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THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

WORLD WAR II Volume 9 1944-1945 Archbishop Mitty High School Media Center

5000 San

Mitty

Jose,

Way

CA 95129

THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

WORLD WAR II An

and comprehensive history Second World War.

objective, chronological of the

Authoritative text by Eddy Bauer.

Lt. Colonel

Consultant Editor Brigadier General James L; Collins. Jr., U.S.A., Chief of Military History. Department of the Army.

Editor-in-Chief Brigadier Peter Young, D.S.O., M.C., M.A., F.S.A. Formerly head of Military History Department at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

Revision Editor

New

.A.shlev

Brown

Reference Editor

Mark

Dartford

Marshall Cavendish York London Toronto

Editorial Staff Brigadier Peter Young Editor-in-Chief Brigadier-General James L. Collins, Jr Consultant Editor Corelli Barnet

Editorial Consultant

Dr John Roberts Christopher Chant William Fowler

Editorial Consultant

Assistant Editor

Vanessa Rigby

Assistant Editor

Jenny Shaw Malcolm MacGregor Pierre Turner

Assistant Editor

Editor

Art Illustrator Art Illustrator

Revision Staff Ashley Brown

Revision Editor Reference Editor Art Editor Editorial Consultant

Mark Dartford Graham Beehag Randal Gray Julia

Wood

Editorial Assistant

Robert Paulley Creation

Production Consultant

DPM Services

Reference Edition Published 1985 Published by Marshall Cavendish Corporation 147 West Merrick Road, Freeport.

N

©Orbis Pubhshint! Ltd 1984, 1980, ©1966Jaspard Polus, Monaco

\'

11520

1979, 1978, 1972

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any lorm or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by an information storage and retrieval system, without All rights reserved

permission from the copyright holders

Primed

Bound

in Cireat Britain

by

in Italy

by Artisan Press

LEGO

Spa

Vicenza

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main

entry under

title:

The Marshall Cavendish World War

illustrated encyclopedia of

11.

Bibliography:

v.

Includes index.

World War, 1939-1945 - Chronology. I. Bauer, Eddy. James Lawton, 1917III. Young, Peter. IV. Marshall Cavendish Corporation V Title: World War VI. Title: World War Two. D743 M37 1985 1

II.

Collins,

940.53'02'02

.

85-151

ISBN 0-85685-948-6 ISBN

1)85685-957-.')

British Library Cataloguing in Publication

Marshall Cavendish Encyclopedia of World 1. I.

2.

(set)

(volume

9)

Data

War

II

World War, 1939-1945— Dictionaries Young, Peter, ]915-

940.53'03'21

D740

I

12870

Foreword

Forty years ago the greatest

was

seen

reached

at its height. It

to the

was

war which a

ends of the earth and affected

-

Now

world has yet

contribution

ramifications

masterly account of the whole

the

war whose

in

some way

or

to

final victory.

neutral: a Swiss.

The

we have

at last

War from

a

pen of a

the

author, a professional soldier, has

of the Second World

War

produced

the first general history

slaughtering about thirty million of them. Thousands of

which

completely uninfluenced by the mythology of any

authors have given us their views on the events of the years

of the

combatant nations. After

1939 - 1945,

of the

War had become shrouded in

another practically all

in

its

inhabitants

books ranging from the official histories

through the memoirs of generals, vanquished,

and

quite apart from

and

adventure stones of various

the

in

both victorious

IS

nations

cuts through the

nearly all were written by people who, though they

may

have been trained historians, had themselves been through

light.

show

Lieutenant-Colonel

and

professional soldier with an acute, analytical

human sympathy

broad,

and

their actions

web with a sharp sword. Here

based on deep study,

first class narrative,

All these works bear the signs of bias and prejudice, for

a mist of legends,

striven to

most favourable possible

in the

Bauer

warriors of lowlier rank.

and individuals have

thirty-five years, the story

to

comprehend

the

is

told by a

mind

but the

problems faced

by both side^

the events described, or at least belonged to one or other of the belligerent nations. it

is

practically

impossible for such an author

absolutely impartial. the B. E. F. at

landings,

as

He may find that

Dunkirk, well

as

Normandy and Burma, atmosphere of the war conceivably

However fairminded one may

lead

him

helped very days. to

On

be

having been with

in several raids

campaigns

to

in

much

and a number of Sicily, to

the other

over-emphasise

Italy,

conjure up

hand the

it

The Second World War

be,

the

may

British

even those IS

who were

still affects every

not born in 194.5.

in a sense to run the risk that

Here

written with the authority of one in his study,

were the

it

may

at last is the chance to read the

to

and

is free

one of

us,

To

ignore

all

happen again.

its

story

unvarnished truth

who was

deeply interested

the least taint of bias. Ifyou

from

be allowed to read only one account of the history of

Second World War, then

it

Brigadier Peter D.S.O.,

M.CM.A.

Editor-in-Chief

should be Colonel Bauer 's.

Young

Editorial

Board

Brigadier Peter Young studied at Monmouth School and Trinity College, Oxford before becoming 2nd Lieut in the Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regt, British Army in 1939. During World War II he served throughout the Dunkirk campaign and although wounded in 1940 BEF Dunkirk went on with Commando raids on Guernsey, the Lofoten Islands, Vaagso and Dieppe, the landmgs in Sicily

and Italy, 1943, the battle of Termoli, Normandy, the last Arakan campaign, commanding no. 3 Commando and the 1st Commando Brigade. After the war he commanded the 9th Regt Arab Legion before becoming Head of the Military History Department at the RMA Sandhurst. He has written over thirty books on military subjects. He was also Editor in Chid of Purnell 's History of the First World War and contributes regularly to the Army Historical Research Chamber's Encyclopedia and other academic Journal, publications. He is also a founder member and Capitaine Generall of the Sealed Knot Society of Cavaliers and Roundheads, a British Civil War re-enactment group. Corelli Barnet was educated at Exeter College, Oxford. Between 1945 and 1948 he served in the British Army Intelligence Corps, then took a

many

Masters degree, 1954. After

years as a very successful general and military

and author Barnet was awarded the Leverhulme Research Fellowship in 1976. In 1977 he was made Keeper of the Archives and a Fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge where since 1980 he has been a teaching Fellow in Defense Studies. In 1982 he gave the Winston Churchill historian

Memorial Lecture, Switzerland.

Among

his

many books

receiving high acclaim, Corelli

Barnet has written: The Desert Generals, The Battle of Alamein, and Britain and Her Army - for which he won the Royal Society of Literature

Award

in 1971. Corelli

Barnet worked

on an epic documentary series for BBC television entitled The Great War and two other notable series, The Lost Peace 1918 - 33 and The Commandos. He won the 1964 Screen Writers' Guild Award for the best British television documentary as

author

an

and

historical

consultant

Spectator and given talks on the BBC. He is a member of the UK/US Education committee and the Royal Historical Society.

Chris Chant was born in Macclesfield, England and educated at The Kings School, Canterbury and Oriel College, Oxford where he obtained an M.A. in Literae humaniores. In his early career he worked as assistant editor on Purnell 's History of the First World War and the History of the Second World War. He was also an editor on the Encyclopedia of World War One. Since then he has dedicated

most of

his

time

to full-time writing, specializing in the

history of military aviation. Included

amongst the many

he has written are Ground Attack, Great Battles of Airborne Forces, World War Aircraft, How Weapons Work and recently titles

H

Air Forces of the World, Naval Forces of the World. He is at present working on the third book of the trilogy published

by Collins, England - Land

Forces of the World, plus a

Dictionary of World Aircraft.

Lieutenant-Colonel Eddy Bauer was born and spent most of his life in Switzerland, where he excelled both in an academic career - as Professor of History and then Rector of Neuchatel University - and as an officer in the Swiss Army. A major interest in modern warfare began from his first hand experience as a news correspondent in the Spanish Civil War. With this practical and academic training he was well qualified for his appointment as head of the Swiss Second Division's Intelligence Service at the

outbreak of World War Two, and it was from this neutral and privileged vantage point that he was able to write a detailed impartial account of the war, week by week, for a military diary of a Swiss newspaper. After the war he continued to use his great wealth of experience on the military, political and media aspects of war, regularly contributing to a variety of journals and writing numerous books, including a study of armoured warfare and a history of Secret Services, which was his final and uncompleted

work.

He

died in 1972.

script.

He

is

Elected

a

member of the Royal

Society of Literature

Member of the Royal United

and an

Services Institute.

Dr. John Roberts is a well-known historian educated at Taunton and Keble College, Oxford, where in 1948 he received an M.A. In 1953 he got his D.Phil, and became a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford. In the same year he went to the United States as a Commonwealth Fund Fellow at Princeton and Yale. He later became a Member of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton (1960 - 61) and visiting professor at the University of

South Carolina and

Columbia. Merton College, Oxford, appointed him Fellow and tutor in Modern History, then Honorary Fellow in 1980. John Roberts has written and published several major historical works, including Europe 1880 - 1945 and Hutchinson

's

History of the World.

He

also edited Purnell

's

and the Larousse Encyclopedia Since 1967 he has been joint-editor of the

History of the Twentieth Century of Modern History.

English Historical Review, contributed to journals such as the

Times Literary Supplement,

the

New

Statesman and the

Brigadier-General James L. Collins Jnr., was commissioned into the United States Army as 2nd Lt. in 1939 after obtaining a B.Sc at the U.S. Military Academy, Vancouver where he received his M.A. before doing postgraduate studies at the Naval War College, the Armed Forces Staff College and the Army War College. Brig. Gen. Collins is a former Chief of Military History, US Dept. of the Army and Commander of the Center for Military History, Washington. He has held a variety of other distinguished posts including Director of the Defense

and Director of the US Commission for and editor on military subjects whose major published works include The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese 1950 - 72 and Allied Participation in Vietnam. He was Chief Editorial Adviser, War in Peace, 1984 a major part work magazine in England, the Editor of Memoires of my service in the World War George Marshall and contributes regularly to

Language Military.

Institute

He

is

a professional author

professional journals.

.

Notable Contributors Lt. Col. Martin Blumenson was educated at Bucknell and Harvard Universities. He served with the US Armv in Europe during World War II. and later in Korea and subsequently joined the Army Reserve. Former Senior Historian, at the Army's Office of the Chief of Military History and visiting Professor of Military and Strategic

Studies at Arcadia University, he has also held important posts at the

War

War CoUege, The Citadel and the Army Blumenson has been a prolific writer and is

Naval

College.

acknowledged as one of the world's authorities on the Italian campaign. His books include: The US Army in World War II: break out and pursuit, Rommel's last victory, Sicily: whose victory^ and Eisenhower.

Andrew Mollo military uniforms.

rank of Brigadier at the early age of 31 and. after serving with Wingate in Burma, returned to command the Special Air Service Brigade in Europe at the soldier, attaining the

end of World War II. He later raised and commanded the 22nd Air Service Regiment in Malaya. Qualified as a military historian and renowned as an authority on jungle warfare he went on to write such books as Fighting Mad, Prisoners of Hope, Chindits - a long penetration. Slim and in

author of over a dozen books,

and photographs. He

among them Army

Army Uniforms of World War

the SS,

World War

and Army

II

is

the

Uniforms of Uniforms of

Apart from writing Andrew Mollo has worked in film and television, as technical adviser on productions such as Night of the Generals and The Spy who came in from the Cold,

Here

I.

and co-directing the -

the

latter

Jacques Nobecourt

Caen

films Winstanley

and

It

happened

being an imaginary occupation of

England by the Germans is

in

World War

II.

a well-known French military

He

studied at the Lycee Saint Louis, Paris and University, France. After serving in the 2nd World

War

he worked as editor of foreign affairs for the journal Combat following which he worked on various other newspapers eventually joining .Vforzd'f as Rome correspondent before becoming its deputy chief. He is also a regular contributor to journals such as La Stampa and Corriere della Serra. Jacques Nobecourt's published titles include Hitler's Last Gamble: the Battle of the Ardennes.

He

Historia in 1963 and the Prix Citta di

received the Prix

Roma

in 1974.

Remy

O.B.E., alias Renault, one of the world's on the French Resistance joined the Free French Forces in London in 1940 under General de Gaulle, and in the same year founded the Notre Dame Brotherhood. Col Remy has written many books specialising on the Resistance and secret service, including Col.

1979 co-edited Dictionary of Battles, 1715-1815.

a military historian specialising in has also assembled one of the largest

collections of insignia, militaria

historian.

Brigadier Michael Calvert D.S.O. Nicknamed Mad Mike, he has had a distinguished career as a fighting

is

He

best authorities

Will Fowler Defence.

and

Educated

on a wide range of

a notable writer

is

military subjects

at

at

present

is

Clifton College

the

Army

Editor for

and Trinity College,

Cambridge he received an M.A. in 1970 before taking a Diploma in Journalism Studies. During his career he has worked for a number of specialist military publishers and the Royal United Services Institute. As an author his most recent books are Battle for the Falklands -

and Royal Marines

since 7 95(5

( 1

Land Forces (1982)

in the

Time-Life

series

Second World War,

Humble

'The Sea Farers",

and

Purnell's History of

Richard

History of the 20th Century.

twenty books.

High Seas Fleet, Hitler 's Generals, Japanese High Seas Fleet, Naval Warfare, Battleships and battlecruisers and United States Navy Fleet Carriers of World War II. Eraser of North Cape published in 1983 is a is

author of

at least

Hitler's

highly acclaimed biography of Lord Eraser.

Captain Donald Maclntyre served in the Fleet Air Arm and during World War II in the Royal Navy as a Commander of destroyers and convoy escort groups in the North Atlantic. Since his retirement in 1954 he has written numerous books on Naval history including Narvik, Battle as a pilot

for the Pacific, Aircraft Carriers, Leyte Gulf, Battle of the Atlantic

1939-45

and

contributed

The

to

Twentieth Century

1977.

the

Naval war

against

publications

and Time

secret

Portrait of a spy

agent of Free France,

and Ten

steps to

published works include Thirty years

The Silent Company, His most recent

hope.

after:

1974 and Sedan, which was published

6 June 1944/6 June

in 1980.

984)

Richard Humble studied at Oriel College Oxford, specialising in Military and Naval History following which he worked for about eight years in illustrated publishing both as editor and contributor on works including Churchill's History of English-Speaking People, The Explorers the

Memoires of a

Hitler.

Purnells

Life Books'

He

History

Worfd War

also

of the

series in

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, retired from US Marine Corps. Born 1921, New Jersey he graduated in 1942 from Lehigh University, going on to attend the Amphibious Warfare School, the National War College and Ohio State University for postgraduate studies. In the meantime Simmons commanded the 2nd Battalion USMC. At the time of Inchon operation and Chosin Reservoir campaign, he, as major commanded weapons company 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines. Amongst his many decorations are the D.S.M., Silver Star, and Legion of Merit with two gold stars. Brigadier General Edwin Simmons USMC (retired), is now director of History and Museums at the US Marine Corps Headquarters and holds a similar position for other military foundations. Widely published, he has contributed to numerous books, encyclopedias, magazines and annuals. He was the Managing Editor for The Marine Corps Gazette, and senior editor for the Publishing Group, Marine Corps Schools and in 1974 published The United States Marines. He served with distinction in Korea. the

Contents of \blume Nine

"The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" The Marines at war Saipan, Tinian and Guam Objective Tokyo Leyte: the planning "I have returned": the landings on Leyte Leyte Gulf: greatest sea battle of all The Struggle for Leyte

The Pacific submarine war The British Pacific Fleet The War in China Stilwell and Chennault: The Americans Burma Road: China's lifeline Luzon Kamikaze: "the divine wind" Japan's war effort The fire raids on Japan Iwojima Okinawa: the plans Okinawa: the battle

in

China

2305 2321 2325 2340 2347 2356 2367 2383 2401 2413 2423 2438 2451 2472 2497 2505 2521 2533 2553 2560

Although he had superior strength, MacArthur put on a cunning diversionary operation to make the Japanese believe they were going to be attacked frontally

"I cannot find any means or method which will solve this situation strategical-

in the area of Wewak. Lieutenant-General

Bushido.

Hatazo Adachi,

enemy

ly or tactically. Therefore,

I

intend to

overcome this by relying on our Japanese I

am determined

to destroy the

by attacking him ruthArmy in New Guinea, fell into the trap. lessly with the concentration of our April 22 was thus a day of easy triumph entire force in that area. This will be our final opportunity to employ our entire for the U.S. I Corps (Lieutenant-General Robert L. Eichelberger) which landed, strength to annihilate the enemy. Make without much difficulty, its 24th Division the supreme sacrifice, display the spirit (Major-General F. A. Irving) at Tanah- of the Imperial Army." This appeal was understood and merah Bay and its 41st (Major-General H. H. Fuller) at Hollandia and Aitape. followed, but the time and trouble it When he had got over his surprise, Adachi cost Adachi to turn round gave the Allies tried to turn his forces round and re- an advantage which they did not let slip, establish his communications. During especially as they were also able to decode July the Aitape sector was the scene of the Japanese radio messages. And so. furious throughout which during the night of July 11-12, the 18th fighting, Adachi urged on the Japanese 18th Army's counter-attack found the Allies Army in terms of mingled despair and alert and reinforced by Major-Generals Charles P. Hall's XI Corps and William determination: C.-in-C.

Japanese 18th

in Aitape

A Men of the Royal Australian Air Force disembark from an L.S.T. near the village of Korako in the Aitape area. A dead Japanese lies on the beach, unheeded by the Allied troops, who now had of preparing

the important task

a forward

airfield

for a continued advance.

2305

2306

This rather sombre example one of a seemingly endless

<< is

variety of U.S. posters exploiting the idea that money invested in

War Bonds, or effort spent in increasing production had a direct effect in reducing the casualty rate at the front line.

< A Marine landing ship packed gunnels with supplies approaches New Britain.

to the

V Part

of the flotsam of the

knocked-out Japanese tank on the beach between

battle, a

Bosneck and Molomer Airdromes on Biak Island.

H. Gill's 32nd Division.

were

The Japanese

held.

