helped matters. Moreover, the growing political ascendancy stuffs hit
of
Hindenburg and Ludendorff in Germany the suspicion and fear — duly
increased
nourished by Karl's wife — that the Hapsburg Empire was gradually becoming Germany's satellite. Karl I, without Czernin's knowledge, established contact with
his
brothers-in-law, both serving armies, and suggested
officers in the Allied
a separate peace between Austria-Hungary and the Allies. Although Karl's attitude is explicable in view of the fears of German hegemony and the actual hardships of war his country had to suffer, it also corresponds with his basic attitude expressed in August 1914 when he stated that only a Franco-Austrian alliance would liberate Austria from the shackles of the 'Prussian alliance'. His feelers proved abortive,
mainly because although he was ready jettison the interests of his
German
to
ally.
he refused to give up Austria's war aims with regard to Italy, while on the other hand France and Great Britain were not prepared to sacrifice their alliance with Italy. The entire manoeuvre proved rather embarrassing to Emperor Karl when
Clemenceau
had
Karl's
letter
to
his
2039
"T
brother-in-law Prince Sixtus (intended to be forwarded to Poincare) published. The March Revolution in Russia threw Germany's leaders into confusion. But Bethmann-Hollweg read the signs of the times correctly and used the occasion to hold a speech before the Prussian Diet in favour of the abolition of the three-classfranchise, a speech warmly endorsed by the Kaiser But the Junkers were not amused. The spectre of the revolution in Petrograd haunted them and they enlisted the Empress for their cause. On March 18, 1917 Mueller recorded: 'Among our Junkers anger increases against the Chancellor's democratic speech in the Diet. The Empress called for Valentini and told him that she would have no part in the Chancellor's politics. Let's hope she makes no politics at
all.'
On the German
public the
March Revolu-
an equally deep impression. Most profoundly affected were of course Germany's Social Democrats who had supported the government's policy under the common denominator of a crusade against tion left
Tsarist despotism, the personification of tyranny. However, the reception of the news of revolution varied even within the SPD. The abdication of the Tsar was greeted with deep satisfaction, but it soon became obvious that the revolution had not brought to the fore the Russian 'proletariat' but an imperialist-minded bourgeoisie. As a result, it was feared that the March Revolution, instead of furthering the cause of peace, would provide the Russian middle classes with a cause worth fighting for and instil new vigour into their warweary troops. Spokesmen of the left wing
Within a matter of days the Chancellor expressed his own concern about the German domestic scene, underlining the shortage of foodstuffs and the effect upon the masses of the Russian March Revolution. On April 3, 1917 Emperor Karl and his wife who visited the Kaiser in Bad Homburg looked rather gloomy as well. Czernin spoke quite openly to Mueller, 'I will tell you something: if the war does not come to an end within the next three months, then the people will put an end to it without their governments.' Two days later the Kaiser states that Mueller 'spoke of our internal situation. One would have to give assurances to the people for greater liberalisation and that would have to be done immediately. He intends to issue an Easter message for the people in the form of a proclamation by the Chancellor granting
weapon of
the struggle for peace. As an immediate practical step we recommend the organisation of a general strike in all countries for May 1, 1917! To many sections of Germany's population, especially those who had been hit hardest by the food shortage and who had
managed to survive the 'turnip winter', the overthrow of Tsarism was bound to appear as the dawn of a new horizon; they were receptive to agitation which called for an end to the senseless slaughter. At the end of March 1917, 26,000 workers in the Kiel naval shipyards downed their tools and went on strike. This action had been preceded by an incident in the Ruhr coalfields, involving 20,000 men who struck for higher wages, better food and shorter hours. Clashes between strikers and police increased in frequency. Even more disturbing to the government were reports that in many instances such as in Berlin and Munich the policemen had apparently ignored their orders and turned a blind eye to the activities of the strikers. Regional organisations of the SPD in Saxony, Thuringia and Brunswick, in the Rhenish- Westphalian industrial area as well as in cities like Leipzig and Halle, publicly denounced the support which its parliamentary party in the Reichstag gave to the government. This represented a current of opinion within the SPD going back to 1916 and which
just
between March 31, 1916 and March 31, 1917 had led to a total of 190,000 SPD resignations from the party. On April 16 1917, 100,000 Berlin munitions workers went on strike. Within a matter of days the number of strikers had increased to 400,000 and was the greatest strike Germany had
universal franchise after the war.'
so far experienced during the war. Various
This Bethmann-Hollweg did, promising that after the war the three-class-franchise would be abolished and the Prussian Upper House reformed. Younger elements in the German army believed that these reforms would be politically meaningful only if carried out at once and if they coincided with a negotiated peace. His opinion was shared by Walter Rathenau, the economist, who also argued in favour of a separate peace with Russia 'at any price'. The Easter message put Bethmann-Hollweg under pressure from both sides. On the one hand conservative diehards accused him of making premature concessions to the mob, to 'the forces of revolution', while on the other hand his message smacked of 'deception' in that its contents were to be implemented only after the war. OHL feigned surprise that it had not yet sufficiently prepared the ground for negotiations for a separate peace to take place between Russia and Germany. When the Social Democrats sought to pass a resolution in favour of peace without annexations Hindenburg concluded that BethmannHollweg was no longer able to control the Socialists and demanded his removal. The Kaiser countered this demand by referring to Bethmann-Hollweg's majority in the Reichstag and the great reputation he enjoyed in southern Germany and Austria. To force Bethmann-Hollweg's hand Hindenburg and Ludendorff now drew up a list of German war aims, with particular reference to the East. Bethmann-Hollweg immediately saw through the manoeuvre and, realising the vulnerability of his own position, lent his signature to the document (which he virtually nullified in a minute at the German Foreign Office).
attempts by the SPD to expel party members who did not toe the more moderate party line proved futile.
2040
Middle class support The German working Hindenburg, senior member in the partnership from Bethmann-Hollweg
that took over
SPD denounced the war and in April 1917 separated from their party, creating the Independent Socialist Party (USPD) which was joined by the extreme left wing Spartacus League under Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg. The Independent Socialists demanded that because of the Russian Revolution Germany would have to democratise her institutions: to a democratic Russia a democratic Germany must profer the hand of peace. A Germany whose policy is determined by the spirit of the Prussian Junker caste will be viewed by the new Russia as a danger to herself. And it is understandable that neither a liberal bourgeoisie nor the working class will be ready to make peace with Germany until all means leading to the overthrow of the dangerous enemy have been exhausted. Scheidemann demanded the immediate implementation of the reforms promised in the Easter message. The Spartacus League within the USPD took what at the time appeared a more extreme attitude. One of their leaflets issued in April 1917 read as follows: Only through revolution can a real democratic and lasting peace be achieved. Soldiers of all belligerent countries, follow the advice of Karl Liebknecht! Lower your weapons and turn them against your own government! Revolutionary propaganda reof the
presents the only honest
and
substantial
classes
were not
alone in their expressions of sympathy for the Russian Revolution. Members of the middle classes as represented in the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft (DFG), the German Peace Society, exhorted the population in the interest of peace to activate in Germany those impulses given by Russia. It demanded a peace without annexations with Russia and a guarantee of her territorial integrity. Associated with the DFG were other organisations such as the Women's Leagues and the League for International Law. The Berlin munitions strike was settled by the government's agreement to certain concessions, one of which was the institution of a workers' committee which, together with the War Foods Supplies Administration was to participate in the
planning of food distribution as well as in actual allocation. The settlement calmed tempers for the moment but did not solve the growing problem of industrial and political unrest. The resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare had been the OHL's trump card, but by April 1917 it had brought the USA into the war on the side of the Allies. Although Allied shipping losses continued to mount, reaching extremely serious proportions during the late spring of 1917, the burdens of Germany's home front did not ease; peace seemed further away than it had ever been before. To curb the impact on the front line of the growing despair at home OHL found itself its
a in the ludicrous position of
having
an order that
returning from
all soldiers
to issue
home
leave suspected of 'carrying subversive propaganda leaflets' should be searched. Any leaflets were to be confiscated and their carriers posted to punish-
ment
battalions. tried to exploit the March Revolution in two ways. Hindenburg and Ludendorff allowed Lenin to return from home to
OHL
Russia via Germany. Secondly, orders were issued to the German forces on the Eastern Front as far down as company level to conduct 'pacifist trench propaganda' with their Russian opponents. But 'the wind has carried the seeds of the revolutionary weeds to us and there is much evidence to show that they are ripening', commented the deputy commander of the IX Army Corps, and there was much evidence to support his statement. These developments hardly helped secure
Bethmann-Hollweg's
position.
mann-Hollweg which was supported only by a small group of active Social Democrats and Jewish Liberals. The reasons for this dissatisfaction, Bauer suggested, were the granting of too many rights to the workers, and the overall failure of the government to take action when circumstances demanded it. The people desired a strong state and a strong will. Thirdly, there was the failure of the government's food policy, the implicit toleration of exorbitant prices, and the failure to curb black market activities. Fourthly, he indicted the failure of Bethmann-Hollweg's foreign policy, whose weakness had glared out as early as 1914 with his public reference to Belgium's neutrality as a 'scrap of paper'. This had shaken the world's faith in Germany's integrity, with the result that no government was prepared
The Com-
and the German Peace
Socialists
Society.
OHL immediately used these demands as a further sign of Bethmann-Hollweg's inability to cope with the Socialists and again demanded his resignation. The Kaiser, already under heavy pressure from the Prussian Conservatives, still managed to resist this onslaught. OHL offered no answer to his question about who could take Bethmann-Hollweg's place, but the tremors of revolution were now strongly felt by Wilhelm himself. 'For the first time in this war I heard him say that he was fighting for his crown', noted Admiral von Mueller at the end of April 1917. A further piece of news touched the very marrow of the Kaiser's own morale, namely the news of increasing unrest among the crews aboard the vessels of the German High Seas Fleet in Kiel harbour - unrest among the very instrument which he considered he had created himself: the German Imperial Navy.
mander
of the 'Imperial Headquarters', the Kaiser's place of residence, General Plessen, refused to shake hands with the Chancellor after the Easter message. In the Prussian Diet, Loebell organised his own intrigue against the Chancellor to forestall the abolition of the three-classfranchise. Publicly the conservative opposition to 'the soft Chancellor' found expression in a speech by the leader of the Conservatives, Heydebrand, delivered at Herford on May 17, 1917. He called for an
end
to a
have revealed Germany's vulnerable point to her enemies and to have demonstrated to them Germany's fear of revoluto
•
Bethmann-Hollweg's awareness of the growing hopelessness of obtaining a negotiated settlement
Ludendorff's closest political adviser, Colonel Bauer, drafted a memorandum for him in which he contrasted the enthusiasm of the German population at the outbreak of war with their apparent weariness early in 1917. He cited the government's failure to maintain enthusiasm for the war among the people as the principal reason for the deterioration of morale. He pointed out that the German government had left this task to Social Democracy and the Trade Unions, who had at first abandoned their anti-monarchic policy in order not to lose their mass support but who had now resumed their subversive activity. Bauer divided the German political scene into two opposed parties: the first of these comprised the leaders of Germany's Social Democratic Party and 'Jewish Liberals' whose aim was a republic and who exploited the food shortage, the promise of universal franchise, and the demand of an immediate peace without annexations for propaganda purposes. Bauer described this party as being very small hut highly active and more articulate than its opposition — much larger party ranging from the conservatives to the mass of the workers. This party represented the majority of the German people and they were primarily dissatisfied with the government of Beth-
was further driven home
by the Congress of the Second Socialist International at Stockholm in May 1917 in which German Socialists participated (while French and British Socialists were forbidden to attend by their respective governments). The German delegates were quickly made aware just how isolated they were in the 'Second Socialist International'. When the Social Democrats, Scheidemann and David, reported their impressions to Bethmann-Hollweg, they told him that the Allies more than ever before were determined to see the struggle through to the end. From an immediate point of view, even more important and depressing was the report that the Russian socialists suspected
development which could only
lead to disaster and to the ruin of Prussia. But Bethmann-Hollweg's most serious enemies were his erstwhile allies, Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Again in April they had unsuccessfully tried to have him dismissed. Ludendorff interpreted the Easter message as an act of homage to the Russian Revolution, and there was some truth in his assessment. He considered the munitions strikes as the proletariat's provocative answer to a policy dictated by fear. Moreover, the Easter message was alleged
tion.
Isolated
IViurrn tutainrpfliditl r
Mc6kiPit
liunpcrn
Farmers, help the hungry in the towns A poster pleads for higher farm output
German
to conduct peace negotiations with her. The only remedy Bauer could suggest was a new chancellor, although he did not say who that person should be. Instead he gave veiled hints at the virtues of a military
dictatorship.
The memorandum was ultimately intenfor the German Crown Prince, but, of
ded
circulated throughout OHL. Hindenburg especially endorsed the point about the failure of Bethmann-Hollweg's foreign policy, because after the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, German hopes of making peace with Russia had course,
it
Hindenburg immediately to come to a quick separate peace with Russia on BethmannHollweg's lack of political aptitude. The changing attitude of the SPD's leadership further helped to undermine the Chancellor's position. Under pressure from their rank and file, the SPD leaders became more been
dashed.
blamed the
failure
outspoken in their criticism of the government, and in April 1917 the party newspaper Vnrwaerts set forth the party's demands for the immediate democratisation and parliamentarisation of Germany's political institutions as well as for a peace without annexations, and at the same time expressed sympathy with the Russian Revolution. The SPD was, in fact, following the line already taken by the Independent
the German peace offer as a move designed to reduce Germany's troop commitment in the East and to increase it in the West. Consequently, so Scheidemann and David argued, only a peace without any annexations, accompanied by a rapid democratisation of
Germany's
political institutions,
could bring peace abroad as well as at home. Bethmann-Hollweg asked the deputies to put their impressions and their ideas on paper, which they did in the form of a memorandum. As soon as OHL heard of it, it was taken as a further piece of evidence of in
Bethmann-Hollweg's lack of moral fibre the face of pressure from 'revolu-
tionaries'.
The Russian offensive of June 30, 1917 demonstrated Kerensky's determination to adhere to the Allied cause, but German counterattacks in Galicia and the Baltic provinces showed how brittle Russia's defensive power had become. After the Stockholm conference of the 'Second Socialist International' the constitutional problem in Germany came to the fore again. The main committee, later to be called the Interparliamentary
Com-
mittee of the Reichstag, made up of Social Democrats, Progressives, the Central Party and some members of National Liberals, called time and again for abolition of the three-class-franchise and for parliamentarisation of the government. But although Wilhelm had committed himself to reforms after the war, he had not clearly spelt out what was to take its place. Implicitly the democratic parties assumed it would be universal franchise, which of course was
2041
strongly opposed by conservatives in the Prussian Diet, the Prussian government, and within OHL. Though Bethmann-Hollwi'i; was by DO means an advocate of democracy, he realised and accepted its inevitability, believing that the sooner it could be carried out the quicker the revolutionary fervour of Prussia's working classes could be curbed But the Reichstag also demanded that all future appointments to commissions should be countersigned by a Minister of War responsible to the Reichstag and this was rejected outright by the Kaiser who was constitutionally the army's Commander-in-Chief, a sphere in which the Reichstag possessed no powers) and forced Bethmanrr-Hollweg on to the defensive. As i
hit
again
be
before,
found
himself caught
ween the two great opponents, the up-
traditional conservative of pursuing a policy which would lead to a republic, and the proponents of a democratic order, who accused him of deliberately stalling their
holders
order,
of
the
who accused him
efforts at parliamentarisation.
Both came
ultimately to the same conclusion that a change in the chancellorship was necessary to further their respective interests. The German shipping magnate, Ballin, by no means a reactionary, conveyed his impressions of the state of affairs in Berlin in a letter to Stresemann towards the end of -June 1917: 'The firm in the Wilhelmstrasse is bankrupt and even a change of course could not restore harmony. The firm simply no longer has any credit.' The only alternative Ballin could see was OHL. Rathenau went as far as to hope that OHL could be won over to support internal political reforms: but in hoping this he was a year too early, and OHL a year too late. Stresemann, always a welcome visitor at the OHL, roundly denounced BethmannHollweg and reported that 'Ludendorff would prefer to see a change in the chancellorship but can't think of the right means to bring it about'. For the moment it appeared as though Bethmann-Hollweg's star was rising again. Against great opposition and with the threat of his resignation he brought the Kaiser on July 8, 1917 to sign a cabinet order to the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to prepare the introduction of universal franchise in Prussia by secret ballot. .
However, last
show
it
.
.
was Bethmann-Hollweg's
of strength and a Pyrrhic victory, another issue currently being
because debated in the Reichstag was added to the one at stake. The Centre-Party deputy, Erzberger, during an audience with Emperor Karl I in
Vienna
in late April 1917,
was handed a
copy of a memorandum by Czernin, in which the latter forecast the collapse of Austria-Hungary within the year. The memorandum also expressed doubts about the effectiveness of Germany's submarine warfare. Karl gave Erzberger the document, leaving him to use it at his own discretion. It was the document on which Erzberger based his speech before the main committee of the Reichstag on July 6, when he argued that Germany's submarine warfare had failed and that since this had been Germany's last weapon, Germany could no longer win the war; thus the Reichstag should move a resolution in favour of peace and a negotiated settlement. This speech was the signal for the beginning of the agitation on behalf of the 'peace resolution'
2042
and
for
OHL's
intervention.
A worsening home situation. A new team — a new policy Left: Bethmann-Hollweg, the opponent of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and of unrestricted U-Boat warfare because it would provoke America to join the Allies. Above: To use or not to use? The dispute over U-Boat warfare, the prime cause of Bethmann-Hollweg's fall. Right: Hindenburg (centre) and Ludendorff
(centre right) with the
supreme
German General
Staff,
power and perhaps in political power also. Bottom left: Hunger in Germany- a dead horse is cut upon the street. Bottom right: The Kaiser, reluctant accessory to the
in military
Hindenburg-Ludendorff takeover
The Prussian Minister of War, Stein, summoned Hindenburg and Ludendorff to Berlin. Bethmann-Hollweg, who was informed of the move, told the Kaiser, who received the two generals rather coldly and ordered them back to their headquarters. This did nothing to change the mood in Berlin, where Bethmann-Hollweg was fast becoming everybody's scapegoat for Germany's military and political failures. It seemed that the Reichstag would not grant any credits unless Bethmann-Hollweg went, and while Hindenburg and Ludendorff returned to their headquarters thenadvisors, Colonels Bauer and Haeften, remained in Berlin setting up a direct liaison between the and the Reichstag
OHL
parties. Ludendorff let it be known indirectly that he could no longer co-operate
with Bethmann-Hollweg and that he would resign unless the Chancellor was replaced. While indicting the Chancellor for allowing a situation to arise which could produce the demand for a 'peace resolution' in the first place, OHL nevertheless collaborated with the spokesmen of the Reichstag in order to have the resolution worded in
such an ambiguous way that it meant all things to all men. Furthermore, on OHL's initiative, the German Crown Prince visited Berlin to sound out parliamentary opinion concerning Bethmann-Hollweg's continuance in office. With the exception *
of the Progressives, all
— even the Social it. The Kaiser,
Democrats — spoke against
who had
so far defended his Chancellor,
wavered again. The situation report by his eldest son, combined with the renewed threat of the resignations of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, persuaded him to accept Bethmann-Hollweg's resignation. There was still the question of a successor. Prominent men refused the post and it was finally offered and accepted by the Undersecretary of State in the Prussian Ministry of Economics, Georg Michaelis. a politically inexperienced man, and therefore malleable in the hands of OHL. The joint action of parliamentarians and their opponents had brought down the Chancellor and put the democratisation of
Germany's political institutions into abeyance. Bethmann-Hollweg fell because he was too reactionary for one half and too liberal for the other. The Reichstag went on to pass the so-called 'peace resolution' with a wording satisfactory to OHL. Its terms were so general and so wide that it
managed to couple the desire for peace with an emphasis on a renewed war effort. And so was inaugurated the reign of
OHL. Further Reading Craig. G.'The German Fischer. F Germany's
Army and Politics (OUP) War Aims in the First World War (Wiedenfeld and Nicolson) .
\For H. W. Koch's biography, see page 39.]
2043
Trench
In spite of the development of wireless and of aviation, the armies of 1914 went to
coihirinnical ions Charles Messenger Afield wireless set in Most wireless sets at this stage were
use.
cumbersome, and could transmit only
Morse code
war scarcely better equipped to communicate with each other than the armies of the 19th Century. The two elements in
communication at front line level were the field telephone and that courageous dogsbody, the runner. These were not enough to produce satisfactory co-operation beunits, and many alternatives, often bizarre,
tween were
tried.
One of the major problems which arose from the development of trench warfare on the Western Front was that of communications. The combatants had gone to war in 1914 prepared for a war of movement, and their primitive signalling equipment was geared to this. During the opening battles of August and September both sides relied heavily on the civilian telephone and telegraph network. At the lower level, orders were transmitted by despatch rider, mounted liaison officer or visual means (heliograph, lamp and flag). There was a certain amount of cable used but much of the limited stocks available were lost during the many retreats. We have seen on the Eastern Front (Vol. 1, page 255) that at higher formation level orders were transmitted by wireless, and the ability of the Germans to break the Russian cipher, together with the efficiency of their intercept stations, contributed much to their victories at Tannenberg and on the Masurian Lakes. On the Western Front the boot was on the other foot in that the German codes were known to the Allied staffs. However, the Germans, probably as a result of their own successes in the East, were more careful in transmitting and gave away little of importance. The main problem was that of information. Wireless sets were mostly capable of only one-way transmission and it was consequently very difficult to obtain reports from the forward troops. Right from the start aircraft helped considerably in this. It was also noticed early on that the German artillery fire appeared to be much more accurate than that of the Allies and it soon became apparent that this was again because of their use of aircraft to assess enemy positions. As a result of this Joffre ordered the French artillery to use aircraft for the location of targets and direction of
fire.
Once static warfare had become an established fact t soon became apparent that, whereas existing equipment could cope with communications down to divisional level, forward of this there would have to be some urgent rethinking. It appeared that telephones and lines would solve the problem, and by January 1915 these were being run down to company headquarters. At the same time, lateral lines were laid so that different HQ's at the same level could speak to one another directly. But all this took time to implement for two reasons. Firstly, production lagged a long way behind demand, and secondly battalion signallers, who had previously been taught only visual methods, had to be instructed to use lines and telephones. However, as a result of the early 1915 battles, both sides realised that lines were not the complete answer. One of the effects of any artillery bombardment was that it succeeded in cutting telephone lines very quickly, and thereby throwing front line troops back on the traditional methods of sending messages by visual means or by runner. It was therefore vital that alternative means were developed. Signalling lamps of various types were one answer, but unless the ground was favourable they could only transmit to the rear to ensure that no messages were picked up by the enemy. Pigeons were another possibility. At first they were used only by the intelligence branches, but were later taken over by the signal services and used down to company level. It is difficult to ;
estimate their effectiveness, but it is certain that by 1918 the British alone had 20,000 birds and 380 full-time pigeoneers, with many more trained as handlers at unit level, and that all the belligerents had a comprehensive layout of lofts. The Germans also introduced two other methods, those of messenger dogs and signal rockets containing written messages. These were tried out by the Allies but not taken up. The use of distress rockets and flares in the case of surprise attack also became standard practice early in the war. Thought was also given to the development of the wireless. Until 1915 this had been regarded as a means of communicating only at higher level headquarters. It was never used further forward than corps HQ, except in the case of cavalry divisions. But wirelesses had been little used, mainly because of the completeness of the civil telephone and telegraph systems. The initial problem was to produce a set small enough for use in the trenches, and it is interesting to note that both the Germans and the Allies tackled it in the same way.
Unwieldy methods Air-ground communications presented complex problems. Much had been expended in making these efficient, especially with regard to spotting for artillery. In 1914 three main methods were used — flare, lamp and wireless. In the case of the latter the first sets were extremely heavy and unwieldy and filled up the whole of the observer's cockpit. This obviously made life extremely difficult for the pilot who had to fly, navigate and spot all at the same time. As a result lighter sets were introduced so that there would be room for the observer. effort
was these light wireless sets which became the first trench As early as June 1915 the British V Corps were experimenting with four of these sets, working from a battalion through two brigades to a division and finally to a lorry-borne heavy set at corps HQ. The results were not unsatisfactory, but the sets were It
sets.
too unwieldy to carry round the trenches — not so much the sets themselves, but the spare accumulators needed to keep the set working. Aerials, too, were easily seen and could be destroyed by the enemy. Proper trench sets were eventually developed, but again wireless was only partly an answer to the problem, and could be regarded only as an alternative to the more traditional means because of its unreliability, vulnerability and unwieldiness. Wirelesses were never used extensively at any time during still
the war.
There was also another reason that precluded the use of wireless in the front line to any great extent. From the start it had been proved possible to intercept wireless messages. Very soon the Germans also introduced special jamming sets, mainly to disrupt air-ground communications. The same problem also applied to telephone lines. In the summer of 1915 it became apparent to the Allies through accurate bombardments during trench raids that the Germans were intercepting telephone transmissions. They attempted to tap French lines physically and it was noticeable on the British front that there was bad crosstalk on all forward lines. Allied experiments showed that a physical connection was not necessary for interception. British trials with a wireless receiver and repeating coils proved that voices could be picked up at a range of 100 yards and morse at 300 yards. The French also obtained good interception using a low resistance telephone connected to a good system of earths. As a result, earths were run back at least 100 yards from the forward trenches. By the beginning of 1916 this had been increased tenfold. However, the introduction of twisted cable metallic circuits and the British Fullerphone, which ran off DC (direct current) instead of AC (alternating current), at the end of 1916, minimised the likelihood of eavesdropping. In spite of the improvements in equipment, both sides suffered from the problems of insecure speech over the telephone. For much of this senior officers were to blame and it was only the introduction of monitoring stations and disciplinary action against offenders in 1917 which reduced this. The original problem with the use of lines — their vulnerability to shellfire — was also tackled early on. The only answer was to bury cables. At first they were buried in ditches a few inches deep, but these became deeper and deeper. After Verdun, the French advocated ditches of a minimum depth of six feet and by the following year the German rule of thumb was 10 feet in open country and six feet beneath the sole of a trench. It was also necessary to conceal these ditches from the air. which meant even more work for the fatigue parties, which were usually drawn from among troops supposedly at rest. This was one of the reasons which led to the establishment of a proper grid network of lines in 1917. Until this time, especially on the British front, lines were laid haphazardly with little regard to an organised layout. Divisional signals officers were supposed to be responsible for the lines in their divisional areas, but when the division was relieved there was no proper handover of lines to the incoming formation, which then superimposed its own network. The result was a jungle of cables which became one of the dominant features of the trench landscape. The French and Germans, however, were much tidier. The main idea behind the establishment of the grid was to lay a series of permanent arteries, each consisting of a large number of pairs of cables. These ran forward to intermediate centres and thence to the front line units themselves. Thus a typical British divisional grid would have three main centres* to cover brigade headquarters, artillery batteries and battalions respectively. Lateral arteries were also consti ucted at all levels.
Grid system It was the attack phase which, from the point of view of communications, was the most difficult. Information took even longer to percolate back, and time and again the only way to send information to the rear was by a runner. This was expensive in men and the chances of getting a message through were seldom good. One of the first answers to this was the introduction of airexperiments in this started as early as the Battle of Neuve Chapelle (March 1915), but it was not until 1916 that the system was properly organised. The French trained observers for use at Verdun, and in April 1916 Joffre issued a memorandum on the subject which was to revolutionise the British organisation. The idea was for specially marked aircraft to fly low over the battlefield. The infant rv would then indicate their craft contact patrols. British
2045
Ifl
'*
/
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*.
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forward positions with flares, signalling lamps or cloth arrows laid on the ground. The aircraft would note these and report them back, either by wireless, by dropping messages or on landing. The Germans used the same method, although not until the later stages of the Somme battles. Kite balloons were also used for this. With the establishment of the grid system, communications in the attack on the ground became much improved. In preparation, arteries were run forward to the front line trenches and then advanced even before consolidation had taken place. Ditches of more than 2,000 yards forward within 30 hours of Zero Hour were not unknown. At the same time, the movement of higher headquarters was facilitated by the easing of communications. Previously, headquarters had moved where they liked and it was then up to the Signals Service to make do as best they could, but now
fi
it
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'
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-'
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2046
1
was the signals experts who dictated the new
location.
An
advanced headquarters would be set up and only when communications were established forward would the main headquarters move up to join them. At the same time, the problems of co-operation between the Allies soon became apparent. Language was one problem and another was flank liaison. The British and French had different rules: the British linked up from left to right and the French from right to left. Thus it often happened that British units
-
^^ik-
*4*
-S^ .fei.f.U
n
,
-J
i
3
f'S
I
1.
The time-honoured method An observer and
signaller of the Royal Garrison Artillery practise their techniques. 2. A signals station a la textbook Rarely was such tidiness achieved at the front 3. To replace a runner
a trained dog was often used 4. A gas-operated searchlight, used both for night fighting and
Morse communications 5. A British officer Mesopotamia unwraps an air-dropped message 6. Telephone wires at an HQ
for in
2047
,
operating amongst the French found themselves responsible for establishing communications in all directions. The salient point on the development of communications on the Western Front was that both sides operated on the same lines. It should be noted that whereas in August 1914 the emphasis was on good communications at the higher headquarters level, by the end of that year the emphasis had moved forward to the trenches themselves and was to remain so until the end of the war Although there were developments in rear communications it was in the trenches themselves that the most striking changes took place.
No one means ever provided the complete answer. Lines quickly became the basic system, but the 'belt and braces' technique of having several alternative means was much emphasised and all were used to a greater or lesser extent. The diversity of the various systems caused an enormous complexity of organisations to run them and also meant that there was never the resources or the time available to develop any one means to its full capabilities The net result was that so often the passing of messages was reduced to the most primitive means of all, namely the runner. Further Reading Nalder, Major-General, The Royal Corps of Signals (London 1958) Raleigh, Sir Walter and Jones. HA. The War in the Air, Vols 1 and 2
(OUP
1922)
Thiele, Oberleutnant, (Berlin 1925>
Zur Geschechte der Nahrichten-Truppe, 1899-1924
[For Charles Messenger's biography, see page 1852 FROM
DATE
•mra
LAT.
LOW.
Left:
A
terse appeal for
help conveyed by pigeon. The wrinkles indicate the
amount
of squeezing necessary to fit a message sheet into a pigeon's ring. Right and below: The point of departure and arrival. Pigeons released in the
front line arrive at a divisional HQ
OOV>;Hl<«l»NT WOBOJI SERVtCO.
2048
BREAKTHROUGH
ATARRAS The General
?
Good-morning; good-morning!' the General said When we met him last week on our way to the line. Now the soldiers he smiled at are most of 'em dead, And we're cursing his staff for incompetent swine. 'He's a cheery old card,' grunted Harry to Jack As they slogged up to Arras with rifle and pack. •
•
•
•
But he did for them both by
*
Siegfried
It would not have been surprising if there had been occasions when Sir Douglas Haig asked himself who was trying hardest, the
\
I
| a \ J=
Germans
or the French, to hinder his launch the combined offensives by First and Third Armies in the VimyArras sector, timed for April 8, 1917. The original Arras plan had been concocted in co-operation with Joffre, but had been heavily modified after Nivelle had become efforts to
Sassoon
JoESB
Cambrai — and even beyond,
gun strongpoints. But overshadowing everything else were the deep belts of newly-laid barbed wire, which shone with 'a sinister blue sheen' prefabricated machine
on
the French C-in-C. Now the British contribution was to be strictly subordinated to the main effort, to be delivered by the French across the Chemin des Dames. Yet the British offensive was to be an immense affair for all that, taking in the capture of Vimy Ridge, the German defence of which had for so long held the French at bay, and the thrusting of a thick wedge out
towards
pursue after his victory in the south. But as the British prepared their detailed plans, the Germans suddenly began to withdraw into the Hindenburg Line. At once, supplementary contingency schemes had to be formulated, in case a wholesale German withdrawal along the entire front completely nullified what had already been planned. So little was known of the new German line that it was not even clear whether it was the sector immediately opposite the Arras front or the Switch Line between Drocourt and Queant which was intended for permanent occupation. The new German defensive zone to the south-east of Arras was sited on a reverse slope which denied the Allies any chance of observation. Outposts covered three lines of defence, of which the rearmost defended the artillery positions. A feature of each line was the system of mutually supporting,
in the sunlight, leaving a lasting
his plan of attack
Kenneth Macksey
e
•
was hoped — the northern anvil upon which Nivelle, with his French hammer, would smash the German armies he hoped to
it
impression
who saw them. Here was a formidobstacle — anything up to 8,000 yards
all
able in depth, based on the principle of a lightly occupied front line reinforced by a strong reserve in rear. The function of the latter was to counter penetrations after they had occurred, for it was by now accepted that although the front line trenches would At Feuchy Chapel, the limit of the first day s surprisingly rapid breakthrough -a battery of 18-pounders in the open. British infantry going down and a tank going up
II
almost inevitably be
lost after
a serious
bombardment, the position as a whole could be retained by the reserves making a counterattack to restore the situation. The German position to the east and north of Arras, however, contained features unlike those of the new line to the south. There the front line was more often than not on a forward slope and easily scanned by observers on the British side, and no-
where was
this
more apparent than on
Vimy Ridge where, in places, the German trenches were as good as held up to view. Prior to the offensive, seven German divisions were positioned opposite the sector held by the British, with six in reserve. There were strange anomalies in their deployment, however. If penetrations of the front line were to be accepted, then the reserves ought to be kept fairly close to the front, ready to intervene at them complete rest from long-range bombardment, they were anything up to 30 miles in rear and, at the earliest, could not hope to enter battle until 36 hours after the British attack had started. Moreover, the commander of Sixth Army, General von Falkenhausen, speed. In fact, to afford
embrace the new defensive doctrine wholeheartedly. He had told his infantry to hold the front line at all costs, even though the defences were laid out for a defence in depth. Thus the main reserve was not only too far away, but the local reserve was also to a great extent within range of the British bombardment and could thus be consumed along with the front line troops. Fully aware that a storm was coming, the Germans were nevertheless late in strengthening their foremost defences and the mountains of shells at Douai were too far from the guns they were meant to supply." For all their withdrawal to a position of strength, the Germans were by no means invulnerable. did not
Opposite page: Top: A battery
of
60-pounders
the open at Feuchy Chapel. Centre: En route for Feuchy, British cavalry advance at the gallop over newly-captured ground near Tilloy on the second day of the attack. firing in
Bottom: Horse ambulances and wounded outside an advanced dressing station, Tilloy. Below: A British reconnaissance patrol returns from a front which now lay open to an advance
•'
to
To the north of Arras the offensive was advance over ground dominated to the
east by the long slope, climbing smoothly to the crest of the Vimy escarpment, from which it plunged steeply to the plain of Douai beyond. The closer it came to the canalised River Scarpe, where it drove eastward through marshes, cutting the battlefield in two, the shallower the drop became. South of the Scarpe, too, where the ground was more complex and rolling, the configuration of the escarpment persisted and here, almost due east of Arras, the village of Monchy-le-Preux dominated the surrounding countryside almost as completely as did the highest point of the escarpment
above Vimy. This sector was made unique by one strange feature. Not only was Vimy Ridge honeycombed with tunnels and caves, but so also were the environs of Arras. The stone which had been used in the building of the city had been quarried from caves to the south-east, beneath St Sauveur and Ronville, and this contributed to the natural tunnels. In addition, there was an underworld of sewers conforming to the course of the stream named Crinchon round the eastern suburbs of the town, and leading the effluence of the area into the Scarpe. The existence of the caves had been discovered, much to their surprise, by the British shortly after they had taken over. They had quickly seen it as a comparatively simple but profitable task to link the sewers to the caves and thus provide a safe covered approach right into the fighting line. Throughout the winter of 1916/17, in the greatest secrecy, this work had gone on and, by March, it was all but finished. The project gave access into the middle of No-Man's Land near the Cambrai and Bapaume roads. In the caves
there was 30,000 men, drainage, a centres and
beneath
accommodation
for
nearly
lighting, ventilation, proper power plant, administrative a hospital. A new town lay Arras — the springboard for the
attack to relieve the old city above. On January 2 Haig's orders for an offensive, to begin on April 8 (later changed to April 9), were received by his army commanders. Allenby's Third Army was to throw the biggest punch eastward from
Arras: Home's First Army was to take Vimy Ridge on the northern flank, while Gough's Fifth Army was to operate against
the southern flank, though Gough's orders, quite naturally, had to be severely modified when the Germans withdrew in February and March.
'The Bull' personalities of the commanders had a great and not altogether fair effect on the
The
Home and Gough were articulate and persuasive men in conference: Allenby, though, had a robust physique but a shy and reticent personality, and was unimplans.
pressive in debate, being inclined to angry, frustrated outbursts when he was thwarted.
He was extremely courageous under fire but in his frequent visits to the front he had failed to achieve an understanding with his men: he found it hard to converse easily with them. He was nicknamed 'the Bull', but he was no blockhead. He was one of the most resourceful of the British generals, the first to use every modern aid and the last to charge headlong and thoughtlessly. Throughout, Allenby endeavoured to surprise his opponents, even at risk to other aspects of the enterprise, but his remote inability to communicate his wishes to those above and below him was a constant threat to the execution of his superbly conceived plans. The core of Allenby's offensive at Arras was to be a dynamic blow delivered by eight infantry divisions followed up by three cavalry divisions, erupting eastwards on either side of the Scarpe. Punching the hole for the infantry would be some 2,000 guns, of which about a third were to be heavy ones. The frontage of the main assault was to be about 7,000 yards, to be widened further as other infantry divisions joined in with flank attacks on either side of the central thrust. Of these flank attacks, the one on the left, against Vimy Ridge, was the more important: the right flank attack, never very ambitious, was gradually reduced in scale by the march of events.
There were
facilities
enough
for both ,
flank attacks to deploy, and the task of Home's First Army, on Vimy Ridge, was made easier by the presence of the under-
.
%&
m
2051
5
a
ground passages leading to that part of the front. But Allenby's main force had to attack through Arras, which lay at the tip of a narrow salient, and had then to exploit this initial penetration of the German front with a violent pursuit in depth. Therefore his follow-up force would have to pass through, or close by, Arras city and could
by German shell fire playing on the few possible routes. As a
easily be delayed
result, the vital, rapid exploitation was liable to be delayed by a stifling traffic
jam
in which the predominant cavalry element could become inextricably mixed. It became essentia] to widen the frontage
of the attack, to use the tunnels as jumping off places and somehow to prevent the Ger-
mans from bombarding Arras
itself.
would dominate the never before, but morale and training would still be the most critical factors. The British army, now a keener instrument than it had been in 1916, was still suffering from many limiArtillery firepower
efforts of both sides as
The
of turning citizens incomplete and training rigid and inadequate. So regular officers and men in the first few months of the war that there were insufficient survivors to pa>s on the basic organisational skills. With the increasing complexity of the war, staff's multiplied by swarms to deal with the myriad problems in rear of tations.
process
into soldiers was al all levels both many of the best had been killed
the battle. But these officers were inexperienced and unfamiliar with their work, and so the wheels of the various new organisations creaked. In the infantry, knowInns grew from experience in battle, of which there had been no shortage, but casualties had been so high that very often it was the most experienced who had been wiped out, and this hampered the dissemination of their hard-won knowledge to others. There was a gulf in communications between officers and men. As a result there were repeated instances in which the paralysed subsequent of officers e loss | actions because the men were not aware I of the plan. In previous articles the steady decline | German army has been described, 75 of the shut certain points are worth emphasising. it was well supplied with muniJ= Though
tions, its reliability
was becoming
suspect:
the troops gave up too readily for Ludenpeace of mind. Some officers felt they would be 'no longer capable of carrying out major attacks'. They could not win without attacking. Overall, though, expectations for the future were pessimistic. In materiel the British were taking the lead. True the tanks — and the British could muster only 70 of the older type of machine for use in April — were not an dorff's
and would be spread thinly across the front at Arras. But in artillery they were considerably stronger than the Germans: moreover, though the artillery had been strengthened by the arrival of many new heavy batteries, it seemed that it would also be more efficient, important
factor
as new, but as yet unproved, techniques of considerable tactical importance had been developed. These Major-General Holland, Allenby's Chief of Royal Artillery (CRA), wanted to put into practice at once. Since Allenby wanted surprise, Holland proposed reducing the five-day bombardment, prescribed by GHQ, to 48 hours, though he intended to deliver the same weight of metal. A careful system of reliefs to rest the men and mitigate barrel wear was worked out: but when this offering was sent to the gunners there persuaded Haig
GHQ
it. The high priests of bombardment took sides in an argument which split the gunners down the middle and was re-
to reject
making Holland a corps commander and giving Allenby a new CRA who was amenable to GHQ thinking. Alienby was baffled. It must be added, however, that Allenby's attempt to carry out what was common practice a few months later came at a difficult moment in development. The new methods had not yet been tried out solved by
even in minor actions: it would have been a gamble to attempt them on a large scale
when so much was at stake. In the event, the appalling carnage wreaked by the artillery when it began serious work on April 4 seemed to justify the shorter bombardment, although when the date of the attack was postponed by 24 hours and the shooting was thus prolonged, there were gunners in Third Army who heaved a sigh of relief since persistent falls of snow had obscured observation and they were unsure
-
<*
how much wire remained uncut. Yet by then the Germans at the front were either dead or marooned in a sea of shell holes. Some companies had been isolated for 48 hours; rations were not getting through, the trenches had been ploughed in and the wire was in ribbons -and this despite numerous examples of inaccurate ranging and malfunctioning fuses. To this had to be added the effect of gas shells fired into the
German battery positions. A new type of made for a much more intense con-
shell
centration of gas was used and this hampered, and in cases almost prevented the
German crews from working their weapons. False faith in cavalry After the guns had done their work it would be the turn of the infantry to breach the line but, as usual, faith in enduring success was placed upon the cavalry: first the horsemen would pass through the bottleneck at Arras, then across ground which had been churned into a wilderness by shellfire, surging on across deep and wide trenches and over grasping strands of wire against an opponent who might or might not be terrified by, their appearance. They were easy targets once they hove in sight — one machine gun was usually enough to stop a regiment. The troopers did not possess very high morale
— they remembered the previous failures. Moreover, the severe winter of 1917 had taken its toll of their mounts' health — weakness which was still more pronounced among
the transport animals. As a result latter's failure the movement of guns and supplies in the battle area, forward of the railways, became enfeebled: it is a fact that the ditches beside the roads around Arras were full of dead horses and mules before the offensive started. The hopes of supporting a deep penetration through the German lines were thus threatened from the outset. Easter Monday, April 9, was a day of sleet and snow, after a winter of most atrocious weather. The average infantryman, trudging into battle with a pack half his own weight on his back, might have doubted if he was meant actually to fight as well as support this weight on his back: moisture now added to his load and soon
of the
'He sent his Highlanders into action with the feeling that they were supreme, unstoppable. Unfortunately the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division held similar beliefs.' .
.
.
Soldiers of the 51st (Highland) Division attack through German barbed wire. Held back after it had crossed the first belt of German trenches, confusion began in the 51st Division when one battalion lost its way and turned 90 degrees right. Only one of the division's platoons reached its objective
*•>;/ t4 V
v
>
f
\
IT
a
j^V
W ^J?#?
.
v
,
each
man was
chilled to the bone.
The
ground he was to cross was quite open to the weather -only the Germans had the slightest cover, and that had mostly been turned into a ruin by the British artillery. Looked at from Third Army's centre line, where it followed the line of the Scarpe, the frontage of attack was one, but operationally it divided neatly into three sectors — the most important being the one in the centre, where the main punch was to emerge from the suburbs of Arras, supported by the two shoulder operations, to left
and
unshaken
Germans. Every attempt to persuade Harper of the why and wherefore of his men being in the wrong place was met with a loyal and point blank denial. The only Highland platoon to reach the objective — adjacent to the successful
Canadian right — came back when
it
dis-
covered Canadians on one side but no other Scots on the other. The 51st Division worked as if it were an independent unit.
The main punch
right.
shoulder was the assault on Vimy Ridge, and here the great Canadian assault went almost according to plansoon there were Allied troops looking far across the plain of Douai for the first time in 30 months. On the immediate right of the Canadian assault matters were not so conclusive. Here the 51st (Highland) Division, the left flank of XVII Corps, was meant to forge the link between the Canadians and the rest of the corps, moving to seize the crest of Vimy Ridge where it overlooked the village of Bailleul. This division was commanded by Major-General (1. M. (Uncle) Harper, a stubborn and oldfashioned soldier, who had been among those to resist the introduction of machine guns, and who now insisted upon implementing a plan of attack which ran con-
In centre, things went better. The failure on the part of the 51st Division, while severely embarrassing its neighbour on the right, in no way prevented XVII Corps from executing its main task of driving deep into the German lines along the north bank of the Scarpe. In a great swathe from Roclincourt, on the left, to St Laurent on the right, the men of 34th and 9th Divisions rose from their trenches and cellars to finish what the artillery had all but accomplished on its own. Their final objectives were on the Point du Jour Ridge — the line Bailleul to Athies — and having
commander's wishes.
-the cavalry's great opportunity. To begin with, the 34th Division enjoyed
The
trary
left
to
his corps
He had no tanks (which was probably as well since he was also anti-tank), and reallocated battalions to the two leading brigades, thereby upsetting normal command arrangements, besides decreasing the size of his follow-up force. But he sent his Highlanders into action with the feeling that they were supreme — unstoppable and irrefutably right in all they did. Unfortunately for them the men of 1st Bavarian Reserve Division held similar beliefs and fought back with great ferocity. Nearly everywhere the 51st Division was e held back after it had crossed the first belt of German trenches and confusion set in I when one battalion lost its way and turned | 90 degrees right to face due south on what -5 it took to be the objective. In fact, it held s a communication trench, and was well f short of the objective, therefore exposing jjj
those who were trying to advance in the south to all the defensive vigour of the
that far the 4th Division passed through and seized Fampoux by nightfall — thus breaching the last recognisable defences, to the west of the DQ Switch, to make a large breach in the German line got
a steady advance across its front — except on the extreme left where the tardiness of the 51st Division had brought confusion. The right-hand brigade of the 51st, on being repelled, fell back through the advancing left-hand brigade of the 34th until, in the end, all that brigade could do was conform with the 51st while giving intermittent flank support to the rest of the 34th Division. It might have been a lot worse but for the action of one man — Private Bryan of the 25th Northumberland Fusiliers. Already wounded by the fire from a machine gun sweeping the front, he nevertheless spotted the gun and made for it on his own, charging into the pit and wiping out the crew. Victoria Crosses are given for acts of great courage: Bryan's was all that and, more unusual, vital in
deciding the course of an action along a large stretch of front, for if the failure of the 51st had shunted down the line, the whole attack might have foundered. Northumberland pluck had saved the day, and the 34th Division reached nearly all its objectives on the Point du Jour Ridge. Here the 14th Bavarian Division fled in such disorder that it received a 'mention' from Ludendorff: 'One of our divisions failed.' Saturated by the worst of the gas attack, which forced its gunners to work for hours on end in gas masks, this division was deprived of both artillery support and reserves. The gas did not kill many men; providing they had their masks to hand they were safe. But wearing the things reduced efficiency and this, together with the suffocation of so many horses drawing ammunition carts, starved the guns of shells — for though there were mountains of shells in Douai, very few had been dumped by the gun pits. Only in front of the 34th Division did the wire hold firm. But once the men reached their objective, they pleaded for permission to go further. It was just the same on their right with the 9th (Scottish) Division. This had been in the line before Arras, on and off, since December and knew the ground over which it was to attack well. The troops simply had to reach the objective quickly, so that the 4th Division could be given an uninterrupted passage beyond. But its nagging concern was of a failure south of the river, exposing its right flank to fire from Observation Ridge, north of Tillois, which held them up before they could even reach their objective, the southernmost extension of the Point du Jour spur. Habitually each platoon, each company, each battalion and so on looked left and right at its fellows — and in rear to see they were being followed — and only then to the front to tackle the Germans. In the 9th Division, the most sanguine hopes and the worst fears were realised. Almost to schedule the Scots, with their comrades of the South African Brigade, cleared the Germans from before them. The
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Royal Scots, part of 27th Brigade,
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel WD. Croft. He recorded: When our turn came to cross No-Man's Land we found the most appalling mix-up waa
of the division. Even at that early hour there were Highlanders who had wandered my left, and also South Africans. Most my people were too much to the right and it was all one could do to get them back into their proper places in time for the advance on our second objective, the rail-
on of
way
GERMAN
line.
had been heavy, and we were getting it in the neck from machine guns on the railway. Then down the slope went that throng of lads, and up they climbed to the railway close under our barrage. Nothing could stop them that day, though there were Boche machine guns everyLosses
where, and skilfully placed too. In some cases they were placed in tunnels under the embankment. It took us some time — we were on the left flank of the division — to clear the railway cutting, which was stiff with dug-outs and contained many Boches. In the middle of our long halt at the second abjective — we stayed there Trbout
1014 pieces
four hours — we suddenly saw heavy columns of our infantry wending their way across the ridge to their assembly positions near the railway cutting. The Boche observers must have seen them too, for as one of the battalions crossed the ridge a 5.9-inch opened on them. But we cast many an anxious look to the right during the first half of the battle, for we could see with half an eye that they were not going quickly across the river. But as we advanced the Boche fire slackened appreciably, and as we approached that formidable belt of wire it died down Top left: The balance of forces before Arras. Top centre: In the cage — some of the 7,000 German prisoners taken between April 9/14. Top right: Although parts of the German arm^ were affected by low morale which caused some formations to surrender too readily, resistance Arras was often bitter in the extreme. Right: Victorious and exultant, men of the 37th Division embus at Arras after having been relieved from Monchy-le-Preux on the third day; they had torn an enormous gap in the German front and an unprecedented breakat
through seemed possible. Below: A German counterattack over badly-churned-up ground
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altogether. Even show no sign of
Some
trap,
the pill-boxes life.
no doubt,
seemed
to
What could it mean? and we set our teeth
and went
for the wire. It was a tough job getting through the wire, even with little or no opposition, and then we saw an inspiring sight — a mob ofBoches haring away out of the trenches. It was too much for the Borderers who raced us for the Point du Jour. What a sight it was when we got there! One could see half the world and
everywhere one looked were fleeing Boches.
Even far-away Monchy seemed covered with fugitives. The telephone spoke to Frank Maxwell: 'Are the Boches on the run?' 'Is cavalry good business?' 'Yes, 10,000 times yes, but
must be done now. Too late tomorrow can't we go on? ..." And so forth. Then the 4th Division came through us. They had been marching all day without the excitement of battle to buoy them up. it
.
.
.
Why
On
they went
and disappeared
into the blue.
A yawning
gap such as had never been before known had opened in the front of XVII Corps. If the Germans were surprised. so were the British— they were quite incapable of adjusting themselves to open
warfare, it was so unexpected. The 9th Division was ready to continue independently but the plan stipulated the 4th Division and, in any case, it was almost impossible to halt the artillery barrage even if this had been desired — which it was not. In fact the 4th Division had not begun to move out of Arras when the 9th reached its objective, and it did not pass through the latter until seven hours after this. Moreover, the nearest cavalry was still six and a half miles north-west of Reserve and could not hope Arras in to enter the gap until the next morning. Nevertheless, for seven hours after that first break the gap was still there, with the 4th Division marching almost unopposed into German-held territory. Prisoners, including a general, poured in, and there was absolutely no sign of strong German counteraction. By nightfall most of the day's tasks had been completed, the rearmost German line had been penetrated and only the eastern fringe of Fampoux continued to hold out, and then largely because its defence was bolstered by opposition from the south hank of the river. South of the Scarpe, VI Corps all but
GHQ
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kept pace with the XVII.
Making
full
use
of the Arras underways, its units were ahle to launch the assault straight into the forefront of the battle with troops who were
dry and almost unscathed. The paralysing effect on the German guns of the bombardment and the gas had made a fact of General Holland's boast, when he was still Allenby's chief artillerist, that 'he would stand on a chair in the Grande Place of Arras during the opening attack with a noose round his neck, the chair to be kicked away when the first enemy shell fell there'. Allenby's attention, as the reports of progress began to trickle in, was focused on the southern bank of the Scarpe, his hopes reaching out to the capture of Monchy-le-Preux on the second day. Across the line of advance lay a dense web of trenches linked by numerous communication trenches. North of the ArrasCambrai road there were no less than six lines of trenches within 2,000 yards of each other, made all the more difficult to cross by the bits of wire entanglement which had survived the bombardment. South of the road, in and around Tilloy and thence south to the Harp, the earth-
works were slightly less complex, yet stronger because each line of trenches was either anchored to a group of buildings or sited to conform to some outstanding topographical feature. The left sector rested
on Tilloy and terminated at Blangy on the banks of the Scarpe. Beyond this the ground slopes gently up to Observation Ridge, which juts out from Tilloy northwards towards the river and dips sharply down to it. But in addition, commanding the flat, tree-studded bottom of the Scarpe valley, was a man-made ridge — the embankment carrying the Arras-Douai and Arras-Lens railway. Three railway tracks converged on embankments standing 20 feet above the surrounding land, and here the Germans had dug many machine gun posts. Thus Railway Triangle was a
own
was this feature the 9th (Scottish) Division as it made for the Point du Jour: its continued occupation by the Germans could stop the whole of the northern flank of VI Corps because it could fire at short range and had an unimpeded view of the western approaches to Observation Ridge. After crossing Observation Ridge fortress in its
which
had
right. It
worried
Above: The Lusitania, a British Mark (male), on the outskirts of Arras. It played a pivotal role in spearheading the capture of Monchy. Below: the German reserves, like these with their transport and field cookers, were caught napping by the suddenness of the breakthrough II
is a sharp drop into a narrow gully, which burrows towards the Scarpe to the
there
west of the village of Feuchy, blocked at northern end by the railway, high on its embankment. This was Battery Valley, an ideal position for the German guns since the sides of the valley gave protection in a well-advanced position: its vulnerability could only be exposed if the top of Observation Ridge fell into hostile hands. The central axis of the British advance climbed a long undulating slope along the Arras-Cambrai road. First came Chapel its
and to its left, midway to the river, Orange Hill. Connecting Chapel Hill and Orange Hill, which are virtually one feature, was a well-wired and dug line called the Wancourt-Feuchy Line, and this was the last line of defence covering Monchy, which comes fully into view after these two hills have been crossed. The distance between any of these features Hill,
Mortars firing — a painting by the German war
artist
Frost
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Below: The remains of a British cavalry attack on the outskirts of Monchy; once again their performance had been disappointing, for they had waited too far in the rear because they were an easy target. Inset. Left: Canadian the ruins of Arras before going up to the front. Centre: German prisoners keep flooding in, much to Ludendorff's alarm - he convened a Court of Enquiry to fix the blame on anybody but himself, even though it was his Hindenburg Line which had failed. Right: Fixing scaling ladders in the ninefoot trenches
troops rest
in
is between 1,000 and 8,000 yards, and observation from one to the next quite unimpeded in clear weather. Hence no one feature could be seized without the simultaneous engagement of the others. Railway Triangle at once proved the main centre of German resistance, the men of 10th Grenadiers in the 11th Division hanging on grimly and so severely cutting down the men of 15th (Scottish) Division that the entire attack came to a halt. Once again it took a single man to correct matters—and this time it was the divisional commander of the 15th, coolly observing the check, passing orders to the men to reorganise for a fresh attempt and demanding that the artillery programme — against the gunners' wishes — should be brought back and restarted, even if uncertain communications made such a course risky. But a single tank saved the day — one called Lusitania which, between breakdowns and spells of overheating, took on each German machine gun in turn and 'shot' the Scots onto their objective.
The advances to Observation Ridge by the right-hand brigade of the 15th (Scottish) Division and both leading brigades of the 12th Division were of similar pat-
The German
front line gave way enough, but resistance hardened on the approaches to the ridge. Here the wildest type of bomb and bayonet fighting broke out as the British infantry charged home. For a while there was a hold up and the schedule began to fall behind until, again, a few individuals decided the issue. Stalemate set in until the renewed barrage crashed down — drumming across the men of the 12th Highland Light Infantry, since they had already incidentally, advanced beyond the point at which the tern. easily
artillery shoot
was
restarted.
Scraping and cringing in the cold mud, the Scots prepared to receive the dose of medicine meant for the Germans. By a miracle they escaped with few casualties, but the chilling experience distilled a confidence which prompted them to despise their own shells and follow so close behind
the barrage that they were on the objective before the Germans could get their heads above ground. The reserve brigades of both the 15th and 12th Divisions arrived almost simultaneously on Observation Ridge and now the German guns in Battery Valley stood exposed to vengeance.
An
exultant charge
After years of subjugation to shell
and discharged
at their late owners in the near distance. But the hurly-burly in the valley consumed more valuable time: the infantry were falling further behind the barrage.
The
result fire,
at them by men and weapons they never saw, here at last was the hidden enemy exposed to their mercy. A wild charge into the very muzzles of the guns, the rarest of events, followed, swept along by the courage of exultant triumph as the Scots dashed in among the flying Germans
pumped
and their abandoned guns. Here and there resolute Germans stood by their guns and fired point-blank at the charge, until they were chopped down as they worked. A few gun teams managed to get away, but they left no less than 60 pieces behind, some of which were quickly swung round
difficulties of infantry/artillery co-
operation were being exposed by contrast. The 15th (Scottish) Division had tampered with its artillery programme and as a fire,
had brought
own men under now move
behind its barrage and in the end become the only formation to reach its objective, the Wancourt-Feuchy Line, and advance beyond it. The 12th Division, close
however, allowed its barrage to proceed without waiting for the infantry and so its men went unsupported and were soon brought to a halt by uncut wire and the
machine guns. The 12th Division could expect no help from the right. The 3rd Division had taken Tilloy after a stiff struggle, and the Harp had fallen after good work by the tanks, but now there were no tanks left and the
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8th Brigade found itself on its own, without barrage or tanks, confronted by uncut wire. Nevertheless, the 12th and 3rd Divisions had accomplished what would have been miraculous had it been accomplished on the first day of the Somme. They had not reached all their ambitious objectives but they had seized the entire German front line and put the Germans to flight. Comparison was bound to be made, however, with the exciting events close by the Scarpe where the 15th Division, moving easily along the southern bank — by reason of good control and a little bit of luck — had ripped a hole in the Wancourt-Feuchy Line (with the aid of a tank). The way for the follow-up division, the 37th,
was
clear and, in fact, the divisional cavalry
regiment, the Northamptonshire Yeomanry, had already, at 1700 hours ridden through and was on the outskirts of Fgmpoux, having chased German infantry, captured some guns and collaborated with the 4th Division on the north bank. Monchy at that moment lay practically undefended.
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Then the 37th Division was denied its great opportunity as conventional generalship took over. Instead of sticking ruthlessly to plan and following the 15th Division through, this division allowed its brigades to go separate ways and to Im Mine committed to action in aid of 12th Division's failure, when the way to success was o|X'ii at Monchy. When at last the divisional commander had got control of inciters again, it was almost dark and Monchy was hut 2,000 yards away, but it was felt that nothing further could be done that day. The British army had not yet broken itself of the habit of shutting shop at dusk: only raids and long-prepared attacks were ever launched in the dark; impromptu assaults never. What was nearly impossible for infantry was quite OUl of the question for cavalry. Throughout the night of April 9/10 the cavalry waited in miserable, wet bivouacs in the outskirts of Arras, with no hope of joining in the battle until next day — by which time German resistance was likely to have been re-established — and principally concerned with their endeavours to feed their already weakened mounts. Because horses had only a limited resistance to the elements, they could not stay long without shelter. During the winter they i
had become 'soft' in billets and now they were not 'hard' enough to spend a night in the front line ready to plunge ahead at crack of dawn to exploit an infantry and artillery victory. They always had to be brought so far back from the front to feed, that their intervention next day was bound to be critically postponed by the time it took to ride to'the front again. We now turn to the right shoulder. The southern flank of Third Army's attack was intended to give VI Corps more room and was to be delivered by VII Corps. Unlike the rest of the Third Army it did not jump
0530 hours but moved later, and then in succession of divisions from the left. Thus, while the 14th Division was due to attack at 0734 hours on the left of the off at
corps, the 21st Division (on the extreme right) would not go over the top until
1615 hours. Only here did Allenby sacrifice the advantages of surprise and expose his men to the agony of suspense as they waited
an opponent who was fully forewarned as well as being snugly ensconced in the strongest and least damaged part of the Hindenburg Line. The echeloned attack was arranged to take advantage of leverage with an expanding succession from the left: but there were those, including the corps commander, General Snow, who felt its success would be in inverse proportion the further it went to the right. At first the 14th Division did well on the
to attack
right of the 3rd Division, profiting as it did by close proximity to the main punch
and from having some tanks supporting it. Yet the tanks only put the finishing touches to a job already well done by the artillery, and on this front the elements of the Ger-
man 17th Reserve Division surrendered most willingly as the British arrived at the entrances to their dug-outs. Here and there, German machine guns hit back, artillery pounded assembly areas and the tanks finally received some attention. But Telegraph Hill fell and with it the Harp — the tanks rolling down wire, coming under fire, a few suffering hits, while most of the rest bogged down in the churned-up ground. By nightfall, however, the 14th Division
had advanced over 4,000 yards, taken many prisoners and guns and done precisely what Allenby desired of it by shielding the right flank of the main punch; but its indirect leverage would take longer to have widespread effect. With the 56th Division, the assault went in with a rush on a 350-yard front, behind the barrage, only a few minutes after the 14th. The 56th had hoped to achieve a deep penetration by pouring waves of reserves across its narrow front, but heavy fighting broke out in and around the village of Neuville Vitasse, which acted as a breakwater. Three German companies belonging to the 17th Reserve Division were wiped out, but so too were a great number of the British infantry caught on uncut wire. The arrival of a solitary tank to crush the wire got things moving again, but the momentum of the attack had been lost and the final objectives remained untaken. With this first set-back on the left of the corps, subsequent failures were inevitable as there was a total lack of leverage and distraction. The unshaken 18th Reserve Division, dug deeply into its new, strong shelters,
made
safer by uncut wire — wire
on Chapel
which had remained uncut because, after the strategic withdrawal, the British had less time in which to destroy it — held firm. In places it looked like a repetition of the first day of the Somme. On the 56th Division's right, the 30th Division, which was pushing in German outposts, came up against untouched wire, a rising storm of artillery
and machine gun
fire,
was only wafer
the hiatus on the 10th after the dramatic success of the 9th. There should have been a fierce drive past Monchy, splitting the German front in two, perhaps reaching the Drocourt-Queant Line before it could be occupied by the German reserves: there was little enough to stop it, the Germans continuing to fall back whenever they were brought under the slightest pressure. Yet instead of a strong drive there was merely a fastidious tidying up of confusion: the 51st Division at last admitted its errors of navigation and struggled back on course towards the objective it might have taken on the first day. with the 34th Division conforming on its right. Allenby's orders, strongly reflected in the corps' orders, demanded a ruthless advance, but the artillery could not get forward to give support. An artillery officer described the trouble
thin: the
kenhausen, the Sixth Army's commander, holding his reserves so far in rear. In effect there was a gap in the German line at least two miles wide opposite the Canadians, with a veneer of defence beginning to gather itself in the plain below Vimy Ridge. In front of the 51st Division, had its men but known it, there was nothing except stragglers, and so from here to Fampoux, a distance of nearly 7,000 yards, only a few knots of resistance were to be found. South of the river a neat puncture had been drilled by the 15th Division and the Northamptonshire Yeomanry. Beyond this, things were not quite so fluid, but the defenders of the Hindenburg Line were already starting to vacate their positions as the pressure to their right threatened to overspill and overwhelm them from flank and rear. On the night of the 9/1 0th it was so cold that several infantrymen died from exposure: indeed the weather was one cause of for
and was
stopped short of the front line. This was shortly after 1200 hours and so the 21st Division (on its right) when it went over in the late afternoon can have been in no doubt as to its coming fate. A few units penetrated into the German front line but could not hold their gains. To all intents and purposes the right flank's attack had failed and the Hindenburg Line had proved its strength. Even so, a vast gap had been pushed through the German defensive system in front of Arras. And to the Germans, who were aware that it would be at least another 24 hours before their divisions destroyed at the front could be replaced by those rushing up from deep in rear, the outlook was grim. Even where the shattered line looked like coalescing, as
?
Hill, it
slightest nudge and it would disintegrate again. Ludendorff showed characteristic signs of acute disturbance while Rupprecht, the Army Group Commander, cursed Fal-
Ar/>
Above left: Crossing the railway line between Arras and Feuchy. a wiring party takes up corkscrew supports
to
secure the British gains
Above right: German prisoners go down the line and (in the background) British troops go up. Below: A British Mark bogged down in mud which had been lashed by sleet and churned by heavy shellf ire I
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which
progressively affected the entire 'Continual storms of snow, hail and rain do not make it any easier to move guns across country which has undergone a five days' intense bombardment. Albeit, we got 'em up somehow by relays, with 12 to 14 horses in the guns, and the gunners harnessed to the waggons' — but not soon enough to be of maximum use. front:
A
golden opportunity lost The front was coalescing again, inevitably, as the Germans had remained undisturbed, even for just a few hours. When, at 1630 hours,
leading regiment of the 1st Brigade (from the 1st Cavalry
the
Cavalry
Division) at last arrived, it was 24 hours too late. Some time before, the 4th Division had been told to push on beyond Fampoux but the start time had been delayed until 1500 hours. In fact, at 1325 hours, the division's commander had heard that he was to support the 1st Cavalry Brigade in
an advance past the Gavrelle-Roeux road and so he cancelled the attack scheduled
1500 hours although it was the very thing required to get the cavalry on to its
for
objective, Greenland Hill. At last the cavalry arrived. falling.
Snow was The commanders conferred and,
middle of the discussion, a report in that the Germans were attacking, although they were doing no such thing. Tamely, possibly prudently now that the Germans seemed really prepared, but without a whimper, this golden chance was in the
came
allowed to
slip.
Earlier that day things had looked promising around Orange Hill and Monchy also. Though at no point south of the Scarpe had the attack reached its final objective on the first day, the first lunge
towards Monchy brought resounding success; at 1200 hours, the 3rd and 12th Divisions swept through the German line which
had held them up the previous evening, flowed smoothly forward to the right of Exhausted
after a rapid
soldier sleeps
advance, a British
on a German arms dump
Orange
Hill and crossed the valley to the long slope on top of which sat Monchy. The gap had opened wide again opposite the critical Monchy Spur, and all the situation needed was exploitation; to help matters, a junior German staff officer, without the knowledge of his commander, had given orders to evacuate the Wancourt-Feuchy
Line.
After a miserable, confused night, the
two leading brigades of the 37th Division had at last been disentangled from the 12th Division and were also ready to enter the gap. On their left, the 63rd Brigade started trickling parties across the valley in a disjointed sort of way. This irregular method of advance, visible in part to the watchers on Orange Hill, gave an indistinct picture of what was actually happening: in fact, it was being pecked at all the way by machine gun and rifle fire, casualties were mounting and there was no way to get to grips with the defenders, because the field artillery, as elsewhere, had yet to drag its guns into range of the Germans.
Monchy was now disintegrating under a steady downpour of heavy shells from the BrUish long-range guns. The Germans were shelling the British advance from positions on Greenland Hill north of the river, but the British artillery was not allowed to reply because they had been told that the 1st Cavalry Brigade might soon be on Greenland Hill — the Cavalry Brigade had, in fact, called off the attempt. Still the advance crept along and still it seemed that the cavalry might find an opening that day. All morning it waited patiently just behind the front, the units on the right coming under fire from an uncleared German position near Wancourt. At one time, the 8th Cavalry Brigade, from north-west of Monchy, thought it saw a chance to slip through with a couple of squadrons, but like the other watchers in the 37th Division it was wrong, and the horsemen came under the lash of machine gun fire. For one wild moment they tried to come into action at a gallop, but the fire was too much and horses and riders began to fall. Only a sudden blinding snowstorm, as thick as any smoke screen, gave them the cover under which to withdraw. On the afternoon of the 10th, German infantry from the reserve formations at last began to put in an appearance, filing over the ridge beyond Monchy. Ever fearful of a continued British advance, the Germans at last began to take heart at the sight of some of their fresh gun batteries galloping forward to unlimber and come into action. 'There was a great arc of our batteries on a wide front behind our endangered positions. It was a most memorable and magnificent battle picture, lit by the evening sun.' On the early morning of April 11 the airmen of both sides were out in clearer weather to see if Monchy had fallen. North of the Scarpe the Germans remained emplaced just as they had been the previous day, firing steadily into the flank of the village and its approaches. Allenby still appeared confident of victory south of the river and gave orders which called for a general advance. He spoke of 'pursuing a defeated enemy' and 'masking and passingby isolated enemy detachments'. At Monchy, 'C Battalion of the Tank Corps persuaded three of its surviving tanks to crawl to the front line during the night of the 10th in readiness for an attack at dawn on the 11th in support of the 1 1 1th Brigade, from the 37th Division. The ground was now carpeted with snow, and tanks and men became sharply silhouetted against the white background. Keeping on the move, particularly for the tanks, was essential for evading the German fire, which now could be aimed more easily than usual. But the order to the supporting gunners had not arrived in time, zero hour was put back two hours and the tank commanders, realising that they would be sitting ducks if they stayed waiting in the open, went ahead on their own without artillery support. After a wary, stealthy approach they staged a lonely battle in and around the
'I
L
ruins of Monchy. For nearly two hours the machines, fully closed down and therefore half blind, tried to subdue several hundred Germans. The crews suffered badly as a hail of machine gun bullets criss-crossed the armour. Soon, one was in flames and a second had fallen silent to armour-piercing bullets.
At
last.
when
all seemed lost, the British barrage on the village and almost immediately hit the surviving tank. Only then did there arrive a mixed bag of infantry, Scots from the 15th Division, feeling their way in from the north-west, and men of the 111th Brigade, up the slope from the west. For one exciting moment it seemed as if the triumphs of the 9th were to be continued. The newly arrived 17th Bavarian Regiment broke at once. Into Monchy from the east rode two regiments of cavalry at full gallop — such a sight had not been seen fell
for years.
shells
fell
But
it
could not
like rain,
last.
German
sweeping men and
horses aside and driving the survivors to dismount, dive for cover and join in the fight like ordinary infantry mortals as the first serious German counterattack in 48 hours began to take shape. One of those Germans put his thoughts in a letter shortly before being killed: We went into the line on April 10. The whole night of the 10/ 11th we were digging ourselves in, in order to get cover from the fire. Then came the morning of April 1 1 Never shall I forget April 111 The English had been firing in the front line all night and in the morning they .
attacked, and our troops went streaming to the rear. Our company it was which swarmed out into the open, and, under the shell, shrapnel, machine gun and rifle fire,
and
heavy casualties, brought the English advance to a standstill. That was at 0500 hours. From then till 1500 hours we lay only six yards from the British. Then fresh troops arrived, counterattacked, and won back all the
dug
itself in again,
ground
that
had been
in spite of
lost in the
morning
We were again masters of the situation. The German position was cemented by
a miscellany of units, flung into the line as they arrived, along the best part of the Oppy-Mericourt Line to just south of Gavrelle, thence bent back in front of Fampoux with a nest of resistance surrounding Greenland Hill. From there fire could be directed across the river in front of a new line hastily being dug from Pelves through Bois du Sart, Bois du Vert and across the main road to Wancourt Tower. There was no breakthrough, and Nivelle's offensive on the Chemin des Dames was all of four days off. Haig had to keep the Germans busy and, as so often before, could only return to attrition in the short term, since a major attack was only a long term business. Now began a battle of rags and tatters to keep the Germans busy, to seize jumping off places for a subsequent offensive timed (later) to start on April 23 and to gain shelter from the inevitable
German
retribution.
On
the 14th there was a last fling at Monchy -a half-cocked battle conceived as part of a major plan to seize the Bois du Sart, Bois du Vert and the hilltop windmill known as Wancourt Tower. Although not all the troops could be got ready in time, the 88th Brigade was allowed to attack due east out of Monchy with two battalions, leaving the village unguarded. These two battalions, well supported by artillery, in fact almost achieved the impossible, breaking the 23rd Bavarian Regiment and charging up the opposite slope. But they charged into a sack the neck of which was tied shut by German counterattacks rushing in from the flanks. And those German attacks did not stop just
but turned west and made for Monchy, where Lieutenant -Colonel Forbes
there,
of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment and nine others found themselves the sole defenders. For five hours,
Robertson
until help at last came, this tiny party successfully held the village while a barrage of artillery fire sealed off the eastern
approaches. Nevertheless it was a commentary not only on British persistence but also on fading German prowess that the Germans had first been broken by the initial attack and second been defeated by such light odds — the plea that artillery ammunition had run out was no more than an excuse. The offensive muttered on in the old and costly routine of attrition on ground which was new to the British. Possession of Vimy Ridge and Monchy relieved the communication centre at Arras from direct German observation and fire. The Third Army's casualties amounted to 8,238 in the three days' fighting from April 9 to 1 1 — extremely light by comparison with several previous offensives. In return, the British had captured 7,000 prisoners, 112 guns and a great German fortress position, and disrupted some six German divisions, whose casualties were about 21,000. The called it a debacle and Ludendorff convened a Court of Inquiry to fix the blame on anybody but himself. Yet it was total
Germans
his
Hindenburg Line which had
failed.
In success the British had also failed — failed to recognise a gap about 10,000
yards wide and to pass men through it. Infantry had halted from exhaustion of themselves and their reserves; artillery could not extend non-stop help to the infantry because it could not drag its guns or its ammunition through mud at the same pace as the infantry could advance; and the cavalry had waited far in rear because it was too easy a target and you cannot dig a trench to take a horse. The existing tanks had again shown their possibilities and made important local contributions, but they were neither in shape nor present in sufficient numbers to be decisive, although their heavy losses suggested to Ludendorff that this was one technical threat he could dismiss as a possible future danger. The fundamental failure on the British side was the system of attack and the communications for command and control. There was no quick and reliable way of passing information from front to rear or converting data into upto-date orders which could maintain a continuous and expanding flow of troops in the forefront of the battle. Quite the reverse would happen as units inclined inwards to a single point, contracting from the flanks, until but one easily arrestable axis of advance was being followed. The break-in at Arras was among the most resounding successes achieved by the British army on the Western Front — and certainly greater than anything prior to 1917. Yet it achieved nothing enduringonly a list of faults to be overcome and of new lessons to be learned. Further Reading Croft. W. D Three Years with the 9th Division Die Osterschlacht bei Arras (Reichsarchiv) .
Liddell Hart, Sir Basil. The Tanks (Cassell 1959) Ludendorft. Gen. E My War Memories (Hutchinson) Military Operations: France and Belgium 1917 (Macmillan 1940) .
[For Kenneth p 245.)
Macksey's
biography,
see
2067
CANADIAN
ONSLAUGHT AT VIMY
\
An integral part of the Arras on Vimy Ridge was a testament to the courage and efficiency of the Canadian Corps, for soon the whole ridge was theirs and the German lines beyond were offensive, the attack
critically exposed.
Richard Holmes. Below: Replacing the water in a water-cooled Maxim. Opposite: Chronology of the Canadian Corps in France 1914/16
The drab
The Canadian Corps France 1914/1916
in
Canada responded enthusiastically to Britain's request for soldiers when the First World War began; by mid-October 1914 the first 30,000 volunteers were training on Salisbury Plain, and by early March 1915 the Canadian 1st Division was on the front line near Armentieres The volunteers kept flooding in, adding another division in 1915 and two more in 1916. Beginning with Second Ypres, they saw much action throughout 1915 and 1916, suffering probably the highest casualties of any British or Dominion corps during the war
1914 October
14. First Canadian contingent, 30,000 strong, reaches Plymouth and proceeds to Salisbury Plain for training.
1915 February February
March
3.
leaves for France. Arrives in billets near Hazebrouck. Takes over sector held by 7th Division 7.
1st Division
15.
Army, south of Armentieres out of the line. Only small casualties so far. April 1 7. Takes over a previously French-held sector in Second Army's area, in Ypres Salient. April 22. Germans attack Ypres Salient, and extremely heavy fighting develops in the St Julien sector, held by the Canadians. May 5. Pulled out of the line and sent to rest near of First
March
25. Pulled
Bailleul.
of
Ypres
Canadian casualties
in
the 2nd Battle
total 5,500.
May 19. Relieves 7th Division in Festubert area during the closing stages of the Battle of Festubert.
Heavy
fighting.
May 30. 2nd Division gathers at Shorncliffe May 31. 1st Division pulled out of the line. Casualties total 2,400. 13. Ross rifles given up for Lee-Enfields. 15. 1st Bde involved in heavy fighting in the Givenchy area. June 30. 1st Division pulled out of the line. September 1-14. 2nd Division crosses to France.
June June
September 13. 1st and 2nd Canadian amalgamated as the Canadian
Divisions
Corps under Lieutenant-General Alderson.
September 22. 2nd Division joins 1st in the line north of Ploegsteert Wood. September 25. Beginning of the Battle of Loos Canadian Corps is not directly involved but makes a demonstration to hold the
Germans opposite
coalfields of the Lille-Douai plain, covering much of the Franco-Belgian border, are broken, to the south-west, by the bare uplands of Artois. The stark outline of Vimy Ridge marks the transition. The ridge itself, viewed from the east, is an impressive sight. Its face is steep and wooded, rising an abrupt 200 feet from the plain. To the south-west, towards Arras and the River Scarpe, the slope is more gentle. To the north, the ridge becomes
higher, culminating, beyond the River Souchez, in the Lorette spur, jutting out sharply to the west. The ridge's western slopes are more gentle, and fold gradually into the chalky Artois hills. In 1917 Vimy Ridge was of paramount military importance. In German hands, it threatened the communications hub of Arras, which lay a mere four miles to the south-west. Allied possession of the ridge would make German retention of the mining town of Lens, and the villages around it, both difficult and costly; it would also prejudice the German hold on the entire south-western edge of the Douai plain. The swirling battles of the early autumn of 1914 had ensured German possession of the ridge. The original German line ran along the western slopes, almost two miles from the crest, from Ecurie in the south to Notre Dame de Lorette in the north. The capture of Vimy Ridge had been a major objective of French offensives in the spring and autumn of 1915. These attacks, at the frightful cost of 150,000 casualties, had achieved slight gains. The German grip on the ridge had been reduced; the battered villages of Carency, Neuville St Vaast and Souchez had been seized by the French, who had also wrested a foothold on the western end of the Lorette spur. As part of a general reorganisation, the British took over the Arras/Vimy sector in March 1916. They were in time to receive a brisk German attack which, in May, captured some 1,500 yards of trench east of Souchez. The British corps commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson, immediately planned a large-scale counterattack, which was, however, vetoed by Sir Douglas Haig, who envisaged an attack on the ridge as part of a future British offensive around Arras.
German
it.
defence of the Arras/Vimy sector hands of Generaloberst Freiherr von Falkenhausen's Sixth Army. Tins formation was divided into four corps-sized Gruppen, from the north Gruppen Loos, Souchez, Vimy and Arras. Vimy Ridge itself was defended by General Hitter von Fassbender's Gruppe Vimy, composed of the / Bavarian Reserve Corps. In the early spring of 1917, Gruppe Vimy held the ridge with three divisions forward, and just over one in support. The 79th Reserve Division. recruited in Northern Germany, held the highest point of the ridge, looking down on the debris of Neuville St Vaast. Three of the division's regiments, the 261st, 262nd and 263rd Reserve Regiments, were dug in along the crest, with the vital Hill 145, just south of Givenchy, covered by the 261st. Each of these regiments had, at any one time, one battalion in the front line, one m reserve at the foot of the ridge, and the third resting on the plain, some miles back. On the left of the 79th Division, to the south, the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division held the ground between Lea Til leu Is and the heights east of Roclincourt. The northern end of the ridge, around Givlay in the
1916 January 1 3rd Canadian Division formed. April 4. Canadian Corps moves to St Eloi Menin Road sector of the Ypres Salient 2nd Division involved in heavy fighting around the St Eloi craters and suffers .
2,000 casualties by the 19th. May 28. Sir Julian Byng takes command of the Canadian Corps June 2. 3rd Division attacked very heavily in the Sanctuary Wood area and nearly overrun August 25. Newly-formed 4th Canadian Division arrives from England and takes over the line held by the 2nd Division. September 3. Canadian Corps hands over its section of the Ypres Salient to the ANZAC and moves to the Pozieres sector of the I
Somme
front.
September 15. Battle of Flers-Courcelette. September 20. Canadians pulled out of the battle after suffering 6,000 casualties.
September 26. Canadian Corps involved in heavy fighting around Regina Trench October. Canadian Corps moves to Vimy area of Arras sector of the
line,
leaving the
4th Division in the
Regina Trench sector. November 18. End of Regina Trench action. 4th Division rejoins the Canadian Corps Total casualties in
Somme
battle 26,574.
enchy, was defended by the 16th Bavarian Division, part of Gruppe Souchez. At the southern end of the ridge, Gruppe Vimy's left flank was secured by the 11th Division of Gruppe Arras. The positions held by Gruppe Vimy seemed extremely formidable. A triple, well-wired, trench system formed the first line of defence. A second line ran just below the crest, while a third line crossed the plain at the foot of the ridge. In addition
main complexes, numerous hidden strongpoints and concrete pillboxes littered the ground between the trench to these three
lines.
The commanding
positions of Hill
and the Pimple, between Givenchy and Souchez, were miniature fortresses, honeycombed with trenches and bristling with wire. The bulk of the German field artillery was emplaced in the second line, sweeping the approaches to the crest. Howitzers and heavy mortars were concentrated in the woods and shattered villages behind the ridge, with obser145, south of Givenchy,
vation posts well forward. This imposing facade concealed one serious flaw, however. The very nature of the ground, and the fact that the Germans had lost most of the western slopes in 1915, meant that the Vimy positions were very cramped. The German system of 'elastic defence', which had worked so well on the Somme, depended on the existence of a reasonable gap between the various defensive lines. Any Allied penetration could be absorbed in this space, checked by a bufferline of machine gun posts, and finally counterattacked. On Vimy Ridge, however, there was simply not enough space for this system to be adopted effectively. The ridge had to be held in strength, and this strength had to be concentrated on or near the crest. The consequences of the restricted nature of the German positions were to prove unfortunate. The field artillery was situated uncomfortably close to the front line, and was alarmingly vulnerable to counterbattery fire. The lot of the infantry in the advanced trenches was even more unpleasant. The men in the line suffered all the disadvantages usually ascribed to troops holding a forward slope: they were shelled mercilessly by day, and forced to spend much of the night repairing their damaged trenches.
Weaknesses unappreciated Falkenhausen, who had taken over command of the Sixth Army when Crown Rupprecht of Bavaria had been promoted to command the army group of which Sixth Army was a part, seemed unaware of the weaknesses of the Vimy Both Falkenhausen and his position. Chief-of-Staff, Major-General von Nagel. envisaged a long fight in the battle /one Prince
itself When five reserve divisions (termed 'counter-attack' divisions by the Germans) were placed at Falkenhausen's disposal on April 3, 1917, he ordered them to be readx to relieve the front divisions during the course of a long drawn out defensive battle'
This
miscalculation was to have disastrous consequences. The Chantilly Conference of November 1916 drew up plans for a series of decisive Allied offensives to take place the following year. Among these projected attacks was a British ad\ ance around Arras The replacement of Joffre by Nivelle, and the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg line, com-
2069
pelled a drastic rearrangement of Allied plans; the Arras offensive was, however, retained. An essential part of this attack was to be the capture of Vimy Ridge by the Canadian Corps of the British First Army. The Canadians were to seize the ridge to cover the left flank of the Third Army, which was to break through east of Arras and advance on Cambrai, as we have seen. The preparatory orders for this operation were issued by Haig's headquarters on November 17, 1916, and were confirmed on -January 2 of the following year. Towards the end of January, General Sir Henry
Home, commanding the First Army, issued own operations order to the Canadian Corps. Home's headquarters initially en-
his
visaged April 8 as the date of the assault. overall plan this was altered, though; the attack on Vimy Ridge was to be launched on Easter Monday, April 9, 1917. The Canadian Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Julian Byng, took over the British trenches below the ridge in the winter of 1916/17. The corps contained four divisions, the projected 5th and 6th Divisions having been shelved in favour of keeping the existing divisions at full strength, with four battalions to each
To conform with the
brigade. The prewar Canadian army had consisted of about 3,000 men, supported by a large Non-Permanent Active Militia
Wartime expansion around a nucleus of regulars and NPAM members had produced a military force of considerable talent and ability. Two of the four divisional commanders in April 1917 were NPAM men; the few British regulars in the corps were mainly to be found on the staff. By 1917 the corps had acquired considerable experience. It was well up to strength, and well supplied with weapons (NPAM).
and equipment.
Discipline, though 'unconby British standards, was effective; the morale and self-confidence of the Canadian Corps were remarkably high. The Canadian assault on Vimy Ridge
ventional'
was
to consist of
two
distinct operations.
A
'Southern Attack' would go in on a four mile front between Ecurie and Givenchy. If this proved successful, a 'Northern Attack' would be launched against the Pimple and the Bois de Givenchy. The four
Canadian divisions were drawn up
in
numerical order. The 1st Division lay between Ecurie and Neuville St Vaast, and the 2nd held the latter town and the ground immediately around it. The trenches from just north of Neuville to a point opposite Hill 145 were garrisoned by the 3rd Division, while the 4th held the line from the 3rd Division's left slightly to the north of Souchez. The timings
and objectives for the Southern Attack were laid down in considerable detail. The first objective was the 'Black Line', which coincided with the third trench of the German front line. The assault was to commence at 0530 hours,
and
this line
was
to be
reached by 0605
hours. After a 40 minute pause, the advance would sweep on to the 'Red Line'. To reach this, the 1st and 2nd Divisions were to press on for 400 yards, while the 3rd Division seized the eastern edge of the Bois de la Folie. The 4th Division's task in this phase was to complete the capture of Hill 145. The 'Red Line' was, in fact, to be the limit of the latter two divisions' advance, and the 1st and 2nd 'Divisions were to spend two and a half hours there, consolidating against any possible counterattack. After this pause, the attack would move onto the 'Blue Line'. While the 1st Division continued its advance towards
2070
\
/
Farbus, the 2nd Division, assisted by a brigade from the British 5th Division, was to fan out and take Thelus, Hill 135, the Bois de la Compte and most of the Bois de Goulot. This phase was to be concluded by 1050 hours. Finally, in an advance to the 'Brown Line', the 1st Division was to take the 'Commandant's House' on the ThelusBailleul road, while the 2nd Division cleared the Bois de Farbus, Bois de la Ville and the remainder of the Bois de Goulot. The attack as a whole was scheduled to end at 1318 hours. If the operation achieved success, the Northern Attack against the Pimple would be launched the following day by a brigade of the 4th Division.
Superb
artillery planning Particular attention was played to the planning of the artillery preparation. The First Army's artillery, under the command of Major-General H. F. Mercer, was strongly reinforced. By the end of March, there were 58 heavy batteries, a total of 245 heavy guns and howitzers at the disposal of the Canadian Corps. These would be augmented by the 138 heavy guns of British I Corps, north of Souchez. On average, there was one heavy piece to
every 20 yards of front; this was almost treble the heavy-gun density on the Somme in July 1916. The assaulting troops were to be equally well supported with field artillery; there were 618 pieces in the Canadian Corps, and a further 102 in I
Below and opposite: Canadians advancing at a steady pace across No-Man's Land. The two week's intense bombardment culminated in a withering three-minute barrage when they went into action through sleet and snow on April 9. Most of the German trenches had been pulverised by the bombardment, but several concrete machine gun emplacements had survived
The vital task of wire-cutting was be carried out by medium guns and howitzers, using the 106 instantaneous fuse, which had become available in large quantities. Orders for the bombardment emphasised the importance of counterbattery fire in the preliminary phases, and good liaison between the infantry and gunners once the attack was under way. It was considered unwise to increase the rate of fire as the hour of the assault grew nearer; this would simply warn the Germans that attack was imminent. The preliminary bombardment was to last for two weeks. While the heavies hammered German battery positions and communication facilities, medium and field artillery struck respectively at the wire and the infantry dug in behind it. As the Canadian infantry moved forward, it was to be preceded by a creeping barrage, which, after concentrating on the German front line for three minutes, would move forward at the rate of 100 yards every three minutes. This barrage was to be thickened by 1 50 Vickers machine guns sweeping the ground well ahead of the infantry, while the bulk of the medium and heavy artillery drenched the German batteries with high explosive Corps.
to
and gas. The massive concentration of men and guns in the Canadian lines below the ridge did not escape the notice of the German observers upon it. By the beginning of April the confidence of Falkenhausen had begun to wane. British and Canadian firepower grew in volume, while the German artillery, short of ammunition, could spend little time in counterbattery work. Furthermore, many of the German artillery units had only recently arrived on the ridge, and their telephone lines and observation posts were incomplete. There were ominous
from aircraft that cavalry was massing behind the Allied lines — a sure reports
commanders anticipated a breakthrough. On April 6, Ludendorff, disturbed at the situation on the Sixth Army front, ordered Falkenhausen to concentrate on the Allied artillery. The following day, Falkenhausen, aware that an attack was imminent, moved the 18th Division and the two divisions of the Garde-Reservekorps nearer the front. These 'counterattack' divisions would still, however, be at least 12 miles from the front on April 9. While the harassed commander of the Sixth Army marshalled his forces to meet the gathering storm, the Canadian Corps concentrated for the assault. Most of the infantry was concealed in the woods in the Canadian rear, around Mont St Eloy and Villers au Bois. Several batteries of field artillery were moved forward under cover of darkness, and dug in around Neuville St Vaast, only a mile behind the front line, to give fire support during the final phases of the attack. Shortly after dark on the evening of Easter Sunday, April 8, 1917, the infantry began to move through the drizzly gloom towards the front. Many units were able to avail themselves of the large tunnels, 12 in all, that ran into the forward trenches. These 'subways to the front' were equipped with electric light and elaborate ventilation systems; they also provided ideal locations for brigade and divisional headquarters during the attack. By 0400 hours on Easter Monday morning no less than 52 battalions — some 30,000 men — were formed up, ready to assault. Despite the inky blackness and the biting cold, morale remained high. Each unit had rehearsed its role in the forthcoming battle on mock-ups in the Canadian rear, and over 40,000 maps had been issued to the sign that Allied
corps as a whole. With the confidence born of sound training, the Canadians waited in their trenches for the roll of gunfire that would herald their advance. At 0530 hours the massed Allied batteries erupted into life. For three terrible minutes the German front line was
pounded with concentrated fire. Then the barrage crashed slowly on across the ridge. While heavy mortars laid down smoke to blind German artillery observers, heavy and medium guns sliced at the German artillery. The new gas shells proved particularly effective, confining the German gunners to the sweaty misery of their respirators, and turning their horse-lines into abbatoirs. Indeed, so heavy were casualties among the artillery horses that it proved difficult for the Germans to get
ammunition forward, or, when the time came, to get their guns back. With the barrage screaming in front of them, the Canadian infantry moved forward into the murk. The weather had become markedly worse, and there were flurries of snow and sleet. On the Canadian right flank, Major-General A. W. Currie's 1st Division advanced with two brigades up and one in reserve. The leading brigades were themselves attacking in depth, with three battalions up and one in reserve. This system, broadly followed by all the Canadian divisions, was to prove very successful; it permitted the leading units to devote all their energies to the Germans to their front, and to leave the important task of mopping-up to the reserve units. The 1st Division, on a front of just over a mile, surged across the wreckage of the
German first line before the few survivors of the garrison could emerge from their dug-outs. By 0605 hours the division was in possession of the Zwiilfer Graben trench
2071
J.
system; an hour later, its second objective, the intermediate line south-east of Thelus, was secure. Most of the German trenches had been pulverised by the bombardment, but several concrete machine gun emplacements had survived, and these caused
some casualties. The 2nd Division, under the command
front line. From the volume of fire pouring onto the brigade from Hill 145 it was apparent that the 4th Division's attack
had failed. The Canadian 4th Division, under MajorGeneral D. Watson, with two reinforced brigades in line, had indeed run into
was
trouble. One part of the German second line had been deliberately left undamaged by the artillery, apparently at the request of a battalion commander who hoped to make use of the trench's commanding position for his own troops. From this trench, the 5th Company of the 261st Reserve Regiment, fighting with grim determina-
reached by 0605, but the machine gunners of the 263rd Reserve Regiment gave a good account of themselves, and casualties mounted. The 21st Battalion of the 4th Brigade, on the divisional right flank, had a stiff" fight for the ruins of Les Tilleuls, which it finally captured, together with the Felsenkeller cave containing two German battalion headquarters. To the left, the 5th Brigade cleared the Turko-Graben system.
severe casualties on two Canadian battalions, one of which, the 87th, incurred losses of 50% in a matter of minutes. Machine guns on Hill 145 took a further toll, and the advance of the 4th Division ground to a halt. In the south, though, fortune continued to smile on the Canadians. At 0935 hours the attack moved on from the 'Red Line'. The rear battalions passed through those in front, and took over the lead. There was
of
Major-General H. E. Burstall, attacked with two brigades in line and two, one of them the 13th Brigade of the British 5th Division, in reserve. This formation would permit the division to fan out when it reached the crest of the ridge and its attack frontage increased.
The 'Black
Line'
First setback
Major-General L. J. Lipsett's 3rd Division, attacking the Bois de la Folie with two brigades in line, achieved more limited success. On the right, the 8th Brigade, composed of three dismounted battalions of the Canadian Mounted Rifles, took the huge Schwaben Tunnel, routing out many of its occupants in various stages of undress. Meanwhile, on the left, the attack of the 7th Brigade was stoutly resisted by the 262nd Reserve Regiment. At about 0900 hours the brigade was ordered to hold onto its gains, and form a defensive line running from the northern end of the Bois de la Folie to the original Canadian
tion,
inflicted
little German resistance, even in Thelus and the strong trench system around it. The 'Blue Line' was secured shortly after 1100, and machine guns were sited to protect against any German counterattack. Soon after 1300 hours the final phase, the advance to the 'Brown Line', began. Farbus, the Bois de Farbus and the Bois de Goulot fell into Canadian hands. With the capture of these woods the southern end of the ridge was firmly under the control of
the Canadians. German transport could be seen moving about on the plain, while scattered groups of Germans withdrew hastily from the foot of the ridge. In an effort to find out the extent of the German withdrawal, 'C Squadron of The
2072
\
/
/
Canadian Light Horse was ordered forward. The squadron had spent the morning in the engaging, if somewhat unusual, task of charging a mutinous Chinese labour battalion. Two patrols were sent out, one of which cantered hopefully into Willerval and after an initial success was severely handled. The squadron as a whole lost over half its horses to shell fire, and had to retire. Willerval seemed firmly held by the Germans; a further advance was, for the time being, out of the question. The 1st and 2nd Divisions consolidated their gains, and repulsed a weak German counter-attack at about 1730 hours. That the success achieved in the south was not matched in the north was a result primarily of continued German possession of Hill 145. Only after the tenacious machine gunners of the 5th Company of the 261st Reserve Regiment had been dealt with did assault on the hill itself become possible. The forward slopes were stormed before nightfall, and the crest fell in the early hours of April 10. It was not until about 1500 hours that the powerful Hang Stellung system on the hill's reverse slopes was seized by the 10th Brigade of the 4th Division. With the capture of the hill, the 4th Division surged forward to the 'Brown Line', and the 3rd Division swung into line on its right. Thus, by the evening of April 10, all the objectives of the Southern Attack had been reached. In the original First Army plan, the Northern Attack against the Pimple and the Bois en Hache was to have followed within 24 hours of the successful completion of the Southern Attack. The proBritish cavalry riding out of Arras. During winter the horses had become 'soft' in billets and were now not hard enough to spend a night in the front ready to exploit a breakthrough
tracted defence of Hill 145, together with casualties incurred by the 10th Brigade, originally designated for the attack on the
Pimple, compelled a temporary postponement of the operation. It was impossible, though, to leave the Pimple in German hands. Machine gun fire from its emplacements raked the slopes of Hill 145, and it dangerously outflanked the other Canadian gains on the ridge. Shortly after 0200 hours on the morning of April 12, the 44th and 50th Battalions, together with two companies from the 46th Battalion, all part of the 10th Brigade, moved west from Souchez and assembled in the darkness within a few hundred yards of the Pimple. The attack had been well rehearsed; after taking the hill itself, the 44th Battalion was to press on to the eastern end of the spur from which the Pimple rose, while the 50th Battalion seized the eastern edge of the Bois de Givenchy. At 0450 hours several heavy batteries began to shell the Pimple, and ten minutes later 96 field pieces lent their weight to the bombardment. With a sharp following wind driving snow into the faces of the German defenders, the Canadian battalions stormed forward. After a short combat the decimated garrison, a battalion of the 5th Guard Grenadiers, fell back, leaving the 10th Brigade in possession of the Pimple. Simultaneously with this attack, the Bois en Hache and the eastern end of the Lorette spur were cleared, though at great cost, by the 9th Royal Sussex and 2nd Leinsters from the 73rd Brigade of the British I Corps. As the sun glimmered fitfully through the heavy cloud on the early morning of April 12, the Canadian Corps was firmly in control of Vimy Ridge, looking down on the tightly-packed houses of Lens and the flat expanse of the Douai plain.
Allied capture of the ridge made German positions close to its foot untenable. Furthermore, the late arrival of the German reserve divisions, together with the paucity of available artillery support, made a serious counterattack impossible. On the night of April 12, a general German withdrawal took place. By nightfall on April 13 the Canadian 1st and 2nd Divisions
The severe bombardment of the ridge had turned it into a quagmire; despite the efforts of the engineers, it was extremely difficult to bring guns into position east of the crest, and all but impossible to keep them supplied with ammunition. The German withdrawal also lessened the value of the ridge for artillery observation. A further push eastwards could only
had reached the Bailleul-Vimy railway and occupied Willerval. To their left the
be attended by tremendous difficulties. The capture of Vimy Ridge remains to this day a remarkable feat of arms. It represented a triumph of co-ordination, preparation and sheer courage. Of pivotal importance in ensuring the success of the attack was the artillery fireplan. For once, there was sufficient artillery and ammunition available, and it was used to remarkable effect. Of the 212 German gun positions on or behind the ridge, 869c were correctly located, and most of these were subjected to heavy shelling both before and during the assault. Observation posts were masked so effectively that many of the
3rd Division moved forward to the line Vimy-Petit Vimy-La Chaudiere. In the north, the 4th Division held Givenchy, with outposts pushed towards La Culotte. The advance was resumed on the following day. By 0940 hours the 2nd Division's advanced guard was within a mile of Acheville, but German resistance was stiffening. It soon became clear that Falkenhausen was holding the MericourtAcheville-Oppy line, and had retained the Avion switch to cover Lens from the south.
The
arrival of the reserve divisions permitted this line to be held in strength. The first elements of the 'counterattack' divisions had arrived in the battle zone on the morning of the 10th, though their main bodies did not appear for another two days. The 4th Guard Division moved into the* trenches between Mericourt and Acheville, the 111th Division held the line from Acheville to Arleux, while the Arleux-Gavrelle sector was entrusted to the 17th Division. To the north, the left flank of Gruppe Souchez, comprising the 80th Reserve Division and the 56th Division, fell back into the Avion switch, supported by the 1st Guard Reserve Division. The presence of large numbers of fresh German troops made a continuation of the
Canadian advance most unlikely. An advance was further impeded by other
factors.
German guns remaining in action were reduced to firing blind. The decision to dispense with a final bombardment proved correct; tactical surprise was almost universally achieved. Ironically enough, the very success of the bombardment impeded the latter stages of the advance. So effective was the fire on roads and tracks that they remained unusable for some time. Following the capture of the ridge, the gunners had the unenviable task of hauling their guns forward through crater-fields of their own making. Despite the success of the bombardment,
Canadians occupy a German trench. Sweeping through in the southern part of the ridge, they were held up for a day in the north by continued German possession of Hill 145
2073
ulian casualties in the assault were Between April 7 and 14, the light Canadian Corps lost a total of 11,297 men
not
the Allied
command
The plan of
entirely blameless. attack, admirable though it
severe.
was, failed to allow for changing circumstances. Shortly after 0700 on the morning of April 9, the Canadian 1st and 2nd
Moth the 79th Reserve Division and the /.s7 Bavarian Reserve Division lost well over 3,000 men each from April 1 to 14. The stuhborn 261st Reserve Regiment had almost ceased to exist, with over 900
Divisions had broken through the most formidable portion of the German line. Complete breakthrough could have been contained only by the weak German third and the incomplete Droucourtline,
casualties. The Germans had lost some 4,000 prisoners, and 54 guns had been captured on or immediately behind the ridge.
Queant Switch (Wotan II Stellung) behind it. There were no troops at hand to
killed,
wounded
and
losses were, however,
missing.
much more
German
Without detracting from the magnificent Canadian achievement, it should be noted that the spectacular success of the attack was a result partly of German errors. Falkenhausen viewed the defensive belt on the ridge through Somme-coloured spectacles; he failed to appreciate the dangerous narrowness of Gruppe Vimy's positions. This oversight engendered a more serious mistake — the positioning of the counterattack' divisions so far back that they were unable to influence the vital stages of the battle for the ridge. Nor was
exploit this opportunity; only eight tanks were employed in the operation, and these had speedily bogged down or been knocked
military importance, and inflicted crippling casualties on the defenders. They admirably fulfilled their basic role of covering the left flank of the Arras offensive. In the grimmest conditions, against a determined foe, the Canadian Corps gave signal proof of courage, skill and ability. Further Reading
McKee,
A., Vimy Ridge (Souvenir Press 1966) Reichsarchiv, Die Osterschlacht bei Arras 1917 The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battles of Arras (Macmillan 1940) Wood, H. F., Wmy.' (Macdonald 1967)
RICHARD HOLMES was edu-
out.
cated
The capture theless,
a
of
Vimy Ridge
was, never-
resounding
The Canadians had
tactical success. seized ground of great
Right: The Battle of Vimy Ridge, April 9/14, 1917. By the 14th the ridge was in Canadian hands, making German positions close to its foot
untenable and forcing a further withdrawal. Below: Sheltering in bomb craters, Canadian machine gunners (Vickers) support an infantry attack
u Sdtf^.
at Forrest
School, Snares-
brook and Emmanuel College, Cambridge. After spending a year at an American university, he returned to England and is at present Lecturer in
War Studies at Sandhurst. He is
the Royal Military Academy, currently engaged in research into the French army of the Second Empire. He is an officer in the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve, and his interests include collecting military antiques.
2075
A CANADIAN AT VIMY enemy guns are pointed at one and one is naked. You want to touch someone. So I rejoined my group. There wasn't much to shoot at — Heinies were coming back with their hands up, and his counter-
This is the personal account ofGus Sivertz, of the 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles, 8th Brigade, 3rd Canadian Division. The 8th Brigade was the Pight front unit of its Division, and attacked towards La Folie
the
the Schwaben tunnel. Sivertz was the front line, synchronising watches with his platoon commander, when the
barrage wasn't so hot. The man next to me smiled and leaned over to say something ... I think he meant to say 'It's going fine', or something like that. He put his mouth almost in my ear, there was such a helluva noise going on. He never finished the sentence, never made a sound, just pitched on his face. There was so little to see except straight ahead. The smoke and the rain and the sleet obscured our flanks, but I felt — or maybe could hear — trouble on our right towards Thelus where the 28th Battalion was driving up. Things got a bit warmer as we got nearer to the Zwischen Stellung [second line], the big, heavily-defended trench that was our intermediate objective. We swarmed over it and cleared it up pretty fast, but then our right was stopped cold by a machine gun firing from a steelslotted pillbox. Zwischen gave up a lot of prisoners; it also gave up the German regimental commander, and you never saw a madder man. He had started his Easter breakfast of bacon, eggs, toast, cereal and
farm and in
barrage commenced: looked ahead and saw the German front line crashing into pieces; bits of men, timbers, lumps of chalk were flying through the air and, blending with the shattering wall of fire, were the Hun SOS signals of all colours. We didn't dare lift our heads, knowing that the barrage was to come flat over us and then lift in three That queer empty stomach minutes. feeling had gone ... I don't think anyone instead one's whole body was scared seemed to be in a mad macabre dance I felt that if I lifted a finger I should touch a solid ceiling of sound (it now had the attribute of solidity). 1 guess it was perhaps the most perfect barrage of the war, as it was so perfectly synchronised. Then, suddenly, it jumped 100 yards and we were away. I suppose we must have crossed the German front line, but I have no memory of it at all. Instead of a trench there was only a wide, muddy depression, stinking of explosives. Then little Lieutenant Christie was hit and just pitched forward, dead. When I straightened up, I tried to hurry to catch up with my group (for the first time we were attacking column of lumps — small, separate in groups). I tripped in some snarled barbed wire and fell, just as a big Hun shell screamed into the muck alongside me. I felt that I'd be on the road west in a moment. Instead, I was just knocked over again, and, in rising, got a terrific slam e on the top of my head. It rammed my tin hat down to my ears. That was a huge I chunk of chalk that the shell had blown | skywards and which was coming down as 5 I came up. Then I ran in a stumbling sort | of way to get up with my buddies. It's one feels that all i terrible to be alone I
.
.
.
.
\
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
waved and
guns as far forward as they could go, and were lobbing the shells over in great glee. They were naked to the waist and their guns' barrels melted the sleet like a hot stove. Man! they were great. ... I made the CCS [Casualty Clearing Station] and sometime next day passed out in the hospital train to wake up at Wimereux with my head in the lap of an angel, who was cutting my blood-matted hair off with a pair of blunt scissors.
his last shot.
and
I
tried to holler at the artillery
their precious
In the meantime we were held up on the right and me — smart as a whip, you know! — figured out that since the pillbox had a steel slot in it it also had a limited arc of
would sneak up under cover,
could get behind him and let the crew share a Mills bomb. It was a good until
By
men of the Lahore Division, who had moved
Zuehlke lost an arm when he went singlehanded down a big dug-out. A German officer shot him at a bend in the stair.
fire;
might have worked,
then he beckoned to me. As we ducked down the big dugout stair, we both heard this bloody 5.9. It sounded like a freight train moving through the sky. And when had exploded, we looked back, and it where I had been sitting, with six other men, there was nothing but tatters of uniform and bits of men. I got through the MO fast — a ticket and an 'On your way, chum.' I sure felt sorry for those medical people; they were pale with sheer fatigue. Soon I was in Neuville St Vaast on familiar ground, with a pleasant fool of a YMCA officer just dancing in excitement; he kept trying to push cigarettes into my mouth, and they just fell out, because contusion stopped control of my jaws. But I
with, if you please, fresh Danish butter and canned cream — Carnation brand — from just 150 miles south of my home in Vancouver. The case was stamped 'Belgian Relief Fund'. Well, he never even got started, and Al Swanby really enjoyed it, while the Heinie private soldiers laughed their heads off. It was a busy spot as we converted the trench for defence, but Fred
was
it
looked up too soon.
coffee
It
and
if I hadn't the grace of heaven, I had my finger hooked to pull the pin of the bomb but hadn't done so when his bullet hit me. Of course, I didn't know I was hit. I didn't know anything. When I woke up, the rain had stopped and it was fairly quiet where I lay. The heavies were pounding our old front line and even there it wasn't too bad. [Sivertz eventually managed to get back to the old front line.] In a few minutes, I found the big medical trench, and I sat down at the end of the lines of wounded men. A medical sergeant came up every few minutes, looking for haemorrhage cases; every few minutes he would pick someone out, and
idea,
.
Canadians dig
I
of a
German
in
along the shattered remains Vimy Ridge is theirs
trench.
A
m*
S? •~Vv*,s"
•
*-
•> ;«-, •**,
\
^»*^i
The Submarine War
FIRST ROUND
TO GERMANY On February
1917 Germany's leaders decided on a bold strategic gamble: to attempt to destroy Britain economically by sinking on 1,
ht any shipping, Allied or neutral. Such an act would bring America into the war, but would Britain be forced out before American involvement tipped the scales in favour of
admiral (Retd) Friedrich Ri. lookouts on watch for hostile aircraft When in the autumn of 1916 the U-Boats received orders to resume their war against merchant shipping no steps were taken to adapt the organisation of the submarine force to that vastly increased task or to create a staff competent to clarify the technical and political problems, and to co-ordinate the military effort. Command remained divided, and several authorities continued to deal with submarine questions. The most important staff dated back to the times when submarines were considered exclusively as weapons to attack larger warships. Before the war the U-Boats were organised as a flotilla consisting of two half-flotillas, just like the torpedo boats, and, like these, under Fleet Command. In August 1914 the Senior Officer of the Flotilla, Fregattenkapitan Hermann Bauer, received the title ofFiihrerder U-Booten (FdU). He was given a lieutenant-commander as his one and only staff officer, who among other duties kept the war diary of the FdU in longhand (which may explain why it is not exhaustive). Hermann Bauer was a good choice for he was energetic, clever and experienced. Born in 1875, he joined the navy in 1892. As early as 1905 he and a classmate of his were the first officers to volunteer for submarine duty. They were nominated commanding officers of U 1 and U2, but Bauer's U2 never got beyond the trial stage and he was put in charge of submarine affairs in the Reichsmarineamt (Navy Office). Later on he served in several ships until he was made Senior Officer of the U-Boat Flotilla in March 1914. As new submarines came along two more half-flotillas were founded under the FdU. In October 1916 they were all named 'flotillas'. However, they were not the only U-Boat forces. After German troops reached the coast of Flanders in autumn 1914 a Marine Corps under the tough Admiral von Schroder took over the defences there. For the most part it was formed from the surplus of naval reservists, but small torpedo boats and patrol vessels were attached. In February 1915 the 'U-Boat Flotilla Flanders' was created of Bl and CI class submarines. The senior officer
was Korvettenkapitan Bartenbach, who
also
had submarine
experience. He was not under the orders of the FdU. Three more units were in a similar position: U-Boat Flotilla Kurland for the eastern Baltic, with only a few submarines: U-Boats of the Mediterranean Division for operations in the Black Sea, with again only a few UB and UC-boats: German U-Boat Flotilla Pola, operating in the Mediterranean with the Austrian Adriatic port of Pola as their base. At Pola there were 20 and more submarines, at least half of them large boats. The I nspektion des Ubootswesens 'Inspection of U-Boat Matters) under the Navy Office was responsible for the technical and some of the tactical developments. The Admiral Staff" was directly in charge of the Mediterranean operations and had a say in the others. The very active Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet, Admiral Scheer, quite naturally was much interested in having strong submarine support available for the fleet opera tions he planned, whereas Marine Corps Flanders counted on its U-Boats as a defence against attacks on the coast which might also endanger the northern flank of the army in Belgium. II
2077
Above: Kapitanleutnants Willy Petz ((/ 85) and Claus Hanien Petz fell victim to a Q-ship Below: Kapitanleutnants Otto Hersing (U 21) and Otto Steinbrinck (UC 65). Steinbrinck was the most successful captain of small submarines; in February/May 1917 he sank 72,311 tons and damaged 51,452 tons In his whole career he destroyed 210,000 tons Bottom: Kapitanleutnants Hans Walter (U 52 and later U 1 7) and Walter Forstmann (U 39). The U-Boat arm received the pick of the young officers and men of the whole navy, but even so the natural gifts (and luck) needed were not at all evenly distributed
The
decisive factors in U-Boat
warfare —
quiet tenacity, the ability to calculate risks,
and good shooting
IV
N Jl
^
2078 i
\
/
I 2079
SUM 1
'^hBBT
Bf*
!
jj
The toll
of British shipping
mounts alarmingly- here the U 35 sinks
the freighter Parkgate
*'
Minelaying was not enough: unrestricted U-Boat warfare was Germany's only hope of destroying Britain's trade A party from a German minesweeper defuses a Russian mine in the Baltic by unscrewing its horns with a spanner
Right:
Opposite: Raiding into the Atlantic, the forward gun of a U-Boat is photographed from the conning tower as it submerges. Owing to the limited number of torpedoes that the U-Boats could carry, the gun armament was of great importance, and shipping was sunk by gunfire rather than torpedo whenever possible
Below: A German minesweeping team marks a mine with a buoy. Although extensive, minefields claimed far fewer victims than submarines, and the work of laying them was as hazardous as the task of identifying and marking those laid by the enemy
A
point he completely neglected
was the
fact that
British
merchant ships were armed, that they often sailed under false colours or no colours at all, and that a number of apparently harmless ships operated which were armed to the teeth with concealed guns. These Q-ships had already destroyed some German submarines which observed prize regulations. To get a personal picture of the situation, Commander Bauer took part in a cruise of U 67 around Scotland in April 1916. South of Ireland they encountered a steamship under the Swedish flag. When U 67 fired a shot across her bows to stop her she answered with gun fire, all the time under the Swedish flag, hit U 67 and forced her to dive. Another steamer opened fire under the Red Ensign. These experiences obviously contributed to
Commander
Bauer's stand in the question of the tactics to be followed. In any case, he felt responsible for his U-Boats and their crews. Therefore he advocated either unrestricted warfare or purely naval operations together with the surface ships of the Fleet. Admiral Scheer vigorously expressed the same view. In contrast to them the Admiral Staff, closer to political currents and less in contact with the fighting men, favoured submarine war under prize regulations. On October 6, 1916 Admiral von Holtzendorff, the Chief of the Admiral Staff, carried his point with the Kaiser, and a number of orders were issued governing prize regulations. These regulations remained in force until
February
1,
1917.
