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23483
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1
KW
9
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San Jose,
CA
riiph School
95129
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THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD VOLUME ONE 1914
>ffl\
Kfe
J
THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD Editor-in-Chief Brigadier Peter
Young
Board Barker; Dr. John Bradley
Editorial
Lt.-Col. A. J.
Professor John Erickson; Lt.-Cdr. Peter
Kemp
John Keegan; Kenneth Macksey; S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard; Norman Stone Revision Editor
Mark Dartford Archbishop Mitty High School Media Center
5000
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Way
San Jose, CA 95129
MARSHALL CAVENDISH NEW YORK, LONDON, TORONTO
Editorial Staff Young
Editor
Brigadier Peter
Deputy Editor
Kenneth Macksey
Co-ordinating Panel
Lt.-Col. A. J. Barker Dr. John Bradley Prof. John Erickson Lt.-Cdr. Peter Kemp
Reference Edition Published 1984 Published by Marshall Cavendish Corporation 147 West Merrick Road
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Freeport,
John Keegan S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard
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Printed and
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in Italy
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No part of this book may be reproduced or any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the copyright holders. All rights reserved. utilized in
© ©
Capt. Sir Basil Liddell-Hart
Island
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Marshall Cavendish Limited 1984 B.P.C. Publishing 1970 now a Division of Macdonald and
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(Publishers) Limited/B.P.C.C.
Barrie Pitt
Executive Editor
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Carolyn Rutherford Bruce French Rose Thomson Margaret Burnley
The Marshall Cavendish encyclopedia of World War One. Bibliography: Includes index. 1.
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The Marshall Cavendish illustrated encyclopedia of World War One. 1. World War, 1914-1918 II. Pitt, Barrie I. Young, Peter, 1915III.
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23483
Foreword World War I began with a minor assassination in the remote corner of a now forgotten European empire. Yet it was to become the first truly global war, embroiling nearly 30 countries across 5 continents. As the tide swelled and nation upon nation rallied its forces,
much of
the world still belonged in the nineteenth century: cavalry officers rode to war on horseback, wearing gaudy uniforms and carrying flashing sabres at their sides. Some even took their servants and households. Military convention had changed little since the days of Wellington and Napoleon. World War 1 changed all that.
The 'Balkan squabble' soon engulfed Europe as the surface tensions broke and the armies marched. Four weary years later, when in 1918 the exhausted combatants from around the world
down
arms, an estimated 13 million soldiers were dead or missing: with them vanished almost an entire generation. Uncounted civilians were dead or homeless. The map of Europe was redrawn as disappeared countries were replaced by new ones that rose from the ashes of the old. Almost overnight, several empires that had taken centuries to build either disintegrated or were shaken to their foundations. An obscure workers movement bubbled up in the cauldron of war as revolution swept through Russia, abruptly ending 300 years of Tsarist rule and bringing Communism in its wake. In Germany, an undefeated army and a starving population seethed with bitterness and resentment. In the chaos that resulted, the evil spark of National Socialism flickered and grew brighter. For the United States, involvement in the conflict had profound consequences. Hitherto an emerging industrial nation with a tradition of isolationism and abstention from foreign entanglements, the U.S. was transformed by the experience into a dominant world power. At the peace negotiations in Paris, many of the people looked to President Woodrow Wilson as the "maker of peace", the embodiment of a democratic idealism they would have as their own. The very face of war itself was changed, in many ways beyond recognition. The airplane, for instance, was no longer an airborne miracle of wood, wire and cloth, but a technically sophisticated instrument of terror and death: by the end of the war, a four-engine bomber was capable of carrying 1000 pounds of high explosive from England to Germany's capital, Berlin. The supremely destructive machinegun held the footsoldier to ransom and spelt extinction for the cavalry. Other machines of war appeared for the first time; the tank and the submarine brought new perils to land and sea. And the horror of gas unfolded a new dimension the age of chemical warfare had begun. The home fronts saw changes, too. By 1918, women from many different social backgrounds were holding jobs in factories, the public services and on the land. Many were also in uniform: activities that would have been condemned as most improper before the war. Thousands of Americans, many of whom had never even ventured beyond their state lines or seen the sea, encountered new countries and cultures for the first time. But the cost had been high, and as the world settled down to an uneasy peace, many felt that an era had irretrievably ended in 1914. When the death toll was finally weighed against Allied 'victory', many also came to believe with a sincerity that must seem naive today that no more could wars be fought and won. Thus the conflict became known as 'The War to end War'. Yet it was in the chaotic aftermath of World War I that the seeds were being sown for a second, even wider-reaching global conflagration. finally laid
their
—
In the Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of World War I, I have found a remarkably thorough and detailed account of this earth-shattering conflict. A well-researched, painstakingly documented reference work of this kind will be an invaluable source for students and researchers of this period. Yet this is not just a record of facts or an academic work without significance beyond its subject matter; it is also the story of what happened to ordinary men and women in extraordinary times. Tales of courage, endurance and suffering, many recounted at first hand, enrich the pages of this set, bringing back to life those momentous events that helped to shape our century. This, coupled with the many superb illustrations throughout, will ensure that this unique and authoritative Encyclopedia will be welcomed by teachers, scholars
and
librarians at
all levels.
CoxC**- 1
^-
Professor Arthur S. Link is George H. Davis Professor of American History at Princeton and Director and Editor of the Papers of Woodrow Wilson. He was educated at the University of North Carolina and has taught History at Princeton, Northwestern University and Oxford. He has written acclaimed books on the Wilson era and has twice won the Bancroft Prize for American History.
.
Reader's Introduction This Introduction to The Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of World War I is intended as a guide to enable the World War I specialist student or interested reader to make fullest use of the broad range of information contained within the work, and so enhance its value as a learning tool, especially for newcomers to this complex and detailed area ofpopular study.
Purpose The primary motivation behind the
War
I
collation of a
work of
this
nature and extent on World
has been threefold:
To
offer a complete, comprehensive and objective reference source on a war which, seen with the benefit of hindsight, has very probably had a more profound effect on the course of twentieth-century history than any other single event of modern times, for if the events of 1914-1918 had been different, so almost certainly would those of 1939-1945.
To provide
the student with a research facility of depth, authority and historical integrity providing ample scope for deeper analysis and study than a simple narrative of facts.
To
help the general reader to understand something of the experience of these momentous years by way of a lively and compelling text, coupled with stimulating illustrative material.
Structure
Made up
of 12 volumes total, the Encyclopedia is arranged as follows: Volume 1 has the Foreword by Professor Link of Princeton and the Editor's Reader's Introduction, a list of major editorial creators and a table of the Contents of the Set. There follows an outline of the war written by the renowned British military specialist Captain Sir Basil Liddell-Hart, introducing the origins, major events and overall concept of the war in a concise and clearly written section invaluable to readers unfamiliar with the subject. brief diary of the war's major events is included for quick date reference, with an additional specially edited chronological table appearing in the contents list of each volume, to give an at-a-glance picture of the sequence of events in each volume in relation to the time span covered. The narrative then begins with an article on the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo in Bosnia in June of 1914.
A
Volumes 2-11. Throughout the set, text entries (numbering over 540, average length 3000-5000 words) conclude with a brief biography of the author and, in most cases, a shortlist of suggested further readings on the specific subject-matter of the entry compiled by the author to complement it. In some cases, articles are reprinted from personal accounts and diaries often written during, or shortly after, the actual events (adding a sense of immediacy to the narrative as a whole) and the sources are fully credited as appropriate at the end of each piece. Also within the narrative framework of the Encyclopedia there are special feature articles which focus on specialist topics: medals and decorations, songs and slang of the day, artists and poets of World War I to name just some. These non-chronological subjects can be located either from the Contents of the Set in Volume 1 or via the General Index in Volume 12.
—
Volume 12 (Index) contains a resume of the war by noted historian A. J. P. Taylor, which reviews the consequences and outcome of the war to match the outline of the war in Volume 1 series of 'profit and loss' charts details overall cost of the war to opposing nations and is a useful guide to the basic economics of World War I. There is also a subject chronology of the war, tabulating events Front by Front. major part of this volume is given over to an extensive and up-to-date World War I Bibliography, which fully lists by subject all primary source and recently published or currently available English language titles in this field. The index itself comprises a fully comprehensive and amalgamated General Index, followed by a separate Classified Index which breaks down into sub-headings for easy reference. The index lists not only all major entries in the text but also lists illustrations under a separate category. Additionally included is a list of major battles, along with their starting dates, and a Glossary of some of the terms which have become unfamiliar today.
A
A
A complete VI
list
of contributors concludes the volume, and the
set.
Text Controlled and edited by a selected panel, the text is written by a variety of distinguished academics and military advisers all having experience in the creation of accessible material for both in-depth study and general enjoyment. Contributors total over 200, and represent every area of international specialty required to compile the Encyclopedia.
writers, historians,
Illustrations
The illustrations form a significant contribution to this work, totalling over 5000 pictures. Most are black and white or sepia tinted contemporary photos many previously unpublished of the statesmen, generals, machinery, scenery and, above all, men, of World War I,
—
—
bringing vividly to life the story of this devastating confrontation. In addition there are a number of color photos of posters, paintings and objects dating from the period. To help students and analysts, there are copious specially commissioned charts, diagrams and maps appearing throughout the set to facilitate graphic perception of the strategy and tactics of armies and the wealth of statistical data accumulated in war. Of especial interest to students of camouflage, heraldry, uniforms and machines of war are the many color drawings of the soldiers and equipment of rival nations, with their weapons, tanks, ships, aircraft and guns. These can all be specifically located using either the General or Classified Indexes in Volume 12.
Conclusion By providing a variety of sources of information about the subjects contained within the Encyclopedia, coupled with a Reader's Introduction to explain their function and location, it is contemplated that the student should, as well as enjoy reading a lively and well-illustrated account of World War I, develop skills of observation and inquiry, of information retrieval and project research essential not only to the study of World War I but to the fullest exploitation and enjoyment of learning itself inherent in all disciplines.
Brigadier Peter Young, D.S.O., M.C., M.A., F.S.A.
Editor-in-Chief
VII
Editorial
Board
Brigadier Peter Young DSO, MC, MA, history at Oxford before joining the British
FSA,
studied 1938.
Army in
During World War II he served throughout the Dunkirk campaign; in the commando raids on Guernsey, the Lofoten Islands, Vaagso and Dieppe; the landings in Sicily and Italy; the Normandy campaign and the last Arakan campaign, commanding No 3 Commando and the 1st Commando Brigade. After the war he commanded the 9th Regiment of the Arab Legion before becoming head of the Military History Department at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. He has written over 30 books on various aspects of Military History and is a frequent broadcaster both in Britain and the United States.
Mark Dartford
is a graduate in American Studies from the University of East Anglia. He has worked in various fields of editorial publishing and research, including Britain's Central Office of Information, specializing in military and aviation subjects, with a particular interest in military history photographs. He is also an active member of various military historical societies.
Lt.-Col. A. J. Barker is graduate of the Staff College at Camberley and the Royal Military College of Science in
England.
in Africa and Burma during and subsequently served in the Far East.
He campaigned
World War
II,
After leaving the Army, Col. Barker joined the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. He was awarded a Research Fellowship in 1968, and has since retired to write full time. He is the author of several authoritative
NATO
works on military history and weapons. Dr. John Bradley lectures in International Politics and General Studies at the University of Manchester. He has written books and articles in several languages, including a history of the Russian Civil War.
John Keegan
senior lecturer in military history at the Military Academy in Britain. He specialized in modern and military history at Oxford, and has written many articles and publications on military subjects.
Sandhurst
is
Royal
Capt. Sir Basil Liddell-Hart was educated at Cambridge and served with the British Army in World War I, during which he evolved the 'lightning war' concept later adopted
by the Germans as the basis for their Blitzkrieg system. Between the wars he wrote military training manuals before joining the Daily Telegraph and Times newspapers, besides being military editor to the Encyclopaedia Britannica. During World War II he became personal adviser to Britain's War Minister, Hore-Belisha. He wrote over 30 books, and his work has been translated and published worldwide. He received honours from both Oxford and Cambridge Universities, and was knighted in 1966. He died in 1970, on the eve of a visit to the U.S.
Kenneth Macksey took part in the 1944-45 Northwestern Europe campaign during World War II, and remained in the army until 1968 serving in Germany, India, and the Far East. The author of several books on military history, Kenneth Macksey retired from the Royal Tank Regiment to join Purnell's History of the Second World War.
Mayer was History Lecturer at the University College, University of Maryland, and Executive Editor of Purnell's History of the Second World War. He has produced articles on political and economic subjects and researched at the London School of Economics. S. L.
Barrie Pitt served in the British Army during World War II, joining the 21st SAS Regiment after demobilization. He subsequently joined Britain's Atomic Weapons Research Establishment and then became chief Historical Consultant
BBC on
The Great War. His first book, on the Zeebrugge raid, was published in 1958 since when he has written many books, articles and reviews
renowned
Professor of International Politics at Edinburgh University, and served with the British Army's Intelligence Corps during World War II. He studied history and Slavonic languages at Cambridge and won a Research Fellowship to Oxford. He has lectured extensively in the United States and Great Britain, and has published definitive works on the Soviet Union and Soviet
to the
history.
before and during World
Professor John Erickson
is
Lt.-Cdr. Peter Kemp trained at Osborne and Dartmouth Naval Colleges before joining the Royal Navy to specialize in submarine warfare. After a submarine accident, he was invalided from the Navy and joined the editorial staff of the London Times where he stayed until taking up an appointment at the War Office (now the Ministry of Defence) in 1950. During World War II he served in Naval Intelligence. His many publications specialize in military and naval history.
VIII
their
series,
for a variety of publications, including the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard,
MBE, War
served in the British
Army
and was wounded in the Normandy Invasion. On retiring, he became Chief Librarian at Britain's Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, an has written a standard work on the Italian campaign in
World War
II
II.
Norman Stone took a First at Cambridge in History, and subsequently received research Fellowships from Christs, Gonville and Caius colleges there. He is a lecturer at Cambridge, specializing in Russian history and is the author of several publications.
—
Some
notable contributors PhD
and has since held the post of and Central European Division of the Library of Congress in Washington. In addition to reviews and articles on history, he has assisted in the preparation of bibliographies on various subjects of Russian and Soviet affairs. Dr. R. V. Allen took his
Soviet
Area
at Yale,
Specialist in the Slavic
Professor Wesley M. Bagby is Professor of History at West Virginia University where he specializes in the diplomatic history of twentieth century America. He graduated from North Carolina University and took his PhD at Columbia. He is active in U.S. national politics and has written several books on diplomatic and political subjects. Lt.-Col. Martin Blumenson, a former Visiting Professor of Military and Strategic Studies at Arcadia University, served with the U.S. Army in World War II and Korea, and subsequently joined the Reserve. He was educated at Bicknell and Harvard Universities and his since written widely on military topics.
Lord Briggs (formerly Professor Asa Briggs MA, BSc, FBA) is Provost of Worcester College Oxford and Chancellor of Britain's Open University. He was previously Professor of History and Vice Chancellor of Sussex University. He became a Life Peer in 1976 and Fellow of the British Academy in 1980. He has combined a varied and acclaimed academic career with frequent contributions to the Press and media on a range of historical subjects. He has written and edited many books and articles including studies on Victorian England and the history of Broadcasting. Pamela Bright served with the British Territorial Army Nursing Service during World War II. Educated at various schools in Europe, she trained as a nurse at the Edinburgh Royal Infirmary and made her career in medicine. She worked at an Israeli hospital during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and is the author of several books on nursing and refugees.
John Glubb Pasha served on the Western Front in World War I, from the Royal Military Academy. Between the wars he was posted to Iraq and subsequently accepted a senior civilian position with the Iraqi government. In 1930 he was given the rank of colonel in the Arab Legion by King Abdullah of Transjordan, becoming its Chief of Staff in 1939. Since retiring he has written numerous books on Arab affairs, and has lectured widely in the U.S. and Europ Gen.
Sir
after graduating
•
Air Vice Marshal Arthur Gould Lee flew fighter planes in World War 1 and held a number of senior posts in World War II, including Senior Air Officer, British Air Forces, Crete; Deputy Chief, British Armistice Control Commission, Rumania; and chief of the British Mission to Marshal Tito, Yugoslavia 1945. He retired from the RAF after the war and turned to full-time writing. His many books mostly biographies include two autobiographical accounts of flying in World War I.
—
Professor Norman Itzkowitz was educated in New York and graduated from Princeton, where he is now Professor of Near Eastern Studies. He has taught history at various academic institutions, and went to Jerusalem as Visiting Professor at the Hebrew University in 1970. He has contributed to a wide selection of publications, concentrating on Turkish and Near Eastern history.
Professor Charles E. Neu is Professor of History at Brown University. He took his PhD at Harvard, and became Associate Professor of History at Rice University. He is a specialist in American Foreign Policy and American-East Asian relations, and has written several works in this field. He also compiled the first full study of Colonel House, Wilson's closest adviser during World War I.
Josephine
Corps
Newcombe served
for
some time
in the
Women's Royal Army
in Britain, qualifying as a military interpreter in Russian.
She
studied Slav languages at Oxford, and lectures in Russian Language and Literature at Bristol University.
MC
Field-Marshal Lord Carver GCB, CBE, DSO, (formerly Gen. Sir Michael Carver) served with distinction in World War II, commanding the 1st Royal Tank Regiment in North Africa, Italy and France. Among senior British Army posts held, he has been Commander-in-Chief Far East and was Chief of Imperial General Staff from 1971 to 1973. His publications include books on World War II and the post-war balance of power.
St Julien attended St Cyr military college and served returning to St Cyr after 5 years to join the staff. He attended the British Army Staff College at Camberley, before returning to France to join her Ministry of Defence's Press Bureau. He has served as a Military Attache in the French Diplomatic Corps.
Col. Clenenden graduated from West Point in 1920 and served as an Instructor and Staff Officer in the U.S. Army until his retirement in 1954. He gained his and PhD before becoming an Instructor at Stanford University. He subsequently worked at the Hoover Institution and has written numerous articles and books on military history, in particular on the American Civil War.
Vice-Adm. (aD). Friedrich Oskar Ruge served in the German Imperial Navy in World War I, was awarded the Iron Cross First Class and took part in the final scuttling of the German High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow in 1919. He served in the North Sea, France and the Mediterranean during World War II, finally becoming Director of Warship Construction in Berlin. After the war he served briefly in the German Navy before taking up a Professorship at Tubingen University, and becoming President of the Marineakademie in 1979.
MA
Cmdt. Christian de in Algeria,
Edward M. Coffman
received bachelor's, master's and Doctor's degrees from the University of Kentucky, and served for two years in the U.S. Army. He taught at Memphis State University before becoming
Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin. articles
and books on military
Professor Dziewanowski
is
He
has written
topics.
Professor of History at the University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee and an Associate of the Russian Research Center at Harvard. Prof. Dziewanowski was born in the Ukraine, but is of Polish extraction. He studied at Warsaw University, fought with the Polish Army during World War II and became an American in 1948. He received his and PhD from Harvard, and then became Professor of History at Boston. He is the author of many noted works on East
MA
European
politics
and
history.
Gen. Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley GBE, KCB, DSO, MC, ADC Gen., B LiU (Oxon), Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces, North Europe and Col. Commandant the Parachute Regiment. He was ADC General to H.M. the Queen 1981-1983. He served both in the ranks and as an officer with the British airborne forces during World War II. He was captured and held for over two years during the Korean War and has taken part in many campaigns since the war. He has a Defence Fellowship from Oxford and has published numerous books, including several on World War I and related subjects.
Professor Richard Pipes was Professor of History at Harvard from 1963 when he became Frank B. Baird Jr Professor there. Born in Poland, he emigrated to the U.S. in 1940. He served with the U.S. Army in World War II and then studied at Cornell University. He joined the faculty at Harvard in 1950, and in 1968 became Director of its Russian Research Center. He is author of various publications in European and
to 1974,
American
history.
Professor Don Schurman served with the RCAF during World War II, and subsequently attended Universities both in Canada and England, gaining his PhD at Cambridge. He is Professor of History at Queens University, and Director of the Institute of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies. Professor Marion C. Siney was educated at the University of Michigan. She joined the Case Western Reserve University 1941, and became Professor of History there. He has written widely on twentieth century history, particularly in the American Historical Review. British historian and is a well-known Magdalen College, Oxford and Fellow of the British Academy. He has lectured in International and Modern History at several Universities, mainly on the World War I period. His many works
Professor A. J.
P. Taylor
journalist, Fellow of
include a much-praised illustrated history of the war.
Constantine Fitzgibbon is a well-known writer and historian. He served in both British and American Armies during World War II, becoming a Major in Military Intelligence and a specialist on the German General Staff. Since the war he has been a full-time writer living in the U.S., Britain and Italy. His books include novels, history and biography.
Professor R. C. Walton is Professor of History at Wayne State. He studied at Yale and Harvard and is an enthusiastic military historian. His published works include a detailed study of the American experience in
World War
I.
IX
VOLUME
1 Contents
223
226 2
The Assassination of
the
9
European Alliances 1871-1914
20
Causes of the war Nationalism
Tannenberg Kenneth Macksey
246
Commanders
47 1
249
John Keegan and Peter Vigor Lemberg Kenneth Macksey
475
255
The Code Breakers
481
H. W. Koch 40 47
\
53
Llewelyn
257
Woodward
The Naval Race Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp The Balkan Wars
260 266
The July
(3 78
280
Crisis
102
504
in Crisis
Masson
Converging of the Fleets
526
Mobilisation
306
Russia F.
The
Barrie Pitt
First Battle of
Warsaw
Kenneth Macksey
— the brink of war
537
Germany Berlin
— the brink of war
— patriotism and war fever
France
— the brink of war
— the brink of war
— the brink of war Masson
VOLUME 2 Contents War
313
Japan Declares Ian Nish
320
Tsingtao Terence Wise
330
The
334
Clearing the Pacific Christopher Dowling
341
Goeben and Breslau got away
Bernard Thorold
Richard Wright 348
Christopher Duffy Serbia Fights Back Major-General Mirkovich Battle of the Frontiers: Lorraine
361
The Ardennes 366
Battle of the Frontiers:
The Sambre
John Keegan
173
184
369
Mons Lionel Fanthorpe
589
Sibley
— seizing the German
598
609 612
Hogue and
638 646
T. Plivier
Siege of Antwerp Christopher Duffy
626
Ypres
Anthony Farrar-Hockley
416
Le Cateau Philip Warner
425
215
Landrecies N. G. Alvey
435
218
Guise Brian Jones
442
Gas Attack
The Capture of Memel
636
Bombs on Southend
German war aims Imanuel Geiss
The Great Retreat Peter Young
the First
Hogg
The Bombardment of the East Coast David Chandler The Battle of the Dogger Bank Paul Kennedy The Dogger Bank: A German View Paul Kennedy and Oskar Eckert The First Zeppelin Raids John Edgcumbe
and French war aims D. R. Shermer
409
Bolimow and
621
British
Heligoland
Battle in Masuria
Przemysl: Siege and Surrender Christopher Duffy
Turkey enters the war John Stephenson
at
The Winter
616
397
A German
The Winter Carpathian Campaign
Winter Fighting O. C. Taslauanu
Clearing the High Seas
198
War
614
384
405
Preconceptions of F. Clarke
Ian
Balance of Naval Power August 1914 Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp
The Admirals Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp
Trench Warfare John Keegan
Norman Stone
The
First Battle of
Home
Norman Stone
374
Brigadier
at
Peter Fiala
David Chandler The Role of the Neutrals Rodney de Bruin Sinking of the Aboukir, Cressy
The War
/.
Mons: a German View Walter Bloem
David Woodward
208
War Plans for 1915 Brigadier C. N. Barclay
593
Richard Milton
196
201
— the ones that
Colonies
Peter Young
560
577
— fiasco at Tanga
East Africa
John Keegan Battle of the Frontiers:
The Christmas Truce Henry Williamson
—
Major R. J. West Africa
Limanowa-Lapanow
Arthur Marwick
South" Africa rebellion and invasion Patrick Scrivenor
354
Battle of
552
C. T. Atkinson
Invasion
The
Norman Stone
565
122
The Liege Forts
544
British at Tsingtao
Prowess of the Armies Sir Basil Liddell Hart
J.
The Air War D. B. Tubbs
N. Bradley
117
170
The Campaign in Armenia Eugene Hinterhoff Economic Rivalries A. S. Milward The Battle of Coronel
David Mason The Battle of the Falkland Islands David Mason
Philippe
163
499
Hart
519
Asa Briggs
155
in Galicia
Race to the Sea Arthur Swinson
Great Britain
151
Newcombe
November
298
Plans and Personalities
108
145
Josephine
War
Austria-Hungary Z. A. B. Zeman
139
490
509
105
131
484
Germany: A New Strategy Leo Kahn Serbia: The September Campaign Leo Kahn Serbia: The Second Onslaught
The Aisne David Mason
H. W. Nevinson
113
Poles and Czechs
284
J.
100
Kemp
Aircraft: a new factor in war Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby
John Keegan 97
France
Norman Stone War in the Mediterranean
Norman Stone
The Marne Manoeuvre
Philippe
Barrie Pitt
89
The Great Retreat: A German view Walter Bloem The Great Retreat: An airman's view
Sir Basil Liddell
Imanuel Geiss
Warsaw
Otto Pick
L. A. Strange
Alan Palmer 61
East
in the
Battle of
-*6dz
Peter
Kurt Peball
Germany's bid for Sea Power Sir
460
229
Barrie Pitt 33
Moltke's and Joffre's Headquarters
468
Mayer
S. L.
The Second
Norman Stone
Atkinson
T.
Antony Brett-James
Archduke
Franz Ferdinand Vladimir Dedijer
454
Nery Professor C.
The Emden's J.
VOLUME 3
last cruise
Lionel Fanthorpe
Turkey: The unknown quantity J. Barker
649
Joffre's Winter Plans
661
The Vosges Offensive
670
Industry at War:
A.
Britain, India J.
and the Middle East
Christian de St Julien
Stephenson
Mesopotamia: the advance Gregory Blaxland
Contents
Christian de St Julien to Basra
Alan Milward
The
Allies
674 677
Industry at War: The Central Powers Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann
855
U-Boats: Germany's Stranglehold on
863
Britain
A.
Bryan McLean Ranft 688
694
Blockade on Germany Bryan McLean Ranft Lusitania:
U-Boats: American Reaction Gaddis Smith
702
American Neutrality Marvin Swartz
712
Easterners versus Westerners
Don Schurman
744 752
The Dardanelles: Turkish Reaction J.
Barker
920
Neuve Chapelle Lieutenant-Colonel John Baynes
1030
Winter Warfare Kenneth Macksey
926
Gallipoli:
A
778
Gallipoli:
An ANZAC View
780
The Capture of Qurna W. F. Woodhouse
784
Shaiba Major-General H. H. Rich
Gallipoli: The Second Stage Richard Wright
936
Turkish View
Submarines in the Marmara Lieutenant-Commander Peter
947 952
957
1060
Kemp
1064
Gregory Blaxland
1084
Gunboats on the Danube
1089
The Secret War: Intelligence Donald McLachlan
Peter
Russia: Exhaustion and Decline
Longworth
Commanders on F.
the Eastern Front
1097
N. Bradley
Naval
War
1113 1121
1123
817
Canadians at War G. W. L. Nicholson
824
The Singapore Mutiny The Second Battle of Ypres
1125
1130 1138
Argonne 1
845
Germany's War Aims Imanuel Geiss
The Second Battle of Artois John Keegan
The Long Retreat Peball
British
Nurse
Serbia
in
Naval
War in Kemp
the Adriatic
Salonika
Alan Palmer
Allen
in the
A
Peter
Ian Nish
Rommel
Serbia:
Pamela Bright
Norman Stone The Fall of Warsaw Leo Kahn V.
Mackensen's Balkan Victory
Dr Kurt
Austria-Hungary: Exhaustion and
Robert
Kemp
Norman Stone
in the Baltic
980
839
War
Bulgaria's Forces Jan Berdnek
Escape German Style Giint her Pliischow
Arthur Swinson
The Senussi War
1076
Japan and the 21 Demands
826
W. K. Bingham
J.
Front Dr Kurt Peball
976
C. Harrison
Desert Rescue
Major
Gorlice: Turning Point on the Eastern
The Eastward Exodus
812
Kemp
Bulgaria Joins the D. R. Shermer
970
M.
Don Schurman
Decline
The Campaign of Hate Christopher Dowling
Escape English Style H. A. Cartwright and
John Vader
David Woodward
Pamela Bright 806
Suvla Bay
1069
J.
Nurse Cavell
1048
Mediterranean
in the
Home
1041
Second Givenchy and Bellewaarde
Philip
945
Artois and
The Chinese Situation Ronald Heiferman The ANZACs
1036
The Generals
Farm
at Gallipoli
in
John Keegan Loos Alistair
Battle
Kenneth Macksey 929
774
The Italian Front: The Opening Ludwig Jedlicka
War
French Offensives
Champagne
Lieutenant-Commander Peter
The Indian Army Brigadier John Stephenson
First Landings Alan Wykes
800
1020
Mountain Warfare
Naval
Kitchener's First 100,000
Peter Simkins
Torsiello
Gallipoli:
America: The Benevolent Neutral Marion C. Siney The First Flame Attack
Michael Dewar 1013
Lieutenant-Colonel Shepperd
914
761
789
902
Naval Assault
First
John Selby A.
1010
Italian Forces
Mario
912
The Dardanelles:
The
1004
War
Enters the William Renzi
Air War: The First Fighter Planes
D. B. Tubbs
E. D. Smith
Defence of the Suez Canal John Vader
733
Italy
894
705
728
873
888
994
Barker
J.
Hunting the Atlantic Raiders David Woodward
882
700
ubert and Aubers Ridge
870
Warning and Disaster
Charles Lauriot
716
i
C >rge Ronald Lewin The End of the konigsberg
142
Gallipoli: Evacuation and Withdrawal Alan Wykes Gallipoli Judgement The late Sir Basil Liddell Hart
The Mesopotamia
Situation
Lieutenant -Colonel A.
VOLUME 4
1
146
Contents
Lieutenant-Colonel A. 1149
985
992
Zeppelins: The Growing Threat Douglas Robinson Zeppelins:
A
Pilot's
View
Barker
J.
Barker
J.
Barker
The Capture of Kut Lieutenant-Colonel A.
1153
J.
Townshend's Regatta
Persia: Stepping Stone to India
Eugene Hinterhoff
1286
Lake Narotch Ward Rutherford
1520
1293
The Easter Rising
1526
James Lunt
Constantine Fitzgibbon 1306
1314
Genesis of the Arab Revolt
Trabzond: Russian Success Robert C. Walton
in
Turkey
1538
The Somme: The Second Stage Brigadier Anthony Farrar-Hockley Verdun: The Surrender of Fort Vaux Christian de St Julien
The End in the Cameroons David Chandler
1545
The Threat to India Brigadier John Stephenson
1550
French North Africa: Unrest and Revolt
Masson
Philippe
VOLUME 5 1321
1328
Genocide in Turkey A. O. Sarkissian
Kut— The
Relief of F.
1332
Contents
Attempt
Last Chance
Lieutenant-Colonel A. 1340
J.
^
ti
1364
The
Home
British at
The Brusilov Offensive: From Victory
158
164
1
1174
Strategy and Supply in the Desert Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Barker
1370
Ctesiphon: Townshend's Pyrrhic Victory Major-General H. H. Rich
1377
Geoffrey Jukes 1582
Balkan Politics Alan Palmer
1591
Rumania Declares War
1596
Rumania
Vimy Ridge
1601
1181
Barker
186
1191
The Ammunition Scandal Major Henry Harris The Belligerents
1405
Jutland. Night Action: Confusion and
Escape Captain Donald Macintyre 1414
Brigadier
1216
Anthony
Farrar- Hockley
Fall of Sir John French Patrick Scrivenor
1217
Haig and Robertson John Keegan
1218
The Tunnel War
1224
Peace Moves
T. T.
Charles 1228
1421
Jutland:
1425
Jutland:
1433
The Air War: Stepping up
1440
Prince 1452
Neu
Austria on the Defensive
Verdun— The
1461
Smallest Ally
Plans
1466
1262
John Keegan The Fall of Erzerum Robert C. Walton Fort
Portugal at
War
Conscription
Arthur Marwick
XII
Dr Douglas Robinson
1657
The Air War: Tactics and Technology D. B. Tubbs The Trentino Offensive
1670
The Italian Front— Few Gains and Mounting Losses Mario Torsiello
Home
Front: Italy
Franco Valsecchi
Peball 1675
The Death of Kitchener
Magnus
Home Z.
Russia at the end of her tether
1680
Front: Austria
A. B. Zeman
Counterattack
at
Verdun
John Keegan
—
The Somme
1489
Norman Stone Lambs for the Slaughter — Training the New Armies
1696
The 'Quiet' Sector Lieutenant -Colonel Jean Delmas
John Keegan
1707
1493
The Somme Barrage Brigadier Anthony Farrar-Hockley
1502
July
1,
1916
1516
Was There The Somme — Counting
1713
The Sykes-Picot Agreement John Stephenson
Home
Front
Masson
The Collapse of Rumania
1725
Operation Arson Terence Wise
1728
The Channel War Paul Kennedy and Oskar Eckert Verdun: The End John Keegan
John Baynes 1517
French
Norman Stone
I
the Cost
The Last Phase Lieutenant-Colonel John Baynes
Philippe
— A Generation Sacrificed
Leo Kahn 1511
Hernani A. Cidade 1276
Contents
1685
Douaumont
Kenneth Macksey 1274
VOLUME 6
The Brusilov Offensive
Prince Wilhelm and Petain
Crown
1265
Kemp
the
1476
Home
1260
The Salonika Offensive
View
Geoffrey Jukes
Verdun— The Storm Breaks Alistair
British
Constantine and Venizelos
Whose
Sir Philip
Christopher Duffy 1248
1645
The Tank Story Kenneth Macksey
Alan Palmer
Victory? Lieutenant-Commander Peter
Dr Kurt
Montenegro— The
Hockley
Zeppelin Raids
Alan Palmer 1242
Leo Kahn The Somme: Debut of the Tank Major-General Anthony Farrar-
1646
German View
Jutland:
Friedrich Wiener
1237
1629
Alan Palmer
1417
The
W.
Falkenhayn Ousted
Donald McLachlan
Plans for 1916
Was There
I
1621
1638
Jutland. Intelligence: Britain's Lost
A A
Wood
1619
Opportunity
Neutral Attitudes
D. R. Shermer 1209
The Fleets Collide Vice- Admiral Friedrich Ruge
Jutland:
Major-General Sixsmith 1200
Kemp
Battle-Cruisers
1396
The New Warfare
Delville
Deon Fourie
Peter Padfield J.
Major-General H. Essame 1
1613
Lieutenant-Commander Peter
Retreat to Kut
Lieutenant-Colonel A.
— Bloody and Futile
Ward Rutherford
Prelude to Jutland
The
The Somme Attrition
East Africa Sibley
Jutland:
War
at
Nikolaus Krivinyi
Major R.
1382
VC
to Failure
Kenneth Macksey 1
Kemp
Glenn Torrey
Verdun: Nivelle takes over
'*&&?
Black Sea
1573
Barker
Donald Clark The Kazak Tribes
Alistair
in the
Q-Ships: Killers in Disguise Rear-Admiral Gordon Campbell,
A. O. Sarkissian 1356
War
1570
Townshend: Surrender, Capture and Disgrace
1350
Naval
Lieutenant-Commander Peter First
Kut— The
The Underwater War: Techniques and Developments Bryan McClean Ranft
1566
W. Woodhouse
Relief of
1556
1736
1740
Helmets
1741
The Bombing War Douglas Robinson
1749
1750
Britain:
1764 1769 1780
Pilot's
Western Front Winter 1916/1917 John Keegan
2002
America's Armed Forces Martin Blumenson
1924
Winter on the Eastern Front Eugene Hinterhoff
2008
America's Choice: Guns Edward M. Coffman
Revolution in Russia Lionel Kochan
2012
America Goes to Arthur S. Link
2021
The Nivelle Plan John Keegan
View
Lloyd George takes over
Professor
1756
The Fighter
Zeppelins:
1922
1937
Dr
Asa Briggs
East Africa: Smuts versus Vorbeck Major R. Sibley Gunboats on Lake Tanganyika Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp
1948
1958
1798
The Kut Garrison: Hardship and 1965
1974
Vital
2028
Mayer
2038
Air Propaganda R. G. Auckland
1986
Towards Baghdad
2049
Breakthrough at Arras Kenneth Macksey
2068
Canadian Onslaught Richard Holmes
2076
A
2077
Gus Sivertz The Submarine Germany
The
Fall of
J.
Charles Messenger
Barker
Baghdad
Into Palestine:
The
First Battle
of
Brigadier John Stephenson 1991
The U-Boat War
Kressenstein and
Murray 2092
1812
Mexico: The Comic Opera War Colonel Clarence C. Clendenen
VOLUME 7
1825
The Death of Franz Josef—The End of an Empire
1993
America Votes for Peace
2094
2001
Neu Thomas Woodrow Wilson
2101
Dr J. F. N. Bradley Poland— A Foot in Both Camps Kamil Dziewanowski
The Rendezvous with Death Ronald Lewin
1844
Trench Raiding Charles Messenger
at
Vimy
War— First Round
S.
Link
to
Ruge
The Submarine War— A U-Boat Commander's View Vize-admiral Friedrich Ruge Jellicoe and the Convoy Controversy Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp Naval
War
in the Baltic
David Woodward l:i
Across the Sinai
Major W. 1860
Contents
Charles E.
Arthur
1836
1853
Canadian
Vimy
at
Vize-admiral Friedrich
Gaddis Smith
1828
Retreat to the Siegfriedstellung
Leo Kahn The Fall of Bethmann-Hollweg H. W. Koch Trench Communications
2044
Gaza
Initiatives
War
Three Revolutionaries: Kerensky, Trotsky, Lenin Dr J. F. N. Bradley
Leslie Missen
Marvin Swartz 1802
The New Russia's
Lieutenant-Colonel A.
Turkey in Decline David Walder
Peace
or Peace:
Decision
1963
Colonel W. C. Spackman
1792
War S. L.
Blockade Runners Christopher Dowling
Army
Geoffrey Jukes
Starvation
1785
Decline of the Tsarist
or Butter?
F.
Woodhouse
Aircraft: Higher, Faster, Lighter
D. B. Tubbs 1871
1917:
A New Year— New
Plans
Major-General Anthony FarrarHockley 1877
Belgium: Life under
'l
German
Occupation Jacques Willequet 1881
Mesopotamia: Maude Takes Over Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Barker
1890
Maude's Offensive Major W. F. Woodhouse
1900
Sixtus, Prince of
Peace
Marvin Swartz 1906
1909 1914
Events in North- West Persia Major D. G. Clark The Dismissal of Joffre Major C. A. Kinvig Rasputin:
Madman
or Miracle
Worker? Colin Wilson
XIII
2105
The
Nivelle Offensive
2266
Jean Delmas 2115
2122
The French Tank Force Richard M. Orgorkiewicz
2273
Bloody April 2282
The Parachute Story The French Mutinies J.
2142
2294
'Revolution' on the Western Front
2301
2308
Bullecourt
any Price: the
2408
Italian
Zionism and the Balfour Declaration
2413
Cambrai: The British Onslaught David Chandler
Major-General Anthony FarrarHockley
2426
Cambrai: The German Counterattack David Chandler
Passchendaele
2435
False
Prelude to Passchendaele
Dawn: Tanks
at
Cambrai
General Sir Michael Carver
The Dover Patrol Paul Kennedy The Eclipse of the Q-Ships
2437
Fuller:
Prophet of Armoured
War
John Keegan 2438
Naval Aviation Captain Donald Macintyre
2441
2318
East Africa 1917
2448
2324
Major R. Sibley L 59 The First Inter-Continental
2454
Hight Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Skrine
2462
2312
Czechoslovakia Otto Pick
Mousa
Lionel Kochan
Bryan McLean Ranft
Michael Dewar 2154
at
John Keegan
B. Duroselle
Count Nikolai Tolstoy 2146
Tragedy
Arab Nationalism Suleiman
Trentino Offensive Kurt Peball
Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Gould Lee 2133
2404
Kemp
Lieutenant -Commander Peter
D. B. Tubbs
2130
The Otranto Barrage
Tank Developments Kenneth Macksey Kerensky's Government Lionel Kochan The Kerensky Offensive
Norman Stone
—
The Riga Offensive Eugene Hinterhoff The Russian Revolution Through Foreign Eyes
Harry Hanak
VOLUME 8 2329
2464
Contents 2469
Passchendaele: The Second Phase
J. F.
John Keegan 2472
2337
Plumer John Keegan
2339
Blockade of the Neutrals D. R. Shermer
2342
The French Armies: Recuperation and
2161
Strategic Bombing Dr Douglas Robinson
2168
The Aces Thomas G. Miller Jr
2180
Meeting the Bombing Threat
2182
The Making of a C. M. Chant
2189
The
Pilot
Battle of the Scarpe
Captain
A
2204
Pacifism
— Conscience on Trial
2212
Lord Fenner Brockway The Trial of Sir Roger Casement
2222
Trotsky and the Red John Erickson
2492
The Bolshevik Revolution
2232
2498
Naval Ensigns
2506
Medals of the
2514
Individual Aircraft Markings
2520
Army, Corps and
2521
National Aircraft Markings
After Caporetto
2525
The Lansing-Ishii Agreement Ronald Heiferman
2526
China: the Unlikely Ally
2372
Ronald Seth 2380
Rommel in Italy Rommel
2385
The Third
2392
Gaza Young
Battle of
Brigadier Peter
Divisional Flashes
Ronald Heiferman
Erwin
Lawrence and the Arabs Major-General James Lunt
2528
U-Boats: the Tide Turns Bryan McLean Ranft
2537
The Convoy Controversy Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp
2545
Wilson's 14 Points
Arthur 2553 ^
2562
Link
S.
Lloyd George and the Generals A. J. P. Taylor
The Scandinavian Convoy Paul Kennedy
Aras from the Air William Bishop
....'''
nr
Death of an Ace Rothesay Stuart- Wortley
~
Camel Scrap
2234
The
2238
Bombs by Night
^
-
P'» ir
The Calculating Ace Rene Fonck
-
2246
Greece Joins the Allies Michael Llewellyn Smith
2254
Salonika: Sarrail's Spring Offensive
Alan Palmer
%ks
^~\!
2581
British
The Language of the Trenches John Brophy and Eric Partridge
2609
1918 Germany's Home Front Andreas Hillgruber
j£^*^s& 2615
Germany: 1918 New Tactics
~<«brJSEa
C""2p'
1914-18
2596
"
-ds^^&ESslzS^E
Army Songs
John Brophy and Eric Partridge
.^wj^^H
^^H
k--
Break Up of the Russian Empire Richard Pipes
a
jSjg^r ^ /**-• <•>
2576
»jHI
__
The Otranto Barrage Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp The Search for Peace Marvin Swartz
|
"
^B .-*
2572
^^U
r
Raid
Paul Bewsher
2568 l
wr- 55
The Lone Hunter's Day
T,
XIV
World War
Caporetto Kurt Peball
Norman Macmillan
2242
First
2364
Final Phase
With the Red Baron
Silent
— World
Reaction
Passchendaele: The Donald Schurman
Cecil Lewis
2226
Army
2484
Ernst Udet
2219
Hand
Rose Thomson
Morale and Discipline Major-General E. K. G. Sixsmith
Patrick Scrivenor
2217
at First
2357
D. Baker
.
N. Bradley
Revolution
John Reed
Recovery Guy Pedroncini 2348
The Sealed Train Harry Hanak Red October
Barrie Pitt
1 2627
The
Allied
Barrie Pitt
Armies
Strategy,
New
2902 JOItl
TOGETHER^ TRAIN TOGETHER
EHBARK TOGETHER
FIGHT TOGETHER
America: Charles
Home
Front 1918
Neu
2912
The American Negro Thomas Keiser
2917
August 8, 1918: Germany's Black Brigadier Peter Young
2928
The Battle of Montdidier Marc Neuville The Czech Legion in Russia
2938
Dr
J. F.
N
2960
War Day
Bradley
VOLUME 2945
in the
10 Contents
The Breaking of
the Hindenburg Line Major-General H. Essame
Americans at W. Stock
St Mihiel
J.
2969
Pershing S. L.
Mayer
2970
Crossing the Canal du Nord
2973
The Influenza Pandemic
Deneys Rietz D. R. Shermer 2979
Defeat of Bulgaria
Alan Palmer 2988
Billy Mitchell
Thomas G.
Play up Play up £ Play THE Came
and the
US
Air Force
Miller Jr
2997
Wilson's Search for Peace Thomas Keiser
3001
The
Battle of
Megiddo Young
Brigadier Peter
3010
VOLUME 9
2756
Contents
2766 2637
2644
The 'Ludendorff
Offensive': Phase
General Sir Hubert Gough John Keegan
Front Britain 1918 Asa Briggs
Till
The Ludendorff Richard Holmes
Air Battle over the Aisne Thomas G. Miller Jr
'Ludendorff Offensive': the Air Battle 2789
2662
Thomas C. Miller Jr The Doullens Conference John Keegan
2794
Russia: the Outbreak of Civil
2676
2805
The
2816
Belleau
Wood:
enter the
Air Observation Christopher Chant
2694
The Battle of John Keegan
2828
Mesopotamia: the
2703
Sir Miles
'Big Bertha'
2839
2716 2721
J.
2848
war
The
2858 2861
The Collapse of Turkey David Walder The Last Sortie of the High Seas Paul Kennedy
3072
The Sinking of Paul Kennedy
3076
Fleet
the Szent Istvan
Latin America and the S. Tulchin
War
3080
Germany Accepts
the 14 Points
H. W. Koch
Bombing
3085
Austria-Hungary Concedes Defeat Z. A. B.
Zeman
The Labour Conference Marvin Swartz 2nd Marne:
1.
The German Attack
RAF: The Third Andrew Boyle
2742
Dazzle Painting Peter Mitchell
2882
The Maurice Affair Arthur Marwick
2889
Russia in Revolution Gerard Walter
Villers-Bretonneux
2896
The End of the Romanovs Count Nikolai Tolstoy
John Vader
Warner
Vittorio Veneto Franco Valsecchi
Warner
2738
2749
Michael Kitch
America's Offensive: The Argonne
Jacques Mordal
Barrie Pitt
2746
J.
Joseph
Piave: Italian counterattack
Strategic
of Baden
L.
3064
Thomas
Douglas Robinson
B. Duroselle
Zeebrugge and Ostend
3057
Marines
Piave: Austria's last throw
Philip
The Capture of Jerusalem Brigadier Peter Young 1918: The French Home Front Professor
The
air
US
Kurt Peball
Jean Hallade
2710
Matz
Max
S.
Philip
Offensive': the
2818
2833
3029
Mayer The Rumanian Imbroglio
3040
Major-General H. Essame
The Air Battle over the Lys Thomas G. Miller Jr
Prince
3050
The 'Ludendorff
The Treaty of Brest-Lit ovsk Sir John Wheeler- Bennett
2701
3024
Fruits of Brest-Litovsk
2684
the Lys
The Collapse of Germany H. W. Koch
The Aisne
Norman Stone
War
Creation of the Czechoslovak Corps William V. Wallace
Offensive' :
'
J. Lunt The Bombing of Constantinople John Vader
3021
Home
2773
Nikolai Tolstoy
3018
Dunsterforce
Barrie Pitt
Arab Revolt Major-General
Leslie Missen
I
2656
2665
Mesopotamia: Victorious Finale Leslie Missen
Service
2872
2nd Marne: 2. The John Keegan
Women's
Allied
Counter
Suffrage
Rose Thomson
XV
.
3093
3179
The Sambre Crossings Douglas Orgill
3101
Return to
3180
Mons
3102
Wilson's Electoral Defeat Charles E. Neu
3181
3107
Lettow-Vorbeck's Bitter Triumph
3190
3113
3116
in
3197
The
The
Germany 3206
Paris Peace Conference
J.
Ebert: Leader of the
New Germany
3210
3212
Andreas Hillgruber
The President and
the Paris Peace
'Archie': Anti-aircraft
3142
The Armistice Jacques Meyer
3217
Demobilisation
The Coupon
Election
Robert Bunselmeyer 3153
The War Horses Brigadier Peter Young
3160
Kurt Eisner
Czechoslovakia: Independence and Recognition Dr J. F. N. Bradley
3161
Revolution in Bavaria
Oddities of the Sea
3232
Clemenceau
3169
The Spartacus Revolt
3248
Angela Raspin
Gas: The Odour of Death
3268
Revolution in Hungary D. R. Shermer
3272
3281
3287
War
The Creation of Yugoslavia China and the Fourth of
Ronald Ian Heiferman Japan at the Peace Conference
The
3296
Arabs
at the
Peace Conference:
Misgivings and Disillusion
Suleiman
the Pity
3300
Mayer
The Ultimate World War
'Cat's Whiskers':
Aircraft of the First
Alsace-Lorraine
May
Ian Nish
3292
B. Duroselle
L.
Kun
Movement
Wilson's American Debacle Thomas Keiser
S.
Bela
Ivo Lederer
at Paris
The Poetry and Ronald Lewin
Masaryk and Benes F. N. Bradley
3267
3276
3230
3238
3265
D. R. Shermer
Mayer
Lloyd George at Paris A. J. P. Taylor
3235
Guns
The Weimar Republic Margaret Rooke
J.
H. W. Koch
L.
3225
John Keegan 3148
3261
Wilson's Tour of Europe S.
3133
Austria: Anschluss or Republic A. Wykes
Dr J.
Michael Balfour 3132
Walk-out and Disappointment
Italy:
3258
P. Taylor
Conference Michael Dunne
Flight of the Kaiser
11 Contents
Christopher Seaton- Watson
The Freikorps H. W. Koch Blockade: The Stranglehold
A.
Andreas Hillgruber 3128
3253
Marion Siney
The Kiel Mutiny Dieter Groh Revolution
Karl Liebknecht
Continues
Sibley
J.
VOLUME
Bruce French
John Keegan
Major R.
Bruce French
Rosa Luxembourg
Mousa
and the Amritsar Massacre Michael Edwardes Britain, India
Ypres
ODcm
SLIP XVI
A
AND HELP
1
3456
Lettow-Vorbeck:
A
Hero's
Homecoming D. R. Shermer 3458
Naval Aviation: The
First Aircraft
Carriers
3462 3468
Captain Donald Macintyre The Eyes of the Fleet: Seaplanes of the First World War Kapp Putsch
A. 3474 3477 3483
3490 3493
J.
J. F.
3499
3306
Gandhi and the Asian Revolutionaries S.
3309 3314
L.
3406
Mayer
and the Iraq Revolt General Sir John Glubb
Britain
Palestine
and the Levant
3408
3412
Elie Kedourie
3320 3321
Jan Christiaan Smuts Mainstay of the Infantry: the boltaction
3416
rifle
Owen Wood
3421
3324
Unrest in Egypt Suleiman Mousa
3330
The Pan-African Movement
The Armoured Heritage: the Last Tanks of the War The Cordon Sanitaire John Keegan The 'Stab in the Back': Germany's Face-Saving Myth S. L. Mayer
3433
Patrick Scrivenor
3528
The Harding
Election: Wilson
Repudiated Wesley M. Bagby
VOLUME 12 index
Pilsudski
M. K. Dziewanowski 3434
Locos
3436
Victory for the Bolsheviks
3337
Poland: A Nation Reborn M. K. Dziewanowski
3340
Paderewski
J.
3444
at
War
3533
F. N. Bradley
3449
The End of the High Seas Paul Kennedy
Fleet
J.
in Perspective P. Taylor
3552
1914-1919: A Brief Chronology Christopher Chant
3558
Index Glossary of Terms Bibliography List of Contributors
Kronstadt: Singeing the Bolsheviks'
Beard
Baltic Fringe
The War A.
Brigadier Michael Calvert
K. Dziewanowski
3518
The Offspring of Versailles The Anglo-Irish War
The Russo-Polish War K. Dziewanowski
African Settlement W. R. Louis
The
The Washington Conference: America Rules the Waves? S. L. Mayer The Origins of Nazism
M.
Imanuel Geiss
M.
The White Armies Defeated
Man
Imanuel Geiss 3517
'Votes for Women' American Style Judith Holmes
3333
3344
3512
N. Bradley
Russia:
John 3505
Nicholls
The 'War Guilt' Question 5. L. Mayer The Chanak Crisis David Walder The Graeco-Turkish War David Walder From Gay Hussar to Storm Trooper The Allies Quit Russia
Richard Condon 335 1
The End of the Ottoman Empire Norman Itzkowitz
3356
Plebiscites: Self-Determination in
Mayer Rumania and S.
3359
-mi^m^ M^f
Action L.
Bulgaria: Litigants at
OMOT1
the Peace Conference
3363
Sherman David Spector The Armenians after the War A. O. Sarkissian
3386
The Treaty of Versailles S. L. Mayer The League of Nations S. L. Mayer The Hall of Mirrors Harold Nicolson The Rhineland Occupied John Keegan The Art of Camouflage
3388
Belgium and the Saar
3365
3372 3376 3379
S.
L.
Mayer
3392
The Belgian Army 1914-1918
3393
Wilson and the League
3399
America 1919 Marcus Cunliffe
Thomas
Keiser
JHMESm® MS® Wm ^ SIWF.ISEA XVII
k
THE FIRST
WORLD WAR IN OUTLINE Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart
by a dispassionate analysis of the briefer wars of 1864 (the PrussoDanish war), 1866 (the Prusso-Austrian war) and 1870 (the Franco-Prussian war). And it was subsequently contradicted by the experience of the South African and Russo-Japanese wars. Here the ominous shadow of the machine gun — 'concentrated essence of infantry' — began to creep across the battlefield, bringing movement to a standstill. Some of the more acute foreign observers who were actually present perceived this paralysing trend, but their voices had only slight echo in the war ministries of Europe, where the military chiefs existed in monastic seclusion chanting the creed of Clausewitz before the altar of Napoleon. One of these onlookers, the youthful Captain Hoffmann, succeeded in making sufficient impression on the German authorities as to induce them to pay some attention to the machine gun, and also to provide themselves with mobile heavy artillery as an aid
overcoming modern defence. The average proportion of machine guns in the major European armies of 1914 was only two to 1,000 men. And in several it was less. Yet experience was soon to show that two machine guns in defence were often capable of paralysing the attacking power of 1,000 men, driving them to take refuge in trenches. As machine guns became more plentiful, together with barbed wire and entrenchments, the paralysis would become more severe. This paralysis was further intensified by another flaw which the gospel of mass revealed under test. The military chiefs, in their anxiety to swell their ranks, had forgotten the warning of to
Napoleon had proclaimed that victory belonged to the 'big battalions', and throughout the 19th Century military theorists, including Clausewitz, endorsed the doctrine of 'mass'. The German and French generals of 1914 certainly went to war with this idea firmly planted in their minds, together with an unshakable belief in the overwhelming superiority of the 'offensive': few realised
the difference that the machine gun had made to the strength of defensive positions against
massed
infantry in attack.
July 28, 1914, Austria declared war on Serbia. On July 31 Russia and Austria decreed the general mobilisation of their forces, while Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia and also to France, followed up by declarations of war on August 1 and 3 respectively. She had already, on the 2nd, in fulfilment of her long-prepared war plan, delivered an ultimatum to Belgium demanding a free passage for her troops. This threat resolved the hesitations of the British government, which now dispatched an ultimatum that Germany should respect Belgian neutrality. No satisfactory answer was possible from the German side — the inflexibility and intricacy of the military machine forbade it — and so by the night of August 4 Britain was also at war. Only one of the 'Great Powers' of Europe had managed to keep out of it — Italy, by her decision to cut loose from her engagements to
On
Germany and
Austria. of war in 1914 set in motion forces more gigantic than any previous war had seen. Two million Germans were on the march, the greater part of them against France, and there were another 3,000,000 trained men to back them up. France had nearly 4,000,000 trained men at call, although she relied on only 1,000,000 active troops in the first clash. Russia had more millions to draw upon than any, but her mobilisation process was slow, a large part of her forces were in Asia and even her great potential strength was to a large extent cancelled out by lack of munitions. The growth of these immense forces had been due primarily to a military gospel of mass. Proclaimed by Clausewitz, the Prussian military philosopher, who drew his inspiration from Napoleon's example, the spread of this gospel had been stimulated by the victories of the Prussian conscript armies in 1866 against Austria and in 1870 against France. It had been assisted also by the development of railways, which enabled far larger numbers of men to be assembled, moved and supplied than had been possible previously. Thus the armies of 1914-1918 came to be counted in their millions compared with the hundreds of thousands of half a century earlier. The military minds of Europe had too absorbing a faith in one of Napoleon's sayings, which were so often contradictory — that victory lay with the 'big battalions'. It had led to a relative neglect of scientific progress and technical invention and to an underrating of the value of weapon power compared with mere manpower. On the eve of the 20th Century one of the most eminent military teachers in Europe, Colonel Foch, had declared that 'any improvement in firearms is bound to strengthen the offensive'. The coming war was to prove the opposite. Foch's deduction, even when made, was contrary to the evidence of the American Civil War, the first modern war — which no soldiers in Europe save the British deemed worthy of study. It was also contrary to the facts that might have been discovered
The outbreak
XVIII
the most sagacious of their 18th-Century predecessors, Marshal Saxe, that 'multitudes serve only to perplex and embarrass'. Even with the aid of the railway it was difficult to handle armies of millions, to keep them supplied, and to prevent them clogging the arteries of movement. Their very mass stultified the dreams of Napoleonic manoeuvres in which their creators had indulged. Napoleon's dazzling campaigns in Italy were aptly christened by Hilaire Belloc, 'lightning in the hills'. There was to be a lot of thunder, but little lightning, in the efforts of his would-be imitators between 1914 and 1918.
'Mobilisation means war' The generals' inability to control the forces they had called forth was revealed ominously before the war itself actually opened. Indeed, it precipitated the war, and not merely by the fears which
such swollen forces generated among the peoples. For 'mobilisation inevitably meant war' — as the Germans, with unconscious truth, declared in their ultimatum to the French. The summons that drew the massed manhood of a nation from their peacetime callings, to don uniform and gather at their war stations, produced a state of nervous excitement that drowned the voice of reason and wrecked the delicate process of negotiation. In comparison, a professional force has the quality of constant yet unprovocative readiness, and is thus no more a menace in time of crisis than in time of calm. The unnoticed sailing of the British fleet for its war station at Scapa Flow offers a significant contrast to the furore caused by the mobilisation of the great continental armies. Once the wheels of mobilisation began to move, no brake could effectively retard them. The machine was not even steerable. Its rigid lock was revealed when the Kaiser, clutching at a report that the French might agree to forsake their Russian allies, said to Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff: 'Now we can march, with all our forces, towards the east alone.' Moltke replied that 'this was impossible. The advance of armies formed of millions of men was the result of years of painstaking work. Once planned, it could not possibly be changed.' The Kaiser retorted bitterly: 'Your uncle [the victor of 1870] would have given me a different reply.' Moltke gained his way, and the German armies continued their concentration against France. As a small concession 24 hours' delay in the actual crossing of the frontier was imposed, and even this led him to record: 'It was a great shock to me, as though something had struck at my heart.' His pathetic exclamation vividly illustrates the rigid limitations of the military machine as well as the military mind. In a survey of the war, the German war plan must take priority. Not only was it the mainspring which set in motion the hands of the war clock in 1914, but, in a sense, it governed the course of the war thereafter. For although it miscarried, it left the German army so deeply embedded in the land of France that the strategy of the Allies was henceforth loaded with, and narrowed by, the instinctive urge to evict it — a serious handicap to any less direct form of action that sober reasoning might suggest. Geography gave Germany and her ally the advantage of a central position. This fact, together with Russia's proverbial slow-
ness, guided Germany's opening moves. Her long-framed plan to strike heavily and rapidly against France, while holding at bay Russia's advanced forces; and then, when France was crushed, to deal with the Russians. The obvious hindrance to such an aim was the obstacle offered by the strong fortress system along the French frontier. To force it spelled a loss of time, and
was
time was the one thing that the Germans felt they could not afford to lose. So they had decided to go round the obstacle — by a wide manoeuvre through Belgium. This plan was definitely adopted in 1905 by Count von Schlieffen, then Chief of the German General Staff. He considered that the military advantages outweighed the moral stigma of violating Belgian neutrality, and also the practical dangers of British hostility. Schlieffen's plan concentrated the mass of the German forces on the right (the north-western) wing for a gigantic wheel through Belgium and northern France, while the minimum force was allotted to the left wing facing the French eastern frontier. When he died, before the war, Schlieffen's last words are said to have been: 'It must come to a fight. Only make the right wing strong.' If the French forces took the offensive against the German left wing its very weakness would be an asset. Like a revolving door, the more heavily the Frenchman pressed on one side the more forcefully would the other side swing round behind him. Here lay the real subtlety of the plan. The French war plan fitted into the German plan ideally — from a German point of view. It was due to a new school of thought, that of the pupils of Foch, who were intoxicated with the French tradition of the offensive and had deluded themselves into the semi-mystical belief that all virtue lay in the offensive, that they had only to attack with enough ardour to be sure of conquering. In 1911 they unseated the Chief of the General Staff, General Michel, who expected the Germans to come through Belgium and was anxious to meet the menace by defensive preparations. In his place was appointed a stolid general, Joffre, who promised to be a stout lever for their designs. Under the cloak of his authority they moulded the French doctrine and plan towards a headlong offensive. Believing that reservists were not capable of such an effort, they relied only on regular troops. And, partly to strengthen their case, they counted only the German regular troops, whereas the Germans had blended both regulars and reservists in their striking force. In consequence, 1,000,000 Frenchmen advanced to meet 1,500,000 Germans — and advanced in the wrong place. Not even the fall of Liege, the gateway into western Belgium, could awaken the intoxicated French command to the reality of the situation. If they had sent a few army corps to reinforce the defence that their small ally was offering there is little doubt that the Germans might have been held up on the threshold, along the line Namur-Antwerp. But the French were intent only on pressing their own offensive. Thus while the Germans were sweeping through Belgium, the French hurled their two rightwing armies across the Lorraine frontier of Germany — into a trap. From this they recoiled in disorder. Belatedly recognising the real direction of the German advance, but not its full width, Joffre now struck a left-hand blow at the supposedly weak German centre in the Ardennes. For his information he relied mainly on his cavalry, of which he had 100,000, but 'this enormous mass of cavalry discovered nothing of the enemy's advance and the .
.
.
French armies were everywhere surprised'. Blundering forward into the wooded Ardennes they met the advancing Germans and suffered a fresh defeat. Fortunately for them, the Germans, also relying on cavalry which proved useless, failed to realise or exploit the opportunity. But in western Belgium, armies were rapidly closing
beyond the Meuse, three German upon the remaining French army
left, and the little British Expeditionary Force Just in time to avert disaster, these fell back. And with their retreat Joffre at last realised the utter collapse of his plan. Whatever his defects of vision, he was not lacking in resolution. Relying on the resisting power of the fortress system, he withdrew troops from his right wing to form a fresh striking force on his left. This new move was blocked by the swiftness and width of the German sweep, and his new force had to seek sanctuary in the fortified zone of Paris.
on the extreme alongside
it.
first German setback But the German plan now began to crack under its own cumbersome weight, logistical misconceptions and nervous handling. Seemingly forgetting Schlieffen's admonition, his successor, Moltke, had used the reserve troops to strengthen the left wing rather than the right; and as the advance went on he weakened the right wing still more by detailing much of it to guard against
The
a possible menace to his communications through Belgium, and meet a sudden appeal from the commander on the Russian front. But later examination of Schlieffen's papers shows that he had come to see the need for such modifications before his death, and that Moltke was wrongly blamed for departing from the original plan. A more basic fault was that even if the right wing had been kept at its original strength, it could hardly have been maintained, for want of supplies. The railways through the Belgian bottleneck were inadequate. Moreover, the German generals pushed their men forward so fast that even the limited supplies failed to keep pace, and the troops had to forage for what they could find in a countryside exhausted of provisions. Hunger and the fatigue of forced marches in August heat reduced them to a dead-beat condition. To make matters worse, Moltke lost touch with his army commanders, because of his lack of foresight in organising means of communition, and the indiscriminate way his cavalry had destroyed the to
telegraph system in France. Thus, in sum, so much grit had worked into the German machine that a slight jar would suffice to cause its breakdown. This was delivered in the so-called 'battle' of the Marne. The opportunity was offered by the German right wing wheeling inwards before Paris was reached, thereby exposing its flank to a counterstroke. The opportunity was grasped, not by Joffre, but by Gallieni, the governor of Paris. The French main armies were continuing their retreat southward when Gallieni moved the Paris garrison forward against the enemy's flank and induced Joffre, after a day-long argument, to support him by ordering a general turn-about. Gallieni's stroke temporarily unhinged the German right wing, and before it could be reunited the British force had moved into the gap thus created. The news of their sudden reappearance came at a moment when the German leaders were nerve-racked by rumours that many thousands of British and Russians were disembarking on the Belgian coast in their rear— in reality, a mere 3,000 marines sent by Winston Churchill as a bluff. This fresh shock to morale cracked the nerve of the German command, and a general retreat began. The tide of invasion rolled back from Paris and the Marne. For a few days the Allies had the chance of converting the German retreat into a serious defeat, but they followed it up so cautiously that the Germans were able to reknit their line along the Aisne. Here the machine gun began to reveal its full power, and cemented the line into an impenetrable barrier. Awakening slowly to this new fact, the opposing commands began to grope for an open flank, by successive side-steps westward, until by October the movement came to rest on the sea, and the entrenched front stretched from the Swiss frontier to the English Channel. Moltke had now been superseded by Falkenhayn who, with forces released by the fall of Antwerp and forces newly raised, now made a desperate effort to break through the line and capture the Channel ports which Moltke could have had for the picking a month earlier. Falkenhayn was blocked near the coast by King Albert's decision to open the locks and let the sea in over the soil of Belgium. He was frustrated farther inland, at Ypres, by the British regulars, whose rifle-shooting compensated their lack of machine guns so effectively that the Germans declared: 'over every bush, hedge, and fragment of wall' was 'a machine gun rattling out bullets'. Even so, the French came up to the relief of the British army just in time, for after resisting repeated attacks for a month there was little left of it. Back at home, however, 1,000,000 volunteers had already come forward at Kitchener's call, and the 'New Army' of Britain was sprouting. It had time to grow as deadlock now ruled on the Western Front.
Reversals of fortune On the. Russian front, meantime, a series of rapid reversals of fortune had ended in a similar deadlock, even if it was one that was less firmly established. Here, the war plans on each side had suffered from a tug of war between the respective allies. Conrad von Hotzendorf, the Austrian chief, had desired to cut off the Russian forces in the protruding Polish 'tongue' by a combined offensive of the Germans from the north and the Austrians from the south. But his allies, despite vague assurances, were disinclined to move until they had settled with France, and he rashly took the offensive alone. Advancing blindly, since his great mass of cavalry proved useless as eyes, he collided with part of the main Russian armies, also advancing, while the other part crashed into his weak flank. Recovering from his surprise, he tried to turn the tables on his opponents by a series of strategic juggles, which imposed a greater strain on his cumbersome forces than they could bear. Thus, in the end, he was driven to begin a
XIX
retreat that was prolonged for 150 miles, to the Dunajec. He had lost Galicia and 350,000 men — nearly half his army. On the Baltic side of Poland the campaign had opened with a Russian advance and ended in a Russian disaster. To meet the urgent clamour of their French allies the Russians had hastened their invasion of East Prussia. One army advanced westwards;
and when another appeared on the southern border the German commander lost his head. But one of his staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Hoffmann, initiated a series of moves by which one army of the invader was caught and crushed at Tannenberg, while the other was slowly toiling forward with no enemy in front of him — they had been rushed back to strike the flank of the other Russian army. Here, as so often later, the swift German moves were also made sure through the folly of the Russian commanders in sending out unciphered wireless orders. But Tannenberg made the reputation of the new German commander, Hindenburg, and his dominating assistant, Ludendorff— although, in fact, they had done more to hinder than to develop the moves that brought victory which had been made before their arrival.
Numbers not enough Russia now began to approach the full tide of her mobilised strength, and a huge phalanx of seven armies was formed for an advance through Poland towards Berlin. Allied hopes rose high as it rolled ponderously along. But Ludendorff (with Hoffmann in the background) dislocated it by deftly switching his forces round the northern flank and driving a wedge into the joint near Lodz. Paralysis ensued, and the two sides settled down in winter trench lines astride Poland. With the failure to achieve any decisive result, in the east or the west, the war changed its form to that of a gigantic siege.
New
factors
now came
to the fore.
historic importance. Its effect was akin not to a lightning flash, striking down an opponent, but to a steady radiation of heat, invigorating to friends and drying up the resources of the enemy. The German military leaders had shown little interest in the action of their own navy, and less concern with the possible effect of Britain's. The French were equally disparaging — when Colonel Repington had suggested that the aid of the British Navy was 'worth 500,000 bayonets to the French'. Joffre and Foch 'did not value it at one bayonet'. None of the continental war leaders could see far beyond their noses. But it was not long before sea power made itself felt. While the German High Seas Fleet stayed in its harbours, waiting for something to turn up, the British Grand Fleet in its northern bases exerted a largely invisible domination of the sea. Under cover of this Germany was stripped of her colonies, and her commerce was swept from the seas, which remained open for the passage of the merchant ships and troopships of Britain and her allies. The short sightedness of Germany's leadership was shown, once again, in her failure to make adequate preparations to interfere with her enemy's sea transport. Her few commerce-destroying cruisers and armed merchant cruisers gave much trouble in proportion to their numbers, but by the end of the year they were
Sea power assumed
its
hunted down. So, after an initial success, was her solitary Pacific squadron — surprised and sunk at the Falkland Islands. Britain now turned her attention to the problem of exerting economic pressure on Germany herself. At first she was fettered by her voluntary acceptance of the 1909 Declaration of London, but the Germans came to her relief by initiating a submarine campaign against commerce and proclaiming their intention to sink at sight. Britain retorted by claiming the right to intercept all ships suspected of carrying goods to Germany, and bring them into her
own
ports for search. This tightening of the ring caused serious with neutrals, the United States especially, but Germany eased the friction by torpedoing the great liner Lusitania on May 7, 1915. The drowning of 1,198 civilians was a shock to difficulties
humanity, and appealed more forcibly to American opinion than even the violation of Belgian neutrality. It brought the American government to recognise the possibility of participation in the war, although the immediate tension was relieved by Germany's promise to modify her submarine action. From now onward the tension between the United States and Britain caused by the blockade was to be relieved repeatedly by some fresh German act at sea. Meanwhile, the economic pressure on Germany was gradually tightened. But it would not become a stranglehold until America herself reinforced it. Before the war the prevailing idea of a short conflict had led governments and generals to discount economic forces. Few men believed that a modern nation could long endure the strain of a large-scale war. The supply of food and of funds, the supply and
XX
manufacture of munitions, were problems that had only been studied on brief estimates. But with the failure to reach a result in 1914 the nations bestirred themselves to develop their resources, and factories for munitions sprouted like mushrooms. Also, they revealed a financial adaptability that dumbfounded prewar economists. Nevertheless, the generals continued to believe in early victory. Kitchener was an exception, and a comment of his in June 1915 is a revealing sidelight on the irrepressible optimism of the others: 'Joffre and Sir John [French] told me in November they were going to push the Germans back over the frontier; they gave me the same assurances in December, March, and May.' The power of self-delusion prevented the military chiefs from soberly weighing the problems, and hampered any solution. Throughout 1915 the French, with British assistance, hurled themselves again and again on the entrenched front in the west. Each time Joffre used a larger scale of munitions, and each time found that the defences had grown stronger in the interval. At the end of the year his losses were so immense that he had impaired France's fighting potential. As some compensation the Allied ranks were swelled by the addition of Italy's forces in May 1915, but she had the Alps as well as machine guns to bar her path, and all she could do was to repeat Joffre's battering-ram tactics on the Austrian frontier, but with fewer munitions. By August 1917 she had fought 11 'battles of the Isonzo' — and was still on the Isonzo. Germany had gained a new ally earlier, through Turkey's intervention in November 1914. She provided a valuable and inevitable distraction to the forces of the British Empire, as well as of the Russian; and she bolted the Black Sea back door by which Russia's potential millions might have been furnished with adequate munitions. The menace also provided the Allies with an alternative idea for their strategy — that of lopping off Germany's 'limbs' before attacking the 'trunk'.
A great opportunity — lost Out
of this arose the British expedition to the Dardanelles, sponsored by Winston Churchill, with the aim of capturing Constantinople and knocking Turkey out of the war. Success would have rallied the Balkan countries to the side of the Allies, and have opened the way for a combined advance up the Danube against the back gate to the Austrian barnyard. Lloyd George had proposed to short-circuit the Turkish obstacle and send a force direct to Serbia: this had advantages, but supply would have been more difficult than by the Danube. In France Gallieni favoured the latter plan, but Joffre, supported by the British leaders in France, opposed any plan that might take away even a fraction of the forces dedicated to the dream of early victory in the west. Their opposition delayed, and finally killed, the alternative schemes. A purely naval attempt to force the passage of the Dardanelles was made in March, but abandoned when the Turks were on the verge of collapse. The task was then handed over to a small military force under Sir Ian Hamilton. Thanks to Turkish dilatoriness a slender chance still remained, and was momentarily increased by the surprise which Hamilton achieved, but mismanagement by his subordinates threw it away after the April landing on the Gallipoli peninsula. Then, too late, a few more troops were sent — but still only in driblets. Nevertheless, the mere threat had a far reaching effect. Falkenhayn had intended to make another bid for victory in the west, and, like Joffre, had an unquenchable belief in its prospects. His plans were upset by the cracks that began to appear in the Austrian defences. Quivering under the pressure from Russia and Serbia, Austria's danger became obvious when the Dardanelles attack opened. Falkenhayn felt that he must cut out the Serbian ulcer from Austria's side before it was swollen by Allied reinforcements. But before he could even do this the Russians must be pushed back to a safe distance. So he postponed his own plans and accepted Conrad's for a thrust at the Russian line on the Dunajec, his decision hastened by the prospect of Italy joining Austria's foes. The thrust, in May, pierced the poorly entrenched front and the Russian armies, starved of munitions, were driven back and back by converging pressure, out of Galicia and then out of Poland. They lost 500,000 men in prisoners alone. But Falkenhayn had been drawn on farther than he desired, and not until October could he deal with Serbia. Fortunately for him he found a fresh ally in Bulgaria, who had been encouraged to join him by the failure of a second British effort at the Dardanelles. And while the French and British were arguing, Serbia was overrun. Too late, once again, the Allies sent a force to Serbia's aid which only arrived in time to become a locked-up investment at Salonika. At the close of a year which had opened in high hope and
Futility in
the trenches year after year: huge losses for no return.
German
soldiers
ended in gloom, the British withdrew from their foothold on
The
the feat could not cloak the admission of failure. Henceforth, the British could only operate against Turkey's extremities in Palestine and Mesopotamia. These campaigns were forced to begin by the need to protect Egypt and their Persian Gulf oil supplies respectively. And by degrees these new campaigns became a process in which two British armies, wriggling across the desert like giant pythons, gradually swallowed Turkey from the feet up, each taking one leg. The position of Austria, as well as of Turkey, had been so far secured that its very security now helped the strategic arguments of the 'western school' — who had done so much to avert danger to Gallipoli.
skill of
their countries' foes. For 1916 Joffre planned to renew his offensive in France, with the dubious help of Russia and Italian pressure elsewhere, and this seemed for the moment the only feasible course. But he was barren of new ideas that might have helped him in breaking-through the trench barrier. More heavy guns, more shells, was his sole recipe for success.
Even here he was forestalled, because in February Falkenhayn was at last able to fulfil his own dream of attack in the west. He was slightly more subtle than Joffre, Falkenhayn planned to use his mass of artillery as a mincing-machine. By taking a point, Verdun, that the French would be loath to give up, he hoped to draw their reserves of men into the maw of his guns, and thus bleed France to death. If the result fell short of his desires, he succeeded so far that he forced Joffre to use up most of the reserves earmarked
in
atypical landscape of
mud and barbed
wire
Joffre's own offensive. And after four months of dreadful struggle, Verdun was only relieved by the launching of the Allied offensive on the Somme. Here the British had now to take up the main burden. It was made heavier by their bull-at-a-gate tactics. Attacking on July 1 without any pretence of surprise, they were foiled in their attempt to break through and paid a forfeit of 60,000 casualties in a single day. Thereafter Sir Douglas Haig tried a method of constant pounding, varied by occasional gambles on a break-through. By November the British were embedded a few miles deeper in the Somme mud, but that was all, at a cost hugely for
disproportionate to the results. A gleam of hope for the future was provided by the appearance of a new weapon, an armour-clad trench-crossing machine which could ferret out the enemy machine guns. To hide its existence it was camouflaged under the name of 'tank'. But when first used, in September, it was employed in small numbers and an unready state, so that the secret was given away for no real gain. The British here repeated the same mistake that the Germans had made a year before when introducing gas.
A great naval battle? The year 1916 also witnessed tbe war's nearest approach to a great naval battle. But the rival fleets met in a North Sea haze effect of the British admiral's anxiety not to risk his superiority of force, upon which Britain's very existence depended, while the German admiral, because of his in-
which intensified the
XXI
feriority,
adopted hit-and-run
German
fleet
the sea. But
reached
These conditions hindered a more damage than it suffered, the
tactics.
decision. After inflicting rather
off from its bases when night closed down on slipped past the British under cover of the dark and
was cut
it
home safely.
not enhance British naval prestige, the British navy in undiminished command of the surface of the sea. Thus its chief effect was to stimulate the Germans' submarine effort. Beguiled by the promise of bringing Britain to her knees, the military backed the naval chiefs in obtaining the Kaiser's consent to a renewal of the 'unrestricted' policy on a greater scale. This was proclaimed on February 1, 1917 — in defiance of President Wilson and in cool acceptance of the risk of American intervention. For the Germans staked all on victory before America's weight could count in the scales. At sea they were soon disappointed, although the margin between success and failure was narrow. The sinking of Allied merchant ships reached its peak in April, when nearly 1,000,000 tons of shipping were lost. One ship out of every four which left the British Isles never came home, and the Admiralty were at their wits' end to stem a peril that menaced Britain with starvation. But in that very month they were constrained to adopt the system of protective convoy which, in scepticism, they had stubbornly opposed hitherto. Its adoption was directly due to Lloyd George who, in face of Britain's sorry situation on land and sea at the end of 1916, had become head of the government. And the prompt success of the convoy system was helped by the extra escorting craft which became available when, on April 6, 1917, the United States joined in the war against Germany. From this time the submarine danger began to shrink. Even more valuable was the financial aid that America brought on her entry into the war. For the burden of financing her allies' as well as her own efforts was straining Britain's resources to the verge of collapse, when America's new credit advances came to ease the pressure. By the end of the year the problem was shifting its basis, as the supply of credit began to exceed the supply of goods that the Allies could purchase, owing to the demands of the growing American armies. These had been raised on a more methodical plan and a longer timetable than Britain had been able to afford with her 'New Armies'. And over a year passed before they entered the battle-line in sufficient strength to have more than a promisory effect on morale. Meantime, the war situation on land changed greatly for the worse. Early in 1917 the Russian Revolution occurred, and its immediate effect was to make remote any prospect that the Russian armies, half crippled since their disasters in 1915, might again pull their weight in the war. And Rumania, joining the Allies in the late summer of 1916, had been overrun while the Allies were ineffectually hammering on the Western Front. This coup was carried out by Falkenhayn, who had been superseded in supreme command by Hindenburg and Ludendorff. But the troubles of the Entente in 1917 were not limited to the loss of allies. Both the French and British in turn exerted themselves in so unwise a way that they seriously reduced their own weight. At the end of 1916 Joffre had given place to Nivelle, who speedily framed a grandiose plan to break the deadlock in the west, and rashly persisted in it when its foundations had been upset by the Germans' cleverly staged withdrawal to a massive and shorter line of defence in rear — the famous 'Hindenburg Line'. The consequence was a disastrous repulse, and its sequel a widespread series of mutinies among the French troops, sick of being thrown against unsubdued machine guns. The calm and careful Petain now replaced Nivelle, and by wise handling he gradually restored the confidence of the troops. But the French army could do little for the rest of the year, and Petain, in any case, preferred to wait until the Americans were ready. Haig had different views. As soon as possible he committed the British, despite Lloyd George's strong note of caution, to his long-cherished plan of an offensive in Belgium. For this design, if not for its site, he found several fair excuses. But there is little doubt now that his real motive was a strange belief that he could defeat the German army single-handed in Flanders. The event proved the fallacy. Immense bombardments destroyed the drainage system and churned the waterlogged ground into a swamp, in which tanks stuck and the infantry sank. Rain made it worse. Yet for over three months Haig continued to pour the strength of Britain into the mud of Passchendaele. Not only did he fail in his own bigger aims, but he did not prevent the Germans sending reserves to force peace on Russia, and also to stiffen the Austrians for a deadly stroke at Italy in October. This came at a time when the Italians were exhausted by their prolonged and ineffectual efforts on the Isonzo. Their front collapsed like a pack of cards, and they If this 'battle' of Jutland did
it left
XXII
Imperial troops
were not able
to rally until they reached the line of the Piave, covering Venice. They had left 250,000 prisoners in the enemy's hands, and although they proved able to hold the Piave their offensive power was crippled for a year.
Tanks In
at
Cambrai
November there was a momentary break
in the clouds over the
Western Front. For having at last given up his vain effort in Flanders, Haig was induced to try a new idea -that of a sudden release of a mass of tanks without any warning bombardment. The dry downland near Cambrai was chosen and the attack proved an exhilarating success, taking the enemy by surprise and breaking the Hindenburg Line. But Haig had no reserves to push through the gap, having used them up in Flanders, and the cavalry, as always on the Western Front, proved incapable of exploiting the opening. Ten days later a sharp German counterstroke took the British by surprise and robbed them of their gains. The only enduring achievement of the Allies in 1917 was the British advance to Jerusalem. Because of its sentimental value its capture in December was a moral tonic. But as the year drew to a close the clouds were gathering thicker than ever over the Western Front. A constant stream of troop trains brought German reinforcements from the Russian front, and by March 1918 there were nearly four Germans to three French or British, while comparatively few Americans had yet arrived to restore the balance. A year before there had been nearly three of the Allies to two Germans. The Allied disadvantage was increased by the difficulty of
among themselves
as to a common plan of resistance. in forming a Supreme War Council, with a joint military board to control a general reserve. But Haig
agreeing
The statesmen had joined
and Petain distrusted the scheme, and preferred to make a private arrangement for mutual aid — which failed when the test came.
On March 21. after a few hours of hurricane bombardment with high explosive and gas-shell, Ludendorff launched an overwhelming mass of troops, whose advance was cloaked by a thick fog, against the southern part of the British front. They broke through so rapidly, except near Vimy Ridge, that the scheme of defence broke down. And within a week they had pushed 40 miles deep into the Allied lines, threatening to separate the British and French armies. The emergency led to Foch being appointed to coordinate, and later to command, the Allied armies. But the danger was already passing — mainly because the German advance had lost its impetus, through its own difficulties of supply. Early in April, however, a new emergency came, when the Germans broke through the British front in Flanders. Air reports had given ample warning that the Germans were switching their reserves north, but Haig had a fixed idea that they would try again at Vimy Ridge, and the Germans were lucky to strike a sector weakly held by the Portuguese. This time, however, they were stopped after a 10-mile penetration — owing partly to Ludendorff 's lack of resolution. But he used up so many of his reserves in belated driblets that he had to make a long pause before he could strike afresh. Meanwhile the Americans, in response to urgent appeals, were beginning to rush troops across the Atlantic at a rate that soon rose to 250,000 a month. For Germany the sands were running out. Late in May Ludendorff launched a heavy blow at the French front in Champagne. For a third time fog was an important factor in masking the machine guns of the defence. But there was also fog in the minds of the French command, who ignored until too late a clear warning given by the American Intelligence, and by stupid dispositions exposed their troops to disaster. In four days the German tide reached the Marne, having gone 30 miles deep into the French front. Paris itself seemed once more in danger. But Ludendorff, who had intended the attack merely as a diversion in aid of a fresh and final stroke at the British, was surprised by his own success. His delay in exploiting it allowed time for the French to rally, and for American divisions to make their appearance in the battle and stiffen the resistance — at Chateau-Thierry. The tactical success of his own blows had been Ludendorff 's undoing. Each time he had first checked his men in pressing along the line of least resistance, and then continued to press when the resistance was hardening. Thus he used up too many reserves and caused an undue interval between each blow. None had severed a and this strategic failure left his troops in a series of great salients whose flanks invited a counterstroke. This soon became possible as the depleted front of the Allies was filled up with fresh American divisions. On July 15, Ludendorff launched his last great stroke, on either side of Rheims. This time there was no surprise. The French were fully forewarned, and Petain had introduced a new vital artery,
method of elastic defence, which brought the Germans sharply to a stop after breaking through a 'paper screen'. Three days later Foch unleashed a counterstroke, in which the sudden advance of a mass of tanks on the Cambrai method paved the way for the attacking troops. After the first shock of surprise had passed, the Germans managed to hold the gate-posts of the salient long enough to avert disaster, but only at the price of evacuating the salient. With his Second Battle of the Marne, in which seven strong American divisions took a leading part, the initiative definitely passed to the Allies.
Foch's first concern was to keep it. On August 8, Haig struck the Somme salient, with the use, again, of a great mass of tanks followed up by the Australian and Canadian corps. The stroke had been skilfully disguised and came as such a nerveshattering surprise that Ludendorff confessed: 'August 8th was the black day of the German army in the history of the war.' It led him to abandon hope of victory, and Foch drove home this conclusion by beating a tattoo on the German front — a series of rapid blows at different points, each broken off as soon as the initial impetus waned. Under this pressure from British and French, Ludendorff was forced back to the Hindenburg Line, and the Americans completed the series on September 12 by erasing the old St Mihiel salient on the other flank. The clear evidence of the enemy's decline in morale, and Haig's assurance that he could break the Hindenburg Line (where the German reserves were thickest), encouraged Foch to make a bid for early victory — by a great converging attack on both the inner flanks of the German line. The British were to form the left pincer, while the Americans — now formed into a self-contained armywere moved west from St Mihiel to act as the right pincer, in the Meuse-Argonne region. To fit in with this design Pershing had been induced to give up his desire to exploit the St Mihiel success towards Metz. The design proved too ambitious. Handicapped by the brief time for preparation, the American blow on September 26 soon lost its impetus. Although the pressure was maintained, the progress was too gradual to endanger the German line of retreat. More successful, the British, after a preliminary coup on the 27th, broke the Hindenburg Line on the 29th. But they could not keep up the advance, after they were through, fast enough to produce any general collapse. at
'Peace at once' Nevertheless, the effect, supplemented by other factors, was greater than appeared. On September 15 the long-quiescent Allied force at Salonika had taken the offensive, and the Bulgarian front swiftly collapsed. On the 29th Bulgaria capitulated, the first prop of the enemy alliance to be severed. The news reached Ludendorff simultaneously with that of Haig's initial success in breaching the Hindenburg Line. Ludendorff lost his nerve and resolved that he must appeal for an armistice. Hindenburg agreed with him, insisting that 'a peace offer to our enemies be issued at once'. It went to President Wilson on October 3 — a confession of defeat that shook the German people, long kept in the dark and wilting under the strain of hunger. Within a few days the German command became more optimistic, as they saw the Allies' slow progress, but the effect of its moment of panic could not be undone. The 'home front' began to crumble later than the battle front, but it crumbled more quickly. Bad news from other theatres accelerated the process. On September 19 Allenby broke through the Palestine front of the Turks, whose attention had been distracted by Lawrence and his Arabs. The British cavalry poured through the gap, surrounded the Turkish forces, and then rode on to Damascus — raced and outpaced by Lawrence. On October 30 Turkey dropped out of the war. So did Austria, on November 4, after her front had been broken by the Italians. This opened the way for an Allied attack on Germany's backdoor. That same day revolution broke out in Germany and swept rapidly over the country. The fleet mutinied when its leaders tried to send it out on a death-or-glory ride. On November 6 the German delegates left Berlin to apply for an armistice. Meantime the Allied advance in the west continued, and, on the American sector at least, with fresh impetus. The Americans reached Sedan on the same day that the German delegates reached Foch's rendezvous. The terms he laid down were severe — sufficient to cripple the German forces more decisively than any battle. But the collapse of the home front, even more than the military menace in front and flank, ensured their acceptance. In any event, the stranglehold of the blockade was stifling the power of resistance, so the Germans had no choice but to sign. And at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1918 the war came to an end.
XXIII
A World War I Diary of Events 1914
9
June 28
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and wife Sophie assassinated, Sarajevo.
Antwerp surrenders to Germans. Belgian Government removed to Ostend. occupy Ypres.
13
British
14
Canadian Expeditionary Force lands
15
in Britain.
Germans take Ostend. Belgian Government moves Le Havre, France.
to
July 23
Austria sends ultimatum to Serbia.
December
25
Austria-Hungary mobilizes.
14
First Battle of
16
Germans bomb Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby on east coast of England.
August 1
Germany
2
Germany invades Luxembourg.
3
Germany
declares
4
Germany
declares
declares
war on Russia. France mobilizes.
1915
war on France.
February
war on Belgium. Great Britain declares war on Germany.
5
U.S. offers mediation.
6
Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia. Serbia declares
Champagne.
10
Russians defeated by Germans in Battle of Masurian Lakes.
18
German submarines begin
war on Germany. 19-20 First
France invades Alsace-Lorraine. B.E.F. arrives
March
12
Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary invades Poland and Serbia.
10
13
France declares war on Austria-Hungary.
17
Belgium moves capital from Brussels to Antwerp. Russia invades Galicia.
20
Germans take
22
Battle of
23
Japan declares war on Germany.
26
German Zeppelin
raid
on England.
in
France.
18
'blockade' of British
Isles.
British take
Neuve Chapelle
in Flanders.
April 22
Second Battle of Ypres. Poison gas
Germans
in attack
first
used by
on Canadians.
May
Brussels.
7
Mons.
Lusitania sunk by German submarine off Irish coast, with loss of 1,152 lives; 102 Americans.
war on Austria-Hungary.
23
Italy declares
Battle of Tannenberg. Battle of Le Cateau. Viviani becomes Premier in France.
31
German
Zeppelins
28
Austria declares war on Belgium.
June
29
Russians invade Konigsberg.
4-6
German
aircraft
30
Germans take Amiens.
15
31
Germans
Allied aircraft bombs Karlsruhe, in retaliation for raids on England.
army
defeat Russian
at
Tannenberg.
3
French Government quits Paris for Bordeaux.
4
Germans take Rheims.
5
Battle of the
19
time.
English towns.
Colonel 'Boom' Trenchard placed in RFC in France.
command
September
Marne.
25
Artois offensive: Allies occupy Lens.
of the Masurian Lakes.
1st Battle
14
French reoccupy Amiens and Rheims.
October
20
Rheims cathedral
12
24
Allies
29
Antwerp bombardment
shelled
by Germans.
occupy Peronne. begins.
October British
first
the
10
2
bombs
for
August
September
XXIV
bomb London
Navy mines North Sea
areas.
13
Nurse Edith Cavell shot by Germans for aiding British prisoners to escape from Belgium.
London bombed by
Zeppelins; 55 killed, 114
injured.
14
Bulgaria at war with Serbia.
15
Great Britain declares war on Bulgaria.
of
war with Bulgaria.
17
France
19
Italy
29
Briand becomes Premier of France, succeeding
at
and Russia
27
Rumania declares war on Austria-Hungary and begins offensive in Transylvania.
28
Italy at
31
Bulgaria at war with Rumania. Turkey at war with
war with Bulgaria.
at
Viviani.
November 17
at
war with
Rumania.
Anglo-French war council hold
first
meeting
in
Paris.
September 15
December 15
war with Germany. Germany Rumania.
British take Flers, Courcelette,
positions
General Sir Douglas Haig succeeds Field-Marshal Sir John French as Commander-in-Chief of British forces in France.
26
and other German
on Western Front.
Combles and Thiepval captured by
and
British
French.
October
1916
24
February
November
10
British conscription law goes into effect.
21
Battle of
25
Fort
Verdun begins; Germans take Haumont.
Douaumont
falls to
Germany
declares
15
Austria-Hungary
31
Battle of Verdun:
recaptured by French.
Vaux evacuated by Germans.
2
Fort
7
Woodrow Wilson
Germans.
re-elected President of the
advance along the Ancre.
13
British
22
Emperor Franz Josef of Austria-Hungary
war on Portugal. at
Douaumont
United States.
March 9
Fort
Succeeded by Charles
war with Portugal.
23
dies.
I.
German warships bombard Scarborough on English coast.
Germans take Melancourt. 28
First
German
seaplane raid on London.
April 19
President Wilson publicly warns
Germany not
to
December
pursue submarine policies.
20
7
Russian troops arrive for service on French front. Sergeant Elliot Cowdin first American awarded French Medaille Militaire.
May
15
1
8
David Lloyd George succeeds Asquith as Prime Minister.
British
French recapture ground taken by Germans Battle of Verdun. President Wilson
makes peace overtures
in
to
belligerents.
15
Vimy Ridge taken by
31
Battle of Jutland; British and German fleets engaged; heavy losses on both sides.
British.
26
replies to President's note
and suggests a
peace conference. 30
French Government on behalf of Allies
replies to
President Wilson's note and refuses to discuss peace until Germany agrees to give 'restitution, reparation and guarantees'.
June 5
Germany
Lord Kitchener, British War Secretary, dies when Hampshire is sunk off the Orkney Islands.
cruiser
6
Germans capture Fort Vaux
in
Verdun
attack.
1917 July British
and French offensive on the Somme.
14
British
Cavalry penetrate
15
Longueval captured by
25
Pozieres occupied by British.
30
British
1
German second
January
British.
and French advance between
and the Somme.
22
President Wilson suggests 'peace without victory'.
3
Germany announces
line. 1
unrestricted submarine
warfare from February
Delville
Wood
1.
February 3
United States severs diplomatic relations with
Germany.
August 3
French recapture Fleury.
17
British troops
on the Ancre capture German
positions.
XXV
28
United States makes public a communication from to Mexico proposing an alliance, and offering as a reward the return of Mexico's lost territory in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona (Zimmerman Telegram).
6
Germany
Germans begin withdrawal along Hindenburg
Line.
China breaks with Germany. Czar Nicholas abdicates. Prince Lvoff heads new
Bapaume
falls to British.
Roye and Lassigny
18
Peronne, Chaulnes, Nesle and Noyon evacuated by Germans, who retreat on an 85-mile front.
19
Alexander Ribot becomes French Premier, succeeding Briand.
April 6
United States declares war on Germany.
8
Austria-Hungary breaks with United
9
Battle of Arras.
States.
China
15
St
Vimy, Givenchy, Bailleul and positions about Lens taken by Canadians.
20
Turkey breaks with United
German bombers make
first
night raid
on London.
Marshal Petain succeeds Marshal Nivelle as Commander-in-Chief of French armies. Bullecourt captured by British in the Battle of Arras.
signed by President Wilson.
U.S. conscription
25
Twenty-one Gotha bombers make first mass daylight attack on England. 200 casualties.
bill
June Registration day for
new
draft
army
in
7
Messines-Wytschaete ridge in English hands.
8
General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of American Expeditionary Force (AEF), arrives in England en route to France.
third reading
war with Germany and Austria-Hungary.
Quentin Cathedral destroyed by Germans. Canadian troops capture Hill 70, dominating Lens.
National
Army
assembles.
16
Russia proclaimed a republic by Kerensky.
26
Zonnebeke, Polygon east of Ypres, taken
Wood by
and Tower Hamlets,
British.
October 23
Poelcapelle captured in Franco-British attack.
American troops
in France fire their first shot in trench warfare. French advance northeast of Soissons.
First
1
Germans abandon Chemin des Dames.
6
Passchendaele captured by Canadians.
7
Bolsheviks, under Lenin and Trotsky, seize
Petrograd and depose Kerensky. 9
mass daylight raid on London by Germany Gotha bombers. 600 casualties.
Italians retreat to the Piave.
10
Lenin Premier of Russia, succeeding Kerensky.
15
Clemenceau Premier of France, succeeding Painleve.
21
Ribecourt, Flesquieres, Havrincourt, Marcoing, captured by the British.
23
Italians repulse Germans on the whole front the Asiago Plateau to the Brenta River.
24
Battle of Cambrai. British tanks approach within three miles, capturing Bourlon Wood.
from
December 1
using 14
German East Africa conquered.
Allies'
reported completely
Supreme War Council,
representing the United States, France, Great Britain and Italy, holds first meeting at Versailles.
July
3
its
Painleve becomes French Premier, succeeding Ribot.
United
States.
XXVI
passes
November
18
1
Bill
14
States.
May
13
at
September 5 New American
9
13
Canadian Conscription
14
26-31 British advance on Cambrai.
5
favour of
in Senate.
occupied by French.
16
in
Alexander.
August 8
cabinet.
15
Compulsory
succeeding Lvoff.
4
7
passes
King Constantine of Greece abdicates his son,
advance on Bapaume.
British
17
12
Commons
Bill.
on a front of 155 miles. Alexander Kerensky becomes Russian Premier,
3
15
Military Service
16-23 Retreat of Russians
March
14
Canadian House of
Russians begin offensive in Gallicia. Kerensky, minister of war, leading in person.
AEF arrives
in France.
3
Russian Bolsheviks arrange armistice with Germans.
5
from Bourlon Wood, Graincourt, and other positions west of Cambrai. British retire
May
7
Finland declares independence.
8
Jerusalem surrenders to British, under General Allenby.
United States
15
Armistice signed between
Germany and Russia
at
Germans advance beyond and cross the Vesle
Coalition government of Sir Robert Borden is returned and conscription confirmed in Canada.
President Wilson proclaims his 'Fourteen Points'.
18
Major-General Sir John Salmond succeeds Major General Sir Hugh 'Boom' Trenchard as
commander of
Americans. 29
Soissons evacuated by French.
31
Marne River crossed by Germans, who reach
the
3-6
American troops take over sector northwest of
February in
Chemin
des
Dames
sector.
March 1
Americans gain victory
3
Peace treaty between Bolshevik government of
in
Toul
salient.
Russia and the Central Powers signed at Brest-
drive
on Western Front ends.
1
Vaux taken by Americans.
3
Mohammed
fails.
Czecho-Slovaks take long stretch of the TransSiberian Railway, with Allied help.
15
Defence of Chateau Thierry blocks new German drive
4
Treaty signed between
5
Rumania
9
Russian capital
Germany and
Finland.
V, Sultan of Turkey, dies.
10
Litovsk.
on
Paris.
18
French and Americans begin counteroffensive on Aisne-Marne front.
23
French take Oulchy-le-Chateau and drive the Germans back between the Aisne and the Marne.
30
Allies astride the
signs peace treaty with Central Powers.
moved from Petrograd
Russo-German peace
treaty ratified
to
Moscow.
by Soviets.
Germans begin great drive on 50-mile front from Arras to La Fere. Bombardment of Paris by German long-range 'Big Bertha' gun from a distance of 76 miles.
Ham
and Chauny evacuated by
24
Peronne,
25
Bapaume and
29
Marshal Foch Commander-in-Chief of armies on the Western Front.
Allies.
all
1
Formation of the Royal Air Force (RAF).
9
Second German drive begun
Ourcq; Germans
retreat to the
Vesle.
August 2
French troops recapture Soissons.
3
President Wilson agrees to co-operate with Allies sending forces to Russia. Allies advance between Soissons and Rheims, driving Germans from Fismes and capturing Aisne- Vesle front.
7
Franco-American troops cross the Vesle.
8
New
Nesle occupied by Germans. Allied
April
in
Allied drive begun by Field-Marshal Haig in Picardy.
in Flanders.
10
Montdidier recaptured.
13
Lassigny massif taken by French.
15
Canadians capture Damery and
29
Noyon and Bapaume
German
maximum 15
German
July
American troops
First
American Marines and soldiers check advance of Germans at Chateau Thierry and Neuilly. Beginning of American co-operation on major
15-24 Austrian drive on Italian front
Toul.
10
Paris.
scale.
RFC, BEF. 9-14
21
the Chemin des Dames Fismes. Cantigny taken by
June
8
14
at
Chateau Thierry, 40 miles from
January
22
allies.
28
1918
19
war with Germany and her
Third German drive begins on Aisne-Marne front between Soissons and Rheims.
Brest-Litovsk. 17
at
27
war with Austria-Hungary.
11
at
Nicaragua
drive halted before Amiens, after advance of 35 miles.
Second German drive halted before Ypres, maximum advance of 10 miles.
22
Baron von Richthofen, ranking German
23
British naval forces raid
after
fall in
new
Parvillers.
Allied advance.
flier, killed.
German submarine
base in
Zeebrugge, Belgium. First United States shipment of Liberty engines arrives in France.
September 1
Australians take Peronne. Americans capture Voormezeele in Belgium.
XXVII
Germans
1
are driven back to the
November 1917
12
Hindenburg Line. 12
foreign
Registration day for between 18 and 45.
new U.S.
draft of
Americans begin vigorous offence Sector on 40- mile front.
14
St.
13
in St. Mihiel
Mihiel recaptured from Germans.
German hands
men
foreign secretary agrees to evacuate
all
soil.
Laon and La Fere abandoned by Germans. Grandpre captured by Americans.
13
in
German
It
had been
President Wilson refers for armistice terms.
16
Lille entered
17
Ostend,
German submarine
and sea
forces.
since 1914.
25
British take 40,000 prisoners in Palestine offensive.
27
Franco- Americans take 30,000 prisoners
28
Belgians attack enemy from Ypres to North Sea, gaining four miles.
29
Bulgaria surrenders.
30
British-Belgian advance reaches Roulers.
at
Verdun.
Germans
14
19
by
Foch
to Marshal
British patrols.
Douai
base, taken
by land
falls to Allies.
Bruges and Zeebrugge taken by Belgian and British forces.
26
Trenchard appointed Commander-in-Chief, Allied Independent Air Force.
31
Turkey surrenders.
Inter-
November October 1
Quentin captured. Damascus occupied by British in Palestine campaign.
1
St.
2
Lens evacuated by Germans.
3
Albania cleared of Austrians by
4
King Ferdinand of Bulgaria abdicates.
5
Prince Maximilian, new German Chancellor, pleads with President Wilson to ask Allies for
Italians.
armistice.
7
Berry-au-Bac taken by French.
9
Cambrai
11
in Allied
XXVIII
forest.
Army
troops. 3
German
4
Americans
7
American Rainbow Division enter suburbs of
Fleet mutinies at Kiel. Austria surrenders, signing armistice with Italy. strike at
Sedan.
Sedan. 8
Heights south of Sedan seized by Americans.
9
Maubeuge captured by
10
Canadians take Mons.
11
Germany
hands.
Americans advance through Argonne
Clery-le-Grand captured by American First
11 a.m.
Allies.
surrenders; armistice takes effect at flag hoisted on Sedan front.
American
VALENTIGNEY - Doubst
Contents of Volume 2
9
The Assassination of
Archduke
155
Battle of the Frontiers:
Franz Ferdinand Vladimir Dedijer
163
Mons
European Alliances 1871-1914
170
S.
20
1
L.
the
J.
33
40
53 61
70 78
198
A German at Heligoland
184
Nationalism
H
W. Koch Germany's bid for Sea Power Sir
47
196
173
Barrie Pitt
Llewelyn
Woodward
The Naval Race Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp The Balkan Wars Alan Palmer The July Crisis Imanuel Geiss Aircraft: a new factor in war Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby War Plans and Personalities
T. Plivier
201
208
Landrecies N. G. Alvey
218
Guise Brian Jones
223
Nery Professor C. T. Atkinson
Mobilisation
John Keegan 97
— the brink of war F. N. Bradley Germany — the brink of war Berlin — patriotism and war fever H. W. Nevinson Austria-Hungary — the brink of war Russia
226
Moltke's and Joffre's Headquarters Antony Brett-James
229
Tannenberg Kenneth Macksey
246
Commanders
J.
100 102 105
Z.
A. B. Zeman
108
Great Britain Asa Briggs
113
France
— the brink of war
— the brink of war
Philippe
Masson
117
Prowess of the Armies Sir Basil Liddell Hart
122
Invasion
139
249 255
257
260 266
Bernard Thorold 131
280
The Liege Forts Christopher Duffy Serbia Fights Back
284
Major-General Mirkovich
298
Battle of the Frontiers: Lorraine
151
Battle of the Frontiers:
The Ardennes
in the East
John Keegan and Peter Vigor Lemberg Kenneth Macksey The Code Breakers Kurt Peball The Great Retreat: A German view Walter Bloem The Great Retreat: An airman's view L. A. Strange The Marne Manoeuvre Sir Basil Liddell Hart France in Crisis Philippe
145
Peter Young
The Great Retreat Peter Young Le Cateau Philip Warner
215
Barrie Pitt
89
Lionel Fanthorpe
Mons: a German View Walter Bloem Balance of Naval Power August 1914 Clearing the High Seas David Woodward The Admirals
Mayer
Causes of the war
The Sambre
Masson
The Aisne David Mason Race to the Sea Arthur Swinson
306
The
First Battle of
Warsaw
Kenneth Macksey
XXX
J
1914 JAN
27
U.S. Marines land on Haiti.
FEB
15
Franco-German agreement on Baghdad
MAR
railway.
14
Turko-Serbian peace
30
Asquith becomes Prime Minister and Secretary for War.
APR
14
Wilson sends U.S.
MAY
22
Britain gains control of Anglo-Persian Oil Co.
JUN
28
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and wife
JUL
5
22
treaty.
Fleet to
Mexico.
assassinated, Sarajevo.
Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany agrees to help Austria-Hungary in the event of Franco-Russian intervention in Serbia.
Germany warns Great
Britain not to interfere
between Austria and Serbia.
AUG
23
Austrian ultimatum sent to Serbia.
25
Serbian reply rejected. Mobilization in Austria-Hungary.
27
Germany
28
Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia.
29
Austrians shell Belgrade.
1
2 3 4
Germany Germany Germany Germany declares
6
rejects British offer
declares war
SEPT
on Russia.
invades Luxembourg. declares war
on France.
declares war
on Belgium. Great Britain war on Germany. Germany invades Belgium.
Austria-Hungaria declares war on Russia. Serbians
Germany.
declare war on
7
of mediation.
BEF
arrives in France. France invades Alsace-Lorraine.
12
Great Britain declares war on Austria-Hungary. Austria invades Poland. Austria-Hungary invades Serbia.
13
France declares war on Austria-Hungary.
14
Battles of the Frontiers.
16
Germans take
17
Russia invades E. Prussia.
Liege. Serbians rout Austrians at Battle of Jadar.
18
Russia invades Galicia.
20
Germans
enter Brussels.
22
Battle of
Mons.
23
Japan declares war on Germany.
26
Battle of Tannenberg. Battle of
Le Cateau.
3
French government quits Paris for Bordeaux.
5
Battle of the
8
2nd Austrian invasion of Serbia
Russians capture Lemburg.
OCT
10
1st Battle
11
Battle of
13
1st Battle
6 9
NOV
DEC
Marne. fails.
of the Masurian Lakes.
Rava Russkaya. Russians
isolate Przemysl.
of the Aisne.
Germans force Russians back Germans take Antwerp.
11
1st Battle
of Ypres.
21
Germans
retreat
in
Poland and Galicia.
from Warsaw.
war on Turkey.
1
Battle of Coronel. Russia declares
2
Germans retreat from Poland. Russia invades Prussia. British Navy mines North Sea.
5
Great Britain and France declare war on Turkey.
9
Sydney-Emden engagement.
11
3rd Austrian invasion of Serbia
22
British take Basra.
fails.
2
Austrians take Belgrade.
3
Serbians force Austrians out of Serbia.
4 18
Battle of the Falkland Islands.
Egypt becomes
British protectorate.
A
Vladimir Dedijer an agitator stepped off a crowded pavement in 28, 1914, Sarajevo and shot the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife Sophie. The two shots resulted from a series of security blunders combined with the unexpected good luck of the conspirators — who had already bungled one attempt. But the shots added the final burden to the tensions racking Europe, and triggered off the First World War Below: The Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie greet a dignitary in Sarajevo on the day of their assassination — the day which ended a period of history
On June
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No
other political murder in modern his-
tory has had such momentous consequences as the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Habsburg
empire, by a Bosnian student named Gavrilo Princip, at Sarajevo in Bosnia on June 28, 1914. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand was the first heir apparent to the Habsburg throne to fall victim to political homicide. Violence and individual terrorism against the members of the 1,000-year-old Erzhaus (dynasty) had not been common during their long history, but it increased suddenly at the beginning of the 19th Century, when a wave of nationalist aspirations swept over the empire.
Unlike some constitutional monarchies in Western Europe, the Habsburgs had failed to modernise their multinational state. Denying the right of self-determination and using force to defend their institutions, the Habsburgs were faced not only with mass revolutionary movements, as in Italy and Hungary, but also with the practice of assassination. The Italians, the first nationality to rebel against the Habsburgs in the 19th Century, used assassination as a political means towards their nationalist ends. The leader of the Italian republican nationalist movement, Giuseppe Mazzini, urged his compatriots and the other subjugated nationalists within the Habsburg Empire to murder their masters, as a means of opening the way of national liberation. Among the Italians who remained under Habsburg rule after the unification of Italy in the 1860s, the tradition of assassination remained alive, and in the Vienna state archives there exist many secret reports which confirm that Italian emigres in the United States, together with South Slav emigres, organised several conspiracies against Franz Josef and his heir apparent, Franz Ferdinand, particularly in the early years of this century. The Young Bosnians were one of the many South Slav secret societies operating against the Habsburg rule. They had conin tacts with similar organisations Slovenia (the secret society Preporod), Croatia and Dalmatia as well as with secret societies in Serbia, particularly with the Ujedinjenje Hi smrt ('Union or Death'), popularly called the Black Hand, headed by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic-Apis, the chief of the Intelligence Department of
rule but against their own society. They were anarchists and atheists. They were for a South Slav federation in the fullest sense of the word.
A
life
and death struggle
On the eve of June 28, Hand was in a life and
1914 the Black death struggle with the Serbian government. Prime Minister Pa§i£ regarded Colonel Apis and his group as a sort of praetorian guard who were threatening the whole political system of Serbia. Colonel Apis had planned a coup d'etat against the government in the spring of 1914, but the conspiracy was discovered in time to prevent its fruition.
The Serbian government had no reason provoke a conflict with Austria-Hungary in 1914. After two Balkan wars and the Albanian Mutiny (when Albanian units in the Serbian army mutinied) the Serbian army was decimated and had nothing like to
enough weapons and ammunition for a major conflict. The country needed peace badly. The Serbian government did its best to stop any incident during the archduke's visit to Bosnia, as Serbian documents, recently found, prove. The Serbian government was informed by the civilian authorities at the border that some members of the Black Hand were smuggling
arms
into
Austro-Hungarian
territory.
An
investigation was at once opened against Colonel Apis, but he denied that his men were involved in these operations. There is a theory that the power struggle between Pasic and Apis led Apis to approve Tankosic's delivery of the arms to the Sarajevo assassins. It seems that Apis did not expect that Princip and his accomplices would succeed in killing the archduke, although he did think their efforts might provoke a greater strain in relations between Pasic and the Vienna government, and that such complications would further weaken Pasic's position in relation to Apis. This thesis was strengthened by Tankosic's statement when he was arrested after the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. A general present at the arrest asked: 'Why have you done this?'
the Serbian General Staff. Although the Sarajevo assassins were
Tankosic answered: 'To spite Pasic.' While Serbia was in no mood to pick a quarrel in mid-1914, the same cannot be said for Austria-Hungary, for she was obsessed with her southern borders, the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea. This area was of the utmost importance to AustriaHungary's expanding industry and commerce—capital from Vienna and Budapest
Bosnians and thus Austro-Hungarian citizens, and although they had plotted against
was invested in railroad construction as far away as Turkey; Austrian Lloyd was
the Habsburg dignitaries for years, three leading members of the conspiracy, Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez, came to Sarajevo from Belgrade, armed with pistols and bombs which they had obtained through some Bosnian youth from Major Vojislav Tankosic, one of the leaders of the Black
one of the leading steamship companies, handling traffic from Trieste and Fiume to the Middle East; and Trieste was successfully competing with some of the greatest
European ports. Yet at the same time, Austria-Hungary's dependence on Germany was increasing.
Hand.
One
Despite the common goal of national liberation shared by the Young Bosnians and the Black Hand alike they differed in their philosophy and in their approach to the internal problems of South Slav society. Colonel Apis was a militarist and a pan-Serb who wanted a privileged position for Serbia among the South Slav lands, something like the position enjoyed by Prussia in Germany. The Young Bosnians were rebels not only against a foreign
went to Germany. German capital, loans and credits had gained a controlling hand in Vienna. Thus the whole expansion of Austria-Hungary required Germany's co-
half of Austria-Hungary's
exports
operation.
The conflict of interests between the European powers was intensifying on the eve of 1914 and forcing Germany and Austria-Hungary toward a common policy in the Balkans. France and Germany were competing actively in this area by offering
and armament contracts to the Balkan states. At the same time, Russia was increasing her influence by advocating an alliance of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro not only against the Ottoman Empire but also against AustriaHungary. During the six months before the outbreak of the First World War, the differences between Berlin and Vienna over Balkan affairs, particularly as far as Serbia was concerned, almost completely state loans
disappeared. On several occasions between 1908 and 1913 Germany advised Vienna to restrain her pressure on Serbia, presumably out of the anxiety that a local conflict might grow to involve all Europe. But from the end of
1913 Germany was much better prepared war with European powers, and so she could permit and even urge Vienna to take a stronger line with Serbia. At the end of September 1913 a rebellion broke out among the Albanians within Serbian territory, and the rebels inflicted very heavy losses on the Serbian troops. Belgrade accused Austria-Hungary of fomenting this trouble, and after the rebellion was put down, units of the Serbian army crossed over into Albania. Austria-Hungary issued an ultimatum to Serbia on October 17, 1913 demanding that the troops be withdrawn. This October 1913 crisis marked a basic change in the German government's attitude toward a possible conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. The Austrian Chief-of-Staff, General Conrad von Hotzendorf, spoke with Kaiser Wilhelm, who 'encouraged Austria to invade Serbia, and he expressed his belief that the other powers would not intervene'. Franz Ferdinand was a strong supporter of a preventive war against Serbia. He saw eye to eye on this question with Conrad and the other generals who advocated an aggressive foreign policy. According to one historian, 'in the seventeen months from January 1, 1913 to June 1, 1914 Conrad, by his own statements, urged war against Serbia no less than 25 times'. Franz Ferdinand's definite attitude toward Serbia can be seen also from his Internal Political Instructions. In them he said that a war with Serbia was a certainty. He also intended to annex Serbia, as is clear from the imperial and royal titles mentioned in his draft Imperial Proclamation, which he would have read in its final form if he had succeeded Franz Josef. for a general
The
fatal
announcement
The Archduke Franz Ferdinand's decision to visit Bosnia-Herzegovina in June 1914 was based on military, political and personal considerations. Great summer manoeuvres were planned in the two provinces. As Inspector General of the Armed Forces of the Empire, the archduke was expected to attend them. It was customary for the Emperor himself to take part but, because of his advanced age, he commanded the archduke to represent him instead. The news of Franz Ferdinand's visit yas
made
public in an announcement which appeared in the press in the middle of March 1914, and this spurred the Young Bosnians and other South Slav secret societies to greater efforts.
Nevertheless the narrative of the Sarajevo assassination shows that it was one of the most amateur plots of modern times. There were seven conspirators, all deter-
Top
Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie leave their train after on the morning of June 28. Above: A policeman stands over the hole left in the road by Cabrinovic's bomb in the first assassination attempt. Top right: The Imperial party is greeted at the town hall by the mayor of Sarajevo. During this halt Franz Ferdinand learned that two officers wounded in the bomb attack were in hospital and decided to change the course of the procession in order that he might visit them. Right: Street diagram of Sarajevo, with Franz Ferdinand's proposed and actual routes, and the positions of the assassins. Stationed outside Schiller's store is Princip, the man destined to succeed. Bottom left: A sensational contemporary drawing of the killing. As the chauffeur halts the car after taking the wrong turning, Princip steps out of the crowd and fires two shots. Below: Princip, second from the right, is arrested as police hold back onlookers. Bottom right: The result of the two shots which ended an era— Franz Ferdinand and his wife lie in state in the Konak. left:
arriving in Sarajevo
to war- a street plan of the incident that sparked off the
The road
First World War. The assassins' positions on June
28:
Mehmedbasic
FRANZ
JOSEF
STREET
N
Cabrinovic
SCHJUERS ©STORE
Cubrilovic
Popovic Princip's Princip's
first
position
second position
Grabez
A B
bomb attack Princip's successful attempt
Site of
Franz Ferdinand's route to the City Hall
The assassins of Sarajevo-dedicated but ineptplunged Europe into four years of war Right:
The funeral cortege
of
*
Franz Ferdinand and his wife passes through the streets of Trieste
*
^
' '
mined in their purpose, but the success of the conspiracy was due mainly to sheer luck. First of all the security measures for the archduke's journey to Bosnia were not impressive. The archduke himself had a fatalistic attitude toward the warnings he had received. When he was warned by a friend that he might be killed in Sarajevo, he sighed: 'I am sure your warning is justified, but I do not let myself be kept under a glass cover. Our life is constantly in danger. One has to rely upon God.' Despite the explosive situation (the day of the assassination was the day of the greatest Serbian festival, Vidovdan or St Vitus' Day), the security precautions were almost nonexistent, particularly in comparison with the police protection provided for the Emperor on his visit to Sarajevo in 1910. For Franz Josef's visit the route through which he was to pass had been lined with a double cordon of soldiers, while for the archduke there were no soldiers, although 70,000 of them were just outside Sarajevo. When the Emperor came, hundreds of suspected citizens were ordered not to leave their houses, but no such measures were taken on the occasion of Franz Ferdinand's visit. The police of Sarajevo defended themselves and put the blame on General Oskar Potiorek, the military governor of Bosnia, and on the military committee for the archduke's reception. The police had prepared a special report on the activities of the Young Bosnians, but were rebuked for having a 'fear of children'. On the eve of June 28 they had again warned that the archduke should not visit Sarajevo on St Vitus' Day. However, the chief of the reception committee, an army officer, rejected the warning by saying: 'Do not worry. These lesser breeds would not dare to do anything.' 'Security measures on June 28 will be in the hands of Providence' was the reply of one police
Vaso Cubrilovic
Danilo Hid
official.
On
their
own
initia-
the police issued orders to their 120 men, reinforced by a few men from Budapest and Trieste, to turn their faces to-
tive,
ward the crowd during the passage
of the Imperial party through the streets of Sarajevo. But 120 could not do much on a route of about four miles. It was 10.10 am on June 28, 1914 and as the archduke's car passed the central
Quay and Franz Josef Street, it turned to the right, according to the original plan. The second car followed it with the chief of the police and the Lord Mayor. Who made this mistake, and whether it was deliberate or accidental, is one of the
General Potiorek, the archduke and his wife, pointed out the new barracks. At that moment a tall young man in a long black coat and a black hat, Cabrinovic, asked a policeman which car the archduke was in; seconds later he had knocked the cap off a hand grenade against a metal lamp-post by the embankment wall, and hurled it at the archduke's car. The driver saw a black
controversial issues of this event. The driver of the archduke's car was about to follow them when General Potiorek shouted at him: 'What is this? Stop! You are going the wrong way. We ought to go via Appel Quay.' Stepping hard on the brake, the driver stopped the car just in front of a shop, close to the crowded pavement. At that instant a short young man with long hair and deep-set blue eyes took out a revolver. A policeman saw the danger and was on the point of grabbing his hand when he was struck by someone standing nearby, presumably a friend of the assassin. Pistol shots were heard. The killer was only a few steps from his target. It seemed at first as though this attempt too had failed. General Potiorek saw both the archduke and the duchess motionless in their places. But as the car was backing down the Appel Quay, the duchess fell towards the archduke and Potiorek saw the blood on the archduke's lips. He ordered the chauffeur to drive at full speed to the Konak, the governor's residence. Franz, Count von Harrach, the owner of the car in which the Imperial party were travelling, and who was himself in the front of the car with the chauffeur, could do nothing. He recalled the scene in the car in this way: As I was drawing out my handkerchief to wipe away the blood from the Archduke's lips, Her Highness cried out: 'For God's sake! What has happened to you?' Then she sank down from her seat with her face between the Archduke's knees. I had no idea that she had been hit and thought that she had fainted from shock.
police station of Sarajevo,
who was with
him and accelerated, and the bomb fell on the folded roof. The archduke threw up his left arm to protect the duchess as the missile bounced off into the street, exploding under the left rear wheel of the next car. The moment the bomb exploded the duchess jumped up in her seat. The archduke ordered the chauffeur to stop, since he noticed that the other cars were not following. Two officers were wounded, one seriously. Policemen and detectives were running around arresting as many onlookers as they could. About 20 people on the pavements were wounded, some of them seriously. A woman watching the parade from the balcony of her bedroom had been hit in the face and had her eardrum shattered by the explosion. While the imperial car was a still target for other assassins, the duchess complained that she felt a pain low down on her neck, near the shoulder blade. The archduke examined the spot and saw the skin had been grazed. Then the voice of the archduke was heard: 'The fellow must be insane. Gentlemen, let us proceed with our programme.' The procession moved to the town hall and here the archduke decided to change object flying towards
the route of the procession to visit one of the wounded officers in hospital. The cars drove along the Appel Quay at high speed. But when the first car, with the chief detective in it, reached the corner of the
His Royal Highness said:
'Soferl, Soferl,
don't die. Live for my children.' Thereupon I seized the Archduke by the coat collar to prevent his head from sinking
forward and asked him:
'Is
your Highness
in great pain?' To which he clearly answered: 'It is nothing.' His face was slightly distorted, and he repeated six or seven times, every time losing more consciousness and with a fading voice: 'It is nothing.' Then came a brief pause followed by a convulsive rattle in his throat, caused by loss of blood. This ceased on arrival at the governor's residence. The two unconscious bodies were carried into the building where their death was soon established. A German Jesuit, Father Anton Puntigam, and a Franciscan father were sum-
moned. The duchess died first. A bullet aimed at the governor had penetrated the side of the car, her corset and her right side. The archduke outlived her for a short time. A bullet had pierced the right side of his coat collar, severed the jugular vein and
come
The fast drive Konak must have made their con-
to a stop in his spine.
to the
dition even worse. It was 11.30 am, June 28, 1914. The duchess's body was in the governor's bedroom, where she had been brought after her death. The body of the archduke was in an adjoining room of the secluded and walled Konak, a building dating from Turkish times. His collar was open, and a gold chain from which hung seven amulets, with frames of gold and platinum, could be seen. Each of the amulets was worn as protection against a different type of evil. His sleeves were rolled up, and on his left arm could be seen a Chinese dragon tattoed in various colours. Around the duchess's neck was a golden chain with a woollen bag containing holy relics guarding her from ill health and misfortunes. The bells of all the Sarajevo churches, one after another,
began
to
toll.
The investigation carried out
in Sarajevo after the assassination did not provide any proof of the responsibility of the Serbian special emissary of the government.
A
Viennese Foreign Ministry, Friedrich von Wiesner, went to Sarajevo on July 10, 1914 to study the investigation material and to find out whether the Serbian govern-
ment had any
responsibility for the assas-
On
July 13 Wiesner telegraphed: There is nothing to show the complicity of the Serbian government in the direction of
sination.
the assassination or its preparations or in supplying of weapons. Nor is there anything to lead one even to conjecture such a thing. On the contrary, there is evidence that would appear to show complicity is out of the question. If the intentions prevailing at
my
departure
still exist,
demands might
be extended for:
•
Suppression of complicity of Serbian officials in smuggling persons
government
and material across
the frontier.
• Dismissal
of Serbian frontier officers at Sabac and Loznica for smuggling persons and materials across the frontier. • Criminal proceedings against Ciganovic and Tankosic. It is interesting that the German authorities came to a similar conclusion. The former Chancellor von Biilow wrote in his
memoirs: Although the horrible murder was the work of a Serbian society with branches all over the country, many details prove that the Serbian government had neither instigated nor desired it. The Serbs were exhausted by two wars. The most hot-headed among them might have paused at the thought of war with Austria-Hungary, so overwhelmingly superior, especially since, in Serbia's rear, were the rancorous Bulgarians and the untrustworthy Rumanians. Thus at least did Herr von Griesinger, our minister in Belgrade, sum up the position, as did also the Belgrade correspondents of every important
German newspaper.
AV The immediate results of the shooting— reprisals against Serbians T-
1L
"
.
in
Sarajevo
itself
But Serbia's guilt or innocence was not the real issue raised by the Sarajevo incident. Almost any incident could have sparked off Austria-Hungary's aggressive intentions towards Serbia, with incalculable international repercussions. Archduke Franz Ferdinand's death was to be avenged with more of Europe's blood than even he, the leader of Austria's war party, could have wished.
Further Reading L, The Origins of the War of 1914
Albertini,
(OUP 1967) Churchill, W., The World Crisis Vol
I
(Thornton
Butterworth) Dedijer, V., The
Road
to
Sarajevo (MacGibbon
& Gee) I., July 1914, The Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents (Batsford)
Geiss,
Gilford,
H.
L,
The
Black
Hand
at
Sarajevo
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1975) B., Triple Alliance and Triple Entente Rinehart and Wilson) Taylor, A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in
Schmitt, (Holt,
Europe (OUP 1954) T., The Eve of 1914
Wolff,
(Victor Gollano*)
in 1914 and was educated at Belgrade University. During the Second World War he served in Tito's Partisan Army, in which he held the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. After the war he was the Yugoslav delegate to the Paris peace conference and later to the UN. He was later expelled from the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party for defending the right of free speech. He was professor of Modern History at Belgrade University from 1954 to 1955 and he has subsequently held teaching and research posts at both English and American universities. His publi-
VLADIMIR DEDIJER was born
cations include Partisan Diary,
Yugoslav/Albanian
is now a Serbian Academy of Sciences, and Editor-in-Chief of the Serbian Diplomatic Papers for 1914.
Relations, Tito
member
of the
and
7"r>e
Beloved Land. He
S. L.
Mayer
Until 1890, Bismarck was able to create a series of alliances designed to protect the German state from hostile encirclement. But on his accession, Wilhelm II forced Bismarck's resignation, and with the departure of the Iron Chancellor, the system of alliances broke down or was allowed to crumble away by the new regime. This development caused new tensions and alignments in Europe, and brought closer Germany's greatest fear — war on
The
defeat
Prussian tion of
of France in the Francoof 1870-71 and the unifica-
War
Germany which accompanied
it,
marked a turning point in European politics and diplomacy. Central Europe, for centuries a battleground for the expansionist nation-states and atavistic
empires
surrounding
the
German and
Italian petty states and principalities, was now effectively closed to any aggressive
designs which France, Austria-Hungary or Russia might have had. Under the astute leadership of their Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, and with the most modern and best-equipped army in Europe under the leadership of von Moltke the elder, Germany had established herself as the foremost power on the Euro-
pean
continent.
Italy,
although
still
cherishing claims to the Italian-speaking districts of Austria-Hungary (such as the Trentino district and arias along the Dalmatian coasts), was anxious to consolidate her newly-won gains in Venetia and the
Papal States. Thus, although Gernfeny and Italy had further ambitions, bcfth nations were anxious to preserve the tenuous status quo which their armies land diplomats had so recently established. JFurthermore, Ger-
two fronts
many, being by far the more powerful nation of the two newcomers, was in a position to dominate European diplomacy, and her aims were to preserve her gains and to consolidate her economic and political structure. Bismarck, who had the complete confidence of Wilhelm I, the Kaiser of Germany and King of Prussia, had been able to create a situation in which he could dominate German politics as the Chancellor and was responsible to Wilhelm, and not to the Reichstag, the popularlyelected Lower House of the German Parliament. After nearly a decade of brief and successful wars against Denmark, AustriaHungary and France, Bismarck was content to follow a peaceful policy toward Germany's European neighbours, and was in a position virtually to dictate his nation's foreign policy. Germany needed time to consolidate, and Bismarck now sought to create an atmosphere of stability in Europe. First on his list was a detente with Austria-Hungary, which Prussia had so decisively defeated in 1866. Austria's Foreign Minister, Beust, was notoriously anti-Prussian, and since
Austria needed stability abroad for internal reasons as much as Germany did, Emperor Franz Josef saw fit, in September
1872, to part with Beust and appoint a proPrussian Hungarian, Count Julius Andrassy, in his place. After a series of private
meetings between Wilhelm and Franz Bismarck and Wilhelm were prepared to receive Andrassy and Franz Josef at Berlin on a state visit in order to Josef,
seal their entente.
Tsar Alexander II of Russia and his Foreign Minister, Prince Gorchakov, came to meet the Kaiser and the Emperor at Berlin at the same time, and although no formal arrangements were made, the way was prepared for a triple entente among the three northern courts. Bismarck recognised that Russia and Austria-Hungary held the keys to German security, as either power, in conjunction with France, could create what Bismarck called 'a nightmare of coalitions' around Germany, by which Germany would be faced with a possible two-front war which could destroy not only German security, but the recentlyconstructed German state. Throughout Bismarck's tenure of office he sought to prevent such a contingency by making a series of agreements with his two eastern neighbours. In 1873 Bis-
marck's diplomacy with Russia and Austria-Hungary bore fruit in a political
and military convention known as the Three Emperors' League (the Dreikaiserbund), and in May 1873 a military convention was signed at St Petersburg in which Germany and Russia agreed that if either were attacked by another European power the other would come to the aid of its ally with 200,000 men. In June a more general agreement was reached in Vienna when Russia and Austria promised, with Germany's approval, to confer if they were threatened by aggression from another
less than honest broker, resulted in the reduction of Bulgarian territory, the independence of Serbia and Montenegro being recognised by Turkey, with Rumania getting the Dobruja and Russia getting Bessarabia.
power.
to the chagrin of Serbia
The significance of the Dreikaiserbund was far-reaching. It made Germany the
French pride was assuaged by France being given a 'free hand' in Tunisia, and Britain was given the right to 'occupy and administer' Cyprus. Germany and Italy took nothing. Bismarck was satisfied that his
leader of the triple entente, but at the
same time it committed Germany to go to war for Russia against a third party, which
Bismarck acting as a something
Austria-Hungary was compensated by receiving the right to 'occupy and administer' Bosnia-Herzegovina under Turkish suzerainty, a formula designed to save face for Turkey and to give Austria-Hungary control
over these southern Slav areas,
much
and Montenegro.
not only could have been, but most probably would have been, Austria-Hungary. Both Austria and Russia had been contending for some years over the disposition of the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire. Russia was especially interested in securing Constantinople and the Straits in order to have a 'window' on the Mediterranean. Austria-Hungary, for her part, being blocked by Germany in her desire to expand her influence and territory westward, could only expand at the expense of Turkey in the Balkans.
therefore,
was attempting
to
anxious to conclude an arrangement with that he did not object too strongly to the inclusion of Austria in such a treaty; Austria, however, was not very enthusiastic, as a renewal of the Dreikaiserbund might negate the advantages she had gained by the German alliance.
However, at this point a change in government in Britain helped to convince Austria. The Conservatives under Disraeli had tended to be pro-Austrian, but when Gladstone denounced Austria-Hungary as — 'the unflinching foe of the freedom of
of additions to the
French army and the war scare of 1875, considered a pre-emptive was not the .only
strike against France,
manoeuvre which shook Bismarck's system of ententes.
A
revolt of Serbs in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1875 became the spark of a general uprising throughout the Balkans against Turkish misrule, and despite German attempts to cool nationalist fervour in the Balkans and to prevent a possible Austro-Russian conflict there, Russia decided to strike against the Ottoman Empire alone in 1877— championing the nationalist cause of her fellow Slavs. The result of the Russo-Turkish War was cataclysmic. The Treaty of San Stefano (January 1878), which ended the conflict, gave Russia predominant influence in a
number
which emerged or excrisis. Rumania, stripped of Bessarabia by Russia, took comof states
panded during the
pensation in the Dobrudja, while Serbia, Montenegro and a 'Big Bulgaria' were formed by the treaty. Austria-Hungary, which was not compensated at all, protested violently and threatened to go to war with Russia if the Treaty of San Stefano stood as written. At this point Bismarck intervened and called an international conference to be held at Berlin to settle the issue and to prevent war
between Germany's allies. The Congress of Berlin of 1878, with 10
Russia, the other would come to its assistance, and that neither would sign a separate peace; and if either party were attacked by another power (presumably France) its ally would at least assume a benevolent neutrality. If Russia joined that power, then both allies were pledged to fight. The alliance was to run for five years, but Russia was informed of its contents, despite the fact that the alliance
Germany
during the next two decades was plagued by the conflicting Balkan aims of allies both of whom were essential to his policy of isolating France. Italy, also searching for security, associated herself with the Three Emperors' League in 1873, gravitating toward the centre of power. Even Britain did not look unfavourably upon Dreikaiserbund. German security the seemed temporarily assured when German troops left French soil in 1873 after the Franco-Prussian war indemnity was paid.
when Germany
alliance proved to be the longest lasting in Bismarck's system. This treaty stated that if either signatory were attacked by
of a Franco-Russian agreement. Russia, however, had no desire at this time to ally herself with France. She therefore turned to Germany in 1880 to ask for an alliance of her own. Gorchakov's power was transferred to an admirer of Germany, Nicholas de Giers, who was of German extraction. Bismarck wanted to assure the Russians that any treaty which he concluded with them would be supplementary to, and not a substitute for, |the Austro-German alliance. Giers was so
ally in the Dreikaiserbund two powers with irreconcilable aims. Bismarck's diplomacy
The authorisation
and Alexander II were closely reBismarck realised^ that Russia's foreign minister, Gorchakov, would not welcome German overtures so soon after the Congress where Bismarck had helped Austria gain territory in the Balkans. The Austro-German alliance was signed in Vienna in September 1879, and this I
lated),
was supposed to have been secret. Germany was therefore secure from isolation in case
Irreconcilable allies
Germany,
helm
Wilhelm first Kaiser of the unified Germany aimed at dynastic solidarity in Europe I,
allies had not gone to war, but Italy was upset at not having received anything in the way of territorial compensation, an oversight which was soon to play into Germany's hands. Bismarck sought to mend his eastern fences almost as soon as the Congress of Berlin was over. First he turned to AustriaHungary, which was already favourably disposed toward Germany, partly as a result of the efforts of Andrassy. Bismarck felt that to have Austria as an ally rather than Russia would be somewhat more profitable, as her army was more efficient and better equipped, although numerically smaller than Russia's. Despite Kaiser Wilhelm's desire to keep dynastic solidarity between Russia and Germany (Wil-
every country of Europe', Austria decided to follow Bismarck's advice. Despite the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in March 1881, the negotiations continued under his somewhat anti-German successor, Alexander III, and a triple alliance was signed at Berlin in June 1881. Germany, AustriaHungary and Russia pledged benevolent neutrality if any of the others were involved in war with a fourth country, unless that country were Turkey. If any of the three were to go to war against Turkey, the othei s would have to be consulted, and no alt ;ration of the status quo in the Balkans could be made without general agreement among the three. This revival of the Thre,3 Emperors' League was to run for three years, although it was renewed for another three in 1884. Thus Germany's eastern frontiers were now secured and France was isolated diplomatically.
In 1873 Italy jravitated toward this combination of pc 3rs, but she was reluctant to ally hei Ai with her potential enemy, Austria-I- ungary, whose Italianspeaking posses ons she coveted. But when France caf.ied the promise made to her at the Conf ress of Berlin by seizing Tunisia in 1881, Italy protested vehemently, not o lly because of Tunisia's proximity, but ecause the largest section of the foreign community in Tunis was Italian, not Fn nch. Italy received no sup-
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The time bomb of prewar Europe
A Europe on the eve of The two Central Powers are surrounded by what were to
war.
become known as the But was this
Allies.
encirclement deliberate, or the result of
Germany's own
mismanagement
of
her diplomatic affairs?
The Bismarckian system of European alliances:
Germany and kingdom of
the double
Austria-Hungary form the centre of an interlocking series of protective treaties,
designed principally to isolate France
JW# ,it^
/.mV
port for her cause, and she realised that without international support her dreams of a colony on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa would never become reality. Reluctantly, and at Bismarck's insistence, Italy entered negotiations with Austria and Germany for an alliance. The Triple Alliance, signed at Vienna in May 1882, stipulated that if Italy were attacked by
France, Germany and Austria would come her aid with all their strength. If Germany were attacked by France, however, Italy would have to come to the aid of Germany. If one or two of the allies were attacked by more than one power, the others would have to come to the defence of the attacked power. On the other hand, if one of the powers should wage an aggressive war, the others would have to maintain a benevolent neutrality. The treaty was to have been secret and was to to
last five years, but, in fact,
it
was renewed
at various occasions and with minor alterations up to the outbreak of the First World War. Thus by 1882 four of the six great powers in Europe were allied, and France and Great Britain were isolated, the former uncomfortably, the latter 'splendidly', as British statesmen liked to put it.
The Bismarckian system of alliances has been charged with creating tensions in Europe, not alleviating them, but it prevented France from waging a revanchist
he could deliver in consonance with other agreements which he had already made. But the tensions which existed in AustroRussian and Austro-Italian relations con-
war
tinued to threaten the complicated frame-
to regain the 'lost provinces' of AlsaceLorraine, taken from her in 1870-71 by Germany. In fact, none of the alliances and agreements reached were offensive or aggressive in character. They were primarily defensive alliances, whose chief aim was to preserve the territorial status quo and peace in Europe. When Serbia and Rumania joined these combinations (in 1881 and 1883, respectively), the alliances concluded were again defensive in character, and it should be remembered that no general European wars were fought while Bismarck was Chancellor of Germany. But, being at the centre of these alliances, Bismarck was able to be the arbiter of European disputes, and since Germany had no aggressive designs anywhere in Europe, peace was assured. Although minor wars were fought during the Bismarckian period (1871-1890), such as the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885, they were quickly concluded and caused no major European upheavals. Bismarck's alliances were technically not
conflicting.