MacArthur

strikes

along the coast MacArthur was already hopping from one island to the next along the coast of

New Guinea. On May 17, his 41st Division landed at Wakde, 125 miles west of Hollandia. On the 27th, a further hop of 200 miles brought him to Biak, where the Japanese put up fierce resistance. Virtually ignoring this as a local incident, he pushed on to the island of Numfoor on July 2 and on the 30th he reached the beak of the Vogelkop. This was at Sansapor, over 600 miles from Hollandia. By now some 120,000 Japanese were cut off,

2308

6

Div. (July 30)

168th Regt. (July 2)

f I

Sansapor

VOGELKOP

Biak

41 Div.

Numfoor

(May 27) ,41 Div.

(May 17-18)

Sarmi-• if/Tanahmerah Bay^^ 24 N^

Wakde

*^

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS

Div. (Apr. 22)

Manus

jf^-" 41 Div. (Apr. 22)

Hollandia

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

41 Div. (Apr. 22)

Aitape

'^^i^zroi:T^1Q44>

Cavalry

NevlN.

Div.

'•"^'^^d

(Feb. 29, 1944)

Japanese 18th Army

NEW GUINEA

1

Madang*

j/

— LosNegros

BISMABCK .Kavleng I ARCHIPELAGO X. 1

Wewak

••.

Mussau

**^

Rabaul New^ & 7 Marine Divs. Britain (Dec. 26, 194aL*"^^5 Marine Div. /7| ^' (March 6,

K^-y'";944)

It

Lae

Japanese

8th

Army

PAPUA *•••••«•«•

Port

Moresby

A

y .y.

trapped in the "green hell" of the jungle in one of the worst climates in the world, and defenceless against malaria. It is understandable that, in face of this great success, MacArthur telegraphed to Eichelberger: "The succession of surprises effected and the small losses suffered, the great extent of territory conquered and the casualties inflicted on the enemy, together with the large Japanese forces which

have been isolated, all combine to make your operations of the past one and a half months models of strategical and tactical manoeuvres." In fact, according to a table drawn up by General Willoughby, chief of Intelligence, Allied Forces in the South-West Pacific, in dead alone the losses on both sides were: Battle areas

American Am

Japanese Ratio

AraweGloucester 472 Saidor 55

4,914 1,275

1:10 1:23

4,143 4,441 8,370 3,899 5,093

1:27

Admiralty Islands

Hollandia Aitape

Wakde Biak

155 87

440 646 524

1:51

1:19 1:6

1:10

MILES

Numfoor

63

2,328

Sansapor

2

374

It

\v

1:37

1:187

should also be remembered that the

200

A MacArthur's conquest of the New Guinea coastline and the islands to the north, which now opened the way for his next move to Morotai and thence the Philippines.

death-rate in American hospitals was three per cent, whereas it was very much higher amongst the Japanese because of
2309

A A column of L.V.T.s or "Water Buffaloes" awaits the order to embark on the L.S.T. that will move them up for the final part of the New Guinea campaign -the landings at Sansapor on the "Vogelkop".

operation and to rejoin Ozawa east of the Philippines. The reason was the air attacks on Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in the Marianas. The double offensive which had paid

Nimitz at Tarawa was now working MacArthur. Mitscher's bombers had

off for

for

an easy job of it over their objectives because the Biak affair had drawn off many fighters from the defence of the Marianas. Washington's misgivings were thus allayed by events.

The Marianas As the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff directive of March 12 pointed out, the capture of the three islands mentioned above gave them a base for an attack on Mindanao in the At Saipan, Army Air Force engineers would lay down the runways Philippines.

:^310

needed for the B-29 Superfortresses of the 20th Air Force to take off on their missions of destruction over the great industrial centres of the Japanese mainland. Operation "Forager", started on July 6, involved 535 warships and 127,571 men of the Marine Corps and the Army. Task Force 58 was followed by the Joint Expeditionary Force, Task Force 51, whose job it was to put ashore two corps of four divisions and one brigade: 1. V Amphibious Corps (LieutenantGeneral Holland M. Smith: 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions); 2. Ill Amphibious Corps (Major-General Roy S. Geiger: 3rd Infantry Division and 1st Provisional Marine Brigade);

and 3.

floating reserve: 27th Division (MajorGeneral Ralph Smith). Admiral Spruance was C.-in-C, and

Turner commanded the and land forces involved in the

Vice-Admiral sea, air,

Spruance was much stronger in Opera"Forager" than he had been in "Galvanic". This is shown by the number

tion

of fast carriers available to the 5th Fleet: 11 at the Gilberts, 12 at the Marshalls, and 15 at the Marianas. The same was true for other types of ship. When the clash came, the opposing forces had the following:

Spruance Carriers Battleships Cruisers Destroyers Totals

15

Ozawa

21

9 5 13

69

28

112

55

7

Spruance thwarts Ozawa's plans .

.

.

American superiority in naval aircraft was over two to one. Spruance had 891, his adversary 430. The Japanese pilots, anchor in Tawitawi, they had had. The Japanese carrier-force had two after their idleness at

had

A

A paratrooper taking part in the conquest of Numfoor Island swings from a tree in which his parachute has become entangled.

landing. Both had recently been promoted. This powerful combination of forces spelled the end of Japanese strategy as it had been conceived since the Washington Naval Conference of 1922. Then, when

they

had

conceded

a

numerical

superiority to the U.S. of five to three in battleships, the Japanese could still persuade themselves that their security was not at risk. In their opinion the bulk of the enemy's forces would be trapped and destroyed piecemeal in ambushes laid for them in the Marshall and Caroline Islands. The balance of strength would thus be in their favour in the Marianas, This turned out to be incorrect. In fact, far from losing strength as he advanced,

lost

what

little efficiency

problems: it did not dare put out to sea because of the submarine threat: and there were no aerodromes near its base where its pilots could be trained. Ozawa's carriers did, it is true, have a greater range of action, but this had been achieved by the sacrifice of a certain amount of armour protection and a reduction in water-tight integrity, which rendered them very vulnerable. Ozawa, in whom the historian Samuel Eliot Morison recognises "a scientific brain and a flair for trying new expedients, as well as a seaman's innate sense of what can be accomplished with ships", overlooked all these weaknesses in the hope of overcoming them by close collaboration with land-based aircraft from the Marianas and the organisation of a shuttle-service between his own and the "unsinkable carriers" of Guam and Rota. But this plan was thwarted by Spruance. Moreover, Japanese strategy could no longer choose between offensive and defensive operations for, unless the Mobile Fleet were engaged, they would lose the Marianas, and the Philippines soon afterwards. In which case. Admiral Toyoda declared later: "Even though the fleet should be left, the shipping lane to the south would be completely cut off so that the fleet, if it

2311

The American Grumman TBF-1 Avenger torpedo-bomber

one Wright R-2600-8 radial, 1,700-hp. one 5-inch and two .3-inch Browning nd one torpedo or 1,500 lbs of bombs. ,

Speed 271 mph :

Climb: 1,430

ht

at 1 2,000 feet. minute initially. Ceiling: 22,400 feet.

feet per

Range: 1,215 miles (with torpedo). empty/loaded: 10,080/15,905 lbs

Span 54 :

feet 2 inches.

Length: 40 Height: 16

feet.

feet 5 inches.

Crew:

••^12

3

should come back to Japanese waters, could not obtain its fuel supply. If it should remain in southern waters, it could not receive supplies of ammunition and arms. There would be no sense in saving the fleet at the expense of the loss of the Philippines."

hoped that the forces will exert their utmost and achieve as magnificent It is

results as in the Battle of Tsushima.'

There

was,

common between

however,

nothing

'"

A The Battle of the Philippine Sea, which marked the end of the Imperial Japanese Navy's air arm.

in

the American 5th Fleet

and the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron destroyed by Admiral Togo on May 27 and 28, 1905.

and Ozawa reaches the Philippine Sea .

.

.

This was why,

when he heard about

the bombing of the Marianas, Toyoda ordered Ozawa to put in action the plan for a counter-offensive which had been drawn up for this purpose. During the evening of June 15, Ozawa sailed into the Philippine Sea through the San Bernardino Strait and 24 hours later joined up with Ugaki's Attack Division. At 0008 hours on the 18th, he sent the following message to the Mobile Fleet: "I humbly transmit to you the message I have just received from the Emperor via the Chief-of-Staff, Naval Section, Imperial G.H.Q.: 'This operation has immense bearing on the fate of the Empire.

Spruance moves out Patrolling off Tawitawi and at the exit of the San Bernardino Strait, Vice-

Admiral

Lockwood's

submarines

had

signalled the approach of the Japanese Mobile Fleet and, with some uncertainty, its composition. In view of the coming battle, Spruance called back his forces which had just been bombing the Bonin and Volcano Islands north of the Marianas, and redeployed his units. On the fianks of his four carrier task groups, still under Vice-Admiral Mitscher, he drew up a Battle Line under Vice-Admiral W. A. Lee: his seven fast battleships, four cruisers, and 13 destroyers. At 1415 hours on June 17 he defined his intentions to his immediate subordinates:

2313

"Our air will first knock out enemy carriers, then will attack enemy battleships and cruisers to slow down or disable them. Battle line will destroy enemy fleet either

by

fleet

action

if

the

enemy

by sinking slowed or crippled ships if enemy retreats. Action against the enemy must be pushed vigorously by all hands to ensure elects to fight or

complete destruction of his fleet." Spruance's intentions were thus purely offensive. He could not, however, go outside the parameters of his mission, which was to take, occupy, and defend Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. By giving chase to the enemy he would have left V Amphibious Corps' bridgehead unprotected and risked exposing it to attack from any Japanese force moving in from north or south. He therefore decided to sit back and wait a while.

The Japanese

fleet

advances At dawn on June 19, the Japanese Mobile Fleet consisted of two detachments: a Van Force (Vice- Admiral Takeo Kurita) with three divisions, two of battleships and one of heavy cruisers, each protecting a light carrier, and 120 miles behind it a Main Body (Ozawa) composed of Forces "A" and "B", with six carriers, five of

them

fleet carriers.

The

Japanese sailed in against the wind: their planes were thus able to take off straight towards the enemy, with the return flight shorter than the outward one. Between daybreak and 1445 hours, Ozawa made four raids on the 5th Fleet. These were all disastrous because of American superiority in training and in the quality of their aircraft. 373 of the 473

Japanese planes available (including floatplanes) took off and met 450 U.S. fighters, which massacred them. Those which escaped got caught in the massive A. A. fire of the Task Groups and the Battle Line. Those of the fourth wave which attempted to land at the airfield on Guam were destroyed in the air or so badly damaged on landing (the runways being pitted with

bomb

craters) that

none of them ever

took off again. Only 130 Japanese planes returned to their ships. There was no compensation for the Japanese as the U.S. fc only 18 fighters and 12 bombert ^red only slight damage "

to the carrier Bunker Hill and the battleship South Dakota. The 5th Fleet lost altogether 58 men killed, including 27 pilots. Worse still for Ozawa, at 0910 hours the submarine Albacore (Commander J. W. Blanchard) put a torpedo into the fleet carrier Taiho (29,300 tons), ViceAdmiral Ozawa's flagship. Then at 1220 hours the submarine Cavalla (LieutenantCommander H. J. Kossler) scored three hits on the carrier Shokaku; she sank towards 1730 in the afternoon with 22 of her planes, which had just returned, on board. Both the Shokaku and the Taiho were lost because of explosions of the fumes from the fuel taken on at Tarakan. Damage to the Taiho was negligible, but a damage-control officer unfortunately gave the order to ventilate the ship and the petroleum fumes swept through from stem to stern. This led to a colossal explosion, as a result of which the ship sank immediately.

Twilight pursuit Ozawa cruiser

transferred his flag to the heavy Haguro and, misinformed about

Japanese losses andmisled by exaggerated reports by his own pilots of U.S. casualties, pressed on with his attack regardless. There is no doubt that the remainder of the Japanese fleet would have been wiped out in the course of June 20 if

_5_

i^

\

•»'iF

Spruance's aerial reconnaissance had

spotted it in time, but it failed to do so, despite the beautiful weather. It was 1600 hours before a plane sighted the Japanese "250 miles" (it was in fact over ^ < A Japanese aircraft 300) north-north-west of Task Force 58. plummets down towards the sea Despite the distance and the lateness of in flames over an American the hour, Spruance turned his carriers escort carrier. In the foreground into the wind and sent up 85 fighters, Grumman Hellcats wait for 77 dive-bombers, and 54 torpedo-bombers action on board another carrier, and in the background, to the inside ten minutes. right, the bursts of A. A. shells below the horizon The sun was sinking litter the sky over another when the Americans saw the fighter American carrier. screen protecting the Mobile Fleet. Each A The aircraft nears the end Japanese ship then took a separate of its parabolic dive into the sea. < < Surrounded by bursting zig-zag course and opened up with all bombs, a "Shokaku" class fleet its guns. Forty Japanese planes were carrier turns sharply in an shot down for a loss to the Americans of effort to evade the attentions of 20, but only a small carrier, the Hiyo, was U.S. carrier-based strike sunk. Meanwhile Mitscher was sailing aircraft. In the foreground destroyers take similar evasive full steam ahead to save his planes as action. much milage as possible. To get them back < A "Kongo" class battleship on board at 2000 hours. Task Force 58 in trouble after being hit by turned up-wind and, in spite of the sub- bombs (left) and a fleet carrier marine danger, turned on all their land- turning away (right).

2315

Jap plane also tried to land on one of our

Our planes continued to land as we continued on our way after the Jap carriers.

was quite a sight to see all the up, flares and rafts in the water and some planes crashing into the water, and pilots and crews also in the water. You could see the planes circle and then land on the carriers. A great job was done

fleet. It

ships

lit

by everyone to save our pilots' lives. The Japs would never do anything like this."

out of 176 planes which got back to Task Force 58, 80 ran out of fuel and fell into the sea or crash-landed. Thanks to Mitscher's initiative, 101 crew were picked up. Another 59 were saved on the following day, making the losses for the 20th 49. Ozawa was informed that only 35 out of his 473 planes were left, and

Even

so,

so he broke off contact.

A catastrophe for the Japanese

The Philippine Sea was thus the graveyard of the Japanese naval air arm. The Japanese carriers, bereft of planes and pilots, were like rifles without cartridges. At the cost of 130 of the 956 planes his task force had at dawn on June 19, and of 138 sailors and airmen killed or missing, Spruance had thus scored a victory the consequences of which were to last until the Japanese capitulation of September 2,

1945.

fact remains that a number of Spruance's subordinate officers and fellow-commanders, who did not know of the loss of the Taiho, however, expressed their disappointment that the Mobile Fleet had not been destroyed, a result of what they considered excessive caution on Spruance's part. Nimitz and King backed him up, however. Perhaps by so doing they were merely vindicating themselves in that this incomplete victory could have been the result of their some-

The

A "^ Flight deck crew throw themselves flat as a Japanese torpedo bomber thunders in at low altitude towards their carrier.

A>

The plane is hit under its port wing. The men at the bottom are the crew of an A. A. gun.

A The twilight sky over an American task force is pitted with the black bursts of A. A. fire.

2316

ing lights. A few hours later, on board the cruiser Montpelier, Leading Seaman James J. Fahey noted in his invaluable diary: "It was a great decision to

make and everyone thought the world of Admiral Marc Mitscher for doing this. This would make it easier for our pilots to land, and if they did hit the water they could be saved. The big carriers were all lighted so the pilots could see where to land, a lot of our destroyers were left behind to pick the men out of the water. I saw one pilot on the wing of his plane waving his shirt. There were so many lights it must have been hard to land on the carriers. A

what

restrictive

instruction

to

take,

occupy, and defend Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. Be that as it may, some months later Admiral W. F. Halsey found that the order sending him to Leyte contained the following paragraph: "In case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet offers or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task."

> The American

carrier Intrepid

under way with her planes ready on the flight deck. V The Intrepid burning after an attack by Japanese aircraft. Overleaf: American heavy units loose off at targets on shore during a pre-landing

bombardment. Note the

fire-

control radar behind the mast.

2317

The disaster of the Philippine Sea was soon to be followed by the loss of the Marianas Islands: Tinian, Saipan and Guam. A consequence of these defeats was the forced resignation of General Tojo as Prime Minister. On July 18, 1944, Hirohito appointed General Kuniaki Koiso as Tojo's successor. The new Prime Minister had been Governor of Korea, had left the Army in 1938, and had the reputation of being a moderate. The War Ministry went to Field-Marshal Sugiyama, the Navy to Admiral Yonai. Shigemitsu, who had taken part in the conspiracy within the Tojo cabinet, remained Foreign Minister.

The search

for peace

The Emperor ended his audience with the new Prime Minister with the following words: "You will need to collaborate to put an end to the war in Asia and I recommend you not to upset Russia." In guarded terms the Emperor was therefore ordering Koiso and Yonai to attempt a negotiated settlement with the United States and Great Britain. The

new Navy Minister saw the

situation in

same light. When he had asked Admiral Toyoda: "Can we hold out until the end of the year?" the reply was: "It the

will in all probability be very difficult."

When we realise that the Japanese language is full of circumlocutions and delicate shades of meaning we see what that meant. The army chiefs had still to be reckoned with, however, and they refused to admit that any negotiated settlement could be compatible with the Emperor's honour, of which they considered themselves the absolute and final judges, regardless of their devotion to his person. "Divine Presence" was one of the Emperor's attributes, but for the military man this was only on condition that he took no part in major policy decisions. Even if the army leaders had been more foreseeing than this. General Koiso would still have found it just as difficult to overcome this obstacle. Potter and Nimitz note this clearly: "On the Allied side, the goal of unconditional surrender set by Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca forbade the proffering of terms which might have served as bases for negotiation." And so the road led inevitably to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. ^^318

2319

V On fire, and shot

away by

with

its

port wing

U.S. A.A.

fire,

a

Japanese Nakajima B5N2 torpedo bomber (Allied code-

name "Kate") prepares its

to take final plunge into the sea.

z.
r-

m.

