THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD Archbishop Mitty High School Media Center
5000 San
Way CA 95129
Mitty
Jose,
VOLUME TWO 1914-15
12876
THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD Editor-in-Chief Brigadier Peter
Young
Board Barker; Dr. John Bradley
Editorial
Lt.-Col. A. J.
Professor John Erickson; Lt.-Cdr. Peter Kemp John Keegan; Kenneth Macksey; S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard; Norman Stone Revision Editor
Mark Dartford
MARSHALL CAVENDISH NEW YORK, LONDON, TORONTO
Editorial Staff Young
Editor
Brigadier Peter
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Kenneth Macksey
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Lt.-Col. A.
J.
Barker
Dr. John Bradley Prof. John Erickson Lt.-Cdr. Peter Kemp
John Keegan S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard
Norman Stone Military Consultants
Reference Edition Published 1984 Published by Marshall Cavendish Corporation 147 West Merrick Road Freeport, Long Island N.Y. 11520 Printed and
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Marshall Cavendish Limited 1984 B.P.C. Publishing 1970 now a Division of Macdonald and
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Barrie Pitt
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The Marshall Cavendish illustrated encyclopedia of World War One. 1. World War, 1914-1918 II. Pitt, Barrie I. Young, Peter, 1915III.
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ISBN 0-86307-181-3
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Contents of Volume 2 313 Japan Declares Ian Nish
War
All Poles and Czechs Otto Pick
475 Germany:
320 Tsingtao Terence Wise
Leo Kahn 481 Serbia: The September Campaign Leo Kahn 484 Serbia: The Second Onslaught
330 The British at Tsingtao C. T. Atkinson 334 Clearing the Pacific Christopher Dowling 341
Josephine
Goeben and Breslau
Richard Wright 348 South Africa rebellion and invasion
—
Patrick Scrivenor
—
354 East Africa fiasco at Tanga Major R. J. Sibley
—
West Africa seizing German Colonies David Chandler 366 The Role of the Neutrals 361
Rodney de Bruin 369 Sinking of the Aboukir, Cressy Richard Milton
Hogue and
374 The Siege of Antwerp Christopher Duffy
384 First Battle of Ypres Brigadier Anthony Farrar-Hockley 397 Turkey enters the war
405
409
416 425 435
John Stephenson British and French war aims D. R. Shermer German war aims Imanuel Geiss The Emden's last cruise /. Lionel Fanthorpe Turkey: The unknown quantity A. J. Barker Britain, India and the Middle East /.
Stephenson
442 Mesopotamia: the advance to Basra Gregory Blaxland
454 The Second Battle of Warsaw Norman Stone 460 Lodz 468
Norman Stone War in the Mediterranean Peter
Kemp
A New Strategy
Newcombe
490 November in Galicia Norman Stone 499 The Campaign in Armenia Eugene Hinterhoff
504 Economic Rivalries A. S. Mil ward
593 The Winter Carpathian Campaign Norman Stone
509 The Battle of Coronel
598 The Winter Battle in Masuria Norman Stone
Barrie Pitt
519 Converging of the Fleets
David Mason 526 The Battle of the Falkland Islands David Mason 537 The Air War D. B. Tubbs 544 The Battle of Limanowa- Lapanow
Norman Stone 552 The Christmas Truce Henry Williamson
560
War
Plans for 1915 Brigadier C. N. Barclay
Ian
First
Gas Attack
Hogg
612 The Capture of Memel Peter Fiala
614 Winter Fighting O. C. Taslauanu 616 Przemysl: Siege and Surrender Christopher Duffy 621 The Bombardment of the East Coast David Chandler 626 The Battle of the Dogger Bank
Paul Kennedy 636 The Dogger Bank: A German View Paul Kennedy and Oskar Eckert
War at Home Arthur Mar wick
565 The
577 Trench Warfare
638 The First Zeppelin Raids
John Keegan 589 Preconceptions of /. F. Clarke
609 Bolimow and the
War
John Edgcumbe 646 Bombs on Southend
1914 SEPT
3
French government quits Paris for Bordeaux. Russians capture Lemburg. Battle of the
8
2nd Austrian invasion of Serbia
10
1st
Rava Russkaya. Russians
11
Battle of 1st
22
1st British
6 9
fails.
Masurian Lakes.
Battle of the
13
OCT
Marne.
5
isolate Przemysl.
Battle of the Aisne.
warships torpedoed.
Germans force Russians back Germans take Antwerp.
in
Poland and Galicia.
of Ypres.
11
1st Battle
12
Germans withdraw ten miles outside Warsaw. Germans retreat from Warsaw.
21
NOV
1
Battle of Coronel. Russia declares
2
Germans
from Poland. Russia invades
retreat
Prussia. British
Navy mines North
Sea.
5
Great Britain and France declare war on Turkey.
9
Sydney-Emden engagement.
11
3rd Austrian invasion of Serbia
22
British take Basra.
DEC
war on Turkey.
fails.
2
Austrians take Belgrade.
3
Serbians force Austrians out of Serbia.
4 18
Battle of the Falkland Islands.
Egypt becomes British protectorate.
1915 JAN
Dogger Bank.
23
Battle of
31
Germans use gas
in
winter battle of the Masurian
Lakes.
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
18
declare British waters to be war zone.
19
British raid
28
Germans
on Dardanelles.
retreat
from Upper Poland.
blockade Germany.
1
Allies
3
Allies repulsed in Dardanelles.
14
Battle of Saint Eloi.
18
4 French and British warships sunk
22
Przemysl taken by Russians.
12
Turks
22
2nd Ypres, Germans use
fail
in
Dardanelles.
to take Basra.
gas.
and Anzac forces land
25
British
26
Treaty of London signed between Britain, France, Russia to cede territory to Italy on her joining Allies.
in Gallipoli.
4
Austro-German offensive on Russians between Gorlice and Tarnow.
7
Lusitania torpedoed
9
French and British campaigns begin
23
JUN
Germans
Italy declares
in Atlantic. in
war on Austria-Hungary.
2
Germans take Przemysl.
3
British
occupy Amara.
22
Austrians re-take Lernbcrg.
23
1st
Battle of Isonzo.
Flanders.
DECLARES When Japan
declared war on Germany in August 1914, it was partly to repay Germany for the humiliation Japan had suffered at German hands over Port Arthur and the Kiaochow Peninsula, but also to gain an important foothold on the Chinese mainland, vital if the growing Japanese economy was not to be starved of raw materials and outlets for its trade. In this article, Ian Nish draws together the reasons for Japan's entry into the war and vividly describes the course of events leading up to the Japanese ultimatum to Germany and the declaration of war. Below: Burning oil tanks on the Chinese mainland. Essential raw materials such as oil were unavailable on the Japanese islands in sufficient quantity to support a
booming industrial
.
.
state
.
V
uf W *', #pF*iP***'-*;
?%,..
!
*
.
&
'*•**-•'
When Japan went
to war with Germany in August 1914. it was the third war in which she had been engaged in two decades. She had fought the Chinese in 1894 on the soil of Korea and Manchuria and gained from the peace settlement of Shimonoseki April L895) a large section of the Liaotung peninsula, an important strategic area in south Manchuria which includes the towns of Port Arthur and Dairen. But Russia, France and Germany had stepped in, made threatening gestures, and offered the I
'friendly advice' that the peninsula should be returned to China. Japan, which had been exhausted by the war, agreed in the end to give back Liaotung and received a
money indemnity from China in return. The intervention of the powers was a bitter experience for the rapidly developing Japanese nation. The fact that Germany, who had only minor interests in
area, had joined with Russia and France and that her minister. Baron von Gutschmidt, had presented a memorandum which was more offensive in tone than those of his partners, rankled with the Japanese and was to have some bearing on the events of 1914.
the
In 1904 Japan made war on Russia, primarily on account of the Liaotung lease which the Russians had acquired from China in 1898. It was doubly humiliating for Japan to be deprived of the territory and then to see it taken by her principal enemy, Russia. The Japanese gained command of the seas by making a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur before war had been declared. Using this advantage, the Japanese transported their troops through Korea, which had concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan, to Manchuria, the main battleground. There they won the large-scale battle of Liaoyang in September and after a long siege captured Port Arthur in January 1905. At the battle of Mukden in March, 400,000 troops were thrown into the fray and the Manchu capital was taken. The Japanese, however, realised that Russia had resources of manpower, as well as munitions and weapons, which Japan did not possess, and also had the Trans-Siberian railway with which to convey them to the Far East. Thus they were in favour of holding on to the ground they had acquired and suing for peace. But before this could happen, the Japanese
t
navy under Admiral Togo defeated the Russian Baltic fleet in a battle in the Japan Sea (Tsushima) on May 28, 1905, sinking six battleships, four cruisers, five destroyers and capturing five other vessels of war. Despite Japan's successes on land and her resounding naval victory, the war had brought the Japanese government to
realise the country's limitations. Japan could only fight the war with the aid of foreign capital. She depended on a number of war loans amounting to £82,000,000. For a short war her resources were adequate; but, when the war dragged on for 18 months, she found that she had fought herself to a standstill. Her economy and her manpower were severely strained, while Russia had untapped reserves of men, money and arms. Whether or not Russia would have found it so easy to transfer them to the east is an open question; but it was not a risk which the Japanese general staff was prepared to take. Thus Japan won the battles, but her victory in the war was limited and her success in the peace settlement was a disappointment to her people.
The peace conference was held, through the good offices of President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in August 1905. Russia promised not to interfere again in Korea and agreed to transfer to Japan the Chinese territory of Liaotung for the remainder of her lease, and to hand over without compensation her railway line from Port Arthur to Changchun, together with all its rolling stock. Although the railway was in a shambles as a result of the war, it was a tremendous gain for the Japanese and went some way towards atoning for their failure to secure a war indemnity. Japan became a world power as a result of her victory over Russia. In Europe and in Asia she had established her reputation as a military power. In Europe she was popular for having exposed the weakness of the unpopular Russia. In Asia she enjoyed the prestige of having defeated a white army. But the difficulties which her wartime experiences had revealed were only imperfectly understood outside Japan. Since she had failed to secure an indemnity from the Russians as part of the peace
-
- -
"
-•-
settlement and found it impossible to raise foreign loans for her national rehabilitation at economic rates, she was forced to draw in her belt after the war. An economic depression set in during 1907 and continued until 1910. It was a time of increased taxation; and the campaign of the militant party politicians in parliament against heavy taxes was sufficiently successful to curb any excesses in government expenditure. Thus, whatever Japan's inclinations after her military victory, the immediate postwar years turned out to be years of retrenchment, and not of expansion.
Two valuable footholds Japan took as one of her first need
to consolidate
priorities the her position in the two
areas where she had positively benefited from the war. In Manchuria she set up the semi-nationalised South Manchurian Railway Company as the instrument of economic development. In Korea, which had been occupied by her armies for strategic reasons during the war, she set up a protectorate after the war. This protectorate did not involve much interference in Korean affairs under the first governor-
Marquis Ito Hirobumi; but it became increasingly rigorous after Ito's assassination by a Korean in October 1909. Finally in August of the following year the Japanese government decided to annex Korea and add it to its colonial empire. Thus, Japan had acquired two valuable footholds on continental Asia and had become virtually the most dominant force in the commerce of north-eastern China. Japan wanted international recognition general,
her newly-acquired territories. Instead she found that her methods and policies in Manchuria — and to a lesser extent in Korea — led her into commercial disputes with other powers. In order to prevent these getting out of hand. Japan negotiated a series of treaties with most of the important world powers. She signed an agreement with Russia in 1907 which defined the spheres of influence of the two for
signatories in Manchuria. The treaty was in 1910 and 1912. This had the incidental effect of overcoming any spirit of revenge which the Russians might have harboured, and thus eliminated the possi- c bility of a renewed Russo-Japanese conflict. Japan also reached an agreement 1
renewed
~**fc.
covering the Par Kast with Russia's European ally. France. Si nee Japan was already Britain's ally, she now had understandings with all tlu- Entente Powers of Europe, Britain, Prance ami Russia. Rut it would not he reasonable to conclude from this that Japan had joined the Entente'. Japanese diplomacy at this time was
concerned only with the Far East; and her obligations should not be understood to extend to Europe. On the other hand, she was more than a Far Eastern power: she had become a Pacific power. As a result of this, there were recurrent crises with the United States from 1906 onwards about apanese emigration to California. The issue gave rise to war scares in both countries but was handled with good sense and coolness by both governments. An attempt was made during 1908 in two arrangements to hold public opinion in check; but they were only partially successful in reducing American- Japanese tension, which remained a constant feature of the Far Eastern scene for some years to come. These fears about Japanese emigration were shared by Britain's dominions, especially Australia and Canada. But the Japanese were always determined not to confuse 'top-line' policy, namely the alliance which they had with Britain, and 'second-line' policy, such as the minor issues arising from local emigration disputes. The leaders spoke of the British alliance as the marrow of their policy. The alliance, which was originally signed in 1902 and renewed in 1905 (during the final stages of the Russo-Japanese war) was renewed again in 1911. When one partner to the alliance was attacked by another power, the 1911 alliance imposed an obligation upon the other partner to go to the aid of the first. Its purview did not extend beyond the Far East and India; its duration was to be ten years. The British intention when signing the 1911 alliance was to exclude from its scope the United States, with whom Britain hoped shortly to conclude an arbitration treaty. This seemed to weight the alliance rather in favour of Britain: whereas Japan was obliged to go to Britain's aid in many eventualities, Britain was not compelled to go to Japan's aid in the eventuality, which particularly troubled Japanese I
of hostilities between Japan and the United States. For this reason, the alliance came increasingly under attack in strategists,
Japan from 1911 onwards, though the governments of the day were unquestioning supporters of the alliance which had brought Japan world status and given her a foothold in the white world of respectability. The existence of the AngloJapanese alliance did not mean, however, that the two partners had — or could be expected to have — identical policies in respect, for example, of the most important issue of the day — China.
Revolution in China In October 1911 an army mutiny occurred at Wuchang, and this touched off the spark of revolution in China. Within three months the Manchu dynasty which had ruled China for two and a half centuries had been overturned, and a republic set up under President Yuan Shih-kai. Yuan had been anti-Japanese throughout his career, and the Japanese were highly suspicious of him. Thus when the south rose up against him in July/August 1913 316
what is generally described as the 'second revolution', many Japanese supported the southern armies. This was the work of the pro-south party in Japan, who supplied arms and money to the southern leaders and, after the failure of the rising, arranged asylum in Japan for the refugees.
in
Although it was under strong pressure from the pro-south party, the Japanese government maintained a studied neutrality to Yuan's republic until the Nanking incident, in which a few Japanese nationals were killed. Many Japanese called for a positive policy after this but, while the government called for retribution
against the general responsible for the crime, it was content with Yuan's apology. The consequence of these revolutionary outbreaks was to destroy central government in China. The chaos that ensued attracted the Japanese who wished to improve Japan's position on the Chinese mainland. Whereas her sphere of interest had hitherto been in Manchuria where she controlled the monopolistic South Man-
churian Railway, Japan now began to show
an interest
in railway-building and in industrial enterprises farther south. The Japanese consolidated their political support of the south by entering into commercial bargains. But they could only enter into the traditionally British sphere in the Yangtse valley at the risk of incurring British hostility. From 1913 on-
wards there was much animosity between Britain and Japan over the latter's apparent encroachments into that area. The government, careful of Japan's weak international position, did not press matters against an unwilling Britain. But there were others in Japan who were calling for a more forceful line. The merchant houses and industrialists, knowing that Japan was a country without great natural resources, saw what a valuable contribution China's raw materials could make to the Japanese economy. There were also the expansionists who thought it politic to abet the activities of the Chinese opposition leader, Sun Yat-sen. Army leaders also kept close contact with all parts of China, largely through Chinese who had gone to Japan for their military training. There were, therefore, many influential
groups in Japan, anxious to profit from China's condition of chaos. The government was restrained, however, by the presence of vigilant foreign powers who supported Yuan.
The advent of war On August 4, 1914, Britain declared war on Germany. The question immediately arose whether the European war would spread as far as British and German naval power extended, that is, to the Far East and the Both powers made declarations in the hope of preventing hostilities being extended to the Far East or the status quo there being interfered with. The Germans told Japan that their East Asian squadron would be instructed to avoid hostile acts against Britain provided Japan remained neutral. Britain, for her part, initially held similar hopes. On August 1, when Grey was telling Japan that, if Britain did intervene it would be on the side of France and Russia, he added that he did not expect that Britain would have to call on Japan for assistance, since the war was unlikely to spread to her area. These preliminary views of Germany and Britain were the Pacific'.
result of wishful thinking, however. It is doubtful whether the war could have been excluded from the Far East or the Pacific, when it so speedily developed into an allout war. The next problem was for Japan to establish her exact obligations under the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The most recent alliance treaty had been signed in 1911 and had laid down that Japan would be required to go to the assistance of her ally if British possessions were attacked by a third power. Since the treaty was limited to the Far East, Japan's obligation would only take effect in the event of an attack on Britain's colonial possessions there, Hongkong and Weihaiwei. Britain told Japan that, in such circumstances, 'we should rely on your support'. The Japanese cabinet met to discuss this question on August 4 and decided that Japan would maintain a strict neutrality towards a European war but, 'in the event of an attack on Hongkong or Weihaiwei or a similar concrete act of aggression, the Imperial Government will be ready at once to support His Majesty's Government if called upon'. The implication seemed to be that Japan would not involve herself in the war, unless Britain asked her to do so. The possibility that Japan might have turned her back on the British alliance and associated herself with the German side does not seem to have been considered seriously. Before the war Japan's attitude towards Germany had been correct without being friendly. But there were grounds for resentment against the Germans. For one thing, the actions of the German minister, Baron von Gutschmidt, in urging Japan to abandon Port Arthur in 1895 had not been forgotten. For another, the Kaiser had during the Russo-Japanese war spoken passionately of the dangers of the 'Yellow Peril'. His remarks had been widely reported in Japan and had been interpreted as being a deliberate affront to her. Nonetheless steps had been taken by Germany to improve relations between the two '
countries. Visits by prominent German leaders had been arranged in the hope, as it was expressed, of winning over the Japanese nation to a more friendly conception of the German Empire. It had been
hoped that the German Crown Prince would visit Japan at the conclusion of his Far Eastern tour in 1910, but he had to give up this intention because of the plague in China. Thus, when the German ambassador, Baron Mumm von Schwarzenberg, left Japan in 1911 at the end of five years, he confessed that he had not been very successful. His successor, Count Rex, faced the same problem. He could rely on certain groups for support: senior army officers and university professors were in many cases German-trained and German-speaking and were well disposed to Germany. The fact remains, however, that successive Japanese governments kept their distance from the Germans. Although the Japanese government an-
nounced its intention of remaining neutral, there were indications that the Japanese navy was ready for action against Ger-
many. The cruiser squadrons at
at
Sasebo and
Masampo
in the south of Korea were to be prepared for war. Indeed
reported there were indications that Japan was more willing to enter the war than her diplomatic statements seemed to suggest.
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JAPAN 1905
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Meanwhile the British Admiralty had been surveying the situation and had found that the British and German squadrons in the west Pacific were so evenly matched that could result in serious damage to British trade in the area. On Admiralty advice, the British government came to the conclusion that Japan should be asked to help in dealing with German marauding raids on British shipping. In a message on August 6, which represented a complete volte face on the part of Britain, Grey told the Japanese: As our warships will require some time to locate and destroy the German warships in Chinese waters it is essential that the Japanese should hunt out and
this
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Port Arthur
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1
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Ceded to Japan
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German Territory Treaty Ports International Ports
destroy German armed merchant cruisers who are attacking our commerce now. If the
Japanese Government would employ some of their warships in this way it would be of the very greatest assistance to us. It means of course an act of war against Germany but we do not see how this is to be avoided. Japan's naval role, as envisaged in this message, was a minor one and did not appeal to the Japanese navy. While it was to be concerned with chasing commerce raiders, the Royal Navy would in due course deal with the main strength of the German squadron. But Britain's request also had implications which went far beyond naval considerations.
Top
left: Japan and the Chinese mainland From 1842 onwards the European powei scrambled for concessions on the Chit coast, and in the harbours of the gre Japan found herself excluded and markets vital to her grown a war involving the Europe, inevitable that she would finI
side or the other
in
an
atte
(hold
on the Chinese mainland Japanese war was th. strength. Delegates gat Peace Conference of 1 is
flanked
!
-
representative officers pose tog after the fall of Porl established herself
•se
vorld
Right: Admiral Togo, the victor of Tsushima,
was more than any other man instrumental
in
raising Japan to the status of a world power. Far right: Port Arthur, Japan's great bone of
contention with Russia. Below left: Two Russian vessels on the bottom after Togo's raid of January 1905, on Port Arthur. Below right Native troops training under German instructors. German possessions in the Pacific continually worried the Japanese with the spectre of encirclement
The Japanese prime minister, Count Okuma, considering that an emergency now existed, called a cabinet meeting in
pm on the following After a long session, the cabinet decided to take a part in the war. The strongest advocate of this course was the foreign minister, Baron Kato. He argued persuasively that Japan should use this opportunity to drive Germany out of her base of Tsingtao and from her Pacific islands and thereby improve Japan's standing in the world. To those who said that it was uncertain who would be victorious in the war, he replied that Japan had nothing to lose. To the question whether an attack on Tsingtao would not violate China's neutrality, he countered that there was time enough to be worried about that. He. won the Cabinet round to the view that Japan's best policy in the new emergency was to enter the war on the side of the Entente. On the next day, this decision was placed before the Elder Statesmen. (The Elder Statesmen, the Genrb, were an extra-constitutional body of statesmen who had brought about the Meiji restoration, and as such wielded enormous power. They were the Emperor's personal advisers, and as it was restricted to the original members, the body gradually died out.) Although they were not sure about the timing of Japan's entry, they did not object to it in principle. Thus within 36 hours of Grey's request, the Japanese had agreed to enter the war. his residence at 10
day.
Consternation in Britain On August 9 Kato told Britain that it would not be possible to limit Japan's actions to defending merchant ships, but that she would have to destroy German power wherever it lay and that she would have to take part on a broad front. This reply
created
consternation
in
Britain.
Grey replied that he believed that for the present acts of war in the Far East would be restricted to the sea alone and that it was desirable to keep it so: Britain would therefore 'refrain for the present from invoking action under the Treaty'. This was to cancel Britain's appeal of August 6 for help and to reject the formal decision of the Japanese cabinet. Behind Grey's rejoinder there were several influences: Britain did not welcome any military action by Japan against China; nor did she look favourably on any Japanese attack on Germany's island possessions in the Pacific. Moreover Grey was under some pressure from Britain's own dominions, from the Dutch and from the United States to prevent Japanese expansion into the central and southern Pacific area. Kato, far from being cowed, pressed ahead with the negotiations. Grey, there-
took the view that it was hardly likely that Japan would reverse her decision and tried to make the best of a bad job. He invited Kato to subscribe to a joint AngloJapanese note to China, stating that fore,
318
Japanese action in the war would not extend beyond the China seas to the Pacific Ocean nor to any foreign territory with the exception of territory on the continent of Asia which was in German occupation. Grey was clearly anxious lest Japan should go on to attack China. While Japan was prepared to make a statement of a vague character, she was not agreeable to making the blanket declaration which Grey suggested. Grey had to concede that Japan alone had the right to decide for herself what action to take, especially after the
German ambassador
Tokyo had used abusive language to Kato on August 9. Kato claimed that the ultimatum to in
Germany
could not be longer delayed, as the matter would leak out. Also, military preparations had been made, and imperial sanction received. So, without reaching any agreement about the restrictions within which Japan's action would take place, Japan moved to the final, crucial stage. The cabinet met on August 15 to approve the
ultimatum, which was endorsed
at
an
Imperial conference in the afternoon. At 7 pm it was handed to the German ambassador, Count Rex. Since the latter was not in telegraphic contact with his home government, the ultimatum was also delivered via Japanese diplomatic channels in Berlin on August 17. To allow for the difficulty of delivering the ultimatum, Japan gave the Germans until noon on August 23 to reply, a longer time than is generally allowed. The Japanese ulti-
matum
called on
Germany:
• To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn; and • To deliver not later than September 15 to
Japan the entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China. The only safeguard which China received from this was in the promise to restore the territory eventually to China.
But the Chinese who had already been negotiating with the Germans for direct restoration to them had little faith in
Japanese good intentions. Yet Japan professed to be acting in the interests of China in getting rid of the
German
lease.
Later
Kato was to claim that Japan was not committed by any specific agreement to return the Kiaochow lease to China. Japanese ambitions in China were beginning to bear
fruit.
While Britain called for some statement on the geographical limitations of Japan's actions, Japanese statesmen were studiously evasive in their public pronouncements. In a long-awaited public speech on August 18, Premier Okuma gave the
assurance that: Japan's object
is to
elimin-
from continental China the root of German influence which forms a constant menace to the peace of the Far East and
ate
thus to secure the aim of the alliance with Great Britain. She harbours no design for territorial aggrandisement and entertains no desire to promote any other selfish ends.
did not act in accordance with Britain's wishes but to attain her own ends. In his writings Kato makes clear that his first aim was 'to build up even more Japan's position in the east', that is, he was seeking status for his country in the
by improving her trade, by showing her naval prowess and by capturing territories. An equally important end was to use the opportunity to improve Japan's position in China and Manchuria. Pacific area
In this sense, the declaration of war against Germany was a symbol of the start of a more expansionist phase of Japanese continental policy. Kato's views were generally shared and were adopted by the cabinet; but there
were also many who had grave doubts about Japan's unilateral declaration of war against Germany. Had Japan chosen the right side? It was a gamble; and not everyone had the abounding confidence of Kato. There were critics of the timing. Was necessary to plunge the country so rapidly into the war? Could she not afford to wait awhile? There were those who distrusted Japan's exclusive attachment to Britain. Large sections of the Japanese population were pro-German; these views were particularly deep-rooted among lawyers, professors, army officers and journalists. So there were important bodies of dissent who were influential in policymaking circles. And the opposition parties were quick to seize on their arguments in order to attack the government's decision. So Japan had once again become involved in a major war; and the story had come full circle. Japan went to war against Germany for a variety of motives, of which hostility towards Germany was a comparatively minor one. These motives, these ambitions, had been manifested gradually in the decade since the Russo-Japanese war. There was her maturing interest in all aspects of China which was very much in evidence in the years preceding the war. It came as no surprise therefore that she wanted to take over the German territory and to entrench herself in north China. 1914 was a golden opportunity to further her interests when her European rivals there were compelled to be inactive. It can be said that it was China who paid Japan's price for her entry into the First World War. Then there was the seemingly intractable issue of the increases in tinarmy and navy estimates. It was easier to justify these to the population at largo after Japan had entered the war alongside some of the world's leading powers and had made substantial gains in its early stages How these gains were achieved we nuist it
the United States. Such statements cannot be expected to be free of ambiguities; and Okuma's was deliberately vague on a
acquired at the end of the 19th Century. In October the Japanese navy took the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana islands, groups of islands lying to the north of the equator. For Japan to occupy permanently a girdle of islands strategically placed in the western Pacific, was welcome neither to the Americans nor to Australia and New Zealand. Japan knew, however, that Britain was so dependent on her help in this area of the globe that she would avoid
number
any dispute.
Japan's warlike operations will not therefore extend beyond the limits necessary for the attainment of that object and for the defence of her own legitimate interests. This was the nearest that Japan came to issuing a statement of war aims at this stage of the war, and was clearly intended to reassure opinion abroad, especially in
of points. did not in any case reach London in time to prevent the publication in the British press on August 18 of a remarkable statement, purporting to set out Britain's understanding of the limits within which Japan would act on entry into the war: she understood that Japan's action would not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China seas, nor beyond Asiatic waters west of the China seas. For the British Foreign Office to issue such a deliberate, unilateral statement was a considerable rebuff to the Japanese, and a revelation of the weaknesses within the But the Anglo-Japanese partnership. Japanese continued to refuse to give specific assurances about their objects if they entered the war. No reply was received from the Germans by August 23, and Japan accordingly declared war. Within three days she commenced operations against the German fortress of Tsingtao, but before this fell, the Japanese had taken action against the Pacific islands which Germany had It
Japan seeking status The person who brought Japan
into the war was her strong-willed foreign minister, Baron Kato. He was confident that final victory would go to the Entente Powers but that, even if that were not so, Japan would not stand to suffer much. He was an anglophile and a fervent believer in the
Anglo- Japanese alliance. Indeed, he professed to be taking Japan into the war in fulfilment of Japan's obligations under that alliance. It was perhaps permissible to make this claim in commending to the public a course which was not altogether palatable, but it is historically unsound. Japan was not under an obligation to go to war unless Hongkong or Weihaiwei were attacked, and this did not take place. Britain specifically asked for Japanese assistance, but later positively withdrew the request. Britain tried to limit the range of Japanese activities, and she disliked many aspects of Japan's campaign against Tsingtao. It has to be concluded that Japan
now
see.
Further Reading R. H., Woodrow Wilson and the Far East (New York 1952) La Fargue, T. E., China and the World W.u (Stanford 1937) Millard, T. F., Democracy and the Eastern Fifield,
Question (New York 1919) IAN NISH was educated
He saw
at
Edinburgh and London
in Japan during the He has taught Far at the University of Sydney and the of Economics, and is author of The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and The Story ot Japan
Universities
postwar Allied Eastern history London School
service
occupation
319
1
TSINGTAO Japan's main contribution to the Allied cause on her entry into the war was the reduction of the German base of Tsingtao on the Chinese coast, together with the capture of some German islands north of the equator. The weather during the siege was appalling, and despite their great numerical superiority, it took the Japanese over a month of concentrated effort to reduce the well-fortified stronghold. Below: A creek liberally strewn with barbed wire — part of the natural defensive position much strengthened by the Germans
Terence Wise
When Great
Britain declared war on Germany, Japan promptly offered to assist her ally and on August 15 delivered an ultimatum to the Germans, ordering them to withdraw their warships from Eastern waters and surrender 'without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow' in the Shantung province of
China. The ultimatum was ignored and Japan declared war on August 23. Four days later a Japanese fleet was blockading the bay of Kiaochow. To understand the full significance of this action one must go back to March 1898 when Kiaochow and surrounding territory were leased to Germany for 99 years by the Chinese. Possession of Kiaochow gave Germany domination of the Yellow Sea, and meant the exclusion of Japanese influence from the mainland of Asia. Previously, in 1884, Germany had seized the Marshall Islands and part of New Guinea, leading to the eventual annexation of the Solomon Islands and Bismarck Archipelago. In 1899 the Palau, Mariana and Caroline Islands were purchased from Spain and in the same year the Samoan islands of Upolu and Savaii were ceded to Germany. Thus by the turn of the century Germany had established a network of bases that spanned the Pacific. Of prime importance among these possessions was Kiaochow, where lurked a strong naval squadron that threatened world trade routes in the Far East and played an important part in Germany's aim to become the dominant power in Europe, which involved challenging the naval supremacy of Britain.
Kiaochow was chosen to become an example of the best of German colonialism, and so a new city was built on the tip of the peninsula that shields the bay. The city, Tsingtao, was set out in European style with broad, tree-lined streets, beautiful public buildings and gardens, schools for the natives, smart cafes, beer gardens and the best hotels in Asia. With its excellent climate and sandy beaches Tsingtao soon earned a new name — the Riviera of the Far East. Trade boomed, a railway line was built and a commercial harbour with building yards and dry docks was constructed. Germany was justly proud of her
Chinese protectorate. In 1902 Japan signed a treaty of alliance with Great Britain and Tsingtao suddenly became a trap — a trap that could not be sprung without Germany losing face. Millions had been lavished on the building of the city: in the next decade many more millions were spent on its defence. The peninsula on which Tsingtao stands is spanned by two ranges of low hills divided by a wide valley. On the hills nearest the city the Germans constructed three ferro-concrete forts, protected on each flank by open batteries of 4- and 6inch guns. Moltke and litis forts were each armed with two 9-4-inch guns; Bismarqk fort, on the highest hill and in a commanding position at the centre of the peninsula, was armed with four 11-inch howitzers. Hsiao-ni-wa fort was built on a promontory to the south-east of the city and was equipped with two 9. 4- inch and three 6- inch guns in revolving turrets, with a searchlight that could be raised or lowered on a lift. Other batteries of 6and 9. 4- inch guns were positioned on promontories along both sides of the peninsula. The valley of the Hai Po river four miles
north-east of Tsingtao is over a mile wide with bare, sloping sides that meet in a marshy bottom. Narrowed by the Hai Po river and inlets on the opposite side, the valley bottom measures only four miles in
chow. Sufficient stores to last a year were stockpiled and although the water supply was liable to be cut off, there were wells and a distilling plant inside the city. A large shipment of ammunition, on its way
length, offering the best site for a main defence line. However, it had one major fault — Tsingtao was only about four miles away. This lack of depth meant that once the Hai Po line fell the entire peninsula
when war was
was lost. Towards the bottom
of the slope from the bed a line of six concrete redoubts was constructed, each 200 yards long and armed with field guns and machine guns. Trenches strengthened by machine gun posts linked the redoubts together and the whole was backed by a reserve trench. Two hundred yards in front of the redoubts the earth was cut away to form an escarpment, whose face was revetted. At its base a 10-foot- wide ditch was dug from sea to sea and filled with barbed-wire entanglements strengthened by sharpened stakes. Just in front of the wire a 6-foot-high wall was built and for some distance beyond the area was strewn profusely with land mines. In the middle of the minefield was an electrified fence that when tampered with would set off the mines around it. The whole belt of obstacles could be swept by searchlights at night. The third defence line on the second range of hills north-east of Tsingtao and beyond che river was dominated by Prinz Heinrich Hill, a 1,200-foot-high crescentshaped peak on the eastern side of the peninsula. At this point the peninsula is 12 miles wide, impossible to man with the garrison available, and consequently the hills were to be used only as advance strong points where small bodies of men could fight delaying actions. The king-pin of this line was Prinz Heinrich Hill, for if this fell the southern end of the line was overlooked and must also fall. Two main lines of trenches were dug to connect the hills but no defence works were erected on Prinz Heinrich. This negligence by the Germans is difficult to understand, since they realised the importance of the hill. Admittedly its steep sides made the summit almost inaccessible but for this very reason a small fort, armed with heavy guns and protected by machine guns, could have controlled not only any assault on the trench line but also any attempt to cross the valley beyond. This omission on the part of the Germans is even more difficult to understand when it is realised that they had had 12 years in which to complete the system of fortifications. By July 1914 a total of 53 heavy guns and howitzers, 77 lighter guns and 47 machine guns were positioned on the peninsula. The number of men stationed there during the forts to the river
is uncertain. The Marine Artillery and 3rd Marine Battalion, which totalled 3,000 men, formed the backbone of the garrison, but this number was swollen by reservists and volunteers who flocked to the base from all over the Pacific. With
seige
the crews off the ships in harbour, the garrison probably totalled just under 6,000
men.
The naval squadron stationed
declared, failed to arrive,
a grave hampering factor to the Germans. In command was the naval governor of Tsingtao, Captain Meyer Waldeck. Towards the end of July, Captain Waldeck reduced the civil population from 55,000 to 30,000 and moved troops from Tientsin to Tsingtao. These men were part of the International Force maintained in the treaty port since the Bcxer Rising of 1900. Buildings and trees that might provide cover for an enemy, or be useful to artillery observers, were razed to the ground, and the Hai Po bridge was blown up.
On August 4 Admiral von Spee left Kiaochow with SMS Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and five light cruisers, one of which was SMS Emden. The balance of his squadron (the old destroyer S90 and five gunboats) was left to help in the defence of the base, assisted by the Jaguar from Shanghai and an Austrian light cruiser, the Kaiserin Elizabeth. From this time on the garrison could do little but improve their defences and await the onslaught. The Japanese had been watching Tsingtao for many years and knew exactly where every fort, redoubt and battery had been built and had an approximate idea of the number and calibre of the guns. (Most world powers were aware of these facts, although their Intelligence reports on the calibre of the guns were usually fairly inaccurate.) Before war broke out Japan had already organised a special Expeditionary Force to deal with Tsingtao and every officer had been instructed in his duties, every soldier trained to perfection.
under Lieutenant-General force, Kamio, with Major-General Yamanashi as his Chief-of-Staff, consisted of 50,000 men, 12,000 horses, 102 heavy guns or howitzers and 42 field or mountain guns. It was to be supported by six aeroplanes and a naval
This
force of four dreadnoughts, four battlecruisers, 13 light cruisers, 24 destroyers,
four gunboats, 13 minesweepers, nine guard ships and a vast fleet of repair, hospital and transport ships.
Brisk naval skirmishes Embarkation was hindered by violent storms along the Japanese coast and a blockade of Kiaochow could not be established before August 27, though on the 23rd the British destroyer HMS Kennet, keeping an eye on the bay, had chased S90 back into harbour, suffering several casualties in the action. Minesweeping operations were begun at once to enable the fleet to move within range of the land
During
this work, which continued week, a Japanese destroyer ran aground on one of the two small islands in the bay. The German gunboat Jaguar darted out of harbour, pumped shells into the destroyer until she keeled over on her side, and retired smartly when more Japanese ships appeared on the On September 2 Major amada with the 24th Infant r\ id 22nd ungkow Cavalry Regiment B Bay, 100 miles frorr to establish a supply base. A B hindered disembarkation and cavalry wen landed the first They were sent to forts.
for
a
I
in the
bay
could not hope to withstand the entire Japanese navy and the bay was therefore extensively mined for a radius of eight miles to prevent an attack from the sea. The air force was represented by a monoplane flown by Oberleutnant-zur-See Pliis-
I
(
scout the approach route to Tsingtao. Conditions were atrocious. Bridges and roads, such as they were, had been carried away by rams and w inds that were the worst for
60 years; rivers were impassable and even small streams had become raging torrents iOO yards wide. The Japanese troops were well known for toughness yet these men, living off a land that could not produce to teed its own population, did not reach their first objective, the village of Tsimo, until the 12th. Here they had to halt tor three days to recover stragglers, though scouts managed to capture the village of Kiaochow the next day. Yamada could not land the last of his men before the 6th: the main force should have been ashore here by the 7th. Because of the delay General Kamio changed his plans and ordered Major-General Horiuchi to take the 23rd Infantry Brigade to I.aoshan Bay. effect a landing and cover the massing of supplies and artillery there. The bay was only 30 miles from Tsingtao and Kamio was taking a chance, as the Germans might oppose the landing, but he had no choice. His troops were already on half rations, without artillery support, and there was little hope of either being forwarded from Lungkow in the near future. Yamada was meanwhile ordered to con-
enough
General Horiuchi's force arrived at Laoshan Bay on the 18th and was ashore by the following day, an advance post manned by two German officers and 30 men being driven off without loss to either side. Meanwhile, at Lungkow Bay the 29th Infantry Brigade under Major-General Hojoji, and units of the heavy artillery under Major-General Watanabe, were being landed. At both landing points engineers began constructing piers, roads and a light railway to send the vital supplies to the front-line troops. By the 25th the floods had subsided considerably, the 24th and 29th Brigades, 22nd Cavalry Regiment and units of the 24th Field Artillery were concentrated
round Tsimo.
On September
27,
General
his position round Tsimo and Kiaochow villages and wait for the rest
solidate
army to catch up. By the 13th conditions had improved
of the
columns to start from Lungkow. also enabling the German monoplane to make its first reconnaissance flight. sufficiently for
Pluchow reported that the Japanese were round Tsimo but that the area between there and Tsingtao was still badly flooded. This was the first information the Germans had of the overall situation.
Kamio gave the order for a general advance commence the next day.
to
Japan's intervention in the war, while obviating the threat of the naval squadron based on Kiaochow, placed Britain in an embarrassing position. In the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, countries whose security was menaced by Japan's territorial ambitions in the Pacific, there was considerable anti-
Japanese feeling. The British government had already issued a statement to allay these fears: 'with a view to protecting the general interest of the Far East and particularly the integrity of China, Japanese actions will not extend beyond the China Seas except so far as the safety of her own shipping makes it necessary, and to no foreign territory except that under German occupation.' To back up this statement Brigadier-General Barnardiston, commanding British forces in North China, was ordered to proceed to Laoshan Bay with the 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers and half of the 1st Battalion 36th Sikhs and to place the force under the orders of General Kamio. The force of 1,400 men left Tientsin on September 19, escorted by the pre-dreadnought battleship HMS Triumph and destroyer HMS Usk, and after stopping at Weihaiwei to pick up 250 mules, arrived in Laoshan Bay on the 22nd, finding it crammed with more than 50 Japanese transports and warships. Two days were needed for disembarkation, then the force set out to cover the 21 miles to Tsimo. The half rations, their column
men were on Above: Meyer Waldeck ably defended Tsingtao for two months against greatly superior Allied forces. Below: A wide, well-paved road in the Chinese quarter of Asia's only German town, called by the
Germans
'the Riviera of the East'
was constantly broken by Japanese lery and supply teams, and the lack
artil-
of
an
interpreter added to their difficulties. Most of their heavy equipment had to be left behind because of the thick mud and the
1
jmBl
men were
half frozen in their tropical doubtful that the British troops realised that they were fighting for the 'Riviera of the East'! shorts.
It
at
Unopposed assault
On September 17, for instance, men Bismarck fort were informed that a Japanese staff officer had been caught trying to poison the city's water supply and had been executed as a spy. Such reports side.
in
cannot be
verified.
When
Horiuchi landed
German
believed
soldiers
that
20
Japanese had been killed in the lighting'. Only five companies of troops confronted the initial Japanese advance three in front of Tsimo and two further east watch ing Laoshan Hay. Consequently Horiuchi's 23rd Brigade, advancing in the south, met
The force reached Tsimo on the 26th and was ordered to march another ten miles the next day to support the Japanese attack on the first German line. However, a 'redoubt' that the Borderers were instructed t.o assault turned out to be an uninhabited trench and the British force took no active part in this action. While the Japanese were landing troops, establishing supply depots and sealing the territory off from the rest of the world, the German defenders could do little but await the inevitable grand assault. This inactivity, added to the conditions on the peninsula, mosquito-infested after a month of continual rain, made the garrison anxious for any sort of action — especially in the big forts where water streamed from the walls and ceilings. A private in the Marine Artillery wrote in his diary on September 7: 'News of Japanese landings. At last they are coming — sighs of relief.' Sealed in their fortresses the men were prey to wild rumours and throughout the siege they knew less about the course of events than their compatriots on the out-
Laoshan Bay the next day, unopposed,
the
is
with no opposition at all, although Yama da's 24th Brigade to tlio north came under fire from litis fort and the ships in Kiao chow Bay, and met stiff resistance as nighl fell. At dawn the advance continued The 24th Brigade soon came under hea\\ lire from the ships and litis again and General Horiuchi was ordered to despatch a com
pany of his field artillery to assist them Three aeroplanes were put up to slop the naval bombardment and although all their
bombs missed they succeedi-d m driving crews of the ships under cover. Neither side suffered any damage hut it was a significant the first instance of an engagement between ships and aircraft. That evening both brigades were within
action
striking distance of the
Genera] Kamio called Top: Most of Tsingtao's artillery was placed in armoured cupolas in the forts which mada up the main defences of the town. This sort of defence had been shown to be ineffective by Germans themselves in Europe During the siege several of the forts were put out of action by the heavy shells of the Allied blockade squadron. Above: 1 he pilot of the only German aircraft in Tsingtao, Pluschow, was unable to spot for the guns as he was always chased off by one of the Japanese aircraft
first
a
German
line
bah and ordered
Prinz lleinrich Hill to be taken during the night so that the advance might continue in the morning. Pacing the Japanese there were 1,000 riflemen half a compain on Prinz lleinrich and the remainder seal tered along the line of trenches and Strong points. They were backed h\ '1 light guns, 12 machine guns and any lire the ships
could bring to bear A company of Horiuchi's 46th Regiment (named Kesshitai by the other soldici
tlved
'troo]
to
tlie"
•
was given the
honour of storming the hill, and sot out at midnight. They had to climb and conquer the lull before daylight exposed them, hut as they neared the top they mot such fierce resistance that the} were pinned down, both their officers being among those killed. Luckily, as dawn broke, a small patrol that had been sent to scout the other side of the hill appeared on the summit behind the
Germans who surrendered
at once, believing themselves surrounded. With this key position taken the assault was launched against the whole line. Soon the thin defences were pierced and the
Germans began
to withdraw, having failed advance or inflict heavy casualties. By 1100 hours the entire line was in Japanese hands and cavalry was sent in pursuit oi' the Germans, who now abandoned much valuable equipment. Many soldiers' were found propped paper against the ramparts to give an impression of strength. Total Japanese casualties for this action were 46 killed and 146 wounded, a small price to pay, for Tsingtao was now doomed. The advance was halted and the to halt the
A German counterattack was launched on the 30th but failed. The Japanese regarded this as proof that the garrison was contained hut the Germans claimed the attack had only been a feint to draw the
struck a mine. She was listing sharply to port, and was steaming slowly eastwards. That they were not aware the damage had
enemy
Japanese battleship subsequently sank. During the 22nd a Japanese naval aircraft achieved some success in aerial bombing by inflicting slight damage on the electric works in the city. Whether this was
the open, and certainly the suffer considerable casualties as a result of machine gun cross fire during this action. German general orders that day claimed 1,784 Japanese killed and 8,000 wounded, in exchange for only 110 Germans killed and wounded, but these figures were probably quoted to boost morale and certainly the garrison was jubilant at this time. However, a discordant note is introduced by the private in Bismarck fort, whose diary records on this day: 'Our infantry appeared to be very done up when they fell back: their toes sticking out of their boots, helmets shot througb etc. Here we sit and are allowed to do nothing.' Of the big forts only litis into
Japanese did
had
so far
put
to
positions, while
contentedly
to
work preparing
artillery
General Kamio sat back await the arrival of his
artillery.
Aircraft over Tsingtao The next morning a German observation balloon stationed near litis spotted a battery of howitzers behind the nearest heights and called down artillery fire on the position. This balloon also hampered the British force, Pliischow's monoplane joining in the harassment, and the following day their position was so heavily shelled tbat the British were forced to move camp. Work on the gun emplacements was seriously delayed and after several days an aeroplane was sent over to shoot down the balloon. The Germans managed to get it down in time but some damage was done to the cables. The balloon broke fron its moorings on October 7 and although PI schow tried to spot for the guns in its pi ce he was unsuccessful as several Japanes, aircraft were sent up in pursuit wheneve he became airborne.
324
been allowed to fire — Bismarck fire until October 9.
General Kamio now realigned his forces the main assault (from north to south: the 29th Brigade under Hojoji. the British
for
further
gun power
to the large Allied
squadron bombarding Tsingtao
under Barnardiston, Yamada's 24th Brigade and Horiuchi's 23rd Brigade*. Kamio's plan was simple, slow but sure. When the bombardment began, a line of trenches would be dug on the forward slope, connected to the reverse slope by communication trenches. A second line of trenches would then be excavated further down and finally a third line dug by the river, only a few yards from the German lines. Because all these trenches were on the exposed forward slope the digging would be done at night with patrols out force
protect the working parties against raiders from the German lines — a pattern soon to become all too familiar to soldiers in France and Flanders. S90 was ordered to make her escape on the night of the 7th but was spotted sneaking through the harbour mouth. A brisk chase ensued during which a Japanese battleship was torpedoed and S90 beached on the Chinese coast to avoid capture. On the 19th men in Bismarck were able to study the Japanese battleship through to
their
telescopes.
They thought she had
how The
deliberate or not is uncertain but with these works out of action the electrified fence in the valley was useless. Not until the 28th were the artillery positions completed, but that night work was started on the first line of trenches. The next day a bombardment of the defences began, the Germans scuttling the ships that remained in the harbour. Over the next two days the remainder of the Japanese artillery arrived and at 0615 hours on the 31st (the Emperor of Japan's birthday) a tremendous bombardment began that was to continue until the fall of Tsingtao on November 7. By day the guns fired shells to penetrate the fortifications: by night star shells and
did not open
The Japanese cruiser Yakumo, armed with four 8-inch guns, added
troops
inflicted by S90 illustrates totally isolated these garrisons were.
been
shrapnel to prevent the garrisons carrying out repairs. Aeroplanes directed the gunners and on both sides of the peninsula Japanese and British capital ships added their huge shells to the rain of projectiles. It was a bright clear day. An hour after the barrage commenced fires burst out in the ship yards and at 0800 hours the oil tanks were hit. A vast pall of black smoke mushroomed over the city. That night the hills and forts were dramatically outlined against the lurid flames. The defenders replied with a counterbombardment but this soon fell off until by November 2 the great forts were firing only occasional shots. There are various accounts of the damage inflicted on the forts
during this bombardment. The Japanese claim that they silenced the forts, and the British battleship to
Triumph was believed
have put Bismarck
fort
out of action
with only seven shells, yet photographs taken between the world wars show that the forts bore little visible damage to either guns or concrete housings. Hsiao-ni-wa fort, for instance, was supposed to have
The garrison of Tsingtao, isolated and completely surrounded The Japanese 150-mm Howitzer used bombard the German trenches at Tsingtao.
Right:
Weight: 6, 160 lbs. Length: 20 feet 9 inches. Elevation: 65 degrees. Crew: 6 or 7. Rate of
to
fire:
Four rounds-per-minute (maximum). Range: 10,464 yards. Muzzle velocity: 1,344 feet-persecond. Projectile weight: 80 lbs. Below left: A Japanese poster of the time depicts Japanese artillery supporting the attack on Tsingtao. Below right: The defences of Tsingtao were based on the natural obstacles provided by the terrain, and the formidable line of redoubts and forts on the southern side of the River Hai Po. Because Prinz Heinrich Hill was inadequately protected, however, the first line
was
easily taken,
and thereafter the
Tsingtao was only a matter of time
fall
of
The
victor of Tsing-
Japanese soldier and his
tao: the
weapons Left:
A Japanese infantryman
in his
standard winter service
The Japanese were unique among the combatant powers the First World War in issuing their troops with both greatcoats and mackintoshes in the winter. The latter was worn over the former, and thus the wearer was kept both warm and dry — in theory. As the Japanese were unable to distinguish between British and German troops at Tsingtao, Japanese mackintoshes were issued to the British troops as a means of identification. They were, of course, useful in their proper function, as the British troops serving at Tsingtao were poorly equipped for the dress.
L. 326
of
atrocious conditions which were prevalent during the campaign. Below: Standard small arms of the Japanese. Among these are (top) the infantry rifle -the Arisaka Model 38/1905 6.5-mm; (centre) the Arisaka Model 44/ 19 1 1 cavalry carbine, 6.5-mm (note the bayonet folded underneath the barrel) (bottom) the Arisaka Model 38/1905 carbine, 6.5-mm; (top right) the Nambu Model 1902 automatic pistol, 7.92-mm (below right) the Model 26 1893 revolver, 9-mm (based on the American Smith and Wesson revolver); and (below centre) the standard Japanese infantry bayonet. Boffom.'The standard Japanese heavy machine gun — the Nambu 1914 Model 3, 6.5-mm (based on the French Hotchkiss machine gun). The Arisaka infantry rifle was exported widely, and was even used in Great Britain as a training weapon during the acute shortage of infantry small arms up to 19 16. Right: A Japanese infantryman in his basic standard issue uniform carrying an Arisaka Model 38/1905 6.5-mm rifle. The colour of the uniform had been changed from blue to green as a result of the lessons learned from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05. The only way in which it was possible to distinguish between the various branches of the army was by the colour of the collar patch - red was the colour of the infantry. The Japanese needed all their physical resilience to withstand the rigours of the campaign for Tsingtao ;
;
X.&S.
%
*
I
.
*
Left:
General Kamio,
i
*f
commander of the
Japanese Expeditionary Force sent to reduce Tsingtao. Above: the Japanese arrive at Tsingtao railhead
been annihilated by naval guns yet only one gun was knocked out and the fort was still intact in 1937. It is far more likely that, as the German record shows, the forts
began
run short of ammunition and reserved their remaining stocks for the to
last assault.
The
i
'
.
3BaMW
first
line of assault trenches
was
completed by the night of the 1st, the work being speeded up by the use of nullahs [ravines] running down the slope as communication trenches. The second line was started at once, 400 yards further down and in places only 300 yards from the Germans, who did all they could to hamper the work by constantly switching their searchlights on and off and spraying with
machine gun fire any working parties caught in the beams. The Japanese made several probing attacks against the two central redoubts, but without success.
A bomb such as this ttheGemv -
neratin
the observation dome and two of the howitzers put out of action by direct hits, yet continued to function. Ammunition in this fort was now reduced to 200 high explosive shells and 120 shrapnel. That night the third line of Allied trenches was started, almost on top of the German line. In the British sector flooding caused the digging to be abandoned and a sandbag parapet was begun instead. By the evening of the 5th much of the minefield and other obstacles had been rendered useless by the Japanese barrage. In Bismarck fort ammunition was down to 40 high explosive shells and 20 shrapnel,
and the two remaining howitzers ceased firing, the spare gunners moving forward to serve in the trenches. That night B Company of the South Wales Borderers was caught by fire from two machine guns while crossing open ground between the trench lines and suffered 30 casualties be-
Crushing bombardment
fore
On
company had six casualties. General Kamio had ordered the third line held at
the 3rd private buildings in the city were badly hit by the barrage. The Japanese protested that this was accidental but it is significant that at last the electric works were put out of action. By the 4th many of the open batteries and the redoubts had been destroyed, together with their guns, while large stretches of the linking trenches had been obliterated. Only the big forts were able to withstand the crushing bombardment, though the garrisons were badly shaken and seized any lull in the shelling to get outside, even if only for a minute or two. That day Bismarck fort had two great holes blasted in
withdrawing.
Their
other
forward
costs and the Borderers sent forward more picquets to hold the position, despite the fact they had no trenches here. The British force was not warned of the impending assault and took no further part all
in the final advance.
Hsiao-ni-wa fort received a direct hit on the 6th and ceased to fire. It was believed out of action but in fact only one gun was destroyed; like many other positions, it was out of ammunition. The Germans now began to demolish these positions and destroy the guns, an act that provoked the
328 .
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who had no desire to capture a set of useless ruins, into sending over an aeroplane to drop leaflets urging the de-
Japanese,
fenders to stop an action that was unworthy of true soldiers. With the fall of Tsingtao imminent, the German monoplane was seen to fly off southwards. At 2100 hours the grand assault was launched. Despite the wire entanglements and exploding mines the Japanese infantry pressed home their attack fiercely, climbing over their dead and wounded. The Germans fought back stubbornly, Moltke fort and Bismarck fort especially causing many casualties with their last shells. Redoubt 4 fell but was quickly retaken, the attack on Redoubt 1 failed, and the Japanese retreated. Just after midnight General Yamada personally led four companies of infantry against Redoubts 2 and 3. Soon the Japanese flag was flying over these redoubts. The attack was resumed and, with the centre of their line pierced, the German defence began to crumble. Redoubts 5 and 6 fell to General Horiuchi, who also led his men personally, and the rest of the line was swiftly occupied. Many of the defenders surrendered, but some scurried back to the main forts to make a brave last stand.
A white flag There still remained almost half a mile of hillside dotted with obstacles to be crossed by the attackers before the big forts
could be captured, and skirmishers began at once to clear the way. Not until 0630
W*
&m\
hours were the Japanese in a position to launch this final assault and then, as the infantry waited tensely for the order to charge, a white flag was waved from the observatory of one of the forts. Other white flags soon appeared. Tsingtao had fallen. Japanese casualties in the campaign were 1,455 killed and 4,200 wounded; the
been paralysed. With Germany banished from the Pacific the Royal Navy was free to drive German merchant shipping from the seas, contain the High Seas Fleet and combat the growing submarine menace in home waters. As the defeat of France had depended upon the success of the
14 killed and 61 wounded. German losses were only 200 killed and 500 wounded, but nevertheless the fall of Tsingtao was a bitter blow for Germany. In October the Japanese had occupied the Marshall, Palau, Mariana and Caroline
had depended upon dividing the Royal Navy. Both plans had now misfired,
British were
August and September Zealand had taken Samoa, New Guinea, the Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago. With the fall of Tsingtao the German flag had disappeared from the Pacific and her empire there had vanished for ever. But these actions, insignificant in themselves, had a far greater effect than the mere loss of prestige. Germany had leased, purchased and annexed her eastern empire Largely for Islands:
Australia
Schlieffen
Plan, so the defeat of Britain
during
and
New
the purpose of dividing the might of the Royal Navy between defence of home waters and defence of world shipping routes in the event of war. By this strategy she had hoped to be able to defeat a weakened Home Fleet with her own navy and obtain mastery of the English Channel. By occupying the network of harbours and wireless stations in the Pacific, the Allies had obtained a stranglehold on the German commerce raiders and within three months of the outbreak of war a vital facet of Germany's strategy had
Further Reading
Army Quarterly Volume XXXV, 1938
(Article by Robertson) Atkinson. C.T..A History of the South Wales Borderers 1914-18 (Medici Society 1931) Dane, E British Campaigns in Africa L. B.
.
Pacific (1919) Godshall. L Tsmgtau under three flags (1929) Journal of the United Services Institution
W
,
Volume LXXXI (Article by F. P. Nosworthy) Naval Review Volume VI, 1919 (Diary of a Ger-
man
artilleryman)
TERENCE WISE was born in London in 1935 and was educated at Rutlish Grammar School, Merton Park He |Oined the army for three years in 1953, serving in Germany with the 17th/21st Lancer was followed by three years whaling in the Antarctic and six years in a bookshop In 1967 he beca freelance writer and books published include a Guide to Military Museums, An Introductn Games and a book on modern whah 1
THE BRITISH AT T*l M.T iO C. T. Atkinson
The siege of Tsingtao was not wholly a Japanese undertaking. Part of the investing force was drawn from the British and Indian contingents of the garrison at the treaty port of Tientsin, North China, the two battalions being chosen to take part in the siege being the 2nd South Wales Borderers and the 36th Sikhs. The Borderers embarked on September 7, 1914, and, under British naval escort, set sail two days later for the theatre of operations further to the south. Below: Watched with curiosity by the Japanese, British troops land in Laoshan Bay in
1
After crossing
Taku Bar the convoy and
Gulf of Chihli to Weihaiwei, picked up some mules there (September 20) and proceeded to Laoshan Bay, on the east coast of the Shantung Peninsula, about 40 miles north-east of escort stood across the
Tsingtao, the well-fortified main German settlement on Kiaochow Bay which was the objective of the expeditionary force. Here the Japanese main body had begun dis-
embarkation on September 18, by which time the original landing force had already seized Kiaochow town and established itself at the head of Kiaochow Bay, thereby isolating the
German
territory completely.
Laoshan Bay, which was crowded with Japanese transports guarded by a strong squadron, was reached on September 22. At 0800 hours next day disembarkation began, the men being soon ashore. Landing the mules, however, proved difficult. They had to be slung over the ship's side by a crane and lowered into lighters which were then towed as near to the beach as the shallowness of the water would permit.
Then the the
real fun began, that of inducing
suspicious
and
unaccommodating
jump out of the lighters and wade ashore. They did not yield easily to persuasion; and what with overcoming animals
to
their reluctance and landing ammunition, carts and stores of all kinds, the battalion had a strenuous time. The bodies of the carts
had to be taken ashore separately and then have the wheels fitted to them. Fourteen days' supplies had to be landed, as well as forage for 300 mules and ponies. The men had no coolies to help them, the Chinese who were working the donkey-engine kept on refusing to work and had to be forcibly encouraged to keep going, but by unflagging exertions the ships had been cleared by 0800 hours, September 24. The battalion's labours were not over then, for the stores had to be transferred to the Base Supply Depot and ther j was a shortage of appliances for moving them. However, as General Barnardiston's dispatch of October 9 testifies, the battalion 'worked hard and cheerfully', and on September 25 it could move forward to Puh-li, six miles from the landing-places.
This march was a foretaste of difficulties come; the road, or rather track, was bad, narrow and congested with traffic; while to add to the confusion hardly anyone in the battalion knew a word of Japanese and only a very few Japanese (ftficers knew much more English, Mai'eover, the Japanese commander, General Kamio, to
proposed to employ the British force in the centre of the line, and not, as General Barnardiston wished, on the left where it would have been in touch with the ships. This not only entailed a longer march than would have been needed, but greatly increased the difficulties of supply, and consequently the privations the British contingent was to endure. Indeed the very first day of the advance found the battalion already on half-rations for want of transport, and for the same reason all crowbars and felling-axes and most of the picks and shovels had to be left behind. The second day's march to Tsimo, 14 miles further on, was peculiarly trying. Chinese roads at the best are apt to consist of a succession of boulders in a river of mud; these, moreover, were blocked with Japanese transport and guns, making halts and checks frequent. Japanese ideas of march-discipline too were not ours, and the driving of their guns was distinctly poor; they frequently broke right into our marching column and drove the men off the road into the potato fields where the long tendrils of sweet potatoes wound themselves round the men's legs and seriously hampered progress. At Tsimo the battalion encamped beside a good stream and managed to
supplement us rations by purchasing on its own account bullocks, fowls, eggs and pes. On the third day (September 27) the battalion had only nine miles to cover to Liuting. where it could hear guns firing and see the masts of German vessels in Kiaochow Bav which were replying to the Japanese fire. The intention was that the German advanced position north-east of Tsingtao should be attacked at dawn next morning, the battalion being assigned a front of 1,600 yards and having a redoubt to carry. However, as the Germans decamped during the night, the battalion was not engaged and bivouacked after a tenmile march at Yang-chia-chung, a village about three miles from the German lines. Here the 2nd South Wales Borderers spent ten days while heavy artillery was being brought forward, ammunition and siege equipment accumulated and the initial stages of the investment begun. The weather was bad, heavy rains reduced the
mud and greatly impeded the forwarding of the guns and
so-called roads to rivers of
other materials, besides making the troops very uncomfortable. The South Wales Borderers being in thin summer clothing with only one blanket and a waterproof sheet apiece, came off specially badly. However, the work was steadily pushed on, though German aeroplanes and observation balloons were much in evidence and their activities were a nuisance, reducing greatly the amount of work that could be done by day. The Japanese, who had plenty of coolies to help them, before long constructed a light railway to connect the base with the advanced positions and were able to bring forward their heavy guns. An interesting episode was the visit, on October 2, of an aide-de-camp of the Emperor of Japan who brought a present of saki for the officers, with cigarettes for them and the NCO's, and expressed the Emperor's great satisfaction at the cooperation of British and Japanese troops. Eventually, on October 10, General Barnardiston received orders from General Kamio for the 2nd South Wales Borderers to take its place in the front line, about 600 yards frontage being assigned to it. It had already had a few casualties from the German shell fire, but considering the weather and the conditions in which it was living the sick- rate had been extremely low.
Knee deep in mud This outpost line had by now been advanced in the centre to the Shibosan or Shuang Shan Ridge about a mile from the German redoubts. This was a clay ridge intersected by ravines which would have given good cover in dry weather, but in heavy rain the loose soil was easily washed away, dug-outs in the sides of the ravines collapsed, streams carried down quantities of mud to fill up trenches and reduce roads to quagmires, and a piece of work was no sooner completed than it was washed away and had to be begun afresh. To struggle against such difficulties and in unfavourable conditions was a severe trial. The troops were thinly clad and usually soaked through, much digging was needed, and, as no wheeled trant )rt was available, rations, ammunition and 'ores, including heavy beams for use in th* trenches, had to be carried up to the front by hand over a mile and a half of tracks often knee-deep in liquid mud. Two companies only were actually in line, A and B going in first.
332
The
arrival of the 36th Sikhs, the first Indian
troops to see action
while D and half C took up their position in a nullah Iwater course] about 300 yards from the village of Huang-chia-yiang, the rest of C remaining at the old bivouac to dismantle the splinter-proofs it had erected, bring the precious wood up to the new line
and
provide
parties. All
man
the
necessary
carrying
were within range of the Ger-
guns, but the battalion suffered far
more from the bad weather and the discomforts and hardships it entailed than from the enemy. Bully beef and biscuits Moreover, largely owing to transport difficulties, the troops had to carry on their heavy task on barely adequate rations, certainly on much less food than they were accustomed to in peace. Bully beef and biscuits they did receive, but no bacon or cheese; bread was occasionally issued and was usually not more than soddened dough; while the men dug up the Chinese sweet potatoes and ate them raw. They sometimes got some rice from the Japanese. It was difficult to find anything dry to make fires,
so
when
a tea ration
w as r
available,
which was not often the case, it could not always be used. 'Tea when made was a peculiar affair.' writes one survivor of Tsingtao, 'the only water available was from a stream that was in flood, and this was of a rich muddy colour which looked like good milky tea." Luxuries like sugar and jam were very occasionally issued, but for the most part the men were on the barest minimum of rations, and in the six weeks there were only two issues of tobacco. The Shibosan Ridge on which the battalion's front companies were estab-
in
the First World
War
entanglement, with a mine-field and a live wire in front. It was therefore necessary to proceed by regular siege operations, digging a succession of trench lines at intervals, 'Artillery
known
respectively
as
the
Covering Position' and the 'First'. 'Second' and 'Third Attack Positions', connected by communication trenches. The southern slope being in full view of the enemy, night work only was possible; by day picquets held the most advanced completed position, the remainder of the outpost companies being in support and reserve further back and generally engaged on carrying fatigues or in improving and maintaining the communication trenches, tasks which kept them fully employed.
The frontage allotted to the battalion was in the centre of the ridge, being roughly delimited by two low knolls, known respectively as '54' and '45.5'. The first task to dig communication trenches up to the crest, prior to the construction of the 'Artillery Covering Position' on its further side. The battalion was handicapped, especially at first, by a great shortage of tools, other than the ordinary small entrenching tools carried by the men. These,
was
though admirable for the purpose for which they were intended, were hardly fitted to deal with rock, for to add to the difficulties the ground proved to be very rocky. Moreover, while only 20 picks and shovels per
company were
available, even sandbags were extremely scarce. Thus the British troops were at a great disadvantage as with better equipped the compared Japanese, who had ample supplies of every
lished
kind of material, plenty of coolies to bring forward stores and supplies, and
obtainable behind it, but to the south it sloped gently down towards the bed of a river without affording a vestige of cover. The German front line was very strong; it consisted of a line of low-command redoubts constructed of ferro-concrete and armed with field guns and machine guns, the heavier guns being in the larger forts to the rear. Trenches defended chiefly by machine guns linked up the redoubts; 200 yards in front the ground was sharply cut away, the face of the cut being revetted, and at the foot of it was a really good wire
larger and better maps than were available for our troops. A section of Japanese engineers was attached to the battalion and did excellent work, despite the language difficulty, the NCO's often managing to explain by dumb show what they wanted done. The Germans indulged in fairly liberal shelling — on the night of October 11/12, for example, they regularly bombarded the neighbourhood of Huang-chiayiang, though the support companies, being well sheltered in the nullahs around, escaped with only two casualties. The weather was the most serious trouble however. From October 15 to 17 it rained
was partly covered with fir trees, and some degree of protection from the enemy's observation and artillery was
B Company of the Borderers lost 30 men and were driven back to the 'Second Attack Position': and so, although C Company and the Sikhs had managed under cover of the diversion to dig their trench, General Barnardiston reported to the Japanese commander-inchief that he did not yet consider the 'Third Attack Position' fit for permanent occupation. He received the reply that the general scheme of assault required it to be held, so that evening it was occupied by picquets. D Company was put in to complete C Company's work, and about midnight Lieutenant Somerville took out a patrol to ascertain the truth of the rumours, which were now current, that the Germans were evacuating their trenches. The position in front of the battalion proved to be held, and the working parties were accordingly withdrawn after completing their night's task. However, both to right and left there was unusual activity, searchlights playing freely and heavy firing going on all night. Actually the Japanese were forcing a decision, and during the night they assaulted and took a fort at the western end of the line, with the result that just as their main assault was about to be delivered at 0700 hours next day November 7 the white flag went up and the siege was over. The sudden termination of the operations robbed the little British contingent of any chance of distinguishing itself in the action which followed,
Barnardiston,
almost incessantly. Not only did it delay the work, but it meant that the men, being without tents or dug-outs or a chance of drying their clothes, 'just got wet and remained wet', as one account tells. Apparently the hard work kept the men fit, for the sick-rate
remained remarkably low.
Clashes with the Japanese The working parties were always covered by standing patrols pushed well out to the while smaller parties reconnoitred the ground between our lines and the German position. To avoid any mishaps through chance encounters with patrols from the Japanese units on the battalion's flanks a Japanese NCO and some men were usually sent out with the South Wales Borderers' patrols; this precaution was fully justified, as our patrols were nevertheless fired upon more than once by front,
patrols and sentries, though fortunately without much serious harm being done. As a further safeguard our patrols were fitted out with Japanese overcoats, 'thin khaki drill affairs with a hood' they are described, and this served the purpose of preventing the Germans from British and distinguishing between
Japanese
Japanese.
The Germans proved very unenterprising and made little effort to interfere with our working or covering parties either by fire or by patrols, so the work proceeded without more delay than the state of the ground imposed. On October 28 a half-battalion of the 36th Sikhs, which had landed a week earlier, reached the front, and one of its companies took over the right of the South Wales Borderers' frontage; two days later (October 30) the 'Artillery Covering Position' just over the crest of the ridge was occupied, whereupon the artillery were brought up into position and next day the bombardment began. It was exceedingly effective, the forts and redoubts suffered severely and some oil-tanks near the dockyard were set on fire, causing a tremendous conflagration. As soon as the 'Artillery Covering Posi-
had been occupied work was begun on the 'First Attack Position'; some nullahs leading to it provided ready-made communication trenches, and on the evening of November 1 the companies from the tion'
covering
position
occupied
it,
while
commander
of the Imperial forces
those in reserve worked in the communication trenches and Battalion Headquarters were brought right forward. Almost immediately preparations were begun for the occupation of a 'Second Attack Position' 400 yards further down the slope. The approach to this lay over the bare open, no convenient nullahs provided covered ways and the new position was in places only 300 yards from the German lines. The soil was crumbly, and as the line was on the edge of the river bed water welled up in the trenches, making the parapets subside and seriously impeding progress. The only thing to be done was to spread potato vines along the bottom of the trench and tread them in; this afforded a tolerable foothold, but quite failed to prevent water oozing in, and on the next night it was decided to substitute a sand-bag parapet for the
A and C Companies were employed on the front line, B and D working at the communication trench connecting it with the 'First Attack Position'. The men worked well, and though so many sandbags were required that the supply ran short good progress was made, useful help being given by the Japanese engineers who managed to drain part of the trench. The Germans, who were well supplied with searchlights, were constantly turning them on and opening machine gun fire on the targets disclosed, with the result that the working parties had to lie down in the mud and wait till the searchlights were turned off and the machine guns stopped fire. This delayed the work greatly, but the battalion tried to make a point of being ahead of the Japanese regiments working on its flanks, although they had so many more men avail-
trench. That evening
able for the work. On the night of November 4/5, the 'Second Attack Position' was practically completed and the communication trench brought through, though lack of sandbags again hindered progress and delayed the starting of communication trenches leading to the 'Third Attack Position', which was to be on the far side of the river bed.
Hitherto neither British battalion had encountered the enemy at close quarters. On the night of November 5/6, however, digging parties sent out by both battalions to complete the 'Third Attack Position' ran into strong German patrols. In the
stage. The Japanese intention to force a finish on the night of November 6/7, whether deliberate or the result of a sudden decision, was never communicated to General Barnardiston, and it certainly came as a complete surprise to the 2nd final
•
South Wales Borderers, who, through no unwillingness or fault of their own, missed a share in the culmination they had worked so hard to bring about. The battalion was waiting to join in that assault, and found it hard to believe that the Japanese did not know it was ready or had inadvertently omitted to warn the British of their intentions. Not having shared in the assault, however, the battalion had come off fairly lightly as regards casualties, its total being 14 men killed or died of wounds or disease and 2 officers and 34 men wounded. Nevertheless the siege of Tsingtao had been an exhausting and trying experience. The battalion had had to work hard in the face of serious difficulties and handicaps. Many of these have been mentioned, want of tools and maps, shortage of rations, the absence of adequate shelter and fuel,
summer
clothing which was ill-suited to the severe weather; perhaps the most serious was the difficulty of co-operating with allies whose ways were not our ways and whose language was unfamiliar. The Japanese, it must be admitted, were interesting rather than easy people with whom to co-operate. Though they welcomed the presence of a British contingent at the siege and liked to serve alongside a British regiment, they seemed anxious to impress on us their extreme efficiency. It looked almost as if they wished the British to be there mainly as spectators, to see how well the Japanese could do the work. [The publishers are grateful to the Regl mental Committee of the South Wales Borderers for permission to reproduce extracts from their Regimental Histor the Great War by Professor (\ T Atki) and published by the Medici Society. |
•Bombay
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MADAGASCAR
NOV 9 MINOTAUR to
Cape
SOUTH AFRICA Freemantle
NOV1 ANZAC convoy puts to sea
500 500
1500
1000 1000
2000
2000 Miles
3000 Kms
CLEARING
THE
PACIFIC
The outbreak
of war brought an immediate response from the governments of New Zealand and Australia. An expeditionary force for service in Europe was raised, but while it assembled there were more pressing problems on their own doorstep
Christopher Dowling
334
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Occupation by
Japanese
ANZAC
troops
Route taken by
ANZAC
Route taken by
HMAS AUSTRALIA
Other main naval
convoy
movements by
Allied ships
Route taken by German ships
German wireless
stations
Above: The clearing of the Pacific and the ANZAC convoys. On the outbreak of war, the offers by New Zealand and Australia to supply troops for service in Europe were gratefully accepted by Britain. The dispatch of the convoys, however, was held up by the uncertain position of the various elements of the German East Asiatic Squadron. While the first convoy
was
waiting, several Allied expeditionary
groups were sent out to capture the Germanoccupied islands in the Pacific and destroy the wireless stations on them. After this, the convoy was able to set out as the German squadron was known to be heading for South America. Below: A powerful Japanese contribution to the Allied naval forces in the Pacific was the baltle-cruiser Ibuki. Displacement: 14,600 tons. Length: 450 feet. Beam: 75 /2 feet. Power/speed: 24,000 hp/22 knots. Armament: Four 12-inch, eight 8-inch and fourteen 4.7-inch. Armour: Belt and turrets 7 inches. Crew: 817 men 1
On
July 29, 1914, the British government sent a telegram to the Governor-Generals of Australia and New Zealand warning them that war was imminent. The following day New Zealand offered to provide an expeditionary force if the need arose. Australia took longer to reply. The Prime Minister, Joseph Cook, was away from Melbourne campaigning for the forthcoming general election. An urgent message was sent to him in cipher but as he did not have the key he could make nothing of it. The Governor-General, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, was in Sydney. The Australian Chiefof-Staff. Colonel Legge, was at sea on his way back from England. The Cabinet was hastily summoned and after an emergency meeting on August 3, the government announced that it was prepared to place the Australian navy under the control of the British Admiralty and to raise an expeditionary force of 20,000 men. This offer was gratefully accepted once war had been declared, the British government requesting that the force be sent as soon possible. Andrew Fisher, the leader of the Labour opposition, had already made his party's position clear when he declared in a famous phrase that Australia would support Britain 'to the last man and the last shilling'. Although the Empire was automatically drawn into any war involving the mother country, none of the dominions was bound to provide armed forces for service overseas, and only tentative plans had been made for joint action with Britain in wartime. However, as a result of measures taken during the previous decade, both Australia and New Zealand had in 1914 the nucleus of an effective fighting force. Compulsory military service had been in existence for several years. The setting up in 1907 of the Imperial General Staff, on which Australia was represented, ensured that the dominion armies were trained and organised on similar lines to those of Britain. Australia had her own military college at Duntroon, which had been established on the advice of Lord Kitchener. Contingents from Australia and New Zealand had fought with distinction in the Boer War and many of these veterans were still fit for active service. In addition, Australia had her own navy, paid for out of her own revenue and largely manned by Australian crews. In peacetime this navy was controlled by the Australian government, but it had been agreed that in wartime it should be put at the disposal of the British naval a,s
Rabaul
in the Bismarck Archipelago. Patey was given permission search the islands and hurried north with the Australia, Sydney and the three destroyers. On the night of August 11 the destroyers stole into Blanche Bay expecting to find the German cruisers at anchor but the harbour was empty. Spee was in fact at Pagan in the Marianas, 1,600 miles away. Unsuccessful attempts were made the following day to locate the wireless station, which could be heard reporting the movements of the Australian ships. After wrecking the post office at Rabaul and capturing a steamer loaded with equipment for the elusive wireless station, Patey withdrew to refuel. On August 12 a task force from the China Squadron destroyed the wireless station at Yap, which linked Tsingtao with German New Guinea and its dependencies. The signals to and from this station had given the Australians a rough idea of the position of the German squadron. These signals now ceased, and nothing was heard of Spee for nearly a month. On August 6 the British government telegraphed the Australian Government proposing that it should seize the German wireless stations at Yap, Nauru and New Guinea. A similar message was sent to the New Zealand government in regard to Samoa. It was inevitable that both Australia and New Zealand would be involved to
JOin TOGETHER- TRAIN TOGETHER
EMBARK TOGETHER
FIGHT TOGETHER
authorities.
The main units of the Royal Australian Navy in August 1914 were the battle-cruiser Australia, the light cruisers Melbourne, Sydney and Encounter (the last-named on loan from the Admiralty), the destroyers Paramatta, Yarra and Warrego and the submarines AE1 and AE2. The commander of this squadron was Rear-Admiral Sir George Patey. On the New Zealand station, which was an independent command, there were three antiquated 'P' class light cruisers. The third and most important British naval force in the Pacific was the China Squadron, with one battleship, two armoured cruisers and two light cruisers. When the warning telegram from London was received there seemed little doubt that the enemy would be Germany. Between 1884 and 1914 Germany had acquired a string of colonies in the Pacific with the aim, it was suspected, of furthering her growing naval ambitions. The chief German naval base was at Tsingtao, which had been garrisoned and fortified. The other German possessions were German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomons, Palau, Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands and Samoa. These territories, with the exception of Samoa, were administered from Rabaul, where there was an excellent harbour. At Tsingtao, Yap, Nauru and Apia there were powerful wireless stations and a fifth was being constructed at Bitapaka near Rabaul. The German squadron in the Pacific consisted of the armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the light cruisers Leipzig, Niirnberg and Emden and several smaller vessels under the command of Vice-Admiral Graf von Spee, an able and experienced seaman. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau carried 8.2-inch guns — a heavier armament than any ship of the Australian Squadron apart from the Australia, which mounted 12-inch guns and was capable of sinking both the German cruisers. While he was reasonably confident of being able to deal with the China Squadron, his immediate adversary, Spee recognised that there were two contingencies which could tilt the scales decisively against him — the bringing up of the Australia and the entry of Japan, and her powerful battlefleet, into the war. Admiral Patey, faithful to official doctrine, regarded the hunting down of the German squadron as his primary task. Of its whereabouts at the beginning of August little was known. Then, shortly before the outbreak of the war, the Australian wireless stations began to intercept messages which suggested that the German squadron was much nearer than had been assumed, possibly at
336
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on Australians love
of sport
in operations against the German colonies but the suddenness of the British request took the Australians by surprise: they were in the throes of recruiting and organising the main expeditionary force, and the German squadron was still at large in the Pacific. Nevertheless, both countries set about raising the necessary troops. The New Zealand expedition was the first to be fitted out. The only escorts on the New Zealand station were the three 'P' class cruisers, which would be no match for the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau should they encounter them, as seemed possible, in Samoan waters. Patey was therefore ordered by the Admiralty to cover the expedition with the Australia and was forced, very reluctantly, to abandon the search for the German cruisers.
Bloodless surrender At dawn on August 15 two transports left Wellington Harbour with 1,363 men under the command of Colonel Robert Logan. Patey met the expeditionary force at Noumea with the Australia and the Melbourne; waiting in the harbour was the French cruiser Montcalm, which had been ordered to join the expedition. The fleet arrived off Apia on August 30. The Germans, who had
'
made no defensive preparations, surrendered without a shot being fired and Samoa was formally occupied. The New Zealanders were thus the first Commonwealth troops to set foot on enemy soil. Shortly afterwards Patey departed with the Australia, Melbourne and Montcalm to escort the New Guinea expedition. On the voyage back the Me/bourne was detached to destroy the wireless station at Nauru, the naval landing party being helped ashore in the heavy surf by a friendly native. The New Guinea expedition left Sydney on August 19 in the troopship Berruna. The Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force, as it was called, consisted of a battalion of infantry and six companies of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve, with supporting units. In command of this force was Colonel William Holmes, a part-time soldier who had served in the Boer War. Some 500 men of the Kennedy Regiment, a citizen battalion garrisoning Thursday Island, volunteered for service outside Australia and were sent to Port Moresby in the Kanowna. Patey gave instructions that the Berruna was not to proceed beyond Palm Island, or the Kanowna beyond Port Moresby, until he returned from Samoa. After more than a week's delay at Palm Island, during which the troops were systematically trained,
HMAS Sydney,
one
of the escorts
on the attack on Rabaul
orders, Patey having been led to believe that there were two wireless stations near Rabaul. No opposition was offered to the landings. The German commander, Captain von Klewitz, planned to lure the Australians inland and then ambush them. He had at his disposal 52 Germans, some of whom had received military training, and about 240 native levies of indifferent quality. As the wireless station was likely to be the main object of any attack, he had stationed the bulk of his forces to cover the approaches to Bitapaka.
Bowen's party soon found the road to Bitapaka and threaded way through the thick jungle which fringed it on either side. The Australians had advanced about half a mile when one of the scouting groups suddenly came upon 20 natives under a their
German NCO, crouching
in the scrub. The natives scuttled for cover as the Australians opened fire and the German, Sergeant-
Major Mauderer, was wounded and taken prisoner. Bowen (contrary to the rules of war) forced Mauderer at gun-point to call out to his comrades that further resistance was useless since there were 800 Australians close behind. Hearing Mauderer's voice, two other Germans emerged from the bush and were at once captured. They turned out to be senior officers and were found to be carrying detailed maps of the road. Bowen sent back for reinforcements and pushed on under sporadic sniping. At about 1000 hours the Australians were held up by heavy fire, which came from a trench across the road. They had already begun to suffer casualties, one of them being Captain Pockley of the Army Medical Corps, who was mortally wounded. Lieutenant Hill now arrived with 59 men from the destroyers and he and Bowen decided to send parties to work round the flanks of the German position. This movement had scarcely begun when Bowen was wounded. As Hill's men crept forward in the stifling heat further reinforcements came up under Lieutenant-Commander Elwell, who took over command of one of the flanking parties. Elwell got to within 80 yards of the trench and ordered a charge. He was killed almost immediately but the Germans, whose position had become untenable, hoisted a white flag. After a lengthy discussion the senior German officer, Lieutenant Kempf, reluctantly agreed to surrender the wireless station. Kempf was sent with a party of men under Lieutenant Bond to round up the rest of the Bitapaka force. Bond, displaying considerable resource and daring, succeeded in disarming some 19 Germans and 60 natives. At about 1900 hours he took possession of the wireless station, which had been partially destroyed by the Germans. Patey decided that it was too isolated to be permanently occupied. Accordingly it was made inoperative and the landing parties were re-embarked. The party which went ashore at Herbertshohe under SubLieutenant Webber had a less eventful day. Webber advanced half-way to Toma without meeting any resistance but, not surprisingly, was unable to find any trace of the wireless station. Fearing that he might be cut off if he went further into the interior, he returned to Herbertshohe.
'No more "Urn Kaiser" On September 12 Australian
troops
marched
into
Rabaul and
Herbertshohe, which had not been fortified by the Germans. The following day the British flag was ceremonially hoisted and Inoccupation formally proclaimed. A thoughtful official provided a translation for the natives: 'All boys belongina one place, you savvy big master he come now, he new feller master. He look out good you feller. He belonga British (English); he more better than other feller. No more Kaiser. God save King.' The acting governor of German New Guinea, Dr Haber, insisted that he had no authority to surrender the colony and its dependencies How ever, after protracted negotiations, terms of capitulation were drawn up and on September 21 all German troops still in the field laid down their arms. In the next few months New Ireland, the Solomons, Madang, Nauru and the other German possessions south of the equator were occupied by Australian troops. The conquest of German New Guinea cost the Australians six dead and four wounded. One other loss, which resulted indirectly from the campaign, was the disappearance on September of the submarine AE1 with 35 men on board. The German casualties were one European and some 30 natives killed, and one European and ten natives wounded. Had the native troops been better trained and disciplined they might have inflicted heavy losses on the Australians, who had to advance over difficult and unfamiliar terrain. Klewitz later admitted that the skill of the Australians in bush fighting came as a surprise to him. By keeping to the edge of the jungle the Australians avoided two large mil which had been placed in the middle of the Bitapaka road Curiously enough, the false report about the 800 troops, wl i
The
first
ANZAC convoy
out for Europe
finally sets
Um
Patey ordered the Sydney to escort the expedition to a rendezvous in the Louisiade Archipelago off the eastern end of New Guinea, calling at Port
Moresby
to pick
up the
rest of the convoy.
At Port
Moresby, which was reached on September 4, Colonel Holmes inspected the Kanowna contingent and pronounced them unfit for active service. Patey was unwilling to discharge them but he had little option when, shortly after leaving Port Moresby, the Kanowna's crew mutinied, refusing to take the ship outside Australian waters. She was promptly sent back to Townsville in disgrace.
The
I
Louisiades on September 9 consisted of the Australia, Sydney, Encounter and Berrima, along with three destroyers, two submarines and several supply ships and colliers. In the early hours of September 11 the destroyers reconnoitred Blanche Bay and St George's Channel and reported the area clear of enemy shipping. At 0600 hours, 25 navai reservists under Lieutenant Bowen were landed at Kubakaul with orders to seize the wireless station, which was thought to lie some distance inland. Another party, under the command of SubLieutenant Webber, was put ashore at Herbertshohe with similar fleet
Um
which assembled
off the
I
Bovven put into Mauderer's mouth, completely disorganised the defence. Somehow the report reached Klewitz, while messages giving the true strength of the landing parties failed to get through. The German commander despaired of defending the coastal areas against such overwhelming numbers and persuaded the governor to order a withdrawal inland. On September 15 Admiral Patey, having handed over the command in New Guinea to Colonel Holmes, sailed for Port Jackson with the Australia. Melbourne and Sydney to prepare for the departure of the convoy for Europe. The Montcalm was left to protect Rabaul. Two days later Patey received a telegram from the Admiralty which completely altered the situation in the South Pacific. On September 14 the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had appeared off Samoa. They had steamed away without firing a shot and had last been seen steering to the north-west — a clever piece of deception on the part of the German admiral. The possibility that Spee might double back to New Guinea could not be ruled out, Patey also learnt that the Emden had begun to cruise against shipping in the Indian Ocean, and while she was at large no convoy could be considered safe. Acting on instructions from the Admiralty, Patey sped back to Rabaul with the Australia and Sydney to support the expedition which Colonel Holmes was fitting out for the occupation of Madang on the mainland of German New Guinea. This operation was successfully accomplished on September 24. Meanwhile, the Sydney was detached to destroy the wireless station at Anguar. Patey was at last free to resume his search for the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, for he had been informed by the Admiralty that the Australia was no longer required for convoy duty. He had, all along, forecast the movements of the German cruisers with remarkable accuracy and he had been convinced for some time that they were making for the coast of South America. News which came at the beginning of October, that Spee had bombarded Papeete, seemed to confirm his view. On October 3 Patey steamed out of Rabaul with the bulk of his squadron and headed eastwards. While Australia and New Zealand were carrying out local operations against the German colonies the main expeditionary forces were being trained and equipped. Recruiting for the Australian contingent began on August 10 and the military headquarters were at once besieged by crowds of eager applicants. One young Queenslander travelled over 2,000 miles to enlist. Medical standards were high and many of those who offered themselves were turned away. Men who were rejected in one capital tried their luck elsewhere. Some sailed to Britain to enlist in British regiments. In New Zealand there was a similar rush to join up. Even before the British government had formally accepted the offer of an expeditionary force the ranks were filled to overflowing. The organisation and command of the Australian expeditionary force was entrusted to Brigadier-General William Thoresby Bridges. Of Scottish birth, Bridges had served with the British Cavalry Division in the Boer war and later went to London as Australia's representative on the Imperial General Staff. He was something of an intellectual and had an impressive grasp of the principles of warfare. In manner he was gruff and forbidding, his most characteristic utterance being a grunt. As his Chief-of-Staff he chose Major Cyril White, who had been the first Australian officer to attend the Staff College at Camberley, where he had attracted favourable attention. White was only 38 when the war broke out but he had already shown himself to be a gifted organiser. Bridges was determined that the Australian contingent should preserve its national identity, and he managed to prevent the War Office from splitting it up and distributing the various brigades among British divisions. He christened the new army the Australian Imperial Force. The AIF consisted of the 1st Australian Infantry Division and the 1st Light Horse Brigade, with a total strength of 20,226 men. Of the three brigades which comprised the infantry division, the first was drawn from New South Wales, the second from Victoria and the third from the remaining states — Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania. The same principle was followed with the three regiments which made up the light horse brigade. The 1st Light Horse Regiment was recruited from New South Wales, the 2nd from Queensland and the 3rd from South Australia and Tasmania. The 4th Light Horse Regiment, which was raised in Victoria, was attached to the infantry division as divisional cavalry. The artillery was equipped with the British 18-pounder gun. The brigadiers and regimental officers were mainly drawn from the Australian militia. They were supplemented by a number of British regular officers who happened to be in Australia. A Sydney barrister, H. N. MacLaurin, commanded the 1st Infantry Brigade; a lawyer, James M'Cay, the 2nd. As commander of the 3rd Bri-
German
338
gade, Bridges chose a personal friend, Lieutenant-Colonel E. G. Sinclair-MacLagan, a British regular officer. Command of t he Light Horse Brigade went to Colonel Harry Chauvel, the Ails " tralian representative on the Imperial General Staff. The st aff of the 1st Australian Division was of high quality and no few' er than 11 of its members were to become generals before the ef^ of the war. One of the most brilliant, and certainly the mc>st eccentric, was John Gellibrand, a retired British officer with st aff college training who had settled in Tasmania. Unathletic aP d unkempt, he was unlikely to have progressed very far as a st a ^ officer in the British Army. The New Zealand Expeditionary Force numbered 7,761 men aP d consisted of an infantry brigade and a mounted rifles brigad e Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury and Otago each provided oiie battalion of infantry and one regiment of mounted rifles. Tlie New Zealand field artillery was armed with the 18-pounder ar1(* the new 4-5-inch howitzer. The staff officers were mostly British regulars, but almost all the regimental officers were New Ze a ~ -
landers. The commander of this force was Major-General Alexander Godley, a resolute but rather pompous soldier.
S* r
Thirst for adventure of these contingents were the pick of Australia ar " Zealand. They went to war in a spirit of romantic enthusiasrf1 They had volunteered because the 'old country' was in dange r because they disliked what Germany stood for, because the v thirsted for adventure and because they felt a subconscious nee" to prove themselves and their nations in the fiery test of battl e They were tough, self-reliant and of magnificent physique. JoF n Masefield, who saw them later in the war, wrote that they 'walkc and looked like the kings in old poems'. The average height °f the Australian was 5 feet 8 inches; that of the New Zealande rs was over an inch more. One battalion of New Zealanders average3 "
The men
1
New
-
'
-
-
5 feet 11 inches.
Bridges was anxious to get the AIF away as soon as possib* e and had planned to send the horses off in the slower transports c)n August 28. However, as German warships were believed to P e cruising in the Indian Ocean, the Admiralty refused to allow tlie transports to sail except in convoy, and escorts could not P e provided until the Samoan and New Guinea operations had bee 11
wound
up.
Japan's entry into the war on August 22 greatly simplified tP e problem of the escort. The Japanese took over the blockade P* Tsingtao and the protection of trade north of Hong Kong, releasir £ the China Squadron for other duties. The Admiralty propose" that the New Zealand force should leave Wellington on Septembr r 20 under two of the 'P' class cruisers and join the Australia ^ fleet, which was to assemble at Albany. The whole convoy wouF sail for England in the first week of October under the Sydnr^ and Melbourne. This plan assumed that the Scharnhorst ar " l
1
1
Gneisenau would have been located or, better still, sunk, by tH e time the convoy was ready to depart. But the date of embarkatic,n drew near and the German cruisers were still at large. By now the New Zealand authorities were becoming increasingly uneasy about sending their transport to sea with an escort P* only 'P' class cruisers, obsolete vessels liable to frequent breaF" downs. The news of Spee's descent on Samoa caused a flurry r" alarm both in Australia and in New Zealand. The sudden rr" appearance of the German cruisers forced the Admiralty to revis' e 1 its arrangements for the convoy. The Australia, as we have see/ belonging New Guinea. Two ships was sent to cover the troops in to the China Squadron, the armoured cruiser Minotaur and tr ^ powerful Japanese battle-cruiser Ibuki, were ordered to procee' : to Freemantle to escort the combined Australian and New ZealarP convoy across the Indian Ocean. However, no additional measure s were taken to safeguard the transports on their voyage to tH e rendezvous. The Australian government now began to hav.^ 11 serious doubts about the wisdom of allowing its ships to sa round the coast of Australia without a naval escort. On Septembe r 24 the Governor-General of Australia, unable to conceal h iS e anxiety, confided to his opposite number in New Zealand that H Zealand goverrl" New did not consider the Tasman Sea safe. The ment immediately recalled two transports which had just le" Auckland on their way south, and postponed the sailing of th e remainder. Although the Admiralty still believed that an escoi*' was unnecessary, they decided, in view of local feeling, to sen ; the Minotaur and Ibuki to collect the New Zealand convoy an d bring it to Western Australia. '
1
Top
right:
The landings on Direction
Island. Centre: Admiral Patey.
commander of the Australian naval forces. Right: Tough and relatively untrained. New Zealand infantry embark
fit,
but
still
it
i
tL
Much to General Bridges's annoyance, the embarkation of the A1F was cancelled and those transports already at sea were ordered hack to port. This false start was extremely frustrating for the troops and had a had effect on discipline. At the end of September news was received of Spee's attack on Papeete. As Papeete was 2.300 miles from New Zealand, the German cruiser could no longer he regarded as a threat to shipping in the Tasman Sea Nevertheless, the New Zealand government Stubbornly insisted that the Minotaur and Ibuki should come to escort transports as arranged. At long last the great convoy began to assemble. On October 16 the New Zealand transport left Wellington under the protection of the Minotaur, Ibuki and two of the 'P' class cruisers and headed out into stormy waters of the Tasman Sea. Almost simultaneously the Australian transports started to make their way towards Albany. By October 28 all 26 ships lay at anchor in the harbour oi' King George's Sound. Hard on the heels of the last Australian transport came the ten ships of the New Zealand convoy. Early on November 1 the Orient liner Oroieto, carrying General Bridges and his staff, led the convoy out to sea. Off Freemantle it was joined by two large Western Australian transports and the ships took up their final stations. The convoy covered an area of over 20 square miles. At the head steamed the graceful Minotaur whose Captain, Edward Kiddle, was the senior naval officer. The Australian transports followed about five miles behind, arranged in three parallel lines. Then came the New Zealand transports in two lines. The Sydney hovered about four miles away on the port beam; the Ibuki, belching dense clouds of smoke from her three funnels, was on the starboard beam. The Melbourne brought up the rear. The speed of the convoy was dictated by the Southern, which could make barely ten knots and was the target of many a curse and gibe. The discipline of the convoy left a good deal to be desired, the Australian transports being the worst offenders. Their stationkeeping was poor, and at night, some of them, disregarding the order to dim all lights, twinkled like floating hotels. Rubbish was constantly being thrown overboard and the commander had to remind his charges that 'this is not a paper-chase'. Strict precautions were taken as the convoy approached the Cocos Islands where, it was thought, the Emden and possibly the Konigsberg might be lying in wait. It would have been suicidal for the Emden to make an attempt on the convoy in daylight but, in view of the skill and daring of her captain, Karl von Muller, there was a danger that he might try to slip in among the transports at night. Actually, Muller had no idea that the convoy was at sea.