He never promised more than
work which Bismarck had
created.
When
the Triple Alliance of 1882 came up for renewal in 1887 Austria was forced to promise compensation to Italy if the status quo in the Balkans were altered. At the same time Russia decided not to renew the
Three Emperors' League with Germany and Austria, and Germany was forced to conclude a bilateral arrangement with Russia. The three-year Reinsurance Treaty, con-
Germany and Russia in June 1887, was a secret arrangement in which each party agreed to maintain a benevolent neutrality if either were attacked by a third power. In exchange for cluded between
a continuation of a Russian guarantee of the German frontier in case of a possible
French attack, Bismarck was forced to support Russian influence in Bulgaria and to pledge a friendly neutrality in case Russia seized Constantinople and the Straits. In order to prevent Russia from acting on this promise, Bismarck arranged yet
Kaiser Wilhelm with Bismarck,
II
the 'pilot' whose expert
guidance he rejected 12
agreement among tripartite another Austria-Hungary, Britain and Italy to uphold the status quo in the Balkans in case it were threatened by Russia. Since Germany did not sign this agreement of December 1887 she had not overcommitted herself. Despite the complexity of these arrangements, it can be seen that although Germany violated the spirit of her agreements with Austria and all Russia, she was never put into a position where she would be forced by any circumstance to violate the letter of the agreements she signed. By pitting her treaty partners against each other, furthermore, Bismarck was able to control both their passions and ambitions, so that an actual outbreak of hostilities among them would be unlikely. Paramount among his considerations, however, was that France be cut off from any possibility of alliance with any power in Europe, thereby ensuring that France would be unable to consider seriously a war against Germany to regain Alsace-Lorraine.
A new
volatile personality Bismarck had hoped to bring Britain closer to his alliance system, and eventually to
reach a specific agreement with her, but his basis of support had always been the free hand he had received from Kaiser Wilhelm I. When the old Emperor died in March 1888, Bismarck was left to deal with his son, the already ailing Friedrich Wilhelm HI. Only 99 days after his succession to the throne, Friedrich Wilhelm died, which left Germany in the hands of a young and volatile personality, the new Kaiser, Wilhelm H. Jealous of the prestige and expertise of the Iron Chancellor, the new Kaiser schemed to get rid of Bismarck. Eventually he succeeded and in March 1890, even while negotiations for a renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia were in progress, and a colonial detente was being arranged with Great Britain, Bismarck was dismissed. An era had ended, and thenceforth — and certainly from 1897 onwards— Wilhelm himself was to take most of the crucial foreign policy
Germany was to make. Almost as soon as the pilot' had been dropped, the Bismarckian system of alliances began to crumble. The new Chancellor, Caprivi, and the new Foreign Secretary, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, lacked the experience and ability to
decisions
maintain the complicated system which Bismarck had constructed. The grey eminence of the German Foreign Office, Holstein, who had always been envious of Bismarck and now hoped to seize control of Germany's foreign policy, had little trouble in convincing Marschall and Caprivi, and, through them, the Kaiser, of
the
incompatibility of the Austroalliance and a connection with Russia. Certainly these arrangements were incompatible in spirit, if not in the letter of the agreements made, and Holstein and Wilhelm felt that the double-dealing of Bismarck must come to an end. Germany had to choose between Russia and AustriaHungary, and it was felt that the Austrian link was far more important to Germany's national interest. The Russian Ambassador to Germany, Count Shuvalov, arrived at Berlin on March 17 — the very day that Wilhelm asked for Bismarck's resignation — with the purpose of asking Germany for a renewal of the treaty for six years, but he was eventually to leave Berlin emptyhanded. The German connection with
German
Russia had finished, and Russia was free to look for security elsewhere. She did not waste much time.
13
Wilhelm attempted
and to
Caprivi, the
meanwhile,
complete
negotiations that Bismarck had begun for a detente with Britain. Although a colonial arrangement
was made by which Germany gave up Zanzibar and her claims in Uganda to Britain,
in
exchange
for
the
island
of
Heligoland and a strip connecting German South- West Africa with the Zambesi River tCaprivi's Finger, as it was called), nothing much was to come of it. Despite a number of attempts during the next few years on the part of both Germany and AustriaHungary, Britain maintained her 'splendid isolation' from specific alliances with con tinental powers. Wilhelm had given up Russia; he had failed to get Great Britain. Russia, however, was anxious to end her newly-found isolation, and France lost no time in taking advantage of the new situation. Both the French and the British had already made extensive loans to the Russian government, and by 1891 France had made it clear that no further loans would be forthcoming unless certain political strings were attached. Consequently the Russians welcomed the French fleet in the summer of 1891 at Kronstadt, the big Russian naval base in the Baltic, and even Tsar Alexander III had to bare his head as the once-hated Marseillaise was played. By August an entente was reached between the two governments, in which each country pledged to 'consult' the other in case of any threat to peace, but the French were not merely content with this vague promise; they wanted a military convention to give teeth to the entente. In October 1893 the Russian navy returned the vis t of the French navy by sending a fleet >{ their own to Toulon, France's biggi st Mediterranean base, and by the end )f the year Giers authorised a secret military convention. If France were attacked by Germany, or Italy supported by Germany, Russia would come to the aid of France with all her forces. If Russia were attacked by Germany, however, or Austria-Hungary supported by Germany, France would go to war against Germany. Within three years the Bismarckian system had crumbled, and Germany was now faced with the possibility of a war
on two fronts. There were a number of attempts by Germany to break the ring which was closing around her. The Triple Alliance be sure, but Germany bring Russia back into her camp. In 1895 Germany combined with France and Russia to force Japan to give back the Liaotung Peninsula, which she had taken from China during the SinoJapanese War of 1894-95, including the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, but Germany negated the advantages gained by this manoeuvre by seizing Kaiochow in the Shantung Peninsula, which endeared her
was renewed,
tried
in vain
to
to
no one, least of all Japan and Great Britain. When Germany tried to prevent
to
an agreement between the Congo Free State and Britain in 1894, and later, in
Some
of the
Japanese troops that shattered the myth
of Russia's
prowess on the
field of battle
1896, when the Kaiser praised the Transvaal Republic for aborting the ill-fated Jameson Raid, Germany further impaired her chances of an entente with Britain. Her support of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal during the Boer War did not improve matters. Even then, however, the Germans thought it was feasible to counteract the Franco-Russian alliance by
15
The time bomb primed diplomatic line-up in 1914
The changed web
of alliances on the eve of war: no longer are Germany and AustroHungary at the centre of a series of protective alliances. For after the removal of the guiding hand of Bismarck, they find themselves hedged in by treaties made between their former allies and previously isolated countries. Of the two non-European Great Powers, Japan has been drawn to the side of Great Britain, leaving unaligned only the United States, secure in their isolationist foreign policy
16
**r&*~
'
17
bringing Britain, who distrusted France and Russia, into the Triple Alliance. During 1900 and 1901 the German Embassy in London tried to convince the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, of Germany's desire to reach an understanding. It was felt that the AngloGerman arrangement concerning China was a possible prelude to alliance negotiations, and although negotiations did take place, the bitter feelings created by Germany's attitude toward the Boer War hindered their progress. Britain, for her part, felt the need for allies more than ever; the wave of international disapproval about Britain's actions in South Africa, combined with the rising strength of the German navy and German ambitions in the Near East (with the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway scheme), persuaded some members of the British government to feel that the time had come to abandon the traditional policy of isolation from the Continent. Britain's isolation
ends
Britain's first major peacetime alliance
was
however, not with a continental power, but with Japan. Japan had been drawn into the Anglo-German entente negotiations at a fairly early stage, but Japan, unlike Germany, could not delay or postpone talks. The humiliation which to
be,
Japan suffered at the hands of Germany, France and Russia in 1895 could never again be tolerated, and when the same powers, who had prevented her from gaining supremacy in Korea and Manchuria, in the name of the territorial integrity of China, violated that integrity themselves on repeated occasions, Japan
determined to seek European support to maintain and increase her influence in Korea and, ultimately, Manchuria. While the Anglo-German negotiations were foundering, Britain encouraged Japan to conclude an alliance, perhaps fearing that Japan might come to an agreement with Russia instead. On January 30, 1902, the Anglo- Japanese alliance was signed. If either party went to war in the ..Far East, the other would remain neutral, but if two or more nations attacked one of the signatories, the other would come to her defence. This gave Japan
the opportunity to wage war against Russia without the risk of French or German naval intervention. Since Japan was offered British support in Korea, the Japanese awaited their opportunity to strike against Russia and to avenge the humiliation of 1895. They did so in 1904. The British gained by having their interests in the Far East looked after by the Japanese fleet, so that they could concentrate more naval power in the North Sea and the Mediterranean in case of a European conflict. Britain was mending her diplomatic fences elsewhere as she negotiated with Japan. An agreement with the United States relinquished Britain's right to help in the building of an interoceanic canal in Central America, giving the United States the opportunity of doing so alone. Although it would be inaccurate to say that Britain was in the process of negotiating an entente with the United States, it is reasonable to state that Britain was going out of her way to avoid any possible conflict with the US and to minimise differences between the two nations. American public opinion would never have considered an alliance with any European nation in 1900, but it
Otto vcfi Bismarck, the Irofi Chancellor' and dofhinant figure in
up
European to
1890
politics
was
of
mutual interest
to avoid conflicts
with Britain, such as the one over Vene-
where the Anglo-German debtzuela, collecting expedition of 1902 fell foul of American public opinion.
Russia was encumbered with a disastrous war against Japan as well as with a major revolution: she could therefore lend France little or no effective support in case of such a strike.
France was another country wooed by Britain in her search for allies. Although Britain and France almost went to war over the control of the Upper Nile in the Fashoda Incident of 1898, it became increasingly clear to both parties that they had more to fear by opposing each other than by working together, at least on a limited basis. Through the efforts of Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador to the Court of St James, tension between the two colonial rivals subsided, and after the death of
Then, in July 1905, just before peace negotiations began between Japan and Russia in the United States through the good offices of President Theodore Roose-
Queen
gested that all three countries could eventually make an alliance directed against Britain; all this occurred while Germany was trying to prevent France from cashing her Moroccan claim. Both Holstein and Biilow, the German Chancellor, opposed the Treaty of Bjorko when they heard about it, Russian diplomats were appalled, and the French would never have accepted it. Thus the Kaiser's private treaty died an abortive death, and Germany's hope of a Continental alliance directed against Britain came to naught. At the same time, the Moroccan Crisis deepened, and it was generally feared that France and Germany were on the brink of war, for Germany felt that if war did in fact break out, Britain would not support France over the Moroccan question. In fact, none of the great powers wanted to go to war over Morocco, and by the end of the year it was agreed that an international conference be held at Algeciras, a Spanish town near Gibraltar, at the beginning of 1906. So far, Germany's attempt to break the Anglo-French entente was having the opposite effect. The British elections at the end of the year had brought the Liberals to power with a huge majority, and the Liberal Party tended to be more francophile than the Conservative Party. The new British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, secretly approved of the opening of Anglo-French military con-
Victoria in 1901, the francophile tendencies of King Edward VII made some impact upon the Foreign Office. The visit of Edward to Paris in 1903 was an unqualified success.
Meanwhile, France sought allies even enemy camp. She made an agreement with Italy in 1900, giving her a free hand in Tripoli in exchange for reciprocal courtesy in Morocco. This detente in North in the
Africa led to Italy's assurance, given to France in 1902, that she was in no way committed to go to war against France. The agreement was made almost on the very day that the Triple Alliance with Germany
and Austria was renewed, and
in direct
never France and the Triple Alliance at the same time. Unlike Bismarckian Germany, Italy had by 1902
contradiction
to
it.
Italy
honour her commitments
made incompatible
could
to
alliances
and agree-
ments, so that she could support either bloc in case of war. But France was reasonably assured that she would not be stabbed in the back by the Italians in case of war with Germany. As the Franco-British negotiations continued, it became clear that the stumbling block was Morocco. After having made an agreement with the Spanish for a possible partition of Morocco — with Spain gaining most of the Mediterranean coast and France the longer Atlantic coast — the French asked Britain for a free hand in Morocco. This free hand was granted by the agreements of April 8, 1904, in exchange for a British free hand in Egypt, which Britain already had controlled in virtually all but name since 1882. The British recognised the position of Spain in Morocco based on the Franco-Spanish agreement. Both parties were given spheres of influence in Siam, and the rest of the agreement dealt with relatively minor affairs, such as fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland, small territorial adjustments in West Africa, and the like. The
main point was that an Anglo-French colonial entente had been signed, thereby linking Britain with the Franco-Russian group to a certain degree. But a colonial entente was not an alliance, and the French knew it. The Germans, anxious to break this arrangement as soon as possible, picked a fight with the French about the Moroccan question, partly, at least, to test the strength of the Entente Cordiale almost as soon as it was formed. Holstein and the Kaiser felt that if the entente were to be broken, 1905 was the year to break it; General von Schlieffen was urging a preemptive strike against France before the entente was given military teeth and while
velt,
Kaiser Wilhelm met Tsar Nicholas
at Bjorko in the Baltic Sea. The German and Russian heads of state agreed privately to a defensive alliance against any EuroII
pean power, the suggestion that such an agreement would render the FrancoRussian alliance meaningless being brushed aside by the Kaiser, who sug-
versations, which began in December 1905. These talks were to continue up to the start of the First World War, and were to commit Britain far more deeply to the
French cause than even Grey himself Far from splitting the Entente Cordiale, the Germans had succeeded in
negotiate an entente, which was concluded the following year, Russia renouncing her claims to Afghanistan, thereby removing any possible Russian threat to India; Tibet being made into a neutral buffer state; and Persia being divided into spheres of influence between the two powers, with a neutral area in the middle. The ring was closed and Germany was left to face a loosely-formed, but nonetheless solid diplomatic isolation every bit as formidable as that which Bismarck had made for France before 1890. By 1907 the parts of the puzzle had been put in place, Britain, France and Russia (with Italy still something of a question mark, as the Triple Alliance was renewed right up to the outbreak of war in 1914) facing the Austro-German combination. Even the United States, though still clearly a neutral, was more or less ranged on the side of the entente allies. There were a number of further attempts on the part of Germany to break the encirclement she found herself in, but to no avail. When war came the combinations which had grouped in 1907 were to face the Central Powers. It has often been stated that these alliances and ententes triggered a chain reaction in 1914, so that when one of the great powers went to war, all the others would be forced to follow. This was certainly not the case. The alliances which were made throughout the 1871-1914 period were basically defensive in character, and in every case one nation had to commit an aggressive act against another in •rder to force the various treaty members to honour their agreements. The alliances, such as they were, could never have triggered a war without a direct attack by another of the great powers. And it is to be remembered that Britain had made no specific treaty commitments to any power, save Japan, despite the Anglo-French military conversations and the Franco-Belgian military talks which followed the Moroccan Crisis of 1905. When Germany attacked France in' 1914, only Russia was pledged to come to France's aid,
and Austria-Hungary was ngt committed to support Germany in an aggressive war. The alliance systems during the 18711914 period did not help to cause the world war; instead, they succeeded in preventing one from taking place for almost 50 years.
realised.
strengthening it. When the Algeciras Conference met in
January 1906, Germany became painfully aware of her diplomatic isolation. When the final roll-calls were taken of the participating countries in the conference, which included every major power except Japan, and many of the lesser European states, only Austria-Hungary and Morocco voted on the German side. Holstein and Schlieffen were forced to step down in Germany, and the conference ended with an enormous diplomatic defeat for Germany. Not only Britain support the Franco-Spanish claims in Morocco; the United States and did
Italy did so as well.
Germany
also
knew
Further Reading
The Origins of the War of 1914 (Volume 1) (OUP 1967) Brandenburg, Erich, From Bismarck to the World War Fay, Sidney B., The Origins of the World War (2 volumes) (Collier-Macmillan) Gooch, G. P., Before the War (2 volumes) Albertini, Luigi,
Hayes, Carleton, J. H., A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900 (Harper & Row) Langer, William L, European Alliances and
Alignments Langer, William L, The Diplomacy of Imperialism Lee, D. E., Europe's Crucial Years: the diplomatic background of World War One (Hanover, NH: New England University Press 1974) Taylor, A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1914 (OUP 1954)
that she could no longer count on the Triple Alliance, and would be forced to
depend on her
sole
and weakening
ally,
Austria. The Algeciras Conference dealt a further and greater blow to Germany. The British plenipotentiary at the conference, Sir Arthur Nicolson, was sent to Russia to
S.
L.
MAYER was
History of the
Executive Editor of Purnell's
Second World War and
has lectured research
at
Political History
World War. He Maryland, and done the London School of Economics. He
Consultant to the History of the
First
at the University of
runs a London publishing house specialising
in
military subjects.
19
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The discontent and corruption of Russia, the discord and decadence of Austrian-Hungary, the Expanionist vigour of Germany, the wish for revenge of France, and the isolationist tendencies of Great Britain— all these factors contributed to the situations which brought about the First World War. Barrie Pitt shows how the factors and factions were interwoven to produce the explosive situation of 1914
Examining the events which
led up to the outbreak of war in 1914 rather like studying the pattern of a Persian carpet. There are hundreds of minor, separate and apparently unconnected flurries of colour and event, and only from a distance can it be seen that they all contribute to larger patterns which in turn interweave with others to form the whole. In the years preceding the First World War there developed three main patterns of circumstances, each main pattern interwoven with the others until, to labour the analogy a little, the resultant hue became so bright as to be positively incandescent. These three main patterns were: • The political and economic tensions of the countries of Europe, plus Russia and Turkey. • The tensions and antagonisms which existed between the crowned heads of those countries (of which an astonishingly high proportion were direct descendants of Queen Victoria). • The military plans and intentions of the main European powers and their state of readiness for war. Let us examine the countries of Europe amongst whom the tensions, both political and economic, grew until they reached such a pitch that war became inevitable. First let us consider the position of Russia. At the beginning of the 20th Century, the myth of the Russian colossus exercised a spell upon Europe. If one thought in terms of warfare — which has always been, inevitably, the final arbiter of power and influence — then its armed forces were the largest and apparently the most formidable in Europe. Despite their poor performance in the Russo-Japanese war, the very numbers of Russia's armies inspired awe in the minds of European nations whose military thinking had been for years based on the concepts of Clausewitz and the doctrine of 'mass'. Russia could boast 1,423,000 men in the army in peacetime, 3,115,000 to be called up on mobilisation, with a further reserve of 2,000,000, to make available a total force of 6,500,000 hardy, uncomplaining soldiers. The astonishing thing to the historian is not that this myth collapsed in the face of actuality, but that it possessed as great a degree of truth as it proved to do. Russia at the turn of this century was ruled by one man, the Tsar, the majority of whose subjects were almost totally uneducated — but patient, faithful and deeply religious, and, as a result of their religion, deeply patriotic. This situation gave to Russia an immense strength which might have given her prestige in peace, or made her invincible in war. Russia's weakness, however, lay in the calibre of the man who occupied the position of supreme autocrat, and of the influence on him of the corrupt aristocracy which flourished at his court. The result of this decadence was a state of affairs which bred resentment, disgust and discontent throughout Russia, especially among the minority of the country's population who were neither aristocrats nor peasants, but comprised the Russian upper middle is
class.
This upper middle class administered Russia. It ran the country's businesses, trade, civil service, and it provided officers for the armed services (but not those who held high command; such positions were reserved for the aristocracy). It provided the intellectuals who were to plant the seeds of revolution. Ironically, it also provided the all-pervading secret police whose job it was to root out the intellectuals and destroy those same seeds. So this upper middle class directed the vast sprawling mass of Russia, abstracted from it the profits of its labour and its earth — and saw those profits vanish into the pockets of a decadent aristocracy. It is quite astonishing how inefficient the aristocracy was. typical example was afforded by the Russian Minister for War between 1908 and 1914, Sukhomlinov. He had been originally appointed in order to reorganise Russia's forces after the disasters of the Russo-Japanese War, and his first few months in office were undoubtedly productive. Then, however, perhaps astonished by his own industry, or exhausted by it, he relaxed into a life of indolence and luxury in which he was abetted by a retinue anxious, for a variety of reasons, to encourage him in it. Whether by accident or design, he was introduced to the young and pretty wife of a local governor who so entranced him that nothing would satisfy him but her speedy transformation into the fourth Madame Sukhomlinov; a change in status made possible by the provision by one of his retinue of what seems to have been framed evidence. Needless to say, the attendant responsible, Altshiller, an Austrian, became the confidant of the Minister for War, and as the latter was now faced with such problems as inevitably face an elderly man with a young wife, more and more responsibility was accorded to him. Altshiller accepted all additional tasks with alacrity, but also so reduced the amount of work for Sukhomlinov to tackle that much of the financial allocation for the armed forces remained unspent, despite the fact that considerable sums were
A
channelled into Sukhomlinov's private purse in order to meet the demands of his extravagant wife. It was not until Altshiller's abrupt departure, in January 1914, that it was realised that he was Austria's chief agent in Russia. Another of Sukhomlinov's intimates was Colonel Myasodev, who was chief of the railway police in charge of Russia's strategic railways along the Russo-German and Russo-Austrian frontiers. Nobody seemed to think it odd that in 1910 he was the proud possessor of five German decorations, nor that he lunched with the Kaiser on occasion at the Imperial hunting lodge just over the border in East Prussia. During 1915 he was to come under heavy suspicion of being a spy, and was in due course hanged for it, though this occurred a little late in the day.
Uprisings and armed rebellion It was therefore no wonder that the minority of Russia's population who administered the country and could see these things going on seethed with discontent. The reign of Nicholas II was harassed by disaster, massacres, uprisings and sporadic outbreaks of armed rebellion, led for the most part by men from the middle class (although the manpower for these revolts came from peasantry), and usually triggered by some piece of crass stupidity or blatant corruption by members of the aristocracy. The aristocracy, in their turn, grew frightened, and frightened rulers, when they cannot control the forces inside their countries, sometimes try to find a cure for them outside, in foreign adventures.
Between 1910 and 1914, a number of powerful and wealthy men were beginning to believe that perhaps their best chance of retaining their positions and power would be to direct the growing anger of the mass of the population against foreign enemies. A war, in fact, might solve a lot of their problems, a proposition which achieved specific terms when the conclusion reached at a Tsar's Crown Council on February 21, 1914, was that 'only a general European War would enable Russia to realise her historic aims'. These 'historic aims' had, in fact, but little relation to the needs of the overwhelming proportion of Russia's population. It is doubtful, despite his presence at the Council, whether or in Russia
not Tsar Nicholas II mainly because it is or not. Moreover, in suffered the effects
fully subscribed to the Council's conclusion, open to question whether he understood it
addition to his natural lack of intellect, he of the educational theories of his father, Alexander III, who, for reasons which he never explained, announced that he would deliberately refrain from instructing Nicholas in any of the technicalities of empire or statesmanship until the young man had reached the mature age of 30. This may well have been a basically sound idea, but for one fatal flaw — the father miscalculated and died when the son was 26. Nicholas thus assumed the Romanov throne with none of the innocent purity of his mind sullied by knowledge or training. In addition to his lack of training, Nicholas lacked political imagination and sensitivity. When, in 1905, the news arrived of the annihilation of the Russian fleet by the Japanese in the Straits of Tsushima, he was playing tennis. He read the telegram, stuffed it into his pocket, went on playing, and never referred to the matter again. He seems to have been not only incapable of seeing an historical fact in terms of national or even human disaster, but also to have been incapable even of realising that it constituted a looming danger to himself and his position. But nature abhors a vacuum, and if the mind of the Tsar was empty of intelligence or imagination, he managed to fill it with sentiment. He was known throughout his domains as 'Little Father', and this title appealed to hint. Moreover, he was 'Little Father' not only to the Russians, but also, he considered, to the entire Slav people, and there were large Slav populations outside the boundaries of Russia itself, for Czech, Slovak and Galician, and the inhabitants of five Balkan states, could all claim, or be claimed as possessing, membership of the Slav family. These related peoples lived in the Empire, or within the sphere of influence of the Empire, of Austria-Hungary. During certain periods when there was friendship and understanding between the 'Three Emperors', and the oft-suggested renewal of the kaiserbund (League of Three Emperors) uniting Germany, Austria
Dm-
likely to become more than a passing fancy in the Kaiser's fertile imagination, Slav irredentism could not receive official support from St Petersburg. But when the fundamental disagreements between Russia and Austria-Hungary became obvious again, then St Petersburg could support openly the
and Russia seemed
pan-Slav movement. At the head of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was the Emperor Franz Josef— the last but one of the House of Habsburg, the royal family which had ruled parts of Europe since the 1 2th Century. One 21
gains the impression that the Habsburgs did not mind what countries or peoples they ruled— they seem to have regarded themselves as hereditary but professional monarchs. In this way, the Habsburgs had accumulated a large, but by this time tottering Empire, which lay across the centre of Europe like an untidily composed patchwork quilt. It contained portions of what had once been nine separate countries, and populations which consisted of 11 different nationalities.
The Empire
also exercised control over the foreign policies of at
two of its neighbours, Serbia and Montenegro, and also what might be known as heavy parental control over Rumania and Bulgaria through the fact that there were large Rumanian and Bulgarian populations inside the borders of the Empire. These served as hostages for the good behaviour of their parent countries. Inside the recognised boundaries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire there were three dominant nationalities — the Germans in the western part, the Poles in Galicia and the Magyars in Hungary. Yet in none of these regions did these nationalities form the majority of the population. They owned the land and they controlled the various provinces, simply as a result of an uneasy combination which they had formed between themselves under the symbol of the Habsburg dynasty. The Magyars in Hungary detested both the Poles and the Germans in the Empire, and had little but contempt for the Emperor and all his House, but they knew that unless they co-operated and allowed Vienna to control the Balkan states of Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Albania, then these small Slav states would appeal for protection tc their 'Little Father' in St Petersburg. With Russia bordering on Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia, it would not be long before the Slav populations inside Hungary would be inviting the Tsar to improve their lot — at the expense of the Magyars. The position of the Poles in Galicia on the north-eastern boundary of the Empire was different in theory but similar in practice. Galicia had a large Slav population and was bordered by Russia; but immediately across the border in Russia was a large Polish least
In these circumstances the Poles within Austriatheir own position as well as they could and clung steadfastly to the safety which the Austro-Hungarian Em-
population.
Hungary maintained
seemed to offer. The German population of the Empire had a Czech, a Slovak and an Italian minority to keep in administrative subjection. Although some Germans may have been tempted to throw in their lot with
pire
the newly-formed in
little,
in
German
Reich, as the majority were genuinely
command
in this western part of Austro-Hungary, they had if anything, to gain. Here they were German overlords, but
Germany they would have been merely other Germans. Thus the three strongest factions in Austria-Hungary, despite
the fact that they disliked one another intensely, contrived to keep the Empire in being, and the eight other nationalities in subjection.
There was one very important factor which did contribute some stability to the delicately poised balance of the Empire. This was the length of Franz Josef's reign. By 1914 he had occupied the Habsburg throne for 66 years. The grandfathers of most of the men serving in his armies had grown up under his rule, and there was a feeling throughout Austria-Hungary that, though the separate peoples of the Empire might squabble bitterly among themselves, they were all subjects of the Emperor. It was difficult for them to imagine life without the patriarchal figure of Franz Josef as the monarch. The figure of the Emperor, then, was a lynch pin of the Empire — but it was not a pin which could stand any great strain.
Germany, the young giant one partner of what were to become known as the Central Powers — Austria-Hungary — was weak and internally disturbed, one of the other partners, Germany, was powerful, stable and outIf
ward-looking. It had not always been so; Germany's emergence as a world power had taken place almost entirely within the second half of the 19th Century — in fact, during the reigns of Queen Victoria and
Franz Josef. Before that, Germany had been divided into 38 separate states. Though the people of these states all spoke the same language, each state had its own ruler, its own administration, its own internal economic problems, its own customs barrier against the others, and sometimes even its own armed forces. Provinces and Principalities, Duchies and Grand Duchies, Kingdoms, Electorates and Free Towns, all had bickered interminably among themselves for centuries, each jealous of its own diminutive status. Until industrialisation placed too great a strain upon its complex structure, this situation was tolerated — though probably only because of usage and tradition.
Supreme autocrats-the rulers The Romanov family pictured at Tsarskoye Selo, the palace The Tsarina is on the left, and the Tsar is fourth from left
of Russia
.
just outside St Petersburg.
.23
-
»
Tsar Alexander
II,
the Russian partner of the Dreikaiserbund of 1873
The forces of nationalism released by the Napoleonic wars, coupled with the great 19th-century revolution in communications and industry, provided Germany with the motive and the opportunity for unification. The Germans accepted the lead offered to them by Prussia, and the course of union was made easier for them by the diplomatic skill of Bismarck. In the 20 years between 1850 and 1870, Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor, had welded Germany into a nation, and in the heat of three wars had tempered the metal and brought out its strength. It did not take long for the Germans to reap the full benefit of their unification. By the end of the 19th Century their industry, their ability, their financial acumen and, perhaps above all, their enthusiasm for their new nationhood had taken them to the peak of Continental power and prestige. And like any young, emergent nation Germany looked for new fields to conquer. But there were almost none left. Britain had got there first. The few remaining areas of colonial value which had escaped Britain had been snapped up by France in an attempt to console herself for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine to the Germans themselves, in the last and most spectacular of the wars which had forged Germany into a world power. There were a few crumbs left for Germany— various territories in Africa, a few islands in the northern Pacific, a piece of a Chinese peninsula; but nothing compared with British India, or French Indo-China. Unable to find an outlet from Europe, the Germans turned inwards, formed an alliance naturally and understandably with Austria-Hungary and uncertainly and rather hesitantly with Italy in 1882, and in so doing frightened their two most powerful continental neighbours into a most unnatural alliance: republican France with autocratic Russia in 1892. Moreover, there was only one genuine outlet into the wide world for Germany's energies, and that was into the field of colonisation where Britain had firmly established herself. It was inevitable therefore that at some time British and German interests should clash. Britain, France and Russia: hardly had Germany begun to feel her strength than — to her eyes at least — she had cause to begin crying 'Encirclement!' Britain, however, was traditionally reluctant to ally herself on a permanent basis with any European power, and during the closing years of the 19th Century she remained diplomatically isolated 24
Sukhomlinov (foreground), corrupt Russian bureaucrat par excellence it was France that constituted Germany's security — a France burning to
from Europe. During these years the
main threat
to
avenge the defeat of 1870. France had never forgiven Germany for inflicting that defeat nor for the humiliation of crowning the German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. More important than all other factors, she had never forgiven Germany for robbing France of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. True, France's colonial ambitions, shrewdly encouraged by Bismarck after 1872, had given her some outlet for her martial energies in such places as Algeria, Indo-China, Madagascar and, more dangerously, in Egypt and on the Upper Nile; but these adventures offered no real solace for the loss of the provinces amputated from the body of France. Military appetite, moreover, grows by what it feeds on, and many of the operations mounted against such rebels as Abd el Kader in North Africa were regarded by the French command as little more than training exercises for 'la Revanche' the recapture of Alsace and Lorraine. So far as Britain was concerned, she would have liked to continue as she had been for 100 years, splendid in her own isolation from the squabbles of Europe — powerful, highly industrialised, immensely rich, and with a growing population constantly increasing her strength in her far-flung Empire. The only essential to her continued prosperity — and it was an essential — was command of the seas. With it, she appeared to be the most powerful nation the world had ever known. Without it, the island population could be starved within two months, and the whole vast Empire disintegrate through lack of central control. Since Napoleonic times Britain had always possessed a fleet larger than the combined fleets of all possible aggressors — and as she gave complete freedom of the seas to all other nations, they in turn had been content to leave it that way. Under Bismarck, even Germany had deemed it wiser not to attempt to challenge Britain's supremacy at sea, but Bismarck left the political scene soon after the coronation of Kaiser Wilhelm II, and in the late 1890's the new Kaiser began to build a fleet of his own. From that moment, Britain's existence could only be secure if he stopped ,
building, either of his
own
free will or, if necessary, as a result of
There were many attempts by British statesmen to reach agreement with the German rulers on a 'Naval Holiday', and at one time they were even willing to contemplate an Anglo-German force.
Franz Josef
I
in
the service dress of an Hungarian general
alliance which would link the world's greatest world's greatest navy.
army with the
It would, however, have needed more perceptive statesmen than Britain possessed at that time to avert the threat of German naval expansion, and indeed it is open to doubt whether any measures would have sufficed. Fundamentally, Germany did not want peace
and equality. She seems almost to have wanted war for itself, and was mystically certain that it would bring her supremacy. There was the pattern of the nations. Britain, her security seriously jeopardised for the first time since the end of the Napoleonic wars; France, thirsting for her past glories and the return of Alsace-Lorraine; Germany bursting with new-found strength, feeling herself hemmed in by history, proud of her abilities and
The All-Highest
of
Germany and
the bane of Europe': Kaiser Wilhelm
II
over-anxious to prove them to the rest of the world; AustriaHungary, tottering and in reality only safe so long as nothing threatened the equipoise of the forces within her frontiers; Russia potentially immensely strong but seething with discontent, her supreme ruler a man of mediocre abilities, and her ruling class willing to direct the forces of discontent within her towards external adventures, in order to stave off internal revolution. This, then, is the first pattern, but there is a second pattern to be superimposed upon the first. At the present time we are inclined to forget the influence and power wielded by the crowned heads of the European continent up to the second decade of the 20th Century. As an example, let us consider for a moment what we mean by the adjective 'Victorian'. The adjective on the whole indicates to us a prim, strait-laced, thoroughly worthy way of life. The way of life, in fact, of the old queen herself, a habit of thought and action which echoed the sentiments and ideals of her most influential subjects, the moneyed middle classes. She thought and lived in such a way. So did the most important of her subjects. She remained in tune with popular opinion on almost every subject in an almost intuitive way. England, even then, had a longer tradition of democratic government than the other European powers. The power and influence of the ruling families in other countries was far greater — in Germany, for instance, the Kaiser was addressed and referred to as the All-Highest' — and the majority of those who so addressed him meant it. It. was like this in Russia, in Greece, in the Balkan states, and to an only slightly lesser extent in Austria-Hungary.
25
.1
1
Victoria's grandchildren-
rulers of Europe The numbers
in square brackets alter the name ot each person on the genealogical table refer to the
portraits
on the opposite page.
Victoria
(1819-1901) 1840 Albert
m of
Saxe Coburg Goth (1819-1861)
Victoria [1]
m
Helena
Alice (51
Princess Royal (1840-1901) 1856 Frederick III (1831-1888)
m
(1843-1878) 1862 Ludwig IV
Grand Duke
12]
of
Arthur 1131
(91
(1846-1923) 1866 Christian 1101 of Schleswig Holstein (1831-1917)
1st
m
[61
Hesse
(1837-1892)
Duke
of
Beatrice [171
Connaught
(1857-1944) m. 1885 Henry of Battenberg 1181 (1858-1896)
(1850-1942) m. 1879 Louise Margaret |14| (1860-1917) daughter of Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia
German Emperor
fc^l^ Edward
?3 Alfred (71
VII (31
(1841-1910) m. 1863 Alexandra [4 (1844-1925)
daughter of Christian King of Denmark
Duke
m IX
(1844-1900) 1874 Marie 18 (1853-1920)
•
Leopold
1151
1st
Duke
Albany
m
(1853-1884) 1882 Helen 1161 (1861-1922)
Campbell
daughter of Alexander Tsar of Russia
m
Louise 1121 (1848-1939) m. 1871 John Douglas Sutherland
Edinburgh
of
Duke
9th
II
1111 of Argyll
of
daughter of George Victor of
Waldeck and Pyrmont
(1845-1914)
Marie [20] (1875-1938) 1893 Ferdinand (19) King of Rumania (1865-1927) I
S2IIS Margaret (211 (1882-1920)
m
1905 Gustavus
Adolphus of
Sweden
?3lES3K5
Arthur [231 (1883-1938) m. 1913 Alexandra
Duchess
VI
of Fife [241
(1891-1959)
(22)
Patricia [25I
(1886-1974) m 1919
Alexander Robert Maule Ramsay [26]
Sir
(1881-1972)
(1882-1973)
Victoria (281
(1863-1950) 1884 Louis of Battenberg [271 (1854-1921)
m
Ernest Ludwig
Alice I30]
Grand Duke Hesse [29]
(1872-1918) m. 1894 Nicholas Tsar of Russia [31] (1868-1918)
of
(1868-1937)
^VZ^\Va George V
Albert Victor (34)
132)
Duke
(1865-1936) m. 1892 Mary [33] (1867-1953) daughter of Francis
Duke
of
of
Clarence
(1864-1892)
m
Louise [36] Princess Royal (1867-1931) 1889 Alexander Duff 1st
Teck
Duke
of Fife(35]
II
^|» Maude
|37l
(1869-1938) m 1896 Haakon VII King of Norway I38| (1872-1957)
[42]
(1870-1932) m. 1889 Constanline [43] King of the Hellenes (1868-1923)
(1884-1954)
(1859-1941)
Albert [45]
German Emperor
Marquess of
Leopold 46 Lord Leopold Mountbatten
abdicated 1918
Carisbrooke
(1889-1922)
Wilhelm
II
[44]
Alice 40! (1883-1981) 1
m. 1904 Alexander of
Teck
1st Earl of
(411
Athlone
(1874-1957)
(1849-1912)
^l£3 Sophie
Charles
Edward 139) Duke of Saxe Coburg Gotha
Alexander
(1886-1960)
1
Maurice (47I (1891 1914)
Victoria
Eugenie
1491
(1887-1969) m. 1906 Alfonso XIII |48l King of Spain (1886-1941)
^
The passing of Queen Victoria marks the end ofTax Britannica'
Certainly none of the rulers possessed the absolute power which Hitler and Stalin later did, but this to & great extent was only because none of them possessed individually quite the degree of megalomania exhibited by these dictators; neither did they possess the modern techniques of communication and transport which are essential for despotic control over large areas. But they nevertheless wielded considerable direct power, and exercised an even greater indirect influence. An examination of the antecedents of the men and women who held the positions of influence throughout Europe reveals that the majority of them belonged to the same family. Astonishing though it may seem, they were to a very large extent the children, grandchildren, or great-grandchildren of Queen Victoria. Victoria had nine children, 34 grandchildren, and 37 greatgrandchildren alive when she herself died, and this enormous family had been branched off and married into the most influential families of Europe. Let us see where they all went.
Undisputed German blood might be as well, in fact, to start by taking a look at Queen VicShe had been born in 1819 the daughter of Edward, Duke of Kent, the fourth son of George III, and Victoria Mary of It
toria herself.
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. Victoria herself was therefore of undisputed German blood, though her ancestors on the male side had occupied the British throne for over 100 years. Victoria's father died when she was only eight months old. Thereafter she was brought up by her mother and her mother's favourite brother, Leopold of SaxeCoburg (later of Belgium), her governess (afterwards Baroness Lehzen of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha) and in due course she married Prince Albert of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. She cordially detested her Hanover uncles and made no complaint when the crowns of Britain and Hanover separated on her accession. She regarded herself to the end of her days as a Coburg, and not as a Hanover. When her first child proved to be a girl (the beloved of Albert and, indeed, his moral and mental reflection) there was no other future for the child but marriage to an actual or potential German Emperor. 'Vicky' therefore in due course became the mother of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the bane of his uncle, Edward VII, and of most of the civilised world. Victoria's second child was the future Edward VII, and her sixth (who was also her fourth daughter) remained stalwartly patriotic by marrying the Duke of Argyll. But all the others (Alice, Alfred, Helen, Arthur, Leopold and Beatrice) married into continental families, all except one of them into the German influence. The exception was Albert, who married Marie-Alexandrovna, daughter of Tsar Alexander II, but he made up for this by himself combining the titles of Duke of Edinburgh and Duke of
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. Victoria's grandchildren and great-grandchildren scattered over Europe with awe-inspiring prodigality. They became Kings of the Hellenes, of Norway; Queens of Spain, of Rumania, of Sweden; one was allied to the House of Orleans, two became Grand Duchesses of Russia. But the solid core became Princes, Princesses, Dukes or Duchesses of the German states — Prussia, Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria, Hesse and of Saxe-Coburg or of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. One of Victoria's granddaughters was Alix, Tsarina of Russia, while her husband Nicholas was himself the son of a princess of Denmark whose favourite sister had married Edward VII. Edward was therefore uncle to both the Kaiser and Tsar; and to so many other princelings that his sobriquet 'The Uncle of Europe' was not bestowed solely on account of his avuncular manner. One would think that the concentration of so much influence and power into the hands of the members of one family, would form a most valuable stabilising effect throughout Europe. And indeed, while Victoria was still alive, this had a certain degree of truth. She treated her vast family very much as a stern but loving Victorian parent and had a habit of expressing herself in a way which makes one believe that she looked upon the various countries of Europe as estates owned by members of her family — estates for which those members had considerable responsibility, but not so much as to outweigh their own filial duty to herself as head of the family. The result while Victoria lived was beneficial to the world and extremely advantageous to Britain, and it was when she died that the trouble started, or rather that it came to the surface. The relationships inside Victoria's family developed in exactly the same way as they do in any other large family. There was the same proportions of unloved uncles, delightful nieces, interfering aunts, upstart nephews and odious relations by marriage that occurs in all families. Within the royal families of Europe, during the closing years of last century and the opening of this, these relationships developed: cousins of the same sex bickered and of
opposite sex hated uncles
in love, sons quarrelled with fathers, nephews their sisters adored, aunts tried to calm the fractious youngsters and were ticked off by their own sisters for interfering.
The
fell
whom
basic trouble
and were striving
was that they all wished to impress Victoria her favour and commendation. This competi-
for
tion bred bitter jealousies.
Unfortunately
perhaps the most bitter of all these by the favourite grandson, Wilhelm II, Germany and King of Prussia, for his uncle, King Edward VII of England, and it counted for nothing except personal instability and international havoc that in the Kaiser's breast the jealousy was mixed with feelings of regard and admiration. Ambivalence in rulers leads almost inevitably to catastrophe. King Edward VII has sometimes been roughly treated by historians. Undoubtedly, his social behaviour was at times extremely tactless, but it gave him, nonetheless, a knowledge of the world which was to stand him in good stead. He was unfortunate in that he did not succeed to the throne until he was over 60, and that his mother, because he did not conform to the pattern set by her own beloved husband the Prince Consort, deliberately excluded him from the business of government until her death. By 1901, Wilhelm II had been Kaiser of Germany since 1888 and the effect of 13 years of being addressed as 'All Highest' upon an essentially volatile personality was not conducive to a becoming modesty. Kaiser Wilhelm endeavoured to patronise his far more mature uncle, by offering advice. Edward countered this at first with courtesy, but as the advice was poor anyway, he did not follow it — and the Kaiser thus received a double humiliation, for not only had his advice been rejected, but he was quite perceptive enough to see that Edward was right and was, in many ways, a wiser man than he. Moreover, as the years went by, Edward's sophistication and charm of manner made him extremely popular all over Europe, while the Kaiser's popularity — and also indeed that of Germany — was rather on the decline; and despite the aggressiveness which characterised their attitude to the world, all Gerjealousies Kaiser of
for the world,
was that
felt
many was exquisitely sensitive to snubs. There was yet another
factor
which contributed
to the Kaiser's
Owing to an accident at birth he had been left with a withered arm which never grew to a size beyond that of a child's. His own force of will had to a very great extent overcome inferiority complex.
handicap and his uniforms could be tailored to conceal it almost entirely. But he was always conscious of his disability. In the course of time, as a result both of the position he occupied at the head of a powerful, emergent but frustrated nation, and of these personal developments of his character, he began to show signs of a temperament which can well be summed up by the modern jibe 'Anything you can do, I can do better!' One of the results of this, on a national basis, was the fact that, whatever this
Fiance's military pride, Germany did possess a larger and betterorganised army. Another, and fatal, result was that the Kaiser remained personally determined to command a larger and more efficient navy than his uncle's. Despite the suggestions for the 'Naval Holidays', despite Germany's repeated protestations of admiration, regard and understanding of Britain's position, the building of the German High Seas Fleet continued — and to ensure that no portion of it could ever be trapped in the confines of the Baltic, work commenced on the enlarging of the vital Kiel Canal so that it would permit passage of the largest warships.
The military machines third pattern is the pattern — and calendar — of military planning. We can to some extent ignore naval planning, as, despite the Kaiser's fleet, his commanders had not had time to develop a maritime philosophy. We can also largely ignore the planning of the Russian military machine, for this was rudimentary and obvious. Russia would mobilise her army with what speed her administration and inadequate railway system would allow, and steamroller it all westward. So too with the armies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The internal conditions of the Empire were not such as to allow useful planning of any event farther in the future than a few months; for who could tell what percentage of soldiers would be needed, in any emergency, to keep order within the Empire? But with Germany and France matters were very different. Germany had been planning for another invasion of France ever since it became evident that the country was recovering too quickly from the sharp lesson which had been administered to her in 1870. Indeed, France had been planning 'la Revanche' ever since the first numbing shock of the 1870 defeat had worn off. France's plan was simple — which is usually a great advantage,
The
29
but it was also obvious and surprisingly naive, factors which are not good qualities in a military plan. She built a system of huge fortresses at intervals along her common frontier with Germany, leaving just north of the centre a gap leading into a huge natuTal cul-de-sac, in which, if the German armies cared to penetrate, they could be systematically anrvmilated. But the French geneivsds were not really interested in so passive a wartime role. Blandly ignoring even; piece of military evidence which had accumulated since the American Civil War, they persuaded themselves that all that was needed for certain victory was valour, a thirst for glory and revenge, and the offensive spirit. Armed with this and his Lebel rifle, and dressed in his bright red pantaloons, the French poilu would sweep forward into the lost and beloved provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, apparently invincibly shielded by hope and faith against such mundane factors as machine gun bullets or steel shells. The generals were quite confident that the whole French army, deployed along a front of nearly 200 miles, would press the enemy back to the Rhine in a matter of days, and banish him for ever from their own and their neighbours' countryside. They did wonder whether Germany would violate Belgium's neutrality, but they cannot be said to have devoted a great deal of thought to any complications which this might cause in their own plans. In fact, when they examined the prospect of such an attempted outflanking move by the enemy, they professed themselves delighted. 'Let them try it,' Foch proclaimed, 'it will make our task easier. As the Boche advance, we will strike up through
Belgium and cut him in half!' As strategic matters could be so easily dismissed, they concentrated all their endeavours on stimulating the Spirit of the Offensive' in their troops, and laying plans for their mobilisation
and deployment. This was indeed an intricate and impressive piece of planning, for it entailed bringing colonial troops across from North Africa, as well as the calling up, equipping, feeding and transport to the deployment areas of the hundreds of thousands of reservists in metropolitan France.
But eventually it was all done, and Plan 17, as it came to be was complete. In the early spring of 1914, army commanders received their own personal copies and the majority pro-
called,
fessed themselves delighted with it. Germany, of course, with her magnificent General Staff and her obedient population quite willing to organise their lives and their businesses on lines which would allow the quickest possible change to wartime conditions, produced a more integrated plan, one on a larger scale which, needless to say, ignored the French invitation to commit suicide in the gap between the fortresses. The German plan was basically the famous Schlieffen Plan. This originally envisaged the deployment of a vast army — including reserves, a factor which the French completely omitted in their calculations of German strength — along the border from Switzerland to a point just east of Liege, with the main weight of the attack in the north. They fully anticipated that the French would rush headlong into Alsace and Lorraine, and German generals were quite happy that they should do so. The more French troops down there, the deeper they penetrated into that area, the less would be French strength in the north, to oppose the main strength of the German army as it crashed like a hammerhead through Belgium, across into northern France, over the Seine and around to the west of Paris in a gigantic arc, and then back eastward again. There it would rip through all the lines of supply and communication of the French armies in front, scoop up all their reinforcements, and finally crush the enemy against their
French cavalry-
embodiment of the 'offensive
spirit
but tactically still in the age of Waterloo
•
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fortresses, or expel them from their own country into neutral Switzerland. This was indeed a gigantic plan, needing enormous forethought and planning. Moreover, after the death of Graf von Schlieffen, it received some modification at the hands of his successor, Moltke 'the younger', which entailed even more planning. But eventually the time came when the German plans were completed in such detail that even the number of railway trucks which would pass over the main Rhine bridges during the first vital days was known to those German officers concerned with such figures. It was a magnificent plan, complete in every detail, and, as had happened in France, the time came when a German general finished reading it and said: Good, now we are ready. The sooner it starts, the better for us!' This was in May 1914, and some four weeks later the Kiel Canal was officially reopened by the Kaiser after it had been widened so that the High Seas Fleet would be able to move through it. Two months before, the French Plan 17 had been completed; three months before, the Tsar had presided at the Crown Council. The stage was set. On June 28 (while the celebrations at the Kiel Canal were still progressing^ a 19 year-old Serbo-Croat named Gavrilo Princip assassinated the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne — Archduke Franz Ferdinand. In any other set of conditions, this could have been nothing but a squalid political murder, with no more effect than that of personal tragedy in one of the more important families of Europe. But it was what Europe was waiting. for — and it is probably true to say that had the assassination never taken place, then Europe would only have waited until another such event gave the signal. As it was, however, the shots fired by Princip not only killed the
own
Archduke and his wife: they sparked off the explosion which plunged the world into war, and indeed ended the era of European world leadership.
Further Reading Albertmi, L The Origins of the War ol1914 (OUP 19b/) Balfour, M The Kaiser and his Times (Cresset Press 1964) Fay. S The Origins of the World War (Macmillan 1967) Geiss. i.July 1914 (Batsford 1967) Gregory, J On the Edge of Diplomacy (Hutchinson) ,
.,
.
,
King, J
C The
Magnus,
World War (New York Harper 1974) King Edward the Seventh (Murray 1964) Bernard, A History of Russia (Cape 1955) First
,
Sir Philip,
Pares, Sir
Bismarck and the Development of Germany (Princeton University Press) Taylor. A J P The Struggle tor Mastery in Europe (OUP 1957)
Pflanz,
,
,
BARRIE PITT, Editor of History of the First World War, was born In 1 91 8, the son of a naval officer He joined the army in 1939 and served in France and the Middle East He continued his military associations after demobilisation by joining the 21st Special Air Service Regiment (Artist Rifles). In 1953 he left London and took an appointment with the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston, He began writing on military matters in 1954, in 1958 his first book, on the Zeebrugge Raid, was published. In 1960 his third book, Coronel and Falkland, appeared, and two 'years later the much acclaimed 1918 — The Last Act In June 1963 he was invited to become Chief Historical Consultant to the producer of the BBC series The Great War, and resigned from the Atomic Energy Authority to do so He also acts as military and historical consultant to a wide variety of publications and bodies, including Encyclopaedia Bntanmca.
V.
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H. W. Koch Colonialism, and to some extent nationalism, have acquired a stigma today. Yet they were fashionable ideals at the beginning of the 20th Century — and it could be argued that they created an atmosphere in which a world war became a possibility.
'A patriot is one who loves his country. A nationalist is one who hates everyone else's country.' There was much in the political atmosphere of Europe in 1914 that bore out this definition. In each nation there was a large section of popular opinion that actually welcomed war, seeing in it a chance to advance the cause of their particular nationality or race. This enthusiasm played a large part in stampeding the statesmen into war, and for this reason needs examination. If today the idea of nationalism has acquired a stigma, basically it means only those elements which make up a nation. These elements were first set out by Johann Gottfried Herder who defined a nation as the Volk, a people of common language, cultural heritage and body of laws. Its sovereignty was unquestionable and it had a distinct 'personality'. Herder's view contained no qualitative notions, as no Volk was innately superior to another, although one may have been more favoured by factors such as geography and climate. This concept was a reaction against 18th Century politics when people and territories were treated like any other disposable commodity. This view made a profound impact in Germany, especially as it became the counter-ideology to the principles of the French revolution, when these were militantly applied beyond the frontiers of France merely in French national interest. Herder's impact was no less in other regions, since he did not spare his compatriots in his indictment of their own conduct in his famous 'Slav chapter'. In this he condemned German treatment of the Slavs outright, prophesying that ultimately the Slav tide would turn against the Germans. Bismarck's unification of Germany was considered by many Germans as only a half-way house towards 'real unification', and that meant different things to different people. Some Germans simply desired the inclusion of the Germans of Austria-Hungary. To others as we shall see, it meant much more. Bismarck himself was suspicious of militant German nationalism or indeed of any other 'ism'. He drew little distinction between the nationalism of the liberals and that of more reactionary groups. To him nationalism, like liberalism, implied an appeal to the 'masses', which could be mobilised by anyone who could touch their emotions. Bismarck, impressed by accounts of the French Revolution, feared nothing more than the intrusion of emotion into politics.
That his fears were
justified
was amply demonstrated
after his
death, when the spread of a type of nationalism which one of its exponents, Charles Maurras, called 'integral nationalism', took place. The nation became the absolute value, occupying the apex of the pyramid of human values. Whatever transcended it was rejected. Precisely this brand of nationalism and the aberrations to which it gave birth gave nationalism the stigma it carries today. The first large-scale manifestation of 'integral nationalism' was in France. The defeat of 1871 was simply not accepted. It could not have happened if France had remained true to her traditions, argued Taine, traditions buried under the sediment of revolutions. 'Abandon reckless individualism, democracy and the principles of the French revolution; return to the source of Frankish, chivalrous and royal France!' This appeal to irrational traditionalism fundamentally challenged, and in part succeeded in changing, the liberal nationalism of Herder. Maurice Barres added the idea, almost a substitute for religion, of la terre et les morts (the soil and the dead). The soil and the dead of the battlefield carry their own innate obligation for posterity: recovery and revenge. Britain was neither a recently unified empire like Germany, nor was she a recently defeated nation like France. Hence in her nationalism there was an attitude of paternal superiority, reaching the point of hysteria only at times of crisis such as the Boer War, or in moments of acute naval rivalry with Germany. Russia, on the other hand, was too "vast, too under-developed and consisted of too many illiterate language groups for a specifically 'Russian nationalism' to develop, other than among politically articulate circles in St Petersburg and Moscow. The forces at work were not nearly as strong as those in operation in the Ottoman Empire, but strong enough to prevent the creation of national unity of a type found in central or western Europe. Yet Russia, too, became the exponent and defender of the idea of Pan-Slavism — a racial ideal rather than national ideal. For the two great multilingual empires nationalism was a liability rather than an asset, because as a disruptive force nationalism could serve Serbs, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks and Poles alike. However, to turn 19th Century nationalism into the generally destructive force which it became, another factor was needed — 'Social Darwinism' — the application of the theory of evolution to a social and political environment. Misinterpreted and widely misunderstood, Darwinism was taken to mean progress through competition in its crudest form. Its emphasis on race and breeding
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coincided with the popularisation of the racial theories which Gobineau and Vacher de Lapuge had already formulated. Together with Social Darwinism they represented the very antithesis of the views held by Herder.
Vulgar brute strength Social Darwinists envisaged
life
as a struggle of
all
against
all in
which only the fittest would survive. The nation was alone and surrounded by a world of enemies, in the fight against which all means were justified. Nietzsche denounced religion, drawing the logical conclusion that the existing basic moral values were not those that made for survival. His alternative was the creation of a race of supermen as a result of the survival of the fittest. At a broader level throughout Europe this theorising aroused a general interest in the theory of evolution which rapidly deteriorated into a vulgar advocacy of brute strength; into an admiration of war and warriorlike qualities. Journalists and popular writers were not alone. Darwinian concepts found expression through the mouths of respectable statesmen and generals, such as Lord Salisbury, Joseph Chamberlain, Biilow, Delcasse, Theodore Roosevelt, Bethmann-Hollweg, Field-Marshal Robertson and Lord Fisher. 'Lasting good is evolved in this world only through strife and bloodshed. While injustice and unrighteousness exist in the world, the sword, the rifled breech loader and the torpedo boat become part of the world's evolutionary machinery, consecrated like any other part of it' wrote a leading British naval officer. It is not unjustified to assert that this sort of statement represented the consensus of a good cross section of
34
European public opinion.
British Indian
cavalryman
Naturally, in an age in which the masses were gradually emancipated and the franchise was widening, the doctrine of the survival of the fittest was unlikely to pacify the unruly spirits of the working classes. Consequently racial theories represented a welcome element to supplement social Darwinism since they transcended the strictly segregated class structure of a nation. If the masses could be induced to forget or temporarily ignore the injustices of the society in which they were living, the less chance there would be for dangerous stresses arising within the nation. Nationalism perverted into race hatred, thrust class hatred into the background. Any form of nationalism goes hand in hand with a good deal of spurious historical learning. Unbalanced or downright untrue history was written by historians, each seeking to 'make a case' for his own national group. The results of such dubious scholarship were then adapted and diluted by popular writers and the press, and injected into the mental fabric of the nations. To the British 'the burden of Empire' presupposed the existence of a force which had selected them, through the evolutionary process, for this mission, or as Cecil Rhodes put it: 'I contend that we are the first race in the world and the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for human race.' Genuine humanitarianism, political, economic and military competition were inextricably intermingled, resulting in blind chauvinism and the kind of xenophobia best expressed by Kipling. Germany countered Britain's mission of 'civilisation' — one incidentally shared by Europe's other major colonial power, France — with the specifically German mission of spreading 'Kultur', the spirit of Kant and Goethe, across the globe. That in
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agents of the German mission were hordes of salesmen upon the world with their samples, that Kant's postulates and Beethoven's Ninth were drowned by a cacophony of steel rolling mills did not do much to endear Germany to her competitors, nor did her strident assertiveness, characterised by Kaiser Wilhelm II's dictum that 'we are the salt of the earth'. In Europe national exuberance already on the verge of excess, gathered further momentum. With each nation or race discoverfact the
let loose
ing its own mission, its own racial superiority, hatred or at least dislike and suspicion of the foreigner and his evil designs began to prevail over more serious domestic issues. In an age of growing de-personalisation, as the result of the rapid growth of an urban industrial society, the idea of 'race' seemed to be the bulwark of the one and last indestructible individuality.
Nor did it lack political organisation and expression. The PanGermans, for instance, represented a wide spectrum of desires and ambitions, ranging from the old-fashioned nationalists, who saw their future aim in the incorporation of the Austro-Germans into the German Empire, to Utopians who wished to re-create European universalism under German dominion, and to extreme racialists. The membership of the Pan-Germans never exceeded 18,000 members while their monthly journal, at its peak, had a circulation of only 5,000 copies. The true significance lay in their composition, largely middle and upper-middle class whose most prominent representatives were economists and geographers advocating the quest for Lebensraum. German industry's representative was Dr Alfred Hugenberg, at the time a director of Krupps. As a result the vociferousness of the Pan-Germans made an impact on the world outside which was quite in inverse propor-
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tion to their actual political strength and influence. Precisely because of the nebulous nature of their programme their utterances received special attention abroad and were frequently considered to have been inspired by the German government. The
German government used the Pan-Germans once, for rabble rousing purposes during the second Moroccan crisis. Moreover, many of their sentiments were shared by sections of the German public of all classes, and by sections of the press which in other respects were liberal.
The Pan-Germans also had their allies in the Flottenverein (Navy League), and the Kolonialgesellschaft (Colonial Association). Unanimity among the Pan-Germans existed only on one point, that of the forcible Germanisation of the Polish and Danish minorities. Even that aim was nothing new. On the express orders of Emperor Frederick III his eldest son, the future Wilhelm II, was not allowed to learn Polish, a language compulsory for every Prussian monarch since the successor of Frederick the Great. In their support for the Germanisation of the Empire's Polish minority, the Pan-Germans collided head-on with a force older, stronger and infinitely more numerous, that of Pan-Slavism. In the final analysis, however, the Pan-Germans could do little more than support policies already pursued or advocated, such as German colonial and naval expansion, and by their activity add further explosive substance to the keg of dynamite called Europe. The Pan-German movement was little different from similar bodies in Britain and France, and its influence upon the shaping of German policy only became marked after the outbreak of war, when they played an important role in the formulation of German war aims. 35
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Pan-Slavism, like German nationalism, was a progeny of Herder and the Romantic movement. By 1900 Pan-Slavism was no longer essentially religiously inspired, but was an activist racism which soared over artificial frontiers to embrace a wider communion of racial members. While Nicholas Danilevsky still argued that all Slavs were brothers, he nevertheless insisted that Russia was the great centre of the Slav people and would lead them on the road to emancipation. It was Russian imperialism in disguise. Dostoevsky's Introduction to Pushkin, a speech delivered on June 8, 1880 at the Society of Lovers of Russian Literature, discarded this disguise and asserted his belief in the unique soul and mission of Russia as leader of all Slavs. The Slavs were to be liberated from the infidel Muslims and from contamination from the west. Their capital was Moscow rather than St Petersburg. As amorphous and nebulous as Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism could be politically utilised by those who called upon Russia to act and display her power and self-confidence in shaping the destiny of the world while at the same time rejecting Western European 'materialist' civilisation, putting in its place an indigenous Slav culture. Russian expansion into the Near and Far East temporarily distracted attention from fellow Slavs but the outcome of the Russo-Japanese war and the Revolution of 1905 brought forth a resurgence of the Pan-Slav movement, especially as the other major propagators of the Pan-Slav idea, the Serbs, had in 1903 overthrown the pro-Austrian Obrenovice dynasty and replaced it by the militantly Russophil Karageorgevich dynasty. One of the by-products of the 1905 revolution in Russia was a constitution and the Duma as a representative assembly where the spokesmen of the Pan-Slav idea were mainly found among the parties of the right and centre. The revolution also produced a certain improvement of the condition of non-Russian Slavs under Russian rule such as the Poles. This revived connexion among Slavs, by now also called Neo-Slavism, found its public expression in a series of annual conferences between 1908 and 1912 in St Petersburg, Prague, Belgrade and Sofia. Cultural and economic links between the Slavs of the Balkans and Russia were established, underpinned by the fervent belief in the ultimate disintegration of the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires by a war in which Russia's aid would be indispensable. The major enemy of the Pan-Slavs was not in Constantinople, Budapest or Vienna but in Berlin, because it was thought, with some justification, that only the strength of the German Empire supplied the energy which kept the other empires in being. In spite of the fratricidal feud of the second Balkan War, by 1914 Pan-Slavism had succeeded in creating more numerous and stronger ties between Slavs than had ever existed before. Other nations did not remain unaffected. Italy, smarting under the defeat inflicted by the Abyssinians at Adua in 1895 rallied its imperialist nationalists under Corradini, as did Charles Maurras in France with his L'Action Frangaise. Within this general climate of opinion the colonial rivalries of the European powers developed and expanded, but it is difficult to disentangle the problem of colonial rivalry from the more general rivalries in economic, military and political areas. Bismarck's decision to embark upon a policy of colonial expansion because of his fear of economic consequences for Germany if she remained passive, was in the main enthusiastically supported by the German middle classes. By the turn of the century, much to the disgust of their comrades, some highly articulate prominent German socialists also supported it. During the early period, between 1884 and 1894, one can hardly speak of an Anglo-German colonial rivalry, although the fact that Bismarck exploited Britain's vulnerability in Egypt in her relations with France did not endear him to Gladstone. Feelings between the two men were reciprocal. To Bismarck, Gladstone embodied the intrusion of the emotional forces of popular democracy into international relations. He may have had his differences with Disraeli or Salisbury, but at least with
them
Bismarck felt that he stood on common ground. Also by 1885, with some minor changes in the future, Germany's colonies in Africa had been established, the major ones of which were Togoland, the German Cameroons, German South West Africa and Ger-
man East Africa. The latter could be considered as a potential threat to Britain's line of communication with India, but that threat was neutralised by Britain's acquisition from Germany of Zanzibar in exchange for Heligoland. The possibility of war Possibly the abortive Anglo-Congolese treaty of 1894 can be interpreted as the beginning of the Anglo-German colonial rivalry, with its provision for a British corridor, separating and isolating German East Africa from the Congolese hinterland and
giving Britain the potential opportunity for establishing the Cape-to-Cairo railroad. When Bismarck went, German diplomacy took on a new tone, the sound of which could all too easily be taken as aggressive. Relations between the two countries by 1895 had deteriorated to the extent that Britain envisaged the possibility of war. Nor was the situation ameliorated by the Kruger telegram which in turn inspired British fears of German intentions to create a German-dominated belt across Africa, cutting off South Africa. Though never put down with any degree of precision, plans for a Zentralafrika were entertained not only in the Kolonialgeselhchaft but also in the German Colonial Office. Two years later the Anglo-German agreement over the Portuguese colonies was not so much stimulated by a sense of rivalry as by Germany's fear that a British loan to Portugal would be the first step to Britain's acquisition of these colonies. In case this was so, since these territories bordered on to German South West and German East Africa respectively, Germany, in order to maintain some 'balance of power' in the areas had to demand compensation through division. In the end the agreement did not bring any benefits to the Germans. It merely created a precedent, in so far as Portugal's African colonies became temporary lubricants of Anglo-German relations to be used again in 1912. Agitation for a greater share in Africa persisted to some degree in Germany, but colonial rivalry as such cannot by any standards be considered as influencing policy making in both Britain and Germany: indeed, on the eve of war co-operation between the British and German Colonial offices was greater than it had ever been before. However, its importance should not be underestimated.
A Franco-British bargain The Moroccan problem played
a far more serious part in pre-war diplomacy, but it cannot be considered simply as one of colonial rivalry. Its complexity was due to several factors. The Madrid Convention of 1880 had guaranteed the territorial integrity of Morocco and equal commercial rights there to the signatory powers which included France, Britain, Germany, Spain, Russia and the USA. By 1900 it represented the only enclave in north-west Africa not occupied by France or Spain. It was foreseeable that sooner or later France would use Morocco's chaotic internal con-
Herder's
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narrower creeds during the 19th Century to
Darwin's theories were widely misinterpreted by political thinkers all
over Europe
ditions as a pretext to absorb the territory in her colonial empire, especially after Fashoda, which marked the end of any possibility of France ever recovering her former position and influence in Egypt. Equally, as France's position was eroded in Egypt so was Britain's in Morocco where she had important trading interests. These were of secondary importance when compared with the possibility of France controlling the western entrance to the Mediterranean. Consequently, the basis for a Franco-British bargain existed. France and Britain were not alone in Morocco, there was also Germany (after Spain had been promised a share, and Italy had been bought off by promises of compensation in Libya in 1902). According to one of the chief architects of the Anglo-French Entente, Sir Thomas Barclay, Germany's economic interests in Morocco were equal and at many points superior to those of France, and what became of equal commercial rights in territories occupied by France had frequently been demonstrated: they were fenced off by high protective tariffs. For Britain the problem was two-fold: firstly she had to secure the neutralization of the Morocco coastline in the Straits of Gibraltar, and secondly, gain the support of France, which implicitly meant also that of Russia, to reorganise the financial
37
structure of Egypt which so far was under international supervision and which the veto of any power could effectively block. Delcasse looked at the potential arrangement from a different perspective. Britain's acquiescence in Morocco would give France a free hand there but, in the long run an Anglo-French rapprochement would effectively eliminate a potential Anglo-German alliance, the spectre of which had loomed on the diplomatic horizon between 1898 and 1901. When concluded in April 1904, the Anglo-French Entente achieved all British objectives. Not so in the case of France. Britain had been wise enough before reorganising Egypt's finances, to secure the consent of the other powers concerned, while France failed to make any official communication to Germany regarding her intentions in Morocco. When late in 1904 France despatched a mission to Fez, Germany thought the time had come to kill two birds with one stone: to show France that she could not act without German co-operation and by implication demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the entente, and secondly, to defend her commercial position in Morocco. Legally Germany had a good case. She lost it diplomatically because Britain was not prepared to put her Egyptian policy in jeopardy, and because Theodore Roosevelt, already in trouble at home over his 'open door' policy in China, was not prepared to add to his troubles by supporting the same policy in Morocco. Germany, once she had stated publicly, through the Kaiser's Tangier visit, her intention of supporting Morocco's territorial integrity, could not afford a secret bargain with France without the risk of putting her reputation at the mercy of France's discretion. Hence she had to continue to insist on an international conference based on the provisions of the Madrid convention. Since all the signatory powers with the exception of Austria-Hungary were ranged against Germany before the conference started, Germany's diplomatic defeat was inevitable. It was the fear of a repetition of Algeciras that lay at the bottom of BethmannHollweg's refusal of Sir Edward Grey's proposal of an international conference after the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. Though Germany and France did come to an agreement over Morocco in 1909, French infringements of this agreement two years later were used by Germany as a pretext to obtain compenpensation in the form of the French Congo. Britain intervened
A courtesy visit by high German officials to Tientsin in 1898. The Germans were very keen to expand their trade with China
38
Agadir crisis), though Lloyd George's Mansion House speech was directed at France as much as it was directed against Germany, because Britain feared that the secret Francoin this crisis (the
German
negotiations could possibly yield results at her expense. Nevertheless, Agadir, seemed to mark a turning point in AngloGerman relations which until the eve of the war continued to improve, so much so that Sir Edward Grey had to veto a visit of the Guard's Band to Germany lest France should take offence.
Emotion and suspicion However, the important point to bear in mind is that these differences and crises took place to the accompaniment of the full blast of publicity in the countries concerned, in which emotion and suspicion rather than reason prevailed. Another major area of colonial rivalry was China, particularly since Germany's seizure of Tsingtao in 1898. In spite of German commercial interests there, it was an area used by the Germans to divert the interest of France and Russia away from Europe, and as a major issue in European diplomacy it declined after Japan's victory over Russia in 1905. There remained Russia's threat to India via Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia, three vital areas which formed the basis of the AngloRussian entente of 1907. In contrast to the entente with France, Anglo-Russian relations, particularly over Persia, were never really free from friction, mainly because of Russia's continued infringements of existing agreements. Both partners remained suspicious of each other, a factor which a skilfully conducted German foreign policy could well have exploited. It is also open to doubt whether Russia would ever have concluded the entente had not Sir Arthur Nicolson, Britain's ambassador at St Petersburg, and Sir Edward Grey used Russia's desire to dominate the Black Sea Straits as a bait to keep the long drawn out negotiations going. Britain refrained from making firm promises but rather held out future possibilities which the Russians interpreted as definite commitments. As it happened, when Russia's Foreign Secretary Isvolski tried to take a firm grip of the straits, by assuring himself of Austria's support in return for the latter's annexation of BosniaHerzegovina (which Austria actually had occupied since 1878) he found himself, as he thought, cheated. Neither France nor
between national
states. Loans to China, mining concessions in Morocco, railways in the Ottoman Empire, such as the Bagdad railway, became objects of political rather than mere economic controversy. Though banking groups found peace more profitable than war, in the unsettled atmosphere of pre-1914 Europe they inclined to co-operate or compromise as the situation and public opinion demanded. That is not tantamount to saying that commercial competition caused the war. Nor did nationalism, racialism, or colonial rivalries. However, the last three especially were responsible for the climate of opinion in which every issue was magnified out of all proportion to its real importance. In an atmosphere loaded with suspicion of 'infamous schemes to encircle the fatherland' or 'Germany's grasp for world power', the outbreak of war was received with a sigh of relief as a liberation from a nightmare.
Charles Maurras, extreme right-wing French nationalist, editor of L' Action Francaise
Karl Peters, founder of the Society for German Colonisation in 1884, advocate of German expansion
Britain were at the time prepared to back his claim, while Austria cashed her part of the bargain, vociferously backed by Germany.
Humiliated, Russia had to withdraw. But Germany failed to achieve her actual objective, namely to break up the AngloRussian Entente. Pan-Slav and Pan-German agitation reached new heights during the Balkan Wars of 1912/13. The signal for the first Balkan War was not given in the Balkans but in North Africa. With France gradually absorbing Morocco, rabid nationalism in Italy cried for the conquest of Libya. While Italy engaged Turkish forces there, the Serbs and their allies thought the moment propitious to expel Turkey from Europe. Within the context of these rivalries the movements on Europe's capital market are also of some importance. France, industrially stagnant, found it easier to have hard cash at hand than German industry which continuously re-invested its profits to facilitate further industrial expansion. France thus financed Russia's industrialisation while Germany struggled to raise enough money to finance potential Balkan allies and the Ottoman Empire. Capital thus became an important instrument in the struggle
Further Reading Barzun, J., Darwin, Marx, Wagner and Race: a Study (Harper & Row, 1962) Erickson, J., Panslavism (Historical Assn., 1964)
in
Superstition
Gifford & Louis, Britain and Germany in Africa (Yale University Press, 1968) Hayes, C. J. H., The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (Collier-Mac, 1948) Henderson, W. O., Studies in German Colonial History (F. Cass, 1962) Kohn, Hans, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (Van Nostrand, 1965) Lee, D. E., Europe's Crucial Years: the diplomatic background of World War One (Hanover, NH: New England University Press 1974) Petrovich, M. B., The Emergence of Russian Panslavism (Columbia, 1956) Rich, N. R., Friedrich von Holstein, vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1965) Roberts, S. H., French Colonial Policy 1870-1925 (F. Cass, 1963)
Wertheimer, M.
S.,
The Pan-German League 1890-1914
H. W. KOCH is Lecturer in Modern History at the University of York. He reviews and has contributed to New Society and Die Zeit. He has also contributed to BBC productions, Purnell's History of the Second World War, the Historical Journal and History. He has published a book entitled Stare and Volk: Institutions and Ideology in the Making of Modern Germany as well as editing a volume on the origins of the First World War and German war aims.
39
Mutual suspicion and the
GERMANY'S BID
Kaiser's pursuit of German prestige were obvious obstacles to
an Anglo-German naval agreement before 1914. Politicians did try to bargain but as
FOR SEA POWER
Germany would set no limit on her ambitions, this costly race continued Sir Llewelyn Woodward
The German High Seas Fleet exercises in the Baltic before the war
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_— same loyalty and affection toward their navy Germans did toward their army. These postcards reflect the public interest in the names and types of ships
The
British public felt the
as the _A*l9iafi*l_
year of Queen Victoria's the German government announced plans for building a fleet of battleships. This plan was set out in a Naval Law which the Reichstag approved in March, 1898, but which was clearly no more than a first stage. In 1900 a second Naval Law provided for a fleet of 38 battleships, with cruisers and auxiliary craft, to be completed by 1920. The cost of this construction and of the necessary dockyards would be over £90,000,000 (in modern terms, about £540,000,000). The chief advocates of this scheme of expansion were the Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral von Tirpitz, Secretary of the German Admiralty. Germany had not hitherto attempted competition with the strongest naval powers, Great Britain, France, and Russia, and, in order to persuade the GerIn
1897,
Diamond
the
Jubilee,
man
people that a large navy was essential and the extension of their national power, the Kaiser and Tirpitz had to organise a propaganda campaign of unparalleled intensity. Such a campaign had inevitably to represent Great Britain, the leading naval power, as a threat to Germany, and as an obstacle to her overseas trade and colonial expansion. Neither the Kaiser nor Tirpitz hid their intention of using the German navy as an instrument of political pressure to compel British acceptance of German demands. The Kaiser, in 1900, not long after the outbreak of the Boer War, told the Queen of the Netherlands, in the inflated style for which he was already notorious, that preparation at sea was essential in case the Lord should decide to use Germany as the instrument of His vengeance. Wilhelm used plainer language to his Chancellor, Biilow: 'I am not in the position to go beyond the strictest neutrality, and I must first get myself a fleet. In 20 years' time, when the fleet is ready, I can use another language.' In the world of sovereign states before 1914, with few limitations on the exercise of national sovereignty, Germany was free to build as large a navy as she might choose. She had not bound herself by treaty not to do so, and Great Britain had no claim as of right to the naval predominance which she had exercised for nearly a century. The question, for Germany, was one of practical calculation. She was already the strongest military power in Europe. Had she also sufficient resources to challenge British naval supremacy? How would other naval powers react to such a challenge? The British reaction was likely to be that, as an island state dependent to their security
Tirpitz— 'Father of the German Navy' — resplendent with his famous 'two-pronged' beard sible act of policy for
Germany
to start it?
Furthermore the matter could not be considered apart from German and British relations
with
other
powers.
Indeed,
Admiral Tirpitz gave this matter much thought, but drew the wrong conclusions from it. In 1898 the British government maintained a 'two-power standard', that iB to say, they kept the British navy at a strength sufficient to meet a combination of the next two strongest naval powers, France and Russia. Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian relations were unfriendly and this 'two-power standard' seemed a necessary means of protection. Tirpitz came to the over-ingenious conclusion that Germany would not have to build up to the strength of the British navy if she wanted to use the German fleet as a means of extorting concessions from Great Britain. All Germany needed was a fleet strong enough to damage the British fleet to such an
extent that the latter, even if victorious over Germany, would be temporarily inferior to the Franco-Russian combination. This conclusion of Tirpitz is generally known as the 'risk theory'. The theory that Great Britain dared not face a temporary weakening had one great flaw. It regarded as permanent the hostility of France and Russia to Great Britain. A more careful analysis might have suggested that Great Britain would find it in her interest to come to an agreement .with France and Russia over outstanding differences, and as these differences were about non-European questions, they were all capable of settlement. In this event Great Britain would no longer be afraid of a hostile combination. Tirpitz might also have considered the problem the other way round. He might have asked himself whether France and Russia had motives for settling their differences with Great Britain. The answer to this question was so obvious that the German failure to anticipate it is hardly comprehensible. The Franco-Russian military alliance had been made largely because the two powers were afraid of Germany. German policy towards France, with and after the annexation of AlsaceLorraine in 1871, had rendered Franco-
German
collaboration
an
impossibility.
Time was making the French more accustomed to the loss of these territories. They were unlikely, and indeed not strong enough, to start a war to win them back, would hope them. They gave up their attempt in 1898 to assert themselves against Great Britain at Fashoda on the Upper Nile because their enmity to Germany was greater than their enmity to Britain in but, if the occasion arose, they to recover
spite of their dislike of the 'Anglo-Saxons'.
Blustering diplomacy Russia, in spite of a
common monarchical
Germany, had to reckon that Germany was a firm ally of Austria, Rusinterest with
predominance in the Balwhen Japan had halted Russian expansion in the Far East, the question of Balkan influence once more became of prime importance to Russia, sia's
rival for
kans. After 1905,
while the increasing German interest in Turkey, and a scheme for a Germansponsored railway from the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf (the Baghdad railway) threatened Russian expansion southwards more seriously than Great Britain. Finally, apart from particular clashes of interest, German methods of diplomacy, especially the Kaiser's incessant bluster about German strength, irritated and alarmed every
upon
imported foodstuffs and seaborne and with only a small army, naval predominance was vital to national safety. If Great Britain defeated Germany at sea, she would still be unable to defeat the German army or invade German terri-
other great power.
trade,
The Anglo-French Entente of 1904, followed by an Anglo-Russian Entente thus
Germany defeated Britain at sea, she could starve her into submission. No British government, therefore, could allow the navy to fall below the standard necessary to maintain superiority against any likely threat to it. An attempt by Germany to outbuild Great Britain would fail because British shipbuilding resources were greater than German. Great Britain was also a richer country and, unlike Germany, did not spend enormous sums on her army. Hence, if Great Britain could not risk losing, and had the means to win a competition in shipbuilding, was it a sen-
Morocco where the Anglo-French agreement had recognised French predominance. This maladroit German effort failed. The very fact that Germany was trying to destroy the entente meant that Great Britain and France were drawn together to meet
nullified the risk theory. The Germans tried to break the Anglo-French Entente by asserting a particular interest in
tory. If
42
a
common
threat.
In any case the British government and people were in no doubt by 1904 that the German naval programme was directed against Great Britain, and that this programme would be carried out. German Fisher,
who remodelled the Royal Navy to of German competition
meet the challenge
naval
propaganda was now even more
strident, and, as before, inevitably anti-
British. It
many was
was bound in
to
assume that Ger-
danger of attack by Great
Britain owing to the British desire to crush a trade competitor, and once again such propaganda recoiled upon the Germans themselves. As the German ambassador in London reported to the Kaiser, the idea of a mercantilist war against Germany never had the slightest support from the British government, from British commercial interests, or from any responsible quarter. During the last two decades of the 19th Century there had been a good deal of British misgiving and irritation over the sudden invasion by Germany of markets which British enterprise had opened up and had come to regard almost as a monopoly. This irritation over German competition, especially in the Far East, was due largely to German methods which British merchants often regarded as unscrupulous. American competition was in fact more severe but less resented, and Anglo-American political relations had never been more friendly. The trade figures, however, showed that by about 1900 the growth of German trade at British expense had become less rapid. It is doubtful whether at any time German commercial development was really harmful to Great Britain. In the ten years before 1914 British trade was expanding almost as quickly as German, and in 1913 one half of British exports to Germany were of manufactured goods. Great Britain had learned a good deal from German competition, while the Germans, like the British at an earlier stage, were suffering from some of the consequences of getting rich too easily. The best evidence, however, of the groundlessness of German fears of a mercantilist war was the thorough-going defeat of the Protectionists in the British general election of 1906. The British thus looked at the increasingly strong German navy not as a necessary instrument of commercial defence, but as a means of increasing German political power. The question for the Germans to decide was whether their plans appeared likely to succeed. With the collapse of the risk theory they had either to give up the idea of exercising political pressure on Great Britain by means of a weaker fleet, or to go ahead with their building in the hope of making their fleet equal or even superior in strength to that of Great Britain. For the next few years they attempted the latter policy. Two factors seemed favourable to Germany. One was the Liberal government which came to power in Britain at the end of 1905
and was anxious
to save
money on
HMS Vengeance before the war. Even in peace she has out her protective anti-torpedo booms
The
'risk theory'
—
a German gamble that did not pay off armaments and spend it on much needed Germany persisted in her naval programme, while British shipbuilding was cut down, she might gain social reform. If
equality or even numerical superiority in home waters. The Liberal government announced, at the Hague Conference of 1907, that they would cut down their building programme from four to three capital ships, and would delay laying down one of the three, in the hope that the Conference would adopt a general scheme of limiting armaments. The other factor favourable in the long run to Germany was the introduction of what was a revolutionary type of capital ship.
This change, initiated by Great Bri-
HMS
tain with Dreadnought in 1906, was under consideration in other countries, and the British Admiralty would have lost the advantage of technical leadership if they had not acted before their rivals. Inventions such as smokeless powder and rangefinders had made long-range firing more feasible. Fire-control was easier at long ranges if a ship's great guns were of uniform calibre. The number and position of these guns (the Dreadnought had ten 12inch guns) thus determined the size and general design of the ship. The Dread-
nought was turbine-driven, and faster as well as larger and more heavily gunned than her predecessors. An increase in the size of battleships set Germany the problem of widening the Kiel Canal, an undertaking which by British estimates could not be completed before 1914. Great Britain would have several dreadnoughts before any other power could complete one. On the other hand the introduction of this new type greatly lessened the value of the existing British superiority in capital ships, and in a competition in which only dreadnoughts would count, Germany might hope to catch up with Great Britain in a few years.
A
safe
margin of superiority
Once again the Germans miscalculated. The Liberal government might go a long way to show that they wanted to stop the shipbuilding race, but they realised the importance to Great Britain of a safe margin of superiority and were unlikely to allow this margin to be lost. The Conservatives were even more conscious of the danger and took care that the electorate was aware of it. In the spring of 1909 there was acute public anxiety in Great Britain when it was thought that by accelerating their rate of construction, the Germans might complete, in advance of their published timetable, as many dreadnoughts as would give them numerical superiority in 1912 or 1913.
The German Admiralty was under no obligation to keep to the three years which they normally took to build a capital ship. If they gave out a contract well in advance of the date of laying down the keel, the shipbuilding firm might collect in its yard
the required armour, guns and machinery, and thus"be able to complete the ship more quickly. During the winter of 1908/9 the British government had disquieting information that Germany was taking steps of this kind. According to the published programme Germany would have nine dreadnoughts by February 1911, while Great Britain would have 12. If they completed their ships sooner, and if they also accelerated work on their 1909/10 programme, then Germany might have 13 dreadnoughts in November 1911. If they repeated the acceleration in the 1910/11 programme they might have 17 dreadnoughts by the spring of 1912. Some estimates even suggested a figure of 21. The British government tried to get information from the Germans about this acceleration, but received incomplete and unsatisfactory answers. Count Metternich,
German Ambassador
in
London,
admitted
some
advance
collection
Franco-Russian plans of aggression, if such had existed. Great Britain and France had no interest in bringing about Russian control of the Balkans and Constantinople, and Great Britain and Russia had no interest in a war for the French recovery of
of
material but he denied any intention to accelerate the programme. The denial of facts definitely known to the Admiralty (the keel and ribs of one ship had been seen on the stocks at Danzig) added to British suspicions. The Prime Minister, Asquith, told Metternich that the British government, while not questioning the German right to build as they thought fit, had to take account in their own programme of all possibilities. They therefore intended to lay down four ships at once and and to get parliamentary approval for laying down another four if necessary for maintaining an adequate lead in capital ships. This programme, and the reasons for it, were announced in the naval estimates and discussed in Parliament in March 1909. The Germans now admitted, in addition to the facts stated by Metternich, that two ships had been allotted to yards before the usual time although they denied that the ships would be ready before the published date. The effect of these admissions on British public opinion was an immediate outcry and the slogan 'we want eight, and we won't wait'. The government decided to lay down all eight ships and thereby to give Great Britain a safe lead. Asquith and Grey said in Parliament that, although we accepted their denial of an intention to accelerate, the German government was not bound by it and could change their decision without previous notice. The Admiralty remained sure that Tirpitz (who seems to have concealed part of what he was doing from the Kaiser) had hoped to present Britain with a fait accompli and only gave up when his
Alsace-Lorraine. In July 1909, just after the British decision to build the four contingent dreadnoughts, Bethmann-Hollweg succeeded Biilow as German Chancellor. The change was unlikely to affect German naval policy which the Kaiser and Tirpitz kept away from civilian control. Nevertheless, Bethmann-Hollweg raised the question of an Anglo-German naval and political agreement. On the naval side Great Britain would abandon the four contingent ships, while Germany would maintain in full her 1909/10 programme. In the political agree-
ment each power would promise benevolent neutrality if the other were attacked by one or more powers. Such terms went beyond the obligations of the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian agreements and were open to the usual difficulties of defining aggression. The Germans realised the high price they were asking and they thought it prudent to make their suggestions 'drop by drop' (tropfenweise), but they insisted that if Great Britain wanted a naval agreement, she must pay for it.
A regular annual statement The British government continued
manoeuvre was found out. The events of 1909, and the immense
over the facts of German shipbuilding. He proposed an exchange of information, a regular annual statement by each country of the dates of laying down ships, and certain other particulars such as dimensions. The German reply, given after some delay, was to suggest statements simultaneous with or immediately before the publication by each country of its annual estimates. On this plan the British government, whose building now depended upon that of Germany, would have had to decide their programme, and remain bound to it for 12 months without knowledge of German intentions. Further discussion was interrupted when the Germans reopened the Moroccan question by sending a warship to Agadir on July 1, 1911, and by making peremptory demands on France for colonial concessions. An even greater obstacle to an controversy
dreadnoughts made the Liberal government more anxious than ever to come to an agreement with Germany. The Germans maintained, however, that they could not cut down their programme as set out under the Naval Law. They had, in fact, enlarged it in 1905. They enlarged it again in 1908 by shortening the cost of building
lifetime
of their
older battleships.
difficulty of discussing limitation
was
The in-
creased by the neurotic outbursts of the Kaiser. He upbraided Metternich for listening even unofficially to the 'shameless suggestion that English friendship depended upon the curtailment of German seapower'. When Metternich reported a proposal by Lloyd George for a permanent ratio of three to two between the British and German fleets, the Kaiser broke out into violent abuse. Biilow was less extravagant, but thought that Germany, in return merely for slowing down her building programme, might secure an unconditional promise of British neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war. Such an unconditional promise would have destroyed the Anglo-French Entente, as Biilow realised, since it would have bound Great Britain not to intervene even if Germany seized some pretext to attack France. In any case Great Britain intended to keep her naval superiority just as Germany intended to keep her military superiority. An agreed limitation of shipbuilding programmes would save both countries much useless expenditure. Such an agreement would have had political as well as financial advantages for Germany if her
aims had been wholly defensive, since British influence could have opposed 44
to see
no reason to pay for a saving in expenditure which would benefit both parties, and obviously would not accept the political terms. Grey was, however, anxious to do something which would avoid the acrimony and public excitement of another
naval agreement came the year when, under pressure from Tirpitz and against the advice of Bethmann-Hollweg, the Kaiser decided upon yet another supplementary Naval Law providing for three additional capital ships in the next six years. Before the details of this supplementary
Anglo-German later
in
programme were made public Herr a shipping magnate well known
Top: Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg, Imperial Chancellor (left), talks with the Foreign Secretary and Vice Chancellor. Centre: Herbert Asquith, British Liberal Prime Minister, unable to withstand the demand for more dreadnoughts. Bottom: Lord Haldane, British War Minister in 1912, visits Berlin to discuss the differences between Britain and
Germany
Ballin,
to the Kaiser, and his friend Sir Ernest Cassel, a British financier of German origin and a friend of the late King Edward VII, suggested a visit to Berlin by a British minister for a discussion of Anglo-German naval relations. Ballin and Cassel seem to have got their project off the ground by telling each government that the initiative came from the other. Haldane, who could speak
German
fluently,
was chosen
for this visit.
JA* pre dreadnoughts •
Ten years
The
of naval competition:
British
The
British
and German Battle Fleets
government was informed
in confidence before the conversations that
programme under the supplementary law would not be cut down but
the building that the
Germans
did not rule out the
possibility of spreading it over a longer time. On the British side, in view of Ger-
man
complaints that Great Britain opposed all their attempts at colonial expansion, the British government said that they had no wish to prevent such expansion,
and would discuss any practical proposals on the subject. They would also be glad to consider proposals which would debar either power from joining in aggressive designs on the other. The Kaiser now characteristically jumped that, in return for
to the conclusion concessions which would not involve a real reduction in the German shipbuilding programme, he could get the long-wished-for promise of British neutrality as well as colonial territory.
February 1912 came to nothing, or rather, worse than nothing, because afterwards Haldane and his German hosts disagreed about what he had said. Haldane alleged that he had menHaldane's
visit in
tioned only the possibility of ceding to Germany the British protectorate over the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba as part of a general bargain (which would also include British participation in the German-controlled Baghdad railway and a naval agreement). The Germans alleged that he had made a firm offer of Zanzibar and Pemba. Anyhow the negotiations would have broken down over the question of neutrality. The Germans asked, unconditionally, for benevolent neutrality.
The
in
JJu dreadnoughts
1899 and 1910. The gap has shortened
British government could not promise that they would not in any circumstances come to the help of France and Russia against Germany.
The German 'concessions', which were merely a slowing down of the construction of new capital ships under the supplementary law, were seen to be very little when the details were published after Haldane's return. They included far more than the increase in capital ships. There were 50-60 submarines, and a larger number of battleships would be manned at full strength throughout the year. Lord Morley, a leading Cabinet minister, who had always wanted an understanding with Germany, said that his colleagues would be idiots if they agreed to a cession of colonial territory and at the same time found themselves forced to increase their naval expenditure to meet the new German pro-
gramme. Hence, after more discussion, exacerbated by the comments of the Kaiser, the negotiations ended with a final German insistence on an unconditional promise of neutrality, and a British refusal to go beyond a promise not to support France and Russia unless they were victims of
German
aggression.
failure of the Haldane mission and the publication of the German supplementary law gave the British naval estimates for 1912 a special importance. Churchill, who had now succeeded McKenna as First
The
Lord of the Admiralty, announced that the two-power standard no longer applied. The Admiralty now required a superiority of 60% in dreadnoughts over Germany. In any case Great Britain would build
two capital ships
for
every one added to
German programme, though any year Germany dropped one or
the existing if
in
two ships from her annual quota, Great Britain would cut twice the number from her programme. This proposal for a 'naval holiday' was badly received in Germany. The Kaiser let it be known through Cassel that such an arrangement would be possible
only between
Two new
allies.
now affected the balance of naval power. One was an Austrian decision to lay down three more dreadnoughts before the end of 1912 (four factors
Austrian dreadnoughts had already been laid down). The other was a statement by the French government of their intention to concentrate the greater part of their fleet in the Mediterranean. The French took this decision on their own initiative. Churchill had already announced a regrouping of the British fleet to increase the number of ships in home waters. The British government could not give, and were not asked to give, a guarantee to defend the northern and western coasts of France in the event of a German attack. They would not go beyond an exchange of letters that, while the disposition of the two fleets was not based on an engagement to co-operate in war, the British and French governments would discuss together, if either expected an attack, what they would do. So far had matters changed since Tirpitz brought forward his risk theory.
The Balkan trouble spot In October 1912, war broke out in the Balkans. One result by the autumn of
Winston Churchill,
First
Lord of the Admiralty,
in
1913 was the aggrandisement of Serbia. In view of the strength of southern Slav nationalism Austria could not but regard this development as a threat to the cohesion and indeed the survival of the multinational Habsburg Empire. On the other hand, if Austria took forcible action against Serbia, Russia might well come to the defence of the southern Slavs and of her own influence in the Balkans, and a European war might break out. In this event Germany would go to the help of Austria and Russia would call on her French ally for support. War did not break out because Germany restrained Austria, and Great Britain and France did the same to Russia. Serbia was compelled to accept the limits set to her ambition by the combined action of the Great Powers. The centre of this collaboration was London, where the ambassadors of the Great Powers held meetings under the chairmanship of Grey. Grey hoped that this common action would lead to a detente between the two rival groups of powers and especially to an improvement in Anglo-German relations.
Bethmann-Hollweg was much
less
hopeful of a peaceful solution of Austrian differences with the southern Slavs. He wanted only to postpone an inevitable war until Germany had been able to detach Great Britain from her entente with France and Russia. The Kaiser agreed with Bethmann-Hollweg: 'the struggle between Slavs and Germans is bound to come. When?' Wilhelm believed that Great Britain would support France and Russia. Hence he refused all naval concessions and his only hope of deterring Great Britain was the strength of the German fleet. He wanted to introduce another supplementary naval law, and gave way reluctantly to Bethmann-Hollweg's advice to do nothing while the Balkan question was being discussed by the Great Powers. Before the publication of the British naval estimates for 1913 Tirpitz said that Germany might accept a ratio of 16 to 10
46
1913.
He
did
much
ensure that Britain was not overtaken by Germany
to
between the two
fleets in
dreadnoughts,
60%
superiority. British Tirpitz's offer was a clever one; it ignored Churchill's qualifications that a 60% figure could cover only the period in which the British pre-dreadnoughts retained their value, and that it did not apply to ships built under the new supplementary law. It was clearly useless for Great Britain
or
roughly,
controversy with the Germans, when announcing the British estimates for 1913, Churchill repeated his suggestion for a 'naval holiday'. The Kaiser was afraid that the Reichstag might find the proposal attractive, so he gave instructions that Grey should be told that the German government did not want it to be brought forward. On the British side the idea was also seen to have difficulties as the Germans, without breaking any engagement might accumulate material for building in the year after the 'holiday', and thus bring about another acceleration to
start
in
the naval race
ing in modern equivalent to £300,000,000 non-recurrent military expenditure. So ended the last phase of Anglo-German naval competition before the outbreak of war. Great Britain had maintained the naval superiority vital to her. She entered the war with 20 dreadnought or superdreadnought battleships in home waters. for
Germany had
15.
another
crisis.
In his speech on the estimates for 1914, Churchill did not refer directly to a naval holiday. He repeated his previous statement about the 60% superiority which he accepted for the time being in home waters, but could not regard as permanently binding. The Kaiser again wanted to introduce another supplementary law, but even Tirpitz was now on the side of Bethmann-Hollweg. He told the Kaiser that Churchill would use the opportunity to start a scare in Great Britain in order to increase the British programme. He also wrote significantly to the German naval attache in London that 'the bow is overstrung here as in England', and that, apart from the needs of the army, large sums were necessary for naval construction other than the building of capital ships. The race was proving expensive. The German bow was indeed overstrung. A new factor had appeared with the development of airships, and in the spring of 1913 the German government had announced a special capital levy amount-
Further Reading Bulow, Prince B. von, Memoirs (1931/2) Fischer, F., World Power or Decline: the controversy over Germany's aims in World War One (New York: Norton 1974) Grey, Viscount, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (1925)
Gooch, G.
P.
and Temperley,
H. (ed.), British
Documents on
the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, vols. 6, 8 and 9 Marder, A. J., The Anatomy of British Sea Power 1880-1905 (1940)
Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, (Munich, 1960)
Ritter, G., vol. 2
Steinberg, J., Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (Macdonald, 1965) Tirpitz, A. von, Politische Dokumente, vol. 1 (1925)
LLEWELLYN WOODWARD was born in London 1890 and was educated at Merchant Taylors' School and Corpus Christi College, Oxford. During the First World War he was with the BEF in France and Salonika. Between 1919 and 1939 he was a Fellow of All Souls and a History Tutor at New College, Oxford. In the Second World War he was attached to the Foreign Office. After the war he was for some years Professor of Modern History at Oxford, and from 1951 to 1962 Research Professor at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, USA. He wrote a number of books, including a short History of England, The Age of Reform, 1815-1870, SIR in
the Oxford History of England, Great Britain and War of 1914-18, Great Britain and the German Navy and an official History of British Foreign Policy in the Second World War. He was a Fellow of the British Academy and a member of the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia. He died in in
the
1971.
Lieutenant-Commander Peter
Kemp
During the first decade of this century, Britain's traditional naval supremacy was maintained against the German challenge by two factors. Admiral Fisher's vigorous reorganisation and reform of the navy, culminating in the introduction of the dreadnought in 1906, and new diplomatic alliances, with Japan in 1902 in 1904. These factors made possible a greater concentration of British sea power in the North Sea to
and France
meet the German menace. Below: The greatest naval force ever assembled— George V inspects his fleet at the Spithead Review in July, 1914
—
-
m
ft
m
4
47
By 1900 the Royal Navy had reigned supreme in the oceans of the world for close on a century. Since 1805, when the combined fleets of France and Spain had been shattered at Trafalgar, no other navy had arisen to present a challenge, and the years of complacency had left their mark. Since Trafalgar, three generations of naval officers had come and gone, the vast majority of whom had never seen a shot fired in anger or been called upon to exercise their brains in strategical or tactical thought. The great technological changes of the 19th Century, the transition from wood to steel, from sail to steam, from round shot to explosive shell, had been introduced with a reluctance and at a pace that gave ample time for their gradual and relatively painless assimilation into the most conservative of all British inRoyal Navy. This conservatism, this endemic resistance to change, had by 1900 reduced the British navy almost to a sham. It still looked unassailable on paper, but behind the facade of long printed lists of ships lay a motley collection of slow, elderly, and inefficient vessels, the majority of them ill-suited to the conditions of naval warfare even as they existed in 1900. The gradual emergence of two new navies, those of the United States and Japan, during the dying years of the 19th Century had posed no problems for Britain; they were still relatively weak in comparison and their operational areas too far away to cause any real concern. Into this placid pool of British naval complacency two stones were thrown in the shape of the German Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900. The first provided for the building of 19 battleships, 12 large and 30 small cruisers, and an unspecified number of smaller craft, and in spite of opposition in the Reichstag, it was passed in March 1898. It created little impression in Britain, where the new German fleet was thought to be aimed more at France and Russia than at the supremacy of the Royal Navy. Shortly after the passage of this first Navy Law, the Boer War broke out in South Africa. The Royal Navy took little active part in this war beyond the usual exercise of contraband control, but this duty had called for the stopping and searching of German merchant ships at sea, an irritant which, combined with the wave of anglophobia which swept through Germany as a result of the war, enabled the German Navy Minister, Admiral von Tirpitz, to get through the Reichstag the far more menacing Navy Law of 1900. Under this new programme Germany planned to have an active navy within 20 years of 34 battleships with four more in reserve, 14 large and 38 small cruisers, supported by an adequate number of torpedo-boat flotillas and attendant small craft. These two Navy Laws changed the whole balance of power in Europe. From being almost exclusively a land power, Germany by these two laws, now declared her ambition to become a dominant power at sea as well. Between 1900 and 1905 she launched no fewer than 14 new battleships, and when it became obvious from their design that they were intended solely for operations stitutions, the
North Sea and the Baltic, there could be no mistaking her motives. This was a challenge at sea aimed directly at the Royal Navy. Until 1900 Russia and France had always been considered Britain's potential enemies in Europe, and it had been the national policy for many years to maintain a fleet equal to or in excess of the sum of those two navies. This two-power standard, allied to a concentration of British naval strength in the Mediterranean, had been enough to contain any possibility of a warlike threat to Britain. The emergence of a German navy on the scale envisaged in the 1900 Navy Law was more than enough to force a reappraisal of Great Britain's traditional position in Europe. Even before 1900 two remarkable men were already convinced that a new alignment of naval power in Europe was required and both were working towards that end. One of them was Edward, Prince of Wales, soon to succeed his mother as King Edward VII. The other was the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher. The former worked for, and finally brought to fruition in 1904, the entente with France which removed the French navy as a threat to Britain. The latter, when he became First Sea Lord in 1904, introduced an interlocking system of fleets and squadrons which ensured the rapid concentration of overwhelming British naval strength in the North Sea. At the same time a series of political events eased Britain's path in other parts of the world. An Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed in 1902, and in the subsequent RussoJapanese war of 1904/5 the Russian naval threat to Britain was effectively reduced. It was completely removed in 1907 when, after the abortive conference at The Hague on the limitation of armaments, an Anglo-Russian accord was negotiated and signed. Thus the decks were cleared to enable British naval policy to be directed to the sole objective of keeping decisively ahead of German naval rearmament. Fisher came to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord in October 1904, with his plans cut and dried. He had already been there as Second Sea Lord in 1902/3 and had laid the first foundations for a more efficient navy by reorganising the entry and training of officers and men, sweeping away old methods and old prejudices with the force of an Arctic gale. Now, with his eyes fixed upon the new threat building up across the North Sea, he proceeded to exert all his ruthless energy in ensuring that when the inevitable conflict came, the Royal Navy should enter the battle in overin the
whelming strength. H^is overall scheme embraced four distinct aspects, all of which ran. concurrently. First came the wholesale scrapping of obsolete warships. In the memorandum to the First Lord of the Admiralty supporting his proposals on scrapping, Fisher wrote a short sceriario:
approaching her
fleet at full
speed.
Admiral
signals: 'What
hquWyou seen?' Venis replies: 'Four funnels hull down.' Below:
SMS Bremen,
1904 German
light
cruiser, with the very old-fashioned-
looking extended ram' bows. Displacement: 3,250 tons. Length: 341 feet. Beam: 43j feet. Armament: Ten 4-1-inch guns, plus smaller guns and two 17-7-inch torpedo tubes. Power/speed: 11,000 hp/23 knots.
Armour: Deck 2 inches. Crew: 286 men
L.\S
s
'
*-
KE,
what was behind?' 'Cannot say, she must have four knots more speed than I had, and would have caught me in three hours, so I had
Admiral:
Venus
'Well,
replies:
to close you at full speed.' Admiral's logical reply: 'You had better pay off and turn over to something that is some good; you are simply a device for wasting
400 men.'
By the time Fisher had weighed all the ships in his balance, he had a list of no fewer than 154, of which 17 were battleships, which he proposed to consign to the scrapheap.
Breakdown and inefficiency Fisher's second reorganisation concerned the reserve fleet. In 1904 it was divided into two classes, the fleet reserve and the dockyard reserve, the latter consisting of ships under major refit or out of commission, but with active service care and maintenance parties on board. The fleet reserve had permanently on board a proportion of their normal complement, mainly engineers, and on occasions of fleet exercises or trial mobilisations were brought up to full complement by men drafted from the barracks. In theory this fleet reserve was always ready for active service, but how far it fell from actual practice was demonstrated each year in the summer manoeuvres with a sorry story of perpetual breakdown and inefficiency. Fisher's solution was characteristic. Sixty old and useless ships were scrapped, the dockyard reserve handed over entirely to dockyard control, and the care and maintenance parties withdrawn. With the release of these parties, and with the pool of trained men made available by the scrapping programme, the ships in the fleet reserve were manned with nucleus crews up to twofifths of full complement of seamen and engineers and the whole of their turret crews and gunlayers, and with the captain and specialist officers who would serve in them on active service. They were then organised into three squadrons based on the three home ports of Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport, and each squadron put under the command of a rear-admiral. They trained and exercised together and were, as a result, quickly brought up to the state where they could provide a useful reinforcement of any fleet. The third reorganisation was the new interlocking system of fleets and squadrons mentioned above. Basically, it consisted of reducing the Mediterranean fleet from 12' battleships to eight, forming a new Atlantic fleet of eight battleships based on Gibraltar and thus within four days' steaming of home or Mediterranean waters, and placing the ten most modern battleships in the Channel fleet, based on Dover. Later, these dispositions were further modified with the formation of a Home fleet, and later still by the absorption of the Channel fleet into a much enlarged Home fleet. An underlying principle of this reorganisation was to ensure the possibility of a rapid and overwhelming concentration of naval power in the North Sea without making it so obvi
A declared ambition become a dominant power at sea
to
i
-Vf
Above: A German cruiser
in Port Arthur in 1898. At this time Germany trying to break into the British trade market in the Far East, and the presence of a warship on a goodwill visit was intended to boost German influence in the area. Below: SMS Westfalen, first of the
was
German dreadnoughts, completed in October 1909. The first two classes of German dreadnoughts, of which Westfalen was typical, were unusual in having only two of their six 11-inch gun turrets on the centreline, the other four being placed two on each side. This naturally limited the percentage of the ship's big guns which could be brought to bear in a broadside. Contemporary British dreadnoughts had three of their 12-inch gun turrets on the centreline and only one on
each s#e, and the later British design, of which the had all its guns on the centreline
first
was launched
*
"*""
~"~
i
.
f
a* 'Tliriir'-
/ .-
^Ui=£"
Zg~££f
"ML"
British naval strength in 1912,
"—"i.''
I^^T^T
;&r
still
numbering many pre-dreadnoughts
as to cause alarm in Germany and so stimulate her into accelerating her declared rate of new battleship construction. Finally, Fisher had decided upon a radical new design of capital ship. Every naval power in the world had fixed upon the mixed armament type of battleship, in Great Britain represented by guns of 12-inch and 9-2-inch calibre. These, mounted within the same ship, caused difficulties in stores and supplies by the multiplicity of varying shell-rooms and magazines, and also considerably complicated the correction of gunnery ranges by the difficulty of recognising the fall of shot from the different sizes of guns. There had been published in the 1903 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships an article by the distinguished Italian naval designer Colonel Cuniberti, recommending an all-big-gun battleship as the best type for Britain's need, to be driven by turbines at a speed of 20 knots. Fisher undoubtedly had read this article, and in Colonel Cuniberti's design had quickly recognised the advantages it would enjoy in modern naval warfare. This was Dreadnought, built in great secrecy and completed in the record time of 11 months. She followed the Cuniberti design almost exactly, carrying ten 12-inch guns in five turrets and being the first battleship in the world to be fitted with steam turbines, to give her a speed of 21 knots. The effect of the Dreadnought upon the navies of the world was electrifying. At one stroke she rendered obsolete or obsolescent every other battleship in existence. That she performed the same operation in respect of all existing British battleships was equally undeniable, but the speed and secrecy of her building, combined with her revolutionary design, gave Britain a long start in the naval rebuilding race which would inevitably follow.
HMS
Fisher has been blamed for thus throwing away the considerable lead that Britain already enjoyed over all other navies, but in fact some other navies, notably those of the United States, Japan, and Italy, were already thinking along the lines of the all-biggun battleship. It was bound to come, and by seizing his opportunity Fisher at least ensured that the Royal Navy kept some of its big lead. With the Dreadnought came the big armoured cruiser, herself a development of the Cuniberti design. She had the same displacement (17,900 tons) as the Dreadnought but was more lightly armoured and had a maximum speed of 254 knots. The need for these ships, in Fisher's philosophy, lay in their ability to force a reconnaissance of an enemy's main fleet. These armoured cruisers carried an armament of eight 12-inch guns, and with their high
50
-w-
German
naval strength
in
1912, approaching Britain
in
dreadnoughts
speed and formidable gun power could clear away any screen shielding the location of the main opposing fleet. The first of these new ships to be laid down was HMS Invincible, but in fact a sister ship, HMS Indomitable, raced her into commission. An unforeseen and unpremeditated dividend accrued in the race with Germany with the launching of the Dreadnought; the fact that with the dreadnought design Germany would be forced to widen and deepen the Kiel Canal. Fisher had seized on this point within a year of the Dreadnought taking the water, and was able to calculate the date of the outbreak of war. The widened and deepened canal would not be ready, he estimated, before the late spring of 1914, and allowing for the fact that Germany would need to get her harvest in before going to war, Fisher estimated the date as September 1914. It was not a bad guess.
A
massive lead — lost Great Britain, at the end of 1905, had laid down a naval shipbuilding programme of four large armoured ships (dreadnoughts and battle-cruisers) a year, but Fisher's Dreadnought and Invincible had so caught the world by storm and given Britain so large a time lead in naval construction that the government insisted on dropping one of the four in both 1906 and 1907, with another to be dropped in 1907, making only two for that year, unless the 1907 Conference at' The Hague on the reduction of armaments proved unsuccessful. It seemed a reasonable pruning of the annual Naval Estimates in view of the fact that not a single dreadnought or battle-cruiser had yet been laid down by any European nation. The reaction in Germany to the launching of the Dreadnought was at first one of stunned silence. Captain Dumas, the British Naval Attache in Berlin, reported home regularly, both on comments in the German press and conversations with German naval officers, and the general tenor of both was such as to cause complacency inside the British Admiralty over the cut in battleship building. So much so, indeed, that Fisher was encouraged, in a speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet in November 1907, to assure his countrymen that they could 'sleep quiet in their beds', confident that the massive superiority of the Royal Navy could disany 'bogies'. Yet even as he spoke he had said too much. Germany's first two dreadnoughts, the Nassau and Westfalen, had already been laid down, and there was much talk in official German circles, duly reported by Captain Dumas, of a new Navy Law, or at the pel
an amendment of the 1900 Law. It took the latter course, was published in November, and passed by the Reichstag in February 1908. The amendment reduced the period for the laying down of the replacement ships from 25 to 20 years, which meant in effect that four new capital ships would be laid down in each least
of the next four years instead of three as envisaged in the 1900 Law. But worse was to come. The amendment also specified that the large cruisers included in the 1900 Law were now to be built as battle-cruisers, which were looked upon universally as the equivalent of dreadnoughts. So, instead of the 38 battleships and 20 armoured cruisers, under the 1900 provisions, the German fleet was now to consist of 58 dreadnoughts and battle-cruisers. Britain was still, it is true, a long way ahead in dreadnoughts, and looking ahead to 1910, would have seven dreadnoughts and four battle-cruisers completed as against Germany's three and one respectively. In view of these figures and the new Liberal Government's election promises on old-age pensions and other benefits, the British Admiralty agreed to ask only for one battleship and one battle-cruiser in the 1907 Estimates instead of the normal four. On the face of it, this was a reasonable reduction; what had not been taken into account was a German ability to cut the building time of a dreadnought from the normal three years to two. Various estimates were made as to the likely or possible position in 1912, according to the politics of the estimator; the Liberal (government) version being that Britain could have 20 by that date compared to a German maximum of 17; the Conservative (opposition) view being a possible German strength of 21 against the British 20. All this was the background of the great navy scare of 1909. There had been much discussion, both in Parliament and throughout the country, of possible German acceleration in shipbuilding, and in particular the ability of Krupp's, the German steel firm which was the principal manufacturer of guns and mountings, to turn out big naval guns at a vastly increased rate. It was widely known that Krupp's had more than doubled its size in the last five years (it employed 100,000 workers in 1909), and there was information in the Admiralty that German purchases of nickel, a necessary ingredient in gun manufacture, had recently
Below:
SMS
Rheinland
class, the first
of the Westfalen
German dreadnoughts.
Displacement: 18,900 tons. Length: 472 feet. Beam: 89 feet. Armament: Twelve 11-inch, twelve 5-9-inch and sixteen 3-4-inch plus six 17-7-inch torpedo tubes. Power/speed: 26,100 hp/20 knots. Armour: Belt 11Vi inches, turrets 11 inches. Crew: 963
The crucial ratio the balance of
dreadnoughts
-
navy had still not progressed beyond the 12-inch gun, and it was not until the 'Bayern' class of 1913/14, of which only two were completed in 1916, that the 15-inch gun was adopted. In August 1914, Britain had 20 dreadnoughts in commission, plus two of the 'Lord Nelson' class which were in fact pre-dreadnoughts but were counted (until 1917) as dreadnoughts. Two more were due for completion before the end of the year, three in 1915, and six in 1916. In addition three more dreadnoughts being built in Britain, one for Chile and two for Turkey, were requisitioned. Two were completed in August 1914 and one in September 1915. Nine battle-cruisers were operational, and a tenth was in
increased very considerably. These facts were behind an Admiralty requirement for six capital ships in the 1909 Estimates in place of the normal four. Faced with a big increase in the Navy Estimates, the radical wing of the Liberal government, led by Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, rose in revolt. The argument raged in Parliament and country, and was eventually solved by a compromise. Four dreadnoughts would be laid down, and four more would be added to the Estimates later in the year if events proved them necessary in order to maintain the British margin. These four contingent ships were not to be considered as the same four which would be the normal requirement in the following year's estimates. By this time the Admiralty had further information on the German situation. An Argentinian naval mission had been visiting Germany and had been entertained at Krupp's. They had been highly impressed by the German shipbuilding and engineering efficiency, and reported that they had seen at Krupp's over a hundred 12-inch and 11-inch guns nearing completion. On the strength of this, Fisher demanded that the four contingent battleships should be laid down at once. The government naturally resisted this demand, and the Conservative opposition moved a vote of censure in the House of Commons. It was lost, but it gave rise to a cry which swept the country. 'We want eight, and we won't wait' was a slogan coined by George Wyndham, a Conservative MP, and it became the rallying call of all those who believed, and they were many, that the reported German acceleration in shipbuilding was true and thus threatened British supremacy on the seas. The government, however, stood firm, and it was not until the next scare developed that their defences crumbled. Reports reached the British Admiralty of dreadnought building by Austria and Italy. It was thought that each country would lay down four. This was the clinching argument, and in Britain the four contingent ships, three dreadnoughts and one battle-cruiser, were laid down, without prejudice to the following year's programme.
The greatest naval power Towards the end of 1913 Winston Churchill had suggested to the First Sea Lord, as an economy measure, that the usual summer naval manoeuvres for the following year should be replaced by a test mobilisation of the Third Fleet (ships normally with a small care and maintenance party on board). Prince Louis of Battenberg, the First Sea Lord, agreed. Orders for the mobilisation were issued on July 10, 1914, and it began on the 15th. An impressive naval review was held at Spithead on July 17 and 18 — in the words of Churchill 'the greatest assemblage of naval power ever witnessed in the history of the world' — and on the 19th the whole fleet put to sea for tactical exercises. Four days later the Third Fleet dispersed to their home ports to pay off. On the 26th came the news that the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum following the Sarajevo murder had been rejected. As yet, only the smaller ships of the Third Fleet had paid off, the remainder still had full crews on board. Winston Churchill was away from London because of the severe illness of his wife, and on his own
Amazement and apprehension
initiative Prince Louis issued orders to stop the demobilisation. Warning telegrams were issued, and by the 28th the Royal Navy
In Germany, the British decision to build the four contingent ships was greeted with a mixture of amazement and apprehension. There had in fact been no acceleration in the rate of German building, but as an administrative convenience in order to allow firms to collect materials in advance, contracts for new dreadnoughts had been placed six or eight months before they were due.
was this fact, more than any other, which had caused alarm in the British Admiralty. As it turned out, neither country had reached the numbers which, projected to 1912, had caused so much fuss. Of the 17 'possible' and 13 'certain' which had been so widely quoted in 1909, Germany only had nine in commission by April 1912. Of the 20, including the four contingent ships, which Britain was to have in that year, only 15 were completed. The surprising lowness of the German figure was caused not by any slowing down in the rate of building but by the British decision in 1909 to increase the size of the big naval gun from 12-inch to 13-5-inch. This caught the German Admiralty by surprise, and the four capital ships due to be built in 1910 were delayed to give time to study the implications of the new British gun. There were two political attempts to stop the naval building race between Britain and Germany, one in 1909 and another in 1911. The first foundered on the German demand of British neutrality in a war in which Germany was involved as a precursor of any reduction in the German naval programme, coupled with a British insistence that the reductions must precede any It
agreement. The second attempt, when it was beginning to show some signs of edging towards an agreement, was effectively killed by German behaviour in the Agadir crisis of 1911. Thereafter, there was no stopping the two nations. Both built virtually to the limit of their shipbuilding capacity. The Agadir crisis so exacerbated anti-British feelings in Gerpolitical
many that Tirpitz felt emboldened to demand a new Navy Law. This took the form of a Novelle, or supplementary Navy Bill, which proposed the formation of a third active battle squadron to be composed of five pre-dreadnoughts from the reserve and three new dreadnoughts to be built in addition to the current programme in 1912, 1914, 1916. When the Novelle was passed one of the three new dreadnoughts was dropped, and the British response was to cut their building programme correspondingly. Winston Churchill, the new First Lord of the Admiralty, sprang a surprise in 1912 when he revealed that the five new ships were to be super-dreadnoughts to act as a fast wing to the battlefleet. Armed with eight 15-inch guns and with a designed speed of 25 knots, these were the 'Queen Elizabeth' class ships, the first British battleships to use oil fuel instead of coal. The German 52
the service of the Australian government. On the German side 15 dreadnoughts were in commission in August 1914, with two more to be completed later in the year and another two in 1916. Six battle-cruisers had been completed, with another due in 1915 and a second in 1917.
had been placed on a 'preparatory and precautionary' footing. The First Fleet, so soon to be renamed the Grand Fleet, sailed from Portland on the 29th, passed through the Dover Straits without lights on the night of the 29th-30th, and steamed silently up the North Sea to its Scottish bases; battleships at Scapa Flow and Cromarty, battle-cruisers at Rosyth. To Scapa Flow, too, travelled Sir John Jellicoe, selected to relieve Admiral Sir George Callaghan as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet. Jellicoe was 52, Callaghan ten years older. At 11 pm on August 4, (midnight in Germany) the Admiralty signal to commence hostilities was sent to all ships and establishments. On the 5th, when the Prime Minister announced the news in a crowded House of Commons, it was noticed that tears were streaming down Churchill's face. A reaction, perhaps, to the end of the three years of nervous strain in which, as First Lord, he had borne responsibility for the Royal Navy in a period of stress and tension; or relief, perhaps, as he himself wrote, that the navy was 'ready; not to be taken unawares; to be concentrated, not to be caught divided; to have the strongest fleet possible in the best station under the best conditions in good time, and then if the battle came one could await its result with a steady heart.'
Further Reading Chatfield, Admiral of the Fleet, Lord, The
Navy and Defence (London,
1940) Churchill, Sir Winston S., The World Crisis 1911-18 (Foursquare) Fisher of Lambeth, Lord, Fear God and Dread Nought; the Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 3 vols., ed. A. J. Marder (Cape, 1952/9) Marder, A. J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol 1 (Oxford University Press, 1961) Patterson, A. T., ed. The Jellicoe Papers Vol 1 (Navy Records Society,
1966)
Grand Admiral von, My Memoirs (London, 1919) Woodward, E. L, Greaf Britain and the German Navy (F. Cass,
Tirpitz,
LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER PETER
K.
KEMP, who was Head
1964)
of the
Naval
Branch and Naval Librarian in the Ministry of Defence until 1968, joined the Royal Navy in 1 920 after training at the Naval Colleges at Osborne and Dartmouth. Specialising in submarines, he was invalided after a submarine accident He joined the editorial staff of The Times in 1 936 and apart from service in the Naval Intelligence Division from 1939 to 1945, remained there until 1950. Lieutenant-Commander Kemp has written several books of naval and military history, and has also written books for children. Historical
THE BALKAN WARS Prelude to the Main Act Alan Palmer
The success of the Balkan League in 1912/13 in driving the Turks from Europe alarmed the Great Powers and each was determined to have a say in the peace settlement, albeit for different reasons.
The resulting peace treaties left some Balkan states dissatisfied and they began to prepare for the 'second round'. Below: Typical of
the opposition to the Turks — a group of guerrillas from the north of Albania
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53
At the start of the 20th Century most of the Balkan peninsula still nominally ruled by the Sultan of Turkey. The crescent flag flew over the White Tower of Salonika on the Aegean, and over the Roman stones of Durazzo on the Adriatic. It flew, too,
was
over the governor's residence in Sarajevo, the capital of the province of Bosnia. But the troops garrisoning Sarajevo were Austro-Hungarian, for in 1878 the Treaty of Berlin had placed Bosnia and the adjoining province of Herzegovina under Austrian military protection even though they remained technically
Turkish possessions. There were five independent Balkan states. The smallest was Montenegro, a Principality until 1910 when its wily ruler, Nikita Petrovic Njegos, celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of his accession by up-grading himself to the dignity of King. The Montenegrins were separated by only a narrow corridor of Turkish territory from their kinsfolk in Serbia, a kingdom little more than half the size of Scotland and with its capital in Belgrade. The Serbs were on bad terms with their eastern neighbours, the Bulgars, against whom they had fought and lost a brief war in 1885. Bulgaria was twice as large as Serbia but more sparsely populated. The largest kingdom in south-eastern Europe was Rumania, rich in corn and minerals (including oil), but the Rumanians, although eager to benefit from any redistribution of Balkan territory, were more interested in Danubian affairs than in the fate of the Turkish lands. On the other hand, the Greeks still looked upon the Turks as hereditary enemies, for at the start of the century the kingdom of Greece reached no farther north than the Thessalian plain, to the south of Mount Olympus, and an attempt to extend its frontiers in 1897 had ended in a disastrous five week war with Turkey, which left the Greeks smarting with the humiliation of defeat and eager for revenge. Yet, despite this success against Greece, the power of the Ottoman Empire declined steadily during the 19th Century, and the great autocracies of Russia and Austria-Hungary had long faced each other in rivalry for the Turkish inheritance should the Sultan's rule in the Balkans finally collapse. In the late 1870's and 1880's it seemed as if war between Russia and Austria-Hungary was inevitable, but in the last years of the old century other questions occupied the chancelleries of Vienna and St Petersburg and a 'Gentlemen's Agreement' was concluded which 'put the Balkans on ice'. This truce survived unrest in Macedonia in 1903, but when Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 ended Tsarist ambitions in the Far East, the traditional Pan-Slav interest in the Balkans revived with remarkable speed. By 1908 the 'ice' was distinctly thin and the Austrians were particularly alarmed at Russian patronage of Serbia.
1
full-scale crisis In July 1908, a mutiny in the Turkish army brought to power in Constantinople a group of young officers, the Committee of Union and Progress, who were generally known more simply as the 'Young Turks'. For 30 years the Austrians had administered Turkish Bosnia-Herzegovina as if it were a colony. Fearing that
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Young Turks might bring new blood to the Turkish government, the Austrians determined to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina. They counted on their German allies to placate the Young Turks, most of whom were pro-German in foreign policy. But when the annexation was announced on October 6, 1908 it aroused storms of protest from the Serbs, whose compatriots formed a majority in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Russian government supported the Serbian complaint that Austria-Hungary had unilaterally abrogated the Treaty of Berlin. The Bosnian question thus produced a full-scale international the
which lasted until the following spring. On March 13, 1909 the Austrians massed troops along Serbia's frontiers to compel the government in Belgrade to recognise the annexation, and to control the anti-Austrian societies which had sprung up in the main towns of the kingdom. A Russian Council of War seriously considered intervention on Serbia's behalf but it was felt in St Petersburg that Russia was in no position to undertake a European war so soon after her defeat by Japan, especially as Germany made it clear that she would support the Austrians. At last the Serbs agreed to give formal recognition of the annexation on March 31, 1909, but relations between Vienna and Belgrade continued to be strained until the outbreak of the First World War. Bosnia-Herzegovina was a rallying point for Serbian national feelings. Its annexation became as much a symbol for the Serbs crisis
was for the French. To many Russian diplomats and soldiers, the Bosnian crisis proved the need for a Balkan union to counter the south-eastward expansion of Austria-Hungary: some favoured a league of Balkan states which would include Turkey; others believed that Turkey
as the loss of Alsace-Lorraine
54
Top left: Enver Pasha, leader of the Young Turks' who sought to redeem Turkish fortunes in 1913. Top right: King Ferdinand of Bulgaria. Centre left: King Nikita of Montenegro. Centre right: King of Rumania. Above: Kaimil Pasha, Grand Vizier of Turkey until 1913
was doomed and that it was essential to replace the rotten edifice of the Ottoman Empire by a more effective barrier based on the principle 'the Balkans for the Balkan people'. The Bosnian crisis also posed problems for the Serbian government. If they suppressed the patriotic ardour of young hot-heads (as the Austrians
demanded there might
well be a palace revolution in Belgrade.
would be far better to divert their enthusiasm away from Bosnia so as to liberate those Serbs still under the Turkish yoke in Macedonia. But there were other nationalities in Macedonia and while agreement was possible between Serbia and Greece, it was difficult for the Serbs and Bulgars to forget 20 years of mutual suspicion. Conversations between the rulers of Serbia and Bulgaria began in November 1909, but it was not until March 1912 that the two countries could reach a formal written understanding. The Russian ministers in Sofia and Belgrade induced the two governments to sign a secret alliance providing for joint action against Turkey, for the cession of northern Macedonia to Serbia and south-eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria, and for arbitration by the Tsar of Russia over the frontiers within a disputed central zone. Two months later another secret agreement provided for joint military action by Bulgaria and Greece but left the eventual It
division of the liberated territories for later settlement. A further military convention was signed by the Bulgars and Montenegrins, and a verbal understanding was reached by the Serbs, Greeks and Montenegrins. By the autumn of 1912 a Balkan League, entirely secret in character, had thus been conjured into existence, largely through the initiative of minor Russian diplomats in the Balkan capitals. But the very form of the Balkan League was so imprecise that it left wide scope for future dispute.
The Russian Foreign
Office
was
less
sanguine than
its
re-
presentatives in Sofia and Belgrade. In the autumn of 1912 there was a sudden alarm in St Petersburg that the Balkan League might endanger European peace and involve the Russian
army in a war with Austria-Hungary and Germany for which it was no more ready than it had been in 1909. Hence in the first week of October the Russians joined the Austrians in warning the Balkan governments that they would not permit any annexation of territory in case of a conflict leading to the defeat of Turkey. This rare unity of Vienna and St Petersburg failed to impress King Nikita of Montenegro, who had played the game of Balkan diplomacy for more than half a century and could distinguish a genuine threat from a pious hope. Claiming that Turkey was exercising an intolerable tyranny over Montenegro's Albanian neighbours (whose very existence the Montenegrins had done their best to ignore for 500 years), Nikita declared war on the 8. There was an anxious pause while the other Balkan states discussed the implications of the Austro-Russian warning but, convinced that two natural antagonists would never co-operate in imposing a peace settlement, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece determined to ignore their disapprobation. By October 17 all three countries had joined Montenegro in war with Turkey. It was a development of great significance. The Balkan kingdoms were no longer content to remain puppets of the Great Powers. They were assuming an independence and
Sultan on October
unknown in previous crises. Foreign observers believed that the Turks would teach the Balkan League a sharp lesson. They were wrong. The League put into the field armies totalling 715,000 men. The crack regiments had modern weapons, mostly of French or German origin, although many units were poorly equipped, especially the Macedonians. The rank and file of the Balkan armies were spoiling for a fight and convinced of victory. The Turks, on the other hand, were unable to muster half as many men and their morale was bad. A new decree on military training issued in August 1909 had created confusion, particularly in the more outlying provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and had failed to expand the army as the Young Turks had hoped. Political intrigues in the previous three years had led to the dismissal of veteran officers and their successors were too well-trained (mostly in Germany) for the unsophisticated weapons with which most regiments were equipped. Moreover, the Turkish forces were already severely taxed elsewhere: for more than a year the Turks had been resisting an Italian invasion of their North African provinces in Libya; and they were forced to station more than 30,000 regulars in southern Arabia in order to hold down risings among the tribesmen of the Hejaz and the Yemen. These commitments in Africa and Asia meant that the Turks could never concentrate more than 325,000 men in south-eastern Europe. From the earliest days of the fighting the Greek navy dominated the Aegean and it was impossible for the Turks to ferry troops or supplies by sea when the Libyan war ended only a few days before the outbreak of the Balkan War. initiative
The first Balkan campaign lasted no more than seven weeks. Everywhere the Serbs, Bulgars. and Greeks were victorious. Only the Montenegrins found modern siege warfare beyond their military capabilities. The heaviest fighting fell on the Bulgars in Thrace. The ancient city of Adrianople proved too hard a nut to crack but the Bulgars isolated the Turkish garrison there and pushed forwards down the railway towards the Turkish capital, Constantinople. The Bulgars gained two striking victories: at Kirk-Kilisse on October 24, and at Luleburgaz in a five-day battle ending on November 2. The Turks were thrown back to the Chatalja lines, the last fortifications before Constantinople. The thud of shells could be clearly heard in the great city on the Bosphorus and wild rumours of imminent disaster began to circulate. But the Bulgarian offensive had come to a halt. For days it seemed never to stop raining. The retreating Turks had sought to destroy the railway tracks and now the weather completed their task for them, washing away the ground from under the sleepers. Water stood in deep pools around the encampments and there were gloomy tales of cholera in some Bulgarian units. Horses slithered in the mud and only oxen could get the supply waggons through, covering a mere ten miles in a day. It was no better in the Turkish lines. The Austrian military attache calculated that it took seven or eight hours for an order to be transmitted from a Turkish divisional headquarters to the junior sodden trenches. The fighting died away, as chilly gusts swept in the first scuds of snow from Anatolia. Yet on November 17 the Bulgarian commander, General Dimitriev, ordered his men forward, despite the uncertainty of supplies and the grim conditions. It was a desperate assault which cost the Bulgars some 15,000 casualties and failed to gain any new positions. To the Bulgars Constantinople was as remote and unattainable as ever. It was no compensation to discover that, while eight Bulgarian divisions were engaged in Thrace, the Serbs and Greeks were acquiring all the cherished prizes in Macedonia. officers in the
The end of Turkish rule in Europe mid-November, the combined allied armies hcd virtuswept the Turks out of Macedonia. The principal Serbian army gained a brilliant victory at Kumanovo on October 24 and thus opened up the Morava/Vardar valley, the main north to south route from the Danubian basin to the Aegean. Skopje was liberated and one column of Serbs swept westwards to free the plateau of Kosovo. The Greeks too pressed forward around the foothills of Olympus. Grevena fell on October 31 and Preveza on November 3. The main objective for the Greeks was Salonika, the principal seaport in the northern Aegean and once the second centre of Byzantium. Crown Prince Constantine duly received the surrender of Salonika from the commander of the Turkish VIII Army Corps on November 8, which by a happy chance was the Feast of St Demetrius, the patron saint of the city. The two battalions of Evzones and a troop of cavalry who entered Salonika at 2 pm were wildly feted with bouquets of flowers and, says an eye-witness 'the sudden release of innumerable pigeons'. The Greeks were only just in time. Twenty-four hours later General Todorov reached the heights above the city with a rain-soaked and weary Bulgarian division which had advanced down the Struma valley and across the hills from Seres. The crown Prince allowed a token force of Bulgars into the town, but General Todorov felt humiliated and relations between the nominally allied commanders were frigid. By early December the Turks had lost all their territories in Europe apart from the environs of Constantinople and three beleaguered cities: Adrianople, surrounded by the Bulgars; Yanina in Epirus, besieged by the Greeks; and Scutari, on the borders of Albania, which was held by the redoubtable Essad Pasha against a combined force of Montenegrins and Serbs. The Turkish prime minister, Kiamil Pasha, believed that if peace were made while these cities were still in Turkish hands, the Ottoman Empire could retain a foothold in Europe. On December 3 the Turks concluded an armistice with the Bulgars and Serbs. The Greeks continued their assault on Yanina, and the Montenegrins made threatening gestures against Scutari although, without the support of Serbian artillery, they were unable to make much impression on the fortress. The partial armistice was enough to satisfy the Great Powers. With rare unanimity they had disapproved of the war since its outbreak. All were gloomily aware that the intensity of Balkan For, by
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passions always frustrated attempts by outsiders to impose any lasting settlement. Both the empires most concerned with southeastern Europe, Russia and Austria-Hungary, retained in their armies men who were due for demobilisation, for each feared that local quarrels might yet lead to a general conflagration. The British, also sensing that a protracted conflict could bring Europe to the brink of war, proposed that the ambassadors of the five leading nations — Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Russia — should join the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, in a conference at St James's Palace to ensure peace in the Balkans. The London Conference duly opened on December 16, but though they met regularly for six weeks, the ambassadors could make little progress on the Macedonian question. By the end of the month they had, however, resolved to establish an independent Albanian state, partly to allay Austrian fears that Serbia might gain Albania or share it with Greece and Montenegro, for the Austrians were determined to prevent the Serbs acquiring a foothold on the Adriatic coast, and over this issue they were supported by Italy. Events in Constantinople did not improve the prospects of an early peace. In the last week of January 1913 a splinter group of Young Turk army officers, led by Enver Pasha, ousted the Kiamil government. Enver's supporters were fanatical nationalists, convinced that they could redeem the failures of the past three months. Sporadic fighting broke out again on January 30. Four days later the Serbs and Bulgars denounced the armistice and operations began once more in earnest.
Mounting tension The new campaign was
brief but dramatic. The Serbs sent a considerable body of troops from Macedonia to assist the Bulgars in front of Adrianople and the city surrendered to the Bulgars on March 26. Farther to the west, the Greeks scaled the rocky headland of Yanina, an inland Gibraltar jutting out into a lake which takes its name from the town. It was not until the first week of March that the Turkish crescent was finally lowered above this natural citadel. Other Greek successes that month were as irritating to the Bulgars as to the common enemy, for Crown Prince Constantine's army sent cavalry patrols forward from Salonika along the Aegean coast, mopping up the Turkish villages at the mouth of the river Struma, a region intended by the General Staff in Sofia as a natural outlet for 'Greater Bulgaria'. Tension mounted still further between the Balkan allies. The Turks were rapidly losing all their bargaining counters, but it was still impossible to re-open peace negotiations in Lon-
Turkish rule in Europe had been characterised by great savagery. Here Turkish troops massacre Serbian civilians
Left:
don. King Nikita, who in 1878 had composed an epic poem to celebrate a minor victory against the Turks, as yet lacked a fit subject for a triumphal ballad. His troops fought on in front of Scutari, whose defenders were running desperately short of food. But on April 22 the Montenegrins gained their prize. Essad Pasha surrendered, in return for a considerable cash payment and an assurance that Nikita would recognise his claim to be considered the spokesman of the Albanian tribes. Montenegro, however, was not permitted to retain Scutari. The Austrians moved troops up to the frontier and occupied some outposts in the corridor separating Serbia from Montenegro. British, French,
Austrian and Russian warships anchored off' the Montenegrin coast in the hope that a joint display of naval power might deter King Nikita. These heavy-handed gestures appear to have been effective. On May 4 Nikita sadly admitted that he would have to accept the arbitration of the Great Powers. The Montenegrin army withdrew from Scutari and the town was occupied by a multi-national force of marines from the naval squadron. It has remained an Albanian city ever since. Nikita's talents as an epic poet were not exercised on this occasion, but his pride was no doubt mollified by the happy discovery that he had made a small personal fortune on the Paris Stock Exchange by judicious speculation on the outcome of a crisis in which he- was himself the Italian,
key figure. At the end of
May 1913, the London Conference secured the signature of a peace treaty between Turkey and the Balkan League. All Turkish territory in Europe west of a line from Enez on the Aegean to Midye on the Black Sea was surrendered, together with Crete and most of the islands in the Aegean. But the treaty created more problems than it solved. It was left to the ambassadors in London to determine the frontiers of Albania and the division of Macedonia among the Balkan victors. Small wonder that the French delegate gloomily commented: 'We shall be six skeletons before our work is done.' He reckoned, however, without the Balkan states themselves. They had no intention of waiting patiently for settlement of their territorial claims by outsiders seated around a table 1,400 miles away. The Bulgarian delegate in London threatened 'Salonika or war'; and significantly, on the very day after the conclusion of the treaty, Greece and Serbia signed a secret military convention in case the Bulgars should attempt to seize by force the territory which they considered to be theirs by right. Nothing more was heard of the earlier proposal for arbitration by the Tsar, but new problems began to trouble the ambassadors in London, for the Rumanians, who had remained scrupulously
Above: Two bodies, hanged by the Bulgarians as Turkish spies, are cut down from the trees used as the gallows
59
neutral in the two earlier campaigns, now demanded compensation, at the expense of Bulgaria, for the general change in the Balkan balance of power. And the Bulgars had no intention of ceding territbry south of the Danube to Rumania so long as they were denied their claims in Macedonia and Thrace. The position of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria was extremely difficult. He was threatened by the Rumanians to the north and by his former allies in the south, and he also knew that there
was discontent in the Bulgarian High Command. On June 21 General Savov, the Bulgarian Commander-in-Chief, informed the King that if a just settlement was not reached within ten days the army would take the initiative and march against the Serbs and the Greeks. The King, fearing that he might lose his throne, bowed to this -virtual ultimatum. On June 28 Savov gave the orders for an offensive in Macedonia and on the following night Bulgarian troops opened fire on the Greek and Serbian outposts. A second Balkan War had begun. At first the surprise of the attack won some successes for the Bulgars, but the Serbian and Greek defences held firm. East of Veles, on the left bank of the Vardar, wave upon wave of Bulgarian infantry sought to oust the Serbs from their trenches in a six-day battle, but by July 8 the Bulgars were falling back into the mountains, with the Serbs in hot pursuit. It was much the same story farther south. There was wild shooting in Salonika itself with the small Bulgarian detachment haphazardly lobbing handgrenades from the six buildings in the city in which they had been quartered. They were easily rounded up. The main Bulgarian attack on the Greek positions at Eleftherai-Pravista was hardly any more successful, and the Greeks used the Bulgarian operations as an excuse for an advance eastwards in the course of which they captured the towns of Serres and Drama, and the port of Kavalla. With the Bulgars heavily committed to desperate fighting in Macedonia, there was only a handful of troops left to guard the crossings of the Danube; and on July 11 a Rumanian army of 150,000 men was ferried across the river and marched on Sofia, meeting little resistance. Nor was this new threat the sum total of Bulgaria's misfortunes. Two days later Enver Pasha ordered the Turkish army to resume operations from the Chatalja lines. Swiftly they avenged Kirk-Kilisse and within ten days they had recaptured Adrianople, the one prize secured by the Bulgars in the earlier campaigns. In despair, the Bulgars sued for peace with their Balkan neighbours. The Turks continued operations around Adrianople until the fourth week of August, but the Serbs, Greeks and Rumanians began conversations with the Bulgars in Bucharest on July 30 and on August 10 the four Balkan states signed a peace treaty. By the Treaty of Bucharest the whole of the central Vardar valley in Macedonia went to Serbia and most of the Aegean coast to Greece. Rumania gained three towns south of the Danube (Silistra, Tutrakan and Balchik) and the fertile agricultural region known as the southern Dobruja. The Bulgars retained the line of the Rhodope mountains and a section of the Aegean coast some 80 miles long and including the second-rate harbour of Dedeagach (which is now known by its Greek name of Alexandroupolis). For these insignificant gains the Bulgarian army had lost 55,000 men killed and sustained 105,000 other casualties. Nor was this the final settlement for Bulgaria. On September 30, 1913 a treaty was signed in Constantinople between Bulgaria and Turkey which modified the peace terms agreed in London only four months previously. The unfortunate Bulgars formally retroceded to the Turks the city of Adrianople and a stretch of the Black Sea coast north of Midye, 25 miles long. It seemed inconceivable to the Bulgars that these hated treaties of Bucharest and Constantinople should be accepted as a definitive settlement of Balkan
affairs.