^.^

The Marines at war During World War II the U.S. Marine Corps achieved the reputation of being the toughest service in the American armed forces. This reputation was built upon a fine combat record; although it must be said that the Marines were

attacks in an attempt to dislodge the

Americans.

fortunate

The American triumph on Guadalcanal the myth of Japanese invincibility, and was the prelude to a succession of Marine victories on Tarawa, the Marianas, and most notably, Iwo

brilliant

Jima.

in possessing a number of photographers to publicise their

exploits to the world. Realising that in a future war Japanese might be their opponents

the

and

the Pacific their theatre of operation, the Marine Corps specialised in amphibious warfare, setting up the Fleet Marine Force to develop amphibious assault techniques. This decision was vindicated by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on January 7, 1941, which brought the war into the Pacific. The first major campaign of the Fleet Marine Force was the assault on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands on August 7, 1942. With little naval or air support the Marines fought a desperate battle against the Japanese, who launched a series of fanatical, but ultimately unsuccessful.

destroyed

The Marine Corps was not based on conscription (although it was forced to accept some conscripts during the war); instead, it was able to obtain most of its

manpower from

enthusiastic,

patriotic

and self-confident volunteers. The new recruit underwent an exexceptionally rigorous training programme that toughened up the individual and emphasised the Marine esprit de corps ensuring that the Marine tradition of hard fighting was always maintained. Legend has it that when the Marine commander on Wake Island was asked by headquarters what supplies he needed during a Japanese attack, he radioed back: "Send us more spirit Japs!". Such was the of the Marines - a great fighting force.

1.

A

Marine prepares

to

hurl a

grenade from his sandbagged machine-gun emplacement on Tarawa.

•*

..

*

Heading for the shore these Marines prepare for their grimmest action of the war: Iwo 2.

Jima.

The Marines land on the volcanic sand of Iwo Jima, with

3.

the

Japanese stronghold of

Mount Suribachi

in the

background. 4.

Silhouetted against a ridge on

Iwo Jima, a Marine of the 5th Division advances against heavy

enemy

fire.

Clearly displaying the strain of battle these Marines rest after their ordeal on Iwo Jima.

5.

Sherman tanks of the Marine Corps move up to the front line on Okinawa. Although the Army bore the main brunt of the land

6.

Marines suffered some 18,000 casualties there.

fighting, the

2322

2323

.T**-.

A

Marine with bayonet fixed way around a barbed wire entanglement on Tarawa, scene of some toughest fighting of

7.

leads the

the Pacific war. 8.

Marines move forward on

Saipan. The

man

in the centre of

the picture has just been shot by a

Japanese sniper.

2324

CHAPTER

151

SaipanJinian and Guam by Brigadier-General

E.

H.

Simmons, U.S.M.C.

The reduction of the Marshalls had been quick and efficient, and had profited by lessons learned at Tarawa: more amphand better air and gunfire tracks, preparation were needed. Seemingly, could be found with the operabut earlier, before "Flintlock", as it launched, called, was even was Lieutenant-General Robert C. Richardson, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, had asked that Holl^d M. Smith be relieved and his V 'Phib Corps headquarters be replaced with an Army corps headquarters. Nimitz had forwarded the recommendation to the J.C.S., who had turned it down, but that would not be the end of the matter. On March 12, 1944, the J.C.S. directed Nimitz to move on into the Marianas with

little fault

tion,

(Ret'd.)

a target t^ date of June 15. These were the islands Magellan had called Los Ladrones, "the Thieves". Except for Guam, a United States' possession since the SpanishAmerican War, the islands had been mandated to the Japanese after World War I. The United States' had dutifully (or carelessly) failed to fortify Guam and after a token struggle it had fallen to the

Japanese on December 10, 1941. Other than Guam, Saipan, 14 miles by six, was the largest and most important of the islands. It had a civilian population of Japanese and natives called Chamorros, most oi whom made their livelihood in the cane fields or sugar mills. Saipan was the headquarters of the Japanese Central Pacific Area Fleet under ViceAdmiral Chuichi Nagumo, the same

V Mopping up operations in northern Saipan: a Marine glances back as a satchel charge he has just thrown into a Japanese dugout explodes. The man on the right is using an Ml carbine, and the one on the left a Winchester pump-action shotgun, an excellent weapon for hand-to-hand fighting.

'r

S^

A Marines

of

V Amphibious

Force escort women and children to the rear during the battle for this first of the

Marianas Islands invaded.

to

be

admiral who had led the raid against Pearl Harbor but had lost at Midway. Also at Saipan were the headquarters of the 31st Army, under Lieutenant-General Hideyoshi Obata. The admiral and the general did not get along. Responsibility for the defence of the Marianas was divided. Nagumo did not think the Americans would attack the Marianas until Novem-

invasion of Normandy, a vast armada assembled in the MarshallsSpruance's 5th Fleet with over 800 ships and more than 162,000 men. Joint Expeditionary Force would be under Kelly Turner; Expeditionary Troops under Holland Smith. The titles were new but the jobs would be the same. Northern Troops and Landing Force was to land on Saipan

ber

on June 15. Southern Troops and Landing Force was to land on Guam on June 18. A few days later there was to be a third landing, on Tinian, just to the south of

he codename for the invasion of the Mi ^nas was Operation "Forager". Wl halfway around the world the Bri sh and Americans got ready for the '

2326

was

Saipan.

V Amphibious Corps formed the headquarters for Northern Troops and Landing Force (N.L.T.F.) under the personal and continued command of Holland Smith, newly promoted to LieutenantGeneral. N.L.T.F. had the 2nd Marine Division, commanded now by MajorGeneral Thomas ("Terrible Tommy") E. Watson, and the 4th Marine Division under Major-General Harry ("the Dutchman") Schmidt. Ralph Smith's 27th Infantry Division was in floating reserve and the 77th Infantry Division was to be held in Hawaii in strategic reserve.

American Intelligence thought there AAA Marine of the 2nd Marine Division about to hurl a were about 20,000 defenders on Saipan. phosphorus grenade into a Actually there were 25,469 soldiers and Japanese-held cave. The island of 6,160 sailors. The island had been divided Saipan is honeycombed with into four defence sectors. The northern sector had two battalions of the 135th Infantry Regiment. The navy sector had the 5th Special Base Force, 55th Guard Force, the Yokusuka 1st Special Naval Landing Force, and a battalion of the 136th Infantry Regiment, and the large southern sector had the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 9th Tank Regiment. General Obata was away on an inspection

which the Japanese had extended and linked up to make a virtually indestructible caves,

defensive complex. All that the attackers could do was snuff out single positions with grenades, flame-throwers, and satchel charges.

A A Marine shakes the sand out of his boot while sitting on an unexploded 16-inch shell.

2327

The American heavy cruiser Indianapolis Displacement: 9,950

Armament:

two 3-pounder,

5-inch,

tons.

nine 8-mch, eight sixteen

and eight .5-inch guns,

1.1 -inch A.A.,

plus four aircraft. 3- to 4-inch

belt, 2-inch decks, 1 2- to 3-inch turrets, 8-inch control tower.

Armour:

Speed 321

knots.

:

Length:

61

Beam: 66 '

0^

feet.

feet.

Draught: 17^

feet.

Complement:

1,269

The Japanese heavy cruiser Chokai Displacement: 11,350

tons.

Armament:

ten 8-inch, four 4.7-inch, eight 25-mm, and four

13-mm

guns, eight 24-inch torpedo

two

tubes, and

Armour:

magazines,

1

Speed 355 :

aircraft.

3- to 4-inch belt, 5-inch

5-inch decks and turrets knots.

Radius: 14,000 miles Length: 665 feet Beam 59 feet. Draught: 20 feet. :

Complement:

2328

773.

at

14 knots.

I

I

I

2329

> The first wave of the 4th Marine Division hits the beach on Tinian on July 25. By the time the island was secured on August 2, the Americans had lost 389 killed and 1,816 wounded.

trip to the Palaus and tactical command had devolved on Lieutenant-General Yoshitsugu Saito, commanding general

>>

Rocky Mount, an amphibious command ship whose facilities he was sharing with Kelly Turner, Holland Smith said: "We are through with the flat atolls now. We

Part of the Navy's softening-up bombardment before the landings on Guam, which took place on July 21.

V > A Japanese merchantman away from the Marianas in sufficient time is bombed by a B-25 Mitchell of the that did not get

5th Air force. Note the "parafrag" bomb drifting

under its two parachutes (bottom right).

down

of the incomplete 43rd Division.

Saipan is rugged, mountainous, and ringed with coral reefs. On board the

learned how to pulverize atolls, but now are up against mountains and caves where the Japs can dig in. A week from today there will be a lot of dead Marines." Air bombardment began on June 11, naval gunfire on June 13. The landing was to be on the southern end of the west coast with 2nd Division on the left and 4th Division on the right; the two divisions would be separated by Afetna Point. The four Marine regiments in the assault were, from left to right, the 6th, 8th, 23rd, and 25th. They landed in 700 amphtracks

we

behind a wave of new armoured amphi-

mounting 75-mm howitzers. The Americans came under heavy fire as they crossed the reef, and suffered some 2,000 casualties on this first day. One battalion had four commanding officers before sunset. In the 4th Division's zone was the sugar mill town of Charan Kanoa, and to the left front of the 2nd Division was the island's key terrain. Mount Tapotchau. During that first night Saito tried to drive a wedge between the two Marine divisions, but this proved a costly mistake. On shore at Saipan, during the 16th, the Americans pushed forward to con-

attack to the north. The 27th Division was ordered to leave one battalion behind to clean out the Japanese on Nafutan Point and to move in between the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions. On June 23 the attack jumped off, but the 27th Division was slow in getting started and the line soon sagged in the middle. Holland Smith lost patience with Ralph Smith, and after confering with Spruance and Turner, relieved him, asking Major-General Sanderford Jarman, an Army general standing by to become island commander, to take command of the division temporarily.

solidate the beach-head and, as night fell, the 165th Infantry began coming ashore. That night the Japanese 9th Tank Regiment struck the first sizeable tank attack of the Pacific war. The 1st Battalion, 6th

reached the top of Mount Tapotchau and -except for the troublesome pocket at Nafutan Point-the Japanese had nothing left but the northern end of the island.

Marines, bore the brunt and the Japanese

On

bians,

and medium tanks. The attack went ahead slowly on the 17th. Swampy Lake Susupe, which separated the two divisions, was troublesome.

lost 31 light

On the 18th, the 4th Division with all three infantry regiments abreast pushed across to Magicienne Bay on Saipan's east coast. On their right flank the 165th Infantry had seized Aslito airfield and to the 165th's right the 105th Infantry had reached the cliffs on the southern tip of the island. By July 19 the Japanese defenders in the south had been compressed into a pocket at Nafutan Point. General Holland Smith, having bisected the island, planned now to face his three divisions around into line and 2330

Next day, June

25, a

Marine battalion

the night of June 26 the defenders of Nafutan Point expended themselves in a

On July 1 the phase of the battle began. As the island narrowed, the 4th and 27th Divisions continued in the assault and the 2nd Division passed into reserve. On July 6 General Saito issued his final wild, futile banzai attack.

final

attack order. "Whether we attack or whether we stay where we are, there is only death." Each Japanese soldier was

ordered to exact seven enemy lives in for his one. After delivering the order the general had a farewell meal of sake and canned crabmeat. Next morning some 2,500 Japanese launched a last banzai against the 27th Division. Later that day Saito cut his stomach

exchange

1*^.

'^-^ip

The Japanese

fleet aircraft-carrier Taiho Displacement: 29,300

tons.

Armament: twelve 3.9-inch and fifty-one 25-mm guns, plus 74 aircraft.

Armour: 23-inch

belt,

magazines, SJ-inch

Speed 33 :

6-inch deck.

flight

knots.

Radius: 10,000 miles Length: 855 feet. Beam 885 feet.

18 knots.

at

:

Draught:

31 5 feet. 1,751.

Complement:

^ ^^_^^^.

^

1^.

^

I

^'

The American

J

light

aircraft-carrier

Independence Displacement:

Armament:

1 1

,000 tons.

four 5-inch (later

removed), twenty-six 40-mm, and 20-mm guns, plus up to 45

forty

aircraft.

A*mour:

l^- to 5-inch 3-inch deck.

Speed 32 :

Length

belt,

knots.

622^ feet. Beam: 109i feet Draught: 26 feet :

Complement:

1,569

O

O

^W 2332

-^

-€^^J

iMKC^-^

^.

asi^-^i

.>flia^

r

X

ir r

^

%

^

on

^ "W 2333

> The conquest of the Marianas by the U.S. Taok Force 51. The 530 ships and 127,000 Marine and Army

troops

(V Amphibious

Corps under LieutenantGeneral Holland M. Smith and III Amphibious Corps under Major-General Roy S. Geiger) were under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Richmond K. Turner. Task Force 58 had softened up the area before the irtvasion force 's arrival, downing 200 Japanese aircraft and sinking 12 merchant ships. The defence of

was the responsibility Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, though he had no major the islands

of

warships, with LieutenantGeneral Hideyoshi Obata's 31st Army providing the major portion of the islands' garrisons. The bitterest fighting was for Saipan, which was commanded by LieutenantGeneral Yoshitsugo Saito. The Japanese fought with supreme courage, and the island was only secured after the Americans had beaten back a final suicide wave attack by 3,000 Japanese

from Makunsho. Japanese losses were 27,000 dead and 2,000 taken prisoner (of which only 252 were military), and the Americans lost 3,126 dead in a total of over 16,000 casualties.

Saito and harakiri.

Nagumo committed

ceremonially with his samurai sword and his adjutant then shot him in the head. About this same time Admiral Nagumo shot himself. Half the civilian population and the remnant of defenders had crowded onto Marpi Point, the northern tip of the island. Urged on by the Japanese soldiers, men and women hurled their children over the 220-foot cliff and then jumped themselves. The soldiers followed them or else blew themselves up with hand grenades. Of the 29,000 defenders, less than a thousand had been taken prisoner. American losses in dead and wounded were 16,525, of whom 12,934 were Marines. The landing on Guam came next. Originally set for June 18, W-day had been re-scheduled for July 21. Ill Amphibious Corps (a redesignation of I Marine Amphibious Corps, which had conducted the Bougainville operation), under MajorGeneral Roy S. Geiger, a Marine aviation pioneer, had come up from Guadalcanal to provide the command for the Southern Troops and Landing Force. Geiger would have the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in the assault, and the 77th Infantry Division in reserve. Peanut-shaped Guam is 28 miles long and four to eight miles wide. Less cultivated than Saipan, the northern half was then covered with dense brush and undergrowth, the southern half, more mountainous, was mostly jungle. General Obata, in the Palaus when the American attack against Saipan began, had hurried back but had been able to get no further than Guam. He left the immediate direction of the island's defences to Lieutenant-General Takeshi Takeshina. Takeshina, nominally in

command of the 29th Division, had only the 38th Infantry Regiment from that division on the island. His other major formations were the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 10th Independent Mixed Regiment. Altogether there were about 13,000 Army troops. In addition there were some 5,500 Navy men under the command of Captain Yutaka Sugimoto. Agana, capital of Guam, is on the west side of the island at the pinched-in waist. South of it is Apra Harbour, formed by Cabras Island on the north and Orote Peninsula on the south. Behind Apra Harbour is Mount Tenjo, 1,100 feet high and the loftiest elevation on the island. Orote was the site of an airfield and the old Marine barracks. South of Orote is 2334

the small town of Agat. The naval defenders were mostly concentrated on Orote and around the rim of Apra Harbour. Two battalions of the 38th Regiment were south of Orote in a good line of entrenchments. Behind them in the hills was the 10th Regiment. Takeshina himself was north of Apra with the rest of the 38th and the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade.

The most obvious landing

site

was

Tumon

Bay, north of Agana. The 3rd Marine Division under Major-General Allen H. Turnage would avoid that and come in over a crescent beach south of

Agana between Asan and Adelup Points. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, made up for the occasion of two veteran regiments, the 4th and 22nd Marines, and under Brigade-General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., would land south of Agat. Hhour for both landings was 0830 on July 21. The naval gunfire shelling began on July 2. Rear-Admiral Richard L. ("Closein") Conolly was in charge and it was the most deliberate and plentiful preparation of the war up to that time. The fighting was bitter but the situation was never as touch-and-go as it had been at Saipan. The two battalions of the 38th were virtually destroyed at Agat by the 1st Brigade, which went on to engage the naval defenders on Orote. Major-General Andrew D. Bruce's 77th Division landed behind the brigade and went after the 10th Regiment in the hills. Patrol contact was made between the 1st Brigade and the 3rd Division on July 25. That night Takeshina made his major counter-attack against the 3rd Marine Division. He found a gap between the 21st and 9th Marines and some of the attackers got as far as the division command post and hospital. But by dawn the momentum was gone and ten battalions

had been virtually used up. Takeshina had fought and lost his battle and after that it was really all mop-up. On the 28th, Mount Tenjo was taken. That same day Takeshina was killed by machine gun fire from a Marine tank and General Obata assumed tactical command. By the end of July the two beach-heads had merged and the two divisions were in position for a shoulder-to-shoulder sweep northwards, 77th Division on the right, 3rd Division on the left, 1st Brigade in corps reserve. They jumped off at 0630 on July 31 against only light to moderate resistance. On August 7, as the island widened out, the 1st Brigade went into

Marpi Point

Saipan: July9 Japanese resistance ends

August 1 Japanese resistance ends Tinian:

Ushi Point

4 Marine Div 4|

1o\ J

2 Marine Div. (lands July 25 after feint to the south)

Asiga

^

San Hilo Point

Tanapag Harbour

\airfield\

Mt.

Lasso

Point

i W

1 f

Ml Maga

A

1

/ \

Masalog Point

Gurguan Point

\ 1 Tinian

\

\ JULY? LAST JAPANESE COUNTER-ATTACK FRONT LINE ON JUNE 16 JUNE 21 JUNE 27

Obi am

Marpo Point

JULY 24-5

JAPANESE COUNTERATTACK FAILS FRONT LINE ON:

JULY 6

Lalo Point

J-DAY

Natulan Point

Ritidian Poiht

Operation "Forager": the Capture of the Greater Marianas by the U.S. 5th Fleet.