'Strange warship approaching' On October 8, when the convoy was about 230 miles south-east of the Cocos Islands, the Minotaur was ordered to proceed to the Cape of Good Hope, a change of plan brought about by Spee's victory at Coronel. The Emden, which was at this moment about 250 miles ahead of the convoy, intercepted the Minotaur's signals, but supposed them to come from the light cruiser Newcastle. With the departure of the Minotaur, Captain Silver of the Melbourne took charge of the convoy. As dawn broke on November 9 the convoy was some 50 miles east of the Cocos Islands, ploughing through a tranquil sea. Suddenly, at 0624 hours, the wireless operators intercepted a message in an unknown code and heard the Cocos wireless station calling: 'What is that code?' After trying unsuccessfully to raise the Minotaur, the Cocos station put out a general call: SOS Strange warship approaching.' Then there was silence.
The Melbourne at once pulled away from the convoy and had begun to steam at full speed towards the Cocos Islands when Captain Silver remembered that his first duty was to protect the transports. Reluctantly, he turned back, ordering the Sydney to go in his place. The Sydney got up steam and soon disappeared over the horizon, travelling at 20 knots. At 0940J|j|MMgi||Brehwards ported that she had sighted an enemy cruiser steeriH|j|
and the Melbourne moved over and took up a position far out on the port beam of the convoy. The Ibuki had also heard the Sydney's signal and was eager to join the fray. The troops thronging the decks of the transports saw her race across the bows of the convoy, smoke billowing from her funnels, her decks cleared for action and two huge ensigns of the rising sun streaming out in the breeze. But the Melbourne refused to let her leave the convoy. Officers and men gazed across the sea and strained their ears for the distant rumble of gunfire, but the only sound of battle was the spluttering of the wireless. At 1144 hours the Sydney signalled: 'Emden beached and done for.' This was the first time that the enemy ship had been positively identified and the news of the Sydney's success was greeted with cheers. The convoy sailed on, and after another night of steaming without lights a report was received that the Konigsberg had been run to earth on the coast of Africa. This meant that the only two enemy cruisers in the Indian Ocean were now accounted for. The convoy was broken up and 13 of the transports were sent ahead to
Colombo
to fuel
and water.
From Colombo the convoy proceeded in three divisions to Aden. From there they were sent to reinforce the garrison in Egypt, a disappointment to many of the men who thought they were going to the Western Front. Arrangements were made for the Australians and New Zealanders to encamp near Cairo and on December 3 the troops
began
to
On December 28
disembark at Alexandria. a second contingent of Australian
and New Zealand troops left Albany for Egypt. The Australian troops on board included the 4th Infantry Brigade and the 2nd Light Horse Brigade. In command of the former was a man who was to become one of Australia's most famous soldiers: Colonel John Monash. By the end of 1914 Germany had been stripped of all her Pacific colonies and her warships had been driven from the surrounding seas. While the Australians and New Zealanders occupied the German islands south of the equator, the Japanese occupied those to the north. The German colonies were weakly defended and, since British sea power prevented reinforcements from being sent out, their fall was only a matter of time. The German cruisers achieved negligible results and Spee only succeeded in delaying the departure of the Australian and New Zealand convoy, of whose existence, owing to poor Intelligence, he was unaware. By a strange irony the Australia scarcely fired a shot in anger during the First World War. Yet the part she played in 1914, if unspec-
was of immense importance. The presence of the Australia helped to drive Spee from the western Pacific and certainly deterred him from venturing into Australasian waters, where he might have done serious damage. As it was, the Admiralty considered the Pacific so secure that it withdrew the Australia, Melbourne and Sydney for service elsewhere. During the remaining years of the war the troopships crossed the Indian Ocean unhindered, often without an escort, carrying the youth of Australia and New Zealand to the battlefields of Europe. tacular,
Further Reading Bean, C. E W.. Anzac to Amiens (Canberra: Australian
War Memorial,
1946) Corbett. Sir Julian
and Newbolt, Sir Henry, Naval Operations (Longmans 1920-1931) Lucas. Sir Charles. The Empire at War (OUP 1921-1924) Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 (Sydney Angus & Robertson 1938-1939) Schuler, P. F. E.. Australia in Arms (T. Fisher Unwin 1916) Waite, W., The New Zealanders at Gallipoli (Wellington: Whitcomb &
Tombs, 1921)
CHRISTOPHER DOWLING was born m New Zealand and educated at Highgate 5 School and Oriel College, Oxford After a year m industry he returned to Oxforc \ to complete a D.Phil thesis on naval his^^urirK^^^jgieontc wars. He is £•
SociefplPP^^SIWHhe
Councillor of the Navy Records Museum Services at Londa^s Imperial
Department
War Museum
...
GOEBEN & BRESLAU
The ones that got away At the very moment of Britain's declaration of war, confusion at the Admiralty and lack of the 'Nelson Touch' among her commanders at sea allowed two German ships, the Goeben and the Breslau to escape the British Mediterranean Fleet. Richard Wright describes their escape into the Dardanelles which was to have far reaching effects on the course of the war At the beginning of August 1914 the French Fleet was the largest in the Mediterranean, totalling 16 battleships, six cruisers and 14 destroyers. Only one of its battleships the flagship Courbet, was of the dreadnought type, six of the remainder being of the Danton class, built between 1908 and 1911. The designed speed of the Danton class ships was no more than 19 knots, and they were armed with four 12-inch and 12 9.4-inch guns. The rest of the French battleships were of older vintage still, and quite obsolete. The principal task of this force, at the beginning of the war with Germany, was to safeguard the passage of the transports conveying the 80,000 men of the French Colonial Corps from Algeria to Marseilles for service on the Western Front. The Fleet's Commander-in-Chief was Admiral Boue de Lapeyrere, a forceful and
competent officer, who had been largely responsible for the modernisation of the French navy. The British Mediterranean Fleet consisted of three battlecruisers each of 18,000 tons, with an armament of eight 12-inch guns, and a speed of 25i knots, four armoured cruisers of 14,000 tons, armed with 9.2-inch and 7.5-inch guns, lour light cruisers armed with 6-inch and 4-inch guns, and a number of destroyers Its commander was Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne, with the four armoured cruisers forming the Fust Cruiser Squadron under Rear-Admiral Troubridge. Admiral Fisher had linn opposed to Above. The Goeben and the Breslau Under command of the German Admiral Souchon, their task was more diplomatic than naval
Milne's appointment to the Mediterranean Fleet in 1911, regarding it as a Court appointment since Milne, who had heen Groomin-Waiting to Edward VII. was still an intimate at Court and had spent a good deal of his service on the royal yacht. Milne was of a somewhat inflexible cast of mind, and even wrote of himself that he never disobeyed an order and never used his discretion. These characteristics were to prove a considerable handicap during the opening days of the war. The mam tasks of the British Fleet were to assist the French in the event o\' war and to watch for the three dreadnoughts and three other battleships belonging to the Austrian Fleet at the port of Pola in the Adriatic, In addition, since Italy had been negotiating with Germany and Austria for some time and it was uncertain whether or not she would remain neutral, Milne's fleet had to keep an eye on her navy, with its three modern dreadnoughts. Germany, with the second largest fleet in the world, maintained only two ships in the Mediterranean. The larger of these was the battle-cruiser SMS Goeben of 23,000 tons, mounting ten 11-inch and 12 a. 9-inch guns, and with a trial speed of 27.2 knots. She was superior in individual speed and fire-power to any other ship in the Mediterranean. Her consort SMS Breslau, on the other hand, was only a light cruiser of 4,550 tons, armed with 10 4.1-inch guns. The squadron's commander was Admiral Souchon, 'a droopjawed determined little man in a long, ill-fitting frock-coat, looking more like a parson than an admiral', but he seems to have been as skilled a diplomat as he was a sailor, displaying throughout the next few days a strong awareness of the political implications of his orders, and often anticipating them. The task of his squadron was ostensibly to show the flag, but in reality to be in readiness to attack the French troop transports. Eventually, however, it was to be required for quite a different purpose. The Goeben was at Haifa when the news came through of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo. Her boilers had been leaking water for some time, and she was due to return to Kiel for repairs in October. Souchon, realised that war was approaching and made for Pola, where he telegraphed to the Admiralty in Berlin to send new boiler tubes and skilled repair men there at once. At Pola repairs were carried out throughout July, but were still not completed when Souchon received the telegram warning him of the imminence of war. He left Pola
SMS
Goeben. At the moment of her entry into the Dardanelles with her consort, Breslau. Turkey was still holding back from entering the war The sale of the two ships, conducted with extraordinary diplomatic skill by the Germans, brought the Ottoman Empire a step nearer to joining the conflict. After the sale, the Goeben was renamed the Yavuz Sultan Selim
with the intention of breaking out into the Atlantic after inflicting what damage he could on the French transports, but his fuel was insufficient, for though he tried to coal at Brindisi, he was refused supplies by the still-neutral Italians and had to make for Messina where he could obtain coal from German merchant ships. On the way Goeben was joined by Breslau at Taranto.
Under false colours At Messina Souchon requisitioned a German merchant steamer, the General, and took on 2,000 tons of coal. At 1300 hours on August 3 he left Messina and headed towards the Algerian coast where he intended to bombard the French embarkation ports of Philipeville and Bone. News of the declaration of war with France was received at 1800 hours and Souchon pressed forward towards the Algerian coast. Eight hours later he received instructions to proceed at once to Constantinople, as the German government wished to sway Turkish opinion in favour of entering the war on the side of the Central Powers. These he disregarded temporarily, ran up the Russian flag, contrary to the Hague Convention, and bombarded Philipeville, whilst the Breslau attacked Bone. This action only delayed the departure of the French transports for a few days until convoys could be formed. Souchon then turned back towards Messina intending to take on more coal before proceeding to Constantinople. In the meantime Milne's fleet had assembled at Malta with instructions to watch the mouth of the Adriatic for the Austrians and to shadow the Goeben. Two battle-cruisers were sent to the Adriatic together with Troubridge's Cruiser Squadron, while the light cruiser Chatham was sent to watch for Goeben in the Straits of Messina. Chatham failed to find Goeben, and Milne, having heard reports of a German collier at Majorca, concluded that she would make for the Atlantic. He therefore detached the battlecruisers Indomitable and Indefatigable from Troubridge's squadron, and sent them westwards to hunt for the German ships. In point of fact Lapeyrere with the French fleet had been moving southwards from Toulon since 0400 hours and would have effecGoeben 's exit. Britain was still officially neutral, however, and full wireless communication had not been established between the French and British commanders, although Milne tried to contact Lapeyrere all day without success.
tively barred
Then at 0930 hours on the morning of the 4th Indomitable and Indefatigable encountered Goeben and Breslau returning eastwards from Philipeville and Bone. Germany and Britain were not yet at war. though Kennedy, the senior British officer, in Indomitable, knew that it was imminent. The two forces crossed one another's path, guns trained fore and aft, omitting the customary salutes. Then the British ships turned and followed Goeben for nearly five hours, determined to keep her in sight until war should he declared, reporting her position to Milne, who informed the Admiralty: 'Indomitable and Indefatigable shadowing Goeben and Breslau, 37.44 North, 7.56 East.' Churchill telegraphed hack 'Very good. Hold her. War imminent.' and tried desperately to persuade the Cabinet to authorise an attack on the German ships should they attack the French transports. But the Cahinet refused to permit an attack before the expiry of Britain's ultimatum to Germany at midnight, and a British opportunity was lost. The chase continued. Souchon drove Goeben to her utmost. Stokers who normally could not work for more than two hours at a stretch were kept at work in the heat and four of them died between morning and evening as speed was maintained. Slowly the German ships drew ahead, until only the light cruiser Dublin still had the enemy in sight. In London the First Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, pointed out There is still time to sink the Goeben before dark". Churchill, his hands tied by the Cabinet decision, could make no reply. During the night of August 4 the Goeben and Breslau, still pursued by the Dublin, disappeared into the fog off the north coast of Sicily. During the 5th and 6th the two German ships took on coal at Messina. Milne had been instructed to respect Italian neutrality and not to go within six miles of the kalian coast. This precluded him from entering the Straits of Messina, and he therefore set Inflexible and Indefatigable to patrol west of Sicily, while the light cruiser Gloucester, backed up by Troubridge's squadron in the Adriatic, patrolled in the south. Twelve hours
after
he reached Messina Souchon was warned by
the Italians that the rules of international law required his departure from a neutral port within 24 hours of arrival, but he persuaded the authorities to count the 24 hours from the time he had been warned rather than his time of arrival. The respite gained was important, since coaling was being carried out. under
great difficulties, from German merchant ships whose decks in some cases had almost to be dismantled to allow the fuel to he transferred. At noon on August 6 he ordered his men, exhausted by their efforts in the heat, to rest, and decided to sail at 1700 hours when the ultimatum expired. The 1500 tons of coal which had heen taken on were insufficient to reach the Dardanelles, and a collier was therefore sent on ahead to a rendezvous at Cape Malea on the south coast of Greece. Then, just before he set out, Souchon received a telegram informing him that entry into the Dardanelles w as inadvisable for the time being. Enver Pasha (Turkish Minister for War) had agreed to the entry of the German ships, but the Grand Vizier and other members of the anti-war party in the Turkish Cabinet were anxious to maintain Turkish neutrality, or at least to keep both sides guessing. Souchon was also informed that no help could be expected from the Austrian Fleet. Despite this he decided to make for the Dardanelles, in his own words 'to force the Turks, even against their will, to spread the war to the Black Sea against their ancient enemy, Russia'. 7
Those about to die That afternoon the officers of the two ships made their wills and prepared for a fight against odds. Sicilian newspapers published highly-coloured accounts of the Germans' anticipated fate at the hands of the powerful British fleet, which they, as well as the Germans, assumed to be lurking at the exit to the Straits. Hawkers crowded the quays selling postcards and souvenirs 'to those about to die".
In fact the only British ship waiting for them was the light cruiser Gloucester, commanded by Captain Howard Kelly. Souchon set a course east and Kelly signalled this course to Admiral Milne. Later Souchon altered his course to north-east to give the impression he was making for the Adriatic, where Troubridge's cruisers were patrolling. The possibility of Souchon's making for the Dardanelles did not occur to Milne. The Gloucester continued to shadow the Goeben and Breslau. As night fell Kelly began to lose sight of the German ships against the dark mass of the Italian coast. He therefore changed course towards the coast so that the Goeben should be visible in the light of the moon when it rose. In order to do this he had to steer direct for
whose vastly superior armament was capable of blowthe ing his ship out of the water. The Goeben did not open lire since time, ami the precarious state of her fuel supplies, did not permit of this, but instead Souchon sent the Breslau to head off the British light cruiser. Thus the Gloucester was forced hack through lack of sea room, hut continued to shadow the two German ships. Soon. Souchon could no longer persist in his falsi' course and later that night turned south-eastwards, at the same tunc trying to jam the Gloucester's wireless messages. He was not successful, and a message reporting the German change of course reached Milne and Troubridge about midnight. Troubridge with his four armoured cruisers began to steam south from the Adriatic. At the same time the Dublin turned north from Malta to attempt to head the enemy off, encountering the Breslau and attempting to find the Goeben - hut without success. Troubridge reckoned that his was a superior force at night or in fading light, hut an inferior force in lull daylight. His ships' combined firepower amounted to 22 9.2-inch guns, 14 7.5-inch and '20 6-inch. The total weight of his broadside was about one-third as much again as that of he German ship, with a far higher rate of tire Yet at 0400 hours Troubridge decided to give up the chase. Among the reasons he gave for this were that Admiralty instructions at the beginning of the war had heen that a superior force was not to he engaged by day. though this, Churchill said later, was intended only to refer to the Austrian Fleet. In addition Troubridge listened to the advice of his Flag Captain. Fawcet Wray. a gunnery expert, who took the view that the Goeben, with her superior speed and the greater range of her guns, could circle round the four British ships and destroy them one by one. In addition Tn.ubridge's destroyers were almost out of coal, which ruled out the possibility of a torpedo attack, and finally he was expecting the despatch of two hatt le-cruisers from Milne. So the Cruiser Squadron slowed down, and when the expected battlecruisers did not appear, put into the port of Zante before resuming its watch in the Adriatic. Both Troubridge and Wray can be criticized for their exaggerated respect for German naval i
t
gunnery and
for letting slip
an opportunity of
at
least
delaying
the Goeben.
Meanwhile Howard Kelly in the Gloucester was still shadowing the German ships. At 0530 hours Milne signalled him to drop astern gradually in order to avoid capture, but Kelly nevertheless continued his pursuit. The Breslau rejoined the Goeben. and passed back and forth in front of the Gloucester as though to drop mines. Kelly pressed on. however, and the Breslau dropped hack in order to ride the Gloucester off. Kelly opened fire with the intention of delaying the Goeben by forcing her to protect the Breslau. and the Goeben did in fact open fire, whereupon Kelly broke off the action, but continued to shadow the enemy for a further three hours, until Milne ordered him not to continue the chase beyond Cape Matapan. This point being reached at 17:50 hours on August 7, the Gloucester turned back, and the Goeben and Breslau disappeared among the isles of Greece to rendezvous with their collier. Shortly after midnight Milne left Malta with three battlecruisers and the light cruiser Weymouth, and headed slowly eastwards. At about 1400 hours the following afternoon he received a code telegram from the Admiralty stating that Austria had entered the war, and decided to group his forces together against this new threat. He therefore signalled to Troubridge to join him. and took up a position where he could not be cut off from Malta should the Austrian Fleet emerge from the Adriatic. The telegram had been released in error, and was corrected 24 hours later, but nearly 40 hours had heen lost before Milne resumed the now cold trail. Milne still did not believe Souchon to have any intention of making for the Dardanelles, but considered it his task to prevent the two German ships from bombarding Fort Said and Alexandria. The Goeben and Breslau coaled during the 8th and 0th off the island of Dhenousa in the Aegean, with steam up. ready to depart short notice. Souchon believed that the British ships were nearer than they really were, and dared not use his wireless to communicate directly with Constantinople. He therefore sent Captain Fiedler in the General on to Smyrna to act as a wireless link, relaying messages from Constantinople at low power. He sent a message to the German naval attache urging him to go to any lengths to arrange a passage through the minefield- ol the Dardanelles, with or without the formal permission of the Turkish government. Early on the morning of the 10th Fiedler relayed a reply to Souchon: 'Enter. Demand surrender of forts. Capture pilot.' The German ships left Dhenousa at dawn, reaching the entrance to the Dardanelles, under the guns of Cape Holies and Kum Kale, at 1700 hours, and Souchon signalled for a pilot. at
3
1
At Constantinople. Finer was in conference with a member of the German military mission when another member of the mission. Colonel von Kress, entered with the news that the Goeben and Breslau were at the entrance to the straits. He asked Enver to allow their passage. Enver tried at first to temporise, saying that the Grand Vizier must he consulted, hut Kress insisted on an immediate answer. Finer consented, and Kress asked a further question: 'If the British warships follow them, are they to be fired on?' Again Enver hesitated, and again Kress insisted. Finally Finer consented, and the two ships were led through the minefields by a pilot cutter. Milne, meanwhile, was searching for the Goeben and Breslau among the Aegean Islands, still convinced that it was Souchon's
Below: The German light cruiser. SMS Breslau Sold in the early days war to the Turkish Navy, she was renamed the Midilh Displacement: 4550 tons. Length: 446 feet. Beam: 43 feet Armament: 12 4 1-inch guns. Crew: 370 men
of the
^?*$& Captain von Kotner (seated centre) and officers of the Breslau. After her sale, the Breslau's crew was replaced by Turkish naval personnel. Right: Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne. His mishandling of the Goeben and Breslau chase stemmed Left:
primarily from his conservative cast of mind.
A former Groom-inWaiting to Edward VII, he wrote of himself that he never disobeyed an order and never used his discretion
I
\
I
+ £ i
t 9 I
f
i
'
t
t
The German
battle-cruiser,
SMS Goeben.
Beam: 96%
Displacement: 23,000 tons.
Power/Speed: 70,000 hp/27 knots. Armament: 10 11-inch, 12 6-inch and 12 24-pounder guns. Armour: Belt 11 inches, turrets 8 inches. Crew: 1107 men Below: The escape of the Goeben and the Breslau. The start of the war found the Breslau in Taranto. She was joined by the battle-cruiser Goeben en route for Algeria where together they shelled the French embarkation ports of Bone and Phil ipeville. Passing back via Messina, Goeben and Breslau managed to shake off the British cruisers Dublin and Glouceste/^anti proceeded towards Turkey. Milne, whose handling of the chase wastQkCost him hrrs.job, remained committed to bottling up the Adriatic and faile^tkto anticipate^ the German Admiral's motives Length: 610
feet.
feet.
for sailing east
AUQ
Goeben Breslau British
Ships
French troop transports 100 Miles
160 Kms.
Sardinia
TYRRHENIAN
SEA
Sicily Str. Phili
ppevilte
of Messina
TR0UBRIDGE
Bone
Tunis*
ALGERIA
TUNISIA
^7
INDOMITABLE & INDEFATIGABLE
AUG
3
Malta
,4
3 BATTLE
A/
346
intention to make for Pola or for the Atlantic. Even on the following day, when Milne heard that the two ships were at Constantinople, he continued to patrol the Aegean, to ensure that they did not re-enter the Mediterranean. At Constantinople, Allied ambassadors insisted on the replacement of the crews of the two ships by Turkish naval personnel. The Turks, still hoping to hold on to their neutrality, asked the Germans to disarm their ships 'temporarily and superficially only', but Wangenheim absolutely refused to consider this. Finally the suggestion was made that the arrival of the ships could be regarded as a delivery under contract, since Wangenheim had informally promised them to Enver after Britain had requisitioned the two Turkish battleships. The ships could be regarded as being sold to Turkey. The sale was announced to the diplomatic corps, and the Goeben and Breslau were re-named the Yavuz Sultan Selim and the Midilli respectively, with Souchon named as Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish navy. The replacement of the requisitioned battleships by these two fine ships was a German diplomatic coup which brought Turkey a step nearer entering the war as Germany's ally. Milne, when the full facts about the episode became known, was informed that he would not be taking up his next appoint-
ment. He was never again employed. Troubridge demanded a Court of Enquiry which ordered his trial by Court Martial on a charge of 'From negligence or other default forbearing to pursue the chase of HIGM's ship Goeben, being an enemy then flying'. He was acquitted, but feeling in the fleet ran so high against him that he was never again employed at sea, finishing the war in command of the naval guns landed in support of the Serbs. Captain Wray was another officer whose part in the episode spelled the end of his professional career. Captain Howard Kelly of the Gloucester, apart from his brother John, the only British officer to come well out of the affair, was awarded the Companionship
Bath for his tenacious pursuit of the German ships from Cape Matapan. The escape of the Goeben and Breslau was, on the British side, as much a strategic and diplomatic failure as it was a naval one. It had its roots in a failure to take Turkey seriously. Churchill's comment, 'scandalous, crumbling decrepit, penniless Turkey', adequately expresses the prevailing British attitude, which ignored or underestimated the revival of national pride under the Young Turks. On the naval side there was a lack of clear direction from the top. Admiralty orders to Milne were confusing and badh' worded. Then there was a lack of communication and co-ordination between Milne and Lapeyrere. For Germany the episode was a strategic success of the first of the
Sicily to
magnitude, strengthening their already good relations with the strategically placed Ottoman Empire. Souchon and Wangenheim anticipated, and sometimes exceeded their orders, showing considerably more initiative than their British opponents. The British official naval history records, justly, 'few naval decisions more bold and well-judged were ever taken'. Further Reading Corbett, Sir Julian, Naval Operations. History of the Great War Vol. (Longmans, 1921) Hough, R., The Big Battleship (M. Joseph, 1966) Milne, Admiral Sir B., The Flight of the Goeben and Breslau (1921) Souchon, Admiral, Der Krieg zur See (Reichsarchiv) Tuchman, B., August 1914 (Constable, 1962)
1
RICHARD WRIGHT was born in Plymouth in 1933. He comes of a family with naval associations, and has taken an interest in naval history, with special reference to the two world wars, for some years. He is at present Technical Information Officer for a London engineering firm.
O Dardanelles^ Canakkale/£
Constantinople.
//& ^*
UG %//Cape He lies"?
Cape Matapan AUG 7 1730 hours
Crete ..
SOUTH AFRICA
Rebellion and Invasion South Africa was the
of the Dominions to take up arms on Britain's behalf, but in doing so she seriously imperilled her own internal security. Although greatly in South Africa's own interest, the invasion of German South West Africa aroused deep opposition among Afrikaners in whom bitter memories of the Boer War still lingered. South Africa's leaders faced not only the problems of invasion but also of rebellion. Patrick Scrivenor
On May vaal
first
31, 1902, the forces of the Trans-
and Orange Free State Republics
finally surrendered to the British. For just under three years a total of 66,000 Boers had tied down 300,000 British troops in South Africa, and in doing so had driven the British to adopt measures that left an inerradicable mark on the Afrikaans consciousness. With the collapse of the regular forces of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, the Boer leaders had fallen back on guerilla tactics, to which their way of life, and skill with rifles and horses, so ideally suited them. Unable to pin down the elusive 'commandos', the British forces under Lord Kitchener saw fit to cut off the Boers from their sources of supply by burning farms and packing the inhabitants into concentration camps. In the camps, as a result of maladministration and malnutrition, 22,251 Afrikaner women and children died, and for each
348
family in the camps there was a wrecked homestead on the veldt. In effect, the Boer War brought about the complete destruction of the two republics, and hastened the end of their already declining
way of life. Whatever its rights and wrongs, the importance of this war
pastoral
here is the great bitterness of feeling caused among Afrikaners.
it
Throughout their struggle the Boer republics were supported, materially and morally, by Germany. The Kaiser's notorious telegram to President Kruger, the consignments of Mauser rifles and ammunition to the republics, and the outcry in the German press against the British policy of farm-burning and concentration camps, brought relations between Britain and Germany to the lowest ebb they had yet experienced. Yet in spite of these tragic events, in spite of the deep division between Briton
A South Africa
in
1914.
The former
British
colonies combine with the former Boer republics to form the Union of South Africa. In August 1914, the Union undertook the invasion of the German colony of South West Africa on behalf of Great Britain, but this move was so unpopular that it provoked a rebellion
among until
dissatisfied Afrikaners. It was not. new year of 1915 that the invasion
the
got fully under
way
and in spite between Germany and the Afrikaners, South Africa entered the First World War in 1914 as a united nation, as an ally of Britain, and under the leadership of two of the most resolute and skilled former opponents of the British, General Botha, and Jan Christiaan Smuts. Although it will be seen that this
and Boer within South
Africa,
of the natural rapport
unity was not as complete as it seemed, it is remarkable that it was achieved at all. The task of reconstruction that faced
the victorious British in 1902 was formidFor three years the British Army had used the High Veld of South Africa as a sort of giant Salisbury Plain. Agriculture in the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and to a lesser extent in the Cape, was virtually at a standstill. The inmates of the concentration camps, black and white, had to be repatriated, and those whose able.
homes Lord Kitchener had thoughtfully burned, had to be provided with new ones. Only money, and a great deal of it, would solve these problems, and only the British Treasury could find enough money quickly enough. Under the terms of the surrender, the British government paid an outright indemnity of £3,000,000 towards the cost of repairing the ravages of the war in what had now become the Crown Colonies of the Orange River and the Transvaal, and this was followed by a redevelopment loan, negotiated by Lord Milner and Joseph Chamberlain, of £35,000,000. In addition to this help from the British government, the Colonial governments provided their own schemes of compensation. South Africa was now divided into four British colonies: the Cape Colony, the Orange River Colony, the Transvaal, and Natal. The idea of a United South Africa
been present, particularly the British (who naturally thought of a United South Africa as a British possession), and after the upheavals of the Boer War, it became increasingly obvious that South Africa's problems could only be solved by some kind of union or federation. During the years between the end of the Boer War and the Act of Union, 19021910, the Milner administration laid much of the groundwork of union. As governor of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, Milner was able to unify under his control the South African constabulary, and the South African railways. He further set up the Intercolonial Council to coordinate all other matters of mutual concern to the four colonies. In 1903 a customs conference was convened at Bloemfontein, and this swept away the tariff walls between the colonies.
had
always
among
No new exodus At the same time, other changes were taking place within the four colonies. Hitherto, the Afrikaans had always been able to escape from the burden of British government by trekking further and further into the interior. This escape was no longer open to them. All Africa was parcelled up among the European powers, and there was nowhere that a new exodus of Boers could go to establish their own nation. The British victory and the ruthlessness with which it was accomplished forced the Afrikaners to realise two things. Firstly they had to accept that their immediate future lay in South Africa under British rule; and secondly they were forced to realise that they were a people, with an identity and potential of their own. In the years after the Boer War the Afrikaners began to find their feet, at first culturally and then politically. Afrikaans, hitherto a despised offshoot of High Dutch, began to be treated as a language in its
own
The 'Second Language Camwas lent strength by the extreme unwisdom of the Milner administration in right.
paign'
trying to impose English as the medium of instruction in schools throughout the four colonies. The two ex-republics set up 'op-
position' schools with Afrikaans and High Dutch as the medium of instruction. Afri-
kaans also made great strides as a spoken and written language against High Dutch. By the end of the first decade of the century, High Dutch was confined to a few old guard Afrikaners and the Dutch Reformed Church. Side by side with this cultural revival went the beginnings of political organisation. Initially the Boer leaders stood aloof from the post-war colonial administration. In 1903 Botha, de la Rey, and Smuts declined seats in the Transvaal Legislative Council, and confined their energies to reconciling the divisions among their own people. In January 1905, Botha formed the Het Volk party in the Transvaal, pledged to conciliation with the British and self government. In May 1906, Steyn and Hertzog formed the Orangia Unie party in Orange River Colony, and in the Cape Colony Hofmeyr's party, formerly called the Bond, was renamed the South African Party in the hope of attracting moderate
English support and counterweighting the aggressively English Progressive Party. All this political activity rapidly bore fruit.
The Liberal government
in Britain
favoured responsible government for the ex-republics, and in July 1906 elections in the Transvaal returned Het Volk with a majority over all the other parties. Botha and Smuts took office, and in December 1906 limited self government was granted to the Transvaal, and subsequently to the Orange River Colony (under the leadership of Fischer and Hertzog). In February 1908 the South African Party ousted the Progressives in the Cape Colony Legislative Council Elections. In this way, three of the four colonies had passed into Afrikaner hands within five years of the end of the Boer War, and in June 1908 the governments of the four colonies agreed to send delegates to a National Convention in October of that year, to discuss the possibility of union.
to
The Convention May 1909, and
sat
from October 1908
at the end of that time
proposals were accepted by the governments of the Cape, Transvaal and Orange River colonies, and by a referendum in Natal. Embodied in the South Africa Act, they were duly passed by Westminster and received the Royal Assent. The Union of South Africa was brought into being as a legislative union under the Crown. The executive power was wielded by a GovernorGeneral and ten ministers. The legislative body was to be a two-house parliament consisting of a Senate of 40 members, and an Assembly of 121 members. The former colonies each became a province, and the seats in the Assembly were shared out on a proportional basis between them. Each province had its own Provincial Council, its
elected for a three-year term, exercising what powers the central parliament saw fit to delegate to it. One Supreme Court for the Union was established, organised in Apellate, Provincial and Local Divisions. Local pride was appeased by the device of a split capital: Cape Town became the legislative capital, Bloemfontein the seat of the judiciary, and Pretoria the executive capital. The franchise was confined to Europeans, except for the Cape Coloured community who received voting rights. No sooner had the South Africa Act become law, than the political parties in South Africa prepared themselves for 1
battle. The Progressives in the Cape, Orange Free State, and the Transvaal, had already combined in the Unionist Party under Dr Jameson (of Jameson Raid fame); Botha's Het Volk combined with Hofmeyr's South African Party to form the South African National Party; the Natal representatives all stood as Independents: and the small but fast growing Labour Party, mainly centred on the mines, threw its weight behind Botha. The elections established Botha and the South African Nationalist Party firmly in power, and he was able to exercise considerable breadth in selecting his Cabinet. Smuts became Minister of Defence, and Hertzog Minister
electoral
of Justice. In 1910 Botha found himself at the head of a nation, which while it had a unitary constitution, was very far from being effectively united. The next four years were to be devoted to easing the strains and stresses that threatened to tear the new nation apart. A better team for this task
than
Louis
Botha
Smuts would be
and Jan Christiaan
difficult to
imagine. Botha,
a Natal-born Afrikaner, brought up and trained in the Transvaal, had fought with great distinction against the British during the Boer War. He was possessed of great charm and tact, but had a resolute will and a great deal of determination. In 1910 he was looked up to almost as 'a father of his people' by many Afrikaners, and had the sympathy of a large part of the Englishspeaking population as well. His Minister of Defence, Smuts, must rank as one of the most remarkable men of this century, and certainly as the greatest South African of his time. Born of Afrikaner stock in the Cape, he was educated at Stellenbosch University" and Cambridge, where he read law. He thus absorbed from an early age the twin South African culture of English and Dutch. He became State Attorney to the Transvaal under President Kruger before the Boer War, and at the outbreak of war took the field against the British. After the collapse of the Transvaal forces, he led a brilliantly successful commando raid into the Capo to within 100 miles of Cape Town. A hard worker and a relentless task master, he presented during these early years an unsympathetic, rather cold figure, but the driving force of his personality showed in
everything he set his hand his
hand
to the
making
of
and he set ho now South
to, I
Africa with a vengeance.
A sharp reaction at once the divisions within South Africa began to show themselves. South Africa had outgrown the traditional Afrikaans way of life and the mentality that matched it. Railways, commerce, the need for centralised administration, taxation and all the trappings of a modern state meant nothing to the farmers of the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and the north-west Cape. As soon as they realised that union and self-government did not
Almost
1
1
simply mean Afrikaner hegemony and a resumption of the Lekker Lewe (the good life' or, to an Afrikaner, freedom from all authority), but on the contrary carried with them the responsibility of running an industrial state, a sharp reaction sot in. It was felt that there were too many British strings attached to union, and that Afrikaners were being dragged into expensive and possibly dangerous world affairs m the
ARCHBISHOP MIT7Y HIGH SCHCOL MEDIA CENTER SAN JOSE. CALIFORNIA 93120
Planned rebellion or spontaneous uprising? Right: The rebellion of 1914 involved only a minority of Afrikaners and was put down by loyal Afrikaner troops Above: The brother of a rebel gives information to loyal troops (left) General de la Rev (right) was shot in a police ambush at the outset of the rebellion Below: General Christiaan de Wet (left) raised troops to march on Pretoria and proclaim a republic
He was defeated by loyal troops and later hunted down by motonsed units (right)
wake
of an Empire whose last major undertaking had been the destruction of their independence, and as they saw it, of their \\a\ of life. They were apprehensive that the union government would accept large numbers of British immigrants, thereby weakening the Afrikaners' numerical position in the country, and they were deeply suspicious of Botha's attendance of the Imperial Conference of 1911, and what
commitments
that might imply. Added to these political discontents were more serious economic ones. The Lekker Leive was over. There was no more land to trek to. Advances in scientific farming, several years of drought, large families, and the spread of the towns, all conspired to drive the less efficient farmers to the wall. The number of 'Poor Whites' increased alarmingly, and sons of Boers were even to be found in the mines — a degradation unthinkable a generation earlier. All these grievances found a resting place in the bosom of the Minister of Justice. Hertzog. He first quarrelled with Botha over the language problem. Hertzog supported a 'mother tongue' educational policy, but while in theory this seemed a fair and sensible system, in practice the expense of duplicating teaching facilities, and the rarity of fully bilingual teachers, made it impracticable. Any alternative scheme was regarded by Hertzog with the gravest suspicion, and although he and Botha did not quarrel openly on this occasion, it was clear that Hertzog represented a powerful section of Afrikaner opinion, and that he was beginning to drift into uncompromising, die-hard attitudes. In October 1912, for reasons that still remain unclear, Hertzog made a bitterly partisan speech at Ny 1st room in the Orange Free State. His subject was harmless enough — the possibility of two independent streams of culture in South Africa, Afrikaans and English, but his tone was an unmistakable challenge to Botha's leadership. Two months later at De Wildt, he made a speech attacking the idea of conciliation with the British, the very idea that had been Botha's watchword since the formation of Het Volk. This was a direct attack and could not be ignored. Botha resigned, was immediately asked by the GovernorGeneral to form another ministry, and did so excluding Hertzog. This action split the Afrikaner community down the middle, and seriously weakened the government's standing among the disaffected Afrikaners.
From
this
moment onwards many
kaners
regarded
traitors
who had
Botha
and
Afri-
Smuts as
'sold out' to the British,
and grouped themselves behind Hertzog in his newly-formed Nationalist Party. Discontent among the Afrikaners was not the only problem that the young South Africa had to face. From 1910 onwards the mines were in a state of spasmodic
350
unrest. The gulf between labour and capital was becoming very wide, and at the same time the imported Chinese and even the native Bantu were becoming capable of skilled work. This situation gave rise to a labour movement among white skilled workers that was at once extremely left-
wing and immovably
racialist,
demand-
ing segregation of the races and the restriction of coloured labour to unskilled work. In July 1913 a strike on the Witwatersrand mines developed into a riot which had to be put down with troops, and in January 1914 a proposed general strike was crushed by prompt measures on the part of the government. Nine strike leaders were deported, arbitrarily and entirely illegally, by Smuts, an action which provoked a storm of criticism. The debate which followed this event showed a significant trend: the Unionists made common cause with the South African National Party, while the Labour Party and Hertzog's nationalists joined in attacking
Botha and Smuts. South Africa in 1914 therefore stood as follows. Botha and Smuts and the South
African National Party held power, drawing their support from the moderate British and Afrikaners. The disaffected Afrikaners, particularly in the Orange Free State, backed Hertzog who took a
uncompromising anti-British line. mining community supported the small but powerful Labour Party, and the English speaking community supported hard
The
the Unionists, temporarily in alliance with
Botha and Smuts. One more thread needs to be added to the situation in South Africa in 1914. In 1911 Botha had attended the Imperial Conference in London. This automatically involved Botha and South Africa in British and Empire foreign policy planning, and he was taken into the full confidence of the Foreign Office and the Committee of each theory, In South Africa, was entirely at liberty 'to do just as she pleased' in the event of Britain's being engaged in a war. In practice each Dominion, belligerent or not, could have found herself the target of Britain's enemies, so this freedom of decision was to a large extent illusory, and Imperial
Dominion,
Defence. including
two important naval radio stations, one at Luderitzbucht and one at Swakopmund. These and the anchorage of Walfisch Bay, situated on the flank of an important sea route, could not be left in the hands of the enemy. The South African government's motives in accepting this scheme were more complex. Outwardly their case was that as allies of Britain
they could not well decline
to do a service well within their capacity. Behind this however lay a long standing
ambition to possess the territory of German South West Africa, and the fear that if they declined to take part in this operation, it would be performed by Australian or Indian troops, thus robbing South Africa of any claim to the captured colony. If the government were anxious to undertake this campaign on behalf of Great Britain, there were many to whom the decision caused grave misgivings. The area of the Cape Province bordering on German South West Africa was one of the most depressed economically, and disaffected politically, in South Africa. Relations with German South West Africa had always been friendly — there was even a small Boer community within the German colony. The Germans had helped the Boers in their struggle against the British, and many Afrikaners saw them as more 'natural' allies than the British. The small German garrison posed no threat to South
and many thought it unwise to antagonise a power that might, after all, win the war. On August 14, 1914 Botha and Smuts called the commandants of the South Africa Defence Force together to brief them on their wartime obligations, and to make arrangements for raising troops to replace Africa,
South Africa, occupying as she did the vital of Good Hope, would have found it difficult to refuse to take action on Britain's behalf. One result of the Imperial Conference was the South African Defence Act, which provided for a small regular force in South Africa (with a cadre of officers) to be supplemented in time of war by a combination of existing urban volunteer units and the old Boer Commandos. All members of this force were liable to service anywhere in Africa in the event of war.
Cape
Vital wireless stations
August 1914 war came. No sooner had Great Britain declared war on Germany than the South African government cabled its willingness to free the Imperial Garrison in South Africa (6,000 men) In
for service elsewhere.
On August
7 Britain
accepted this offer and suggested in the same cable that the South African governseize German South West Africa. The advantages of this scheme from the British point of view are obvious. Apart from the general policy of stripping Germany of her colonies, there was the need to capture the
ment
the outgoing Imperial garrison. The question of invading South West Africa was not under discussion, but nonetheless an intransigent and hostile attitude was displayed by many of the officers present, particularly three of them, Beyers, Kemp and Maritz. On August 26 the invasion policy was debated in the Assembly, and was hotly opposed by Hertzog. The decision to invade was nonetheless carried, although in the Senate another Boer War general, de la Rey (in all other matters a devoted adherent of Botha), refused to vote for the policy. £2,000,000 was voted for the maintenance of 15,000 troops for six months, and the Defence Force was warned to hold itself in readiness for service any-
where
in Africa.
On September
13 Beyers and Kemp commissions, giving the decision to invade as the reason, and Beyers and the old general, de la Rey, set out on September 14 for the Defence Force camp at Potchefstroom, where 1,600 men were already gathered. What their intentions were must remain a matter for speculation, as a police patrol on the watch for motor car bandits, opened fire on their car and killed de la Rey. There is no doubt that Kemp, at any rate, intended to use the men at Potchefstroom to march on Pretoria and stage a coup d'etat, and it is probable that Beyers and de la Rey were implicated as well. Beyers denied any such intention, but joined de Wet (a leading anti-government figure in the Orange Free State) in denouncing the campaign
resigned
their
and calling upon the government to withdraw their troops from the German South West African border. Botha's response to
was to give an undertaking that only volunteers would be used against the Germans, and to assume command Of these forces in person. This concession might at this stage have mollified Afrikaner opinion, had it not been for the activities of Maritz, the commander of the Union Forces at Upington on the South West African border. Maritz should never have been entrusted with this command, and Smuts, with many misgivings, had consented to his appointment only under intense pressure from Beyers. An unbalanced man, obsessed with many deep prejudices, Maritz hated the British, Jews and native Africans with equal intensity. He had been in collusion with the German authorities in South West Africa since August 21, and only the fact that they did not trust him, prevented their supplying him with sufficient arms to raise a full scale rebellion in the northern Cape. Early in October he crossed the South West African border with his forces and handed over to the Germans such men as would not join his rebellion as prisoners of war. On October 10 he proclaimed the independence of South Africa and declared war against Great Britain. The government's reaction to this treachery was sudden and decisive. A state of Martial Law was proclaimed, and the troops already gathered in Defence this challenge
Force camps were promptly commandeered to crush the rebels. In the Transvaal a party of commandeered troops mutinied, and fled with other sympathisers to the farm where Beyers was staying. In the Orange Free State de Wet and his supporters used force to try to stop the recruiting of volunteers, and while Botha was occupied crushing Beyer's mutineers near Rustenburg, de Wet proclaimed his intention of getting in touch with Maritz, marching to Pretoria and declaring a re-
From the government's point of view the situation was grave. Beyers, although his forces were scattered at Rustonburg, was still at large; Kemp, having 'requisitioned' men and material in the Western Transvaal, was on his way across the Kalahari to join Maritz; and it was known that a German squadron had sunk two British warships at Coronel and might well be on its way to South Africa. However, the mobilising of tin- Defence Force was almost complete, and as the majority remained loyal Botha had 40,000 public.
men
in the field, all Afrikaners. English-
speaking contingents were kept in the background to prevent any racial bitterness being added to the strife. On November 9 government troops and de Wei's forces clashed at Doomberg on the Sand River. De Wet's son was killed, thus destroying any chance of negotiating with his now embittered father. Therefore on November 12 Botha It'll upon de Wet at Mushroom Valley and routed him. De Wet himself escaped hut was run down l>\ troops in motor cars while trying to reach Maritz on December 2, and on December 8 Beyers was drowned while trying to cross the Vaal.
The
and purposes
was to all intents Kemp, after an epic
rebellion over.
crossing of the Kalahari, joined Maritz, and on January 25, 1915 they attacked and
captured Upington. Within a week however Kemp saw the futility of his cause and took advantage of Botha's earlier amnesty terms to surrender. Maritz fled to South West Africa, and later to Angola.
.
able to turn his attention to the long deferred invasion of the German colony. Three months of precious time had been it was now high summer. As August 10, L914, the decision had been taken to seize the wireless stations of Swakopmund and Liideritz-
and
lost,
early
as
bucht
with small expeditionary forces assisted by the Royal Navy. Since then these forces had been stagnating in the two ports mentioned, and they now provided Botha with the solution to the otherwise overwhelming problems of terrain and supply that faced him. The German garrison in South West Africa was not large, 2,000 regular troops and 7,000
IMP
and against it Botha could 43,000 men. However South West Africa, although its central plateau pro-, vided fair grazing, was protected on all sides by desert. To the east lay the Kalahari; to the south the only slightly less desert wastes of Namaqualand; and the whole of the western coastal strip of the German colony consisted of a waterless plain, 40 miles wide. The Germans had command of the railway, which ran north and south along the spine of the colony, with branches to Luderitzbucht and Swakopmund. As they withdrew from these two places, they destroyed the railway reservists, field
zr***' r Bombs from capital of the
Much
German aircraft German colony
a
lines. fall
on Botha's forces encamped on the way
discussion has taken place as to collusion there was between the rebel leaders in 1914. There is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that plans were made between the rebels as early as August 14, but a conspiracy, even if it did exist, was not the prime cause of the rebellion. The desire for independence, still very strong among Afrikaners, was not appeased by the terms of the Act of Union, in which the Afrikaner farming community thought itself to be very much a 'poor relation' of the mining and commercial interests in South Africa. Many bitter memories lingered from the Boer War, and all those economic and social
how much
to
Windhuk, the
overwhelming superiornumbers, Botha faced great difficulties. Clearly an attack from the east across the Kalahari was out of the question. The southern route, from the Orange river So, in spite of his
ity
pressures which had led to the decay of the old independent Boer way of life were, with some justice, laid at the door of Britain. Maritz's outburst that he did not want the land ruled by Englishmen, niggers and Jews' expressed the feelings of many of his compatriots. The rebellion was the last fling of the spirit of independence that had previously led the Boers to face Zulu impis rather than British government; and to scrape a living from the sour veldt of the Orange Free State, rather than pay taxes in the fertile Cape.
Overwhelming problems With the rebellion
at
an end. Botha was
in
northwards, was feasible, but transport prevented its use for the main body of an attack on the German colony. Botha therefore decided to attack with four columns. The expeditionary force at Swakopmund was to be built up, and the main column, commanded by Botha, was to attack eastward from this base towards the central plateau and the colony's capital, Windhuk. Three lesser columns, commanded by Smuts, were to strike, one east from Luderitzbucht, and two north from the border with South Africa to Keetmanshoop and Gibeon. These three southern difficulties
Commando 1914 style The South African forces in 1914 were raised from both the British and Afrikaans sections of the population. The Afrikaans units
were organised
Commandos, and in many cases each man was
in
expected to supply his own weapon and horse A variety of rifles were used, including
German Mausers
columns were to join forces at Keetmanshoop and press north together. In February 1915, Botha arrived at Swakopmund and at once set about repairing the railway, and solving the supply difficulties posed by the waterless coastal belt. Inefficiency (and some sharp practice) by the Remounts and Transport service of the Union Defence Force, and also Botha's need to treat the relations between British and Afrikaner troops 'serving together for the
first
much
time)
delay.
with kid gloves, caused
The problems
of
communica-
with comparatively small numbers of troops operating in four columns widely separated over vast distances of desert, were huge. It was not until April that operations got seriously under way. As the German Commander-in-Chief, General von Heydebreck, was content to tions,
withdraw into the interior, the coastal columns gained the edge of the central plateau, at Jackhalswater and Aus rewithout spectively, encountering any difficulties worse than a lack of water caused by the pollution of wells with sheep-dip by the Germans. From Aus, Smuts moved forward to Keetmanshoop, where his two southern columns converged with excellent timing. All three
columns pursued the Germans north, and on April 25 fell upon the German rearguard at Gibeon, inflicting severe losses. The main German body escaped north. At Gibeon the southern columns halted, while attack in the north developed. On 6 Botha took Karibib, and by the 20th had entered Windhuk, where, on the strength of 4,000 troops still at large in the north of the colony, the German governor tried to negotiate a partition of the colony. Botha, whose patrols were already in pursuit of the remaining German forces, rejected the governor's proposals, but the need for fresh horses, and slowness in the repair of the bridge blown by the Germans at Usakos, prevented pursuit with his main force until June L0. On July 9, 1915 the last German forces surrendered at Tsumeb, after a march, incredibly rapid in the circumstances, of 120 miles in one week by Botha's forces. Of his force, which by the end of the campaign totalled 50,000 men. Botha had lost only 1 13 killed and 31 1 wounded.
the
May
Further Reading Davenport, T. R. H., The South African Rebellion 1914 (English Historical Review No 78, 1963) Gifford and Louis, Britain and Germany in Africa (Yale University Press, 1967) Hancock, W. K., Smuts, Vol 1 The Sanguine Years (Cambridge University Press 1962) Segal and First, South West Africa (Andre Deutsch 1967) Thompson, L M The Unification of South Africa 1902-10 (OUP, 1960) Walker, E. A., A History of South Africa (Long.
,
mans, Green & Co., 1935)
m Jr
PATRICK SCRIVENOR was born in 1943 in Jerusalem. Subsequently he lived in West Africa and South Africa, where he was at school in Cape Town He was educated at the King's School Cantertnnv and Oriel College Oxford, where his special subiect was military history From 1964-67 he served as a regular officer in the 1st Battalion, The Royal Ulster Rifles, with whom he spent six months confronting President Sukarno In 1968 he joined the staff of Purnell's History of the Second World War, and became Executive Editor of the History of the First World War.
Fiasco at Tanga
Above: East Africa: theatre of operations. All along the coast, the Germans had observation posts in constant communication with each other. The movements of British ships were thus accurately charted. Over this vast area, wide variation in climate, wild animals and diseasecarrying insects added further hazards and discomfort to the combatants
354
— Allied and German
alike. Inset:
The
Battle of Tanga.
The
British
suffered a decisive defeat at Tanga through their apparent disregard of elementary principles of war, particularly that of surprise. Right: This photograph (presumably posed) shows a German colonial officer with two Askaris in bush' country
Major R. J. Sibley. Britain's assumption that the war in East Africa would be quickly over left her woefully unprepared for a full scale conflict. High quality reinforcements were withheld in favour of other theatres of war and what troops were sent (from India) were under-trained and inexperienced, lacking arms, ammunition and transport. The senior officer inspecting them prior to their departure remarked that 'the campaign would either be a walk-over or a tragedy'
t,
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The uniform and equipment worn by these soldiers were usually modified to suit the particular conditions of war: the puttees
and boots, for example, were frequently dis-
In the scramble for Africa and the subsequent Anglo-German agreement of July 1885, Germany had acquired an area of 700 miles from north to south and about 600 miles from east to west known as German East Africa (present day Tanzania), an area of land nearly as big as France and Germany together. The boundary line between German East Africa, British East Africa (present day Kenya)
carded. This Askari
and Uganda was an arbitrary line drawn on the map with little or no reference to the
carries his rolled
African population or the natural features.
blanket on his back; his
The Germans had been harsh in their colonial approach to the Africans and the Maji Maji Rebellion in the early 1900's was put down with great severity on the part of the German forces. Later, many reforms
rifle
would be an
SMLE.303
introduced by Dr Dernburg, changed the attitude towards the Africans, and during the period 1906-1914 some Africans appreciated the Germans did have a little
German
more to offer than just oppression. They were harsh, but they were just, and during the years 1914-1918 there was no revolt by the Africans against the Germans. There were many features peculiar to German East Africa which made this theatre of war so different from the others. There was a wide variation in climate, from the sweltering damp heat of the coast near Dar es Salaam and Tanga, to the
356
fierce penetrating sun and dust of the Central Plateau. Furthermore, there were the cold mists of the highlands near Moshi and the foothills of Kilimanjaro and also further south, near Iringa and Sao Hill area, or as they are commonly known, the Southern Highlands. Most of the area over which the campaign was fought was covered in 'bush' — scrub ranging from an open park land to a thick, dense forest. Whatever type, it was in many cases an obstacle to military operations. There was also a plethora of other hazards to plague the soldiers who had to contend with rhinoceros, elephant, lion, crocodiles, climatic conditions and a constant battle against mosquitos, tsetse flies, jigger fleas, ticks and a host of tropical diseases caused by some of these insects — malaria, bilharzia and sleeping sickness. There were also scorpions, warrior ants and wild bees. It is even said that some of these insects were put to use by the German commander in
Europe during the First World War would not work in German East Africa, so a new system — particularly of fire and movement in difficult country, and communication over vast distances, had to be designed. The vast distances involved made the movement of troops from one theatre of operations to another very difficult, and this was further accentuated by the lack of accurate maps. The Germans started the cam-
Bottom: German Askaris line up in front of a reconnaissance plane. The lack of accurate maps in East Africa lent an added importance to reconnaissance work. Below: Lieutenant-Colonel Paul von Lettow Vorbeck (far left) with officers of the German Schutztruppe and friends in East Africa. Lettow Vorbeck's drive and professional ability were vital factors on Germany's side
in
the East African
campaign
his battles.
Clearly the problems that beset the comin German East Africa were not to be found in other theatres of operations and this fact must always be kept in mind. The problems of logistics — that of obtaining food, water and ammunition — were a constant headache, not to mention the
manders
problem of health. The
tactics
employed
in
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paign with an advantage because they were working on interior linos of communications, whereas the Allied powers had to fight with exterior linos of communications, so for them the task of troop movement and resupply wore much more difficult.
At the outbreak of war, British East Africa and Uganda were totally unpre-
pared
for
The telegram from
hostilities.
the Colonial Office to Sir Henry Belfield on July 29, 1914 stated that precautionary measures were to he put into force. In fact, the military forces in British East Africa and Uganda at the time were the 3rd Battalion The King's African Rifles, the 4th Battalion The King's African Hitlos and four companies of the 1st Battalion The King's African Rifles. In all, this totalled 17 small companies and there was no existing organisation which could
expand them. Rifles (KAR), who to bear the brunt of the fighting in
The King's African were
the initial stages of the war, were spread over three territories. The 3rd Bn KAR had its headquarters in Nairobi but the five
companies and its Camel Company were dispersed throughout British East Africa. The Headquarters of the 4th Bn KAR were in Bombo and the seven companies were dispersed in Uganda. The governor was overall Commander-in-Chief and exercised his authority through the commanding This naturally led to a certain degree of friction. The British strength on August 4, 1914 was 62 officers and 2,319 African ranks, a ratio of roughly 30 Africans to one European. The soldiers, or Askaris as they were known, were infantry soldiers carrying rifles, and each company had one machine gun. There was no artilofficers.
lery in this force. It
was
significant that
there was no organisation to expand the KAR and therefore, as the campaign progressed, reinforcements had to be diverted from India to this particular theatre. It is interesting to speculate why there was no organisation for reinforcing the KAR. Possibly it was because the British did not expect the war in East Africa to be prolonged and that the Germans and British would come to some agreement to terminate hostilities quickly, since any indication that there was hostility between the European races, they felt, would inevitably affect their position vis-a-vis the Africans.
European volunteers There was no shortage of European volunteers at the beginning of the war and nearly 3,000 came forward, but there were no arms, no ammunition, no transport, and no staff to organise them. Nevertheless a volunteer reserve was set up and the East African Mounted Rifles and East African Regiment were formed. The defence
force (Schutztruppe) of GerEast Africa was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul von Lettow Vorbeck, a Prussian officer who had considerable experience of colonial or guerrilla-type warfare. This he had gained in China during the Boxer Revolt of 1900-1901, in South West Africa in the Herero Campaign of 1904-1906 when he served on the staff of General von Trotha, and as an independent company detachment commander. He had been wounded in 1906 in South West Africa and had visited German East Africa on his way back to Germany. The strength of his character, his drive and outstanding professional ability were to be major factors in the campaign about to begin. At the outbreak of the war the German forces were organised on much the same
man
lines as the British. Their defence force
was composed
of independent regular companies (each of three platoons which were self-contained, mobile tactical units containing their own supply and transport i,
sub-unit. These companies were known either as Feldkompangie (FK) or Schutzenkompagnie (SehKi and there were 14 of them with an overall strength of 260 Germans and approximately 2,472 Askaris. Each company had from two to four machine guns and also 250 carriers to lift supplies and ammunition. The 1871 pattern rifles, which used black powder, was still in use in eight of these companies, and this was tactically significant since the smoke from the black powder gave away the soldiers' positions. This had had little or no effect during tribal wars but in a war with more sophisticated opponents it could have severe repercussions.
Lettow Vorbeck
lost
no time
in
taking
the offensive and persuaded the Governor, Dr Schnee (who still hoped that there would be no war so that his colonial development could proceed unhindered) to allow the German troops to concentrate in the north of the colony. The vital sector, from the standpoint of either side, lay on the boundary of the two territories between Mount Kilimanjaro and the sea. This was not only the main area of German settlement but, more important, the place where, on either side of the border, ran two railways—the British railway linking Uganda and Nairobi with the outside world and the German line from Tanga to the settled areas around Kilimanjaro. The British railway was most vulnerable where it approached the border in an area of uncultivated and uninhabited bush, but the German line was protected by the Usambara ranges and was, in some measure,
Under fire, German Askaris carry supplies across open country during the fight for Tanga
tPOif
*
•«./y.*:
IT
' Tlr*,
*
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t
?c:
; secure from raiding parties. Colonel von Lettow Vorbeck took the view that the Germans could best protect their colony by threatening the enemy in their own territory at the sensitive point, the Uganda railway, but his long-term strategy was to force the British to commit as many troops to East Africa as possible, thus preventing them from going to the other, more important, theatres of operation. After he had completed his initial. tour of inspection, he realised that communications and supplies would be of vital importance if a successful long-term war was to be fought, and so he appointed MajorGeneral Wahle, a retired officer who was visiting Dar es Salaam at the time, to take charge of the lines of communication. The first German move was to be against Taveta, a small post at the south-eastern foot of Mount Kilimanjaro. The German commander at Moshi, Captain Tom von Prince, demanded that the post at Taveta should be evacuated and on August 15 (just as the landing of the BEF in France was nearing completion), Colonel von Bock and Lieutenant Boell moved across the border of German East Africa and seized
Taveta and then attempted to exploit their success by pushing further into British territory, striking for the
and
in the direction of
Uganda railway
Mombasa. They were
met, however, by the King's African Rifles under the command of Colonel L. E. S. Ward, who had quickly deployed on their own to meet the German threat. Alone in the field they prevented further incursion into British territory.
When
Governor of British East Africa, Sir Henry Belfield, asked for reinforcements, the Colonial Office turned to the India Office. They had already been asked to provide troops for the main the
theatres of
passed
to
war and so the request was Committee of Imperial was decided that India should the
Defence. It provide two forces, one
to
capture the
principal German port, and another to reinforce the King's African Rifles. The Indian Expeditionary Force 'C\ as it was and to be known, was to reinforce the comprised of 29th Punjabis, two Imperial Service Battalions (made up of half battalions from the states of Bhurtpore, Jind, Kapurthala and Rampur), 27 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, Battery of
KAR
Calcutta Volunteers and a machine gun This force was commanded by Brigadier General J. M. Stewart. battery.
Prompt
action, quick results Arriving in Mombasa on September 1, 29th Punjabis provided a much needed reinforcement in the Kilimanjaro area where the KAR had successfully held the enemy thrusts from the foothills of the mountain, in addition to putting down tribal unrest which had been instigated by German propaganda. Colonel von Lettow Vorbeck had commanders, 'prompt telegraphed his action promised quick results', but it was the equally prompt action of the King's African Rifles that had saved the British Protectorate, and now the Germans realised that an easy victory was impossible. Meanwhile another Expeditionary Force, 'B', was assembling in Bombay, having taken a lower priority to the demands of Europe, Egypt, Persian Gulf and North West Frontier. The 27th Bangalore Brigade and an Imperial Service Brigade were selected, but their title was misleading as they were assembled from the length and breadth of India and were strangers to each other and to their new commanders. Command of Expeditionary Force 'B' was
held by Major General Aitken. The quality of the one British battalion in this force was unquestionable, but the Indian battalions were not of this quality: the 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry and 98th Infantry had not seen active service for a generation and these deficiencies were magnified by the lack of training and knowledge of each other. Prior to embarkation, the regiments equipped with a converted MLE Rifle were rearmed with a standard short Lee-Enfield, which was totally unfamiliar to them. The senior staff officer remai'ked to General Aitken, after inspecting the troops at Bombay that 'the campaign will either be a walk-over or a tragedy'. General Aitken left India with Expeditionary Force 'B' on October 16, with the task of bringing the whole of German East Africa under British authority by effecting a landing in Tanga while Expeditionary Force 'C pushed forward to Moshi. The presence in East African waters of the German cruiser SMS Konigsberg presented a threat to shipping and particularly to ships bringing reinforcements from India. The Konigsberg, the sister ship of SMS Niirnberg, carried ten 4.1-inch guns and was faster than any of the three British cruisers in Admiral King-Hall's Cape Squadron — HMS Hyacinth, Astraea and Pegasus. On July 31 Captain Max Looff, commanding the Konigsberg, slipped out of Dar es Salaam for the open sea and on August 6 sank the City of Winchester off Aden, but was not seen again until Sep-
tember 20 when he sailed into Zanzibar and sank HMS Pegasus.
The effect of these successes was to bring three more British cruisers into East African waters, HMS Chatham, Dartmouth and
Weymouth
v'"?;-'
NA *<&< *?/'
4Jk TJk
'MY.
IV
under
Captain
Drurv-
Lowe, with orders to find and destroy the But the Germans had obser \ation posts all alone the coast in communication with each other. Thej also had agents in all the major towns. When British ships loft harbour or were spotted along the coast the information was passed rapidly to Tabora or Dar es Salaam and signal to S\\ Africa, Berlin and back to !<> this method the Kbnigs the A was verj much in the picture- as to what our ships wore dome and parth as a result was not discovered until October 30, hiding in the Rufiji River, the hanks of which wore well defended. General Ait ken was not prepared to detach troops to secure the land defences, and Kdnigsberg was n< prepared to venture to sea, but her ten 4.1 -inch mms were nevertheless a source of danger to the British forces in East Africa from then on. The journey from India to Mombasa was miserable for the Indian troops of Expeditionary Force B'. Even physical training was a problem as their ships were so small that all available space was taken up. This was particularly true of the Assouan of ,900 tons carrying the 63rd. whose future performance in action could be partly attributed to the rigours of the voyage. On arrival at Mombasa General Aitken conferred with the governor, and Tanga was settled on as his force's destination. What scant Intelligence there was about the German dispositions indicated that the coastal areas were lightly held and that '
1
the German force was concentrated at Moshi. Captain Meinertzhagen (GSO 3 Intelligence) who had already seen service in East Africa, indicated that the Germans could get troops to Tanga with the greatest of ease, but his advice was disregarded. So too was an offer of assistance from the commanding officer of the KAR. The value of the KAR in bush warfare had yet to be recognised. General Aitken for the first time was informed by Captain Caulfield RN that the Royal Navy had made a truce with the
Germans
at
Tanga and Dar
es
Salaam and
the Germans would have to be told if this truce were to be broken. The naval officers insisted, and Aitken reluctantly agreed that the Germans would have to be warned of the repudiation of the Admiralty's local truce. So at one stroke, a cardinal principle of war, surprise, was sacrificed. On November 2 Captain Caulfield in
HMS the
Fox steamed abrogation
into
of the result that
Tanga
to
truce,
with
notify
the
Lettow Vorbeck immediate despatched from Moshi down the railway to Tanga one and a half companies, and lour more companies and headquarters followed on November 3. Captain Baumstark with two companies north of Tanga was also ordered to move on the town. Captain Caulfield now refused to take HMS Fox inside the harbour for fear of mines, and mine-sweeping operation^ were begun. Aitken was therefore forced to look for other landing places and beaches 'A', 'B' and 'C were selected. Darkness fell quickly on the night of November 2. At about 2200 hours the 13th Rajputs and 61st Pioneers landed in full moonlight at beach 'A' after wading through deep water from the lighter. Their objectives were found empty and the covering force secured its foothold, 'but the men both of the 13th and of the 61st, debilitated by nearly a month of sea sickness and
360
were thoroughly exhausted', according to the Official History. The German 17/h FK had constructed a defensive position in depth based on well sited machine gun positions. The machine guns were always the basis of German tactics in East Africa because rifle fire in the hush always tended to be
Cramped quarters,
aimed high and was
not really effective.
'No spirit or grit' The 13th and 6 1st advanced on Tanga township, came under very heavy (ire from the German defensive position, and were held. Brigadier-Ceneral Tighe committed his reserve, and at this moment the commanding officer of the 13th and his adjutant were severely wounded. The newly arrived German FKs began an enveloping movement and the British force pulled back in great disorder. The GSO 3 Intelligence wrote in his diary, 'We suffered some 300 casualties today and our men behaved disgracefully, showing no military spirit or grit. I never have had much faith in our second-rate Indian troops.' General Aitken decided that the Rajputs and Pioneers were unreliable and decided all troops except the gunners would be landed as soon as possible at beaches B' and 'C\ No orders were given for reconnaissance and in fact at that time Tanga was deserted, the German FKs having pulled back from the town. The German commander was more active than his opposite number and personally made a
reconnaissance into and through Tanga on a bicycle. He also appreciated the value of artillery and in his memoirs much regretted that his artillery, which would have been annihilating at such close range, had not arrived. Lettow Vorbeck, from his personal experiences in East Asia, felt that British troops were moving clumsily in battle and h'e was certain that in unknown close country, such as Tanga, their difficulties would be immense. General Aitken decided to advance on November 4 on a frontage sufficiently wide to turn the enemy's flank, the direction of the advance to be maintained by the 2 Loyal North Lancashire Regiment with the
other
less
reliable battalions the best battalions.
sand-
Dense wiched between sisal and the heat made it impossible for battalions to advance at the same speed and maintain contact Inevitably straggling occurred and the expected drill movement of a body of troops became the stampede of an uncontrollable mob.
The superior German fire tactics took and the 63rd Palamcottah Light
their toll
Infantry ceased to exist as a fighting unit, those remaining departed at great speed for the beaches forcing the battalion on their left to move to the right filling the gap caused by their departure. The 98th
whose morale suffered when 63rd moved back through them, were plagued by wild bees who had been roused from their Infantry,
hives in the trees by the high rifle fire. A little progress was made into Tanga by the two Kashmir battalions but on the extreme left the 101st Grenadiers, after putting up a stubborn fight, were forced to pull back. The German counter attack was developing against the British open left Hank. Lettow Vorbeck had appreciated that it did not reach further south than the right wing of his own, and as the troops began to withdraw panic was caused by carriers
who.
coming under
fire,
dropped
their
made for the beaches. They were German Askaris and this was
loads and
mistaken
for
the signal
ments
for
dash
the
more unreliable
regi-
Lettow Vorbeck pressed home his counterattack and the British assault crumbled. Aitken gave orders to re-embark the next day (November 5), and the embarkation was covered by the 2/Loyal North Lancashire and Kashmir Rifles. Even the sound of rifle fire caused the Indian troops to panic and many carriers attempted to swim for the boats. Orders were given that all supplies, ammunition and machine guns were to be left behind and a last appeal by the North Lanes to take the machine guns they were carrying was refused. As predicted the battle of Tanga ended in tragedy. The simple principles of war had been disregarded, the complete lack of surprise, the lack of Intelligence, the failure to make a reconnaissance, and the lack of co-operation between the navy and the army combined with the use of troops of questionable ability had made the Battle of Tanga a decisive defeat for the British and it was to have its repercussions for some considerable time to come. On November 8 Expeditionary Force 'B' arrived back in Mombasa, with over 800 to
casualties,
for the beaches.
and a
of morale
loss
many units unfit The Germans were able
rendered
which
to fight.
rearm three and discard their old 1871 pattern rifles. They collected vast amounts of ammunition and companies
with
modern
to
weapons,
clothing that the British left on the beaches, but above all they had achieved a victory with a loss of only 60 men over vastly superior numbers, and their morale had reached a peak which was to carry them through the remainder of the war when all other colonies had surrendered. Lettow Vorbeck wrote afterwards that 'Tanga was the birthday of the soldierly spirit in
our troops."
Further Reading Sketches of the East African Dolbey. Capt Campaign (Murray) Gardner. Brian. German East (Cassell. 1963) Lettow Vorbeck. Colonel von. My Reminiscences of East Africa Listowel. Judith. The Making of Tanganyika .
(Chatto&Wmdus.
1965)
Meinertzhagen. Colonel R Army Diary 18991926 fOhver 1960) Moseley. L Duel for Kilimanjaro (Weidenfeld .
..
& Nicolson) Moyse-Bartlett. H The King's African Rifles (Gale and Polden Ltd.) The Official History East Africa vol 1 (HMSO) .
MAJOR
R.
J.
SIBLEY, a serving Army
officer,
was
commissioned from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1955 into the Essex Regiment, and served with the Regiment in Hong Kong and Germany He was seconded to the 3 Bn The King's African Rifles in Kenya and later the 6 Bn The King's African Rifles in Tanganyika from 1958-61 Whilst in East Africa many of the battlefields of the 1914-18 East African Campaign were visited. From 1963-5 he was attached to the British Embassy in South and 1965-6 served in Berlin. From 1966-7 he was a student at the Royal Military College of Science and the Staff College Camberley Now in a staff appointment which entails lecturing officers in Tactics. He is a member of the Institute for Strategic Studies and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and has been awarded the Ogilby Trust prize for research in the field of Military History Africa,
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tin
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Seizing the German Colonies David Chandler. At the outbreak of war it was vital that the Allies should capture the German harbours and radio stations in West Africa; but little in the way of men and equipment was available for this difficult operation. Above: Troops of the 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regiment, commanded by British officers, board a train for Lagos. It was on these troops that the Allies' hopes of success depended Compared with the momentous events taking place in Europe, the first military operations in West Africa were insignificant in both size and scope. Nevertheless, the problems posed by the need to conquer the German colonies bordering the Bight of Benin and Biafra were highly complex, and the resulting military operations are of considerable interest. The Allied commanders, with only a few thousand British and French native troops, a handful of guns and one or two naval vessels at their disposal, were called upon to conquer areas totalling some 360,000 square miles of tropical country presenting great contrasts of climate and terrain, endowed with few roads and even fewer railways, and defended by European trained and officered African battalions which were in certain respects better-equipped than their
opponents. The conduct of these campaigns presented huge administrative difficulties, and were waged as much against Nature as against the Germans. In many ways the operations were reminiscent of the imperial expeditions of the previous half century, and indeed were actually under the control of the Colonial Office until April 1915. Germany had entered the 'race for Africa' considerably later than the British and French, but had gained control over several areas by 1914. The explorer and trader Dr Nachtigall laid claim to both Togoland and coastal Cameroon in 1884, and Germany had won international recognition for the former by 1890. As for Cameroon, its size had been vastly expanded in 1911 at the expense of French Equatorial Africa following the Agadir crisis. The natural French desire to regain
their former 100,000 square miles was one good reason for their eagerness to mount operations against the German joint colonies in 1914. There were also strategic considerations that made such action desir-
At Atakpame near Kamina in Togoland the Germans had constructed a power ful radio station and this, together with other stations built earlier at Douala in able.
Cameroon and Windhuk
in South West enabled Berlin to monitor— wi the assistance of a 'friendly' station in Brazil — all naval and mercantile radio messages in the South Atlantic and to issue instructions to her own shipping. Further, Douala possessed one of the finest natural harbours in Africa, and as Admiral Sir Henry Jackson pointed out, 'if the Germans had ever got command of the sea, or had B force in Douala, they would have made
Africa,
t
.1
the route to the
Cape very uncomfortable
indeed.'
Yet in spite of this awareness there were tew contingency plans for the reduction of the German colonies in existence at the outbreak of war Sn 1914. Indeed the British government only set up a subcommittee ol' the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider operations outside the European theatre on August 5, with Admiral Jackson serving as Deputy-Chairman. As a result much depended on the initiative of the men on the spot and their ability to extemporise expeditionary forces from such forces as were at their disposal. The British forces in West Africa were as follows. An Imperial Garrison was established at Freetown in Sierra Leone to protect the important coaling station there. This consisted of the 1st West India Regi-
were British
officered,
and
in total strength
possibly 7,000 men (exclusive of porters). However, a large proportion was perpetually engaged in internal security and policing operations in the various artificially created and feud-dominated countries to which they belonged, and could not be spared for invasions of neigh-
numbered
territories. The same was equally true of the various constabularies in the British colonies. The French were not much better off.
bouring
General
Aymerich,
Commander-in-Chief
of French Equatorial Africa, exercised military control from Brazzaville over
Middle Congo, Chad, Gabon and UbangiShari. His total force in 1914 comprised
575 French and 7,020 native troops, including two camel squadrons (in Chad), two battalions of Senegalese Tirailleurs,
Above: A workings
armed constabulary. The Germans
1,500
were also prepared to raise levies as need arose — a policy never permitted by the British colonial authorities. Furthermore the Germans were able to equip each company with three machine-guns, and this advantage in fire-power, together with that derived from superior local knowledge of terrain, went a long way to redress their numerical disadvantage, particularly in Cameroon. The campaign against the Germans in Togoland proved the shortest and one of the most successful of the First World War. Despite the absence on leave in England of both the governor and the commanding officer of the Gold Coast Regiment, the Acting-Governor, Mr Robinson, and Captain F. C. Bryant, RA lost no time in taking
the
initiative
without
awaiting
gun crew demonstrate the 12-pounder gun outside the fort at Dschang. The fort was captured from the Germans on January 2, 1915 and occupied briefly by the British who destroyed it (left) before retiring. Right: Sava Hill, Mora, the base of Allied forces in September 1914. British
of a naval
This dry, rocky country bordering the
Mandara Mountains
is
starkly different
from
much of the land further south which is low and swampy and has a ten-month wet season Far right: The theatre of operations, German Cameroons. Allied successes in Togoland had encouraged hopes of an early settlement of the war in West Africa; but the task facing the British and the French in the German Cameroons was to take months of arduous campaigning to achieve
ment, the West Africa Regiment, two companies of garrison artillery, one of sappers, and various supporting services. Permission to use any of these troops for operations outside Sierra Leone had to be obtained from the War Office, and the Colonial Office (initially entrusted with controlling the expeditions against Togo and Cameroon) had little wish to be beholden to another department of state. In therefore, this left only the West African Frontier Force (the WAFF, founded in 1897) immediately available. The Gold Coast Regiment comprised eight companies of infantry and one battery of guns; the Nigeria Regiment boasted four battalions (one company of mounted infantry and 32 line companies supported by two >atteries); Sierra Leone contributed one battalion, and tiny Gambia was defended by only a single company. All these forces
effect
362
and a few mountain guns. The French forces in Dahome and the Ivory Coast numbered possibly 3,500. But as in the case of the WAFF, the primary duty of these forces was to police the tribal areas where risings and revolts were endemic. Moreover, the French were very short of machine-guns. The British forces could boast about one per company, but their allies were nothing like so well provided for. As for the Germans, their troops were well-trained, well-equipped and generally well-led,
if
somewhat
inferior in overall
Togoland, the Acting-Governor, Major von Dbring, could call upon 300 European and some 1,200 native troops besides a number of police. In Cameroon, Herr Ebermaier, the Governor, was supported at the outset by 200 European officers, 3,200 African troops and three batteries of artillery, besides
numbers
to their opponents. In
instructions from the Colonial Mobilisation was rapidly completed, and by the outbreak of war the Gold Coast Regiment was ready to take the offensive. The ominous import of these preparations were not lost on Major von Doring, and on August 5 he promptly suggested that the two colonies should declare a state of local neutrality — hoping thereby to ensure the safety of Kamina radio. His suggestion was referred to London and rejected.
formal Office.
Tribal loyalty
Rumours that the Germans were
raising the tribes within their region induced certain British officers to ask leave to take similar measures in the Gold Coast, but this the colonial authority would not allow. The dangers of inter-tribal warfare, made all the more dangerous by the arti-
men from
ficial
colonial frontiers
which had
in
many
cases divided African peoples, were deemed far too serious. However there is no doubt that the Gold Coast tribes, particularly the Ashanti, were very keen to see active service — against whom was a matter of indifference. At a rally of chiefs held at Sunyani in late August, the provincial commissioner had the greatest difficulty in persuading the Paramount Chief of western Ashanti that the best contribution he could make to the war effort was to guarantee local order, and thus release police and troops for more active roles. The chief first wished to offer 5,000 warriors to assist the 'all-same canoe boss on the great river' (the translator's pidgin rendering of George V, 'the Sailor King'). When this was politely refused, he offered as many porters. On receiving the same response, the chief played his last card:
north and east of Togo. When news of these steps were signalled to London the Colonial Office was horrified and ordered that no further moves were to take place without their express permission. However, before the day was out London intercepted a German message sent from Kamina in clear, revealing that Doring was proposing to abandon the coast and fall back 100 miles towards the interior. The Colonial Office promptly executed a volte-face and ordered Bryant to occupy Lome and prepare it for use as a base for an advance towards Kamina. By the 7th the French had undertaken to send 28 officers and 450 Tirailleurs with two guns from Cheti and Grand Popo into eastern Togoland, while 500 irregular cavalry and a further force of infantry moved from Ouagadougou into German territory in the
*N^—V |
by a British or Empire soldier in the First
World War
(or so it is believed)
was aimed
a German rearguard by RSM Alhaji Grunshi. Bryant advanced along the line of the railway whilst a second column, at
commanded by Captain
P. E. L. Elgee prepared to march from Kete Krachi in support. The Germans, contrary to their withdrawal agreement, sent two trains of troops southward to delay the advance, but both engines and men were soon captured after the death of their commander, Captain Pfaeler. German demolitions were frequently encountered, but the column covered 60 miles in ten days to reach Nuatja, after crossing two rivers, the Lili and the Haho. Meanwhile a second column pushed on up the western railway line to guard the flank of the main party, and Bryant was Lake
^P*
British
<^D
French Forces
Forces
British
<=3
Forces
Chad (Brisset)
French Forces .'
Gold Coast
Army
German Forces
Dikwai
ft
Lamy« KousVen!
/
Land over 1600 feet
Nigerian Forces
Land over 1600 feet
Railway
50 Miles Railway
80
Kms J.
W
Takum
*
Sept 17
COL MAIRS COLUMN
IT
-nkom*~-^.0ssld
A
Nsanaking'
Sept 6
|%
GERIAN
'
n9 e
»°m, Manen- k *
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Mt.
Railway
Cameroon Buea« Victoria*
\ /, (Aymench)
22/77 Fernando Po Poito
Lome-Ke'a
•
Segum BRITISH
.
Aug
?
nmM
ROYAL NAVY •Knbi
COLUMN
MAIN
COLUMN (Bryant)
if
the
Germans
defeated,
why
Togoland were almost
north-west. That evening, as the French
not attack the French? In
advanced on Anecho, Captain Barker returned to Lome to receive the formal surrender of the 120-mile coastal belt from Herr Clauswitzer. He was joined there two days later by troops advancing from Afolao. Two days later Bryant (newly promoted to temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) was supervising the build-up of men and material at Lome. Eventually he had gathered 558 troops (including 23 British), 34 civilian experts, and 2,000 porters, many of whom arrived by sea having been safely transported through the boiling surf by the endeavours of two Elder-Dempster Shipping Line employees, Captain Minto and Mr Longhurst who were later awarded money grants 'charged against the expenses of the Togoland expedition'. On August 13 the advance on Kamina began. A day earlier the first shot fired
in
the end the Ashanti gave way, promised to keep the peace, and for good measure threw in a guarantee that they would refrain from eating any German nationals that might stray their way. The loyalty of this warlike people could not have been more convincingly demonstrated. Captain Bryant lost no time in taking measures to secure the occupation of Togoland.
On August
6,
Captain Barker was
sent to Lome under flag of truce to demand the surrender of the colony within 24 hours. Meanwhile three columns (varying in strength from one to four companies) formed up at Ada, British-Krachi and Gambaga ready to cross the frontier. The Governor of Dahomey had responded favourably to a suggestion that French forces should take similar action against the
joined by 158 Senegalese Tirailleurs at Abilafoe. As Bryant's patrols approached the
River Khra on August 21, enemy opposition stiffened. Reconnaissance revealed that the Germans were holding a stronglyentrenched position provided with wellsited machine-gun positions several hundred yards north of the demolished railway bridge over the river. On the 22nd, Bryant launched two columns against the position; the first (two companies strong, including a party of Frenchmen) was to attack up the railway line and simultaneously try to turn the enemy left. The second (one and a half companies and three light guns) was to hold the road and turn the German right. The battle raged from 1130 hours until dusk. The Allied force suffered heavily from the German machinegun fire (the first time British native
d3
troops had encountered this type of ordeal), and at nightfall the Germans— reinforced to 460 troops dining the day — were still in possession of all their positions. Bryant's force had suffered 75 casualties (including 21 killed) for Little gain. During the night, however, the Ger-
mans decamped
to
the northwards.
The
reason was the rapid advance being made by the French column from Cheti towards Kanuna. Nevertheless, it took Bryant two days to regroup his exhausted troops, and he deemed it necessary to call in Elgee's column from the west to reinforce him before pressing his advance again. The Germans, however, were about to concede that the campaign was lost. Early on the 25th they blew up Kamina radio station, and sent out emissaries to ask for terms. Bryant demanded unconditional surrender — and this was agreed on the 26th. Bryant forthwith signalled the Colonial Office as follows: T have the
Native troops under
German command
fire
a 2.95
honour
to inform you that Togoland surrendered unconditionally to me today. I occupy Kamina at 8 am tomorrow.' It must have been especially satisfying for a substantive captain to have conquered an area not much smaller than England in a mere three weeks.
'Dum-dum' bullets Kamina was occupied by
the French Comand Captain Elgee's
mandant, Maroix, column the next morning. They rounded up 260 German prisoners and much war material, including 1,000 rifles and a great deal of ammunition, including a quantity of softnosed dum-dum bullets. This last discovery confirmed earlier suspicions: 'Excuses will avail you nothing,' Bryant warned Doring, and charges of violating the Hague agreements were eventually preferred against the German Acting-Governor. Severity could be tempered, with magnanimity where noncombatant enemy nationals were concern-
Bryant declared that 'Englishmen do not fight women' and allowed a number to proceed to Lome under escort. He also went out of his way to inform the Baroness Codelli that her husband was safe and unharmed on the coast. So ended a brief and highly successful campaign. Admittedly the Germans had not offered much resistance before the Khra, but the advance represented a considerable administrative achievement. The War Office lost no time in promoting Bryant to forestall the accumulated wrath of the Colonial Office, occasioned by his repeated pressing-ahead without specific permission. The whole operation had been an object lesson of what local improvisation and determined leadership could achieve. The first moves against German Cameroon from Nigeria did not share the same
railways. The responsibility for planning and executing the invasion of Cameroon, with the radio station and natural harbour of Douala as the prime objectives, was from the first laid on the shoulders of MajorGeneral C. M. Dobell, Inspector-General of the WAFF. He was told that the French were very keen to participate in Cameroon's reduction in order to regain 100,000 square miles of territory in the Middle Congo region. General Dobell left England on August 31 accompanied by a small staff, and after calling at Gambia and Freetown to pick up British and French reinforce-
good fortune. Geography made 'tropical Prussia' easier to defend than Togoland.
ments, he reached Lagos in mid-September. He faced a difficult situation. Besides the
ed.
cm
gun.
German
resistance
in
the
in places. Communications were few and far between. A good road ran from Kribi to Yaounde, and two small railways linked the capital Douala with Eseka, and Bonaberi with Bare, known respectively as the Northern and Western
desert
Cameroons took months
of difficult fighting to
subdue
Roughly triangular in shape, measuring some 600 miles to Lake Chad, it presented marked variations of terrain and climate.
natural hazards and enemy forces already described, he found a newly-united Nigeria (the northern region had only been made
The
subordinate to Lagos on New Year's Day, 1914) with many racial and tribal problems beneath the surface. Towards the end of August three columns had assembled at suitable points along the
plain comprised dense rain to the north-west by Mount Cameroon (13,000 ft), and elsewhere by a number of rivers, tributaries and mangrove swamps. The rivers usually had dangerous bars at their mouths, and were not navigable for many miles before falls were encountered. The region had a ten month wet season and was diseaseridden. The western frontiers adjoining Nigeria were well protected by the Mancoastal
forest,
dominated
dara Mountains, which provided many natural fortresses to a defender. The centre of the country formed a temperate plateau of veldt-type country, but the eastern approaches from French Equatorial Africa were partially obstructed from an invader's point of view, by the neutral Spanish colony of Rio Muni. As the far north of the country was approached, the bush became sparser, merging into semi-
Nigeria-Cameroon frontier. That commanded by Captain Fox (four companies strong, including
some mounted
infantry)
advanced from Maiduguri until encountering the fortified position at Mora — dominated by a 1,700 foot mountain — on August 26. This was too strong to tackle with the forces available, so Fox decided to await the arrival of promised French reinLieutenant-Colonel under forcements Brisset from the Lake Chad area. The second column (600 rifles, five machineguns and two artillery pieces) conducted a difficult 100-mile march from Yola (March 22-28). Its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel P. Maclear, then attempted a night attack
364 i«
a
against the enemy detachment at Garoua on the River Benoue (August 29/30), but was driven back after sustaining 63 casualties. This setback sparked off a revolt among the peoples settled around the middle-reaches of the Benoue, but when the
Germans
tried to exploit this situation
by sending a raiding party against Wukari on September 17, it was beaten off with heavy losses by a detachment of the Nigeria Police. This restored the local situation. The third column, under LieutenantColonel G. T. Mair, proved even less fortunate. Advancing with four companies and as many guns on August 17 from Ikom, Mair successfully passed the Cross River and occupied Nsanakang over the Cameroon frontier. However, German reaction was swift. Rushing 500 riflemen supported by five machine-guns from Douala by train, the German commander, Kapitan Ramstedt, surrounded the 220-strong advance guard of Mair's column within Nsanakang on September 6. Decimated by superior fire-power, only 62 soldiers made good their escape. For a loss of perhaps 126 killed and wounded (including the force commander), the Germans killed 89 troops and captured 67 prisoners, two guns and five machine-guns. This tale of checks and disasters was only slightly ameliorated by the French record. Their initial drive from Fort Lamy against Koussery in the far north of Cameroon was repulsed with considerable loss and it was not until mid-September that a second attempt captured the frontier town. Such was the situation that Dobell found awaiting him. Insufficient forces was clear to the General that the forces already engaged and those accompanying him were insufficient for the task ahead. The Colonial Office now agreed that representations should be made to the War Office for permission to use part of the Sierra Leone Imperial Garrison, and in due course six companies of the West Africa Regiment and a battery of guns were sent to Nigeria. Similarly the Royal Navy made available Cumberland, the gunboat Dwarf and a few minesweepers to join Challenger and the French cruiser Bruix. These naval forces, together with a flotilla of the Nigeria Marine, were put under the command of Captain C. It
HMS
HMS
HMS
Fuller, RN. Dobell's initial
was
capture Douala by a combined operation. The Royal Navy moved first, and began the task of replacing the buoys and lights marking the channels. This done, Fuller discovered 11 blockships sunk across the river some miles below Douala, and also a minefield. Trying to find a way round this obstacle through the creeks, the flotilla came under repeated attack by the Hertzogin Elizabeth and Nachtigal, but by September 22 a plan
way through had been
to
discovered.
The
next day, HMS Challenger, and the main body of the expeditionary force in ten illequipped coasters, arrived at the river mouth. It was vital for health reasons to get the troops ashore with a minimum delay, and a combined reconnaissance force was sent off up the Dilamba Creek in an attempt to reach the Eastern Railway and cut it. Mangrove swamps made the going extremely hard. Two days later on September 25, the French transports arrived, and the same
afternoon HMS Challenger (lightened to reduce her draught from 22 ft to 19 ft 7 in. forced the passage past the wrecked blockships, while minesweepers tackled the mines. An ultimatum was then sent to the German Governor, only to be rejected, and so on the 26th the troops were disembarked in Dilamba Creek whilst the Challenger i
shelled Douala for several hours.
The Germans promptly dismantled
their'
radio station and destroyed certain key installations before surrendering Douala and Bonaberi to force majeur on the 27th. The Allies took possession of 95 vessels of all sizes, a floating dock, an ice-factory, a. good hospital and large amounts of stores (which were very welcome as the expedition had only been supplied with a month's rations). By the 28th, the Allies had 208 British and French officers, 436 white NCOs and ORs, and 4,310 native troops ashore, and three batteries. Dobell now faced a double problem. On the one hand he had to extemporise an administration to run the captured area — and his resources were slender in the extreme. Aided by his single administrative staff officer, Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Rowe, the General used civilian experts
and junior officers to create a nucleus of a staff and service system, and thanks to their joint knowledge of tropical countries, this proved sufficiently adaptable to meet and defeat successive crises in the realms of public health and supply. The second facet of Dobell's problem was the need to advance inland to conquer Cameroon as a whole. The Colonial Office — which, as in the case of the Togoland operations, was in charge of the theatre at this juncture — was alarmed because key German radio personnel escaped inland from Douala, taking some of their lighter equipment with them. There was, therefore, a chance they could establish a new radio station in the interior. The expedition set about this second task by mounting operations up Dilamba Creek on October 6 to dislodge German forces holding the Eastern Railway. After some very heavy fighting, three French columns converged on Edea on October 26 — the capture of which forced the enemy to retire up the River Sanaga. Meanwhile a second force was preparing to expand the conquered coastal area westwards. After overcoming daunting natural obstacles and considerable opposition, Colonel Gorges and a British column took Buea (4,000 ft) below Mount Cameroon. At this juncture 1,200 German military and civil prisoners had been taken, including nuns, women and children. All were shipped off to in-
ternment decision
in British or French colonies — that drew a loud protest from
Germany. Dobell was now free to concentrate against the Northern Railway, and by December 10 the railhead at Bare had been reached and occupied. Three weeks later Dschang was captured and razed (January 2, 1915). In an attempt to mount a counteroffensive, a strong German force attacked the French occupying Edea on January 5, but were driven off with over 200 casualties. However, a study of this attack made General Dobell realise that his forces were over-extended, so Dschang was evacuated. Heavy fighting continued around Bare for several months, and it became clear that without further reinforcements the Allied chances of subduing the rest of
Cameroon were
limited. Pending the arof further aid something of a lull descended over the theatre, although there was still plenty of local activity particularly in the northern sectors. On Februrival
Lieutenant-Colonel 3, for example, Cockburn. at the head of troops of the Nigeria Regiment, successfully stormed an enemy camp at Mbureku on Mount Manenguba. The German commander. Zimbecoming increasingly merman, was anxious about the security of Yaounde, the second most important town in Cameroon, as Nigerian and French columns began to probe towards it from the west and east. By March the front line therefore ran from Edea to Yabashi, thence to Bare, N'kongsamba and the area west of the Northern Railway. The capture of Campo, Kribi and Victoria had almost completed ary
the Allied control of the coastal area. Away to the north-west, Nigerian troops led by Brigadier-General F. C. Cunliffe were observing Mora and Garoua, while another detachment was holding Ossidinge on the Cross River. As for the forces of General Aymerich, they were making slow progress in their advances from the south
and
east.
By
this time it had become clear that a change in the direction of the campaign in London was necessary. Accordingly in April overall control was transferred from
the Colonial to the War Office — to the great relief of most of the British commanders. It was widely hoped that a few more weeks would encompass the final destruction of German resistance in Cameroon, but in fact ten more months of heavy fighting (interspersed with occasional lulls when the climate made effective operations virtually impossible) still lay ahead of General Dobell and his Allied forces. Despite a rapid success in "Togoland and some progress in Cameroon, the war was not yet over in German West Africa.