Raiding the shipping routes In the autumn of 1916 heavy gales
in the northern waters were costly in time to the submarines taking the route around Scotland. In some cases members of the watch on the conning tower were
The Navy
Office, Admiral Staff, Fleet and Marine Corps were independent of each other and directly under the orders of the Kaiser who was supposed to give a ruling when their plans and opinions differed. That was no mean task under the best of conditions. Nothing like the present situation had been taken in account in the Kaiser's education and training. He had no adequate assistance in the shape of a combined staff or a wellselected 'brains trust' to help him in his decisions on the difficult political and military problems of the U-Boat war, which, in itself, was something quite new in international relations. all
The scope
of the task
In the autumn of 1916 the overall military situation pointed to unrestricted U-Boat war as the only means left that could bring a decision in a comparatively short time. Neither the German attack on Verdun nor the Franco-British offensives in Flanders and on the Somme had succeeded in a breakthrough, and both sides were exhausted. On the Eastern Front a dangerous situation was overcome by the quick victory over Rumania, but if Russia was exhausted Austria was distinctly weakening, and a very long front had to be held. Great Britain was the key to the situation. If she could be cut off from her supplies she could not survive. The German naval staff calculated as follows: of a total British tonnage of 20,000,000, 8,600,000 at least were requisitioned for military purposes, 500,000 were needed for coastal traffic, 1,000,000 under repair or damaged, 2,000,000 had to serve the Allies. In this way about 8,000,000 tons of British origin were available. Actually, in the summer of 1916 no more than 6,750,000 tons of British shippitig carried supplies to the British Isles and France, but about 4,000,000 tons of neutral and Allied ships transported cargoes to Great Britain. Unrestricted warfare would destroy about 600,000 tons per month and in addition dissuade two-fifths of the neutral ships. In this way maritime traffic to England would be reduced by 39% in five months whereas submarine war under prize regulations would destroy only 400,000 tons per month and reduce maritime traffic by no more than \8 r/i in five months. This would not be sufficient to force England to give up, whereas unrestricted warfare would achieve this end. But much depended on the political consequences of the unrestricted war, particularly how President Wilson would react to it. From the point of view of international law and agreements there was not much difference between war zones declared and mined by the British, and zones barred to merchant ships under threat of unannounced submarine attack. Nobody was compelled to enter them whereas hundreds of thousands of German civilians were starving without having any choice in that matter, with the food situation in the winter of 1916/17 worse than ever. However, Wilson did not seem to mind that but had very forcibly declared that he was against submarine war.
flung against the casing and seriously injured or even killed, others were hurled overboard and drowned. After consulting the commander of Marine Corps U-Boats on conditions in the Channel, the FdU gave orders to his U-Boats to take the short cut through Dover Straits unless they were newly commissioned and their crews therefore not yet experienced enough. Not all large boats were employed for merchant warfare. Between beginning of November and middle of December three were directed to the Skagerrak and the Norwegian coast to scout for the raiders Mowe and Wolf on their way to the Atlantic and to assist them if they were attacked. To keep this protection at hand Wolf towed U 66 submerged at ten knots for eight hours off the Norwegian coast opposite the Shetlands. After dark she cast the towing line off and proceeded at full speed northward. Both raiders succeeded in passing the British patrols without being sighted. The three submarines scuttled six small ships (none larger than 1,000 tonsi and examined 43 more. Three other U-Boats cruised along the Norwegian coast up to the Vestfjiorden (port of Narvik) where the Admiral Staff expected iron ore traffic to England. They found only one larger ship which turned out to be a British Q-ship. In the heavy sea neither side obtained hits. The weather was mostly very bad, and the guns were covered by ice, the men on the bridge exhausted, and there were no more than three hours of uncertain daylight. Altogether the operation was a waste of men and material. Once the U-Boats reached the waters south of Ireland and the Bay of Biscay conditions were generally better. They met heavy traffic, and the British patrols were frequent only in the approaches to the Channel and near the coast. Some U-Boats even put a man or two as prize crews on board suitabie ships which were used to receive the crews of the ships they scuttled, and to put them ashore in Spain. In this way, U 46 'worked' first with a small steamer and then with a trawler. Altogether she sank nine ships totalling 15,000 tons. Some more escaped after
gun
duels.
17 U 70 stopped and scuttled a British steamer of 5,600 tons in the middle of the Channel. Then she continued to the Bay of Biscay. Her total haul consisted of 16 ships with 26,000 tons. There were about ten more cruises of this type, and not all were finished on February 1, 1917. As a rule they lasted about four weeks, with a stay of one to two weeks in the waters to the southwest of the British Isles. They were all successful with the exception of two boats which had technical trouble. One lost oil through leaky tanks, in the other the propeller shaft of the port engine broke. On January 5 U48 tried to stop a French steamer north of Cape Finisterre but the Frenchman returned the tire, altered course and escaped in a westerly direction. The German captain calculated that she would haul round again to reach the French coast. He was right and intercepted his quarry the following morning. His torpedo missed, he steamed ahead and sank her with another torpedo after a chase of 15 hours. Five hours earlier the French-
On December
L'OS;!
already reported 'I am safe'. Altogether U 48 destroyed ships totalling 27,000 tons At that time there were six UB II boats under Fleet Command, mainly used for hunting British submarines which were supposed to watch the swept channels near Horns Reef and Doggerbank, and to report any movements there. The UB craft did not meet any of their opposite numbers, and very little traffic. They searched a number of ships, sank one small steamer and made
man had 1
1
'*r.
two prizes. They, too, were much hampered by rough weather and might have destroyed more tonnage if they had been stationed nearer to the English coast. What really could be done was shown by the UB-Boats based on the ports of Flanders. Even the few one-engined Bis stopped 17 neutral steamers, with machine gun or carbine, and made one prize. The UB II boats were much more successful. In two cruises between November 22 and January 9 UB 18 stopped and scuttled 15 steamers totalling 17,400 tons, and also 11 trawlers and small coastal Bailing ships. Twice she encountered Q-ships but escaped unharmed thanks to the watchfulness of her experienced captain.
U-Boat casualties
UB 19 met with a different fate. On November 22 she left Zeebrugge under a new captain. In the central part of the Channel she stopped and scuttled five ships totalling 5,200 tons. On the way back she sighted a tanker without a flag and took her under fire. The ship first tried to get away, then stopped and lowered two whalers which pulled away. UB 19 thought her adversary harmless and approached to 500 to 600 yards. Now the captain felt misgivings and gave the order to dive but it was too late. It was the Q-ship Penshurst which opened fire with several guns and at once damaged UB 19 so seriously that she had to be abandoned. Eight of her crew were killed, 15 saved by the whalers, and some injured, among them the captain. In a similar way a few days later the same Q-ship sank UB37 which had approached to 700 yards. There were no survivors. UB 29 was also lost, probably hit by the British destroyer Landrail which early in the morning of December 13 dropped depthcharges on a diving submarine southeast of the Goodwin Sands. Much oil came to the surface after that attack, UB 29 did not return to her base. Almost all the other boats had encounters with armed steamers or Q-ships. In this period four UC I and eight UC II boats operated from Flanders. Only the larger type passed Dover Straits or went north of Great Yarmouth to drop the mines. UC 19 was lost, probably hit by an explosive kite towed by the destroyer Ariel in the western Channel on December 6, 1916. UC 18 had a weird experience in the night of January 24/25 when she returned through the Dover Straits after laying mines off Brest and St Nazaire and scuttling 13 ships totalling 14,600 tons. In the very dark night she sighted a destroyer and dived. To give it time to depart the captain stayed on the bottom for half an hour. When the boat rose again to the surface the crew felt a shock, and the stern would not come up. Opening the hatch of the conning tower they saw the stern of a destroyer on the after part of the submarine. The destroyer tried to get free by going astern, UC 18 assisted these endeavours by diving quickly. Then she went on as deeply as possible and remained unmolested. Other U-Boats had difficulties with nets but succeeded in getting rid of them, mostly by going down as deeply as possible, sometimes by going astern. This was dangerous, however, because the wires might foul the propellers. On January 18, 1917, UC 21 torpedoed the destroyer Ferret which did not sink but could be towed in. A number of steamers of 5,000 and more tons were also brought in after hitting mines. Seven UC II boats attached to the flotillas under Fleet Command undertook 11 operations, each time laying 18 mines. By these fields 11 ships of 14,300 tons were sunk. These UC-Boats also stopped and examined 31 neutral steamers. Four of them were scuttled because they carried contraband, and also some trawlers. UC 31 took one as a prize and put a coxswain on board. Soon afterwards the submarine had a fight with an armed steamer and was compelled to dive. In this way she lost contact with the trawler which later was retaken by a British patrol vessel. In November and December 1916 six large minelayers of the
U
U
71 to 80 were used for merchant warfare under prize regulations, mainly in the North Sea because their engines were unreliable. However, 79 was sent to the Bay of Biscay as an experiment. She passed Dover Straits on Christmas Eve and went south to the coast of Portugal scuttling nine ships totalling 14,200 tons. On account of engine trouble she went around the Shetlands but used so much fuel that she could not hope to reach a German North Sea port. East of the Shetlands her captain thereclass
U
^^"^|M
^^' "
"
Above and opposite: Two stages in an unusual fight in the North Sea. A German seaplane, commanded by Kapitan Christiansen, engages the British submarine C 25 with gunfire, damaging the conning tower and injuring the crew on it. After half an hour the seaplane exhausts its ammunition and is forced to break off the fight, leaving the C 25 wallowing out of control until eventually she is towed into harbour by another British submarine, the E 51
Norwegian steamer with a cargo of salt from Norway, declared her a prize and used her for towing
fore stopped a small
England
to
the submarine. After three days they reached the German Bight and destroyers took over. The prize was 'ater released. In January 1917 two of the large minelayers were sent on minelaying operations to distant waters again. U 76 went to the Polar Sea in order to mine Kola Bay. There she was rammed at night by a darkened ship when she tried to avoid it by diving. She got away but her pressure hull was so much damaged that she had to stay on the surface. She tried to return to Germany but after some days the engines broke down. With the last of the electric power the boat reached sheltered water near Hammerfest. There the crew was taken off by a Norwegian fisherman, and U 76 sank with opened seacocks. U 80 laid several small minefields off the Orkneys, the Hebrides and the north coast of Ireland. Here an auxiliary cruiser, the Laurentic (14,900 tons) struck a mine and sank. She was on her way to the USA with a large cargo of gold which, according to newspaper reports, was valued at $35 million. The losses were lower than could reasonably be expected under the dangers inherent in fully observing prize regulations. From October 1916 to end of January 1917, 11 U-Boats were lost in all theatres of war, but only four were destroyed by enemy action in the waters around the British Isles and off the coast of France.
February
1
— the great
decision
In all areas taken together the total results of the submarine
operations were:
• October 1916 • November 1916 • December 1916 • January 1917 -
337,000 325,000 308,000 328,000
tons tons tons tons These figures were carefully calculated after the war with the help of all available sources. In 1916/17 the estimates of the Admiral Staff were about one-third higher. Yet it was evident that even these results would not be enough to force Great Britain to give up the struggle. Therefore the advocates of unrestricted submarine warfare continued to plead their cause. After discussions with the Austrian government the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg declared the willingness of the Central Powers to enter negotiations for peace in a speech before the German Parliament on December 12, 1916. President Wilson, re-elected 'for peace' on November 7, 1917 took these proposals up but in only a very general fashion. In their answers (Lloyd
2UK4
\
8
jppp"
/
or reconnaissance lines were attempted as had been done during fleet operations. Only in a few cases, more or less by accident, did two submarines co-operate against the same target. Commander Bauer received the title of 'Commodore' but an interesting and promising plan of his was not accepted by the Admiral Staff. Fully realising the necessity of utilising the U-Boats to the utmost he suggested the conversion of the merchant submarine Deutschland into a command ship. Equipped with additional wireless she was to take up a position in the western part of the barred zone, with FdU or a deputy on board. Specially trained personnel were to watch Allied wireless traffic. This would give the officer in charge valuable information and enable him to inform and possibly concentrate the U-Boats on rewarding targets or in promising areas. Moreover, Deutschland
was to carry oil for other boats. The Admiral Staff was not over enthusiastic about this plan. It wanted the Deutschland to conduct cruiser warfare in distant waters, and thought that a normal large U-Boat could be fitted
envisaged by Commodore Bauer. But this project which might have led to 'wolf pack' tactics was not pursued with any energy, and it was shelved when Bauer was relieved of com-
for the duties
mand
early in June, 1917.
A new
stage in the
war
The declaration
Commons on December 19, and in the Allied note 30) the Allies declared the German offer an attempt to deceive the world, put the whole blame for the war on Germany and practically demanded the disintegration of the AustroHungarian Empire and the removal of the Ottoman Empire from European soil. These facts, as well as the discourteous tone used on both occasions, were taken by the German military leaders as a complete rejection of the peace proposals. The Chancellor si ill had hopes and tried to induce President Wilson to act. However, in a conference at the Emperor's on January 9, 1917, Bethmann-Hollweg was persuaded to consent to a declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare as from February 1, 1917, as the only means of ending the war in a reasonably short time. On February 1, 1917 the German government declared a large area around the British Isles and off the French coast as well as the central and eastern Mediterranean as barred zones where all ships would be attacked and sunk without warning. In April the Polar Sea east of the North Cape outside Norwegian territorial George in the
of
December
HQ
waters was added. Neutral shipping was given time to leave these zones, and shipping channels were arranged for neutral countries like the Netherlands and Greece. All armed merchant ships were to be treated like warships even outside the zones. On February 1 the submarine force comprised 105 submarines in all — a rather modest number after two and a half years of war. and the organisation was substantially unchanged. There was agreement between the staffs that the best prospects for playing havoc with the flow of supplies going to Britain and France were to be found in the approaches to the Channel and the Irish Sea, in the Bay of Biscay and off the larger ports. Therefore the large U-Boats were sent mainly to the waters west and southwest of the British Isles. The smaller boats of the FdU operated off the east coast of England and Scotland, those of the Marine Corps in the Channel and in the approaches to the Thames. A few large boats were sent north to intercept traffic between Norway and the Shetlands or going to northern Russia. To save time the large U-Boats had orders to take the route through the Dover Straits. In view of the concentration of defences there and the tricky navigation with rapid currents and large changes of depth, many captains were against this short-cut. all the more so as there were repeated delays. After a month the order was rescinded, the captains were given free choice In May they were urged again to use the shorter route but no direct order was given, and few did so. The few large minelayers were sent to the waters around Scotland and Ireland, only one to northern Russia. These arrangements worked comparatively well but there was not enough co-ordination, and the U-Boats generally acted as independent units. The map of the operational afea was subdivided by a grid, and according to their importance the resulting squares were allotted to individual U-Boats which could no longer freely choose where they wanted to go. No concentrations
of unrestricted submarine warfare had considerable influence on the situation in the North Sea and the tasks of the High Seas Fleet. In an Order of the Day of January 31, 1917 Admiral Scheer said that every effort of every component of the entire navy was to be put into the service of the U-Boat war. On the following day he wrote in his war diary: We now enter a new stage of tin- war in which the submarine arm is to bring the decision by strangling British economic life and sea communications. Every means of naval warfare must be put into the service of our U-Boat operations. Of course, this will principally apply to the light forces and auxiliary units charged with escort and minesweeping duties. However, the situation created by opening unrestricted submarine warfare will have to be taken into consideration for the employment of the Battle Fleet itself too.
The main task of the Fleet now was to get the U-Boats safely through the mines and submarines in the southeastern part of the North Sea. Any actions of the Fleet or of its light forces were to be directed against the British anti-submarine units or against Allied shipping. At first there were doubts if surface ships were permitted to attack merchant ships without warning. On February 28 the Admiral Staff ruled that in the 'barred zones' no difference was to be made between attack by submarine or by destroyers or other surface warships.
Scheer now planned an operation against the traffic between the Dutch ports and the Thames. There comparatively fast and well-protected steamers carried mainly food to Britain However, nothing came of Scheer's plan for various reasons, among them restrictions on fleet movements without airship reconnaissance, ordered by the Kaiser. In February and March HUT an uncommonly hard winter hampered the passage of the U-Boats from and to their bases on North Sea and Baltic, and repairs were delayed by difficult working conditions In the open North Sea the British mining campaign which had started in early 1915 became more effective by the use of fast minelayers, submarine minelayers and improved mines (with Hertz horns Whereas from November 1916 to end of January 1917 only one German minesweeping vessel struck a mine and sank, the figures w ere four in February, seven in March, two in April and 13 in May 1917. However, the German navy was prepared. The mam results of >.
:
the early British attempts to block the exits of the German Bight was to show how necessary large and well-equipped mine-
sweeping forces were
to
ensure relative freedom of movement
the German units, whether surface ships or submarines Before the war there were three minesweeping divisions of about
to
little ships had not been built draught was too great During mobilidivisions of tugs and fishing vessels were added, one
15 very old torpedo boats. These for
minesweeping
sation local at
least for
for their
every naval port
war more auxiliary units were commissioned, among them a flotilla of Sperrbrecher, medium-sized steamers, made almost unsinkable by a cargo of wood and emptj barrels, equipped with a primitive mine-detonating gear at their bows. Simultaneously, special minesweepers were built (called M-Boats), of 450 tons, with two propellers and a draughl of only (>'• feet. These replaced the torpedo boats for actual sweeping. In addition, a great number o\' small torpedo boats were built. In the first years of the
2085
in
three classes, displacing 110, 220 and 350 tons respectively.
They were equipped escort duties, laying
for
minesweeping,
marker buoys,
too,
etc.
but used mainly for
Then there were
large
minesweeping motor launches carried on the deck of special steamers, called 'motherships', to fields of particularly shallow mines. Eventually, all the older destroyers of the Fleet were equipped with light minesweeping gear and used for exploring the channels. There were two kinds of minesweeping gear, a heavy one which did good service as long as the British mines were laid in long rows, and a light one which was very accurate but tricky to handle. To protect the minesweepers themselves, a kind of very simple paravane was introduced. These forces and means were sufficient for getting the Fleet and the submarines into open water between the barred zones, with small losses to the combat vessels. Those of the minesweepers were heavy.
A
staggering kill ratio During every month of unrestricted war in 1917 on an average almost 100 cruises were undertaken, about 250 torpedoes launched (hits slightly over 50%) and 700 mines laid. Conditions were now easier for the U-Boats, at least as long as the British anti-submarine weapons and methods were not substantially improved. The apparent results were much higher than the Admiral Staff had calculated, but even the actual sinkings surpassed the German expectations: • Februarv 1917 - 520,000 tons - 564,000 tons • March 1917 - 860,000 tons • April 1917 - 616,000 tons 1917 May • These results were gained with the loss of 16 U-Boats, with one interned, including eight off the Flanders coast and only one in the Mediterranean. These losses were higher than before but acceptable in view of the increased number of cruises. Yet only 18 U-Boats were commissioned in the first four months of unrestricted war whereas in the preceding four there had been 43. No such augmentation was to be expected for the rest of the year. Therefore the causes of the losses were of particular interest in order that corrective measures might be taken. At the time they could be ascertained in only a few cases, but the experiences of those submarines that escaped attack gave valuable hints. Four were destroyed by the weapons of surface ships. UB 36 was rammed by an armed steamer during the attack on a small 26 was rammed by night and under a full moon in the convoy, Dover Straits by the destroyer Milne. 46 surfaced under similar conditions a few hundred yards in front of the destroyer Liberty and was also rammed. UC 39 was surprised by destroyers when she
UC
UC
stopped a steamer near Flamborough Head with gun fire. She dived but a depth charge damaged her and she had to return to the surface where she was received with heavy fire. Her captain and several men were killed, the rest jumped overboard and were saved. UC 39 did not go down at once. She was taken in tow but sank after some hours. U 83, U 85 and UC 18 fell victims to British Q-ships. Quite a number of other boats were luckier and got away from Q-ships, some by the skin of their teeth. Some damage and losses could have been avoided if the captains and lookouts had been more distrustful. Yet in the times when prize regulations were in force the U-Boats had stopped so many ships that it took them some time to become cautious enough and go only for rewarding tonnage. In some cases the Q-ship had the worst of the encounter. U 62 (Kapitanleutnant Hashagen) sighted a small steamer, apparently unarmed and harmless, about 150 miles west of Fastnet. But Hashagen did not trust appearances and manoeuvred submerged until he could fire a torpedo which hit amidships and caused the boilers to blow up. Even now U 62 remained under water and closely scrutinised her quarry through the periscope. In this way she discovered several guns which were still partly camouflaged. When one began to fire on the periscope U 62 went about 2,200 yards ahead, came to the surface outside of the arc of fire of her opponent's guns and sank the steamer with her two guns (105-mm and 88-mm). Then U 62 approached and searched the wreckage drifting about. In a small wooden box they found a postcard addressed to a sailor in HMS Tulip (Q12). They asked for the captain and took him on board. It was Commander Lewis, and his first question was: 'Will you kill me now?' Hashagen was greatly taken aback but managed to answer in a noncommittal tone: 'No, not yet.' Actually, Commander Lewis was treated like a member of the crew during the 19 days he stayed on board U 62. After the war the two captains got in touch and met in England. Submarines were another danger. The British E 54 torpedoed
U 81 which was about to sink a ship with guns after damaging it with a torpedo. In spite of a considerable sea E 54 saved the commanding- officer and six men. U 81 was at the end of a cruise which brought the total of her three operations to 86,000 tons sunk and 3,000 damaged. North of the Shetlands UC 43 was hit by a torpedo from the British submarine G 13 and sank with all hands. (The only loss in the Mediterranean, UC24, was also due to a submarine, the French Circe.) Others were luckier. Shortly after leaving Zeebrugge UB 10 sighted the British C 7 on a dark night. C 7 fired a torpedo, the German turned quickly away, the torpedo detonated on the bottom of the sea about 200 yards off. Some weeks later UB 10 sighted the periscope of a submarine and the tracks of two torpedoes at the same moment. One passed ahead, the other hit but did not detonate. A third torpedo fired immediately afterwards passed under UB 10 which understandably avoided further enemy action by diving. The human element Of the other losses two (probably three) blew up owing to failures of their own mines (UC 68, 32 and probably UC36). 59 got into a German minefield through a mistake in the navigation of the escorting vessels, 30 and possibly UB 39 perished in the combination of nets and mines in the Dover Straits. Quite a number of U-Boats had disagreeable experiences when they passed this area. Trusting in their low silhouette and in the difficulties of the patrols in keeping alert all through the long nights of uneventful waiting, they generally started on the sur-
UC
U
UC
always with the tide. The strong current exerted considerable on the nets which helped the net-saw of the U-Boat to make a breach when it ran on the upper guy of the net. Some boats preferred to try their luck by going as deep down as possible, and most of the others had to follow their example for part of the trip at least. Some succeeded without any incident, others went clean through a net they met, not a few stuck and got free again, and some heard noises from steel wires scraping along the hull without knowing whether they were mine ropes or part of a net. In any case, passing the narrow part of the Channel was a nerve-racking experience which nobody liked. In contrast, the dangers of the open sea and the enemy there were borne with equanimity. The human element played a prominent part in submarine warfare. The U-Boat arm received the pick of the young officers and men of the whole navy, but the natural gifts for this special type of action, and also luck, were not at all evenly distributed. Promising captains made unproductive cruises, others seemed to have all the breaks. Of course, chance could not be ruled out, but quiet determination and tenacity, a flair for the ever-changing situation, the ability to calculate the risks, and good shooting were decisive. The most successful captain of small submarines was Otto Steinbrinck, who was based in Flanders. From February to May face,
force
2086
/
/
Opposite page: The crew of the U 35 take a cold shower. Left: A U-Boat rescues survivors of a merchant ship it has just sunk — a painting by Felix Schwormstadt. Below: The theory and practice of unrestricted U-Boat warfare. When she launched the campaign on February Germany gambled that she would be able to sink a sufficient percentage of the shipping
c
| 13
| I i a 35
1
available to Britain from all sources to drive her out of the war before America was propelled into joining the Allies. The gamble was based on estimates of the total tonnage available to Britain (10,700,000 tons) and the amount the Germans could sink each month if they were not obliged to warn the victims (600,000 tons): the estimate was that within five months Germany could sink 39% (compared with only 18% under prize regulations) and Britain would be forced to sue for peace Indeed, the first three months of the campaign showed a great increase in sinkings, alarmingly high to Britain's leaders but equally alarming to Germany's because Britain was by no means anxious to sue for peace
-o. GERMAN U-BOATS LOST (5)UNDER REPAIR |5)IN DOCK .(5)ATSEA .
.(5)
—ta_
BRITISH SHIPS LOST
1916
September
November
October
December
1917 January
February
March
April **- •
-
i
i
I
%,t
^*
'
I
84 596 ions
109 954 tons
109 94S Ions
14 689 Ions
145 195 tons
BRITISH SHIPPING LOSSES IN THE
^— —^
WESTERN APPROACHES. CHANNEL
El
EAST COAST
f— September 1916January 1917
E°bruary
April 1917
516 394 tons
Shipping available to Biitain
(In millions ol tons)
German estimate ol British losses months ol U-Boat warfare (In millions
in 5
ol tons)
2087
9 Jifnrl
tt?
Crew 0f ,he merch ant ship Mashobra are captured ^amShKand P S SUnk by an A "stro-Hungarian U-Boat ,
'
SS^np 9 I mlfl ' a
w
in
hiS th6a,re 0<
irn
the
W3r n6Utral Shipp,n was allow «d 9
9 a narrow route: 0u,side ? ,5 unrestricted rules of submarine
,hi s
-*
channel the
warfare operated
20M
J
P* -"
1
^
>-£>•* *>*
-"*..
\
-
^•J <*-<
\(
'
Another link in Britain's vital chain of supply is
shattered
*•-,
1917 he undertook four operations in the Channel and the Irish Sea with UC 65, laid 18 mines on each, torpedoed seven steamers, stopped 54 vessels ranging from a fishing smack to a steamer (one with a rifle, another one with a megaphone) and scuttled them all with gun fire or explosives, beat off a French flying boat with machine gun fire, crossed a net and searched for another one but did not find any trace of it. In these four months Steinbrinck sank 72,311 tons and damaged 51,452 tons by mine or torpedo: In* his whole career he destroyed about 210,000 tons N Among the ships damaged by his exertions was the US steamer New York which struck a mine off Liverpool but did not sink (10,000 tons). The US Admiral Sims was a passenger, and was on his way to London where he was to discuss the naval situation and the participation
oftheUSnavy.
From a military point of view the first phase of unrantqcfed U-boat warfare fulfilled what the Admiral Staff had promised. Yet it contributed to bringing the USA into the war and this extra weight on the Allied side was not compensated by the withdrawal of Russia after the Revolution. Further Reading Bauer, H., Als Fuhrerder U-Boote im Weltkrieg (Germany 1941) Bauer, H., Reichsleitung und U-Boots-Einsatz (Germany 1956) Doenitz, Admiral Karl. Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1959) Gibson, R. H., and Prendergast, M., The German Submarine War, 19141918 (Constable 1931) Grant, R. M„ U-8oafs Destrqyed (Putnam 1964) Grant, R. M., U-Boatlntelligence. 1914-1918 (Putnam 1969) Hashagen, Commander E., 7"r>e Log of a U-Boat Commander (Putnam 1931) Michelson, A., Der U-Bootskrieg 1914-1918 (Germany 1925)
[For Vizeadmiral Ruge's biography, see page 1404
x
:
The Submarine War
I"
who
On
many of the daring U-Boat commanders
raided its
fii
commerce in the Atlantic was Frei)iegel, commander of the new U93. id the U 93 sunk 27,000 tons of lore it was damaged by a Q-ship. aptured and the U-boat, badly i
Ruge.
Of
limp back to base. Vizeadmiral
commander U 93 showing damage by shello right:
the fire
to
Spiegel,
from the Prize, a British Q-ship; and Sanders, the
P
ommander
U 93, commanded by Kapitanleutnant Freiherr von Spiegel, the submarine base at Emden on April 13, 1917, and after a short dive to test all components, human and mechanical, she proceeded in the wake of a group of minesweepers. After passing the mined area the sweepers turned back and 93 moved north in the neutral channel between the British and German war areas via the Dogger Bank Light Vessel. The southwest wind increased to Force 10, and heavy seas forced the submarine under water for some time. On April 15, on the latitude of Dundee, she sighted a small Danish sailing ship with a cargo of British coal and sank her with gun fire after the crew had taken to a boat. In the afternoon Fair Isle came in sight but the weather became too rough to pass Fair Isle Straits on the surface. Therefore Freiherr von Spiegel decided to go around the Shetlands. On April 18, 100 miles west of them, a large British ship was stopped. She carried 2,100 tons of maize and 500 tons of oil cake. Her captain handed his papers over, and the crew were given time to get away in the boats before the ship was sunk by a torpedo. A few hours later, a Norwegian steamer was sunk in a similar way. After passing a line of patrols between the Orkneys and the Faroes undetected U 93 had gyro trouble but succeeded in repairing it. The weather improved but there was still a heavy swell. She tried to cut off a steamer which was too fast, however. In order to regulate the gyro and overhaul the torpedoes 93 dived and proceeded at 100 feet for several hours. On April 21, she sighted two boats under sail evidently from a ship sunk by another U-L it, then exchanged recognition signals with U 67, and wireless usages with U 60. On the following day a large Norwegian full «ed ship with a cargo of pitch-pine for Liverpool was stopped anc 'tied by explosive charges. At that time gunfire was heard to north. After that no shi ng was met off the North Channel, and U 93 moved to an area lL to 200 miles west and southwest of Fastnet where she sighted a L sh patrol vessel. On April 23, she attacked the steamer Stanmon h a bronze torpedo which did not reach its target, and then witn lewer make which also missed because The left
U
U
t
had a gyro failure. Then U 43 surfaced nearby and attacked the steamer with artillery fire. U 93 surfaced too and also began to shell her, but the steamer zigzagged cleverly and replied so vigorously that both submarines broke off the engagement. A few hours later, however, the Stanmore was sunk by a torpedo from U 50. The destroyers she had called by SOS had arrived too late. In the following days several patrols were sighted and a small Danish sailing ship was rendered useless and left, deep in the water, floating on its cargo of 300 tons of pitch-pine. U 93 towed its crew of six a considerable distance to the east. On April 29, U 93 unsuccessfully attacked two steamers and then sank two others (each about 5,000 tons with cargoes of grain and ammunition) by torpedo. The first started to burn and blew up with considerable loss of life; the second had to be sunk by a bronze torpedo and some shells. The captain and two gunners were made prisoners. On the following day two more steamers were sunk. The first, with a cargo of ore from Africa to England, went down at once. U 93 rescued 14 men, some seriously injured, and took them on board where they were fed, clad, and their wounds it
The second steamer, Italian (3,200 tons, with a cargo of ammunition), blew up in two detonations, and nobody was saved. On the following day U 93 put the Danish crew on a Finnish ship keeping only the gunner. Recognition signals were exchanged with U 21. Then a steamer came in sight. On diving U 93 got too much forward angle and went too deep, rose with the help of compressed air, got too deep again and surfaced to attack with the guns because the opportunity for torpedo attack was past However, the tables were quickly turned because the opponent was armed with six guns which forced U 93 to dive. Some hours later, another steamer with food and ammunition was sunk lis torpedo. Only two torpedoes were left and the captain decided to go north again before returning home. Towards evening a three-masted schooner came in sight and was stopped by gunfire. She turned into the wind and her crew left in a boat while U 93 approached from the port quarter and began to shell the apparently deserted vessel at a distance of no more than 300 yards. At the first hit the dressed.
2092
\
/
/
schooner hoisted the White Ensign and returned fire with four guns and some machine guns. It was the Q-ship Prize, commanded by W. E. Sanders, who had caught his adversary napping, with all the officers in the conning tower and a number of men sight-seeing on deck, including the gun crews. U 93 at once received several hits on the starboard side as Spiegel shouted 'Hard aport, emergency full speed ahead.' Fire from the machine guns and a shell through the base of the periscope made it necessary to clear the bridge. Captain, quartermaster and pilot jumped aft, the Chief Engineer down into the control station, the executive officer took shelter in the lee of the conning tower. The forward gun continued to hit the schooner, doing much damage, and there were loud screams. Hits in the fuel and diving tanks now caused U 93 to take up a list of 14 degrees to starboard. The gunlayer of the after gun was wounded, the quartermaster tried to get it going again, the blast of another hit threw the captain, quartermaster and machinist's mate overboard unobserved by the others. Now the forward gun was put out 'of action by a hit and Lieutenant Ziegner, the executive officer, took over and tried to get away from the schooner, zigzagging at high speed. After one or two more hits U 93 succeeded in getting out of range.
Detection seemed unavoidable When the captain could not be found Ziegner decided to steer westwards until noon on the next day to throw off pursuit. Several men had been seriously injured and one died during the night. The pressure hull was pierced in one place, elsewhere rivets were leaking and the boat could not dive. When the damage was examined on the next morning it was found that U 93 had been hit at least nine times. Both guns and the periscope were out of action, several fuel and regulating tanks damaged, a number of valves, compressed air flasks and the wireless masts wrecked and more than half the fuel lost. What remained would just be sufficient to reach the German Bight of the North Sea, without reserves for high speed or other emergencies. Attempts were made to stop the leak in the pressure hull but were not successful.
As long as the boat remained on the surface the hole was above water, but diving was impossible. Nevertheless, Lieutenant Ziegner decided to try to return to Germany, giving the Shetlands a wide berth. It took them six days at economic speed until they were well to the north of the Shetlands. Once they sighted a German submarine at a great distance but were not able to contact her. The weather was fairly good, with moderate winds and the sea from astern or from the quarter. On May 6, gyro and magnetic compass failed but after an anxious half hour the gyro worked again. When it was time to change course the wind increased to Force 9 from the west with snow squalls. It was difficult to steer a straight course, the seas rolled over the conning tower where the officer and the petty officer of the watch were secured with safety belts. On the following morning, about 100 miles east of the Shetlands. several destroyers and trawlers came in sight at distances down to 4,500 yards Detection seemed unavoidable. U 93 turned away to where there was a gap in the line of patrols. A heavy snow squall set in, but tin- submarine went on at high speed. After an hour when the weather cleared there was nothing in sight. The course was now set for thi' west coast of Jutland which was reached at Bovbjerg in the night of May 8/9. Attempts at wireless communication failed. The boat followed the coast southwards, avoided a number of small ships, passed inside Horns Reef and contacted a German trawler which accompanied her to Sylt Island. Here they did not take oil because they thought they had still enough to reach Wilhelmshaven. After two and a half hours the engines stopped Not a drop of fuel was left, and they were towed in. All ships the\ passed cheered them, and Admiral Scheer, C-in-C Fleet, came on board to congratulate them. They had sunk 27,000 tons Some weeks later they were informed through the Red Cross that Kapittinleutnanl Spiegel and the Other two men had been rescued. In August. 1017. I'll -IS sank the Prize with a torpedo She blew
up.
There were no survivors.
[For Vizeadmiral Ruge's biography, so- page 1404.]
2093
JELLICOE
r-
War Cabinet Lloyd George
&THE CONVOY
Earl
Curzon
Neville Chamberlain
Arthur Henderson
Lord Milner
Jan Smuts (Secretary) Maurice Hankey
CONTROVERSY
DURING NAVAL DISCUSSIONS ONLY
1st Lord of the Admiralty
W
1st Sea Lord
Appointed First Sea Lord in 1916 Jellicoe soon found that the tools at his disposal were grossly inadequate and that his tasks were growing as Germany began unrestricted U-Boat warfare. Temperamentally unable to delegate responsibility, the burden became unbearable as 1917 wore on, and as he sank into a mood of profound pessimism Lloyd George began to
r
1st Lord of the Admiralty Campbell Geddes
Sir Eric
PROMOTED
1st Sea Lord
Wemyss
Vice-Admlral Sir Rosslyn
DECEMBER PROMOTED
Controller of the Navy Sir
27
Campbell Geddes
Sir Eric
•
(First
\
Board of Admiralty
intrigue against him. Peter Kemp. Right: The chain of command between Lloyd George, Jellicoe and the pivotal Anti-Submarine Division. By the end of 1917 Lloyd George had placed his nominees in the key positions The Balfour-Jackson duumvirate
)
Alan Anderson
PROMOTED
Permanent Secretary Deputy 1st Sea Lord Wemyss
Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn
Lord and First Sea
INTRODUCED
2nd Sea Lord
Lord at the British Admiralty had been falling into disrepute, both within the navy and in the country at large, as 1916 drew to its close. Too long a succession of non-events in the North Sea, allied to some tactless remarks by Balfour in Parliament after the first German destroyer raid into the English Channel on the night of October 26/27, 1916, brought a storm of criticism in the national press. 'More salt' in the Sea Lords (none of them had in fact served at sea during the war) was called for by the Daily Mail, while of Balfour as First Lord it wrote that 'charm and amiability do not unfortunately win wars'. This general dissatisfaction was exacerbated when, after a second raid into the Channel on November 23/24, the German destroyers again escaped without loss or damage. The fact that neither of these two tip-and-run raids achieved anything was completely overlooked; that 'German destroyers are permitted with impunity twice within one calendar month to insult our coast', as the Daily Mail had it, was what really rankled. And the alarming growth, during the last three months of 1916, of the rate of merchant shipping losses through the U-Boats' activities added to the clamour for a change in the higher naval direction of the war within the Admiralty. Up in Scapa Flow, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe had been changing his mind. The battle of Jutland, followed by the abortive affair in the North Sea on August 19, had convinced him that it was no longer action with the German High Seas Fleet that was the kernel of the naval war but the increasing attack on seaborne trade by the U-Boats. There were even thoughts in the Commander-in-Chief's mind that he might give up the Grand Fleet and go to the Admiralty as a new Director of Submarine Warfare, serving under Sir Henry Jackson, the First Sea Lord, but he gave up the idea as likely to embarrass Jackson. In the end, it was Jackson who, in a letter to Balfour, paved the way for Jellicoe's appointment as First Sea Lord. Jellicoe should come, he suggested, 'as understudy to the First Sea Lord with the understanding that he would, at a convenient opportunity, take my place'. He, Jacki
Vice-Admlral Sir Leopold Heath
Deputy Chief of the Naval
PROMOTED
St; iff
Acting Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Olive r
Assistant Chief of the Naval St aff Rear Admiral Alexander Duff
>
yv Naval Staff Chief of the Naval Staff (1st
Sea Lord)
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe
Deputy Chief
of
Naval Staff
Acting Vice- Admiral Sir Henry Oliver
Assistant Chief of Naval Staff
^-^
Rear-Admiral Alexander Duff
MAY PROMOTED
^Z Anti -Submarine Division Director Rear-Admiral Alexander Ouff
Assistant Director Captain H.
MARCH
C.Walwyn
-«-
1
-PROMOTED
MARCH 1 PR0MOTE0T0
Captain Frederick Charles Dreyer
On the
Staff of the Division Commander Reginald Henderson
DIRECTOR Of
NAVAL ORONANCE
(Direct unofficial line of communication to Lloyd
George)
The Anatomy of Lloyd George's Machinations
same letter, indicated his willingness to resign at any was good enough for Balfour, who was being irritated by the demands in the press for changes at the Admiralty, and on November 22 Jellicoe was offered, and accepted, the post of First Sea Lord, while Jackson retired to.a more congenial atmosphere as Admiral President at Greenwich. Command of the Grand Fleet was taken over by Beatty. Balfour's fate as First Lord was sealed on December 7 when a new Coalition Government was formed under the leadership of Lloyd George. There was an immediate cry, instigated by Lord Fisher and his supporters, for that fiery old seaman to be reson, in this
time. This
1.
2.
May: Lloyd George revives the office of Controller of the Navy and appoints Sir Eric Geddes. He has a seat on the Board of Admiralty. own nominee
his
—
July: Sir
Edward Carson
is
'promoted'
War
to the
Office and
Geddes takes over
the former's position. 3.
August: Sir William Graham Greene, the Permanent Secretary to the Admiralty is relieved of his post and replaced by Sir Oswyn Murray.
4.
August: Admiral Sir Cecil Burney. the 2nd Sea Lord, is replaced by Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss. and the post is elevated to the position of Deputy
5.
September: Vice-Admiral
1st Sir
Sea Lord.
Leopold Heath
is
promoted
to the
now more
tunior
position of 2nd Sea Lord.
called to service as First Loro, but fortunately for the country, and particularly for the navy, Lloyd George would have none of it. The new First Lord was to be Si Edward Carson, and on December 11 he entered the Admiralty to complete the new team.
6.
December: Admiral
Sir
John Jellicoe 'resigns' and 1st Sea Lord.
is
2094
\
/
/
\
replaced by
Wemyss
as
Second-in-Command of the 4th Battle Squadron at Jutland, and Jellicoe had noted him to become his Chief-of-StafF if Madden were to go. To second him as Assistant Director, Jellicoe brought in Captain F. C. Dreyer, who had been his flag captain in the Iron Duke and was the greatest gunnery expert of his time. Dreyer, on becoming Director of Naval Ordnance in March 1917, was relieved by Captain H. T. Walwyn.
The problem intensifies was phenomenal, simply because nothing had as yet been done to face the problem in its growing intensity, and it was not helped when, on February 1, 1917, the German government Duff's task
*"
I'limmmii
""
Above: Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Sea Lord November 1916/December 1917. Above left: Sir Eric Geddes, appointed Controller of the Navy to ease the burden on Jellicoe. First
Left:
Rear-Admiral Alexander Duff, first Director of the new Anti-Submarine Division
A meagre inheritance As he settled in at the Admiralty, Jellicoe inherited virtually nothing worthwhile in the struggle against the U-Boats. There was no system of underwater detection beyond the hydrophone which had proved itself of little value. Attempts to make it directional were very largely a failure, and throughout 1917, and well into 1918, the number of U-Boats which could definitely be proved to have been sunk through hydrophone detection was minute. In June 1917 trials were begun with a new method of acoustic underwater detection based on the reflection of a supersonic beam from the hull of a submerged submarine. It was named from the initial letters of the sponsoring committee, the Allied Submarine Detection Investigation Committee, and as the 'Asdic' it was to become supremely successful. But the war had ended before this new equipment was ready for fitting in ships. The weapon with which submerged U-Boats were attacked was the depth charge. This had been evolved in 1915 and issued to the fleet in 1916 in limited numbers because it was nobody's business at the Admiralty to urge accelerated production. They were originally dropped over the stern of the carrying ship by release gear controlled from the bridge, and could be set to explode at 40 or 80 feet. On the defensive side, mines were being used to a greater extent than ever before. They were laid in fields across supposed submarine tracks, and were also used in nets either moored across main sea routes, such as the Dover Straits, or towed by patrol vessels in areas where U-Boats were thought to be operating. None of these defensive forms of anti-submarine warfare did anything to lessen the growing menace of U-Boat attack.
Only troop transports, the coal trade to France, and the trade to Holland, known as the 'Beef Trip', sailed in convoy. That all these were virtually immune from U-Boat attack hardly registered at the Admiralty. For all the rest of the seaborne trade to and from Britain, specified routes were laid down, patrolled by sloops, trawlers, Q-ships and such destroyers as could be spared from more urgent duties. The protection afforded by this patrolling was less than nothing, for as well as failing to intercept U-Boats they revealed to the U-Boat captains the route along which the merchant ships would be sailing. This, then, was the legacy which Jellicoe inherited when, at the end of 1916, he stepped into the Admiralty to become the new First Sea Lord. His first step was to set up, on December 16, 1916, the Anti-Suhmarine Division of the Naval Staff. Until this time, there had been no single organisation within the Admiralty which dealt with anti-submarine warfare as a problem on its own; the responsibilities had been split between the Intelligence, Operations and Trade Divisions. These were now brought together to form a single division, and Jellicoe brought down from the Grand Fleet Rear-Admiral Alexander Dulf as its Director. Duff, tall and extremely good-looking, was the most outstanding of the young flag officers in the fleet. He had been
announced their intention to institute an unrestricted submarine campaign covering all waters around Britain and France and extending some 400 miles out into the Atlantic. The Mediterranean was also to be subject to unrestricted warfare, although in fact ships had been sunk there without prior warning for over a year. Allied to this unrestricted campaign was a considerable increase in U-Boat building, though in the event these orders were now being placed too late. Germany began this campaign with a total of 142 U-Boats, and built up the number steadily to a maximum of 184. Allowing for refits and rest periods, the average number at sea on any day was 46, though this number could of course vary considerably. The highest number ever at sea on one day was 70, on October 13, 1917. In the face of these numbers, and with no prospect of solution in sight to the problem of underwater detection. Duff could do little beyond augment the patrols and the various hunting craft in the hope of stemming the tide. This was of course a policy doomed to failure, and the loss figures rose alarmingly. Taking Allied and neutral shipping sunk in addition to British ships, the figures rose steadily from 291,459 tons in January 1917 to a staggering 834,549 tons in April. In the face of figures such as these, Jellicoe's confidence slumped. of an optimist throughout the whole of his career, and his present immersion in the very centre of affairs, with daily contact with the War Cabinet to whom he had to present these gloomy figures, depressed still further his pessimistic outlook. His was a nature which could not decentralise, and he sat at his desk for long hours every day dealing with papers and writing minutes that he could well have left to other members of the Admiralty Board, or even to his secretary. Another burden he had to bear was the increasing criticism of the Admiralty's apparent lack of drive against the U-Boats which came from Beatty and other officers of the Grand Fleet. All he could think of was to back up Duff in demanding yet greater numbers of patrol craft to use on the merchant ship routes. It is probable that, immersed as he was in paper work, in War Cabinet meetings, in trying to answer the growing criticism, he was already losing that flexibility of thought and mind which alone could work out a solution to the problem. And when one adds to that an evergrowing pessimism, it was no wonder that his hand faltered in the approach to this appalling problem. For the true answer was there for all in the Admiralty to see, had they the wit to look far enough and analyse the problem. It lay in the immunity of the troop transports and (later) the coal trade to France from attack by U-Boats. Troop transports had normally sailed in convoy from the start; the coal trade from January 1917. An intelligent appraisal of the larger problem, embracing the whole body of seaborne trade, would have proved the possibility of putting the great majority of it into convoy. Nor was there any lack of historical precedent to point the moral. Always in past wars the vital trade had sailed in convoy; always the convoy system had beaten the depredations of privateers and other would-be attackers of seaborne trade But there was no one inside the Admiralty, and for that matter very few in the operational commands at sea, with a sufficiently inquiring historical mind to learn from the lessons of the past. This was one of the more unfortunate legacies left by the Fisher regime of 1904/10, with its emphasis on materiel to the detriment of thought.
He had never been much
Scraping the barrel The great difficulty, in
Jellicoe's eyes, was the provision of naval escorts for merchant convoys. He was not prepared to reduce the wasteful and useless patrolling of trade routes and use the ships thus saved as convoy escorts. Indeed, his only policy at tins moment was to try to scrape the barrel still further in order to get yet more ships out on patrol. And this particular problem was not helped by an odd belief in the Admiralty, to which even Duff subscribed, that, to be effective, naval escorts should outnumber the ships to be escorted by two to one. And finally the Admiralty's cast- was bolstered by the opinions of masters of merchant ships, who all stressed the problematical difficulties of keeping station in
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The case for convoying
The case against convoying
Convoying was already in operation in some areas and had shown its relative immunity to U-Boat attack — it was in use for troop transport, the coal trade to France and in trade with Holland (the 'Beef Trip'), and the number of sinkings was much reduced.
If the
Admiralty were
to
maintain
its
policy
that naval escorts should outnumber merchant ships in convoy by two to one, then the number of naval escorts available was wholly inadequate to implement convoying.
The masters of many merchant Patrolling of shipping routes by sloops, trawlers, Q-ships and destroyers was manifestly inadequate in preventing sinkings, and it was impossible to increase the number of patrols any further because by 1917 the Admiralty was scraping the bottom of British shipping reserves.
Other defensive measures — hydrophone, depth charge and mining — were equally inadequate, while 'Asdic' was tested only in the summer of 1917 and was never operational in the First
World War.
Some of the
larger shipowners were keen to
introduce convoying
ships stressed the difficulties of keeping station in convoy convoy — the evidence that convoying reduced sinkings it appeared to remain unnoticed. Inset: British Torpedo Boat Destroyers make a smokescreen to protect a convoy All ships are dazzle painted, a technique which it was hoped would confuse U-Boat commanders by distorting the shape of the vessel and giving a false impression of its speed Below: A
was
British
available in 1917, but curiously
convoy (conveniently forgetting that transports and colliers had found no difficulties in maintaining convoy formation) and who all wanted a gun mounted on their ships to conduct their own defence. Some, though not all, of the larger shipowners, on the other hand, clamoured for the introduction of convoy. While the Admiralty, it would be fair to say, was busy marshalling all possible arguments to prove that the introduction of convoy was impossible, the Prime Minister was slowly losing his confidence in his chief naval adviser. 'A palsied and muddleheaded Admiralty' he was to write later, describing this period. In fact, unknown both to Jellicoe and Duff, a member of the Antisubmarine Division was providing Lloyd George with information that proved that the institution of ocean convoy was well within the Admiralty's capability in respect of escort vessels. This was Commander Reginald Henderson, a young officer of imagination and drive who took the trouble to analyse the ocean sailing figures and so reduce the problem to its correct proportions. Behind the backs of his superiors, Duff and Jellicoe, Henderson was working on Lloyd George, with information and well-argued opinion, to get the convoy method introduced. He was supported in this by the arguments of Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the War Cabinet, also working on Lloyd George in the interests of convoying. Lloyd George made his move on April 25 when he obtained the permission of the War Cabinet to intervene directly in the Admirit in his War Memoirs, 'there take peremptory action on the question of convoy'. The Admiralty was informed of this decision of the War Cabinet. It may possibly have been because of this impending visit by the Prime Minister that on April 26 Duff sent up a memorandum to Jellicoe recommending the introduction of ocean convoy, but a more likely explanation is that the staggering April losses at the hands of the U-Boats, coupled with the success of the French coal trade convoys and the entry of the United States into the war with its promise of easing the scarcity of escorts, had caused him to reconsider convoy as the only possible solution. He had also had Henderson's figures on the true extent of the problem, and so was no longer befogged by undigested and erroneous theories on the supposed magnitude of the task. Duffs memorandum swept away some at least of Jellicoe's doubts, so that when Lloyd George made his appearance in the Admiralty on April 30, he found the question
alty discussions and, as he put
last — convoying
There was agreement
Scandinavian trade into convoy; convoys down the east coast of Britain, and most important, to run a trial ocean convoy to see once and for all whether the system would provide the solution so urgently desired. This trial convoy sailed from Gibraltar on May 10, consisting of 17 ships escorted by three armed yachts as far out as W, by two Q-ships for the ocean passage, and by eight destroyers for the final stage through the submarine danger zone around the British Isles. The convoy split near the Scilly Islands, those ships bound for west coast ports being escorted through the Irish Sea, and those for east coast ports being convoyed through the English Channel to the Downs. The results were quite extraordinary. Not only was no ship sunk, but also no U-Boats were sighted and the overall passage was made in two days' less time than had the ships sailed independently. Nevertheless, even though the Admiralty had at last introduced the convoy system, the seeds of distrust had already been sown, and were actively germinating in the Prime Minister's mind. Both Jellicoe and Carson were probably at this time marked by him for removal as soon as circumstances made the way clear, and Lloyd George's determination to get rid of both men was given considerable impetus by a renewed chorus of criticism of the Admiralty both in the press and in the Grand Fleet. In an attempt to relieve Jellicoe of some of his vast, though self-assumed, burden of work, Lloyd George reorganised the Admiralty administration in May 1917 by bringing in Sir Eric Geddes as Controller of the Navy with a seat on the Board. It was the first time that this essentially naval post had been filled by a to put the
1
civilian,
and there was some
irritation in the
navy
at the fact, in
alleviated when the Prime Minister gave Geddes the rank of honorary vice-admiral. It grew even more vociferous when Geddes proceeded to buy a vice-admiral's uniform and to wear it! Yet Jellicoe at least recognised the merits of the appointment and found in Geddes a pair of shoulders well capable of bearing a large part of the heavy burden. And what was more, Geddes brought into the Admiralty administration a drive and a capacity for getting things done swiftly and capably. His undoubted ability, speed of decision, and grasp of the problems of merchant shipbuilding earned him within the Admiralty the name of 'Goddis'.
no
Outer
Ruytingen
Folkestone
Snouw Bk
FRANCE
The Dover Barrage, a vast barrage of steel nets reinforced by minefields and patrolled by a fleet of drifters. It was thought to be a great deterrent to the passage of U-Boats down the Channel, but in October 1917 the Admiralty and the public were shocked to discover that U-Boats were pouring through the barrage, most of them on the surface. The Dover Barrage fiasco was another nail in Jellicoe's coffin Jellicoe did his
War
own
personal cause no good
Committee meeting on June
when he came
out,
with the statement that because of the shipping losses caused by the U-Boats to date, it would be impossible to continue the war into 1918. This bombshell was, in some ways, directed at the army for allowing the continued occupation by the Germans of Zeebrugge and Ostend, whence two flotillas of U-Boats operated in the North Sea and English Channel. This further instance of Jellicoe's pessimism, which by now had grown to extreme proportions, still further fortified Lloyd George's determination to replace him by some other admiral who would bring a greater measure of energy and direction to the war at sea, though as yet he had no candidate in mind. at a
Policy
20,
Yet with Carson as First Lord, Lloyd George was quite unable These two men — Carson and Jellicoe — had built up a close understanding of mutual trust, and Carson was not the kind of man who would ever consent to do Lloyd George's dirty work for him. And politically, Carson had too strong a following for Lloyd George to make an enemy of him. So it was Carson who would have to go first. It was decided to bring him into the War Cabinet and give the vacant post of First Lord to Geddes. The changes were made on July 20, reluctantly on the part of both Carson and Geddes, who both could see clearly that what lay behind the move was the elimination of Jellicoe as First Sea Lord. The next sweep of Lloyd George's broom got rid of Sir W. Graham Green, who had been Permanent Secretary of the Admiralty since 1911. The excuse put forward was that he had been dragging his feet over Admiralty reform, and even over the adoption of the convoy system, but this was patently nonsense. However, he was relieved at the beginning of August, and even Jellicoe himself could now see the trap closing in on him. It became even more obvious when the Second Sea Lord, Sir Cecil Burney, who was a close personal friend of Jellicoe's, was relieved on August 7 by Vice-Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss with an additional title as Deputy First Sea Lord. This was the writing on the wall with a vengeance, and was reinforced a month later with the appointment of Admiral Heath as Second Sea Lord to allow Wemyss to concentrate on his duties as Deputy First Sea Lord. All these changes on the Admiralty Board had in effect provided Jellicoe with no fewer than three direct deputies to assist him in his work; Wemyss as Deputy First Sea Lord; Sir Henry Oliver, who had moved up from being Chief of the War Stall' to Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff; and Duff, who was promoted from his post as Director of the Anti-Submarine Division to become Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff, all of them with a seat on the Board. Yet Jellicoe remained immersed in paper work, somehow constitutionally unable to delegate authority to his three deputies He grew more and more exhausted, more convinced that there was no light at the end of the tunnel, less responsive to any new ideas to break the naval deadlock in the North Sea, and continually irritated by what he saw as political pressure impinging on his sphere of responsibility in naval affairs. There was complete lack of sympathy between him and the Prime Minister, and to dismiss Jellicoe.
to institute regular coastal
1
Straits
December 1917
Lloyd George's machinations
already settled.
At
The Dover ENGLAND
way
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also a coldness developing between him and his First in the national interest, there was also a lessening of the cordial relations which had existed at the beginning of the year between Beatty and himself. Jellicoe, as First Sea Lord, naturally bore the ultimate responsibility for operations at sea, and when these also began to turn sour towards the end of 1917, his position in the Admiralty became virtually untenable. The first shock came with the two
there Lord.
was
And what was perhaps worse
German
attacks on the Scandinavian convoys on October 17 and
December 12. In the first incident two German light cruisers fell upon the convoy, sank the two British escorting destroyers and nine out of the 12 merchant ships in the convoy, and got away completely unscathed. In the second, four German destroyers found the convoy, sank one and disabled the other of the two escorting destroyers, and wiped out the entire convoy. Once again they got away unscathed, even though there was a British cruiser force in the area to 'cover' the convoy. Though both of these were 'fleet' operations controlled by the Commander-in-Chief (Beatty) and the Admiral Commanding Orkneys and Shetlands (Colville), it was on Jellicoe that the recriminations fell. Another blow to British naval pride came on November 17, when plans were made to exploit the German need to sweep British mines in order to keep free the U-Boat passage routes in the North Sea. Gradually a situation had been built up where a sizeable portion of the High Seas Fleet was needed to provide protection for the minesweepers in their work. On the morning of November 17 a British force consisting of four battle-cruisers led by the Lion; eight light cruisers in two squadrons; the 1st Cruiser Squadron which consisted of the 'monster' light cruisers Courageous and Glorious and 19 destroyers was concentrated in the area. In support was the 1st Battle Squadron of six battleships with another 11 destroyers. The German covering force consisted of four light cruisers and eight destroyers, with two battleships within reach near Heligoland. The opposing forces made contact in the early morning, with good visibility and a calm sea, but through the use of smoke screens the German ships made good their escape, as an inexact knowledge of the extent of the minefields prevented the British ships from coming to grips with the flying Germans. Once again the Admiralty came in for blame, for the lack of adequate and up-to-date information in the fleet on the mined areas in the southern North Sea pointed to bad and inefficient staff work at headquarters.
The Dover Barrage
fiasco Finally there was the affair of the Dover Barrage. Admiral Bacon had been recalled from retirement early in the war and given this 'plum' appointment, somewhat to the dismay of other admirals still on the active list. Roger Keyes particularly wanted this job. Bacon closely resembled Jellicoe in that he refused to delegate authority. His main task was to close the Straits of Dover both to U-Boats and to German destroyers operating from bases in occupied Belgium. To stop the U-Boats, he had laid down a vast barrage of steel nets reinforced by minefields and patrolled by an army of drifters. Destroyers of his force also patrolled the vicinity of the barrage each night, but were proving powerless to stop the occasional German destroyer raids aimed either at the shipping using the anchorage in the Downs or at the patrolling drifters. None of these occasional raids did much damage, but the impunity with which they were made, and the navy's inability to stop them, acted as a perpetual irritant which was exploited by those newspapers which campaigned for a more militant policy on the part of the British Admiralty. But the real headache was caused by the U-Boats. Bacon had great confidence in his Dover Barrage, and maintained that it was proving a powerful deterrent to the passage of German submarines down the Channel, forcing them to make the much longer passage round the north of Scotland to reach the big killing grounds of the Western Approaches. How far from the facts was Bacon's confidence was revealed when the German UC 44 blew herself up in a minefield she had just laid off Waterford in October 1917. A German report on the Dover Barrage was recovered from the wreck, and it proved that no fewer than 190 U-Boat passages of the Dover Straits had been made in the first six months of 1917. Only eight U-Boats had reported touching a net, and only eight had been forced to dive by the patrols. All the remainder had made the passage on the surface. This report blew the bottom out of Bacon's contention that the Dover Barrage was an efficient deterrent. The First Lord, Geddes, set up in the Admiralty a Channel Barrage Committee to investigate means of improving its efficiency, and appointed Roger Keyes as its chairman. Bacon was basically unco-operative, and protested violently at a suggestion by the Committee that
the whole of the Channel Barrage should be brilliantly illuminated at night to force U-Boats to dive into a deep minefield laid for the purpose. He had to be given specific orders by the Admiralty to provide this searchlight patrol. It came into operation on December 19, and that very night UB 56, forced to dive by the illumination of the surface, was destroyed in the deep minefield. The dramatic loss of this U-Boat sealed Admiral Bacon's fate, and when finally he was dismissed on December 28, Roger Keyes was appointed to the command in his place.
'You
kill
him;
I'll
bury him'
Bacon's coming dismissal reflected badly on Jellicoe, for Bacon had always been looked upon as one of Jellicoe's men. And Jellicoe had never been happy over the action by Geddes in setting up the Channel Barrage Committee, and had had 'words' with the First Sea Lord about it. He also refused to countenance Bacon's dismissal, and fought hard against it. His position as First Sea Lord was now becoming untenable, for to Lloyd George's determination to get rid of him, coupled with the growing loss of confidence in him by Geddes, was added a violent campaign in certain powerful sections of the press for a more vigorous policy at sea. One of the most vociferous campaigners for drastic changes at the Admiralty was Lord Northcliffe, who at the time owned both the Daily Mail and The Times. Against such enemies Jellicoe had little chance. In a conversation with Northcliffe, Lloyd George is supposed to have said: 'You kill him: I'll bury him.' The actual dismissal came on December 24 in the form of a short written note from Geddes. It was a complete bolt from the blue, and ironically enough was delivered to Jellicoe immediately following a meeting with a representative group of captains from the Grand Fleet who had come to London to present him with a silver model of the Iron Duke as an expression of the high esteem in which he was held. Jellicoe replied to Geddes's message the same evening in a dignified note suggesting that he should go on leave immediately in order not to commit his successor by any further acts on his part as First Sea Lord. On Christmas Day Geddes went to Sandringham to get the King's approval (which was given 'with great regret'), and Wemyss took over as First Sea
Lord on December 27.
The decision was received with mixed feelings. Most of the press was jubilant; most of the navy was dismayed, not perhaps quite so much by the actual fact that there was to be a new First Sea Lord as by the abrupt curtness of the dismissal. All the Sea Lords in the Admiralty, with the exception of Wemyss, decided to resign in protest, but were persuaded, in part by Jellicoe himself, to change their minds. 'And so another great man goes down under the sea of mud of the gutter press', wrote one naval officer. Jellicoe's dismissal was certainly abrupt and discourteous; it was equally certainly inspired by the active hostility of Lloyd George and Geddes. But apart from that aspect of the matter, the removal of Jellicoe was probably necessary in the national interest Although he kept himself in good physical health (he was only 58 in 1917) the mental stress had obviously been terrific, and his temperament was not one that would allow him to relieve part of the strain by decentralisation. All this weight of decision bore him down, tired him out mentally, and added to the natural pessimism which the cares of high office bred in him. This state of mind can perhaps best be seen in the way he dragged his feet over the introduction of convoy as the only antidote to the growing severity of U-Boat warfare. His prophecies of gloom, too, undoubtedly emanated from a tired mind. His year of office as First Sea Lord had certainly been one of extreme difficulty, as much in the campaign on the Western Front as in that at sea, but had not as yet been so utterly disastrous as to merit his doom-laden pronouncements. It was hardly surprising that the recipients of these opinions should feel that they came from a man wlio was losing his grip. Further Reading Bacon, Sir Reginald, The Life of John Rushworth, Earl Jellicoe (Cassell 1936)
Bacon, Sir Reginald. Dover Patrol. 1915-1917 (Hutchinson 1919) Chalmers, W S The Life and Letters of David. Earl Beatty (Hodder & Stoughton 1951) Dreyer. Sir Frederic, The Sea Heritage (Museum Press 1955) Hankey, Lord, The Supreme Command (Allen & Unwin 1961) Jellicoe, Earl, The Grand Fleet. 1914-1916 (Cassell 1919) Jellicoe, Earl, The Submarine Peril (Cassell 1934) Lloyd George, D War Memoirs. 6 vols (Nicholson & Watson ,
,
1933-1936) Marder, A. J From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. Vol 4 (OUP 1969) Newbolt, Sir Henry, Naval Operations. Vol 4 (Longmans 19281 ,
\F\)r
Peter Kemp's biography, see page 52.]
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NAVAL
WAR
IN THE
BALTIC In October 1917 the
Germans
launched combined land and sea operations against the Russians in the Gulf of Riga. Would the Russians be too crippled by the Revolution to offer stern resistance?
David Woodward. Above. Left: Admiral Kanin, Russian C-in-C Baltic, succeeded by Nepenin in September 1916. Right: Admiral Essen, C-in-C Baltic prior to Kanin. Below: The Slava, Russia's principal defence on the Gulf of Riga
f 2
1
1
when spring came
to the Eastern Front and the ice was comparative quiet at sea and on land. The Russian army was slowly endeavouring to recover from the terrible defeats which it had suffered during the previous year, and at sea the main force of the Russian fleet (four new dreadnought battleships) and its supporting craft were strictly bound to the defence of the Gulf of Finland and Petrograd. The Russian naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kanin, had been placed under the orders of the local army commander and had about the same degree of independence of action as a general commanding an army corps. In addition to the Gulf of Finland Kanin was responsible for the defence of the Gulf of Riga, which was protected by the islands of Dago and Osel and accessible only through shallow, narrow and well mined channels leading to Riga, outside which the Russians had managed to check the Germans at the end of their advance the previous autumn. The whole position was one of great importance, for upon it depended
In
1916,
melted
in the Baltic, there
the entire right flank of the Russian Eastern Front. At this time the principal naval component of the defence of the Gulf was the obsolete battleship Slaua and a few even more obsolete gunboats and destroyers. Both the Russians and the Germans had airfields in the neighbourhood and as early as April 27, 1916 the Slava had the unhappy distinction of being the first capital ship ever to be hit by bombs from aircraft. Three seaplanes from the German seaplane carrier Santa Elena, a converted freighter, dropped 31 bombs on her and scored three hits, two of which burst on the quarter deck causing serious damage so that she had to be withdrawn for repairs. To avoid exposing the damaged ship to German forces which might be waiting outside the Gulf, it was decided to withdraw her northward through Moon Sound. Accordingly, a channel some 40 feet deep was dredged by a force of more than 40 dredgers, working with tenacious energy. The Slaua was finally extricated and her place taken by her sister ship Tsarevitch, with the cruisers Diana and Admiral Makarov. Later, when she had been repaired, the Slava returned to the Gulf. Small forces of destroyers and submarines (five, and later eight of these British) did what they could to interfere with German seaborne communications, but the season for submarines had hardly begun when the British E 18 was lost off Libau on May 24, the day after she had torpedoed the big German destroyer V 100, blowing her bows off but not sinking her. To reinforce the British submarines already in the Baltic, four semi-obsolete boats of the C-class, the only ones small enough to make the journey by river and canal from Archangel to Petrograd, were towed out from the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, to lighten them for the journey, their batteries had been removed and placed on board a merchant ship which was to have made the voyage independently, but this ship was sunk by a U-Boat en route and it was necessary for the newly arrived boats (C 26, C 27, C 32 and C 35) to wait for another shipment of batteries before they could begin operations. The success of the Allied submarines during 1915 had forced the Germans to adopt convoys for their Baltic trade, and these convoys coming down the Swedish coast were tempting targets for Russian destroyers. Admiral Kolchak, the able and energetic commander of the Baltic Fleet destroyers, carried out two raids before he was transferred to the Black Sea fleet as Commanderin-Chief on July 17. The first of these raids took place on June 10, immediately after the battle of Jutland, for the Russians calculated, correctly, that the Germans would be short of escorting destroyers due to losses and damage suffered during the battle. However, owing largely to the bold front put up by three small German auxiliaries, the largest of which was a trawler, the Russians were unable to sink any of the merchantmen, but did succeed in sinking a 2,000-ton Q-ship, the Hermann. Jutland had another important effect on the situation in the Baltic at this time. On June 4, the Russians started the great attack in Galicia which has gone down in history as the Brusilov offensive. Concerned by its success, Falkenhayn, Chief of the German General Staff, asked Admiral Scheer, commanding the High Seas Fleet, if he could arrange a diversion in the Baltic to give the impression that a German landing behind the Russian front was impending. Scheer replied that he was unable to do this because he had only 11 out of his 18 dreadnought capital ships available, owing to the damage sustained at Jutland. The second Russian convoy raid took place on the night of June 29, with two cruisers, Gromoboi and Diana, and eight destroyers. The Russian attack was led by the three modern destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, who were immediately engaged by eight German destroyers. The convoy, delayed by fog, was some miles away. The
Russian destroyers then steamed
off at full speed, luring the 8-inch and 6-inch guns of the two cruisers. The Germans, in hot pursuit, caught up with the Russians and fired seven torpedoes which all missed, and then withdrew. During the summer the Russians laid some 6,000 mines in the Irben Straits between Osel and the mainland. With the Straits thus sealed to them the Germans sought to attack by forcing their way into the Gulf of Finland. Accordingly Rear-Admiral Langemak, commanding the Baltic Scouting Forces, ordered the 10th Torpedo Boat Flotilla to carry out a bombardment of Baltiski Port, near Reval. Eleven of the most modern German destroyers took part on the night of November 9/10, and the operation constituted one of the most disastrous nights for destroyers in the history of the First World War. The German Flotilla steamed into a minefield of some 5,000 mines, and, although they forced their way through to Baltiski Port and carried out a bombardment of little importance, seven of them were sunk one after another during the night by mines. As a result Langemak was appointed by Prince Henry of Prussia, the Kaiser's brother and Commander-in-Chief in the Baltic, to a post in which, according to the German Official History, he
Germans onto the
had
independence of action'. small consolation to the Germans for this reverse came on November 19, when the Russian armoured cruiser Rurik struck a mine off Hogland. There was a huge flame which flashed through the starboard hawse holes up on to the forecastle, while a column of water 140 feet high crashed down, covering the forecastle completely and washing away all the bridge personnel except the captain, the navigating officer and the man at the wheel, who were pinned against the front of the charthouse by the pressure of water. Officers in the wardroom aft believed that the ship's magazine had exploded, while members of the crew on deck, thinking that the ship had been hit by a bomb, dashed below. The bridge having been put out of action, several minutes elapsed before the alarm rattlers could be sounded. Officers went through the ship to steady the hands, all the watertight doors were closed and the pumps were set working. The whole forepart of the ship was now full of water up to frame 30 '75 feet from the bow), but as the ship very gently gathered speed, the foremost intact bulkhead began to bulge inward and had to be reinforced with baulks of timber. Work in the engine room at this time was made very difficult by gas, of which it was almost impossible to rid the ship and against which gas masks were apparently useless. The engineroom men were continually being overcome, recovering in the fresh air, returning to the engine room, once more being overcome, and once more recovering, this process continuing for hours until the fumes were finally dissipated, and the ship brought by tugs safely to Kronstadt. The campaign of 1916 was nearly over. The ice closed in and when it melted in the following spring the Russian navy and the Russian Empire melted away with it. On March 12, 1917 the Revolution began and on the 16th news was released of the Tsar's abdication. A hush fell on the main fleet at Helsingfors which lasted for a couple of hours and then followed a complete collapse of power, typified by events on board the battleships Andrei Pervosvanni and Imperator Pavel I, both of which had thoroughly bad reputations and were known as 'the convict ships'. On board the Andrei Pervosvanni, flag ship of the 2nd Battleship Brigade, the commander reported at nightfall to the captain and the admiral, Nebolsin, that the men were in a riotous mood. Nebolsin told his flag captain, Gadd, to arrange matters to suit himself and went ashore to see the Commanderin-Chief, Admiral Nepenin, who had succeeded Kanin. Gadd learned that members of the crew had broken the locks on the rifle racks, helped themselves and then started to shoot at some of the officers. Gadd ran back to the wardroom, told the first officers he could find to get their revolvers and follow him. They all dashed forward along the alleyway leading to the crew's quarters as the mutinous sailors disappeared. Soon, however, the mutineers gathered on deck and began firing through the scuttles of the officers' cabins where lights were burning. Putting out the lights, the officers barricaded themselves in their quarters aft. The mutineers continued desultory firing, from which there were some casualties, and Gadd left shelter and went forward to reason with them. Some listened fairly respectfully while others tried to kill a couple of petty officers. When Gadd intervened, he was himself attacked and saved only at the last minute by some of the men to whom he had been talking. An uneasy peace was then established. In the meantime Nebolsin had been shot dead on the dockside, and in the Imperator Pavel I matters were much worse, for her captain was overcome and sat in the wardroom telling his officers to do whatever they wanted. 'less
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Mutinies were also reported in some of the destroyers and minesweepers. Parties of men began roaming round the dockyard, rioting, shouting and, from time to time, killing officers they met, either by chance or because of some special grievance. News came to the Fleet Command from Kronstadt that about 80 officers had been killed there, but while the base at Kronstadt
and the main Baltic Fleet at Helsingfors were in the grip of a mutiny, at Reval, the advanced base of the fleet, nothing at all was happening and the cruisers and destroyers there continued with their winter refits. During the entire time between the beginning of the Revolution in March and the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in November, it was noteworthy that discipline was maintained in most of the destroyers and small craft, although it had collapsed in the big ships. However, although some ships and men of the Baltic fleet were to show that they could still fight with the greatest courage, the Russian warships in the Baltic were never a fleet again. The ships elected their own Soviets, whose prime concerns were revolution and peace and who sent delegates to the Centrobalt (the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet) which struggled continually with officers and C-in-C's.
e
»
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i
Despite this chaos, however, as soon as the ice melted the Russian minelayers got to work repairing the gaps in the minefields caused by ice. The Germans did the same, and for the first time in history aeroplanes were used for minelaying. The summer passed quietly with routine measures of minesweeping and escorting but revolutionary agitation in the Russian ships and dockyards continued and the circumstances under which three ships were lost throw light on the state of the fleet. The submarine AG 15 was said to have been sunk because someone forgot to close a hatch when she dived; the destroyer Okhotnik struck a mine and her crew abandoned ship without orders, taking with them all available lifesaving material and leaving their officers behind to drown, and when the destroyer Stroiny elected a new captain his first action was to run the ship aground so firmly that she had to be abandoned as a total loss. The Russian nation, army and navy were clearly by now in a state of semi-revolution and were judged by the German High Command to be unable to launch another offensive. Accordingly, the High Command looked forward to a long, quiet summer, in the course of which they could wage unrestricted submarine warfare
I Top: Admiral Kolchak, the able and energetic the Russtan Baltic Fleet destroyers until he took over command of the Black Sea Fleet in July 1916. He undertook
commander of
two raids on German convoys in June Above: The British C 35, one of the four boats which re sent to reinforce British submarines already in the Baltic, although small and semi-obsolescent, only C-class boats were small enough to make the journey by river and canal from Archangel to Petrograd Left: Naval operations in the Baltic 1916/17; when the ice melted in March 1917 the Revolution was already crippling the Russian navy, so that when the Germans attacked in October they gained a sweeping victory
-*•
M 1 •'Id!
last huge offensive in the spring of 1918, when the German army would endeavour to drive the British from the continent and defeat the French before the new American armies arrived. The expectation that the Eastern war could be allowed to wither on the vine was dashed on July 1, when the Russian army launched its final offensive in the region of Lemberg. It failed, and the collapse of the old Tsarist army followed, but it alarmed Hindenburg and Ludendorff seriously enough for them to decide that, before 1918 began, Russia must be driven out of the war. Plans were made for an attack by land on Riga, to be followed up by an advance on Petrograd. The fleet was to co-operate by landing troops on the islands in the Gulf of Riga. The army's request for naval help was on this occasion well received by Scheer. A series of mutinies had taken place in the High Seas Fleet during the summer but by the autumn the fleet was judged to be once more well in hand and it was thought that successful operations against the Russians were just what was required to put the finishing touches on the re-establishment of the fleet's morale. Accordingly, Scheer despatched his second in command, Vice-Admiral Ehrbardt Schmidt, with his flag in the battle cruiser Moltke. Under his command were 11 capital ships, nine light cruisers and 52 destroyers. With them was a fleet of 19 troop transports, four hospital ships, ten supply ships and 65 minesweepers, organised on a scale not to be seen again until the great amphibious operations of the Second World War. Opposed to them in the Gulf of Riga was a Russian force of two battleships, three cruisers, three gunboats, 26 destroyers, and three British submarines, together with minesweepers and patrol craft, all under the command of Vice- Admiral Bachirev, with his flag in the cruiser Bay an. Ashore, protecting the approaches were 95 guns, ranging from eight 12-inch to 38 anti-aircraft guns. The German landing force to be set ashore on the island of Osel totalled a reinforced infantry division of 23,000 men, commanded by General von Kathen, while Russian forces ashore were of about the same size. The code name for the whole operation was 'Albion', and its first phase called for the seizure of Tagga Bay on the northwest shore of Osel, which was large enough to be made into a well-protected base to contain the entire German force. Troops were to be landed to take the Russian positions in reverse, the most important of which was the battery of four 12-inch guns on the Sworbe peninsula at the southwestern end of the island. When this had been done the German heavy ships were to follow their minesweepers into the Gulf of Riga, one group passing between Dago and Osel into the Kassar Vik, while the other, commanded by Vice-Admiral Behncke, to the southward, would force the Irben Strait. Minesweeping, in the approaches to Tagga Bay, was a long process, so long that Schmidt realised that if he waited for its completion it would be daylight and he would miss the advantage of surprise. He accordingly signalled at 0210 hours to the minesweepers: 'Make way for the fleet. Take in sweeping gear at once.' The German force continued through the unswept waters and through the densely packed ranks of the minesweepers, squeezed together in the narrow waters. One of the reasons why Schmidt was able to take this kind of risk was the excellent construction of the German battleships. On the first day of bombardment, October 12, on the northwestern coast of Osel, the battleships Bayern (one of the biggest and most powerful battleships of the German navy) and the Grosser Kurfiirst both struck mines but were able to complete their bombardments. In the course of the operation the battleships Konig and Kronprinz both ran aground but, like the ships mined, were not put out of action.
on the high seas and prepare for a
The destroyers engage The first troops went ashore early on the morning of October 12, and by the 17th the occupation of Osel was completed. The next day 11 German destroyers, breaking into Kassar Wik, engaged Russian destroyers, disabling the modern Grom; the gunboat, Khrabri, went alongside to take off the crew who, seized with panic, promptly abandoned ship without any attempt to save it or prevent it from falling into German hands, and the Grom, listing heavily, drifted away. One of the German destroyers came alongside and put a prize crew aboard her, which hauled down the Russian ensign and then re-hoisted it under the German flag, while a party made for the bridge where they collected the confidential books and charts which showed the location of the minefields, a most important coup. A little later the Grom sank under tow, though her wrecked hull remained above the water. On the morning of October 16 Schmidt decided the time had come to clear the Russian ships out of the Gulf and out of Moon
Sound. Protected by minesweepers, the battleships Konig, flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Behncke, and Kronprinz, entered the Gulf and were almost immediately attacked by the British submarine C27. Both torpedoes missed and the submarine half rose to the surface between the two German ships. To the surprise of the British captain no one opened fire on him and, correcting the trim of his boat, he dived at once. Behncke afterwards demanded an explanation as to why fire had not been opened on C 27 and was told the British submarine had a net cutter on her
bows, similar to that used by German submarines, and she was therefore taken to be a U-Boat-. Immediate danger past, C 27 surveyed the situation and saw that not only were minesweepers preceding the battleships but that they were also marking the swept channel with buoys. Accordingly the captain of C 27 decided to wait for another target using the channel. The first ship to appear was the depot ship, Indianola. The torpedo ran straight, the German ship was hit in the engine room and lay dead in the water. This time the Germans made no mistake and depth-charged plentifully, while the Indianola was towed away. C 27 now had only one torpedo left and her captain decided, on the next day, to leave the Gulf. Running submerged he picked his way through the shallows and sandbanks with an echo sounder and returned safely to the Allied
submarine base at Hango. Another British submarine in the Gulf, C 32, failed to find the German battleships which were lying at anchor amongst the light buoys of the swept channels. She was, however, severely depthcharged and on the following day, October 17, she ran aground near Pernau and became a total loss.
A
sweeping German victory the same day the German battleships resumed their attack on the entrance to Moon Sound. They discovered with surprise that the obsolete 12-inch guns of the Slava outranged the modern 12-inch guns of the German battleships. The explanation of this was that the Russians, profiting by the lessons of their war with
On
Japan, had modified the turrets of the Slava and her sister ship Grajdanin iex-Tsarevitch) to give their guns a greater elevation and hence range. Fire was opened at 22,400 yards when the Russians were at dinner, the Germans steaming in to close the range. Both guns in the forward turret of the Slava were put out of action by a failure of their breech mechanisms. The Russian ship, therefore turned through 16 points and, steaming stern first, opened fire with the guns of her aft turret. With the Slava was the Grajdanin and the cruisers Bayan, the flagship of Vice-Admiral Bachirev, and Admiral Makarov. It was soon clear that the Germans were prepared to press to the full their greater strength — 20 12-inch guns against eight — and Bachirev decided to withdraw northward from the Sound. The Slava was to leave last as she was so badly damaged that it was feared that she might sink at any minute and block the channel for any ships following. Hit several times, the Bayan was soon blazing from an oil fuel fire which her crew were unable to put out for another 24 hours. However, she made good her escape with the Admiral Makarov and the Grajdanin. The Slava, however, struck a mine and finally sank at the entrance to the channel, listing to starboard, with her upper deck funnels and superstructure torn to pieces but still above the surface. According to the German account, discipline had been maintained in the ship until she grounded, when her crew swarmed overboard onto the rescuing craft. She certainly fought under the old Tsarist ensign, the blue Cross of St Andrew. This flag was secured by the Germans and lodged alongside the White Ensign taken from HMS Vindictive at Ostend. On October 21 the battle was over: Moon Sound and the islands of the Gulf were held by the Germans, who had lost one destroyer, four torpedo boats and ten minesweepers. Such a sweeping and cheaply won victory would have been impossible if the Russian forces had not been crippled by the Revolution but, on the other hand, the whole operation was one with which the Germans might well be satisfied from the point of view of the efficiency with which it was organised and carried out. Further Reading
DerKriegzurSee, 1914-1918, Ostsee Bd. 3, Frankfurt/Main (E. S Mittler) Navy in the War and the Revolution (Oldenbourg
Graf, H., The Russian
1923)
Hopman, Admiral, Das Kriegstagebuch Eines Deutschen (Scherl 1924) Battleships in Action 2 Vols Wilson, H.
W
(Sampson Low
\For David Woodward's biography, set page 193.]
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Seeoftiziers
1926)
Previous articles have described the evolution of Nivelle's plan from December 1916, the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line and the opening of the Allied offensive with the British attack in the Arras sector on April 9, 1917. General Nivelle hoped that the British offensive would keep the Germans north of the Somme and thereby facilitate the attack along the Aisne by General Mich-
Reserve Army Group which was intended to break the German line and allow strategic exploitation by the French. As a result of the German withdrawal Army Group North's front had been shortened. reduced the forces Nivelle, therefore, in Army Group North to one army, Third. Thus reduced, Army Group North had one task — to follow the Germans to within eler's
attacking distance of the Hindenburg Line. Because the field of offensive available to the French armies was now smaller, Nivelle decided to include the left flank of General Petain's Army Group Centre in his April offensive. This army was to extend Reserve Army Group's hoped-for breakthrough by capturing the Moronvilliers heights, to the east of Rheims. The area covered by the French offensive extended from Saint-Quentin in the north to Vienne-le-Chateau on the Aisne, beside the Argonne ridge. The actual sector of attack was reduced to the front between Laffaux (north-east of Soissons) and Vaudexincourt on the River Suippe, east of Rheims, thus including the entire zone of Reserve Army Group and the left flank
THE NIVELLE OFFENSIVE /
valleys.
First,
the
valley
of the
Aisne.
From Berry-au-Bac to Chavonne both banks lay in French hands, from Chavonne to Vailly the right bank was held by the Germans, from Vailly to Conde both banks German-held
Lying in a limestone valley, the river was an important obstacle some 54 yards wide; more-
lay in
territory.
over the obstacle was compounded by the canal running alongside the river. To the north of the French lines, between the Aisne and the Ailette, another tributary of the Oise, there is a massif running from east to west and cut by deep gullies (one from Jouy to Vailly and another from Bray to Massy). This massif is topped by a narrow, barren plateau 660 feet up, along which runs the road from Malmaison to the village of Craonne known as the Chemin des Dames. The road got its name in the 18th Century,
when
it was opened to facilitate access Chateau de la Bove which had been bought by the daughters of Louis XV, Mesdames Adelaide and Victoire. The coppiced slopes of the plateau were quite impassable to artillery and some escarpments impassable even to infantry. The top of the plateau was a flat limestone area pitted with quarries and underground workings that the Germans had turned into veritable fortresses. The outlets of the underground quarries on
to the
the southern slope of the plateau could
point of an offensive, aimed at smashing the German front, was to take place on terrain known to be difficult was focal
one of the
many
offensive.
'We
peculiarities of the Nivelle will be able to break the
German front when we like, provided we don't attack at the strongest point and if the whole action takes them by surprise' he had noted in January 1917 before the London conference. But were the conditions of surprise realised when the offensive was launched on April 16? Is it even possible to make a surprise attack after an artillery preparation of 14 consecutive days? It can be argued that preparations which extend over a vast front give no clear idea as to where the actual attack come, provided they take in the whole Germans were wise to what was being prepared— long before the artillery bombardment began. will
zone; but in April 1917 the
\jfc& >4
f
PP^^T^
of Fourth Army (Army Group Centre). The principal point of attack was to be be-
tween Laffaux and Courcy, an area of broken ground overlooked by the Chemin des Dames. The battlefield extended along a front of 25 miles from the wooded massif of Saint-Gobain in the west to the chalky rolling 'Champagne pouilleuse' ('Champagne badlands') east of Rheims. The battle area was a series of parallel ridges and
a tunnel under the Chemin des Dames and eventually comes out at Braye to rejoin the Aisne canal itself near Pontarcy. North of the Ailette the terrain rises again, then descends towards a plain that is dominated by the Laon ridge. The battlefield chosen by Nivelle was thus strewn with obstacles for an attacker, moreover roads were few. The fact that the
Theyhadbeen able to assess the intentions of the French less by the actual <^ay to day preparations iroad repairs, concentrations of ammunition etc. I, which seem largely to have gone unnoticed, than by a series of fortuitous German surprise attacks on the French line. Ludendorff wrote later that he lent 'only half an ear to the news of operations in Lorraine' when he learned from a document stolen from the French in
February
»5 ^m^L
.s<* -.;!
General Nivelle offered the Allies a bold
new
strategy —
a spectacular French breakthrough on a thirty-mile wide sector that was to lead to victory in the west.
A
massive assault by nearly a million men was launched on April 16, 1917. The Germans knew it was coming. Instead of the promised breakthrough Nivelle's troops gained a few miles of ground at a cost of 130,000 casualties. For the French soldiery it was the last straw. Jean Delmas. Above: French infantry in a front line trench prepare to go over the top be located and hu by the French artillery but their exits on top of the plateau were invisible to (he French observers. With wells sometimes 70 feet deep these quarries could shelter men and material from the heaviest gunfire. Below the plateau to the north flows the Ailette in a valley just over a mile wide that is particularly marshy during the spring. The lower part of the valley is crossed by the canal running from the Oise into the Aisne and which runs through
near
Mai sons-de-Champagne
that they were preparing an offensive on the Aisne. More significant, however, were the results of a local German attack. launched on April 4 north-west of Rheims
and which,
after extensive artillery
bom-
bardments, penetrated deep into the French lines. On April 6, the commander of one of the French sectors attacked was obliged to admit to the disappearance of a sergeant-major together with the plan of attack for his unit and the surrounding units General de Bazelaire. Commander of \ll Corps, informed the Commander of Fifth Army of this development with his appreciation that it is hard to imagine greater negligence. All that we were planning to do is now known by the enemy."
The document was in fact of great importance: on the plan of attack for one of the battalions of Fifth Army were indicated not only the dispositions and the order of battle of all the attacking armies south of the Aisne, but also the objectives of two army corps north of the river. It seemed that the whole plan would have to be changed at the last minute, hut Nivelle, who was told of the situation h\ Micheler, judged this to he impractical; changes on so large a scale would have necessitated a further postponement of the French offensive— a postponement which was unacceptable in view of the date set tor the beginning of the British offensive, April 9. Furthermore, from German sources it appears that on April 15 British and brench militaiy attaches at The Hague were guilty of a serious indiscretion when. at a dinner, they revealed the date of the attack on the Aisne as April 16. This information was later confirmed by the declaration of a German officer, taken iMOfi
prisoner on April 21, who told his captors that on April 16 at 0500 hours his regiment had received the message: 'We have been informed from The Hague that the French attack will begin on April 16 at
dawn.' On the 15th General von Boehn, Commander of Seventh Army, which was responsible for the threatened sector (from La Fere to Kheims), signed an order of the day which clearly anticipated the importance of the days to come: 'The decision is near. Our great energy and will will bring us victory.' To effect the rupture of the German front quickly and efficiently, it was necessary for the French to destroy — or at least neutralise — the German outer defences beforehand. This was the object of the long preparatory bombardment which was to last for five days, preceded by five days' range finding and counterbattery. In fact, because of bad weather which put off the Reserve Army Group's attack till April 16, preparations begun on April 2 were to last 14 days. But despite the extent of the means at the disposal of the French — preparations which looked terrifying from the German point of view — Nivelle was unable to obtain the effect he wished for. To this failure was added the fact that French aviation was still behind that of the Germans. If the weather conditions had hindered observation and gun sighting from the air, the French planes had also been harassed by German air squadrons. On April 6, Mangin, the Commander of Sixth Army, foresaw the delays caused by German planes: 'on at least four occasions our aeroplanes have been driven back by enemy planes and have had to abandon their tasks; several German planes have openly flown over our positions during the
Above: Forewarned and ready— a German machine gun post awaits the French attack. Below: The second wave of the attack by Colonial Corps (Sixth Army) advances in sections. In the background the first wave has reached the German trench on the Chemin des Dames II
afternoon.'
On the same day, General de mander
Mitry, Comof VI Corps, concluded that 'the
proposed barrage to be covered by our fighter planes
is
totally illusory'.
The
fol-
lowing day, General Mazillier, Commander of one of the attacking corps in Sixth Army, wrote: the impression that has been gained of the aerial battlefield is that we no longer possess the mastery of the air we gained on the Somme and which, from the beginning of the battle, has been such an advantage — both materially and '.
.
.
4
K;l
i
k
V
morally.'
Micheler attempted to explain this poor performance to his subordinates: four squadrons were missing out of the 12 assigned to the Reserve Army Group; in the existing squadrons 'over half the aeroplanes are unfit for flying, and many of the best pilots have gone to pick up some better models and have not returned.' By April 13 the situation was no better.
The Commander of the 41st Division that 'German planes have flown
noted
across our batteries without being touched — to the exasperation of the artillerymen, and at the same time fired on our trenches — to the exasperation of the infantrymen. Conclusion: adequate material must be given to the artillerymen if we are going to break the German line on D-day. We need planes! We need ammunition!' An account of the concluding phase of the preparation is found in a memo written by a liaison officer belonging io I Corps on April 14: We have used the a v well. The npression situation is better, but I have thi
yt* I
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that it can get no better than it is now; it cannot be completely transformed, even if we have a good day tomorrow I surveyed the whole sector, spoke with almost everyone and observed as much as I could on my own. The preparation is nothing like what we hoped for or planned. The preliminary bombardment has not been successful — the photographs clearly show this. The counterbattery fire has been activity proves insufficient — enemy this no less than the relatively small amount of enemy batteries destroyed. With the amount of ammunition now remaining, it will be impossible to cover targets that have been missed. The infantry, then, will meet very strong resistance. They will find badly made breaches and breaches that have already been repaired. The enemy have been able to repair their breaches almost up to the front line and our guns have been unable to stop them. I Army Corps hope to get through nonetheless, but the price will be .
hard— this
heavy. The everyone's impression and we are preparing ourselves for it with cold resolution. battle will be very
is
The Reserve Army Group who were to launch the attack on April 16 comprised three armies, two of which would break the line and one of which would exploit the breakthrough. The two attacking armies on the Aisne covered 25 miles of front, 10 miles for General Mangin's Sixth Army and 15 for General Mazel's Fifth Army. The line of separation between the two crossed Chemin des Dames just east of Hurtebise Farm on a narrow part of the plateau no more than 30 yards wide. The Sixth Army to the west had been given the following mission:
• To break the German line in two places — between Hurtebise and Soupir and between Laffaux and Vauxaillon. • To exploit this breakthrough in the general direction of Laon and the lower arm of the Serre below Barenton. Mangin hoped it would be 'a quick and brutal conquest of all the enemy's positions in a single thrust'. The Fifth Army
would attempt, first break the German line between Hurtebise and Rheims and then to exploit this success by covering from the east the northward movement of the other armies of the Reserve Army Group. Fifth Army would then follow the Germans into the Rheims sector. Tenth Army (General Duchene) was to move into the front between Fifth and Sixth Armies on D-day itself and to penetrate the gap in the German line towards the north-east. Its main effort would be directed towards Marie and Montcornet, east of the Sissonne marshes. Fourth Army (General Anthoinet was to enlarge Fifth Army's gains by taking the hills south of Moronvilliers between Rheims and the Suippe valley.
of all, to
Two
simultaneous attacks army comprised 17
Mangin's
infantry divisions divided into five corps and one cavalry division. Eight of these divisions were positioned in the front line and had
u
»
<**.
>&**£ V.
Pine Hill — the key to the front German positions, then les Grinons and la Croixsans-tete, key to the second ridge. The first German positions, almost at the base of the slopes, face south. They have three points of resistance well established in the wooded part of the plateau just north
come
honeycombed
Colonial Corps' attack, orientated west-east: in the south from the bridgehead on the right bank of the Aisne between Chavonne and Hurtebise. three corps would attack in a northerly direction. It was hoped that the convergence of these attacks on the Malmaison plateau would force the Germans to evacuate the CondeVailly-sur-Aisne salient. By the evening of D-day, Sixth Army should have occupied the heights north of the Ailette above the
Laon
W0& t^MvZt
Cour Soupir to the right. Beyond the first ridge a wooded plateau and then another ridge with gentle, open slopes. Beyond this.
been ordered to achieve the D-day objecFacing them were seven or eight German divisions belonging to Boehn's Seventh Army. Sixth Army's front described a right angle round Fort Conde. Mangin had planned for two attacks — each coming from one side of the angle: to the west, from Vauxaillon to Laffaux, would tives.
.
the day's fighting General Marchand was neither happy nor optimistic: Our infantry have occupied the northern edges of the plateau but have been unable to move down its slopes. Enemy machine gun posts still hold out within the territory we have occupied. It seems that the Germans have an underground passage which passes under the Hurtebise bottleneck from north to south and which conceals machine gunners who fire into the rear of our troops. At Hurtebise Farm several machine gunners hold out despite the fact that our troops have occupied most of the farm and have it surrounded. Having announced that his three brigade commanders and two regiment commanders had been seriously wounded. General Marchand went on to say that the 52nd and 53rd Colonial Infantry Regiments have lost all but one senior officer. The 52nd has, in effect, lost all its officers. The Senegalese of the 88th Battalion, whose position was never adequately secured, made a disappointing effort. Furthermore, most of the colonial battalions, debilitated by the cold, the rain and the conditions of the bivouac, are suffering a crisis of morale and are liable to panic — especially during the night — at the least sign of a German attack. The two other corps attacking south to north had their problems also. General Pelle's Moroccans got beyond the Chemin des Dames ridge towards midday and established a position south-west of Cernyen-Laonnois. hut the neighbouring division was held up. As for VI Corps, attacking between Chavonne and Soupir, their task was a difficult one. General Anselme. the commander of one of their front line divisions, describes the operations of April 16: Exceptionally difficult ground over which to attack — densely wooded slopes, three spurs. two deep basins — Chavonne to the left and
I
plain.
At 0600 hours on the 16th the attack was launched in overcast, misty weather. At first progress seemed to be good on all fronts, then it slackened. The accompanying barrages, which occurred according to timetable, were not followed by the troops and thus lost much of their effect. On the extreme right of Sixth Army, the II Colonial Corps gained the northern edge of the plateau but was forced to halt on the outskirts of Vauclerc Wood. A Senegalese battalion reached the village of Ailles but was completely annihilated there. Losses throughout the day were considerable, and in his
summing up
of
of the
first
ridge.
The whole mountain is underground eaves,
with
joined by long passages and leading out to
the
exterior
defences.
covered with mines gunners.
and
The summit
is
pockets of machine
Our own lines fall on the loner slopes of the two spurs. Behind us there is a marshy plain that offers no cover and which is risible from the German positions General attack at 0600 hours. The first objective was the Grinons ridge. The most essential point to be gained was Pine Hill in the centre. Our artillery barrage neutralised the German machine gunners. .
.
.
The 25th Light Infantry Battalion rushed the first line of trenches and took 30 prisoners. As the slope was almost vertical, the
barrage was forced to move back 100 yards in three minutes: soon the German machine gunners reappeared and opened fire on our soldiers. The second wave, going in bit by bit. artillery
manoeuvred ski/fully, and took a breastwork at the top of the quarries, then engaged in a fierce hand-to-hand fight with the German machine gunners. The eaves under Pine Hill were taken 2 107
and 300 men were made prisoner, of whom eight were officers. The advance continued but was forced to halt by a second line of machine gunners. The men on the outer flanks were shot down. We had gained a position almost at the northern edge of the wood; our right flank advanced even further towards the underground caves of Cour Soupir and our left towards les Grinons. Night came. At 2100 hours a violent German counterattack took place but the infantry, knowing that Pine Hill was a Key position, held on to it courageously. On the left, the 335th Infantry Regiment pushed on. towards les Grinons by the western slopes of Pine Hill; they got through the front lines, but they had to move across
some 80 yards of ground under the fierce of the German machine gunners dotted over the ridge. They then rushed the next line of trenches which was still firmly held. Our machine gunners then came into action.
fire
A hand
grenade
began, but the ground was devoid of cover and the advance was halted. A new preparation was necessary if les Grinons was to be taken. battle
Another attack began
at
1230 hours by
the 4th Battalion, reinforced by the 25th Battalion of Light Infantry. They were able to advance another 200 metres and took 40 prisoners at the foot of the Grinons slope. Another burst of machine gun fire then halted them, but one company from the 4th Battalion succeeded in establishing contact with Bruneau's battalion near Chavonne. Here, the situation was precarious. Bruneau's battalion on the left crossed the flat ground towards Chavonne, got through the barbed wire which had not been adequately cut and made a rush into the village
under heavy fire from the German machine gunners. Violent hand-to-hand fighting took place in the village. In the course of a strong German counterattack Bruneau, who had remained throughout at the head of his battalion, disappeared, dead or wounded — no one knew. The adjutant was also wounded near the cemetery and the assault was finally halted. The village itself no longer provided cover for the attackers as almost all the buildings had been
German machine gun fire swept what remained of it, making it untenable. The Germans were thus able to reoccupy the northern end of Chavonne and at 1245 hours another counterattack was launched destroyed;
against the French positions in
Our machine gunners
the,
south.
enemy get to within a few yards of them and then let
the
massacred them.
On the evening of April 16 then, our soldiers occupied the centre of Pine Hill, a part of Chavonne in the west and most of the Cour Soupir basin in the north-east.
and scrambling up the slopes, under fire from the German machine gunners. Little by little, the entrances to the caves were blocked by the French. Towards the end of the afternoon, their attack seemed to be petering out and Schussler judged the moment ripe for a counterattack. But with what? In one of his companies there was now no more than 20 men. General Mangin was getting impatient with the slow movement of the majority of his units. He now condemned his division commanders' decision to break off the attack to restart the artillery bombardment of obstacles which still appeared intact after the infantry advance had begun. 'The resumption of the artillery bombardment was no solution,' he later wrote. 'It simply proved that our troops were too slow going in. The first bombardment had prevented the enemy from establishing a continuous line of machine guns. We should have profited from the gaps in their line and gone through the pockets of resistance.'
At 1700 hours he gave the order to continue the advance along the whole front with the object of securing at least possession of Chemin des Dames. But this was a vain hope: German resistance was hardening all the time and I Colonial Corps' attack from the direction of Laffaux was a complete failure. Gains in this region that had been made during the morning were almost all lost in the same evening after a savage German counterattack. Commandant Tournes, liaison officer attached to Sixth Army, wrote a commentary on April 16 which stressed the discrepancy between the hopes that had been placed in this offensive — especially in its first day, which should have been decisive — and the actual results achieved: The results we had hoped to gain from the day's fighting have not been realised by Sixth Army's attack. The reasons for this failure have been the enemy's reinforcement of his front and defects in our artillery preparation. Other causes will no doubt appear when we know the details of the action, but we know that over this shell-torn ground, made even more difficult by the night's rainfall, our infantry were unable to move in quickly enough behind the creeping barrage. Furthermore, the Germans appear to have more machine gunners than they have ever had My personal impression is that from now .
company held the Chavonne cellars and succeeded in mowing down the waves of French infantry. Seriously threatened on its left, it evacuated the ruins of the village, but towards midday the commanto
retake the positions
and
tightly
controlled artil-
bombardments. General Mangin has decided that we shall attack again tomorrow afternoon; but it is evident that we must have the patience lery
German sources underline the intensity of the fighting in these regions; a single
dos returned
.
on we shall have to conduct our attacks more methodically in the face of an enemy whose defence is particularly strong. Without question, the Germans are determined to cling on to the positions they now hold; we will never dislodge them except by long, penetrating
Mown down in waves
.
and the wisdom bombardment to moving
wait for the artillery
to
take
in; if not,
before shall have another
its full effect
we
failure on our hands.
128 tanks Fifth
Army
held a 15-mile-wide front be-
tween Hurtebise on the Dames plateau and Courcy. The front ran west-east as far as the foothills of Craonne, then slanted south-east in the direction of Rheims over ground relatively undisturbed by fighting. From Berry-au-Bac, for about five miles,
2108
\
front had doubled in two months. The Deuxieme Bureau had calculated that be-
hind these divisions, in the Laon-Rethel zone, at least 12 divisions were being held in readiness. For his attack, General Mazel had 16 divisions (11 in the front line) grouped into five corps, two Russian brigades and one
cavalry division. He had also obtained eight tank groupes (128 vehicles). On the 16th, at 0600 hours, Mazel wrote in his diary: 'The infantry have gone into the attack. The enemy barrage came late and was irregular and feeble; everywhere, except in the centre of I Corps, which encountered fierce resistance at Balcon, our men have succeeded in penetrating the enemy line.' But, as with Sixth Army, this penetration was abruptly halted. Between Rheims and Berry-au-Bac, local successes were won at a heavy cost in lives; one Russian regiment succeeded in taking Courcy but was unable to cross the canal. All attempts to take Brimont and Sapigneul and Spin Hill failed with heavy losses, the 41st Division managed to cross the canal north of Brimont but, under fire from the guns on Spin Hill, they could only hold their ground with great difficulty. However, north of the Aisne, in the direction of Juvincourt, the efforts of XXXII and V Corps brought them as far as the German second line and they were able to create a salient east of the Rheims-Laon road. This breakthrough was achieved mainly by the infantry; the role of the tanks in the action had proved disappointing. Bossut's squadron (80 tanks) should have attacked with XXXII Corps between the Aisne and the Miette Brook to take the third line (the first and second lines had been penetrated during the morning by two infantry divisions). But the squadron, arriving on the battlefield at 1430 hours, succeeded in crossing the German first line despite heavy fire from their left flank, but at the moment of moving forward was blown apart by the German artillery. Bossut himself was killed and many of the tanks put out of action. Those who had suffered only slight damage were able to get through to the third line but were not followed up by the infantry. Towards 700 hours they fell back to the new French positions. General Passaga, commander of XXXII Corps, whose attack relied almost completely on the usage of the tanks, now realised that he would need at least 48 hours to gather enough artillery east of the Aisne to break down the Ger1
it
had abandoned. The 183rd Division was defending the Soupir front. Its commander, General von Schussler, had prepared to defend it in depth because he anticipated an immediate collapse of his front line after the French artillery bombardment. He could see the French entering the Cour Soupir basin
the French line was established just east of the Aisne Canal, then it veered west, just north of Courcy. Parallel to the canal, slightly to the east, runs the River Suippe which eventually flows into the Aisne upstream of Berry-au-Bac. The terrain between the canal and the Suippe had been well prepared by the Germans with strongpoints on Sapigneul Hill and Spin Hill and on the Brimont Ridge north-east of Courcy. The second and third German lines had been extended north of the Aisne towards Juvincourt, Corbeny and the base of the Bove plateau. These positions were held by six German divisions between Rheims and Berry-auBac, and by three divisions between Berry and Hurtebise; in effect, the density of German troops along this sector of the
/
man
defence.
Chaubes' squadron (48 tanks), who were engaged further to the north with V
Corps, encountered little difficulty in their advance and arrived at the German first line at 0700 hours. They were accompanied by five infantry companies.
***%
V.
^
Bogged down The first German
trench, almost three yards wide and extremely deep, prevented the tanks' advance. The leading tank nonetheless attempted the crossing, vacillated on the edge of the trench and bogged down, preventing the others from passing. Behind it, the other tanks, under fire from the German guns, stopped for a moment and then attempted to redeploy themselves to find another way round. During this movement, several of them were set on fire or put out of action by the German artillery and remained immobile; not one of them was able to
,
\
\
I
i
cross the
German
trench.
The constant artillery and machine gun fire from the Germans made it impossible for the infantry to build up a passage for the tanks; they had too little time and insufficient material and the tanks were trapped, immobile, under fierce German fire. Realising that it would be impossible to accomplish their mission, eight tanks — the
Above: The first casualties of the attack begin to trickle back to the French lines 80% of the French losses were incurred on the first day of the offensive. Below: A German signals station above Berry-au-Bac. Beneath them runs the canal, beyond that the Aisne.
-;
ZJk f .
x.-
•
210a
*_
Jise
XXXVIIJV'J Corps SotssOns
A|sP e
— ARMY*
SIXTH
/vi Corf
FRENCH FRONTLINE
PLANS DIRECTION OF ATTACK FIRST OBJECTIVE
SECOND OBJECTIVE
-*—
"*—
— —
EVENTS ATTACK APRIL 16-19 ATTACK APRIL 17-19
X
REACHED APRIL 1617 LINE REACHED APRIL 19 PRINCIPAL GERMAN TRENCHES LINE
ARMY BOUNDARIES CORPS BOUNDARIES
XXXVIII %..
ROADS RAILWAYS
Corps
MILES
OKMS
4 5
Top: Map of the French offensive of April 1917— the second battle of the Aisne and third battle of
Champagne. Top
of Fort
Brimont by
Above:
April 15, the
Army wash
right:
Fifth
The bombardment
Army, April
eve of battle—
16.
men
of Fifth
Roucy Wood. Right: Infantry of Third Army, advancing on St Quentin, cross a bridge destroyed by the retreating Germans. To the extreme left flank of the main French assault Third Army bridged the gap between the British and French offensives in
2110
A /
/
Auberive
%
;
XVII Corps
\
FOURTH ARMY
X"
Cor P s
the attacks we are making cannot lead to anything decisive. Can First Army Corps take the California plateau and the wood with the resources that it now has? I seriously believe that even if we brought in all the artillery we have in this area
good but
f0
nothing would be changed. 'We will break the German line,' Nivelle had said, 'if we can launch a surprise operation of 24 to 48 hours' duration.' And Mangin had ordered 'quick, brutal destruction of all the enemy's dispositions in one sharp thrust'.
few that were still in action — turned and reentered the wood. The crews of those that were out of action took up their machine guns and joined the attacking infantry. In the course of the day, all the tanks that had been abandoned were set on fire by the German artillery. Out of a total of 48 tanks which made up the three groupes 32 were destroyed or simply remained stranded in front of the German trench, eight were unable to start and eight managed to limp home, damaged but still capable of move merit. Thus reads the account of the fighting written by V Corps' commander. GenBoissoudy, who signed this report, concluded: On April 16, the possession by eral
enemy of strategic observation points moment when the tanks were immobilised was the principal cause of their
the at
the
destruction.
Corps, whose mission was end of the Dames plateau, had totally failed to achieve their objective. Their task was a particularly arduous one which involved taking possession of Craonne — a village situated beneath the almost vertical slope of the California plateau and which served as an important German observation point over the French positions. I Corps' losses were particularly heavy. General Muteau, their commander, reported that in the course of the day (April 16) the infantry regiments of the three active divisions suffered the following losses: 14 officers and 1.257 men of the 1st Division. officers and .1,766 men of the 2nd Division and 37 officers and 1,538 Effectively,
I
to secure the far
(
men of the 162nd Division. Our regiments, who moved out at H hour precisely, came almost at once under fire from the German machine gunners who had been screened from the bombardment by the concrete casemates or had taken refuge in the underground caves. On the plain east
The. results obtained by the evening of April 16 clearly showed that neither Fifth nor Sixth Armies had achieved this. None of the objectives planned for D-day had been realised: the German line was still intact and their third position had never been reached, except fey one or two tanks too badly damaged to fulfil a useful role. Fifth Army could boast one minor success just north of the Aisne in the direction of •Juvincourt-an advance of about three miles along three miles of front. But this salient was too narrow to allow quick exploitation: it was framed by the California plateau and Spin Hill — strongly held German positions with a wide view over the plain and the French lines. Losses were very severe in the divisions actually engaged in the fighting, but the reserves remained almost intact. Tenth Army never entered the battle and remained in its original zone. Mangin seemed confident that the second day would bring better results, but Micheler was more circumspect: many divisions would be unable to go in again, their losses were
and exhaustion had taken its on those who had not been killed. Furthermore, the troops' morale had fallen as the fighting had dragged on, and after
crippling, toll
the realisation that the
were superior
to
German
defences
anything they had anti-
cipated.
End of a nightmare On the German side,
ofCraonne
the troops had felt something approaching relief when the French attack finally began. For them it signified the end of a nightmare— the end of days of tense preparation. But on the evening of the Kith, calculating their
pletely destroyed.
losses as many men killed as missing) they realised that they had paid dearly tor their tenacious defence and that in spite of it they had lost some ground. They could not completely understand the situation. However, the German High Command expressed itself encouraged by the French troops' failure to break the line and envisaged a series of local counterattacks to nullify the gains they had made According to the original plan, on the following day, April 17. the French were to exploit their breakthrough in a northerly direction. This task was to have fallen to
these machine gunners appeared suddenly before the advancing French in fantry had realised they were there. The situation which thus developed accounts for the extremely heavy losses suffered by our troops For the 2nd Infantry Division the situation also presented grave problems; the German trenches now occupied by the French front hue troops lay directly under the California plateau and they Were sub jected to almost incessant machine gun fire. Losses were consequently severe: the 208th Regiment, in particular, was almost com .
.
.
The 2nd Division is note incapable of further effort and, despite their courage. the 8th and the 110th Regiments are. according to then- commanders, incapable of resisting a serious German counterattack. If we are going to make any further progression, or even hold the positions we have on the plateau, I believe the nit-ri must /><• re placed by fresh units.
The liaison officer attached to Corps was unreservedly pessimistic. Negating 1
possibility of further progression towards the Ailette, he added that the alter
the
natives at our disposal all look reasonably
Sixth and Tenth Armies while Fifth Army would cover them from the east On the same day General Petain's Armj Group Centre was to enter the battle Fourth Army was to join up with Fifth Army and capture Moronx ilhers Heights Mangin and Maze! now envisaged: • The complete possession of Chcnun dos Dames by Sixth Arm\ followed by a resumption of the bombardment in order to the north. achieve the objectives • The continuation of Fifth Army's attack along the whole front, with its local point on the plain between the Aisne and Cor-
m
2111
2nd French preparatory bombardment begins. 4.544 guns are massed along the front.
Sth German attack penetrates French
line.
Germans
obtain information on the French plans. British operations in Arras sector begin 1
1th
Micheler attempts to explain French deficiency aircraft
.
in
and ammunition.
14th French admit that their bombardment has been inadequate. I
Sth
Date of French attack leaked to the Germans by British and French military attaches at The Hague. Mangin expresses extreme optimism as to the French chance of success.
16th mist and rain. Despite enormous casualties very little achieved. Failure pronounced as being the result of lack of reinforcements and the tanks' failure to fulfil their hoped-for role. 166 officers and 6.651 men killed in three divisions alone. Mangin still optimistic.
French attack begins
in
Nivelle's
Offensive April 1917
17th High wind, rain and hail prevent resumption of French bombardment. Nivelle sends telegram to Micheler renouncing the idea of northward exploitation. Still hopes for a breakthrough in the north-east. General Gamelin warns Petain of the obstacles likely to prevent this breakthrough. Fourth Army's attack begins and fails. 1
7th -20th
Fourth. Fifth and Sixth Armies gain them four miles of ground in the direction of Chemin des Dames and three miles on the Juvincourt plain. Total failure to gain objectives 'indispensable to all subsequent operations'. Now 30.000 men killed since beginning of operations and 100.000 wounded. Nivelle reassures Haig as to French support for the British attack ore April 23 but he alone is still optimistic.
Attacks
by.
list Micheler urges limitation of French objectives.
Ammunition supplies now
critical.
Mangin
protests.
22nd Nivelle
goes to PStain's and Micheler's HQs and defines his
new
(limited) objectives.
23rd Poincare intervenes in favour of postponing continuation of theoffensive. Nivelle sends stiff reply.
27th French government orders Nivelle to abandon
May
operation.
29th Nivelle
abandons Mangin.