Boundless self-confidence The general effect of the Balkan Wars may be clearly seen on the map. Turkey ceded 55,000 square miles of the Sultan's empire in Europe, territories almost as large as England and Wales. The area of Serbia was increased by 82% and of Greece by 68%. Even Montenegro was enlarged by 62% although as the kingdom was so small this involved a transfer of little more than 2,000 square miles, most of it in the corridor which had separated Montenegro from Serbia. Bulgaria, on the other hand, acquired only 12,500 square miles of new territories and lost 2,800 square miles to Rumania. Moreover, much of the land added to Bulgaria was barren and sparsely populated, with only about 400,000 inhabitants. By contrast, the Southern Dobruja which Bulgaria handed over to Rumania had a population of 286,000 although it was so much smaller in size. 60
These geographical and demographic statistics give no impression of the real significance of the Balkan Wars for Eastern Europe. Their victories brought almost boundless national selfconfidence to the peoples of Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. In Athens the prime minister was Eleutherios Venizelos, once a Cretan revolutionary. When he was a student in the early 1880's Venizelos had decorated the wall of his study with a map on which he had drawn the boundaries of a 'Greater Greece' extending not only over the lands newly acquired in Thrace and Macedonia and Epirus but including segments of Asia Minor and Constantinople as well. To many in Greece this vision now seemed attainable. And in Belgrade Venizelos's Serbian counterpart,
was even more explicit. 'The first round is won: now we must prepare for the second round, against Austria,' he declared. Pasic,
In the predominantly Southern Slav populated areas of AustriaHungary —in Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia as well as in BosniaHerzegovina— the Serbian victories encouraged the younger generation to look to Belgrade for future liberation. The Bucharest Settlement was not so much an end as a beginning. The Wars also brought increased influence to the military leaders over political questions among both the victors and the vanquished. Pasic, as prime minister of Serbia, knew that his country was exhausted by the Balkan campaigns: the 'second round' would require long preparation. But the younger officers in the Serbian army knew no such inner restraints and there was a strong possibility of a military coup in Belgrade during the spring and summer of 1914. In Constantinople the Young Turks looked for salvation to their 'little Napoleon', Enver Pasha, who was so enthusiastically pro-German that he even wore his black moustache in upturned points in emulation of Kaiser Wilhelm. A German military mission was requested from Berlin to undertake reorganisation of the Turkish army after the Balkan and Libyan humiliations. In the last year of general European peace German influence in Turkey increased rapidly and the Turks handed over more and more of their administration to German experts, both in civil and military matters. In Sofia, too, the Bulgarian General Staff urged King Ferdinand to secure a powerful ally. Bulgarian policy throughout 1913 and 1914 showed a devastatingly simple singleness of purpose: Bulgaria would side with any European Great Power able to help her tear up the Treaty of Bucharest and secure the prizes of which she felt herself robbed in Macedonia. There was little doubt where she would look for such support. In the autumn of 1913 Ferdinand and his prime minister visited Vienna and discussed future military collaboration with the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. At the same time, significantly, Bulgaria rejected the offer of a loan from France and accepted a proposal from German bankers. Conversely, Serbia negotiated a loan of 250 million francs from France in January 1914 and arranged for the purchase of war materials from Russia. All over south-eastern Europe the pieces were falling into place almost as if there had been a regular pattern reflecting the general balance of power on the continent. Hence when an assassination in the most cosmopolitan of Balkan cities precipitated the First World War, each of the Balkan states saw it in essence as a continuation of the contest of 1912/13, transferred to a larger arena. It was a viewpoint of which there was little understanding— and even less sympathy — in London or in Paris, or in any of Europe's major capitals.
Further Reading Crawfurd-Price, W. H., The Balkan Cockpit, 1914 (T. W. Laurie, 1915) Helmreich, E. C, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912/13 (Oxford University Press, 1937) C. A. and Palmer, A. W., Independent Eastern Europe (Macmillan, 1962) Stavrianos, L. S. The Balkans Since 1453 (Rinehart, New York, 1958) Vacalopoulos, A. P., A History of Thessaloniki (Institute for Balkan Studies. Salonika, 1963) Weber, F. G Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria and the diplomacy of the Turkish alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1970)
Macartney
,
ALAN PALMER was educated Oxford.
He served
in
at Bancroft's
the Royal
Navy
at the
School
end
in
Essex and Oriel College, Second World War and
of the
a schoolmaster when he finished at Oxford. His chief historical interests south-eastern Europe. He is the author of The Gardeners of Salonika, an account of the Macedonian Campaign of 1915-18, and he is co-author (with C. A. Macartney) of Independent Eastern Europe. The Lands Between was published in 1970: it is a history of East-Central Europe from 1812 to 1968. Alan Palmer compiled the Penguin Dictionary of Modern History, 1789-1945 and has written a study of the 1812 campaign, Napoleon in Russia. He has written a
became
are
in
biography
of Metternich.
In an atmosphere of deliberately fabricated calm Kaiser Wilhelm, Emperor Franz Josef and many of their officials continued their summer vacations after Sarajevo.
ImanuelGeiss
But military advisers urged immediate mobilisation, and with much hesitation, dissent, and last minute misgivings in government circles, the fateful course of events slowly unfolded.
The Serbs must be disposed of, and that right soon!'
Bethmann-Hollweg, the
German
Chancellor,
tried persistentlyto
ensure that Germany would not appear as the first aggressor
The shots that killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo on June 28. 1914 did not automatically unleash the First World War. True enough, there were plenty of tensions between the Great Powers in 1914. Many people were accustomed to talk rather glibly about the inevitability of a war, and many historians have followed them since. Yet there was nothing automatic about the development of events from Sarajevo to the outbreak of war, at least, not until a certain point of no return had been reached. Given the will of all the powers concerned to find a peaceful solution in July 1914, this might have been possible at any time until July 29. Then Austria, under German pressure, prematurely opened hostilities against Serbia by shelling Belgrade, thus provoking Russian general mobilisation. It was the bombardment of Belgrade — mild compared with what the world has seen since— that started the famous mechanism of mobilisations and railway timetables which is often taken as an excuse for not troubling to find out what really had happened in July 1914, before this deadly mechanism had set in. The Austro-Hungarian decision to settle their differences with Serbia by war was the step that set in train the procedures of mobilisation, which once started could not be stopped. How was this fatal decision reached? Most outspoken of the war party in Vienna was Baron Conrad von Hbtzendorf, the Austro-Hungarian Chief of General Staff. His sympathies were with the German aristocracy, the middleclasses in Austria and the Magyar aristocracy in Hungary, who felt threatened by the rising tide of Slav nationalism and democracy. He represented a section of the ruling circles in Austria-Hungary who chose to stake everything on a preventive war — Germany against Russia, Austria against Serbia — to solve all their domestic troubles.
The golden opportunity seemed to present itself in June 1914 with the outrage at Sarajevo. Yet, the immediate reaction in Austria and Germany was confusion. It took some days before a clear political decision crystallized. In Vienna, Conrad at once wanted to seize the chance and make war against Serbia as soon as possible, and he was supported by the clamour of the German press in Austria and by leading members of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Minister Count Berchtold, however, hesitated to go as far as that. The Austrian Prime Minister, Count Sturgkh, preferred to wait for the results of the official investigations at Sarajevo. Emperor Franz Josef took the same view and was not sure whether Germany would support Austria-Hungary against Russia in case of war. Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, was even more outspoken on that point and actually feared Russian intervention and German neutrality. Even the bellicose Conrad admitted the force of the argument and was prepared to make the Austrian decision dependent on the position that Germany, the more powerful ally, would adopt. To clear this point, the Austrians despatched Count Hoyos, Berchtold's principal aide in the Foreign Ministry, in all haste to Berlin, where he arrived on July 5, armed with a weighty memorandum on the Balkan problem and a covering letter from Franz Josef to the German Kaiser. Hoyos was to find out what the Germans would do after Sarajevo. Thus the ultimate decision was squarely placed in Berlin. It also took some time before the ruling group in Germany made up their minds after Sarajevo. Now, when the chances for an early showdown seemed to be as good as at any time before, the political leaders seemed to hesitate because they saw clearly the likely outcome — world war. From the start the German Foreign Ministry 62
counselled moderation to both Austria and Serbia, perhaps without clear instructions from the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. German diplomacy was thus in accordance with the reaction in the capitals of the other Great Powers. Sarajevo was seen as a grave incident, but not one which could or should lead to war if AustriaHungary and Serbia acted reasonably. The German general staff, on the other hand, immediately resumed its pressure for a preventive war against Russia. General von Moltke, drinking the waters of Karlsbad, did not even trouble to return to Berlin. His deputy, General von Waldersee, gave the impression to at least one competent observer, the Saxon Military Plenipotentiary in Berlin, 'that they would regard it with favour if war were to come about now', because 'conditions and prospects would never become better' for Germany. On July 3, the prevailing impression in Berlin was still that the Kaiser was in favour of maintaining peace.
Warlord or Peacemaker? The views of his political and
military advisers conflicted, and the final decision thus lay with the Kaiser. In the past, Wilhelm II
had wavered between his ambition to fulfill his official title of Supreme Warlord (Oberster Kriegsherr) of the German Empire, and to play the role of the Kaiser of Peace (Friedenskaiser). Similarly, in the last few years he had oscillated between encouraging and restraining Austrian attitudes towards Serbia. After Sarajevo, however, he was incensed and thought that Austria had to act now if she still wanted to be taken seriously as a great power. When he read the report of the German Ambassador in Vienna, Tschirschky, which reflected the prevailing mood of moderation and restraint of the German Foreign Ministry, the Kaiser angrily minuted, 'Now or never!', and 'The Serbs must be disposed of, and that right soon!'. This happened on July 4. One day later Hoyos arrived from Vienna on his special mission to Berlin and handed over his documents to the 73-year-old Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Count Szogyeny. The documents as such did not plead for war, at least not directly and openly. But Hoyos, who belonged to the war party in Vienna, may have given them a warlike twist in conversation. Szogyeny, a Magyar aristocrat like Hoyos, apparently seized upon the more bellicose interpretation. In any case, during the special audience accorded to him by the Kaiser on July
'Action against Serbia
Istvan Tisza,
Hungarian Prime Minister, wasfirmly opposed to war
and was apparently worried by Russia's rearmament and by the and Russia seemed to be on the verge of concluding some naval agreement. On July 7, the Chancellor told Riezler: 'An action against Serbia can lead to world war.' The following day he outlined the objectives sought by such 'action': 'If there is no war, if the Tsar does not want war or if France, frightened by the prospect, pleads for peace, we have at least the chance to divide the Entente by our fact that Britain
action.' In other words,
when taking
his 'leap into the dark', as
Bethmann-Hollweg seems to have aimed at a continental war against Russia and France in the first place, and a local war against Serbia with the breaking up of the Entente he himself called
it,
only in the second place.
Harsh conditions The German decision
New Palace at Potsdam, Szogyeny seems to have pressed warlike solution, perhaps by stressing the seriousness of the situation. Before lunch, the Kaiser hesistated to commit himself. When lunch was over the Austro-Hungarian ambassador pressed his point again. This time the Kaiser gave the assurances desired by the war-party in Vienna: Austria should act as quickly and energetically as possible and she could fully count on Germany's support, if Russia were to intervene. The Kaiser's only reservation was that his Chancellor had to approve the imperial commitment. This was not difficult. In the afternoon, the Kaiser's chief political and military advisers, who were at hand on that sunny summer Sunday afternoon, were hastily summoned to the New Palace at Potsdam. The Chancellor nodded approval when his imperial master told him what he had told the Austrian ambassador a few hours ago. Germany's top leaders then thought, as General von Plessen, the Kaiser's principal aide-de-camp, noted in his diary, 'that the sooner the Austrians make their move against Serbia the better, and that the Russians — though friends of Serbia — will not join in after all.' The following day, the Chancellor repeated the German commitment in a conversation with Szogyeny. Bethmann-Hollweg also considered 'immediate action' by Austria 'as the best solution' of Austrian difficulties in the Balkans. What quickly became known as the German blanc checque, issued by the Kaiser, was duly endorsed by the proper constitutional authority, the Chancellor. In fact, the alleged blanc checque was more than the name suggests, because the Germans did not merely give complete freedom of action to the Austrians, but they prescribed to their ally the course of action to be taken — speedy war against Serbia at any cost. Berlin thus threw in its weight in favour of the war party in Vienna. Germany's leaders were fully aware of the probable consequences of their action. They cannot have forgotten earlier calculations that an Austrian war against Serbia would mean war against Russia, and might well mean a world war. The last time they had said so themselves was only a few days before, immediately after Sarajevo. A more recent source, Kurt Reizler's diaries, allows us a glimpse into the reasoning of the German Chancellor. Bethmann-Hollweg did not take the decision lightly 5,
in the
for a
64
of July 5 and 6 had an immediate and telling effect on the Austrians. Berchtold swung round in favour of Conrad's bellicose line. His colleagues in the Cabinet followed suit, so did Emperor Franz Josef. For a week, Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, held out in opposition against the idea of war against Serbia, not out of love for the Serbs, but because he felt that even without a victory over Serbia, Austria-Hungary already had enough South Slavs in her territories. On July 7, a great debate took place between Berchtold and Tisza in the Council of Ministers in Vienna. Tisza warned against war without declaration, which apparently Hoyos had pressed for in Berlin. Instead,
Tisza suggested confronting Serbia with harsh but acceptable conditions. Only if they were refused, should Austria mobilise and declare war. Against Tisza's opposition Berchtold's view prevailed: war against Serbia, but diplomatically prepared by an ultimatum which was to be made unacceptable beforehand. Berlin was informed of Austria's decision through the normal diplomatic channels, which also ensured the necessary co-ordination of German and Austrian diplomacy. The decision for war and Austrian preparations for the ultimatum were veiled behind ostentatious indulgence in summer vacations. The Chancellor urged the Kaiser not to forgo his traditional summer cruise to Norwegian waters. The Kaiser took the advice, but not without having made sure that his army and fleet were ready for any contingency. Moltke stayed at Karlsbad, only to return to Berlin on July 25. After representations from Jagow, Secretary of State for the German Foreign Ministry, Moltke's deputy General Waldersee, went on leave, while keeping a careful eye on the military preparations of the German army, and on political events. Bethmann-Hollweg scuttled between his country estate Hohenfinow and the capital but always within easy reach of Berlin. His deputy, Vice-Chancellor Delbriick, was allowed to stay on his summer vacations, but was re-called to Berlin on July 23. Secretary of State for the Navy, Admiral Tirpitz, stayed on his summer leave during the whole crisis. The Prussian Minister of War, General von Falkenhayn, who had taken part in the momentous talks of July 5 and 6 at Potsdam, went on leave on July 7, only to return on
July 25. The Austrians adopted the same technique. Berchtold asked his top generals to go on leave on July 8 — Conrad, Chief-of-Staff and General Krobatin, the Minister of War. Both returned to their posts in Vienna on July 22. The Austrian Emperor enjoyed his customary summer vacation in Tyrol. On the other hand, all those who counted in the days of diplomatic crisis, ministers of Foreign Affairs and ambassadors, remained at their posts.
.
.
can lead to world war'
Count
Stiirgkh,
Austrian Prime Minister, advised caution
The European powers were indeed misled by this camouflage. The British and Russian Ambassadors in Berlin took their summer vacations. The Russian Ambassador even left Vienna on July 21, after the Austrians had assured him that they would not make any demands that could lead to international complications. The French President Poincare and his Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Viviani, did not cancel their State visit to Russia and the Scandinavian countries in the second half of July. Thus France was partly paralysed in the decisive days of the crisis. This only underlines one important observation: the Entente Powers had to wait, in any case, to see what the Central Powers would do after Sarajevo. They could only react to whatever action the
Central Powers were to take. Obviously, Austrian preparations would take some time. The necessary delay gave rise to doubts in Berlin, as to whether the Austrians seriously intended to go to war. Privately, the Germans aired their misgivings at the lack of energy Austria displayed, while they took every opportunity to urge upon the Austrians the need for the greatest speed. From one German document the true motive of German haste is clear. The Germans feared the Austrians might give Serbia the chance to meet Austrian demands on their own initiative, thus making an attack on Serbia superfluous, the last thing Germany wanted at this stage. Germany wanted at least a local war between Austria and Serbia. As early as July 7 the Foreign Ministry drafted its first instruction to a German ambassador to this effect. The German Ambassador to London, Prince Lichnowsky, was given the difficult task of influencing the British press in advance, 'but to avoid everything that could create the impression, that we incited the Austrians to go to war'. The task was impossible because this was exactly what German policy was doing in the following weeks.
An intolerable delay On the other hand, Berlin was happy about any sign of firm resolve on the part of the Austrians. Berlin raised no objections to the Austrian decision to put an unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia; nor to some of the harsher terms of the ultimatum. Neither did they object to the first military preparations against Serbia, among them the shelling of Belgrade by Austrian artillery. German fears about Austrian weakness were only too well founded. The Austrians had waited to make their decision until the German declaration of July 5. Even then they were not very confident about it and they moved very slowly. On July 14, they fixed the date for delivering the ultimatum as July 25 in order to await the end of the French State visit to Russia and the conclusion of harvesting. Only three days later, on July 17, they decided to deliver the ultimatum on July 23, apparently to please the Germans. But even then the Germans feared their reluctant ally might
still find a chance to back out. According to Austrian intentions, mobilisation would begin only after the rupture of diplomatic relations with Serbia, while the declaration of war and opening of hostilities were to take place after the deployment of troops was finished. Since Austrian mobilisation would take 16 days war
against Serbia would have begun only by about August 10. The Wilhelmstrasse deemed such a delay absolutely intolerable because it might have given the other powers a chance to intervene diplomatically. It reacted accordingly as soon as it learned of the Austrian intentions on July 24. Meanwhile, the Austrians had given the last touch to their ultimatum. When Szogyeny showed it to Jagow on the evening of
German Secretary of State assured Szogyeny: German Government is naturally in agreement with the
July 22, the
of the Note'.
'that the
contents
The other powers, however, were taken back.
Sir British Foreign Minister, described the ultimatum to Serbia as 'the most formidable document that was ever addressed from one State to another'. He immediately launched a series of proposals of mediation between Vienna and Belgrade. They all came to nothing because Berlin insisted that if there were any mediation, then it had to be between Vienna and St Petersburg. Grey was supported by the French and the Russians. The acting French Foreign Minister, Bienvenu-Martin, put the whole issue very clearly on July 27, when he remarked to the German Ambassador in Paris, Baron Schoen, that the best way to avoid a major war was to prevent the local war against Serbia. This formula neatly sums up the position of the Entente Powers, and it was only when they saw that the local war could no longer be avoided that they lost all hope in mediation. At the same time, Russia made it clear that she would not be indifferent to the fate of Serbia. While they did not object to Austrian demands within the limits of international law, the Russians were not prepared to have Serbia unduly humiliated. They advised the Serbs to be accommodating and suggested that in the case of an Austrian attack the Serbs should withdraw their troops and appeal to the Powers for redress. On the other hand, Russia decided to prepare mobilisation beforehand and to mobilise if the Austrians were to invade Serbia. On July 25 Austria broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia. At the same time, partial mobilisation
Edward Grey, the
against Serbia was ordered in Austria-Hungary. War, according Austrian plan, could thus begin on August 10. On July 24, the German Foreign Ministry had learned of the leisurely Austrian schedule, much to their dismay. The following day, Jagow told Szogyeny that the German government expected 'that if Serbia gives an unsatisfactory answer, our declaration of war, and war operations, will follow immediately. Here every delay in the beginning of war operations is regarded as signifying the danger that foreign powers might interfere. We are urgently advised to proceed without delay and to place before the world a fait accompli.' While the German government thus urged their Austrian ally to the
65
Far
Edward Goschen, Ambassadorto Berlin
left: Sir
British
Right: Sir
Edward Grey,
British Foreign Minister, pleaded for a peaceful
Centre left: Prince Lichnowsky,
German Ambassador to London
solution
Bienvenue, acting French Foreign Minister during theJuly crisis Below left: The French state visit to Russia went ahead despite Left: Martin
the assassination at Sarajevo. President Poincare (left) with Tsar Nicholas II
open actual warfare as soon as possible, Jagow justified his stubborn refusal to pass on British proposals of mediation by pretending to fear the Austrians might rush things and confront the world with a fait accompli in response to German pressure to consider to
mediation.
The Austrian fait accompli German pressure on Vienna was
immediately
successful.
to declare
The
war on Serbia
at once, Berchtold, Ambassador, Tschirschky,
following
day,
vigorously supported by the German adopted the German idea. Conrad, however, was far from happy about the new turn. He would have preferred to keep to the original time-table but he gave in reluctantly. On July 27 the Austrian government took the final decision to declare war on Serbia the following day, 12 days earlier than planned. After Jagow had achieved one of his short-term aims, he told the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, on July 29, half reproachingly, half ruefully, that now the very thing had happened that he had always warned against — Austria had reacted violently to suggestions of mediation and had confronted the world with a fait accompli. On the same day, July 29, the Austrians, again in agreement with Berlin, continued to escalate the crisis into open war by shelling Belgrade — with devastating effect in St Petersburg. Meanwhile Berlin had aggravated the crisis by two more steps. On July 27 Jagow had assured the British and French that Germany would not mobilise so long as Russia mobilised only against Austria. Two days later, the German Foreign Ministry received a lengthy memorandum from Moltke which amounted to a demand for immediate German mobilisation even as an answer to Russian partial mobilisation. The second point was just as serious because the government defeated the only initiative coming from Germany which might have had a beneficial effect. This time the initiative had come from the Kaiser himself. He had arrived at Potsdam on July 27, having broken off his sailing holiday in Norway on July 25. He was horrified by the threat of war now it was drawing nearer. In particular, he was impressed by the first intimation that Britain might join her allies. Yet he took the compliant answer from Serbia to the Austrian ultimatum as the face-saving plank for beating a diplomatic retreat. On the morning of July 28, all his warlike sentiments had gone for a while and he minuted the Serbian answer: 'A brilliant achievement in a time-limit of only 48 hours! It is more than one could have expected! A great moral success for Vienna; but with it all reason for war is gone and Giesl ought to have quietly stayed on in Belgrade! After that I should never have ordered mobilisation.' The Kaiser immediately ordered his government to tell the Austrians they should accept the Serbian answer in principle, while negotiating on the points not fully conceded by Belgrade. Somewhat in contradiction to this premise, he suggested Austria should content herself with occupying Belgrade as a safeguard for the implementation of Serbian concessions. The Chancellor and the Foreign Ministry did not obey their Sovereign this time. The Chancellor did not despatch the relevant instructions to Tschirschky until the evening of July 28 when he knew that Austria had already declared war on Serbia. To make matters worse, Bethmann-Hollweg falsified the Kaiser's argument by omitting the crucial sentence that war was no longer necessary and by distorting the Kaiser's other points to fit his own policy of intransigence.
On July 29, the Kaiser held another kind of unofficial Crown Council at Potsdam. From very meagre sources we know the discussion seems to have centred around the question whether Germany should mobilise before Russian general mobilisation or not. By July 26, the Chancellor had mapped out his strategy for the next week which was to put the whole blame for world war on Russia in order to keep Britain out if possible, and to bring the German Socialists into the war. This is why he resisted the pressure of his generals to bring about immediate German mobilisation. Bethmann-Hollweg wanted Russia to mobilise first against Germany because, as he put it, he could not pursue military and political actions at the same time. On July 29 the German generals appreciated Bethmann-Hollweg's point and agreed, although chafing at the delay. It was in this situation that Bethmann-Hollweg risked his most daring move — the bid for British neutrality, because in explaining himself he had to give away his next plans. Now Belgium entered the scene. On July 26 Moltke had drafted a German ultimatum to Belgium which the Foreign Ministry sent to Brussels on July 29, with minor modifications, and with instructions to the German minister to hand it to the Belgian government only after, new instructions. The violation of Belgian neutrality made necessary by the Schlieffen Plan, made it vital for Germany to secure at least British acquiescence. In the evening of July 29, after his return from the Potsdam talks, the Chancellor summoned the British Ambassador and asked for British neutrality in return for the promise that Germany would not annex French or Belgian territory on the continent, reserving a free hand for colonies.
A scathing reply of the British Foreign Office was scathing, but an answer was no longer needed because after Sir Edward Goschen had left the Chancellor, a telegram arrived from London. In it Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, reported Grey's warning that Britain would not remain neutral in a war between Germany and France. Bethmann-Hollweg, badly shaken, now desperately sought to save the situation by urging Vienna to come to some terms with St Petersburg, hoping to secure British neutrality after all, by shifting more energetically than ever the
The reaction official
67
blame for a continental war onto Russia. At the same time he wanted to persuade the German public to support his policy by demonstrating his peaceful intentions. Yet the Chancellor did not want to put an end to the local war against Serbia but only to improve Germany's position in a major conflict. Russian mobilisation now became the Chancellor's obsession. Russia's partial mobilisation of July 28 had already alarmed the German general staff. The news of the shelling of Belgrade convinced the Russian generals that war with Austria and Germany was imminent. They successfully pressed the Tsar for Russian general mobilisation on July 29, as Russian mobilisation was notoriously slower than German or Austrian. After receiving a telegram from Wilhelm II appealing to Nicholas II not to mobilise against Germany, the Tsar ordered a halt to general mobilisation and a return to partial mobilisation. The next afternoon the generals and Foreign Minister Sazonov renewed their pressure on the Tsar. Nicholas gave way. Russian general mobilisation was ordered for a second time on July 30, at 6 pm. While the Russian generals definitely carried their point on July 30, their German counter-parts became impatient as well. In the evening they told the Chancellor he had to make up his mind on German mobilisation immediately. The Chancellor, still waiting for news that Russia had mobilised against Germany first, won a last delay until noon next day. But his options were clearly spent. During the morning of July 31 the Germans waited for the news of Russian general mobilisation. At 11.55 am, just before the self-imposed dead-line, the long-awaited telegram from St Petersburg arrived. At 1 pm a state of imminent war was proclaimed in Germany, the phase of military preparations which automatically preceded German mobilisation (which was always a general one). While an ultimatum was sent to Paris and St Petersburg, the Foreign Ministry prepared the respective declarations of war the same afternoon. War had become inevitable because German
Luxembourg and Belgium. From now on the famous mechanism of mobilisation alone
meant immediate
hostilities against
mobilisations and counter-mobilisations set in. On August 1, at 5 pm, Germany ordered formal general mobilisation, five minutes before France did the same. Last-minute illusions, such that Britain might stay neutral if Germany were to refrain from attacking France, came to nothing. France, while not willing to forsake her Russian ally under German pressure, tried desperately to secure British assistance which seemed far from being certain at the moment. The Russians, the French and Sir
Eyre Crowe in the British Foreign Office urged Grey to make Britain's position clear. It was only under the pressure of events — the German declaration of war on Russia on August 1 and on ,
France two days later— that Grey gradually committed himself, because he knew that the country and the Liberal Party were not united on the issue of war. The German invasion of Belgium, on August 4, removed his last hesitations. The same day Britain sent an ultimatum to Berlin demanding the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Belgium. When Germany refused, Britain entered the war against Germany automatically, after the timelimit of the ultimatum had expired, at 11 pm Greenwich time or
midnight German time.
Further Reading L, The Origins of the War of 1914 (Oxford University Press, 1967) Fay, S. B., The Origins of the World War (Collier-Mac, 1967) Fischer, Fritz, Germany's Aims in the First World War (Chatto & Windus,
Albertini,
1967) Geiss,
I.,
July
1914.
The
Outbreak of the
First
World
War
(Batsford
1967)
Kantorowicz,
H.,
Gutachten zur Kriegsschuldfrage 1914 ed.
I.
Geiss
(Frankfurt, 1967) Lafore, L, The Long
Fuse (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966) The Last Days of Imperial Vienna (New York: Dial Press 1976) Renouvin, P., Les Origines Immediates de la Guerre (Paris, 1925) Ritter, G., The Schlieffen Plan (Riband, 1966) Ritter, G., Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des 'Militarismus' in Deutschland (Munich 1954-67) Schmitt, B. E., Origins of the First World War (Historical Association Pick, R.,
1958) Taylor, A. J. P., The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (Clarendon Press, 1965)
IMANUEL GEISS was born on February 9, 1931 in Franfurt/Main. He was educated at the Universities of Mainz (Interpreters' Institute of Germersheim), Munich and Hamburg. From 1948-60 he was a student and collaborator of Professor Fritz Fischer in Hamburg and from 1960-64 was engaged upon research work for the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation at Bonn. He was Research Fellow of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft between 1964-68 and during Member of St Antony's College, Oxford. He is Senior Lecturer at the Department of History, Hamburg University and was visiting lecturer at the Department of History, Tel Aviv University, spring term 1969. His main publications include: Der polnische Grenzstreifen 1914-18, Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Kriegszielpolitik im Ersten Weitkrieg and Julikrise und Kreigsausbruch 1914. that period (1965/66) Senior
Vor 6ott und dcr 6efcbicbte
6c wiflcn
ift
rein:
mcin Ich babe
den Kricg nicbt ofcwollt.
Two views of the
Kaiser. Above: A German postcard of the Kaiser's peaceful intentions. Before God and History my conscience is clear: never wanted the war.' Below left: An Italian caricature of the Kaiser as many saw him, aggressive and ambitious I
Below: A run on a savings bank in Berlin on August 1 was only one expression of public hysteria. Embassy windows were broken and foreigners attacked
Aircraft: Below: A modern reconstruction of atypical 1910 aircraft of the wire a Bristol Box-kite
and canvas era-
In August 1914, the military use of aircraft was very much in its infancy, and only a few far-sighted men realised its potential.
The majority of military or naval leaders controlling military aviation in most countries
barely understood the new arm, intending basically to use it as third dimensional cavalry to carry out reconnaissance missions or to spot for the artillery.
a new factor in war
Here Air-Marshal Sir Robert Saundby details the growth of the new arm, from the days of ballooning to the first primitive bombings and reconnaissances.
During the First World War no one spoke or wrote of 'Air Power'. The phrase had not yet been invented and, with minor exceptions, aircraft were still regarded as ancillary weapons. It was their task to help navies and armies to gain their ends. Until the foundation of the Royal Air Force in April 1918 practically all operational sorties were employed in some form of naval or army co-operation, and even by the end of the war the proportion of co-
ventions.
It
is
true that the extremely
rigid conventions of earlier warfare
had
been largely destroyed by Napoleon, with his levee en masse, but they had been replaced by new formalities. Armies still thought in terms of lines, fortifications and cavalry charges, and navies of long-range bombardment between lines of battleships. Italy was first in the field of military aeronautics. An Army Aeronautical Section was formed as early as 1884, and balloons were used for reconnaissance during the Eritrean War of 1887-88. Five aeroplanes and two small airships took part in the army manoeuvres in Libya in 1911, with some degree of success. Towards the end of that year war broke out between
operation to other types of sortie was still about 19 to 1. In these circumstances the belief grew up, and was strongly held by the armies and navies of all countries for very many years to come, that aircraft were of value only in so far as they could directly support and participate in naval and military operations. Although the Wright brothers successfully flew a heavier than air aircraft in December 1903, balloons of various kinds had existed since de Rozier and d'Arlandes had made a successful flight at Annonay in a hot-air balloon in November 1783, and as early as 1901 the Brazilian engineer Santos-Dumont had developed a successful dirigible airship. But navies and armies the world over were very slow to see the war potential of aircraft, and generally took little interest in them. For a long time aviation had mainly peaceful uses, and even its first military applications were inoffensive and ancillary. Balloons were used during the siege of Paris in 1870 to carry messages and, on occasions, people in and out of the beleaguered city. The British, during the Boer War of 1899-1902, used man-lifting kites in order to see 'the other
Turkey and
Italy, and on October 23, 1911 Captain Piazza, who bore the imposing
title of
off for
'Commander
the
first
of the Air Fleet', took flight. He flew over
wartime
the Turkish troops, causing consternation in their ranks. On November 1 a further remarkable development occurred when Lieutenant Cavotti dropped four bombs on
enemy
These bombs were apgrenades modified Swedish parently weighing two kilograms each (4.4 pounds). During the next few days several more of these small bombs were dropped, and it was not long before the Turks protested that the Italian aircraft had bombed a targets.
military hospital at Ain Zara. Independent inquiries could not establish the existence of a hospital at that place, though it is possible that some tents were used as a casualty clearing centre. The Italians pointed out that their warships had bombarded the camp at Ain Zara a few days previously with 152 heavy shells without drawing any protest from the Turks. There followed a prolonged discussion in the Italian, Turkish and neutral Press about the ethics of air bombardment — the first example of a long series of such controversies which has continued ever since. It is significant that the very first use of a few tiny aerial bombs resulted in a protest, suggesting that they were far more devastating and inhumane than a large number of heavy shells fired by naval guns. By this time many other countries had formed small naval and military aviation corps. In the USA, on August 1, 1907 the Signals Corps established an Aeronautical Division, responsible for 'balloons, air
machines, and kindred subjects'. At
first
the division possessed only balloons, but in 1908 it acquired a small dirigible airship. In August 1909 the first aeroplane was delivered to the US Army, but it was 18 months before it received another, lent to it by the generosity of Mr Robert F. Collier. In December 1913 an Aviation
side of thehill'. It seems likely that one of the curbs on the development of aviation was the fear of its misuse by the evilly-disposed. Francesco de Lana, a Jesuit monk who lived during the latter part of the 17th Century, gave a warning that an airship might be able to cause 'a -ship to capsize by flinging down pieces of iron, kill the crew and set the ship ablaze with artificial fire, with bullets and with bombs. Not only ships, but also houses, castles, and towns might be served in this
way, without risk to those who cast down such objects from immeasurable heights'. And in Rasselas the great Dr Johnson wrote that the security of the good would be gravely imperilled if the wicked were able to attack them from the air at will. It must also be remembered that in the years before the First World War the conduct of warfare was still shackled by con-
,..
of what air warfare would be like. With surprising candour unmistakably identified as France, and German aircraft are seen attacking the Tower. Few prewar tacticians dreamt of using aircraft as daringly as this
An imaginative prewar German view the
enemy
Eiffel
is
71
School was set up at North Island, San Diego, but progress was still very slow, and at the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 the Army Air Arm had only 20 aeroplanes on its strength. The Naval Air Arm was almost non-existent.
'Good sport— but useless' In France there were many enthusiastic junior officers, but the navy and army chiefs were apathetic. By 1914 the army possessed an air arm, but so little thought had been given to the military uses of aviation that it would seem that the authorities had not grasped the importance of applied flying as distinct from pure flying. It is said that General Foch, an unusually progressive and open-minded man who had commanded the Ecole Superieure de la Guerre, remarked that 'Aviation is good sport, but for the army it is useless'.
The Germans had
set
up naval and
mili-
tary corps of aviation, but seemed equally uncertain as to their use. The Army Air Service was placed under the InspectorGeneral of Military Transport, suggesting that aeroplanes were mainly regarded as a means of conveyance. The German Naval Air Service, however, concentrated from an early date on large rigid airships. The first Zeppelin did its trial flights in 1900, but it was not until 1906 that a second ship was built to government orders. By 1914, the Germans possessed a considerable number of large airships, whose long range and great lifting power put them, in those days, in a class by themselves. As, however, their envelopes were filled with hydrogen gas, they were very vulnerable to antiaircraft shells and incendiary bullets fired
A Based on the design for the 1914 Britain' race, the military
Round
Sopwith 'Folder'
was typical of civilian machines adapted by the armed forces
V The Sopwith Tabloid made
from
appearance in 1913 as a sporting biplane. Apart from very clean design, especially in the cowling of the rotary engine, it was remarkable in the placing of the two occupants side by side its first
its
aircraft.
In Britain, it was not until 1911 that the first step was taken by forming the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers. This had one company of aeroplanes, one of small airships, one of balloons and one of man-lifting kites. Before the formation of this unit a number of enthusiastic young naval and army officers had learned to fly at their own expense, and when in 1912 the Royal Flying Corps was formed, they were naturally drawn into it. The RFC was a joint service, with Naval and Military Wings designed to meet the needs of both services. A Central Flying School was set up at Upavon on Salisbury Plain, staffed by officers and men seconded from the army and the navy. The Commandant was Captain Godfrey Paine, RN, and the second-incommand and chief instructor was Major H. M. Trenchard of the Royal Scots Fusiliers.
The Sopwith Gordon Bennett Racer, pressed by the Admiralty on the outbreak of war, was one of the best prewar designs. Very clean, and with a fully cowled 80 hp Gnome rotary engine, it was capable of 105 mph
Unlike most other nations, the British had a clearly defined, though very limited, idea of the task of military aviation. It was to be reconnaissance, pure and simple. The navy hoped that their airships and aeroplanes would be able to search very rapidly great areas of sea, and keep a close eye on the whereabouts of the enemy's main naval forces. Thus they hoped to maintain always a favourable tactical position, and avoid being surprised. The army hoped that aeroplanes would be able to fly over the enemy's rear areas, reporting troop and traffic movements, and the location of depots, dumps, and railheads. The Intelligence Staff, using this and their other sources of information, would be well placed to locate the enemy's main forces and estimate his intentions.
Belgium, Austria and Turkey had very
The Bristol Box-kite was the first British mass-produced aircraft, and its importance lay in its use in the development ot RFC tactics and in training — many military and civilian pilots learning to fly
on
this type.
Blf was in service with the services from before the war well into 1915asafirst line aircraft. In common with other Albatros reconnaissance types, it had an immensely strong fuselage made up of
The Albatros
German
air
The Box-kite is a classic example of the first consistently successful type of aircraft - a heavily-braced, multi-bay pusher biplane with no or a small nacelle, the elevator on the biplane tail being supplemented by a forward
plywood skinning on a basic wooden rectangular framework Despite the exposed engine, it is clear that some thought has been given to streamlining in the design of the relatively pointed nose. Engine. Mercedes 6-cylinder
Despite its low performance and not very good handling characteristics, the Longhorn' served design philosophy, particularly in the forward in a training capacity well into the war, elevator and the complicated structure supporting after starting it as a general duties and reconnaissance aircraft Engine: Renault, the undercarriage and the forward elevator.
The Maurice Farman M.F.7 'Longhorn', although dating from 1913, exemplifies the pre-1910
elevator Engine: Gnome rotary, 50 hp Maximum speed: 40 mph Loaded weight: 900 lbs Span: 33 feet (46 feet 6 inches with top plane extensions). Length: 38 feet 6 inches
in-line,
100 hp.
Maximum speed: 66 mph
Climb:
About 260 feet per minute. Ceiling: 9,840 feet. Endurance. 4 hours. Loaded weight: 2,356 lbs Span: 42 feet Length: 25 feet
70 hp. Speed: 59 mph Ceiling: 13, 123 feet Endurance: 3 hours 30 minutes Weight 1,885 lbs. Span. 51 feet Length 37 feet 2a inches (from leading edge of forward elevator to trailing edge of rudders)
73
In an effort to combine the speed potential of the monoplane with the strength and reconnaissance capabilities of the biplane, the Morane-Saulnier company of France
produced the Type 'L' parasol scouting monoplane, which was so successful that the
German authorities ordered several firms to
74
build copies. This at this time.
was
a not unusual practice
Gnome or Le Rhone Maximum speed: 71 mph. Ceiling:
Engine:
80 hp. 13,100feet. Endurance: 4 hours. Loaded weight: 1 ,499 lbs. Span: 33 feet 9 1/2 nches. rotary,
i
Length: 20 feet 9 inches
_-*
Designed by the first Geoffrey de Havilland and built by the Royal Aircraft Factory, the BE 2a was the basic military aircraft of the RFC at the outbreak of war. It had been ineligible for the 1912 Military Trials on Salisbury Plain, but flying hors concours it had been clearly the best all-round performer
Engine: Renault V-8 in-line watercooled engine, 70 hp. Maximum speed: 70 mph. Climb rate: 9 minutes to 3,000 feet. Ceiling: 10,000 feet. Endurance: 3 hours. Loaded wsight: 1 ,600 lbs. Span: 38 feet 7 /2 inches. Length: 29 feet 9V2 inches 1
the trials, this being reflected in the orders placed for this type but not for the winner of the competition. This particular aircraft was the first RFC machine to land in France. at
The Aviatik B was one of the prototype I
German two-seater reconnaissance aircraft of the First World War. This sort of design — two-bay biplane with an in-line tractor engine and two crew — was common up to the war's end
Below: The Caudron G III, adopted by the French air force as a reconnaissance aircraft, was obsolescent by the beginning of the war and was soon reduced to training duties Below right: The original version of the SE2,
shown
here,
was
built
by the Royal Aircraft factory,
Farnborough, and was a direct descendant of the first aircraft built for the single seat scouting role. It wascapabteof 92mph
76
.
little in the way of military aviation. Belgium was overrun early in the war, and the air needs of Austria and Turkey were met by the Germans, chiefly by means of
passing on aircraft superannuated from the
Western Front.
The Russians, then as now, were highly and unco-operative, and little is known about their military aviation at that time, but it is fairly clear that they had secretive
made much progress. Alone among the belligerent
not
nations, Britain had created a unified air service, with naval and military wings. This sensible organisation did not, however, last long. The British Admiralty decided in July 1914, only some six weeks before the outbreak of the war, to break away and form its own air service. So the Royal Naval Air Service came into being, and the RFC reverted to the status of a corps of the
army.
Thus we see that, in August 1914, the British had the RNAS and the RFC, trained for reconnaissance; the French had air services trained for nothing in particular but which were fairly large by the outbreak of war; the Germans placed their army aircraft under the control of military transport, while their naval air service had the largest and most advanced airships in the world; the United States had made an early start with an Aeronautical Division
of the Signals Corps, but had progressed incredibly slowly;' the Italians had also started early, and at least had some war experience, both of reconnaissance and bombing; while Russia, Austria, Belgium and Turkey had made little or no progress. It is fair to say that, on the outbreak of the war, the military and naval air forces of all countries were new and untried. It is also true that the generals and admirals had for the most part only the vaguest possible idea of the tasks which they expected aircraft to perform. It soon became obvious, however, that aircraft provided great opportunities for reconnaissance
over land and sea, and at
main employment! But
first this was their air reconnaissance
has
its limitations as well as its advantages, and the danger of relying on negative reports was not fully realised. A famous instance of this was the failure of General von Kluck, commander of the German First Army, to keep in touch with and outflank the British Expeditionary Force during the retreat from Mons. He
had
on a report from an aircraft sayroads through the Foret de Mormal were clear of troops. He took this to mean that there were no troops in the area, whereas in fact the forest contained a large British force. The troops, on hearing or seeing the approach of the aircraft, had moved off the roads under the trees, and so relied
ing that
all
was seen. This incident, with did not encourage many senior officers of both services to rely on aircraft to give effective assistance to land or sea operations, and none of them had any faith in the offensive power of aircraft nothing
others,
Further Reading
M
War Planes of the First World War Doubleday 1972) Campbell, C, Aces and aircraft of World War One Bruce. J
(New
,
York:
(Blandford Press 1981) A Aces High: the war
Clark.
,
in the air
over the
Western Front, 1914-1918 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1973) Smith, Myron J., World War One in the air; a bibliography and a chronology (New York: Scarecrow Press 1917)
AIR-MARSHALL SIR ROBERT SAUNDBY KCB, KBE, MC, AFC, BL was born in 1896 and was educated at St Edward's School. He was serving Warwickshire Regiment at the World War and in 1915 was seconded to the Royal Flying Corps, with whom he won the MC for destroying the Zeppelin L-48 in 1917. After the war he continued his career in the RAF in the Air Ministry, at Netheravon and in Aden, where he was awarded the DFC. After his service in Aden he became commander of a Training School in Egypt in 1926. After a spell at the Staff College he served in the Wessex Bomber Area staff, from which he went to the Air Ministry, the RAF Staff College, and back to the Air Ministry, where by 1939 he had become Director of Operational Requirements. He with
the
outbreak
Royal
of the First
became Assistant Chief of the Air Staff in 1940 and in 1941 was promoted to Air Vice-Marshal In 1944 he was knighted and in 1945 was promoted to AirMarshal. In 946 he was invalided out of the Service 1
as a result of a spinal injury sustained in the First World War. He received numerous awards and was a member of the governing bodies of many societies, aeronautical and otherwise. He died in 1971
The BreguetAG4, nicknamed the Whitebait', was an example of the sometimes rather odd designs which were built in fairly large numbers and were developed quite considerably
l„
/ til
»i
•<->; '
BarriePitt
War Plans and
The Great Powers knew with a fair degree of certainty whom they would be fighting in the event of war, and they made their plans accordingly.
Until they received the signal to start, the flaws in these plans and in the men who were to execute them, were obvious only to a few.
Kaiser Wilhelm on manoeuvres in 1913. Of all the war plans the Germans' was the most complete II
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H\ August 5, 1914. Europe was at war, dragged into it by a fatal amalgam of pride -Germany's and fear hunger, hunger for 'her place in the sun', her fear of Russia's strength and France's spirit of revenge for 1870: Britain's fear of Germany's growing naval power, Austria's fear of disintegration; the Hapsburg family pride, France's wounded pride.
But if these were the psychological facwhich had dragged Europe to the edge of the abyss, it still needed an extra force to push her over the edge, for at the last minute practically all the political leaders with the exception of the Austro-Hungarians, glimpsed the horrors ahead and tried to pull back from them. This extra force was supplied by what, without exception, was referred to in each country as tors
'military necessity'.
The military plans of Germany, France and England had in fact only just been agreed and completed, while those of Russia were as ready as they would ever be; Austria relied upon the infinitely more powerful German military machine to protect her from overwhelming danger from Russia, and was confident that her immediate quarry, Serbia, could not withstand even the creaking machinery of the armed forces of the Empire. In the eyes of the High Commands of the European therefore, all was ready. All was necessary was the signal to start — and each command wanted that signal at the earliest possible moment, in order to gain advantage over the opponent. Thus
Powers,
that
the soldiers urged the statesmen to order mobilisation as soon as possible — while the statesmen were at the same time actually warning each other that 'mobilisation will inevitably mean war'.
six
weeks
occasion after a night long staff River Pregel were pointed out to him as it lay under the dawn sun. 'The hills are inadequate for defence,' he replied coldly, 'and the river itself is an unimportant obstacle.' He believed that the best work of the General Staff could be done away from the distractions of the office and ties of routine — on Sundays and during holidays in fact — and in pursuit of this opinion he always gave his Staff especially difficult problems to solve on these occasions. One Christmas an officer on his staff, General von Kohl, wishing to save something of the festivity to enjoy with his family, worked all Christmas eve and completed the problem by the morning. Impressed by such industry, Schlieffen rewarded him by giving him another problem to solve on Christmas Day. Such, then, was the man who, during the closing decade of the 19th Century, analysed the military situation which existed in Europe, and came to the conclusion that the premises upon which Moltke had based his plan no longer applied. Though Schlieffen fully agreed that in theory the most powerful enemy must be struck down first while the other was held off by defensive action, he no longer agreed that it was possible for Russia to be struck down quickly enough for a return of the armies westward in time to prevent invasion of the German Empire by French ride, the beauties of the
German General Staff. He believed that in the event of Germany having to fight a war against Russia and France simultaneously, the bulk of Germany's forces should march east in order to defeat the more powerful foe first. Once victory had been obtained in Russia, then Gerof the
many's intricate railway system would allow a swing of power to the west in order with France, but until then, only a weak army should be employed there, intent on fighting a defensive war, prepared if necessary to retreat slowly, possibly as far as the Rhine. But in 1891, the post of Chief of the General Staff was taken by Graf von Schlieffen, a man whose only distraction
to deal
from military life had been an idyllically happy marriage — but this had ended tragically after four years when he was still only 39 years old. Henceforward his life was dedicated to the army, and as he was possessed of immense industry and considerable mental powers, the army felt the impress of his thought and of his per-
forces.
Three factors contributed to this conclusion. The first was that Russia had built lines of fortresses along the rivers Narew
and Neman, the second was that an army of the size that Russia was expected to deploy would be almost impossible to surround and annihilate — and would thus, at
sonality.
V The Schlieffen Plan of 1905 shows how the conquest of France was to be achieved within
On one
What were these plans for which each High Command was so anxious to obtain an apparently essen&al head start? Far and away the most important one, in view of the events which followed, was the now famous Schlieffen Plan of the German High Command. Ever since the formation of the German Empire by Bismarck, the German General Staff had been haunted by the dread of having to fight a war on two fronts — and even during the time when Bismarck's statesmanship had been sufficient to make such a development unlikely, they had made plans to meet the contingency. Until 1891, the opinion of Moltke the Elder had held undisputed sway in the councils
V Schlieffen planned only defensive action
in
the east until France
was beaten, but the Austrians and Russians had some general plans War
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Austrian Plan
Russian Plan
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Schlieffen Plan for defence
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Russian tempting the German pursuers deeper and deeper into a Napoleonic
best, retreat into the vastness of
space,
third factor was the totally unexpected recovery of France from her defeat in 1870, together with the determined spirit of revenge which animated her national thought. Indeed, to those who wished to cling pedantically to the law which suggested that the most powerful enemy should always be struck down first, Schlieffen could reasonably have argued that there was every reason to suspect that France had now achieved this position. So Schlieffen reversed the previous strategy of the German General Staff, and proposed to attack France at the outbreak of war with seven-eighths of
tragedy.
The
Germany's army, while one-eighth guarded East Prussia and Silesia. During the period immediately following her defeat in 1870, France had endeavoured to guard against a recurrence of her misfortune by building a series of fortresses along her common frontier with Germany, leaving a gap just north of centre leading into a huge natural cul-de-sac called the Trouee de Charmes, in which, if the German Armies cared to penetrate, they could by systematically annihilated. As Schlieffen could read a map just as well as the Staff Officers in Paris, he never had the slightest intention of succumbing to this temptation, but he also had no intention of attempting to invade France by a frontal assault on a relatively short, but heavily fortified line.
He knew that his only chance of defeating France quickly was by using every man of his enormous army to the fullest advantage — which meant that those armies must deploy and engage the enemy over a
far wider front than that offered by the frontier. This led him to the in-
common
evitable decision that neutral countries must be invaded, and for many years he was resolved upon the violation of Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland. In the end, however, his successors decided that a Dutch invasion would be unnecessary, and only
Belgium and Luxembourg need be atOnce this decision was taken — again on the equivocal grounds of 'military
tacked.
necessity'
— then
the plan could take shape,
and the initial disposition of the army which this decision now made possible, immediately revealed military potentialireaching nature. Instead of being compressed along the 200 miles between the Swiss and Belgian borders, the General Staff could deploy — with intent to use immediately — their forces from Switzerland up as far as Aachen, an extra 100 miles. Furthermore, those troops stationed in the most northern part of the line would have in front of them, not the difficult and heavily fortified country of central France or of the Ardennes, but — once the guarding fortress town of Liege had been taken — the flat, open plains of Belgium. ties of a far
Where would this lead? Not only straight through the heart of Belgium — a country notoriously difficult to defend — but into France at a point which
German
military intelligence considered of the left flank of the proposed dispositions of the French army. If the whole attention of the French army to the south could therefore be fixed by fighting on its own intended front, then this northernmost German army, having raced across Belgium, could continue virtually
was northward
unopposed into France itself. But would the French army be prepared to wait in these deployment positions for the onset of the German army? In view of the 'Spirit of the Offensive' with which the French High Command and the whole French army had become imbued, it seemed unlikely — but in view also of the for the reclamation of the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine by the French, it was not difficult to forecast the direction of their thrust once war was declared. A French advance into AlsaceLorraine could hardly have suited the German plans better. The first version of the Schlieffen Plan therefore took the fullest advantage of
desire
what was known of French plans, and what could be deduced of French intentions. That part of the German army deployed opposite the main French strength — in Alsace-Lorraine — would be deliberately kept weak and would be instructed to fight a defensive action which would not discountenance a slow retreat to the eastern borders of the captured provinces. This manoeuvre would not only fix French attention to the southern part of the front, it would serve to entice the offensive bulk of the French army forward and into a trap. And while this was happening to the south, the right wing of the German army — the First Army — would smash forward through Belgium and France like a gigantic hammerhead, the Second, Third and Fourth Armies acting as its shaft, the whole weapon eventually pivoting on the French fortress of Verdun. On the line Verdun-Paris, the shaft would rest, while the First Army would continue on to the
west of Paris, swing around to the southeast and in the end would trap the French armies between itself and the now strengthened German southern armies. There the French would be either annihilated or forced over the border into
Swiss territory and internment; and weight was given to this hope by the undoubted fact that if the German First Army did plans to this extent, it would lie across the lines of communication intended to feed the French. That the plan would require enormous determination and ruthless execution was fully appreciated — and indeed the original Schlieffen Plan contained the ominous paragraph: 'there can hardly be a shortage of provisions. The rich lands of Belgium and Northern France can furnish much, if they lack anything they will produce it — under suitable pressure — from outfulfil its
side.'
Perhaps the greatest ruthlessness, however, would have to be applied to the men of the German First Army themselves, for it was intended that the defeat of France should take a maximum of six weeks, which meant that this army would have to cover — on their feet or their horses' hooves — a distance of some 400 miles, fighting at least some of the way, and prepared for a violent and full-scale battle at the end of their journey. Although, until his death in 1913, Schlieffen held to the basic principles of his plan (he died muttering: 'It must come to a fight. Make the right wing strong'), it does seem that from his later memoranda he saw the point of his successor's modification to it, for Moltke the Younger had not the same faith in the marching ability of the German infantry. Moltke therefore, decided in favour of a double envelopment of the French forces, so he strengthened the left wing of the German Armies (the Fifth, Sixth
and Seventh Armies) and
in-
structed them, instead of retreating or even fighting a merely defensive battle, to hold the French onslaught at first and then to be ready to drive it back toward the intended south-eastward sweep of the First Army. In order to do this, of course, Moltke was forced to add strength to his southern armies at the expense of those in the north — but as he was in any case a man who felt the weight of his responsibilities and worried continually about them, perhaps the extra worry -of tampering with the master's plan was not so noticeable as it otherwise might have been. Moltke was in any case an unusual man to attain the highest post in the German
army. He felt this himself acutely, and indeed enquired of the Kaiser when offered the post, in what was surely an usually brusque manner, if His Majesty really 'expected to win the big prize twice in the
same
lottery?'
also made it as a condition of his acceptance that the Kaiser stopped winning all the war games which were making nonsense of the annual manoeuvres. As he had previously told the Kaiser 'quite brutally' that the latter's Pekin expedition in 1900 was 'a crazy adventure', it cannot be said that Moltke lacked moral courage: he was indeed a most unusual soldier altogether. He was a poor horseman with an embarrassing habit of falling off on staff rides, he was a Christian Scientist with side interests in other cults; he
He
81
painted, played the cello, carried a copy of Goethe's Faust and himself began a translation of Maeterlinck's Peleas et Melisande. 'I do not know how 1 shall get on in the I'W'nt of a campaign.' he said in 1906 upon his appointment. 'I am very critical of myself. It the French General Staff had been Germany's closest ally, they could hardly have devised plans more perfectly designed to fit in with German intentions than those
they did.
During the opening decade of this century, French military thought was largely dictated by a clique who came to be known as the 'Young Turks' (after the Turkish military revolutionaries), and whose leading spirit was a certain Colonel du Graridmaison. Scornful of the caution which experience had bred in their immediate predecessors, the Young Turks argued that
the offensive was more in tune with French character and tradition, that the possession of the new '75' — a field gun unique in mobility and rapidity of fire — had completely altered the tactical balance of the battlefield, and that Napoleon's dictum to the effect that the moral is to the physical as three is to one, all meant that the offensive was far stronger than the defensive, and that an attack conducted with sufficient enthusiasm could not fail. Obviously, the exponents of this doctrine would have no need for subtlety or guile on the battlefield. They could proceed directly to their objective, secure in the knowledge that no power on earth could prevent its attainment. As the objective of all French national thought was the return to the nation of the lost provinces, this meant — as the German General Staff had deduced — that the main thrust of the French army as soon as war was declared, would be out from the defensive fortresses so carefully built for them after 1870 to the north and south of the Trouee de Charmes, straight into a frontal assault on those German armies defending Alsace-Lorraine. Just as the Germans hoped. Not all the French armies could be deployed in this thrust however, and even the most enthusiastic of the Young Turks could not blind himself completely to the possibility of the Germans violating Belgian neutrality. Therefore, on the left wing of the main First, Second and Third Armies (which would be charged with the task of liberating Alsace-Lorraine), could be deployed the Fourth and Fifth French Armies along the Franco-Belgian border, almost exactly as far as the western end of Ardennes — countryside which all the military thought of those days considered impassable. Nevertheless, the French command managed to convince themselves that if the Germans did sweep through Belgium, it would be through the impassable Ardennes that they would come, thus allowing the French Fourth and Fifth Armies to drive northwards — into these same impassable Ardennes — 'cutting the invader in half. This was exactly the expression used by General de Castlenau, Deputy Chief of the French General Staff when he triumphantly justified to the military Governor of Lille, General Lebas, the decision ..
made
to
abandon
Lille as a fortified
they come as far as Lille,' de Castlenau concluded, 'so much the better for us!' As the Governor rather sadly pointed out to his companion on that occasion, de 'If
82
Castelnau had three stars on his sleeve while Lebas had only two — so that there was nothing he could do about a situation which both of them considered unsatisfactory. That it was unsatisfactory could be seen by anyone who cared to consult a map, for from the left flank of the Fifth Army at Hirson up as far as the French coast, there was nothing in the way either of constructed fortifications or of .proposed de-
ployment positions, and this was exactly that portion of the Franco-Belgian border which faced the historic invasion path into France — the flat Flanders plain.
brows over calm, blue eyes, Joffre looked like a Santa Claus. Behind and sheltered by this facade of steady dependability, the most irresponsible and illogical plans could be hatched, and await their time of test unquestioned.
In the event of a war against Germany Britain entered on the side of France, there would in fact be an extra accession of strength — the BEF. It was not one which the French considered of very great importance, for by continental standards it was derisory in size, and if more modern in outlook than any other
which
army
The notorious Plan
17 Such then, were the proposals for action of the French General Staff, embodied finally in what eventually became the notorious Plan 17. The plan was basically the expression of the French desire for revenge and for the return of the lost provinces, and this desire was pure emotion, overpowering and blind. Logic and cool thought played no part in the plan's formulation, and any justification given for it was based, when required, upon a totally mistaken estimate of German strength which would be deployed in opposition. No matter how often the French Deuxieme Bureau unearthed evidence to the effect that the Germans intended to use Reserve formations in their assault divisions, or how often the few logical brains in influential French circles pointed out the weaknesses in the plan, nothing could shake the confidence of its authors. They did not in fact want to be convinced of anything but their own strength of faith and consequent infallibility — for 'Faith will conquer all' seems to have been their precept. They rejected evidence that argued in favour of their staying on the defensive because their hearts and hopes, as well as their training and strategy, were fixed on
the offensive. They persuaded themselves that the Germans intended to use Reserve units only to guard communication lines and 'passive fronts', or as siege or occupation troops, because they would not use such troops for any other purpose themselves. To admit that Reserve formations could be used in attacks would throw all their own calculations out of kilter. They persuaded themselves that if the Germans came through Belgium they would do so through the Ardennes, as this route would be most convenient for their own proposals. When one commander-in-chief of the French armies, General Michel, revealed that he himself had doubts as to the advisability of a military plan which put so much trust in the offensive, he was quickly relieved of his command (in 1911) and General Joseph Jacques Cesaire Joffre was appointed in his place. From the point of view of the Young Turks, this was an excellent choice and in the event, as it seems that there was no chance of discarding Plan 17, it was a good choice for France too. An engineer who had progressed steadily up the ladder of the military hierarchy without the benefit of connection or nepotism, Joffre's career had been one of quiet efficiency which gained him the recommendation of a 'cool and methodical worker with a clear and pre3 mind'. But for the Young Turks, his appearance was probably his greatest et.
Massive and paunchy in his baggy with a benevolent face adorned 'bite moustaches, and bushy eye-
>rm,
in Europe, this was something which French leaders did not care to notice.
The presence French
armies
leaders, not so
of the
BEF
alongside the
was desired by French
much
as a fighting unit —
might release a French army for service elsewhere — but as an earnest of
though British
it
participation
as
France's
ally.
When the head of the Ecole Superieure de la General Ferdinand Foch, was asked by his British opposite number what
Guerre,
was the smallest
British military force
which would be of assistance to France, Foch answered: 'A single British soldier— and we will see to it that he is killed'. This, Foch considered, would be enough to commit Britain to a French alliance — and as it happened his questioner on this occasion, Brigadier-General Henry Wilson, the Anglo-Irish Commandant of Britain's Staff College, wished just as ardently to see Britain committed at France's side. Quick and impatient, Wilson was constantly bubbling with ideas, with enthusiasm and above all with energy. He had been brought up by a succession of French governesses and as a result not only spoke French fluently but was an ardent Francophile. Britain had no military alliance with France, only a 'friendly association' — the Entente Cordiale — but under the cover of this association staff conversations had taken place between the military leaders of both countries since 1905. These conversations had not been particularly productive at first, because after the blunders of the Boer War, French soldiers felt with some justification that there was little reliance to be placed in a British army, while the British on their part felt their age-old antipathy to all things French, military
matters in particular. Two events had occurred which affected this situation, although only one was evident at the time. The first event, unnoticed by the French, was the appointment of a committee headed by Lord Esher, to investigate and to thoroughly overhaul Britain's military establishment in the light of the unsatisfactory state of affairs which the Boer War had revealed. The 'Esher Triumvirate' of Lord Esher, Sir John Fisher and Sir George Clark had carried out several far-reaching reforms, including the provision of the army with a new General Staff and the creation of the Committee of Imperial Defence. As early as 1905, as a result of a war study carried out by the Director of Military Operations, it had been decided that in the event of General de Castelnau, Deputy Chief of the French General Staff when he triumphantly justified to the military Governor of Lille, General Lebas, the decision he had made to abandon Lille as a fortified city. 'If they come as far as Lille,' de Castelnau concluded, 'so much the better for us!'
4
The raw material that would implement the plans
j\_-
fas rail
-
\
Far
left:
The German 10th Jager Regiment communications
practises
Left: French fortress troops receiving training Below: Officer's machine gun class, School of Musketry, Hythe
83
Shortly after this depressing discovery, there was a change of government, one result of which was the appointment of Richard Haldane as Secretary for War. Haldane was a barrister with a deep interest in German history and German life -but his interest was not so deep that he wished to see Britain subordinated to it. Having studied some aspects of German military procedure, he adapted it to suit British needs and traditions, and then introduced his new reforms. As a result, he could later write: The Expeditionary Force, the Territorial Force, and the Special Reserve had been organised under my own eye, by soldiers who had studied modern war upon what was in this country a new principle. Before they took matters in hand not only was there no divisional organisation, but hardly a brigade could have been sent to the Continent without being recast. For there used to be a peace organisation that was different from the organisation that was required for war, and to convert ti'.e former into the latter meant a delay that could have been deadly. Swift mobilisation like that of the Germans even in 1870, was in these older days impracticable. All this had been changed for the Regular Army at home by the end of 1908, and it was after that year easy to mobilise. But at this time, Britain
was still considering independent action alone in Belgium, for Belgian independence was all that concerned Britain — an invasion of Belgium by France would be just as inimical to British interests as invasion by Germany. France, however, had been willing to guarantee that she had no intention of violating Belgian territory unless compelled to do so by previous violation of Ger-
military alliance with anyone — and at this stage, the British generals had no particular leanings towards the French. Independent action in Belgium alone was still the desideratum, with Britain's major action against whichever country emerged as the enemy (there were, in fact, few doubts as to who this would be) confined to her traditional arena — the sea.
The
vital question in 1910 came the second event,
Then
changed
all
this:
Henry
which
Wilson
was
appointed Director of Military Operations. When the French military attache in Lonand raised don called upon the new the question of the comparative lack of progress in the Anglo-French talks, suggesting that it was really a pretty important question, Wilson replied 'Important
DMO
But it is vital! There is no other!' Immediately, the joint planning took a new impetus. Wilson could see nothing, go nowhere but France and Belgium. He spent all his leaves touring the frontiers from Aachen to Switzerland or walking over the 1870 battlefields in Alsace-Lorraine or the Ardennes. At home, his whole attention was concentrated on the preparation of a scheme whereby the greatest possible British force could be transported to the Continent in the quickest possible time, and by 1911, Plan as it came to be called— by the French and after Wilson — was nearing completion. The plan provided for a schedule of mobilisation under which the whole of the question!
W
infantry of six divisions would embark on the fourth day, cavalry seventh day, artillery ninth day — but not (and the political leaders of the country were not in-
ceed to a concentration area near Maubeuge. During the months which followed, the final details of this plan were perfected and agreed between Wilson and members of the French General Staff, and every day that passed and every detail which was agreed, interlocked the BEF more firmly into the French plan — Plan 17 — although it was only a tiny part of it. Wilson, moreover, either because he could see nothing else or because he was determined that no alternative course of action for the British should exist, drew up no other plans — and there seems little doubt that the French were
aware of this. If the British entered the war at all therefore, (and Wilson for one was determined that she should), she would do so initially as a very junior partner of France, and her army would be allotted a part in accordance with French wishes. And as there was no gap in the middle of the French deployment positions, it was
arranged that that army should take position on the left of the French Fifth Army, just clear of the western end of the Ardennes; in front of the open doorway into France, in fact, square in the path of the
German hammerhead. If the military plans for the Western Front were firm to the point of rigidity, those for the Eastern Front were so flexible as to be positively flabby. This was due to a difference of opinion between the two allies of the Central Powers, Germany and Austria, and to the chronically uncertain state of the Russian military mind, aggravated in this instance by requests by France for immediate action
manoeuvres. The politicians, however, had no wish to commit Britain to an automatic
Belgium. On July 20, 1911, Henry Wilson signed a memorandum with the French General Dubail, specifying that in the event of British intervention as an ally of France against Germany, 150,000 men and 67,000 horses would be landed at Le Havre, Boulogne and Rouen between the fourth and twelfth days of mobilisation, and pro-
against the German foe in order to relievepressure in the west. The Russian General Staff, for reasons both military and racial, wished to concentrate against Austria. It was, after all, Austrian action in the Balkans which Russia wished primarily to prohibit and, moreover, it would be sound strategy to try to knock Austria out of the fight before Germany could disengage her more power-
Esher, British politician and army reformer
Haldane's reforms speeded up mobilisation
Wilson incorporated the
many—and the realities of the situation did suggest that it was unlikely that Germany would give the same pledge. These were the circumstances in which the Anglo-French Staff Conversations began, and British officers attended French
84
formed of this until much
later) to
BEF
into
French plans
ful forces
from the west. There were plans
for a gradual withdrawal from the 'Polish Tongue' in the face of an overwhelming attack at the start by German forces, but
the complications of such a manoeuvre
were really so
far
beyond Russian attain-
ment that they warrant but little attention; it was the Russian plan for attack into Austria and East Prussia — and most espraiseworthy their eminently pecially willingness to launch these attacks in order to aid their French Allies — that would affect the course of events. Plan A — the blueprint for the onslaught of the much-vaunted 'Russian Steamroller' — envisaged the concentration as far forward into the western salient as possible of as great a force as her mobilisation schemes would provide. Thus six Russian armies would assemble in the tongue of territory which lay between East Prussia to the north and Galicia to the south, and bounded by Silesia to the west. The sparseness of the railways in the area made the whole deployment difficult and cumbrous in the extreme, but it says much for Russian willingness to please — and even more for their belief in the ability to march of the Russian soldier — that the programme called for an advance within days of the Russian First and Second Armies into East Prussia, while the Fourth, Fifth, Third and Eighth wheeled south-west in order to attack the
Austro-Hungarian Armies and drive them back over the Carpathians. So far as German plans for the eastern fronts were concerned, that part of the Schlieffen Plan which dealt with it laid down nothing but defensive action until such time as France had been beaten and the mass of their armies had been released for deployment against the Russians. Indeed, had it not been for a natural aversion to yielding up national territory, it is likely that the German forces in East Prussia might have been withdrawn to the line of the Vistula. There were, however, two objections to this strategy. One was that it would give the Russians time to mobilize and to begin the manoeuvres which did in fact lead to an invasion of the Prussian territory. The second was that — on the assumption that Russian military machinery was in the state of creaking palsy which both German and Austrian Staffs believed — it would be
perhaps
cheaper
and
more
effective
strategy to attack Russia immediately, and thus disrupt and wreck the Russian armies before they could attain any momentum at
Conrad von Hotzendorf — Chief-ofStaff of the Austro-Hungarian Armies — was the champion of the Austrian school of thought which held this opinion, and as Moltke's attention was fixed on the Western Front (and if Conrad's plan was successful all.
it
would undoubtedly keep the Russians Moltke finally agreed to it.
fully occupied),
obstruction to Austrian plans, it was the intention of the Austrian Staff to invade from the north-west corner, with their Second Army — generally considered to be their best, and under the command of General Potiorek. With the unexpectedly swift mobilisation and movement of the
Russian army, however, Conrad would be forced to milk half of this army away in order to oppose the Russian threat, with the result that the initial invasion of Serbia would be carried out by a force of some
180,000 men.
As this was also the strength of the Serbian army, and these had the additional advantage of defending their own countryside, Austrian plans were not as well laid
The German General Staff: tradition
and
efficiency as they might have been, neither did they really justify the hopes which were held in
them. These then, were the military plans for the five major powers immediately preceding the outbreak of war. Let us examine the materials with which they hoped to' put their theory into practice. On the Western Front, 1,485,000 Ger-
mans
faced 1,071,000 Frenchmen and 150,000 British, although only the southern halves would be in any sort of proximity until Belgium had been crossed. In the south, the German Seventh Army of 125,000 men stood to withstand the thrust of 256,000 Frenchmen of the French First Army, while immediately north of them the German Sixth Army of 220,000 men awaited the French Second Army of 209,000 men. Northwards of the German Sixth Army were the 200,000 men of the Fifth Army, manning the fortified zone between Metz and Thionville. It was on this army that the German offensive would hinge as it wheeled forward on to the French fortified zone between Verdun and Toul, cutting across the southern half of Luxembourg and across the narrow angle of the Belgian Ardennes and down on to Sedan. These 420,000 Germans would be opposed by the 360,000 Frenchmen of the Third and Fourth French Armies, upon whom they
would fall, in theory, in frontal assault — though the proposed role of the French Fourth Army was to 'thrust northwards and cut the lines of communication of any German force attempting to invade France via Belgium'.
A
head-on clash Thus while Russia's
intentions were to swing north-west and south-west out of the Polish tongue, Austro-German intentions were to move exactly to meet them. If all armies began to move at the same time, in fact, the result would be two head-on clashes.
There was, however, another military problem which faced the Austrians — the basic problem of the initial episode of the war, the subjugation of Serbia. Confident that such a small country could offer little
According to the original deployment staffs, the 240,000 men of the French Fifth Army faced what was virtually a void, for if the German General Staff did not consider the heart of the Ardennes country impassable, they were at least of plans of both
the opinion that it was so difficult of access that the fewer troops sent through it the better. The 180,000 men of the German Third Army therefore would skirt the heart of the country along its northern edge, turn south just north-west of Givet, and cross the Franco-Belgian border — opposite
Hirson, on the left flank of the French Fifth Army of 254,000 men. On the flank of this French Fifth Army, as has been related, would wait the BEF of 150,000 men, its concentration area squarely in the path of the German Second Army, while the German First Army swung into France even further to the north.
Army of 320,000 Army of 260,000 men composed of the men considered
The German
men and
First
the Second
were each by the German General Staff to be fit to carry the hopes and burden of the German
national ambition. Obviously, none of these armies would either remain immobile, in situ, or travel irrevocably on their planned paths if the movements of the enemy opposite demanded some variation in performance, but the main axes of the army movements could not be changed to a very great extent and only — in the first instance — outwards from the centre. There would be little variation therefore in the strengths which opposed each other at the first deployment and the strengths which met each other in battle, unless the passage across Belgium significantly affected the strength of the German army. As the Belgian army consisted of six infantry divisions, one cavalry division and the garrison troops of Antwerp, Liege and Namur, this hardly seemed likely.
Thus, even if the Allied armies expanded outwards from the centre point of Verdun in order to receive the shock of the German First, Second and Third Armies, the best that could be achieved in the north would be that the French Fifth Army took the German Third Army on its right instead of its left flank, and a part of the German Second Army on its left flank, leaving the BEF to receive the remainder of the German Second Army and the whole of the
Army. But even
First
this would depend upon excellent Allied Intelligence, and also upon the willingness of the Allied High Command
believe the reports with which that Intelligence provided them. Overall command of the German armies was assumed on the outbreak of war by the Kaiser himself, as Supreme Warlord, but the power was intended to be wielded by Moltke, the Younger, in his capacity of Chief of the General Staff. Uncertain of himself, deeply worried by his responsibilities, shocked by the Kaiser's attempt to change the basis of the plans for a two-front war into plans for a war solely against Russia, Moltke never managed to unburden himself of the weight of his uncle's reputation. 'I never considered myself to be the equal of the old Field Marshal,' he had confided to his diary. This weakness at the head of the General Staff affected the whole of its principle of action. Almost alone of military organisations, the German General Staff had deliberately devised a method of combining tradition and efficiency, which would solve the problems presented by officers of royal or aristocratic influence but military incompetence, pressing their claims to high office. The German General Staff were perfectly willing to allow the titular heads of army units of Corps status and above to hold their position solely by right of seniority or connection — in fact they preferred it so, for these men could employ their time with the parades and cereto
monies,
the
time-wasting speeches and
85
The commanders upon whom so much depended General Michel lost his place as commanderin-chief of the French forces to Joffre in 1911 when he expressed doubts about the French war plans
Henry Wilson (1864- 1922) was Director of Military Operations in 1910. He planned the r6le of the BEF and was principal liaison officer with French headquarters in 1914
Sir
John French (1852-1925) saw much
colonial
the Boer War. In 1907 he was Inspector-General of the Forces and took command of the BEF in 1914 service and distinguished himself
in
General deCastelnau( 1851- 1944) joined the army in 1870 and subsequently distinguished himself at Staff College. A major-general in 1906. he commanded Second Army in 1914
Conrad von Hotzendorf (1852-1925) became Chief of Staff in 1906. A war-monger, he was dismissed in 1912 for advocating war with Italy but reinstated in December the same year
General Dubail (1851-1934) lectured on strategy and tactics at the Ecole Speciale Militaire. He served in the East and Algiers and in 19 14 was commander of First Army
Rupprechtof Bavaria (1869- 1955) was the son of Bavaria. He was to
of King Louis
III
command the German Sixth Army in
1914
General Joffre (1852-1931) saw much colonial service in China and Africa. He commanded a corps in 1908 and in 1911 was appointed Chief of General Staff
Grand Duke Nicholas (1856-1925) was the great uncle of the Tsar. He served in the RussoTurkish War of 1887 and in the Caucasus. In 1914 he was Commander-in-Chief
Alexander von Kluck 1846-1934) was to (
command the German First Army on the outbreak of war. The Schlieffen Plan undoubtedly gave this army the most arduous task
Karl von Biilow (1846- 1921) commanded /// Corps from 1903-12. He was a colonel-general and army inspector in 1913 and commanded the
German Second Army in 1914
One of KaiserWilhelm's
Duke Albrecht von Wiirttemberg 1 865- 1939) entered military service in 1885 and was an inspector-general in 1913. He commanded the German Fourth Army in 1914
Friedrich Wilhelm (1882-1951)
(
was Crown that of
Prince from 1888-1918. He was removed from command of the Death's Head Hussarsin 1913 and commanded Fifth Army in 1914
many titles was Supreme War lord
and he always took aspecial interest in
However, he had little sayin decisionmaking
military affairs.
Helmuth von Moltke 1848-19 16) (
was nephew of Field-Marshal He was Chief of
Moltke.
General Staff from 1906 and thus directed
German strategy outbreak of war 1914
at the
*
in
V
87
fe
public relations. While the scions of royal or aristocratic houses were thus displaying the panoply of war. its business would be anonymously directed by then chiefs-of-staff— these were
the important men. chosen and appointed by the GeneraJ Staff for their cool heads
and professional
ability.
Unfortunately, this system depended ultimately upon the authority of the General Staff over the army commanders, for these, unless firmly kept in place, might throw off the authority of their own chiefsot -staff who were, after all, subordinate in rank. Under a strong-willed Chief of General Staff, such a situation would never arise, but under Moltke the army commanders were to prove restive and their chiefs-of-staff, doubtful of the support they would receive from General Headquarters, were unwilling to insist that their guidance be accepted fully. In these circumstances, the importance of the titular army
commanders who were to attempt to realise the Schlieffen Plan was far greater than author had ever intended. Nevertheless, not all the army commanders were cast in the same mould, and they had risen to their exalted ranks by divers means: it is revealing to compare the role of each army with the man who its
commanded
it.
Those in the south — the Seventh, Sixth and Fifth Armies, which were originally intended to hold Alsace and Lorraine by defensive action — were commanded respectively by Generaloberst von Heeringen, by the Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, and by the Crown Prince himself, Wilhelm, eldest son of the Kaiser. All three of these owed their military standing to some form of external circumstance, for Heeringen had been Minister for War in 1913 and thus in a position to exert some influence on the appointment of army commanders. He was, in any case, to consider himself subordinate to Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria while the reins of influence wielded by the other two are obvious. It is indeed surprising that these
two army commanders were to prove themselves even as effective as they did. Rupprecht of Bavaria not only looked every inch a soldier, but he had spent all his life as a serving officer, although he did not possess the intellectual powers to take him to the highest Staff ranks. Nevertheless, he had in the past demonstrated coolness and resolution as a commander and he was imbued with considerable common sense and a loyalty to the Kaiser which was not necessarily to be expected. The Crown Prince lived under his father's shadow, but not willingly. An indication of the family differences which existed is revealed by the fact that he took little trouble in hiding his feelings for King Edward VII, whom he had regarded as his favourite
Though he was thought to be reliable and surprisingly reasonable in his attitude to his chief-of-staff, it cannot be claimed that he would have risen very far in so highly a professional hierarchy as the relation.
German army, had he not been who he was. The German Fourth Army, due to cross the narrow corner of Belgium, was also commanded by a member of a royal house — by Duke Albrecht of Wiirttemberg, whose combination of family influence and military capacity is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that he was promoted out of harm's way as quickly as possible.
88
But the three armies
to the north
were
commanded by men who, although they possessed the aristocratic 'von', were professional soldiers who were not members of any royal houses — although even these were carefully guided by selected members of the General Staff elite. all
The two most important were undoubthe two commanding First and Second Armies, Generaloberst von Kluck and Generaloberst von Biilow. Kluck* was tedly
the man chosen by the General Staff to command the most vital part of the swinging hammerhead — the outer part, the First Army which would smash its way through
Belgium with the Second Army, then swing as it crossed the Franco-Belgian border and sweep outside Paris, then back to entrap the French armies from the rear. This was the army which must move farthest and fastest, and would need the most ruthless driving. There seems little doubt that Kluck was chosen because he ruthlessness. the necessary possessed Though he could be courteous and pleasant in his private life, in his professional career he revealed an attitude of almost subhuman brutality, which made him hated and feared by those who served under him. An atmosphere of sullen obstinacy surrounded him. No humour, no sensitivity to human suffering or needs, no wish to alleviate the lot of man or beast whether they served in his own army or the enemy's ever revealed itself. The perfect military commander, in theory, so long as the army under his command could stand the strain. And Billow, commanding the Second Army to Kluck's left, was cast in the same mould. He was senior to Kluck both in the military and the aristocratic hierarchy. Billow's was the army which, if events unrolled exactly as planned, would smash down on to the left flank of the French Fifth Army and also on the BEF, and — once more in theory — perhaps their fate might be alleviated by two minor but quite significant facts. Billow had recently married a woman much younger than himself, and to add to his regret at having to leave her so far away, he suffered sporadically — but usually in time of acute nervous tension—from a particularly painful form of neuralgia. A combination of the two would be enough to affect the judgement of the wisest and most objective of men, and Biilow could hardly be claimed as that. free
Lanrezac, commanding the Fifth Army on the left flank. It was possibly because of the actual situation of his command and of the problems which would face him if the Germans came through Belgium, that Lanrezac began to doubt the infallibility of Plan 17; the first indication of his lack of faith was a request to move his army to the north so that it would serve better to block the gateway to Paris. Unfortunately, Lanrezac's manner was not one to endear him either to superior or subordinate, and
he was curtly told to obey his instructions. Perhaps even more unfortunate was his attitude to the British who were to take station on his left flank. He had all the Frenchman's traditional hatred of the British, distrust of their motives, and contempt for their military strength. Of General Sir John French, commander of the BEF, the following quotations from the writings of many who knew him would
seem to give a fairly accurate picture: T don't think he is particularly clever, and he has an awful temper.' — George V. 'He has the mercurial temperament commonly associated with Irishmen and cavalry soldiers.' — unknown. 'He has the heart of a romantic child.' — Lord Esher. 'In my own heart I know that French is quite unfit for this great command at a time of crisis in our Nation's history.' — Haig.
He had, however, a reputation for courage and resource and had showed on at least one occasion a practical grasp of minor tactics. His exploits as a cavalry general during the Boer War — he commanded the column which relieved Kimberley — had brought him to the notice of the public, and had made him something of a popular hero; but this had been 14 years before, and those years had been spent to a great extent enjoying the fruits of success. These had not necessarily been of a sybaritic nature, but they had done nothing to improve the depth of his knowledge or the lucidity of his mind. Age, however, and increased blood pressure, had increased
his
irascibility:
combined
with an essentially volatile temperament, this element gave to French an explosive force which under some circumstances might be vitally important, but only luck would fit the force to the circumstance. This was not a secure basis
commanding an army. These then were the commanders of the armies that were to meet in the summer of 1914. Few of them had much experience of the sort of warfare they were to encounter, although most had grown grey in the service
for
A
Marshal's baton
So much
for the German commanders: what of the men who would oppose them? Whatever military shortcomings might
lurk unsuspected in Joffre, lack of selfconfidence was not one of them. On one occasion prior to the war he was asked by his aide whether he thought that war was soon to be expected. 'Certainly I think so,' Joffre replied. T
have always thought so. It will come. I shall fight it and I shall win. I have always succeeded in whatever I do — as in the Sudan. It will be that way again.' Tt will mean a marshal's baton for you,' the aide suggested with some awe at the vision. 'Oui!' replied Joffre, acknowledging a simple fact. This confidence in themselves, in the military prowess of their armies and most of all in Plan 17, activated also the men who would command the French armies — with one exception. The exception was
of their respective countries. The average age of the army commanders at the beginning of the war was 55 years. Kluck, Biilow and Hausen, of the German First, Second and Third Armies respectively, were 68 years old. Joffre, Sir John French,
Conrad von Hotzendorf, Lanrezac and de Cary (commander of the French Fourth Army) were only six years younger. Dubail and Castelnau (French First and Second Armies) were 63 years old and Grand Duke Nicholas (the Russian C-in-C) was 58. Crown Prince Wilhelm was by far the youngest army commander at only 32 years old. They were all rather old by modern not surprising that many to grasp the new forces dominating the battlefields. [For Barrie Pitt's biography, see page 31.] standards. of
them
It is
failed
MOBILISATION result of the success of Germany's conscript armies in 1870, other European powers — except Great Britain, who still relied on her navy — built up conscript armies of their own, all with elaborate systems for the maintenance of second-line troops. Since they could all now mobilise large numbers of men quickly, the critical factor in the event of war was the speed with which armies could be moved to the front, and here Germany's plan gave her an advantage. Below: ^French mobilisation — gunners relax in the hot August sun before moving off to the front John Keegan
As a
'One of the decisive factors in the crisis of July 1914,' wrote Alberwhose exhaustive examination of the events of that month invests his judgement with particular weight, 'was the absence of all understanding of military matters on the part of the responsible statesmen, in particular of mobilisation. They had no knowledge of what mobilisation actually was, what demands it made on the country, what consequences it brought with it, to what risks it exposed the peace of Europe.' What then was mobilisation, and why was it so important? Mobilisation, in its simplest terms, is the bringing of the armed forces of a state onto a war footing. And in 1914 that meant, for the continental armies, a sudden and enormous increase in size. tini,
Before the introduction of universal conscription, mobilisation lives of few but soldiers and their families. In 1914 the proclamation reached into every family circle, emptying the fields, halting the workshops and filling the barracks and railway stations to bursting. For if the states of continental Europe — republics, liberal monarchies and autocracies — agreed on little else, they were at least united in holding it the duty of every able-bodied male citizen between the ages of 20 and 45 to bear arms. Behind the active peace-time armies, therefore, large as they had grown during the previous 50 years, stood even larger armies of reservists— civilians liable to annual military training, and to call-up in the event of war. The common belief in the duty of universal service rested of course upon no abstract principle, but upon what seemed to be the most important lesson of the wars of the 1860s and 1870s: that it was numbers which counted, numbers swiftly concentrated and as swiftly deployed. It was for that reason above all others that the conscript armies of the German states had so decisively defeated the long-service army of France; and no nation had been quicker than the French to imitate the German system. But though most European states followed the French example fairly quickly, none succeeded in outstripping the efficiency of the German system which, as a result of constant improvement, still remained the model for all. A description of its essentials therefore
would have touched the
serves to explain the pattern of military organisation in the Europe of 1914. Those essentials, well known to every subject of the Kaiser, were four: universal conscription; 'localisation' of units, both 'active' and 'reserve'; periodic reservist training; and the maintenance of 'reserve' cadres. What those provisions meant is best understood by following the average German through the four stages of his military life. At 17, he registered for service. If found fit, and chosen to fill the recruit contingent of his annual class (it is worth noting in passing that over 40% were exempted at this stage as surplus to requirements), he would at 20 be drafted to whichever specified active regiment had its station, a permanent one, nearest his home. If an infantry regiment, it would hold and train him for the next two years, if cavalry or artillery for the next three. On discharge he was transferred to the reserve, and had to report annually for one month's training. At 27 he passed into the Landwehr, whose units would be brought into being only in time of war though he remained liable for periodic training. At 39, he passed into the Landsturm, a force intended to take over static duties in wartime, and at 45 he was allowed to retire for good to civil life. His liability for military service, in one form or another, had thus preoccupied the greater part of his adult life.
An
all-embracing system centre, as by an officer of the mobilisation section of the German General Staff, the system looked even more allembracing. His map would show the German Empire, from the Polish-speaking tracts of Silesia to the annexed territories of Alsace-Lorraine, divided into 24 military districts, each the recruiting and garrison area for an active army corps (the Guard Corps was recruited throughout Prussia), each of two divisions, which were quartered on major towns. Their eight infantry and four artillery regiments were each allotted a permanent station in a subsidiary town, as was the separately organised cavalry. Each maintained a surplus of officers and NCOs to form cadres for the reserve units of the corps. The VII Corps, to give an example,
Viewed from the
89
erman mobilisation a poignant farewell as a father holds his
^1 4
--"«^
*>v-
• /4
'N%
:
>*.
/
fifr^mid*
* •'
r
'
*'* 1
I
recruited in Westphalia. Its headquarters were at Munster, as were those of one of its divisions, the 13th Division. Its other infantry division, the 14th, had its headquarters at Diisseldorf and the eight infantry regiments were stationed respectively, two
Cologne and one each at Paderborn, Detmold, Munster, Minden, Wesel and Kleve. These, of course, were peace stations. On at
the units of the corps concentrated at a given assembly point. These, however, were merely the active troops of the corps' district, though the battalions and batteries would have been brought up to new strength on mobilisation by the addition of about 25% more soldiers, drawn from the classes of the reserve aged 23-24. mobilisation,
From
the rest of the reserve, a parallel but quite separate corps, the VII Reserve, would be formed on mobilisation. Its men would be slightly older and its artillery rather weaker than those of its active counterpart, but it would nevertheless constitute a formidable force, led as it would be by professional, full-time officers. The VII Reserve was in fact a particularly strong corps, since one of its brigades, the 28th, belonged to the active army, to whose
war requirements it was surplus. Mobilisation would still not have exhausted the trained military manpower of VII Corps district. The proclamation would also have brought into the depots two other large groups of reservists; those men of the Reserve, aged 23-26, surplus to the requirements of VII Reserve Corps, and the classes belonging to the Landwehr. From the first group could be raised so-called Ersatz battalions, on the scale of one for each active brigade, from the second group one Landwehr regiment for each active regiment. Thus VII Corps district could also put into the field: the 25th Ersatz Brigade, comprising the 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th and 79th Ersatz Battalions; the 25th Landwehr Brigade, comprising the 13th and 15th Landwehr Regiments; and the 27th Landwehr Brigade, comprising the 53rd and 55th Landwehr Regiments besides the unbrigaded 16th, 56th and 57th Landwehr Regiments. In all, therefore, the district provided 74 infantry battalions of varying quality, six artillery and three cavalry regiments and auxiliary troops in proportion. In addition to these units, the district still disposed of sizeable numbers of men of military age, if of less immediate military value; in particular those of the Landsturm whose units when activated would release field formations from guard and administrative duties, and the so-called Ersatz reserve, which included the large proportion of each annual class originally excused active service. Their role would be to provide replacements, once they were trained, for soldiers killed or wounded at the front. The VII Corps' establishment was of course a particularly complete one. Not all could field two reserve divisions, indeed the most recently established corps fielded none. Nevertheless the Empire could, within three weeks of mobilisation, almost double the number of major units in its field army, and multiply its total numbers six times. In peace its strength stood at 25 active corps of 51 infantry divisions, in round numbers some 800,000 men. In war, it could add 14 reserve corps of 31 divisions, some 20 Ersatz and 30 Landwehr brigades, and several hundred thousand auxiliary troops, raising its strength in all to about 5,000,000. These figures were, of course, a closely guarded military secret; closest of all was the order of battle of the reserve formations. Germany's decision to form reserve corps, regarded at the time as a warwinning coup in itself, was carefully shielded from foreign intelligence.
The French system The French military system mirrored the German; and for good reason. Many reservists had spent the first — decisive — weeks of war in 1870 travelling from their homes to their regimental depots, located sometimes as far distant as Algiers, and then in search of their units somewhere in Alsace-Lorraine. That experience had taught the French army the value of 'localisation'. In 1914 the country was divided into 21 corps districts, including the
XIX
in North Africa, each fielding, like the German ones, two active divisions: white and coloured colonial divisions brought the total to 47. Mobilisation produced, however, comparatively fewer Reserve divisions, for both the population and birth rate were lower in France than in Germany. Indeed it had only been by extending the length of active service from two to three years in 1913, and by always exempting a far smaller proportion of the annual class, that she managed to match her neighbour in peacetime strength. In war strength she failed to do so, fielding less than 350 Reserve battalions against Germany's 380, and those raised from men as old as 33, as against an upper age limit of 26 in Germany. She possessed moreover no equivalent of the Ersatz divisions. Behind her 25 reserve divisions stood only the terri-
men aged from 34 to 47, of whom the youngest were to form 12 territorial divisions. Their operational value was doubtful. Little wonder that the French general staff was committed to the doctrine of a short war, to be won by elan rather than numbers. The Russian army's problems were precisely the reverse of the French. It suffered from an embarrassment of numbers and a paucity of means to train, equip and officer them. In consequence, while France conscripted over 80% of each annual class and Germany less than 60%, Russia conscripted only 30%. And though even that proportion provided her with an Active army of 1 ,400,000, organised into 79 infantry and 24 cavalry divisions, that order of battle was really a skeleton of the wartime one. For rather than overstrain the already creaking machinery by the creation of numerous new divisions on the outbreak of war, Russia preferred to run a larger number of divisions in peace, but only at halfstrength, to be filled out with reservists on mobilisation. She planned therefore to raise only 35 reserve divisions; and since the army was not 'localised' and the Russian reservist had to travel on average 700 miles to join his unit, none was likely to take the field before the first month was out. Surplus reservists were to be formed into depot battalions, rather than into the equivalent of Ersatz divisions, and the enormous militia of older and untrained men, the Opolchenie, some 6,500,000 strong, was wisely not to be called out at all. Unlike France, Russia could stand casualties and wait out a decision but initially her strength would lie chiefly in those full-strength Active divisions which were stationed on the frontiers. The Austrian military system, though conforming in principle to the universal pattern, was complicated by the 'dual' organisation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thus there was a 'Joint Army', in which the bulk of the annual class spent its two years service, with a strength of 32 infantry and nine cavalry divisions; and in addition there were the Landwehr and the Honved, run respectively by the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the Empire. Their conscripts, unlike those of the Joint Army, served only 20 weeks, spread out over two years, so that their 16 infantry and two cavalry divisions were more akin to reserve than active divisions. All three armies nevertheless possessed reserves of their own, in which liability to recall extended to the age of 32. Thereafter all reservists passed into the Landsturm, which was based on a 'Dual' rather than a 'Joint' organisation, until the age of 42. And because a true Reserve element was lacking in the Austrian army, all could expect to be called out on mobilisation. Since units were 'localised', the system worked more simply in practice than might appear on paper. Each of the 16 corps' districts administered two Joint divisions and normally one Honved or Landwehr division, and Landsturm — Hungarian or Austrian — in proportion. Thus the VIII Corps district (Prague) raised the 9th and 19th Divisions of the Joint Army and the 21st Schiitzen Division (Infantry Division) of the Landwehr. (Joint Landwehr and Honved divisions were numbered from 1 to 48.) The IV Corps' district (Buda-Pest), a well populated region with many natural horsemen, raised the 31st and 32nd Divisions and 10th Cavalry Division of the Joint Army and the 40th and 41 st Divisions and 5th Cavalry Division of the Honved. On mobilisation, reservists would be called out from each locality to complete the joint units stationed there; the Honved and Landwehr reservists in each half of the Empire would receive the same summons to their local regiments; and the Landsturm would be embodied in these units. Surplus reservists would be formed into so-called Marsch battalions which, in brigades, formed the nearest equivalent to Reserve divisions elsewhere. Once complete, all units of whatever status came under command of the Joint General Staff and would be deployed as the war plan demanded. The armies of the minor military powers, among whom must be included Britain, were organised neither as logically nor as efficiently as those of the major powers. Serbia, though operating a 'localised' system, had a top-heavy reserve structure and no effectorials,
Her Active army was of five divisions and her mobilised strength totalled about 190,000. The army of the tiny mountain kingdom of Montenegro, where military obligation ceasA only at the age of 63, was reckoned even by sympathetic observers little better than 'an old-world peasant militia'. The Belgian army, in process of transition from partial to general conscription, could field 117,000 men, organised into six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, but only by using the Civic Guard, a volunteer force, to help garrison the great national fortresses on which her security chiefly depended Great Britain's military system was wholly individual. Adequate to her needs as an imperial power in peace, its chief defect was that it provided paltry reserves for war, since the volunteers tive third-line troops.
91
of her active (or Regular) army were long-service men, enlisted for Beven years with the colours and only five on the Reserve. Half the army, moreover, was always abroad and the battalions at homo were on establishments so low that the majority of reservists would be absorbed on mobilisation by their parent units, leaving few to form cadres for new units. Indeed, insofar as expansion was planned, this was to take place not within the Regular Army but within the volunteer Territorial Army, which provided Britain's nearest equivalent to the continental second-line troops. It and when the Expeditionary Force went overseas, the defence of the kingdom would devolve upon its 14 infantry divisions and 14 cavalry brigades, whose regiments and battalions, by a process of splitting in half and then building up again by the halves, were to multiply and re-multiply. Thus Britain's assured contribution to a continental war amounted to only six Regular divisions of
infantry and one of cavalry. The mobilisation scheme, however, was frequently practised and very efficient, for reservists were few enough to be called up by individual telegram. Britain's real power lay in her navy, which had an equally well drilled mobilisation system. By understandings with the French,
she planned not to reinforce the Mediterranean in the event of but to concentrate all capital units in home waters into a Grand Fleet, based on the north-eastern ports. The regular and civilian reservists needed to complete ship and shore crews were to be summoned simultaneously by telegram from their homes throughout the kingdom. The Austrian, German and Russian navies had their reservists closer to hand, since each was allotted the hinterland behind its main bases as a conscription area: in practice France followed that system also, most of her sailors being Bretons. All five navies, in total contrast to the armies, planned to confine their fleets, initially at least, to the safety of harbour.
common danger
Numbers and speed number
was the means in which the armies of speed was the method. And the transportation of numbers at speed in 1914 turned upon the efficiency of the national railway system. No army was prepared to leave that issue to the railway companies. Each general staff maintained its own railway section which drew up and constantly revised rail movement tables, advised — in Germany dictated — where new lines should be laid, supervised with particular care If
the
of troops
Europe believed victory
lay,
the layout of frontier terminals (some village platforms on the German frontier with Belgium were half a mile long) and stood ready to take over the direction of the network on the threat of war. That threat was generally thought likely to develop in three stages: a period of political tension, followed by days of increasing strain in which a hostile power might be expected to take secret
military measures, culminating in the public proclamation of mobilisation. Each general staff had accordingly devised procedures (dangerously open to mis-interpretation as it turned out), designed to forestall surprise attack before its own mobilisation was proclaimed. The first of these was the general practice of stationing in frontier districts rather more divisions than were raised there and of keeping them near war establishment. Next was a programme of preparatory measures, to be implemented in case of political tension, which would put all divisions of the active army on a mobile footing, measures such as stopping of leave and the requisition of horses. Finally, in case of tension persisting, came a scheme of 'covering operations' by the frontier divisions, intended to protect the railheads at which the rest of the army, active and reserve, would detrain in the event of general mobilisation. In that event, neither the French nor German armies were expected to give their respective countries any great lead over the other. Their field armies were expected to complete to war establishment and concentrate on the frontiers between the third and 13th days from proclamation. In France, the cavalry divisions would complete concentration on the fourth day, those infantry divisions assigned to reinforce the covering troops on the fifth day, the rest of the active divisions on the ninth and tenth days, the reserve divisions from the 11th to 13th days, the territorial divisions from the tenth to the 15th days and the divisions coming from Africa on the 16th and 17th days. Each corps was allotted a main railway line, from which all other traffic would be cleared, leading directly from its home district to its designated detraining area. The IV Corps, for example, which would assemble its regiments in Normandy between the first and fourth days, would begin to move on the fifth day from Le Mans via Chartres
and Rheims to Verdun, where on the 11th day it would concentrate under the command of Third Army. The German timetable for its different categories of troops was closely similar and for both armies the quantity of transport to be despatched was enormous — the German plan demanded the movement of 20,000 trains in 17 days. The Austrian concentration would take a little longer, the Russian a good deal longer. Only eight of Russia's corps would be ready to deploy by the 15th day and some would not arrive in the concentration area until the 30th.
Irreversible, cumulative and fatal possible that no passage of history has been as closely studied as the month of July 1914, and it is clear that the process of mobilisation was irreversible, cumulative, and once started, led directly to war. That it did so is unarguable, and for a simple reason. Diplomatic telegrams offered at worst verbal menaces which could always be taken back; but measures of military preparation posed It is
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93
NORWAY The line-up for war Right:
Germany's
efficient internal rail-
way network gave her an immense advantage over her neighbours
in
mobilisation. In addition, her initial deployment of most of her force in the west gave her numerical superiority over France. The map shows the First
DENMARK
and Second Line mobilised strengths of the combatant powers. Below: A German regiment (top) marches through Berlin to entrain for the front. A French cavalry picquet (centre) guards a railway line near the Franco-German Russian troops (bottom) mobilised more quickly than anyone
frontier.
had expected
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deadly dangers which unless matched would eat irretrievably into what strategists now call 'reaction time'. That effect is best illuminated by General Joffre's solemn warning to the French cabinet on Jui\ 31 that: 'any delay of 24 hours in calling up our reservists will have as a result the withdrawal of our concentration points from 10 to 12 miles for each day of delay; in other words the initial abandonment of just that much of our territory'. Within 36 hours of this warning France had mobilised, and a da\ later was at war. Joffre's warning added little, however, to the dangers which threatened the peace. The fatal measures of military advice had already been given to other politicians elsewhere, some as much as a week before. What were these measures? Three in particular stand out: The Russian general staff's concurrence in the implementation of the 'Period Preparatory to War' on July 24. Moltke's part in the decision to proclaim the German 'State of Imminent Danger of War' on July 31. The Russian general staff's insistence on the immediate proclamation of general mobilisation, on July 30. In none of these cases were the implications fully grasped by the statesmen
£
responsible. Austria, of course, was the first country actually to mobilise, but only partially (in accordance with Plan B), as she made clear. She followed that with an outright declaration of war on Serbia on July 28, issued in the knowledge that Germany would support her in that extreme measure. Dangerous though her actions were, far more so were those initiated by Russia on July 24, the day before Austria's proclamation of partial mobilisation. The Tsar's government, alarmed at the growing threat to Serbia, decided then on five preparatory measures, of which the most important were: the recall of the troops from camp to garrison; the institution of a 'state of war' in the fortresses and the frontier districts; the preparation 'in principle' of 'plans to mobilise partially against Austria'; and the issue of secret orders, to take effect on July 26, for the 'Period Preparatory to War', which entailed the 'trial mobilisation' of some reservists, the recall of serving soldiers from leave, the mobilisation of the Black Sea and Baltic fleets and the mining of harbours. Moves of this sort could not be disguised; indeed it was known in Germany by July 27 that the 'state of war' had been declared in the fortresses, while 28 reports of warlike preparations on the frontiers reached the German foreign office between July 26 and 30. The agreement within the Tsarist government to these measures was based on no clear understanding of their effects. The generals appear to have accepted the inevitability of general war from the outset and with equanimity. Sazonov, the foreign minister, did not accept it and seems at first to have thought that the Austrians would view the mobilisation of 13 Russian corps on their Carpathian frontier as a chess-board counter to their mobilisation against Serbia and, accepting it as such, demand no further escalation. It was swiftly pointed out to him, however, by the
'not a threat but a friendly warning', Sazonov took fright and affront simultaneously, and summoned the Chief-of-Staff and the War Minister. Both had for some days regarded war as unavoidable and now stated 'that the risk could not be accepted of delay-
ing a general mobilisation later by effecting a partial mobilisation now'. At the prompting of all three, the Tsar accordingly gave assent for the general mobilisation decree to be telegraphed to the armed forces. But in the last minutes remaining before its despatch, the Tsar changed his mind, and the second decree, for partial mobilisation, was sent in its stead, reaching the four military districts involved by midnight. As perhaps no one in Russia but the generals realised, however, the effect of either decree, at least on Germany's calculations, was bound to be identical. Indeed Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff (alarmed by the inroads he suspected Russia was making into his precious 'reaction time', and by reports that Conrad von Hotzendorf, his Austrian opposite number, was planning to stand defensively instead of attack in the Carpathians) was already using his own channels of communication to urge Vienna to proclaim general mobilisation. That move, he pointed out, would invoke the treaty and bring Germany to Austria's side. The Russian generals now came to Moltke's assistance, persuading the Tsar to change his mind again and substitute the general for the partial decree before the latter had taken effect. Intended for proclamation on July 31, the measure was made public accidentally in St Petersburg on the evening of July 30. But in any case Moltke had that afternoon persuaded the Kaiser of the reality of his own fears, which had been heightened further by reports, undoubtedly exaggerated, of the advanced state of French and Belgian preparations for war. At the Crown Council meeting it was therefore decided to proclaim the 'State of Imminent Danger of War' on July 31, the following day. Its proclamation coincided with the Austrian announcement of general mobilisation, and was intended by the German government to lead directly to its
own.
bellicose role.
generally agreed that beyond this point a European war could not have been prevented: such was certainly the German generals' belief at the time. Their principal concern henceforth was to ensure that it should come about in a manner that would allow the Schlieffen plan to follow its prescribed course; in short, that France be brought in at the same moment as Russia. Two ultimata were accordingly drafted and despatched, the first demanding of Russia a cessation of mobilisation within 24 hours, the second demanding of France a declaration of neutrality, within 36 hours, to be guaranteed by unacceptable concessions on the part of France. France responded as Germany hoped. Her covering troops had been deployed since July 30, though on a line 10 kilometres (6i miles) short of the frontier so as to avoid provocative encounters, and a mobilisation warning order had been issued on July 31. On the morning of August 1, Joffre advised the Cabinet that mobilisation could be postponed no longer. It was proclaimed that afternoon at 3.55 pm. At 4.0 pm the same posters went up in the streets of Germany. Britain alone was as yet untouched by the continental emergencies. On July 29, however, the Admiralty had decided to notify units of the 'Precautionary Period'. The fleet, which fortuitously was practising mobilisation, was accordingly ordered to remain at readiness. On August 1, in reply to frantic French requests to safeguard the Channel crossings, the Admiralty ordered full mobilisation. And on August 3, after reports of German violations of Belgian neutrality had been authenticated, the War Office also ordered full mobilisation. It is perhaps the greatest irony of 1914 that the sole ingredient of each army's long-laid plans which worked to perfection was mobilisation. For if the statesmen underestimated its effect on diplomacy, the generals failed altogether to calculate its influences on operations. Since all armies, including even the Russian when the pinch came, met their timetables to the minute, any advantage of the sort the Germans had enjoyed in 1870 was quite cancelled out. All that the generals ensured, in their obsession with numbers and timing, was that the opening battles would be fought on the largest possible scale and with therefore the least possible chance of decision. Fearing defeat even more than their governments feared war, they had unknowingly combined to cheat each other of victory.
Despite these representations, and the even more urgent insistences of his own generals, Sazonov was not, by July 29, yet convinced of the need for general mobilisation. But his mind was made up that morning by a telegram from the German Chancellor that: 'further progress of Russian mobil; measures would compel us to mobilise, and then European could scarcely be prevented'. Though the German ambassador «d that it \ as
JOHN KEEGAN was born in 1934 and educated at King's College, Taunton, Wimbledon College and Balliol College, Oxford, where he read Modern History and specialised in Military History. He is Senior Lecturer in Military History at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and is the author of many articles on strategy and nV4ary and international history, and author of the book World Armies.
general
commanding the mobilisation
office,
that the Austrians
would certainly feel obliged to mobilise against Russia 'as a necessary measure of self-defence', and that their full mobilisation would compel Germany, under the guessed-at terms of the Dual Alliance, to mobilise in East Prussia. If she did so, Russia would be caught on the wrong foot since she herself had no means to switch suddenly from partial to full mobilisation. Sazonov and the general staff accordingly decided to prepare two imperial decrees, one for partial, one for general mobilisation, to lay both before the Tsar for signature and subsequently to implement one or the other as the situation seemed to require.
A
bellicose role
France had meanwhile reacted to this crisis by ordering the recall of troops from leave on July 26 and, next day, of the North African garrisons, 100,000 strong. But the government's, and in particular the generals', chief concern was with the reports they had heard of Russia's plan for partial mobilisation which, as Joffre saw at once, threatened to dislocate that immediate offensive into East Prussia upon which France counted to distract Germany if general war broke out. This view was made clear to St Petersburg on July 28, and it was undoubtedly reinforced by the efforts of Paleologue,
the
French ambassador, who throughout the
.
crisis
played a
It is
The news
of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the heir apparent to the throne of Austria-Hungary, was received initially with shock and horror by the rulers of Russia. But the full impact of the news coujd not be gauged accurately, for the majority of officials and the politically minded were away from the cities on their annual holidays, and those left in the cities were too busy to consider the matter, as they had their hands full coping with explosive internal social problems. Throughout the month of July 1914 Russia felt the waves of considerable social unrest. It originated at Baku (on the Caspian Sea), whose oilfields employed a large labour force which broke into open revolt when, as a result of bad housing conditions, an outbreak of plague occurred in the region. Bolshevik agitators were quick to exploit the situation and armed clashes took place between the police, aided by Cossack troops, and the strikers. This struggle in the Caucasus sparked off a
whole series of strikes whose aims were improve wages and living conditions. On July 16, 1914 a strike broke out at the Putilov works in St Petersburg and, in the violent clashes that followed, two workers were killed, some 50 wounded, and 100 to
the brink of war J. F.
N. Bradley
After the assassination at Sarajevo, Russia proclaimed herself protectress of the Slav populations everywhere and made it clear that she would resist any aggression against them. Russia and Austria, egged on by Germany and France, moved inevitably, though hesitantly, towards war. Below: Summoned from their fields as the harvest approaches, the peasants provided the weight in the 'Russian steamroller'
arrested. difficulties at home few people belligerent enough even to entertain the idea of an immediate war. On July 18, 1914 the foreign minister, Sazonov, met the German ambassador, Count Pourtales, and declared that Russia had only one desire and that was to be left in peace. She had so much to reform and improve that peace was of vital necessity to her. It is clear that this declaration was designed to try to keep the Germans out of the crisis which was thought to concern only Austria-
With such
felt
But two days later Russia's with France caught up with
cussion with the German ambassador but nothing was achieved. It was clear that
Saaonov and invalidated this particular
Germany would stand behind her Austrian
limit the Sarajevo crisis, for at
any conflict involving Russia and her allies. During the day the Russians decided to withdraw some 80,000,000 roubles (about £8,000,000) deposited in German banks and the government discussed the possibility of partial mobilisation. In this way Russia, challenged by the Austrians and egged on by the French, began to consider war as a solution to the Serbian crisis. Next day, July 25, at 10 am the Tsar reviewed his Guards at Tsarskoye Selo and then went into conference with his most important ministers. It was decided in principle to mobilise 13 army corps for eventual use against Austria-Hungary. Sazonov had another meeting with Paleologue and Sir George Buchanan, but the latter again refused to be drawn into the Balkan problem. Seeing the reluctance of
Hungary. alliance effort
to
Poincare and Viviani, the French President and Prime Minister, arrived in St Petersburg on an official visit. Conversations between the French and Russian rulers made it clear that France, as much as Germany, was involved in the crisis caused by the Sarajevo assassination. During one of the long ceremonies and banquets for the French guests, the Tsarina suffered a mild heart attack which prevented her from taking any part in politics for some time. This simple heart attack undoubtedly had some effect on subsequent developments in Russia, for it removed a strong anti-war influence from the presence of the Tsar. At the same time rumours began to circulate blaming the Germans for the organisation of social unrest and strikes in Russia. On July 21, 1914, while President Poincare was laying wreaths and then receiving the representatives of the French immigrants to Russia, the police clashed again with the strikers and violent fights developed in the industrial suburbs of St Petersburg. At the same time the police succeeded in organising an enthusiastic reception for President Poincare by the crowds as he paid an official visit to the Winter Palace in the heart of the capital. In the evening it was announced that among the many arrested during the day's disturbances, the police had discovered several notorious this juncture
ally in
the British to take a more active role, Sazonov hoped that a war could be averted if Serbia would accept Britain as mediator. But his subsequent note claiming that 'the Imperial government is closely following developments of the Austro-Serbian conflict which cannot leave Russia indifferent', dashed the slender hope of successful British mediation. Pourtales, the German ambassador, felt it necessary to restate that his country Austria.
would stand behind her
Nationalistic fervour
On
this
same day remarkable changes
occurred in the Russian situation. At first 16 squadrons of Cossacks were ordered to St Petersburg from Tsarskoye Selo to patrol the city in which martial law was proclaimed. But with the prospect of war so near the strikers unexpectedly began to give up and even Baku calmed down. Then suddenly the strikes almost everywhere
German
agents. the following day the Bolshevik organisers of the St Petersburg strikes, conscious of the danger to the strike movement of the label 'German inspired', called off the strike. But by then the situation was outside their control and sporadic clashes continued throughout the day. The French visitors continued their visit by calling on the Tsar at Tsarskoye Selo just outside St Petersburg. With the full concurrence of the French leaders Sazonov instructed his embassy in Vienna to 'point out the dangerous consequences of any action on the part of Austria of an unacceptable character with regard to the dignity of Serbia'. This was the first public warning from Russia that she would not tolerate direct action against Serbia. On July 23, 1914 Franco-Russian conversations continued in St Petersburg. President Poincare expressed openly his fears of Austrian-German machinations against Serbia and urged the Tsar to stand firm in the Balkans although he did not encourage the Tsar to start a war. In the afternoon Poincare was allowed to review some 60,000 of the Tsar's best troops. At the farewell dinner he again urged the Tsar to be firm and promised faithful support by France. A few hours later the
On
visitors were on their way home. Early on July 24, 1914 the news of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia reached St Petersburg. At 12.30 pm Sazonov met the French ambassador, Paleologue, and the British ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, to discuss with them the implications of the ultimatum. While the French ambassador repeated Poincare's insistence that Russia stand firm on the Balkan problem, Sir George Buchanan
French
reaffirmed his country's policy of neutrality so far as the Balkans were concerned. In the evening Sazonov had an animated dis-
98
ally
The Russian military colossus, whose existence haunted the rulers of Europe
turned into demonstrations of loyalty, and Russia's rulers seem to have found the long-awaited confirmation of the view that a just war would unite the nation. The Tsar issued orders for partial mobilisation in the militarv regions facing Austria-Hungary. On Sunday July 26, 1914, the Duma, the Russian equivalent of Parliament, set up in 1905, entered the war agitation. It adopted almost unanimously a resolution which spoke of 'its (the Duma's) readiness at the summons of the sovereign to stand up in the defence of the country, its honour and its possessions.' Predictably only 13 left-wing deputies did not vote for the motion. But it was clear that most of Russia was aligning herself behind the Tsar and the war policy. On July 27, 1914, Sazonov still entertained some hopes for a diplomatic resolution of the crisis, but found it difficult because of the immense pressure that public opinion was putting on him. He
found it almost impossible to restrain various conservative papers, such as the Novoye vremya, St Petersburg Courier, or Rech (which openly clamoured for war), from accusing Austria of wanting to crush the little Slav state of Serbia. Crowds were swamping newspaper offices with
areas other
demands
became
for the latest
news and there was
enthusiastic cheering outside the Serbian legation. In this atmosphere of increasing nationalist fervour Pourtales still thought that Russia would back out of the crisis and not resort to war. But the following day even Pourtales had to revise his opinion. Though Sir George Buchanan warned Sazonov against any aggressive moves which, he thought, would alienate British public opinion, Sazonov had now reached the stage at which it was impossible for him to turn back. At 6 pm he obtained from the Tsar signatures on two ukases (edicts), one confirming the partial mobilisation in the military
facing Austria-Hungary, and the starting the process of general mobilisation, one or other to be used if and when necessary.
'Mere precautions'
On
July
29,
diplomatic
1914,
hectic. Pourtales called
several times
activity
on Sazonov
demanding
a stop to mobiliacted cautiously, explaining to Pourtales and Count Szapary, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, that the measures taken were mere precautions. Paleologue, however, was informed that partial mobilisation against AustriaHungary was now proceeding and general mobilisation would proceed secretly. It was clear that war was inevitable. Nevertheless a direct appeal from Wilhelm II to his cousin, Nicholas II, was made, but to no avail, though the Tsar did change his mind temporarily and changed his order for general mobilisation to one for partial mobilisation. On July 30 came the final measures for war when news of the Austrian bombardment of Belgrade proved to be the final straw in the war issue. Paleologue informed Paris of partial mobilisation in Russia and received orders to reiterate France's determination to stand by her Russian ally, whatever the consequences. The streets in the cities were filled with agitated crowds discussing the situation and ready to lynch any Germans. Pourtales saw Sazonov, and delivered an ultimatum which ordered Russia to stop mobilisation. But after the bloody events in Belgrade, and with mobilisation slowly but successfully proceeding, the ultimatum obviously could not be accepted. Even the Tsar came to the conclusion that nothing else could now be done, and at 4 pm he signed the final order for general mobilisation. On July 31 the mobilisation order was decreed officially at dawn (it had been made public by accident the night before). Pourtales could still not believe this and had an audience with the Tsar in which he asked him to stop the decree. But by then no one could stop the military machine. The general mobilisation was received enthusiastically and contrary to all expectation proceeded very smoothly. The solitary, solemn Tsar and his enthusiastic people had only a few hours of peace left. On August 1, 1914 at 7 pm Pourtales arrived with a document declaring war on Russia. Paradoxically it took the Austrians, who were the real cause of the armed consation.
flict,
five
Sazonov
still
more days
to
Further Reading Buchanan, Sir George,
do likewise.
My
Mission to Russia
(Cassell) Letters of the Tsahtsa to the Tsar 1914-1916
S-
i)
A SIGNALLING CAVALRY
CLASS,
ENTRAINING
6.
A SUB-LIEUTENANT.
RUSSIAN
SOLDIERS
HORSES
A contemporary view of the Russian army. Despite its cumbrousness and lack of industrial backing for a large-scale war, the Tsar's
army commanded great respect in the minds Russia's enemies by virtue of its enormous size — even in time of peace. This, combined with the threat of the countless millions
8 iS
of
INFANTRY
ON
MANOEUVRES.
(Duckworth) Nicholas II, Journal Intime (Payot) Paleologue, M., An Ambassador's Memoirs (Hutchinson) The Secret Letters of the Last Tsar (Longman) Wilford, W. T., Rebuilding the Russian Army 1905-1914: the question of a comprehensive plan for national defense (University Microfilms International 1980)
INFANTRY.
who could be
mobilised in time of war, enabled Russia to play a more aggressive role in European affairs than her military power properly warranted. Even so, Germany and Austria-Hungary finally came to the conclusion
that their combined strength to hold Russia's hordes
was
sufficient
N. BRADLEY is Lecturer in International Politics the University of Manchester. He is author of Russia and La Legion Allied Intervention in J. F.
in
Tchecoslovaque en Russie and co-author of Czechoslovakia, Past and Present He has written many articles in several languages and has written a history of the Russian Civil War.
Later in July Bethmann-Hollweg drew a Socialist leader into his confidence about the international situation. He assured him that no action would be taken against the Social Democrats and the Socialist guaranteed that there would be no strikes. Thus Bethmann-Hollweg advised the Kaiser that 'in all events Russia must ruthlessly be put into the wrong.' This was necessary, because it was not against socialist tradition to fight autocratic Russia. The more tensions rose before the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the more Bethmann-Hollweg hoped that
France would ask Russia to remain at peace and the more he hoped that Russian mobilisation would be avoided. Neverthe-
Germany
backed Austria's ultiprepared to bear the military consequences. Meanwhile discussions went on with the various ministries and the military to prepare economic and administrative measures in the event of war. In relation to these preparations diplomatic actions looked more like an attempt to prevent a serious intervention by France and Britain than to reduce the accepted less,
the brink of war
matum and was
situation in which Germany found herself in June 1914, surrounded by the Entente powers, seemed solvable only in military terms, and thus Germany supported Austria-Hungary in her demands on Serbia. Realising that this would probably lead to a European war, the German authorities used the remaining month of peace to put their own house in order so that the war could be prosecuted with the support of the whole German people
The
escalation of risks. When the state of mobilisation was finally declared and Germany prepared to fight a war against France and Russia, it was the outcome of a long political development in Germany. In this respect the years preceding the decision to risk war on July 5/6 were more important than the period between July 6 and the outbreak of
war.
The assassination of Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, unleashed pressures, considerations and hopes which were too difficult to control. Whereas the public remained undisturbed, leading circles in the government were preparing for war. Already on July 2, the Saxon Ambassador to Berlin reported back to his ministry that 'the military side now again urges the government to risk a war at a moment when Russia is not ready'. A day later the Saxon military attache had gained the impression that 'one would consider it favourably if a war were to break out now. Relations and prospects could not get better for us.'
When the Austrian appeal for help was sent to Berlin on July 5/6, the Kaiser and the Chancellor reacted favourably to a suggested military solution to the Serbian problem. The Kaiser assured Austria of Germany's full support even in the event of 'grave European complications'. The Austrian ambassador was then able to pass on to Vienna what amounted to a 'blank cheque' from the Germans and reported that the Kaiser 'would regret it if we let this present chance, which was so favourable to us, go by without utilising it'. When the Kaiser arrived on July 6 in Kiel to start his usual North Sea cruise, 'in order not to alarm world opinion', as he said himself, he informed Krupp, the steel and armaments magnate, at dinner that he would declare war at once if Russia mobilised. This time people would see that he was not 'dropping out'. The Kaiser's repeated protestations that in this case no one would ever again be able to reproach him with indecision were almost comic to hear. This remark is understandable if the Pan-German threats against imperial weakness are borne in mind. (After the outbreak of war thi Pan-Germans made peace with the Kaiser. They thought that 100
their national opposition to the Kaiser had been wrong and that their campaign for war in the previous years had been premature. To their mind the Kaiser had been right to wait so long because he had to
ensure that the people were with him.) After the fateful decision in Berlin during these two days, policy had to be ordered in such a way that the outcome was advantageous to Germany. The minimum programme seemed to be a localised war against Serbia and the preservation of Austrian unity. If that entailed humiliation for Russia on the Balkan issue, it would be welcomed. If Russia went to war that would cause Germany to help Austria and to launch attacks on France and Russia This situation was called by the Germans a 'European conflagration', and was ac-
would solve a number of if the war were successBritain intervened it would lead to a
ceptable since
it
German problems ful. If
'world war'. This
was equally
acceptable.
Such a policy amounted to an escalating series of risks. If, however, 'war does not break out', the Chancellor told his assistant Riezler, 'if the Tsar is unwilling or France, alarmed, counsels peace, we have the prospect of splitting the Entente. But this was wishful thinking on Bethmann-Hollweg's part. The generals and the right wing would not have been satisfied with a local action against Serbia alone. All diplomacy besides military preparations seemed to be unreal after the basic decision for war had been reached in Berlin. The aim could not have been to reduce the danger of war; if that had been so, the crisis of July would have been managed in a different way.
The goal was
either to gain a series of diplomatic successes cheaply or to launch a war in which Germany appeared as a defensive power rather than the aggressor. This was particularly important to placate the German Social Democrats.
Thus at the end of July Moltke repeated his earlier arguments in favour of war. He told the Bavarian ambassador that this moment, which would not be repeated in the foreseeable future, was most suitable for war. The reasons were: the superiority of German artillery and the German rifle, the insufficient training of the French soldiers because of the change from a twoyear to a three-year period of service, the good harvest in Germany and the state of readiness of the German army. After the government had accepted the what happened among the people? Except for the Social Democrats, who demonstrated against war from July 25 to July 30, the atmosphere was full of expectant anxiety. After mobilisation had been declared, enthusiasm began to sweep over the country, but this emerged fully only after the war had started. The socalled 'August enthusiasm' was so strong that a well-known sociologist commented: 'The whole German society had been changed into a community, and the nation was inspired by and for war.' In 1917 Bethmann-Hollweg looked back upon August 1914 as a period in which the longing and striving for a new state and a new people, which found its expression in this mass enthusiasm, moved him tremendously. risk of war,
Further Reading L, The Origins of the War of 1914
Albertini,
(OUP
1966)
Dedijer, V., Fischer, F.,
The Road to Sarajevo (OUP 1966) Germany's Aims in the First World
War (Chatto & Windus
1967) July 1914, The Outbreak of the First World War (Batsford 1967) Journal of Contemporary History 1914 Vol 1 No 3 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1966) Krieger, L. and Stern, F. (eds.), The Responsibility of Power (Macmillan 1968) Tuchman, B., August 1914 (Constable 1962) Geiss,
I.,
« \
h>*q Many
reservists
were glad
to find
themselves
in
uniform again -not
all
for the reasons
suggested by
this
German cartoon
V*_*
.>»»
*-"
AMI
.«.'.
•;-^ rt
^^
~&r
*
tJ
.
:
rf?
>. x
?
^
ML I jjrf The first intimation of the now inevitable war — a German officer reads out the Kaiser's order for mobilisation on August 1
Decked out as if for a wedding, farm boys gleefully set out for their mustering place afterthe declaration of mobilisation
H.W. Nevinson was a famous prewar journalist and was sent by his newspaper, the Daily News, to cover the last days of
Patriotism
and war fever
German troops, agents of an aggressive nation's ambitions
peace in Berlin. He describes the almost hysterical war fever which gripped the city at the beginning of August 1914, his experiences in the capital of a country at war with his own, and his departure from the city with the British Ambassador
On
the evening of July 31 I started for Down the midnight Channel the searchlights were turning and streaming in Berlin.
long, white wedges. Passing into Germany, at once met trains full of working men in horse-trucks decked with flowers, and
we
scribbled
over
Nach Paris
with
chalk
(To Paris),
Nach
inscriptions:
Petersburg,
but none so far Nach London. They were cheering and singing, as people always cheer and sing when war is coming. We were only six hours later in Berlin, but my luggage was lost in the chaos of crowds rushing home from their summer holidays, and I never recovered it, though
among the know many of
in the middle of the war I received a postcard that had somehow arrived through Holland, telling me that the porter with whom I had left the Schein, or registration ticket, had found the luggage, and what should I like done with it? A fine example of international honesty. For two days I waited and watched. Up and down the wide road of Unter den Linden crowds paced incessantly by day and night, singing the German war songs: Was blasen die Trompeten? which is the finest; Deutsch-
Lieb Vaterland kann ruhig sein! Fest steht und treu die Wacht, Die Wacht am Rhein.
Deutschland iiber Alles, which land, comes next, and Die Wacht am Rhein, which was the most popular. As I walked
a-tiptoe for war, because they
A German
infantry-
man. Well trained and enthusiastic, the infantry formed the backbone of the
German army
to
and
came
to
fro
patriot crowd, I the circling and
returning faces by sight, and I still have in mind the face of one young working woman who, with mouth that opened like a cavern, and with the rapt devotion of an ecstatic saint, was continuously chanting:
clearly
known
Sometimes a company of insometimes a squadron of horse went down the road westward, wearing the new grey uniforms in place of the familiar it.
fantry,
Prussian blue. They passed to probable death amid cheering, hand-shaking, gifts
and of food. Sometimes the Kaiser
of flowers
swept along in his
So the interminable crowds went past, had never
in full
uniform
fine motor, the chauffeur
clearing the way by perpetually sounding the four notes which wicked Socialists interpreted as saying Das Volk bezahlt! ('The People pays!'). Cheered he was certainly, but everyone believed or knew that the Kaiser himself had never wished for
A Jager, or rifleman. More lightly equipped than the standard infantry of the line, the Jager regiments were used for skirmishing and scouting
103
intervals when we had to pass through the cordons of cavalry drawn up for defence of our Embassy. On my return the director of the hotel was much moved, and wrung my hand with protestations of sorrow and regard, declaring that only by allowing his patriotism to supersede his reason had he charged me with instigating the war, which was absurd. The chambermaid was also much moved, refusing to be comforted, because her three brothers and her lover were already on the march. So, imitating to myself the saying of the herald who proclaimed the beginning of the long war between Athens and Sparta — 'This day sees the beginning of many sorrows for the most civilised peoples of the world' — I slept as best I could, and next morning I went about the city purchasing a few necessary things. All was quiet, and life seemed going on much as usual but for the excited crowds gathered round the newspaper offices, and the removal of all English and French names from the shops and banks. Even the sacred name of Cook was gone. In the evening, however, I received a kindly invitation from Sir Edward Goschen to come into the
Embassy, which had been barricaded. As the Adlon was getting cleared for German officers, I gladly went, and was welcomed A young German
soldier bids farewell to his civilian
Military discipline
is
war. He claimed the title of FriedensKaiser (The Kaiser of Peace') just as many have chosen to call our Edward VII 'The Peace-Maker'. The most mighty storm of cheering was reserved for the Crown Prince, known to be at variance with his father in longing to test his imagined genius on the field. Him the people cheered, for they had never known war. Every moment a new rumour whirled through the maddened city. Every hour a new edition of the papers appeared. All day long, and far through the night into the next day, I went backward and forward to the telegraph office, trying to send home all the descriptive news I could. How much of it went I never knew, but when at last I succeeded in reaching the head censor himself, he received me politely and said that in future I might telegraph in English instead of my German, if I came direct to him. I think he was too serious and too courteous to be mocking me, but telegrams had already ceased to run, and no more went. On the morning of the fatal 4th, I drove to the Schloss, where the Deputies of the Reichstag were gathered to hear the Kaiser's address. Refused permission to enter, I waited outside, and gathered only rumours of the speech that declared the unity of all Germany and all German parties in face of the common peril. A few hours later, in the Reichstag, the Chancellor,
Bethmann-Hollweg,
announced
that under the plea of necessity the neutrality of Belgium had almost certainly already been violated. Then I knew that the
long-dreaded moment had come. In the afternoon I heard that our Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, had de-
manded his papers, and war was declared. was at the Adlon, having been turned out
I
dangerous foreigner. While I was dining I heard the yells of a crowd shouting outside our Embassy in the neighbouring street, and breaking the windows with loud crashes. Soon the noise of the Bristol as a
104
life
through the iron bars of his call-up centre.
already apparent
came
nearer, and in front of the hotel entrance I could distinguish shouts for the English correspondents to be brought out.
Savagely set upon The wild outcries were chiefly directed against a prominent American correspondent who, in support of his London paper's policy, had been sending messages far from conciliatory. He and my colleague, who was acting with me for the Daily News, were given up to the police by the hotel director, and as I was passing into the front hall to see what was happening, he pointed me out as well. Two of the armed police seized me at once and dragged me out, holding an enormous revolver at each you try to run away,' they kept shouting, 'we will shoot you like a dog!' To which I kept repeating in answer that, under such circumstances, I was not such a pure fool as to try to run away. During this conversation they flung me out into the ear. 'If
mob, who savagely set upon me with sticks, fists and umbrellas. But I did not pay much attention to their onslaughts, for I had suffered worse at Suffrage demonstrations. Seated beside me, and holding the revolvers still in uncomfortable proximity to my skull, the police then took me, with a Dutch correspondent, by taxi to the Praesidium, or central police court (a kind of Scotland Yard). There our treatment became more courteous, and after we had made our statements and shown our passports we were dismissed, with a note guaranteeing protection. But as a scrap of paper seemed insufficient insurance against the fury of a mob inflamed (as German, British, French, and all mobs then were) by the raging patriotism of war, I demanded to be sent back protected as I had come. So back in a taxi I was sent, though protected by only one policeman, who kept his revolver in a more respectful position, and convoyed me to the back door of the hotel, uttering mystic words at
with amazing courtesy. Before dawn on August 6 a string of motors was waiting outside the Embassy, sent by the Kaiser's orders to convey the
Ambassador and his staff to a local station, a few miles away from Berlin. Again by the courtesy of Sir Edward Goschen, a few of us correspondents were invited to join the staff, and I hardly realised at the time from what a hideous destiny that invitation
preserved me. I suppose I should have been kept shut up in Ruhleben or some similar camp for four and a half years, and been unable to play any part in the historic events to come. But from such loss our Ambassador saved me, and for twenty-four hours his train carried us all slowly lumbering through North Germany to the Dutch frontier. On our way we passed or were impeded by uncounted vans decorated with boughs of trees and crammed with reservists going to the Belgian front. The men had now chalked Nach Bruxelles or Nach London as well as Nach Paris on the vans, and at every station they were met by bands of Red Cross girls bringing coffee, wine,
and food. At all the larger
stations, too, the news of our train's approach had been signalled, and to cheer us on our way all the old men, boys and women of the place had flocked
down with any musical instruments they could collect, and, standing thick on the platform, they played for us the German national tunes, 'Deutschland, Deutschland' predominating. They played with the persistence of the German bands known to me in childhood. Sometimes, to impress their patriotism more distinctly upon us,
they brought their instruments close up to the carriage windows, and the shifting tubes of the trombones came right into the carriage. Silent and unmoved, as an Englishman should, sat Sir Edward Goschen, looking steadily in front of him, with hands on his knees, making as though no sight or sound had reached his senses. [From a contemporary report by H. W. Nevinson, war correspondent of the Daily News.]
and
to the Triple Alliance
by the Russian
policy of alliances on the Balkans. As far as our relations with Serbia are concerned,
AUSTRIA-
HUNGARY the brink of war The news of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand was at first received calmly in Vienna, but as war fever mounted, the war party saw their chance and pressed again for a war with Serbia. In Austria-Hungary the various nationalist elements either rallied behind the war effort or prepared themselves to take advantage of the dislocation which the war would bring Z. AS. Zeman On
the evening of June 28, 1914, a friend asked Count Paar, the Emperor's aide-decamp, how the ruler had taken the news of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. Paar replied: The Emperor did not say very much about today's frightful stroke of fate. He was deeply in the first moment and seemed to be moved by the blow; he closed his eyes for several minutes and seemed wholly lost in thought. Then, however, he spoke — not really to me, but to himself— the words seemed to burst from his breast— 'Horrible! The Almighty permits no challenge! ... higher Power has restored the order that I was unhappily unable to maintain.' Finally, with every sign of profound emo-
shaken
A
he turned to me and commanded our return to Vienna for the morrow. Otherwise, not a word more. Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne, had broken the Habsburg tion,
'order of legitimacy' by his morganatic marriage to Sophie Countess Chotek. The Emperor had never forgiven him and now, at last, an act of God restored the order. Josef Redlich, the historian and politician, recorded in his diary on the day of the Sarajevo assassinations: It is a day of historical significance. It is impossible to tell whether it bodes well or much worse for Austria. The fateful hour approaches for the Habsburgs: for the first time, a Habsburg has been killed by the son of a Balkan people who are deadly enemies oftheAustroHungarian Empire, of the Germans and of Catholicism. The impossibility of a peaceful coexistence between the half-German monarchy, allied with Germany, and the nationalism of the Balkan peoples, whipped up to the lust to kill, should now be clear to everyone. I doubt whether the 84-year-old
man has the strength to draw the necessary conclusions from this event. As far as I can see Vienna is taking the news quietly: because it is a Sunday afternoon the news is spreading slowly. There exist deep antipathies against the Archduke, reaching down among the wide masses of the people. A day later, the Russian ambassador to Vienna reported to St Petersburg that: 'The tragic end of Archduke Franz Ferdinand found little response in financial circles here and on the stock exchange — that index of the mood in business circles. The value of government stocks did not change, which is explained here by confidence in the continuation of peace.' On several occasions in the past, the Emperor had resisted pressure from Conrad von Hbtzendorf, the Chief-of-Staff, for a preventive war on Serbia. We have no evidence that he immediately gave way to that pressure after June 28, 1914, but we know that he made no determined effort to stop the diplomatic and military moves that led to the declaration of war on Serbia a month later. At lunch on July 5, the Austrian ambassador to Berlin handed over a letter from his Emperor to the Kaiser, together with a detailed memorandum on the situation in the Balkans. Wilhelm II read the documents at once and carefully, and then said that he expected Austria-Hungary to act against Serbia. He added however that, since the conflict might have severe European repercussions, he had to consult his Chancellor. On the following day, the ambassador reported to Vienna that the German government 'recognized the danger presented to Austria-Hungary
the German government's standpoint is that we should judge ourselves what is to be done to clear up the relationship; in this respect, we can rely on Germany as an ally and friend, whatever course we take.' Later in the conversation with BethmannHollweg, the German Chancellor, the ambassador was able to ascertain that 'the Chancellor, like his Imperial master, regards our immediate intervention against Serbia as the most radical and best solution of our difficulties on the Balkans.' Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister, made certain of Germany's support; he did not, however, make equally careful enquiries as to the course of action Russia proposed to take. In that he abandoned the cautious diplomatic practice of his predecessor, Baron Aehrenthal. Anyway, the Imperial Crown Council decided on war against Serbia as early as July 7, 1914. It did so against the advice of Count Tisza, the Prime Minister of Hungary. On the following day, Tisza sent a closely argued memorandum to the Emperor in which he stated: 'an attack of this kind on Serbia would be bound, in all human probability, to involve Russian intervention and thus lead to world war.' There was no doubt that the decision taken by the Crown Council would set in motion the whole European system of alliances. The rest of the events that led to the declaration of war on Serbia have the air about them of a mere formality. At 6 pm on July 23 the Austrian Minister to Bel-
grade handed over an ultimatum to the Serbian government. Its conditions were stiff, and the time it gave the Serbs to fulfil them was ominously brief. A few minutes before the 48 hours' moratorium ran out, Pasic, the Serbian prime minister, arrived at the Austro-Hungarian legation. His reply was officially described by the Austrians as 'unsatisfactory'. Half an hour later, the Minister and other members of the Austrian mission to Belgrade left the town. On July 28, 1914 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia.