Further Reading Bryant, Colonel F. C, The Capture of Togoland (in the Cavalry Journal, 1926) Dobell, Major-General Sir C, The Campaign in the Cameroons 1914-16 (in the RUSI Journal, 1922)
Haywood, Colonel
A., and Clarke, Brigadier F., History of the Royal West African Frontier Force (Aldershot, 1964) Jouin, Marechal, Conquete du Togo (in La Revue Historique de I'Armee, 1965) No 2 Jouin, Marechal, Conquete du Cameroun (in La Revue Historique de I'Armee, 1964) No 3 Moberly, Brigadier-General F. J., History of the Great War, Togoland and the Cameroons 1914-16 (London, 1931)
Ramsden, Lieutenant-Colonel B. V., Sunyani and All That (in the Army Quarterly, 1965) Schwartze, Der Grosse Krieg Vol 4
DAVID CHANDLER
is
a
Senior Lecturer
in
the
Department of Military History at Sandhurst. A Yorkshireman by birth, he was educated at Marlborough and Keble College. Oxford. Appointed to a Short Service Commission, he spent 18 months on secondment to the RWAFF, 1 958-60. He is author of The Campaigns of Napoleon and edited the Memoirs of Parker and Merode-Westerloo He has contributed to Purnell's History of the Second World War and many other historical and military jounals He was appointed Visiting Professor in Military History at the State University of Ohio for 1970
THE ROLE OF THE Rodney de Bruin. In 1914 several countries abstained from entering the world conflict. As 'neutrals' they held a unique economic position which it was in their interest but not always in their power to preserve. The demands of the combatants for war materials could lead to rapid industrial development in neutral states but trade with either side was often dangerous \\ ar can be a profitable business for neutral countries it' thev are able to meet the increased demands of the combatants for goods and war materials. This was not entirely true of the First World War, although many European countries remained neutral. Norway. Sweden, Denmark, the Switzerland, Netherlands, and Spain preserved their neutrality throughout the conflict, but in many cases geography made their positions difficult. British control of the seas meant that they could not continue their overseas trade without British consent, and the Allied blockade affected them all at some time, preventing them from taking full advantage of their neutrality at the expense of the combatants. In fact, they were at the mercy of British good will and sense of justice, and on the other side of the Atlantic the United States, the greatest neutral power, naturally wished to continue her profitable trade with Europe after the outbreak of war. There had been an attempt to clarify the situation concerning blockade, contraband, prizes and convoys in the Declaration of London, which was issued on February 26, 1909. This declaration was ratified by all interested parties except Britain who declined on the grounds that the conditions it laid down were unduly favourable to neutrals in time of war. Britain did not make her intentions known until August 20, 1914, when a British Order in Council was issued w-hich stated that Britain was willing to abide by the Declaration of London, but with some additions and modifications. The different categories of contraband were declaration in the established abolished and all prohibited goods destined for enemy countries, even if carried by neutral shipping via a neutral port or country, were to be considered contraband. This was a severe blow to the carrying trade of the non-combatant states. The British immediately set up a Prize Court as part of the Admiralty Court and the president of the latter was ex officio president of the Prize Court. In September 1914 Sir Samuel Evans was appointed judge for prize affairs and held this position throughout the war. His office was in London, but other British Prize Courts were set up in Egypt, Zanzibar, Cyprus, Gibraltar and Malta. France had had her own Conseils dcs Prises since 1861. Accordingly Germany and Austria-Hungary set up Prize Courts in their European territories, as well as in the German colonies in Africa and the Far East, and the combatants had already produced lists
366
relations with the Central Powers, and she so favoured by Britain economically that she was practically under British protection. The Republic of Portugal was proclaimed on October 5, 1910 and its first president, Dr Manoel de Arriaga, faced a difficult His supporters became dissituation. illusioned when it was obvious that there was to be no significant improvement in their conditions, and the royalists con-
was
tinued to plot against him. When war broke out in August 1914 Portugal was firmly in the Allied sphere of influence. The rebellion of the pro-German General Pimenta de Castro prevented Portugal from entering the war on the Allied side, and she remained neutral. De Castro's
Britannia takes Belgian refugees into her care
of contraband goods. Allied and German minefields were being laid in the North Sea and Britain intended to force neutral shipping to sail under her coasts where it could be easily controlled by the Royal Navy. The Germans intended to blockade British ports on the east coast and many neutral ships were sunk by German mines in the North Sea. It is not surprising that the neutral states, especially the United States and
the Netherlands, protested vehemently against this state of affairs. The Central Powers declared their willingness to obey the Declaration of London of 1909, and the British replied with a new Order in Council on October 29, 1914 but this did not contain any improvement for the neutrals. Spain declared her neutrality on August 1914 and the king gave France as7, surances that she might denude her Pyrenean frontier of troops. The Spanish government was soon fully occupied with internal problems as the peoples of Catalonia renewed their agitation for autonomy and the army had to be used to restore order during native risings in Morocco. Spanish industry, which centred on Catalonia, was able to supply the belligerents with iron, munitions and other goods, and this trade stimulated its growth. Rapid industrial expansion produced conditions in which socialism gained ground and this gave the upper classes cause for alarm. Spain had no opportunity to continue trade
dictatorship was not overthrown until May 14, 1915. The position of Switzerland was quite different, as that country is bounded by Germany and Austria to the north and east, by France in the west and by Italy in the south. The Swiss have no direct outlet to the sea and were therefore dependent on the good will of both sides. They produced certain industrial goods, and their precision instruments were needed by the Allies and the Central Powers. Both sides tried to exert pressure on Switzerland but they could not be too harsh because of the danger of crippling the Swiss economy, thereby interrupting or stopping the production of important goods, and Switzerland was granted economic concessions by all the belligerents. However Switzerland's dependence on the Allies, particularly Britain, was so great that she was compelled to follow the Dutch example and set up a trust trading company. This company consisted of Swiss import firms and exporters who regulated the import of raw materials and the export of industrial products, under the strict supervision of
the Swiss government.
An impregnable redoubt The Swiss announced their neutrality on August
4,
1914, but they mobilised their
and remained on a war footing throughout the First World War. They were prepared to defend their neutrality by force and the Alps made Switzerland an ideal defensive position. The German and French speaking communities were divided in their sympathies, and the powers of the Federal government were increased to forces
enable it to distribute food supplies evenly. Switzerland was able to supply the combatants with certain goods and this led to the development of Swiss industry.
Finally the geographical position of the country made it useful for spies of both sides.
The Netherlands, traditionally a seafaring and trading nation, was very concerned with the rights of neutral shipping and trade. They possessed a vast overseas empire from which important raw materials were supplied and offered for sale in Amsterdam. They had close commercial with Germany, the greatest buyer of Dutch colonial raw materials and Dutch agricultural produce and the biggest ties
supplier of many industrial goods. When Britain announced her blockade measures Dutch overseas trade practically ceased and Dutch ships were held up and experienced considerable delays. In
an attempt
A Swiss
to
improve this situation,
frontier post at the
end
of
Netherlands.
Francis
Oppenheimer
his British confrere on December 26, 1914. Although Dutch neutrality was desirable for both the Allies and the Central Powers,
became
were occasions in 1914 when the narrowly escaped being Netherlands dragged into the war. In the first weeks of the war the Royal Navy discovered some there
trawlers among Dutch fishing boats in the North Sea. The Germans were equipped with carrier-pigeons which were meant to carry news about the movements of the British navy to the Germans. It is not surprising that the British consequently scrutinised all fishing fleets and minelayers would inthat suspected filtrate these fleets to lay mines close to the British coast. They repeatedly exercised
German
Munition stores were
fence.
many. The Germans agreed to this scheme 15, 1914 and Baron Hartogiensis was appointed German commercial attache to supervise contraband in
their
verifying
rights,
which
interfered
with the catch of Dutch fishermen. The Dutch also refused to allow the British passage up the River Scheldt, either to confiscate German and Austrian ships interned in the harbour at Antwerp or to send reinforcements there. Queen Wilhelmina had ordered general mobilisation in the Netherlands on July 31, 1914 and the Dutch army of 203,657 men quickly got under arms. The Dutch navy was also alerted. Lieutenant-General C. -I. Snijdera was appointed C-in-C of the Dutch forces and the nucleus of Dutch defence was the fortress of Holland. The army may have been ready but it was certainly not well-equipped, even for de-
insufficient,
the railways lacked carriages and clothing stores were inadequate. Compulsory service was unpopular and only 2,000 men enlisted in the voluntary landstorm. The Netherlands retained this army on a war footing for four years. There was a considerable amount of antiGerman feeling in the Netherlands after the invasion of Belgium, and especially after the fall of Antwerp when many Belgian refugees crossed the Dutch border. Although the greater part returned home, their grief and distress made a great impression on the Dutch people. The Germans were attacked verbally in the press and anti-British feeling, a legacy from the Boer War, receded. In Protestant circles Germany had more
1914 To maintain her economy, Switzerland was dependent on the good
the Committee for the Trade of the Netherlands called a meeting with representatives of seven large shipping companies on November 10. They decided to form a trust company and the shipping companies agreed not to carry any goods unless they had first been authorised by this company or the Dutch government. The Netherlands Oversea Trust Company was thus established, and the Dutch believed they would now be able to comply with British demands concerning the supply of goods, and also come to some agreement with Ger-
on December
the
will of all
support 'pagan'.
and
her neighbours
France
Abraham
was regarded as Kuvper. who had
sympathised with the Boers, thought necessary
explain away the Belgian neutrality.
to
violation of
it
German Ho wrote
in his party organ Do Standaard thai there could be a state of necessity in which a government should have the right to break the statute law in order to maintain the absolute right. Many people admired the military organisation of the Germans and their successes in the war. and among hem there were some Dutch officers who hoped t
German
Their wish was but understandable in view of their dissatisfaction with the deplorable Dutch military equipment lor
a
politically
victory.
short-sighted
King Christian had
alliance with autocratic and reactionary Russia added to these suspicions. One might conclude that there were no truly neutral states in Europe during the conflict. Many of the neutrals sympathised with the Allies and were perturbed by the brutal German invasion of Belgium. To countries with a seaborne trade Allied blockade was a great inconvenience, but as these countries were also small, weak, land powers, the Royal Navy was seen as a lesser threat than the German Army.
sat on the throne of 1912, and in 1914 important changes in the Danish constitution were made. The suffrage was extended
Denmark and
all
since
men, and most women were quali-
fied to vote at the
age of 25 years instead of
The predominance of the upper house was broken and a. more regular parliamentary government established in Den30.
mark.
German supply source Denmark also had difficulty in adjusting trade relations to meet the new circumstances and many exporters posing as Americans tried to carry contraband to Danish harbours. Britain proposed that Denmark follow the Dutch example but the Danish government feared German intervention. On October 29, Britain classed Denmark as a source of German supply and declared that all contraband destined for Denmark would be seized. It was not until January 1915 that the Danish government conceded
to British Strategically Denmark was in an unfortunate position between the German naval bases and that militarily weak
pressure.
constant danger. Sweden had little to do with the Allies and close connections with Germany. The Swedish sold all their copper supplies to Germany and British pressure to stop the sale of ores to the Central Powers was unsuccessful. Russia also used Sweden as a transit country for American goods which were desperately needed. In Norway democratic reforms had taken place in 1907 when the suffrage was extended to women ana he royal suspensive veto was abolished. In ntrast to Sweden, Norway was wholly in ti British sphere of influence, and had economu ties with that country through the carrying trade. An agreement concerning restrk ions on Nornation
felt in
1
368
Above top: King Gustavus V of Sweden. Above: Pope Benedictus XV. He was elected in 1914. Above left: King Christian X of Denmark. Above right: Manoel Jose d'Arnaga, President of Portugal
wegian trade with the Central Powers was reached on October 29. 1914. The United States tried to carry on trading with Europe on the same footing as before the war. President Woodrow Wilson was determined to remain neutral but the sympathies of the American people were divided. Those of Irish origin were antiBritish and those of German origin were often sympathetic towards Germany. There were also many who were pro-British, and the sale of war materials to the Allies and the purchase of war bonds issued by Allied
governments brought about a vested terest in an Allied victory in certain fluential circles.
When
inin-
not isolationist, the
mood was one of sympathy towards France and Britain since their victory would clearly advance the cause of democracy, freedom and progress far more than a German victory. On the other hand, there was some doubt about the true motives of the British and the French, and their general
Further Reading Bonjour, E., Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutral itat (Basle, 1965) Churchill, W. S The World Crisis 191 1-1 8 (Four Square) Japikse, N.. Die Stellung Hollands im Weltkrieg, Politisch und wirtschaftlich (The Hague, Gotha, 1921) Livermore. H. V., A New History of Portugal .
(Cambridge University Press, 1966) Oervik, N., The Decline of Neutrality (Oslo. 1953) Payne, S. G., Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (Oxford University Press, 1967) Smith, D. M., The Great Departure. The United States and World War I 1914-20 (New York, 1965)
RODNEY DE BRUIN was born in 1924 in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia and endured the hardships of the Japanese occupation of Java. After the Indonesian
Revolution
(1945-49)
he
studied
economics and Asian history at the Teachers' Course in Djakarta. In 1956 he was repatriated to Holland and since then he has been a member of the staff at the State Institute for War Documentation in Amsterdam and became head of the Indonesian Collection there. In 1967 he delivered a lecture on the Japanese sponsored Three A Movement in Java during the first year of the Japanese occupation to the 25th International Congress of Orientalists at Ann Arbor, Michigan. He took a doctor's degree at the University of Utrecht.
-
Sinking of the
Aboukir Hogue and Cressy Less than two months after the beginning of the war, Britain's confidence in her mighty navy was rudely disturbed. Three armoured cruisers were sunk by a single German submarine — a weapon whose potential had been guessed at and which now seemed about to be realised. The loss of life was considerable, though the sinking of the three ships was of little coiisequence to overall British naval supremacy. Below: JiMS Aboukir, first of the U 9's victims. RichardjJMilton
HMS Hogue and in all
(right)
HMS Cressy
ways- they were designed,
served together, and
finally
sister ships
and went down together built
In late September 1914, the Royal Navy experienced its first contact with a new form of naval warfare. It was a shock which brought home the vulnerability of surface warships to an invisible underwater enemy. On September 22, three armoured
HMS Hogue,
Aboukir and Cressy, were sunk in the North Sea by a solitary German submarine in an action which lasted scarcely an hour. For the first time, many naval chiefs and commanders of some of the world's largest and most powerful fighting ships were brought face to face
cruisers,
with the practical possibility of destruction by a craft inferior in armament and size, operating secretly in the enemy's home waters. The unhurried but inexorable progress of technology since Nelson's victories 100 years before, had at last come to fruition.
Hogue, Aboukir and Cressy were predreadnought ships whose design and construction dated from 1898 to 1902. They were three of the four Cressy or Bacchante class ships which made up 7th Cruiser Squadron, stationed at the Nore under Rear- Admiral Henry Carpbell. The fourth ship was HMS Baccht te, Campbell's flagship. This squadron, U. ether with the 1st and 3rd Destroyer Floti as at Harwich and ten submarines of the ^th Flotilla,
formed the 'Southern Force -all
command
Christian, whose
370
under the
of Rear-Admi al Arthur flagship was Eur-
HMS
yalus — yet another Bacchante class cruiser. The task of the Harwich flotillas was to keep the area of the North Sea below the 54th parallel free of German minelayers and torpedo craft, and one of the 7th Cruiser Squadron's duties was to support the destroyers in these sweeps. Two areas of the North Sea were earmarked for patrols by Southern Force — the Dogger Bank, and an area off the Hook of Holland known as the 'Broad Fourteens'. The Broad Fourteens was an area of concern to the Admiralty both from a tactical point of view and for political reasons. Firstly, it was an ideal position from which to get early warning of any attempt by German ships to attack the transports taking the BEF, and later its supplies, across the Channel to France. It was also a good station from which to intercept enemy minelayers making for British coastal waters. Apart from its purely tactical importance, however, dominance of the
Broad Fourteens was necessary politically in order to honour a pledge given to Bel-
gium
at the beginning of the war. Part of Britain's guarantee to Belgium — the ostensible cause of Britain's entry into the war — was to ensure that the river Scheldt, Belgium's chief exit to the sea, remained clear for shipping. In order to fulfil the guarantee the Admiralty was anxious to maintain a British presence in the area and accordingly ordered patrols.
The four cruisers of the 7th Squadron and Euryalus. which had to undertake patrol duties as a result of the general shortage of cruisers, were usually split between the patrol areas. On September 17, bad weather conditions forced both destroyer flotillas to return to Harwich, leaving Rear-Admiral Campbell patrolling the Dogger Bank area with the four cruisers alone (Bacchante was in harbour for repairs at the time.) At this time, Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, was visiting the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow, and on the same day as the destroyers were forced back to port a conference was held on board Jellicoe's flagship, HMS Iron Duke. The conference was attended by Churchill, Sturdee, Chief of the War Staff, Keyes, in charge of the Submarine Service, and Tyrwhitt, commander of the Harwich Force. During his visit to the Grand Fleet, Churchill had been infuriated to overhear the expression 'livebait squadron' and on enquiry discovered it was the fleet's nickname for the 7th Cruiser Squadron. When Churchill raised the matter of the Bacchantes, Keyes and Tyrwhitt took the opportunity to point out the danger of exposing the cruisers to such an advanced position, especially without a destroyer screen and in an area where numerous fishing boats could report their
movements. Churchill recognised the danger in which
| §
s § « g.
-
Armoured cruisers: outdated, outmoded, too slow, too weak and idefal submarine prey
the cruisers were, and the following day, on his return to London, he recommended to the First Sea Lord, Lord Louis Battenberg, that they should be removed. His minute read: The Bacchantes ought not to continue on this beat. The risk is not justified by any service they can render. The narrow seas, being the nearest point to the enemy, should be kept by a small number of good modern ships. The Bacchantes should go to the western entrance of the Channel and set Bethell's battle-
ships—and
later
Wemyss'
cruisers — free
convoy and other duties. The first four Arethusas (light cruisers of 1914 vintage) should join the flotillas of the narrow seas. for
A
major blunder
Battenberg concurred with Churchill's recommendations, especially since he had never been very enthusiastic about the Bacchantes steaming up and down alone in the North Sea. He was willing therefore to adopt Churchill's plan. But two days later, on September 19, Sturdee persuaded the First Sea Lord to approve an order moving the cruisers not to the western approaches, but to the southern patrol area. Meanwhile, Admiral Christian was patrolling off the Dogger Bank with the Bacchantes, still unescorted. He signalled to the Admiralty that he intended to maintain his position, but before this was received, the Admiralty sent him this
message: The Dogger Bank patrol need not be continued. Weather too bad for destroyers to go to sea. Arrange for cruisers to watch Broad Fourteens.' Churchill did not see the signal, which was described as 'routine'. Admiral Christian duly moved his patrol south, and by dawn on September 20 had reached the Maas Light Vessel, where it was found that his flagship Euryalus needed coal and repairs to her wireless. But as the weather was too bad for him to transfer his flag to another ship, Christian returned to port leaving in command the Senior Officer, Captain John Drummond of the Aboukir. At last, on the night of September 21-22, the weather moderated, and the cruiser Lowestoft and eight destroyers, under Admiral Tyrwhitt, left Harwich late on September 21. This force had not, however, joined up with the three cruisers by dawn on the 22nd. At dawn on September 22, the stage was thus set. The three elderly cruisers were deployed in a regular order, steaming at a dangerously low constant speed of under ten knots, in an area sandwiched between the Dutch coast and a German minefield, without escort and almost on the enemy's doorstep. Only the other principal in the drama, the (7 9, had yet to appear. In common with the adversaries she was soon to meet, the U 9 was not a modern craft. Her surface propulsion was by Kort-
ing diesel engines, underwater propulsion f being by electric motors whose batteries § needed frequent recharging. For arma- ^ ment, she had four torpedo tubes of 17-7- § inches, two bow and two stern, and one « 2-inch gun. The bow tubes had reloads, §. giving the U 9 a total of six torpedoes. Under the command of Leutnant Otto Weddigen, the U 9 sailed from Kiel on
same day as the Bacmoving to their southern patrol area. Her destination was the Flanders Bight, where she was to try to September
20, the
chantes were
prevent landings by British troops on the Belgian coast during the battle of tin Marne. On the voyage south, her gyro compass proved to be faulty and, unable to navigate precisely, Weddigen found himself off the Dutch coast, some 50 miles from his destination, on the night of September 21. Here the U 9 encountered the tail-end of the heavy weather that had forced the Harwich destroyers to rot urn to 1
and was obliged herself to remain submerged at a depth of 50 feet all night. port,
A single torpedo At dawn on September 22 the weather moderated and Leutnant Weddigen surU
9 in order to recharge her faced the batteries. Visibility was good and Weddigen soon saw the masts of the three cruisers to the south of him. The U-boat's heavy-oil engines were making a lot ofsmoke, hut as
for
action
it
was hotter
to
operate sub-
merged, Weddigen dived immediately without completing the recharging of the batteries Once submerged, the U-boat commander eould see that the cruisers were without a destroyer screen and were approaching on a steady course of about nine knots m line abreast, two miles apart. \\ eddigen at first took the ships to be light cruisers, possibly of the
Birmingham
class.
fired only a single bow the Aboukir from a range of 500 yards. The torpedo struck the Aboukir on the starboard side and she began to sink. Captain Drummond apparently believed that he had struck a mine and signalled to the Hogue and Cressy to close in, but to keep ahead of him. The captains of the other cruisers complied with Drummond's signal and stopped their ships to pick up survivors. The 9 had dived deep after her first shot to reload the torpedo tube and now returned to periscope depth. The sea was still choppy following the bad weather and four-to-five foot whitecaps helped obscure the periscope. The U-boat commander saw the Aboukir going down and the other two ships standing by. Now he correctly identified the targets as armoured cruisers,
At 0620 hours he torpedo
at
and full-throated at
first,
but they gradu-
ally subsided into a low wailing chant fell like surf on a distant shore.'
and
As we have seen, the Harwich destroyers had eventually set sail to rejoin the cruisers, but they arrived too late to participate in the action. Now they were redirected to Terschelling at the mouth of the Zuider Zee in order to try to cut off
the U 9. But the submarine steered a northerly course close in along the Dutch coast to make Kiel without further contact with the British and to receive a jubilant welcome. Leutnant Weddigen was awarded the Iron Cross for his exploit by a Kaiser reported to be 'in seventh heaven'.
First real defeat In Britain the news was a bombshell. At first it was widely believed that the sinkings were the work of a 'pack' of sub-
U
and at 0655 hours he fired both bow torpedoes at the stationary Hogue, from a range of only 300 yards. Both torpedoes hit and the U 9 was so close to her target that she had to manoeuvre to avoid a collision. The Hogue was doomed, however, as she began to heel over a moment after being struck for the second time. One of her officers recalls: Within three minutes of the first torpedo hitting, the list had increased to about 40 degrees, and realising that her end was very near all hands began to tear off their clothes and crawl down the high side or jump overboard to leeward. To add to the general confusion the stokehold
crowd suddenly poured up on deck,
dear
Undeterred by any thought of a British counterattack, Weddigen recklessly surfaced to ascertain whether the Cressy was stationary or still moving, and found her stopped with her boats away picking up survivors from her two sister ships. The U-boat's batteries were almost completely exhausted by now, but she still had two stern torpedoes and a single reload left for a bow tube. The U 9 submerged and manoeuvred for a stern shot but her periscope was spotted by the Cressy just before she fired. The Cressy's captain ordered full speed ahead, but one of the two torpedoes hit and stopped her. The U 9 turned again for a bow shot and with her last torpedo sank the remaining cruiser. The U-boat then l -engaged and surfaced north of the scene o 'he action to recharge her batteries. In the distance
victims were the struggling for survival seen by one of their number as 'Two tho isand swimming :
drowning men all herded together, hardly with elbow room. Strong swimmers were dragged under in the frenzied clutches of weak swimmers or men who could not swim at all. The cries for help were loud
or
372
position, but made it clear that it was unable to evaluate properly the reasons for so positioning the ships.
What
the enquiry showed was that the was not clearly understood and that the command arrangements were not clearly laid down, especially regarding the responsibility for ordering the Harwich destroyers to sea again. There was also the question of why both admirals were in port at the time of the incident, with the knowledge and consent of the Admiralty. The court was not given an explanation as to why Admiral Campbell had not transferred his flag when the Bacchante had to put in for repairs. In the case of Admiral Christian, the bad weather object of the patrol
shifting his flag to
one of the other cruisers when the Euryalus the patrol. in looking for the culprit, in a more objective mood, the whole of 19thcentury naval thinking should not be overlooked. The submarine was still a relatively unknown quantity (although great left
Perhaps
had been made in improving it since it would not be fair to say that the Admiralty ignored the threat posed by the submarine. Indeed, extensive memoranda had been written on its importance by Fisher, Jellicoe, Bacon and Keyes. The strides
1900), but
their
life.
Aboukir was hit. The captains of the Hogue and Cressy were blamed for stopping their ships to pick up survivors, and all three were blamed by the court for failing to anticipate the possibility of submarine attack and failing to post sufficient lookouts. The court criticised the Admiralty for placing the cruisers in a hazardous
had prevented him from
blackened faces dripping sweat and tense with apprehension. It was now a case of every man for himself, and tearing off my boots and clothing and then fastening to my wrist by its chain my gold watch, which I greatly prized, I walked down the sloping deck into the water and struck out for
ment, the court blamed the captains of the and also criticised in strong terms the Admiralty's decision to place them on the Broad Fourteens. The report of the court blamed Captain Drummond for failing to 'zigzag' the formation when the weather moderated and also for ordering the other two ships to close when the cruisers
point
German view of British naval powerformidable on top but vulnerable below
Trie
marines ravaging unescorted
ships.
When
became known that only a single U-boat was responsible, both the public and naval chiefs were shocked. The total complement of the three ships was about 2,200. Of these, 62 officers and 1,397 men had been lost in the action. The public was appalled both at the loss of life and at the loss of three it
cruisers, not realising that the ships were virtually obsolete, and that their loss did not materially diminish the superiority of
the British navy over the Germans. But Britain was also smarting under her first real defeat, and outraged public opinion demanded that culprits be found. As was often the case in the war years, Churchill came under fire. He was blamed for taking on himself the responsibility for the positioning of the cruisers, against the advice of the Sea Lords. Few of his critics knew that the disposition of the ships was the result of the signal of September 19 from the First Sea Lord and the Chief-of-Staff.
A
court of enquiry sat to ascertain who to blame for the disaster and interviewed the principals involved. In judge-
was
is,
though, that although the naval
command
realised the danger represented by the submarine, the same was not true throughout the navy. Before September 1914 no one had experienced the full potential of the submarine in action. Thus as no one really knew what to expect of the submarine in war, no extensive precautions had been taken against them in the planning of evasive manoeuvres and what to do in the event of submarine attack. Perhaps the men of 1914 were not so much negligent as short-sighted when overtaken by technical development.
high
Further Reading Churchill, W., The World Crisis (Four Square) Gretton, Sir Peter, Former Naval Person (Cassell)
Hezlet,
Sir
Power Marder,
(P.
Arthur,
The Submarine and Sea
Davies 1967)
A. J.,
From Dreadnought
to
Scapa Flow
(OUP
1965) Stafford, E. P., The Far 1968)
RICHARD MILTON was
and
born
the
in
Deep (Barker
London
in
1943
Following a technical education, he spent eight years with a major industrial organisation working principally as a technical author. In 1 967 he decided to make journalism his career and at present he is News Editor of a weekly journal in the electronics field
He
lives
and works
in
London.
.Great Yarmouth
rjLowestott
Displacement: 493/61
Beam: 19%
feet.
1
ISTROYER
<
German submarine U 9
,
FLOTILLAS
S EPT 20
t<\
Ipswich
the
tons. Length: 188 feet.
Power/speed: 1,050/1,160 hp
^Z^r 'SEPT 22 U*
Harwich
and 14/8 knots. Armament: four 17.7-inch torpedo tubes and one 2-inch gun Crew: 28
?v Huok
ol Hiillnnil
MJ
fy
H »« ue
# Rotterdar
HOLLAND
NORTH SEA The southern
patrol area of the Royal Navy in the North Sea. Here a series of coincidences, bad management and the weather brought together four old vessels and led to the loss of three British ships and 1,459 men
Zeehni||go
a
Oslond,
9 Dovt!i Fnlkifstnno
Calais.
Dunkirk
FRANCE
BELGIUM
Antwerp
-CJ*
*'
I
4KB
&"'
jac v*
«*• Jm
4:
C
^
***.
»><
A,
V
-
V,
*i a
IE SIEGE OF
•>* '
5*
1 tb
*
*** '*a^?
-'
Antwerp — the final Belgian defence and their planned 'national redoubt'. The Belgian High Command, however, had made a fatal error, for they chose the positions in a spirit of 'pious neutrality' rather than with proper strategic and tactical considerations. This, and the excessive trust placed by the Belgians in the outgunned and outmoded fortresses, meant that inevitably the Germans broke through onto the first line infantry, whose morale had been eroded by years of neglect. The arrival of a few British troops could do little but delay the loss of Antwerp. Above: Poorly led and poorly armed, Belgian troops wait by a makeshift barricade for the next onslaught. Right: General von Beseler, originator of the new siege tactics which took Antwerp so economically in terms of first line troops. Christopher Duffy
On August
18,
80,000
men
how
even the newest of these works were behind the times. The principle of the monolithic fort, with its 500 men and scores of guns, was already outmoded by the dispersed arrangement of defences which the Germans had adopted for their Feste at Metz in 1900. At Antwerp, as at Liege, the dimensions of the armour and concrete protection had been based on the
(five divisions)
the Belgian field army left their untenable position on the river Gette. By the morning of the 20th they had abandoned the greater part of their homeland to the
ot'
Germans, and fallen back northwards to the levels and heathlands around the great fortress-port ot' Antwerp. The direction of the retreat had been dictated partly by the impossibility of establishing contact with the French army, now fast withdrawing southwards, but more particularly by an idea that had been at the heart of Belgian strategy since the 1850s. This was the idea of using Antwerp as a retreat in the event of invasion, a notion which had recently taken concrete form in the plan of campaign drawn up in 1905, which regarded the position as 'the refuge of the government, the redoubt whose fall would spell our defeat and the loss of our independence'. Unfortunately for the Belgians, the 'national redoubt' failed in nearly every way to live up to the demands of the 20th Its position, tucked up against the Dutch province of Zeeland, had been chosen largely out of a spirit of pious neutrality, as being equidistant from France and Germany. As the engineer and strategist Brialmont pointed out, that consideration held little force once the FrancoPrussian War had shown Germany to be by far the more likely of the two potential enemies. From the point of view of the British and French, King Albert and his men could hardly have stranded themselves in a more inconvenient corner of their country. Foreign naval access up the Scheldt to Antwerp was barred by the Dutch through right of ancient treaty, and the one overland route of relief was confined to the vulnerable corridor, some 13 miles wide, which ran between the Scheldt and the frontier of Zeeland. Any respectable 18th-
Century.
.
century strategist would have thrown up hands in horror at the thought of thus running his line of communication perpendicularly across the front of the enemy.
his
The civilian sniper or franc-tireur. Probably no more than a handful existed, but the German advance lived in fear of them. Below: Undertrained and too few in number, the Belgian artillery could do little other than hamper the continuing German advance 'national redoubt' did not make up for its awkward situation by any great tactical strength. Decades of energetic
The
had encrusted the countryside around Antwerp with 48 forts and redoubts, but it had been made clear at Liege that it was to take no more than one day's fire from the super-heavy Skoda and Krupp siege howitzers to show that most of the building had been in vain. The inner core of the fortress of Antwerp had been designed as long ago as 1859, and consisted of a continuous city rampart and a 27-mile circumference of forts. An enormous new perimeter of 66 miles was begun in 1878, with the construction of Forts Lier and Walem, and it was rounded off when Stabroek and Waver Sainte Katelijne were building
built in 1906.
Few
people appreciated just
far
calculation that the 210-mm howitzer shell was the heaviest projectile that the materials would be called on to withstand. It is easy to appreciate the alarm of the Belgian General Deguise, as he saw the devastating effects of the 280-mm le Creusot howitzer which the Russians employed in their siege experiments at Ochakov in 1912. He promptly sent a report to the War Ministry, and the document was just as promptly filed away and forgotten. August 1914 found the forts in disarray. Important works such as Walem were filled with reels of wire for telephone and electric light installations which were far from complete. Worse still was the state of Waver Sainte Katelijne, with its gaping shafts for cupolas (gun turrets) which had ninth-hour burst of not yet arrived. activity did little to strengthen the position:
A
trenches could seldom be dug deeper than one foot, owing to the high water-table, and the clearing of fields of fire had the effect of making the forts stand up like 'islands in the midst of a calm green sea'. These impoverished forts were supposed to hit back at the siege batteries by means of 150-mm guns of 1886 to 1892 vintage. Black or brown powder charges propelled the shells up to 9,000 yards, which already fell short of the range of the monster artillery of the Germans, and the effective reach of these fortress guns was shorter still, for the artillery had no external observation posts for directing their fire.
Mentally and physically unfit The 70,000 fortress troops were impressive in numbers only. They were reservists, whom family life and Belgian beer had ren-
i
dered unfit mentally and physically for a return to the colours which some had left as long as 13 years before. It would certainly have been a mistake to have locked up Belgium's best troops in the defence of fortifications, but the authorities forgot that there is a limit to just how bad a garrison should be allowed to become. What was needed was a mixture of the reservists and the younger men whom Major de Witte described as young lads who care for nothing'.
The strategy of King Albert, as commander in chief, was to harass the Germans from his position on their flank and rear, and to hold the Antwerp position as long as his retreat along the coastal corridor was not compromised. General Galet, Chief of the General Staff, was in full agreement. Albert's and Galet's wishes were, however, distorted, misrepresented and contravened at every level of command. The eloquent and forceful de Broqueville, who combined the offices of Prime Minister and War Minister, gathered about him a circle of staff* officers who dreaded the thought of being stranded in Antwerp, and ceaselessly pressed for a retreat. At the other extreme the governor of Antwerp, General Deguise (of the Ochakov experiments), regarded the defence of the position as an end in itself, and was bent on putting into practice the lessons he had derived from a lifetime's study of fortress warfare. Thus no real unity of command could be achieved, even after the field army and fortress staffs had been joined together in a Supreme Council of War on September 6. The demoralisation and disunity of the defenders go far towards explaining how the German siege detachment, which probably stood at no more than 100,000 men, was able eventually to conquer Antwerp. While the mass of the German armies wheeled south against the French and British, only a mixed force of second line troops could be spared to contain the Belgians. The demanding task of guarding the Aachen-Liege-Louvain-Brussels road
The Germans were able
to
and rail communications was entrusted to the III Reserve Corps (5th and 6th Reserve Divisions) and the Marine Division (sailors, cavalrymen, coastal and Landwehr gunners: a scratch force characteristic of this phase of the war). In the following weeks the Germans were faced with the still more taxing business of mounting their own attack with the help of the slight accession of force represented by the 4th Ersatz Division. The Germans were at least fortunate in their commander, Infantry General von Beseler. He was a sapper by training, and his former post as Assistant Chief of the Prussian General Staff had fitted him both for shouldering heavy responsibilities and for putting into effect the theory of the 'short and forceful' siege attack which the Germans had evolved before the war. The Belgians had not been long in the Antwerp position before the critical situation of the French and British, together with the tempting weakness of the enemy screen north of Brussels, prompted Albert to attempt something enterprising against the German rear. On August 24 the Belgian field army began an advance — something between a small offensive and a large sortie — on an miles.
uncomfortably cramped front On the next day the 5th Division penetrated to within three miles of Vilvoorde, but further to the east the 2nd Division was checked at the LouvainMalines Canal, and it became increasingly clear that the Germans were everywhere superior in artillery. There was little purpose to be served by holding the captured ground, now that the Battles of Mons and the Sambre were over, and on the 26th the Belgians fell back to Antwerp. of 20
The
'sortie'
of
September 9 was an
more ambitious affair, being mounted on a front of 44 miles with the purpose of allowing the 2nd Division to altogether
turn the German right in the area north of Louvain. Things already began to go wrong on September 10 when the 2nd Division, which
break through the Belgian defensive lines with extremely
skilful
should have been advancing fast, allowed itself to be halted by a local check at
Wygmael. The
division
remained
station-
ary on the 11th, which allowed the Germans to bolster up this threatened flank and then launch a counterattack on the 12th. That day found the Belgian centre heavily engaged north of Vilvoorde. An American correspondent recorded his impressions as he saw the troops and dog-
drawn machine gun batteries streaming back after an unsuccessful attack on Weerde: 'Every now and then a soldier would stumble, as though he had stubbed his toe, and throw out his arms, and fall headlong. One man was hit as he was struggling to get through a hedge and died standing, held upright by the thorny branches. A young officer of chasseurs, who had been recklessly exposing himself while trying to check the retreat of his men,
suddenly spun round on his heels, like one
wooden toys which the kerband then crumpled up, as though all the bone and muscle had gone
of those
vendors
sell,
A man plunged into a halfditch and lay there, with his head under water. I could see the water slowly redden.' Something of the bitterness of the contest is conveyed by the fact that the same division recovered from this reverse and managed to take Weerde in the out of him. filled
evening. The Belgians were probably as severely weakened by their bloody success in the centre as by the repulse of their left, and it took no more than the briefest of German counterattacks to push them back to Ant-
werp on September
13.
Failing morale The second 'sortie' had cost the Belgians 8,000 men in casualties and missing. Albert knew that the inroads on the morale of the army had been greater still, and he was convinced by the reasoning of telegram of the night of September 24, which claimed that a third push would almost certainly succeed. As Galet renot at
all
Joffre's
combined use
of infantry
and
artillery
marked: 'His Majesty had been struck by the physical exhaustion and disorganisation ef the army after each of the earlier sorties. It was clear to him that two or three days of active operations were enough to render our t loops incapable of with-
Albert's headquarters. The first shell to on Waver Sainte Katelijne had cracked open a vault and filled the inside of the fortress with fumes, a circumstance which was particularly alarming, for this was a modern concrete fort, and the older
standing an enemy counterblow, let alone continuing their own offensive.' Also, the roads of central Belgium seemed to be alive with columns o\' German troops and guns. Against his every instinct Albert nevertheless concentrated his burnt-out army between Malines and Dendermonde for a final blow, this time against the German left Hank. The troops had scarcely assembled on the start line when, on September l'T. they were thrown back by the German attack which signalled the beginning of the last phase of the contest for north Belgium. Beseler had meanwhile been cudgelling his wits to devise a means of reducing Antwerp with the small force at his disposal. The grandiose prewar siege plan was of no use at all, for it envisaged a push by 1 1 well-endowed divisions over the dry heathland to the east of Antwerp. With the equivalent of just five or six divisions at hand, Beseler«would have laid open the
masonry works were bound to suffer still more when the enemy turned his attention in their direction. The unchecked destruc-
whole of German-occupied Belgium if he had committed his forces on that side of Antwerp. He instead decided to confine his attack to the third sector of the defences, to the south-south-east of the fortress. The defence works on that front were backed up by the flooded rivers Nete and Rupel, but Beseler reckoned that this inconvenience was of small account compared with the advantage of being able to protect the communications of the main German
armies engaged against the French and
He
ordered the Marine Division Reserve Corps to carry out the main attack, while the 4th Ersatz Division hovered on the eastern flank, and the 37th Landwehr and 1st Reserve Ersatz Brigades tested the Belgian corridor extending between the Scheldt and the Dutch border. Prewar studies served Beseler well in the question of siege tactics. In place of the old practice of the sap attack, where the besieger literally dug his way towards the enemy, the Germans substituted an attack which alternated vigorous infantry and artillery onslaughts: • the infantry first went forward to win ground for artillery observation posts; • the super-heavy siege guns could then crack open the permanent forts, while the field artillery evicted the enemy from the intervening trenches; • finally the infantry advanced to occupy the devastated defences and prepare the way for the next bound. September 27 saw the accomplishment of the first phase of siege operations. A methodical advance put the Germans in possession of Malines, with its soaring towers, and of the high ground between the Dijle and the Grote Nete rivers. The batteries of 160 heavy and super-heavy artillery pieces could now be concentrated in the area to the east and south of Malines, and by the early fternoon of the 28th they were in full act n against the forts of Walem, Waver Sa te Katelijne, Koningshooikt and Lier, ana '\e redoubts of Boschbeek and Dorpveld. i e Belgian gunners were blind and outranged, and thanks to their black powder 'great plumes of smoke showed to the enemy the emplacecleai ment- oi 'he defending artillery'. Report of extensive damage flooded into British.
and the
378
///
fall
tion of the forts offered a powerful argument to those who beseeched Albert to abandon the whole position at once. The king was not to be panicked, but he
recognised
that
the
Antwerp
position
offered much less security than possible just two days before.
had seemed Measuring the resistance in weeks now, rather than months, Albert took the first steps towards transferring
the base of operations to Ostend, and from the night of September 28, stores were moved to the west bank of the Scheldt over the two pontoon bridges in Antwerp, and the dangerously-exposed railway bridge above the city. The bombardment continued without respite on September 29. A defender recalled that the shells were all the more
coming in volleys: 'A distant rumbling gradually swelled into the roaring of an express train, and ended in a frightful detonation which moved and shook the entire fort. We went through this moment of indescribable agony regularly every seven minutes, and every time each of us asked himself whether the shell that was coming was the one that was going to terrifying for
crush him to death.' In the morning one of the 150-mm cupolas in Walem was ripped open, and at 1230 hours the magazine exploded, with horrible effects in the troop accommodation: 'More than 70 men were buried under the ruins; about 70 more were badly burned and roamed about the fort, filling it with the terrible impression of their screams, their blackened and bloody faces and hands, their burnt clothes. In the postern casement lay charred corpses
and torn
limbs!'
On the 30th the endurance of the garrisons was tested to the utmost. At each impact, Redoubt Dorpveld was momentarily pressed into the ground, then sprang back and tossed the defenders about as if they had been in a ship. At Walem. Commandant de VVitte was reduced to the expedient of ordering his gunners to cease fire and suffer in silence, in the hope of luring the German infantry into a premature assault. He was rewarded by seeing the Marine Division venture within range, and recoil again as the fort suddenly sprang into life. Waver Sainte Katelijne continued to be the target for some of the heaviest German guns, and one shell had the spectacular effect of propelling a cupola bodily out of its shaft. The defenders had had enough, and they abandoned the fort in the course of the day. The
first
breach
breach in the ring of forts was exploited by the Germans in an otherwise unsuccessful infantry attack late in the afternoon of October 1. The 5th Division soon found the gap, and pushing half, This
first
a mile northwards it occupied Waver Sainte Katelijne and swarmed over Dorpveld, where Commandant Deschaet and 13 faithful men held out until two successive mines broke open the last place of refuge and compelled them to surrender at 0500 hours on the next morning. The bombardment was renewed on October 2, and the German 6th Division was brought up to help in the work of widening the breach. Fort Koningshooikt and Redoubt Tallaert were occupied with little or no resistance after the explosion of their magazines. Walem for a time kept up an active defence, but many of the garrison were fast cracking under the new bombardment: 'Heaped up in the single postern casement that gave them any confidence, most of them lay on the floor, physically and morally exhausted. Some were in the grip of a nervous depression, and the explosion of each 30.5-cm shell
Igian canals, nistoncally the aetensive lines in the tace of invasion, and hamper, if not stop, the inexorable German advance towards
to deter
once again helped Antwerp
The sacrifice was prepared; we awaited it firmly and would sell
our lives dearly'
One of the groups
multitude of small stands made by and retreating Belgians
of cut-off
would provoke a start and a trembling which even the bravest of them could not always master!' On two occasions knots of men broke away and fled across the open country, but each time they were engulfed by the German artillery fire. Commandant de Witte and the 150 survivors gave themselves up to the surrounding German infantry at 1700 hours. The events of October 1 and 2 had thoroughly justified Beseler in his decision to depart from normal siege practice and launch an attack on the principles already described. He had been motivated by the rapid exhaustion of his stocks of superheavy shells, and by a well-grounded fear that the Belgians were about to receive help from their allies. On September 7, when the fall of Antwerp had still seemed far distant, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, had urged Kitchener and his colleagues in the Cabinet to consider the importance of the fortress-port from the standpoint of the naval war with Germany. Kitchener, however, was not to be persuaded to divert forces, including Territorial divisions from France, while the Foreign Secretary, Grey, could not bring himself to ask the Dutch to allow free passage for British forces up the Scheldt. At 8.30 pm on October 2 Sir Francis Villiers, the British Minister in Belgium,
telegraphed to London an alarmist report to the effect that the Belgian field army would begin to abandon Antwerp on the next day. This placed the situation in so urgent a light that Churchill, instead of completing the first leg of an intended journey to Ostend, was brought back in his train from Victoria Station from where he hurried to Kitchener's house. There the hastily-reassembled Cabinet sent word to the Belgians that they could expect the rapid help of a force of Royal Marines, and at the same time urged them to hold on at Antwerp until the issue of the battle in northern France had been decided. Churchill was to go to Antwerp in person and supply the Cabinet with first-hand information for further decisions. The British help to Antwerp had so far been confined to the activities of an improvised armoured train of six 4.7-inch
guns under Commander A.S. Littlejohn. Manned by British sailors and Belgian troops, the contraption would rattle up and down the tracks around Antwerp, getting off a number of rounds, then retire again before the Germans found the range. The British and French had plans for throwing 53,000 men into Antwerp, but in the event the resistance collapsed so fast that there was time only for two small reinforcements to arrive. The first of these was made up of General Paris and the 2,082 men of his
Royal Marine Brigade, who reached Ant- I werp by train early on October 4, and were > immediately rushed into action to plug §, the breach in the line of forts. Two days §. when Antwerp seemed already later, beyond salvation, there arrived the last reinforcement, in the shape of two 'Naval Brigades', a rather grand title lor a collection of coal miners, and reserve naval officers, stokers and ratings, many of whom had not handled small arms until they received their rifles at Walmer a week before embarkation. Churchill himself arrived at Antwerp in the middle of the afternoon of October 3. By then the third sector was, in effect, one great gap, and the Belgians had retired behind the broad but shallow Nete inundation. Churchill's tour of the battlefield was discouraging, and at 1800 hours he had to tell London by telegraph that the Belgians could not promise to hold on for nunc than three days, unless the British could assure them within that time that a large force would be coming to their help. A relative lull in the fighting was prolonged into the 4th, since the Germans were building up their forces for the next bound. In the evening Churchill watched the Marines in action against the German troops who were creeping and darting along the streets of Lior. and was mined to offer his resignation as First Lord in
return for the
command
of all the British
Antwerp. The British Cabinet turned down the suggestion, as Lieutenant Genera] Henry Rawlinson was already chosen for thai post. forces
in
-
Improvised bayonet attack Early on October 5, the decisive day of the siege, the Royal Marines and the 5th Belgian Division were still managing to keep a large German force bottled up in Lier. They did not notice, however, that two battalions of the German 6th Reserve Division were building a trestle bridge across the flooded Nete one mile below the town. Beseler reinforced the bridgehead so rapidly that within a few hours it was able to withstand the counterattacks of the 2nd and 5th Belgian Divisions. After nightfall the Belgians made their last
army
to the west bank of the Scheldt, and the consolidation of the 2nd Division and the British on the 11-mile line of the 1859 forts on the east bank. The Belgian army made its crossing on the same night, accompanied by Rawlinson, Churchill and an uncontrollable mass of refugees. Albert stayed in Antwerp until noon on the 7th, when he left General Deguise instructions to defend the position to the bitter end. Defense a I'outrance was by now a devalued term, and there could be little real prospect of the fortress troops and the 2nd Division staying long in their defences now that they had been forsaken by the field army. The 37th Landwehr Brigade had already forced the Scheldt upstream at Schoonaarde, and the corridor of retreat was fast
lead the way was largely a recognition of a fait accompli. The movement over the Scheldt on the starlit night of October 8/9 was hidden from the Germans by the low-hanging smoke billowing from the burning oiltanks at Hoboken. The skeleton of the 2nd Division completed its crossing over the lower pontoon bridge at 2330 hours. The 2nd Naval Brigade and three battalions of the Royal Marine Brigade marched simultaneously across the upper bridge, and on the next day they moved by train down the shrinking coastal corridor. Thanks to their own steadfastness (and muddled staff work) the remaining British
being constricted. All the time the Germans were bringing
fortress.
forces encountered
much more
difficulty in
extracting themselves from the doomed
The 1st Naval Brigade underwent a series of tribulations which began with its guiding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Ollivant, waiting in vain for the sailors at the lower bridge; 'he was very shortly afterwards kicked by a horse and for a time rendered incapable of performing his duties'. The brigade instead made its crossing by ferries and barges at the site of the now-destroyed upper bridge, and spent the morning of the 9th in pushing through the crowds of refugees on the far side. Weary, hungry, thirsty and short of ammunition, the formation was finally broken as a fighting force by the news that the Germans were across the path of retreat.
men
Commodore Henderson
led 1,500
internment in Holland. One thousand more were gathered up by the disciplined and aggressive Royal Marine rearguard battalion, as it fought its way through to safety at Zelzate. Unfortunately the Marines set such a cracking pace that almost all the naval stragglers were left by the roadside. into
Sense of abandonment The Belgian fortress troops had long
since
been overtaken by a depression that was compounded of a sense of abandonment and an all-too-justified mistrust in the strength
The result of a round from one of the giant Krupp or Skoda howitzers on one of the old Belgian masonry forts. None could stand more than a few days' pounding before collapse or surrender
throw in a bayonet attack by troops already thoroughly demoralised by the enemy account reads: 'This attack was improvised in darkness, without preparation or reconnaissance, and was launched in broken ground by battalions taken from different regiments, brigades and divisions. The difficulties of the terrain and the weight of the enemy rifle and machine gun fire therefore caused this assault to sink into onfusion.' The penetration of the Nete line left the defenders with no intact ne save the ring of antiquated forts of 1859 intage. General Rawlinson arrived at Antv ^rp at noon on October 6, just in time to take part in the deliberations which determined on the evacuation of most of the Belgian field artillery.
380
Galet's
their artillery forward for the final blow
against Antwerp. At midnight on October 7/8 the retreating Belgian field army saw the sky to the north-east suffused with the purplish glare which told of the beginning of the bombardment of the abandoned city. The coming of daylight allowed the besiegers to turn an accurate fire against the 1859 forts, and the outer forts which were still being held by the Belgians on either side of the breach. All day long the defenders deserted in droves, and at 2000 hours General Paris, as commander of the British forces, decided that he could no longer expose his men to the danger of being stranded at Antwerp. Deguise gave his assent to the British evacuation, but his order to the Belgian 2nd Division to
of their fortifications. It was exceptional even for a garrison commandant to resist the urge to take to his heels before the Germans arrived on the scene. On October 10 Beseler merely had to occupy the abandoned works, and arrange for the surrender of the four forts still garrisoned by the defenders. In Fort Sainte-Marie, on the west bank just below Antwerp, General Deguise waited the summons in the company of General Tollen, the fort commandant, an NCO, and a single loyal private soldier — Private Sianne of the 12th Regiment. Deguise recalls: Towards three o'clock on the afternoon of October 10, a German colonel accompanied by an hostage and several armed soldiers, presented himself at the fort. He saluted me with the greatest possible deference, then announced 7 am Colonel von Kleitz.' I replied 7 am Lieutenant-General Deguise. The resistance of Antwerp is now at an end, and I deliver up my sword to you.' 'Your Excellency,' said the German colonel, 7 understand that the present circumstances must be very painful for you. I have to accept your sword, but I have no doubt that it will be returned to you. May I ask what has become of the garrison of the fort? I believe it should number about 400 men.' I showed him the and the soldier who had stayed with me. The German colonel very politely
NCO
refrained from any comment.
Germans. Beseler's perilously-stretched force had contained the 'sorties' against the communications of the main German armies, and then evicted the Belgians from a position which offered the Allies the chance, if they had been able to seize it,
The Belgian survivors of Antwerp rallied soon on the Yser, and afterwards took part in the unfolding war as an element in the great mass of Allied forces. That was small consolation for the loss of Belgium's richest city, and the destruction of the basis of more than half a century of strategic
of retaining Belgian Flanders in their grip. It is an open question as to whether this gigantic salient could have long been tenable, or whether the Allies would have
calculation.
The German Staff History speaks generously enough of the significance of the help rendered by the British: 'It was of moral rather than tactical value. At the same time the British brigades performed inestimable services as rearguard to the Belgian field army which had left two days before. They thus delayed the fall of the fortress for a few days. From the standpoint of operations as a whole this gain of time, short though it may have been, was of importance for the enemy alliance in view of the struggle on its north wing, and the considerable delays and difficulties caused to enemy sea transport by the U-boat danger.' By holding back five or six German divisions from the main theatre during a critical period, the resistance of Antwerp quite possibly saved Nieuport and Dunkirk for the Allies. The balance of strategic loss and gain nevertheless leans heavily in favour of the
contented themselves with denying the ports to the Germans. We can at least say that the shape of the war would have been radically different, if the defence of the fortress of Antwerp had been equal to the effort
Above: A dog-drawn machine gun cart. The Belgians made much use of dogs in their army Below: The siege of Antwerp. Faced with the problem of getting past a series of forts as quickly as possible and with the minimum
number of troops,
Beseler, the
German com-
mander, decided to use artillery to reduce positions, rush up infantry to occupy these and then repeat the procedure to move further forward. In this way Antwerp was gradually taken by the
German
forces
which had gone into
its
construction.
Further Reading Churchill, Sir Winston, The World Crisis (Four Square) Deguise, Lt-Gen., La Defense de la Position Fortifiee d'Anvers en 1914 (Brussels 1921) Essen, L. van der, The Invasion and The War in Belgium from Liege to the Yser (London 1917) La Campagne de TArmee Beige (Paris 1915) L.F.R., Naval Guns in Flanders (London 1920) Military Operations: France and Belgium 1914 (Macmillan 1925)
[For Christopher Duffy's
page
138.
biography,
see
]
381
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of Ypres marked the final German attempt of 1914 to break through the Allied line in the West and take the Channel ports. But the attempt was frustrated by the tenacious Allied defence of the salient which formed around Ypres. This, of doubtful tactical importance in itself, was defended by the British and the French, while the Belgians held the line further to the north. Both sides suffered appalling and crippling losses, and here the British regular army stood and was destroyed. In the midst of this destruction, however, the British and French halted the German thrust. Brigadier Anthony Farrar'-Hockley describes the battle which finally ruined any chances of an outright German victory. Left: A British 6-inch howitzer. Use of such guns was greatly
The
First
Battle
hampered by bad communications. Right: General Smith-Dorrien, commander of II Corps, was pessimistic of the Allies' chances, especially in the latter stages of the battle
No victor emerged from the Race to the Sea, but, when it ended, the opposing high commands, German and Franco-British, each preserved the illusion that they had outstripped the other. Believing that the Germans had exhausted their reserve divisions, Foch, commander of the French northern group of armies, was convinced that his enemy would not be able to extend a defensive line to the coast. North of Lille there must be a gap between the right flank of the German line in the city and the German occupation force in Antwerp. Discounting the German cavalry who might temporarily delay, but would not long be able to oppose a general Allied advance, there was nothing to halt the French strategy of enveloping the German flank. Unfortunately for Foch, there were scarcely any French units to carry out what he termed 'this glorious enterprise'. On the Channel coast, the Field Army of the Belgians had reassembled behind the Yser; but its condition was not good either in morale or equipment. Foch might exhort the Belgian High Command to turn to the offensive but he failed to understand how much their unfledged divisions had suffered in their gallant defence along and behind the Meuse. They had lost many of their best leaders, and in these battles, as in the succession of subsequent withdrawals, had been deeply impressed by the immense power of the German armies. The Belgians held Nieuport on the Channel coast and the short line of the Yser south to Dixmude with a few outposts to the east. The town of Dixmude, also east of the river, was in French hands, however; the defences had been prepared and manned by a brigade of French sailors under Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h. Below Dixmude, covering the Forest of Houthulst, was de Mitry's cavalry corps with two divisions of elderly French Territorial infantry under command. From Ypres to the La Bassee canal, the BEF under Sir John French was already advancing. The British advance had begun at the latter end of the Race for the Sea at a time when it had still been thought an easy matter for the British to capture Lille and pass beyond. The lack of fire and leadership by Smith-Dorrien and Pulteney as their corps arrived in Flanders, while not leading directly to the loss of the city, had certainly permitted Crown Prince Rupprecht to get there before them. On October 18, Sir John French needed no urging by Foch. Chafing at the delay by Smith-Dorrien and Pulteney, encouraged by the success of his cavalry under the thrusting leadership of Allenby, the loss of Lille had not shaken his expectation of a continuous advance to Brussels. There were now eight British divisions in the line: two each of infantry in II and III Corps, two of cavalry under Allenby close to the Lys and an infantry and a cavalry division under Rawlinson in IV Corps immediately west of Ypres and in contact with de Mitry by the Forest of Houthulst. Soon, the Indian Corps arriving from India and Haig's I Corps brought up from the Aisne should be available to strengthen their numbers. Could the Germans possibly match such a force? As it happened, the Germans could do better in numbers and were about to prove it. The surplus of untrained young men in
Germany had been formed into six and a half new corps during summer and four of these began to entrain for Belgium on October 10. Though none of the junior ranks had undertaken
the
training beyond company, battery or squadron level and were in these sub-units by reserve officers, cadets and noncommissioned officers excluded from the first line, they were animated by a passionate idealism which, combined with their youthful vigour, promised much to Duke Albrecht of Wiirttem-
commanded
army commander. The new Fourth Army under the Duke's command was already in the field. The siege troops at Antwerp had been formed into /// Reserve Corps under Beseler and they now advanced steadily westward both to screen the arrival of the new corps from Germany with the cavalry and to close up as far forward as possible to the Allies' line. Between October 15 and 18, the four new corps passed through Brussels in numerous railway trains which were directed into VI rural stations and sidings some miles west of the city, and set off on foot along the Belgian country roads. Both Falkenhayn and Duke Albrecht were informed in general terms by Monday, October 18 of the enemy opposing them. On the other side, Foch, more calculating than he often seemed, had perceived that the gap in the German line had closed. He warned Ronarc'h in Dixmude against any idea of manoeuvring; your tactics under present circumstances must be confined purely and simply to resisting on your actual position. Your mission is to stop the enemy in his tracks.' To Joffre at GQG he sent word of a need berg, their
French reinforcements, most importantly to cover the rear of the Belgian army. He ordered de Maud'huy at Arras to extend his flank on to the north bank of the La Bassee canal so as to shorten the line Smith-Dorrien need hold and wrote to French advising reconnaissance and preparation of a defensive line in rear of the BEF. for
Massed columns The apprehensions of a major clash of arms were felt no less by Sir John French's staff, his corps and divisional commanders. The Royal Flying Corps had reported massed columns of troops marching westwards towards Roulers, Thourout and Court rai. Beseler's corps had been identified in the coastal zone, where its including the massive siege guns used at Antwerp, was ranging on the Belgian line and Honarc'h's posts. A host of refugees fled before the advancing Germans, dodging the pickets of Beseler's screen and the Fourth Army cavalry. Beside this was the hard evidence encountered by the infantry attempting to secure the ridge overlooking Lille. In both Pulteney 's corps and Smith-Dorrien's, next to the south, they were opposed h British divisions, regular troops which, they judged ctly, outnumbered them. A successful offensive is not susl insl this type of opposition. It must be said for French that he had been several times during the preceding week, as he protested his corps com manders that the infantry advance was slow tiff opposition', only to learn next day that the enemy had sen vanquished or artillery,
t
I
385
followed the Jdger and there were brief exchanges of shell and rifle fire. But they wore opposed only by small parties of de Mitry's cavalry, holding a succession of ridges ahead, and the morning was occupied by short marches followed by prolonged halts as the French were engaged and driven back. Few men saw action, scarcely any saw the enemy at all. It was different in the afternoon. At 1300 hours the leading brigade of the 45th began to attack the village of Kortemark while almost the whole of the 46th Division deployed to capture the low ridge of Hooghe, topped by the village of Hooghlede. The fields were either of stubble or the remnants of vegetables, many being intersected by ditches or streams. As they came within range of the French guns, the men changed marching formations as they had practised on the drill square and manoeuvre grounds at home, the ranks turning finally into line for the assault, while the officers and non-commissioned officers called out instructions to the men to keep their dressing. In each company, the sergeant-major marched behind to see that none fell out without a wound — an unnecessary measure with these young men. The light was waning when the battalions of the 46th took the ridge. The French dragoons had gone and all they found amongst the smoking red brick and tile of Hooghlede were a few civilians crouching terrified in their cellars.
By Monday evening, Duke Albrecht and his Chief-of-Staff, Generalmajor Use, were not dissatisfied with the progress of Fourth Army. Beseler's /// Corps, with XXII Reserve Corps, had captured
The cavalry was ready
to exploit the
breakthrough, but none
came
forced back without difficulty, but he misinterpreted the actions of the German cavalry completely. The Uhlans — such were the light cavalry — were simply drawing aside as a screen. Their task was now to reconnoitre for the marching columns fast coming into position between Beseler's corps in the coastal zone and the Sixth Army on either side of Lille. Slightly ahead of their fellows, the 45th and 46th Reserve
Divisions, of Generalleutnant von Kleist's XXIII Reserve Corps, spent the night of Sunday, October 18, in and around the villages of Lichtervelde and Ardooie in which they were wakened in
darkness on the Monday morning. After breakfast from the field kitchens, they formed into regimental columns. Behind the leading brigade, two regiments, a total of six battalions, was the artillery, drawn by horses. Ahead, detachments of cavalry moved in bounds to reconnoitre, supported closely by the Jdger (light infantry) companies stripped of their packs and ready to give quick support to the cavalrymen. The 46th Division had not been marching for more than about 30 minutes when a cavalry scout galloped back to say that the enemy was ahead. Ten minutes later the 45th was halted by a similar report, clearly true as the leading battalion was almost at once shelled by French 75s. The first test of war was now upon them and in both divisions there was excitement and some confusion as artillery parties ran their ladders up trees or climbed buildings to find observation posts while the infantry broke column to be dispersed on either side of the divisional route.
Short marches, long halts Those that had looked for an immediate epic action to follow were disappointed. The guns fired; one of the leading battalions German
troops, veterans of the
These were now
to
be replaced
advance and retreat in France. the line by raw, young recruits
initial
in
the Allied outposts covering the Yser, leaving only outskirts of Nieuport east of the river in French and Belgian hands respectively. Both towns and the interconnecting defences had been drenched by heavy artillery and mortar fire. To the south the other three German Reserve corps had everywhere crossed successfully the main road and railway running north to the coast through Menin, Roulers and Thourout to a depth of about five miles. The fact that these corps had been opposed only by a light force of cavalry was known to the Duke and confirmed the Intelligence reports of French capabilities. Next day he expected his ardent novices to drive in among them or to force them back in a rout. For the main offensive was to begin on the 20th when, in the darkness of the Tuesday morning, the Fourth and Sixth Armies would advance together after a preliminary all
Dixmude and the
bombardment.
On
the advice of his Chief-of-Staff, Generalmajor von DelmenCrown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria had withdrawn his XIII Corps into reserve during the night of the 18th, relieving them in the line by six divisions of cavalry. These he believed would be more than adequate to overcome the two British cavalry divisions under Allenby along the Lys, and that the substitution would put into his hand two more strong infantry divisions for the offensive. North of the La Bassee canal, he now outnumbered the BEF by three to one in units and somewhat more in individual strength as none of his battalions had less than two-thirds of their full war strength while most were more than threequarters up to strength. The British had less than half their complement, some less than a quarter. It was his immediate intention to destroy their positions on the ridge overlooking Lille; as a preliminary to breaking out into the low ground between Bethune and Armentieres. Very early on the Tuesday morning, two Westphalian battalions were led by guides along the road to Le Pilly through mist and
singer,
>
j
darkness. In the darkness one company lost touch and was still absent when the regimental commander gave the order to advance. They used the road as a guide to direction until dawn, when they saw the houses of Le Pilly above the ground mist. Le Pilly was a tiny village and its buildings had been seriously damaged by the morning bombardment. The commanding officer of its garrison was Major E. H. E. Daniell, and he had expected such destruction. He had placed his battalion, the 2nd Royal Irish, outside buildings, the trenches being dug along the hedge-rows of the gardens and orchards. Every man he could muster was waiting in skilfully sited positions as the Westphalians came out of the mist and the German artillery lifted to allow their infantry to close.
However excited or apprehensive they might have been, the long years of training and campaigning now permitted the Royal Irish to fire accurately and easily into the massed Westphalian ranks. Within a few minutes, the British Royal Field Artillery began to drop shells among the assault force. The tight enemy formations broke up. For the next five hours, the Westphalian regimental commander attempted by one means or another to get his men into the village. The majority of these were by infiltration under cover of artillery fire. In the middle of the morning a fresh company appeared — probably the one which had lost its way when the battalions first formed up — but its arrival made no difference. The regimental commander sent back for his third battalion and arranged a completely fresh bombardment with as many guns as were available.
A motley group
A
expense and while certain prudent measures had been taken towards a rearward defence, the most important measure was to fight and defeat the Germans where they stood. With these words and a formal farewell, the French Commander-in-Chief left to visit the Belgian headquarters at Fumes. He arrived at this little town at about the same time as the first regiment of the French division sent from the south, the 42nd under the swarthy and indomitable Grossetti. This first regiment, the 16th Chasseurs, was at once ordered to parade and march past the Belgian king, who was also the executive Commander-in-Chief of the national army. Joffre's journey to Flanders had been designed to encourage and, if necessary, exhort his allies as they passed once again into a slogging m&tch with the Germans, all hopes of an advance into open country as a grand manoeuvre having passed. His reminder to both British and Belgians that he would share freely his resources as they were needed reflected sincerely his intentions. But this upright policy in the high command was not and could not be expected to be reflected uniformly throughout the chain of command. The prime reason for this was that there was no
battalion destroyed Despite the successful morning defence, the 2nd Royal Irish at Le Pilly were not well placed to resist indefinitely. The village stood in a salient which was now wholly isolated by the fire of the Germans lying south and east. When the assault was renewed by the three Westphalian battalions at 1500 hours, only 300 officers and men remained to resist, more than half of them wounded. Shells had blown in many of the open trenches as the Germans assaulted, reaching at last the village street. Daniell ordered everyone still fighting to fix bayonets. For some time small groups struggled among the buildings but at the end of the day they were overcome. Daniell was dead with 256 of his men, 240 of the remaining 290 were wounded and of these only 30 managed to escape to their own lines. The battalion had been destroyed. It was not, however, the type of prize which Crown Prince Rupprecht sought, for the capture of Le Pilly had been planned as the first stage of an attack to capture Herlies and to move towards Aubers. Elsewhere in VII Corps and along the entire front of XIII and XIX Corps immediately to the north, the Sixth Army captured nothing. Its commander ordered XIII Corps to persevere if necessary into the night. At 1800 hours, under the fire of the whole corps artillery, partly by chance, partly by force, five battalions broke in on the 2nd Battalion, Sherwood Foresters, to fight amongst the villages of La Vallee and Ennetieres until, at 0515 hours on the 21st, the defenders were crushed and the unit destroyed. French knew nothing of the loss of Daniell and the 2nd Royal Irish during the 20th, and could not know that the 2nd Sherwood Foresters were destroyed until much later on the 21st. The low cloud and continuing intermittent rain prevented air reconnaissance, but the news from his own four corps, de Mitry and the Belgians was that the line was holding generally in the face of persistent attacks throughout the morning and afternoon. A new French headquarters appeared, with General d'Urbal to take command of all the French elements in Belgium, including the division sent to strengthen the Belgian defence line. LieutenantGeneral Sir Douglas Haig reported that his I Corps had begun to march into the battle zone through Ypres. The prisoners taken the previous day were reported to be youthful and ill-trained. All these facts sustained French's optimism and enabled him to order I Corps to 'march in the direction of Thourout' and to 'attack the enemy wherever met'. During the night, however, his mood changed until, next morning, when Joffre called at his headquarters, he asked the French Commander-in-Chief 'for facilities to make a great entrenched camp at Boulogne to take the whole Expeditionary Force'. Joffre refused. It was clear to Joffre that his British colleague was apprehensive once more of a repetition of the retreat to the Marne and remembered himself what defeatism had prevailed at that time with French and his chief-of-staff. Concealing his anger at such a want of confidence when the line was holding adequately
— he was that that
to confess all his
anger later — he reminded his
allies
was not only Flanders but the whole line south to Arras was under attack. France would not favour her own at their it
of British waits for the
Germans
in
Plugstreet
Wood'
command of the international forces in the Flanders sector, and when crises arose there was a tendency for local national commanders to look after their own security without regard for the consequences of an ally on right or left. Thus as Sir Douglas Haig advanced his corps on Wednesday morning, October 21, he discovered that Rawlinson's cavalry and a brigade of de Mitry's had fallen back from the important Passchendaele ridge without more than brief resistance and then, Haig wrote in his diary, 'about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, without any warning whatsoever, the French cavalry corps on our left received orders to retire west of the canal. The reason for this withdrawal was said to be that the enemy was advancing in strength of about a division. The GOC of the French Cavalry Division on the immediate left of the 1st Division fully realised the effect of this withdrawal and declined absolutely to obey this order until it was repeated. He refused to uncover our flank without "une ordre for me lie".' single Allied general in
Abandoned without
contest
was repeated and the Forest of Houthulst contest. If de Mitry was at fault in this. Rawlinson, on Haig's right, was a greater offender. He had allowed Passchendaele village to pass by default to the enemy on the previous day — for want of proper orders — and had placed out his All the same, the order
was abandoned without
infantry, the 7th Division, to the south on open forward slopes, a line drawn arbitrarily on the map without any appi >n or reconnaissance on his part, and despite representatii MajorGenera] Capper, the division's commander, he sti ck to these poor dispositions. Three of the new German infantn divisions and a cavalry division from those on the Lys attackoci the 7th Division throughout the day. The advance of Haig's corps eased their plight in the afternoon when the line might have been resiled j
But Rawlinson
let
matters
drift.
3H7
AJlenby's professional outlook and methods provided an admirable contrast on Rawlinson's right. As with II Corps, the Ca\ airy had now been fighting continuously for more than a week. The strongest of his units comprised only 300 men, many had less and two were down to 180. With the essential tasks of manning and maintaining trenches, patrolling by night or carrying in supplies, commanding officers were unable to permit more than two or three hours oi' sleep a day. The artillery contingent was smaller in number and had a lighter weapon than that of the other
Sixth
Yet the commander's ability made all the difference. Allenby 's line covered the most important piece of ground in the Ypres /one. the Messines ridge. It was as well that Allenby had sited his force with the utmost care and insisted upon the same standard of devotion to the work amongst his subordinate commanders. He knew that dismounted action of this kind ran contrary to the independent and sometimes impulsive characters of the cavalry officers but a single command from him was enough; all respected their robust and determined chief and none doubted the need for their presence in the line. Even so, the frequent visits of Allenby and his divisional commanders, the use of administrative troops to stand relief and other measures to ease the burdens of defence, could not prevent accumulated exhaustion. When five of Crown Prince Rupprecht's cavalry divisions attacked Allenby's two divisions early on the morning of the 21st, ambiguous orders were issued in one brigade, and within two hours the whole of 2nd Cavalry Division's line began to retire without being under serious pressure. The system of personal command now paid dividends; Hubert Gough, the divisional commander, came forward and restored his brigades in person, moving up and down the line between headquarters and units until all was secure once more. The Messines ridge was threatened more seriously from the south, whence a force of Saxons got into Ploegsteert Wood — Plugstreet to the British — from which they were ejected by a strong counterattack later in the day. Sixth Army had resumed the offensive before dawn once more from Arras to the Lys, across which the cavalry attacked Allenby and Rawlinson. On the ridge, 11 battalions of General von Claer's VII Corps struck again from the morning mists, concentrating now upon four of Smith-Dorrien's battalions beyond Le Pilly, while the remainder of the corps with five regiments from XIII Corps attacked Conneau's cavalry posts and Pulfeney's battalions immediately to the north. They did not gain much ground but caused many casualties amongst the British, one battalion losing its last eight officers. Conneau had neither the men nor the fire power to resist sustained attack by strong parties of infantry. In the afternoon his foremost trenches were abandoned. Everywhere along the front airmen flew seeking information. A British observer flying above the Forest of Houthulst recorded, 'Dixmude can hardly be seen for a mass of shells. French sailors having hellish time — much smoke rising from area of Nieuport — difficult to see enemy movement nearer than Clercken but close to 3,000 troops moving forward on road in that area.' Like the
Crossing in darkness
Army, the Fourth was attacking
at every point, and though break through anywhere, both Duke Albrecht and Crown Prince Rupprecht gained ground of tactical importance. Encroachment was not enough, however, for the royal army commanders or their chiefs-of-staff; what they were expecting — what Falkenhayn expected of them — by the end of this second day of the offensive was the opening of a breach towards Estaires opposite Lille, and across the Yser in the coastal zone.
unable
corps
to
Facing the Yser, the dogged Beseler was equally determined to get across the river. Deliberate assault under artillery bombardment by day having failed, he decided to attempt a crossing in darkness by stealth. At Tervaete, the river looped eastward, making a salient into which the Germans might fire from three sides. After dark, his artillery maintained a slow harassing fire on all the Belgian river posts while engineers brought light pontoons, boats and planks up to the bank. These were slipped into the water without being discovered. As soon as the infantry
were ready to cross, the German guns and mortars concentrated their fire on the trenches and fortified houses of the Belgian 1st Division. The German infantry began to cross at a run, scrambling up the bank on the far side. Behind the first wave came reserve detachments helping to carry machine guns and reserve ammunition. The artillery bombardment switched to Belgian positions on either side while the heavy guns returned to shell the Belgian artillery lines. But this was scarcely worth their attention; for all that was available by night to support the 1st Division were a few light field batteries, and even for these ammunition was scarce. At daybreak, more guns were made available by the Belgian command, while the Royal Navy began to fire from the sea. With this aid, the 1st Division counterattacked to retake some of their positions. But they could not drive the Germans back across the Yser. Though confined to the loop, Beseler's men had gained a footing on the western bank. By the morning of the 22nd, Foch believed that the Allies were losing all initiative. He ordered d'Urbal to mount an offensive with French forces, while he sought to engage the Belgians and British in co-operation.
D'Urbal had under his command Grossetti's division on the coast, Ronarc'h's sailors at Dixmude, de Mitry's cavalry and the Territorials. Close behind was IX Corps, sent by Joffre as a reinforcement. But the corps could not get into the line by the early morning of the 23rd to attack — they were still getting out of their
| $
railway trains at Poperinge, seven miles behind Ypres, on the evening of the 22nd. So the orders sent to them to commit the leading division to an attack at 0900 hours, over ground none had seen, with two cavalry divisions as yet unassembled, was meaningless. The request that Haig's corps should co-operate closely was equally fruitless; the request reached his headquarters at 0200 hours on the 23rd and, misjudging the British positions, showed an advance directly through Haig's units. Moreover, a reinforced brigade of I Corps was at that moment moving to counterattack Kortekeer Cabaret and could not be stopped. French decided on a compromise whereby the British would draw aside, yet guard the French flanks — a measure jibed at unpleasantly by d'Urbal. For a few hours there was some anxiety in both I and IV Corps headquarters, not least because of the danger that the French artillery might fire into their lines. But the morning developed in an unexpected way: there was no sign of any units of IX Corps at 0900 hours and at Kortekeer Cabaret the counterattack triumphed, killing or capturing 1,281 members of the 45th Reserve Division. When the first French battalions were able to get forward at noon, there was some doubt as to what they should do. Common sense prevailed. To establish a continuous French line, Haig's corps was relieved, passing into reserve. By the 24th, the line from Dixmude to Zonnebeke was held by French troops, leaving only Grossetti's French troops detached with the Belgians. The British carried on the defence with Rawlinson's, Allenbv 's, Pulteney's and Smith-Dorrien's corps on much the same ground as they had held since the 18th, except that Smith-Dorrien had withdrawn altogether from the ridge. Foch's plans for a counteroffensive had therefore achieved nothing. Though the Germans had, by a glance at the map, achieved a
great deal, Falkenhayn for his part was aware that his own plans 5 had not been significantly successful. He gave a plain warning to | the royal army commanders and their chiefs-of-staff that he must « shortly consider whether their offensive operations ought to be |
A gun crew prepares
388
to
open
fire
from a
hill
opposite Messines
abandoned. The two army chiefs-of-staff were, unlike their royal commanders, career officers whose reputations were at stake. They had been appointed to ensure professional standards, and both
Use and Dehnensingen were aware that, quite apart from their general wish to see Germany triumph, their particular sectors would be denied full reinforcement and supply if they did not succeed. Use therefore decided that Fourth Army should attack two points only: Dixmude and the ridge east of Ypres. Delmensingen persuaded Crown Prince Rupprecht that they should shorten their line of attack to the sector from the La Bassee canal to Menin, for this would not only permit a greater concentration of troops but give power to, and derive power from, Fourth Army's offensive immediately to the right.
A bond
of suffering Facing Dixmude, Duke Albrecht's gunners had now an excellent observation post suspended below a sausage-shaped kite-balloon. Powerful field glasses magnified every target in and around the town. Except for those back in the ruins, the French sailors found it necessary to spend daylight hours in primitive shelters of broken timbers and rubble built as far above the water line as possible. The surface water and the wind, chillingly cold in the late autumn, however, sapped the strength of the Dixmude garrison more than the shells. The north of the town was held by Commandant Delage and the south by Commandant Varney — though one of Varney's battalions was held back by Ronarc'h at the Caeskerke railway station, west of the Yser bridge, as a reserve, with one section of machine guns covering the approaches against a sudden break-in by the Germans. Hard by was Colonel Meisser's regiment of Belgian infantry, with whom the French had formed a bond of suffering. Before midnight on the 24th, the steady harassing artillery fire of the day increased progressively, battery by German battery, the weight of shells falling on the east and south of the town. At 0100 hours on the 25th, the line of bombardment began to move west, concentrating at 0130 hours on the defences round the Yser bridge. At this hour, as the seamen expected, an assault began. But after they had beaten this off there was another and another and another. By 0630 hours they had stood to for 15 separate assaults, each interspersed by local bombardment. The original defence line was no longer discernible. When the dawn came, the vestiges of the German storming parties fell back, the defenders of Dixmude sought for shelter among the reeking ruins of the town. Exhaustion struck both sides and the peace of inaction settled over the area for some hours. Nearby, along the Yser, a new battle was developing. Though his bridgehead across the river had not been chosen as the schwer-
punkt (point of main
effort) of the renewed offensive, Beseler continued his own attempts to break through. During the night, his engineers had ferried field guns over to the west bank and when these were in position he attacked. The Belgian division in front of him fell after an hour or so into a desperate confusion as a German brigade — attached from another corps— joined the fighting. Demoralised by fear and fatigue, men began to leave the battlefield. In daylight, the foremost storming parties reached the railway line about two miles from their original bridgehead. In Furnes, plans were made to evacuate the main army headquarters to Poperinge, leaving only a small advanced command post for the king and his military operations staff. In the hour that the Germans began finally to break the remnant of the defence on the railway line shielding Peroijze and the Furnes road, Grossetti came suddenly from Nieuport, marching with the first of his two brigades. He attempted a counterattack but wisely did not push it beyond the railway embankment. This offensive gesture gave him time to lay out his complete division in the area. Having seen his battalions into position on either side of Peroijze, Grossetti had a chair brought to the open cross roads where, in full view of his own and such Belgian soldiers as remained, he sat down as shells and bullets dropped all round. 'I don't know how much will be left tomorrow of the 42nd Division,' he signalled to d'Urbal, 'but so long as one man remains, the Germans will not cross the railroad.' Meanwhile, the Allied formations southward to the La Bassee canal had not remained aloof from the struggle. Three of Duke Albrecht's 'schoolboy' corps, reinforced by such reserves as he had been able to draw in from Antwerp and the intermediate coast defences, attacked along the low ridge which covers Ypres. Those attacking out of and immediately parallel to the Forest of Houthulst shortly after dawn were disconcerted to find themselves caught in the open by a French bombardment, the preliminary to an attack by Dubois' IX Corps. A little later, the French 17th Division made two sharp assaults with the aim of regaining the crest of the ridge in this sector. On the left there was a head-on clash with the advancing Germans so that, despite their dash, the French infantry gained only a mile of
ground beyond Langemark; but the assault on the right met the advancing Germans on the quarter flank. The leading regiment caused the Germans to falter, then to begin breaking out of formation. Those immediately behind swept on through their own comrades' ranks and those of the enemy, recapturing Zonnebeke on the western side of the ridge. While this action was taking place, two divisions of Fourth Army fell upon a brigade of the British 7th Division immediately to the north of the Ypres-Menin road. The defending battalions were required, as earlier, to hold a line on the open forward slope of the ridge, from Polygon Wood at its highest point through the village of Reutel
down
to the outlying
mound
of Kruiseecke.
South of the Menin road, Sixth Army was attacking in co-operation with these forces to assist Duke Albrecht to break through the British line towards Ypres. A generous ration of shells had been allocated for the operation and these started bursting in heavy concentrations among the British trenches at 0430 hours. By 0600 hours, the exposed defences, lacking any form of buttressing by sandbags, were severely damaged, many blown in. A number of companies, close to buildings, had managed to cover their trenches or build crude strong points with masonry and timber. Their rifles and few machine guns were able to drive back the assaulting German infantry. But in the centre of the line, towards the village of Reutel, 244th Reserve Regiment came up very quickly — the leading companies actually ran into their own bombardment — while one battalion marched through a gap created by the annihilation of a company of the 2nd Scots Guards. The 2nd Wiltshires in Reutel thus found themselves attacked from front and rear by the three battalions of 244th Reserve Regiment and were, before 0800 hours, wholly overcome.
Clerks, orderlies and signallers Before mid-morning then, on the 24th, what Duke Albrecht had commanded to be done had been accomplished: the British line had been opened. There were no reserve positions behind the Wiltshires so that the way was open for the remainder of XXVII Reserve Corps to march to Ypres. At the headquarters of 7th Division, Major-General Capper mustered staff officers, clerks, orderlies, signallers and transport men to compose a blocking force. He expected 'the Germans to appear at any moment, even while the men were being called in and staff officers were being told off to the command of detachments'. This alarm, strange to say, was not needed. The commander of the 244th Reserve Regiment does not seem to have been aware of his success, except in the task of capturing Reutel. He made little attempt to press his advantage. General Capper's calls for assistance were by now being answered. Haig's 2nd Division, relieved from the line by the French IX Corps, was stood to and the 5th Brigade turned quickly out of its billets and bivouacs to hurry forward. But nearer and speedier were Dubois' cavalry which came at a gallop to help the British. This prompt action stabilised the line until the remainder of the
2nd Division came up
Belgian troops played a
in the afternoon,
vital,
if
when
not so famous, role
in
British and French
the north
Approximate front lines October
Miles
N^-
r—i—
German
i
Km
w
—^^—
10
—__
French
•Roubaix
•
16, 1914
Belgian British
Lichtervelde
• Roulers Thourout
•
Lille
• Kortemark
Ostend
NOR TH SEA
PHASE
1
-
OCTOBER
PHASE
18-21
2
-OCTOBER 23-25 \i%f. Forest
of'!
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Top: The basic front line during the First Battle of Ypres. At the beginning of the battle, the front line was extremely fluid as the Allies retreated north and south of Ypres. Although there were French forces as far forward as Roulers, it was already anticipated that the main defensive line (even though
Oct 25 Oct
25
an Allied offensive in the direction of Bruges was being planned) would have be established along the line which did in fact exist during the main battle. Above: Four major phases in the battle. There was little large scale movement during the course of the battle, and the most noteworthy
to
Below left: Belgium flooded by the Belgians. While the British and the French held the Germans in head-on combat to the south, the Belgians flooded parts of their homeland and held the Germans at bay in this fashion. Below: Ypres as it will always be remembered — mud, water and improvised
The First Battle of Ypres — last battle of the
trenches,
'Old Contemptibles'
in this
instance occupied by Belgians holding onto the last corner
of their overrun country
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Oct 26
Oct 27
Oct 28
Oct 29
British front
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— —
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2300 hrs Nov
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•
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French front
Oct 26
Oct 27
Oct 28
Oct
French front
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———
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Nov
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29
aspect of the two months' fighting was the enormous reinforcement of the German front. While the Allied front received replacements, it did not receive much in the way of reinforcements. Nevertheless, although the Allies were forced to give up ground, they could not be forced out of
•
•
his
the salient and inflicted huge losses on the German forces opposing them. It should be emphasised that the map at the top of the left-hand page has been turned through 90 degrees, and so the long axis of the map is in fact the north-south axis
infantry threw off a late counterattack and advanced a further half mile on the western side of the ridge. South of the Menin road, the other two brigades had a terrible day under intense shellfire as they lay in their crumbling, sandy trenches in and behind the salient of Kruiseecke. Fortunately, the two divisions attacking consisted of dismounted cavalry, whom the British rebuffed at every approach. A similarly successful defence was maintained along the Messines ridge. On Pulteney's front, nine German battalions rushed forward in the clear and sparkling dawn to capture Le Quesne, Bois Blancs and La Houssoie, 111 Corps' last foothold on the ridge facing Lille. All day the battle continued, the guns of either side firing as much upon each other's batteries as upon the infantry. At dusk, the assaults were renewed. Close by. Smith-Dorrien's corps was attacked at 2100 hours by seven battalions which drove into the British trenches between the 1st Gordons and the 15th Sikhs, a battalion of the Jullundur Brigade which had just entered the line. After the fine morning, heavy grey clouds had spread so that the night fighting was unilluminated apart from weapon flashes. Before midnight, it was raining heavily. Roused and formed up in these unpleasant conditions, the 4th Middlesex marched forward through the downpour and mud to counterattack. They took back
German dead and wounded in and around their positions. To the Germans it began to seem that, no matter what they did, the Allied line would never break. They gained the Le Quesne salient on the 25th when Pulteney withdrew his battalions, but this simply meant that the line remained intact a little to the west. To the Allied troops in the trenches, it seemed that the
every trench and found next morning almost 400
f
of
As each body Germans is destroyed,
we surge forward and take on the next, shooting and charging alternately, bayoneting the survivors until by sheer exhaustion and losses we come to a standstill'
British,
French and German casualties
at
Ypres totalled about 250,000
in less than 12 hours. Smith-Dorrien reported that he had sent to de Maud'huy to ask for help but had not yet had an answer. After a further unhappy hour of discussion, it was agreed that additional guns and a higher ration of shells should be made available to II Corps and, for the rest, they must trust that the
would hold. Next day, the line still held — and the soldiers of II Corps showed that weary and diminished as they were after 14 days' continuous fighting, they could take much more than their corps and divisional commanders believed possible. From de Maud'huy came a message offering to relieve the right flank battalion of II Corps with a unit from his XXI Corps and generously adding that line
'Conneau's cavalry corps is entirely at your disposal'. 1,000 British reinforcements arrived in the II Corps' area on the 26th, and a second 1,000 on the 27th.
Terror-stricken
men
was not only in the II Corps area, however, that there were signs of crisis. The pounding of the Kruiseecke salient continued throughout the 25th and Monday the 26th. Haig, who still had It
only a fraction evening of the some stuck to sustaining first
of his corps engaged, noted in his diary on the many units had fallen back but that their trenches. Haig was given to writing and impressions and conclusions in his diary, even
26th that
German
capacity in manpower and shells was inexhaustible. The British were particularly conscious of shortages because they were a small band of regulars whose reservists had long since joined them. The sources of reinforcements had to be such regular divisions as could be brought to France from overseas, including Indian army divisions, and men recovered from sickness and wounds suffered in the days of Mons and the Marne. There was therefore much relief at Sir John French's headquarters when word was received that a large draft, comprised mainly of officers and men in the latter category, were ready to sail for France. They began to arrive behind Ypres on the 25th. It was known, too, that a third and shortly a fourth French infantry division would be in the line with Dubois' soldiers. The continuing reports of German losses, the persistent defence of the Allied line, the successful advance by Dubois' IX Corps and the arrival of reinforcements all served to elate French so that his evening report to Whitehall on the 25th noted that, 'The situation is growing more favourable hour by hour. My anxiety is over.' Then at midnight, after a drive in rain and wind, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien appeared at to say that he feared his section of the line might break at any moment. He gave this grave opinion to French in his sitting-room at St Omer in the presence of Wilson, the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, who wrote in his diary: 'Sir John was rather short with him.' But despite French's suspicion that II Corps' commander was a man easily dismayed, he could not disregard the warning. Yet there was little immediately to hand to give him. The only reserve was the 1st Division at Ypres, 28 miles from II Corps. Even if sent at once, they could not be turned out and march this distance
GHQ
A new 'home'
for the
army-the
wet, cold
and disease-ridden trench
392 II
these were shown subsequently to be misjudged. He was not wrong in stating that the salient had been abandoned piecemeal or that terror-stricken men had fallen back from the line. But he was as yet inexperienced personally in the horrors of the firing line and was unaware of the losses suffered by the infantry of 7th Division. For 36 hours, the trenches of the salient had been bombarded with little respite, mostly by 21 -cm shells. When the assaults ceased, the direct bombardment — which had lifted to pound the British batteries in rear — began again. More men were buried under the falling, sandy earth. Some were dug out, their faces blue and swollen, in time to be revived — some were not. Some were wounded but stayed to help their friends while others were ordered to make their way back by the doctors in the regimental aid posts. Those still forward were increasingly in difficulty with the sand blown into the guideways and faces of their rifle bolts and machine gun locks. In the early afternoon, as a fresh assault began on them, those Germans who had infiltrated through the lines during the morning darkness began to shout 'Retire! Retire!' The British, without thinking, scrambled from their trenches, led by their officers, where any survived, and thus the line of the 20th Brigade crumbled. What is remarkable is that all those who thus fell back — whether as individuals or groups — of their own urgent initiative reassembled by units within a matter of hours. But the 'units' were skeletons and could not have held a battalion front again
when
A temporary German casualty
station near the line at Ypres
save for the appearance of 100 or so to each from the reinforcement draft. Much the same breach of the line and recovery happened on Smith-Dorrien's front by the village of Neuve-Chapelle. Heavy bombardment was followed by an eight-battalion assault by the 16th Infantry Regiment with units from the 56th, 57th and 142nd Regiments. The line of the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles (not to be confused with the Royal Irish Regiment destroyed at Le Pilly) was infiltrated in early assaults, then crushed and finally broken. Yet the line reformed quickly, the survivors of the Irish Rifles combining with the 1st Wiltshires and the 2nd South Lancashires to a total of 587 all ranks, with the strength and spirit to make a counterattack. If the trials of the BEF were intensified as a result of their lack of trained reserves, the Germans, as has been seen, could not afford to continue such a prodigal expenditure of soldiers without achieving decisive results. On October 27, Falkenhayn came forward to Crown Prince Rupprecht's headquarters to speak plainly, as was his habit. Notwithstanding their superiority in numbers, neither Fourth nor Sixth Army had exploited a breach in the Allied line. Astonishingly, the French had been able to operate a brief offensive towards the Ypres ridge, their successful advance only being stopped by the committal of the 2nd Ersatz, 37th and 38th Landivehr Brigades between two of the new reserve corps. The only advantageous factor which emerged was that, in order to reinforce the Flanders front, the French had reduced their power to threaten
The bewilderment of being in a strange country and the numbness his wound mark the face of an Indian of the Lahore Division as he walks through the rain and mud of a French village in Flanders
of
393
the south and hence Falkenhayn felt able to withdraw two regular corps. // Bavarian from Peronne and from the Aisne, for service in Flanders. By other measures, two more divisions could be brought up for the offensive. These six divisions, additional to the strength already in Flanders, were to be used as an army group under General von Fabeck, the whole under the supervision of down Prince Rupprecht as a new right wing of bis army. Reinforcements of heavy artillery were also being sent by rail to Flanders from the Argonne and Champagne. A special allocation of shells had already been despatched from the reserves in Germany. Once these resources had been combined, the plan was for Fourth and Sixth Armies to attack along their fronts to prevent any movement of troops to assist the sector attacked by Group Fabeck. Group Fabeck was to attack where the numbers were weakest, the line of approach most direct: against the British, from 'Plugstreet' Wood to Gheluvelt on the Menin road. to
XV
'Incapable of attack?' Buoyed up by the fact that his line was holding, whatever the pressure, by the belief that the Germans, due to losses, were now 'quite incapable of making any strong and sustained attack' — so he reported to Kitchener on the evening of October 27 — and exhilarated by Foch's optimism and the arrival of the French 31st Division, Sir John French agreed that the time had come to attack again. He did not demur when d'Urbal extended the width of his assault beyond even his new strength and happily expected that Haig's contribution would share in a triumph. He disregarded the fact that this attack failed to carry the line forward more than a few hundred yards at a cost of 2,000 French soldiers and a proportionate number of his own. They would attack again on October 29. There was further evidence to hand, however, to convince him that the Germans were not spent. On the 28th, the Bellini Tosi station used by British Intelligence to monitor the German wireless intercepted a message from Fourth Army to XXVII Reserve Corps, ordering it to join the neighbouring Bavarian Reserve Division in a general attack to be launched at 0530 hours on the 29th. This Intelligence was received at Haig's headquarters at Hooge Chateau at 1500 hours on the 28th — Haig had now taken command of the 7th Division from Rawlinson and the 3rd Cavalry Division had passed to Allenby's corps. Due to the continual cutting of the telephone cable by shellfire and the losses amongst runners, it was after midnight when the battalions in the line passed the information out to their rifle companies. As the company runners made their way out with these details, one young Scot suggested that the rumbling noises to the east meant that the Germans were retiring. What in fact they were listening to was the mass of heavy guns — held back hitherto for secrecy — moving down the pave into position. At 0500 hours it was still dark and densely foggy. At exactly 0530, silently and without a preliminary bombardment, the Germans appeared to the north of the Menin road. A chance wind, blowing aside the curtain of fog at one point and a last-minute loss of direction in another deprived them of the full benefit of surprise which their skill had otherwise earned. The British began to fire steadily except at one point where, due to an issue of badly made cartridges — the brass cases were slightly oversize — the
was low. By 0550 hours, the Bavarians had broken in at this point and were exploiting their breach. Now the German bombardment fell on selected targets, principally reserve positions, headquarters and the routes between them. Immediately south of the Menin road, the Germans were also now appearing en masse like 'a crowd coming on to the ground after a football match' with many more behind. As the two sides closed, confusion grew. The 1st Black Watch, 1st Cameron Highlanders, 1st Scots Guards, volume of
fire
1st Coldstream Guards, 1st Gloucesters, 1st Grenadier Guards, 2nd Scots Guards, 2nd Gordon Highlanders, 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers had by the end of the day beaten off all assaults except for an encroachment by three battalions of the 16th Bavarian Reserve Regiment 500 yards along the road towards Gheluvelt. The 1st Coldstream Guards had been destroyed, the few remaining men having been taken under command of Lieutenant Boyd,
their quartermaster, the only surviving officer. The Gloucesters, as an example of casualties in other units, had lost seven officers
and 163 men. Yet Group Fabeck had not been committed: the massed foe had so far only come from the combined resources of Fourth and Sixth Armies. The main attack was yet to begin — on the 30th. Some hint of Group Fabeck' s presence had been detected by III Corps on October 29 when, during the course of 11 hours' fighting, it was discovered that a new formation, XXIV Reserve Corps, had
come
into the
German
line.