Left:
French
56
The balance
of
forces on the main sector of the Nivelle
German
offensive. The French figures are for Mangin's Sixth, Mazel's Fifth and
DIVISIONS 31
Duchene's Tenth Army
2536
1195
— constituting
6-8 to 9'9-cm guns
Micheler's Reserve
Army Group. The Ger-
542
W*^^ 546 546
1260
206 128
k
man
10 to 14-9-cm guns
figures are for
First and Boehn's Seventh Army, which formed three-
Below's
15 to 19'9-cm guns
the divisional strength of Army Group Crown Prince Wilhelm. fifths of
French numerical
14^
superiority could not
Guns over 20-cm
compensate
for Nivelle's strategic blunders. Above right:
ra-
St Chamond tank with infantry of Fifth Army
A
2112
\
/
beny, with the aim of exploiting its previous successes and pushing beyond Prou vais Ridge. But on the morning of the 17th adverse weather conditions (high wind, rain, hail) hindered the preparations. Mazel decided to postpone the resumption of the offensive in the salient north of the Aisne. During the morning, Nivelle sent a telegram to Micheler in which he stated that yesterday's fighting clearly demonstrated the enemy's intention to hold their positions on Sixth Army's front and to render as difficult as possible your Army Group's progress northwards. It must therefore be in a north-easterly direction that your greatest efforts must be directed, starting from the point now held by Fifth Army. On Sixth Army's front confine yourself to consolidating its position on the heights south of the Ailette, so that we can establish ourselves securely north of the Aisne. This clearly shows that only 24 hours after the beginning of the offensive, by his limitation of Sixth Army's role, Nivelle renounced the idea of strategic exploitation northwards in combination with the British. However, he had not altogether
abandoned his grandiose schemes, but merely redirected them towards the north east where he considered there was the greatest likelihood of a breakthrough. The manoeuvre had simply been modified and it was now fifth Army who would bear the brunt of the fighting. But Fifth Army's failure, north of Rheims, to take Fori
the rain and mud. They have fought without relief and are now utterly exhausted. I now have only one fresh regiment at my disposal, with which I shall endeavour to launch a new attack provided the regiment is not needed to relieve another unit. I am determined, above all, to consolidate the positions that I now hold and to clean up step by step the village ofCraonne. It proved necessary to relieve other units, to replenish munitions, repair lines of communication and to evacuate the wounded. For a few days, a relative calm reigned over the front. The first part of the offensive had achieved the following objectives for the French: • An advance of four or five miles from Vailly towards the Dames ridge and the taking of German observation points over the Aisne valley, thus acquiring good observation over the Ailette. • An advance of three miles on the Juvincourt plain. • The capture of 11,000 German prisoners by Fifth Army and of 5,300 by Sixth Army. • The seizure of a certain amount of material: 140 guns, 300 machine guns and .
some ammunition. But against these gains had
.
.
to be set
the failures:
• The
failure to gain complete possession of the Chemin des Dames, Craonne and the California plateau, the possession of which
was
'indispensable
to
all
subsequent
operations'.
• The heavy
Brimont compromised the proposed liaison Army — as General Gamelin, Chief-of-Staff of the Reserve Army Group, warned Petain. Thus, no sooner had Fourth Army launched its attack in Champagne on the morning of April 17, than it became
with Fourth
apparent that the objective assigned to it could not be achieved. Petain advised the
advance which had penetrated as far as Bray-en-Laonnois and which had enabled the French to establish a position on the ridge dominating the Aisne valley. Leaving behind them a considerable amount of valuable material, the Germans burned the villages they evacuated: Aizy, Sancy and Jouy. all
When
he had congratulated
Vaillv,
Mangin on
commander
of this army that 'the orders for tomorrow (April 18) must take account of this situation. They will, very probably,
this success, Micheler gave him the following instructions: 'It is important now to exploit quickly the gains we have made:
be confined to consolidating the ground already won.' The 'ground already won' was a small zone just west of the Suippe, bordering on the Germans' first positions and comprising several observation points that had been gained at enormous cost. But here also results were deceptive, as were all the apparent advantages won by the three French armies between April 17 and 20. Fifth Army's salient north of the Aisne was never secured because the California plateau and Sapigneul Hill and Spin Hill were still held by the Germans. Here, on the 18th, the Germans launched a fierce counterattack between the Aisne and Juvincourt that was rebuffed only with difficulty by the French. During the three days, the only notable progress achieved was on Sixth Army's left flank when the German commander evacuated the CondeVailly region as far as the Chemin des Dames on the night of the 17th. He had been forced to take this action by VI Corps'
the situation permits. envisage a move1 Colonial Corps north of the LafTaux Ridge. It is, of course, understood that you adhere to the instructions of the C-in-C; you must not engage in any action against well-held German positions with.' out further orders It is evident that at this stage Micheler was attempting to restrain Mangin who, optimistic after his limited success, wanted to press on towards the north. But with Fifth Army now bearing the brunt of the fighting, much of Sixth Army's heavy artillery had to be transferred to that sector; moreover, the men of Sixth Army were exhausted and needed a rest. The commander of I Corps described their condition: Forced to evacuate thenif
I
ment by
.
.
billets after the German bombardments, the troops were exposed to severe weather conditions even before the fighting started.
They were then subjected to four days' combat, hemmed in, deprived of sleep, under constant fire from the German machine gunners and forced to struggle in
losses,
which would have
seri-
ous repercussions on the whole future of the French army. A study of the losses incurred by the French between April 16 and 25 reveals that 30,000 men were killed. 100,000 wounded and 4,000 taken prisoner by the Germans. Almost 8091 of these losses were incurred on the first day of the fighting: the pessimism expressed by the front line commanders was therefore very understandable. In the final analysis, the disparity between what had actually been achieved and Nivelle's grandiose schemes was glaring Nivelle, however, was not convinced that his plans for breakthrough and exploitation had failed. On the night of the 19th he decided to bring in Tenth Army on the front between Fifth and Sixth Armies to 'conduct operations north of the Aisne' He planned that Tenth Army should enter the line on April 21 and hold the front between Hurtehise and Berrv-au-Bac. This reorganisation of the dispositions would limit henceforth Fifth Army's role in the battle to an action in combination with Fourth Army to relieve the divisions who had advanced from Rheims. Nivelle confirmed his intention to adhere to these last instructions in a note to Sir Douglas rlaig intended to reassure the British commander that the support he required for his attack on the 23rd would be forthcoming. Even though our attacking armies have advanced more slowly than ue had hoped. I do not intend to alter or modify my last instructions. I would stress that I envisage no breaking off of the attack The armies of the Reserve Army Group and the Army Group Centre will open preparations for the forthcoming attack along the whole of their front. Their attacks will be launched as soon as possible and I will inform you as soon as their dates have been fixed. But Nivelle's optimism was shared neither by his subordinates nor by the French government, which had been appal
2113
led by the offensive's initial failure and by the rumours of very heavy losses. Nivelle had divided the High Command and government intervention was inevitable. On April 21 Micheler asked Nivelle whether 'the aspect which the fighting since -July 17 has taken on' had not led him to modify the instructions given in his latest directive. Micheler believed that the Reserve Army Group, which had no fresh divisions to bolster its attack, was incapable of effecting the proposed exploitation north of the Aisne in the face of an enemy
who had had ample time
to rest
and
re-
group. He therefore suggested that the present plan should be abandoned and that the Reserve Army Group should seek to achieve only limited objectives which would consolidate the front it already held, encircle the Chemin des Dames and Cra-
onne, take Spin Hill and Sapigneul Hill to the east and finally to launch an attack that would take it beyond Brimont Ridge, from which point it could prepare further operations in conjunction with Fourth Army. This represented a return to the idea of a limited manoeuvre that was not intended to rupture enemy lines but merely to consolidate positions already held.
No more
shells
Another reason
led Micheler to limit the scope of future operations — the munitions
The consumption of shells had been so great during the first days of the French crisis.
attack that already on the 19th Micheler had demanded its reduction. 'We have plenty of ammunition,' he said, 'but no country can compete for long with a shell expenditure as heavy as that of the last few days.' Accordingly, he had declined to give Mangin the supplementary allocation which he had asked for for his operation to obtain the Dames ridge. In his protest, Mangin neatly outlined the problem: The tenacity the enemy has shown clearly demonstrates the price he places on holding the observation points of the Chemin des Dames. We must either cease our struggle for them and return to our lines or press the
Germans beyond
the Ailette.
The opera-
am
planning, which I believe will take no more than three days — dependent on the German reaction — will need 130,000 155-mm shells and 650,000 75-mm shells. tion I
would add that our p<<
I
carious
ing objectives:
• To
relieve
Rheims by a combined attack
by Fourth and Fifth Armies. • To complete the occupation of the Dames plateau by a combined attack by Sixth and Tenth Armies. In effect, he had abandoned his grand projects and had returned to the idea of local attacks which would take place at the beginning of May. But it was during the last ten days of April that the crisis in the Fi nch High
Command
On
April 23, from Poincare, the President
ot
was telephoned through
to
public,
arose.
essage e Re-
<
N
headquarters: 'The President has be fluenced by those who must undertake
2114
elle's intn
that the attacks on Craonne and on the Vauclerc Plateau cannot take place on the date fixed for them. The artillery bombardment will be inadequate: XI Corps' supply of
ammunition
totally
is
insufficient.
Several days of intensive preparation are needed otherwise, they tell me, the failure of the first attack will simply be repeated: we shall lose a lot of men and gain nothing. .' After indicating that no date had yet been fixed for the reopening of the attack on Craonne, Nivelle ended his reply to Poincare by stating that the Commanderin-Chief can only express his dismay that rumours of this nature, which are totally without foundation, are believed by the President of the Republic. It is totally impossible to exercise command in conditions such as these, and I demand that those who have shown themselves capable of giving voice to these rumours and who are undermining the discipline of the French army be the objects of exemplary punishment A few days later, the French government ordered Nivelle to abandon his May operation against Brimont Ridge. Government intervention was now complete and determined even the details of operations. Nivelle protested, but it is possible that he already knew that his days were numbered. On April 29, Petain had been nominated Chief-of-General-Staff — technical adviser to the War Ministry. It was thus Petain who had placed the Unfits on Nivelle's plan and who was particularly sceptical about the projected operations. Was it a last throw of the dice when Nivelle abandoned Mangin? On April 29 he suggested to Micheler that Mangin should be relieved of his command and pretended to sound his opinion, knowing that Micheler would be forced to emphasise the difficulties he had had with his subordinate: 'The trouble with General Mangin is that he will not admit to having a superior. Feeling himself pressed from above, he goes his own way. But apart from his grandiose ideas, as a general I cannot fault him because his work is first class.' .
.
.
.
But on May 2 Mangin was relieved of his command. On the 6th the Reserve Army Group was dissolved and Micheler was given command of a single army. Simultaneously with this crisis, the first symptoms of what was to become the major crisis in the French army in 1917 began to appear. Some historians believe that the real crisis can be traced back as far as April 17. It is certain that on the 16th on the Aisne a corporal and five soldiers of the 151st Regiment (69th Division) abandoned their posts in the face of the enemy. The following day, at Auberive on the Suippe, the first instance of a collective refusal to obey orders took place: 17 men of the 108th Regiment abandoned their positions at the moment of attack and dispersed in confusion. Finally, on April 29 an incident took place at Mourmelon-le-Grand which was much more serious than any previous cases: 200 men of the 20th Regiment fled from their barracks at Chalons and took refuge in some woods — the day before their company was due to leave for the front. Guy Pedroncini writes: 'The three first cases, whether collective or limited to one individual, are relatively simple: a group of men suddenly refuse to go into the
The phenomenon can be explained terms But the seeds of a which was to augment in the weeks
and months
to come can be detected here. Later mutinies were confined to the Soissons-Auberive sector — the precise area of the April 16 offensive. Crisis of command, the beginnings of a crisis of morale — such was the atmosphere at the end of April and which marks the end of the 'Nivelle offensive'. Between Soissons and the Suippe, the French armies continued to make preparations for the limited operations defined by Nivelle, which would gradually escalate during the first two weeks of May and lead to other failures. French and Germans remained in uncertain equilibrium on the slopes of the Dames Plateau. The lessons of this failure were yet to be learnt by the French. On the German side, despite the general awareness of the ground lost and the thousands of men killed, the High Command felt that its theories about a defence in depth had been validated. Before the Somme, the German defence system had concentrated all its strength in a single line, but on the Aisne it had been laid out in depth, in accordance with Ludendorff's
instructions, and had profited from particularly favourable terrain. The first position was only lightly held, the second fortified to a certain extent and the third held even more solidly. These dispositions constituted a decisive factor in this German defensive victory, the second important factor being their use of machine guns in enormous numbers, particularly in the line. Thus the French, who could establish a relatively easy victory over the first line, were then mown down by the machine gunners in the second position. Furthermore, where the defence was particularly deep, Ludendorff had suggested
second
— and had almost achieved in the critical Aisne sector — the doubling of each first line division with a 'division of intervention' who would be ready at any moment to carry out a counterattack. This type of defensive layout, worked on by Ludendorff ever since his appointment to OHL in 1916, had been vindicated. Furthermore, if it is remembered that Ludendorff kept his nerve after the British offensive of April 9 by not reinforcing the Anglo-German section of the front, one can conclude that the German victory of April 1917 was won, not by the troops themselves, even though they fought bravely, but by the superiority of the German High Command. At the Calais conference of February 26 Nivelle had declared: 'Either we will be unable to break through in 15 days, in which case I shall stop because I do not wish to be involved in prolonged frontal attacks similar to those on the Somme; .' or we shall get through He did not get through. Did he stop in .
.
time? Further Reading Herbillon. Colonel. Le general Alfred Micheler (Paris 1933) Hellot, General, Histoire
de
la
Guerre Mondiale
Vol 3 (Paris 1936) Goes, Gustav, Chemin des Dames (Hamburg 1938) Pedroncini. Guy, Les Mutmenes de 1917 (Pans 1967) Rouquerol. General. Le Chemin des Dames 1917(Pans 1934)
attack.
in military crisis
.
.'
.
[For Jean Delmas' 1705.]
biography,
see
page
of a tank force in France came shortly after that in Britain. It developed independently of the technological advances being made in Britain, and in a less
The creation
dramatic but more complex way. As in Britain, the idea of the tank was not conceived in France by any one man but emerged more diffusely, in response to the contemporary military situation, out of
TANK FORCE On April
16, 1917, the first
day
of the Nivelle offensive, the French first used tanks in battle — seven months after the British first fielded them on the Somme. Richard M. Ogorkiewicz discusses the origins and early development of French armour
T
-
'
LP
r-
the existing technological possibilities. In fact, there were at least three sets of ideas which contributed to the development of the first French tank and hence of the first French tank units. The initial set of ideas arose out of the development of the armoured car, the first of which had been exhibited as early as 1902 at the Salon de VAutomobile in Paris and although progress up to 1914 was very slow, once war began more and more armoured cars were built. Thus, by August 1914 the French Ministry of War had already ordered its first 136 armoured cars and within a month they began to be attached to French cavalry formations. However, these early, improvised armoured cars could operate only on roads, and in
consequence, when the opening, mobile stages of the war were succeeded by more static warfare, during which the roads were cut or blocked, their usefulness quickly f jjj
came to an end. The short period
<°
of operation of the
first s
armoured cars was, however,
sufficient
Below: Chars Schneider move up
to the front
to£
arouse interest in the possibility of developing them further, so that they could be used beyond the confines of open roads.
The most significant move in this direction was taken by the French armaments firm which took out a patent for an improved type of armoured vehicle in January 1915 and then began to consider the design of another armoured car, fitted with tracks instead of wheels. The French technicians' interest in the use of tracks for armoured cars was prompted by a visit to England in January 1915 by Brillie and another Schneider engineer to examine the potential of the Americanbuilt Holt tractor for hauling heavy guns, g As a result of this visit, the Schneider ~ Company purchased two tractors from the a> United States which were tested at its | works at Creusot in May 1915. From these m tests came the idea of using the lighter of Schneider,
the two tractors, the 45-horsepower 'Baby Holt', as the basis of a tracked armoured car capable of moving off the road and crossing obstacles. In July, Schneider engineers began to work on the design of such a vehicle and in August they produced of
a layout drawing of its chassis, essentially that of a lengthened
which was and widen-
ed 'Baby Holt'. However, a month later further work on the design of the new type of fighting vehicle was interrupted by the temporary ascendancy of other ideas. The new ideas were prompted by the immediate tactical problem of cutting through the belts of barbed wire with which the opposing armies protected their trenches. The wire obviously had to be cut before any infantry attack could succeed and this fact turned thought to various wire-cutting or wire-crushing devices. The leading proponent of this trend of thought was J. L.
Breton, a parliamentary deputy who, in November 1914, submitted designs for a mechanical wire-cutter mounted on a wheeled agricultural tractor. His designs were favourably received by the technical branch of the Engineer Corps and, after some experiments, the Ministry of War placed an order in August 1915 for ten of the Breton wire-cutters for further trials. But it soon became clear that the performance of the Bajac wheeled tractor on which the cutter was mounted was inadequate and in consequence Breton was put in touch with Brillie in order to explore the possibility of mounting his wire-cutter on the 'Baby Holt' currently being tested at Creusot. This was deemed to be possible and the Ministry of War went so far as to place an order with Schneiders for ten armoured tracked tractors fitted with wirecutters. However, further trials conducted
Left: Schneider tank. The girder fitted to the front of the vehicle was designed to force barbed wire under the tracks to be crushed. Below: Schneiders in action
with the 'Baby Holt' from December 1915 February 1916 showed that the wirecutters were superfluous, since the tractor could crash through barbed wire by itself. This realisation coincided with the emergence of yet another set of ideas and the development of tractor-mounted wire-cutters was seen to be a blind alley and came quickly to an end. to
Sanction from Joffre The third set of ideas for the tank's development came from Colonel Estienne, an artillery officer who had already made a major contribution to technology warfare. Estienne's idea for a tracked armoured fighting vehicle began to take form in the latter part of 1915. In a letter to Joffre on December 1, 1915, Estienne asked for an interview to explain his idea of a tracked armoured vehicle which would facilitate the infantry's advance. At the time, GQG were daily receiving suggestions on how to achieve a decisive victory, most of them fit only for the waste paper basket. But a proposal bearing the signature of a widelyrespected officer deserved — and was accorded—some consideration. On December 12 Estienne was summoned to present his ideas to Janin, the general responsible for equipment at Joffre's headquarters.
Eight days later he was on his way to Paris to explore, with Joffre's tacit approval, the possibility of constructing the proposed vehicle. The favourable attitude of Joffre and other French generals ensured that the ideas would be quickly translated into practice. Thus, within four weeks of writing his letter, Estienne was able to get in touch with Brillie, whom he managed almost immediately to interest in his ideas. Brillie, in turn, having studied the earlier schemes for the tracked armoured car and for the wire-cutter vehicle, was quickly able to produce the layout of a vehicle corresponding to Estienne's ideas. In conse-
quence, on December 28, 1915 Estienne was already able to present to Janin a more concrete scheme which planned for the construction of 300 to 400 vehicles. Again Joffre responded quickly and favourably, recommending to the government depart-
ment concerned that trials be pursued without delay. Then, on January 18, 1916, he received Estienne's personal report which was then submitted to his staff who received it favourably. In consequence, on January 31, 1916, Joffre wrote to the Under-Secretary of State for War asking for 400 vehicles built along the lines proposed by Estienne. The responsibility for the supply of the vehicles was vested in the army technical services. These operated slowly and were not too well disposed towards a project which did not originate from them. Nevertheless, on February 26, 1916, the Ministry of War placed a firm order with Schneiders for 400 vehicles. It is interesting that this order was placed only two weeks later than the original British order for tanks and involved four times as many tanks. But the production of the French tanks took longer and the first was completed much later than the first British tank The specifications of the vehicle which Schneiders eventually produced did 'not differ very much from those originally laid down by Estienne. For security reasons it
was at first referred to as an artillery tractor and was aptly called the tracteur Estienne. However, after Estienne adopted chars d'assaut as a generic name for what in English began to be known as tanks, they were called chars Schneider or less frequently, chars CA. The main difference between the new vehicle and the original specification was that it had a short 75-mm gun instead of a 37-mm gun, and a crew of six instead of four. In principle, it amounted to an armoured box-hull on a modified 'Baby Holt' chassis. The hull had 11.5-mm plates at the sides and rear but at the front
Below: Schneider— Crew: 6; Armament: one 75-mm gun (90 rounds), two Hotchkiss machine guns (3,840 rounds); Armour: 11.5 mm max (17 mm later); Speed: 3.7 mph; Weight: 13.5 tons; Engine: Schneider 70 hp; Length: 19 ft 8 in; Width: 6 ft 6V2 in; Height: 7 ft 10 in; Range: 30 miles
t
k
l
fc
w
e
Above: French tank soldier— collar patches of 81st Heavy Artillery Regiment on service dress tunic beneath the leather combat jacket
a
an extra plate was later added which brought the total thickness to 17-mm
making
it
virtually
immune
to all rifle-
In the front right hand corner of the hull was mounted the short oarrelled 75-mm gun which could be fired over an arc of 20 degrees to the right of the axis of the tank. In addition, in each side plate there was a large spherical mounting for a Hotchkiss machine gun. Within the hull there was stowage space for 90 rounds of 75-mm gun ammunition and for 3,840 machine gun rounds. With all its equipment the Schneider weighed 13.5 tons. It was powered by a four-cylinder water-cooled Schneider engine which developed 70 horsepower and gave it a maximum speed of six kilometres per hour. In this respect, the Schneider was comparable to the original British tanks. But it was greatly inferior to them in one other important respect, namely trench crossing performance, because its tracks were very much shorter than the overhead tracks of the rhomboidal British tanks. The limited trench-crossing capability of the Schneider tank was seen to be a particularly serious shortcoming after the British tanks made their debut on September 15, 1916. Once the Germans knew of the existence of tanks they widened their trenches to make them more effective as tank obstacles and this, in turn, made the French revise their ideas on the employment of tanks. Estienne's original idea was that tanks should be used in surprise mass assaults on enemy trenches. The tanks were to attack ahead of the infantry and after crossing the first line of trenches one half of them was to keep the enemy down by their fire so that the infantry could follow through the gaps which the tanks opened in the enemy defences and take the trenches. But the possibility of achieving complete surprise was lost as a result of the use of tanks by the British army — calibre
bullets.
Below: St
diamond -Crew:
guns (7,500 rounds); Armour: Length: 25
ft
11 in;
Width: 8
ft
Armament: one 75-mm gun (106 rounds), four Hotchkiss machine mm max; Speed: 5.3 mph; Weight: 23 tons. Engine: Panhard90 hp. 9 in; Height: 7 ft 8 in; Range: 37 miles 9;
17
/Above. Engine of a St Chamond. With exposed moving parts and hot pipes, the interior of the early tanks was a hazardous place
-i.
»
•
.
'it
1
i 2119
use which the French regarded with bitterness as premature — and this coupled with the inability of the French tanks to cross wide trenches, led the French to envisage new tactics for tanks.
Diminished role In general, in the period leading up to the first tank action, less came to be expected of tanks than Estienne had originally envisaged. Thus, the role assigned to them became the more modest one of comple-
menting the
artillery
fire
by attacking
enemy positions that had escaped the artillery bombardment and which were holding up the advance of the infantry. Moreover, tanks were to be accompanied by units of specially trained infantry who would help them cross obstacles. Tanks were not, however, intended to be tied down to the pace of the infantry when they were able to move ahead on their own.
Before the proposed tactics could be put tanks had to be produced in number and this proved to be more difficult than expected. The first Schneider tank was delivered to the French army on September 8, 1916, but by November 25, when all 400 were expected to have been delivered, only eight were in the hands of the troops. Moreover, they had been built using mild steel, because of delays in the production of armour plate, and were therefore suitable only for training. E | By mid-January 1917 there were still 5 only 32 training tanks. But by the time the to the test
Above: St Chamond tanks in a French wood. Below: Schneiders, knocked out by German artillery and stripped by the French for spares. The first two French tanks had poor cross-country capabilities. The Schneider and the St Chamond could only cross trenches 6 ft and 8 ft wide
had more than 200 Schneiders. The delays in the delivery of armour plate and in the whole tank production pro-
the eve of the first French tank action in April 1917 there were only 16 St Chamond tanks fit for battle. As it happened, none of them was used, the only St Chamonds to accompany the Schneiders into their first action being four unarmed vehicles
even from the navy; the men for most part came from cavalry regiments whose reserve squadrons were being disbanded for lack of employment. They had all undergone the contemporary type of conventional military training but otherwise almost all were
gramme were due
which carried supplies.
completely ignorant of technical matters. They had, therefore, to learn from scratch how to operate tanks and it was typical of the kind of muddled thinking which sur-
tanks were introduced into action, in April 1917, the French the British army
army was better off than was at the same stage as
it
manufacturing
not only to the usual
with
The production of tanks was accompanied
a new product but also to the dispersion of the available effort in two different directions. The second type of tank originated with the technical services who, once shown the way, thought they could do much better than Estienne and Brillie. It became known as the St Chamond tank, named after the firm which designed it and which in April 1916 received an order for 400 vehicles — and all this without any reference to Estienne. On paper, the St Chamond tank was superior to the Schneider. It had a normal, instead of a short-barrelled, 75-mm gun and two more machine guns; it also had a longer track and an electrical instead of a mechanical transmission which made it easier to drive. However, at 23 tons, it was considerably heavier than the Schneider and consequently performed poorly over soft ground. Moreover, the front of its box-hull projected well over the front of the tracks which greatly reduced its trenchcrossing capability. It also experienced more breakdowns than the Schneider and its production was no faster. Admittedly, the first vehicle was delivered at about the same time as the first Schneider but on
by the formation of the first tank units. The original scheme for their organisation was due to Estienne who submitted it to Joffre in March 1916. It was approved but it was not until July that Estienne was relieved of his artillery command on the Verdun front and attached to Joffre's headquarters to take charge of the formation of tank units — the artillerie d'assaut. Following Estienne's original ideas, the basic unit became a groupe of 16 tanks: each was divided on traditional artillery lines into four batteries which could be temporarily combined under one command
difficulties associated
when required. The organisation
of the tank units started in August 1916, at Marly near Paris. Soon afterwards a second training centre was set up at Cercottes, near Orleans, and a tank camp was established near the front,
Champlieu, which became Estienne's headquarters. The first groupe was formed at Marly in October and by the end of March 1917 the camp at Champlieu contained 13 groupes of Schneiders and two at
Chamonds. The officers of these units came from various services within the army and some
of St
rounded new technological developments at this time that, after a mere two to three months' training at Champlieu, they were thought ready for battle. Further Reading Deygas, F. J., Les Chars d'Assaut (CharlesLavauzelle, Paris 1937)
Crow.
D. (ed.),
AFVs
of
World War One
(Profile
Publications 1970) Dutil, L, Les Chars d'Assaut (Berger-Levrault. Nancy, 1919)
Duvignac, A., Histoire de I'Armee Motorisee (Imprimerie Nationale. Paris 1948) Macksey, K. and Batchelor. J., Tank (Macdonald 1970) Perre.
J..
Batailles et
Combats des Chars
Fran^ais (Charles-Lavauzelle. Paris 1937)
RICHARD M OGORKIEWICZ graduated in engineering at London University and after a period working in the motor industry returned to the Imperial College of Science where he is now a senior lecturer in mechanical engineering. He is the author of two books and numerous articles on the development of armoured fighting vehicles. He has also lectured on the subject in Britain, the United States. Israel
and Sweden.
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BLOODY APRIL
l
'Bloody April' 1917 marked both the high and low water points of the Allied struggle for mastery of the air over the Western Front. The
Germans, though
inferior in
numbers, were
introducing superior machines, and the Allies' pilots had to exert all their courage and tenacity to match and then beat the German effort. D. B. Tubbs. Above: Allied fighters, such as this Nieuport, were still handicapped by
inadequate armament. Below: Shepherd and charge: a Nieuport seen from the Farman it is
escorting
I •I
2123
Ik lour months which culminated in 'Bloody April', 1917, taught one very important lesson: numerical superiority in the air cannot make up for technical inferiority. The preparations for the Battle of Arras and the battle itself came at a time when the Royal Flj ing !oi ps was suffering from a preponderance of obsolete aeroplanes, inadequate training for pilots and slow delivery of new t\ pes The Ionian air force, on the other hand, had recently been reorganised, new fighter aircraft were in production and, most important of all, morale, thanks largely to the inspiration of Oswald Boelcke, recently killed in an accident on the Somme, was higher than it had ever been. It is significant that when General Nivelle was discussing his proposed big push at a London conference in January, Sir Douglas Haig expressed the view that the Royal Flying Corps would not be ready for an offensive by April 1. At the same time Nivelle's plans greatly extended the front for which the British armies were responsible — they were to relieve the French as far south as the Roye-Amiens road, so that the French C-in-C could concentrate his forces and deal the Germans a tremendous blow on the Aisne, a blow which was supposed to rupture their line 'within 24 or at most 48 hours'. However, m February Allied grand strategy was neatly upset by the German High Command. Instead of waiting for the pincer movement which was to have nipped off the salient created by the Somme fighting, the German armies moved back to the Hindenburg Line defences they had been building throughout the winter. Alter much bad weather had hindered flying, a patrol of RFC Sopwith Pup single-seaters returned from offensive patrol to report large dumps burning and villages in flames: the salient was being evacuated and the country between the old and the new front lines laid waste in a 'scorched earth' policy. Complete plans for the German withdrawal were captured on March 14 and a British advance accordingly planned for March 17. For the first time since 1914 there would be something approaching open warfare as the British Fourth and Fifth Armies moved steadily forward for the next two weeks. There was little air opposition because on March 3 the Germans in their turn had captured General Nivelle's strategic plans for the great thrust on the Aisne and were massing their air forces to the north and south of the fighting around the Hindenburg Line, knowing that no important offensive could be launched from the now fluid British front line. The Aisne/Champagne sector was the affair of the French, and the main RFC concentration, supported by RNAS fighter squadrons, was on the Third Army front near Arras, and opposite the German fighter station at Douai, once the home of Immelmann and Boelcke, now HQ of Manfred von Richthofen's new Jagdstaffel 11, with Vstrutter Albatros D Ills (160/175-hp Mercedes D Ilia in-line waterI
(
<
cooled
'six').
During the British advance to the Hindenburg Line, 'Contact Patrol' techniques learned on the Somme were put into effect, Aeroplanes co-operated closely with infantry and cavalry, carrying messages (dropped in message-bags), and sending out W/T 'zone calls', identifying tactical targets for the gunners and discovering (usually by drawing infantry fire) the German strongpoints. In practice aircraft were little needed, since opposition was slight and ground communications (cavalry and field telephone) reasonably effective. For long-distance reconnaissance of and behind the Hindenburg Line the army wings of the Fourth and Fifth Brigades, RFC, made some use of single-seater fighters — a return to the original idea of 'scouts'. Photographic maps of the line were made by FE 2bs of No 22 Squadron escorted by No 54's Sopwith Pups (80-hp Le Rhone rotary). The Battle of Arras began for the ground forces on Easter Monday, April 9, for the airmen five days before that. Their job was to clear the air of German machines so that corps aircraft of the First Army (holding a line roughly from the Bethune-La Bassee road south to the village of Angres, opposite Loos) and the Third Army (concentrated opposite Vimy Ridge and down to the Scarpe) could get on with their work of trench-mapping, artillery ranging and counterbattery work.
The German air force, well — Halberstadt and Albatros
equipped with tractor single-seaters scouts, each armed with a pair of LMG 08/15 machine guns synchronised to fire through the propeller, in contrast with Allied machines' one gun, had profited by the lull between the Battle of the Somme and the Battle of Arras to train the hand-picked pilots of which the new Jagdstaffeln (fighter squadrons) were composed. A steady procession of sitting targets was provided by the BEs of the RFC on corps work or longrange reconnaissance, when head-winds often reduced cruising speed to a snail's pace. The RFC now learned the dangers of standardising and keeping in service an obsolete machine. A formation of six BE bombers, each virtually unarmed, required an escort of six FE 2b fighter-
2124
reconnaissance aircraft plus an 'umbrella' of six Sopwith Pups — an expensive way indeed of delivering six 112-pound bombs or a shower of 20-pound Cooper bombs from 6,000 feet with primitive bomb-sights. But Major-General Trenchard, commanding the RFC in France, and his French opposite number, Commandant du Peuty, in charge of the Groupement de combat on the Aisne, believed firmly that an offensive policy must be maintained whatever the cost. The aeroplane, they held, could not be used defensively because the sky was too vast. 'Victory in the air,' de Peuty announced in a note from GQG on April 9, 'must precede victory on land.' Again, 'Your task is to seek out, fight and destroy V aviation boche.' The constant presence of Allied aircraft far behind the German lines not only worried the civilian population but pinned down quantities of fighters and AA gunners who could otherwise have been employed against 'corps aircraft' engaged in vital mapping, artillery spotting and counterbattery work above the trenches. Furthermore, reasoned Trenchard, if his airmen managed to retain the initiative when poorly equipped, there would be absolutely no holding them when equipment improved. Events were to prove him right. April 1917 started early upon its 'Bloody' reputation. In the five days before the infantry attack, in a snow-storm, on April 9, 75 British aeroplanes were shot down with a loss of 105 crew (19 killed, 13 wounded and 73 missing). Wastage too was very high: 56 aeroplanes crashed and written off. Pilots were being posted to squadrons with as little as 10 hours solo to their credit and often with no experience whatever of the type they were to fly in combat. The average expectation of life for a British airman on the Western Front during the month of April 1917 was 23 days. The 25 squadrons, one third of which were single-seater units, lost 316 airmen killed in action from an establishment of 730 aircrew, a casualty rate of over 40% not counting those wounded, missing and grounded. A magnificent exploit on the credit side, however, was a raid on Douai aerodrome by FE 2ds of 100 Squadron during the night of April 5/6. Two days later the FE 2ds made another raid on Douai, bombing the aerodrome and railway station twice. Meanwhile the squadron's two FE 2bs, whose armament of Vickers one-pounder pom-pom guns had arrived only that day, attacked trains and other
ground targets.
The worst piece of news reaching RFC HQ during the opening week concerned the Bristol Fighters, of which so much had been expected. Six F2As led by Captain W. Leefe Robinson, VC, of Zeppelin fame, had been jumped' by Manfred Freiherr von Richthofen and four of his Staffel in Albatros D III single-seaters from Douai. Richthofen shot down two, and two more fell to his comrades; the remaining two reached home, one badly damaged. From the wreckage the Germans could learn only that the unidentifiable engine was a V-12 of considerable power. The lesson drawn belatedly by the RFC was that the Bristol should be flown like a scout, using the synchronised Vickers as main armament, the observer's Lewis being a heaven-sent bonus to protect the tail. Flown thus, the Bristol was a most formidable fighting machine, and was to make a great name for itself later in the war. In the opening days of the Battle of Arras air fighting ran through the gamut of aerial tasks: unsuccessful attacks on kite balloons, artillery shoots to flatten German wire, photography, bombing and fighting. As infantry moved forward through unseasonable Easter snow, contact patrol aeroplanes, using Klaxon horn and Verey pistols, kept track of the advance. Zone calls were sent out to indicate special targets, and the gunners' response proved so prompt and accurate in counterbattery work that aircraft were able to turn upon infantry targets — the 'trench-strafing' which was to become a permanent and hazardous feature of squadron life. On the 10th, Nieuports of 60 Squadron went on tactical photographic reconnaissance, an unusual job for single-seaters. On the 11th Richthofen equalled Boelcke's score of 40 by shooting down a BE 2c of No 13 Squadron which lost a wing as it dived. Miraculously the crew escaped with bruises. Unwilling to leave the front for a spell of celebration -and propaganda — leave, the Jasta commander insisted upon adding one more to his score. In fact he added two: on April 13, the first fine day of the battle, an RE 8 shortly after 0830 hours and an FE 2b at mid-morning. The former was one of six RE 8s, in which four were escorting the other two. All six were shot down, because the slow and cumbersome biplane was no match for a singleseater and by a series of misfortunes the OPs of three Spads, six FE 2ds and a flight of Bristol Fighters which were supposed to escort them past Douai failed to appear. Richthofen was allowed to remain at the front. British 'Offensive Patrols' met few HA (Hostile Aeroplanes), which were all joining in the battle, but RFC bombers were active all day, and that evening's mission against
. I
Front Line Strength April 9 1917 British
German (v. British
754
P
(38$single-seater fighters)
^ (
alone)
264 4 single
1 1
seater
fighters)
Losses Whole of April 1917
3
16
II
J I 119
Aircrew killed & missing
b4 151
Left.
The
credit
and debit
of
Bloody
April', in
which the RFC suffered
air
crew losses
Henin-Lietard railway station shows the scope and complication of such missions. Six 230-pound bombs and seven 112-pounders were dropped, the force comprising 12 Martinsyde G 102 'Elephants' escorted by five Spads and six Sopwith Pups, plus nine FE 2d pusher bombers with an escort of six Nieuports. Only one Martinsyde was lost, but on the way home the FE leader mistook a patrol of V-strutter Albatros for friendly Nieuports, and Jasta 11 claimed three more victims. It was a high time for the great individualists, the as (aces) as the French called them. The activities of the great fighter pilots are dealt with in another article, but it may be noted here that Boelcke's record score of 40 was being challenged not only by his pupil, Richthofen, but also by the Frenchmen Georges Guynemer
and Rene Fonck, and the young Englishman Alfred Ball. Guynemer and Ball, particularly, believed in hunting alone and attacking unseen from extremely close range, although they took part also in Flight and Squadron patrols. Thanks largely to Boelcke, whose Jagdstaffel had practised full squadron take-offs and patrols as early as September 1916, much had been learned about fighter tactics. Acting at first in pairs as Boelcke and Immelmann had done in the Fokker Eindekker days, single-seater pilots had learned to operate in flights of three, or, preferably, four (two pairs), under a flight commander. After trying line-ahead, line abreast and echelon formations, both sides hit upon the Vee ('vie') and diamond, with the leader in front where his view was clear and his Verey light or 'wing wag-
own targets when the signal to attack was given, and reformed afterwards at a prearranged rendezvous. Four machines were regarded as the maximum for one leader to control, and when larger formations were used these were built up from several groups each under its gling' signals could be seen. Pilots picked their
own
flight
commander.
Into the battle the High
Command
of the Luftstreitkrafte
moved
reinforcements comprising two Jagdstaff'cln (fighter squadrons), four Abteilungen of corps aircraft, and two Schutzstaffeln of armoured close-support biplanes with downward-firing guns, the new AEG J I two-seaters (200-hp Benz water-cooled six-cylinder engine). Their appearance coincided with the withdrawal of No 3 (Naval) Wing from Luxeuil, the base from which Sopwith 11Strutters had been engaged in strategic bombing of Germany. This enterprise, very much to the taste of RNAS pilots, was not relished politically by the French, who feared damage to the property of loyalists in Alsace-Lorraine and lived in dread of reprisals against French towns including Paris, which lav alarmlingly close to the front. The second phase of the Battle of
Arras opened on April
16,
totalling
40%. Right A Spad
VII
over the Hindenburg Line
when General
Nivelle launched his widely publicised offensive on the Aisne. The fighters were commanded by Commandant du Peuty, the able ex-cavalryman whose 'offensive thinking' had early influenced Trenchard. Du Peuty was still under 40, a fact which did not endear him to certain senior officers. Under his command came Groupes de combat 11.12 and 14. plus three escadrilles of Nieuport and Caudron machines -on paper four groupes, or 200 aeroplanes. In fact he had 131 machines on April 16, and only 153 by April 21, his maximum, to which could be added 30 machines from the Paris defences. Staff arrangements were woefully, and it seems almost wilfully, muddled. Pilots were sent to Le Bourget on ferry duty who should have been in action, and the front of the Groupe des Armees de Reserve was divided geographically, not according to commands. The staff had also decreed, on April 1, that each army must file its expected air requirements by 2000 hours the previous day
German supremacy There were to be six standing patrols along the whole front, three for each sector comprising • two patrols (one offensive, one defensive) at 6,000-8,000 feet (corps aircraft height); and • one high patrol. There was no zone call system, and often fighter escadrilles were not warned of local attacks or changes of plan. German fighter supremacy was such that on April 13 it was requested that zero hour for the offensive on the 16th should be advanced to first light, as German dawn patrols would otherwise discover all German lighters did, in fact, harry the front line during the attack, driving away French artillery and contact patrols. There was a continual cry for close, that is defensive, fighter support, notably from General Mangin, and in fact during the Verdun attack low patrols did operate at 2,000-3.000 feet between 0500 and 0615 hours to drive off marauding HA and to attack balloons. Bad weather limited du Peuty's long-range offensive patrols ('fortunately', said his detractors^ and when these did go out, in patrols of six, 'never less than five', the Germans avoided combat, thus giving unconscious support to du Peuty's opponents on the French staff, who were quick to speak of 'wasting petrol', 'shadow-boxing' and the like. Theirs was to he the last word. Commandant du Peuty eventually resigned, and despite his cavalry background joined an infantry unit in the trenches. where he was killed. In machines, too, France was weak. The Spad S Yll il^O-hp Hispano-Suiza) was a good fighter, as witness the scores of Gu\ ne mer and other aces, but the pusher Voisins and Farmans were
hopelessly outclassed. Only slightly better able to defend itself was the Caudron 4, a twin-engined three-seater (two 130-hp Hispano-Suizas) which lasted until replaced by the Letord I (two llispano-Suiza V-8si. The Aviation Militaire also possessed for some reason the Paul Schmitt 7, an extraordinary biplane of great span, minimal performance and no fewer than 12 sets of interplane struts. The PS 7 (265-hp Renaultl was unique in that the angle of incidence of the entire biplane cellule could be varied to give either maximum speed or maximum lift, but the drag was so great that neither speed nor lift was sufficient. The Paul Schmitt was armed with two machine guns and proved extremely unhandy in the air. Strangely, all documents relating to its adoption are missing from the French archives. The French also used Sopwith lj-Strutters in two-seater and single-seat bomber form. Criticising it, with some justification, as more of a touring machine than a combat aeroplane, they applauded its 'exploits sportifs' with the 240-pound bomb. French aviation, so brilliant during the early war years, was far from happy in spring 1917, despite the gallantry of individual airmen. The new German tactics of ignoring offensive patrols the better to concentrate above the trenches were employed also on the Arras front, where the Germans, said General Trenchard, were 'undoubtedly slipping underneath our high patrols without being seen by them'. Even when a force of Bristol Fighters and RNAS Sopwith Triplanes trailed their coats above Douai itself Jasta 11 failed to rise. Richthofen preferred to meet Nieuports in the air, which he did on April 16. Six Nieuports met four Albatros and four Nieuports went down. Economical of aeroplanes, the Germans made few fighter sweeps behind the British lines, and because in their 1914 retreat they had prudently dug in on high ground affording a view over the plains, they had less need of aerial reconnaissance than had the RFC. Strangely, they made no sustained bombing attack on Calais, Boulogne and Dieppe, where disembarkation could have been severely hindered. As the ground forces prepared for a new assault in the Arras sector to take some of the sting out of Nivelle's failure further south, bad weather kept most machines on the ground. The four days from the 16th to the 20th were virtually 'washed out'. On the 21st a preliminary bombardment flattened German wire and sorties were made against the balloons directing counterbattery fire. Two were shot down on the Third Army front and one on that of the Second Army. Three others were damaged but hauled down in time because the Germans had discovered a method far quicker than the winch: the cable was passed under a pulley and hitched to a lorry which then drove away, towing the balloon rapidly to the ground. The counter to this, invented by Major L. Tilney, CO of No 40 Squadron (Nieuports), was a hedge-hopping fighter attack at ground level. The Nieuport 17 sesquiplane was still the favourite mount of Captain Ball, the RFC's top-scoring pilot. He preferred it to his new SE 5, which was now operational after No 56 Squadron's CO had improved upon the Royal Aircraft Factory's design of the cockpit. W. A. Bishop, another future VC, also cherished his Nieuport 17 although clearly it was outperformed,
2126
Could the agility of the Triplane match the heavier armament of the Albatros?
and
its
single Lewis doubly outgunned, by the Albatros V-strut-
A
further four Nieuports were lost to Jasta 11 ters it had inspired. pilots on April 21, but the RFC was past its bad time. The factory strikes at home which had halted production had now largely been settled and supplies of vital new aircraft were reaching the front. The SE 5 was in action, Sopwith Pups and Triplanes were more than a match for the German fighters, and the Sopwith its way. Admittedly the SE was in trouble with Hispano engine and with a new and secret gun-synchronising device for its Vickers but there was a Lewis on the centre-section and these teething troubles would soon be overcome. The new synchronising gear had the great advantage that it could be fitted quickly to any type of engine. Invented by George Constantinesco, a Rumanian mining-engineer and developed by him with Major C. Colley, Royal Artillery, the device was known in the RFC as the CC gear, and must count as one of the simplest and most useful inventions of the war. It worked on the same principle as a modern car's hydraulic brakes, and may be described diagrammatical ly as a column of liquid in a pipe sealed by a plunger at each end. Pressure exerted at one end, by an engine cam, could not fail to reach the other and exert a similar and simultaneous pressure on, for example, the trigger of a gun. Tested on a BE 2c in August 1916, the design was adopted forthr with. The first squadron so equipped, No )f) (I)H 4si, landed in France on March 6, 1917. Meanwhile obsolete machines like the BE 2c, FE 2b, 'Strutter' and the early marks of Spad continued to suffer, and occasionally to mistake Albatros for the friendly though outmoded Nieuport.
Camel was on its
.
Leutnant Werner Voss' Albatros D III The D III had double the armament of contemporary Allied fighters, but its wings were relatively weak and water from the Left:
fighter.
centrally-placed radiator was likely to scald the pilot if it were punctured in combat.
Engine: Mercedes D Ilia inline, 160/175 hp. Armament: two Spandau machine guns. Speed: 103 mph at sea level. Climb: 3.3 minutes to 3,280 feet Ceiling: 18,050 feet Endurance: 2 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 1,454/1,949 Span: 29 feet BVa inches. Length: 24 feet.
lbs.
A Sopwith Triplane of No 1 Naval Squadron This type took the Germans completely by surprise, for though its firepower was only half that of the Albatros. its manoeuvrability, climb and altitude performance left the Albatros standing Engine: Clerget 9Z rotary, 1 10 hp Armament: one Vickers machine gun Speed: 1 13 mph at 6,500 feet. Climb 9 minutes 25 seconds to 10.000 feet Ceiling: 20,500 feet Endurance: 2 hours 45 minutes. Weight empty/loaded: 1.100/1,500 lbs Span: 26 feet 6 inches Length: 18 feet 10 inches Lett:
Haig's second offensive opened on April 23, St George's Day, on a 9-mile front, Croisilles-Gavrelle. Fortunately two Triplanes of Naval had, two days before, dispersed an unusual ly powerful C Va and escorting German reconnaissance formation of 14 Albatros, disappointing them of vital information. Tiny, compact and with the masses of engine, pilot and tanks closely concentrated, the Tripehound' was immensely manoeuvrable and in its element at 16,000 feet, where this engagement took place. Over the lines on St George's Day, German fighters from a variety of units harried the unfortunate corps aircraft as they wheeled in figures of eight spotting for the guns, while army squadrons gave what support they could. In an area bounded by Lens, Henin-Lietard, Bullecourt, Sains and the battle line itself 48 British scouts and Bristol Fighters plus 20 two-seater fighterreconnaissance machines were on Offensive Patrol, while the number of famous names figuring in the day's engagements read like 'Who's Who': Ball, Bishop, Hermann doling, Lothar von Richthofen (brother of Manfred) and of course Richthofen himself. That evening a bombing raid on Epinoy by six FEs of 18 Squadron escorted by five Pups was attacked by two formations of Albatros and Halborstadt fighters and there developed one of the first big 'dog-fights' of the war, as British Fighters, Triplanes and Nieuports hastened to join in a fight, which lasted for an hour. Later FE 2d night bombers of 100 Squadron overflew Douai to bomb Pont a Vendin station, also machine gunning troop trains whereby desperately needed German reinforcements arrived late and almost too tired to relieve their comrades in the trenches. During daylight fighter opposition was intense. New German 1
DFW
two-seaters were also in service, including the Albatros C V Mercedes I) IV straight-eight) and (' Nil (200-hp Ben/ IV sixi which would outperform an SE 5 at 10,000 feet Whatever motives had led the Jagdstaffkln to avoid combat earlier in the month, they were now deployed in full force and full of spirit. On the morning of April 29, picturesquely, the Richthofen brothers each shot down a Spad before entertaining their father. Major Albrocht Freiherr von Richthofen, to lunch in the mess At 1600 hours Manfred destroyed an FF after a stiff light over Inchv. while on yet another sortie the two brothers scored again, against a pair of BE 2ds. In a final combat of the day, when Jasta 11 was involved with 11 Triplanes of Naval 8 and one Nieuport of 60 Squadron. Manfred secured his 52nd victim, but only after Captain L. Barwell's Nieuport. absurdly underpowered and underarmed in comparison with the Albatros. had defended itself magnificently for almost half an hour Not all Manfred von Richthofen's victims were easy ones, though U must be pointed out that although without so many defenceless BEs and antiquated pushers in the sky his score would undoubtedly have been smaller. <22()-hp
!•'.
The Red Baron Quantity production of factory-designed BE 2. FE 2 and RE 8 biplanes made up to some extent for the Allies' lack of high ground. It was therefore essential for the Germans to shoot them down With so mini) targets the German rate of scoring was high four times (and on some sectors even five times) the HFC rate: but the RFC lighters were usually matched against lighters, either on offensive patrol or while driving the predatory Albatros from Us
Right:
German
air
force
personnel gather round to inspect a captured Nieuport. Below: An Albatros C X reconnaissance machine,
which joined the C in
service
VII
early entirely in
1917 and soon supplanted
it
•
I
tV/4,
*>
U: 2128
»
during the worst month in the history of British air fighting overseas. French airmen too had taken a terrible beating during the ill-fated 'push' of General Nivelle, now fortu-
sible for supply had been more flexible in outlook. It would have been perfectly possible to update the Royal Aircraft Factory's series of helpless BE two-seaters so that pilot and passenger changed places, giving the observer a clear field of fire. Frederick Koolhoven of Armstrong-Whitworth had refused to build BEs and the result was the FK 8, the 'Big Ack', a far more robust and effective machine. The lack of British engines, a result of blind trust in the French aviation industry, led to many casualties, for a rotary Le Rhone or Clerget of 110-hpor 130-hp, although marginally sufficient for a single-seater fighter, was woefully inadequate in two-seaters like the Sopwith li-Strutter. The Factory's air-cooled stationary engines, based on Renault designs, lacked smoothness, power and reliability, while the cooling scoops devised by Factory designers had a disastrous effect on the performance of BE and RE aeroplanes. Technical inferiority must always mean a high casualty rate. Machines already proved obsolete against the Fokker monoplane in 1915 could not be expected to hold off an Albatros D III, and it is not surprising that some squadrons during Bloody April lost more aircrew than there were chairs in the Mess. Perhaps Trenchard's policy of 'offensive at all costs' was unduly robust for the machines under his command. But the Royal Flying Corps did all he required of it during both periods of German air supremacy, and the fact that RFC pilots never lost their offensive spirit was to prove decisive during the coming struggles with the 'Circus', and the tremendous ground-strafing days of 1918.
nately superseded. In the RFC casualties would have been lighter
[For D. B. Tubbs' biography, see page 541
prey. Their antagonists, the Jagdstaffeln invented
by Boelcke in 1916 and efficiently developed by Richthofen, had done well, thanks to good equipment, good training — and plentiful targets. There was also the panache that characterised the elder Richthofen. It was a master stroke to paint the aeroplanes of his squadron in brilliant colours — quite against German army regulations — while reserving the only almost totally red machine for himself, a return to the personal style of the mediaeval knight, with his crest and coat of arms. No better publicity device has ever been invented than the blood red aircraft of 'the Red Knight'. Further to raise the rate of scoring it was now decided to increase the local striking power of the Jagdstaffeln by banding together four of them into a larger group. Jasta 11 was combined
with numbers 3, 4 and 33 into an independent fighter wing called Jagdgruppe 1 which first went into action, rather clumsily, on April 30, the day on which Rittmeister Manfred von Richthofen went on leave to celebrate his 52 victories. Reorganised on his return, and now comprising Jagdstaffeln numbers 11, 10, 6 and 4, this unit became the true 'Richthofen Circus', a private army of mobile trouble-shooters known after July as Jagdgeschwader 1. 'Bloody April' was over. The supply of new machines from England improved and new types came into service capable of outfighting the Albatros D III and Halberstadt scouts which had
taken such
toll
if
those respon-
.
|
mm
2129
IMMH
j
. '
.
.
THE PARACHUTE STORY The men who fought in the air asked for parachutes. The generals who had never experienced aerial combat said no — they were unproven, they were bad for morale. Aircrew losses continued Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Gould-Lee. Above: Baled-out German balloon observer is disentangled from a tree
to rise.
In these technically sophisticated days the parachute is taken for granted by everyone, even children, to whom parachute jumping is merely a Saturday afternoon sport, in which skilled sky di.vers, among them young girls, leap from 10,000 feet to alight neatly on bull's-eye targets. Older people recall the mass parachute descents of the Second World War, in operations in Crete, Arnhem, the Normandy invasion, and they remember also that in that war the lives of thousands of airmen of a dozen nations were saved by their parachutes. Against so accustomed a background, it seems scarcely believable that in the First World War, of little over half a century ago, no British airman of the Royal Flying Corps or the Royal Air Force, indeed no Allied airman, was provided with a parachute. This omission did not occur because there were no parachutes. They were in regular use long before the first aeroplane left the ground. Since the 1880s, parachutes of various design had been employed by circus showmen for thousands of exhibition jumps from free balloons, many by women, in both Europe and America. Most of the jumpers contrived their own 'chutes, in silk, and though some were more efficient than others, fatalities were astonishingly rare. The basic principle common to all was that the bulky parachute, folded into a container fixed to the balloon
basket, and linked to the jumper by a static line, was opened when the wearer leapt out and the static line pulled the canopy from the container. In 1907, an American, A. Leo Stevens, devised a 'Life-Pack' parachute that was strapped to the back of the parachutist. The canopy could be opened either by a static line attached to the basket or by the jumper, while falling, pulling a rip-cord handle outside the pack. Numerous demonstrations of this pack 'chute were made from balloons during the next few years, though most exponents preferred to use the static line. When the aeroplane came, bold spirits soon began to parachute from it too. The first jump was made in March 1912, by Captain A. Berry at St Louis, Missouri, his 'chute being pulled from a container fixed to a Benoist aeroplane in the manner of the balloonist. Similar demonstrations followed throughout the USA. The feat was repeated in England in 1913, with a pack parachute, when W. Newall, holding the pack in his lap, made numerous jumps from Grahame-White aeroplanes at Hendon, the canopy being opened by a static line attached to the aircraft. Then, in October 1912, in the USA, F. R. Law made the first true free-fall descent from an aeroplane, a Wright biplane, using
2130
a Stevens rip-cord 'Life-Pack'. This exploit, which was described and illustrated in the American magazine, Aeronautics, was repeated at numerous aviation meetings, yet it held no significance for any of the supposedly forward-looking experts in military aviation in America, or in the European countries then on the edge of war. In the past, military men had regarded parachute jumping entirely as a circus stunt, and although, following on tbe introduction of airships and observation balloons, this attitude changed, the possibilities of the free-fall rip-cord parachute as a means of escape from crippled aeroplanes were ignored throughout the world's armed forces. Indeed, when war broke out in August 1914, all these recent experiments and achievements were put aside and forgotten. Both British and French employed old-fashioned, slow-acting Spencer type parachutes for observers in captive balloons, but gave no thought to the aeroplane. There was some excuse for this indifference at this stage of the military aeroplane's development, for all were so underpowered that they could only just carry a machine gun and ammunition (when they came into general use in 1915), as well as pilot and observer. And even when the performance of aircraft began to improve, no real need for parachutes at first arose, for such skirmishes as occurred between opposing observation planes were usually ineffective and bloodless. This gentlemanly air was changed with the arrival of the Fokker monoplane, with its fixed machine gun firing forward through the arc of the propeller. The Eindekker's easy conquests of illarmed British machines such as the BEs — dubbed 'Fokker Fodder' by indignant Members of Parliament — lifted the casualty rate to a level that began to weaken RFC morale. This setback was eventually rectified by British pusher-types, forward-firing scouts, but as air fighting between fighters developed, the Germans again won the technical lead. Even the newer Allied fighters were mostly outclassed by such machines as the Albatros D III, while two-seaters were largely helpless victims. When hundreds of Allied airmen lost their lives trying to fight in inferior aeroplanes that too often broke up or hurst into flames, the need for life-saving parachutes became clear. Why, demanded Press and public, if balloonists could escape death by parachute, could not the crews of heavier-than-air craft? The primary answer of RFC Headquarters was that no paraRight:
Rescue
at
sea for a baled-out British balloonist
chute suitable for aeroplanes existed. Even had this been true, any kind of parachute could have been developed rapidly under the spur of war, just as the primitive aircraft of 1914 had swiftly advanced in performance under this spur. But it was untrue. Not only did the authorities shut their minds to the achievements of Stevens, Law, Berry and Newall, but they refused to accord any merit to a British parachute, the Guardian Angel, which R. E. Calthrop, a retired engineer, had produced and convincingly tested just before the war. But the RFC chiefs declined to consider it. They said it was not safe — as if diving to one's death in a burning aeroplane was safer! And when the alert-minded Superintendent of the Royal Aircraft Factory at Farnborough, Mervyn O'Gorman, set out to test the Guardian Angel as an engineering proposition, and sought financial approval, he was snubbed with 'Certainly not!' by General Sir David Henderson, GOC of the RFC. And for many months 'Certainly not!' was to remain the official attitude to every attempt to have the Calthrop 'chute adopted or even tested. It remained for a few junior officers to carry out tests without permission. In January 1917, at Orfordness Experimental Station, Captain C. F. Collet made successful jumps from a BE 2c, and some months later Major T. Orde Lees and Lieutenant A. E. Bowen jumped from the high span of the Tower Bridge, 150 feet above the Thames — all on Guardian Angels. But these demonstrations had no impact on official policy, in spite of the fact that in France, at General Sir Hugh Trenchard's demand, black Guardian Angel parachutes were used to drop spies at night. With ever-mounting losses in the field, culminating in the calamitous 'Bloody April', when RFC casualties reached their highest yet, the call for parachutes grew ever stronger, but the senior officers and technicians of the RFC and the officials of the Air Board remained obdurate. The Guardian Angel was not 100^ safe, they declared, it was too bulky to be disposed in an aeroplane, its weight would affect performance, and in any case, airmen said they did not want parachutes. In their concern for safety, the authorities were both unconvincing, for they ignored the near 100^ safety record for balloonists, and sophistical, for they were still compelling half-
trained young airmen to fly such death-traps as the BE 2 series, which when matched against the Albatros was almost tantamount to a death sentence. The argument of bulk was shown to be fallacious by experiments made later in the war, which proved that the Guardian Angel could be stowed satisfactorily in the top of the fuselage. The argument that performance would be lowered was valid only for the obsolescent machines still in use in mid-1917, and not for the higher-powered replacements that arrived in the autumn. As for the last objection, this presented a view that was confined chiefly to middle-ranking officers who had never experienced the fierce air fighting that developed from the latter half of 1916 onwards, and to a minority of fighter pilots who inclined to the notion that to want a parachute might indicate that one was 'windy' or even 'cissy', but these tough fellows were those lucky enough to fly machines, such as the Sopwith Triplane and Camel, and the SE 5a, that could outfight the Albatros and Fokker. In the author's own experience in France as a fighter pilot, he never encountered anyone who expressed this view. The majority of airmen, fated to fly inefficient craft such as the BE, the RE, the FE, or even the good but obsolescent types like the Nieuport and the Sopwith Pup, and who provided most of the 'fodder' for such top-scoring aces as Manfred von Richthofen, certainly did want parachutes. But they could not clamour too loudly for fear of being accused of showing poor morale — except for a few whose courage could not be challenged, aces such as McCudden, Ira Jones and Mannock. The last indeed, because he dreaded being burned alive, openly expressed his detestation of General Trenchard because he mistakenly thought the latter had ruled 'No parachutes!' Another reason for the denial of parachutes, though not officially stated so far as the author was able to discover in an examination of War Office records, was that a pilot might be tempted to abandon his aircraft rather than fight to a finish. This ignoble supposition, starting as a canard and becoming accepted as authoritative, was deeply resented, then and since, by all airmen who fought in the First World War, especially as they knew that the reverse would be true, that to have a chance of escape in emer-
Postwar lady
aviator, with parachute,
about to take
off in
her Avro 504
gency would stiffen morale — as was to be proved a thousand times in the Second World War. If British air chiefs were blind and obstinate, the corresponding leaders of the American Air Corps were no less at fault, for though faced with the probability of air war from 1914 on, they did not prepare for it, in either aeroplanes or parachutes. Though the pioneer inventor, Leo Stevens, was actually in their service as a balloonist instructor, and could have produced his ripcord 'Life-Pack' by the thousand, America entered the war in mid1917 without parachutes, and had to borrow them for her Observation Balloon Sections from France. The French too were smitten with the lack of realism shown by their allies. Though Frenchmen had shown an early interest in parachutes for use in aeroplanes, and had made successful drops with dummies as far back as 1910 — and one live jump by the famous aviator Adolphe Pegoud in August 1913 — the onset
war saw them jettisoning their pioneer experience, just as the Americans had done. In August 1917, Calthrop, who until then had been forbidden to publicise his Guardian Angel, rebelled, and placed advertisements in aeronautical journals. He guaranteed his 'chute to have shown a 100% safety factor under numerous tests, and disclosed that active service pilots who had learned of his invention had asked him to provide them with parachutes at their own cost. But the Air Board said no to so flagrant a pandering to low morale. Nevertheless, his action helped to forward public and parliamentary pressures for action. The end of 1917 saw the formation of a Parachute Committee to establish whether parachutes should be adopted, and experiments were initiated, though in languid fashion. This belated step was taken chiefly through the urgings of General E. M. Maitland, himself an airship parachutist. In of
France, another senior
2132
officer,
Brigadier-General C. A. H. Long-
A wartime parachute experiment with a back-pack,
static-line
model
commanding the 3rd Brigade, RAF (as the RFC was soon to become) who had also done parachute drops, later wrote that 'he and his pilots keenly desired parachutes', and he recommended the Calthrop pack fitted in the top of the fuselage. The authorities' reaction that this 'would impose a dangerous strain on the pilot', which the chairbound experts presumably considered more onerous than being roasted in a burning aeroplane, was indication of the stubborn official resistance the protagonists of the parachute had to face. Yet as 1918 opened, the climate began gradually to change, for as air fighting became more and more lethal and extensive, the unnecessary loss of life could no longer be dismissed as unimportant compared with the holocausts of the offensives on the ground. croft,
Further Reading Gibbs-Smith, C. H., The Aeroplane: An Historical Survey (HMSO 1960) Gould-Lee, Air Vice-Marshal A., No Parachute (Jarrold 1968) Kirtleside, Lord Douglas of, Years of Combat (Collins 1963)
Low, Professor A. M., Parachutes in Peace and War (London 1942) Murphy, T. V., Parachute (Putnam 1930) Penrose, H., British Aviation 1915-1919 (Putnam 1969)
VICE-MARSHAL ARTHUR GOULD-LEE became a writer when he from the RAF in 1946. He has published 12 books, biographical except the last two No Parachute and Open Cockpit, which describe his AIR
retired
service as a fighter pilot in the First World War A graduate of the Staff and Imperial Defence Colleges, his appointments during the Second World War included Chief Instructor, Turkish Air Staff College, 19371941, Senior Air Officer, British Air Forces, Greece, 1941, Deputy SASO, Headquarters, Middle East, 1941-1942, SASO and Acting AOC No 12 Group, Fighter Command, 1942-1944, Deputy Chief, British Armistice Control Commission, Rumania, 1944, and Chief of the British Mission to Marshal Tito, Yugoslavia, 1945.
>ximately 8,500,000 )14 us that
THE FRENCH
til 1917 -iff observe the occursuch a large mass of men of cases indiscipline, individual ones in general but somemnes of small groups. In 1914, during the period of the war of movement, there had been cases of troops running away and looting and plundering. Since the period of trench warfare had set in, cases were noted of 'desertion to the enemy' (soldiers deliberately surrendering as prisoners of war), and of 'abandoning their posts in the face of the enemy' (soldiers hiding away during an attack). There were many cases of self-inflicted wounds, but then in an army which lost 1,394,000 dead and which continually proved its bravery, such things were only to be expected. They involved only a very small number of men. Death sentences executed up to April 1917 did not exceed five to six a month on the average. Throughout the whole war there was approximately one execution for every^0,009 men mobilised. It may be said, then, tb^at the discipline of the French army was satisfactory up to " April 1917. But in April 1917 the situation chang^f dramatically. In his book, Pedroncyii gives
ice
MUTINIES On April
16, 1917 it was apparent that Nivelle's offensive was yet another futile bloodbath. The next day there began a series of mutinies affecting two-thirds of all French divisions. Was this a revolutionary movement exemplified by the recent Russian Revolution, or simply a gesture of despair by the exhausted
and
L£ I
-».Sj.jI«
bitter poilus?
J.B. Duroselle Below: Tired and dispirited, poilus return from the front
•
A
end 1918, and it is it was not necessary
i
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i
:
r»> '
A
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the date of April 17, 1917 -the day after the abortive Nivelle offensive — for the first case of serious mutiny: 17 men of the 108th Infantry Regiment abandoned their posts in the face of the enemy (12 of them were subsequently sentenced to death but all were reprieved). According to Petain, the period of the mutinies extended up to October 23. In fact, some minor and sporadic cases occurred as late as January 24, 1918. But by August 1917 the situation had returned to near normal. The period of the mutinies thus began on April 17, reached its climax in June, declined in July, and was practically ended by August. According to Pedroncini, who has made the most detailed study of these events, throughout this period there were 250 cases of collective indiscipline. All took place in infantry regiments, apart from 12 in artillery regiments. In all, they affected 121 infantry regiments, 23 battalions of light infantry (elite infantry), seven regi-
ments of colonial infantry, one regiment of territorial infantry (the oldest reservists!
and seven
artillery
regiments.
A
single infantry regiment had 17 incidents on its own. If one examines the distribution of incidents on a divisional basis, one notes that 68 divisions were affected
by the mutiny, while the other 44
divi-
sions of the French army were untouched. Of the 68 divisions affected, five were affected profoundly, a few others very seriously, 15 seriously, 25 underwent repeated incidents and 17 only one. This seems to indicate the extent of the agitation very clearly. One can say with Pedroncini 'that the crisis of indiscipline struck widely and for a few dramatic days it placed the French army in a vulnerable position'. But to say that a division or a regiment was affected by the crisis does not in the least mean that all the soldiers of the division (approximately 15,000 men) or of the regiment (2,000-3,000 men) mutinied. To understand what actually took place, let us choose a few of the 250 cases listed. On April 29, 200 men of 20th Infantry Regiment left the barracks in which they were resting in the military camp of Chalons-sur-Marne. They dispersed into the woods. The next morning, their regiment was sent back to the front without them. Most of them, appalled, rejoined it in time. Only 15 faced trial, six were sentenced to death and none were executed.
The 18th Infantry Division had fought May. It comprised four regiments including 32nd and 66th Infantry Regiments. The bulk of its men had not been given any leave for six months. Now on May 17 and May 19 two battalions received an order to return to the line. In both cases, there were re-
and generous leave was promised. remained at rest until the evening of
to rest It
May
27 receiving 1,000 men in reinforcement. May 27 was Whit-Sunday. In the village of Villers sur Fere, the soldiers were drinking hard, in company with soldiers of another regiment who had heard talk of mutinies. Tempers became heated. During the evening, news came that the regiment was due to travel back by truck
towards Craonne. Immediately a crowd collected, composed of men from the 2nd Battalion and from two companies of the 1st Battalion. The officers dispersed it. A few hours later there was another demonstration. The Colonel intervened. The men told him they had nothing against him but refused to return to the firing-line. A few of them even shouted 'Long live the Colonel!'
But the agitation grew. Crowds of men crossed the village singing the Internationale. Revolver shots were fired, hand grenades were thrown, motor vehicles were smashed (but no one was killed). At 2230 hours, the 3rd Battalion which had not taken part in the demonstration boarded its motor trucks. A little later, the 1st finally did likewise. The 2nd refused. At 0500 hours in the morning of May 28,
a detachment of gendarmerie arrived. Eighty men refused to board, firing rifle shots into the air. Then, 20 soldiers submitted and the other 60, escorted by gendarmes, marched on foot to the neighbouring little town of La Fere en Tardenois and announced they were going to take the train for Paris. But once they had arrived there, at 0730 hours, they too submitted in their turn. And the regiment fought well once back in the line. Twelve soldiers
and two corporals were court-martialled, being sentenced to death. The President of the Republic, Poincare, reprieved only one of them. Three were executed, another succeeding in escaping on the eve five
of execution.
At the beginning of June, the demonstrations became more serious because, on the one hand, they were considerably bigger, often involving elements belonging to several different regiments, and, on the other hand, they also contained the makings of some sort of organisation, with meetings at which leaders emerged, many of them strongly socialist. The 5th Infantry Division, comprising 129th, 74th and 274th Infantry Regiments, had been commanded by the famous GenMangin before his appointment as commander of an army. It had held the Des Eparges sector for nine months, then had been rested for a month in February/ March 1917, then brought up close to the front for the battle on April 16, but without being engaged in it. Considered an elite division, it had been well cared for and well nourished. Now on May 28 and protest meetings and assemblies 29, against the war were held in the 129th Infantry Regiment. The soldiers declared
bitterly in the first half of
eral
fusals to obey. In both cases, the officers regained control of their troops within a few hours. And these troops subsequently fought energetically. The rumour that became current later that General Duchene ordered the 'decimation' of these battalions—one man being executed out of every ten — is legend. There were three death sentences, one of which was executed.
that they liked their officers, but that they no longer wanted to take part in useless offensives, and that they wanted to protect their women who were being raped and
The 36th Infantry Division comprised four regiments, including 18th Infantry Regiment which had fought well from May 4 to May 8 on the Plateau de Craonne at the Chemin des Dames. The regiment had
massacred by Annamite workers in Paris. (There had, in fact, been disturbances and the rumours had grown to outsize proportions.) Nevertheless, the regiment resigned itself on May 30 to go back to the
20 officers and 824 men and had been mentioned in dispatches. It was sent back
line to cries of
lost
2134
It
'Down with the war!' was then the turn of 74th Regiment on
May
30 and 31. There were mass meetings, uproar and the singing of the Internationale. Calm returned on June 2 and 3, but on June 5, the 74th heard it was to relieve a regiment (the 418th) belonging to another division which had been in the line for a very long time and was at the end of its tether. Immediately a meeting was held attended by 300 soldiers. A motion was put — 'We shall not move back to to the vote the trenches' — and passed. The men then saw their officers endeavouring to bar th.e road to the neighbouring town to them, and simply sat down to wait for them to go — as they did not want to fight them — before continuing on their way. Another refusal was given on June 6. But arrests were made by the gendarmerie and order was restored. Nevertheless, on June 6, 193 men of the 274th Infantry Regiment refused in their turn to move up to the line. They were not hostile, they said, but they had had enough. They wished to protect their families who 'were bitterly unhappy'. The most important mutiny took place about the same time on June 1 at Ville en Tardenois and Chambrecy. It involved one brigade of 43rd Infantry Division (23rd and 133rd Infantry Regiments). Towards 1300 hours on June 1, men from these two regiments began a demonstration. They no longer had any confidence in the word of the Generals. They would agree to return to the line only if they were granted 45 days of rest. Towards 1500 hours, the demonstrations became 'political'. A parade was organised, with a red flag at the head, and the Internationale was sung. BrigadierGeneral Bulot and a colonel succeeded in dispersing them. But that evening agitation was resumed on new subjects: the Blacks and the Annamites were firing on their wives with machine guns. They demanded 'peace at any price'. The rumour ran that a revolution had broken out in Paris and that the Louvre was on fire. They assembled in front of the town hall of Ville en Tardenois. General Bulot once again endeavoured to stop them. But this time he was openly insulted: 'Murderer! Drinker of blood! Death! Long live the revolution!' He was knocked about, hit by stones, and his general's stars were torn off. At a certain moment, he was in danger of being killed. General Mignot, the Commander of the division, gradually restored quiet by promising not to send the two regiments into the line and to transmit their complaints to the general commanding the army. There remained however 100 demonstrators who marched towards the nearby village and endeavoured unsuccessfully to undermine other regiments, subsequently returning to Ville en Tardenois where they smashed the windows of the town hall. The next morning (June 2) it started again. Two thousand men demonstrated with a red flag until 2200 hours. Finally on June 3, the two regiments were taken by truck to other cantonments. If General Bulot was insulted and threatened, it was not because he was not a brave man but of his brutality. During rest periods, he made his men work too hard; in battle, he had the reputation of a 'butcher'.
because
It
must be pointed out that during the
fighting from April
16 to April 20, 23rd
Regiment lost 630 men out of 2,371, and 207( of its officers. And the division, after a very brief rest, had fought once again in the beginning of May. Here is a final example, one in which the Infantry
lasted longest. In fact, in the 77th it lasted from May 31 to June 6. On May 31, having received the order to return to the line on the Plateau crisis
Mutiny — the day after Nivelle's abortive offensive
The French Army consisted of Of these,
68 Divisions
I I 2 Divisions. were affected by
V The French mutinies of April/August 1917. The period reached and was
began on
of the mutinies
April 17,
climax in June, declined in July all but over by August. It affected' two-thirds of all French divisions, but only 35,000 men out of an army of 3,500,000 its
To
quell
a mutiny Altogether, there were
cases
238
of collective
250
indiscipline
Infantry Regiments
in
affecting:
121
Infantry Regiments
23 Bns
7 I I
2
of Light Infantry
Regts of Colonial Infantry Regt of Territorial Infantry
Regiments
in Artillery
affecting:
7
Artillery
Regiments
r
Infantry Division,
de Craonne, 150 men belonging to 60th Light Infantry Battalion demonstrated and refused. The next day, they were 400, and they went off in bands around the neighbouring villages to convince other units to join them. It must be pointed out that until then their attitude had remained calm and no political demands had been advocated, the soldiers limiting themselves to
demands
for leave.
inflamed on June
The
situation
became
Light infantrymen numbering 250 to 300 left their cantonments, leaving their equipment behind as well as their rifles, and dispersed into the woods. The other men of the battalion agreed to board trucks to return to the front. Two cavalry brigades had arrived since the morning. They encircled the village of Blerancourdelle and the woods to cut off the mutineers from all contact with the outside world. The cavalrymen had been given orders not to use their weapons. But since the mutineers refused to surrender, the cavalrymen tightened their grip. In order to avoid an armed clash, the colonel commanding 60th Light Infantry Battalion proposed to act as intermediary. He succeeded in convincing the 2.
mutineers who, in their turn, were despatched to the front. But at that moment, another component of the 77th Infantry Division, the 159th Infantry Regiment stationed at Blerancourt. a neighbouring village of Blerancourdelle, was affected in its turn. About 30 men demonstrated. On 4, one platoon — about 15 men — left the battalion at the moment of moving back to the line. Then, from June 4 to June 6, other incidents involving up to 150 men occurred in other components of the division: the 57th Light Infantry Battalion and the 97th Infantry Regiment. The mutineers had to be arrested and disarmed. The last incident was also the most serious one. A group of light infantrymen from 60th Battalion refused to move in support of an attack mounted by the Moroccan Division. This was no longer a refusal to move up into the line, but a refusal to take part in a battle already engaged. It is true that this incident was to remain practically the only one of its kind. Our intention has been to extract a few accounts out of the 250 cases, accounts de-
June Total mutineers
approxJT Sentences
2873 I
years
(5 I
in all:
381 heavy sentenc
492
01 the
629
of
hard
I
abaar or over
lighter sentences
I
381 heavy
were
for
sentences,
execution
(3 sergeants. 1 cavalry corporal. 30 corporals b 542 privates). Of these, 75 were for acts
before 16/4/17. 68 for acts between 16 & 30/4/17. 42 for acts between
and 428
1
& 15/5/17
between 15/5/17 and 31/1/18 for acts
Executions 7 mutineers were
executed
summarily
52
others are thought to have
a firing squad committed suicide and 1 escaped)
faced
(of these,
1
23
cases are
in
doubt
(10 probably executed. 8 possibly
b
5 doubtfully.
were after 1/7/17) There were 43 certain All
executions (27 for collective indiscipline and 16 for individual indiscipline)
liberately shorn of any embellishments and patiently reconstructed by Pedroncini from reliable records. Many other stories could be told. Apart from minor details, they all resemble one another. How many mutineers were there? Pedroncini estimated 35,000 men — out of an army of 3,500,000, this works out very approximately at one mutineer for every 100 soldiers. Thus, in all divisions, eves those most badly affected, the great majority of the soldiers remained disciplined.
And when considerable groups of soldiers belonging to several units of a division refused to obey, nearly all of them submitted after a few hours, leaving only a few dozen irreconcilables. And yet the
French Grand Quartier General had legitimate cause for grave anxiety, for a number of good reasons Firstly, when a line is held by troops who are bogged down in trenches, the only possibility of manoeuvre comes from the divisions resting in the rear. This is true
2135
not only for the offensive, but also for the defensive. Should the enemy make a sudden attack, fresh divisions have to be sent in reinforcement. After the mutinies the General Staff became aware that none of the divisions placed in reserve were necessarily reliable, and it was naturally apprehensive about a German attack. Secondly, the Entente was unaware of Ludendorff 's real intentions. Was Ludendorff informed of the mutinies in the French army? To-
day we know that he was not informed any earlier than June 30, that is to say at the very moment when they were beginning to diminish. The secret had been well kept. In his memoirs he says: 'We received the impression in the second half of May that there was a slowing-down in the French offensive: this passivity by the French army became prolonged. I had nevertheless to keep in mind that a resumption of its attacks was possible at
any moment.' Furthermore, Ludendorff was profoundly anxious about the morale of the German army and civilians. Certainly were no acts of collective indiscipline in the army but the civilians staged widespread strikes, much more serious than in France; a pacifist current developed in the Reichstag. Thirdly, in such fluid, dispersed and widespread affairs as were there
the mutinies,
it
was impossible
to
know
whether they constituted a simple, but exceptional crisis, relatively easy to solve, or whether they were not the first sign of a total breakup of the army. There was
an example of an army in
full disintegra-
ted: Verdun, the bloodbath which sapped both French and German morale. Below: After the mutinies came the courts-martial. There were 3,000 sentences, of which 1 ,400 were heavy M (over five years' hard labour) and 600 were 1 capital. Right: An executed mutineer is untied E from the post. Of the 600 sentenced to death, only 43 were actually executed— Petain o. strove to heal rather than to punish his army uj
2136 -
t.ion:
the Russian army.
One of the
first acts
and Workers Soviet' of Petrograd had been to proclaim 'Prikase 1' under which officers lost the right to punish soldiers and were henceforth to be elected. Soviets were being constituted on the front. 'Stavka' — the General Headquarters - was no longer being obeyed and the number of desertions was increasing. Many units were refusing to move up into the line. Furthermore — something which had never occurred in France — officers were being murdered, sometimes collectively. Now all this was filtering through to France. 'The many striking details given by the masscirculation papers on the Russian Revolution', wrote Paul Painleve, who was then the Minister of War, 'were over-stimulating for minds which were tired, embittered and fed up with the present, and of the
'Soldiers
avid for
new
things.'
The Russian example Was the French army on
the brink of following the Russian example? Before exam-
how
the French government and Grand Quartier-General (GQG) undertook to solve the problem of the mutinies, we must endeavour to explain the mutinies themselves. Thanks to innumerable documents and eyewitness reports, this is easier for us than for contemporaries. There exist two main types of explanation, the first one consisting in seeing them as the result of a vast organised revolutionary plot, with clandestine leaders — the pacifist socialists of the extreme left, those who, in Switzerland, had proclaimed at Zimmerwald (1915) and at Kienthal (1916) that the war was 'imperialist', that both camps, equally capitalistic and bourgeois, were defending neither their countries nor justice, but merely the interest of the rich, and that the duty of the proletariat, be they soldiers at the front or workers in the ining
factories,
was
to
transform this 'imperialist
war' into a 'revolutionary war'. This was the theory which Lenin had unceasingly advocated since July 1914. The second explanation consists in saying that the mutinies were a spontaneous outbreak, linked to the despair and misery of the soldiers. Living in constant danger, in mud, filth and discomfort, they had 'had enough'. They had just come from the recent offensive, were at rest and were
hoping as was normal to rest
for at least
three weeks. But then, at the end of three, five or ten days, they learned that the next morning trucks would come to take them back to the line. It was the last straw. In the spring of 1917 — as everywhere in Europe — a wave of 'pacifism' was gathering strength. The word is extremely ambigu-
There were 'revolutionary' pacifists, who wanted the transformation of the international war into a civil war, and the coming to power of the proletariat. In his pamphlet The State and the Revolution, Lenin had very recently given a ous.
perfect definition of this type of pacifism.
On
the other hand, there was another kind
of pacifism which was growing to a considerable volume and embraced all those who believed a rapid peace was possible on it would come about 'without annexation or indemnities'. For a Frenchman this meant: 'What use are Alsace and Lorraine if they are to cost us over
condition
1,000,000 lives?' Opposed to the pacifists were those determined to continue fighting the war to the bitter end, and who were
reason called the 'bitter-enders' (jusqu'au boutistes). Without going into details, it can be said that in 1917 French political circles were divided into these two latter trends. The President of the Republic, Raymond Poincare, a Lorrainer by birth, a dry little man with a harsh voice and an authoritarian little beard, possessing a remarkable analytical intelligence but a
for this
was a resolute opponent of the His powers were limited, but he
cold heart, pacifists.
did possess in any case the power of designating the next Prime Minister in case of a ministerial crisis. Since March wavering Aristide Briand 1917, the had been succeeded by the 75-year-old Alexandre Ribot, a tall, crafty, competent old man and a skilful manipulator of Parliament. His Minister of War was the great mathematician Paul Painleve, an eminent aviation specialist. The 'bitterenders' criticised him for having kept as his Minister of the Interior — the man who controlled the police and consequently kept an eye on trade unionists, pacifist propagandists and strikers — the RadicalSocialist Malvy.
But it was becoming increasingly obvious that Poincare would in the end have to choose between two more eminent men. Should pacifism be triumphant, it would be Joseph Caillaux, a bald-headed monocled man, who was considered by everyone as the man for a quick peace. Caillaux, the Prime Minister in 1911 at the time of the Agadir crisis, had been dismissed from because of a scandal. But he was keen to return to power. On the other hand, should the French office
stiffen up, the strong man of the 'bitterenders' was an old man a year older than Ribot, who was daily harrying Poincare, Ribot. Painleve and Malvy for their lack of energy in his paper L'Homme Enchaine and in the Senatorial War Commission. This man was the 'Tiger', Georges Clemenceau. Poincare approved his ideas but detested him personally. It was only in November 1917 that he felt it indispensable to summon him to power. Who was supporting the pacifists in the spring of 1917? There were, of course, some bourgeois — some because they were secretly sold to the Germans like the journalist Ernest Sudet, others through dis-
.
*
2137
couragement
like
Malvy and a few dozen
deputies. But the essential element of pacifism in France, as likewise in Italy, Russia or Germany, was a faction of the Socialist Party. In 1915, the Socialist Party in France had split into 'majority
Radical
supporters' (bitter-enders supporting the 'Sacred Union' of socialists and bourgeois for the defence of France), and 'minority supporters' who were real pacifists, and sometimes even revolutionary ones. A very quick evaluation of their actions in the spring of 1917 will show the limits of pacifism. Annie Knegel, in her fine book Aux origines du Parti Communiste Frangais, did not hesitate to call the year 1917 'the second defeat of internationalism'. This naturally refers to the Socialist Internationale. Its first defeat came in
August 1914 when
away by the
was
literally swept enthusiasm of the was raising its head it
patriotic
Sacred Union'. It once again in 1917.
Some minority socialincluding some who had gone in 'pilgrimage' to the new Russia, and some trade union leaders, attempted to unleash a great wave of strikes in France. When the Petrograd Soviet and then the Dutch and Scandinavian socialists proposed the holding of a great international socialist congress in Stockholm to discuss peace, the French socialists would have liked to have gone. The Ribot government refused them 'passports for Stockholm'. It had consulted Retain who immediately replied that he could not halt the mutinies if the French socialists were allowed to go to the Stockholm Congress. Of course, strikes did take place in France. There were strikes in January 1917 in the munitions plants and among building workers. For the first time since 1914 a May Day parade was held in Paris followed by a mass meeting of 4, 000 people. But these strikes were connected much more with rising prices (inflated by the Germans' unrestricted submarine campaign) than with political motives. They were of small importance compared with the 1917 strikes in Great Britain and Germany. A more serious strike was the June 1917 strike of the miners of the Loire basin, at Saint-Etienne and Firminy. Cavalry regiments had to be sent there, but work ists,
was resumed
fairly quickly.
Naturally, there were links between the fighting soldiers and the rear areas, for postal censorship could filter only some of their letters. The General Staff made a very valuable study of opinion based on these letters. Jean Noel Jeanneney, in an unpublished book, has shown the evolution of their content very well. From March 10 to April 16, 1917, there was, he says, 'a rise of hope'. The Germans operated a strategic withdrawal in March which encouraged many illusions. 'Events are precipitating. How marvellous!' 'Let us hope we are entering the first phase of the end.' The Russian Revolution was well received. 'Victory is smiling on our arms', wrote a soldier on March 27, and another one on March 20: 'If you could .
.
.
Top: Hiding his claws, 'The Tiger', Georges Clemenceau, the new Prime Minister and proponent of war to the bitter end', reassures Petain, the newly appointed C-in-C of the shaken French armies. Right: By 1917 French morale was at breaking point; the bloodbath of the Nivelle offensive was the last straw for many of the troops in the front line
2138
see the enthusiasm of the troops, it's extraordinary; there are entire regiments who ask to leave immediately to go and shove a bayonet in the ribs of the Boches.' Then the United States came into the war and there was another onrush of happiness. And rumours flew about a decisive assault. This assault which aroused the greatest
words recur again and again: fratricidal struggle, useless hecatombs, frightening
apprehensions at the highest levels (Petain was very hostile to the Nivelle plan) was welcomed with exultation by the soldiers. This was 'the final blow which must end the war victoriously' 'We shall be home in time for the harvest.'
every
.
.
.
A
'formidable balls-up' Morale changed completely following the
failure of April 16. It took the soldiers several days to become aware of this. But by then it was stark tragedy. 'The famous offensive,
which they had announced
to
the sound of big drums, had misfired once again.' It was, said the soldiers, 'a complete fiasco', or in soldiers' language 'a pretty pill', a 'great shambles', a 'formidable balls-up'. Then came the recriminations: 'Nivelle got a lot of men killed for nothing.' The soldiers started to write about 'butchers', and 'drinkers of blood'. Only the British and their leaders continued to be admired, and more so than in the past. Incidentally this was the zenith of the popularity of the British army among the French soldiers. From complaints and lamentations, the soldiers moved on to revolt. This can be found also in the letters from soldiers belonging to divisions which did not take part in the mutinies: 'The butchers who command us made us stage this attack without any artillery preparation.' They blamed the incompetence of the army leaders and the obsolete methods of the General Staff. 'Naturally there was not a single great leader in the front line to show himself to the men.' Why didn't they imitate the British 'who have been able to adapt themselves much more easily to the war and choose young leaders, leaders who only yesterday were officials and businessmen? Our own general stalls are too steeped in the prewar mentality.' It was in this atmosphere that 'internationalist' ideas appeared. In fact, they were exceedingly rare, and the number of leaflets sent from the rear areas in letters did not show any increase. If there was an actual plot, it is not the intercepted correspondence that proves it. Possibly there was an organisation distributing leaflets in railway stations, but not on a big scale. Let us quote, however, to give an example, some excerpts from letters: 'The Boches are not nasty. No doubt they too have had a basinful.' There were also some signs of fraternisation between French and German infantrymen, but these were few. The soldiers referred to the Stockholm conference, but were often unaware that this was a socialist proposal. 'Let us pray God', one of them naively wrote, 'the soldiers are discussing Stockholm. Most of them do not know exactly what it is all about, but consider this word as something new, as a providential lifeline, a chance of peace. One wretched poilu met me in the street just now and said: "Well, old man! They're going to Stockholm".' In June one censor noticed in 'a certain number of letters an occult and organised propaganda'. Indeed in various letters originating from different places, the same
butchery, fighting for the benefit of profiteers who are enriching themselves. Here are a few examples: 'The capitalists are the cause of this war, because they could see the workers were too happy. That is what the rich didn't like, that is why they tried
way
to bring about the
war and they
finally succeeded; getting the entire working class killed off, that is what our deputies
our war aims.' And again: 'I believe that Poincare, King George and all the others reached an understanding with Kaiser Wilhelm to get us knocked off.' A handwritten notice posted on a wall in Beauvais on June 10/11 states: 'You must have noticed that they are proceeding to the destruction of the worker. What should we do to thwart this plan? Not much: a revolution successfully carried out.' But what prevented a real solidarity with the workers of the interior was their feeling of profound injustice. The workers lived at home with their families and were earning good wages, not risking anything, while the wretched soldiers were living in misery, receiving insignificant pay and were constantly being killed. And this is the conclusion reached by one soldier: 'We had hoped for a moment that the workers' strikes would have reached the proportions we were expecting but the workers were content with a small rise in wages, and now they are all back at work. The massacre will continue.' From this survey of opinion by the postal censorship, and from the other documents available, it is possible to draw the conclusion that pacifist and revolutionary propaganda played a rather secondary role in the army mutinies. Curiously enough, apart from a few socialist writers, those who attributed the mutinies to a revolutionary plot were the generals. For them, this was a way to conceal — or to conceal from themselves — their own enormous responsibilities. 'This is a general organisation, originating in Paris under the instigation of the Germans and endeavouring to deliver France to the enemy' (General Franchet d'Esperey, Commander of the Northern Army Group); 'The origin of these movements increasingly appears to lie in secret organisations operating in the rear' (General de Castelnau, Commander of the Eastern Army Group); the movement is 'basically of revolutionary origin' (General Fayolle, Commander of the Centre Army Group); 'The ringleaders seem in fact to be men returning from leave. They have practically certainly been worked upon by a secret organisation' (General Passaga, Commander of the XXXII Corps); 'The centre of the pestilence lies in Paris which the bulk of troops on leave have to cross. Centres of indiscipline are being created by incitements coming from the outside' (General Micheler, Commander of Fifth Army). Such quotations could be multiplied tenfold. Now, against this interpretation by the generals, there is that of the troops' officers. It must be pointed out here that practically no officer ever took part in the mutinies. The officers in general attributed the mutinies to the lassitude, the lack of leave and the discomfort of the troops. They have pointed out that, apart from one exception, the mutinies never occurred on the front line. 'They say: we shall let the call
Boches pass through. But this
isn't true',
said the soldiers of the 167th Infantry Division. 'When we see them attacking, we shall fire straight into them. We shall hold the trenches. But we shall not take part in attacks doomed in advance and hopeless.' Of course there were here and there among the troops some trade union militants, but much more numerous were workers and clerks who remembered
the prewar strikes. The mutineers were referring to themselves as 'strikers' and not as revolutionaries. They adapted the procedures used in strikes: meetings, parades, red flags, singing of the Internationale, passing motions. The soldiers who had a deep feeling of mutual solidarity sometimes allowed themselves to be temporarily dragged off by comrades from another unit. Had the disorders spread it is probable that a revolutionary organisation would have been created, with elected councils or Soviets, soldiers' delegates and so on. The SRA (the army intelligence section) concluded as follows: 'The army has no desire to stage a revolution, but if it believes one is being organised it will wish to take part in it.'
The saviour of France Therefore, without disregarding entirely the part played by a few militants, we believe that the principal explanation of the mutinies is that it was a spontaneous revolt of despair. To accept the risk of being killed is very difficult, but history proves that one does it for what one believes to be a great cause. On the other hand, one does not want to sacrifice oneself for nothing. At Verdun in 1916. the French soldiers believed that the country had to be defended at all costs. At the Chemin des Dames in 1917, they accepted the sacrifice in order to gain final victory, as they
had been too easily led
to believe.
But
in
Ma\ June 1917 they did not want to die for nothing. This was perfectly well understood by the man who, being appointed Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North-East, was task of stopping the Philippe Petain.
Few
given the painful mutinies: General
historical figures
cussed as has Petain.
have been so disDuring the First
World War this unknown colonel, close to retiring age in 1914. had been very quickly picked out bj Joffre and had rapidly climbed in rank. Appointed in February 1916 Commander of the Armies at Verdun, and then of the Centre Group of Armies which included Verdun, he hail become one oi the very top leaders. His appointment to Verdun literally galvanised the soldiers. When Joffre was dismissed from his com-
mand, the government had a choice between Nivelle — who promised a rapid victory — and Petain the tomporiser. The choice of Nivelle proved unfortunate and finally explains the mutinies. Petain replaced him on May 15. 'I am waiting for the Americans and the tanks.' he said. It is beyond doubt that in 1917 his role was decisive, and we can only endorse the title chosen by Spears for his book: Two men who saved France: Petain. de Gaulle. is It interesting to compare Petain's action when quelling the mutinies in the French army, with that of General Cadorna when he in his turn had to quell the mutinies which broke out in the Italian army in the summer of 1917 Cadorna
2139
relied only on repression, forcing those of his subordinates who had been indulgent to rescind their own decisions and to have many soldiers shot. Petain, on the other hand, analysing the whole outbreak as a reaction of despair by the soldiers, sought to moderate repression and to practise what Pedroncini calls the healing of the huge sick army. His note dated June 18, 1917, expressed his views very clearly. 'The first objective
was to obtain an immediate repression in order to prevent the agitation from spreading.' But 'it is not enough to obtain an immediate repression. We must prevent the prolongation of disorders by modifying the environment in which these malevolent germs found a favourable terrain. I shall maintain this repression with firmness, but without forgetting that it is being applied to soldiers who for three years now have been with us in the trenches and who are "our" soldiers.' On the repression, many legends have circulated, especially since the censorship had imposed the most absolute silence. Not only were the civilians not to know that there had been mutinies, death sentences and executions, but furthermore the segregation between units was to be absolute to avoid contagion. This led to the bandying about of the most varied and imaginary figures: 2,700 mutineers shot, said the historian Albert Mathiez in 1920 (whereas we have seen that throughout the entire war executions were between five and six times fewer); 528 said the magazine Le Crapouillot in August 1934. The rumour circulated that the artillery was given the job of massacring the mutineers. This is utterly baseless.
Some
officers
would have
desired a more brutal repression and demanded the restoration of 'courts-martial' whose sentences would be executed immediately, without any automatic appeal to the President of the Republic. Petain was absolutely against this. There has also been talk of summary executions without trial. During the mutinies themselves, the only case when mutineers were fired on was that of the 42nd Infantry Regiment, on June 6, 1917, when the Colonel ordered a machine gun to fire on a column of demonstrators from another regiment. There was one man killed and three wounded. It will be noted that the area situated to the south of the Chemin des Dames was the centre of the mutinies, between Soissons in the west and Rheims in the east. To the northwest of Soissons, in the area where the French troops connected with the British front, they were practically nonexistent. In the east, in Champagne and in Lorraine, they were sporadic
and tardy.
The Army Historical Service has calnumber of death sentences as
culated the
being 55, of which seven were executed immediately by order of Petain. Guy Pedroncini, in an exhaustive study of the court-martial documents, reached the following conclusions. There were during the period under examination between 24,000 and 25,000 sentences pronounced, a great number of which related to cases of little importance (drunkenness, insults or assaults on superiors, minor refusals of obedience: refusals to sweep up, to take horses to the trough, simple abandonments of one's post: for instance leaving one's cantonment to go boozing in the neighbouring town). Eliminating these
2140
and those which, being purely individual ones, could not be connected with the mutinies, Pedroncini achieved a total of 2,873 sentences pronounced (with a margin of error of between 3% and 6%). Out of these, he counted 1,381 heavy sentences (over five years' hard labour) and 1,492 less heavy sentences. Out of the 2,873 there were 629 death sentences (one cavalry corporal, 30 corporals, 3 sergeants and 542
businessmen — but practically none to the bourgeoisie. Out of 450 sentenced to death, there were two artists, one notary's clerk, two students and one schoolteacher. All the others were manual workers or clerks. The
privates), of which 75 were inflicted for deeds committed prior to April 16, 1917, 68 for
great maiority were peasants, which corresponds perfectly with the composition of the French army in general. Measures of recovery were taken simultaneously with those of repression. The first one was to put a stop to all offensives. While Sir Douglas Haig, at last rid of the French control which he resented, en-
cases,
deeds committed between April 16 and 30, 1917, 42 for deeds committed between May 1 and 15, 428 for the period May 15, 191^ to the end of January 1918. Nearly all these sentences were pronounced rapidly (half within 20 days following the crimes).
How many executions? What
proportion of those
condemned
to
death was actually executed? Each death sentence had to be notified to the Grand Quartier-General (GQG) by telegram. GQG would immediately transmit it to the President of the Republic who had the right to reprieve. However, on June 8, the government allowed by decree 'should the necessities of discipline require an immediate penalty' that a death sentence need not be submitted to the President of the
Republic and immediate execution could be proceeded with. It appears that Painleve exerted heavy pressure on Petain to urge him to be indulgent. The right of immediate execution accorded to Petain on June 8 was applied by him in seven cases. As for Poincare, he advocated a certain firmness and in all cases he was hostile to intervention by political personalities in favour of the condemned. The decree of June 8 was cancelled on July 13. Finally, Pedroncini counts 50 ascertained executions (50 privates and two corporals — but one private committed suicide before he faced the firing squad and Corporal Moulin escaped and was still alive after the Second World War). Those cases are certain. There are 23 doubtful cases to be added (ten probable executions, eight possibles, five very doubtful) which would make a total of 75. The 23 doubtful cases were all sentenced after July 1. If we take the absolutely certain cases, there were 43 actual executions for the period of indiscipline: 27 for acts of collective indiscipline, 16 foi individual acts. To this would be added five executions for individual acts prior to April 16, and two executions, one for murder, and the other one for rape followed by murder, that make a total of 50. Since mutinies are collective events, we can see that the repression was in the end extremely restricted as far as death sentences were concerned. As for the other sentences, these ranged from hard labour for hie (23 cases) to penalties of a year in gaol or less. The courtsmartial often used 'suspended' sentences — the penalty would be applied only if the guilty man committed another crime. Pedroncini has made an extremely detailed study of the ages, family situations, geographical origins and professions of those sentenced. This study strikingly shows: that while certain 'bad eggs' (men with a record, may have played a part, most were good soldiers; that a wide cross-section of the soldiers, both single and married, young but also relatively old, were involved in the mutinies; that the mutineers belonged to all the lower social classes — peasants, workers, clerks, small
percentages are about the same for all the other sentences: out of 2,873 there were eight students, four notary's clerks, one lawyer, three schoolteachers, one regular
army
officer
and one dramatic
artist.
The
deavoured to realise his dream — which was to break through not towards the east but towards the north, towards Ostend — the French army practically stopped operating. Petain did not want any useless large scale offensive. His intention was, however, to preserve offensive-mindedness by launching a limited and spectacular offensive as soon as he considered the army had recovered. In any case, the result was that for the French army the year 1917 was, relatively, the least bloody of the whole war: an average of 10,000 killed per month, compared with 21,000 killed per month in 1916 and 1918, and 30,000 killed every month in 1915, and especially the bloodbath of 1914; nearly 400,000 killed in a bare five months. He endeavoured to improve the living conditions of the soldiers. The most urgenc was the problem of leave. In principle, each man was entitled to seven days every four months. But practice did not match theory. Often, the High Command reduced the number of soldiers on leave to a low percentage per unit. One can understand that a soldier who was entitled to a period of leave and instead was retained for an offensive would feel very bitter about his treatment. Petain therefore gave orders to re-establish and enforce the official scale of leave and to have posted up the list of all soldiers given leave every fortnight in order to allow time for complaints to be delivered and prevent injustices or omissions. In November 1917, 88% ot the men expressed themselves satisfied with this. Next came the question of rest. In order to prevent troops from being sent back to the line prematurely, Petain issued strict orders. Furthermore, as certain officers under the pretext of 'keeping the troops up to scratch' used the men's rest periods to make them work, march and drill, a clear instruction was drawn up: 'The troops must be left alone for absolute rest during the time required for them to relax morally and physically (three to four days). Instruction will be resumed subsequently in accordance with a controlled progression designed to avoid boredom and tiredness.' An effort was also made to improve the food. Not only was the ordinary ration much improved, but also 'divisional cooperatives' were created to sell at low cost to the soldiers all the things that civilian traders were selling them at exorbitant prices. Petain endeavoured with less success to fight against drunkenness. The comfort of the cantonments was greatly improved. Massive purchases of beds were made and more spacious army huts were built.
An
effort
was
also
made
to
improve
the trenches which had a justified repu-
'Despairing peasants, not revolutionaries' tation of being less comfortable than those of the Germans and the British. Finally a propaganda effort was also launched, somewhat similar to the one which Ludendorff created at the same time in the German army and which he called 'patriotic teaching'. Petain strove to 'give the army once again the feeling that it was a single organism co-operating for a common purpose.' As early as July 21, the confidential bulletin of the Special Services Bureau made this reassuring observation: 'The sense of discipline is returning. The
GQG
A
painting by Pierre Bonnard of the depressed war-weary soldiers who after the abortive Nivelle offensive were refusing to launch attacks against the German lines. They were
not pacifists, or revolutionaries, but they had been pushed into mutiny by despair
average opinion among the troops is that at the point we have reached it would be absurd to give up. But the officers must not treat their men with haughtiness.'
Extraordinary popularity Petain, who already had the reputation of being careful of his soldiers' lives, also acquired that of the man who keeps his promises. His extraordinary popularity in France dated from 1917, even more than
from Verdun. He revealed himself to be an acute psychologist and an effective man of action. In the disarray of 1917, what better could have been desired? In conclusion, it is necessary to emphasise once again the weakness of the movement. Some divisions were utterly untouched by the movement. The 42nd Infantry Division, famous for its part in the Battle of the Marne in Foch's army, more
famous still for its heroism at Verdun from which it obtained its nickname 'the division of Verdun' of which its members were so proud,
did
not
budge.
•
Esprit
de corps
triumphed over its sufferings. But in all those divisions affected by the mutinies, the vast majority of soldiers were hostile to the mutinies. And finally, apart from one exception, the French soldiers did not start fighting one another. The mutiny appeared at the moment of the deepest despair, but it had evaporated within a few weeks because, when faced with the choice, the overwhelming majority of the soldiers chose the nation rather than the revolution.
Further Reading Fayolle, Marshal, The Secret Diaries of the Great War (Paris 1964) Nobecourt, The Infantrymen of the Chemin des
Dames (Paris 1965) Pedroncini, G., The Mutinies of 191 7 (Paris 1967) Ribot, A., Diary of Alexandre Ribot and unpublished conferences 1914-1922 (Paris 1936) Serrigny, Thirty Years with Petain (Paris 1959) Watt. R. M., Dare Call It Treason (London 1964)
V
2141
;
RUSSIA'S FORCES IN FRANCE 'REVOLUTION' ON
THE WESTERN FRONT
In April 1917 Russian troops, no snow on their boots, were sent to fight on the French front. Difficulties arose from the very beginning, and soon they were engaged in a miniature Russian Revolution on French soil. Count Nikolai Tolstoy. Below left and right: The Russians are welcomed to Marseilles. Bottom: They arrive at the front in time for Nivelle's offensive
In the spring of 1916, at the height of the horrifying campaign of Verdun, news was suddenly spread among the French public that seemed to many to herald the complete reversal of the tide. France's reserves
manpower, strained to breaking point by Falkenhayn's massive offensive, appeared about to be replenished from a source reputed to be virtually limitless. In April of that year 30,000 Russian disembarked at Marseille, La troops Rochelle-Pallice and Brest. They formed the first contingent of what the Russian General Staff hoped to increase to a complement of 40,000 men a month, ready to serve on the Western Front. Basically, the idea was to use Russian manpower to better effect in the west. The Russian military machine was not able to draw on anything like the material resources in arms and supplies necessary to maintain its vast army over a prolonged campaign. Russia herself was still virtually in the opening throes of her industrial revolution: a revolution that was taking place in the largest of
nation in the world, millions of whose inhabitants were still illiterate peasants. France, on the other hand, appeared to have the arms, the communications system and the military organisation to absorb Russia's stock of surplus manhood. The answer seemed simple: transport Russian troops to France, where they could be properly equipped and organised. Russia had, after all, deliberately sacrificed thousands of her troops to divert vital German divisions at the time of the battle of the Marne, and it seemed only a logical step to employ the troops in France itself against the common enemy. These were the arguments employed by
Paul Doumer, the French emissary at Petrograd; to such effect that, in December 1915, the Tsar agreed to have despatched a first expeditionary force. This in itself was no mean task, for though two brigades sailed from Archangel to Brest, a third travelled from Moscow the whole length of Asiatic Russia, embarked in Manchuria on board the French transports LatoucheTreville and Himalaya, and then sailed for some two months the 20,000 miles back around the world to France. On April 20, 1916, the first Russian troops disembarked at Marseille. The inhabitants of Marseille were almost delirious with joy, and the moujiks' sunburned faces beamed as the inhabitants cheered, children threw flowers and waved flags, and girls rushed to embrace the new saviours of France. The news of the arrival of the Russian troops at Marseille and the other ports spread fast, and when they took part in the Bastille Day parade in Paris that year, the watching crowds could scarcely contain their delight. These Russian reinforcements, whose very existence few now remember, received a greater welcome even than the Americans some two years later. Altogether, four Russian brigades had been sent to Fi ance. Of these, the 2nd and 4th Brigades were sent on to Salonika for the Macedonian Front. There remained the 1st and 3rd Brigades, led respectively
by Generals Lochvitsky and Maroushevsky; the whole force being commanded by General Palitzine, commander of all the Russian troops in France. Each brigade in 1916 comprised nearly 10,000 men. Shortly after its arrival, the Russian contingent was ordered to the front, where
they soon engaged the Germans in the Champagne. Their bravery was unquestioned, but difficulties arose almost from the beginning. The Russians did not always get on with their French allies and suffered from a general feeling of neglect
was difficult for them to news or parcels from home, and there was a suspicion among the rankand-file that the French regarded their Slav allies as cannon fodder, and accordingly meted out to them inferior facilities and
isolation. It
receive
in the
way of
quarters, medical services
and leave opportunities. There was little justification for this view, which resulted largely from ignorance and a clash of national temperaments; but this ill-feeling was aggravated rather than improved by opportunities for the Russians to go on leave to Paris and the Cote d'Azur. There they not only became to some extent corrupted by the sight of a vie en rose unknown at home in the Motherland, but, far
more dangerously, they now come in with exiled compatriots, whose
contact
views
varied from bourgeois republican
to fanatical Bolshevik. Defeatists, agitators and propagandists found the disillusioned Russian troops malleable mat-
and by January 1917 the majority of the Russian troops in France openly expressed the belief that they had been sold to France in exchange for French arms. erial,
was
precisely at this inflammable time March Revolution took place in Russia and the Tsar was forced to abdicate. The new Prime Minister, Kerensky. was It
that the
to prosecute the war on the Allied side, but Russia was clearly sliding into anarchy and revolution: a tendency that was if anything aggravated among the
determined
soil, exposed as they were Bolshevik propaganda from Paris, and suffering from the real or imagined grievances of their peculiar situation. On every side the pressures were intensified. Thus the officers, who held their commissions from the Tsar, were more or less discredited in the eyes of the troops. Although they took the oath to the new
troops on French to
Provisional Government, many were rightly or wrongly suspected of monarchist leanings. Their disciplinary powers were reduced, and the respect in which they were held was greatly diminished. From ensuing events, it seems too that many of them were of poor quality, and the French High Command felt it necessary to add to
numbers of French officers in Russian uniforms. The Russian commander, Palitzine, was replaced by General Zankeievitch; an officer equally patriotic and brave, but equally incapable of handtheir ranks
ling the increasing disintegration of the units under his command.
The troops themselves were greatly disturbed by the news they received, more or less garbled, from Russia. The land reforms of the Kerensky government left many of the simpler souls imagining that, forgotten in France, they would not receive their share of the land now being reapportioned. And it is easy to sympathise with their desire to return and play some part in the critical events now deciding the future of their homeland. All these currents were seething at the very time of the appallingly misguided offensive launched by Nivelle in mid-April, in which the small Russian force suffered 6,000 casualties. Small wonder that the troops became at first disorderly and truculent, and soon after openly mutinous. On May Day, 1917, the Russian army in France paraded under red flags to celebrate international socialism, and by that time the officers had lost control of the men. The failure of the Nivelle attack had been the last straw for many of the war-weary French troops, and the far more dangerous mutinies of the army were beginning to spread. The rebellious Russian brigades provided a focal point and example for this seditious spirit, and it became clear to General Castelnau, who commanded the region in which the Russian troops lay, that this dangerous Allied force must be removed from the military zone before their influence spread. Accordingly, the two Russian brigades were put on trains and removed en masse to a large military camp in the department of the Creuse in the heart of rural France. This was the camp of La Courtine, which had been used since 1914 for purposes varying from training machine gunners to confining German officers. So great was the
urgency with which the French regarded the need to remove this dangerous force, that they forgot in their haste to take measures to disarm all or part of the mutinous body on the journey. The long term plan was to return all the troops to Russia, the one point on which they themselves were virtually all agreed. But there were important obstacles in the path of so clear a course. Though the French were only too anxious to see the last of their troublesome allies, the Russian government was far from being as keen to receive a large body of revolutionary troops at so critical a time. But such questions were in any case largely academic, as con-
2144
ditions at sea could not allow the return of a large force in the foreseeable future. The result was that the camp at La Courtine remained, understandably in view of the terrible crisis at the front, largely forgotten. It was not, however, neglected in any material sense, and sup-
and other facilities were maintained admirably. This, however, in no way served to allay the troubles racking the men massed there. Their behaviour was by all accounts excellent as regards the civilian inhabitants, and the struggle that soon erupted was almost entirely a Russian affair, reflecting accurately enough the situation in Russia itself. Of the two brigades, the 1st was soon found to be greatly affected by Bolshevik doctrines while the 3rd remained loyal to the Provisional Government. Great illfeeling developed between the two, and finally the loyal 3rd Brigade marched out of La Courtine and set up camp some miles north at Felletin. There they took measures 8 against an attack by the 1st Brigade. | Meanwhile the 1st Brigade had expelled J its officers and set up a revolutionary com- w mittee to run its affairs. Two delegates from the Russian government, Rapp and Svatikov, were received enthusiastically by the 3rd, but rebuffed and derided by the 1st at La Courtine. As has been seen, the Provisional Government was not anxious to receive the Bolshevik contingent at home, and after fruitless efforts on both sides the French ambassador in Petrograd was told that the mutineers must be suppressed in plies
France itself. The French authorities too were worried that the continued immunity of the rebels was becoming more widely known and might yet spread the example they dreaded. General Comby began to draw a ring of steel around La Courtine. The advanced circle consisted of some 3,000 loyal Russian troops (largely drawn from the 3rd Brigade, now removed to Bordeaux), accompanied by a battery of
75-mm guns. Beyond these was a reserve force of French troops, to be used only in an emergency. On September 14, 1917 a final ultimatum was sent to, and rejected by, the Bolshevik J leader, Globa. On the 16th, the 75s opened £ fire, firstly on the perimeter and then, after o. long intervals to allow the rebels time to m change their minds, onto the fortified camp buildings. Resistance could not last long, and many rebels were killed or surrendered. Only at the end was there fierce fighting involved, when Globa and a hard core of 500 were driven from their positions and forced to surrender. Only Russian troops were involved in the fighting, and the awkward moment had passed. The ringleaders were shot, and most of the others eventually sent to work in the penal battalions in French Africa. six
COUNT NIKOLAI TOLSTOY was Wellington and Sandhurst, has an
and
History
Political
Dublin and wrote his Survival
in
Britain'.
His
monographs
include
a
journals,
and a novel, The Founding
of
School. His great-grandfather
famous
writer,
in
at
Modern
Theory from Trinity College, PhD thesis on 'Celtic Pagan
Dark-Age
number
educated
MA
Leo Tolstoy.
was
publications in
learned
of Evil
Hold
the cousin of the
First column. Top: The first 40,000 of the many more
thousands that it was hoped would reinforce France's waning manpower reserves are welcomed to Marseilles. Centre: French cooks distribute ratatouille to
the newly arrived Russians. Bottom: The Russians' C-in-C, General Palitzine, reads a despatch from Russia's new Provisional
Government
calling
on
all
troops to continue the war Second column. Top: Russian troops march
through Paris for the •La Rochelle-Pallice
From Moscow
& Manchuria
•La Courtine 2 Brigades moved here when they became mutinous
RUSSIAN BRIGADES LANDING IN FRANCE .Marseille
FRONT LINE April
20
from
Moscow
& Manchuria
first
time since the fall of Napoleon. Centre: The Russians in France. BottomMarching past the flags of the Russian Revolution. Third column. Top: In action in the Champagne, 1916. Centre: Russian ballads on the French front. Bottom: Suffering from a general feeling of neglect and isolation, they felt they were mere cannon fodder
time to use tanks as a substitute for artillery, an Australian division struck against Bullecourt on April 12 only to be cut down in swathes. Yet the push was prolonged to help the mutinying French, and as the losses mounted the Australians' confidence in the British command began to crack. Michael Dewar. Below: Machine gun fire, intended to cover the noise of the tanks' approach. Opposite: The two battles of Bullecourt
Attempting
for the first
During the latter days of February 1917 the Germans, fearing an attack on the salient into which the Somme battle of the previous winter had bent their line, carried out a planned withdrawal to a position chosen by themselves, thus enabling them to meet the expected British and French offensives of the spring of 1917 on their own ground. The British advance in the wake of the German withdrawal brought them face to face with the formidable fortifications of the Hindenburg Line not far short of Cambrai, from the village of Bullecourt on the northwest to the village of Harincourt on the south. The British planned to break through the German line at Arras on April 9. In order to assist this attack it was decided that a subsidiary assault should be mounted against the point where the German second line of defence, the so-called DrocourtQueant 'switch', left the Hindenburg Line near Bullecourt. It was upon this second line of defence that the Germans would almost certainly fall back if the British broke through at Arras. Moreover the capture of the junction of the DrocourtQueant 'switch' and the Hindenburg Line would
make
their
position
extremely
precarious.