Guam: August 10 Japanese resistance ends

h

Saipan

June15-July9, 1944

Mt.

/ Japanese

Tinian

July

Saipan Channel

24- August 1,

Pali

Point

./

Mataguac

A

1944

ML

„

A

Santa

Rosa

Aguijan

Asan Point Cabras Apral-larbour

y

Fadian Point

Orote «Ss5,iSuma Peninsula

Marine Bde. followed by 77 Div 1

Rota

H

Facpi Point

6 Expeditionary Umatac

Guam July 21

-August

Force JULY25-6:

10,

1944

Menzo* Cocoa

JAPANESE COUNTERATTACK FAILS FRONT LINE ON: D-DAY JULY2B

2335

A A Sherman tank pushes forward on Tinian, with Marines following up.

on the left of the 3rd Division. By August 10, the Japanese had been backed

line

to the rims of the

northern

cliffs

over-

looking the sea.

On

that day, General Obata sent his message to the Imperial General Headquarters: "The holding of Guam has become hopeless. I will engage the enemy in the last battle tomorrow, the ." In front of him was the 1st Bat11th talion, 306th Infantry. Sometime during the next morning's fighting. General Obata took his own life. Japanese losses on Guam were counted by the Marines at 17,300 killed and 485 prisoners taken. Survivors would continue to be killed for months -even years to come, and this would run up the count. last

.

.

.

.

.

last known survivor surrendered in 1972. American casualties were 1,919

The

7,122 wounded, and 70 missing. these, U.S. Army losses were 405 killed, 1,744 wounded, and 51 missing.

killed,

Of

Meanwhile, the landing on Tinian had been made. This smaller island, covering 50 square miles and about 12 miles from north to south, is mostly a low, fairly level plateau densely planted to sugar

2336

cane.

The engineers

room

for

said that

it

offered

B-29 runways. Only 2^ miles south of Saipan, it was within easy artillery range of the bigger island and, by July 15, V Thib Corps and 13 battalions of Marine and Army artillery in position to bear on it. Intelligence on what was waiting at Tinian was good. The battle plan for its defence had been captured during the fight for Saipan and there was also a co-operative Japanese six

8,500-foot

major who had been taken prisoner. Vice-Admiral Kakuji Lakuda, com-

mander of the

1st

Air Fleet, was the senior

Japanese on the island, but he seems to have left its defence to Colonel Kaishi Ogata, commander of the 50th Infantry Regiment. Also present was the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry Regiment, and some other Army remnants. Naval elements were under Captain Goichi Oya and consisted principally of the 56th Naval Guard Force. In all, there were 4,700 Army and 4.110 Navy defenders. There was the usual numerous but mixed bag of guns, ranging here in calibre from 25-mm to 140-mm, with a bonus of three British 6-inch naval guns. Model 1905.

For the Tinian operation, V 'Phib Corps would use the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions with the Army's 27th Division in reserve. Infantry strength in the Marine divisions was down to 65 per cent as a result of theSaipan operation, otherwise their combat readiness was superb. Harry Schmidt, who had commanded the 4th Division at Saipan, had moved up to command of V Corps; Holland Smith had

Division was Major-General Clifton B. Cates, a World War I hero and a regimental commander at Guadalcanal. J-day was July 24, 1944. The 24th Marines came across the northern beach, designated White 1, in column of battalions, landing just before 0800. The 25th Marines landed on White 2, managing to squeeze in two battalions abreast. Opposition was "light"

relinquished that post to be Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. There was a good beach on the southwest coast near Tinian Town but it was too obvious an objective and reconnaissance showed it to be strongly defended. There were also two other beaches on the west coast near the northern tip of the island, so small as to be hardly taken seriously by the defenders. The northernmost was barely 60 yards wide; the other had a usable width "of about 75 yards. The problem was how to thread a corps through such a pair of needles' eyes. The plan was for the 4th Division to make the initial landing while the 2nd Division made a demonstration off Tinian Town. The new commander of the 4th

a block-house with about 50

on White

1,

A Staff-Sergeant Federico Claveria, U.S.M.C, of Baldwin Park, California, poses for the

camera to give sweets to a Japanese child in the internment camp on Tinian.

"moderate" on White 2, where Japanese had

to be reduced.

The 23rd Marines, the 4th

Division's remaining infantry regiment, landed in reserve about 1100 on White 2. By nightfall there was a beach-head 4,000 yards wide by 2,000 yards deep. Naval gunfire had been plentiful, delivered by three battleships, five cruisers, and a gaggle of destroyers. Air support

came from Army and Marine squadrons already in place on Saipan, as well as from three attack carriers and five escort carriers. Off Tinian Town the battleship Colorado had taken some bad hits from the British 6-inch guns; two 5-inch gun mounts were knocked out and there were 150 casualties.

Norman

Scott,

Her was

escort, the destroyer hit

seven times and

2337

A Men of the 3rd Marine Division move up into Agana on

Guam on July 31. A > Marines move forward towards the last Japanese positions on Guam. American troops pass

V>

knocked-out Japanese tanks near the old Marine barracks on

Guam.

had 22 killed and 47 wounded. But Colorado had kept firing with her 16-inch guns and with the help of the cruiser Cleveland had knocked out the Japanese guns. Colonel Ogata had planned a night counter-attack, a convergence on the beach-head with his Army troops moving north and Oya's Navy men moving west. It was supposed to be spearheaded by a company of tanks, but these had been caught during the afternoon as they moved into their attack position and only six had survived. At 0200, the 56th Naval Guard Force struck the 24th Marines, who were very solidly in position on good ground on the left flank of the perimeter. At almost the same time the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry, hit the 25th Marines in the centre of the line. An hour later,

the Marines counted 1,241 Japanese bodies across their front. The 4th Division began the day's advance at 0930, clearing the beach-head to allow Tommy Watson's 2nd Division room to land. The 2nd Division was given the eastern half of the island. They took Ushi airfield near the northern tip, then swung around and formed on the 4th Division's left flank for a systematic, shoulder-to-shoulder sweep, marching southwards at the rate of 3,000 to 4,000 yards a day. On J 7 (July 31) the 4th Division occupied Tinian Town. There was a banzai attack next morning, accompanied by a rumour of Ogata's death. The fate of Ogata, or for that matter, of Kakuda and Oya, was never substantiated, but later in the same day,

tank-led attack with the 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry, found the juncture between the 23rd and 25th Regiments. One company got through as far back as the Marine 75-mm pack howitzers. The artillerymen depressed their muzzles and blasted the attackers into oblivion at point-blank range. Nowhere was the attack succest "ul and when morning came

August

Ogata's

2338

~

1, General Schmidt announced resistance had ceased" organised that "all

By August

12 a total of 13,262 civilians

had been rounded up and put safely into stockades. Combatant prisoners taken numbered 235. The death count of the Japanese defenders was put at 6,050. The Marines had lost 290 killed, 1,515 wounded, and 24 missing.

2339

CHAPTER 152

Objective Tokyo he wished to strike north at in the southern Philippines, and thence if possible at Luzon. These operations depended on a clear superiority of air and sea power over the Japanese in the area. They would probably require the presence of the main American fleet, as well as the other naval forces in the south Pacific. Aitape,

Mindanao

With these

forces

MacArthur

felt

that

he could be in Mindanao in December 1944, and Luzon the following spring. With his existing forces he was committed to a subsidiary role.

But in addition to these strategic considerations there was an emotional tie with the Philippines for MacArthur. As military adviser to the Philippine Army he had created and trained it on the model of the Swiss Army. When the Japanese landed 200,000

men

The return of General Douglas MacArthur to the Philippines was assured. As his aircraft climbed

above Oahu in the

after-

noon sunlight he turned to an aide and said, "We've sold it!" He had sold his plan for an invasion of the Philippines to President Roosevelt

and Admiral Nimitz. On board the Baltimore and at a private house near Pearl Harbor they had spent the afternoon of July 26, 1944 and the morning of the following day in discussion. Finally they agreed that both sound strategy and national honour required the liberation of the Philippines. It was further agreed that "the Philippines should be recovered with ground and air power then available in the Western Pacific" as they were not going to wait until the defeat of Germany. Nimitz was to add that "from hindsight I think that decision was correct". But at the time there were two strongly-held strategic concepts of the war in the Pacific. In the

autumn

of 1943,

MacArthur had

submitted his views for the future to the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff. After neutralising the Japanese air base in Rabaul by capturing the neighbouring base of Kavieng, and establishing himself further up the New Guinea coast at Hollandia and

2340

in

December

1941,

MacArthur

led a

mixed American and Filipino army of about half that number. Fighting a defensive battle, he retreated to the Bataan peninsula and the island of Corregidor. In the spring of 1942 Roosevelt ordered

MacArthur

to Canberra as C.-in-C. of newly-formed S.W. Pacific Area. He was reluctant to go, but obeyed the order, and when he arrived in Australia promised "I came through and I shall return." He had thought that the Allies couldmountanattacktorelievetheBataan garrison before it was overwhelmed by the Japanese, but now he felt that this promise was true for the whole

the

of the Philippines.

Now MacArthur held an position in the American hierarchy. Unlike other senior

unusual military

comman-

he had not for some time had any direct connection with the War Department, yet he was considerably senior to any other serving officer, having retired

ders,

as a Chief-of-Staff of the U.S. Army in 1935, when Marshall held the rank of Colonel. His background and his own self-confidence did not incline him to act as a subordinate in the manner of the

other commanders.

A

pronounced consciousness of his and the political importance which it fostered, gave to his relations position,

By

the beginning of 1945, U.S.

1 9

industry was working in top gear to produce the necessary materiel for the final effort against Japan.

<<< A

bulkhead

is lifted

into a

Liberty Ship in one piece. Such methods meant the ship would leave the yard within 60 days.

< < The night shift at work at U.S. Steel's Federal Shipyard in Kearney, New Jersey. < 12-inch gun barrels being turned by lathes in a U.S. arms factory.

V

Riveters prepare steel plate for

yet another naval vessel as the

battleship Indiana nears

completion at the Newport shipyards in Virginia.

News

2341

s\vi:fi{ij:i)oaioi

ucmsiiM '^

OF

Jk

HIS

OWl U'^-^ z^*

DC

^^^^^^^^^r

il^Hp

^^fl

ft

r

.^§n|

r •

^^^

1^1

j

!.JH>*AN\H0CKV

imluif f/me

with Washington something of the flavour of an independent power. But in service

Admiral

circles

Leahy

that "the mention of the

commented name of Mac-

Arthur seemed to generate more heat than light". He had not been to America since 1935, did not meet any of the American chiefsof-staff until December 1943, had not received a direct communication from the President since assuming command of the South-West Pacific Area, and at the end of 1943 had never met Admiral Nimitz, his colleague in the Central Pacific.

Added to this difference of personalities was the natural rivalry of the Army and Navy which was brought out by the two proposed plans. there

The Navy's plan: Formosa the goal Admiral King,

supported

by Admiral

Nimitz, based his planning on the experience of the fighting in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. He definitely considered it "essential to avoid as long as possible fighting the Japanese army in any land area where they could delay operations". American strength lay at sea and in the air, and not in slow and expensive fighting in jungle and urban .

.

.

areas.

The Navy submitted that the most

FREE LABOR WILL WIN A

*<1

^

artist,

America's favourite Rockwell, was a

Norman

frequent contributor

to

Saturday Evening Post. Here he illustrates the week's lead story, about a naval hero. A '^ Part of a Rockwell painting

illustrating Roosevelt's "four freedoms". The different sections were widely used as posters.

A The Labor Day slogan of the U.S. labour movement on a poster distributed by the Office of War

Information. The purpose of was two-fold: they urged workers to greater efforts and also made them feel as important to the war effort as

these slogans

men

in the forces.

<
similar theme from the

Army. < The shipyards

U.S.

at

Beaumont,

Texas.

2343

A

"Fletcher'' class destroyer

passes close battleship

to

the giant

Wisconsin.

I MAN A &m I

> A direct appeal to the emotions in this War Bonds poster.

V

Precision work on a grand This turbine spindle, soon to power the propeller shaft of a tanker, is just one of more than a hundred in production at a Westinghouse works.

scale.

you give at least IO% of your pay in War Bonds? Will

line of advance therefore lay through the Carolines and the Marianas, with Formosa as the eventual goal. Given the necessary priority, it was fruitful

confident that it could capture the eastern Carolines by the end of July 1944, and Guam and the Marianas in September or October, By the end of the year, it could begin to bomb Japan from the latter base. The Joint Chiefs-of-Staff were in favour of the plan, for as King had put it, it would "put the cork in the bottle" of the enemy communications when the Americans captured Formosa. From bases in China, Formosa, and the Bonin islands they could strangle the Japanese mainland islands by submarine and air attack on the traffic through the South China Sea.

MacArthur would liberate Mindanao set up bases for the Far Eastern Air Forces to pound down Japanese air power and

after which he would help the Pacific Fleet to capture Formosa. The Navy felt that this plan would

on Luzon,

bring about the defeat of Japan more quickly than the rather more systematic approach advocated by MacArthur. Bypassing the Philippines would be no real hardship for its inhabitants, and might even liberate them more quickly than by landing on the islands themselves. It was as protagonists for these two conflicting doctrines that MacArthur and Nimitz met with President Roosevelt

Oahu. Admiral Leahy, who was one of those present at the meetings, remembers: "It was both pleasant and very informative to have these two men who had been at

pictured as antagonists calmly present their differing views to the Commanderin-Chief." Rear-Admiral Wilson Brown stated that in no conference attended by

him did the speakers stick so closely to the subject or make such clear, concise, and candid expressions of opinion. Undoubtedly the conference was also a triumph for Roosevelt who "was at his best as he tactfully steered the discussion from one point to another and narrowed down the area of disagreement between MacArthur and Nimitz". At the meetings the speakers were dealing with facts, and not second-hand reports handled by politicians.

When MacArthur

took his leave on he assured the President that despite the differences between himself and Nimitz there was no cause for concern; agreement was near.

July

27,

CHAPTER

153

Leyte: the planning

2347

A Mac Arthur (left) and

Nimitz:

odds with each other they were dominant figures in the

often at Pacific.

> > The men who planned

the

naval strategy in the Pacific-

Rear-Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Nimitz's chief planner; Admiral Chester Nimitz, C.in-C. Pacific Fleet

and James

Forrestal,

.

;

Under

Secretary (and from 1944, Secretary) of the Navy.

>V An

honour guard

fires a

salute as the body of a U.S.

Marine

There were still diflFerences between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz as to the best strategy for winning the war but the two sides had reached agreement. Leahy was later to assert that "the agreement and the President's familiarity with the situation at this conference were to be of great value in preventing an unnecessary invasion of Japan which the planning staffs of the Joint Chiefs and the War Department were

is buried at sea. Previous Page: work on the 35,000-ton battleship Indiana at Newport.

.

.

advocating, regardless of the loss of life that would result from an attack on Japan's forces in their own country." Despite this top-level agreement, the J.C.S. continued to discuss the Pacific strategy. It was a short while later, on September 1, 1944, that Rear-Admiral Forrest Sherman, Admiral Nimitz's chief planner, confronted them. He said that it was high time a decision was reached, and that even a bad one would be better than none. Central Pacific armed forces had no directive for anything beyond the

Palaus objective, which was due in two weeks. Admiral King still opposed Luzon, which he said would slow up the war for mere sentimental reasons (earlier he had dismissed MacArthur's plans as "desires

and 2348

visions").

The plans, however, had won a powerful ally in

General Marshall, who appreciated

argument about -national honour, and also that Luzon would be easier to capture than Formosa. MacArthur had warned the J.C.S. that if they left the

the

16 million population of the Philippines on the vine" until the end of

to "wither

the war with Japan, they would not only unpredictable hardships on the

inflict

loyal Filipinos, but also cause all Asia to lose faith in American honour. The J.C.S. planners worked out a timetable to be presented to the "Octagon" Combined Chiefs-of-Staff conference at

Quebec on September 11, 1944: 1. September 15, South-West Pacific Forces occupy Morotai; Central Pacific forces occupy Peleliu October 5; occupy Yap, with Ulithi to follow. October 15, South-West Pacific Forces occupy Salebaboe Island; November 15, land at Sarangani Bay, Mindanao; 2.

December

20. at Leyte.

South-West Pacific and Central Pacific forces then combine to occupy either (1) Luzon, to secure Manila by February 20, or (2) Formosa and Amoy on the China coast by March 1, 1945. But as with many of the best laid plans. 3.

2349

The Japanese Kawasaki Ki-45 KAIc "Toryu" {Dragon heavy fighter

Engines: two Army Type 1 (Mitsubishi Ha-102) radlals, 1,080-hp each at take-off. Armament: one 37-mm Ho-203 and two 20-mm Type 1 (Ho-5) cannon, plus two 551 -lb bombs.

Speed 335.5 mph at 1 9,685 feet. Climb 7 minutes to 1 6,405 feet. :

:

Ceiling: 32,810 feet. Range: 1,243 miles.

Weight empty/loaded: 8,818/12,125 Span: 49

feet

Length: 36 Height: 12

Crew:

2350

2.

5^ inches. inch.

feet

1

feet

If inches.

lbs

Killer)

this timetable

was scrambled within a

week.

Task Force 38, under Admiral Halsey, Eniwetok on August 28, 1944, to bomb Yap, the Palaus, and Mindanao, and make a one-group diversionary strike on the Bonin Islands. The aim was to destroy Japanese air forces which might challenge the forthcoming landings on Morotai and Peleliu, and to deceive the enemy as to the next target. The Palaus were bombed on September 6-8, Mindanao airstrips near Sarangani Bay on September 9-10. These attacks were unopposed, and this caused Halsey to cancel later strikes for Mindanao and move to the Visayas on the 12th. The task force moved in close and flew 2,400 sorties in two days; about 200 enemy planes were shot down or destroyed on the ground. Several ships were sunk and left

many

installations destroyed.

seemed to Halsey and his staff that the Japanese air forces were practically finished, and at noon on September 13, It

he sent a very important signal to Nimitz. He recommended that the Palau, Yap, Morotai, and Mindanao landings be cancelled as unnecessary, and that Task Force 38 and the men earmarked for these operations

be

diverted

to

MacArthur

an immediate seizure of Leyte. This signal was passed on to King and Macfor

Arthur.