What was
not realised
was that they
had been brought into position to dispose a greater density of troops for the offensive on the 30th. The effect of this squeezing up was felt also by III Corps north of Armentieres. A dawn bombardment greater than any they had previously known was followed by the attack by two regiments on Le Gheer where the defences, 2,000 yards in length, were held by a single weak battalion, the 1st Hampshires. The front trenches were quickly lost but the flank battalions stood coolly to fire at this assault brigade from the German 40th Division, the left flank formation of Group Fabeck. In two hours, almost 700 of the division were killed, the assault brigade so weakened that it fell back before a surprise attack in open order by the Somersets under Major Prowse and the whole line was restored. In the front trenches, the Somersets found each man of the original company lying dead at his post. The fire from the 250 heavy guns, howitzers and mortars allocated to Fabeck, supplemented everywhere along the front of attack by the field guns firing on precisely registered targets, caused widespread devastation through the morning of the 30th. The storming parties north of Le Gheer were less menacing, advancing in daylight with the loss of many casualties. Those regiments that quickly broke out of their massed formations to infiltrate in small parties, a practice slowly being developed through the autumn by the Germans in Flanders, made useful gains, forcing Gough's cavalry back from Hollebeke and the 3rd Cavalry and 7th Division from Zandvoorde. Haig began to fear that if this pressure were maintained the line would break. The five battalions in the area were very weak — the 2nd Royal Warwicks consisted of Captain Sydenham and 156 officers and men, for example. Dubois, asked also for assistance, sent almost his whole reserve. But the Germans stopped when they had captured their first objectives and when a lull came between 1900 and 2000 hours, the British cavalry were surprised to hear a band playing selections from light opera in the Hollebeke Chateau.
'Profoundly disappointed' There was general disquiet in the higher headquarters on either side of the line on the night of the 30th. Crown Prince Rupprecht informed Fabeck that he was 'profoundly disappointed by the achievements of the day', and was informed that an attack was being made that night by way of continuance without respite, the aim being to capture Messines ridge. Duke Albrecht was disturbed to learn of the spread of the waters west of the Yser— the Belgian engineers were operating the sluice gates in reverse. The growing flood would soon prevent further attack in this sector. Falkenhayn, Crown Prince Rupprecht and Fabeck gave clear and stern orders that the offensive must be pressed with greater vigour. Amongst the Allies, Smith-Dorrien had been told to send forward his strongest brigade to support the Cavalry Corps (his II Corps had been relieved by the Indian Corps) and there was a small body of Territorial Force battalions arriving with a yeomanry regiment. Haig planned to recapture Zandvoorde and Hollebeke — all that had been lost on the 30th — with a composite force. Foch grew alarmed at the spirit of pessimism and inactivity he detected at French's headquarters and drove to Saint Omer. It was half an hour after midnight .vhen he saw the British Commander-in-Chief, who was gloomy. 'We're
all in for
it,'
said French.
'We shall see,' Foch replied. 'In the meantime hammer away, keep on hammering, and you will get there. It's surprising the results you attain in this way.' A dose of Foch optimism was what French needed; and the dose was fortified with a promise of eight battalions from the 32nd Division and three batteries of artillery. As so often, these troops were still travelling when Foch spoke of them as being immediately to hand but this was a detail which fortuitously did not matter on this occasion. As the two men parted, their own soldiers watched or slept. The Germans completed their reliefs with fresh battalions for the morning of the 31st. At 0800 hours, the bombardment opened. Seven hundred artillery pieces of all types were firing— 'the worst we had ever had', in the opinion of a sergeant of the 1st Queen's. 'The ground was literally shaking as if we were in the middle of an earthquake.' Opposite the Messines ridge, nine battalions of German veterans began a cunning assault, rarely revealing more than a small group or two to the waiting cavalrymen. By about 1100 hours, two thirds of the 119th Grenadiers had insinuated themselves into the southern edge of Messines village while the three battalions of the 125th worked forward into the north-east through the cemetery. Their gunners now dragged forward a field gun to snipe at the houses held by the foremost British squadrons. Nearby, opposite Hollebeke and Zandvoorde, the disjointed attacks of the French and British came to nothing as they ran directly into
394
.
Communications — the nervous system of all^ modern armies — ff^gile But of paramount importances^* % German thoroughness justified. While the Allie%,suffered from"|SO©r field communications, the Germans were able to relyon an ex eel &rk service I
I the
German bombardment and massed infantry. They struck
back,
however, with their own somewhat lighter bombardment against the assault forces of the Bavarian Corps. The centre of the battlefield saw therefore a stalemate, while immediately to the south the issue on the Messines ridge hung in the balance. To the north, on either side of the Menin road, the fighting had risen progressively to a frenzy from 0800 until 1145 hours. In the last hour before noon, four battalions of British infantry perished but for a tiny fragment, such as the 1st Queen's, which had two officers and 12 men left that night. Gheluvelt village and chateau had been captured so that, apart from the British guns in their battery positions along the road, there was nothing to prevent the reserves of Group Fabeck marching into Ypres. m Brigadier-General FitzClarence had been warned of this position by the telephone of the 1st Scots Guards — the only cable to brigade headquarters still uncut at this time. With his staff captain, Thorne, he reconnoitred and found that a small element of the Scots Guards and 1st South Wales Borderers had combined under the latter's commanding officer, and this force managed to regain the stables of the chateau but was too weak to advance any further. FitzClarence had no reserve of his own but was given the 2nd Worcesters, the divisional reserve, to do what he could. As he returned to prepare a counterattack, the commanders of 1st and 2nd Divisions conferred in their joint headquarters to plan a blocking operation forward of Ypres, but at 1300 hours a German heavy shell landed directly in the room where they were talking, killing or mortally wounding a divisional commander and almost all those present. There was now no authority to prepare the defence of Ypres and only the Worcesters to counterattack. One of their companies had been detached to watch the village while at 1345 hours the remainder set off towards Gheluvelt Chateau under Major Hankey, their commanding officer, and the adjutant, Captain Senhouse-Clarke. After a march of 1,700 yards, they drew into open country and could see the trees of the chateau park a mile ahead. Shells were bursting in their path, the German artillery seeking to deny just such a counterattack as the Worcesters intended. Far sightedly, packs and all other impedimenta except for rifles, bayonets, cartridges and water bottles had been left
behind. Thus lightened, the Worcesters were now able to double forward to the trees, pause in their shelter and then, in two waves break into the park towards the house. There were about 1,200 Germans in and around the chateau, of whom some were inside the buildings looting. Two companies had been placed out to watch the western approaches to the park but had not crossed into the trees. They were all from the reserve regiments and had been allowed to relax into that dangerous state of euphoria which follows the dangers of a close battle won. The accurate fire, mature discipline and spirit of the
Worcesters caught them unawares. They were routed. To the rear, Haig had heard of the casualties in his two divisional headquarters. Leaving French, who promised to obtain all help possible from Foch, I Corps' commander rode deliberately forward along the Menin road. He sat as ever upright in the saddle, his service dress tunic, breeches and boots immaculate. Whatever the faults history may find in him now, he had a cool head and a practical brain. He had never shunned regimental service and, though a cavalryman by profession, bad taken pains to learn the infantry art. In all the BEF, he was certainly the best commander for such a situation as he now faced. The obvious and the easiest course would have been to withdraw at ever} point. It was a tempting option. But Haig knew that many of tbo fragmented units would find it difficult to break cleanly from the Germans and that there was consequently a danger of high loss if he took this course. Instead he instructed his chief engineer to site a new line while he rode forward to order all his troops to hold firm.
Slow and painful adjustments As adjustments were made slowly and
painfully through the after noon, officers and soldiers forward did what they thought best while waiting for fresh commands. Colonel Lovett oftheGlouces ters formed up an ad hoc force of survivors and counterattacked the leading Saxon battalion in his area, supported bj three batteries. Lieutenant Blewitt of the Royal Field Artillery brought a sniping gun into action from 54 Battery. His crew hit a German sniping field piece and then turned on to the Saxons General BuKin organised a counterattack with what was left of five bat-
group of cavalry and the 13-pounders of C Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. A company of field engineers, the 26th, joined the assault. For the loss of over 1,000 of their number this little force drove the Germans back from the ridge and combined with the French and the mixed force of cavalry and infantry which still held Messines and the ridge. On the road to Poperinge. French found Foch. He told him that: the troops (1 Corps are in full retreat towards Ypres, the heavy artillery were retiring at a trot towards the west, the roads were blocked by ammunition wagons. It was the beginning of a defeat.' As a personal point, if he had to continue the battle without help, 'there is nothing left for me to do,' said French, 'but to go up and be killed with I Corps.' It is probable that the British Commander-in-Chief was for once less downcast than he appeared; for he knew that Gheluvelt Chateau and village had been recaptured. He was nonetheless sure that without French help his own dwindling force might not survive successive days of assault. November 1 did not bring the onslaught expected by the Allies. At various points along the line there were attacks but none were pressed except the night attack on the Messines ridge which established a German hold leading ultimately to its capture. The fact was that the German divisions were dispirited by their continual hardships and losses. The youthful corps in Fourth Army no longer thrust forward to be sure of a place in the forefront of the battle; they no longer cheered or sang spontaneously as they came forward. Despite official discouragement, the veterans continued to use their methods of infiltration, fire and movement by small groups in preference to the formal assault column and line prescribed. The regiments knew, too, when an assault was worth pressing and when it was not. Yet for all these changes in attitude, the Allied line continued to lose high numbers of casualties daily, and there was a growing tally of sick as a result of exposure. The BEF was delighted to welcome the units of the Territorial Force and Yeomanry which Kitchener had grudgingly released. Without their presence at this stage and that of the Indian Corps, the line could not have been maintained. During the first few days of November both Falkenhayn and Joffre had to consider whether they should continue to reinforce Flanders. The French Commander-in-Chief was anxious to concentrate forces in France for an offensive, but Foch convinced him that they could not survive in Flanders without greater participation on the part of other French forces. If they had it, he promised that they would continue to attack. Grossetti was brought down to command the corps south-east of Ypres. Falkenhayn had to decide whether or not any potential remained in the battle. He was under pressure by the Kaiser and the government to send major reinforcements to the Eastern Front but decided early in November to make one last attempt to reach Calais. He withdrew part of // Corps from Roye, a brigade from each of the 1st and 2nd Guard Divisions in Artois and artillery from Arras. General von Linsingen, commander of 77 Corps, was appointed to command this new 'group', to which was added Corps from Group Fabeck. Once again, Sixth and Fourth Armies were to mount strong attacks from La Bassee to Dixmude while Linsingen pressed up the road from Menin towards Ypres. Now that they had the Messines ridge in their possession, there seemed to be every reason to hope that Fabeck would break through to Poperinge and Linsingen at Ypres simultaneously. Fourth Army began its offensive on November 10 on its right wing. Dixmude fell at last. It was an empty victory, however, as a result of the completion of the inundation of the Yser bank. Ronarc'h and his sailors, and the Zouaves who had recently reinforced them, withdrew from the ruins across the bridge and saw it demolished. On the 11th, from dawn until 0900 hours, the German bombardment fell on French and British lines, the fury of sound, smoke, flame and blast rising to a peak in the final hour. On the left of his front, Linsingen's 30th Division managed to push back a French brigade along the railway line running into Ypres, capturing Hill 60 and the cutting below. Just south of the Menin road, the 39th and 4th Divisions were thrown back after a bloody struggle between British and German riflemen amongst the trees and houses along the crest of the ridge. North of the Menin road, the four Guard regiments advanced in the old formation, regimental column, appearing 'like grey ghosts coming down out of the clouds'. talions, a
I
XV
driven back by the 2nd Guard Grenadiers, who marched steadily on into the trees beyond. They believed that they had made a breach but were in error. From three sides they were hit by a hail of rifle fire and soon the leading battalion was beyond relief. To the left, the 4th Guard Grenadiers had been shot at from 0900 hours onwards and had retained a fighting strength only as a result of the fog which screened them intermittently from their foe. But a forward observation officer of the Royal Artillery, whose telephone cable had been cut in the swelling bombardment, doubled back along the line to tell his battery to fire. The gunners fired shrapnel and the perfectly disciplined, apparently indestructible ranks now reeled, halted and fell back. To the north, Brigadier-General FitzClarence was again fighting a critical battle such as he had undertaken twice before. The 1st and 3rd Foot Guards had reached the British fire trenches to find many of them empty. It was now the policy to abandon these during a preliminary bombardment, taking shelter immediately in rear and doubling forward just as the bombardment lifted to admit the German assault. But this morning, the attackers had reached the trenches at a jog trot and their packed numbers overwhelmed those few platoons which had got into position. Soon they had killed or captured those behind. On the extreme right, the 3rd Foot Guards had expected 54th Reserve Division of Fourth Army to be in Polygon Wood by mid-morning but the young reserve battalion did not leave their trenches. In consequence, the 1st King's in the wood were able to open fire at short range and from a flank directly into the 3rd Foot Guards. When the smoke of the action and the fog cleared a little in the rising wind, the King's saw the German dead banked in front of them, lying as they had fallen in their close ranks. Though the 1st Foot Guards had broken through the whole British front line during the morning, they had now to contend with the strong points of timber and packed earth which Haig had had built behind. Though scantily manned, they were able to delay the Guard regiment while the British guns by Hooge were brought to bear. When they fired, the 1st Foot Guards broke up, doubling into the shelter of Nonne Boschen (Nun's Copse). Brigadier-General FitzClarence had been engaged for several hours in firing with his headquarters staff at the regiment from a strong point. He was now sent the 52nd Light Infantry to counterattack, an operation joined by the 1st Northamptons, who were hurrying up and a company of engineers, ever ready to join the fighting. The 1st Foot Guards were forced back. Rain began to fall heavily. The wind drove into the combatants. Hoping finally to eject the enemy from the foremost trenches captured that morning, Brigadier-General FitzClarence sought for a further reserve while his brigade major and the colonel of the 52nd reconnoitred in the gloom. Returning with two battalions, he met them at the corner of Polygon Wood to be told that they could not locate the enemy precisely in the darkness, while in between lay numbers of dead and wounded of both sides. FitzClarence told everyone to wait while he went to see conditions for himself. A few steps along the path, he was mortally wounded by rifle fire. It was the end of the night's operations; and so far as the critical struggle for the Ypres sector was concerned, the end of this first great battle for the area.
Further Reading Blake, R. (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1918 (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1952) Cruttwell, C. R. M. F., A History of the Great War (OUP 1936) Deguise. Lt-Gen.. La Defense de la Position Fortifiee d'Anvers en 1914 (Brussels 1921) Dubail. Gen. A., Quatres annees de commandement, 1914-1918 (1920) Essen, L. van der, The Invasion and the War in Belgium from Liege to the Yser (London 1917) Falkenhayn, Gen. E. von, General Headquarters 1914-1916 (Hutchinson 1919) Farrar-Hockley, Brig. A., Death of an Army (Barker 1967) Liddell Hart. Sir Basil, Foch, Man of Orleans (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1931) Military Operations: France and Belgium 1914 (Macmillan 1925) Smith-Dorrien, Gen. Sir Horace, Memories of 48 years service (1925)
GENERAL SIR ANTHONY FARRAR-HOCKLEY GBE, KCB, DSO and bar, MC, ADC Gen, BLitt (Oxon) was educated at Exeter School and enlisted in the army when he was under-age
Hail of
rifle fire
had now been relieved. At Gheluvelt, the guards were met by some of Smith-Dorrien's battalions reinforced by part of a Zouave regiment. The British in the village were
The
396
British 7th Division
during the Second World War.
He served
in
the airborne
the ranks and as an officer. Since 1945 he has taken part in many campaigns including Korea where he was captured while serving with the Gloucesters and held for two and a half years. Among other books, he has published three on the First World War: Death of an Army, The Battle of the Somme, and Goughie: The Life of General Sir Hubert Gough, all of which were
forces
in
acclaimed
for their originality
and
insight.
i
a
ENTERS THE WAR For long the 'sick man of Europe', Turkey had been powerless to prevent the piecemeal dismantling of her European possessions in the years before 1914. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was one reaction to her decline; another was the growth of German influence, exemplified by the army reorganisation carried out by General Liman von Sanders. Yet, despite these remedies, Turkey's entry into the war in 1914 seems little more than a desperate throw by a small group of energetic and ambitious men to recoup her losses. She was handicapped by her poverty, technical backwardness and the inefficiency of her system of communications which placed her outlying provinces, Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia, in extreme jeopardy. Yet by the summer of 1914 German influence in Turkish affairs was irresistible, and Turkey's entry on the side of the Central Powers seemed inevitable. Below: Turkish infantrymen — ill-clad, half-fed and often barefoot, they were indomitable fighting men. John Stephenson
Every European power had something both to gain and to lose by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore they watched her tottering progress through the 19th Century with a blend o( parental solicitude and vulturine rapacity. Britain, while she would herself have liked to replace Turkish power in the areas that abutted onto the route to India, strove to keep the Ottoman Empire in being, for fear of Russia's filling the gap caused by Turkish disintegration. Britain's relations with Turkey were further complicated by public disapproval of Turkish methods disapproval so frequently expressed by W. E. Gladstone. But Britain was not the only power with an interest in maintaining the status quo in the Middle East. As adviser, guide and mentor. Bismarck's Germany had much to offer, and in place of Britain's moral nagging he initiated 30 years of sustained diplomatic, military and economic effort which resulted in Turkey being dragged into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. Not that Bismarck himself desired or anticipated this end: he wished to preserve the Empire but had no desire for Germany to expand eastwards or to become embroiled there. Above arl he wished to avoid a conflict between Russia and Austria-
Hungary in which he might be compelled to take sides. The spring of 1882 saw the despatch to Constantinople
of a military mission under the leadership of the celebrated General Colmar von der Goltz to train and develop the Turkish army. His difficulties were many. Neither he nor his colleagues were ever given real executive command but the work they did gave the Turkish General Staff and many others the deepest respect for the German army, and began a period of German influence to the point of domination in Turkish military organisation and training which was to continue until 1918. With the accession in 1888 of the new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, the pace was to quicken and friction between the Kaiser and his Chancellor at once became apparent. The occasion was in 1889 when the first of two state visits to Constantinople by the Kaiser and Kaiserin was being planned. On the reports submitted by General von der Goltz the Kaiser wanted far more than influence with the Ottomans. To him Turkey was 'a bridge to world dominion'. Bismarck is said to have replied: 'world dominion is a term that finds no place in my political dictionary'. The visit nevertheless took place and Abdul Hamid was deeply appreciative of the compliment. Henceforth German influence gained ground steadily in Turkey while that of Britain and France waned. The next decade was one of feverish activity. In 1888 the Deutsche Bank had obtained the right to operate a short line of railway from the Bosporus along the east side of the Sea of Marmara. To this was now added a concession for an extension to Ankara, which developed into a trunk line through Asia Minor and on to Baghdad, under the aegis of the Anatolian Railway Company, itself the parent of the Baghdad Railway Company. Complications with Britain were to arise as to the proposed terminus of the line, whether to Basra or Kuwait, but these need not concern us at this point. German shipping companies, heavily subsidised, were active in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and even in the Persian Gulf. German cable companies began to cut out existing British cables, extending into Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. German wireless stations were also set up. German trade advanced by leaps and bounds, particularly in armaments. German schools, German scientific and archaeological mis-
German
sions,
even German religious institutions were
active.
In the autumn of 1898 the Kaiser made his second visit to Constantinople where he was received with the utmost honour. From there he went on to the Holy Land, making a ceremonial entry into Jerusalem, and laying the foundation stone of a German religious hospice. In Damascus he demonstrated his enthusiasm for Pan-Islamism in a speech which both astonished and alarmed the world: 'His Majesty, the Sultan Abdul Hamid, and the 300,000,000 Moslems who reverence him as Caliph, may rest assured that at all times the German Emperor will be their friend.' Sentiments easily expressed by a ruler with no Moslem subjects. This was also the first occasion on which the Sultan's title of Caliph received any recognition from a European power. There were admittedly certain checks to the progress of German influence with the Ottomans and later with the Young Turks. Certain things needed explanation. The Kaiser's personal friendship with Abdul Hamid could hardly be approved of— until 'the Young Turks themselvc s were driven to using Hamidian methods. The Italian War of 1911/12, the declaration of independence by Bulgaria, the failure of Turkish forces in the Balkan Wars — all these reflected on the German connection. But the benefits derived from it outweighed the disadvantages. Many of the Young Turk revolutionaries had either been trained in Germany or by Germans. The personal prestige of two outstanding German
398
ambassadors, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, 1897-1912, and Baron von Wangenheim, 1912-15, and the appointment of General Liman von Sanders in 1913 to reorganise and train the Ottoman forces, made German influence appear irresistible.
'Union and Progress' The Young Turk revolution was declared been brewing
for long before that.
A
in July 1908, but had party was gradually formed
in the first years of the century among Moslems in Turkey in favour of constitutional reform. It was known as the Party of Union and Progress, and its members were called Young Turks. It had its origin in Turks exiled abroad, chiefly in Paris, and it was joined by groups of army officers located in Salonika, Adrianople and Damascus. The major and most dangerous type of discontent was the feeling that under the Hamidian regime the Empire would soon cease to exist. The Sultan and his ministers were becoming more and more the tools of the Great Powers and particularly of Germany. Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus and Egypt had been lost, either de facto or de jure, and even in what was left of the Empire the Sultan's authority was frustrated and nullified by the powers, whose interference was rapidly becoming intolerable. Now, at the turn of the century, Macedonia appeared the next province to be lost, and the cause of this progressive decay was thought to be the Sultan himself. A movement for greater political freedom within the Empire received, as might be expected, strong support from non-Turkish communities, Greeks, Jews, Armenians and Arabs, who looked to Western intervention. But the Sultan could never be overthrown by propaganda from outside; only by internal revolt could this be done. For this there was but one spearhead — the army — and the revolutionary machine was ready. Hostile critics of the Young Turk movement have tried to explain it as of foreign origins with Enver as a renegade Pole, Javid a Jew, Talaat a Bulgarian gipsy. The movement was in truth a movement of Moslem Turks, mostly soldiers, whose first aim was to replace an incompetent ruler by a government more competent to defend the Empire against its obvious threats. The fundamental question was survival — how could the state be saved? History had been unkind to them, and not without some cause, but though their work was often ill conceived, incomplete and frustrated by events, they nevertheless helped to prepare the way for the new Turkey which was to emerge after their disappearance. Enver was born in Constantinople in 1881, the son of a railway official. Trained at the War College, he quickly became a leader among the Young Turks. During his period as military attache in Berlin he became an enthusiast for all things German and convinced of German victory in the coming war. In 1913 he became a general and Minister of War. Jemal was born in 1872 and was also trained at the War College. He was to become Minister of the Interior and later commander in Syria. He was regarded as highly competent and of a cold fanatical spirit. Javid was a Turk of the Dunmeh (Judaeo-Islamic) sect. He became a brilliant Finance Minister. Talaat was born at Adrianople in 1874, and was probably the most brilliant man in the movement. He attained a high position in the Posts and Telegraphs department. Early in July 1908 a Major Niazi Bey and Major Enver Bey raised the standard of revolt against Abdul Hamid and proclaimed the Constitution. On July 21 the Sultan surrendered completely to their demands. The parliament dissolved in 1878 was recalled and elections held in November produced a large majority for the Young Turks. Never was a revolution effected with so little bloodshed and with more complete success. Abdul Hamid, as before, promised to be the mildest of constitutional monarchs, and the powers which had been busy pushing through reforms in Macedonia abandoned them, leaving the apparently liberal Young Turks to manage their own affairs. For a time all seemed well but in April 1909 a counter revolution was proclaimed. It need not detain us. The Committee of Young Turks at Salonika authorised the III Corps under Shevket Pasha to march on Constantinople. It was not opposed and the outcome was the deposition of Abdul Hamid. He was deported to Salonika, but his methods survived with the new leaders. Very soon after the revolution of 1908 the process of dismemberment of the Empire was renewed and the wolves gathered round. The new government was now to receive blows from outside such as few can ever have been called upon to resist — and the Young Turks could not resist. On October 5 Ferdinand of Bulgaria threw off the suzerainty of the Sultan and proclaimed himself Tsar of an independent kingdom. On October 7 the Austro-Hungarian government took advantage of the crisis and
Sultan Mohammed V, who succeeded his brother after the Young Turk Revolution
General Colmar von d er Goltz. leader of the German military mi ssion to Turkey in 1882
first
annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, and five days later the Cretan Assembly proclaimed the union of the island with Greece. The next blow to the Ottoman Empire came from an unexpected quarter, from Italy, which made a sudden and unprovoked attack on Tripoli. The war here lasted until October 1912 and reflected little glory on the Italian army which in the end was holding only a fringe on the sea coast. But by this date the Turkish army had to concentrate in defence of the homeland. The losses of Crete and Tripoli could be borne, but the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, though wounding the prestige
came
thunderclap to the powers. One million more Serbs were to be added to the 5,000,000 Serbo-Croats already under Austrian or Hungarian rule. Austria-Hungary paid £2,500,000 to Turkey in compensation for lost crown lands, and Russia, on behalf of Bulgaria, paid £5,000,000, thus easing the situation between the Tsar and Ferdinand, and causing a temporary rapprochement between the three Slav states. Germany, though horrified by the unilateral action of her ally, AustroHungary, stood by her and the stage w,as set for the Slav-German of Turkey,
like a
which seemed bound to cornel But before it came the Ottoman Empire was to suffer still more, for in October 1912 the First Balkan War broke out. conflict
-,
•
Unprepared and unwilling The genesis
of the
Turks,
of the leaders of the
was Minister
of
Marine
two wars which followed or of such action as was possible on the part of the powers. It is enough to say that when the First Balkan War finished, and the Treaty of London of May 30, 1913. was signed, nothing was left of the Ottoman Empire in Europe but a small area outside the Chatalja lines to the west of Constantinople. The League had been completely victorious, but the balance of power had been badly upset and the emergent free states had to face the problems they had brought upon themselves. The real significance of the demise of the Empire was becoming apparent.
As one commentator was to write: European statesmen had to realise that their failure to prevent the war had caused the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. No doubt it was an ill-managed, tyrannous, ramshackle concern. But it filled a gap. In its place stood or crawled three young nations with more appetites than assets, the starveling infant state of Albania, and a mountain— for Montenegro was no more than that. The association of the four allies had been temporary, their jealousies dated from the Middle Ages. They could no more take the place of the Ottoman Empire than four loose flints can take the place of the most indifferent brick. Where Turkey had been the Powers had made a void into whwh they were drawn in 1914. Nature abhors a vacuum. So do politics. The Treaty of London was quickly torn up and the victorious fell to fighting over the spoils. Bulgaria treacherously attacked the Serbian armies and was heavily defeated, losing much of her territorial gains not only to Serbia but to Greece and Rumania — which was not to be kept out of any 'compensation' to be had. But in the meanwhile a Turkish force under Enver, making forced marches, slipped back into Adrianoplo. which was undefended and firmly retained it in the negotiations which ended the war. Serbia, Rumania, Greece, even Bulgaria, got something out of these wars either in territory or population. But the losses
allies
war was simple. Russia had temporarily
reconciled Bulgaria with Serbia. These two states, viewing with despair the sufferings of their fellow nationals in Macedonia, found Russia and all the other powers quite unprepared and unwilling to take any action to save them from the Young Turks. They decided to act together, and with the help of a man of genius from Greece, Venizelos, the Balkan League was formed of the three states, to be joined later by Montenegro. Military preparations went forward, to the undisguised dismay of the powers, who on October 7 solemnly informed the League that they were opposed to a rupture with Turkey and would in any case permit no change in the territorial status quo in the Balkans. They were to be quickly disillusioned. It is unnecessary for our purpose to go into the details of the
Jemal Pasha, one
General Liman von Sanders, military adviser to Turkey in 1913, increased German influence
in
Young
1914
Turkey affected it little, so it seemed at the moment, except that Albania, which had always been a fine recruiting ground For soldiers and statesmen, could no longer be' drawn upon. Christian subjects were no loss as they were not used as soldiers. Defeat in the field, as has sometimes been found in other nations, was
to
Talaat Bey, Minister of the Interior
and perhaps the most
brilliant of
in
1914
Young Turks
Enver Pasha, Younq Turk and Germanophih 1914 he was a general and Minister of W.n
399
a positive gain because it drove home to the Turks army reform must now be basic and unqualified. Germany was at hand to help, and the large mission under General Liman von Sanders worked wonders. The Ottoman Empire in Europe had indeed 'filled a gap'. Freed from its control the Balkan nations could now contrive and conspire in other directions. Turkey took no part in this, hut she was in
one waj
that
not to escape the holocaust which followed. \\ hen war came to Europe the climate of opinion in Constantinople was deeply influenced in favour of Germany. The Sultan
Mohammed V was
a nonentity; the Grand Vizier, Said Halim, a respectable figurehead. The Committee of Union and Progress was firmly in power, and the Cabinet contained Talaat as Minister of the Interior, Javid as Minister of Finance, Jemal as Minister of Marine (shortly to command Fourth Army in Syria) and Enver Pasha, recently become Minister of War. As early as
was
August 2 he had already negotiated with Baron von Wangenheim, the forceful German Ambassador, a treaty for the armed cooperation of Turkey. This was kept secret, even some of the ministers not being informed of it. Meanwhile a formal proclamation of neutrality had been made. At this period though the Entente Powers had retained little influence in Turkey the population retained memories of their friendship and snowed little enthusiasm for a war against them. But the Entente Powers
had allied themselves with Turkey's historic enemy — Russia — and two incidents now completed an estrangement which had become inevitable. The Turkish government had ordered two dreadnoughts, the Reshadiye and the Sultan Osman, from the Armstrong-Whitworth shipyard in Britain and had paid for them b\ a nationwide campaign for subscriptions from the populace. They were now ready for sea and Turkish crews were prepared to take them over. At this point the British government laid hands on them. Britain was perfectly within her rights and offered full compensation for the ships, but Turkish fury followed. While Turkish indignation was at its height the second and far more calamitous event occurred. The German battle-cruiser Goeben, already well known to the inhabitants of Constantinople, and its attendant cruiser, Breslau, evaded British pursuit in the Mediterranean, approached the entrance of the Dardanelles and were admitted. The breach of neutrality thus committed was countered on the following day, August 11, by the announcement that they had been purchased by Turkey. The German crews remained, exchanging caps for fezzes. Three days later the British naval mission under Admiral Arthur Limpus was dismissed.
Nightmare negotiations For two more months a nightmare of negotiations continued. On Aqgust 18 the Entente Powers made a declaration to the effect that if Turkey observed 'scrupulous neutrality' during the war they would uphold her independence and integrity against 'any enemies that might wish to utilise the general European complication in order to attack her'. But neutrality was the last thing Enver wanted and Germany had promised him the recovery of Egypt at least. So Turkey rapidly mobilised, and disregarding the advice of Liman von Sanders proceeded to plan an attack on Suez by way of the Sinai desert. Finally, at the end of October, while the Grand Vizier and other ministers were still murmuring smooth phrases, Enver with his German confederates took the final plunge. The Goeben and the Hamidieh sailed into the Black Sea and bombarded Theodosia and Odessa. On November 2 the British government published an official indictment of Turkish provocations and within days a state of war was declared to exist between Turkey and the Entente. Turkey's entry into the war was a desperate throw by a small group of energetic and ambitious men. She was handicapped by her poverty, by her technical backwardness and above all by the inefficiency of her system of communications which placed her outlying provinces, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, in extreme jeopardy. Little remains to be said. Cyprus was at once annexed by Britain. On December 17 a British protectorate was claimed in Cairo with Prince Hussein, a son of the late Khedive Ismail, as Sultan in place of Abbas Hilmi, who remained in Constantinople and openly sided with the Turks. In return for the acquiescence of her allies in the British protectorate over Egypt, Great Britain, it was understood, would be willing to recognise, at the end of the war, Russia's claims to Constantinople and the Straits, and those of France to Syria. But the end of the war was still very far off, and not only the areas with which we have been dealing were to be involved. The vast but lesser known stretci s of the Ottoman Empire deserve a brief study.
400
The Ottoman Empire fell roughly into two parts: the vital European part where Islam was in constant strife with the Christian kafir, and the acquired part, mostly Moslem, which embraced Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Arabia proper. Between them was the Turkish heartland of Anatolia, with its large Christian minorities.
comparison with European Turkey, the Moslem areas have little attention from Western historians. One can read deep and learned histories of the Eastern Question in the 19th Century and the decay of what is called the Ottoman Empire without gaining a suspicion that it was anything more than the Balkans, part of Anatolia and, rather vaguely and spasmodically, Egypt. But these outlying dominions were not to remain in In
received
obscurity much longer. The transformation of European Turkey was complete; the process in the Islamic lands was about to begin. There were certain basic differences between the problems presented by European and Moslem subjects. First of these
was
religion.
Whereas
in
Europe differences of religion lay be-
hind all urges more often described as nationalism or liberalism, elsewhere in the Empire the religious factor took on a different aspect. Eastward and southwards of Anatolia Islam dominated almost the entire area. Admittedly there were schisms. The orthodox Sunni faith prevailed except in Mesopotamia where the Shiahs maintained their holy places and were in a majority. The Wahabis in central Arabia were a fierce puritanical sect whose activities dated from the mid-18th Century and for long periods were politically independent. The Emir Hussein of Mecca, guardian of the principal holy places of Islamic pilgrimage, had, as such, a peculiar position in the Moslem world, in veneration competing with that of the Caliph himself, and was believed to cherish hopes of political independence. The purity of Islam, as practised in Anatolia, particularly by the Young Turks and their followers, was much in question by the orthodox. But in spite of these divergencies the fact that Moslem ruled Moslem was of more importance than that Turk ruled Arab if this huge part of the Empire were ever in jeopardy. A jehad, or holy war, might be proclaimed.
Centralism or tribalism? Secondly, in Europe, even neglecting the question of religion, a case could be made, and was made, that government of their
own lands, individually, by Rumanians, Serbs, Bulgars and Greeks was intrinsically better and more efficient than rule by the Turks, however much these nations were torn in strife between themselves. But it was a difficult matter to make a similar claim for the Arabs, even if the Arabs as a whole, or in recognised divisions, had shown a genuine desire for independence. The saying that the logical conclusion of self-determination is tribalism applied here probably more than in other places. Quotations from writers of the period well versed in their subject can be multiplied to show that however great the genius of the Arab peoples for many of the arts of civilisation, government was not
SMS
Breslau flying
German colours just before Turkey bought
The German crew remained, exchanging caps
her
in
1914.
for fezzes
one of them. Turkish rule though lacking by European standards — and here we are not considering European subjects — had a firmness and consistency which kept order and controlled strife for long periods in many provinces. Mostly the provinces were run on a light rein. There was little persecution, but reforms for the benefit of the people were on a scale far greater than anything attempted in the European part of the Empire. It is interesting to note that these benefits were at no time more enthusiastically advanced than during the reign of Abdul Hamid II, the
commonly accepted
arch-villain of
Ottoman
history in Europe.
comparison with Europe, communications were inadequate. Roads were slowly developing particularly in Syria and Palestine. In
The Hejaz railway, ostensibly constructed for the Mecca pilgrimage, but in reality more as part of a centralisation policy, had been completed as far as Medina in 1908. It was slow, badly constructed in its southern section and chronically in difficulties over water and fuel. The proposed extensions to Mecca, the Yemen, and Akaba were unlikely to be completed. The Baghdad line extended only to Ras el'Ain, some 200 miles west of Mosul. A 1-05metre gauge line ran through Damascus and Deraa into Palestine as far as Beersheba with a spur to Haifa. Both the Syrian and Mesopotamian systems were limited by breaks at the Taurus and Amanus mountain ranges where the completion of tunnels had been long delayed. Telegraphs were reasonably efficient but the shortcomings of other communications made reinforcement from the centre slow and difficult. The result was a considerable measure of independence for local governors whose control sometimes depended more on personality than material resources. In the circumstances it is difficult not to admire what was accomplished. The unkempt Turkish gendarme with his rifle slung over his shoulder riding a donkey round a handful of villages was treated with respect. As for the shabby, poorly equipped soldiery, Gertrude Bell pays a memorable tribute, worth quoting at length: Of what value are Pan-Arabic associations and the inflammatory leaflets that they issue from foreign printing presses? The answer is easy: They are worth nothing at all. There is no nation of Arabs; the Syrian merchant is separated by a wider gulf from the Bedouin than he is from the Osmanli; the Syrian country is inhabited by Arabic-speaking races all' eager to be at each other's throats, and only prevented from fulfilling their natural desires by the rugged half-fed soldier who draws at rare intervals the Sultan's pay. And this soldier is worth a good deal more than the hire he receives. Other armies may mutiny, but the Turkish Army will stand true to the Khalif; other armies may give way before suffering and privation and untended sickness, but that of the Sultan will go forward as long as it can stand, and fight as long as it has arms, and conquer as long as it has leaders. There is no more wonderful or pitiful sight than a Turkish regiment on the march; grey beards and half-fledged youth, ill clad and often barefoot, pinched and worn — and indomitable. Let such as watch them salute them as they pass: in the days when war was an art rather than a science, of that stuff the conquerors of the world were made. It is difficult to assess the extent of Arab opposition to Turkish rule, or its nature. Syria was probably most affected. The list .
of
.
.
Arab freedom
societies, civil
and military, under many
titles,
formidable, but most of them had a short life and, as might be expected, rivalry between them was intense. The Turks, by nature suspicious, took them seriously but probably realised that unity could not be counted on. They knew how to deal with that sort of thing. But when unrest was connected with religion or foreign interest the matter became more serious. The high standard of education given by Christian schools and colleges, notably the American College at Beirut, disturbed Turkish hegemony; in Armenia the intense and well-meant efforts of missionaries, and of others whose zeal was equalled only by their inis
BULGARIA
states, weak in themselves and hostile to each other. Obviously their boundaries were not final. They might survive; they might be swallowed by greater powers or greater systems. But their condition was hardly one to encourage the similar self-determination of the various potential states, tribal areas, or provinces of Turkey in Asia. These were even less mature than their Balkan cousins, just as bitter in their rivalry and, potentially, just as determined to rid themselves of their particular 'yoke', light though that might be. They were still more susceptible to the greed of outside powers. But the pressing necessities of war do not make for clear long-term thinking, nor for memories of consistent policies of the past.
Further Reading S., The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (Macmillan, 1966) Antonius, G., The Arab Awakening (London, 1938) Bell, G. L, Syria: The Desert and the Sown (Heinemann, 1907) Eliot, Sir C., Turkey in Europe (F. Cass, 1965) Graves, P., Briton and Turk (Hutchinson, 1940) Kedourie, E., England and the Middle East (London, 1956) Lewis, B., The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford, 1961) Marriott, Sir J., The Eastern Question (OUP, 1940) Seton-Watson, R., Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question (F. Cass, 1960)
Anderson, M.
BRIGADIER JOHN STEPHENSON was commissioned in the Indian army in 1 91 of the First World War in Palestine, serving two
and took part in the last months and a half years in that country,
in Syria and later in Iraq. His interest in Middle Eastern affairs, particularly those pertaining to the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, dates from those years. Educated at Christ's Hospital, the Staff College, Camberley, and the RAF Staff College, Andover, he ended his army service in 1948, his last appointment being commander of the 51st Pakistan Brigade at Karachi, then the capital of Pakistan. He became Librarian of the Royal United Service Institution in 1957, and Director in 1961 He resigned in 1968
X
Batum
he
states. Though Russia and Britain had apparently accepted the inevitability of the Baghdad Railway to be built under German control, the question of its southern terminus was likely to cause further trouble. Ibn Saud of central Arabia had also been prominent in the area, and was in alliance with the British. None of these troubles equalled those suffered in Europe, but they indicated areas inflammable in a general conflagration. As the war starts, it is impossible to escape certain reflections. European Turkey, but for the Adrianople enclave, had been irretrievably lost. In its place were a number of raw inexperienced
Gulf
BLACK SEA
Adri anopl<5rdine)|j
vincible ignorance of oriental thought, tended to make the unhappy Armenians a race to be distrusted and terribly punished. Until the late 19th Century the Turks had called them the milleti-sadika, 'the loyal community'. In Palestine Zionism was already causing complications, not made easier by the German connection with it and with other colonising activity. In Mesopotamia there was the problem of the Shiah community, and the increasing British control of certain
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Cavalry Corps
Alexandria^
Planned Turkish Offensives 100
200
300 MILES
and forces in 1914. /Abovecartoon, captioned Turkish troops encounter first Serbian land and sea forces'. Left: Turkish plans
German -LB
2Q0_
4b0 KMS
401
Turkey goose steps towards the abyss
The
old,
decadent, fly-blown Turkey and her
straitjacketed Sultan are borne to war by Young Turks (including Enver Pasha), and
on by German General Liman von Sanders. Tsar Nicholas peers malevolently round the corner. On the left the Balkan
sternly urged
II
League
is
falling apart.
The
rulers of
Monte-
negro, Greece and Bulgaria look up anxiously as their counterparts in Rumania and Serbia are unbalanced by Franz Joseph's seizure of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unattached, Victor Emmanuel III of Italy looks on from Tripoli
402 t
FRENCH & BRITISH
WAR AIMS British and French
war aims were only embryonic
aim was simply
survival, but over
and beyond
in 1914. this the
By September of that year the major French
still
wanted to
liberate
Alsace-Lorraine and, of course, drive the Germans from northern France. For the British the liberation of 'poor little Belgium' was an emotional reaction which embellished the traditional desire to preserve the Low Countries as buffers. However, as the war bogged down at the end of 1914, both began to formulate more specific war aims, aimed partly at making the carnage seem worthwhile, partly at securing American aid. Below left: Front page of a French magazine. The original title read: 'Bad seed, but good manure.' Its violence manifests France's desire to drive the Germans from French soil. Right: British post card, October 1914. Its naivety typifies the diffuseness of British war aims in 1914. D. R. Shermer
404
of the First World War is immediately confronted with a paradox. The German September Programme was a model of clear-cut war aims. In contrast, the British and French had no detailed or
The historian
co-ordinated programme. In one sense the absence of a British or French 'blueprint' is not surprising. Each of these nations had gone to war for ostensibly defensive reasons. Naturally, therefore, the first priority of each was to gain victory over their enemies. More important, at first no one heeded Kitchener's warnings of the long struggle ahead before victory could be achieved. The war, men thought, would be over by Christmas, by Easter at the latest. Not until the end of 1914 did this euphoric view vaporise beneath the carnage of the battlefields. By that time, with early prospects of victory curtailed, the belligerents had time not only to intensify their search for allies, but also to reflect on what they were fighting for — and against.
Moreover, the continuation of the war
and after was itself the most pressing reason for formulating far-reaching war aims. Aims, even spoils, had to be found in order to make the holocaust worthwhile, in order to inspire the soldiers and their kin to carry on. As the war lengthened, it also became increasingly necessary to obtain American financial and material aid. Thus, the character of the Entente powers' aims was influenced by desire to win American approval. In this context the disparity between the September positions of the Germans and the Allies becomes more clear. Since the Germans had won the first campaigns, they planned to keep all or part of their territorial gains. In contrast, the Allies had first to reverse the German verdict of arms before they knew what they would be in a position to demand themselves. Thus the most pressing French aim was to clear northern France of the Reichsheer; that of the British, to free Belgium and to return the Low Countries to their former position of buffers between Britain and Germany. The Russians for their part were fully occupied with seeing how much longer they could survive as a Great Power, and even as a political entity. However, the Russian peasantry had neither the education nor the time to understand complex issues; it was better to speak to them of bearing arms to defend the Tsar and Holy Mother Russia. In France, the Chamber of Deputies had no opportunity to debate specific war aims, for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were adjourned throughout the autumn of 1914. Once war began, if not overtly before, every Frenchman dreamed of the reunion of Alsace-Lorraine with the homeland, but few other objectives were formulated that year. Not until July 1916 did the French government begin to define into 1915
its war objectives. As autumn gave way to winter, a strong
seriously
current of French opinion felt that the Germans would be at a disadvantage in a long war, owing firstly to the Germans having a smaller pool of manpower than their adversaries, and secondly, to the Allied blockade which would eventually prevent Germany from continuing its war effort. For these reasons, only a small minority of Frenchmen thought of a negotiated peace. War d I'outrance was the rallying cry.
Only on the issue of Alsace-Lorraine was nearly every sector of the populace united. But even on this subject there was room for some divisions; the French
vehemently opposed to war, until the British people were outraged by the German violation of Belgium's neutrality. Yet now that war had begun for a suitably
socialists
(as well as opinion in Great Britain) favoured a plebiscite before the future of Alsace-Lorraine was settled. Most Frenchmen adhered to the somewhat tortuous argument that opinion in those two
righteous cause, these newspapers' Liberal principles forced them to belabour the war's aspect of righteousness in order to avoid the charge of inconsistency. Even though such editors as Scott of the
provinces had already been evidenced by the pro-French patriotism of the AlsaceLorraine deputies in the Reichstag in 1874. The future of the Saar was not seriously debated in the French Senate until the autumn of 1915. The publicist, Maurice Barres, discussed the future of the left bank of the Rhine in articles in L'Echo de Paris in early 1915, but these were discontinued in May under a government ruling forbidding the discussion of future peace terms beyond generalities. In short, the French seemed most preoccupied with bolstering morale at home and at the front and suppressing discussion of a compromise peace by dampening discussion alto-
Manchester Guardian and A. G. Gardiner of the Daily News found war itself the antithesis of liberalism and the epitome of Tory imperialism, the object was now to snatch victory from the vested interests by making war serve a just cause. Therefore instead of putting forward a specific
gether.
Prussian power broken Before his articles were discontinued, Barres had projected a defence zone for France against Germany. The population of the Rhineland should have a choice be-
tween attachment to France and independence in perpetual neutrality, he wrote. But informed opinion on this subject ran far ahead of official caution. According to Barres, President Poincare in August 1914 disavowed all territorial annexations except Alsace-Lorraine. Yet Poincare and his Foreign Minister, Delcasse, were adamant in their wish to break up the
German Empire. On October
13 Delcasse
was asked by the Russian ambassador in Paris, Isvolsky, to state French war aims; the French Foreign Minister, although he stated that one should not count one's chickens before they hatch, said also that Prussian power should be broken and the German Empire destroyed. According to Isvolsky's account, Delcasse did not speculate on the future of the Rhineland. On November 21, Paleologue, the French ambassador to St Petersburg, was received by the Tsar. Their discussion involved the 'necessary' destruction of Austria-Hungary, the Schleswig and Polish questions, and the idea of establishing an independent Hanoverian Kingdom in north-west Germany. Paleologue emphasised that 'without doubt' Delcasse would endorse Paleologue's personal view that 'perhaps' France would want an extension of territory into the Rhineland. In fact, Delcasse remained noncommittal. On receiving Paleologue's despatch of his meeting with the Tsar, he gave no indication of his own views. The French Prime Minister on December 22 spoke before the Chamber of Deputies after it had reassembled. While he spoke of the necessity of victory in order to reestablish 'that right which was outraged' (alluding to Belgium), to regain AlsaceLorraine and to break Prussian military might, the premier did not go beyond these aims. He remained inscrutable. In England, Parliament held its usual autumn session, and discussion about the war proceeded. The press continued to exercise its critical functions despite wartime restrictions. However, the principal newspapers supporting the Liberal government of Asquith had actually been the most
programme, these papers concentrated on moralistic generalities about the rights of small nations. On the surface, such idealism did not fit in handily with the chessboard machinations of statecraft. As early as August 8 Gardiner spoke of fighting, not against the masses of Germany, but to free Germany from the dominance of Prussia. H. G. Wells on August 14 called the conflict 'The War to End War'. Yet in practice the differences between idealists and practical
statesmen became more and more one
of vocabularies. Wells, after all, believed that the war was caused by German militarism, just as Grey was saying in November that, besides the sine qua non of the liberation and restoration of Belgium, peace must prevent either 'continuance or recurrence of an armed brute power in Central Europe'. Victory must 'end mili-
tarism
for ever', he said. Asquith on September 19 had spoken in the same vein.
'To withstand the arrogant claim of a single to dominate the development of the destinies of Europe', as Asquith stated, became the cardinal aim of British foreign
power
policy.
This attitude towards the Germans had important ramifications. If Germans were depicted as brutes -a judgement which many felt confirmed by the sacking of Louvain and the rumours of armless Belgian babies -then they were unfit to govern colonies. It was thought, however, that these areas were incapable of self-government in the foreseeable future. Thus, the idea arose of taking these peoples under he wing of those powers who spoke of the rights of nations and the rule of law. This t
situation also suited the realists nicely, for they saw the chance to rid Britain of the German naval danger and dilute the Ger-
mans' economic power by depriving them of colonial coaling stations, bases, com munications facilities, raw materials and
manpower.
German East Africa was the key to the Cape-to-Cairo route, the dream of the Cecil Rhodes school of empire-builders Moreover, many people believed that German East Africa and South-west Africa were potential bases for attacks on India and South Africa respectively. All these factors led the British dominions to overrun all the German colonies by early 1915 except East Africa. Lewis rlarcourt, the colonial secretary, agreed with Milner and other imperialists that (he war was being fought above all to achieve the security of the British Empire vis-a vis Germapy; the elimination of the German colonies would also contain German} in Europe. Plans were even mooted to defied Germany eastwards. The future of one of the German colo-
nies, the Cameroons, brought out a difference of approach between Harcourt and Grey, the British Foreign Secretary. Grey wanted to make concessions to the French in the Cameroons to help offset their sus-
picion that Britain was collecting the colonial spoils while France was decimated on the Western Front. Harcourt, on the other hand, valued the Cameroons for its im-
pregnable naval and coaling fortress station of Douala. Eventually the Cameroons
were divided between French and
British mandates. These facts show that the object of conquering the German
colonies went far beyond holding them (as some thought as hostages for the liberation of Belgium. Yet there was a qualitative distinction between Allied and German annexation. Klaus Fpstein has pointed out that 'only 1
German annexations threatened plete overthrow of the
the comEuropean balance
and all German annexationist plans were certain to violate the now fashionable principle of nationality'. On the other hand, all the large nations played the game of power politics and the Allies exaggerated the Germans' faults in order to make their own eventual annexations less conspicuous. In the Liberal government's attitudes
>
Newspaper
bill
boards denounce German
aggression. Next day Britain declared war
Despite all this, it is necessary to rethat these Allied ideas were not the products of any concerted Entente policies. A. J. P. Taylor has pointed out that 'There was no serious exchange of ideas between the Entente Powers on war aims during the first winter of the -war. Since they also failed to exchange ideas even on the conduct of the war, this is not surprising.' As Grey admitted to Theodore Roosevelt on December 18, 'We have not yet discussed terms of peace.' It is true that the Pact of London was a formal bond between the British, French, and Russians, but the pact was largely a practical necessity designed to make Britain a contractual ally of the other two powers: previously, while France and Russia were allied to each other, Britain was allied to
member
of power;
neither.
towards Europe, Gladstonian principles made themselves felt. The principle of
No separate peace The immediate origins of the Pact of London lay in the French defeat at Charleroi, August 21-23, followed by Russia's disaster at Tannenberg at the end of that month. Under the impact of these two events, Delcasse-, who was recalled to the Quai d'Orsay on August 27 from retirement and semi-disgrace, telegraphed on the
national self-determination was praised; according to Asquith, it was the only principle which was serious and lasting. There was a certain British sympathy with Russian designs in the Near East, and more with French claims on Alsace-Lorraine. There was much support for an enlarged South Slav State and for Rumanian claims to Transylvania. These principles were also expected to serve realism by winning Rumania and perhaps Bulgaria as allies.
'Poor little Belgium' Towards the end of the year, the French government began to be more specific in its objectives, and placed emphasis upon a precise system of security against German revanchism. Here some differences between the French and British positions emerged. On December 22, Deschanel, the President of the French Chamber of Deputies, for-
mally laid claim to Alsace-Lorraine, and also emphasised that Belgium must be freed. But the French were not as concerned as the British with Belgium; for the British, 'poor little Belgium' was a completely emotional issue. Moreover, the French cared less for national self-determination than the British, and were not averse to the continuance of Austria-
Hungary
in
some form.
Serbia than for care much for either. The French hoped that Russia could be mollified with freedom of the Straits; the British were not so sure. The Russians themselves remained taciturn, for in September the Foreign Minister, Sazonov, contented himself with stating that he favoured 'the destruction of German power and the principle of nationality' (even though too strict an applies ion of the national principle would undoubtedly disrupt Russia's western provinces with their large minorities!). The French were pleased to hear Grand Duke Nicholas's promises in
France cared
Poland;
less
for
Britain did
not
I
an autonomous Poland — which the Russians were already defaulting by December. August scheme
406
of
on
29th to the principal French ambassadors abroad: 'Never more than today has cohesion between the three Allied powers been more necessary.' Delcasse recom-
mended the closest possible co-ordination among Allied ambassadors. By coincidence, Sazonov on August 7 had suggested an agreement to forbid any of the three Entente powers to conclude a separate peace with the enemy, an idea which it was hoped would also influence Italy to enter the war by removing her fears of being abandoned or double-crossed by her partners. Spurred on by the Tannenberg debacle, on September 1 Sazonov proposed that a triple declaration be signed by Britain, France, and Russia. On September 5 the Pact was signed by Paul Cambon, the French ambassador to London, his Russian counterpart Count Benckendorff, and by Sir Edward Grey for Britain. The three governments agreed 'not to conclude peace separately during the present war'; when peace terms would be discussed, 'no one of the Allies will demand terms without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies'. The USA, as an associated power, never signed. The Pact gave Allied morale a powerful and badly needed boost. It helped to allay Russian suspicions that France might make a separate peace on the Western Front in order to gain Alsace-Lorraine without further loss of life. Still, the extent of Allied lack of co-ordination was revealed by the fact that only after the Pact was signed were the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance communicated to the British! Meanwhile, the Allied successes at the
Marne and Lemberg temporarily gave an illusion of complete
On September
and imminent triumph.
13 Sazonov intimated to the British and French ambassadors to St Petersburg that, as far as Russia was concerned, France was free to establish herself in the Rhineland-Palatinate. From the autumn of 1914 onwards, one further influence on the British part of Allied war aims made itself apparent. The
Independent Labour Party, a largely workwhich organisation ing-class socialist adhered closely to the orthodoxy of the Second International on the evils of war, in mid-August issued a manifesto deploring the war and sending sympathy and greetings to the German socialists. The Fabians, an intellectual socialist movement led by the Webbs, dissented from these views and expressed ideas on the war that coincided in many ways with those of the Liberals. The Parliamentary Labour Party supported both the war and the recruitment of soldiers for it. The party leader, MacDonald, was replaced by Arthur Henderson when he dissented. From September to November the idea of a ginger group for radical ideas on the war gained ground. In November a society called the Union of Democratic Control
was formed from an alliance of certain Liberals and Independent Labour Party Members. The UDC called for the prinof self-determination to be freely applied; for the ratification of all treaties by Parliament; for the abandonment of the Balance of Power Concept for a concert which would establish an international machinery for guaranteeing peace; and for the drastic reduction of armaments and the nationalisation of arms manufacturing in order to break the power of the 'merchants of death', as they called arms manufacturers. The expected democratic control of foreign policy to lead to the implementation of policy by the force of world public opinion. Above all, the society pressured for a just and moderate peace. ciple
UDC
The UDC, however, although an important Above: Arthur Henderson, new Secretary to the Labour Party. Below left, left to right: Count Benckendorff (Russian Ambassador in London) Sir Edward Grey (British Foreign Secretary), Paul Cambon (French Ambassador in London). All signed the Pact of London, September 1914, agreeing not to conclude peace separately'. Below: Asquith — 'national self-determination'
influence in later years, inflamed public opinion in the winter of 1914-15 with its proposals to such an extent that many considered its acts treasonable. The people had not yet suffered sufficiently to be receptive to its ideas.
may
be seen that British and French in 1914 were, in their different ways, half-formed and at best tentative. Neither nation was united behind a specificprogramme such as Bethmann-Hollweg's September demands. As Balfour told the It
war aims
House
of
Commons
at a later date:
'We
entered this War with little in our minds besides the necessity of defending Belgium and of preventing France from being crushed before our eyes.' He spoke the truth. Yet in relation to the Allies' war aims, it is well to bear in mind Cromwell's dictum: 'no man goes farther than lie who knows not where he is going."
Further Reading
Hanak, H., The Union of Democratic Control during the First World War (Institute of Historical Research Bulletin, 1966) Louis, W. R., Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-19 (Oxford University Press, 1967)
Pingaud,
A., Historie diplomatique de la France pendant la grande guerre (Paris) Taylor, A. J. P., The War Aims of the Allies the First World War in Essays Presented Sir Lewis Namier (Macmillan, 1956)
D.
R
SHERMER
campus
is
a lecturer University
in
history at the
in
to
London
Maryland and is principal of the Overseas School of London, Hampstead. He took his master's degree at the London School of Economics under D C Watt and gained a mark of distinction of
the
of
•107
GERMANY'S
WAR AIMS I
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Germany's leaders took seriously the first line of the German national anthem Deutschland, Deutschland ilber alles: indeed, they had developed precise aims for making Germany a 'Supreme Power'. German Weltpolitik, as manifested in the September Programme, was the political expression of the pervasive feeling that she had a right to find adequate territorial expression for her bursting energy. Unfortunately, the analogy to a coach with horses harnessed in opposite directions is only too apt: the policy of Mitteleuropa necessarily involved Germany in a war on two fronts, Bismarck's perennial fear, and those who favoured peace on the Eastern Front so as to permit concentration on the Western Front were never influential enough to effect changes in German policy. The grandiose colonial counterpart of Mitteleuropa was Mittelafrika: if both major aims had been pursued to a successful conclusion, Germany would have attained a power status superior to that of 'the whale' (Britain) and 'the bear' (Russia). However, with stalemate in the west and indecisive victories in the east, the reality of the war situation at the end of 1914 made Germany's war aims look awry. Below: The Kaiser and Crown Prince Wilhelm (wearing the bearskin of the Death's Head Hussars) reviewing troops bound for the Western Front. Imanuel Geiss
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When Genera] von Falkenhayn, Moltke's successor as German Chief-of-Staff after the Battle of the Maine, threw his hastily formed now arm> corps into the Battle of* Ypres, the regiments, consisting mainly of university students, are said to have stormed across the fog-bound battlefield to death at the hands o( British machine gunners, while singing Deittschland, Deutschland tiber alles. Whether true or not. this patriotic Legend about the students of Langemark still persists. The raw troops, sacrificing themselves for the greater glory of the German Reich, could hardly have imagined that their political and military leaders were taking the first line of their death song literally. It is true that German students could read in their history text-books that the Reich was on
way
to becoming a World Power or, for matter, already was one, for their Kaiser had boasted so for almost two decades. But most students, like the average German of prewar days, had probably no more than the haziest idea what that actually meant. While the students, blinded by nebulous patriotism, willingly gave their lives in the service of their beloved Fatherland, the men at the top of the Reich had developed precise aims for its
that
German supremacy.
War was the logical German Weltpolitik — the Ger-
Since the First World
outcome of
version of imperialism around 1900 — any attempt at assessing German war aims in the first few months of the war must go back to a short analysis of German Welt-
man
410
Germany
German
historians ever since)
from the status of an ordinary continental power to that of a world power, and indeed equal in prestige to the British Empire.
decided,
and
politik. Its
An
main aim was
to raise
excess of energy
German pression
German
Weltpolitik was the political exof a new sentiment pervading society, the feeling that Germany
was bursting with new energy and had a right to find adequate outlets for it. This excess of energy was the result of three
developments in Germany. The founding of the German Reich in 1871 after three short and easy wars between 1864 and 1871; the growing economic power of the new Reich due to rapid industrialisation; and the sharp rise of the German population due to industrialisation. Those three factors and the ideology of the Reich as the supreme symbol of Ger-
man
unity
and
power,
made German
Weltpolitik almost inevitable. It was not just the whims of the eccentric Kaiser or of a few cringing court politicians, for it
found enthusiastic support throughout a society which sought a higher political status in keeping with their increased economic power and their increasing military power. Yet right from the start of Weltpolitik until the First World War there were certain basic issues that the Germans had never clearly resolved. This uncertainty helps to explain the way German war aims sprang up and developed during the war. Firstly, was prewar Germany already a world power or not? German society (and
seemed un-
this in itself produced a dangerous instability. Secondly, how was the status of world power to be achieved or
consolidated so that there was no doubt about Germany's status? Was Germany to rely on her own strength, or to act as junior partner to one or other of the established world powers? On the whole, Germany strove to become a world power in her own right without the help of others. An alliance with Britain or Russia — whale and bear, to use a cliche of the time — was possible only in theory, because in practice it was ruled out by the social and political structure of the Reich. The landed gentry, in particular those in Prussia east of the Elbe, were interested in high agrarian tariffs to keep out cheaper Russian and American grain. Their bread and butter interests clashed with their traditional pro-Russian sympathies, because Tsarist Russia was one of the last strongholds of autocratic conservatism. Similarly, the economic interests of industry, commerce and later of shipping blocked an under-
standing with Britain. German statecraft never managed to coordinate the divergent forces which pulled the Reich in opposite directions. This inability proved to be fatal when Germany entered the period of imperialism by inaugurating Weltpolitik. Because she was unable to lay down priorities or to coordinate her tremendous forces properly,
Germany tried to expand in all directions at the same time, by peaceful means be-
and by military conquest and various war aims once war had broken out. This also explains why Germany never succeeded in concentrating her forces on one front after peaceful means towards Weltpolitik failed. Thus, the proud German Reich can best be likened to a coach with horses harnessed in opposite directions, or, less charitably, to the famous two asses bound together and faced with two bundles of hay in opposite directions. fore the war,
Grandiose dreams of Mittelafrika acquired Germany Ironically,
more
colonial territory before the period of Weltpolitik than after 1900, when the political effects of Weltpolitik and the building of the German battle fleet made themselves felt. Apart from a narrow strip in
the Cameroons, Germany made no more gains in the 20th Century. German colonies became almost self-supporting after the reforms of Dernburg, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and one, German South West Africa, even began to prosper after the discovery of large diamond fields in 1907. However, German public opinion
became dissatisfied with German possessions. The German colonies in Africa, disconnected as they were, reminded German colonial enthusiasts of grandiose dreams for a consolidated block of
German
colonies in the centre of Africa — Mittelafrika. Germany strove to finish what had to be left undone in the 1880s, to connect German possessions in West and South West Africa with those in East Africa by trying to gain
a foothold in the Belgian Congo and to acquire the Portuguese colonies one way or another. Mittelafrika as a colonial war aim can be seen, if only indirectly and obliquely, in the last days of July 1914, and triumphantly re-emerged during the it war itself as one of the most consistent German war aims. Another direction of German prewar expansion was the Middle East, where the Reich cultivated friendship with the Otto-
man Empire by penetrating Turkey economically, by the Baghdad Railway and by a strong military mission. Turkey, as part of a generously defined Mitteleuropa, became one of the favourite German war aims of the First World War. One of the most persistent grievances of Germans in the period of Weltpolitik was that their territorial basis on the European continent was too narrow. Consequently they attempted to broaden it, either directly by annexation or indirectly by means of economic penetration. This then is the sum of German war aims. It is very difficult, however, to isolate schemes for achieving these war aims at least as far as the government is concerned, because documentary evidence is largely missing. As Sir Eyre Crowe shrewdly put it
in his
famous memorandum of January
'Ambitious designs against one's neighbours are not as a rule openly proclaimed', and prewar Germany was no 1907:
exception.
The lack
of official
German
from the prewar period on future war aims is easily explained. If
documents
problems of foreign policy were never discussed in Wilhelmine Germany in constitutional bodies, which would have left adequate documentary sources at least for the historian, it is not to be expected that the problem of expansion on the Con-
basic
was discussed either. Even if there had been talks at the top of the Reich it is unlikely that anything would have been committed to paper. It is much more likely that such talks were hushed up and treated as top secret, because the knowledge of such ideas in peacetime would have been even more damaging to the Reich than they were in wartime, when, again, all discussion of war aims at government level was kept strictly secret. Yet it is inconceivable and would run counter to all historical and political extinent
perience that leading
Germans should
have given thought, at
the consequences of their persistent demand to make Germany a world power. The widely held idea that Germany's frontiers were too disadvantageous implied the intention to do something about them once the opportunity presented itself. A recent study of the German press between 1911 and 1914 brought out that at least the Pan-Germans and their allies saw and accepted that consequence. They either only hinted at the need to annex territories after 'the next war', to quote General Bernhardi's famous book Deutschland und der nachste Krieg, or they openly said that annexations would be necessary, but that it would be inopportune to go into
Mitteleuropa and Mittelafrika: hidden cards in Germany's bid for 'World Power' status Below
to right: Prince von Bulow (German Chancellor till Wilhelm's trust in 1909), Mathias Erzberger (Catholic politician with 'wild annexationist ideas'), Berchtold (AustroHungarian Foreign Minister) shaking hands with Bethmann-Hollweg (German Chancellor and author of the September Programme), Admiral von Tirpitz (he favoured a separate peace in the east). Below: King Ludwig III of Bavaria reviewing troops on the Western Front
he
not
least privately, to
left, left
lost
\
It
...:
t
**A
details now. A tow writers even ventured into the open before the war and their suggestions bore a striking similarity to plans formulated in government circles
war had broken out. As for the government and the Kaiser, we have only fragmentary evidence for the time before the war. but masses of evidence for the war period itself. Even the meagre prewar evidence suggests that the government and the Kaiser were affected after
expansionist ideas in German — and how could it have been otherwise? What we know about that time
by
the
society
fits both into the pattern of prewar publications and of actual plans during the war. As early as 1892 the Kaiser confided to his
quiet until the final phase of the crisis of July 1914. It is only then that indirect evidence of German desires to annex neighbouring territories in the west became apparent. In the German ultimatum to Belgium, which was drafted not by the Foreign Ministry, but by the German Chief-of-Staff, Moltke, on July 26, the Ger-
a plan of direct annexations and more subtle forms of indirect rule in the West as well. Once war had broken out, the Kaiser protested the innocence of German intentions by proclaiming that Germany 'was not driven by the lust of conquest', as, by the way, Crowe had predicted in his famous memorandum more than seven years
man government
earlier.
'offered' to respect Bel-
The Kaiser has been echoed ever
gian territorial integrity after the war, but on condition that German troops were allowed to march through without meeting any resistance. This meant that Germany would feel free to annex Belgian territory, if Belgium were to demand her neutrality effectively against the German invasion. Similarly, Chancellor Bethmann-Holl-
German propagandists and, until a few years ago, by practically all German historians in their almost uncritical apologia. Such protestations seemed roughly plausible only as long as official German war aims were not too well known. Of course the Reich and its leading political classes were not 'driven by the lust of con-
promised the British government to refrain from annexations of French and Belgian territory in Europe if Britain were to remain neutral in the
quest' but conquest by war had a pretty important place in their political thinking and their ambitions for Germany. Since the early 1960's German war aims have become sufficiently well known, in particular through the studies of Professor Fritz Fischer and his students, to dismiss the German protestations as sheer official
since by
Above: General von Falkenhayn: he favoured a separate peace with Russia. Right: One German war aim; peace and plenty-for Germans. Below: A German cartoon — the Tsar tells Franz Josef that his motive for attacking Austria is to rid himself of dissident elements
friend and adviser Eulenburg his dream of Germany's 'Napoleonic supremacy' albeit 'in the peaceful sense'. His peaceful dream included, nevertheless, a war against Russia, after which the Poles, 'liberated from the Russian yoke' by the Germans, would a; the Kaiser to annex them. Some 15 yt 'a later Bethmannv of State for the Hollweg, then Secre, suggested similar Interior, seems to haN horror of Chanideas to the Kaiser, to claims in his cellor Biilow, as the lai close
,
s
important is postwar memories. What cropped up that the same kind of idt very soon within the German governm.
World War hao Western Europe, everything
after the First for
412
As emained
arted.
weg, on July
29,
coming war. The Chancellor refused to clude Belgian and French colonies
in-
in
Africa in his promise, thus continuing Germany's prewar drive for more colonies. The Chancellor's move not only gave away Germany's definite intention to go to war and to violate Belgian neutrality, but also to have a free hand in the West, if Britain were to join the war against Germany. One might dismiss such indirect evidence as irrelevant if the German government had not followed up the threats implied in their 'offer' to Belgium and Britain by devising
propaganda. From then on it has not been possible to take the German protestations of innocence seriously, particularly as they are not consistent with the fantastic outburst of annexationist sentiment and propaganda inside and outside the govern-
ment after the war had started. It is not enough to play down that phenomenon as a regrettable
but
psychologically
under-
standable reaction to the stress of war, because, as has been shown earlier, the climate for 'annexationist fever' had been prepared well before the war. The only rational explanation can be found in the strong will for expansion and more power,
which propelled German society on its disastrous course. This strong will was restrained in times of peace only by the fear of giving away secret ambitions too early. Once that tactical inhibition had been removed by war and by the prospect of early victory, the dam burst and let loose a flood of annexationist plans, which increased with the likelihood of German victory. In victoria Veritas. On August 11, 1914, the Kaiser, now in a different mood, swore to his Imperial Guards, when they left Berlin for the front, that he would not sheathe his sword until
he could dictate peace. In a similar vein the Bavarian King made the same promise. Their most devoted political servants in the Reichstag, the Conservatives, did their best to prevent the only element in Germany that was at least theoretically antiannexations from stating their case in public. When, in the first days of August, the Social Democrats wanted to include in their formal endorsement of the government's policy the warning that they would resist any attempt to convert the defensive war into a German war of conquest, the spokesman for the Conservative Party, Count Westarp, forced them to withdraw this clause. Otherwise, Westarp threatened, the Conservatives would reject the Social Democrats' statement in the plenary session of the Reichstag at the risk of provoking an open debate on one of the most delicate points of German policy on the very day when the need for national unity was to be proclaimed. The Social Democrats, as usual, gave in. The government, in particular, was very interested in preventing a public debate on German war
aims when war had barely started, again
They apparently knew too well, and had no about the demands that would
for tactical reasons.
German sentiments illusions
come to the
fore.
Furthermore, they feared that public demands for far-reaching war aims would commit the government one way or another, in either case with dire consequences. If they came out against expansionist war aims, they would not only act against their inner wishes, but would also alienate the traditional supporters of an expansionist policy at home and abroad. If they came out in favour of expansionist war aims in public, they also feared a bad impression at home and abroad. The German working class, essential for waging any modern war, might rebel. On the other hand, the peoples of the Entente Powers would be even more determined in their resistance, and the neutral states would be unfavourably impressed.
printed 'privately' and spread amongst national groups and government circles, might have a considerable circulation. After the outbreak of war the Pan-Germans, a comparatively small, but closelyknit and influential group, were the first to fill the vacuum created by the government's ban on public discussion of war aims. On August 28 their Executive Committee held its first wartime session to lay down their plans for the period after victory, which, a week before the Battle of the Marne, seemed to be just around the corner. A few days later the Pan-German League circulated their views in a 'primemorandum to the vately printed' limited audience of people in the know that was so typical of politics in Germany during the first half of the war. The PanGerman overall aim was the creation of Mitteleuropa, comprising at that time no
more than Germany and Austria-Hungary, but 'inclusive of those areas to be acquired by the German Reich and Austria-Hungary'. Heinrich Class, the leader of the Pan-Germans, added cheerfully: 'The Netherlands and Switzerland, the three Scandinavian states and Finland, Italy, Rumania and Bulgaria will attach themselves to this nucleus gradually and of compulsive necessity, without need of the least pressure from the nucleus states. If one includes the dependencies and colonies of these states, the result will be a vast economic unit capable of asserting and maintaining its independence against any other in the world.'
'A land-bridge to the Caucasus' The Pan-Germans also explained what they understood by 'areas to be acquired' by Germany: Belgium in some kind of indirect rule; the area of Longwy-Briey in northern Lorraine, rich in iron-ore, plus the French Channel coast as far as the Somme and French border areas from Belfort to Verdun, including those two fortresses. In the East the Pan-Germans demanded the annexation of a broad belt of Polish territory along the German border, Lithuania and the Baltic provinces. Russia was to be reduced to her territorial status of the late 17th Century before Peter the Great. The Pan-Germans claimed that their demand for Mitteleuropa was not only 'absolutely imperative' but also 'widely accepted as such' presumably by the German public. And how right they were, because Mitteleuropa struck a note with the Germans comparable only to the mystical idea of the Reich, and in fact Mitteleuropa served as a kind of substitute for the old Mediaeval Roman Empire, which had been run by Germans. With their desire for annexations, the Pan-Germans found themselves more and in the mainstream of German polithought. Representatives of heavy industry, a potent political factor indeed, took up Pan-German ideas, and some went even further, such as Hugo Stinnes and August Thyssen. Since many heavy industry owners were notoriously close to the Pan-Germans, they served to increase the power of the extreme right in the debate on war aims.
more
Pent-up expansionist energies Since the German government had not sufficient trust in the intellectual and polithe German public, they imposed, in August 1914, a formal ban on any publications discussing peace terms and war aims in other than vague and general terms. This is why the pent-up expansionist energies in German society could only emerge rather furtively and in semi-public memoranda and meetings. Nevertheless, some of the memoranda, tical self-discipline of
tical
Yet industrialists also found
more
allies
respectable political groups. Catholic steel magnate, Thyssen,
in
The had
secured the assistance of Matthias Erzberger, a member of the Catholic Centre Party and one of the most active members of the Reichstag. Erzberger, a political busybody at that point in his career, set out his dreams for German expansion in a memorandum to the Chancellor. These were even more startling than those of the
Pan-Germans, perhaps because he added to the list of desiderata the creation of a 'liberated' Polish kingdom under German
hegemony, while Austria- Hungary was to be given the Ukraine, Rumania and Bessarabia. Erzberger modestly called his sweeping scheme 'the minimum which all sections of the German people should demand on the conclusion of peace'. That Erzberger's wild ideas were not the maximum is revealed by Thyssen's own war aims. He admitted himself that the main targets of his claims were the iron ore deposits in northern France and southern Russia. In the East he attained Alexandrian dimensions (which even Ludendorff caught up with only in May 1918), pleading for a land-bridge, dominated by Germany, across Russia and the Ukraine to the Caucasus. Outside and, indeed, inside German government circles the annexationist fever seemed to run so high in the first weeks of the war that one Minister, the Secretary of State for Colonies, Solf, thought it wise and necessary to divert general attention from the European continent to Africa. When asked by the Secretary of State at the Foreign Ministry, Jagow, to submit a memorandum on desirable colonial war aims, Solf proceeded from the assumption that, although victory over France was imminent, there would be no substantial annexations in Western Europe. As a kind of ersatz (substitute) Solf painted the emergence of Mittelafrika in the most glowing colours. Mittelafrika would be set up in three successive stages: annexation of Angola and northern Mozambique (although Portugal at that time was still neutral); of the French and Belgian Congo, plus Dahomey and parts of the Western Sudan as far as Timbuctu; and once Britain was conquered, the whole of Nigeria would be added to round off Mittelafrika. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg accepted the gist of the scheme yet continued to hope for annexations in Europe as well. For him Mittelafrika was apparently nothing more than the colonial
complement to Mitteleuropa. The government's war aims on the European continent developed with such ominous speed once war had broken out that it seems most unlikely that all those ideas should have arisen just from the excitement of war. Two days after the
Chancellor's oblique hints to the British possible German about annexations in France and Belgium, the Kaiser told the Prusso-Polish magnate and courtier Count Hutten-Czapski that he thought of restoring a liberated Polish kingdom with close relations to Germany once Russia was defeated. In early August, in fact, German troops in Poland did spread proclamations of the liberation of Poland, and this object remained one of the favourite slogans of German propaganda during the war. On August 6 the Chancellor first formulated the programme of reducing Russia to
government
its
ing
pre-Petrine territorial status when laydown instructions for fostering open
413
revolt
in
Finland against
On August
Russian
rule.
the idea of setting up the Ukraine as a buffer state was formulated by the Chancellor in an instruction to the German ambassador in Vienna. In the evening of August L'l the Chancellor and his entourage discussed the Polish question in the Army General Headquarters at Koblenz, probably in the way outlined above. What is more important, on the same occasion the proposals for Mitteleuropa, the central point of Bethmann-Hollweg's Sep11
tember Programme, were mentioned for the first time in the sources. There was talk 'Greater Germany' Gross-Deutschland), with Belgium. Holland and Poland as protected states (Schutzstaaten) in a narrow sense, and Austria in a wider sense. On September 9, 1914, at the height of the Battle of the Marne, the Chancellor formu-
o\
<
lated his so-called 'September
Programme',
which was found and first published about a decade ago by Professor Fritz Fischer. It was a provisional formulation of German war aims in the hour of expected victory over France. It has become such a key
document for understanding German war aims in the First World War that it seems justified to quote its most important passages in full. The Chancellor, in an opening paragraph, described
it
to the
Vice-Chan-
Delbriik, as 'provisional notes on the direction of our policy on the conclusion of peace' and he continued: cellor,
The September Programme The general aim of
war
is
to
any militarily important ports, must place her oast at our disposal in military respects, must become economi-
occupy
cally a solution,
German which
province. Given such a the advantages of
offers
annexation without its inescapable domestic disadvantages, French Flanders with Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, where
political
414
Zollverband) through common customs treaties, to include France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland
and perhaps
Italy,
Sweden and Norway.
This association will not have any common constitutional supreme authority and all its members will be formally equal, but in practice will be under German leadership
and must
stabilise Germany's economic dominance over Mitteleuropa. • The question of colonial acquisitions, where the first aim is the creation of a con-
tinuous central African (Mittelafrikanisches Kolonialreich) colonial empire, will be considered later, as will that of the aims to be realised vis-a-vis Russia. • Short provisional formula suitable for a possible preliminary peace to be found for a basis for the economic agreements to be concluded with France and Belgium. • Holland. It will have to be considered by
what means and methods Holland can be brought into closer relationship with the German Empire. In view of the Dutch character,
achieve security for the German Reich in west and cast for all imaginable time. For this purpose France must be so weakened as to make her revival as a great power impossible for all time. Russia must be thrust back as far as possible from Germany's eastern frontier and her domination over the non-Russian vassal peoples broken. As specific war aims, the following items appeared: • France. The military to decide whether we should demand cession of Belfort and western slopes of the Vosges, razing of fortresses and cession of coastal strip from Dunkirk to Boulogne. The ore fie Id of Briery, which is necessary for the supply of ore for our industry, to be ceded in any case. Further, a war indemnity, to be paid in instalments; it must be high enough to prevent France from spending any considerable sum on armaments in the next 15-20 years. Furthermore: a commercial treaty which makes France economically dependent on Germany, secures the French market for our exports and makes it possible to exclude British commerce from France. This treaty must secure for us financial and industrial freedom in France in such fashion the German enterprises can no longer receive different treatment from French. • Belgium. Liege and Verviers to be attached to Prussia. Question whether Antwerp, with a corridor to Liege, should also be annexed remains open. At any rate Belgium, even if allowed to continue to exist as a state, must be reduced to a vassal state, must allow us to the
most of the population is Flemish, can without danger be attached to this unaltered Belgium. The competent military quarters will have to judge the military value of this position against England. • Luxembourg. Will become a German federal state and will receive a strip of the present Belgian province of Luxembourg and perhaps the corner of Longwy. • We must create a central European economic association (Mitteleuropaische
this closer relationship
must
leave
them
free of any feeling of compulsion, must alter nothing in the Dutch way of life, and
must also subject them to no new military obligations. Holland, then, must be left independent in externals, but be made internally dependent on us. Possibly one might consider an offensive and defensive alliance to cover the colonies; in any case a close customs association, perhaps the cession of Antwerp to Holland in return for a German garrison in the fortress of Antwerp and at the mouth of the Scheldt. Mitteleuropa was hardly more than a veil German hegemony and a kind of umbrella for all the specific annexations and systems of indirect rule by economic and political means. A new source, the Riezler Diary, confirms that leading statesmen in Germany were perfectly aware of that function of Mitteleuropa. For Riezler and Bethmann-Hollweg it was a more sophisticated and effective way of establishing German domination than by crude direct annexations. Belgium and Poland were to be made satellite states and to be Germanised afterwards. A comparison with the Pan-German programme is instructive, because it reveals that there were only differences of priorities, methods and stress, but not of kind. The September Programme may be considered as a kind of blueprint for German war aims in 1914. It was not, however, a blueprint in the sense that it was a rigid programme that was constantly consulted and referred to. In fact, it was never referred to again after October 1914, but a closer analysis of later war aims programmes makes it clear that they were not too far from the September Programme. Apparently, it formulated ideas which were prevalent more or less during the whole war, with variations according to the military and political situation. The war had reached a turning point in the middle of November 1914, which made for
a fresh look at German war aims necessary. The offensive against France had, after the setback at the Marne, definitely failed,
while the situation in the East re-
mained precarious because of Austrian defeats. The German war plan first to crush France and then Russia had plainly gone sour. In this situation it was Tir-
who suggested a new strategy of separate peace with Russia in order to throw Germany's military weight against France and Britain. Falkenhayn took up the suggestion and elaborated it in a long conpitz
versation with the Chancellor on November 18. Bethmann-Hollweg agreed and passed on to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin a detailed report, in which he also gave an unequivocal definition of the aims he hoped to achieve by a separate peace with Russia: Then we could, if we thought it right, even reject any peace offer that might come from France, and if the fortune of arms favoured us, so force France to her knees that she had to accept any peace that we liked, and at the
same
time, if the
navy
lives
up
to its
promises, also impose our will on England. Thus, for the price of having our relations with Russia remain essentially what they were before the war, we would create what conditions we liked in the west. At the same time, this would end the Triple Entente.
Grandiose dreams After the failure of speedy total war on both fronts, the Chancellor was apparently willing to conclude a compromise peace in the East in order to gain total victory in the West. Zimmermann, the Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, however, opposed such a course. He still clung to the concept of total victory on the fronts. Zimmermann's opposition was typical of that of party politicians and spokesmen of vested interest who interpreted any partial compromise as a betrayal. Perhaps also to salvage as much as possible from one grandiose dream in the East, the Chanexperts to work out in cellor instructed detail what minimum demands should amount to in case of a separate peace treaty with Russia. Both civilians and military experts were asked, including Ludendorff
who was
Chief-of-Staff to
Hindenburg
in
the East, during the Chancellor's visit to Hindenburg's headquarters at Posen. The overall result of the enquiries was the advice to annex Polish territory along the lines suggested by the Pan-Germans. It was only in 1915 that the answer to the enquiries from the government crystallised into official policies.
The year 1914 thus closed with all the military plans of Germany and her allies awry, while the political leadership had not sufficiently adjusted to the new situation. The result was that a separate peace could not be achieved on either front. At the same time Mitteleuropa, the supreme German war aim, began to take shape. Further Reading Fischer, Fritz, Germany's Aims in the First World War (Chatto, 1967) Gatzke, H. W., Germany's Drive to the West (Oxford University Press, 1967) Geiss, I., Der polnischen Grenzstreifen 1914-18 (Llibeck, Hamburg, 1960) Krieger, L, The Responsibility of Power. Chapter on Bethmann-Hollweg and the War by Fritz Stern (New York, 1968)
[For Imanuel Geiss's biography, see page 68.}
THE CRUISE OF THE Leaving Vice-Admiral von Spee's East Asiatic Squadron early on the morning of August 13, 1914 the German cruiser Emden, accompanied by her collier Markomannia, set course for the Indian Ocean, then virtually a British lake. During the next three months she cruised 30,000 miles, sank or captured 23 merchant ships, disposed of a cruiser and a destroyer, inflicted £15 million worth of damage and occupied the attention of a combined Allied naval search force involving at one time or another nearly 80 vessels. Not surprisingly, she and her captain rapidly became a living legend in Germany, where she was seen as the epitome of German superiority. In Britain her captain's chivalry, daring and humanity were applauded by the public as romantic examples of what they thought war should be like. A formidable ship in her own class, the Emden was outclassed by the Australian cruiser Sydney, and her adventure ended in 'grim and bloody tragedy'. Below: SMS Emden; soon she added an oval fourth funnel in simulation of HMS Yarmouth. Lionel Fanthorpe
On
the afternoon of August 12, 1914, ViceAdmiral Maximilian von Spee, commander of Germany's East Asiatic Squadron, gathered his five senior captains around the chart table of his flagship, SMS Scharnhorst, anchored off Pagan Island. During their discussion it became clear that Spee
favoured a 'fleet-in-being' policy. This entailed keeping the Squadron united and its whereabouts a secret — a sinister, tenebrous but formidable threat. Like a chess player, Spee calculated that a threat was often more effective than its implementation.
He
also envisaged a
and operations against the America. The Indian
move eastwards Pacific coast of
Ocean — tempting hunting
the German Squadron — was virtually a British lake in the summer of 1914. and coaling problems made it impracticable for Spee's vessels to enter it. The 11,420-ton Scharnhorst and her sister ship, the armoured cruiser SMS Gneisenau, each used 93 tons of coal a day at an average speed of 10 knots; at an action speed of 20 knots consumption rose to 375 tons a day. Without ports and agents coal would be unobtainable. Captains Maerker of the Gneisenau, Schonberg of the light cruiser SMS Niirnberg (3,400 tons) and Thiereken of the auxiliary cruiser SMS Prinz Eitel Friedrich agreed with Spee. Captain Schultz of the Scharnhorst agreed in principle with a move east but suggested a preliminary squadron raid on an enemy port. Captain Karl von Miiller of the light cruiser SMS Emden disagreed. He argued in favour of activity in the Indian Ocean. Coal supplies were impossible for the entire squadron or the heavy armoured cruisers, but not for
ground
for
and his uncle, Rudolf von had led an early German nationalist movement. Miiller was quiet, withdrawn, lonely and conscientious. Trained on SMS Stosch and Gneisenau, he had been signal officer on SMS Moltke and officer of the guard on the cruiser SMS Gefion. He had also served aboard SMS Schwalbe and the torpedo school ship ily
tradition
Bennigsen,
SMS
Blucher. After a day and a half's cruising from Pagan, the Emden was unable to establish contact with the German radio station at Yap, north-east of the Palau Islands, and sent a cutter to investigate. Herr Schmidt in charge of the Jaluit Trading Company on the island showed the shore party the wreckage of the radio installation — shelled by three British cruisers: Hampshire,
steamed for Bali. While they cruised slowly and waited for darkness to cover their passage through Lombok Strait, Miicke (Muller's second in command) had an ingenious idea for disguising the Emden. Her three funnels were the trademark of a German light cruiser. British light cruisers had four. Miicke knew that the British Yarmouth had three round and one oval, and he produced a very fair simulation of this style. With her false stack in position, Emden passed through the Sunda Straits off Batavia, between the Indian Ocean and the Java Sea. From time to time Miiller intercepted heavy wireless traffic among Allied warships searching for German raiders. One shore station even asked, 'Emden, where are you?'
HMS
Yarmouth and Minotaur. The Emden's next objective was Angaur Island in the
Narrow escape On September 3 Emden was
Palau group, leased by a German phosphate company. Here a hoped-for rendezvous with the collier Choising failed to materialise but the Emden encountered
Simalur Island
Prinzessin Alice instead. When war was declared she had been carrying 4,000,000 dollars in gold for the Indian government, but she had promptly changed course and delivered it to the German Consul in the Philippines. Miiller took on extra men from this vessel and Markomannia. He put a letter to his mother aboard Prinzessin Alice, which was then directed to Cebu, a neutral port in the Philippines.
A
floating coffin
came within enough
approaching
Sumatra when she of the Hampshire — big
off
sight
blow her to pieces at long range. Despite this narrow escape, Miiller carried out his coaling and had succeeded in loading nearly 1,000 tons aboard before he was interrupted by a Dutch government yacht. During the coaling two spare five-pounder guns had been transferred from Markomannia 's storage lockers to Emden's wardroom. At 1100 hours on September 8, Emden encountered the 4,094-ton Greek steamer Pontoporos commanded by Captain D. Polemis and carrying 6,500 tons of coal from Calcutta. Miiller gave careful thought to
The Emden now steamed towards the
to their legal position. Technically the ship
was neutral but the cargo was contraband.
one light cruiser, which could, in an emergency, coal at sea. Captain Fieltiz, Spee's Chief-of-Staff, agreed with Muller's arguments that British naval strength would be diverted to Europe if there were no active German warships elsewhere. Miiller returned to the Emden to await
Moluccas with the idea of entering the Indian Ocean via Mindanao and the Dutch East Indies. On the night of August 20 Miiller was attempting to contact Tsingtao in the German colony of Kiaochow, the Emden's last home port, when he received a radio message from the old German light cruiser SMS Geier. During the British bombardment of Yap, Korvettenkapitan Grasshof had hidden Geier and her collier
Spee's decision.
Bochum
Coaling was
still in progress aboard the a cutter arrived with a message from the Vice-Admiral. Miiller was granted permission to detach his ship and operate as an independent unit. At 1730 hours on August 12 the Squadron steamed almost due east from Pagan, warships to port, Scharnhorst leading, merchantmen and auxiliaries to starboard led by Prinz Eitel Friedrich. Early next morning Emden detached and, accompanied by her collier, Markomannia, headed SSW at 12 knots along the eastern side of the Marianas. The Emden carried ten 10-5-cm rapid fire guns and two torpedo tubes. She was 395 feet long by 43i feet wide and her bow projected further at the waterline than at deck level. Her twin steam engines could propel her 3,650 tons at a top speed of 24-5 knots, and cruising economically she could cover 6.000 miles.
Emden when
The Emden 's 10'5-cm (4* 13-in) guns were 40 calibre ones (that is to say the barrel length was 40 times th barrel diameter). This gave them a high uzzle velocity of 2,835 feet per second, a. I, with a shell weighing 30-86 pounds an a rate of fire of eight rounds per minutt made her a formidable ship in her own c ss. ere young, Most of the Emden s men enthusiastic, dedicated and efh ient. Korvettenkapitan Karl von Miiller, corn June 16, 1873, had a long Prussian milit ry fam.
416
in a cove.
On August
met him and advised him Honolulu
to take the ship
to be interned. too old, too lightly armed to
21, Miiller
The Geier was and with her
maximum
speed of 12 knots too slow to be anything but a floating coffin in action. The Emden steamed on again. On August 22 she crossed the equator, and on August 23 she established radio contact with the German steamer Tannenfels and arranged a rendezvous with her at Timor to replenish coal and food. Emden and Markomannia reached the rendezvous and waited half a day on August 25 for Tannenfels, which did not appear. In desperation Miiller took 470 tons of coal from Markomannia, seriously depleting her reserves. While coaling was in progress a small party went ashore for fodder for livestock kept aboard the Emden as a dietary sup-
plement. A machine gun guard accompanied the party because of stories of Timor's head-hunters, but there were no incidents. Shortly afterwards the Dutch battleship Tromp arrived and prevented further coaling because it contravened the neutrality laws. It transpired that Tannenfels had kept her appointment but Tromp had driven her away. Emden was escorted to the edge of the three-mile limit and made off eastwards in the direction of the Pacific. As soon as he had lost sight of the Dutch battleship, however, Miiller turned west again and
Prize Officer Lauterbach studied the recent Calcutta newspapers discovered aboard
Pontoporos and they enabled him to calculate approximate positions of the ships sailing notices were published. On the strength of this Emden, Markomannia and the captive Pontoporos headed for the
whose
Colombo-Calcutta steamer lane. At 0900 hours on September 10
Emden
intercepted SS Indus, a British passengerfreighter en route from Calcutta to Bombay. Technically under charter to the British government, legally Indus was undoubtedly an enemy vessel intended to transport men and horses from India to the European theatre of war. Her captain had assumed Emden was a British cruiser until too late.
now
Markomannia's mate was
charge of Pontoporos, assisted by Vice-Steerman Meyer, Emden's senior NCO, while Lauterbach took over placed
in
the Indus. The personnel from Indus were sent aboard Markomannia where an armed guard under Kapitanleutnant Klopper ensured that the prisoners did not seize the collier. Having taken what he could from Indus, Miiller ordered her to be sunk, and a sinking party from the Emden (consisting of an engineer officer, a petty officer and three stokers) boarded Indus, removed the doors from the bulkheads between the boiler
rooms and engine room and opened
the sea cocks. Later four shells were fired into her at the waterline, but she took almost two hours to go down. During the morning of September 11 Emden encountered Lovat, an English ship bound for Bombay to pick up troops. Lauterbach was mildly embarrassed because her captain was an old friend. He and his crew were put aboard Markomannia, but Lovat sank as stubbornly and reluctantly as Indus.
Timor
Miles
200
(Port)
400
h OKms.
400
The elusive Emden kept 14 major Allied warships occupied.
One radio message even asked Emden, r
where are you?' Above: The Emden's 30,000-mile cruise, during which she twice only narrowly escaped detection by superior Allied warships. Tanks of the Burmah Oil Company in Madras burning fiercely after shelling by the Emden from a range of two miles
Right:
At 1100 hours on September 12 Emden intercepted the 4,657-ton Kabinga, an English vessel belonging to the Ellerman and Bucknell Steamship Company of London. Kabinga was carrying jute to New York, and sinking her would render the German government liable for the cargo. In any case, Miiller was looking for a lumpensammler (junkman or prisoners' repatriation ship). The crews of Indus and Lovat were placed aboard Kabinga, and with a German prize crew in command she steamed in Emden's wake.
Three unexpected cheers During the night, Killin, a Glaswegian heading from Calcutta to Bombay with 6,000 tons aboard, was captured and sunk. At 0300 hours on September 13 the
collier
7,600-ton Harrison liner Diplomat, loaded with 1,000 tons of tea, was also intercepted and sent to the bottom. At 1630 hours that afternoon the Italian Loredano was encountered. Despite the prewar Triple Alliance between Italy, Germany and Austria-Hungary, her captain broadcast the Emden's position as 86 degrees
24 minutes east, 18 degrees 1 minute north and this information was duly relayed to shipping from the Calcutta lightship. The 4,000-ton collier Trabboch, in ballast, was encountered and sunk at 1800 hours on September 14. Later that afternoon, with the crews of Killin, Diplomat and Trabboch also aboard the Kabinga, the
lumpensammler was escorted
safely
to
within 75 miles of the sandheads off the mouth of the River Hooghly, where those aboard unexpectedly gave three rousing cheers for the Emden. Emden's men were now becoming adept at boarding and sinking techniques. Their next encounter was with the Clan Matheson, another Glaswegian, heading from Southampton to Calcutta with a cargo of Rolls-Royce cars, locomotives, typewriters and thoroughbred racehorses. The horses were shot before the ship was sent down, and yet the whole process was over in less than an hour. Next morning Captain W. Harris and his crew were transferred to a small Norwegian freighter. Harris shook hands with the German captain before leaving and told Miiller to his face that at
least he appreciated the courtesy he his men had been shown.
and
On September 15, Emden, Markomannia and Pontoporos were cruising and coaling in the deserted ocean south of Calcutta. collier was then sent off to a rendezvous at Simalur Island. Two days
The Greek later the of Bengal
Emden
searched the upper Bay and crossed the Madras-Rangoon
and Calcutta-Singapore routes, but sighted no vessels. Miiller began to consider a fresh line of attack.