War fever builds up In the meanwhile, the mood in Vienna began slowly to change. At first, the events in Sarajevo, which had been extensively
reported in the press, found no reflection in the popular mood. On Sunday and Mon-
day no one seemed to be mourning Franz Ferdinand, and people pursued their usual mid-summer amusements. By July 15 it was an open secret on the margins of political life in Vienna and Budapest that inevitable. Even formerly sensible, intelligent and moderate politicians consoled themselves with the thought that the
war was
war, and the sacrifices it would entail, would bring the Germans and the Slavs together. On Sunday, July 26, there were demonstrations in Vienna urging war and further demonstrations broke on subsequent days. They were largely organised by the Christian Socialists. The Social
Democrats remained
aloof.
of the latter party were still highly critical of the policies of the Austro-
The leaders
Hungarian government. On July 24 the Democrat newspaper, the ArbeiterZeitung, accused the government of trying to provoke a war with Serbia by making demands which were meant to give 'the Social
105
utmost offence to the self-respect of the Serbian state, so as to ensure that they would not be accepted'. The editorial asked the European Great Powers to restrain Austria and offer arbitration. On the following day the German-Austrian Social Democrat deputies issued a proclamation saying: 'everything desired by AustriaHungary for the protection of its national interest may be obtained by peaceful means', and they put responsibility for the imminent war squarely on the shoulders of their government. But the party was not united in its condemnation of the war. The news, on August 4, that the German Social Democrats had swung behind their government and voted for war removed the doubts that existed among the Austrian socialist leaders. Like many other socialists on the Continent, they looked up to the German organisation which had done so much to advance the cause of socialism. The Reichsrat in Vienna was not meeting, however, and the Austrians were at least spared the ignominy of having to vote for the war and the ways of financing it. The party rank-and-file were now free to go out into the streets and take part in the demonstrations.
'A historic is
moment
approaching
The
.' .
.
Russia had joined the hosalso contributed to easing what remained of the pacific consciences of the socialists of the Central Powers. They had always considered the Empire of the Tsars to be the 'fortress of European reaction' and there existed perhaps the chance that fact that
tilities
it
would be swept away by the war. Their anti-Russian feelings made it easy Austria to accept the war.
for the Poles in
Polish Socialists had advanced, from the time of the Balkan crisis in 1912, the idea of fighting for the unity and liberation of Poland on the side of Austria and Germany in a war on Russia. The Polish Social Democrat party in Galicia and Silesia (PPS) called on the workers on August 1 (before the issue of war and peace had been definitely settled) to take an active part in any such war. Their manifesto proclaimed: 'a historic moment is approaching for our land and our Pilsudski's
people, a
moment when we
shall
commence
the
struggle against the centuries-old enemy of Poland, the moment of our struggle against Tsarism.' The support of the socialists for the war was in step with the other Polish parties and politicians in Austria. No other nationality in the Habsburg Empire, neither the Czechs, nor the South Slavs, gave the war such an undivided support. No scenes of wild popular enthusiasm after the declaration of war were recorded in Zagreb or Prague. This did not mean that their politicians were disloyal to the
monarchy and bent on rebellion. Only a few of them revised their policies about the Habsburg state after the declaration of war on Serbia. But the war itself was a dramatic change in the political life of the monarchy:
its
consequences played them-
selves out later.
The Re'chsrat
in
Vienna was not
re-
called during the crisis or even after its
106
usual summer recess (the parliament in Buda-Pest, on the other hand, went on meeting), and the deputies in Austria were confined to the rumour-ridden, stifling atmosphere of their provincial towns. At the same time, the war gave the military extensive powers over the civilian population, and the soldiers did not always use them wisely, especially when dealing with the Slavs. Finally, the war promised to undo the political developments, at any rate those in the Austrian part of the monarchy of the four decades or so before 1914. We have seen that the Germans had been made
withdraw from their more advanced positions of political power: immediately after July 28 there appeared signs that
to
they were resolved to use the war for getting them back. There was the alliance with Germany to give them added courage
and
resolution.
Slavs in exile
Among the
Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes, the
politicians in Dalmatia were the most articulate advocates of South Slav unity. Many of them were bilingual, Italian being their second language; they were of the generation that had witnessed the last stages of the unification of Italy. They now looked towards Belgrade to give a lead in the work for the unity of the South Slavs. Serbia was to be their Piedmont. As early as 1913, soon after the partial mobilisation
by Austria-Hungary, Ivan Mestrovic, the well-known Dalmatian sculptor and > amateur politician, went to see the Serbian § premier in Belgrade. Pasic, who had just returned from St Petersburg, told him that war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was only a question of time. On his return to Dalmatia, Mestrovic informed Frano Supilo, a journalist from Fiume, and Ante Trumbic, the Croat Reichsrat deputy from Spalato, of his conversation with Pasic. The three men then discussed the possibility of a war transcending the Balkan context. When, a year later, Austria declared war on Serbia, Mestrovic, Trumbic and Supilo were in Rome, by no means surprised by the new turn of events. They provided the nucleus of the leadership of the South Slav committee in exile. Pan-Slav and pro-Russian sympathies that had existed among the Czechs before the war provided the basis for dissent after its outbreak. Karel Kramer, the leader of the chauvinist, middle class Young Czech party, had been in touch with the Russian Foreign Ministry about the creation of a Slav Empire in central Europe. (The Russian diplomats, it should be said, were highly sceptical of Kramer's plans.) In spite of censorship,
Kramer
suc-
ceeded in making his point in the party newspaper on August 4, the day of German invasion of Belgium: The historical moment which so many have feared and so many have expected, has arrived. The words of the German Chancellor about the fight between the Slavs and the Teutons have become a reality. The policy of the European Powers will be brought to judgement — now all the mistakes of internal policy will have to be accounted for. We shall go as far as to say that at the end of this war we shall hardly recognise the map ofEurope. Top left: Enthusiastic Vienna crowds display placards of the Kaiser and Franz Josef. Top right: Austro-Hungarian troops are given a send off from Vienna, and (below) from Prague
In a conflict between the Teutons and the Slavs Kramer knew that every member of his party would support the right side: later during the same month, and in September, Pan-Slav sympathies occasioned disturbances as the Czech troops were leaving for the front. Thomas Masaryk, professor of philosophy at the Czech university in Prague and a deputy in the Reichsrat for a small political party, also turned against the Habsburg monarchy on the outbreak of the war. He did so for reasons different from Kramaf's. Masaryk was not convinced of the strength and stability of the Tsarist state: when Britain and her Empire came into the war he realised that the Central Powers could not win, and that the Czechs would form an independent state at the conclusion of the war. In any case, Kramaf was soon arrested
i?> ^^^V^' ^\ lit
»' -\4k
\
'
7--*^*5ilBEr.s
and Masaryk went into Ilk
^ _
J>'-V
"*fi-
r^ *
^
li*vk<
YiJSttff'rJ o.
exile.
They
rep-
resented then a small but significant trend in Czech political thinking and a fraction of the electorate. The Agrarians and the Social Democrats, the two biggest political organisations, took a different view of the situation. The Social Democrat daily put it this way, on August 5, 1914: The Czech nation, because of its international position, has to rely on Austria in the future, and it must work for the reform of the state according to its needs. It is in the situation of a man who occupies, for the time being, small rooms in a house best
S suited to his needs. His endeavour should % therefore not be directed towards either g demolishing the house or moving somewhere else, but to negotiating better living conditions for himself. By then, when the first news from battlefields all over Europe started reaching Vienna, the political leadership of the monarchy was once again united. Tisza,
the Hungarian premier, had been won over to the plan of an ultimatum to Serbia by the promise that no annexations of Serbian territory by Austria-Hungary would take place, and by the optimism in Berlin as to the future of the Austrian adventure in the Balkans. The socialists in the monarchy had also dropped their reservations about the war on the foreign enemy, thereby temporarily renouncing their peacetime policy of struggle against their class enemy at
home.
Open
opposition to
political
war
dis-
appeared and was replaced by secret opposition to the existence of the monarchy Early in August 1914 this was in its initial stages, unorganised and dispersed.
itself.
The war transformed it into an organised mass movement, so powerful that, in its last stages, it could afford to come into the open. Further Reading May, A., The Hapsburg Monarchy 1867-1914 Volume 1 (Oxford University Press 1961) Steed, W., The Hapsburg Monarchy (1913) Shamafelt, G. W., The secret enemy: Austria-
Hungary and
the
German
Alliance
(Michigan:
University Microfilms International 1982)
Taylor,
A.
J.
The
P.,
Habsburg
Monarchy
(Peregrine Books 1967)
Zeman, Z. A. B., Breakup of the Hapsburg Empire 1914-1918 (OUP 1961)
ZEMAN was
born in Prague and was Great Britain. He has taught history at the Universities of London, Oxford, and St Andrews. K.s published works include: Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918, The Breakup of the Hapsburg Empire, 1914-1918, and Nazi Z.
A.
B.
educated there and
Propaganda.
in
Great Britain the brink of war As war loomed on the European horizon, Britain found herself torn between two possibilities — to take an active part in the war, or to hold herself aloof from what many considered to be just another continental imbroglio. When Belgian neutrality was violated, however, Britain could not afford to stand aloof, and entered the war enthusiastically and with very few dissenters Asa Briggs 'On Sunday, the 28th June,' James William Lowther, the Speaker of the House of Commons, wrote of the year 1914, 'we were staying at Balls Park near Hertford with a large party as the guests of Sir George and Lady Fauld Phillips. In the middle of dinner Mr
Harry Lawson (now Lord Burham) was summoned to the telephone, and returned with the news of the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his consort at Sarajevo. The news was startling and its importance was at once recognised by the party, though we little foresaw to what terrible and earthshaking events it would eventually lead.' There must have been many other house parties in England where the news was greeted in the same way. Yet there was little general recognition at first that Britain, torn by its own domestic conflicts, would be drawn into the struggle. What was happening in Dublin seemed far more important than what had happened at Sarajevo. So, indeed, were what Lloyd George called 'the muddy byways of Fermanagh and Tyrone' which the Cabinet was discussing when the Austrians issued their peremptory note to Serbia on July 23. An Englishman who spent the second week of July in Berlin was puzzled 'in that electrical atmosphere' to notice 'the unconsciousness that the English Press exhibited of the significance of events on the Continent'. It was not until the very last day of July, three days after Austria had declared war on Serbia, that The Times, read throughout Europe as if it were an official mouthpiece of British policy, wrote that if Germany backed Austria in its struggle against Serbia, a German advance through Belgium to the north of France was possible and might enable
eir solidarity
ith
France
at
Germany
to acquire possession of Antwerp, Flushing and even of Calais, which might then become German naval
Dunkirk and
bases against England. 'That is a contingency which no Englishman can look upon with indifference.' The Times asked for immediate action. 'If it is merely a contingency, why should England not wait until it is realised before acting or preparing to act?' it asked, already somewhat rhetorically. 'Because,' was the answer, 'in these days of swift decision and swifter action, it would be too late for England to act with any degree of success after France had been defeated in the north.' Not everyone agreed with the answer offered by The Times. Indeed, within the Liberal Cabinet itself there were the sharpest divisions. The memories of the last war in which Britain had been involved, the Boer War, still influenced Liberal attitudes. The 'Liberal Imperialists' — Grey, Haldane, Churchill and Asquith himself— were preoccupied with the 'national interest', particularly at moments of emergency: 'if Germany dominated the Continent,' Grey wrote almost laconically, 'it would be disagreeable to us as well as others, for we should be isolated.' By contrast, the 'Little Englanders', as they were called by their opponents, inherited a Gladstonian distaste for European entanglements. They included John Morley, Gladstone's biographer, who had been bitterly opposed to Winston Churchill's test mobilisation of the British Third Fleet on July 15 and the decision, supported by the Cabinet on July 25, to put into force 'precautionary period' regulations which had been carefully planned earlier. He did not know just how far Churchill had gone in making sure that the
the outbreak of war. The French flag and the Union Jack are displayed side by side
did not disperse, but he felt that he could count on 'eight or nine likely to agree with us' against measures being pursued by Churchill with 'daemonic energy' and by Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, with 'strenuous simplicity'. He knew that he had the backing not only of Lewis Harcourt, the son of the old liberal leader, Sir William Harcourt, but of powerful City of London bankers and financiers and of C. P. Scott, the influential editor of the Manchester Guardian who had written on July 27 that 'the only course for us would be to make it plain from the first that if Russia and France went to war [against Germany and Austria] we should not be in it'. He knew, too, that many influential Conservatives were less bellicose than some of the Conservative newspapers. The critical day was Saturday, August 1. According to King George V 'public opinion here' was 'still dead against our joining in the war'. The Stock Exchange had been closed on the Friday, and fears were being expressed in London that credit had collapsed and 'bankruptcy on a wholesale scale' was likely. A caucus of Liberal MPs voted by 19 votes to 4 in the lobby of the House of Commons that England should remain neutral: they had doubtless read in their copy of that week's Punch: fleet
'Why should I follow your fighting line For a matter that's no concern of mine? I shall be asked to a general scrap All over the European map, Dragged into someone else's war, For that's what a double entente is
.
.
.
for.'
Yet when the Cabinet met, Churchill was 'very bellicose and demanding immediate mobilisation', Grey was comparing the German leaders with Napoleon and telling the Prime Minister, Asquith, that he would resign 'if an out-and-out uncompromising policy of non-intervention at all costs' were adopted, and Lloyd George was hesitating. The most interesting exchange of that day was a set of notes passed across in the Cabinet meeting between Lloyd George and Churchill. 'Please God — it is our whole future, comrades — or opponents,' Churchill wrote, 'the march of events will be dominating.' It was. The issue turned increasingly on Belgian neutrality, and on the same day Grey sent for the German ambassador to
warn him
of the great seriousness of a
German
refusal to respect
Belgian neutrality. If Belgian neutrality were violated, he said, it would be difficult to restrain public opinion in England. Although on August 2 there was still a strong group inside the Liberal government against intervention — one member of the Cabinet, John Burns, the ex-trade union leader, resigned — the Cabinet decided to implement promises given by Grey to the
At Trafalgar Square recruiting office
young men sign onforthe King's
French years before not to allow the German Fleet to turn the Channel into 'a base of hostile operations'. When Germany announced her intention of marching through Belgium and, if opposed, to treat Belgium as an enemy, the march of events was beginning to seem inexorable. 'Happily,' Asquith wrote with remarkable self-confidence, 'I am quite clear in my mind as to what is right and wrong.' Britain had no 'obligation of any kind' to France or Russia to give them military or naval help, but 'we must not forget the ties created by our longer standing and intimate friendship with France'. Above all, 'we have obligations to Belgium to prevent it being utilized and absorbed by Germany'. On August 3, Morley and Sir John Simon, a liberal of younger vintage, also resigned from the government, and Grey, who had for years pursued a foreign policy, the details of which had seldom been fully discussed with other Ministers, gave full assurances to France. He also told the House of Commons in what Asquith called an 'extraordinarily well reasoned and tactful and really cogent speech' that if Britain did not stand by France and stand up for Belgium 'we should be isolated, discredited and hated'. According to Asquith, the speech reduced the 'extreme peacelovers' to momentary silence. According to Grey, when he delivered the speech he was 'stirred with resentment and indignation' at what seemed to him 'Germany's crime in precipitating the war'. 'The tense atmosphere, the supreme importance of the occasion, the doubt as to the future, the fine voice and presence of the speaker, his suppressed but still evident emotion,' wrote Lowther, 'added to the terrible interest of his description of the situation ... I was forcibly reminded [and it was a curious comparison] of John Bright's speech on the eve of the Crimean War, when he spoke of the Angel of Death and the fluttering of his wings — almost credible in the House itself. This was certainly the greatest and most thrilling occasion I ever witnessed in the House.' Grey's speech, which was delivered on the day when the King of the Belgians made 'a supreme appeal' to Great Britain, (Grey read out to the House King Albert's telegram to King George V) certainly won immediate support from all sides, not least from the Irish. John Redmond, the Irish leader, declared his full approval of British assistance for Belgium. Given the alarming intensity of the Irish question even a few days earlier, this was a bold and significant gesture. Bonar Law's approval on behalf of the Conservatives showed that all Parliament was prepared to enter a war the full consequences of which were not even dimly perceived. Whatever the reactions inside Parliament, it was still not clear just what would be the reactions outside. The City remained hostile to war: 'money,' Lloyd George was to write later, 'was a frightened and trembling thing. Money shivered at the prospect. Big Business everywhere wanted to keep out.' So too, it seemed, did substantial sections of labour. On August 1 and 2 huge 'Stop
shilling, the traditional token of recruitment into the
Army 109
the War' meetings had been held in provincial towns and cities under the Labour Party's auspices. Macdonald, the Labour Party's leader, had been strongly opposed to Grey's decision in 1907 to extend the entente with France to Tsarist Russia; he had objected to the 'Naval Scare' in 1909: in 1911 he had urged that British workers should join their foreign comrades in a general strike 'if the Great Powers were foolish enough to go to war'; and he had been one of Churchill's fiercest opponents. 'Mr. Churchill,' he had written in 1913, 'is a very dangerous man to put at the head of our fighting services. He treats them as hobbies.' Many radicals, some of them with unbending nonconformist backgrounds, shared the same distaste for all forms of militarism, and some of them formed a 'Neutrality League' to try to stop 'the drift to war'. Britain, the League urged, was obliged to protest against the German assault on Belgium but not to /go to Belgium's aid. 'If Britain did intervene successfully in Germany,' one of them, Arnold Rowntree, a member of the well-known Quaker business family argued, 'Russian despotism would become dominant in Europe.' C. P. Scott was even more trenchant. 'We care as little for Belgrade as Belgrade does for Manchester,' he had said when the
was at its height, and on August 4, the day after Grey's speech, the Manchester Guardian was still complaining that 'for all its appearance of candour' the speech was 'not fair either to the House of Commons or to the country.' Grey need have had no fears, however, for it was already beginning to be clear by August 2 and August 3 that these were sophisticated minority voices. Indeed, it reveals much about stratified British society on the eve of the war and the difficulties of communicating effectively across the social divides that Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, waited anxiously while Grey, the supreme aristocrat, was making his speech to discover even what Parliamentary reactions would be. 'There is a good deal of active opposition,' he said to a friend, 'and the crisis has come about so rapidly that the country does not know what it is all about.' They discussed the situation until a secretary came into the room with a slip of paper from his tape machine. 'They have cheered him, sir,' he said. A little later his private secretary burst into the room. 'He has had a tremendous reception, sir,' he told Nicolson. 'Thank God,' was Nicolson's response. 'Now the course is clear, but it will be a terrible business.' crisis
ALHAMBRA
T-;>
'Now the course
For the
was
G3@T LIKELY! fc.
A
REVUE
time since Waterloo Britain
in a major European war. the European Powers Britain was the least prepared emotionally to go to war, and many areas of opinion in the country were wholly opposed to war. Top: Only a few days before the Irish had been at the brink of civil war over the Home Rule question. Here Irishmen in London support Britain's defence of Belgian neutrality. Left and right: War erupted, quite unpardonably, in the middle of the London Season. A theatre poster (left) advertises a light hearted farce. Tea in
Of
rr»«
first
is clear'
to
be involved
all
Kensington Gardens (right) was in those days an enjoyable occupation. Centre right and far right: Into this peaceful world broke the demand for mobilisation and the declaration of war
The cheers came from outside as well as inside Parliament, and they were resounding ones. August 3 was August Bank Holiday, and the sun was shining brightly. Even on the Sunday cabinet ministers had heard the 'hum' of a 'surging mass' outside 10 Downing Street. By Monday the crowds were so dense that motor cars could not get through. There were cheers for ministers, and the sounds of God Save the King, the Marseillaise and 'Poor Little Belgium'. The invasion of Belgium, which began on August 4, was an ideal issue on which to appeal outside Parliament to the largest possible public. A War Council had been held on August 3, and Haldane had put through the orders for the mobilisation of the army, the reserves and the territorials. On the 4th, Asquith told the House of Commons that the British government had given the Germans until midnight to provide assurances, which obviously would not be given, that Belgian neutrality would be respected. At 11 pm (English time), therefore, two countries were at war. A huge crowd outside Buckingham Palace cheered the King, Queen and the Prince of Wales, who appeared on the balcony. Farther along the Mall another patriotic crowd was smashing the windows of the German embassy. Very soon, all was bustle and movement,
for as C. E. Montague wrote, 'the purposeful people' quickly found things to do, while 'the rest could at any rate throw the common routine of their lives into confusion and give themselves the sensation of living at high pressure, hustled by mighty events'.
Further Reading Dangerfield, G., The Strange Death of Liberal England (MacGibbon 1966) Gardiner, A. G., 7"rie War Lords (1915) Marwick, A., Britain in the Century of Total War(1966), The Deluge (Penguin Books 1967) Masterman, C. F. G., The Condition of England (191 1) Nowell Smith, S. (ed.), Edwardian England (Oxford University Press 1964) Playne, C. E., The Pre-War Mind in Britain (1928), Society at War (1931) Wilson, T., The Downfall of the Liberal Party (1931)
LORD BRIGGS is Chancellor of Oxford University (since 1978) and Provost of Worcester College, Oxford (since 1976). Previously he was Professor of History and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sussex. His publications include Victorian People, The Birth of Broadcasting, The Golden Age of the Wireless and A Study of the Work of Seebohm-Rowntree, 1871-1954. ,
«S*J
-^
*u,>
'?
0i
J— nflb.
Ami
H.*..-.
GENERAL MOBILIZATION Army Reserve
r_
y
itttt AUGUST
5.
1914
(RECULAR AND SPECIAL RESERVISTS).
MAJESTY
HIS
THE KINO
luis
been
graciously pleased to direct bj Proclamation that the Arniv Reserve be called out on permanent service.
ALL RECULAR RESERVISTS
are required
to report
BRITAIN
themselves at once at their place of joining in accordance with the instructions cm their identity certificates for the purpose of joining the Army.
ALL SPECIAL RESERVISTS
*
themselves on such date and
are required to report at such places as they
may
he directed to attend for the purpose of joining If they have not received any such directions, or if they have changed their address since last attendance at drill or training, they will report themselves at once, by letter, to the Adjutant of their Unit or Depot.
the
Army.
The will then
L*#
1^.
necessary instructions as to their joining lie given.
AT
WAR
Australia, The outbreak
New
Zealand, Canada, South Africa — the distant allies
of war in Europe affected the
who had never seen Europe and knew little of its affairs. The Enghshlives of many people
speaking Dominions of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, and the Union of South Africa were all automatically involved in the war on Britain's side. Vital to Britain's survival as producers of food, these countries also
provided soldiers for the Allied cause. Brought up to attitudes of rugged independence, and to open-air, active lives, the soldiers of these nations were to acquire a reputation out of all proportion to their comparatively small numbers. They went to war in a spirit of adventure, combined with a boisterous zest for life
but she also possessed valuable mineral deposits, and occupied acomm anding strategic position in the Pacific and Indian Oceans
A cargo of frozen lamb is embarked at Wellington, New Zealand. Since the development of refrigeration, the export of meat to Europe, primarily Britain, had become of great importance to New Zealand
Canada's small regular army was equipped and organized on the same lines as the British Army Here artillerymen, garrisoned in Nova Scotia, receive instruction in the use of their guns
In spite of the bitter memories of the Boer War (1899-1902) South Africa entered the war in 1914 on the side of Britain. The defeated remnants of a Boer Commando (above) surrender to the British in 1902
A sheep auction cultura
in Australia.
Australia's
economy was
primarily agri-
,
'
4
'
.'
f i
f r*
J^
^ •#* .
;•
7/
%> *
Philippe
Masson
the brink of war A proud and
patriotic
French soldier
is
escorted to the station by his family
x^
The election results of 1914 had shown that pacifist feelings were strong, and that the left wing parties had gained considerable strength. It took only one month of international crisis, however, to sweep away socialist ideals and raise a wave of patriotic fervour which unified the country and carried it into war. At the end of June 1914, France was preoccupied with the summer holidays, the 'Season' was in full swing and the Tour de France had just begun. Naturally the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was headline news on June 29. Few, however, were of the opinion that the incident could lead to war, and interest in the event soon died away. Despite the assassination, the political life of France carried on as usual. 'During the meeting of the Council of Ministers on June 30 we touched on Austria and discussed Religious Orders at great length,' noted Poincare, President of the Republic. Parliament was still engrossed with the question of income tax. Nevertheless, on July 13, Senator Charles Humbert, representing the region of La Meuse, addressed the Senate and attacked the country's military organisation, denouncing the inadequacy of munitions and the lack of heavy artillery. Clemenceau, always sarcastic, affirmed that 'we are neither governed nor defended', and believed it would be more economic to arm soldiers with crossbows, 'seeing as the Ministry of War attached importance only to the morale of the troops!' Even though the parliamentary debates were prolonged on July 14, Bastille Day, nobody seriously believed that war
would break
out.
The general
public was absorbed in the trial of Madame Caillaux. Joseph Caillaux, an eminent bourgeois, had been detested by the centre and right-wing factions ever since he had put forward the idea of income tax. Gaston Calmette, editor of the newspaper Le Figaro, led a violent press campaign against him, laying great stress on the contacts he was supposed to have had with Germany, without the knowledge of the Minister of the Interior, and the protection he had afforded a suspect business man. Finally, he made public some inti-
mate letters exchanged between Caillaux and his wife before their marriage. At the end of her tether, Madame Caillaux killed Gaston Calmette in his office on March 16, 1914. The press and anti-parliamentary circles revelled in the affair and at the opening of the trial, the courtroom was crammed. However, the news of the ultimatum which Austria had issued to Serbia reached Paris on June 24 and pushed all internal problems into the background. On July 29 Madame Caillaux's acquittal caused some interest, whereas a week earlier it would have caused a riot. On the 25th the government recalled soldiers on leave and suspended all manoeuvres. Withdrawals of money from the banks and savings banks increased rapidly. The national press was unanimous: 'However attached one may be to the idea of peace, there comes a time when it is necessary to resort to violence in response
114
to violence
War then becomes
one's sacred
With Europe on the verge of war, France was deprived effectively of government, for on July 15, the President of the Republic, Poincare, and duty.' (La Lanterne.)
the President of the Council of Ministers, Viviani, embarked on the battleship France for Russia, on an official visit which
had been planned some During the course of the
time
earlier.
Poincare reaffirmed France's intention of standing by Russia in the present crisis. Unfortunately, neither Poincare nor Viviani knew of the Austrian ultimatum until June 24 after they had left St Petersburg and were on board ship returning to Paris. The absence of both Presidents at such a crucial moment naturally gave rise to sarcastic comment from Clemenceau. 'At the Elysee Palace and the Quai d'Orsay, Ambassadors jostle around the notice "all enauiries to the hall porter".' visit,
Patriotic ovation On the request of Abel Ferry, UnderSecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Poincare and Viviani cancelled their plan-
ned stops at Copenhagen and Oslo, and arrived at last at La gare du Nord on the morning of July 29 where they were greeted by an ovation from crowds snouting patriotic slogans. T have never found it so difficult,' wrote Poincare, 'both morally and physically, to remain unmoved.' As international relations grew worse hour by hour, and it became known that Russia had started to mobilise, the situation in France was confused. A clash between the extreme left and the extreme right seemed inevitable. Since July 24 young nationalists had marched along the streets of Paris crying 'Long live the army, long live Alsace-Lorraine, down with Germany.' But in the outskirts of Paris the workers replied with the cry 'Long live Peace' and sang 'L'Inter nationale'. On July 27 the trade union publication
La
Bataille Syndicaliste called for a
mass demonstration in the main streets of Paris which would involve tens of thousands. The police reacted with great force. Street battles raged during the evening and 600 demonstrators were arrested. Police caps, hats, walking sticks and umbrellas littered the pavements. Le Temps protested against 'an impious demonstration'. In fact, politicians were curious what the reaction of the socialist party and the trade unions would be in case events necessitated general mobilisation. On July 29, the committee of the International Workers Association (LTnternationale) convened in Brussels. In spite of entreaties on the part of Jaures, the Social Democrats in Germany hesitated in putting pressure on their government. T who have never hesitated to incur the hate of our patriots by my obstinacy and strength of mind and will never weaken in attempting to create closer ties between France and Germany, have the right to state that at this very
working
caught up in the of national excitement, would no longer follow the advice of political leaders or trade unionists. Besides, Jouhaux, Secretary General of the CGT, received no reply on behalf of the Secretary of the Central Trade Union Organisation in Germany. On July 31 the papers announced that general mobilisation in Russia had been decided upon. Patriotic demonstrations multiplied and emotions ran high. Clemenceau entitled a leading article he wrote, On the edge of the precipice. Jaures, fearful and distressed, still called on the common sense of the general public 'so that by means of self control it can overcome panic and nervous tension, and survey the progress of men and things.' of the
general
class,
feeling
Obsessed with the Russian problem, he
was one of the few statesmen who was fully aware of the drama which faced Europe^ 'No, no,' he repeated, 'revolutionary France cannot march behind peasant Russia against reformationist Germany.'
Violent death In the evening as he finished dining at the cafe Le Croissant Jaures was killed by two shots fired by a young fanatic named Raoul Villain. It was obvious that the assassin was intoxicated by the demonstrations calling for war and the frenzied press campaign which had been attacking Jaures for several weeks. L 'Action Frangaise had denounced him as 'a traitor' and 'a scoundrel'. Gohier wanted him to be stuck to
the wall
like
the posters an-
nouncing mobilisation'. According to L'Echc de Paris, Jaures was 'in the service of Germany'. Peguy saw in him 'the Germanophile, the drum-major of capitulation, the man who has always capitulated when confronted by demagogues, the man who has capitulated time and again to the point of insanity'. Jaures' sudden and brutal death posed the question: 'what would his attitude have been during the days which followed?' According to Abel Ferry, Jaures was determined to denounce the instability and levity of the French government, which had fallen victim to the intrigues of the Russian ambassador, Isvolski, and the trap
r Human it e JAURES ASSASSINE *
JOURNAL SOCttUSTE
z
g^ssa.—.! mm huhk ^--^rz.^z
JEAN JAURES
moment
the French govermnent wants peace and is working to maintain peace.' But in Germany, the fear of attack by Russia, which had just mobilised 13 army corps, increased rapidly. In fact the work of Internationale was grinding to a halt. It was no longer a case of resorting to an international general strike 'to take place simultaneously' as Jaures had envisaged only two weeks earlier. It was already obvious that some
U
The death of the great French socialist, Jaures, announced by his own newspaper
laid by his autocratic government. 'If Jaures had been able to develop this thesis in his newspaper, it would have had such repercussions in England, that to begin with at least, England would not have backed France, and in France itself, the national unity which followed his death would have been shattered.' Romain Rolland wrote: 'There is no doubt that after having fought until all hope of preventing [war] had been lost, he would have yielded loyally to the common duty of national defence, a cause into which he would have thrown himself heart and soul. But it is also certain that while he was stoutly accomplishing his patriotic duty he would always have been on the look out for an opportunity of re-establish-
At
last
— la Revanche
Below: Marching through streets lined with cheerful civilians, enthusiastic troops of a Paris regiment take leave of their home city en route to the front.
Bottom: Civil servants in Paris show their support for war against Germany, secure in the knowledge that their category would be one of the last to be called up
ing the shattered unity of Europe.' In the Council of Ministers, the death of Jaures provoked 'after a few exclamations, prodigious silence'. The news arrived a few minutes after a threatening note had been delivered by the German ambassador laying down the attitude France should adopt in the case of a war between Germany and Russia. One could well believe that the situation as a whole would result in public unrest. 'So what,' someone said, 'war abroad, and civil war. So we'll have everything.'
The government took prudent measures and decided to keep two regiments in Paris. Viviani issued a pathetic proclamation — 'A dreadful assassination has just taken place. On behalf of my colleagues I myself stand in front of the early grave of this republican-socialist who fought for such noble causes. During the troubled times to which our country is subjected the government is counting upon the patriotism of the working class and the whole population. The assassin has been arrested. He will be punished.' In fact, the danger of civil war had been avoided. The influence of L' Internationale was on the wane. The working classes were overcome with patriotic fervour and were intoxicated with the idea of nationalism. On the very day Jaures died, G. Herve stated: 'it's a dream. Our wings have been broken with the shock of hard reality and we have fallen to the ground, each one of us on to our native ground and for the moment our sole preoccupation is to defend it as did our ancestors.' The response of the socialists to the assassination left no doubt as to what they felt. 'They have assassinated Jaures, we will not assassinate France.'
On Saturday August 1, at 3.55 pm, on the insistence of the Chief of the General Staff, General Joffre, the Council of Ministers proclaimed general mobilisation. The decision was accompanied by a declaration on the part of the President of the Republic: 'Mobilisation does not mean war — in the present circumstances, it seems the best way of maintaining peace.' All over the country, down to the smallest village, church bells were rung and the first yellow mobilisation posters were stuck on post office walls. All the reservists of the years between 1887 and 1910 were recalled. A few young people demonstrated noisily, singing and brandishing flags. On the whole, however, people were calm and accepted the inevitable ordeal without a murmur. On Sunday, August 2, ordinary day to day life ceased. Mobilisation was carried out promptly, even enthusiastically. Out115
•
mm.
D
side barracks and in front of railway stations thronged crowds of men who had been mobilised, carrying suitcases and women and parcels, surrounded by children, many of whom were weeping. There were shouts and cries as the men clambered into the goods wagons which had inscriptions scrawled on their sides: To Berlin. We'll get them.' In Paris, at La Gare de L'Est, a convoy got under way every quarter of an hour. 'The first day of mobilisation was gay and splendid like a public holiday,' said Le Figaro. 'If you did not see Paris on August 2 you have never seen anything,' Peguy was forced to say. Processions made their way along the boulevards. People jostled round the news-
paper kiosks waiting for newspapers. Demonstrators smashed shop windows belonging to Germans and Austrians, or those they believed to be either German or Austrian, like shop branches of Maggi or Singer. At 5.0 pm on August 3 the German ambassador announced that his country 'considered itself to be at war with France'.
Almost 3,000,000 men responded
to the
arms' without a murmur. All fears aside. The Minister of the Interior considered it useless to carry on arresting the anarchist or trade union militants (listed in the famous 'B' book) to ensure public order. The General Staff expected at least 139L of those called up to default, but in fact, not even 1.59? did so. On that August 3 the socialists in Paris swore to carry out to the full in the face of all aggression 'their duty to the Republic 'call to
were swept
and L 'Internationale' How can one explain such ardent and unanimous enthusiasm which would have been unthinkable a few weeks, even a few days before? The spiritual and nationalist revival which had taken place since 1905 was an important factor. At first this revival had been limited to the young intellectual bourgeoisie and the middle classes, but it had finally become a catalyst and the movement soon involved the whole of the work'.
ing class. The enthusiastic patriotic demonstrations were contagious, especially as a large part of the national press ran wild and time and time again reported and carried articles on the theme of nationalism, whether it was of importance or not.
Victims of aggression The element of duty and the feeling that it was France's right to go to war was also 116
If one is to believe him, 'The widespread frenzy whipped up by nationalism and militarism' now also affected the working class. 'Although they are fighting militarism and its accompanying evils, the French socialists,' stated Ferrero, 'are far from bringing to their campaign the eagerness, violence and hate to be found among the socialists of other countries.' Even
French gastronomic delights safeguarded civilian guards Paris food lorries
— an
armed
an important factor. The French were convinced that their government had worked to maintain peace and that they were the victims of aggression. The whole of France with one accord felt it was duty bound to take part in a war which had been thrust upon it. Anti-German feeling had not been unknown among the masses. One would have thought that the recollection of defeat in 1871 and the loss of AlsaceLorraine was kept alive only by young nationalists. In fact, the idea of 'la Revanche' was just under the surface and needed only Germany's political bungling and Wilhelm IPs blustering to revive it. After ten years of frequent 'alarms', the French
felt 'it
must come
to
an end'.
This patriotic feeling had flourished completely independently of the discipline instilled by two or three years of military service, and remained deeply rooted in the majority of the population. Since the time of Jules Ferry and Paul Bert, primary education had helped to spread a simple kind of patriotic exhibitionist tendencies. Anti-militarism among teachers did not appear until 1905 and hardly affected those called up in 1914 as it still involved only a minority of the teaching profession. In 1899 the French language version of a study by the Italian sociologist Guglielmo Ferrero on Militarism and Modern Society appeared in France. According to him the driving force behind French society was a 'radical and warlike patriotism'. The aim of education was to 'inflame' the hearts of young people with the idea of 'the Mother Country' and 'her political and military greatness'. 'It is perhaps the only stimulating idea which penetrates their rrfinds during the whole of their school career, and the impression it makes on them is all the more great.'
though this statement may be slightly exaggerated, the fact cannot be denied that at each socialist congress any motion towards pacifism met with strong minority opposition. In 1914, the working class areas of Belleville and Menilmontant doubled their requests for the troops to march through their streets. To understand the great wave of patriotic fervour which swept through every class of French society, one must finally examine the concept of war itself. For the French in 1914, as for all Europeans, the word 'war' conjured up the Napoleonic campaigns or the Franco-German conflict of 1870/1871. They believed the war effort would be violent
but
short-lived, that the fight to a few large battles. All the experts agreed that a war, even if only because of the fire power available, could not last more than three months. No one imagined that this conflict could in fact compromise the whole of European civili-
would amount
it was not merely 'a civil between Europeans' as General Lyautey called it. Be that as it may, on August 3, 1914, as at its great moments through history, the entire French nation, faced with the
sation and that
war
prospect of war, recaptured a feeling of vigour, energy and unity which people believed they had lost forever.
Further Reading Chastenet, J., Jours inquiets et jours sanglants Ducasse, A., Mayer, A., and Perreux, G., Vie et mort des Francais 1914-1918 Hausser, E., Paris au jour le jour Pomcare, R L'lnvasion ,
PHILIPPE MASSON was born in 1928 and was educated at Stanislas College and at the Sorbonne, where he obtained a degree in History in 1 959. He is a member of the Comite d'Histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale and is a lecturer at the Naval War College of France, where he became official historian of the French Navy. He is a specialist in contemporary history and has published several articles on the Second World War
Prowess of the Armies How well matched were the armies about to fall at each others' throats in August 1914? Some had serious faults in their command systems,
some in their training, and some in the qualities of their and weaknesses of all the European armies are investigated, throwing troops. Here the strengths much light on their subsequent performance in the field Sir* Basil Liddell Hart
*
i
A picture depicts
garianj^piry: Picturesque and superbly horsed, Austrian cavalry were an extravagant echo of the past
_
The nations entered upon the
conflict in
1914 with the conventional outlook and system of the 18th Century modified by the events of the 19th Century. Politically, they conceived it to be a struggle between rival coalitions based on the traditional system of diplomatic alliances, and militarily a contest between professional armies — swollen, it is true, by the continental system of conscription, yet essentially fought out by soldiers while the mass of the people watched, from seats in the amphitheatre, the efforts of their champions. The Germans had a glimpse of the truth, but — one or two prophetic minds apart — the 'Nation in Arms' theory, evolved by them during the 19th Century, visualised the nation as a reservoir to pour its reinforcements into the army, rather than as a mighty river in
of
which are merged many tributary forces which the army is but one. Their con-
ception was the 'Nation in Arms', hardly the 'Nation at War'. Progressively throughout the years 19141918 the warring nations enlisted the research of the scientists, the inventive power and technical skill of the engineer, the manual labour of industry, and the pen of the propagandist. For long this fusion of many forces created a chaotic maelstrom; the old order had broken down, the new had not yet evolved. Only gradually did a working co-operation between all the new factors in warfare emerge. The German army of 1914 was born in the Napoleonic wars, nursed in infancy by Gneisenau and Scharnhorst, and guided in adolescence by the elder Moltke and Roon. It reached maturity in the war of 1870,
when
it emerged triumphantly from a trial against the ill-equipped and badly led longservice army of France. Every physically able citizen was liable to service; the state took the number it desired, trained them to arms for a short period of full-time service, and then returned them to civilian
The
system was to produce a huge reserve by which to expand life.
object
of this
the active army in war. In this organisation and in the thoroughness of the training lay the secret of the first great surprise of the war, one which almost proved decisive. For instead of regarding their reservists as troops of doubtful quality, fit only for an auxiliary
Russia's only asset —
numbers
role or garrison duty, the Germans during mobilisation were able to duplicate almost every first line army corps with a reserve corps— and had the courage, justified by events, to use them in the opening clash.
opponents went forth to battle in 1914 with as intense a belief in their country's cause, this flaming patriotism had not the time to consolidate such a disciplined combination as years of steady heat had produced in Germany. The German people had an intimacy with and a pride in their army, notwithstanding the severity of its
This surprise upset the French calculations and thereby dislocated their entire plan of campaign. The Germans have been reproached for many miscalculations but less than justice has been done to the correctness of many of their intuitions. They alone realised what is today an axiom— that, given a highly trained cadre of leaders, a military machine can be rapidly manufactured from shorttime levies, like molten liquid poured into a mould. The German mould was a longservice body of officers and NCO's, who in their standard of technical knowledge and skill had no equal on the continent. But while the machine was manufactured by training it gained solidity from another process. The leaders of Germany had worked for generations to inspire their people with a patriotic conviction of the grandeur of their country's destiny.
~*+-
A
And
if
discipline, that
was unknown elsewhere.
This unique instrument was handled by a general staff which, by rigour of selection
and training, was unmatched in professional knowledge and skill, if subject to the mental 'grooves' which characterize all professions. Executive skill is the fruit of practice, and constant practice, or repetition, tends inevitably to deaden originality and elasticity of mind. In a professional body, also, promotion by seniority is a rule difficult to avoid. The Germans, it is true, tended towards a system of staff control, which in practice usually left the real power in the hands of youthful general
As war memoirs and documents reveal, the chiefs-of-staff of the various armies and corps often took momenstaff officers.
their
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tous decisions with hardly a pretence of consulting their commanders. But such a
system had grave objections, and from it came the grit in the wheels which not infrequently marred the otherwise welloiled working of the German war-machine. Tactically the Germans began with two
important material advantages. They alone had gauged the potentialities of the heavy howitzer, and had provided adequate numbers of this weapon. And if no army had fully realised that machine guns were 'concentrated essence of infantry', nor fully developed this preponderant source of firepower, the Germans had studied it more than other armies, and were able to exploit its inherent power of dominating a battlefield sooner than other armies. Strategically, also, the Germans had brought the study and development of railway communications to a higher pitch than any of their rivals.
An inferior instrument The Austro-Hungarian army, though patterned on the German model, was a much inferior instrument. Not only had it a tradition of defeat rather than of victory, but its racial mixture prevented the moral homogeneity that distinguished its ally. This being so, the replacement of the old professional army by one based on universal service lowered rather than raised its standard of effectiveness. The troops within the borders of the empire were often racially akin to those beyond, and this compelled Austria to a politically instead of a military based distribution of forces, so that kinsmen should not fight each other. Her human handicap was increased by a geographical one, namely, the vast extent of frontier to be defended. Nor were her leaders, with rare exceptions, the professional equals of the Germans. Moreover, if common action was better understood than among the Entente Powers, Austria did not accept German direction gladly. Yet despite all its evident weaknesses the loosely knit conglomeration of races withstood the shock and strain of war for four years in a way that surprised and dismayed her opponents. The explanation is that the complex racial fabric was woven on a stout Germanic and Magyar framework. From the Central Powers we turn to the Entente Powers. France possessed but 60% of the potential man-power of Ger-
many
(5,940,000 against 9,750,000), and this debit balance had forced her to call on
the services of practically every ablebodied male. A man was called up at 20, did three years' full-time service, then 11 in the reserve and finally two periods of seven years each in the Territorial Army and Territorial Reserve. This system gave France an initial war strength of nearly 4,000,000 trained men, compared with Germany's 5,000,000, but she placed little reliance on the fighting value of reservists. The French command counted only on the semi-professional troops of the first line, about 1,000,000 men, for the short and decisive campaign which they expected and prepared for. Moreover, they assumed a similar attitude on the part of their enemy — with dire result. This initial surprise apart, a more profound handicap was the lesser capacity of France for expansion, in case of a long war, due to her population — under smaller 40,000,000 compared with Germany's 65,000,000. A Colonel Mangin had advocated tapping the resources in Africa, the raising of a huge native army, but the government had considered the dangers to outweigh the advantages of such a policy, and war experience was to show that it had military as well as political risks.
The French General
Staff, if less technic-
than the German, had produced some of the most renowned military thinkers in Europe, and its level of intelligence could well bear comparison. But the French military mind tended to lose in originality and elasticity what it gained ally
perfect
in logic. In the years preceding the war, a sharp division of thought had arisen which did not make for combined action. Worse still, the new French philosophy of too,
war, by its preoccupation with the morale element, had become more and more separ* ated from material factors. Abundance of will cannot compensate for a definite inferiority of weapons, and the second factor, once realised, inevitably reacts on the first. In material, the French had one great asset in their quick-firing 75-mm field gun, the best in the world, but its very value had led them to undue confidence in a war of movement and a consequent neglect of equipment and training for the type of warfare which came to pass. Russia's assets were in the physical sphere, her defects in the mental and moral. If her initial strength was no greater than that of Germany, her manpower resources were immense. Moreover, the courage and endurance of her troops were famous. But corruption and incompetence
tn
4fm>«mjt0*:.
permeated her leadership, her rank and file lacked the intelligence and initiative for scientific warfare — they formed an instrument of great solidity but little flexibility—while her manufacturing resources for equipment and munitions were far below those of the great industrial powers. This handicap was made worse by her geographical situation, for she was cut off from her allies by ice or enemy-bound seas, and she had to cover immense land frontiers. Another radical defect was the poverty of her rail communications, which were the more essential as she relied on bringing into play the weight of her numbers. Between the military systems of Germany, Austria, France and Russia there was a close relation, the differences were of detail rather than fundamental, and this similarity threw into greater contrast the system of the other great European Power — Britain. Throughout modern times she had been essentially a sea-power, intervening on land through a traditional policy of diplomatic and financial support to allies, whose military efforts she reinforced with a leaven from her own professional army. This regular army was primarily maintained for the protection and control overseas dependencies — India in particular— and had always been kept down to the minimum strength necessary for this purpose. The reason for the curious contrast between Britain's determination to maintain a supreme navy and her consistent neglect, indeed starvation, of the army lay partly in her insular position, which caused her to regard the sea as her of the
essential life-line and main defence, and partly in a constitutional distrust of the army, an illogical prejudice, which had its almost forgotten source in the military government of Cromwell. Small as to size, it enjoyed a practical and varied experience of war without parallel among the
Continental armies. Compared with them, obvious professional handicap was that the leaders, however apt in handling small columns in colonial expeditions, had never been prepared to direct large formations its
in la
grande guerre.
Experience has tended to show that the larger the force, the smaller the scope for generalship, and the less the call upon it. Compared with the manifold personal initiative of a Marlborough or a Napoleon before and during battle, the decisions of
an army commander in 1914-1918 were necessarily few and broad— his role was >. more akin to that of managing director of o
a vast department store. In a war where all the leaders were soon out of their depth, and slow to recover, practical acu-
than as Commanders'. Because of his unrivalled knowledge of the German Army and cordial relations with the French, as well as
wheels' to enable them to cross no-man's land and make a lodgement in the enemy's
men counted
more than the-theoretical
his gift for "putting juniors at their ease,
technique acquired in peacetime exercises. These, especially in the French army, too often bred the delusion that the issue of an order at a distance was equivalent to its fulfilment on the spot.
Grierson would have been a peculiarly good Chief-of-Staff for French. Yet 'when Grierson— his Chief Staff Officer at manoeuvres -had pointed out to French the impractic-
Mr Amery, author of The Times History of the War, -probed a weak spot in the prevailing European theory by arguing that superior skill now counted more than superior numbers, and that its proportionate value would increase with material progress. The same note was struck by General Baden-Powell, who urged that the way to develop it was to give officers responsibility when young. Two generals, Paget and Hunter, had a vision of the value and future use of motor vehicles in war, while Haig said that, rather than mounted infantry, he would prefer infantry 'on motors'. In view of the development of the motor between 1903 and 1914 it is strange how little use of it was made at the outset of the next war— or even at the end! The most remarkable feature of the Royal Commission on the South African War was the way that French and Haig discoursed on the paramount value of the arme blanche, implying that so long as the cavalry charge was maintained all would be well with the conduct of war. An equally striking underestimate of fire-power was contained in Haig's forecast that: 'Artillery seems only like.ly to be really effective against raw troops.' His confident opening declaration was that 'cavalry will have a larger sphere of action in future wars'. And he went on to say: 'besides being used before, during, and after a battle as hitherto, we must expect to see it employed strateg-
for
Errors in selection
ability of some of his proposals, he had at once been replaced by Sir Archibald Murray'. Grierson, instead, went to France
qualms
of an army corps. A man of and sedentary habits, 55 years old, the combination of good living and hard work had undermined his constitution. He collapsed and died on his way to the front. This was but one of the most prominent instances of the trouble caused by a system which brought officers to high position at an age when their energy was declining, and their susceptibility to the strain of war increasing. As a fortunate
Chief, Sir
offset the
In the little British army which originally took the field, personality had for a time more scope, and much was to depend upon it. Unfortunately, the issue was to suggest that the process of selection had not succeeded in bringing to the fore the officers best fitted for leadership. It is significant that,
on the way out to France, Haig spoke
to Charteris
future
chief
military secretary and Intelligence officer) of his
(his
concerning the Commander-inJohn French, whose right hand he had been in South Africa: D.H. unburdened himself today. He is greatly concerned about the composition of British GHQ. He thinks French quite unfit for high command in
as
commander
full figure
enemy suffered at
least as heavily
from this handicap. Indeed, the directing head of the German armies, Moltke, who had recently been undergoing treatment, caused alarm among his entourage in the
French infantry — undue confidence in morale
position.
on mueh larger scale than formerly.' a contrast there was to be between this expectation and the event! French, Germans, Russians, and Austrians certainly had unexampled masses of cavalry ready at the outbreak of war. But in the opening phase they caused more trouble to their own sides than to the enemy. From 1915 on, ically
What
their effect was trivial, except as a strain to their own country's supplies. Despite the relatively small number of British cavalry, forage was the largest item of supplies sent overseas, exceeding eVen ammunition, and thus the most dangerous factor in
time of crisis. He says French's military ideas are not sound; that he has never studied war; that he is obstinate, and will not keep with him men who point out even obvious errors. He gives him credit for good tactical powers, great courage and determination. He does not think Murray will dare to do anything but agree with everything French suggests. In any case he thinks French would not listen to Murray but rely on Wilson, which is far worse. D.H. thinks Wilson is a politician, and not a soldier, and 'politician' with Douglas Haig is synonymous with crooked dealing and wrong sense of values. This judgment is similar to that of another general, eminent as a military historian: 'There could hardly have been worse selected GHQ's than those with which we began the South African War and 1914.' Apart from errors in selection, there is the question of whether or not officers were miscast for their actual roles. In 1912 French himself had expressed the opinion that certainly Haig and perhaps Grierson would 'always shine more and show to greater advantage as superior Staff Officers
very
first
days of war by his state of semi-
collapse.
Errors of conception were to cost more than any errors of execution. Lessons of the Boer War that went wider than the selection of leaders had been overlooked. Read in the light of 1914-1918, the 'Evidence
taken before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa' offers astonishing proof of how professional vision may miss the wood for the trees. There is little hint, among those who were to be the leaders in the next war, that they had recognised the root problem of the future — the dominating
power of
fire
defence and the supreme
difficulty of crossing the bullet-swept zone.
Sir Ian Hamilton alone gave it due emphasis, and even he was too sanguine as to the possibility of overcoming it. His proposed solution, however, was in the right direction. For he urged not only the value of exploiting surprise and infiltration tactics to nullify the advantages of the defence, but the need of heavy field artillery to support the infantry. Still more prophetically, he suggested that the infantry might be provided with 'steel shields on
aggravating the submarine menace. While, by authoritative verdict, the transport trouble caused in feeding the immense number of cavalry horses was an important factor in producing Russia's collapse. In the British army, also, one unfortunate result of this delusion was that when the cavalry school came to the top in the years just before the war, there was the usual human tendency to penalise the careers of officers who propounded more realistic ideas, while a still larger circle were thereby induced to maintain silence.
A
rapier
In other
among
ways the
War brought
scythes bitter lessons of the
Boer
exerting an influence which to some extent counteracted that inelasticity of mind and ritualism of method which have increased with the increasing professionalisation of armies. For the progress in organisation in the years before 1914, the British army owed much to Lord Haldane, and the creation of a second line of partially trained citizens — the Territorial Force — was also due to him. Lord Roberts had pleaded for compulsory military training, but the voluntary principle was too deeply embedded in the national mind for this course to be adopted, and profit,
The British Army — highly trained but small
Germany, and Germany's deficit of homegrown supplies could only be serious in the event of a struggle of years. Britain would starve in three months if her outside supplies were cut off. In munitions and other war material Britain's industrial power was greatest of all, though conversion to war production was a necessary preliminary, and again all depended on the security of her sea
communications. France was weak, and Russia weaker still, but the former unlike the latter could count on outside supplies so long as Britain held the seas. As Britain industrial pivot of the one alliance, so was Germany of the other. A great manufacturing nation, she had also a wealth of raw material, especially since the annexation of the Lorraine iron-fields after the 1870 war. The stoppage of outside supplies must be a handicap in a long war, increasing with its duration, and serious from the outset in such tropical products as rubber. Moreover, Germany's main coal and iron fields lay dangerously close to her frontier, in Silesia on the east and in Westphalia and Lorraine on the west. Thus for the Central Alliance a quick decision and an offensive war were more essential than for the Entente. Similarly, financial resources had been calculated on a short war basis, and all the Continental Powers relied mainly on large gold reserves accumulated specially
was the
Haldane wisely sought to develop Britain's military effectiveness within the bounds set by traditional policy. As a result, 1914 found England with an expeditionary force of some 160,000 men, the most highly trained striking force of any country — rapier among scythes. To maintain this at strength the old militia had been turned into a special reserve for drafting. Behind this first line stood the Territorial Force, which even if enlisted only for home defence had a permanent fighting organisation, unlike the amorphous volunteer force which it superseded. The British army had no outstanding asset in war armament but as a result of the Boer War it had developed a standard of rifle-shooting unique among the world's armies. The reforms by which the army had been brought into line with continental models had one defect, accentuated by the close relations established between the British and French general staffs since the Entente. It induced a 'continental' habit of thought among the General Staff, and predisposed them to the role, for which their slender strength was unsuited, of fighting alongside an allied army. This obscured the British army's traditional employment in amphibious operations through which the mobility given by command of the sea could be exploited. A small but highly trained force striking 'out of the blue' at a vital spot can produce a strategic effect out of all proportion to its slight numbers. The last argument brings us to a comparison of the naval situation, which turned on the balance between the fleets of Britain and Germany. Britain's sea supremacy, for long unquestioned, had in recent years been challenged by a Germany which had deduced that a powerful fleet was the key to that colonial empire which she desired as an outlet for her commerce and increasing population. This ambition was fostered, as its instrument was created, by the dangerous genius of Admiral von Tirpitz. To the spur of naval competition the British people eventually responded, determined at any cost to maintain their 'two-power' standard. If this reaction was instinctive rather than reasoned, its subconscious wisdom had a better foundation than the catch-words with which it was justified, or even than the
need of defence against invasion. The industrial development of the British Isles had left them dependent on overseas supplies for food, and on the secure flow of seaborne imports and exports for industrial existence. For the navy itself this competition was a refining agency, leading to a concentration on essentials. Gunnery was developed and less value attached to polished brasswork. Warship design and armament were transformed. The Dreadnought ushered in the new era of the all big-gun battleship. By 1914 Britain had 29 such capital ships and 13 building, to the 18 built and nine building of Germany. Further, Britain's naval strength had been soundly distributed, the main concentration being in the North Sea. More open to criticism, in view of the forecasts of several naval authorities, was Britain's comparative neglect of the potential menace of the submarine. Here German opinion was shown rather by the number building than those already in commission.
Germany's credit that though lacking a sea tradition, her fleet an artificial rather than a natural product, the technical skill of the German navy made it a formidable rival to the British ship for ship, and perhaps its superior in gunnery. In the first stage of the struggle, the balance of the naval forces was to affect the issue far less than the balance on land. For a fleet suffers one inherent limitation — it is tied to the sea, and hence cannot strike direct at the hostile nation. The fundamental purpose of a navy is therefore to protect a nation's sea communications and sever those of the enemy. Although victory in battle may be a necessary prelude, blockade is its ultimate purpose, and as blockade is a weapon slow to take effect, its influence could only be decisive if the armies failed to secure the speedy decision on land, upon which all counted. In this idea of a short war lay also the reason for the comparative disregard of economic forces. Few believed that a modern nation could endure for many months the strain of a large-scale conflict. The supply of food and of funds, the supply and manufacture of munitions, these were problems that had been only studied on brief estimates. Of the belligerents, all could feed themselves save Britain and It is to
war purposes. Britain alone had no such war chest, but she was to prove that the strength of her banking system and the wealth distributed among a great commercial people furnished the 'sinews of war' in a way that few pre-war economists had realised. The war for which the armies had prepared bore little relation to the war in which they found themselves engaged. for
CAPTAIN SIR BASIL LIDDELL HART was born 1895 and was educated at St Paul's School and Corpus
College, Cambridge.
Christi
became an
officer in the King's
Infantry, with
whom
he saw
In
in
at
1914 he
Own
Yorkshire Light service on the Western
where he was gassed and wounded. was during the First World War that he evolved what he termed 'the expanding torrent' method of attack, and proposed the technique of a short 'lightning war', which the Germans adopted as the basis for Front,
It
their Blitzkrieg
system.
1920 he wrote the first post-war final manual on Infantry Training, and subsequently edited the manual Small Arms Training. After being put on the Retired List in 1927 he became Military Correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, Ten years later In
he moved to The Times as its adviser on defence. Meanwhile, he had also been Military Editor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. In 1937 he became personal adviser to the War
Mr Hore-Belisha. He 938 so that he might press army publicly, but once the began he felt necessary to Minister,
in
1
it
writings
betray
the
gave up this position the needs of Britain's Second World War remain
military
country. After the war he spent
German generals and
silent lest his
weaknesses
many months
his
of
interviewing
analysing their campaigns
with them. Sir Basil Liddell
Hart wrote
some 30 books and
his
more than 30 languages. He was awarded the Chesney Gold Medal of the Royal United Service Institution in 1 964 and became an Hon D Lift of Oxford University the writings
same
have been translated
year.
Corpus
He was
to the
also an honorary Fellow of
Christi College,
He was knighted He died in 1970,
into
Cambridge.
1966. shortly before a scheduled in
visit
United States.
121
r
Belgium and Luxembourg were the first countries to feel the weight of the German onslaught in the west. Germany's best and largest armies smashed through these two small countries, waging a campaign of destruction and terror calculated to dissuade the civilian population from hindering the fulfilment of the Schlieffen Plan.
Bernard Thorold
*<*-
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fci
I
m*
K
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The
first
move
of the
German war machine
on the Western Front was the invasion of Luxembourg, seizing the Grand Duchy's railway services. Much of Germany's mobilisation and advance against France depended on rail transportation. The exact schedule for the attack had been worked out over a period of years, down to the smallest detail, so much so that the complete German rail network had been under military control for some time. In order to deploy their armies along the length of the French frontier the German General Staff required the railways of Luxembourg and Belgium. So it was to be two neutral countries that would first face the full weight of the world's best organised army. There was a great deal of wishful thinking, on both sides, during the diplomatic struggle leading up to the outbreak of hostilities. Germany hoped the Belgians would allow them to move unimpeded towards the French, or at the worst only offer token resistance. Equally, the Belgians optimistically felt the German threat might be a ploy to mislead the French.
The German army was due to start its march into Luxembourg within an hour of Lichnowsky's communique to the Kaiser, which raised last-minute hopes that Britain might remain neutral, or even restrain France, but Moltke flatly refused to counter-
mand
the orders for invasion, claiming that reverse the deployment towards the French frontier at this stage would cause chaos. On August 1, a few minutes before 1900 hours, the time the German 16th Division was due to move into Luxembourg, the Kaiser sent an order to Trier, the division's headquarters, ordering them on no account to cross the frontier. The order arrived too late and the first German unit crossed into Luxembourg on schedule (an infantry company of the 69th Regiment commanded by a Lieutenant Feldmann) and took their objective, the junction of rail and telegraph lines between Germany to
and Belgium. The Germans had chosen to start their advance at a point named TroisVierges (the Three Virgins), a fact rapidly exploited by the world's press.
At 1930 hours, to their amazement, the 16th Division received the Kaiser's order not to cross the frontier. This was countermanded, by Moltke, at midnight, by which time Britain had made it clear she had no intention of bargaining with Germany. All the next day, August 2, troops poured, unopposed, into Luxembourg and by the evening the small country was completely occupied by the German Fourth Army. The first stage of Germany's plan to seize the railheads had been completed.
Germany now turned
to
Belgium.
An
ultimatum was delivered to the Belgian government, on August 2, who had ordered mobilisation at midnight on July 31, as a
German
mobilisation. Many Belhopefully believed their neutrality would not be violated, even after the previous day's events in Luxembourg. Fortunately the King, Albert, his Prime Minister, Baron de Broqueville and the Chief-of-Staff, General de Selliers de Moranville, did not suffer from this illusion and were determined to resist the impending invasion at all costs. The Germans used the pretext of French troops violating Belgian territory in the south to send their ultimatum. The French had in fact, far from crossing the frontier, ed some ten miles behind it, in order result of
gians
still
to avoid giving cause for
any such accusa-
The German note ended by saying, that, as the Belgian army was not capable of stopping a French advance, the Germans would do so. Should Belgium resist Gertion.
many's assistance it would be considered an act of war. The Belgian reply was delivered at 0700 hours on the morning of August 3, refusing entry to the German army. From this moment the Belgians considered themselves at war and King Albert automatically became the active commander of his country's army. He immediately ordered the destruction of all the rail
bridges and tunnels on the border with Luxembourg, and the bridges crossing the
Meuse at Liege. The Belgian army, now due
to face 34 poised to advance divisions through their country, was not impressive.
German It
was under equipped, badly trained and
under-officered,
many
infantry companies
having only one commissioned officer. Owing to her neutrality, Belgium had her divisions deployed in all round defence, in order to be in a position to counter an attack from any direction, and yet not appear to be threatening any individual nation. The prewar deployment of her army was as follows: 1st Division at Ghent, 2nd Division at Antwerp, 3rd Division at Liege, 4th and 5th Divisions on a line Mons-Charleroi-Namur, and in the centre, Brussels, the 6th and Cavalry Divisions. This meant the 1st Division covered Britain, the 3rd Germany, the 4th and 5th France. In this way, if any country attacked it could be held by a division or more, while the rest of the army deployed. Belgium's border with Germany was defended by a series of 12 forts on the line of the River Meuse, centred on Liege, six to the west side of the river and six to the east. The circumference of this defensive position was some 30 miles. The Liege salient had been constructed by Brialmont between 1888 and 1892 and was considered one of the strongest fortified positions in Europe. The garrisons of the fort and town, together with the 3rd Division, were commanded by General Leman.
The key
to
Belgium
Liege was obviously the key to Belgium, and both the Germans and Belgians appreciated this fact. It stood directly in the line of advance of the German First and Second Armies. King Albert suggested a daring, but basically sound plan. Belgium should move all her forces to hold a line along the River Meuse between Liege and Namur, thus using the wide river, flanked by the two fortified towns, as a strongly held defensive line. There was much to be said for the ploy and had it been used the Germans would probably have lost many men and much valuable time in their attempts to take the line. General de Selliers de Moranville, however, was strongly opposed to this manoeuvre, fearing the Belgian army might be cut off by the Germans and have their line of retreat to the safety of the fortifications at Antwerp blocked. His plan was to place the main part of the Belgian army behind the River Gete, some 36 miles west of Liege, and there link up with the hoped for British and French reinforcements, while the German assault was held up by Liege and Namur. De Moranville used the same argument against his King as Moltke had used against the Kaiser — it
was
too late to change the mobilisation plans. A compromise was reached — the
main body formed up along the Gete from Diest to Perwez, while, at Albert's insistence, Liege was reinforced by an additional division and one brigade, and Namur strengthened with a further division. Ludendorff, as German Chief of the Operations Section, had worked out a plan to assault Liege with six infantry brigades from the First and Second Armies, which, when the attack went in, were commanded by General von Emmich. The main invasion of Belgium started early on August 4, although an advance guard of Marwitz's cavalry had crossed the frontier at Gemmenich on the 3rd. The Uhlans of Marwitz's cavalry, armed with lances, were engaged in the traditional cavalry role, reconnoitering the Belgian positions and screening the infantry that followed them. It was important to the German timetable that Liege should be taken within 48 hours and the path cleared for the First and Second Armies, while the armies were engaged in their concentration, so avoiding any delay to the main advance. The German troops had been told that any Belgian resistance was unlikely. The cavalry rode into villages along the whole length of the German/Belgium frontier, heading for the Meuse and Liege, supported by motorised infantry. Their major task was to capture the bridges across the river and to secure the railway lines and tunnels, before they could be destroyed. Under the overall supervision of General von Biilow (commanding the Second Army), Emmich's forces advanced on Liege. This
German spearhead consisted of six infantry brigades drawn from the 777, IV, VII, IX, and XI Corps. Each was supported by a squadron of cavalry, a battery of artillery (two batteries were equipped with field guns, the remaining four with howitzers), a battalion of Jdger (Rifles), and cyclists. In addition to this battle formation, General von Emmich also had
X
under his command two heavy mortar batteries and Marwitz's cavalry corps — 2nd, 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions. When the advance across the borders began on the morning of August 4 the Belgian frontier guards had fired on the Germans, but as there was little else they could do to stop the advance, they retired to Liege, to confirm the news of invasion. By the afternoon every road across the frontier was filled with the German brigades moving towards Liege. The German cavalry that took Vise, some eight miles north of Liege, on the Meuse, found the bridge crossing the river destroyed and the far bank held by Belgian troops.
Two regiments were
despatched to
some three miles further north, where the river was forded. The Belgians found their left flank cut off and were forced to retire to Liege. As similar movements were reported south of Liege, it was apparent the German invasion had begun in earnest. While the German army was crossing Lixhe,
the frontier on the 4th, the majority of the
Belgian army was moving into its new position behind the Gete. The 3rd Division moved to Liege. With the 3rd Division, the
detachments at Liege and Namur and the cavalry division acting as a screen, the four divisions took up their positions along the line of the Gete: ,1st Division at Tirlemont, 5th at Perwez, 2nd at Louvain and
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The Belgian army was little match for the Germans. Here exhausted Belgian troops pause in their retreat to Antwerp
the 6th at Wavre. The 4th Division moved to support the garrison of Namur. These movements were complete by the morning of the 6th. The Germans had arrived at Tongres by the morning of the 5th. Emmich sent Captain Brinckman, German Military Attache at Brussels, to Leman's Headquarters with a message demanding free passage for the German troops through Liege and the rest of Belgium. Leman, who had been ordered the previous day, by King Albert, to hold his position at all costs, replied with a sharp 'no' and so the siege of Liege began. While Liege was being besieged, the German advance into northern Belgium had continued. On August 10 German cavalry and infantry took up positions opposite the Belgian main defensive line, on the Gete. The German line was gradually extended northwards to Hasselt and Diest. These troops were from Kluck's First Army. By August 13 it had become apparent that Liege would soon fall, and the way would be clear for the German advance. On the frontier the Germans were formed up and ready to begin the long march to France. The armies were numbered from right to left, the northernmost being the First Army under Kluck, next the Second Army under Biilow, stretching to the Luxembourg border was the Third Army under
Hausen, and forming up in Luxembourg the Fourth Army under the command of
Grand Duke Albrecht of Wiirttemberg. The First, Second and Third Armies were the pick of the German army, under the of the best generals. This force, poised to strike through Belgium and into France, the heavy punch of the Schlieffen Plan, consisted of 16 German army corps and two corps of cavalry. By the 15th the main body of the advance corps of the First Army was across the Meuse, north of Liege. It was obvious the 100,000 Belgians in position on the Gete could not hold the might of this German advance. The government called on its allies, France and Britain, for support, but to no avail. Joffre was convinced the Germans would not continue to cross the Meuse, but strike directly south against France. The only support the Belgians received was Franchet d'Esperey's I Corps, to hold the Meuse bridges between Namur and Givet, on the French border. Sordet's
command
Cavalry Corps also moved into southern Belgium, but their task was to reconnoitre the German advance from the east and also to spread the false rumour that the whole French army was following, to give support to the Belgians. None of this did much to reassure the Belgians holding the Gete line.
Vigorous resistance The first German assault on the Gete line was made at the extreme north on a small village called Haelen, which was held by the Belgian Cavalry Division. At dawn on August 12, six German cavalry regiments, three horse-batteries and two Jdger battalions attacked the Belgian position. Initially the Germans drove the Belgians back and took possession of the village and, their target, its bridge. The Belgian commander, General de Wn'.e, decided to use his cavalry as dismounted riflemen. Each charge, with sabre and lance, bj the Uhlans was met by accurate rifle fire. During the afternoon the Belgian cavalry
126
was
reinforced by an infantry brigade. At 1800 hours, after the destruction of some
The five Belgian divisions were skilfully withdrawn, with little loss, apart from that
of their best squadrons, the Germans halted their attack. As de Witte prepared to counterattack on the morning of the 13th, the Germans, who had been much surprised by the vigorous Belgian resistance, withdrew leaving the village and bridge in Belgian hands. The Belgian flank was, for the
of the 1st Division at Tirlemont.
present, secured.
The steady German advance continued and, by August 17, the triangle between the Meuse, the Gete and the Demer was occupied by the German advance corps. The Belgian right flank was threatened as Germans advanced through Huy, some 15 miles from Namur, which the Belgian 8th Brigade was forced to abandon, falling back on Namur, in the face of some 10,000 Germans.
On the 17th, once the Liege position was secured, the main manoeuvre of the Schlieffen Plan could at last get under way. Moltke gave the go-ahead that day. The armies would march on the 18th, with the First and Second Armies cutting off the Belgian army from its fortress retreat of Antwerp, and then pivoting south-west and south respectively, while the Third Army would march on Namur. To
ensure a unified advance, Biilow (Second Army) was given overall command of the two northern armies. The morning of August 18 saw 77 Corps (First Army), under Linsingen, moving to attack the Belgian left flank, while three corps from the First and three corps from the Second Army advanced on the Gete. Early the same morning, King Albert, realising no help was coming from his allies, decided, in view of the overwhelming odds against him, to withdraw his army to Antwerp. The Germans obviously intended to attack and destroy the whole Belgian army in one battle, which was exactly what the King was determined to avoid. This decision was made none too early. The 18th saw Haelen again attacked, and this time taken. The German IX Corps (First Army), under General von Quast, attacked Tirlemont. The Belgian 1st Division put up a strong resistance and caused the Germans considerable trouble, but the town was over-run that day with the Belgians losing 1,630 officers and
men.
now faced the GerCorps, supported by the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions advancing between Diest and Tirlemont. On the Belgian right, between Jodoigne and Namur, the Guard, and VII Corps advanced. Both columns had strong reserves, the The Gete
position
man II, IV and IX
X
Army's being 777, TV and IX Reserve Corps and the Second Army's, the Guard, VII and IX Reserve Corps. The Belgian left flank was in grave peril as a result of the capture of Haelen and Tirlemont. King Albert now gave the order for his army to break contact and retire to the defences of Antwerp. His order was unpopular amongst many Belgian officials who realised that it would leave the road to Brussels open. The Belgian capital was of no strategic importance and the King wisely saw that saving his army was of greater practical use than a sentimental defence of Brussels. Colonel Aldebert of the French Military Mission also objected, claiming the Germans would not continue to cross the Meuse in force, but swing south. He, too, was ignored by the King.
First
By August from the 4th Division and the 8th Brigade, which had been cut off at Huy, the whole Belgian army was safely en20, apart
trenched in the Antwerp defensive position.
In their position at Antwerp the Belgians still posed a threat to the German army, on their flank if the Germans continued westward and in their rear should they turn south. This caused the HI and IX Reserve Corps, whose task had originally been to push to the coast, towards Calais, to switch direction and instead watch Antwerp. The First Army followed the Belgians' retreat to Antwerp, while the Second Army pivoted round Namur and swung to the south, where the French army was massing along the Sambre.
Poor cavalry reconnaissance The first German troops to reach Namur had been the forward cavalry patrols who met the Belgian cavalry screen, to the north of the fortress, on August 5 and again to the south-east on August 7. Not only Belgian and German cavalry had been active in this area. On the 4th King Albert had given permission for the French to send General Sordet's Cavalry Corps on a sortie to establish the Germans' strength and direction of advances. The corps crossed into Belgium on the 6th, and moved towards Neufchateau. They then struck north and came within nine miles Finding that the Belgian 1st Division had withdrawn and the town was under siege, Sordet now moved eastwards towards the Meuse. Due to the Germans being delayed at Liege, Sordet saw few of them and no doubt his reports did much to strengthen the French High Command's view that the Germans would not cross the Meuse, but would strike directly south to the French frontier. Still convinced the Germans would not cross the Meuse in force, Joffre decided to stick to Plan 17 and meet the Germans with his armies extended across to the Rhine, holding back the French left wing until the whole line was ready. On August 8 a French infantry regiment was despatched to hold the Meuse bridges north of Dinant and link with the Belgians at Namur, thus filling the gap between the fortress and the French Fifth Army. Simultaneously the French I Corps moved into line along the Meuse, between Mezieres and Givet. On the 13th I Corps was moved northwards to ensure no crossing could take place between Givet and Namur. On the 15th, the 8th Infantry Brigade (General Mangin) had been given the task of supporting the cavalry corps, then moving westwards. Just south of Dinant, I Corps stopped a German attempt by Richthofen's cavalry corps (Guard and 5th Cavalry Division), supported by five Jdger battalions and three groups of field artillery, to cross the river near Dinant. Repelling this German attack cost the French nearly 1,100 casualties. By the 13th Joffre decided the Germans were wheeling towards his Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies and decided to counterattack with the left wing on this assumption. He totally ignored the reports of the Fifth Army commander, General Lanrezac, that the Germans were deployed on a much broader wheel and were advancing of Liege.
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After the
fall
of Brussels,
German soldiers go sightseeing fall to German forces
inthefirst national capital to
on the west of the Meuse. On August 15 the French received reports from the Belgians that 200,000 Germans had crossed the Meuse and also received the news of I Corps' action at Dinant. The fact that the Germans were indeed performing a wide sweep on the west side of the Meuse then dawned on the French headquarters. The French Fifth Army was ordered to put its right hand corps (II Corps) and its reserve under command of the Fourth Army and move into the Marienbourg area, where the Meuse and Sambre meet. The Fifth Army was reinforced with Sordet's cavalry and Valabregue's Reserve Division and, in addition, XVIII Corps (from the Second Army Reserve) and the 37th and 38th Divisions, who had recently arrived from Africa. The Fifth Army would hold the line, behind Namur, up to the Sambre, where it would
link up with the British Expeditionary Force, moving to the north of the Sambre, by Mons; the BEF, in turn, would link up
Also on the 20th, the German IV Corps, commanded by General von Armin, entered Brussels. The government had left
with the Belgian army. Moltke had by now received news of the situation to the south, which he passed on to Bulow. In view of the concentration at the Sambre, where the forward troops of the Second Army made contact on August 21, Bulow realised he was going to meet stronger resistance than anticipated and so decided to leave the original plan and order Kluck's First Army directly south, rather than south-west, thus bringing it in line with the Second Army, on the Sambre. Although Kluck was opposed to this and wished to carry out SchliefFen's tactics, he had no option but to yield to his superior. Bulow turned his attention to Namur where his advance guard met the Belgian outposts on the 20th.
Antwerp on the 18th. The streets were rapidly occupied by Uhlans, clearing the way for a spectacle of German military might calculated to impress the inhabitants. At 1300 hours the men of the IV for
Corps began to march with grand precision past their commander. Rank by rank streamed through the capital, in what appeared an unending
flow.
Eventually,
after three days and nights, the 320,000 men of the German First Army had passed through the city, leaving it in the hands
of a
German
military governor.
nor men of the Gerexpected much resistance from the Belgians, in fact they had been assured there would be none. They were consequently somewhat surprised and
Neither the
officers
man army had
127
angered when, from the moment they crossed the frontier, they found themselves fired on. Their immediate reaction, haunted by memories of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, was that civilian snipers were responsible. A view confirmed when they found bridges, telegraph lines and tunnels blown — obviously the work of civilian
The situation was not improved when German troops fired on each other, in some cases by mistake and in others, the saboteurs!
result thirst
of looting alcohol to
quench their
during the long marches in that hot
summer. The cry of 'francs-tireurs' went up, and the invading troops from private soldier to army commander were determined to take their revenge. In some cases civilians definitely did block roads and fire on the Germans, but to nothing like the extent the Germans claimed. The Belgian government had issued posters before the invaders arrived, warning civilians to stay indoors and on no account to be actively hostile to the occupying forces. These posters were declared by German commanders to be an incitement to the civilians to rebel.
Campaign
of terror
The shooting
of civilians as a reprisal for
imagined resistance began on the first day of the invasion. At this early stage this
the Germans became convinced that Belgian Roman Catholic priests were organising and encouraging the francs-tireurs in their guerrilla warfare. Working on the principle that the easiest and best solution to the problem was to fill the Belgian population with fear, the Germans began systematically to execute civilians and priests and to burn their villages. Some of the first to suffer were six hostages shot at Warsage and the village of Battice, which was burned out, as an example to others. Moltke was aware reprisals were
taking place as early as August 5, but shrugged them off as a brutal necessity. The executions continued with the German advance, but far worse was to follow. The reprisals were not actions which occurred on the spur of the moment, once the invasion was under way. It had already been decided that, as speed was the essential factor of their march on France, examples must be made to discourage any form of resistance. The Germans had even taken the precaution of having posters printed before the invasion, listing offences which were punishable by death and closing with a warning that, not just individuals, but the whole area, where a hostile act took place, would be considered responsible. Hostages would be taken at
random and
shot.
Even
sheltering a Bel-
gian soldier in uniform was to be punished by transportation to hard labour camps in
Germany. The advance wake, a
trail
of the armies left, in their of death and burning. "In-
dividual executions were soon replaced by a further deterrent — mass executions. The first place to suffer this was a town named Aerschot, where elements of the First Army arrived on August 19, after crossing the Gete. Working on the simple process of rounding up the population in the town square, men on one side and women on the other, individuals were picked out at
random. At Aerschot 150 civilians were executed. Bulow's cess at Andenne
army repeated the
pro-
and Tamines, while Hausen's Third Army, not to be outdone,
FRANCE!
BELGIQUC
t
EOYA UMEotBELGlOUn
TOUTUTOUS POUR LA
The heel
of the
conqueror Top
left:
A French poster awards
fortress of Liege the Legion
the Belgian
d'honneurior
its
resistance to the Germans. /Above. All too late, a Belgian poster attempts to rally the people to the defence of the homeland. Top right: A cartoon by the famous Dutch cartoonist, Raemaeker, depicts France exposing the ogre of German barbarism. Below left: Louvain, symbol of German frightfulness' At the orders of General von Luttwitz, German troops rampaged through the city in an outburst of burning and killing, destroying the priceless library and shooting many civilians, including women and children. Below right: The victors parade in Brussels. The Germans celebrated the capture of the Belgian capital with an impressive display of military strength
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129
'Inconvenient though
it is,
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The advance single act did
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Second and Germany than
First,
to discredit
Third Armies was channelled through the gap between the Ardennes and the Dutch border. did this violation of an internationally guaranteed independence
shot no less than 612 at Dinant, one of whom was a three-week old baby. Kluck was upset to discover these reprisals did not bring about the rapid results expected of them. Determined to suppress the populace the Germans continued the massacres. Vise had been occupied on the first day of the invasion. On August 23 there was a report of sniping there. The German answer was to dispatch a regiment of infantry from Liege to Vise and there, in cold blood, long after the fighting had passed, to execute a selection of the population and then render the town uninhabitable by gutting it with fire. Similar occurrences were happening all over Belgium, but one name stands out far above the others — that of Louvain. Louvain, which had been the Belgian Army Tactical Headquarters until August 18, was a medieval city, known all over the world for its library which had been founded in 1426. It housed some 230,000 volumes, including a unique collection of medieval manuscripts. The town boasted many fine examples of Gothic architecture and a collection of Flemish masters. At first the occupation of Louvain was quiet and uneventful. On the second day a German soldier was shot in the leg by a sniper, the occupation forces claimed. The situation became tense. The Burgomaster was arrested, with two of his officials, in spite of his plea to civilians to hand over all arms. The Germans were sure the government and local officials were encouraging the resistance. Executions bega to take place and hostages were selectt
130
from the inhabitants. Then on August 25 the Belgian army on the outskirts of Antwerp carried out a raid on the First Army's rearguard, throwing it back on Louvain in confusion. Some shots were exchanged in the town, which, the Germans claimed, were the work of civilian snipers. Who was responsible for this shooting has never been established. The Germans' reaction was swift and horrific. They went through the ancient city on a rampage of burning, shooting, destroying and looting, at the orders of General von Luttwitz, the Military Governor in Brussels. Luttwitz calmly announced to the horrified American and Spanish Ambassadors the next morning (the 26th) thaL the Germans would destroy the city as a reprisal, which they systematically proceeded to do. The library was destroyed with its valuable contents, the Town Hall and church of St Pierre were damaged. Whole streets were set on fire, women and children shot, together with priests and male civilians. Reports of this wanton barbarism were released in the world press on August 29. The next day the pillage abruptly ended — but it will never be forgotten. Over those terrible five days, the Germans seemed d termined to live up to the reputation of their ancestors, the Huns, and no-one was slow to dri " this comparison. King Albert, in a conversation with the French Ambassador, remarked of the Germans: 'These people are envious, unbalanced and ill-tempered. They burned the library f Louvain simply because it was unique
No other
and universally admired.' As the German First, Second and Third Armies faced the French Fifth Army and the BEF across the Sambre at the start of the third week of August, the occupation of Belgium was complete. The three weeks the Germans had taken to reach the south of Belgium had given the Allies time to deploy. But, most important, the small and weak army of Belgium, together with the whole population of the country, had set an example of heroism and determination that fired the rest of the world. The
Germans had also been forced to abandon part of the SchliefFen Plan and had not been able to extend the wheeling blow as far west as they had hoped.
Further Reading Edmonds, Brigadier-General Sir James, France and Belgium, 1914 (Macmillan 1933) Keegan, J., Opening moves (New York: Ballantine 1971)
Tuchman, Barbara W., August 1914 (Constable 1962)
Tyng, Sewell, The Campaign of the Marne 1914 (Oxford University Press 1935) The Official History of the Great War, vol. Military Operations.
BERNARD THOROLD was
1,
born in 1942, and Edward's School, Oxford and the RMA Sandhurst. He was commissioned into the Scots Guards, with whom his service included a tour in East Africa. At present he works for a Public Relations Consultancy. He has written various articles and book reviews for historical and military
educated
at St
periodicals.
THE LIEGE FORTS In the 1880s Belgium had built a series of forts around Liege and along the Meuse to deter the Germans from marching through Belgium on their way to attack France. Faced with these forts in 1914, Ludendorff found his troops nervous at the prospect of having to storm the mighty bastions— but the German siege guns soon proved their worth Christopher Duffy
The
victors stand
terrain
on one
knocked-out cupolas of Liege. In spite of the open able to approach the forts under cover of their siege guns
of the
German troops were
'Oh these stupid Belgians! Why won't they give us a clear passage? I know the German army. It \\ ill be like putting a baby in the path of a steam-engine.' The exasperated comment of Sturm, Secretary of the German Legation at Brussels, summed up the feelings of his masters towards Belgium, that annoying little obstacle which geography and history had interposed between the German First and Second Armies and the northern border of France. Among the many changes wrought by Colonel-General von Moltke in the Schlieffen Plan had been the decision to preserve Holland as a neutral 'windpipe' for German commerce in the event of war. The
?
men of Kluck's First Army were therefore to be funnelled through Belgian territory, namely the 15-mile gap between the southern border of Holland and the foothills of the Ardennes. The area was transversed from south to north by the 320,000
River Meuse, which was nearly 200 yards wide and a considerable obstacle in its own right. The most important crossings lay within the town of Liege or under the guns of
its forts.
Long before the war Moltke, and his right-hand man Ludendorff, had concerned themselves with the problem of feeding their armies through this heavily-defended passage. Espionage and impudent recon-
naissances revealed to them the weaknesses of the position, and in a famous memorandum of 1911 Moltke as good as pronounced Liege's doom: 'Inconvenient though it is, the advance must proceed through Belgium without violating Dutch territory. A prerequisite is the possession of Liege. This fortress must therefore be taken at the outset. I believe that it is quite possible to reduce it by a coup de main. The advanced forts are sited so badly that they cannot see or command the intervals. I have sounded all the routes of advance which lead between the works to the interior to the town. It is perfectly feasible to execute a push in several columns with-
A baby in the path
of a steam-engine'
Liege,
commanding
the important
Meuse
cross-
ings, lay directly in the path of the German steam-engine'. Despite their state of disrepair, the Liege forts constituted a serious obstacle, and the Germans added punch to their 'steam-engine' with a formidable siege train.
The Austrian-made Skoda 30.5-cm howitzer played a vital role in crushing the Liege forts. Weight: 28 tons. Crew: variable, but usually 12. Rate of fire: ten rounds-per-hour. Range: 13,124 yards. Projectile weight: 846 lbs
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1880s by the Belgian engineer Brialmont, the twelve forts of Liege represented the best work of the most outstanding military engineer of his day. Brialmont's plans, however, were never entirely put into effect, and the system of fortification remained incomplete. Over the course of the years the condition of the forts had been Built in the
allowed to deteriorate, and by 1914 they were in a sorry state. Here we show the plan view and side elevation of a typical Brialmont fort
A Outer gate
with drawbridge
B Inner gate with drawbridge C Ditch covered with wire entanglements D Cupola for howitzer
E Cupolas for quick firing guns F Cupola for observation and searchlight G Central gallery from the gate H Barracks and magazines underground Stone reinforcement of the concrete walls J Infantry positions around the ramparts Counterscarp galleries with machine guns I
covering the ditch
Big Bertha The German-made 42-cm howitzer, popularly known as Big Bertha, or more accurately Fat Bertha, was the largest gun yet to be seen in war. Weight: 75 tons. Crew: a two gun battery had a complement of 280 men. flare of fire: ten rounds-per-hour. Range: 15,530 yards. Weight of projectile: 2,052 lbs
/ MAASTRICHT
BELGIUM r\... .GERMAN
A A A A A A A A A A A A A
2irfBR.A
A
BRIGADE PONTISSE
BARCHON EVEGNEE FLERON
HAUDFONTAINE
«2#
EMBOURG / ^T BONCELLES
FLEMALLE HOLLOGNE LATIN
LANTIN LIERS
/
The defences of Liege had serious gaps in them. There were no intervals between the forts -not even earthwork trenches -and there was much dead ound not covered by the forts' guns. The Germans were able to infiltrate the system anddestroy the forts piecemeal r
;
out being seen from the forts.' As the First Army was far too unwieldy for the purpose, General von Emmich was given command of a force of 25,000 infantry (six reinforced brigades), 8,000 cavalry and 124 guns, and instructed to carry out a surprise assault before the main mobilisation was complete. Bearing in mind that Emmich might fail, the heaviest possible artillery was to be held in readiness for an attempt to bludgeon the forts into submission. No such firmness of purpose was evident on the Belgian side. Once a model of professionalism, the Belgian army had dein spirit and numbers during decades of politically-inspired reductions. In the years immediately before the war King Albert I inspired a tardy military renaissance, but he would have needed two decades more of uninterrupted peace to bring his programme to completion. As things were, in August 1914 he could mobilise just 130,000 men, and support them with only 102 machine guns and 312
clined
Between 1888 and 1891 Brialmont applied these principles to the construction of a girdle of 12 detached forts around Liege. The works were built on a triangular or trapezoidal trace [ground plan], and consisted of an inner redoubt and a surrounding outer rampart. The redoubt was a lowlying monolith of concrete which was more than 7 feet thick and was studded with laminated iron domes housing the longrange armament of between five and eight artillery pieces of 12-cm, 15-cm and 21 -cm calibre. The outer rampart conformed approximately with the trace of the redoubt, and consisted on the forward sides of
an earthen bank surmounted with an
infantry parapet; a 5-foot-thick wall formed the rearward, or gorge front, and was pierced with armoured windows which admitted air to the accommodation, magazines and other facilities of the fort. Guns of 5.7-cm calibre saw to the defence of the ditch from cupolas and counterscarp case-
mates
(coffers).
light field pieces.
Defects in design
was the collapse of operational planning. As early as 1882 the leading strategist and engineer Henri Brialmont (1821-1903) had called for the fortification of the Meuse to deter the Germans from marching through Belgium to get at
A number of defects in the siting and design of the forts were all too apparent by 1914. The forts were disposed at a radius of three or four miles from the centre of Liege, and at average intervals of two and a half miles. That arrangement seemed on the map to command all the approaches to the fortress area. Among the more important forts Pontisse and Barchon defended the Meuse valley below Liege, and Flemalle and Boncelles performed the same service above the town. Fleron and Chaudfontaine formed the outposts towards Germany and could sweep the rail-
Worst of
all
the northern flank of France. In keeping with this realistic view of affairs, Albert had envisaged a fighting retreat to Antwerp, beginning with a determined stand on the eminently defensible line of the Meuse. A matter of days before the outbreak of hostilities, the Chief of the newly-created General Staff, de Selliers de Moranville, had thrown everything into disorder by demanding an adhesion to the most unreal kind of neutrality: since a concentration on the Meuse signified an unfriendly distrust of Germany, he insisted that the army must take up a position in the heart of Belgium as if to face all comers. The movement to the Meuse was thus fatally arrested at the beginning, and the most Albert could do in the time remaining was to order the 3rd Division and the 15th Brigade to Liege, and the 4th Division to the sister fortress of Namur. Thus on the very eve of war the 4,500 fortress troops at Liege were joined by some 30,000 men who were already exhausted by marching in near-tropical heat. The main army was stationed behind the River Gete, too far back to lend any help to the defenders of Liege and Namur. The advent of rifled artillery in the 1860's had broken the rule of the 24pounder siege cannon, which had lasted 250 years, and hastened a fundamental re-shaping of permanent fortification. Small, pacific Belgium produced in Brialmont the universally acknowledged expert in this rapidly changing branch of warfare. The essential features of his works may be summarised as follows: • The continuous town ramparts were replaced by a ring of detached forts. • The scarp wall [inner wall of the ditch] gave way to an earthen bank, and the work of holding back the enemy fell to the counterscarp wall (on the outer side of the ditch and railings and other obstacles in the ditch. • Guns were emplaced in revolving cupolas
batteries in order to eliminate all the dead ground. More serious still was the lapse of more than 25 years between the designing of the forts in the 1880s and their test in an unaltered and badly-maintained state in 1914. Brialmont had calculated the dimensions on the assumption that the 21 -cm mortar was the heaviest weapon which the
would have to face, and he failed to to terms with the troglodyte life which a prolonged siege would impose on the garrison. One unfortunate mistake was the position of the latrines in most of the forts on the far side of the rearward ditch. Lieutenant-General Leman allowed himforts
come
expense of his old master: 'Brialmont's military genius had an academic bent, and he forgot that his self a little joke at the
works were made
for
human beings. He
left
out of account a natural function of mankind which does not cease during a bombardment: quite the reverse.' The advent of a new generation of siege guns in the 1900s was the worst possible news for the Liege forts. In 1909 the Krupp works at Essen perfected the 'Big Bertha' (more properly translated 'Fat Bertha'), a rail-transportable howitzer of 42-cm calibre. Nothing quite so awe-inspiring had been seen since the great days of monster artillery in the 15th Century. The gun w£ s
broken down into five sections, and tran: ported by rail to the chosen site. The v eassembly of the bits took a good six hou*s, at the end of which the 200-man crew would feed the shell and charge into the breach. The gunners touched off the charge and sent the 2,200-pound shell rolling and roaring through the air for up to 9 miles. A
14, 1914 he was summoned to take command of the fortress of Liege and the 3rd Divisioni On February 3, Leman arrived to tnke up duties at Liege, and was immediately put in a bad temper by the sight of his reception committee: a single officer, dressed in civilian clothes. Still fuming, he was taken down the dingy Rue
January
of iron.
given concrete protection.
manent
delayed-action fuse made sure that the missile penetrated deep within the target before exploding. It was not until shortly before the war that the Germans appreciated that they could not guarantee themselves the use of intact railway lines leading directly up to the enemy fortresses. Work was therefore pushed ahead at frantic pace on two roadtransportable versions of 'Big Bertha', and the Germans gratefully accepted the loan of a number of the excellent Skoda 30-5-cm howitzers which the Austrians had developed at Pilsen in 1910. The Skoda howitzer had been designed to be roadtransportable from the beginning, and the assembly of the weapon required a mere 40 minutes. King Albert entrusted Liege to the charge of Lieutenant-General Gerard Leman (1851-1920), 'a grave, silent man' who had spent almost his entire career at the Military School, first as cadet, then as officer instructor and commandant. As a severe and exacting disciplinarian he stood Out among the generally easy-going Belgian officers of his generation, and on
I
• Accommodation and magazines were
way from Aachen with their guns; Loncin on the western side dominated the corresponding line to Brussels. Such neat dispositions ignored the heavily broken and wooded nature of the terrain on the east bank of the Meuse which called for a considerably larger number of forts and per-
King Albert (left) in German uniform before the war, with his future opponent, Emmich (right)
135
Sainte-Foi, shown through a door, and told that the room within was his office. Such soldiers as he could see were solitary,
on the thundery night of August 5/6. 'The harsh flash of the lightning and the bril-
morose and shabby, and used every shifty
liant glare of Fort Fleron's artillery fire joined to form a picture at once horrible
expedient to avoid saluting their
and
Leman
that one
officers.
gristle
all
beautiful.'
man
could to restore some discipline and spirit to the garrison. He was given no help at all by the General Staff, which refused to let him know the number of troops he would have under his command in the event of war, and forbade him to build any field works for fear of offending the Germans. On July 29, the day of mobilisation, Leman was at last allowed to Degin work on his three lines of trenches. The time was too short, the days were too hot, and the newly-arrived 3rd Division too exhausted to prepare more than scratch defences before the Germans appeared on August 4. The plan of the coup de main on Liege was the brainchild of Major-General Erich von Ludendorff, who was Chief of the Operational Section of the General Staff from 1908 to 1913. Observers have wrestled with adjectives to describe the peculiarly imposing and formidable appearance of the man; 'fat' is a feeble word to apply to a soldier who seemed to be all bone and did
from his bullet head down
to his
jack-booted feet. At least historians agree in seeing him as one of the most clearheaded and indefatigable commanders 'of that war. By 1914 he had every right to regard his work concerning Liege as already over. It was as a well-informed spectator that he accompanied the 14th Brigade of Emmich's force as it advanced on Liege
The fortress of Liege — pounded to rubble
The coup de main Contact with the realities of war soon depressed the high spirits with which the Germans had first crossed the Belgian frontier. It was planned to invest Liege by cutting it off with a grand cavalry sweep on August 4, but the operation petered out in exchanges of fire across the Meuse. The bridges outside Liege had been demolished by the Belgians, and the 34th Infantry Brigade had to be ferried on pontoons from Vise to its appointed place on the western bank. Ludendorff found the troops nervous at the prospect of storming the mighty fortress.
The enterprise could
certainly not have
been bolder, for the Germans hoped to penetrate between the forts in darkness during the night of August 5/6, and emerge unopposed on the next day at the town of Liege. The arrangement of the attack in five main columns was characteristic of the complicated plans with which armies embark on wars, and the risk of'a repulse was all the greater as the Germans had counted on meeting with a mere 6,000 troops, instead of the 35,000 or so which Leman actually had in the position. Halting, stumbling and colliding, the German columns wormed their way forward from their start-lines on the dark and rainy night. The hedges and straggling
any attempt at deployment, and casualties began to mount as the Germans came under fire from road blocks, from the forts and from each other. On the west bank of the Meuse the isolated 34th Brigade sought to break into Liege from the north, but stuck fast between the erupting guns of forts Liers and Pontisse. An NCO of the 7th Jager Battalion records: 'The man next to me received a shot in the body. I grasped him and was in the process of heaving him onto a passing
villages hindered
ammunition waggon when a shell splinter removed his head. We rushed on, without any hope of emerging from this murderous fire alive A knot of troops under Major von der Oelsnitz penetrated to the door of Leman's headquarters, but every man was '
taken or cut down in the hand-to-hand fighting.
On the east bank the advance of the united 38th and 43rd Brigades, forming the southernmost of the columns, came to a stop in confused fighting in the dripping woods around Fort Boncelles. Determined attacks could not be pressed further than the glacis of the fort. One of the defenders scribbled in his diary: 'Our cartridges are giving out and our rifles are burning our hands; our men are like madmen. Eighty yards away we see the flash of German rifles. Our forts are firing with wonderful precision. The searchlight sweeps along and the shell bursts where the ray has passed, right in the middle of the Germans.' Elsewhere on the east bank the 27th and 11th Brigades made still more modest penetrations.
German troops cautiously approach the wreckage of oneof
""•**
by the biggest guns yet used in war
4 s
"*** *-<>
& I
(
Liege's forts
The one hope of retrieving something from the wreck lay with the 14th Brigade, which was to advance due west between the forts of Evegnee and Fleuron. The start was exceptionally unpromising. At Retinne an outburst of Belgian artillery and machine gun fire reduced the commanding officers to a heap of corpses, and from being mere onlookers Ludendorff and Emmich had to step in and take charge of the troops in person. After losing time in taking a wrong turning, Ludendorff fought his way through the long village of Queuedu-Bois and finally emerged with a bare 1,500 troops on the heights overlooking Liege. The Belgian resistance on this sector had collapsed, but Ludendorff's communications to the rear were broken, and there was no news to be had of the other columns. The whole of August 6 passed without the situation becoming any clearer, but early on the 7th Ludendorff and Emmich took the bold decision to send the 34th Regiment under Colonel von Oven into the town and across the intact bridges. Ludendorff gave Oven ample time to carry out his task, and then drove in a car over the Meuse and up the slope on the far bank to the old but strong citadel, which he assumed must now be in German hands. He hammered at the gate to attract Oven's attention. The doors duly opened: revealing a frightened Belgian garrison whose only wish was to surrender. It is not enough to say that Ludendorff had been very lucky. Fortunate misunderstandings of this kind rarely befall people who have not done something to deserve them.
Not even these massive structures could withstand the
was taken on a troublesome 11 -mile journey to its emplacement near Mortier, where it was ready for action on the late afternoon of August 12. General von Einem assumed command
of this second, or siege
phase of the operation against Liege. The first breach in the fortified perimeter was opened as early as August 8. On its way to the town of Liege the German 27th Brigade loosed off some rounds from its two light howitzer batteries against Fort Barchon, on the right bank of the Meuse below the town. The parapet was crowded with troops, for another force was advancing on the fort from the rear, and the sudden loss of more than 30 men so demoralised the garrison that the
commandant
German guns
surrendered at 1630 hours. (This account follows Belgian time: German time was an hour later.) The ensuing gap on the northeastern side of Liege was widened still further by the pounding of Fort Evegnee into submission on August 11. Major Wesener tells of the next act in the siege, the beginning of the bombardment by the first of the 'Big Berthas': It was a memorable moment as the howitzer discharged the first shell on enemy soil at 1740 hours on August 12 against Fort Pontisse, on the south-eastern side of Liege. A hundred-fold cheer accompanied the shell as it howled and snorted along the high .
.
its target. I was gratified had turned out well, and
trajectory to
everything
.
that that
The events of the night of August 5/6 had meanwhile forced Leman to a painful decision. The shock of the encounter of the raw armies had filled Liege and the countryside with disorientated troops of both sides. Leman feared that a fresh collision would break the 3rd Division, especially as he had learnt that elements of five separate corps were present in Emmich's mixed force,
and drawn the conclusion that all were before Liege. On August 6
five corps
Leman
accordingly disengaged the 3rd Division and the 15th Brigade and sent them to safety in the interior of Belgium. The defence of Liege now rested upon the garrisons of the individual forts, with which Leman maintained a tenuous communication by means of runrters sent out from his new headquarters at Fort Loncin. However mistaken Leman's appreciation of his intelligence may have been, his extrication of the 3rd Division undoubtedly saved this force for the field army.
Only partial success The disappearance of the Belgian troops gave the Germans a badly needed opportunity to put themselves in order. The first measures were to feed more troops into the centre of Liege and establish communi-
A A German officer inspects the damage done by Big Bertha' and her smaller sisters before the forts V Landwehr troops in Liege. The town itself fell
cation between the brigades scattered around the 30-mile perimeter of forts. Since the coup de main had met with only partial success, the IX, VII and X Corps were brought up from the rear for the serious business of a formal, siege and closed in respectively from. the north, south-east and south. The two road-transportable 'Big Berthas' were ordered up from the Krupp works, and after a final burst of activity the first of the pieces moved out of Essen railway station early on August 10. From the unloading point outside the blocked railway tunnel at Herbesthal the howitzer
137
the eagerly-awaited opening of fire could be undertaken on this very evening. Sixty seconds ticked by -the time needed for the shell to traverse its 4,340-yard-high trajectory—and everyone listened in to the telephone report of our battery commander, Who had his observation post 1,625 yards from the bombarded fort, and could watch at close range the column of smoke, earth and fire that climbed to the heavens. The violence of the first explosion convinced the Belgians that the magazine at
Pontisse had blown up. It took further detonations as the successive bursts strode nearer the fort, to persuade them that they were dealing with some unheard-of form of artillery. 'Big Bertha' hit Pontisse squarely at the eighth round, then fell mercifully silent for the night. Her sister joined in the argument when the artillery re-opened fire at 0800 hours on August 13, stripping away armour plate and blocks of concrete, cracking arches and poisoning the air with heavy brown fumes. An official report sums up the conditions inside Pontisse: 'Ventilation: very bad; the men were seized with stomach pains, diarrhoea, nausea and an inability to hold
back their urine. The fort was reeking with explosive fumes from the outside. They tried to stop up the windows with mattresses, but it was no use. Latrines: the garrison used stinking boxes which were emptied into the channel; it became blocked, and the men were greatly inconvenienced.' Fort Pontisse surrendered at 1230 hours when it was at the limit of its resistance. It was the same story at the forts of Embourg (surrendered 1730 hours on August 13), Liers (0940 hours on August 14), Fleron (0945 hours on August 14), Boncelles (0730 hours on August 15) and Lantin (1230 hours on August 15), all of which were rendered untenable by the stench of explosives and excrement a few hours or minutes short of complete physical destruction by the Krupp and Skoda howitzers. Fort Chaudfontaine was an exception. It held out with its works largely intact until, at 0900 hours on the 13th, the explosion of a magazine sent a searing flame through the casemates. The Germans could not call themselves masters of Liege until they had reduced the three surviving forts of Loncin, Hollogne and Flemalle. These works formed a chain to the west of the town, and their fire would have thwarted any attempt by the First Army to cross the open, rolling country on the left bank of the Meuse. Fort Loncin, the soul of the defence, was the first to attract the besiegers' attention. It had been under intermittent fire from August 10, but these early cannonades were as nothing compared with a heavy and accurate fire of 21-cm guns which several times rocked the fort to its foundations on the morning of the 15th. Fragments of concrete jammed the steam engine powering the electric light and ventilation, and the inside of the fort rapidly filled with suffocating dust and fumes. General Leman was in one of the gorge casemates when, at 1500 hours, the enemy opened fire with their 'Big Berthas'. 'We could hear the shells coming,' he later wrote, 'we heard a rushing of air which increased in intensity until it became a furious hurricane roar and ended in a dreadful crash of thunder; fountains of earth and smoke were thrown into the air, md the whole earth shook.'
138
After two hours and 20 minutes of torment a single, mighty explosion of the magazine wrecked the concrete redoubt and brought the resistance to an end. The Germans sent their pioneers forward to lend what help they could to any survivors. 'We could hardly make out the trace of the fort. The ruins formed a miniature Alpine landscape, with debris strewn about like pebbles in a mountain stream. With some difficulty the pioneers drove a narrow path across this chaos of concrete, armoured cupolas and fragments of walls; their track resembled some mountain climb, with its ascents and
been an obstinate and doctrinaire opponent of prepared entrenchments and intermediate batteries. The emplacement of the Ger-
and ammunition had been thrown everywhere; a cupola had been blown from its place at the salient front, and had fallen on its dome; it now looked like a monstrous tortoise, lying on
Secondly, it was obvious that the Belgians had paid too little attention to the likely conditions of life in a fort under
drops.
Heavy
artillery
its shell.'
A
few blackened and dazed Belgians stumbling about the wreckage. Among them was General Leman. He had been knocked flat by the explosion, but was saved from suffocation by one of his companions, who pushed him through an armoured window into the gorge ditch.
were
No thought
of surrender The terrible end of Fort Loncin shocked the companion forts of Hollogne and Flemalle into surrender on the 16th. The way for the German advance into Belgium
was
Leman, now restored to his was brought before Lieutenant-
clear.
senses,
General Kolewe, the military governor of Liege, and handed a sword as a token of the Germans' esteem. He had never harboured any thought of surrender. It is easier to praise the endurance of Leman, the boldness of Ludendorff and the skill of the Essen and Pilsen arms manufacturers than to estimate just how far their efforts influenced the course of the
Germans had allowed themselves ample time to reduce Liege, and the move of the main armies into Belgium was not delayed by the full term of 14 days' resistance by the forts. Since the mobilisation of the Germans was completed on August 13, and they crossed the Belgian borders in force on the 14th, it is reasonable to calculate the penalty in time at one or two days — the period they had to wait before moving through the Liege gap. In the circumstances of 1914 these dearly-bought hours were probably ample justification for the fortification and defence of the war. The
Liege position. As a technical exercise, the attack on Liege attracted the most lively interest. Two lessons seemed to emerge. First of all the events of August 7 and 8 demonstrated that there was no means of preventing an enemy from penetrating between detached forts in the absence of field troops, or intermediate works. The blame could not be laid at the door of Leman, who surely had a well-ordered sense of priorities in deciding that the 3rd Division should not be thrown away in the defence of a fortress; forts were supposed to guard an army, not the other way around. The responsibility was largely that of the Brussels government and the Belgian General Staff, which allowed the fort installations to decay, and refused to undertake field works before the actual invasion. Fortifications and moral rectitude are no substitute for firm alliances and a strong field army. Nor can the long-dead engineer Brialmont escape all censure, for he had
man guns
behind the forts was all the more dangerous as Brialmont's cleared and fire-swept 'zones of servitude' did not extend to the rear, and he believed that a well-defiladed mask wall was good protection for the gorge front of a fort. At Liege the mortars taught the defenders of Fort Fleron otherwise. One of the 'Big Berthas' which dealt the fatal blows at Fort Loncin was actually sited in a square in the centre of Liege.
siege. Water cisterns and reservoirs were easily cracked; commandants found that observation posts were too few and too exposed to give useful information on outside events once the telegraph lines were broken; the feeble means of ventilation were unable to clear the fumes given off by explosives and latrines, and compelled the surrender of several forts which could have held out a little longer. It was tempting to conclude that the peculiar fixedness of permanent fortification—static in space, almost unalterable in dimension and properties — rendered it vulnerable to the slightest advance in the techniques of the attack. A cavalry regiment could at least trot to safety over the horizon, but it seemed that the fortress had to await the shock of whatever weapons the enemy held in store for it. That view was over-simplified, for very few armies have ever been so well equipped for siege warfare as the German forces in 1914. The Second World War was to show again and again the great powers of resistance of permanent works against careless besiegers. Fortification was one among the many useful weapons of war. It was just as wrong to dismiss permanent defences as a useless expense as to trust oneself to them completely and abdicate military sense.
Further Reading Brialmont, H. A., La Defense des Etats (Brussels, 1895), reprinted with introduction by C. Duffy (Osnabruck, 1967) by C. Duffy (Osnabruck, 1967) Essen, L van der, The Invasion and the War in Belgium from Liege to the Yser (London, 1917) Galet, General S. M., Le Roi Albert Com-
mandant en Chef devant
mande
I'lnvasion Alle-
(Paris, 1931)
Hautecler, G.,
Leman sur
La Rapport du General Defence de Liege en Aout
(ed.), la
1914 (Brussels, 1960) Keegan, J., Opening moves (New York: Ballantine 1971) Ludendorff, General, My War Memories, 2 vols. (London) Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkheg 1914 bis 1918, vol.
1
(Berlin, 1925)
The Schlieffen Plan (Wolff, 1958) Schryver, A. de, La Bataille de Liege (Aout 1914) (Liege, 1922) Tuchman, B., August 1914 (Constable, 1962) Ritter, G.,
CHRISTOPHER DUFFY was
born in 1936, went to College, Oxford, and took a First in Modern History in 1 958. He is at present a Senior Lecturer in Military History at the RMA Sandhurst. Mr Duffy has published a life of Maximilian Browne (the Irish fieldmarshal of Maria Theresa), and a study of the War of the Second Coalition. He has edited reprints of the works of the military engineers Brialmont and Balliol
Todleben.
SERBIA FIGHTS BACK When Austria attacked Serbia in August
1914, her military leaders expected a walk-over. The Serbs, however, although outnumbered and lacking in arms and equipment, had much valuable experience of war, and a skilful high command. The result was not the walk- over that the
Austrians had expected Major-GeneralB Mirkovich .
The small kingdom
of Serbia,
which by
its
geographical position presented an obstacle to the Austro-Hungarian foreign policy of Drang nach Osten (expansion eastwards) looked to Russia for protection against Austrian aggression. The Serbs believed that Austria wished to swallow up their country as soon as possible, and that while the Austrian Emperor, Franz Josef, was reluctant to go to war, Kaiser Wilhelm II's influence might well persuade him to do so. At that time the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary had over 50,000,000 subjects and was able to mobilise over 4,000,000 men in the event of war, although in peacetime the army consisted of 478,000 men. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was Archduke Friedrich and the Chief of General Staff was General Conrad von Hotzendorf. For the war against Serbia three armies made up the 'Balkan Army' (the Second, Fifth and Sixth), totalling about 308,000 men. In fact, in the first offensive against Serbia, the Second Army could not be used in its entirety, as on August 18 some of its units had to be
rushed to the Russian front in Galicia. It is generally estimated that about 200,000 men and some 700 guns of the 'Balkan Army' took part in this campaign. When mobilisation was complete Serbia would have a total of 450,000 men, including 50,000 for whom there were insufficient arms. Even some of the units for which arms were available did not have uniforms,
and only caps and greatcoats could be supThe first-line army comprised the First, Second and Third Armies and the Uzice Army, a total of about 180,000 men. Although short of rifles and ammunition, the Serbian army was well trained and had recently experienced two wars. Its equipment was good, and its artillery perhaps better than the Austrian. The Serbian High Command was skilled, and the rank and file knew they were fighting for life or death in defence of their homeland, and that there cause was a just one. Their morale was high, but the Austro-Hungarian armies were better disciplined and plied.
equipped.
The kingdom of Montenegro did not have a regular army. Their armed forces were
a kind of militia organised on a tribal with the chiefs of the tribes as their
basis,
The Montenegrin forces amounted between 40,000 and 45,000 riflemen. The Montenegrin soldier was a keen warrior, proud, patriotic, and unable to accept defeat. He had the advantage of experience in two Balkan Wars and it was felt that these qualities compensated for his lack of modern arms and equipment. Serbia had two frontiers with AustriaHungary; the northern one formed by the Rivers Danube and Sava; and the western one by the River Drina. The Serbian capital Belgrade lay between the southern banks of the Rivers Danube and Sava, and the Austrians could easily shell it from their territory. Both frontiers formed officers.
to
natural barriers. In the north — near the
Sava — the roads became muddy and even
swampy during
rainy periods, but as there are no very high mountains in that region, the area could be described as suitable for military operations. In late summer the temperature is high but the country is covered with rich vegetation which — together with fruit gardens and maize fields
139
-provides good natural camouflage for troop movements. On the western frontier the country near the River Drina is more mountainous. The river itself is not wide like the Danube and Sava, but swift and dangerous to cross. Its banks are covered with willow bushes which offer good camouflage for defence. Communications there are poor and the only two good roads are in the valleys of the Jadar and Lesnica rivers. These valleys are dominated by the mountains of Cer and Iverak, and control of their crests is vital for use of the roads. The crest of the Cer is about 12 miles long; its southern slopes are rather steep and descend to the valley of Lesnica. Immediately after the reply to the ultimatum was given to the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade on July 25, 1914, the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pasic, ordered the government to retire to Nis and the Headquarters of the General Staff
On July 28 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and on the same day Serbia ordered general mobilisation. The Serbian Supreme Command mobilised in six days and concentrated in 11. The successful execution of these two important and delicate operations was due to the great physical endurance of the Serbian soldiers and the almost superhuman efforts of the Serbian railways. Serbian units, often equipped with oxen teams, marched considerably longer distances than their forced marches required in those hot August days. The AustroHungarian 'Balkan Army' did not complete its mobilisation or its concentration on time. Certain units of the Sixth Army (XVI Corps) were delayed for five days. The Serbian war plan was drawn up in 1908 by the Chief of the General Staff, Voivode (Field-Marshal) Radomir Putnik. The plan was based on the assumption that in the event of war against Serbia, AustriaHungary would direct her main forces southwards, crossing the Rivers Danube and Sava, while her auxiliary forces would come from Bosnia, crossing the River Drina and penetrating eastwards. The task of the main forces would be to advance through the valley of the Morava which leads directly to central Serbia. Consequently the Serbian Supreme Command planned to locate their main forces on an to Kragujevac.
east/west line across the central part of the country, and place the weaker forces to defend the frontiers on the Danube, Sava and Drina. In this initial position the Serbian army would have to act defensively, permitting the Austrians to penetrate their territory until the plan of the invader was observed.
A
flexible
The
defence plan
such a defensive plan enabled the Serbian High Command to direct its main strategical force quickly by using interior operational lines. It also offered the opportunity of initiating a counteroffensive in favourable conditions with superior forces. Putnik made the basic details of this plan known to the Montenegrin Supreme Command and to the Serbian army commanders, together with an explanation of the political and military situation in Serbia and Montenegro. The original Austro-Hungarian war plan was to invade Serbia by an advance from both the north and west frontiers, but Russia's entry into the war caused this to
140
flexibility of
be revised. The new plan aimed at crushing the forces in western Serbia quickly by encircling them from the south. By taking Valjevo, the Austrians would threaten the left flank of the main forces concentrated in central Serbia, and their rear would be endangered if the Austrian Sixth Army penetrated via Pozega towards the valley of the Western Morava. Austrian foreign policy aimed at a swift victory in Serbia in the hope that their success would incite Bul-
Rumania and Turkey
Krupanj, which two Serbian companies successfully defended until the evening. So the heroic fighting of one and a half battalions of Serbian veterans prevented two Austrian corps from achieving their objectives. Only 42nd Honved Infantry Division had successfully crossed and bridged the river on that day. The slow advance of VIII and XIII Corps can be explained by the fact that the Serbs had some of the Comitadji units available,
to join
which had been attacking and confusing
the war on the side of the Central Powers. In the early morning of August 12, General Potiorek (commander of the Austrian Sixth Army) launched his offensive against Serbia from both northern and western frontiers. On the Danube sector
Austrians in a variety of places throughout the day. The Austrian Sixth Army acted defensively all day, with the primary task of protecting the right wing
VII Corps opened with heavy artillery fire on Serbian positions, with intensive shelling points at Belgrade and Obrenovac. A small detachment tried unsuccessfully to take the Isle of Ada Ciganlija, near Belgrade. On the Sava sector, after heavy
tions functioned perfectly in Serbia, thus enabling, the Serbian Supreme Command to keep a minute-by-minute watch on the battle situation. From 0400 hours onwards, Putnik, his deputy (General Zivojin Misic) and the Chief of the Operational Department (Colonel Zivko Pavlovic) were able to follow and discuss the developments on all fronts. They noticed at once that the
garia, Italy,
the
of the Fifth
Army.
Telephone and telegraphic communica-
Austrian Second Army was mostly engaged in demonstrative action, while the Sixth Army did not move forward anywhere. They concluded that the decisive battle would be fought in the north-west of Serbia. Two points on the northern front caused the Serbian Supreme Command some concern; Sabac, where the Austrians had driven back the Serbian defence and Obrenovac, which was shelled continuously. Consequently, in the afternoon of August 12 Putnik ordered the commanders of the First and Second Armies to move their units nearer the north-west front. The commander of the Third Army was ordered to use his Reserve where necessary as reinforcements to stop the advance of the Austrian Fifth Army. The commander of the Uzice Army was ordered to launch an offensive toward Visegrad immediately,
and the commander of the Montenegrin army was to secure the flank of the Uzice
Army in the course of its offensive. This directive was executed during the night of August 12/13 and on the 13th itself. While the Austrian Fifth Army had lost one whole day at the beginning of the offensive, the Serbian Supreme Command had Field-Marshal Putnik, Serbian Chief-of-Staff
shelling at Sabac, at 0315 hours the 44th Infantry Regiment crossed the river and captured the town. The soldiers of this regiment immediately started to kill all the male population and rape the women, while the children were massacred with bayonets. At noon, two Serbian battalions of the 6th Infantry Regiment and two cavalry squadrons launched a vain counterattack. The Austrians could not advance further on the same day as they had to wait for reinforcements. They had made another crossing of the Sava in the region of Mitrovica, easily capturing three villages as the Serbs had only one infantry company stationed there. The Fifth Army, after systematic artillery preparation, launched its own offensive at dawn on the lower Drina. VIII Corps attacked the Isle of Samurovica Ada, north of Janja, taking it by noon. This isle was defended by only one Serbian battalion. Simultaneously XIII Corps attacked the Isle of Ada Kurjacica, to the west of
made good use
of their time. Since Potiorek feared that a Serbian advance toward Sarajevo could incite insurrection among the Serb population in Bosnia, the whole of the Sixth Army was pinned down in a defensive position opposite the Serbian Uzice Army. In the course of August 13 the elements of the Austrian Second Army at Sabac and Mitrovica did not advance but waited for the Fifth Army to take up position as scheduled. VIII Corps had not yet taken position north of Lesnica and XIII Corps had to wait. Its orders were not to take up position at Loznica until VIII Corps had
achieved
its first success.
So another day
was wasted by the Austrians. This stagnation
of the Austrian offensive gave one
more precious day
to the Serbs for the execution of their movement order of the previous day by their Supreme Command. The cavalry squadron of the 1st Drina Division arrived at Misar (south-east of Sabac) in the early morning and at noon took part in the attack on the town with the Sabac Detachment. The advance guard of the 1st Sumadija Division arrived as
Top Serbian officers rest during their onslaught on Serbia. The Austrian rank and file lacked the physical fitness and patriotic motivation of their Serbian enemies Bottom: Montenegrin troops await battle. Although ill equipped they were formidable soldiers
141
scheduled on the holding position south of Sabac, as a reinforcement for the troops who were slowly retiring from Sabac. Their task was to secure the necessary time for the principal force of 1st Sumadija Division to arrive, since the latter had been en route from Lazarevac from August 12. The 1st Drina Division was completing its movements, and its 5th Infantry Regiment, with half of the divisional artillery, arrived at the appropriate position near Loznica (12 miles south of Lesnica). The second half of the divisional artillery took up position near Zavlaka. The main force of this division gathered in the evening near Kamenica for the defence of Valjevo. Thus all the Serbian manoeuvres were completed in time. In the course of the 14th, the Sabac Detachment, reinforced by the complete 1st Sumadija Division, attacked the Austrian position from early morning and throughout the day, but could not regain the town. Fifth Army made a modest advance resulting in heavy 1 )sses on both sides. VIII Corps (25,000 men and 96 guns) succeeded in driving back the Serbian Lesnica Detachment (1,500 men, 500 Comitadji and two guns). They also took the ridge of the Cer with infantry but the artillery was left in the valley as it was impossible to get the guns through the mud. XIII Corps, with 36th Infantry Division, drove back the Loznica Detachment and took the position of Loznica after very fierce fighting. Its better equipped 42nd Honved Division, which specialised in mountain-warfare, advanced to Ljubovija during the day.
The
Serbia takes the initiative During the night of August 14/15, Putnik judged the situation on the battlefield along the following lines: 'The Austro-Hungarian main attacking force is the Fifth Army on a front along the lower Drina; the direction of its principal attack is the line LoznicaValjevo. Elements of their Second Army at
Sabac are simultaneously attacking from the south as an auxiliary force. The main force of the Second Army is still concentrating on demonstrative actions on the rest of the front. According to information received by Serbian Military Intelligence, the Second Army is soon to be sent to the Russian Front. Potiorek's Sixth Army is on the defensive.' Thanks to the slow advance of the Austrians, the Serbs had managed to move their Second Army north-westward to reinforce the Third Army, and overcame a temporary crisis. After a review of the strategic situation, the Serbian Chief of General Staff came to the conclusion that the time had now come for the Serbs to relieve the Austrians of the initiative. This could only be accomplished if the Serbs succeeded in preventing the Austrian Fifth Army from linking up with their forces in Sabac; it was necessary for the Serbs to counter-attack with their main forces, striking at the unprepared and isolated Fifth
Army.
Carefully studying the best possible topographical position for such a battle, the Serbian Chief of General Staff chose that of Cer, just south-east of Lesnica. On the same night the following directive was issued by him: The Third Army of General Paul Yourishich-Sturm will stubbornly hold the enemy which is advancing through the Valley of Jadar; General Stepa Stepano-
142
vich will attack the enemy's
two
flank with
left
simultaneously
securing himself with the 1st Sumadija Division from the direction of Sabac' On the night of August 14/15, General Stepanovich received the Directive and immediately issued his orders: • The Cavalry Division urgently to execute a forced march on the line Sabac-Lesnica, with the task of clarifying the situation at Macva (northern region between the Sava and the Drina); to operate on the flank and in the rear of the enemy; to secure the right flank of the Serbian Second Army; • The 1st Sumadija Division to postpone further attacks on Sabac; to settle its. troops on the right bank of the River Dobrava; to keep the road leading to Tekerish; • The 1st Combined Division immediately to execute a forced march via Miletic in the direction Bosnjak-Mihajlov Grob-Rakita, where one infantry regiment was to be left, with artillery; one column to advance along the crest of the Cer, while the main force is to advance through the valley of Lesnica into the enemy's flank; • The 1st Morava Division to advance through the valley of Taninava, then by the Sabac road to join the 1st Combined Division at Tekerish to continue the advance via the Iverak Mountain toward Obrez, attacking the enemy in the Valley of Jadar, cooperating with the Third Army. During the day of August 15, the Austrian Second Army continued its demondivisions,
activities. The Fifth Army had made a small advance with its left wing and was pushing forwards with its right. VIII Corps was advancing with its 21st
strative
Infantry Division along the crest of the Cer, and its 9th Infantry Division appeared on the position of Rashuliacha, toward Tekerish. XIII Corps, with 36th Infantry Division, arrived at the Loznica position and the 42nd Honved Division advanced as far as Krupanj. The Fifth Army was threatening to encircle the Serbian Third Army. The Sixth Army had reinforced Corps. opposite Cajnice, with its The Serbian First Army remained grouped round Lazarevac as a strategic Reserve; the Second Army was executing its forced march, to position for the Battle of Cer. The Third Army was occupied all day in defending its wide front. The Uzice Army was preparing its offensive against Visegrad. The Lim Detachment appeared at the mouth of the Lim; the Comitadji groups had crossed the frontier, near Srebrnica, and were active in Bosnia, in the rear of the Sixth Army. While the Austro-Hungarian Fifth Army was arranging its troops to spend the night on the Cer, its commander, General Frank, was unaware that the Serbian Second Army was approaching from the opposite side. Nor, of course, did General Stepanovich know that his army would find the Austrians on the Cer. So, both armies were
XV
brought into an unexpected and unprepared bataille en rencontre.
The 1st Combined Division to penetrate the crest of the
had orders Cer during
the night, to take up positions at Trojan and Kosanin Grad. While advancing on the slopes of Cer at about 2300 hours, it came across the first of the Austrian outposts, drove them back, and began to settle into its fighting position. Before midnight, on the left wing, the whole of the Serbian 6th (Supernumerary) Infantry Regiment was engaged in the fight.
One
battalion of the Austrian 21 st Infanby its divisional commander, General Pschiborsky, himself armed with a rifle in his hand, fearlessly launched an assault on two Serbian battalions. After a short and brisk struggle, the Serbian try Division, led
Bonbashee
(fighters
with hand-grenades)
forced the Austrians into chaotic flight, in which Colonel Friedel, commander of the Austrian 27th Infantry Regiment, was killed. About 0130 hours, fighting develop-
ed on the Serbian right, where the Serbs captured the range of Divaca. At dawn, the Serbian 6th (Supernumerary) Infantry Regiment captured the Austrian position on the Borino Brdo; the defeated Austrians retreated in disorder; the Austrian 21st Infantry Division suffered heavy losses, and was demoralised.
A crisis overcome During
the
16th
the
Serbian
cavalry
had succeeded in driving back the column of the 21st Infantry Division,
division left
on the northern slopes of the Cer, thus preventing it from meeting with the elements of the Austrian Second Army at Sabac. One squadron of the Serbian cavalry division successfully secured the flank of the 1st Combined Division near Osojee. The task of the principal forces of the cavalry division was to proceed on the line Petlovaca-Prnjavor during the day. The
Combined Division was tired, having spent the previous day on a long forced march and having fought all night long, without any rest. Confronting it was the Austrian 9th Infantry Division, which immediately attacked the left of the 1st Combined Division. After heavy losses in the first two hours, the Serbian 6th Infantry Regiment retreated in disorder; soon afterwards the Serbian 1st Infantry Regiment was driven back to the holding position of Radovica Brdo. For the moment it looked as though the whole front of the Combined Division was lost. Then the army commander, General Stepanovich, intervened. He made a personal appearance in the front line, urging the troops to make a last effort to hold on, as reinforcements were soon due. At 1600 hours, the 1st Morava Division arrived, and the crisis was overcome. On August 17 the 1st Sumadija Division made an effort to capture Sabac by assault, but failed. The Serbian Second Army was engaged
all
day in
battle.
General Rashich
attacked the Cer with the 1st Combined Division, captured Trojan and Parlog, and then began preparations for attacking Kosanin Grad. General Gojkovich, with the 1st Morava Division, operated on the Iverak Mountain, but was unable to advance as this would expose its left flank. The Serbian Third Army had been driven back. The Austrian 42nd Mountain Division was threatening to penetrate along the road, thus endangering Valjevo. Seeing this danger, the Serbian Supreme Command ordered the commander of the Third Army to despatch the 1st Timok Division to the threatened sector of the front. The operations on this day show the Serbian intention to advance with its right wing on the northern part of the Cer battleed to do the field, while the Austria: same with their right on ine southern pa-* of the battlefield. Early in the morning on August 18, Austrian IV Corps (31st and 32nd Infantry Divisions), commanded by General Tersztyansky, strengthened with the 29th Infantry Division of IX Corps,
In its
spite of a superiority in numbers, the Austrian offensive against Serbia was turned back at every point. The Austrian Second Army best troops to the Russian front, and difficult terrain and excellent Serbian staff work turned the scales against Austria
launched the attack on the 1st Sumadija Division from the Sabac bridgehead, with orders to take Tekerish, thus facilitating the offensive of the Fifth Army.
The
Serbs,
however, defended their position, massacring the Austrians at the River Dobrava, and drawing them back. General Terszty-
ansky lost the day, and withdrew to Metkovic Mehana. The Serbian Cavalry Division had orders to pursue the Austrians toward Lesnica,
but had to remain along the line Metkovic — Brestovac because of the activity of the Austrian TV Corps. Meanwhile, the Serbian Second Army continued its counter-offensive along the
Cer and Iverak. The 1st Combined Division was attacking nearly all day at Rashuliacha, but failed to take it. Then the commander ordered preparations be made for attacking Kosanin Grad. The first assault was repulsed, but the Serbs did not give
had
lost
many of
up. They attacked continuously during the night and finally captured the Kosanin Grad at 0500 hours on the following morning. On the Serbian left the 1st Morava Division, operating in the direction of the Iverak mountain, thrust back elements of the Austrian 9th Infantry Division from their positions on Begluk and Spasovina, later on taking the Cote. About midnight the Austrians attempted to recapture these positions, but failed with heavy losses.
143
Adversaries in the Balkans
Left:
An infantryman
of the
Austro-Hungarian and on this
forces. Facing difficult terrain,
occasion badly led, the Austrian soldier was unable to make much use of the fact that he was better equipped than his Serbian counterpart. Nor did his relatively greater formal military training compensate for the Serbian soldier's more recent experience of battle. Right: A Serbian infantryman. In fact, a Serbian soldier would have been fortunate to find himself as fully equipped as this. Some of those called upon to defend their country could not even be supplied with rifles. They might, however, be veterans of the two Balkan wars and many other less official skirmishes with the Turks
They
also attacked all day along the front held by the Serbian Third Army, as well as attacking the position whicb was defended by the Ljubovija Detachment. There, the whole day was spent under attack from the 42nd Division, but with little success for the Austrians. Early in the morning of August 19, the Austrian TV Corps renewed the attack on the 1st Sumadija Division, with additional strength, driving the Serbs back. However, as General Tersztyansky could not advance in the direction of the Cer, leaving the 1st Sumadija Division in his rear, he fought this division all day, thus preventing the TV Corps from joining the Cer battlefield, where the decisive battle was then in its final stage. At the same time, the Serbian cavalry division could not join the battle, as it was now forced to remain in its position because of the presence of the TV Corps in that area. On that day, the Serbian Second Army continued its victorious advance. General Rashich captured the position at Rashuliacha at mid-day, and in the early evening the advance guard of his 1st Combined Division appeared along the front at Le§mca. General Gojkovich, with his 1st
14-
Morava Division, moved the attack on the Iverak early in the morning, driving back the Austrians after brief but severe fighting. The 1st Morava Division took the Velika Glava at 1100 hours, at which time an artillery duel began, and the fighting spread all along the front. The attack on the Iverak proved successful, and at 1620 hours the important ridge of Rajin Grob was taken. After that the 1st Morava Division speedily advanced. In the course of the Austrian retreat, their rear-guard made little attempt to resist. The Austrians were completely beaten. The elements of the Serbian Third Army on the Cer front had been engaged in heavy fighting with the strong Austrian forces. The Austrian 36th Infantry Division was forced to withdraw from its position only after the Serbs had reinforced their right wing. This forced the Austrians to retreat in disorder, leaving much material and about 500 pnsoners-of-war. The Serbian Second Army, with its successive victories, had won the Battle of Cer on August 19, 1914, and the rest of the day was used to pursue the Austrians over the Drina. In the course of August 20 and 21, the whole of the Fifth Army was driven
into Bosnia.
The
victory of the Battle of
Cer was followed by fighting at Sabac, which was liberated on August 24, 1914. In the First Serbian Campaign, AustriaHungary lost about 7,000 dead and 30,000 wounded; Serbia, 3,000 dead and about 15,000 wounded. The Serbs took 4,000 prisoners-of-war, 46 cannons, 30 machine guns, 140 ammunition wagons, and a mass of rifles, field hospitals, transport, engineers' trains, stores and other impedimenta. This victory in the Battle of Cer
caused General Stepa Stepanovich to be promoted to the rank of Field-Marshal and this was the first victory for the Allies over the Central Powers in the First World War.
MAJOR-GENERAL B. MIRKOVICH was educated
in
Valijevo, Serbia, then at Military College in Belgrade,
where 'Apis' was commissioned in
his lecturer in strategy. artillery,
and fought
in
He was
four
wars
(1912, 1913, 1914-1918, 1941-1945). He was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Yugoslav Air Force in 1941. When the Yugoslav government signed the Tripartite Pact with Hitler (March 25, 1941), General Mirkovich organised the overthrow of the 'pro-Pact' government. He died in London on August 21, 1969.
JohnKeegan
less
Rather than meet the probable German invasion at the beginning of the war, Joffre decided instead to persevere with his plans for two French invasions of Germany in areas where it was expected that German troops would be
When the French invasion actually started all
went well
at first in the Lorraine region, but
gradually the Germans held the French, and when the Germans counterattacked, the French were driven back with heavy losses
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Frenchmen, whether soldiers, strategists or merely patriots, had held Alsace and Lorraine in their unwavering gaze for more than 40 years. The patriot mourned a captive province of France, ravaged in hat tie by the Germans in 1870 and then half dismembered in an imposed peace. The soldier looked beyond the artificial frontier Germany had dictated to the valley of the
by Joffre on August 3 to set out immediately for Mulhouse, a town only a little short of the Rhine and deep in German-held territory, with the object at once of securing First Army's projected axis of advance and of raising the countryside against the enemy. Its commander, General Bonneau, expressed doubts both tailed
Rhine,
usefulness and feasibility of his mission from the start and his subordinates
German
seem
concentration area for any new invasion, but also the ultimate objective of an army of liberation. The strategist saw the obstacles which nature imposed between that army and its prize; to the south the peaks of the Swiss Jura; in the centre the wooded crests of the Vosges; to the north the uplands of the Moselle. The gaps between, leading towards the Rhine at Strasbourg and Mulhouse respectively, he would call the Lorraine and Bel fort gateways. The Belfort gateway, defended by one of the oldest and strongest of French fortresses, was too narrow to afford passage in either direction to a major force. The Lorraine gateway, on the other hand, remained 'the most dangerous opening on the French frontier', that through which the Germans had come in 1870 and a French army must go if la revanche were to be consummated. In the decades following the FrancoPrussian war it was less upon revanche than a second German incursion — and how it might best be repelled — that the French high command brooded. Prevailing military wisdom counselled fortification as the answer, and great sums were accordingly spent in the 1880s in extending and improving the fortresses along the Meuse and Moselle, particularly in the areas Belfort — Epinal and Toul — Verdun. The system so created was not meant however to commit the French army to a wholly passive defence. It incorporated a central gap, coinciding exactly with the mouth of the Lorraine gateway and known as the Trouee de Charmes, into which the French intended to entice the head of an invading
German column, which would then be amputated by mobile forces braced against the bastions to the north and south. Two developments served to rob this scenario of probability as 1914 drew near. The first was growing evidence that the Germans would refuse to play; the second was the French army's rejection of the defensive mood, a mood which just lingered on into the 20th Century. Plan 17 laid even its ghost. It categorically forbade any reliance upon fortified systems, committing the French army, immediately on completion of its mobilisation, to 'two major (offensive) operations, one on the right, in the country between the wooded district of the Vosges and the Moselle below Toul; the other, on the left, north of the line Verdun-Metz'. It is the first of these that has come to be known as the Lorraine offensive, the earliest phase of the Battle of the Frontiers. In Alsace, that battle was to have its beginning before even the preliminary stage of concentration was complete, as a result of the particularly intrusive 'covering' mission assigned to VII Corps. For while the other local frontier formations,
XX Corps based at Nancy and XXI Corps at Epinal, had orders merely to take up positions from which they could protect
detraining areaj of First and VII Corps, based at on in the extreme south, was de-
the
Second
Armies,
of the
have caught his lack of enthusiasm. Certainly the corps conducted itself with none of that elan which ten years' into
doctrination in the spirit of the offensive was supposed to have infused into the French army. Bonneau took two days to reach Mulhouse, a mere 15 miles from his base, quite neglected to reconnoitre his front once he arrived and lost the town within 24 hours of its capture to troops secretly, though not indetectably, assembled in the adjacent forests. By August 11, although reinforced, he had beaten a retreat as far as Belfort, where he and the commander of his attached cavalry division instantly received news of their dismissal.
Threat of dismissal Joffre had already had occasion
to
remove
one obviously incompetent general, but Bonneau's dismissal was to inaugurate a positive reign of terror over the French high command. 'My mind was fully made up on this subject,' Joffre wrote later. 'I would get rid of incapable generals and replace them with those who were younger and more energetic' By the end of August he was to have removed from command one of the five army commanders, three of the 21 corps and 36 of the 83 divisional commanders. Messimy, the Minister of War, would have gone further, threatening death to any officer found wanting in courage or capacity. Joffre, who ruled absolute in the 'Zone of the Armies', suppressed that despatch, knowing that the scent of promotion was sufficient to encourage the others and that dismissal was death enough. Rightly his concern was with efficiency, which he did not think served by dramatic decrees, and it was for the same reason that he now began that refashioning of command structures which was to make his control of the fighting formations so much more direct than Moltke's throughout the campaign of 1914. He judged that much of Bonneau's vaccilation was a result of the distance from higher supervision at which he had operated. He accordingly separated VII Corps from First Army on August 10 and, by the addition of the 8th Cavalry Division, the 1st Group of (three) Reserve Divisions, several Alpine battalions and the 44th Division (the latter released by the dissolution of the Army of the Alps on Italy's declaration of neutrality) established the Army of Alsace, under General Pau, a onearmed and hard-headed veteran of 1870. These changes completed the order of battle which the southern wing would deploy in the Battle of the Frontiers. North of the Army of Alsace and aligned along the crest of the Vosges stood the First
Army,
commanded
by
General
Dubail, a man esteemed by Joffre for precisely the qualities his subordinates feared in him; a cold heart, a sharp eye and a biting tongue. His command, whose headquarters were located at the fortress town of Epinal, comprised XXI Corps, native to the region, and VIII, XIII and XIV Corps,
from the Alps and the Massif Central. The Second Army, commanded from Nancy by General deCastelnau (whose uncompromising Catholicism had won for him from colleagues,
who were more
sensitive to the
temper of the Third Republic, the nickname of 'Monk in Boots'), disposed anti-clerical
of a rather stronger force, as befitted its position astride the Trouee de Charmes. It consisted of the local Corps, commanded by another devout Catholic, Ferdinand Foch (better known for his fervent advocacy of the offensive), and
XX
XV
XVI Corps from
the Riviera and the IX and XVIII from Bordeaux and Touraine. Also subordinate were five reserve divisions and three of cavalry, shortly to be organised into a corps under General Conneau. The two armies, totalling 23 divisions, were deployed on a comparatively narrow front of 65 miles between Pont-aMousson on the Moselle, and St Marie-auxMines on the Vosges crest, although the bulk of the forces were in the Trouee de Charmes itself, only 25 miles wide. Joffre issued his orders to the two armies on August 8, in amplification of the very vague statement of intent contained in Plan 17. That had merely laid down that the southern wing had to mount an attack below Metz. His General Instruction No 1 directed First Army 'to take as its objective the German army at Sarrebourg, and seek to put it out of action by driving it back on Strasbourg' assisted by the Army of Alsace which, advancing through Belfort Gap via Mulhouse, was to wheel north-west along the Vosges and seize Colmar, destroying the Rhine bridges and securing the whole right wing from attack across the Rhine. Second Army, leaving its two left hand corps (IX and XVIII) to cover the approaches southwards from Metz, where the main body of the German army was supposed to lie, was to advance on Saarbriicken, on the front Dieuze — ChateauSalins — Delme. These operations were to start as soon as the commanders were ready. Joffre issued his final instructions on August 13, under a covering note to Dubail, in which he told him, 'I count on you absolutely for the success of this operation. It must succeed and you must devote all your energy to it.'