With a force of fast carriers available MacArthur no longer needed to develop airfields in the southern Philippines before invading Leyte or Luzon; the Navy could furnish the air support the Army needed until it had captured or developed airfields on the target island. If the 30,000 troops who were to land

on Mindanao on November 15, and XXIV Corps (intended for Yap) could be diverted to Leyte, MacArthur would have an effective invasion force.

name General Sutherinformed the J.C.S. and Nimitz on September 14 that if Halsey's recomIn MacArthur's

land

V A Boeing B-29 Superfortress under construction. Production of these bombers was based at four main plants. Between June 1943 and the Japanese surrender in August 1945, more than 4,200 of these aircraft were built.

2351 „.-rTv ^jiriH

SCHOOL MEDIA CENTKJt

SAN JOSK. CALIFORNIA »S12»

m wings

oj U.ij.

i^uvy L'utoiinas

towards lines of Curtiss Helldivers parked at an

Stretch out

airbase before transferring to

an

aircraft-carrier.

> Curtiss Helldivers. The folded wings were necessitated by shortage of space on the carriers-many of which were originally designed to take smaller aircraft.

> > The

light carrier

Cowpens.

i

4

^1

r?*-

H 4.

Js^^ '?*?,.

r-S'i.

mendations were adopted, MacArthur would invade Leyte on October 20, that is two months ahead of the target date. Nimitz agreed, but said that the Palaus operation should not be cancelled because it would be needed as an anchorage and air base.

After their earlier performance, the J.C.S. acted with commendable alacrity. The Combined Chiefs-of-Staff conference,

V A

Helldiver peels off before in to land on its base

coming

carrier.

Below, the crew prepare

the flight deck for a landing.

2354

with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Mackenzie King, was still in session at Quebec when the new proposals came through. Breaking off from a dinner, the J.C.S. held a brief consultation. "Having the utmost MacArthur, in General confidence Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Halsey," wrote General Marshall, "It was not a difficult decision to make. Within 90 minutes after the signal had been received General MacArthur and in Quebec, Admiral Nimitz had received their instructions to execute the Leyte operation." The target date was fixed for October 20,

and this avoided the three intermediate landings at Yap, the Talauds, and Mindanao. MacArthur's acknowledgment reached Marshall as he was leaving the dinner to return to his rooms. The instructions were formalised soon after in the following message: "1. Admiral Wilkinson's YAP ATTACK FORCE, the XXIV Army, Corps, then loaded or at sea, will be assigned to General MacArthur to land LEYTE 20 October. "2. All shipping used in the Palaus operation, after unloading, to be sent to Southwest Pacific ports to help VII 'Phib lift General Krueger's Sixth Army to

LEYTE.

ALL FIRE SUPPORT SHIPS and ESCORT CARRIERS used in the Palaus "3.

operation to be assigned temporarily to

Admiral Kinkaid, Commander Seventh Fleet, to help cover "4.

ULITHI

an advanced

LEYTE.

to be seized promptly, as

fleet

base".

The Japanese Kawasaki

Ki-61-l "AZ/eA?"

(Swallow) fighter

Engine: one Army Type 2 (Kawasak 1 ,1 75-hp at take-off. Armament: two 12.7-mm Type 1 and two 7.7-mm Type 89 machine gu Speed 368 mph at 1 5,945 feet. Climb: 5 minutes 31 seconds to 16, Ceiling: 37,730 feet. Range: 684 miles maximum. inline,

(

:

Weight empty/loaded: 4,872/7,185 Span 39 feet 4^ inches. :

Length: 28 Height 1 2 :

feet feet

85 inches. 1 1 inches.

2355

>

"Hara-kiri"-i/ie

New

York

magazine P.M.'s view of the Japanese threat. >> Caught between two fires V > A comment from the New York publication Burch.

An

especially hideous Japanese,

clutching the frayed umbrella of the fleet, wishes he could protect himself from the storm of the Allied offensive. V The St. Louis Star Times points out the eventual fate of Japan.

V V> Retribution -he who sows bombs, reaps bombs. Opposite top: The assembly line at the Boeing works in Seattle. Opposite bottom: Women at work inside the fuselage of a B-24 Liberator at Fort Worth, Texas.

\% r .

.

p.-:.-:

». -.i

"•

r

v=v-.-.

.-

.:',*'>':'.'.,,:

'

•

' —.'// _ /\'•-•:':

,Uh^,^r**y.'.r.i-.jp -tr,

There followed a series of planning conferences by the commanders of the forces involved. The operation would employ all the American military forces not engaged in Europe or on garrison duties in places like the Aleutian and Marshall Islands. Though no Australian troops were to be used, ships of the Royal Navy would participate, Australian and one ship of the Royal Navy, the fast minelayer Ariadne. While the ships were assembled, and planning continued at all levels of command, the J.C.S. discussed the next move after Leyte. Was it to be Luzon, or

7,;^^1»

^ -_<«f-j/ ; •\-

j^rfCs^

I.

,— --1^-.—

Formosa? After pressure against the Formosa operation by General Millard Harmon, commanding the Army Air Forces in the Central Pacific, and by General Simon Bolivar Buckner, commanding the 10th Army, it was shelved in favour of Luzon. It

was

a

sound move,

logical

and

strategically

for if Leyte could be captured

reasonable time. III and VII in Amphibious Forces would be capable of putting in a second major landing before the end of 1944. Formosa would require

an assault force of at least nine divisions,

which would not be available until about the middle of 1945. Japanese air strength was still too great to allow the invasion of Okinawa, so after clearing Luzon, the Americans could take Iwo Jima. as a rung in the "ladder up the Bonins". and Okinawa, as a base for air attacks and the final invasions of the Japanese home islands. On October 3. 1944 the Joint Chiefsof-Staff issued a directive to Nimitz and MacArthur. which seemed to be the final tribute to the general's skills as a sales-

man. "General MacArthur will liberate Luzon, December, and starting 20 establish bases there to support later operations. Admiral Nimitz will provide

cover and support, occupy one or more positions in the Bonin- Volcano Island group 20 January 1945. and invade the Ryukyus, target date 1 March 1945." Yet the liberation of the Philippines had been decided by many events beyond his control. Landings on the China coast in support of the Formosa operation were ruled out because of the strength of the Japanese in both areas. Chinese Nationalist forces would be of little help, partly because of their lack of equipment and training, but also because of the enmity between Stilwell and Chiang fleet

2357

•

•^ Kai-shek.

The naval forces assigned to him from Halsey's Task Force 38, had been released through a misconception. Halsey believed that Japanese air-power in the Palaus, Mindanao, and Visayas was finished; in fact the Imperial General Headquarters had ordered that it be held back in readiness for the major landings which were expected in that area.

Yet despite this, the landings on Leyte and Luzon vindicated MacArthur's promise to return, and set the American forces in the Pacific on a return journey which would end less than 11 months after "Octagon", with the surrender of Japan.

Two amphibious operations brought the converging forces of MacArthur and Nimitz to within striking range of Leyte. On September 15, 1944, the 31st Division under MacArthur began landing on Morotai island. He planned to expand its partially-completed airfield to cover operations to the south of the Philippine islands.

There was no opposition, but the airwas unusable; another (ready for fighter operations on October 4 and bombers on the 15th) was quickly built. On September 15 Halsey assaulted the Palau Islands. Fringed by coral reefs, this island group is 470 miles east of Mindanao. Halsey planned to use it as a seaplane base and anchorage for the attack on the field

Philippines.

The landing on Peleliu was strongly opposed. On the first day the 1st Marine Division had secured a beach-head; on the second it had occupied, but not secured, the airfield. The tough, well-sited bunkers which covered the airfield were eventually cleared, and by October 1 the field was taking fighters and a week later medium bombers. The Japanese, however, hung on in the island for another six weeks. On September 17, the 81st Division landed on Angaur island, six miles south of Peleliu,

and by noon had practically

By the 21st an airstrip had been built and was taking Liberators. On the 23rd the 81st was landed on Ulithi atoll, which proved to be abandoned. It was quickly developed and became the main secured

fleet

it.

base in October.

MacArthur, by way of the south-west, and Nimitz, through the central Pacific, had now reached their forming-up points for Leyte.

WOMAN ORDNANCE WORKER

CHAPTER

154

1 have returned": the landings on Leyte On the U.S. side, although everyone stuck to the item of the March 12 directive which laid down that the major objective of the coming offensive was to be Mindanao, opinion varied as to the direction the offensive was to take after this objective had been secured. In the Pentagon Admiral King, supported, albeit with slight differences of opinion, by Nimitz, reckoned that there would be no harm in neglecting the rest of the Philippines and taking a leap forward to Formosa and Amoy on the south coast of China. This would cut communications between the Japanese homeland and its sources of raw materials and fuel, and would thus force a capitulation. But in his command post at HoUandia, General MacArthur was sickened by the idea of leaving Luzon and more than seven million Filipinos exposed to the rigours of a Japanese military occupation any longer. When he left Corregidor in March 1942, he had given his solemn

promise to the Filipinos that he would return, and he did not intend that anyone should make him break his word. Roosevelt summoned MacArthur to Pearl Harbor and there MacArthur laid before him arguments not only of sentiment and prestige but also of sound military strategy: "I

argued against the naval concept of

frontal assault against the strongly held island positions of Two Jima or Okinawa. In my argument, I stressed that our losses would be far too heavy to justify the benefits to be gained by seizing these outposts. They were not essential to the enemy's defeat, and by cutting them off from supplies, they could be easily reduced and their effectiveness completely neutralized with negligible loss to our-

They were not in themselves possessed of sufficient resources to act as main bases in our advance. "In addition, I felt that Formosa, with a hostile population, might prove doubtselves.

<
Urging racial harmony

among

<<

industrial workers. Encouraging recruitment

for the

Women Ordnance

Workers.

V General MacArthur, accompanied by LieutenantGeneral George C. Kenney, Lieutenant-General Richard K. Sutherland his chief-of-staff, and Major-General Mudge, ,

commander

of the 1st Cavalry Division, inspects the beach-head at Leyte, October 20, 1944.

ful to

serve as a base of attack against

Japan

itself."

This was how MacArthur, according to his memoirs, spoke to Roosevelt, who had Admiral Leahy with him. And, as it later turned out, MacArthur was to a certain extent right. He captured Luzon, at the cost of some 8,300 dead,

between January 9 and June 25, 1945. The seven and a half square miles of the little island of Iwo Jima cost Nimitz 7,000 more, and Okinawa was captured by the U.S. 10th Army with the loss of 8.000 dead. As was his wont, the President

took no part in this strategic debate, and Leahy and Nimitz were not insensitive argument. MacArthur's The to "Octagon" Conference, which opened at

Quebec on September after

preliminary

11, 1944, envisaged, operations and the

F

M^

capture of Mindanao, that there would be a landing at Leyte in the central Philippines on December 20, after which the two Allied forces in the Pacific would unite to occupy "either (1) Luzon to secure Manila by 2nd February, or (2) Formosa and Amoy on the China coast by 1st

May

1945."

By now Nimitz's fleet was so large that it was decided to appoint two flag officers under him to command alternately.

< A The landings on Leyte were preceded by a massive shore bombardment. American troops watch columns of smoke rising from the island as they approach the beach.

< A wave

ofL.C. V.(P.)s heads

for the beach-head

A

.

.

and

.

.

the troops

.

wade

ashore after disembarking.

While one was at sea, the other would be at Pearl Harbor planning the next major operation. When commanded by Admiral Spruance it would be known as the 5th Fleet; while under Halsey, the 3rd Fleet. Sub-units would similarly exchange commanders and designations. In August 1944 Spruance was relieved by Halsey, and Vice-Admiral Theodore Wilkinson relieved Richard Turner in command of the 5th (now the 3rd) Amphibious Force. However, Mitscher remained in command of the Fast Carrier Force of 17 fast carriers, six new battleships, 13 cruisers, 58 destroyers, and 1,100 fighters,

and

dive-

and torpedo-bombers,

now Task Force

38 instead of 58. On August 28, Halsey set out from Eniwetok to bombard Yap Island, the Palau Islands, and Mindanao, paving the way for the landings Nimitz and MacArthur were preparing at Peleliu and Morotai. The results exceeded all expectations: in 2,400 sorties Mitscher's squadrons shot down 200 enemy aircraft at a cost of only eight of their own and dealt a very hard blow to the Japanese bases in this sector, giving MacArthur the necessary air superiority.

2361

Luzon, starting 20 December, and establish bases there to support later operations. Admiral Nimitz will provide fleet cover and support, occupy one or more positions in the Bonin- Volcano Island group 20 January 1945, and invade the Ryukyus, target date March 1945."

Samar Biliran

^Tinago

Formosa and Amoy were thus

to be Pentagon's calendar of events. MacArthur and Nimitz, the one leaving from Australia and the other from Hawaii, were to meet in Leyte Gulf. Their commands remained contiguous, and the only transfer of units was that of 3rd Amphibious Force and XXIV Corps (Major-General J. R. Hodge) from Nimitz

taken

to

off the

MacArthur.

MacArthur takes Morotai

.

.

.

a^mmOCT30

Whilst waiting for the start of this new offensive operation, to be called "King 11", MacArthur seized the island of Morotai north of Halmahera. His losses were insignificant as the Japanese were not expecting to be attacked. Yet its fall

MMB NOV- 30

meant that the Moluccas were now

H

FRONT LINE ON:

OCT 24

useless to them.

»—• JAPANESE COUNTER-ATTACKS MILES

25

Burgos Bohol

A Operation "King 11" -

the

assault on Leyte.

A> An

.

L.V.T. rolls ashore

at

Leyte plans approved

Leyte.

> On

the beach, U.S. troops

"hit the dirt " as they

Interpreting the weakness

under

enemy somewhat

come fire from Japanese snipers and machine gunners.

shown by the

optimistically, the im-

petuous Halsey submitted the following suggestion to Nimitz on September 13: cut out the intermediate objectives and

make

straight

upon

for

Leyte.

MacArthur

remarking that this would save two months on the schedule and, as Nimitz agreed, the Chiefs-ofStaff, still in session at Quebec, took only an hour and a half to concur, such was the confidence of General Marshall and Admiral King in their subordinates. Yap and Mindanao we^e thus set aside and a landing on Lt-yte was fixed for October 20. On October 3, Allied commanders in the Central and South-West Pacific received seized

this idea,

the following directive for the next stage in the operations-

"General 2362

Mac/rthur

will

liberate

.

.

and Nimitz Peleliu

Meanwhile, Halsey's 3rd Fleet attacked Peleliu in strength. The island was defended by the excellent Japanese 14th Division, whose commander (LieutenantGeneral Inouye) had intelligently applied the new instructions from Tokyo. Instead of the usual cordon of men defending the beach, he had deployed his forces in depth, taking advantage of the caves to provide cover from aerial and naval bombardment. And so, although the first wave of the U.S. 1st Marine Division (Major-General W. H. Rupertus) landed on September 15, it was not until November 25 that the last enemy surrendered, and meanwhile the Americans had had to bring in their 85th Division (MajorGeneral P. J. Mueller) as reinforcement. The U.S. forces suffered considerable losses: 2,000 killed and over 8,500 wounded, or approximately the same as the garrison which they completely wiped out. On the other hand, in the same group of the Palau Islands, III Amphibious

Force occupied the large atoll of Ulithi without loss, giving the U.S. 3rd Fleet a very safe, well-sited base 1,000 miles from Manila and 1,400 from Okinawa. This action ended on September 23. So, ten months after the assault on Tarawa, Nimitz had reached a point 4,250 miles from Pearl Harbor.

??

I

have returned

?5

Between October 10 and 15, and using the method which had been so successful against the Gilberts, the Marshalls, and the Marianas, Task Force 38 ensured the success of Operation "King 11" by plastering the bases on the Ryukyu Islands, Formosa, and Luzon, from which the Japanese might have attacked the Leyte landings. A thousand Japanese planes took off, but Mitscher scored a clear victory, knocking out over 500 of them at a cost of 110 of his own. It is true that two cruisers were torpedoed during this action, which took Task Force 38 to within 60 miles of Formosa, but the U.S. Navy's rescue services were so efficient that the damaged ships were able to be towed to Ulithi. The Japanese airmen greatly exaggerated this little success, which was no compensation for the loss of their planes and some 40 merchant ships. They claimed to have sunk 11 aircraft-carriers, two battleships, and four

">^^

,

.J.

n^i.

"-^""^SbfUii-

The Japanese battleship Nagato 39,1 30 tons. eight 16-inch, sixteen 5.5-inch,

Displacement:

Armament:

eight 5-inch, and ninety-eight

25-mm

guns,

plus three aircraft. Armour: 4- to 12-inch belt, 14-inch

22-inch barbettes, 1\- to 7-inch

turrets,

deck, and 12 inch control tower.

Speed 25

knots.

:

Radius: 8,650 miles Length: 738 feet. Beam 1 1 85 feet.

at

16 knots.

:

Draught:

31 feet.

Complement:

1,368.

A

•»

|§

The American battleship Mississippi

Displacement: 33,000

Armament:

tons.

twelve 14-inch, fourteen

40-mm A. A., and 20-mm A. A. guns, plus three aircraft. Armour: 8- to 14-inch belt, 5- to 18-inch 5-inch A. A., sixteen

fifteen

turrets, 4- to

6-inch decks, and 16-inch

control tower.

Speed

:

21 5 knots.

Length: 624 feet. Beam: IO61 feet. Draught: 34 feet.

Complement:

1,930.

"VTl*!