A raid on Madras commended itself to him for four basic reasons: it was a long way from the location given by the Loredano;
it
would disturb British supremacy
unchallenged for a century; the port installations were easily accessible from the sea; and one of the in India,
Madras
Emden's crew had once worked in the city and knew its geography well. The harbour was protected by Fort St George with a 30-year-old battery of 5-9-inch guns. At 2145 hours on September 22 Emden fired first of 125 shells from a range of two miles. Hits included the prominent white and red striped tanks of the Burmah Oil
the
417
From the moment Sydney picked up the radio signal Above:
Emdens fate was sealed
SMS Emden,
of the Dresden class. Displacement: 3,600 tons. Length: 395 feet. Armament: Ten 4. 1-inch, eight 5-pounders, four machine guns plus two 17.7-inch torpedo tubes. Power/speed: 13,500 hp/24.5 knots. Armour: Deck (amidships) two inches, conning tower four inches. Crew: 321 Below: HMAS Sydney, of the Dartmouth type (Weymouth class). Displacement: 5,600 tons. Length: 450 feet. Beam: A8V2 feet. Armament: eight 6-inch, four3-pounders plus two 21-inch torpedo tubes. Power/speed: 22,000 hp/26 knots. Armour: Deck two inches. Crew: 376
Beam: 43^
feet.
419
Company, which burned
Answer-
Hampshire. Minotaur, Weymouth and Yarmouth; the Australian ships Melbourne and Sydney: the French Montcalm; the Japanese Chikuna. Ibuki and Yakagi; and the Russian Askold. Despite them all Emden sank the 3,600-ton King hud and the sugar-laden Tymeric before apprehending the 4,000-ton Gryfevale to serve as
The world could scarcely fail to react to these exploits. Macaulay records Lars Porsena's grudging praise of Horatius when 'e'en the ranks of Tuscany could scarce forbear to cheer'. The Allied reaction to Muller was very similar. His chivalry was respected, his daring admired, his humanity applauded. He appealed strongly to British sporting instincts, but this did not lessen their determination to hunt him down. In Germany he was rapidly becoming a living legend, an almost mystical epitome of that superiority of the fatherland which Kaiser Wilhelm frequently preached. Emden needed good quality coal and found over 6,000 tons aboard Buresk, destined for Admiral Jerram's ships at
lumpensammler
Hongkong.
ing-
shells tailed to find
fiercely.
Emden and
she
steamed away from Madras unscathed. Muller now cruised south past the old French colony o\' Pondicherry, but finding no ships there lie pressed on towards the Singhalese port of Colombo. No fewer than 14 major Allied warships were now search-
HMS
ing For the German raider: of Asia. Empress of Russia,
I,
420
for their crews.
Empress
Gloucester,
The
collier
was
added
to
Miiller's retinue. Before
October 3 Foyle
and Ribera were captured and sunk. The raider then proceeded to the Maldive Islands and Chagos Archipelago where boiler tubes were changed and condensers overhauled. Her next call was Diago Garcia where the Germans were welcomed by the assistant manager of the island's oil company (a septuagenarian French Madagasque) who had heard no news for three months and knew nothing of the war. The Emden's men took care not to enlighten
him.
The ship was canted, scraped clear of barnacles and repainted. Muller then headed back towards his hunting area in the Indian Ocean where his next prizes included Clan Grant on October 13, with a miscellaneous cargo including live cattle,
.
The beginning of the end: Direction Island —Emdens last raid Top left: A lifeboat from the captured Buresk supports the severed Perth-
collier
Cocos cable salvaged after the German raid on the British radio and telegraph installation on Direction Island in the Cocos group. Top right: The instrument room after the Germans had gone. However, before it was wrecked the telegraph station had managed to signal tne Emden's presence to the nearby Anzac convoy. Below: Mucke's landing party leaving Direction Island — surprised by the Sydney's arrival, Muller had been forced to abandon the landing party and head out to sea
'Bran***
t».flG.a.».
9tt
HoTubir
ia*-*i
Mr, hor* the honour to request that in the aeae of boaaalty
I
tou bo* ourrw>der jour
(1)
Tot.
•.
to
ahl|.
appreciate your tal) entry,
In order to alto* hoe aucb
1
will recapitulate the poaltloa.
I
are oehor*, 3 funnel* an* 1 »*a* down and eoat
Cuoa disabled. (£)
Tou cannot leave thie lsltnd, a&d m$ ahi: is i«Uet,
Tn t*.e erent of your aurreoderlaj to which 1
restore to raalnd you lu no dUjrace but rather jour alafortuae I
will ead< arour to do all
can for /our sick and wounded and
I
take thea tu a boa;-itul.
1
!ur* the honour to be, Sir, Tour obedient Sarraat,
// B.I.8.K.S, 'Cad en"
.....
422
\J
veptala.
'Muller and Emden
seemed romantic survivals in a world sliding rapidly into the ruthless realities of total Top,
left to right:
war'
The Emden's
captain, Karl
von Muller— 'quiet, withdrawn, lonely and conscientious his chivalry and daring caught the imagination of the world; the letter from Captain Glossop requesting Muller to surrender his ship — sporting and polite, it reads rather like the winning captain's speech after a game of cricket; Captain John Glossop of HMAS Sydney: the Sydney immediately after action against the Emden - the latter's fourth salvo knocked out the Sydney's fire direction system, causing her to withdraw out of the Emden's ,
range.
Below: The wreck of the Emden aground on a coral reef south of North Keeling Islandplaced at a disadvantage by Sydney's greater range, her guns and torpedoes no longer operable, Muller decided that he should run her aground
42a
the 4,800-ton Benmohr carrying machinand the 7,500-ton Blue Funnel Troilus on October 19, laden with valuable metals and rubber. But even while Miiller was making these captures, Markomannia had been sunk. Markomannia was actually coaling from Pontoporos offPulo Topak, an island on the west coast of Sumatra near the south end of Simalur on October 12. ery,
When Yarmouth appeared Markomannia was sunk with 1,300 tons of coal aboard and Pontoporos was taken in prize with 5,000 tons aboard. Buresk was therefore Emden's last remaining source of coal. The 473-ton British ocean-going dredger Ponrabbel, bound for Tasmania, probably qualified as Muller's most unusual victim. She was captured and sunk on October 16. The sheer volume of prisoners was now causing problems which Miiller solved by intercepting St Egbert, an English ship bound for New York, to use as another lumpensammler. He also picked up the collier Exford and disposed of the 5,000-ton Chilkana. Early on the morning of October 20 Emden ran dangerously close to Hampshire and her companion Empress of Russia but was not seen. The Germans celebrated their Kaiserin's birthday on October 22 and the three following days were uneventful. On October 26 Emden and Buresk pulled into Nancowrie in the Nicobar Islands to coal. Miiller was planning a dawn attack on Penang harbour for October 28. Entering the harbour mouth as planned Emden passed within yards of a pilot boat which paid her no attention. As dawn broke the Germans saw the Russian light cruiser Jemtchug. At 0518 hours the first torpedo from the Emden struck the Jemtchug amidships causing severe damage. It was followed by heavy accurate salvoes from the Emden's guns. Jemtchug was ablaze and sinking fast, but some of her men had reached action stations and were grimly returning Emden's fire. The French destroyer D'Iberuille joined in. Emden put a second torpedo into Jemtchug, which finished the Russian completely, before heading towards the harbour mouth. What looked like a fast torpedo boat steamed rapidly from the open sea towards the raider. It was not until after Gunnery Officer Gaede had put a shell through her funnel that the Germans realised she was only a harmless pilot boat. Miiller ceased firing and the Emden headed out to sea. At 0700 hours the raider stopped the British Glen Turret, carrying explosives, but instead of being sunk she was sent into Penang as Muller's messenger. The German captain apologised to the survivors of the Jemtchug for not picking them up and to the crew of the pilot boat for unintentionally firing on their
unarmed
vessel.
Full naval honours The small French destroyer Mousquet appeared next and prepared to attack the Emden, manoeuvring as though to launch a torpedo. The Germans steered hard to port and fired three salvoes at Mousquet. Several shells hit her stern and detonated the magazine, but even after this she launched two torpedoes which the Emden
The French captain's legs were shot away during the action but lashed to the bridge he continued directing
easily avoided.
the fight until his shattered vessel took him down with her. The Germans picked
424
up over 30 survivors, two of whom died during the night of October 29 and were buried at sea with full naval honours. Meanwhile Fronde, sister ship of Mousquet, was following Emden, taking care not to close with her. The following day Miiller apprehended the 3,000-ton freighter Newburn carrying salt to Singapore and arranged for her to ship the French survivors to Khota Raja where the severely
wounded could
On
receive hospital treatment.
Emden met Buresk near North Pageh Island in the Nassau Group at 0330 hours, and two days were spent in October 31
coaling, cleaning, carrying out repairs and resting. During coaling a cable snapped and Emden suffered her first casualty of the war: a torpedoman's thigh was broken. Dutch patrol boat arrived to en-
A
sure
Emden was
limit
and brought the news of Portugal's
outside the three-mile
entry into the war.
Having arranged a further rendezvous with Buresk, Emden set off for the Sunda Straits dividing Java from Sumatra. Nothing offered itself as a prospective prize in the Sunda area and Miiller devised an alternative plan: an attack on the British telegraph and radio installation on Direction Island in the Cocos (or Keeling) group, where the Australian, African and Indian cables met. Early on the morning of November 9 Emden anchored off the island while Miicke led ashore his landing party of 50 men, threading shallow coral mazes with a
steam launch towing two cutters. At 0630 hours they landed and found Superintendent D. A. G. de H. Farrant, of the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company. No resistance was offered. Farrant gave Miicke the keys and congratulated him on the award of the Iron Cross, news of which had been picked up during a German broadcast. Firearms were handed over to the raiders and the islanders assembled in the square near the telegraph building.
The Germans were thorough and efficient wreckers. Even an innocuous seismometer was smashed along with the electrical equipment, but three sets of charges were needed to topple the mast and the undersea cables were difficult to locate and sever. The Emden's lookout reported a vessel with a single funnel and two masts, a description which fitted their anticipated the Buresk. An officer ascended to the crow's nest and confirmed the description, but it was either an optical illusion or the Buresk was accidentally obscuring another vessel. Bearing down on the Sydney, a protected Emden was cruiser of 5,400 tons carrying eight 6inch guns and capable of nearly 26 knots. She was bigger and faster than the Emden and carried weapons outweighing and outranging those on the German cruiser. Nor was it a fluke that she had arrived in so timely a manner since, in fact, the island telegraph station had managed to transmit a signal announcing the arrival of the Emden before the Germans could interrupt, and this signal was picked up by the great Anzac convoy nearby — of which the Sydney was one escort, sailing in advance of the main body of ships. From that moment the Emden's fate was sealed. Miiller was forced to abandon his landing party and head for open sea. To be caught at anchor would give Emden no chance at all. At 0940 hours the first three German salvoes bracketed Sydney; the fourth landed, collier,
HMAS
knocking out the
fire direction system. The Australian ship withdrew to 7,000 yards, out of Emden's range but well within her own. Shells fell near the German bridge and the wireless room disappeared following a direct hit. The crow's nest and a stern gun were struck. Another shell destroyed the gunnery control system. Hits below deck ruptured Emden's steam pipes and drastically reduced her speed. Multiple fires were spreading rapidly. A direct hit shattered the number one gun; number four's ammunition port exploded wiping out the crew. At 1020 hours the steering and communication systems were destroyed. A hit below the waterline temporarily flooded the torpedo flat, but Emden kept on manoeuvring skilfully on the engines in the hope of delivering an effective torpedo. Another Australian broadside brought down the German foremast; the funnels were gone; scores of dead, dying and wounded lay among the wreckage. With guns and torpedoes inoperable Miiller decided to run his ship aground. Shortly after 1100 hours she shuddered on to the coral reefs south of North Keeling Island. Throughout the heat of the day the Germans suffered considerably from heat and thirst; several were killed attempting to swim through the surf. The Sydney had raced off to capture the Buresk, and when she returned Captain Glossop reopened fire on the wreck of the Emden because the
German
battle colours
still
flew.
Miiller
them with a white flag and firing immediately ceased. The Sydney now rereplaced
leased one of the Buresk' s boats which she had in tow and Leutnant Fikentscher, who had been with the prize crew aboard the collier,
crossed
handful of
men
to
the
to give
Emden
with
a
what aid he
The Sydney turned and headed
could. for Direc-
tion Island, intending to capture Miicke's raiding party. It was nearly 24 hours before the Australians returned to the wreck and took off Emden's survivors. Miiller was the last man to leave. Of his ship's
company 141 were dead and 65 more were wounded. Only 117 men remained unhurt. Miiller and Emden seemed to be strangely chivalrous, anachronistic survivals in a world sliding rapidly into the new ruthless realities of total war; their adventure ended in grim and bloody tragedy. But what had been achieved? In their three-month cruise of 30,000 miles the men of the Emden had sunk or captured 23 merchant ships, disposed of a cruiser and destroyer, inflicted £15,000,000 worth of damage on their enemies and occupied the attention of a combined Allied naval search force involving nearly 80 vessels at one time or another.
romantic,
Further Reading Hoehling, A. A., Lonely Command (Cassell & Co, 1957) Hough, R., The Pursuit of Admiral von Spee (Allen and Unwin, 1969) Hoyt, E. P., The Last Cruise of the Emden (Andre Deutsch, 1966) Mucke, Kapitanleutnant H. von, The Emden (Ritter&Co, 1917) Raeder, E., Der Krieg zur See, Vol. 2 (Mittler
& Sohn, Berlin, 1923) Thomas, Lowell, Lauterbach
of the China
Sea
(Hutchinson, 1939) Witthoeft, R., Unsere Berlin, 1926)
Emden (Reimar Hobbing,
[For Lionel Fanthorpe's
page
169.
]
biography,
see
the unknown quantity 'Magnificently placed astride three continents', Turkey was an ally to be courted in 1914. But on the whole, she was reluctant to join a war from which she might profit little. The Balkan Wars had left her drained of money, manpower and material and popular opinion protested against her further involvement. Even after her entry into the war enthusiasm was lacking and the demands of the war machine led to hardship and financial loss. Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Barker were promised territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Russia in the Caucasus and of Persia in Azerbaijan. A restoration of Turkey's sovereignty over Egypt was taken for granted — although it is unlikely that Germany would have permitted the real control to revert to Turkey if an invasion of Egypt had ever been successful. Germany must certainly have persuaded Enver, Talaat and Jemal that Germany
Turkey's strategic position is such as to make her a valuable ally in any global war. Germany had appreciated this, and Turkey — unaware perhaps of the Kaiser's golden visions of the whole of Asia Minor under his flag — had seen material advantage in an association of the two nations. Yet — however confident of the result Germany may have appeared — the diplomatic history of August to October 1914 shows that Turkey was not easily persuaded to join in the First World War. To ensure that she did so, Germany probably found herself obliged to involve her reluctant ally those definite acts of hostility which eventually precipitated the crisis. At the same time, from the perspective of history, it seems improbable that Turkey could have remained neutral throughout the First World War, as she did in the Second. Securely astride the most important icefree sea access of Russia to Europe and her allies, Turkey's geographical position was such that she could also threaten
was going
main
line of
communication with
India and Australia. Although it was not known to the governments of Britain, France and Russia at the time, Turkey had bound herself to Germany before the first shot was fired in Europe, and her three months of nominal neutrality between August and November 1914 were spent in preparation for the moment when her ally should give the signal for action. The exact stage at which Germany decided to do this is not clear. But the battle of the Marne, the Russian successes against Austria, the Balkan situation, the slowness of Turkish mobilisation and the reluctance of the Turkish cabinet — voicing general Turkish sentiment—to go to war against the Allies were all contributory factors. Mutual hatreds continued to flourish, but after their experience with Bulgaria and Serbia in 1912 few Turks wanted any more wars. They had seen Serbia, Greece and Montenegro profit politically at Turkey's expense and Rumania add to what she believed to be her prestige. But the Balkan Wars had drained Turkey's resources of money, manpower and material, and for the time being she was content to stay in the small corner of Europe into which she had been forced by the Balkan Wars. Nor for that matter was Britain anxious to provoke a war with Turkey. Not only
win,
Turkey's
otherwise
was suicidally Wars Germany
had been quick to appreciate that Turkey's depleted army was left with little else but obsolescent weapons and in a poor state of maintenance. This was an ideal oppor-
in
Britain's
to
policy in joining the war rash. But after the Balkan
tunity.
Although
his
prestige
had been
somewhat lowered by events in the Balkan Wars, the Turk had proved himself to be courageous, enduring and obedient. As such he made an excellent private soldier. All that was needed was to organise
Mehmed
V,
Sultan of Turkey
in
1914
might a belligerent Turkey imperil the passage of Indian troops through the Suez Canal, she might also upset her Empire's Moslem population, and this could be much more serious. For this reason, great indulgence was shown to Turkish breaches of neutrality (particularly in harbouring the Goeben and Breslau) and everything was done to pacify her and detach her from her German allegiance. The Military Correspondent of The Times wrote: For Germany the Turkish alliance was an excellent trouvaille. Magnificently placed astride three continents, inveterately hostile to Russia whose overwhelming numbers lay upon the soul of the German strategist like a nightmare, embittered with England on account of the atrocity campaigns and the loss of Cyprus and of Egypt, and capable of serving as a weapon against Russia, Austria or England at will, the warlike Empire of Ottoman appealed with irresistible force not only to the soldier- breast of a military state, but to the commonsense of German statesmen and to the pocket of the German merchant. The two principal advantages which the Germans hoped to gain from the alliance were the closing of the Dardanelles be-
tween Russia and her allies, and by the declared hostility of the head of Islam, the disaffection of the large Moslem population of the British Empire. In return the Turks
Turkey's ragged legions on German lines and Germany's ally would be able to field a formidable force of real military worth. Thus the Turkish army became dependent on Germany for money and munitions, whose price Turkey paid by submitting to a German dictatorship of her strategy and to a large
ment and
measure of control
in the direction of her troops.
manage-
Compulsory military service In effect, the Germans had been concerned with the organisation of the Turkish army since 1882. In 1911 Turkey, excluding her Red Sea provinces and Tripoli in North Africa, was divided into four Ordus (army inspections) subdivided into territorial army corps, and a new recruitment policy was introduced. In the past, liability to compulsory service had been limited to certain classes of Moslems — a policy which had invested Turkey's war againsl Christian nations with a religious character. By the new law national service was extended to include Christians and Jews as well as Moslems, and it aroused considerable controversy. Not only was it a departure from custom — sufficient reason in any oriental country to invoke distrust and obstruction — but the government also appeared to be interfering with the liberty of some of the semi -independent races nominallx under
Turkish domination. For obvious reasons Christians and Jews disliked it. and their
425
I
Turkey — the reluctant Below: On camels and horses, men and munitions journey to the Eastern Front. For Turkish aid Germany promised Russian land
ally
"
on-
ig tea
M 'iv 10
Jin ,4
ng Ha\ Ya* an* Jai tlv
En th.
he
Above: A troop of Turkish cavalry. Mounted on undersized and undertrained horses, Turkish horsemen in 1914 were even less effective than their British and French counterparts lack of enthusiasm
Moslems who had
was reciprocated by the respect for them as
little
soldiers.
The Sultan was the army's supreme commander, while its administrative chief— nominally controlled by the parliament — was the Minister for War. He was assisted by a Superior Military Council with consultative and advisory duties. In 1914 the vice-president of this body was Feldmarschall von der Goltz. From 1913 a
A Turkish Infantryman The design of Turkish uniforms was strongly
military
influenced by German advisers. This soldier wears the traditional Kabalash hat, a khaki tunic with flap-down collar, khaki trousers and puttees wound from the boots uo. His
officers,
equipment
German
is also of pattern
L>
428
t!
mission of about 70 German under General Liman von Sanders,
was responsible for training. Divided into the active army (Nizam), reserve army (Ihtiyat) and territorial army (Mustahfiz) there were 38 divisions composing 13 army corps in August 1914. These divisions were numbered 1 to 40; the 19th and 20th Divisions did not exist at the time. Few of the divisions were up to peace establishment and after the war the total number of combatants in the Turkish army in
W**l
August 1914 was stated by the Turkish general staff to be about 150,000. From the date of mobilisation up to the signing of the Armistice, 2,700,000 men were called up and 34 more divisions were formed. The total number of men of military age available in the Turkish Empire at the beginning of the war was said to be something under 4,500,000. As a large proportion of these were Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, Jews and Circassians — men of races who did not have much, if any, interest in a Turkish victory in the war — the Turkish effort, judged by these figures only, appears to have been good. However, desertion was rife, and assumed proportions that could not have existed
among European
nations. In
large
undeveloped
tracts
of
Turkey were and wild
country in which the deserters could live without fear of apprehension and at one period there were about 400,000 of them. The normal composition of a cavalry brigade was 10 to 15 squadrons (1,400 to 2,000 sabres), 12 machine guns, and eight horse artillery guns. An infantry division consisted of three regiments each of three battalions, a
machine gun company, a vary-
number of field or mountain batteries and the usual ancillaries such as sappers and medical personnel. The nominal avering
age strength of a division was 8,000 to 9,000 rifles, 12 machine guns and 24 to 36 guns. Cavalry regiments in peacetime were organised into five squadrons, one of which formed a reinforcement depot for the other four squadrons in the field on mobilisation. With a nominal strength of 647 all ranks (472 sabres) each squadron was armed with Mauser carbines and swords; each man carried 60 rounds of ammunition for his carbine and — for the most part — was mounted on an undersized horse of doubtful worth. Trained mainly for patrol and piquet duties, neither the Turkish horsemen nor their mounts were suited to the shock tactics beloved by European cavalry. Most of the Kurdish and Arab cavalry which had existed as militia had been disbanded by 1914, but some of them were reenrolled and at times large groups of Arab horsemen were used against the British. The artillery was organised into regiments, each infantry division being allotted nominally one field gun regiment of two
or three battalions, each of three 4-gun
Each corps' cavalry brigade should have had a battalion of two 4-gun horse artillery batteries, and each corps should have had two mountain battalions, each of three 4-gun batteries and one howitzer battalion of three 6-gun butteries of field and heavy howitzers. But in October 1914 there were insufficient guns in the country to equip an establishment of this order and some of the corps were very short batteries.
of artillery. The Turks had lost many of their guns in the Balkan Wars and had only been able to replace a few of them.
Under strength and
inefficient
Infantry battalions consisted of four companies, each with a nominal war strength
266
and men. Equipped on and armed with Mauser rifles, the infantrymen were clothed in khaki like the rest of the Turkish army. In
of
modern
officers lines,
1914 there was a shortage of rifles hut this was made up by Germany. L50 rounds were carried by each man and an additional 100 rounds per man were carried in firsl line pack transports, with a further reserve of 400 rounds per rifle in carts or park trans-
129
assemble outside the Sultan's palace in Constantinople. The Turkish infantryman was a formidable adversary. He had an instinctive eye for ground and always held his position with cool stubbornness. Bottom left: A wooden model of an Austrian howitzer in Constantinople. It was designed to raise money for the war fund: with each contribution a nail was hammered into it. Above: Turkish infantry receive sound basic training. Poorly fed and equipped, they nevertheless won renown for their remarkable endurance. Above right: Enver Pasha (wearing sword) inspects an Austrian howitzer. In return for money and munitions, Turkey submitted to the dictatorship of her strategy by her allies. Right: Soldiers of the Turkish Camel Corps rest at an oasis. Far right: Feldmarschall von der Goltz, the German VicePresident of the Turkish Military Council. Below right: A Turkish eeaplane— built in Germany. Below: Turkish dignitaries and the diplomatic corps in Constantinople just before the war Left: Turkish infantry
port. The machine gun companies were armed with Hotchkiss or Maxim guns and
consisted of L20 to 160 all ranks. When the Turkish army was reorganised it had been planned that there should be an engineer pontoon section and a field battalion and telegraph company attached to each army corps. But in 1914 these existed onlj in cadre form and the Turks went to war with only one company of
engineers with each corps. By 1913 some officers had learned to fly and the Germans had provided a few aircraft, but there was no Turkish air force to speak of in 1914. On paper the medical organisation was complete, in effect it was really very much under strength and inefficient. Similarly, while the supply and transport arrangements were fairly well organised in and around Constantinople, they were generally indifferent elsewhere and much depended on local improvisation. Some factories capable of turning out guns and ammunition existed in the Constantinople area but their output was so limited that throughout the war the Turks depended on the Germans for most of their equipment.
Turkish
the Turkish gunner handled his artillery well and shot accurately. Only the poorly mounted cavalry were seldom effective. What value is to be assigned to the Turk as a fighting man depends largely on the worth of the tactical lessons to be drawn from the campaigns in which he was involved. He had not the military qualities of the German, but he must certainly rank high on any list of the martial nations of the world. Wretchedly fed and ill-equipped,
was to continue doggedly resisting month after month and year after year in conditions which many Allied troops would rarely have tolerated. The initial keystones of the TurcoGerman war plan for the Middle East were an advance across the Caucasus into Russia and an invasion of Egypt. In he
November 1914 the Turkish First Army army corps was concentrated five
of
Many
schools and colleges existed in the military education of young men training to be officers and for the staff. Indeed in 1908 the military correspondent of The Times described the Turkish system of military instruction as being 'very complete", and observed that the number of school-trained officers in the army had risen to 50 9c. But after that date the standard dropped, owing to the number of expeditions and campaigns in which the Turkish army became involved. In the Balkan Wars the reserve system of the Turkish army had broken down completely and it was not until 1914 that a new scheme was introduced. When general mobilisation began at the beginning of August most of the younger reservists — men of 23 to 30 years of age — were drafted into active units, while the older reservists — from 30 to 38 years old — were sent to depots for training. Some men' in the Mustohfiz category (38 to 40 years of age) were enrolled for a few weeks' rudimentary training and then sent home with instructions to be ready to rejoin at 24 hours' notice while others were sent to garrisons or pioneer units. Considerable numbers, especially among the non-
Turkey
for
Moslems, obtained exemption by paying an exoneration tax. Nevertheless, on the whole the new mobilisation arrangements ran smoothly. But there was little enthusiasm for the war and the drastic system of requisitioning that accompanied the call-up of the men upset Turkey's
economy for
in a fashion that led to starvation
hundreds of thousands and the financial
ruin of
many
of the country's merchants.
Something must now be said about the quality
of
the
individual
as
a
for in spite of all the defects of his
soldier,
army's
organisation the Turk has never been an enemy to be despised. The backbone of the Turkish army, the Anatolian Turk, was a hard, tough fighting man who could exist without so many of the comforts which were already becoming the way of life of European armies. On the defensive, the Turkish infantryman's eye for ground, his skill at digging-in and his stubbornness in holding the position he had taken up made him a formidable adversary. In an offensive he would attack with great gallantry though often without much skill. Similarly,
432
was difficult even before they embarked on it. To defend the Suez Canal the British had to guard its whole length and bar the road to Egypt. To do this properly required many more troops than were available when Turkey ended her months of spurious neutrality.
Nevertheless
Britain
could
muster more men than the Turks could raise for an invasion. British and French warships anchored in the Bitter Lakes could provide powerful supporting artillery and the availability of a detachment of the Royal Flying Corps and some French seaplanes would enable the defenders to be kept informed of the progress of an invading force. To get to the Canal the Turks had to face a terrible advance across that desert renowned in Biblical history as the wilderness through which Moses had led the children of Israel. And to be successful they had to seize Ismailia in the centre of the Canal. Once in control there they could cut off the water supply to Port Said and Suez and so render untenable the position of the defending troops north and south of Ismailia. Capturing Suez or Port Said would bring little advantage since the Turks would still be separated by many miles of salt lake or barren desert from the inhabited delta and they too would be deprived of water when the British closed the sluices at Ismailia. Possibly those who planned the projected operation appreciated the difficulties the Turks would have to face. But doubtless the expectation that Egypt would rise in revolt against the British as soon as the Turks approached the Canal was a factor that carried more weight than it merited.
The Kaiser's 'Holy War' The Turks had not planned operations on a large scale or of decisive importance
Mesopotamia in 1914. The modern Iraq most direct avenue of approach from Europe to south-west Asia, a route to Persia and the Persian Gulf and a means of getting round the Caucasus and into Afghanistan. But from the Turco-German viewpoint there were many drawbacks to military operations in Mesopotamia. The in
affords the
The German general. Liman von Sanders
around Constantinople in European Turkey; the Second Army of two army corps was in Asia Minor not far from Constantinople; the Third Army of three army corps was deployed near the Caucasus; the Yemen Army Corps and the As/rand Hejaz Divisions were in Arabia and of the bulk of the XII and VIII Army Corps normally in Mesopotamia had been sent to Syria and Erzerum. As devised by the German military mission to Turkey, the plan to invade Russia was a simple one From its base at Erzurum the Third Army would advance across the Caucasus while two corps would move round to envelop and destroy the Russian troops defending the bleak mountain passes. Its success depended on the Turks capturing the mountain passes and being able to supply their forward troops through the Black Sea by way of Trebizond and Erzurum. As the fortified towns of Turkey-in-Asia lav in a region to which it was extremely difficult to get the troops overland the plan was fundamentally sound. Under the guns of the Goeben and Breslau it could be expected that the Turks would be able to land reinforcements and stores at Trebizond and from there it was only a short journey along a good road which had been made for the purpose. Against Egypt the Turks set themselves a task which they must have appreciated
country's climatic extremes, its indifferent land communications over great distances, the lack of local food produce, the problem of navigating the Tigris and Euphrates and the vulnerability of Basra from the sea were but a few. It was soon to become clear, however, that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. By compelling Britain to divert troops to Mesopotamia, her war effort elsewhere would be diminished. The great distances involved would operate more to Britain's disadvantage than that of Turkey; navigation downstream was easier than navigation upstream, and — in the absence of good land communications — traffic of any volume was limited to the waterways; the inhabitants were Moslems and so it could be expected that their religious susceptibilities could be turned against the infidel invaders, the lack of communications, the shortage of local supplies, the climatic difficulties would all tend to restrict British troops operating in the area and it was likely that these could be met and countered by comparatively small Turkish forces. Another important consideration was that Baghdad, through which passed most routes to the East, formed an ideal centre for German propaganda in Persia and Afghanistan, a tender point with the Indian government.
A Turkish Cavalryman The uniform
of the Turkish cavalry was
similar to that worn by the infantry. The main differences were the single large box pouch worn on either side of the belt instead of the three small box pouches, and the knee-high boots which were usually black. The cavalry carried 7.65Turkish Mauser rifles
mm
Since August 1914, German and Turkish agents throughout the Middle East had been intriguing against Britain. Rumours were rife of agents slipping secretly into Egypt in disguise, and in Cairo the British ambassador is said to have reported that he was concerned about such individuals causing mischief by impersonating Indian soldiers. 'In substantiation of this,' he wrote, 'I have to state that his Majesty's Consul at Aleppo has learned that a tailor in that town has been commissioned to make a variety of Indian costumes and head-dresses on designs and measurements supplied by German officers there.' This rumour was never substantiated, but there was no doubt that the German propaganda machine was enthusiastically developing the theme of a Holy War. To what lengths
mendacity they went may be judged from the fact that a report was even circulated to the effect that the Kaiser had embraced Islam. Hadji Mohammed Guilliano, as he now called himself— Hadji being the term applied only to those who had been to Mecca — was intent on restoring Islam to its proud position of 1,000 years before. Apparently the German Emperor had seen the light when he had visited Mecca. There, while he lay three days and nights seeking God's will before the great shrine, a voice from heaven had come to him as the saviour of Islam and the sword of the Lord telling him to 'Arise and Fight'. At the same time, supporting rumours were assiduously circulated to strengthen the suggestion that only the Turks and the Germans were concerned with preserving of
the faith. Britain's main object in waging war against the Turks and their subject peoples, the faithful were told in November 1914, was to rifle the tomb of the Prophet Mohammed and add his bones to the collection of those of the Pharaohs and other ancients in the British Museum. Meanwhile, a new family tree was found for the Hohenzollerns. The whole family
was descended from Mohammed's sister, the word went out, and it was the sacred duty of all Mohammedans therefore to rally round the Turks and Germans. Even more incredible was the story that Germany had a giant aircraft with an all-powerful magnet. The aeroplane had visited Petrograd, Paris and London to suck up — in turn — the Tsar of all the Russias, the French president, and his most gracious
433
4
Above: The Sheikh-ul-lslam proclaims a Holy War. The
and unwilling Majesty King George V, and all three had been taken to Berlin as prisoners. In this day and age such blatant falsehoods would seem to be not merely that
puerile but utterly ridiculous; nevertheless they had a far reaching and dangerous effect upon some of the ignorant people of the Moslem Middle East. Calling for a Holy War had a measure of success amongst the Arab tribes of the Middle East but fortunately there was one fault in the propaganda. And it was because of this that the Turks and Germans preached largely to deaf ears among the Moslems under British rule. Turkish claims of leadership of Islam were disputable, since the Sultan was not of the true blood of the Prophet and on hearing the news of Turkey's alliance with Germany, the Aga Khan spoke up for the vast numbers of Moslems who looked to him as their spiritual head in India. 'Turkey,' he declared, 'has lost the position of trustee of Islam and evil will overtake h< r. Nothing that the Turks or their German masters can do will ever weaken the loyalty of the Moslem Indian, based as it is on the consciousness that their most cherished interests, religious as well as civil, were guaranteed to them by British rule.' He concluded a speech in London by saying
434
Kaiser,
'All
who had been
Indians
know
to
that
Mecca, ensured that German propaganda developed the theme
if
Britain was ever
weakened, India's aspirations — India's whole future — would go to pieces.' To the British — more especially those in India — this declaration of loyalty was very welcome. Britain was apprehensive of the effect of the German-inspired, Turkish-led propaganda on Moslem opinion. One final factor relevant to Turkey's war plans and linked with the campaign in Mesopotamia was the growing dependence of the Royal Navy's oil-fired warships on the oil piped across 140 miles of desert from fields in southern Persia to the refinery at Abadan. Neither the oilfields nor the refinery were in Turkish territory and it was primarily to safeguard the oil supply that it was decided to send an AngloIndian expeditionary force to 'demonstrate' at the head of the Gulf in November 1914. Such were the factors behind the Turks' subsequent attempts to embarrass Britain at minimum cost in manpower to themselves. The 'national' movement in India, the constant unrest on the North-West Frontier, the natural tendency of Persians, Afghans and Arabs to intrigue were all to be exploited for this purpose. A large proportion of the populations concerned were Moslems and the religious factor was expected to exert considerable influence.
Further Reading Barker, A. J., The Neglected War: Mesopotamia 1914-1918 (Faber & Faber 1967) Barker, A. J., Townshend of Kut (Cassell 1967) in Mesopotamia (HMSO 1927) Candler, E., The Long Road to Baghdad (Cassell 1919) Wavell, F.-M. Earl, The Palestine Campaigns (Constable 1954)
Campaign
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL
A.
J.
BARKER
served
for
22 years as a regular officer in the British army. As an infantryman he campaigned in East Africa and Burma during the Second World War, and afterwards in the Middle East and Malaya. A graduate of the Staff College and the Royal Military College of Science, Colonel Barker also saw service as a staff officer in India, Europe, Egypt, Malaya and Singapore. Apart from several essays on military subjects and three books on infantry weapons he has written six books on military history: The March on Delhi, Suez: The Seven Day War, Eritrea 1941, The Neglected War: The Mesopotamia Campaign, Townshend of Kut and The Civilising Mission. After retiring from active service, Colonel Barker was employed by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority until he was awarded a NATO Research Fellowship and resigned from the UKAE A to become a full-time writer.
After Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and her territorial agreement with Britain in 1907, her threat to India from the north had been removed. Britain had long regarded the defence of India as of great importance and in 1914 the most professional part of the British Army was there. Increased German influence over Turkish affairs posed a new threat to Britain's communications with her Empire. John Stephenson
Abba Hilmi, Khedive of Egypt. Britain's occupation of Egypt gave her command of Suez
Lord Curzon, ex-Viceroy of India. He constantly emphasised the importance of India's defence
1914 Britain had enjoyed no position in India she would have had no position in the Middle East. She might equally have had no position in Malta, Aden, Socotra, Mauritius, Ceylon, Malaya, Singapore or Hong Kong. She would not have worked so consistently to preserve the existence of
resources, the 'Route' scarcely less so. One commentator has said: No pre-1914 British
If in
the Ottoman Empire, opposed French interests in Syria, or developed treaty relations with Persia and with the various sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. Above all, she would not have found herself committed to a defence policy based on Indian needs which neglected the rest of the 1914 Empire, kept the best of her army in the East, and very nearly caught her unprepared to face the war of 1914 in Europe. The ability to send expeditions from India to Egypt, Mesopotamia and East Africa would have been poor compensation had France been defeated, as she nearly was, in the first months of the war. In a word, India was greedy with British strategic
Government would have dreamt of letting its armed forces become inadequate for the defence of Hong Kong or Capetown, let alone Bombay; but pre-1914 British Governments hardly gave a thought to the military
requirements of a war in Europe, the one where a great war could actually happen. Not until Haldane, in 1907, was anything done to provide for this contingency; and even he provided no more than an expeditionary force of 167,000 men when continental armies were measured in
place
millions.
There
is
of India,
ample evidence that the defence
especially of its north-western approaches, was ranked first in importance until a very few years before 1914. Speaking in the Budget Debate of 1903 in the Indian Legislative Council, Lord Curzon drew attention to the world changes that were affecting Asia and which would, as
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi-the Messiah of Indian liberation
he
said, 'have an effect on India that is at present but dimly discerned. The geographical position of India will more and more push her into the forefront of international politics. She will more and more become the strategical frontier of the British Empire.'
Two years later, the erstwhile Military Member of the Viceroy's Council was to write: In all the discussions which have taken place since the war in South Africa upon the vital subject of the defence of the Empire, at least three main points stand out, and the fact that the defence of the land frontier of the Empire means the defence of the land frontier of India. It is true enough that the defence of India has long been recognised as the essential military problem of our times. It is fortunate that the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom has proclaimed more than once, in clear and unmistakable language, that the problem of the British Army is the
problem of the defence of Afghanistan — inother words, of the defence of India. As late as 1906 Colonel Repington, the military correspondent of The Times, could write a long article assessing the Russian threat to India, undoubtedly the most serious problem that has ever been incurred by the British Army — this primary military problem of our day', examining in great detail the forces, methods and resources of the Russians. He assessed closely the capacities for traffic of the newly built railways on the Afghan border, the probable positions of bases and magazines, the potentialities of local transport, roads, passes and railway extensions. He did the same thing for the Indian potential, which he rated poorly — at least as regards
communications, and made recommendations as to the forces needed in the area. 'This estimate is based not on thoughts of conquest or ideas of expansion, but on the need for holding our own. It is an estimate for defence and security, not for aggression.' And it entailed, he explained, placing 50,000 men in Kabul in six weeks and 250,000 men on the Helmund within eight months, increased to 500,000 within eighteen months, together with 100,000 men on the lines of communication. Thus did British experts regard the defence of India, 'the brightest jewel in the Empire's crown', within a few years of the outbreak of the First World War, the war in which India's boundaries were to remain unthreatened.
Russian threat removed But the background of the problem was already in a state of change caused by three events of the utmost importance. Firstly, in 1902, Britain made an end to her dangerous political isolation by concluding an alliance with Japan, the fast rising power in the Far East, the treaty being renewed and extended to ten years on August 12, 1905. The treaty was purely defensive and brought both powers into line only if the interests
it
was designed
were attacked by another power. It covered not only the Far East but the whole area from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Secondly, Russia suffered an overwhelming defeat in her war with Japan in 1904/5. This defeat, at any rate for a time, removed the threat of a major aggressive war by Russia in Afghanistan or anywhere to protect
else. It also frustrated for
many
years the
methods and purpose of her public policy from Persia to Korea towards the goal which some of her most influential spokesmen had repeatedly proclaimed — namely that of exclusive domination in Asia, which
was held
to
be her appointed destiny or
mission.
These two events alone might reasonably have been expected to cause a reappraisal of Empire defence policy. But the third event was even more convincing. In 1907 a combination thought by the Germans to be utterly impossible became fact. By means of a convention, Britain and Russia, the two rival oriental imperialists, adjusted their respective spheres of interest, primarily in Q ersia, but extending also to the Middle L st and Afghanistan, which Russia agreed be definitely outside her field of influei j The Emir Habibullah of Afghanistan ind he could no longer play off one pov rful neighbour against another, and for a rime relations with him were less than cord, il. But Russia stood by her agreement and thus Berlin i
.
436
regarded it as an additional indication of the Machiavellian design to encircle Germany with a ring of enemies. Thus by a combination of force and negotiation the major threat both to India and to the route to India had been removed. There were other dangers remaining and new ones would arise, but the 19th Century bogey of a Russian descent from the north was not to haunt Indian dreams for many years to come. At least one expert on India, and probably many more, realised the change. Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich, who was well acquainted with all parts of Afghanistan, Baluchistan and the North- West Frontier wrote in an article in 1905: It surprises me that there should still be men of light and leading who are actually afraid of Russia — afraid that, with her vast resources of men and money, and with the development of her railway system to the borders of Afghanistan, she could really peril our security in India by an advance in force from the Oxus. We will for a moment set aside the fact that she has been disastrously beaten by a comparatively small Asiatic power, and is in no position to risk another failure in the Asiatic field. He concludes: If Japan has not, however, settled the Frontier Question for us, she has at .
.
.
spiritual influence from the SultanCaliph at Constantinople. And Britain had probably administered a coup de grace to Turkish friendship by her entente with Russia - the perennial enemy of the Ottoto
man
regime.
Without
this preliminary survey of British policy with regard to India and the route to India the immediate problems of the areas concerned, as we approach August 1914, have little meaning. In India the movement for independence from British rule, though it had not yet attained the organisation, speed and force of the lurid postwar years, had been growing steadily almost since the Mutiny of 1857. The first session of the Indian National Congress had been held in 1885. Starting as a body of moderates, it rapidly
became the leading
aiming
force
for
com-
By the early years of the 20th Century a number of influences combined to make anti-British sentiments plete independence.
Many more students had Europe and the United States, where they had not only seen liberalism in action, but had learned how much can be attained by agitation and even sedition. more
vocal.
visited
They learned
in defensive tactics, it is beyond belief that she should contemplate aggres-
also of the lowly status of Indians abroad and experienced what today is called racialism. They observed the rise of Japan and held that country in great esteem, not for its military achievement but for the way a backward Far Eastern agricultural country had by its own volition become a highly organised
sive action against another host which, we may confidently predict, would be her equal
to
least deferred its practical solution by force of arms sine die. Russia has not gone completely mad. With her huge army badly
beaten
in numbers, and her superior in national cohesion, if not in scientific resource. Nevertheless, there was no deep rethinking of the problem to match this tremendous change. Perhaps the convention with Russia was distrusted, the Japanese alliance considered temporary, perhaps the formation of the six-division
Expeditionary Force took up the whole energies of the General Staff of the War Office; perhaps the intensive re-examination by Lord Kitchener of the Indian Army
had indicated that India was
still
too
weak
war to consider contributions to. a conflict outside her own borders. We shall study the Indian problem in more detail later, but the problem of the route to India, that is of passage through the Mediterranean and Middle East, deserves an introduction at this point because its background too had suffered a change no less important than the one in all the resources of
we have been
considering with regard to the defence of India. The Russian threat to the sea and land routes through the Middle East was of long standing and had influenced British policy towards the Ottoman Empire throughout the 19th Century. But whereas the 1907 convention with Russia had removed the threat to India, the threat to the route continued in other hands, those of Germany, in a somewhat forced collusion with
Turkey, which had been influential enough since the 1880's but was becoming still stronger with the assumption of power by the Young Turks in 1908. In place of a veiled threat from Russia, covered by a generally friendly Turkey, Britain now had a direct threat to her communications with India, by sea in the Mediterranean, by land through Syria and Mesopotamia, and through Persia to India herself— all Moslem lands and all liable in some degree
modern
industrial state. They were led believe that Britain had become industrially decadent and was dragging India down with her, while the economic leadership of the world passed to America
and Germany. Much had been hoped from the arrival of a Liberal government in London, but when the Minto-Morley reforms came it
was a matter
of
'too
little,
too
late'.
major reforms, including those connected with defence, had to go through the mill of the British Parliament. Not only
All
was there the inevitable delay of procedure and debate, but Indian questions raised little enthusiasm in the Commons, and much bitter opposition in the Lords. During the delay, agitation and discontent had steadily built up so that when the new measures were announced they were found behind the enthusiasms of the reformers, and consequently in the nature of a damp squib. There was some terrorism — two British magistrates were shot in to be far
Bengal
and some secret
societies
were
formed. The viceroy was driven to resort to deportation without trial, this being one degree less drastic than proclaiming martial law, but when trials were ordered nebulous charges were the rule, 'exciting hatred and contempt of Government', or 'taking part in a conspiracy to deprive the King-Emperor of his sovereignty in British India' — accusations which could almost have been applied to the most moderate member of Congress who had voted for independence. The sensational press was expanding and reaching the villages. But none of the individual murders or bomb outrages constituted rebellion; the inspired leadership which was to come was then lacking. Nevertheless when the one real specific grievance, Curzon's partition of Bengal, was repealed, many agitators became sensible of the connection between
'bombs and boons'.
Moslem discontent was of great imThe Moslem community had
The economy of India was so poor and financial crises so frequent that annual
become very aware of the defeat and
expenditure on defence was the natural target of politicians. At a time when all European powers had increased, or were increasing, their military expenditure in order to equip their armies with the latest scientific and mechanical inventions, India was falling behind. As the Official History of the War comments: Economy had become a tradition, and the inherent military risks attaching to such a policy had also become a tradition; risks, moreover, which were undertaken successfully and generally which, amid general plaudits, had built up the British Empire; and consequently British officers have always been found ready to take the risks, whose dangers as professional soldiers they thoroughly under-
portance.
absorption of several Moslem countries by Christian ones and was highly critical of Britain when it considered her either privy to the affair or failing in protest even when not directly concerned. Morocco had been absorbed by France, Persia had been divided into Russian and British zones of influence, Tripoli had been lost to unprovoked attack by the Italians, and the two Balkan wars of 1912/13, when Turkey was virtually expelled from Europe, were regarded as nothing but an attack on Islam. Feeling was particularly strong in Afghanistan and among the border tribes, where respect for the Sultan-Caliph was greater than elsewhere.
Above: The
1st
Herts
Yeomanry disembark
at
and every part of the
army were submitted to exhaustive examination. A vast amount of information was collected in readiness for the arrival of the new commander-in-chief and an outline of reorganisation had been framed for his approval. His first year, November
1902 to November 1903, was taken up with internal reorganisation and the renumbering of units to eliminate the last vestiges of the localised Presidency Armies. But the functional proposals of November 1903 were of fundamental importance. Four great principles were enunciated: • The main function of the army was to defend the North-West Frontier against an aggressive enemy; • The army in peace should be organised, distributed and trained in units of com-
Alexandria on September 20, 1914. Britain's concern for India dominated her policy
Finally to be considered is the growing indignation felt for the treatment of Indian immigrants abroad, especially in South Africa. In all, these immigrants numbered some 2,500,000, half being in Ceylon and Malaya, the remainder in British Guiana, Fiji, Mauritius, Natal, the Transvaal and East Africa. They were mainly low-caste men, usually manual workers and small traders; they were regarded as slaves and when they stayed on after their period of indenture was completed their continued presence was bitterly opposed. Some measures had been taken; emigration to the Transvaal was banned in 1907 and that to Natal in 1910. Active in defence of these down-trodden men was a lawyer, by then well known in South Africa but not so well in India. His name was Mohandas
Karamchand Gandhi.
of military policy
in the firm belief that it was a necessary part of their British birthright. We must now turn to the defence potentialities of India. Here we can only examine broadly what military contribution India could make if the Empire became involved in a great war, and how that contribution evolved from the defence policy behind it. stood,
Four new principles Though the Indian Army
of 1914 showed the imprint of the reforms introduced in 1903 by Lord Kitchener, a great deal had been done as the result of the inadequacies highlighted by the Second Afghan War of 1878-9. The old Presidency Armies had been abolished and the unity of the Indian Army had been recognised. Frontier policy had been reoriented by Lord Curzon, and during the years 1900-1903 every branch
in
Egypt
mand
similar to those in which it would field in war; • The maintenance of internal security was a means to an end, namely, to set free the field army to carry out its functions; • All fighting units, in their several spheres, should be equally capable of carrying out all the roles of an army in the field, and that they should be given equal chances, in experience and training, of bearing these roles. The scheme, and the concomitant setting up of nine divisional areas iplus one in Burma) was a great advance, but the concentration of troops towards the frontier to meet aggression, and elsewhere in India to secure training in tactical formations, necessitated the abandonment of 34 garrisons, the movement of a large number of troops, and the building of new quarters
take the
437
Above: Soldiers of the Indian Army. From left to right: A sepoy of the 2nd Gurkha Rifles, a
sepoy of the 4th Gurkha kit, a sowar (Sikh) of the
The British mountain gun This 10-pounder, 2.75-inch gun was the standard equipment of the Indian Army on the North West frontier of India. It was ideally suited to the conditions of frontier warfare as it could be dismantled and broken down into mule loads for ease of transport in rugged mountain conditions. Its usefulness in the flat deserts of Mesopotamia is more questionable, but it remained a sturdy and reliable weapon
438
wearing service Bengal
Rifles, 1
1th
Lancers, a sepoy of the 15th Ludhiana Sikhs, a sepoy of the 26th Punjabis (Pathan)
for them elsewhere. All this was very expensive, and the scheme was never comAs we have seen, the Anglopleted. Japanese alliance, the Russo-Japanese War and the Anglo-Russian convention altered the whole situation, and Kitchener himself, before he left India, acquiesced in, if he did not initiate, a considerable reduction in military expenditure and a relinquishment of part of the increases and additions he had advocated in men, buildings, munitions
and
stores.
Of these reductions those concerning equipment and munitions in all their forms were the most important.
A British-Indian
division, with operations North-West Frontier in
on or beyond the view was on a
much lower
scale as regards supporting arms, artillery, engineers and signals than
European divisions; divisional transport was on a pack or mule-cart basis; medical resources were far below European standards. Such divisions, however admirably led and however magnificent in fighting
fluence of the two rivers stretching from Al Qurnah to Al Faw, should fall into British control for piloting and buoying. Two new factors of potential or actual importance had recently emerged. The first was the projected Baghdad Railway whose threat to Britain's eastern interests was obvious. Though unable to prevent its construction as far as Baghdad or even Basra, Britain could have a big say in any
extension to the Persian Gulf and the location of the terminus. A satisfactory agreement on this and many other points was proposed in July 1912 by Britain and was on the point of ratification when the war came. But the threat of the railway was not immediate. The tunnels in the Taurus and Amanus ranges in Anatolia were far from completion, and the gap entailed a long haul by waggon, pack mule or motor lorry. Railhead, even then, was BLACK SEA
spirit, were severely handicapped if placed beside divisions organised, equipped and trained as were those of the Expeditionary
Force in Britain. The Indian Army in general lacked even in 1914 the backing of almost all the industrial organisation and factories necessary to maintain an army in the field. It lacked mechanical transport,
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aeroplanes, wireless, sufficient field telephones and above all, a modern medical system. By 1914, from a strength of 76,000 British and 159,000 Indian troops, it was found possible to equip, on Indian standards, six infantry divisions and six cavalry brigades. Shortly before war broke out the government of India had been approached with regard to the extent to which India would 'be prepared to co-operate with the Imperial Forces by the despatch and maintenance of reinforcements in the event of serious war breaking out in Europe in which Great Britain may be involved'. After long consideration a reply was sent saying that under normal conditions the Army Council could rely on getting two divisions and one cavalry brigade from India, which might be increased under abnormal conditions and at some risk to India by another division, but that such increase could not
be counted on with any degree of certainty. This reply was not received in London until after the outbreak of war. Such was the attitude of the government of India towards the military help which could be given in a war stemming from Europe, having regard to internal security and to the defence of her own frontiers. In the circumstances it was not an unreasonable position to hold.
The great new need — oil Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf went back to the 17th Century, if not earlier, both for reasons of trade and because of the importance of Mesopotamia as a route to the East. The inevitable threat to India forced Britain to win control of the Persian Gulf with her naval strength and to come to terms with the local rulers. This control also removed the scourge of piracy, slave trading to some extent, and put a check on the internecine wars of the Arab chiefs. For many years Britain had enjoyed navigation rights on the Tigris and Euphrates for commercial vessels, and it was unavoidable that control of the Shatt al Arab, the broad conBritain's interest in
/
7*
* V
in
1882
was
still
under Turkish
suzerainty, though Mohammed Ali, at the beginning of the 18th Century, had won a large measure of independence which was recognised during the reigns of his successors. But a combination of the heavy debts incurred by her rulers and the construction of the Suez Canal had attracted European attention to such an extent that Egyptian finances had virtually come under European control. A nationalist revolt under the leadership of Colonel Arabi was swiftly
put down by a smart campaign under Lord Wolseley, and Cairo was duly occupied. In this affair Britain had acted alone. There is not the slightest doubt that Britain intended to get out as soon as a stable
government had been restored, and peated assurances were
But Egypt was
so far
made
re-
to this effect.
gone into chaos, and
her peasantry so abject and miserable, that Britain was forced to stay, thus guarding that section of the route, but having to pay heavily in various compensatory concessions to Germany, France and even Russia. Egypt, except for her position on the route to India, was a millstone round Britain's neck, but the proposition enunciated by an ex-viceroy of India, Lord Ripon, was judged unanswerable: 'As long as India remains under British rule, the interests of England and of India go far beyond the traffic of the Canal, for they demand that no other nation should be allowed to
dominate Egypt.' /ERITREA
_J
British administered
-HAOHRAMAUT Bound by treaty
e, ,J
and
FR SOIrt
N
Aden
to Britain
\BR SrW;
-
.'
ABYSSINIA
Above: A map
ITALIAN
S0MAULAND
illustrating the
BOO MILES
800
KMS
importance of
Mesopotamia to Great Britain at the outbreak of war. Once the Royal Navy had begun to rely on oil, this whole area became vital for Britain's defence and also for her commerce still 200 miles west of Mosul and the vast distances to the south and east precluded any large-scale offensive by the Ottomans in that direction. But the second factor was of actual and immediate importance. Increasingly, vessels of the Royal Navy were passing from coal to oil fuel and the safety of the wells in Persia and the refinery at Mohammerah had to be ensured. This was recognised by the government of India and had been considered, but no plans had been made. India still looked in a north-westerly
The external defence
of
Egypt was not
thought to present any great problem. Invasion by sea could be ruled out in practical terms, even though in 1912, in order to complete naval superiority in the North Sea, Britain virtually handed over the Mediterranean to French naval protection. From the western landward side, Italy's recent occupation of Tripoli as yet presented no threat, though tribal disturbances in the western desert were possible. On the eastern flank the Sinai desert had been crossed and recrossed by
armies moving in both directions. But to launch an invasion by way of Syria would
tremendous administrative difficulmodern army. To be successful, such an invasion would probably need a rising in Egypt to welcome it. Pan-Islamism was indeed a threat to Egypt but the internal security problem was not conentail
ties for a
sidered outside the capacity of the existing garrison, or of the reinforcements which would certainly arrive in the event of war.
direction.
Aden, a considerable fortified harbour and coaling station, administered by the
Bombay
Presidency, with its companions, Perim Island and Socotra, was maintained as an essential protection to the shortest route to India, Australasia and farther East. Admittedly it was on the mainland of Asia and was contiguous with what was
nominally Turkish territory. But it was not expected that the local Arab tribes, even if reinforced by the infrequent attention of the Turkish government, would be likely to cause any but passing trouble. This attitude was perhaps complacent; Turkey maintained a garrison in the Yemen, used principally as a place of exile officers who had incurred the displeasure of the central government. How Britain came to occupy Egypt in 1882 is one of the most striking illustrations of her concern for her communications with India. Egypt was a Turkish province,
for
Further Reading
Cemal, P., Memories of a Turkish statesman, 1913-1919 (New York: Arno 1973) Churchill, Sir Winston, The World Crisis (Four Square) Imperial Strategy (by the Military Correspondent of The Times) (Murray 1906) Kedourie, E., England and the Middle East 19141921 (Bowes & Bowes 1956) Lloyd, Lord, Egypt since Cromer (Macmillan 1933) The Army in India and its Evolution (Govern-
ment
of India 1924)
The Empire and the Century (various authors) (Murray 1905) Thompson, E., and Garratt, G. T., The Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India (Macmillan 1934) Zinkin,
and Zinkin, T., Britain and India: Empire (Chatto & Windus 1964)
M.,
Requiem
for
[For Brigadier Stephenson's biography, see
page
401.
]
439
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Baghdad Railway:
e
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*^*
A German
enterprise in Turkey that threatened most vital interests
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MESOPOTAMIA THE ADVANCE TDBASRA The deterioration
in Britain's relations with Turkey and Germany's thrust to the east put Britain's interests in Persia in jeopardy. As the prospect of Turkey's involvement in the war grew more certain, the Admiralty appealed to the India Office for troops to defend the Persian Gulf. On September 16 Odin, with British and Indian troops aboard, entered the Shatt al Arab. Two months later they were ordered to commence hostilities against the Turks. Gregory Blaxland oil
HMS
1908 an Englishman named G. B. Reynolds made an important discovery. He struck oil in southern Persia, seven years after the search had started and a few days after a telegram had reached
their preparations were complete, Turks announced that they were merely taking precautionary measures.
In
until
the
For the blockade of Abadan they relied, in typically optimistic fashion, on a single gunboat and a few soldiers on the Turkish
him calling off further attempts. A pipeline was laid 140 miles southwards to Abadan, whence ships could take the oil down the River Shatt al Arab and on through the
bank of the Shatt. Their main ambition eastwards was to spread Jehad, or Holy War, as far as India in the name of the Caliph of Islam, Sultan of Turkey, and although the attempt had to contend with a deep schism within the faith, it touched
Persian Gulf to the world beyond. The Royal Navy had no great need of oil until Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in October 1911. He conceived a new division of battleships which, being oil-fuelled, would have greater speed, range and gunpower than any possessed by the Germans. While he devoted his great energy to gaining the approval of a Cabinet much concerned about naval expenditure, an admiral was sent off to examine means of supply. The result was the AngloPersian Oil Convention, signed near the end of 1913. Abadan became prominent in British strategic planning. It
lay in the
Sheikhdom
of Mohammerah.
which was under the suzerainty of Persia. The opposite bank of the Shatt, half a mile away, was Turkish territory, as was the whole of Mesopotamia, 'the Land of the Two Rivers', Tigris and Euphrates, whose junction 100 miles inland forms the source of the Shatt. Forming a lone breach through deserts and mountain ranges, the rivers provided what was once the main trading route between Europe and India, and consequently the British had long been active in this area, although without maintaining a military presence. They had gained navigation rights for their steamers on the Shatt and treaties of allegiance from the sheikhs whose territories flanked the Persian Gulf, in exchange for stamping out piracy. The deterioration in Britain's relationship with Turkey, coupled with Ger-
many's vaunted Drang nach Osten (the Thrust to the Easti put British interests in jeopardy, and there was much concern in particular about the concession granted
Germany for the construction of a railway linking Constan nople with Baghdad
to
and onwards
to the Pei
ian Gulf.
However,
the Balkan War of 1912-13, which German aid could not avert, led to a slight improvement in Turkey's relationship with Britain, and an agreement was prepared confirming the latter's rights of navigation and giving
Turkey's humiliation
442
in
the British at a sensitive spot. Militarily, Mesopotamia was regarded by the Turks merely as a recruiting base, and three regular divisions were removed for the invasion of Egypt, leaving only one in occupation, weak in numbers, ill-equipped and reinforced by mutinous conscripts. There were also some battalions of gendarmerie and various tribal levies whose
Above: Viscount Hardinge, Viceroy of India in 1914. A professional diplomat, he was known for his sound understanding of Indian affairs. Right: British officers and Indian troops cross a backwater of the Euphrates in Mesopotamia
her
representation on the board of the
Baghdad Railway Company. for ratification
It was ready by the end of July 1914.
The railway line meanwhile had made slow progress. There were gaps between Konia and Baghdad amounting to 500 miles, and eastwards of Baghdad construction had not been started. Troop movement could achieve little more than its primeval speed, which was that of a raft along an ever-winding river. If the Royal Navy needed oil it also hungered for ships, and as if reckless of the risk to the oil the First Lord ordered the seizure of two battleships being built for Turkey in British dockyards, as part of his moves anticipating war in late July 1914. The crew of one had already arrived to take over and felt a bitterness that sped to Constantinople. On August 2, Germany, already at war with Russia, made a secret pact with Turkey. Not being able to conceal the sprawling process of mobilisation and anxious not to become involved in war
loyalty was governed by self-interest, which in turn depended on which was the winning side. There was no thought of deploying this force to meet a British invasion, and although troops were moved to Basra, 70 miles from the mouth of the Shatt and 400 by river from Baghdad, their function appears to have been to preserve order during the rounding up of ruffian
The
according to a investigated the lack of preparation, was: 'How could England, with its little army, add aggressive action against the Turks to her contest with the German millions?' This of course was a product of German wooing.
conscripts.
Turkish
attitude,
staff officer
who
Acts of hostility Britain similarly had no plans ready for the protection of Abadan, although the matter had been discussed at military level. However, the danger of war with Turkey soon became apparent from consular reports of troop movements and acts of against British subjects and hostility property. The first request for the despatch of troops to Abadan came from the Admiralty on August 25, and because the Persian Gulf came under the political tutelage of India, it was made to the India Office, the department of the home government responsible for Indian affairs. Its Secretary of State, the Earl of Crewe, was a member of Asquith's cabinet, and the Viceroy at Delhi awaiting his orders was Viscount Hardinge, a professional diplomat
m
.;••'»
Far left, top: Indian troops on the march — to the accompaniment of bagpipes and drum. Far left, bottom: Three Sikh soldiers pose beside a mule supply train in Mesopotamia. Top left: British troops construct a military observation tower out of sandbags. Bottom left: LieutenantGeneral Sir Arthur Barrett (seated centre), divisional commander of the first British expedition to Mesopotamia
who was eager to improve the lot of his people and who was sensitive to their aspirations.
The Indian Army consisted of 76,000 British and 159,000 Indian troops, all regulars voluntarily enlisted, backed by a puny reserve. They were there for the defence of India against external and internal threat, and there had long been strong resistance to any suggestion that plans should be prepared for the use of any of the troops elsewhere. However, an improved relationship with Russia much reduced the external threat, and with the prospect of war in Europe growing blacker, the government of India at length relented and agreed to make two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade available for despatch to Europe. In the event, this force was increased to one cavalry and three infantry divisions, the first of whom left India on August 24, leaving the remainder to march and countermarch around their training areas until the return of the ships. An additional mixed brigade was at the same time mobilised for an expedition against German East Africa. The viceroy was well aware of the risk to the security of India and accepted it. Another risk, for which he was partly responsible, should have been less acceptable. India needed money for many projects, and since the detente with Russia, military expenditure had been reduced to the minimum to provide it. Operational divisions were cut from nine to seven, with administrative units sufficient only for fighting a frontier campaign from established bases. There was no motor transport and no aeroplane unit. Worst of all, the medical service was sadly depleted. There was a deficiency of 300 — 400 medical officers and 200 assistant surgeons, and the Army Bearer Corps was 1,850 men short of the 4,500 to which it had belatedly been decided to raise it.
The gulf undefended The Admiralty's plea for troops to protect the Abadan oil refinery had a sympathetic hearing at the India Office, where there was concern about the political consequences of 'leaving the head of the Persian Gulf derelict' and the sheikhdoms of Mohammerah and Kuwait to the mercy of the Turks. But other factors carried weight in the cabinet, among them the need to concentrate all on the campaign in Europe. Indeed, Churchill accepted the paramount claim of this need. 'Indian forces must be used at the decisive point,' he replied on September 1 to a submission from his Admiralty staff. 'We shall have to buy our oil from elsewhere.' Others were worried about the danger of provocative action at a time when Turkey was merely making threatening noises and might welcome cause to send charges of British ag-
gression ringing round the
Moslem
world.
Consequently many words were passed by mouth, minute and telegraph, and the only thing done was to send a second sloop to join the one already patrolling the head
of the Persian Gulf, On September l<> the Odin, entered the Shatt al first sloop. Arab, churning up the mud as at high tide she scraped the alluvial bar that had formed across the one and a half miles of
HMS
its mouth. She was of elegant line, mounting six 4-inch guns and four 3-pounders, and was thought capable of sinking the Turks" one gunboat and of protecting Ahadan against ground attack. After reporting fresh earthworks on the Turkish side of the river, the Odin put in at Mohammerah, home port of the friendly sheikh, which was just inside the River Karun and some ten miles upriver from Abadan. The Turks vainly tried to remove her by protesting against the violation of neutrality. Meanwhile signs of Turkey's belligerent
intent were accumulating, and from India's point of. view the most worrying of these were the activities of agents bent on winning over the Arabs as a preliminary to the proclamation of the Jehad. This led the military secretary at the India Office,
Major-General Barrow,
to
submit an appre-
ciation advocating an immediate landing at Abadan 'ostensibly to protect the oil installation, but in reality to notify to the Turks that we meant business and to the Arabs that we were ready to support them. So startling and unexpected a sign of our power to strike would at once determine the attitude of the sheikhs.'
This document, coupled with the easing of the battle crisis in France, which made Turkish troops leave their trenches to launch an attack across muddy plains near Basra
the need for troops less pressing, set the British intervention in motion. On the day of its issue, September 26, the viceroy was warned to be ready to divert the third of his infantry divisions earmarked for Europe for an expedition to the Persian
On
October 2 warning was converted to definite instruction: a brigade group was to be despatched, with a sealed order to be opened at sea notifying its destination as Abadan. Having passed on instructions for this move, the viceroy pondered on its consequences and sent a telegram beginning with the words, 'I suppose it has occurred Gulf.
to you,'
and pointing
to the risk of protest
from the Persian government at this landing on their territory and to its likely effect on Moslem Indians. This had not been fully appreciated at home. The outcome, strained out of continual exchanges between London and Delhi over a further eight days, was that the destination of the brigade group was altered to Bahrain, an island 300 miles from the head of the Persian Gulf on which British troops had the right to land by treaty. They would be in position here to fortify the morale of the sheikhs and to intervene in defence of the Abadan refinery if war with Turkey broke out. The brigade selected was the 16th Infantry Brigade of the 6th (Poona) Division, and its commander,
Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, had instructions brought to him by a staff officer from GHQ, Simla, where the
Commander-in-Chief, General Sir BeauDuff, had just had the management of the expedition added to the many other
champ
responsibilities he bore in his dual capacity as soldier and administrator, as Comman-
der-in-Chief and Military Member of the Viceroy's Council. Delamain's instructions contained three 'plans of operation' he was to be ready to execute, with suggestions, but no more, as to his best course of action. It was rare for a brigadier to have such latitude. The brigade consisted of the mixture that became standard after the Mutiny of 1857, one British battalion (2nd Battalion the Dorsetshire Regiment) and three Indian ones (20th Punjabis, 104th Rifles and 117th Mahrattas) in which British officers held the more senior and technical appointments and Indian officers the remainder. All were over 800 strong, and with two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery (each with six 10-pounder guns), a company of Indian Sappers and Miners and various ancillaries added, the force had over 5,000 officers and men and 1,290 chargers and pack mules, the latter being the only form of transport. All were embarked at Bombay or Karachi by the evening of October 15, after some muddles in transit and delay caused by the belated realisation that for entry into the Shatt ships of shallow draught were needed, the procuring of which set the whole of Bombay buzzing with news of the destination. They sailed next day tight packed in five transports,
which were part of a large convoy of ships, some bound for Europe and some for East Africa in a great sprouting forth of the Indian Army. Not until their ships parted company with the others were the men told their destination. The remainder of the 6th Division was meanwhile held in readiness to follow, but officially
without knowing where, except by enquiry at the bazaar.
'Commence
hostilities' escort,
on the watch for the German cruiser SMS Emden, the transports reached Bahrain on the 23rd. There were orders here, emanating from the Admiralty, that the troops were to stay on board, and the only release from close
With battleship
confinement which was made grim by heat and a shortage of water, came in practising landing drills in rowing boats.
stifling
On
the 31st, following the bombardment of Odessa by the Turks, the Admiralty signalled, 'Commence hostilities against Turkey,' and next day Delamain received the order: 'Clear Turks out of the Shatt and its vicinity as far as Shamshamiya if possible' (just beyond Mohammerah). Action
was assured at last. The first essential was to wipe out the Turkish fort at Al Faw, which stood on the tip of the tongue of land forming one side of the Shatt's mouth. major^f the Dorsets
A
was sent
to
could about
Kuwait its
what he meanwhile
to find out
defences, and
the transports sailed to the head of the gulf with their naval escort, from which pre-dreadnought battleship, the Ocean, had to drop out as the water level subsided. Minesweeping at the mouth of the Shatt began on the evening of November 3, and on the 5th, which was the day of Britain's formal declaration of war against Turkey, the Dorset major returned with the news that the fort of Al Faw was in ruins but was thought to be held by 400 troops with seven or eight guns. At dawn next morning the sloop Odin, which had been relieved at Mohammerah by a sister sloop, HMS Espiegle, sailed up the river with two little minesweepers,
HMS
meeting a stream of fishing dhows coming downriver. Battle began at 1000 hours, when some shells whistled in from the hazy outline of palms and fort on the distant
downstream located the
man
shore. The Odin closed, enemy guns, which were Ger-
guns numbering only four, and after 40 minutes' pounding with her 4-inch guns, suffering only two hits in exchange. Closer inshore the Odin encountered the crackle of rifle fire from trenches by the river bank. Her gunners turned to shrapnel, which from 500 yards barked above the trenches with deadly effect, sending their occupants scuttling and flopping among the palm trees. Forty miles upstream the Espiegle accorded similar treatment to some Turks enfield
silenced
them
trenched opposite the Abadan refinery.
In the early afternoon two of the transports and a naval launch sailed upriver with 17 boats in tow, containing Royal Marines and Dorsets wearing pith helmets,
turbaned Punjabis and Mahrattas. They passed the old fort and trenches without
drawing a shot and sailed a further four miles. The boats then cast off and made for shore in line, on gaining which the men clambered out and struggled through soft sand to the palm belt, groggy on their feet after three weeks in cramped quarters on board ship. They found the Turks had gone, leaving among their dead the garrison commander, who had only just arrived from Basra. The Odin had gained the victory on her own. It was a dramatic start. Despite the haphazard conception of the operation, Britain had invaded enemy territory on the morrow of declaring war. The troops had their first taste that night of the torment 'Mespot' could inflict. It had been hot, very hot, when they landed, and now it was desperately cold and a wind howled from the river, against which cotton khaki drill and other items of the Indian winter scale of clothing provided feeble protection. Having thrown the Turks' guns into the river, the troops re-embarked next day, and on the 8th landed unopposed at the village of Sanniya, two miles beyond Abadan. The whole brigade disembarked here, an extremely laborious business lasting over two days, for the banks were high, the current strong, and the only craft able
to bring the mules ashore were eight lifeboats specially made by the sappers. Delamain's task was almost accomplished, without a shot being fired on land. He now heard that an attack was going to be made on his camp at dawn on the 11th. It duly came in, made by 300 Turks, and was comfortably halted by the Mahrattas and repulsed by the Punjabis, who charged through the date palms. The Indians had ten casualties and were left with 37 of the enemy, dead and prisoner. Hearing that a much larger Turkish force was assembling and being cut off from India by wireless failure, Delamain decided to stand his ground for the time being, and the rain that now descended turned the ground to such a quagmire that it would have been impossible to do anything else. On the 13th news arrived that his
divisional commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Barrett, was at the bar of the river. He was unaware of the situation and had no definite instructions other than that
he was to assume command. With him were a second infantry brigade, three batteries of field artillery, two squadrons of cavalry
and
various ancillary units, including 1,200 camels, the whole filling 18 transports, two of which were too heavily laden to cross the bar. Disembarkation at Sanniya was spread out ovt four days, during the course of which at nal arrived for Barrett: 'Your objective Basra.' This port of legendary fame wa; a further 32 miles upriver. Although usei as a base, he defence its capture was not essential foi of Abadan, and it appears that t. e viceroy, who himself issued the order, wa. lured on '
I
448 .
to impress the Arabs and likewise his people in India. At dawn on the 15th, Delamain's brigade set off on a reconnaissance in force, led by the Dorsets fanned out across the squelchy plain with the riverside belt of palm trees, in places a mile wide, on the right. Over 2,000 Turkish infantry — dark men in coarse khaki uniforms — were in position among the palms, around the village of Saihan, with 800 levies and eight guns, and after some tough fighting they were driven out by the professionals from India with expert aid from the mountain batteries. The Turks left 160 dead and 25 prisoners, against nine killed and 53 wounded, mostly Dorsets. By mid-day Delamain had brought his men back to camp.
by the need
Close-quarter fighting Heartened by this success and urged
to
boldness by his political officer for its effect on the Sheikh of Mohammerah, Barrett set his whole force in motion on the 17th, leaving one battery of guns to follow when disembarked. The cavalry reported that an old mud fort beyond a bend in the river named Sahil was held by the Turks. The newly arrived 18th Brigade, forming the advanced guard, had meanwhile begun a wide turning movement across the plain, intended to envelop the right of any enemy position and drive its defenders to the riverbanks, where they could be shot up by the sloops. With this object in view, the brigade was now directed on a mosque that could be seen in front of the palms three miles to the left of the fort. The 7th Rajputs led, with the 2nd Battalion
the Norfolk Regiment coming up on their right. Some shrapnel shells burst on ground impact among them without doing much harm, and then came a furious rain shower. With 200 rounds of -303 and the day's ration to carry — and in the case of the more weather-conscious 16th Brigade a great coat as well — desperate exertion was needed to keep moving through the mire. The 16th Brigade was brought up on the right to attack the fort, while the 18th flopped down in the mud to await its alignment. Mules, horses and gun teams tugged and heaved to get the mountain and field guns in position between the two widespread arrays of rain-soaked men, who soon began to steam in the sunlight. As the advance was resumed another furious shower produced mist which in turn was dissolved by the broiling sun and replaced by another speciality of the region, a mirage. Palm trees looked like charging elephants and the mosque a wobbling mountain, and it was impossible for the
gunners to direct their fire. Ankle-deep in clinging mud but with improving, the Dorsets led 16th Brigade against the fort. They came under wild rifle fire from their left, where black visibility
puffs of
smoke revealed Arabs
tinuous trench
line,
in a con-
and soon afterwards
much harder to better directed fire, observe, hit them from their right, revealing Turks in a position on the near side of the fort. Bringing their two machine guns into action, the Dorsets struggled to face this unexpected threat, while the Sappers and Miners, Mahrattas and Rifles came round their right to attack through the
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left: British soldiers find relief from the fierce heat of the Land of the Two Rivers' Above: Captivity -one of the realities of war Below: The British landings in Mesopotamia and the taking of Basra. During the action the Turks lost 1,500 men and 150 prisoners, against a British loss of 489 men
* Basra*
NOV
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merah
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Forts
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gale now sprang up to complicate the task of collecting the wounded and deprive the troops of the food and clothing that should have been landed for them.
The Turkish command panicked at news and pulled out of Basra with
of the defeat
*
or wounded and 150 prisoners, against a British loss of 489, 170 of them Dorsets.
Pipeline 10
20Miles
h 15
Bubiyan Island
Persian
Gu ,f
30Kms.
such speed that three battalions were left to follow by instinct. Word of the departure reached General Barrett on November 20, and next day the sloops Odin and Espiegle berthed in the evening at the town's decrepit harbour, having with difficulty squeezed a passage through a block island.
gans who had just set light to the customs house. Sailors went ashore to begin the task of pacification and next day Indian troops, brought by steamer, completed it. The main body arrived around noon on the 23rd, having toiled across countless irrigation ditches in a 28-mile march began at 2000 hours the previous evening. On the 24th they made a ceremonial entry the picturesque yet squalid town, heard a proclamation read promising the people liberty and justice, and gave three cheers for the King. They then began clearing the filth from their allotted camping areas and rounding up villains for hanging in the square. It was a squeeze to fit the division into the few patches of land not subject to tidal flooding, and it was a complicated task to draw sufficient water from the centre of the river, where alone it was fit for drinking. Cases of dysentery were soon reported. into
After some tense close-quarter a rush by the Dorsets brought the British into the plantation by the fort, whereupon brown and white clad figures erupted from the entire enemy line and made off northwards through the palms. They were saved from annihilation by the tenacity of their gunners, the slow progress made on the British left, the bad visibility and the mud, through which the cavalry could scarcely trot. Nevertheless the Turks had lost over 1,500 killed
palms.
fighting,
ships sunk off Shamshamiya The town was in the grip of hooli-
of
Meanwhile Barrett was wondering what he might be required to do next. There was no doubt in the mind of his political officer, Sir Percy Cox. 'Effect of the recent defeat has been very great,' he advised the viceroy, 'and if advance is made before it wears off
Baghdad
will in all probability fall into
our hands very easily.' Enver Pasha, Turkey's dynamic war minister, was equally aware of the need for prompt action.
Further Reading Atkinson, C. T., The Dorsetshire Regiment 1914-
1918 Barker, A. J., The Neglected War (Faber & Faber 1967) Churchill, Sir Winston, The World Crisis (Four
Square) Dane, E., British Campaigns
in the Near East (Hodder & Stoughton 1919) Kearsey, A., A Study of the Mesopotamia Campaign (Gale & Polden 1934)
Moberly,
Brig-Gen.
F.
J.,
The Campaign
in
Mesopotamia (HMSO Petre,
F.
L.,
1923) History of the Norfolk
Regiment
1914-1918
GREGORY BLAXLAND was born
in 1918 in Norwich and entered the army through Sandhurst. During the Second World War he served with The Buffs in Flanders, Tunisia, Sicily and Italy, and in the Far East just after the end of the war. After staff experience as a brigade major, he rejoined The Buffs in Kenya in 1954, only to be laid low by polio. Since this he has been writing, starting as a sporting journalist, but turning to weightier subjects with J. H. Thomas: A Life for Unity. He has also written Objective: Egypt, Amiens 1918 and The Farewell Years The Buffs.
1948-67.
449
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General Nixon- -the next Commander-in-Chief General Sir John Eccles Nixon was 57 when, in April 1915, he took over command of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force. A dedicated man, he had grown grey in the service of the Queen. Educated at Wellington and commissioned into the 18th Bengal Lancers in 1878, Nixon fought in Afghanistan, on the Northwest Frontier, and in South Africa. Like his controversial subordinate in Mesopotamia, Townshend, Nixon owed his advancement primarily to Kitchener, who had been impressed by the combination of professionalism and dash which Nixon had shown — first as a cavalry brigade commander during the Boer War, later as Inspector General of the Cavalry in India, and
an infantry divisional commander. In his turn, Nixon had been similarly impressed by the selfsame qualities in Townshend. In 1895, as an Intelligence staff officer with the force sent to relieve Chitral, Nixon first learned of Townshend's epic defence of the Chitral Fort. Twenty years later, when Nixon was commander of the S«,thern Army in India, Townshend was one of his brigaq|fers, and it was he who recommended that Townshend should be given a division. Nixon was outspoken and honesf-'-and was always popular among soldiers, especially Indian soldiers whose languages he finally as
spoke fluently. Ever an optimist, he was not a man with the 'Nelson touch'. Yet for six months, when no other British commander could say the same, Nixon's operations in Mesopotamia were a series of unbroken successes for which he was congratulated by King George V and thanked both by the British and the Indian Government. At that time his lack of vision, his incapacity to see beyond the immediate field, his rash impetuosity and confident optimism were considered to be qualities which made for a great commander. In reality, Nixon was not a great commander, but he was always prepared to take a risk, and no general ever achieved great military success without taking risks or committing errors. In November 1915, it was known that the Mesopotamian expeditionary force might have to advance as far as Amara and Nasiriyeh. Nixon's predecessor, General Barrett, was well aware of this and if he knew it, the Force's headquarters must have known it. Yet they did nothing about procuring the all-important river transport so necessary for an advance. Faced with inefficiency at this level, Nixon lacked the streak of ruthlessness necessary to handle it. And it was at this point in his career that his luck appeared to turn
Major-General To wnshend — Nixon's senior commander Charles Vere Ferrers Townshend was born on February 21, 1861. Until 1917 he was the heir presumptive of the 5th Marquis Townshend of Raynham, and for many years was greatly preoccupied with the glories, prerogatives and vicissitudes of the Townshend family and estates. (It was to his great regret that he never succeeded to the title.) Excessively ambitious, Townshend was a restless character and an incessant string-puller. No sooner had he obtained one appointment than he was thirsting for change and pestering his influential friends for help towards another step on the ladder of success. Never a modest man, he contrived by influence and self advertisement to figure in several late Victorian campaigns. In India the importuning of senior officers led to his receiving a direct rebuke from the Commanderin-Chief, who told him that it was not 'desirable' for officers to
urge their own advancement.
But Townshend was an able soldier and his first real opportunity to show his ability came in 1895, when four Europeans and 300 Indian troops were besieged by tribesmen in Chitral Fort in the far north of India. Until a relief force arrived, 'Chitral Charlie', as Townshend was to become known,
undertook the defence of the fort and showed himself to be both courageous and a good leader. At the end of the siege he was rewarded with honours and promotion and there is little doubt that his six weeks in Chitral had an enormous influence on his future military thinking. After Chitral, Townshend joined the Egyptian Army and fought in the battles of Atbara and Omdurman where his professional dedication first came to the notice of Kitchener. Promoted to major-general in 1911, he commanded a territorial division for two years before being given command of a regular
When war broke out he was penning asking for a command in France. Fond of all the good things of life, Townshend was a noted ladies' man, entertainer and raconteur. He was an ardent admirer of Napoleon, a keen student of military history and his ideas on training troops were in advance of the times. (He was one of the first generals to take senior NCO's into his confidence and have them attend military conferences.) In 1915 Townshend's early successes as commander of the 6th (Poona) Division in Mesopotamia added to his reputation and infantry brigade in India.
letters to friends
inspired in the
Turks a marked respect
for his capabilities
he Anglo-Persian Oil Company at Abadan, Persia, in 1914; a Company anker moored alongside the quay. At the end of 1914, when Turkey joined the Central Powers, British presence in the Middle East consisted of just one Indian brigade on Abadan Island.
'•
^/*m^.n<
THE SECOND BATTLE OF
WARSAW As the Russians prepared
Command
to
push forward
into
Germany
in the
autumn
German High and advance on Warsaw
of 1914, the
conceived a plan to forestall the Russians by a flank attack from the north-west. The first few days of the attack went well, but then the distances involved and the poor conditions prevailing restored the stalemate. Norman Stone explains the plans and details the slowly stagnating action. Above: A German reconnaissance patrol watches for any sign of Russian opposition to the swiftly advancing German advance guards
mm
At the end of October 1914, the situation on the Eastern Front became more than usually difficult for the Germans and their Ludendorff 's offensive in October had proved a failure: his army and those of ally.
Austria-Hungary were in
full retreat, in-
dulging as they did so in futile recrimination. It looked as if the Russians were about to invade Germany with nearly twice the number of troops available to the Central Powers in the East. Certainly, the Russian High Command — Stavka — had about 2,000,000 men in the bend of the Vistula ready to achieve 'the goal to which all our efforts must be directed: the invasion of Germany'. Commander-in-Chief, Russian The
Grand Duke Nicholas, told his French allies that he had won a great victory; and English newspapers began to talk exultantly of 'the Russian steamroller'. They forgot that steamrollers are ineffective if there are no roads and this was the case in Russian Poland. As soon as the Russians advanced beyond their rail-heads they ran into supply difficulties, and the further they went, the more difficult it became to transfer reserves from one part of the front to another. As a result, their planned invasion of Germany did not get under way
immediately. At the beginning of November, the Russians looked forward eagerly to the collapse of the enemy front. The Grand Duke had massed four armies in the bend of the Vistula, from north to south Second, Fifth, Fourth and Ninth. He intended to set these marching towards Germany. Their flanks would be protected in the north, along the East Prussian border and the Vistula below Warsaw by Tenth and First Armies, and in the south, in Galicia and along the Carpathians, by Third, Eleventh and Eighth Armies. The plan was above all to destroy the German army and thus show the French that they had not wasted their money in investing in Russia. If the Germans could be defeated in the East, they would have to suspend their operations in the West and rush reinforcements to the East, and this was what the Grand Duke
hoped
for.
'Alarming shortage of officers' His plan met strong objections from the commander of the south-western front, Ivanov, who preferred to stand on the defensive against the Germans, and concentrate instead against Austria-Hungary. Ivanov's Chief-of- Staff, Alexeyev, pointed in a memorandum to the weakness of the south-western group, where casualties had been high and where lack of officers 'has
taken alarming proportions'. According to Alexeyev, the Austro-Hungarian army was far from beaten and against it the Russians would need everything they could spare.
Alexeyev really wanted Fourth Army to turn south-west on Krakow, while Ninth and Third Armies advanced on both banks of
the
Vistula
defeat the stricken Austro-Hungarian First Army. Stavka, on the other hand, regarded the defeat of Austria-Hungary as comparatively unimportant, and Danilov, of Stavka, told Ivanov that the invasion of Germany was 'the essential goal of the war'. Stavka wanted a quite different course of action from Ivanov's front: Fourth and Ninth Armies were to march due west, against the Germans, and were to leave the defence of the front north-east of Krakow and to
QMG
Grand Duke ordered on the 12th that the offensive should begin on November 14. As the Germans fell back on Czestochowa and Kalisz early in the month, they had little idea what to do next. They appealed to Falkenhayn for reinforcements, and stated that Germany was in terrible dan-
The fate of Austria will
be decided on the Seine, not on the Bug'
Ludendorff travelled to Berlin late in October to plead with Falkenhayn for
ger.
He was told that the Germans in the West had their hands full, that they were
help.
along the San to Third Army. In the upshot, a blundering compromise was reached. Ivanov was allowed to keep Third Army on the San; and the defence of the front north-east
of
Krakow was
allotted
to
Ninth Army, which thus fell out of the 'steamroller'. Fourth Army, none the less, would march west against the Germans, parallel with Second and Fifth Armies. In this way, the Russians fell between two stools. The 'steamroller', without Ninth Army, was too weak for its task and the front against Austria-Hungary, without Fourth Army, was not capable of serious activity. Still,
Stavka went ahead with
its
plans
for the invasion. In the conviction that the
Germans had been
decisively beaten and were retreating in disorder on Kalisz, Wieleri and Czestochowa, the armies of the North- Western Front, under Ruzsky, were prepared for a massive pursuit. In the north, Tenth Army (Sievers) would invade East Prussia with a strong force of 20 divisions to offset what Danilov called 'a superstitious fear of the area'. First
Army (Rennenkampf would advance along )
the Vistula below Warsaw, with a strong group — V Siberian Corps (Sidorin) and some cavalry — at Wloclawek. Further south, facing west, came the armies of the steamroller — Scheidemann's Second Army, centring on Leczyca with ten divisions, Plehve's Fifth Army, between Piotr-
kow and Przedborz with
six divisions,
and
Evert's Fourth with ten infantry divisions between Przedborz and Miechow. South of Fourth Army opposite Krakow stood Lechitsky's Ninth Army, while on the south bank of the Vistula, Third, Eighth
and Eleventh Armies were operating against Austria-Hungary. The Russians' task was to push forward Fourth Army against the Germans in Silesia, capture the rich industrial regions there, and pin down the German Ninth Army (Mackensen).
While Fourth
Army made
this frontal
attack on the Silesian border, Second and Fifth Armies were to move forward over the Warta on the flank of the German position between Kalisz and Czestochowa. Preparations for all this took time. The Germans had retreated a long way, right back to the border, and the Russians had to follow them. In retreating, the Germans destroyed railways and roads as much as possible: they blew up the tunnel at Miechow and all the curved rails for a mile on it. The Russians ran into terrible difficulties of supply as they advanced: a Guards division of Fourth
either side of
Army was
supplied only by horse and cart along 120 miles of indifferent road in bad weather, and Fourth Army command announced that it could not begin its attack on the Germans until it had received 25 tons of biscuit. In the end, these had to be brought up by commandeered automobiles driven by staff officers. As a result, the Russians took a fortnight to advance over the area left to them by the Germans. The
about to turn the Anglo-French flank at Ypres and that they could send nothing much to the East until the middle of the month, perhaps later. At bottom, Falkenhayn believed that the Eastern Front did not greatly matter. As Schlieffen had said, 'the fate of Austria will be decided on the Seine, not on the Bug'. He cared little for the East, so long as things did not go too badly, and also disliked sending reinforceto Hindenburg and Ludendorff, could easily replace him and who already enjoyed great popularity. As a sop,
ments
who
and maybe to raise his position vis-a-vis the Austro-Hungarian army, Hindenburg was given on November 1, the title Oberbefehlshaber der deutschen Streitkrafte im Osten, shortened to Oberost, signifying his command over Ninth Army (Mackensen) at Czestochowa and Eighth Army in East Prussia. Hindenburg and his staff were clear that, without reinforcements, they stood little chance of warding off the Russian invasion of Silesia. They also had little faith in the powers of resistance of the AustroHungarian First Army (Dankl) on their right. Mackensen, in charge of Ninth
Army, felt much the same: 'We must find some means or other of attacking.' No attack could be more effective in preventing the Russian invasion from getting under a stroke from Thorn up the Vistula, straight into the flank of the steamroller armies, and the Germans learnt that their enemy would remain inactive for the next few days. They had cracked the Russian code, and were therefore able to listen into the Russian radio which, in view of the. poorness of communications between Warsaw and the army headquarters, provided the Russians with their only means of command. From this source, the Germans knew of the Russians' movements in detail and their official historian rightly says, 'seldom has any commander in a war of movement had such a sure basis for his decisions as Hindenburg on the 3rd of November, 1914'. Hindenburg decided to transfer most of his Ninth Army from Czestochowa to the north, by Thorn. He had two large railway lines at his disposal, running all round the front — one from Rzeszow and Tarnow in Galicia to Kattowice in Silesia and thence to Thorn and East Prussia, the other from Sanok in Galicia to Oderberg in Silesia and thence to Poznan. The Russians, by contrast, had only one such line, WarsawIvangorod-Radom, for four times as many troops. Hindenburg decided to transport his troops along these lines, and by November 10 the German Ninth Army had been, as one authority says, 'spirited away'. It was, even with the remarkably good state of the German railways, quite a feal to send over 250,000 men in live days from one part of Poland to another, and the Russians were utterly taken by surprise. Ninth Army was to plunge forward into the Russian flank, between the Russian First
way than
455
The
fear
now
info
nagging the Russians
— the possibility of
T the :tf
Gu
another Tannenberg
am til
ha
Krupp 120-mm howitzer, in use with the Russians. Weight 26 cwt. Crew: 5-6. Rate of fire: 4-5 rounds-per-minute. Range: 7,400 yards. Weight of shell: 46 pounds. Below: The Second Battle of Warsaw. The German plan Left:
ali
:
was
to thwart the intended Russian invasion of the eastern areas of Germany. And though
the short-term aim, the capture of Warsaw, was not attained, the Russians were taken completely by surprise and prevented from invading the German Reich
NINTH (
ARMY
XXVR CORPS IR CORPS
Mackensen )
XX CORPS XVII
CORPS
Strzelno*
Warsaw
456 it
th mi on
and Second Armies, and the expected reinforcements would exploit the success.
Germans attempted a cavalry feint from Thorn. From a strategic point of view, these
left the previous front of virtually uncovered -only two corps, Woyrsch's Landwehr and Gallwitz' Guards, now stood between the steamroller and Silesia. This was a risk that had to be taken if Mackensen's flank attack were to have enough force behind it. There was also some advantage, inasmuch as the fur-
dispositions were very dangerous: Second and Fifth Armies were moving west, and had organised themselves in order to do so,
This operation
the
army
ther the Russians advanced, the more vulnerable they would then be to a stroke on their flank. At all events, the Germans had to prepare for the invasion of their country. The population of Breslau began to trek out to the west, remembering what had happened to their countrymen in East Prussia when the Russians invaded in August. 60,000 young men who were oniy just under military age were taken off to central Germany; the pithead coal of the Silesian mines was carted off, and arrangements were made to blow up the mines if However the the Russians appeared.