Giant misapprehension insistence on the importance of these southern operations stemmed, of Joffre's
course, from a giant misapprehension of German intentions and capabilities. Despite the appearance of enemy troops on the
Belgian Meuse, he was still convinced that their strength lay in the centre. He was further convinced that their frontline strength consisted exclusively of Active corps, and his overriding conviction was that Moltke would use this strength to strike southwards from Metz, to make the rest of Alsace and Lorraine his own. Joffre intended to forestall him by directing his first thrust to the Rhine. All of Joffre's presuppositions were unfounded, and though his misreading of Moltke's strategy was in the long term the most serious of his faults, his failure to detect that the Ger-
mans had formed
their Reserve divisions into first-line corps and were committing them to a front-line role was of more immediately grave significance to First and Second Armies. As late as August 16 they
were assured by GQG's (Grand Quartier General, French HQ) Intelligence branch
that they faced no more than six corps along their whole front. Despite these assurances of their own First neither superiority, numerical nor Second Army displayed much of that reckless offensive dash which legend associates with the Battle of the Frontiers. The pace of their advances was, on the contrary, rather hesitant. Topography does much to explain this. For though the Lorraine gateway provides easier going than the regions of the Vosges on its south and the Moselle plateau on its north, it is by no means the open plain that a hasty glance at the map suggests. It rolling rather than flat, distinctly is broken in places and plentifully patterned with thick woodland. Militarily the most important features are the waterways, the Seille and Petite Seille rivers on the left, the belt of marshy lakes joined by the Sarre Canal in the centre and the River Sarre on the right, all lying generally parallel to the line of advance and dominated by low ridges, almost everywhere covered by dense forest. Caution demanded that the French should secure the cornerstones of the gateway strongly before entering, by sending troops to seize the crests of the Vosges on the right and masking the commanding Delme ridge on the left. Once inside, march security demanded that they should advance on a continuous front, beating the woodlands and the high ground between the waterways clear of lurking Germans. But, as always, speed and security militated against each other. For though it proved easy enough to position the flank guards (though not without a fight for the Vosges crests, abandoned on July 30 in accordance with the '10-kilometre rule'), it was found much more difficult to deploy marching columns off the roads (which naturally clung to the river valleys), without the advance dropping to a snail's pace. Consequently neither army made more than a few miles in the first day of the offensive, August 14, and it was not until the next that either crossed the line of the frontier, abandoned for diplomatic reasons a fortnight before. Neither had encountered concerted resistance, for though some Germans stood and fought for isolated positions, they seemed content for the most part to be off as soon as the French appeared, using their plentiful artillery to cover their retreat and harass the attackers. Progress on August 1 6 was a little quicker, bringing the advance guards of both armies to positions some eight miles northeast of their line of departure. Already, however, the topography had begun to impose its own pattern on the course of Operations, causing the axes of the two armies to diverge and their subordinate corps to choose separate fronts of attack. Foch's XX Corps, on the left of Second Army, itself protected on the left by IX and XVIII Corps in covering positions east of Nancy, found itself attracted into the valley of the Petite Seille, which leads via
Moyenvic and Chateau-Salins to Morhange; XV Corps in the centre was drawn into the valley of the Seille and on towards Dieuze; while XVI Corps on the right, marching as flank guards, struggled to keep pace over virtually roadless terrain. At the same time it was supposed to maintain contact with First Army. First Army, however, was making its way nearer east than north-east and, con-
fined to a fairly narrow corridor between the belt of lakes and the shoulders of the Vosges, was having difficulty in assuring the protection of its flanks. The three cavalry divisions, now formed into a corps under Conneau, the senior divisional commander, had been allotted the vital role of liaison between the two armies but could not operate freely in the lake region. At no stage were they in close touch with either army, nor apparently, with the
in the Vosges and march to his right flank. At the same time he pressed Castelnau to extend towards him across the lake region. This Castelnau was unwilling to do, since his own left wing was about to be weakened
enemy. The right wing of First Army, consisting of XIV and XXI Corps, were fighting battles of their own, the latter seeking to secure the commanding peak of the
Unco-ordinated advance The advance of the spearhead continued
Donon
to the main body's right rear, the former to debouch eastward over the Vosges crests. Pau's Army of Alsace, taking the same route as the unhappy Bonneau had taken a week earlier, was making independently for Mulhouse, and at a
scarcely faster pace.
This divergent pattern of advance in by lateral roads
territory poorly served and in an age of still
primitive signal
communications carried with it of course the danger of surprise attack and defeat in detail, a danger heightened by the failure of either commander to keep a tactical reserve under his hand and by the inability of the cavalry to scout effectively
among
the lakes and woods. Dubail was danger and on August 16 he ordered the bulk of XXI Corps to disengage alert to this
The generalissimo of the French armies, Joff re, centre, with two of his commanders in the south — de Castelnau, left, of Second Army and Pau of the Army of Alsace
by the transfer, on Joffre's direction, of XVIII Corps to the Belgian frontier, and the troops that he was to receive in replacement were of considerably lower fighting worth.
therefore to diverge, but in the puzzling absence of concerted enemy resistance — made all the more puzzling by his occasional stubborn defence of a ridge or village and by his continuous drenching of the zone of advance with heavy calibre shellfire from battery positions beyond the range of the French 75s — the temptation to make ground rather than consolidate a continuous front grew stronger. This trend became evident on August 17 and even more so the next day when XV Corps of Second Army pushed quickly into Dieuze in the valley of the Seille and VIII Corps of First Army raced a regiment into Sarrebourg, as soon as it was discovered to be empty. On August 19 Foch's corps, which hitherto had lagged rather behind the rest of the Second Army, came within sight of Morhange, after an advance of over eight miles in difficult terrain.
ing two of Heeringen's three corps up from their original positions opposite the Belfort gap and inserting them on Sixth
Army's
left between the lake region and the shoulders of the Vosges. Dubail and Castelnau therefore deployed seven corps and three reserve divisions against eight corps and five Ersatz divisions. Moreover, one of the French corps was isolated in the Vosges (though so too was one of the German); the reserve divisions were committed to cover Nancy rather than manoeuvre
where they were needed on left wing; and Pau's Army of Alsace, though opposed only by Landwehr units, was too deeply engaged before Mul-
offensively
Castelnau's
house to lend assistance. In the Lorraine gateway itself, therefore, the French de-
Such successes made an encouraging show on Joffre's situation map. Nevertheless a cautious observer might have found grounds
for
unease in the existence of un-
secured pockets of territory interrupting the indicated line of furthest advance, particularly that on the left where the Forest of Koecking covers the high ground between the Petite Seille, occupied by XX Corps, and the Seille, on which XV and XVI Corps were operating, and that in the centre where the boundary between First and Second Armies bordered the Forest of Fenetrange. Both salients provided covered assembly areas for an enemy counterattack, perhaps by those 'three corps' of Seventh Army which GQG's Intelligence section had marked as 'unlocated' for the last six days. Suspicion on the same score might well have been sharpened by the suddenly increased resistance Dubail's soldiers had met throughout August 19 to their efforts to press on up the Sarrebourg-Phalsbourg road which, leading as it does to the narrow saddle of the Vosges at Saverne, is the natural exit from the Lorraine gateway to the Rhine Valley. Dubail's senses had been attuned for warning signals of a counteroffensive throughout the last two days. Few enough had come his way but his suspicions were rightly founded for the German Sixth and Seventh Armies (known to GQG only as the Armies of Lorraine and Alsace, so defective was its grasp of the German order of battle) were indeed preparing a counterstroke. It was very grudgingly that their commanders had surrendered as much ground as they had, and from the first moments of the French advance they had petitioned Moltke for permission to play a more aggressive role. Moltke had hitherto refused for the good reason that his plan of campaign demanded inactivity on the German left, an inactivity which it was hoped would tempt the French into committing their armies of the right so deeply that by the time Germany's object
in
apparent
them
invading it
Belgium had become
would be too
late to extricate
for transfer to the north.
Only
in the
event of French disengagement were Sixth and Seventh Armies to advance. Since their combined strength fell only a little short of their opponents, Sixth Army controlling five corps
Bavarian and Seventh ve),
Army
/
Bavarian Reserve) and XV and XIV
three (XIV,
the two
commanding
generals,
Thedemocratictouch-Crown Prince Rupprecht of Sixth Army and his Chief-of-Staff, Krafftvon Delmensingen
, (
r/gr?f ),talktomen /
fresh from the battle
Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria and Heeringen, found their allotted role almost inexplicable. Krafft von Delmensingen, Rupprecht's Chief-of-Staff and effective director of both armies' operations, found it inexcusable. Aware though he was of Schlieffen's conception of using the German left as bait with which to tempt the French right into the Lorraine gateway, he urged
Moltke's headquarters (OHL) two powerful if incompatible arguments against an extended retreat: that it would open a gap between Sixth and Seventh Armies through which the French might launch a decisive attack; and that if allowed to advance freely the French would transfer their uncommitted forces to oppose the German advance into Belgium. It was the second argument which proved the more telling. On August 17 an emissary from OHL arrived at Sixth Army headquarters with the news that there was indeed evidence of some French troop movement from Lorraine to Belgium and although he forbade counterattacking to fix the remainder in place, he did so on the tactical rather than strategic ground that such an attack would have to be frontal — a form of attack which was anathema to German staff teaching. Scenting indecision,
on
Krafft
and Rupprecht intensified their and late on August 18 the
arguments,
operations section at OHL effectively conceded by declaring that it would not compel Krafft with a direct refusal if he persisted in asking for operational freedom of action. He replied that if the decision was to be left to him, he would mount a counterattack as soon as it could be organised. Auspiciously, a readjustment of force by each side had now conferred upon the Germans a slight numerical advantage.
Castelnau had
lost
XVIII and most of IX
Corps, requisitioned by Joffre to stiffen the northern end of the French line, and had gained only three reserve divisions in exchange. Rupprecht and Heeringen, however, had recently been allotted five of the ten available Ersatz divisions, ad hoc units weak in artillery but formed from young reservists and so constituting a powerful reinforcement of infantry.
Krafft had further augmented German strength in the Lorraine gateway by bring-
ployed only 11 divisions to the Germans' 19; and their superiority in cavalry (three divisions to two) was nullified by its seeming inability to find the enemy. That the Germans were close about him, and in greater strength than in the opening days of the campaign, Dubail did not doubt. He calculated, however, that a determined attack would probably suffice to chase them out of their positions and open the road to Saverne and the Rhine, if launched suddenly enough. On the evening of August 19 he therefore warned the commander of the 15th Division, in reserve to the other division of VIII Corps (16th) which had been engaged north of Sarrebourg all day, that it would have to undertake a night march of eight miles and then mount a dawn attack on the bridges of the Sarre beyond the town. The division arrived at its forming-up positions at 0400 hours, August 20, an hour later than intended and tired after a march over unfamiliar roads, but nevertheless it moved swiftly to the attack. The first objective was carried at bayonet point and the columns had pressed northward nearly a mile up the Sarre valley when an overwhelming barrage fire descended on the leading waves, and from the woods on each side poured down continuous volleys of rifle and machine gun fire. The Battle of Sarrebourg had begun.
Solid marching masses 15th Division was very shortly driven out of its advanced positions and retired to the high ground west of Sarrebourg, thereby escaping the worst of the bombardment which continued to play along the whole front. At mid-morning it swelled in intensity and the German ininfantry, hitherto concealed in the surrounding woodland, suddenly appeared in solid masses marching straight on Sarrebourg itself. The town was held by the 16th Division, which had already suffered losses in the overture to the battle the previous day. Against the furious assault of / Bavarian Corps, it nevertheless held firm, yielding ground only very slowly on the approaches to the town and then contesting it street for street under steadily increasing pressure. The 95th Regiment, in the centre of town itself, threw up barricades of barrels and furniture, loopholed the houses and made a strongpoint of the German cavalry barracks, which com-
The
manded
the main street. Throughout the afternoon it fought as popular art and official training had taught that French soldiers should, kneeling in comradely groups, the officers moving upright among them, firing in salvoes until their am-
munition was exhausted and then
carried
rifling
piped
before them.
The
soldiers of
and XVI Corps, southerners from Marseilles and Toulon, were seized by a sudden and infectious panic, abandoned their positions and poured rearward, carrying with them all but a few battalions of light infantry. Within a few hours the leaders had crossed the line of departure from which they had set out a week before. Dubail's left flank was exposed along its whole length; Foch's XX Corps at Morhange was threatened with encirclement, as the Reserve divisions on its left also gave way before the attack of the /// Bavarian Corps. If it should break Nancy itself was lost. But Foch's men were natives of the re-
la bouche'.
The
all
XV
the pouches of the dead until they were empty too. By four in the afternoon, after over 1,000 men had been killed or disabled, and with no sign of reinforcements marching to their support, it had become clear that they could hold Sarrebourg no longer. The divisional commander, soon to be an army commander, de Maud'huy, issued the order to disengage and stood to review the regiment as it passed southwards out of the town, calling on the band to strike up the Marche Lorraine as a parting gesture. Then he took up his place with the rearguard, 'son eternelle
Sarrebourg, though dispirithowever spell defeat to Dubail, for his other two corps, though also attacked all day by XIV and XV Corps, had given little ground andavere still in fighting trim. If his left flank, resting on the lake region, was still covered by Second Army, there was therefore no reason why he should not loss of
ing, did not
gion, less volatile than the southerners, and were supported on their left by one of those splendid brigades of white colonials who time and again in the Battle of the Frontiers were to demonstrate the superior staying power of regular troops. Hustled out of its overnight positions, Corps
accept the day's events as a local set-back and regroup preparatory to resuming the
nevertheless kept its ranks steady and under Foch's firm control established a new
XX
But of Second Army he had had no word since morning. When news came, it was of outright disaster, disposing for good of any notion of further advances, indeed threatening the whole right wing, from Pont-a-Mousson to Belfort, with defeat in the open field. It had dawned misty on Second Army's front, as so often that hot August, and de Castelnau accordingly decided to postpone the beginning of the day's march until visibility improved. The troops had breakfasted and broken camp; they had not entrenched their overnight positions. On those positions, at about five in the morning a violent bombardment suddenly descended and some minutes later the infantry of XXI and / Bavarian Reserve Corps
line
offensive.
around Chateau-Salins from which
it
repelled every attack which the Bavarians launched against it. So successful indeed was its defence that at the very moment when the order to retreat arrived, the troops had the impression that victory was at hand. The order was inevitable, however, given the total disruption of Castelnau's front, and under cover of darkness XX Corps set off to rejoin the rest of Second and First Armies in a forced march to the line of the Meurthe. By morning it had left the Bavarians 12 miles behind. Castelnau's initial assessment of the result of the Battle of Morhange was that it would necessitate the abandonment of Nancy and a retreat as far as the Moselle. This Joffre categorically forbade. Fortunately the Sixth and Seventh Armies did not press their pursuit and it was not until August 25th that their advance guards appeared on the Meurthe position. In the
moved wave upon wave to the assault. They had formed up undetected in the Forests of Fenetrange and Koecking, whence, pouring in converging columns, they quickly
down
days which had intervened, the French had recovered themselves remark-
three
ably, organised ticularly on the
powerful
a
front,
par-
mountain known as the Grand Couronne east of Nancy, and were ready to resist whatever onslaughts the Germans might make on it. These were to be heavy, for their success in Lorraine had kindled in OHL's thinking the notion of a double envelopment of the French armies, a notion which was not to be extinguished until the battle of the Marne had settled the issue in the west for good.
Why had Joffre's first offensive failed so lamentably? The conventional explanation is that the French cast themselves to destruction in a frenzy of offensive ardour. A more careful examination of the conduct of the Lorraine campaign suggests that it was rather due to a neglect of elementary military principles. Neither commander had maintained a proper tactical reserve, reconnoitred his line of advance or organised a continuous front. As a result, the front had been infiltrated easily and the overconfident infantry bushwhacked in undefended positions. These were not conclusions, however, which Joffre yet seemed ready to draw. On August 22 he was to start Third and Fourth Armies on an ominously similar offensive into the even more broken and densely forested territory of the Ardennes.
Further Reading Der Weltkrieg Volume Geiss,
I.,
I
(Reichsarchiv)
July 1914: the outbreak of the First World
War (New
York: Norton 1974)
Les Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre Volume (Etat-major de I'Armee) I
Foch (Eyre 1931) The Memoirs of Marshal Joffre Liddell Hart, Sir Basil,
&
Spottis-
woode
Tuchman, Tyng,
S.,
B., August 1914 (Constable 1962) The Campaign of the Marne (OUP
1935)
\ForJohn Keegan 's biography, see page 96.
|
German troops advance in their
counterattack
in
Lorraine
***
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The Battle of the Frontiers, Joff re's offensive into Germany which became a French defeat. Ignoring the threat to his left flank should the Germans make rapid progress through Belgium and Luxembourg into northern France, Joffre decided that the best way to fight Germany was to launch offensives in Lorraine and the Ardennes and then the Germans were to invade in the north, to sweep up into their left flank 'om the Ardennes. The two offensives, particularly that in the south, if
started well, but only against German screening forces, and when the French came upon the main German forces they were held, and then decisively pushed back when Moltke at last gave in to his army commanders and allowed them to take the offensive. Lanrezac's attack in the north was a hastily improvised attempt to stop the German advance, and was repulsed with heavy losses, as were the other two French offensives. Plan 17 had collapsed.
Battle of the Frontiers 2:The Ardennes offensive in the Ardennes at the beginning of the war started out as the northern half of Joffre's offensive into Germany and turned into a flank stroke into the German line of advance. But the French adherence to tactical doctrines long out of date, and a serious under-estimate of the German numbers, led to a decisive defeat — which at least had the result of enforcing a reconsideration of those doctrines
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the two day battles of the Ardennes, August 22-23. 1914, two French armies, the Thud under Ruffey and the Fourth under de Langle de Cary, met two German, the Fourth under the Duke of Wurttemberg and the Fifth under Crown Prince Wilhelm. It was, however, far from being an equal encounter. The Germans, whose strength between Bastogne* and Thionville Joffre's Intelligence Section had estimated on August 16 at only six or seven corps with two or three cavalry divisions, actually had ten corps and two cavalry divisions. The In
French,
who
flattered themselves that they
were advancing with a numerical advantage, had ten corps, with two reserve divisions and three cavalry divisions. The Germans thus had a numerical superiority over the French of 380,000 to 361,000 (200,000 in the Fifth Army and 180,000 in the Fourth to 168,000 in the Third Army and 193,000 in the Fourth). By August 16 it was clear to the French that the main German advance was swinging round through Belgium, while to the south of Metz the Germans seemed to be on the defensive. Joffre came to the conclusion that he had the opportunity to break his enemy's centre, and then fall upon the German right. It was his intention, therefore, to use the Third and Fourth Armies for a great thrust through Luxembourg and Belgian Luxembourg. This, his principal attack, would strike at the southern flank and the communications of the Germans who had crossed the River Meuse between Namur and the Dutch frontier. He hoped that he would be able to attack them before they could swing south and deploy for battle. The offensive of the First and Second Armies further to the south was of secondary importance, its aim being to hold the German forces, who seemed to be shifting westwards and so posing a threat to the right flank of the Third Army. Further north, the Fifth Army, the BEF and the Belgian army, by checking the German advance from the Meuse, were to give the Third and Fourth Armies time to develop their offensive. Joffre sent out his orders on August 20. The Third Army was to begin its offensive movement next day in the general direction of Arlon — 'The mission of the Third Army is to counterattack any enemy force which may try to gain the right flank of the
Fourth Army.' The Fourth
Army was to move in the general direction of Neufchateau. Joffre telegraphed to its commander, de Langle de Cary: 'I authorise you to send strong advanced guards of all arms tonight to the general line Bertrix-Tintigny to secure the debouchment of your army beyond the River) Semois.' The eve of the great French offensive in the Ardennes found the BEF concentrated south of Maubeuge, the French Fifth Army with its forward elements on the River Sambre and on the Meuse near Dinant, the Third and Fourth close up to the Belgian frontier, astride the river Chiers, from the vicinity of Longwy to Sedan, and ready to cross the Semois river. To the south the newly-formed Sixth Army under Maunoury was keeping Metz under observation, while the First and Second Armies (Dubail and de Castelnau) mauled at Sarrebourg and Morhange had been compelled to retire. The repulse of de Castelnau and Dubail was a poor omen, but on the 21st the French re crossed the Belgian frontier and •
152
advanced some 10 Ardennes — no mean
to 15 miles into the feat for the country is
very difficult: rough, tree-clad hills, broken up by deep river valleys with occasional narrow belts of pasture. The French groped forward, their aeroplanes able to see nothing, their cavalry proving ineffective for reconnaissance in the forest defiles and villages. Thus on the 22nd the French columns literally ran into the Germans, who were crossing their front, and a number of separate actions developed, which are known to the French as the battles of Virton and of the Semois, and to the Germans as Longwy and Neufchateau. The nature of the country made liaison between the various columns practically impossible, and rendered it extremely difficult for corps (still less army) headquarters to exercise any effective control over operations. Under the circumstances the Germans, who were more realistically trained than their adversaries, enjoyed a tactical advantage, which was far more important than their slight numerical advantage. Moreover, while the French were not expecting serious opposition, the Germans had no such illusions. They expected to meet an aggressive foe of a strength equal to their own, and in consequence had explored the Ardennes with Hollens' cavalry (IV Cavalry Corps) who were ready to guide and support their advancing infantry. The French, not knowing that the Germans had Reserve corps in the line, underestimated their enemy. Heavy rain fell during the afternoon and evening of August 21, and during the night that followed there was a heavy mist. In the early hours of the 22nd the Crown
(II
Corps),
hesitating
thus exposed,
to
advance when
made no
real effort in the direction of Tintigny, but, halting on the outskirts of Bellefontaine, launched an
attack eastwards bringing timely assistance to the hard-pressed IV Corps of Ruffey's army. This altruistic action had an unhappy effect on the Colonial Corps on Gerard's left. This was the formation to which de Langle de Cary had given the task of taking his main objective, Neufchateau. Its selection was not surprising, for not only had it three divisions, as opposed to the normal two, but it was composed largely of professional soldiers, veteran campaigners of Indo-China and North Africa. This corps d'elite pushed forward in two columns. On the right the 3rd Colonial Division advanced through the Forest of Neufchateau by way of Rossignol and on the left a mixed brigade, advancing through the Forest of Chiny by way of Suxy. The columns, separated by a broad and well-nigh impassable stretch of woods, were expected to converge for the final assault on Neufchateau. Expecting little opposition except perhaps from patrols or advanced guards, the 3rd Colonial Division ran into Pritzelwitz's VI Corps in the woods north of Rossignol and launched a series of furious bayonet charges. Five French battalions were taking on nine German battalions, with three
squadrons of dismounted cavalry. The French column tried in vain to break through, while the Germans deployed and worked round both their flanks. It was as if the French had learned nothing since the days of Waterloo, when their columns had withered before the musketry of British
and German infantry fighting in line. The very courage and zeal of the French was their undoing. The loss of officers was par-
Prince's advanced guards located French troops at Virton, Ethe and Signeul. It was still dark and the Germans halted under cover in the forward edge of the woods
ticularly heavy. Early in the action three
and dug
of the
in.
battalion commanders were by a burst of machine gun fire as they conferred at the roadside. Confive
mown down
Surrounded,
outnumbered — but
still
fighting
The French got on the move some hours and it was already daylight when
later
they stumbled into the German lines. In the fog V Corps under Brochin wandered into the German XIII Corps (Fabeck), which was preparing to attack. There ensued a disorganised battle, which ebbed and flowed for two hours until the fog lifted to reveal the French artillery in close support of their infantry. The Germans lost no time in bringing a heavy fire on the hapless 75s. Simultaneously the German infantry got in their attack. Panic seized the French and it was not long before V Corps, Ruffey's centre, was beating a hasty retreat for Tellancourt, leaving each of the neighbouring corps with a flank in the air. On Ruffey's right Sarrail's VI Corps did well, but during the afternoon it was compelled to retire in the face of superior numbers. On the left of the Third Army the IV Corps (Boelle) became engaged at Virton and Ethe with Strantz (V Corps) and part of Fabeck's XIII Corps. Boelle's two divisions, fighting separate battles, though less than three miles apart, held their own, but were unable to make progress, and so left de Langle's right flank unprotected. Gerard
fusion reigned.
The leading brigade
fell
await — in vain — the support of the second brigade of the division. The failure of Gerard's II Corps to advance had left the right flank of the Colonial Corps in the air. The German 22nd Brigade, belonging to Pritzelwitz' VI Corps, striking in from the east towards St Vincent now compelled the second brigade of the French corps to turn 90 degrees instead of continuing the march on Rossignol. Hard pressed though it was this formation might have rendered some assistance to its fellows had it not been that the narrow River Semois divided them. Though not more than 15 or 20 yards wide, its banks
back on Rossignol
to
were marshy and vehicles could only cross by the stone bridge at Breuvanne, one and a quarter miles south of Rossignol. By keeping this under a heavy artillery fire the Germans effectively cut the Colonial Division in two, depriving the defenders of Rossignol of all relief. Surrounded and outnumbered, the survivors fought on with admirable devotion. In the dusk the regimental colours were buried among the burning houses of the shell torn villages. When the last wave of German infantrymen broke over Rossignol the division had suffered 11,000 casualties. The divisional commander and one of the brigade commanders were dead and the other brigade commander was a wounded prisoner. Most of the divisional artillery was in German hands.
It was Gerard's failure to advance that had permitted the German 22 nd Brigade to intervene with such effect, but it was by no
means the sole reason for the catastrophe that overwhelmed the 3rd Colonial DiviThroughout the day the 2nd Colonial Division remained at Jamoigne, barely three miles distant, in Army Reserve. Early in the afternoon General Lefevre, the corps
12, with one German regiment and squadron of cavalry against one troop, one German battalion of engineers against one company and nine German batteries (54 77-mm field guns) against three batteries
75-mm
sion.
(12
commander, ventured
Another German brigade remained in reserve. Given a fair chance the hardened French colonial troops were more than a match for the ardent but inexperienced
to ask de Langle de Cary's permission to send the division into action, but permission did not come through until night had fallen. Leblois, the divisional commander, sent forward a battalion to create a diversion, but that was all. It cannot be said that either Lefevre or Leblois displayed much initiative, and the latter was removed from his command a few months later for his incapacity. The left-hand column of the Colonial Corps, some 6,000 strong, advanced harassed by Uhlans, and under the surveillance of German aircraft. Nevertheless, the brigade under Gaullet reached the neighbourhood of Neufchateau without undue difficulty. Here they met the Hessians and Rhinelanders of the XVIII Reserve Corps under Steuben, and gave a good account of themselves against odds of two to one. Gaullet held on until nightfall without word of the other column. Neither corps nor army headquarters enlightened him as to events at Rossignol and, threatened with encirclement, he fell back during the night. The 5th Colonial Brigade regained its start line, south of the Semois, unmolested. Gaullet had done rather well as the breakdown of the opposing forces at Neufchateau reveals. For in opposition to the six French battalions the Germans had
Bayonets fixed and rifles at the ready, French infantry move forward to begin their attack
German
field guns).
reservists.
Captured without a shot Roques' XII Corps scored an initial success at St Medard against one of Steuben's brigades, but perceiving that Neufchateau remained in German hands, it halted though there was nothing much between it and Recogne, about seven miles north of St Medard. Poline's XVII Corps got through the forests during the morning, to find open country between it and its objective, Ochamps, where the Germans were firmly ensconced. A typical French attempt to storm the place by a brusque attack broke down. A German counterattack came in from the east, and fell on the French communications. Wagons and guns, nose to tail, blocked the road through the Forest of Lunchy, where the corps train was awaiting the fall of Ochamps. Surprised by part of XVIII Corps under Schenck, the French broke and fled in confusion after the briefest resistance. One group of artillery broke out, but for the most part the guns, unable to deploy, were captured without a shot fired. Soon the whole corps was in panic-struck flight. It was not rallied until it was far beyond its original start line. De Langle de Cary's
army, like Ruffey's, had a breach the width of the front of a whole corps in its centre. After heavy fighting Eydoux' XI Corps had driven part of Schenck's corps from Maissiu, but hearing of the departure of Poline's
men, Eydoux prudently evacuated the place and took up a defensive position on the heights to the south. He at last had carried out his mission. For the French it had been a day of disaster. For two corps (I Colonial and XVII) had been severely mauled, and if those of Gerard and Roques
and XII) were more largely because they had made no serious effort to carry out their missions. Two corps of the German Fourth Army had not been engaged at all. Pritzelwitz's victory at Rossignol had cost him dear, and Stuben had paid an even heavier price, without enjoying the same measure of success, at Neufchateau. From the German point of view the honours of or less intact
it
(II
was
the day had gone to Schenck's XVIII Corps, which had routed the French XVII Corps and also fought the XI Corps to a standstill.
The reports that reached the army commanders and seeped through to Joffre were both sparse and garbled. At the end of the day Ruffey still thought he had not three corps to deal with. De Cary, still unaware of the presence of VIII Corps and VIII Reserve Corps, nevertheless gave the Commanderin-Chief a fairly realistic account of the day's work: 'All corps engaged today. On the whole results hardly satisfactory. Serious reverses in the region of Tintigny [Rossignol and Ochamps. Successes before St Medard and Maissiu cannot be mainfive
but
Langle
de
|
; :«>cWi
AT:'-
-
Ml
ifcp
"V
-
— it
'*-»
5*8
German
'Without good tactics, the best strategy must be ineffective'
artillerymen take a brief rest
on the side
of the
road during
their
advance
through the Argonne
Have given orders to hold the front Hondvemont/Bievre/Paliseul/Bertrix/
German numbers. He attributed the failure
Straiment/Jamoigne/Meix-devant-Virton.' To this Joffre, not the man to abandon his offensive lightly, replied: 'Information collected, taken as a whole, shows only approximately three army corps before your front. Consequently you must resume your offensive as soon as possible.' De Langle received this order early on August 23, and made a real effort to carry it out, but the task allotted to him was hopeless, and when night fell his army, thoroughly shaken by the events of the last three days, so far from having made progress, was actually further to the rear. Joffre now realised that the Fourth Army had shot its bolt, and with his approval shortly after midnight on the 24th de Langle de Cary gave orders for 'a withdrawal beyond the River Meuse'. Thus ended the second great French
Army having
offensive — in utter failure. The German army commanders for their part were not slow to trumpet their success. The Crown Prince received a telegram from his father, the Kaiser, reading: 'Congratulations in the first victory which, with God's help, you have won so splendidly. I award you the Iron Cross, Classes I and II. Con-
doctrine,
tained.
vey to your brave troops my thanks, and those of the Fatherland. Well done! I am proud of you. Your affectionate father, Wilhelm.' But, in fact, things were not quite so rosy as the German commanders painted them, for, though mauled, neither the French Third nor Fourth Army was broken. The battle left Joffre still labouring der his early delusions with regard to
of the offensive to
two divisions of the Third
allowed themselves to be
surprised, and to a division of the Fourth Army falling back and dislocating the whole line. This had led to the Colonial Corps being violently attacked and having to give way. He attributed the German advances in the north to their having drawn troops from their centre. On August
25 he telegraphed to Monsieur Messimy, the Minister for War: 'I am studying the means of stopping this [rearward] movement by abandoning as much ground as is necessary and preparing a new manoeuvre, the object of which will be to oppose the march of the enemy on Paris.' One can only admire Joffre's dogged resolution, but the disaster must be attributed at least in part to his miscalculation of the German strength and intentions. In the Ardennes his troops, handicapped by a false tactical
had
little
chance in an offensive
against the better trained Germans, who also enjoyed a considerable numerical advantage. To his credit it must be said that Joffre was quick to discern the weakness of that fatal French tactical idea that infantry should attack head down, regardless of the enemy's fire and without artillery support. As early as August 24 he issued an instruction to all the French armies: Each time that it is necessary to capture a point d'appui (strongpoint) the attack must be prepared with artillery, the infantry must be held back and not launched to the assault until the distance to be covered is so short that it is certain the objectives will be reached. Every time that the infantry has
been launched to the attack from too great a distance before the artillery has made its effect felt, the infantry has fallen under the fire of machine guns and suffered losses which might have been avoided. When a point d'appui has been captured, it must be organised immediately, the troops must entrench, and artillery must be brought up. The French, in their blue coats and red trousers, paid a heavy price to learn lessons which were taken for granted by their British allies. Without good tactics the best strategy must be ineffective. If the company commanders fail how shall the generals succeed? The unfortunate infantry were horribly mangled in the
Ardennes
fighting.
A company commander,
Grasset, describes his ordeal near Virton
on August 22: The sun was scorching, yet my watch showed only nine in the morning. The hours were passing but slowly. It seemed to me
we had been there for a long, long time. was sustaining heavy losses. Evidently its action was hampering the enemy, who concentrated the combined fire of his infantry, artillery, and machine guns on us. We were surrounded by a heavy that
My company
cloud which at times completely veiled the battlefield from our eyes Little Bergeyre sprang up, shouted: 'Vive la France!' at the top of his voice, and fell dead. Among the men lying on the ground, one could no longer distinguish the living from the dead. The first were entirely absorbed by their grim duty, the others lay motionless, having entered eternal rest in the very attitude in which death surprised them. .
.
Not for the first time invasion from the east
Mi **«
...
The changing fortunes of war. Left: a quiet
French
French square witnesses
artillery
departing for war.
Below left: the same square witnesses a church service held by the invading Germans. Below. German infantry wait on a wooded hilltop for the signal for their next advance into France
•
\ The wounded offered a truly impressive Sometimes they would stand up bloody and horrible-looking, amidst bursts of gun-fire. They ran aimlessly around, arms stretched out before them, eyes staring at the ground, turning round and round until, hit by fresh bullets, they would stop and fall heavily. sight.
Heart-rending cries, agonising appeals horrible groans were intermingled with the sinister howling of projectiles. Furious contortions told of strong and youthful
and
bodies refusing to give up life. One man was trying to replace his bloody, dangling hand to his shattered wrist. Another ran from the line holding the bowels falling out of his belly and through his tattered clothes. Before long a bullet struck
him down. We had no support from our artillery! And yet, there were guns in our division and in the army corps, besides those destroyed on the road. Where were they? Why didn't they arrive? We were alone. I was wondering, in my anxiety, whether we were going to lose all our men on the spot. Another young officer who had his baptism of fire in the Ardennes was Lieutenant Erwin Rommel of the 124th (Wurttemberg) Infantry, belonging to the Crown Prince's Fifth Army. In the attack on Bleid near Longwy, he was scouting forward of the line with three other men when he saw 15 or 20 Frenchmen twenty paces away, 'in the middle of the highway drinking chatting, their rifles lying idly in their arms. They did not see me'. The 5th Company of the French 101st Infantry Regiment did not believe, it seems, in takcoffee,
11 ing such elementary precautions as posting sentries! Rommel continues: / withdrew quickly behind the building. Was I to bring up the platoon? No! Four of us would be able to handle this situation. I quickly informed my men of my intention to open fire. We quietly released the safety catches; jumped out from behind the building; and standing erect, opened fire on the enemy nearby. Some were killed or wounded on the spot; but the majority took cover behind
garden walls, and wood piles and fire. Rommel's platoon then came up and assaulted a building which was the main French position. On signal the 2nd Section opened fire. I dashed forward to the right with the 1st Section — over the same route I had passed over a few minutes before with the platoon — across the street. The enemy in the house opened with heavy rifle fire mainly directed at the section behind the hedge. The assault detachment was now sheltered by the building and safe from the hostile fire. The doors gave way with a crash under heavy blows of the battering ram. Burning bunches of straw were thrown onto the threshing floor, which was covered with grain and fodder. The building had been surrounded. Anyone who had taken a notion to leap out would have landed on our bayonets. Soon bright flames leapt from the roof. Those of the enemy who were still alive laid down their arms. Our casualties consisted of a few slightly wounded. The point of this passage is that while the French were still employing the tactics of the middle, if not the beginning of the 19th Century, the Germans were already
much more modern
versed in
Movement'
tactics.
The
'Fire
point
of
and this
tactical dissertation is simply to suggest that the battles of the Ardennes were lost as decisively at pre-1914 manoeuvres as in the offices where Plan 17 was concocted. One thing was certain: with the Fourth Army back across the Meuse, Plan 17 was dead.
steps,
returned our
Further Reading King, J. C, The hrst World War (New York: Harper 1972) Rommel, F-M. Erwin, Infantry Attacks (Quantico, Virginia 1956)
Spears. Maj-Gen. Sir Edward, Liaison 1914
(London 1968) Thoumin, R., The
First
World War (London
1963)
Tyng,
S.,
The Campaign of the Marne. 1914
(London 1935)
BRIGADIER PETER
YOUNG
(retd),
DSO,
MC
and
two bars, FSA, RFHistS, was born in 1915 and educated at Monmouth School and at Trinity College, Oxford. Commissioned in 1937, he served with distinction throughout the Second World War. He was wounded during the Dunkirk campaign, special service and sent more than taking part in such important raids as those against the Lofotens and Dieppe. When the war ended he was commanding the 1 st Commando Brigade. He was a student at the Staff College, Camberley, in 1946, and from 1953 to 1956 commanded the 9th Regiment of the Arab Legion. He is ex-Head of the Military History Department at the RMA Sandhurst, and has written
volunteered
for
four years with
No 3 Commando,
numerous books and
articles.
Baltle oi the Frontiers At the beginning of the war, Joffre, instead of keeping one of his armies in reserve as had been planned originally, decided to deploy all his troops along the frontiers. It was the commander of the Fifth Army, Lanrezac, whose army was to have been the reserve and was now the most northerly of the French armies, who realised the full import of the German advance in the north and obtained permission from Joffre to try to stop it. Lanrezac's tactical ability did not match his strategic insight, however, and his troops were pushed back with heavy losses Ready, even over-eager, to fight, French cavalry failed to form the essential links between the armies, or even to act as effective screens in front of them
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It had become a point of dogma in French war planning before 1914 that troops deployed on the Sambre and Meuse were troops wasted. In making that judgement, the French army closed its ears to history,
common
sense and a good tune. For Sambre-et-Meuse, that jaunty little march to which 200,000 conscripts annually learnt their paces, recalls one of the most illustrious and instructive episodes of its past — Jourdan's victory over the Austrians at Fleurus in 1794, which ended at a blow the danger of a march on Paris from northern Belgium. Common sense might have warned that the passage of a century since the signing of a treaty had not diminished that danger, for it is only a short across central Belgium to France from the German frontier where, as Joffre's Chief of Intelligence unguardedly admitted, 'the rail resources were inscribed on the terrain'. But those who, glancing northward to the open plains, argued that the Sambre and Meuse could not safely be left in the sole care of the Belgians and their forts, were held to be fainthearted; and those who, like General Michel, stuck to this argument, found their careers cut short and their plans shelved. Michel's Plan 16 would have deployed over a third of the French army behind the Sambre and northern Meuse. It would also have amalgamated the Reserve and the Active corps and although it was his colleagues' disagreement with that rather than the deployment issue which brought
step
Michel's resignation, his successor, Joffre, discarded both elements of the plan on his assumption of office. Joffre's Plan 17 provided for no major concentration north of Mezieres and allowed for only two eventualities: German invasions either via southern Belgium or via Switzerland. He planned to deal with both by a forestalling attack, north or south of Metz as the case demanded, reinforcing whichever of his two pairs of armies was involved with a fifth, which he would hold initially in central reserve. In the event, Joffre decided to deploy all five of his armies on the frontier from the outset, and to launch both his projected offensives almost simultaneously, with the results we have seen. In so far as he preserved any masse de manoeuvre by the beginning of the third week of the campaign, it was the Fifth Army, concentrated opposite southern Belgium. As yet he had no firm plans for its employment, the reality of German intentions and capabilities having not upset his picture of the future by this date. Lanrezac, the Fifth Army commander, believed however that he had caught a glimpse of the truth and found it deeply disturbing. As early as July 31 he had feared for his left flank should the Germans move onto the lower Meuse and on August 5, by which date his Intelligence section had collected indications that the force attacking Liege amounted to as many as six corps, he requested permission at least to extend his left wing as far as Givet, where the Meuse enters Belgian territory. Thanks in part to a Belgian threat to withdraw on Antwerp if not speedily supported, Joffre granted leave for Lanrezac's I Corps to move to Dinant, just north of Givet, but having it in mind as he did to use the rest of Lanrezac's army in his projected attack into the Ardenne" he was unwilling to allow the rest of it to fo.iow.
A
Meanwhile he kept his plans dark. suspicion, however, of the trend both of Joffre's offensive intentions and of German operations in Belgium was growing upon Lanrezac, a suspicion which, if accurate, he recognised as holding the gravest consequences not only for his own army, most exposed of the five though it was, but for the whole of the French forces. It was a suspicion, however, to which it was difficult to give substance, since GQG's Intelligence section consistently minimised the number of German corps in Belgium in its estimates, ignored its prewar judgement
The raw material of Plan 17 -French troops in fighting order
that the enemy would employ Reserve corps in the first-line, treated all Belgian Intelligence as rumour and accepted Sordet's failure to make contact with the Germans between Liege and the Ardennes as evidence of their absence.
An
unfruitful interview
By August 14 Lanrezac had concluded that he could convey the extent of his fears, and the reality which underlay them, only by exposing them in person and trusting to the favour in which he knew his normally unapproachable chief held him, and set
GQG. It was an amiable but unfruitinterview which ensued. Lanrezac's manner has been described as professional (the unintellectual Sir John French found it downright offensive) and Joffre did not like to be lectured. He dismissed all Lanrezac's arguments against continuing with preparations for the offensive into the Ardennes and, as to the danger from beyond the Sambre and Meuse, he felt, he said, that 'the Germans have nothing ready there'. Lanrezac pointed out to Joffre's assistants when the interview was over that their own Intelligence estimates put the German strength in Belgium at six corps which, since it equalled that of his own army and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) — now marching towards Maubeuge — combined, was a factor which no plan for an offensive into the Ardennes could leave out of account. But they too proferred him only reassurances. On his return to Fifth Army headquarters, however, Lanrezac found awaiting him a new GQG Intelligence estimate which admitted the presence of eight German corps in Belgium — evidence that light had at last began to penetrate to GQG, if not all the way to Joffre himself. The events of the following day, August 15, brought news which even Joffre could not ignore: news that the Germans had seized the bridges at Huy, midway along the Meuse between Namur and Liege, and that Franchet d'Esperey's I Corps had been assailed at Dinant, suffering 1,000 casualties before driving the Germans off. Joffre did not ignore the news. At 1530 hours he issued an amendment to his plan of campaign which for the first time conceded that the Sambre and Meuse line was under threat. Special Directive No 10 instructed Lanrezac's army to quit its concentration area and move northwards with the angle formed by the confluence of the two rivers at Namur. It was to leave behind his XI Corps, allotted to Fourth Army, which Joffre still intended should advance into the Ardennes (as indeed it was to do on August 20) but receive in exchange XVIII Corps, at that moment in training in Lorraine. The 2nd Group of (three) Reserve divisions concentrated around Vervins, and Sordet's cavalry corps, still vainly off for ful
searching empty countryside beyond the
Meuse, were also to come under his command. As two of his three original corps (III and X — though not I) had recently received a third division (those mobilised from the French population of Algeria) it was with a substantially strengthened command — ten Active, three Reserve and three cavalry divisions — that he undertook his independent mission. It was for the moment, however, merely a precautionary one, on Joffre's stipulation. The task he had allotted Lanrezac was to act in concert with the British army and Belgian forces against the opposing forces in the north and he offered no estimate of how strong those forces might be. Not until August 18 did he reveal his mind
..
Left:
A French dragoon, equipped with a Lebel wooden lance. His brass helmet
carbine and a
was covered
with felt to prevent it reflecting the sun and giving away his position. It had a horse-hair plume at the
back.
A groundsheet and blanket were
also
carried.
Right: A typical French infantryman equipped with a Lebel rifle. His bayonet handle is visible
above
his
haversack and his coat,
buttoned back to
facilitate movement, hides the rest of the bayonet. The French infantry carried two leather ammunition pouches at the front, and a leather pack with a rigid frame at the back. A blanket, waterproof cape, a spare pair of boots and a mess tin were also carried in the pack. The pack was fastened at the top and the ends neatly rolled up.
more
No
clearly
when,
in Special Directive
Fourth and Third Armies, he wrote of two strategic possibilities and of the measures to be taken, depending on which of the two materialised. His supposition was that German strength in Belgium had increased to between 13 and 15 corps, of which eight seemed to be operating above the Sambre and Meuse, the rest in the Ardennes. The latter in any case were to be engaged by Fourth and Third Armies, whose departure was imminent, and it was possible that those armies would find that a portion of the German force presently above the Sambre and Meuse would by then have joined those in the Ardennes, leaving only a fraction in northern Belgium. If so, the 13, issued to Fifth,
Fifth Army could safely commit the Sambre lines to the care of the Belgians or the BEF, itself turning east to support Fourth Army's drive into the Ardennes. His second hypothesis was that the eight German corps of the northern group might 'seek to
pass between Givet and Brussels and even to accentuate its movement further to the north': in which case the BEF, the Belgians and the Fifth Army should march to outflank them from further north still. The issue was still unsettled when the advance guards of III and X Corps reached the banks of the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur, after five days and 60 miles of marching, on the afternoon of August 20. Lieutenant Spears, the British liaison officer at Lanrezac's headquarters,
had passed and repassed the long columns on his busy journeys during those days in search of the as yet elusive BEF. 'The men were cheerful and gay,' he wrote later, 'in spite of the fatigues imposed on them by the constant marching in torrid weather. The reservists were obviously getting fit, and indeed, under the gruelling they were being submitted to, it was a question of getting
fit
or dying of exhaustion.' Their
commander was
far
from cheerful— he
feared for the security of his left flank, which would hang in the air until the BEF came up, and those fears had not been subdued at that now notorious interview with Sir John French on August 17. He feared also for the security of his right flank, as long as the postponement of Fourth Army's
159
The
battle of the
Sambre -
foreseen but not forestalled
0*
•'#
*~
left the enemy deeply frustrated by his failure to awaken Joffre to the real danger which threatened on the Sambre; and, having reached the river, he found himself in two minds as to how to hold it.
advance into the Ardennes to operate there.
He was
The Meuse between Namur and Givet, on which Franchet d'Esperey's I Corps was deployed, makes an easily defensible line for it flows through a deep, sometimes precipitous trench with open country on both banks which provides room for manoeuvre and easy observation. The Sambre between Namur and Charleroi, though also a natural if less topographically dramatic obstacle, is much less readily tenable. It flows through a
were very much larger than anyone at
GQG
or indeed at Lanrezac's headquarters had guessed, amounting in all to 11 infantry and two cavalry corps divided between Kluck's First Army (from east to west //, IV, IV Reserve, III, IX and // Cavalry Corps) and Billow's Second Army (from east to west VII, VII Reserve, Reserve, X, Guard, Guard Reserve, and / Cavalry Corps), to which First Army was
X
temporarily subordinated. On August 20, Biilow had received orders from Moltke to invest Namur forthwith and engage whatever French and Belgian forces were to be found on the Sambre. In concert with those operations, Hausen's Third Army (from north to south, XI, XII Reserve, XII and XIX Corps) was to press forward through the Ardennes to the Meuse between Namur and Givet and attack eastward across it into the flank of the same
not arrive in the Namur-Givet reach of the until the next day. The French pickets, belonging to X Corps, had an even dimmer notion of their army commander's intentions, for he had still not made it known on which side of the river he would give battle. Suspecting, however, that after their long march they would eventually be directed onto the far bank, the local commanders were privately determined to hold onto the bridges from the outset rather than perhaps have to recapture
Meuse
them
was an area wholly unsuited for manoeuvr-
(Kluck was
under his command) he
But their numbers were few, a brief reconnaissance the commander of the German 2nd Guard Division convinced himself that he could carry the bridges at Auvelais quickly and without loss. His corps commander, who had only shortly before received Billow's instructions not to advance, would have forbidden the attempt had not Ludendorff, who was paying him a casual visit, not overheard the exchange. Taking on himself the responsibility, as he had done at Liege a fortnight before with such dramatic results, the Quartermaster-General directed the Guard to carry the bridges if they could. They were favoured by the terrain in their attempt, having behind them the heights of La Sarte, from which their field artillery could dominate the French bridgeheads. Of those there were eight, or rather seven, since the French advance guards,
and one to be avoided in a general engagement intended to produce decisive
decided that in view of probable French strength on the river, he must curtail Kluck's great flank march and bring his army down directly southwards onto his own right between Charleroi and Maubeuge, the French fortress on the upper Sambre. Both Kluck and Kuhl, his chiefof-staff, disputed Billow's decision at length arid with vigour, but Biilow refused to
who were few in number, had overlooked a railway viaduct, believed to be in III Corps area, when taking up their positions the night before. The more numerous Germans soon found it, pressed across and followed by more of the division, mounted an attack into the French flank which drove them out of Auvelais and into the village of Arsimont two miles beyond. This pene-
them to conform to his of advance, however, Biilow, though he did not know it and perhaps could not have guessed, extinguished the remaining chance of a true strategic envelopment of the Allied armies, and ensured that Kluck would run headlong into the BEF at Mons.
tration of their line forced the rest of the X Corps pickets, although successfully defending their bridgeheads, also to disengage and seek positions behind the river. On III Corps' front, a precisely similar chain of events had developed at the same time. One of its detachments had also missed a bridge, over which the German
But Mons, though in every sense an integral and indeed crucial part of the Battle of the Frontiers, was to be a quite separate affair from that which began to unfold between Charlerio and Namur, and Namur and Givet on the afternoon of August 21. Namur itself, garrisoned by fortress troops and the 4th Belgian (Mobile) Division, was swiftly invested by two corps (Guard Reserve and XI) supported by the train of super-heavy artillery which had broken open the very similar forts at Liege a
Corps soon found its way, drove off the French guard and consolidated its hold on the south bank. Six miles of the Sambre, more if it is measured along its loops, had thus fallen almost by default within enemy hands. Since the numbers engaged had been small, and the French losses consequently light, the situation was nevertheless one which Lanrezac might well have accepted without regret, for it had, of course, never been his intention to make his principal stand in the region of the Borinage at all. Neither his soldiers nor his officers were to know, however, that they had not suffered a serious reverse, for he withdrew during
thickly populated section — a succession of small industrial towns in which factories, warehouses and dwellings stand in close juxtaposition along both banks of the river, intersected by narrow cobbled streets. This region, known as the Borinage. which extends for several hundred yards back from the stream, both to the north and south, offers obvious difficulties from a military point of view. Though readily adaptable to defence by small groups of infantry and machinegunners, its numerous walls and houses render it particularly unfavourable for the effective use of light artillery (the principal French supporting arm). It ing,
results. Lanrezac both recognised this unsuitability and intended to force a decision it. He seemed unable to choose between the two alternative solutions: to cross the river and fight with it at his back, or to let the Germans cross and fight them In the open country on his side. Throughout the day the commanders of III and X Corps were without word from him and were left to make their own decisions on which tactical dispositions to adopt. That this was so, Lanrezac must have guessed, just as he must have realised that these decisions would commit him to a course of action bearing perhaps no relation to the situation of the British on his left or the Belgians on his right, with whom he should have been formulating a common plan. Nevertheless, he kept silent, reveal-
despite
ing his indecision so far as to telegraph Joffre on the morning of August 21 asking subordinate for advice. That was unwise.
A
who teaches
his superior strategy (how-
ever well) but asks for tactical guidance risks a dusty answer. At 2000 hours he received his answer. Joffre, who had just sent him instructions to open the attack, telegraphed 'I leave it entirely to you, to judge the opportune
moment ment.'
for starting
your offensive move-
By then Lanrezac had made up
mind at manders
last,
his
having told his corps com-
in conference that afternoon that
he intended
to hold on the high ground south of the river. But he was too late, for at the moment his orders were going out, reports of heavy fighting in the Borinage started to come in. The enemy had crossed the river and the battle, known as that of Charleroi to the French, Namur to the Germans and the Sambre to the British, had begun. On the German side it had been preceded by a debate between the commanders of the forces advancing to the Sambre and Meuse as important in its outcome as that between Joffre and Lanrezac. Those forces
enemy
concentration. The detailed planas was normal in German staff practice, was left entirely to the army commanders, but with these orders 6ame OHL's (Oberste Heeresleitung, the German GHQ) latest estimate of the forces likely to be encountered, which put French strength at between seven and eight corps and the BEF as not yet in the battle area. Since the handling of operations on the Sambre was to be in Billow's province ning,
3'ield.
own
week
still
In forcing
axis
Lanrezac could send little he possessed no calibre of gun powerful enough to answer the giant before.
to its aid, for
howitzers and could spare only a brigade of infantry. Namur's fate therefore success or failure of Fifth
the
fight
hung on Army's
on the Sambre.
Haphazard
fighting
broke out in a haphazard fashion in the afternoon of August 21 when the advance guards of X and Guard Corps, marching south between Charleroi and Namur, made contact with the French pickets at the bridges between Mornimont and Roselies. Neither party was clear about its course of action. The Germans had
That
fight
orders not to attack that day, Biilow wishing to co-ordinate his attack with that from the east of Hausen, whom he knew would
and
later.
in
X
the night of August 21 into that Olympian silence which in his own dealings with the oracle at GQG he had found so deeply frustrating. The conclusion which his subordinates, reduced accordingly to making guesses drawn from the day's events, was that they must be reversed and the commanders of III and X Corps therefore communicated their intention to counterattack next day, August 22. By morning they had heard no more either of encouragement or disapproval and so launched their men through the morning mist into close and bloody conflict with the Prussians. What ensued is the sort of engagement usually known as a soldier's battle, in
161
which the two sides blunder unawares into each other and the decision goes to which ever sticks it the longest. Spears, busy again on a mission of liaison, has left us his impressions of the mood in which it
was fought: Louder and louder grew the sound of guns, until it become obvious that a great bottle teas raging close at hand. It was strangely exciting, and an intense feeling of curiosity, a longing to know what was going on, a desire to be in it. seized us. The country we were now in was characteristic of the back area of a battlefield in a war of movement. Empty spaces with not a soul to be seen, under a sky of brass, shaking with
now
a single heavy discharge, then a pulsation of the whole atmosphere, as if all the Gods in heaven were beating on drums the size of lakes. A little further on one might come upon a man working in a field, apparently quite unperturbed; then two or three country folk dressed in their best, black suits and white shirts grey with dust, carrying odd packages, would hurry by. A farm lately occupied by troops, gates torn off or swinging wide open on one hinge, fences broken, signs of cooking, oddments lying about, the buildings looking strangely empty, forlorn and shrunken, after having evidently been filled to bursting point by men now perhaps in the centre of that hell over there. Then convoys hopelessly blocking the road, themselves stuck, not knowing where to go, awaiting orders. Further on troops not yet engaged, the men eagerly watching anyone coming by, scanning the faces of passing officers to discover whether things were going well or ill, the officers serious, anxious, in little groups, talking in low the concussion
of
artillery,
tones. it became all too obvious that French line must have fallen back since the morning, for we were now almost in the firing line, whereas, according to the morning's information, we should have been far behind it. We began to encounter long
Presently
the
processions of wounded men hobbling along alone or helping each other,
pathetic
their clothing torn, their faces black with
grime or grey with dust, white bandages with an occasional bloody patch, masks of pain through which stared living and
advance guards of VII Corps, driving ahead of them Sordet's exhausted cavalry. Lanrezac's report of the day's actions to
us. These were an even more poignant sight than the wounded. Hardly any officers, the
two respects: firstly, he and slanderously misrepresented the whereabouts of the BEF, locating it to his left rear when in fact it was already holding the line of the Conde canal to his left front; secondly, he communicated his intention to move I Corps to the support of the much battered X Corps, replacing it on
men
the
Then came country carts on which lay on straw some seriously wounded men. We had got even closer to the fighting line than we had intended, for a few minutes
agonised
eyes.
later a couple of battalions in retreat crossed
worn expressions exhaustion dragging at their
in disorder, terrible
on their
faces,
heels and weighing down their tired feet so that they caught on every stone in the roadway, but something driving them on. Was it fear? I do not think so— just the desire to find a place to rest, away from those infernal shells. These men were not beaten, they were
worn out. It had been for the French a particularly unhappy affair, for so little did the higher
command
intervene that the attacking inCorps were left quite without artillery support and were cut down in hundreds by the riflemen of the Prussian Guard, firing from covered positions. But they too fought without benefit of informed supervision, being ordered to quit a position at the very moment that they had driven the Frencb from it. Later this order was rescinded but for several hours that much contested spot lay quite unoccupied by troops of either side. On III Corps front, the French met a full-scale counterattack (organised in flat disobedience of Billow's Corps commander) which, orders by the like the battle around Arsimont, first blunted and then routed the French advance. By evening the whole French line had been driven back over five miles from the Sambre and by a force half their strength (three divisions to six). Only around Thuin, on the extreme left where their flank should have touched the BEF's (though it did not) had the French kept a foothold on the river. That was due to the arrival of XVIII Corps, a reinforcement nullified by the appearance of the German X Reserve Corps west of Charleroi, and of fantry of
X
X
Joffre is notable in
wilfully
Meuse with the 51st Reserve Division. Thus it was that the eastern front of the Fifth Army, so sedulously guarded while the enemy was still remote, was entrusted Reserve division at the very of gravest danger, when Hausen's
to a single
moment
attack from the east, which Lanrezac had long foreseen and feared, was about to materialise. The morning of August 23 opened less eventfully than the French had expected, the Germans being themselves in need of a pause to regroup their units before pressing the attack. When, however, towards midmorning the assault fell on the western end of the line, it again unhinged the defence, causing both XVIII and III Corps to give ground, in places as much as three miles. But on the other wing, the fighting swung markedly in the French favour, the Guard and Corps being apparently uncertain of I Corps' change of front and exposing themselves in the early afternoon to a potentially deadly thrust in the flank by that supremely self-confident formation. At the time that Franchet d'Esperey was ready to unleash it, news came from 51st Reserve Division, which had been left 12 miles of river front to hold, that it had lost a bridgehead to Hausen's Saxons and that there was a risk of the front collapsing. Handling his corps brilliantly, d'Esperey reversed its lines of advance and regained
X
his old positions, from which he launched a furious and successful counterattack. The episode could not however restore the situation on the Meuse, many of whose crossing places fell into German hands that afternoon. Elsewhere too the circumstances of Fifth Army had deteriorated and that evening at 2300 hours Lanrezac signalled his intention, both to Joffre and his corps commanders, of breaking off the action next day. 'Givet is threatened. Namur taken. In view of this situation and the delay of the
Fourth Army, I have decided to withdraw army tomorrow on the front BeaumontGivet.' The great retreat had begun. Thus Lanrezac, who might have played the role of Hector in the Battle of the Frontiers, turned out to be only a Cassandra. Insight, as Joffre knew, though he had the
himself, is not enough to make a strategist a general. Lanrezac had foreseen the Battle of the Sambre and Lanrezac had little
lost
it.
Further Reading Der Weltkrieg Volume (Reichsarchiv) Kluck, General von, The March on Paris I
(Arnold 1920)
Les Armees Francaises dans
la
Grande Guerre
(Etat-major de I'Armee)
France and Belgium 1914 (Macmillanl Stevenson, D., French war aims against Germany 1914-1919 (Clarendon Press 1982) Tyng, S., The Campaign of the Marne Military Operations:
Volume
(OUP A street
in Lille
shows the marks of heavy
•mg within tnetown
itself,
3n cavalry patrols.
mainly
On August 24 the French an open stores,
declared
city, having withdrawn equipment and troops
I
19351
Lille
all
[For John
Keegans
biography, see page 96.]
The crew of an 18-pounder in action at Mons. The sheer professionalism of the tiny BEF came as a surprise to the advancing Germans
J. Lionel
Fanthorpe
As the French forces fell back from the frontiers, the British Expeditionary Force found itself defending the canal between Mons and Conde. The resulting battle against the numerically superior German forces was the first fought in western Europe by the British since the battle of Waterloo. Although vastly outnumbered, the speed and accuracy of the British marksmen forced the Germans to abandon their unsupported massed infantry attacks
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'Before the week is over, the greatest action the world has ever hoard of will have been fought,' wrote Major-General Henry Hughes Wilson in his diary on August 21, 1914. These four battles which formed the 'greatest action' were known as The Battle of the Frontiers'. They were linked to each other like a party of roped mountaineers. The first, Lorraine, affected Ardennes, which influenced the outcome of Charleroi, which in turn had a serious impact on Mons. This was to be the setting of the first battle since the Crimean War that British troops had fought on European soil. As a result of Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality the BEF, commanded by General Sir John French, began its channel crossing on August 12. It consisted of two Army Corps, I and II, commanded by Generals Sir Douglas Haig and Sir Horace SmithDorrien (who hurried out to France to replace General Grierson, who died on August 17). The supporting cavalry division consisted of four brigades and was led by Major-General Sir Edmund Allenby (known as 'the Bull'). The four brigades of this division included dragoons, hussars, lancers and the composite Household Cavalry. The first British troops to disembark at Boulogne were the 2nd Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. Kilts swinging and bagpipes playing, they received an ecstatic welcome before setting off for the Belgian frontier. The first British troops in action were the 4th (Royal Irish) Dragoon Guards under Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Mullen. Captain Hornby led 'C squadron into the village of Soignies on a skirmishing reconnaissance, killing an enemy cycle patrol and eight Uhlans (German heavy cavalry) of the 9th Cavalry Division. It was already August 21 when the BEF began advancing into the actual line of battle. Allenby's cavalry were in the lead, followed by Smith-Dorrien's II Corps with Haig's I Corps at the rear. Reconnaissance aircraft and cavalry reconnaissance units discovered strong enemy forces between Enghien and Charleroi, and German cavalry in the area around Nivelles. The French armies on the British right had run into large German formations and had suffered heavily, and this, plus the reported strength of the opposing German forces, made it abundantly clear that the BEF's first action would be defensive. The French staff had once hoped optimistically to break the German attack along the Charleroi-Mons line and then counterattack,
assume the offensive, pivot around Namur, raise the siege, liberate Brussels and link the British left wing with the Belgian army which they expected would be advancing from Antwerp. The BEF infantry marched through the sweltering heat of August 22 and spent most of the night digging in. Originally The BFF arrives
at Le Havre on August 14, 1914. The troop convoys used the western channel ports, ratherthantheshorterstraits
they had hoped to defend the high road from Charleroi through Binche to Mons, but this was obviously impracticable after the German success and the French withdrawal on the British right. Sir John French, therefore, positioned his men along the line of the Mons Canal with II Corps on the left behind the canal and I Corps extending as far as Villers St Ghislain on the right — a total of 27 miles.
A
dangerous salient
Curving up
in a distorted semi-circular bulge to the north and east of Mons lay the area known as 'the Salient' — as welcome strategically to the defenders as a malignant wart, which it resembled on the map. If the Germans were to be kept out of Mons for the maximum possible time, the Salient had to be defended; and this defence was allocated to II Corps. Before moving out to protect the flanks, the cavalry was ordered to act as a screen for the salient's defenders, to provide reconnaissance patrols and to fill the gap between the two corps. Lanrezac, commanding the French Fifth Army, had quarrelled with Sir John French at their first meeting on Monday August 17. Subsequently, when Lanrezac asked for a British attack to ease German pressure on his army, he received only a promise that the BEF would hold its line for at least 24 hours. In round figures, the BEF would have to hold its line with 75,000 men and 300 guns. The British army, in defiance of the decimal system, maintained that a corps was the sum of two divisions, and that a division contained 18,073 men, 5,592 horses, 76 guns and 24 machine guns. A British cavalry division, however, consisted of 9,269 men with 9,815 horses. The BEF were
opposed by at least 200,000 men and 600 guns belonging to Kluck's First Army and elements of the right wing of Billow's Second Army. A German army corps was made up of two infantry divisions each containing 17,500 men, 4,000 horses, 72 guns and 24 machine guns, in addition to heavy artillery, bridging trains, supply columns, field hospitals and bakeries. The French Fifth Army consisted of approximately 300,000 men: the I, III, X and XI Corps, the 37th and 38th Divisions, two reserve Divisions — the 52nd and 60, and cavalry. It was French practice to organise their divisions as units of 15,000 men, 36 guns and 24 machine guns, with either two or three divisions making
up a
corps.
Lanrezac's men had been attacked not only by Biilow but by Hausen's formidable Saxons of the Third Army who had driven a wedge into the extended French line and struck alternately at Lanrezac's right and the left of de Langle de Cary's Fourth French crossing, for fear of German naval intervention. In fact the Germans, unimpressed by the BEF's size, made no attempt to interfere
hand for support. Kluck's two central corps, /// and IV, suffered drastically from this head on meeting. One German reserve captain of /// Corps discovered he was the only officer left alive in his 8U'-!'!hl~KAM PALACE f*
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Too arc leaving hone to fight fop the safety and honour of »y toplre. Belgium, whose oountry we are pledged to defend, has been attacked and France le about to be
Invaded by the same powerful foe. I have Implicit oonfldonee in you my soldiers.
Duty le toot vetohvord, and I know your duty Till be
nobly done. I shall follow your every movement with deepest
interest and nark with eager satisfaction your dally
progress, indeed your welfare will never be absent f rots
ay thoughts. I pray Sod to bleee you and guard you and bring
you back victorious.
The King's message to guarantee Belgian plans previously
Although Britain went to war to n accordance with concert with the French
his troops.
neutrality, her
made in
army moved
i
Army. The ghost of the humiliating defeat at Sedan in the FrancoPrussian War of 1870 haunted French military thinking in 1914. Lanrezac later wrote of it as 'that abominable disaster'. Anything, even the retreat of the Fifth Army, was preferable to another Sedan. He is also reported to have said: 'We have been beaten, but the evil is reparable. As long as the Fifth Army lives, France is
not
lost.'
Mons was by no means an easy
place to defend. The main features of the district were small hamlets to the north, rows of cramped houses, factories and sprawling slag heaps. It was a drab area of bogs and mists, coalmines and railway embankments. The canal was 7 feet deep, 60 feet wide and crossed by 18 bridges in 16 miles. It represented practically no obstacle to the German advance. General Sir Hubert Hamilton, a veteran of the South African War, knew that his 3rd Division was mainly responsible for the defence of the salient. Because of the serious disadvantages of the position, a second line of defence was prepared behind Mons. If it became necessary to occupy these second positions the line would straighten out automatically, disposing of the awkwardly
company and the only surviving company commander in his battalion. It appeared to the defenders that a solid mass of field grey was advancing in columns of four. They moved unhurriedly, like a football crowd or a civic parade. This formation was apparently based on the idea that losses were compensated for by having every available rifle in the firing line at the earliest pos-
moment. Watching the
sible
slowly-rolling, grey ocean of men, Captain Ashburner of the 4th Battalion's 'C' Company asked Captain Forster to pinch him in case he was dreaming. The Germans were 600 yards off when Ashburner gave his fire order. It would have been difficult to miss the enemy infantry and few did. The Lee Enfield rifle fired a flat trajectory up to 600 yards and machine gunners added substantially to the heavy German casualties. Subsequent German attacks, however, were preceded by long,
accurate artillery bombardments, machine gun and small arms fire. The 4th Battalion offered stiff resistance, but an eventual withdrawal was unavoidable. Lieutenant Dease and Fusilier Godley both earned a VC for their machine gun work — the former posthumously, the latter in a prisoner-of-war camp. Also predominantly of London origin was the 4th Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Hull. They were positioned to the right of the Fusiliers and shared with them the brunt of Kluck's attack on the salient. Their war diary for August 23 read simply: 'Battle commenced 10.15 am, retirement started 3 pm.' Like the Royal Fusiliers, the Middlesex soon found that the Germans abandoned their suicidal close order advance and began to move carefully, supported by heavy artillery, machine gun and rifle fire which gouged into the hastily dug British trenches with deadly results. The Middlesex also had to withdraw. Their machine gun section, which was in action for the first time, distinguished itself under Lieutenant Lawrence Sloane-Stanley, who refused to be evacuated, despite severe wounds, until the final withdrawal. The Royal Fusiliers lost 200 men, the Middlesex 700. Further east, the 1st Battalion of the Gordon Highlanders defended the right flank of the salient, and the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Scots extended the line towards Haig's I Corps. In response to a request for reinforcements, Lieutenant-Colonel John Cox, commanding the 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Regiment (which was in reserve), sent forward two companies to assist the Gordons. Not many days earlier Scots and Irish had gone for each other vehemently in a brawl in Devonport which had put nearly a dozen of them in hospital. Now, however, with the defenders in serious difficulties,
Company
Quartermaster-Sergeant
Thomas
Fitz-
patrick, a Dubliner, organised a mixed group of Royal Irish batmen, cooks, drivers and latrine orderlies into a useful fighting
reinforcement. to the west of the salient, was held by the 1st BattaRoyal Scots Fusiliers. With only one machine gun to supplement their rifle fire, and with only ruined buildings and slag heaps for cover, these 210 Royal Scots held back over 2,000 German troops and prevented the encirclement of the
Jemappes,
lion of the
salient.
Horace Smith-Dorrien, Corps which took the left wing at Mons Sir
commander of
II
Sir
Douglas Haig,
commander of Corps of the BEF on the right at Mons I
exposed salient.
Dawn
attack
Brigadier-General F. C. Shaw was in command of the 9th Infantry Brigade, containing the 4th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, which was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Norman McMahon and it was against his sector of the salient that the brunt of Kluck's first attack fell. Dawn and the first shell greeted the fusiliers more or less simultaneously on the morning of August 23. After a short sharp bombardment had killed and wounded 20 men, there was a pause followed by the appearance of a German cavalry patrol.
The fusiliers' first volley unseated most of them, and Lieutenant von Arnim of the Death's Head Hussars was brought in swearing profusely with a bullet in the knee. The Germans next attacked the salient frontally with four infantry regiments. This was largely because Kluck had not been able to make the best use of his superior numbers by going round the British left flank, as Bulow had ordered him to remain on 165
The
British infantry in a skirmishing line. British had learnt much from the Boer War
of the power and accuracy of modern rifles, and their standard of marksmanship was very high.
Almost alone among European armies they understood the need for camouflage
and concealment
k.
The region in which the battle of Mons was fought is one of the dreariest in Belgium. An almost continuous industrial area stretched from Mons to Conde along the south side of the canal. It was in this area among the slag heaps andthehousesthattheBEFestablished itself to face the onslaught of the German IV, III and IX Corps. The right wing of the British position formed an awkward salient around the town of Mons itself, and this weak point was to come under heavy attack from IX Corps. Howeverthe canal formed a natural barrier between the British and the Germans, and the flat country to the north of the canal
the
Mons — the battle where khaki-clad marksmen of the BEF came into their own
afforded the British excellent fields of fire
rrs
The BEF - a drop in the ocean in terms of fighting strength to the French, but concrete proof of Britain's resolve to support her ally
Above: A British cavalryman was equipped with a Lee Enfield rifle, shown here in a leather gun bucket. But his primary weapon was still the long bamboo lance with a metal tip.
which was both strong and
flexible.
He
also had a groundsheet, a horse blanket under the saddle and a water bottle on his back.
Above
right:
A
British infantryman,
shown
here on the march and not as he would appear on parade. The scale of infantry equipment in included the Lee Enfield SMLE No 1 Mk III per?onal ammunition and an entrenching tool. The infantry had almost completed the change from leather to webbing and the belt, ammunition pouches, and water bottle the
BEF
rifle,
carrier
were
all
made
of
webbing.
Adjacent to Jemappes. near the Mariette bridge, the line was held by the 1st Battalion of the Northumberland Fusiliers. Captain Brian St John of 'B' Company ordered his men to hold their fire when a dozen Belgian schoolgirls emerged from a house and raced for shelter. The Germans, who had driven the girls forward as cover, were close behind. When withdrawal from Jemappes and Mariette became due it was found that the bridges could not be destroyed. Captain Wright of the Royal Engineers made a daring but unsuccessful attempt at Mariette which won him the VC, while Lance-Corporal Jarvis and Private John Heron were respectively for their successful attempt awarded the VC and
line on either side of Bavai. Kluck did not press on immediately, because he believed that the British would stand and fight again as they had done at Mons, and by the time he realised they were continuing the retreat it was too late for the German forces to carry out an effective encirclement. In retrospect the Battle of Mons developed a peculiar mystique. Legends of supernatural intervention on the allied side- 'The Angels of Mons' — gained currency. In some romantic British minds it began to rank with Hastings and Agincourt. It cannot be denied that the British at Mons fought with great courage, skill,
Jemappes. So far neither of Kluck's flanking Corps. IX on his left and // on his right, had been used. At 1700 hours French received a telegram from General Joffre, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies, renowned for his imperturbability and known to French soldiers as 'Papa' or 'LeGrandpere'. Three German army corps, a reserve corps plus the IX and TV Corps, and two cavalry divisions were moving against the British front. The German // Corps was turning on the left from Tournai. This meant that the BEF was outnumbered six to one, and Lanrezac's Fifth Army was dropping back. Sir John French ordered the BEF to retreat before dawn on the 24th to a new line stretching from Jerlain, south-east of Valenciennes, to the Maubeuge fortress which covered its right flank. Bavai was the dividing point between I and II Corps. Smith-Dorrien's corps' headquarters was situated in the Chateau de la Roche at Sars-la-Bruyere and had neither telegraph nor telephone. The chateau was difficult to find in the dark and Smith-Dorrien did not receive the retreat orders until 0300 hours. Haig, on the other hand, received his by telegraph an hour earlier and his I Corps was able to start pulling out well before dawn.
Grenadiers wrote: 'curse them, they seem to understand war, these English.' But these qualities were also demonstrated by the Belgians at Haelen. and the French brigade under General Mangin
DCM
at
A
defiant last stand
II Corps began its retreat under fire and as part of the fighting retreat along the Elouges-Audregnies road, Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Boger's 1st Battalion of the Cheshire Regiment was to all intents and purposes wiped out after a defiant last stand during a rearguard action against vastly superior numbers. Despite the hard German pressure on the centre and left of II Corps and the cavalry divisions, by the morning of the 24th most of the BEF, weary but more or less intact, stood along their
The
German machine gunners. Because of its size and weight the machine gun was still almost entirely a defensive weapon. Consequently the attacking Germans were unable to match the fire power of the British
and
discipline
at
tenacity.
A German
officer
in
the Brandenburg
Onhaye.
The
Battle of Mons lasted nine hours prior to the retreat and engaged 35,000 British soldiers of whom 1,000 became casualties. The advance of Kluck's army was held up for one day. During the four days from August 20 to 24 the French had lost 140,000 men. For the Germans, Mons was both a victory and a lost opportunity: for the allies it represented a fortunate escape from really grave
military disaster.
Further Reading Barnett, O, The Sword Bearers (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1963)
Carew.
T.,
Collier, B.,
The Vanished Army (William Kimber 1964) Brasshat (Seeker & Warburg 1961)
Corbett-Smith, Retreat From Mons (Cassell 1917) French, F-M. Sir John, 1914 (Houghton Mifflin 1919) Green, H„ The British Army in the First World War (Treherne 1968) Keegan. J Opening moves (New York Ballantme 1971) Ritter, G., The Schlieffen Plan (Oswald Wolff 1958) Ropp.T., War in the Western World (CUP 1960) Spears, Maj-Gen. Sir Edward, Liaison 1914 (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1930) Tuchman, B August 1914 (Constable 1962) .
,
LIONEL FANTHORPE is married and has two young daughters, and is the Further Education Tutor at Gamlmgay Village College where he also teaches History. His novels and short stories are concerned mainly with science fiction and the supernatural and include The Watching World and The Unconfmed. He is J.
rock-climbing instruction officer to the 4th Cambridgeshire (C) Battalion and has other interests.
many
Of all the personal accounts of the Battles of the Frontiers and the Allied retreat which followed them, the most remarkable is by a German, Walter Bloem. A novelist by profession, he was recalled from the reserve at the age of 46 in August 1914 to command a company of his old regiment, the 12th Brandenburg Grenadiers. The regiment belonged to the 5th Division, III Corps of First Army, and was therefore on the extreme right wing of the great German wheel toward Paris. It left Frankfurt on August 8, entered Belgium six days later and ran into the BEF at Mons on August 23 Walter Bloem
German troops prepare The scale is
clearly
of
for battle.
equipment carried
in their battle
order
seen
«
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Sunday: the second since we crossed the Rhine. Reports coming back along the column seemed to confirm the fact that the English were in front of us. English soldiers? We knew what they looked like by the comic papers; short scarlet tunics with small caps set at an angle on their heads, or bearskins with the chin-strap under the lip instead of under the chin. There was much joking about this, and also about Bismarck's remark of sending the police to arrest the English army. The regiment was advanced guard, and after a march of some 12 miles halted in the village of Baudour. Hussar patrols, trotting past, reported the country free of the enemy for 50 miles ahead. The cooks were brought up and we settled down to a comfortable midday rest. Scarcely had we finished our meal, when two Hussars, covered in blood, galloped up to us stating that the enemy was holding the line of the canal in front. A third Hussar limped along behind them carrying a blood-stained saddle; his horse had been shot under him: 'They are in the village just ahead.' Almost at once despatch-riders, adjutants, motor-cyclists rushed past. Somehow we all felt in our bones that this time there was going to be real business. A signal from the adjutant; the Major wished to see the company commanders. 'Mussigbrodt, bring my horse." In a moment we were gathered round our battalion com-
there must be riders.' I had scarcely spoken when a man appeared not five paces away from behind the horses — a man in a grey-brown uniform, no, in a grey-brown golfing suit with a flattopped cloth cap. Could this be a soldier? Certainly not a French soldier, nor a Belgian, then he must be an English one. So that's how they dress now! All this flashed through my mind in the fraction of a second, and in the meantime the fellow had raised his arm, a sharp report, a wisp of smoke, and the whisk of a bullet passed my head. In the same second had pulled out my loaded revolver and fired -peng!- missed too. He dodged behind the horses and I behind the buttress of a wall — my blasted revolver had jammed! I pulled the empty case out of the chamber: it ran free again. Then I peered round the side of the wall aiming, ready to fire. Yes, there he was, his long, thin face just behind a horse's tail looking at me, also along the sights of his revolver. We fired simultaneously, again missed by a hair's breadth, and then suddenly he rushed away with long strides into the meadow. Ten, twelve shots rang out and he fell dead on the grass. My staff had run round to the other side of the building to tackle him from behind: he had seen them and then took to his heels, but too late. [This British soldier was from a patrol of A Squadron. 19th Hussars, the 5th Division's attached cavalry regiment. As we left the buildings and were extending out again, another shower of bullets came across the meadow and rattled against the walls and all about us. More cries, more men fell. In front a farm track on a slightly raised embankment crossed our direction. 'Line the bank in front,' I ordered, and in a few short rushes I
}
mander. 'Maps out, gentlemen! The village of Tertre in front of us is held by the enemy: strength not yet known. The regiment will attack. The Fusilier battalion, supported by two batteries in position south of Baudour. will occupy Tertre railway station. We, the 1st Battalion, have orders to take the strip of wood west and south-west of Baudour — you will see it on the map, gentlemen — and clear any enemy out of it. We shall be supported by Wiskott's Battery.
advance
My
orders, therefore, are as follows. The battalion will at once on the strip of wood, companies in the following
order: B, A, C, D. B Company will send out half a section both to its right and left as flank-guards to the battalion. Any questions,
gentlemen? No. Then please move off immediately.' German Grenadier regiment the third battalion was known
[In a
as the Fusilier Battalion. Bloem belonged to the first.] I galloped back to my company. 'Fall in!' I sent Sergeant Schuler with half his section to the right and the other half under Corporal Tettenborn to the left. Tettenborn, a gallant and splendid soldier, I never saw again; he lies buried at the southern edge of Tertre village, one of the first of the regiment to be killed. We marched off. The Fusilier battalion was extending out, its front line of skirmishers already under enemy fire from the direction of Tertre station, a few bullets whistling over us too. Wiskott's Battery galloped past, and a few minutes later, as we turned off to the right towards the wood, the guns were already unlimbered alongside a factory-wall, their muzzles pointing at the wood. The battery commander was on the observation ladder looking through his glasses, and we had scarcely got past before they opened fire, the first shells whizzing just over our heads. We struggled through a mass of dense undergrowth, and reached the farther edge with our faces and hands scratched all over, but otherwise met no opposition. Looking from here Tertre village was on our left, and from the noise of rifle-fire and bursting shells it was clear that heavy fighting had begun with an enemy not to be so easily brushed aside. In front lay an extremely long,
marshy-looking meadow. Its left side was broken into by scattered buildings and sheds, and on the right a narrow strip of wood jutted out into it. At the far end, about 1,500 yards straight ahead, were more scattered groups of buildings. Between the near and the far buildings a number of cows were peacefully grazing. We had no sooner left the edge of the wood than a volley of bullets whistled past our noses and cracked into the trees behind. Five or six cries near me, five or six of my grey lads collapsed on the grass. Damn it! this was serious. The firing seemed at long flat,
range and
half-left.
'Forward!' I shouted, taking my place with three of my 'staff" ten paces in front of the section leader, Holder-Egger, and the section in well-extended formation ten paces behind him again. Here we were, advancing as if on a parade ground. The crack of bullets about our ears, and away in front a sharp, rapid hammering sound, then a pause, then more rapid hammering — machine guns. Over to our left, about Tertre, the rifle and machine gun fire was even more intense, the roar of guns and bursting shells increasing. A real battle this time!
meeting were approaching one of the scattered farm buildings in the meadow, and being the first I went in, and noticed at once a group of fine-looking horses, all saddled up. I turned to my 'staff': Get hold of the horses; but look out! Where there are horses First face-to-face
We
we were
there, lying flat against the grass bank and looking cautiously over the top. Where was the enemy? Not the faintest sign of him anywhere, nothing except the cows that had become restless and were gadding about. One, as I watched, rose on its hind legs, and then collapsed in a heap on the ground. And still the bullets kept coming, over our heads and all about us. [The British infantry opposite Bloem' s battalion have been identified as the 2nd King's Own Scottish Borderers. I searched through my glasses. Yes, there among the buildings away at the far end of the meadow was a faint haze of smoke. Then in God's name let us get closer. 'Forward again — at the double!' We crossed the track, jumped the broad dyke full of stagnant water on the far side, and then on across the squelching meadow. More firing, closer now and tearing into our ranks; cries, more lads falling. 'Down! Open fire — far end of meadow — range 1,000 yards!' And so we went on, gradually working forward by rushes of 100, later 50, and then about 30 yards towards the invisible enemy. At every rush a few more fell, but one could do nothing for them. On, on, that was the only solution. Easier said than done, however, for not only was the meadow horribly swampy, filling our boots with water, but it was intersected by broad, water-logged drains and barbed-wire fences that had to be cut through. I shouted down the line: 'Advance by groups from the right, in short rushes.' And then I heard Holder-Egger 's voice as he led on forward. From our new line I again searched the front through my glasses. Still no sign of the enemy. Only the unfortunate cows, now just ahead of us, and being between the two firing lines they were in a bad way, bellowing desperately, one after the other collapsing. To right and left, a cry here, a cry there: 'I'm hit, sir! O God! Oh, mother! I'm done for!' 'I'm dying, sir!' said another near me. 'I can't help you, my young man, we must go on — come, give me your hand.' Graser's clear voice again: 'On again — double!' On we went. Behind us the whole meadow was dotted with little grey heaps. The 160 men that left the wood with me had shrunk to less than 100. But Grabert's section at my signal had now worked forward and prolonged our line to the right. He, too, had lost heavily, nevertheless there was still quite a respectable crowd of us gradually moving on, wave by wave, closer and closer to the invisible enemy. We officers had some time previously taken a rifle from a dead or wounded man, filled our pockets with cartridges, and were firing away into the haze of smoke at the far end of the meadow. I felt, however, that these continuous rushes were telling on the men, and that they must have a breathing space. 'Stop for a bit!' I shouted down the line. 'No further advance \
without
my
orders!'
noticed that at this period of the advance if one lay quite flat, the enemy's fire always passed over one, that it was, in fact, slightly high all the time we were lying down. It appeared very strange at the time, and it was not until several months later when a wounded friend was showing me photographs he had taken afterwards of the English position, that I saw the reason. At the end of this meadow was a canal with an embankment on I
*
We had been badly beaten —
and by the English we had so laughed at!'
our
side,
flat meadow below the canal embankment made a lot of dead ground for
and as we were crossing a
level, this near-side
which naturally became more pronounced the nearer we got to the canal. The machine gun fire from the houses on this side of the canal seemed to have been silenced — they were hammering no more at us anyhow. From now on the English fire gradually weakened, almost ceased. No hail of bullets greeted each rush forward, and we were us, the shelter of
able to get within 150 yards of the canal bank. I said to Graser: 'Now we'll do one more 30-yard rush, all together, then fix bayonets and charge the houses and the canal banks.'
'Hounds of
hell'
for this moment to get us all together at close ra age, for immediately the line rose it was as if the hounds of hell had been loosed at us, yelling, barking, hammering as a mass of lead swept in among us. 'Down!' I shouted, and on my left I heard through the din Graser's voice repeating it. Voluntarily, and in many cases involuntarily, we all collapsed flat on the grass as if swept by a
The enemy must have been waiting
scythe.
From now on matters went from bad
to worse.
Wherever
I
looked, right or left, were dead or wounded, quivering in convulsions, groaning terrible, blood oozing from fresh wounds. The
worse was that the heaviest firing now began
to
come on us from
the strip of wood that jutted out into the meadow to our right rear. It must be our own men, I thought, who could not imagine we had got on so far and now evidently took us for the enemy. Luckily we had a way of stopping that: 'Who has the red flag?' Grenadier Just produced it, and lying on his back waved it wildly. No result; in fact the fire from the right rear became even heavier. The brave Just stood up and with complete unconcern continued to wave the red flag more frantically than ever. But still no effect. 'Lie down, Just, good fellow, you've done well but it's no use; they must see but they won't believe.' I blew my whistle full blast and any of the NCO's with whistles did the same. Still no good. The firing continued, more and more
my men were being hit. [The fire was coming in fact from a machine gun section of the 1st East Surreys.] I discovered too at this time that we had scarcely any ammunition left; and here we were, isolated and 120 yards from the English position. Next to me was a grenadier hit through both cheeks and tongue, his face a mass of blood; and beyond him Pohlenz, my bugler, a bullet hole through the bugle slung on his back, the home-made cigarette in the corner of his mouth, and himself firing shot after shot, as calmly as an old philosopher, at the garden of the white house in front. He declared he'd seen of
someone moving in
maybe altogether, I never knew. As the darkness deepened the din of battle all along the line quietened down, and then quite distinctly from behind came a bugle-call, the 1st Battalion 'assembly'. Surely we had not to go back, to give up what we had gained? But the call was repeated again and again. We had to obey; it was impossible for us to judge the general situation, and, no doubt, it was for the best. It was now too dark for the enemy to see. I got up on my legs, my limbs all stiff and hurting as if they'd been drawn from their sockets. The dampness of the meadow and the soaking in the dykes had wetted my clothes through to the skin. Nevertheless I was up, actually while,
it.
standing up. 'Did you hear that, lads? We have to go back. But we must take the wounded with us.' The pieces of tent-cloth carried by each man were tied to rifles and on these extemporised stretchers all the wounded were gradually collected. It meant hard work for the others and took time, but it had to be done in spite of protests from some of the wounded themselves, though others were only too willing to be moved, and in any case they couldn't be left where they were. 'Me too, sir, me too!' 'Of course, lad, only be patient, and wait your turn.' Knopfe did not leave my side, and Pohlenz, Niestrawski, Sauermann all joined us. Marvellous, my three trusty staff, not a hair of any of them touched. Thanks to the darkness all went well. No more bullets came from the canal bank, only in the distance an occasional crackle of musketry. So conscientious were we in those early days of the war that we collected all the rifles we could find and many of the packs to take back with us. I had five rifles slung over my shoulder as we slowly processed stage by stage back with our groaning burdens to the battalion, back across the same waterlogged dykes we had jumped a few hours before. Now and again one's foot hit against something soft — a corpse. Our bones were so weary we could hardly carry on, but it had to be done. Some of the dykes were so broad that armfuls of sticks and faggots had to be fetched from the wood and thrown in to make a way across. At times, hearing the movement of the procession, a voice would call through the darkness: 'Friends, help me. Come and take me back.' 'We're coming; we'll take you with us.' And any who had no burden went out in search of the despairing cry to bring him in.
Bayonets fixed ready All at once I heard a familiar voice in front: Major von Kleist, a head taller than me, stood facing me in the darkness, so dark that I couldn't see his features, and laying his two hands on my shoulders said in a heart-broken voice: 'My dear Bloem, you are now my only support.' 'How do you mean, major? You surely don't say 'The battalion is all to pieces — my splendid battalion,' and the voice of this kindly, big-hearted man trembled as he spoke. 'I've given orders to entrench 200 yards in front of the road leading to the wood. Will you see to that while the rest of the companies get reorganised? Watch the front very carefully, and send patrols at once up to the line of the canal. If the English have the slightest suspicion of the condition we are in they will counterattack tonight, and that would be the last straw. They would send us all to glory. Have bayonets fixed ready, and every section digging or resting must have a sentry on watch. Will you go and see to that
—
'Pohlenz, my lad, stop firing. We must keep every round we've got in case those fellows across the canal make a counterattack on us. Instead, you must make your way back as quick as you can to the battalion, find the major and tell him that B Company is here, has no more ammunition, and has had heavy losses and wants
now?
am
reinforcements and ammunition.' [Bloem's losses were so heavy that he could do no more while waiting for reinforcements than tend the wounded and pray for darkness to fall. It was a wait of several hours. Gradually the dusk came.] In the half-light there was suddenly a stir behind us. Reinforcements; actually reinforcements. It was von der Osten and his group. He had followed the embankment to the wood, and after that had not been able to find us again. He had asked everywhere for B Company but none knew where it had gone. Finally by following up the trail of dead and wounded, recognizing them by the company tassel on the shoulder, he had arrived, each of his nine men with 250 rounds apiece. This ammunition was quickly distributed along the line and another effort made to silence the machine gun in the upper room of the white house. 'Two rounds each at the white house. Aim just below the eaves of the roof!' Through my glasses I could see in the failing light that at least no window pane was left. The gun was silent for a
what was the meaning
relying on you.' inky dark was this night; not a glimmer of light. So that was our first battle, and this was the result. Our grand regiment, with all its pride and splendid discipline, its attack full of dash and courage, and now only a few fragments left. In God's name, I
How
of
it all?
my way
back behind the line of black, ghostly figures still shovelling away, but the trench was a failure. Two spadedepths down into the meadow and the water level was reached; after that the water oozed up at once and filled it. I searched for the new company commanders and gave them the major's instructions, and together we tried to get the companies formed I
groped
up again.
And now for the outposts. Ahlert helped me get the patrols together. It was no easy matter in this pitch darkness, in the indescribable confusion, and the men all chilled to the bone, almost too exhausted to move and with the depressing consciousness of defeat weighing upon them. A bad defeat, there could be no gainsaying it; in our first battle we had been badly beaten, and by the English — by the English we had so laughed at a few hours before. [From The Advance from Mons by Walter Bloem (English translation by G. C.
Wynne). ]
BALANCE OF NAVAL POWER AUGUST 1914 The
British, with very few exceptions, believed they had the best navy in the world in 1914. Their superiority over Germany in numbers and tradition was obvious, but their inferiority in certain technical fields, especially mines and torpedoes, was not generally realised. Below: Tegetthof, one of
Austria-Hungary's four dreadnought-class ships
Lieutenant-Commander P.
Kemp
Britain, in August 1914, had retained her immense lead in battleships and battlecruisers over all other European nations. In spite of the periodical scares over the rate of German building during the immediate pre-war years, her own building rate had been just more than enough to
the declared 60% numerical superiority over Germany. These were her own ships, built for her own navy, but an immediate bonus was available on the outbreak of war in the shape of three dreadnought battleships being built (and virtually completed) in Britain for foreign navies. The Almirante Latorre, ordered by Chile, was taken over in September 1914 and commissioned as HMS Canada, and two battleships built for Turkey, the
maintain
and Rashadieh, were requiAugust and added to the Grand Fleet as HMS Agincourt and HMS Erin. The two Turkish ships raised the British total of dreadnoughts at the outbreak of war to 24, to which Germany could reply with only 13. And looking ahead, the comparison was brighter still, with 13 British dreadnoughts on the stocks in various stages of construction (with two due to join the fleet later in 1914) and only ten laid down by Germany (of which two were also due later in 1914). Among the 13 British ships were five of the new Queen Elizabeth class, faster and more powerfully armed than any others in the world. The battle-cruiser comparison was almost equally favourable in numbers. Counting HMS Tiger, to which only the finishing touches in the dockyard were required, there were ten British battlecruisers, although one of these, HMS Australia, was in the service of the Australian government. And on the German side, counting SMS Derfflinger which was in the Osrnan
I sitioned in
of completion as the Tiger, there were six such ships in commission. But they included the Bliicher, a 15,800ton armoured cruiser which carried only
same
state
8.2-inch guns compared with the 11-inch and 12-inch of the later German battlecruisers and the 12-inch and 13.5-inch of the British battle-cruisers.
Of the other nations concerned, France and Russia were slightly ahead of Austriaand Italy. France had four
Hungary
battleships of the Courbet class, all launched in 1913 and 1914, of 23,500 tons and armed with twelve 12-inch guns,
A German
naval squadron steaming in line Heligoland in ships designed primarily for operations in the North Sea
ahead
off
whilst almost complete at the outbreak of larger battleships of the Bretagne class, carrying ten 13.4-inch guns. And in addition she had six Danton class battleships, technically pre-dreadnoughts because of their mixed armament of 12inch and 9.4-inch guns but, like the two British Lord Nelsons, being counted as dreadnoughts because of their recent construction and ability to maintain the speed of the dreadnought fleet. The Russian fleet was divided into two, one part in the Baltic and the other in the Black Sea. There were four dreadnought battleships of the Gangoot class in the Baltic— each carrying twelve 12-inch guns in four triple turrets— and four more on the stocks, big ships of the Borodino class, 28,000 tons with nine 14-inch guns in triple turrets and a designed speed of 261 knots. Also in the Baltic was the armoured
exit into the Mediterranean was through the Straits of Otranto, a comparatively narrow stretch of sea which the navies of
A huge
under-armoured. A crude addition of dreadnought-type ships on both sides gave a superiority to the Entente Powers over those of the Alliance of 49 to 33. Such a comparison was virtually meaningless, if only because Britain's naval commitments were worldwide while those of Germany, apart from a tiny sprinkling of colonial possessions which were indefensible in war, were confined only to the North Sea and the Baltic. There were many other considerations which went a long way further to reduce the apparent disparity in overall dreadnought strength, but these will be
war were three
disparity in overall
strength
.
.
which compared roughly with the German Bliicher. There were no dreadnoughts in the Black Sea though there were three in process of completion which were just about equal in displacement and gunpower to those owned by Austria-Hungary. But as far as the Entente Powers were concerned, the Russian Black Sea fleet could count for little unless Turkey could be brought into the war on the side of Britain, France and Russia, and any prospect of this, remote at the best of times, was made even more unlikely in August 1914 by the British requisitioning of two Turkish battleships which had just been completed in Britain. Austria-Hungary, whose only access to the sea was in the northern Adriatic, had three new dreadnoughts launched in 1914, with a fourth due to be launched in 1915. These were the Viribus Unitis class, ships of 22,000 tons with twelve 12-inch guns. She also had three Franz Ferdinands, small pre-dreadnoughts of 14,500 tons with cruiser Rurik,
a mixed armament of 12-inch and 9.4-inch guns, and thus ships of little value in terms of naval warfare in 1914. Like Russia in the Black Sea, the fleet's only
Britain
and
France
would have
little
difficulty in blocking.
An uneasy partner The third member of the Triple Alliance was Italy, and it was no secret in London or Paris that she was an uneasy partner in the arms of Germany and AustriaHungary. It was not expected that she would follow them into a European war, but in terms of the European political grouping her navy had to be counted. She had one dreadnought, the Alighieri, completed in 1912, and three more on the verge of completion. These, on paper, were powerful ships, carrying thirteen 12-inch guns in three triple and two twin turrets, but their displacement of 22,000 tons argued that they were either over-gunned or
discussed later in this article. In smaller ships, the overall ratios were much the same as with the capital ships. Neither Britain nor Germany had built heavy cruisers after the step-up to battle-cruisers, but in what were known as light cruisers, Britain had 18, with eight being built, and Germany eight, and eight more projected. Only France, and to a lesser extent Russia, had continued to build heavy cruisers. France had four, headed by the Quinet and Rousseau of 14,000 tons and carrying fourteen 7.6-inch
guns, while the Russian Baltic fleet had two class cruisers of 7,750 tons with a mixed armament of 8-inch and 6-inch guns. In Britain's Royal Navy were 225 des-
Bayan
troyers, of which 127 were fast, modern boats and the remainder, though mostly more than ten years old, still valuable in
terms of the fell
many
naval duties which
to the lot of destroyers in war.
The
comparable German figures were 152 overall, 108 fast and modern, and 44 more elderly though still useful. British submarines outnumbered German U-boats by 75 to 30, but most of the British boats were small and of use only in coastal operations. Germany, at the outbreak of war, had more submarines capable of overseas operations than Britain, and also more being built and projected. Of the other nations concerned in the European line-up in 1914, France could muster 81 destroyers and 67 submarines, Russia, in the Baltic and Black Sea combined, 106 destroyers and 36 submarines, Austria-Hungary, 18 destroyers and 11 submarines, while Italy had 33 destroyers
and 14 submarines. Outside Europe there was one other navy to be
into its home waters and unable to intervene in operations in other parts of the world. This geographical advantage had been rammed home in the naval staff talks between Britain and France in 1912 in which the French had agreed to withdraw their Atlantic and Channel squadrons, together with their Far East and Pacific squadrons, and concentrate them all in the Mediterranean, accepting naval responsibility for the whole of that sea. This decision, it is true, owed something to the effect of the Balkan War of 1912/13, as well as to the naval staff talks in London and Paris, but it effectively
was pinned
released
the
battleships
of the
British
Mediterranean Fleet to swell the number of those in
home waters.
Numbers, however, counted for little. It was quality which mattered more than quantity when it came to the actual test
taken into account, that of Japan.
Under the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 there was no obligation for Japan to enter the war, since the actual declaration on August 4, was a British initiative, but it was very obvious that, in her expansionist mood, she would do so. Her acquisitive eyes had long been focused on the well-equipped German base at Tsingtao in China, and there were German colonial
islands in the Pacific which might come her at the final peace discussions were she involved in a successful war. From the British point of view, the Japanese fleet had a potential value in war to cover and track down the powerful German East Asiatic Squadron and thereby release British ships for other operations nearer home. Japan had a useful fleet of four dreadnought-type capital ships, of which her two Kongo class battle-cruisers were as large, as powerfully armed (eight 14-inch, sixteen 6-inch), and as fast (27 knots) as any others
way
in the world.
The battleship Asi was a mixed
armament ship which, however, ranked
as
a dreadnought, and her capital ship fleet was supported by two first-class Nisshin cruisers and three second-class type Hirato type, together with the older Tone. Of her 54 destroyers, all were of British design and most of them built in Britain. Counting up their ships, the three Entente powers appeared overwhelmingly strong. Moreover, with Britain lying across the German exits from the North Sea into the world's oceans, the High Seas Fleet
but quality not quantity when .
.
.
it
came to the test of battle. In pure design, there was little to choose between the British and German dreadnoughts, and although there were some naval experts, even in 1914 and before the results in action had pointed to deficiencies in the British ships, who thought the German design superior. They were eventually proved wrong when the battleship Bayern was raised after the holocaust in Scapa Flow at the end of the war. A minute examination of her construction proved that British naval architects in 1914 had nothing to learn from their German counterparts. One of the considerable disabilities from which the British capital ships suffered in comparison with the German was their lack of beam. Successive Liberal governments in Britain, voted into power on promises of social benefits to all, had refused to spend money on new docks so that all British ships had to be built to fit the existing docks instead of the other way round. This meant that no British dreadnought could be built with a beam of more than 90 feet. At Wilhelmshaven there were two docks to take ships up to a beam of 102 feet; at Kiel there was a floating
>-
dock with an available beam of 131 feet: while between the two new locks on the Kiel Canal at Holtenau was a huge space large enough to accommodate anything. In Germany had a great advan-
this respect tage.
Ship for ship, all the Gorman battleships and battle-cruisers had about 1 feet more on the beam than the British. This gave them an immediate advantage in that they were less susceptible to damage by mine or torpedo. It also enabled them to carry thicker armour on sides and gun turrets, a possibility which was enhanced by a considerable saving in weight which arose from the different functions of British and German ships. British ships were designed for a world-wide role. Their crews lived permanently on board, and they carried enough coal to give them a steaming radius of 4,000-5,000 miles. German capital ships were designed purely for North Sea or Baltic operations. Their crews lived ashore in barracks when the ships were in harbour, and the fuel they carried gave them a steaming radius of under 2,000 miles.
Their great beam, allied to the saving in weight in fuel alone, and combined with the fact that crew habitability was not of primary importance in view of their short endurance and the living accommodation ashore, enabled a much more complete watertight subdivision below decks to be built into their hulls. As a result, the German capital ships were more nearly unsinkable than any of the British. It all came down to the size of the available docks. When Admiral Jellicoe visited Kiel in 1910, the Kaiser told him that in Germany they built docks to take the ships, and not ships to fit the docks. Writing after the war, Sir Eustace Tennyson-d'Eyncourt, the Director of Naval Construction, had this to say: 'Had wider docks been available, and had it been possible to go to a
greater beam, the designs on the same length and draught could have embodied more fighting qualities, such as armour, armament, greater stability in case of
damage, and improved underwater protection.' With their greater beam, ar therefore greater displacement, thj man ships could have a consic thicker armour belt built into fchei the Bi first dreadnoughts, belt was 10 to 11 inches uf deck only, while the compa
i»"i»
-
.
•
Z
.
*
-
*
*
HH|
dreadnoughts carried 12 Orion to Iron Duke classes, was 12 inches thick, but in Kaiser and Konig class,
inches. In the British armour
the comparable
German
side
armour was 13J inches thick. There was something of the same story in a comparison of the big guns of the two fleets. A considerable amount of capital had been invested by the main British gun manufacturers in wire-woupd guns, and therefore all British big naval guns were wire-wound. The German navy had gone for the built-up gun, which had proved itself not only more robust but with a longer life. There was a tendency for the muzzles of big wire-wound guns to droop fractionally after firing a few rounds, with consequent inaccuracy in range keeping, while their life was estimated (by the Germans, it is true) as 80-100 rounds. The life of the built-up gun was estimated (again by the Germans) at 220 rounds. They fired their shells with a considerably
endorsed by Admiral Jellicoe, also a gunnery expert, ran into opposition from the Navy's Inspector of Target Practice, who argued strongly for the retention of individual gunlaying. This battle of opinions continued until the end of 1912 when a test between HMS Thunderer, fitted with Scott's director system, and her sister ship HMS Orion, using individual gunlayers, clinched the argument. In three minutes of firing at a range of 9,000 yards, with the ships steaming at 12 knots, the Thunderer scored six times as many hits as the Orion. But by now time was running short, and with opposition still being expressed by the diehards, only eight battleships in the Grand Fleet had been fitted with director
by August 1914. The Germans had a system of director firing, known as Richtungsweiser, which had much in common with Scott's director except that it was mounted in the ship's conningtower and not in the foretop. If firing
indeed throughout
all
British naval history
up to that year, the gun was always the dominant weapon. Officers who had specialised in gunnery had always enjoyed a better record for promotion to the higher ranks than officers of other specialities, and in this veneration of the gun as the queen of the naval battlefield, other weapons had had less drive put behind them in the race towards perfection. British torpedoes were unreliable in their running, and not infrequently ran deep or sank to the bottom after being fired; a somewhat strange state of affairs when it is remembered that the
Royal Navy had pioneered the torpedo from its very birth. By 1914 the 21-inch torpedo had largely replaced the earlier 18inch, and all the dreadnought battleships all modern destroyers carried the larger version. The German navy had also two sizes of torpedo, 450-mm (17.7-inch) and 500-mm (19.7-inch), with a larger 600-mm (23.6- inch) torpedo under develop-
and
Although in 1914 Italy had only one dreadnought her commanding position in the Mediterranean made her navy a factor to be reckoned with greater muzzle velocity, and the muzzles ment. The four earliest German dreadthere were any diehards in the German noughts (Nassau class) had the 450-mm, did not droop. navy they were never permitted to interGun for gun, the German was smaller fere with technological development, and as also did the Bliicher and Von der Tann among the battle-cruisers. All other dreadthe Richtungsweiser system had been than the British. Taking ships comparable noughts and all destroyers and U-boats introduced throughout the High Seas Fleet in size and date of completion, where the from G.174 and U.19 onwards had the by 1914. German gunnery was always British fitted 12-inch guns, the Germans 500-mm torpedo. Any older boats which excellent, their salvoes compact with very fitted 11-inch; when the British went up to little spread, and always remarkably were still operational had the old 17.713.5 inches, the Germans replied with 12inch. Allowing for the higher muzzle veloaccurate for range. inch torpedo. But although slightly smaller, This accuracy was based on the stereosize for size, the German torpedo was a city of the German guns, there was nothing more reliable weapon in range, running, scopic rangefinder, which had a telling in the disparity of size so far as range was and depth-keeping than the British. advantage over the British type in that it concerned, though the British ships held a absorbed very little light. This was parsubstantial advantage in weight of broadticularly valuable in the North Sea, where Negligence and inefficiency side. Given equal accuracy in ranging and If the performance of British torpedoes in the frequent mist and bad light, little in shell and fuse design, this advantage could be seen through the British type could have been considerable since heavier left much to be desired, that of British shells are more accurate at long ranges because of the high absorption of light mines was shocking. No one at the Adthan lighter ones. through the lenses and prisms. miralty had been given responsibility to think out the use or value of mines in In the ten years ending in 1914, the Royal It was a similar story in shells, mines Navy had made a striking advance in the and torpedoes. When Jellicoe had been terms of naval strategy or tactics; no one range and accuracy of its gunnery. WhereThird Sea Lord and Controller in 1910 he had been charged with the technical as in 1904, battle practice ranges had been development of mines. Those with which had sent a memorandum to the Ordnance 3,000-4,000 yards and often with a stationBritain went to war in 1914 were thorBoaid asking them to produce an armourary target, by 1914 the range had grown oughly inefficient, either breaking away piercing shell that would penetrate armour to 16,000 yards at towed targets. Accuracy at oblique impact and burst inside. At the from their moorings when laid or else was very good, but the individual gunend of the year Jellicoe went to sea, and frequently failing to explode when hit by layers in the turrets were always handithe responsibility to see this development an enemy ship. In the German navy as capped by the smoke of burnt cordite, through to its conclusion fell to his succesmuch attention was paid to the developfunnel smoke, shell splashes, and the sor, Admiral Sir John Briggs, who was anyment of the mine as to every other weapon, difficulty of identification of the target. In thing but energetic. Nothing had been done and the sinking of the new dreadnought 1911 Admiral Sir Percy Scott, who had by 1914 on this requirement, and this battleship Audacious by a single mine been recognised as the greatest expert in sorry tale of incompetence had its result within a very few weeks of the declaration gunnery in the Royal Navy, brought out in the war when the British armourof war told the story. his director system, by which all guns piercing shell broke up on oblique impact In smaller ships of war, the Germans were trained, laid, and fired by a master against the German armour instead of were in every way as good as the British. sight in the foretop, well above the smoke. penetrating and bursting inside. All their destroyers, to which they still In addition to obtaining a clear view, the gave the older name of torpedoboats, were director sight made certain that all turrets German superiority excellent seaboats and very strongly conwere trained onto the same enemy ship, for The German superiority in torpedoes and structed. Unlike British practice, they were the individual gunlayers in the turrets had mines lay as much in better and more in every case tested by running their merely to follow the electrically repeated sophisticated workmanship as in a fatal acceptance trials in really bad weather to elevation and bearing of the master sight. British tendency to regard these as the guarantee against leaking and straining. Scott's director system, enthusiastically weapons of a weaker power. In 1914, and Their U-boats, too, were as well con-
Above: An artist's impression of signalling in the German fleet. Below: The map shows the naval bases of the North Sea, and the blockade alternatives open to the Royal Navy. It was the policy of distant blockade that was finally decided upon.
Immense propaganda campaigns encouraged the public to take an interest in their navies. Top: An Aryan goddess spurs on the German fleet with the cry Death to the Enemy'. Above: A painting of the launching of Austria's
first
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177
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. valuable ally to Britain the Far East, allowing Britain to deploy all her battleships in home waters
France, by agreement with Britain, stationed her fleet in the Mediterranean, relying on Britain to protect the channel ports and her northern coastline
Italy, very much an unknown quantity in the event of war, was well supplied with bases although her fleet was small. It could however influence matters in the Mediterranean
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Germany, numerically vastly inferior to Britain, had fewer commitments, and based her hopes on reducing Britain's superiority
piecemeal,
in
isolated actions
Austria-Hungary, another minor naval power, based her fleet in the Adriatic and was able to exercise a threat to the sea lanes of the Mediterranean
179
The eyes and teeth
of the fleets, the seaplane
and the big gun
A The breech mechanism. The breech
block, which swings out to allow the shell to be loaded into the breech, is a threaded block into which longitudinal slots have been cut, corresponding to threads and slots in the breech. After the breech block has been moved back into the breech, the threads of each fitting into the slots of the other (1 and 2), the whole mechanism is locked by giving the breech block a partial twist, which locks its threads with those of the breech (3). B The breech of a British naval gun. 1 Electric firing pistol. 2 Breech block. 3 Priming charges. 4 Cordite propellant in silk bags. 5 Soft copper driving band. 6 Shell. 7 Rifling in barrel. C Construction of a German (above) and a British gun (below). The German gun is made of three tubes (1) sweated together, with a liner carrying the rifling (2) inside them, while the British gun comprises an inner tube (3) carrying the liner (4), bound with wire (2), with an outer tube (1) over that
<
structed as British submarines throughout, not even excluding the new British E-class boats which were one of the most successful classes of submarines ever built in Britain at least up to 1925, and they had turned their attention to the long endurance submarine for ocean warfare some years before Britain had faced this challenge. One reason for this German superiority in materiel was that in Germany, technology in the metallurgy, engineering, shipbuilding, and chemical industries was in a very advanced state. This stemmed, at least in part, from the different educational backgrounds of the two countries. In
England, most higher education was devoted to training for the professions, but in Germany its main emphasis was on training for trade purposes. All through the naval materiel picture in Germany was
an emphasis on attention to detail which extended right through from top to bottom. It was not only in shells and fuses, rangefinders, mines, and torpedoes that they were far ahead. Their attention to detail even reached down as far as saving life after ships had been sunk in action. While the British navy still relied on the boats carried on board to save life after action, the German ships were issued with sufficient special lifejackets for the whole crew designed to hold men upright while floating in the water.-
This was a product of the basic German mentality and planning, meticulous in every detail and allied to an urge to be prepared for any and every emergency. The British mentality was not geared in that age to so deep a regard for perfection in such detail. Britain had its engineers and shipbuilders who were in every way as brilliant as any in Germany, but their attitude was more that of the gentlemanly amateur than that of the dedicated technologist. There was a complacency in Britain, founded upon its broad industrial base which could guarantee a faster rate of naval building than Germany could ever achieve, which perhaps militated against such a perfectionist doctrine. Every argument which was produced to sustain the naval race against Germany in the decade leading up to 1914 was based entirely on quantitative rather than qualitative superiority. What was perhaps perplexing was the sincere belief in Britain, and particularly in the British Admiralty, that ship for ship, those built in Britain were undoubtedly superior to those built in Germany. There had been no lack of reports from the British Naval Attache in Berlin stressing the excellence of German ships, as well as of their guns, their results, their shells and fuses and their torpedoes. Yet the belief in British
gunnery
superiority was quite genuinely held and believed. One man only seemed to have doubts, but this one man was Admiral Jellicoe, the Commander-in-Chief designate of the Grand Fleet in the event of a war against Germany. Three weeks before the outbreak of the war, in a memorandum addressed to Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, he drew attention to the 'very striking inferiority' of the armour and underwater protection of British battleships and battle-cruisers as compared with German. He concluded with a statement that it was 'highly dangerous to consider that our ships as a whole are superior or even equal fighting machines'. This memorandum by Jellicoe followed a
was the immense anchorage of Scapa Flow. Having decided on the development of
'Undoubted superiority' or 'Striking inferiority'? speech a few days earlier by Churchill in which he spoke of 'the undoubted superiority of our ships unit for unit'. Churchill
was quite sincere when he said that, and was in fact only echoing the genuine beliefs of the
This
Admiralty as a whole.
German thoroughness and
attention to detail extended to dockyards as well as to ships. Theirs were not only magnificently organised for the building, equipping, and repairing of warships but were
also tied into the German system of mobilisation, the whole operation being brought together under a single directing staff.
The German dockyards had bene-
of course, not only from the fact that they were relatively new and had thus been initially planned and laid out to cope with modern methods of warship design and construction, but also from ungrudging investment of public money in the needs and growth of the new navy. Britain's dockyards, on the other hand, had been developed through the centuries, originally planned and laid out for a sailing navy, fitted,
and adapted time
after time to try to keep pace with the technological changes of naval warfare. Not that they were inefficient—the Dreadnought had been built in Portsmouth Dockyard in the incredibly short space of 11 months — but many of their facilities suffered from a lack of modern layout and from the legacy of the more unhurried days of sail.
Obsolete dockyards Of more immediate importance
in the context of a war against Germany was the actual situation of the three major British
dockyards at Chatham, Portsmouth and Devonport. Their position had largely been dictated by the wars of the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries when the traditional enemies of Britain had been Spain, Holland, and France. The western approaches to Britain, the English Channel, and the southern North Sea had been the naval battlegrounds of those years, and the English dockyards had been developed on the strategic realities of
war against the
traditional foes. But with the emergence of Germany as the only obvious enemy, the focus of naval warfare had shifted from the Channel to the northern half of the North Sea, and Chatham, the only major dockyard on the east coast of Britain, was too far south to provide immediate support to a Grand Fleet which would necessarily have to be stationed in the north of Britain. The need for a fully equipped base in
the north had been recognised by the British Admiralty as far back as 1903 when it was decided to develop Rosyth, on the northern side of the Firth of Forth, as a first-class naval base. When Sir John Fisher came to the Admiralty in 1904 as First Sea Lord he did his best to hold back the work at Rosyth partly because he had doubts about the safety of Rosyth as a fleet anchorage and partly because he preferred the Cromarty Firth on the grounds that it was farther north than Rosyth and thus a better base from which to command the northern exit from the North Sea into the Atlantic. Farther north still, in the Orkney Islands,
Rosyth as a
first-class
dockyard against
Fisher's opposition — first-class being defined as a port where the dockyard was capable of building, equipping, and repairing warships of any size in every respect, where permanent depots of men and stores of all descriptions were maintained, and where the scale of defence was heavy enough to deter attacks by battleships. The Admiralty next considered the possibility of developing a second-class
base in the north to back up Rosyth — second-class being defined as a base where smaller repairs could be undertaken and only stocks of the more immediate stores were maintained. The choice lay between Cromarty and Scapa Flow, and after much
Cromarty was chosen. Scapa Flow was designated as a fleet anchorage in war, but the Committee of Imperial Defence, to whom the whole question of
discussion
coast bases was referred, recommended that no defences should be erected there. The Admiralty protested, but when it was discovered that the cost of setting up fixed defences would come to £379,000
east
and that the annual cost of upkeep would amount to £55,000, even the Admiralty agreed that it was time the financial horns were pulled in. When war came in August 1914, the plight of the Grand Fleet in respect of bases was frightening. The strategic requirements of the policy of distant blockade dictated the stationing of the Grand Fleet as far to the northward as possible in order
command the northern North Sea between the Orkneys and the Norwegian coast, and Scapa Flow was the only answer. It was completely undefended, with no nets or booms to prevent entry by U-boat, and no searchlights to detect enemy marauders by night. Both Cromarty and Rosyth had by 1914 been given a sketchy coastal artillery defence designed to keep surface ships at bay, but both were wide open to U-boat attack and their approaches were easy to mine. The dockyard at Rosyth, which had been subject to interminable delays on the grounds of economy, had only just been begun to be constructed and would not be operational for some years later. Only Chatham still remained as a to
first-class east coast base,
too
far
away adequately
but was much to nourish a
Grand Fleet with Scapa Flow as its main operational base. There was, it is true, a second-class base at Harwich, but that again was too far south for the Grand Fleet and was in any case earmarked as a base for light
craft.
situation in Germany was exactly the opposite. On the German North Sea coast, protected by the island of Heligoland, were two of the three main fleet bases, Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven. In the Baltic, but readily accessible to those in the North Sea through the Kiel Canal
The
which had been widened and dredged to take dreadnoughts, was the third great naval base at Kiel. Subsidiary bases at Hamburg, Bremen, and Emden were interconnected through the rivers Elbe and Weser, and the Ems-Jade Canal. The islands of Heligoland, which protected the mouths of the Elbe and Weser rivers, and Borkum, which provided the same service for the Ems, were both heavily fortified, and at strategic points along the coast, powerful forts and gun emplacements gave
181
additional security. Nature, too, had been kind to Germany by providing shoals and sandbanks off the coast which restricted approach by heavy ships to narrow channels which were easily defensible. One final area of comparison on the materiel side lay in the air. Both Britain and Germany had recognised the possible importance of aircraft in sea warfare at roughly the same time, mainly for use as
advanced scouts. Whereas Germany had fixed her eyes firmly on the rigid airship as the most desirable means of longdistance scouting, Britain had vacillated between airships and aeroplanes. Her airship policy had been a sorry tale of indecision throughout. Money for a rigid airship had been voted in the 1909 Naval Estimates, but the resultant Mayfly had
had her back broken during her trials when a gust of wind caught her when she was halfway out of her hanger. This was in 1911, the same year in which Jellicoe, during a visit to Germany, had been taken for a flight in a Zeppelin, and returned to London with glowing accounts of their value to a fleet at sea. However Jellicoe's enthusiasm carried less weight with the Board of Admiralty than the disaster to the Mayfly, and in 1912 the Committee of Imperial Defence agreed with the Admiralty that airships were useless. This odd decision, which went in the face of all German experience, was largely influenced by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur K. Wilson, First Sea Lord until December 1911, who argued that airships presented as large a target as battleships and could be brought down by naval guns. He did not explain, and nobody seems to have asked him, how the guns were to be sufficiently elevated to engage a Zeppelin and how the fall of shot was to be spotted. Nevertheless, in 1914 the Royal Navy ordered eight rigid airships, none of which were ready by the outbreak of war. There were already seven small non-rigid airships, of which four were too unreliable for operations at sea and one was used for training.
The
first aircraft-carrier
Such enthusiasm as the Admiralty could muster for naval flying was directed mainly into heavier-than-air machines. In 1912 an aircraft had been successfully launched from the deck of HMS Africa while the ship was at anchor. In 1912, during the course of the naval review at Weymouth, an aircraft was successfully flown off from the foreof HMS Hibernia while she was under way. In 1913 the old cruiser HMS Hermes was commissioned as the first aircraft-carrier in any of the world's navies, accommodating three seaplanes. When war came in 1914, the Royal Naval Air Service could boast a strength of 52 seaplanes though only 26 of them were airworthy) and 39 land-based aeroplanes. In Germany there had been no deviation from the Zeppelin programme. They were based mainly at Cuxhaven and, while their primary role was for scouting purposes over the North Sea, they had a subsidiary role as potential bombers against land targets. In 1914 there were some 28 available for fleet work, though some of these could be withdrawn temporarily for other purposes. In addition, seaplanes and landbased aircraft for naval purposes were stationed at air bases around the German orth Sea coast. castle
i
r
lb.
The evolution of strategic thought in the two major naval powers, Britain and Germany, during the years leading to the outbreak of war is interesting. Both navies had been obsessed more by the development in material than by its relation to strategy and tactics, and little thought was given to the best way in which these magnificent new fighting ships should be used. It was not the day of the naval thinker but the day of the naval specialist. Almost the whole of naval education in both countries was directed towards the technical aspects of a naval life, and virtually none to its more philosophical aspects of the strategical and tactical uses of a fleet. In Britain, with her long heritage and expertise in the use of sea power on a world scale, this was inexcusable. In Ger-
many
it was, if not wise, at least understandable for her experience of sea power extended back less than 20 years.
A second Trafalgar? Most British naval officers were at least aware of the fact that in most of the wars of the past the principle of close blockade of an enemy in his ports had led to satisfactory conclusions in the end. When, in about 1904, it became apparent that the next enemy upon the seas would be Gerit was accepted that the general war strategy would consist of a close blockade of the German North Sea coast. Its total length was no more than 150 miles in the form roughly of a right angle, so that a blockade would lie roughly along the hypotenuse. A corollary of this close blockade was the capture of one or more of the German islands — Sylt and Heligoland were those most frequently mentioned — for development as a forward British base for light craft charged with the blockade. Behind the advanced light forces would lie the main fleet of Britain, ready to engage the High Seas Fleet as it came out and inflict upon it a second battle of Trafalgar. It took a long time for the realities of
many,
modern naval warfare
to
impinge upon this
strongly held British belief. It was, of course, unrealistic even in 1904, for the mine and the torpedo, the submarine and the torpedo-boat, and the long-range coastal gun were all realities before that date. At least as late as 1907, in a series of war plans drawn up in that year, and later still in the minds of many senior admirals whose task it was to decide British naval strategy, the doctrine of close blockade held sway. Even when at last the facts did percolate through naval thinking, the plan was modified to a close blockade in daylight hours by light craft with fleet support and a withdrawal of the supporting fleet at night to a distance beyond which German light forces could not reach if they sailed at sunset and were back in their harbours by sunrise the next morning. This distance was worked out as 170 miles, and the scheme incorporated in the war plans. By as late as August 1911 close blockade was still in fashion. In a memorandum issued during that month by the Commander-in-Chief Home Fleet, the agreed strategy was indicated in some detail: The present War Plans provide for a blockade of the Heligoland Bight by the 1st and 2nd Destroyer Flotillas, supported by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, with the principal objects of • preventing raiding expeditions leaving German ports in the earlier stages of hos-
tilites;
•
preventing the German Fleet putting to sea without the British Commander-inChief knowing it and, when it is known to be at sea, conveying him such information as to its movements as will enable it to be brought to action by the British Main Fleet. Here we were, back to the days of Hawke, Cornwallis and Nelson! By 1912, at long last, even the naval diehards had come to the conclusion that close blockade was too risky an operation to consider. The German islands, on the capture of which the original scheme had depended, were now heavily fortified. German submarines and torpedo boats, it was at last agreed, could carry out a war of attrition against British advanced forces that could, in a reasonably short time, whittle away the numerical advantage on which the ultimate safety of the nation depended. Some other scheme was needed. It took the form of a proposed 'observational blockade', to consist of a line of cruisers and destroyers stretching from the south-westerly tip of Norway to a point in the centre of the North Sea, and then southward to the coast of Holland. The main battle fleets would be at sea to the westward of this line. As the 1912 War Plans stated: 'The general idea of these plans is to exercise pressure upon Germany by shutting off German shipping from oceanic trade through the action of patrolling cruisers on lines drawn across the approaches to the North Sea, and supporting these cruisers and covering the British coasts by two battle fleets stationed so as to be in a position to bring the enemy's fleet to action should it proceed to sea with the object of driving the cruisers off or undertaking other offensive action.'
'Observational blockade' For the next two years, almost
to the brink 'observational blockade' remained the official strategy of the Royal Navy, in spite of the obvious impossibility of maintaining a blockade line of 300 miles in length with its invitation to the enemy to attack the blockading ships one by one in a series of concentrated raids. But right at the end, in the war plans issued to the fleet in July 1914, the overall strategy was changed finally to that which in the final reckoning would bring victory to Britain. The observational blockade was abandoned and the policy of distant blockade adopted, closing the two exits from the North Sea, first, by the Channel Fleet in the Dover Straits, and second, by the Grand Fleet stationed in the north of Scotland to guard a line from the Orkney Islands to the Nor-
of war, the
wegian coast. The maritime domination of the North Sea, ran the new War Plan, upon which our whole policy must be based, will be established as far as practicable by occasional driving or sweeping movements carried out by the Grand Fleet traversing in superior force the area between the 54th and 58th parallels [roughly the latitudes of Heligoland and the southern tip ofNorway]. The movements should be sufficiently frequent and sufficiently advanced to impress upon the enemy that he cannot at any time venture far from his home ports without such serious risk of encountering an overwhelming force that no enterprise is likely to reach its destination. German basic strategy had gone through changes almost as radical as those in Britain. It had begun with the Riskflotte
theory, with the building of a fleet strong enough to dissuade a British encounter with it because of the resultant British inferiority with the navies of France and Russia. After 1904, with the entente with France, and especially after 1907, when Russia, too, joined hands with Britain, a new strategy had to be worked out, and a satisfactory one was found based on the known British policy of a close blockade of
the German North Sea coast. During such a blockade, the German Admiralty expected, there would be countless opportunities for bringing to action detached squadrons of the British fleet whose duty it would be to support the blockade. This attritional warfare, in which by reason of the proximity of their bases the German fleet could ensure local superiority, would in the end produce the situation where the numerical superiority of the Royal Navy had been whittled away, and in which the High Seas Fleet could risk the full-scale battle.
The
British change from close blockade and from that to distant blockade, was unknown in Germany. It was realised in naval circles in Berlin that close blockade was no longer a feasible operation of war in the face of modern weapons, and that Britain was bound to modify her plans to a distant blockade. They confidently expected the Royal Navy to use both forms of blockade, which would 'alternate frequently or merge into one another as the situation changes. It is very probable that during the first days of the war, when attacks on our part may be expected, our waters will be closely blockaded, also when it is intended to transport the Expeditionary Force to France'. These were the occasions, it was thought, when a sudden sortie of the High Seas Fleet could make a killing of a detached squadron of British ships. From the very start, the High Seas Fleet had no intention of coming out into the North Sea to try conclusions with the Grand Fleet. That was never a part of their basic strategy. It remained, even after it became clear that there was to be no close British blockade, based on the hope of meeting, in superior force, detached British squadrons and destroying them until parity with the Grand Fleet had been reached. Britain, on the other hand, so misread the German strategy that she was convinced that the High Seas Fleet would steam out into the North Sea within a few days of the declaration of war to do battle with the Grand Fleet. It would have suited her to observational blockade,
book admirably, but the Germans were much too wise to risk everything on one such desperate fling. If Britain had somehow stumbled, so far as the Navy was concerned, into a correct strategical posture for a war against Germany, the evolution of the tactical art had taken a long step backwards.
when
the wind no longer dictated the course a ship could steer, there was a fine chance to break clear from the straightjacket of the rigid line of battle. All it needed was men of vision, admirals who were prepared to trust their subordinate
commanders
of squadrons and divisions to do the right thing in the stress of battle. But in the Royal Navy, and very largely in the German navy too, there were few such admirals. Command at sea was centralised in the Commander-in-Chief, and for a junior admiral to act on his own initiative
was
to court relegation to
of ships which might stretch as far as five miles, tactical manoeuvring by signal from the flagship was fraught with hazard. It took time to pass the signal by visual
means up and down the
line of battle line of battle, hallowed for centuries in the Fighting Instructions of the sailing navy, had always been a producer of sterile battles at sea, and it had only been when admirals like Hawke or Boscawen in the Seven Years' War, or Rodney in the War of American Independence, or Nelson in the Napoleonic War, had risked their reputations and disregarded the rules of the Fighting Instructions that decisive actions had resulted. Now, in the age of steam
The
line (Jellicoe, for
example, distrusted wireless), and often the flagship was obscured from the view of cruiser squadrons and destroyer flotillas in attendance on the fleet, when signals never got through at all. Although in the various fleet battle orders there was a certain amount of lip service paid to decentralisation and individual initiative, it never worked out in practice. The fleet battle orders were themselves too rigid and too mandatory to allow any individual leeway. It was not very different in the High Seas Fleet, though admirals commanding squadrons were allowed some discretion in the tactical handling of their ships. But in general, like the British, once the line of battle had been formed it was subject to centralised control. The only real difference between the two fleets lay in their night-fighting capabilities. One or two British attempts to introduce night encounters in the pre-war fleet manoeuvres had ended in uncertainty and muddle, and Jellicoe in particular would have none of it. 'The difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe,' he wrote, 'and the exceeding uncertainty of the result, confirmed the opinion I had long held that a night action
between
fleets
German
fleet,
was a pure
lottery.'
The
on the other hand, had practised night action in a big way, and
had made
The
an operational
backwater. All tactical training in the past 50 years had consisted of intricate manoeuvres executed by signal from the flagship, not unlike an old-fashioned courtly dance by mastodons on the surface of the sea. Even when the manoeuvres ordered involved ships in danger of collision, there was no questioning an admiral's instructions, and in 1893 the battleship Victoria had been rammed and sunk by the battleship Camperdown because the Commanderin-Chief had ordered a particular manoeuvre with too little sea room in which to perform it. No one questioned him. The manoeuvre was carried out and the Victoria was sunk. In battle, with smoke from funnels and guns reducing visibility and with a line
very proficient in the art. For all the German advantages, and they were many in such things as broaditself
ships, better guns and shells, better rangefinders and searchlights, and a more meticulous attention to every detail of naval warfare, there was one sphere in
beamed
which the Royal Navy long-service fleet,
excelled. It
manned by
was a
officers
and
volunteers and who were making service in the Royal Navy their career. German sailors were enrolled on a short-service basis, and their training was
men who were
neither as long nor as thorough as that of the British seamen. There were other weaknesses as well, and one over-riding handicap was the incredibly chaotic arrangement whereby naval policy was placed under the control of the General Staff of the army. But it was the short-service basis of German enrolment which was the telling factor. Three years was the service spell of the German seaman, compared with 12 years, and a chance of re-enlistment for a further ten to qualify for a pension, which was the British system. Compared with the German, British ships spent far more time exercising at sea, and the innate sense of seamanship which this developed amongst officers and men stood them in good stead in the war which was coming. Of the qualities of leadership, there was not much to choose between British and
German.
If Jellicoe's
weakness was an
excess of caution allied to an inability to decentralise in the control of an immense fleet, his opposite numbers in the High first Ingenohl and later his successor, Pohl, were no better, if in fact as good. Lower down the scale, in the viceand rear-admirals and captains, there was about an equal proportion of good and bad on both sides, if one counts ship handling, tactical skill, and professional knowledge as the criteria of judgment.
Seas Fleet,
One priceless intangible Above
however, there remained
this,
the Royal
for
Navy one
priceless intangible. The officers and the men they led had no knowledge of the materiel advantages of the German fleet, of more robust ships and
more efficient weapons, nor would they have believed it if they had. They had complete confidence in the ships and weapons they manned, complete confidence in their leaders, and complete confidence that in their own skills and training they held the key to invincibility. This supreme confidence, as clearly recognised in Germany as in Britain, bred in its turn an inferiority complex which pervaded so much of German naval thought and action. Perhaps one can allow the last words to the German Admiral Scheer, writing of the Royal Navy as he saw it in 1914. 'The English fleet had the advantage of looking back on a hundred years of proud tradition
which must have given every
man
a sense
of superiority based on the great deeds of the past. This could only be strengthened by the sight of their huge fleet, each unit of which in every class was supposed to represent the last word in the art of marine construction. The feeling was also supported by the British sailor's perfect familiarity with the sea and with conditions of life on board ship.' How, indeed, could a new and untried navy hope to win in battle against men such as these? Further Reading Bacon, Admiral Sir Reginald, The Life of John Rushworth, Earl Jellicoe (London, 1936) Chatfield, Lord Admiral of the Fleet, The Navy and Defence (London, 1942) Herwig, H. H Luxury' Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918 (Allen & Unwin 1980) Marder, A. J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 1961) Admiralty Papers Brassey's Naval Annual (London, 1913, 1914, ,
1915) Jane's Fighting
Ships (London,
1913,
1914,
1915)
[For Peter
Kemp's biography,
see
page 52.] 183
-
Clearing the
High Seas David Woodward
On the outbreak of war German commerce raiders, operating singly along British trade routes, caused great annoyance
a country dependent on imports, and the Admiralty was faced with the difficult task of hunting these raiders down to
Before the war began the German admiralty had planned to send to sea four large, fast, armed liners to attack British merchant shipping and to reinforce the efforts of the regular German warships already on station in the Pacific and the Atlantic. The first of these, designated 'A', was the Victoria Luise, which had been the fastest passenger ship in the world and holder of the North Atlantic Blue Riband. That had been many years ago and when she was surveyed, just before the outbreak of war, it was found that her boilers were faulty and the plan to send her to sea had to be abandoned. The second ship, referred to as 'B', was the Kaiser Wilhelm II, another Atlantic record breaker in her day, but on the outbreak of the war she was in New York and was laid up there until the United States entered the war and seized her for use as a transport. The third ship, 'C, was the Kronprinz Wilhelm, which succeeded in escaping from New York on the outbreak of war. The fourth, 'D', was the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, yet another record breaker and the only one of these ships sent to sea from Germany before the outbreak of war. The choice of these big liners proved a mistake, for their fuel consumption was
enormous. Subsequent
German commerce
raiders, such as the Mowe and Wolf, were medium-sized freighters, inconspicuous in appearance (the original four ships all had four funnels), fast enough to catch the average unescorted British freighter but with an economical fuel consumption. The British made the same mistake of employing large fast liners as auxiliary war ships in the first weeks of the war. The three biggest and most famous of the
Cunard
Aquitania, Lusitania and Mauretania were taken over by the British Admiralty as armed merchant cruisers, but were speedily released when it was discovered that their combined fuel consumption was 30,000 tons of coal per week — the exact amount of coal taken on board by the Grand Fleet at one of its normal coaling sessions. In addition to the three big Cunarders, more than 50 other passenger liners, ranging in size from about 5,000 tons to 20,000 tons, had also been taken over by the Admiralty. These were to form the backbone of the force holding the blockade line between the Shetlands and Norway to cut off sea communications between liners,
Germany and
the outside world. Other
armed merchantmen helped to hunt down enemy shipping still at sea. Altogether, in the first weeks of the war, 7% of the German merchant fleet was captured and 21% driven to take refuge in neutral ports. When the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse was taken over she was provided with six 4.1-inch guns and placed under the command of Fregattenkapitan Max Reymann on August 2. The Germans then waited two days before deciding to send her to sea, as it was thought that the sailing of potential commerce raiders in the critical days just before the outbreak of war might be considered by the British as an act of provocation. However on August 4 the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse did sail, narrowly escaping detection by the British patrols, and on August 7 sank her first victim, the British trawler Tubal Cain, off the north-west coast of Iceland.
A
hasty disguise The Kronprinz Wilhelm, in the course of her routine peacetime existence as a steamer of the Norddeutscher Lloyd, had
Hoboken, New York from 29. There she had been hastily loaded with provisions and coal; she had taken on board so much coal, so arrived
at
Bremen on July
it was stored in the elegant, heavily over-decorated firstclass dining saloon. From there it was moved below by the simple process of cutting holes in the decks and pouring it
hurriedly, that
somewhat
down.
On August 4, hastily disguised as the White Star line Olympic by the addition of black tops to her four yellow funnels, she had left New York and steered south to a rendezvous east of the Bahamas with the
Karlsruhe. For two hours on the morning of August 6 the Karlsruhe and the Kronprinz Wilhelm lay side by side at sea. Those two hours were sufficient to transform the Kronprinz Wilhelm into an auxiliary cruiser which was to have the longest raiding career of any of the German ships at sea on the outbreak of war. During their meeting the liner's derrick booms swung
on board two 3.4-inch guns and 300 rounds of ammunition, as well as rifles, pistols and ammunition, which had all been carried on board the Karlsruhe in peacetime for the purpose of arming merchant ships as raiders. Coal and provisions were
dumped over the high
side of the liner onto the deck of the light cruiser, which also collected reservists from the Kronprinz Wilhelm and gave in exchange a handful of specialist officers and ratings, including the new captain, Kapitdnleutnant Thierfelder, who had been the Karlsruhe's navigating officer. At 1000 hours the lookout in the crow's nest high on the Karlsruhe's foremast sighted smoke on the horizon, then two masts and three tall, thin funnels. This was recognised as the British armoured cruiser Suffolk, flagship of RearAdmiral Sir Christopher Cradock, commanding the 4th Cruiser Squadron. The two ships separated at once and, while the Karlsruhe lured the Suffolk away to the north, the Kronprinz Wilhelm escaped to the south. The Karlsruhe was about five knots faster than the older, larger British ship and for a while seemed to be getting clear away. It was dark by now and the
HMS
Suffolk dropped astern. Almost immediBristol, coming in support of ately her admiral, sighted the Karlsruhe ahead, right under the moon, while the British ship steamed on, invisible in the dark. Only when the Bristol opened fire did the Germans know that they were being followed. They turned away and the Bristol started in chase, but instead of her usual speed of 24 knots she could only develop 18 and once again the German ship escaped, both from the Bristol and Berwick, a sister ship of the Suffolk, which was coming up from the south. On August 15 the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse reappeared south-west of the Canaries, a focal point of great importance for shipping to and from the Cape and the River Plate. In two days she captured four British ships, the Royal Mail liner Arlanza, the Union Castle liner Galician and the freighters Kaipara and Nyanga. The Nyanga was carrying a cargo for Hamburg, while the Kaipara was loaded with frozen meat from the Plate — 70,000 carcasses of mutton, 15,000 carcasses of beef and
HMS
HMS
30,000 rabbits.
The two freighters were sunk and their crews were transferred to one of the Kaiser Wilhelm's supply ships and even eventually released at Las Palmas. The two liners were allowed to go free after their wireless had been put out of action because the captain of the Kaiser Wilhelm did not want
to
set
their passengers,
including
more than 400 women and
children, adrift
in open boats.