On March 26 General Sir Hubert Gough, commanding Fifth Army, informed his corps commanders of his intended method of attack. The sector to be seized would be in the neighbourhood of Bullecourt. The village lay in front of the Hindenburg Line, but was included in it by extending
front trench around its eastern, southern and western sides. The 62nd (West Riding) Division, commanded by General Braithwaite, and part of V Corps would strike on the western side of the bastion, and the 4th Australian Division commanded by General Birdwood, and part of I Anzac Corps, on the eastern side. It was decided that the best time for Gough's intervention would be 24 hours after the launching of the main offensive from Arras. The operation was therefore planned to take place at dawn on April 10.
the
reconnaissance that the artillery barrage had not inflicted sufficient damage on the wire along the intended front of attack. Consequently the operation was postponed 12. Meanwhile at dawn on First and Third Armies launched their great offensive at Vimy and Arras respectively. Such was the state of euphoria
until
April
April
9,
engendered by
its
initial
success
decision.
On
April
8,
a Major Watson, com-
manding the 11th Company of D Battalion, the Royal Tank Corps, worked out a plan for a 'surprise concentration' in
A most
extraordinary decision
During the days preceding the offensive Anzac leaders became increasingly
the
apprehensive about the extent of the task On March 31 MajorGeneral White, Birdwood's Chief-of-Staff, wrote: 'Between Queant and Bullecourt the enemy's line forms a re-entrant some 1,500 yards deep. An attack there would be unwise unless Queant were also attacked.' Unless the Queant salient could be removed, both the Australian flanks would be dangerously exposed. However, Australian misgivings were overruled, and it was decided that the fire from Bullecourt could be suppressed by artillery, while that from Queant would be muffled with smoke and other barrages. The inherent difficulties were therefore accepted, reliance being set before their troops.
placed upon artillery and, to a lesser extent, upon tanks, which were to support the attack. On April 7, it became apparent from air
that
Gough now took a most extraordinary
which
his
tanks, massed on a narrow front ahead of the infantry, should 'steal up to the Hindenburg Line without a barrage', their noise being drowned by machine gun fire. As they reached the German trenches, down would come the barrage, under cover of which the infantry would advance and 'sweep through'. The plan sounded simple enough — on paper. Watson's battalion commander was so impressed that he laid the plan in front of Gough, who accepted it almost without question. Birdwood and White were full of doubts, but Gough assured them that the tanks would crush the wire before the infantry arrived at it. With grave misgivings, the Anzac leaders gave way to the army commander's wishes. The attack was planned for the next day, April 10. As it was already afternoon, there was very little time to prepare and plan what was an extremely complex operation. The outline plan was as follows: if the
Hindenburg Line had been abandoned
(as
British line April British attack April 11
2000 yds
British line April 15
German
lines
German counterattack April 15
Limit of
Hendecourt
German advance
Railway lines
220 Div*
BullecdLrt
62 Di
V
,2
Guar
12 Aus Bde
X 4
lEcoust
13 B
Aus
Bd
,15 Br
4 Aus Divl Aus.
Noreui!
,\\«
&p
€
iicourt
^»T At* Bde
X
3
20Bn1 I
ANZAC 10 Bn
Corp s
Louverval
Boursies
\
9 Br
4 Ers Divi DeniVour ivI^o
^V 1
Aus Bde
iavrmcourt.
Hermies
jfk
V
*«c
JtK l
Above: A British work party prepares for 2nd Bullecourt. Below: The morning after the night before- litter around the railway embankment after the preparations for 2nd Bullecourt.
Above: An Australian 18-pounder in action at Bullecourt. Bottom: Behind the front at Bullecourt, Australian signallers lay cables, burying them for protection against shellfire
Gough suspected)
as
to attack along the re-entrant east of Bulle-
Hindenburg Line had not been evacuated. Moreover the breakthrough in Third Army's area was not so imminent as had been previously believed. Birdwood asked for a postponement. This was not granted and at 0025 hours on April 10 the 4th Austra-
it
made
Once they had seized the Hindenburg Line, four of the 12 tanks, followed by an Australian battalion, would turn westwards and subdue Bullecourt. Upon the
court.
arrival of the Australians in Bullecourt,
the
62nd (West Riding) Division would
move forward, occupy the village, and then seize the Hindenburg Line to the west of it. Both divisions would then advance, the 4th Australian Division taking Riencourt, and the 62nd Division taking Hendecourt. Unavoidably the plans for the attack had to
be
made
in great haste.
The
dispositions
were basically those already laid down for the postponed attack. Within the Australian division, the 4th Brigade was to advance on the right and the 12th on the left. As the 4th Brigade was to drive on to it was to attack with four e Riencourt, S battalions, 16th and 14th whose task it I was to seize the Hindenburg Line, and 13th | and 15th who were to pass through Riena court. The 12th Brigade would attack with « only two battalions, the 46th to seize the I first trench of the Hindenburg Line, known
*
Z&&:
.
OG1, and the 48th to seize the second, known as OG2. Within the 62nd Division, the 185th Brigade was to advance on the
would be occupied and to Riencourt. If, on it was still occupied, it would be attacked at dawn. All Watson's tanks would be concentrated on the front of the 4th Australian Division, who were a further advance the other hand,
'.*.
right, the 186th in the centre
on the
and the 187th
left.
Patrols reported late on April 9 that the
lian Divisional Headquarters received final orders to carry out the attack at 0430 hours that morning. The Australians were ready to advance at the appointed hour, but the tanks, which had lost their way in the snow and sleet, were late. Despite the risk involved, the attack was postponed for half an hour. The greater part of two brigades was lying in the open on the start line horribly exposed to German artillery fire. At 0500 hours, when the tanks had still not arrived, the attack was cancelled. The troops were extricated just before dawn. Later the same day Gough informed his corps commanders that he intended to mount the attack with tanks at 0430 hours the next morning. The plan remained the same except that the Australian commanders decided that the infantry should advance 15 minutes after the tanks.
The Australian infantry was again in position on time, but the tanks were late, having suffered mechanical troubles during their approach march. The machine gun fire intended to cover the noise of their approach did not materialise. Thus, when some of the tanks eventually arrived, their presence was painfully obvious. In the 4th Brigade's sector on the right, only three of the six tanks were in position at 0430 hours, the rest either having broken down or lost their way. At 0445 hours the 4th Brigade moved
off. At 0500 hours its advance was detected by the Germans in the Hindenburg Line, and the possibility so feared by the Australian commanders occurred. The 4th Brigade was facing intense machine gun fire along insufficiently
broken wire entanglements without a single tank to clear a passage. But, despite heavy casualties, the obstacle was negotiated and OG1 and the support line OG2, which ran roughly parallel 170 yards away, were taken. Very quickly the whole of the 4th Brigade's objective in the Hindenburg Line was captured. None of the three tanks
which were to have seized this gap had reached it, though one was now floundering about in the wire. German machine gunners in Riencourt now forced the 4th Brigade to shelter in the trenches of the Hindenburg Line. Officers of the 13th and
1
who had reached OG2 any attempt to continue the advance would be madness. Therefore the decision was taken to hold on, and both OG1 and OG2 were duly blocked on the right. At 0516 hours a message was sent 15th
Battalions
realised that
through by telephone reporting that both had been taken.
objectives
The
failure of the tanks The narrative must now turn
to the 12th Brigade on the left of the attack. The tanks, as with the 4th Brigade, were late on the start line. Owing to a misinterpretation of orders, which clearly stated that the infantry was to advance at 0445 hours irrespective of whether or not the tanks had reached the Hindenburg Line, the brigade waited for the tanks and so did not eventually leave their start line until 0515 hours. Even then the tanks had still not reached the Hindenburg Line, and, what was more serious, the artillery barrage had ceased as planned at 0500 hours. As the troops moved, dawn began to break. Dependence upon the tanks had fatally delayed the start, and then prevented the protection of the naked flank. As the 12th Brigade reached the wire their heaviest loss occurred, chiefly from German machine gunners firing in enfilade from Bullecourt. However, the obstacle was negotiated and OG1 and OG2 were seized after much hard fighting. The Germans were thicker on the flanks and counterattacked immediately. A sharp bombing struggle ensued. By 0700 hours the Australian division
had seized practically its whole objective in the Hindenburg Line, and the leaders on the spot gave up any idea of further advance and made preparations to hold the captured positions. Both brigades decided they could hold the line if bombs and ammuntion could be sent forward. The obvious course at this stage would have been to call for the barrage already arranged in the event of a failure to advance beyond the Hindenburg Line. This was so designed as to lay a curtain of shell fire on the flanks and in front of the captured position, so as to prevent any German counterattack. The signal for this barrage was given no less than 17 times during the morning by Captain Murray, an officer in 12th Brigade, but no answering barrage fell. The reason for this disastrous blunder was that the news reaching all headquarters from division upwards was diametrically opposed to what was actually happening. The reports from the Hindenburg Line describing the failure of the tanks and the curtailment of the attack had not yet been received. The telephone lines had been cut soon after the message describing the capture of OG1 and OG2 but before the decision not to advanee any further had been taken. In these circumstances, with everything apparently going well, and tanks and infantry moving into Bullecourt and beyond Riencourt, the staffs of division and corps refused to put down the barrage immediately in front of the Hindenburg Line for fear of causing casualties to the Australian troops who were supposed to be beyond the Hindenburg Line. Queant was still screened by smoke, but Bullecourt, Riencourt, and Hendecourt, all seething with German troops, were not hit by a single shell. By 0930 hours, the two brigade commanders, Brand and Robertson, at last realised the true position, that only the Hindenburg Line was held, that ammuni-
2150
and bombs were desperately needed, and, more important than anything else, artillery support was vital. But artillery observers still insisted that they could see tanks and Australian troops beyond the Hindenburg Line, and that they dare not shatter these with fire. On the matter being referred to him, General Birdwood supported this decision. Finally, at 1100 hours the truth was grasped as far back as Divisional Headquarters, but by this time it was too late. At about 1000 the Germans had started a heavy counterattack from all directions. Among the Australians, amtion
munition was critically short, and shells continued to burst uselessly on the distant horizon. It became obvious to the troops in OG1 and OG2 that, without a further supply of bombs, they could not hope to hold out until dusk. At 1020 hours, the stiuggle became desperate. The Germans, troops of the 26th Reserve (Wiirttemberg) Division, were bombing their way down OG1 and OG2 from both flanks and also from the central road. If the Australians were to avoid destruction or capture they must withdraw, and officers gave the order to this effect, the troops making their way, as best they could, back to the old Australian front. German machine gunners swept the open ground and casualties were high. Shortly after 1100 hours a barrage was laid on Bullecourt, and at about 1145 hours the artillery at last opened up on the Hindenburg Line opposite the whole of the 4th Australian Division's front. The barrage was not in time to prevent grievous loss in the first stage of the withdrawal, but greatly assisted in subsequent stages.
Gross blunders in planning Apart from the 48th Battalion, who managed to hold out alone until 1225 hours on the left of the central road in OG2, the majority of the position had been rewon by the Germans by 1145 hours. After the orderly withdrawal of the 48th Battalion, the wounded were collected by both sides under the cover of the Red Cross flag, and this truce lasted until 1800 hours. So ended the First Battle of Bullecourt. The six and a half battalions and accompanying units of the 4th Division engaged lost over 3,000
and men, of whom 28 officers and 1,142 men were captured. The casualties in the accompanying tanks amounted to 52 killed, wounded or missing out of a total of 103 officers and men taking part. As for their tanks, their carcasses were to be seen motionless and burning all over the battlefield. None, except for one which had entered Bullecourt, had breached the Hindenburg Line. The 4th Australian Division had been employed in an experiment of extreme rashness, and one which had failed with shocking loss. The errors at battalion level were minor compared to the gross blunders of the general, plan. Gough's tactics at Bullecourt are indefensible. His general conception of assisting Third Army by a stroke at the German army's exposed flank and rear was sound, providing a practicable means of doing this could be found. Instead he attempted a deep penetration on a narrow front along a deep re-entrant. He adopted, on the spur of the moment, a plan devised by an inexperienced and junior officer of an experimental arm. Finally, after the fiasco of the tanks on April 10, he insisted on repeating- the identical operation the next day. The plan had been based officers
upon a gross overestimate of the capabilities of the tanks at that time. The historians of the German regiments involved, the 123rd and 124th, both of the 26th Reserve (Wiirttemberg) Division, admit that when the tanks first appeared at Bullecourt, they had a strong morale effect on the troops, but the fright soon passed when it was discovered that these apparently invincible machines were so vulnerable. The derelict wrecks of the tanks were inspected in detail by the Germans after the battle, and improved methods of defence against tanks evolved as a result of this unique opportunity. The scores of holes made by German armour-piercing bullets were noted with interest. Nevertheless the tanks had helped the Australians by attracting much of the fire that would otherwise have been directed at the infantry. Any criticism of the 62nd Division for not coming to the aid of the 4th Division is illfounded. Their orders stated that they were not to advance into Bullecourt until it had been taken by the Australians. Moreover, it would have been madness to send unprotected infantry, without tanks and in broad daylight, across the open ground towards a well prepared enemy in the dugouts of Bullecourt. The useless sacrifice of the 62nd Division would in no way have helped the 4th Australian Division. After First Bullecourt the 4th Division were taken out of the line for a well earned rest. The 1st Division, who were in the line in the area of Lagnicourt a few miles to the south of Bullecourt, became involved in the German counterstroke. On April 15 the Germans launched a major attack with four divisions along a front of 13,000 yards. This was defeated by the 1st Division who organised an extremely successful defence in depth, and then counterattacked, restoring the line to its former position. On April 16 Nivelle launched his attack at Chemin des Dames. The failure of this attack convinced the Allies that future attacks during 1917 must have limited objectives within the range of the mass of supporting artillery. Bearing these principles in mind, the British planned an offensive involving 14 divisions of First, Third and Fifth Armies. If it succeeded, the Germans must fall back on the Drocourt-Queant 'switch'. On the extreme right of the attack, Gough decided to repeat his attempt to thrust through the Hindenburg Line at Bullecourt. May 3 was chosen as the date for the attack. This attack differed from that of April 1 in that the Australians would not be attacking alone. Not only would the 62nd Division advance through Bullecourt, but the attack would extend along the whole British front to Vimy Ridge. Secondly, the attack would be made with massive artillery support. Thus in the weeks preceding May 3 Bullecourt, Hendecourt and Riencourt were reduced to rubble and the greater part of the wire entanglements was gradually blown to bits. The first objective both for the 2nd Australian Division, which had taken over from the 4th on April 14, and for the 62nd Division, attacking the village and the German line west of it, was the two Hindenburg trenches, OG1 and OG2. The second objective was the FontaineMoulin Sans Souci road, a further advance of 200/700 yards for the Australians, and 700/1,200 yards for the British. The third phase was to be an attack upon Hendecourt by the 62nd Division and upon Riencourt
An experiment of extreme rashness which failed with
shocking loss
Below: A formidable German pillbox
-
•
B
at
Gough's overestimate of the ability of tanks to knock out German machine gun nests was a major cause of the failure of 1st Bullecourt. Bottom: The Hindenburg Line near Bullecourt, showing the first, second and third line trenches with the communications system Bullecourt.
.jjjjfrjifcjf-
V
-**
-**&•
3£%
>-t3Pl
J*"*\
S^^^ZmII -**-
.
--—»
.^JetJicourr.
Above: The crew of a Mark IV tank: 1 Commander. 2 Gearsman. 3 6pounder gunner. 4 Lewis machine gunner (and loader for 6-pounder). 5 and 6 Brakesmen. 7 Lewis machine gunner (and loader for 6- pounder). 8 6-pounder gunner Moving over rough ground without suspension or any means of shock absorption, and at a maximum speed of 3.5 mph, tank crews were subjected to intense noise, vibration, smell and high tempera-
2152
tures (around 100 degrees Fahrenheit) which compounded with cramped space to produce an extremely exhausting fighting environment. Below, left and right: The cramped interior of the Mark V tank, looking forward on the right-hand side, and looking behind the engine from left to right. Bottom: An exterior view of the same Mark V, showing camouflage painting
by the 2nd Australian Division. The 62nd Division would be assisted by ten tanks, but after the experience of April 11, the Australians preferred to do without tank support. The attack would be protected by a creeping barrage, and further barrages were arranged in case the attacks were brought to a standstill at the second objective or after taking Riencourt. On reaching
Hindenburg Line, bombing parties would extend each flank, so that the British and Australians could join up. the
'An officer lost his head' That the attack was expected by the Germans was confirmed on May 2 by two captured German fliers. But the attack went ahead as planned at 0345 hours on May 3. The 6th Brigade on the left of the Australian division captured their objectives on OG1 and OG2 by 0416 hours. Precisely what happened in the 5th Brigade on the right will never be known. They are thought to have hesitated on the wire.
Thus, when the barrage lifted, the Germans were able to direct an enormous weight of fire upon the troops still attempting to cross the wire. The hesitation proved fatal.
Somewhere an
officer lost his
and ordered the withdrawal.
The
head, rear
waves, seeing the troops in front of them running back, also retired. Apart from one or two small parties who had negotiated the" wire and reached the German trenches, the 5th Brigade failed to reach its objective. Such was the position on the right one hour after the start. Meanwhile on the left the 6th Brigade was fighting hard to consolidate its position in OG1 and OG2. Two hours after the commencement of the attack the Australian centre had reached its second objective at the junction of the Fontaine-Moulin Sans Souci road and the central road at a point known as the Six Cross Roads only 400 yards from Riencourt, though with barely enough troops to hold it, while behind them the right and extreme left
had failed. where the 62nd British Division was attacking Bullecourt and the Hindenburg Line west of it, temporary success had been achieved. The left brigade of the 62nd Division (the 187th) had captured part of the front Hindenburg trench, but were soon repulsed. The right brigade
of the division
On
the
left,
(the 185th)
managed
to fight their
way
into
the village, but the dugouts hidden amid the rubbish heaps provided a most difficult problem, and by 1600 hours nearly all the brigade had been driven back. As for the tanks accompanying the 62nd Division, they again seem to have failed. The History of the 27th (Wiirttemberg) Division records that eight tanks were destroyed and the remainder withdrew. It also states that the German troops had lost their fear of tanks since April 11. At 0850 hours the Germans mounted the first of many counterattacks against the bridgehead established by the Australian 6th Brigade. The German troops were drawn from the 27th (Wiirttemberg) Division and included the divisional 'Storm detachment' armed with flamethrowers. Maxfield's small force on the Six Cross Roads bore the brunt of this attack which was repulsed with some difficulty. The fact that a co-ordinated counterattack had been mounted so soon was due to the fact that the Germans had expected and prepared for the Bullecourt offensive. Gellibrand,
commanding the 6th Brigade, now decided that unless the 62nd Division could advance, the maintenance of Maxfield's force so far forward was useless and dangerous. The matter was decided at 1100 hours when the British barrage, supposed to be to fall on Maxposition. Finally, Maxfield himself was mortally wounded. The remnants of his force were brought back, so that by
200 yards beyond, began field's
1130 hours the second objective had been evacuated, and at noon Gellibrand was able to bring back the barrage to protect the troops in the Hindenburg Line.
Counting the cost At 1400 hours, the 28th Battalion came up the central road, and were ordered to attack the 5th Brigade's second objective
by bombing along OG1 and OG2. By 1800 hours both trenches almost as far as the Noveuil-Riencourt road were captured. Therefore, despite the initial failure of the 5th Brigade, the 2nd Division had now established itself in almost the whole of its first objective. But the position was sustained only by the narrow link of the central road reaching up between the two
protruding German positions. At 1810 hours General Smyth, the divisional commander, ordered the 2nd Division to hold its position throughout the night, but the 28th Battalion and the fragment of the 5th Brigade on the right of the central road withdrew at 2100 hours to the old front line. Major Brown, the senior officer in the 28th Battalion, was told by one of his officers in OG2 that the 6th Brigade was falling back, exposing his rear. With his men worn out, the left apparently retiring and the Germans reported to be threatening the central road behind him, he had given the order to withdraw. The fact that his fears subsequently proved unfounded did not help the 6th Brigade who held on alone in the Hindenburg Line facing the Germans in front and on both flanks. Their achievement represented one of the few positive gains along the 16 miles of front from Vimy to Queant. Meanwhile, on the left flank of the Australians, the 22nd Brigade of the 7th Division (General Shoubridge) was brought forward to attack Bullecourt. Having passed through the 62nd Division, they made a strong attempt at 2230 hours on May 3, but failed. They made a further attempt at 0430 hours the following morning, but again, after temporarily holding part of the German line south and west of the village, the. were forced to retire. The Germans in Bullecourt no longer manned their trenches by day or night, but posted sentries above the dugouts while the whole garrison remained below. Thus they were able to escape the effects of a bombardment, and issue promptly to meet the British whenever they attempted to approach the village. This very largely explains the failure of both the 62nd and 7th British Divisions to make any headway 1
in Bullecourt.
On May 4 the Australians attempted successfully to gain some elbow room, and extended their hold on OG1 and OG2 on the left to a point 725 yards from the central road. On the right the trenches abandoned by the 28th Battalion the previous night were retaken by the 2nd and 4th Battalions to a distance of 400 yards from the central road. Two German counterattacks were then repulsed.
On May 5 a further attack by the 20th Brigade from the 7th Division with full preparation was planned for artillery May 7. The Australian division was required to hold on without support until then. In preparation for this attack the tired 1st and 3rd Battalions on the left of the central road were hurriedly relieved during the afternoon and evening of May 6. These fresh troops were to co-operate with the 7th Division by securing the two Hindenburg trenches as far as the northeast corner of Bullecourt, where the 7th Division would join hands with them. At 0345 hours the 7th Division attacked. They captured the trench west of Bullecourt and bombed along it on both flanks. The 9th Battalion on the Australian left flank simultaneously bombed along OG1 and OG2 towards Bullecourt. At 0515 hours the two parties met. The left of the Australians was now secure, though the southwest of Bullecourt still had to be taken. On May 15 the Germans mounted their general counterattack against the 54th Battalion of the 5th Australian Divi-
last
sion.
The temporary success
of this thrust
in penetrating the Australian right in
OG2
drew attention to the fact that the wire defences were inadequate on that flank. The 14th Field Company were immediately ordered to complete the task. On May 17, the 173rd Brigade in Bullecourt carried out an operation to capture the remainder of the village and found that the Germans were in the process of withdrawing. The brigade thus easily penetrated beyond the village and occupied OG2. The new British front line was there neatly rounded off and the Bullecourt salient eliminated. Thus
ended Second Bullecourt. In the two battles of Bullecourt, four Australian divisions suffered 10,000 casualties, roughly 3,000 in the first and 7,000 in the second. The casualties in the 62nd and 7th British Divisions amounted to 3,447 and 2,682 respectively. German casualties were in the order of 10,000. More important. Bullecourt shook the confidence of Australian soldiers in the capa city of the British command. The errors of judgement, especially on April 10 and 11, were obvious to almost everyone. But the two battles of Bullecourt did achieve some positive results. The whole German plan of defence was based upon the impregnability of the Hindenburg Line. When the Germans lost ground they were compelled to throw in large numbers of reserves. Great losses were inflicted on the Germans at Bullecourt and at Arras. Large numbers of reserve divisions were deployed. Arras and Bullecourt — had the
Russian front remained intact — might have helped to bring Germany's strength very near to breaking point. Further Reading Atkinson. C T The Seventh Division 1914-1918 (John Murray 1927) Bean. C. E. The Australian Imperial Force in France 191 7 (Angus & Robertson 1933) Buchan. John. A History of the Great War. Vol III (Nelson & Sons 192?) Ellis. A. D.. The Story of the Fifth Australian Division (Hodder & Stoughton) Lucas. Sir Charles. The Empire at War. Vol III (OUP 1924) Wyrall. Everard. The History of the 62nd (West Riding) Division 1914-19. Vol (John Lane) .
W
.
I
\For Michael page 1012.]
De war's
biography,
see
2153
I
CZECHOSLOVAK! For much of the war the Czechoslovak nationalists were divided between Czechs and Slovaks, exiles and those who remained at home. Thomas Masaryk, the major figure in exile, aimed at unity within an independent Czecho-Slovak State, but in Prague there was initially little support for his ideas and the movement was stymied. Yet in 1917 hope revived — Russia's new government was sympathetic and a Czech Legion was founded, and by early 1918 nationalists in Prague found the courage to call for unity and independence. Otto Pick. Below: Masaryk visits Czech- American volunteers on his propaganda and recruiting drive among the Allies. Opposite. Left: Paul Milyukov, Russia's Foreign Minister and friend and helper of Masaryk. Right: Dr Karel Kramar, rival Czech leader who was content to wait for Russian help
The cause of Czech and Slovak nationalism became virtually identified with the and personality of Thomas Masaryk. His decision not to return to Prague from a visit to Italy in December 1914, but to stay abroad to enlist Allied sympathies and support for his cause, transformed it into an international issue. Masaryk's personality and character played an important role in his success. His integrity had gained him an international reputation of sorts and the relentless logic policies
of his argument seemed irresistible at the time. The determining motive of his actions was a fear of Pan-Germanism. He was well aware of the weakness of AustriaHungary and, as the war dragged on, became convinced that a victory of the Cen-
Powers would make Berlin the dominant influence in Central Europe. He was not rabidly anti-German, and some Czechs held this against him all his life, but he had a firm understanding of power politics and felt therefore that German influence had to be contained if the Central European Slavs were to survive. He did not subscribe to the fashionable PanSlavism of the time. He had made a thorough study of Russian history and philosophy, and had come to the conclusion that the autocracy could not serve as a model for his people. Nevertheless, he was prepared to use the Pan-Slav sentiments propagated from Petrograd in 1915/16 to advance his cause, and he was well aware of the pro-Russian sentiments which prevailed in the Czech lands at this time. In tral
a special Memorandum, conveying Masaryk's views to the British Foreign Office in October 1914, his friend R. W. SetonWatson noted Masaryk's belief that only
liberation by the Russian armies could create favourable conditions for the establishment of a Czech-Slovak State. The reverses suffered by the Russians in the
soon cured Masaryk of this illusion: he grew more and more impatient with Czech politicians, like Dr Kramaf, who seemed to be content to wait for the Cossacks, and he increasingly pinned his hopes on the western Allies. On the other hand, he realised that in the long term only cooperation between Russia and the western powers could keep German power in Central Europe at bay, and in 1917 he was virtually alone in urging that the Bolshevik regime be recognised. As a realist, Masaryk argued that the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia were too few to stand alone and he therefore linked their future with that of the Slovaks, who inhabited the northern part of the Hungarian half of the dual monarchy. To achieve his end he revived the concept of a Czechoslovak nation first mooted in 1848, but his realism did not go far enough to make him understand that by doing so he field
was
in fact creating a sea of troubles for himself and his successors for years to come. It is curious that a self-proclaimed
nationalist of Masaryk's intellectual calibre failed so completely to appreciate the nature of Slovak nationalism. Perhaps his perceptions were distorted by his own background as a member of the Slovak minority living in Moravia: in the environment of his early youth Slovak peasant and Czech petit bourgeois had shared in a common dislike of the German-speaking aristocratic
He had gone on from Moravia become a leading member of the Czech intelligentsia in Prague and to make his landowner.
to
way in the multinational political maelstrom of Vienna. His rationalist philosophy led him to underestimate the intense emotional Catholicism of the Slovak peasantry, and by accepting the concept of the Czechoslovak nation he tried to substitute rationalism for nationalism. Masaryk's fears concerning the growth of German influence in the Habsburg dominions resulting from the monarchy's increasing dependence on German military power were confirmed by the Easter Manifesto of 1915. All the German parties in the Austrian half of the dual monarchy, with the exception of the Social Democrats, proclaimed their intention to transform Austria into a unitary state, with German as the only official language, and to cede Dalmatia to Italy and Galicia to Poland, thus getting rid of the Slavs in Austria's southern and northern peripheries. Germanisation was to be the fate of the Czechs. The Easter Manifesto was an illusion as it ignored the vested interests of the Hungarians, but it did illustrate the prevailing aspirations of most of the German-speaking citizens of the Habsburg monarchy.
The
'Mafia'
In Prague, there
was
initially not
much
Masaryk. Professional politicians, like Kramaf, regarded him as an idealistic academic, whose marriage to an American had lured him to seek political solutions in the west. Kramaf, since the 1890s the leader of the powerful 'Young Czech' party, had increasingly adopted Pan-Slav views and sought his solutions in Russia. A proclamation to the Czech nation from the Tsar, allegedly dropped from a Russian aircraft, circulated in support
for
2155
Bohemia immediately after the outbreak war and created much pro-Russian enthusiasm, but it was a forgery, composed and printed in Prague. Czech emigres in
of
Russia obtained an audience with Nicholas II to voice the expectation that a Romanov might come to wear the ancient crown of the Kings of Bohemia after the war. In Prague, several nationalist politicians formed the 'Mafia', an underground organisation dedicated to the overthrow of Austria-Hungary. Disaffection spread to the Czech regiments in the Austrian army, as Czech soldiers did not want to fight against fellow Slavs. Two regiments from Prague, the 28th Infantry and the 8th Landwehr, demonstrated against being sent to the front, and in April 1915 the 28th deserted as a body to the Russians. Through his contacts in London, Masaryk succeeded in getting word to the Russians that there were Czech soldiers whose reluctance to fight against fellow Slavs
might prompt them to change sides, and was arranged that would-be deserters on the Eastern Front should sing the song Hej Slovane — virtually a Slav anthem ever since 1848 — to signify their intention to cross the lines. Masaryk hoped that these men would form the core of a Czech military effort on the Allied side, but the Tsar's government adamantly refused to agree to this. The Imperial Court was firmly committed to the principle of legitimacy, and the fear that deserters who had already broken their oath of allegiance to the it
Habsburg Emperor could not be trusted
to
keep faith with the Russian Tsar proved stronger than Pan-Slav sentiment. However, as early as 1914 the Russian authorities had sanctioned the formation of a small unit — the Druzhina — made up of Czechs and Slovaks resident in Russia who
2156
were used
for 'special duties',
but in 1916
numbered only about 1,500 men. Russia's aims in Central Europe were cer-
this unit
ambiguous; in 1915 the SlovakRussian Society in Moscow was persuaded to advocate the incorporation of Slovakia in the Russian Empire after the war. The Imperial Government had no sympathy for Masaryk's ideal of a Czechoslovak state, but it was naturally always prepared tainly
discontent in Bohemia for its purposes. The Austrian authorities reacted to unrest in predictable fashion. In March 1915, Prince Thun, the conciliatory and moderate Governor of Bohemia, was recalled and the greater part of civic jurisdiction was transferred to military control through the Kriegsiiberwachungsamt — the War Supervisory Office. Kramaf and many others were arrested in May 1915, thousands were interned and courts-martial in the army worked hard to weed out potential traitors. to
utilise
own
Kramaf was sentenced
to
death for high
was commuted to life imprisonment and he lived to become the first Prime Minister of the postwar Czechoslovak Republic. The Mafia was driven underground, and for the time being Masaryk remained abroad as the only spokesman for Czech and indeed Slovak treason, but the sentence
nationalism.
He
realised by now that no solution could be found as
satisfactory long as the Habsburg Empire remained in existence. The suppressed Slav nations of
Central and Eastern Europe must be allowed to determine their own destiny, and if the Entente powers could only be persuaded of this, they would gain millions of allies in the enemy's heartland. But in 1915, the Allied leaders would not listen: they had not gone to war to destroy the Habsburg monarchy, but to maintain the
Czech
artillery of the Russian army at Zborov. the Austrian army, disaffection spread to the Czech regiments, for they were reluctant to fight against fellow Slavs. In April 1915 the entire 29th Regiment deserted to the Russians In
balance of power, of which Austria-Hungary was an integral part. The British were preoccupied by the war against Germany; the French thought of the postwar settlement when Austria-Hungary might come to be manipulated to contain Germany; the Russians, though always keen to stir up Pan-Slavism, were in full retreat.
Masaryk's pressure group In the meantime, Masaryk was building up a team of colleagues, relatively unknown in Czech or Slovak politics, to assist his political campaign. At first he lived in Geneva, but in March 1915 he moved to London, where he stayed until May 1917 and where he had the benefit of the advice and friendship of the historian Robert
Seton- Watson and of Wickham Steed, the Foreign Editor of The Times. In September 1915 he was joined by Dr Eduard Benes, who had been one of his students and had left his post as lecturer at Prague University. Benes made his headquarters in Paris, where he was greatly assisted by
Milan Stefanik, a young Slovak astronomer, and also one of Masaryk's former students living in France, who had excellent connections within the French Establishment. Masaryk meanwhile remained in London, which he regarded as the centre of the Entente. Stefanik played an important role; he was not only political
an airman of some distinction, rising to the rank of general in the French air force, but as a real Slovak he lent credibility to the Czech-Slovak image which Masaryk and Benes were trying to project.
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By 1918 there were Czechoslovak units fighting on the French, Russian and Italian fronts, and in each of these countries recruiting organisations issued postcards appealing for volunteers. Shown here are American and Russian examples. The Russian cards (opposite and bottom centre) not unnaturally appeal in Russian for recruits for the Russian front, while the American cards (all the remainder) use the Czech language to inspire CzechAmerican patriots to fight in France. WheVi the war began, Masaryk believed that only liberation by the Russian armies could create favourable conditions for the establishment of a Czechoslovak state, but the reverses suffered by the Russians in the field soon uebuuytu uns illusion, increasingly ne pinned his hopes on the Western Allies, but at first they would not listen to him: they
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which Austria-Hungary was an integral part. By the end of 1916, however, they had swung behind the causeof Czechoslovak independence
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—
Above and below: Masaryk in 1917, and the British passport issued to him in May of that year to enable him to go to Russia. While in London he lectured at London University's newly founded School of Slavonic Studies, but the Russian Revolutions in February and October 1917 dramatically changed his prospects, substituting for the old Imperial regime a government which was sympathetic, and demanding his immediate presence in Russia No
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2158
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In a railway siding at Serdobsk members of the Czech Legion hand over their rifles to the Bolsheviks before entraining for Siberia and the French front. Soon the Legion was to be involved in the Russian Civil War
Perhaps the main problem which faced Masaryk and Benes was the lack of proper
communications with their people at home, and until 1917 they were faced with the danger that their policies and commitments might be rejected there. Links with the Mafia were weak and irregular; nationalist leaders were in Austrian jails, and those Czech politicians who wore still at large were cautious and felt that they had to face the contingency of victory by the Central Powers. Inevitably, a degree of opportunism governed their actions. In London, Masaryk, with Seton-Watan academic base at the newly established School of Slavonic Studies; his inaugural lecture in the summer of 1915 dealt with The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis'. A lecture on similar lines given soon afterwards at the Sorbonne in Paris was arranged by the French historian Ernest Denis, whose understanding of the Slav world rivalled that of Seton-Watson in Britain. In October 1916, the periodical The Neiv Europe was founded by Seton-
warfare and a promise to the submerged Slavs of the Habsburg monarchy was not without value in this context. Throughout the latter half of 1916, developments continued to favour Masaryk's policy. After the death of the Emperor Franz Josef on November 21, his former subjects no longer troubled to conceal their war-weariness. His successor, Karl, was ready to make some concessions to the Slavs in the Empire, but it was too late. The re-election of Woodrow Wilson to the Presidency of the United States in November 1916 encouraged the advocates of national selfdetermination, and the Entente's reply to the new Emperor's peace feelers in December included 'the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Rumanians and Czechoslovaks from foreign domination'.
son's help, found
Watson in London, and Masaryk thus obtained an important outlet for his ideas. A Czech-Slovak National Council was established in Paris, with Masaryk as President, and in February 1916 he succeeded in getting a personal commitment from Aristide Briand, then French Premier, in favour of a fully independent Czechoslovak state to be set up after the war. The disappointing military progress of the war had perhaps convinced the French statesman of the importance of political
1917 — a decisive year The year 1917 saw a decisive turn
for the better in the fortunes of the Czechoslovak effort abroad. The first Russian Revolution removed the Tsarist autocracy, for which Masaryk and his colleagues with their liberal ideas had little sympathy, and replaced it with the Provisional Government, which was more attuned to the concept of national self-determination. The new government included as Foreign Minister the historian Paul Milyukov, who was on terms of personal friendship with Masaryk. When Masaryk arrived in Russia in the spring of 1917, Milyukov had left the government, but Kerensky and his colleagues were sympathetic and it was agreed to expand the Druzhina into a Czechoslovak Legion of 30,000 men, recruited from Czech and Slovak deserters and prisoners-of-war who had been conscripted into the Austro-Hungarian forces. In fact, the rush of volunteers produced a
some 50,000 men, which proved mettle at the battle of Zborov during Kerensky's offensive in the summer of
force of its
Masaryk had
his army, his 'greatest he called it, and the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris really began to function as the government-in-exile of a state which existed only in the minds of its leaders. Czechoslovak units were also formed in France in December 1917 and later,
1917.
asset' as
in Italy.
The Bolshevik Revolution and Lenin's determination to withdraw from the war changed Masaryk's position in Russia. Early in 1918 an agreement was reached between the French Ambassador and Trotsky, the Commissar for War, under which the Czechoslovak Legion was recognised as an Allied army and was to withdraw across Siberia for transhipment to France. They were to surrender most of their arms, but on March 26, Stalin, after negotiations with Masaryk in Moscow, issued an instruction to all local Soviets to the effect that the Czechoslovaks 'were going through as free citizens, as an armed unit carrying a few weapons as protection against the counter-revolutionaries'. The Legion was reluctant to surrender any of its arms and on May 14, 1918, in a railsiding at Chelyabinsk, one of its units clashed with German prisoners-of-war returning home as a result of the peace of Brest-Litovsk. The clash led to conflict with the local Bolshevik authorities and the Legion found itself involved in the Russian Civil War. In the meantime, Masaryk had travelled across Siberia ahead of his troops to get to the United States. He felt rightly that with the entry of the USA into the war, the political centre of gravity had moved to
Washington.
He
arrived
there
in
May 2159
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BBWPCNi 1918. Wilson had proclaimed his Fourteen Points early in 1918; he demanded that the 'peoples of Austria-Hungary be accorded the freest opportunity for autonomous development'. Masaryk had lectured in
1902 and 1907 and he had useful contacts in the American Administration. He felt that Wilson would understand his policy, although he did not share his fellow academic's somewhat naive optimism. Yet Masaryk's influence on Wilson was not negligible, and partly as a result of this the conditions contained in the Fourteen Points were later expanded to provide for an independent Czechoslovak state. His hand, of course, was strengthened by the existence of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia. However, in the United States, Masaryk's major source of strength lay in the enthusiastic support which the idea of Czechoslovak independence derived from the Americans of Slovak and Czech descent, and which was expressed through
America
in
their associations. In Slovakia, which was part of the Kingdom of Hungary, there were few opportunities for the expression of national aims as the policy of the Budapest government was much more repressive than that of the Vienna government, and continued to be so until the very end of the war. An influential, though small, group in Slovakia, which used the review Hlas to publicise its views, had always maintained that the political future of the
Slovaks could only be safeguarded by union with the Czechs. As the war went on, this echo of 1848 found a growing measure of response among the priests, teachers and lawyers who were the activists of Slovak nationalism. Many of them, however, had reservations about accepting the concept of a unitary Czechoslovak state and nation,
2160
and these were shared by the Slovak organisations in America. Yet in Slovakia, the nationalists had been silenced. They had their contacts with Czech politicians in Prague and in Vienna, and they spoke through the Czech Deputies in the Austrian Parliament in May 1917 who claimed to be acting on behalf of 'all branches of the Czechoslovak nation'. Slovakia spoke more openly on the other side of the Atlantic. At the end of 1914 the Slovak League in America, claiming to act on behalf of all Slovaks in Hungary, demanded complete autonomy and self-determination. On October 22, 1915, the Slovak League joined with the Czech Alliance, its counterpart among Americans of Czech origin, in concluding an agreement in Cleveland, Ohio, which spoke of liberation of the Czech and Slovak nations and their union 'in a federative form of state, with complete Slovak national auto-
nomy
for Slovakia'.
While the basis
for
a Czechoslovak state
was being formulated by emigrants and descendants of emigrants in America, the flow of events served to narrow the gap between Masaryk and his fellow exiles on one hand and the politicians in Prague on the other. While at the end of 1916, the Czech members of the Austrian Parliament still thought it opportune to repudiate the Allied call for the liberation of the subject races of Austria-Hungary by proclaiming their loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty, they were bold enough in the spring of 1917 to respond to the Manifesto issued by 222 Czech writers who urged them to act as 'true spokesmen of the nation'. The Writers' Manifesto spoke of the 'Rights of the Czechoslovak Nation' and prophesied that the outcome of the war would 'democratise the Europe of the future'. In May
White House 1918 — Masaryk signs the declaration of Czechoslovak independence. In January of that year Wilson's Fourteen Points had declared that the peoples of AustriaHungary should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development'
1917, when the Reichsrat, the lower House of the Austrian Parliament, had been recalled, the Czech Deputies, together with the representatives of the other nonGerman nationalities, called for free and equal status in the Empire. The two radical
Czech deputies went further and demanded theestablishmentof anindependentCzechoSlovak state. On January 6, 1918, all the Czech deputies in the Reichsrat threw their caution overboard and published their
Epiphany Resolution calling for a sovereign Czecho-Slovak State. The imminent military defeat of the Central Powers and the conciliatory policies and peace feelers initiated from Vienna gave courage to the politicians in Prague and at long last brought them into line with Masaryk's policy of unification and independence. Further Reading Lettrich.
J.,
History of
Modern Slovakia (Praeger
1955)
Macartney, C. A., The Hapsburg Empire. 17901918 (London 1968) Seton-Watson, R. W., A History ot the Czechs and Slovaks (OUP 1943) Seton-Watson, R W, Masaryk in England
(CUP 1943) Thomson, S
H.,
Czechoslovakia
in
European
History (Cass 1966)
Wiskemann,
E.,
Czechs and Germans (Mac-
millan 1967)
Zeman, Z. A. B., The Break-up Empire (OUP 1961) I
ot the
Habsburg
For Otto Pick 's biography, see page
474.
|
Spring 1917: the twilight of the Zeppelin and dawn of the strategic bomber. First came the Gothas, but these were soon followed by the German 'Giants' — none of which was ever shot down over England. Their aim was strategic, but directed more against morale than military targets. The losses they incurred in combat and in accidents far exceeded any moral effect, however. Dr Douglas Robinson. Below:
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A German Intelligence photo* graph of the July 17 raid. Note St Paul's Cathedral and the plume of smoke (marked '15') rising from the Central Telegraph Office
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By January 1917, the reign of the Zeppelin as a strategic bomber was over. Though sporadic attacks continued on the north of England, the Zeppelin only appeared once more over London during the war, and then by accident. In its place there came the first unit of large bombing aeroplanes especially organised by the Germans to bomb London by day. Here was foreshadowed the burning of Hamburg and Dresden, and the holocausts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The immediate consequences also were farreaching: the British responses to the pioneering efforts of the 36 Gothas of 3 were the formation of the Royal Air Force and the doctrine of strategic bombing of civilian centres which remains with us today, more than 50 years later. The England Geschwader (England Squadron) was under the direct control of the Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL), or Supreme Command of the German Army. The chief aim, as set forth by General Ludendorff, was to score a propaganda success which would intensify the effect on the British population of the economic strangulation by the U-Boat blockade. Conceivably, bombs in the heart of London could so arouse the English population that the government might be forced out of office and replaced by one that would sue for peace. Disruption of war industry, of communications between London and the coast and of transportation across the Channel were secondary objectives. Lastly, it was hoped that the activities of the England Squadron would force the withdrawal from the Western Front of men and weapons out of all proportion to the German forces engaged. As will be seen, the last objective was more than realised, while the initial daylight attacks on London at least had a seriously disturbing effect on home front morale. As related earlier, the German army had proposed the bombing ill Kngland as early as the autumn of 1914, but the lack of suitable long range aircraft had rendered this goal unattainable then and later. In the year 1916, however, the aircraft department of the Gothaer Waggonfabrik AG, builders of railway rolling stock, produced in the Gil and GUI twin-engine bombers, machines with the range sufficient to attack southern England from Belgian bases. In the autumn of 1916 it was the intention of General Ernst von Hoeppner, commanding the German Luftstreitkrdfte, to commence attacks on London with 30 of these aircraft by February 1, 1917. In the event, the twin-engine bombers were not ready until May 1917, but preparations and training for the attack on London proceeded through the winter and spring of 1917. Bombing Wing 3, consisting of the three Staffeln (flights) 1, 4 and 6, at this time operating single-engined C-type machines, had been concentrated at Ghistelles near Ostend. In order to improve their over-water navigation, their personnel were attached to naval air stations on the islands of Heligoland and Sylt. In mid-March the wing was renamed Kampfgeschwader 3 OHL or Bombing Wing 3 of the Supreme Command, while the
BOGOHL
were renumbered 13, 14 and 15. The name England Geschwader was, however, the favourite colloquial designation. Also in March the first Gothas of the series production type, the G IV, were delivered and training with them commenced. These aircraft were destined to become a household word on the other side of the Channel. The power plant was a pair of Mercedes 260 hp D IVa six cylinder inline water-cooled engines. The biplane wings, spanning 77 feet 9^ inches, comprised a lower wing centre section covered with plywood, on which were mounted the two engines driving pusher propellers, outboard lower panels covered with fabric and a pair of fabric-covered upper wings meeting on the centreline, the whole stoutly braced with steel tube struts and wire. The fuselage, some 35 feet long, was built on spruce longerons and spacers, plywood-skinned. Right forward, in a cockpit circled by a gun ring mounting a single 7.62-mm Parabellum machine gun, rode the aircraft commander (not a Staffeln
who also acted as bombardier. Much of the space in his cockpit was taken up by the Gorz precision bomb sight with a telescopic tube over three feet long. A few feet to the rear sat the pilot on the port side of a roomy cockpit. Usually he was an officer inferior in rank to the aircraft commander; sometimes he was an NCO. Abaft the wings, and separated from his fellow crew members by the main fuel tanks, which filled the entire fuselage, was the rear gunner, always an NCO, armed with a Parabellum on a ring mount. This did not cover the traditional 'blind spot' behind and beneath the tail, from where a skilled fighter pilot could attack at close range without fear of retaliation. Hence, it was a sensation when the British discovered that the rear gunner could shoot downward under the tail through a plywood tunnel leading down and aft from the rear cockpit. The bombs were carried horizontally under the fuselage and centre section. The usual bomb load by day was 660 pounds; at night, when the Gothas flew at lower altitudes, 1,100 pounds could be carried. pilot),
2162
As so often happens, the early products of the parent company had the best performance; later 'improvements', modifications and overloading with equipment lowered the original performance, particularly rate of climb and ceiling. The contract called for Gotha G IV to reach 18,000 feet in one hour with full load; actually, maximum altitude in the first raid on England was 16,700 feet, and as low as 12,500 in later daylight raids. Cruising speed was about 80 mph, 'much too little'. Manoeuvrability was considered excellent for so large an aircraft, and an asset in defeating the attacks of Allied fighters. On the other hand, light construction and poor stability with empty tanks caused many landing accidents, the operational losses throughout the campaign (37) exceeding the combat losses (24). Along with the first of the big bombers there arrived in March the commanding officer of 3, Hauptmann Ernst Brandenburg, destined to lead the wing in its earliest triumphs, and to leave his mark on the personnel. An observer (most German pilots in the two-seater squadrons were NCOs), he had had no flight training, but it was for him to determine the doctrine, tactics and operational procedures for the first strategic bombing squadrons. He planned to attack London by day, to ensure precision bombing of specific targets, and in close formation to exploit the massed defensive firepower of his aircraft against British fighters. As the G IV's arrived, he put his crews to work in training flights with war loads, at first singly, then in formation. Many other operational problems had to be anticipated and provided for at this time. Good weather over England was allimportant to the success of the bombing attacks, while bad weather at the bases on return, considering that the Gothas had no radio or blind flying instruments, could lead to disaster. Although the most able meteorologists in Germany were assigned to the England Geschwader, their job was made almost impossible by the lack of necessary data. Typically, the weather over north-west Europe is made in the vastness of the North Atlantic, and sweeps in over the British Isles before arriving on the coast of Belgium; and weather data in England was of course classified information. Navigation without sophisticated radio tracking equipment, such as exists today, was a matter of dead reckoning, in which the evaluation of wind direction and velocity was all important. In practice, the navigator-observer attempted to establish the winds at altitude during the climb-out from the bases to the coast, determining from landmarks below the amount of drift and retardation or acceleration of the bomber's progress over the ground as a result of the wind. He then gave his pilot a compass heading to hold in order to make good the course for England, and an estimated time of arrival. Over England navigation was visual from landmarks and the map, the River Thames and the sprawling mass of London being unmistakable by day. At night, as with the Zeppelin crews, errors were frequent. The equipment of each day bomber included compressed oxygen in cylinders, each crew member using a pipe stem mouthpiece rather than a mask. Later this was replaced by liquid air in insulated flasks. No doctrine on the use of oxygen existed, and flight crews preferred to do without it even though the day raids were made well above 12,000 feet, the altitude at which nowadays its use is obligatory. Personal equipment included fur-lined boots, coat and gloves, helmet and goggles, but no parachutes. The spectre of drowning in the North Sea in case of engine failure over water was always with the flight crews. Carrier pigeons were carried with which to send off distress messages, and the bomber itself was advertised as being able to float on the water for at least eight hours, as it had watertight compartments in its plywood fuselage. This may be doubted; but the claim undoubtedly improved morale. Objective evaluation of the results of raids was difficult for the Germans, and there was a tendency to exaggeration and wishful thinking not unknown in later bombing operations. The crews' attack reports were highly coloured and overestimated the degree of destruction of military targets, particularly at night. Newspaper reports, as a result of strict British censorship, provided no information of operational value. There was a mass of Intelligence forthcoming from German agents residing in London, and from neutral travellers passing back and forth between London and Holland or the Scandinavian countries. These gentlemen seem to have been unable to resist the temptation (probably financial) to tell any German agent what he wanted to hear, for their reports of military damage in particular were wildly exaggerated, if not completely fabricated. Finally, towards mid-May, the three Staffeln were at last fully equipped with six Gothas each. These were assigned to fields around Ghent as follows: Staffeln 13 and 14 at St Denis Westrem and Staffel 15 and the headquarters unit at Gontrode. In June,
KAGOHL
Staffel 16 was added at Gontrode, at Mariakerke.
and
in July, Staffeln
17 and 18
With about 25 Gothas available in the three Staffeln, plus his headquarters aircraft, Brandenburg was ready for his first attempt on England. But the initial attack, on May 25, 1917, failed to reach London. Twenty-three Gothas set out from the bases around Ghent. One force-landed at Thielt, another turned back over the North Sea with a failing starboard engine. The remaining 21 came inland north of the River Crouch, but at Gravesend towering clouds barred the way to the capital. Disappointed, Brandenburg turned south, crossing Kent to the Channel at Hythe. Once more changing course to the east, the formation salvoed its bombs on the hapless coastal resort of Folkestone, then passed close to Dover on its way back to Belgium. While British Intelligence might have been expected to be well informed about the England Geschivader, with its aerodromes set
down among a
hostile population, responsible
commands had
not
been alerted to the imminence of daylight aeroplane attacks in force. With no warning system, the 74 aircraft which rose in pursuit from English aerodromes with no advance notice had to climb after a retreating opponent and attacked without coordination or concentration. None of them achieved any success, but the Germans lost one Gotha over the sea, possibly to Royal Naval Air Service pilots from Dunkirk. Another crashed near Bruges on the return flight. The Gothas had with one blow killed and wounded more English civilians than in any one Zeppelin raid of the war. There were 95 dead and 195 wounded: the highest concentration of casualties was in Folkestone, where most of the bombs fell on a busy street lined with shops. There was much anger and resentment in Folkestone, but in London, which had been spared because of the weather, the reaction to the death and destruction in 'a coastal town to the south-east' was more one of curiosity. Nor did Londoners take alarm from the second Gotha onslaught. On the evening of June 5, 22 of the big bombers appeared over Sheerness. civilians
The
local
attack eight soldiers and three and 25 soldiers and nine civilians injured. anti-aircraft guns damaged one of the raiders, which In
were
a
five-minute
killed,
ditched in the Thames off Barton's Point. Sixty-six British aircraft took off; only five got within range of the German formation, and none scored successes. Newspapers however claimed that ten out of 20 bombers had been destroyed. Londoners were understandably complacent. Brandenburg and his crews now felt ready to tackle London, and after anxiously awaiting the right weather, they finally received the signal from their meteorologist on June 13. Twenty bombers took off; their number, however, steadily decreased as they approached England. Two turned back soon after take-off with engine trouble, and a third aborted near the English coast and dropped its bombs on Margate before heading home. Three more left the formation over the English coast, one bombing Shoeburyness and another dropping its cargo on Greenwich Only 14 remained, in a loose diamond formation which appeared over London about 1130 hours. Attacking from 15,000 feet, they were clearly visible in the clear air, but many of the civilian spectators on the streets of the capital took them to he British A few aircraft released their bombs on the way in - live missiles falling in East Ham. These killed eight people and caused some damage. Fifteen more fell along the north side of the river m Blackwall, Poplar and Limehouse. One of these, a 110-pounder, caused the first major tragedy of the raid. Descending on the Upper North Street School, Poplar, it exploded in a crowded classroom, killing 18 small children and injuring 30 more, together with four adults. Brandenburg's intention was to bomb the heart of the city, whose large buildings-St Paul's Cathedral, Tower Bridge, the Tower itself and others -stood out below as on a relief map. Liverpool Street Station and the surrounding area were the main target. At 1140 hours the lead aircraft tired a white flare. The Gothas scattered to bomb individual targets, and within two minutes, 72 bombs crashed down within a radius of a mile of Liverpool Street Station. Only three hit the station, but these. falling on and around a loading passenger train, killed 16 people and injured 15. Other bombs fell close to Fenchurch Street Station, killing 19 people and injuring 14 in a building at No 65 Fenchurch Street, while 13 were killed and 11 injured by another bomb landing in Central Street, Finsbury. The Royal Mint was struck and damaged. The formation then divided, some dropping bombs in Southwark, others going north to Dalston. Altogether the casualties reached the shocking total of 102 dead and -132 injured — higher than necessary because many people, not realising the aircraft were German, had failed to seek cover.
The defenders again replied bravely but without co-ordination, while the Gothas, once more flying in tight formation as they withdrew, gave better than they got. A Bristol Fighter, caught in the crossfire of many Parabellums, was driven off with the observer mortally wounded. The British airmen made no claims, and none of the Gothas was lost over England or in landing.
Triumph and disaster For the Germans it was a triumph loudly proclaimed the length and breadth of the Reich. 'According to our observation,' reported Brandenburg, 'a station in the City, and a Thames bridge, probably Tower Bridge, were hit. Of all our bombs it can be said that the majority fell among the Docks, and among the city warehouses.' The doughty Hauptmann was summoned to Supreme Headquarters to receive Germany's highest decoration, the Ordre Pour le Merite. This nearly proved his undoing, for on departure from Kreuznach, his two-seater Albatros crashed, killing the pilot and sending the leader of the England Geschuader
many months. For Londoners, here at last was a new menace which could not be dismissed lightly — a formation of large German aircraft free to circle at leisure over the capital in broad daylight, distributing their lethal loads where they desired. The home defence squadrons, intended to attack Zeppelins, were equipped with slow, to hospital for
stable variants of the BE 2c observation aircraft — quite incapable of climbing up to and pursuing the Gothas or of facing their heavy defensive armament. Over the objections of Sir Douglas Haig, his best fighter squadron, No. 56, equipped with SE 5's, was brought
back to Bekesbourne in Kent, while No 66 Squadron, with Sopwith Pups, was relocated at Calais. More long range measures contemplated doubling the Royal Flying Corps, and the possibility of retaliatory raids across the Western Front against Mannheim and other German cities. The successor of the popular Brandenburg was Hauptmann Rudolf Kleine, an experienced airman who. unlike other senior officers of KAGOHL 3, was a qualified military pilot His fust attempt against England was on July 4, when 25 Gothas started for Harwich, though only 18 made it to the target. The Royal Naval Air Station at Felixstowe was considerably damaged. Since the attackers did not come inland, the aircraft based in England made no interceptions, but some Camels from Dunkirk attacked the homeward-bound raiders and claimed — erroneously — to have shot one down in Barnes The next day No 56 Squadron returned to France. On July 7 (though not in consequence of this event the England Geschwader was back lor a second daylight blow against London. Twenty-four Gothas set out; two turned back with engine failure. but one first succeeded in dropping three bombs on Margate, where three were killed and three wounded. The remaining 22 Gothas came inland north of the Crouch, and proceeded to the northwest ill London, thence turning to cross the capital against the wind Their bombs, falling in the City and the Fast End, caused some I
spectacular damage, including a smoky tire visible for miles which destroyed a temporary shelter on the roof of the General Post Office in St Marti nVle-Gr and; and verj severe injury to Ironmongers' Hall in Fenchurch Street, caused bj a bomb which detonated inside the enclosed court. Many bombs fell in the vicinity of Cannon Street Station without striking the terminal itseli Casualties were much lower than in the June 13 raid, hut still totalled 54 killed and 190 injured. Once again the unco-ordinated and impromptu attacks of isolated aircraft ascending from home defence and training stations were ineffective Seventy-eighl RFC and 17 RNAS machines as cended, including 30 of the new Camel fighters, hut the onlv success was won by an intrepid pair in a slow Armstrong- Whitworth two seater who brought down a straggler in the sea off the North Foreland. Two young RFC pilots, one from a training squadron, were shot dead in the air when they made headlong attacks single handed on the tight German formation On the other hand, Kleine lost four more of the big bombers in crash landings in gust] winds at St Denis Westrem and Gontrode. Despite the lower death and damage toll, the July 7 attack produced a far more intense reaction among the London public than the earlier raid of -June 13. The first had been a surprise, the second seemed to prove that the Germans could come w henev er they pleased and bomb at leisure, and nothing was going to stop them. There were riots in the Fast End in which the shops -lied and looted not always German, were Angry questions were asked in Parliament hero Lloyd George, vspaper readers alike the Premier, astonished members and by admitting that 'complete protect!' in the air would never insisted, must come first be secured'. The army in France,
of foreigners,
2163
Bui public pressure for more defensive aircraft, and for reprisal raids against German cities, could not be resisted, and thus the menace of Kleine's 30-odd Gothas produced a far larger diversion of aircraft from the war effort in France. At the Cabinet meeting of -July 11, it was resolved to set up a committee to Mime the defence arrangements against raids and the air organisation generally and the higher direction of aerial operations. The work was done by the farsighted former Boer leader, Lieutenant-General Jan Christiaan Smuts, now a member of
War
tin
Cabinet.
report argued that the defence of London, the political and economic heart of the Empire, demanded 'exceptional measures'. He recommended that three home defence squadrons of modern single seater fighters be formed, a defensive anti-aircraft barrage system be developed to bar the Germans' path to London, and the entire 'London Air Defence Area' be placed under a single commander. This appointment was given on August 5, 1917, to an experienced airman brought home from France, Brigadier-General E. B. Ashmore. Smuts' second report on the air organisation generally is not germane to the immediate subject, but since it called for the use of aviation after the German example as 'an independent means of war operations', with the Royal Flying Corps and Royal Naval Air Service amalgamated into a third and co-equal arm, it is evident what effects the two daylight raids on the capital had had on the astute military leader. 'Air supremacy may in the long run become as important a factor in the defence of the Empire as sea supremacy' - a prophetic vision for 1917, but one for which the Gothas had provided the inspiration. Unpopular with the conventional military and naval leaders, Smuts' second report was taken up by the politicians, egged on by agitation among their constituents in favour of forming a British air striking force. The result was the establishment of the RAF on April 1, 1918. Rarely has a single event such as the July 7 daylight raid had such far reaching consequences. Yet Kleine had been greatly impressed by the strength of the London gun barrage and the aggressiveness of attacking British aircraft. Crews which had taken part in the June 13 raid warned that the defences had been greatly strengthened. Unacceptable losses seemed inevitable if daylight attacks continued on the capital. But Kleine was stubborn, and persisted with peripheral daylight raids with diminishing num-
His
(irst
bers of Gothas.
On
July 22, 21 Gothas bombed Harwich and Felixstowe. Condamage was done at the naval air station at Felixstowe, with 13 killed and 26 injured — mostly service men. A hundred and twenty-one aircraft ascended from British aerodromes; but the Gothas had been over land so briefly that the former stood no chance of intercepting them. Strong west winds delayed the next attack until August 12. The target was the British naval base at Chatham. Only 13 bombers departed the bases around Ghent; two turned back shortly with engine trouble. A third, experiencing engine trouble over the English coast, dropped four bombs on Margate from 12,000 feet and was lucky to make it back to the beach at Zeebrugge. Carried north by a stiff south-west wind, the remaining ten Gothas reached the coast near Felixstowe. From here the leader set course for Chatham. En route they passed over Rochford, where one of the three new fighter squadrons called for by Smuts — No 61, equipped with Sopwith Pups — was based. As bombs fell from the German formation, the Pups madly scrambled and gained altitude. The sky in fact seemed to be filling with unfriendly aircraft— f32 in all ascended this day — and the Gotha formation turned back, dropping its bombs on Southend, where 32 were killed and 46 wounded. A naval pilot shot down one of the fleeing bombers over the sea; four more were written off in crash landings. Only 15 Gothas were serviceable on August 22 for the last daylight attack on England. Four dropped out with engine trouble before reaching the English coast at Margate. The remaining 11 were too few for effective self-defence. A gun barrage brought down one in flames near Margate; another spun into the sea after an attack by a naval fighter. Harried and hunted down the coast, the remaining black-crossed bombers hurriedly dropped 34 bombs on Ramsgate, where eight were killed and 12 injured. Some more bombs fell on Dover, where a fighter shot down another Gotha into the sea. Altogether, 137 aircraft ascended from English aerodromes, and had the Germans persisted in their advance inland, it is certain that few of them would have escaped. It was clear even to Kleine thi the day bombers had been mastered by the defences, and a swit h to night attacks was imperative. The Gotha crews were given a hasty course in night flying, and arrangements were made to illuminate the runways at St Denis Westrem, Gontrode and Mariakerke with petrol flares and searchsiderable
2164
lights. Formation flying was of course out, and the big bombers would now fly individual courses to England by compass. Larger bomb loads could be carried as it was safe to fly at lower altitudes, and the rear gunner was often left at home. On the night of September 3, Kleine led four of the more experienced crews towards England, the target being the naval base at Chatham. Here 131 naval ratings were killed and 90 injured by a 110pound bomb exploding among them as they slept in a crowded drill hall. The Gotha crews felt themselves protected by darkness against British guns and aircraft. But three officers of No 44 Squadron succeeded on this night in taking off and landing in their Camel fighters, though they saw nothing of the raiders. Immediately all squadrons commenced training in night flying. Encouraged by this initial success, Kleine sent out 11 bombers manned by volunteers on the following night, September 4. Two turned back with motor trouble; one fell in the sea off Sheerness, possibly a victim of the guns. The handful of Gothas kept Londoners awake from 1 1 pm to 1 am as they crossed the capital singly, scattering their bombs. It was in this raid that a bomb on the Embankment scarred Cleopatra's Needle and left holes in one of the bronze sphinxes, visible to this day. The British believed that 26 bombers had attacked London; actually only five had gone the whole distance. Casualties were correspondingly light— 19 dead, 71 injured. Eighteen British aircraft ascended, but only two caught brief glimpses of the Gothas, which by now were painted in dark mottled camouflage. In the ensuing night raids at the end of the month, the Gothas were joined by the remarkable and little known Riesen (Giant) aircraft, which after three years of experiment were at last ready for operational testing on the Western Front. Several large German industrial firms had taken contracts to build these huge machines, intended to supplement the Zeppelin as a long-range strategic bomber, but only the products of the Zeppelin Werke at Staaken near Berlin saw action against England. In August 1917 Riesenflugzeugabteilung 501, commanded by Hauptmann Richard von Bentivegni, arrived at St Denis Westrem; it reported to the newly renamed BOGOHL 3, the England Geschwader, and was expected to co-ordinate its operations with Kleine's Gothas. The six aircraft of Rfa 501 were Staaken R VI's, the largest aircraft to fly over England in two world wars. Their huge wire-braced biplane wings measured 138 feet 5^ inches across. Between the wings were two nacelles, each housing two Maybach or Mercedes engines of 260 hp driving tractor and pusher propellers. In each nacelle, between the engines, was a cockpit for a mechanic, who was expected to repair breakdowns in flight. The massive enclosed fuselage measured 72 feet 6 inches in length. Right forward was an open observer's cockpit with bomb sight and gun ring. Just to the rear was a glassed-in cabin occupied by the two pilots and the aircraft commander. Instruments included a practical artificial horizon. Unlike the Gothas, the Giants had a radio transmitter and receiver for Morse code, and parachutes for the crew. Abaft the wings was a gunner's cockpit where one or two machine gunners handled two upper guns and a lower one firing under the tail. 660 gallons of fuel were carried in the tanks in the fuselage. Racks accommodated 18 220-pound bombs. Sometimes three 660-pound bombs were carried, and occasionally a single monster 2,200-pounder. Sixteen Gothas led the offensive against London opening on September 24; three reached the capital. A bomb landing in front of the Bedford Hotel in Southampton Row killed 13 people and injured 26. More bombs fell in Dover. One bomber crash landed at its base. Thirty English aircraft ascended but did not encounter the Germans. On the night of September 25, out of 15 Gothas only one reached London; more damage was done by three which bombed Camberwell and Bermondsey. One British pilot found and fired on a Gotha, pursuing it for ten minutes; the Germans admitted one aircraft missing. For the first time, two of Rfa 501 's Giant bombers joined the Gothas against England on the night of September 28. Twentyfive of BOGOHL 3's aircraft set out, but the night sky over the North Sea was full of towering clouds. On this account. 15 Gothas turned back, plus one more due to engine trouble. The remainder flew a short distance inland, scattering their bombs in poor visibility on Essex and Kent. Three were claimed by anti-aircraft gunners along the Kentish coast; in fact, the Germans had three Gothas missing, while six more crashed on landing at the bases in Belgium. Nor did the two Giants bomb London, though they succeeded in reaching England, and received the congratulations of
General von Hoeppner. On the next night, September 29, Kleine, for various reasons. was able to send out only seven Gothas, which were joined by three Giants. Three Gothas and one Giant (probably Bentivegni
himself in R .19) reached London, and their bombs damaged Waterloo Station. One Giant bombed Sheerness and bombs fell in various places in Kent. One Gotha was shot down in flames by anti-aircraft gunners at Dover This was the last raid by the Oiants for more than two months, hut they had already shown several advantages over the Gothas- greater bomb carrying capacity, greater reliability as a result of having four or more power plants, superior navigation due to being fitted with radio and gyro instruments for blind flying and, as the future would show, greater resistance to attack. No Giant was ever brought down over England. September 30 saw 11 Gothas dispatched to London. The air crews thought they had hit the Admiralty, warehouses on the docksides and the City, but most of the damage was to houses in Fast London. By now, however, Kleine's handful of aircraft were achieving a significant effect on morale, totally disrupting the nightly repose of millions of Londoners, main of whom were spending the night in the Underground. Further, a recent innova tion by General Ashmore blind barrage firing was causing an enormous expenditure of shells, fragments of which caused nearly as much damage as the bombs. Although everyone else, including Britain's leaders, had written off the Zeppelin as a bombing weapon, the indomitable Leader of Airships, Korvettenkapitiin Strasser, still believed in them as did his chief, Admiral Scheer. At a conference in Berlin on January 26, 1917, Strasser proposed that the Zeppelins be lightened to attain altitudes of 16,500 feet or more with war load, and with ships built to these specifications, raids continued during this period. London was not attacked, though still ordered as a target; in practice, the raiders dropped their bombs ineffectively in the eastern counties and the Midlands. Strasser recognised that little material result could be expected, but pleaded that the raids be continued for their morale effects and to tie down defending guns and aircraft in the Midlands and the North, which the Gothas and Giants could not reach. The high altitude operations brought new problems loss of engine power as a result of the thin air al altij> airships incon tude, and winds which at times carried the tmcntlv over France together with much misery for their crews. Oxygen was carried, but not used steadily as it should have been, while the men suffered terribly from cold, frostbite, fatigue and exposure. ( )ne painful loss occurred over England when on the night of -June (>, 1017, the new /. IS was shut (low n in flames over Suffolk by an RFC pilot Among those lost was Slrasser's deputy,
German submarine
attacks on hospital ships. This bombing squadrons, which were being broken up and sent north to replace the RFC's heavy losses in the Battle of Arras. A far louder cry for reprisals arose after the daylight Gotha attacks on London, but the activities of the 41st Wing, established in October for reprisal bombing of German cities, belong to the next chapter. reprisal for
was the swan song
of the naval strategic
Further Reading Aschoff. Walter. Londonfluge 191 7 (Potsdam Ludwig Voggenreiter Verlag. 1940) Bulow, Hilmer von, Die Angnfte des Bombengeschwader 3 aul England (in die Luftwacht. 1927) Fredette. Raymond. The Sky On Fire (New York Holt. Rinehart & Winston. 1966) Haddow. G and Grosz. Peter. The German Giants (Putnam 1962) Jones, H A The War In The Air Vols V and (OUP 1935 and 1937) Morison, Frank. War on Great Cities (Faber & Faber 1937)
W
.
W
,
[For Dr Douglas Robinson's biography, sec
/>
991.1
Above The engineer's compartment in the port engine nacelle of a Staaken R IV One of the many remarkable requirements for the German R types was that the engines had to be serviceable in flight Below: German bombs These are of the type designed by the Test Establishment and Workshop of Aviation Troops to replace the earlier Carbomt type
From
Germany with love
1 1
1
1
Korvettenkapitiin Viktor Schutze. A frozen compass had led his flagship north inside the coast as dawn was breaking, while her Commander believed he was already over the sea. As for the Allies, this period saw only the petering out of the strategic bombing effort from Luxeuil. Operations early in 1017 were hampered by bitter winter weather. Not until January L'.'i did ten naval Sopwiths bomb blast furnaces at Burhach There
was one small
raid in February, and two in March, again on Burbach. A single Handley Page 0/100 joined the wing in April and made a lew night attacks. On April II, ~ British and r French bombers, escorted by fighters, made a day raid on Freiburg im Breisgau, dropping leaflets announcing that it was in
J! DIAMETER LENGTH
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21.6
i„ c »..
157.6
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14.3
9.8
108.2
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300
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2205
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EXPLOSIVE FUSES
46 I
12 I
2165
Right: A precarious position: the port
upper wing gunner'of aStaaken R IV en route to his post. The pusher propeller of the port nacelle is just in front of him. Gun positions on the
upper wings were common features on the Giants as they gave excellent fields of
fire.
Below: Bombing up a Gotha G V, a development of the G IV which saw service in 1918. Far right bottom: The major daylight Gotha raids over England
2166
Above: The Zeppelin Staaken R VI Engines: Four Maybach Mb IVa (245 hp) or Mercedes D .
IVa (260 hp) inlines. Armament: Up to 4,400 lbs bombs over very short distances (increased range meant more fuel and therefore less bombload) and up to four Lewis or Parabellum machine guns. Speed: 84 mph. Climb: 9,843 feet in 43 minutes (with Mb IVa engines). Ceiling: 14,174 feet. Endurance: 7-10 hours. Weight
of
empty/loaded: 17,465/26,125 lbs. Span: 138 feet 5 /2 inches. Length: 72 feet 6 inches. Right: The Gotha G IV. Engines: Two Mercedes D IVa inlines, 260 hp each. Armament: Up to 1,100 lbs of bombs and two Parabellum machine guns. Speed: 87.5 mph at 12,000 feet. Climb: 9,840 feet in 28 minutes. Ceiling: 21,320 feet. Endurance: 6 hours. Weight empty/ loaded: 5,280/7,997 lbs. Span: 77 feet 9i inches. Length: 38 feet 1 1 inches 1
German
I
I
^"
—_ JHarwich
Britain
—
airfield
British airfield
May
25 1917
June 13 1917 July
7
1917
August 12 1917
X
7\
Chelmsford
North Weald Bassetl
Hawault Farm
Snttnn't Farn
LONDON. Dartfurd
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Eastchurch
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Harrietshani Hill I
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lone
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A-
Ramsgate
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Tollbridge
llieliwmunster ' hlord
Mariakerke''
Tunbridge Wells
Staffeln 17
Lympne'
h 18
'Folkstone
(in
July)
Ghistelles
''Ghent Sunkirk
Rye
•
i\
Belgium
i
St Denis •
Lewes
Westrem-
iBrighlon
Hastings
France Lastbuurne
--. Staffeln 13 & 14
Gontrode Startel 15
|& 16
&HQ
in
June)
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$
4
,
f
i
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m
*
**
.**
The introduction of effective armament did much more than produce the fighter aeroplane — it led to the emergence of the aces, morale boosters for the
home front and
inspifr*4ion
the other pilots. At first these men were individualists for
- tjiey had to be,'for they wer But as their grew and was passed on
the pathfinders. skill
jto others, their-outstanding light was eclipsed by the
whose very numbers could overwhelm the peculiar* 'packs',
talents of the lone flyers. Thomas G. Miller. A bov&. Albert Ball's- last fight on May 17, 1917,
by NoriH«i Arnold
Left:
Max Immelmann,
the so-called Eagle
Though he achieved a victory score of 15 by the time of his death on June of Lille'
1916. his real
18,
importance lay In developing the art of aerial fighting and in boosting the morale of the German people He and his mentor, Oswald Boelcke, were the first two German aviators to be awarded the Pour le Mente. Right: Immelmann and his mount, a Fokker Eindekker. Again, the importance of the Fokker was not that
it
fighter,
was
not, but that first
a
good was was the
which it
it
true fighter
and
thus showed the way to the more efficient weapons of the future. Far right: Immelmann s
end: the collected
remnants of his Eindekker It is still uncertain how Immel-
mann died, for the Germans claim that he crashed as a result of a structural failure in his aircraft, while the British claim that he
was shot down by an > FE 2b, which before a § synchronising gear, was « the backbone of the ? RFC's fighting forces m Airborne armament of a fashion came almost immediately in the war of 1914. In most two-seater aircraft on both sides the observer managed to carry at least a cavalry carbine, and, as early as September 1914, such relatively powerful aircraft as the Voisins of the French Escadrilles V14 and V21 began to mount Hotchkiss machine guns. It was only a question of time before someone brought down a hostile aircraft. The occasion came at 1005 hours on October 5, 1914, when a Voisin of V24 flown by Sergent Joseph Frantz with Sapeur Quenault as his mechanic/gunner encountered an Aviatik B-type of Feldfliegerabteilung 18: Quenault put 47 rounds into the Aviatik
which dived into the ground and burned, killing Vizefeldwebel Wilhelm Schlichting and Leutnant Fritz von Zangen, the very first names on the long list of those who have died in air combat. Frantz' and Quenault's victory was typical of dozens of random encounters between opposing aircraft that followed. Airmen of all the armies were killed and captured as a result of such combats during the autumn of 1914 and the winter of 1914/15. But it rapidly became obvious to the flyers that fighting was a specialised task requiring manoeuvrable single-seat aircraft, not the clumsy and underpowered two seaters with which both the Allies and Central Powers were almost completely equipped. Efforts to produce such a machine began about the same time in Britain, France and Germany. The problem was to devise a means whereby a machine gun could be aimed and fired by the pilot without undue distraction from his primary duties of controlling the aircraft. Roland Garros, the famous prewar French flyer, helped by the expertise of Raymond Saulnier of the Morane-Saulnier firm, developed a steel deflector plate, wedge-shaped in cross-section, to be attached to each blade of the monoplane's propeller at the point where it was intersected by the fire from a Hotchkiss mounted on the cowling. After several unsuccessful tests, Garros and Saulnier perfected their device so that it would reliably deflect bullets striking the propeller, without harming it; the majority of the bullets fired passed between the blades. Garros now had a machine with an easily sighted gun that he could aim by controlling his
The fighter aircraft had been born. Garros first used his invention in combat on April 1, 1915. He flew up behind a German aircraft and opened fire from a range of only 30 feet. The German aircraft burst into flames and crashed behind the French lines, killing its crew. This grim event was to be repeated many thousands of times in the next four years. direction of flight.
2170
Twice more in the next three weeks Garros repeated his feat. Then on the 19th his Morane Parasol was forced down by ground fire while returning from a pointless bombing raid. He was captured and his secret fell into German hands. Garros' Morane was examined by Anthony Fokker who, according to his story, returned to his factory and within less than a week conjured up a synchronising mechanism that would enable a Spandau machine gun to be fired between the propeller blades of his M5K single-seater monoplane, an aircraft based on the Morane layout. Later research has turned up the fact that work had been in progress on this device at the Fokker works for some months, but Tony Fokker never missed an opportunity to cast himself in a starring role. At any rate when tested and demon-
M5K the mechanism worked and the German army promptly placed an order for a number of the Fokker monoplanes, which received the military designation of E I. Late in strated in the
May Fokker started on a combined demonstration and instruction tour of German operating units on the Western Front during which a small number of the best pilots in various Feldfliegerabteilungen learned to fly the machine. By the time he returned to Schwerin in mid-July, 11 pilots had received Fokker E I's, which were now in full production. Immelmann, the 'Eagle of Lille' Max Immelmann was not only one
of
Germany's
first aces,
but his
character and combat tactics might almost be regarded as typical of a good fighter pilot. Called back up as a reserve NCO upon the outbreak of the war, he applied almost immediately for aviation training and was ordered to flight school early in November 1914. He proved to be a slow pupil, but reached the front in midApril and was then assigned to the newly formed Feldfliegerabteilung 62, another of whose original members was the veteran Leutnant Oswald Boelcke. Immelmann was, in psychological terms, 'other-directed'; the impression he made on his peers and superiors was very important to him and he wanted their opinions to be favourable. Somewhat envious of Boelcke's sole stewardship of the section's Fokkers, he persuaded the more experienced pilot to take him up in one and give him a bit of dual instruction. After the first landing, Immelmann asked Boelcke to step out and made five good landings in succession. Three days later, on August 1, both went up to inter cept an RFC bombing raid on their aerodrome, and Immelmann
down an unarmed BE 2c, its sole occupant wounded. He was awarded the Iron Cross, First Class and received the congratulations of Boelcke, not unmixed with envy and incredulity at such luck. Thus started a more-or-less friendly rivalry that lasted almost a year. The two shared a victory on September 18 (which was Boelcke's third — he had rapidly caught up with his chief competitor). Five more followed in that autumn; then on a memorable day for both Immelmann and Boelcke, January 12, 1916, each shot down his eighth opponent and received the Pour le Merite, the first award of this decoration to aviators. The era of the 'ace' had dawned. During these few months of the autumn of 1915 and early forced
winter, the classic tactics of fighter aircraft evolved,
still
un-
changed in their essentials more than half a century later. As first worked out by Immelmann and Boelcke and their contemporaries, they may be summarised as follows: • The ultimate position desired in aerial combat is that where one can shoot at one's enemy at a range from which he cannot be missed while he remains unable to shoot at one. In combat, with aircraft having guns firing forward, this position is directly behind and slightly above one's opponent. If he has guns firing aft, the preferred position is directly behind and below, out of his line of fire;
• The
basic defensive manoeuvre for an aircraft attacked from forward of the beam is to turn directly toward the opponent, thus presenting as small a target as possible and, by maximising the relative speed of the two aircraft, minimising the time he can keep one in his gunsight; • The basic defensive manoeuvre for an aircraft attacked from aft of the beam is to enter and maintain as tight a turn as possible in order to make it difficult for one's opponent to get on one's tail and keep one in his gunsight; • The basic offensive manoeuvre is to turn more tightly than one's opponent, thus flying in a circle of smaller radius and eventually into a position on his tail; and • The initial approach to an enemy should be from a superior altitude, and from such natural cover, such as the sun or clouds, as is available. By using a higher altitude, the patrol area may be better surveyed, and one may convert altitude to airspeed by diving in order to overtake an opponent and the airspeed back to altitude to withdraw from combat and regain position for another attack.
The most important characteristics of a fighter aircraft thus are a high ratio of thrust to weight and low wing loading for manoeuvrability. The manoeuvres most used in combat are the simple steep turn, dive and zoom climb, and combinations of the three. More elaborate acrobatics are seldom used and almost never effective.
A peculiar individualism scarcity of fighter aircraft and their initial dispersion among observation units accustomed the first aces to flying and fighting alone. However, they probably would have done so in any case. The qualities of daring and aggressiveness that characterised the best fighter pilots were likely to be accompanied by such traits as extreme individualism, impatience with authority, egotism that could easily turn into selfishness and a taste for the fruits of military glory -decorations and popular adulation. One must remember that most of them were very young men, some scarcely out of boyhood. The few months that followed the emergence of Immelmann and Boelcke have been called 'the Fokker era' by two generations of British historians. They accurately perceived that with the Fokker E I and its principal successor, the E III, the German air forces gained a temporary material and moral ascendancy over their opponents. Interestingly enough, though, the Germans were largely unaware of the existence of this 'era'. They were too conscious of the very small number of fighter aircraft actually available to them. German records show 55 Fokker E-machines at the front on October 31, 1915 and only 86 at the year's end. The difficulty lay in the slow production of rotary engines. The Allies were no faster off the mark. Gustave Delage's classic Nieuport 11 appeared in the summer of 1915, almost simultaneously with the Fokker E I. This little sesquiplane, nicknamed Bebe, was generally superior to the German fighter in performance, its only critical deficiency being its inadequate armament of a single Lewis gun mounted on the top wing and firing over the propeller. However, the Nieuport factory was no more capable of going into large-scale production than was the Fokker. The same slow hand-building craftsmen's methods used before the war were still the norm, and by February 1916, only 210 Nieuports of all types had reached the front, mostly two-seaters. The Royal Flying Corps was still largely equipped with the products of the Royal Aircraft Factory in mid-1915, and these had not been designed with air combat in mind. The prewar Bristol
The
2171
'scouts' were made into makeshift although the original designs had not been produced
and Martmsyde single-seater fighters,
with any notion of later arming the types. The first British singleseater fighter designed for the purpose, the Airco DH2, arrived in France in ones and twos as early as December 1915, but not in squadron strength until the following February. Like the Germans, the KFC's initial disposition was to disperse its fighters as protection machines to the observation squadrons. The most marked superiority of the Fokker lay not in its performance, which was no better than those of its chief contemporary adversaries the Nieuport 1 and DH2, but in its armament. Here the British and French clearly had been out-thought and outengineered. While their fighters had to make do with shakily mounted Lewis guns fed from 47-shot drums, the German 1
machines had fixed Model 08/15 'Spandau' machine guns fed with 500-round continuous belts. Allied pilots had to change drums every 47 shots while in combat and with their guns located in the windstream, and in any case only had room to carry a maximum of four extra drums.
The next step in the evolution of fighter aviation followed almost immediately upon the emergence of Boelcke and Immelmann. It came during the Verdun campaign, which opened on February 21, 1916. The importance of that epic series of battles to both the French and the Germans led to concentrations of aircraft on an unprecedented scale. Instead of a few dozens of machines being available to each side, now it was a few hundred, but only a very few of them were fighters. The Battle of Verdun was to be the crucible of French fighter aviation and out of that desperate fighting came her first aces. When the German offensive started, only one fighter escadrille was located in that sector. Within three weeks five more had arrived and were concentrated into a group at Behonne, just outside Bar-le-Duc, a nominal total of 36 fighter aircraft. Opposing them were 21 Fokkers attached to the German Fifth Army, divided into three groups located at Bantheville, Jametz and Anvillers. The latter group was commanded by Oswald Boelcke, 1 sent down from the British front. J Boelcke, quiet but aggressive £ The few Fokkers were used singly, mostly on escort missions, except for Boelcke's two-plane Kotnmando. The quiet but aggresup to within a few feet below and behind a German aircraft, then sive Saxon continued the tactics that had brought him success stand up in his cockpit to sight his Lewis gun, trusting to the and fame, patrolling over the lines for the unwary. His first partner dubious stability of the Nieuport. It was a technique suited only having been killed in an accident, he was joined at Sivry by the to combat with unhandy, poorly armed two-seaters and utterly young Baron Erich von Althaus. It had not yet occurred to Boelcke suicidal given any kind of competent opposition. As might have to fly and fight in co-operation with another aircraft, and the two been expected, he was severely wounded in June and never fought pilots operated independently over Verdun. On the French attempts were made to substitute some order for the flamboyant individualism of their 30-odd fighter pilots, but the shortage of Nieuport 1 1 's and the heavy losses suffered by the escadrilles would have prevented them from being carried out even had the pilots been willing— which they emphatically were not. As early as February 29, 1916 before the age of the aces was much more than six weeks old, Commandant du Peuty, commanding the French air forces at Verdun, issued an order that began its end. The order specified that the mission of the fighter escadrilles was offensive patrols by several aircraft flying in formation, the
Fokker
side,
objective of
which was
to find, fight
and destroy German
This was a real innovation for the time, but
aircraft.
unspecified whether or how aircraft were to fight in formation. In the event, the French escadrilles, when they obeyed the order at all, flew together without any idea of fighting co-operatively and combats invariably degenerated into duels between individual pilots. For the Germans the heroes of the air fighting over Verdun were the peerless Boelcke, who brought down a further ten aircraft, and Althaus, whose five victories brought him up to a total of nine, for which he was awarded the Pour le Merite. The French had many more, chief among them in actual accomplishment being Jean Navarre who brought down seven, Charles Nungesser six, and Jean Chaput and Maxime Lenoir with four each. Navarre and Nungesser, both flamboyant figures, were the ones who caught the imagination of the public. Navarre was the first French ace. The son of a wealthy paper manufacturer, whose natural intolerance of authority was heightened by financial independence, he had been a military pilot since 1914 and had already been credited with two victories when the Battle of Verdun started. He shot down two within the French lines on February 26, and a further five during the next few months when his red-striped and skull and crossbones-marked Bebe became well-known to the soldiers. Navarre was reckless to the point of insanity. He claimed a distaste for killing, but took the most meticulous care to ensure that his victims did not escape. His method of attack was to fly
2172
it left
again. Nungesser, crippled and battered in a bad crash in 1915, flew indomitably for four months at Verdun, with only will power keeping him alive. His particular technique, the same as Navarre's, was based on point-blank shooting. He once confessed to a curious general that before pulling the trigger he closed his eyes:
'when
I
open them, sometimes
my
opponent
is falling,
sometimes
am
in a hospital!' Charles Nungesser, with his jingling medals, his huge car and his Paris binges the archtype of the public image I
of the ace, held a roving commission in the French air service. Despite an endless succession of wounds and crashes, he survived the war, credited with 45 victories. The struggle for the ancient citadel of Verdun cost the French almost 100 aircraft and the Germans around 30. Most of the French losses were inflicted by two-seater 'combat' biplanes, of which the LVG C II was the best. Proportionately more of the German losses were due to the French fighter pilots. The tactics were based on the individual pilot seeking targets of opportunity.
The fighter's influence grows lessons of Verdun now were to be applied on a larger scale as the centre of gravity on the Western Front shifted to the Somme. The aviation buildup for this campaign was even more impressive than for Verdun. The Royal Flying Corps concentrated 185 aircraft, the French around 201 against 129 German machines. The RFC, recognising almost as soon as the French and long before the Germans the need for concentrating fast single-seater fighters into specialised squadrons, fielded four of them, Nos 24, 29, 32 and 60. Unfortunately their equipment was riot adequate to the concept: the first three operated the flimsy, underpowered DH2, No 60 the treacherous Morane Bullet. The Germans were cursed
The
with heterogeneous equipment, KampfeinsitzerKommando Nord, one of their two fighter units, being composed of two new Halberstadt D II's, six Fokker E Ill's, one Fokker E IV and one Pfalz E IV. However, their major handicap was the fact they were grossly outnumbered. Not only did they have the aggressive, confident RFC to deal with, but the French concentrated six
*y
:
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^
C
escadrilles of Nieuports at Cachy. Thus on July 1, the day the Battle of the Somme opened, only 19 German fighter aircraft faced 66 British and about 72 French. The result of the Allied superiority was predictable; the few (lerman fighters were simply brushed aside, and British and French aircraft, although they suffered considerable losses, had effective command of the air. During July and August the Germans lost 51 aircraft in combat. No German fighter pilots achieved prominence during this first phase of the air battle. Although the Germans began the regular use of co-operative tactics, their numerical and material inferiority rendered them completely ineffective.
o
> I
g
E
Above nghf and above: Charles Nungesser, France s third highest scoring ace, who achieved 45 victories He is seen here in the cockpit of his Voisin 10 of VB 106, before his rise to fame as a fighter ace It was while flying the lumbering Voisins of VB 106 that Nungesser first gave evidence of the pugnacious spirit that was to lead him to flying fighters. He revelled in macabre individual markings, skull and crossbones, coffins and candles, perhaps in the hope that being surrounded by so many unlucky markings would ward off the real thing In fact. Nungesser's career in the air was punctuated by a series of crashes, in both cars and aeroplanes, but he survived the war only to die in an attempt to fly across the Atlantic in 1927. An impulsive and daredevil pilot, he did not hesitate to plunge into the most dangerous situations if he thought that there was even the most remote chance of success. Had he not been so impetuous, he might have ended the war with a score very near that of Rene Fonck, the Allied ace-of-aces. who reached a total of 75 victories and with whom at one time Nungesser had a great rivalry Above left Jean Navarre, an ace with 12 victories, was the first French ace to achieve widespread fame It was the concentration of German aircraft around Verdun in the early days of 1916 which gave Navarre his chance, but soon after this he was shot down and severely wounded, and did not fly again during the war He habitually wore a lady's silk stocking as a flying helmet, a bizarre but functional and
warm headgear
Max Immelmann had been killed on June 18, the British claiming that he had been shot down by an FE 2b, the Germans asserting that a fault in his synchronising gear had caused him to shoot off his own propeller. The truth of the matter will probably never be known with certainty. At any rate his death was a blow to the morale of the German public, and the authorities did not care to risk another one. Boelcke, recently promoted to Hauptmann (Captain), was now worth more as a national hero than as a soldier, and by order of the Kaiser ne was grounded and despatched on a tour of Germany's forces in the East. However, the events of July and August on the Somme overtook officialdom's attempt to preserve Boelcke under glass. Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant-Colonel) Hermann Thomsen, the de facto chief of the German army's flying forces, had decided to organise seven Staffeln (squadrons) of single-seat fighters, and Germany's most successful fighter pilot now was hastily recalled to command one. The new units were to be equipped with D-class machines (D-class denotes armed single-seater), largely the radical new Albatros D 1 and D II, with a scattering of Fokker D Ill's and Halberstadt D II's. The Albatros machines were sturdy streamlined biplanes with two synchronised machine guns. 1,000 rounds of ammunition and almost twice the horsepower of the Nieuport and DH2. Four of these Jagdstaff'eln were assigned to the First and Second Armies on the Somme, and Oswald Boelcke's Jagdstaffel 2 was one of them. Boelcke returned from Russia with two pilots from his brother's unit, both recommended as potentially good air fighters. One of them was a 37-year-old colonial called Erwin Bohme. The other was a lieutenant of Lancers, Manfred, Frciherr von Richthofen. These two were the only pilots he recruited personally- Otherwise he took whoever was sent to 2173
Below: Richthofen's at Doual early
Jasta 11
in 1917. Richthofen's Albatros D III is second from the front, without a prominent cross on the fuselage Right: A German postcard of
Boelcke and his last Boelcke was
victory
the real father of disciplined air fighting.
Far right: Undefeated in the air, Boelcke lost his life in a midair collision with his friend Erwin Bohme,
who succeeded him leader of Jasta site
page
of aces,
as
OppoThe ace
2.
left:
Manfred von
Richthofen,
who
shot
down 80
Allied aeroplanes, most of them
the
vital
two-seater
reconnaissance and artillery
spotter types.
Richthofen achieved his successes by superb shooting Opposite
page right: A morbid hobby- his victims' serial numbers as Richthofen's wallpaper
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The new age of chivalry, with knights like Guynemer, or the cold ruthlessness of hunters like Manfred von Richthofen? him. In a frantic two weeks he trained his eager fledglings to fly as a homogeneous unit rather than in the random individual patrols hitherto used, and to sacrifice individual scores for Staffel scores through teamwork. He whetted their appetites during their training period by going out alone every morning before breakfast, 1915-style, running his victories up to 25. Jagdstaffeln 1 and 3 had already been in action when Boelcke's pilots finally got their new Albatros machines and Boelcke judged them ready. On September 17 Jagdstaffel 2 burst on the startled RFC like an
avalanche.
The
Allies outclassed During the months of September-November 1916 Jagdstaffel 2 shot down 76 British aircraft for the loss of seven of its own. Together with the other two fighter Staffel n it completely reversed the air situation on the Somme. The new German aircraft completely outclassed the new Nieuport 17 and the primitive DH2, and Boelcke's tactical leadership and personal example gave to German aviation an elan it had never before possessed. In October German losses fell from 27 the previous month to 12, while Allied losses were 88. However, one of the 12 was Oswald Boelcke. In a combat on the 20th, he and Erwin Bohme collided lightly, but it was enough to make his Albatros uncontrollable. His pilots last saw him diving ever more steeply into the clouds. So died the chivalrous Oswald Boelcke, at the height of his fame. But he left German fighter aviation a legacy it was never to lose, and which was to cost many British and French lives. While Boelcke was the outstanding German hero of the Somme campaign, the British and French each produced rivals. In the RFC it was Albert Ball, in the French service, Georges Guynemer. Albert Ball was the first British ace to achieve a service-wide reputation as an air fighter and the first to become well known to
the public. A shy charming boy of 20, he was at first an indifferent pilot, a characteristic he shared with many other famous fighter pilots, including Richthofen. But his individualistic nature rebelled at the dull, hazardous routine of the observation pilot and he seized the opportunity to fly a Nieuport fighter that was assigned to No 1 1 Squadron. In this machine he began his fighting career in May 1916. Like all the early aces, his tactics started with the simple ambushing of careless or indifferently defended twoseaters. However, as he acquired experience and confidence he began to make single-handed attacks on formations of German aircraft, which at that time were mostly LVG and LFG Roland C II armed two-seaters. His preferred position was a few yards directly beneath his opponent, who he would then shoot by tilting up his single wing-mounted Lewis gun. Ball attacked, shot and escaped very quickly, taking advantage of the preoccupation of a close formation with stationkeeping. In late August he went to No 60 squadron, which had just been pulled out of the line and re-equipped with Nieuports after having suffered disastrous losses. In the congenial atmosphere provided by No 60's understanding CO, Major Smith-Barry, the temperamental Ball thrived. During the last week of August and in the following month, Albert Ball became the most successful British fighter pilot of the period. His service with 60 Squadron overlapped the arrival of the first Jagdstaffeln on the British front by only about three weeks, during which his solitary patrol habits and the wariness of experience prevented him from falling victim to the new German equipment. Indeed he shot down two aircraft of Boelcke's Jagdstaffel 2 in a week. When Ball was sent back to England on October 4, he was recorded as having crashed 10 German aircraft and 'forced to land' another 20, plus one 'out of control'. The vague categories of victory used by the RFC inflated his score far beyond the actual accomplishment, which was that he had shot down nine German aircraft. But the importance of Albert Ball did not lie in the material achievement, but in his effect on RFC morale at a time when it was being outfought by a numerically inferior enemy as a result of superior equipment and more intelligent tactics. Ball proved by example the eternal importance of aggressiveness and daring and he did so when it was of particular value to Britain.
The incomparable Guynemer The aces
often are compared to the knights of the Middle Ages, and the simile is not a bad one. It is particularly apt when applied to Georges Guynemer. The impetuosity, fierce pride and immensely strong personality of this tall, dark youth found its natural outlet in air fighting. A schoolboy m 1914. he was a legend to his countrymen when he was killed three years later Admitted reluctantly to aviation upon his peremptory demand, he went to Escadrille MS,'!, where he and his gunner scored a victory on July 19. 1915. The unit, converting to Nieuports. was sent to Verdun, but Guynemer was shot down and severely wounded
2175
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Georges Guynemer, France's most famous hero.
A solitary hunter, he finally disappeared without trace behind the
German lines Left:
France
s
most famous ace. Georges Guynemer.
the cockpit of his Nieuport Note the Lewis gun fitted to the top wing, a measure made necessary by the fact that the Allies still did not have a gun synchronising gear ready for operational use Above: His identity card Below: Guynemer and his famous Nieuport 16 amed Le Vieux Charles. Young and apparently very frail. Guynemer was turned down for military training several times, but by sheer determination got himself accepted for flying He preferred flying alone, and often flew far behind the German lines, with the result that many of his victories could not be confirmed His final score was 54 in
make
a name for himself on that front. He entered during the Battle of the Somme, shooting down on .July 16 and his 23rd in November, as that dreadful campaign was in its final throes. In tactics (luynemer, like Immelmann, used no tricks. He flew sometimes alone or, more often, with another aircraft. He rarely hesitated to attack a German formation, and his attacks were usually deadly because he was a superb shot. From the Somme he went on from success to success By the end of April 1917, he was the leading Allied ace, credited with 36 victories, most of these can be verified by historical research because so many of them were shot down within the French lines. Even when commanding his escadrille he was an enigma, a distant figure who would not lead but fought his own solitary battles. Like some hero in a myth he was doomed and knew it. But while he lived he personified the classic French
was
haustion
the older organisations, who found themselves their veterans to command the new Jagdstaffeln. The RFC received nine new fighter squadrons during the winter: however, the older fighter squadrons continued to operate the types that had been found inadequate during the Battle of the Somme. Many of the best British pilots had been lost or fought to exhaustion during that campaign, and most of the new arrivals were insufficiently trained and without combat experience. The RFC was not ready to fight another major offensive action. However, this was precisely what it had to do. Sir Douglas Haig had been directed to support Nivelle's French offensive on the Aisne, and thus was forced to undertake a large-scale attack on his front. The situation of the RFC was almost a guarantee of disaster in the air, and this was what in fact occurred. The RFC and RNAS had 385 fighter aircraft on the front for the Battle of Arras, opposed by only 114 German machines. However, the Germans were superior in every other aspect: their aircraft were better, they combined a defensive strategy with
early spring equipped
aggressive tactics, and they had high confidence in themselves and their equipment. During the month of April, 1917 — 'Bloody April' -they shot down 151 RFC and RNAS aircraft for the loss of about 70 of their own. No less than 88 of these aircraft fell to Jagdstaffel 11, commanded by Boelcke's pupil Manfred von Richthofen. He gained 21 of these victories himself, and by the end of the month had a total of 52. Other notable aces of April were Kurt Wolff of Jagdstaffel 11 with 21 victories, Lothar von Richthofen (Manfred's brother) and Karl Emil Schaefer of the same unit with 15 each, Otto Bernert of Jagdstaffel Boelcke with 11, and Sebastian Festner of Jagdstaffel 11 with 10. It was the combination of tactical skill and better aircraft that brought a victory of such magnitude to the Germans. Their tactics were the sophisticated opportunism of the true military professional: when their fast-moving formations encountered groups of aircraft of smaller size or inferior performance, they attacked persistently until all their opponents were shot down. When they found themselves dealing with superior numbers or with aircraft of better performance (only the Sopwith Triplane matched the Albatros D III at this time), they would hit and run. On May 7, 1917 another symbolic tragedy occurred, underlining
before he could
his heroic period his ninth victim
warrior
As November 1916 came, both sides were approaching exWith the exception of Guynemer and a relatively few others, the concentration of French fighters at Cachy lost its effectiveness with the appearance of the Jagdstaffeln. The singleoi two-aircraft patrols that the pilots insisted upon flying were unable to cope with the formation tactics of the Germans. The campaign that had begun so brightly ended with the French quiescenl and the British fighter pilots struggling ineffectively nsl superior equipment and tactics. The plight of the RFC was epitomised on November 23 when Major L. G. Hawker, VC, the brilliant CO of No 21 Squadron, encountered Manfred von Richthofen in single combat and was shot down after a most gallant fight Hawker, a veteran fighter pilot from the old Bristol Scout days ol L915, was almost certainly Richthofen's superior in piloting skill and was no less brave: the outcome depended solely on the immense super or its' of the Albatros 1) 11 over the 1)1 12. More or less by unspoken mutual agreement, the air fighting over the Somme drew to a close by the end of the month. During this respite the Germans continued the expansion and re-equipment of their lighter arm. The original seven Jagdstaffeln grew to 37, 3l> of which were stationed on the Western Front. The Albatros I) III followed hard on the heels of its predecessors and by i
'i
many
of the
German
units. This
expansion
difficult for
stripped of
all
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the lessons of the previous months' air fighting. A German infantry unit saw a British SE 5 emerge inverted from a low-hanging cloud and fly into the ground. Its pilot was Albert Ball, returned to France only to die. Neither he nor his aircraft showed any signs of combat injuries; without much doubt he succumbed to vertigo in the overcast and crashed before he had time to recover. It was perhaps as well that one of the supreme exponents of individual air fighting passed on at the end of the age of individualism. The surviving aces of the early period would fight on, most to die in their turn, some to adapt to the new methods and survive the war: other free spirits would emerge to fly and fight alone. But after April, 1917 the emphasis in air combat changed from the solitary ace to the tactics of interdependence and prudence.
April 1917: the end of the solitary hunter's day in the air with the arrival of the packs — the colourful German 'circuses', the elite French groupes and the constant and aggressive British patrol flights
Further Reading
Cross and Cockade Journal Cuneo, J., The Air Weapon 1870-1916 (Harnsburg. Penn.: Military Service Publishing Co. 1947)
Below
Hawker. Hawker, VC (The Mitre Press 1965) Hervouin, Guynemer Heros Legendaire (Paris Monceau 1944) Hoeppner, Gen. von, Deutschlands Kneg in der Luft (Leipzig: Koehler
The members of Jasta 1 in March 1917 From left to right, standing, are: unknown, Leutnant Hintsch, Vizeleldwebel Festner, Leutnant Emil Schaefer, Rittmeister Manfred von Richthofen (in the cockpit of his Albatros D III), Oberleutnant Kurt Wolff, Leutnant Georg Simon, Leutnant Otto Brauneck and, sitting, Leutnant Esser. Leutnant Krefft and Leutnant Lothar von Richthofen (on the ground), Manfred's brother The known total of Allied aircraft destroyed by this group of men is 204 Below: Part of the opposition the personnel of 56 Squadron, RFC Though the British did not in general band together their best pilots into special units, as did the French and Germans. 56 Squadron was one of the exceptions. From left to right, standing, an Lieutenants Gerald Maxwell. W Melville, H. Lehmann. C Knight. L M Barlow and K J Knaggs Sitting are Lieutenants C A Lewis anc J O, Leach, Major R G Blomfield, Captain Albert Ball and Lieutenant R T C. Hoidge The total victory scores of the aces in this group amounted to 124 The normal British practice was to allocate pilots, left:
1
1921)
Immelmann, Max Immelmann, The Eagle of Lille (Hamilton) Kiernan, R. H Captain Albert Ball, VC (Aviation Book Club 1939) La Doctrine de Aviation Francaise de Combat 1915-1918 .
I'
Mortane, Carre d'As (Paris Baudiniere 1934) Raleigh, Sir Walter and Jones. H A., The War in the Air (OUP 1922-1937) Richthofen. Manfred von. The Red Air Fighter (Aeroplane and General Publishing Co 1918)
THOMAS G MILLER
JR was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1926 and Penn Charter School and the United States Naval Academy He completed pilot training at Pensacola in 1952 and flew carrierbased attack and fighter aircraft as a regular and reserve officer until 1 961 He is one of the editors of the Cross and Cockade Journal of First World War Aero Historians, and has written several articles for that magazine and for the Journal of the American Aviation Historical Society He is the author of The Cactus Air Force, an account of the pilots who flew from Guadalcanal m the critical days of 1942 educated
regardless of any
skill they might possess as fighter pilots, to any need of replacements The result of this practice was that the influence and example of the better pilots was more evenly spread, and this raised the general standard of fighter squadrons On the German side, the posting of pilots of above average ability to special units meant that the remaining Stalfeln were deprived of their example
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arrival of German airships found the British totally unprepared, but their efforts to provide
The
protection were comical rather than effective
Autumn
1914: Admiralty accepts responsibility for defence of Great Britain against aerial raiders. Home Office orders all illuminated signs to be extinguished and street lights and house windows to be shaded. Persistent offenders liable to six months in gaol or £100 fine. Great increase in traffic accidents. London lakes drained to deprive the Zeppelins of landmarks. A few big guns stationed in Hyde Park, but majority of gun defences made up of pom-poms and naval 6-pounders firing useless shrapnel. RFC has 116 aeroplanes available, 20 of them obsolete trainers, the rest fit only for the scrap heap. RNAS has 50 better aeroplanes available. The two co-operate only minimally. June 1915: Commissioner of Metropolitan Police warns public to stay under cover during attacks and to have water ready to put out incendiaries. Posters of British and German aeroplane silhouettes issued. Raid on the Tyne kills 18 and causes £50,000 worth of damage. Balfour admits that inexperience is the cause of the poor defences, and that Paris attacks as it is a military fortress.
mw.
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is
more
successful in resisting
September
1915: Admiral Sir Percy Scott appointed commander which comprise eight 3-inch and four 6pounder guns. He demands more guns and searchlights, but says that only aeroplanes can halt the raiders. A committee investigating this comes to the opposite conclusion, as Paris is defended, successfully, by guns. But aeroplanes attacking Paris have to fly over the front line and along a defended corridor to attack the city, which is defended by more efficient guns in any case, and back again, unlike those bombing London. Nevertheless, airfields are provided — two in Hyde Park, one in Regent's Park and one in the grounds of Buckingham Palace. October 1915: Efficient French gun, firing HE, brought over to London, and this nearly brings down a Zeppelin. Raids on London cease temporarily. January 1916: Raid on the Midlands causes 183 casualties. Public outcry for warning system ignored, but London lighting regulations extended to Midlands and West, and clocks stopped from chiming, as this is thought to guide the Zeppelins. February 16, 1916: War Office takes over control of defences and starts reorganising them. London defence detachments and the ten RFC stations united toform 18th Wing under Sir John French. Network of 100 AA guns planned, but never realised as a result of a lack of guns. Contemporary French report shows Paris' better record in repulsing attacks, but fails to give the following good reasons: 1. German aircraft have to fly over the front and thence to Paris (see above); 2. Insufficient machines to attack Paris and London in strength; 3. London is the capital of Germany's main opponent — Great Britain. Summer 1916: Total blackout and London's AA defences rearranged in a ring around the city. First Zeppelin shot down (by Lieutenant Leefe Robinson at Cuffley). End of the major Zeppelin raids. November 28, 1916: First daylight raid by German aeroplanes — Gothas. Spring 1917: Now 12 Home Defence Squadrons, placed strategicof London's defences,
between Dover and Edinburgh and equipped with modern AA guns, searchlights and listening posts established between coast and London with telephone links between themselves and central control in London. May 25, 1917: Gothas bomb Folkestone and cause 287 casualties. Warning of new offensive ignored by Londoners. June 13, 1917: Gothas strike at London. 594 casualties. Angry public demands more efficient defences and retaliation against V'LI I1K1II V. X l»U L.ICUIV iVi OUUUU1 V/ilO l.\.Ull*,VA UWIU A lUllVV ll/l Home Defence duties. Lloyd George says that no reprisals will take ally
machines. Groups of
V.
1
place — they are against the national character (in fact there are no aeroplanes available!). As a result of this raid, many boroughs in the south and east of London institute their own shelters, warning systems etc. July 7, 1917: 22 Gothas bomb London, causing considerable damage. 100 RFC pilots go up, but individual attacks prove fruitless.
July
17, 1917: Official warning system introduced: for day raids policemen on bicycles warn population and Boy Scouts sound the all-clear, while maroons give the signal at night. July 1917: Major-General Ashmore takes over as commander of London's defences. Separate operational zones allocated to aeroplanes and guns so that the two do not clash with each other as previously. Gun barrier 20 miles east of London established, nearby fire brigades warned to be available to aid in fires in London and balloon aprons around London set up.
August 1917: End of the daylight raids. September 3, 1917: Night attack by Gothas.
Opposite page, top: The roof of the Central Telegraph Office after a 112-lb bomb had been dropped on it during the raid of July 7, 1917. Though German bombs caused the majority of the damage and casualties, many other minor casualties were caused by the fragments of British AA shells falling on the large number of civilians who remained outside to observe the novel sight of the bombing rather than taking cover. Opposite page, bottom left: Boy Scouts being briefed by a policeman. The Scouts blew the all-clear on their bugles after a raid was over. Opposite page, bottom right: The room in the Central Telegraph Office immediately below the roof in the photograph above. One man was killed and four were injured by this bomb. Above: Part of the balloon apron around London. Realising that German night bombers took advantage of the darkness to fly at lower altitudes with an increased bomb load, the British put up balloon aprons in the main approach routes to London, hoping to cause the bombers to crash into them before reaching London or to fly higher, with a consequent decrease in their load and bombing accuracy. Below: A wrecked Gotha. It was the large number of operational accidents, rather than the British countermeasures, which hamstrung the German bbmbing effort
131 naval ratings
and 88 seriously injured in Chatham. First fighter aircraft manage to take off and land in darkness. General Ashmore orders all fighters to operate by night from this time on. September 4, 1917: Only ten out of 22 raiders reach London as a result of harassment by fighters and guns. September 24-28, 1917: Beginning of 'stream' raids over London -a procession of German aeroplanes flies over the capital and bombs, keeping Londoners awake for several hours. General Smuts asked to investigate and report on means of combating the German night raiders. Newspapers asked not to print stories and pictures of the results of the raids so as to keep up public morale. killed
Defences again improved: step patrols for aeroplanes introduced machines flying as a team at different levels), AA batteries, lights and listening posts better co-ordinated. Guns fire barrages, rather than at individual bombers. Dover provides shelters for 25,000 of its inhabitants in the caves around the town. September 30, 1917: 12,700 shells fired at the raiders over London, which forces them off course. By the end of October, the heavy barrage has put off would-be raiders. (four
1
.
v
/
\
/ #^l
.%*
What was it like learning to fly in the early days of aviation?
Initially,
methods were
crude, quite naturally. But the art progressed at a fairly quick pace, and by the time the
war broke out many competent pilots had been 2182
/
/
\ V
^s
\
/
turned out by the schools. The war altered all this, however. More and more pilots were needed, and to produce the number required meant that training programmes had to be curtailed, and the standard thus fell. Moreover the arrival of the Fokker Eindekker proved that the type of training given had been of the wrong sort. The result was a very difficult and bloody period for the RFC, a period that continued until the arrival of Smith-Barry and his new school of flying. C. M. Chant. Above: One of the great training aircraft, the Bristol Boxkite 2183
Above: A Sopwith Pup. Tractable, delightful to fly and viceless, the Pup was relegated to training after it had become obsolete as a front line aeroplane. In training, its main use was as an advanced trainer, in which a pupil could learn the feel of the sort of aircraft used in combat after he had become proficient on the ordinary school machines Below: In 1918, the RFC started putting out diagrams such as this to help novice pilots get to know the sort of tactics they would meet on the front. All too often in the years before, pilots had been thrown into combat with no idea of what to expect
'
PO« IT 'Q*i
•COUT TOILS CNKMY» ATTSMPT «Y IMMEDIATE TURN IN OPPOSITE OIWCCTION
INCORRECT METHOO THE NATURAL INCLINATION Of THE ATTACKER. IT INEXPERIENCED. IS TO TURN IN THE SAME direct uri ano fOLLOv*. THIS RESULTS IN GIVING THE ENEMY JUST THE OPPORTUNITY ME DESIRES i
{£
v
A HOSTILE TWO-SEATER WHEN ATTACKED rROM BEHIND AND BELOW ALMOST INVARIABLY TURNS WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING- THE OBSERVERS GUN TO BEAR ON THE ATTACKER THIS MANOEUVRE CAN BE EFFECTIVELY COUNTERED BY TURNING AT FIRST IN THE THEN TAKING OPPOSITE DIRECTION AND
V
SPEED AND
ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR
HANOINESS. TURNING AFTER THE ENEMY ANO AGAIN COMING UNDER HIS TAIL this
M
tstfie fmptrij/af h G&trnmtnt and is intended fot Official us* only
diognim
Art
OUTMANOEUVRED.