Austro-Hungarian High
Command
offered
defend Silesia for the Germans, and proposed on November 7 that their Second Army (Bohm-Ermolli) should be sent to Silesia with five divisions. Conrad did this purely out of generosity, as Hoffmann, Ludendorff's GSO 1 wrote, This man of genius at once saw how right it was to to
attack from Thorn'. Conrad was willing an absolute defeat of his armies in the Carpathians — much weakened by the
to risk
withdrawal of his Second Army — if this would save Silesia and contribute to a great victory in Poland. At all events, Silesia was relatively safe, and the rear of Ninth Army was protected. By November 10, Ninth Army was drawn up in its new positions, with little interference from the Russians. Behind a cavalry screen, of Frommel's cavalry corps, stood XI Corps at Jarotschin, XVII at Wreschen and XX at Hohensalza. From East Prussia came / Reserve Corps to Thorn, with XXV Reserve Corps north-east of it. On the 12th there arrived in Thorn the 3rd Guard Division taken from Gallwitz' Corps in the south. Mackensen's Chief-ofStaff, Griinert, called
the corps chiefs-of-
and instructed them to begin their advance on the 11th. First, I Reserve Corps and XX Corps were to move on Wioclawek and destroy the Russian V Siberian Corps standing isolated there. Then the other corps would engage the Russian Second Army by marching southeast, on the important town of Lodz. Noone had a very clear idea of what would then happen, but the invading Russian armies would be thrown into such confusion
staff together
that they could scarcely recover.
and Second was in fact struck from the north by greatly superior forces. Tactically as well, the Russian dispositions were disastrous to them, for their armies and corps lay separated by wide distances. V Siberian Corps was isolated at Wioclawek and the neighbouring VI Siberian Corps was on the other side of the Vistula, and the only crossing in the region was at Wyszogrod, 30 miles up-river. Between V Siberian Corps and the nearest elements of Second Army to the south there was another gap of several miles: and Second Army was itself spread over 55 miles — II Corps north-west of Leczyca, XXIII at Chelmo and Dabie on the lower Ner, IV to the south of XXIII and at Piotrkow, with a cavalry corps (Novikov) on the Warta at Sieradz. To the south came Fifth Army's three corps — I Siberian, XIX and on a front of 30 miles between Piotrkow and Przedborz. Second Army's corps were too far strung out to help each other very much, let alone help V Siberian Corps, and Fifth Army's corps could not move fast to the help of Second Army, although as events turned out they moved with a quite remarkable speed. In these circumstances, the German thrust achieved extraordinary success in the initial stages. On the 11th, without a special order, the German Ninth Army began its advance. The two left-hand corps—/ Reserve and were expected to destroy V Siberian Corps at Wioclawek: / Reserve Corps Corps would move up the Vistula, would go forward on his right, turn V Siberian Corps' flank and fall on its rear. Meanwhile, the two regular corps on Corps' right would advance south-east over territory known to be empty of Russians until they hit the Russian line. Reserve Corps would follow in I Reserve Corps' tracks, and 3rd Guard Division would prepare to advance after it arrived in Thorn. On the 1 1th and 12th came the engagement at Wioclawek. The German corps attacked two divisions from V Siberian Corps frontally at Wioclawek and Brzesko, while Corps tackled the other one by Lubraniec and Izbica, hoping to sweep up V Siberian Corps' left. In fact I Reserve Corps' attack was too resolute, and it pushed the RusCorps' sians so far back that the effect of flank-attack was not felt. Corps was too far away on / Reserve Corps' right for it to intervene in time. As a result, V Siberian Corps escaped up the Vistula in the direction of Plock. It was badly shaken, and, as events proved, scarcely capable of I
V—
XX—
XX
XX
XXV
XX
XX
XX
action, but
Rapid German success When the Germans struck, they achieved
sen of the
a
very rapid success largely because the Russian armies were arranged to fight a different battle altogether. Ruszky, the Russian commander of the north-west group of armies, supposed that the main German force was still between Kalisz and Czestochowa waiting to be attacked. He ordered Fourth Army to move forward in a frontal attack on these lines, and expected Fifth and Second Armies to march westward over the Warta to grip the northern flank of the Germans at Kalisz, while First Army did little more than police the right bank of the Vistula, with V Siberian Corps to guard its left, at Wioclawek, in case the
it
had been kept
intact.
Macken-
German Ninth Army
recognised this, announcing in an order that the Wioclawek attack 'has not entirely come up to expectations'. Just the same, his army could now move south against the Russian Second Army in the certainty that its left was secure. On November 13, there was no fighting of any importance, as the two sides shaped up to the new situation. Only on the 14th, when the German corps had come up against the Russian line, did events begin to move again, with the battle of Kutno, lasting until
November
16.
The Russians were still not aware of the danger to them. Ruzsky reported to Stavka on the 14th that the Germans' forces were much as before — four corps retreating on
Czestochowa, one on Kalisz, two at Wieluri.
At Thorn there were only two divisions, he thought, and Second Army need not worry about his flank. Ruzsky's Deputy Chief-ofBonch-Bruyevitch, spoke to Danilov by Hughes apparatus and said that the events at Wioclawek could be explained only by the incredible incompetence of V Staff,
Siberian
Corps'
divisional
commanders.
The Grand Duke's Chief-of-Staff, Yanushkevitch, made the celebrated reply: 'to make a whole army corps retreat before that bunch of clods that calls itself XXV Reserve Corps is too like the Manchurian war to be true'. The Russian headquarters had no idea of the dangerous situation and the most that Ruzsky would do to help was under First Army the right-hand corps of Second Army, II Corps, west of Leczyca. Ruzsky then made the situation much worse by ordering Fifth and Second Armies forward, while First Army's group on the left bank would be reinforced by VI Siberian Corps coming over the river at Plock. II Corps was to advance against the two German divisions supposed to be at Wioclawek. Ruzsky refused to let Fifth Army throw any of its weight to the north. As a result, Second Army had to swing its weight somewhat to the south, and XXIII Corps, instead of co-operating with II Corps on its right, instead made for Dabie and Uniejow, to the west, while the other three corps of Second Army, to the south of XXIII Corps, lurched irrelevantly forward. The gap between II Corps and the rest of Second Army was thereby increased to 30 miles, and there was a further gap between II Corps and V Siberian Corps. As a result of these weird — though, given the premises, comprehensible — decisions, two and a half to put
Russian corps, in an inconvenient and isolated position, were left to face the assault of five
German ones.
A
brilliantly commanded force In consequence, the Germans in the battle of Kutno secured a very great success. Mackensen had, apart from his highly
favourable situation, many advantages. He knew more or less exactly what the Russians were doing, from their radio communications, and his infantry units had in many cases twice the number of guns of their Russian equivalents. He knew that V Siberian Corps was in a bad way, and though parts of VI Siberian Corps were being ferried over against him at Plock as the bridge had been destroyed, the only possible way over the river for the greater part of First Army was at Wyszogrod, upstream. The German Ninth Army could therefore safely pursue V Siberian Corps only with / Reserve Corps, and concentrate on the other Russian corps — XXIII at Dabie, on the Ner, and II, isolated at l^anieta. On the 13th, Ninth Army's troops were ready for their advance. / Reserve Corps — a brilliantly
commanded
force —
would con-
tain the Russians by Plock while XI,
XVII
and XX Corps struck forward between Kolo and Lubieri towards Leczyca, against the Russian XXIII Corps at the confluence of the Ner and the Warta and II before Leczyca. On the right were Frommel's cavalry and some Landsturm. As a reserve, behind XX Corps, came XXV Reserve Corps and 3rd Guards Division. Between / Reserve Corps and XX Corps, a cavalry corps, under Richthofen. With Frommel's cavalry covering their right wing, the three infantry corps in the
457
plunged
southwards. XI Corps at Chefanno and Dabie, encountering strong resistance from Will Corps, but the Russian line was an uneven one, and was taken by surprise-, so that one of XI Corps' brigades broke through to the Ner at Grabow by the evening of the 14th. The entire Russian resistance collapsed and Will Corps retreated in confusion behind the Ner. This left the Russian II Corps isolated in the middle of the battlefield, and against it concentrated XVII and Corps, double its strength in numbers and five or six tunes in artillery. XVII Corps struggled forward along bad roads in the general centre
moved on the Ner
XX
direction of Leczyca. Its left-hand division was held up at Chodow, on the KlodawaKrosniewice road, by the left of the Russian II Corps, but his right-hand division had practically no obstacles before it except bad roads, and struggled forward to Leczyca, right in the centre of the Russian position, on the Bzura river. If the town fell, then the Russian position w^ould become untenable,
and II Corps would be pushed over the Bzura eastwards, away from the rest of Second Army. XVII Corps' divisions had already marched 25 miles that day, but Mackensen set them forward at 2200 hours telling XVII Corps: The situation demands the utmost from the men and their com-
manders, and you must forget about their
XVII Corps' 36th Division moved on Leczyca in the night, and took it at 0530 hours, forcing back the left of II Corps opposite XVII Corps' other division. Meanwhile Corps, on XVII Corps' left, kept pace on the 14th, coming up against the right of II Corps at Lanieta, while / Reserve Corps pressed forward on Gostynin against the V Siberian Corps. tiredness.' Accordingly,
XX
On the 15th the Russian front began to crumble. With XVII Corps on its left flank, crossing the Bzura, the rest of II Corps had to withdraw from Krosniewice, leaving 2.000 to 3,000 prisoners, and pulling back its right towards Kutno. XX Corps — whose men had been marching steadily for five days — was not in much condition to follow the Russians beyond Lanieta, and Mackensen ordered XXV Reserve Corps to move into the front line on XX Corps' left. / Reserve Corps went on mopping up V Siberian Corps by Gostynin, and in all the army was able to take close on 15,000 prisoners as V Siberian Corps and II Corps fell back. That day, XI Corps and Frommel did little but ward off the feeble counterattacks coming from XXIII Corps on the other side of the Ner. As a result of the fighting of the 14th and 15th, the Germans had opened a gap of nearly 20 miles in the Russian front between XXIII Corps and II Corps. Their task was now to complete the ruin of II Corps by delivering a blow from their left — XX Corps, Richthofen's cavalry and XXV Reserve Corps — towards Kutno, to
match the blow of XI and XVII Corps. The situation was complicated, as usual,
by the failure of the Russians to understand what was happening to them. Second Army
had begun
to reorganise its corps to face the obvious danger in the north, but still believed that it faced not more than three German corps, on the Vistula and the Ner. Like the commander of II Corps, Second Army supposed that the main thrust was XI and XVII Corps on the Ner and at ieczyca, and he had no idea that XX, Reserve Corps, Richthofen's cavalry and, later, 3rd Guards Division were on the Russian II Corps' right opposite Kutno. II 1
458
XXV
Corps, with Second Army's assent, therefore threw in its reserves towards Leczyca to hold the Bzura position, and rather neglected its right. As a result, a brigade or so, with some cavalry units, was left to face the enemy before Kutno. On the 16th, therefore, there was a Reserve and Russian disaster as
Army was ready. The Russian movements continued on the 17th. Second Army's corps had to carry out a long flank march from the Warta positions to north of Lodz. Ruzsky expected them to do this in 36 hours, but there was little hope of this in bad weather, and along bad roads. The four army corps could
Corps moved forward towards Kutno. They were preceded in the early hours of the morning by one of Richthofens cavalry divisions, which, at 0300 hours in the middle of a snow-storm, entered Kutno —
not cover 70 miles in such a short time. None the less, they did much better than could be expected, particularly Fifth
XXV
XX
much to the surprise of the inhabitants. II and Reserve Corps, pursued by Corps, fell back on and over the Bzura, and by mid-day the German reserves, Reserve Corps, reached Piatek virtually without fighting. Richthofen's cavalry, probing towards Lowicz, made an unexpected capture, Baron KorfF, Governor of Warsaw, who was driving towards Kutno to inspect the defences. / Reserve Corps in the north drove V Siberian Corps beyond Gabin, hearing from that corps' reports by wireless that it was 'in complete disarray'. This brought the battle of Kutno to an end. The Germans had had 60 battalions with 400 guns against II Corps' 32 battalions and 100 guns. On the flank of II Corps at Leczyca they had had, unopposed, six battalions with 33 guns. Not surprisingly, II Corps, in a state of great confusion, fell back partly on Lodz, partly on Lowicz, and a gap of 40 miles, between the Vistula and the Ner, was opened between First and Second Armies, with three German infantry and one cavalry corps, ready to exploit it by moving due south on Lodz.
XX
XXV
XXV
Rennenkampf, the commander of the Russian Army, lost the chance of encircling the Sermans by his dilatory and feeble moves to the north of the main battle area. Above: Litzmann, >p:
First
he able but short-sighted commander of the 3rd Guards Division. Below: Germans skin a lamb. As ie Germans advanced, the poor communications available in the centre of Poland made it imperative that the troops live off the land as much as they could, so that the railways :ould be used for munitions and reinforcements
Helpless bewilderment Ruzsky, commanding the north-western front, was taken utterly by surprise. He had intended to begin his invasion of Germany on the 14th, and the armies in the south had begun their advance. But the Russian Fifth Army, and still more Second Army, could not risk advancing against the Germans with a large force in their flank and rear. They therefore swung round to the north. Second Army's westward movement was brought to an end on the 15th, some of its brigades were withdrawn to the east, and others swung north to help XXIII Corps on the Ner. Neither Stavka nor Ruzsky had much idea what to do. Stavka in particular was mesmerised by the Germans' progress and watched the wheels running round with helpless bewilderment. The only sensible decision on the Russian side had been early on the 16th, when Second Army withdrew II Corps from the Bzura to escape the pincer-movement of XX Corps in the north and XVII Corps in the west. Far from recognising the sense in this decision, Ruzsky told Grand Duke Nicholas, 'Everything has followed from this error. I don't want to go any further into this subject, the details of the operation are even more depressing.' The most that Ruzsky could now do was to instruct Second Army to transfer its corps to the north-east, building a defensive wall before Lodz on a line Konstantinow — Zgierz — Strykow. The Siberian Corps and II Corps would retire up the Vistula until they could be reinforced by the rest of First Army. Fifth Army would fall back to the east towards Piotrkow. Ruzsky now hoped that the Germans would pour into the area between Second and First Armies and could eventually be crushed between them when
First
Army's corps, with their commander — wizened, stubborn old man with a notorious temper — riding all round the lines spurring them on. From the morning of November 18, the seven corps of Second and Fifth Armies were moving into position. II SiCorps to Strykow, IV Corps to Zgierz, XXIII Corps to Alexandrow, with I Corps marching south of them, through berian
Lodz to Andrespol, east of Strykow. Plehve's Siberian Corps and, on its left, XIX Corps, fell into line by Pabjanice and Laskowice, his other corps — V — pushing forward to Piotrkow, as general reserve. This flankmarch, carried out within two and a half days, was certainly among the most notable feats of the Russian army in this war. I Corps, for instance, managed to cover 70 miles on November 16 and 17, reaching Andrespol at dawn on the 18th with 50' of their effectives, having marched without interruption for 48 hours. While this went on, the Germans were not seriously opposed as they marched south, except by retreating elements of II Corps. Mackensen ordered Ninth Army forward on Lodz, which he did not expect to hold out. He was more concerned to prevent Second Army from escaping east to the Vistula, and never imagined that the Grand Duke intended to stand at Lodz. He ordered Frommel's cavalry and XI Corps to take the offensive up the Ner to prevent XXIII Corps from slipping away. Meanwhile XX and XVII Corps, with XXV Reserve Corps following, were to advance on Lodz. XX Corps on Strykow. In the north, / Reserve Corps was to continue its advance up the Vistula, to dissolve V Siberian Corps and the units brought to reinforce it from VI Siberian Corps, and generally to prevent First Army from interfering with the fate of Second Army. / Reserve Corps had 25 I
I
battalions and 100 guns against 100 battalions (V and VI Siberian Corps, II Corps) and 250 guns, but the Russian troops had
been very badly shaken, and were prepared back on Lowicz if pressed. / Reserve Corps' advance on Gabin on 17th was attended by thousands of prisoners. On the 17th the Germans north of Lodz stormed forward, conscious that another Tannenberg was possible. XVII Corps reached Zgierz via Ozerkeu as XX Corps, with XXV Reserve Corps on its left and Litzmann following, arrived at Strykow and Brzeziny, straight into the gap between the Russian Second and First Armies As the vanguard of the Russian Corps arto fall
I
rived in the area, there was sporadic fight ing, but the troops on both sides were too exhausted for anything serious To the west, Frommel and XI Corps advanced up the Ner against a retreating Will Corps.
reaching Szadek, Alexandrow and Podde bice. The great question now was could Second and Fifth Armies resist encircle-
ment
and could First arrive in time to save them? The question was answered, with a painful and costly affirmative, by the battle of od/ for sufficiently long,
Army
I
159
Key to the Polish Campaign
At Lodz the German drive on Warsaw was finally halted, but only at great cost in men and effort. The fighting was marked by extreme savagery, and the German breakout from Brzeziny, which marked the end of this battle, was a classic of heroism and endurance. Norman Stone relates the complex and ill-organised actions which made up the Battle of Lodz. Above: A machine gun post on the perimeter of the
German positions
On November
18,
the
Germans were poised
encircle Lodz, with 250,000 men on three sides of it. In the west was a mixed force — two Landsturm corps on the extreme right south of Szadek; a cavalry corps (Frommel) in this town; and a regular infantry corps XI (under Pliiskow), north of
to
Szadek, advancing on Pabjanice. On the northern side were two corps — XVII (Pan(Scholtz) at Strynewitz) at Zgierz, and kow; on the north-eastern side were Reserve Corps (Scheffer) and 3rd Guards Infantry Division (Litzmann), poised to cut off the city in the east. The left of the whole army was covered by / Reserve Corps (Morgen) north-west of Lowicz, whose task was to prevent the Russian First Army (Rennenkampf) from aiding Second Army (Scheidemann). The Russians, meanwhile, made superhuman exertions to save their line. They had hurried up divisions by forced marches to the Lodz front, and by the evening of November 18 they had managed to save the town from immediate danger; after an extraordinary effort, their troops held a strongly fortified line along the western and northern approaches, from Laskowice in the west to Strykow to the north-east. Their various corps had been flung into this
XX
XXV
line helter-skelter: some of them had been marching for over two days over nearly 80
and were down
50%
of their effective strength as a result of the loss of poured they Exhausted, stragglers. through Lodz into the small manufacturing towns round the city: two corps of Plehve's Fifth Army — I Siberian and XIX Corps — stood at Pabjanice and Laskowice guarding the western side against the attacks of two German corps, Frommel's cavalry corps and Pliiskow's XI Infantry Corps. On their miles,
to
left was Novikov's cavalry corps, with three divisions of Cossacks, protecting the flank of the army. On the northern front were the various corps of Scheidemann's Second Army, just falling into position — XXIII by Alexsandrow opposite Pannewitz' XVII Corps, IV at Zgierz, II Siberianonly a division strong — and I Corps at Strykow, and an infantry detachment
C0RPS P0SEN t BRESLA CORPS
y£
IstKbDiv
Krause on their right, towards The transfer of such enormous numbers of men — almost 500,000 — within three days along bad roads was a triumph of determination, but the troops were exhausted, and were by no means out of the German trap. Everything depended on under
Brzeziny.
being relieved: the Russian First
their
Army, under the lackadaisical command of Rennenkampf, must come to their help from the north, and at the moment this army was being easily contained by Morgen's / Reserve Corps, between Lowicz and Gabin. In the end, Rennenkampf 's inaction very nearly did for Scheidemann what it had done for Samsonov's army at Tannenberg. All in all, the German position was not propitious as it seemed — there was always a danger that, far from trapping
as
Russian Second Army, Ninth Army would itself be smashed between the Russian First and Second Armies and a more able commander than Rennenkampf would probably have managed this. But the Germans — both Mackensen, the army commander, and the supreme commanders in the East (Hindenburg and Ludendorff) — were confident that all they had to do was to chase the Russians from Lodz, and trap them against the Austro-Hungarian the
The Russians opposite / Reserve seemed incapable of energetic action and those in Lodz were thought to be in panic striken retreat. But confidence among the Germans based in reality on a promise from Falkenhayn of reinforcements. Falkenhayn had, early in Novfront.
Corps
ember, sent Colonel Hentsch, one of his favourites among the Great General Staff in Mezieres, to tell Conrad and Ludendorff that reinforcements would arrive by about November 24, once the Ypres salient had been overrun. At this time, Falkenhayn was reckoning that he could defeat the British and French in Flanders, even though afterwards 'we cannot reckon on success'. He
wanted to secure a limited success in the West, and then to send reinforcements to the East, where the danger was greater.
By November 18, however, his plans had gone wrong. The Ypres offensive had been a bloody failure: Bethmann-Hollweg, the Reich Chancellor, telephoned to express his horror at 'the enormous losses at Ypres'; Plessen, the Kaiser's GeneralAdjutant, described Ypres as 'a first-class moral defeat'. By contrast, the danger in the East had been largely dissipated by Ninth Army's victory at Kutno. Falkenhayn therefore decided that he must keep his reinforcements in the West to save the situation, the more so as they would now be irrelevant to any strictly defensive operation in the East. To Conrad, who was
pleading that immediate reinforcements in the East could have a decisive effect, Falkenhayn replied that the reinforcements must be held up in the West, and 'it is of course quite impossible for reinforcements to arrive in time to affect the decisions now taking place in the East'. To Hindenburg, who had really begun
the whole operation on the expectation of reinforcements, Falkenhayn had to explain himself: in a letter of November 18, he told Hindenburg that the reinforcements had already been made superfluous because of Ninth Army's success in its purely defensive task. There was, he went on, no point in pushing the Russians back, as they could always retire to a defensive front along the Vistula, and nothing would be changed; besides, there was no point in winning victories against Russia, 'for our most dangerous enemy is not the one in the East, but rather England, with whom the conspiracy against Germany stands or falls'. Germany could not run the risk of another battle of the Marne, 'which must, in the main, be explained by the weakening of the western army to strengthen the eastern one'. Falkenhayn was not at all interested in Hindenburg's Drang iiach Osten, which he regarded as detrimental to Germany's position in the West, and certainly detrimental to his own prestige. Indeed, at this time he was urging Bethmann-Hollweg to make a separate peace with Russia, perhaps at Austria-Hungary's expense. Whatever the long-term im-
N0V22J¥0v/ f
German advance Russian advance
Railway
\ The
Battle of
Lodz- its fighting
10
20 20
halted the main Russian invasion
40
An heroic view
of a
German
cavalry charge
461
plications of this, Falkenhayn was deternot to send reinforcements to the
mined
East until he could properly spare them from the Wesl
A great chance missed This left Hindenburg
and
Mackensen They were
largely to their own devices. confident enough that Ninth Army could defeat the Russians, hut felt that a great chance had been missed — as was maybe the case On the 19th, the German corps round Lodz opened their offensive west, north and east of the town. They were expecting that the town would give in virtually at once, and pressed hard, particularly on the western side, in the hope that their hope would he fulfilled. For their part, the Russians also miscalculated: they supposed that the Germans were in overwhelming strength west and north of the city, but not on the east side. On the 19th, Mackensen pushed forward A7 Corps and Frommel's cavalry, together with Koch's Landsturm. These forces had had a relatively easy time on the 17th and 18th, pursuing XXIII Corps up the* Ner.
They expected to take Pabjanice with some ease, and advanced confidently. However, they found in their way the two corps of Plehve's Russian Fifth Army that had been swung forward over the last two days, well dug in, supported on their right by
elements of Scheidemann's XXIII Corps and on their left by Novikov's Cossacks. XI Corps' supply-lines had been entangled during the advance, and as a result the corps' four heavy batteries, so urgently needed for the storming of Fifth Army line, had only 70 rounds left. In consequence, its attacks were a complete and bloody failure. Elsewhere on the Lodz front much the same happened as the Germans tried to throw Second Army back. There were now four corps along the northern sector, but the country was broken, with small woods, hillocks and burnt-out factories offering excellent cover for the defence. As well, the weather turned to snow and frost, with cutting winds driving in the Germans' faces as they
struggled forward. Pannewitz and Scholtz struggled forward against this strong Russian position. Pannewitz' right took Aleksandrow before XXIII Corps opposite it had been able to settle down from its long march from the lower Ner, and thus re-established contact with Pliiskow on his right. But the rest of Pannewitz' corps could do nothing. Similarly, Scholtz' Corps, south of Strykow at Nowosolna, moved scarcely half a mile forward with high losses. His task had been to break the Lodz-Nowosolna road, the artery of the defence: he failed utterly to do this. Besides this he was expected to capture the Wionczyn wood, on his left. This was the strongpoint of the defence east of the town, and it had to be taken if XX Corps were to remain in contact with Scheffer's group (XXV Reserve Corps, Richthofen's cavalry and Litzmann's Guard Division) on his left. In fact, the defence of the Russian I Corps was particularly dogged, and resisted all of Scholtz' efforts on the wood. For the Germans the fate of the battle in effect depended on the progress made by Scheffer and Litzmann on their left. If these two — together with Richthofen's cavalry — could advance on Lodz from the south-east, then Scheidemann must surrender. For the moment, Mackensen did not think that Scheffer's corps would
XX
have any more important effect than mopping up single Russian units as they sought to escape from Lodz. Scheffer, meantime, moved forward from Brzeziny, confident that he had little to worry about. On the Litzmann's division crossed the 19th, Miazga, a frozen stream flowing east of Lodz from Nowosolna to Bedkow, and reached Wola Rakowa. Scheffer's two divisions pressed on to the south in compliance with Mackensen's order 'to have a lasting flanking effect'. 49th Reserve Division got to Bedkow without serious resistance, and from there to Tuszyn; 50th Reserve Division (Goltz) followed it to Bedkow. Richthofen's cavalry divisions — 6th and 9th — probed forward as far as Piotrkow and even to Skierniewice, the castle of which was occupied, as head-
quarters, by the Grand Duke Nicholas. On the 20th the general pattern of the battle was repeated. Pliiskow and Frommel
were
urged
effective
on,
with
Koch's
not
very
Landsturm, and once more dashed
themselves in vain against the Russian positions
before
Mackensen that
Pabjanice: Koch told his orders could not be
carried out. In the same way Pannewitz and Scholtz south of Zgierz and Strykow could manage nothing since once again the forces in the Wionczyn wood held out, and Scholtz could establish no continuous front with Litzmann and Scheffer. The fate of the battle, as before, depended on Litzmann's and Scheffer's turning to the west, and cutting off the main Russian positions: they ought to have done this on the 19th, but failed to do it because they thought the Russians were abandoning Lodz and could be caught further south. It was not until the 20th that Scheffer curtailed his by now irrelevant movement to the south and swung to the west, confident of meeting up with Frommel's cavalry at Pabjanice. Litzmann, with only some shattered battalions in his path, entered the important town of Rzgow, while 49th Reserve Division followed to Tuszyn, and
50th to Goszimowice, where it met up with elements of Plehve's V Corps hurrying up from Piotrkow. There were now only 12 miles free to the Russians south of Lodz, and a desperate note was heard from the city. Communications between Scheidemann and Stavka thus became increasingly precarious, messages being carried by motor-car and, as often as not, captured by the Germans. The high commands, Ruzsky and Stavka, were in a state of helpless confusion: they
knew that Rennenkampf must somehow be brought to bear, and watched with increasing resentment as this court favourite made blunder upon, blunder, falling back before an enemy half his size, and generally displaying his Tannenberg form. Still, something was done: troops drawn from Warsaw, from the garrison of Nowogeorgiewsk, and from various units designed for Tenth Army in the north were A Russian heavy mortar. Above right: An Austrian patrol moves across the open, cold and wintry wastes of the central Polish plain
Below:
*I**K3* *
#
.#w Rt.hpr and set marching westpatched together wards from Skierniewice in order to threaten the rear of Scholtz and Scheffer as they advanced to the south-east of Lodz. Scheidemann sent desperate appeals to Rennenkampf by wireless: 'I am in great danger from the rear: the situation is critical: every minute is dear: help me!' These appeals reached Mackensen, not Rennenkampf, who was too far away. On Mackensen's side, there was nothing he could do but set his teeth and order his men onward, wherever they were. Gradually on the 20th he had come to recognise that the Russians were not retreating from Lodz; he knew that his fate now depended on Scheffer, with whom contact was increasingly difficult; he also knew that the Russians were quite likely to fall on Scheffer's and Scholtz' rear, if they could liberate themselves from Morgen's pressure north of Lowicz. Obviously he could not afford to continue unless Morgen gave an assurance that all was well. On the 19th
and 20th, Morgen's reports were jubilant.
He had been pursuing two beaten corps — those of Sidorin and Churin — up the Visand the reinforcements brought to of little value. He was capturing thousands of prisoners and many guns as he moved forward, mopping up a demoralised enemy, taking Mock and Gostynin. He gave an absolute assurance that there was nothing to fear in the north, and so Mackensen did not halt Scheffer as, with hindsight, he ought to have done. Even so, he told Morgen to swing south, towards the town of Lowicz, where he could more effectively prevent the Russians from tula,
them had proved
interfering with the operation of Scholtz and Scheffer, and on the 20th, therefore, Morgen's divisions swung towards the town. On the 21st the German offensive continued much as before — there were counterattacks all along the western and northern side, which were thrown back as all the German attacks had been. Morgen appro-
ached Lowicz and there hit upon unexpected resistance — some troops from First Army in the north had been thrown in there to stop Morgen. Three Russian divisions and some Cossacks also began to move on Scholtz' rear: they even took Brzeziny for a time, before being expelled by a wounded officer in command of the
walking
wounded
from
Scholtz'
front.
Hell, Scholtz' chief-of- staff, expressed confidence to Mackensen: 'we do not rate very highly the threat from the enemy advancing on Strykow, as they are apparently devoid of active leadership.' In consequence, Scheffer's corps, on Scholtz' left, went forward east of Lodz, with very great success. Against Litzmann and Scheffer the Russians could only seize battalions from
virtually all their divisions and send them in any order to the eastern side; part of
Novikov's cavalry was sent from the front opposite Frommel towards Rzgow. These troops were flung in throughout the 21st, and by the end of the day had succeeded in bringing Litzmann and Scheffer to a halt. Early in the day, one of Litzmann's brigades swung west, south of the Wionczyn wood, crossed the Choiny, a stream running south of Lodz, and entered Dabrowa, a suburb of the city. The brig-
-mr-
from the ade's guns eruns were only a mile from centre of the city, and fired into its congested streets, before the brigade was forced back by pressure on its flank from the south. But this was the only real success that Scheffer's group had: 49th Reserve Division, moving north from Rzgow, struck a solid resistance and failed to move forward: 50th Reserve Division, south-east of it was obliged by elements of V Corps to fall back on the Miazga and form a defensive front, together with one of Richthofen's divisions. But to Mackensen,
that Morgen was too much for him. The three divisions sent from Skierniewice towards Strykow on the 20th displayed an incredible dilatoriness — Oranovsky complained that they had made only nine miles in 24 hours. Rennenkampf made things worse by proposing an entirely unsuitable commander: he replaced Slussarenko, the existing one, by Shuvalov.
seemed well: Morgen had continued his advance on Lowicz, and reported new
Strykow on the 22nd was therefore hesitant: Oranovsky grumbled to Stavka: 'Our troop commanders, though spurred on all
all
captures that brought his totals to 15,000 prisoners, 31 guns and 40 machine guns. Despite the obvious danger to the rear of Scholtz at Strykow, Mackensen would not give in: and his confidence can be measured by an order to Pannewitz that he must avoid street-fighting in Lodz. He ordered the eastern group 'to annihilate the enemy east of the city'. Hope of this had to be abandoned in the course of the 22nd, and for the next two days it seemed as if Scheffer himself would be surrounded and annihilated. Only a near-miracle saved him. In the morning of the 22nd he set his troops forward — Litzmann and one of Richthofen's divisions on a front between Andrespol and Olechow. This attack came to nothing, for a new Russian force, 1st Siberian Division, checked it at once. 49th Reserve Division was involved in heavy fighting west of Rzgow, counterattacked by fresh Russian forces, and had to appeal to 50th Reserve Division on its left for help. This division in its turn had to swing back to Modliczka. against a new Russian force from Piotrkow. By early afternoon, the whole group had turned out to be in a very dangerous position, being attacked from all points of the compass save the north. Soon, Russian troops began to appear from this direction also, and Scheffer was given up for lost
by Hindenburg and his staff. Elsethis day the German attacks were
where on
In the west, Frommel and Pluskow were too exhausted for any more than feeble demonstrations. Pannewitz and Scholtz had more fight left in them, but it was rapidly exhausted against the stout frustrated.
resistance north of the city, as before. Finally, a report from Morgen arrived that he had encountered strong resistance at Lowicz— Churin 's II Corps, now reinforced — and 'can no longer absolutely guarantee that my objectives will be reached'. Meanwhile, Scholtz reported that, from the church-tower at Dobra, he could see long columns of Russian infantry moving
towards Strykow and Glowno. He had to swing one of his divisions, the 41st, on his left, to defend his rear, and thus lost all contact with Litzmann to the south-east.
was now quite cut off, and his depended now on what the Russians did. If they closed directly on his rear, he was more or less lost. However, the usual bewilderment by all Russian commands prevailed. Ruzsky and Ivanov busied themselves in futile rivalry: at one point, Oranovsky, Ruzsky's chief-of-staff, demanded the dismissal of Alexeyev. Ruzsky went on wringing his hands at the inertia of Rennenkampf, who kept complaining Scheffer
fate
an aristocratic and inadequate staff officer, who was himself replaced, on Nicholas' insistence, by Vassiliev — all in 36 hours.
The progress
of these three divisions on
the time, are incapable of energetic action." On top of this, the higher commands were all behaving like weathercocks. So far, Ruzsky had been determined to stand: now
he suggested retreat. Scheidemann in Lodz had been crying for help: on the 22nd he recovered his nerve and announced that he could hold out for ever, the morale of his men being excellent. Stavka itself, dependent on the bewilderingly contradictory reports of these commanders did nothing but repeat, in Pavlovian fashion, contempt for the troop commanders and a wish that they should attack. In this way, Scheffer and Litzmann had a better chance of getting away. Scheffer and Litzmann were on their own. Frommel, Pluskow and Pannewitz were exhausted; Scholtz had sent his available forces to his own rear, to defend himself against the Russians stirring there. One division was moving from Brzeziny to the south, and the rest of Vassiliev's group had now advanced over Strykow: Scholtz now had 25 battalions in his rear against 15, and needed everything for himself. On the 22nd, and over the next two days. Scholtz could just about hold his own, but no more. Meanwhile, Morgen's corps opposite Lowicz began at last to tire out, and remained where they were. Oberost (the Eastern High Command was in despair; they heard that the Russians had ordered empty trains to come up to SkierI
niewice in preparation for the transport of the thousands of German prisoners they expected. Hoffman, on his own initiative, went round the various corps' chiefs-ofstaff to suggest the idea of a retreat — an idea roundly denounced by Mackensen, who was convinced, against all the evidence, that Scheffer would somehow escape from a situation worse than that of Sam-
sonov at Tannenberg. In what was perhaps the greatest single epic in the whole of the First World War,
and Litzmann managed to get away, in the course of 60 hours' fighting between November 22 to 25. Late on the 22nd, cut off from the troops of Scholtz. Scheffer decided to cut his way through to
Scheffer
the north-east. No other way was open: in the west lay Lodz, to the south an army corps of Plehve's army together with Novikov's Cossacks. In the oast he could see no way out, but yet in the north there were four divisions under Vassiliev. The
i
|
'1'
German official history rightly says, any human reckoning, the fate of Scheffer' group was sealed; the Russians can hardly be blamed for behaving precipitately ordering up empty trains for the prisoners
*
it
463
i
the) expected to take.' Bui Scheffer plunged on: his confidence was strangely high, and it was this above all that carried him through, tor he was not really aware of the full desperateness of Ins position until after he had escaped. As it was. he had to cover
20
null's
and
more
through
superior
in order to escape. issued orders to his scattered troops on the 22nd. The two cavalry divisions under Kichthol'en were to cover the eastern and southern Hanks, the infantry divisions were to cross the Miazga and then pass on to the north and north-east: 49th Reserve Division would pass along the Rzgow — Karpm road, cross the Miazga at Karpin
Russian forces
He
move north on Borowo; 50th Reserve Division on its right was also to cross at Karpin, coming from Wola Rakowa, and was then to advance on Lasnowska Wola. Litzmann's division of Guards was to retreat gradually, protecting the northand then
western (lank, moving hack on Bedon and Bukowiec. The group had 2,000 wounded
and 10,000 prisoners: these were to follow 49th Reserve. At first the withdrawal was easy, and even passed unnoticed by the Russians. The force at Lodz was of course exhausted, capable of defensive action only, and with losses running to 70'/r Novikov's group in the south was not much better. There were few Russians to the east, because their command had made a mistake, transferring the bulk of their reinforcements to the Strykow front against Scholtz, instead of trying to capture Scheffer. As a result there were only two divisions and some cavalry in front of Scheffer as he retreated; and the Germans also had larger calibre and more effective artillery. Even so it was a great achievement for Scheffer to escape, for his men were very weary, and the weather was demoralising in the extreme: even the water for the machine guns froze. Scheffer's troops were over the Miazga by dawn on the 23rd. The operation had been very difficult, as both of the Reserve divisions had to use the same crossing at Karpin, and there were traffic snarls that only Scheffer's personal direction could ,
!
Having
crossed, the two divisions then made for their objectives. 50th Reserve (von der Goltz) was to go right on Koliuszki, where it met a Caucasian cavalry division; 49th Reserve (Waencker)
clear up.
was to go towards Borowo, which was defended by 6th Siberian Division. Here the Russians enjoyed an excellent defensive position, a long
embankment
of the
Lodz — Skierniewice railway, by the village of Galkow. Throughout the day, Waencker's division struggled against this
bankment,
em-
and
repeatedly failed to capture it: yet capture it they must if Scheffer's group were to escape to Brzeziny. The divisions' attacks on the 23rd were in fact ill-managed affairs, inevitably so as their units came up only one by one to the front line from Karpin. Much depended on what Litzmann could do, and it was from here that relief came. Litzmann had been able to withdraw without trouble, as the Russians who ought
have been opposing him were in fact attacking Scholtz; his men, after a long march through the woods to the west of
to
Galkow, emerged from them at midnight and, with their guns firing as they advanced, they stormed a battalion of sleeping Russians by Galkow at 0300 hours and pushed forward to Brzeziny. It seems that Litzmann was only trying to save his own division at the expense of Scheffer's troops; at all events, his action turned out to be though selfish. His forward decisive. <
brigade captured
<¥ jK
ijfcr
t
Brzeziny
in
the early
hours of the morning of the 24th, nearly capturing the commander of 6th Siberian Division as it did so. The rest of Litzmann's troops then arrived. They were now safe, for the gap between them and Scholtz was
notimore than a few miles. As a gesture,
Litzmann sent a bicycle patrol to find out what had happened to Scheffer, now to the south. This patrol rode unwittingly through a gap in the Russian lines, and arrived at Scheffer's headquarters in Chrusty-Stare. Scheffer, surrounded by many now useless guns, by his wounded and his thousands of prisoners, had just ordered 49th Reserve Division to make a last attempt on the embankment; his relief at hearing Litzmann's news can be imagined. Even so, his position was still difficult. If the Russians to the south made a serious move in his rear, he was probably lost. Two things saved him. In the first place, the Russian
commanders mistook the 10,000 prisoners marching behind Waencker's division for German infantry, and therefore hesitated to attack as they ought; and finally 50th Reserve Division broke through at Koliuszki after an artillery barrage had broken the Russians' nerve. The Caucasian cavalry opposite Goltz fell back in disorder; Goltz took up a position on the flank of 6th Siberian Division on the embankment; his artillery then shot up the Russians from their flank. The Russians fell back in disarray, leaving another few thousand prisoners to 49th Reserve Division as it stormed forward. By 1600 hours Scheffer's group had entered Brzeziny, and the next day, November 25, was able to swing into place on Scholtz' left, having forced Vassiliev to retire from Strykow. The whole group had suffered losses of 50% of its total, but brought in 16,000 prisoners and 64 guns. With this breakout, the battle of Lodz came to an end. The Germans were clearly victorious, though only after a very great effort. The Russian invasion of Germany had been utterly frustrated and they decided, after a staff conference at Siedlce, to withdraw their line almost to the Vistula,
and to concentrate instead on defeating the Austro-Hungarian army, as maybe they should have done all along. The centre of gravity now shifted to the Carpathians. Further Reading Cruttwell, C. R. M. F., The Great War (OUP 1934) Danilov, Y. N., La Russie dans la Grande Guerre (Paris 1927) Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918 Volume 6
(Reichsarchiv) Golovin, N. N., The Russian War (London 1928)
Army in
the World
Goodspeed, D. J., Ludendorff (Hart-Davis 1966) La Grande Guerre: relation de I'Etat Major russe 1 aout-24 novembre 1914 (Paris 1926) Ludendorff, General E. von, My War Memories (Hutchinson)
Mackensen, General A. von, Briefe und Aufzeichnungen (Leipzig 1938)
NORMAN STONE was was educated
at
born in Glasgow in 1941 and Glasgow Academy and at Gonville
and Caius College, Cambridge.
After taking a First 1962, he was awarded a Research Fellowship at Christ's College, Cambridge and spent two years in Vienna doing research into the last years of the Habsburg monarchy. In 1 965 he became Research Fellow at Gonville and Caius College, and in 1967 an Assistant Lecturer in the in
the History Tripos
in
Cambridge, specialising in Russian several articles and a book on the Eastern Front of the First World War. University of history.
He has written
Left: Typical of the war in Poland -a German skirmishing line in the Lodz area. Above: Polish peasants bow to their new masters as
an advance guard moves
£
into a village
465
p
rudder
aft
hydroplanes
engine cooling water circulating
pump
oil
tank
bilge
16 cylinder
motors
600
NK
engine
B. HP. at
400
R. P.
'J/&
submarine B11, which penetrated the Narrows at Gallipoli and sank the Turkish vessel Messudieh. Displacement: 280/313 tons. Length: 135 feet. Beam: 13% feet. Power/speed: 600/190 hp and 12/7 knots. Armament: Two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Crew: 16. For the superb feat of torpedoing the Messudieh, the
Submarines —
now beginning to make the menace
British
B11's commander, Lieutenant Holbrook, was awarded the VC, while all the other members of his crew were also decorated. During this trip, Holbrook showed that small submarines could penetrate heavily defended waters and cause considerable damage
itselffeltatsea
rudder
aft
hydroplane
coupled diesel engines
/
hydropi
control clinom;
horizontal petrol
Above: The
pump
mam engine
compressors
1
.
periscope air
vent for surface special anti-sub' net cutter.
"engine running
sharp steel blade strengthened and supported by two wooden planks bolted on either side torpedo loading hatch
torpedo
firing
compressed
airtank
bow doors opening handles torpedo tubes
guide cables
bow doors
steering position
petrol
torpedo tube blowing tanks
compensating main
Kingston valve
ballast
tanks
tank blowing
operating
bottles
control
reload'
air
(P&S)
torpedo
periscope shaft
and
well
Below: The German submarine U-9, which sank the three British armoured cruisers Hogue, Aboukir and Cressy. Displacement: 493/61 tons. Length: 188 feet, Beam: 19% feet. Power/ speed: 1,050/1,160 hp and 14/8 knots. Armament: Four 17.7-inch torpedo tubes and one 2-inch gun. For his feat in sinking the three British cruisers, the U-9's commander, Otto Weddigen, was awarded the Iron Cross (First Class) by the delighted Kaiser. The sinking proved that submarines operating on their own could successfully deal with much larger and more powerful ships in the open sea, even allowing for their tactical misuse
Two old and small submarines — but powerful auguries for the future __
s_h
periscopes
capstan forward
searchlight
forward torpedo loading hatch
escape hatch
CZZ
».
.
i*
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r
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spare torpedo
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forward hydroplane galley
radio
forward torpedo door
WAR in the
Mediterranean Turkey's entry into the war found Britain and France woefully unprepared for action in the eastern Mediterranean. All that was available was a mixed force under a poor admiral. The only feat of note was the sinking of a Turkish battleship. Peter Kemp narrates the course of events in the area. Below: Submarine Bll, which went
I
HM
up the Narrows and sank Messudieh Left:
two
HMS Indefatigable,
one of the British battle-cruisers in the
Mediterranean. Below left: Lieutenant Holbrook, who won the VC for his daring attack on the Messudieh. Above right: HMS Indomitable, the second of the two British battle-cruisers. Right: The French predreadnought battleship Suffren. Below right: The Turkish Messudieh was built in 1874 and had long been out of date. Below: The B11
-
>a
f '
W
>u i»jd '
*"&
I—fcilMI
mma
H~
consequences of the escape of the Goeben and Breslau in the Mediterranean
The
full
at first realised in Britain, and it was only gradually that it became apparent how great a disaster it had been. The Navy
were not
knew — 'To think that wrote Admiral Beatty, and only instance of
me full
sick!'
— but
political
the Navy', provide the first
is to
it
'to
failure.
God,
it
makes
was only
later that the implications of the failure it
struck the Cabinet. Writing now with hindsight, one can see that the arrival of these two ships at Constantinople was the overriding factor in deciding Turkey to enter the war on the German side. A long diplomatic rearguard action was fought in Constantinople which had the effect of delaying a Turkish declaration of war, and for a time it looked like succeeding. In the end it was a German trick which put the final spoke in the Allied wheel. Admiral Souchon, without the knowledge of the Turkish Grand Vizier or of Jemal Pasha, the Minister of Marine, took the Goeben and Breslau, with the Turkish cruiser Hamidieh, into the Black Sea at the end of October and bombarded the Russian ports of Sebastopol, Odessa, and Novorossiysk. Even then, the vote in the Turkish Cabinet was in favour of continued neutrality. But a Russian declaration of war forced the issue, and on November 1
Vice-Admiral Carden, who was commanding a British blockading force in the eastern Mediterranean, was ordered by the Admiralty to commence hostilities against Turkey, though war was not formally declared until November 5. Sackville Hamilton Carden was a naval officer
with few recommendations for active
command. He had been Admiral Superintendent of Malta Dockyard, and as a contemporary opinion had it, he was 'very second-rate; no "go" in him, or ideas, or
The reason had been odd, to say the initiative.'
choice to
command
for
his selection
least.
The obvious had been
then turned for home. His difficulties began with the loss of his compass. In the B-class submarines, as in most others, the steering compass was fixed outside the pressure hull to prevent it being unduly affected by the boat's residual magnetism, and an image of the compass card was reflected to the helmsman through lenses and prisms. At this crucial moment the lenses fogged over with excessive condensation and the image of the card was lost. There was nothing for it but to steer blind, and hope to reach the open sea to the south-
ways, for these B-class submarines were small coastal boats and not designed for long periods submerged. Bll had remained under water for nine hours, a period much longer than had ever been thought possible, had negotiated a minefield twice in extremely difficult waters and had successfully attacked an enemy warship and sunk her. And on her return trip she had navigated the Dardanelles blind without a compass. The Admiralty sent a signal to Carden expressing their warm appreciation of Holbrook's feat a,nd recommended the award of the Victoria Cross. Bll's first lieutenant was awarded the DSO, and every other member of her crew received either the DSC or the DSM according to rank. The importance of Holbrook's success lay not so much in the sinking of a Turkish battleship as in its vivid demonstration of the capabilities of submarines when used in a strategic role. They had originally been designed and developed for tactical use, mainly in a defensive role, but the possibility of a much wider role was now opened up. Where Bll could go, others could follow, and a logical conclusion of Holbrook's feat was that a longer-range boat could penetrate the Straits and operate in the Sea of Marmara against Turkish supply lines to her army in Gallipoli. Already there was much discussion in London and Paris on the need to open a new campaign in order to bypass the stalemate on the Western Front, and the only obvious choice was one directed against Turkey in an attempt to knock her out of the war. Bll's successful penetration of the minefield brought into the field of reality a submarine campaign in the Sea of Marmara that could possibly have a decisive effect on a new campaign against Turkey, and Holbrook's exploit carried a good deal of weight in the London and
eastward.
Paris discussions.
Indomitable, one of the battle-cruisers, and six of the destroyers; these were however replaced by some of the older French six French destroyers, and three French submarines. For some weeks the six submarines, three British and three French, had been pressing for a more active role in the block-
battleships,
The way was opened when Captain commanding the destroyer flotilla, Pownall, and Lieutenant-Commander ade.
Coode,
senior officer of the three British submarines, devised a system of mine guards which, it was thought, might enable a
submarine to push her way through moored mines without being damaged or sunk. The guards were fitted to the British submarine Bll, and on December 13 Lieutenant Norman Holbrook took her up the Straits in search of a ship to torpedo. It was known that the entrance to the Narrows in the Dardanelles was guarded by five lines of moored mines, and in spite of the strong adverse current, Bll forced her way through successfully. Above Canakkale, but uncertain of his exact position, Holbrook sighted a Turkish battleship, which was guarding the Dardanelles minefield. She was the Messudieh, and closing submerged to a range of 80 yards, Holbrook torpedoed her. Through his periscope he watched her sink, and
in this area
Vice-Admiral Arthur Limpus, a brilliant officer who had been Head of the British Naval Mission in Constantinople until September 1914 and who knew the Turkish capabilities and Turkish waters intimately. He had been turned down as it was thought that his appointment to command in these waters might offend the Turks. Carden's force in the eastern Mediterranean, which was watching the Dardanelles in case the Goeben and Breslau should come out, consisted of the British battle-cruisers Indomitable and Indefatigable, the French battleships Verite and Suffren, two light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and three submarines. On November 3, on instructions from the Admiralty, the combined force bombarded the Turkish forts
Kum
at Seddiilbahir and Kale, an operation which will be discussed later in its implications on the future Dardanelles operations. Nevertheless, the naval war in the eastern Mediterranean never became entirely static. Most of the major activity, it is true, took place in the Black Sea with a number of clashes between Russian squadrons and the combined Turkish and Ger-
man ships, while Carden's fleet maintained its watch on the Dardanelles and its blockade of Smyrna and the Bulgarian port of Dedeagach. Suspected damage to the Goeben following an action with a Russian force in the Black Sea gave the British Admiralty the excuse of withdrawing the
By guess and by God Holbrook's last look through the periscope had shown him that Bll appeared completely landlocked, which made him think that the submarine must be in Sari Sighlar Bay. On this assumption he dived deep and proceeded 'by guess and by God' towards the entrance of the Straits. The submarine was bumping badly along the bottom, but that was a risk which had to be taken. After a few minutes of this, Bll grounded heavily on a sandbar, her conning tower awash and the target for Turkish shore guns. Holbrook ordered the maximum power on the electric motors and they were just able to force her over the bar and into deeper waters. There were still the five lines of mines ahead, but having successfully negotiated them on the way up, there was no reason why they should not equally successfully be penetrated on the way down. No one
on board, in fact, knew when Bll went through the minefield, and it was not until half an hour later, when the submarine was brought to periscope depth and Holbrook could check his position, that it became apparent that the mines were safely
astern.
On
hand was the open
Holbrook's
starboard
and Bll was clear An hour later the submarine sea,
of the Straits. surfaced and made contact with the destroyers which were waiting to escort her
back It
to Mitilini.
was a remarkable achievement
in all
While Admiral Carden maintained his watch on the Dardanelles, operations farther south were directed against the expected attack by Turkey on the Suez Canal. Vice-Admiral Richard Pierse, commanding the East Indies station, had been ordered to move his headquarters from Bombay to Suez and to absorb responsibility for the Levant coast into his command. He was told to watch the Syrian ports of Alexandretta, Beirut, and Haifa. and to stop all supplies coming down for the support of Turkish forces by the Hejaz railway. The main Turkish force earmarked for the attack on the Canal was still at Damascus, and as yet showed no signs of moving. The cutting of the railway, with the consequent effect on supplies, could delay its movement still further.
Bombardment and demolition Pierse had two battleships, the Siciftstirr and Ocean, and three light cruisers, the Minerva, Doris and the Russian Askold, under his command, together with the French coast defence ship Requin. He sen( the Doris north along the Syrian coast as far as Alexandretta to do what mischief she could, and Captain Larken made the most of his few opportunities for offensive action, both by bombardment and demoli tion, in destroying rail and telegraph communications. But it was only when the Doris reached Alexandretta that anything much more than a pinprick he-
came
possible.
469
North of Alexandretta the Hejaz railway runs close to the coast, and on the night of December 18 a small parly from the Doris landed, destroyed the telegraph lines, and loosened a couple of rails on the track. Early next morning the inevitable
nam
came puffing along and was derailed. A second tram, stopped by the wreckage of the first, was shelled hut managed to hack into safety as the British shells were not powerful enough to bring down a bridge behind it. Following this small success. Captain l.arken sent ashore an ultimatum to the Turkish governor of the town demanding the surrender of all military stores and rolling stock under threat of bombardment. The ultimatum was rejected with a threat that British residents would be executed if Turkish inhabitants were killed in the bombardment. A reply by Larken that the Minister of Marine and his staff would be handed over to the British authorities alter the war for punishment brought a reconsideration of the Turkish reply, and the ultimatum was accepted. By this time most of the military stores had been removed, hut two locomotives remained. The Turks agreed to destroy them, but asked for dynamite from the Dons to carrv out their task. The Doris,
W
having no dynamite, offered guncotton in its place, but the Turks had no experience of the use of this explosive, and their national pride could not stomach the operation being performed by a foreigner. The difficulty was finally solved by making the torpedo lieutenant of the Doris a Turkish naval officer for the rest of the day. Such were the niceties of war in 1914! Early in the new year. Admiral Pierse reported to the Admiralty that signs of a Turkish advance against the Suez Canal were increasing. There were thoughts in London of an amphibious operation to capture and hold Alexandretta, from which port both the Hejaz and Baghdad railways could be cut but the proposal was shelved. Instead, the Doris was sent back to Alexandretta to cause as much more embarrass-
ment
to
Turkish lines of communication as
she could. About
all
that she could achieve
was to bombard the cliffs north of the town and bring them, together with the coast road above them, tumbling into the sea. Originally, the plan for dealing with the Turkish attack on the canal had centred upon an amphibious landing at Gaza, which would have provided an opportunity to cut the whole Turkish supply line and roll up the attacking force at leisure. But in the dilatory fashion in which the war in the Mediterranean was being conducted at this stage, nothing was done to put the plan into operation, and the great advantages in a war of movement which the flexibility of sea power can provide were allowed to dissolve in apparent lassitude. Further Reading
Britons as
temporary members of the Turkish
armed forces
Churchill, W.
S., The World Crisis (Thornton Butterworth 1923-9) Corbett, Julian S., Naval Operations Vol 2
(Longmans, Green & Co 1921) J., From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. 3 (OUP 1965) PRO, Admiralty Secretary In-Letters, Reports of Rear-Admiral Limpus and Rear-Admiral Marder, A.
CT
™
Pierse
>
Turkey's
first
blow
bombardment
of
in
the war — the
Novorossiysk
[For Lieutenant-Commander Peter biography, see page 52. ]
Kemp's
5 5
the dissident minorities
s
3k
r-
*
%^»
A
Austria-Hungary and Russia both had strong and vociferous nationalist minorities among their populations. Would these minorities now support their rulers, or would they try to take advantage of the situation to establish nations of their own in place of the heterogeneous empires of prewar days? Otto Pick. Above: Men of the Polish Legion.
()
v li
he d V
*tf 1^
Eduard Benes. Masaryk's right-hand man Czech Realist' Party
in
Thomas Masaryk,
university professor
and
the
creator of the 'Realist' Party
The shots fired at Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, killed more than the heir to the Habsburg throne. The assassination ushered in the destruction of the dual monarchy itself by
the Poles, Czechs and Slovaks were specific to each of these nationalities and very few parallels can usefully be drawn between them. The Poles and Czechs were 'historic' nations, since in the past they had had states of their own. While the Kingdom of Bohemia still existed in theory, that of Poland had been wiped off the map by the partitions at the end of the 18th Century and by the settlement of 1815. A hundred years later the Poles were still partitioned among Russia, Germany and Austria.
providing an immediate casus
belli
which
that unstable state could not withstand. The nationalism of the various races which inhabited Austria-Hungary, was, of course, a major cause of this instability. The precise political, social and economic factors which affected the attitudes of
One
472
of the greatest
problems of the Dual Monarchy: the large number
of intensely nationalistic races,
Joseph Pilsudski, commander of the Polish Legion, saw the chance of a unified Poland
Their urge for self-determination was thus directed both against the Germans and against their fellow Slavs — the Russians. Furthermore, in Austrian Poland they themselves lorded it over another Slav nationality — the Ruthenes. The Habsburg share of Poland was the province of Galicia, and there was constrife between the Polish landowners and the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) peasantry. At times most of the Slav nationalities living in Austria-Hungary
tinual
most speaking a separate language
the pull of Russian-inspired PanSlavism and looked to St Petersburg for support. Russia tried to use this ideological appeal to further her own national interest, but she was compromised by the autocratic nature of her own internal regime and by the treatment handed out to both Poles and Ukrainians under her rule. The Galician Poles were thus largely immune to Pan-Slavism, despite a shortlived belief after the 1905 Revolution that a change could follow the introduction of felt
constitutional government in Russia. The party of the Polish middle-class in Galicia — the National Democrats — did not quite abandon its hopes of a Polish-Russian reconciliation. The ambiguity of Russian
which repressed both Polish and Ukrainian nationalism within the Tsar's dominions, but encouraged the Ruthenians (who were after all Ukrainians by another name) against the Poles in Galicia, ranged the Galician landowners firmly on the side of the Habsburg Emperor. The Germans and the Magyars in AustriaHungary regarded the Poles as a companion Herrenvolk and there was a particular affinity between the Polish nobles and their fellow aristocrats in Austria and Hungary. Vienna consistently supported the Poles at the expense of the Ruthenians in Galicia. To the Habsburgs the Polish nobles were natural allies in support of the imperial policy of maintaining the status quo, and accordingly they were given a free hand in Galicia. The Ruthenians had no influence in Vienna, and were woefully policy,
Polish allegiance — to
Germany,
Russia, Austria, or only Poland herself? The Russians
also tried to cash in on nationalism. The proclamation Polish issued by the Russian Commander-inChief, Grand Duke Nicholas, on August 1914, made a considerable impres17, sion throughout Poland. The proclamation promised the Poles the unification of all Polish territories, including Prussian Poland and Austrian Galicia, under Russian suzerainty, of course, but with a great deal of autonomy. The Germans, however, had a rival programme for the Poles. Even Bismarck had envisioned the recreation of an autonomous Poland under German suzerainty in the event of a Russo-German war, and the proposal gained new life during the Russian Revolution of 1905/6. The weakness of the proposal lay in the fact that the Galician Poles would be excluded, as the Habsburgs wanted no part in encouraging in Central and Eastern Europe which would threaten the very existence of the Austro-Hungarian state. The satisfaction of the Galician Poles under
nationalism
Austrian rule lent credence
to the concept
if Russian Poland were to be detached from the Romanovs it could be added to Galicia rather than be made into an adjunct of the Berlin government. This implicit rivalry between Germany and Austria over Russian Poland dampened the enthusiasm of Germany for the project. Nevertheless, when war broke out in 1914 Germany decided that Russian Poland should be incited to revolt and eventually be restored as a quasi-independent state. On August 5, the Wilhelmstrasse decided to secure the consent of the Vatican to have the Polish clergy use their influence on the population of Russian Poland. The request was cloaked in the garment of a liberating crusade for Catholicism against Russian Orthodoxy, which the Germans claimed
that
was violating the rights of the Catholic Church in Poland. This attempt, however, proved ineffectual. Mass support for the German proposal was not forthcoming, and eventually the presence of about 1.000.000 Russian troops in Poland put any Polish rising against Russia out of the question. In Galicia there had been enough antiRussian feeling to admit the formation of Joseph Pilsudski's Polish Legion which, in collaboration with an underground Polish 'government' in Warsaw, put forward political demands for a future Polish state. For that reason Pilsudski's Legion was incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian army so that it could still lend military assistance to the cause of the Central
under-represented in the Reichsrat. Consequently it was thought in St Petersburg that Ruthenian discontent could easily be fanned by Pan-Slav propaganda. The Galician Russian Society, led by Count Vladimir Bobrinskij, was founded for this purpose in 1907. Subversive material imported from Russia was circulated throughout Galicia right up to the outbreak of war and Russian subsidies were made available to support Ruthenian self-help organisations and to finance pilgrimages to Kiev. Determined efforts were made by the Russian Orthodox Church to proselytise the Ruthenians. After the failure of the Galician harvest in 1913, large shipments of grain arrived from Russia to succour the underprivileged Ruthenian peasantry. However, as far as the Poles were concerned, they were reasonably content with their position in Galicia, particularly in contrast to the rigorous anti-Polish policies
pursued in German and Russian Poland at that time. The outbreak of war found the Austrian Poles therefore in an ambivalent position; their nationalism was directed primarily against Russia. The Poles living in Germany and Russia, however, were not nearly so satisfied as the privi' >ged Austrian Poles of Galicia. Germany deluded herself into thinking that the hostility of Russian Poles toward St Petersburg implied that they were longing to be liberated by Germany when the time was ripe. In fact, few of the Poles living under the Tsar were prepared to
exchange Russian
for Prussian rule, paras there was a fairly strong social revolutionary undercurrent in the Polish independence movement at this time. Russian industrialisation had succeeded in tying important economic circles in Poland, especially in the textile industry, to the enormous Russian market.
ticularly
Top: Although on the whole Poland remained loyal to Russia, many Poles joined the armies of Pilsudski reviews men of his Polish Legion, which fought fortheAustrians. Above: Polish troops in action on the Eastern Front in late 1914
Germany and Austria-Hungary. Here
47:i
being at the same time choked Attempts at raising a Polish Legion in Germany wore fruitless. Polish 'Sharp-shooter' organisations under German tutelage were incorporated under Austro-Hungarian military command. By the end of 1914 Germany's flirtation with while
rowers
politically
nationalism was virtually over. The other major Slav nationality in Cis-
Polish
presented a very different The Czechs were both socially and economically on a much more complex level o( development. By 1914, the Czech Leithania
picture.
aristocracy had certainly lost its political influence among its own people. Middleclass virtues and middle-class feelings
dominant political and The setting up of a Czech University in Prague in 1882 (the ancient university of Prague, founded in 1348, had represented social
the
ethos.
to teaching in German under Habsburg rule — a cause of much discontent
turned
among
the Czechs) served to accelerate the
growth of a Czech professional class., and indeed by 1914 Czech officials had proliferated to a remarkable extent throughout the middle ranks of the Imperial bureaucracy in Cis-Leithania. Bohemia was the industrial heartland of the monarchy. Its rich coal and lignite deposits had led to the development of foundries and engineering industries and there was a well-organised and politically conscious Czech working class. Bohemia, its resources and its Czech population, played a central role in the monarchy. Its position could not be compared with that of Galicia, which was essentially a province on the periphery of the Empire. The Habsburgs could have managed without Austrian Poland; they could not survive the loss of Bohemia. The racial question in the Czech lands was particularly complicated by the presence there of a considerable German population — originally the descendants of
and craftsmen brought in by Czech kings from the 13th Century onwards. The Czechs thus had to contend with the German base of the Empire in Austria proper, and with large numbers of Germans in their own country who had been accustomed to a privileged position, both in political and social terms. During the last two decades of the 19th Century and subsequently, the Bohemian Germans found themselves increasingly on the defensive. Their monopoly of the professions was being diluted. Industrialisation was bringing Czech peasants from the countryside into the towns, most of which had hitherto been German strongholds. In Prague, for example, the Germans had been reduced from 18.5% of the city's population in 1880 settlers
8.5% in 1910. The new industries were also bringing Czechs to work in hitherto exclusively German-speaking areas. A to
Banka —
bank— Ziunostenskd supported Czech economic enterprise, and much was also done to raise the level of the peasantry by encouraging various forms of great Czech
agricultural co-operation.
Austria's most dangerous enemy A new political party was founded in 1890 by Thomas Masaryk, a Professor of Philosophy at the Czech U diversity in Prague. He called it the Realis. ^arty, because he and his friends rejected w at they regarded oreoccupation as the Czechs' unrealisti with their 'historic' state ri, ts. Masaryk preferred to look for a moder* federal and democratic Austria, where all i, >tionalities
474
would be able
to enjoy their natural rights. In retrospect this blueprint seems hardly
more realistic than the mirages pursued by Masaryk's opponents. Yet, despite his small following, Masaryk was a man to be reckoned with mainly because he was the first Czech politician of real international stature. He possessed great moral courage and integrity. To the disgust of Czech chauvinists he had exposed as forgeries allegedly mediaeval documents purporting to provide evidence of the past greatness of the Czech nation. He also acquired an international reputation by his defence of a Jew accused of ritual murder. His influence among the other Slavs of Austria-Hungary was considerable: students from all parts of the monarchy came to attend his lectures in Prague. In the event, Masaryk proved to be the Habsburgs' most dangerous enemy. When the war did break out in July 1914, however, the Czech lands were quiescent, although the Czechs were perturbed by the prospect of having to fight against Slav Russia. Masaryk was the first to grasp the wider implications and to seize the opportunity. He quickly came to the conclusion that the decrepit Empire could not survive a major war and in December 1914 he went abroad to enlist Allied support for the certain
Czech cause.
As a 'Realist', Masaryk soon realised that a Slav state in Central Europe, consisting
of
Bohemia and Moravia, would
viable and he consequently combined the causes of Czech and Slovak nationalism to form a new 'Czechoslovak' concept. This had some limited support
hardly
be
among Slovak intellectuals as a revival of the more romantic ideals of 1848. More significantly, it had some appeal among the numerous citizens of Slovak descent in the United States. The disparity between the historical and social background of the Czechs and Slovaks was considerable. The Slovaks were conquered by the Magyars in the 10th Century and the Habsburgs acquired them with the Hungarian Crown. As Slovakia had always been part of the inner Magyardominated core of the Kingdom of Hungary, and the Slovaks had never had a 'historic' state of their own, their political movements had to exist in the much more difficult conditions of the Hungarian half of the
dual monarchy. For centuries they had been exposed to the harsh pressures of Magyarisation. Yet for ten centuries they had succeeded in preserving their language and their national identity. During the 19th Century, the fever of nationalism had gripped Slovakia, but at no stage were the Magyars prepared to make any concessions or even to accept the existence of a Slovak nation. The process of Magyarisation was relentlessly pursued right to the very end. There were no Slovak institutions of higher education. And in 1874 the three existing Slovak secondary schools (serving almost 2,000,000 people) were closed. The activities of the Slovak educational self-help organisation—the Slovenskd Matica — were progressively curtailed until its dissolution in 1875 for allegedly promoting Pan-Slav tendencies. By comparison, the lot of the Czechs in Cis-Leithania was indeed en-
The Cis-Leithanian electoral reform of 1907 had no counterpart in the Hungarian kingdom; Slovak representation in the Budapest Parliament remained low (2 deputies in 1905, 7 in 1906 viable.
and only 3 in 1910). Emigration to America was understandably much higher than from any other region of Austria-Hungary. The Slovaks sometimes looked to Vienna but the terms of the 1867 really precluded any assistance from that quarter. Nevertheless, when Franz Josef found himself at odds with his Hungarian subjects over their contribution to the common AustroHungarian army in 1905/6, he threatened to broaden the franchise in Hungary. As this would have increased the representation of the Slav minorities, it was a potent argument. But for Franz Josef this notion was no more than a bargaining counter, to be abandoned when it had served its purpose. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir apparent, loathed the Magyar challenge to the dynastic position of the Habsburgs, but this did not mean that he had any special sympathies for the Slavs and, had he lived, it is by no means certain that he would have supported the Slovaks and other Slavs. Slovak nationalism was really kept alive by a small self-sustaining intellectual elite. In comparison with Bohemia, Slovakia was economically underdeveloped. Most Slovaks were peasants, there was no Slovak middle class and Slovaks even found it impossible to obtain more than a primary education in their own language. Religion played a much more direct part in politics than in Bohemia, simply because the Catholic Church and the small Protestant community in Central Slovakia were the only institutions not entirely submerged by the tide of Magyarisation. Austria-Hungary, then, had acute probfor
support,
Compromise
lems of nationality and language to face. But Germany and Russia also had large Polish minorities, and both powers optimistically hoped that the Poles in their opponent's territory would welcome them as liberators. The Poles in Austria-Hungary were comparatively well off, and prepared to support the Dual Monarchy, but rivalries between the various nationalities were to problems for Austriaendless Hungary, particularly in her armed forces.
cause
Further Reading Macartney, C. A., The Habsburg Empire, 1790-
1918 (London 1968) Macartney, C. A., Hung-
(OUP
y and
her Successors
1965)
Macartney, C. A., and Palmer, A. W., Independent Eastern Europe (Macmillan 1967) May, A. J., The Passing of the Habsburg Monarchy (OUP 1966) Seton-Watson, R. W., Racial Problems in
Hungary (London 1908) Seton-Watson, R. W., A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (OUP 1943) Taylor, A. J. P., The Habsburg Monarchy
(OUP 1948) Thomson, S. Harrison, Czechoslovakia in European History (Cass 1966) Wiskemann, E., Czechs and Germans (Macmillan 1967)
Zeman, Z. A. B., The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire (OUP 1961)
OTTO PICK was
born in Prague and educated at the Prague and Oxford. He has lectured at universities in Britain, Canada, the USA and Germany and is currently Reader in International Relations at the University of Surrey. He has published many articles on East European affairs and a book on Czechoslovakia. Universities of
GERMANY: 4 NKW STRATEGY The
Schlieffen Plan
and the
had
man charged
was unable
failed,
with
than a
be turned into concrete strategic plans remained to be seen. In fact Falkenhayn
sure that the German army could destroy French fighting power with one gigantic blow and overrun France: the western Allies would be forced to sue for peace, and the enemy in the East would either follow suit immediately or be defeated with little difficulty. Indeed, their confidence had been so great that they had failed to work out an alternative strategy to meet the needs of a protracted war; they had even omitted to seize the practically undefended Channel Ports when they could have done, during the retreat of the French and British forces. The setback came as a profound shock, even to the few Germans who had felt misgivings for some time. One of the immediate effects was that Moltke suffered a severe breakdown in health and morale. It was obvious that he would have to be replaced. The appointment of his successor took place at the Kaiser's headquarters in Luxembourg on the evening of September 14. The War Minister, Lieutenant -General Erich von Falkenhayn, was entrusted with the full powers of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army in the Field, although the change in command
was not made
public for the time being. It was feared that Moltke's would be correctly interpreted as an admission of failure, and this would encourage the enemy, dismay the German people, and make a bad impression on those neutrals whose confidence both sides in the war were strenuously attempting to gain. Moltke was ordered to remain at Supreme Command headquarters,
dismissal
but not to interfere with the conduct of operations. To Falkenhayn himself his appointment did not come as a surprise. As early as August 10, General von Lyncker, Chief of the Military Cabinet, had asked Falkenhayn whether he was prepared to take over if Moltke should show himself unequal to the task, and Falkenhayn had eagerly affirmed that he was. In the army at large, however, the choice of Falkenhayn as supreme commander was as unexpected as it was unpopular. For one thing, at 53 he was younger than any of the army and corps commanders under him, with the exception of the Crown Prince. Worse than
Here Leo Kahn
Moltke's plans had achieved — deadlock. German troops on the Eastern Front look out at the same barbed wire and machine guns that were to bedevil Falkenhayn's own planning. His preference for the west led him to ignore the favourable situation in the east.
ideas,
felt
little.
describes the transference of power and the problems faced by the new man. Left: All that
but whether or not these could
Germany's hopes of a speedy and decisive victory in the west had faded with the battle of the Marne and the withdrawal of her armies on the right wing. Clearly, the German soldier would not be 'home before Christmas'. It is doubtful whether such high expectations could have been fulfilled even if the Schlieffen Plan, or the modified version of it that Moltke put into operation, had fully succeeded; but speculations of this kind are futile. The important point is that the German military and political leaders had staked all on the success of the Schlieffen strategy. They had
make any radical
alterations, and the situation dictated his strategy. Thus Falkenhayn was unable to alter his predecessor's plans more
its
execution did not long remain in favour. He also suffered a severe breakdown in health and morale. It was not long therefore before Moltke was replaced by Erich von Falkenhayn, the Prussian Minister for War, and on September 14 Falkenhayn took on the responsibilities of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army in the Field.
The new man had new
to
that, his training at the General Staff had been comparatively and he did not share in the prestige of those who had sat
short,
at the feet of the great Schlieffen. The Kaiser's preference smacked of favouritism. What kind of a man was Falkenhayn? He came from an old and noble Prussian family with strong military traditions. At the age he entered cadet school and later attended the War Acadeim of where he was counted among the outstanding students. He served for a little over three years in the General Staff under Count Waldersee, who also thought highly of his abilities. From 1896 to 1902 he was in China, first as a military instructor, then as a 1
1
.
German Expeditionary Corps at the time of the Boxer Rebellion. The experience helped him to acquire a wider mental horizon than that of the average Prussian officer, and it sharpened his interest in international politics. After his return to Germany, the progress of his career was fairly quick, though not spectacular. By 1912, at the age of 50, he was Chief-of-Staff of IV Corps with the rank of Major-General. A post of this nature no longer satisfied his growing ambitions and he fell discontented and restless. Only a year later, however, the Kaiser made him Minister of War. How this sudden elevation to one of the highest and most important offices of state came about remains something of a staff officer in the
mystery. It lends colour to the allegation, voiced bj many of Ins contemporaries, that Falkenhayn, who usually made no effort to win the affection of colleagues and subordinates, could he very adroit in courting the goodwill of those who could further his career. However that may bo, he proved himself to he a gifted administrator, who dealt very efficiently with the problems arising from the vast increases in the personnel and equipment of the armed forces. His performance in parliamentary debates was also creditable. Although he was a staunch conservative and rather narrow-minded nationalist facing a more liberal majority in the Reichstag, he displayed enough restraint and formal courtesj to avoid violent clashes on most occasions. He represented the interests of his department forcefully, yet was careful not to press extreme demands, as the diehards ol the military establish
menl urged him to do. Altogether, he showed an inclination to compromise or hide his time rather than risk defeat: an attitude which makes for success in politics, hut can he fatal in he e. induct t
of
mi itan operat 1
On August joined
ion-.
Hi, Falkenhayn and his mobile staff left Berlin and Moltke's wartime headquarters at Koblenz, where the
1, 3
d
V 1,
me
informed and make his influence felt, hut in this he was disappointed. Moltke and his staff, understandably, resented his presence and co-operated as little as they could. Moreover, it soon turned out that the information which Moltke himself received from his army commanders left much to be desired As soon as things began to go wrong, news from the battlefronts became inadequate and misleading. Even so, Falkenhayn assessed the developing situation more soberly than the General Staff and the generals in the field, and was not carried away by the unbounded optimism which was prevalent among the Germans up to he disaster of the Marne. He recognised many of the mistakes that were committed and the flaws in the victories which were achieved. He pointed out that it was vitally important to occupy the Channel coast while there was time, and he warned against the premature crossing of the Marne. He realised, even though not to its fullest extent, the danger which threatened the German armies from the direction of Paris. He was aware that Moltke's strategy was but a travesty of Schlieffen's ideas, which it was supposed to follow. The Schlieffen Plan,' he said on September 1. has not even started yet." There has been considerable argument whether Falkenhayn had ever been a true adherent of the Schlieffen school of thought. This was certainly the case inasmuch as he had been as convinced as everybody else in Germany that quick victory in the W est was the obvious aim, which could be achieved by a wide, enveloping sweep of the German right wing. But it was also true that he had altogether little faith in strategic theory. His approach was essentially pragmatic. A military leader, he believed, should meet any situation as it arose and not try to impose his will on events in accordance with preconceived ideas. He had not made a very thorough study of Schlieffen's strategy, and did not understand all its implications; when it failed, he was unable to draw
keep himself
fully
t
the logical conclusions.
We may now sum up the basic qualities of the man who took command at the first great turning point of the war. There is no doubt that he was a thoroughly competent professional soldier. His grasp of factual elements was quick and sure, but he had little imagination, and his ideas were conventional. He was a good administrator, though rather shy of radical reforms. (It is significant that he made no changes in the OHL operational staff, of which he had been severely critical.) His capacity for hard work was outstanding. He had complete confidence in the superiority of his own judgement, without the gift of inspiring confidence in
The Schlieffen Plan has not even started yet' Casualties among men and animals as a result of the conditions were very substantial on the Eastern Front, creating a great drain on the resources of the already over-extended combatants
mm
uuiera. nt; wtih uiimiuuuh, out ne iacK.eu trie ooiuness, conviction that luck was with him, which marks the great leader. The doubts which others felt about Falkenhayn's ability to make the resolute and imaginative decisions which the hour demanded were soon justified. In his war memoirs, Falkenhayn tries to convey the impression that the situation which confronted him in the middle of September was one of acute danger, requiring quick, temporary remedies and leaving no room for a fundamental recasting of overall strategy. As an objective assessment this cannot be accepted without great reservations.
'Hanging in the air' Let us examine the situation in broad outlines. On the Western Front, the German retreat had come to a halt, and in some places lost ground had been regained. The German armies had reestablished cohesion all along the line. The dangerous gap between First and Second Armies had been effectively sealed up on the very day that Falkenhayn succeeded to the supreme command. The engagements which followed the battle of the Marne had revealed that on the whole tactical conditions favoured the defence, even against superior numbers. It had certainly been a weakness in the German position that the Belgian army still held Antwerp, but one can hardly agree with Falkenhayn that this constituted a serious threat to the rear of the German army. There was only one real danger-point: The western wing of the
German army was 'hanging in the air' and obviously exposed to an outflanking movement by the enemy, and the Germans knew moving strong forces westwards. Here quick countermeasures were indeed urgently demanded, and in this connection we must mention another factor which rightly that the French were
had a decisive place
in Falkenhayn's deliberations. During their retreat the Belgians and the French had destroyed a large part of the railway installations, so that the movement of troops and supplies behind the German front was greatly hampered. The only supply line fully intact was that leading from Brussels via Mons and Cambrai to St Quentin. Altogether, then, it may be said that the situation on the
Western Front presented some clear-cut, immediate problems and was fraught with uncertainty from a long-term point of view. As far as the near future was concerned, the position was not really critical.
On the other hand, a truly alarming situation had developed in the Eastern theatre of war, though not in the German sector. The Austrian armv had suffered a heavv defeat in Galicia at
AFalkenhayn faced the problem of trying to reconcile the conflicting requirements of all the areas in which German troops were fighting
A Hindenburg and Ludendorff had their attenon the area which was their consider the Western Front
tion too firmly fixed
special concern to
V The stabilisation of the front
in
boded no good -all Falkenhayn could expect was a series of Allied offensives the west
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Maine, but it was still in full retreat and there was no telling when and where the retreat would come to an end. All seemed to depend on the question whether or not the Russians would forcefully press their advantage. If they did, the consequences were incalculable. Upper Silesia with its indispensable wealth of mining and industrial resources would be in danger of being overrun. Further Russian successes on a large scale would destroy any hope o\' bringing Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers and of closing the Dardanelles to the sea traffic of the Entente. They could also very well lead to a rapid disintegration of the shaky internal structure of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which, would then cease to be an effective military power. All questions of loyalty apart, it was clearly in Germany's vital interest to come to the aid of her ally as strongly and as soon* as possible. By contrast, the situation in the German sector was not only stable, at least for the time being, but held the distinct promise o( future victories, provided the necessary reinforcements were made available. The German army led by Hindenburg and LudendorfF, the victors of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes,
uciU'Uiivcu Liic iiivduiug lvussicui .niiiii^ iiuiii i\;isi riussia anu pushed them beyond the River Niemen. German generalship had proved itself superior to the Russian, the German war machine was infinitely more efficient, and it was supported by an excellent system of railway communications. Only lack of sufficient manpower, combined with the bad news from the Galician front, was preventing the German forces from pursuing the Russian Niemen Army and possibly striking another crippling blow. It follows from this summary of the war situation as it presented itself to German eyes in mid-September that it was not only possible for Falkenhayn, but actually imperative, to formulate a new general strategy and convey his ideas to all the military and political leaders. He himself was under no illusion that it was still possible to fall back on original aims of the Schlieffen Plan. In his words, 'the intention of forcing a speedy decision which had hitherto been the foundation of the German plan had come to nought. A very much longer duration of the war than was generally assumed was certainly to be reckoned with.' Such a radical change in the whole character of the war obviously called for a new plan, but instead of this Falkenhayn merely made a succession of isolated and often inconsistent decisions.
The Austrian monster in action. The Powers was superior in all respects
Right:
Below: Guns largest
gun
in
artillery of
the Central
the East. The Austrian 30.5-cm howitzer theatre of the war
was the
in this
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The first, fundamental question to be answered was this: should the order of the two-front war now be reversed, that is to say, should the Germans go on the defensive in the West until the Russians were defeated, and, in order to achieve this, transfer the main weight of their forces to the East? As we have seen, the misfortunes of the Austrian armies had made it in any case impossible for Germany to maintain a passive role with weak forces on the Russian front; and the German successes, though as yet far from decisive, seemed to indicate that a fairly quick defeat of the Russian colossus was quite feasible. Half-hearted strategy Falkenhayn rejected the idea out of hand
for various reasons. In the first place, the notion that a decision must first be sought in the West was too deeply ingrained in him to be abandoned as long as there was any choice. Also, he did not credit the possibility of an early Russian collapse, and he was less impressed with the victories in East Prussia than most people. He still took it for granted that the Russians would make use of -their vast territory to avoid decisive battles and thus give the Germans no chance of an early victory. A more telling reason was probably the realisation that a shift of the major war effort to the East would necessarily involve, on the Western Front, a large-scale withdrawal to shortened lines and easily defensible positions. This would have meant giving up large tracts of economically and strategically valuable territory in Northern France and Belgium. It would also have meant leaving the initiative to the Allies, and this for a length of time which one could not assess. He shared with practically all his fellow generals an excessive fear of the effects of withdrawal on morale, as well as an implicit faith in the superior merit of offensive action at all times. 'But to a German leader it was quite beyond doubt that the securing of the Western Front had to be attempted by means of an offensive, so long as such a
thing seemed at
To conquer
came back
to it. It seems that he was not yet thinking in purely strategic terms; he was still reacting to the shock of the German retreat. He saw the vital importance of the Race to the Sea', but he also wanted to show the enemy at once that the defeat of the Marne had not robbed the German army of its power to hit back.
He immediately
West continued, therefore, to be the guiding principle, and the immediate aim was the thorough consolidation of the German position on the Western Front. But did Falkenhayn, in those early days of his command, have any clear conception of how it was to be achieved? If he did, then only in general outline, too sketchy to be called a plan. The Germans would check the Allies' outflanking attempts and counter with an enveloping movement of their own: the German right wing would be firmly established on the sea; possession of the Channel coast would be secured. There was no longer any hope that even the complete success of such operations would bring the war to
along the front.
While the fighting of the preceding weeks had not prevented the Allies from building up their left wing, the Germans had succeeded in repulsing all their attempts to turn the German Hank. Falkenhayn now saw his opportunity which he hoped would turn the tide once again in Germany's favour. He formed a new army for this purpose from four recently raised army corps, strengthened by the forces which had besieged Antwerp. His decision to use raw and hastily trained troops in a decisive battle on difficult terrain is usually accounted as one of Falkenhayn's major blunders, especially as experienced troops were available. The only excuse is that by that time, partly through his own mistakes, Falkenhayn was under pressure of time.
The perennial problem — to give
of all in the
an end in 1914, it would at least place the German forces in a dominating position for future far-reaching operations. The general intention was sound and, once the alternative of a temporary withdrawal had been rejected, probably the only one with which the Germans might be able to avoid a fatal deadlock. Falkenhayn could not yet tell exactly when and where he would start the envisaged enveloping offensive, but one thing was obvious even then: it was essential to build up the strength of the right wing at all costs, even at the risk of weakening parts of the rest of the front. Falkenhayn did something towards this end, but he was half-hearted about it. True, large-scale troop movements from one sector to another were difficult owing to the bad state of the railways, but they were not impossible. General Groener, the expert on rail transport on Falkenhayn's staff, had produced a workable plan, which he submitted to Falkenhayn on September 15, but Falkenhayn did not accept it then and never
all
intact.
all possible.'
first
ordered counterattacks
was a decision which even the stoutest defenders of Falkenhayn find difficult to explain. If the purpose had partly been to slow down the westward movement of French troops, it became soon evident that Falkenhayn had miscalculated; yet he persisted in the attacks. The heavy losses in officers and men which the German armies had suffered was already making itself felt, and ammunition was beginning to run short. The Germans could ill afford to squander fighting strength in fierce battles which had little chance of affecting the main issue. Only one of the attacks made sense and brought results: Antwerp was reduced on October 9. By then, the other battles had ceased. The Belgian army which had defended Antwerp escaped It
first priority to
the West or to the East? Falkenhayn's first plan to envelop the Allies by a wide sweep up to the Channel coast and then southwards had not taken sufficient account of the Allies' own aggressive intentions and proved
to be impracticable. Subsequently, a well-designed trap because the Allied command called off an offensive which had obviously intended. The time for subtle and imaginative
failed it
was past. clear that the main battleground had shifted from France to Flanders, where a strong British force was concentrated at Ypres, covered on both flanks by Franch and Belgian forces. An enemy offensive from Ypres towards Bruges was imminent. Falkenhayn forestalled it, by the narrowest margin of time, by starting his own offensive at Ypres on October '20. The complete confidence in victory which Falkenhayn seems to have felt at the beginning of the Ypres offensive was certainly misplaced. He greatly underrated the quality of the British regular army and the physical difficulties which the muddy soil of Flanders presented to the impetus of attack. The last desstrategy It
was
179
r>o:}
potato German effort to force a decision in the West before the winter set in was foiled, but it so nearly succeeded that it must be considered a justified attempt. 11 wrong decisions had been made, thej had been made earlier.
Complete victory possible the meantime, the situation in tho Eastern theatre of war had improved considerably. The Russians had stopped their pursuit of the Austrian army under the throat of an attack by the German Ninth Army in Silesia, which actually pushed deeply into Poland during tho first days of October. The German operations undertaken to relieve the pressure on the Austrian ally exposed East Prussia to renewed Russian offensives, but for once Ealkcnhayn was willing to accept a risk of this kind. Tho Russians wore showing no signs of relying on an evasive strategy; on the contrary the\ were preparing for massive assaults on Poson and Silesia, and Ludendorff was planning a sharp, decisive blow against the right flanks of the expected Russian advance. In view of these facts Falkenhayn changed his former views completely: he also was now convinced that full victory over Russia could be achieved fairly quickly. Again the question arose whether the time had come to transfer troops on a large scale from the home reserves and the quiet sectors of the Western Front to the East. Conrad, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, and Ludendorff urged Falkenhayn with increasing vigour to do this. Falkenhayn, however, still hesitated. His support for the German army in the East remained, for the time being, tardy and inadequate. As a result, when Ludendorff caught and defeated the Russians at Lodz he was unable to complete the encirclement which he had planned. Lodz was another brilliant victory which missed being decisive. With the battles of Ypres and Lodz the first phase of the war was over. On both the Western and Eastern Fronts the fighting had ended in deadlock. Ever since the battle of the Marne Falkenhayn had wavered between the realisation that a long, uncertain war was lying ahead and the tenacious hope that a speedy, decisive lii
victory over the enemy in the West could still be achieved; 'First Ypres' had settled the question; nor could there be any doubt now that for a long time to come major operations on land would be confined to the East. The so far vaguely perceived danger of the British blockade was now recognised by Falkenhayn as the most important factor in the war situation. Beyond this, he did not, and Falkenhayn's inheritance, the result of Moltke's strategy -trenches right up to the North Sea
perhaps could not, form a clear plan of the means by which the war might be brought to a victorious, or at least tolerable, finish. In the preparation for a drawn-out struggle Falkenhayn did the things which obviously had to be done, and did them extremely well. Under his direction the technique of trench warfare was developed to a high pitch of perfection, and it was largely due to his initiative that in Germany a superb system of war economy and war production was brought into being. Falkenhayn's reputation as a supreme commander is low; lower, perhaps, than he deserves. He inherited a more than difficult situation, which nobody in Germany had foreseen and planned for. Many of his errors of judgement were due to an attitude of mind which he shared with most military men of his time. Given the blunders committed by the Allies after their victory on the Marne, a great leader might still have prevented a fatal war of attrition. But Falkenhayn was not a great man, and if one were asked to sum up German post-Marne strategy in one sentence, one could only say: strictly speaking, there was no strategy.
Further Reading Blebruck, Hans, Ludendorff,
Tirpitz,
Falkenhayn
(Berlin: Carl Curtuis,
1920)
Falkenhayn, Erich von, General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its Critical Decisions (Hutchinson) Liddell Hart, Sir Basil, A History of the World War 1914-1918 (Faber & Faber, 1934)
Moser, Otto von, Kurzer strategischer Uberblick uber den Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Berlin: Mittler & Sohn) Zwehl. H. von. Erich von Falkenhayn, eine biographische Studie (Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1920)
LEO KAHN was
born in Germany in 1909 and studied law and history at the Cologne and Berlin where he obtained the degree of a German doctor of law. He emigrated to England in 1937. After the war he worked as Reader and Editor for London publishers and published the novel Obliging Fellow in 1946 He joined the staff of the Weiner Library in 1956 as head of the Historical Manuscripts Section and has been Principal Archivist and head of the universities of
Foreign Documents Centre of the Imperial
War Museum.
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At the beginning of September 1914 both Austria and Serbia were poised to launch offensives. Serbia struck first, and Austria a day later. Both efforts failed and had little effect on the course of the war, yet losses exceeded those in the First Serbian Campaign. Leo Kahn. Above: Serbian irregulars watch for invaders
Id
Alter their first, disastrous attempt to crush Serbia it might have been expected that the Austrians would reverl to the
a place called Kupmski Kut, situated about midway bet ween Macva and Belgrade, where a loop of thi' river formed a narrow tongue of land belonging to Austria, but completely dominated on three sides by Serbian artillery. It was an ideal place for the enterprise. The crossing was effected without great difficulty and a strong bridgehead was soon established. In the following two days the First Army succeeded in enlarging the bridgehead and began its advance towards the north and north-west. at
German General Stall had urged upon them even before host ties had started: that of using no more than the necessary minimum offerees in a defensive war against Serbia and throwing every available unit against the Russians into the vital Galician sector. At that time, the Austrian High Command had sent about strategy which the
i
1
i
two-fifths of their mobilized forces to the south-eastern war theatre, in the lingering hope that Russia, despite her threats, would not enter the war, or at least not at once; when that hope had faded it had been considered too late to interfere with a deployment already in full swing. The events of August had shown only too clearly that Austria-Hungary lacked the strength to force decisions in her favour on two fronts at the same time, but General Potiorek, smarting from his defeat, wa. determined to renew the offensive against Serbia as soon as possible. This time he planned to concentrate his forces for a massive offensive on one broad front along the river Drina. The Army High Command hesitated for a short time. They thought
Extreme lack of prudence In the meant line, things had been going badly with the Serbs on a secondary, though by no means unimportant, invasion
front.
that there was still a chance that Bulgaria would declare war on Serbia and take part in the operations. When this did not
happen, General Potiorek was given a free hand, with one emphatic reservation: on no account must he 'risk anything that
might lead
was uppermost
Entrenched Austrian inrantry wan and invade Serbia
to
go over
to trie
offensive
exhaustion had prevented the Serbs from pursuing the beaten enemy across the border, but after a week's respite they felt strong
enough
Austrian
to carry territory. The
the
war
into
General Staff, therefore, elaborated a plan for what is
commonly known
as 'the expedition in the conquest of the district of Syrmia was intended to be, not a mere expedition, but the first essential phase of a general invasion of Bosnia. The plan was duly communicated to Serbia's allies, who offered their strong moral encouragement, though no material help. Thus, in the beginning of September, each side was poised to launch an ambitious offensive, and in both plans sentiment played a more decisive part than a sober assessment of the chances of success. The Serbs struck first: their invasion of Syrmia started in the early hours of September 6. Field-Marshal Putnik had prepared the offensive in the greatest secrecy — not even his own generals were informed of his intentions until the very last moment — but the surprise which he achieved was only a tactical one without much significance. On the Austrian side. General Potiorek had foreseen the possibility of a Serbian move into Syrmia. He did not, however, regard the contingency as a serious threat that would compel him to reconsider his own invasion plans. The Serbs, he predicted correctly, would not be able to penetrate far beyond the frontier. The Serbian First Army crossed the Sava
Syrmia'. In
Timok
1.
3th Regiment, was immediately pushed forward between these two towns. By 1700 hours of September 6 it was outside the town of Shashinski, while other units were still struggling to complete the crossing of the Save. The inevitable result followed. The exposed column was attacked from two sides, and it was only by miracles of individual bravery that a considerable body of men managed to extricate themselves from a hopeless light and regained the Serbian banks of the river. The defeat of the Timok I Division did not amount to an immediate danger to the main Serbian force, but it compelled the First Army to advance with more caution than would have been required if the planned-for support on the left flank had been forthcoming. Various units fought a 1
in
The Serbs, on their part, were becoming over-confident, partly as a natural result of their own success, partly because the news of Russian victories in Galicia helped to create an exaggerated impression of Austria-Hungary's military weakness. After the battle of the Jadar valley, shortage of supplies and sheer physical
of their divisions, the
stead, half of the division's strength, the
to a further fiasco'. Clearly, the
question of prestige everybody's mind.
One
had been ordered to cross over at points near Yasenova Grada, on a stretch of river between the Austrian towns of Mitrovitz and Yarak. Its objective was to gain a firm foothold in the Mitrovitz district and subsequently to render support to the main invasion force on the left flank. The crossings were strongly contested and could be accomplished only with some delay and in successive stages. In their eagerness to make up for lost time the Serbs then proceeded with an extreme lack of prudence. They omitted to fortify a bridgehead, and they made no attempt to take either Mitrovitz or Yarak, which were both held by comparatively feeble Austrian forces. In-
fact,
number
of
successful
engagements and
occupied several towns, Yarak among them. However, five days after the start of the expedition the Serbs were still far from their first objective of any real importance—the possession of the summits of the Frushkagora mountain range, which would be the key to success in the intended invasion of Bosnia. By that time, the Austrians had mounted their offensive across the Drina, and the Serbian forces
Syrmia had to be recalled. They were now urgently needed in the defence of in
own country. The Austrian offensive opened in considerable strength -six army corps were engaged — during the night of September 7/8. The Austrians attacked along the their
King Peter of Serbia: he described himself as an old broken man on the edge of the grave
482
MHM ^HBl
whole stretch of the Drina lying between Ratcha in the north and Lyubovna in the south. The Serbian army, equally deployed in a long continuous line on the river bank, was under orders to defend every square inch of Serbian territory. Throughout the second Austrian invasion there was little room for imaginative strategy and tactical finesse. It was a matter of straightforward, frontal assaults, stubborn defence, and im-
mediate counter-thrusts. The campaign, as we shall see, had hardly any effect on the course of the war, hut it contained some of the most ferocious fighting of the war, and the losses in men and material exceeded those of the First Serbian Campaign. For the purpose of summarising the course of operations, two sectors with sharply contrasting geographical features may he distinguished: a northern sector in the
flat,
fertile
lands of the
Macva
recently reinforced Austrian mount;. in corps were extremely well trained and equipped for this kind of warfare. In the event, the outnumbered and outgunned Serbs could offer but feeble resistance in the first stages of the attack. They could not prevent the Austrians from overrunning the strip of land between river and mountains and penetrating into the mountain regions themselves. Putnik's m'sjudgment of the enemy's strength does not altogether explain the
dis-
and another sector in the mountain country stretching southward from the town of Loznica. trict,
In the
northern sector, the Austrians
first
the river and establish a hridgehead at Limanska Ada, in the central part of the sector. The attack, although tenaciously pressed and supported by heavy artillery fire, was repulsed three times and finally abandoned. But the Austrians were successful at a point further north where a tongue of land, the Parashnitza (resembling the Kupinski Kut mentioned in connection with the Syrmian expedition), offered an invading force the same favourable conditions. The establishment of the Parashnitza bridgehead was to remain the only real success which the Austrians achieved in the northern sector. Their attack never gained momentum. There followed a series of bloody skirmishes which yielded no decisive advantage to either side. After five days the fighting died down, and the opposing forces dug themselves in on the lines which they were holding. The offensive developed with much greater force in the southern sector, and this had not been expected by Marshal Putnik. He tried
riddle of his tactical dispositions.
to cross
had weakened his front by withdrawing troops from it for the Syrmian campaign, for he had not believed that the Austrians would be inclined to risk a major effort in difficult mountain terrain. However, the
He had
reckoned with the possibility of an Austrian attack in this sector, even if he had underrated the weight with which it might be carried out. Why, then, had he left his troops in exposed positions on the river bank? Why had he not entrenched them firmly in the natural strategic positions presented by the Yagodnya — Boranya--Guchevo mountain range and, to the north, by the Iverak and Cer mountains? No rational answer has been suggested by anybody. In all probability the ensuing, punishing battles for the possession of single summits and other vantage points could have been avoided, and it is very doubtful that the Austrians could even have held on to their bridgeheads if the Serbs had been in strongly fortified mountain positions not far distant.