After she had been released, the Arlanza rigged a spare wireless transmitter and reported what had happened to her, but owing to bad atmospheric conditions the message never got through. On August 17, Las Palmas reported what had happened and the Admiralty ordered a concentration of cruisers and armed merchant men from as far away as the coast of Ireland and the Bristol Channel. One of these, the light cruiser Highflyer, found the
HMS
German
Spanish territorial waters off the Rio de Oro with three colliers, from which she was replenishing her bunkers after very heavy fuel consumption had made it necessary for her to await her supply ships in neutral waters immediately after her four-fold coup off the Canaries. The Spanish authorities had proved themselves friendly to the Germans and permitted them to violate Spanish neutrality. While waiting for the colliers in
A One of the Germans' most successful armed merchant cruisers — the Kronprinz Wilhelm V HMS Highflyer, the British light cruiser which sank the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse
this, and the need to burn coal to work the auxiliary machinery, proved nearly as costly in fuel as normal steaming.
she lay with steam up, but
On arrival, as the auxiliaries made off, the British cruiser summoned the Kaiser Wilhelm to surrender. She refused and, in reply, asked that the Highflyer respect Spanish neutrality. No one, at the time, drew the German's attention to the violation of Spanish neutrality which the raider's presence indicated. The Highflyer opened fire and the Kaiser Wilhelm replied, but in her haste to get ready for sea her guns had been badly mounted and, after firing about 250 rounds, the force of their recoil tore them off their mountings. After an action lasting an hour and a half the Kaiser Wilhelm listed to port and sank in shallow water, with her starboard side above the surface. Her crew escaped ashore. During this time the Karlsruhe was appearing and disappearing, both in fact and in rumour, in the area between the northern coast of Brazil and the West Indies, causing much alarm. Of this ship Sir Julian Corbett, the official British historian of the First World War at sea, wrote: Instead of concentrating the whole
of their outlying cruisers under Admiral von Spee's flag, they left two or three to operate singly as long as they could against our trade. The cruising grounds assigned to them, moreover, were chosen so as to cause us the utmost embarrassment. The chief of the detached ships were the Emden and the Karlsruhe, and the fields of their activity were respectively the Indian Ocean and the north-east ofPemambuco. Not only did these waters constitute two of the richest and most important focal areas on the great trade routes, but in relation to the Pacific, they were also the most distant in which it was possible for an enemy's cruiser to operate without the likelihood of immediate capture — certain it is that no other device could have caused us greater annoyance. While the Karlsruhe was operating to the north-east of Pernambuco, the other German light cruiser, Dresden, which had started the war on the West Indies station, was gradually making her way down the South Atlantic to round the Horn and meet Vice-Admiral von Spee in the Pacific. On the way she captured and sank a couple of British ships and caused a great stir in the ports of the River Plate and on the east coast of Brazil. After she had been fitted out by the Karlsruhe, the Kronprinz Wilhelm disappeared until August 27, when she stopped a Russian ship 500 miles of the Cape Verde Islands, and then vanished once again on a cruise which was to last 250 days without dropping anchor, in the course of which she took 15 prizes. Finally, on the last day of August, one more raider was added to the German strength in the South Atlantic. A ship of the Hamburg Slid Amerika line, Cap Trafalgar, which had taken refuge at Rio on the outbreak of war, left that port for the island of Trinidada, 500 miles off the Brazilian coast, where she met the small German gunboat Eber. The Eber parted with her main armament of two 4.1-inch guns to the Cap Trafalgar and gave her some of her complement. The Cap Trafalgar mounted the guns, cut away her third funnel — a dummy — and was ready for
NNW
action.
Brazil
The disarmed Eber went where she was interned.
iw:
off to
"fes!
185
The first British shot of the war was fired by the destroyer Lance during a sweep of the North Sea as part of the British policy of distant blockade. Another sweep on August 28 resulted in the battle of Heligoland Bight— the first full scale naval fight of the war
HMS
David Woodward No one knows who
fired the first British shot in the First World War. The gun, Destroyer Lance from the forecastle of is at the Imperial War Museum in London, but the name of the gunlayer has vanished both from the records of the Admiralty and from the memories of the few men who still survive the events of the morning of August 5, 1914. The war had started officially at 2300 hours on August 4. By that time the German auxiliary minelayer Konigin Luise was already making her way down the North Sea from her base at Emden to lay mines at the entry to the Thames. The Konigin Luise was a former excursion steamer that, in peacetime, ran from Hamburg to Heligoland with holiday-
HM
makers. She had been converted into a minelayer in the space of 12 hours, so hastily that the main armament planned
had not the windows
for her, a pair of 3.4-inch guns,
been mounted. In addition, had been left in her glass-enclosed promenade deck. With her two raked masts and two raked funnels the German ship looked very like one of the Great Eastern Railway steamers running between Harwich and the Hook, and in keeping with this impression she had been specially painted with black hull, buff upper-works and yellow funnels with black tops, the standard Great Eastern Railway colour scheme for its ships. When minelaying began it was under the cover of a rain squall, out of which loomed long, low, dark shapes. Two of
these changed suddenly into small, squat lumps as two destroyers changed course and headed for the German ship. They came out of the mist and opened fire at once.
An unknown steamer The ships were HMS Lance and HMS Landpart of the British 2nd Destroyer with 20 other destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, had left Harwich at dawn on the first day of the war to sweep northward towards German waters. The 1st Flotilla followed the Dutch coast and the 2nd Flotilla, led by the light cruiser Amphion, steamed up the middle of the North Sea. A few hours after leaving Dort they met a British fishing vessel which reported that she had seen an unknown steamer 'throwing things overboard' about 20 miles north-east of the Outer Gabbard. When the destroyers came up with the Konigin Luise through the mist she was still throwing things overboard, but she turned to run for home. The only guns which there had been time to mount were a pair of pom-poms and to reinforce these, as the British drew close, the Germans rail,
Flotilla which,
HMS
who
survivors
were, according to the History, 'chivalrously treated'. The destroyers then continued their sweep and very soon sighted another ship resembling the Konigin Luise, at which they steamed full speed to attack. Fortunately, although the ship was flying a huge German flag, Captain Cecil H. Fox of the Amphion recognised her as a genuine Great Eastern Railway steamer, the St. Petersburgh, carrying the German ambassador to Britain back to Germany — hence the huge German flag. At first the excitement of the chase was too much for the British destroyers and, failing to heed the signals, they pressed home their attack until Fox took the Amphion between the destroyers and the St. Petersburgh, deliberately fouling the range. The British ships withdrew but,
German
Official
opened fire with rifles and revolvers. Once her mines had been laid there was nothing for the Konigin Luise to do except scuttle herself, for her tiny armament was too weak to harm the enemy. Within a few minutes the German ship lay over to port with steam and smoke trailing from her
next morning, on her way back to Harwich the Amphion struck one of the Konigin Luise 's mines. The first explosion broke her back forward, killing members of the British crew and their German prisoners, and then, a little later, there was another explosion of a ghastly lemon colour and the ship sank. The total number killed was one British officer and 150 ratings, together with 18 Germans. On the same day, August 6, the Cabinet in London authorised the despatch of four divisions of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France. They were to sail from United Kingdom ports, covered by the
funnels. T^he British ships stopped
commanded by Vice-Admiral
Channel and picked up
Fleet, a force of elderly battleships Sir Cecil
HMS Arethusa,
the British light cruiser
commanded
Commodore Tyrwhitt. Length 450
by
Beam: 39 feet. Displacement: 3,520 tons. Main armament as built: Two 6-in., six 4-in. Armour: Belt 3-in., Deck 1-in. Speed: 30 knots
feet.
»
»
•
-
The Konigin Luise in her peacetime garb. She was sunk while minelaying off the Thames.
Burney. This fleet was judged strong enough to deal with any German surface ships which might be risked so far from
home
as the English Channel, while the British main force, the Grand Fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, was to cruise in the North Sea, in case the High Seas Fleet intervened. The old battleships of the Channel Fleet faded away as it became clear that the German surface ships would present no real threat to the movements of the BEF, but two forces of British light craft were formed at the time of mobilisation which
were to serve throughout the war and to become famous. One was the 'Harwich force' of light cruisers, destroyers and submarines, and the other was the 'Dover Patrol' consisting of destroyers and small craft.
There were many surprises on both sides during the early weeks of the war, and one of the first was the failure of the German navy to interfere with the movement to France of the BEF. No one seems to have expected a fleet action but it did seem possible, even probable, that German light surface craft and U-boats would make an attempt on the troop convoys which had consequently been routed across the central and western part of the English Channel, the principal route being that from Southampton to Le Havre. The main reason why the Germans did not attack, according to the German Official Naval History, was that the German army was completely confident of victory over the Allied armies on
the Western Front, so that it did not matter to them whether the BEF was attacked on its way to France or defeated in battle after it had arrived there.
were hampered for a long time by the very short range of their wireless sets. Within two days of the outbreak of the war both the British and the Germans had submarines
The
first
submarine operations
With the exception of a few fruitless cruises by a pair of Greek submarines off the Dardanelles during the First Balkan War in 1912, the operations of August 1914 were the first occasion in which submarines, as we know them, were used in warfare. The submarine was an untried weapon and, compared with the submarines of today, they were very primitive. When submerged their speed and radius of action were very small, so that their passage to the positions to meet the enemy was the surface. Until the anti-submarine measures of their opponents were much better developed they preferred to wait on the surface in daylight, diving only when a possible enemy came in sight. The early U-boats had a great capacity for attracting attention to themselves, during daylight by the smoke from the exhausts of their Korting petrol engines, while at night these same exhausts gave forth brilliant flames, and at all times the noise of the engines served as a warning to any foe for miles around. In addition, at the beginning of the war these boats were without the chronometers essential for accurate navigation. From the very beginning of the war it was clear that submarines were first rate scouting craft although British submarines
where they hoped
made on
in
enemy waters seeking
in-
formation.
On August 5 two British submarines, E6 and E8, left Harwich for the Heligoland Bight. Their captains were, respectively, Lieutenant-Commander C. P. Talbot and Lieutenant-Commander F. H. H. Goodhart. On the first day of their patrol the area seemed full of small craft, but orders to remain submerged throughout the day and watch shipping through their periscopes, restricted them to a very small area of the Bight. On the next day, therefore, they decided to surface but by that time the German ships had withdrawn and the British submarines returned to port. In those days a patrol lasting between five and seven days was considered the maximum that could be carried out.
The German submarines were soon engaged on a similar enterprise. From July 30, when a state of 'War imminent (drohende Kriegsgefahr)' had been proclaimed in Berlin, they had been disposed as a reconnaissance screen across the Heligoland Bight, escorted out to sea every morning by the light cruiser Hamburg which, rather like an anxious mother taking a large family out to play, saw
them to their stations and then watched them submerge — a lengthy process which took between five and seven minutes. On August 6, the 1st U-boat Flotilla of
187
between the German light and the British light cruiser with accompanying destroyers. These operations were described in an Admiralty communique as representing 'a
ten boats, strung out in line abreast over 70 miles, headed in a north-westerly direction up the North Sea, hoping to find the British Grand Fleet, whose location was unknown at that time. One boat broke down and returned to port, one disappeared apparently as the result of an accident (U13). and a third
exchange cruisers Fearless
certain liveliness'.
To Commodore Keyes, however, the was not to be dismissed with a
action phrase.
He wrote to the Director of the Operations Division of the Admiralty a private and nearly insubordinate letter: 'I feel sore and sick. Owing to our scat-
HMS
and sunk by ramming. This was the
first
encounter between
ships of the Grand Fleet and a U-boat. From the beginning of the w'ar the Grand Fleet was very U-boat conscious. The Fleet's base at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys was almost ideally placed for the first tasks of .the British navy, to blockade Germany and cut off her warships from the Atlantic. But, at the beginning of the war, Scapa Flow possessed no anti-submarine defences of any sort and at any moment a U-boat could have entered the Flow and carried out an attack. Under these circumstances, there were many false alarms that caused picket boats, destroyers and trawlers to be sent to search a suspected area in all weathers, while the entire fleet raised steam and gun crews were called to action stations. In August 1914 U-boats continued to be one of Jellicoe's greatest worries. On an early occasion he felt obliged to move the Grand Fleet out of the North Sea to Loch Ewe on the west coast of Scotland, only to bring it back almost immediately as there was a false alarm of a German invasion attempt. Since the Grand Fleet was in northern waters, and the High Seas Fleet lay in the estuaries of the Elbe, the Jade and the Ems, the southern part of the North Sea became a non-man's land, though the British were able to protect ships trading between the United Kingdom and Holland and those conveying the BEF.
Above: U35, a German ocean-going submarine Below: SMS Stettin, a German light cruiser. Length: 385 feet. Beam: 44 feet. Displacement: 3,550 tons. Main armament: Ten 4.1-in guns. Speed: 23 knots
A German
cruiser had put 16 destroyers and Fearless to flight
'A certain liveliness In search of this traffic there were U-boat reconnaissances as far south as the line from Harwich to Rotterdam, and on August 17 two German light cruisers, Stralsuhcl and Strassburg, with two more U-boat^, were sent south to try to get a clearer; idea of what was going on. There was a brief
',
'
/
//
light
tered destroyer disposition a German light cruiser, equal in offensive power to the Fearless, had put 16 destroyers and the Fearless to flight. It is not by such incidents we shall get the right atmosphere.' Two days later Keyes followed up this letter with a plan of his own for creating the 'right atmosphere'. Reconnaissance by Keyes' submarines since the beginning of the war had made clear the routine of the German patrols by day and by night around Heligoland. On this knowledge Keyes proposed that a force of British destroyers should infiltrate the German positions, just as the night patrols were relieved by the day patrols, slip in behind the latter and, turning back westward, get between them and their base. As a bait to lure the Germans farther out to sea three British submarines were to show themselves on the edge of the German patrol area. The plan was adopted, although Keyes' proposal that the battle-cruisers under Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty should take part was rejected. Commodores Tyrwhitt and Keyes accordingly sailed from Harwich in the light cruiser Arethusa and the destroyer Lurcher respectively, convinced that any big ships they met would be German. After they had sailed, however, the Admiralty changed its
HMS
HMS
mind.
The BEF and the French armies were being forced out of Belgium by the advancing Germans and the Belgian coast would soon be open to attack by German forces from the direction of Brussels. Accordingly it was decided to send some 3,000 Royal aTnres~to^stend To protect the ships carrying them the Admiralty now decided that Beatty's battle-cruisers should, after all, take part The~HeHgoland operation but, because of the need for wireless silence, Keyes and
man
Tyrwhitt were left in ignorance of this change of plan. Accordingly when they met Beatty's ships early on the morning of August 28 there were a few tense moments, during which fatal mistakes might have been made. As the sun rose on that day there were patches of white mist scattered all over the sea. On occasion, visibility from the decks of the ships was reasonably good, while the
ships hauled away. It was high time, as far as the Arethusa was concerned. Her
forward engine room was flooded to a depth of three feet, her speed dropped, her wireless was out of action and her signal halliards shot away. After the Germans had disappeared into the mist, the Arethusa and Fearless came up from astern, lay stopped side by side while they communicated by semaphore and Tyrwhitt tried to reassemble his scattered destroyers. Within a short time this was done, the Arethusa managed to raise steam again, and with Fearless and the combined destroyer force Tyrwhitt
lookouts at the mastheads could see little or nothing. At other times, ships' masts could be seen sticking out of banks of mist, while their hulls were invisible below. Meanwhile, the Germans guessed that the British attack was about to develop, although they did not expect that heavy British ships would be involved. Their own heavy ships were in harbour, for the most part behind the sand bar at the mouth of the river Jade, which could only be crossed near high tide. The British striking force, made up of the two light cruisers Arethusa and Fearless and 31 destroyers of the 1st and 3rd Flotillas arrived at first light in the area from which it was to begin its raid into the Bight. Here they were joined by six vessels of
started westward to roll up the German patrol line. A new and much bigger destroyer, V 187, was now sighted. Dodging the British destroyers she ran into two of Goodenough's light cruisers which, after following the Arethusa and Fearless into the Bight, had now come up with them. V 187 altered course violently once again, only to run into more British destroyers. She had got to within 2,000 yards of a division of four boats before their 4-inch shells stopped her, set her on fire, killed most of her crew and tore her hull to pieces. She slowly sank, in clouds of black smoke
Commodore Goodenough's command which Tyrwhitt into the Bight. raid began: Tyrwhitt's force was to steam south until Heligoland lay 12 miles on its port beam, then turn westward between the German outpost vessels and
were
to follow
The
and roll up the line. There was an excessive amount of wireless traffic between the British ships so the Germans were soon on their guard and they despatched light cruisers and torpedo craft to their bases
investigate.
At 0650 hours Greenwich Mean Time Tyrwhitt's force sighted one group of German destroyers on the port bow and, shortly afterwards, another to starboard. Both groups turned for home, with the British in chase. The first serious opposition encountered was from the light cruiser Stettin, which had been lying at anchor off Heligoland. Today it may seem almost unbelievable that a light cruiser on patrol duty expecting an enemy attack and exposed to submarines, should have been at anchor in the open sea. The action between the Arethusa and the Stettin lasted about 25 minutes. The two ships steamed south at full speed. The The
British
submarine E4, which was completed
Commodore
Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt (right) with Flag-Lieutenant Floyer
Stettin
was a coal-burning ship and sent
rolling clouds of smoke, while the three funnels of the oil-fired Arethusa was crowned by a slight heat haze and nothing more. Both ships had great waves of spray like a pair of glistening wings at
up great
bows and tumbling white wakes The Stettin was joined by another light cruiser, the Frauenlob, and the Arethusa soon began to suffer. The range fell from 9,000 yards to 3,400 yards and the British and German ships settled down on a severe and parallel course. The brand new guns of the Arethusa gave trouble. Three jammed and a fourth was put out of action when its ammunition was hit and the cordite began to blaze. Soon she had only one gun in action, the forecastle their
behind.
6-inch. On her bridge the signals officer killed by Tyrwhitt's side. With her single gun the Arethusa in turn got a hit
was
on the Frauenlob's bridge and both Gerin
1913, rescued survivors after the
German
and escaping white steam. The spirit with which men had gone to war in August 1914 then showed itself, for some of the British destroyers stopped and lowered boats to pick up survivors. While they were doing this the Stettin reappeared and opened fire, so the destroyers, collecting their boats as best they could, made Defender leaving two belonging to behind for rescue later in the morning by the British submarine E4. This took the British officer and seamen from the boats, together with a few German prisoners — 'as a sample' said the submarine's commanding officer later — and gave the remaining Germans water, biscuits, a compass and the course to. steer for Heligoland. During this time the British steamed westward, departing from their course from time to time to chase reported enemy ships, or to attack those actually sighted. Much confusion and, to quote an official report 'a distinct element of excitement' was added to the operations by the signals of Keyes, who had sighted Goodenough's light cruisers, taken them to be enemy and reported them as such. off,
HMS
destroyer V187 sank at Heligoland
189
Meanwhile, Goodenough realised that there was great danger of British light cruisers and submarines attacking each other and accordingly withdrew his light cruisers from the scene and waited in the hope that the situation would soon clear itself up.
Mistaken identity There were other cases of mistaken identhe British ships, seeing brief and shadowy manifestations of ships appearing and disappearing in the mist, reported them as enemy and then proceeded to chase. These chases sometimes ended with the recognition of each other as British, but sometimes the chaser lost the chased in the mist without realising that he had been chasing a friend. However, by about 1010 hours the situation, so far as the British destroyers were concerned, was much clearer, and Tyrwhitt's force, more or less reconcentrated, started westward again. The Fearless and tity as
Arethusa were in company and steaming at 10 knots, which was now the latter's
maximum
speed.
The morning had not been as successful as the British had hoped. True, they had sunk one destroyer, but, on the other hand,
was by no means certain that the it Arethusa would be able to get home. The Germans were recovering from the surprise of the British attack, and their light cruisers, which had been on guard duty close
under the coast, were now putting to sea, although the battle-cruisers were still penned up behind the bar at the mouth of the Jade. The first of the German light cruisers on the scene was the Strassburg; the British destroyers, on their way westward and
homeward, turned back
to engage her and at this providential moment Commodore Goodenough's light cruisers came down from their waiting position to the north, in answer to a call for help from the Fearless. The Strassburg was driven off, but almost at once another light cruiser, the Mainz, appeared, having hurried up from the Ems where she had been lying.
Tricks of light and fog had greatly magnified the size of the Strassburg, so that
she appeared to be a cruiser of the Roon class of about twice her displacement. It seemed likely that a ship of that size would be scouting in front of the big ships of the High Seas Fleet so that when the message reporting her supposed presence was received by Beatty, who had been steaming backwards and forwards some 40 miles
away waiting for his chance, it seemed to him that the time had now come for the battle-cruisers to be committed. Tyrwhitt signalled 'Respectfully request that I may be supported. hard pressed.' The Arethusa and the other British light craft
Am
would stand no chance if, by themselves, they were to encounter the big ships of the High Seas Fleet, and Beatty took his ships into the Bight. At least one of the dangers which confronted them, that of submarine attack, was much reduced by the still calm which kept the sea in a state of glassy calm, thus making it comparatively easy to spot an attacking submarine and avoid it. By now the destroyers, which had started out at dawn into the Bight with Arethusa
and Fearless, had begun to head for home, but they were ordered to return to the battlefield. Captain Blunt in the Fearless signalled those short of ammunition to return home at once; no one did so and the destroyers were soon in action against the Mainz. For 15 minutes, from 1135 to 1150, they engaged the German ship without hits by either side. Then, when the destroyers closed it could be seen what was implied when unarmoured ships were engaged at ultra short range. The destroyer HMS Laurel was hit amidships; the ready-
use ammunition of No. 2 gun exploded and put the gun and its crew out of action, blowing away half the after funnel. Beams in the engine room were twisted and the captain seriously wounded. Another shell from the Mainz hit the forward funnel and exploded inside, causing a back draught in the boiler which set fire to the oil fuel. This fire was soon put out with sand, but a third shell cut the main steam pipe, the fire main and the electric wires taking light to the stokeholds which were thus suddenly plunged into total darkness. A fourth shell passed straight through the ship, exploding outboard. Laurel's crew then rigged emergency oil lighting in the stokeholds, only to find that forced draught blew out the lamps. Nevertheless, the ship managed to steam slowly away, amid great clouds of smoke that partially hid her from the enemy.
HMS
Liberty, was hit Laurel's sister ship, in a number of places, her mast and bridge shot away and her captain killed. At 4,000 yards a single salvo of four shells hit Laertes in the bows, in No. 2 boiler room, at the base of her centre funnel and also
HMS
There was no water and she stopped dead.
aft.
left in
her boilers
The Mainz was now attacked by Good-
enough's light cruisers, only half visible through the mist until they fired their broadsides, when the gun flashes glowed
The
first salvos fell close to the ship and the yellow smoke and fumes of the British shells drifted across her deck, mixed with white steam from a broken steam pipe. A hit aft killed or wounded the crews of the two quarter-deck 4-1-inch guns and their places were taken
bright.
German
by others. Another hit aft damaged the Mainz's rudder and she began to circle round to starboard, a circle interrupted by a crash heavier and louder than that of her 4- 1 -inch guns. A huge column of dirty grey water leaped out of the water alongside, the ship rocked and then settled down on an even keel, torpedoed and rapidly losing speed. Firing by clockwork Mainz was now surrounded by British light cruisers and destroyers. A German survivor afterwards described the light cruisers as firing as if by clockwork. Her
main mast came down with a run and the midships and after funnels crashed down on the deck. Smoke and flames drifted across the ship, and all the time shells were whistling overhead or exploding in
the ship or in the water and huge splashes of water were leaping up in the air and slowly falling back again. There was a sudden silence; only one of the German's twelve 4.1-inch guns was still in action. Kapitan Paschen, the commanding officer of the Mainz, gave the order to sink his ship then but the order miscarried. The pause in the action ended as the British opened fire once more, and it was at once clear that these shells were much heavier than the 6-inch guns of the 'Town' class cruisers which had done the damage so far. Close at hand, through the mist and smoke came Beatty's battle-cruisers, HMSs Lion, Princess Royal, Queen Mary, New Zealand and Invincible, five times the size of the Mainz and looking even more impressive because they were neat and tidy, in order, undamaged, steaming fast and firing as if at exercise. The Mainz was in her great and final agony, but she managed to get out a signal telling the High Seas Fleet and Hipper's battle-cruisers that the British heavy ships were actually in the Bight. The last gun of the Mainz was now still:
the order to sink the ship was given once more and the necessary preparations were made. Members of the crew began to jump
191
SMS Seydlitz,
one
of the three
X
German
battle-cruisers
penned up behind the Jade Bar during the action
of the Heligoland Bight
>
The German
light cruiser
Koln- badly damaged by two salvoes from
into the sea and were picked up by the British. But this rescue work took time so
HMS
Lion and then shot to pieces by the British battle-cruisers
him as to the fate of his son. The Mainz sank at 1310. The German officer who had refused Keyes' offer of rescue, and another officer who had also
Keyes brought the Lurcher alongside the quarter-deck of the German ship so that many of the Germans were able to climb on board and save their lives. Other destroyers helped and every living person was brought to safety except for one young officer who stood apart and watched the proceedings. Keyes shouted to him that everything possible had been done and urged him to come over to the Lurcher. The young man stood to attention, saluted and refused. The Lurcher backed away, her upper deck crowded with survivors, and the Mainz sank. One of those rescued was Lieutenant von Tirpitz, son of the German Minister of Marine. He was brought to England as a prisoner of war. Churchill, on learning of this, at once sent a personal message through the International Red Cross to young Tirpitz's father, reassuring
stayed with the ship until she sank, were both picked up by the Germans. The last act of the crew of the Mainz had been to throw overboard the confidential books in a bag weighted with a 4.1-inch shell. When the bag was thrown the shell fell out and the bag floated away, spreading secret papers on the waters of the Bight. Horrified, even in those moments which might have been their last, the Germans threw used cartridge cases at the contents of the bag as they drifted by and succeeded in sinking them. Their work was in vain, for two days previously the Russians had recovered from the wreck of the light cruiser Magdeburg, at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, the vital German cyphers which were handed over to the British. For months the
HMS
German
Lurcher
(left)
backing away from the sinking
UmMe
cruiser
Mainz
after picking
-
Admiralty in London was able secret
to
read the
German messages.
By the time that the Mainz had sunk, Beatty's battle-cruisers had been in action with two other German light cruisers, both of which sank as the result of the damage they had received during a brief blasting from the heavy guns of the British ships.
Fog and confusion The Koln was making her way through the confusion of the misty sea when suddenly from out of the mist there emerged, vast and terrific, the form of a great cruiser steaming at full speed. This was the Lion and two salvoes from her settled the fate of the Koln. Yet another of the German light cruisers, the Ariadne, then appeared. Engaged, she at once caught fire. She was an old ship, painted and repainted time and again, so that the paint on her hull was at least a quarter of an inch thick. This
up survivors
•
put*"
T
Jt^Lar
^"
EfiEr-
—
nfflM ^^^BBRffiSSS****- *,* -•
iSSF".'.*
'
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fire and blazed away, so that the very steel plates of the ship's hull seemed to have burst into flames. She staggered back into the mist from which she had come and, some two hours later, sank. Meanwhile the British battle-cruisers, steaming very slowly, undertook the destruction of the Kbln. She was the flagship of Konteradrr.iral Leberecht Maass commanding the destroyers and torpedo boats in the Bight, and of her company of 380 men only one survived that afternoon. He was a leading stoker, stationed as a messenger on the 'tween decks', where he was protected from the worst effects of the enemy fire until smoke and flames drove him into the open. Here he saw Lion and the other British battle-cruisers steaming slowly by and deliberately shooting the
caught
A
the cruisers reporting from around Heligoland could see everything which was going on, and that when they reported sighting individual enemy units these units were all there were to see. Nobody mentioned the mist which was concealing powerful enemy
notable British success, but ominous
weaknesses began reveal themselves
to
forces.
The effect of the was immediate and
battle on the Germans conclusive. The success of the British attack was a tremendous
shock and made the Kaiser even more determined than before to protect the High Seas Fleet from damage, for he considered that an undamaged German fleet would be a card of first-class importance for him to play when the time came to discuss peace terms. At the end of August 1914 it seemed to the Germans this time was close at hand, for the Russian invasion of Germany had been repelled, and the success of the German invasion of France and Belgium looked as though it would bring the Ger-
Koln to pieces. Maass had been killed, presumably when the bridge was shot away. The Koln's funnels were full of holes, the deck was littered with half-burnt bits of boats, woodwork, life-jackets and tangled bits of aerials and signal halliards which had been shot away. The whole of the deck seemed to be glazed with green and yellow stuff from the incomplete explosion of the British lyddite shells that gave out a suffocating smell. The ship lay for a while sinking on
even keel.
mans
to Paris very shortly. In the meantime, the Germans decided to lay mines in the Bight to keep British ships out instead of risking precious war-
ships.
For the British, the first month of the at sea had ended well. German merchant shipping had disappeared from the sea, Allied merchant shipping was moving almost unchecked all over the world, and so were Allied troops on their way to the
war
an
When the order came to abandon
ship the leading stoker and a handful of men clung to the remains of a lifeboat, but 76 hours later he was the only man left alive of the entire ship's company. At about 1310 hours, having sunk the Mainz and the Koln and with the Ariadne sinking, Beatty considered his position. There were still a number of German light craft scattered around in the mist patches of the Bight — in fact there were now no fewer than seven light cruisers in the area, Stralsund, Strassburg, Stettin, Frauenlob, Kolberg, Danzig and Hela. Beatty's force was scattered, the Arethusa was still in a critical condition and, most important of all,
at 1200 hours
sible
for
the
it
various battlefields of the war. Only in the Baltic was the British navy unable to support the armies of its Allies. Further Reading Chalmers, Rear-Admiral W. S., The Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty (Hodder and Stoughton, 1951) Chatterton, E. Keble, The Sea Raiders (Hurst
and Blackett) Corbett, Sir J. S., History of the Great War, Naval Operations, Vol. 1 (Longmans, Green & Co., 1920) Groos, O., Der Krieg zur See 1914-18. Der Krieg in der Nordsee, Vol. 1 (E. S. Mittler & Sohn, Berlin, 1920) Herwig, H. H., 'Luxury' Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918 (Allen & Unwin 1980) Jellicoe, Admiral Viscount, The Grand Fleet, 1914-16. Its Creation, Development and Work
would have been pos-
German
battle-cruisers
to
begin to cross the Jade Bar. In fact orders for them to do so had been given at 1207 hours, which meant that all three, Seydlitz, Moltke and Von der Tann would be on the scene of the battle at about 1500 hours to snap up detached British light cruisers and destroyers. Accordingly Beatty ordered the recall to be sent out. Just then the Arethusa's hard-pressed engines finally broke down and she had to be taken in tow by the armoured cruiser Hague. Altogether she had lost one officer and ten men killed, and one officer and 16 men wounded. The total British losses were 35 killed and about 40 wounded. No British ships had been sunk, while the Germans had lost three light cruisers and a destroyer, together with over 1,000 men killed, wounded or taken prisoner. It had been a notable British success — perhaps too well celebrated since in the excitement and pleasure of the moment nobody seems to have considered how poor communications between the various groups of British ships had been and how disastrous that might have proved. Poor communications were to dog the British navy throughout the war, but the Germans too suffered from a notable failure of communications. During this battle the weather in the Jade was fine and clear; no one reported mist around the sea of battle so the German command imagined that
(Cassell &Co., 1919) Knight, E. F., The Harwich Naval Forces (Hodder and Stoughton, 1919) Marder, A. J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 1965) Niezychowski, Count Alfred von, The Cruise of the Kronprinz Wilhelm (Doubleday, Doran, Garden City, New York, 1929) Roskill, S., Admiral ot the Fleet, Earl Beatty (Collins
1980) Scheer, Admiral R., Germany's High Sea Fleet in World War (London, 1920) The Naval Memoirs of Admiral Sir Roger Keyes (Eyre and Spottiswoode)
WOODWARD was born in 1909. From 1932 1940 he was a foreign correspondent, first with Reuters and then with News Chronicle- From 1 932 to 1 937 he was stationed in Geneva, from 1 937 to 1 939 in Rome, in 1939 in Berlin, and in Amsterdam from 1939 to 1940. As News Chronicle war correspondent, he travelled in the Middle and Far East from 1940 to 1942, and was News Chronicle DAVID
to
e
|
|
naval correspondent from 1942-43. Attached to the Psychological Warfare Branch of the US Office of War Information from 1 943-44, he covered the cam-
Normandy
as combined
-
paigning from
s
service war correspondent to Manchester Guardian
to Berlin
| and The Times from 1944-46. He was Press I
-
The damaged German Frauenlob
is
light cruiser
SMS
inspected after the battle
UNESCO
from
1946-48;
Officer
Secretary (Information) to the British Legation, Tel Aviv, from 1949-52; and he joined the BBC in 1952. His publications include The Tirpitz (1952), The Secret Raiders (1955), Ramsay at War (1957), aod The Russians at Sea (1965). to
First
193
Heligoland — the clash MAP
of cruisers in the confined waters of
1
m
0825 HRS
STETTIN
the Heligoland Bight FEARLESS 1 WITH DESTROYER ARETHUSAJ SUPPORT
Map 1 Fearless and Arethusa enter the Bight and Arethusa encounters Stettin and Frauenlob. Arethusa is badly damaged but manages to score one hit on Frauenlob. Both German ships retire
/
\
/^
,-—1'"',
0805 HRS 0758 HRS
Map
2 The German destroyer V187 tries unsuccessfully to dodge the British ships and is sunk by destroyer action
Map
home
3 British destroyers returning
turn to
engage Strassburg. Strassburg is driven off and Mainz appears. Mainz engages the British destroyers and inflicts some damage Heligoland
4 Mainz is now attacked by Goodenough's light cruisers which were called down from the north by Fearless
Map
0855
Map
5 Beatty's battle-cruisers appear (in to Arethysa's call for help) and finish off Mainz. The battle-cruisers also sink the German cruisers Koln and Ariadne
HRS
answer
FRAUENLOB RETIRES
DAMAGED
0825 HRS
LIGHT CRUISERS 0838 HRS
NOTTINGHAM & LOWESTOFT
li'iHai 1205-1230 HRS
•1205 HRS
Beatty's Battle -cruiser
Squadron
FEARLESS
Goodenough's Light Cruiser Squadron Light
Fearless
Cruiser
1210 HRS 1st Destroyer Light Cruiser 3rd.
Flotilla
230 HRS
Destroyer
STETTIN
1205 HRS
Arethusa Flotilla
GOODENOUGH'S
German Ships
LIGHT CRUISER
SQUADRON All large
maps on same
scale thus:-
8000
Yards
1230 HRS
SHOWN
LOCATION OF ACTIONS
1205 HRS
ON LARGE SCALE MAPS
1230 HRS
FEARLESS ENGAGES KOLN & STETTIN
50
Nautical miles
NORTH SEA 1
^Heligoland
FRAUENLOB
.
HRS\ RET 08255 HRS \ r | RE s |
DAMAGED
V
'1230 HRS
MAINZ BADLY DAMAGED
AND SINKING
GERMAN BATTLE] CRUISERS BEHIND
SAND BAR Bremerhaven
1230 HRS
iOHRS
MAP GOODENOUGH'S
3 1130-1200
HRS
1200 HRS
LIGHT CRUISER
SQUADRON 1200 HRS
1200HR:,
1200 HRS
> MAINZ SCORES ON ALL THREE DESTROYERS HITS
1st DESTROYER FLOTILLA (Part of)
/ 1130
HRS
1130 HRS 1200 HRS
t\ t » MAINZ
\
s.
1130 HRS
1130 HRS I
1200 HRS 11 30
1130
1200 HRS
*"r^
HRS
""V
1325 HRS
1335 HRS
1230-1340 HRS
1230 HRS
LION LEADING BATTLE CRUISER SQUAD
OPENS
DESTROYER FLOTILLA
3rd
HRS
FIRE
1310HRS
V
MAINZ SINKS, >< LURCHER STANDS BY LIGHT CRUISER
SQUAORON
FOLLOWS BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON
'
1230 HRS
He was
THE ADMIRALS In 1914 many of these men were over 50 years old and several had joined the navy while still in their teens. Almost all of them had seen colonial service and some had been involved in local fighting there — but none had any experience of a major naval conflict. Peter Kemp JELLICOE, John Rushworth (1859-1935), entered the Royal Navy in 1872. As a lieutenant he showed great courage during the Arabi Pasha rebellion of 1882 in Egypt when he adopted native disguise to carry secret despatches to Sir Garnet Wolseley through a hostile horde. He specialised in gunnery, and the brilliance with which he passed all examinations was a measure of his excep-
much so that as a young officer he was brought Admiralty to assist the director of naval ordnance, then Captain J. A. Fisher, with the implementation of the Naval Defence Act of 1889. He was promoted commander in 1891 and appointed as executive officer of HMS Victoria, flagship of the Mediterranean Fleet, being on board at the time of the accident during manoeuvres when she was rammed and sunk by HMS Camperdown. Though ill with Malta Fever, he survived the disaster and was picked up clinging to a sea chest. In 1897 he was promoted captain and narrowly escaped death in the Boxer rebellion in China in 1900 after a bullet passed through his lung during the abortive attempt by Admiral Seymour to lead an international naval brigade to tional intellect, so
specially
rewarded by promotion to captain at the age of at which commanders were promoted to cap-
The average age tain was 43. 29.
Beatty's marriage to a wealthy American lady and his passion fox-hunting made it seem for a time as though a career in the navy had no great attraction for him, for his length of service in command of cruisers and the battleship Queen was insufficient to qualify him for promotion to flag rank. His outstanding record however, could not be overlooked, and in 1910 the Admiralty promoted him to rear-admiral by a special Order in Council. He was 38 at the time, an unprecedently early age at which to reach flag rank. He was offered the appointment of second-in-command of the Atlantic Fleet, but once again jeopardised his career by refusing it. He was offered no other appointment until 1912, after a chance meeting, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, asked him to come as his Naval Secretary. Beatty agreed, and his wide understanding of the art and technique of naval warfare so impressed Churchill that in 1914 he chose him to command the battle-cruiser force with the rank of vice-admiral. At the outbreak of war the battle-cruisers, with Beatty in command, were concentrated at Rosyth. for
HMS
to the
the relief of the legations in Pekin. When Sir John Fisher became First Sea Lord in 1904, he brought Jellicoe with him to the Admiralty to be his director of naval ordnance. Promoted to rear-admiral in 1907, Jellicoe served a year as second-in-command of the Atlantic Fleet and then returned to the Admiralty as Third Sea Lord and Controller, where his exceptional talent proved of immense value in helping to maintain Britain's lead in dreadnought design and construction over Germany. During this period he was selected by Fisher as the eventual commander-in-chief of the British fleet in the event of a future war with Germany. All his future appointments were chosen with a view to giving him experience for this task, and as, successively, commander-in-chief of the Atlantic Fleet, the Second Division of the Home Fleet, and Second Sea Lord, his tactical skill and undoubted talent for leadership were developed to the full. His appointment as Second Sea Lord was cut short by the murder at Sarajevo of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and at the end of July 1914 he was ordered north to Scapa Flow to hoist his flag as commander-in-chief of the Grand Fleet in the superdreadnought Iron Duke.
HMS
Jellicoe — tactical skill
and an undoubted talent for leadership
Beatty — his outstanding record could not be overlooked
BATTENBERG,
Prince Louis Alexander
of,
(1854-1921) was the
eldest son of Prince Alexander of Hesse and the Rhine. He came to England as a boy, was naturalised, and joined the Royal Navy in 1868. His early career was one of distinction and his promotion was rapid. As a captain in 1894 he became secretary of the naval and military committee on defence, which developed later into the Committee of Imperial Defence. He was assistant director of naval intelligence in 1900, and after a year's service in the Mediterranean, returned to the Admiralty in 1902 as director. On promotion to flag rank he was appointed to the command of a cruiser squadron and in 1907 became second-in-command of the Mediterranean Fleet. year later he was selected as commander-inchief of the Atlantic Fleet and in 1911 joined the Board of Admiralty as Second Sea Lord. On the retirement of Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, Battenberg stepped up to the post of First Sea Lord, and it was in this appointment that, in July 1914, he was faced with the decision whether or not to keep the reserve fleet in being on completion of a test mobilisation in view of the threatening European situation. It was due to his initiative and understanding that when the declaration of war came on August 4, the reserve ships and their crews were not dispersed. Shortly after the outbreak of war a scurrilous press campaign was started, concentrating on Battenberg's German origin. His great patriotism and love for England led him to resign his position as First Sea Lord. It was the final great act of a most distinguished naval career.
A
Battenberg — BEATTY, David, (1871-1936) joined the Royal Navy at the normal age of 13. His first opportunity to distinguish himself came during Kitchener's reconquest of the Sudan in 1896-8 after the murder of General Gordon, when he was given command of a gunboat on the Nile. His dash and courage, coupled with a strong personality, gained him the DSO and promotion to commander at the early age of 27. Two years later, when he was executive officer of the battleship HMS Barfleur on the China Station, he led a naval detachment to Hsiku to free Admiral Seymour who was held there by the Boxer rebels although at the time he was suffering from a wound received while serving with the besieged Tientsin garrison.
forced to resign by a scurrilous press campaign
TIRPITZ, Alfred von (1849-1930), entered the Prussian navy in 1865, and after specialising in torpedoes, commanded the Far Eastern Cruiser Division, setting up Tsingtao, in China, as a future German naval base. In 1897 he was selected as secretary of state for the navy, and as such was responsible for the drafting and passing of the two Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900, setting out a programme of naval building which was designed to lift Germany to the position of a great naval power. In this task he was able to interest the German Emperor and to foster his naval mania to an extent where the two in alliance were strong enough to override all political opposition to rapid naval growth. The great achievement for which Tirpitz will always be remembered is his transformation, within the space of 20 years, of a naval coastal defence force into a high seas battle fleet. Although he realised that Germany could never match the naval strength of Britain, and that German rearmament on such a scale was certain to sour relations between the two countries, he took comfort in the belief that Britain, faced with the reality of a
strong
German
navy, could not contemplate war against
it
because
of the risk of losing her superiority at sea. It was this aspect of German naval rearmament which was in large degree responsible for the British entente with France in 1904 and with Russia in 1907, which effectively countered Tirpitz's Riskflotte theory. Tirpitz was promoted to admiral in 1903, and Grossadmiral in 1911. On the outbreak of war he attempted to obtain effective command of the High Seas Fleet either by himself becoming its commander-in-chief or through the creation of a supreme navy command structure which he would dominate. Both these moves were rejected, and he remained as secretary of state for the navy unable to exercise any strategic or operational control over the navy which he had so largely brought into being himself.
Tirpitz —
HIPPER, Franz von (1863-1932), 1881 and as a midshipman in the L< •
he 9
German navy
engaged
in
in colonial
adventures which added Togoland to -nan empire. He specialised in torpedoes and in 1895 was ted to the Second Torpedo Division at Wilhelmshaven as an ir. This was followed by three years as navigation oftu iperial yacht Hohenzollern, from which he was appointed to command the Second Destroyer Division. He was selected for a stuff course in 1905, and on promotion to commander took charge of the trials of the new cruiser Leipzig in 1906. On promotion to captain in 1907, he commanded the armoured cruiser Gneisenau. After another short spell as captain of a destroyer flotilla, Hipper was promoted commodore in 1911 and appointed Chief-of-Staff to the second-in-command of the cruiser force of the High Seas Fleet. He reached flag rank in 1912, and with a change in the organisation of the cruiser force, was placed in command of the High Seas Fleet destroyer forces. On October 1, 1913, he became Flag Officer Commanding Scouting Force, High Seas Fleet. He was still holding this appointment at the outbreak of the First World War, flying his flag in the battle-cruiser Seydlitz.
Hipper — a torpedo specialist, a field in which
the
German
navy excelled
transformed a coastal
defence force into a high seas battle fleet in 20 years SCHEER,
Reinhart (1863-1928) was born at Obernkirchen, HesseNassau, and his early service in the German navy was connected with the colonial expansion of Germany in the Cameroons and East Africa. In 1903 he commanded the First Torpedo Division, and seven years later was appointed Chief-of-Staff to Admiral Henning von Holtzendorf, Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet. On promotion to flag rank he was given command of a battle squadron of the fleet, and was stationed at Kiel at the outbreak of the First World War. He had been, throughout his naval career, interested in the development of submarines, and with the early operational use of these craft in the war he was able to develop and introduce new ideas for their tactical use in action. Many of his ideas in this field proved of extreme value, and with the startling successes of the U-boats in the early months of the war, he was marked out for rapid promotion, particularly as he had shown a distinct tactical flair in the handling of his battle squadron and in the use of smaller craft in action. In 1916 he was Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet.
HENRY, Prince Albert William of Prussia (1862-1929) was the younger brother of Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany. His father decided that he should be trained as a naval officer and his first experience of the sea was in the sail-training ship Niobe in 1877. Prince Henry's promotion, due to his royal connections, was rapid and in 1890 he was made captain of the cruiser Irene. As a commanding officer he was always imperious, but in spite of his strictness he was never less than just. On one occasion, having ordered his ship's company to bathe on an icy day and on receiving his first lieutenant's protests, he went below to his cabin, came up on deck naked, and dived over the side into the sea. He was promoted rear-admiral in 1895 and in 1897 commanded the Second Cruiser Squadron in the Far East, bearing with him his brother's famous directive 'If anyone dare to interfere with our good right, ride in with the mailed fist'. It was under Prince Henry that much of the German colonisation in this area was carried out. He was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Fleet in 1903, and almost immediately on completion of this appointment was made Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet, holding this appointment until 1909. On the outbreak of* the First World War he was made Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic Station, flying his flag in Kiel. The active operations in this area, however, were carried out by other officers, and Prince Henry was little more than a figurehead. He had by this time been promoted to the rank of Grossadmiral, senior to all other German naval officers, and it is recorded that his conservatism and lack of drive did much to hamper German naval operations during the early years of the First World War, for he still wielded considerable influence with the Kaiser.
Scheer — valuable work
Prince Henry —
in the
conservatism
development of U-boats and
and lack of drive did
their tactical
to
use
his
much
hamper the German navy 197
* The German
light cruiser Ariadne, scouting for her battle-cruisers which she thought were close at hand, was attacked by the 13.5-inch guns of Beatty's battle-cruisers. The German battlecruisers, imprisoned behind a sand bar, were unable to come to the Ariadne's aid. T. Plivier
HMS Lion, Beatty's flagship, one of the battle-cruisers which made such a devastating attack upon small German ships like Ariadne
After her spell on patrol duty the Ariadne did not make for Kiel, nor did she go into dock for repairs. The cleaning of her boilers was put off to some future time. After four days in harbour she was cruising once more in the outer estuary of the Jade. In the crow's-nest Karl Kleesattel was perched up among the clouds, above the bridge and the two funnels, in a half light that belonged to neither night nor day; he was soaked to the skin by the damp in the air. The sea was smooth, but above it volumes of dark fog towered and billowed. He thrust his hands into his pockets. He could only bury his face in his collar up to the mouth. He had to scan the horizon ceaselessly, and the floating, eternally shifting layers of fog. He could see three or four miles, no farther. A man's heart beat more slowly in that grey chaos. Suddenly he started up. On the port bow a booming issued from the fog. There was nothing to be seen, only the seething outlines of great masses of fog. There it was again, a dull, thunderous roar. And again, and yet again! In the intervals of volleys fired by heavy guns! The Ariadne altered course. The gun-pointers adjusted their instruments. The ammunitionconveyors clattered and raised shells and charges on deck from the magazines below the water-line. The stretcherbearers lined up in front of the dressing-station. Down below in the stoke-hold the firemen bent in front of the furnace doors and emptied their wellfilled shovels with the wide sweep of their strong arms down the craters — several yards in depth— or stirred the red-hot glow with heavy pokers. Their bodies gleamed red in the fire-light. The sweat made white channels in the coal-dust that powdered their skin. In the engine-room flashing metal, piston-rods, all in furious motion. And between them the oilers with oil-smeared arms and balls of cotton waste in their hands. The steam pressure from ten boilers that was here transformed into power set gleaming, blue steel rods in motion and sent the propeller-blades pounding furiously through the water. On the bridge, in the captain's hands, all the threads were gathered: guns, engines, navigation, wireless telegraphy. And the link of wireless made him and his ship just an outstretched feeler of the heavily equipped battle-cruisers steaming up astern. The light cruiser's task is to make contact with the enemy and to keep in touch with the flagship of the reconnaissance forces, and report on the position. For three hours the Ariadne had been steaming at a high speed. The look-out had been reinforced by one man. Harry Mathieson stood shoulder to shoulder with the 'Admiral' in the crow's-nest. Neither of them took the glasses from his eyes. Mathieson searched the horizon astern. 'Still no sign of our battle-cruisers.' — 'That's only because it's so hazy. They're following close in our wake. Just like in the manoeuvres. When we knock up against the English and report, they'll appear.' It grew rather brighter. There was a break in the foggy atmosphere of the gigantic 'wash-house', but out beyond, the damp mists continued to rise. 'Admiral, do you see?' 'Yes, right ahead!' 'Ship right ahead!' the look-out reported to the bridge. 'She's bearing straight down on us!' "Three funnels. That's the Koln.' 'She's under fire.' 'She's in flight!' Another vessel issued from the wall of fog, a gigantic grey colossus. The Ariadne called the ship with her searchlight. The ship did not reply. 'A battle-cruiser!'
'A British ship!' the bridge they recognized the ship's silhouette. The bridge sentry, messengers, guns' crews — each man passed on to the next what he had heard. The Ariadne was one single bundle of strained nerves. Rigid faces below the ventilation shafts and pump shafts leading to the magazines and engine rooms. 'A big British ship.' 'Four turrets: 13.5!' 'Flagship Lion.'
From
'And what about our ships?' 'Not in sight yet.' second battle-cruiser of the
A
same class hove in sight, the Tiger. (In fact Plivier is mistaken as Tiger did not join Beatty's flag until November 1914.) Sixteen heavy turret guns
HMS
trained upon the little Ariadne. 'Hard a-starbord!' ordered the commander. 'Hard a-starboard, sir!' replied the helmsman. The Ariadne reversed her course and tried to retreat into the
fog at full speed. The Lion fired from her foremost turret. Smoke rose from the muzzles. 'Like an express train clattering n iron bridge,' ob-
served Harry Mathieson. A second and a half! Two fountains rose out of the sea a few huii rda ahead of the ship. 'Fifty-five hundred!' announced the fire-control for the information of their own gunners. 'Fifty-five hundred!' the voicetube men repeated to the gunners. 'Salvo- fire!' The gun-pointers -for the foremost starboard gun it was Petty Officer Paul Weiss —jerked the trigger-lanyard. A deafening roar.
The gun sprang back on its mounting. Each shell 32 pounds Mere peas, which ricocheted ineffectually against the
of iron.
heavy armour-plating of the battle-cruiser. The Ariadne was 2,600 tons. Each one of the battle-cruisers was 30,000 tons. The five men serving each of the Ariadne's guns stood unsheltered on deck. The 80 serving each British turret gun stood behind thick protecting walls of plate armour. The next salvoes fell astern. The enemy had zigzagged towards them and got their range. And now the gun-flashes were directed on the Ariadne from two points. The brown cordite smoke rose like a wall.
The Koln had vanished
in the fog.
Thousands of tons of water The Ariadne had turned her
stern-post to the battle-cruisers
j?*J8 t:«*~Vc$
A stylised German postcard coming under fire from the
of the time depicts the Ariadne
and V187
British battle-cruisers at Heligoland
offered only a narrow target. The shells crashed beside the Columns of water, green and resplendent, rose like crystal arches and then fell on her deck. Five hundred, or perhaps a thousand, tons of water falling from cloudy heights — and the force there is in water! The ship's whole frame creaked and shivered and then suddenly dropped down like an overburdened mule sink-
and
vessel.
ing on
its
haunches.
Below decks all was confusion. Glasses, instruments, and controls were smashed. The lamp filaments were shivered to dust.
On the quarter-deck blood-stained, battered faces rose from out of the ebbing water. The tall Lieutenant Alvens was carried away with broken arms. 'More revolutions!' the captain insisted. The wireless telegraphic apparatus tapped out an SOS. 'Fire!' came the order from the gunnery-officer. The stokers worked like devils under the lash. Coal-barrows, pokers, clattering furnace doors! The sweat-soaked rags stuck to their thighs. The lungs and chests worked like bellows — steam! steam! On deck, by the guns: charges rammed home, breech closed! See through the telescopes the grey phantoms approaching. When the gun lies true on its mark, fire! Suffocating fumes from the powder. Smarting eyes. Throats burning and parched. When the smoke disperses, on again without a pause. Each shell 32 pounds of iron, and 160 pounds each broadside. The Lion and Tiger fired at long intervals, but with every salvo they hurled over six tons of steel and dynamite into the air. Turuslavsky gripped his coal-shovel and resumed his place in the row. The pressure in the boilers was near bursting-point. But the engine had reached the limit of its powers. 'She's too old, the damned hulk.' 'Too slow to get away.'
199
No help, no hope Ammunition-porters and look-out-men and the blackened faces of those in the guns' crews, all kept turning their eyes eastwards whence heavy reinforcements might come. And again and again all living flesh stooped and crouched when the air reverberated with the onrush of the shells. An earthquake must be like that. Just the same upward thrust in your guts. But floating vessels have more spring and soften the shock. All the same, your whole body is shaken to the very bones.
Your nerves are a-tremble.
And it wasn't the end yet, what was going on on deck — that gurgling downward plunge and the blaze that shot up as high as the crow's-nest and blinded their eyes. Kleesattel recovered his sight — he could still hear, he reflected. The shell had smashed through the deck and exploded in the bows. A rush of air at high pressure whistled through the hole it had pierced. Coal-dust! Smoke! The dust settled in a dark cloud,
HMS New Zealand,
one
of Beatty's battle-cruiser squadron,
steaming
commander.
And now the shells were coming in a long, level flight and tore the sides of the ship. Seething steam and black, curling smoke poured out of every crack and crevice. The lights went out in the stoke-hold aft. The compartments were full of smoke, and it swept across the decks. Those who could still use their legs cleared the stern and dragged the wounded along with them. Midships from the navigator's bridge telephone wires and voicetubes, riddled with shot, came tumbling down like mutilated iron intestines. There was nothing to be seen of the bridge, funnels, masts; they were lost in a thick veil of smoke which the battered
into action at Heligoland
emitting sparks. The ascending smoke was of a dark ochre-brown. exits and man-holes, and finally even through the hole pierced by the shell, a flood of half-naked, blackened bodies emerged. The stokers! They were leaving their posts. The bunker coal had caught fire. The stokeholds were full of smoke. Five boilers were put of action. The Ariadne was now only making headway at half speed. The machinery attached to the forward gun was out of action; the sights and telephone had been swept away. Petty Officer Weiss took his bearings over the barrel and chimed in only a little behind the other guns.
Through
'Salvo -fire!'
They crouched behind the smoke of their guns, five men at each gun. A handful on the bridge and at the searchlight and signal stations. At the foot of the bridge and round the sockets of the funnels stood the fugitive firemen. Everywhere clutching hands, and jaws so tightly set that the bones showed white through the cheeks!
There was no ~aore ammunition for the after guns. The ammunition-conveyor had been blown in. The magazine was plunged in darkness. The men were groping past chests of charges and piles of shells, up to their waists in water, till they reached the iron ladder.
On armoured decks I and II also, the watertight hatch stuck fast and couldn't be moved a fraction of an inch. A blow had bent it. Something between fifteen and twenty men were huddled together, clinging in the darkness. Their pulsing blood counted the hammerstrokes as they listened to the pattering of tools against the hatch
from outside.
The commander with artificers was trying to liberate the imprisoned men. Several firemen, Stanislaus Turuslavsky carrying a big hammer in his hand, came to the deck. The fire burst forth. Boots and fragments of all sorts were transformed into flying z
ammunition. Men's bodies were swept across the empty space like dry leaves and hurled against the iron bulkhead. Turuslavsky and the other firemen on their way to the hatch lay on the ground like fish cast up on dry land, gasping for breath. The artificers had disappeared and so had the wounded men who had been laid on deck on stretchers, and the sick-bay attendants, the doctor, and the
ship trailed after her in a broad path. For the past half-hour the sky had arched above the ship and crew like an immense, booming metal bowl; now it was suddenly still and stopped its swinging motion. The Lion and Tiger had ceased fire. They could no longer see anything in the smoke. Two boats were still seaworthy, being only knocked about by splinters above their water-line. They were launched. Then the wounded were let down with ropes. The rest of the crew crouched in the bow. Their eyes were inflamed and their voices hoarse. 'There are still some under armoured decks I and II.' 'And some in the magazine aft.' 'All the watertight compartments are flooded.' 'Petty Officer Weiss is aft with one or two men.' A hundred pairs of eyes stared fixedly astern into the raging witches' cauldron, seething with steam and smoke. The charges and shells lying beside the guns exploded. The hull was one burning, red-hot mass. The flimsy armoured deck beneath their feet grew hotter and hotter, so that it was unbearable in the forecastle. An 'officer's uniform, four gold stripes on the sleeve — the captain. He spoke just a few words. Why did the German High Sea Fleet not arrive? Why was the Ariadne forced to submit to being shot at till she caught fire? He did not answer these questions. He ended with 'Three cheers for His Majesty the Emperor!' A shadow fell upon the glassy red chaos, a group of human forms supporting one another and helping one another along. Paul Weiss and his men. Scorched and exhausted, they came towards the bows. The men from the armoured deck were not
with them. The captain gave the order: 'On life-belts! Abandon ship!'
THE GREAT RETREAT On August 24,
1914, 1,000,000 Germans invaded France. For the French and their British allies, the great retreat had begun. It lasted for 13 days, blazing summer days in which the Germans made their bid for the swift decisive victory which Schlieffen had designed. They were desperate days for the Allies whose only offensive plan had not survived the opening battles of the war. Brigadier Peter Young
The
long, hot
and dusty road back from Mons — British cavalry fall back, unable to hamper seriously the German advance
During the 13 days of the retreat, five of the seven German armies scythed down towards Paris on a 75-mile front. For the troops on both sides they were days of endless marching under a scorching sun; marching until nearly every man seemed to have nails sticking through the soles of his boots into his blistered ^ feet, and the horses had worn their shoes wafer thin. Every movement was hampered by refugees. Order and counter-order plagued both sides, communication by wireless and telephone was often desperately slow, so that one liaison officer described an army as: 'A giant with a quick and brilliant brain, but whose nervous system .is slow, lethargic, and inadequate. Something goes wrong with one of his distant limbs. Hours pass before he registers it. Once he has done so acounter-move is rapidly devised, but transmission is again slow, and before his arm or leg can receive and obey it, it may have been gnawed to the bone.' Each side had its special troubles. The French were subject to
unaccountable panics, and inclined to see spies everywhere. The back areas of formations which had suffered severely were infested with pillaging deserters. The Germans, especially in Belgium, saw franc-tireurs (snipers) behind every bush. So rapid was their march that their supplies could not keep up, and in consequence there was a good deal of marauding and drunkenness, with the usual deterioration of discipline. Both these factors led to the heavy-handed treatment of the civilian population, which did so much to foster the 'Campaign of Hate'. When the retreat began Joffre's situation was far from en- e viable. The Belgians, except for the garrison of Namur, had § retired into Antwerp. Joffre had six armies, five French and one I British, with which to face the seven German armies. The four| armies of his right and centre had all been severely mauled. The „ BEF and the French Fifth Army were about to receive the full jc onslaught of the three most powerful German armies. The im- E
201
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The pattern of 1914
German firepower and Allied retreat
of the German advance temporarily broken, German infantry halt on the exhausting advance into France only long enough to push Allied screening units back to the main body of retreating troops. Right: The price of defeat for France -walking wounded limp back toward the rear in an effort to escape capture by the onrushing German armies
The momentum
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mediate problem was to halt the retreat of his own armies, maintaining his front intact, and at the same time, by taking troops from Lorraine, where his line was unbroken, to reinforce his left. He resolved to create a new army, the Sixth, under General Maunoury, which was to form round Amiens, on the left of the BEF. This done he proposed to resume the offensive. In the days between Mons and the Marne, the BEF, the smallest of all the Allied armies, played a vital role for it found itself at the outset right across the axis of advance of Kluck's army, the most powerful of all the German armies with 320,000 men. It was unfortunate that Sir John French neither liked nor trusted his neighbour General Lanrezac (Fifth Army). Also, French was out of his depth as an army commander, and tended to underrate the resilience and fighting ability of his well-trained soldiers. To understand the day to day development of the retreat it is essential to appreciate the conditions of extreme stress under which both armies, staff, fighting and administrative troops, alike,
were struggling.
Diary of the retreat August 24: Belgians reconnoitre from Antwerp. The French evacuate Lille. French Territorials (88th Division) delay General von Marwitz' cavalry near Tournai. Action at Elouges and fighting at Frameries and Paturages. On this day the BEF loses 2,606 men — more than a< the Battle of Mons on the previous day, when the losses were 1,638. British GHQ at Bavai. French Grand Quartier General (GQG) at Vitry-le-Francois (until August 31). German offensive in Lorraine. Foch (XX Corps) holds Nancy.
A typical day's fighting is recorded by Lieutenant Spears, the British liaison officer with the French Fifth Army: Unfortunately, as the Germans began to realise the cost of attacks in close formation they offered fewer and fewer targets to the really formidable 75s, and made more and more use of their heavy artillery, which was as superior to that of the French as were the 75s to the German field guns. During the retreat, a typical day's fighting often consisted in being smothered all day by heavy shells from invisible German
batteries, presumably out of range of our guns, and against which they could do nothing. There was always a generous interval for lunch, then the shelling would start again. It was maddening, all the more so that whenever any of our batteries did open fire they seemed to be located immediately by one of the ubiquitous Taubes. So the long day wore on, the constant shelling slowly exhausting the men's nerves. And all the time no sign of a single German. It was only when the long shades of evening lengthened on the plain that there seemed to be a movement as of hardly discernible shadows; far away along hedges and beneath trees, the field greys, almost invisible in the fading light, were creeping forward.
on the German Guard Cavalry Division. GHQ moves from Noyon to Compiegne. 'Zone of the Armies' increased to include Paris.
August 29: St Nazaire is selected as the new base of the BEF. Maunoury's Sixth Army in action against Kluck's First Army at Proyart and Rosieres. Lanrezac's victory at Guise. Sir John French refuses to permit I Corps (Haig) to co-operate. Fifth Army Headquarters move to Laon. GHQ at Compiegne. Joffre visits Sir John French, who is anxious to withdraw the BEF and rest it for a few days. For most of the BEF, except the cavalry, this is a day of rest. The Fourth Army is ordered, to the disgust of General de Langle de Cary, to resume its retreat in the direction of Rheims.
GQG
Joffre orders preparations to move from Vitry-le-Francois to Bar-sur-Aube, and notes, disapprovingly, that the news added 'to the general nervousness and anxiety'. Moltke ('Gloomy Julius') writes to his wife: 'How few suspicions the All-Highest (The Kaiser) has of the seriousness of the situation. He has already a certain "shout — hurrah!" mood that I hate like death.'
August 30: Intensely hot. OHL (German HQ) moves forward from Koblenz to Luxembourg. Kluck wheels south-east. Generals Petain and Mangin promoted to command divisions in III Corps (French Fifth Army). Sixth Army round Montdidier. Sir John French writes to Joffre: / feel it very necessary to impress upon you that the British Army cannot under any circumstances take up a position in the front line for at least ten days. I require men and guns to make good casualties which have not been properly estimated owing to continual retirement behind fighting rearguards. You will thus understand that I cannot meet your wishes to fill the gap between the Fifth and Sixth Armies, viz line Compiegne-Soissons. (In fact the line of the River Aisne between these two towns, a line to which the BEF was very near on this day, was by far the best and clearest defensive position for his command to adopt at this stage.) Joffre hears, through
an intercepted German wireless message, that the Russian Second Army no longer exists. Joffre replaces Ruffey (Third Army) with Sarrail. The Times publishes the socalled 'Amiens despatch', in which a correspondent, Arthur Moore, describes the state of the BEF after Mons and Le Cateau (the 'Fiercest Fight in History'). He concludes that Britain must face the fact that the 'first great German effort has succeeded', and that 'the investment of Paris cannot be banished from the field of possibility'.
August 31: Blazing sunshine. At Ostend, the Royal Marines reembark. Fall of Givet. Alarmed by Sir John French's intention to withdraw the BEF from the line, the Cabinet decides to send Lord Kitchener to Paris. Cavalry actions near Compiegne and at
GHQ
August 25: Night. Belgian sortie from Antwerp towards the gap between Louvain and Brussels. The Germans sack Louvain. The Germans invest the fortress of Maubeuge. Maunoury 's Sixth Army assembling near Amiens. Messimy, the French Minister of War, orders Joffre to provide three active corps for the defence of Paris. Fifth Army moves its headquarters from Aubenton to Vervins. The 4th Division reinforces the BEF. at St Quentin. On this day the BEF suffers 905 casualties. Action at Maroilles, Solesmes and Landrecies. In Lorraine de Castlenau and Dubail counterattack.
GHQ
Army headquarters aeroplane drops a message over Paris announcing the arrival of the enemy in three days' time.
Venizel. at Craonne.
at
Dammartin-en-Goele. Fifth
A German
September 1 : Excessive heat. Germans capture Soissons. Maunoury is at Ververie. Kluck, a day ahead of Biilow, turns south, resolving
BEF, which, to his disgust, gets away after the actions at Crepy-en-Valois, Villers-Cotterets and Nery. In the last the German 4th Cavalry Division is virtually destroyed. I begins to move from and II Corps (BEF) are re-united. Dammartin to Lagny. Joffre, who is reinforcing Paris, advises at Bar-sur-Aube for September the government to leave. 1-4. Interview between Lord Kitchener and Sir John French in to destroy the
GHQ
GQG
August 26: The Belgians
Antwerp. The Battle of Le Cateau. 8,482 casualties in the BEF on this day. Despondency at GHQ and Fifth Army HQ (at Marie) due to exaggerated reports of the fighting at Landrecies. Conference at St Quentin. Those present include Generals Joffre, Lanrezac, Berthelot and d'Amade, as well as Sir John French and General Wilson. Nothing decided. In Lorraine the French counterattacks continue. On the Meuse (August 26-28) de Langle de Cary beats off the Duke of Wurttemberg's Fourth Army. retire to
August 27: A very hot day, but cloudy. An ill-equipped brigade of Royal Marines begins to land at Ostend. At 1100 hours Joffre visits Sir John French at Noyon. BEF suffers a total of 1,180 casualties during the day. General von Kluck is released from Billow's command.
August 28: Joffre visits
Airless, oppressive day. Battle of Heligoland Bight. and rebukes Lanrezac at Marie, and replaces General
Corps) with General Hache. De Langle in heavy fighting on the River Meuse. Cerizy. The 5th Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General Chetwode), for a loss of less than 30 men, inflicts 300
Sauret Fourth
(III
Army
de Cary's Action at Sir Philip casualties
Paris.
September 2: Intense heat and blinding sunshine. The French government quits Paris for Bordeaux. GHQ at Lagny, moving later to Melun. HQ Fifth Army moves from Jonchery-sur-Vesle to Chatillon-sur-Marne. After lunch several of Lanrezac's staff standing in the street outside his office hear his voice: It sounded at first as if once more he was roughly taking his chief- of- staff to task, but the words trailed off into a wail— 'Nous sommes foutus, nous sommes foutus!' we heard him say, which freely translated and politely put means— 'we are done for, we are done for!' Anyone might have heard. It was lamentable. Nothing could have been more utterly discouraging than to have thus brought home to one t> 'The first German effort has succeeded' The Allied retreat, although precipitate, was ordered and controlled. Day by day the rearward movement was controlled and never got out of hand. With only minor holding movements at Landrecies, Le Cateau and Guise on August 25, 26 and 29 respectively, the French Sixth Army, the BEF, and the French Fifth and Fourth Armies were pushed back by the onrushing Germans determined to reach Paris and fulfil all the objectives of the Schlieffen Plan, and knock France out of the war
205
the attitude of the general to whom 250,000 them to safety and ultimately to victory.
men looked
to
lead
cavalry corps formed. By evening the
Marne.
At 1700 hours Fifth Army HQ leaves for Orbais l'Abbaye. Lieutenant Spears writes: 'I well remember the poignant sadness of abandoning the beautiful rich valley of the Marne, so typical of France, to the enemy, and the shame of seeing more girls by the bridge over the river shaking their fists at us.' At Senlis, Kluck's men shoot the mayor and six other civilian hostages. From the diary of an officer of Kluck's army: 'Our men are done up. They stagger forward, their faces coated with dust, their uniforms in rags. They look like living scarecrows.' After four days of marching an average of 24 miles a day over roads pitted with shell-holes and barred by felled trees: They march with eyes closed, singing in chorus so as not to fall asleep. Only the certainty of early victory and a triumphal entry into Paris keeps them going. Without this they would fall exhausted and go to sleep where they fell. They drink to excess but this drunkenness keeps them going. Today after inspection the General was furious. He wanted to stop
GHQ
at
Melun
until
BEF
September
has retired across the In a telephone con-
9.
Mas Army
versation, General de
Latrie (XVIII Corps), asserts to the that his troops are too exhausted to carry out their orders for the next day. Told by d'Esperey to 'march or croak'. chief-of-staff of Fifth
The
limit of endurance September 4: Broiling weather. Joffre orders the Allies to turn and attack on the 5th. The BEF (September 4 and 5) receives its first line reinforcements, 10% of the establishment of each unit. The Detachment Foch is reconstituted as the Ninth Army in between the Fourth and Fifth Armies. General Wilson visits Fifth Army. Visit of Gallieni and Maunoury to Melun. 'General Kluck fears nothing from the direction of Paris. After we have destroyed the remains of the Franco-British army he will return to Paris and give the IV Reserve the honour of leading the entry into the French capital.' (A German officer.) In the morning Kluck sends a wireless message to the Supreme Command: The First Army requests to be informed of the situation of the other armies, whose reports of decisive victories have so far been frequently followed by appeals for support. The First Army, which has been fighting and marching incessantly, has reached the limits of its endurance. It is through its efforts alone that the crossings of the Marne have been opened for the other armies and that the enemy has been compelled to continue his retreat. The IX Corps has won the greatest merit by its bold action in this respect. It is now hoped that every advantage will be taken of this success. The message of the Supreme Command in accordance with which the First Army was to follow in echelon behind the Second, could not be carried out under the circumstances. The intention to force the enemy away from Paris in a south-easterly direction was only practicable by advancing the First Army. The necessary flank protection weakens the offensive strength of the army, and immediate reinforcements are therefore urgently needed. Owing to the ever-changing situation, it will not be possible for the commander of the First Army to make any further important decisions unless he is kept continuously informed of the situation of the other armies who are apparently not so far advanced. Communication with the Second Army is constantly maintained. This is not the place to discuss the deliberations and negotiations that went on during these days, and which led up to the battle of the Marne. Our purpose has been to give an impression of the events of those days, not only of the way they unfolded from day to day, but of the atmosphere, the doubts and fears, which enveloped all those millions of men, each of them nearly strained to the limits of human endurance by the burden of responsibility,
Brief respite in a foreign land
- British
cavalry rest on a roadside
this general drunkenness, but we managed to dissuade him from giving severe orders. If we used too much severity the Army would not march. Abnormal stimulants are necessary to combat abnormal
fatigue.
A
(Fifth Army) ambushes a German cavalry a motor-car, and takes a bloodstained map giving the lines of advance of each of Kluck's corps. It is clear that he is bypassing Paris and making for the gap between the Sixth and Fifth Armies.
French patrol
officer in
September 3: Allied airmen detect Kluck's wheel to the south-east. At Gallieni's headquarters General Clergerie and Colonel Girodon, following the track of Kluck's corps by the coloured pins on the wall map, cry out simultaneously, 'They offer us their flank! They offer us their flank!' Reims abandoned to Biilow's army. D'Esperey replaces Lanrezac in command of the Fifth Army. (Joffre: 'Do you feel yourself capable of commanding an -army? D'Esperey: 'As well as anyone else. The higher one gets the easier :
is. One gets a bigger staff; there are more people to help.') Biilow reports the French Fifth Army 'decisively beaten' and fleeing 'utterly disorganised to south of the Marne'. Conneau's
it
or by sheer hard marching. In detail the fighting techniques of 1914 are a thing of the past, but even so one may learn much from those hectic days: the value of good communications, and good liaison; the harm that can be done by mutual suspicion, such as existed between French and Lanrezac; the value of men like Foch and d'Esperey, determined not to be beaten. The interest of the campaign lies above all in the reactions of the men involved. The Kaiser was living in an atmosphere of euphoria, which poor 'Gloomy Julius' could no more control than he could control Kluck, whose army rushed down upon Paris and then suddenly swerved away, like a runaway steamroller with a drunken driver at the wheel. Maunoury, who unlike many generals never considered that his own was the only army in the field, de Langle de Cary in perfect control of himself despite his awful repulse in the opening battles, and the old Gallieni taking a firm grip on the capital, all deserve their measure of praise for staunch work in those days when everything seemed to be going wrong. But one figure stands out above all, the massive unshakeable Joffre, playing the part of Atlas and ready to take all the burdens of the Allied cause on his broad shoulders. It says much for French resilience and the flexibility of their staff that they could recover so quickly from the Battle of the Frontiers, fall back under heavy pressure, and devise a counterstroke even during the confusion of a withdrawal. In war, things are seldom as bad as they seem.
Further Reading Keegan, J., Opening Moves: August 1914 (New York: Ballantine 1971) Kluck, General Alexander, The March on Paris (Longmans 1920) Spears, Sir Edward, Liaison 1914 (Heinemann 1930) Tuchman, B., August 1914 (Constable 1962)
\For Peter Young's biography, see page 155.}
France's colonial troops
^
r.
ft
The French Spahi. The Spahis were recruited
The French Zouave. The Zouaves were
from the native population of the French North African colony of Algeria, and were mostly born horsemen. As they were light cavalry, the Spahis carried little in the way of equipment, but what they did have was the standard French cavalry issue, worn with their colourful native dress. Apart from their sabres, they were armed with carbines, either the8-mm 1886 Lebel.orthe 1890/92 Berthier
Vb
recruited
mostly from the white population of the French colonies of North Africa, and wore the traditional uniform shown here in the opening stages of the war. Their equipment and small arms were identical with those of ordinary infantry regiments of the line, and comprised a metal-framed pack (containing spare boots, great coat, blankets and mess tin), and the standard 8-mm 1886 Lebel rifle
^
VV;
=^ 207
*.
Outflanked, outgunned and outnumbered, the British II Corps fought an important holding action at Le Cateau during the retreat from Mons. This check was a rude shock to the German command and led several commanders to come to the erroneous conclusion that the BEF was more numerous than had previously been thought. Philip Warner
•
Like
many other famous battles, Le Cateau its name from a nearby town which
outflanked British have expected it.
takes
little of the actual fighting. The main actions took place along the line of the Le
could possibly
forces
Not unfittingly, August 26 was the anniversary of the Battle of Crecy which had taken place over 500 years before, in 1346. On the former occasion a heavily outnumbered English force had also been surrounded, but on that day the magnificent longbow with its volleys of arrows at 12 to the minute had reduced the opposition to helpless fragments. In 1914 the longbow had been replaced by the rifle which pumped out bullets at 16 rounds
saw
Cateau-Cambrai road and they were not, for the most part, in positions which those holding them would have chosen to defend. But this was a retreat and an emergency. The Battle of Le Cateau earned its place in history for the desperate and dogged resistance that took place when no one, neither in the triumphant German army, nor in the outnumbered, outgunned and
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to the minute.
The combination
of rapid
and high quality marksmanship would not win the day at Le Cateau, but it would give the advancing enemy a check which was vital if the retreat was ultimately to be turned into a counterattack. At this stage the Germans might reasonably have assumed that the superior fire-power of their artillery would sweep away the opposition and allow their infantry to swarm over the ground thus cleared. Against massive superiority in men and materials the small English force had little but courage and tenacity to withstand the onfire
slaught.
The general situation was complicated but not confused. The higher command was well aware that the retreating troops were too weary to march further but not too exhausted to lie down and fire their rifles. A complication was the fact that I Corps under Lieutenant-General Haig, and II Corps under General Smith-Dorrien (who had taken over the command only five days previously), had become separated. The previous night had brought them to the Forest of Mormal, a compact wooded area of beech and oak measuring some nine miles by four. It was clearly unwise to try to march through this obstacle, crossed as it was by unmarked and confusing paths. They therefore separated, II Corps taking the west side and I Corps the east. During the night I Corps was involved in the fighting at Landrecies. When morning came therefore I Corps was in no state to move west over the eight miles which separated it from II Corps. The latter would have to go it alone, or almost alone. In retrospect it is easy to see how II Corps found itself in such an exposed posi-
the higher command had decided that holding the Le Cateau position would be less exhausting than another day's march in stifling heat over sun-baked roads and it was therefore decided to make a stand at this position. Subsequently it was found that the French on the right flank of I Corps were already retiring and the Germans were in greater strength than had previously been realised, so the decision was taken to continue the retreat to a more tenable position. Then came the separation around the Forest of Mormal, and I Corps' engagement at Landrecies. There was now a gap between the two corps, but the II Corps' troops, now arriving in the Le Cateau area, looked less exhausted than had been feared. It was therefore decided to make a stand, give the German army a sharp punch on the nose, and then regroup further back. By this last decision it was hoped that the danger of German troops pouring through the gap between the two British corps would be averted. tion. Originally
Darkness and heavy rain In the circumstances, the troops in the field — always liable to be cynical about the intellectual powers of the higher command — might well have thought their worst fears were justified. Many units were ordered to take up positions in the dark, sometimes to the accompaniment of heavy rain. Some had difficulty in locating the areas they had been allotted, for they were
using unfamiliar French maps which had neither contours nor hachuring (shading) Once daylight arrived, and the morning mist cleared, they could see they were in
Brought to a standstill by hastily improvised positions Right:
Checked again by the
British,
German
Below: Waiting for the onslaught, the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers dig in by a road infantry wait to attack.
open countryside, with very few fences and very little woodland and that there were not many opportunities for the enemy to approach unseen. However, the British were too busy trying to cope with their disadvantages to count their blessings. 4th Division was far from complete, lacking signals, artillery, ammunition and ambulances, and already it had some of its forward troops tangled up with the enemy. 5th Division never received the general order to stand at all and was therefore brought into the fight in positions which they had not anticipated holding. The Suffolk Regiment was particularly badly placed, and when the men were told to dig in they had to scrape out makeshift trenches with their mess tins. 3rd Division, in the middle sector, was better prepared than the others, having had earlier warning, but nevertheless faced overwhelming odds.
The battle may be said to have begun at approximately 0600 hours, being opened by a brisk artillery bombardment which landed on the troops hastily trying to dig in. It is difficult enough to dig a trench with a mess tin at the best of times but particularly so when lying flat on the ground under shellfire. The German force, which included IV Corps, IV Reserve Corps, and II Cavalry Corps, was overwhelmingly superior, both in men and guns. Nevertheless their first effort to drive a wedge between the two British corps was swiftly foiled by a brisk counterattack from half a battalion of the East Surreys. The Surreys were soon joined by the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry (DCLI), and German attempts to create a gap and pour through it were immediately abandoned. By 0800 hours the whole British line was under heavy artillery fire, to which the outnumbered British gunners replied with considerable vigour and success. At the time it was thought that the accuracy of the German fire was due to information sent back by spies but in fact it was mainly from the use of spotter aircraft. Most of the British infantry had to suffer this bombardment without being able to make a reply; the exceptions were the East Surreys and DCLI, mentioned above, who were still ploughing steadily ahead at midday. By 1000 hours the situation of the British infantry had become extremely trying. The Germans had mounted guns on the heights east of Le Cateau, and the 5th Division was raked with fire from both sides. In the forefront of this holocaust were the Suffolks and King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI), soon to be joined by two companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders who also had to dig themselves in as best they could with their mess tins. Shortly after 1000 hours the German infantry began to advance. 11th Battery and 108th Heavy Battery poured shells into this new target. Casualties on both sides
were shattering, but neither side stopped attack; the 11th Battery continued to function after every officer had been killed its
and there were only enough men to fire one gun; the Germans, although cut and torn by the intense bombardment, rallied their ranks and pressed forward. An extraordinary scene took place in front of 122nd Battery where a platoon of Germans came over a ridge in close formation. The battery fired a salvo and every German fell. It might have been thought that the Ger-
mans would have
resorted to
more open
formation or some other tactics, but it was not to be. They continued to advance and continued to be slaughtered. Up in front the Suffolks, helped enormously by the machine guns of the KOYLI, were still holding the attack. Needless to say this heroic stand was not without fearful cost and the Manchesters, Argylls and Middlesex moved up to help. The Manchesters seem to have had the worst of it for they were caught in a fearsome mixture artillery and machine gun fire. this point the Suffolks began to run out of ammunition for their own machine
of
rifle,
At
The commanding officer, Major Doughty, managed to bring some up himself but was badly wounded in the process. guns.
Then the Argylls arrived. But the last remaining gun of 11th Battery was now put out of action by the German 'heavies' mounted on the Montay spur, the German infantry battalions were gradually inching forward, and flanking fire was raking both sides.
The
Suffolks
had now been under
devastating and incessant bombardment for six hours; their position
was
impossible.
Nevertheless they stood their ground and continued to return shot for shot.
Heavy machine gun fire The troops in the centre
of the line had seen little action so far, but their turn was coming. Away on the left it was a different story. Soon after 0600 hours the King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment was caught in an unexpectedly heavy attack by machine gun fire. As they were in close formation at the time the destruction was very considerable. The battalion was ordered to lie down but in that formation only the front rank of each platoon could return the fire. However, so good was their marksmanship that they had an immediate effect on the German machine guns at a distance of 800 yards. Unfortunately the influence of this was somewhat diminished by the fact that
several German batteries now ranged on the regiment, inflicting further heavy casualties. Two companies of the Warwickshires, guided by a staff officer, forced their way up the hill to help, but their own losses were so great that they were forced to fall back. After a time the King's Own, now reduced to about half its original strength, managed to move away to the right during a temporary lull in the fire. There they managed to shelter in a country lane, and from that point managed to extract a suitable revenge on the machine gunners who had accounted for so many of their comrades.
The preponderance guns (the
of
German machine
those in this quarter was 21) gave them a decided advantage which they did not neglect to use. First they enfiladed the Lancashire Fusiliers. Then, encouraged by this success, the 7th Jdger (a rifle regiment) advanced over a cornfield unaware that the official figure for
Inniskillings were positioned ready to meet them. By the time they realised their mistake they had left 47 dead on the field. The left
platoon
of
Inniskillings
was
sur-
rounded by a circle of German dead without having one of its own members wounded.
Shortly
afterwards
the
Lancashire
Fusiliers were able to regroup and inflict their own share of casualties on the ad-
vancing Germans. Other units involved at this stage in this area were the East Lancashires, Rifle Brigade, Somerset Light Infantry and Hampshires. These held their ground well and even made counterattacks. The problem for General Smith-Dorrien was to decide how long it was feasible to hold the position, faced as they were with over-
whelming
artillery
and machine gun
fire,
without risking being surrounded. At times elements of the 11th Infantry Brigade were pushed out of position by the intensity of the shrapnel but always reoccupied the original ground. By midday the Germans were using the greater part of the artillery of three divisions against the sector of the British line held by the Suffolks. Unfortunately there were few reserves to reinforce the Suffolks, for many of the Argylls had already been committed to the fight, but the remainder, with the 1st Middlesex, were now brought up. This was clearly a situation which could not last and it was decided that the gun's of the 5th Division should be brought back (by this time they were virtually in the front line). The removal of these guns is one of the more epic stories of gunner history. By sheer heroism, but at fearful cost in the lives of men and horses, a substantial portion of these guns was saved and withdrawn; the last team was only 400 yards ahead of the advancing Germans and the gap would have been closer still had not a section of the Manchesters held them back with intense fire. At this moment three Victoria Crosses were won. A party of volunteers under Captain Reynolds of the 37th Battery galloped (field artillery were not normally allowed to gallop owing to the danger of shaking off men riding on the limbers) to within 200 yards of the advancing Germans and calmly proceeded to limber up two howitzers which had been left behind. One team was shot to pieces before it could move off but the other triumphantly bore away its valuable howitzer. Captain Reynolds, Driver Luke, and Driver Drain all received the VC for the part they played in this action. By 1445 hours the Germans were upon the Suffolks with overwhelming force and attacked them from front, right and rear. But not without cost. The Suffolk line, now reinforced with Argylls, poured out a pitiless fire into the advancing enemy. Ultimately completely surrounded, they were overwhelmed from the rear; the ground over which they had fought for the last nine hours had scarcely a square yard which did not bear the marks of bombardment. In a battle where courage and endurance were almost universal it may seem unfair to single out individuals, but two perhaps typify the spirit of the day. One
was Major-General
Sir Charles Fergusson
who commanded the 5th Division. He galloped about among the bursting shells everyone to stay in their positions and give as good as they got. How he managed to survive this constant exposure to such a hail of fire was never encouraging
211
understood, and seemed something of a miracle. Another extraordinary survival was that of Captain Jack of the Cameronians, a staff officer, who walked up and down the front line all day supervising operations but was never once hit. When the decision was taken for the 5th Division to retire it was soon apparent that drafting an order was one thing but
Taking up a natural
this time the
KOYLI were
firing position in a ditch, riflemen wait for the attack
delivering it another. In the front line the fighting was often literally hand-to-hand, and immediately behind it the area was so swept with shell-fire that passage was almost impossible. The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry had their first knowledge of the passage of events by seeing German infantry advancing on it in dense masses down the ridge in front. Very coolly the Yorkshiremen allowed the enemy to proceed well down the slopes then proceeded to drive them back over the ridge behind with intense and accurate fire. At this point the regiment might have had a breathing space but as the flanking units were now under orders to withdraw the KOYLI now found themselves outflanked and almost
holding up the
German advance
at what the latter had thought was an open gap. In such circumstances men do incredible things. Corporal Holmes picked up a wounded fellow soldier and carried him a mile through heavy fire. For this he was awarded a Victoria Cross. Major Yate's 'B' Company held their section of the line until only 19
entire
men were
left in
which
will
any condition
to fight.
As
Cross.
Among the regiments actually destroyed on this day was the 1st Battalion of the It
was part of the
Not least of their satisfactions was the deadly sniping which eliminated every attempt of the Germans to set up machine
8th Infantry Brigade in the 3rd Division and had been employed in holding a position north of the village of Audencourt. In theory this brigade had received orders to retire at 1530 hours but in practice some of the units never received these orders at all. This was hardly surprising in view of the general situation. Since 1430 hours the whole area had been under furious bom-
gun
bardment and large numbers of
surrounded by enemy. Their immediate reaction was not of dismay but of satisfaction, for with the enemy now at 500 yards range their unperturbed marksmen took fearful toll of the advancing infantry.
posts in
commanding
positions.
By
gentle incline through knee-high beetroots; they were met with a storm of bullets, rapid
and accurate, which cut them
to pieces at
follow the one they have already repulsed
they would be overwhelmed at any moment, and were not prepared to surrender, the gallant 19 fired to the last moment then leapt out of their trenches and charged. Major Yate, who led the charge, was badly wounded and fell into German hands. He was killed somewhat mysteriously less than a month later when trying to escape from a prison camp in Germany. For his conduct on that great day of August 26 he was awarded a posthumous Victoria
Gordon Highlanders.
horses, and machine guns had been lost. At 1700 hours the advancing German infantry clashed with the Gordon Highlanders and a small detachment of the Royal Scots. It was a dramatic moment. The German infantry were advancing up a
vehicles,
a range of 500 yards. The irresistible force met the immovable obstacle — and stopped. For the next hour the German infantry tried to break through this deadly barrier and then, when frontal attack, failed, to outflank it. Meanwhile German casualties were mounting so sharply that the whole German attack was halted. At about 2000 hours the firing died down and, after dark, ceased altogether; it was now obvious that the rest of the British line had fallen back and the Gordons were in urgent need of further orders. However, the orders never came as the party sent to establish fell into contact with 3rd Division enemy hands. In consequence, at 1230 hours, Colonel W. G. Gordon VC, of the Gordons, decided it was time to take the necessary move to link up with the remainder of the British force, and marched off. Moving in the dark through enemyheld territory to an unknown objective is generally a hazardous occupation, and proved to be so in this case. Not knowing the strength of the opposition they ran into from time to time, the Gordons had to dis-
had
HQ
engage rather than destroy; after several heavy exchanges of fire they found themselves completely surrounded. Few were able to escape and half of the battalion was captured — a sad end for a unit which had not only protected the division but played a not inconsiderable part in saving the corps from the encircling movement of the
German forces.
The
Battle of Le Cateau: caught in an
open
were pressed to the point of annihilation and accomplished more than might have been thought humanly possible. Others,
misled.
less heavily involved, carried out their tasks methodically and competently. Their chance for distinction — and destruction — would not be long in coming, but it was not at Le Cateau. The French part in the battle is often
tance caused the German commander to overestimate the number of British troops involved, and to formulate future plans based on a miscalculation. The battle also provided the Allies with a welcome breathing space in their hasty retreat.
position,
Depleted, battered and lost fact that by this time everyone was
The
desperately tired and in many cases men fell asleep as they touched the ground on a halt, does not mean that they had lost spirit and the will to fight. The worse the situation the better became the resistance. A typical example was the two companies of
Dublin
Fusiliers under Major Shewan. depleted, much battered, and often lost, 78 of them found their way through the German lines to Boulogne. The presence of these small but still dangerous detachments on the battlefield long after the main forces had been withdrawn was a circumstance of no small discomfiture to the Germans. In consequence they wasted valuable time and effort in guarding
Much
against counterattacks which never came, and in shelling positions which had long been empty of British troops. From a brief and inevitably selective account such as this it might perhaps be assumed that Le Cateau was an important occasion for a few units only. This would be far from the truth. Some units indeed
II
Corps
of the
BEF was
able to maul
its
The Le Cateau battle may therefore be said to have had a much more than local influence, for the quality of the resis-
pursuers badly and then rejoin the retreat
overlooked because it was unobtrusive. However, the measure of their contribution is the absence of the German 77 Corps from the fight. This should have made a wide sweeping movement to take in the British left flank but it was opposed by three of General d'Amade's divisions and never reached the Le Cateau position at all.
Cavalry units have also received little mention in this account, which was, as we have seen, mainly an artillery duel. But cavalry, as always, did vital work in unglamorous activities such as protecting
and screening various units. The best tribute to any army is that
Further Reading Battine,
C, A
Military History of the
War
(London) Caffrey, K., Farewell. Leicester Square: the
Contemptibles, 12 August- 19 (Andre Deutsch 1980)
Old
November 1914
Coleman, F., From Mons to Ypres with French (London 1916) Hamilton, E. W., The First Seven Divisions (London 1916) Military Operations: France and Belgium 1914 (Macmillan 1933)
Spencer Watkins, 0., With French and Flanders (London 1915)
in
France
flanks,
which comes from the opposition. General von Kluck, commanding the German First Army (which was composed of seven corps) informed his Commander-in-Chief, General von Moltke, that he had beaten no less than nine divisions at Le Cateau. The resistance he encountered led him to believe that I Corps was in the Le Cateau fighting and that the 6th Division had also taken part (it was still in England at the time). Moltke was suitably impressed, and
PHILIP WARNER was born in 1914 and had just taken his degree at Cambridge when the Second World War broke out. He joined the army and went to Malaya at the beginning of 1 94 1 After the surrender of Singapore in February 1942 he was a Japanese prisoner of war for three and a half years, working on the Bangkok-Moulmein 'railway of death' and then in a copper mine in Japan. On demobilisation he became an Assistant-Principal in HM Treasury, and a year late, transferred to the British Council as a lecturer in Spain. In 1 948 he became Senior Lecturer at the RMA Sandhurst. He is the author of several .
books and*a number
of articles.
213
The guns Light and
medium
of the 'Great Retreat'
field
pieces of both sides
British 18-pounder Mark I. Calibre: 3-3-inches. Barrel length: 28 calibres. Weight of shell: 18 pounds. Maximum range: 7,000 yards. Elevation: —5 degrees to + 16 degrees. Weight of gun and carriage: 3,800 pounds
Above:
French 75-mm field gun. Calibre: 75-mm. Weight of shell: 16 pounds (shrapnel).
Left:
Maximum
range: 7,440 yards. Elevation:
—10
degrees to + 19 degrees. Weight: 2,657 pounds. Rate of fire: 6 rounds-per-minute normally, but up to 20 rounds-per-minute when necessary
LANDRECIES
N.G.Alvey While II Corps was fighting the Battle of Le I Corps was retreating round the Forest of Mormal, and here German troops moving from the edge of the fighting at Le Cateau bumped into it near Landrecies. There ensued a confused and violent battle at the end of which the British were able to extricate themselves better than the Germans, and thus further Cateau,
hampered the progress of the German armies Above: Highland machine gunners prepare the evening of August 23, 1914 the BEF still fighting hard near the Mons canal. On their right the brilliant but irresolute General Lanrezac started to withdraw the French Fifth Army. Although this exposed the British to a flank attack Lanrezac neg-
On
was
lected to inform Field-Marshal Sir John French of his intention, and it was only through the initiative of Lieutenant Spears, the British liaison officer, that French learned of Lanrezac's decision. Piqued by the arbitrary conduct of this 'Staff* College pedant', and mindful of the British government's insistence on minimising losses, French decided to sever contact with the French and retreat south-westwards to the Channel ports. French's command was an Joffre, whose were to be rigorously tested in the next few days, could only suggest that the BEF retreat towards Cambrai rather than Amiens and thus reduce the gap that otherwise would develop between the French and British armies. Also, General von Kluck, commanding the German First Army, had moved troops west to press on the British left wing and head the BEF eastwards to Mauberge, where he hoped to encircle them. French realised Kluck's intention to tempt him into the wellfortified and provisional fortress of Mauberge, and ordered the BEF to retreat southwards towards his own HQ at Le
independent one and General tact
and iron
will
Cateau. But about
15 miles north-east of Le Cateau their retreat was blocked by the Forest of Mormal. French now faced an
awkward
decision.
North
to south
com-
for action
munications through the forest were inadequate. To have passed the whole army down the west or the east side of the forest would have swamped the roads already cluttered with army transports and refugees, and would have involved flank marching under the very noses of the Germans. With great misgivings French decided to split the army and ordered I and II Corps to march down the east and west sides of the forest respectively. I Corps, under Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig, was to cross east over the River Sambre and recross it south of the forest to rejoin II Corps.
Early on August 25 I Corps crossed the just below Mauberge. This may have misled Kluck into thinking his plan had succeeded, but later, when he learned from aerial reconnaissance that British forces (II Corps) were marching towards Le Cateau, he inclined his right wing forward to turn the left flank of the BEF. By a skilful fighting withdrawal II Corps foiled
Sambre
manoeuvre and units of the German and TV Corps passed north of them into the forest of Mormal. West to east communications through the forest were good and it was not long before the Germans this
III
About 5.30 pm refugees rushed into the north-west outskirts of Landrecies shouting that the Uhlans (German lancers) were on their heels and flourishing captured lances and accoutrements to prove it. Haig sent Brigadier Charteris to investigate this but Charteris could find no trace of the
Germans who may have been an advanced patrol which fled when, unexpectedly, they found the British in Landrecies. About 1800 hours German patrols of the 48th Infantry Brigade of /// Corps engaged the two troops of the 15th Hussars, who held them at bay for an hour near Maroilles, until the Germans brought up a field gun and compelled the hussars to fall back. The arrival of a company of the 1st Battalion
of the Royal Berkshire Regiment coming to relieve the hussars decided the Germans to retire to the bridge. There was such a congestion of supply lorries and refugees in Maroilles that the other three companies of the 1st Royal Berkshires were delayed in coming up. When they did arrive the Germans had barricaded the bridge and got their field gun into position. The only approach to the bridge was by a long cause-
way
over marshy ground and the British, losing over 60 men, temporarily abandoned their attempts to dislodge the after
encountered the blind flank of the British I Corps. This corps had been delayed by having to share roads with French reserve
Germans. Meanwhile,
and Haig had set up his HQ at Landrecies where the 4th (Guards) Brigade was billeted. Landrecies guarded a bridge over the Sambre, and two troops of the 15th Hussars guarded another at Maroilles where the 6th Brigade was billeted.
was guarding the road to Le Quesnoy. The company commander, Captain Monck, expected some French troops along this road and so was not surprised when men arrived singing French songs and answering his
divisions,
at Landrecies No 3 Company of the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards
215
French. It was dark but while investigating the intruders someone flashed a light and it was seen that, although the soldiers in front were dressed in French and Belgian uniforms, those in the rear were Germans. Monck immediately gave the order to fire but the Germans had crept close enough to lower bayonets and charge, knocking down Monck and killing Private Robson and seizing his machine gun. The steady fire of the unit soon drove the Germans back, however, and the machine gun was recovered.
challenge
in
Monck was
Panic reaction Haig, hearing the noise of battle, quickly prepared the defence of the town. The 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards was to defend the west entrances and the 2nd Battalion
Coldstream Guards to check any encirclement from the south and east. The 1st Battalion Irish Guards was ordered to prepare the town for defence and, to the consternation of those townsfolk who had not fled, mattresses and furniture were thrown out into the streets to build barricades. •Judging by some of his orders, such as that to destroy all papers, Haig had overestimated the gravity of the situation, but he was not his normally imperturbable
he was suffering from diarrhoea. About two hours later Charteris, who had been supervising the fortifying of a school, found Haig preparing to motor west to Le Grand Fayt where his new HQ was being set up. Haig told Charteris to sit with the driver and plan the route. There was a good deal of firing and their chances of getting through were rated low. It was an eerie ride in darkness with the headself as
lights off but they encountered no German patrols and, after one or two lucky guesses, Charteris guided them to an outpost of the 1st Division. Haig went immediately to and ordered 1st Division to his new attack next morning to extricate the 4th Brigade from Landrecies. He also sent Charteris to ask the French for help. Meanwhile at Landrecies the 3rd Coldstreams were still engaging the enemy. At
HQ
first alarm Major Matheson and No 1 Company under Captain Longueville had
the
hurried up to reinforce the picket guard on the Le Quesnot road, and to line the northern outskirts of the town. The Germans attacked them persistently throughout the night using hand grenades and firing high explosive and shrapnel shells into Landrecies. Every rush they made was repulsed by the cool, regular and accurate fire of the
/
Coldstreams. By working up behind the hedges the Germans were able to enfilade part of the British line which then had to withdraw to the cover of some cottages. Then a small haystack was set on fire,
up the British position. The field gun and shelled the British at point blank range. Although the Germans were only 25 yards away Private West dashed out twice under heavy fire and managed to extinguish the flames. But the British had only infantry and machine guns to meet any attack, so about 0100 hours Colonel Feilding, the battalion commander, had a howitzer brought up by hand. He pointed out places where the flashes of other German guns had been seen and after three rounds from the howitzer the German guns were silenced. By now the Grenadier Guards had reand
this
lit
Germans brought up a
pulsed several attacks on the western outskirts of the town, and at 0300 hours the Guards mounted a diversionary Irish counterattack to help the withdrawal of; the 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards, who had borne the brunt of the fighting. They had lost 12 killed, 105 wounded and seven missing. Captain Monck, who had been involved in the fighting from the outset, had had bullets through his cap and coat :
\
\
i
•
I
>
but was unwounded. The Germans (14th Infantry Brigade of IV Corps) had lost about 130 men. It was decided to evacuate Landrecies before dawn with the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards under Colonel Pereira covering the retreat. The brigade arrived at Etreux in the afternoon tired, but wellsatisfied with their performance. I Corps HQ staff, including Haig himself, and also one French and two British divisional commanders might have been captured if the German attack bad been successful. The subsequent retreat to the Maine would have been seriously hampered but for the steadfastness of Colonel Feilding and his
sumed
their retreat, such was the urgency be gone, that they did not recross the Sambre. This precipitate retreat on a new line of march left a gap between themselves and II Corps which exposed their right flank when they fought at Le Cateau, ami was later exploited by the German cavalry during the subsequent retreat to the to
cling movement through Belgium, had unwittingly placed the BFF in the most
dangerous battle area and had provided French with disastrous underestimates of the strength of the German forces opposing him. Losing faith in lus French allies,
French desired only organise his army.
to
withdraw and
re
Maine. French, hearing of a critical situation from the normally unruffled Haig. was profoundly disturbed. The British GHQ sucto a pessimism as exaggerated as
cumbed
Further Reading Callwell,
battalion.
their optimism before and during the battle of Mons. This so affected Colonel Huguet, the head of the French mission to the BFF, that when asking Lanrezac for help he
The action was not a major one but Haig, unnaturally apprehensive, imagined bis corps was pursued by the bulk of the enemy forces. Certainly the delay due to the confusion on the roads during August 25 had left I Corps north of II Corps and the French Fifth Army, but Kluck, obsessed with envelopment from the west, had been pressing hardest on II Corps. So little was this appreciated by Haig that at 0350 hours on August 26 he suggested that troops of II Corps should march from Le Cateau to assist at Landrecies. When I Corps re-
wrote: 'The I Corps has been violently attacked in the night and is falling back, if it can, on Guise to the south.' French became convinced that the unannounced withdrawal of the French at Mons had placed his army in desperate peril, a conviction that was reinforced by the battle of Le Cateau fought on August 26. Not without justification, he felt that Lanrezac had been solely concerned with saving the French Fifth Army, and had not considered the plight of his ally. The French, unaware of the extent of the German encir-
Ma|-Gen C E Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. His Life and Diaries (Cassell .
1927)
Chartens, Brig-Gen J., At GHQ (Cassell 1931) Edmonds. Brig-Gen J.. History of the Great War. Volume (Macmillan 1933) French. F-M. Viscount, 7974 (Constable 1919) Memoirs of Marshal Joffre (Paris: Plon 1932) Ross. Sir John. The Coldstream Guards 1914-1918 (OUP 1928) Smith-Dorrien, Gen. Sir Horace, Memories ol 48 Years of Service (Murray 1925) Spears, Sir Edward. Liaison 1914 (Hememann I
1930)
N G. ALVEY was a Arm from 1942 to
radio
mechanic
1946,
serving
in
in
the Fleet Air Britain,
the
and the Arctic He is now a statistician and works at an agricultural research station. Atlantic
A
up ammuniThe discomfort of travelling on these unsprung vehicles was acute in the extreme Inset: Kluck (with coat) and his staff. British artillery carriage brings
tion.
*
Professionals in every other way, senior German commanders sometimes lacked the ability to see beyond their own horizons and consider the operational needs of neighbouring armies
-^»
.
\
Like the British actions at Le Cateau and Landrecies, the French battle at Guise was important in slowing up the German advance and thus facilitated a more orderly retreat by the Allies. Much larger in scope than the British holding actions, the Battle of Guise demonstrated the ability of the French, in particular the Fifth Army, to hold together as a fighting unit despite the adverse conditions under which they were operating. Brian Jones
Below left: Unkempt and dishevelled after the retreat, French troops turn and wait for the Germans. Below nghf Fired but victoriously aggressive. German troops wait for the next attack
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The Battle of Guise,
at
which the French
Army struck back at the advancing German Second Army on August 29, 1914, Fifth
was
so
overshadowed by the staggering
German movement which swept down through Belgium to the gates of Paris and by the fateful and much vaster Battle of the Marne, to which it was an important prelude, that to many it remains little more than a name. It might even unkindly be suggested that British, French and Germans alike had good cause to leave it a decent obscurity. The British could vital part and yet deliberately chose not to participate in the battle; the Germans (who because of the dual nature of the engagement called it the Battle of St Quentin) considered themin
have played a
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provoked controversy and recrimination and the French army was afflicted with yet another cause celebre. The general commanding the French Fifth Army, Lanrezac, was an unfortunate man whose tendency to expect the worst had aroused grave misgivings in the French high command. Lanrezac was not happy about the army to which he had been appointed in May 1914. He was totally unfamiliar with the area of northern France where it had to operate, as he had
consequences
\<
+
%
mistakes through misappreciating
significance; the French achieved a striking tactical victory, but the general responsible was dismissed within a few days of his triumph. On all sides the battle and its
--*
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selves to be the victors, but were led into
~.«
spent five years as chief-of-staff to the First Army in the east of France. Now he was leading an army of some 250,000 men, about whose capabilities he entertained strong doubts. With the BEF on his left and the Fourth Army under Langle de Cary on his right, he was in the path of the German First, Second and Third Armies as they moved southwards and westwards in conformity with the spirit, if not the exact letter, of the Schlieffen Plan. Despite the fact that the French high command had envisaged that Belgium's neutrality would not be violated by the Germans, and that the Fifth Army would not be engaged from the outset, the choice of an army commander of Lanrezac's views and ability was nevertheless exHeadlong attacks fortunate. ceedingly against the massive German forces which poured into Belgium would have resulted in a catastrophe from which there would have been no recovery. In the event, Lanrezac had successful y removed his troops
from their exposed position and although forced to give up ground after hard-fought engagements such as at Charleroi, he had
the
commander
of the
German
First
Army,
on the other hand became convinced that the British army was of no account and could quickly be despatched. Having been released from Billow's overall command, he accordingly hastened in pursuit of the British and pushed south-west past the left wing of Lanrezac's army which was thus left "with both flanks exposed and facing the
German Second Army.
This army numbered over 250,000 men, but its commander, Generaloberst von Biilow, at the age of 68 lacked the dash of his former subordinate and was prudent to the point of over-cautiousness. He nevertheless strove to maintain the impetus of the German advance in spite of the difficulties engendered by a week of continuous marching in the exceptionally hot weather of that August and the loss of a corps, which had been sent to the Eastern Front on the 26th. The morale of the
Second in the
Army was
high, and any weakness French front would be exploited
with ruthless
efficiency.
A change of front This weakness developed as a result of
fire their 75-mm gun on its improvised high elevation mounting against the new ground forces, the almost unassailable reconnaissance aircraft
moved south and then
faced west at the Oise while XVIII Corps, reinforced by the 38th African Division, was brought across to form up on the river above the Reserve divisions so as to spearhead the attack on St Quentin. Ill Corps, reinforced by the 37th African Division, similarly moved west and took up its position to the north of XVIII Corps. Since I Corps was placed in reserve, ready to move northwards or westwards as required, this new arrangement left only X Corps to defend what was now the northern flank and what had formerly been a front defended by the whole army. The gap between the Fifth and Fourth Armies became the responsibility of Abonneau's 4th Cavalry Division and Boutegourd's Reserve Division, though fortunately for this small force no German push seemed to be developing in this area. This redeployment of the Fifth Army occupied the whole of August 28 and Lanrezac's burdens were made no lighter by the presence of Joffre, who urged that every possible man and gun should be thrown into the attack, and expressed the opinion that a single corps should be adequate to cover the right flank. The one item of good
A French crew
The
threat to
— carrier pigeons provided one of the answers
not suffered irreparable losses. But the French armies and the British army had been obliged to pull back without reference to each other. Thus the British had been left exposed at Mons when the Fifth
Army had withdrawn, and
this
army
in its
turn was threatened on its right when the Fourth Army pulled back. In such an uncoordinated withdrawal it was inevitable that the Germans should catch up with some part of the Allied armies in a position unfavourable to the latter, and it was the British army's misfortune that this should happen to its II Corps at Le Cateau. After a vicious action against overwhelming forces from the German First Army, SmithDorrien's corps successfully disengaged, but its losses were considerable and the consequences important. Sir John French became convinced that an immediate withdrawal to some depth was imperative for the British army to rest and reorganise sufficiently to remain a fighting force; he also felt complete justification for his suspicions that the Fifth Army and its commander were not to be relied upon. Kluck,
the orders which Lanrezac received at his
HQ
Marie on August 28. Joffre was anxious to take some of the pressure off the British and to shield the newly created Sixth Army which was still grouping near Amiers. From the position which the Fifth Army had reached the previous day on the at
bank
of the Oise in the area of Guise, was to strike out westwards across the Oise towards St Quentin, regardless of what the British might do. This sudden decision to attack entailed enormous problems for Lanrezac and his staff, who in the middle of a hasty yet orderly retreat towards Laon were required to halt the movement and change the face of the front from north to north-west. Very much against his inclination and judgeleft
Lanrezac
ment, Lanrezac complied. Just downstream of the town of Guise the Oise turns sharply southwards, and within the right angle formed by the river to his north and to his west Lanrezac deployed his forces for the attack on St Quentin. The 53rd and 69th Reserve Divisions under General Valabregue were
retreat
presented communication problems
news for Lanrezac was that Sir Douglas Haig was eager to help with his I Corps by harassing the Germans from the south of St Quentin, but nothing was to come of Haig's gesture as Sir John French, considering that all British troops were in urgent need of rest, forbade him to participate in the attack on St Quentin. Undismayed by this further complica-
Lanrezac attempted to compensate absence of the British by using his Reserve Divisions to the south of XVIII Corps, but these divisions were badly tired
tion,
for the
and could contribute little positive help to the attack. An ominous indication of the course the battle would take came when units of X Corps, charged with the protection of the heights south of the town of Guise, were hotly engaged by a force of Germans who came through the town on the 28th, and it was only when Exelman's Division from the XVIII Corps halted its
march westwards and came to their assistance that the Germans were driven back. In fact, by now the German Second Army had arrived in strength at the Oise between
Guise and Etreaupont and already constituted the threat to his right flank which Lanrezac had foreseen. He still thought he had a fair chance of delivering a powerful blow against St Quentin, which had been overrun by the German right wing, consisting of X Reserve Corps and VII Corps, but he also realised that his own X Corps would not be able to contain an all-out assault by the crack Guard and X Corps. Initially, the attack against St Quentin, which started in the thick morning mists of August 29, achieved some success, for the Germans in that area had thought that the camp-fires they had seen the previous night were those of their own army now level with them on the opposite bank of the Oise. But as pressure across the river to the north built up, Lanrezac was forced to modify his plans so as to avert the collapse of his right wing, for already by 1000 hours the Germans had seized the bridges at Guise. Following his orders, XVIII Corps continued its thrust westwards, but III Corps, which was established on both banks of the river, turned northwards away from its original objective to meet the German advance past Guise. By noon the im-
petus had gone out of the attack on St Quentin. Although the Reserve divisions succeeded in taking Urvillers and XVIII Corps reached the outskirts of St Quentin, they were driven back to the river in growing disorder as the day wore on. Joffre's plan for a smashing blow westwards had been thwarted, but the ubiquitous Commander-in-Chief refrained from comment as he stood behind Lanrezac at the Fifth Army HQ which was now at Laon. On his own initiative Lanrezac ordered the bulk of his army to counter the determined German drive coming from the north and brought into action his I Corps which had been held in reserve. It had been planned that part of this corps should be moved from its position on the right to fulfil the role of the British on the left, but lack of transport had prevented the move. It was consequently at full strength and had been able to take some of the rest it needed, but perhaps its greatest asset was its commander, Franchet d'Esperey, who by his personal bravery and iron discipline had maintained a high level of morale within the corps. When at 1300 hours I Corps received the order to go to the aid of the
hard-pressed X Corps which had been driven back some three miles from its original line on the Oise, Franohet d'Esperey had anticipated it, having witnessed the serious plight of X Corps. Yet only at 1530 hours when he was completely satisfied with his preparations did he commit the major part of his corps. With standards flying and bands playing, the fresh troops of I Corps advanced with tremendous fervour and rushed into the gap between X Corps and III Corps, which had fought its way up the Oise, and also alongside the right flank of X Corps. Mounted on his charger, Franchet d'Esperey spurred on his confident infantrymen whose task had been
made easier by careful
artillery
fire.
This sudden and powerful intervention drove in at the German flanks and carried forward with it the battle-weary troops of the adjoining corps. 'As the equally weary Germans were forced back they became herded together with their backs to the river and the French 75s inflicted heavy casualties upon them. Farther upstream General Abonneau left only a small screen to guard the gap between the Fifth and Fourth Armies and took the bulk of his
German Attacks French Attacks
==
IjSS
Principal roads
5 Mile s
"lOKms. The
Battle of Guise: in contrast with
contemporary
British actions, the
French were able
to
make
a limited counteroffensive
221
The price of glory cavalry division to Vervins to strike against the enemy left flank. All along the line the Germans were forced back and the spirits of the French troops soared as they realised they had inflicted an impressive reverse on German units which included a much vaunted Guards Corps.
Exposed flanks Even so, the Germans were far from defeated and at nightfall, when any further advance by the French became impossible, they were still present in strength on the south bank of the Oise. It was obvious that the Fifth Army could not continue for long to contain them along the line VervinsGuise-Ribemont, for Lanrezac knew that the British were two days' march behind him on the left and that the Fourth Army was pulling back to Rethel. The Fifth Army"s victory at Guise had placed it in an even more perilous position for both its flanks were exposed over a considerable depth and if it persisted in" its defiant posture facing the German Second Army, concerted action by Kluck's First Army and Hausen's Third Army would soon shatter its thinly defended flanks and encircle it. It was a matter of the utmost urgency that Lanrezac, like Smith-Dorrien at Le Cateau, should disengage and extricate his force. Yet his army was where it was as a result of Joffre's express orders, and only Joffre could authorise its withdrawal. Attempts by Lanrezac to obtain this authorisation were in vain because Joffre could not be
GHQ
contacted, and the staff at seemed little disposed to help Lanrezac in his predicament. In fact, the order for the retreat to be resumed was given at 2300 hours, but it failed to reach Lanrezac. The signals staff at had taken the coded order to be merely a confirmation of a message telephoned already by the operations staff. This failure was remedied only when a
GHQ
2;
telephoned confirmation of the original order was given to the Fifth Army at 0800 hours on the next morning. Once in possession of Joffre's permission to
retreat,
Lanrezac wasted no time in
pulling back his army in the face of mounting attacks from the east of Guise where the Germans had recrossed the Oise. Again the Fifth Army was retiring, but this time it was with the satisfaction of knowing it had administered a sharp rebuff to an enemy who had fast been acquiring a reputation of invincibility. The Fifth Army was exhausted, but it had given an encouraging example to the other Allied armies, and its success went beyond a general raising of morale on the Allied side and the inflicting of over 6,000 casualties upon the Germans. By its vigorous riposte at Guise, the French Fifth Army caused a serious dislocation of the German plans, for Billow, stunned at being stopped in his tracks, called for help from his right-hand neighbour, Kluck, and this movement towards Biilow changed the advance of Kluck s First Army to a south-easterly direction
and thus away from Manoury's hastilyassembling Sixth Army. Furthermore, so exhausted did Biilow consider his army to be, that he allowed it to rest for 36 hours. As a result, not only the Fifth Army, but all the Allied armies in the west were able to continue their retreat unimpeded. Without the aggressive stand and counterattack by the Fifth Army on the left bank of the Oise near Guise on August 29, the subsequent fortunes of the Allies must have been even more precarious than they turned out to be. For the qualities shown by him in the battle, Franchet d'Esperey was well rewarded. On September 3 he replaced Lanrezac as commander of the Fifth Army. Holding the views that he did
and expressing them provocatively,
,
Lanrezac inevitably
fell
foul of his
GHQ
and his fate was sealed by his inability to work harmoniously with the British. Nevertheless, in fighting a battle which was not of his own choosing he handled his forces with great skill and showed greater perception than his Commander-in-Chief.
was the misfortune of this enigmatic man, whom Joffre had once seen as a future It
generalissime (commander-in-chief), that he should be remembered as an army commander who was relieved of his post rather than as the man who by his coolness and timing snatched a precious victory at Guise.
Further Reading Asprey, R. B., The First Battle of the Marne (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1962) Blond, G., The Marne (Macdonald 1965) Christian-Froge, R. (ed.), La Grande Guerre, Vecus, Racontee, lllustree, Par les Combattants (Paris: Quillet 1922) Cole, R. H., Forward with the bayonet: the French Army prepares for offensive warfare 1911-1914 (Michigan: University Microfilms International)
Edmonds, Brig-Gen.
Sir
James, Military
Operations: France and Belgium 1914 (Macmillan 1933) Isaac, J., Joffre et Lanrezac (Paris: Chiron, 1922)
Lanrezac, General C, Le Plan de Campagne Francais (Paris: Payot, 1929) Spears, Brig-Gen. E. L, Liaison 1914 (Heine-
mann Tyng,
1930)
S.,
(OUP
The Campaign of the Marne 1914
1935)
BRIAN JONES is a lecturer in the Department of Languages at the RMA Sandhurst. He did National Service in the Royal Navy before going up to Oriel College, Oxford, where he read French and Russian. After he came down he taught English for a year at Chaumont in France. Before joining the academic staff at Sandhurst he taught in grammar schools for several years. He has translated and edited the memoirs of Charles Parquin, a cavalry officer in
Napoleon's Guard.
One of the most heroic
actions fought by the
BEF during
the retreat from Mons to the Marne was that at Nery, a village near Compiegne, where on September 1 a single battery of the Royal Horse Artillery which, with the 1st Cavalry Brigade, was covering the withdrawal of III Corps, held off for several hours the whole of the German 4th Cavalry Division. The battery, which in 1914 was equipped with six 13-pounders, is now known as 'L' (Nery) Battery, RHA
'L' Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, following in the wake of its Cavalry Brigade to Nery, reached it after the other units had begun to shake down into their quarters. The allotment of the village was as follows: at the northern end were the 5th Dragoon Guards with their horses in the open; the 11th Hussars were billeted on the eastern face and up the east side of the village street, the men and horses being under cover — in houses, yards, barns, sheds, or lean-to's. On the west side of the village street, and in the fields behind the village on this side, were the Queen's Bays, one squadron being in a field further to the south; all their horses were in the open. 'L' Battery on arrival was given a field to the south to bivouac in, and the sugar factory was allotted to it as its headquarters. In the north-west corner of the field were some haystacks. While the battery was completing its arrangements for the night the Battery
Commander proceeded
to
Cavalry Brigade
Headquarters, situated in the main street, to ascertain
what protective arrangements
had been made
to cover the bivouac of his
battery.
He received orders that 'L' was merely required to block the two roads which led east and south from the sugar factory. He A
British
crew poses beside
gun — a 13-pounder, the standard equipment their
of the
RHA
was
also told that the force would continue at 0430 hours on September 1. Major Sclater-Booth returned to his battery, and the necessary posts were found by 'L' to cover the southern end of the billeting area. Gradually the work was finished and,
the
march
wearied with the day's march under the hot August sun, men and horses settled down to rest. Silence brooded over the little village and the surrounding bivouacs that nestled around it on the western slope and at the bottom of the narrow valley, which was shut in to east and west by its guardian heights. Day broke cool and very misty, and when the march should have been resumed it was quite impossible to see objects more than 150 to 200 yards away. Orders were, therefore, issued that units should stand fast until 0500 hours. The battery, which was standing halted in mass with the teams hooked in, took advantage of this delay to let down the poles and water the horses by sections at the sugar factory. Generally, it may be said, 'the only desire of our force in Nery at this moment was to get outside an excellent breakfast'. This very natural desire was to be roughly frustrated. The mist was nearly as thick as ever when, just before 0500 hours Major Sclater-Booth, withJiis
walked down from the sugar factory to the north-west corner of the battery field, where the haystacks stood. Leaving the others here, the Battery Commander walked on up the main street of the little village to Brigade Headquarters in order to get the latest instructions as to the resumption of the march. Going into the house he found the Brigadier and his Brigade Major. Hardly had he entered when a high-explosive shell burst over the village, and a roar of gun and rifle fire broke out from the heights overlooking the eastern side of Nery. At the same moment Lieutenant Tailby, who had been sent with a patrol to reconnoitre the high ground north of Nery, reached headquarters and reported that he had ridden into a body of German cavalry in the mist and had been chased back. It officers,
was now about 0505 hours and the 1st Cavalry Brigade had been taken completely
by surprise.
Despite the disadvantage at which the British Cavalry and Horse Artillery were taken, and despite the heavy artillery, | machine gun and rifle fire pouring into the 3 open bivouacs around the village, steps s were taken by all units to offer an effective 5 resistance and hold on till assistance •§ arrived from neighbouring troops.
As soon as
a shell burst immediately in front of him, knocked him down, and put him out of action for the rest of the fight.
broke out the Brigadenecessary action was being taken. Major SclaterBooth also went out into the street with the Brigadier, and then left at once to return to his battery. Suddenly a mob of maddened horses came galloping wildly down the firing
Major went out
to see that the
An inferno
street. They were the horses of the Bays, stampeded by the enemy's fire. At the same moment a high-explosive shell burst among the surging mass of animals and rendered the road impassable. Crossing over to the western side of the street the Battery Commander ran behind the houses and so came to the field where 'C Squadron of the Bays had bivouacked during the night. From here the battery field was open to view, and Major Sclater-Booth saw that three guns had been unlimbered and brought into action to answer the fire of the German battery, the flashes of which could be seen stabbing through the slightly thinning mist. Apparently the German guns were in action on the heights to the eastward a short half-mile away. The din was terrific. There was one incessant roar of gun and rifle fire, punctuated by the violent detonations of 'Universal' shells bursting over the battery. As he ran forward to reach his battery
main
w
of shells
At the moment the surprise was effected, Captain Bradbury and the other officers of the battery were standing near the haystacks. Suddenly, with no previous warning, a shell burst over the battery, and
immediately afterwards the bivouac came under very heavy rifle fire from the ridge. Captain Bradbury shouted out 'Come on! Who's for the guns?' and running out from behind the haystacks, made for them, followed by all the other officers. Meanwhile, in the exposed battery, horses and men were falling fast. Joined by those men who were engaged in steadying the horses in the inferno of bursting shells, the officers got three guns unlimbered and swung round to face the German battery. Captain Bradbury, Sergeant Nelson, and others took one gun; Lieutenant Giffard took another; while Lieutenants Campbell and Mundy were at a third. The ammunition wagons were 20 yards away, and over that death-swept open space the ammunition had to be brought up. Hardly were the three guns in action when one of them,
Flyweight guns at Nery The heroic action of 'L' Battery at Neryj which resulted in the award of three VCs. Inset: Superior in numbers and calibre, the German guns nevertheless suffered heavy casualties
under Lieutenants Campbell and Mundy, was knocked out by a direct hit; the other two guns opened fire on the enemy. These two guns of 'L' carried on an unequal struggle. A few rounds only had been fired when Lieutenant Giffard, in charge of one of the guns, was severely wounded and all the detachment either killed or wounded. This left only one gun — under Captain Bradbury — still in action. Lieutenants Campbell and Mundy, when their gun was knocked out, at once ran to the gun where Captain Bradbury and Sergeant Nelson were working, while Gunner Darbyshire and Driver Osborn crossed and recrossed the shell-swept zone behind the gun to bring up the necessary ammunition from the wagons. Almost immediately after the two subalterns joined Captain Bradbury's detachment Lieutenant Campbell was killed, and the distribution of the duties at the gun became as follows: Lieutenant Mundy in position close to the gun, acted as Section Commander, while Captain Bradbury carried out the duties of layer, and Sergeant Nelson those of range-setter. The gun appeared to bear a charmed life and remained untouched. Also it was clear that its fire was not without result, for the Ger-
man guns were being badly mauled. When the action began the German guns seem to have been in two groups — one battery in action on the heights, and now busily engaged with 'L' Battery, and two more batteries, unlimbered farther to the north almost opposite the centre of the village
and
firing
on
it.
Drawn by the fire kept up by mans now apparently decided
'L',
the Ger-
to
mass
all
their guns, and the two batteries in action abreast of the centre of the village moved round to join that engaged with 'L'. The solitary gun of the latter was now opposed to heavy odds; for the hostile guns were under 800 yards away and in a commanding position. The action broke out
with renewed fury and the massed German batteries made a determined effort to crush the single undaunted gun. Lieutenant Mundy was now seriously wounded, and the tale of casualties began to mount up, until at last at 0715 hours there remained only Captain Bradbury, still unhit, and Sergeant Nelson, who had been severely wounded. They kept up the best rate of fire they could, but naturally it became very desultory. A reinforcement now reached the little detachment, in the person of Battery-Sergeant-Major Dorrell, and on
Captain Bradbury, knowing up with the gun was running low, went back to fetch up more from the wagons. As he left the gun he was hit by a shell and mortally wounded. There now remained only the BatterySergeant-Major and the wounded Sergeant Nelson. With these two to serve it, the gun fired its last remaining rounds and was silent. The end had come. But it had not been fought in vain, for, his
arrival
that the ammunition
as its last discharge boomed and echoed, reinforcements of all arms reached the field and the result it had fought so hard to attain was achieved. 'L' Battery's casualties amounted to 45 officers and men killed and wounded out of a strength of 170. Among the killed was
Captain Bradbury, who was awarded posthumously the Victoria Cross: it was also awarded to Sergeant Nelson and BatterySergeant-Major
Dorrell.
The
German
cavalry division lost more heavily, was driven into the surrounding forests, did not emerge from hiding until late next day and was still unfit to,move on September 4.
[From the Royal Artillery War Commemoration Book 1914-1918, reprinted by permission of thef \ ^ Royal Artillery Institution.] '
MOLTKE'S & JOFFRE'S HEADQUARTERS The headquarters of the commanders of the French and German armies presented a remarkable contrast: the one calm and stolid, unbedevilled by political interference and dominated by the placid bulk of Joffre; the other frenetic, overshadowed by the frequent presence of the Kaiser and his entourage and in no way dominated by its titular head, Moltke. Antony Brett-James From his office in Berlin General Helmuth von Moltke could see the equestrian statue of his famous uncle and namesake, the architect of victory over France in 1870. Thus overshadowed, and aware of the inadequate experience he had gained during a comfortable, but not active, career, Moltke felt little self-confidence in the post of Chief of the German General Staff, to which the Emperor had appointed him, his former aide, in 1906. In that year he had confessed: 'I do not know how I shall manage in the event of a campaign. I am very self-critical.' Besides this innate lack of confidence, Moltke was alienated temperamentally by the atmosphere prevailing in staff circles, and found it hard to identify himself with the military hierarchy, for he preferred to read philosophy, to play the 'cello and to translate Maeterlinck's Pelleas et Melisande than to indulge in the more active pursuits of his fellow officers. Moltke was further handicapped by poor health. He was aged 66 in 1914 and was not a fit man — in the previous year his doctor had warned him about a heart condition. What is more, he so lacked toughness of nerve and mind that sheer anxiety would prostrate him before long. Under real stress as Commander-inChief he lost control of himself to the point of tears, and felt overcome by a sense of terror. Such was the man in charge of Oberste Heeresleitung (the Army High Command, or OHL). He had not recovered from the shock of hearing his Emperor say, on August 1: 'Now we can go to war with Russia only.' To do this would, at that late hour, have entailed reversing the highly complex machinery of mobilisation against the Western Powers, with consequent confusion to the deployment of 11,000 troop and supply trains. As we know, a telegram from Germany's ambassador in London had caused the Kaiser to change his mind once again, but the shaken, despairing Moltke wrote afterwards: 'Something in me broke, and I was never the same thereafter.' Joseph Joffre, who was 62 in 1914, was the complete antithesis of Moltke. He not only believed in maintaining an appearance of calm, but was able to do so. His white hair, big moustache and corpulence enhanced the placid, phlegmatic impression he gave people. Undoubtedly he inspired confidence, he looked so imperturbable, so full of bonhomie. Sometimes, it is true, he flashed with anger or shouted with rage, but such outbursts were rare; and his plain, sometimes blunt language expressed in a toneless voice, his lack of fluency, which derived in part from slowness of thought, and his sartorial inelegance — witness the worn kepi pulled well down, the baggy red breeches, the sack-like greatcoat, the undistinguished gaiters he often wore — all contributed to a sense of limitless sang froid. When he visited the headquarters of his subordinate commanders he sat there and said very little, but his calm fostered the impression that events must be going reasonably well elsewhere, however grave the local situation. Joffre, at least, did not have the President of the Republic breathing down his neck at Grand Quartier General (GQG, the French GHQ). As Commander-in-Chief he had complete authority within the 'Zone of the Armies', as it was called, and even Monsieur Poincare, the President, needed Joffre's permission to enter. Joffre was deeply suspicious of, and determined to resist, the threat of government interference in the conduct of operations. Believing as he did that civilians should be told next to nothing, he not only kept the President in ignorance of military reverses and bypassed the Minister of War, but also warned his generals not to discuss strategy or explain operations with Poincare or any members of the government who came to the forward zone. Moltke, by contrast, when OHL moved by special train from Berlin to Coblenz on August 16, had the Kaiser and a small retinue lodged with the Lord Lieutenant of the Rhineland. He had to make decisions about the war against Russia as well as deal with the operations in the West. Politicians came and went. There were conferences with the Chancellor and with Admiral Tirpitz, the Naval Minister. Moltke wrote to his wife that he became ill every time he listened to the conversations at the noisy, intrigue-ridden Imperial
Headquarters, especially the Emperor's blood-thirsty, even gloating references to enemy corpses. He also fretted at the tiresome, time-wasting protocol and red tape. No wonder he was heard to mutter with a sign of envy: 'Joffre is a lucky man. In France a prince counts for nothing.' When, on August 5, GQG moved to the small town of Vitry-leFrancois, a hundred miles to the east of Paris, Joffre and two aides-de-camp accepted lodgings in the house of a retired engineer officer named Capron. The branches of the staff were installed in the hall and classrooms of a school in the Place Royer-Collard. Fortunately the holidays were on, so dislocation was reduced, and the immediate availability of accommodation in unused schools proved a boon to many other headquarters that month.
Lack of collaboration Three main staff departments served Joffre and the field armies of France. The premier bureau kept day-to-day records of all available troops and material. The deuxieme bureau (Intelligence), which established itself at Vitry in the school gymnasium, was responsible for collecting and analysing every scrap of information about the enemy: his strength, locations, movements and intentions. In some ways the most important were the members of the troisieme bureau or Operations Branch, who, besides knowing the position of all French units, had to transform Joffre's decisions into operational and movement orders. It was a regrettable handicap that the Operations and Intelligence Branches worked in sealed compartments at the expense of collaboration. GQG also had specialist branches to deal with services such as aviation, ciphers, railways, medicine, motor cars, supplies, and telephones and telegraphs. OHL was likewise divided into branches, but these did not correspond exactly with those at GQG. For instance, No I dealt with strategy and tactics, No II was concerned with heavy artillery, fortresses, et cetera, while No III handled aviation and vehicles. A sub-section, Illb, covered propaganda, the press, communiques and espionage. Another section had responsibility for field railways. There was, of course, an important branch devoted to Intelligence about foreign armies: their organisation, mobilisation, new formations, strategic and tactical measures, and so on. Moltke's principal staff officers were not outstanding. General Hermann von Stein, the Quartermaster-General to the Forces in the Field, was 60, and during the second half of the war served as Prussia's Minister of War. Despite a rough exterior, Stein was basically a man of goodwill and sympathy, who had great energy and thought clearly despite a tendency to be dogmatic. The head of the Operations Branch was Lieutenant-Colonel Gerhardt Tappen from Hanover. Blessed with good nerves, a strong will, and the power of quick decision, he was optimistic, industrious and precise; but he often showed himself to be contemptuous of war techniques and reluctant to consider new ideas. Moreover, his chilling manner and sarcastic tongue earned him the hatred of subordinates. If Tappen was an optimist, LieutenantColonel Richard Hentsch, Director of the Intelligence Branch, tended to err on the gloomy side. He was a clever, active Saxon of 44, whose handling of a special mission during the Battle of the Marne will be discussed in a later issue. Joffre's daily routine at Vitry-le-Francois followed a punctual pattern because he insisted on a regular way of life. He rose at 5 am every morning from his brass bedstead, and after breakfasting he would walk the hundred yards or so to his headquarters where the Grand Rapport, or 'morning prayers', took place. This was attended by Joffre's lively Chief-of-Staff, General Belin, and his assistant, General Henri-Mathias Berthelot. This brilliant and industrious man, who weighed nearly 17 stone, was bulkier than Joffre, and, suffering from the August heat, wore a white 'smock', and slippers instead of boots. He was Joffre's strategic adviser and normally passed on the Commander-in-Chiefs decisions to the head of the troisieme bureau, Colonel Pont, a conartillery officer. Also present were Major Maurice Gamelin, of the troisieme bureau, a short, pink-cheeked, well-
scientious
Moltke: a mighty army — groomed
figure, and the heads of the specialist departments already mentioned. Joffre would be informed of all messages received during the night; and problems of manpower, transport, rations and anything else that had cropped up were discussed
and
settled.
Punctually at 11 am, Joffre would be back at Capron's house for lunch. This meal he usually shared with Belin, Berthelot, Gamelin, and his two aides-de-camp, and if anyone arrived late, the Commander-in-Chief showed his displeasure. After lunch he looked in at the school to hear the latest situation reports before taking a slow stroll with his ADCs, followed discreetly by the police, and replying to the people of Vitry who bowed whenever they met Joffre on his walk. He liked in particular to walk to the level crossing and observe the regular passage of the trains, for this appealed to his sense of order. Next came the afternoon session of desk work. Joffre's own office was in a first floor classroom. Some visitors thought his office just as expressionless as his face, for it seldom had a map on the walls and, because Joffre hated papers piling up, the desk was bare of dossiers and documents. Joffre would listen patiently to visitors, or to commanders from subordinate headquarters, but he said little and did not interrupt. He disliked officers who talked loudly or too dogmatically; he appreciated modesty while deploring nervous hesitation. Dinner was served at 6.30 pm, and as at lunch the Commanderin-Chief, gourmet that he was, relished the food more obviously than the wide-ranging talk, in which 'shop' was forbidden. After the meal Joffre returned to his office to read the latest despatches from the armies in the field, and to attend the second conference of the day, known as the Petit Rapport. Though Joffre met few of his staff beyond those who attended the daily rapports, he also relied on liaison officers who, belonging to the troisieme bureau, were sent forward to deliver and explain orders to army commanders and to report back personally to the Commander-in-Chief on what they had observed and learned. Precisely at 9 pm Joffre retired for the night, double-locked his door and fell quickly asleep. The only known occasion when he was sufficiently disturbed to spend two sleepless nights was when he was debating whether or not to remove General Lanrezac from command of the Fifth Army in the middle of its August retreat. Only an event of real urgency justified anyone in waking the Commander-in-Chief. When Adolphe Messimy, the Minister of War, anxiously telephoned one night and asked to speak to Joffre, he was informed that the General was sleeping. The Minister stood in such awe that he agreed with the Chief-of-Staff that Joffre should not be woken. At OHL the usual daytime work started-and finished later than
an indecisive commander with
am
until 1 pm, then lunch and a siesta until worked through until dinner at 8 pm: Moltke allowed his officers a glass of wine at meals, but forbade champagne because it was inappropriately luxurious when the forward troops were risking their lives in battle. After dinner the staff returned to their desks till around midnight. The atmosphere at OHL was normally more austere, more agitated and far noisier than at French GQG. The cause of this agitation and noise was simply the deplorable state of communications with which the staff had to cope. For one thing, the Germans were marching and fighting in hostile territory. Whereas their telephone and telegraph wires were cut by saboteurs or became especially vulnerable to accidental damage, the French commanders could rely most of the time on the prewar, permanent civilian telephone network, which was supplemented by Joffre: 8.30
2.30 pm.
The
staff
field cables.
At Coblenz, OHL was too far behind the armies, given the shortage of telephone circuits and modern equipment, plus a lack of amplifiers to boost speech over long distances. Bellowing matches over bad lines were no substitute for a calm exchange of views. Nor was the wireless any better. For one thing, every message had to go in cipher, a lengthy process at the best of times, so staff officers had to restrict their orders and reports to the most vital and urgent. Even so, OHL's one and only receiving set became so overloaded with signals that the backlog often took half a day to clear. What is more, the very powerful French transmitter on the Eiffel Tower caused so much jamming that messages became garbled and had to be repeated two or three times before the harassed operators could be certain that they had the correct version. Later still, the cipher staff might well find discrepancies which had then to be disentangled over the air. When, because of shortrange or weak sets, such as the rear link from Kluck's First Army headquarters, a message had to be retransmitted, the delays were even more serious. The head of the telegraph services at OHL, Ohnesorge, was anything but 'carefree', as his name might suggest, but he did effect a gradual improvement. Meanwhile delays, frustration and frayed tempers increased the already severe strains imposed by military operations, however great their initial success. It was particularly exasperating when overcrowded telegraph circuits were burdened with unimportant private telegrams from senior officials and the Kaiser himself. Besides impatience, hoarse voices and edgy tempers, another consequence of poor communications was a heavy volume of motor traffic between OHL and the front. This service was largely provided by the Imperial Volunteer Automobile Corps. The drivers 227
were experienced and reliable, and needed to be, for they covered great distances for the cars of that period. The German General Staff seem to have succumbed to the belief that communications
which were smooth and efficient in peacetime war games would be no less so when everything was 'for real'. On August 16, when Prince Rupprecht, commander of the Sixth Army, required an urgent decision, difficulties arose not so much on account of the poor telephone lines, which ran through German territory, but because during three days of long-range discussion OHL simply could not reach a decision. One staff officer was sent to Sixth Army headquarters, then another, each returning to OHL for fresh instructions, and each visit being followed by renewed telephone conversations. In the end it was Sixth Army headquarters who made the decision, and General Stein acquiesced. An earlier move forward of OHL might have removed many of these troubles. Eventually on Sunday, August 30, the German Headquarters moved forward by car from Coblenz to Luxembourg. While the Kaiser took up residence in the German Embassy, Moltke and two aides-de-camp lived in the Hotel de Cologne, and the rest of OHL were lodged in the Hotel Staar near the railway station. Besides offering poor accommodation, this hotel was noisy, hot, and none too clean, so the staff were glad to take their principal meals in part of the local officers' club which had been set aside for their use. The senior officers usually dined at the imperial table in the Embassy. On orders from Moltke, requisitioning of property was kept to a minimum so as to avoid inconveniencing the local inhabitants. As a result, the OHL found itself working in the classrooms of a small girls' school. The conditions were not unlike those experienced by Joffre's staff in Vitry-le-Francois, but in the Grand Duchy's capital the desks had been pushed into corners and replaced by planks laid on trestles. The classroom floors were as bare as the improvised table-tops. Since the school had no gas or electricity, Moltke's st iff had to make do with oil lamps and candles. Worse off were thf Operations Branch, who worked as best they could in a very narrow passage which had formerly served as the girls' cloakroom. Many of Moltke's staff considered that OHL should have gone much further forward than Luxembourg in order to control more closely the German advance on Paris, which had been ordered on August 27. They may well have been correct. But another possible remedy for their difficulties was never used. At no time until the end of the Battle of the Marne did Moltke himself, or Stein or Tappen, leave headquarters and visit the separate army com-
manders. One reason is that apparently nobody had foreseen the need for providing someone who could act for the Chief of General Staff in his absence. This might have mattered less had Moltke been
Commander-in-Chief, with his own Chief-of-Staff. In the event, the Quartermaster-General, the next senior officer, already carried an immense burden of work, so he could stand in for Moltke for only very brief periods. This fact partially explains, though does not excuse, Moltke's failure to go forward to see and hear for himself. One German general, writing afterwards about the Marne campaign, contrasted this stay-at-headquarters attitude of the German High Command with Joffre's tireless energy. 'Wherever there was an important decision to be made, wherever it was necessary to establish friendly relations between the armies, Joffre was on the spot, now advocating action, now exercising restraint, always explaining.'