2184
:
ItCMMCM U
Oil
|
IH*
,
-
21 S
Hi
The Wright brothers had made their first successful heavierthan-air, controlled and sustained aeroplane flight in December 1903. But not until 1906 was flight of a sort achieved in Europe, and it was only in 1908, at the first aerial race meeting, organised by the French champagne industry and held at Le Mans near Rheims, that European aviators realised the full extent of the progress made by the Wrights — they were far ahead of their European rivals. The appearance of Wilbur Wright at Le Mans was therefore a huge incentive to the fledgling European flying community, in a personal way because Wilbur Wright showed how patience and research could be used to achieve consistent advance in a new field, and in a technical way because Europe got the chance to see the most advanced flying machine in the world, the aeroplane its own flyers would have to beat. In a way, then, 1908 should be looked upon as the date of the true birth of flight in the world -until that date only the Wrights knew how to fly, the other claimants to the title of flyer having made only the most insignificant and paltry hops in comparison. After the Rheims Aviation Week, the development of flight in Europe advanced with great speed and enthusiasm, while on the other side of the Atlantic it underwent a reversal, for too few were sufficiently interested to maintain a lively progress in the art. In the early days of flight there was a fundamental difference of opinion on the form flying should take, in a way analogous to the use of the car and the horse. A majority of the flying community believed that the aeroplane should be an ordinary means of travelling, like the newly-triumphant car, and as such should be inherently stable. The pilot of this sort of aeroplane would be virtually nothing more than a chauffeur, directing the course of his vehicle but doing very little else, and leaving the actual flying to the machine itself. The main exponent of this form of flying was the Frenchman Gabriel Voisin, whose aeroplanes, for this reason, were great, lumbering, strongly-built and inherently stable machines which perambulated sedately around the skies in considerable numbers. The other school of flight believed not only that the aeroplane should be fully controllable by the pilot (as were the majority of the aeroplanes built by the other school of thought), but also that this controllability should be used. The aim of this school was therefore to avoid inherent stability, so that the pilot might control his machine fully, as the rider docs his horse The adherents of this belief were the showmen of the skies, who were already thinking in terms of flying exhibitions and the like, where manoeuvrability would be a great asset. But in the infancy of flying, it was almost inevitable that the chauffeur
approach should prevail, when it was still an achievement to get an aeroplane into the air, let alone having to worry about the problems of controlling an unstable machine The first aviators were, naturally enough, self-taught There was no one to teach them, and so they had to learn to fly empirically. Casualties were few and far between because the aircraft were so underpowered and inadequate aerodynamic-ally that even if they did crash, it was only from a lew feet up and at a low Bpeed, the pilot standing a good chance of surviving the misfortune Learning by experiment, the pioneers of flight gradually taught themselves how to control their elementary machines once tho\ had managed to get them into the air. First, the would-be flyer did straight runs across the aerodrome, without allowing the wheels to leave the ground, increasing the speed run by run until the aircraft was almost leaving the ground, in this way getting to know the feel of the aircraft and how the controls affected the run of the machine. Then came the first powered hop, just a few feet off the ground, and straight so that the aircraft touched down further across the grass field used as an aerodrome Once this had been mastered, the novice pilot could progress to gentle turns, circles, figure eights, vol-plane landings landings with the engine off) and finally cross-country flights. Once the first generation of pilots had learned to fly. things were much easier for the novice — he could now be told how he might control the machine, and what was likely to happen in given circumstances. But the process was still one that had to be learned by the novice on his own, for there were no such things as dual-control aircraft- indeed, aircraft of the early days were able to carry only one person, so that once the novice was aloft, he was on his own, with only his own skills and imagination to help him. Even if there were two seats, the controls were only arranged for one person to use them. A good description of this early empirical method of learning to fly appears in Graham Wallace's book Claude Grahame-White, about one of the great pioneers of British aviation. After working in the factory where his Bleriot Type XII was being built, Grahame-White was too eager to wait for the arrival of the mechanics who were to assist ,
i
him
and started early practice one day with a runs across the aerodrome and a near accident, the two Englishmen had to try a flight. For 20 exhilarating minutes they careered to and fro, until Grahame-White thought he had mastered the controls. in his first flight
friend. After high-speed
'It's a flying machine, isn't it?' he shouted above the roar of the engine. 'Then let's see if it can fly!' Fleetwood Wilson nodded in speechless agreement. Grahame-White recalled everything he had observed other pilots do on take-off. He checked the wind direction and taxied to a far corner of the parade-ground for the longest possible run. He opened the throttle wide, and the White Eagle bounded forward. Tentatively he eased back the cloche, as the joy-stick was known, and with blood-quickening elation realised that the abrupt cessation of vibration meant the wheels had left the ground. They were airborne! With a reassuring grin at his companion he essayed a more positive movement of the elevators. The ground receded with a sickening rapidity, and he hastily levelled off. Only a few seconds — and now he had to land, the trickiest of manoeuvres, as he well
The perpetual
struggle:
the chauffeur outlook and inherent stability against the rider
view and
full controllability
knew. More by luck than down.
skill
he brought off an impeccable touch
-
They sat in breathless silence, overwhelmed bx the sensations of flight. 'Ready?' asked Grahame-White when his pulse rate was back to normal. 'Let's try again With mounting confidence he continued to fly from end to end of the parade ground, consistently improving his handling of the White Eagle. Thus the pioneers taught themselves to fly. But with the increasing popularity of aviation, it soon became clear that something better would have to be developed. Plying schools were springing up all over Western Furope, especially in France, and to make full use of their facilities competent pilots had to be turned out at the minimum expense, and novice pilots trained under the current methods were very prone to breaking the machines of the schools, with a consequent loss of revenue. '
Dual control? The next method was used most extensively by the flying schools run by the British and Colonial Aeroplane Company, at Brooklands and at Larkhill on Salisbury Flam This development was a step towards full dual control, and was used on the schools' most common aeroplane, the Bristol Boxkite This could carry two people, who had to sit in an exposed position over the leading edge of the lower wing First of all. the pupil underwent a series of lectures explaining the theory of flight as it was understood at the time Then he went for a series of short flights with the instructor, who would explain what he was doing as he flew the aeroplane. When the- pupil was judged to have picked up sufficient knowledge to give him some likelihood of controlling the machine adequately, the instructor would allow him to take over the control column, which controlled the aeroplane in pitch and roll. Here, however, the Boxkite was an unfortunate machine, tor the novice sat behind the instructor. So. in order to learn how to manoeuvre the machine in pitch and roll, the novice had to reach past his instructor and try to get the hang of this difficult staue of instruction when in an awkward and, more important, unnatural position. When the instructor thought the pupil could control the aeroplane with a fair degree of competence, the two would change positions and the pupil would have full control o\ the machine, tor he could now use the rudder bar as well as the control column. In an emergency, the instructor hoped that he could reach across his pupil and regain control of the aeroplane himself. After a few flights with the instructor, the pupil was then sent off to do a short solo flight on his ow n. and if this proved satisfactory, he could then progress to the more difficult lessons of cross-country flights and tin- like An excellent description of this second sta.ue the evolution of flying training appears in the book Recollections of an Airman
m
A
who learned to fly at a school at the London Hendon run by Claude Grahame-White. When I learned to fly, things had progressed greatly. We knew that the machines into which they put us would fly, and we had expert instructors who could tell us how to fly them. All we had to do, so to speak, was to obey the instructor's directions and fly, which, of course, sounds a good deal easier than it really was. At any rate I never had any dual-control work before I took my A Licence, which I succeeded in obtaining about three weeks after I started my course of instruction. This was about the average tune it took in those days. I got a good deal of ground instruction, however, and in my opinion this is neglected in the majority of flying clubs today. It is so easy to impart when the weather is too bad for actual flying. Our ground instruction consisted chiefly in sitting in a machine, which teas put up on adjustable trestles— fore and aft and on the wing tips. In this we were shown the effect of the controls, and we had to learn thoroughly (by instinct rather than experience based on vision! what should be the machine's attitude in regard to the ground when taxying, how to get the tail up to the correct height to gain flying speed in the shortest possible distance and how to take off. We were also taught the proper angle of climb and how to make gentle turns, glide down, flatten out to land, etc. Our instructor made quite sure that we knew almost instinctively the correct procedure for a wheel landing Handing with the tail up and a proper three-point landing before he would even let us taxi the machine. Then we learned to control the machine on the ground, after which we were allowed to indulge in straight flights a few feet off the ground. Finally we passed onto half-circuits, circuits (first left-hand and then right-hand) and figures-of-eight. My actual flying time before taking my ticket was only three and a half hours, which shows the value of the ground instruction we by
1.
Strange,
Aerodrome
at
|
got in those days.
perhaps wrong to describe Strange's training as belonging second stage of flying training, for he got no dual instruction in the air as the aeroplane he was using was a Caudron with only a 35-hp Anzani engine. This would have proved unequal to the task of taking off with two people aboard. His training, however, was very thorough and progressed gradually and methodically, and he benefited from all the experiences of the first stage. After he had learned to fly on the Caudron, Strange went on to finish his instruction on a Boxkite in the manner already described. His Boxkite instructor (Louis Noel, a Frenchman) had 'a forceful way of expressing himself (to pupils about to go solo): "I have told you how to fly; you have understood? Yes? Well, I give you the last chance to say No. Very well, you can fly, do you hear? I, Louis Noel, say you can fly; I speak no more. I go to the bar; if you commit suicide, that is bad, but if you almost do that, it will be much, much worse for you."' Throughout both these stages in the development of flying training, it must be remembered that the 'chauffeur' school of thought was dominant in flying circles. For the period up to the beginning of the war this view was entirely justified on the grounds of safety and aircraft capabilities, even if it was short sighted. In these early days of flight, the theory of flight was very imperfectly It
is
to the
2186
Top: A Bristol Boxkite This aeroplane formed a vital link in the development of training from the single-seat to dual control type Centre: Claude Grahame-White, one of the great figures in the pioneer days of flying, especially in the promotion of safety and adequate training Above: A Maurice Farman S 7 Longhorn Together with its derivative, the Shorthorn, this was the premier early training machine
understood, and it was not realised what the various positions an aeroplane might get into in the course of aerobatics might do to the airflow round the machine, and consequently how control response might be affected. Moreover, in order to get the machines to fly on the small amount of horsepower available from early aeroplane engines, the whole machine had to be very light. The best place to economise in weight, indeed the only place on early aeroplanes, was in the airframe, and these were thus extremely flimsy. This did, however, have the beneficial side effect that the structure broke up in a crash, and this afforded the pilot some degree of protection. Louis Bleriot is reported to have said: A man who keeps his head can never be injured through a fall. If one falls one must not try to save both the machine and oneself. I always throw myself upon one of the wings of my machine when there is a mishap, and although this breaks the wing, it causes me to alight safely.' Bleriot was something of an authority on crashes — he was perpetually being pulled from the wreckage of his machines by his mechanics! To return to the point, however For reasons of weight economy. then, early aeroplanes had a flimsy structure. This, combined with the not very advanced state of stressing aeroplane structures, meant that early types were not suitable for aerobatics. Such aerobatics as were performed were done by daring men m especi-
experimental stations and the companies producing aeroplanes what they should learn. Aerobatics now had to come into the curriculum of flying training of all pilots, whether they were destined for scout squadrons or not. In fact, the ability of any pilot to perform aerobatics quickly and smoothly became the criterion of whether or not he went to a fighter squadron or to one operating bombers or reconnaissance machine.No longer could the air forces of the world afford to select pilots in the way Cecil Lewis describes his own selection, at a time when he was below the age for enlistment. Arriving from school. Lewis was interviewed by I.ord Hugh CecU: 'Were you in the Sixth'' 'Yes, sir- Upper Sixth. Er-a year under the average, sir.' 7 see. Hon old are yon?' 'Almost IS. sir.' Liar' You were 17 last month.) 'Play any games?' Yes, sir. I got my School Colours at Fues. and captained the House on the river. I should hate got my House Colours for Rugger this year if I'd stayed; but '.Fires, you say? You should have a good eye. then.' Yes. I suppose so. sir.' 'Does Fires need a good eye' Well, he seems to think so. Fm getting on all right
lengthened machines Training continued along these lines up to the beginning of the war and indeed into the war For in the first year of hostilities, the main use of the aeroplane was for reconnaissance, and here the chauffeur idea was quite reasonable, for the aeroplane was merely a means of getting an observer to the place from which he could see what the opposition was doing and back again alter he had seen what he wanted. In this sort of war flying the pilot was nothing but a chauffeur, though the more adventurous were already beginning to see further ahead. Hut in the late summer and autumn of 1915 the whole concept of war flying changed with the arrival of the f'okker Eindekker. To avoid being shot down, aeroplanes had to take evasive manoeuvres, and this pilots were not adequately trained to do Those already at the front had to learn by experience how to avoid the Kokker (which, luckily, was not a very strong machine and could therefore not stand being thrown about) or be shot down. The lesson of manoeuvrability now had to be learnt by pilots and designers alike. The latter had to design machines that could be stunted without breaking up, so that the pilot could use the manoeuvrability now afforded him to avoid attack or to put himself in a good position to attack another aeroplane, while the former had to learn to make good use of his new-found agility.
Six foot three, sir.' 7 don't think you could get into a machine.' Lord' He's going to turn me down. He mustn't 'Why, sir'' turn me down!) 'Well, they're not built for young giants like you. you know.'
ally
st
at
to find out
'
'You're very
tall.'
Oh
Couldn't
A slow
I try.
sir''
smile, a pause, then
Y,
s, I
suppost so
I'll u rib
note to
01 at Hounslow.' There are exceptions to ever) rule, but what, basically, was needed m pilots was south (reactions are quicker good eyesight, excellent health, an average size it is difficult to accommodate verj large or verj small [X'ople in the cockpit' and a lively intelligence (to weigh up conditions, and the tactic- to he adopted in view of them, quick 1} and accurately Typical of the training still being received as airmen on the fronts were beginning to realise the full demands that were going to he made on their acrobatic >kills is Cecil Lewis' first solo, made after he had had only one and a half hours' dual: Yates, my / had trundled around the aerodrome with S instructor, doing left-hand circuits, and made a few indifferent the
'
.
I
I
landings.
You'd Yes.
better
go solo
this afternoon, if the
wind drops
sir.'
Remember to
The
birth of aerobatics This, of course, took time. The designers had to conduct much research into aerodynamics and aircraft controllability especially .
the hitherto dreaded spin, which the brilliant Farnborough test pilot frank doodden had clone so much to clear up. The pilots had to learn their new antics, but first they had to wait for first-hand accounts from the front to find out what were the best tactics to adopt and then ally these with the results of test flying by pilots
Yes.
sir.'
i
take plenty of room to get off Last week George had neglected that important point,
caught the upper lip of the concrete, and gone w.<\ tars$ down into the meadow on the other side.) 'Get your tail well up before you try to take her off. Don't climb under 7,5. and when you come down, keep her at 55 until you want to land. If you're at .100 feet oicr the Members' Bridge you'll get in all right.' (Sandy had misjudged it two days ago. and floicn into the sewage farm' Hoic ice had laughed.' >
.
.
'Yes, sir.' in the nacelle of the IFarman) Longhorn, the engine ticking in ei the instructor laming over the side. 'Run her up.' Stick back, throttle slowly forward. 1,200 revolutions |. 'She'll do.' Chocks
Alone .
(
over the bumpy ground. How difficult to steer right down the aerodrome with a following wind! Give her a bit of throttle, rudder round she comes. Throttle back. Take a deep breath. Try the controls. Rudder — Elevator — Ailerons God! Who said they wanted to fly? How the heart pumps! Waiting for the pistol at the school races last year! Just the same — sick, heart Well, come on! Can't stay here all night! pumping, no breath Throttle full open, elevator forward We're hardly moving. The revs are all right. Why doesn't the tail lift? What's the speed? 30! She'll never get up, though 40! Ah! It's coming up! We shall soon fly into the track! Steady now. Don't pull her off too soon! 45! 50! Now! Ease back the stick! Gently, gently Bounce Bounce Bounce She's lifting! She's away! 45! Keep her down, man! For god's sake keep her down, we shall stall! Easy does it. Ah! We'll clear the track after all Steady now There it goes, well underneath. Now I can breathe. Keep her at 50. That's it. Good Now, what about a turn? Just a little left rudder. Bank. Ease her round I'm getting oh all right. What's the height' 500. That'll do. That's safe enough And so round the track, getting confidence, turning, turning, always left Try a right turn now. Now oh, she's shuddering. There's something wrong! Straighten! Quick! Straighten! No, it's (ill right Funny, that vibration. Must report it when I get
away. Taxi slowly.
Away .
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down. When I get down! How the hell do I get down? (Young Johnson, a week or two back, was frightened to come down, flew round and round the aerodrome for an hour until his petrol gave out, and then crashed on landing.) The engine keeps me up. If I shut it off What did he say? Put your nose down before we shall fall shutting off. Let's try it God! Stomach in your mouth like a scenic railway! How I hate scenic railways! Horrible things. Try again. Throttle back and nose down together That's better! .
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That's it! Keep her at 55 How quiet it is without the engine! Look out! 60, 65. Nose up a bit. Shall we get in? Yes. No. A bit more engine. That's it. There go the pines underneath. Lovely woods look from the air! Mossy. Now shut off again. Steady. Now Now! Hold your breath. Ease her back. Gently Quick! You're flying into the ground! Pull her up! Up! Not too much That's it. Now why don't we land? We're stalling. Engine, quick! Bang! Bounce! Bounce! Bounce! Rumble! Rumble rumble We're down! Hurrah! We're down! I've done it! I haven't crashed! I've .
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done it! Pause for a minute .
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theory was available, few to translate the findings of the test pilots into practical flying possibilities, so that events like spinning were still taking a heavy toll of less experienced pilots when there was a means of recovery. It just needed teaching, first to
to
.
.
.
instructors
had taken the trouble
and then
to pupils.
• What was needed was
a permanent, skilled, trained and dedicated corps of instructors to replace the present group of inferior pilots and those eager to get back to the front, though the latter could do much to aid novices by giving talks and keeping the schools of aerial gunnery and fighting fully posted on the latest fighting tactics.
•
Proper training aeroplanes were needed to replace the obsolete inefficient aeroplanes then used for training. It was wasted effort to teach a man to fly on a Farman Longhorn and then have to retrain him to fly something nearer a combat type. What was needed was something with a reasonable performance and handling characteristics approximating to current combat types. For this the Avro 504 was ideal. All that was needed was to turn it into a full dual-control aeroplane and devise some means of letting the instructor in the rear cockpit communicate with his pupil. This was done by fitting a tube to the machine. The instructor spoke into one end, and the pupil, who had the other end attached to his flying helmet, could hear. • Training needed to be made much more systematic, starting with the instructors and then moving on to the pupils. The instructors must first be educated in a homogeneous system of training, and this had then to be taught to all pupils. The system was based on the latest scientific knowledge, the use of the best aeroplanes available and, most important, the instillation into the pupil of confidence — confidence to fly his aeroplane almost to the limit, at any height, relying on his ability to correct any position the machine might end up in, i.e. that he might be able to control the aeroplane in any altitude. Smith-Barry pestered General Trenchard with letters to this effect while he was in France, and it is one of Trenchard's great achievements that he found the time to read and realise the value of Smith-Barry's suggestions. At the end of 1916, Smith-Barry was sent home to organise his scheme at Gosport, using No 1 Reserve Squadron as a nucleus. The scheme was an enormous success. Once Smith-Barry had collected his instructors and trained them, the first course of training produced its first batch of pilots in nine weeks instead of the usual 15, and the pilots were much better than average. Later in 1917, the Gosport School received its
and
first
.
get your breath. Good boy! You've done it! Phew! Thank God it's over! Now, come on! Taxi up to the sheds in style. Confidence. That's the way! Show 'em. Good! Switch off. Mechanics examine the undercarriage. 'Any damage?' 'Nao! These 'ere airioplanes '11 stand anything!' And so flying training continued, inadequately. The demands of war made huge calls on the output of the various flying schools, now greatly augmented in number. Originally, all military pilots had been trained at civilian schools, but soon the navy and the army built their own schools, and these were greatly expanded and added to after the beginning of the war. Demands from the front were so great that pilots had to be sent out there with only a few hours solo to their credit. It was a lucky novice who had flown the type of machine used by his squadron before he had to fly it in combat. Consequently casualties were very high, especially among the new pilots, but the High Command correctly said that casualties must be accepted in the hour of crisis, the end of 1916 and the beginning of 1917, to maintain aerial superiority. Training itself was also hit, for the squadrons about to go overseas were loathe to leave behind a competent pilot to become an instructor, in exchange for a novice pilot, who would be a liability to himself and his squadron. Thus instructors tended to be inferior pilots, who did not make able teachers, and- wounded or resting front line pilots, whose heart was not in the job — they wanted to get back to the front. The same applied to the aerial gunnery and advanced flying schools, to which newly qualified pilots were posted to learn about fighting rather than just flying, always given the proviso that demands from the front did not preclude this. Onto this not altogether fortunate scene now appeared a remarkable man, R. R. Smith-Barry, and his creation, the third stage in the evolution of flying training. In 1916 Smith-Barry was in command of an RE 8 squadron on the Western Front, and he was appalled by the quality of the new pilots posted to him. The basic material was good, but the standard of training given new pilots was no longer adequate to give new pilots even a fair chance of survival on the Western Front. He correctly diagnosed the basic faults in the training given these novices and concluded:
2188
• Though more advanced aerodynamic
pilots or instructors
Avro 504's and training got successively
better.
Great credit must go to Smith-Barry's system for the way in which British pilots were to a great extent able to cope with better German machines later in the war by using their superior fighting abilities. The proof of the pudding is in the eating: when the effects of Smith-Barry's training made themselves felt, British aerial casualties declined. In addition, the system is the basis of nearly every flying training system in use all over the world today. Flying training started by showing the pilot how to take his machine wherever he wanted to go whenever the weather was reasonably good; Smith-Barry showed the pilot that he should and could control his machine in almost any circumstances and in conditions that would have grounded even the most courageous pilot of even a few years before his own time.
Further Reading Any first hand accounts of the First World War in the air Bishop, W. A., The Courage of the Early Morning (Heinemann 1966) Cole, C, McCudden VC (Kimber 1967) Douglas of Kirtleside, Lord, Years of Combat (Collins 1963) Gould Lee, A., No Parachute (Jarrolds 1968) Grinnell-Milne, D., Wind in the Wires (Hurst & Blackett 1966) Lewis, C, Sagittarius Rising (Peter Davies 1936) McCudden, J. T. B., Five Years in the Royal Flying Corps (Portway) Raleigh, Sir Walter and Jones, H. A., The War in the Air (OUP) Recollections of an Airman (Hamilton) R C.F.S. (Putnam) Wallace, G., Claude Grahame-White (Putnam 1960) Yeates, V. M., Winged Victory (Cape 1934) [a novel] Strange,
L. A.,
Taylor, J W.
,
CHRISTOPHER CHANT was born in Cheshire in 1945 and was brought up in Tanganyika in the twilight of the British Empire He was educated at the King's School, Canterbury and at Oriel College. Oxford, where he took a degree in Literae Humaniores (Philosophy and Ancient History) He has been interested in and devoted to military history, in particular aviation history (especially the period up to 1914), for many years, and hopes to make his career in this field At the moment he is an Assistant Editor on History of the First World War. concerned mostly with research on maps and statistics He now lives in East Anglia
To take the pressure
THE BATTLE
fast collapsing into
off the French army, mutiny, thousands of
British and Dominion troops were thrown in east of Arras to prolong a flagging offensive. Inevitably the Germans reciprocated, and once more the 'doctrine of attrition' began to exact its bloody toll. Captain A. D. Baker. Below: Digging out a ditched tank on newly captured ground
OF THE SCARPE *#
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Iii spite <>f the great victory achieved by the British armies in the opening phases ol the Battle ol Arras, Sir Douglas Haig never believed that 'any great strategical results were likely to be gained' by followuccess and he considered that 'it would have been possible to have stopped Ik- Ana-, offensive at this point, and to have diverted forthwith to the northern theatre of operations the troops. laboui and material required to complete preparations there' But Haig was not a free agent. The Arras offensive had been launched as part of General Nivelle's Btrategic plan for a decisive breakthrough on the Western Front in 1917, and as such was subsidiary to the French operations on the Aisne The great French offensive, launched on April 16, 1917. and from which so much was expected, began badly and continued against a background of i
.
.
.
rising concern
and disappointment, which
inevitably gave rise to questions about the value of its prolongation. In these circumstances it became all the more important for Haig to press on with his attacks in order to draw German attention away from Nivelle. Consequently, pressure was maintained along the British front so that the greatest possible assistance could be rendered to the French and that British troops would be ready to back up and exploit fully
Vimy Ridge, the high ground extending down to the River Scarpe, and the low hills stretching southwards from the river. The
any major success.
excellent
On
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Sir Douglas Haig informed his army commanders that there was to be a pause of several days before any further attacks on the Arras front were to be launched. His object was to prepare for a
April
l.
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well co-ordinated operation; attacks being launched by his army commanders were designed not only to follow up the successes of the early phases of the Battle of Arras but also to make their forward positions more tenable. The ground over which the battle was to be continued is dominated bv the large
scale,
the local
observation from this high ground, for which the British army had paid a high price, soon proved its value: the artillery, controlled by direct observation, repeatedly destroyed German forces as they concentrated for an attack, or advanced towards the British lines. From the base of the ridge and the line of hills the ground slopes gradually downwards towards the east, the monotony of the undulating open plain only occasionally relieved by patches of woodland, lines of trees along the roads, and numerous straggling villages. The marshes along
the valleys of the River Scarpe and the River Sensee form the only natural barriers to the east of the high ground, but the many re-entrants along the southern half of the front provided extensive areas of dead ground, which the attacking formations made good use of as assembly areas and which the Germans utilised skilfully in the siting of thenpositions. At a meeting on April 16 with General Allenby (Third Army), General
Home (Fifth
(First Army) and General Gough Army) Haig outlined the plans for
the next assault, along the line GavrelleHendecourt to be launched in four days time, the attack being preceded by a local operation to secure the village of'Guemappe
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included in the general attack, in order German defence to distribute its fire over a wider area. For his part General Gough of Fifth Army indicated that he would prefer to launch his assault against Riencourt and Hendecourt when Third Army had reached the River Sensee. Haig, adopting his normal policy of respecting the wishes of the commander on the to force the
spot, reduced Fifth Army's role to artillery support, included Guemappe in the objectives for the general assault and allotted to First Army the task of carry-
ing out a local attack just south of Lens in place of part of its attack on the OppyMericourt line. High winds, poor visibility and the obvious strength of the enemy in artillery and infantry, which totalled nine divisions against the nine British and Canadian divisions assigned to the assault, forced a postponement until the artillery was redeployed forward and communica-
had been restored. was not until Monday, April 23. at 0445 hours that the attacks began on a tions It
nine-mile front against the line Gavrelle-
18. It soon became clear that the various corps and divisional commanders were not happy with the plans as laid before them, particularly with the local operation against the village of Guemappe which the Commander of VII Corps, Lieutenant-General Haldane, preferred to have
on April
Above: A British Mark tank, destroyed by a grenade attack immediately after crossing the British line into No-Man's Land. Once again the tanks' performance was disappointing, for when the attack was reopened on April 23 only 19 were fully serviceable, and of these about half broke down on going into action. Below: Expecting a British assault to loom out of the thick mist, German troops crouch in readiness behind their shell-torn wire I
Roeux -Guemappe- Font aine-les-Croisilles. Haig's final plans for the Second Battle of the Scarpe were for the First Army to capture La Coulotte and Hill 65 just south of Lens and the village of Gavrelle. The possession of Gavrelle was important in order to protect the left flank of Allenby's Third Army, whose objectives were Greenland Hill and the village of Roeux north of the River Scarpe, to the south, the Bois du Vert, the Saint Rohart factory and the spur beyond the River Sensee between Cherisy and Fontaine-les-Croisilles. The objectives for this operation were minimal, no deep penetration of German defences was expected and it was certain that this battle and those that would follow would not be as spectacularly successful as that on the first day of the Arras battle when, by great preparation and surprise, magni-
ficent results
had been achieved
1
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2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, which managed on to a section of the Hindenburg
rLine opposite Fontaine-les-Croisilles.
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along
to hold
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all
the line. Instead bitter struggles of attrition were expected: the Germans were no longer uncertain of the point of attack but fully organised and well prepared to put into operation Ludendorff's system of flexible defence. This comprised forward defensive positions, thinly held with just sufficient troops to maintain the continuity of the line, and to provide centres of resistance to disorganise the attacking force, while the troops saved by this method of deployment were used to strengthen the divisional reserves. These were kept sufficiently close to the front to be able to counterattack almost immediately, before a firmly established line of defence could be organised by the assaulting infantry. Along the whole front the fighting was hard, nagging and bitter as the troops, exposed to the murderous fire of the German machine guns, pushed forward into the valley of the Scarpe and over the open plain to the north and south of it. In the south, on VII Corps" front, Lieutenant -General Snow's divisions were deployed with the 33rd Division on the right, the 30th in the centre and the 50th on the left. All three divisions made progress in the early part of the attack. nearly all the leading battalions securing their objectives. By 0730 hours the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers had reported that all was peace and quiet". Little of the ground gained, however, was held in the face of fierce German counterattacks which began at about 1100 hours and succeeded in driving the British troops back to their start lines. Two companies of the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland High- E landers and the 1st Middlesex, who man- I aged to press on, were cut off and surround- I ed, and likewise the two companies of the |
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Further north VI Corps' attack was delivered with the 15th Division on the right facing Guemappe, the 29th Division in the centre facing Infantry Hill, and the 17th Division on the left with the task of clearing the southern bank of the River Scarpe. The advance here was met by extremely heavy machine gun fire and a heavy artillery barrage which the war correspondent, Phillip Gibbs, witnessed: As soon as our men left the trenches our gunners laid down a barrage in front of them and made a moving wall of shells ahead of them -a frightful thing to follow, but the safest if the men did not go too quick or fail to distinguish between the line of German shells and our own. It was not easy to distinguish, for our men had hardly risen from the shell holes and ditches before the enemy barrage started, and all
back to deal with a machine gun still operating in the rear C7 bogged down and its activities, after firing some 200 rounds of 6-pound ammunition, came to an end. The battalion to the Argylls' left in this attack, the 4th Gordon Highlanders, was also well-supported by a tank of 'C Battalion under the command of Sergeant Noel, who, like Second-Lieutenant Smith, was late arriving in support, in his case because of the need to off-load some wounded crewmen. Sergeant Noel led the Gorin driving the Germans from the trench line and capturing the Chemical Works, a most important link in the German defensive system which commanded much of the ground over which British troops had to advance to the north of this position. Sergeant Noel remained with the infantry until they had dug themselves
dons
the ground about them was vomiting up fountains of mud and shell splinters. At the same time there came above all the noise of shellfire a furnace blast of machine guns. Machine gunners in Roeux and
in and then retired having expended all his ammunition. These two episodes demonstrate clearly the value of tanks in these conditions, but they are rare examples and indicate the more general
Pelves, in the two small woods in front of Monchy, and in the ground about Guemappe were slashing all the slopes and roads below Mniichy-on-the-Hill. 'It was the most awful machine gun fire I have ever heard', said a young Gordon this morning, as he came back with a bullet Ins hip. The beggars were ready for us,
success that could well have been achieved had more of these weapons been available. Unfortunately few were, only 19 being in any way fit for action on the 23rd, and about half of these suffered mechanical faults on going into action and five were disabled by armour piercing bullets, so that their importance in the general course of the battle was negligible. The general attitude of the infantry at this time has been well expressed, although perhaps a little unfairly, in the Regimental History of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers: 'Tanks were to be used again, and one might have expected a variation in tactics as the result of study and experience but they were again dealt out to Corps with the impartiality generally associated with useless trench stores.' The left-hand brigade of the 51st Division, the 153rd, managed to reach the Roeux-Gavrelle road and to capture the Roeux railway station buildings, but the situation became increasingly chaotic as the day progressed, for the Germans counterattacked with great determination and seemingly regardless of their losses. The battle swayed to and fro over the ruins of Roeux and the Chemical Works, so that Major-General Harper, commanding the division, remained ignorant of the extent and exact whereabouts of the front line until the morning of the 24th when it was established that the Allied advance had been to a depth of about 1,000 yards, although neither the Chemical Works nor the village of Roeux itself remained in the hands of the Scots. On the 51st Division's left the 37th Division had pushed its line forward to its final objectives, successfully capturing some two miles of German defences to the east of the Roeux-Gavrelle road after an advance of about 2,000 yards. First Army's 63rd (Naval) Division with very heavy artillery support quickly captured Gavrelle, but attempts to press on failed as a result of German fire from the slopes of Greenland Hill and the high ground northeast of the village. After some bitter and determined street fighting the division consolidated its position and prepared its defences to await the inevitable counterattacks. At about 1045 hours the Germans began to shell the whole front heavily and were reported to be massing for an attack. Five assaults were made in all, every one of which was repulsed, with grave losses, by the heavy
m
and made
it very hot. But we folk went on, those of us who weren't hit quickly, and made an attack on the village of Guemappe.' In spite of the fierce resistance the infantry made reasonable progress at several points. The Scottish troops of the 15th Division captured Guemappe after a struggle lasting for two hours, and the 29th Division gained the western slopes of Infantry Hill. The 17th Division, however,
was unable
to
make any worthwhile
pro-
gress opposed as it was by 'one of the hardest-fighting units in the German army', the 26th Division, one of whose regiments set up a well-camouflaged outpost on the forward slope of a spur from which it was able to observe the British troops assembling for the coming assault, with the most disastrous results for them. On this sector most of the German counterattacks were held but the Scots were unable to retain their hold on Guemappe.
The tanks come
in
North of the River Scarpe an even grimmer battle raged on XVII Corps' front where a very confused situation existed throughout the day as the 51st (Highland) Territorial Division attempted to clear the enemy from the western outskirts of Roeux and the Chemical Works. Here the right
hand brigade, the 153rd, advanced between the river and the railway line on an expanding front only to be stopped by heavy machine gun fire from Roeux and from German positions south of the river. The troops began to try to work their way forward, the 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders making very slow progress until they were joined by C7, one of the tanks of 'C Battalion allotted to the The tank, commanded by Second-Lieutenant Smith, arrived late after having been held up by wounded lying in the Fampoux-Roeux road, but soon had the attack moving forward rapidly again as it fired into the German positions in the ruined houses. With its help the Argylls soon cleared the village. Turning five
51st Division.
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infantry as they came on in extended order in artillery formation. In the relatively minor operation just south of Lens the 5th Division of the Canadian Corps and the 46th Division of I Corps were given, respectively, the objectives La Coulotte, south of the River Souchez, and Hill 65 to the north of the river. Both of these positions were part of the original German third line which had been considerably strengthened. The attacking battalions of the 5th Division .suffered heavy casualties because there were too few gaps in the wire, although previous reconnaissance reports, both land and air, had indicated that the going would be relatively easy. The isolated groups which did manage to penetrate the wire were very soon driven back to their start lines. In some sections of the line German troops in the forward positions were seen holding up their hands in surrender as the British pushed forward, but on seeing the leading elements falter and then stop as they reached areas of uncut wire they quickly remanned their machine guns and drove the attacking battalions back. To the north of the River Souchez 46th Division's assault was very quickly brought to a halt just forward of the slopes of Hill 65. Although some slight gain was made, further operations in (his part of the front were called off.
When it became obvious that the objectives south of the River Scarpe set for the 23rd had not been gained. General Allenby for the advance to be re1800 hours. In the renewed fighting the 17th Division again made little progress but Guemappe was recaptured, the Scottish troops of the 15th Division establishing themselves along a line near the cemetery some 200 yards beyond the village, and the 29th Division finally managed to push its line forward to within 200 yards of its objective. Further to the south the 50th Division made some gams, hut the rest of VII Corps, attacking later than the hour designated by Allenby. were again unsuccessful. At first light on the 24th, however, it became apparent that German resistance had weakened all along the front of the attack south of the
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The companies were ordered forward at once with patrols in enhance. The Adjutant ran on. searching the ground from side to side in advance of the patrols, who got close to where the Hindenburg Line teas crossed by the Fontaine-St Martin Cojeul road before exchanging shots at short range with the enemy. Alter advancing some 1.200 yards the Leading patrols met up with the battleworn companies of the 1st Middlesex and 2nd Argylls who had spent some 15 hours cut off from the British front line. They had survived the British barrage of the previous evening and had also, to a certain extent, blunted the German counterattacks launched at the :53rd Division and the left of 30th Division. After 2-1 hours of heavy fighting during which the Germans had launched continuous counterattacks, the British line had advanced from one to two miles over the firmly
with much surprise and much suspicion, hut he came on confidently and shouted something. Someone ran out from B'
15-19-9
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front and British troops remained in possession of the villages of
Gavrelle and Guemappe. and of the high ground overlooking Fontaine-les-Croisilles and Cherisy. They had also made good progress to the east of Monchv-le-Preux on the western slopes of Infantry Hill and had gained a foothold on Greenland Hill
GHQ
On April 26 at Lieutenant-General Kiggel, Haig's Chief-of-Staff, chaired a meeting with Generals Home and Allenby m which be informed them that the British
would be continued. Objectives would again be limited with no deep pene-
A work
offensive
party of
Royal Engineers leaves Arras by
tration intended, partly because the existing front line was considered an unsuitable base for a major offensive, and partly because Haig had decided that no flesh
light railway
to repair the
newly
won
front
divisions were to be brought in to reinforce the tired and understrength formations already available in the line and in the immediate army reserves It was decided thai prior to the next general assault two minor operations would take place on April 28 »ne. by Third Army, on each side of the River Scarpe to capture those eternal objectives' Roeux, the Chemical Works and the spin- east of Monchy-le-Preux on which the Boisdu Vert was situated. The other by '
Army
capture Oppy and Arleux. was to he launched along the whole front on May 3. First
The
mam
to
offensive
Tired! depleted formations The operations in the vicinity of the River Scarpe on April 28 were even less successful than those on the 23rd, Certainly the \2\\\ Division, now in the line after relieving the 17th Division, had some limited success in capturing a small section of the
German
line east of Monchy-le-Preux, but without the capture of Roeux further progress was virtually impossible. In the operations against Roeux and the Chemical Works the 34th and :37th Divisions failed badly, but this was hardly surprising for the enemy was well organised and the British formations were tired and depleted and simply not fit for the task. The « 37th Division went into action with its g battalions only some 200 strong while the 34th Division was composed largely of poorly trained conscripts whose inexperience merely served to compound the mistakes and confusion which inevitably occurred, the more so in an area of ruined buildings. Moreover, the visibility was poor and the artillery found it very difficult to shell the C.erman counterattack units before they appeared. At the end of the day there was nothing to show for the effort expended except that the 37th Division had been almost destroyed.
Counterattack.
:
-
;
Astray shell explodes in front of German troops advancing in extended order
In contrast the Arleux operation at the other end of the front was a limited success. In this attack the 63rd (Naval) Division was to extend its flank to protect the right of 2nd Division whose task was to capture Oppy, while the 1st Canadian Division captured Arleux. The Naval Division failed completely and the two Royal Marine battalions in the attack were back in their start lines by dusk, one of them being almost annihilated by German machine gun fire in enfilade during the withdrawal. The 2nd Division fared somewhat better, although its task was made more difficult by 63rd Division's failure which left the 2nd Division's right flank exposed. Its leading troops found the wire uncut in many places and those who did manage to force a way through were faced with the formidable obstacle of Oppy Wood before the village could be reached. After some very severe fighting the troops were forced to their original positions, although the two assaulting battalions of the left hand brigade penetrated in sufficient depth, reaching the sunken Oppy- Arleux road, to cover the Canadian right flank. The Canadian 1st Division in fact achieved the only tangible success of the whole operation by capturing Arleux in an efficient attack in which an advance of 1,000 yards and the capture of the objective was achieved in just three minutes over the scheduled time of two hours. The British High Command could be well satisfied with the results of the attacks on the 23rd and 28th for it had become cleai that the continuation of offensive action was fulfilling in every respect the objective for which it was designed. In his dispatches Haig's satisfaction was apparent: 'As the result of the fighting which had ahcadx taken place 12 German divisions had been withdrawn exhausted from the battle or were in the process of relief.' And Ludendorif himself bears testimony to the success of the battle's purpose: 'The Battle of Anas was at its height in the second half of April, and was swallowing up a liberal supply of reserves and material
back
'
However, although Haig loyally main-
tained his part in the general strategic plan of the Nivelle offensive, it had become increasingly clear to him by this time that the French government was seriously considering the possibility of abruptly breaking off the main attack; even Nivelle's own position as Commander-in-Chief appeared to be in question. Haig's first intimation of this attitude had come with reports he had received of remarks by Albert Thomas, the French Minister of Munitions, to Lloyd George which admitted that if a positive success were not attained in the first few days of the attack on the Aisne then the offensive would be stopped. Haig's reaction to this news was to indicate quite clearly that he would regard it as very unwise to reduce the pressure on the Germans at this time, as to do so would probably be much more costly in men and material in the long term. This difficulty was resolved temporarily at a conference in Paris on April 20, attended by Lloyd George, at which the French government agreed that the offensive should be continued but that the situation should be reviewed after a period of two weeks. By the time these deliberations had ended it had become obvious that the French offensive was not going to achieve the success expected of it. Whatever limited successes were gained, and these were substantial, were neutralised by the almost universal belief, based on Nivelle's own self-confident assertion, that this operation was to be the one which would shatter the German front and open the way to final victory. The failure to achieve overwhelming success produced not only a profound disillusion and despair among the soldiers. leading very shortly to mutiny, but anger and shock among the politicians in Paris,
the offensive either. In fact he stated that his intention was to continue the operations on the Aisne until Rheims was safe. Two days later Haig went to Paris at the request of Monsieur Painleve, the French Minister of Defence, who also indicated that the French Prime Minister wished to see him. M. Painleve assured Haig that the French government and the army would 'loyally discharge their duties towards the British army and that the offensive would be maintained'. But Haig could hardly have been convinced by a man who had persuaded himself that the French had already been defeated on the Aisne and who made it plain that he wished to see Nivelle replaced by Petain, clearly hoping that Haig would urge the dismissal of Nivelle when he saw the Prime Minister. Haig received further assurances of French determination to continue operations when he met Monsieur Ribot, the Prime Minister, and was informed that nothing had been decided about Nivelle, although Ribot concurred in Haig's observation that any change in command during a battle 'was to be deprecated".
Haig's two aims was obvious that
It
Nivelle's
days
as
Commander-in-Chief were numbered and that with his removal French offensive operations would cease, giving way to the policy of 'avoiding losses while waiting for American reinforcements'. In a letter to
to look immediately a scapegoat. Increasingly Nivelle's actions were questioned by the French government, but when Haig met the
Robertson on April 29 Haig had no doubt as to what this would mean as far as the task of the British army was concerned: Petain calls it the "Aggressive Defensive" and doubtless in his mind he figures the British army doing the aggressive work while the French army "squats" on the defensive.' Realising that the French would not persevere with their offensive in spite of assurances to the contrary, Haig considered that it would be in British interests
French Commander-in-Chief on April 24 it was apparent that there was certainly no intention on his part to break off the battle and he confidently asserted that the French government had no intention of stopping
and consequently found I himself working with two aims in view. | Firstly, he had to continue his efforts on the * Arras front, but only so far as he was able £ without reinforcing the tired and depleted -
whose reaction was
for
not to do so either,
e •
divisions already there, partly to ease the pressure on the new French positions on the Aisne, partly to maintain pressure on the (iermans in order to keep the initiative away from them, and partly in order that
when the time came
for
breaking
off
the
hattle he would be able to leave the front in a favourable position for possible future operations. Secondly, he had to prepare for the great assault in Flanders which he had determined should be the main British effort of the summer of 1917. The fighting of May therefore was to be in a different category to thai of April for the initial impetus had gone and the main strategic
aim had been attained. was against this background that It had launched the operations of April 28 and had instructed GHQ to plan for a further renewal of the offensive along the entire front on May 3 in support of the next major French attack on the Chemin des Dames scheduled for May 5. At a conference on April 30 Haig informed his army commanders, Home, Allenby and Gough, hat French plans were uncertain, but that they were tending more and more towards the adoption of a defensive position. He indicated that the British objectives to be achieved by May 15 were Lens-Achevillef'resnov-t Greenland Hill - the Bois du Vert and Riencourt facing the German Drocourt-Queant line. At the same time he stated that he felt that the French should do their best to maintain pressure on the Germans and should also relieve the British of the additional frontage they had taken over prior to the launching of the offensive on the Aisne. On May 3 Haig made these points personally to Petain, who had just been appointed Chief of the French General Staff, a post which had not existed previously and which greatly extended Petain's power. It was now apparent that he was de facto Commander-in-Chief of the French armies, although Nivelle nominally continued to hold that post until May 16. At a military conference held on the following day and attended by Haig, Robertson, Petain and Nivelle, it was agreed that the Anglo-French aim should be to continue the present offensive in order to exhaust the German power of resistance, t
2198
and that the British would assume
res-
main operations, with the French army in support making enerponsibility for the
getic local attacks and taking over a section of the British front, which they did on May 20, extending their line to the River
Omignon. These arrangements received political confirmation at the Inter-Allied Conference held on May 5 attended by the four military representatives mentioned above and by the two Prime Ministers, Lloyd George and Ribot. Thus by early May it was the British on whom had now fallen the burden of maintaining offensive operations on the Western Front. Two days later, on May 7, at a further meeting with his army commanders Haig gave them a brief outline of his Paris meeting with Petain and Nivelle and indicated the nature of future operations. He explained that the present operations would gradually be brought to a close, the aim firstly being to confuse the enemy as to the true point of attack by engaging in wearing-out tactics against specific local objectives with whatever formations were available, and secondly, when this end had
been achieved, to deliver the main blow from Flanders. He re-emphasised the need for actions to be very strictly limited and that consequently artillery fire was to be employed to the utmost so that the infantry could be used sparingly and in the most economical way possible. The general impression to be created was that the Arras front was to remain the main battleground. What Haig did not mention at this time was that another reason for continuing these attacks was 'the lamentable state of the French army' which made it Above: Time to clean and reload the Lewis gun, and for a quiet cigarette, before the next push forward. Above right: A quiet time also for British cavalry as they too await orders
move forward. Their services were not great demand at Arras Below, left to right: Mixed feelings in the faces of German prisoners. 'In some sections of the line German troops in forward positions were seen holding up their hands in surrender as the British pushed forward, but on seeing the leading elements falter and then stop as they reached the areas of uncut wire they quickly remanned their machine guns and drove the attacking battalions back.'
to in
the line the British troops would be climbing out of their trenches with the full moon at their backs; a line of silhouettes for the
German machine gunners
knock down. 0345 hours and along practically the whole front the leading troops were initially successful in breaking into the enemy defences. On First Army's front two divisions of XIII Corps, the 31st and the 2nd, attacked the village of Oppy between Fresnoy Wood and Gavrelle. The 31st Division had a most difficult task which was complicated further by the fact that it was observed forming up in the light of the moon and consequently hit very hard by German artillery. In spite of this initial setback some early progress was made by to
The attack was launched
at
right hand brigade — the West Yorkshire — although on its left the 92nd East Yorkshire Brigade, as it advanced on Oppy Wood, found itself caught among felled trees and criss-cross lacings of barbed wire stretching between
the
division's
93rd
vitally necessary for the British to
keep the
German army fully occupied. While Haig knew that serious trouble had broken out and that signs of demoralisation— large scale absence without leave and refusal to obey orders — were spreading through a large number of French units, he was probably never fully aware of the true extent of the mutinies within the French army. But it is clear that his conclusions from the evidence available were that the French were neither capable of launching any further major offensives nor of resisting a determined German assault. The last major operation at Arras, the Third Battle of the Scarpe, was launched on Thursday, May 3, just two days before the French made the final attack of the Nivelle offensive. The British formations surged forward on a IB-mile front extend ing from the Acheville-Vimy road, north of Arleux, to a point in the Hindenburg Line at Bullecourt, south of the River Sensee. They aimed at achieving a new line of defence, a line familiar to the troops attack ing over the same old ground. Filth Arms was to capture Riencourt and llendecourt
along a 4, 000-yard front of which Bullecourt was the centre; Third Army was to attack the line Fontaine-les-Croisilles! Cherisy/the Saint Rohart Factory/the Bois du Sart/Pelves and Plouvain: and First Army was to secure Oppy and Fresnoy. In support Haig had amassed an enormous
amount
of artillery in accordance with his general policy of economising in infantry, but the German artillery build-up had itself been equally impressive. The novel feature of this attack was that it was to be delivered before first light, a decision reached as the result of a compromise by Haig between the desire of Cough's Fifth Army, prompted by the Australians, to launch a night attack, and Allenby and Home who, like all British commanders at that time, preferred to attack in daylight. The time finally decided upon — one and a half hours before dawn — pleased no one and meant that British troops, some not informed of the changed time until the evening of May 2. were unprepared for the attack both psychologically and in terms of training and preparation. Furthermore, all along
those still standing. This brigade failed completely to achieve any of its objectives and the earlier successes of 93rd Brigade were soon lost as heavy German counterattacks drove the brigade back to its start line. The 2nd Division was so weak that a composite brigade was formed for this operation consisting of four battalions totalling only some 1,800 men in the assault. Like its counterpart, the 31st Division, it too was heavily shelled while
assembling and suffered heavy casualties. In the attack which followed, the 2nd Division was, nevertheless, partially successful on its left flank where its units were able to give some support to the Canadian attack on Fresnoy. The Germans were aware that the Canadians were about to attack and persistently shelled the forming-up areas during the night, but even so some slight tactical surprise was achieved when the attack was finally launched, although this surprise was very short-lived for 'within a minute of zero the German batteries laid a barrage in No-Man's Land which caused losses to the rear waves of the attacking battalions' The st Canadian Brigade reached it> objectives without difficulty h\ 0540 hours, alter an advance of some 1,400 yards, but the tith Canadian 1
1
2199
Brigade to the left of Fresnoy found the going very difficult for the wire had not been well cut, causing confusion in the darkness and loss of contact with the creeping barrage, and also the German artillery was very well directed. The 27th Battalion was hit very hard, its leading company to the tight was virtually destroyed as it deployed to attack, and very few troops passed the start line. Of these, one was Lieutenant Combe, who with five men reached the wire, broke through, captured part of the trench line and held it until supporting units came up to consolidate the position. Combe, who was killed towards the end of the action, was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross. In spite of the fierce opposition and the difficulties encountered, the Canadians did finally force their way through to their objectives and occupied Fresno} village. Their success was the outstanding feature of this day's fighting along the whole front, and is attributed by the Official History to 'the high standard of the Canadian infantry reinforcements', who had generally undergone more training and were also rather older men often with better physique than the British re-
placements at this time'. XVII Corps to the south was faced with the task of eliminating (lerman resistance in those all too familiar objectives — Greenland Hill, the Chemical Works and Roeux. In spile of the fact that these features were subjected to very heavy artillery bombardment for almost three days, the 4th and 9th Divisions were completely unsuccessful, and the usual confusion of a night advance was further increased here by the fact objectives were ruined that the buildings, which were difficult to fight over even in daylight. The advance of 9th Division was marked by greater disorder than elsewhere, many units becoming intermingled, losing their way and firing on each other. Casualties were very heavy and the action was a disaster pure and simple for the 6th KOSB which suffered over 400 casualties and was practically destroyed". Immediately to the south of the River Scarpe the 12th, 3rd and 56th Divisions of the VI Corps were set the task of capturing the line Pelves/Bois du Sart/Saint Rohart Factory. On the extreme right the 169th Brigade of 56th Division advanced with great determination, passing through Cavalry Farm in the darkness and capturing the German trench line to the east of it — a position which they succeeded in
mam
holding until they were withdrawn. The I67th Brigade to their left was badly mauled, making no progress in the face of German artillery, machine guns and uncut wire. The leading battalions suffered severe casualties, particularly the 1st London and the 7th Middlesex who, on reaching the top of a rise behind which the German line was situated, were faced with a defensive position which the artillery had missed: As soon as the first wave topped the ridge it was obvious that the enemy's front line had never been adequately dealt with by the artillery and had apparently escaped the barrage, as it was full of infantry standing shoulder to shoulder ready for our infantry to come on. The unfortunate Middlesex men must have shown up clearly against the sky-line in spite of the darkness, for as each line reached the rising ground it was swept away by a withering fire from rifles and machine guns. Survivors stated that, as
2200
t/wy advanced it seemed as if the whole < lerman line burst into a sheet of flame. Major-General Deverall's 3rd Division found conditions much the same, although the Germans, apparently forewarned of the attack, caused much disorganisation and difficulty by saturating the British positions with gas, forcing the infantry to wear their gas masks in the assembly areas which resulted, naturally, in a lowering of morale and a loss of dash in the assault
&3^
\
*
which ended in failure. On the extreme left the 36th Brigade of the 12th Division carried out a highly successful attack and captured a considerable section of the German front line, but without a corresponding advance north of the Scarpe further gains were impossible as the German machine gunners in Roeux were in a position to take any further attacks in enfilade. In fact, the 36th Brigade's advance represented the sole gain of Third Army's operations on May 3. VII Corps on Third Army's right flank deployed the 21st Division on its own right with the River Sensee and Fontaine-lesCroisilles as its objectives, while the 18th and 14th Divisions in the centre and left respectively were to advance their line to the Saint Rohart Factory through a point 1,000 yards west of Cherisy to the western outskirts of Fontaine-les-Croisilles. Success, apart from some small gains by the 21st Division, was as elusive here as elsewhere. At the junction of the 21st and 18th Divisions much difficulty was caused by the smallness of the areas allotted to the flanking brigades of both divisions, for when the attack began the troops became inextricably mixed and the advance lost all cohesion and disintegrated. In front of Cherisy, which the 18th Division held for a short time, the situation was chaotic as a number of battalions and companies swerved into their flanking units in the dark. The only tank to get forward soon found itself out of touch with the leading troops and turned back causing utter consternation among the advancing infantry who retreated back to their start lines as the tank came out of the misty dawn light towards them. Apart from the capture of some trench line west of Fontaine-lesCroisilles and south of the Scarpe, the attack was well described by Captain Kelly of the 9th Leicesters as 'a tragic failure'. The reasons on his section of the front were, as far as he was concerned, clear: Delivered in pitch darkness, so that touch between units was rapidly lost, it was delivered on too wide a front I several yards between each two men), and over too deep an area — 1,000 yards of No-Man's Land had to be crossed before reaching the enemy. The ground had been imperfectly studied, so that several unexpected trenches
were encountered lost
touch
with
in
which many who had
their
neighbours settled
down. Finally the enemy seemed well aware of our intentions, which had been discussed in detail over the telephone, no one realising that there were ways of listening in', and a heavy barrage came down simultaneously with our own. As usual the German machine gun fire was very effective. Nevertheless some hundreds got right up to the enemy and kept up an isolated fight through the morning till they were rounded up by them or crawled from shell hole to shell hole. One man I spoke to took four hours to cross the 1 ,000 yards.
The Third Battle
of the Scarpe
was a
dreadful failure, and after the ending of the operations on May 3 the situation resolved itself into a struggle for Fresnoy and Roeux, on both of which places the Germans set a high value. On May 8 a heavy bombardment signalled the opening of a determined assault against the British positions north east of Fresnoy which
were dangerously exposed to fire from Acheville and Mericourt. The first attack by the German 1st Reserve Division failed, but with the addition of the 4th Guards Reserve Division and the 5th Bavarian Division the attacks were successful and Fresnoy once again formed part of the German defence line.
'The place was a shambles'
On May in
some
11
British troops again attacked
force on both sides of the Scarpe
the south 56th Division captured Cavalry Farm on the Arras-Cambrai road and a mile of trenches to the north of it and, in the wake of an artillery barrage delivered by nine brigades of artillery
To
'
-
in
which
'the
18-pounder barrage was to
creep east at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes, firing four rounds per gun per minute on less than two yards of front — with a 4.5-inch howitzer barrage keeping 100 yards ahead of it', an understrength 4th Division successfully captured Roeux station the Cemetery and the Chemical Works. The 4th Division was relieved the following day by the 51st Division which finally completed the capture of Roeux on May 14. The value placed by the Germans on this position was demonstrated by the fierce counterattacks launched on May 16 by a fresh division drawn from Sixth Army reserve, all of which were unsuccessful except for a small lodgement just north of Roeux station and the railway line. The greatest struggle, however, in this final stage of the Battle of Arras took place around Bullecourt in which I ANZAC
Corps and V British Corps of Fifth Army were initially engaged. On May 3 the Australians, in a dashing assault, successfully gained a foothold in the Hindenburg Line to the east of Bullecourt village, an achievement which forced a change in the nature of the operations around this sector of the front, for while the Third Battle of the Scarpe was over in 24 hours with no really substantial success other than at Fresnoy, the battle raged on for 14 days around Bullecourt where the precarious foothold of the Australians was extended and the village captured. The 6th Australian Brigade's success in securing a lodge-
in the Hindenburg Line was undoubtedly an outstanding achievement, for no other unit, British or Australian, made any gains on May 3 in spite of persistent attacks and heavy casualties, but it soon found itself in a grave and difficult situation for its position extended like a narrow peninsula into the German defences and was dominated by the Riencourt Ridge. The salient was exposed to very heavy and concentrated fire, but although the situation was ugly the Australians never relinquished any part of the ground which they had captured. In fact they extended it, although German troops continually counterattacked on both flanks, often with flame throwers, but these were as un-
ment
successful as their hombing attacks down the trench line. The British units, meanwhile, slowh
progress and on May 7 the 7th Division gained a foothold in the southeast corner of the village, and from this time on
made
constant pressure was maintained in order to force the Germans out of their defensive positions and to link up with the Australians on the right. The bitterness of the fighting is apparent from the following: On May 11 the 91st Brigade (7th Division) was ordered to continue the attack. The
Queens and South Staffordshire battalions advanced behind a creeping barrage of 100 yards in six minutes and the infantry formation is interesting.
They advanced
at
0340
hours on the 12th on a two company front, each with a frontage of one platoon, waves to follow each other closely and to be in close order, or very slightly extended. The mass-attack' did no good. It was followed by an attack of the 2nd Royal Warwickshires with two companies of the 22 nd Manchesters at 0340 hours on the 13th and again at 1900 hours by a company of the South Stafford'
but neither made any headway against severe German fire. The feature of the defence was intense artillery fire; any shires,
small advance was immediately wiped out. The place was a shambles. But the advance did continue and Bullecourt was finally captured on May 17 by the 58th London Territorial Division. On May 20 the 33rd Division struck at the Hindenburg Line between Bullecourt and Fontaine-les-Croisilles, and by the end of the morning the whole of the German forward position had been captured. In the evening this success was followed by the capture of a mile of support trench. By May 26 the British position around Bullecourt
was secure. The operations along the Arras front were now drawing to a close, the final bloody flare-up occurring on June 5 and 6 when the power station south of the River Souchez, and one mile of enemy positions north of the Scarpe on the western slopes of Greenland Hill, were captured. But these actions were really in the nature of deceptions, for the mam weight of the British effort had shifted to the north where on the morning of June 7, 1917 the attack on
Messines
literally exploded into action. Battle of Arras had been maintained
The
effort had been made and draw in more and more German reserves, and the main object of the operations had undoubtedly been achieved
for six
weeks. Every
to hold
at
a cost of 150,000 British casualties, of
which 87,226 were suffered by Third Army alone. The bruised and battered understrength divisions north and south of the Scarpe. particularly those of Third Army, had refused reinforcements, had continued offensive action for specific local objectives based on the formula of careful preparation, limited exploitation, economy in infantry and a liberal use of artillery brought together in large concentrations, in order to persuade the Germans that the Anas offensive was to continue. Within the scope of the original plan the Battle of Arras was a considerable success, hut the French failure on the Aisne created a different set of circumstances, which have been outlined, and forced Haig to extend the opera-
Above
left:
A
station Left:
British advanced dressing Pushed back again and again.
man shell holes All along the troops would be climbing out of trenches a line of silhouettes for
German
tr
line British tfieir
the
.
.
.
German machine gunners
to
knock down
'
Above: The German 7.7-cm M 1916 field gun. This new model was longer than the M 1896 and could be fired at very much increased angles of elevation Range: 9,405 yards. Weight in action: 2,750 lbs. Muzzle velocity:], 57 ] feetper-second Elevation: + 38 degrees to —9 degrees 30 minutes. Traverse. 2 degrees right to 2 degrees left. Below: The German 15-cm M 1916 (Krupp) field gun Range: 23,500 yards. Weight of gun: 7 tons 3 cwt Weight of shell: 28 lbs. Maximum elevation: 46 degrees
The German 15-cm M 1913 long howitzer Range: 9,296 yards flare of fire: 2 roundsper-minute normal rate Right:
2202
tions of British troops for far longer than
had been intended, all the time using up men and material, particularly artillery ammunition, which should have been earmarked for Flanders. But the most valuable commodity consumed was time. The lost summer weeks proved in the end to be a vital ingredient in the disastrous failure of British operations later in the year.
But Haig remained loyal to his committhroughout, and the operations around Arras serve as a fine example of
ment
Allied co-operation, for without the British army engaging the full attention of the Germans the extent to which the French
army was demoralised and unwilling
to
been discovered and exploited with the most grievous consequences for the Allied cause. The cost in terms of men and time was perhaps a small price to pay to prevent that possibility from becoming a reality. fight
might
have
Further Reading Bean, C. E. W., Anzac
to
Amiens (Canberra
1948) Blake. Robert (Ed), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1919 (Eyre and
Spottiswoode)
Months (Ernest Benn Ltd 1930) Wyrall, Everhard, The Die-Hards in the Great War (Harrison and Sons Ltd.) Kelly, D. V., Thirty-nine
CAPTAIN A D BAKER was commissioned into the Royal Army Education Corps in 1 965 after a number years m the Far East as an Education Officer in the Colonial Service He was educated at Cambridge University and London, where he gained an MA in of
War Studies He is at present a member of the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst
Pacifism Conscience on trial to the First World War was confined to the socialist movement and to groups of pacifists. There were only three socialist parties of the countries involved in the uar which, at its beginning, had anti-war majorities — the Russians, the Americans, and the Serbians (and the two latter were small) but in most others the anti-war minorities with the socialist parties became influential and, indeed, in two cases became majorities before the end of the war. The pacifists were not significant politically, hut they set a precedent of refusal to render militarj service which has spread since. The actual outbreak of hostilities was sudden, but ever since the Franco-German conflict of 1870 the socialist parties of Europe had been debating what their attitude should be in the event of war. Mosl accepted the duty of national defence, hut they differed as in he means of preventing war. At the Stuttgart Conference of the Socialisl International, as distant as 1907, Jean Jaures, the French leader, and Keir Hardie, representing the British Independent Labour Party (ILP) had included resort to an international general strike as an instrument to stop governments embarking on war Tins proposal was not accepted, but a resolution was unanimously adopted requiring socialist parties to adopt the means which the) considered most effective to prevent war and, should war occur, to intervene for its speedy termination and to use Us crises to hasten the end of capitalism. The subject was discussed at a series ol succeeding conferences with much the same result. Then in 1912 came the Balkan Wars, predecessors of the world war. It was the occasion for an extraordinary congress at Basle of socialist representatives from 23 countries. They met in the cathedral, placed at their disposal by the Church, a generous gesture in view of the anti-clericalism of European socialism Said the ecclesiastical spokesman: 'This gathering is filled with the spirit of Christ, though the speakers may use a style which sounds strange in our ears.' The delegates were aware that the conflict in the Balkans might lead to a wider war, and Congress made a special appeal to Germany, France and Britain. 'It would be criminal folly,' said the unanimously adopted manifesto, 'for the three leading civilised nations to go to war because of a Serbo-Austrian dispute about access to the sea.' It declared that the greatest danger to European peace was 'the artificially instigated hostility' between Britain and Germany, and urged socialists in both countries to press for
Organised opposition sections
ol
t
an agreement on naval disarmament. Warships
deemed as important
at this
time were
security as nuclear-headed missiles are today. There had been great naval rivalry between Germany and Britain since 1911 when the Germans sent a cruiser to Agadir to protest against the British-French division of norto
national
thern Africa. Despite these conferences and discussions, the First World War took socialists, as everyone else, by surprise and found them unprepared. The Bureau of the Socialist International was summoned hastily in Brussels on the eve of Austria's declaration of Serbia. The Bureau called on German workers to press government to exercise restraint on Austria and on French workers to press their government to persuade Russia to keep out of the conflict. There was an unreal optimism at this meeting. Haase, the German leader, expected the Kaiser to refrain from declaring war 'not for humanitarian reasons, but simply from fear'. Jaures assured the delegates that France wanted peace. Keir Hardie said it was 'quite out of the question' that Britain should become involved in the war. It was the last speech Jaures delivered. He told the delegates how the right-wing press in France was encouraging 'patriots' to assassinate him. Two days later he was shot dead while sitting with friends in a Paris cafe. The day the British delegation returned from Brussels, Keir Hardie and Arthur Henderson issued a call to the working class to keep Britain out of the war. 'Let us silence those of our ruling class who would lead us into alliance with Russian despotism', they wrote. 'The success of Russia would be a disaster for the world.' Two days later, on Sunday, August 2, great public demon-
war on their
2204
"Me
be a soldier
?— I'd
strations were held in all large towns. Despite a downpour of rain the Trafalgar Square meetings in London spread into Whitehall, Charing Cross Road and the Strand, blocking traffic. Trade Union representatives joined Hardie, Henderson, George Lansbury, Will Thome and Cunningham Grahame in demanding that Britain keep out of the war. The next day, when Sir Edward drey, the British Foreign Secretary, informed the House of Commons that Britain would intervene if Belgium was invaded and revealed that she was committed to support France, Ramsay MacDonald, leader of the Labour Party, rose and said firmly that whatever attacks might be made on the party, they would insist that the country should remain neutral. Even when war was declared the next daw the Labour Party remained united in opposition. The Parts Executive adopted a resolution condemning British foreign policy for reinforcing Russia's power in Europe and Asia and attacking Sir Edward Grey for committing Britain 'without the knowledge of the British people, and the honour of the country, to supporting France in the event of war'. The working class, the resolution proceeded, had unswervingly opposed the policy which had led to war and it was they who must take action to secure peace at the earliest moment on conditions which would re-establish amity between the workers of Europe,
Three-part federation
The same afternoon a dramatic change took place. At a meeting of the Parliamentary Party, MacDonald proposed thai the Labour Executive's resolution should be read to the Commons. It soon became clear that the MPs had different views A majority of them not only rejected his proposal, but went on to decide to vote the war credits and to give support to the war effort MacDonald
rathe,
P
During the war many thousands of men in all the belligerent countries refused to be conscripted. Their motives ranged from pacifism through socialism to nationalism, but their bravery cannot be doubted, for it took moral courage of the highest order to refuse to join up when it looked as if the whole world was taking up arms. Lord Brockway. Left: A French view of the British anti-conscriptionist ingly to promote good relations with Britain, as we with Germany. They are no enemies of ours, but faithful friends. In fact, the majority of the German Social Democrats, although they had laboured for peace, had not proved to be 'faithful friends'. On July 30, two days before Germany's declaration of war on Russia, the Party Executive and the Parliamentary group had reached a unanimous decision not to vote for war credits if hostilities began. They sent a deputation to Paris to meet the French Socialists and an agreement was reached that both parties should abstain. Nevertheless, the next day the German Parliamentary party, dominated by fear of a Russian invasion, decided by 78 votes to 14 to grant the credits for the conduct of the war. Except by the German and Polish socialists of Austria, the decision w as universally regarded as a betrayal of international socialism. It set the precedent for other parties and only the Russians — Mensheviks and Bolsheviks alike — and the Serbians decided to place international solidarity before national interests: in the other belligerent countries minorities were left to maintain opposition to the war. The attitude of the Serbian socialists was particularly courageous. They had only two members in a Parliament of 166, and in an overwhelmingly hostile atmosphere denounced the government for its part in generating the crises. 'The vote on war credits was taken by roll-call,' writes Julius Braunthal, in his History of the International. After 164 "Ayes", through deathly silence, there rang out the memorable cry of r
"No" from thi' two socialist members.' The ILP opposition to the war meant loss of popularity, but effect on its membership was added cohesion and dedication
>
• sfave than lose
my
liberty
lt>
weekly organ, the Labour Leader rose in circulation to JO. 000. There was no prohibition of meetings, and these were held continuously throughout the country, sometimes threatened by violent interruption. There was little censorship, though on one occasion the police insisted on vetting the proofs of the Labour Leader and on the deletion of an advertisement of an anti-war book. A one-act play. The Devil's Business', exposing the armaments industry, was also seized; hut generally there was liberty ill speech and press Mo>t heat was turned against Ramsay MacDonald, though in fact he was less forthright in his opposition to
!
immediately
resigned as Leader of the Parliamentary Party. Despite his previous attitude and his secretaryship of the Execu tive, Arthur Henderson agreed to take on the leadership. The Parliamentary Party's decision brought a deep rift in the Labour Party- At this time there was no individual membership: the party was a federation of the Trade I'nions, the Fabian Society and the ILP. The best known leaders Hardie. MacDonald, I'hilip Snowden — as well as the active workers, were in the [LP. Only four ILP MPs -MacDonald, Hardie, FredJowetl and Tom Richardson had voted against the decision of the Parliamentary group, but there was no doubt about the attitude of the membership in the country. The ILP was traditionally antimilitarist
the
and internationalist.
The author was present
at the meeting of the National 11. Council held nine days alter the declaration of war. It adopted a statement prepared by W. C. Anderson, now a forgotten name he died in the influenza epidemic at the end of the war -but then a rising hope of the new generation of leaders. The statement acknowledged that Sir Kdward Grey had worked lor peace lmmcdi ately before the war, 'but it was then too late; he himself had played his part, along with other diplomats, in creating the abyss' It was not the Serbian or the Belgian government which had involved Britain. Great Britain is not fighting for oppressed nations or for Belgium's neutrality. I fit had been France who droce through Belgium and into Germany, does anyone believe that iii' would then have opened hostilities against France Treaties ami agree nients had forced France to he taken in toie behind despotic Russia, and Britain behind France. The statement ended with a peroration: Out of the darkness ami the depth we hail our working class com rades of every land. Across the roar ofguns, ice send sympathy and greetings to the Herman Socialists. They have laboured unccas 1'
the war than man) of his colleagues On the whole, tolerance was shown to the opponents of the war both by the public and b) the government in Britain. In no other belligerent country was the same freedom permitted lor the expression of anti-war views This tolerance was. perhaps, most conspicuously shown in the continued association of the Labour Party and the ILP. Following the decision of the Parliamentary group to support the war. the
October) and the government for pursuing a policy which brought Britain into the conflict On this occasion the parts leadership put the entire blame for the Outbreak of the war on the German government, insisted that Britain as a guarantor of its neutrality was in honour bound to defend Belgium, and declared that the real reason for the war was German militarism and that a German victor) would mean the death of democracy in Europe. Thus, at this crucial moment, the Labour Party and the ILP were in fundamental conflict. Nevertheless, their political affiliation remained Indeed, during 1914, the year of the outbreak of war. an ILP leader. \Y (' Anderson, was actually elected Chairman of the Labour Party ILP delegations moved anti-war resolutions at the Labour Party con ference, always overwhelmingly defeated, but there was no influential support for its exclusion As the war went on the contrast in policy became more market! The II. P criticised the Labour leadership for recruiting for the forces, opposed conscription and condemned the Labour Parliamentary group tor entering a national coalition government Yet even so on neither side was there any move to break At one ILP conference a motion was presented for disaffiliation from the Labour Party, but it was defeated by a large majority Both the Labour Party and the ILP were looking forward to the end of the war. convinced that the Trade I'nion-
Labour Party Executive met
reversed
its
earlier
(though
resolutions
not
until
condemning
05
would be necessary. House of Commons the small ILP group of five fought on two fronts. It never hid its opposition to the war and to its military implications. Philip Snowden was particularly outspoken, saying once that if he threw a handful of pebbles at the Tory benches political alliance
In the
he could not fail to hit a Member profiting from armament sales. Fred -Jowett was ceaselessly active in calling for a statement of peace terms; the soldiers had a right to know what they were fighting for, he urged. The second front on which they were active was in their demands for social equality in Britain with regard to the costs of the war. Jowett again was active in urging the conscription of wealth. The ILP members were attacked strongly for declining to recruit for the forces. In this attitude they were joined by lour Liberal MPs, Arthur Ponsonby, C. P. Trevelyan, .Joseph
King and
Strikes
One
Sir
W.
P. Hyles.
and deportations
ILP opposition to the war was support given by Liberals and intellectuals. Two of the Liberals just mentioned, Charles P. Trevelyan, who resigned his post as Under Secretary effect of
for education, and Arthur Ponsonby, associated from youth with the Court, later joined the party. The Labour Leader, the ILP organ, became distinguished for its writers: H. N. Brailsford, J A. Hobson, Lowes Dickinson, Bertrand Russell, E. D. Morel, Mrs H. M. Swanwick, Vernon Lee, Gilbert Cannan, Edward Garnett and others. It was a paradox that at a time when the ILP was running against the tide of public opinion, it stood higher in prestige than ever before. It could not be ignored. One illustration of this was the repeated controversies into which H. G. Wells entered with the contributors to the Labour Leader. There were differences within the ILP regarding ideological tactics in opposing the war. In England the attitude was based on the principle that war was morally wrong, expressed in criticism of the self-interested foreign policies which had led to the war, in advocacy of treaties of peace which would reflect goodwill between nations, and in concentration upon the need to end the fighting by negotiation. It was a pacifist rather than a revolutionary approach and gained the support of many middle-class and religious people. In Scotland, and particularly in Glasgow, the approach was working class, and potentially revolutionary. The war was denounced as the outcome of capitalism, and tbe ILP identified itself with the wartime grievances of the workers, enlarging these grievances to the war itself. David Kirkwood confronted Lloyd George in the munitions factories and was deported from the city. Emanuel Shinwell voiced the frustrations of his members in the Seaman's Union and was similarly deported. -John Wheatley led a rent strike against increased charges for tenement dwellings; James Maxton was imprisoned for sedition when he advocated a strike. This dynamic group succeeded in gaining the support of large numbers of workers who would march the streets and demonstrate at their bidding. A song which Maxton wrote was popular on these occasions. Its words illustrate the proletarian theme of Glasgow ILP propaganda: I am Henry Dubb And I won't go to war Because I don't know What they're all fighting for
Oh,
To To To
hell with the Kaiser hell with the Tsar hell with Lord Derby And also G.R. I work at Munitions I'm a slave down at Weir's If I
leave
my job
They give me two years To hell with the Sheriff To hell with his crew To hell with Lloyd George
And Henderson, too. don't like the landlord His rent I won't pay I
Three cheers
for
John Wheatley
I'm striking today To hell with the factor I'm not one to grouse But to hell both with him And his bloody old house.
Important events were happening within the international movement. The Socialist International had been destroyed as an effective organisation by the support given by the socialist
2206
leading parties to one or other of the two sides in the war. Sociawere killing each other in battle. But among the parties not engaged in the war and the sections which had placed their internationalism above national involvement, there was a passionate desire to re-establish association with a view to exerting pressure to bring the war to an end and to gain a just peace. The ILP had succeeded in maintaining contact through neutral countries with socialists opposing the war in Germany and published outlists
spoken
letters
from Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg,
mili-
tant leaders of the German opposition, and from Clara Zetkin, chairman of the Women's Section of the Social Democratic Party. In 1915 the Italian Socialist Party took the initiative in calling successive international conferences at Zimmerwald and Kienthal in Switzerland. They brought together socialists from Germany, Russia, France, Serbia, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Holland, Rumania, Bulgaria, the USA and Argentina. The ILP was not represented only because the British government declined to issue passports. Lenin was in the Russian delegation. He urged withdrawal from the Socialist International and the formation of a new International based on the policy of transforming the war into a civil war and revolution. His line was defeated at Zimmerwald by 31 votes to seven. The majority called for a campaign to end the war on a basis of 'no annexations or indemnities' and self-determination by peoples. The ILP endorsed the Zimmerwald manifesto, which was to become very important.
Approach
to the Allies
In March 1917 came the first Russian Revolution, the overthrow of the Tsarist government. Kerensky, leader of the more moderate Menshevik section of socialists, became head of the Provisional Government. The Petrograd Soviet issued a manifesto 'To the Peoples of the Entire World' appealing to workers of all countries to bring the war to an end by a united campaign for peace, and
calling on the Russian government to endorse the Zimmerwald peace terms. The government agreed, and sent a note to all the Allies, who received it with consternation. They selected pro-war socialists to go to Petrograd to convince the Provisional Government that the Germans must be militarily defeated before negotiations for peace could begin; but the missions failed. The Russians' reaction was that, since governments would not act for peace, they must appeal to the peoples through a world socialist conference. Thus was born the idea of the Stockholm Conference. The Allied socialists who had visited Russia on behalf of their governments included Cachin of France and Henderson of Britain. Both returned with the conviction that an international socialist conference was inevitable and were able to convince their respective parties of this. For the first time the ILP felt that opinion was turning its way. In August 1917, an Inter-Allied Socialist in London agreed to send delegates to Stockholm. Of the eight countries represented only three — Belgium, Greece and South Africa — dissented. The consequences in Britain for the Labour Party were profound. When Arthur Henderson, a member
Conference
of the British government, applied for permission to go to the intended conference he was shut out of the Cabinet room while a decision was reached. This incident, and, more important, the issue between a military conclusion to the war and international socialist action for a non-punitive negotiated peace, broke the alliance between Labour and the government. While these developments were taking place, the response to the Revolution in Russia had been wide. In France and Austria the anti-war minorities in the Social Democratic parties became majorities. In Britain the Revolution was enthusiastically welcomed by the ILP, who hoped that Democratic Socialism (for which Kerensky stood) would replace Tsarist despotism and because the Revolution appeared to signal a breakthrough in the war, opening the way to international action for peace. A committee, of which Philip Snowden was chairman, took the initiative in calling a conference of solidarity with the Russian Revolution and its peace aims. The response surprised everyone Eleven hundred delegates assembled at Leeds representing trade unions, cooperative societies, women's organisations and peace societies in addition to the ILP and BSP. Robert Smelhz, the miners' leader, presided and the speakers included MacDonald, Snowden. Andei son and the fiery Robert Williams, transport workers' leadei MacDonald and Snowden emphasised the promise of peace that events in Russia had heralded, Anderson spoke of the Revolution as 'the conquest of power by the disinherited', and Williams called on British workers to follow the Russian example of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. This conference represented the height of revolutionary fervour in Britain: it called lor the forma tion of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, Immediately following the Leeds Congress the Petrograd
Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet, supported by the Russian government, invited the Labour Party, the ILP and the BSP to send delegations to exchange views on how international workers' action could be mobilised to end the war by a Peoples' Peace. It was an indication of changing public opinion that the Labour Party, as well as the ILP and the BSP, accepted the invitation and, still more, that the government decided to issue passports. The British government's concurrence was partly due to the fact that the British Ambassador to Russia, Sir George Buchanan, as well as Arthur Henderson (this was before he returned to London) recommended that the delegations should be permitted to go. They held the opinion that if Russian co-operation in the war was to be retained, the strength of international pressure for a peace initiative must be recognised. The Labour Party selected G. H. and W. Carter, a railwayman's leader, as their repreRoberts sentatives, the ILP chose Ramsay MacDonald and Fred Jowett, and the BSP appointed E. C. Fairchild. They travelled to Aberdeen, the port from which their ship was to leave, but there the seamen refused to sail if the ILP and BSP delegates were in the party. The Labour Party delegates thereupon declined to board the ship, reflecting the solidarity which persisted despite war differences. The British government subsequently permitted Russian delegates to come to London, but before co-ordinated international action could be implemented a decisive change took place in Russia itself. In October 1917, the second Revolution exploded- Lenin's Bolshevik Revolution. It lost the sympathy which the March Revolution had aroused, because it dissolved the Constituent Assembly, destroyed civil liberties, including freedom of speech and press, persecuted the Mensheviks and later the Social Revolutionaries who had been partners in the earlier overthrow of the Tsarist regime. The leadership of the ILP were bitter against this'elimination of democracy, though there was some support for the economic revolution among the rank and file. The Labour Party and trade union leadership also turned against the Bolshevik Revolution. Only the small BSP backed Lenin. The moment for a British revolution passed. But, more serious for peace, the new forces of power in Russia rejected the proposal for the Stockholm Conference. They had no interest in a peace settlement, even on Zimmerwald terms, which would retain capitalism. Lenin and Trotsky were concerned, above everything else, to bring peace to Russia in order to maintain the Revolution ('Peace and Bread') and therefore initiated negotiations with Germany to end the war. Their advice to socialists in other countries was to repeat their revolution. Zimmerwald and Stockholm ceased to have any serious importance.
MP
Towards
a just peace leaving the subject of political opposition to the war mention must be made of the Union of Democratic Control. This was an organisation of many of the intellectuals who had become associated with the ILP, formed not so much to oppose the war as to influence opinion towards a just and enduring peace. The term 'democratic control' was used because the group were convinced that the secrecy of foreign commitments prior to the war had contributed to the diplomatic breakdown which occasioned it, and because they felt that public knowledge and involvement should determine the character of the peace The founder was E. I). Morel, who was already well known lor his exposure of the cruelties committed on the rubber plantations of Belgian Congo and for his work Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy, telling the story of the hidden understanding between Britain and France for the division of northern Africa and the exclusion of Germany. Other members of the committee were Ramsay MacDonald, II. N Brailslord, brilliant journalist and author of The War of Steel and Gold, C. P. Trevelyan, the ex-Liberal Minister, J. A. Hobson, the econo mist, and Lowes Dickinson, Cambridge Professor. They published a series of reasoned pamphlets, which had a considerable unpad on thinking among influential people, warning against vindictive treaties at the end of the war and advocating a settlement which would avoid further war and make disarmament possible, As the conflict approached its end they received encouragement from President Wilson's Fourteen Points, especially from his insistence upon self-determination by peoples, hut they were disillusioned by the actual terms of the Peace Treaties, II. I' opposition to the war was more than political, lis younger members had been brought up in the Ken rlardie tradition of anti-militarism and to this was added an inheritance of personal, almost religious, dedication which meant that socialism was a way of life as well as a political conviction. The implication of Before
change would come from mass action rather than from individual behaviour, and in the European
Marxism was
that
social
parties, as well as among Marxists in Britain, the view was that opponents of the war should not refrain from joining armies but should seek from within them to stimulate socialist ideas and action. To thousands of young ILP members, on the other hand,
anti-military convictions ruled out the possibility of personal participation in the war. Thus it came about that when conscription was threatened in 1915 there was a large and instant response to the proposal that an organisation be formed of men of military age who would refuse war service. From the first, however, it was realised that the party should not be committed to illegality. The author of this article was editor of the party organ, the Labour Leader, and could not himself take the initiative, but at his suggestion his wife wrote a letter to the paper offering to receive the names of men who had decided to resist conscription. The response was astonishing. Hundreds of replies were received, including many from young Christians and pacifists, and including many non-members of the ILP, particularly Quakers. The suggestion was repeatedly made that an organisation of objectors should be formed, and a provisional committee was set up with Clifford Allen, an active young ILP member at Cambridge University, as chairman and the author as secretary. Other members included a young Quaker, Barratt Brown, who later became Principal of Ruskin College, Oxford, and C. H. Norman, a shorthand writer at the Law Courts, who had made a reputation by his letters to the press exposing war scandals. It soon became necessary to establish headquarters in London and the author was given leave of absence by the Board of the Labour Leader so that he might devote all his time to the job of secretary. Clifford Allen proved himself an exceptionally talented leader. a winning personality, and an exceptional gift for organisation. Although he was a rationalist, he had a magnetic, spiritual
He had
appeal as a speaker and he showed tolerance and understanding towards the many diverse elements among Conscientious Objectors, as the resisters came to be called. Membership of the No-Conscription Fellowship (NCF) was confined to men of military age, but it received devoted co-operation from older men and women. Among these were Bertrand Russell, already distinguished as a mathematician and philosopher at Cambridge, and Catherine Marshall, the experienced political secretary of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Society whose challenging campaign had been called off with the outbreak of war. Edward Gruhb, a respected Quaker, was selected as treasurer in order to avoid difficulties about funds when those liable to service were arrested. The NCF conducted a rigorous campaign against conscription and its committee members, all except Clifford Allen, were arrested under the Defence of the Realm Act in the autumn of 1916 for publishing a leaflet forecasting resistance to any military service bill. They were sentenced to two months' imprisonment with the alternative of lines of £100; Edward Grubh decided to pay the fine, but the rest opted to go to prison The omission of Clifford Allen was explained in court on the ground that proceedings were to he taken against him under the Military Service Act and he was
'the men were handcuffed to poles, subjected to
crucifixion (ankles and wrists tied to a cross), put on a diet of bread and water, and confined in
crowded punishment
cells.
They still refused orders and were sentenced to .
.
.
ten years' penal servitude. Only one of the 37 gave
way under this pressure' soon arrested was paid after
for
returning his call-up notice The author's fine a month, so that he might fill Allen's
had served place as chairman hi'
2207
While the activities of the No-Conscription Fellowship were two large conferences were held attended by a critical its organisation was necessarily 'underground' because of police attention. Its committee would meet in different towns and a code was prepared which indicated that if a particular centre was mentioned for a meeting another would be intended. Only once did a member travel to Newcastle when, in fact, the venue was Manchester. Because the members of committees would in course of time be liable to arrest, reserve committees were appointed both nationally and regionally, with the provision that when necessary women and men above military age w nu Id take over. Thus it came about that after a year Bertrand Russell became Acting Chairman, succeeded, when he was himself imprisoned, by Alfred Salter MP, with Catherine Marshall public press
I
he
(
-ompleaf Angler
Edward Grubb kept the post of treasurer throughout. Bj considerable ingenuity a weekly news sheet, the Tribunal, was published. The authorities made repeated efforts to identify the printers and twice succeeded in dismantling the presses, but to then astonishment the news sheet continued to appear. The publisher, Joan Beauchamp, was imprisoned for contempt of court because she would not reveal where the new printing press was. Frequently, stocks of copies were seized, but this was overcome by diversified distribution through the co-operation of sympathetic lorry drivers who were members of the ILP. On one occasion a member of the staff took a heavy parcel to the Embankment to hand over to a driver. When confronted by a policeman, she asked him if he would look after the unsuspected parcel while she went to a neighbouring toilet. Meanwhile, the lorry drove off. It is not known what the policeman said when he discovered the contents of the parcel, but he had not noted the features of the woman or the registration number of the lorry. Many adventurous incidents of this kind occurred. Bertrand Russell contributed regularly to the Tribunal and prepared many leaflets. When the distribuas secretary
one leaflet were arrested, he wrote to The Times acknowledging thai he was the author He was arrested and imprisoned. 'I'lie Military Service Act made some provisions for Conscientious Objectors. Local tribunals were set up to judge the genuineness of men, who could appeal to higher tribunals if dissatisfied with decisions. The tribunals had many choices. They could reject an applicant, when he would be taken into the forces under military escort They could decide that he should be attached to a noncombatant corps. They could exempt him conditionally by requiring that he do alternative service, for example, as an orderly in a hospital. Or they could exempt him entirely from any kind of obligation under the Act. There was much discussion within the NCF as to what course to follow. A few were inclined not to register at all, holding that to do so was to accept the Act. Some were ready to perform non-combatant service on the ground that conscientiously they could reject only duties involving killing. A greater number felt that they had a duty to the community which required them to accept civilian alternatives to military service. Many felt that any obligatory service condoned conscription and therefore found only total exemption acceptable. Discussion was carried on in an atmosphere of tolerance with an appreciation that each individual should decide his action as his conscience dictated. Whatever attitude was adopted, the organisation would give necessary support. In the event, of the 12,000 who registered as Conscientious Objectors half accepted the exemptions offered by the tribunals and 6,000 were arrested for declining to do so. Even in wartime the imprisonment of men who claimed to be actuated by conscience affronted influential public opinion and, following a devastating speech by Snowden in Parliament exposing the inconsistencies of tribunal decisions, the government decided to give the 6,000 a second opportunity after they had served three months. They were offered alternative civilian service, and many accepted. Later, the alternative of lighter conditions of detention were offered with free association without the rigours of prison discipline, and with periodical weekend leave. Dartmoor and Wakefield gaols were set aside for this purpose, and again many accepted. Of the 6,000 who went to prison, 1,200 refused all compromises. They were repeatedly court-martial led and sentenced, most often to six months, a year and two years. They were not released until six months after the end of the war. When the older associates of the NCF replaced the arrested members of its committee, they were met by the problem of the maintenance of the dependants of the 6,000 men in prison. The usual grants would probably have been available as legally the objectors were regarded as in the forces, but their wives declined to consider accepting them. To meet the needs of wives and children a very considerable fund was required, but the committee accepted the responsibility of providing dependants with the tors of
2208
same amount
as the dependants of private soldiers were paid. In the difficulty did not prove so great as it seemed. Most of the local and regional NCF branches assumed responsibility for their own members and sympathetic friends adopted families. The effectiveness of this considerable effort was another indication of the high organisation and dedication of the NCF. When the Objectors were first arrested they had no knowledge of what their punishment would be for refusing to obey orders in the forces. The law authorised the death sentence if a refusal took place when on active service. The first reaction of senior officers at the War Office was to rush offenders to the front. The NCF learned that Objectors at Landguard Fort were in irons. A Quaker chaplain was hurried there and found that they had left for France. Even before his wire arrived at NCF headquarters news was received that 37 Objectors were on the way to Southampton to be shipped across the Channel; one of the men had thrown a note from the train as it passed through a station and a railwayman member of the ILP telephoned its contents. Catherine Marshall immediately got together an influential deputation and somehow got the Prime Minister, Mr Asquith, to receive it. lie expressed great concern, particularly since the promise had been given in Parliament that Objectors would not be sent to the front, and immediately signalled to Southampton forbidding the transfer of the men, only to receive the reply that they were already on a ship to Le Havre. In France the men were handcuffed to poles, subjected to 'crucifixion' (ankles and wrists tied to a cross), put on a diet of bread and water, and confined in crowded punishment cells. They still refused orders and were taken to the front and court-martialled. They were paraded and 'sentenced to death by being shot' — after a pause they were told that the sentence was to be commuted to ten years' penal servitude. Only one of the 37 men gave way under this pressure. These men were liberated six months after the end of the war at the same time as other objectors. They had been imprisoned for three years. The NCF'' declaration of faith was based on the principle of the 'sacredness of human life', but most of its young members had not then thought out the philosophy and implications of pacifism Many of the ILP objectors reflected strong political tones when fact,
MILITARY SERVICE ACT. 191B lun
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Ihuivdat. March 2nJ |he War utiles he ii
Bystander ARE
Any man who
YOU
IN THIS
QROUP^
1
AT7ES"
•Ei/.
has adequate grounds for applying to a Local Tribunal for a
CERTIFICATE OF
EXEMPTION
UNDER THIS ACT
Must do so BEFORE
THURSDAY, MARCH Why
wait
the Act to apply
for
Come now Vci can
at
and
join
once
of
put
to
your your
>our
own claim
free
if
will.
before a Local
Tribunal for exemption from being called up
Service
2
for
Military
you wish.
ATTEST NOW they gave evidence to tribunals and courts martial and some ol them did not claim to be pacifists. In Glasgow, for example, James Maxton deliberately invited arrest for sedition rather than unite prosecution as a Conscientious Objector. The tribunals were generally harder on political than on religious objectors. Even when 1LF objectors were both pacifist and political they emphasised the political argument. This was true of Fmrys Hughes, later Labour MP for South Ayrshire', who served three years in prison. Towards the end of the war there was much public concern about the Conscientious Objectors who remained in prison. Clifford Allen had been released in a serious state of health and influential people were concerned that many of the Objectors were undergoing their third year under hard labour conditions through successive sentences when the permitted maximum for this more severe treatment was two years. Mrs Henry llohhouse, widow of a Liberal Postmaster General, whose son, a Quaker, had been broken physically by imprisonment, organised a petition to the government signed by politicians, religious leaders, academics, scientists and writers, urging that the Objectors should be re leased; most of the signatories were supporters of the war. The concern was felt not only among the elite. While the author was in Lincoln jail, thousands of local munition workers stopped work for a day while a deputation of their shop stewards waited on the governor of the prison because they bad heard wrongly that the author had contracted tuberculosis. This campaign for the release of the imprisoned Objectors was overtaken by events as the surrender by Germany approached; otherwise it might have been (
I
successful.
The conscription law also applied to residents in Britain from the Allied countries. They were given the alternative of joining the British forces or being deported to their countries of origin, and many of them resisted. This particularly affected Russian socialists who were not prepared to fight for the Tsarist regime, and they formed an Anti-Conscription League of those 'who cannot participate in an imperialist war, considering it contrary to the principles of the international solidarity of the workers'. Maiskv. subsequently Soviet Ambassador in Britain, and Chicherine, afterwards Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, were among the organisers of the League. Both were in reduced circumstances.
a' Vetch
me° ?
A cartoon from7"r?e Bystander commenting on the efforts of Lord Derby (War Office) to widen the net of conscription, presumably to Left
catch the odd fish, including Ob|ectors. who slipped past Centre: A recruiting poster encouraging men to join up before they are called up. Above: The Bystander's comment on those who waited to be called up
and when at first the NCF placed at their disposal its political and organisational resources it did not occur to anyone that they would become prominent representatives of Russia Perhaps the most complete opposition to the war was manifested in Ireland. Although the Military Service Act applied to the territorj no attempt was made to enforce it. When the London newspapers began to agitate about this, a date was fixed for Irish compulsory service. Prominent Irishmen came to consult NCF representatives regarding methods of resistance and. in view of the massive anti-British opinion, it was agreed that a general strike should be called on the daj conscription was to be imposed. The strike was amazing!) thorough. In Dublin and the Southern Counties no work was done and even in Lister the stoppage was extensive. In lace of this demonstration the government never dared to apply the Act. This resistance was not, one need hardly say, either socialist or pacifist; it was entirely nationalist The Irish people were bitter because their Home Rule Bill had been sacrificed at the beginning of the war. and opinion had gone to the extreme of disavowing the constitutional part) at Westminster under John Redmond, and turning to the militant Sinn Feiners. Some even supported the fatal effort of Roger Case ment for German co-operation in a rebellion De Valera and 17 Sinn Feiners were captured and detained in Lincoln prison and Roger Casement was hanged in Pontonvillo prison B\ a strange coincidence, ho author was in Lincoln prison when de Valera and four of his colleagues escaped and in Pentonville prison on the eve of Casement's execution When one turns to other countries involved in the war. accurate figures about resistance to military service are difficult to assemble, but there is evidence that everywhere some personal resistance occurred. Most frequently, it was by members of otherworldly religious organisations and had little political effect. The largest number was m the United States of America, where conscription was introduced within six weeks of the entry into the t
•J •__.,,;
|
The
Conscience
Fruits of
A Conscientious Objector refuses to register under the IVI
on religious or ethical ground-;
He appear before which there
(of
one
is
h, 5
llltdry
Cprwjpp Apf Local Tribunal:
rejects his plea
each
for
in
Registration District) to appeal.
which case he
is
immediately
drafted into the forces under military escort:
accepts his plea m
which case he
is
attached to a
non-combatant corps,
or
conditionally accepts his plea in
which case he
is
given alternative
service (hospital or factory work). If
dissatisfied with the Local
Tribunal's decision, he can
^peai
which serves larger steal Tribunals but offer the
make an _
to one oi the lhait
I
—
-
,
«-
the Local Tribunal's decision.
01 al
same range
._
.
Appeal Tribunals: ratify
of
„
pass
alternatives
a
i
more
lenient
judgement; or allow him to appeal to the If
he
dissatisfied with the sentence
is
_
.
Lentral
Appeal Tribunal. he can refuse
accept
to
its
decision.
arrested and
After three months he
is
given the
opportunity of accepting the
imprisoned.
Tribunals' decision and taking up the
work assigned firs
he
If
remains
in
still
to him. in return for
freedom.
declines to do this he
prison, and his dependents
receive help from the funds of the
No Conscription Fellowship In
the event of the objector being
court martialled. his case has to be referred to the Central Appeal
Tribunal which,
case to
fall
if
;t
considers the
within the sphere of
conscientious obiection, refers him to a
Committee headed by W Bryce, MP. for work under civil control.
8,608Courts Martial proceedings up
to
May
31
1919 on
Of the 4,126 employed 2.868
were subsequently sent out Exceptional Employment, 27
to
died and 444 were arrested or
Qntrol KJ C LI
|
-1
1
•
|
1
Q
recalled to the army for
1
absconding
1
regulations. The earliest date
or other
breach of
0^,0^,^
riuiinai
employed under
oLEUMMIocI]U,OU _____
last
Court Martial proceedings. .
work
of national
under
importance
in
Control
employment was
released on April 19, 1919
.
4,522Recommended4,i26 for
man
Civil
employed
293 refused 82 exempted 10 returned to army
Civil Control
10 medically unfit 7
in
prison-
awaiting work on the date April 10, 1919,
528l\lotso
when
the
government authorised the discharge of Conscientious
recommended and returned
to military authorities
758Special recommendatioi IS and men who refused
to plead their
cause before the Central Tribunal
2210
Objectors at work, and
discharged specially
Left: The trials and tribulations of a British conscientious objector in the First World War Top: Keir Hardie speaking at a peace demonstration in 1914 Centre: Bertrand Russell (left) and Jean Jaures (right), the former imprisoned and the latter assassinated for anti-war activities Above lett Arthur Henderson, he called on the working class to keep Britain out of the war. but within a year was in Asquith s government Above right. Karl Liebknecht. German Social Democrat He violently opposed the voting of war credits imprisoned 1916
1
but public pressure brought opportunities of exemption from military duties for clergymen and members of religious organisations which regarded all war as wrong. There were many retions,
Irish. Widespread concern was learned that 14 Conscientious Objectors had been placed on a troop ship for France, where they would be liable to death sentences. Protesting pressure brought them home. Four hundred resisters were sentenced to terms of imprisonment of up to two years. In Canada conscription was introduced in 1917, though the French-populated province of Quebec voted against. Members of the other-worldly Mennonite sect had been given a pledge when they migrated to Canada that they would not be asked to perform military service and were exempted. Mennonites were exempted in Russia and Germany under similar historic pledges. In Russia the known number of sentenced resisters before the Revolution during the war was 837, of whom 329 were Tolstoyans. They were imprisoned for terms varying from four to six years. When the Kerensky Revolution took place, Conscientious Objectors were released and dismissed from the forces. In Germany most of the objectors were Seventh Day Adventists or intellectuals. The Adventists were sent to prisons and the intellectuals were often interned in lunatic asylums. There were a few anarchists and socialists, but most political opponents held
sisters, religious, political,
was caused
war. The law imposing compulsion permitted exemption only to Objectors who were members of a religious organisation which objected to military service, and non-combatant service was required, but notwithstanding this limitation there were 64,693 claims. The breakdown of this figure is remarkable. As many as 16,000 were persuaded to abandon their position and the large proportion of 56,830 were accepted as genuine, of whom, however, only 20,873 were passed as fit for non-combatant service. Of the 8,700 who objected to non-combatant military service, figures are available for 1 ,800: these show that 1 ,200 were allowed to do farm work and 100 joined Quaker relief activity in France. About 500 were court-martialled and sentenced to severe penalties. Among them 17 were sentenced to death (afterwards commuted to long terms of imprisonment), 142 to life imprisonment, three to 50 years' imprisonment, four to 40 years, and f>7 to 25 years. Most of these sentences were afterwards reduced, but some of the men remained in jail until pardoned by Presidential Proclamation in December 1933. The greatest political effect of opposition to conscription was achieved in Australia. Before the war there was compulsory training for home service in the cadets, varying from ten days to one month in a year, and there was already considerable resistance to it despite the short periods. During the 30 months from January 1912, as many as 27,749 cadets out of 123,497 were prosecuted for failing to comply with military regulations and 5,723 boys were imprisoned in military forts or prisons. The opposition to any form of conscription had a good deal of support from the Labour movement, which remembered the use of troops in a strike at Eureka Stockade, and the Broken Hill miners gave full support to the resisting cadets, presenting a medal to one boy who had been in jail on bread and water. A year after the declaration ol war when conscription was threatened, a representative Peace Alliance was formed to campaign against it and to press for an early and just peace. The response was impressive, and when in 1916 and 1917 referenda were held as required by the Australian constitution, on a government proposal to introduce conscription, the majority vote went against. The people of Australia were overwhelmingly behind the war and made considerable sacrifices for it, notably at the Dardanelles, but there was an active minority who were anti-militarist, anti-war. Both New Zealand and Canada introduced conscription. In the Now Zealand Pill as originally introduced there were no exemp-
in July 1917,
Maoris and
when
it
the Marxist view that they should penetrate the forces. In France there was no provision for Objectors and the number of resisters involved is not known. The penalties they faced were execution or long terms of imprisonment. In Holland there was refusal of service by Anarchists; non-combatant military service was the only alternative to armed service. There were some 800 resisters involved, of whom 150 applied to join a non-combatant regiment and only 15 were accepted. In Denmark alternative service in the form of forestry work was conceded from 1917 and two camps for this purpose were opened. The number of individuals is not known. In Czechoslovakia conscription was imposed on the establishment of the Republic in 1918; there was no exemption. Objectors could be repeatedly arrested. The sentence on a first charge was from three to 12 months; the number of persons has not been recorded. From Bulgaria we know only that some Tolstoyans were shot. In Austria and Yugoslavia there was mass resistance by members of the Nazarine sect. They were sentenced to long terms of detention, many of them to 11 years. Such is the record of the opposition to the First World War. political and personal. Perhaps the truest comment on the political opposition is that it was a 'near miss' or more accurately a 'near hit'. In history it is not of much value to write its", but it is fair to say that if the second Russian Revolution had not occurred in November 1917, and if the military collapse of Germany had not become evident shortly afterwards, the international solidarity between the working class movements on both sides of the war frontiers might have brought a conclusion on the basis of the Zimmerwald Conference and the planned agenda of the Stockholm Conference. The immediate effect was lost in frustration when the Woodrow Wilson perspective for a Peace Treaty reflecting the free choice of peoples was destroyed.
Further Reading
H N The War of Steel and Gold (George Bell) Braunthaz, Julius, The History ot the International. Vols 1 and 2 (Nelson) Brockway. Lord Fenner, Socialism over Sixty Years (Allen & Unwin) Brockway, Lord Fenner, Inside the Left (Allen & Unwin) Graham, John Conscription and Conscience (Allen & Unwin) McNair, John, The Beloved Socialist: Biography of James Maxton (Allen Brailsford.
.
W
..
& Unwin) Ponsonby. Arthur. Falsehood
in Wartime (Allen & Unwin) RusspII, Bertrand, Autobiography, Vol 2 (Allen & Unwin)
LORD BROCKWAY was
born
in
Calcutta
He was educated
in
1888
of
Congregationalist mis-
School tor Sons of Missionaries at Blackheath (now Eltham College) In 1906 he became a journalist and in 191 was editor of the Labour Leader, the organ of the LP He was secretary of the No Conscription Fellowship in 1915. was imprisoned as a Conscientious Ob|ector from 1917 to 1920, was Joint Secretary of the Prison System Enquiry Committee from 1921 to 1922 and held the posts of Organising Secretary, General Secretary, Chairman, and Political Secretary of the ILP between 1922 and 1946 sionary parents
at the
:
I
He was Chairman
the
No More War Movement and
War
Resisters Colonial In 1975. he became Co-Chairman of the World Disarmament Campaign He was elected Labour MP for East Leyton in 1929 and for Eton and Slough m 1950 He is the author of 15 books, including Socialism over Sixty Years, Inside the Left. Death Pays a Dividend. Red Liner and Outside the Right In 1964 he was made a Life Peer and took the title Baron Brockway of Eton and Slough of
of
from 1920 to 1931, Chairman of the Movement Freedom from 1954 to 1968 and its President since that date International
for
2211
The trial of Sir Roger Casement was one in which the British sacred cow of 'Fair Play' was most conspicuously
THE
absent. Accused of treason,
TRIAL OF SIR
Casement was prosecuted by a man who had abetted precisely the same crime three years previously, and the voice of clemency was silenced by public hysteria and the covert
ROGER CASEMENT
circulation of discreditable matter while the case was still subjudice. Patrick Scriuenor. Left: Casement (top centre) on the 19 on his way to Ireland
On August
'i,
man
was hanged
in Pentonville prison.
1916, Sir Roger
U
Casement He was
the sixteenth and the last of the Irishmen to be executed for their part in the Easter
Rising in Dublin, 1916. Yet Sir Roger's case was different from the others. He had taken no part in the fighting in Dublin, he had not been taken in arms against the King, and indeed one of his motives in coming to Ireland had been to try to stop the Rising. Why then was this former servant of the crown, with a world-wide reputation, tried for his life and hanged? Casement was born in 1864 of Protestant stock in County Antrim. He entered the British Consular Service and became
famous as
work
in exposing the horrors of the rubber trade, both in the Belgian Congo and in Putumayo in South America. For this work he received a Knighthood, but in 1912 he left the Consular Service and devoted his energies to the cause of Irish freedom. He was a prolific writer of articles, poems and pamphlets, and in 1913 became the Treasurer of the Irish Volunteers, the para-military a result of his
organisation formed to counter the threat of Sir Edward Carson's Ulster Volunteers. The position of the Irish Volunteers at the outbreak of war was a curious one. Their leader, Sir John Redmond, declared a common purpose with Britain, encouraged British recruitment in Ireland, and even wanted the Volunteers formed into a front line unit. But not all the Volunteers supported Redmond. Many, in addition to being Volunteers, were members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the secret Sinn Fein organisation. These men opposed the recruitment of Irishmen into the British army and wished to use the war as a lever for Irish independence. They continued to import arms for the Volunteers, and sought to raise funds from the parallel organisation in America, Clan na Gael. Casement was not a member of the IRB, but he shared many of their views, and his international standing made it inevitable that he should go to America to raise funds. In September, 1914, Casement left for New York on the first leg of a journey that was to finish on the gallows. He left in the belief that Ireland's opportunity had come, and that a German victory would be Ireland's deliverance. It must be remembered that in 1914 people expected a victory similar to the victory of 1870: a swift decisive land campaign, involving only the contending armies, followed by a peace dealing mainly with the exchange of
2212
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign signed an undertaking, which Casement soon came to look upon as a formal treaty. The undertaking agreed that Casement should form a brigade from the Irish POWs in Germany. The brigade was to be equipped by Germany as a gift to the cause of Irish independence, but none of its members was to be paid by Germany. The brigade was to be officered by Irishmen, and used only for Ireland's purposes. In the event of a German naval victory, Germany was to transport the brigade to Ireland, and if it subsequently helped Ireland to win her independence, Germany would recognise the new government, and give it support and goodwill. Affairs,
a few pieces of territory. It must not be supposed that Casement, or like-minded Irish nationalists, wanted at this stage to see Britain and France invaded, occupied, and reduced to a state of economic vassalage to Germany. In September 1914, victory for the Central Powers still appeared possible in the near future. Casement's first
was
on reaching America, therefore,
act
draw up a
petition to the Kaiser, requesting that the independence of Ireland be made one of the Central Powers' war aims. This petition was signed by most of the members of Clan na Gael, and was followed by further approaches to the Gerto
man government
through their Ambassador in Washington, Count Bernstorff. The response to these approaches was sufficiently favourable to persuade Casehis next move must be to visit himself. At this stage he still had great faith in the unlimited goodwill of Germany, a faith that appears amazingly naive in an experienced diplomat. He was, however, able to communicate this faith to
ment that
Germany
the Clan na Gael sufficiently for them to sanction the trip, and on October 29 he left America secretly to travel via Norway to
Germany. His motives were wished
to
threefold; he form a brigade from Irishmen
among the British POWs in Germany to return to Ireland under German auspices in support of the Rising; he wished to secure a formal statement of German support for Irish independence; and he hoped to persuade the Germans to provide arms for the Rising. Casement completely underestimated the difficulties in his path. To start with the British had knowledge of his mission, and attempted to kidnap him on his way through Norway. This sorry little incident, which sadly tarnishes the image of the British Secret Service, was wholly unsuccessful, and Casement reached Ger-
many safely. Once there his difficulties started in earnest. His own health gave way, and the German authorities, preoccupied with the fortunes of the war, had little time to spare. However on November 20 the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung published a declaration of Germany's sympathy for the Irish cause, and on December 27 Casement and Zimmerman, the Ger-
German bodyguard Armed with
this
agreement, Casement
POW
started on a tour of the camps to recruit men for his brigade. He was accompanied by a bodyguard of German soldiers, provided, as his prosecuting counsel was later to say, by 'a nation that thinks of everything'. And the presence of these guards was a measure of his success. On one occasion they had to protect him from the enraged prisoners, and in all only 52 men joined his brigade. This was a bitter blow to Casement, but worse was to follow. The failure of his recruiting and his persistent refusal to accept money from the Germans, persuaded them that Casement was an unrealistic dreamer, and their interest in his schemes dwindled accordingly. Their promise to train his recruits in the use of machine guns was not kept, and Casement's hopes for a great German expedition and the use of at least
200,000 rifles and machine guns for his brigade receded into the distance of vague promises and polite evasion. The Germans, in fact, preferred to deal direct with Clan na Gael, and had already agreed on a cargo of 20,000 rifles plus ammunition to be sent to Ireland in support of the Rising Throughout 1915 and the early part of 1916, Casement was working in the dark. Barred from the complete confidence of the Germans or the Clan na Gael, he did not know what the plans of the IRB leaders were, nor on what they were counting from him. All he knew was that the Germans were prepared to transport the 20,000 rifles to Ireland when requested. No one had told him even the proposed dale of
the Rising.
And then on
April 6, 1916, 17 days before
the Rising was due to take place, he received a letter from Joseph Plunkett who was in Switzerland in an attempt to make contact with the Germans on behalf of the IRB. The letter contained the following four points of information: • The Rising had been fixed for the following Easter Sunday (April 23); • The arms consignment must reach Tralee Bay not later than the dawn of Easter
Saturday (April
• German
22);
officers
would be necessary
for
the Irish Volunteers;
• A German submarine would in
be needed
Dublin harbour.
This letter came as a bombshell to Casement. He had no idea that the rebels were depending to such an extent on German aid, and it caused him some bitterness to have to reply that no German officers would be sent, and no submarine. His belief in Germany's goodwill had undergone a sharp reversal, and he now considered that Ireland had been cynically betrayed. In fact the rebels were not depending on German aid to the extent indicated by Plun-
and anyway Casement's reply was never forwarded to the rebel leaders in Dublin. But Casement was not to know this, and he pictured a hopeless Rising kett's letter,
taking place in Ireland based on aid that would never arrive. From this moment on he became obsessed with the need to prevent the Rising at all costs, and he changed his plans accordingly. He dare not, however, let the Germans suspect that his aim was now to stop the Rising that he had persuaded them so hard to support, and he had no wish to postpone the delivery of the arms, for he still hoped for a future opportunity for a successful rising. On the afternoon of April 9, therefore, the German vessel Aud sailed from Lubeck with its cargo of arms, and Casement set about persuading the German government to send him by submarine to Ireland, thereby outstripping the Aud and arriving in time to warn the rebel leaders of the lack of
German support. He managed to do this, telling the Germans that his presence during the Rising was
essential due to the lack of experienced military leadership among the rebels, and on April 12 he left Kiel in the German
submarine U 19 accompanied by two colleagues, Monteith and Bailey. That night he noted in his diary: 'Left Wicklow (code name for Wilhelmshaven) in Willie's yacht.' The A ud's adventures were many and perilous, but she reached her rendezvous in Tralee Bay on Thursday, April 20. There was no one there to meet her. Plunkett's letter had told Casement that the Rising was fixed for the evening of Easter Sunday (April 23). Since then, the rebel leaders in Dublin had decided that
Easter
Monday
April 24) would be a hotter most of the officers of the British garrison would be at the Fairy house races. They had not been able to communicate this change to either the Aud or Casement, but it affected the landing of the arms vitally. It had already been decided that it would be impossible to smuggle so large a quantity of arms, and that they would therefore have to he landed openly In such an event the police would be bound to hear in a short time, so it was vital that the arms should be landed as I
date, as
near to the time of the Rising as possible. This left the Aud with three dangerous days to wait.
The amazing thing is that at this stage the British government was aware of the Aud's mission and of the likelihood of a rising in the near future. In New York the office of a German attache had been raided, and the code used by Clan na Gael to wireless Germany had been discovered and handed over to the British. They had thus been able to intercept and interpret all the important messages passing direct between America and Germany since February. None of the vital information thus gathered was passed on to Dublin Castle. Whether this was another case of Intelligence work cutting off its nose to spite its face (by refusing to pass on information for security reasons!), or whether, as some Irishmen have speculated, it was done deliberately to allow the Rising to come to a head in order to discredit the home rule faction, is not known, but in view of similar failures in naval Intelligence, it seems likely to be the former. But if the British had communication problems, so did the rebels. The Rising was planned to take place on a national scale, the main blow falling in Dublin with supporting insurrections throughout the country, but particularly in Wexford, the north, and the west. The insurrection in the west, and the continued success of the Rising all over Ireland, depended on the safe arrival of the German arms consignment, and above all on the correct timing of the landing of the arms. But the rebel leaders had sanguinely supposed that the Aud possessed a wireless set, and was therefore abreast of their changes in plan. The pilot and reception party detailed to meet the Aud had postponed the time of the rendezvous without bearing in mind the possibility that the Aud might arrive according to the previous schedule. When Captain Spindler hove to alongside Inishtooskert Island in Tralee Bay on Thursday, April 20, he encountered what he later described as the 'greatest disappointment' of his life. There was no pilot or reception committee, and the prearranged signals, made after dark, met with no response. On April 18, Dublin Castle had finally come to learn of the journey of the Aud, and on the morning of the 21st (Good Friday) she found herself the target of an intensive search by a total of 29 British warships. One of these even boarded her, searched her, and left without any suspicions, but such luck could not last. At noon the Aud was sighted again, and this time the alert was given. By the end of the afternoon the
Aud was
and unable to Captain Spindler to make for Queenstown harbour. but on reaching Queenstown, Spindler scuttled his ship. The Rising's only hope of outside support thus vanished three days before it was due to take place. What m the meantime had happened to Casement? His attempt to outstrip the. \ud had been very nearly successful, and he escape.
located, identified
HMS
Bluebell
ordered
too arrived off the west coast of Ireland on Thursday April 20. They had already sighted the Aud but had failed to make contact. During the evening and night of Thursday the 19 also tried to make con tad with the rebels by signal, but with
U
success. Lieutenant Weisbach, comof the I' 19, grew increasingly anxious as the night drew on, and finally informed CasemetTt thai he could no longer
no
mander
risk his ship in the vicinity, and that he intended to run deep into Tralee Bay and land Casement and his companions some-
where along the deserted shore line. At 0030 hours on the morning of Good Friday, Casement, Monteith and Bailey were put ashore by a small collapsible boat on Banna Strand. The boat lived up to its name and capsized on the journey from the submarine to the shore. The ensuing struggle to right it was as much as a man in Casement's poor health could stand, and it was a sorry party that waded ashore, Monteith and Bailey supporting a half-conscious Casement. They revived him, and left him hidden in a prehistoric fort, called locally McKenna's Castle, while they made their
way
to Tralee.