2364

2365

w

A General Mac Arthur, accompanied by LieutenantGeneral Kenney, inspects the beach-head on Leyte Island.

cruisers and to have damaged or set on fire 28 other vessels. It would appear that the threat to the Japanese Empire had

miraculously melted away. This was what Tokyo was beginning to believe when, at dawn on October 17, a huge U.S. armada sailed into Leyte Gulf. It was the 7th Fleet under ViceAdmiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, 700 ships strong, which was also carrying 174,000 men of the U.S. 6th Army. On the same day, detachments seized the island commanding the entrance to Leyte Gulf then, for two whole days, the guns of the old battleships, cruisers, and destroyers of 3rd and 7th Amphibious Forces, or Task

Forces 79 and 78, (Admirals T. S. Wilkinson and D. E. Barbey) roared out and the aircraft of 18 escort carriers joined in. The defence of the Philippines had been entrusted to the victor of Singapore. General Tomoyoki Yamashita, under Field-Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi, C.-in-C. Southern Army. Yamashita's 14th Area Army had seven divisions, with a total of 265,000 men, but on Leyte there was nly one division, the 16th (Lieutenant-General Makino). However, v

2366

the Japanese High Command had now decided to fight for Leyte rather than concentrate for the defence of Luzon, although the American attack had preempted their planned reinforcement. The landing achieved local tactical surprise. In the evening of October 20 the U.S. 6th Army (General Krueger) had established a front of over 17 miles. On the right, X Corps (Major-General F. C. Sibert: 1st Cavalry and 24th Divi-

had occupied Tacloban and its aerodrome; on the left, XXIV Corps (Major-General J. R. Hodge: 96th and 7th Divisions) had got as far as Dulag, sions)

where 100,000 tons of materiel and stores had been landed on the beach. The cruiser Honolulu had been hit by an aerial torpedo, but this was the only noteworthy incident of the day. General MacArthur landed with the third wave: his promise to return had at last been kept. His implacable will and dynamic personality had ensured that the Philippines would have priority, but one major obstacle stood before his return to Manila: the remains of the Imperial Japanese fleet.

CHAPTER

155

Leyte Gulf: the greatest sea battle of all

expectation

In

of the

U.S.

offensive,

Admiral Toyoda, C.-in-C. Combined Fleet, had drawn up Plan "SHO GO'' (Operation "Victory"), one variant of which was to cover the event which actually took place. And so at 0809 hours on October 17, he had merely to signal "SHO GO 7" from

Tokyo area

for his subordinates to plan in motion. This alert order found the Japanese fleet disposed as

the

set the

follows: 1. in Japan, under Vice-Admiral Ozawa, a carrier force (of which only four carriers were operational through lack

2.

3.

of trained aircrew), the battleshipcarriers Ise and Hyuga, three light cruisers, and eight destroyers; in the Ryukyus, under Vice-Admiral K. Shima, a force of two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and nine destroyers;

and in Lingga roads, off a group of islands half way between Singapore and Sumatra, Vice-Admiral Kurita's force of seven battleships, 11 heavy cruisers,

two light cruisers, and 19 destroyers. The plan was as follows: The carrier force with its 116 aircraft, including 80 fighters, would act as bait, advancing without too much precaution into the Philippine Sea east of Luzon; it would thus draw out Mitscher's carrier force towards the north and, by sacrificing itself, would enable Kurita and Shima

to carry out the tasks allotted to them: to destroy the U.S. landing forces and their

escort ships of the 7th Fleet. 1.

Kurita would- form two sub-forces: Force "A", under Kurita himself, and

composed

of

five

battleships,

A The Princeton on fire after sustaining a hit from a "Judy' dive-bomber. At right is the U.S. heavy cruiser Reno.

12

and 15 destroyers, would advance through the San Bernardino Strait between Samar and Luzon to meet Force "C" in Leyte Gulf, and 2. Force "C", of two battleships, one cruiser, and four destroyers under Vice-Admiral S. Nishimura would sail through the Surigao Strait between Leyte and Mindanao. Shima finally received the order to follow Nishimura and, when the time cruisers,

came, to co-operate with him. After the destruction of the U.S. transports and the 7th Fleet in Leyte Gulf, MacArthur would have to surrender to Yamashita, who was already counting on greeting him with the trenchant words he had used to Percival at Singapore: "All I want to know is: Do you surrender unconditionally or not?" Cunning though the plan was, it nevertheless meant 68 Japanese ships against 275 American, and a one to four inferiority in aircraft for the Japanese. Even including the planes they had in the Philippines, the Japanese were a long way from matching Halsey's and Kinkaid's 1,500. Also, it would take greater

2367

The Japanese battleship Fuso Displacement: 34,700

Armament:

tons.

twelve 14-inch, fourteen

6-inch, eight 5-inch, and sixteen

guns, plus three aircraft. Armour: 4- to 12-inch turrets,

belt,

25-mnn

8- to 12-inch

\- to 7-inch decks, 6- to

1

1

2-inch

control tower.

Speed: 24.7 knots. Radius 1 1 ,800 miles :

at

1

6 knots.

Length: 698 feet. Beam: IO85 feet. Draught: 31 i feet.

Complement:

1,396.

n

The Japanese Displacement: 11,262

light

earner Zuiho

tons.

Armament: eight 5-inch and forty-eight 25-mm guns, and 168 5-inch rocket launchers, plus up to 30 aircraft.

Armour: none. Speed 28 knots. :

Radius: 9,236 miles Length: 712 feet. Beam: 75^ feet.

Draught:

21 1 feet.

Complement:

2368

785.

at

18 knots.

I

I

i»

2369

Jian

co-ordination

could

be

expected

between Kurita and Nishimura to close their pincer in Leyte Gulf. Again, and this was the most important point, "SHO GO" envisaged nothing beyond October 25 and ignored what the 3rd Fleet was likely to do after Ozawa's diversion had fizzled out and Halsey set off full-steam ahead southwards with his 17 carriers and six fast battleships. If he did nothing, Toyoda would be left in Japan with Ozawa and no fuel oil, and Kurita would be left at Lingga with no ammunition or spare parts. Like Hitler on the Western Front, he was thus forced to go over to the offensive. He gave his order at 1100 hours on October 18.

Kurita mauled off

Palawan

.

.

.

On October 22, having refuelled at Brunei, Kurita separated from Nishimura. At the 23rd he was heading northeast of the island of Palawan, a stepping-

dawn on

stone between Borneo and Mindanao, when he was attacked by the submarines Dace and Darter (Commanders Claggett and McClintock). Dace scored a bulls-eye on the heavy cruiser Maya, which blew up. Darter scored a double, damaging the Takao so badly that she had to be sent back under escort, and sinking Kurita's flagship, the heavy cruiser Atago. The admiral was saved but he lost part of his

and coding staff, which was hamper his control of operations.

signals to

and loses the giant battleship Musashi .

.

.

Despite the loss of these three cruisers, Kurita was off Mindoro 24 hours later, and at the same time Nishimura was

between Mindanao and Negros Islands. Shima, coming down from the north, was following Nishimura at a great distance and remained out of contact with him for fear of interception by U.S. tracking devices.

Ozawa finally set out from Kure on October 20 and progressed without incident along the path of sacrifice. In the evening of the 23rd the carrier Zuikaku, his flagship, sent out a long message designed to draw to herself the attentions of the enemy. As expected, the Darter sent out a signal to report contact. This reached Halsey at 0620 hours on the 23rd. Nishimura and Shima were spotted in the early morning of the 24th. When he got McClintock's message from the Darter, the C.-in-C. of the 3rd Fleet, now reduced to Task Force 38, closed in to within 150 miles of the Philippines with his total force except for Vice-Admiral J. S. McCain's Task Group 38.1, which was re-forming at Ulithi. So Halsey had RearAdmiral F. C. Sherman's Task Group 38.3 off Luzon, Rear-Admiral G. F. Bogan's Task Group 38.2 off San Bernardino Strait, and Rear-Admiral R. E. Davison's Task Group 38.4 off Leyte. This gave Mitscher a total of 835 aircraft.

^ The giant battleship Yamato under attack from American Liberator bombers on October 26, 1944. Sister ship to the 64,200-ton

Musashi, sunk

in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, she finally went down

off

Okinawa.

"

pilots were incapable of that his measuring up to the U.S. airmen and sent them instead against 3rd Fleet. At the cost of heavy losses one of them scored a direct hit on the light carrier Princeton. Explosions and fires rent the unhappy vessel and caused heavy losses amongst the ships which went to her rescue. So Rear-Admiral Sherman ordered her to

be finished off with a torpedo.

Halsey's controversial decision Halsey

now assumed

no longer

that Kurita's force

offered a threat. He therefore entire fleet north to attack

took his Ozawa's carriers, so completely taking the fJapanese bait. His reaction has since been the subject of lively discussion in the U.S. Navy and Army. The day after his victory he explained his decision as follows: "As it seemed childish to me to guard statically San Bernardino Strait, I con-

A Smoke

rises

from burning

docks and shore installations of the former American naval base of Cavite City in Manila Bay hit by carrier-based planes of the U.S. Navy.

Overleaf: Operation "Sho (Victory) gets under way.

Go

1

From the information given by tactical reconnaissance in the early morning of the 24th, Admiral Halsey deduced that he could leave all enemy forces observed in the south-east to be dealt with by Kinkaid and that he himself should concentrate

on the larger enemy force apparently intending to pass through the force acting as bait off the Strait. As one can never Bernardino San Philippines lured Halsey's attack, he ordered Vicestrong in be too whilst Viceaway 3rd Fleet Admirals Kurita and Nishimura Admiral McCain to join him. Between closed in a pincer move on the 1026 and 1350 hours. Task Force 38 flew unsuspecting 7th Fleet in Leyte 259 sorties against Kurita's force, conGulf. Nishimura's arm of the centrating most of its attacks on the pincer was destroyed in the battle (64,200-ton) battleship Musashi. In inset giant Surigao Strait (see 1) of but Kurita, undeterred by heavy spite of protective A. A. fire from nearly losses in initial engagements in 130 guns, the Musashi was hit by 19 torthe Sibuyan Sea, went ahead and pedoes and 17 bombs and went down almost succeeded in destroying the evening with half her crew. during Task Group 77.4 in the battle The heavy cruiser Myoko had to be sent off Samar Island (see inset 2). This latter battle also saw the back to Brunei; three other cruisers first widespread use of Japan's suffered minor damage. These attacks new weapon - the kamikaze. forced the Japanese admiral to turn about The Battle of Cape Engano and caused him to be late on the schedule Halsey's (see inset 3) where agreed with Nishimura. No Japanese 3rd Fleet sank four Japanese aircraft carriers. planes were used in this first engagement. Admiral Fukudome, C.-in-C. of the 2nd Air Fleet in the Philippines, considered Vice- Admiral

Ozawa's carrier

centrated TF 38 during the night and steamed north to attack the Northern Force at dawn. I believed that the Center Force had been' so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet."

Nimitz's instructions

his attention

As we can

see, Halsey greatly exaggerated the effects of his aircraft on Kurita's force, but he could not know that the hangars of the four enemy carriers, of whose approach he hadjust been informed, were half empty. He had to ask himself if his reconnaissance had given him the full tally of this new force. Moreover, by sailing northwards, Halsey was conscious of obeying the instructions of Nimitz who, as we have seen, required him to consider as his main mission the destruction of an important part of the Japanese fleet if the opportunity arose. This reveals the serious snags in the organisation of command as conceived by the Pentagon, for if the 3rd Fleet had been under MacArthur, there is no doubt that he would have foi*bidden it to leave the San Bernardino Strait uncovered. Though he was told just before night-

2371

The Battle of Cape Engaho

O © Q) ©

1st

STRIKE (0845-0930)

2nd STRIKE (1000-1010) 3rd STRIKE (1300-1500) 4th

STRIKE (1710-1740)

50 NAUT MILES

Battle Line (Weyler)

t Left Flank Cruisers (Oldendorf)

HIBUSON

'-« parts Desron 56 (Smoot)

0404

b

0355

0400

0400

24(McManes)

Yamashiro 0419

Mogarni part Desron 54

part Desron 24

C323

T \

\o309^ It/

I

r\

part Desron 54 (Coward)

0323

'•yf0340

y/

,*

y^^l J f

V

Yamashiro torpedoed

0320

0300

M Yamagumo Fuso torpedoed 0309

The Battle of

.Jt

Surigao Strait

->Fuso 0338

Yamagumo 0319

0225 :"INAGAT 5

NAUT MILES

2373

that Kurita had turned eastwards again, Halsey refused to part with his battleships, not wishing to leave them without air protection and wanting to give his carriers the cover of their guns. Mitscher, Bogan, and Vice-Admiral W. A. Lee, the last of whom commanded Task Force 34, all disapproved of their com-

battleships, eight cruisers, and 28 destroyers, whereas his adversary had only

mander's initiative, but Halsey was in no mood to extemporise and they gave in.

A few minutes later his force, steaming in

fall

V The Lexington

at sea, with

Hellcats parked forward. Together with the Essex, she formed the heart of Task Force 38, the Fast Carrier Task Force of the U.S. Pacific Fleet,

commanded by Vice-Admiral Marc A. Mitscher. During the Battle of Cape Engaho the Task Force accounted for four carriers

and two

destroyers of

Ozawa's 3rd

Fleet.

Admiral

Kinkaid destroys Nishimura and Shima In

Leyte

Gulf,

Vice-Admiral

Kinkaid

was hourly following the movements of Nishimura and Shima. He spent the afternoon setting a series of ambushes for them in Surigao Strait. He had six old

19 warships altogether.

As Vice-Admiral Kinkaid sailed up the Surigao Strait between 2300 hours on October 24 and 0300 hours on the 25th, Nishimura was attacked by 30 P.T. boats, which fired torpedoes; all of them missed. line ahead, was caught in a crossfire from the destroyers of the Eastern and Western

Attack Groups under Captain Coward and Commander Phillips. The battleship Fuso was hit, and 30 minutes later broke in two; three destroyers were wrecked. Though hit, Nishimura's flagship, the battleship Yamashiro, maintained her course and, followed by the cruiser Mogami, sailed into Leyte Gulf. At 0353 hours Rear-Admiral G. L. Weyler's six battleships "crossed the T" and opened fire

on the Japanese, loosing

!"«%•<

»•

^ *.

.^>

*^^^^^'

'V.

'»:

off 285 14-

and 16-inch

shells.

Mogami succeeded

in

turning about, but Yamashiro capsized and sank at 0419 hours, taking down with her her obstinate admiral and almost all her crew. At this moment Shima appeared, having followed Nishimura some 30 miles behind. It did not take him long to sum up the situation, and at 0425 hours he decided on a "temporary withdrawal". In doing so he came under attack from the P.T. boats then, when dawn came, from the 7th Fleet's aircraft. All told, out of 19 Japanese ships which ventured into this trap, only two survived, including the old destroyer Shigure which had so often flirted with death in the Solomon Islands. RearAdmiral J. B. Oldendorf lost 39 men killed

A The deck of the escort carrier Kitkun Bay shrouded in smoke from bursting Japanese shells. She was one of six escort carriers in the "Taffy 3" (TG 77.4.3) group commanded by RearAdmiral Clifton Sprague, which fought a desperate action in the Battle off Samar against the numerically superior Force "A" commanded by Admiral Kurita.

and 114 wounded.

Kurita attacks again On board their floating H.Q., the amphibious force flagship Wasatch, Kinkaid and his staff hardly had time to congratulate themselves on their night victory at Surigao before the astounding news reached them that off Samar Island Task Group 77.4, consisting of 6 escort carriers and 20 destroyers under RearAdmiral Thomas L. Sprague, was engaging a heavy Japanese force. When asked by Kinkaid at 0412 hours "Is Task Force 34 guarding San Bernardino Strait?" Halsey had replied: "Negative. TF 34 is with carrier groups now engaging enemy carrier force." 2375

Kinkaid had misinterpreted ambiguous instructions from Halsey which said that Task Force 34 "will be formed" to block the San Bernadino Strait-a statement of future intention, not of fact. Kinkaid was now exposed to attack by vastly

A The American destroyer Hoel, under Commander L. S. Kintberger, took part in the gallant delaying action fought by Task Group 77.4.3 on October 25. Despite the disparity in armament and

speed, the Hoel Kongo as

selected the battleship

more powerful

her target and succeeded in launching half her torpedoes, in spite of sustaining heavy damage to her bridge and superstructure. With only two guns still operative, the Hoel launched her remaining torpedoes at the

heavy cruiser Haguro. By now Hoel was too seriously damaged to maintain speed and she came under a murderous fire from the Japanese fleet, sustaining more than 40 shell hits. The order to

abandon ship was given only after a shell in the engine room brought her to a standstill: she was already listing to port and on fire. She sank at 0855.

A

forces. force, much

heavily damaged than Halsey had supposed, had returned to the attack at the steady speed of20 knots. Nishimura's catastrophe had in no way put Kurita off his intention of making for Leyte Gulf and destroying everything he found there. At 0658 hours on October 25, the first shells fell on the American ships nearest the Japanese, Task Group 77.4.3 (RearAdmiral Clifton A. F. Sprague). If victory had depended on materiel superiority, the Americans would have suffered total defeat. No U.S. ship had a gun over 5-inch in calibre and the escort carriers' top speed was 20 knots. Kurita,

/^

Kurita's

less

on the other hand, had the 33 14-, 16-, and 18-inch guns of his four battleships, the 8- and 6.1-inch guns of his eight cruisers, and the torpedoes of his 15 destroyers. And the slowest of his ships could do five knots more than the fastest of the Americans'. But his first order was "General chase". This was a blunder, as it prevented any concerted action.

Gallant resistance in spite of what could only seem a desperate situation from the point of view oi materiel, conducted themselves with gallantry and a spirit of both sacrifice and initiative. Whilst the escort carriers commanded by Admiral Sprague protected themselves behind a smoke screen or took refuge in the rainstorms, the U.S. destroyers fired off their torpe-

The Americans,

does and then opened up with their guns. In the air, Task Group 77.4's planes flew back empty over their targets in increasing numbers, after dropping their last bombs, to draw the Japanese fire.