Sometimes the staff at GQG fussed and badgered to excess, as they did with Lanrezac's Fifth Army when it was conducting a complex transfer of corps — Lanrezac was so angry that he ordered his staff to ignore the telephone calls. But by going to confer on the spot with his army commanders and with Sir John French, Joffre
was able to make up his own mind and keep control far better than was Moltke, waiting too far away for second-hand, often garbled and out-of-date reports and all the time a prey to corroding anxiety. If Joffre's personality seemed passive, the same adjective could well
have been applied
to Moltke's control.
Further Reading Bauer, Colonel Max, Der grosse Krieg im Feld
und Heimat (Tubingen: Osiandersche Buchhandlung) Baumgarten-Crusius, Maj-Gen. Artur, Le Haut Commandement allemand pendant la Campagne de la Marne en 1914 (Paris: CharlesLavauzelle, 1924)
Blond, Georges, La Marne (Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1962) Gamelin, General Maurice, Manoeuvre et Victolre de la Marne (Paris:
Bernard Grasset, 1954) La Bataille de la Marne (Paris: B. Arthaud, 1964) Memoires du Marechal Joffre (Paris: Plon, 1932) Kuhl, General von, La Campagne de la Marne en 1914 (Paris 1927) Muller, Admiral Georg von, The Kaiser and his Court (Macdonald 1961)
Isselin, Henri,
Joffre,
Jean de, G.Q.G. Secteur 1 (Paris: I'Edition francaise illustree, 1920) Spears, Brig-Gen. E. L, Liaison, 1914 (Heinemann 1930) Stevenson, D., French war aims against Germany, 1914-1919 (Clarendon Press 1982) Pierrefeu,
ANTONY BRETT-JONES was
educated at Mill Hill School and Cambridge. During the war he served with the Royal Corps of Signals, and from his experiences in the South-East Asia campaigns he wrote Report My Signals and, in collaboration with Lieutenant-General Sir Geoffrey Evans, Imphal, the account of one of the decisive battles of the Burma campaign. Since 1961 he has been Senior Lecturer in Military History at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and he has written widely on the Napoleonic Wars. Among his books on this period are Wellington at War, 1812, and The Hundred Days.
TANNENBERG On
the evening of -July 30, 1914. Tsar Nicholas signed the declaration for the mobilisation of the Russian Armed Forces and set in train the processes which, within the next 40 days, would call over
uniform and align the armed strength of Russia along the German and Austro-Hungarian frontiers. On August 1, having received no reply to a 24-hour ultimatum demanding that Russia should cease movements on the common frontier. Germany also began mobilisation But. though they started almost level. there was a great difference between the Russian and German timetables, since in theory Russia needed 40 days for the completion of call-up and concentration in war locations (30 days to be ready for offensive operations while Germany needed only .'5.000.000 citizens into
Kenneth Macksey describes the clash of two Russian armies with one German army in East Prussia. Below: A German print of the time shows a howitzer in action
man
Earmarked
i.
il
also
al if
to attack
Russian
five army corps, plus the usual satellite cavalry and reserve formations, and each, on paper, looked a match lor the German Eighth Army on its own. But Russian infantry formations were smaller than their German counterparts, while their artillery, particularly of the heavier type, was far exceeded by the Germans in power, and was not well supplied with ammunition: Russian artillery went to war hacked by only 850 rounds per gun. Individually the
The Russians intended to spread their army fairly evenly along the frontier: the Germans intended to hold only the nor-
i
as possible, but
Fast Germany were Armies — the Fust, under (leneral Rennenkampf, was concent rated in the area Knvno-Bruskoniki. and the Second, under (leneral Samsonov. was con centrated to the south and south-west of First Army between Grodno and Lomsha. Both were originally intended to comprise
two
i.
Litovsk. In the development of her grand strategy Russia was not in complete command of her own destiny. Her war plan included alternatives designed to take advantage of whatever courses of action the Central Powers might adopt. Above all, the Russian plan made provision for offensive operations against the Germans in order to relieve pressure upon the French, for in fidelity to their French allies they were consistent and generous to the point of foolhardiness. Fearful of having the full might of Germany concentrated against them at the outset, the French had prevailed upon the Russians at various conferences between 1911 and 1913 to open simultaneous joint offensives beginning on the 15th day after mobilisation (Ml 5), and the Russians had concurred though aware that premature aggression might be dangerous to their army. In 1912, General Joffre had reached agreement with General Jilinsky. who was to command the Russian north-west group of armies (posted opposite East Prussiai. to strike a blow either from the Narew to Allenstein if the Germans concentrated in East Prussia or directly against Berlin should the Germans concentrate their main forces in the area Thorn-Poznan. The effect of this agreement upon the Russian armies was profound since, by M15, only one third of the Russian force would have arrived in their wartime location and the next third would not arrive for a further eight days, while the remainder would take a further 17 davs
territory
lowed for a withdrawal to the Vistula circumstances made it necessary,
10 days.
thern sector with the minimum forces necessary to protect Hast Prussia, while Austro-Hungarian army, already the deeply involved against Serbia, completed mobilisation a little faster than the Russians and posted their main striking forces in Galicia with the intention, subsequently, between of advancing north-eastwards Lublin and Cholm and cutting the railways leading from Warsaw to Brest
back upon in the rear, its forts well pre pared to hold oil' the Russian armies whose siege train was practically nun existent. Schliellen's plan in the east was primarilj aimed at preserving intact as much Ger-
in an appearance. However, those Russian forces which assembled by Ml 5
to put
would be of first-line quality, better prepared than those which would follow and. in fact, the Russian Chief of the Mobilisation Department calculated that the Army would be ready for the offensive on August 20 (M21), although there would be others who would complain that this did not allow newly formed units sufficient time in which to settle down. But though the Russians accepted
the
need
offensive against did not attack her
for
a
Germany first
I,
possible (if
early
Germany
and positioned two
strong armies in the north ready to invade East Prussia, the remainder of her deployment in the north-west was defensive and not geared for a direct attack against Berlin such as France desired. German planning did not suffer from the same external pressures as Russian planning did. Autocratically expecting their allies to comply with their own long conceived master plan, they elected to defend East Prussia with their Eighth Army, under General von Prittwitz, comprising three army corps '/, XVII and XX) the / Reserve Army Corps, a cavalry division, Landwehr brigades and fortress troops stationed in Konigsberg, Thorn and other lesser fortified places. This was a strong force whose task of holding the 'Russian Steamroller' would be made easier among the miriad forests and lakes of Masuria (should the Russians come from due east),
Russian First and Second Armies were hardly worth To'r of the combat value of the German Eighth Army and even that figure did not take into account the superior German preparations and infinitely better training. Furthermore by making an army commander deal with the commanders of no less than five different army corps, in addition to the leaders of attached formations, induced almost as much weakness as strength, since command and control with the inadequate communications available was ill-co-ordinated, slow anil inaccurate. The reason for the strengthening First and Second Armies was fundamental, however, to the Russian plan — this was the force which was intended to play the major part within the meaning of the Russian Instructions t<> (IOCs Military District* in the case of war with the Triple Alliance of: 'Defeating the German troops left in Eastern Prussia which was to he occupied with the object of creating a favourable situation for the development of further operations.'
of
A tremendous German advantage Nevertheless, for all their physical and weaknesses, the Russian psychological north-west group of two armies, acting in concert, would probably outmatch the
German Eighth Army. The Eighth Army.
since even a minor frontier fortress covering a narrow corridor between woods and water could have a defensive effect out of all proportion to its size. In any case, if things went badly, there was always the
its turn, could outmatch each of the Russian Armies if only it could take them on separated in time and space. The possibility of its being able to do this was enhanced by superior organisation, technology and internal communications which gave the Germans a tremendous advantage in mobility over the somewhat immobile and roadhound Russian armies. German mobilisation went without a
heavilv fortified River Vistula line to
hitch,
fall
in
the
reservists
reporting
punctili-
229
ously to their units, drawing their equipment and moving with smooth precision to their concentration areas in endless processions of railway trams marshalled with a thoroughness that bore testimony to years of preparation for that one fundamental manoeuvre. As the first line formations began to arrive, the cavalry and the local Landsturm closed up to the frontier in readiness to meet the first Russian incursions should they come. The rapid movement of hundreds of thousands of men and horses with millions of tons of stores went ahead smoothly, and a glance at the map shows why this was feasible and why the German mobilisation was so much swifter and more efficient than that of the Russians. For to the west of the frontier an intricate cobweb of main lines fed by subsidiaries crowded upon route centres while to the east single threads linked only the principal cities served by inadequate engines and rolling stock. First to be mobilised were the cavalry,
though in fact the German Landsturm were ready for call out by a tocsin, sounded from local belfries, even before mobilisation had been declared. Cavalry were therefore first into action along the length of the frontier, both sides throwing out a screen to shield the mobilisation of their
main forces assembling in rear, but also darting into each other's territory on raids to discover the opposing dispositions and, of secondary importance, to create alarm and confusion among populations already distraught by the thought of what war — a great unknown — might bring. From out of the fortress of Thorn German cavalry probed into Poland and on the first day of the war crossed the frontier on a wide front with a view to establishing bridgeheads over the River Warta between Kalisch and Bendzin. Russian cavalry was busy in East Prussia penetrating 40 miles beyond Augustov to establish the presence of German / Corps mobilising east of Gumbinnen while other strong patrols roamed the land between Soldau and Neidenburg, cutting the railway line, blowing up viaducts, pillaging and burning the villages, putting the populace into a state of terror, and causing a stream of pitiful refugees streaming westward to greater safety under the wing of the main German forces. Yet already the cavalry of both sides was learning the lessons which all cavalry had to learn at the start of this war — the lesson
Russian cavalry passing through
Tilsit
on
its
way
that small parties of armed infantry — even if they should only be aged Landsturm —
when
fighting from prepared positions could be deadly. Moreover cavalry formations were not fit for sustained action. A cavalry division at full strength was only just equal, in men, to two infantry battalions. Thus, in manpower, the five Russian cavalry divisions with Rennenkampf were equal to one German infantry division Soon the sight of refugees and the glow of burning villages began to prey upon the conscience of the German command. Politically the unopposed movement of Russian bands deep in Prussia could not be conceded; militarily there was bound to be pressure put upon Prittwitz to stop it, if only to sustain the Army's morale and
appease his fellow countrymen — above all those of the aristocracy of which he was a member. Prittwitz hardly needed his cavalry to search for the main body of the Russian army since for years his government had been well supplied with information concerning Russian mobilisation and operational plans by a Russian staff officer, Colonel Myasoyadov. Moreover, Prittwitz himself was being kept well aware of current developments by the Russians themselves, whose use of radio paid no attention to the needs of security. For much of the time messages were tapped out unciphered due in part to Russian ineptitude in the handling of the cipher system — and even when the cipher was
to the front In East Prussia
employed, after August 26, it was soon to be cracked by Austrian cryptographers. Though information of German movements to the Russians was far less profuse and never concise, it was, nevertheless, conclusive. Russian cavalry quickly found out not only that the German troops on the frontier had no reinforcements but they also came to believe that the Austrian front extended north up to the Vistula, thus reducing the likelihood of a strong German presence, but the news from Belgium and France could leave no doubt that the preponderance of German effort had been sent to the west. Hence, if the Russians were to keep faith with the French, they were bound to embark upon an invasion of Germany in the north while attacking the Austrians in the south in order to take pressure off the Serbs. To enable this, the process of mobilisation had to be changed and accelerated with more troops brought prematurely down the creaking lines of communication to the front; a decision which, in peacetime, would have taken many months to crystallise but which in August 1914 had to be taken in a matter of hours — hours made more dramatic by a heart-rending plea from the French Ambassador, Paleologue, to the Tsar on August 5: 'I entreat your Majesty to order your armies to take immediate offensive. Otherwise there is a risk of the French Army being overwhelmed.' But French interference with Russian
/
4 rwt'im
s
*Ȥ
,
-s
planning had already gone even further than that when, on August 1, their War Minister, reflecting Joffre's original conhad given it as his opinion that a direct Russian attack along the shortest route to Berlin -from Warsaw to Poznan — would be best, a contingency upon which the Russians had never wasted much thought since it would have led into the heart of the strongest German defences. On August 8 the Russians fell in with their cept,
scheme. The Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, ordered a re-allocation of army corps to create a new offensive mass for an improvised army to be formed in the area of Warsaw. Two of the corps concerned were taken away from Rennenkampf's First Army. But at the same time First and Second Armies were told to go onto the offensive on August 13 allies'
(M14) before one third of their strength was mobilised yet after the amputation of one fifth of their infantry strength. For the Allies this was a council of unnecessary despair, taken six days before the Battle of the Frontiers had begun in the west and long before any suggestion of defeat for the French had arisen. It was a classic example of the consequences of improved communications allowing central commanders too much opportunity to assert remote control
without having sufficient information at their disposal to calculate the effects of their decisions.
A
'determined offensive' to First and Second Armies were given by Grand Duke Nicholas and they read: 'The offensive would be commenced by the First Army which must engage the largest possible German
The orders
forces: the offensive to
be carried out to the north of the Masurian Lakes, turning the enemy left flank. The Second Army to attack turning the Masurian Lakes from the west, with the object of defeating the German corps deploying between the Vistula and the Masurian Lakes, and thereby preventing the Germans from retreating across the Vistula.' The order then went on to mention the need for close touch to be established between the two armies, but Jilinsky, a fussy
man who owed
his position more to Court influence than to ability, confirmed these orders to Rennenkampf and told him. to make a determined offensive 'with the object of defeating the enemy, cutting him
A Russian reconnaissance
from Konigsberg and seizing his lines upon the Vistula'. Since the Russians had clearly guessed that the main German strength was opposite Rennen-
of retreat
kampf task
this set that general a pretty stiff while, at the same time, actually
encouraging him to diverge from Samsonov's Second Army which, from the south, was being ordered to wheel towards Lotzen. Jilinsky's orders to Samsonov were much more precise than those to Rennenkampf who had been addressed in general terms. Corps tasks were specified to Second Army (perhaps because Samsonov had not yet returned from leave in the Caucasus when the orders arrived, and did not put in an until August 16) appearance at his with a route which was to take it in a north-westerly direction just behind the Masurian Lakes. But Jilinsky's detailed reservations imposed dispersion on Second Army from the start, an injunction to guard the line Grodno-Augustov, with one corps, being matched by a warning to keep a watchful eye in the direction of Allenstein from whence, 'the enemy may attack the left flank of the Second Army'. Both armies were told to start operations on the 17th and issued their first orders, respectively, on the 15th and 14th. Looming large in their considerations were matters of administration. With a shorter distance to cover, Rennenkampf had less reason for concern that his supply trains were in-
HQ
4* Jt
'<
down by
off
Russia's peasant army — a vital factor in Allied strategy
Mt
aircraft shot
'
n ~-
^
*j
*
the
Germans
in
the ruins of Neidenburg
complete, the stocking of stores inadequate and that the men had no field-kitchens. In
any
case, discipline in his tight and the
army was com-
men could be expected to stay under control. With the paratively
prospect of moving into much less well developed terrain which had already been despoiled to a certain extent by cavalry, Samsonov, whose administrative services were in chaos, had to give freer local administrative rein to his men, who were eventually forced into 'living off the land'. It was Wellington who once said, with the candour of bitter experience, 'No reliance can be placed on the conduct of troops, in action with the enemy, who have been accustomed to plunder'.
The Russian First Army moved off even weaker in numbers than its first line strength gave reason to expect. Because second line troops had not yet appeared down the over-loaded railway lines, infantry companies had to be detached to guard vital points in the rear (against the Poles) and because the cavalry, reconnoitring ahead, made no effort to cooperate with the infantry who followed,
had further to disperse their mass by arranging their own local reconnaissance as they advanced into an unknown and intricate country. Meanwhile the German I, XVII and I infantry
5
Reserve Corps shifted from their concen- J tration areas to shield Gumbinnen from i the east, while XX Corps spread out along o
A German infantry, part of Eighth Army, advances through thickly wooded country near Tannenberg to attack the Russian Second Army V A defensive position on the Masurian Lakes. Having defeated the Russian Second Army, the Germans redeployed to meet the First Army
The advance
of the Russian forces resulted in the preliminary battles of
the southern frontier in preparation for the invasion they knew must come along that axis. The German orders showed a full and confident awareness of all that Jilinsky intended.
The Russian Second Army also moved off, but much more hesitantly due to its state of chronic unpreparedness, and Jilinsky, detecting this even from the remoteness of a headquarters well in rear, began at once to badger Samsonov to greater
speed at a time when speed was the last thing his unfit men were capable of achieving without bringing on exhaustion in the humid summer heat. The Russian First Army, as befitted their orders, were first into action, but to the north and not the south of the Forest of Rominte as their opponent, Prittwitz, had been led to expect. Nevertheless Prittwitz had already concentrated an overall superiority of numbers against Rennenkampf, and the German divisional cavalry — working far more closely with the infantry than did the Russian Cavalry Corps under General Nahichevansky — were soon able to supply Prittwitz with any information he lacked of the true schwerpunkt of Russian First Army. Action was joined on the morning of August 17, the uncoordinated advance of the Russian Corps bumping into the backing elements of the German / Corps which, under General von Francois, had moved to Stalluponen contrary to Prittwitz's orders since Francois fervently desired to keep Prussian soil inviolate. Short of firm directions from Corps HQ, and devoid of direction from
Gumbinnen and Stalluponen, and caused
army level, the Russian divisional commanders attacked the Germans where they found them and were themselves attacked in turn, each side trying to outflank the other in a wild encounter in which mutual aggression was the keynote. At once, on this the day when the last forts at Liege fell and when the Battles of the Frontiers in the west were rising to their climax, the soldiers in the east learned the same
hard lessons as their comrades were learning in the west. Where an attack was made against an unshaken enemy who had not been broken up by artillery fire the attackers suffered terrible losses — and at Stalluponen the losses on both sides were particularly heavy since there were no trenches in which to shelter and both sides fought, more often than not, from exposed positions in the open. Caught on the march in rear, and by surprise, the 105th Russian Infantry Regiment was mown down and lost over 3,000 men. To this the surviving Russians reacted like nearly all men when first exposed to a hail of seemingly impeneti able
fire:
instead of trying
to counter the enemy they fell back in disorder.
gave way and
Prittwitz, whose orders had been flouted, demanded that / Corps should withdraw on Gumbinnen but Francois was made of
sterner stuff and responded in the Nelsonian manner, 'Report to General Prittwitz that General Francois will break off the engagement when he has defeated the Russians' — despite the fact that his own left flank was already suffering the same kind of treatment as had been handed out
the
Germans
to retire in panic
-
Russian 105th Regiment. His men, had been caught and blasted in the open along with some field artillery which, in accordance with pre-war doctrine and to the
too,
the desire to engage targets at close range, was standing at the front adjacent to the infantry it was supporting. Throughout the day Francois fed in more troops and, at a price in lives and endurance put a stop to the Russian advance, but in the evening his pride had to go by the board and he did at last pull back as ordered.
The chance of fame It may seem strange in
so professional and disciplined a body as the German army that orders from above should be disobeyed,
even though Francois was acting with the independent judgement to be expected of a good corps commander. It was true that the German corps commanders had no more respect for Prittwitz than their Russian opposite numbers had for Jilinsky, but the cause of their disobedience goes deeper than that. The generals were the most ambitious members of their profession and had risen to high commands either by nepotism or favour. At any event the winning of fame, if not always the spur, was now uppermost in their minds and, since all expected the war to be a short one, and to be decided by the initial battles, the chances of gaining that fame might only be fleeting. Hence every opportunity to engage the enemy was seized and exthe limit — and sometimes, ploited to beyond. Corps commanders could take risks and hope to get away with it against
233
56th
0°
Div
XX CORPS
Konitjsberg, (Kaliningrad)
%
re9e/
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28th Div
H
1
1-
/ .Allenburg
Div III
CORPS 27th 3rd Div
GUARD RESERVE
Div
1st Guard
i0*
J3erdauen 5th Div
IV
Nordenburg
CORPS' 1
57th
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# Dersunischki
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Pilvischi
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XXV CORf
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Tannenberg its withdrawal from Gumbinnen and Stalluponen, the German Eighth Army was forced back on a line Bartenstein-Rastenburg. Here, however, a priceless advantage came to their aid. Due to the folly of the Russian commanders in sending their wireless messages in clear, the staff of Eighth Army were able to anticipate the movements of the Russian armies and knew well in advance of the Russian Second Army's attack from the south. Leaving one corps to hold the line Bartenstein-Rastenburg the rest of Eighth Army executed a pincer movement to trap Second Army in the forests and lakes of
After
the Tannenberg/Bischofsburg area. This tactic succeeded brilliantly, and the Russian forces were routed and almost completely annihilated. The whole weight of the Eighth Army could now be switched back to the east, again with foreknowledge of the Russian dispositions, and the Germans were able to force the Russian First and Tenth Armies out of East Prussia and back over the Niemen. The credit for this deft switching of fronts has normally been given to Ludendorff, but in fairness it must be given to Colonel Hoffmann, an officer on the staff of Eighth Army, who had prepared the plans for this battle before Hindenburg and Ludendorff took over
over 60 feet
Dense
30-60 feet under
forest
30 feet
German
Eighth
Army
Russian Armies
~ -
N
—
r
"
Withdrawals of Russian Second Army
—
—
——
—~— ^— ^ » -
Nare^
10 10
20
15
20
30
25
40
30 Miles
50Kms
^=^= »•»«
Front line
between Germans and Russian Second Army August 22
Front line
between Germans and Russian Second Army August
Front line
between Gentians and Russian
First
Army September 6
Germans and Russian
First
Army September
between Germans and Russian
First
Army September 12
Front line between
Front line
21
1
Roads
C ommand boundary between Russian
First
and Tenth Armies
235
the enemy and with their superiors: army commanders, mindful of their national usibi lity, became hedged in by caution.
And shock
at
this
critical
of sweeping
moment losses
the awful caused by a
moment's concentrated enemy fire, demolished all the prewar theories of fire and movement as if they had never existed. Hence, with the props knocked away from the archway of their confidence, the tendency among less hardy generals was likely to be regressive — the very opposite of what the manuals demanded. Prittwitz was already infected with the regressive spirit. Rennenkampf, on the aftermath of Stalluponen, was still ready to comply with his instructions and ordered the advance to continue on Gumbinnen on the 19th following which a 24 hour halt would be called in order to 'bring up the lines of communication organisations and the units
remaining in
rear'.
Correctly, Rennenkampf (of German extraction himself) perceived that the Germans, holding the line of the River Angerapp, to the west of Gumbinnen, would advance to meet him to the east of that town — so he sought to establish himself obliquely to the line of the German advance in the hope of catching it in flank. Undesirable attention was drawn to the vulnerability of his own right flank, however, where the Cavalry Corps had become
engaged with a few German Landwehr troops sent down from Tilsit by rail, and on the 19th there had been fierce engagements in which the Russian Cavalry, profusely and well supported by their own artillery, dismounted and charged on foot, with singular success, while those of their comrades who stayed mounted also executed a charge and captured two enemy guns. But this caused Russian losses amounting to nearly 400 and, in addition, temporarily exhausted men and horses as well as their supply of ammunition. Of
A German
trench position
in
more fundamental importance, the absence
soon this
of the cavalry from the vicinity of the main battle had left a gap in the right flank of Corps, which was itself right flank of the First Army — and this gap became deadly when, on the 20th, instead of clearing up the position on that flank as ordered,
engaged with both the German 1st and 2nd Divisions debouching out of the forest round their flank. A great artillery duel, so like the one expected by the pundits, broke out. To quote a contemporary record
the Cavalry Corps commander withdrew his troops on the feeble pretext that shells to replenish his artillery had not arrived. (At least he had grasped the significance of
as though a gigantic kettle was boiling'. Quickly the superior German guns gained ascendancy and then the infantry came to grips, guns were being ridden into the open
XX
artillery, if
nothing
else,
but he had
Rennenkampf in direct peril.) Rennenkamp's Army, for all
its
left
troubles,
was nevertheless settling down, though in doing so was falling behind the rate of advance set by its commander. Then, on the 20th, in sweltering weather after days of rain (Colonel Knox, the British Attache watched Russian infantry marching up on the 19th with expressions of 'dull unreasoning misery'), which tried the tired men even further, the Russians met the Germans in force for the first time. The ever increasing threat to the German northern flank as Russian cavalry and infantry advanced after Stalluponen, convinced Prittwitz that this was the time to mount a counter blow before the Russians could secure their front on the line of the River Rominte and their flank on the Forest of Zulkiner. An attack by Francois's / Corps (re-inforced by 1st Cavalry Division) was ordered for the 20th and executed with all the drive that corps commander could muster. Second Infantry Division was the forest while the filtered through cavalry rode cross-country towards Pillkallen — the whole manoeuvre bringing the Germans clear of the Russian flank and squarely into the gap left open by the
Russian cavalry. At 0300 hours on August 20 heavy German artillery fire smothered the gun positions of the Russian 28th Division on the extreme right flank of XX Corps and
Division
found
itself
heavily
'No individual firing could be heard;
it
was
open sights, German aircraft were soaring overhead to report progress and the ground began to be covered by the
to fire over
corpses
who
'lay in lines
with their
officers
and with their battalion commanders, as it were frozen in the very attitudes in which death had overtaken them'. By midmorning the Russian 28th Division was disorganised and in flight leaving exposed the
left
of the
29th Division, but the
Commander, General Rozenshield-Paulin, kept his head and adjusted his front most skilfully to absorb the German onrush. Francois, temporarily checked, paused to reorganise for a final telling blow from his strongly threatening position. Meanwhile there had been stirring events in the centre of the line immediately south of Gumbinnen where the advancing German XVII Corps (General von Mackensen had collided with the Russian III Corps as it came up, piecemeal, from the east. Typically of III Corps, it had been slow starting for the corps
commander's orders to his divisions had been delayed by inefficient communication channels. At first the Germans made good progress in their centre, forcing the Russians back upon their reserves, but the Russian flanks held out until it was the Germans who drove themselves into a salient, pummelled from all sides by closerange artillery fire. The Germans were mown down; the survivors hugged the ground among the dead and then, as
a peasant's house ddring the battle. Civilians fled the area as their homes, crops and cattle were seized
Russian pressure asserted itself, they lost and rushed off westward. As an eyewitness later wrote: 'even the River Rominte could not stem the tide of fugitives and late in the evening of August 20 a considerable number of men belonging to one of these regiments were discovered on the banks of the River Angerapp'. their nerve
It was much the same when the German 36th Division tried to advance by rushes. At 1,000 yards the Russian rifles and machine-guns opened up: within the next 200-300 yards all further forward movement had stopped. 'It was like hell opening before us. No enemy was to be seen; nothing but the fire of thousands of rifles, of
machine-guns and of late,
the
German
artillery.'
And
as, too
artillery galloped
up
to
saw shells bursting between the guns, the ammunition wagons disappearing in all direccome
to the aid of their infantry, 'we
tions, and loose horses galloping riderless over the battlefield. The infantry lay with their faces to the ground, no one daring so much as to raise his head, not to speak of firing a shot himself.' Throughout the day, in this sector, the German officers repeatedly renewed the attack until the men would have no more of it. At length, 'panic gained the victory over the strongest discipline — Prussian discipline — the discipline of the East Prussian Regiments'. The German XVII Corps withdrew, leaving a mass of material and thousands of dead behind, and as it went back those on its flanks — even some of the victorious infantry of / Corps on the left — had also to give way. But the reason for their retreat was not physical since their position was strong and, indeed, promised much if exploited. The failure lay with the army commander
— von
Prittwitz.
From Francois,
as evening wore on, Prittwitz had received good news, but from elsewhere it seemed bad. To Francois on the telephone Prittwitz said 'The XVII Corps is heavily engaged and cannot advance, nor is there any good news from Corps. I may be obliged to retreat behind the Vistula.' The shock of defeat was upon Prittwitz, but added to it was a mounting series of reports of a vast movement of Russian columns breaking in a wide swathe across the southern frontier not only in a close envelopment towards Lotzen as expected, but as far west as the axis Mlava-Soldau-Deutsch Eylau. The Russian Second Army was indeed on the move, but this westerly column was something unexpected — I Corps, which had been detached from Rennenkampf to form the new army near Warsaw for the advance on Berlin, and was now brought back by Jilinski to widen the frontage of Second Army's manoeuvre. To Prittwitz it seemed that not only had he been defeated by a numerically superior foe at Gumbinnen, but he was about to be enveloped by a great host which was bound to overwhelm Corps, strung out as it was along the southern frontier. Had he realised how
XX
XX
weak Rennenkampf s army was and how it had lost 16,000 men on the 20th, and had he known the deplorable state of Samsonov's army he might have kept his head. As it was both he and his Chief-of-Staff, Count Waldersee, suffered ordered a withdrawal.
panic
and
In announcing this decision to two members of his staff, General Grunert and
Lieutenant-Colonel Hoffman, he met cooler arguments based on the belief that Sam-
sonov should not be given a free run without a fight and that, in any case, the strong position won by Francois and / Corps should be exploited instead of thrown away. For the moment Prittwitz stood firm against all their pleading— the decision was his, not theirs, though later that night he allowed himself to be persuaded and they heard no more talk of a withdrawal to the Vistula. Unfortunately Prittwitz had forgotten just one thing — the small matter of a number of telephone calls to Moltke in which not only had he talked of withdrawing to the Vistula but had added that he might not hold even there were he not strongly reinforced. It was easy to forget all that on the 21st, for by then his troops opposite Russian First Army had pulled back to safety and had not been followed up in any strength. Moreover by then the movements along the southern frontier looked less threatening. But on the 22nd came two telegrams separated in time by half an hour. The first announced that a special train was on its way bearing a new Commander-inChief and a new Chief-of-Staff; the second, inadvertently delayed, told Prittwitz and Waldersee they had been sacked and that Generals von Hindenburg and Ludendorff would replace them. Thus a weak man and his doubting assistant were replaced by two men whose individual strong characters were already proven but whose prowess as a team was yet to be tested since they had never met before that dramatic moment when they went on board the special train* at Hanover. Strong or weak, their destiny was already settled by Hoffmann whose unwilling acceptance of the withdrawal from Gumbinnen led him to propose a reshuffle of
Eighth Army's deployment by lifting / Corps from the northern wing to re-inforce XX Corps in the south. Therefore, when Ludendorff arrived on the 23rd, having also already perceived that this was the only be adopted, he found it already well in train. The damage to the German position in the East was almost mended but the repercussions went much further than the mere replacement of top individuals, for although Moltke had realised that Prittwitz had lost his nerve, he had also come to the false conclusion that the armies in East Prussia might actually be outnumbered by five to one — despite faultless information telling him this could not be the case. realistic course to
The brink And what
of defeat of the victor of
Gumbinnen —
of Rennenkampf? On the night of the 20th he and, more particularly, some of his staff were convinced that they stood on the brink of defeat (as indeed they did)
what
and there were members of his staff who urged a retreat out of danger just when Prittwitz was urging the same on his own staff. But Rennenkampf, though knowing he was out-numbered and out-flanked, kept his nerve and stood firm waiting for what the 21st would bring. It brought anticlimax; the Germans did not attack and only gradually did the Russian infantry creep forward to find out the reason while the Cavalry Corps remained out of action as it had done throughout the 20th. Not until the evening was it at last discovered that, not only had the Germans gone, but they had also made a clean break of several miles. Even then Rennenkampf was slow
in following up, no order for pursuit being issued until the morning of the 22nd and the general advance not beginning until the afternoon. This inactivity was neither
imposed for tactical expediency nor because bad communications: it was simply in line with Rennenkampf's original intention to pause on the 20th in order to reassemble his administrative resources. But, on the 20th, he had been forced into a pitched battle and so a pause was all the more necessary on the 21st to compensate for it. Moreover Rennenkampf was now handicapped by the multiple difficulties of
of
operating
in
a
hostile
country,
while
dependent upon an inadequate supply train which could not be supplemented from major local resources. Paradoxically he could not make use of his most important capture — the
excellent
German
railway
system -since the Germans had removed all stock and Russian stock was of a different gauge. From now on the Germans, in a friendly hinterland out of contact with hostile elements, could move with absolute freedom and at the speed of peacetime manoeuvres, while their opponents would be hampered by poor rearward communications, advancing with the slower, instinctive caution of soldiers who had suffered the harrowing experience of close range fire in dense country. To all intents and purposes, they were in constant contact with their enemy at all points.
A
frightful risk to the direction that Russian First Army should now take, this had been laid down by Jilinsky in his first Operation Order in which he had demanded the turning of the German left flank developing into a movement to cut the enemy off from Kbnigsberg, and this order was reaffirmed on August 26 by a telegram saying that Kbnigsberg should be invested by 'say two corps, while the remainder (just one corps, in fact) should continue the pursuit to the Vistula'. Jilinsky had his eyes fixed on the Vistula and visualised First and Second Armies making their junction at the river, after a wide double envelopment regardless of what the undefeated Germane in the centre might do. Thus Rennenkampf was exposed to frightful risk — but a justifiable risk providing Samsonov could defeat the main German army gathering against him on the southern frontier. On August 20, as the Russian First Army grappled with the Germans at Gumbinnen, as the Austrians began their main advance in Galicia, and the German First Army entered Brussels, the Russian Second Army had yet to make a serious incursion into East Prussia. Up to then it had been marching westward from its concentration area in friendly territory to the south of the frontier, but under conditions which were most unfriendly, covering 15 miles a day
As
through deeply sanded country in which the transport floundered on roads that were, in places, very little different to the surrounding fields, from where the Polish peasantry looked on in sullen resentment. And from the rear Jilinsky harried Samsonov with repeated demands for greater speed, orders which were passed on (not without protest) by Samsonov to his already weary men. An eyewitness watched transport being left behind in order that the horses so released could be brought forward to double the teams and drag out the leading carts. 'The troops never saw
237
j
their supply trains. A day's halt was never •riven. The reservists, unused to marching,
wore worn out.' While Samsonov's subordinate commanders pleaded for time to organise their formations and settle down their units, Jilinsky pointed out the danger in which First Army stood as a compelling reason for applying pressure on the southern flank. But many orders never reached Samsonov in time because the telegraph system was completely clogged and piles of messages were stacking up without the remotest chance of their being sent. Upon an already overloaded army commander and his staff, Jilinsky now placed further burdens by adding I Corps (which had earlier been removed from Rennenkampf to the Warsaw area for the 'drive on Berlin') to Second Army in order to strengthen that army and widen its frontage further west into East Prussia than originally intended. Thus not only was the drive to Berlin curtailed, but Samsonov was given yet another corps lo manage on an ever-
widening front when his communications were already stretched and in chaos. From then on there would be a danger that his control would be tenuous and that each corps commander would fight very much in splendid independence of the others. It was the sight of Russian I Corps kicking up the dust in long menacing columns which, when reported by German airmen to Prittwitz, had led to the temporary panic at German Eighth Army HQ on the 20th, and which now attracted German I Corps away from the north to fill the gap lying open between the right of German XX Corps and the Vistula. A race to the Vistula was in progress, each side endeavouring to outflank the other, but whereas the Russian attempts were strictly
Germans were, for the moment, mainly defensive — with the intention of fighting from trenches and catching the Russians on the move. By this time it was well understood that entrenched men would prevail over men in the open and both infantry and artillery were learning that in matters of survival the spade was mightier than the bayonet. On August 20 the Russians turned north from Mlava and at once the cavalry, feeling its way through thick woods, lakes and swamps, found the villages, situated in defiles on the only firm ground in between, heavily entrenched and wired. Samsonov, sensitive to his corps commander's reports, called for caution, sending VI Corps to obtain possession of the Ortelsburg area, I and XV Corps to secure the line SoldauNeidenburg and keeping XIII and XXIII Corps in rear. This did not satisfy Jilinsky who accused Samsonov 'of a lack of resolution', though he steadfastly refused to be impressed by Samsonov's story of an army approaching exhaustion. Nevertheless, by the end of August 22, Soldau, Neidenburg and Ortelsburg were in Russian hands. Here the invaders were enmeshed in a complex country where the towns had been abandoned by the bulk of its inhabitants, here too they were harried by German rearguards and watched and occasionally bombed from the air by German aircraft and Zeppelins. 'Our aviators could not fight them,' wrote General Martes the commander of XV Corps, T forbade aimless infantry to fire at aeroplanes, as it only offensive, those of the
produced disorder.
The
fire
which was
occasionally opened by field artillery
was
also unavailing, and so the enemy aviators observed us with impunity.' Looting was now rife, for the Russian soldiers were extremely hungry and the taking of food inevitably led to the removal of more durable valuables — so soon the tales of rape, arson and murder, which were the stock in trade of the propagandists of both
accumulated and received more sides, credence than they warranted. Clearly, however, Samsonov's hard-ridden army was getting out of hand. In the meantime the German redeployment went ahead with all the smoothness at their
command and quite unhindered forces. From a central con-
by external
XX
centration at Hohenstein, Corps (General Scholtz) covered the gaps through the forests into which the Russians had already advanced: train load by train load / Corps began to arrive on its right in the area of Deutsch-Eylau/Gilgenburg. Gradually Samsonov's immediate superiority in numbers was being overtaken by a gathering of German forces which moved to its battle stations with absolute confidence under commanders supplied with positive information of every important Russian move — for in addition to all previous information, Jilinsky's original plan had been found on the body of a dead Russian. Nothing is likely to bolster a commander's prowess more than a complete knowledge of what is going on across the other side of the hill. Rarely have commanders been better supplied with information than were the Germans in East Prussia that August. Assuming that their men would fight well — and in defence of their homeland it was hardly likely that they would do otherwise
morning of the 25th the Russian First Army advanced only 20 miles, its progress regulated by Rennenkampf's keen appreciation that if the men went any faster such straggling might occur as to put his already inferior force in even greater danger. They followed in the wake of Eighth Army's retreat without realising that transfers were being made from oppotheir front; their cavalry reconnaisstill practically non-existent. At last Jilinsky came to understand the
site
sance was
danger in which Rennenkampf might stand and now he directed reinforcements, in the shape of II Corps, to come up from the south and help fill in the gap between First Army's left and Second Army's right. Even so it was not until August 27 that
Rennenkampf was an empty space and that the move on Konigsberg were the
Jilinsky realised that
moving
into
orders to very opposite of co-operation with Second
Army. In comparative safety, on
August
25,
when Rennenkampf was half-way between Gumbinnen and Konigsberg, the German Reserve Corps was told to turn its back on Rennenkampf and co-operate with XVII Corps in dealing with Russian VI Corps advancing on Bischofsburg, while XX Corps stopped the main Russian advance on Hohenstein, and / Corps prepared to strike in the direction of Usdau. On August 27, the 37th Division, having administered a smart repulse to the Russian XV Corps, was withdrawn at the suggestion of the XX Corps commander to a better position to the flank. This withdrawal merely encouraged Samsonov to advance straight ahead in the belief that
/
— they had nothing to fear.
the retreat apparently in progress opposite
They knew that the Second Russian Army was fanning out, VI Corps moving
his front.
north from Ortelsburg to Bischofsburg, I Corps from Soldau towards Gilgenburg while XXII followed by XXIII Corps came up from the south to fill the gap. With each hour's march the dividing segments of Samsonov's army were presenting themselves for piecemeal destruction. Several alternative solutions to the threat presented themselves to Ludendorff: 'The temptation was very strong to make a detour south of Soldau in order to turn the flank of the Russian I Corps. The shock of such a blow to the Narev [Second] Army, brought due south from watching the
Russian First Army in the north, combined with the advance of the XVII and I Reserve Corps might have led to the complete destruction of the enemy. But our strength was not sufficient for this. Therefore I proposed to General Hindenburg that I Corps should attack from Eylau and Montowo, together with the right flank of the reinforced
XX
Corps from Gilgenburg, both towards Usdau, thereafter I Corps was to be sent to Neidenburg to surround, together with XVII and I Reserve Corps, at least the main body of the Army of the Narev.
Rennenkampf was now being extended to Thus he further exposed the flank
not only of XV but also of XIII Corps, which, also under the impression that it had little in the way of enemy ahead, shot off to Allenstein and opened a vast gap between its tail and the following XXIII Corps. Meanwhile, VI Corps was thought to be continuing its advance on Bischofsburg, though nobody could be sure since wireless contact was broken and, like all the corps in Samsonov's army as it fanned out into East Prussia, it was working on the intuition of its commander and not under positive central control. The tragedy from Samsonov's point of view was that he, personally, on the 27th was continuing with his offensive in blithe ignorance of the fact that a far more powerful and much more deadly German offensive had begun on both his flanks on the 26th.
The principal of course, from
German blow was to come, German / Corps and its
commander, the irrepressible Francois, had not taken too kindly to the firm orders from Ludendorff to advance without fail at dawn. He had learnt from the failures at Gumbinnen that to advance without artillery support
was
to court disaster and,
for all the excellence of the
'No immediate danger' Thus, on the 25th, the German
was taking First
Command
a calculated risk in leaving
Russian
except by
made
Army
almost unattended
Landwehr and
fortress troops.
But their calculations were based on sound reasoning, for being aware of the orders already given to Rennenkampf, the measure of the threat could be gauged and evaluated 'as of little immediate danger'. Between the morning of the 23rd and
arrangements
move
his corps to its fresh station in such quick time, one quarter of his field guns, all his heavy guns and all of his artillery supply columns had still to arrive. He asked to be allowed to fix his own time of departure and was smartly told by to
Ludendorff: 'The Army Commander cannot delegate to the Commander of the / Corps the right to settle the time of attack, as the decision does not depend alone upon the operations of / Corps. It is proposed to
iix
noon as the time
Cor
the
commencement
of the offensive. Then / Corps should report all arrivals of artillery units.' Later, at 1030 hours, this start time was confirmed. But Francois, handled with a firmness such as had been unknown from Prittwitz, was no more inclined to obey and took his time, occupying a limited objective by 1500
hours but going no further.
was a very different matter on the It Russian right Hank. There VI Corps suddenly found itself exposed to a thunderbolt delivered by Mackensen's XVII Corps, and Mackensen had also learnt much at Gumbinnen. His artillery preparation against the weak Russian artillery was such that he had gained complete mastery in tirepower from the outset and his infantry, advancing fast and by rushes, were soon at close quarters with the Russian 4th Division which began to give way all along the line. By nightfall the Russians had lost half their infantry, two batteries
guns and were reeling back to Ortelsburg. exposing both right and left flanks of the Russian XV and XIII Corps, and,
of
worse even than
this,
HQ
VI Corps had
utterly failed to relay its bad news to Army or to its neighbours. Thus when, early a posion the 27th. Francois was at last tion to unleash a full and properly co-
HQ
m
ordinated blow the Russians were already half plunged in defeat-but still without realising
it.
Colonel Knox, the British Military Attache, spent much of August 26 with Second Army and dined with Sanisonov that night in Neidenburg. Sanisonov, he his diary, 'is content and satisnoted fied' but. like many another soldier, "worried because he had not yet received a
m
letter
from his
'nervous':
'he
General Postovski, as being generally nervous and
wife'.
the Chief-of-Staff is
was recorded
goes by the name of the "Mad Mullah". Rut on the morning of the 27th. signs of increasing nervousness were to be found further afield. Sanisonov was still relying on his plan and hoping he had not underestimated the German strength, but a
French
airman
called
l'oiret,
who was
with on inexhaustible energy reconnaissance flights for the Russians, had detected signs of the Germans advancing against the Russian left. As Knox was leaving Neidenburg. 'A man rushed up shouting that the German Cavalry was on flying
There are signs of nerves.' There were no nerves with Francois that morning, however, for this time his preparations were complete, he was attacking to a schedule he approved of and with all us.
the artillery support he could muster, against Russians who were hardly even dug in. Twenty-eight field and eight heavy batteries battered the Russian artillery to pieces Oil the Usdau front as dawn broke on the 27th. Soon the German infantry were following up as their guns turned upon the Russian infantry and though many Russians did stand and fight, if was the majority, worn and disheartened by many
days unrewarding marching, their spirits undermined by hunger, who turned and ran for Soldau as last as they could. Only at lleinnchsdorf was there a hitch to the German's plans a brisk Russian attack well backed by artillery stopped one brigade and threw it on the defensive while elements of the 2nd Infantry Division on its left took panic and fled westward. Artillery dominated the battlefield and infantry without it were helpless. Rut this local reverse — and it was no more than thai -had a worrying effect on Ludendorffwho sensed, in any case, that trouble might develop at any tune on the southern flank from the direction of Warsaw. Philosophically he wrote, 'The Commander is placed under a great strain. He must keep a tight hold on his nerves.' As the 27th passed and news of the reverse 5 to Russian VI Corps on the right flank be-
•
Decisively beaten and completely surrounded, the Russians surrendered in their thousands
Vi
V
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.
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.
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apparent while only dull mutterings came from I Corps on the left, Samsonov formulated his orders for the next day. the 28th, telling I Corps it must hold firm but ordering XIII and XV Corps: 'under the command of General Martos, at
of disasters
dawn
assume an energetic offensive in direction of Gilgenburg— Lautenburg with the object of attacking in flank and rear the enemy forces opposite XXIII and I Corps.' Demonstrating his the
to
general
ignorance of the position on his right flank he added, 'The VI Corps is being transferred to the
Passenheim area' (closing in it was
on the Second Army), when in fact
actually diverging in the direction of Ortelsburg. These orders did not reach I or VI Corps on the 27th so both, acting in isolation, continued to withdraw while VI Corps took no steps to say what it was doing. But the demand for an offensive by the two corps, which already had their heads half in the German noose, was much more serious, not only because it practicguaranteed their double envelopally ment if the twin horns of the German attacks made progress, but also because neither corps was really capable of sustained action — let alone a drive of some 30
miles
if
the counter-stroke was to reach
The Russian ready outnumbered on
objective.
XV
Corps was
its
al-
its front and the addition of XIII Corps, from where it lay in exhaustion at Allenstein, was hazardous in the extreme. Already, the German / Reserve Corps was curling round its rear from the east, through Patricken and Klaukendorf and the gap left open by the precipitate withdrawal of VI Corps. No sooner had Martos made preparations for the attack against the German Corps and taken measures to bring XIII
XX
The end for the
Corps as swiftly as possible from Allenthan he was joined by Samsonov who, just after dawn on the 28th, seems to have come to realise, at last, the true gravity of the situation on his left flank. Telegraphing this information to Jilinsky, he thereupon set out for the front to take control of the Martos offensive himself, and upon leaving took the telegraph apparatus with him, thus cutting himself off not only from Jilinsky (who was probably getting on his nerves) but from his other formations as well. Samsonov's arrival at HQ XV Corps was not without drama. XIII Corps was on its way but its tail was under fire
being quite hopelessly overtaxed. By midafternoon it was known that XIII Corps could advance no further. Then Martos turned to Samsonov with the words, 'Now we must expect a disaster.' It was agreed that both XIII and XV Corps should retreat. Martos was ordered to return to Neidenburg in order to organise a firm base to hold open an escape route for the retreat to move upon, but no sooner had this been arranged than firing broke out in the rear of XV Corps and several Russian units took flight. The front was breaking. Later Martos and his staff set off for
it left Allenstein: 'The troops became involved in street fighting, in which the inhabitants took an active part; even women fired at our soldiers from the win-
Neidenburg
stein,
as
dows.'
The advance guard of this Corps had then become heavily engaged at Grislienen and was soon to find itself barred from a junction with XV Corps. Thus XV Corps was forced to attack on its own, but before it could do so was attacked itself in the area of Waplitz — an attack which Martos had anticipated and which was met by a storm of Russian artillery fire. This attack had just been beaten back and the German prisoners were being marched away when Samsonov arrived, took in the situation and embraced Martos saying, sadly, 'You alone will save us'. The phrase, as Martos wrote, 'struck me unfavourably' — and the reason is plain; this was the first insight permitted to Martos as to how serious the Russian situation actually was. Watched
by Samsonov from high ground above Muhlen, Martos strove to beat back the Germans, but though a few local successes were recorded the strength of his men was
of d disastrous
(little realising that it was already in German hands, so swift had been Francois's advance after the collapse of the Russian I Corps). 'The night was dark and warm. After about an hour we perceived the staff of the Army resting around some buildings at the side of the road. I rode up to General Samsonov, who seemed to me to be calmer. He again spoke to me aside of the serious position we were in and said that it was still possible to get out of it if we held Neidenburg.' But soon Martos was ambushed and a vital link removed from the Russian chain of com-
mand. Although a German victory was assured on the 28th, Ludendorff had not passed the day without anxiety. The counter-stroke by Russian XV Corps had disturbed him and at mid-day he had sent an impulsive signal to Francois, who was making for Neidenburg (that vital route centre in the Russian
rear),
telling
him
to
assist
the
XX
Corps and bend the purfrom Neidenburg to Lahna instead. Two hours later Ludendorff had regained his composure and rescinded the
right flank of suit northwards
campaign
Russians •
•
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order but it did not matter — Francois had once more disobeyed and persevered with his own aim, sending one division to Lahna but the rest of his Corps to Neidenburg. This time his reading of the battle was wholly correct, for by going to Neidenburg he completely stoppered up all that remained of the Russian Second Army less those elements of I Corps which had escaped to the south, and those of VI Corps to the east. But even now Ludendorff was not completely secure in his feelings, for his thoughts turned constantly to Rennenkampf and the Russian First Army in the north. 'I could not rejoice to the full at this great victory; the anxiety caused me by General Rennenkampf 's Army was so heavy a strain on my nerves.'
Indeed Rennenkampf was on the move but in nothing like the strength that Ludendorff believed. A mere six and a half divisions (not the 24 in Ludendorff's mind) were moving westward towards Konigsberg at just a little under 20 miles a day (no mean achievement), but it was not until the evening of the 27th that Jilinsky had woken up to the fact that this was of no assistance to the main battle which had already been lost in the south. His telegram, 'Co-operate with the Second Army by moving your left flank forward as far as possible towards Bartenstein, and by sending out your cavalry in the direction of Bischofsburg', was neither sufficiently urgent nor in time. If that telegram had been sent even as late as the 25th the unsettling effect upon Ludendorff might easily have persuaded him to relax pressure on Samsonov instead of delivering an uninterrupted offensive. As it was, Jilinsky had allowed Ludendorff to roll with his
left and then administer a hefty right which turned into a knockout blow. Among the confusing lakes, swamps and forests of the area Neidenburg — Muschaken — Allenstein — Hohenstein — a rectangle some 25 by 10 miles in size, the Russian Army writhed in the agony of death. It was now each Corps — XV, XIII and part of XXIII — for itself, as the best leaders were dead or captured and such orders as con-
tinued to be written only rarely reached their destination. Blocked at Hohenstein, XIII Corp's only way of escape was through a narrow defile at Shvedrich between two lakes, but from the moment it entered this defile on the night of August 29/30, it was successively harassed by the Germans who infested every village and wood. Desperate rearguard actions took place time and again to hold vital crossing places. Several Russians took panic and sank in the swamps but gradually the ever shrinking column struggled through to the south to Kurken and then into the Forest of Kommusin. Down to only four regiments, they were now directed upon Muschaken, becoming intermingled with elements of XV Corps as it groped its way back from Lahna with German / Corps hot on their heels. Soon, too, parts of XXIII Corps joined in and constantly there were outbursts of firing from different directions as a dozen fights broke out with the German columns scouring the forest for their prey. Efforts were made to form three corps columns in the forest by posting Staff Officers at a central crossroads and asking each man as he came by which Corps he belonged to and sending him down the correct route. But when, next morning, these columns started to break out from the southern fringe of the forest it was
only to find he German cordon waiting. To quote a Russian: 'Whenever our units took the offensive, the Germans, without meeting the charge, would roll their line back, and bring our attacking units under their machine-gunfire.' Here and there the sheer weight and desperation of the Russian charges to escape encirclement broke through, since the Germans could not hope to hold everywhere in sufficient strength and they themselves were already extremely weary after three days' continuous fighting. At one point a savage local Russian attack swept away a German brigade, capturing artillery and machineguns, but the overall situation could not be altered, and everywhere else, cut down by the thousand, utterly bewildered and exhausted, hungry and short of ammunition with hardly any artillery of their own to reply to the hammering German guns, the central corps of Second Army began to surrender in thousands. The end of the left-hand column was symbolic of the rest: 'Soon the forest ended and they debouched on to a large open space. From two directions searchlight beams shone forth sweeping the whole of the country in front of us. The beams shone on the leading units and immediately after there followed machine-gun fire and a few rounds of rapid shrapnel fire. Confusion seized the column, and this time the attempts to re-establish order failed. Five times the Germans repeated the same manoeuvre and each time the column melted and melted.' I
A shot in the forest Somebody
else had gone on the night of the 29th as well — Samsonov. Falling into c the deepest depression as he rode from one | distraught unit to another and saw the E
nrr'
m
rj
I
>
-*,
^4* «
-*
-A
_
<3
A Russian 15-cm
howitzer, the 1884
model. Russian industry could not meet the army's needs and the
Russians bought from
artillery
many other countries
<]
Russian small arms. to bottom:
From top
Mosin-Nagent rifle M1891,7.62-mm. Mosin-Nagent carbine M1910, 7.62-mm with its standard bayonet and scabbard. Dragoon rifle M1891.
From left to right: A grenade, a Nagent revolver 7.62-mm and a Smith & Wesson Russian .44
Russian
soldiers: formidable individually, but collectively
ill-organised
and poorly equipped
<]
A Russian
infantry-
man armed
M
with the 1891 Moisin-
Nagent 7.62-mm rifle. Although scabbards were issued it was
common
practice to
have the bayonet permanently fixed.
The kittel or smock shown in both illustrations was a campaign uniform worn by all branches of the Russian army
A Russian cavalryman. The cavalry were
D>
issued with either the 1891 dragoon rifle or theM1910 MoisinNagent, both 7.62-mm. Again the kittel is shown, but otherwise there was little standardisation of uniforms and equipment in the Russian army during this period of reorganisation
M
243
The Germans claimed a
total of
92,000 Russian prisoners after the battles
horror of his plight, he had mentioned his intention of ending his life. His staff had tried hard to dissuade him but during a short spell at rest he slipped away. A shot was heard in the forest. The man that had led the Second Army to disaster was dead. Though the trapped portion of Second Army was mostly failing to break out from the north, the Russian I Corps, somewhat restored to order by General Artamanov after its collapse on the 27th at Usdau, was doing what it could on the 30th to destroy the cordon at Neidenburg, and causing General Francois no little anxiety orders especially since Ludendorff's actually directed him away from Neidenburg in the direction of Malga and thus exposed his lines of communication to both north and south. 'It was a lucky circumstance,' wrote Francois, 'that these orders arrived too late to be carried out.' Indeed, after a few hours a German airman reported the advance of Russian I Corps from the south, just in time for Francois to lay an ambush — a weak centre opposite the axis of the Russian advance flanked by stronger forces on either side. Heavy fighting broke out around and in Neidenburg, witnessed by General Martos (who by then was a prisoner), and by Francois who was close to hand. Martos saw early signs of confusion amongst the Germans, who were hard pressed, but upon hearing that the remnants of Second Army were surrendering in profusion to the north he accepted a request by Francois
in
East Prussia. The Russians admitted only 60,000
to ask the Russians in the south to desist. This was probably a German ruse to gain time, but the crisis was already passing.
Neidenburg was under fire, Ludendorff was already rushing troops to the rescue. At the same time he was endeavouring, with rather less success, to press XVII Corps to complete the destruction of the Russian VI Corps in the east — a failure for which he in part was responsible since he had already encouraged both the commanders of XVII and of / Reserve Corps to turn back northward ready to
Knowing
Rennenkampf whose cavalry was reported in Bartenstein. But in confusion and with tension to the very end, the great battle of encirclement was drawing to its close. Throughout the 31st, Russian I Corps maintained a sulky presence in and around Neidenburg, though checked by the reinforcements sent thither by Ludendorff, but that evening, realising that all further hope for those inside the gap could be abandoned and that, for the time being, all thought had to be given to the defence of Russian territory, Jilinsky ordered those outside the trap to pull back and prepare for the threat of the face
future.
That night Hindenburg signalled his Kaiser with the great tidings, claiming 60,000 prisoners already. 'Their guns are still in the forest and will be collected.' The Germans eventually claimed a total of 92,000 prisoners with 300 guns but Russian calculations (based on less reliable in-
formation) would admit to no more than 60,000 and 180-190 guns. It mattered not. The destruction of the best part of one complete army was great in its intrinsic value despite the fact it was but a small slice of what Russia could put into the field over all. The loss of so many guns from an army which was already dangerously short of artillery was much more serious, but the worst long term effects were bound to be those upon morale. In their first major encounter 'green' German troops had shown themselves markedly superior to 'green' Russians, and this was the sort of advantage which could best settle the balance of power for there is nothing like
success in war — particularly among 'green' troops — to breed an unconquerable spirit for later conflicts.
Permitting themselves a fragrant whiff of revenge, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, at the latter's suggestion, named their triumph Tannenberg, 'in memory of that other battle long ago in which the Teutonic
Knights succumbed to united Lithuanian and Polish hosts'. Together, in the Protestant church at Allenstein, they rendered thanks to Almighty God for their victory. But there was not much time for relaxation, difficult as it was to finish one battle and make plans for the next. East Prussian territory was still occupied by Rennenkampf and that had to be recovered as a matter of national pride. German strength
was now overwhelming as to the veterans Tannenberg were added the fresh corps
of
244
.
from France. These — / Guard Reserve and
XI Corps — could be
sent straight to the northern part of the province to consolidate the line protecting Konigsberg while / Reserve, XX, XVI and / Corps came into line to the south. Russian plans were in disarray. The drive on Berlin had never taken shape because the forces allocated to it were successively dispersed either to bolster the North- West or the South-West Army Group enjoying mixed fortunes against the Austrians in Galicia. Grand Duke Nicholas was not deterred by the necessity for sacrificing all the original proposals 'in the interests of a decision over the Austrians', and proved it by sending I Guard Corps to the South-West
Army Group on August 29 after Tannenberg had been lost. Two days later he made an
equally fundamental decision in respect of the North-West Army Group, by directing Jilinsky to get First Army 'to maintain, at all costs, its position to the north of the Masurian Lakes on the roads from the line Insterburg — Angerburg to the line Vilkovishki — Suvalki'. Second Army was gradually to retreat covered by its cavalry, and a new force, later to be called Tenth Army (a cosmopolitan formation comprising XXII Finnish Corps, III
Siberian Corps and I Turkestan Corps) inserted between First and Second to cover the line Arys— Bialla. That same day, however, it was the agreed opinion between the staffs of North-West Army Group and First Army that they would do well to withdraw in the north. They were worried about the enemy threat through Lotzen since a local fortress there was still in German hands as lack of heavy artillery had prevented the Russians from taking the place.
A chivalrous ally Rennenkampf, on the other hand, took the view that his position along the rivers Omet, Alle and Deilne was extremely strong (as was later admitted by Ludendorff but concurred with his staff that the left flank was weak. He nevertheless saw no reason to withdraw, especially after i
Jilinsky had stated that the left flank could be supported by an attack by 30 battalions. On September 4 Jilinsky went even further, telling Rennenkampf that a German offensive was expected in the south near Mlava and that First Army should prepare to take the offensive towards Konigsberg. The adverse position of the French who, at that moment, looked in dire straits as the Germans approached Paris, thus continued to inspire a chivalrous desire on the part of the Russians to persevere with their original War Plan despite the catastrophe at
Tannenberg.
Already, in fact, Hindenburg had been given his next task — the clearance of the
Russian First Army from German soil. Covering forces only were left in the south, the rest prepared to attack on September 7 on a wide front with their schwerpunkt along the right flank — / Corps on the right directed on Arys — Bialla; XVII Corps next in line through Lotzen towards Goldap; then XX Corps on Angerburg, XI Corps on Nordenburg, / Reserve Corps on Gerdauen and the Guard Reserve Corps on Allenburg. Throughout the morning of September 7 reports began flooding in to Rennenkampf of a general advance along the German front and of heavy fighting particularly amongst the lakes on his left. With these
reports came the positive identification of the arrival of a fresh corps from France. Jilinsky spoke confidently of Second Army advancing to Neidenburg again and of the detraining units of Tenth Army delivering attacks against the German right flank near Bialla — but he was both too late and quite unrealistic since neither army was ready for a heavy assault. He also went on fussing Rennenkampf about the danger to his left flank even though Rennenkampf needed no such reminder. Gradually First Army's left flank was forced back and, as this main axis of the German assault was detected, Rennen-
XX
to signs of opposition
by diverting troops pursuit to carry out turning movements, thus wasting valuable time. Retreat alone could save Rennenkampf's crumbling army. Control was beginning to fail and false reports were ruling the decisions of local commanders. Jilinsky's orders fell behind events and read more like an historical commentary instead of the dictation of future action. Unhappily he made it worse by reverting to the practice of defining the movements of individual corps and covered his own failings from
the
by complaining loss of control
to
GHQ
of
Rennenkampf's military. The
— personal and
kampf began to withdraw Corps from his right to occupy a lay-back position at
outcome surprised him for it was he who was sacked, Grand Duke Nicholas re-
Darkehmen, covering the approaches to Gumbinnen. East of Lotzen, however, the II Russian Corps which, up to then, had
porting to the Tsar: 'I am inclined to think that General Jilinsky has lost his head and in general is not capable of controlling
seen very
brought the German complete and bloody halt.
little action,
XVII Corps
to a
Heavy losses
The
But once again the key was turned by Francois and / Corps. Attacking at the junction between the Russian First Army and the newly arrived XXII Corps (from Tenth Army), Francois was able to exploit the lack of co-ordination between the two Russian formations and lend point to the force of an earlier plea by Rennenkampf that XXII Corps should be placed under his command. Here the Germans outnumbered the Russians by four to one, and soon, to quote Francois: 'The battlecovered with Russian dead witnessed heavy losses and also the bravery with which they fought.' Yet that night, September 8, Jilinsky could coolly tell Rennenkampf that the enemy turning movement had been 'conducted with which will be forces, inconsiderable driven back' when, in actuality, it was the field
their
XXII Corps which was falling back and First Army. But on September
away from
addition to chasing the beaten enemy of the previous day to Lyck, turned north to dislodge the Russians opposite Lotzen, and thereby help free XVII Corps to carry out its allotted task. By nightfall the Lotzen defile had been breached, the Russian entrenched positions 'to the horror of the defenders, could not withstand the German fire. German cavalry were passing through the gap and Rennenkampf's left flank was completely turned without, moreover, the least chance of rescue by Jilinsky. By the end of September 9 an involuntary Russian withdrawal under fair local control was under way, the firm discipline which marked Rennenkampf's qualities as a commander, steadying the soldiers. On September 10, reacting to the collapse of his left flank, Rennenkampf issued orders for a deliberate withdrawal of 30 miles to the east of Gumbinnen — orders which arrived promptly at some HQs but late at others so that the ensuing movements were uneven and liable to further disruption as the enemy probed each gap. Unfortunately for the First Army, the Germans followed hard on their heels and frequently the Russians would be forced to turn and counter-attack. In places the two 9,
Francois,
The Chief-of-Staff, General Yanushkevich, visited Rennenkampf on September 13 and found him 'just as usual'.
operations.'
in
sides became intermingled and Ludendorff came to complain: 'It was difficult to distinguish friend from foe and there were cases of our columns firing at each other.' Indeed when the pursuit should have been gathering speed Ludendorff tended to react
latter kept his job.
Now
operational control
came
virtually
under the hand of the Grand Duke, for although he appointed General Ruzsky to replace Jilinsky on September 17, the intervening four days saw a flow of orders from the Grand Duke, bypassing Army Groups, which were designed to stabilise First, Tenth and Second Armies on the line of the River Niemen. The Battle of the Masurian Lakes came tamely to its end as the two sides fell apart. Attention was now fixed on the swing of the Central Powers' fortunes in France and in Galicia. Once again German and Russian claims as to losses were conflicting, Ludendorff stating 45,000 and the Russians admitting to only 30,000 — but East Prussia had been liberated. The battles of East Prussia
had broken
made many reputations, diverted Grand Strategy into new channels from its and
pre-ordained course, and demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of German and Russian forces in the briefest possible time. It was a German victory, but a victory over only a fraction of Russia's potential forces. If anything it merely hardened the determination of the combatants to fight with even greater determination in the future. Further Reading
Hoffmann, Max, The War of Lost Opportunities Ludendorff; Erich, My War Memories Golovine, N. (translated by Muntz), The Russian Campaign of 1914 Cruttwell.C. R. M. F A History of the Great War 1914-18 Liddell Hart, Captain Sir Basil, A History of the .,
World War 1914-18 Reichsarchiv, Die Befreiung Ostprussens Martos, Outline of the Operations of the XV Corps in East Prussia in 1914 Francois von, Mameschlacht und Tannenberg Lambert, D. W., The deterioration of the Imperial Russian Army in the First World War August 1914-March 1917 (facsimile edition, Michigan: University Microfilms International 1980) Lukomsky, A. C, Recollections Knox, A., With the Russian Army 1914-17
KENNETH MACKSEY Regiment
in
1968
Purnell's History of the
part
in
from the Royal Tank ,become Deputy Editor to
retired
to
Second World War. He took campaign in 1944
the North-West Europe
and 1945, and afterwards served in Germany, India and other parts of the Far East. He has written several books on military history, The Shadow of Vimy Ridge, Armoured Crusader (the biography of Major-General Hobart), and The Crucible of Power which describes the battles for Tunisia, and an illustrated history of tanks in co-operation with John Batchelor, the technical
artist.
245
have played some part, however minor, in the plans made time to deal with the possibility of a war against Germany. Subsequently he was sent to Turkestan. His position there was that of GOC, Turkestan Military District, and not, as is stated by some writers, Governor-General of Turkestan. In the summer of 1913 he attended the manoeuvres near Samarkand, and he was still commanding in Turkestan when the war broke out. However, Samsonov suffered badly from asthma, and this caused him to be on sick leave in the Caucasus when hostilities broke out in 1914. Consequently he did not arrive at headquarters at Bialystok until August 13, only four days before his Army began its advance. He had been warned in advance that, in the event of war, he would be given this appointment: although all army commanders designate had been told of the plans they would have to implement, should Russia be involved in a war with Germany, less senior officers on Samsonov's staff had not been informed. Nor were they accustomed to working with each other, nor — clearly — was there time for them to become so. These difficulties, and Samsonov's characteristic disregard of reconnaissance, his shortage of equipment and his lack of food and ammunition, made it unlikely that any operation he undertook would be successful. clearly
at that
COMMANDERS IN THE EAST John Kecgan and Peter Vigor The careers and characters of the men who took
command on
the Eastern Front
Samsonov — no great aptitude for strategy or tactics
Rennenkampf
-
courageous to the brink of recklessness GENERAL ALEXANDER VASSILIEVICH SAMSONOV
was
When
he was old enough, he joined a cavalry regiment and, at the age of 18, he took part in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, where he was first apprenticed to the bitterness of defeat. He then went to the Nikolaevsky Military Academy (the Russian Staff College), and sometime later, probably in the 1890s, he born in 1859.
commanded
a cavalry school. In 1900, he was sent to command a cavalry unit during the Boxer Rising, and, in 1904, at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, he was given a cavalry brigade. During this war, reports of his abilities vary. He is said to have done well in the skirmish of May 30 in the area of Wa-fang-kou, and again at the full-scale battle in that same area which took place a few days later (the Battle of Te-li-ssu). On the other hand, he does not seem to have had any great aptitude for strategy, and his reconnaissance was so faulty that his superiors often paid little or no attention to his reports. In January, 1905, he took part as a cavalry commander in General Mishchenko's raid, the sort of dashing, picaresque affair which clearly appealed to him, and in which he seems undoubtedly to have distinguished himself. The next month, he was involved in the Battle of Mukden, and it was after this battle that he had his famous quarrel with Rennenkampf, who had also been present at that engagement. Each accused the other of letting him down during the fighting and the altercation grew so fierce that they came to blows. As these two men were later to be commanding the two armies which, at the start of the First World War, invaded East Prussia and fought at Tannenberg, it was, to say the least, an unfortunate incident. By the end of the Russo-Japanese War, his reputation stood extremely high among his fellow Russians, to whom his dash and energy made a great natural appeal, and who, by temperament, were inclined to dismiss as unimportant his poor grasp of strategic principles and his bad reconnaissance. Those British and German officers, however, who were present as observers at the war, saw things very differently. Although they agreed that Samsonov was an extremely likeable man, they thought him a poor general. However, it is only fair to add that the Cossack units he commanded during the war were far inferior to the traditional Cossack regiments. On several occasions they fled without firing a shot. The Japanese, who had started the war with considerable respect for them, soon came to regard them with contempt. One reason for this startling decline in the Cossacks' military prowess must be found in the big and rapid expansion which was forced upon them at the start of the war against the Japanese, and the high rate of dilution which this entailed. Many of the new recruits were not Cossacks at all. Soon after the war had ended, Samsonov was made Chief-ofStaff of Warsaw Military District, and in this position he must
RENNENKAMPF
GENERAL PAUL was born in 1854. He entered the army at the age of 19, and, six years later, he was sent to the Nikolaevsky Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1882. From there he went to an appointment on the Staff. The next we hear of him is in 1900, when he was promoted to major-general and commanded a column of cavalry during the Boxer Rising. There his units were responsible for the capture of Tsitsihar and Kirin. In 1904, when the Russo-Japanese War broke out, he was again given command of a cavalry formation, but he appears to have made no more than indifferent use of it. At all events The Times correspondent of the day describes his raids in north-eastern Korea as no better than 'an aimless ramble', while the same observer had a poor opinion of his handling of his troops later in that year. In July, 1904, Rennenkampf was wounded but by mid-September he had resumed command and was operating near Pien-nu-lu-pu. In October of that year, he was involved in the Battle of the Sha-ho. According to Russian opinion he did well in this engagement, but foreign observers were extremely critical of him. For instance, the British officers attached to the Russian army thought that Rennenkampf was extremely bad at reconnaissance, and that his Cossacks were remarkable only for their 'dilatoriness and want of enterprise'. In this connection, it must be remembered that Rennenkampf s Cossacks, like those of Samsonov, were no longer of the quality of their famous predecessors due to the need for a hasty expansion of the Russian cavalry in the Far East on the outbreak of war. In 1905, Rennenkampf took part in the Battle of Mukden, and it was after this battle that he had his unfortunate quarrel with Samsonov. The quarrel ended in blows. Needless to say, relations between the two were not cordial from then on. The Russo-Japanese War ended in the summer of 1905 and Rennenkampf emerged from it with a reputation which stood extremely high among his compatriots. General Gourko, for instance, said that he was a man of exceptional energy, courage, determination, and military capacity (though he thought that his morals were suspect). Once again, however, the foreigners were unimpressed. A German general, who had spent the war attached to the Japanese army as an observer, said of Rennenkampf that he 'had not distinguished himself very greatly as a leader' during the conflict, and the British and Japanese concurred in this opinion. The
difference in assessment is probably due to the difference in outlook between the Russians and the other nations. The Russians admired, above all, personal courage carried to the brink of recklessness, especially when coupled with energy and panache. The more humdrum virtues of self-discipline, planning and careful staff work they were inclined to treat with contempt. Yet it is clear that, even in the relatively unsophisticated wars of the beginning of the 20th Century, no campaign could possibly be
won without them. Against an undisciplined enemy, however, or one provided with no more than rifles and machine-guns, energy, coinage and panache may be sufficient. This, no doubt, is why Rennenkampf was successful when he was sent to lead a punitive expedition against the revolutionaries who, supported by mutinous troops, were swarming all over Siberia after the end of the RussoJapanese War and, in particular, were preventing trains from travelling along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Rennenkampfs next appointment was GOC, III Corps, and from there he was promoted, in 1913, to the command of Vilno Military District. General Golovine maintained that the early Russian successes in August. 1914, were due to 'the superb training' given to the troops by Rennenkampf during those pre-war years. In the spring of 1914, the Russian High Command held a 'war game', at which Rennenkampf was present. The situation which formed the subject of this game was similar in many respects to that which actually happened later in the year. In particular, Rennenkampf, who was playing the part of GOC, First Army, was ordered to advance immediately, before he had completed his
would have risked blighting brilliant officer, and in 19] I,
ti(
at
!.
F even (he most he resigned. 'My
military career,' he wrote much farther I had ever dared to hope. Th< a war and, recognised that it was my dut as younger men. applied to be allowed to retire.' Retirement did not suit Hind which thrived on work, but he passed his tin oiigh in Hanover, collecting pictures of the Madon and iild shooting game. He was quite forgotten by the pu almost by the army and it was therefore with no sense of tion though much unspoken frustration) that he lived through the first days of August, 1914. His frustration might have gone further unsatisfied had not one of Moltke's junior staff officers been a distant cousin who, during a discussion of a suitable senior for Ludendorff, recalled that the retired general lived conveniently close to the main railway line to the east. Mohke 'recalled the long record of yeoman service and stall' experience, as well as the sturdy bulk of the general'. He decided accordingly to secure the Kaiser's approval and on August 22 telegraphed Hindenburg (then still generally known as Reneckendorf to ask li
than 1
1
i
i
he was ready for immediate service. 'Am ready' came the reply, and he left at once for the east, promoted to colonel-general and GOC Eighth Army. It was in Ludendorff, who accompanied him, however, that Moltke put his principal trust. 'I know of no other person,' he had written, 'whom I trust as implicitly as you.' The extraordinary strength of Hindenburg's character had yet to reveal itself: it was to outlast Ludendorff's brilliance. if
mobilisation. Rennenkampf objected to the order. In August. 1914, when war broke out, the Russian High Command was confronted with almost the same situation, and it issued the same order. As a good soldier, Rennenkampf complied with the order but he cannot have been happy about doing so.
Ludendorff— an officer of
exceptional talent and personal
Hindenburg — brought out of retirement to take over in the East
courage
MAJOR-GENERAL ERICH LUDENDORFF
owed his appointto the crucial post of Chief-of-Staff, Eighth Army, to two factors: his patiently acquired reputation as a Staff officer of more than usual talent, and his recent display of decision and personal
ment
COLONEL-GENERAL PAUL VON BENECKENDORF UND VON HINDENBURG was very much more the conventional Prussian officer than Ludendorff, and it was indeed the very normality of his character and career which recommended him to Moltke when looking for a suitable senior partner to accompany Ludendorff to the Eastern Front in August, 1914. The two names which Hindenburg's family bore were those of Prussian houses which each traced their ancestry to crusading members of the Order of Teutonic Knights of the 13th Century. The Hindenburgs had later distinguished themselves in their service to Frederick the Great for which he settled on them the west Prussian estates of Limbsee and Neudeck. On the latter, Paul von Hindenburg was born in 1847. He was educated from the age of 11, as was traditional in the family and in the Prussian officer class, at a cadet boarding school and, after serving as a page to the widowed Queen Elizabeth of Prussia, was commissioned in 1866 into the 3rd Foot Guards. He fought both in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, winning the Order of the Red Eagle for his part in the crowning victory of Koniggratz, and in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, when he was awarded the Iron Cross and chosen to represent his regiment at the proclamation of King William I of Prussia as Emperor of Germany in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. His postwar career was marked by no similar moment of drama and with little distinction. He came to be regarded as a steady, dependable officer, good enough to be regularly promoted but not at any accelerated rate. In 1904 he was appointed as a full general, to command IV Corps at Magdeburg. That was perhaps the limit which his career would have reached in peace-time service for if his name was considered, as is said, for the succession to Schlieffen in 1905, it was only briefly so. In 1908 he had the bad luck or
bad judgement
to defeat the
Kaiser on
summer manoeuvres, which
courage as a junior commander on the Western Front. There were other factors in his record which made his promotion a controversial one.
His comparatively humble origins were not among them, for the German army had already largely overcome its prejudice against the middle-class officer. Ludendorff's early career, however, was undoubtedly hampered by his undistinguished name and circumstances, and his consequent inability to join a good regiment. He compensated for these drawbacks only by his undoubted intellectual brilliance. Born at Kruschevia in Prussian Poland in 1865, he was the third child of a small landowner. His mother, a von Tempelhoff, had brought no money to the marriage and his father lost what he had before Ludendorff's career was launched. After cadet school at Plon near Berlin, Ludendorff therefore found his choice of regiment somewhat limited and was eventually elected to the unfashionable 57th Infantry at Wesel on the Rhine. After a tour of duty with 2nd Marine Battalion at Kiel, he was transferred however to the more distinguished 8th Grenadiers and in 1893, when he passed into the Prussian Staff College, he entered a milieu where his real talents could shine. His outstanding performance as a student won him a place on the Great General Staff, the intellectual elite of the German army, and in 1904 he was posted to its headquarters at Berlin. He received his initial training under Schlieffen, author of the German war plan, and archetype of the Prussian Staff mind, and in 1907 was promoted to lead the Second Section which, dealing as it did with operations, formed the pinnacle of the German Staff system. Two events were shortly to curtail, at least apparently, what promised to become a career of the greatest distinction: an ill-judged marriage to a divorcee, and an adventure into politics. The minor scandal of the marriage (in 1914 still a very happy one) he quickly put behind him, but his political adventure was not so lightly forgiven. It was provoked by the General Staffs disagreement with the War 247
Ministry over the military budget of 1912. The Staff wished for and the Ministry opposed a larger vote to increase the army's size (necessary in Ludendorff s opinion to make the Schlieffen Plan work). He was unwilling to conduct the argument along normal bureaucratic lines and sought allies among the Reichstag deputies. They were instrumental in securing a partial victory for the Staff but Ludendorff's demarche became talked of, and in 1913 he was effectively dismissed from Staff headquarters to command first a regiment, later a brigade (as major-general) in the Rhineland. The outbreak of war, however, rescued him from exile and he was swiftly reinstated as Deputy Chief-of-Staff to Second Army whose commander, Biilow, remembered his part in framing the plans to capture Liege by a coup de main and sent him as his personal representative to General von Emmich, whose force was to make the attempt. Ludendorff joined the force at a critical
when appointed
moment in the operation, took personal command of the leading brigade, and fought it into the heart of the fortress, bringing about the surrender of the garrison of the citadel, it is said, by banging on its door with his sword-hilt. Ludendorff was awarded the Pour le Merite and was to add to the lustre of his reputation by another intervention in the conduct of the Battle of the Sambre, which also led to glittering results for Second Army. It was therefore altogether understandable that when on August 21 Moltke was confronted with the need to replace the commander of the hard-pressed Eighth Army, battling alone in East Prussia against superior Russian forces, he should at once have thought of Ludendorff. He was not senior enough to take over command himself but was the obvious man to fill the post of Chief-of-Staff, in German practice the decisive appointment. The choice of Hindenburg, who was intended only as a figurehead, was an afterthought.
Able commanders and customary German thoroughness triumphed over superior
numbers
^ •:'$**.
-^
-»
The war plans of the Russian and AustroHungarian armies were diametrically opposed
in
concept
since
the
Russians
aimed at victory by an inexorable direct advance with an overwhelming mass, while the Austro-Hungarians sought to make up for a quantitative and qualitative inferio-
Kenneth Macksey Russian and Austrian forces collided with each other in Galicia
by attempting to pre-empt the Russian mobilisation and by the employment of an indirect strategy. But, though the Austro-
rity
Hungarians jealously retained their independence from German control and put their quarrel with the Serbians first, their overall plans were dependent upon, if not integrated with, German intentions. Thus, while the Russian scheme was relatively simple, that of the Austro-Hungarians was as complex as their own Empire. Once the Russians were sure that the Germans had actually concentrated in the West, they proceeded with their projected attack on Galicia — an invasion by General IvanofFs South-Western Army Group in which Fourth Army was to rest its right on the Vistula and, with Fifth Army on its left, move south, from out of the Warsaw bulge, against the northern flank of the AustroHungarian armies which, the Russian Commander Grand Duke Nicholas assumed, would be facing eastwards towards Tarnopol. Yet this was only a subsidiary movement since the main Russian effort was to be made by Third and Eighth Armies teach four corps strong) advancing, respectively, against Lemberg on the right and along the River Dneister on the left with the cavalry, which traditionally moved in advance of the infantry, held back to fill in gaps instead of being used ahead to scout for information.
Conrad von Hotzendorf, the AustroHungarian Chief-of-Staff, expected the Russians to do precisely the reverse. He assumed the Russians would hold in strength the base of the Warsaw Bulge and that, up to August 18, the quicker rate of Austro-Hungarian mobilisation would give a temporary superiority over the Russians. Therefore, if he could defeat inferior forces at the base of the bulge and join up with a German offensive (which he deluded himself into expecting from East Prussia) the Russians would be dealt a truly crippling blow. But not only did Conrad make unfounded assumptions about the Russians (whose mobilisation would not be as slow and ineffective as he imagined), he also misunderstood the Germans, since Moltke had never actually promised to attack in East Prussia, and a copy of Eighth Army's orders was by no means reassuring. Indeed, apart from a vague correspondence in 1909, the only hint of assistance Conrad ever received from his ally was a message, on August 15, saying that the German Eighth
war on July 25 and then. tried to recall when hostilities began against Russia on August 6. By then Second Army lay scattered in confusion among numerous railway yards between one theatre of war and
of
In haphazard, badly controlled offensives, the vast
the other, and it was three weeks before it could be shunted into the order of battle in Galicia. Moreover, Conrad did not realise that, by projecting First and Fourth armies northward, he was not only pushing them head-on against the Russian Fourth and Fifth Armies and also against the Ninth Army, which had been put together near Warsaw at the last moment for the drive against Berlin, but that he was also exposing their flank and rear to the impending invasion by the Russian Third and Eighth Armies from
the east.
Russian troops engage the attacking Austrians
Army was about to engage the First Army near Stalluponen.
Russian
Already, that day, Conrad had committed ten cavalry divisions in a great sweep on a 100-mile front in search of the main Russian forces — a cavalcade whose progress could be traced by a trail of abandoned horses, exhausted by saddle soreness and from being over-ridden. Unhappily this one venture achieved little since it found only the scantiest of information about the Russians, and from then on the Austrian cavalry were to be of little assistance to the main army. Yet what was learned served to convince Conrad not only that his enemy had deployed to the south-east of Warsaw but also that there was nothing of importance building up to the east of Lemberg. Hence he believed his plan of fighting the main battle north of Lemberg could be launched without the threat of being caught in flank and rear from the east. On August 18 the advance of the Austro-Hungarian main body (nearly 1,000,000 strong) began with First Army resting its left on the Vistula
and Fourth Army moving on its right (both directed to seek battle between Lublin and Cholm) while Third Army acted as flank
Grand Duke Nicholas also made false assumptions. Expecting to find the main Austro-Hungarian strength in Eastern Galicia, he ordered Ivanov to advance Fourth Army (General Salza) to the line of the River San before its mobilisation was complete in the belief that its presence there would strengthen the northern flank prior to the time when decisive pressure would be applied by Third and Eighth Armies. Newly arrived reservists were told to catch up their units on the line of march and were still doing so on August 23 when at Krasnik, the leading elements bumped into the Austrian First Army (General Dankl) driving up from the south. The surprise was mutual. The appearance of an Austrian army was not at all what Nicholas expected, but it was not possible to avoid battle. XVIII Corps was told to come south from Warsaw Fourth Army, and Fifth Army to wheel right and inwards to catch the Austrian First Army in flank. Third Army (General Russky) and Eighth to reinforce
was ordered
Army (General Brusilov) were, meanwhile, slow in moving and Nicholas was not to know that this very slowness had prevented his enemy from detecting their presence and realising the immensity of the threat. Nor was Nicholas to know that by wheeling Fifth Army he was actually pushing it across the front of the Austrian Fourth Army (General Auffenberg), of whose presence he was unaware. The Austrian Fourth Army had reached the line Rava Russkay-Frampol on August 24 without meeting opposition and in the firm belief that it was only opposed by light
enemy
forces.
In ignorance of the
approaches to Galicia in the direction of Czernowitz. Unfortunately for Conrad he
whole of the Russian Fifth Army was just six miles off, Auffenberg ordered an attack for the 26th against the Russian Fifth Army whose Commander, General Plehve, was also in ignorance of
was short of an army — the Second which he had ordered to Serbia on the declaration
the true situation since his 'information' stemmed entirely from misconceived orders
them both (moving northward into the Lemberg-Rava Russka area) and the light Kovess Group covered the southern guard
to
fact that the
249
> Lemberg: the first clash in Galicia The fighting in Galicia in August 1914 was typified by much confusion and misunderstanding on both sides. Reconnaissance was poor, and commanders were rarely able to gauge exactly the strength of the enemy. This disadvantage told particularly against the Austrians, who were heavily outnumbered
The penalty which might have to be paid weakening of the Austrian centre
for this
could be better appreciated a few hours later, for while First and Fourth armies
began
Russian infantry crossing a ford
from
GHQ. Plehve
to strike only flank.
A
in
believed he
an area where roads were bad and bridges rare
was about
an isolated enemy
an impasse, but
into
what
they construed to be a thinly held area: the Russians moved west in what they took to be empty territory. Suddenly, on August 26, they met and the Battle of Komarow began, but still the two senior commanders refused to understand what had happened, each thrusting down his pre-ordained axis, and under the impression that the fighting was only local. Throughout the 27th they wheeled and fenced across ground of close configuration without ever getting into really close combat. Tactically there was
A Russian machine gun
the Aus-
hand as, true to theory, they groped for and found the Russian flanks. By now Auffenberg had sensed he was engaged with a major enemy force and was calling for reinforcements to fight a decisive battle. This call was raised to a
cry for help
The Austrians marched north
strategically,
trians got the upper
force in
cry
when
men
,
his 27th Division lost over 8,000
an ambush on the morning of the 28th. Conrad was impressed. He had now reached the much more important conclusion that the decisive battle was taking place earlier than he had expected in the area of Komarow, and so three divisions under the Archduke Josef, which had been peeled off from Third Army on August 24 to protect Fourth Army's flank were now thrown into this main battle. in
to assert their numerical superiority over the Russian Fourth and Fifth armies to the north-west of Lemberg, the awful presence of the Russian Third and Eighth armies had been felt at last as they approached the Zlota Lipa on the 25th. At that time the Austrian Third Army was on the Grula Lipa, only 12 miles off, and as usual the Austrians were unaware of their peril. General Brudermann, their commander, interpreted a report which spoke of five or six infantry divisions and four of cavalry advancing from Tarnopol, with several others to the south approaching from the River Seret, as representing an inferior force of which he was capable of attacking. Fully confident in the power of the offensive he advanced next day, the 26th, without regard to the co-ordination of one corps with another and with even less care over the integration of artillery preparation in support of infantry attacks. The outcome was a foregone conclusion. Not only were the Austrians mown down in heaps and stopped, but the far wider Russian advance now began to overlap the Austrian flanks until, as night was falling, panic set in and the Austrians started to run. Some did not stop running for 25 miles until they reached Lemberg where they started a panic among the civilian population. Others did not bother to run
position in
The Russians had few machine guns and were short of ammunition Galicia.
"••
--
.
iJM
/ V
*S^
10
30
20
40
50
440
20
60 Miles
300
lOOKms.
Height
in feet
150
60
Austrian advance
Russian advance
—
Austrian withdrawal
Russian withdrawal
Brest Litovskji
JJ
|
Pripet
A
4 to
e
^ Lublinll
t Thelm
RUSSIAN
Frampol
#
AUSTRIAN FIRST
ARMY (Dankl)
ARMY
la
3
Lutsk
Rownol
,Komarow
AUG 26
^fes
(Auffenberg)
\
# Krytow
V\
AUSTRIAN FOURTH
Vis^
F^B
ARMY
Krasnik,
\
\
/
RUSSIA! Interim
ARMY
withdrawal
I
line I
(Ruzsky)
Lemberg
San
IS
w
Mikolajow
fcSambor
Tarnopoll
I
AUSTRIAN THIRD
ARMY
(Brudermannl
LIGHT
KOVESS
GROUP
AUSTRIAN SECOND
ARMY (Bdhm-Ermolli)
A U JS T R
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251
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at all, for the Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian army along with their civilian compatriots often gave up most willingly and, moreover, supplied the Russians with all the information they needed about Austrian dispositions and plans. Either way a great deal of abandoned equipment fell into Russian hands. Too late Conrad realised that he had miscalculated both strategically and psychologically the appeals for help from Third
Army. At that moment Third Army was outnumbered by three to one, Lemberg was three days march away from the almost
unopposed and advancing Russians, the lines of communications to the deeply engaged First and Fourth Armies were threatened as they fought on at Komarow and — terrible to contemplate —there was nothing available to reinforce Third Army. Second Army had largely returned from Serbia but had been committed to take over from the Kovess Group on Third Army's right in order to oppose the advancing Russian Eighth Army. The only spare divisions were the three which had been sent to help Auffenberg and he not only refused to part with them when seemingly
on the verge of victory at Komarow but managed to persuade Conrad that his refusal was justified. That night Conrad wrote to Franz Josef, 'I am now going through the most terrible moments of my life' — but he allowed Auffenberg to continue his offensive and withheld an order for Third Army to retire to Lemberg. This was folly, but it might have been a good deal worse had the Russians taken violent advantage of their victory on the Zlota Lipa. But Ivanov now halted (as had
Rennenkampf that, since the
Gumbinnen) thinking enemy main body was close, after
IS
L
Galicii
vften
dispute*,
fought again
is
he ought to halt and concentrate for the crucial battle. Thus the text book theory of the need to concentrate physical mass in battle obscured the fundamental fact that the power of modern armies to concentrate
firepower with fewer men was the only really decisive factor. The generals had yet to grasp this. Even so Nicholas countermanded Ivanov's halt order when he heard of it, but 48 hours had been lost which had given the Austrians a chance to reorganise and come to a conclusion at
Komarow. Between the 28th and 30th Auffenberg
sought the slow envelopment of the Russian Fifth Army while, on his left First Army reached towards Lublin to create the possibility of a double envelopment. In addition, Josef's three divisions from Third Army were reaching round the Russian Fifth Army's flank — all of which became known to Plehve on the night of August 30. Indeed, had Auffenberg's orders for the 31st been obeyed Plehve's encirclement would have been completed since his orders to withdraw could not have been acted upon in sufficient time. But two simple and typical battlefield misunderstandings
frustrated the Austrian plan. First an air report that Russian forces were driving into the flank of Josef's divisions persuaded their commander to divert nearly half his force
to
meet
this
new
covered too late that the
threat.
enemy
He
dis-
force
was
merely a light flank guard reconnoitring ahead of the Russian Third Army. Another air report describing an entirely imaginary Russian movement on the western
flank
halted
Archduke Peter* made them r
the
left
arm (under
of the encirclement
and
Thus, rather to his surprise, Pienve got away almost intact .
253
J
was
not until the morning of Septemthat Auflenberg discovered he had been rubbed. Filled with 'intense anger and dismay but, in the absence of contradictory orders from Conrad, always in the hope of overtaking the fleeing Russians, and despite [vanov's known threat from the east, he set off in pursuit -only to be recalled next morning by a peremptory order from Conrad. The last round of the Lemberg battle was about to begin.
and ber
it 1
1
Once again Conrad was planning m dreamland, for having been persuaded by Auflenberg and his romantically inclined Chief-of-Operations, Sopf. that the Russian armies in the north had been routed and that the victory at Tannenberg would add to Russian discomfort, he now saw the chance of winning his own Cannae against the Russian Third and Eighth armies at Lemberg. On the night of September 1 the orders went out. In the centre Third Army was to halt 'along the line of the Wereszyca and there reorganise for renewed resistFrom the south Second Army, ance'. assembling in the area Sambor-Stanislau, was to cross the Dneister and advance along the Mikolajow-Lemberg road and cut the advancing Russian's communications. Meanwhile, Fourth Army, recalled from its abortive pursuit of Plehve, was to perform a reciprocal movement to Second Army and drive on Lemberg from the north. But the aftermath of Tannenberg and Komarow had also infected Nicholas. The
Army bumped Army moving
into the Austrian Fourth south at Rawa Russka on the same day it was just as much a surprise, though it was the Russians who went on advancing. Meanwhile Plehve's rebounding Fifth Army was threatening to envelop Dankl's flank and Auffenberg's rear. Only by sidestepping to tack his army onto Fourth Army's left did Dankl save himself, and only by executing an almost miraculous pivot while in contact with two opponents did Auflenberg escape disaster at Rava Russka. Though Austrian losses were mounting disastrously their armies stayed intact because the Russians allowed it by advancing so ponderously and because, in a tight spot, the Austrians could still be led into furious, sacrificial attacks which temporarily halted the Russians. This was
the Second. Third and Fourth Armies'. No sooner had those orders been issued on September 9 than a report by Dankl made it quite plain he could no longer hold on the left. He said he intended to retire to the River San, but Conrad ordered him to hang on, excusing the risk with the statement that: 'Many a battle has been won because it was given up as lost prematurely by the other side.' There also comes a moment when unrealistic plans can no longer be carried out by beaten troops, and on September 10 this was virtually the position with the Austro-Hungarian army.
Some would advance without artillery support in dumb obedience to the bankrupt system of the outright offensive. General Bohm-Ermolli, commanding Second Army. would decline to pass on the order because it was impossible to arrange artillery support in time. There was no worthwhile forward movement that day anywhere. The men cowered in apprehension. In fact the initiative had passed to General Ivanov, and in double measure since he, at last, had tumbled to the fact that the main Austrian forces were opposite Third and Eighth armies but that his right flank in the north was only opposed by the weakened Austrian First Army.
More important, Plehve's Fifth Army was on Hruszow practically unopposed. (Indeed up to this moment the Austrians had refused to credit the conadvancing
tinued
existence
of
the
Russian
Fifth
drive to Berlin was now a thing of the past and the defeat of Germany of second importance to the defeat of Austro-Hungary.
Army, imagining that it had been destroyed at Komarow and only believing it
On August
messages
31 Nicholas told Ivanov to destroy the Austrians, cost what it might, and to do so by virtually ignoring the Austrians to the south of Lemberg and, shifting all his weight northward to catch the Austrian First and Fourth armies which were said to be pursuing Plehve's Fifth Army. Meanwhile Plehve was to stand and prolong Fourth Army's left flank while Ninth Army came down from War-
saw and fitted in between Fourth Army and the Vistula. Thus two massive jaws, hinged loosely on Krylow, were to close on the northern half of Conrad's forces while the southern half was kept in play by Eighth Army. A highly complex battle was in prospect — a battle in which the Russian preponderance in numbers was bound to be decisive. Again both sides acted impetuously without being in possession of precise details of each others' movements. When Dankl's Austrian First Army, advancing to the assault on Lublin, found itself unexpectedly opposed by a mass of Russians twice its strength moving south at Frampol on September 6, it could only give way; and when the Russian Third Austrian troops from the Fourth
now
Conrad and the Archbishop
of
Lemberg
certainly the case with Second
Army
in its
now
purposeless advance from the south for, since Conrad's plan had already collapsed in the north, its southern component could only effect delay and not a decision.
These Austrians wore themselves
out with unco-ordinated and costly attacks until, by September 6 Second Army was stopped, battered and then flung into panic. By September 8 both sides had fallen apart and, for almost the first time a semblance of order came upon the line. The Austrian First Army still held up the left flank south of Lublin, while Fourth. Third and Second armies faced roughly eastward on the line of the Wereszyca. That day they fought a series of head-on battles along the length of the front against the Russian
Third and Eighth armies — without advantage to either side and with a mounting casualty bill, but to the further encouragement of Conrad who conceived yet another grandiose scheme for a 'concentric attack against the enemy on the Lemberg front by
Army near Rava Russka
when
intercepted Russian radio the situation plain.) Nicholas and Ivanov now shifted their grip by holding in the east while attacking from the north and as this re-adjustment of weight came to be applied throughout the 11th, Conrad could find no way to relieve it other than to ask pathetically for still more attacks from soldiers whose spirit had been broken and whose strength
made
was expended. At last there was no further response from Conrad's followers: 'In the circumstances there was only one course of action; namely, to break off the battle and withdraw all the armies behind the River San.' That day Hindenburg's Eighth Army was in the process of breaking through at Lotzen. This event was not known to Conrad when he admitted to Moltke that night,
'German assistance
for the first
is
now
too late
phase of the campaign, but
present situation demands urgently as strong reinforcements as possible, at least three corps, to be sent us by rail via Cracow: otherwise any support will arrive
much
too late.'
[For Kenneth Macksey's -biography and Further Reading, see page 245.)
THE CODE BREAKERS GHQ
with two heavy radio ment at its receivers/transmitters. These regulated the radio traffic at GHQ, together with the radio equipment of the cavalry division and the permanent sets in the fortresses of Konigsberg, Thorn and Posen. The greatest possible range of the two receiver/transmitters was 156 miles. The cavalry division had at its disposal one heavy long-range and one light radio receiver/transmitter. The heavy receiver/transmitter matched the one at GHQ, while the light receiver/ transmitter had a range of 50 miles. The fortresses of Konigsberg and Posen each had a 2-5-kilowatt transmitter and a mast 240 feet high with a range of 500 to 625 miles. The receiver/transmitter at the fortress of Posen had a mast 120 feet high and a range of about 300 miles. Bi-lingual officers in the German permanent radio installations began examining, assessing and decoding enemy radio traffic at the beginning of the war, and their first ex-
Kurt Peball All the armies were fairly well equipped with radio sets in 1914. Although eavesdropping and code breaking techniques were not highly developed, the Germans, aided by Russian carelessness, were able to break the Russian code
At the beginning of the First World War radio communication in land battles was far from perfect. Apart from transmitting orders, its potential was untested. Provision for its full use, such as decoding, did not exist, while position fixing and decoding systems were dealt with only by the
General
Staff.
Yet
the armies were
all
endowed with radio equipment. The radio sections were part of the army signal corps, while the Germans, Austrians and Russians could also make use of the large, permanent radio instalrelatively well
perienced engineer was a civilian, a former university lecturer and later a classical scholar at the University of Konigsberg, Dr Ludwig Deubner. At the same time a slender contact had been established between the German and Austro-Hungarian radio receiver/transmitters, although the transmission of orders and other basic
lations within their countries.
The German Eighth Army, which was
to
defend the eastern border of Germany in August 1914, had a single radio detach-
1
f
.....)
-
CO-
^
L
*
.-0
.
.
lay a telephone,
cable
mutual information was already arranged by telephone and telegram in both armies. On the Austro-Hungarian Eastern Front in August 1914, the armies had mobile field-radio stations: Number 1 with XII Corps, Numbers 2 and 5 at 1st Army Detach ment, Number 4 at 2nd Army Detachment,
Number
9 at Army Group Kummer, Numat 4th Army Detachment and Numbers 10, 11 and 13 at GHQ. These field-radio stations used long-wave radiotelephone broadcasting with a range any-
ber
12
where between 50 and 125
miles.
Army
GHQ
radio traffic was regulated by the radio plan released on August 14, 1914. In the Austro-Hungarian army the research group of the General Staff's assessment office had concerned itself with the interception of foreign radio traffic since 1909. There had been Italian and Serbian cipher groups since 1911 and in 1913 a single Russian cipher group was set up under the direction of a captain at General Staff, Theodor Ivanyshin. Their experience
could confirm, evaluate and consolidate the very strong Russian army radio traffic after the outbreak of war. Since the beginning of the war had listened in to Russian radio traffic from the fortress Przemsyl, and since August 9, had been aided by Number 9 field-radio station
GHQ
•
0*1
M
ft*
w >/ /
» •
-at
Austro-Hungarian troops
/
k
M
V2> ^r
f
^ESKiiFMi
Sk
1
w
"
w
n
—n
nrvfriM 1
/ /
tw
IV.7
A portable German radio
set,
"
.
i
^
A
»
small by the standards of the day
Few
sets transmitted
speech
in
1914,
and here the Morse key
is
visible
255
many Russian
place names and officers' names were transmitted in clear and the names of the German destination in code.
were sent
All enquiries
were marked
ing each of many minor breaks in the coded message, it was possible to reconstruct the entire rode system. It is not surprising that Russian radio messages transmitted before and during the Battle of Tannenberg made history, and two famous messages, both sent in clear, betrayed the exact intentions of the Russian armies to the German Eighth Army. The first was picked up during the night of August 24/25 by the radio station at the fortress of Konigsberg and at 0520 hours was forwarded to GHQ at Reisenburg. The text of this message ran as follows: — Receiver/Transmitter Konigsberg. Picked up at 0230 hours. To the head of communications at Reisenburg: General Aliew (commander of IV Corps of Russian First Army). The Army will begin its attack. On August 25 the line Wirbeln-Saalau-Norkitten-Kl. Potauren-Nordenburg, and on 26th the line Damerau-Petersdorf-WehlauAllenburg-Gerdaunen should be reached. The dividing line between XX and III Corps: Pregel. The dividing line between III and IV Corps, the road Schwirbelm-Kl Potauren-Allenburg. Khan Naktishevansky (commander of 2nd Cavalry Division of Russian First Army) moves in front of the army front between Pregel and the line Darkehmen-Gerdauen-Bartenstein in the direction of Allenburg. North of there, Rauch (commander of Russian 2nd Guards Cavalry Division) with his division. South of there, Gurko (commander of the Russian 1st Cavalry Division). The crossings over the River Pregel cut by XX Corps. Rennenkampf. The other radio message was picked up at 0600 hours on the same day by the transmitter/receiver at the German Eighth Army HQ itself and also by the permanent set at the fortress at Thorn. The text of it was somewhat distorted and incomplete owing to a bad translation. It read: — After the battle on XX Corps' front, the opposing corps went back in the direction ofOsterode on August 24. At Gilgenburg after the stated the army pursued its Territorial Reserve pponent further, who retreated to Konigsberg-Rastenburg. The Second Army advanced to the line Allenstein-Osterode on August 25. The positions held by the corps were: XIII Corps the line GimmendorfKurken. XV Corps Nadrau-Paulsgut. XIII Corps Michalken-Gr. Gardienen. The dividing line for the above mentioned corps: between XIII and XV, the line NeidenburgWittigwalde. The I Corps shall remain in District No. 5 while it protects the left flank the corps to turn in the area of the army Bischofsburg-Rothfliess in order to protect .
A German mobile wireless
and
later by
Number
station
on the Eastern Front
12 field-radio station.
As the operational value of intercepted Russian radio messages became increasingly clear and was confirmed by other methods such as captured despatches, cavalry and air reconnaissance, other fieldradio stations were switched to eavesdropping. Field-radio station Number 12, under the command of Oberleutnant Alois Svec at 4th Army Detachment, was especially active,
and on August 20
it
broke down
part of the Russian army code. This code, which the Russian army used at the beginning of the war, was not known to the Germans and Austrians, and complete deciphering was not achieved until September 1914. However, organisational difficulties in the transmission o. )fders
within the Russian radio sections made it possible for the Germans and Austrians to deduce quickly Russian intentions without knowledge of the code. All Russian army groups down to the level of corps on the Russian north-west and south-west fronts were equipped with radio, and permanent radio receiver/ transmitters existed in most fortresses and several large towns in western Russia. Much Russian military radio traffic was blotted out by private radio traffic, while circulation and use of codes caused confusion because several codes had to be used at the same time. It frequently happened that the Russian receiver/transmitter had to ask the code of the receiving station or, on the pretext of speed and convenience
and stops and by study-
in clear,
for the decoder,
.
.
.
.
.
the right wing. On the side of Rastenburg 4th Cavalry Division shall remain under the command of VI Corps (Sensburg) reconnoitres the line Rastenburg-Bartenstein and Seeburg-Heilsburg. The 6th and 15th that Staff at OstroCavalry Divisions lenka (site of the for the Russian Second army). As the German Official History remarks, 'Eighth Army was informed of their opponents' intentions in a way which seldom happens in war.' Indeed they could not go wrong since so much could be reduced to a certainty when the other side of the hill lay revealed. .
.
.
GHQ
THE GREAT RETREAT a German View During the days of the Allied retreat to the Marne, it was decide who was the harder pressed, the retreating Allies or the pursuing Germans. Here a German, Captain Walter Bloem, gives his account of the great Allied retreat, or from his point of view, the great advance. At the time he writes of, his company had been marching and fighting without respite for three whole weeks, and his men were near breaking point. Nor was the end in
difficult to
sight, for although at this point victory for the Germans close, it was clear that many days' fighting remained. On the German soldiers, many of them reservists, the pace was beginning to tell
appeared
listened speechless with amazement. Positions evacuated! Bridges blown up! Advance on the canal! Incredible. And so the explosions during the night were explained. 'Do I understand you rightly, Stumpff? Has the enemy actually retired?' I
'No doubt about it, sir.' 'Well, I'm damned! Then things aren't so bad after all.' 'It's too early to judge the situation for certain,' he said. 'Perhaps it's only a ruse to entice us over the canal.' 'In any case, we're going on forwards, Stumpff! That's good enough.' [Most of this day, August 26, was taken up, however, in driving off the British rearguards from the line of the Mons Canal. It was not until the next day that Bloem crossed the frontier and after a long march spent his first night in a
French
village.
[
When the regiment assembled the next morning, the 27th, we heard that the corps on our right, IV, had won another battle against the English, who had made a stand at Le Cateau, and had captured 12,000 prisoners and two batteries of guns. More Our march was now in a southwesterly direction in pursuit of the defeated English army, which had left traces of its hasty departure on all sides. Car after car in the ditch with burst tyres or broken rejoicing!
axles, nearly all commercial vans with the names of private firms on them from apparently every big town in England, and
lected all the transport resources of her private industries accordingly. Large heaps of supplies lay burnt by the roadside; the flames had destroyed the bread and any cereal food, but their only effect on the thousands of tins of Fray-Bentos bullybeef had been to cook the contents. It was
khaki jacket, a dark blue schoolboy's cap with two long black silk bands hanging from it at the back, a short blue and black square-checked pleated skirt, between which and his stockings, which only reached to below the knee from a pair of brown shoes, was an expanse of muscular, hairy, naked leg. So he was a Scot, a Highlander. I offered the elderly gentleman my arm, for he had had a bullet through his right shoulder and a ricochet hit on the knee that made him limp, and led him back to the company, who gazed at us in blank
excellent!
amazement.
Our Rathenow Hussars were quick in discovering English stragglers. At a longish halt a couple of Hussars came up to me: 'Sir, we have taken prisoner a wounded English colonel and a major; they
Niestrawski came up alongside me almost bursting with indignation: 'Please, sir, that's a dirty trick to play on anyone; !' surely our Hussars didn't do that 'Didn't do what, lad?' He thought for a moment, puzzled. 'Or did those dirty swine actually take away
containing, tion.
as
almost
invariably,
ammuni-
England obviously regarded this war business undertaking and had col-
—
are in the waiting-room of the railway station over there; the major is unhurt.' I went across and found two somewhat dishevelled most gallant-looking but
their
own wounded
colonel's trousers?'
almost wept with laughter. [Another day's march brought Bloem to the banks of the Somme. It was about 9 pm when we reached the small hamlet, Le Mesnil-Breteuil, at the end of our tether. I had my billet in the house of an elderly woman who had remained to look after her home and her little garden, though her sons had fled. 'Why should I run away? I know you people I
gentlemen. Putting on my finest manners I greeted them in my best English and told them I had the honour to consider them as my prisoners — a turn in their career to which they appeared to resign themselves in a most cool and matter-of-fact manner. The major wore the ordinary infantry uniform with which I was now amply familiar, but the colonel had on a short
\
blew the main Here German pioneers erect a temporary bridge to speed the advance
As the
Allies retreated they
river crossings.
£2*a|
: -
AL V 1
I
•
*
'
Tm.
from the days of the seventies. But now you look quite different — not nearly as handsome as then. You had blue coats with polished buttons in those days, and beautiful, shining helmets. Now you're grey all over, sad-looking — I don't like it.' She led me to a small room, my bedroom, and a strangely youthful smile lit up her wrinkled features as she spoke: 'Well, captain, in the year 1870, when I was quite a young widow, a German armydoctor was billeted here for 12 days, and, believe me, I looked after him properly. I did every mortal thing for him, tout, tout, all for love. He was 29 25; in the afternoon he always used to sleep on the bed in his boots and spurs. There! You can still see the scratches of his spurs on the wood at the end of the
monsieur! and
tout,
and
I
was
she giggled. 'Oh, fellow he was!'
bed,"
what a handsome
[There followed two days on the road at a pace which had now begun to tell heavily.
|
Heat, blisters, and no rest For three whole weeks, ever since we detrained at Elsdorf on August 10, we had had not a single rest-day, nor even the suggestion of one. Day after day onwards without ceasing; every night in a fresh billet. The officers, it is true, had at least a bed and were able to take off their clothes at night; but the men throughout all this period of unspeakable trials and suffering had had only the straw they could pick up in the sheds and buildings to act both as mattress and blankets; they had had no time even to wash and dry their socks. Before the war I should have regarded such powers of endurance as beyond the capacity of the most robust peasant-lads. And how the men's feet suffered! From time to time we had to examine them; and it was no pleasure to look at the inflamed heels,
and toes of my wretched young lads, whole patches of skin rubbed off to the raw flesh. Many a morning we company commanders would ride up to the battalion commander: 'Major, could you explain to the higher command the need for a restday? The men literally can go on no farther, and if we are asked to stand and fight any day now we cannot be responsible for their The conduct under present conditions. major shrugged his shoulders uneasily: 'I assure you, gentlemen, I know all that as w ell as you do, and no day passes without myself and the other battalion commanders making this very same complaint to the colonel; but it seems quite useless. Apparently this frantic, everlasting onward rush is absolutely essential, and so you must keep on taking every care of your men on the march and use all your powers to keep up their spirits at any price. Make it clear to them that we must allow the enemy no rest until we have utterly defeated him on the whole front. Tell them that sweat is soles,
.
.
.'
:
saving blood.' [The scent of victory also drew them forward. On September 1, Bloem crossed the Aisne.]
And now we were only 30 miles from the City of Light [Parish 30 miles, that meant two days' march at most at our present rate of progress: so that by to-morrow evening at latest we would be standing at its gates, and perhaps the following morning make our triumphal entry into the surrendered city. [That morning, however, Bloem detected that the line of march had shifted eastward, carrying the army away from
The heat and dust
of
August 1914. German
field artillery
Paris and, though he could not know it, towards battle on the Marne. Two days later the regiment was approaching the river and constantly hampered by refugees. It was pathetic to see the endless mass of refugees fleeing madly in continuous streams along all the roads leading south, trying to escape from us. And now the roads were blocked ahead they could get no farther. Always the same ever-recurring little family tragedy: a cart with railed sides packed high with furniture and belongings, and drawn by miserable, broken-down horses: lying somewhere among the belongings an old man, fainted with the heat or with sunstroke, or an elderly woman pining away with worry, and the family, men, women, and children, half-starved, exhausted, dirty and neglected, shambling along literally trembling at the sight of us and the fear of being killed. [Not all French people felt the same. That evening the regiment billeted on the farther bank.[ Once more a comfortable French farmhouse welcomed us as guests as hospitably as if we'd been on manoeuvres in our own country. The farmer's wife, a fine woman, brought us a meal of boiled eggs, baked potatoes, beautiful golden-yellow butter, and most delicious cider: she told me, with tears in her eyes, that her husband had joined the Territorials, and that her five sons and her son-in-law had joined the \
army. 'And yet, madame, you treat us as if we were your defenders and not your enemies?' 'Well sir, I think like this: what I am doing now for you, I hope, perhaps, some other mother will be doing for my poor young men.' [Next morning the regiment set off towards the Petit Morin. Hitherto it had scarcely encountered the enemy, except as stragglers, since the fight for the crossings at Mons. But this day, September 4, was spent in continuous skirmishing and that
evening for the first time they were ordered to dig in.] I had only been back a few minutes at the trench, broadening and deepening very, very slowly, when all at once a mad firing started on the left beyond C Company
during the advance into France
where the machine gun company was. 'Hullo, what's up!' It was a cavalry attack. We could see, coming out of a wood, two or three dozen riders in steel helmets and blue overcoats moving towards the front of the next company, followed by more and still more. Our machine guns swept them, and one after another they fell from their horses; here and there a horse would rear up on its hind legs and collapse, while others rushed on past us as if ridden by devils. It was soon over; surely the enemy had gone mad. Fifteen minutes later a cyclist brought a message for me to go to the market square in the village to see the major. I went back through the dark, narrow street. In the middle of the square was the church, and from an upper window a faint light showed up a red-cross flag flying from it. Wounded were being brought or dragging themselves to it from every direction, German and enemy all together. Near by, in an open space in the square, sat the major, a flickering candle at his side. Around him in a circle lay and stood a dozen or more French cuirassiers, most of them badly hit, and their wounds wretchedly bandaged with bloody pieces of rag. Major von Kleist was struggling to remember his French grammar, but in vain. 'Awful, Bloem, isn't it? Will you crossexamine these prisoners? They speak a language I simply can't understand.' In a few minutes I had unravelled the mys-
The cuirassiers had been with a baggage column which had lost its way and had suddenly come under fire from our machine guns. I asked whence they had come and where they were going, but could get little out of them; like good soldiers they held their peace. 'We were on the march westwards, captain, always westwards. What is happening elsewhere, how the battle is going, we have no idea, tery of the cavalry attack.
we know
nothing, absolutely nothing!' [Neither prisoners nor captors knew that the great retreat was over. Next dayBloem's regiment and Kluck's army were embroiled in the Battle of the Marne. \
[From The Advance from Mons by Walter Bloem (English translation by G. C. Wynne).[
259
THE GREAT RETREAT an Airman's View L. A. Strange
The airmen were probably the only fighting men in France who appreciated the weather of August 1914. Cloudless skies and no wind afforded matchless flying conditions, and visibility was superb. But the speed of the retreat was too great even for aircraft. Every day the RFC's bases would have to be moved back, and many an airman returning from a mission found the field from which he had taken off in enemy hands. Below: The first aircraft of the RFC to land in France, a BE 2, number 347. There were few national identification marks at this period, and airmen frequently found themselves
,L
***"'rt *
*
x
fired
on by their own side
On August 24 German shells fell quite close to our aerodrome. The battle of Mons was drawing to its close and the famous retreat had begun; but we were not the least downhearted. Our transport had to bustle off in a hurry before daybreak, but towards the middle of the it was well morning before we flew off to Le Cateau, where an emergency aerodrome had been prepared. I remember that one Henri
Farman developed engine trouble at the last moment and had to be left behind; the smoke arising when it was burnt to prevent
it
falling into the
enemy's hands
Maubeuge aerodrome. There were no quarters for us; we slept in our valises near the machines. The next day we soon realised that great events were was our
last sight of
taking place. We were under fire; shells were bursting in unexpected places and we constantly saw troops on the move. We
made when
a
number
of reconnaissances,
and
dropped low, it came as a shock to me to sight the grey-green uniforms of German forces in localities which had been held by our own men the day before. The Germans blazed away whenever they saw me, but my machine took no damage. Up I
in the air I constantly saw fierce fights going on in isolated places when I looked down on one side, while a mile away on the other were transport, troops, and guns, all mixed up in the commencement of the historic retreat.
When I returned from my dawn reconnaissance to the field that was our aerodrome at Le Cateau, I could see no signs of machines or transport. A great battle was in progress; the only thing to do was to fly on southward and look for signs of our Squadron. Our eyes searched the roads until at last Number 5 Squadron's dear old
- •-*
«
-
«
red Bovril lorry hove into sight; I then landed my Henri Farman by the roadside and waited until the transport came along. When it did, I received orders to do another reconnaissance and report to an aerodrome near St Quentin. This new job took me in the direction of
Valenciennes and Maubeuge. While flying over the latter place, I was surprised to find heavy firing going on round the old forts, as I had imagined them to be in German hands by then. When I finally returned to St Quentin, I discovered our new aerodrome to be a cornfield that had only just been cut. A big L, fashioned of wheat-sheaves, told us where to land. We were lucky enough to get a really good dinner in St Quentin that night, but beds were unattainable luxuries, and so we were once more compelled to sleep in our valises on the aerodrome. We stacked up sheaves round the machines and used others for bedding. I fell asleep to the sound of distant firing, and it turned my last conscious thoughts to those forts round Maubeuge, which I pictured as rocks surrounded by the incoming tide. Dimly wondering how long the French reservists who manned them would be able to hold out, I found it almost impossible to realise that only a few days previously we had basked peacefully in warm sunshine in that same Maubeuge. Our impromptu couches seemed comfortable enough, but we woke up with sore bodies and sighed regretfully for the cosy beds in Maubeuge Town Hall, where we had been billeted, and the glorious omelettes that Renee, our waitress, gave us for breakfast.
August 27 was a day of great anxiety for our forces as fresh masses of Germans were
•
-
-
reported to b in order to i
ig
round flank.
cavaln rearguard action advancing foemei dashing way th rien's
westward Smith Dor-
to
tion in the '•
into the in
the
.'tic-
their leader, artillery gallop enough guns wer< i-
•.
of
horse
ii
range. Meanwhile our planes did their best to k< informed of all that went on, now and then we found a chance to lend a hand to the ground forces in some hardfought skirmish or to harass the thickest hordes of the enemy by dropping petrol bombs, hand grenades and the steel arrows that were known as flechettes. After a hard and busy day's work, we settled down to another night on our cornfield. The fine weather had broken; thunderstorms were succeeded by a steady drizzle, which did not promise a comfortable night. But before we had time to think of supper, shells began to make our wheatsheaves fly about, and all machines beat a hasty retreat to La Fere. No aerodrome had been arranged there, with the result that our machines landed just where they could in fields on the outskirts of the town. As No 5 Squadron had no chance of reuniting, I spent the night helping a staff officer to direct stragglers to collecting stations. We stood at the junction of four crossroads, sending the men of various divisions to their proper rallying points. We heard many stories that night — grim tales of whole regiments wiped out, while it was a terrible sight to watch the return of those splendid troops who had marched
up
to
Mons
weapons,
so recently.
tunics
and
Some were minus boots,
with their
The eyes of the German advance, and the Allied retreat
Sopwith Tabloid Engine: Gnome rotary, 80 hp. Armament: small arms chosen by the pilot or one .303-inch Lewis gun. Maximum speed: 92 mph at ground level. Initial climb rate: 1,200 feet-perminute. Endurance: 3V2 hours. Weights empty/ loaded: 730/1, 120 lbs. Span: 25 feet 6 inches. Length: 20 feet 4 inches
Hansa- Brandenburg D An orthodox two-seater, only about 12 examples were built for the German army. The fuselage was of steel tube construction covered with ply, and the rest of the structure was of the normal wooden construction with fabric covering. Engine: Benz Bz 1 10 hp. Span: II,
43 feet
0%
inches. Length: 27 feet
8%
inches
Avro 504 Engine: Gnome rotary, 80 hp. Armament: small arms as chosen by the pilot, one .303-inch Lewis gun or a few small bombs. Maximum speed: 82 mph at ground level. Climb rate: 7 minutes to 3,500 feet. Endurance: 3Vi hours. Weights empty/loaded: 924/ 1,574 lbs. Span:
36
feet.
Length: 29 feet 5 inches
Aviatik Bl This aircraft first appeared in 19 14, and was derived from the prewar P 15A. As it appeared originally, it lacked the fixed fin shown here, and possessed struts bracing the ends of the upper mainplane from the outer pairs of interplane struts. Its power was provided by a 100 hp Mercedes D engine. The type was only I
produced
in
very small
numbers
263
have another go at the same lot, we found them moving south, so we dropped down to a low height and flew along over the road, where we managed to plant our third bomb right on to a lorry, which took fire and ran into a ditch. The lorry behind it caught fire as well, and both were well ablaze when we left. It was not a serious loss to the German army, but it sent us home very well pleased with ourselves. That same evening a German machine dropped three bombs on our aerodrome, and one fell fairly close to our transport, but luckily it did not burst. We all made a rush to the spot to grab bits of the bombs as souvenirs and found that they were full of shrapnel bullets.
to
A
successful bluff cannot remember whether this machine was the Albatross [sic] that Spratt brought down. He flew a Sopwith Tabloid and forced the enemy to land by circling round above him and making pretence to attack him. As a matter of fact, he had run out of ammunition, but the bluff succeeded and the occupants of the German machine were taken prisoner. On August 30 we took another step backward, landing at Senlis. We did not stop long in Senlis, but moved on that same night to Juilly, where we had a most exciting time that all old members of the RFC will never forget, as they were kept up all night, making an improvised stockade around the field in which the machines were parked on account of the rumours of a large force of Uhlans in the neighbouring woods. It was even suggested that we should fly our machines away in the dark, which at that time would have been somewhat of a feat if we had managed it successfully, as night flying was still a great adventure. However, with the aid of a squadron of the Irish Light Horse we kept watch all night. There were a number of false alarms, but the only invaders of our I
Above: The early days of flight. The pilot lazes while young and old alike admire his machine Below: The ear trumpet gone mad — an early version of the early warning air-raid system puttees wrapped round their feet. All were utterly worn out with ceaseless marching and fighting, but if they were not exactly
what one might term orderly, at least they were obedient and glad to listen to the voice of authority. The memory of that
my
mind, as there were so many alarms and the situation still remained so uncertain; but I see from my diary that August 28 was more hopeful. The entry I have is as follows: August 28 — Messenger for the day. Flew all day from La Fere with messages. Weather thunderstorms, bad, heavy machine waterlogged, cannot climb at all well. Hasty but orderly retreat; many stragglers and some confusion along the line of retirement, but perfect discipline and order extending back to the fighting line, which is very difficult to define, as so many separate battles are going on in little night
is still
fresh in
isolated spots, some so forlorn that they are obviously only desperate last stands far out of reach and without any hope of retirement. Saw a British cavalry regiment ride
down two squadrons o/"Uhlans, whom they caught unawares and completely cut up. Meals anyhow and any time. No letters from home yet. That night I could only manage a meagre dinner of bread and chocolate, but I had a wonderful bed at the maire's house. No rest for the weary, however, as about 0200 hours rifle fire in the street outside woke me up. I got out by the back garden and went off to my machine, where I stood by till dawn, when Captain Bonham-Carter turned up and we went off for an earlymorning reconnaissance, feeling much safer as soon as we were in the air. That night we landed on the race-course at Compiegne, which was a treat after the fields which had been our aerodromes. I spent the morning of August 28 fixing up a new type of petrol bomb to my Henri Farman, and in the afternoon Penn Gaskell and I went to try it out. We dropped two bombs on either side of the road north of St Quentin, where we found a lot of German transport; returning ten minutes later
aerodrome were a number of refugees trekking back from the battle area. We left before dawn and flew to landing grounds farther south, some of our machines going to Serris, a little place not far from Paris, while others made for Pezarches. As a matter of fact, we departed none too soon; a Henri Farman of No 3 Squadron that had developed engine trouble had to be left behind and burnt, but the mechanics were told to salve the engine. They got it on to a tender and just got away in time, with the bullets of the Germans whizzing round their ears. As usual, the German airmen spotted our new aerodrome at Serris and paid us a visit. They had an uncanny knack of finding out where we were located almost as soon as we arrived, so that we were not at surprised to see them there. Norman Spratt went up to have a go at one of these disturbers of our peace and managed to fire 30 rounds at him from his revolver at close range, but the enemy remained apparently undamaged. Spratt landed in desperation and tied a hand grenade on to the end of a long piece of control cable; he had the bright idea of flying over the Hun and hitting his propeller with the grenade, but I felt very sceptical about his chances of bagging a victim that way, and I do not think he ever did. all
Gordon Bell, on his Bristol Scout, was another pilot who distinguished himself during the retreat. Like Spratt, he flew a
machine that was very light about the | undercarriage, and I always admired the S way these two pilots landed and took off s from small rough fields without damaging their machines. Bell was wounded soon afterwards and had to return to England. He got a shot in his engine which forced him to come down where he could, with the result that he landed in a tree but of the machine and escaped with a few bruises. When he picked himself up, however, he discovered that he had been wounded slightly in the knee, and from subsequent investigations it seems likely that he was fired on by our own or French troops. Some infantrymen could never resist the temptation to take a pot shot at an aeroplane without bothering to ascertain its nationality, and more
was thrown out
than one airman got his baptism of fire from his own side. It was a case of 'save me from my friends' with a vengeance. Gordon Bell had a great sense of humour and a bad stutter when angry. On this occasion a staff officer galloped up and asked if he had crashed. Bell explained, with much stuttering and profanity, that he always landed like that. The Germans pushed on towards Paris at a very fast rate. On September 4 we received orders to move to Melun, and beat a most undignified retreat, as we had to clear out in a great hurry. The Germans were at that time within 20 miles of the
French
capital.
day at Melun proved most exciting, however, as from the first reconnaissance we were able to see Kluck's
Our
first
army streaming east instead of south, while the British troops were moving in a southerly direction instead of the northerly one in which we expected to find them. It took many confirmatory reports to convince the Higher Command that this was so, because the sudden break off of the German advance seemed almost a miracle, while I fear that there were still a number of old-fashioned officers who did not yet quite trust the efficiency of aeroplanes, and so credited us with no powers of observation. During the night we heard the guns booming away to the north of us, and wondered what was happening. As it was a very warm evening, and for once in a way the whole of our transport had turned up, we did not bother to go and look for billets, but just rolled into our valises. Later in the night we had cause to regret this, as a fierce thunderstorm burst upon us. Some of us decided to stick it out and remained in the open, hoping that the rain would not penetrate our valises; while others packed themselves into the overcrowded, Stirling transport lorries. The result was that we were all either drenched or suffocated. The next day, however, we quickly forgot these discomforts in our joy at learning the definite news that the British army was advancing for the first time since the battle of Mons. The retreat was over; our spirits rose again, and all traces of weariness disappeared in the excitement and anticipation of at last getting back a bit of our own. [From Recollections of an Airman by L. A. Strange. |
The
were in full retreat, but the not have everything their own way. as this wreck indicates — although it probably crashed as the result of an engine failure Right:
Allies
Germans did
MANOEUVRE Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart
The Marne Manoeuvre, so often referred to as the Battle of the Marne, was not in the strict sense of the word a battle at all. Responding to Billow's urgent appeals, Kluck had altered the course of the German First Army to swing to the east of Paris instead of west as originally planned. In doing this he exposed his right flank to attack by the fortress troops in Paris itself, and this deviation from the letter of the Schlieffen Plan proved to be the Germans' undoing. Seriously over-extended, exposed on the flanks and in the rear, their troops badly exhausted, the Germans ordered a general withdrawal. Their bid for swift victory had failed. Below: French infantry wait to recross the Marne and pursue the retreating Germans
*
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General Gallieni, the military governor of Paris, struck at the exposed German flank and eventually persuaded Joffre to order the general turn-about to exploit the German retreat
Colonel Hentsch, liaison officer between OHL and the German field armies, sanctioned the German withdrawal and thus tacitly confirmed the failure of the Schlieffen Plan
On August
day, in a note to his army commanders, he indicated a line still further south — a line, moreover, where they would 'fortify themselves' and await 'drafts from the depots'. In Joffre's own words: 'The state of our men, as reported by the army commanders, gave additional reason for inclining to this solution.' Joffre's chief advisers were
30, 1914 Joffre was driven abandon the project of building up a new mass to envelop the Germans' flank, since on that day he had been forced to part with its nucleus, the Sixth Army,
to
as a reinforcement to the Paris garrison. Instead, he pinned his faith to a new design of breaking the German centre. But this idea in turn began to crumble, as the enemy pressure developed and his retreating forces threatened to get out of control. On September 1 he ordered the retreat to be continued to a line south of the Seine, saying that it was impossible to make a stand on the Marne. Although a captured map was brought to him that evening, which as he himself later admitted, 'made it perfectly clear' that Kluck was changing direction, it did not change his own intention to continue retreating. The next
in agreement on this. The most influential, General Berthelot, held that 'the troops were so worn out by the long retreat which had never ceased since the Sambre, that they were incapable of making any effort'.
Gallieni was left to discover for himself, on the 3rd, that the Germans were changing direction and moving across his front. But he was quick to see the chance that was offered, and early next morning ordered his forces to prepare for a stroke against them. Informing Joffre by telelate
4 *
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^*
General von Bulow, commander of the German Second Army, persuaded Kluck to swing southeast to help repel a threatened attack by the French Fifth Army
phone of what he had done, he urged him sanction a counteroffensive. Some of the younger men on Joffre's staff backed up the idea, but Berthelot was firm for continued retreat. Joffre hesitated to go against his judgment, although after Gallieni 's intervention he had been moved so far as to telegraph an enquiry to Franchet d'Esperey — whom he had put in Lanrezac's place as commander of the to
Fifth Army — whether 'your army is in a state to attack with any chance of success?' Just before it reached Franchet d'Esperey, the latter had issued orders for his army to retreat to the Seine 'as quickly as possible'.
Then in the afternoon ominous news from the flank of the Fifth Army reinforced Berthelot's arguments, and Joffre was inclined to feel that the counteroffensive must be 'delayed for five or six days' at
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Advancing again
at last.
Exhausted though they were, the French armies
'I decided that I would once more move my headquarters to the rear' — actually the order was given to move them over 80 miles back. This is a fact which makes it hard to believe subsequent
least.
claims that Joffre had still any thought of taking the counteroffensive. At dinner he heard that important papers had arrived from the Fifth Army, and as soon as it was finished he started reading them. But he was still studying Franchet d'Esperey's messages when he heard that Gallieni was on the telephone and insisted on speaking to him personally. Joffre had such a dislike of the telephone that, according to his aide-de-camp, this was about the only occasion he ever consented to speak on it. Gallieni was, however, his old chief. What passed between them will never be known with certainty. Gallieni, according to his staff and secretaries, vehemently urged Joffre to take the counteroffensive and by the force of his arguments gained Joffre's assent. Joffre, according to his own account, told Gallieni that he had already made up his mind to take the counteroffensive, and that his plan was now in accord with Gallieni's proposals of the morning. Joffre's aide-decamp, however, has disclosed that there was an argument, and that Gallieni evidently used an emphatic tone. He admits, too, that it was only then that Joffre took the definite decision. Apart from this evidence, the run of the facts tends to confirm the view that Joffre was decisively influenced by 'his master's voice'. There was reason afterwards for denying the suggestion, since Joffre needed the laurels of the Marne to cover the ashes of his opening plans, while Gallieni had '68
•
rallied
immediately to follow up the German retreat
been nominated by the government as his prospective successor. And laurels are kept the harder
the it
is
longer to part
with them. In such circumstances human memory has convenient blanks. Indeed, when the controversy waxed fierce in later years, after Gallieni's death, Joffre went so far as to declare at one time that he had 'no recollection' of even having any conversation on the telephone! Although Gallieni's orders to the Sixth Army were issued at 0830 hours, Joffre's were not sent out until several hours later — another significant fact. They did not reach the armies until the early hours of the 5th: both Franchet d'Esperey and the British felt that it was too late to make a change, so their armies continued the retreat for another day — while the Sixth
Army was moving
against the enemy's
flank. Gallieni's stroke temporarily
the
German
right
unhinged wing — Kluck was taken
by surprise, having sent out no reconnaissance aeroplanes to watch his exposed flank. And now, when taken off his guard, the 'disappearance' of the British encouraged him in a freshly dangerous delusion. For having pulled back half his army to meet the flank threat, he was now emboldened to draw off the remainder in the hope of retrieving his initial setback by winning a local victory. Thereby he left a gap of 30 miles, covered only by a screen of cavalry, between himself and Biilow. The British columns had turned about on the 6th and were marching north, but not fast enough to warn Kluck until, on the morning of the 9th, they were suddenly reported to be moving into the gap. The news of their unexpected reappearance at this
came at a moment when the leaders were nerve-racked by rumours that many thousands of British and Russians were disembarking on the Belgian coast in their rear — in reality, a mere 3,000 ill-equipped marines sent by Mr Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, as a bluff. The fresh moral shock cracked the nerve of the German command. With its approval, the armies of Biilow and Kluck fell back in hasty crucial point
German
retreat.
Controversy and legend No battle has caused more controversy or given rise to more popular interest and legend than that of the Marne. But then this crisis of September 1914 wrought the downfall of the German war plan and thereby changed the course of history. One school contended that Joffre had conceived the idea of the counteroffensive, and at most admitted under pressure of facts that Gallieni's initiative in seeing the opportunity had given an impulse to Joffre's decision to seize it. The other school argued that Joffre, after the failure of his first attempt to stage a counteroffensive on the line of the Somme, had given up all idea of a fresh attempt at an early date, and that but for Gallieni's fiery determination and persuasion the retreat would have continued. A dispassionate judgement is now possible, and even if we recognise that on Joffre fell the grave responsibility of taking the decision, the weight of evidence shows that Gallieni's inspiration dictated both the site and promptness of the thrust. Furthermore, dispassionate judgement rebuts the alternative case of Joffre's advocates—that Gallieni marred the prospect
The sudden appearance
of the
BEF between
the
by precipitating the blow, for we know that 24 hours' delay would have enabled the Germans to complete the protective redistribution which Gallieni interrupted.
On the German side a similar controversy has raged as to whether or not the order to retreat was a mistake, and whether Kluck of the First Army, Biilow of the Second, or the envoy of OHL, Colonel Hentsch, was responsible for the fatal decision.
The multiple controversy has at last served to show that the Marne was a psychological rather than a physical victory. So, also, have been most of the immortal victories of history, with the actual fighting of secondary importance. For the profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battles is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men. Before and during the crisis the German commanders were constantly looking backward apprehensively over their right shoulders, fearful of an Allied stroke against their ever lengthening communications in Belgium and Northern France. Unfortunately for the Allies, there was small warrant for this nervousness. The belated plea for landing the BEF on the Belgian coast had been overruled by the pledge to commit it as an appendix to the French left wing. Yet the Belgian field army, even if it was under German guard at Antwerp, had at least caused a serious detachment of German strength to perform this guard duty, and, moreover, it was a chronic irritation to German nerves. The fertile brain of Mr Churchill was also at work. Resources were scanty, but he despatched a brigade of marines under
German
First
and Second Armies threatened the most sensitive part
Brigadier-General George Aston to Ostend, with orders to give their presence the fullest publicity. They landed on August 27, and stayed ashore until the 31st. Now let us turn to the 'other side of the
On September 5, the day when the French troops were moving forward to
hill'.
strike at Kluck, Colonel Hentsch, the representative of OHL, came to the threatened army with this ominous and despairing warning — 'The news is bad. The Seventh and Sixth Armies are blocked. The Fourth
and Fifth are meeting with strong resistance. The English are disembarking fresh troops continuously on the Belgian coast. There are reports of a Russian expeditionary force in the
same
parts.
A
with-
drawal is becoming inevitable.' We know from other sources that the 3,000 marines in the German command's imagination to 40,000, and that the Russians were said to be 80,000 strong.
had grown
Thus the German flank army was
left
with the belief that its rear was seriously menaced, and that, in any case, OHL was contemplating a withdrawal. At the least such knowledge must have been insidiously enervating during a period of strain. And even if OHL came to have doubts of the Belgian news, it also became imbued with the idea of a retirement, and when Hentsch came again on September 9 with full powers to co-ordinate it, 'should rearward movements have begun', not only had these begun, but they also coincided with fresh disturbing news from Belgium. For if the Belgian sortie from Antwerp that day was short-lived, it to face its ordeal
had
the
incalculable psychological effect of menacing news at a moment of crisis. The German retreat gathered moall
of the
mentum and
German
spread.
line
With
it
turned the
tide of the war.
Mr Churchhappy inspiration and General Aston's handful of 'Marine promenaders'. But equally helpful was that amazing 'Russian' myth which originated and spread so mysteriously. Mr Churchill, we know, had History should do justice to
ill's
actually proposed to bring a Russian expeditionary force in such a way. Did the proposal perhaps leak out and become exaggerated into realisation in the process? General opinion, however, has long ascribed the legend to the heated imagination of a railway porter working on the simple fact of the night passage of troop trains with Gaelic-speaking occupants. Keeping this external factor on the circumference of our thought, let us turn to trace the sequence of events in the actual battle zone. The immediate chain of causation begins with the escape by retreat of the French and British armies from the frontier trap into which Joffre's plan had led them. The first, highly coloured, reports from the army commands in the battles of the frontiers had given the German supreme command the impression of a decisive victory. While Kluck's army, on the German extreme right or outer flank, was pressing on the heels of the British — so close that the 'outside' British corps (Smith-Dorrien) was forced to halt and give battle — Kluck's neighbour on the inside, Biilow, was following up Lanrezac's French Fifth Army. When on August 26, the British left wing
back southwards badly mauled from Le Cateau, Kluck had turned south-westwards again. If this direction was partly due to misconception of the line of retreat fell
269
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FRENCH SIXTH
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(Maunoury)
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Sezanne
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300 :
Approx Front Lines Sept. 5
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Approx. Front Lines Sept. 9
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German Movements
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CORPS
B E F (French)
German Retreat
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CORPS
XI
CORPS
FRENCH NINTH ARMY
CORPS CORPS
FRENCH FIFTH
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ARMY
(Foch)
(Franchet d'Esperey)
15 Miles
25Kms.
taken by the British — the idea that they were retreating to the Channel ports — it was also in accordance with his original role of a wide circling sweep. And by
of the wheeling German line would pass the near side of Paris and across the face of the Paris defences. By this contraction of his frontage for the sake of security,
him into the Amiens-Peronne where the first parts of the newlyformed French Sixth Army were just de-
Moltke sacrificed the more comprehensive prospects inherent in the wide circling sweep of the original plan. And, as it proved, instead of gaining security, he exposed himself to a fatal counterstroke. On the night of September 2 Moltke sent a message to the right-wing commanders which confirmed the change of plan and foreshadowed a new one. 'The French are to be forced away from Paris in a southeasterly direction. The First Army will follow in echelon behind the Second Army, and will be responsible henceforward for the flank protection of the force.' But the First Army was a full day's march ahead of the Second: and if Kluck tried to carry out the second part of the message he would be neglecting the first part. Hence he decided to march on, while detailing an incomplete reserve corps and a depleted cavalry division to serve as a flank guard.
carrying area,
training after their 'switch' from Alsace, it had the effect of dislocating Joffre's design for an early return to the offensive by compelling the Sixth Army to fall back towards the shelter of the Paris defences.