The Austrian army maintained the offenSeptember 28. The actions which
sive until
were fought during that time, with alternating success, were individually not significant enough to merit detailed des-
Two
the struggle indicate the nature of this part of the campaign. In the case of the Gucevo summit, ten days of continuous and bitter fighting resulted in a situation where the mountain ridges were divided between the two sides, so that neither had obtained the advantage cription. for
instances
in
commanding heights may
for
which
instance
it
had striven
was
The other Matchko Kamen
so hard.
that of the
mountains, which was taken and retaken eight times. One of the Serbian regiments taking part lost no less than two-thirds of its officer strength in these engagements. In the end the Austrians prevailed, hut were too exhausted to reap the tactical benefits of their victory. Clearly, this kind of fighting could not continue indefinitely. It was. no doubt. mainly the extreme fatigue of the troops, and tbe fact that no decisive success was in sight, that induced the Austrian Command to call a halt to the offensive. There may, however, have been an additional consideration. The Serbian Uzice Army, in
combination with Montenegrin forces, had made an impressive advance into southern Bosnia. This theatre of operations, up to then regarded as fairly safe and unimportant, suddenly seemed to require increased attention. The Austrians had failed in their second invasion attempt almost as completely, if less dramatically, as they had in the first. Their big effort had yielded them nothing but some tiny territorial gains of virtually no strategic value: a tract of marshy plain north of the Macva, a triangular piece of rugged mountain territory in the southern sector, and the isolated Parashnitza bridgehead. Austria's military prestige had suffered a further blow.
The
fortified front lines
which had been
established did not remain quiet for long. Through the whole of October there developed a stubbornly conducted trench .warfare, costly and essentially futile at the same time. It was an unmistakable sign that the Austrians had no intention of disengaging themselves on the Serbian front as much as possible, hut, on the contrary, were resolved to resume the offensive in the near future.
.1
e i
•
l. \ -%
\.
d c h e
d
Serbian refugees: sights
like this
had a demoralising
effect
on retreating Serbian troops, some
of
whom
deserted to help their families
183
and
had suffered an unexpected and humiliating defeat by the Serbian army in the Jadar vallej A minor second Austrian offensive began on September 7, and led to some very bitter lighting with heavy losses on both sides. Little territory changed hands, and the Austrians finally withdrew Meanwhile. Serbian and Montenegrin troops entered Bosnia from the south, and even threatened Sarajevo. The Austrian commander, General Potiorek, had to divert forces to deal with this threat, but by the end of October Bosnia had been cleared of Serbian forces. Potiorek had been the military governor of Sarajevo, and he had been responsible for security arrangements on the day of Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination. Consequently, defeat of the Serbs was a matter of personal vindication for him, as well as a military objective. After the continued lighting of October, Potiorek now possessed some strong bridgeheads over the River Drina, but Belgrade was still in Serbian hands. The position was galling for the armies of the Dual Monarchy. The despised Serbian state was still checking them after three months of war. Originally the Chief of the Austrian Staff, General
S3 \h THE SECOND ONSLAUGHT Austria's second major offensive against Serbia began so well that it seemed as though Serbia must be subjugated. But Austria's advance slowed as her supply lines became overextended. Serbia had time for a desperate counteroffensive, surprising the Austrians and causing them to retreat again. Josephine Newcombe. Below: Serbian infantry on the attack
Conrad von Hbtzendorff, had forecast that Serbia would be destroyed in 14 days, and he had hoped to inflict the decisive blow before the Russians mobilised, and thus be in a position to transfer troops north to meet the Russian threat.
w
The Austrian Second Army had been removed from Serbia after the August campaign, to fight in Galicia, for Conrad considered this front to be of greater strategic importance. This left Potiorek with the Sixth Army under his command, and the Fifth
Army, commanded by General Frank.
In October, Potiorek sent a complaint to
Vienna, direct to the Emperor, by-passing the army GHQ, saying that he was being deprived of munitions, which were being sent to the Galician front instead. There
was
certainly a reluctance in Vienna to let the Serbian victory stand, so, to the annoyance of Conrad, Potiorek was given a free hand in Serbia and could now act independently of the Austrian GHQ. It seemed important to him to carry on the offensive and to launch a third invasion, despite the fact that it was now the end of October, bad weather had set in, rain was flooding the plains and snow was falling in the mountains. Roads in Serbia were generally poor, and were now badly churned up by the traffic of the armies. Yet Serbia for the past decade had been a
thorn in the Austrian flesh. Austria's war aims were vague, but in the years before the war, as A. J. P. Taylor comments, 'the defeat of the "South-Slav conspiracy" became the solution for all the difficulties of the Habsburg monarchy'. Bosnia and Herzegovina had been annexed in 1908, and now Serbia was to be broken. Serbia also blocked the single north-south route down the Balkan peninsula connecting the Hungarian plain with Salonika and Constantinople. Turkey entered the war on October 29, and this had extended the area covered by general operations, but by the
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enu ui nuveinuci uic amcs ui nciiuci aiuc had given any support to the combatants. Britain, France and Russia had not yet given Serbia practical help, nor had Bulgaria come into the war as expected to assist Austria.
Difficult
mountain terrain
The theatre of operations for the battles of November and December 1914 included some ground fought over in the earlier Austrian offensives — but it was to extend
much
further east this time into the mountains of Serbia. The Sava and Drina rivers formed natural barriers to the north and west of Serbia. To the north the Serbs
held the Macva plain. This was rich land, and the Serbs were reluctant to relinquish it, but the defenders were in range of Austrian river monitors on the Sava, and the constant bombardments from these craft forced the Serbs to abandon the
Macva on November
1. It had also begun and the riverside trenches had become untenable. To the south of the Macva is the ridge of the Cer hills, a spur of the main mountain range running
to flood,
roughly south-east across Serbia. Much of the campaign was to be fought over this difficult mountain territory to the south of the River Jadar, and on the watershed of the Kolubara river, which lent its name to the main battle of the campaign. After the siege warfare of October, when the positions of the armies had not altered in the north and west, the Serbian* army was becoming exhausted. Its line was very extended in proportion to the size of the army, and there was little rest for the troops. They had to remain for days without relief in the sector of muddy earth-
works allotted to them. Austrian superiority in guns and ammunition was increasing, and at the end of October the Serbian line was subjected to an intense bombardment. The Serbian Second Army retired from the Macva plain to the foothills of the Cer range on November 1, but the
uuiuuarumttiiLS sun iiiui easeu in iurtc. o^y their strategic retreat to the Cer hills, the Serbians hoped to gain vantage points on heights to compensate for the inferiority of their artillery. During the first few days of November the Austrians established a salient in the Macva, and reorganised their forces, which
had been diverted by the Serbian invasion of Bosnia. On the night of November 5/6 the Austrian bombardment was particularly vigorous to the south of the Jadar, across the Drina to the Gueevo range. On November 6, General Potiorek, freed from the orders of his GHQ, gave the order to his armies to retake the general offensive. For their third invasion the Austrians still kept their general strategy of striking across the Drina from Bosnia, but now their principal forces were concentrated in the southern sector of the theatre. Between Loznica and Ljubovija 110 Austrian battalions faced 72 Serbian ones. Potiorek had selected the most difficult terrain on the whole frontier for attack, evidently relying on his superiority in artillery. Once again the town of Valjevo was an initial objective. This was a railhead, and a junction of routes, and was the fist step in realising the ultimate aim of the capture of the Serbian arsenal at Kragujevac. The thickly wooded mountainous country across which the Austrians would advance was not suited for defensive operations. The Serbs were ill-equipped for mountain warfare, and their infantry had not had the same opportunity for rest as the Austrians. From the point of view of numbers and supplies Potiorek had every chance of success in the campaign.
A patriotic peasant army The two armies were disposed in the following order on November 6. Serbia had some independent units in four detachments defending Belgrade. These were troops of the third Ban, or line (composed of older men and untrained soldiers). The Serbian right
wing,
lu
(.lie
nui
l
ii,
wa.3
iui
aicu uy
Army was the main left wing, and was based further south from Kostajnik to the River Uzovnica. The Uzice Army (recruited round the town of Uzice) formed First
left flank along the Drina to the River Lim. Beyond the Uzice Army was a small detachment of Montenegrins. In all the Serbian army consisted of 204 battalions of infantry (including 25 battalions of third Ban troops. There were 41 squadrons of cavalry, 101 artillery batteries and 150 machine guns.. The Serbian troops had been recruited on a territorial basis, men of the same company often being from the same village. The men were mainly peasants, fiercely patriotic, but depressed by retreats, particularly when they had to abandon their own land to the enemy. Ox transport was generally used because of the very rough country. The infantry of the first and second Ban were armed for the most part with Mauser rifles. Austria had two armies, the Fifth and Sixth posted along the Sava and Drina rivers at the start of the campaign. The Fifth was to the north, and the Sixth concentrated on the Drina along the sector Loznica to Ljubovija. The strength of the Austrian force was about 265 battalions of infantry vith a full complement of field, siege and mountain artillery, a total well in excess of that possessed by the Serbians. Of particular advantage to Potiorek were his superbly equipped XV and XVI Mountain Corps. The Habsburg army, in complete contrast to the Serbian, was composed of an extraordinary mixture of races. It has been calculated that of every 100 men called up in 1914, only 25 spoke
the
German
as their mother tongue.
'*
^^^
*%$£&.,/ ,*'*"
.
<<4F^lt;-
^r<
'JtyLJt
The
rest
spoke nine languages between them and would have a varying knowledge of Ger-
•V* mm
nci
Second Army. This army was concentrated round the town of Sabac and to the south towards the Jadar. The Third Army composed the centre, and was based from the Jadar to Kostajnik, a 2,500-foot peak. The
man. some knowing little more than the commands. As the Austnans had penetrated into
drill
the first
Macva
plain without opposition, the shock of battle came in the southern
sector. On November 7. after an intensive artillery preparation, the Austrian army
attacked across the Drina. The Fifth Army attacked in the sector from Sabac to Lesnica. and the Sixth along a front from Loznica to Mount Rozanj. Despite heroic resistance, the defenders had to fall back. The whole of the Serbian Third Army was forced to withdraw to defend the Jadar road in the direction of Zavlaka, blocking he route to Valjevo. Further south the First Army, despite reinforcement, also gave way. Part of the Uzice Army held its ground and prevented the Austrians from crossing the Drina, but one section was forced back four miles. On November 8 the Austrians approached the positions of the Serbian Second Army, now entrenched on the foothills of the Cer range, apart from a salient protecting Sabac. Shortage of ammunition forced the Serbs to offer only a feeble resistance, whereas the Austrians had supporting artillery fire from heavy gun batteries and their river monitors. They advanced without difficulty along the front to within a mile of the Serbian positions, and dug themselves in. In the Sabac sector, 400 yards of water separated the combatants, and here the Austrian attempts to cross were repulsed. Marshal Stepanovic, commander of the Second Army, was ordered to stand fast, but if necessary to retire to the right bank of the i
Dobrava and swing
his line backwards,
protecting the approach to Valjevo from the Macva district. Further south the situation was grave for the Serbians. The Third Army was cut off from the first when the Austrians took Kostajnik, and another retirement was necessary. As the invasion developed, Marshal Putnik, the Serbian commander-in-chief, had to take the decision to retreat again to positions more favourable for defence. This would draw the Austrians further from their bases and the Serbs would approach nearer to their own railheads at Valjevo and Uzice. The condition of the roads would no doubt make it difficult for the Austrians to bring up supplies and ammunition. Putnik ordered a general retirement eastward from the Jadar, the main armies protecting the approaches to Valjevo, and the Uzice Army retiring to a new line to defend the town of Uzice. The Valjevo line possessed advantages for the defence, and the importance of holding the town was apparent to all the men of the Serbian army. However, no sooner were the troops entrenched on the newly fortified positions than it became obvious that hopes of determined resistance must be abandoned. The Austrians had succeeded in transporting guns over the muddy roads, and were inflicting heavy losses on the Serbian ranks. The Serbian armies which had retired to the Valjevo line were tired and dispirited. They had been exposed to the bad weather without sufficient clothing or camp equipment, but more important was the effect on morale of the retreat itself. Masses of refugees were moving back along the same roads as the army, many in a miserable state. This particularly affected the soldiers who had been recruited locally and some deserted their units to help their families. New recruits for the Serbian forces, drafted
486
German cartoon
of a
Montenegrin infantryman: Montenegro sided with Serbia when war broke out
An Austrian cavalryman on the advance through Moravian
territory
near Kraljevo
into Valjevo, were untrained and badly equipped, and did not raise morale. Probably a vigorous Serbian offensive could have restored the spirits of the army, but this was impossible without more artillery ammunition. Valjevo was hurriedly evacuated, and Putnik ordered the army back to positions on the River Kolubara.
Well-timed retreat
3 m e
%
s I"
| General Misic,
commander of the Serbian
First
Army
15 the Austrians entered the news reached Vienna there was general rejoicing, and Potiorek was decorated with a new order, specially created for him. The spirits of the Austrian army were high. Victory was the best way of uniting its varied elements. However, the Austrian staff seemed at this time to underestimate the difficulties they faced opposing the Serbian army, hardened by the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, and fighting for the very existence of its own country. At the same time the difficulties of transport were increasing as winter advanced, and the roads became a major obstacle. Putnik timed his retreats well, whenever possible saving his troops from the losses of prolonged pitched battles and putting every obstacle he could in the path of the advancing enemy.
The Kolubara
line
had been entrenched
since the beginning of the war, and even before the capitulation of Valjevo it had been understood that the supreme effort to arrest the progress of the enemy would be made from these fortifications. The river itself was not a formidable obstacle to an
Marshal Putnik, the Serbian commander-in-chief
advancing enemy, but its approaches were devoid of cover, and at other points they were commanded by formidable mountain heights, so that the advantage could lie with the defence. The new front was formed in the north by the lower reaches of the Kolubara, up to its confluence with the Sava. To the south-west of Lazarevac it adopted the watershed of the River Ljig, and entered country of a very rugged nature. From the source of the Ljig the §
was worse than usual, and heavy rain and snow had made all the roads into quagmires. The Serbian withdrawal was not easy, as the soldiers marched back, sometimes knee-deep in mud, accompanied by increasing numbers of refugees. However,
E
|
| 5
| | £
| <8
|
General Potiorek, the Austrian
commander
in
Serbia
during the retreat the Serbians continued to make the path of the Austrian advance more difficult by systematically destroying bridges and telephone lines behind them. When the Serbian army reached the Kolubara line it was exhausted, and had even been forced to abandon some valuable equipment along the route. Rearguard actions against the Austrians had also caused losses, and the morale of the men had suffered. The Kolubara-Ljig positions were reached on November 16. The line was adequately fortified, and the Serbian staff might well have been confident in offering resistance,
was trying with
the
to hold a very comparatively
his disposal. The first came on November 17 against certain sectors of the new line. The Serbian Third Army was able to conits position, but the Austrians advanced in strength against the Second Army. The battle of the Kolubara,
tinue consolidating
was called, was to last until November Rain and snow were falling more or less continuously during the battle, and thick morning fogs were to give some advantage to the attackers. Both armies had many men suffering from frostbite. The Austrians first tried to take Lazarevac, which was an important vantage as
On November Valjevo. When
J,
although Putnik extended front small forces at Austrian attack
it
22.
point.
The Austrian
staff appreciated the
weakness of the Serbian centre, and planned to work along the Lazarevac Mladenovac railway and perform a flanking movement. However, General Potiorek's tactics against the First Army in the south were not so good. The Austrians decided to attack the right wing of the First Army rather than the left of the Serbs. On the left they could have exploited the gap between the First Army
and the Uzice Army, and might have been able to get through to the Western Morava river. The Serbs gained time, and were able to strengthen their left. On the night of November 18 both combatants were established on their respective lines, ready to give battle. The Austrians had brought up their main forces, and the Serbs had fortified themselves more or less solidly on the Kolubara positions, and southwards to the heights of Suvobor and Ovcar protecting the entrance to the Western Morava valley. The Austrians were now ready to make a final thrust to take the area of central Serbia. The Austrian offensive had as its main objective the breaking down of the opposition of the Second Army in the Lazarevac sector, and the driving of the First Army towards Gornji Milanovac. Two heights near Lazarevac, Covka and Vrace Brdo, were menacing the Austrian advance, so Potiorek launched an onslaught on these positions. Advance in this sector was essential to the Austrians, as the Kolubara had flooded. On November 19 the Austrians attacked and by the end of the day had secured a foothold on the western slopes of Vrace Brdo, and had taken the hill Milovac further to the south. The Serbian First Army meanwhile had been persistently driven back despite the strength of its positions, and the Austrians occupied a strong salient on the principal routes to
Kragujevac. Potiorek decided to press on in this direction, although there was the risk that Putnik might lure the Austrians on further in the centre, and then by throwing his two wings against their Hanks transform the situation. However, although the Serbs considered this plan, they were not strong enough to carry it out. The Austrians could justifiably rely on the fatigue and demoralisation of the Serbian
army and
their
own
men and make more
r ft.
i.
superiority in
material. They also began to use of their and XVI Mountain Corps, which were far better equipped for lighting over the terrain than any units possessed by the Serbs. On November 21 the Austrians renewed the attack against the Serbian First Arm> The day saw prolonged fierce fighting, hut finally the Serbs were forced to give way. For the next three days the Austrians
XV
•1ST
.I
v h
Zemun*
Serbian Lines Serbian Counterattack 1
Austro-Hungarian
i-
Railways
F
—
^
I
|
5
Land over 1600 feet
The Second Serbian Campaign:
Austria,
slowed by overextended supply
fought to gain control of the positions on Mount Maljen held by the Serbian First Army. Potiorek achieved his object by November 24, when the positions were evacuated, but then did not continue the attack, giving the Serbs a valuable respite. The Austrians, however, had also been disorganised and depleted by the long marches over almost impassable routes, and the incessant fighting which followed. The Serbian Second and Third Armies were clinging tenaciously to their positions, and the Austrian staff decided to draft reinforcements to intensify the attack on Lazarevac. The Austrian centre was to press on to Kragujevac, and their right down the Western Morava valley. To the Austrians the Serbian army seemed nearly broken, and they hoped to close the pincers around Kragujevac, and round up the whole of the Serb forces plus their arsenal. The offensive against the Serbian First and Uzice Armies wa continued more slowly, while forces were concentrated against the Second and 1 rd Armies. The Austrians were attemptin, to envelop the Serb positions from the rr;rth and this
488
lines,
was taken by
15 Miles
10
~?5
25
25Kms
surprise by a vigorous Serbian offensive
would involve piercing the Serbian line between Lazarevac and Belgrade. As a result of this new manoeuvre, the Lazarevac salient was the scene of a fierce struggle which continued without interruption until the end of November, the Serbs offering a most heroic defence in view of their ammunition shortages. By November 28 Marshal Stepanovic had asked for permission to send munitionless cannon to the rear, as their inactive presence was demoralising the men. However, he was told to keep them, and assured that a small convoy of shells from Russia arriving via the Danube would soon put the weapons
back in action.
During the offensive the heights of Covka and Vrace Brdo were singled out by the enemy as key points, and a fierce Austrian
bombardment forced the Serbs to retire. On November 26 the Austrians attempted a further crossing of the Sava near its junction with the Kolubara. They threw across an advance company under the protection of a heavy artillery bombardment in which they employed three river monitors. The Serbs had been forced inlarid
river, but were able to ambush the first group of invaders, and wiped out half the contingent, halting the Austrian advance. However, exploits like this, and the retaking of Covka by the Serbs on November 27, while demonstrating the continued fighting spirit of the defenders, could not prevent a further retreat by the Serbian armies. Putnik was now fighting parallel to his lines of communication, and risked being driven off them if he retreated further. But on the other hand he was approaching the railway which supported him, while the Austrians were leaving their supply lines further behind. Putnik now took the bold decision of another retreat, although that would involve the surrender of Belgrade. It was essential to shorten the Serbian line, although the decision to abandon the capital was not easy. The issue was resolved on November 27/28 when the Austrian Sixth Army made alarming progress. The order for the evacuation of Belgrade was given on November 28, and was carried out during the night of November 29/30. On December 1, Austro-Hun-
from the
garian troops marched into the city unopposed, and again the news was received with rejoicing in Vienna. It was assumed that the campaign was ending. Meanwhile in the southern sector the Austrians continued their offensive. The loss of the Maljen positions (November 24) had been a catastrophe for the Serbs. Further withdrawals had to be made by the Serbian First Army each day, and the Austrians crossed to the right bank of the Ljig. On November 29 the Serbian left flank had taken up positions astride the Western Morava, but the Austrians were moving in force against them trying to outflank the whole positions by a penetration down the valley to Cacak.
Miraculous change of fortune The end of November marked a very critical stage in the history of
the battle.
appeared that the Austrians would soon complete the destruction of the weary defenders. On November 30 Potiorek issued an order to his Sixth Army to stand fast It
3, and to the Fifth Army position east of the Valjevo railway to secure the vital supply route. The Serbian right and centre had retreated,
until
to
December
improve
its
leaving the Austrian advance to Belgrade by units of the Fifth Army unopposed. Potiorek ordered this army to advance to a line from Popovic to Grocka on the Danube. This increased the frontage of the army, but brought the Austrian left well behind the enemy flank. The Fifth Army could now be based on Belgrade for supplies, and leave the Valjevo railway for the Sixth. Potiorek was now attempting to envelop both instead of one of his enemy's flanks. But Serbian military experts realised that the Austrian army was suffering serious transport difficulties. From November 30 there was a four-day pause in the Austrian offensive, and it was precisely at this point that the apparently miraculous change in the Serb fortunes happened. At last small quantities of ammunition from Britain, France and Russia had arrived, despite some Bulgarian attempts at sabotage. This crucial because it made possible some offensive action. Morale in the Serbian army seemed at a very low ebb, but there
was
was the chance that a vigorous counteroffensive might restore it. The Serbian staff organised a last bold bid for victory.
On December 2 Putnik gave the order that on the following day all the Serbian armies were to attack along the entire front 'in order to restore the morale of our soldiers'. King Peter of Serbia, now very old, suddenly appeared from retirement, and entered the trenches with a rifle and 50 rounds of ammunition. He spoke to many of the soldiers and aroused their enthusiasm for a final effort to save their country.
The suddenness and vigour
of the offensive took the Austrians entirely by surprise.
Their line was now extended to
include Belgrade, and while their left was being strengthened and moved to the right bank of the Kolubara, Putnik launched his attack. The Serbian plan was to pierce the enemy's centre and then take on the separate parts of the Austrian army. The
Serbian Second and Third Armies, because of the ground before them, were in a comparatively favourable position. The task of the First and Uzice Armies was much
more
difficult.
The
the flank of the First
latter
had
to protect
Army and prevent the
Austrians from obtaining control of the
Western Morava valley. Massing of hostile mountain troops had continued here without interruption, and it was obvious that an Austrian attack was imminent. The whole Serbian counterattack depended on the First Army reaching the main watershed of the Kolubara and the Western Morava. The commander of the First Army, General Misic, was an able and popular officer. His troops had led the retreat, but now the order was reversed and they took the lead in the Serbian advance. In place of the demoralisation and sense of failure of the end of November, the Serbs felt a new enthusiasm. The four-day pause in the Austrian offensive had given them a vital rest. The Austrians had evidently never considered a counterattack, and had neglected security. On December 3, the day of the Serbian advance, they had left their heavy artillery in the rear, and Misic caught them in valleys and dales, dangerously vulnerable to attack from the heights above. It was some time before the Austrians could organise any resistance, and by nightfall the First Army had advanced a few miles, inflicted heavy casualties and taken about 1,500 prisoners. The Uzice Army met strong opposition, but pushed forward on the left. Both the Second and Third Armies made progress and recaptured some important heights. After the weeks of discouragement the successes of the first day's offensive restored
Serbian
spirits.
Relentless pursuit
The next few days saw an increasing momentum of the advance. On December 4 Misic's army attacked over mountainous terrain, where success had to be backed up by relentless pursuit. The Austrians did not have time to recover from the surprise of the first day's drive. Potiorek had a last card to play, however, in the Belgrade sector. The left flank of the Austrian Fifth Army was well behind the Serbian right flank, and had made progress south-eastwards from Belgrade. On December 5 Potiorek ordered them to press the attack to the south, and engage the Serbian right.
Meanwhile the Serbian movement
to the
Kolubara was continued almost without interruption. The progress of the Serbs north of Arantelovac brought the Austrian attackers within danger of being cut off from the main body by a Serbian breakthrough in the centre. By December 6 there was no doubt of the defeat of the Austrian invasion. Their centre and right
were completely broken, and they were retreating rapidly everywhere except in the north. Conditions for the retreat were no easier than for the advance, and the Austrians abandoned weapons and equipment in vast quantities, hampered by the morass of mud on the roads. On December 8 the pursuing armies arrived before Uzice and Valjevo, where it was expected that the Austrians would make a stand. There had been ample time for the Austrian garrisons to prepare additional defensive works. But Uzice fell after a brief spell of resistance, and Valjevo was taken by surprise. The approaches to Valjevo had been entrenched and the guns were in position, but the First Army were deployed round the hills and outwitted the defenders. By December 10 the Uzice Army reached the Drina, and three days later the First Army reoccupied the lower reaches of the
Drina and Sava from Loznica to Sabac. On the western front the battle was by now virtually over. All Austrians who were not casualties had retired across the Drina and Sava. From December 6 military interest was centred in the north, where Austrian troops had been trying to outflank the Serbian offensive. In this theatre the Austrians were still well supplied, for they had the routes to Belgrade behind them. Commanded by General Frank, they tried to make a desperate bid for victory by at least retaining Belgrade, and the area to the south. On December 6 they began to attack the Serbian extreme right, and after severe fighting gained some ground in the course of December 7. The next day the Austrians seemed in a strong position, but timely reinforcements arrived to help the Serbs. Now that the Austrians were in headlong retreat in all other sectors, troops could be spared by the Serbs to deal with General Frank's attack. December 9 was a crucial day in the fighting as both sides realised it was the final issue in the third invasion. Eventually the Austrians began to give way. They retired to Belgrade, where they could make use of their river monitors, but on December 13 General Frank informed Potiorek that he could not hold out in Belgrade, and on the 14th and 15th the Austrians crossed back over the Sava, covered by their monitors. On the 15th Serbian troops re-entered the capital. In the western theatre it had taken the Austrians four weeks to advance from the Drina to the line of the Serbian counterattack, but Marshal Putnik took only ten days to retrace his steps. Throughout the campaign the Austrian supremacy in men and weapons had increased, as reserves were drafted in to make good losses, while the Serbs had no such help. Marshal Putnik's achievement was remarkable and the Austrian defeat was without doubt
The losses of men, killed, wounded and missing, 227,088, numbered more than half the total of troops brought catastrophic.
Serbia since the beginning of the Back in Vienna General Potiorek was removed from command, ostensibly for reasons of ill health. The Serbs were jubilant, but victory for them had been hard won. They were almost as exhausted as their enemies, and their losses since the beginning of the war were estimated at 170,000 men. Vienna said that difficulties of provisioning had necessitated the withdrawal of their forces in the Balkans, but the reason for the Austrian defeat lay both in tactical errors and in a fundamental failure to recognise that the Serbs were a real fighting force. into
war
in August.
.1
e
Further Reading Clissold, S., A Short History of Yugoslavia
i-
(CUP 1966) Desmazes and Naoumovich, Les
i,
y
victoires
Serbes en 1914 (Paris 1928) Gordon-Smith, G., Through the Serbian
Campaign
s, i;
(1916)
d
Macedonia (HMSO) Serbia's Part in the War (1918)
Military Operations:
Price,
C
JOSEPHINE
M.
NEWUUMBL
is
now
a lecturer
e in
Language and Literature at Bristol She served for some time in the Women's Royal Army Corps, and qualified as a military
Russian
University.
interpreter
in
Russian
At
Oxford University she
studied Russian and later studied Serbo-Croat and Polish. She has travelled widely in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries.
489
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NOVEMBER CALHIA
With Russians only 15 miles from Krakow, Austria attempted a counteroffensive to the north of the city which had to succeed within approximately ten days or her southern flank would be seriously compromised. By the end of the month the offensive had ground to a halt and the Russians were clearing the Austrian southern flank away from the Carpatjlians — but Krakow had been saved before winter slowed operations. Norman Stone. Above: Russian soldiers on the Carpathian front where casualties of 50% were*the rule
m
mm
J
In the first few days of November the Austro-Hungarian position was highly precarious. Four armies were strung out along a gigantic front, from the centre of Russian Poland to the river San, and thence along the Carpathians into Bukovina and towards the Rumanian frontier. The position in Poland down to the Vistula — from Kielce to Sandomierz — was occupied by the five corps of the First Army (Dankl); from the Vistula along the line of the San, and defending the great fortress of Przemysl, was the Fourth Army (Archduke Josef Ferdinand) with three corps and some extra divisions; along the Carpathians were two armies — the Third (Boroevic) with four corps, and the Second (Bohm-Ermolli) with three. Bukovina was defended with startling ability by a group under Pflanzer-Baltin. All of these armies were holding their positions well enough, except for the First. This had advanced deep into Russian Poland in October, and had tried to capture the important town of Ivangorod on the Vistula in concert with the Germans. It had failed — against in-
creasing odds — to take the town, and, having incurred high losses, now had to counter a Russian offensive developing north of the Vistula. South of the river the Russians did not attack seriously, but the three Austro-Hungarian armies there had to retreat, as they were continually outflanked on their left while Dankl's
army withdrew — first from Ivangorod
to
Sandomierz and Tarnobrzeg, then to the and then direct on Krakow. Archduke Josef Ferdinand on his right had to keep pace all the way along, so that in the upshot he too had to fall back on Krakow from the east. This was what happened during the early part of November. Early in the month, the situation of the Central Powers in Poland offered little comfort. The German Ninth Army on Dankl's left faced the onrush of two Russian armies on the northern flank, Second (Scheidemann) and Fifth (Plehve); Dankl had to contend with attacks by two other armies — Fourth (Evert) and Ninth (Lechitsky); south of the Vistula were two others, Eleventh (Selivanov) and Eighth river Nida,
(Brusilov), with a 'Dniestr-Group' opposite Pflanzer-Baltin in Bukovina. Dankl pulled back from Ivangorod to the Kielce-Sandomierz position by November 2, and the Russians followed. They intended to push him back to Krakow, and then to proceed with their plan to invade Germany; the offensive of Evert and Lechitsky was therefore unrelenting. Dankl's army was in no state to resist. His losses in battle Lad
been high — he reported that they had run to 40,000-50,000 among his / and V Corps alone; his munitions were running short; and a deadly epidemic of cholera had broken out which immobilised whole brigades -in quarantine. Fortunately the army's medical services were good, and the crisis passed over, but for the first two weeks of the month Dankl's army was severely hampered. He fell back from the Kielce-Sandomierz position towards the Nida, a marshy region that Conrad expected to hold out. If it did not, then the left of Fourth Army would be affected, and the Archduke would have to give up the line of the San, including Przemysl. Conrad therefore hoped that Dankl would stand on the Nida. Dankl knew better: he said that, unless the Germans
on his
left
were prepared
to attack,
he
On November 5, losing position after position, he reported that he must retreat. 'If the First Army is to be kept in existence,' he went on, 'we must draw the consequences, from the superiority of 300 battalions that the Russians could not hold on.
enjoy against us and the Germans. We must fall back until the Russians have so much difficulty with supplies that their
must come to an end of itself.' Conrad wanted to get out of this problem by urging Mackensen's army to attack the offensive
left of Evert's army: but the Germans refused — it made no sense to them to expose themselves to Plehve on their left by attacking Evert on tneir right, and besides this they thought nothing at all of Dankl's army. The reports of their liaison officers were very pessimistic; so for that matter were the reports of Conrad's liaison officer, Fleischmann. They did not believe 'that First Army will be capable of effective resistance even in the chosen position on the Nida', and were in a hurry only to get away. They wanted Dankl to retreat to the south, so as to draw the Russian armies after him and give the Germans a breathing-space, and they were doubly annoyed with Conrad when he said Dankl would retreat in conjunction with Ninth Army towards the south-east.
The Austrians By November
back
fall
front on the his five corps undertook a disorderly retreat on Krakow. The other armies had to fall back as well. They did so in good order— Fourth Army reached the line of the Dunajec on the 8th, and Boroevic on its right accordingly reformed his line. The great fortress of 6,
Dankl's
Nida had crumbled and
Przemysl on the San was
left to its
devices, with a garrison of 100,000
under
a
resourceful
commander,
own men Kus-
manek von Burgneustadten. Conrad told him that he expected the fortress 'not only to ward off all attacks, but to bind down considerable enemy forces'. With this retreat, the whole Austro-Hungarian position from Krakow to the frontier with
Rumania became
difficult, and was covered only thinly: in consequence Conrad had to move his own headquarters further back, moving from Nowy Sacz on the upper San to the Silesian town of Teschen (Tesin) on November 8/9. This place had excellent connections with Germany; it was included in one of Archduke Frederick's titles, and Archduke Frederick owned much of it — he is said to have made a great deal of money out of the move; and finally, in Conrad's words, it possessed 'a very loyal, mainly
German
population'.
Conrad's task was somehow to bring support to the stricken First Army — he had to move troops from the south to the north bank of the Vistula. He knew by now that the Germans were intending a great stroke into the northern flank of the Russian armies; he recognised that this was strategically correct, and wished to do all he could to help. The next 'decision' would unquestionably come in the bend of the Vistula, not south of the river. BohmErmolli,
commanding
the Second
Army,
suggested that from five to seven divisions, mainly taken from his army, should be transported from the Carpathians to Prussian Silesia, since 'even fortunate operations in Galicia can only slightly affect the situation as a whole'. Conrad reacted favourably to this suggestion, and
ordered that Bohm-Ermolli 's headquarters and two corps (TV and XII) should be moved as early as possible. The move lasted from November 10 to 23. Boroevic would now have to take over this part of the front, and had as a result the most difficult task of all. Meanwhile, Fourth Army fell back in good order on Krakow, thus opening up a further gap on Boroevie's left, which parts of Lechitsky's army began to exploit. Between the 6th and 10th Dankl continued his retreat, all the time being badly mauled by Evert and losing thousands of prisoners. On the 8th, Dankl came to see Conrad, and explained that his army would melt away if it had to face a really serious offensive. By the 10th, however, it was in an entrenched position north-west and north of Krakow, from Skala to Zarki; here it began to receive reinforcements, and the fortress garrison of Krakow rushed out its guns to help. Archduke Josef Ferdinand's army began to arrive east of the town, and transferred reinforcements to the other side of the river, using the excellent crossings at Krakow. Dankl could now consider himself relatively safe. But much depended on the Russians — if they concentrated on Krakow, Dankl's army would have to fall back again, into Moravia. In fact the Russians missed their chance, much to Ivanov's annoyance. The Russian High Command (Stavka) wanted to invade Germany with the four armies in the bend of the Vistula, while First and Tenth Armies covered the north, and Third, Eleventh and Eighth the south. At the beginning of November, the Russian line was considerably disorganised — the armies were not ready for a full-scale offensive, standing in Poland on a line from Uniejow — Piotrkow — Kielce to the Opatowka (against Dankl) and up to the San. Parts of Lechitsky's army were in fact on the wrong side of the Vistula, and had to be brought over the river in order to take part in the planned invasion of Germany. In the same way Third Army was concentrated on the south side of the Vistula, whereas in the event of an invasion of Germany it would have to be largely on the north side, to cover the flank there. On top of this came very great transport difficulties, as Dankl
had foreseen. The Germans in retreating had destroyed most of the routes with great thoroughness, mining all the railway tunnels and carting off the rails. By November 10, as Evert's army came up against Dankl's line north of Krakow, the difficulsupply became almost insuperable corps of his army had to be sent 1,500 horses in three days; for lack of fodder, some of these horses died in harness. ties of
— one
Far from beaten If the Russians' transport difficulties contributed a great deal to Dankl's survival. Russian planning did the rest. The Grand
Duke Nicholas and his staff wanted above invade Germany and help the French
all to
in
West.
the
They
therefore
regarded
Austria-Hungary as a secondary matter, and instructed all the armies in the bend of the Vistula to
Third
move
against
Germany;
Army (Radko-Dmitriev)
with ten north and east, while Eleventh (Selivanov) with five divisions covered Przemysl and the San, and Eighth (Brusilov' with ton divisions and some cavalry protected the Carpathians. By this moans the Germans
divisions
was
to
cover
Krakow
ui the
491
Left to right: General
Bohm-Ermolli commanded the Austrian Second Army, General Conrad, Austrian Chief-of-Staff General Dankl commanded commanded the Russian Eighth Army; General Mackensen commanded the German Ninth Army ;
the Austrian First Army; General Brusilov
would have concentrated against them over 30 divisions between Uniejow and Czestochowa. Ivanov, commanding the south-western front, strongly objected to this; his chief-of-staff, Alexeyev, sent a memorandum dated November 5/6 to the Grand Duke in an effort to persuade him to concentrate instead against AustriaHungary. He pointed out that the AustroHungarian armies were far from beaten, and that to achieve their destruction would mean a full Russian concentration against them, for the Russian army was not strong enough to achieve 'two ends alike of the greatest importance, that is, a decisive attack in the direction of Berlin and operations no less decisive in Galicia, to destroy the Austrian army there'. Alexeyev said that the Austro-Hungarian army was still far from harmless: their retreat on the San had been 'prepared with the greatest care, and executed in the best order, without our being left a single trophy' Alexeyev and Ivanov wanted the Grand Duke to set up a different plan — instead of having Evert and Lechitsky take part in the invasion of Germany, they were to concentrate on Krakow from both sides, while Radko-Dmitriev advanced over the Dunajec to take the defem rs of Krakow in their southern flank, and usilov went forward in the Carpathians. the end, a bad compromise was reached, t >rt was to ichowa, go on against the Germans at Cz^. but Lechitsky was to go against lakow, '
while Radko-Dmitriev stayed mainly on the south bank, though sending some of his troops to help Lechitsky along the Szreniawa river. Of course in view of the Russians' transport difficulties it would have been difficult to do anything else: but the results of these instructions were unfortunate for the Russians. Without Ninth Army's full co-operation in the west, Fourth Army must get bogged
down; and without Third Army's
full co-
operation north of the Vistula, Lechitsky too must get bogged down north-east of Krakow. This was what happened. At the same time, if Ivanov's idea had been followed, the two Austro-Hungarian armies
mistaken in their prescriptions. Conrad had expected the Russians to push forward in great strength into Silesia, and the population of Breslau had panicked. Conrad expected the Russian Fourth and Ninth Armies to move westward, leaving Third to cover Krakow, and nothing very serious to cross the Dunajec. As things turned out, his plans were all wrong. Only Evert was moving west: Lechitsky was covering the front north of Krakow, and Radko-Dmitriev was advancing on the south bank of the Vistula. As a result, the front against Evert was actually stronger utterly
would have had
than the supposed invasion force, while Fourth Army, which Conrad expected to be much stronger than the Russians
30 Russian divisions against them. As it was, Evert was too weak to force a passage north-west of Krakow; Lechitsky could not do much more than hold his own northeast of the town; and Radko-Dmitriev was hanging in the air south of the Vistula, unable to bring his strength to bear until a week had elapsed. In these circumstances, the Austro-Hungarian High Command-was able to withdraw Fourth Army to Krakow, reinforce Dankl, and transport Bohm-
it, and indeed to find their flank, advanced straight onto the front of Lechitsky's army and was soon itself outflanked by Radko-Dmitriev south of the Vistula. Conrad had expected Ivanov to concentrate his troops in the west. In fact Ivanov had spread them out fairly evenly along the whole front — partly because supply difficulties made it almost impossible for him to do otherwise and partly because he had no stomach for the invasion of
Ermolli's force to Silesia. Conrad was also able to plan an offensive that threw Ivanov's front into turmoil.
Germany. As it was, the Russian front opposite Bohm-Ermolli, Woyrsch and Dankl's left —
at
Krakow
(17 divisions)
opposite
about 13 divisions — consisted of army, with ten divisions: from north (westofNovoradomsk) to south (northwest of Krakow) — the Grenadier Corps, in
Conrad plans wrongly
all
Evert's
The
battle that followed had a peculiar aspect. Both sides had, in effect, been
492
-
November
in
Galicia: Austria's offensive north of the Vistula drew resources from her southern flank as the offensive dwindled, Russia to move troops back to save Krakow at the battle of Limanowa ;
pushed strongly from the south, and Austria had
XVI, XVII and III Caucasian Corps; here the Russians were surprisingly weak. Opposite Dankl's right at Skala and the front of Fourth Army north and northeast of Krakow (12 divisions) were an almost equal number of Russian divisions, those of Ninth Army — XIV Corps and Guard Corps against Dankl, XVIII and XXV Corps against Archduke Josef Ferdinand, with a further group of three divisions under Krusenstern arriving from Ivangorod to strengthen Lechitsky's left. Conrad was therefore due for a surprise
when he opened his offensive. By November 12 the Germans were advancing into the rear of the Russian armies west of the Vistula; Conrad decided to do the same from his end. The three right-hand corps of Dankl's army north-west of Krakow — /,
V and X— between Skala and Zarki, were
prepared for attack; the main blow was to be delivered by Archduke Josef Ferdinand north-east of Krakow with VI Corps (Arz) on the left, adjoining Dankl's right, XIV (Roth) in the centre, by Niepolomice, and XVII (Kritek) on the right, along the Raba. There were a further two divisions (15th Infantry and 13th Rifle) in reserve at Wieliczka, and two cavalry divisions as a screen at Bochnia. The rest of the AustroHungarian dispositions were being carried through. Bohm-Ermolli's five divisions were being transported by a remarkable feat of improvisation along the poor railways leading out of the Carpathians to-
wards Oderberg on the Austro-German frontier and thence to their stations north of Woyrsch's corps: to carry them, the railall over Hungary were used to the with one train leaving the main railhead in the Carpathian foothills — Miskolc — every 45 minutes for a fortnight. The divisions arrived by November 23. The pattern that Conrad expected was for Bohm-Ermolli, Woyrsch and Dankl to parry the Russian invasion of Silesia, while Archduke Josef Ferdinand drove into the Russian flank north-east of Krakow: the Archduke was ordered to advance so that his army 'can intervene in the expected battle from the flank, from which flank attack the decision of the battle is expected'. This movement was to begin on November 16, when all was ready and the troops had been rested.
ways full,
Only ten days This concentration north of the Vistula had been achieved at the expense of baring the front south of the Vistula and along the Carpathians. The withdrawal of the Archduke's army to the enceinte of Krakow left a wide gap between him and Boroevic, in the Carpathians; and the withdrawal of Bohm-Ermolli from the eastern Carpathians exposed Boroevic's right wing in a highly dangerous fashion. The events of November showed to the full how dangerous Conrad's dispositions had been — whatever their theoretical advantages. The
to Conrad's offensive north of the river was therefore an increasingly menacing situation south of it, while Boroevic with four corps sought to oppose the Russian Eighth Army, under Brusilov, with nearly double his strength, while the other Russian army, the Third, advanced on Krakow from the east and threatened to cut Boroevic entirely off from Archduke Josef Ferdinand. However, this situation took time to emerge, as Boroevic could retreat into the Carpathians against Brusilov, and Radko-Dmitriev found it difficult to advance at any speed over the Dunajec from the San. Conrad had in effect ten days to win a victory north of the river. He had a bare superiority north of the river, bought at the expense of severe inferiority south of it. To be fair, the offensive that followed was, like the offensive of August 1914 that ended in the battle of Lemberg, founded on a promise of German reinforcements. Falkenhayn, in response to repeated admonitions from both Conrad and Ludendorff early in November, agreed to send these before the end of the month — the date given by his envoy from Mezieres, Colonel Hentsch, was November 24. On this basis Conrad and Ludendorff went ahead, feeling rightly that they could not afford to delay their plans. In the end, no such reinforcements arrived until early December — Falkenhayn wanted them to restore the position in Flanders, where he had suffered at
background
493
.e
l,
id
te
d
s.
17
Far left: An Austrian tunnelling machine in action on the Galician Front. Right: A Krupp-made Russian 15-cm howitzer, Model 1880. Little is known about this gun except that had a crew of 5 and a rate of fire of 3 rounds-per-minute. Centre left: An Austrian 22.5-cm mortar in it
travelling position. Little this
gun also except
and a
is
known about
had a crew of 4 rate of fire of 2 rounds-per-minute. that
it
Centre right: A Russian 25-cm coastal gun. Little is known about this gun too except that it had a crew of 22 and a rate of fire of 1 round every five minutes. Bottom left: An Austrian 10-cm light field howitzer, Model 1899. Weight: 2,250 lb. Range: 6,015 yards, flare of fire: 5 roundsper-minute. Crew: 6. Bottom right: A German 25-cm heavy minenwerfer. Weight: 1,362 lb. Range: 992 yards
v
i;
d h
e ,1
495
An Austrian machine gun post near Sosnow-'both armies were adequate
for the defensive: offensives
Ypres 'a first-class moral defeat'. He told Conrad that 'there is no possibility of these
strove to turn the enemy left north-east of Krakow, along the Szreniawa river,
reinforcements arriving to take part in the present operations', and Conrad felt with justice that he had been let down. On
while Dankl, Woyrsch and Bbhm-Ermolli sought to pin the Russians down on their front by minor attacks between Krakow and Kalisz. The decisive theatre was the Szreniawa one, until such time as RadkoDmitriev could bring pressure to bear against Krakow from the south bank. It took him ten days to do this, and this was the time available for Conrad to win the smashing victory he so greatly needed. At midday on the 16th Fourth Army's
November
he complained to Bolfras, head of the Emperor's military chancellery: 19,
'The German High Command is shortsighted in not seeing that the decision lies here [in the East], and it is, quite faithless as well, ruthlessly operating at our expense when we, with our none too powerful muscles, have been holding the door against half Asia. I suppose we've got to
swallow all this of the Germans.'
.
.
.
but I've had
my
fill
At the outset, however, Conrad was reckoning on German help. His armies began their advance on November 16, and the battle soon divided fairly easily into two parts. South of the Vistula the situation became ever more menacing until Conrad had to call off his action north of the river; north of the Vistula, between
November 16 and 25, Conrad was engaged in an offensive parallel to the German one in the north — Archduke Josef Ferdinand
Typhus cases
496
in
troops attacked, having moved Kritek's corps to the left bank, on their extreme right. On the left VI Corps (Arz) advanced on Slomniki against Krusenstern; in the centre XIV Corps (Roth) attacked towards Proszowice, with Kf itek on their right with XVII Corps. The flank of the army south of the river was covered by no more than some territorial brigades and two cavalry divisions under Feldmarschalleutnant (Lieutenant-General) Nikic. The whole army faced at the outset forces not significantly inferior -XVIII and Corps, with Krusenstern's other divisions arriving. On the
XXV
were
in
general a blunder'
left of Lechitsky's army the Russians were comparatively weak, however, and it was here that Conrad was able to spy an illusory hope. On the 16th also, the right of Dankl's army—/, V and Corps — was expected to join in the attacks of the Archduke's group. Conrad had issued his orders with confidence, knowing that Mackensen in the north had won a solid success at Kutno. On the 16th and 17th, the AustroHungarian attack got under way; but
X
everywhere
it
met
solid resistance,
'decision' would come in this area, and the Archduke transferred his reserves to Roth and Kfitek. Elsewhere, these two days
an Austrian isolation hospital besides typhus there was a serious cholera epidemic which immobilised whole brigades :
much
Conrad's surprise. Dankl's corps, Arz's VI Corps and most of Roth's XIV Corps found themselves frontally attacking solid defensive positions. Losses were high, gains small. Only on the right did the weakness of the Russian front tell — Roth's righthand divisions at Glew, and Kfitek at Igolomice, managed to get forward against XXV Corps' divisions, and began to threaten the left of Lechitsky's army. South of the river, Nikic met no resistance as he made for the town of Bochnia. Obviously the to
were confused. Against Woyrsch and BdhmErmolli the Russians had been ordered to advance so as to take some of the pressure from Scheidemann and Plehve by Lodz. There was confused fighting along Dankl's left, Woyrsch's front and Bohm-Ermolli's front at Cykarzew and Prusiecko on the middle Warta. At this stage, Conrad was not disheartened: in the first place, he thought Falkenhayn would send him reinforcements, and in the second he was sure that the Russians were intending to retreat after the blow they had suffered at Kutno. Mackensen felt the same, and both he and the Austro-Hungarians regarded their task as being to prevent the escape of the Russian armies to the Vistula. In these circumstances, Conrad told his generals on the 17th: 'The result of tomorrow's attacks will be of decisive importance for the fate
The enemy
not superior in numbers, and he lacks supplies and munitions; he is exhausted.' On the 18th a hard battle began between the eastern side of Krakow and Czestochowa. On the extreme right Kfitek and
of the war.
Austrian infantry wait
in
is
XIV Corps
to retire.
However these were purely local successes, and Conrad learnt from intercepted Russian radio messages that the Russians did not consider themselves in serious danger, and that they were prepared to take the offensive north of Pilica against Woyrsch if need be — their front there having been reinforced by two cavalry corps, under Prince Tumanov and Count Guillenstern, as well as the Grenadier Corps. Besides, the four corps of Third Army were crossing the Dunajec, and Brusilov was advancing in the south.
These advances were undermining Conwhole position. However he set his and continued: born in 1852 he had had de I'audace dinned into him from an early age, with all its Napoleonic connotations. He had not much chance of success. His army's losses had been huge -845,000 of the 900,000 men who had originally been on the pay-roll in August rad's teeth
an ambush position -Conrad (the Austrian commander) complained
Roth did well, advancing towards Proszowice on the Szreniawa. The Russian XXV Corps began to crumble, and one of Krusenstern's divisions was rushed up to its support. Radko-Dmitriev south of the river
was ordered
the Grenadier Corps, had been turned north to meet Bbhm-Ermolli. They captured a few thousand prisoners and forced
to speed up his slow advance towards the Dunajec: he was still considerably in the rear with XXI, IX, XI and X Corps and part of VII Corps, and he was not sure whether to support Brusilov by attacking Boroevic, or to support Lechitsky by attacking the Archduke. Eventually he decided to support both, and as a result he was ineffective for another few days. Even so, Conrad's offensive stuck: with one of Krusenstern's divisions now reinforcing Lechitsky's left, Kritek could not break through, and the Szreniawa front witnessed a series of indecisive frontal attacks. Only on the left of the AustroHungarian forces — by Pilica and Rzedkowice- were there any successes. Dankl's northern corps, // and the group of Tschurtschenthaler, advanced there and discovered that the Russian XIV Corps opposite them was isolated, since its left-hand neighbour,
two corps stormed Russian positions at Mykanow and Klekoty, but were held up by Fourth Army long before they could reach the important town of Novoradomsk. Elsewhere on the 19th and 20th nothing decisive occurred. Kritek loyally did his best to carry out the Archduke's orders, taking Nowe-Brzesko and reaching the Szreniawa line by the 20th. Meanwhile the danger south of the Vistula became clearer than ever, as AustroHungarian airmen reported the arrival of
Radko-Dmitriev's troops. These had been very dilatory in making their presence felt. They had not immediately followed Fourth Army as it retreated from the San, because they needed to make up their losses before moving on, and because the great fortress of Przemysl had to be contained. By mid-November, the five divisions of Eleventh Army (Selivanov) had been assembled for this task, and Third Army was free to move on. Four and a half infantry and two cavalry corps were set in motion between the Vistula and east of Nowy Sacz, with the cavalry concentrated
we have been
1914 were no longer on it by the end of November; they had been replaced by about 500,000 men who had had little serious training; there was a lack of heavy artillery, and of ammunition. The Russians' state was perhaps worse — losses of at least 50^ were the rule, and munitions were sinking fast, so that Fourth Army had only 50 rounds per gun. Both armies were
adequate
for the defensive, if carefully used: offensives, though no doubt theoretically sound by the standards of the time, were in general a blunder. Even so, it is difficult to see what else Conrad could have done, given the all-round unwilling-
ness to come to terms.
Senseless attacks On November 19, with the Germans doing astoundingly well at Lodz, Conrad's men ground forward. On Dankl's left, // Corps and Tschurtschenthaler once more gained ground; Woyrsch got stuck almost at once; on his left, Bohm-Ermolli, south of the Warta, attempted to roll up the Russian line from the north, without success. His
holding the door against half Asia
in the south. Against this stood pathetically little — between Gdow and Niepolomice
only Nikir's three infantry brigades and two cavalry divisions. Reinforcements were called from everywhere in order to save Kritek's flank— XI Corps (Ljubicict was summoned to Bochnia from Boroovic's front, while a mixed group was concentrated on the Raba west of Novvv Sacz under Feldmarschalleutnant Nagy — cavalry division, some supply-line battalions, and the Polish Legion under Pilsudski. This group, united under Fourth Army, was given the almost impossible' task of protecting its right (lank. The group was ordered to move offensively, concentrating round Bochnia to attack the Russian XXI Corps, which was thought to be isolated on Radko-Dmitriev's right wing. west of the lower Dunajec. This attack made no sense at all: Nikic. who was in charge of it, got stuck at once and withdrew, while the right wing of the group was pushed in by cavalry raiding Nowy Sacz, and pressing on to Rajbrot and even Limanowa. By November 24, the position
497
on the right of Archduke Josef Ferdinand's army was poor. Kritek was stuck on the
his front.
At the same time, the southern Hank was quite open, with only Nagy's tiny
western
niawa by Proszowice; Ljubicic was faced between Zakliczyn and Szczurowa by the Russian XI and X Corps; the Russian XXI Corps was transferred to the northern bank to attack Kfitek and IX Corps, with three cavalry divisions, pushed against the tiny force o( N'agy on the Raba. In the circumstances, Conrad could do nothing but suspend his offensive north of the river; by the 25th the fighting there was effectively over. This was a great surprise both to Conrad and to the army commanders. While the danger in the south was slowly becoming more apparent, Dankl and the Archduke w^ere pursuing their costly successes: on the 21st and 22nd, Arz
force in the path of three Russian infantry divisions. Elsewhere the front was in disorder; in the Carpathians the Russian
risk of exposing his Carpathian front in order to send enough forces north of the river; and his army commander in the Carpathians, Boroevic, had the almost impossible task of containing maybe three times his numbers of Russians. This was the first of the terrible Carpathian campaigns, and it ended in a sharp Austro-
and Kritek ground against the Russian positions on the Szreniawa, but were held up by XXI Corps, elements of which had crossed the Vistula to assist XXV Corps. Further north, Dankl and his neighbours were involved in the usual confused engagements. The success on the 19th and 20th of Tschurtschenthaler and II Corps had forced Evert to detach one corps from the south and put it into line opposite II Corps. Attacks at Pilica stuck therefore, while the three southern corps of Dankl's
army made
better, though limited, sucwith an advance between Skala and Jangrot. Woyrsch and Bohm-Ermolli continued their advance, but Bohm-Ermolli failed to reach Novoradomsk because Tumanov's cavalry took his northern flank. On the 22nd, Conrad was still confident that the Russians were really seeking to retire from the Polish salient altogether; the Archduke even set 'objectives for pursuit' for his army. These objectives were cesses,
The officers and men of the AustroHungarian units were exhausted by almost
fantasy.
uninterrupted fighting over the previous
month: Kritek's men failed to move, and the others were not much better off. By the 25th Fourth Army had to abandon its offensive altogether: it had reached a line Skala — Slomniki — Szreniawa river, had taken 9,000 prisoners but had lost 25,000 men. In much the same way, Dankl's attacks in the end, despite some local successes against the exhausted Russian XIV Corps at Wolbrom. Once the Archduke's progress had slowed down, the Russian Ninth Army was able to help Evert, and this brought Dankl's successes to an end. He had lost 30,000 men, but captured 17,000 prisoners and some guns. In much the same way, Bohm-Ermolli and Woyrsch became involved only in a series of futile exchanges. By the 25th, the Russian position at Lodz and Lowicz had improved, and Plehve's army could concentrate on its southern wing. As a result Bohm-Ermolli's northern flank was turned and forced back on the Sosnia river. After this, neither side wished to commit itself. The real decision must now come not north, but south of the Vistula river. The situation was becoming highly critical: Ljubicic, hard-hit by Radko-Dmitriev's corps, was told to fall back on the lower Raba to a prepared position from Niepoiomice to Dobczyce, while the Archduke's army was to stay put on the Szreniawa. By the 25th this had become impossible. The
failed
whole of Radko-Dmitriev's XXI Corps had now been taken across the river, and had begun to push against Kritek's right wing; and Nikic's force was in no condition to hold out against the two Russian corps on 498
Army was almost through to the Hungarian plain. Conrad's greatest weakness had been his own obstinacy; but there were times when that obstinacy was an advantage. He refused to give up the battle as lost and by the 25th had elaborated a new plan — the Archduke's army would swing south and attack Radko-Dmitriev Eighth
Russian left flank; he busied himwith preparations for this, and asked Falkenhayn for help. This time, the Gerin the
self
mans
agreed, having earmarked four corps the East, and Conrad was given a division, 47th Reserve (Besser), which was to arrive in Oderberg as from the 27th. In the meantime, Conrad's men would have to fall back: Fourth Army was to withdraw to Krakow, letting the Russians run up against the defences, and Ljubicic was to retreat to a line Wieliczka — Dobczyce. for
Great losses and retreat
On the 26th the retreat was carried out — in good order from the Szreniawa, in bad order from the Raba — and the Archduke's army now occupied a front line along the border to the north of Krakow. In the east, Ljubicic
had
more
trouble,
abandoned
Bochnia, and was ordered if necessary to fall back on the eastern defences. Nagy in the south was not capable of seriously resisting the Russians opposite him, who were able to occupy Lapanow and probe his front at Limanowa. This position became increasingly menacing over the next few days, as Ljubicic, who had sustained great losses, fell back successively to Wieliczka, a few miles east of Krakow, by the 28th. Krakow might well have fallen if the Russian Third Army had not sent a good part of its effectives to the north bank. As it was, Conrad was able to restore his line. The whole of Fourth Army was to be transported through Krakow to the south bank; five brigades under Feldmarschalleutenant Smekal defended the northern approaches of the city and were put under Dankl's orders. Kritek's XVII Corps went to help Ljubicic, Arz' VI Corps went to Krzeszowice as reserve, while Roth's group, with the newly-arrived German division, went some way south of Krakow to Chabowka and Jordanow. Roth's was now the main role, as Conrad ordered: 'the plan now is to take three divisions from the forces of Fourth Army gradually withdrawing into Krakow, send them south rapidly and by surprise, and attack the enemy in his southern flank.' The engage-
ment that followed, by which Krakow was saved, was the battle of Limanowa, justly celebrated as an Austro-Hungarian success. By the end of November the two forces were in equal strength facing each other from Krakow into the Beskidy Zachodnie mountains. In this way, the centre of the action switched from north of the Vistula to south of
Krakow. The result of the actions
in the
east, along the Carpathians, was likewise to switch the important theatre to the Krakow region, and in the coming battle
Limanowa these two came together. During November, the Austro-Hungarian position in the Carpathians had gone from bad to worse: by the end of the month things there had reached a crisis on the of
side,
in
the
Beskids.
Early in
November Conrad had taken the deliberate
Hungarian reverse. It is often wondered the Austro-Hungarian armies did so badly here. The area was perhaps the poorest in Europe, and contained very few railways, none of any importance. Besides they did not run all the way along the line, but from north to south to rneet up only in Budapest. As a result, Boroevic could not shuttle reserves from one part of the
why
another. Again, despite the the rest of the terrain, there were five good crossing-points in the Carpathians—from east to west the Uzsok Pass, the Baligrod — Cisna road, the Lupkow Pass in the Beskids, the depression at Dukla and the saddle of Konieczna. All that Boroevic could reasonably do was to string out his corps — eleven divisions in all — and hope they could hold out. By contrast, the Russian Eighth Army, under Brusilov, had all the advantages. They had only to concentrate their superiority of numbers at one point to force the isolated troops against them into retreat. In the first ten days of November, Boroevic was pushed back into the main chain of the Carpathians; by mid-month his forces stood along the five passes. Thereafter Brusilov pressed forward with his left — XXIV Corps (Tsurikov) and Eck's Group, five divisions in all — towards the Uzsok Pass, driving back the few brigades of Krautwald and Karg. By the 20th, the Austro-Hungarian right had had to fall back to Czirpkaofalu and Telepocz, the centre — VII Corps — abandoning Lupkow Pass, and falling back to Mezolaborcz. By the 25th, Boroevic had to send his reserve to the right flank, and staged a successful counterattack there, ultimately recapturing the Uzsok Pass; but this action bared the centre and left of Boroevic's army, and Brusilov struck forward here with three strong corps — VIII (Orlov), XII (Lyesh) and VII (Shcherbachev). The Austro-Hungarian front was thrown into turmoil; Boroevic had to abandon Mezolaborcz and then Bartfa; his headquarters were moved to Kassa (Kosice); preparations were put under way for the defence of 'the bridgehead Budapest', and by .the 29th the three left-hand corps of Boroevic's army stood on the Tapoly, prepared to abandon even Eperjes as the Russians advanced. However, the danger passed over. By the end of the month, the 'decision' for the whole front would obviously be made around Krakow; Brusilov was told by Ivanov, much to his disgust, that: 'The decision as to the fate of the present operation will occur on the banks of the Vistula, and to achieve success we must direct there the full strength of the armies of the southwestern front.' As a result, Brusilov had to break off his offensive on the Tapoly and much of his strength towards direct Krakow. The great question, both for Poland and the Carpathian front, would be decided south of Krakow. front
to
difficulties of
[For Further Reading and biography, see page 465. ]
Norman
Stone's
*****
*
/
E Si
3
5 5 ra
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THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA Turkish morale was high alter having soundly defeated a Russian offensive in November 1914. Enver Pasha decided to utilise this spirit in a great winter push. As his grandiose plan moved into operation in December, the Russians retreated and the Turks advanced through he snows and frosts of the Caucasian mountains, enduring terrible hardships in the process. Enver's offensive, which he had started with some 95,000 men, ended in complete catastrophe. Turkish losses were appalling — about 75,000 men and the whole of the artillery. Russian losses were also formidable — 16,000 killed out of 65,000 men. Eugene Hinterhoff. Above: Turkish troops in the Caucasian mountains — in this campaign biting frost proved nearly as fatal to the Turks as Russian resistance t
.»
499
Hon Turkey entered the war on October the mobilisation and deployment of her forces were almost complete. By the middle of September the Turks had 36 divisions on a war footing, at about full \\
29,
The European
strength, organised into three armies.
First Army was concentrated in Turkey for the defence of the Straits; the Second Army was based on the Anatolian shores of the Sea of Marmara; and the Third Army, under the command of General Hasan Izzet Pasha, was deployed along the
frontier with Russia. This army consisted o( IX. and A7 Army Corps. Of these three was placed in an area bearmy corps,
X
X
tween Sivas and the Black Sea, with the rest of the army's forces concentrated in the Erzurum area, which the commander rightly considered to be the strategic key to the whole deployment area. He regarded his forces as inadequate for any serious offensive purposes, but at the same time he did net expect, in view of the rather moderate Russian strength, any serious threat from them. The Russian Caucasian Army consisted of two army corps: the I Caucasian Army Corps consisted of two infantry divisions, two Cossack rifle brigades and the 1st Caucasian Cossack Division, and the II Turkistan Army Corps consisted of four brigades. The total strength of the Caucasian
Army was
sotnis
(each
100 battalions, 117 equivalent to a cavalry squadron) and 256 guns, amounting to about 100,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry and 256 guns. The viceroy of the area, Count
Vorontsov-Dashkov, was nominally commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Army; in fact it was commanded by his deputy, General Myshlaevsky, a former professor of military history but totally unsuitable for his task. Fortunately the Russians had as chief-of-staff for the Caucasian Army a brilliant man, General Yudenich. The Russians evaluated the strength of the enemy correctly and came to the conclusion that the Turks would require at least a further four weeks from the beginning of November to prepare for a largescale offensive, and meanwhile the weather was likely to make operations on a large scale impossible. In other words, both sides were bent on adopting the defensive, and at the same time were not expecting any major move by the enemy. The initiative was taken by a Russian general, Bergmann, commander of I Army Corps. His forces crossed the frontier on November 2 in the general direction of Kbpriikoy. On his right flank General Istomin's brigade moved from Oltu on Id; on his left flank General Baratov's Cossack Division, having crossed the River Aras, moved into Eleskirt valley, in the direction offensive met and on November 6 he ordered an attack on Kbpriikoy. Hasan Izzet Pasha was not taken by surprise, however, and ordered a general coun-
of Yuzveran. Bergmann's with light resistance only,
ter-offensive with the well-deployed forces of his IX and XI Army Corps. Contact was established between both sides on November 6 along the bank of the River Aras,
but during the next fe days Bergmann's forces themsei s found dangerously threatened by the envek ing movement of the Turks, who were occi ving the commanding mountain heights i \d beginning to encircle both Russian flanky On November 11 Hasan Izzet's troops went into action. Two divisions of XI Corps marched
500
along the River Aras towards Kbpriikoy, threatening the Russian left flank; at the same time two divisions of the IX Corps attacked to the north-east of Kbpriikoy, in an effort to turn the Russian right flank in the area of Siligul mountain. With the greatest difficulty and with considerable losses, Bergmann succeeded on November 12 in withdrawing to the line Sanamer — Ardos — Horsan, which he occupied on November 4. He was not out of danger yet, however, because on the 14th the Turks were threatening to cut both his lines of retreat towards Zivin and Mecinkirt. Bergmann was saved from complete encirclement and annihilation by the hasty arrival of Russian reinforcements, which counterattacked and partially retrieved the situation. After two more days, the fighting died away. Bergmann, who had only himself to blame, had received up to 40% losses, and the morale of his Russian troops was considerably shaken. At the same time the morale of the Turks, although deprived of a complete victory, was very high. They were elated with the success and Enver decided to utilise this spirit in a great offensive. Encouraged by the results of recent fighting, which contributed to greater selfconfidence among the commanders on all levels, Enver decided to put into effect his grandiose plan, which was designed to outflank the Russian forces deployed along the frontier, cut their lines of communication with the main base in Kars and retrieve the territories ceded to Russia in 1878. The occupation of Kars, Ardahan and Batum would facilitate the planned revolt by Caucasian Moslems against Russia, and open the route to Tbilisi and beyond. Enver's ambitious plans found a sympathetic response from German officials — with the exception perhaps of the cautious Liman von Sanders. In any case, among German military advisers there was a general consensus that the Turkish offensive, even should it end in failure, would do Germany no harm. On the other hand, if successful, it could draw considerable Russian forces from the European theatre of war.
Enver's plan opposed Enver's plan in theory looked promising feasible, despite its boldness; the main justification for it was Enver's knowledge of the Russians' sensitivity to an outflanking manoeuvre, especially after their
and
recent defeat at Tannenburg, as well as information that the Russians happen-
ed to be very
weak
in
Sarikamis, which
as the main target for a frontal attack during the first phase of the offensive. Yet his plan met with strong opposition from the senior Turkish commanders on the spot. To begin with, the commander of the Third Army, Hasan Izzet Pasha, who only recently had won a resounding victory over the Russians, found fault with the plan and was now forced to resign; equally the commander of the IX Corps, Achmed Fevzi Pasha, expressed an opinion that such an operation was possible and feasible, but only after the most careful preparations and, above all, after the issue to the troops of warm clothing and the organisation of advance supply depots. All these objections, put
was intended
forward by experienced commanders, were brushed off by the impetuous, 33-year-old Enver, who dismissed several senior
and after arriving in Erzurum on December 6, on the 19th issued an order for a general offensive which was to begin
officers
on the 22nd.
The gist of his operational plan, approved by the German chief-of-staff of the Turkish army, Generalleutnant Bronsart von Schellendorf, consisted in the first phase of an outflanking manoeuvre, to be conducted by IX and XI Army Corps, co-ordinated with a frontal attack by X Corps, in general direction of Sarikamis, with the cavalry division causing a diversion along the right bank of the River Aras. The outflanking manoeuvre in the general direction of Oltu was to be made along the crest of a mountain
ridge
suitable,
especially
in
winter conditions, to infantry and to pack animals only, as it is a barren plateau, swept in winter by biting gales. Two divisions of IX Corps (17th and 19th) began their long and arduous trek without any warm clothing, being issued only with very limited rations (dry bread and olives) and having no field kitchens. The Turkish move did not escape the attention of General Istomin, whose brigade was deployed in the Oltu area. His report, however, was not taken seriously by his superior, General Bergmann, who was still smarting after his recent defeat at Kbpriikoy. On the 23rd, after heavy fighting, Istomin was forced to evacuate Oltu, withdrawing in the general direction of Ardahan. The next day, a heavy fall of snow increased the difficulties of IX and XI Corps; the 17th Division, which was trapped in a blizzard, lost about 40% of its men. Enver, who was riding with the division, and who saw for himself the conditions, disregarded the wise advice which General Bronsart von Schellendorf was trying to give him, namely to concentrate all the dispersed divisions of IX Corps and only after that to continue the advance. The main reason for Enver's objections to halting the momentum of his offensive was fear of losing the impact of surprise. Meanwhile, however, Enver's offensive became seriously weakened as a result of an excessive initiative of the commander of Corps, Hafiz Hakki Pasha, former Turkish attache in Vienna, who, without asking Enver's permission, sent two divisions of his corps in the general direction of Ardahan, in pursuit of Istomin's retreating forces. Yet, in spite of the Turkish outflanking Bergmann still attached movement, only a local significance to it, and suggested to General Myshlaevsky, who came with
X
Tbilisi, an attack in the direction of Kbpriikoy. Yet, only a few hours later, Myshlaevsky rescinded his order after having been sniped at by a Turkish patrol while making his way from Sari-
Yudenich from
kamis to Mecinkirt, and more properly when reports about the appearance of Turkish forces in Bardiz reached him.
When
at last
he reached Bergmann's HQ in Mecinkirt, almost in a state of panic, he signed a new order not for an offensive, but for a general retreat to start on the night of December 25/26. He thus accepted a defeat without even the slightest attempt to fight a defensive battle.
Sarikamis, meanwhile, evacuated by the and left with two sotnis and about 1,000 railway men only, was preparing to defend itself against an imminent attack by overwhelming Turkish forces. Yudenich, who had taken command of II Turkistan troops,
Corps, decided, in spite of a numerically superior enemy, to put up an organised resistance. He thought rightly that the Turkish attack, as a result of very severe winter conditions, must slowly be losing its
momentum. At dawn on December 26, the Turkish 29th Division of IX Corps began its march from Bardiz on Sarikami§, and by midday was involved in fighting with Russian patrols; the commander of the Turkish division, unaware of the Russian weakness, instead of pressing the withdrawing Rus-
sians, decided to break off the battle and to bivouac on the spot, in the open in the temperature -20°C (-36°F). The next morning, several hundred Turkish soldiers
were lying frozen to death, and many more had deserted to seek refuge in a few scattered hamlets; the strength of the division fallen from 8,000 to 4,000, a loss of 50% of its effective strength. On that day, Enver could still, if not actually retrieve the situation, then at least avoid the coming disaster. He found himself in a position similar to the one in
had
which Napoleon, waiting
for
Grouchy, saw
instead the arrival of Blucher's column, which was to decide the fate of the battle of Waterloo. In the same way, Enver was waiting for his Corps to arrive, but the Russian reinforcements began to arrive in Sarikami§ instead, which otherwise could have been an easy prey for the Turks. It was only on the 26th, when Enver's categorical order reached him, that Hafiz Hakki abandoned his ambitious drive to-
X
wards Ardahan, and undertook with his troops a desperately dangerous march
Feasible only in theory, the offensive proved catastrophic in Constantinople are, left to right, Wilhelm II, Enver Pasha — the influential German military mission Turkey was sympathetic to Enver's ambitious plans
Riding
in this
carriage
Mohammed V and in
*
% WP —*^
i 4^1
*
across the high Allahuekber massif at an altitude 01 nearly 10.000 feet, losing one-third of his force after a murderous
BLACK
SEA
^^
Batum.
19-hour march
Meanwhile, Russian reinforcements were in Sarikami§, and its defences wore growing stronger every day. Yet in arriving
TURKEY^
spite of that, great anxiety still prevailed in Russian HQ, especially after the capture of the chief-of-staff of the Turkish 28th
Division together with Enver's original order, outlining his grandiose plan for the annihilation of the Russian forces. General
Mvshlaevsky. used to conducting war more on a map than on a battlefield, was highly impressed by Enver's order and found the Russian situation desperate. He immediately issued an order for general retreat: he was especially worried by the reports about the movement of Turkish troops towards Ardahan, from where they could cut the Russian lines of retreat from Sarikami§. It was only as a result of heated arguments with Yudenich, who understood that the difficulties in which Enver's troops found themselves were growing, that Myshlaevsky's order
was
deferred.
The
situation
which only a few days ago was almost hopeless, began improving day by day, from this time on, especially after the arrival on the 27th of General Przevalsky's brigade from the right bank of the in Sarikami§,
River Aras.
Plan for annihilation The 28th passed quietly because Hafiz Hakki persuaded Enver to give a brief rest to his 30th and 31st Divisions, exhausted after their march across the mountains: unfortunately, due to the lack of warm clothing, one more night in the frozen Turnagel woods to the north-west of Sarikami§ reduced the strength of Corps to barely 6,000 men. The next day was the day of the decisive battle for Sarikamis. Both IX and Corps, totalling some 12,000 men, reached the positions north-east and south-east of Sarikami§. The 31st Division kept the railway to Kars under fire from the slopes of Turnagel, and the 30th Division took Alisofu. Sarikamis was encircled in this way on both flanks and virtually cut off from Kars. Theoretically, Enver's plan seemed to be near realisation. General Przevalsky decided on an active defence, attacking the encircling Turkish
X
X
During some savage bayonet fighting the Turks succeeded in penetrating into Sarikamis, but eventually they were driven off, losing many dead and prisoners. As a forces.
result of their terrible losses, the strength of the Turkish corps fell to some 3,000 men each; even Enver saw that it was useless to insist on further fruitless attacks. And yet, in spite of the fact that the scales of the battle were shifting definitely in favour of the Russians, General Bergmann was still insisting on a general retreat; fortunately for the Russians, Yudenich, after a quarrel with Bergmann, taking advantage of his position as chiefof-staff of the Caucasian Army, took over command of his forces, fter a reappraisal of the situation, he wire, a Tbilisi that, in the Turks was his opinion, the situation uld be comdesperate and that they for the impletely annihilated. He ask mediate despatch of all avail le reserves. IX Corps On the 31st the chief-of-sta reported to Enver that the ren its of his corps, huddled in Turnagel w s, were s and about 2,500 strong, with 14 '
502
15Miles
10
25Kms
The Armenian Campaign at first the Russians retreated before the Turkish offensive, but ultimately it was the Turks who failed miserably in the high, barren and bitter country :
machine guns; the corps was cut off from Bardiz by the Russians, who were threatening its left flank. On January 1, 1915, Abdul Kerim, commander of XI Corps, decided to press a frontal attack on Sarikamis through Karaurgan. The battle, in which both sides suffered heavy casualties, lasted four days, and slowly the Turkish pressure began losing its momentum. On January 2, Enver left Turnagel woods, passing the whole of the next day with X Corps, which was also in a serious predicament, being involved in heavy fighting with the Russians, who were enveloping its left flank. In view of the threat of a complete encirclement, Hafiz Hakki ordered a withdrawal. Meanwhile
Enver, on his way from Bardiz to Erzurum, narrowly escaped capture by a Russian patrol at Kizilkilise. The complete encirclement of Turnagel woods began on January 2, and after two days of bitter fighting the remnants of IX Corps, including its commander and 1,000 of his men, were taken prisoners. The liquidation of Corps, as a result of mistakes committed by Bergmann who, being senior to Przevalsky, took over the command of forces in Sarikamis, proved to be more difficult, and the remnants of the two Turkish divisions managed to escape. At the same time, the Russians were mopping up the whole Turkish division which was sent by Hafiz Hakki towards Ardahan. The battle for Sarikamis came to an end on January 15-17, with the capture of a few thousand Turks who, although dispersed and disorganised, were still putting up a desperate resistance in Turnagel woods. Enver's offensive, which he had started
X
with some 95,000 men — against 65,000 on the Russian side — ended in complete catastrophe. Turkish losses were appalling — about 75,000 men and the whole of the artillery. Russian losses were also formidable- 16,000 killed and 12,000 sick, mostly
from
frostbite.
Further Reading
W. E. D. and Muratoff, P., Caucasian Battlefields (CUP 1953) Churchill, W. S., World Crisis (Four Square)
Allen,
Guse,
F.,
Die Kaukasusfront im Weltkrieg
(Leipzig: Koehler
& Amelang)
Korganoff, Gen. G., La participation des Armeniens a la guerre mondiale sur le front du Caucase (Paris 1927) Hovanisian, R. G., Armenia on the Road to
Independence (University of California 1967) Pomianowski, J., Die Zusammenbruch der Ottomanischen Reiches (Vienna 1928)
EUGENE HINTERHOFF was
born in Korea, as a Russian subject. After serving with the Russian forces in the First World War, he joined the Polish army after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. He served in the Polish army up to 1933 and took part in the Polish-Bolshevik War, being awarded the Polish equivalent of the Victoria Cross. After leaving the army he became a journalist, working for a Polish agency in Vienna and Prague. During the Second World War he served with the Polish troops
VM, the
under Britain
British
command, and afterwards he settled
and became a
British subject.
As a
in
result of
number of articles on military history he produced for papers all over the world he was awarded a NATO Research Fellowship in 1962. In 1967 he was made a Member of the Order of the British Empire
the increasing
Liman von Sanders, German military adviser Turkey, favoured advance into the Ukraine
in
Enver Pasha: his plan met with strong opposition locally from senior Turkish commanders, but impetuous 33-year-old brushed off all objections and dismissed several senior officers
Russian trenches-when frost and snow had slowed the Turks' impetus, the Russians ceased retreating and took a stand
this
at Sarikamis,
503
ECONOMIC RIVALRIES A.S.Milward In the years before the war Germany beat Britain into second place in European trade and then began to challenge her overseas. Such economic rivalry crushed Britain's confidence in her economic supremacy, and psychologically prepared both countries
for
war
In 1870 Britain dominated the commercial and industrial world to an extent never previously achieved by any nation in modern history. Many of the more far-sighted realised that the enormous size of the United States and her vast potential resources meant that she would eventually rival Britain's position, but as far as Europe was concerned there existed only one other industrial power of any significance, France, and from 1815 onwards Britain seemed to have held off the French challenge with little trouble. The outward and visible sign of British strength was the disproportionately huge size of her foreign trade compared to that of other nations. As the world's most important exporter of manufactured goods and importer of foodstuffs and raw materials, Britain stood at the centre of the world's trading network, the link which bound together the whole complicated construction. Her trade was carried in the world's biggest merchant navy, which
504
also carried a significant portion of the trade of all other countries (a third of the shipping entering and leaving German ports in 1873/74 was British) and that merchant navy was protected by
the world's biggest naval force, maintained at a level sufficient to equal that of any other two navies combined. In the same city from which the government of the world's largest empire was carried on was the centre of the world's shipping insurance market and the greatest money market controlling, in most years, the pattern and size of international investment, with only the Paris money market as its rival. All this was the result of the industrial growth of Britain which took place from the late 18th Century onwards, and the relative absence of these developments elsewhere. Only in Belgium and in France had there been similar developments on such a scale. Belgium was too small a country to affect the British
and France remained much less industrialised than However, in the 1850s the industrial revolution spread to Germany and in the following 20 years Germany built up the economic power which culminated in her victory over France in the Franco-Prussian War. By 1870 these developments had had little impact on people in Britain, but nevertheless, the industrial revolution which took place in Germany at this time was the basis of the later Anglo-German commercial rivalry which was to trouble the whole world before the First World War. For Germany was as populous and well-endowed with resources as Britain and had, also, the advantage of a later start in industrialisation, so that her factories and equipment were often more modern and more productive than those in Britain. Between 1870 and 1914 Germany became a more important industrial power than Britain and this fact, together with the continued growth of the United States, changed Britain's whole economic position in the world, breaking down one by one the props on which the Empire and British commercial superiority had rested. Although, with the help of hindsight, we can see that the advantages of the British position were being diminished even in position, Britain.
the mid- 19th Century, in 1880 there seemed small likelihood that British industrial production would be overhauled by that of any other European power. In that year the value of British exports of iron and steel was three times the value of those of the rapidly developing German iron and steel industry. The value of British exports of machinery was four-and-a-half times that of Germany, and the value of the export of manufactured cotton goods 20 times that of the German industry. The German merchant marine was barely one-sixth the size of that of Britain. In the subsequent decade, the power, of German industry first made itself felt on international markets. Within an astonishingly short period of time British traders found that the conditions under which they operated had been changed for ever. Jealousy and fear of Germany became a prevalent factor in industrial and trade circles, and Germany came to be seen as a dangerous threat to Britain's place in the world — a potential enemy with whom ultimate conflict was all too likely. Since Germany's international economic activities and ambitions were the expression of her rapidly growing domestic economy the only possible British position appeared to be a defensive one, to hold the advantages she already had against encroachment. Thus Germany was seen as an economic aggressor, the disturber of an international trading
system which had appeared synonymous with peace. In the early 1870s over 11^ of Britain's exports went
many
herself, after the
to Ger-
USA
Britain's biggest customer. By the of British exports went to Germany and
end of the 1880's only 7 c/< their total value had declined from £26,000,000 to £16,000,000, while Britain's imports from Germany had greatly increased.
German
exports to Britain consisted increasingly of manufactured goods, and for all the soothing articles in the Manchester Guardian, the idea that 'the workshop of the world' was buying machinery from her most dangerous rival gave rise to a considerable amount of popular unease, exploited in papers such as the Daily Mail. The unease also contributed to the passing of the Merchandise Marks Act of 1887, which instituted for the first time
the practice of clearly labelling the country of origin on goods imported into Britain by British importers. It was in the 1880s that German exports to a number of European countries first became more important than British exports. Germany had of course numerous commercial advantages in Europe of which the most important was the possibility of using through railway transport from the manufacturer to the buyer. By 1890 Germany had become the chief supplier of Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Rumania and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In every case it was Britain which was ousted from first place. Although the total volume of British trade in all those countries remained high, the significant fact was that Germany's share of new trade there grew rapidly against that of Britain. 'The Germans,' said a leader in The Times in 1886, 'are beginning to beat us in many of the qualities which are the factors of commercial success. They are content with smaller profits; the clerks work for lower salaries; they speak all languages; they are bound
by no hard and
fast traditions.'
In fact, after 1885
Germany's gains
at Britain's expense in slowed down considerably. After 1895, however, Germany again forged ahead, this time more spectacularly, and by 1900 had become overwhelmingly the most important commercial country on the continent. Only in peripheral countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Norway did Britain retain her position. These developments were directly related to industrial developments in Germany. The first German breakthrough had been based on the development of the iron, steel and engineering industries. After 1895 the growth of German exports was more related to the astounding developments in the chemical industry there. Eor until 1914 Germany had almost a world monopoly in dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, photographical supplies, plastics and artificial fibres. At the same time her electrical industries and her motor car industry began to supply markets throughout Central Europe. The consequence of these events was to divert British trade
continental
markets
Left: Anglo-German trade rivalry — in links Britain's island location was an
an age of rapid and cheap rail economic liability visa vis European trade. Below: The Baghdad Railway- when Germany was awarded the concession to build in 1899 dawned upon Britain that Germany had become a world power it
it
~ '
A
1 '
J*
'
•
increasingly to the Empire, where German rivalry was much less intense. Even German exports to Britain, however, increased rapidly in the Late L890s. The value of German iron and steel manufactures exported to Britain in 1902 was four times that of 1890. The existence of a carefully graded tariff in Germany meant thai British exports to that country showed an increasing proportion of semi-manufactured goods and raw materials — the flourishing German dyestuffs industry was based partly on coaltar imported from Britain, where it was a waste product. The new direction of British trade, which increasing German domination in European markets was causing, was often thought by British observers to be responsible for the failure of the new and more scientifically based industries to develop. One reason, for example, that cotton goods continued as the staple British export right up to 1914 was the increasing volume of trade with India. Soft Empire markets did not require goods based on the chemical industry or electrical machinery. The development of these industries in Germany and their failure to take root in Britain was the origin of the present day idea that the Germans are more 'efficient' economically. At the start of the 1880s the level of British exports to Italy was five times that of German exports, but Germany closed the gap slightly in the 1890s. After 1898 the British lead disappeared so that by 1907 Germany had become Italy's leading supplier. In fact Britain's position there was much weaker than even this suggests, for the bulk of British exports to Italy was coal whereas the bulk of German exports was manufactured goods. Thus in the late 1890s young Italians began to go to Germany rather than Britain for their technical education and business training. When they came back they naturally tended to strengthen the ties between their country and Germany.
British or
German predominance?
The same
story is true for the Balkan countries. The building of railways there in the 1890s was usually financed by German capital and the railways were directly beneficial to German exporters. Only in Greece, where sea transport remained important, was Britain able to retain her position. In Serbia, Rumania and Bulgaria the British predominance of the 1880s was exchanged in the last decade before the war for German
predominance. In Russia, Germany's trading position had always been slightly better than that of Britain. Most British firms were utterly ignorant of the Russian market and indeed of the country as a whole. Germans visited the country more and knew it better. Thus Germany was able to strengthen her hold on the Russian market in the 1890s so that in spite of the heavy French capital investments in that country Germany was the dominant supplier by 1904. The knowledge that this trade expansion was a reflection of developments inside Germany and thus not a temporary pheno-
menon
increased the prevalent unease and defensiveness in British economic circles. The response to the German challenge in Europe was a number of schemes for strengthening the commercial ties between the members of the British Empire. These
varied from projects for full-scale political and economic integration to plans for tariff preferences between Empire countries. It was becoming more widely felt in Britain that to persist in a policy of free trade which gave to Britain and Germany the same trading facilities in British colonies when Germany herself practised discriminatory tariffs, was folly. The fears that these plans and projects aroused in German economic circles was intense, for it was generally felt there that the maintenance of free trade by the British had been the cornerstone of the 19th Century international trading system which had so benefited Europe.
Both British and German fears were symptomatic of one thing, the knowledge that the commercial and economic rivalry between the two countries could not be confined to Europe. In the Turkish Empire, in China, and in Africa there were also serious clashes of
economic
interest.
Between 1840 and 1880 Turkey had been more or less a financial subsidiary of Britain, the corrupt and inefficient Turkish government being sustained by British economic and naval power as a strategic counterweight to the Russian Empire. The economic penetration of Germany :nto south-eastern Europe was bound to bring German economic expansion in the end into Turkey. As the railways through the Balkans reached Constantinople British fears increased, for the Ottoman Empire guarded not only the Straits but also the Persian Gulf and thus lay near British trade routes to India. The question of i railway through Asia Minor to the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates and the headwaters of the Persian Gulf was one that Britain could scarcely ignore, and
506
there seemed no reason why German capital should halt at Constantinople. In 1888 a Turkish government loan of £1,500,000 was placed in Germany and in the same year the Deutsche Bank took over the financing of the Anatolian Railway Company which was to construct a line from the Asiatic side of the Straits through Asia Minor. In the following year the Hamburg-Levant shipping line began to offer through freight tariffs from Hamburg to places in Asia Minor via the new Turkish railway system, thus undercutting British exporters. British policy was to delay the building of this railway system for as long as possible, a policy which did little to increase British popularity in Turkey. Meanwhile an interminable set of manoeuvres went on at the Sultan's court to obtain concessions for the next stage of the railway to Baghdad. When that concession was awarded to Germany in 1899 it became clear in Britain that Germany, economically, had become a world power. The concession was followed by the beginning of direct German steamer services into the Persian Gulf. In the early years of this century, the Persian Gulf was coming to have a wholly new significance for Britain after the discovery of oil in the region. The Royal Navy was beginning to adopt the new oil-fired boilers in preference to the older coal-fired type. The motor car industry was also beginning to grow rapidly and soon the aircraft industry was to expand into a major oil-consuming factor. For a long time the British had been established at Basra at the head of the Gulf and it was hoped from there to extend control over the new oil discoveries in Mosul and Kuwait. The threat of a German controlled railway at Baghdad seemed to aim at the whole British economic domination of Mesopotamia. Britain therefore refused to permit any increase in the Turkish customs in order to facilitate financial provision for the new railway. Finally in 1913 she permitted German construction of the railway to go ahead to Baghdad but only in return for a sweeping set of concessions. These were that the line could not go to the headwaters of the Gulf of Persia itself; that the traffic on the Mesopotamian rivers would be exclusively controlled by a British shipping company; and that southern Mesopotamia and central and southern Persia would be the exclusive preserve of the AngloPersian Oil Company, controlled by the British government, and the Turkish Petroleum Company, in which one half of the shares were owned by the National Bank of Turkey controlled by a leading British banker and the chairman of the Peninsula and Orient Shipping Company. Britain's price for the Baghdad railway was very high, but the strength of Germany's challenge can be measured from the desperate conditions which the British government imposed. in China In China the real threat from German trade was much less. In the 1890s Britain supplied over half the total imports into both China and Japan. Hong Kong and Shanghai became the two great outposts of western capitalism in China, particularly Shanghai. One was a British colony and the other was dominated by British shipping companies and import agencies. Nevertheless even here the breath of German economic competition was felt. The German government offered a subsidy to the North German Lloyd shipping company in 1886 to operate a direct service from Germany to Hong Kong. In 1897 a German economic mission visited China, but British worries about its activities were soon eclipsed by more serious events in the same year. For in that year the German government forced the Chinese government to cede to it the port of Tsingtao in the northern province of Shantung. The German move was in one sense the result of British commercial opposition in the previous decade. At that time Germany had aimed her thrust at the very heart of British economic power in China, the valley of the Yangtze river, and had attempted to take over the Chu Shan islands and to establish a commercial base there rather like that which Britain had in Hong Kong. Although Tsingtao was in northern China and therefore further removed from British power, the ultimate implication was that German economic influence might spread to the whole of Shantung province. This proved to be the case, for it was soon revealed that Germany had obtained from the Chinese government exclusive
Germany's foothold
mining concessions and the sole right to build railways in that province. It has to be said that in spite of this activity German trade and German capital were able to make scarcely any encroachment at all on the British position in China before 1914. In Africa commercial rivalry between the two countries was closely bound up with the political disaster of the Boer War, and it is difficult to sort out whether British fears of Germany in that
Above: Hong Kong — one of Britain's Far Eastern trading centres. Below: A Berlin iron works: in 1893 Germany's steel production overtook Britain's, and by 1914 it was double — Krupp steel led the world
%
-H (,
}
1~
*<
jF».
.-•At-'*.
•»«*».