The Japanese

fleet retires

This confusion allowed the Japanese no time to take advantage of their enormous numerical and materiel superiority. The carrier Gambler Bay was sunk by the 8-inch shells of the cruiser Chikuma which, together with her sister-ship Chokai, was then sunk by Commander R. L. Fowler's torpedo-bombers. The destroyer Jo/i7is^07i torpedoed the i^amano then, though hit by three 14-inch shells, went on fighting until the last of her guns

was destroyed. The Hoel and the escort destroyer Samuel B. Roberts met with an equally heroic end. These sacrifices were not in vain, as the heavy cruiser Suzuya was sunk in its turn. So E. B. Potter and Admiral Nimitz are right when they say of the battle off Samar: "The history of the United States Navy records no more glorious two hours of resolution, sacrifice, and success." Rear- Admiral C. A. Sprague writes: "At 0925 my mind was occupied with dodging torpedoes when near the bridge I heard one of the signalmen yell, 'Goddammit, boys, they're getting away!" I could not believe my eyes, but it looked as if the whole Japanese Fleet was indeed retiring. However, it took a whole series of reports from circling planes to convince me. And still I could not get the fact to soak into my battle-numbed brain. At best, I had expected to be swimming by this time."

^ The American escort carrier Gambler Bay was also a member of Task Group 77.4.3. She was launched on November 22, 1943 as a "Christmas gift" to the Navy from the Kaiser Vancouver

shipyard-one over the year's allotment of 18. Armed with a single 5-inch gun, the Gambier Bay, and her sister ship Kalinin

Bay, were no match for the four Japanese cruisers that stood to

and astern at ranges of less than 18,000 yards. Although badly hit, Kalinin Bay was kept afloat. Gambier Bay, however, after escaping damage for some

port

time was severely damaged on fire by hits from the

and

set

Chikuma. The remaining cruisers-Haguro. Chokai, and Tone-closed in for the kill and the order to abandon ship was given just 15 minutes before Gambier Bay turned turtle and sank at 0907.

The American destroyer Johnston Displacement: 2,050

tons.

Armament: five 5-inch, and six to ten or 20-mm A.A. guns, plus ten 21 -inch

40-

torpedo tubes. Speed 37 knots. :

Length: 376i feet. Beam 39i feet. Draught: ITJ feet. :

Complement:

300.

,.i^i~-ia'^i^

The American escort

carrier

Sangamon Displacement: 11,400

tons.

Armament: two 5-inch A. A., twentyeight 40-mm A. A., and twenty-two 20-mm A.A. guns, plus 30 aircraft. Speed: 18

knots.

Length: 553 feet. Beam: 1 14^ feet. Draught: 32 feet

Complement:

(at full load).

1,080

JC^^^i


(^f>yf^\

I

'W

^

2379

All Kurita had to do at that moment was draw in his forces so as to start again in better conditions, but on reflection he decided to pull out and before nightfall he had returned to the San Bernardino to

From the somewhat confused explanations of his decision he has given since the war, it turns out that he thought he was up against Task Force 38, and that he reckoned he had carried out his mission when his ships reported the destruction of three or four light carriers and several cruisers. The least that can be said is that he missed the chance of a great victory

Lo,

and

five

others caused losses and

damage to five more. By the end of the day the battle off Samar had cost Thomas Kinkaid five ships, 23 planes, 1,130 men and 913 wounded.

killed

Strait.

which he would most likely have had pay within the following 48 hours with

for to

an equally crushing defeat.

Kamikaze A

V barrage of anti-aircraft shells bursts in the sky and a of black smoke rises from a burning ship as Japanese bombers attack the American

plume

fleet.

2380

Kurita's withdrawal did not put an end to the troubles of Task Group 77.4. Some hours later Vice-Admiral T. Ohnishi sent out his new weapon, the kamikazes. One of them sank the escort carrier Saint

Ozawa caught At midnight on October 25, Admiral Ozawa had only 29 fighters and bombers left, whereas Halsey was bearing down on him with ten fast carriers, whose planes were to carry out 527 sorties in six waves from dawn to dusk. The first wave took off at 0540 hours. It caught the Japanese forces sailing north toward Halsey off Cape Engaiio, sank the light carrier Chitose and left the fleet carrier Zuikaku so badly damaged that Ozawa had to transfer his flag to a cruiser. The second wave set fire to the light carrier Chiyoda, which was then left limping behind. Towards mid-day Mitscher sent up his third wave of 200 planes. This settled

its

account with the Zuikaku,

the last survivor of the six carriers which had bombed Pearl Harbor. She succumbed under the blows of three torpedoes at 1414 hours. About an hour later, the fourth wave sank the light carrier Zuiho.

Halsey and the pursuit This success was only partial, however, as Halsey could not turn a deaf ear to Kinkaid's S.O.S., which came first in code then in clear. At 0848 he ordered McCain's task group to hasten to the rescue then, shortly before 1 100 hours, on an order from Nimitz. he sent Task Force 34 and Bogan's task group southwards. The Japanese withdrawal was greatly helped by these detachments, though Rear-Admiral Du Bose's cruisers did finish off the Chiyoda with gunfire and sink two of Ozawa's destroyers. The latter also lost the light cruiser Tama, shattered by a clutch of torpedoes from the submarine Jallao. Leyte Gulf, the greatest naval battle of all time, had involved 244 ships totalling 2.014.890 tons. By comparison. Jutland brought together under Scheer and Jellicoe some 254 ships totalling 1,616,836 tons. Thirty-two ships were lost:

Japanese Battleships 3 Aircraft-carriers 4 Escort carriers Cruisers 10

Destroyers Totals

U.S 1

2

9

3

26

6

Tonnage 306,000 37,000 These figures reveal the crushing defeat inflicted on the Japanese Navy, although Ozawa had carried out his decoy mission

A Admiral

Yamashita trapped in the Philippines

William F. Halsey,

pugnacious Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Navy's 3rd Fleet at the Battle of Leyte Gulf

brilliantly.

Japan's impossible task When

questioned after the capitulation by an American commission of enquiry about the consequences of this battle. Admiral Yonai. Navy Minister in General Koiso's cabinet, replied: "Our defeat at Leyte was tantamount to the loss of the Philippines.

When you

took the Philippines, that was the end of our resources."

Indeed Yamashita was virtually cut off in the archipelago and, what is more, could only move his troops from one island to another with the greatest of whereas his adversary had complete liberty- of movement and almost unlimited supplies. In spite of a superiority of men and materiel, which increased in proportion to the Japanese difficulty,

losses,

MacArthur never used overwhelm-

ing strength in hammer-blow attacks, but showed the same qualities as a tactician as he had done in the Papua

2381

lost 3,508 killed and 12,076 wounded, two-thirds of these only lightly. On the same day it was relieved by the U.S. 8th Army.

divisions,

MacArthur moves on Without waiting to clear up on Leyte,

MacArthur pressed on to Panay and Negros; then, when Yamashita had dropped his guard, Brigadier-General W. C. A The

escort carrier St Lo, last

victim of the Battle off Samar. Hit by one of the earliest

kamikaze less

attacks, she

than 30 minutes.

sank in

days of stringency. If we realise that the reconquest of the Philippines required no fewer than 38 amphibious operations, we can see that no further comment is necessary unless it be to add to the praise of MacArthur a tribute to his airmen, Generals G. C.

Kenney and sailors.

E.

C.

Admirals

Whitehead, and his Kinkaid and D. E.

T. C.

Barbey. In the days following the landing on Leyte, nearly 50,000 Japanese still managed to get across to the island. The "no withdrawal" defence of Leyte fell to the Japanese 35th Army (LieutenantGeneral Sasaku Suzuki). But its adversary, the U.S. 6th Army, increased from 101,000 men on November 12 to over

on December 2. MacArthur was cooking up one of his specials for Yamashita: on December 7 his 77th Division 183,000

made a surprise landing in the Gulf of Ormoc on the west side of Leyte. Stabbed in the back, the 35th then collapsed.

Army

crumpled,

"I am exhausted. We have no food. The enemy are now within 500 meters from us.

Mother, my dear wife and son, I am writing you by dim candle light. Our end is near. What will be the future of Japan if this island should fall into enemy hands? Our air force has not arrived. General Yamashita has not arrived. this letter to

Hundreds of pale

soldiers of

Japan are

awaiting our glorious end and nothing else. This is a repetition of what occurred in the Solomons, New Georgia, and other islands. How well are the people of Japan prepared to fight the decisive battle with .?" the will to win This was a last letter from a soldier of the Japanese 1st Division a few days before December 26, the end of the battle, when the Japanese had run out of men. 80,577 of them died, and 878 were taken prisoner. The U.S. 6th Army, with seven .

2382

.

Dunckel's Western Visayan Task Force landed on Mindoro on December 15. This was 310 miles north of Leyte and it was taken without the loss of a single man. It brought U.S. aircraft to within striking distance of Luzon, the bay of Manila and Lingayen Gulf. The Philippines were now cut in two and Japanese communications with the Dutch East Indies were almost severed. Lingayen Gulf, from where the Japanese first landed on Luzon on December 22, 1941, was MacArthur's next objective. For this he gave I and XIV Corps (Major-Generals Innis W. Swift and Oscar W. Griswold respectively) to the 6th Army. The divisions involved were the 6th and 43rd (I Corps) and 37th and 41st (XIV Corps). Transport and supplies were to be the job of III and VII

Amphibious Forces. After a decoy action to make Yamashita think that the invasion of Luzon would come from Mindoro, the Americans landed on January 9, 1945, and met no stronger opposition than some sporadic mortar fire. A week later they were 30 miles along the road to Manila for the loss of 900 men, including 250 killed. In the restricted waters off-shore the kamikaze corps, under Vice-Admiral Takijiro Ohnishi, had some success against the U.S. 7th Fleet. In the Mindoro operation

on December 15 one of them damaged the cruiser Nashville, causing her to turn back with 131 dead and 158 wounded on board, including Vice-Admiral A. D. Struble. During the Lingayen landings between January 1 and 31, 54 U.S. and Australian ships were attacked by these suicide planes but, apart from the escort carrier Ommaney Bay and two small ships, they all survived. On January 6, however, on the bridge of the battleship New Mexico, Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Lumsden, British liaison officer with MacArthur, was killed, giving the AngloSaxons a foretaste of what they were to get off Okinawa.

CHAPTER

156

The Struggle for Leyte by Richard Humble

The

first Americans to return to the Philippines were a small Ranger task force with their destroyer transports

and

escort.

The Dinagat Attack Group, under RearAdmiral Arthur D. Struble, transported the 500 men of Company D, 6th Ranger Battalion, U.S. Army, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Mucci. In the darkness of October 17 and 18, 1944 they were to demolish the Japanese radio location equipment on four islands at the two entrances to Leyte Gulf. If these electronic feelers were not ripped out, it was feared that they would signal the arrival of the invasion fleet on the 20th.

The main landings were planned for mid-day to allow a daylight run into the gulf, in which floating mines and obstacles had been reported. Throughout the morning the warships moved into position, and the transports halted about eight miles off the beach. The landing craft were hoisted out, and began circling round their larger parent ships. The noise and apparent confusion of a major amphibious operation had begun to build

A

Improvised supply

the beach at Leyte.

dump on

Soon

after the

landings, supplies were arriving so quickly and in such disarray that the dumps began to spill over onto the airfields, with a consequent threat to air operations.

up.

From 0700, fire support units had been in action in the pre-landing shoot. First to arrive were the battleships Mississippi, Maryland, and West Virginia. At 0900 2383

they were relieved by the Close Covering Group, after they had sent 30 shells per main battery gun rumbling over the fleet into the jungle coast line. manoeuvres, these Throughout and retorpedo-bombers, fighters, connaissance aircraft from the 3rd and 7th Fleets made attacks on the airfields in northern Mindanao, Cebu, Negros,

Panay, and Leyte, and conducted sweeps over the surrounding areas. Rear-Admiral D. E. Barbey, whose air plan was administered by Captain Whitehead, had ordered a break in the bombing and strafing of the beach 45 minutes before H-hour. This was a departure from the standard operating procedure of that time. The gap was covered by highangled naval gunfire and rocket barrages from 0915 to 1000. By 0930 the bombardment was reaching its cacophonous climax and the landing craft had formed up for the 5,000 yard dash for the beach. At 0943 the signal

was run up on the control vessel PC-623, and preceded by 11 L.C.I, rocket craft, the boats went in. In a couple of minutes the L.C.I.s had flag

V An American

light A. A. gun, on the edge of Tacloban airfield. In the background, two heavy guns pound the Japanese

dug

in

lines.

MacArthur was

later to

claim that by November 7, 1944, 144 Japanese aircraft had been shot

down

over Leyte.

fired 10,000 4.5-inch rockets in a close pattern over the northern and southern landing areas. Behind the L.C.I.scamethefirst wave of amphtrack tanks, followed by L. V.T.s and then the amphtrack personnel carriers. By the time the fourth wave had hit

"Red" Beach area, the

in the northern landing to hit back

enemy had begun

with mortars sited in the neighbouring hills. With the correct range and deflection they dropped bombs on the L.C. V.(P. )s from the Elmore and sank a boat from Aquarius, killing 3 men and injuring 15. On the southern beaches a 75-mm battery near Catmon Hill took on the destroyer Bennion, straddling her repeatedly and wounding five men with a near miss. Artillery and mortar fire fell on "Blue" Beach as the 96th Division

was landing. Both the Japanese and the Americans realised that they had begun a battle that was of considerable strategic importance. If the Japanese lost the Philippines they would no longer control the sea-lanes to the oil of the Netherlands

East Indies, tin and rubber from Malaya, rice from Indo-China, nor have access to the varied mineral resources of

and

the islands themselves. The American leaders Roosevelt, Nimitz, and the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff had

been persuaded by General MacArthur, and also by the course of the war, that the capture of the Philippines would be easier than that of Formosa, and would liberate a large and loyal population. It would also cut off supplies to Japan and give the Americans a base for operations

leading

to

the invasion

Japanese home islands.

of the

Yamashita's threadbare forces With

this in mind, each adversary approached the battle with as much determination and as many resources as

he could muster. Field-Marshal

Terauchi

(Southern

Army)

whose area included the Philippines, had made the 14th Area Army and the 4th Air Army responsible for their defence. The 14th Army was so under strength that he had ordered it to concentrate on the defence of Luzon and regard the southern islands as of secondary importance. The 14th Army consisted of eight infantry divisions and three independent mixed brigades. On October 6, LieutenantGeneral T. Yamashita, the "Tiger of

Malaya", had assumed command.

made Lieutenant-General

S.

He

Suzuki, with

three infantry divisions and two mixed brigades, responsible for the defence of the central and southern islands. Suzuki in turn gave the 16th Division, under Lieutenant-General S. Makino, the task of defending Leyte. The island which Makino had to defend is about 115 miles long north to south, and between 15 and 45 miles wide east to

rugged and mountainous, except for a strip of flat land running north from Ormoc in the west, and a broad fertile valley in the north-east which narrows and fades out halfway down the east coast. The main Japanese airstrips were one each at Tacloban near the entrance to the San Juanico Strait and at Dulag 11 miles to the south, with three at Burauen further inland. It was on two beaches near Tacloban and Dulag that MacArthur planned to land. He was assembling his invasion forces at Hollandia, which had become the main base in New Guinea, and at Manus in the Admiralty Islands. Naval forces west.

It

is

consisted of the U.S. 7th Fleet (ViceAdmiral T. C. Kinkaid), which included two cruisers and two destroyers from the Royal Australian Navy, and the Ariadne, a fast minelayer of the Royal Navy. The U.S. 3rd Amphibious Force had joined it from the central Pacific. The U.S. 3rd Fleet, under Halsey, which included four fast carrier groups, was to cover and support MacArthur, but would remain

under Nimitz's orders.

The U.S. 6th

Army

(X and XXIV Corps), under Lieutenant-General W. Krueger, provided the land forces and the 5th U.S.A.A.F. the supporting air force.

A American

cross over to

Carrier strikes In preparation for the landings, the 15 fast carriers of the 3rd Fleet made a series of heavy raids on Japanese bases

Okinawa, Luzon, and Formosa. They came under very heavy aerial attack during these operations and between October 10 and 17 lost 26 aircraft and had two cruisers put out of action. The Japanese, however, claimed that they had sunk two battleships and 11 carriers, and damaged many others, for the loss of 320 aircraft. Basing their moves on these spurious successes they in

troops

move up

through Tacloban. In this area the 1st Cavalry Division swung up to the north to mop up part of the Japanese 16th Division,

Samar, and then

launch a series of amphibious landings along the north coast. Slightly to the south, the 24th Division cleared the Leyte valley and drove on round to the north of the

Ormoc

valley.

As

it

was

driving south along the valley, it met elements of the 77th

had landed just Ormoc on December 7.

Division, which

south of

altered their plans for the defence of Leyte and the Philippines. Admiral S. Toyoda, Commander-inChief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, ordered the land-based aircraft to undertake the decisive battle for the Philippines under the operational title "SHO-1". The 2nd Air Fleet (350 operational aircraft) together with 150 carrier aircraft of Vice-Admiral J. Ozawa's 3rd and 4th Carrier Divisions, moved to Formosa. The 5th Fleet (Vice-Admiral K. Shima),

2385

A An American jeep column moves through Tacloban, liberated on October 20. > A Filipinos welcome American troops ashore.

> American

consisting of the 16th and 21st Cruiser Squadrons, was ordered to sail from the Inland Sea to seek out and destroy any

American ships damaged

in the action.

soldier helping his

wounded comrade.

5th fleet moves on Concurrently with Imperial General structed Southern

these

moves

Headquarters

Army

to

fight

the in-

the

on Leyte instead of Luzon, rauchi ordered the 14th Area Army to

•ecisive battle

2386

deploy

its

maximum

strength to hold the

Yamashita protested, but the order was repeated on the 22nd, two days after the American landings, and so he island.

ordered the 35th Army to concentrate for the defence of Leyte. The naval section of Imperial General Headquarters subsequently discovered that the reports of U.S. naval losses were inaccurate, and ordered the 5th Fleet to make for the Ryukyu islands. This information, however, was not passed on to Yamashita. The land forces were now committed to Leyte without naval support.