The
fatal counterstroke But Kluck had hardly swung out to the south-west before he was induced to swing in towards the south again. For in order to ease the pressure on the British, Joffre had ordered Lanrezac to halt and strike
back against the pursuing Germans, and Biilow, shaken by the threat, called on Kluck for aid. Lanrezac's attack, on August 29, was stopped before Biilow needed this help, but he asked Kluck to wheel in nevertheless, in order to cut off Lanrezac's retreat. Before acceding, Kluck referred to Moltke. The request came at a moment when Moltke was becoming perturbed in
way the French were slipping away from his embrace and, in particular, over a gap which had opened between his Second and Third Armies, through the latter having already turned south, from south-west, to help the Fourth Army, its neighbour on the other flank. Hence Moltke approved Kluck's change of direction — which meant the inevitable abandonment of the original wide sweep round the far side of Paris. Now the flank
general over the
'1
A 'The Miracle of the Marne' On September 5, 1914 the German armies were over the Marne and apparently in hot pursuit of the Allies. However, on the same day, Gallieni struck at the exposed flank of the German // Corps (part of First Army) with the eight divisions and one cavalry corps of the hastily composed French Sixth Army. This threat to the flank of the First Army was so serious that Kluck was forced to halt his advance and face west to meet it. Into the gap thus created between the German First and Second Armies drove the BEF as part of the turn-about of the whole Allied front. The German front was seriously ruptured and they were compelled to withdraw
How
lightly he regarded any danger from is also shown by the fact that no aircraft were allotted to the flank guard, and no air reconnaissance was ordered to the
Paris
westward.
Meantime Moltke was growing depressed and his decision to abandon the original plan was definitely taken on September 4. In place of it, Moltke substituted a narrower envelopment, of the French centre and right. His own centre (Fourth and Fifth Armies) was to press south-east while his left (Sixth and Seventh Armies), striking south-west, was to try to break through
General Berthelot, Joffre's chief adviser, in favour of sticking to the original plan and continuing the retreat
was vehemently
France's older guns, brought out once again in the hour of crisis
French Model 1878 120-mm gun Weight limbered up 8,250 pounds. Length of barrel: 27 calibres. Range: 8,975 yards. Muzzle velocity: 1,590 feet-per-second. Weight :
of shell: 40 1/4
pounds
271
General Maunoury, commander of the French Sixth Army, carried out air reconnaissance that confirmed the German swing to the east of
subsequent advance against Kluck's wing was the turning point of the Marne
Paris. His
right
V German soldiers manhandle afield gun into position.
It
was not
losses, or an actual
compelled the German withdrawal, but a general feeling of the insecurity of their position — almost a loss of nerve
tactical reverse that
"- ;
the fortified barrier between Toul and Epinal, the jaws thus closing inwards on either side of Verdun. Meanwhile his right (First and Second Armies) was to turn outwards and, facing west, hold off any counter move which the French might attempt from the neighbourhood of Paris. Moltke's order continued to ignore that Kluck was ahead of Biilow in the race southward and that he had already crossed the Marne, for it not only told Kluck to 'remain facing the east side of Paris', but to remain north of the Marne while Biilow wheeled into line, facing west, between the Marne and the Seine. Thus to fulfil the order Kluck had not merely to halt, while Biilow caught up and passed him, but to perform a sort of backward somersault. Such gymnastics are upsetting to the equilibrium of a large army. And in this case the French countermove which Moltke wished to guard against had already begun before his new plan could take effect. Moreover, Kluck, reluctant to be thus deprived of the chance of being the agent of decisive victory, continued his advance south towards' the Seine on the 5th, saying that 'the movement to face west might be made at leisure'. For the moment he still left the weak detachment of three brigades and a small amount of cavalry to guard his flank. Next morning
was struck by the French Sixth Army moving out from Paris. During these days the Franco-British retreat had continued. On August 30, it
Joffre —yielding to the pressure of a govern-
ment alarmed at seeing him abandon the capital by his direction of retreat— detached Maunoury's Sixth Army to reinforce the Paris garrison. Parting with it signified his abandonment of the flank counterstroke, for this was the force he had assembled for its. execution. Moreover, a
memorandum drawn up
that
same day
shows that he had transferred his
faith to a
counteroffensive against the German centre 'in the hope of accomplishing the
rupture which we formerly attempted facing north-east and debouching from the Meuse'. On September 1, Joffre issued orders for the retreat of the Allied armies to be continued to a line south of the Seine, Aube and Ornain rivers. Not only was the effect to take the armies away from and far to the south-east of Paris, but a commander who is contemplating an early counteroffensive does not place the obstacle of a river barrier between himself and the enemy. And a further note to the several army commanders next day added that
and ned
it
was
Joffre's intention to 'organise
from which he planan immediate but an
fortify' this line,
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eventual counter-offensive. That same day he replied to a suggestion of a stand on the Marne, made by Sir John French and communicated through the Minister of War: 'I do not believe it possible to envisage a general action on the Marne with the whole of our forces. But I consider that the co-operation of the English army in the defence of Paris is the only course that can give an advantageous result.' To the Minister of War and to Gallieni he repeated the same verdict. When zealous
the evening
apologists say that the idea of a counteroffensive was at the back of Joffre's mind, the historian can agree. This array of evidence is more than sufficient to dispel the legend that Joffre had any intention of giving battle on the Marne or that he plan-
stant response. He ordered Maunoury to carry out further air and cavalry reconnaissances as soon as it was light on the 4th. Quickly convinced by these early reports that the Germans were moving obliquely past the front of the Paris defences, exposing their own flank, Gallieni was equally quick to act. At 0900 hours he ordered Maunoury's army to get ready for a move eastward to strike the Germans in flank. He then informed Joffre by telephone of his preparatory moves, and urged him to sanction a counteroffensive. (This consent was necessary not only to ensure a combined effort but because Joffre had persuaded the new Minister of War to subordinate Gallieni to himself.) Gallieni's fiery and inspired arguments made an impression, but no more, on the slow-thinking Commander-in-Chief of the
ned the counterstroke which tilted the balance so dramatically. The definite nature of his reply was the more significant because on September 1, a staff officer with Lanrezac's army had found the German order for a change of direction in the wallet of a dead officer, and this was sent to Joffre's headquarters early next day. And on the morning of the 3rd, the changed direction, to the southeast, of Kluck's marching columns had been noticed and reported by British aviators. In the afternoon they added that these
columns were crossing the Marne and
in
Maunoury
reported that there left in the area
were no German troops
west of the line Paris-Senlis. All this was reported to Joffre without making any impression on his plans- save that on the night of the 2nd he altered the limit of his retirement to a line still further south!
Air reconnaissance But from Gallieni, the new military governor of Paris, even a fragment of information gained on the 3rd had drawn an in-
armies To save time while Joffre was cogitating, Gallieni rushed off by motor to Melun to explain the new situation to the British, and if possible gain
field still
Un Fortunately, Sir John French was absent from his headquarters, and at first Gallieni could not even find Archibald Murray, French's chief of the their co-operation.
general
staff.
Gallieni pointed out to Murray that it was vital to seize the opportunity which the Germans had given by orTerinj> their right flank, told him that the 'Am Paris' was already in motion against the German flank, and begged that the British should cease to retreat and join with his forces in an offensive next day. After wait ing three hours in vain for Sir John French's return, Gallieni had to leave at 1700 hours with the mere promise of a
telephone message
later.
This brought no
satisfaction, for its purport was that the British would continue their retreat' next
day. Their decision had been confirmed by receiving a letter, written that morning, from Joffre who said: 'My intention, in the present situation is to pursue the execution of the plan that I have had the honour to communicate to you — that of retiring behind the Seine — and only to engage on the selected line with all forces united.' The meagre influence which the
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of Kluck's change of direction had achieved was shown by a subsequent paragraph which said: 'In the case of the German armies continuing their movement towards the SSE perhaps you will agree that your action can be most effectively applied on the right bank of this river, between the Marne and Seine.' This casual qualification to the definite opening statement gave the British little encouragement to fall in with Gallieni's suggestion. After Gallieni's morning message, Joffre had been moved so far as to send a telegram, timed 1245 hours, to Franchet d'Esperey (who had superseded Lanrezac in command of the Fifth Army), saying: 'Please inform me if you consider that your army is in a state to make it [an attack] with any chance of success'; an inquiry which hardly suggests a sense of vital opportunity or an urge to action. This reached Franchet d'Esperey while Henry Wilson, of French's staff, was with him, and, after discussion, a reply was drafted, saying 'the battle cannot take place before the day after tomorrow', and that the Fifth Army would continue its retreat on the morrow, attacking on the 6th. To this message he added, in his own hand, a qualifying note even less encouraging: 'In order that the operation may be successful the necessary conditions are: firstly, the close
Joffre — architect of the Marne victory or reluctant follower of Gallieni's insistent urgings? Controversy around this point has waxed hot, but it was Gallieni's prompt action that
gave the
Allies their
opportunity
V German troops of Kluck's First Army on their
way
Marne. The chimera of early far to the south and extended lines of communication
to the
victory led First
exposed
its
Army too
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and absolute co-operation of the Sixth Army debouching on the left bank of the Ourcq on the morning of the 6th. It must reach the Ourcq tomorrow ... or the British won't budge. Secondly, my army can fight on the 6th, but its situation is not brilliant. No reliance can be placed on the Reserve divisions.'
What was likely to be the effect on Joffre of such a discouraging reply to his tentative enquiry? To harden his hesitation can be the only answer. That hesitation was the more natural because Berthelot, his chief adviser, was vehemently in favour of continuing the retreat and maintaining the original plan. Then early in the afternoon, came an
ominous report of German progress across the Marne. As Joffre's own memoirs relate: 'This was all that was needed to cause Berthelot to return to the charge.' The memoirs, it is true, argue that Joffre merely continued to put off a decision, but they admit that he issued new instructions that were designed to accord with Berthelot's plan. More significantly still, the decision was taken to move the GQG over 80 miles further south. Then while Joffre was having an early dinner, Franchet d'Esperey's message arrived. If Gallieni's coup d'oeil gained the opportunity it was, as he himself said, a
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coup de telephone which gained the Battle of the Marne. On returning to his headquarters in Paris he had found a belated message from Joffre which was favourable to his proposal for a counterstroke, but preferred
it
be delivered south of the would have lost the it given by a blow against the
to
Marne — where greater effect
enemy's flanks and
rear.
Gallieni seized the telephone, got through to Joffre, and by the fervour and force of his arguments at last won his sanction for the 'Army of Paris' to strike north of the
Marne as part of a general counteroffensive by the left wing armies. Joffre promised to obtain the co-operation of the British. Gallieni promptly issued orders (2030 hours) to Maunoury's army, which he reinforced. After several hours' delay were sent out for the offensive on September 6 — it was too late now for the 5th, and too late to be generally effective even for the 6th. The delay had Joffre's orders
far-reaching consequences — not all ill. On the 5th, while Maunoury's troops were moving east towards the enemy, both the British and Franchet d'Esperey's troops were marching south in accord with their original orders — away from the
enemy, and even away from each other. But for Gallieni, the gap they thus opened might have proved perilous. When they
»
«•
turned about next day, they had much to recover, and were not as quick in
and past their amazed inhabitants, making two journeys, with 3,000 soldiers at a time.
retracing their steps as the situation demanded. This 'disappearance' of the British not only enabled but encouraged Kluck, who had been taken completely unawares, to pull back half his main body ill and IV Corps) from the sector where the British had been, to reinforce the hard-pressed flank guard which was trying to hold off Maunoury's menacing advance against the German rear. The arrival of these fresh forces began to check Maunoury's advance on the 7th, and Gallieni pushed forward every possible reserve he could scrape together in order to strengthen
The pressur the Germans gained extra force from it was ct that directed against their rear Hank. It Gallieni had received the two further army corps for which he had n. before and which were only jusl piecemeal, the German the Maine might have bee: cul the battle been as decisive tactically strategically. Even in the actual Bit nation, the menace was such that at 2200 hou the 6th, Kluck called back his two remaining army corps, so creating a 30 mile wide gap between himself and the neighbouring army of Billow. Only two weak cavalry corps, with a few Jiiger battalions, were
ground
Maunoury. Here occurred the famous
if legendcrusted episode of the Paris taxicabs. A fresh division had just detrained near Paris, but it was 40 miles from the battle front. If it marched there it would be too late, and there was only sufficient rail transport to take half the division. That afternoon, the police held up taxicabs in the streets, bundling the passengers out
in
some
cases,
and
after collecting
600 cabs,
sent them to the suburb of Gagny where they filled up with soldiers. During the night this forerunner of the future motorised column swept, as only Paris taxicabs can sweep, through the outlying villages
'
i
i
.
left to
fill
it
and Kluck
failed to
arrange
that this thin screen should be put under a single command. The consequences were fatal. Although he was able to hold and even press back Maunoury's troops, the gap he had left in the southern front uncovered Bulow's flank. Although still untouched by Franchet d'Esperey's slow advance on the 7th, Biilow, sensitive to his raw side, drew back his right to the north bank of the Petit Morin. And when news came that the British were advancing into the centre of the gap, it proved the signal for the German retreat, which began on
t»
MW^w^
1
rjgOT"
,y %c\ • N.
'
'5*>,»
German dead on the field of the Marne. 'Every effort must be made to attack and throw back the enemy. A unit which can no longer advance must at *
all costs
retain the ground
it
has gained,
\
and rather than retire, be killed on the spot. In the present circumstances no weakness can be tolerated.' Joffres order of the day, September 6
a
Boulogne
•
Planned German Invasion
Advance
>
Actual Invasion
Advance
A
September 9. If the continuance of the British withdrawal on September 5 had marred the chance of a crushing victory, it was a pleasant irony of fate that their very withdrawal made possible the 'victory' as actually achieved.
An impossible task necessary, however, to take account on other parts of the battle front, for unless the German intentions
It is
of the situation
had been frustrated, Joffre's victory would have been impossible and defeat probable. To the frustration of their left wing attack in the Lorraine sector, the Germans themselves were the chief conelsewhere
For by pressing the French back on their own fortress line they had already made their task of breaking through it almost impossible. And yet another of the many 'accidents of the Marne' made their repulse certain. For when Dubail'"' and de tributors.
Castelnau's armies, after their defeat in the battle of Sarrebourg-Morhange, ended their hasty retreat, their line sagged inwards. And into this re-entrant, formed quite unintentionally, the main German attack was launched, pushing towards that very Trouee de Charmes which the French had prepared for their reception. ^8
Line to be reached by
Fortress
AUGUST
23rd
Line 10 be reached by
Rupprecht had been urged into
31st
Kilometres
50
^^ Army
i
Thus the French were given an opportunity to strike back effectively at the German flanks, and thereby they temporarily paralysed the original German advance, which came to a halt on August 27. This not only gave the French breathing space to strengthen their position, but enabled Joffre, with safety, to transfer part of the force from the right wing to the more critical left wing. News of this transfer inspired Moltke to frame his new plan of September 5, and lured him into another vain attack on the French fortified barrier, despite protest from Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, commanding the Sixth Army. The new attack was launched frontally against the Grand Couronne de Nancy, the ridge which formed a flank buttress for the Trouee de Charmes. But assaults, inadequately presuccessive pared, collapsed under the well-knit and superior fire of the French artillery, and on September 8, Moltke ordered Rupprecht to stop the offensive and the vain loss of life.
AUGUST
it
against his own judgement by the excessive confidence of the artillery expert, Major Bauer, that his super-heavy howitzers would have the same effect as on the obsolete Belgian fortresses. Yet, curiously,
i
AThe German onslaught in the west-as Schlieffen planned
it
and as
it
actually
took place. Although the Germans initially kept up with the schedule planned by Schlieffen, the weather and the very speed of their advance forced the Germans to slow down in the last few days of August. Besides this, Kluck's change of direction put an end to any idea of encircling Paris
he now only gave up the attack under protest— so Micawberish was the judgement of the military leaders of 1914-1918. The German centre (Fifth and Fourth Armies), west of Verdun, was no better able to fulfil its role as the right arm of the pincer-like squeeze ordained in Moltke's modified plan. In the Verdun area Sarrail had replaced Ruffey as commander of the French Third Army, and the first instructions he received indicated not only a continued retreat but the abandonment of Verdun. Sarrail thought differently, however, and determined to cling on to the Verdun pivot as long as possible, without losing touch with the Fourth Army to the west. It was a happy piece of initiative, and the brake thus placed on the south-eastward advance of the enemy's Fifth Army was an essential factor in upsetting Moltke's plan. The stout resistance
A further paradox is that although Foch issued repeated orders for attacks, his troops in reality were on the defensive, a defence needlessly desperate owing to his own disobedience of orders. At 0130 hours on September
commander of the First Army. Unconnected by blood to any of the German royal houses, he was probably the most professional of any of the German army commanders. Nonetheless he was initially subordinated to Biilow Kluck,
of Sarrail's troops, and still more the deadly fire of their artillery, not only held up but paralysed the Crown Prince's advance. A belated attempt on the 9th to break the deadlock by a night attack, ended in a suicidal fiasco, with the Ger-
mans
firing on each other. Sarrail, howasked in vain for reinforcements which might have enabled him to convert his resistance into a dangerous counterstroke from Verdun westwards against the German flank — for by holding on to Verdun he had formed one side of a sack into which the German armies between him and Maunoury, on the other side, had pushed. The German Third Army under Hausen formed a link between the German centre and right wing, and was assigned the indefinite role of being ready to support either. This role was perhaps in part the reflection of the fact that since it was composed of Saxons, the Prussians tended to discount its value. In the event it was virtually divided. Its left was used to help the Fourth Army in the abortive attack on the French Fourth Army under de Langle de Cary; an attack which, after perhaps the severest fighting of the whole battle, was driven to ground by the French artillery. Its right joined with Biilow's left in an attack on Foch, who had taken over command of a new army, the Ninth Army (formed by simple subtraction from de Langle de Cary's army) in the French
ever,
centre.
Among
the legends of the Marne that which has grown up round Foch's part is the most comprehensive and has the least substance. The first claim, still widely believed, is that Foch decided the issue of the whole battle by a counterstroke which threw the Prussian Guard 'into the marshes of St Gond'. In fact, however, the Germans took their leave without interference—after the issue had been decided further west. The second, and more modest claim, is that Foch made the victory possible by preventing a German breakthrough in the French centre. Even this is inaccurate —because the Germans were not trying to break through here. Biilow was merely carrying out his new protective task all
of wheeling his line to face west. And, in the course of this wheel, his left wing
naturally
bumped
against Foch's front.
6,
Foch had
received Joffre's famous order for the general 'about turn'. Unlike the other armies, he received it in time to act on his share of it, which was to cover the flank of Franchet d'Esperey's attack by holding the southern exits of the marshes of St Gond. Instead, he concentrated the bulk of his forces for an offensive north of the marshes, leaving the weak XI Corps to hold the wide and vulnerable sector east of the marshes. His troops were tired and much reduced by the hard retreat, and their offensive quickly died away; in their retreat they failed to hold firmly the southern exits of the marshes. Thus Foch continued to keep his main strength on that flank. But the Germans could only cross by the narrow causeways, and in consequence made a side-step — as they might have done earlier. On the 7th, their attack east of the marshes broke down under the fire of the French artillery. As the only way of evading it, a bayonet attack in the half-light before dawn was arranged. This caught Foch's right by surprise and it gave way rapidly. Fortunately the Germans did not follow up as rapidly and so captured few of the tormenting guns. Even so, the situation was serious and Foch called for help; Franchet d'Esperey lent a corps to support his left and Joffre sent another to fill the gap now yawning on his right. On the 9th the continued German attack against Foch's right made fresh progress and met little 1400 resistance — until, shortly before hours, it was stopped by receiving Biilow's now notorious order for a general retire-
on September 8, Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch left, as his emissary, to visit in turn the five armies west of Verdun, he was given full powers to co-ordinate the retreat, 'should rearward movements have been initiated'. He found none had occurred when he visited the headquarters of the Fifth, Fourth and Third Armies. Passing on he spent the night of the 8th with Biilow, and there found such an intensification of gloom that when he left in the morning he could at least feel confident on one point — that orders for a retreat would soon be given. At about 0900 hours on the 9th, air reports told Biilow that six enemy columns (five British and one of French
cavalry) were approaching the Marne and so entering the mouth of the gap. By 1100 hours he had issued orders for the retreat of his army to begin at 1300 hours and sent word to Kluck of his action. Hentsch, delayed by blocks and panics on the road, did not reach Kluck's headquarters till almost noon. There, according to his evidence, he found that orders for a
retirement had already gone out, and in confronting them merely added the direction of the retreat— north-eastward.
ment. The Germans drew off undisturbed and even unobserved. To meet the earlier emergency Foch had taken the 42nd Division from his intact left wing and switched it across to his right; but it only arrived in time to fire its guns in the twilight after the vanished foe — contrary to the popular legend of its decisive counterstroke against the flank of the German break-through. And one has to add that although Biilow had exposed his flank in making the wheel, Foch thought only of making a frontal counterattack. On the battle as a whole his main, and most serious, effect was that he detracted from the main offensive instead of helping to cover it.
The order to retreat In our survey of the battle front we have travelled back to the decisive western
now
The German Supreme Command Luxembourg, to which it had moved from Koblenz on August 30, and depended for communication with the armies on wireless, supplemented by occasional visits by staff officers in motor cars. No regular motor or motorcycle despatch service had been organised, and wireless communiflank.
was
at
cation suffered not only from the time lost in enciphering and deciphering but from interference from the Eiffel Tower in Paris. As the army commanders, faithful to the tradition of 1870, were jealous of control, information was as sparse as it was slow except when they had successes to report— and exaggerate. Moreover, Moltke had already reconciled himself to defeat. For the gloom at Luxembourg is well shown by the fact that when,
Further Reading Cruttwell, C. R. M. F., A History of the Great War (Oxford 1934) Gilbert, M., First World War atlas (New York: Macmillan 1971) Joffre, Marshal J. J., Memoirs (Paris: Bles, 1932-33) Lanrezac, General C. '
L
M.,
Le plan de
campagne
francais et le premier mois de guerre (Paris: Payot, 1920) Liddell Hart, Sir Basil, Foch, the Man of Orleans (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1931) Liddell Hart, Sir Basil, The War in Outline
la
(Faber 1936)
The Schlieffen Plan (Woolf 1958) Spears, Maj-Gen. Sir Edward, Liaison 1914 Ritter, G.,
(Eyre & Spottiswoode 1968)
[For Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart's biography, see page 121. ]
279
rRANCE IN CRISIS Philippe Masson
As the German armies bore down, at first upon the French capital, and then past it, the elan and confidence with which France flung herself into war evaporated, and was replaced by a grim despair exacerbated by memories of 1870. The Allies won the so-called Battle of the Marne, but never again did French confidence rise to the febrile optimism of the early days
*
-JL
J29i<&k
UK • l
«\
-
On August tion of
3,
1914, the day of the declara-
war on France by Germany, France
rose in a great display of 'patriotic fervour'. Forgetting her years of domestic quarrels, the whole country prepared for the 'invader' in an outburst of enthusiasm. This enthusiasm, however, included a great deal of optimism and naivety — the war was expected to be short and victorious. Was the public morale strong enough to stand up to the losses and reverses which in the euphoria of the moment no one had foreseen? On August 4 the war had truly begun. The first encounter between the opposing forces occurred as clashes between patrols in the Vosges and Lorraine, while German troops further north advanced into Belgium and marched towards Liege. At home, mobilisation continued with the same orderliness and tnthusiasm as on the dav
before. At this time there was a real epidemic of enlistments, which was the
source of inspiration to the anarchist G. Herve, who previously talked about raising the flag over the barrack rubbish heap, and to the old 'epicurean liberal' Anatole France, who had deplored this sudden wave of patriotism several months earlier. However, August 4 was to be equally the occasion of an astonishing national reconciliation. The funeral of Jaures, the 'funeral of peace', took place in front of the town hall of Passy. In the middle of an enormous crowd, all the leading French political and literary figures filed past the coffin. In the first line were Barres, Buisson, de Constant, members of the right-
wing
factions, and on either side of Jouhaux stood Sembat, Vaillant and Huymans — leaders of the Socialist Party and extreme left-wing trade unionism. Red flags and
national flags mingled symbolically. In the afternoon, the entire Chamber of Deputies paid their respects to a great statesman. "In these dark days which
France has to face, a terrible misfortune has come to pass -the death of Jaures It was a moving and astonishing spectacle: the Socialist deputies rose, followed by members of the left, then th( chamber, and lastly the publigallery. The President of the Monsieur Poincare, found the app words: 'France will be defended by all her sons whose "sacred union" will never be broken in the face of the enemy, and who are today bound together with the same spirit of indignation and patriotic fervour against the aggressor.' Without dispute, 18 proposals were passed unanimously. These gave the government exceptional powers in matters concerning the economy, '
JJ *. -.
i
J I
•%
*
Not only were the French authorities expecting Paris to be besieged, but they also had to deal with a stream of refugees from Belgium
and with the press and national defence. After this final demonstration of national unity, the country entered into a period where euphoria was soon replaced by uncertainty, and before long, concern. Up to August 20, there was a period of waiting, and the expectation of great military events. The entire country eagerly awaited the hour of mobilisation. On the 7th, the Paris regiments (with full
campaigning equipment, from bayonets to field guns) reached the Gare de I'Est amid an overwhelming reception. Women threw bouquets, little flags and cigarettes to the soldiers. Women too were seized with the desire to take part in the great adventure themselves, and this occasioned the most remarkable phenomenon of this uncertain
— the
extraordinary mobilisation of women's capabilities. Under the auspices of the Archbishop of Paris, Monsignor Amette, Pastor Wagner and Levy, the Chief Rabbi, subsidiary services multiplied, making use of the goodwill and enthusiasm evident at the beginning of the war. The Red Cross opened hospitals at Stanislas College, Chateau de Longchamp and at the Hotel Meurice, as society and bourgeois women discovered an identical vocation — nursing. A number of them soon turned parts of their homes into hospitals. In Paris and in the provinces, the trams began to function again thanks to conductresses — women mobilised to take period
over men's jobs. In the country, women, helped by the children, courageously set themselves to doing the harvesting. This period of waiting, however, did not lessen the feverish tension amongst the public. In fact it increased, as a result of the government's strict censorship of the press, which forced the public to be content with restricted news bulletins. On August 14, moreover, a decree was passed to prohibit all radio receivers, rare as they were. The worst thing about this censorship of news was that it obviously encouraged
development of somewhat fantastic rumours — which the public is always eager a
'The gentle rain'
was also understood that the hospital trains were full of young men who sang in a 'cheerful manner'. One of them declared: 'It is foolish to leave the theatre as soon as It
the curtain
to believe.
In fact, with the press
now
strictly con-
the atmosphere of euphoria conand the press quickly found a jingoistic tone which it extolled and expanded right up to the end of the war. trolled,
tinued,
Each newspaper had
its
own
speciality:
L'Echo de Paris, it was France in general and in the war; Le Figaro attacked the national aid programme; L' Homme Libre led an unmerciful attack against the for
'conscientious objectors', while L'lntransigeant, Le Matin and L'Excelsior made a speciality out of false items of news or
anecdotes. Since August 4, Le Temps had reassured its readers about the wounded: 'In a time of tragedy such as this, for which we are not responsible, it is encouraging to be able to prevent certain
comforting
disheartening aspects of war. Statistics from previous wars show that the more advanced the weapons are, the fewer is the number of men lost.' L'Excelsior confirmed that all the wounded were 'unanimous in announcing that bullets are not painful. Their speed and velocity cannot be denied; the wound which they produce is for the most part insignificant'.
little
rises.'
As a general
rule,
more-
over, German shells never exploded; following this report L'Intransigeant of August 17 announced: 'The ineffectiveness of enemy shells is the sole topic of conversation. The shrapnel shells explode softly and fall in a gentle rain. Their aim is also very poor.' The food supply of the German troops was also deplorable, according to the papers. As early as August 16 a soldier declared: 'I now no longer take a rifle, I take bread. When the Germans see me, they pursue me for it!' In fact the deceit of
the
enemy knew no bounds; they concealed
their artillery batteries behind a red cross or a white flag. It was obvious, moreover, that the Kaiser's soldiers were incapable of showing the slightest initiative. They were led into battle under pressure from
their officers, and fled like rabbits at the first sight of a French bayonet or 'our few
Even the children were affected. 'We cannot play war games any longer,' remarked one of them, 'no one wants to be the German.' In fact, for more than a week every newspaper celebrated the capture of Mulhouse on August 8. On the 10th a ceremony took place in front of the monument commemorating the siege of Strasbourg in 1870 — the town was lost that same evening and was not to be reoccupied, troops'.
temporarily, until the 19th. In fact, the awakening from this dream was to be a harsh one, beginning in political circles. Since August 4, General Joffre's GQG had been niggardly with inand the government only formation, learned about the unfavourable results of operations in the north in bits and pieces and by contact with British officials and with those of neutral countries. On the 24th, however, the situation exploded — long telegram from Joffre arrived at the Ministry of War and confirmed all at once the defeats in the Battle of the Frontiers and the loss of Charleroi. The conclusion was without ambiguity. 'Our aim must be to hold out as long as possible — to strive to make use of the enemy and to attack at the right moment.' Anguished telephone calls from the prefets of the northern departements confirmed the retreat of the French armies and the exodus of the civilian population. The government realised that the hour of crisis was at hand. Should it proclaim Paris an 'open city'? After interminable discussions, the Minister of War, Messimy, wrested from his cabinet colleagues the nomination of Gallieni as military governor of Paris. The capital would be defended and Joffre was asked to put three army corps at the disposal of this fortified area.
On August 26, bad news continued to pour in. Joffre announced that he had prepared a 'new manoeuvre' to halt the German advance, but this depended on doubling the number of troops on the line Verdun-Amiens. On Poincare's advice, Viviani, President of the Council, decided to reshuffle and enlarge his cabinet and to nominate individuals 'capable of inspiring confidence at home and abroad'. Briand, the independent socialist, became Minister of Justice, Ribot became Minister of Finance, Delcasse, advocate of the Entente Cordiale, returned as Minister of Foreign Affairs, while Millerand replaced Messimy as Minister of War. It was a sign of the times, moreover, when two Socialists agreed to participate in this government 'of national defence': the trade unionist Marcel Sembat became Minister of Labour and the aged Jules Guesde became minister without portfolio.
For three days, the government and general staff did their utmost to conceal the disastrous results of the battles from the public. The official communique of the 24th remained optimistic: 'Our armies advanced the day before yesterday and boldly launched the offensive everywhere.' Le Matin, which had become a specialist in false news, printed across five columns: 'The Cossacks are five days march from Berlin — German disorder.' The communiques of August 26 were already less encouraging. The morning one read: 'Our armies retired for a time on the defensive', and the evening one: The Germans appear
be taking up the offensive again; they are being held back by our troops.' The public became anxious and feared something was being hidden from them, and so sought to find other sources of information. In Paris, at the Gare du Nord or the Gare de I'Est, the inquisitive crowds counted the hospital trains, and questioned the officers, the wounded and the refugees who stepped off the occasional trains still in service. The authorities were well aware of the danger — gossips were taken off to the police station as 'alarmists'. Belgian refugees were speedily directed to the Cirque d'Hiver, which had been converted into a reception centre, before they could tell anyone of their experiences. Finally, on the 28th, when the Germans were only 60 miles away from the capital, GQG decided, fairly tactlessly, to warn the country of the gravity of the situation. The to
communique, which was extremely long, listed a whole series of minor battles won by the French, including the capture of a German flag in the Vosges. The loss of the stronghold at Longwy, 'stripped of all its military value', after 21 days of resistance, was represented as a great feat of arms. In fact, it was the last sentence after this lengthy preamble which was to be the final blow: 'On the rest of the front, from the Somme to the Vosges, the situation remains unchanged. The German troops appear to have slowed down their advance.' This news immediately struck the public as a disaster: the invasion of Belgium, the loss of northern France, and the Germans less than three days march away from Paris. By letting slip the last line 'The German troops appear to have slowed down their advance', the French commander gave the impression of no longer being in control of the situation. To compensate for the disastrous effect of this communique, Viviani considered it necessary to issue a stirring proclamation: 'People of France, our task is tragic yet it is simple: to push back the invader, to pursue him, to prevent our land from being contaminated, to liberate it — to hold out as long as it is necessary. Concentrate on the frontiers. We have the willpower and we shall have the victory!' There was only one dissenting, but objective, voice — that of Clemenceau: 'The truth is that the Germans appear to be outflanking our own left flank, and if they fail to meet any resistance, the road to Paris will be open to them.' On the 29th he concluded: 'As a result of reassuring dispatches, we now hear we are on the Somme without knowing why or how!'
The Germans 'in Paris!'
On August
30 and 31, as if to emphasise the threat, the first German aeroplanes flew over Paris. On the 30th, at 12.35 pm, a Taube dropped three bombs — which claimed one victim, and left a message: 'The German army is at the gates of Paris — you have no alternative but to surrender — Lieutenant von Heidssen.' Some children handed these leaflets to a policeman who transmitted a report 'concerning corrupt information thrown onto the streets by strangers in an aeroplane, in contradiction to the Prefet's orders'. The following day there was another visit and another message: 'We have the honour of advising you that the French army has been beaten near StQuentin!' On September 1 and 2, the situation be-
came even more serious. It was reported that the Germans were marching towards Compiegne, some 20 miles from the capital, which Clemenceau interpreted as 'the Germans are in Paris'. Following this unfortunate statement, his newspaper, L'Homme Libre ('The Free Man'), was suspended for eight days; it reappeared as L'Homme Enchaine ('The Man in Bondage'). GQG immediately decided to transfer all affairs of state to
Bordeaux. The move was effected in secret on September 2, when two trains carried politicians and officials to safety. This transference was not
September
made known
until
when
a proclamation was issued: 'In order to attend to the national welfare, the government has left Paris temporarily. Under the command of an eminent leader, a courageous and spirited French army will defend the capital and its patriotic citizens against the invader.' This could have been mistaken for a return to the gravest hours of 1870. There now appeared two parts to France, entirely different, and each meeting a very different fate. Three-quarters of the country was plunged into the agony of war, but remained physically unharmed; but all the areas situated north of the Seine and the Aube suffered the same agony as well as the horrors of the fighting and the occupation which followed it. The retreating French troops were followed by interminable streams of refugees. Families, carts and herds of cattle mingled together and trudged along the roads and lanes. The main roads were reserved for the army. Already more than five departements were experiencing the tyranny of occupation. If the Germans did not actually indulge themselves in an orgy of rape and childmaiming (as according to their inflammatory propaganda they threatened to do), they went almost as far by imposing an unrelenting harshness — the conqueror's prerogative. The Kaiser's troops burnt houses and arrested and shot hundreds of hostages, as they claimed that they were beset by snipers; this was the case at
Nomeny,
4,
Senlis,
Lille
and at Cambrai.
In Paris the departure of the authorities only accelerated an exodus encouraged by General Gallieni, who did not wish to encumber himself with useless civilians who would consume his supplies of food and the like. Gallieni made a proclamation of stunning terseness and simplicity, and this impressed the population: 'I have been
ordered to defend Paris. I shall fulfil this order to the end.' The stations were stormed by would-be passengers, and trains steamed out towards western and central France. The exodus was relatively limited, however, since records of September 8 show that 1,782,000 people still remained in the capital (950,000 women, 585,000 men and 247,000 children), 63^ of the population of 1913. In fact, the exodus mainly concerned the upper classes. When the communique of September 4 announced the Germans' presence in the region of Compiegne-Senlis, about 20 miles from Paris, General Gallieni set about
manning and
repairing, insofar as
it
was
possible, the old fortifications of Paris, most of which were nearly 100 years old. The isolated forts were occupied by marines.
Lines of defence, with trenches, rows of spikes to halt cavalry and barricades of paving stones were built up in front of the gates of the city, 14 out of 55 of which
283
remained open for traffic. Illustrated signs were reduced in number, and street lighting was cut down to within a radius of one and a quarter miles around the Eiffel Tower. Food supplies remained adequate, and cattle occupied the Bois de Boulogne. At the time when France was preparing for battle on which 'the fate of the country depended', news, especially in Paris, was reduced to official bulletins, information not needing censorship and the 'Berlin courier', the Taube which paid Paris daily visits.
The
official
communiques remained
evasive or ambiguous. On September 5 'the enemy appears to be passing Paris by; they have reached La Ferte-sous-Jouarre'. The following day the 'situation remains unchanged'. Day and night, however, troops travelled across the capital towards the front on the eastern side of the city. On
Sunday September people went up as
6,
some
far as the
inquisitive
end of the
of the eastern suburb in order to 'hear the guns'; they returned disappointed. The communiqve of the 7th confirmed rumours such as: conditions could not get worse', or: 'there is a general action on a lines
line passing
their doors followed by the and colleges on October 20. It was estimated that there were 11,000 pupils in the lycees compared with 18,000 in 1913, whereas the size of the classes had scarcely changed in the primary schools, which proved that bourgeois families were hesitant about returning to Paris. In addition", on October 8 the cinemas and the Stock Exchange reopened. Transport improved — the underground operated until 9.30 pm instead of 7.30 pm. By the end of the month, the railway was functioning normally in West, South and Central France. Nevertheless, the government did not
moratorium in stock dealings and creating a forced run on money. No one doubted that this measure, which had previously been introduced in 1870-71, was the beginning of a never-ending spiral of inflation. Equal aid was granted to all soldiers' wives — the government granted them 1.25 francs (one shilling) a day, plus half a franc per child under 16 years old. Finally, on August 14, a moratorium on the payment of rents was announced. As early as the beginning of September,
return to Paris until December 20. In this period, Poincare and a number of ministers increased their visits to the capital and to the front. The government's continued stay at Bordeaux tended to encourage intrigues; Millerand was constantly reproached for the unconditional support
insufficient.
reopened lycees
Joffre, and a number of listened complacently to the which Gallieni's headquarters continued to address to GQG, especially
which he gave
politicians criticisms
those complaints concerned with the com-
through Nanteuil, Sezanne,
Vitry-le-Francois and stretching as far as On that day, none of the existing newspapers mentioned the disappearance of the taxis which were requisitioned to transport a newly arrived division up to the front. The legend of the 'taxis of the
Verdun.'
Marne' was
to
come
later.
For three long days, the extremely brief reports were not enough to enable people to form any precise ideas about the battle being fought east of Paris. There was a total uncertainty about this critical situation. The ordinary people were not the only ones in the dark — the government remained equally ignorant. Finally on the 10th, a telephone call from Gallieni's headquarters to the government in Bordeaux reported that the Germans were retreating. Ecstatic joy soon spread among the relieved French. All over France, Joffre's communique, 'the battle of the Marne has achieved an indisputable victory', was read and read again ceaselessly. It was then widely hoped that with France liberated, Germany in her turn would be invaded. On Sunday September 13, when 'the German retreat became accentuated' and Gallieni was congratulating the troops who had fought under his command, the Archbishop of Paris held solemn prayers in Notre-Dame; crowds poured into the cathedral and the flood of people filled to capacity the open space in front of the cathedral. Similar ceremonies took place throughout France.
A coup d'etat? With
immediate danger averted, back into its old pattern. The government regretted having left Paris so rapidly and became anxious about General Gallieni, whose popularity now the
political life fell
surpassed that of the commander-in-chief, Did the military governor contemplate a coup d'etat? On September 10, the ministers Briand and Sembat made a fourday visit of the capital under the pretext of inspecting relief services and hospitals, and returned to Bordeaux completely reassured—the loyalty of the governor of
Joffre.
Paris
was
certain.
Gradually there was a return to everyday life. From mid-September Parisians began to return to the capital. Schools ^84
Part of the famous taxi-borne dash of the French Sixth Army out of Paris
mand
of operations, the organisation of supplies and the medical services. In fact, three weeks after the battle of the Marne, 'the most famous victory of all time', a certain disenchantment set in. Since October 7, the front had been stabilised north and east of Paris and even
ammunition
Clemenceau was not embarrassed to say that 'the Germans are at Noyon'. Indeed, the military communiques were always very soothing and the majority of newspapers adapted themselves extremely well to the absurdly strict censorship. 'Provided,' wrote Alfred Capus, editor of Le Figaro, 'that one does not write about the authorities, the government, politics, constitutional bodies, banks, the wounded, German atrocities and the postal service, one can print freely under the inspection of two or three censors.' People at home, however, were informed, with little delay, of the shortage of munitions and the deficiencies of the medical services by soldiers' letters and accounts given by the wounded. The army also insisted that losses were not to be published, while it was easy to ascertain the growing numbers of families in mourning. Finally, it was the economic problems which flared up. On August 4, the government had passed a bill establishing a
however, more drastic measures were introDespite the introduction of new taxes, the government's income was still duced.
and
The economy remained para-
were estimated be almost 300,000 unemployed. The Treasury had to resort to loans from the Bank of France, and Ribot succeeded in balancing the excess in spending by issuing Treasury bonds. These were a great success and enabled Ribot to tap all realisable capital in an attempt to prevent inflation. The first issue of these National Defence bonds was launched at 5% on September 25. It brought in 217,000,000 francs (nearly £11,000,000) in 24 days. At a time when the prospect of a rapid solution to the war was fading away, the gravest problem was the disorganisation of the French economy. The occupation of ten departements proved to be an extremely serious blow to production. In this occupation, France had lost 500,000 hectares (about 130,000 acres) of cultivated land, 40 c/c of her coal when her northern mines were abandoned, 90% of her iron ore with the loss of the Lorraine mines, twothirds of her blast furnaces, and 80% of her steel. Finally, 60,000 workers remained in the occupied areas. This dislocation of heavy industry, aggravated by the mobilisation of tens of thousands of men, partly explained the shortage of munitions which had become evident since the beginning of October. This necessitated an increase in the export rate and the authorisation of a complete conversion of industry in regions which were lacking in raw materials, such as the Paris basin or Central France. Of all those countries involved in the war, France was the most affected economically. lysed,
in Paris there
to
Consequently a certain disillusion, mixed with a feeling of concern, began to appear in October 1914. Certainly the 'sacred union' had endured the ordeals and deceptions of August. As J. Chastenet remarked: 'Political parties keep their flags furled, personal rivalries are only hinted
and we still believe in a fairly prompt and complete victory. This enthusiasm has not faded away.' Meanwhile, the physical and moral demands of a long war were perceptible. To compensate for the terrible losses, the 1914 recruits already had to be called up. The enormous requirements of the armed forces involved an unprecedented financial and material effort. The entire balance of a generation had already been jeopardised. at
Further Reading Chastenet, J., Jours inquiets et jours sanglants Hausser. E., Paris au /our le /our Poincare, R., L'lnvasion Stevenson, D French war aims against Germany, 1914-1919 (Clarendon Press 1982) ,
[For Philippe Masson's biography, see page 116.]
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The Germans halted
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headlong retreat fromjtReJVU ne along the line of the River Aisne, and turned to face their pursuers from eminently defensible positions just north of the river. Joffre ordered the Allied armies to continue their Victorious career' but well-sited German artillery soon frustrated any hopes of a swift decision. Below: Part of a battery of German heavy mortars waits on the heights above the Aisne.
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German
and Second Armies, following their triumphant march towards Paris and their unexpected rebuff by British and French loops at the Marne, were in full retreat northwards. In the rain and wind which made life miserable for Germans and Allies alike, the German right wing was falling back. By September 11 the First Army, under General von Kluck, had crossed the Aisne, but though the Allies
from half a mile to two miles from those on the north. Most important, for the troops engaged in that battle, the tops of the bluffs were at that time covered in patches of woodland. Lastly, the river itself provided a formidable obstacle to troops attacking north, and an equally advantageous barrier for those defending the ground. Not only is it 50 to 60 yards wide, but it is too deep to be fordable, which naturally led to increased emphasis being placed on bridges.
as hard as they could, their fighting stamina had been drained away;
Commanding positions
•ptember
9,
1914, the
First
t
pressed
they had not the strength to turn Kluck's flank. During the late hours of September 12 Kluck withdrew his last troops to the north of the Aisne, and Biilow, on Kluck's left, pulled back the right of his Second Army to the north of the river. The extent of the Germans' demoralisation and disorganisation during the retreat can be judged from the extent of the gap which appeared between the First and Second Armies. Apart from three cavalry divisions, there was no defence along an 18-mile line between the left of the First Army, at Vailly, and the right of the Second Army, at Berry-au-Bac, and the
German High Command (OHL) was
From this description of the area, it will be seen that a defending force on the north of the valley held certain distinct advantages. Artillery positions on the bluffs — and the Germans were well equipped with heavy weapons — would have commanding fields of fire against an enemy
forced
turn its attention immediately to this problem, for if the Allies could penetrate to
this gap, the total collapse of the
German
Armies on the Western Front might well Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, faced two alternatives. Either he could allow the retreat to continue, and risk a further steady demoralisation of his troops, or he could make a stand, in the hope of buying time for his troops to follow.
reorganise and replenish supplies and A stand on the Aisne was the natural choice, but it was vital to close the gap. Moltke had already placed Kluck's
ammunition.
Army under
Billow's command, and also the Seventh Army, recently arrived from Alsace.
now he gave him
which had On September 12 Biilow ordered Kluck to close to the right of Second Army, an order which Kluck, by no means for the first
time, chose to ignore.
The area where Moltke had chosen
to
halt the retreat was ideally suited to a defensive battle. North of the Aisne, the terrain is in the form of a high plateau, a wide ridge, which rises out of the plain of
Champagne near Craonne, and extends
westwards
for about 25 miles as far as Juvigny, north of the picturesque old town of Soissons. The plateau is in fact an area of high ground between the Aisne and a second river valley, that of the River Ailette, which runs more or less parallel to the Aisne some six or eight miles to the north. Between the two, running approximately east-west along the top of the plateau, runs the road known as the Chemin des Dames, which was later to feature prominently as an objective in the fighting. At its highest point, the plateau is 600 feet above sea level, or some 480 feet above the level of the rivers. Just north of the Aisne, a series of sharp bluffs run out of the ridge, some of them reaching close to the river, others stopping a mile or two short of it, and between these bluffs, of course, a corresponding series of clefts runs into the ridge. A glance at the contour lines on a map will show that the bluffs generally come to an end in a sharp steep slope. On the opposite side of the Aisne, to the south, a similar series of bluffs runs out towards the river, at distances varying
Fourth Army, and Sarrail's Third Army further away to the east on their right.
On
receipt of these orders the various
army commanders in turn issued their own orders with, in the British case in and optiBEF's GHQ advance to a line
particular, considerable vigour
mism.
On September
12, the
ordered its three corps to about five miles north of the Aisne, taking in Lierval, Chavignon and Terny, a line which would take them, on their left, to the top of the plateau held by the Germans, and on their right, not only to the top of the plateau, but over it, over the River Ailette, and on to the next plateau further to the north. The first Allied troops to reach the Aisne were the British 11th Infantry Brigade of III Corps, who attacked towards the bridge at Venizel. The condition of this bridge and of others along the river, was indicative of the extent of the Germans' demoralisation at this stage in the battle, and of their lack of preparation and training for the defensive situation in which they found themselves. They had made a gesture of destroying the bridge, but had not stayed long enough to complete the job. One of the four main charges had failed to explode, and the reinforced concrete roadway was still strong enough to support infantry, even if
some risk. They had also recently dug trenches on both sides of the bridge. Those to the south, intended it seems to cover the retreat across the river, had now been evacuated. Others had been dug for defence just north of the river and were still occupied when a British reconnaissance party reached the bridge. The Germans opened fire from those trenches, and had they stayed in position they would have had an excellent chance to kill the British troops, hold up the advance, and possibly return to finish the task of destroying the bridge. In fact they immediately retired, and that night the British were able to start moving across the weakened bridge. at
rest,
First
Milon, Longpont and Soissons on the left. D'Esperey's Fifth Army was to press forward on the right of the British, as were Foch's Ninth Army, de Langle de Cary's
German infantry in Neufchatel, dour and grim after their retreat from the Marne attempting to cross the river, while the attacking force's own artillery would be unable to fire effectively against the guns at the top of the bluffs. Even if they succeeded in crossing the river, to continue the pursuit the attacking troops would have to dislodge the Germans from their positions, which would involve either storming up the steep slopes of the bluffs, into the teeth of
machine gun and other
small arms
or penetrating into the
fire,
between the promontories, where they could be picked off with fire from two sides. Moreover, during such attacks the defenders would be free, behind the ample cover of the woods, to move reinforcements to any region threatened. It was on the top of this ridge, understandably, that Moltke ordered his forces to entrench. But if he thought his armies entirely secure there, Moltke reckoned without the determination of the Allies. On September 10 General Joffre, commanding the Allied armies, issued orders to press forward and exploit the success with the utmost energy. The pursuit was to incline to the north-east, and the burden of the fighting was to fall on the infantry, 'in whose legs', according to Joffre, 'victory
clefts
lay'.
The
British
were commanded
to pur-
sue 'their victorious career' between the road from Fere-en-Tardennois to Bazoches on the right, and that between La Ferte,
They emptied
their
ammunition
carts to
reduce the weight, and crossed in single file, passing both carts and ammunition across the river by hand. By 0300 hours they were on the north bank, but were by no means finished yet. Although they had marched 30 miles in the rain, and had barely eaten in the previous 24 hours, they were immediately ordered to take the heights above the river, with the result that any Germans who felt themselves secure in their commanding positions were quickly disillusioned. The British charged up the hill and attacked with bayonets, and rather than continue the fight there, the Germans who survived left their outposts and retreated to the main line of defence on top of the plateau , To the left and right of this British spearhead, both French and British troops alike were busy on September 13 attempting the river crossing, with varying degrees of success.
Attempted outflanking movement the left, the French Sixth Army was ordered to cross to the west of the River Oise, in an attempt to outflank the German right wing, an early indication of the
On
tactical
manoeuvring which was
to
domin-
ate the battle at a later stage. Another
early indication of later tactics was the transfer of a division, the 37th from Fifth Army, from the eastern to the western flank where it came into the line north of Compiegne, and of the entire XIII Corps taken from the Fourth Army, which was assembling behind it. In response to the order. General Maunoury, the Sixth Army commander, tried to move 8th Division of IV Corps across the Aisne, but the Corps was almost wholly engaged in the frontal attack across the river, and IV corps commander could only detail a single brigade to reconnoitre the crossing over the Oise. This failure to pursue the outflanking
they could begin the crossing, by a variety of means. Some used a boat they discovered, others a raft improvised from railway sleepers, and still others, later, more elaborate rafts constructed by units oi the Royal Engineers. A more sophisticated raft still, big enough to carry 60 men. was constructed further east at Moulin les Roches, anil that evening and night most of the remaining part of 5th Division crossed on it despite heavy casualties from fire on the north bank,
movement with vigour was
prove an
The one
expensive mistake later in the battle, although at the time Maunoury was obviously
crossing
to
not in a position to appreciate the strength of the German positions at the Aisne. The IV Corps managed to construct floating bridges for the passage of the Aisne during the night of September 12, but their construction took so long that they were
There they were pinned down dark,
A
when
at
until after
last
bridge intact
valley.
appeared most feasible was Conde itself. But ironically it was not used. The bridge had been left undamaged, but it seemed so perfectly placed for
artillery.
The Germans had
set
up
three perfectly placed batteries, mainly of 8-inch and 5.9-inch howitzers, on the promontory at Chivres, where one overlooked Conde and the other Venizel. These batteries were immune to British fire, and on 13th completely dominated this area of the battlefield. One battery came into action against II Corps, on the right of III Corps, which was ordered to cross between Vailly and Missy. The railway bridge at Vailly had been demolished, but there was still a plank spanning the road bridge, which the Germans had failed to destroy. Under a steady hail of shellfire, units of 3rd Division filed over this plank, while engineers began to construct a more stable and reliable pontoon bridge.
At Missy an advanced detachment of of 5th Division took possession of the bridge, but rifle and machine gun fire from hidden positions on the north bank forced them to withdraw, and they and other units which arrived to support them entrenched just south of the river.
cyclists
line
On
the
right
Corps of General Conneau, and had they turned to the right ai Sissonne and moved eastwards, they might have penetrated behind the German Second and Third Armies, perhaps rolled up the flank of the Second Army, and created groat havoc in
German
lines.
In
the centre of the
Army's front the Reserve Divisions of General Valabregue also penetrated the gap between the two German armies and marched on virtually unopposed to some three miles north of Berrv-au-Bac, where Fifth
they bivouacked
During
for
the night.
day of Allied advances, of course, the Germans had not been entirely idle. Moltke was successful in bringing up reinforcements to fill the gap between the First and Second Armies. The most im-
To their right the reserve divisions suffered even more and were
German
German
the
1
the
this
portant unit in this reserve force was VII Reserve Corps, which became available after the fall of Maubeuge on September 7. The Corps received a variety of orders
Lamaze
unable to cross the river. At Soissons, on the flank of Sixth Army, the 45th Division had more success and during the hours of darkness on the night of the 12th got the greater part of two brigades across the River Aisne by means of two separate bridges which the Germans had failed completely to destroy. Later that night they also brought rafts into use, until finally, at dawn, German gunfire stopped further progress and destroyed the two bridges behind them. The 45th Division might well have been cut off without support, except for the British III Corps, with whom they were in contact on their right. It was 11th Infantry Brigade of this III Corps which had made the first crossing at Venizel that morning, and during the day other troops came forward to attempt the crossing, but found that they had to face an exceptionally strong onslaught from the
in
D'Esperey's men wen' facing almost due east, against Rnlow's Second Army. on a line running from the south of Rheims roughly along the easl bank oi the \isne canal to Berrv-au-Bac. There his 111, and \ Corps were held up by the enemy, with no immediate prospect of an advance. Better progress was made on the left, where XVIII Corps crossed tin- Aisne, moving northwards, at Pontavert, and advanced no less than seven miles unopposed to Sissonne, in the gap between the German Second and Seventh Armies. The leading roups were part oft hi' Cavalry t
place on the Corps front where a
unable even to reach Nampcel during September 13, still less proceed northwards as far as the Oise as ordered. On their right VII Corps also managed the river crossing, but they then met strong resistance from the heights of the Aisne plateau, where the German First Army had ample artillery positions which pinned down the French troops in the of
gap
between September 7 and September 12, as priorities changed and new problems arose, until on the morning of 12th it was
Brief respite Men of the Royal Field Artillery take a rest before resuming the road north
attacks from
German machine gun and
artillery positions north of the river that the British suspected a trap, and prudently
avoided the temptation to use it. No-one appears to have ascertained whether the
Germans had
in fact laid
an ambush.
On
the right of the British sector, I Corps had orders to cross the river if the enemy continued his retirement, at Bourg, Pont Arcy, and Chavonne. The Pont Arcy bridge also had been only partially destroyed and was weakly defended, and there and at Bourg the 1st Division crossed the river and moved northwards to positions on the series of spurs running down from the plateau facing their sector. There was a fierce exchange of artillery fire at long range with the Germans in Troyon, but at dusk this had, in the main, failed to halt the British advance, and 1st Division, with 2nd Cavalry Brigade, had established positions as far north as Paissy and Moulins. The Germans successfully disputed I Corps' crossing only at Chavonne, where a temporary trestle bridge had been thrown across the river. Here German
heavy artillery batteries killed some 20 men from the leading units of 2nd Division and forced them to withdraw temporarily across the river. The last of the troops concerned in this battle were those of the French Fifth Army on the extreme right, who had orders to cross the Aisne and penetrate the
ordered to Laon, some ten miles north of the Aisne. Zwehl. the Corps commander, moved his men with commendable speed, and allowed them to halt for only two hours that evening before he pressed on in two columns again through the night. Almost a quarter of his men fell by the wayside during the march, but the remainder covered more than 40 miles in 24 hours, and were five miles south and south-east of Laon by 0600 hours on September 13. At 0930 hours he ordered his men to their feet yet again, and started them in a south-westerly direction towards Chavonne. An hour and a half later Biilow ordered the Corps to turn to the south-east towards Berry-au-Bac, where his own lines were threatened, but Zwehl claimed that his men were already committed in their original direction, and declined this order. Thus by 1400 hours on September 13 the Corps, tired from the march but fresh in terms of actual fighting, had its 13th on the Division established Reserve Chemin des Dames, and its 14th Reserve Division spread out to the east against the right wing of the British and the left wing of the French Fifth Army. The former division was- perfectly placed to hold off the advanced troops of the British I Corps in their push of September 13, but they had
the gap with only some two hours to Had they not marched so quickly, had they not been forced to ignore Billow's order, it is probable that the flank of all the filled
spare.
forces west of Chavonne would have been turned, and conceivable that the battle would have been decided there and then in favoui of the Allies. It is therefore a logical consequence that if the British had broken through, the entire war on the Western Front might have been brought to
German
287
usion in the succeeding weeks, and is then circulating among the troops that they would be home by Christ-
mas 1914 might even have come
true.
A
stalemate situation As it was. the situation was stabilised; the Germans gained time to improve their defences, and the British and French, although they had, with considerable skill and courage, won positions on the north side of the river, were far from either outflanking the Germans, or from continuing their retreat by frontal pressure. From these positions, as they issued their respective orders for September 14, both sides were thinking in terms of attack. Biilow,
now commanding First, Second and
Seventh
advance
Armies,
hoped by an offensive
'completely
to
consolidate
the
General Joffre feeling that the enemy was retreating on the whole front without serious resistance on the Aisne and the Marne, ordered the pursuit to be continued energetically in a northerly direction, and as reconnaissance on the British front by airmen of the Royal Flying Corps appeared to indicate that the Gerline of his forces'.
man
retreat was continuing, Sir John French in his turn ordered the army to advance to the line Laon to Fresnes. It was the British I Corps which bore the brunt of this fighting. Their first objective was the Chemin des Dames ridge, and at 0300 hours the advanced guard of
moved out
in the mist and experience in the day's battle was a strange one and by no means the last example of its kind. Men of e 2nd Sussex came under fire from trenches 300 yards to their front, and promptly returned the fire. The Germans,
the 1st Division
teeming
,1
rain.
Their
first
German infantry annihilated by their
own guns X
troops of VII Reserve Corps and Corps, raised their hands to surrender, and the British units stood up to receive the prisoners. The temptation to fire was evidently too great for the Germans in the second line, and they immediately started shooting, not only on the British but on their own men as well. A short Lime later the same British regiment, having advanced beyond Troyon, came into contact with another group of Germans, who fired on them. The British returned the fire and these Germans likewise put up their hands. This time the action of their countrymen seemed quite deliberate, when batteries entrenched near a sugar factory started shelling their own men. Caught between German and British fire, the Germans were all killed, and the British then turned their attention to the batteries themselves. Within a short time the teams of horses and men manning the guns were cut down, and all twelve guns silenced. That particular fire fight ended at 0700 hours, but during the next two hours the combat grew steadily more fierce. One of the main objectives was another sugar factory, to the north west of Troyon, where the Germans were well established, and although the British succeeded in capturing the buildings, field guns and machine guns in the region prevented them further. As they dug ridge just beyond the factory, the Germans mounted a series of
moving on any trenches
on
the
A battery of German artillery in action. came as a rude shock to the Germans when It
their artillery failed to stop the Allies
crossing the river
from
counterattacks, but the British hung on. A further British advance took their forward posts on to Cerny, on the far side of the ridge and overlooking the River Ailette. But this success was attributable more to the fog than to the fighting, for they were as completely invisible to the Germans as the
Germans were
to them. They had actuallypenetrated far into the Germans lines without seeing the enemy or being seen by them, and when at last the swirling mists cleared sufficiently to provide views of the men around them, both sides mistook the enemy for their own. The British were the first to realise the error, and opened fire, at which the Germans took to their heels and left the British in command of the heights of the ridge at that point. Further to the east, a second battalion also crossed the Chemin des Dames, and cleared the opposition with machine gun fire, which meant that the German line was breached in two separate points, and from two commanding positions the 1st Corps were overlooking the Ailette valley. Early in the afternoon, the Germans mounted a counterattack in strength against the British 1st Division, drove them straight out of the sugar factory they had occupied, and machine gunned the British flanks from their newly won positions, inflicting severe damage. The British, mainly Scotsmen of the Black Watch, Cameron Highlanders, and Scots Guards, replied with a return counterattack, which took them back into the German positions, and through the trenches on the plateau. The Germans surged back yet again, and most of the Scotsmen were forced back into the valley. One party of 50 stuck it out, fought until their ammunition was almost gone, then
Haig's Corps had the best chance to break through between Kluck's and Bulow's armies I
fell
back short of the crest of the ridge, overrun by finally
where they were waves of Germans.
upon tier of trenches German wisdom in selecting the north side of the Aisne to make their stand
Tier
became
clearly
apparent on September
14 in the sector occupied by 2nd Division, on the left of the 1st Division. After crossing the river over a floating bridge at Bourg, and pushing on northwestwards along the Oise and Aisne canal, they found themselves at the foot of a trio of clefts spreading out deep into the plateau, and of course overlooked by the four corresponding spurs. Wherever they advanced up the slopes, the British found themselves trapped by accurate fire coming from apparently right above them, not only on both flanks, but even on many occasions
General von Heeringen, whose Seventh Army to reinforce First and Second Armies
Brigadier-General Hunter-Weston, whose Brigade was the first to reach the Aisne
from behind, from Germans posted
Corps, and split the British armies in two. But during the afternoon the situation settled down as the British brought up reserves and managed to stabilise their position, although the day had cost 3rd Division some 700 or 800 killed or wounded. Further still to the left, 5th Division began the day with an attack on the Chivres spur, where it was essential that the German batteries should be cleared before significant progress could be contemplated. Almost as soon as they started out the leading brigade came under heavy shell fire near Missy, which slowed the operation almost to a halt, and by noon they had still not cleared Missy. Late in the afternoon, with light beginning to fail, the Division was ready to start up the spur to s assault the crest, but again the German §
was moved
in tier
of trenches where they were perfectly concealed from the British fire from down in the valleys. Nevertheless, after
tier
after taking
heavy
losses
and
inflicting
similar punishment on the Germans, the 2nd Division had by mid-afternoon secured a line from Beaulne to Chavonne, including some parts of the extremities of the plateau. To the left of I Corps, II Corps started the morning of September 14 already in position on the north bank of the Aisne. The 3rd Division made some further slow progress, but at about 0900 hours the Germans started a heavy counterattack, and the Division was soon trying to escape, many of them by the narrow single-plank bridge over the river at Vailly. The Germans might well, had they followed up the attack with sufficient determination, have driven into the gap between the I and II
entrenchments proved too much
for
1
1th
them. 5
Howitzers and mortars, vital for
dropping shells into entrenched positions t>
The German 21-cm Langer Morser (long mortar) known about this gun other than its
Little is
bore, equivalent to 8.3-inches, and its range, which varied from 10,280 yards with the 1914
short shell to long shell
1 1,
155 yards with the 1896
V The Battle_of,the Aisne marked the end of the headlong Gerrmarrretreat from the Marne. Substantially reinforced and well-positioned on the heights above the river, the First and Second Armies held on despite severe fighting as the Allies crossed the river and tried to storm the heights
Noyon •
SEPT1! LINE
BY SEPT
CORPS
II
REACHED 18
IX
N\
CORPS
FIRST
Ai
ARMY
Klurk jV
CORPS
""*
" "" "> VII
II |
^ Chavigr
CORPS
C0RPS
Terny Sfc
^^*l
CORPS
Vic.
A/s/? e 5thRes
Chivres
45^
•Coni iyiissy* j
SIXTH
ARMY
SEPT 14
SoJSSOnS
Venizel •
Maunoury II
SEPT 13
i
Height
in
Feet Ill
600
300
German Army French
Army
Positions of in front
September
B E
German
line are
units
those of
17/18
F
10 Miles
^T-T^ 10
90
15Kms.
"#
• Longpont
COR
CORP
A
The British 1886 6-inch howitzer This howitzer weighed about 44 cwt and could fire a high explosive shell weighing between 100 and 122 pounds
•SiSsonne
Laon VI!
RES
SEVENTH ARMY Heeringen
CORPS
CORPS
XVIII
\ III
CORPS V CORPS
Cg? nne
/
ill
CORPS
sppfiC
Neufchatel #
/
CORPS iTc^r
VII
#
Berry-au
CAVALRY
SECOND ARMY
CORPS
Biilow III
CORPS
%
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CORPS SJPT12 SEPT 18
X CORPS TO REINFORCE CORPS III
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The German
troops, mainly 5th Division of /// Corps, had been in position since
September 12, and had constructed an elaborate system of trenches protected by fencing and barbed wire. The result for the British was predictable. They failed to maintain order, became mingled, confused and demoralised, and had to withdraw.
White flags The 4th Division
of
the
task
of
clearing
Corps,
III
westernmost British unit
in the line,
out
the
the
had
German
heavy guns, to aid the French advance on their left, and also to help 5th Division's advance. But here progress was slow. The
Germans enjoyed the
benefits of great natural cover, well constructed trenches, and a vast superiority of artillery, and the division spent most of the day trying to dig trenches, though accurate German shelling prevented even this work from being carried out without frequent breaks to race for shelter. This day, so far as the British were concerned, ended with more fighting on I Corps' front. The 2nd Division again suffered through accepting a German surrender. Irish and Coldstream Guards, fighting in the woods on the Soupir Spur, saw a large group of Germans they were threatening to encircle start waving white flags. They naturally came forward out of the woods to take their prisoners, and the response was a burst of fire from a second body of Germans on the sky-line behind the first. It seems that the novel experience of finding themselves in retreat had had a thoroughly demoralising effect on some German units, and they were surrender, halfforward to coming heartedly and in piecemeal fashion. In some cases, however, they appeared to change their minds about surrendering, and took up arms again, and in others they incurred such resentment on the part of neighbouring units that they were fired on by their own men. In either circumstance the British, in coming out into the open to accept the surrender, were putting themselves in an extremely vulnerable position. They would quickly have to adopt a more realistic and sceptical approach to offers of capitulation from isolated groups
of enemy troops. These casualties, and others incurred in the intermittent fighting that continued throughout September 14, brought the losses to I Corps to over 3,500, and made it clear that despite the gallantry of individuals and units, the general situation on the British front was far from satisfactory. Two gaps still yawned in the line, the first of one and a half miles between 2nd and 3rd Divisions, and the second, the width of the Chivres promontory, between the combined 4th and 5th Divisions and the remainder of the army. It was also obvious that the forces were far too thin in the front line for a strong attack, and there were now no reserves available. The problem of bridges still had not been solved, and although the engineers worked as bravely and efficiently as anybody could expect of them, they were subjected to constant shelling from the excellent German artillery
positions,
and
no
permanent
bridge was established that day, which meant that supplies had to be brought up in the dark and passed over the river by hand, and that the wounded were generally forced to lie in the open until stretcher
parties could get to them at night. Morale was not high. On September 14 the French were also experiencing the same problems as the British, and achieving tin- same inconclusive results. On the left, 45th Division. with a Moroccan Brigade attached, crossed
on the Aisne canal, and around Rheims. There, on September 12. after a German occupation lasting just two weeks, Corps
the Aisne between Compiegne and Soissons. and attacked from Vic towards the ridge and through the hamlets on the spur, but when they came up against the Germans' prepared positions they were halted and unable to resume the advance. The VII Corps and the reserve divisions of Generals
to
Lamaze and Ebeney on their left were incapable of even starting an advance on this day. Still further to the left, IV Corps attacked in an effort to help the outflanking movement which Joffre had ordered, but failed to get more than one brigade across the River Oise. Wav out in the flank two
Men The
1
had fought their way
in to
the city against
German rearguards of Second Army, On 13th, when D'Esperey himself entered the liberated city, his 111 Corps took Courcy the north, but failed to dislodge the Germans from the small town of Brimont. a short distance to the north of thai On this day Corps in the centre also drove forward again, crossed through Rheims and, despite coming under violent artillery fire from the retreating Germans, reached the villages of La Neuvilletteand Betheny. On the right of the army, X Corps crossed the River Vesle. The next day, September 14, as well as on 15th and 16th, the French 1
tried desperately to continue the offensive,
but there was part of
I
little
more progress. On 15th
Corps was driven back by a Ger-
Cameronians prepare a machine-gun post just to the south of the River Aisne. however, were unable to storm the fiercely-defended German positions on the heights
of the 1st Allies,
other cavalry divisions, the 1st and 5th, were pushing forward in the region of Montdidier, and behind them XIII Corps
was assembled and almost ready to come into the line. But Manoury had too many
man
counterattack, but this modest loss
was compensated by the advance of X Corps as far as the main road between Rheims and Suippes. On September 17 a
engaged against the Germans to the front, and with limited strength these flanking divisions were not enough to carry out the proposed turning
counterattack forced the French III Corps to withdraw to the west bank of the Aisne canal, and on September 18 X Corps, which had been withdrawn from the line, was put back to support III Corps. This
movement
move helped
of his troops actively
in time. the British right, the Cavalry Corps of the Fifth Army was still, at dawn on 14th, occupying the undefended ground between the German Second and Seventh Armies, but either because they were unsupported, or simply because they lost heart, they failed to exploit the advantage of their position, and withdrew back across the river at Berry-au-Bac, where the front remained stable for some time. On the left of this army, and adjacent to the British, the Moroccan battalions of XVIII Corps came into line with the eastern outposts of the BEF, but the German Seventh Army counterattacked in force near Craonelle, and halted the French, forcing" them to entrench. The only encouraging news for the French on this day was further east,
On
fierce
to settle the position. From that point on, although the French and Germans fought several minor battles, there were no significant gains, and the
front in this sector
became
stabilised on
the line extending from the foot of the Berru and Nogent-L'Abesse Hills, out along the Suippes highway to the east, and along the west bank of the canal up to the
River Aisne
itself.
Military vandalism This left thecity of Rheims in French hands, but it was not sufficiently far from the front to escape the fighting. On September 18 the Germans began to shell the city with both explosives and incendiaries. The bombardment continued for ten days with no respite, and the city was widely dam-
293
rhe cathedra] itself was a major despite the fact thai it was in use as a hospital and had a red cross flying from its tower. The stained-glass windows were blown out. much of the stonework was destroyed, and the towers were extensively damaged. Hut the walls remained intact, as did, symbolically, the statue of Joan of Arc m front of the cathedral. The Germans won no great esteem outside their own country for this act of military vandalism, but perhaps the words of one of their generals, Ditfurth. in a news bulletin of November 1914, may be taken as typical of the German attitude: // is of no consequence if all the monuments ever created, all the pictures ever painted, and all the buildings ever erected by the great architects of the world were destroyed, if by their
was no longer
a question of pursuit but of methodical attack. Each position was to be consolidated as it was gained. Despite his preparations to retire, Bulow at this time appeared ready to take the
t,
destruction we promote Germany's victory over her enemies. The commonest, ugliest stone placed to mark the burial-place of a German grenadier is a more glorious and perfect monument than all the cathedrals in Europe put together. Let neutral peoples and our enemies cease their empty chatter, which is no better than the twittering of birds. Let them cease their talk about the cathedral at Rheims and about all the
churches and castles in France which have shared its fate. These do not interest us.
One
of the bridges overthe Aisne at Soissons blown up by the Germans. Others were missed
The Allies also were making their plans, and since they could see that the Germans had halted their retreat on 14th and were apparently being re-equipped, rested and refreshed in their entrenched positions on the north of the river, a frontal attack was unlikely to bring about the speedy defeat of the German armies.
During this bombardment the Allies were firmly in possession of positions to the north of the River Aisne, which gave Billow great cause for alarm. Although these positions were held in no great strength, he was preparing to fall back even further, to La Fere, and on the night of 14th confirmation arrived from Supreme Command
'Entrench where you are!' Although he issued no formal order to the effect, the British Commander-in-Chief told his corps commanders, late at night on 14th, to entrench where they stood. In the early hours of the following morning French himself, along with the other army commanders, received a telegram from General Joffre confirming his decision, and
He was not to know yet that events would render further withdrawal unnecessary.
pointing out that since the enemy appeared to be on the point of accepting battle in prepared positions north of the Aisne, it
of the plan.
initiative as far as an offensive was concerned, and ordered the Seventh Army to throw the enemy in front of it (the British) back over the Aisne, and support the First Army. But this order held a greater element of optimism than of realism, and Kluck, still disinclined to obey Bulow's orders, responded to the situation by ordering his Army to carry on entrenching and hold their position at all costs. Both sides made gestures at attack, but no assaults carried any significant ground, and all were repulsed with heavy losses. The most energetic offensive was made by the British 5th Infantry Division of II Corps, which attempted again to win the
Chivres spur. When they attacked over ground they had covered on the previous day, they found that the Germans had been busy constructing new defences in the woods, including barbed wire barriers six feet high. Because of the density of the undergrowth on their front, they could not contemplate a flanking movement, and although they set to work with wire cutters, the barrier proved too secure and their assault came to a halt. One brigade (the 14th Infantry) moved up the valley on the western side of the spur, but German artillery rained down on them, and they too were stopped. This experience was in fact only one illustration of the growing
dominance of
artillery in the battle, and warfare both sides were
in this aspect of
helped by a comparative innovation — the aeroplane. For the British, the Royal Flying Corps, formed only two years
Right: Hard work for German troops helping to move a huge 21-cm gun Far right: As a result of their sites on lower ground, the British
60-pounders were unable to
hit
back
effectively
tr
5*3*-
""**"*w
**15Sq*o
evolved an eminently workable procedure. The first instance of co-operation between artillery and the Royal Flying Corps was on September 13, and from that day on an aeroplane normally took off' for each division each morning carrying an artillery officer. He made notes of the German concentrations on squared maps, and passed the details, either by wireless or by handing over the completed maps after landing, to ground artillery commanders. The aircraft also flew during a pre-arranged general bombardment, and after observing the accuracy of fire, sent corrections down to the ground units. September 15 itself saw a further incursion of modern scientific techniques on to the battlefield, when the British aerial observers took photographs of the enemy's positions, which resulted in greatly imearlier,
proved range finding. The Germans used aircraft even more intensively, and had them constantly flying over the entire front. They worked to such good effect that if Allied troops were so unwise as to move in their own lines while an aircraft was overhead, an accurate barrage of shellfire was almost certain to
One German
device consisted of observers aerial dropped when they flew over Allied positions. The range and direction of the aircraft, when the paper appeared glinting in the sky. gave gunners an accurate indication of the position of ground targets. German gunnery personnel also made use of observation balloons for target spotting, which they managed to keep well out of range of Allied guns. In addition, they so clearly appreciated the importance of artillery that they placed spotters even among the British follow.
silvered
paper
which
5
T"^ "
•
.-
"
W%
»-
vVv*
on the easternmost spur of the plateau, and flung the French out of Craonne and Craonelle. At the western end of the line, further reinforcements arrived from Alsace and from Antwerp, in the form of 7th Cavalry Division and IX Reserve Corps, both of which came into the line on the 15th Their arrival strengthened the German defences, and their determined fighting put paid for the time being to any ideas the French nurtured of transferring troops to turn the flank of the German First Army.
Nevertheless it was this flank that offered the only possible prospect of break-
TheGigincourt bridge in their
rebuilt by
theGermans
rush to cross the river
lines. One observer disguised himself as a farmer, and when his 'cover' was 'blown' he was found to be in direct telephone
communication with his own side. Another was discovered hiding in a haystack, with food to last him a week, and another up a tree: small wonder that the British found themselves continually under such accurate shellfire that at first they suspected the existence of spies among their own
men.
On the flanks of the battle of the Aisne, the French Armies were having no greater success in gaining ground than had the British. On the right, the Germans were packing their lines with newly arriving reserves, including XVIII Corps from Fourth Army, which came into action on 15th and VII Reserve, XV, and XII Corps which had already moved into position. Troops from these units counterattacked
ing the developing stalemate. To the east, the lines of the German and French Armies ran down to the border with Switzerland Neither side could think of outflanking the other there, and as reinforcements were brought into the line, gaps filled in, trenches dug, and wire defences construct ed, the front became hourly more stable, the feasibility of a successful frontal attack more remote. In the west, on the other hand, the flanks were still open, and the inducements to continue the operations there were considerable. Strategically, a successful outflanking movement by the Germans would offer control of the Channel ports, indeed of the Channel itself. From the Allied point of view a successful outflanking movement would threaten the main communications of the German armies, whereas if the Allies allowed themselves to be outflanked, they would not only lose all hope of re-establishing contact with the Belgian armies, still holding out in Antwerp, but they would also sacrifice their chance of regaining the city of Lille and the valuable coalfields of Northern France.
295
was to this strategy, therefore, that It both sides increasingly turned their attention, thinking not only in terms of an offensive, but also in terms of preventing the enemy from carrying out the manoeuvre. On September 17 General JofTre emphasised the need to maintain the frontal effort 'in order to keep the enemy under threat of attack and thus prevent him from disengaging and transferring portions of his forces from one point to another'.
New plan from Falkenhayn The German command was coming to exactly the same conclusion. When on September 14 Lieutenant-General von Falkenhayn, until then Minister of War, took over the duties of Chief of the General Staff, he took immediate steps to prevent the French from moving any of their troops
rights of inviolability' for having taken advantage of their privileged position to commit an act of treachery. Whether he thought about his legal position at the time is not known, but a British officer who had a machine gun trained on the Germans opened fire and mowed most of
them down. Apart from this episode, the most severe was between the German and French armies on the flanks. On the right the French attempted to retake Craonne, only to be repulsed, and from that point control of the town changed hands several times, though it was the Germans who held it at the end of the day. fighting
On
the
left,
Joffre
mounted yet another strong attack in the region of Chavonne, again using machineguns to excellent effect, and they penetrated the British line and took several prisoners.
The two
forces then
began
fight-
ing hand to hand, until the British called up reserves and threw the Germans back to their original positions, but not before the British had lost 400 men killed and wounded. The German official report for the day, which stated that the VII Reserve Corps' attack had led to 'no success worth mention', said nothing to indicate the severity of the fighting, nor the enormous casualties incurred for such unremarkable rewards.
was anticipating the
attempted outflanking movement by forming a new army, the Second Army under General de Castelnau, with four Corps, XIII and IV Corps from Sixth Army, XIV
No success after repeated attacks The VII Reserve Corps was again ordered to carry out an attack along its whole front on the following day, but their commander
protested, pointing out that 'the daily repetition of attack orders could not obtain any success'. He at least had arrived at an accurate assessment of the situation, an
assessment which other generals might well have emulated. During the two following days there were in fact minor outbursts of fighting, but no results were achieved, and by September 27 the ground fighting died away altogether, although both sides continued to fire artillery shells into each
And it was that day, in that marked the end of the Battle of the Aisne. What had been achieved? For the Germans, they had at least halted the momentum of their retreat, and built up defensive positions which seemed capable of resisting indefinitely the most determined
other's territory. fact,
Casualties on both sides were severe on the Aisne. Here British stretcher bearers work to clear up a group of wounded and dead, both British and German
round the western flank by ordering counterattacks along the whole front. The scene was thus set for the final week of the battle of the Aisne, a week of desultory attacks, intermittent bombardment, and almost perpetual digging to strengthen the entrenched positions. And each side also managed to bring further reinforcements into their line to render the developing stalemate even more intractable. When the fighting did flare up it had lost nothing of its fierceness, and there occurred yet another of the many incidents which indicated the vast discrepancy in outlook between the German and Allied armies regarding the ethics of war. On September 17 about 400 men of the German 53rd Regiment indicated their intention to surrender by holding their hands high and advancing. The British, units of the Northampton and Queen's regiments, held their fire and allowed the German soldiers to advance right to the edge of their trenches. The Germans then opened fire, at point-blank range, and killed and wounded about 200 men. For this act, according to the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention of 1907, the Germans appeared to 'lose their '96
..
Corps from First Army, and XX Corps from the old Second Army, which had recently been dispersed. The next battles of any consequence took place on September 20, when the German VII Reserve Corps fell upon Moroccan troops of the French Fifth Army, and in three separate advances drove them out of their positions. This action left the British right flank exposed, and the Germans turned and began working westwards. With machine gun and shrapnel fire they inflicted severe casualties before reinforcements could be brought up and the
British situation restored. On the centre of the British front, immediately east of the Oise and Aisne canal, the Germans mounted two exceptionally strong attacks, both of which the British repulsed. One exuberant counterattack, however, led the British into an ambush,
and the Germans opened up again with machine guns, putting their enemy into rout. Eventually the British rallied and two companies of the King's Regiment inflicted
accurate
70 casualties on the
Germans with
rifle fire.
Further
to
the
left,
the
Germans
British and French efforts. The Allies, through lack of fresh reserves, had failed to follow up their success at the Marne, and had allowed their effort to degenerate into the sterility which was to characterize the battlefield for most of the remainder of the war. In that sense, the encounter on the Aisne can be counted a German victory. In the meantime, attention was becoming increasingly concentrated on the open flank to the west. By the time the battle on the Aisne was dying down, activity at the western end of the line was developing fast, and it was obviously there that the next moves in the war would be played out.
Further Reading Buchan. John, History of the Great War (Nelson) Dane. Edmund. Battle of the Rivers (Hodder & Stoughton) Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan. The British Campaign in France and Flanders 1914 (Hodder &
Stoughton)
Edmonds. Brigadier J E Military Operations. France and Belgium 1914 (Macmillan) Keegan, J Opening Moves (New York Ballantme ,
,
1971)
DAVID MASON,
after
graduating from St John's
College, Cambridge, worked as a newspaper reporter in the provinces before moving to London to become first an advertising copywriter, then a publisher's editor, and finally gravitating towards Fleet Street, a feature writer with The Sun in its infancy and with The Sunday Times. He gave up journalism in 1965 to become a professional writer
The war-torn roads and villages of France French dead lie where the ebb and flow have left them
of
battle
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4V
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ftf* ^
*
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iM vl
..... -'..*
"*
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i **?
RACE TO THE
When General Erich von Falkenhayn, the Prussian War Minister, took over from Moltke as Chief of General Staff in mid-September, he found the German situation in Northern France far from satisfactory. The German right wing, on the Oise, completely lacked reserves and, in his own words, 'was hanging in the air'. The diversion of three army corps to the Eastern Front gave the British and French forces, for the moment at least, numerical superiority, and the French railway network allowed them to move troops both forward and laterally faster than the Germans. Indeed the western formations of the German army were operating on a single supply line running from Belgium to St Quentin, and this could easily be cut by enemy cavalry, as Falkenhayn immediately realised. To make matters worse, estimates of ammunition requirements, drawn up some years previously, had proved woefully inadequate and the infantry generals were complaining that there was a shortage of artillery to support them. Some commanders, indeed, were so pessimistic as to argue that the wisest course would be to withdraw on the right flank, to prevent the Allies enveloping it. Falkenhayn, however, would tolerate no such suggestion. The original objective of the offensive must still be maintained, he ordered, and if the front further south could be held, it should still be possible 'to bring the northern coast of France, and therefore the control of the English Channel, into German hands'. To achieve this object he arranged that reinforcements on a large scale should be sent towards the northern flank with all speed. Meanwhile the Allied left hook he had anticipated did not take long to materialise. On September 17 General Maunoury's Sixth Army struck north on either side of the Oise, so threatening the German right flank. Maunoury was an excellent soldier,
courteous, and, as Sir Edward Spears has recorded, a man who was aware 'that others as well as himself had their troubles and difficulties'. His eager co-operation with Sir John French had been much appreciated by the British. However, on this occasion, Maunoury was out of luck, for the Germans had brought down IX Reserve Corps from Antwerp, supported by four cavalry divisions, and after advancing some four miles, Sixth Army was brought to a halt on the line Carlepont-Noyon. The first attempt at outflanking the enemy had failed, and the only result was that the line of battle — already stabilised east of the Oise and to the north of the Aisne — was now extended a short distance towards the sea. The gap between Noyon and the ports of Calais and Dunkirk was still 100 miles wide. The Germans settled their plans at a conference called by Falkenhayn on September 21. Firstly, Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria's Sixth Army would be concentrated west of Cambrai, with the task of pushing for the coast, then curving south to the Somme, thereby enveloping the French left wing. Meanwhile XXI Corps and / Bavarian Corps would come up on the left and fair,
Arthur Swinson
Unable to reach a conclusion on the Aisne, both the Germans and the Allies began to move forces first west and then north in an effort to outflank each other. As they moved to the north, the value
n
of possessing the Channel ports became more evident, and thus developed the Race to the Sea
threaten Peronne. Before these operations could get under way General Joffre made his next move, with General de Castelnau's Second Army, which on September 22 advanced across the River Avre (a tributary of the Somme) and headed west for Lassigny, Roye, and Chaulnes. De Castelnau was a man of strong religious faith and high ideals — the French called him 7e capucin botte, the monk in boots— and his attack went in with great force. By the 23rd he was threatening German communications around Ham and St Quentin and a breakthrough did not seem impossible. However, at this critical moment the German XVIII Corps arrived from Rheims and, supported by II Corps, drove back de Castelnau's right wing. His left wing, which had reached Peronne and formed a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Somme, consolidated, but even this limited success could not be maintained. On the 26th XXI Corps arrived and with the help of / Bavarian Corps drove the French out of Peronne and pushed them back over the river. So this new sector of the line became stabilised, and the fighting again moved to the north.
Tremendous power and momentum A new formation had now come to the
This contemporary painting depicts fierce street fighting in Arras. French popular art still echoed the spirit of the offensive'
'98
i^L
fore: II Cavalry Corps under Lieutenant-General von der Marwitz, which by the 27th was driving hard to the north, pushing back the French Territorial troops under General Brugere. The task of the cavalry was to clear the way for XIV Reserve Corps which had come up on the right of // Bavarian Corps and was now heading for Albert, 20 miles north-east of Amiens. Within two days Marwitz hoped to reach Amiens itself, and then the sea. The German flanking movement was developing tremendous power and momentum. To prevent the Allies drawing reinforcements from the Aisne, the Supreme Command had ordered First, Second, and Seventh Armies to take the offensive. Eight days previously the French
The end of the Battle of the Aisne brought about the final campaign of movement on the Western Front at the beginning of the war. Each side tried to outflank the other to the north, and as both sides raced
From the Aisne to the Channel ports: the Race to the Sea that neither side won i
!
m
600 300
in
-i
I
10
30
20
10
5 Height
20
towards the north, the various units involved leap-frogged past each other and taxed their lateral lines of communication to the utmost in their efforts to move large bodies of troops to the north faster than the opposition could do. As the armies moved in this direction, the value of possession of the Channel ports became increasingly clear, and so the outflanking movement became the Race to the Sea Miles
1
30
40
50Kms.
Feet I
Germans British
French
K
SIXTH
.Beauvais
^%'
Compiegne
#
Aisne
ARMY (Maunoury) Soissons' .Braine
Oise
Ves/e
# Rheims
had been optimistic of enveloping the enemy, and now they were in danger of being enveloped themselves. The danger was greatest to XXI and X Corps, north of the Somme, which were covering de Maud'huy's Tenth Army, now coming off the trains near Arras. De Maud'huy, who has been vividly described by Sir Edward Spears, was small in stature but big in spirit, and he 'could not conceive of defeat so long as a single Frenchman remained alive'. Before reaching Arras, he had hoped to find himself in a position to go on the offensive once his forces were deployed. On the morning of the 28th things looked black indeed, for the weight of German artillery and infantry was pressing back XXI and X Corps, and it seemed impossible to stabilise the line. However, by the evening the French, after hours of dogged and costly fighting, succeeded in halting the enemy thrust on a line running through Maricourt, Fricourt, and Thiepval. Tenth Army was able to deploy without hindrance. However, yet another flanking move developed, for once he was held in front, Marwitz headed north with his cavalry corps to threaten Arras. Fortunately he was held by Conneau's cavalry corps which had hurried north-east to meet such an eventuality, and for a few hours the situation was saved. Moving a whole army by rail, even over an efficient network such as the French possessed, is a complex business, for not only men have to be accommodated, but guns, ammunition, animals, supplies and thousands of tons of equipment. Once the troops have left the trains, they have to be united with their equipment, which can take a week or more. It is to de Maud'huy's credit that instead of waiting on events, by October 1 he was actively preparing to launch an offensive. This would go in from the line Arras-Lens and strike south-east against the German flank. He thought that there would be only cavalry to deal with but he was mistaken. The Germans had succeeded in bringing up three more corps, and instead of striking, Tenth Army— now deployed over a wide front — was in danger of being struck itself. Even before de Maud'huy had reached Arras, the German Supreme Command had made new plans, which were, in Falkenhayn's words: 'To carry out with the greatest speed movements behind the German front corresponding to the enemy movements, with the object of not only meeting the enemy's efforts at envelopment, but of countering them also ... by means of an enveloping movement by the Germans.' At all costs he was determined that, firstly, the French would not form a line east of the great cotton town of Lille, and secondly that they would not link up with the Belgian army defending the fortress of Antwerp, close to the Dutch frontier. It was decided that three distinct operations should be launched, with all the troops which could possibly be concentrated on the northern flank. These operations were as follows: • There would be an attack against Arras on October 2, launched by three corps— TV, from First Army, the Guards Corps from German
infantry line the road as a
horse-drawn piece of
artillery
gallops by
Second Army, and I Bavarian Reserve Corps from Seventh Army. The attack would be co-ordinated with an attempt to break through at Roye, 45 miles to the south. • Three cavalry corps I and II under Marwitz, and TV under Lieutenant-General von Hollen, were to cover the right flank of the offensive, carrying out a wide sweep across Flanders towards the coast.
• Antwerp would
be captured before the Allies could reinforce
it
any further. So far as Antwerp was concerned, it may be mentioned here that on October 3 a brigade of the Royal Naval Division reached the fortress, followed on the 6th by two more brigades. These had been landed at Dunkirk. On the same day 7th Division landed at Zeebrugge, followed 24 hours later by 3rd Cavalry Division. Sustained, accurate
fire
The three German corps detailed for the offensive moved forward on October 1 and the following day struck Tenth Army — still, it
own offensive— on a line to the east of Arras. Reeling before the blow, the French gave ground, but there was no panic or disintegration, units retired in order, covering each other, and under a sustained and accurate fire from the guns. By October 4, the Germans had slowed down considerably after heavy losses and by the 6th they had been halted altogether. The French dug in along a line running through the eastern outskirts of Arras, reaching Thiepval in the south and Vimy and Souchez in the north. The troops were desperately tired, but they knew if they weakened now their country would be overrun. On the night of the 6th Foch told de Maud'huy: 'Fight to the last man and hang on like lice. No retirement. Every man to the attack.' On the morning of the 7th the Germans came on again, but their attacks faltered beneath a steady fire and they did not gain a yard. Their attacks on the 8th failed likewise, and by the 9th Falkenhayn realised that the three corps could make no further progress. Another sector of the line was stabilised, and the gap between the northern flank and the sea had narrowed to 45 miles. To add to his discomfiture, the attempt to break through at Roye had proved a complete failure. The Germans found their inability to defeat the French in open battle hard to understand. The Supreme Command even described it as 'incomprehensible', but the field commanders spoke of the strength of French field fortifications, and the unappreciated power of defensive weapons. What they probably underestimated, however, was the courage and tenacity of the poilu who was disputing every yard of the sacred soil of France. Blocked in front, the Germans rested their hopes on yet another flanking move by the two cavalry groups under Marwitz and Hollen. While the battle before Arras was raging, they had carried out a wide sweep to the north, pushing back local Territorial troops, which were all the French could put in the field will be recalled, preparing for its
against them. Supporting the cavalry were a number of infantry and sapper units, which could deal with minor fortified positions, repair where necessary demolitions and bridge canals and rivers. On October 2, Marwitz gave orders for a general offensive, ordering / and // Cavalry Corps 'to break down the weakening resistance of the enemy by operating against his flank and rear; to block all the railways leading from Paris and the lower Seine; and to destroy completely the railways from the Lower Somme and the coastal railways near Abbeville'. The Kaiser wrote to him on the 3rd: 'His Majesty wishes to see the cavalry corps in the rear of the enemy tomorrow.' Once their railway network had been paralysed, Marwitz reasoned, the French could not continue reinforcing their left flank in such strength and with such speed. The argument was sound but Marwitz's troops put up a poor performance. The sweep degenerated into a crawl and then all
momentum was
lost. The French Territorials showed themselves means overawed by the reputation of their adversaries, and from prepared positions put down a steady and accurate fire. On October 6 the resistance was so successful along a line stretched from Lens to Lille that Marwitz was forced to withdraw his men to a position behind the Lorette heights. The following morning XXI Corps, led by General Legrand-Girarde, which had just detrained at Bethune, 20 miles north of Arras, moved against them. Marwitz now found himself in some difficulty, for in their
by no
dismounted role, his cavalry could not hope to hold out long against good infantry, and XXI Corps came from the French First Army. Somehow, with the aid of his attached infantry units, he managed to hang on throughout the 7th, though taking heavy casualties. On the 8th the French were in high hopes of breaking through, only to be frustrated, as the Germans had been a few days earlier. On October 4 the German XIV Corps had entrained at Metz and come by rail to Mons, 50 miles behind the battlefront. By forced marches it arrived just in time to extricate the cavalry and the French drive was brought to a standstill. Again Marwitz was sent north with orders to penetrate the line between La Bassee and Armentieres, and head for Abbeville. This lay some 45 miles beyond Arras and 30 to the north-east of Amiens and. if Marwitz could reach it, he would retrieve his somewhat tattered reputation. Both horses and men were tired, and after so many failures morale must have suffered considerably. While Marwitz was still advancing towards Lens, Hollen and IV Cavalry Corps had been operating some 15 miles further north, and on the extreme right flank of the German offensive. Advancing north-west from Menin they had reached the outskirts of Ypres by the evening of October 7, and the following morning passed through the town itself, expecting to reach the sea coast within the next 12 hours. Hollen's orders were as follows: 'You will ride round the flank and rear of the enemy, thoroughly destroy his communications, especially the railways which lead from the coast and the south to the area Amiens-Lille-Alost. At
—
•"
the cost of the last horse and man you will ensure hat the enemy's operations against our right flank are hindered in every way.' In compliance with these orders, the grey columns struck south-west from Ypres. and using every available road and track streamed towards the little town of Hazebrouck which lay a mere 20 miles ahead. If they could reach this before nightfall and there seemed no reason why they should fail -they would find themselves at the farthest point the German army had yet penetrated From here a short journey would bring them to the rear of the French line, now stabilised as far north as La Bassee; and their ride south-west to Abbeville should produce panic among the French civilian population and dismay to the armies on the Somme t
Resolute defence But the moment had come for the pendulum to swing hack again. Before they were half-way to Hazebrouck, Hollen's leading units came under a sustained fire, and headed back for cover General de Mi try had been ordered north by Joffre to counter the threat with a hastily improvised cavalry corps, consisting of 4th Division from Fifth Army and 5th Division from I Cavalry Corps. Though outnumbered, de Mitry had the advantage of knowing the ground and had time to select his positions. The land around Hazebrouck is flat, dotted with small farms, and there are numerous hedges and ditches to provide defensive fire positions. Evidently de Mitry 's defence was resolute, for not only did Hollen abandon his advance but by evening his regiments were retiring on Bailleul. Next morning any further advance was out of the question, for a new factor presented itself. The BEF had been moved up from the Aisne to take its place on the left of the Allied line. The coastal gap was now under 30 miles. The idea of moving the BEF from the Aisne was put to Joffre by Sir John French on September 29, as the latter recorded in his diary:
Commander-in-Chief. I want him disengage us from our present positions as soon as possible and post us on the left flank of the Allied Forces. I feel sure the freedom of action which we shall thus gain will increase the value of our troops and enable the cavalry to assert their superiority by wide flanking movements on the flank. Apart from these tactical reasons, there were obvious administrative advantages in the move. The BEF was supplied from England via the Channel ports. All ammunition, guns, heavy equipment, clothing and quantities of food had to be brought over each day, amounting to some thousands of tons. The nearer the BEF was operating to the coast, the shorter its line of communications would be. The task of getting wounded back to the Channel would be enormously facilitated, and the treatment of c wounded plays a vital part in keeping up an army's morale. | Joffre would not agree to such an important move without 5 / sent definite proposals to the to
detailed consideration; and naturally, before he could release
the British divisions from the line he had to bring up French formations to replace them. However, matters were put in hand at once, and on October 1 Joffre wrote to French that he was happy to be able to comply with the wishes of the Field-Marshal'. French also learned that Joffre had appointed his assistant, Foch, to co-ordinate operations on the northern flank involving both the BEF and de Castelnau's Tenth Army. On October 8, while General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's II Corps was detraining at Abbeville, French paid a visit to Foch's headquarters, and later recorded: 'He gave me a great reception with a guard of honour. He took a very optimistic view of the situation, said that the enemy was making no headway anywhere, and that he was gradually getting round the German flank on the north. It gave me a great hope for the future to find him so confident of success.' Foch was overoptimistic, and both he and French misjudged the German capacity to reinforce their armies. Smith-Dorrien, whose corps was the first BEF formation to arrive from the Aisne, was 56 years of age, but hard and fit. Temperamentally, he found it far from easy to get on with French but was in complete agreement with the plan now being implemented and anxious to attack without delay. On the morning of the 9th a fleet of motor buses arrived (on the initiative of Foch) and aboard these 10,000 men were carried 22 miles to the east. Smith-Dorrien's orders were to make contact with de Castelnau at Bethune, and resting his right flank there, to take up a position along the La Bassee-Aire canal. By the 11th his men were in position.
While these moves were taking place, III Corps was coming off the trains at St Omer and getting ready to move forward to Hazebrouck. The coastal gap had still not been filled, but at Gent Sir Henry Rawlinson had formed 7th Division and III Cavalry Division into IV Corps, which had now come under command of Sir John French. Rawlinson's orders were to move westwards until he reached the northern flank of III Corps. The Belgian army, which had managed to extricate itself from Antwerp, was moving behind him. Though the Allies had gained a slight advantage, the situation was very fluid and the next seven days would be critical. For the moment the brunt was borne by II Corps and their task was not easy. The ground ahead of them was little better than a morass, intersected by hedges, deep, muddy dykes and streams. It was hard to move the guns forward except along the pave of main
roads and the land was so low that even shallow trenches filled with water. The flat terrain made artillery observation difficult and forward observations officers were to be seen on church towers or scaling brewery chimneys.
A
set-piece attack Facing Smith-Dorrien's II Corps was Marwitz with / and // Cavalry Corps, supported as usual by infantry and cyclist battalions. On the 1 1th they had secured the town of La Bassee and were now preparing to advance. Also, to hinder the offensive of II Corps, they had fortified every building and were prepared to dispute every ditch and hedge. Fighting broke out on the 12th when Smith-Dorrien advanced on an eight-mile front with five brigades to the north of the canal and one to the south. During the morning actions were on a small scale and each unit dealt with local opposition as the situation demanded. At 1500 hours a set-piece attack went in, timed to synchronise with an attack by the French XXI Corps on the right. The latter failed to materialise, and the British went on alone. The troops moved in extended order from hedge to hedge and dyke to dyke. A counterattack by the Germans near Givenchy, five miles to the east of Bethune, was repulsed. By evening the leading troops had reached Givenchy itself, a straggling village on a slight rise with a tall church tower. By dark the Corps was digging in along a line which stretched from Noyelles in the south to Lacouture in the north, and the infantry slept on the ground by their weapon pits, denied even the comfort of blankets which would not arrive for three more days. That night Smith-Dorrien wrote in his diary: 'It was an obstinate day's fighting though nothing serious, and we lost about 300 killed and wounded.' Next day, October 13, the fighting became heavier, and he recorded: dull morning which in the afternoon turned to very heavy rain. We made very little advance throughout the day along the whole line. At one point 5th Division was in rather a dreadful position. At about 3 p.m. a general attack combined with the E French took place. It was not very successful. I fear our casualties 3 in the last two days have been something near a thousand. Many of these casualties were sustained by the Bedfords, who £ were driven out of Givenchy, and by the Dorsets whose flank was ^ thus exposed. Although II Corps was opposed only by cavalry, « the original intention of enveloping the German flank was far I
A
The road north: troopers of the 11th
Hussars on their way to Flanders
' :
!
^
-
m* *
*
*
RSM
-.
w
I
-M |*4
•'
"
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ir"
\ .
•*%i
•;-V-
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«
from being realised and French ordered General Pulteney, commander of III Corps, to advance eastwards from Ha/ebrouck to give Smith-Dornen any assistance he might need. At that moment Pulteney was advancing on Bailleul, his two divisions moving side by side, while Allenbv's cavalry headed for the high ground east of Mont des Cats. The Germans had entrenched themselves and Pulteney decided on a general attack along a five-mile front. The day was wet and misty, and it was not until 1400 hours that the infantry got moving. They enjoyed little artillery support because of the had visibility and found themselves among hoptields, grappling with German units well supplied with machine-guns However, by dark, the villages of Outtersteene and Meteren were captured and the cavalry occupied Mont Noir, three miles north of Bailleul. During the day intelligence reached Pulteney that Lille had been occupied by the German XIX Corps and that part of the town was in flames. In the light of this he decided to renew his offensive the following day before the German cavalry could be reinforced by XIX Corps. The 14th produced even worse weather than the day before, and again observation was difficult. Patrols eventually established that the Germans had abandoned Meteren and Bailleul and retired behind the River Lys. Also on the 14th Allenbv's cavalry corps reached Messines. about six miles to the north of Armentieres. Its operations so far had been carried out with great brilliance. II
I
In
the Indian
the two commanders deteriorated and the lend ended only with their deaths.
However,
Corps on La Bassee canal things were going far from brilliantly. With the intention of wearing down the British infantry, Marwitz staged a series of night attacks and in the daytime his units put down a heavy fire to harass any forward movement. At 1000 hours on the 14th, a stray bullet killed MajorGenera] Hubert Hamilton. GOC 3rd Division. His death was to trigger off one of the most tragic feuds in British military history. Sir John French arrived at II Corps' headquarters soon after Smith-Dorrien had received the news and later French recorded: 'He was in one of those tits of deep depression which unfortunately visit him frequently. He complained that the II Corps had never got over what he described as the "shock" of Le Cateau, and there was no great fighting spirit throughout the troops he commanded. I told him that thought he greatly exaggerated these disabilities.' Smith-Dorrien later denied this allegation, explaining that his depression was momentary and due to the news of Hamilton's death. But from this day onwards relations between For
(left), commander of the Cavalry Corps, and Rawlinson (right), commander of IV Corps, two of the key figures in the Race to the Sea
Allenby
summer
of
October 1914. a group
of
was during
this visit that French decided II Corps operations astride the canal. He therefore arranged with Foch that Tenth Army should extend its line northwards to the canal so that Smith-Dorrien could bring his brigade on the south of it back into reserve. This was a wise decision, for Smith-Dorrien was now engaged in wheeling his formation, pivoting on the right flank at Givenchy, a most difficult operation it
could not continue
its
in this terrain.
A
running battle
On
the 15th, however, things seemed to go rather better and Smith-Dorrien wrote that night: Today the 3rd Division has done extraordinary well With their guns dispersed among the infantry right up in the firing line they have managed to drive the enemy from one loopholed village to another, crossing the dykes with planks which they had carried with them. The Hermans must have suffered very heavily, as in our advance large numbers of them were found dead.
French cuirassiers passes some men of the
.
1st
Cameronians
resting by the roadside
303
Corps had also suffered heavily and its total casualties so reached 2,000. Smith-Dorrien, it is interesting to note, did not think this loss excessive, and wrote in his diary: 'I shall sleep feeling that our heavy losses have not been in vain.' During the evening of the 15th news reached headquarters II Corps that Marwitz's cavalry was withdrawing, and SmithDorrien expressed his intention to move north-east towards III Corps, so closing the gap between the two formations, still lightly guarded by French cavalry. This move was found impractical as the French lacked sufficient troops to man the trenches north of the canal. Smith-Dorrien therefore decided to continue the wheel to the south-east to realise his original plan of enveloping the enemy. Unknown to the British, Marwitz's cavalry had been relieved by two infantry divisions, 13th and 14th. So during the 16th Smith-Dorrien was to discover:
'Progress, though successful, was slow'
Although the enemy had fallen back, they had not gone far, and they were still disputing every hedge and village, so progress, though successful, was slow. Unfortunately the day was foggy, air observation was impossible, and the infantry had to feel their way forward, denied any closely co-ordinated artillery support. Nevertheless, 15th Brigade retook Givenchy, and the following morning the Norfolks reached Canteleu, half-way between Givenchy and La Bassee. On the 17th, also, 9th Brigade got a footing on Aubers ridge and, just before dark, took the villages of Aubers and Herlies at the point of the bayonet. Seventh Brigade was unable to secure lilies and so the troops on the right flank had to be brought back to avoid presenting an exposed flank to the enemy. On the left of the Corps, the French cavalry, assisted by the Royal Irish Regiment, captured
and
II
far
the village of Fromelles, taking 50 prisoners, but it failed to get up into the general line of the wheel and 3rd Division was slowed down. On the right of II Corps' position the Devonshires cooperated with a French unit, the 295th Infantry Regiment, to capture the canal bridge three-quarters of a mile to the east of Givenchy. This was the nearest point to La Bassee that any Allied troops were to reach for the next four years. SmithDorrien's offensive was spent. Further north the situation was more hopeful. From October 14 a continuous line was formed as far as the coast, for on this day Allenby's cavalry corps, moving north-eastwards, made contact with 3rd Cavalry Division (of Rawlinson's IV Corps) south of Ypres. Without any great opposition 1st Cavalry Division occupied Dranouter, two miles north-east of Bailleul, and 2nd Cavalry Division occupied Kemmel. Joining forces, these then advanced to a line from Neuve Eglise running down through Messines to Wytschaete. Hearing of their progress, French sent Allenby instructions to reconnoitre the River Lys from Estaires to Menin and report back at once. As he realised, in the Ypres gap lay the last chance of outflanking the Germans before they, too, formed an unbroken line from Switzerland to the sea. At first, on the 15th, things seemed to go well, for Conneau's cavalry corps secured Estaires and then headed for Sailly, two miles to the north-east. Their attack on the latter failed and when Allenby reconnoitred the river Lys he found that the bridges were already in German hands. Any advance beyond Comines, six miles from Menin, proved impossible for the Germans held the line of the canal running down from Ypres. Still, after heavy fighting, slightly to the north some precarious footholds were gained, and the Germans were driven from the villages of Houthem and Hollebeke on the far side of the canal. Towards mid-day Sir John French conferred with Foch and then met Pulteney and Allenby at Hazebrouck to discuss the next moves. Orders were issued that III Corps (with the help of de Mitry's cavalry) should secure bridges over the Lys at Sailly, Bac St Maur Erquinghem and Pont-de-Nieppe. Though the evening was foggy and the ground had not been reconnoitred the units detailed for the task went ahead and the first three bridges were secured. Next morning the leading units of III Corps went across
them.
On October 16 Sir John French issued an operation order which included, for the first time. Sir Henry Rawlinson's IV Corps. In view of events a few days later the wording is of particular interest: 1. It is the intention of the C-in-C to the enemy wherever met.
advance eastwards, attacking
The Cavalry Corps will establish itself on the right bank of the river Lys between Armentieres and Menin and then move in an easterly direction, eventually covering the left flank of the advance.
2.
Ill Corps will closely support the movement. II Corps will push forward drawing towards III Corps as opportunity offers. IV Corps, covered by its 3rd Cavalry Division on its left flank, will move between Courtrai (6 miles ENE of Menin) and Roulers it will .
04
.
.
NE
also observe towards the for the advance of the enemy against the Belgian Army. In short, this was an offensive by the entire BEF. The opposition, according to Sir John French's best intelligence, consisted of cavalry plus three divisions of the Antwerp siege corps
which were moving against Ypres.
On
the 16th there
was
little
progress. Allenby's
men
failed to
Lys between Houplines and Comines, Corps, which had secured its passage across the river by
force the passage of the III
night operations, was occupied in consolidating its positions. Rawlinson's 7th Division moved to a covering position about five miles east of Ypres and began digging in. As French had anticipated, the Germans went back, in places as much as three miles, and his orders for the 17th were to continue the advance along the same axis. Allenby was ordered not to attempt the passage of the Lys until the advance of III Corps further south had made itself felt. Again things seemed to go well. The 6th Division advanced to a line running down from Rouge le Bout to Armentieres, and 4th Division entered Armentieres itself. This was a modern manufacturing town with wide streets crowded with refugees from Lille. Prisoners taken in and around the town proved to be from XIX and XIII Corps, confirming the presence of these formations — or elements of them in the area. During the 17th, 7th Division remained entrenched in its position along the line Zandvoorde-Gheluvelt-Zonnebeke, with 3rd Cavalry Division near Passchendaele, awaiting the advance of III Corps. Reconnaissance indicated that the main German position now lay about half a mile to the east, running through Koelberg. Ill Corps also discovered that the Germans were entrenching their line on a rise of ground called Perenchies Ridge about four miles east of Armentieres. During the day the Allied position at Ypres was strengthened by the arrival on the left flank of four cavalry divisions under General de Mitry, and Haig's I Corps had begun arriving at Hazebrouck. Despite evidence of German reinforcements, Sir John French was still determined to maintain the offensive and at 1915 hours issued orders to this effect. So on the 18th, Allenby's Cavalry Corps made attacks along the whole line from Deulemont to Tenbrielen (two miles north of Comines), in touch with III Corps on its right and 7th Division on its left. But it could make no progress. Rawlinson's IV Corps was ordered to move on Menin, but bearing in mind his instructions not to push too far ahead of III Corps, Rawlinson told 7th Division to merely move forward and gain ground from which to attack the following day. By midday Rawlinson's interpretation of his orders was discovered at
GHQ
and he was told to push on Menin. These instructions he disregarded, probably saving his division. The truth was that French's offensive was based on inaccurate Intelligence. The Germans were not retiring through weakness, but according to a prepared plan. On October 14, probably as a result of the heavy losses sustained during Smith-Dorrien's advance north of the La Bassee canal, Falkenhayn, the Chief of the German Staff, issued orders that the partial offensive by Sixth Army should cease, and Fourth Army under Duke Albrecht of Wiirttemberg would be brought up between Menin and the sea. This would carry out the final and decisive enveloping movement, completely countering operations by Sir John French and the BEF. Duke Albrecht's orders, in fact, were no less than to win the war 'by successfully closing the enemy who is still engaged in the concentration and reorganization of his forces, and by gaining Calais, the aim and object of the 1914 campaign'. This new army contained no less than eight new divisions, formed mostly of volunteers, who (to quote Captain Cyril Falls) were 'the flower of the youth of Germany, middle and upper-class students, flaming with patriotism and enthusiasm, ready for sacrifice'. These divisions were joined by forces released by the fall of Antwerp, and a Marine Division. On October 16 the leading formations of this massive striking force were riding west on trains from Brussels; on the 17th they were on a line 20 miles from the Yser; and on the 18th the leading formation, III Reserve Corps, began attacking the Belgian outposts east of the river.
Naval support Below its junction with the Ypres canal, the Yser is nearly 20 yards wide, and five to ten feet deep. It is canalized and has
embankments on both sides, and at this time the west bank commanded the east by over six feet. The whole region between the Yser and the sea is low lying, and intersected by canals and ditches. Passage over the river was impossible except at the bridges which were spaced about three miles apart. Despite the difficulties, the German troops attacked with great elan; the immense importance of the operation had been impressed upon them and they pushed ahead regardless of heavy losses. By midday they had captured the advanced posts at Keyem and Schoore, but failed repeatedly to cross the river. The Belgian infantry in their stubborn defence were supported by fire from a Royal Navy flotilla under Admiral Hood. The shells were not, according to German reports, effective in inflicting casualties because they broke up into a few large fragments, but the morale impact of the Royal Navy's support was immense. The general commanding 77/ Reserve Corps decided not to allow his troops to cross the Yser at Nieuport on the coast, 'on account of the heavy fire from the British naval guns'. So the position remained in Belgian hands, and with it the locks which controlled the inlet of sea water. Later on the locks were opened and the sea flooded in to cover the Belgian front. Without too much exaggeration one could say that 'the race to the sea' was won neither by the BEF nor the Germans, but by the Royal Navy. But, whether one accepts this view or not. from October 18 onwards, the contending armies settled down to trench warfare, and the war of movement was at an end. Both sides were disappointed by their failure to envelop the other, but the Allies had the satisfaction of having secured the Channel ports. Within the next few days they had little opportunity to enjoy this success, for the Germans were about to launch a massive offensive designed to break through the BEF and destroy its formations piecemeal. The first battle of Ypres was now beginning. Could either side have seized a vital advantage by enveloping the other during this curious campaign? Falkenhayn was severely Germany for employing green troops in Fourth Army, for they lacked any ability to manoeuvre and suffered crippling casualties. To this Falkenhayn replied that it was a question of time since no other troops were available. If he had not rushed these young men to the Yser, the Allied offensive would have gained momentum. In short 'the prize to be won was worth the stake', for, 'if the German Army could succeed in throwing the Allies back across the Yser and following them up, there would criticised in
Wurttemberg, commander of the
German Fourth Army
A group
be a complete and favourable change in the situation on the Western Front .' French was criticised too. On his own admission, the Germans had outwitted him, and later he was to write: 'Although I looked for a great addition to the enemy's numbers the strength they actually reached astounded me. This, taken with the speed in which they appeared in the field, came like a veritable bolt from the blue.' The trouble was, according to Smith-Dorrien, that French relied too heavily on the unreliable Intelligence supplied by Foch. He indulged in easy optimism and ignored the inherent military probability that, having failed in their thrust on Paris, the Germans would make a supreme effort to seize the Channel ports and cripple the BEF. It is very easy to be wise after the battle. French could at least argue that if his offensive had proved abortive, his decision to bring the BEF north to Flanders had been completely vindicated. It was indeed one of the major decisions of the war. .
.
Further Reading Ballard, Brigadier-General C, Smith-Dorrien (Constable, 1931) Falkenhayn, General von, General Headquarters 1914-16 (Hutchinson, 1919) Falls, Cyril,
The
World War (Longmans, 1960)
First
French, Gerald, The Life of Field-Marshal Sir John French (Cassell, 1931) French, Field-Marshal Viscount of Ypres, 1914 (Constable, 1919) Sheppard, H. W., A Short History of the British Army (Constable, 1926) Shermer. D. R., World War I (Octopus 1973) Spears, Major-General Sir Edward, Liaison 1914 (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1930) Official History of the War, Military Operations France and Belgium 1914, Vols.
1
and 2 (Heinemann 1929)
ARTHUR SWINSON
has been interested in military history since his boyhood. He Army from September 1 939 to 1 946, first in the infantry and later on staff, attached to the Indian Army and seeing action in India, Assam, Burma, and Malaya. He joined the BBC in 1 949 and worked for 1 2 years as writer
served
in
the British
and producer,
in television, and has 300 credits for plays, stage plays include The Bridge of Estaban and Conflict at Kalanadi, and military works include Six Minutes to Sunset (about the Amritsar massacre), Kohima, and North-West Frontier. He has also travelled widely in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East and is a member of the Royal Central Asian Society. first in
documentaries, and
radio
and then
films. His
of officers of the 5th Bavarian Reserve Division read their orders while resting on the grass at the edge of a road
Marwitz, commander of the and // Cavalry Corps
/
305
THE FIRST BATTLE OF
WARSAW Kenneth Macksey
Exhausted and demoralised by their various setbacks, on September 12, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian forces were in full retreat. In an effort to bolster the efforts of their nagging allies, the Germans, who had already defeated two Russian armies, sent Ludendorff with all the forces they could spare to the Austrians' aid. With these reinforcements it was hoped that the Central Powers could stem the ponderous advance of the Russian armies. Below: An extraordinary Austrian method of firing the rifle. Lying on his back behind a crescent-shaped parapet, the infantryman aims the rifle over his head and fires — the chances of hitting the target must have been small indeed
Once an army that has been
led to believe
on the brink of victory finds overnight that it has been defeated, the possibility of an ordered withdrawal in face of the enemy — the most difficult of all military operations—becomes remote. When that army is already split by racial tensions and has lost many of its best officers, and if the it is
torrential autumn rains are already falling on rutted and broken roads, then any attempt at retreat is likely to become a rout. That was the fate of the Austrofirst
Hungarian army as it turned its back on the Russians and made for the River San on September 12, 1914, but if Conrad really hoped they might stand and fight on the river he was hopelessly misled. His army, for the time being, was not capable of a fight and might have collapsed absolutely had the Russians been able to follow up with a little more vigour — but the Russians themselves had serious difficulties in maintaining a vast army at the end of tenuous communications. As it was Conrad could not avert yet another step back, and, on September 16, he had to give in to the pleading of his generals and go still further south-west towards the line of the River Dunajec, thus giving up most of Galicia, and penning his army in the angle between the Vistula and the Carpathian Range. He was fortunate only in one respect— the generosity with which Russian wireless messages told him of their every impending move in the pursuit: evasion could be calculated and not left to chance. As it was the fortified town of Jaroslaw was lost to the Russian Fifth Army and 150,000 troops were marooned in Przemysl, while a full 350,000 out of the original 1.000,000 who had set out in August were either dead, wounded or in Russian hands — some of them very willing prisoners among Russians who, as fellow Slavs, they welcomed as liberators. Conrad's strategy was bankrupt and the
army he had
was shown to have feet Germans could save them.
built
of clay. Only the
On September
14 General Ludendorff
A
was
at Insterburg, celebrating the conclusion of the Battle of the Masurian
when a message from Moltke informed him that a new Southern Army was to be formed and based on Breslau under General von Schubert and he, Ludendorff, was to be its Chief-of-Staff. The nucleus of this army was to be two corps withdrawn from Eighth Army in East Prussia, but Ludendorff made an immediate counter proposal to the effect that the whole of Eighth Army less one corps and other weak forces should be transferred and kept under the control of Hindenburg. Events now moved with the swiftness which epitomised the work of the German General Staff at its best. On September 14 FalkenLakes,
hayn was
secretly
installed
in
place of
Moltke: on September 16 Ludendorff arrived in Breslau, to be told that his proposals had been accepted and that the best part of Eighth Army, redesignated
Ninth Army, was to move to Upper Silesia and come under Hindenburg while the truncated Eighth Army was to be taken over by Schubert (with operational control vested in Hindenburg) and to stand on the defensive to the east of the Prussian border. On September 18 Ludendorff met Conrad to formulate joint plans for the future. In fact the joint planning was anything but cordially shared, for while the Germans tried to give an impression that com-
U
S
T
R
HUNG
The
First Battle of Warsaw. The Russians, finding their advance checked, withdraw and lure the Central Powers' forces into the trap of overextending their lines of communication. Taking advantage of the breathing space offered them, the Russians shift their main weight from their left flank to their right, blocking the German move against Warsaw
plete
agreement had been reached on the
need
for a
general offensive against the Russians, Conrad wished only to stabilise the front prior to making a deferred step
by step offensive. Above all, Conrad had no intention of coming under German command. Ludendorff was more realistic, assessing the Austrians as being on the verge of collapse, and thus likely to open the way to a Russian invasion of Silesia via Krakow. If the Austrians would not attack in force then the Germans would have to do so themselves in order to divert the Russians. Willy nilly the orders to Ninth Army on September 17 were of a tentative nature, 'to advance against the flank and rear of the first group of armies pursuing the Austrians which could be reached' — anything for a spoiling battle, in fact. Such was the speed and efficiency of the German redeployment from the north that they were ready in ten days, and on September 29 had begun to advance, with
8th Cavalry Division as part of an improvised corps under General Frommel on the left directed to the east of Lodz. Then consecutively to Frommel 's right, on a XVII, XX, south-easterly alignment, Guard Reserve and XI Corps were set moving on the axis Czenstochau-Ivangorod, while the Austrian First Army (which already had part of Woyrsch's Landwehr Corps under command) was prevailed upon to cover the extreme right flank prior to the rest of the Austrian army resuming the offensive after the Russians had been attracted to the German front. The German advance entered a land in which railways were scarce and roads mediaeval. Without having the least notion of the location of the main Russian forces, Ludendorff had to build his own communications as he advanced (his transport supplemented by a swarm of light, onehorse-drawn carts). But while Ludendorff strove hard to build roads, almost from
307
nothing, he also demonstrated his apprehension of the future by laying elaborate plans to destroy the railways should he have need to withdraw. In essence his was only to be a diversionary raid on the grand scale without pretensions to any other important strategic objective.
to full capacity
In the Russian camp, by mid-September, a series of reports — mostly unfounded — began to suggest that a massive redeployment of German troops was taking place from the Western Front to the east, and when German troops came to be positively identified in southern Poland on September 23 there could be little remaining doubt of their intentions. Having it was the Austrians be destroyed and having almost achieved that aim, Grand Duke Nicholas now reversed his policy. It was the Germans who now had to be rebuffed before anything further could be done against the Austrians.
announced that
who had
to
However, he was far more subtle than Ludendorff, and had no intention of obliging his opponent by fighting at the fullest extent of poor communications. Instead he conceived an ambush by withdrawing the whole of his force, less Third and Eighth Armies, from opposite the Austrians on the Dunajec and placing it along the Vistula from north of Sandomierz to Warsaw, with the greater part, consisting of Second and Fifth Armies, backed by First Army withdrawn from the Neman, in the vicinity of Warsaw. His plan was simplicity itself. While Tenth Army made a diversionary advance into East Prussia from the Neman to pin down those Germans already there, the German advance on Ivangorod should be counterattacked across the Vistula by Fourth and Ninth Armies. Finally the uncommitted mass, gathered close about Warsaw, would
I
The direction of their movement altered once again, Austrian troops file eastward
far
quote Ludendorff, 'The Russians intended to cross the Vistula between the mouth of the San and Ivangorod and attack the Austro-Hungarian Armies north of the Vistula.' Three Russian brigades had certainly been discovered close by Opatow (part of the Russian rearguard whose withdrawal had hung fire for lack of timely orders), but their strength was grossly exaggerated in German eyes — as the dispatch of Guard Reserve, XI and Austrian Corps to envelop them illustrates. The German advance was as cautious as might be expected in view of the fact that they expected to meet a host and slow because the roads were knee-deep in mud. In the event most of the Russians slipped away on October 4 and the Germans netted only 8,000 with nine guns— most of whom were to
Massive redeployment
earlier
meant that they were
too slow (by German standards) in building up to full strength. The story from now on is one of unpleasant surprises for Ludendorff. Russian radio traffic indicated, on October 1, that,
Russian
artillery
army was short
on the move. The Russian
of
all
types of
artillery
swing down from the north, envelop Hindenburg's left flank and drive him amongst his Austrian allies to the south. As Colonel Hoffmann, Ludendorff 's principal Staff Officer, was to write, 'The idea was a good one.' Moreover, it was made much more effective by the comparatively high speed with which the Russians transferred their strength to the north and the unusual degree of secrecy with which they managed to cloak the move. Some columns travelled by rail and others — mostly the rearguard — marched. The conditions along the lines of communication to the west of the Vistula were atrocious. Ravaging of the countryside and of administrative facilities increased and for long periods the marching columns were without bread and the horses deprived of fodder, and even though the Russians managed to get back on time, the chronic inability of their railways to work
victims of artillery fire. In the meantime Hindenburg was casting anxious eyes towards the old battle-
Masuria where Russian Tenth to the frontier and become engaged with the German Eighth Army's forward defences between Suwalki and Augustow on September 29. Unforfield
in
Army had advanced
tunately the Germans omitted to prepare strong defences to the east of the frontier because / Corps commander, the redoubtable Francois, was dedicated to fighting only offensive battles. Pressure built up, but the Russian attacks were not pushed home with the same determination of August and the Germans were just able to hold their own, though Schubert followed Prittwitz into oblivion and was replaced in command of Eighth Army by Francois. For the time being the position was
Ludendorff could rightly claim that by October 5 this Russian diversion had no effect upon the main battle taking place in southern Poland, and later, could contemplate withdrawing a division for use in the south. The Austrians were also back in action, having realised on October 4 that the Russians who had advanced to the Carpathian foothills were but a screen and that, therefore, they might safely attempt the relief of Przemysl, and satisfy German demands for offensive action. For the next four days the Austrians enjoyed a free run right up to the San, relieving Przemysl on the 9th, but upon the river line the Russians stood firm and, as Nicholas planned, in great security. Moreover Conrad had become almost as disenchanted with offensive action as his troops. The advance was stabilised,
discontinued and stalemate settled upon Galicia. In Poland, however, all was in constant motion. Ludendorff felt (without being in possession of positive evidence) that on October 5 the Russian flank extended as far north as Ivangorod and that therefore he would have to incline the axis of his advance that
way — a complex and time-consuming
re-
adjustment and a dangerous one too. for by turning north and extending along the Vistula the Germans incurred an everincreasing responsibility for clearing the western bank of the river in order to ensure the security of their rear: at the same time they further exposed their already vulnerable left flank, though this threat was mitigated by the thorough destruction of the railway between Warsaw and Lodz. Formations had to make sharp changes in direction and fresh arrangements had to be made for their supply and so it was not until October 8 that the advance could be resumed — thus giving the Russians all the more time to prepare
the bridges there and cross to the further bank'. Within 90 minutes of these orders being given, the picture at LudendorH's HQ changed lin. Now. the ai radio intercept said, uo less than seven Russian corps could be expected to concentrate on the vicinity of Warsaw by the llth. the very da) Mackensen hoped to be in a position to attack th< nthArmy was being asked to tackle the impossible and this was the time to admit n But Ludendorff could not bring himself to do so, for the Austrians were si ill advancing to the San and the Germans had yet to make a strong contact with the Russians. The reinforced XVII Corps was permitted seize
t
continue its advance on Warsaw, XX and Guard Reserve Corps were directed to clear the banks of the Vistula and XI ( 'or/is came under the command of the Austrian to
Army in order to stiffen the Austrians' resistance as they became strung out along the Vistula and to link Ninth Army's right with Conrad's left at the confluence with the San. At last, on the 10th, XV7/ Corps joined in action against a sizeable Russian force at Grojec and defeated it, but the richest prize yielded up by this battlefield came from the body of a dead Russian officer —
First
Lured on by the false Russian retreat, German forces stream on towards Warsaw reception. No sooner had the advance resumed, however, than an intercepted Russian radio message showed that Ivangorod was not, after all, the most northerly extent of the Russian flank; now it was shown to be a good 30 miles further north and so, after 14 hours further painful deliberation, there had to be yet another a
recasting of plans and groupings.
German ambitions were being deflected towards Warsaw, much further to their left than had ever been envisaged. For this reason Mackensen's XVII Corps took Frommel's corps under command in order, as writes, 'to find out what the at Warsaw was'. According to Ludendorff" s orders, however, there were 'no strong Russian forces, but many sick and wounded (rumour says 80,000)' at War-
Hoffmann
position
so Mackensen was, 'by a rapid thrust, to gain possession of Warsaw, to
saw and
nothing less than an Army Order which revealed the entire Russian plan. It came too late to permit full remedial measures. Already the Germans realised that the Russian Ninth and Fourth Armies were aggressively forcing bridgeheads over the Vistula between Kazimierz and Kozienice in efforts to widen the flanks of their existing fortress bridgehead at Ivangorod, and as preliminaries to an offensive against the German Ninth Army's right. The most desperate fighting broke out in which some, but not all, of the Russian incursions were eliminated. To quote Hoffmann: 'We did not succeed in forcing the III Caucasian
I
/ -Jtl 1
4
**
A
*
*
A German
patrol encounters opposition. Despite fierce hand-to-hand fighting, the Germans and Austrians were driven back from Warsaw, and mutual recriminations for this
defeat brought relations between the two allies to a
Corps
low ebb
recross the river at Kozienice. horrible at that time. It without intermission; it was im-
to
The weather was rained
possible to entrench in the saturated and flooded ground of the lowlands of the Vistula. The trails of the Russian guncarriages were literally in the Vistula, but
the Caucasians had set foot on the
bank and clung
to
it
left
fast.'
It could be added that the Russians suffered from as many disadvantages as the Germans, whom they out-fought. But the vital product of this Russian success was the establishment of a steadily widening lodgement on the German right flank at the very moment when the Germans were pressed in front and running short of reinforcements.
Schlieffen's ghost
At 1830 hours on October 11 Ludendorff conceded failure and ordered Mackensen to dig in and prepare to retreat. Yet Ludendorff had not yet given up, and throughout the 12th he searched hard for reinforcements to prolong the action. From the Western Front only one corps was available -the XXV Reserve -but that had to be sent to East Prussia where pressure 310
from the Russian Tenth Army was still intense. Falkenhayn's sole aim remained the defeat of the Allied armies, in the Race to the Sea and in the coming battles near Ypres: the ghost of the Schlieffen Plan lived on and gave priority to the west. So Ludendorff's hopes of relief turned on Conrad being able to cross the San and distract the Russians, but that day Conrad reported this to be impossible so long as the Russians had bridgeheads on the west bank (particularly the one at Ivangorodl. Each depended on the other and was ready to allot blame to the other for overall failure. In any case, snow had fallen in the Carpathian passes and Conrad's communications were almost washed out. He was prepared, however, to relieve those German troops south of the River Pilica thus releasing them for operations in the north, but this was not quick enough for Ludendorff who wanted to bring the Austrians north at once, under his command, for use near Warsaw. Since Ludendorff and Conrad could not reach agreement, the matter was raised to the highest level of all, but not even an appeal by Kaiser Wilhelm to the Emperor Franz Josef could change the Austrian determination to stay free of
German domination.
Despite the glaring evidence of his failure at Lemberg, Conrad remained in royal favour and his words carried weight when he stated: 'The flighty and rambling operations of the German Ninth Army have created the present difficult position.'
There had to be a compromise on Auswhereby the Germans at Ivangorod were relieved by the Austrians, after the Germans had left, on the theory that the Russians would then come out of Ivangorod and could be defeated in open comtrian terms
bat by the Austrians advancing, a little later, from the south. Hoffmann objected but in the end had to be satisfied with this naive arrangement. Slowly the Austrians advanced to take over at Ivangorod and slowly the Germans were released to shift northward to the Pilica in readiness for the oncoming Russian attack. Mackensen brooded over his left, perfectly aware from a stream of intercepted Russian messages that it was being threatened by a quite
overwhelming enemy force which was moving unchecked into an open space he could not
fill.
On October
19 he sent back
wounded and that night began to withdraw to the Pilica. The following night, as his
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the Austrians at last appeared close to Ivangorod. Ludendorff began to remove the Guard Reserve Corps from Ivangorod and side-step it to the Austrian left. It was now the Austrian's turn to see if they could eject the Russians from Ivangorod where the Germans had failed so dismally, and on the 22nd they were to try — and this despite a mounting threat to their right when, on the 18th, the Russians recrossed the San close to its mouth and
began pushing towards Krakow. At last Russian strength was close to its zenith. Not only was Second Army moving
Warsaw while Fifth from the city itself, but Fourth and Ninth Armies were rapidly expanding the Ivangorod bridgehead, filling the extra space made free by the German and Austrian withdrawal. Thus the Austrians had set themselves a greater task than the one which had already defeated the Germans, but for four days they were to go on trying to break-in — four days of fierce hand-to-hand combat among the woods during which the line freely to the west of
Army debouched
moved wards
fractionally
backwards
to the inevitable
Austrians.
German
and
for-
exhaustion of the accounts tend to be-
•
the Austrian effort since they failed achieve their aim, but nothing can diminish the bravery of men who tried for so long to achieve the impossible in appalling conditions. In any case the relationship between the Germans and Austrians was now stretched to breaking point, both ready to blame the other for shortcomings, neither ready to give whole-hearted co-operation, the Austrians determined to resist German dictation, and the Germans desperate to assert operational control over the Austrians. On the 20th Ludendorff had refused to leave German troops on the Austrian front and had extracted XI Corps from the Austrian First Army and despatched it to extend little
to
this, of course, had left; further weakened First Army's attack against Ivangorod. Yet this redeployment was only a stop-gap and barely in time at that, for on the 24th Frommel's Cavalry Corps on Mackensen's left had been driven in with the loss of 11 guns and it was only the arrival of XI Corps on the 25th which prevented a debacle. On the 26th Mackensen was forced to bend back his left still further as the pressure built up, and at 0900 hours
Mackensen's
Ludendorff was forced to tell him to come back a full 60 miles as quickly as he could. Then at 1300 hours the Germans monitored an Austrian order from Conrad, telling First Army to withdraw from Ivangorod, ending, 'but the German Reserve Corps is not to be informed of this until six o'clock this evening'. This caused great
German
indignation and a flurry of hot protests — but it also gave a convenient pretext for German accusations to the effect that the battle had been lost by a
premature
Austrian
withdrawal.
But
clearly the Austrians had only followed the
Germans' example, for on the 25th Ludendorff had ordered the preparation of a layback position on the line Kielce-Radom and now he ordered Guard Reserve, XX and Woyrseh's Corps to withdraw to that line, and be ready to support Mackensen's withdrawal as he struggled to retire to safety out of contact with the Russians.
Threat of invasion The renewed threat of a Russian invasion of Upper Silesia loomed large above the Germans, and in these circumstances Ludendorff had no alternative but to put the survival of
German
troops before the
311
-
of his ally. 'The general lines of the
were already familiar to the German troops. The retirement was to be retirement
carried out in a westerly direction if possible thereby escaping the enemy's
enveloping movement.' The unfortunate Austrians were thus left more and more to their own devices, First Army beginning to crumble as, for the second time in two months, it executed a precipitate withdrawal, in appalling weather. Feeling he had been left in the lurch, Conrad protested at the German withdrawal, though this was hardly consistent with his earlier reservations about the wisdom of the advance. More realistically, however, he made the general Austrian retirement conform to the German axis, using the Vistula as its centre line and directing his major forces to cover Krakow and Przemysl while sending only light forces into the Carpathians, to hold the passes, as winter conditions supervened. Ludendorff was by no means in the clear as yet, for Mackensen had still to be brought back to safety behind the Prialac and a renewed attack by the Russian Tenth Army on Eighth Army in East Prussia was
down troops there which would have been invaluable in south Poland. Indeed, Eighth Army was already suffering from tying
its
earlier disinclination to dig a fortified
line covering the frontier,
with Francois
forced into an uneconomical use of troops in offensive/defensive operations when, if he had made ready a properly dug line, he might actually have been able to reduce numbers at the front and spare reinforcefor Ninth Army. As it was, the Germans were once more forced to pull back onto their own sacred territory and fight a
ments
battle in the homeland between Lyck and Goldap. There was nothing but
costly
good sense in these persistent Russian attacks on East Prussia, since they were bound to prevent reinforcements being
German armies: the Germans from now on were dedicated to keeping their own soil inviolate. These
diverted to help other
Russian attacks also played unknowingly on a fault in the German command system, for
Francois reported direct to Falkenhayn
and Berlin and not
to
Hindenburg and was
therefore able to circumvent the latter's attempts to deprive him of reinforcements. In any case, Hindenburg and Ludendorff
could expect very
little
help from Falken-
hayn whose offensive against Ypres was just getting into its stride. The fact of the matter was that Germany had committed her entire army in the belief that a decision had to be reached at the outset of war. She (and her opponents of course) had yet to be convinced of the inevitability of a long war. Unfortunately, however, the ingredients of a decisive manoeuvre were already lacking: Germany no longer had a strong central reserve to tip the balance, and all Falkenhayn could send to Ludendorff when he called for help on the 27th were '40,000 trained men without officers and with only a few non-commissioned officers'. The Russians now smelt victory. For once, accurate reports were arriving of the successive lines of defence the Germans were throwing up — one as far back as Czestochowa. Before their eyes they could see the debilitation of the Austrians. Colonel Knox the British Attache visited the church at Zvolen shortly after the Austrians had withdrawn and wrote: 'The place is infected with typhoid. The church is full of Austrian wounded — nearly all Magyars who cannot speak much German. These poor people have been without anything to eat for two to three days; the smell in the church is dreadful. These poor devils were no doubt quite healthy three months ago. Now they have been torn from their homes
and dragged to a foreign country, made to stand up before the enemy's bullets, and finally left by their own people, mutilated, to die of starvation. This is war.' On the German front the retreat was more methodical because the eventuality had always been in Ludendorff 's mind and his organisation was ready. Moreover his fertile mind was already thinking ahead to find a way to turn the tables on the Russians after they had been drawn into the communication desert he intended to create in southern Poland. If the Russians could be lured to the fullest extent of their communications in the south and the German army then transferred northward to Thorn it might be possible to attack those same Russian armies in flank and rear. But first the withdrawal from Poland had to be completed. Unlike Schlieffen, Ludendorff possessed a glimmer of political insight and so he was aware that, in the Poles, the Germans had
a potential ally — or at least a neighbouring people who hated the Russians even more than they disliked the Germans. Hence the German plan of destruction in Poland as they withdrew stopped short of absolute scorched earth. They merely concentrated upon rendering the railways and roads quite inoperative to a depth of 120 miles, calculating that no modern army could
advance more than 100 miles beyond base without such communications.
its
The Germans did their work with systematic thoroughness — so much so in fact that at times their own withdrawal became threatened as bridges in their rear were prematurely demolished. The German
offensive
was
at an end.
By
the end of October all the earlier gains had been given up — and more, for this time the Austrians had to withdraw almost as far as Krakow, once more leaving Przemysl completely isolated. But the Russians also had their difficulties. Colonel Knox saw for himself what prevented the Russians from overtaking their defeated enemy as he followed their advance into Poland in pursuit of foes who seemed to have vanished. 'Everything goes to show that the Russians marched beyond the effective range of their supply columns. The result was that horses died in harness, and only the extraordinary endurance of the men and the disorganisation of the Austrians and their consequent inability to counterattack saved the Russian army from disintegration. No less than 1,500 horses were sent to a single Corps. The men had to drag the guns for several days.' Nevertheless the Russians had reason to be pleased with themselves, while the leaders of the Central Powers were soured by a welladvertised set-back (even though they might try to disguise it under the title of 'a strategic withdrawal'). Hoffmann, who could not escape responsibility for much of what had transpired, might call the affair 'the finest operation of the whole war', but Conrad, who ought to have been first in a desire for success and was churlish in his criticism, was nevertheless closer to the truth when he commented that Hindenburg's operations were 'in the highest degree wild and ill-considered' and 'a gross misconception'. [For Kenneth Macksey's
page
biography,
245.
Forced back
own fortified areas man a machine gun post
to their
again. Austrians
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