Only two hours after they landed the remains of the boat were found by a local farmer. Nearby was a quantity of ammunition (about 1,000 rounds and later three loaded revolvers were found on the same beach. The police were alerted and instigated a search. At 1300 hours they searched McKenna's Castle and found Casement, considerably recovered, but still wet and dishevelled. He had shaved his beard before leaving Germany, and the police were unaware of his true identity. They searched him, however, and found a number of sheets of paper on him covered in foreign script with corresponding rows of numbers. He was detained in Tralee police station, while a telephone call to Dublin I
disclosed the sensational nature of their He was put on a train to Dublin under guard, and from there was sent on
arrest. to
London.
The 'Black
Diaries'
Casement arrived
in London late on SaturEaster Sunday he was taken to Scotland Yard, and questioned by Basil Thomson, the Assistant Commissioner of Metropolitan Police (who specialised in spy-catching during the war), and Captain Reginald Hall, the Director of the Intelligence Division at the Admiralty. Both men were obviously anxious to know what Casement's presence in Ireland presaged. During the interview Casement said: 'Knowing all the circumstances, I came from a sense of duty, in which if I dared tell you thi' facts, you would be the first to agree with me.' The next day the Rising in Dublin broke out. For three days Dublin was engulfed in bloody fighting, culminating in the defeat of the rebels and the execution of
day
22.
On
their leaders.
was
Throughout
this.
Casement
Brixton Prison doubtless longing lor the comfort of his old lodgings in Ebury Street. But Ebury Street had not escaped the attention of the police, and even as he was being questioned at Scotland Yard. Ins previous lodgings were raided. The police removed three trunks which had been left there when Casement abandoned his lodgings, and in one of these three trunks were found five volumes on which the whole of the subsequent Casement controversy has been based. His diaries The government was now laced with the problem of what to do with Casement. The world would watch with interest their treatment of a man with an international reputation as an humanitarian Thomson had hoped for a court-martial, hut at a meeting between the cabinet members concerned and Sir K K Smith, tin- Attorney-General, a civil trial for nigh treason in
was decided upon. Nonetheless Casement transferred from Brixton Prison to the Towci (it London, where he was detained in conditions of great hardship, and here he remained from April 2'.'> until Ma) 15 in ever-deteriorating health and with (lie meagrest possible facilities for arranging his own defence. During this period lie made an attempt on his life,
THE CASE AGAINST CASEMENT THE
—
IRISH
LOHENGRIN'S "COUP DE THEATRE"
strike. He was watch24 hours a day, and the solicitor
and went on hunger ed
lor
whom his relatives had approached to undertake his defence was not allowed to see him for 1 1 days. When he did so on Ma\ !), he was horrified by his client's condition. His clothes were filthy, he was unshaved and verminous, and the strain of waiting had told upon his mind to the extent that he spoke incoherently and had difficulty in remembering things. The Mr Gavan Duffy, protested strongly, and when it was made clear to him that Casement was to be tried in the civil courts, he demanded his transfer back to Brixton. This was eventually granted on May 15. At the same time he demanded details of the charges from the Public Prosecutor, and retained two counsel for the police court hearing, Professor J. H. solicitor,
Morgan and Mr Artemus Jones. The magisterial enquiry that opened at Bow Street on May 15 had the appearance of a dress rehearsal lor the trial itself. The prosecution was led by F. E. Smith, and the defence by Artemus .Jones, instructed by Gavan Duffy. Smith produced evidence of Casement's activities during the preceding months, dwelling on his conduct in Germany and his landing in Ireland. A statement by Bailey (Casement's companion on his journey) was read out, and objected to by the defence on the grounds that it had been obtained by a promise of freedom. The objection was overruled. At the end of the hearing the magistrate formally charged both Casement and Bailey with treason, and committed them for trial. Casement and Duffy had a little over three weeks in which to prepare their
defence.
The formal indictment that they would to answer at Casement's trial was that of High Treason — 'by adhering to the have
King's enemies elsewhere than in the King's realm, to wit, in the Empire of Germany, contrary to the Treason Act, 1351.' In the event of a plea of Not Guilty there were two courses open to Casement's defence. The first was the legal course, favoured by Duffy, Morgan and Artemus Jones, and also by Serjeant Sullivan of the Irish bar, a further counsel engaged by Duffy before the trial. This was to question the legal validity of the indictment itself, and to question the relevance to the indictment of the facts adduced by the prosecution. The second course open to Casement was what might be termed the 'Irish' course. This Casement favoured himself and it was strongly urged on him by several people, but particularly by Bernard Shaw, who took an early and intense interest in the case. It amounted to this. Casement should admit the facts of the case as produced by the Crown (which could not, in any case, be readily denied) and should defend his conduct as being that of an Irish patriot, claiming to be held as a prisoner of war, and not as a traitor. Casement favoured the second course, while his counsel prepared his defence along the lines of the first course.
2214
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Top: An example of the relish shown by the British press in condemning Casement Though still on trial, he is openly referred to as the traitor', a renegade', and his crazy enterprise is clearly attributed to Germany
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;-
MM Witd
^^*^£»~^^^fj^^ **«*^B
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-
•
Above. 28 of the pitiful 52 who joined Casement's Irish Brigade pose in front of their flag Starved of the promised German support and training, there was no way of using them, and they were eventually returned to
POW camps
On June
12 Casement and his leading counsel had their first meeting in Brixton, and disagreed so violently that Casement seriously considered conducting his own defence.
He was dissuaded from
this
course by his friends, and resigned himself to a line of defence that he regarded as fatal. There was a third choice open to Casement's advisers. To take the case out of his hands, and to plead guilty but insane. This obviously was not a course that commended itself either to Casement or his friends, but as the trial drew nearer it suggested itself more and more strongly to the Crown. The outcry resulting from the executions that followed the Rising had alaimed the government, who were particularly anxious not to antagonise any powerful section of American opinion. Having gone so far, there could be no question of not bringing Casement to trial, and any avenue that might avoid having to execute him was worth exploring. And here the diaries previously removed from Ebury Street first make an appearance in the story of the trial. Shortly after their removal, Captain Reginald Hall had invited representatives of the press, both British and American, to his Here he had office in the Admiralty. shown them photographic copies of pages of a diary purporting to be that of Casement. The passages described, in considerable detail and with evident relish, various homosexual encounters that the writer claimed to have had. One of the journalists, shocked by this attempt to influence public opinion about a man awaiting trial, told Casement's friends
who
protested
vigorously
against
this
clumsy and even unconstitutional device of Hall's. But it seems that Hall was not the only offender. Hoping that Casement's lawyers might plead guilty but insane, F. E. Smith showed parts of the diaries to Gavan Duffy, and offered to give him the
At this point the trial was further delayed by the defence and the prosecution both challenging the suitability of the jurors. In all 37 jurors were objected to, and two hours were spent doing it. It was nearly noon by the time F. E. Smith rose to open for the prosecution. The AttorneyGeneral began by stressing Casement's former service in the Consular Service, the fact that he drew a pension from the British government, and the almost fulsome expressions of loyalty contained in Casement's letter accepting his knighthood. He drew the inevitable comparison between Casement's expressed loyalty in time of peace, and his treachery in time of war. He went on to describe Casement's activities in Germany, culminating in his journey to Ireland and his arrest. He told the jury that he hoped to be able to satisfy them that the accused had encouraged soldiers of the crown to enter the service of the enemies of their country 'while their hearts were heavy with captivity'. He ended by describing Casement's arrest, and proceeded to call his witnesses.
These
broadly into three categories. witnesses, testifying to Casement's previous service, to the details of his pension, and to the details of his arrest; returned POWs, testifying to his recruiting activities in the German prison camps, and the 'Kerry' witnesses, giving evidence of his landing, the fate of the Aud, and the coded list found on his person at the time of arrest. These proceedings took until the afternoon of June 27, and it was not until then, at the conclusion of the prosecution's case, that Sullivan was able to try again to quash the indictment. He had not spent much time in cross-examining the prosecution witnesses, as his defence was to be on a point of law, rather than on the evidence. fell
Official
manner
strued as follows: 'levying war against the King or being adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere.' In other words the offence was any act of war against the King, or any act in support of the King's enemies, committed either inside or outside the realm. In their view the charges against Casement were consistent with this interpretation. It
remained
for the defence to present
their case. Sullivan had elected to call no witnesses, relying on his speech to the jury. On June 28 he rose to address the jury. His theme was to question whether in fact the prosecution had produced any evidence to show that the prisoner had adhered to the King's enemies, and whether it had ever been his intention to do so. The fact that others might have used his actions to the detriment of the realm, argued Sullivan, did not make him guilty of treason. Only an intention on his part to commit treason could make his acts treasonable. This line of defence inevitably involved Sullivan in some Casement's recruiting explanation of activities, and his argument here was that the arming of the Irish Volunteers was the necessary, and indeed constitutional result, of the arming of the Ulster Volunteers. This earned him a rebuke from the bench for introducing matter not in evidence, and he had to discontinue. Shortly after this Sullivan,
who was showing
distinct signs of strain, his speech was continued the following day (June 29) by Artemus
collapsed,
and
counsel are selected on the principle of setting a thief to catch a thief, then F. E. Smith was well chosen'
'If prosecuting
diaries to be used as evidence of insanity. The defence refused outright to take this line, and Duffy did not even bother to show the copies to his leading counsel, Sullivan. This refusal by the defence to use the diaries led to their subterranean
use by the Crown in a discussed later.
never within the realm while he was succouring the King's enemies, he could not be guilty. Sullivan's motion to quash the indictment was rejected by the Lord Chief Justice. The bench's view was that the passage in question should be con-
that will be
'Not Guilty'
The
trial of Sir Roger Casement opened before three judges and a jury in the Lord Chief -Justice's Court on -June 2(>, 1916. The proceedings were started by the King's Coroner who read the indictment, setting out various acts of treason said to have been committed by the accused, and asking him how he pleaded. Before Casement could answer tins, his counsel, Sullivan, rose to intervene. He moved that the indictment be quashed outright on the grounds that no offence known to the law was suggested in the indictment as framed. No treason was alleged to have been committed within the realm, and as this was the only treason recognised by the law, the charges had no meaning Sullivan got no further than this before he was interrupted by the Lord Chief Justice, who ruled that in a ease of this kind such an objection could not he raised until after the prosecution had presented their case
The King's Coroner again asked Casement his plea, and 'Not Guilty'.
received a clear answer of
Again he argued that what Casement had done was not an offence within the meaning of the statute under which he in question, when translated from Norman French, defines treason as follows: 'levying war against the King or being adherent to the King's enemies in his realm giving them aid and comfoct in the realm or elsewhere. It
was charged. The statute
has, in common with all English composed by lawyers, no punctuation, and with no punctuation the passage quoted is clearly open to two separate interpretations. Sullivan maintained that the passage should read as follows: 'levying war against the King or being adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving them aid and comfort in the realm or elsewhere.' In
other words, only if you support and help the King's enemies while you yourself are within the realm regardless of where the comfort to the King's enemies takes effect can you be deemed guilty of treason i
i
under
this
statute.
As
Casement
was
Jones. He did his best to reinforce Sullivan's original line, that Casement had gone to Germany not to aid and abet the Germans, but to form an exclusively Irish force for exclusively Irish purposes, but he also found it necessary to make frequent allusions to matters not in evidence, and was constantly in trouble with the bench. He was followed by F. E. Smith, who in summing up made particularly damning use of the notebook in which Casement had made the entry about Willie's Yacht', and which contained the record of his itinerary. By tins stage the outcome of the trial was virtually a foregone conclusion, and
the Lord Chief Justice in summing up left the jury with little alternative but to find guilty
At 2.48 pm, having been out for just over an hour, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. It is the practice in English law to allow a prisoner found guilty of a
J 2215
capital offence to make a statement before sentence is passed. Many of the finest speeches in Irish history have been made this rather strained situation, and in
Casement's was he said manj
oi
tained
be no exception. In it the things that he and
to
Bernard Shaw would have liked
to
have
his defence. He pointed out the ludicrous antiquity of the statute under
been said
in
authority of the court to try him. He underlined the hypocrisy of a nation that claimed to lie involved in a world struggle to protect the rights of small nations, and
article, 3,
hand in arms solely
Prison.
'asement's friends pressed for an appeal,
outside the realm, unless the offender be within the realm at the time of the offence. The appeal failed, but was remarkable for the inspection of the original statute to see if there had ever been any punctuation on it! Casement's only chance of a further appeal was to the House of Lords, but Duffy's application for this was turned down by the Attorney-General.
Intense unpopularity After his sentence Casement's friends were not idle in seeking his reprieve. The
Home
Secretary
received
petition
after
most telling of which came from Bernard Shaw and another from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Bernard Shaw declined to sign his own petition on the grounds that his signature would frighten away more useful ones (Shaw had incurred petition, the
unpopularity for his support of Casement). But Shaw was not the only factor preventing people from speaking up in Casement's support. For over two months copies of the pages of the diaries had been circulating on both sides of the Atlantic, and in many quarters they had the desired effect. John Redmond, the intense
Nationalist leader, was shown a copy, pronounced it loathsome, and declined to sign a petition on Casement's behalf. The same applies to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Bishop of Durham. Even Asquith, on hearing that Irish
the American Ambassador had seen the diaries, enjoined him 'you need not be particular about keeping it to yourself, thereby associating himself irrevocably with the smear campaign to discredit
2216
Casement was hanged on August The hangman, Ellis, who must be
that
taunt must have peneE. Smith's hide, for he rose and left the court with his hands in like a daring schoolboy his pockets, leaving a prefects' meeting. Casement's speech was calmly and movingly delivered, and, according to Bernard Shaw, at least two jurors subsequent ly stated that had they heard it before, they would have reversed their verdict. Nothing, however, could now do that, and sentence of death was duly passed. The prisoner was removed to Pentonville
and Gavan Duffy lodged notice of appeal on July 3, The appeal was conducted on July 17 and was based on the same points that Sullivan had raised in trying to quash the indictment. For a third time Sullivan started his argument that it was no offence to adhere to the King's enemies
1916.
Casement was guilty of the offences levelled against him. But there can have been few trials that redounded so little to the credit of British justice. The case is so hedged about with anomalies and
inciting the Ulster loyalists to advance their own party
interests This trated even F.
(
papers
accounted something of an expert in this field, said that he was the bravest man he had ever hanged. As far as the letter of the law is concerned it cannot be reasonably denied
which executed Irishmen for advancing their right to freedom. In the most telling passage of his speech he belaboured the Conservatives, prominent among whom had been F. E. Smith, for yel
their
private
eight allowed for the use of his Irish brigade against British troops in Palestine. All hope of reprieve was now lost, and as mentioned at the beginning of the
which he was charged. He challenged the
to
Casement's
in
handed by the governor of Pentonville to Basil Thomson. A note in Casement's writing read: 'there is enough in these papers to hang me ten times over.' So there was. They contained a signed copy of the agreement between himself and the Germans, of which clauses seven and
F. E.
Smith
later in life as
Lord Birkenhead
Casement's reputation. What were these diaries that caused so much trouble, not only at the time but subsequently? The allegation that they were forgeries, the work of Thomson and Hall, though a tempting speculation and much encouraged by the British government's refusal to reveal them until 1959, does not hold water. Witnesses who were Casement's colleagues in the Congo and South America have found corroborative details that Thomson and Hall cannot possibly have known about. It seems clear that they are genuine in the sense that Casement wrote them, but whether they are a genuine record of fact is another matter. Many of the homosexual incidents recorded are most unlikely, both in their frequency and in some of their details, and to anyone reading them it occurs most forcibly that these are erotic fantasies, with perhaps only a slender basis in fact. In either case they are the record of an
unhappy man. In spite of the diaries, the case for the of the Royal Prerogative grew stronger as the date of execution approached. Two letters were of great importance here. The first was from the British Ambas-
exercise
sador in America, stressing the effect that the execution would have by making Casement a martyr, and by providing the proGerman faction in the States with superlative ammunition. The second was a private letter from Miss Gore-Booth (a of the Countess Markiewicz) relative alleging that Casement's reason for coming to Ireland had been to stop the Rising. This, as we now know, was true, but even as a suggestion it carried great weight with the wavering Cabinet. Their minds were almost made up in favour of clemency when the effect of these two letters was rudely shattered by new evidence con-
contradictions that it is difficult to know where to start. In the first instance there is the minuscule extent of his treason. It is not possible to lay the life of one of the King's subjects at Casement's door. The sum total of his offence was to seduce the doubtless shaky allegiance of 52 Irish POWs, and to be partly instrumental in importing to the bottom of Queenstown Harbour a shipment of arms. There were generals on the Western Front who contrived to do more damage to the realm of Great Britain in one day than Casement did in the whole of his sad escapade. There is further the absurdity of a law where a man's life hangs on the correct positioning of commas in a document almost 600 years old. Who is to say whether Sullivan or the bench were right in their interpretation? Worse than this, there was a partiality in Casement's treatment. There were other traitors who had gone free because of their potential political
embarrassment. De Wet in South Africa: and the Irishmen who had fought for the Boers, notably Arthur Lynch. But the most glaring anomaly of the
Casement
trial is the position of the Attorney-General, F. E. 'Galloper' Smith. In 1913 Smith had stood foursquare with Sir Edward Carson and other Ulstermen behind the creation of a totally illegal armed force, the Ulster Volunteers. They obtained their arms, secretly and illegally, from Germany. He went further, and publicly declared his intention to levy arms against the crown in the event of he Liberals' Home Rule Bill becoming law. and his readiness to overthrow the con n happening. If tution to prevent this prosecuting counsel are selected on the I
principle thief,
of
then
setting
F. E.
a
thief
catch
to
a
Smith was well chosen
Further Reading Caulfield, Max. The Easter Rebellion (Muller) Macardle. Dorothy. The Irish Republic (Victor Gollancz) Mackenzie, Sir Compton, On Moral Courage (Collins)
Montgomery Hyde. H Famous Casement (Penguins) ,
Trials:
9
Roger
Shaw. Bernard, The Matter With Ireland (Rupert Hart-Davis)
\For
Patrick
page 353
.
\
Scrivenor's
biography,
see
There was a good deal of activity along the fronts, and it was rumoured that a big offensive was being prepared on the other side. Every day we saw long rows of cap-
WITH THE
destroying them in a few seconds. In this way he had shot down my friend Puz. He
tive balloons, which, against the summer sky, looked like a string of over-sized
RED BARON
threw a half loop, with the object of him from above but immediately he grasped my purpose, and half rolled out of the way. tried another manoeuvre but again Guynemer forestalled me. and the jockeying for position continued. Once, as I was coming out of a turn, he had advantage of me for a few seconds, and a regular hailstorm of bullets rattled against the wings of my 'plane. tried every trick I knew — turns, loops. rolls, sideslips — but he followed each movement with a lightning speed and gradually I began to realise that hi' was more than a match for me. Not only had he a better machine, but the man in it was a superior duellist. But had to fight on. or turn away. To turn away would be fatal. I went into a steep turn, and for a mo-
sausages. These balloons annoyed us and we decided that something would have to be done about them. So one morning I started out early, at a time when I should have the sun at my back as I made my dive at the enemy balloon. I flew very high, higher, I think, than I had ever flown before. The altimeter showed 15,000 feet, the air was thin, and it was very cold. The world below me looked like a huge
aquarium. Above Lierval, where Reinhold had fallen, I sighted a hostile machine. From a distance it looked like a minute water beetle. Then, from the west, a small object rapidly approached. Small and black at first, it quickly grew in size and I soon recognised it as a Spad, an enemy fighter on the lookout for trouble-seekers like myself. I braced myself in my cockpit, for I knew that there was going to be a fight. We met at the same altitude. As the sun caught it, I saw the other man's machine was painted light brown. Soon we were circling round each other playing for an opening. Below we probably looked like two great birds of prey indulging in springtime frolics, but we knew that it was a game of death. The first man to get behind the other's back was the winner. In the single-seater fighters you could only shoot forward, and if your opponent got on your tail you were lost.
At the time of which he was writing, Ernst Udet was a novice, but he went on to be Germany's second greatest ace, with 62 victories. Above: The master— Richthofen and his Dr I Sometimes we passed so near
to each
could see every detail of my face — that is, all that was visible of it below his helmet. On the machine's side there was a Stork and two words painted in white. The fifth time that he flew past me — so close that I could feel the draught from his propeller — I managed to spell out a word. V-i-e-u-x. And Vieux Charles was Guynemer's insignia. And, indeed, there could only have been
other that opponent's
I
one Frenchman who handled a machine with the skill that he showed. He was a man, who like all the really dangerous beasts of prey, always hunted alone.
Guynemer
it
was who made
a practice of
diving at his victims from out of the sun.
had some 30 victories to his credit and I knew that I was in for the fight of my life. I
getting at
I
I
I
I had him at the end of my sights pressed the trigger there was no response my gun had jammed! Holding the stick in my left hand. I hammered at the gun with my right My efforts were unavailing. For a moment I had considered the possi bilities of escaping by diving away from him. But with such an opponent that would have been inviting disaster. In a few seconds he would have been on my tail, and could have shot me down with the utmost
ment I
.
.
.
.
.
.
ease.
We
flew in circles round each other. a wonderful flying experience — if one could forget that one's life was at stake. 1 have never had to deal with a more It
still
was
2217
:
Above: The Richthofen Circus' prepares to take off The photograph, which features Fokker Dr fighters, must have been taken after April 15, 1918, as the aeroplanes have Greek' crosses rather than Iron' crosses as their national markings. Top right: Ernst Udet in the days of his successes Right: Another of the great circuses' — Jagdgeschwader Nr 2 near Laon I
skilful opponent,
and
pletely forgot that he
for a
while
I
com-
was Guynemer,
my
enemy. It seemed to me, rather, that I was having some practice over the aerodrome with an old friend. This feeling, however, did not last for very long. For eight minutes we had been flying round each other in circles, and they were the longest eight minutes that I have ever experienced. Suddenly Guynemer looped, and flew on his back over my head. That moment I relinquished hold of the stick, and hammered with both hands at the machine gun. It was a primitive remedy but it sometimes worked. Guynemer had observed my actions and
now knew that I was his helpless victim. He again passed close over my head, flying almost on his back. And then, to my great surprise, he raised his arm and waved to me. Immediately afterwards he dived away towards the west. I flew back home, stupefied. There are some people who believe that Guynemer himself had a machine gun stoppage at the same time. Others claim that he feared that I, in desperation, might ram him in the air. I do not believe any of them. Rather do I believe that Guynemer gave proof that even in modern warfare there is something left of the knightly chivalry of bygone days. And, accordingly, I lay this belated wreath on Guynemer's unknown grave. I reported for duty to the new squadron at ten o'clock one day, and at 12 o'clock on the same I made my first flight with
In addition, Staffeln 4, 6 to the squadron. Richthimself led No 11 Flight. I was
Jagdstaffel 11.
and 10 belonged hofen
2218
made a member of it because he liked to have all new-comers where he could keep an eye on them. There were five of us. The Rittmeister took the lead, then came Just and Gussmann, then Scholz and myself brought up the rear. It was the first time that I had piloted a Fokker Triplane. We flew at an altitude of about 1,500
several Sopwith Camels. These British single-seaters had the task of protecting the Roman road, which was one of the main arteries of their communications' system. I had no time for further observations, for Richthofen set the nose of his red Fokker towards the ground and dived, with the rest of us following close on his tail. The Sopwiths scattered like chicks
a westerly course. Above the ruins of Albert we saw, just below the clouds, an RE 8, a British artillery cooperation machine that was evidently spotting for the guns. Although he was somewhat higher than ourselves, he apparently did not observe our approach,
from a hawk, but one of them was too late — the one in the Rittmeister' s sights. It happened so quickly that one could hardly call it an aerial fight. For a moment I thought that the Rittmeister would ram him, so short was the space that separated them. I estimated it at 30 feet at the most. Suddenly the nose of the Sopwith tilted downwards and a cloud of white smoke shot from the exhaust. The ill-fated machine crashed into a field close to the road and burst into flames. Richthofen, instead of changing direc-
feet, setting
and continued to fly in circles. I exchanged a quick glance with Scholz, who nodded. I left the flight, and went in to challenge the Briton. I attacked from the front and opened fire at such close quarters that his engine was positively riddled with bullets. He at once crumpled up and the burning wreckage fell close to Albert. A minute later I had rejoined the flight and continued with them towards the west. Scholz signalled his pleasure by waving to me. And Richthofen, who seemed to have eyes everywhere, also turned his head, and nodded to let me know that he had witnessed the incident. Below, to our right, we saw the Roman road. The trees were still bare, and the columns of troops marching along the road looked as though they were moving behind iron bars. They were proceeding towards the west, English troops who had been beaten back by our offensive. Flying low over the tops of the trees were
we expected, continued to dive until he was close above the Roman road. Tearing along at a height of about 30 feet from the ground, he peppered the marching troops with his two guns. We followed close behind him and copied his example. The troops below us seemed to have been lamed with horror and apart from the few men who took cover in the ditch at the roadside, hardly anyone returned our fire. On reaching the end of the road the Ritt meister turned and again fired at the column. We could now observe the effect of our first assault: bolting horses and stranded guns blocked the road, bringing the column to a complete standstill. [Reprinted from Ace of the Black Cross by Ernst Udet, published by Newnes. tion as
\
ARRAS FROM THE AIR Bishop finished the war with 72 victories, but here he describes the extraordinary sensations of ground strafing
'Billy'
Dawn was due at 5.30 on Easter Monday, and that was the exact hour set for the beginning of the Battle of Arras. We were up and had our machines out of the hangars while it was still night. The beautiful weather of a few hours before had vanished. A strong, chill wind was blowing from the east, and dark, menacing clouds were scudding along low overhead.
We were detailed to fly at a low altitude over the advancing infantry, firing into the enemy trenches, and dispersing any groups of men or fatigue parties we happened to see in the vicinity of the lines. Some phases of this work are known as 'contact patrols', the machines keeping track always of the infantry advance, watching points where they may be held up and returning from time to time to report just how the battle is going. Working with the infantry in a big attack is a most exciting experience. It means flying close to
the ground and passing through our shells and those of the enemy. The shell fire this morning was simply
own
war had known. There was a greater concentration of guns than at any time during the Somme. In fact, some of the German prisoners said afterwards that the Somme seemed a paradise compared with the bombardments we carried out at Arras. While the British fire was at its height, the Germans set up a counterbarrage. This was not so intense, but every shell added to the shrieking chorus that filled the air and made the lot of the flying man just so much more difficult. Yet the risk was one we could not avoid; we had to endure it with the best spirit possible. The waves of attacking infantry as they came out of their trenches and trudged forward behind the curtain of shells laid down by the artillery were an amazing sight. The men seemed to wander across No-Man's Land, and into the enemy trenches, as if the battle was a great bore to them. From the air it looked as though they did not realise that they were at war and were taking it all entirely too easily. That is the way with clockwork warfare. These troops had been drilled to move forward at a given pace. They had been timed over and over again in marching a certain distance and from this timing the 'creeping' or rolling
indescribable. The bombardment which had been going on all night gradually died down about 5 o'clock, and the Germans must have felt that the British had finished their nightly 'strafing', were tired out and going to bed. For a time almost
out.
complete silence reigned over the battlefield. All along the German lines starshells and rocket-lights were looping through the darkness. The old Boche is always suspicious and likes to have the country around him lighted up as much as possible so he can see what the enemy is
got
about.
The wind kept growing stiffer and stiffer and there was a distinct feel of rain in
barrage had been mathematically worked And the battle, so calmly entered into, was one of the tensest, bitterest of the whole world war. For days the battle continued, and it was hard work and no play for everyone concerned. The weather, instead of getting better, as spring weather should, gradually worse. It was cold, windy and wet. Every two or three hours sudden snowstorms would shut in, and flying in those squalls, which obliterated the landscape,
the air. Precisely at the moment that all the British guns roared out their first salvo of the battle, the skies opened and the rain fell in torrents. Gunfire may or may not have anything to do with rainmaking but there was a strange coincidence between the shock of battle and the commencement of the downpour this morning. It was beastly luck, and we felt it keenly, but we carried on. The storm had delayed the coming of day by several minutes, but as soon as there was light enough to make our presence worthwhile, we were in the air and braving the elements just as the troops were below us. Lashed by the gale, the wind cut the face as we moved against the enemy. The ground seemed to be one mass of bursting shells. Farther back, where the guns were firing, the hot flames flashing from thousands of muzzles gave the impression of a long ribbon of incandescent light. The air seemed shaken and literally full of shells on their missions of death and destruction. Over and over again one felt a sudden jerk under a wing-tip, and the machine would heave quickly. This meant that a shell had passed within a few feet of you. As the battle went on the work grew more terrifying, because reports came in that several
ticklish business the fourth day of the battle I happened to be flying about 500 feet above the trenches about an hour after dawn. It had snowed during the night and the ground was covered with a new layer of white several inches thick. No marks of the battle of the day before were to be seen; the onlyblemishes in the snow mantle were the marks of shells which had fallen in the last hour. No-Man's Land, so often a filthy litter, was this morning clean and white. Suddenly over the tops of our parape thin line of infantry crawled up and commenced to stroll casually towards the enemy. To me it seemed that they must soon wake up and run; that they could not realise the great danger they were in. Here and there a shell would burst as the line advanced or halted for a minute Three or four men near the burst would topple over like so many tin soldiers. Two or three other men would then come running up to the spot from the rear with a stretcher, pick up the wounded and the dying, and slowly walk back with them. I could not get the idea out of my head that it was just a game they were playing at; it all seemed so unreal. Nor could I believe that the little
machines had been hit by shells in flight and brought down. There was small wonder of this. The British barrage fire that morning was the most intense that the
really
of our
was very
On
brown
figures
moving about below me were
men — men
going to the glory of victory or the glory of death. I could not make myself realise the full truth or meaning of it all. It seemed that I was in an
entirely different world, looking down from another sphere on this strange, uncanny
puppet show. Suddenly I heard the deadly rattle of a nest of machine guns beneath me, and saw that the line of our troops at one place was growing very thin, with many figures sprawling on the ground. For three or four minutes I could not make out the concealed position of the German gunners. Our men had halted, and were lying on the ground, evidently as much puzzled as I was. Then in a corner of a German trench I saw a group of about five men operating two machine guns. They were slightly to the flank of our line, and evidently had been doing a great amount of damage. The sight of these men thoroughly woke me up to the reality of the whole scene below me. I dived vertically at them with a burst of rapid fire. The smoking bullets from my gun flashed into the ground, and it was an easy matter to get a good aim on the German automatics, one of which turned its muzzle towards me.
Hateful bullets But in a fraction of a second I had reached a height only 30 feet above the Huns, could make out every detail frightened faces. With hate in my heart I fired every bullet I could into the group as I swept over it, then turned
so low of their
I
my machine away. A few minutes later I had the satisfaction of seeing our line again advancing, and before the time had come for me to return from my patrol, our men had occupied all the German positions they had set out to take. It was a wonderful sight and a wonderful experience. Although it had been so difficult to realise that men were dying and being maimed for life beneath me, I felt that at last I had seen something of that dogged determination that has carried British arms so far. The next ten days were filled with incident. The enemy fighting machines would not come close to the lines, and there was very little doing in the way of aerial combats, especially as far as I was concerned, for I was devoting practically all of my time
De Havilland
2220
light
to flying low and helping the infantry. All of our pilots and observers were doing splendid work. Everywhere we were covering the forward movement of the infantry, keeping the troops advised of any enemy
movements and enabling the British artilwhere it seemed
lery to shell every area
concentrations were taking place. Scores were broken up before the Germans had fairly launched them. Our machines were everywhere back of the enemy lines. It was easy to tell where the Germans were amassing for a counterof counterattacks
First of all our machines would low over the grey-clad troops, pouring machine gun bullets into them or dropping high explosive bombs among them. Then stroke. fly
the exact location point of the mobilisation would be signalled to the artillery so that the moment the Germans moved our guns were on them. In General Orders commending the troops for their part in the battle, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig declared that the work of the Flying Corps, 'under the most difficult conditions', called for the highest praise. We were acting, you might say, as air policemen. Occasionally one of our machines would be set upon by the German gangsters — they were 'careful' fighters and seldom attacked unless at odds of four to one — and naturally we suffered some casualties, just as the ordinary police force suffers casualties when it is doing patrol duty in an outlaw country. The weather was always favourable to the German methods of avoiding 'open-air' combats. Even the clearer days were marked by skies filled with clouds sufficiently large and dense enough to offer protection and hiding places to the high winging Hun
machines. I had several skirmishes, but did not succeed in bringing down another machine until April 20, when I was fortunate enough to begin another series of extremely in-
teresting and successful fights.
I
was
pro-
be a Captain about this time and thought I was very happy; but the promotion was followed by another incident which really made me proud. The sergeants
moted
to
bombers above No-Man's Land. DH 4's and 9's played a great part German morale by harassing their front line troops constantly
in
destroying
of
my squadron had made me a round 'nose' my machine. It fitted on the propeller
for
head and revolved with it. I had it painted a brilliant blue, and from that time on my machine was known as 'Blue Nose'. It was given to me, the Serjeant-Major explained, as a sign that I was an 'Ace' — that I had brought down more than five machines. I was so pleased with this tribute from the men that I took old 'Blue Nose' visiting several other squadrons, where I exhibited my new mark of distinction to many of my friends and flying companions. The machine I got on April 20 was the first I ever destroyed in flames. It is a thing that often happens, and while I have no desire to make myself appear as a blood-thirsty person, I must say that to see an enemy going down in flames is a source of great satisfaction. You know his destruction is absolutely certain. The moment you see the fire break out you know that nothing in the world can save the man, or -men, in the doomed aeroplane. You know that there is no 'camouflage' in this, and you have no fear that the enemy is trying any kind of flying trick in the hope that he will be left alone. I was flying over a layer of white clouds when I saw a two-seater just above me. We generally met the enemy in force during these days, but this German machine was all alone. Neither the pilot nor the observer saw me. They flew along blissfully ignorant of my existence, while I kept carefully underneath them, climbing all the time. I was only ten yards behind the Hun when I fired directly up at him. It had been an exciting game getting into position underneath him, carefully following every move he made, waiting, hoping and praying that he would not see me before I got into the place I wanted. I was afraid that if he did see me I would be at a distinct disadvantage below him. My hand must have been shaky, or my eye slightly out, because, although I managed to fire ten rounds, I did not hit anything vital. Even in this crucial moment the humour of the situation almost got the better of me. My machine seemed so little, carefully flying there under the
The cockpit
of
an SE 5a
SE 5a had
fighter.
Though
a distinct advantage in
it
Hun, who thought he was so from any danger. Suddenly, from just beneath him, he heard the 'tatbig, peaceful safe, so far
tat-tat-tatter-tatter'
of
my machine gun
almost in his ear, the range was so close. Then he must have seen my smoking bullets passing all around him. Anyway, there was consternation in the camp. He turned quickly, and a regular battle in the
began between the two of manoeuvred every way possible, air
us.
We
diving, rolling, stalling; he attempting to get a straight shot at me, while my one object was to get straight behind him once again, so as to have a direct line of fire right into
him.
Twice I dived at him and opened fire from almost point-blank range, being within two lengths of him before I touched the lever which set my gun to spouting. But there was no success. The third time I tried a new manoeuvre. I dived at him from the side, firing as I came. My new tactics gave the
German
observer a direct shot at
me
from his swivel gun, and he was firing very well too, his bullets passing quite close for a moment or two. Then, however, they began to fly well beyond my wing-tips, and on seeing this I knew that his nerve was shaken. I could now see my own bullets hitting the right part of the Hun machine, and felt confident that the battle would
soon be over. pulled my machine out of its dive just I in time to pass about five feet over the enemy. I could see the observer evidently had been hit and had stopped firing. Otherwise the Hun machine seemed perfectly passed I 'ooked all right. But just after back over my shoulder and saw it burst into flames. A second later it fell a burning mass, leaving a long trail of smoke behind as it disappeared through the clouds. I thought for a moment of the fate of the wounded observer and the hooded pilot into whose faces I had just been looking — but it was fair hunting, and I flew away with great contentment in my heart. {Reprinted from Winged Warfare b\ Major W. A Bishop, VC, DSO and MC, published by Hodder and Stoughton 1918. I
.
1
was not as manoeuvrable as the Sopwith Camel, the extreme strength and its good turn of speed
its
2221
LONE HUNTER'S DAY
motor, things looked up. Single combat, a duel with another machine, was, performance apart, a question of good flying.
gaged would
While Bishop's squadron was active over the Battle of Arras Cecil Lewis' unit was flying behind the German lines On
first Offensive Patrol (in April with two others, we attacked five German scouts: four bright red and one green. I chose one and dived, got him in the sights, and pressed the trigger of the Vickers. Not a shot! I continued in the dive, trusting to the Lewis gun to do the I!)
the
I
7>,
trick:
it
two shots and jammed! zoomed away, trying franclear the Vickers jam. Nothing fired
Damnation! tically to
I
shift it. so I pulled the Lewis down sliding quadrant to clear it and reload. The spade grip of the gun knocked down the hinged wind-screen, and the blast of a
would its
100-mph wind nearly blew my head off. This was a pretty state to be in surrounded by five enemy scouts! was a sitter for any Hun, so I turned west and climbed away, working all the time to get my screen up and clear the Lewis jam. At last I managed it; but then, try as I would, I could not force the gun up the quadrant back into place on the top I
plane. The slide was twisted. I came home fed up, my gun pointing straight up into
heaven. Nevertheless, that day the squadron got four Huns: a good start. Ball accounted for two of them In 1917 co-operative tactics in singleseater fighting were rudimentary. A combat was a personal matter. In a fight no pilot has time to watch others: he is too .
.
.
itself,
occupied in attempting to down his own man or In avoiding an enemy intent on downing him. Tactics apart, the vital question is that of performance. A machine with better speed and climbing power must always have the advantage. During the next ten days Offensive Patrols were carried out daily, and unfortunately it soon became clear that, good as the SE 5 was, it was still not equal to the enemy. Scrapping at high altitudes, 15,000 to 18,000 feet, the Huns had a marked superiority in performance. This naturally tended to make us cautious, since we knew that, once we came down to their level, we should not be able to get above them again. Height, apart from its moral superiority, means added speed for the one above, who in his dive and zoom away has gravity on his side. Since machine guns in a scout are fixed, firing forward in the line of flight, it follows that the pilot aims the whole machine at his adversary. If that adversary is above him, he will be forced to pull his machine up on its tail to get him in the sights. That means loss of speed, manoeuvrability and, if carried to an extreme, a stall, and wandering about at stalling speed is asking for trouble when there are enemy guns about. This inferiority of performance was an initial difficulty. Later, when the SE5 got a larger
Two machines
so en-
each trying to turn inside the other and so bring his guns into play. Ability to sustain such tight vertical turns is the crucial test of a fighting pilot. Once the balance of the controls is circle,
the machine will slip, lose height, and the enemy will rush in. Then, by all the rules of the game, you are a dead man. But when a number of machines had closed and were engaged in a 'dog-flght', it was more a question of catch-as-catchcan. A pilot would go down on the tail of a Hun, hoping to get him in the final burst; but he would not be wise to stay there, for another Hun would almost certainly be on his tail, hoping to get him in the same way. Such fights were really lost,
a series of rushes, with momentary pauses select the next opportunity — to catch the enemy at a disadvantage But, apart from fighting, when 20 or 30 scouts were engaged, there was always a grave risk of collision. Machines would hurtle by, intent on their private battles, missing each other by feet. So such fighting to
.
demanded
.
.
iron nerves, lightning reactions,
snap decisions, a
cool
head and eyes
like
a bluebottle, for it all took place at high speed and was three-dimensional. At this sort of sharpshooting some pilots
Below left: James McCudden, who rose from the ranks and scored 54 victories before he met his death in an accident in 1918. Below: A weapon whose bark was worse than its bite — the explosion of a British anti-aircraft shell
all air fighting (and indeed in every branch of aerial warfare) there is an essential in which it differs from war on the ground: its absolute coldbloodedness. You cannot lose your temper with an aeroplane. You cannot 'see red', as a man in a bayonet fight. You certainly cannot resort to 'Dutch' courage. Any of these may fog your judgement — and that
excelled others; but in
spells death.
Often at high altitudes we flew in air well below freezing point. Then the need to clear a jam or change a drum meant putting an arm out into an icy 100-mph wind. If you happened to have bad circulation (as I had), it left the hand numb, and since you could not stamp your feet, swing your arms, or indeed move at all, the numbness would spread to the other hand, and sometimes to the feet as well. In this condition we often went into a scrap with the odds against us — they usually were against us, for it was our job to be 'offensive' and go over into enemy country looking for trouble — coldbloodedly in the literal sense; but nonetheless we had to summon every faculty of judgement and skill to down our man, or, at the worst, to come out of it alive ourselves. So, like duelling, air fighting required a set steely courage, drained of all emotion, fined down to a tense and deadly effort of will. The Angel of Death is less callous, aloof and implacable than a fighting pilot
when he
dives.
Below: An Albatros D Va, increasingly the main opposition for Allied fighters from the middle of 1917 onwards Note the auxiliary strut from the leading interplane strut to the leading edge, to prevent flutter
There were, of course, emergency methods, such as standing the machine on its tail and holding it there just long enough to get one good burst into the enemy above you; but nobody would fight that way if he could help it, though, actually, an SE 5 pilot could do the same thing by pulling his top gun down the quadrant. He could then fire it vertically upward while still flying level.
Hedgehopping over Hunland This was how Beery Bowman once got away from an ugly situation. He had been scrapping a couple of Huns well over the other side of the lines. He managed to crash one of them but in so doing exhausted the ammunition of his Vickers gun: his Lewis was jammed. The other Hun pursued him and forced him right down on to the 'carpet' — about 100 feet from the ground. There was nothing to do but to beat it home. The Hun. out to avenge the death of his friend, and having the advantage of speed and height over Beery, chivvied him back to the lines, diving after him, bursting his gun, zooming straight up again, hanging there for a moment in a stall, and falling to dive again. He repeated this several times (he must have been a rotten shot) while Beery, with extraordinary coolness and presence of mind, pulled down his Lewis gun and managed to clear the jam. The next time the Hun zoomed, Beery throttled right down and pulled back to stalling speed. The result was that when the Hun fell out of his zoom, Beery was not ahead of him as before, but beneath him. As the
Hun
dropped into his dive Beery opened with his Lewis gun, raking the body above him with a long burst. The Hun turned over on his back, dived, and struck the ground, bursting into flames. Beery laconically continued his way home. He was awarded the DSO. With the exception of Ball, most crack fire
did not get their Huns in dogsafer means. They would spend hours synchronising their guns and telescopic sights, so that they could do accurate shooting at, say, 200 or 300 yards. They would then set out on patrol, alone, spot their quarry iin such cases usually a two-seater doing reconnaissance or photography*, and carefully manoeuvre for position, taking great pains to remain where they could not be seen, below and behind the tail of the enemy. From here, even if the Hun observer did spot them he could not bring his gun to bear without the risk of shooting away his own tail plane or rudder. The stalker would not hurry after his quarry, but keep a wary eye to see he was not about to be attacked himself. He would gradually draw nearer, always in the blind spot, sight his guns very carefully and then one long deadly burst would do the trick. Such tactics as those were emploved bv fighters fights.
They preferred
Captain McCudden, VC, DSO (killed in an accident in July 1918, having accounted for more than 50 German machines), and also by the French ace Guynemer (killed without trace in September 1917). The squadron was doing well in Huns. Ball came back every day with a bag of one or more. Besides his SE 5 he had a Nieuport scout, the machine in which
•2-2-2A
.
lie
had dune so well the previous year. He had a roving commission, and, with two machines, was four hours a day in the air.
The only
Of the great fighting pilots his tactics were the least cunning. Absolutely fear-
target sighting his guns. He never boasted or criticised, but his example was tre-
the odds
made no
difference to him. He would always attack, single out his man and close. On several occasions he almost rammed the enemy, and often came back with his machine shot to pieces. One morning, before the rest of us had gone out on patrol, we saw him coming in rather clumsily to land. He was not a stunt pilot, but flew very safely and accurately, so that, watching him, we could not understand his awkward floating landless,
But when he taxied up to the sheds we saw his elevators were flapping loose — controls had been completely shot away! le had Mown back from the lines and made his landing entirely by winding his adjustable tail up and down! It was incredible he had not crashed. His oil tank had been riddled, and his face and the whole nose of the machine were running with thick ing.
1
Mack oil. He was
up
like
walked straight
to the sheds, shoulders and face with a rag, ordered out his Nieuport, and in two hours was back with yet another Hun oil off his
to his credit.
was a
man. His one relaxation was the violin, and his Ball
quiet, simple little
favourite after-dinner amusement to light a red magnesium flare outside his hut and
walk round it in his pyjamas, fiddling! He was meticulous in the care of his machines, guns and in the examination of his ammunition. He never flew for amusement.
2224
mendous The squadron .
.
sets out 11 strong
on the
patrol. Eleven chocolate-coloured, lean, noisy bullets, lifting, swaying, turning, rising into formation — two fours and a three — circling and climbing away steadily towards the lines. They are off to deal with Richthofen and his circus of
evening
red Albatroses.
The May evening is heavy with threatening masses of cumulus cloud, majestic skyscrapers, solid-looking as tains, fraught with caves
and ravines — strange and
snow moun-
and
valleys, rifts secret pathways
the chartless continents of the sky. Below, the land becomes an ordnance map, dim green and yellow, and across it go the lines, drawn anyhow, as a child might scrawl with a double pencil. The grim dividing lines! From the air robbed of all in
significance. so angry at being shot
tins that he
wiped the
trips he took, apart from offensive patrols, were the minimum requisite to test his engines or fire at the ground
Steadily the body of scouts rises higher and higher, threading its way between the cloud precipices. Sometimes, below, the streets of a village, the corner of a wood, a few dark figures moving, glides into view like a slide into a lantern, and then is hidden again. But the fighting pilot's eyes are not on the ground, but roving endlessly through the lower and higher reaches of the sky, peering anxiously through fur-goggles to spot those black slow-moving specks against land or cloud which mean full throttle, tense muscles, held breath and
the headlong plunge with screaming wires — a Hun in the sights, and the tracers flashing.
Ambush from above A red light curls up
from the leader's cockpit and falls away. Action! He alters direction slightly, and the patrol, shifting throttle and rudder, keep close like a pack of hounds on the scent. He has seen, and they see soon, six scouts 3,000 feet below. Black crosses! It seems interminable till the 11 come within diving distance. The pilots nurse their engines, hard-minded
and
set, test their guns and indicators. At last the leader
watch their sways side-
ways, as a signal that each should take his man, and suddenly drops. Machines fall scattering, the earth races up, the enemy patrol, startled, wheels and breaks.
Each
thunderbolts
his
take
man! sights,
The chocolate steady
their
screaming planes, and fire. A burst, 50 rounds — it is over. They have overshot, and the enemy hit or missed, is lost for the moment. The pilot steadies his stampeding mount, pulls her out with a firm
Collision courses,
and then the steady circling, waiting for the other to grant you even
man
the smallest chance
hand, twisting his head right and left, trying to follow his man, to sight another, to back up a friend in danger, to note
another in flames. But the squadron plunging into action had not seen, far off, approaching from the east, the rescue flight of red Albatroses patrolling above the body of machines on which they had dived, to guard their tails and second them in the battle. These, seeing the maze of wheeling machines, plunge down to join them. The British scouts, engaging and disengaging like flies circling at midday in a summer room, soon find the newcomers upon them. Then, as if attracted by some mysterious power, as vultures will draw to a corpse in the desert, other bodies of machines swoop down from the peaks of the cloud mountains. More enemy scouts, and, by good fortune, a flight of
Naval triplanes.
But, nevertheless, the enemy, double in number, greater in power and fighting with skill and courage, gradually overpower the British, whose machines scatter, driven down beneath the scarlet German fighters. It would be impossible to describe the
Below
left
and right: The war from the
air
From
be seen were the front line dispositions, but from lower down the chaos that reigned in No-Man's Land during the first stages of an attack could be seen altitude,
all
that could
too clearly— infantry held up in front and casting around for a way to circumvent these horribly costly obstacles. There was little that a pilot could do to help all
of strong points
however. His real use lay in keeping up the morale of the infantry by strafing the opposition and in keeping HQ informed of the directly,
front line situation, so that
new
plans to
keep the advance moving could be worked out
action of such a battle.
A
pilot,
in the
own engagements, might see a Hun diving vertically, an SE 5 on his tail, on the tail of the SE another Hun, and above him again another British second
between
twilight sky.
The game
his
These four, plunging headlong at two hundred miles an hour, guns crackling, tracers screaming, suddenly break up. The scout.
Hun plunges flaming to his death, death has not taken him already. His victor seems to stagger, suddenly pulls out in a great leap, as a trout leaps on the end of a line, and then, turning over on his belly, swoops and spins in a dizzy falling spiral with the earth to end it. The third German zooms veering, and the last of that meteoric quartet follows bursting But such a glimpse, lasting perhaps ten seconds, is broken by the sharp rattle of another attack. Two machines approach head-on at breakneck speed, firing at each other, tracers whistling through each other's planes, each slipping sideways on his rudder to trick the other's gun fire. Who will hold longest? Two hundred yards, 100, 50, and then, neither hit, with one accord they fling their machines sideways, bank and circle, each striving to bring his gun on to the other's tail, each glaring through goggle eyes, calculating, straining, wheeling, bent only on death or dying. But, from above, this strange tormented circling is seen by another Hun. He drops. His gun speaks. The British machunseen ine, distracted by the sudden enemy, pulls up, takes a burst through the engine, tank and body, and falls bottom uppermost down through the clouds and the deep unending desolation of the
lowest if
.
.
.
of noughts
and
crosses, start-
ing at 15,000 feet above the clouds, drops in
altitude
engagement by engagement.
Friends and foes are scattered. A last SE, pressed by two Huns, plunges and wheels, gun jammed, like a snipe over marshes, darts lower, finds refuge in the
ground mist, and disappears. Now lowering clouds darken the evening. Below, flashes of gun fire stab the veil of the gathering dusk. The fight is over! The battlefield shows no sign. In the pellucid sky, serene cloud mountains mass and
move unceasingly. Here where guns rattled and death plucked the spirits of the valiant, this thing is now as if it had never been! The sky is busy with night. passive, superb, unheeding. Of the 11 scouts that went out that evening, May 7, only five of us returned to the
aerodrome.
The Mess was very quiet that night. The Adjutant remained in his office, hoping against hope to have news of the six missing pilots, and, later, news did come through that two had been forced down, shot in the engine, and that two others had been wounded. But Ball never returned.
I believe I was the last to see him in his red-nosed SE going east at 8,000 feet. He flew straight into the white face of an enormous cloud. I followed. But when I came out on the other side, he was nowhere to be seen. All next day a feeling of depression hung over the squadron. We mooned about the sheds still hoping for news. The day after that hope was given up. I flew his Nieuport back to the Aircraft Depot. [Cecil Lewis.]
2225
The Allemanders have been getting rather uppish lately; and there has been another wail from the Gunners that our artillery machines are being unduly interfered with. Things are also boiling up for another light round Passchendaele, and so it is particularly important to prevent the enemy from carrying out reconnaissances which might betray the movements of our troops Talking of which, the contrast presented to the eyes of an airman between the areas immediately behind our own trench lines and those of the Germans is quite extraordinary. Our own support and reserve areas are chockablock with troops, bivouacs, huts, horse-lines, lorry parks and every conceivable adjunct of an army in the field. Only the batteries seem to be well camouflaged. Whereas behind the German lines one sees practically nothing. Curious, isn't it? Last week a reconnaissance in force of enemy scouts and two-seaters had the audacity to cross the lines! They got as far Ypres. As luck would have it, one of flights happened at that moment to be climbing to get their height over Poperinghe before going off on an offensive patrol, and spotted the Huns. There were only four Bristol Fighters against some 16 EA (enemy aircraft), but they went straight in among them; and McGrath, one of my observers, got an Albatros down in flames. It crashed near Vlamertinghe on our side of the lines. McGrath, who is a Canadian and was on his last patrol before going home on as
my
leave, came back literally dancing with delight, as it does not often fall to our lot to get a machine down in our own territory. As soon as his report was made out, he begged for the squadron car to take him
crash so that he might souvenir before the infantry in the neighbourhood — Australians, who are notorious as having no peers in the art of scrounging — had collared everything worth having. Off he went, and came back with a badly damaged aneroid — the Australians had been there first all right — which was the best he could procure. I expect that the aneroid will go down as a treasured heirto the scene of the
collect a
loom in some distant British Columbian homestead. The German formation was severely handled, as McCudden and his Flight of SEs came up shortly afterwards and accounted for at least two more of them, after which the remainder thought better of it and turned tail for home. In spite of a very fair toll exacted from the enemy, we received a rude letter from GHQ asking what the devil we meant by allowing the Germans to cross the lines at all, and would we kindly see to it that this sort of thing should be stopped forthwith. We humbly expressed our regret at the occurrence and glibly promised that it should never happen again.
DEATH OF AN ACE Werner Voss, fourth on the list of German aces with 48 victories, was a superlative aerobatic pilot, but was finally brought down after an epic fight against several British aces the French coastline ran back past Dunkirk to Calais and turned down towards Boulogne, from out whose harbour mouth were moving two slim ships, black upon the silver Channel waters the leave-boat probably, and her accompanying destroyer. The leave-boat, with 2,000 happy souls aboard her, homeward bound to England, for a few days' rest and comfort. Pigmy craft they looked, those two black boats, one tiny and one tinier To the southward lay the fair land of France, Picardy and Artois; the long straight files of trees which guard the roads marching ever onwards till lost to sight on the horizon. Dimly in the distance rose the spire of Amiens Cathedral. To the eastward, Lille, Douai, Courtrai, Tournai, Valenciennes French towns held in bondage in the iron grip of war. Then Belgium one narrow flooded strip of whose territory remained to her as a barrier against the foe. Ypres the white stones of her ruins shining in the sunlight; Ypres, immortal in the annals of .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
our race.
Far up the coast to the north-east one could distinguish the mouth of the Scheldt, the frontier of Holland; with Bruges and Ostend in the middle distance. Then to the northwards — England! From 20,000 feet above the earth how lovely and alluring are the 'white cliffs of Dover'. I could see Dover Castle, Folkestone, Lympne, and Dungeness round the foreland to Chatham and the mouth of the Thames the river winding up to London the City hidden in the haze; in my mind's eye I could see the street, the house we live in, you and I. I could see you, too ... A wave of temptation swept over me. How easy to leave my formation and to fly on to the northwards! Within a few hours I could have been with you .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
back with you in England Suddenly I felt every fibre of my being revolt against the whole idea of war! Why was I here? What were we all doing? What was the meaning of this mad, ruinous gamut .
.
.
.
.
.
which we had precipitated ourselves? Then a red flare from the leader of the SEs, indicating that he had sufficient height and was now making for the lines, brought me back to realities. The thoughts of a moment since fell away like a dream. No more doubts assailed me. Why this war indeed? Britain and her Allies were fighting for right! Victory was essential; and we of the Flying Corps could be deemed lucky that the part which we had been into
After that we felt in honour bound to pass on our 'strafing' from the GOC to our friends the enemy, the original instigator of the trouble. So, three days ago we took the air, six Bristol Fighters, eight SE 5s
called
and two flights of Camels. I led my own contingent. It was a perfect morning. Rarely have I seen the atmosphere so clear as we climbed to get our height behind the lines. The map of north-west Europe spread out below us precise in every detail. To the westward
The multi-hued
2226
.
upon
to play in the great struggle exacting than that of many of our comrades in arms, in that it was a clean fight, novel, exciting and romantic.
was
less
'Circus' altered my course eastward and opened up the throttle. Once more we were off to join in a tourney with the Allemander. We were to sweep him from the sky, 'larn' him to cross the line, in fact! But the worst of it was that there were no I
Allemanders in the sky that morning! It so jolly a day
was unthinkable that on
these incredible Huns should be still lying abed instead of disporting themselves in the upper air. Where were Woolf, Voss, Richthofen and the rest? We knew them all by sight by this time. We knew them by the way they flew. Each had some little trick in flying by which we could identify him; and they painted their machines with a medley of gay colours (a form of extravagance which is denied to us by the unimaginative and parsimonious denizens of the Air Board). Richthofen himself flew a red Albatros; Voss affected checkers of black and white. Another sported green
and silver, another blue, and so forth They make a gallant showing. As I said, the heavens were devoid .
.
.
of
Huns, which, taking our resolve 'to do a big thing' into account, was most annoying! There is nothing so unutterably boring as parading about the sky in undisputed possession of that empty space. It is not only boring, but intensely chilly. Well, we roamed about in search of adventure for quite an hour and a half, affording the German anti-aircraft batteries a good excuse for blazing off their ammunition. For the first time I was able to look down in uninterrupted contemplation upon the towns of Ledeghem,
Iseghem, and Englebelmer — names which daily appeared in operation orders as the line which we were to patrol — and satisfy myself that they were not the fiction of the Intelligence officer's restless brain. A red flare again flickered up from the leader of the SE 5s. There were enemy in sight! But search as I might I could see nothing. Then, of a sudden, I espied the Hun ... a solitary, lonely Hun in a Fokker triplane. This triplane was a rara avis on the Ypres front. Two of them had been seen at close quarters during the previous week farther to the south by a British pilot who had thought to recognise Voss as one of the pilots, and had further reported that in his opinion the machine was fitted with a Le Rhone engine taken from one of our machines which had been forced down in
enemy
territory.
In the light of after-events the pilot in Anyway, I question was probably right was just about to become an eye witness to one of the finest individual efforts of the war in the air. Completely undismayed by the strength of the British formation arrayed against him in four tiers, one above the other, the German aviator flew straight to the attack. Bald-headed he went for the SEs, guarded though they were by the Bristols from above and the Camels from below; and single-handed he fought them, the whole eight of them, though accounted in their number were several of the crack pilots of the day: Bowman, Rhys-Davies, Maxwell, and some more. For eight minutes on end he fought the eight, while I sat 1,000 feet above, watching with prof'oundest admiration this display of skill. .
.
.
the wings and fuselage of the SE 5s had es-
manoeuvring was
the Albatri proved themselves unworthy
bullet
amazing. He was in and out and round about our scouts, zigzagging like forked lightning through the sky. None of our men could get at him. Then he broke off the fight and darted off to join a flight of Albatri which had appeared upon the scene — and were hanging about some distance away as if hesitating to take part. Placing himself at the head of this formation, he again wheeled to the attack. But
of their would-be leader. They followed him to just within range of our machines,
showed that not one
The dexterity quite
of his
and then they turned and fled. The triplane came on alone; again he flew to the attack; but, as was bound to happen in the end, the heavy odds against
him
told their tale. Rhys-Davies got in a short, straight burst and the triplane crashed in No-Man's Land, between the trenchlines. When they returned home,
holes
in
caped unscathed. PS — It has been officially announced in 'Comic Cuts' that Lieutenant Voss had met with a hero's death fighting single-handed against terrific odds. He thoroughly deserved the tribute paid to him; and the RFC were the gainers by the disappearance of a very skilful and gallant foe.
[Rothesay Stuart-Wortley,
MC]
Left: Werner Voss Top: A Fokker Triplane coming in to land By the time of Voss's death, the type was obsolete, despite its fantastic manoeuvrability Above: A. P. F. Rhys Davids. 23 victories. Below: A crashed Triplane
DOG FIGHTING:
FACT AND FICTION These celebrated photographs,
first
produced
in
the
anonymous
auto-
biography of an RFC officer in the 1930's, are claimed to be authentic, but are more probably faked'. The author claimed that they were taken with a camera fitted to his aircraft's cabane struts and operated auto-
2228
— I
they give a
good impn
have been like. The original earn 1. Must have broken up at instarr up after being hit by a German at whoi 2. 'God, what a sight' (a Fokker D VII 3. His wings suddenly collapsec up) 4. A doii lypical confused /; 5. Have got the camera pointed an SE 5, taken with the camera than aligned along the line of fire of i
there
first
(Albatros
D
V's pouncing
on
and outward 6. They got
a
i
•:'
2229
*
2230
Left: Panorama of the Western Front' by W. G. Wyllie. Below: 1918 aircraft. 1. The Italian Savoia-Verduzio-Ansaldo 5 bomber and reconnaissance machine, of the 87°
t
Squadriglia (La Serenissima). The SVA 5 had good climb and range, and an odd fuselage marked by a change from rectangular to triangular section aft of the cockpit. Engine:
SPA 6A
inline,
205-220 hp. Armament: two
Vickers guns. Speed: 143 mph at sea level. Climb: 12 mins50secsto 13.120 feet. Endurance: 4 hours. Weight empty/loaded: 1,500/2,315 lbs. Span: 29 ft 10V4 ins. Length: ft 7 ins. 2. The French Spad S XIII, in the markings of a pilot of the US 94th (Hat in the Ring) Squadron The S XIII was an improved version of the VII. Engine: HispanoSuiza 8. 220-235 hp Armament: two Vickers guns. Speed: 138 mph at 6.560 ft Climb: 12 mins 10 sees to 13,124 ft. Ceiling: 21,800 ft. Endurance: 2 hours. Weight empty/ loaded: 1,245/1,807 lbs. Span: 26 ft 6 3/4 ins. Length: 20 ft 4 ins. 3. The German Albatros D Va, an up-engined version of the D III.
26
4
Tbe one illustrated was flown by Leutnant von Hippel of Jasta 5. Engine: Mercedes D Ilia, 170-185 hp. Armament: two Spandau machine guns Speed: 1 16 mph at 3,280 ft. Climb: 22.8 mins to 13.120 ft. Ceiling. 20.500 Endurance: 2 hours Weight empty/ loaded: 1.511/2.061 lbs. Span: 29 ft 8 .4 ins. Length: 24 ft s/s ins. 4. The French Nieuport 17, this machine being flown by Charles Nungesser Engine: Le Rhone rotary. 1 10 hp. Armament: one Vickers gun Speed: 107 mph at 6.500 ft Climb: 9 mins to 10,000 ft. Ceiling: 17.500 ft Weight empty/loaded: 825/1,232 lbs Span. 26 ft Length: 19 ft 7 ins ft.
1
CAMEL SCRAP A remarkable but frequent occurrence in dogfighting was that the fight could
break up and leave each
On September
10 1 led five Camels of 'A' Flight on the north offensive patrol, which covered an area to the north of Ypres. We had not been long over the lines, and were flying at 14,000 feet, when I saw below us over Houthulst Forest a formation of enemy planes, made up of two twoseaters protected by five Albatros Scouts. I had previously arranged that, in the event of encountering escorted aeroplanes, I should attack with one Camel, while the deputy leader and the other Camels were to remain above to protect our tails from attack. On my left was a new pilot, 2ndLieutenant R. J. Brownell, MM, a Tasmanian, who is now in the Royal Australian Air Force. I had told him that, until he got used to flying over the lines and rapidly spotting enemy craft as distinct from friendly, he must keep right alongside my 'plane and do whatever I did, maintaining formation station in all attitudes. Lieutenants Grassland, Moody and Smith made up the remainder of the formation. The enemy 'planes were flying south about 1,000 feet below and ahead of us well east of their lines, and probably climbing to gain height before crossing the trench-lines upon reconnaissance. I swung our formation round above them from the north-easterly course we followed and dived for the two-seaters. Brownell came down in station. He had seen nothing. He simply knew that I had dived and that he had to keep position. The remaining three Camels maintained their height. Down I lushed through the crisp, cold air, watching my Hun through the sights, holding my control stick with both hands, thumbs resting on the double gun-triggers within the spade-shaped stick-top. The observer in my opponents' bus saw me and I saw him swing his gun to bear. I saw the
DFW
cockpit. The pilot had less in the and wires to contend with compared with earlier types, but he now has a gun butt just in front of his face. This would damage his face in any crash. Above: The end of a German aeroplane over Arras by Bertram Sandy
Top:
way
A typical
of struts
2232
pilot
completely alone
double flash of his shots even as he grew to personality in my sights and I pressed the fateful triggers. At the very first burst he crumpled up and fell backwards into the cockpit. My streams of lead poured into the fuselage of the 'plane around the pilot's cockpit and the DFW tipped up and over sideways and fell tumbling down. I looked round for Brownell and saw him close beside me on my level. Following me down in the dive without knowing why we dived, he suddenly found himself squarely on the tail of the second DFW. He pressed his triggers instinctively in a long burst. The Hun's tail rose upward. A curl of smoke came from his fuselage and he fell headlong, plunging like a flaming comet. Above us the three Camels kept the five Albatros Scouts engaged, and, after seeing the two-seaters go down, Smith dived on the tail of one of the scouts and shot 100 rounds into it, until it fell out of control. Next day, in misty weather, with a patrol of seven, I saw a concentration of enemy planes, some 21 strong, flying below us east of Langemarck. There were three of the new Fokker triplanes, while the remainder were Albatros Scouts. They greatly outnumbered our strength. I could not determine whether they had observed us or not, but in any case I decided to attack. I dived on one of the triplanes, closed right in and as my burst went home I saw him falling down below his own formation. I knew that the Hun formation was so strong that it would be but to court disaster to follow him down. As I pulled forward from among the Huns for breathing space to review the situation I saw that one of my formation who had followed me had done just the thing I knew was wrong. Engrossed on the shooting of an Albatros he had passed right through the Hun level.
Instantly a Fokker pounced upon his tail. A burst of bullets caused the Camel pilot to look round and swerve away from the Albatros he followed. I saw the triplane close in upon the Camel's tail and I dived instantly upon it. As I dived I fired a short burst, before my sights were centred, because I knew that most Huns answered to the warning of bullets flying near. This fellow, however, was of a different breed. He looked round at me and, as I saw his begoggled face above his shoulder, he swerved slightly to one side, then followed on the Camel's tail. I think the Camel pilot was wounded by the triplane's very first burst, because he did not use the Camel to manoeuvre as he might. I increased speed and pulled closer to the triplane. Then I heard the splatter of Hun bullets rattling round my own ears. Glancing upward I saw two Albatros Scouts
coming down upon me, but above them was another same.
little
Camel treating them the
was almost dead upon the triplane's when the pilot looked around again. The range was so close that I could almost read the man's expression. I gave him another burst and saw the stream of tracer miss his head by inches as he swerved outward from my line of sight. The Camel was below him falling steeply in a gentle curve. I
tail
When my
burst ceased the German pilot looked again ahead. Damn him! 1 thought. I'll get him next time. Each time I had fired a trifle earlier than I might have done, in the desire to shake him off the Camel's tail. And all the time we fell downward, losing height, fighting earthward from 14,000 feet along a pathway inclined at 60 degrees, rushing through the misty air towards the ground behind the German lines. From behind me came another burst of flying bullets. Out of the corner of my eye I saw a solitary RE 8 heading towards us. I followed the swerving triplane and got squarely on his tail. Before I could fire he got out of my sights once more. Again I registered on him, dead. I pressed the triggers and saw my bullets flying home. His head did
not look round this time. His angle of dive suddenly steepened. I increased my own to vertical, barely 20 feet behind him. Suddenly the RE 8 flashed in front of me between the German and my bus. I saw the wide-open mouth of the horror-struck observer. The wings passed across my vision as the pilot vainly strove to turn away. For a fleeting instant of time I looked into the face of the observer and the cockpit in which he stood. He thought that I would hit him head on and wipe him from existence, torn to fragments with the whirring engine and propeller that I carried. So did I. For a fragment of time I hung in space, mentally, already dead. The observer and I saw each other as souls already hurled into the eternal cosmos.
There was but one thing to do. 'My God,' I breathed in prayer, even as I did it. I yanked the Camel's stick hard into my stomach and flashed between the twoseater's wings and tailplane as my gallant little Camel answered to the pull. By a miracle we missed collision, by a miracle my Camel held together. I flat spun upside down on top of a loop and fell out sideways. I had lost height so rapidly in my downward rush from 14,000 feet that the pressure in my fuel-tank had not had time to stabilise to meet the higher atmospheric pressure, and my engine ceased to run. Not certain of the cause I tried her on the gravity tank and she picked up. I turned weal and scanned the sky. High overhead I saw 'planes pass between the mist and sky like goldfish in a bowl held up against a curtained window. Around me and on my level there was nothing to be seen, no aero-
enemy or friendly, except the RE 8 disappearing westward in the mist, westward towards the lines. The triplane and the Camel both had vanished. The ground below was free from shell-holes, but indistinct on account of mist. I climbed upward as I travelled west and found some Camels of the squadron. Our patrol time was finished, and we returned to our aerodrome in formation. And as I went I cursed the damn-fool pilot of the British RE 8. [Reprinted from Into the Blue by Norman Macmillan, published by Duckworth. planes,
fast
Top: The ground crew wait as the pilot and observer make their final preparations for a reconnaissance flight in their Bristol Fighter on a wintry day. Above: A fine air-to-air photograph of an Albatros C III 2-seater. Note the excellent field of fire for the observer
\
2233
THE SILENT
RAID
Less well-known than the exploits of the great airmen are the deeds of Germany's airship crews. Here we reprint an account by the helmsman of the L 45, one of the ships that took part in the so-called 'Silent Raid' of October 19/20, 1917.
Below: A naval Zeppelin being walked out of the Aladin' shed at Ahlhorn
'
*»
On
October 19 the final orders came and our shed [at Tondernl at 11.30. The journey over the sea was cold and misty. We barely sighted some of the other air-
we
left
ships off the Frisian coast. There were at least 12 ships under orders to attack England, so I understood Kolle to tell the navigator, and from the radios that were taken
on board
We
I
all must have started. at all clearly, for it was
think they
did not see
them
the custom to fly independently while keeping a general direction. Once started the radio gave us little news. Once or twice we
thought we saw another ship; L 54 we recognised by the setting of her cars; L 47 we distinguished through the glasses. Then I heard Kolle identify L 50, so it seemed to him, and he passed some disparaging remark about her commander, for he despised his skill as an airman no less than he suspected his determination. L 49 we thought we recognised, or so the navigator said, by her little flag that she flew from her forward car. But it was a dreary, windy crossing and owing to the cold and height many of us were feeling numbed and slack by the time we made the English coast at about 8 pm. We could not be sure of our landfall as it was dark and our navigation was undoubtedly at fault. We should, so I believe, have crossed the Lincoln coast; but from an argument we had with the officers our navigating warrant officer, Hashagen, expressed grave doubts as to the landfall. I felt sure we were a long way south of that. Kolle, however, though looking anxious would not give way. I looked at my comrades in the car to see if I could read their thoughts, but only cold and anxiety were there. The wind must have freshened from the north for even then, like the lightning, some searchlights cut the air; all I could see by their warm beams was the leeway that we were making. Kolle swore and jumped at the ballast control cords. The ship rose rapidly. '5,800!' [metres, 19,000 feet] read Hashagen off the altimeter; the height and the cold made him look ghastly in the pale searchlight beam as he leant on the glass panels. I shall never forget his face. I felt, too, that I would get little sympathy from him, if I dropped out, for the height and anxiety were telling on him already. Guns opened up too, but that did not trouble us. For nearly two hours more we struggled to keep our westward course but the wind blew ever stronger and I could tell that our navigation was getting more and more un-
We
certain. dropped a few bombs at some faint lights but providence alone knows where they went. I scarcely believe that
Lieutenant
Schiitz,
mand, even troubled
our
second-in-com-
to set the
bombing
sight.
By this time it was bitterly cold. Hashagen once read the thermometer aloud and gave over 30 degrees of frost [C, about 60 of frost F|. I heard him mention Birmingham as our target, but he did not believe we had reached that locality. We climbed still higher as the weight of the bombs and petrol grew smaller and it grew still colder. Hahndorf, an engineer, now came in to report to Kolle that the men were feeling the cold. The sailmaker, in particular, who was attending to the valves of the gas-bags, complained of his feet. Well he might do so, for he could not wear his felt boots when climbing about the ship. He said he could not go on much longer. Two engineers, so Hahndorf said, were sleepy; while the
petrol rating was grumbling and fumbling over his work. Something must be done. The wind was rendering our progress westwards laborious. It was clear to us who had no say in the matter, that we ought to turn back, yet Kolle would not give in. The navigator and director began to express misgivings. Finally, Hahndorf reappeared and gave it as his opinion that his engineers could not be trusted to go on much longer under such conditions. Reluctantly Kolle gave the order to turn; it was now about 11 o'clock. Hurriedly he gave his instructions for the return overland over Belgium. This was a bad sign, for it was not a step that our airship commanders would do unless the weather or other conditions were threatening. I could tell by the compass that we were now steering south-eastwards. The wind must have increased in violence and the cold was the worst I have ever experienced; I could scarcely continue, in spite of
attack on England must have failed. The jubilation at having flown over the enemy's capital gave way to anxiety. At the helm of the ship we began to feel that the gale was driving us away, still further out of our course. We were so high that the earth was scarcely visible. Clouds were obviously being driven beneath us until we could not distinguish the sea. It was somewhere after midnight that Hahndorf came to report to the commander that the sailmaker could scarcely go on with his duties: his feet were frostbitten and the poor fellow was now lying in his hammock unable to do more. The petrol rating was complaining of weariness and sickness, leaning up against his tanks. Two engineers were suffering from height: one of these had been relieved by the man from the port wing car. Kolle became visibly perturbed! Even Schiitz, usually so cheerful, looked pale and anxious. So we went on in gloomy
boots and quilted clothing, it was terrible. It grew too cold to pull out the food to eat; the meat that one man pulled out was hard as stone. Kolle clearly not knowing where he was let out more ballast; we must have touched 6,500 metres.
For some two or three hours — we hardly the time went by — we drove on, but, as events showed later, our course was pure guess work. When and where we
all felt
Over London again At about 11.30 we began
to
see lights
below and as the lights continued so it suddenly dawned upon us that it could only be the city of London that we were crossing in the
dim
air.
Even Kolle looked amazed
lights
as
Schiitz
at the
suddenly shouted
'London!' It was then that we first realised the fury of the savage tempest that had been driving us out of our course. But Kolle clearly had but one thought — that was higher. So he released more ballast and the bombs — first two sighting shots and then the rest. Over London! We had achieved what no other German airship had done since Mathy had bombed that proud city over a year ago! And his last trip across the city had proved his undoing. Fortunately for us we were unseen; not a searchlight was unmasked; not a shot was fired; not an aeroplane was seen. If the gale had driven us out of our course, it had also defeated the flying defences of the city! It was misty or so it seemed, for we were above a thin veil of cloud. The Thames we just dimly saw from the outline of the lights; two great railway stations, I thought I saw, but the speed of the ship running almost before the gale was such that we could not distinguish much. We were half frozen, too, and the excitement was great. It was all over in a flash. The last big bomb was gone, and we were once more over the
darkness and rushing onwards. It was then that our misfortunes began. Hahndorf reported to Kolle that the engine of the port
wing car was scarcely working-
he thought owing
to
the sooting of the
The plugs were cleaned by the engineers but alas! their hands were so plugs.
cold and they themselves so clumsy with lassitude and fatigue owing to the height that, by the time the plugs were cleaned and replaced, the engine had ceased to function — the cooling water had frozen;
the radiator had split and there was no means in our power to get the engine into action again. this moment our journey became one long story of misery and pain. The cold grew intense and we all began to feel dejected at the consciousness that our real
From
silence.
knew how
crossed the sea
we
could not
tell.
Hashagen
argued we were now steering over Belgium. but somehow his voice lacked conviction. Kolle uttered not a word. We well knew that he was more than uneasy. The want of our port propeller told on the steering and I myself feared that this would endanger our safe return to Germany. The hours dragged on. The petrol rating was now really ill. Both ratings from the port wing car were now relieving other sufferers. Hahndorf was growing anxious about his fuel supply and said so. Kolle stormed at him. But the man's worn, pale face and his frozen black moustache and beard deserved only pity. He was gallantly struggling against sickness. At last dawn began to light up the sky. One, and then another, airship were barely distinguished against the eastern light. They could only be German, but we dared not use our radio, and that in itself was proof that we might be over the enemy's air defences. Kolle rapped out a bitter exclamation as this suspicion grew into certainty; flashes on the ground showed hostile gunfire to be at work: whether shooting at us or not we could not tell. We saw no bursts. Still more, to our intense relief, we never sighted an aeroplane! Schiitz assumed a reassuring tone, but this was abruptly checked when we felt the forward engine behind us slowing down and finally stopping! Hahndorf came in; he was almost breaking down. The petrol supply for the forward engine had given out and the radiator, as the engine ceased running, had frozen solid. With this accident our hopes of reaching home decreased greatly. Vet somehow we could not realise it or else Kolle had succeeded in making us believe that things were better than they were. This failure of the engine, direct ly occasioned by the illness of the petrol rating, was the outcome of a bad leakage in a union of the feed pipe. It had occasioned the entire loss of two tanks of fuel before Hahndorf could discover the mishap. Worse still, the forward engine actuated the radio dynamo anil this
was now
useless.
The
telegraphist had
only a small accumulator to work with. We tried to steer eastwards; but. with two engines and two propellers gone, we began to make worse leeway We could see
2235
the land below and it was becoming clear to me at least that this could not be Germany. The north wind was not abating and the struggle to fly eastwards became desperate. The telegraphist soon reported that his apparatus could no longer transmit. In the last attempt to fly eastward, Kolle determined to come down so as to avoid the tearing wind that was driving us more south than was safe for us. But there was little need to come down very far. In spite of the bombs, ballast and fuel that had gone, it seemed to me that we could scarcely have kept our extreme height, for
we had
lost
much
gas.
Shortly afterwards another misfortune overtook us: a third engine failed! This time it was in the after car, where the men had been refilling one of the radiators that had been steaming heavily owing to the height of our flight. The water-inlet cover
The Zeppelin L 43 about to set off on a test flight in March 1917 Note the undersides and gondolas, painted black in an effort to conceal the ship from the British searchlights. Built at Friednchshafen, the L 43 was one of the first high-altitude Zeppelins, made necessary by the improving defences met regularly by other naval airships over England
had been clumsily replaced, the water had been jolted out or steamed away until the engine grew hot that the exhaust side was red. In vain they struggled to rectify the damage — it was all to no purpose, and the it could be remedied. was, if I remember, at this same time while at a height of some 4,000 metres or rather less that we flew over a large town in the early morning. What it was I do not know. A voice in the car exclaimed 'Dijon!' That caused me to think. If that indeed was Dijon then we must fly over Switzerland to reach our own country. We still struggled on, but it was now obvious to me that we should never bring the ship home to our country. Before nine o'clock Hahndorf came to report that the petrol supply was failing and that his men were nearly exhausted. Kblle turned to his charts once more, but could find none to help him, for they did not extend so far south. So he brought the ship down nearer the ground to look where
pistons seized before It
he might be. By this time we thought we were over Switzerland and it appeared as if internment in a neutral country would be the only method of putting an end to our
and of avoiding a total wreck of the ship with evil consequences to ourselves. Kolle was doing the right thing, so I felt. Two of the others, as we were coming down, exclaimed 'Switzerland! See the snow mountains!' People could now be seen streaming out of their houses to look at the ship, which was now only 1,500 metres up. That fact alone made us feel sure that we had not reached Germany, for at home the population would never be seen rushing out to look at a Zeppelin airship like this. Before we landed we were to have further unpleasant experiences. sufferings
Switzerland or France? Between 8 am and 9 am we sighted a curious little town in a gorge, such as might be expected in central Switzerland. But the country was growing rocky and Kolle turned north again to look for level ground for a landing. The valley here grew broad and level — a good place for an emergency descent and we might still save the ship — who could tell? But we were to have a rude shock. Suddenly we saw a large tract of ground all cultivated with vegetables. On this there were working some gangs of coloured men — so we could see from their
ifwW. t
2836
i
^fMmjCm
»
heads and bare arms — all dressed in blue. 'Black men! French soldiers!' rang out a cry. Kolle stamped his foot and hurriedly ordered full speed on an eastward course again. But Hahndorf came in and talked rapidly. His men were exhausted; and the petrol supply was nearly running out: he could not go on with only two engines out of five and two propellers out of four in action. It was risky and he pointed to the mountains eastwards. A forced landing would be the only way to save the crew. Kblle bowed to the inevitable and manoeuvred as though descending at Ahlhorn in Germany itself. He calmly ordered the emergency landing flags to be flown and
scraped the ground. Two the car jumped clear to land. Then lightened of this weight the whole ship seemed to pivot on her nose and was again caught by the wind. Swaying and jolting, we were tossed across the stream until the whole craft came hard against the eastern side of the valley where she siuck fast, entangled in the bushes and wedged among the stones. It was almost with a sense of gratitude that we clambered or jumped out of the cars. The long ordeal was over, but at what cost! No sooner were we on the ground than Kolle ordered us to fall into line by the ship. All the ship's charts and papers, all our private papers,
manoeuvred the valves for the landing. We could not but admire our commander in this moment for his conduct was well worthy of what a German naval officer's should be. But ill-luck was to pursue him to the bitter end. In this mountainous river valley where we now found ourselves, the north wind was no longer blowing as it had done high overhead, but sharp little squalls were felt at times. As we were touching the ground, one of these eddies came swirling across the water to our ship. She heeled over to port and the wing car
he and Schiitz collected from us. They were stacked into the forward car. The tools were distributed to us and with them we proceeded to break all the instruments and batter the forward car. Hahndorf drew out the emergency pistol, and fired a blazing charge into the central gas-bags, which were still more than partly inflated. With beating hearts we watched the fire take hold of our fine airship. Some of us who were not too exhausted felt as though our last link with the Fatherland was snapped and that the future mattered nothing. We
was torn
off as it
men from
to our senses as the last few tanks of petrol exploded and we had to run from the blazing gas and spirit. Some were almost too exhausted to move and were helped away to safety. Kolle was splendid in this trying moment. We then gave a last salute to the ship and the ensign as it was vanishing in the flames. But with a hoarse shout as though in pain Kblle made us fall in and marched us up a narrow track out of the valley. The sailmaker had to be carried for his feet were frozen stiff, while two others were almost too ill to walk. So our little party of 13 struggled on to the neighbouring farm where we found a German sergeant in charge of a party of prisoners! What a strange meeting in the enemy's country. This man called his party to him and they helped us to the farm where we surrendered, weak, exhausted and dejected; but still proud of our ship, our commander, and the great flight that
were brought
just completed. Few men could boast as we might do, that they had accomplished such a journey and thrown bombs at the enemy's great capital! But we were too exhausted to do more or go further. [From an account by the helmsman of the
we had
L45.1
BOMBS BY NIGHT Although the Germans led the way with strategic bombing, the Allies also produced large bombing aircraft and towards the end of the war started to launch large-scale night raids — with few practical results. Below: A Caproni Ca 3 bomber caught in the searchlights
a quarter to eight. Eight thousand feet above the coast near Dunkirk we move. My pilot is a senior officer, and I have never flown with him before, so I sit quietly and do not talk, as I watch carefully the dials of my petrol instruments, and also keep a careful eye on the country below. The pilot looks at the engines with a satisfied glance, and the machine swings round and points It is
east.
Soon the dim pattern of the Dixmude gleam of a sky above Thorout appears a dazzling Verey light which drifts and dies — German machines are abroad in the darkness also. Far below now lies Thorout, and for a minute or two its pale beam waves vainly and impotent floods lie below, reflecting the quivering star-shell. In the
in the moonlit sky, its strength so dissipated that it is useless. Soon south of Ghent
we move, and lights
of the
see to our right the landing huge Gotha aerodrome of
Gontrode. I stand up and look across the pilot, and count the lights. 'Eight on each side — two red at the west!' I
say. 'I
make
it
more,' he comments. 'Count
again!'
sure of my accuracy, and draw in notebook a detailed sketch of the landing arrangements. 'Look!' suddenly cried the pilot. 'We've been heard!' I peer down once more and see only the two red lights glowing on the ground. The two lines of white electric lamps have been switched off, for the drone of our engines has been heard high above the aerodrome. Suddenly I realise that we will be heard through the whole of our long journey. The absence of searchlights and shell fire in these undefended regions makes one forget that from town to town, from village to village, the report of our progress is sent to I
make
my
1,000 military centres in a vast radius.
Already our passage into virgin territory (for not for years has country east of Ghent been bombed at night) must be causing a sensation. Brussels
The
largest
must be apprehensive:
wartime bomber used by the
Aix-la-Chapelle is uneasy. .
.
is
feeling anxiety: Cologne
.
Far ahead I can see a light flashing and flashing in a regular code. I presume it to be near Brussels, and point it out to the pilot. In a few minutes through the slight haze of the distance appears a great number of twinkling lights, and soon to our left I see a vast sea of glittering, shimmering gems, with lines of lights radiating outwards from it like the tentacles of an octopus. I suddenly realise that it is' Brussels, and with a cry of utter delight stand up to look down more clearly at it. It is a wonderful spectacle. There, in one wide sweep before my eyes, lies the whole city, triumphantly blazing out into the night. I can see the long lines of the boulevards stretching through the mass of lights, on the outskirts of which glitter little villages, from which also radiate the lines of street lamps, as though illuminated starfish lay here and there across the country. Brussels passes. Road and forest and village flow beneath us in a regular and expected stream. Slowly the minutes go by. Ten minutes to ten says the watch. For over two hours we have been in the air, and our engines show no signs of wavering. On them alone now depend our chances of return. Soon I see far ahead of me the silver ribbon of the Meuse shining in the haze of the horizon, and then the lights of Namur, cold and sparkling, appear by the side of the river. I examine every tiny landmark on the ground below, and check it with my map. There is no doubt. There lie the lights of the town — there lies the forest on its outskirts — there lie the two bridges, from one of which the thin black line of the railway trails off into the distance. 'Namur!' I say to the pilot. He looks down and flies round in a wide circle in order to examine every point, and to ensure for himself that no doubt whatever exists as to the identity of the place. He is quite satisfied, and turns the machine towards the south-east. We cross the river south of the town as I explain to him my intentions. I want him to turn north-west,
British in
any numbers: a Handley Page 0/400
against wind, and to throttle the engines. We will glide down parallel to the railway line, which will help me to get a good line. We will reach the bridge at a low altitude,
and I will drop my bombs. We will turn quickly down wind to escape. Before I crawl into the back I point out to him some very bright lights in the direction of the Namur Zeppelin sheds, which seem to confirm my supposition of the activity
German
airships tonight. Then, with a of explanation, I stoop through the door behind my seat and lie on the floor of the machine. I slide open the little trapdoor beneath the pilot's seat, and see a small square picture of moonlit country. Ahead there is just visible the curve of the river, and the black line of the bridge across of
final
word
it. Beneath me runs the railway track which is to be my guide. To my joy I can see, at one place upon this thin dark line, the intermittent red glowing of an engine's
In a swift moment I realise the actuality of the country below. For a second fire-box.
ceases to be a map and becomes peopled with busy human beings. Oh, Namur (think I), ablaze with lights, you enjoy this moonlight night of late September, far, far from the turmoil of war, little conscious that overhead this very moment lies a furclad airman peering down at you, preparing to drop his terrific missiles, packed with fierce explosive! Laugh on in your cafes, you exquisitely-clad German embusquesl For me this moment is rich and ecstatic. Then the difficulty of the task absorbs my mind. The noise of the engines has ceased. Through the machine sounds the faint rush of wind hissing and sighing round the tight-strung wires and planes as we sink lower and lower. My bomb-sight draws nearer and nearer to the bridge. Pressing the buttons of the direction indicator I steer the machine to right and left, as green or red glow the lights before the eyes of the pilot. The direction bar touches the bridge and drifts off to the left. I swing the machine round quickly, again the bar crosses the bridge, again it drifts off. We are flying slightly side to wind, and I can it
in flight
over
Germany
with an
SE 5a
escorting
it
scarce keep the head of the machine on a straight course. The pale-glowing rangebars draw nearer and nearer, with a slow progression, to the black edge of the silver river. Again I press the right button; again a green light glows; again the machine swings towards the bridge. The rangebars cross the base of it. I press over the and again. Clatterbomb handle quickly .
.
.
sound the opening and closing bomb doors behind me click-clatter-click-click-clatter
bomb after bomb slides out into the moonlight depths below. For a moment I see the fat yellow shapes, clear-let in the pale light beneath me, go tumbling down and down towards the dim face of the as
country.
hurry back to my seat beside the pilot. 'Half dropped, sir. 'Fraid they will not get it. Oh! I am sorry, sir! We drifted!' I
The
first salvo misses One, two, three red flashes leap up in the water of the river some hundred yards to the south of the bridge. One, two more flashes, more rapid and brilliant, leap up on the moonlight embankment, leaving large white clouds of smoke. 'Jolly good! You didn't miss by much! he says encouragingly.
Boom-boom-Boom-boom-BOOM! souncl the five explosions as we turn. It is strange to look at Namur — still sparkling beautifully with a wealth of light under the stars — still unchanged, though we know that the thundering clamour of these five unexpected explosions must have stirred up the placid life of the little tranquil town till it is seething like an ant-hill upset by the wayside. In the squares must run the alarmed population, rushing to and fro aimlessly, utterly terrified. In the military headquarters the telephones and telegraphs must have burst into a sudden activity. The vibrant roar of the explosions must have been heard for a great distance. Even in remote Aix-la-Chapelle the strolling Germans must have wondered at the far-away sound drifting to them under the stars.
Again we fly to the south: again we turn and start on our second 'run' over the target: again this time
I
crawl into the back, steeled
by a great anxiety and a great
I realise the enormous responsibility which is mine. With this sense of responsibility weighing heavily on
determination, for
me I lie down, peering through the little square hole. My face is wet with the perspiration of anxiety in spite of the intense cold of the biting wind: my hands shake with excitement. I decide to take the machine to the river along the railway line, and slightly to the east of it, and then to judge the wind drift so that the machine is turned by it to the left, when I will press the starboard signal button and swing the machine at an angle across the bridge, and then drop my bombs. It is a great risk, and unless I judge exactly I will not succeed. In a fever of apprehension, and with my whole being concentrated on the relation of the fine wires and bars of my bomb-sight with the black thread of the railway far below me, I lie on the varnished strips of wood on the floor of the machine, my legs flung wide apart behind me, my bare hands and face frozen with the icy blast of wind, my uncovered eyes running with water, arer and nearer to the bridge draw the range-bars. Gently and rarely do I ) ch the starboard signal button, to swing
the machine again and again to the right as the wind drifts it to the left. We are near the bridge — we are almost over it. I press the starboard button determinedly, and I see the glow of green light illuminate the dashboard. To the right swings the machine. White glows a light as I press the central button. I look below quivering with anxiety. The machine ceases its leftward drift and swings to the right, and the two luminous range-bars are in line with the bridge. I grasp the bomb-handle and once, twice press it over. I look behind — the bombs are all gone. It is all over! The irrevocable deed has been done! The failure or success of the long raid is sealed. I climb clumsily to my feet and look through the door beside the pilot. 'All gone, sir, I ... Oh! look, look!' Upon the thin black line of the bridge leap out two great flashes leaving a cloud of moonlit smoke which entirely obscures
^rt»
end of it. 'Oh — damn good — damn good!' yells out the pilot excitedly. 'Hit it! Hit it! You've
-one
hit
it!
Oh — priceless — priceless!'
'Good — oh, it,
sir?
Two
sir! I
am glad. It is hit, I am bucked!'
isn't
of them.
'Something for you for this when we get back!' he says. 'Oh! damn good— damn good, Paul. Priceless — priceless!' I look round, and in the back of the machine I see a sight which left the clearest image of this raid in my mind. There stands the moonlit figure of the tall good-
humoured gunlayer, and with a characI see him put out his arms with the thumbs pointing upwards — the teristic gesture
most sincere expression of congratulation he can deliver. My heart goes out in gratitude to this solitary man who already, for nearly three hours, has stood alone on a thin platform in the back of the machine, watching and eager, knowing that he has no control over his destiny, that his life lies in the hands of the little figure whose black head he can see so far away from him in the nose of the machine. Now we turn at once and start on our Charleroi sparkles long homeward trail on our left. Near it at La Louviere flashes an aerial lighthouse, whose presence I record on my notebook. Having found our way to Namur by map, we seem to return by a kind of curious homing instinct. We know where we are as if by second nature. Indeed so little do I trouble that I mistake Courtrai for Roulers, but it makes but little difference. Such confidence have I in our safety, so lively is the moon-drenched night, so friendly are the undefended skies, that we fly on and on as in a stupor of utter bliss. We know that if we return we are famous, and we know that we will return. Song and laughter, and rich thoughts of .
«*t*' f»-
fr.
LrR)
A night bomber airfield. The most dangerous moments in flight occur at take-off and landing, and the primitive
War flying
its
proffered glories
1 1 hours after he is coming back from Namur. How wonderful it is — how wonderful he is! Ypres flickers to the left with its ever uneasy artillery fire. In our ease we do not even trouble to cross the lines as soon as possible, but fly on parallel to them, some five miles on the German side. At last we turn and cross slowly over the white blos-
scarcely
>/*/
m
.
when next comes leave, fill my drowsy brain. I hug the pilot's arm affectionately. At twelve o'clock he was at Dover, now
vnPut
t
London and
far-distant
,./.,
.
facilities of First
World
fields made these moments doubly dangerous, particularly when landing.
soms
of
the
ever-rising,
ever-drooping
star-shells.
Reprinted from Green Balls by Bewsher, published by Blackwood. I
I
Paul
THE CALCULATING ACE Rene Fonck was the doyen of Allied aces with 75 victories. He survived the war and attained his pre-eminence by means of careful tactics and unsurpassed marksmanship The month of September 1918 saw the very characteristic symptoms of Boche agony appear. We were grounded in a clearing at Noblette north of Chalons, and for a few days none of us had flown. It was, in fact, a question of not letting our location be known too soon, for we were on the verge of dealing a staggering blow to the enemy. Finally, on September 26, 1 obtained permission to take off. That date marks one of the toughest days of my fighting career. I remained in the air from morning to night, and if my machine gun had not jammed, I would have added eight planes to my credit. Nevertheless, that day I repeated my sextuple exploit of the month of May. Our infantrymen had advanced several kilometres and menacing Boche patrols were flying above them. The first patrol that I attacked consisted of five
Kokkers. Without giving them the time to work out by signals their plan to attack me, I dived into them at full speed, guns blazing. Letting myself then fly on my wing, I turned over completely in order to rocket up behind one of the planes which had already fired at me. But I also had fired, and two of the German aircraft crashed to earth in the vicinity of Somme-Py. The others, fearing for their safety, had thought it more prudent to take to their heels. I then gained altitude and saw in the direction of Suippes an enemy plane being
by our own anti-aircraft artillery. I headed there at full speed and reached it at an altitude of 18,500 feet above Perthesfired at
les-Hurlus. fired at
With the
first
burst that
30 yards, the observer was
The defenceless
pilot
I
killed.
became frightened,
verticle dive was so sudden and steep that his companion, whom I had just sent off to join his ancestors, toppled
and his
fell on me at the finishing my loop, when I was going to climb in order to attack the two-seater again. I had at that moment, I must admit, an odd feeling at suddenly seeing a body falling in space. The corpse, like a sack,
overboard and almost
moment
of
me
dropped down and little by little seemed to shrink as it approached the ground — but I did not have time to analyse my feelings; It was necessary to fight and win. Without further delay I charged again. Through a sudden bank, I caught the enemy plane under the tail and sent a few incendiary bullets through his fuselage. A little later, while I expected to see him in flames, one of his wings broke off and the plane came crashing down to the ground. Towards evening I was patrolling with Lieutenant Fontaine. We were accompanied by Adjutants Loup and Brugere. The Boches were out in force. Facing us were eight enemy planes ready to fight. I awaited the attack confidently, and would have willingly provoked it when a Spad came in unexpectedly to lend us a hand. I immediately recognised Capitaine de Sevin and the Cicognes of the 26th. It was a formidable array, and without hesitating any longer, I launched the assault, followed by my comrades. I dived at full
2242
speed into the middle of our enemies. The fusillade crackled and the Boches were not hesitant to withstand the blow.
Adjutant Brugere was hemmed in close by two Fokkers and, to relieve him, I brought down one of his adversaries. During this time Capitaine de Sevin was going through a very risky acrobatic manoeuvre in order to shake off a Boche who had come to grips with him, and who seemed to me to be rather a bold devil. Only the captain's skill as a pilot permitted him to escape, for his motor had conked out. He was pursued to within 300 feet from the ground. I too had difficulty in defending myself. I fired bursts at any Boches who passed in
my
self
by
line of fire, while disengaging aim taildives. Moreover,
my
mywas was
true, since a plane against which I firing came tumbling down with broken
wings. Meanwhile, five Albatroses came to the rescue. I dived into their midst with
wide-open
throttle,
and with
my
first
shot down the plane in the most favourable position. Two others owed their skins to the jamming of my machine gun, and despite the cold, which perpetually reigns in this high altitude, I must confess I felt drenched with perspiration upon returning to the field. But, for me, the day volley
I
excellent. I now had 66 official victories to my credit. That was tbe end of my great victories.
had been
The enemy
at times, tried to regain the initiative by pitting his best squadrons against us. During the month of October I succeeded again in some good kills, but the story does not offer anything particularly exciting to recount. last victory still,
My
took place on November 1, 1918. At 1420 hours, exactly, I brought down on the outskirts of Vouziers my 75th official plane. It was one of those numerous two-seater planes whose mission it was to drop into the trenches propaganda leaflets designed to discourage our poilus. That cost the Boches who were flying that sortie dearly, for coming at them, in a few seconds I sent them to join their papers, while my brave comrades below were advancing magnificently. Those who read these pages are perhaps astonished at the number of my aerial victories. Others will believe that I was lucky when I claim to have passed uninjured under the fire of several machine guns criss-crossing at short distance. Upon reflection, however, my readers will better appreciate my situation. I studied the methods and techniques of my opponents at great length, and I acquired, little by little, a thorough knowledge of the strategy of the enemy fighter, reconnaissance and range-intelligence (artillery observation) pilots. Furthermore, I enjoy keen sight and know how to use it. My aim is legendary among my comrades, and it resulted in my achieving many advantages. Even in 1915 I wanted to put a machine gun on my Caudron G III. The one on the
twin-engined Caudron, which I had later, was stationary, and when I used my Spad
sent my bullets into the target as though directing them by hand. This is not an easy thing to do, however. You must consider that hunter and hunted are moving at full speed and keep at variable altitudes. You must estimate at a glance the speed of the adversary, correct your speed in comparing it with his, and foresee the deviations of' the trajectories produced by the angle of fire. The resistance of the air also intervenes as an important factor, and this resistance varies a great deal according to the altitude of the plane. The corrections, depending on circumstances, cancel each other out or complement each other, and to give you a less abstract example, I must tell you that one day, finding myself only 600 feet away from a Boche, I had to aim 60 feet ahead of him in order to shoot him down. The speed of our planes sometimes reaches 200 mph, which gives us an average speed of about 150 feet per second. As it is necessary to fire at a distance of 300 to 600 feet in order to reduce the correction to a minimum, it is easy to see that the person who fires has only a few seconds of effective firing at his disposal. The margin of time is so slight that, in using a machine gun, I succeed most often by sending off a burst of only five or six cartridges — but in general that is enough I
for
me.
know how to position myself in an actual duel. Guynemer fought differently and faced fire regularly, but this strategy is very dangerous. It places the pilot at the mercy of the jamming of his gun. I always utilise the blind spots, and because of that, am forced to fire from whatever position I
my Spad
might be
in.
But
I
have been doing
My
this for a long time. bursts are from eight to ten bullets at the maximum and I often do not use more than three. Besides
the advantage of economising on ammunition, this method has also the advantage of facilitating my aim and reducing the chance of jamming or damaging my machine gun. I should also like to add that, to obtain
good results, you must also know how to control your nerves, how to have absolute self-mastery, and how to think coolly in difficult situations. I have had to duel with a great many Boche aces and have had the patience, while fighting, to wait for the moment my adversaries give way to
nervous irritation — the
fatal mistake — and have profited a great deal from their errors. I always believed that it is indispensable to maintain absolute confidence in ultimate success, along with the most comI
plete disdain for danger.
These are the necessary qualities for a fighter pilot. And I should like to repeat that, in order to become a great ace, the period of apprenticeship is long and strewn with disappointments and repeated setbacks during the course of which our lives are risked hundreds of difficult,
times.-
[Reprinted from. Ace of Aces by Rene Fonck, published by Doubleday.]
Above: Rene Fonck practises his art on his airfield with a carbine Only by dint of constant practice, and care lavished on the
guns themselves, did Fonck become the great marksman that he was. Below: Fonck in the cockpit of his Spad XIII of the Cicognes
Wary Germans bemused by captured
Italian technology: sound locators such as this peculiar device were designed to detect approaching aircraft. When the manually-operated sound boxes were pointed towards the sound of the oncoming machines, a rudimentary gauge at the base of the contraption indicated approximate height and direction of the enemy formation.
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«
GREECE JOINS
THE
ALLIES h %
The outbreak of the First World War split Greece into factions which, as the war progressed, became increasingly irreconcilable. Venizelos,
the Prime Minister, found that despite a parliamentary majority his pro- Allied policy was continually blocked by King Constantine, and that eventually he would be forced to lead a revolution to take Greece into the war. Michael Llewellyn Smith Athens, June 1917. Constantine is in exile in Switzerland, and Venizelos, once again Prime Minister of all Greece, reviews the troops he is about to throw against the Central Powers
%
2
4 9 58
6
ROAD TO WAR
GREECE: THE
September 21 The
1913
Bulgarians begin to mobilise. The Serbs appeal to Greece for help under the terms of the May 1 91 3 agreement. Venizelos wishes to intervene, but insists that the Allies furnish :
August 1
:
End
of the
Second
Balkan War.
December 10:
Greece
officially
takes over Crete.
1
:
:
Venizelos, the Greek premier, resigns. This marks the beginning of the crisis in Greek
^L
November 9 The Allies offer
and
British
Bulgaria parts of eastern Thrace and a portion of Macedonia as an inducement for her to join the
The offer is
insufficient,
however.
December 6 The Rumanian :
to do.
October 3
in
October 1
Crete.
The Allies send an ultimatum to Athens demanding the surrender of the Greek fleet. :
Lambros becomes premier.
:
October 5 is
:
1915
succeeded by Zaimis.
January 25: Rumania
refuses to join Greece to help Serbia.
Venizelos resigns when Constantine refuses to aid the :
Gallipoli.
He
is
as premier by Gounaris, opposed to the Entente.
succeeded
who is
:
yields to the ultimatum
November 1 9 The Allies demand :
that the Greeks dismiss
1
:
Britain offers
Greece
Cyprus as an inducement to war.
November 23 The Provisional Government declares war on
October 20 Greece rejects the
Germanyand
:
:
Bulgaria.
offer.
November 30 The Greek government rejects the Allies' latest demands. Allied parties land :
November 5
Zaimis resigns and succeeded by Skouloudis. :
is
at
Greece declares benevolent neutral (to the
Peiraeus.
December 1 The Allied landing :
Allies).
parties withdraw.
1916
Greece
December 8 The blockade of :
instituted.
January 1 1 The French occupy
December 1
Corfu as a refuge for the Serbs, after the Greek government has refused its permission.
that
:
all
:
The
Greek forces
Allies in
demand
Thessaly be
pulled out.
December 1 The Greek government complies. :
January
1
5
:
The Serbs land on
Corfu
December 1
May 26: A Bulgarian and German force occupies Fort Rupel in Greek Macedonia. This further enhances the Allies' suspicions that Constantine is in league with the Central Powers.
:
The
Allies
decide
to recognise the Provisional
Government of Venizelos
in
Salonika.
1917 June 1 1 The French envoy :
June 6 The Allies start the :
April
1 Gounaris rejects the second Allied offer of the Smyrna region on the grounds that the :
guarantee Greece against Bulgarian
Allies are refusing to
aggression.
August 22
:
Venizelos returns to
power.
September 6: Bulgaria concludes an alliance with Germany and Austria- Hungary. By the terms of this alliance, Bulgaria is to receive the Kavalla region if Greece proves hostile and goes to war.
in
materiel.
October
:
area around it, if Greece will cede the Kavalla area to Bulgaria and join a Balkan bloc to help Serbia against Austria- Hungary. Venizelos favours the policy, but Constantine is against it.
October 1 1 The Greek government
all of the Central Powers' representatives Athens and surrender all war
Venizelos resigns and
November 8:
January The Allies offer Greece the Turkish city of Smyrna and the
on
Venizelos
:
Allied troops begin to land at Salonika. Constantine now goes back on his agreement with Venizelos, and refuses to go to war.
herself a
Allies
:
Salonika.
premier, Bratianu, refuses to
guarantee Greece against Bulgarian aggression, as the Allies have asked
March 6
September 29
October 9 Venizelos goes to
French governments promise to send in troops. Venizelos then secures the King's approval for the plan, but only in secret. Publicly, the Allies' request to land troops at Salonika is rejected.
:
him
a
shot.
:
neutrality.
Allies.
:
establishes a Provisional
50,000 men as support.
September 24 The
August Outbreak of the First World War. King Constantine rejects Germany's appeals for Greece to join the Central Powers.
September 7
The Greek IV Corps surrenders to the Central Powers at Kavalla without firing
Government
L
1914
September 1
'pacific
in
Athens presents an ultimatum
blockade' of Greece.
demanding the abdication
June 21 The Allies send an
Constantine and the renunciation by the Crown Prince of his claims to the throne. Allied troops invade Thessaly and French troops occupy the Isthmus of Corinth.
:
ultimatum to Greece, demanding the demobilisation of the Greek army and the formation of a responsible government. The Skouloudis government resigns and is replaced by one formed by Zaimis.
June 26 The Greek army :
on
a
is
placed
peace footing.
August 30 A Venizelist and movement takes over :
June 12: Constantine abdicates
in
favour of his second son, Alexander.
June 26 pro-
of
Zaimis resigns and replaced by Venizelos. :
is
Allied
June 27: Greece declares war on
Salonika.
the Central Powers.
2247
On the night of September 25, 1916 a bespectacled bearded man came out of a house in the Road of Patisia. He had his hat almost down to his ears and the collar of his coat was turned up. He stood for a moment, gazed furtively around, and then with the determined step of a young man sped towards the centre of the city. He took pains to keep himself in the dark and made several detours before he arrived at the appointed place near the Stadium Road. There a car was waiting and, as soon as he stepped in, it started at high speed towards the coast, to a waiting ship. The car flew the French flag and nobody guessed
whom
it
carried.
(D.
Alastos, Venizelos,
p 171)
The bearded man was Eleutherios VeniGreece's leading statesman and ex-Prime Minister, who had been dismissed by King Constantine a year previously because of the dispute between the two
zelos,
men over the question of Greek intervention in the First World War. The waiting ship carried Venizelos from Athens to his birthplace, the island of Crete, where he was sure of enthusiastic support from the population. It was there that Veni-
message of revolution revolution carried out with the specific purpose of bringing Greece into the war on the side of the Entente Powers, Britain, France, Russia and Italy. From Crete Venizelos sailed, by way of the Aegean islands, to Salonika, chief city of northern Greece, where he set up a revolutionary Provisional Government and began to form an army to help fight against the Germans and Bulgarians. By this sudden coup d'etat half of Greece found itself, as yet unofficially, at war with the Central zelos proclaimed his
—a
Powers. Since the outbreak of the war the question of intervention or neutrality had split the Greeks into two opposed factions. Greece had close ties with Britain, France and Germany, but the weight of tradition and sentiment drew her towards the side of the liberal western democracies, Britain and France, which together with Russia had presided, as 'Protecting Powers', over the establishment of the new. Greek kingdom in the 19th Century. Venizelos, as Prime Minister of Greece before the war, had held conversations with Lloyd George and Churchill in London in 1913,
in which he had tried to negotiate an entente with Britain. The possibility was discussed that Britain might" cede Cyprus to Greece, in return for the lease from Greece of facilities on the island of Kephallenia for a naval base for the British Mediterranean Fleet. Had these negotiations been successfully completed they would almost inevitably have involved Greece in the war from the beginning. But the outbreak of the war in August 1914 interrupted them, leaving Greece quite free to choose her attitude to the conflict. It soon became evident that there were acute differences of view within Greece over the policy she should follow. Venizelos, consistently with his previous attitudes, publicly declared his sympathy with the Entente from the beginning. Mere
sympathy was no argument for intervention. But Venizelos and his Liberal Party argued that, given the sympathy and support of the Entente Powers, especially Britain, Greece could and should enter thef war in order to achieve her secular aim ot liberating the Greek populations which* still lay outside the boundaries of the Greek state. In the Balkan Wars of 1912/13
m 9
M*
i
A
'
:
'248
;
the most pressing of Greek ambitions had been satisfied, and the country looked forward to a long period of economic reconstruction and the development of the new territories. But, in Venizelos's view, Turkey's participation in the war on the German side offered Greece an unrepeatable opportunity to further the national policy of expansion and incorporation of the 'unredeemed Greeks' of the Ottoman Empire within the Greek state. Specifically, Venizelos was tempted by the offer of important territorial concessions on the coast of Asia Minor — Smyrna (Izmir) and its hinterland — made by the Entente in January 1915 in order to bring Greece into the war. Venizelos, who had helped to engineer the offer, urged the King that it should be accepted without hesitation. The King refused the bait. Although Carrying a picture of their hero. Greek students demonstrate in support of Venizelos, revolution, and war against the Central Powers. Greece's peasants were not nearly so interested in the war, and tough Venizelist recruiting officers tou/ed the countryside press-ganging the reluctant villagers, sometimes burning the houses of those who refused to join
Venizelos's Liberal Party commanded a substantial majority in the Greek Chamber, he was unable to impose his views in the face of determined opposition from certain powerful quarters. The anti-Venizelists
who were most
influential
were King Con-
stantine himself and his adviser Dr Streit, the Greek General Staff and notably the
Deputy Chief of General Staff I. Metaxas, and a few prominent anti -Venizelist politicians. Their line of reasoning was that Greece's geographical position and relative military weakness imposed on her a policy of neutrality. Hostility to Britain and France was out of the question, for Greece
with her exposed coastline and important ports was utterly vulnerable to pressure and blockade by the British and French fleets. But, however tempting the rewards, intervention on the side of the Entente was too dangerous. Firstly, the Royalists argued, the bait of territorial concessions in Asia Minor was delusive. It was easy for the Allies to promise rewards, but there was no guarantee that Greece could hold down the promised area after the war against a hostile Turkey. In any case, this and any other territorial concession depended on the ultimate victory of the Entente, which the King and General
<
i
<3
Greece, divided into two camps by the choice
hostile
BOSNIA
between war or
neutrality.
V Salonika, July 1916; Russian troops disembark to the refrains of a British military band. French and British troops had been requested by Venizelos (against the wishes of King Constantine) in autumn 1915, his last major act before finally resigning the Premiership. By January 1916 an army of more than 150,000 French and British troops underthe French General Sarrail was defending a 70-mile front in Greece. Soon the Allies were working with Venizelos to topple the monarchy, the strongest force preventing Greece from declaring war against the Central Powers
Staff thought unlikely. Secondly, the Staff feared that if Greece intervened against Turkey, she would be exposing her flank to a potentially disastrous attack by Bulgaria, which was still resentful of the 1913 territorial settlement in the coveted Greek Macedonia.
Who
Balkans,
and
rules Greece?
In the elections of June 1915, called as a result of Venizelos's dispute with the King
and his consequent resignation, Venizelos to power with a reduced but still adequate majority. His actual return to office was, however, delayed for two months by the fact that the King was ill —
was returned
ill, according to the Royalist government, to swear in a new Prime Minister and undergo the exhaustion of another round of arguments with Venizelos. By late August, however, Venizelos was back in the saddle. A month later he and the King were once more locked in dispute. The issue facing Greece was no longer intervention in Turkey, but whether or not to intervene by coming to the aid of Serbia if she were attacked by Bulgaria. Greece was bound to Serbia by a mutual aid treaty of 1913, under which either country must assist the other in case of aggression by a
too
The treaty stipulated that if Serbia were attacked by Bulgaria, she must, in order to be able to invoke Greek aid, put 150,000 men into the field against Bulgaria herself. In September 1915 Bulgaria's intention of joining the Central Powers was at last clear to all, and on September 22 she ordered mobilisation with a view to attacking the Serbs. Venizelos had repeatedly declared that a Bulgarian attack on Serbia would activate the treaty, and he now persuaded the King to sign the decree for Greek mobilisation. The Royalists on the other hand argued that the Greco-Serbian treaty was intended to apply only in the case of an isolated Bulgarian attack on Serbia, and not in the context of a general European war such as the present. But in any case Serbia, already hard pressed by Austro-German armies in the north, could not put her quota of 150,000 troops into the field against Bulgaria; Venizelos, eager not to miss this opportunity to force an entry into the war, asked the Allies to supply the troops instead, thus fulfilling Serbia's obligation for her and enabling Greece to apply the treaty. This was his last act as Prime Minister. The King once more dethird party.
manded
his resignation.