*f „.
continent wort more economic or political. In the long-run, however, the lesson for Britain was the same as elsewhere. The enormous growth lit' the German economy had produced a power which could scarcely, in its own economic interest, stand idly by while Britain continued to exercise the world dominance that she had exercised since 1815. The Cheat Trek of the Boer farmers had taken them northward out oi' British South Africa to found their independent republics. But both the Orange Free State and the Transvaal were weak countries, bound by many ties of commerce and sympathy to Germany Not the least of these ties of sympathy was that Germany was increasingly seen as the rival of their great enemy, Britain. Meanwhile. German firms had been constantly increasing their commercial activities in the weakly governed Portuguese colonies in Africa. It was generally supposed that the Portuguese empire in Africa was on the point of collapse. It was also realised that if it did collapse German commercial interest there would be in a strong position to press German claims in the event of a partition. Ultimately that might mean that the Transvaal would also join with Germany for protection against the British. The main trading outlet of the Transvaal was through the Portuguese controlled port of Lourenco Marques, where German traders were particularly prominent. In 1895 the railway line from Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal, to Lourengo Marques was completed and its completion was celebrated by a visit from a delegation of German naval officers. The building of the railway produced an immediate rise in German trade with the Transvaal and of German investment in that country. At the turn of the century it would have been safe to conclude that whereas the growth of German trade had quite changed the British economic position in Europe, outside that continent British trade was little affected. But British statesmen taking a long-term view could be by no means certain that that state of affairs would endure. In 1895 a leader in The Times again voiced the statesmen's fear. 'Germany is by far the most dangerous of our industrial competitors at the present moment all the world over, and one cannot but regret that the influence of German competition upon British industry has not yet received the full amount of official attention which the magnitude of the interests at stake deserves.' Or, to put it in other words, if the German economy continued to perform better than the British economy, Britain's position even in South Africa or China could not long remain safe. 1
'Unfair' subsidies In fact, after 1890 the German merchant marine began to grow in size very rapidly. British businessmen attributed this growth to the 'unfair' subsidies provided by the German government, but subsequent studies have shown that these subsidies were too small
have made any real difference to German businessmen's decisions to build ships. The growth of the German merchant navy was simply a reflection of the growth of German industry at home and its relentless search for export markets. Between 1899 and 1902 a number of old-established British shipping companies, including part of the Holt Line, were bought out by German companies, again giving rise to a national outcry in Britain. In
to
1897 the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse was launched, and it was not long before she secured the coveted Blue Riband for the fastest Atlantic crossing. Her sister ship, the Deutschland, launched in 1900, was even faster and won the same trophy. Even so, on the eve of the First World War the total tonnage of the British merchant marine was still four times greater than that of Germany. But whereas in 1880 the British merchant marine had been also much more modern than the German, having, for example, a much higher proportion of steamships, in 1914 this was no longer the case. German ship owners converted their ships to oil-firing much more readily than their more conservative British counterparts.
was not only in shipbuilding that Germany was more efficient. It was also true in industries where Britain had long been dominant. A deputation of British employers and workmen visited German iron and steel works in 1895. Their report, published in 1896, demonstrated the immense technical advances made in Germany. Not the least of these advantages appeared to be the higher level of education of the German workmen. They underIt
stood far better the nature of the technical processes they were performing and be< ause their level of education was higher their chances of promotion were also far higher. This factor counted for a great deal in the gr wth of the new German industries. From the development of synthetic aniline dyes in Germany, sprang almost the wht of the modern chemical industry including the first large drug firms and plastics firms. Their activities were based on a constant stream of scientific research. They were
508
the forerunners of modern companies in their search for a 'new product' and a new method of marketing it. The greater number of universities in Germany, their far higher quality, their widespread availability and their cheapness contrasted sharply with the universities in Britain. From German universities a steady flow of science students poured into the laboratories of German chemical firms to create a series of great industries which barely existed at all in Britain. The development of the German economy was based both on the development of these new industries and on the continued growth of the more traditional 19th Century industries. Germany had produced about 2,000,000 tons of pig-iron in 1875, much less than Britain; by 1913 she was producing over 19,000,000 tons per year, a far higher quantity than in Britain. In 1887 she mined 60,000,000 tons of coal; by 1913 her coal output stood at 190,000,000 tons. In 1893 she became the biggest steel producer in the world; by 1914 she produced twice as much steel as Britain. But it was the development of the newer industries that took hold of the imagination more. Aniline dyes were first mass-produced in the 1870s. Explosives of a quite new type were produced in the same decade. The first antiseptics and anaesthetics were produced before 1890, and between 1900 and 1910 appeared the first plastics, artificial fibres and insecticides, as well as mass-produced photographic equipment. It was also in these years that Germany took the lead in the production of scientific instruments, of precision gauges, and of many important machine tools. When war eventually broke out Britain was to discover that some indispensable items of machinery and equipment could not be produced in Britain because there was neither the technical knowledge nor the necessary skills, as British users had relied on German imports. Such was the case, for example, with optical glass for sights and binoculars. The idea that logically there must be an ultimate showdown with Germany was born in Britain before 1900 as a result of these commercial and industrial rivalries. In Germany an equally dangerous idea was born, that Britain would ultimately launch a preventive war to stamp out German trade rivalry. Indeed, when the war did come, many Germans argued that it had been caused by Britain precisely for that reason. After 1900 the fear was never absent in Britain that Germany's economic domination of Holland and Belgium would go so far that she would take over those small countries which were so strategically important to British interests. At the same time the building of German warships directly threatened the British strategy of keeping the navy at such a level as to match that of any other two powers combined. The growth of the British navy had in many respects been a function of Britain's enormous overseas trade and it was hardly surprising that in these years the German navy should also increase in size. It was on these growing fears that E. E. Williams capitalised in his Made in Germany. What he wrote there in 1896 stayed in peoples' minds through the subsequent years: Roam the house over and the fateful mark will greet you at every turn, from the piano in the drawing-room to the mug on your kitchen dresser. Descend to your domestic depths, and you will find the very drain pipes German made. You pick out of the grate the paper wrappings from a book consignment, and they are also 'made in Germany'
You stuff them into the fire and reflect that the poker in your hand was forged in Germany. As you rise from your hearthrug you knock over an ornament on your mantelpiece; picking up the pieces you read, on that bit that formed the base, 'manufactured Germany'. And you jot your reflections down with a pencil that was made in Germany. There were, indeed, many reminders that Europe now contained not one great industrial power but two. 'Rightly or wrongly,' said Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, in 1908, 'a great part of the world has come of late years to concentrate upon the relations between England and Germany, to look to them for the chief indication of whether the peace of the world in
is
likely to be disturbed
'
Further Reading Feis, H., Europe, The World's Banker (New York 1965) Hoffman, R. J. S., Great Britain and The German Trade Rivalry 1875-1914 (New York 1964) Saul, S. B Studies in British Overseas Trade 1870-1914 (Liverpool 1960) ,
MILWARD
has taught and lectured at a variety of Universities, both in and the United States including the University of East Anglia, Stanford University in California and the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. He is author of The German Economy at War and numerous articles on related subjects.
A. S.
Britain
THE BATTLE OF CORONEL
A >i
±
At the outbreak of war German possessions in the Pacific were many and They included the Marianas, far-flung. Marshall Islands, Carolines, the the Bougainville in the Solomons. German New Guinea and the islands now known as New Ireland and New Britain which lie off that coast, and Samoa. Perhaps most important of all. there was the young and vigorous German colony in the Kiao-chow territory up in the Yellow Sea, grouped about its capital, the naval base of Tsingtao. From this base operated the ships of the German East Asiatic Squadron. !
The composition of* this squadron was well-known, and so was its reputation. In Whitehall it was recognised as a naval unit of compact strength, excellent morale and high efficiency, officered and led by sailors of character and experience. The information about it which Whitehall lacked, however, was in some ways the most important -the location of its principal ships and the intentions of the officer all — and these vital were to remain largely matters of constant and rather harassed speculation in the minds of a number of important people, for the best part of three months. One of the light cruisers of the squadron
who commanded them facts
— SMS Emden — did in fact reveal her posimuch earlier than did the others, for
tion
she suddenly appeared in the Bay of Bengal
upon a commerce-raiding cruise which
paralysed trade in the area, thoroughly frightened business interests from Singapore to Ceylon, and compelled the admira-
Tahiti, they vanished again long before British or Allied naval forces in the area could concentrate and bring them to action. Then in the middle of October they arrived at Easter Island, and when the reports reached Whitehall the conclusion hardened that they were heading for South America and the co-operation of the German interests in Chile. This could hardly have come as much of a surprise to the Admiralty, for the alternative courses of action which faced the Commander-inChief of the East Asiatic Squadron, once Japan had entered the war on the Allied side, were not very attractive. Whether it was a surprise or not, the fact remained that by the beginning of November a German force of considerable strength would be off' the west coast of South America, and might shortly afterwards come around the Horn to the east coast. it could then cause among the trade lanes bearing vital supplies of foodstuffs and war materials from the Plate might be so serious as to be fatal, for it was realised that England could be brought to the point of starvation and collapse in six weeks if her overseas trade was brought to a standstill. All the might of the Grand Fleet would be unable to save her in these circumstances. At all costs, the ships of the German East Asiatic Squadron must be found and annihilated before they could bring about such a perilous situation.
The damage
But how — and by whom? For British were very inadequate.
forces in the area
whose pockets, lives or sentiments were not immediately threatened by
A
her activities.
As
tion of all
But it was quickly evident that she was operating alone. The other ships of the squadron — SMS Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Niirnberg and Leipzig— vanished into the limitless expanse of the Pacific, and although at intervals news would arrive of their sudden appearance at such places as
Fanning and Christmas and later off the French
Islands, at Samoa port of Papeete at
single British cruiser the harsh afternoon glare softened into twilight on Saturday October 31, 1914, the slim, low-built shape of a British light cruiser slipped into Coronel Bay and anchored. Her sides were streaked with salt and rust; her boats, though seaworthy, showed signs of rough handling, and the bareness of her upperworks was not en-
due to war conditions. HMS Glasgow had come round the Horn from the Falktirely
lands in weather which lived well up to reputation, and had since been battling up and down the Chilean coast in gales which tossed her about like a piece of cork and swept away all fittings not voluntarily removed three months before. She had been hard worked since summer, and now she was battered — but her engines were still sound and her crew alert. A boat sped away from her side and from the bridge Captain John Luce watched her go, reckoned the odds against them all once again and hoped that Lieutenant Hirst, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who sat in the boat's sternsheets, would quickly send and collect his telegrams and return on board. Down in the wireless room, as Captain Luce well knew, his telegraphists were listening to the almost continuous, high-singing Telefunken signals which indicated the presence in the immediate vicinity of enemy ships, one call-sign in particular so dominant that he almost expected to see its user, SMS Leipzig, sliding into the bay alongside him. And if the situation to seaward was ominous, it was not improved by conditions ashore. The strong German and proGerman element along the Chilean coast had already proved actively hostile and there was little doubt that someone in Coronel was at that very moment sending out the news that the Glasgow was in the bay. Thus if the efforts of Vice-Admiral Graf von Spee, Commander-in-Chief of the German East Asiatic Squadron, were directed towards cutting off the Glasgow from the other ships of her squadron, then his task was being greatly facilitated. Altogether, Glasgow was in a tricky situation and Captain Luce was not the only one on board to appreciate it. In the wardroom there was speculation on the chances of getting to sea before the trap was sprung and — less immediately — cool consideration of the chances of battle even if they did manage to regain the Flag and join company with the armoured cruisers Monmouth and Good Hope and the armed merits
chant cruiser Otronto which together formed the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock. Given half a chance, Cradock would fight -that was the general opinion, and despite the almost overwhelming power and efficiency of the enemy squadron, no one doubted that Cradock's course would be the correct one. From a purely practical point of view one telling hit on one of Spee's ships could wreck the squadron. There was no German base available for repairs, and a neutral port could only offer shelter for 24 hours, after which internment for ship and crew were automatic — leaving the rest
weak and unbalanced to run the gauntlet home. About the ship the Glasgow's men worked steadily, making good gale damage, cleaning and re-oiling the guns, checking ammunition and trimming the coal bunkers, while all the time the Telefunken signals
of the squadron
whined in the ears of the wireless telegraphists. Ashore Lieutenant Hirst talked long and urgently to official and unofficial members of the British service, and it was daylight before he completed his business and returned to the Glqpgou\ still with hours of work ahead of him. As he reached his cabin the anchor cable was already coming in, the little cruiser swinging free. As they cleared the bay there was as yet no immediate sign of the enemy — not that the men aboard Glasgow need be unduly worried if it was to be a meeting with the Leipzig only, for, on paper at least, there was an exciting equality of strength between them. The Glasgow and Leipzig were light cruisers manned by long-service officers and men; they had been in commission for over two years and were thus
presumably efficient in neajmanship and gunnery, and both were ed with ten 4-inch guns. The Ge g|ms were in fact 41 -inch, and som §d Glasgow were aware of the these guns compared very favOurabl ith the older guns. Ho' this, Glasgow herself moi British
6-inch
ver,
to
ted two
offset
more
modern 6-inch guns which were reputed to have the range of the old 9-inch batteries. Should the Glasgow and Leipzig meet then, there appeared the possibility of a single-ship action — but reflection revealed Unless the the possibility as slight. Leipzig actually forced an action, the
Glasgow must first attend to other work and responsibilities -for her primary duty was to return to the Flag and deliver the telegrams and information. Quite possibly, in company with the armoured cruisers and the Otranto, a search might then be made for the Leipzig which, if successful, would undoubtedly be of fundamental importance, for every chance must be taken to reduce the strength of Admiral von Spee's command before the British and German squadrons met.
The
Glasgow
and
Leipzig
might
be
as equals, but the combined British ships in the locality were certainly no match for the crack squadron of the
reckoned
Imperial German Navy. The two German armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau by themselves would constitute an enormous menace to the heterogeneous collection of ships which composed the
exact position was by no means certain — and perhaps with the help of her 12-inch guns the German cruisers could be fought off. But even this was a slim chance, for the guns aboard Canopus were as old as herself, and although she had now been for some weeks under Admiral Cradock's command, he had been able to hold only one hurried conference with her commander, for the Canopus had arrived at the Falklands on the morning of the day the rest of the squadron must leave. That conference, however, had been enough to convince Cradock that the Canopus's engines were in such a state of disrepair that the voyage down from the Mediterranean had practically crippled them, and that a hasty overhaul at Port Stanley would be essential in order to get the battleship around the Horn. But if Cradock couldn't wait for the Canopus perhaps the battle would -should Fate prove kind. It was at least arguable that Spee would keep his distance if her four 12-inch guns were present in the British battle-line. However, if the Glasgow, Monmouth and Good Hope could catch isolated units of
British squadron, for the German ships held superiority in speed and also in broadside weight and range. Add to them the light cruiser Leipzig and her two sister
Spee's command and thus deal with it piecemeal, then the whole strategic situation in the Southern Seas might be
and Dresden, and the squadron under Admiral Graf von Spee's command became an admirably balanced — and modern — fighting force.
But it seemed rather a lot to hope for. At sea again, the Glasgow steered first north and then Captain Luce took his ship around to the south-west, plunging ahead into wind and a rising sea as fast as the engines would take her, in order to deliver the telegrams and naval intelligence into Cradock's hands without breaking wireless silence. Seas swept the foredeck and the wind sang in the signal halliards. Four hours later the Glasgow rejoined the Flag some 40 miles west of Coronel Bay. The Good Hope and Monmouth were there, rolling like barrels in the heavy seas, and the Otrantn developed a list whenever she came broadside to the wind. There was no sign of the ( 'anopus.
ships, the Niirnberg
Only one hope force, the British had two armoured cruisers (one of which had already been condemned as unfit for further service), one fairly modern light cruiser, and a converted merchantman. One hope — and one hope only — seemed
Against this
elderly
to
exist
even an avoidance of overdefeat, should the ships of the
for
whelming
Royal Navy meet the East Asiatic Squadron in force. Somewhere to the south was the old battleship HMS Canopus— her
successfully dealt with.
Below: The German light cruiser. SMS NurnIn a state of sad disrepair, she nevertheless played an important part in the battle
berg.
K.*-
—
Above: The German
light cruiser.
SMS
Dresden. She had steamed
The seas were far too heavy for boatwork, Glasgow towed a cask containing the vital papers across the Good Hope's bows — so the
and in the ruling weather conditions she was both extremely lucky and extremely adept, for the manoeuvre was immediately successful. It was also to some effect, for by two o'clock a string of signals was fluttering from the Good Hope's halliards and Captain Luce's appreciation of the situation was confirmed. The squadron were to form line abreast, about 15 miles apart, with the Good Hope to the west and the Glasgow to the east of the line, and sweep north-west by north at ten knots. The signals preceded by the Leipzig's call-sign bleated loud through the dull-grey afternoon, and Cradock had decided that she was to be found and annihilated before the heavy might of the German armoured cruisers could come to her protection. For this task the guns of the Canopus would not be necessary. The squadron spread out — cold, wet, and pitching now on the steep following sea. The Good Hope, carrying the Admiral aboard, treasuring the honour and reputation of the Royal Navy above all else; the Monmouth, with her crew of Scottish fishermen and coastguards, her 12 young naval cadets fresh from Dartmouth, and her outdated engines kept going only by the super-
human
efforts
Wilshin and his
of
Enginoer-Commander
the Otranto looming tumbled seas; the Glasgow plunging on, grim and hardbitten. Officers and men with enough experience to cause
out
LZ
of
the
staff;
down
the Atlantic to join Spee
them misgivings kept them to themselves. It was part of the pattern of that day that the Glasgow should see the smoke first. She reported it to the Flag and moved off starboard to investigate, with the Otranto still in company (for the sweep line had not yet formed) and the Monmouth only four miles astern. The cloud grew wider as it came up over the horizon, and as the Glasgow approached it, it was seen to have three stems. By 1625 hours the to
Seharnhorst and Gneisenau were recognisable, and astern of the armoured cruisers came the Leipzig whose signals had baited the trap. The Glasgow steamed nearer to establish the course, while, incredibly, the enemy squadron remained apparently unaware of her presence. Then at 1630 hours black smoke belched from the German funnels as Spee ordered full steam for a chase, and the Glasgow turned to race back towards the Flag. Immediately she turned, her telegraphists were deafened by the scream in their earphones as German keyboards jammed her signals — but by 1645 hours Cradock knew that the meeting he had long anticipated was at hand, and he also knew the strength of the enemy force in sight and their course. He ordered concentration on the Glasgow and formation of the battle-line, and at 1710 hours on that grey, squall-swept Sunday afternoon the British ships were together and turning. At this moment the armoured strength of the opposing force was nearly 15 miles away, and the German squadron had yet
more units detached. For the British ships
— even against such preponderant strength — it might still be possible to attain some success
if
conditions of wind and sea could
be used to advantage, and with this in mind the British line was formed by 1730 hours and was driving south-east across the rising sea — the Good Hope leading, then the Monmouth, Glasgow and the huge, lumbering, thin-skinned Otranto— in an secure the inshore position. Once there the wind would blow the British smoke clear of the guns while at the same time it would blanket the Scharnhorst's black pall across the German gun-sights. effort to
The race
is lost
There was even a chance that if the British could win .through to this position, they might, whilst doing so, execute the classic naval manoeuvre of crossing the enemy's T, and at the moment of passing thus bring their whole broadside weight to bear upon the Seharnhorst at a time when she could only reply with her foredeck guns and be masking those of her consort. But by 1745 hours the hopes were falling. The gap between the squadrons had narrowed — and Spee's ships were working up to 20 knots whilst Otranto was holding the British back to 15; she was almost as much of a drag as the Canopus would have been, without the possible compensation of 12inch guns.
By 1750 hours was lost.
it
was evident
that the
race
At 1800 hours Admiral Cradock ordered
Above: The
a turn
British
away
armoured
to the south
cruiser,
HMS Good Hope,
— they were then
four points to starboard of an enemy who obviously had both the intention and speed to keep them there; for the Germans a battle in line, broadside pounding against broadside, held every advantage. But there were still some benefits to be obtained from factors of light and wind. The clouds were broken and the sun was sinking. If the British could close the range with the setting sun behind them, it would serve to blind the German gunlayers whilst at the same time lighting up the German ships into perfect targets. Somehow Cradock must close until the Monmouth's old 6-inch guns — and perhaps even Glasgow's puny 4-inch armament — could inflict damage, for at long range there were only the Good Hope's two 9-2-inch guns to battle it out with twelve 8-2-inch guns which the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau could bring to bear — although possibly the Glasgow's modern 6-inch guns might be able to play some part. At 1804 hours then, the admiral ordered each of his ships to turn four points towards the enemy, and in line abreast they
steamed towards them. Spee turned his squadron away and kept his distance. to action yet.
He was
not ready to come
Thwarted, and to ease the labours of his battling squadron, Cradock turned back to a southerly course, reformed his battleline and grimly watched the strength arraying itself against him. The Leipzig had closed up and the Dresden was now
flagship of Admiral Cradock's squadron
racing in over the horizon only a mile astern of her; doubtless the Niirnberg would soon arrive. The two lines were separated by 18,000 yards of water. To the west the British line still rolled until their
maindeck guns were awash and
spray drenched telescopes and gunsights, encrusting them with salt: the Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, Otranto — for what use a merchantman would be in a naval battle. To the east steamed the Germans: the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, Dresden. Their guns were high above the waterline,
equipment was dry. The scene was set, but hardly for a battle. Only a miracle could avert a massacre. Two old armoured cruisers, one light cruiser and one armed merchantman were pitted against two modern armoured cruisers with two, and perhaps three, light cruisers. Two British 9-2-inch guns and two 6-inch guns had to answer at long range twelve 8-2-inch guns. Even at short range their
the odds were not appreciably less, for the Germans fired a broadside of 3,812 pounds against the British 2,815.
Most significant of all — and most tragic — against some 2,200 fully trained, longservice German sailors who were reckoned among the most efficient in the Imperial German Navy, were to fight a similar
number
of Britons the vast majority of been happily pursuing civilian vocations less than six months before, and who now had little more than their pride and their courage to give them confidence. But they had their admiral — and whether
whom had
he was brave or quixotic, resolute or reckless, impelled by honourable motives pr by incredible stupidity, it seems that Sir Christopher Cradock had their hearts. When at 1818 hours he wirelessed to the Canopus, still trudging up through the seas over two hundred and fifty miles away to the south 'I am going to attack the enemy now!' they cheered him as their forefathers at Trafalgar had cheered 109 years before, drifting down on to the FrancoSpanish crescent. From the Good Hope's masthead fluttered the battle-ensign, and from her halliards the signal in 'Follow the admiral's wake'. Carefully, imperceptibly, the British line edged in towards the enemy, striving for a converging course, hoping to close the range. Five minutes later, the Scharnhorst led the German line away one point to the eastward and the lines were parallel again. From the British decks men watched across the grey waste in silence and grim resolve. The scene was now one of ominous clarity The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau rode powerfully over the seas, the details of their heavy armament picked out by the sun, the seas racing along the towering sides and occasionally sweeping the foredecks. Behind the armoured ships came the light cruisers, crashing through the seas with only their upper-deck guns workable: it was some slight consolation to the British to know that at least the weaker units of the enemy force suffered the same discomforts as themselves 1
5
1
I
THE BATTLE OFCORONEL On November
1902
armoured cruisers, a light cruiser and a converted merchantman met Admiral von Spee's well balanced and modern fighting force in the Pacific. Against Monmouth, Good Hope and Glasgow (the Otranto's part in the action was negligible) Germany had Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, Dresden and Nurnberg 1
1914,
two
British
1902: The 8-2-inch guns of the East Asiatic Squadron open fire on the British ships. The shells fall short at first, then the Good Hope and the Monmouth receive direct hits on their foredecks
2000: The combined weight of the guns of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau have started fires in the Good Hope, and as they reach the main magazine an explosion engulfs the Good Hope in flames and smoke. The first German victory of the battle has been achieved 2125: The Glasgow has steamed off to the west and escaped in the darkness, leaving the stricken Monmouth to limp to safety. But the Nurnberg's searchlight finds her and her decks are ripped apart as the firing starts. Her end is now only thirty minutes away
Main
Maximum Broadside Speed
Armament
Range [yards]
[pounds]
Armoured Cruisers 8.2"[5]
13.600
6"
11.200
[6]
German
Weight [knots] ~
Scharnhorst/Gneisenau
^^ii^ 1
5
9.2"
[2]
12.000
Good Hope 6"
[16]
11.200
Monmouth 6"
[14]
11.200
.
1560
23
900
24
3 Glasgow
[2]
11.200
4"
[10]
3.800
4.1" [10]
10.500
-
2125
155
Leipzig/Niirnberg/Dresden
Glasgow escapes
_-v
v
**&t
Light Cruisers
6"
-
•*'"."
-
•»
*" #
Ai^Ji A .
-
7
•
«
•
For another half-hour the two battleplunged southwards in parallel lines at about 16 knots — the highest speed of which the Otranto was capable. Then, behind the British, the sun's rim touched lines
the horizon, and as it slid down to become first a semi-circle and then a gradually diminishing segment the light conditions
straddled by three shells from the Gneisenau, whose marksmanship was upholding her claim to the Kaiser's Gold Cup for gunnery. One of the minor miracles of the day was the Otranto's unscathed departure from the line. Now the action was at its thickest. With the early loss of the Good Hope's fore 9-2inch gun the British chances of harming the enemy at anything but short range had been halved — and with no alternative, Cradock led across the shell -torn seas to bring the 6-inch guns of the flagship and
began to change. Evening crept over the sea from the east and touched the German battle-line, greying it into the sea and the sky beyond. As twilight thickened, the moon came up behind heavy clouds to show fleetingly through them, briefly outlining the German ships — and now it seemed that the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were closing in. Spee was edging forward. To the west, the afterglow of the sun made a fiery, yellow-shot tapestry of the windswept sky against which the British ships stood out in black, hard-edged relief; nothing would help them tonight but their courage and
them and still flame scoured the decks. Then both the Good Hope and Monmouth
pride in the long tradition of the
turned broadside to their antagonists and
their
Monmouth into action. The after 9-2-inch still fired — once a minute — but its noise and flame were lost amid the holocaust which raged around it, for ammunition blazed fiercely and fire was already spreading through the flagship's decks below. Still they plunged across towards the
German
line, still
the shells crashed into
Royal Navy.
Outranged and outgunned At 1902 hours on Sunday November 1, the 8-2-inch guns of the German East
— then
shell splinters
whined
irritating
whine
of splinters.
The Good
away in order to avoid masking her stilldefiant, though now sporadic fire; in order, too, to avoid entering the zone of fire still laid down by the indefatigable German gunners. Again the shells found the Monmouth. Flames burst out on her quarterdeck, she listed heavily to port, her head was lower and her fire slackened. Heavy seas flooded through gaping bows and dragged her away from the line — but she was not yet beaten, and to those on board the Glasgow who could spare her a glance it looked at this time as though she was having some success in overcoming the fires within, which now sulked dully. But she never rejoined the line, and as time passed her guns lapsed into silence. All that could now be seen of the enemy were the repeated flashes from their
Not so the Good Hope. She flared like a beacon. Since action had commenced the British flagship had received the undivided attention of the gunners aboard Scharnhorst who had first hit her with their third salvo, and who since then had been firing at her, coolly and extremely competently, at a rate of nearly four salvoes every minute. By 1923 hours the range was down to 6,600 yards.
Burning but defiant
On through
the raging and shell-torn sea, Cradock held the converging course — so steadily, in fact, that Spee began to suspect a torpedo attack and edged off another point to eastward. Still the shells crashed into
shrilly over-
Hope's deck amidships threw up a fan of sparks, her upper bridge, masthead and foretop glowed redly as high-explosive shell from the Scharnhorst burst against them, then the glow died as cordite flared on the deck below, and ammunition exploded whitely along the gun-deck. Alongside the looming Otranto, water spouted up to reach her deck level. She drew out of line on the Glasgow's port quarter, and as her huge bulk made an excellent ranging device for the enemy her captain took her away to the westward -though not before she had been neatly
sag away to starboard, losing speed as she did so until the Glasgow, still punching up through the seas astern of her, had to drop
batteries.
Asiatic Squadron at last opened fire upon the British ships, at a range of 12,000 yards. From the bridge of the Glasgow were seen two orange flashes from the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and as the thunder of Good Hope's 9- 2s answered, grey- white mushrooms blossomed from the sea five hundred yards short of the British flagship, beautifully aimed, beautifully grouped. The Glasgow's pair of modern 6-inch guns fired experimentally into the darkness, but even while the gunnery-control officer was vainly searching the east for some sign of fall of shot, the orange lines sparkled again and then again — and the lines were lengthened now as the Leipzig and Dresden also opened fire. For a few more brief seconds, only the crash of the seas and the sounds of their own movements were heard by the Glasgow's crew
head, the seas erupted around them, the Monmouth ahead steamed through a forest of water, and the Good Hope's foredeck exploded in a sheet of flame, which twisted the fore 9-2-inch gun into a hopeless, useless knot of steel protruding from a turret like a blazing cauldron. Before the mind could react, the next salvo arrived. The Monmouth's foredeck flared up in hard-edged flame and black smoke billowed from sudden, sharp fires along her port side. As she rolled, her gun-crews fought with their guns -still hopelessly outranged by the German guns which now straddled the British line along its length, filling the night with screaming shells and the vicious
black, and twisting, tortured debris cartwheeled away into the night. As though beaten out of line by sheer weight of metal, the Monmouth began to
Above: Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, 'treasuring the honour of the Royal Navy' Left: The British armoured cruiser, HMS
Monmouth, manned by
reservists recruited Scottish fishermen and coastguards
the Good Hope, ripping away her decks and bulkheads, bursting in the crowded flats, spreading fire and chaos through her riven hull: still, stubbornly, she pushed on through the waves, her port 6-inch battery defiant, but firing slowly and spasmodically now as gun-crews perished in the consuming flames or were cut down by flying steel. At 1940 hours she seemed to slow and stagger under the rain of blows; yet another fire blazed up on her foredeck,
Then, ominously, the Monmouth's ports glowed redly in the gathering darkness as burning cordite turned the narrow confines of her mess decks into a choking hell. Still the Gneisenau's shells crashed through her decks and exploded with sickening violence amid the shambles below. An armourpiercing shell came through the body of the ship and exploded among ammunition
and the clouds of steam and smoke which billowed around her glowed sullenly in its light — but she still was moving towards the enemy. A sheet of flame played continuously along her sides upon which the seas had no effect. She might roll until her casemates were awash but as she heaved herself up again the flames flickered weirdly between the waterline and the deckrail. At 1942 hours the Good Hope seemed to gather up all her remaining strength, turn directly towards her tormentors and charge them. Firing as she went, she heaved her stricken weight over the mounting seas trailing flame and wreathing clouds behind her — and as Spee ordered Ins ships out of her course there was for a lew brief moments a pause in her agony. Then abruptly both the Scharnhorst and Gneis enau opened (ire upon her with full broad sides. Blanketed under a dreadful fire, she was at last brought to a halt with her upper deck a sea of flame, and her last desperate
stacked for the starboard battery, a curtain upwards along the starboard side, outlining the upperworks in
throw defeated. As though stunned, she drifted down silently between the lines.
among
the port 6-inch batteries burst into action. Hope and feverish activity galvanized the gun-crews; salvo after salvo thundered from the gun-decks. Abruptly, the Gneisenau's guns shortened range, one of her high-explosive shells hit the Monmouth's fore-turret, blew off the roof and burnt out the housing. As flames licked up out of the steel shell, a violent explosion shattered the forecastle and when its anger died no sign of gun or turret remained.
of flame spread
517
* £
Then the
tires reached a main magazine 1953 hours — 50 minutes after the first salvo had been tired at her— the Good Hope was shattered by an explosion which lived tor years in the memories of those who witnessed it. A broad column of flame rose upwards from between her main and aftermost funnel until it towered two hundred feet above her decks, and in its awful light jagged and incongruous shapes soared up and away into the darkness,
and
at
twisting and weaving in the blast, tumbling in the sudden vacuums. Then the column of fire broke, flooding outwards at its base to wash along the decks and fill the gutted hull with lazy waves of fire. Debris crashed down into the sea. the whole mass of the forepart of the ship silently detached itself and slid down into oblivion, and, incredibly, two 6-inch guns of the port aft battery each fired twice into the darkness. Then the waves took the blazing hulk further off into the darkness, the flames sulked, the pall above glowed luridly, and all that remained of Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock and his men drifted out of the battle. And, for the moment, the battle was done. The Glasgow had borne a charmed life. Circumstances had also added a most bizarre note to the atmosphere in which she played her part in the battle, for at the outbreak of war her commission on the South American station had been almost
complete and many of her complement had acquired parrots to take home to England.
When action became inevitable, these birds — some 60 of them — were released from their cages and given a chance to escape to the mainland. They rose in a cloud of brilliant blues and greens and oranges, then, unwilling to risk the rising power of the gale, they all settled back on the Glasgow's upperworks and remained there despite all attempts to scare them away. When the first salvoes thundered out, they rose again, cawing and screaming, but as the battle wore on they gradually ceased their protests and returned to the ship, clinging drunkenly to stays and yards
movement
hausted itself on the journey and failed to explode on arrival. But with the Good Hope and Monmouth out of the fight, every time the Glasgow fired the whole enemy line answered and she steamed through chaos.
At 2030 hours, with the Good Hope gone and the enemy invisible, Captain Luce ordered cease fire, and then took his ship around to the west to find, and offer succour the Monmouth. When he found her, the badly battered cruiser was listing and her head was still down, but her upper decks were no longer aflame and only the portholes below the quarterdeck still glowed. The tragedy, however, was not yet ended. As the Glasgow bore up to render what assistance she could, the moon made one of its rare appearances to light up a tumultuous sea, the two ships — and four enemy ships sweeping in search of them. If the Monmouth could turn her stern to sea she might last, and if she could hold the northwest course she might, by the grace of God, keep clear of the German line — and perhaps even limp as far as the Chilean coast; but the Glasgow must leave her or perish. She signalled to the Monmouth twice, passed close under her stern, and, with misery aboard at the thought of the compulsory desertion, steamed west and away into the darkness. The Glasgow, alone among the British squadron, had speed, and it was soon evident that she must have shaken off any pursuit and was free to turn south to race after the Otranto for the Magellan Straits, her wireless at last clear of the enemy attempts to jam it and able to tell the dreadful story to the Canopus, still labouring up miles to the south. to,
A column of smoke For a time there was hope that the Monmouth had eluded the enemy and was limping towards some sort of safety. But at 2100 hours firing broke out again to the north, and with ice in their hearts the men aboard Glasgow counted, the gun-flashes and watched a searchlight stretch its pallid fingers over the horizon. berg had found her.
The
Nurn-
Captain von Schonberg had known from
or their own failing strength loosened" their hold. As the action progressed so their numbers fell, and only ten were eventually recovered. Incredibly, this loss of the parrots was almost the heaviest casualty sustained by
the moment he received the first signal ordering formation of the battle-line that his chances of getting Niirnberg into position were extremely remote. Her boilers were in sad need of repair, her engines of replacement, and her port propeller of two new blades - so, despite the eagerness with
the cruiser. It was afterwards estimated that some 600 shells were fired at the Glasgow, but some protecting fate guarded her from all except five, of which three lodged harmlessly in her coal bunkers, one entered and broke up against a conningtower support without exploding (though it wrecked the captain's pantry), and another burst aft, just above the port outer propeller, and tore an irregular hole in the ship's side just as though she had been rammed. It flooded one compartment but did nothing to affect the Glasgow's steam-
which he and his
until
either violent
ing abilities.
Fury and desperation In return, the Glasgow hi engaged both the Leipzig and the Dresden for the major part of the battle and at the >nd, in fury and desperation, she had taken on the 1
Gneisenau and Scharnhorst and even hit the latter ship with one of her puny 4-inch shells, which, however, apparently ex-
518
officers
might stare into
growling darkness ahead, he knew that their hopes of adding to the tumult were small. The wind from the south howled through the stays, the seas swept the forecastle and flooded the conning-tower — and the Niirnberg piledrove through them in an effort to reach the
torn,
the battle.
Then came the explosion — and apparently the end — and although much relief was felt when wireless signals indicated the highly satisfactory result, there was some disappointment and dissatisfaction at the role of spectator which the Niirnberg had played. Then at 2035 hours the look-out reported a column of smoke on the starboard bow, for which Schonberg at once steered. Apparently the smoke must have been made by the Glasgow, for although no mention made of the Niirnberg in Captain is Luce's report, Schonberg chased the British
ship until she disappeared from sight, her speed taking her rapidly over the horizon. As the Niirnberg turned back towards the ships of her squadron, Schonberg saw the Monmouth against the light of the moon. The armoured cruiser was listing, but she was undoubtedly under way. At first Schonberg thought that he had come across one of the ships of his own squadron, so he bore down on her from the south-west, making the agreed recognition signal and passing close to port. There was no reply, but not wishing to harm a friend, he closed in and switched on his searchlight. It picked out first the white ensign — still flying — then the details of the torn and shattered hull, then the working-parties scurrying about the decks. Foam threshed under her stern; the Mon-
mouth was making progress. In fairness to Schonberg it must be stated
Monmouth every chance to down her flag. He waited some
that he gave the
haul
minutes before opening fire, his searchlight still pointedly illuminating the white ensign from some 600 yards away. His first salvoes were from 4-inch guns aimed high, and although, when this brought about no lowering of the flag, he fired a torpedo at the Monmouth, he was not upset when it failed to explode on the hull, having possibly passed underneath the rolling ship.
He then ceased fire and waited for Monmouth's next move. It was not long in coming. She seemed to gather speed and begin to turn — and two of Schonberg's officers on deck heard instructions shouted from the Monmouth's bridge ordering the men back to the guns from their tasks about the ship. Either the intention was to ram Niirnberg, or turn to bring the starboard guns to bear on her. There is no need to doubt the regret with which Schonberg states he then acted, but unless the Monmouth hauled down her flag, his course — his duty — was obvious. As the Monmouth circled, so did the Niirnberg — at twice the speed — and as the German light cruiser came round close under the Monmouth's stern, she opened fire on the unprotected part of her hull, tearing it open and ripping the decks apart. Under the onslaught, the Monmouth shuddered and listed over further and further. The seas washed up to the port deck-rail, then across to flood around the funnels. Slowly, still under a hail of shell, Monmouth leaned completely over and capsized. At 2158 hours the waters closed above her stern — from which her flag had flown until the end. Further Reading Churchill, W. C, The World Crisis (Odhams Press) Corbett, Sir Julian, Naval Operations of the Great War, Vol 1 (Longmans Green) Cradock, Sir Christopher, Whispers from the
Fleet
Coronet and After (Peter Davies) Coronet and the Falklands (A. M.
Hirst, Lloyd,
Irving,
J.,
Philpot)
Pochlammer, Hans, Before Jutland (Jarrolds) Raeder, Erich, Der Krieg zur See (E. S. Mittler and Sons) Spencer-Cooper, H., The Battle of the Falkland Isles (Cassell)
Verner, Rudolph, The Battle-Cruisers at the Action of the Falklands (John Bale and Sons and Danielsson)
[For Barrie Pitt's biography, see page 32. ]
CONVERGING OF THE FLEETS David Mason: Less than two weeks after the Battle of Coronel, a squadron of British ships set sail for South America. This time, the Admiralty were sending battle-cruisers and on December 8 they caught their first glimpse of their enemy off the Falkland Islands. Below: HMS Inflexible, one of the two battle-cruisers which left the Grand Fleet to sail south
On
the morning of November 4. Winston Churchill opened the telegram which conveyed the news of the defeat at Coronel, and one can imagine with what heavy heartedness he pondered the significance of such a defeat in the first major challenge to the Royal Navy's supremacy at sea since the Napoleonic Wars. Within an hour of reading the news, he had enumerated his potential response, and the staff of the Admiralty were seeking out the answers to questions which in their very breadth and urgenc) boded ill for Graf von Spee, fresh from his victory on the other side of the world: How far is it. and how long would it take Dartmouth and Weymouth to reach Punta Arenas. Rio, or Abrolhos respectively, if they started this afternoon? How long would it take (a) Kent to h Rio and Abrolhos? (b) Australia (i) without and
Montcalm to reach Galapagos via Makada Islands, and also Id/umo and Newcastle to reach them? (c) The Japanese 2nd Southern Squadron to rep/ace Australia at Fiji? Defence, Carnarvon and Cornwall respectively to reach Punta Arenas?
HMS
HMS
HMS
avenge Good Hope and Monmouth. Inflexible was to join the Invincible. Both were to leave the Grand Fleet for foreign service. Both were ordered to coal at once and steam south to Devonport for dockyard repairs. They arrived there on November 8, and on November 9, after preliminary inspection, the dockyard authoriAdmiralty that the ships could not be completed before midnight on November 13. It looked as if Saturday November 14 would be the earliest day they could sail, but the
ties signalled to the
telegram from the docks was read by Churchill and Fisher
to-
was perfunctory: 'Ships are to sail Wednesday 1 They are needed for war service and dockyard arrangements must be made to conform. If necessary dockyard men should be sent away in the ships to return as opportunity may offer. You gether. Their reply 1
are held responsible for the speedy dispatch of these ships in a thoroughly efficient condition. Acknowledge.' The telegram was drafted in the handwriting of Winston Churchill, and bore his initials, but it was clearly a joint effort, and it was to prove fortunate for Britain and the Royal Navy that their business was now conducted by two figures of such bustling energy. They were not to be thwarted, and at 6.15 pm on Wednesday November 11 the two ships set sail, with Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee, until then Chief-of-Staff at the Admiralty, flying his flag in the Invincible. They had orders to rendezvous off South America with Rear-Admiral Archibald Stoddart, on whom responsibility for the area had temporarily devolved. The Admiralty was adding big names to the big ships it was sending against Spee. Nevertheless, the choice of Sturdee to lead the squadron was a curious one, and several diverging interpretations have been placed on it. Churchill himself claimed that Sturdee was a skilful seaman, but adds significantly that he would not have been able to work satisfactorily with Lord Fisher. He had indeed been associated in his early career with one of Fisher's most bitter enemies, Lord Charles Beresford, and it is hard to see how the two men could have worked together as First Sea Lord and Chief-ofStaff. Why then was he not simply sacked? Perhaps, as far as Churchill was concerned, sacking him immediately after the loss of Cradock would have reflected too badly on the previous handling of the Royal Navy's affairs, in which Churchill himself had played a part. Whether or not Churchill thought of this is not recorded, but promoting him was a clever move. If Sturdee found and annihilated Spee's squadron, no harm would have been done.
Below SMS Gneisenau and SMS Scharnhorst (four funnels) and SMS Nurnberg (right, in background) with vessels of the Chilean Navy at
Valparaiso after their action at Coronel
_
_ ._,^jMn^JLJL«JL k
flHtfttHML^^hiL.
"!J
I
i
If he failed, with the powerful fleet placed at his disposal, he could be got rid of with no complications. Even as his voyage began, Sturdee was showing little of the fire and competence which wins praise (and battles) for a seagoing admiral. Churchill and Fisher had sent two of their fastest ships, and had hustled them on their way with no delays. Yet Sturdee's ships, capable of a sustained 25 knots, proceeded in the interests of fuel economy at a leisurely ten knots, stopping occasionally to examine neutral merchant ships for contraband, pausing for gunnery practice, and all the time talking liberally over the wireless, which did little to enhance security. It was hardly the reaction Fisher and Churchill had tried to engender. While these measures were being taken against him in England, Spee himself, at the opposite corner of the globe, was facing more difficulties and problems than one would normally expect of a triumphant admiral. On the day after the battle, he wrote a long letter to his superiors in Germany which began: 'Yesterday was All Saints' Day and a lucky day for us.' It went on to explain in detail the course of the battle, and ended with the words: 'You can hardly imagine the joy which reigns among us. We have at last contributed something to the glory of our arms — although it might not mean much on the whole and in view of the enormous number of the English ships.' And with the enormous number of the English ships growing steadily, he set off with his squadron for Valparaiso, where he arrived during the morning of November 3. The strong and enthusiastic German population in Chile greeted Spee and the news of his victory with delight and enthusiasm, and even half a century ago, as Spee noted, he was inflicted with the celebrity's plague of clicking cameras. He tried to avoid festivities, but the one celebration he could not escape was a dinner at the German club, where he was kept, almost interned, for an hour and a half. As the proceedings reached a climax of alcoholic euphoria, one individual staggered to his feet, hoisted his glass high, and
the damnation of the British Navy'. Spee himbut not to that toast. Instead he proposed another one, which showed him to be a man of a greater calibre, who respected the memory of the admiral who in peace-keeping missions before the war had been his friend and colleague: 'I drink to the memory of a gallant and honourable foe.' Having spoken thus he downed the drink and strode out. As he walked back to the ship there was one other indication of the burden he knew he carried, when a woman stepped forward and presented him with a bouquet of arum lilies. 'Thank you,' he said to her, 'they will do nicely for my grave.' The German admiral remained aboard his flagship that night, and on November 4 the squadron set out for Mas Afuera, where they arrived on November 6 and stayed until the 15th. There, at that remote and quiet base, Spee could complete coaling from his fleet of colliers and work out where to go next, and while he wrestled in his own mind with the seemingly endless permutations of possible answers to that question his new opponent, Sturdee, was faced with the equally formidable task of anticipating Spee's moves, of finding him and bringing him to account in the vast areas of those southern waters. To Sturdee as to Spee, the alternatives offered seemed almost infinite in their variety. The German might turn round and retrace the route which had brought him to the coast of Chile, and disappear again into the enormity of the Pacific Ocean. He might choose to round the Horn and make due east across the Atlantic toward the Cape of Good Hope and South Africa, where his assistance might be warmly welcomed in the Boer rebellion which had recently been reported. He might, on the other hand, break for home waters, either by steaming northwards and through the Panama Canal, or by rounding the Horn and sailing up the centre of the South Atlantic. Sturdee had the problem of outwitting him, but even if he did so, he still had to catch him, and while the strength and speed of the force he was gathering
proposed a toast self
was the
'to
last to rise,
V
Above: The German armoured cruiser, SMS Scharnhorst. Flying Spee's flag, she fought mainly against the Good Hope at Coronel; but she survived the battle only to face a more powerful opponent a month later. Displacement: 1 1,600 tons. Length: 450 feet.
522
Beam:
Power/Speed: 21 knots. Armament: Eight 8-2-inch guns, guns, 20 24-pounder guns. Armour: Belt 6 inches, turrets 6% inches. Crew: 765 men Below: The British battle-cruiser HMS Invincible. After Coronel, 71 feet.
six 6-inch
the need to send a more powerful squadron against Spee in the Pacific dictated the Admiralty's decision to withdraw her and her sister ship, HMS Inflexible from the Grand Fleet and prepare them hurriedly for the journey to South America. During the Battle of the Falkland Islands
hits which caused only slight damage. Displacement: 17,250 tons. Length: 562 feet. Beam: 78 1/2 feet. Power/Speed: 28-6 knots. Armament: Eight 12-inch and 16 4-inch guns. Armour: Belt 7 inches, turrets 10 inches. Crew: 750 men
she received 23
*
523
rolhos
Rocks 17 November: Stoddart arrives
26 November: Ma's
Sturdee
Afuera
arrives
6-15 November
9 November:
Canopus arrives 7 December: Sturdee & Stoddart arrive
Saint Quenti
Falkland Islands 8 December: Von Spee arrives
19-21 November
Magellan Straits
26-29 November
i
Picton Island
3 December
Cape Horn 1 December
GERMAN EAST
ASIATIC
SQUADRON
BRITISH FLEET
Above: Prelude to the next battle: the British and German fleets converge on December 8 at the Falkland Islands off South America
Above: The German admiral, Spee: a highly respected opponent. He foresaw the retribution that would follow Coronel
were adequate to ensure the destruction of the East Asiatic Squadron, there remained the question of retaining the necessary
his fleet the cruiser Kent. He already commanded the cruisers Carnarvon and Cornwall, and the armed merchant cruisers Orama and Otranto, and by the time Sturdee reached him at that rendezvous on November 26, he had also been joined once again by the light cruisers Bristol and Glasgow, of which the latter had been accommodated by the Brazilians at Rio for extensive dockyard repairs. The Defence was dispatched to join the Cape squadron, and the Otranto to Sierra Leone for boiler examination, which left Sturdee with a formidable fleet of two battle-cruisers, three cruisers, two light cruisers and an armed merchant cruiser. Sturdee also found new orders waiting for him. Despite the absence in those days of the kind of world-wide communications networks which facilitate the transfer of information in a more modern world, the (by modern standards) cumbersome techniques of Intelligence gathering were even then of paramount importance. In Valparaiso on November 22 the British Consul General received and passed on the names of all the German ships that had been at Mas Afuera on November 15. On November 23, the Admiralty received further information to the effect that the German squadron was then in the St Quentin Bay in the Gulf of Pehas, and it was deduced therefore that Spee was still on the Chilean coast. When Sturdee arrived at the Abrolhos Rocks on November 26, he intended to spend three days there, but Luce, the captain of the Glasgow, had the moral courage to persuade him to sail at once, and so the subsequent Admiralty order to the same effect was lent even more force. Sturdee's problems, which until that time had constituted a complicated set of theories, now began to take on the concrete shape of a practical difficulty as he sailed down the coast of Brazil, past Uruguay, and south past the Argentine, veering further from the coast of the continent as he neared the Falkland Islands. There was a growing possibility that Spee might slip past him along the edge of land, meet a collier and break for home. In fact, one report received en route indicated that the German squadron
HMS
fuel for the chase.
There, the critical word was one which reverberated in the nightmares of seagoing commanders in those distant waters — coal! In its long years of sea supremacy the British Empire's strength and foresight had ensured a world-wide network of coaling stations where her ships could call to replenish their necessary fuel stocks, and there was also a number of seagoing colliers steaming their steady, comfortable pace across the oceans to rendezvous points with their glamorous sisters, the fighting ships. But they were prey to the enemy as prize vessels, and if encountered were promptly boarded and relieved of their valuable cargoes. Land stations were open to attack by the German navy. There were plans at Falkland to fire the coal stocks should the Germans arrive there with no British ships in the vicinity to put up an effective defence. When, on November 9, information was received which indicated that Spee was still on the west coast of South America, and would have to be sought out there, the southern coaling base at Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands became vital, and thus entered the picture for the first time. To provide some degree of protection, Captain Heathcoat S. Grant, in the Canopus, was ordered by Stoddart to go there, moor his ship to command the harbour entrance, and co-operate with the governor in the defence of the base. Grant tried to hold his ship in position by moorings, but when these proved unsteady, he ran his vessel aground in the mud overlooking the narrow neck of land to the southeast, close to the most vulnerable point on the base, the radio station. Hastily the crew and civilian population worked to set up three of the Canopus' 12-pounder guns on emplacements on shore They built a land observation station in constant telephone ich with the ship, and daubed the ship's superstructure in a ariety of garish colours to break up the outline. It was some Section for the base, but if the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau ed, it would hardly be enough. Meanwhile, further to t north, Admiral Stoddart's ships were concentrating, while Admi Sturdee's were still moving south to meet them. On Novembt 17 Stoddart put into the base at Abrolhos Rocks off Brazil in HMS Defence, where he absorbed into t
].
am
I
524
HMS
HMS
HMS
was already only 400 miles from Montevideo, and Sturdee immediately turned to starboard to make in the direction of that But on December 1 one of his reconnaissance vessels came back from Rio with news that the report was false, and Sturdee
city.
turned once again to make directly for the Falklands. In the hope of covering as wide a track as possible, he spaced his ships out at extreme intervals, covering a belt 50 miles wide. A glance at any atlas will show, however, just how small a proportion of the possible sailing routes can be covered by cutting a corridor 50 miles wide across the southern Atlantic Ocean. On the afternoon of December 7, after an uneventful voyage, Sturdee sailed his ships into the Falkland Islands, intent on leaving again two days later, fully coaled and provisioned, to continue the search for his enemy. The coaling was to begin at once, but that apparently simple operation was fraught with complications. In the first place the squadron's own colliers, sent on ahead from the Abrolhos Rocks, had still not arrived, and as there were only three colliers in the harbour, not all the ships could carry out the operation at the same time. The Carnarvon, Bristol and Glasgow were told off to coal first, with the Inflexible and Invincible next. As protection, the Macedonia, another armed merchantman which had joined them on their way south, took up station ten miles from the harbour entrance, and the remaining ships anchored in Port William, the outer harbour of the Falklands, except for the Glasgow and the Bristol, which joined the Canopus in the inner Stanley Harbour. All the ships were guarded by a line of improvised mines which the crew of the Canopus had laid down. By 0600 hours the next morning (December 8) Carnarvon and Glasgow had finished the task, but the Bristol had got nowhere, owing to the deterioration of coal in one of the colliers. However, one of the squadron's own colliers had by now arrived, and at 0630 hours the Inflexible began coaling.
Break
for
home
Long before the British had reached Falkland the East Asiatic Squadron had left the base at Mas Afuera and worked up steam to sail south. Spee had virtually made up his mind now which course he was going to take, and on November 19 the naval staff received a telegram from him confirming his decision: 'The cruiser squadron intends to break through for home.' On the day after he. sent that telegram,
he sent another outlining his require-
La Plata and New York: 'Send steamers, German if possible, to arrive at Port Santa Elena on December 5 with 10,000 tons of coal and provisions for 1,000 men for three months. No oil. Intelligence reports particularly desirable.' And this was ments
to
followed by a telegram direct to the naval staff stating that New York and La Plata were to arrange for the dispatch of 20,000 tons, with provisions at New York for 2,000 men for three months. On November 21, as the weather deteriorated with their progress southwards, the squadron put into the anchorage at St Quentin Sound (in neutral Chilean water, though at that stage delicate matters of international law were the least of Spee's worries) where they were replenished from three supply ships with which they made a rendezvous, the Seydlitz, Ramses and Memphis, which helped to solve his problem with a supply of 6,910 tons of coal. They stayed there for five days, during which time Spee suffered further intractable difficulties in trying to estimate the position and strength of the British who might have been sent against him. In fact during this period, on November 23, the German consulate at Valparaiso received a message from the Naval Staff which might have thrown enough light on the situation to relieve Spee of all doubts, if not of all apprehension: 'According to the press, a British squadron consisting of ten ships has been sighted 300 miles from Montevideo. Take all possible steps to warn cruiser squadron. Inform Punta Arenas.' Unfortunately, it appears that the message was never conveyed to Spee, and he remained in ignorance of the powerful fleet that was sailing down the South Atlantic to meet him. Indeed, on the following day, he allowed his realistic pessimism to be tempered slightly, and asked an officer of the collier Amasis to check the truth of a message he had received indicating that the British had abandoned the Falkland Islands altogether. It is hardly likely that the admiral, knowing well the British navy and nation, would have regarded the report with anything but the greatest scepticism. On November 26, the very day, coincidentally, when Sturdee left Abrolhos for the Falklands, Spee put to sea again, and sailed southwards. But that evening a storm began to rise, and for several days the fleet was subjected to the furious vindictiveness of nature that has made that remote corner of the world the most hated region that mariners know. At night the ships were scattered; during the day they tried to come together, not least to keep the colliers in touch. Wave after wave pounded at the ships, sending them tossing off the crest of one into the trough and back on to the crest of the next, washing the invaluable cargo of coal off the decks, and making life impossible
below. It was weather to make even the hardiest of seamen dream of a still life on land, and in the Gneisenau, the terror of the passage showed through even the clipped laconic style affected by diarists, official or private, the world over: Nov 29. Wind 8. Sea 12. Scharnhorst partly not visible as the waves appear to be over 95 feet high. Impossible to lay the tables. Broken-up furniture thrown overboard. All crockery was smashed. In the ship and in the mess there were water leaks everywhere. Impossible to be on deck. Necessary to secure oneself with ropes. We are about off the entrance to the Magellan Straits. Dec 2. Sighted two icebergs, appear to be 155 feet high. At the same time sighted a sailing ship. Leipzig detached to investigate. Weather much improving. Sailing-ship turned out to be English sailing-vessel Drummuir with 2,800 tons of Cardiff coal. Position 30 miles of State n Island. And here, as the weather abated, the crews could take stock
SW
and rest after five days of hardly knowing whether they would survive or not. On December 3, at the eastern end of the Beagle Channel, the squadron dropped anchor close to Picton Island, and there they spent three days, while they coaled from the colliers and also emptied the additional stocks of fuel captured in the Drummuir. The operation thus lopped a further three days off their sailing schedule, and gave the British fleet time to reach the Falkland Islands and settle in the harbour there. On the morning of December 6, shortly before they sailed, the admiral called his captains to a council on board the Scharnhorst to discuss a plan he had conceived. He intended, he told them, to attack the Falkland Islands, destroy the wireless station and the arsenal, and take the governor prisoner as a measure of retaliation for the recent imprisonment and inconsiderate treatment of the German governor of Samoa. There was considerable disagreement among the captains as to the advisability of this course, and some suggested a wide sweep round to the east of the Falklands, and a visit to Port Santa Elena to pick up the latest Intelligence, rather than this foolhardy charge against an unknown enemy. As far as Spee was concerned, however, the enemy was by no means unknown. The crew of a captured British steamer had reported that the harbour was undefended, and the wireless station at Punta Arenas had passed on to Spee this priceless item of Intelligence (which was perfectly true, when the British steamer had left). Spee made his decision. The Falkland Islands were their next target, and with the wholehearted agreement of his Chief-of-Staff Captain Fielitz and of Schonberg of the Niirnberg, he instructed Captain Maerker of the Gneisenau to draw up plans for the attack by his ship and the Nurnberg. They sailed on the final leg of their journey at noon on December 6, and any doubts Spee nurtured of the wisdom of his decision were dispelled that night when the Amasis re-entered the picture and transmitted a message stating that the reports of the British abandonment of the islands were almost certainly true. The Falklands were undefended, and the coal-stocks were intact. Maerker's plan was simple. If the harbour was clear of enemy ships, the Nurnberg was to reconnoitre to the north, and the Gneisenau to lower boats to clear the entrance of mines. The remainder was brief and to the point: 'the Nurnberg will then proceed in as far as Port Stanley in rear of boats, and will embark stores and do destruction. The Gneisenau will follow as far as the channel connecting Port William and Port Stanley. She will anchor there and send armed cutters to the townside under command of Lieutenant Kotthaus, who is to deliver an ultimatum to the governor and try to bring him back to the ship. The cutters will be covered by the Nurnberg. The two ships will rejoin the squadron not later than 1900 hours.' At 0530 hours on December
8, Spee ordered a signal hoisted on his flagship to the Nurnberg and the Gneisenau— 'Detach'. With the land mass of the Falkland Islands to the north, they gathered speed and were soon heading for the start point for their attack off Cape Pembroke. They were due there at 0830 hours, but it soon appeared that they were at least one hour behind schedule, though by that time they could at least make out the target, lie wireless masts on the mainland. Nor was that all. Smoke was seen — obviously the coal stocks being fired on their approach, some officers said. One observer, however, was sceptical. It was from a battle-cruiser, he claimed in astonishment. Then his view t
through binoculars appeared to confirm it. He had seen the tripod masts of a battle-cruiser. He looked again to check, and fancied he saw the masts of a second battle-cruiser, but the smoke- obscured 1
the mast.
They
sailed on, confused.
Hut this was only the start of their confusion, and even at thai early hour it was nothing to the confusion thai their own presence, already spotted, had set raging among the British Meet at anchor and still coaling in Port Stanley.
,
o
£
BATTLE OF TH squadron in Port Stanley, the strategic situation in the South Atlantic was reversed. But the British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee, still faced a difficult problem: where was Admiral von Spee? At dawn on December 8 he was informed by a lookout \\
ith the arrival of the British
li was 0735 hours on the morning of Tuesday December 8, 1914, when the lookout on Sapper Hill, the best vantage point in the Falkland Islands, first noticed the smudge of smoke on the horizon which heralded the approach of German warships. No doubt he was desperately pleased that after the fear of waiting through the previous three weeks, during which the islands' population had been defended only by the old battleship Canopus, there now lay at anchor in the two harbours behind him a force of British ships big enough, fast enough and sufficiently powerfully gunned to take on all the naval might that
the Imperial German Navy could conceivably send against them in those waters. Although a Scandinavian, and therefore strictly an impartial neutral, the lookout must surely have felt a certain inner satisBelow: The battle-cruiser HMS Invincible flying Admiral Sturdee s flag off the Falkland Islands
faction as he picked up the telephone to set into action the defence of his temporary
homeland, by reporting to the Canopus: 'A four funnel and a two funnel man-of-war in sight steering northwards.' But as far as the British squadron
was
concerned the Germans could hardly have arrived at a more inconvenient time. Having sailed his ships into the harbour on only the previous day, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee was not planning to put to sea again until that evening, and his ships were in various stages of preparation for what he thought would be an extended chase. The only
under way was the tiny armed merchantman Macedonia, patrolling off vessel
the islands in course of relief by the cruiser Kent. Of the others, the two battlecruisers, Invincible and Inflexible, were in
the early stages of coaling, and in addition having taken on only 400 tons each: both would take some two hours to cast off the colliers and work up steam to leave the harbour. The light cruiser Glasgow had in fact finished coaling, but as she was in the middle of repairing machinery, she also would require at least two hours to raise steam. The month-long voyage from Europe Had also impaired the efficiency of the light cruiser Bristol, and to give the engineers ample opportunity to effect repairs, she had both her engines opened up and would not be fit to sail for some three and a half hours. Of the three armoured cruisers, Cornwall and Kent had not even begun coaling, whereas the Carnarvon, ironically enough, was if anything over-ready. Having finished the necessary fuelling, her decks were covered in stacked coal for an to
FALKLANDS
E
that two German warships had been sighted. Luck as well as careful planning had brought the two great forces together. Admiral Sturdee received the message calmly and only after he had made sure that his men had breakfasted gave the order for 'Action' David Mason extended cruise, and
enemy
action,
dangerous
this, in
could
the event of
prove
extremely
to the ship's personnel.
Nor was the mechanical condition
of the ships the only indication of their state of preparedness. From where the Canopus lay in her mud berth, it was impossible to communicate directly with the flagship Invincible, coaling in the outer Port William harbour, and the officers on the Canopus therefore passed the message on to the Glasgow, which was conveniently placed in visual contact with both the Invincible and the Canopus. But the Glasgow's signalling lamp was either not noticed or not read through the cloud of coal dust rising from the Invincible, and for five minutes there was no acknowledge-
ment. Five minutes was long enough for the
German
ships, sailing at their best
speed, to be two miles closer to the base than when first spotted. Finally it was the captain of the Glasgow, John Luce, who applied his wits to the problem and ordered
a gun to be fired. The report of the Glasgow's 3-pounder attracted attention on the Invincible and the flag lieutenant raced down to the admiral's cabin. It was already 0800 hours.
Various minor legends have grown up around the situation in that cabin — that Sturdee was in his bath; or shaving; or still in his pyjamas; that he remarked with a calm imperturbability in the true Drake tradition 'Then send the men to breakfast'. In fact, this order carried less of the aristocratic disdain of imminent danger than is at first apparent. For excepting the stokers and engineers, who were concerned in raising steam, the crew were
better employed in filling their stomachs in getting to battle stations too early and sitting around becoming progressively more tense while waiting for the action to start. At any rate, all ships were ordered to prepare to weigh anchor, and at 0830 hours the order 'Action' was at last given.
than
Inevitable confusion
was a pity, for the Germans that they could not know, or did not guess, the true state of readiness of the British squadron. With gunnery of the high standard displayed at the Battle of Coronel, and with a measure of determination, Spee's best course might well have been to attack before the enemy ships could gain room to manoeuvre on the open sea, cause as much damage as he could in the shortest possible time, and make off, It
leaving the British to sort out the inevitable confusion before they could give chase. But that would be presuming clairvoyaiu'v on the part o\' the Germans. The course they in fact adopted was the natural reaction to the situation as they saw it. Shortly after 0800 hours the two ships concerned in the first phase of the attack on the Palklands, the Gneisenau and the Nurnberg, came within sight of land. \ty the far distance, and well out of gunnery range, the crews could see the tall masts of the wireless station. It was a clear, calm morning, with exceptional visibility, and only the slightest rustle of a breeze on the surface of the sea. Soon the long, low promontory of land came into view, stretching out to the east and masking the harbour. Then other, unexpected features appeared. First, from the end of that promontory, near the Cape Pembroke lighthouse, a tall column of smoke rose up, moving from right to left as they approached it, that is from east to west, and in the direction of the harbour. It was 0840 hours. Then from the control top of the Gneisenau 's foremast the
to close with the rest of the fleet, and turned once more to the south-east, away from Cape Pembroke. The Germans were on the run.
Brisk and efficient Within a few more minutes, at 0940 hours, the British ships began to move out of the harbour. The armoured cruiser Kent had already been ordered out to replace the armed merchantman Macedonia, which was in fact the vessel whose smoke the Germans had first noted. The Glasgow, a brisk and efficient light cruiser, was next to leave, and set off in pursuit of Spee's squadron right away, with the task of keeping in touch and reporting back enemy movements, until the more powerful ships had caught up. At 0950 hours the big ships began to leave the harbour, first the Carnarvon, followed by the Inflexible, Invincible and Cornwall in that order. The Macedonia was to remain behind. By 1030
gunnery officer, Lieutenant-Commander Johann Busche, fancied he saw through his binoculars
the
large
A
masts of a
tripod
It must have been a devastating moment. As he peered for confirmation, the masts were obscured by a vast cloud of smoke. Was it the English burning their coal stocks? Or was it, perhaps, the smoke from a ship using oil fuel to work up a head of steam in a hurry? Shortly, the masts became visible again. At ten miles, it was
battle-cruiser.
battle-cruiser!
what they were, but as the moments progressed the evidence began to accumulate, and in Busche's mind the
difficult to tell
truth gradually began to dawn. First there were two masts, then six, then another two. And the biggest of them were very big, tall tripod masts, four of them, and that could only mean two battleships or battlecruisers, either of which would be an
insuperable foe for the German squadron. When Busche transmitted the news down to the bridge, he was told rather impatiently
by
commander, Captain there were no battle-
his
Maerker, that " cruisers nearer than the Mediterranean. Even so, as the Gneisenau and the Niirnberg steamed steadily towards Cape Pembroke, the news that there were warships
in the harbour, as yet unidentified, was tapped out by wireless to Spee in the Scharnhorst, lurking over the horizon. For the moment, Spee did nothing, and for a few still, almost ephemeral minutes the status quo was maintained. It changed suddenly at 0920 hours when the Gneisenau was subjected to the first shot of the day. It landed short, but Maerker wasted no time in turning through 90 degrees to evade the next salvo, and making off to the south-east. In fact the old battleship Canopus had enjoyed the distinction of firing the first shells. Two of its initial salvo of four were practice shells, loaded the night before by a keen gun-crew for a practice shoot planned for 0900 hours that morning, and it wa one of these which ricocheted off the wa r and hit the base of the Gneisenau s funi causing Maerker
change his mind aboi 'he attack. After ten minutes of flight U the south-east,
to
Maerker turned
his
two
Si
s
again on to
a north-easterly course, but er steaming for seven minutes in that rection he received orders from Spee ai 937 hours
528
Above: Vice-Admiral Sturdee. Fisher
was
Sir Frederick Doveton his foremost critic
had threaded its down by Canopus, and all were straining to comply with the exciting signal flown from the Inhours the
last of the line
way through the mines
laid
vincible— 'General Chase'. The pursuit was on. Among the most disappointed men that morning were surely the stokers of the Canopus herself. When the enemy appeared, they had climbed into the rigging of their ship, anticipating a spectacular view of their colleagues annihilating the enemy. And what a sight they were promised. As Englishmen, they surely revelled in the prospect of a quick and convincing victory, before going down to lunch secure in the knowledge that those southern seas were rid for ever of the threat from the East Asiatic Squadron. On paper, their original optimism was fully justified, as an examination of the number, size and strength of ships shows. It is evident that not only were all the British ships able to outpace the German ships so long as the latter stayed together but even if the slower Leipzig were detached the British could still catch and fight the two German armoured cruisers with at least their two battle-cruisers and the light cruiser Glasgow, while the re-
mainder dealt with the Leipzig. In whatever permutation Spee combined or detached his ships, the British still had ample strength and speed to overwhelm him. Most important, the power of the gunnery was tipped heavily in the Royal Navy's favour. It
was
perhaps
superiority of numbers
overwhelming and armament that
this
dissuaded Sturdee from being hasty. For a time, he pressed on at 26 knots, and rapidly gained on the Germans, who had by this time joined forces again and were steaming due east, but between 1048 and 1115 hours he ordered two reductions of speed, to give his slower ships time to catch
up and to clear the cloud of smoke that hampered his gunnery controller's vision. By now the Germans had been able to evaluate the strength of their pursuers, and see and confirm that these were battlecruisers, stronger and faster by far than their own vessels. If they were to have any chance of escape that day, it would be into the mists and fogs and storm haze that appear so frequently and with so little warning in that corner of the South Atlantic. Already nearly three hours had passed since they first realised that they were opposed. At the moment the skies were still clear and visibility was good — damnably good: but how long would that last? If the normal course of a day's weather were a true guide, their chances of escaping to safety increased with every minute in which the British stayed out of gunnery range. At 1122 hours Spee decided that he had gone for long enough to the east, turned a few points to starboard, and steamed off to the south-east. The British followed suit, and both squadrons were again on parallel course. Another hour passed, during which Sturdee, held back to 18 knots by the speed of his slower ships, failed to gain on the Germans. At last, however, with half the day gone, and half a day gained by the Germans in their effort to play for time, Sturdee reverted to his former policy, to the relief of his fellow officers, and ordered the two battle-cruisers to put on speed to 26 knots. For the time being, they would have to work without the armoured cruisers Carnarvon, Kent and Cornwall, but they still had the little light cruiser Glasgow three miles ahead.
A
tactical advantage Shortly after 1230 hours Spee made another turn slightly to starboard, and further to the south, and as the two fleets veered more and more in the direction of the wind, it became more and more depressingly apparent to the British that Spee was building up a tactical advantage, as the breeze blew the smoke from the British vessels downwind directly in front of their bows, and promised to obscure their vision for sighting and spotting when the gunnery duel eventually began. Was Sturdee being outwitted, his overwhelming despite superiority of strength and speed? The gunnery duel in fact began at 1250 hours, when Sturdee ordered his ships to engage the enemy and the Inflexible fired off her first pair of shots. The distance was still some 16,000 to 16,500 yards, or over nine miles, and within range of 12inch guns of the mighty battle-cruisers, although they had never before fired at more than 12,000 yards. The shells fell short. The Invincible then joined in but her shots also fell short, at least of the
J
J K Above: A German naval rating, wearing the traditional winter uniform of the First World War. The sailors of the Gneisenau and the Scharnhorst were the foremost gunnery experts of the German Navy
Above: A
British naval rating, wearing familiar bellbottoms. Although his gunnery technique was inferior to that of his German counterpart, the morale of the British sailor was high
529
THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND
British
Main
Maximum Broadside Speed
Armament
Range [yards]
[pounds]
Battle Cruisers
jjiL 1
f&
12"
[j[
4"
[16]
German
Weight [knots]
§
16.400
5350
28
lnflexible73lnvTncibl
^m
ISLANDS
Armoured Cruisers
8.2"
[8]
13.600
25
6"
[6]
11.200
21
6"
[14]
11.200
W
12.000
[6]
11.200
A month
after her defeat at the Battle of Coronel, Britain sought revenge for her lost ships in a major battle off the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic.
The key shows the superior force Britain sent against the Germans, headed by the two battle-cruisers Invincible and Inflexible and comprising three armoured cruisers and one light cruiser. The Germans had no battle-cruisers; Spee's force was limited to two armoured cruisers and three light cruisers. Lasting for many hours, the battle divided into three stages: the pursuit of the German squadron, beginning at 1 030 hours, and the sinking of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau; the pursuit and sinking of the Nurnberg; and the pursuit and sinking of the Leipzig. Of the five ships sent against the British, only one, the Dresden, escaped
;
I
900
24
Hi.
5 Cornwall/7 Kent
L "" l 9 Carnarvon
75 " 6"
22
Light Cruisers
""• 11 Glasgow
6"
[2]
H-200
4"
[10]
3.800
325
L illlf. I
4.1" [10] 10.500
155
™
-i»
»
•
-
J ill
Leipzig/ Nurnberg/ Dresden
6 Indicates battle action and broadsides
8
10
The large map takes up the pursuit
of the Gercruisers at noon. Just after 1300 hours, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau part company from the German light cruisers and turn to port, pursued by Invincible, Inflexible and Carnarvon. A broadside action follows, with the British guns making their superiority felt. Just after 1300 hours, Spee in Scharnhorst orders a turn to the south, forcing Sturdee to make a cumbersome turn in pursuit. By 1500 hours, all chances of escape have been abandoned by the Ger-
man
mans. At 1510 hours, Sturdee turns the British ships away to clear their smoke and the forces realign themselves, the Inflexible now exchanging fire with the Scharnhorst which sinks at 1617 hours. The Gneisenau then comes under fire from all three British ships and goes down at 1802 hours. Meanwhile, the Dresden has led away the Nurnberg and Leipzig, but they are quickly pursued by Glasgow, Kent and Cornwall. Just after 1500 hours the second stage in the fighting
commences.
1405 1400
1412
1408 1436
1405
1449'
1527
1435
1340
1333
1550
1500 1448 1600
1453 1300
1557
1315
<] At 1700 hours the Nurnberg opens fire on the Kent, and at 1735 hours her speed drops when two of her boilers burst, leaving her captain no alternative but to turn and fight. At 1802
hours the Nurnberg turns towards the enemy to fire her starboard battery. The Kent then crosses the Nurnberg's and fires a fatal broadside. At 1927 hours the Nurnberg rolls over and sinks
1445 1426
T
1445
<3 At
1832 hours Cornwall and Kent are
exchanging cruiser
fire
still
The light away to pursue the
with the Leipzig.
Glasgow has
fallen
Nurnberg. At 1857 hours the
last
shot
is
1501
/
1445 1502
fired
and the German captain, refusing to surrender, scuttles his ship. The British ships turn away and then return to pick up survivors. At 2123 hours the Leipzig finally sinks
1527
at the Leipzig
1509
< c OT
1510
d)
Q
cruisers. The only vessel endangered by this expenditure of ammunition was the light cruiser Leipzig, limping along at the back o( the German squadron, but she escaped with no more than a splashing. By 1315 hours the shots were beginning to fall more accurately, though still so wide that the crew of the Glasgow, which still had the best view ahead of the battle-cruisers, were thrown into despair over the lamentable inaccuracy of the British gunnery. At 1320 hours Spee took the inevitable decision. Already the light cruisers Dresden. Niirnberg and Leipzig were falling behind, and he faced the choice of either having his squadron attacked by the main part of the British squadron, or of splitting up his ships and allowing them to run on their own. He therefore gave the signal
'Part
company. Try
to escape',
and as the
three light cruisers turned away to starboard the two armoured cruisers turned to port, to close with the approaching enemy on a north-easterly course.
The battle thus divided into two distinct engagements, both weighted heavily in the Royal Navy's favour — the action between the two pairs of battle and armoured cruisers; and the chase of the light cruisers, with Glasgow, Kent and Cornwall chasing the Dresden, Leipzig and Niirnberg. Carnarvon was still some ten miles astern and trying to catch up with the battle-cruisers. When the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau turned to port, the Inflexible and Invincible made a similar turn and, from being in line behind the German ships, came on to an almost parallel course. It was the ideal situation for a broadside action, and at about 1330 hours both sides opened up. The range was down to 14,500 yards, the wind blowing almost directly from the British ships to the
German
ships and the
weight of the British broadside almost three times that of the German. Because of their respective positions in the line, when the firing began in earnest,
was matched against the
the Invincible
Gneisenau, the Inflexible against the Scharnhorst. And it soon became obvious
whose gunnery was the
better.
Below: Survivors of the Gneisenau flounder in icy waters off the Falkland Islands. Some were picked up by the Inflexible (in background) and the Carnarvon, but many drowned
*H*
00
M
ft
*&&*m"
m
<**>* -•
It
was
Fisher himself who told the Royal Navy in unforgettable words that 'Gunnery! Gunnery! Gunnery!' would win battles at sea. But it seemed that the Germans had taken the better note of his dictum. Their broadsides were most impressive. With perfect timing, tidy ripples of fire ran along the side of both ships, with brown puffs of cordite smoke circling vivid flashes of flame as each gun fired. Moreover, the aim of the Germans was accurate, and within 15 minutes the Scharnhorst, which had overtaken its sister ship, hit the Invincible. Sturdee's reaction was to turn a couple of points to port, to move to the advantageous position where he was outside the range of the German ships, but still had them in his own range. From here he managed three hits, one on the Scharnhorst and two on the Gneisenau, but no serious damage was done. However, the smoke frqatahis own
i
***' .
-
v*mwllJw2mp^4< *»
*.
guns blinded his view of the enemy, and he was forced, soon after 1400 hours, to turn four points towards the enemy to clear his vision.
when the smoke away on the breeze, it was the German ships had abruptly
Nevertheless,
finally drifted
seen that turned off to the south again, and the range had lengthened to 17,000 yards. Sturdee had been outwitted and had to make another cumbersome turn in pursuit. But again, through superior material rather than superior skill, he began to regain the advantage. His margin of speed brought the range down to 15,000 yards, and at 1448 hours the British were able to fire on the Germans again, without themselves being fired on. It was a situation which Spee could not allow to continue. Rather than prolong the agony, he decided on direct action, and at 1455 hours, as the near misses from the British ships grew ever nearer and began to strike home, he turned hard to p£rt in
an attempt
to cross his
enemy's
1
that his full battery and secondary armament, 5-9-inch guns, could be brought into action while the British were only able to bring their forward turrets to bear. Both sides were scoring hits, and the flash of explosive shell on the British armour punctuated the fountains of spray as other shells fell short, wide of, or over the target. Sturdee responded to Spee's move by turning his own ships to port, which brought the adversaries back on to almost parallel courses, and allowed both to bring their broadsides again into play. Now it was no longer a question of manoeuvre or tactics. By 1500 hours all considerations of escape or chase had been banished. It was a matter entirely of gunnery aneV at the range of only 12,500 yards, strength of armour.
Salvo after salvo For a seemingly endless time, the two pairs of ships fired off salvo after salvo at each other. For almost all the British sailors this was their first experience of battle,
and the continuous thunder of the guns, the scream of the shells, the hiss of water from missed shots, and the fury and blast of explosions around them made the sight a stunning experience. Even for the Germans, who had fought at Coronel, this was first experience of gunfire of this magnitude. For minutes on end the crews raced to wheel the ammunition on the noisy trolleys from magazine to gun position, load the gun, wait while the gunnery officers gave out details of range, elevation and aim, and then the order to fire, then begin the whole racing drill again, exactly as in the 1,000 practice shoots they had
their
carried out, only different, vastly different, this time. This time they were filing for their lives. Then, at the very height of battle, a beautiful, full-rigged sailing ship came into sight on the eastern horizon, and sailed towards the thunder and fire and smoke of the battle. It later transpired that she was a French vessel, which, having
V
#
"» Mr
V
Above: After the left
battle:
members
Europe four months
of Kent's
earlier,
crew pose on her damaged upper deck
remained
ignorance of the outbreak of war. She was soon gone, as the captain in
blissful
hoisted his colours and fled. The battle went on, with hits being scored on all ships, and with the Germans, despite excellent gunnery, suffering far the
worse damage. Their own shells failed to penetrate the British ships' armour, and although they exploded against the superstructure, they did little to impair British gunnery or injure British sailors. The British, by contrast, were using new shells filled with lyddite, an explosive based on picric acid and named after the town of Lydd in Kent where they were first tested
some twenty-five years before this battle. With their terrible explosive effects they penetrated the armour of the German ships and burst in fragments. Splinters of jagged steel wrecked the ships' machinery, and tore into the gentle flesh and brittle bone men. There were many that day who learned that although serving one's country had a great appeal in those patriotic days, there was nothing glamorous about the naval battle itself. Quite simply, in the German ships men were dying. Below decks, fires raged ind water flooded in, and those who had n been killed outright in the explosions w being burned or v bodies without drowned. Everywhere limbs, limbs without dies. All were thrust aside by those w still survived, to be accorded later the ity of being covered with a flag. fter 1500 In the Scharnhorst, soo hours, the fires were gaining unbreakable hold. Her upperworks, mangled of the
534
web
'Try to escape
to
He then made
of twisted steel, bore.no resemblance the designer's intentions; her three funnels were all blown away, and she was developing a list. The Gneisenau was also listing, from the flooding of water through a hole in her side made by an underwater Other hits, from the increasingly hit. accurate British gunnery, caused devastation in the starboard engine room, and smashed one of the boilers, which caused her speed to fall. At about 1510 hours, Sturdee turned the British ships away from the Germans to port, to clear their smoke, and as they came round on to the opposite course Spee ordered his ships correspondingly to turn to starboard, to prevent the British gaining the leeward position. By 1527 hours this manoeuvring had put the ships on approximately south-
westerly courses, again parallel, but now with their opposite broadsides firing, and they had again changed targets, with the Inflexible exchanging fire with the Scharnhorst. Then the Gneisenau became veiled from the British ships by the smoke from the Scharnhorst, and this latter ship had the fire of both battle-cruisers turned on her. Despite this, her crew for long minutes
managed
maintain their rate of firing, until at last, at 1537 hours, they could do no more. It was astonishing that she had been able to keep up the fight for so long. Her upper decks were wrecked, her lower decks an inferno of roaring flame and billowing smoke. to
Decks awash Spee clearly knew that his ship was near its end, and signalled to the Gneisenau
if
your engines are
intact.'
gallant, defiant gesture, turning to starboard to close with the two British ships and attack with torpedoes and to give the Gneisenau a chance to get clear. But he never got within range. With his decks awash, his speed slackening, and his ship listing heavily, Spee bowed out of the battle. The Scharnhorst turned over on her side, her propellers churning helplessly out of the water, and after seven minutes sank with the admiral on board. his
last
The Gneisenau now came under
fire
from
both British ships, and with her speed reduced to 16 knots had no chance of obeying the admiral's order to escape. Maerker, like his admiral, prepared for a fighting end, and ordered several of his engine-room personnel to help man the guns. They would certainly not be needed at their usual posts, since the starboard engine room, one boiler room and one
dynamo room were wrecked and
filling
with water. British gunnery was improving all the time, and the situation below deck on the Gneisenau deteriorating as it did
As shell after shell struck home, fires broke out, raged, were extinguished, only to start again when the job became too so.
for the fire parties to tackle. The starboard forced draught intake fans were smashed and the pressure cut. The foremost funnel was finally blown away, and a shot fell into the dressing station, where men, who had already been badly wounded and waited for medical attention, were put out of their agony. The guns themselves received hits, and one by one the 8-2-inch
enormous
and then the 5-9-inch casemates, were blown away and their crews killed. This loss of so many guns coincided with a failure in the ammunition service, and the Gneisenau's fire ceased for some minutes. Since she could no longer fly any colours from her twisted masts, the British believed she had surrendered, and held their fire. But the Germans, like the British at Coronel, had no such thoughts. For them proverbial discretion held no appeal over sacrificial valour, and when the ammunition service was restored by the repair of a hoist, the Gneisenau fired off one single, futile shot, and promptly brought down on herself once again a deluge of devastating fire not only from the battle-cruisers, but also from Admiral Stoddart's ship Carnarvon, which had by now caught up with the fighting. The three turrets,
British ships ceased fire once again when the Gneisenau failed to reply further. Gneisenau's reaction was the same — another valiant and futile effort, but this time it became possible to fire when the steering gear jammed and the ship involuntarily turned to starboard, bringing the port guns into operation. Again the British loaded and fired in reply, and within five minutes, at 1720 hours, Gneisenau had come to a complete halt, listing badly, and obviously on the point of sinking. Then astonishingly, as the British crews ceased fire and relaxed to await the end of their shell was found in loaded into the stillturret, and incredibly,
enemy, another single the Gneisenau, functioning fore suicidally, fired
off. It
missed the
Inflexible,
and the crews of all three British ships prepared to open fire again. It was a tribute to the skill of her builders that the Gneisenau still failed to sink, and Captain Maerker refused to allow her to fall into enemy hands. Everybody now prepared to abandon ship, grabbing hammocks, planks of wood, anything that would float. The boats were no use — they had been reduced to a splintered shambles in the explosions. Then two officers went below, and put into effect plans for just such a contingency which had been built into the ship by her designers. Explosive charges were carried between the twin skins of the Gneisenau's hull, and the ship seemed to shudder as they were fired. At 1802 hours the Gneisenau sank, with the sound of three cheers for the. Kaiser to mark her end, and with the crew's patriotic singing growing ever fainter as men drowned or perished in the freezing water.
From
this ship, unlike the Scharnhorst,
several survivors were picked up, including one who shivered in the Carnarvon, sipped hot cocoa, and announced cheerily: T believe I have a cousin in one of the British ships. His name is Stoddart.' Among those who did not survive was one of Admiral von Spee's sons, Heinrich.
The chase begins During the four hours in which the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had fought the British ships on their own, the three German light cruisers had been trying to make their escape, with two British armoured cruisers and a light cruiser in pursuit. When the chase began, the two small squadrons each formed a triangle. The Dresden led the fleeing Germans, followed by the Niirnberg to port and the Leipzig to starboard. Behind them came the Glasgow, with the Kent and Cornwall working
up astern of
her.
From
the
first
it
was
obvious that the Dresden, which had only recently joined the squadron, was in excellent mechanical condition and might well outrun the British fleet. At first the bestplaced British ship, the Glasgow, set off in hot pursuit, and it seemed that the other two pairs would ultimately come to battle. But the two slower German ships were masking the Dresden, and Captain Luce in the Glasgow had to choose his best course. Since he would have to detour widely round the other two to come up with the Dresden, and since it would be well past 1700 hours before he could possibly close, he elected to let her go, and the Dresden sped off towards the southern Antarctic mists. This left the Glasgow in close contact with the German ships. Soon after 1500 hours Luce opened fire on the Leipzig to make her alter course to starboard in order to return the fire and thus lose some of her lead. When the Leipzig found the range, Luce turned away and the Leipzig resumed her southerly course, having lost about one and a half miles. Luce at once closed the range again to repeat the tactic and the Leipzig lost another one and a half miles of her lead. It was these tactics which allowed the Cornwall to catch up and get within range. Meanwhile, although the Glasgow was not damaged, one hit was scored on the Leipzig. It started a fire in the clothes store. At first this had little effect and it was not noticed until it had spread through the compartments below
deck and gained an unbreakable hold. While this fire raged, the two other British ships were gradually catching the Leipzig
and Niirnberg. It would have seemed that the weak link in the British chain was the Kent, an old ship of long service which on paper had not the speed to keep up with the 23 to 24 knots of the German ships. But the crew of the Kent were equal to the unprecedented situation. They had the advantage of a light ship, not having had a chance to coal at the Falkland Islands, and to compensate for their lack of fuel every available piece of wood, from the chaplain's lectern to the decks themselves, was broken up and thrown into the furnaces to keep up the pressure. The result was a strain on the boilers which it seemed impossible for the old machinery to bear, but it did so. By 1617 hours the Kent and Cornwall were within range of the Leipzig and opened fire. The Leipzig was now faced with three separate opponents, but she gained some temporary respite when the Niirnberg turned off to eastwards, and the Kent swung away to follow, while at almost the same time the Glasgow fell away in pursuit of her original tactics. It was obvious now that the fate of the Leipzig would depend on the Cornwall. But the Cornwall' s 6-inch guns were outranged by the Leipzig's 4-1-inch guns, and the Cornwall therefore took the only course open, and moved up to close range, through the hail of accurate rapid fire which the Leipzig could still produce. Ten shells hit the Cornwall, but did no significant damage. Meanwhile, 50 shells had hit the Leipzig and by about 1830 hours the fire had become so strong that the ship became almost unworkable and began to slow down. Almost all her ammunition had gone. Ellerton in the Cornwall kept closing on the Leipzig, firing with his forward guns and then turning away to bring his broad-
side to bear, but thus opening the ran^
—
a manoeuvre he repeated over and over again, while Glasgow hammered away all the time. With these tactics Ellerton kept the range between 7,000 and 10,000 yards. At last the German vessel ceased fire altogether, and the Cornwall flew out the signal 'Am anxious to save life. Do you surrender?' The reply was a final broadside from the Leipzig, whose captain took the same view of surrender as the captain of the Gneisenau had done, and as Cradock had done at Coronel, and as no doubt most other captains would do of those two seafaring nations. Cornwall and Glasgow both therefore opened fire once again, using the devastating lyddite shell, and at such range, with no reply from the Leipzig, the effect was as might be expected. It was summed up by a survivor, who told an officer of the Glasgow, Lloyd Hirst: 'The lyddite would burst in the middle of a group and strip them of arms and legs — men would rush about with exposed bones, crazy from the effects of the shell — each explosion would account for about 40 men.' But the captain still refused the offer of surrender, and instead, like the Gneisenau's captain, scuttled his ship. The underwater torpedo tubes and seacocks were opened, and as the fire continued to ravage the upperworks, and the men began leaping into the sea, the commander, Captain Haun, at last told his crew that anybody who could reach the flag could haul it down. The fire was such that nobody could do so, and because it still flew, the Glasgow and Cornwall opened fire again with lyddite, and killed many of the men waiting on deck to go into the sea. The fire, the explosive lyddite, and the shock of the icy water killed almost all the Leipzig's crew. The ship was still floating on her port side when the British boats picked up the last of only 18 survivors, and she eventually sank at 2123 hours.
Luck runs out When the Kent the Niirnberg, was still clear hours a mist drizzle in the ill
turned away in pursuit of at 1615 hours, the weather and visibility good. By 1700
had appeared, there was and it seemed that the
air
weather and obscure conditions that the
Germans had prayed for might save them yet. The Kent was still out of range, so far as her officers could tell without the benefit of accuracy in their range-finding gear, rattling and shaking as the ship bore on at her unaccustomed pace. The Germans had no such disability, and at 1700 hours they opened fire "with their stern 4-1-inch guns, which continued to pour shells, mostly near misses, at the British. The British replied but their shots fell short
and wide, and
for a time it looked as if the Niirnberg would hold them off until the mist, thickening by the minute, saved them altogether. But her luck ran out. At 1735 hours two boilers burst almost simultaneously, and her speed dropped to only 19 knots. Her captain, Schbnberg, had no alternative but to turn and fight, and as the Kent raced up, closing the range to only 6,000 yards and firing her starboard batteries, the Niirnberg replied with all her port guns. For a few minutes, the l\rv was about even, and the Niirnberg almost destroyed the Kent with a single shot. It happened when the Niirnberg scored a hit on a casemate on the Kent, killed several
535
Ik-
men and sent a flash of flame down the ammunition passage, and ignited some empty shell hags It could easily have reached the shell room, in which case the danger to the Niirnberg would have been the tall of debris from what remained o( the Kent. But a Royal Marine sergeant with great presence of mind slammed shut the access door in the hoist to isolate the shell room, and smothered the burning charge with shell bags until a tire party arrived with hoses to extinguish the fire and flood the compartment. Thus the action of one man saved the Kent, hut sealed the fate of the Niirnberg. Shortly after this incident the Kent changed from orthodox shells to lyddite, again with the dreadful results that had decimated the Leipzig. Xiirn berg's top mast, funnels, guns were shot away in turn, and although she poured incessant fire into the Kent for some 20 minutes, at 1802 hours some other course of action was vital if she were to avoid simply being pounded to destruction. The course her captain chose was to turn in towards the enemy to fire his starboard battery — and it was fatal. The result was that the Kent 'crossed the T' of the Niirnberg, and was able to give the ship a full lyddite broadside while the Niirnberg could fire only from its two forward guns which were immediately shot away. greatest
A
short,
macabre ceremony
By 1825 hours the Niirnberg had slowed almost to a halt, and the rest of the battle was startlingly similar to the others that day.
At 1836 hours the Niirnberg could fire no more, and the Kent withdrew to await a surrender. None came, so the Kent, after 15 minutes, opened fire again, and this
German ship hauled down There was the short, macabre, but almost traditional ceremony as the captain fell in with his few remaining men, thanked them for fighting the ship so bravely, and ordered the one serviceable time at last a its colours.
boat to be lowered.
and
It
was not serviceable
sank on reaching the water. The captain remained with his ship, and at 1927 hours the Niirnberg turned on to her starboard side and quietly sank. At this moment the Kent lowered two boats, which searched for survivors until darkness fell at 2100 hours. Perhaps the most after
all,
in fact
bizarre aspect of all the day's fighting came during the search for survivors. With men w allowing about in the water, clinging to spars and hammocks, and any other piece of wood that might offer support in the increasingly choppy and freezing sea, large numbers of albatrosses appeared and swooped down in savage attacks on the survivors. Several men met their end pecked by the bills of these gigantic southern birds of prey. Only 12 men were picked up by the Kent, and of these only seven survived. Spee's elder son, Otto, was one of those killed. The Dresden had escaped: the other four ships concerned in the battle were sunk: there remained only the small supply ships, the Seydlitz, Santr Isabel and Baden. When the time came for he attack on Port Stanley, these three sh, s were ordered to wait off Port Pleasant, l ne 30 miles to the south, and they woi have been entirely safe there but for ti determination and courage of the onl, inhabitant within sight, a Mrs Felton. In ue adventure story tradition, she wej to the r
nearest high ground, and organised her
536
maid and a small boy
into a miniature network. She observed the movements of the ships, and sent the boy off as runner to the maid, who stayed by the telephone and reported Mrs Felton's messages to Port Stanley. When the first message was transmitted to Sturdee, at 1 127 hours, he directed the Bristol and the Macedonia to 'destroy the transports'. By the time the order was received, the Bristol had worked up steam and was racing to join the big ships, but she immediately turned back to assist the Macedonia. The Seydlitz, by far the fastest of the three auxiliaries, made off at the first sign of trouble, but the Baden and Santa Isabel, still observed by Mrs Felton, were too slow to escape and the Bristol was quickly up with them. The Bristol's captain ordered a shot fired across their bows, and both ships surrendered, whereupon the two English ships took off their crews and sank the ships by gunfire, rather stupidly, as it turned out, since they also sank valuable tons of coal and supplies. In mitigation it must be pointed out, however, that the naval battle was still undecided, and the transports were thought to be an invasion force — so Captain Fanshawe, acting on Sturdee's
Intelligence
orders,
had
option.
The
Seydlitz raced off eastwards, but found herself running into the battle area of the bigger ships. She changed course several times, and, sailing in wide evading sweeps, managed to get away. She eventually arrived at San Antonio on December 18, and was interned there. For the British, there was one redeeming feature of her escape; she carried the crew of the captured British supply vessel Drummuir, who were thus spared a possible death by gunfire from their own countrymen. The Dresden itself had a far longer little
extension to her freedom, but this will be described in another article. On December 16 Sturdee had sailed in the Invincible for home waters. Three days later
Inflexible
followed,
and
Admiral
Stoddart resumed command of the area. From the moment news arrived in London giving the details of the battle, arguments began to rage as to the merits of his victory. Lord Fisher himself was one of his greatest detractors, and on December 11 he announced that Sturdee would have to transfer his flag to the old armoured cruiser Carnarvon, send the battle-cruisers home, and stay down there until the Dres-
den had been tracked down. Churchill refused to countenance the idea. On De-
cember 10 Fisher had already warned Churchill against over-enthusiasm: 'let us be self- restrained — not too exultant! — till
we know
details! Perhaps their guns never reached us! It may have been like shooting pheasants: the pheasants not shooting back! Not too much glory for us, only great satisfaction.' When he did hear that the Dresden had got away, Fisher sent a string of telegrams to Sturdee demanding an explanation: 'Report fully reason for the
course which you have followed since the action.' Sturdee ultimately replied: 'I submit that my being called upon in three separate telegrams to give reasons for my subsequent action was unexpected.' But not even Fisher could prevent Sturdee receiving a hero's welcome in London when he arrived home, and King George followed this with the award of a baronetcy, a grant of £10,000, and, after Fisher's death, the rank of Admiral of the Fleet.
How
well had Sturdee fought in the of the Falkland Islands? To his credit, he had sunk four of the five main ships he was sent against, and the German admiral and 2,200 of his men had been
Battle
was a severe blow
to the German cleared for good the threat to British trade in remote waters. Winston Churchill later expounded the implications of Sturdee's victory: 'Within twentyfour hours orders were sent to a score of British ships to return to Home Waters. For the first time we saw ourselves possessed of immense surpluses of ships of certain classes, of trained men and of naval supplies of all kinds, and were in a position to use them to the best advantage.' killed. It
navy, and
it
Sturdee had also achieved his victory with only minimal damage to his shi