But
it
was
too late
from landing. By January 1916 an army of more than 150,000 French and British troops under the French General Sarrail was defending a 70-mile front from Skala Stravros on the Gulf of Orfano to the marshes at the source of the River Vardar. Though Sarrail had sent columns across the Greek frontier to the aid of the Serbs, they had been too weak to stop the Allied troops
and
too late to affect the issue,
and the
armies, smashed by the great German-Bulgarian offensive, had been forced to evacuate Serbian soil and retreat over the mountains through Albania to the sea. The Anglo-French Salonika army was
Serbian
thus left to defend its own entrenched camp against the Germans and Bulgarians. The Serbian army no longer existed to help. With Venizelos's second resignation, and the abstention of his party from the elections of December 1915 on the grounds that they should never have taken place
2252
because Venizelos had been unconstitutionally dismissed by the King, prospects
Greek intervention seemed to disappear. Throughout the early months of 1916 the Venizelists watched in frustration as the Entente put mounting pressure on King Constantine and his government to ensure of
Zymbrakakis, with Sarrail's sympathy and protection, had conducted a Venizelist coup at a time when Venizelos's own intentions were still uncertain. Zymbrakakis and his men declared for the Allies, and uncooperative Royalist officers were forced to leave
Salonika. This 'National Defence'
at least Greece's benevolent neutrality. It
movement, as
was now widely claimed
military or political significance in the absence of Venizelos himself, but cleared the ground for his arrival in Salonika when
in
Entente and
Venizelist circles that the King and his closest advisers were moved not by their country's best interests but by pro-German tendencies. Constantine's wife Sophia was the Kaiser's sister, and Constantine himself had close and affectionate ties with Germany, where he had attended military academy. Most of the charges made were wild and unconvincing, but as time passed the very excesses of the Entente Powers in
Athens tended to push Constantine more and more into the arms of Germany.
On the pretext that their position as 'Protecting Powers' under the 19th century treaties regulating the establishment of the Greek state gave them the right and duty to intervene in Greek internal affairs in order to restore constitutional normality (which was allegedly threatened by Constantine's treatment of Venizelosl, Britain and France inflicted one after the other a series of humiliating demands on the Greek
government. Greece became the 'Belgium of the Entente', its neutrality grossly violated not only by the dictatorial Sarrail in Macedonia but also by the Powers' intelligence services in Athens. In reaction to this humiliating treatment, the Greek government co-operated, if at all, with less and less good grace. First the Greeks refused to allow the re-equipped units of the Serbian army to cross Greek territory from Corfu to the Salonika front. Then, more seriously, in May 1916 when German and Bulgarian troops entered Eastern Macedonia (Greek territory, but outside the area occupied by Sarrail), the Greek garrisons in the area were ordered from Athens to offer only token resistance, and a Greek corps which surrendered was sent off to Germany for internment for the duration of the war. Eastern Macedonia was overrun by the Bulgarians, its forts
and its Greek populations exposed to harsh treatment by the invaders. Thus the Royalist government, carried by the logic of the policy of neutrality at all costs, had reached the extreme point of permitting foreign troops to occupy Greek territory against the mere assurance (of doubtful value in the case of Bulgaria, which had designs on Greek Macedonia) that these troops would be withdrawn at the end of the war. The Royalist claim that the Anglo-French Salonika armies and the Bulgarians in Eastern Macedonia, were on exactly the same footing, foundered on the fact that the Allies had come by invitation to assist Greece's ally Serbia, whereas the Bulgarians had come uninvited, as predatory enemies. At this point Royalist policy becomes extremely difficult to justify. occupied,
The Revolution begins For Venizelos this was the last straw. After months of hesitation he determined on revolutionary action to end this humiliating state of affairs and to bring Greece into the war. He had already been anticipated by his own extreme supporters in Salonika. There on August 29, 1916 a few Venizelist
Cretan
officers
of the
gendarmerie
army and the
under
Colonel
P.
he saw
it
was
called,
was
of little
fit.
When
finally Venizelos decided to act, his departure for Crete and Salonika was not quite so romantically furtive as the description quoted at the beginning of this account would suggest. It was organised by the powerful and unscrupulous French intelligence service in Athens, whose protection was enough to guarantee Venizelos against interference from the Royalist regime. Venizelos took with him his friend Admiral Koundouriotis, and was followed a few days later by another political friend and colleague, General Danglis. After a few days in Crete, spent whipping up support, Venizelos sailed via Samos (Khios) and Mytilene (all of which islands declared for Venizelos) to Salonika, arriving on October 9. There he took in hand the National Defence movement and
established his Provisional Government, headed by the triumvirate of himself, Koundouriotis and Danglis, and exercising control over Crete, the Aegean islands and such of Macedonia as was not in Bulgarian hands.
Constantine packs his bags The first proclamation of the Provisional Government, issued in Crete, called on the whole Greek nation to do what the official Greek state had failed to do, that is, to save Greek honour by joining the Allies and driving the Bulgarians from Greek soil. The Venizelist revolution was thus theoretically carried out for reasons of foreign
and not internal
policy. Venizelos
empha-
sized that the movement was not antidynastic, and stressed the possibility of reconciliation with the King should the King adopt Venizelos's own policy towards the war. But such talk was largely for the benefit of the British, who did not wish to see., the Venizelist movement turn too rapidly republican. In reality the Veni-
and Royalists were now separated unbridgeable chasm which had already swallowed up the original issue
zelists
by
an
of neutrality or intervention. The schism of the Greek nation reached its peak in this physical division of Greece into two mutually hostile camps. In Athens, the King and his government still preserved, subject to the pressures of the Entente (which soon were to include blockade), a mobilised neutrality. In Salonika, Venizelos's Provisional Government, eager
by the Allies, began as soon as possible an effective army to fight on the Macedonian Front. Though the status of Venizelos's government was uncertain, and its ability to declare war on other states juridically dubious, for all practical purposes Venizelist Greece was now at war with the Central for official recognition
to raise
Powers.
When Venizelos arrived in Salonika, the troops of the National Defence were few and ill-organised, consisting of Colonel Zymbrakakis's regiment, some 2,000 of the Greek 7th Division, and some other volun-
Below and right: The uniforms of a Greek and infantryman. The infantryman is
officer
shown wearing the field service uniform of 1912, but often there was much non-conformity as regards dress. By a curious assortment of regulation and private clothing the volunteers managed to appear more like the Montenegrins than the Greek regular forces, and when the French made available a large quantity of equipment and helmets the situation was further confused They were armed with the 6.5-mm Mannlicher Schoenauer M 1903/14 and were also supplied with a number of French weapons including the 8-mm Lebel and rifle,
Mannlicher Berthier
rifles
The Venizelos government proceeded form an army by hook and by crook,
teers.
to
despite the fact that the majority of the Greek officer corps remained loyal to King Constantine. Numerous Venizelist
volunteers from Crete and the islands crossed over to Salonika to join up. To fill the ranks, the Venizelists recruited vigorously in Macedonia itself. Most of the villagers, strained in their loyalties between Venizelos and Constantine, and already resentful of Sarrail's heavy-handed and often brutal treatment of the local populations, were reluctant to fight. Tough Venizelist recruiting officers toured the countryside press-ganging the Greek inhabitants. Captain Kondylis, a friend of Venizelos, later to become a prominent politico-military leader and to turn Royalist, rampaged through the Chalcidice (Khalkidhiki) peninsula, burning the houses of those who refused to join up. These methods cost the Venizelists heavily after the war in political support, but for the time being they served their purpose. By mid-November 1916 three Greek battalions were serving under British command on the Struma front, and Venizelos could inform Sarrail that the National Defence army numbered over 23,000. But there was a limit to the efficiency and size of a National Defence corps which relied on only a part of Greece as recruiting ground, and was deprived not only of extreme Royalist officers but also of the
hundreds of 'neutral'
officers
who remained
in Royalist-controlled Greece, loyal to the
King and
official
government. The
artificial
division of Greek territory could hardly last, once the Entente governments decided
support Venizelos and appoint diplomatic representatives to the Provisional Government. In summer 1917 the French Prime Minister Ribot and Lloyd George decided on firm action to reunite Greece under Venizelos. A French Colonial Governor, Jonnart, was sent to Athens as Allied High Commissioner with orders to be tough with the Royalist regime. King Constantine was told to pack his bags, and left Greece for exile in Switzerland on June 14, surrendering the throne to his second son Alexander, a young man with a passion for motor cars and a minimal interest in polito
Detachments of Sarrail's troops moved from Macedonia to guarantee a peaceful transition to Venizelism, and
tics.
south
occupied Thessaly (Thessalia) with its rich corn lands, which had been under Royalist control and were needed to supply the Allied-occupied territories. On June 27 Venizelos entered Athens and became Prime Minister of all Greece, reconstituting his Provisional Government as the official government of the whole country.
One clare
was officially war on the Central Powers.
of his first acts
Further Reading Campbell, J. and Sherrard, (Ernest
Benn
P.,
to de-
Modern Greece
1968)
A., The Gardeners of Salonika (Andre Deutsch 1965) Toynbee, A. J., The Western question in Greece and Turkey a study in the contact of civilization (New York Fertig 1970)
Palmer,
MICHAEL LLEWELLYN SMITH has
spent several
Greece and has contributed numerous articles on modern Greek politics and history to The In 1965 he Spectator and other periodicals published The Great Island— A Study of Crete and more recently he has been researching into modern Greek history at St Antony s College, Oxford years
in
•
.
'
By the second week
SALONIKA: SARRAILS SPRING
OFFENSIVE
in February 1917 Sarrail's staff had
outlined a plan involving units from all the five nations whose
armies were serving in Salonika, a series of attacks
along a 140-mile
Upon their success depended not only Sarrail's career, but also the whole future of the front.
Salonika
front.
Alan Palmer. Left: Silhouetted
against the dawn sky, a Horace Farman and waiting cavalry
f.'.
and high-handedness had earlier
In the
week of January 1917 a top was held in Rome in order
first
level conference
to
co-ordinate
Allied
policy
over
the
and in southeastern Europe. Lloyd George and the CIGS, Sir William Robertson, travelled from London; the French Premier, Briand, and his War Italian Front
Minister, Lyautey, joined their train in Paris; the civilian and military leaders of Italy were at hand; and General Sarrail, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Macedonia, and General Milne,
the
Commander
Army, crossed and on to the
of the British Salonika the Adriatic to Brindisi
Italian capital. It was, in one respect, a momentous occasion: for at no other time in the war did the leaders of the British, French and Italian governments confer in person with the men responsible for. operations on that 'forgotten front' in the Balkans. So far as Macedonia was concerned the Rome Conference achieved little. The French were encouraged to despatch two more divisions to Salonika (although the British and the Italians resolutely refused
augment
Arrangements improved rail communications across Italy and northern Greece so as to speed up supplies from the west and thus improve the prospects for launchto
were made
their forces).
for
ing a sustained offensive against the Bulgars. But the most important consequence f the conference was a tacit vote of con>
fidence
2256
for
Sarrail,
whose independence
lost
him
the sympathy of the British and Italians (and, indeed, of many of his compatriots as well). Sarrail returned to Salonika, believing that for once he had the support of his superiors and determined to go over to the offensive at the first opportunity. The Rome Conference did not specifically insist on an attack on the Bulgarian positions in the spring; but Lloyd George in particular made it clear that if British divisions were to be tied up in Salonika, the Allied forces must achieve something more dramatic than a mere holding operation to deny the Central Powers access to the Aegean. A threat to withdraw British units to Egypt overhung all the decisions of the next five months in Macedonia. Sarrail was aware that he had won for the 'Armies of the Orient' a reprieve; the fate of the campaign and of his own career were in the balance. By the second week of February his staff had outlined a plan of operations involving units from all the five nations whose armies were serving in Macedonia. There would be a series of attacks along a front of some 140 miles. In the far west a French brigade would probe the lightly held area between Lake Prespa (Prespansko Jezero) and Lake Ohnd (Ohridsko). A joint force comprising three French divisions, an Italian division and a Russian brigade) would advance up the Crna from Monastir (Bitola) towards Prilep. The Serbs, with French and Russian support, would attack east of the river Crna in the Moglena Mountains so as to take the Bulgarian defences along the river Vardar in the rear. The British 10th and 27th Divisions would cross the River Struma (Strumica) and occupy the town of Seres (Serrai), and the 28th would make a diversionary attack along the Belasica Mountains, the southern fringe of Bulgaria proper. Ultimately the French, Serbian and Italian divisions would thrust towards Sofia through Kumanovo or Stip while the British would turn northwards up the Struma and through the Rupel Pass, which was little more than 120 miles from the Bulgarian capital. Intelligence reports and the experience of the fighting on the Crna in the previous October suggested that Bulgarian morale would crack once King Ferdinand's forces suffered a serious reverse. Sarrail and Milne had high hopes of a decisive victory.
Milne did not, however, approve of the essentially subordinate role Sarrail assigned to the British divisions. An attack in the Struma sector was not to his liking. would, he thought, be very difficult to consolidate his hold on the marshy ground around Seres during the early spring because of the rain and thawing snow. Moreover, if the offensive were to be continued into the summer his troops would be menaced by malaria, notoriously severe in the Struma marshes. Accordingly Milne proposed that the principal British effort would be a frontal assault on the main Bulgarian defences above Lake Dojran (Dojransko Jez), the key bastion of the Bulgarian position, which was more easily accessible from Salonika and which commanded routes into southern Serbia and southern Bulgaria. Sarrail duly accepted Milne's amendment to his original project and in the last week of February received approval for the proposed offensive from It
Paris. It
was hoped
to
begin preliminary
around Lake Prespa in the middle of March and to launch the main attack not later than April 15. In retrospect, it is clear that both Sarrail and Milne were over-optimistic. Sarrail was short of aircraft and of heavy artillery, and the weather in February and March was so bad that there was no
operations
prospect of an early spring, an essential precondition for success in such inhospitable terrain. Strategically, however,
was sound enough, even if assumed a degree of inter-Allied col-
Sarrail's plan it
laboration hitherto lacking in Macedonia; but the wisdom of Milne's decision to concentrate on Dojran rather than on the Struma is open to question. Milne was proposing to send his men forward against one of the most formidable natural fortresses in Europe, a succession of rocky ridges climbing more than 2,000 feet above the lake, each of them heavily fortified with infantry dugouts protected by five feet of concrete and artillery observation posts sunk even more deeply into the rock and capable of noting every movement of men and waggons up from the British railhead. On the other hand, it could be argued that once the British had succeeded in breaching these defences the whole campaign would be effectively
shortened, whereas success in the malarial swamps of the lower Struma would leave the Bulgars still in command of the
mountain ramparts guarding their homeland. Sooner or later the British would have to scale the Balkan summits if they were to penetrate Bulgaria.
Gas— its
first
use in SE Europe
for the offensive were with misfortune. The early feint around Lake Prespa came to nothing for a blizzard swept down in the third week of March and snow continued to fall inter-
The preparations beset
mittently for the rest of the month and into April. At the same time, the Bulgars sensed that an offensive was being planned and took early countermeasures, particularly in the British sector. They bombarded the ravines south of Dojran with gas shells, the first use of chemical warfare in southeastern Europe, and German aircraft were despatched on a series of raids against supply dumps and against the main base at Salonika. There was no hope of surprising the defenders; the Germans and Bulgars were so sure than an attack would be launched around Dojran that they concentrated 33 searchlights in the ten miles separating the lake from the River Vardar. With less than 12 hours to go before his men went forward, Milne was informed that a wire-cutting patrol had brought in a prisoner who had revealed that the Bulgars in the Dojran sector had received reinforcements and that they were expecting a British attack that very evening. Milne was reluctant to change the plan of operations or to delay the attack. The British were committed to launching their offensive two days ahead of the joint Allied thrust in the Moglena Mountains. Postponement at Dojran would throw out the whole timetable for the French, Serbs and Italians as well as nullifying the effect of the preparatory actions around Dojran itself. The heavy guns of XII Corps had already been bombarding the Bulgarian positions for three days, and it was hoped that they had cut a way through for the infantry to penetrate under cover of dark -
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ness. He decided to make no alteration in the timing of the offensive: the infant r\ of XII Corps would move forward at 2145 hours on April 24. XII Corps, which was commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Mai t land Wilson, comprised 22nd and 20th Divisions (veterans of the Salonika fighting) and 60th Division (London Territorials who had arrived from the Sum me in December). The 26th Division held a front a mile and a half wide, running westward from the shore of Lake Dojran; its objective was the first line of Bulgarian defences, across the hill known as the I'etit Couronne and in front of the small lakeside town of Dojran. On its left, the 22nd Division held a line some 2,000 yards long and was assigned the task of taking the western slopes of the Petit Couronne. The 60th Division was, at the same time, to relieve pressure by a raid on the Bulgarian positions near Machukovo, some six miles to the west. Even before 26th Division reached its assembly positions, the Rulgars had begun to put down a heavy barrage from howitzers, supported by a hatters' of German naval guns. Nearest the lake were the 7th Wiltshires, crouchud in the cleft known as 'Patty Ravine'. As they scrambled up towards the I'etit Couronne, they found that any gaps in the wire were covered by machine guns: all except one of the battalion's officers were casualties and so
GOC
British Salonika Army, his multinational HQ Staff Irked by the subordinate role of the British divisions in Sarrail's plan, he forced amend-
/Above: Milne,
surrounded by
ments. They were soon to prove disastrous. Opposite. Sarrail, C-m-C of the Allied Forces in Macedonia. He was acutely aware that his career was hanging on the outcome of the spring campaign, but he was optimistic
were three-fifths of the men. On their left, the 10th Devons and the L2th Hampshires had to move along the deep defile of •lumeaux Ravine which circumscribed the base of the Petit Couronne As thej pressed forward, Bulgarian searchlights threw beams directly down the ravine and shells began to explode on its rocky walls. Even when the survivors reached the Bulgarian trenches there was little hope of cover, for Bulgarian machine gun nests were staggered up the slopes of the hill. The 7th Royal Berkshires, the 11th Worcesters and the 9th Gloucesters scaled the steeper banks of the -lumeaux Ravine to the west of the Devons and the Hampshires, and, despite the constant barrage. succeeded in reaching the inner line of trenches on the I'etit Couronne, where thej fought off two counterattacks. But it was impossible to consolidate these gams and before dawn all the battalions of 26th Division were ordered to fall back across the -lumeaux Ravine. The attack had proved a costly failure, a vain exorcise in heroic courage
The 22nd Division had more
success,
because the gullies in its sector were less exposed to Bulgarian artillery fire. The 8th King.- Shropshire Light Infantry and the l.'Uh Manchesters established a hold on a number of outposts in the principal Bulgarian line. They withlargely
stood five counterattacks, but the failure
on their right prevented any further advance, since the) would have come under heavy enfilade lire from the I'etit Couronne. The 60th Division at Machukovo found their assault checked by a combination of searchlights and crossfire and never penetrated beyond the first line of Bulgarian trenches. By the morning of April 25 it was clear that the British would be able to make little impression on the Dojran defences and all the attacking forces
were withdrawn. Milne's faith in victory
Meanwhile, to the west, in the Moglena Mountains it was still snowing and Sarrail accepted the need to postpone the whole of the offensive It was left for Milne, in consultation with London, to decide if the attack at Dojran was to be renewed once the weather had improved. Sarrail himself had given up the grand objectives of February, He was no longer talking of a joint advance on Sofia but merely of clearing the enemy from the vicinity of Monastir so as to consolidate the gains made on that sector of the front
225 7
e
S
5 | a ^
I
Wearing early-pattern gas masks, a British crew fire a 2.75-inch mountain gun. The first use of chemical warfare in southeastern Europe was by the Bulgars when, towards the ^end of March and early April, they bombarded the British lines with gas shells
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November. He informed Milne that he had no intention of maintaining the offensive into the heat of summer. It would, therefore, have been possible for Milne to call a halt to all operations around Dojran or, if he wished to rein the previous
deem
the reputation of his troops after the
failures of April 24, to content himself with a raid on Seres, falling back before the malarial season in June, when the
thermometer could shoot up
to
100
F.
in the shade.
Milne, yet again, had to balance in his mind the apparent invulnerability of the Dojran defences and his own conviction
Above
German
top: Bulgarian infantry. Bolstered by divisions, they fought well In northern Greece to prevent an Invasion of their
country. Above centre:Tbe Serbian Voivode Misic and General Milne inspect a British guard of honour Sartail found that the Serbs had excellent morale, making and consolidating gains against the Bulgars. /Aboi/e. Briand, the French Premier. After the conference in Rome in early January he authorised the despatch of two more French divisions to Salonika; the British and Italians refused to augment their forces similarly. Right: Juxtaposition of ancient and modern methods of bringing in the wounded to a British hospital — the horsedrawn (a stretcher and a sedan chair) and the motorised (presented by the Queenswood School Clapham Park for service with the British army in the field )
2260 .-.
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that the Bulgars would collapse once they were forced to withdraw into their own country. There was no other military commander or political leader with such consistent faith in the certainty of ultimate victory in the Balkans. During the weeks which followed the abortive assault on the Petit Couronne Milne had further proof that Whitehall was anxious to forget Salonika. He was informed that early in June 60th Division and two cavalry brigades would be withdrawn for service on the Palestine Front. After consulting General Wilson, he resolved that before his army was reduced in strength, it
should make one more attempt to prise the Bulgars from the ridges above the lake. Once again the attack would be made at night, since the two generals held that it
*
*. 1
*v
'
was essential "for the infantry to have con* solidated its initial gains before daylight revealed its dispositions to the watchers on the Grand Couronne, the summit dominating the town. But this time the British artillery preparation would be briefer and more concentrated; and, in the hope of eluding the Bulgarian gunners, no until
two hours
after the initial assault
The
battalions which had suffered most heavily a fortnight previously were moved to quieter sectors of the front, apart from the units of 60th Division, who were again to operate near Machukovo. The line of 26th Division was manned by 77th Brigade (11th Scottish
near
Rifles,
the
lake.
12th Argyll and Sutherland High-
landers, 10th Black Watch), with the 7th Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry to their
supported by the Gloucesters and the Royal Berkshires (who had participated in left,
the earlier attack). Sarrail was notified that Xll Corps would be ready to resume their assault on the Dojran defences at 2200 hours on May 8. The decision suited him well. Now
and the Moglena Mountains, he issued orders for his own limited offensive to
dawn on May 9, Something at might be saved from the wreck of
begin at least
.
February's high hopes. The British attack was carried out under strangely different conditions from those of the previous assault. A mild night fnllr»w*iH sovoral Hnvc nf licrVif rain anH n mist drifted in from the lake. Mingling with the smoke of exploding shells the mist lay like a thick fog over the ravines and momentarily it was wrongly suspected that the Bulgars were again using gas. By contrast, the higher ground on the Petit Couronne and above was lit by a good
moon.
The mist and smoke led to confusion,
par-
on the right flank of the Patty Ravine, where the battalion commander of the Scottish Rifles was out of touch with his men soon after midnight. Telephone wires had been destroyed by Bulgarian artillery and visual signalling was impossible under such murky conditions. The Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry, who were far enough to the west to be free from mist and smoke, crossed Jumeaux Ravine with ticularly
Passing the corpse of a Bulg the Serbian Second Army moves up to consolidate its gains. They are eager to attack and only await the order', a French liaison
French, Russians and Italians began to lose their impetus, and it became impossible for the Serbs to advance in isolation. Bitterly, they blamed Sarrail's generalship 'only light casualties, reaching the lower
slopes of the Petit Couronne so rapidly that they came under British fire as well as under fire from Bulgarian trench mortars. For most of the night they were able to hold on to a section of the Bulgarian line some 50 yards up the hill; and the Gloucesters established a firm grip on the lower slopes of the Petit Couronne. Further west still, 60th Division attained more success than in the previous operation. But when the sun broke through on May 9 it was clear that the main Bulgarian defences were still inviolate and the
-> outposts gained by the British Were exposed to fire from positions higher up the hill. During the daylight hours it was impossible to dislodge the Bulgart or to protect the attackers from constant crossfire when they tried to reach the crest of the Petit Couronne. Slowly, in parties of 12, the British forward troops were brought back, running the gauntlet of No-Man's Land in the course of the afternoon. By nightfall on May 9 all the survivors were once more back in the old British line. The casualty rate was no less high than in the previous fortnight's attack: the "77th Brigade alone lost on this one night 1,700 men dead, missing or seriously incapacitated; and no more ground had been won than on April 24.
The Russians sweep through All now depended on the inter-Allied offensive west of the Vardar, in the Crna loop
and the Moglena. A successful attack here might yet threaten Dojran by an enveloping movement. But Sarrail's series of assaults went off at half-cock. At first all seemed to go well in the Crna loop. The
Second Brigade swept through first Bulgarian *lines and occupied a mountain spur over a mile beyond the main Bulgar positions. The French and Italians •on their flank made far less dramatic progress but they too were able to seize severaj Bulgarian outposts. Like the British units on the Petit Couronne, however, they came under a barrage from their own gunners through a failure in communication; and the attack ground to a rapid halt. The Russians were thus left isolated on their hillock; half of them were killed in the course of the one morning and others passed into prison camps. Resistance stiffened as German reserves from Eleventh Army were moved up to bolster the Bulissian
the
gars to the northeast of Monastir. The tragic fate of the Russians was characteristic of the confusion between the Allied commands during the first three days of the battle. Early on May 10 the Italians, supported by three companies of French infantry, launched a surprise attack at 0800 hours, the order for which
had been countermanded by Sarrail at 0730 hours. The amended instruction had never reached the Italians, apparently because (as at Dojran) Bulgarian gunners had shot away the telephone wires in a bombardment soon after dawn, and despatch riders could not get through. Casualties among the Italians were heavy and
the whole episode led to deep resentment against Sarrail. The Italians were already chafing at his refusal to permit their divisional commander to amend the Operation Order; and when on May 11 the Italians again ran into heavy fire on the same sector of the front their anger with Sarrail knew no bounds. On May 12 and May 13 the weather worsened. It rained heavily and there were several days of thick mist. By the time the weather improved again, on May 17, the German-Bulgarian defenders were at full strength and an attempted breakthrough north of Monastir came to nothing. Meanwhile the Serbian Second Army had attacked at dawn on May 9 in one of the bleakest and most remote sectors of the front, the southern spurs of the long, broken and formless ridge known as the Dobropolje, high up in the Moglena Mountains, 20 miles east of the fighting in the Crna loop. The Serbs persisted throughout May 10 and May 11, broke off all operations during the bad weather but succeeded, in the evening of May 14, in establishing a strong position on the lower slopes of the Dobropolje. Their infantry was supported by five French batteries and by two old 4.7-inch naval guns which were manned by the British and which had arrived in Macedonia little more than a fortnight previously, still bearing the name 'Ladysmith' on their sides -in an unexpected evocation of earlier conflicts. The artillery played a considerable part in preventing any Bulgarian
f 8
s
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.
an wc
2128
Above: Under British escort, German prisoners march from the front south to Salonika.
Below
left: The spring offensive in the Balkans, with the British pushes of April 24 and May 8 around Lake Dojran shown in greater detail. The offensive was a failure, costing the Allies 14,000 men in dead, wounded and prisoners. Milne blamed poor staff work, the French and Serbs blamed Sarrail, while Sarrail himself blamed the weather and the Serbs
counterattack, and Second Army was able to consolidate its gains. The morale of these troops was good. 'They are eager to attack and only await the order', a French liaison officer reported to Sarrail from the slopes of the Dohropolje on May 22. But the order never came; on every other sector the spring offensive had petered out, less than a fortnight after it had begun; and it seemed imprudent to permit the Serbian
Second
bounding their horizon. But Milne had insisted that XVI Corps would press forward only -if there were a general advance all along the front; and by the end of the third week in May it was clear that the 'Army of the Orient' would remain on the defen-
When the weather became warmer, the British and the Bulgars withdrew from the banks of the river to the foothills again, and the Struma was left .to its mossive.
Army to 'go it alone'.
quitoes,
On
the most eastern part of the front, along the lower Struma, operations which were designed primarily as a feint resulted in the occupation of a larger area of Bulgarian-held territory than anywhere else. The British XVI Corps (Lieutenant-General C. J. Briggs) had been ordered to engage the Bulgarian Second Army so as to prevent it from sending reinforcements to Dojran. The 10th (Irish) Division was to advance some three and a half miles along a nine-mile front, after four days of heavy artillery bombardment, while 85th Brigade (28th Division) was to seize two important Bulgarian outposts further north, on the left bank of the river. The terrain in this sector was completely different from the wild mountainous country of the Moglena or the succession of ridges above Dojran, for here the opposing defence lines and
command
posts ran through foothills, which were separated from each other by a
flat
valley several miles wide.
Much
of the
ground was marshy, but there were some large open fields of maize and corn, and here and there isolated farmhouses which the Bulgars had fortified. It was in this region that the Irish succeeded in establishing themselves on May 15, defying ineffectual counterattacks in which the Bulgars vainly sought to camouflage themselves beneath sheaves of corn. Further north 85th Brigade had a far harder task, but they took both the Bulgarian positions and were well placed to wheel northwards towards the Rupel Pass, a dark gap in the hazy mountain barrier
its flies
and
its frogs.
The Balkan spring .
offensive,
which had
looked so promising on paper in February, achieved nothing more than the capture of a few outposts on the Dohropolje and between Lake Dojran and the Vardar, and the temporary occupation of a cluster of farmhouses beyond the Struma. Almost every commander had a different reason for the failure of the offensive to come to the boil. Milne thought in specifically military terms and was primarily concerned with what had gone wrong at Dojran; and he argued that enemy fire power had been far greater than intelligence reports had indicated. Some of the responsibility he therefore attributed to poor staff work. The Italians blamed Sarrail, whom they accused of taking decisions from headquarters far distant from the battle area and of ignoring the advice of
commanders who were
better conditions. The Serbs, in general, agreed with this complaint. Sarrail himself blamed the weather and a subordinate French commander divisional
acquainted
whom
with
local
he considered
ally disloyal.
to
He was
have been person-
also highly critical
of the Serbs for having allowed political considerations to induce a military reorganisation at the end of March which weakened the Serbian First Army and thereby contributed to its inactivity in the
very days when the Serbian Second Army was doing so well among the southern spurs of the Moglena. There is, of course, no simple explanation for the failure of the offensive, but there were two lessons for
future; an inter-Allied offensive in Macedonia needed a supreme commander
the in
whom
had
faith; and,
all
the national contingent by some means, the el
had to be recovered U^tffl the Bulgars and
of surprise if
prevented from ma preparations aro; which the Allies inten In all, some 14,000 Allied^ killed, seriously wounded it taken pris durin« the offensive. The two night attacks around Dojran on April 24 and May 8 accounted for almost a quarter of the total battle casualties of (he British in Macedonia during the three-year campaign. By the standards of the Western Front these figures were not exceptional, tragic though they were. But, as the 'Westerners' in London and Paris were never tired of pointing out, Salonika was a 'sideshow', justified only if it brought dramatic consequences at little cost in men and material. Six British divisions and 150 merchant ships were involved in the Macedonian campaign; and after the failure of the spring offensive, there was a powerful pressure group in London, headed by the CIGS, which wanted only a token force left in the Balkans to hold Salonika itself. All the old doubts and suspicions which had been temporarily allayed by the Rome Conference returned, and the future of the whole campaign was as uncertain as ever. Further Reading Cyril. Military Operations: Macedonia, The Official History (HMSO 1933) Owen, H C Salonika and After (London 1919)
Falls.
,
Packer. Palmer, 1965)
C Return
Sarrail,
Gen
to Salonika (Cassell 1964) The Gardeners of Salonika (Deutsch
,
A..
M Mon Commandement en .
Orient
(Paris 1920) Villari, L..
The Macedonian Campaign (London
1922)
[For Alan Palmer's biography, see page 60.]
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engagement was 'conducted with singular lack of
and was to have considerable repercussions on U-Boat warfare in the Mediterranean. skill'
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dreadnought enters Taranto's inner harbour
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ALBANIA
^%,,!*Valona
:
^Otranto
Throughout 1917 the Adriatic remained the key to the U-Boat war on shipping in the Mediterranean. Cattaro (Kotor), some 140 miles above the narrow Straits of Otranto, was the main U-Boat
rA \ -
base, while farther north, at Pola (Pula), lay the as yet virtually fleet. A few U-Boats still operated from Constantinople, emerging through the Dardanelles into the eastern Mediterranean, but extensive minelaying from the tip of Gallipoli to the Anatolian coast was making their passages increasingly hazardous. Almost the entire threat to Mediterranean shipping came from Cattaro. The presence of three Allied navies in the Mediterranean made any measures of co-ordination and common doctrine extraordinarily difficult. The great inland sea was divided into 11 zones, of which the British naval authorities were responsible for four, the French for four, and the Italians for three. Differing command structures, national pride and the language barrier all contributed to a lack of cohesion in the application of Allied sea power, producing a situation in which the U-Boat attack on shipping flourished. In the rest of the oceans, the violent American
undamaged Austrian
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reaction to the torpedoing of the cross-Channel steamer Sussex had forced Germany to modify her first 'unrestricted' U-Boat warfare, but in the Mediterranean, where few American ships sailed, Germany felt it safe to continue her sink-at-sight policy. Shipping losses in that sea continued to mount alarmingly. As around the British Isles, the system of protection of merchant shipping was based on the ineffective method of patrol of routes. Important ships, such as troop transports and ammunition carriers, sailed singly escorted by a destroyer, but too often this arrangement broke down when such a ship passed out of one national zone into another. As an example of this lack of co-ordination, the Italian troop transport Minas, bound from Italy to Salonika, was torpedoed in one of the British zones in February with the loss of 870 lives. An Italian destroyer had brought her to the western limit of the British zone, but no British destroyer was there to continue the escort because of a misunderstanding in the British headquarters in Malta. Great faith, contrary to all the evidence, was placed in the net barrage across the Straits of Otranto which was designed to stop
J
Opposite page. Top left: The Otranto net barrage, supported by 120 net drifters and 30 motor launches, across the Straits of Otranto — a large sieve through which U-Boats could pass with relative impunity' Top right: A British motor launch, part of the Otranto Flotilla. Built in 1915, it had a speed of 19 knots, and like the Italian motor launches it was painted in diagonal stripes so that it should not be mistaken for a U-Boat — however, it was so conspicuous that U-Boats could easily avoid it. Bottom: British drifters at anchor, Taranto harbour.
Armed
with a six-
pounder gun and fitted with hydrophones and depth charges, they formed part of the flotilla engaged in net sweeping against the Austrian and German submarines. This page. Above: An Italian motor torpedo boat, the MAS 57. Displacement: 1 1 tons Length: 52 feet Beam: 8 2 feet. Armament: One 47-mm, one 6.5-mm machine gun, plus six depth charges. Power/speed: 400 hp/ 24 knots. Crew: Eight. Launched in 1917. Below: The Novara (of the improved Spaun class), one of the three Austrian cruisers which attacked the Otranto Barrage on May 14/15, 1917. Displacement: 3,500 tons. Length: 424 feet Beam: 42 feet. Armament: Nine 3.9-inch, two 12-pounders, plus four 17 7-inch torpedo tubes. Power/speed: 25,000 hp/27 knots. Armour: Belt 2' 2 inches, deck 3>4 inch 1
V.
f 221W
the passage of the U-Boats from their base at Cattaro into the Mediterranean. This faith echoed that held in Britain in the similar Dover Straits barrage, again in spite of all the evidence to the contrary. Both, in fact, were really no more than large scale sieves through which the U-Boats were able to pass with relative impunity. Since its inception at the start of 1916, the Otranto Barrage had caught but two U-Boats, the Austrian U 6 and the German UB 44, out of the hundreds of passages made. The Otranto Barrage consisted of 120 net drifters and 30 motor launches, all equipped with depth charges to be dropped on any U-Boat which ran into thQjiiets. All these small ships carried a gun, but in no single case mms the gun as large or efficient as the In the Dover Barrage, the drifters^ gun mounted in the U-B were reinforced by destrO; fciNvhose function it was td U-Boats to dive deep so ^ey should become ta nets, but this the A lay in the ItaJ Italian
Com
'm
operations^*
ilk
K*6ar-
rage normally lay at anchor at Taranto, proceeding to sea only if the drifters signalled for assistance. At first the Italian authorities had not permitted the motor launches to be out at night in case they were mistaken for U-Boats, but this difficulty had been overcome by painting them in diagonal stripes. An unforeseen result of this was that they were now so conspicuous that U-Boats had no difficulty in avoiding them.
The Austrians
strike first
A
three-power conference to discuss measures for a more successful approach to the U-Boat and shipping problem was convened Corfu on April 28, and among the subjects discussed was a offensive strategy in the Adriatic. The Italians were not >ared to consider any big ship operations while the Austrian
was
still at
Pola,
and seemed
to
have
little
stomach
J Allied
Submarine Diving Patrol
Area
Advanced Destroyer Force: Northern Day Limit
Brmdisi
Advanced Destroyer Force: Night
Otranto Vv
watn«
avglel
W
*
for
any
othe^ form of offensive operations. It seemed that none of the Allies was prepared to move alone against the Austrians, and none was prepared to act in co-operation with another in trying to tempt^t^^kjistrians out for, full scale battle. The mere fact of
r.
limit
3 destroys
Trawlers and drifters
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The combat of May 14/15.
Opposite page. Top
left:
A ranging shot goes wide. Top right: The three Austrian cruisers which raided the Otranto Barrage, the Novara, Saida and
Helgoland.
Below: The Novara, making a lot of smoke, fires her forward guns. This page. Top left: Destroyers rush to shield the Novara, her steam supply damaged by a shell from the Dartmouth (which in turn was hit by a torpedo from the UC25).
Top
right:
The Novara
(centre) limps
Austrian ships at Pola, even though inactive, was enough to paralyse all Allied naval initiative in the Adriatic. Yet the Austrians were not entirely inactive, and even as the Allied conference was in session in Corfu, they were planning an offensive operation against the Otranto Barrage. There had already been four small scale attacks, on March 11, April 21 and 25, and May 5, but none of them had amounted to anything. Now a more ambitious operation was being planned. The net drifters were to be attacked by three cruisers, and a simultaneous operation was to be carried out by two destroyers on the Italian transport traffic approaching Valona (Vlone), near the eastern end of the barrage. Two U-Boats were despatched to lay mines off Brindisi, with a third patrolling the exits, in case Anglo-Italian forces could be drawn out by the attack on the drifters. The whole operation was timed for the night of May 14/15. The first to strike were the two destroyers, the Czepel and Balaton. An Italian convoy of three ships, escorted by the destroyer Borea, was approaching Valona when, out of the darkness, the Czepel and Balaton fell upon them. The Borea's main steam-
home
pipe was severed by the first shell fired at her, and she was disabled and left sinking. Of the three merchant ships, one loaded with ammunition was hit and blown up, a second set on fire, and the third one hit. The two destroyers then steamed off northward. Meanwhile the three cruisers had passed through the barrage before turning back to attack the trawlers. Although Admiral Acton, the Italians' Commander-in-Chief, had some Intelligence of a movement by the enemy and had in fact sent out four French destroyers under the command of Captain Vicuna in the flotilla leader Mirabella, to patrol north of the barrage, he had failed to warn the drifters that enemy operations were suspected. As a consequence, the three Austrian cruisers, Novara, Saida and Helgoland, were thought to be friendly ships, and allowed to pass unchallenged. It was not until the easternmost group of drifters heard the gunfire of the attack on the Italian convoy that they had any indication that enemy ships were out. Eaca Austrian cruiser took one-third of the line of drifters and began^lowly and systematically, to destroy the barrage. The drifte^Jwere hailed as they were approached and ordered to
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abandon ship. In those cases where the crews obeyed, they were taken prisoner before their ships were sunk; where they did not do so, they were engaged at point-blank range by the 4-inch guns of the Austrian cruisers. There were some scenes of great gallantry, of which that of Skipper Joseph Watt of the drifter Gowan Lea was perhaps the most outstanding. The Nouara was sighted at a range of 100 yards and Skipper Watt, ignoring her orders to abandon ship, turned the Gowan Lra towards her at full speed, firing her one 57-mm gun. When the gun was put out of action by a 4-inch shell, the crew Bel to work to try to repair it. Again the drifter was hit, a box of ammunition on deck exploded and took off the leg of one of the crew, but still the men worked on, trying to repair their tiny gun. Finally the Novara passed on, confident that no drifter could have survived the hammering that the Gowan Lea had received. Even when the cruiser was out of sight, the men of the Gowan Lea were still working on their gun. For his gallantry in this action, Skipper Watt was awarded the Victoria Cross. Forty-seven drifters were out on the barrage that night, and when the Austrian cruisers had finished their work, 14 of them had been sunk and three seriously damaged. Of those that escaped to the north, several made signals reporting the attack, but no one at Brindisi read them. The first that Admiral Acton knew of the action was when the shore station at Valona reported hearing the firing of the destroyer attack on the Italian transports. His first action was to order the Mirabella, with the four French destroyers (now reduced to three through mechanical trouble in one of them), to steer to intercept. His next was to go on board the British cruiser Dartmouth and order such ships as were ready to proceed to sea. First away were the British cruiser Bristol and two Italian destroyers. The Dartmouth, with two more Italian destroyers, followed about half an hour later. A third light cruiser, the Italian Marsala, with two more destroyers, sailed from Brindisi three hours after the Dartmouth. Although the Austrian cruisers had completed their action against the barrage before Admiral Acton's ships had left Brindisi, they still had further to go to reach Cattaro than the AngloItalian ships. By steering to the northeast, the Dartmouth and her consorts could well cut them off and bring them to action. So far, of course, Admiral Acton did not know of their presence in the area; he had sailed his ships only on the information received from Valona. It was only two hours after sailing, when he received a signal from the Mirabello that she was in combat with three cruisers, that he was able to learn the strength of the enemy force. But even with the benefit of the signal from the Mirabella he was not yet in possession of the full facts, for he had no knowledge of the presence or the position of the two destroyers which had attacked the convoy. In fact, these were now about half-way between him and the Austrian cruisers, some 40 miles SE. Captain Horthy, commanding the three Austrian cruisers, was similarly placed. He knew the position of the Mirabella and her three destroyers because they were in sight, but he had received no reports of Admiral Acton's force. Horthy turned to engage the destroyers, but the action was broken off when one of the two Austrian destroyers, the Czepel, sighted the cruisers and destroyers from Brindisi and reported them. First blood went to the Austrians. Admiral Acton sent in his destroyers to deal with the Czepel and Balaton. In a long range gun duel a shell from the Czepel hit a boiler in the Italian Aquila and brought her to a stop. The two Austrian ships then made off at high speed and finally reached Durazzo (Durres) in safety. The crippled Aquila brought the two main forces into contact. Admiral Acton, thinking that the Austrian cruisers were to the north of him was actually steaming away from the Aquila, but fortunately smoke was just then sighted from the south. It came from the Austrian ships, which were closing in on the Aquila to finish her off*. At once, the British and Italian ships reversed their course and arrived just in time to cover the crippled Italian ship and bring Horthy's ships to action. Horthy was now in a difficult position. Ahead of him was the Brindisi force of two cruisers and four destroyers, with, as yet unknown to him, another cruiser and two destroyers (Marsala and her escort) still to the west. Astern of him was the Mirabella and her three French destroyers. There was nothing he could do but settle down to fight his way out of the trap. Almost at once his ship, the Helgoland, was hit on the bridge by the Dartmouth. It was not a decisive hit though it killed Horthy's second-in-command and damaged the Helgoland's communications system. To open the range, and also because he was becoming worried by the Mirabella and her three destroyers astern of him, he turned away towards the north-west. In fact, he need not have worried, for the Mirabella was now a spent force. She had
2272
been forced to stop by water getting into her fuel tanks. At the same time one of the French destroyers was also experiencing trouble with her steam condensers, and was also brought to a standstill. The two remaining destroyers decided to stay with their consorts to guard against possible attack by U-Boats. So far as the main action was concerned, they played no further part. The two main forces, now more evenly matched, continued to fire on each other, but the Bristol which had not been in dock for a long time and thus had a foul bottom, began to fall astern, leaving the Dartmouth to bear the main brunt of the action. A splinter from one of her shells wounded Horthy, and the command of the Helgoland passed to one of her lieutenants. Another shell from the Dartmouth hit the Novara and damaged the steam supply to her main engines. The situation was beginning to look promising for the Allied squadron, but Admiral Acton now decided to slow down to allow the Bristol to catch up. By the time she had done so, the Austrian cruisers had drawn ahead and there now seemed little chance of catching them. The situation, however, was in fact a good deal more promising than it looked, though the true position was not fully apparent to the Italian admiral. The Novara was slowing down as a result of the Dartmouth's hit and was soon to come to a complete stop. The third Austrian cruiser, the Saida, had fallen some distance astern of the other two, and Admiral Acton saw a chance of cutting her off and driving her down onto the Marsala and her two destroyers which, having left Brindisi some three hours later than the other ships, were now approaching the scene of battle from the south. The Saida was heavily engaged by both the Dartmouth and the Bristol, but was not so badly hit that she could not continue her course. It was at this moment that the Novara came to a stop, and Lieutenant Witkorocski, who was commanding the Helgoland after the wounding of Horthy and the killing of her commander, ordered the Saida to take her in tow. This was seen in both the Dartmouth and the Bristol, and it seemed that the fate of these two ships was sealed. But even as Admiral Acton turned to a closing course for the kill, smoke was sighted to the north, which soon revealed itself as coming from a large cruiser and five torpedo-boats which had sailed from Cattaro on receipt of a signal from Captain Horthy that he was being engaged. Feeling that the odds were now too heavily weighted against him, Admiral Acton broke off the action and set his course for a return to Brindisi.
Two of the Allied destroyers were now in tow; the Aquila, which had been hit by the Czepel, and one of the French destroyers which had broken down. Both reached Brindisi in safety. But the day was yet to end badly for the Allies. While she was still some 40 miles from Brindisi, the Dartmouth was hit by a torpedo from the minelaying submarine UC 25, one of the three sent by the Austrians to patrol off Brindisi before the start of the operation. At one time the Dartmouth was in danger of sinking, and her crew was taken off by the attending destroyers, but in the end she was saved and finally reached Brindisi the following day in tow of a tug. This, however, was not the end of the Allied discomfiture. One of the French destroyers which had been ordered out to assist the Dartmouth struck one of the mines which had been laid by the UC 25 and was sunk. This small engagement, conducted with singular lack of skill, was to have considerable repercussions on the conduct of U-Boat warfare in the Mediterranean. One immediate result of the whole operation was that the Italian Commander-in-Chief came to the conclusion that it was impossible to defend the net drifters on the Otranto barrage during the hours of darkness; they were therefore withdrawn each night, leaving the Straits unguarded against the passage of U-Boats into the Mediterranean. This, of course, was a counsel of despair, and the figures of tonnage losses rose to new heights. The average of monthly loss was more than doubled during the second quarter of 1917 compared with the first. It was not until July that the Italians felt themselves able once again to provide naval support for the drifters on which the maintenance of the barrage rested. And even that, of course, was not the real answer to the problem. The whole conception of trying to deny the passage of U-Boats by a barrage was wrong, whether in the Straits of Dover or in those of Otranto. The real wonder of all these vast and costly operations in trying to close such stretches of water was the continuing faith in their efficiency in spite of vast and conclusive evidence to the contrary. Further Reading Naval Staff Monographs, The Mediterranean 1917 (Copy Library, Ministry of Defence) Chatterton, E. K., Seas of Adventures (Hurst & Blackett 1942)
[For Peter Kemp's biography, see page 52.
\
in
the Naval
\
1
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1
1
The Italian Trentino Offensive, June 1917 ^a
In the
summer of 1917 the Austrians
seemed poised to launch an offensive in the Trentino — to sweep down the foothills of the Alps into the Venetian plains. The Italian Chief-of-Staff, Cadorna, thought
it wise to eliminate he could resume his attacks on the Austrians along the
this threat before Isonzo.
When the material support
expected from France and Britain failed to arrive, Cadorna should have
abandoned his plan. He did not. Kurt Peball. Above: An Italian heavy artillery train in the
Alps
1917, despite ten battles on the the Italians had been unable to make any significant gains of terrain or to force a strategic decision in their favour. Cadorna, however, still hoped to launch
By June Isonzo,
successful offensives on this front, especially with the increased supply of arms, equipment and soldiers expected in the
future from Britain and France. One of the preconditions for such a vie-
*<
tory was, in Cadorna's opinion, to eliminate first the threat against the Italian army in the Trentino. There the Austrians were still
holding
in
a
continuous
line
the
positions in the Lessinic Alps round Monte Pasubio and in the area of the central Vallarsa, taken after their offensive in May and June 1916, and looked ready to start a new offensive into the Venetian plains. A further consideration of Cadorna was
the idea that a victory in the Trentino would enhance the prestige of the Supreme Command which had so greatly suffered by its lack of success, not the least in the Trentino. In this area, after all, it had been impossible to inflict on the Austrians any decisive damage during the attacks in the autumn months of 1916 and the winter of 1917. It had been impossible
reconquer Monte Kempel dominating the Assa Valley north of the Asiago Plateau, the northern slopes of the Posina Valley, or Monte Col Santo dominating the Italian western flank. Everywhere the Austrians had built up well their advanced positions, although nearly all their supply lines were situated within range of fire of the Italian artillery and their positions were only weakly manned due to the loss to
An eyrie in the Alps guarding the boundary of the
Empire Below: Primitive
living quarters for an Austrian unit on the Trentino front
•
manpower on the other Austrian fronts. The Italian plans for an offensive in the Trentino began in December 1916. The offensive was to be launched in spring 1917 on a wide front between the Cima di Maora in the north of the Asiago Plateau and Monte Corno at the north-eastern edge of of
the lower Vallarsa valley. Two armies were to take part. In the area of the Vallarsa valley units of First Army (Conte Pecori(jiraldi) were to attack, while a new army was to go into action on the Sette Comuni. This new army, Sixth Army, was formed of XVIII Corps, positioned in the Val Sugana, and two corps positioned on the Arsiero and Asiago Plateaus, XX and XXII Corps. XXVI Corps was also included under its command. This army was to launch the main attack under the command of Lieu-
tenant-General Mambretti. In spring 1917 it was decided that the focal point of the offensive was to be the conquest of the heights of Monte Kempel on the Asiago Plateau. The operative idea in this action was that after the success of the main thrust and the loss of their dominating mountain position, the Austrians would be compelled to withdraw their forces on both sides of the Assa Gorge and the central ,Assa Valley. The action was to be accompanied by an attack across the Assa between Roana and Forni. Later, Above. General Cadorna. An autocrat and a martinet, he quoted with approval the maxim — The superior is always right, especially when he is wrong'. It came in useful after the Trentino offensive Below: The disastrous Italian offensive of June 1917
Right: Field-Marshal Conrad von Hotzendorf (studying map) with his staff. His hatred of the Italians was fanatical. Below right: Machine gun emplacement of the Austrian 11th Infantry Regiment. The Italians used gas in their bombardment of the Austrian defence
npigoletti
Lepo! Height 207:
Mt.
FornoA
Attacks June 16
Costa Alta*
29Div
16th
-
18th
25
ELEVENTH
ARMY
III
Corps
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XIV c^a/pSO
orovere Asiago
25 Div
Mt. Santo IPOSfOg
Posing
DIVISIONAL BOUNDARIES
v-
Detachmen\ 32 Oiv
CORPS BOUNDARIES
ARMY BOUNDARIES ITALIAN FRONT LINE
SIXTH XXIX Corps
ARMY
(Mabretti)
ATTACKS JUNE 10 AUSTRIAN FRONT LINE
V \Corps FIRST
ARMY MILES
(Pecori- Giraldi)
OKMS
2276 J128
OVER 6500 FEET 5000 6500 3200 5000 1600 3200 650 1600 UNDER 650
;
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the Austrian positions at Monte Pasiibio were to be stormed by units of First Army, and Monte Col Santo was to be conquered. The Austrians would thus be forced to withdraw their front line to the Lavarone and Folgaria Plateaus.
4
h#sfh _
Cadorna's plan
is
'watered down'
Cadorna's plan was based on the expectation of support from the Allies. Yet in early spring 1917 it became clear that he could not expect any help before the summer, and the Trentino plan had to be 'watered down'. To begin with, however, Sixth Army received continuous reinforcements from the middle of March. In particular, crack troops
— Alpini and Bersaglieri — were constantly sent from the other Italian fronts. Gradually the army was reinforced with artillery. Due to heavy snowfalls during the winter and spring, and the occurrence of the Tenth Battle of the Isonzo between May 12 and June 5, the offensive in the Trentino had to be postponed until June. At last, at the beginning of June, ten Italian divisions, equipped with 1,500 guns and mortars of all calibres, were concentrated on the Asiago Plateau on a sector less than nine miles wide. This sector consisted, especially in the north between the Cima di Maora and the two summits of Monte Ortigara and Monte Zebio, of extremely difficult terrain.
These
normally
bare
and barren
crests and slopes had been transformed into a moon landscape by repeated offensives. The spearhead of the Italian attack was to be on the right wing of Sixth Army
against
the area Ortigara-Monte Forno.
XX
Corps (Montuori) had been increased 35 battalions, of which 20 were Alpini and three Bersaglieri. Towards the south — between Monte Zebio and the Assa Gorge — XXII Corps joined up. It had a strength of 39 battalions, including three Bersaglieri. Along the southern border of the upper Assa XXVI Corps with a strength of 24 battalions linked up. XVIII Corps, which stood north of Val Sugana and thus not in the immediate area of the offensive, was ordered to keep 51st Infantry Division ready as a reserve. According to the plan, XX Corps was to break through the Austrian positions and to occupy the entire northern edge of the plateau from Asiago to Cima Portule. XXII Corps was to push forward up to the eastern edge of the lower Galmarara. Feint attacks were to be started by XVIII Corps in Val Sugana and by XXVI Corps across the lower Assa. Facing the Italians were units of the Austrian /// Corps (von Krautwaldi belonging to Eleventh Army. From the Sugana to the Assa Valleys were 6th and 22nd Infantry Divisions, and linking up with them towards the south in the area Roana-Forni was the Gruppe under Colonel Vissodich. The strength of 111 Corps amounted to only 42 battalions. Of these, 21 battalions were to
in position shortly before the Italian attack,
seven were on the march and 14 stood ready as reserves. The artillery of the corps was relatively weak — 400 guns of mostly
medium and
light calibre.
At the planned
focal point of the Italian
Austrian positions ran from the south over Monte Campigoletti (6,854 offensive, the
2277
to the eastern edge of the Ortigara feel (heights 6,906 feet and 6,794 feet) along the Porta Maora, and then to the west of the Val Maora, the so-called 'Caldiera Position' at an average height of 6,500 feet, finally sloping down towards Monte Civaron (3,386 feet) and towards Val Sugana. The area chosen for the breakthrough by the Italian XX Corps was occupied by only two Austrian brigades. Of these 3rd Battalion of 57th Infantry Regiment stood at the Porta Lepozze in the 'Caldiera Position' between height 6,585 and height 6,729. The two summits of Monte Ortigara were occupied by 20th Sharp-Shooter Battalion, while 7th Sharp-Shooter Battalion was positioned on Monte Campigoletti. The Commander of the Army GroupTirol, Field-Marshal Conrad von Hotzendorf, had drawn the attention of the Austrian Supreme Command to the threat of a strong Italian attack in the Trentino and had asked for the corresponding reinforcements. However, due to the tense situation on the Isonzo where the Tenth Battle of the Isonzo had taken place, his request could not be complied with and no reinforcements could be promised. At the same time the commanders of the Army Group were becoming ever more aware of the extent of the threatening danger: Until June .9, observations and information had provided us with a fairly elear picture of the intentions of the enemy, records the official Austrian General Staff Report after the war: Numerous deserters reported almost unanimously that the attack would start at the latest on June 12, between the border of the Empire and the Asiago. Extensive newly-formed camping sites, large camp fires, a very busy nocturnal motor vehicle traffic behind the front of the enemy, the driving into position and trying out of numerous new batteries, and the starting i
of the Italian air barrage on June 6, were unmistakable signs of the coming events, which in addition were supplemented by the reading of wireless messages. The issue of the Italian Order of Attack to all corps commanders of Sixth Army, discovered in the same way, conveyed an idea of the extent of this planned, large-scale enterprise. Nonetheless, the final planning stage and the beginning of the offensive were illomened for the Italians. The material support expected from Britain and France had not come. The attack had thus to be confined to the area occupied by Sixth Army, and the planned flanking operation on
Monte
Pasiibio
had
to
be abandoned. Thus
the whole offensive took on the character of a limited enterprise, confined to limited aims, and in fact should not have been started at all. Yet, as the preparations for the offensive had already progressed so far,
Cadorna seemed
to persist in
an 'attack
any price' spirit in spite of everything Almost like a bad foreboding, a tactical mishap occurred before the offensive had properly begun. At Monte Zebio (5,837 feet) a large mine had been placed under the Austrian positions near the Casara (the alpine dairy chalet) Zebio. It was meant to explode during the preparaat
else.
tory artillery fire as a surprise for the Austrians. Due to some carelessness it exploded in the afternoon of June 9 just at the time when the Italian Catania Brigade took up its position in the area. The unit lost 22 officers and 100 men.
Bitter hand-to-hand fighting On June 10 at 0515 hours in heavy mist, the Italian artillery began to bombard the Asiago Plateau and the long planned Trentino offensive started. At first, however, it was impossible to give the artillery fire a definite direction. Until 1100 hours visibility was almost at zero because of the mist. The Austrian positions were nonetheless almost completely covered by the fire of the guns and the mortars, and partly by gas shells. In a short time the Austrian battle emplacements were almost completely destroyed. Soon the Austrian artillery positions, the roads leading to the positions, the reserve stores and the sites of the Austrian higher command behind the front were under the fire of the Italian artillery.
The
Austrians
had
already
suffered heavy losses, especially 20th SharpShooter Battalion in the Ortigara position which lost a third of its forces as a result of the bombardment.
When
towards 1000 hours the mist began
slowly, the first Italian assault troops left their positions. Their attacks, however, could not achieve a breakthrough.
to
lift
They encountered strong defensive fire from the Austrian positions. Again and again the Italian assault troops attacked in continuous waves. Again and again they were thrown back until at 1200 hours Italian success began to build up at the Ortigara position. The 8th and 9th Alpini Groups under General di Giorgio succeeded at last in advancing up to the zones which were 'dead' ground to the Austrian guns. From there they began, at 1400 hours, their assault on heights 6,794 and 6,906. The Austrian 20th Sharp-Shooter Bat-
which was stationed there, was waiting for reinforcements. These were already on their way: 3rd Battalion of 59th Infantry Regiment was ascending the northern slope of the Ortigara but had been discovered by the Italian artillery and could advance only in groups under the heavy bombardment over a terrain which was almost devoid of cover. After heavy losses they reached the Ortigara positions only in the late afternoon by which time the position talion
had been assaulted by wave after wave of the Italian troops. In a bitter struggle involving hand-tohand fighting, the Austrians succeeded in holding the Ortigara position at height 6,906. The Alpini, however, surrounded this position in the north-east after they had stormed height 6,585 in hard hand-tohand fighting, and also late in the afternoon took the northern part of the summit of the Ortigara (height 6,794). A breakthrough through the Porta Lepozze behind the Austrian positions on the OrtigaraCampigoletti sector appeared imminent. However, the Italian command was not in control of the attack. There was a lack of unity in the direction of the attack so that by the evening of June 10 only the right wing of XX Corps with 8th and 9th Alpini Groups (de Giorgio) had achieved a success. In the centre of the corps, 1st and 2nd Alpini Groups under General Cornaro had not been able to ascend further than the slopes of the Ortigara and the Campigoletti. The situation was similar in the other areas of the front. The left wing of
/Above/Austrian dead laid out after a battle. Below: Panorama of the Asiago plateau, looking south from the foothills of Monte Ortigara
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vidual assaults and artillery attacks were These were to help to make the newly-won positions battle proof and to prepare a base for further attacks. This was a great tactical mistake. If a new attack had been launched in the early morning of June 11, the Austrians would probably have retreated before the numerical superiority of the Italians, and the position Lepozze-Ortigara-Campigoletti would have fallen into Italian hands. But by his decision Cadorna escalated the
to be carried out.
'attack at any price', which had been forced through during the preceding weeks under this guiding motif, into the 'tragedy at any
— the
struggle for Monte Ortigara, one of the bloodiest battles ever fought for a mere mountain, chosen by a whim of fate to become the Golgotha of the best Italian troops of the war, the Alpini. During the nights between June 11 and June 13 the Austrians were able to reinforce their front line. The reinforcements were given orders to hold the present positions at any price and to retake the lost positions by June 14 at the latest. However, as the reserves could be brought forward only slowly and were continuously disturbed by Italian attacks, the counterattack was postponed until June 15. The concentration of reserves involved great difficulties for the Command of Army price'
Group
XX Corps had not achieved more than penetration in a few places of the Austrians' first line. Fierce Italian attacks against Monte Dorole, Monte Interotto and Camporovere were repelled partly by the Italian barrage fire and partly by handto-hand fighting. Also the Gruppe under Colonel Vissodich in the upper Assa Valley had achieved only a local breakthrough at Rotzo, and this was easily cleared up by at
the Austrians.
A
great tactical mistake
The element
of surprise in the offensive
had thus disappeared. The strong resistance of the Austrians and the loss of more than 6,700 men by the Italian XX Corps moved Mambretti Lieutenant-Ceneral
(Commander
of Sixth
Army)
in the late
hours of the evening of June 10 to try to persuade Cadorna to end the offensive. The latter, however, was not prepared to make such a decision. After a long discussion he agreed merely to a recovery period of two days for the troops in the area of the attack. During this time, however, indi-
Tirol.
Field-Marshal von Hotzen-
dorf had requested immediately after the beginning of the offensive that his front should reinforce with reserves from Fifth Army on the Isonzo. The Supreme Command had refused his request with the comment that 'a partial attack of ten Italian divisions on the Asiago Plateau' was 'no reason to worry' and did 'not justify' a transfer of forces from the Isonzo to the Trentino. The Army Group Command should try to manage with the reserves at its disposal. Yet very little was at its disposal. Nevertheless, 23rd Sharp-Shooter Battalion reached the Ortigara front on the eve of June 14. Two battalions were taken out of the Assa position of the Gruppe under Colonel Vissodich. These three battalions and 4th Battalion of 27th Infantry Regiment formed the reserves for the attack. The Command of the Army Group Tirol had only 15 more battalions as reserves for the entire front sector of the Army Group between the Ortler and the Gailtaler Alps. Of these reserves only 2nd and 3rd Battalions of 1st Emperor's Rifle Regiment in the area of the central Assa Valley were near the battle area, at the disposal of Third Corps. At the same time troop transfers were taking place on the Italian side. On June 12, XX Corps replaced 8th and 9th Alpini Groups (di Giorgio), fighting in the
sector, by a brigade of 10th Infantry Division. However, this replacement was long delayed, and was then suddenly stopped by the Austrian counterattack of June 15.
Lepozze
Complete surprise This counterattack took place at 0230 hours after a short preparatory bombardment by the artillery. It took the Italians entirely by surprise. The Austrians had put three and a half battalions into the Lepozze sector, but because the terrain over which the attack took place was largely unknown to the officers and soldiers of these battalions, the surprise inflicted on the Italians could not properly be exploited. It is true that the Austrian assault patrols succeeded immediately in penetrating the Italian positions on height 6,794, but here the attack slowed to bitter hand-to-hand fighting with the Alpini battalions. During this struggle the Austrians were again pushed out of their positions and had to retreat to their starting line after a loss of 1,000 prisoners. An Italian counterattack followed at dawn. The Austrian positions at the Ortigara and at height 6,729 were again entirely
covered by heavy artillery fire. Then followed wave after wave of the assault attack. Again and again, throughout the whole day, the Italians assaulted the two Austrian positions and were always thrown back. When in the evening the attacks were stopped to rescue the wounded, both sides had suffered losses of more than 6,000 men each. On both sides a regrouping of
had become necessary. Italians were planning a further attack on the entire front between the Porta Lepozze and the Assa Gorge. Again the main thrust was to be carried out by forces
The
XX
Corps. Reinforced by a Bersaglieri regiment, 52nd Infantry Division was to storm the Ortigara position, and 29th Division, as before, was to push forward against the area surrounding Monte Forno. In 52nd Division two assault groups were formed. The group on the right (four battalions) was to take height 6,729 and the height of the Porta Lepozze Ridge behind it. Then the main force (11 battalions) was to take the summit of the Ortigara (height 6,906). The three battalions of the second assault group were to prevent the Austrians on Monte Campigoletti from interfering in the struggle for the Porta Lepozze and the Ortigara. Both attacking groups were very well equipped. The Austrian defence was four times weaker, comprising only nine battalions, of which merely four were immediately at the front, to counter the attack of the 35 Italian battalions. On June 18 at 0800 hours the Italian artillery began the preparatory fire for the
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attack. Until noon the firing was accelerated and developed into an intense bom-
bardment. The Austrian positions were again completely covered by the bombard-
ment and destroyed. The focal points of the
fighting were, as expected, the Lepozze positions and the two summits of the Ortigara. There the heavy bombardment by the Italian artillery continued throughout the night of June 19. The Austrians were holding firmly on to hardly visible trenches in the rocky The two Austrian battalions had soil. suffered so many losses through the heavy Italian bombardment, lasting for 20 hours, that the remaining forces could no longer resist the mass assault of the Alpini which started on June 19, at 0600 hours. The first to succumb to the superior strength of the Italians were the Emperor's Sharpshooters at the eastern front of the Ortigara. From here the Alpini surrounded 3rd Battalion of 14th Infantry Regiment, fighting at the northern edge of the mountain, and forced it to surrender. With the conquest of the main summit of the Ortigara (height 6,906) a wide gap had been created in the Austrian defence line. The 1st Battalion of 14th Infantry Regiment had, however, succeeded in holding height 6,729. The 7th Sharp-Shooter Battalion had equally succeeded in holding the positions between the summit of Monte Campigoletti and the south-western slope of the Ortigara. Thus the Italians were prevented from thrusting further forward to the west. They were met by machine gun fire in the flank from Monte Campigoletti and by frontal machine gun fire from the slope of Cima Dieci. Under the protection of artillery fire the Austrians tried immediately after the loss of the Ortigara positions to bring in reserves for counterattack. However, these had a already suffered such heavy losses on their march over terrain almost devoid of cover that they had to be withdrawn and were brought forward again only after dark.
Again the Italian attack, like the previous attacks, had been undertaken with only half the required gusto. Also, a mistake in the direction of the fighting prevented the tactical success of the conquest of height 6,906 becoming a wider success. General Como Dagna Sabina, Commander of the Italian 52nd Infantry Division, had intended to continue the attack against the Austrian Campigoletti positions immediately after his troops had completely conquered the Ortigara. Yet, complete misjudgment of temporary advantages, the Commander of XX Corps gave the order to cease the attack and merely to defend the conquered positions against any counterattack. The launching, on the next day, June 20, of a massive Italian aeroplane attack on the Austrian communication lines in southern Tirol did not alter the fact that the Italian attack on the Asiago Plateau had long since passed the peak of its strength and had been halted by the defending Austrians, who had better control of the terrain and were better led. In the aeroplane attack 5| tons of explosives had been dropped by 145 aeroplanes. The Austrians had only 26 aeroplanes, including three fighter planes, to put against this large formation which included 61 fighter planes. Meanwhile the Austrians had been able to bring two battalions of reinforcements to the area of the Porta Lepozze and the in
2280
Campigoletti positions during the night June 19, and Field-Marshal Conrad von Hotzendorf again requested further reinforcements on his front. This time they were promised. of
The 'Ortigara Tragedy' By June 24 the Austrians had seven talions
and three companies ready
bat-
for the
reconquest of the lost Lepozze-Ortigara positions. A total of 60 light, 31 medium and heavy guns and 12 mortars were at their disposal. The attack was to be made on June 25. Only experienced mountain troops were chosen for the attack itself for they had to make frontal attacks in groups. They had to proceed divided in three detachments and make staggered attacks. The detachment furthest to the north consisted of ten assault patrols of 1st Battalion of 1st Emperor's Rifle Regiment and of half a battalion of 57th Infantry Regiment. It had to storm height 6,794 (Lepozze). The central detachment consisted of seven assault patrols, two and a half companies of 3rd Battalion of 2nd Emperor's Rifle Regiment and of half a battalion of 57th Infantry Regiment. It had to take the main summit of the Ortigara (height 6,906). The southern group consisted of six assault patrols. These were to thrust forward from the positions on the northern slope of Monte Campigoletti at the rear of height 6,906. During this attack the lost positions were to be taken in one continuous action. The artillery received the order to start at first with a concentric bombardment of the Italian positions and then to lay a barrage on the plains inter-
spersed
with
gas
shells,
gassing
give
up height 6,585
after bitter hand-toretreating to the northeastern slopes of the Porta Maora. Thus the Austrians had reoccupied this bitterly contested area which had been theirs before the beginning of the Italian offensive. The offensive in the Trentino, planned by the Italians on such a large scale, had ended in disappointment. Indeed, in view of the losses suffered, the result was a catastrophe. The 'Ortigara Tragedy' had cost the Italian Sixth Army a total of 913
hand
fighting,
and 22,823 soldiers killed in action, wounded, missing or taken prisoner. Of these, 12,735 were suffered by the Alpini battalions alone which formed part of 52nd Infantry Division, fighting on a front of only a mile and a quarter. Austrian losses were 251 officers and 8,577 soldiers. Of still greater importance on both sides was, however, the morale element. For the officers
Austrians the failure of the Italian offensive on the Asiago Plateau meant a great respite for the Army Group Tirol. On the Italian side; however, the unsuccessful offensive was a deep shock to the morale of the troops, and the name of Monte Orti-
the
most important batteries. On June 25, at 0230 hours the bombardment of heights 6,794, 6,729 and 6,906 was started by the Austrian artillery as a surprise attack. 'Behind the wall of fire the assault waves made their way to the wire entanglement of the enemy and started to destroy it', records the official Report of the Austrian General Staff: 'When the range of the fire was increased at 0240 hours, the assault patrols broke into the Italian positions on Monte Ortigara. The continued thrust against the eastern edge of the heights led into trenches and dugouts which were overcrowded with reserves. Many hundreds of Italians who had suffered considerable losses by the massive barrage laid down their arms because the continuing artillery fire made any retreat impossible.' At the crack of dawn, however, the assaulting Austrians, who had hardly begun to settle down again in their old positions, suffered heavy losses by counterfire from the Italian artillery. In particular on height 6,794 the losses of the Austrians reached 50% of the strength of the occupying battalions. Yet, when seven Alpini battalions tried to storm the lost positions in the evening, they were repelled with heavy losses. The same fate was suffered by a later attack on June 26 at 0300 hours. The Italians finally ceased fire in the Lepozze sector in the early hours of June 26 and withdrew to the Porta Maora. The Austrians achieved the conquest of height 6,585, situated in the Porta Maora, a few days later. During the night preceding June 30, a company of 10th Battalion of 14th Infantry Regiment succeeded in descending unnoticed from height 6,794 and surprising the Italians, who had to
gara became, for the soldiers on the Italian fronts between the Ortler and the Isonzo, a symbol of futile death and took on the form of a slogan for the defeatist tendencies in the Italian army which, from the middle of 1917, began to be a cause for serious worry to the Italian Supreme Command. Further Reading Cadorna, L, La guerra alia fronte italiana, 2 Vols (Milan 1923) Corselli, R., La grande guerra, 2 Vols (Bologna 1942) Faldella, E., La grande guerra, Vol battaglie dell' Isonzo, 1915-1917
1
:
Le
(Milan 1965) Silestri,
[For
M
,
Isonzo 1917 (Turin 1965)
Dr Kurt
page 935.]
Pehall's
biography,
see
Above: The Pomilio P series of two-seat fighter and reconnaissance aircraft was one of the several excellent designs to emerge from Italy during the First World War The original version, the PC, entered service early in 1917, and was superseded by the model illustrated here, the PD, during the summer. The PD s chief advantage over the earlier
was
enhanced stability, but it was soon replaced by the PE The P series served with 30 squadriglieoi the Italian air force. Engine: Fiat A- 12 inline, 260 hp. Armament: two 6.5-mm Revelli machine guns (one fixed and one flexible). Speed: 1 14 type
its
definitive model, the
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a
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.
prelude to passchendaele
To follow up the British offensive at Arras Haig planned a large-scale action in Flanders. Lloyd George feared a bloody campaign but the British cabinet gave its grudging
The Capture of Messines Ridge
assent. Major-General Anthony Farrar--Hockley. Below: Messines ridge under shell fire
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Every war throws up
its
legends. Perhaps
the principal legend of the First World War for the British is Passchendaele. With the passing of time since 1917, the facts about the Third Battle of Ypres and Passchendaele have become distorted extravagantly. Thus we are now told that the war cabinets in London and Paris were against the venture from the start; in reality, at the outset, they approved it. It is said that the French high command were opposed to it at the time of execution; in fact they were willing to support any action undertaken. Recollections are quoted and figures published to show that the mud and weather were the worst, the casualties the highest of the war; yet analysis shows that there was at least
as severe weather, more deep mud and a higher list of casualties on the Somme in the previous year. Yet, if recollections are faulty, it must be remembered that the majority of the men drawn into the Third Battle of Ypres had been engaged in the Somme campaign, so that before they entered the formidable struggles of 1917 their moral and physical reserves had been drawn on deeply. The burden of hardship
was cumulative. Just before the New Year of 1917, Lloyd George succeeded Asquith as Prime Minister in London. His declared aim was to get on with the war by winning it; for Germany had effectively quenched hopes of a negotiated peace in 1916 by making it
clear that Belgium and the substantial tracts of France occupied by the Kaiser's armies were to be regarded as bargaining
But when the new Prime Minister means of winning, he shrank from the prospect of costly offensives on the Western Front. Hence his early predilection for the indirect approach through the Balkans; his interest in the slight prospects of the Italian Front; and assets.
came
to consider the
his readiness to believe the imaginative and eloquent Nivelle when he promised to win the war for France and her allies in 48 hours by means of a scientifically prepared, technically executed offensive. After a degree of chicanery, much discord
and hard bargaining, a formula was agreed
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by which the British and Dominion armies under Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig should operate under Nivelle's command. The plan was that Haig should open operations on April 8, Easter Sunday — an opening (Hist [toned in the event to the following
day — when his First, Third and Fifth Armies should attack along a 40-mile front north and south of Arras. It was expected that an attack of this magnitude would quickly draw in the German reserves. A week later, Nivelle would launch three French army groups across the Aisne and in Champagne. In response to Haig's proposal to switch the British effort to Flanders if there was no breakthrough on the Arras front, Nivelle told his staff that it was 'a matter of no importance. The remaining (German) reserves will have been sent to the area of decision (the Aisne/ Champagne) so that the British will be able to break through wherever they wish'. Though Haig was not confident of the French plan he was not altogether untouched by Nivelle's profound belief that it would break open the German line. He too began to speak of 'a chance to return to a war of movement'. At the end of the previous year, he had resuscitated his early plans for an offensive in Flanders, but thinking in terms of his own breakout he now insisted that General Plumer, commanding Second Army in the Ypres salient, should make them more enterprising: a grand strategic movement as distinct from a short term tactical advance. What was it that attracted Haig so powerfully to Flanders? From the British Commander-in-Chief's viewpoint, it had strategic advantages as a sector of operations. The trenches ended on the sea, an open flank which the Royal Navy still had the means to dominate in Belgium. Not only could warships provide heavy supporting fire for land operations — as they had done in 1914 in support of the Belgian army — but they could cover and disembark a force of troops. In preparation for operations, much work had been done
*^9
by Plumer in the preceding year, particularly in developing communications and in mining beneath the German defences. There were also logistic advantages: the British supply ports were close at hand; the railways were largely controlled by British movement staffs when elsewhere in France British rail movements had often to wait on the nod of GHQ. Then there were maritime interests. As early as 1915, the Royal Navy had sugthe desirability of clearing the Belgian coast so as to retrieve the ports of Zeebrugge and Ostend. From these small harbours, German coastal craft and submarines set out to raid Allied shipping in the Straits of Dover and the North Sea. By the end of 1916, shipping losses were so great that any means of reducing them was of high importance. The War Committee of the cabinet noted on November 23, 1916, that 'there is no measure to which the Committee attach greater importance than the expulsion of the enemy from the Belgian coast'. Haig knew the ground in front of Ypres better than any other sector on the Western Front. During the final phases of open warfare in the autumn of 1914, he had served there as a corps commander with distinction. He had ridden repeatedly over much of the ground held now in strength by the enemy. He did not need maps or photographs to help him visualise the country when his original plans were brought back to his desk early in 1917. gested
The search for an original plan The
original author of this plan was General Sir Henry Rawlinson, who had been detailed to prepare a scheme of operations in February 1916. His draft was
a poor sketch of possibilities. Then the planning staff at took it up, devising six stages of operations, including a diversionary attack at Neuve Chapelle, to the point of breakout. The main task was to capture the Messines-Wytschaete ridge, south of Ypres, and then progressively to
GHQ
extend over this high ground north-eastward. In securing it they would break through the three main defence lines of the Germans and, this done, a force on the coast would advance from Nieuport to Middelkerke to link up with the divisions put ashore by the navy. At a rough estimate, a force of 60 divisions was envisaged operating over two or three weeks continuously. This was the plan used at Second Army headquarters by Plumer and his Chief-ofStaff Harington, as they made ready during the spring and summer of 1916 for a Flanders offensive. When Haig was obliged to discard the Flanders sector in that year for the Somme, they continued the work as best they could with a much reduced force of men, putting the infantry into mining under engineer supervisors. When winter
came, Haig asked Plumer to suggest any changes in the plan extant or, if he wished, to propose a new plan. He was given a limit of 30 to 35 divisions, less reserves. General Sir Herbert Plumer was an infantry soldier, a plain man in character who had made his way in the Service by hard, painstaking work. 'I do not care for slackers', he would say often, but he was indulgent with subordinates who made honest errors. Charles Harington, known as Tim, had a quicker intelligence and a sharp sense of humour. The two men complemented one another. A special planning team had been appointed at GHQ which was also to devise and prepare a plan for the breakout in Flanders and the clearing of the coast. Lieutenant-Colonel C. N. MacMullen and Major the Viscount Gort were the officers concerned. They began work on January 8. It was made clear to them that they should not consult General Plumer or his staff as it was hoped that they might produce 'original ideas of your own' — the words of the head of the Operations staff at GHQ. When Plumer resubmitted his plan at the end of January, Haig felt that it was 'altogether too cautious'. He asked Rawlinson to comment on it but gained
from this second opinion; both Army that there would be too little room behind and below the city of Ypres to assemble the assault divisions and to mass the artillery for simultaneous attacks north and south with a central attack to link them. Dissatisfied, Haig turned to the ideas of his planning team to which he added his own. When MacMullen and Gort had completed their work, they were instructed to show it to Plumer and Rawlinson and to 'record their comments but not to incorporate them in the little
Commanders agreed
The only result of this consultation was agreement by Plumer that they might plan'.
carry the crest of the Messines- Wytschaete ridge and the crests north to Hill 60 on the first day with lesser numbers— 12 instead of 17 divisions. Haig said they should go for the slopes beyond as well. With that, MacMullen and Gort's plan became the plan of operations. These studies had continued into March. In April, first the British, then the French attacked in accordance with Nivelle's scheme. North of Arras, the Canadians took Vimy Ridge in an epic action: their British comrades exploited an early tactical surprise on the river Scarpe. To the south, Australians and British had to fight a bitter action to get into the Hindenburg Line. But neither the greater nor the lesser success of these actions touched Nivelle. Despite some interference and, latterly, the reservations of his government, he continued to express complete confidence in the immense artillery fire about to be released on the Germans as a prelude to his infantry assaults. By the end of the month, his confidence, like the greater part of his armies, was shattered. Appalled by their losses, infuriated by the continued egotism of their chief, Nivelle's immediate subordinates turned on him in his office, shouting accusations, heaping abuse on him. He staggered out into the garden like a drunken man and, to all intents and purposes, out of his command of the French armies on the Western Front. Petain, the
Right: Australians in a trench on Messines ridge. The men in Plumer's Second Army knew that they were better looked after than most others and responded with affection and loyalty. Below: Crater made by one
underground mines exploded by the British at the beginning of the battle of Messines ridge, June 7. According to official British sources British. Australian and Canadian tunnelling companies laid 24 mines underthe German lines on
of the 19
the ridge during the year preceding the battle The tunnels ranged from 200 to
2,000 feet in length and the mines were placed at depths of from 50 to 100 feet. Of the five mines which did not explode, two were discovered by the Germans and three were not blown since they had not been placed on the front of the subsequent attack
dour
came
and stubborn saviour of Verdun, in his place.
While
this final crisis in the
Command was
French High
approaching, but after it was certain that the great offensive had failed, the Allies met in Paris on May 4 and May 5 to review strategy. For the long term, the delegates- were cheered by the knowledge that the United States had entered the war on the Allied side, but it was known that months must pass before America could put a military force of any size into the field. Immediately, the British confessed in private their anxieties at the continuing rise in shipping losses; losses which forbade any question of their mounting a major offensive in the Balkans. For this and other reasons, Lloyd George was now convinced that it would be imstill
any decisive assistance to Italy. Nonetheless, he told the conference, they could not let Germany remain unpractical to give
assailed so as to overwhelm either Italy or Russia: 'The enemy must not be left in peace for one moment ... we must go on hitting and hitting with all our strength.' But conscious of France's difficulties on the Western Front, he reminded them that "it will be no good doing so unless the French do the same. Otherwise, the Germans will bring their best men and guns and all their ammunition against the British army, and then later against the French.' There was agreement that the chief commanders must decide where and when to attack. It was commonly said by the French delegation that France would continue to mount offensive actions during the year, but Lloyd George, astute and acutely sensitive to the mood of a meeting, had doubts. He began to take soundings so that Petain, meeting him in a corridor, remarked, 'I suppose you think I can't fight?" 'No, general.' said Lloyd George, 'with
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The guns
of Passchendaele
Left: British 12-inch
Mark 3
rail
howitzer,
an enlarged version of the 9.2-inch howitzer. Range: 14,500 yards (accurate to within 10 yards of target).
Maximum elevation:
120° right or
45°. Traverse:
Weight of shell: 750 lb. Muzzle velocity: 1,475 feet per second. Thirtyfive Mark 3 howitzers were built and 138 left.
12-inch howitzers of all marks. Total number rounds fired by all marks -227,000
of
Right: Field artilleryman in shirt-sleeve order. He is wearing the regulation grey-blue shirt and riding breeches and carries one tool of his trade, a knife for picking stones out of horses' hooves. His boots and leggings, ideal for use in the Flanders mud, were issued to some field artillery units in 1917 but were
withdrawn
in
1918
Below: British 12-inch Mark 9 railway gun. Only four of these guns were built. The first and second had a maximum elevation of 30 and a range of 28,000 yards The third and fourth had a maximum elevation of 35%* and a range of 33.000 yards The traverse of both types was T Weight ot shell: 850 lb Total weight of gun and carnage: 152 tons The
Mark 9 was combined with one 9 2-inch gun to form a siege battery, manned by four officers and 67 men. The four Mark 9 guns fired a mere 5,000 rounds throughout their use in France
1
your record, I couldn't make that mistake, hut I'm certain that for some reason or other you won't fight.' On May 7, Haig called his army commanders to Doullens. 'There is an end to uncertainties concerning the summer,' he began. The French offensive had achieved a limited advance only, he told them, so that the plan of co-operation was at an end. 'The objective of the French and British will now be to wear down and exhaust the enemy's resistance by systematically attacking him by surprise. When this end has been achieved the main blow will be struck by the British forces operating from the Ypres front.' The fighting in front of Arras would be sustained to deceive and
wear down the enemy Russian forces would
and mounting the same aim.
Fit rich, Italian
also be
with they must actively prepare to capture the Messines-Wytschaete ridge by about June 7 and begin the next phase in Flanders some weeks later. They were now committed to the Third limited
offensives
Meantime,
Battle of Ypres.
Two
modifications should,
however, be remarked. First, Haig had decided to secure the Messines-Wytschaete ridge as a separate operation. A close reconnaissance had shown that the centre ground between the northern and southern sectors was too wooded and broken for a tank attack. It seemed preferable to capture the ridge well before the main offensive so as to clear the rear areas for the large number of assault troops engaged in it; to capture the high ground on what would become the boundary between the two sectors; and to concentrate the whole of the artillery support well in advance. Second, (lough had been selected to command the northern sector in preference to Rawlinson. Perhaps Haig feared that
Plumer and Rawlinson were
insufficiently
bold for the type of operation he had in mind. Whatever his reason, Rawlinson was allotted the narrow coastal operation between Nieuport and the beach, and the landing from the sea, to take place immediately behind the German lines about
Middelkerke.
Haig now received a number of uneasy letters and telegrams from Robertson, the CIGS. Russia was collapsing as an active ally and the evidence from Paris continued to suggest that 'at the back of the French mind there is a strong desire to avoid casualties, and after all that is only
Above: Aerial view of the River Yser and surrounding countryside. The ten days' artillery bombardment prior to the main attack destroyed the surface drainage of the battlefield which, with the autumn rains, soon
became
a quagmire 'too thick to swim in and not thick enough to stand in'. Below: German pill-box on Messines ridge,
destroyed by British
another way of saying that they do not want to fight. The Cabinet are quite consistent in the desire to support our views as to the necessity for continuing a real offensive action, but at the same time they are equally desirous of the French doing their share.'
artillery
The French mutinies To
settle matters,
May
Haig went
to
Amiens on
18 to meet Petain. The new French Commander-in-Chief said candidly that there was unrest in his armies but he repeated his intention to carry out the agreement made in Paris. He would not join in an Allied attack towards St Quentin and Cambrai but he had four offensive opera tions in preparation, two of which would be mounted quite soon: at Malmaison on June 10, at Verdun at the end of July. Haig gave him a resume of his own plans which Petain said were too ambitious, well beyond their understanding of a limited offensive. Nonetheless, it was clear that the British must ^o on attacking and he would give every support he could. Immediately, he could agree to relieve only 8,000 yards of the British trenches in the south, but the French divisions in Belgium should co-operate in the battle at Ypres Haig described his colleague that night in his diary as 'business-like, knowledgeable
2288
might have been better if he had; for some months to come he remained uncertain as to whether the French could maintain even an effective defence. The dilemma, then, was this. The campaign in Flanders relied at least upon some degree of offensive action by the French sufficient to menace the German line. If Haig accepted that they could not do this, he would cancel the offensive and the summer would pass uneventfully. In these circumstances, the Germans would
to a line Hooge-ZandvoordeWervik. Meantime, he ensured that the Gheluvelt plateau on the ridge had adequate troops and artillery support. Plumer had planned to exploit his triumph at Messines as soon as he could shift his artillery forward — a task undertaken tidily and quickly in two days. But Gough, now in charge of the line to the north, demurred. His patrols had reported the strongest reaction to any attempt to
assuredly begin to probe to discover why the Allies were inactive during the campaigning season. Would they not then discover the weakness of the French army and take advantage of it? Yet if, to avoid such an outcome, Haig launched the offensive, the danger was, in Lloyd George's words, that 'the Germans will bring their best men and guns and all their ammunition against the British army'.
high ground. They did not need the low ground, he said: better to attack the Gheluvelt plateau deliberately as a part of the next major operation. Even if they succeeded in pushing some way forward on the high ground, he would find himself with a salient on his flank, most vulnerable to an attack during the weeks of preparing to assault. Haig agreed and thus unwittingly gave Crown Prince Rupprecht a breathing space.
A
lost
Messines
dust upon them. The supporting artillery fire, meticulously planned and registered, suppressed almost entirely the enemy guns. There was some random fighting for the German second line and, in the confusion, a number of the attacking battalions
were shelled by their own
artillery.
The
Germans
counterattacked. The action little. But the confidence of Second Army and the strength of their newly won heights was such that by June 14, they had driven the Germans completely off the Messines-Wytschaete ridge and also had captured to the north the area of the railway cutting where ultimately they would make their junction point with the northern sector of attack. The German commander of the northern army group in north-east France and Belgium was still Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria; von Kuhl remained his Chief flared
and brief of speech. The latter is, I find, a rare quality in Frenchmen!' The head of the military liaison mission with the French was General Sir Henry Wilson. During the remaining days of May, he sought to discover the precise nature of Petain's plans for offensive action and
became increasingly convinced that they had been shelved. On June 2, Petain's Chief-of-Staff, Debeney, came to give a frank explanation of their position to Haig: a substantial proportion of the French army had mutinied. At best, his Commander-inChief would be able to persuade the soldiers to return to their trenches to defend the line but there could be no question of an attack on June 10 at Malmaison. This dreadful news was passed to Haig on a promise of complete secrecy. The question arose, should the Field-Marshal tell t,he cabinet?
Very
little
is
known
of
what went
through Haig's mind at that time. He told few of his staff— not more than half a dozen officers — that numbers of French soldiers had actually refused to obey orders, though as time passed it was generally
recognised
GHQ
at that the French army was in a state of 'unrest', it was 'unreliable', 'not willing to fight'. Indeed, it seems likely that Haig did not know the details of the matter himself. It
for
of-Staff.
a
Though
it
close
up on the German positions on the
Now
opportunity
ridge operation was so close that Haig decided to let it go on and, for the time being, to say nothing to the cabinet. At 0310 hours on June 7, 19 of the 20 great mines so skilfully, so daringly prepared by Plumer's engineers, exploded in 'great leaping streams of orange flame'. So great was the shock that in Lille, 15 miles inside the enemy lines, German soldiers rushed in panic into the streets. Along the Messines- Wytschaete ridge, the defence garrison in the first line lay dead or unconscious as Australian, New Zealand and British regiments of infantry advanced through the maze of moonlit
The
drawing
was
their view until
the end of May that the British threat lay along the River Scarpe, both men had been uneasy about the Messines ridge and they had proposed a withdrawal at the end of April; it was too vulnerable to a deliberate attack supported by mines. The local commanders protested that their
were impregnable. For this and other errors, Major-General von Laffert, commanding Gruppe Wytschaete, was repositions
lieved of his appointment on June 16. But this did not relieve the Crown Prince of his problems. He feared that the British were now in process of a series of operations of the Messines pattern with the aim of
driving him from Belgium. On June 19, he was expecting imminently another short attack, intense in fire support, perhaps with mine explosions, along a narrow front. If it had come, he was ready to abandon the low ground west of the Lys by with-
had
the
to decide
Commander-in-Chief whether to go on. He did not
British
hesitate to tell First Army to make their diversionary attack on the Arras front towards Lens: this was a wearing-down venture with which everyone would agree.
Further, he continued all movement and work towards the launching of Gough's army in July on to the Pilckem ridge. On the coast, Rawlinson's Fourth Army was gradually built up in readiness for the advance from Nieuport and the sea landings by Middelkerke. General Anthoine's army, the only French force which Haig was sure would attack with him, was strengthened by the addition of two divisions relieved by the British in the Nieuport sector. All was going to plan, therefore, in the military field. In London, ministers were not at all sure what the plan was: and
what they knew made them anxious. General Sir Henry Wilson reported
his
about French morale to the war cabinet on June 8 — not in order to turn the government against Haig's offensive: Wilson asserted that an offensive was necessary to keep the French in the war. But Wilson's news raised all Lloyd George's apprehensions that he was being carried forward to support a bloody campaign on the Western Front. He now returned to his idea that they should reinforce Italy, even Egypt, but was unable to rebut Robertson's claim that this would simply leave the Germans free to transfer divisions, more quickly than the Allies could do, to defeat Italy or reinforce the Turks. The Prime Minister decided to create a new cabinet committee to look searchingly at the whole matter of what fears
their war policy was to be. Hankey, its secretary, writes: 'The War Policy Committee consisted of Lloyd George, Curzon, Milner and Smuts (who had just become a member of the War Cabinet). (They) managed to hold sixteen meetings between June 8 and June 20 when the results of the enquiry were laid before a full meeting of the War Cabinet, and the final conclusions were reached.' When it came to the point of decision, the war policy committee could not reject Haig's advice; advice supported by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Jellicoe, who had said to everyone's surprise that unless Zeebrugge and Ostend were taken from the enemy in 1917. they
would
lose the war, Kisses of shipping.
due
to insupportable
Yet Haig did not promise to clear the
2289
We are the Dead. Short days ago We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow, iOved
and were loved, and now we
lie
In Flanders. fields.
MESSINES
1917
MINES AND OBJECTIVES RE FERENCE British front /me
o
St Eloi
Objectives
German positions German
Heights
divisions
*
Metres
coast; that was simply the greater aim. He promised to conduct an offensive only so long as it lay within his means, only so long as it achieved results by improving his tactical stance while wearing down the
HOLLAND
Zeebrugge
Middelkerke
2nd objective (64 mile
Nieuport
line)
^ «*
Germans. So when the cabinet somewhat grudgingly gave its approval to the Flanders offensive, it was not in the positive expectation that the Belgian coast would be cleared. And it was a belated approval; for when it finally reached GHQ, the guns were firing a preliminary bombardment for Gough's assault.
The German counterplan It was then July 25. Much had happened Ghent
in Flanders since
London
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OBJECTIVES/ PLANS
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MAY
18
1917
JULY
31
1917
Warneton
FRANCE
r.
RAILWAYS MILES
• Lille
2292
KMS
10 15
to
War
Committee on June 18. The 3rd Australian Division under Monash attempted the opening of a feint towards Lille and were doggedly rebuffed in the valley below Messines. The New Zealanders tried a similar operation also in the third week of June and were no more successful. At the end of the month, three corps of General Home's First Army attacked at Lens in the midst of a violent thunderstorm: ostensibly reopening the offensive on the Arras front. Policy
Chertken
Noordschoote*
Haig had been called
to state his proposals to the
Above: Plumer's Messines operation -a brilliantly successful limited advance, executed in a week. Fifty-three days were now to elapse before Haig's planned big push up to the Dutch frontier (left)
Crown Prince Rupprecht was
not in the
by these actions. He and von Kuhl were in full agreement that the British were preparing a major offensive least disturbed
They transferred ten divisions from the Lens-Lille sector in June and a further four in July. The Crown Prince grew impatient to mount an offensive of his own but was reminded by Supreme Headquarters that while he had adequate guns, neither he nor they had adequate artillery ammunition to do more than maintain a defence. It was then suggested in Flanders.
by the head of his operations staff that they might make a small attack on the British force— 1st and 32nd Divito the prince
sions—which had recently relieved the French in the Nieuport sector. From July 6 to July 10, an intermittent bombardment fell on the British battalions, on the wooden pontoons across the Yser, on the trenches and dugouts on the sandy beach and the sparse gun lines in rear — 300,000 shells of high explosive and mustard gas in all. At 2000 hours on July 10, 15 battalions, led by a storm unit of the Corps, assaulted towards the right bank of the Yser and quickly captured it on the seaward side of Lombardsijde, an operation which made the War Policy Committee in London wince. The Flanders front was held by General Arnim's Fourth Army. In June, an old
German Marine
opponent of Haig and Rawlinson appeared as its Chief-of-Staff, Colonel Fritz von Lossberg. He was delighted to be permitted by his army commander to redesign the entire defence system against the impending Allied attack. After a tour on foot of the trenches and an intense study of maps and air photographs, he laid out three complete zones, each 2,000-3,000 yards deep. The first zone was to be lightly held: its forward trenches were merely outposts but behind these were a series of machine gun posts covered by company fortresses, all in reinforced concrete. The second zone was primarily a series of connected forts in depth beneath which were shellproof shelters for the regimental counterattack reserves. The field artillery lay behind the second zone — the Flanders zone — ready to support the defence in the foremost two. Counterattack divisions occupied the third zone — the Wilhelm zone. Each defence gruppe (corps) had at least one counterattack division to every two divisions in the centre or forward zone. It was readily accepted that the British would penetrate to the second zone and the counterattack formations practised regularly the swift move forward to eject them at the moment when, in Lossberg's view, they would be at their weakest due to fighting to reach such a depth in the German defences. On the other side of the line. General Sir Hubert Gough had closed his four assault corps -XIV, XVIII, XIX, II, left to right — into the line. On his left was General Anthoine's First Army, north of Boezinge; on his right, south of Klein Zillebeke, was Plumer's Second. Gough had been selected by Haig for the northern operation because he had a quick, restless mind and the willingness to exploit any opening the battle might oiler. Thrice,
Haig had seen Rawlinson miss the chance of a breakthrough on the Somme. At Anns, Allenby had missed his chance. Gough, he believed, might serve him better. Hubert Gough was then 47, the youngest general in the army. He had a quick
temper but a generous heart. His staff admired him and he treated them with affection. He did not recognise that one of his principals failed often to grasp his policy and treated the corps and divisions with a brutal lack of consideration. Having been warned at the outset by Haig to be ready for swift action, Gough
was astonished to find in the MacMullen and Gort plan a steady advance with limited objectives separated by repeated pauses to gather up the artillery. He protested that each assault should seize what-
ever
it
could manage,
when they would
pause to review progress, bring up the guns and make deliberate plans for the next assault. By this means he hoped that the initiatives of the regimental officers and men would not be stifled or wasted. Haig agreed with this view. The objectives set for the four corps were therefore wideranging, extending through Arnim's entire forward zone, into the secord, Flanders, zone and, at points, into the Wilhelm zone. General Anthoine's army was to cover Cough's left flank; General Plumer's the right. On one point none of them disagreed: the key to success was the Gheluvelt plateau on the ridge, the high point on the Ypres-Menin road. Once that was seized by II Corps, the assault to the north by the remaining three and to the south by Plumer's army would be facilitated.
The men and tanks move up By the first week in July, Gough had 752 heavy and medium guns and howitzers in the line, 324 4.5 howitzers and 1,098 field guns. They outnumbered the German artillery by almost two to one. Yet this superiority did not make itself felt for many days. The German gun lines were all hidden from view; the Allied guns could not be wholly hidden. Each German field battery had two, sometimes three, separate concealed positions. When British aircraft observers reported the evacuation of a battery area it was often a voluntary as distinct from a forced removal. Until the Royal Flying Corps established superiority over the battlefield late in July, the enemy shells punished the Allied lines severely, delaying the engineers on roads and light railways, constantly breaking telephone cables. The day for zero was postponed twice and then a third time for the French, whose guns had been unable to complete registration owing to the heavily overcast sky. Good use was made of the delay by the infantry. Gough was determined not to be caught by an initial withdrawal of the enemy from his outposts. By bold and extensive patrolling, battalions discovered which sectors of the foremost line were evacuated by the Germans during heavy shelling. On the extreme left, the Guards Division found that 3,000 yards of the enemy trenches were deserted on July 27
them. The French found others close by. A German counterattack failed to dislodge them so that, at Zero Hour on July 31, they were in occupation
and
at
once
filled
of their first objective. The night after the Guards made their discovery, the assault brigades of each division marched forward to the advanced assembly areas where, in cramped, but for the most part sheltered, positions, they spent the next day resting, card playing, and writing last letters home before the battle. On the night July 29/30, they
moved forward
into the line, the assault battalions lying back in the reserve trenches. Due to careful arrangements, none of these movements were seen by German observers, and thus the tense Allied forces were not swept by heavy shellfire. Even so, the nightly programme of German harassing fire claimed a number of casualties. It might also have caused Fifth Army's chief of artillery to reflect that his counter battery work was
by no means accomplished.
On the same nights that the infantry advanced, 136 tanks crept forward to assembly positions on a close arc east of Ypres. The three tank brigades were not committed to a mass attack — and indeed it is doubtful if they could have moved en masse from this point. The shell-torn ground, the broken woods and buildings were certain to slow the clumsy caterpillars. Still, the prospect of their support in breaking in amongst the concrete defences of the German second zone was a comfort to the infantry. Each company, battalion and brigade had been rehearsed in rear on similar ground on which the enemy trenches and posts had been outlined in white tape. Company and battalion commanders had been taken through a huge model of every detail of the ground. Demonstration teams had shown methods of tackling obstacles, machine gun posts, platoon and company fortresses.
Loose formations of platoons
had practised 'fire and movement', the Lewis light machine guns covering in the rifle grenadiers and the Mills bombers. Prior to marching into the line, each battalion had shed its men to be 'left out of the battle' — three officers and about 30 men from each rifle company so as to provide immediate replacements for killed and wounded. The average strength of a battalion was 16 officers and 675 soldiers. Zero Hour was the official moment of sunrise: 0350 hours on July 31, 1917. By 0300 hours, British. Belgians. French, Australians, New Zealanders were stood to arms from the coast to the low lands south of Messmes. It was a misty morning but a light breeze from the west sprang up about 0315 hours. It was still dark at 0350 hours but the bombs fired by the engineers, the mortars and the flickering lighl of the barrage from the field guns gave some illumination. infantry climbed to latterday stories, neither officers nor soldiers were drunk, though many had had a tot of rum with their breakfast tea and sandwich, the French and Belgians a cognac with their coffee. Within six minutes they had crossed No-Man's Land and were engaged in the Third Battle of Ypres.
Quickly,
the assault
from their trenches. Contrary
Further Reading Beaverbrook. Lord. Politicians and the War, 7974-76(Collins 1966) Blake. R. (ed). The Private Papers of Douglas Haig. 1914-19 (Eyre 1952)
Edmonds.
Brig. J. E Operations in France & Belgium 1917. Vols 1-2. Official History of the War (Macmillan) Hankey, Lord, Supreme Command. 1914-18 ,
(Allen &Unwin 1961) Liddell Hart. Sir Basil, Reputations (John
Murray)
[For General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley'^ biography, see page 396. ]
2293
PASSCIIENDAELE (the soldiers' name for the Third Battle of Ypres) evokes the horror of the fighting there in August, 1917. Although casualties were fewer than on the Somme, weather and ground conditions were the worst that British soldiers have ever been expected to endure. The British barrage had churned the waterlogged ground of Flanders into a morass in which movement was scarcely possible, and the August rains compounded this blunder. John Keegan
The very name Passchendaele
Moving off behind their barrage at 0350 hours on July 31, the assaulting battalions of Second Army, which was to play a supporting role to Fifth Army, found the wire well cut everywhere in front of them and the defenders of the outpost zone either disabled, ready to surrender or already in flight. The advance was not unopposed but such opposition as the British and Australians of II ANZAC, IX and X Corps met was quickly overcome. By noon the whole
of the
German
northern
where
it
touched Fifth
Army's
front, had been occupied, in places to a depth of 1,000 yards.
But this success was a subsidiary one. It was Fifth Army's effort which counted. And its success on July 31 was mixed. Cough's left hand corps, which included the Guards, who had touch with the French First
Army
*****
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.
outpost zone, on the army's
front,
to the north, did well
— almost
were the crucial ones: the 'high' ground between Klein Zillebeke and the Ypres-Roulers railway, none of it more than 200 feet high but all of it providing the observation posts from which the Germans detected every trace of movement within the salient and the cover behind which they concentrated in safety their own reserves and artillery. It was
as well, indeed, as the French who, as at the Somme, managed to get further on this the opening day of their ally's offensive
objectives
than any British unit. The neighbouring XVIII, also achieved the German second line without too much difficulty and in places secured bridgeheads across the little river which ran parallel with the front and 2,000 yards from the British line. There were many tales of gallantry reported that morning, altogether 12 soldiers were to win the Victoria Cross on July 31, in almost every case for total disregard corps,
known that the greater proportion of the German guns was located on and behind Gheluvelt plateau, the approach to which lay across the neck of land between the
manoeuvring to outand destroy one of the countless German pill-boxes or shell-crater machine gun nests which dotted the front of attack. It was these machine gun nests which II Corps' divisions found such an obstacle,
re-entrant valleys of the Basseand the Hanebeek and was covered by the ruins of a number of woods, first Shrewsbury Forest, Sanctuary Wood and Chateau Wood, then Nun's, Glencorse, and the 'beer' woods, Bass, Stout and Bitter. None any longer bore any reIsemblance to a stand of living timber. The
for personal safety in
the
when they moved off behind their barrage towards the dawning sun on July 31. Their
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were broken down to shattered stumps and the trunks lay about on a bed of slimy bare earth and shell holes. Much of the debris the Germans had wired together, manufacturing thereby a nearly trees
impassable barrier. It was through this wilderness, defended by the front battalions of four German regiments, that the leading brigades of the 24th, 30th and 8th Divisions had to find their way, assisted in the centre (30th Division's sector) by 52 tanks of 2nd Tank Brigade. On the right the 24th Division, detailed to form a defensive flank towards Second Army, advanced easily enough on the right, getting to its second objective without severe loss, but the centre brigade was held up on the far edge of Shrewsbury Forest by a collection of pill-boxes at a point called Lower Star Post (after a feature around which thousands of officer cadets had manoeuvred in Sandhurst days before the war). Unable to get forward, it could not provide flank protection to the right hand brigade, which was forced to withdraw, while the left hand brigade, itself taken in flank by enfilade fire from Dumbarton Wood, failed to hold its first objective. This division's success had therefore to be regarded as very partial. Its neighbour, 30th, had even less success to report at the end of the day, and heavier casualties. Its commander did not start would hopefully, since he knew that have preferred to substitute another division for his. One of the 'Pals' divisions, recruited by Lord Derby in Manchester and Liverpool, it had suffered dreadfully on the
Above A
distant shell bursts on Pilckem Ridge, August Below: During the battle for Langemarck British troops move forward over shell-torn ground near Pilckem, captured from the Germans in the first day of the offensive Opposite: The first month s fighting in the
Flanders campaign Compare with Haig's optimistic plan (page 2292)
GHQ
Somme, from which its spirit had never really recovered. The misgivings of GHQ were borne out at the very beginning of the advance, when a sudden German bombardment drove one of the brigades back into its dug-outs, thereby delaying the men's start and depriving them of the protection of the barrage. It was to their credit that this brigade nevertheless recovered itself and pressed on without artillery cover through Sanctuary Wood to the crest line and captured the ruins known as Stirling Castle. But they were late in doing so, had had to be reinforced by the battalions detailed for the next phase in order to get as far as this, and were quite unable to press any further forward. The line secured was generally that of the first objective. This news did not penetrate to divisional, let alone corps headquarters. The preparatory bombardment and the creeping barrage was accordingly laid down for the advance to the third and fourth objectives and it was not until the battalions ordered to take them advanced into the rear of the first phase battalions that anyone else in the division discovered how ill they had fared during the day's fighting. Costly and unsuccessful
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2297
behind a new barrage, to go on to the second objective. That was reached soon after 0600 hours but, lying as it did on a reverse slope (to the British front line) it was under direct view of the Germans, themselves still ensconced on high ground at Westhoek opposite, who called or put
Killed (each symbol represents SOO men)
684
TIOH.cers
9.582
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down heavy artillery and machine gun fire on it. The position had to be abandoned.
Many
and delays might have been overcome had the tanks of 2nd Tank Brigade been able to keep up with the infantry. As Tank Corps headquarters had warned, however, the ground of these obstructions
was quite unsuitable
for the
employment
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of tanks and, confined as they were by the ground to movement in the gaps between the woods, they were easily spotted and hit by German shell fire. Nineteen in all
were knocked out, 17 in front of a monster pill-box at 'Clapham Junction' on the Menin Road which all efforts by British destroy had quite failed. artillery to Twenty-two others broke down or were ditched in the bad going.
Missing
Left: British and Dominion casualties, July 31 to August 25. Below: Stuck in the mudjacking and hauling a field gun, Pilckem Ridge
German defensive doctrine emphasised the necessity for counterattack, immediately by the front units affected, as quickly as possible thereafter by the Eingreif divisions if their help should prove essential. Since the British had almost nowhere occupied more than the German outpost zone, there was no reason to call the Eingreif divisions into play. On XIX Corps' sector, however, footholds had been secured in or beyond the German third line. The integrity of his defensive system was threatened and serious counterattack therefore expected. At 1100 hours a severe barrage, emanating from behind the Gheluvelt plateau, fell on the sector between the Ypres-Roulers railway and St. Julien, shortly followed by the appearance of German infantry en masse (since identified as belonging to the 50th Reserve Division, northern Eingreifdivision ofGruppe Ypres). Under their assault, the 39th Division gave way, carrying with it successively the formations on its right, each of which found itself with a flank in the air. By 1630
of XIX Corps' most advanced had been regained by the Germans and the weary British infantry had been thrust back to the line of their second objectives. Elsewhere XIV Corps held their counterattacks, and the against line French, rebounding vigorously, chased their assailants beyond the point from which they had started, thus adding to their gains for the day. During that day and into the afternoon of August 2, the Germans launched haphazard raids and
almost
all
positions
assaults of this nature but failed to alter geographical outcome at all significantly. Their first and most of their second trench lines had passed to the British. It was not a particularly brilliant result in view of all the effort expended on preparation and plans and the lives lost in the attempt (3,700 in all, with over 20,000 wounded and missing, some of the latter category properly belonging to the 'killed'). Most of these losses had been suffered, not in the assault, but during the period of consolidation, when all communication
the
%A*
had as usual been lost with the artillery, and during the German counterattacks. No cure for this loss of communication was known nor was one expected. Nevertheless it was Haig's considered decision, after visiting Gough on July 31, that the offensive should be pressed home, and that as quickly as possible. On August I his view was somewhat changed, however, by his Operations Branch, which pointed out that no advance was likely to succeed until Fifth Army, and in particular II Corps, had been reinforced by fresh divisions and until a further bombardment had been completed. Operations Branch laid particular stress on the importance of the Gheluvelt plateau, an appreciation they believed shared by the Germans, and urged that the next stage of the offensive take the plateau as its primary aim. So it was decided. But in the meantime rain had begun to fall, heavily and uninterruptedly. It had begun to fall, in fact, on the afternoon of July 31, just as the first
%
of the
^£
^
\H
German
^
counterattacks came
in, so that by the end of the first stage of the battle on August 2, the hattlefield was already beginning to take on the appearance by which it would ever afterwards be remembered. The innumerable shell holes had begun to fill to the brim with water (the water table hereabouts was only. three feet below the surface), the paths to liquefy, the trenches to collect a foot of slop at the bottom, even the pill boxes (of which a number were now in British hands) to become slimy and mud-choked at doors and embrasures. Under the weight of bombard-
ment, some pill boxes were eventually to in the semi-liquid soil until door lintels were flush with the ground, barring
settle
all access.
The bombardment had been resumed immediately after the lull in the infantry fighting on August 2. Despite the fact, however, that the British had chosen the Gheluvelt plateau as their next main objective, they did not and could not bring the total weight of their artillery to bear on the German batteries on and behind it. So superior were German observation facilities that it would have been to invite even higher casualties than those actually Buffered had the British massed any more of their guns on the exposed plain due east of Ypres.
Disappointment and intense hatred It was for resulting reasons, the inaccuracy of the preparatory bombardment and the weakness of the accompanying barrage, that the attack of II Corps on August 10, planned to secure the Gheluvelt plateau and overwhelm the German artillery positions, achieved very much less than expected. As on July 31, the infantry advanced easily enough onto their objectives, actually securing all those assigned, but as soon as German counterattacks began, they were unable to summon accurate or prompt help from their own guns and fell victim to the well-rehearsed German tactical scheme. The German counterattack barrage was so organised as to cut the forward British troops off from contact with their rear, thus denying them reinforcement, resupply or casualty evacuation. By the afternoon, the three assaulting battalions of the two right hand brigades, 7th Queens, 11th Royal Fusiliers and 7th Bedfordshire, had all been much reduced in numbers, were without food or water and were short of ammunition. But since the troops who should have reinforced them were judged not fit for the task in the circumstances, and since the commander of 18th Division wished to keep his reserve brigade intact against eventualities, it was decided to let the exposed battalions fall back further to positions in which they could be supplied more easily. Thus the brunt of the August 10 attack resulted, admittedly in the gain of a little ground on the left at Westhoek, but also in a second failure to clear up the Gheluvelt problem. Despite this disabling factor, Gough decided to press on with the extension of his gains, meagre as they were, attacking in conjunction with the French. The attack, by all four corps, was scheduled for August 14, but the onset of particularly heavy rain twice caused its postponement for 24 hours so that it did not begin until August 16. Its
outcome might have been foreseen.
On
the right, the battered divisions of
Corps once more set out across the muddy wilderness of the Gheluvelt plateau.
11
2300
The 56th Division was reasonably but that did not save
it
fresh,
from disaster on
start line, where several of its leading companies were caught by a sudden German bombardment and broken up. Others its
of its battalions did better but only isolated parties reached their objectives in and around Polygon Wood. The 8th Division, which had suffered over 3,000 casualties in the first two days of the offensive and had had only a fortnight's rest, did surprisingly well in view of this treatment, arriving promptly on its first objective. But the failure of 56th Division meant that its flank hung in the air and of this the Germans soon became aware. Bold parties of infiltrators quickly took up positions behind the foremost battalions of 8th Division and, as the situation became more
and more difficult, they were ordered to withdraw as night drew in more or less to their start lines.
divisions of XIX Corps, attackleft of II, 16th Irish and 36th Ulster, were neither fit for the task. Both had been continuously in the line since August 4 and their battalions had been reduced, by what was known engagingly as 'trench wastage', to two-thirds or even half their strength. In consequence, an observer noted, the attacking waves they sent forward were like those for a raid
The two
ing to the
rather than a major offensive. Despite that and despite heavy casualties suffered from the outset, the leading battalions pressed
on magnificently. Their task, however, was hopeless. So few were the mopping-up parties available to 16th Division that their
waves of infantry were shot down from behind by Germans emerging unscathed from dugouts and positions already 'captured'. The 36th Division was held up by wire and strongpoints which it had not tbe men to outflank. And at 0900 both divisions were suddenly subjected to devastating counterattack by the 5th Bavarian and 12th Divisions, supported by an intense bombardment. The foremost companies of the 16th Division, 7th Royal Irish Rifles and 9th Royal Dublin Fusiliers, were at that moment almost onto their objectives and went down fighting beneath the overwhelming mass of German infantry. The rest of both divisions fell back under this pressure to their start lines, onto which the corps commander decided to bring back the barrage as a precaution against the Germans pressing tbeir attack further still. On the northern flank, beyond the gaze of the German observers on the high ground, XVIII and XIV Corps again did better on August 16 than their less fortunately placed neighbours. They had also been better able to prepare their attacks, largely untroubled by bombardment, and had made such careful arrangements as siting armourers' shops far forward in order that rifles choked with mud could quickly be cleaned, and passed forward again during the course of the battle. As a result both corps gained ground, 20th and 29th Divisions advancing almost 2,000 yards to take Langemarck, scene of the Kindermord in 1914. Gough seemed not the least discouraged by the progress of the battle when visited by his corps commanders on the day following this, the third round of the battle, on August 17. He warned them to be ready for another resumption on August 25 and meanwhile ordered them to undertake
preparatory operations with the object of securing jumping-off positions. Some of these attacks, as on August 20, when seven tanks were employed, were profitable and cheap. On August 22, however, a succession of small operations all along the front resulted in heavy casualties for very little result. Both XVIII and XIX Corps took a little more ground to the south of Langemarck, certainly not worth the 3,000 casualties. On tbe same day, at a slightly later hour, II Corps made yet another attempt to establish a firm hold on the Gheluvelt plateau. The two light infantry battalions assigned, 6.h Somerset and 6th Cornwall, upheld the traditions of their regiments in the most splendid manner. After a spirited advance, during which they took numerous prisoners and secured possession of Glencorse Wood, they were prevented from advancing further but settled down determinedly to defend what they had t^iken. Under steady shelling and frequent counterattack, they were to remain out, unsupported and unsupplied, for over two days, until August 24. The outcome was a bitter disappointment to GHQ and at a conference between
Haig and Plumer on August 25
it
was
decided that the responsibility for carrying on the battle should be transferred from Fifth to Second Army. Haig, long Gough's
had wearied of his overprotector, optimistic forecasts and of his slapdash planning — though by no means before Gough's own soldiers, many of whom would long feel an intense hatred for the staff of Fifth Army. Plumer's methods, proved at Messines, did not promise to achieve a quick breakthrough. His 'step by step', siegecraft tactics would, on the contrary, win results only slowly. But they were sure. And as Haig had at last grasped that nothing could be done at Ypres until the Gheluvelt plateau had been captured, he now turned to the one man who, he could be certain, would win it for him. Later on the same day he conveyed to Gough the news that Plumer was to be given command of II Corps, with which in three weeks he would launch a major offensive. In the meantime, Fifth Army was to press its
offensive.
During the morning and afternoon of August 27, therefore, the infantry groped their way forward through driving rain, scarcely able to keep their footing in the sea of mud to which the weather and the bombardment had reduced the surface of the battlefield. Nowhere was any ground gained, though in XVIII Corps' sector 'the Germans at first showed every inclination to surrender; but on seeing the slow pro-
gress of the infantry struggling over the slippery ground, they opened rapid fire at close range'. It was an episode which aptly summarised the character which the battle
had now taken
on.
Further Reading Brig. J. E.. Operations in France & Belgium 1917, Vols 1-2. Official History of the War (Macmillan) Gibbs, P., From Bapaume to Passchendaele
Edmonds,
(Heinemann 1918) Gladden, E
N.,
Ypres, 1917 (Kimber 1967)
Gough, Sir Hubert. The Filth Army (Hodder & Stoughton 1931) Richards, F., Old Soldiers Never Die (Faber & Faber) \
For John Keegan's biography, see page 96.
]
THE DOVER PATROL With hundreds of merchant ships passing through each week, the Straits of Dover were simultaneously the Allies' artery in the First World War and one of Germany's main naval targets. They were protected by an elaborate system of nets, mines and patrols which was thought to be adequate until,
during 1917, a series of events surprised and then rocked the Admiralty, the Cabinet and the public. Paul Kennedy. Below left and right: Admirals Roger Keyes and Sir Reginald Bacon. Bacon commanded the Dover Patrol. Keyes wanted (and was soon to get) his job
At the beginning of 1917, the naval situation in the Channel was not very satisfactory from the British point of view. On two occasions in the previous few months, German destroyer forces had raided Allied communications in the Straits of Dover region at night and exposed the unpreparedness of the British naval defences there, a fact which caused much criticism of the Admiralty to be raised at home. (See Vol 4, No 62.) Nor could Vice-Admiral Bacon, commanding the Dover Patrol, expect any let-up in the long winter months, for it was learnt that the German destroyer flotilla at Ostend had been reinforced and that further raids were likely. Moreover, after the High Seas Fleet's 'fright' at Jutland, it was to be expected that more and more attention would be paid by the Germans to the Channel area, if only to convince their public that it was an active force. Finally, following the decision for unrestricted U-Boat warfare, the Germans obviously wished to weaken the British control of the Straits by destroyer attacks and thereby ease the passage of their submarines into the Atlantic. True, Bacon could count upon the assistance of as many as 20 cruisers and destroyers from Commodore Tyrwhitt's Harwich Force in addition to his own flotillas in case of need, but this superiority in numbers could not really compensate for the great strategic disadvantage of not knowing where and when the Germans would strike. The German destroyers appeared to have tremendous opportunities of hitting swiftly at Allied commerce under cover of darkness and returning to base before Bacon's forces could carry out effective counter-
measures. The Admiralty was therefore very interested to learn, through Intelligence sources, that a further German destroyer flotilla would be despatched to Zeebrugge on the evening of January 22. Tyrwhitt, reinforced by six of Bacon's destroyers from Dunkirk, was accordingly ordered to intercept this force and at 1730 hours he set off from Harwich with six light cruisers, two flotilla leaders and 16 destroyers under his command. By midnight, they were divided into three groups, with seven destroyers patrolling off the Maas and the other 11 off the Schouwen Bank, while the Commodore himself kept the six cruisers in two lines about 25 miles east of the North Hinder lightship. All probable routes were thus covered. The German force, consisting of the flotilla leader V 69 and ten other destroyers, was commanded by Korvettenkapitan Max Schultz. He elected to take the mid-Channel route and to steer south-westwards between the Schouwen Bank and the North Hinder. At 0245 hours on the 23rd, his ships were spotted by the first of the two cruiser divisions, which was led by Tyrwhitt himself in HMS Centaur. During the rather haphazard action that followed, the greater part of Schultz's flotilla managed to escape under cover of a smoke-screen and to resume course for Zeebrugge; but V 69. her helm jammed by a shell, was rammed by another destroyer, the G41, while a third vessel (the S 50) also lost touch with the division. All this was unknown to Tyrwhitt, however, who could only signal to the other British detachments that the German force had been engaged and had now scattered. At this, some of the patrols left their lines and headed to the scene of the recent action while others held their positions. By 0330 hours. the British forces were as dispersed as their German counterparts, or even more so. As a result, the hulk of the German destroyer flotilla passed through the British lines without being noticed, and readied Zeebrugge a few hours later. Schultz himself had a much harder time of it, for his V 69 encountered the second British cruiser division at 0340 hours and was raked with shell at very dose range. So convinced were the three cruisers that the destroyer had been sunk that they switched off their searchlights and abandoned firing too soon, thus allowing the heavily-battered craft to limp away in the darkness towards the Dutch coast The second damaged destroyer, the G41, reached Zeebrugge without incident hut the straggling S 50 ran into two destroyer detachments off the Schouwen Bank shortly after 0400 hours. Following some smart shelling on its Simoom with a torpedo before part, the S 50 managed to hit fleeing eastwards and then northwards, back into the Bight. At this, the action was at an end. although Tyrwhitt's forces scoured the whole region until dawn, when it was decided to sink the crippled Simoom and to withdraw. The results of this carefullyplanned 'ambush' had been most disappointing, chiefly as a result of the haphazard reaction of the patrolling detachments to the news of the first action; and not only had the Harwich Force failed to prevent the reinforcement of Zeebrugge but they had suffered more injury than they had L:iven. On the night of February 25 26, the German destroyer forces at Zeebrugge resumed the offensive again, Korvettenkapitan Tillessen's 6','/) Flotilla (six destroyers! being ordered through the
HMS
2301 ,
Straits to attack Dover while Korvettenkapitan Albrecht's halfflotilla (five destroyers) was to strike at shipping in the Downs anchorage. (The other half of this 'Z' Flotilla patrolled near the Maas lightship but had an uneventful night.) At 2230 hours, Tillessen's vessels were spotted crossing the central part of the barrage by the destroyer Laverock, which was patrolling a little south of the large light-buoy 11 A. Though his ship was hit several times by shell, Lieutenant Binmore kept it in touch
HMS
with the
German
force, firing
and manoeuvring
to
such good
effect
that Tillessen believed he had met at least three British vessels and returned to base before the rest of Bacon's forces could arrive on the scene. Albrecht's raid, too, was anti-climactic. Approaching the Downs around 2300 hours, his destroyers shelled Margate, Westgate and the wireless station at the North Foreland for some 15 minutes and then made off again, leaving two of the vessels to patrol near the Elbow buoy. Despite searches by British destroyer patrols from Dover and Deal, which had been alerted by the alarm rocket of an armed drifter, no contact was made and all forces returned to
base around midnight. Neither Bacon nor the Admiralty were
too disappointed at this: if the German forces still possessed the freedom to strike anywhere, they also seemed to recognise that the
Dover Patrol was too strong to permit anything other than swift harassing raids to be carried out.
Complacency shattered Four weeks later, the British felt less complacent about their dispositions in the Channel area. On the evening of March 17, Tillessen led his two flotillas of destroyers out of Zeebrugge for further raids upon Allied commerce. He himself was to take the seven vessels of the 6th Flotilla thivigh the barrage, while the first half of Z Flotilla (five vessels under Albrecht) took a similar course five miles further east. The remainder of Z Flotilla — four destroyers under Kapitanleutnant Zander — was to attack shipping in the Downs.
Although aware that some movement was impending, Bacon did not deem it necessary to alter the existing arrangements: four destroyers patrolled near the mid-Channel light-buoys while further detachments were on call at short notice at Dover and Deal. Thus, the 6th Flotilla enjoyed a decisive numerical superiority when it encountered the patrolling Paragon shortly
HMS
2302
before 2300 hours. Hit by shells and a torpedo, she was already in flames when the depth charges on board exploded and tore the vessel in two: only ten of the crew survived the explosion. Tillessen then waited in the area for other British warships to come up and investigate the shellings and flames: he was not disappointed. Shortly afterwards, Llewellyn was spotted, and crippled by a torpedo, before the German force steamed off. Moreover, so secretive were these manoeuvres that neither the Llewellyn nor the nearby Laferey saw the raiding destroyers. They therefore warned Bacon that submarines were active and he ordered the Dover destroyers to return to base, from where they had just emerged. Yet no sooner had the British vessels anchored again than the news was received that another German destroyer force (Zander's half-flotilla) had sunk a drifter off the Downs and shelled both Ramsgate and Broadstairs. Although the Deal destroyers were quickly despatched to the scene, it was too late: the attackers here, as in the mid-Channel action, were already scurrying back to Zeebrugge at high speed. Annoyed at this raid, Bacon and the Admiralty evolved a much closer barrage patrol system, consisting of two detachments of destroyers, but these were only to be employed on dark nights or when it was known that German action was impending: on normal nights, there was little change and Bacon was well aware of his great strategic handicap, where 'the enemy can vary the time of attack at will and choose the night. They can predetermine whether to "shoot and scoot" or to carry out a more or less pro-
HMS
HMS
longed attack.' As it was, the Vice-Admiral's pessimism proved unjustified. On the evening of April 20, the 3rd Flotilla, newly-arrived at Zeebrugge, was despatched in two groups to raid the mid-Channel commerce by its chief, Korvettenkapitan Kahle (who chose to direct operations from ashore). Unaware of this planned move, Bacon's dispositions were fairly normal with four destroyers patrolling near the barrage. However, the destroyer leaders HMS Broke and HMS Swift were also sent to cover the area southwest of the Goodwins, and it was these two vessels which fell m with Korvettenkapitan Gautier's 5th Half-Flotilla, which was looking for British ships following its rapid and inaccurate hombardment of Dover. In the wild melee which then followed Commander Peck of the Swift unsuccessfully attempted to ram B German destroyer, despite being damaged by the more numerous
r
Above and opposite: Destroyers of the Dover Patrol and the Harwich Force. The Germans wanted to weaken the British control of the Straits in order to ease the passage of their U-Boats into the Atlantic, and although Bacon could count on the assistance of as many as 20 cruisers and destroyers from Commodore Tyrwhitt's Harwich Force in addition to his own flotillas in case of need, his superiority in numbers could not really compensate for the great strategic disadvantage of not
knowing where and when the Germans would strike The German destroyers appeared to have tremendous opportunities of hitting swiftly at Allied commerce under cover of darkness and returning to base before Bacon's forces could carry out effective countermeasures
German force. Commander Evans of the Broke had more luck. After ramming the destroyer G 42, his vessel managed to repel boarders in a manner reminiscent of Trafalgar and then to fight its way clear again. Unable to pursue the other German destroyers because of engine troubles, Evans returned to the scene of his first encounter, found the G 42 sinking and proceeded to pound the nearby and almost stationary 85, although his own boilers then failed. At 0115 hours on the 21st, British reinforcements arrived from all sides and the Broke was taken in tow. Though 40 of her crew had been killed or wounded, and a further five on the Swift, the British public regarded the sinking of the two German destroyers with great delight and 'Evans of the Broke' became a hero overnight. Moreover, the Zeebrugge force now desisted from further attacks upon the Channel-Downs area and, apart from a raid upon Dunkirk on April 24 (during which the French destroyer Etendard was sunk), did not oppose the Allied control of the Straits at all.
G
Massive attack needed The months of May and June
1917, therefore, saw the British forces themselves going onto the offensive again. Already, on the night of March 7, a force of coastal motor-boats under Lieutenant
Beckett had attacked German destroyers as they left Zeebrugge during an air-raid, torpedoing one of them. Within a few months, however, more decisive action against German submarine bases along the Belgian coast was considered very necessary by the government, in view of the critical state of the Allied struggle against the U-Boats. Bacon was particularly anxious to cut the canal line between Bruges and Zeebrugge by destroying the locks at the latter-named port, and he had worked out how this could
be done by prolonged shellfire from a force of monitors stationed Unfortunately, the weather conditions required for such a tricky operation (a correct tidal direction along the coast, no low clouds to prevent the aircraft spotting for the ships, no morning mists over the target and correct wind direction to maintain the smoke-screen laid around the monitors by the supporting vessels) were fairly rare, and it was cancelled three times due to this. The morning of May 12 promised better things, however, and Bacon's mixed force therefore set out from Dover for the Belgian coast just before midnight on the previous evening. This operation was a particularly complex one indeed. While two cruisers and 12 destroyers from the Harwich Force gave general cover, the bombardment squadron itself came from Bacon's command and consisted of some 41 ships and launches, including three squat monitors equipped with 15-inch guns, which were to shell the lock gates at a range of some 13 miles. Since this bombardment was to last 85 minutes, destroyers and launches had to provide a constant smoke-screen to conceal the monitors from the formidable 12-inch guns of the Knocke battery; and fighter cover was arranged for the ships as well as for the spotter aircraft. During the night, the exact position of the target was established by the destroyer Lochinvor, by the ingenious method of steaming directly from the bombardment buoy mark up to the Zeebrugge mole and obtaining the true bearing of the off thi' coast.
HMS
latter.
Early morning haze prevented Bacon's monitors from opening almost 0500 hours, by which time the spotter aircraft was running low on petrol and was soon forced to depart. Nevertheless, the ships kept up an accurate fire ami saturated the target area with 250 shells. By 0600 hours, a tremendous aerial dogfight was taking place over Zeebrugge, and the Knocke battery was beginning to open fire. Believing that the lock gates had been badly damaged. Bacon ordered a return to base However. later photographs revealed that the gates had miraculously escaped being hit, although 19 shells had landed within 15 yards of the target. Zeebrugge's usefulness to the Germans as a destroyer and submarine base was thus unimpaired. Nothing daunted. Bacon busied himself with plans for destroying the dockyard area of Ostend, from where the U-Boats also operated. Following repeated postponements as a result o( unsuitable weather, the bombardment force set out at 2200 hours on
fire until
June
4.
Although only two monitors were
to be
employed on
this
occasion, the covering forces were rather larger: besides the usual close escort of destroyers and launches, two groups of cruisers and destroyers from Harwich were on the spot to guard against German interference. In the event, this proved to be a wise precaution, since a number of German destroyers were patrolling off Ostend that night. In
HMS
Lochinvar found it impossible to take a bearing from the harbour mole because of their presence, and the bombarding position of the monitors was established by dead reckoning only until Ostend cathedral was sighted. Further north, Tyrwhitt's force encountered two German destroyers at 0230 hours on the 5th and drove them back to Zeebrugge under heavy shell fire. One vessel, the S 20, was so badly damaged that it gradually lost speed and was overwhelmed by the British destroyers. Soon afterwards, however, Tyrwhitt noticed further German forces to the south and abandoned the chase of the remaining destroyer, which was fleeing towards Zeebrugge. Bacon, too, despatched part of his escorting force to cut off the retreat of the second group, but no further encounters occurred. At 0.300 hours, the monitors anchored off Ostend and commenced shelling the dockyard area. The German shore batteries quicklj responded and, despite the smoke-screen, Bacon's force was repeatedly straddled, although no ships were hit. In contrast, the monitors were presented with a somewhat easier target and managed to land 20 of their 115 shells in or near the dockyard. Some small vessels there were sunk and several German destroyers damaged, but the port was in no way put out of action. What was needed was successive bombardments of that sort, but this was rendered impossible by the peculiar conditions of the tide, wind and visibility which these operations required. Nevertheless, something had to be done to close these bases and to prevent the submarines from using the shorter Channel exit. By mid- 191 7, the U-Boat campaign against Allied shipping was very fierce and the Flanders flotillas had been responsible for almost one-third of the mercantile sinkings in spring. Forcing these submarines to operate from German bases would probably not have prevented them from continuing to wreak havoc with British commerce but it would have reduced their effectiveness. In any case, the situation was so bad that any scheme offering prospects of cutting the extent of the sinkings was eagerly welcomed. Since the bombardments of Zeebrugge and Ostend had been inconclusive and the Admiralty firmly opposed Lloyd George's suggestions for a more prolonged naval bombardment, the War Cabinet approved a large-scale offensive by the army in Flanders with the object of securing the Belgian coast. The navy, too, was expected to play its part, landing 24,000 troops near Westende to turn the German flank as soon as Haig's forces had reached Roulers. In the event, this scheme proved almost still-born: with his soldiers bogged down in the mud at Passchendaele, Haig was forced to call off the joint operation on September 23. fact,
Meanwhile, Bacon was adopting more moderate measures to German use of the Channel waters. A large monitor was allotted to the barrage patrol forces, and its commander was instructed to bombard Zeebrugge and Ostend whenever wind and disrupt
allowed it. On several occasions, therefore, these bases were shelled from the sea but, apart from the nuisance value, little damage was done and the use made by the U-Boats of these ports continued unabated. tidal conditions
Flotilla Leader HMS Broke and Evans of the Broke', a hero overnight after the engagement on April 20/21. The Broke and the Swift intercepted Korvettenkapitan Gautier's5fA? Halt-Flotilla after it had bombarded Dover. After ramming the destroyer G 42, the Broke managed to repel boarders and then to fight clear. Later she returned to find the G 42 sinking, and then proceeded to pound the nearby and almost stationary G 85. Opposite. Top left: HMS Swift. Only five of her crew were killed or wounded. Below left: HMS Simoom, fatally damaged by a German
Above and inset:
who became
destroyer
in
an earlier raid on January 23. Top
and sunk by
HMS Broke,
larger U-Boats were allowed by the German Admiralty to travel through the Dover Straits again, which saved them about ten days for the double journey to the Atlantic: yet only one submarine hit a mine in the 253 passages made in the period JanuaryNovember 1917, and only six boats were sunk by the British patrols. Moreover, while few of the submarines ever touched the net, the Royal Navy found that the barrage possessed 'an uncanny capacity for damaging our own ships'. By mid-1917, the danger of the mine-nets to the patrolling warships had become so great that the western portion of the barrage was lifted and the mines swept up. Although relaid with strengthened moorings, it proved to be as ineffective as before. More rewarding than this was the increased minelaying by the British in the Bight and Channel areas: although this involved a long and wearisome contest between British minelayers and German minesweepers, the number of U-Boats destroyed by mines in 1917 was double the 1916 figures. German coastal shipping in the Bight, which threatened to revive in the summer of 1917, was also disrupted by these mines; and, more particularly, by the successful seizure
2304
Leading
April 21 1917'
by Tyrwhitt's forces of four merchantmen as they attempted the journey from Rotterdam to Germany. Nevertheless, these were small measures compared with the need to crush the U-Boats, particularly as the German losses on the newly-laid minefields were not fully known to the Admiralty. More important to their Lordships was the fact that, according to Intelligence sources, over 30 submarines were passing the Straits monthly without any apparent difficulties, and that about 20 merchant vessels were sunk by the U-Boats in the Channel waters every month. Furthermore, a growing proportion of the total German submarine force appeared to be using this route to reach the Western Approaches, despite the barrage and Bacon's patrols. As a result Geddes appointed a Channel Barrage Committee in November 1917, under the chairmanship of Rear-Admiral Roger Keyes, to consider ways of blocking this exit effectively. This decision proved to be the catalyst for a row which not only
Dover Patrol and the future of the station had far wider and more important repercussions. Keyes, the Director of the Admiralty Plans Division, was no friend of Bacon, and had been quite critical of the ineffective methods of halting the U-Boat traffic through the Channel. He himself, he believed, could do the job far more efficiently. Bacon reciprocated this dislike and was, moreover, very annoyed at 'the meddlings of an irresponsible committee'. While technically very brilliant, the Vice-Admiral was a difficult man to get on with and could not be told anything. His experience at this command was what really counted, Bacon felt. If he was left to get on with the job, so he repeatedly informed the Admiralty, all would be well and success would be achieved. Of course, the very creation of the Barrage Committee meant that Bacon was no longer left a free hand — the anti-submarine campaign had become too crucial for that — and he was soon clashing with Keyes and his colleagues. No one disputed the need to lay a deep minefield barrage as the best form of obstruction to the U-Boats, for it was obvious that the German submarines were diving below the shallow mine-nets: the great dispute focused upon the accompanying measure. The Committee favoured a brilliantly illuminated and very closely patrolled barrage, which would force every U-Boat to dive into the deep minefield. To this Bacon took great exception, pointing out that it would expose his affected the tactics of the
commander, but which Failure of the barrage The cross-Channel barrage itself, so assiduously laid and patrolled since 1916, was even less of a success. By December 1916, even the
right:
Seaman Ingleson on the forecastle of the Broke where he bayonetted Germans who boarded her during the action. Below right: The Broke's new bell, inscribed 'Made from the lip of torpedo tube of G 42, rammed
also
German submarine or destroyer attacks. Although he favoured some illumination, he did not wish his vessels to be stationed en masse along the barrage. In any case, he concluded, he could not spare many warships from other tasks for this particular duty. He also opposed Keyes' wish to scrap the old minenet barrage, and there was a further disagreement when the Committee opposed Bacon's idea of laying shallow mines. Finally, Keyes privately felt that more vigorous steps should be taken to deal with the German bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. A series of events at the beginning of December 1917 forced Bacon to give way. The Intelligence Division reported that scores of U-Boats had passed through the Channel in the past month, and interrogations of captured German submariners confirmed the belief that the barrage presented no great hindrance. The Admiralty also believed that in future all U-Boats would be taking the shorter Channel route in order to assemble for mass attacks upon the frequent Allied convoys in the Knglish or in St George's Channel. Bacon was therefore ordered to concentrate as strong a patrol as possible, with illuminations, along the deep minefield which had been laid between the French coast and the Varne, withdrawing warships from the barrage and from Dunkirk if necessary. The Vice- Admiral's reply not only recounted his earlier objections but also pointed out that the new scheme, by removing the Dunkirk force, would tempt the German destroyers to attack the drifters and patrol vessels. Nevertheless, on being summoned to London on December 18, he agreed to institute a flare and searchlight patrol along the deep minefield; and, when this was done on the following night, the submarine UB 56 was driven into the mines and destroyed. Bacon was unconvinced, while Keyes was very satisfied and Geddes took careful note of the whole affair. The latter, under pressure from Lloyd George, had become increasingly dissatisfied with the way the Royal Navy was being run by Jellicoe: it was too cautious a policy altogether for the worried politicians, and this lack of real vigour and understanding seemed to be typified by Bacon, one of Jellicoe's disciples. Wemyss, the Deputy First Lord, was also annoyed at the Dover commander's disregard of Admiralty advice, and by the end of December he had persuaded Geddes to replace Bacon. But Jellicoe dug his heels in at this idea, stoutly defending his old friend and thereby sealing his own late as First Sea Lord. On December 24. Geddes asked Jellicoe for his resignation: on the 28th, Bacon patrol boats to
was recalled from his own post. Thus, the Dover Straits problem turned out to be the immediate cause of a much larger matter, which had involved the two Scandinavian convoy incidents and the failure of Napier's forces to achieve anything during the action on November 17 Ho be dealt with in a later issue); while in the background were the personal disputes and suspicions, which had caused Jellicoe to be so distrusted by Lloyd George, the Northcliffe press, the 'Young Turks' in the Admiralty and fleet, and even by Geddes. With Wemyss installed as First Sea Lord and Keyes as commander at Dover, these circles were now much more content, although many in the service were shocked at the changes and particularly disgusted at Jellicoe's dismissal. Bacon remained unrepentant at his sacking and at the Admiralty's obvious discontent over the running of the Dover Patrol. It had been, he insisted, a great success: 'We had maintained sea communications with the Armies in France without intermission. in spite of destroyers, submarines, mines and aircraft, and our commerce had passed as freely and with almost equal security to and from the Thames as it did in peace time.' In fact, during the three years of his command, only five merchantmen had been torpedoed and one lost to German gunfire of the 88,000 vessels that had passed through the Straits — an astonishingly good record indeed. But the Dover Patrol had been far less successful m denying the U-Boats the use of the Channel passage on their way to and from the Atlantic; and this. b\ 1917, was the crucial factor. It remained to be seen whether the implementation of the deep minefield and close patrol system, and the leadership of Keyes. Bacon's sharpest critic, would solve this problem. Further Reading Aspinall-Oglander, C Roger Keyes (Hogarth Press 1951) Bacon. Adm Sir Roger. The Dover Patrol. 1915-191 7 (Hutchinson 1919) Gladisch. Der Krieg zur See: Der Krieg in der Nordsee Band VI and VII (Berlin 1937 & 1965) Keyes. Adm. Sir Roger. The Naval Memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes (Butterworth 1935) Marder. A. J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow (OUP 1969) Newbolt, H., Naval Operations Volumes IV and V (Longmans 1928 & ,
W
.
1931)
Pound,
R..
Evans of the Broke (OUP 1963)
[For Paul Kennedy's biography, sec
p.
633.
1
r
>v
Above: A U-Boat takes on torpedoes at Zeebrugge, thorn in the Allies' side throughout the war. Below: The German destroyer SMS S 49. Displacement: 1,074 tons. Length: 261 feet. Beam: 27 /2 feet. Armament: Three 3.5-inch, plus six 19.7-inch torpedo tubes and 24 mines. Power /speed: 23,500 hp/33 knots. Crew: 85/100. Bottom: A British motor launch. Dis-
w
1
placements? tons. Length:80fee\. Beam: 12 Armament: One 6-pounder. Power/speed:
feet.
440 hp/19 knots. Crew: Nine. Opposite: Actions in the Dover Straits in 1917
It.
3
2306
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tai
u^i
"7
North Sea
North Sea
Margate
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dBioadsIaiis
Weslgale
•
'Elbow Buoy
/Ramsgate
Goodwin Sands
|
;
Daa \
Dover*
/
£
Search ight patrol
/•
*.\»
,
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UBS6
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• Dunkirk
The Varne •
le Colbarl
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DECEMBER
18
J
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f
2307
THE ECLIPSE OP THE Q SHIPS In July
1915 the Prince Charles achieved the
first
Q-ship success by sinking the
U 36.
From then until August 1917 Q-ships sunk another ten U-Boats, but after that date there were no more sinkings. Why did they fail to fulfil their early promise? Bryan McLean Ranft The concept of disguising and arming merchant ships to decoy submarines to their doom had originated in the first year of the war but it was not until July 1915 that the Prince Charles, a small
Gordon Campbell and F. H. Grenfell, showed exceptional qualities of leadership and imagination in developing effective tactics for their ships. Their subordinates, nearly all reservists, and all
converted Fleet Auxiliary, achieved the first success by sinking U 36 liet ween then and the end of 1916, the Q-ships, to give them their Admiralty nomenclature, sank another four German submarines by accurate close-range gunfire. Although this was a small proportion of the total sinkings of 46 U-Boats from the beginning of the war, the Q-ships also damaged several more of their opponents and must have added considerably to the tension under which submarine ships' companies worked. They could never be certain that the slow shabby tramp which made so tempting a target for shelling or boarding might not turn out to be equipped with a heavy enough armament to penetrate their fragile hulls and send them plunging to the bottom if they ventured too close to her. For the officers and men of the Royal Navy who manned the Q-ships came opportunities for aggressive action against their opponents which were largely denied to their comrades in more orthodox ships. Individual captains, such as
volunteers for this excessively dangerous service, developed their particular brand of courage and endurance, especially for the uniquely testing ordeal of lying concealed under heavy shelling until the attacking submarine decided that their ship was completely helpless and abandoned and ventured within range of their hidden guns. The high proportion of Q-ship officers and men who were decorated for gallantry was amply justified. As the German submarine threat increased and entered into its most dangerous phase with the resumption of unrestricted attacks on merchant shipping in February 1917, it was inevitable that the British Admiralty, aware of the general failure of its efforts to sink U-Boats on a significant scale, should seek to increase its Q-ship force. More and more were put into service in every ocean where U-Boat attack could be expected, and their armament was made heavier and their disguise more complex. After the introduction of convoys in April 1917, Q-ships were often included in
own
"N
The Q-ship, bringing up the rear of an ordinary convoy, deceives the U-Boat into believing that she is merely a straggler. Taken in by this ruse, the U-Boat surfaces and opens fire with her gun, to conserve torpedoes for more valuable targets. I
1 The Q-ship's 'panic party' abandons ship to further the deception, while the U-Boat closes the range cautiously, shelling all the time. U-Boat
fires a torpedo, fearing a trap or making sure the Q-ship ensures that it hits her, relying on her 'cargo' of timber or the like to keep her afloat.
3
If
the
of the
kill,
4
After the U-Boat has closed to point blank range, the Q-ship breaks out her White Ensign, drops her gun shields and opens up a hail of fire on the U-Boat.
5 If the U-Boat is not sunk by this hail of fire, but pulls back and resumes shelling at long range, the Q-ship goes into her Abandon Q-ship' routine, to persuade the U-Boat that the Q-ship has finally been completely abandoned.
6
Tricked again, the U-Boat closes to point blank range is blown out of the water by the Q-ship's gunners, who have remained by their guns as the U-Boat makes her final approach, convinced that all opposition from the Q-ship has ceased
once more, and
U-Boat
Q-ship Gunfire fn n Q-ship
onvoy
2308
—
Gunfire from U-Boat
Torpec
them and convincingly acted the part
of stragglers, hoping thereby themselves rather than on the genuine merchant ships huddling closer to their naval escorts. But the most characteristic part of their work was still done cruising alone, or occasionally in company with a British submarine, in the home waters of the British Isles. It was here that the concentration of merchant shipping was heaviest and it was here that the U-Boats found most of their victims. The increase in the numbers of Q-ships and hitting power and the growing expertise and sustained courage of the ships' companies did not however produce a corresponding degree of success. Of the greatly increased total of 63 German submarines sunk in 1917, Q-ships accounted only for six — and no less than 24 of their own number were sunk. In August they had their last success of the year, and, although they continued their efforts until the end of the war, they were responsible for none of the 69 sinkings of 1918. Why did they fail to fulfil their early promise? It was, in fact, their early successes which led to their eclipse. Although every effort was made to keep their existence and mode of operation secret it was only a question of time until a submarine which had been attacked managed to escape and return to Germany with news of the deadly trap which it had just evaded. This made clear the reasons for the hitherto unaccountable disappearance of several submarines, and the German authorities were quick to react. U-Boat commanders were warned to be increasingly cautious in surfacing and then approaching even the most seemingly helpless and abandoned merchantman. They were to continue shelling at long range until absolutely certain there was no resistance left. As the success of the Q-ship depended upon the submarine coming within the point blank range necessary to guarantee fatal hits on its low silhouette before it submerged, this was the beginning of the end of its effectiveness. If submarines were to shell at long range until the Q-ship either sank or was shattered by the explosion of her ammunition, which now included torpedoes and depth charges, or until her armament was put out of action, they would have found an effective counter to what had appeared to be a deadly foe. The general conditions of 1917 made it even more likely that this would happen. An increasing number of ordinary merchantmen were being defensively armed and so submarines to attract attack on
Opposite: The tactics of Q-ship warfare Below: A Q-ship shows
naturally avoided coming too close to any Allied ship, while the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare justified their attacking by torpedo without venturing on the surface at all. However, the torpedo was a very expensive weapon to use against small tramps and sailing ships, which were the basic material for Q-ships, and in the early months of 1917 the more enterprising captains began to devise methods to counter attacks by the more likely long range gunfire and even to survive the more catastrophic torpedo attack. For a time they were successful.
Acting and courage versus firepower They had no technological breakthrough or secret weapon to help them, only their own determination and their ability to get even higher standards of courage and endurance from their hardened crews. Greater theatricality was demanded from the 'Panic Parties', whose role was to abandon ship when she first came under fire so as to delude the submarine of the seriousness of the damage inflicted. The nucleus of officers and men left on board had even longer endurance in the face of heavy and with the possibility of violent explosion ever present, in the hope that the U-Boat would eventually come near to watch the death agonies of her victim. Deception was taken even further. If in action the Q-ship were forced to reveal her identity without sinking her opponent, a further 'Panic Party' abandoned ship, leaving only the captain and minimum gun crews to take whatever opportunity offered of having another go at the submarine when it finally approached what must be the near-sinking ship. An even more dangerous tactic was adopted in a torpedo attack. Instead of trying to avoid being hit, the Q-ship Captain manoeuvred his ship so that she was hit. but not in a vital spot, such as the engine room. As Captain Campbell put it in the Order Book of his Q-ship, the Farnborough. 'Should the Officer of the Watch to face the prospect of
shell fire
see a torpedo coming, he is to increase or decrease speed as necessary, to ensure it hitting.' It was hoped that the ship would stay afloat long enough for the U-Boat to be enticed alongside and engaged effectively. The cargo of timber normally carried was some guarantee of this. In Campbell's ship every officer had to read and sign this order and the whole ship's company was told of its implications None took advantage of the opportunity subsequently offered of leaving the ship before she sailed on a voyage
its
teeth — in harbour. Right. A hydrophone in operation, too late in the war to detract from the important role of the Q-ship. Below right: The U 93, participant in one of the most exciting contests between U-Boat and Q-ship. She was seriously damaged by the Q-ship Prize, but was able to limp home to Germany after a magnificent feat of seamanship by one of her junior officers The Prize, also seriously damaged, got home too, and her captain was awarded the VC Four months later she was torpedoed by the U 48with the loss of all her crew
A
2309
to her own destruction. If 1917 was to see Q-ships' effectiveness, it was also to witness the heights of the courage and devotion of their crews. One of the most eventful of Q-ships' careers was that of Captain Grenfell'a Penshurst. She was a single screw steamer of 2,035 displacement and was first fitted out at the end of 1915. Her top speed under the hest possible conditions was ten knots. Her heaviest gun was a 12-pounder, mounted aft, concealed by a ship's boat sawn into sections which could be instantly removed for action. In addition she had two 6-pounders and two 3-pounders, all hidden behind screens or dummy deck-houses hinged to fall away at a touch. Her armament was completed by depth charges. In addition to her captain, there were four officers and twelve RN gunnery ratings; the rest of the ship's company of 45 were RNR ratings She was typical of her kind and so was her routine. Normally she plodded along at eight knots, with most of the crew visible on deck, including the captain, dressed and behaving as merchant seamen. When a submarine was sighted a system of gong signals sent the crew to their action stations and the 'Panic l';ni\ in act their 'Abandon Ship' routine. At a final signal, the gun shields clattered down, the White Ensign was hoisted and a rapid hail of fire opened on the U-Boat in an attempt to penetrate its fragile hull before it could submerge. By 1917 these were orthodox and well practised Q-ship tactics, and it was by skilful use of them that the Penshurst made the first kill of the year. On January 14, cruising to the west of the Isle of Wight, she was attacked by a submarine on the surface. The U-Boat opened fire at .!,()<)<> yards and closed rapidly, firing all the time. The Penshurst stopped her engines and the panic party abandoned ship with gusto. Those remaining on board had to undergo the normal Q-ship ordeal of lying hidden while under heavy fire until Grenfell decided that the U-Boat was within killing range. On this occasion it was half an hour before he gave the signal. Skill or luck was with him, as the first shot from the 12-pounder hit the base of the conning tower, causing a large explosion, presumably of some ammunition. Further hits followed rapidly and UB 37 sank by the stern. No survivors were found. February 1, 1917, the opening day of the last phase of unrestricted submarine warfare, saw five U-Boats operating in the Western Approaches to the British Isles. It was in these waters, crowded with merchantmen, too narrow to permit effective dispersal and yet embracing too large an area for effective antisubmarine patrol, that the crucial battle for Britain's survival was to be fought. Q-ships were brought into the fight and it was Captain Campbell's Farnborough which got the only success of the month in the area, althougb another decoy, the Lady Olive, sank UC 18 in the Channel. The Farnborough, a former collier, was one of the largest of the Q-ships and heavily armed with five 12pounders and two 6-pounders. Captain Campbell and his experi-
virtually i
In-
end
committed
ol
(In-
RNR
enced crew had accounted ready for more.
The pattern
for
two submarines
in
1916 and were
of failure Cruising off the west of Ireland on February 14 the Farnborough was torpedoed by a hitherto undetected submarine. Although Campbell was able to turn to avoid a direct hit on the engine room, a bulkhead burst and the engine room started to fill. The bulk of the crew left in three boats, leaving another dangling at the davits to increase the impression of panic. Campbell was left on the bridge watching the periscope of his opponent, still submerged 200 yards away. She was U 83, one of the newest boats and had already been cruising for three weeks. Her captain, Bruno Hoppe, was extremely cautious and moved slowly round the Farnborough, still submerged. Although the range was sometimes only ten yards, Campbell resisted the temptation to fire on the periscope. Even when U 83 surfaced at 300 yards he waited further until she came into a position where all his guns could bear. He then loosed a hurricane of fire which the submarine had no chance of avoiding. She sank leaving only two survivors. The Farnborough herself was now sinking as a result of the torpedo hit and it was only the prompt arrival of destroyers in answer to her wireless call for help that enabled her to be towed back to port. It was in this action that Captain Campbell won the Victoria Cross. In March, the Q-ship Privet sank U 85 off Start Point but in April and May, the most dangerous period of the U-Boat war against merchant shipping, although there were many encounters, the decoys sank no submarines. Instead, one of their own number, the Tulip, was sunk and her captain taken prisoner. The pattern of failure was beginning to emerge. However, April did see one of the most exciting and unusual contests between submarine and Q-ship. The two protagonists were strangely contrasted. The submarine I J 93 was one of Germany's largest and
2310
on her maiden voyage. She was over 200 feet long and, in addition to her 18 torpedoes, carried two 4.1-inch guns. Her opponent, surprisingly, was also a German ship, the three-masted schooner, Else, captured by the British as the first prize of the war at sea. Renamed Prize she had been converted into a Q-ship at the end of 1916. She was some 112 feet long, armed with two well concealed 12-pounders and equipped with an auxiliary engine. Speigel, the U-Boat's captain, sighted her on the evening of April 30 and decided to make her the twelfth of his bag on this first cruise. Although he had no suspicion of the Prize's role, he subjected her to prolonged shelling at long range, inflicting serious
damage
above and below the water line. When he did close, he came up dead astern, where none of the Prize's guns could bear. It was only after another 20 minutes that he moved round to the port quarter and the Prize was able to open fire. But there was no instant victory; the submarine kept up her own fire, scoring two more hits, and just failed to ram her opponent. It was not until
'Campbell made no attempt to escape and awaited the torpedo attack in the hope that the ship might survive it long enough to hit back' Below: The dazzle painted HMS Pelargonium, Flower-class Q-ship. Right: The Q-ship Dunraven. On August 8, 1917, four days out on her first voyage, she met a U-Boat in the Bay of Biscay and went through the usual tactics of Q-ship warfare, but was unable to deliver the coup de grace before she blew up. In fact, the sinking of the Dunraven demonstrated that the early hopes of Q-ships proving a decisive counterto the U-Boat had been delusive, for in long engagements with well-fitted Q-ships, manned by exceptionally brave and experienced crews, the submarine emerged the victor. The fact that there were no more sinkings by Q-ships after August 1917 proves that the U-Boat captains had mastered the tactical problems of dealing with them
the Prize's gunners knocked her forward gun out of action and with their next shot destroyed the conning tower, that she made off. She was hit frequently as she retired and it was confidently assumed that she had sunk. Three of her crew, including the captain, were rescued from the sea, presumably thrown there by the destruction of the conning tower. In fact U 93 did keep afloat and, although unable to dive, got back to Germany after a magnificent feat of seamanship and leadership by one of her junior officers. The Prize got home too and her captain, W. E. L. Sanders, a New Zealander, was awarded the VC for this hard fought engagement. In August she was not so fortunate, and was torpedoed by the UB 48 in the Atlantic with the loss of all her crew. August 1917 was also to see the last sinking of a submarine by a Q-ship, when the UC 72 was sunk on the 20th by the Acton, after having seriously damaged the famous Penshurst on the previous day. More significantly it was to see the end of Campbell's career as a Q-ship captain, in a defeat and not a victory. He had a newly fitted ship, the Dunraven, into whose equipping had gone all the experience gained in his two previous commands, the Farnborough and the Pargust. In his own words, 'The Dunraven was a beautiful ship, and all her arrangements in every detail were as perfect as we could wish for'. On August 8, four days out on her first voyage, she met a submarine in the Bay of Biscay. The U-Boat engaged the Dunraven in the way most disadvantageous for a Q-ship, by gunfire at 5,000 yards. Campbell had decided never to open all-out fire at over 1,000 yards, and so set afoot his planned tactics for drawing the U-Boat nearer. These consisted of firing deliberately short with his smallest gun, one that an ordinary merchant ship might carry, and, though appearing to be trying to escape, actually reducing speed. None of the early shots hit and after some 30 miputes the submarine closed to 1,000 yards and her shooting became dangerously accurate. Campbell then ordered the usual 'Abandon Ship' routine to be carried out. As this was being done, the ship was hit three more times and the poop, where a great deal of ammunition was stowed, was set ablaze. Campbell then made the difficult decision not to open fire, despite the imminent risk of explosion, until the U-Boat presented a better target. Just as she moved into a favourable position, the explosion did come. The whole of the poop was blown out together with a large part of the Dunraven's heavier armament. Alarmed at the violence of
the explosion, the submarine crash dived. The White Ensign was now flying and there could be no doubt of the Dunraven's identity. It was only a matter of time before she was torpedoed. Campbell made no attempt to escape and awaited the torpedo attack in the hope that the ship might survive it long enough to hit back. The torpedo came after 20 minutes and Campbell ordered his 'Abandon Q-ship routine', which left only himself and the crews of the two remaining guns on board. Their chance never occurred. When the UC 71 surfaced it was to submit the Dunraven to another 20 minutes of long-range shelling, to which she could make no effective reply, and then submerged again. In desperation Campbell fired two torpedoes, without effect, and it was only because the submarine had exhausted her own torpedo stock that the Dunraven was saved from immediate destruc-
The U-Boat now made for home and Campbell at last signalled for the assistance that he had hitherto spurned, lest the arrival of reinforcements should have scared off his opponent. The rescuing craft came in time to save Campbell and his crew, but not the ship. Despite valiant efforts, the Dunraven was too badly damaged to be towed back to port and was finally sent to the bottom by one of the rescuing destroyers. Although it was later in August that the Acton was to sink 72, the sinking of the Dunraven demonstrated that early hopes of Q-ships proving a decisive counter to the U-Boat had been detion.
U
lusive. When the Penshurst sank after a similar action in December, there was no room for doubt. In long engagements with well
manned by exceptionally brave and experienced crews, the submarine emerged the victor. The fact that there were no more sinkings by decoy ships after August 1917 proves that the submarine captains had mastered the tactical problem of dealing with them. If the U-Boat was to be defeated and Britain saved from disastrous losses of merchant shipping, other ways would have to be found.
fitted Q-ships,
Further Reading Campbell, Rear-Admiral Gordon. VC.
My Mystery Ships (Hodder &
Stoughton 1928) Chatterton, E Keble. Q-Ships and their Story (Hurst & Blacken 1923) Grant, Robert M., U-Boats Destroyed (Putnam 1964) Newbolt. Sir Henry, Naval Operations Volume /V(Longmans Green 1928)
[For Bryan
McLean
Ranft's biography, see
p.
693.
r~
2311
From
its
birth in 1911 the
Royal Naval Air Service showed itself open to
experimentation with new
weapons and concepts, and the war was only a few weeks old before its innovations began to make a striking impact on air warfare. Captain Donald Macintyre.
Above:
A Sopwith Baby fires
experimentally-fitted Le Prieur anti -balloon rockets
Military aviation during the First World War up to April 1, 1918 was conducted by two quite separate units, the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) which was a unit of the army and came under War Office control and jurisdiction, and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), administered and controlled by the Air Division of the Admiralty. The latter, with which we are concerned here, had come into being in March 1911 when three naval officers, Lieutenants Samson, Longmore and Gregory and Captain Gerrard, Royal Marine Light Infantry, were selected to learn to fly at the Aero Club's field at Eastchurch on the Isle of Sheppey, being given free instruction by Mr G. B. Cockburn on two Short S 38 box-kite aeroplanes lent by Mr Frank McClean. The next step was, naturally, to adapt their newly-acquired art to naval purposes. In December 1911 Longmore, having fitted air bags to the undercarriage and beneath the tail of one of these aeroplanes, successfully alighted on the River Medway. Such an arrangement did not, however, permit taking off from the water. In the meantime, therefore, Samson had obtained permission to erect a platform over the forecastle of the old battleship Africa and he flew off from this, while the ship was in harbour, in January 1912. Four months later he repeated the performance from Hibemia as she was steaming at 15 knots. More robust aeroplanes soon emerged fitted with wooden floats on which they could both take off from and alight on water. There were thus two potentially practicable ways of integrating aviation in naval operations. Although the old light cruiser Hermes, adapted to carry seaplanes, had a trackway on her forecastle from which an 80-hp Caudron amphibian made several flights while the ship was under way in 1913, and although in the same year the Admiralty bought a tramp steamer still on the stocks and redesigned the ship, renaming her Ark Royal, with a 130-foot flying-off deck as well as facilities for operating seaplanes, the concept of launching aircraft from decks lapsed until the end of 191 5 in favour of hoisting seaplanes in and out by crane. Meanwhile, prior to the outbreak of war, naval aviators had busied themselves in experiments to adapt aircraft for reconnaissance by equipping them with radio sets, and for offensive action by installing guns and practising bomb-dropping; and finally, in July 1914, Squadron-Commander Arthur Longmore had successfully launched the first airborne torpedo, a weapon 14 inches in diameter and weighing 800 pounds. It may be noted here that the French also had a naval aviation section which
HMS
HMS
HMS
2312
operated seaplanes from the converted cruiser Foudre. The Imperial German Navy, on the other hand, had acquired in the splendid rigid airships designed by Graf Zeppelin a means of effective long-range aerial reconnaissance at a time when the Royal Navy had nothing of the kind. The Germans also operated a number of seaplanes; but, like the British types, these were of limited endurance and reliability and it was on the Zeppelins that they relied for operation with their High Seas Fleet. The RNAS, in addition to its force of seaplanes which, by August 1914, had grown to 52 in number, also operated 39 land planes of various types and six military airships at the outbreak of war. The latter had come into their possession as a result of a reorganisation recommended by a government-appointed Air Committee in 1912. Responsibility for their development had been transferred from the War Office to the Admiralty whose original interest in aviation, inspired by the Zeppelins, had suffered a setback when the first British craft of this type, the R 1 or, unofficially and cynically, the Mayfly, had been destroyed in September 1911 before ever taking the air. The same Committee had also made Home Air Defence a naval commitment; hence the acquisition of the landplanes, whose primary task was envisaged as destroyers of the Zeppelins which were expected to bomb British ports. The British naval airships were low-performance non-rigid types, virtually powered balloons; the seaplanes were not yet equipped to work with the fleet; both types of aircraft were therefore restricted at first to patrol work, operating from a chain of coastal stations. Thus it was the landplanes, a heterogeneous squadron of which, comprising three BE biplanes, two Sopwith Tabloid biplanes, two Bleriot monoplanes, one Henri Farman, one Bristol and one Short, was sent across to operate from a field near Antwerp, that struck the first offensive blow. Six weeks after the outbreak of war four of these aircraft took off, each carrying two 20-lb bombs, to deliver the first strategic bombing attack in history. Their target was the Zeppelin base at Diisseldorf. Three failed to locate it as a result of mist in the Rhine Valley. FlightLieutenant Collet, however, sighted the sheds and, gliding down to 400 feet, released his failed to explode.
bombs, one of which scored
a hit but
Two weeks later, on October 8, 1914, just as the Antwerp field was being abandoned in the face of the German advance, a se< ond attempt was mounted. Two Sopwith Tabloid aircraft took off, flown by Squadron-Commander Spenser Grey and Flight-Lieu-
NAVAL
JMK,
AVIATION tenant Marix. Spenser Grey, unable to locate the airship sheds, flew on to Cologne and dropped his bombs on the railway station. Marix had complete success: his bombs ignited the hydrogen gas of the new army Zeppelin Z IX in her shed and a spectacular blaze marked her total destruction.
Against the U-Boats
On
the evacuation of Antwerp, the naval air squadron moved to co-operate with the British army, first from a field near Ostend and then, as the Allies retreated, from a succession of temporary fields until by the beginning of November 1914 it became permanently established at Dunkirk, whence its aeroplanes made a number of raids on U-Boats and other targets in
back
German-occupied Bruges and Zeebrugge.
RNAS
In the same month aeroplanes again penetrated deep into Germany. The objective tliis time was the heart of the Zeppelin organisation, the factory and sheds at Kriedrichshafen on
Lake Constance. Four
little Avro biplanes powered by 80-hp rotary engines were transported by sea and road to Belfort, near the junction of the Swiss. German and French frontiers and. under conditions of great secrecy were erected and prepared. The four pilots selected were Squadron-Commander E. F. Briggs, Flight-Commander J. T. Babington, Flight-Lieutenant S. V. Sippe
Gnome
and Flight-Sub-Lieutenant Cannon. Bad weather held up the operation for a week but November 21 dawned reasonably fair; by 0930 hours Briggs, Babington and Sippe were airborne, each aeroplane carrying four 20-lb bombs. Cannon broke a tailskid while taxi-ing and had to give up. At their cruising speed of some 80 mph the other three, setting off at five minute intervals, flew the 125-mile course to the target, arriving shortly before noon to be met by a barrage from shrapnelfiring guns and machine guns mounted on roofs. These opened up as the aeroplanes dived to the attack. Briggs' petrol tank was hit and he was forced down and became a prisoner; but not before he had seen his little bombs burst in the target area, as had those of his two comrades. Damage had been inflicted on workshops, and bombs missed a Zeppelin in its; shed by only 60 feet; the gasworks had been hit. Babington and Sippe returned safely in their little puttering biplanes of canvas, wood and wire. If such an operation, so far from the sea. seems at first a strange occupation for the Royal Navy, it must be remembered that attacks on Zeppelins, whether on the ground or in the air, made an im-
portant contribution to two of the Admiralty's tasks — home air defence and reduction of the German fleet's aerial reconnaissance advantage. And in December 1914 naval seaplanes took up the same task in the first seaborne air operation. Three cross-Channel packets. Empress, Engadine and Riviera had been requisitioned by the Admiralty on the outbreak of war and equipped to carry four seaplanes each. Plans were laid to attack the naval airship bases on the North German coast; and on Christmas Day the three seaplane carriers, each carrying three .Short seaplanes, were escorted by the light cruisers HMS Arethusa and Undaunted and eight destroyers to a position some 12 miles north of Heligoland where, in a clear, calm, bitterly cold dawn the nine seaplanes were hoisted out. Only seven succeeded in getting airborne, and they set off to seek the airship sheds, which were believed to be at Cuxhaven. As they approached the land, however, the clear weather gave way to banks of fog and mist; the sheds could not be found -they were in fact at Nordholz to the south of Cuxhaven. The pilots turned their attentions to the dockyards and to the ships of the High Seas Fleet anchored in Schillig Roads, whence came a heavy fire from anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. The damage that their little bombs could do was negligible, but they achieved a measure of success, nevertheless. The appearance of the aeroplanes over the fleet caused the ships to get under way so hastily that the battle-cruiser SMS Von der Tann and a cruiser were in collision and both were damaged. The pilots then set course for Heligoland where their ships, having driven off a Zeppelin and a seaplane which had unsuccessfully attacked them with bombs, were waiting. Three of the British seaplanes arrived, alighted alongside and were hoisted on board, where soon afterwards they found themselves in reversed roles as a Zeppelin and several seaplanes again dropped bombs round the squadron, though without scoring any hits. Of the remaining four Shorts, one had suffered an engine failure and had landed near a Dutch trawler, which picked up the crew. The others, with petrol rapidly running out, alighted near the British submarine E II stationed off Norderney Gat for just such an emergency. The crews were hastily taken on hoard before the submarine was forced to dive and abandon the seaplanes as a Zeppelin shaped up to attack with bombs. Thus air strike from the sea, which was to be so prominent a feature" of the
Second World War. was initiated, though this par-
2313
C*4
Above.lhe British Coastal Star class blimp No 4. The Star class was an improved version of the standard Coastal class anti-submarine blimp, which was introduced on June 15, 1915. The trefoil shape of the envelope is noteworthy Engine: One Berliet, 1 10 hp, forward and one Fiat, 240 hp, rear. Capacity: 200,000 cubic feet. Length: 210 feet. Seam: 44 feet. Height: 52 feet 1 inch. Speed: 43 knots. Armament: Two
Lewis guns and light bomb load. Left above: An SS type blimp sets off to hunt submarines. Lett below: A Short Type 166 seaplane being hoisted out from HMS Ark Royal off the Dardanelles. Right centre. The control car of a Submarine Scout Zero (SSZ) class blimp This was slung from the envelope with wires. The engine is a 75-hp Rolls-Royce Hawk. Right below: An SSZ class non-rigid airship, used on anti-submarine patrols. 76 of this type were built for use by the Royal Navy and the United States Navy Engine: One Rolls-Royce Hawk. Capacity: 70,000 cubic feet. Length: 143 feet 4 inches. Beam: 39 feet 6 inches. Height: 47 feet. Speed. 46 knots Armament: One or two Lewis guns and up to 65 lb of bombs. The pipe projecting downwards and forwards from the envelope was to channel air from the propeller into the envelope, to maintain the gas pressure in the envelope. This pressure was needed to hold the blimp's shape, as there was no internal bracing, as in the Zeppelin, to support the fabric of the envelope. Without this pressure-fed air, the envelope tended to become flabby at low altitudes, which made the craft very difficult to control
2314
2315
ticular form was not successfully repeated owing to the inability of the fragile floatplanes to take off from the open sea in anything hut a flat calm Further attempts to launch such raids were frustrated by this weakness; so, too, were efforts to send up little Sopwith Schneider seaplanes carried in the Engadine to attack Zeppelins in the air. The requirement for a carrier from which seaplanes could take off hoth for attacking the Germans' scouting Zeppelins and for reconnaissance for the Grand Fleet had been early appreciated in fact, and in September 1914 the old Cunar-
der Campania had been taken in hand for conversion to a seaplane carrier with a 120-foot flying deck erected over her forecastle. When she emerged in May 1915, a single-seater Sopwith Schneider seaplane, intended to operate as a fighter, was successfully flown off with the ship steaming at 17 knots into wind, using a trolley which fell off as soon as the aeroplane was airborne. The Heel also required larger seaplanes for reconnaissance, however, and as no existing type could take off from the 120-foot platform, the Campania was sent back for a longer platform to be fitted and it was not until April 1916 that she again came to sea.
The
first
of the 'Blimps'
The further development of ship-borne aviation will be described later. But meanwhile the RNAS was occupied during 1915 with three main tasks — combating the German submarine campaign against merchant ships which began on February 18, 1915, opposing the Zeppelins which in January had opened a bombing campaign by attacking King's Lynn, Yarmouth and Sheringham and in supplying aerial support to the forces engaged at the Dardanelles. In addition naval seaplanes transported by sea to Bast Africa played a key role in the discovery and destruction of the commerce-raiding cruiser SMS Konigsberg, which had taken refuge up the River Rufiji. Air opposition to the U-Boat campaign took two forms — bombing of the U-Boat bases in Belgium and aerial patrol of British coastal waters. For the former, aeroplanes and seaplanes were concentrated at Dover and Dunkirk and a series of raids were mounted against Ostend and Zeebrugge as well as one or two long-range raids against the Antwerp yards, where U-Boats were being fitted out. The largest of these was made on Zeebrugge by 24 aircraft, but even this achieved little concrete result with the 20-lb and occasional 100-lb bombs carried. The desultory raids were continued, however, more as a form of harassment than in the hope of destroying U-Boats. The need to maintain an air patrol of coastal waters led to an important development. Seaplanes were unreliable, of low endurance and in short supply. On February 28, 1915, Admiral Fisher, the First Sea Lord, sent for the two senior officers of the airship section, Commander E. A. D. Masterman and WingN. F. Usborne, and brusquely informed them he wanted some small, fairly fast airships to hunt submarines and he wanted them at once. The officers hurried back to Farnborough e and hit upon the expedient of slinging the fuselage of a BE 2c § aeroplane, powered by a 70 hp Renault engine, under the gasbag | of the little Willows training airship. The result was the first of | the submarine scout (SS) airships soon to be familiarly known as 5 'Blimps'. By the end of the year 29 of these with an endurance of 5 eight hours at their top speed of some 45 mph were in operation. e Other developments with regard to lighter-than-air craft were
Commander
2318T
decided upon during 1915 also. At a conference called by Mr Balfour, First Lord of the Admiralty, on June 19 it was decided that following the completion of the programme for construction of 50 of the SS ships no more should be built. Instead there were ordered 30 of a new and larger type known as the Coastal or 'C type, the first of which, produced by attaching to the envelope of an Astra-Torres dirigible a gondola made up of the fore part of two Avro fuselages placed end to end, had just been completed. Subsequent units were built by private contractors and assembled at the Kingsnorth airship station. At the same conference the recommendation was made that work on R 9, the first rigid airship to be laid down since the loss of the R 1, which had been suspended, should be resumed and that three further rigids should be built. The Board of Admiralty gave its approval and, indeed, increased the number by one. The four new ships, numbered R 23 to 26, were built by Vickers at Barrow (23 and 26), William Beardmore at Inchinnan, Renfrew (24), and Armstrong Whitworth at Barlow, near Selby, Yorkshire (25). They were powered by four 250 hp Rolls-Royce engines. None of these was delivered before the autumn of 1917. Four more improved versions of this 23-class were ordered in February 1916 as '23 Xs and, later, Short Brothers of Cardington were commissioned to build two ships derived from the SchutteLanz type of dirigible. When the Zeppelin L 33 was forced down in September 1916 and captured largely intact, it was decided to cancel two of the later '23 X' class and build five airships based on the design of L33. None of these, however, was completed before the end of the war.
Zeppelins the major
By themselves, the
enemy
whether by the flying-boats (which, starting with two American Curtiss craft, were built up into a large organisation at Felixstowe), by floatplanes or by airships, could do little more than harass the U-Boats. Lacking an effective weapon such as a depth-charge, they did not, in fact, account for any U-Boats during the First World War. It was not until the convoy system was introduced in 1917 that aircraft proved their inestimable worth as integral parts of the escort, which can be judged from the fact that during the whole war only two ships from convoys which had a combined sea and air escort were lost to U-Boat attack. At the beginning of 1915, however, it was the Zeppelins raiding English coastal towns that constituted the RNAS's primary objective. Expeditions on the lines of the Christmas Day operation were repeated on four occasions in March, April and May to locate the airship sheds and to bomb the radio direction-finding station at Norddeich whence the Zeppelins received navigational aids. Rough weather or fog frustrated the attempts each time. At the end of April it became known that three new Zeppelins had arrived to occupy the newly completed sheds at Evere and Berchem Ste Agathe in Belgium and on May 31 one of these dropped the first
aerial patrols,
bombs on London.
The British seaplane carrier Ben-My-Chree in Gallipoli, November 1915. An ex-Isle of Man packet, one of her seaplanes claims the honour of launching the
first
successful torpedo strike from the
air
against a
ship. Following the evacuation at the end of Gallipoli, the Ben-My-Chree was put into a squadron based on Port Said and saw much action against
the Turks.
She was sunk by shore
batteries in January 1917
The aviators at the RNAS station at Dunkirk, which flanked the route followed by the raiding airships, marked them down as their prey. Their first chance came on May 17 when LZ39, returning from a raid, was sighted in the early dawn to seaward. Every available plane went up after her; two Morane monoplane fighters flown by Squadron-Commander Spenser Grey and Flight-Sub-Lieutenant R. A. J. Warneford were the first to come up with her and attacked with their machine guns; but though they caused casualties to the crew in the gondola and shot away one of her propellers, the airship was able to climb away. Flight-Commander A. W. Bigsworth in an Avro, however, had succeeded in climbing higher; flying along the length of the envelope he dropped his four 20-lb bombs. Though smoke coming from the airship's tail indicated that some, at least, had hit, they failed to explode; with five damaged gasbags, the Zeppelin escaped to make a rough but safe landing at Evere. The airmen now decided to make a night attack on the Zeppelins in their shed; soon after midnight Flight-Lieutenant J. P. Wilson and Sub-Lieutenant Mills took off from Dunkirk in Henri Farman aeroplanes for Evere — while Warneford in his Morane made for Berchem Ste Agathe. Unknown to them, they had chosen a night when the three Zeppelins had gone up to raid England, but fortune favoured them in that LZ 38 had had trouble that forced her to return to her shed, while LZ37 on her way back to base was sighted by Warneford. Setting off after her, Warneford came up with LZ37 over Bruges; he was at first driven off by machine gun fire from the airship which even reversed their respective roles by boldly turning in pursuit. The Morane was able to outclimb her, however, and at some 12,000 feet Warneford gained a position above his giant opponent: he released his six 20-lb bombs and was rewarded by the sight of a dazzling explosion before the blast tossed his little Morane upside down — at the same time his engine stopped. By the time he had regained control sufficiently to manoeuvre for a landing in a field, the Zeppelin was already a blazing wreck on the ground. Warneford repaired his defect, a broken petrol pipe, restarted his engine, scrambled back into his cockpit as the Morane was rolling, and took off safely and returned to Dunkirk. His deed brought him the award of the Victoria Cross; but unhappily he was killed only ten days later when a Henri Farman biplane he was testing broke up in the air.
Grand
Fleet still unprotected While Warneford's duel with LZ37 was taking place, Wilson had arrived over Evere, to be greeted by a challenge flashed through the darkness by a searchlight crew. With a pocket flashlamp he made replies that persuaded them to leave him in peace to orbit the field for 15 minutes, by which time there was sufficient light for him to aim his three 65-lb bombs from 2,000 feet. To his disappointment, the only result seemed to be smoke billowing from his target. When Mills arrived ten minutes later he was greeted by heavy machine gun fire as he dived low; he swerved away and climbed to approach once again at 5,000 feet, from which height he released his four 20-lb bombs. The result was spectacular, as LZ 38 was destroyed in a brilliant conflagration. After further adventures in the thick fog covering the ground near their base, both pilots eventually got their aircraft safely home. The RNAS had made the Belgian base too dangerous for Zeppelins. LZ39 was moved away to the Eastern Front only to be destroyed in her shed by fire nine months later. Nevertheless the airships based elsewhere continued to raid England and to scout for the High Seas Fleet. In an effort to repeat Warneford's success, a number of landing grounds on the East Coast, from which naval aircraft could operate, were established, but the difficulties of night flying were too much for inexperienced aviators; there were many crashes, while those pilots who got safely into the air found it impossible to locate the airships and so no 'kills' resulted. Nor did yet another seaborne air strike operation mounted from the Engadine and Riviera have any better success in July 1915. On this raid the aeroplanes carried were Short seaplanes, to bomb and reconnoitre the Borkum area, and Sopwith Schneiders, to go up after the Zeppelins that were sure to be attracted to the scene. Of the former only one succeeded in completing its mission and returning to the parent ship. The floats of the little Schneiders were quickly shattered as they tried to take off and the squadron had patiently to endure the sight of four Zeppelins floating serenely above them. Thus the RNAS, for all its fine work in other fields, was still unable to give effective aerial support to the Grand Fleet. In the absence of suitable aeroplanes and a ship from which they could take off, kite balloons carrying observers were towed by ships of the fleet, conferring on it at least some of the advantages enjoyed
by the High Seas Fleet with its Zeppelin scouts. For nearly two years more the RNAS had to rely upon land-based aeroplanes and seaplanes of doubtful value. With these, however, they were able to play an important part in two overseas operations during 1915. The first of these was the search for SMS Konigsberg, already described in Volume 2 (page 863). The second theatre in which the RNAS provided the air support with ship-borne seaplanes and land-based aeroplanes was the Dardanelles. The first unit to arrive was the seaplane carrier HMS Ark Royal carrying a mixed outfit of six seaplanes of various types and two Sopwith Tabloid aeroplanes. The latter were no doubt intended to fly off the Ark Royal's deck; but, in fact, they never did so, owing chiefly to the ten knots maximum that the ship was capable of producing. The seaplanes, however, did much useful work during the bombardments of the Turkish forts during
February and March 1915. Meanwhile, No 3 Aeroplane Squadron RNAS, from Dunkirk, arrived aboard transports at the island of Tenedos on March 24 and, from an airfield prepared there, 18 aeroplanes of six different types were soon operating. These took over the majority of the tasks of co-operation with the bombarding warships of the fleet, while the Ark Royal's mobility was made use of to try to deflect the Turks' attention from the Liallipoli landings which were being planned. When the landings were made during the last week of April 1915, however, and during the subsequent fighting, all aircraft were kept fully occupied over the Galhpoli Peninsula, bombing and scouting. Much of the spotting for bombarding warships was carried out from RNAS kite balloons based on the balloon ships Manica and Hector.
HMS
The It
first torpedo strike was seaplanes from another
carrier, the ex-Isle of
Man
packet
Ben-My-Chree, that contributed the achievements most significant for the future of naval aviation. On August 12, 1915 a Short Type 184 seaplane piloted by Flight-Commander C. H. K. Edmonds was hoisted out and, with a 14-inch torpedo slung between its floats, took off on a shipping strike mission. Sighting a large Turkish transport, Edmonds glided down to within 15 feet of the water, and at a range of 300 yards released the torpedo. It ran true and exploded abreast the steamer's mainmast. That the steamer had, in fact, been already torpedoed and beached by a British submarine and might have detracted from the significance of the exploit if Edmonds had not repeated it five days later, his torpedo hitting another Turkish transport which was set on fire and gutted. At about the same time FlightLieutenant G. B. Dacre, also from the Ben-My-Chree, and flying a Short seaplane with a torpedo, was forced down on the water by loss of engine power. This did not deter him, however: sighting a large steam tug on the other side of the Straits, he taxied his Short across, released his torpedo and sank her. Relieved of the missile's weight, he was then able, after a two-mile run, to get airborne again and return to his parent ship. Following the evacuation which marked the end of the Gallipoli campaign, the seaplane carriers Ben-My-Chree and Empress and the steamers Anne and Raven II. each of which carried two French seaplanes, were formed into a squadron based on Port Said. Many and varied were the duties on which they were employed in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Red Sea during the fighting with the Turks, bombing sorties of the type later described as 'interdiction' as well as 'strategic' being interspersed with scouting missions for the army. The Ben-My-Chree was sunk by shore batteries in January 1917 but her place was later taken by the seaplane carrier City of Oxford. None of its achievements, though, brought the RNAS any nearer to an effective means of providing the Grand Fleet with the air support it was calling for. The problem was being tackled, as we have seen in the efforts to give ships flying-off decks. In a further article we shall follow the developments which were eventually to provide a solution.
Further Reading Bell Davies.
Vice-Adm. Richard, Sailor
in
the Air (Davies 1967)
Longmore, Air-Chief-Marshal Sir Arthur. From Sea to Sky (Bles 1946) Moore, G. W Early 8/rd(Putnam 1963) Naval Eight, A History of No 8 Squadron RNAS (The Signal Press) Raleigh, Sir Walter and Jones, H. A. The War in the Air {OUP 1925-37) Samson, C, R,, Fights and Flights (Benn 1930) Snowdon Gamble, C F The Story ol a North Sea Air Station (OUP) Theatford. W British Naval Aircraft since 1912 (Putnam 1962) Young. D Rutland of Jutland (Cassell 1963) .
,
,
,
[For Captain
Donald Macintyre's biography, see page
1413.
]
2317
war in German East Africa had entered its thud and last phase. The first phase in 1914 had seen the abortive Tanga affair, and during 1915 there had been a period of guerrilla war by the Germans against the British railway line. The British still failed to appreciate the real fighting potential of their African soldiers in the King's African Rifles (KAR), but the lii mans had seen that Africans could make good soldiers and Lettow Vorbeck had already recruited and trained enough to see him through the war. The second phase consisted of Smuts' invasion of German Kast Africa combined with the Belgian thrust in the western areas, and General Northev's strike northwards from the southern border. But Smuts had been unable to defeat Lettow Vorbeck and his The
I
forces.
EAST AFRICA
i
the
British
Dependencies
elsewhere were of no avail to keep them in the field. Only the African soldier could stand the East African climate indefinitely. So states the official history of the war in
East Africa. When General Smuts took stock of the situation
and realised that most of
his
mostly. Nothing could show more eloquently the deadly nature of the country into which we had now moved.' The fluctuations in the strength of the 2nd Loyal North Lancashire Regiment
By September 1916 Smuts had been
ommunication had become impossibly stretched and his logistic organisation was finding it impossible to carry out its task. But, more important, the European and South African troops were finding it almost impossible to continue in the harsh African climate. The third phase of the war, October 1916 to November 1917, saw the occupation of German territory completed, largely by the efforts of the King's African Rifles and West African units. Yet Lettow Vorbeck, a master of the fighting withdrawal, was not decisively defeated. There stood Out, too, the further distinguishing peculiarity of a climate pitilessly hostile not only to the European but to the Indian soldier, and in particular, in this connection, the rainy season, which, while it lasts, not only takes its heavy toll
Kingdom and
white troops were unfit for further action, he said: 'I believe between October and December 1916 we evacuated between 12,000—15,000 patients, malaria cases
forced to call a halt to his advance. His lines of
but renders serious military a physical impossibility. To defeat the climate little regard had been paid, yet here, above all, lay the real reason why, in the end, the valour and steadfast endurance of the troops from the United
of health, operations
<
In 1917 the British followed
Germany's example and began to rely on the real fighting ability of their African soldiers, but once again both
sides became exhausted and, rather than surrender, Lettow Vorbeck made a desperate attempt to gain time by
invading Portuguese East Major R. Sibley. Below: Askaris, backbone of German resistance in East Africa
Africa.
illustrate how the British troops had suffered. In November 1914 its strength
was 832 350 were 31 the
all fit
ranks; by June 10, 1915 only for active service;
on October
war diary records 836 admissions
In April 1916 the regiment South Africa to recuperate and returned in June with 531 all ranks. By December the unit had fallen to 345 all ranks in spite of the fact that it had not seen heavy fighting. The 2nd Rhodesian Regiment, strength 500 in March 1915, had by October 1916 shrunk to 125 — and by December only 67 remained. During the period March 1915 to January 1917 a total of 1,038 of all ranks served with the unit. Recorded casualties were: killed 36, to hospital.
was sent
to
wounded
84, admissions to hospital 2,272, cases of sickness 10,626 (3,127 malaria, 921 dysentery). Indian troops suffered casualties similar to the white troops, and, with the KAR, had borne the brunt of some of the heaviest fighting. The expansion of the had been slow to start. It had been recognised as the obvious solution as far back as 1914 by some of the more far-sighted British officers, but failure and indeed stubbornness to accept the fact that the black soldier was better than the white in East African conditions prevented recruiting. During the period October 1916 to November 1917 much was done to rationalise the training of the KAR, all recruiting was centralised, differences of pay and conditions were smoothed out and the number batof British NCOs serving with talions was increased. As the was to play such an important part in the remainder of the campaign it is essential to look a little more closely at their organisations. By the early part of 1917 the KAR consisted of five regiments, each with its own depot, totalling altogether 13 battalions. total
KAR
KAR
KAR
But
in
February 1917
it
was agreed
to in-
crease the KAR to 20 battalions. In April 1917 the formation of the 6th KAR began at Morogoro, using initially ex-German Askaris who were in the camps. The KAR official history states: 'At first the quality of these new units was very different from that of the three battalions that had participated in the campaign to date ... So much the greater therefore was the achievement of those officers, NCOs and experienced soldiers who carried the
POW
new
battalions through the disasters that some of them during their first few months on active service.' Meanwhile, the already trained forces continued operations. During September 1916, troops were dispatched to Kilwa. The reason behind this was to strike at the German food supply depots, which were becoming increasingly scarce. A defensive position was prepared on the heights overlooking Kilwa and by the end of September four battalions had arrived. Smuts had given orders that the Kilwa Force should push inland as soon as possibefell
Brigadier-General Hannyington, comForce, set out for Kibata with the 2/2nd KAR and Kibata Fort was seized on October 18. This was a real baptism of fire for the new KAR. At the end of October, Smuts visited Kilwa and decided that the HQ of 1st Division together with the 2nd Brigade should go to Kilwa and by the end of November the Kibata garrison was strengthened. Between December 6 and 9 Lettow Vorbeck attacked Kibata and, in spite of the poorly co-ordinated artillery plan, his attack was successful. The young Askaris in the KAR were not used to the severity of the struggle and the German attack inflicted heavy losses on the KAR and the Gold Coast Regiment. Lettow Vorbeck appreciated the strategic effects of this small engagement: 'Our vigorous actions at Kibata forced him (the British] to move from Kilwa against us and to leave the rest of the country and our supply ble.
manding the Kilwa
system in peace.' Lettow Vorbeck learnt at about this time that he had been awarded the Pour le
Merite — Germany's highest The news was received in
decoration.
a
personal
from General Smuts! 'I mention this letter from General Smuts as a proof of the mutual personal esteem and chivalry which has existed throughout in spite of the exhausting warfare carried on by letter
both sides.'
Smuts now aimed at crossing the Rivers Mgeta and Rufiji before the floods rose so that he might link up with the Kilwa Force.
The main force had stayed inactive on the banks of the Mgeta since September, but Smuts had activated it into four columns with the aim of overwhelming the Germans on the River Mgeta line while outflanking them and securing a crossing on the Rufiji at Mkalinzo. The columns advanced and BrigadierGeneral Beves was given the task of executing the flanking move to cross the Rufiji. The advance was slow for the rains made it impossible to make any speed, and in fact the Nigerians had to wade waist deep for most of the advance. Simultaneously with the four columns advancing, a further push was to be made from Kibata. The Germans had turned Kibata into a good defensive position, and this was a real stumbling block for the offensive. The Kibata battle was fought in condiwhich resembled Flanders more than any other engagement in East Africa — the familiar theme of rain, opposing trenches, sapping, sniping periscopes and grenades were all to be found in this engagement. Beves' column pushed its way through thick bush and reached the Rufiji. He entions
countered no opposition, crossed the river
and dug in the Germans were surprised the sudden appearance of the South African troops The other three columns cached the Rufiji and skilfully established themselves on the terman side of the river under cover of darkness. Hut yet again the Germans Blipped through the net. At this point Smuts was called away from East Africa to represent South Africa at the Imperial Defence Conference in London Before leaving Smuts declared 'thai the campaign is over, and that all thai now remains to be done is to sweep up the remnants of the enemy force!' This was not an accurate or a widely held belief. Lettow Vorbeck had still not been brought to battle and was still full of fight. The majority of German East Africa was undoubtedly now in British hands, but the war dragged on and the men Smuts saved from becoming battle casualties by his cautious approach became hospital casualtieSmuts was not an astute soldier; a brilliant statesman and politician, but no Boldier.' This was Meinertzhagen's view. This series of operations — the last and in Mime respects the boldest of Smuts' plans -could hardly be said to have come within measurable distance of success. The converging advance from the north and that of the 1st Division from the south had nearly effected a junction which might have encircled the German main body in the Rufiji and compelled its surrender. But the at
i
I
defeat of the
Germans was the paramount
aim and
had
not been achieved. of February 1917 the rains fell with abnormal violence. All hopes of striking a final blow at the Germans vanished. The problems of food this
still
By the beginning
supply were acute on both sides. a
war
which
famine
It
became
was
frequent. Colonel Dobbs, the British AQMG, stated in his report: 'I honestly cannot see how we are going to feed the troops in view of the weather and serious transport situation.' The iermans withdrew from the Rufiji delta and in this area fighting came to a halt during the wet season. in
(
General Northey's force, which had pushed up from Rhodesia to Iringa, was by the end of September extended over a front some 200 miles wide. The 2nd Division, under van Deventer, had reached the railway and did not have the ability to go further south. Northey's position had become precarious, for the German force
under General Wahle, which was retreating from Tabora, was marching eastwards in three columns under Captains Wintgens, Langenn and Zingel and was heading straight for Northey's line of communications. His force at Iringa was in danger of being isolated. Wahle's command was about 2,000 strong and in a good state of morale. He held the initiative, but his command structure was not strong and some of his subordinates acted independently, thereby detracting from his strong tactical and strategic position. The large force operating in the rear of the British positions at the time presented a very real threat, but Wahle's aim was to withdraw and join up with Lettow Vorbeck so the potential German threat was never fully realised. In December Smuts was able to call upon Northey to support the general
advance from the Mgeta river. Captain Wintgens from General Wahle's column refused to join Lettow Vorbeck and had decided to wage a war of his own. His column had several engagements
2320
against Northey's force and then, to everyamazement, he turned north-west towards Tabora. This caused great alarm in this Belgian-held town. By February it had become apparent that Wintgens was handling his force with considerable skill and with the initiative firmly in his hands he had pushed on, driving clean through the British lines of communication. By May the situation was such that a special force commanded by Brigadier-General Edmunds, totalling 1,700 rifles and 14 machine guns, was formed to track down Wintgens' small army. Fever eventually took toll of Wintgens' health and on May 21 he handed over command to Oberleutnant Nauman and he himself surrendered. Nauman took over command of the force numbering some one's
50 Europeans, 500 Askaris and 700 carriers and continued to fight with a renewed vigour and drive. He changed his direction of advance repeatedly, thereby posing an unknown danger to the Belgians and to British East Africa itself. He was still actively attacking in September 1917 but on September 30 he was surrounded by a Colonel Lilley and the 4th King's African Rifles quite close to the border of British East Africa. On October 2 he formally surrendered with his force of 14 Europeans, 150 Askaris and 300 carriers. For nearly a year he had kept a British column in the field chasing him over 1,600 miles, creating valuable
disorganisation
and
diverting
Askaris from the main war theatre. Lettow Vorbeck is less complimentary for he says: 'Captain Nauman led the forces on until finally he surrendered to the pursuing enemy column near Mt Kilimanjaro towards the end of 1917. It is to be regretted that this operation, carried out with so much determination and initiative, became separated so far from the major theatre of war as to be of little use.' Lettow Vorbeck's judgement is quite wrong and he does not give this small Ger-
man From been
force credit for its incredible efforts. the British point of view it had a considerable danger, operating in
?
He still had the
determination and drive to continue the struggle where possibly an ordinary general would have surrendered' Opposite top: The war in East Africa in 1917. Vorbeck's aim since the Battle of Tanga in 1914 had been to attract into East Africa as many British troops as possible. By the end of 1917 the logic of this strategy implied a continuation of the tactic of retreat out of German territory into Portuguese East Africa. He did not hesitate to take this line. Opposite bottom: A lookout post of the Kings African Rifles, rapidly expanded during 1917
together for three years the German Colonial Army in East Africa. His tactical sense was proved time and time again in engagements, as his long term strategic plan worked itself out with each passing month. To succeed tactically and strategically there must be a fighting army and here was Lettow Vorbeck's greatest single achievement. To hold together an army in such conditions as prevailed in East Africa was difficult enough, but to hold together, in East Africa, an army that since 1915 had been continually withdrawing was an outstanding example of leadership. The bulk of that army was not made up of his fellow countrymen but Africans who had no interest in the European war and yet followed him through what must be one of the most difficult campaigns in the First World War. His efforts must rate as one of the outstanding examples of leadership in that war.
The
rains,
and
severe
which in 1917 had been abnormally prolonged, had
main forces. It had held the was completely independent for supply and thereby free to attack anywhere. General van Deventer, who had
brought operations to a standstill in the valleys and lower coastal ground that the British were occupying. The British spent
taken over command of the British forces from General Hoskins, comments: 'Such a raid could perhaps only have been carried out in a country like German East Africa where the bush is often so thick that two considerable forces may pass within a mile of each other and where an energetic leader of a small force can nearly always live off
ling,
the rear of the initiative,
the country.' In the early part of 1917, Lettow Vorbeck was becoming alarmed by the difficulty of feeding and clothing his force — 'more dangerous than the enemy seemed to me the material position of our men'. The supply and baking of bread, so important to the Europeans in his force, was becoming increasingly difficult. There was a great shortage of boots, but Lettow Vorbeck's experiments had proved that a European could go barefoot where there were tolerable paths. He could not, however, move through the bush. 'To be ready for any emergency, I had some lessons in boot making. It is very convenient for a European who knows the simplest rudiments of this craft to be able to kill an antelope and make a boot from his skin a few days later without the help of any of the tools of civilisation.' Such was the man who had held
much
of
March and April
but they had failed
in active patrol-
to notice that the
Germans were pulling back. Lettow Voraim was to get food for his men and this meant finding the fertile areas. Van beck's
Deventer decided Kilwa and Lindi were to be the firm base from which the new offensive would take shape. The commander at Kilwa, Brigadier General Beves, was instructed to push out his column and attack, while the Lindi force was told to contain the Germans and build up its strength before attempting any advance. On July 6 a severe action took place at Mhindi and the Germans withdrew to Narungombe and prepared carefully sited defensive positions. The British columns planned to attack the Germans' left and right flanks, aided by a simultaneous frontal assault. The defences were well prepared and held by eight companies and 48 machine guns. All columns attacked but without a great deal of success — the new KAR recruits were finding conditions hard. The day was saved by the 3rd Battalion, the King's African Rifles, who charged the Germans' left flank and took the position with bayonets. The Germans left behind two machine guns, which later stood for years outside the main barrack gates of the
'*»,«.
:~*
# »» ft *»
..
-
Fi
**' -**A
*fc*;
3rd KAR in Kenya and now stand outside the gates of the 3rd Battalion, The Kenya Rifles. This assault by the 3rd KARchanged the whole situation — the Germans withdrew from their other positions. The battle of Narungombe was won and became one of the battle honours borne by the KAR. The assault from Lindi and Kilwa was planned for September and the forces at
both bases were strengthened. An airfield was constructed and food dumps were built up. In the meantime the Lindi force had attempted some offensive actions but these had been none too successful. An account by an officer in the 25th Fusiliers speaks for itself: 'It was decided that we were to hold on here, and arrangements were made to bring water, while bully and biscuit would be on ration — no tea, no cooked food, for no fire could be allowed. For five days we lay in the confined square in our shallow trenches, drinking sparingly of foul water. Our porters had a bad time here. At the end of five days many of them were almost unable to walk.' Van Deventer moved his tactical headquarters to Kilwa so as to be able to coordinate the southward advance and the link up between the Kilwa and Lindi Forces. The two forces were such a short distance from each other, but could they hold Lettow Vorbeck? A decisive movement was impending. Lettow Vorbeck realised this and, always ready to exploit a tactical weakness, he moved forward with five companies and took command himself. The battle of Maliwa was to be one of the bitterest engagements of the war. Attack and counterattack followed in quick succession. The full fire power of the machine gun was exploited. The history of the King's African Rifles vividly describes the battle. Early in the action all the 'nachine guns of
2322
KAR
were disabled and practically gun teams were wiped out. 'C Company dashed out to recover one gun that had apparently been abandoned in the open, and found the entire team lying dead around it. 'A' and B' Companies had been the first committed to battle, and when they were forced to fall back, 'C Company went
112nd
all the
r
through them at the double with bayonets By the early afternoon the whole battalion was again committed, two companies of 312nd KAR in support. The whole
fixed.
force
remained on the defensive
until the
enemy broke the attack about 2000 hours, 112nd KAR had lost over half its European and over a third of its African personnel. Lettow Vorbeck considered it was a decisive victory: 'On the evening of October 18 we had, with some 1,500 men, completely defeated a whole enemy detachment of at least 4,000 and probably not less than 6,000 strong. With the exception of Tanga, it was the most serious defeat he had suffered.'
British
casualties at this battle were 50% of those in-
about 3,000, more than
volved—the Germans lost 519 men. This was a fine victory for Lettow Vorbeck, but, as he himself comments, the losses for his small force were heavy and impossible to replace. The junction of the British Kilwa and Lindi Forces brought the campaign in German East Africa to its final phase.
The Germans evacuated Chiwata on November 15 and fell back on Nambindinga, where Lettow Vorbeck made a decision which determined the conduct of the remainder of the war in East Africa. The continual bush fighting was consuming at a rapid rate all the Germans' ammunition—already in short supply. Furthermore this type of fighting could not
bring about a satisfactory solution.
The logistic system was also going through a period of stress and it was only by reducing the number of Askaris in the field that it could be made to work. It was becoming impossible to get from the land the food that was required, for the area available for food gathering had been reduced and the land had been exhausted by the British advance. The vital supply of quinine was getting lower — without quinine it was impossible for the Europeans to carry on the struggle, so this was a direct indication to Lettow Vorbeck to reduce his European strength. It was decided that the optimum number to continue the struggle was about 2,000 all
and anything above this figure had left behind. So the strongest and fittest men had to be singled out and the wounded and sick left behind. The method of operating was to change radically. A system of supplies and ammunition, stored in dumps, was no longer possible. All supplies now would have to be captured, and in sufficient quantity to enable the war to continue. With these factors in mind Lettow Vorrifles,
to
be
beck decided to continue the struggle by withdrawing into Portuguese East Africa. The following statement clearly indicates that he had not lost sight of his aim and still had the determination and drive to continue the struggle where possibly an ordinary general would have surrendered. If we succeeded, however, in maintaining the force on the new territory the increased independence and mobility used with deter mination against a less mobile enemy would give us a local superiority in spite of the great numerical superiority of the enemy. In the unlimited territory at our disposal it
would be possible
to
withdraw from un-
-* »*»
i Preparing a landing place for British Above top: General Smuts — a brilliant statesman and politician, but no soldier'. The majority of German East Africa was falling into his hands, but the war dragged on and the men who Smuts saved from becoming battle casualties by his cautious Left:
military stores.
approach were becoming hospital casualties. Above: General von Lettow Vorbeck His efforts in successfully holding together a largely African force in a very demoralising retreat must be rated as one of the outstanding examples of leadership in the First World War. Right: General van Deventer. Like Smuts, he was unable to bring Vorbeck to a decisive battle
favourable positions. The enemy would be compelled to keep an enormous amount of men and material continually on the move, and to exhaust his strength to a greater extent proportionately than ourselves.
The
decision having been made, Lettow
Vorbeck abandoned Nambindinga, leaving behind his surplus soldiers, and then marched up the River Ravuma. On November 21 he marched south with 300 Europeans, 1,700 Askaris and 3,000 carriers, and on November 25 the small army crossed into Portuguese territory, from where it was to carry on the struggle. During the year General Smuts had left for the Imperial Defence Conference in London, saying that the campaign was over, but this of course was quite untrue. He had become obsessed by Lettow Vorbeck and in spite of his overwhelming strength in men and material he was irresistibly
drawn forward but unable to bring the German to a decisive battle and defeat him. His tactics were coloured by the desire to avoid casualties, and this forced him to attempt wide flanking movements from which Lettow Vorbeck slipped away every time. The further Smuts advanced, the more men he required and correspondingly more supplies — this became a vicious circle, for the longer he took the more casualties were suffered as a result of the severe African climate. He was an energetic but cautious man with a keen political sense — this helped him to command his army drawn from several nationalities — but he lacked tactical knowledge. 'Smuts has cost Britain many hundreds of lives and many millions of pounds by his caution.' Smuts had handed over command to Hoskins and van Deventer, who during 1917 brought the campaign to a point when all German East Africa was in British
hands but Lettow Vorbeck was still able to continue the fight. The year was also significant because it proved that European and Indian troops could not stand up to the severity of the African climate. A vast expansion of the King's African Rifles was experienced and the foundations of an army laid that was to continue the campaign into Portuguese East Africa. The soldiers of the King's African Rifles had been regarded by many British officers as excellent material as early as 1914 but the Governor of Kenya and various officers required to report on the expansion of the KAR had advocated caution. This was a great pity for more of these excellent soldiers might well have brought the campaign to a close earlier. Lettow Vorbeck on the other hand had complete trust in his African soldiers who remained loyal to Germany in the most severe of fighting conditions. The British battalions who served near the KAR in some of the most difficult fighting gave a clear indication of what they thought of the qualities of the KAR. An officer of the 25th Royal Eusiliers in his diary says: 'It was here that one saw, and realised the full fighting courage to which well trained native African troops can rise. The l/2nd King's African Rifles was one of the original prewar regular battalions, and magnificently they fought here, and we, who were an Imperial Unit, felt that we could not have wished for a stouter, nor a more faithful regiment to fight alongside.' By far the most significant factor during 1917 was the performance of the German commander Lettow Vorbeck. His aim since the Battle of Tanga in 1914 had been to attract into East Africa as many British forces as possible — this aim he achieved with great success. The size of the British
was fast approaching a point where was larger than Lord Roberts' whole army in the South African War. Tactically he had handled his force skilfully, avoiding
forces it
pitched battles and always outmanoeuvring his opponent so that he was never forced into a static battle from which there was no escape. This must be one of the few campaigns in the First World War where the dominant weapon was the machine and mobility was the key to tactical success. Lettow Vorbeck both tactically and strategically was conducting the campaign to his battle appreciation. Morale, it is agreed, is the greatest single factor in war — and Lettow Vorbeck had up to now led his small army for three years in a series of fighting
withdrawals -the superhuman effort to keep any army together in such a setting cannot be underestimated. But when this
superhuman
effort is considered together with the fact that he was leading mainly African soldiers who were quite unfamiliar with this scale of warfare, and the enormity of his logistic problems, it is only then that the German Commander can be fully
appreciated.
Lettow Vorbeck had retired from GerEast Africa. He was going to carry on the fight from Portuguese East Africa.
man
Further Reading Gardiner, Brian, German East (Gale and Polden) Lettow Vorbeck, General von. My Reminiscences of East Africa (Hurst and Blackett,
London)
Moyse-Bartlett, H., The King's African Rifles (Gale and Polden)
Moseley, L., DuelforKilimanjaro (Weidenfeld and Nicolson)
[For Major E. Siblev's biography, see page 360.}
2323
TER-CONTINENTAL FLIGHT In October 1917 the Germans selected a crack crew for the largest airship of the time and sent it on a special mission — to take supplies to the hard-pressed force which was fighting a desperate rearguard action under General von
Lettow Vorbeck in German East Africa. Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Skrine Photograph: A Zeppelin over the minarets of Constantinople. Soon there was to be a Zeppelin over the pyramids of the Nile
The naval Zeppelin L59, built in the autumn of 1917, was the largest airship of her time. She was built in great haste in order to carry a special load of arms and to the force in German East commanded by General von Lettow Vorbeck, now in desperate straits for lack
equipment Africa
ammunition and medical supplies. The Germans were cut off from the outside world and very little news reached Germany. It was not until May 1917 that there was any hope of sending supplies by airship. The German Colonial Office proposed the method at the suggestion of of
Doctor Lupitza, former head of the Medical
Department of Togoland. The German Admiralty favoured the plan, but no airship yet built had the range to reach German East Africa with a useful load. The colony was 4,300 miles from the nearest base — Jamboli (Yambol) in Bulgaria.
There were several unknown factors to be taken into account as well — among them the endurance of any given crew. The men of the Naval Airship Service were used to missions averaging 20 hours in northern and eastern Europe, and. were specially selected for their ability to stand the stress of long flights in bad weather. But this flight would be different from any other. It would be five times as long,
through unknown turbulence and extremes of temperature, with possibilities of meeting hostile aircraft at both ends of the journey. The Allies had aircraft in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea but
very few in East Africa. Lettow Vorbeck had none.
Without weather reports or radio directional aids the navigation problem was formidable, and no one could tell how the Zeppelin would find the troops on the ground. Even when the airship arrived, the matter of making a safe landing in bad weather would have to be left to chance as there would be no trained ground crew to receive her. Altogether it was a daring scheme, but one apparently justified by the gravity of the situation in the summer of this year, as Lettow Vorbeck was driven from his positions in the centre of the territory towards the south-eastern corner, in the Makoudi highlands, near the border with Portuguese East Africa.
The German Admiralty was encouraged with the plan in July, when a Zeppelin commander, Kapitanleutnant Ernst Lehmann, based at Seerappen in the
to proceed
Baltic Sea, undertook an endurance flight on his own initiative. Lehmann was one of the few who had commanded a Zeppelin before the war on regular commercial flights with passengers. He possessed the vision and enthusiasm for really long-dis-
tance flight in rigid airships. He worked out a system of reliefs or watches and devised ways of making living conditions more tolerable. He found that his ship, a standard type, with a crew of 28, could carry enough fuel, ballast and a further 10,000 pounds of bombs, stores and equipment for a flight of over 101 hours, and still have a reserve of fuel at the end. There were other reasons, in part psychological, governing the decision to build a special airship for the Africa flight. The German High Command and people were disappointed by the failure of the bombing attacks on England. Losses had been too high and the army had lost faith in the Zeppelin in 1916. A successful flight to Last Africa would do more than bring aid
beleaguered force. It would have a powerful political effect throughout the world and raise morale at home in a year of deadlock and stress. The prestige of the navy was at stake. The surrender of Lettow Vorbeck's wasting force would leave Germany without a colony when peace came. Thus the German Admiralty ordered the L 57, then under construction, to be lengthened and her gas capacity increased to allow a flight of four and a half days, carrying a load of 16 tons of small arms, ammunition and medical stores. Kapitanleutnant Ludwig Bockholt was selected as her commander, and the date of the flight was fixed — the new-moon period of October. The giant ship had two additional gas cells; she had five engines, like others of her class, but these were of an old type, of 1914 vintage. Bockholt found the new airship underpowered and not easy to handle. She was 743 feet long and had to be flown nose upwards in order to maintain height under full load with only four engines; in this attitude rudder control was to a
poor.
Bockholt was not able to load stores for full speed trials until October 3, but as bad luck would have it, the meteorological forecast was adverse; he hoped nevertheless to complete the trial in two hours before the weather broke. He was surprised by an unexpected gust of wind which caught the airship as she was being pulled out of the hangar and had to take off prematurely in order to avoid striking the side of the shed. Not long afterwards the weather looked more threatening. Eventually he decided to land, a feat which he managed to pull off but not even a landing party numbering 700 men could anchor the L 57. She swung broadside to the wind and was blown across the landing field into a fence, where she caught fire. Her hydrogen bags exploded and she became a total loss. This disastrous start did not affect German determination to press on in their effort to avert surrender in East Africa. The Admiralty ordered the lengthening of another naval airship under construction, the L 59 — The Africa Ship' as she came to be known. Within 16 days she was airborne, with Bockholt in command. the
Ignorance of the true situation No word of Lettow Vorbeck's real
situa-
tion seems to have reached Germany at this date, though there were disquieting rumours in the Colonial Office, based on
Allied
broadcasts.
The general himself
had no thought of surrender, though he faced grave problems. At this point Lettow Vorbeck made up his mind that he could no longer live on the country without supplies. Surrender was out of the question for such a leader. He decided, therefore, to invade Portuguese Bast Africa, capture all he could and continue his war! He announced his decision on October 24 at a conference with the
Governor,
who was
in
charge of
civil
administration. But there was now no means of rapid communication with Germany, and only a day after this, the L 59 made her first trial flight. On October 30 Bockholt received orders to proceed to Jamboli, and from there to
East Africa, where he and his men were ground forces. A return flight was impossible, for no hydrogen plant to join the
existed, but there
was consolation
in the
thought of the uses that might be made of the airship and engines as well as the precious freight. Bockholt's orders about the location of the troops in East Africa were necessarily vague. He was to try and make a rendezvous with the German forces first at Mahenge, about half way between Lake Nyasa and the Indian Ocean. Failing this he was to land at Liwale — nearer the coast and the Makondi district, thought to be secure: in fact none of these places were in German hands at the time the orders were written. The L59 would have to stalk any large bodies of troops and the plan was to drop one of the crew by parachute. He was the man who would make the final decision, distinguish friend from foe and signal whether or not it was safe to land. Flight-Sergeant Grussendorf volunteered for this final
key task.
The cargo was planned with great care and amounted to 15 tons, about three quarters being ammunition and small arms of various types. The dural girders of the airship frame were to be used to build a long-range wireless station, a portable field hospital, huts or bridging stores. The engines would drive dynamos for the wireless transmitter or electric power. The walkways in the hull were of leather to make boots and sandals. Everything was planned to save weight, not only for air-
reasons but because the camwas reaching a stage where all movement through the bush would be by man-pack — and there were no roads. At 0700 hours on November 3, the L 59 left Staaken, near Berlin, and headed through fog and low cloud for Breslau and the Balkans. Among those on board was Doctor Hugo Eckener, formerly one of Count Zeppelin's men and now in the Naval Airship Division. He was a masternavigator and commander and had played transport
paign
a great part as adviser and trainer. He and Ernst Lehmann were going as far as the forward base to assist in the final preparations. Doctor Lupitza was in charge of the medical side and was going on with the crew to Africa. Bockholt was the navy's choice as captain (despite the protests of Strasser. the Leader of Airships), and though less ex-
perienced than some other commanders he proved himself to be well suited, in temperament and skill, for such a mission. He had volunteered to join the Airship Division at the
first
opportunity.
He was
a
determined and thrustful man. with an unshakable faith in the war-winning power of the Zeppelin. It is probable that he owed his quick promotion to the high casualty rate among airship crews, higher than in
any other
service.
Arrival at Jamboli By noon on November
4, after an eventful journey, the L59 was over her forward base, where the ground staff and a landing party of 400 Bulgars weir ready to receive her. The Zeppelin came down slowly under elevator control from 5,000 to 500 feet, where the engines were stopped and a red flag, below the gondola, showed that the trail rope was about to he dropped. The last stages of a gentle landing were controlled with the help of the gas manoeuvre valves. By 1230 hours she was in the hangar, 28 hours after leaving Staaken It was a satisfactory performance considering the very short time that had been avail-
2900'
Jamboli (Yambol)
Dongola Sea of Marmara
EGYPT
able for building the ing up the crew.
new
airship and work-
up under
The German Admiralty was still without any definite news of Lettow Vorbeck's position. The Allies claimed the capture of a part of his force that had been operating independently of the main body. This was true, but many of the German detachments were disposed on a wide front, too far away to be controlled from headquarters and thus forced to act independently for long periods. Most of the Germans' wireless equipment was useless until the L59 could bring the 73 pounds of spare radio parts needed, and these were worth many times their weight in machine guns or ammunition. The Germans were quite unaware that their secret had leaked out and that the Allies were alerted and had warned their aircraft to expect an airship. Had their
Admiralty
was
known
that
Lettow Vorbeck
had would have cancelled the
in retreat, or that British aircraft
been warned, operation.
As
it
it
was, the mission was
allowed to proceed.
On November 13, the L59 was ready for the operation. She took off for Africa with her heavy load, but almost immediately met unexpected air currents from a mete-
She was forced downwards over the hangar and to avoid hitting it much of the ballast. had to be dropped. A postponement of the flight was orological inversion.
necessary.
The second attempted start, on November 16, nearly met with disaster not far from Jamboli. The cloud height was 1,200 feet, but even so L59 was mistaken for an
A whole swarm of aircraft Varna gave chase but Bockholt managed to get into cloud over the Black Allied airship.
from
Sea and narrowly escaped being shot down. He then crossed the sea to Asia Minor and followed the railway line for a considerable distance towards Smyrna. It wound in and out through narrow valleys. Cloudcovered mountains towered above the airship. Presently it ran into he ivy thunderstorms and the only safe course was to take the Zeppelin out of the valley and well clear of them. This gain in altitude could
2326
not be achieved by dynamic
TURKEY
Mediterranean Sea
lift
(planing
engine power) alone, and so a large part of the ballast had to be released before L 59 reached a safer altitude. Bockholt realised he had no hope of completing the long flight without ballast and he had no alternative but to turn back for Jamboli. Several days of bad weather imposed a further frustrating delay. It was not until November 20 that the
Black Sea
,
Bucharest
full
and a decision was made to start early next day for the rendezvous with Lettow Vorbeck s men, somewhere near the Makondi highlands. It was too late. Bockholt's loss of the L 57 had deprived Lettow Vorbeck of any chance
weather was
Jamboli (Yambol)
<& of
Otranto
Aea an
?
^J\
TURKEY
ir>
W.Smyrna ? Cos
right,
# Adalia
&*\_ f
Crete
Mediterranean Sea
of relief.
There was great activity when the hangar doors were opened on that freezing wintry morning of November 21. The hydrogen filling hoses were pulled out and made fast for the last time. The gas valves were freed and the hydrogen, began to flow into the cells with a hissing sound, soon to be lost in the noise of the engines being run up and tested. Navigators were busy over maps, charts and instruments and in studying the latest weather reports, which forecast a cold front approaching from the north-west. Outside and around the ship the Bulgar landing team were waiting for the order 'ship clear for flight', followed by 'Airship out of hangar — march!' This
time weather and
Bockholt
expected
200MILES
clear
winds as far as the but turbulence and thundertail
African coast, storms were predicted over the Mediterranean after he left. He followed the River Tundza to Adrianople and after that the old strategic road that led to Constantinople. He reached the Sea of Marmara over the heights of Rodosto, keeping at a medium altitude of 2,000 feet in order to conserve gas. He kept on over the sea and passed over Marmara Island on the Asiatic coast before heading for Smyrna by the same route as before. By 1400 hours the L59 had reached the point from which she had been forced to return a fortnight earlier and by 1 700 hours they were at the eastern end of the azure-blue Gulf of Smyrna.
Before reaching this point German reconnaissance aircraft had flown over the Allied airfields on the islands off the coast and had seen no special activity. It was important nonetheless to keep well out of sight, and the L59 turned inland again, before turning south. She cruised over many historic places and mountainous country, full of attraction and interest for those of the crew who had time to look downwards.
After dark she approached the danger area east of Kos where Allied aircraft had been seen during the day. But now there was no trace of them and as L59 left the coast there was nothing but a firmament of stars and the dark night of the sea to be seen.
Above: The Africa Ship, L 59. Left: A cross-section of the L 59's odyssey, from the mountains of southern Turkey to the baking wastes of the Sahara, whose featureless surface presented great problems of navigation. Below left: The L 59's flight. Below: A section through the L 59s hull. Running the length of the ship was a triangular girder, the main structural member of the vessel. Braced to this by wires were circular transverse formers, over which the fabric outer skin of the airship was stretched. The space left inside was utilised for the gas bags for the hydrogen which lifted the ship The cargo carried on the trip comprised (with its weight in pounds in brackets): 31 1,000 rounds of ammunition (16,950), 230 machine gun belts with 57,500 rounds (3,855), 54 ammunition boxes with 13,500 rounds (972), 30 machine guns (2,460), 4 rifles (36), 9 machine gun barrels (90), 61 sacks of bandages and medicines (5,790), 3 sacks of sewing materials (265), mail (55), binoculars (62), rifle bolts (110), bush knives (168) and radio parts (73) -a total of 30,886 pounds
Towards 2200 hours the crew could pick out the lights off the southern point of Crete. The next few hours would be the critical ones, for the sub-tropical sky was glittering and shimmering — a sure sign that a storm was approaching. A north-east storm was indeed on the way, the wind increasing and the radio operator reporting electrical disturbances with his reception. The L 59 was passing the toe of Crete when intermittent sheet lightning gave way to a real thunderstorm. The strength
wind increased steadily so that she could make no headway. "We will never get through,' the watch officer remarked. 'We must try and navigate around it. The of the
commander seemed to agree. Next came a report from the
look-out
man
on the ship's back that it had begun to rain heavily. Clouds chased above and below the ship in different directions. It seemed impossible to escape from this witch's cauldron. Vertical gusts buffeted the ship and the bows rose and fell as much
as an old canal steamer in a rough sea. Continuous lightning lit up the rushing clouds. There were steaming, bubbling, endless mountains of air. Rain and hail lashed the windows of the gondola. It was quite impossible to keep the ship at the altitude of 2,000 feet ordered and she was down to 1,000 feet at times. Then came a report from the look-out man on the upper platform 'The ship is on fire!', and so it was. The airship, lit up by lightning, had become heavily charged
and was a terrifying sight as the whole
of
upper surface appeared
Lehmann was working
glowing with the bluish flame known as St Elmo's fire. It flashed and streamed from the machine gun sights and any projecting struts. Men ii v icing the engines or attempting to walk forward along the narrow corridor in the keep were liable to shocks if they grasped a handrail. The long radio antenna had to be reeled in. (Airships were always liable lo be st ruck by lightning in a thunderstorm. There were occasions when it could not be avoided and then the envelope and frame members were often holed, though seldom with fatal results. The risk of fire was less than might be supposed, provided the ship was below pressure height and not discharging hydrogen.) The L59 survived this one and flew on, receiving no messages south of Crete. By this tune the German Admiralty had been informed of the grave situation of Lettow Voi heck and sent a recall signal, first via Jamboli and later by means of the more powerful long-range station at Nauen, but without result. At 0500 hours the airship crossed the African coast near Solium, 200 miles west of Alexandria, amid extremely difficult air turbulence and navito be
gation problems.
navigation Bockholt had been navigating by astral observation throughout, checked in daylight by occasional landmarks such as the railway line leading to Smyrna, but from now onwards visual aids were few and far between and he had to follow the surface method of navigation by dead reckoning over an African landscape that was almost featureless for hundreds of miles, without recognisable landmarks. Ground speed and drift were estimated by observing the time taken for the shadow of the ship to pass a fixed spot on the ground, the length of the ship being known; the other data required were obtained from a table. The loneliness of the desert had a depressing effect and to this was added the discomforts of Difficult
flight in violent
bumpy
the overheated ground. of
High
air
weather, the result rising from the
air
temperatures presented another
peculiar difficulty to the L59. As the fuel was used up she became progressively lighter and tended to rise. Superheating of the gas within the hull decreased the density of the gas and raised its lifting power until a stage was reached, at 'pressure height', where the pressure in the cells relative to the outside atmosphere was so high that it was essential to allow gas to escape through automatic valves.
Bockholt soon found that the L 59 was light
and was losing
gas.
He had
to fly
nose downwards in order to keep below pressure height. With the airship in this attitude it was necessary to shift the ballast and some of the freight towards the tail in order to maintain stability. The work was hard on the crew, who had been shaken by the experiences of the previous night. The hardiest sailors were suffering severely from airsickness. After their fourhour watches the men in the control gondola, who were responsible for the elevators
and
steering,
were complaining of a
strange flickering in front of their eyes and severe headaches. Others, who had been gazing at the bright reflections from the sand, had similar symptoms but they pass-
ed
off after four hours' sleep.
2328
The system
four-hour
watches
devised
by Ernst
well.
Despite such trials the navigation proved remarkably accurate. Although there were no weather reports south of Suez the ship
kept a steady course south-by-east, passing over the oases of Farafra and Dakhla, the only real landmarks and inhabited places in a long day's flight over the desert wastes. The handling of the ship in this very high day temperature was more difficult. At Jamboli, for every 2-000-ft rise in altitude the air temperature rose by 4 Centigrade but now the difference was 20 The difference in temperature between the gas and the air outside sometimes amounted to 10 C and there was a loss of gas, which in turn could only be rectified by disposing of ballast. To avoid this loss called for particular skill on the part of the elevator controller. In this sphere Sergeant Pilot Grussendorf was a master. He discovered the technique needed. Just after dark on the second day there was a noticeable rise in the upper air temperature as the Zeppelin approached the River Nile, near Wadi Haifa, but during the night, as she flew parallel to the river, the gas cooled. She then had to fly nose upwards with one engine temporarily out of action with a cracked casing. To compensate for a loss of gas during the day 4,400 pounds of ballast were dropped and the trim of the ship adjusted by moving ballast and freight nearer to the bows. The failure of the forward engine put the wireless transmitter out of action once again but the receiver was unaffected and it was possible to listen in to the longrange broadcasts from Nauen. In the heart of Africa the crew had news of how things were going on the Italian Front. By this time the crew had learnt how to overcome the main difficulty of flight in the tropics, when great heat by day is followed by supercooling of the gas at night. They had navigated accurately by mainly nautical methods and without radio directional aids. They were now at the latitude of Khartoum, well over half way to their destination, and only Allied aircraft could have stopped them reaching any part of German East Africa. The end of a great achievement that would astonish the world appeared to be within their grasp and the thought that they were bringing help at a critical time was a stimulus to C
.
all
on board.
The L 59 ordered back They could not guess that the end of Lettow Vorbeck's three-year campaign against great odds was approaching. The news came as a great shock after midnight on November 23, in a signal received from Nauen ordering them to break off the operation and return. According to this report, the Allies had occupied the Makondi Highlands and the German troops were surrounded a long way from Liwale. The report was not strictly accurate, but was enough to deter the High Command. All on board received it in a mood of dismay or suspicion. How could the operation have been mounted without full knowledge of the situation in Africa? Some thought that the British had sent a false signal in the German code — a story that persisted for years but which was quite untrue. Bockholt obeyed orders and headed for home in a mood that can well be imagined, frustration,
he had come 2,800 miles from Jamboli and was still going strong. At that rate he could have flown the L 59 with a 15-ton load from Germany to San Francisco. He turned away from Khartoum. There was much pondering as to what course they should follow on the return flight. While they were studying maps and radio messages a gusty headwind sprang up, bringing warmer air and less buoyancy. for
The engines could no longer hold the ship at a steady height. stalled and dropped
At 0300 hours she
2,000 feet without Bockholt immediately ordered some ballast to be released in order to gain height. This should have been enough to bring her upwards but instead of this she fell further towards a mountain peak at the south-east corner of the Jebel Ain. She did not hit the mountain but was carried into a ravine between two steep ridges in a kind of whirlwind. Now very close to the ground she began to pitch so violently that it seemed as if first the bow and then the stern had struck the bottom of the ravine. Then several light knocks were felt, each followed by a slight roll. It turned out that these were only caused by the weights of the fixed antenna dragging over the ground. There were no marks whatever on the
warning.
ship's gondola.
Bockholt saw the danger just in time and ordered the engines to be switched off. At the same moment a 10,000-pound load was thrown out. The lightened airship rose and was driven clear of the dangerous peak. The course was now northward and well away from the Nile valley, on a heading for Farafra Oasis. The crew was tired and some were ill when they reached the Mediterranean at 0330 hours on the third night but there was no loss of morale or discipline. The night sky was lit up by searchlights but L 59 was able to avoid them. Bockholt set a more easterly course for home than the one he had followed on the outward journey, probably in order to lessen the chance of interception. The L 59 struck the Turkish coast at the Gulf of Adalia at 1400 hours. From here Bockholt made straight for Jamboli over the mountains of Anatolia. During the last night the L 59 was flying 'heavy', with the nose upwards and engines full out in order to clear the mountain tops, which she did with 1,300 feet in hand. A sudden downdraught of wind caught the ship and caused a drop almost as sudden as that experienced over the Jebel Ain. She
survived this last hazard by dropping another 6,000 pounds of ballast and ammunition, which they could hear exploding in the valley below. She reached home early on November 25 after four days in the air. She still had enough fuel left to go on for a further three days. Further Reading Eckener. Dr Hugo, Wolff. 1949)
My Zeppelins
W
(Flensburg
Goebel, J. and Forster 40,000 km ZeppelinKnegsfahrten (Leipzig: Koehler) Lehmann, E. A., and Mingos. H The Zeppelins ,
.
(New York Sears, 1927) Lehmann, E. A., Zeppelin -The Story of Lighterthan-air Cralt (Longmans 1937) Lettow Vorbeck, Gen von, My Reminiscences of East Africa (Hurst & Blackett 1919) H., Zeppelm-Weltfahrten (Dresden: BilderstelleLohse, 1933) Nielsen, T.. The Zeppelin Story-The Life of Hugo Eckener (Wmgate 1955) Robinson, Dr D., The Zeppelin in Combat (Foulis 1966)
Luschnath,
Archbishop Mitty High School
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