MacArthur's powerful forces MacArthur had 200,000 men of General Walter Krueger's 6th Army, LieutenantGeneral C. Kenney's 2,500 combat aircraft, and the 7th Fleet-often called "MacArthur's Navy" which had an additional 500 aircraft. The 3rd Fleet had

2388

-

1,000 aircraft as well as nearly 100 of the

most modern warships in the world. He would need these resources because the Leyte invasion would be conducted out of range of land-based aircraft. How-

MacArthur

did not exercise direct command over Halsey and the 3rd Fleet, who were under Nimitz and so could be ordered away to attack the Japanese ever,

fleet if it

approached.

Airstrips: the vital factor

The 7th Fleet had some small escort carriers, but they would be inadequate to defend the fleet and transports, and cover the beach-head if major units of the Japanese Navy or Air Forces succeeded in evading the 3rd Fleet. Consequently it was essential that Kenney's Far East Air Forces should start operating from local airstrips as soon as the invasion forces had captured them.

With

this in

mind the invasion beaches

chosen were close coastal

airstrips

to,

near

or opposite, the

Tacloban

A American

troops celebrate the

capture of the first Japanese flag in the Philippines.

and

Dulag.

As soon as he heard of the landings, Suzuki (35th Army) instructed the 16th Division to keep control of the airfields at all costs, and ordered Leyte to be reinforced by four battalions. On the October 22 Yamashita told him that he was to fight a decisive battle on Leyte and that he would be getting two divisions and an independent mixed brigade from Luzon. With further reinforcements from Davao and Cebu, Suzuki had the equivalent of four strong divisions on the island. If the decisive naval and air battles were successful, the Japanese land forces could be sent against the estimated two divisions which the Americans had put ashore. The 16th Division was ordered to hold a line Burauen-Dagami, whilst the bulk of the Japanese forces concentrated in the Carigara plain. These deployments assisted the Americans, who advanced rapidly against light opposition, and by November 2 the 6th Army had reached a line Carigara

2389

A A Japanese Type

95 light

tank, knocked out during the

American advance, comes under inspection. Designed in 1935, the Type 95 remained in production until 1943, but was totally

Jaro - Dagami - Abuyog. They had an advanced detachment at Baybay and had captured all five airstrips.

obsolete by Allied standards

when Japan entered the war. A> An L. v. T. and a Sherman spearhead the U.S. 6th Army's advance.

> The prompt

treatment of

battle casualties plays

an

important part in the morale of fighting troops.

2390

f <

I

have returned'

Before examining the American plans for the break-out from their beach-head, let us recall an incident which took place on the first day. General George MacArthur had last visited Leyte Gulf in 1903 as a 2nd Lieutenant of Army Engineers. Forty-one years later he boarded a landing craft with President Osmeha, Resident Commissioner Romulo, Chief-of-Staff Sutherland, and Air Commander Kenney. After the craft had grounded, MacArthur waded through the knee-deep surf, inspected the beach, and walked inland about 200 yards to examine the effects of the bombardment. It may not have looked like the return of a conquering hero, but MacArthur made up for this in his broadcast on the "Voice of Freedom" network.

Standing on the beach in front of the microphone, his hands shook and his voice'betrayed his deep emotion: "People of the Philippines, I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God our forces stand again on Philippine soil."

He urged the population to rally to him, and also introduced the new president Sergio Osmena. A passionate yet restrained speech, it was an outlet for powerful emotions held in check and only betrayed earlier when, with a smile, he had remarked "Well, believe it or not, we're here." After the war General Yamashita said that he had imagined that the film of MacArthur's return had been mocked up in New Guinea. Had he known that the general was at the front he would have launched the whole strength of the Japanese forces in a suicide raid on MacArthur's headquarters to avenge the death of Admiral Yamamoto. Meanwhile unloading was proceeding at a fast and sometimes chaotic rate. L.S.T.s originally intended for "Red" Beach were diverted to Tacloban air-

I

strip,

.smmmi:?

and here the rapidly-growing supply

dump began

to restrict the

airfield engineers.

work

of the

On October 24, Kenney

made the

drastic threat that everything not removed from the airstrip by dawn on the 25th would be bulldozed.

Engineers' nightmare The

proved to be almost unusable, despite the hard work and constant attention of the Army Engineers airstrips

and Filipino labourers. The Dulag strip was still soft, with many rough spots, on October 25, but served as an emergency landing ground during the Leyte sea battle. Tacloban was a little better, despite the fact that the water table was only 18 inches below the surface. One engineer reported that "an airstrip there could at best be a thin slice of coral or metal laid upon a jelly mold".

Krueger

visited this airstrip

and told

the engineers that unless they started laying gravel, they would be digging foxholes for their lives in 24 hours. The

2391

^

•^*-

K0,

.Jf

^

%^

^r

y^

•.>^-

'^.^

< Men

of the 7th Division, after

landing at Dulag, push on through Burauen, some ten miles inland. The division had previously seen action in the Aleutians, on Attu, and in the Marshalls, on Kwajalein, winning Presidential Citations

on both. Inset: American infantry, pinned down by Japanese machine gun fire.

work was done, and again saved about 100

pilots,

this

strip

though the surface

was

so bad that about a quarter of the aircraft were destroyed when they crashlanded or nosed over on soft spots. carrier groups rein the area to provide air cover

Three of the

V Heavy going in a swamp. Note man (centre right) being

the

pulled out of a particularly soft piece of ground by his comrades, the soldier with the Browning

Automatic Rifle (foreground), the mortar bomb containers

and

being carried by the second from right.

man

remainder of the 26th Division, and for the loss of nine aircraft, sank all the transports and four of the escorting destroyers.

fast

mained and attack the Japanese airfields which were beginning to receive reinforcements from Formosa. Japanese troop reinforcements began to arrive via Ormoc, but the shipping and naval escorts suffered heavy losses. Four battalions from Davao and Cebu arrived between the 26th and 28th. The main body of the 1st Division and some 2,000 men of the 26th Division from Luzon were landed between November 1 and 2. The convoy carrying the remainder of the 1st Division and some 10,000 of the 26th Division left Manila on November 8th. It came under low level attack by the 5th U.S.A.A.F. and sustained considerable superficial damage. The men were landed without their equipment. A day later the empty convoy was caught again by the 5th U.S.A.A.F. and all but one ship were sunk. A day later, aircraft from Halsey's carriers attacked a convoy carrying the

Japanese reinforcements Between October 22 and December 11, the Japanese succeeded in reinforcing the original garrison of 15,000 men with some 45,000 men and 10,000 tons of stores. Their operations cost them one light cruiser, eight destroyers, six escort craft, and 17 transports -shipping they could ill afford to lose. Despite this, the 35th Army was outnumbered by the 6th Army, whose strength stood at 183,000 by December 2. By November 1, Suzuki realised that he was up against two American corps, each of two divisions, and that he lacked the strength to carry out his original plan. He ordered the 1st Division and the truncated 26th, when they arrived at Carigara and Jaro respectively, to hold the U.S. X Corps in the north. The remaining reinforcements were sent to assist the 16th Division under attack by

the U.S. XXIV Corps in the south. In the ensuing heavy fighting the Americans were halted near Limon and to the west of Jaro. At a

conference with Terauchi, on 10, Yamashita urged that the reinforcement of Leyte was weakening the defences of Luzon, and proving too costly in transports and naval vessels. Terauchi agreed that there was little hope of holding the island and that supply operations should cease.

November 9 and

borne counter-attack with the 40 aircraft and 250 paratroops of the 2nd Raiding Group, which had flown in from Japan. Yamashita decided that a joint air and ground attack should be launched near the end of the month, preceded by an air attack between the 23rd and 27th.

.

the counter-attack

a spectacular, but fumbled, attack 27, three transport aircraft carrying demolition troops were sent to crash-land on the strips at Dulag and

In

on November

Yamashita plans

.

.

.

Tacloban. Despite this, Yamashita ordered the 35th Army to use the 26th Division on the

Burauen

front with a view to launching an attack with the 16th Division to

recapture some of the airfields. Suzuki, who had hoped to concentrate his forces in the north, was now forced to send the along the AlbueraDivision 26th Burauen track and the 102nd Division to the Mount Pina area to protect the right of the 1st Division, holding out at Limon. The 4th Air Army proposed an air-

One

aircraft crashed

on Buri

airstrip

killing all its occupants, the second hit the beach and most of the men escaped, and the third landed in the surf near the V American "Long Tom" H.Q. of the U.S. 728th Amphibious Bat155-mm guns directed at talion, between Rizal and Tarragona. A Japanese positions further brisk hand-to-hand fight ensued, in which inland. The Long Tom was some Japanese were killed and others probably the best gun used by the Americans in the war, escaped to the jungle. having a first class performance, attempt serious second and more A as well as ruggedness was made on the Buri strip on the night and good cross-country of December 5-6. About 150 infantrymen movement capabilities.

:* 'r;

^vv^>

\v^.^. *iij^*''

^-^'

make

a fresh landing south of Ormoc, wedge between the two wings

to drive a

of his opponents.

On the morning of the 7th, the U.S. 77th Division landed four miles south of Ormoc and met no resistance. The convoy and escorts, however, came under attack after the landing and during the return, and lost two destroyers sunk and two

damaged

to kamikaze attacks. Suzuki was forced to switch his 16th and 26th Divisions from the front to oppose this landing. On December 10, however, the 77th beat him in the race for Ormoc. With the main Japanese base in American hands, Yamashita told Suzuki that he was on his own. Japanese resistance began to crumble fast. On December 20, X Corps and the 77th Division met at Cananga, and part of this force turned west. On Christmas Day, with the help of a force moved by sea from Ormoc, it captured Palompon, the only port of any

significance left to the Japanese. Though organised resistance ceased.

A The Japanese heavy cruiser Nachi under air attack in Manila Bay on November 5, 1944. She was sunk in this attack.

had worked down through the mountains and attacked American troops bivouacking near the strip. The Japanese were driven off at dawn.

Paratroop landings

fail

Through a piece of bad co-ordination, the paratroop attack came 20 hours later. Between 39 and 40 aircraft, carrying about 15 to 20 men apiece, roared over Tacloban and Dulag. At the former they were destroyed or driven off by the A. A. fire, while the Dulag section crash-landed killing crew and paratroopers. However, a drop from 35 different aircraft on the Burauen strips met with greater success. The Japanese set fire to stores, fuel, ammunition, and some small liaison aircraft. For two days and nights ground crews and other air force personnel stalked one another and the Japanese, before the paratroopers were eliminated. Ironically, the weather had proved more effective than these airborne sorties, for the U.S.A.A.F. had abandoned the Burauen strips, which had become waterlogged, leaving only rear echelon units behind. With his X Corps held up near Limon, ana XXIV Corps delayed in its advance north X ^m Baybay, Krueger decided to

2396

io^

there were still groups of Japanese obeying Yamashita's order to live off the country and keep up the struggle with the Americans. As the official naval history comments "Japanese unorganised resistance can be very tough." Following his instructions to keep up the struggle, Yamashita added a message explaining that the high command had decided to concentrate on the defence of Luzon, and that he was shedding "tears of remorse" for the tens of thousands of his countrymen who must fight to the death on Leyte.

Mopping up continued until March 17, There was still over a full division of Japanese troops on the island. Some used 1945.

the rugged and badly-mapped terrain for guerrilla tactics, whilst small units tried to escape to Cebu across the 25 miles of the Camotes Sea. By March 1945, despite sweeps by the U.S. 77th Division, there were still several

thousand Japanese at large. Oh March 17, two ships appeared off the coast and embarked Suzuki and part of his staff. For

M

'Jt

<^i

M

a month they sailed in search of a Japanese-held port until on April 16 they were caught by U.S. aircraft off Negros,

and General Suzuki was killed. Small groups of Japanese continued to be hunted and killed by Filipino guerrillas until the end of the war. The Leyte campaign was a costly operation. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps lost several hundred men on and around the island, in addition to the heavy losses sustained in the battle off Samar. V A Japanese destroyer The Army, not including the A.A.F., manoeuvres at high speed in an had 15,584 battle casualties, of which the effort to avoid the bombs of 3,508 killed were about equally distributed four B-25 Mitchells of the 30th between X and XXIV Corps. In January Bombardment Group, attacking their full strength stood at 257,766 officers

and men.

her in Ormoc Bay. During this action, 16 of the 20 Japanese fighters sent

up

to intercept the

Understandably, estimates of Japanese bombers were shot down by casualties vary greatly. The 6th and 8th American escort fighters. Armies reported 80,557 confirmed dead, Overleaf: A Filipinos pass through the almost one-third of which had occurred American lines to the safety of during the mopping up operations. The the rear areas. American forces took only 828 Japanese V Local aid for the Americans prisoners.

in the

form of Filipino porters.

2398

•\>>.->

s

•^4r

^

.>^'

AA

U.S. troops advance inland on Panay Island. These manoeuvres were backed up by raids on Japanese airfields by fighters and bombers of the U.S. 3rd and 7th Fleets.

A The wardroom of the U.S.S. Suwanee serves as an emergency sick-bay during the fighting at Leyte.

t>

A

U.S. B-25

medium bomber

attacking Japanese destroyers off the coast of the Philippines.

maL.1

2399

iNniirriiYWEHniKi

Right:

The G a rand M1

rifle

Far right:

The Garand Ml carbine

The Earand Ml rifle and Ml carbine THE GARAND Ml RIFLE America was the only country to enter World War with its infantry already equipped with a semiautonnatic rifle: the Garand M1. By September of 1941, about two months before the declaration of war on Japan and the Axis powers, only 60,000 Garands had been II

issued, but everything

was

set for

an enormous production. In the three-and-a-half years in which the U.S.A. was directly Involved in the war, over 4 million rifles were supplied to the Army. The story of the Ml rifle began in 1920, when John Garand (whose semi-automatic rifle had been tried out but not yet approved by the Army) was taken on and designated by the Springfield military arsenal to

weapon.

Nine

work on a new

years

his

later,

was tested and chosen as the best weapon from a number of other prototype

rifle

eventually

automatic rifles. Garand's rifle had been

made

and tested in two calibres: .30inch and .276-inch. With the first version, the .30/06 cartridge

was

used (from the ordinary Springfield bolt action rifle used by the American Army); with the second, a new cartridge made by J. D. Pedersen was used. In 1932, however, the .276 was finally

abandoned in favour .30/06, and four years greatly improved

rifle

of later,

was

the the

offici-

adopted and production was begun at the Springfield arsenal. The Ml Garand is a gas-operated semi-automatic rifle. Just after firing, a proportion of the gas is

ally

bled off through a small vent

in

the

front of the barrel, near the muzzle. The resultant pressure operates a piston that ejects the case and

reloads the weapon. This rifle also works as an ordinary, single-shot rifle. It can also be used in its single-

V

shot capacity, with the addition of a grenade launcherfixed on the barrel. The Garand is 43.6 inches long without its bayonet. The empty rifle is heavy, weighing 9.5 pounds; eight rounds are held in a t>ox magazine housed in the wooden stock; the rear sight is calibrated from 1 to 12 (100-1,200 yards); the bullet has a maximum

muzzle velocity of 2,800 feet per second, its maximum range is 3,600 yards; and the rate of fire is from 16 to 24 shots per minute. The post-war rifle - the M14 -

was

largely based on Garand's original design.

John

THE M1 CARBINE Although it was an excellent weapon, with ballistic qualities comparable to those of a machine gun, the Ml rifle still had one drawback - its great weight. It was necessary, therefore, to supply the with a lighter all-purpose gun. With this in mind, the American armament authorities organised a competition in 1940 for semi-automatic carbine a weighing no more than 5.5

Army

pounds. The competition was won by the Winchester Repeating Arms

Company. One

of the best-known armourers in the world, this firm had been founded by Oliver Winchester,

whose name was

linked

with all the most famous American repeating rifles of the last century. Winchester's technicians had prepared the carbine in record time - just 48 days - and the weapon was introduced as the US Ml carbine. During the war, it had ample opportunity to prove its multi-purpose qualities, and even if it was not as versatile as had originally been intended, it earned great respect as a useful weapon. The Ml carbine, like the Garand, was gas-operated. It was different from the rifle, apart from a few technical changes, in its weight, its very compact dimensions, and its cartridge. In fact, although the calibre was the same as that of the rifle, the cartridge, also created by Winchester, was much shorter: about 43 mm. The Ml weighed 5.5 pounds and measured only 35.6 inches long. Accurate range was about 300 yards, although maxi-

mum

range was 2,000 yards. The magazine held 15 or 20 rounds. The carbine was also adapted in a different version for assault troops, with a folding metal stock (M1A1), and in one which could fire automatically, in bursts (M2). In the latter the 30- round magazine was normally used.

CHAPTER

157

'he Pacific by Richard Humble

^ An American submarine, one of the scourges of Japan 's surface communications. Note the Goodyear "blimp" and the

Sikorsky R-4 helicopter hovering overhead.

r

*

w^u^J-r

A The Japanese submarine

KD3A

1-53,

With a standard displacement of a Type

boat.

1,635 tons and a torpedo armament of eight 21-inch tubes and 16 torpedoes, she was launched on August 8, 1925, completed on March 30, 1927,

renumbered

1-153

on

May

5,

1942, surrendered to the Americans in 1945 and sunk in 1946.

of the Atlantic" is a term familiar to all, yet histories rarely refer to the submarine war in the Pacific as the "Battle of the Pacific". Germany's failure to sever the Allied supply-routes across the Atlantic with her U-boats is well known, while the war beneath the sea on the other side of the world always seems to take second place to the dramatic battles fought on the surface. Yet, as

The "Battle

General Hideki Tojo himself admitted to General MacArthur after Japan's surrender, there were three main reasons for the Allied victory in the Pacific. The first was the American ability to keep

V The Japanese submarine a Type

KD6A

1-68,

boat. This type

was capable of diving to 245 feet, had a standard displacement of 1,400 tons, and an armament of six 21-inch tubes and 14 torpedoes. 1-68 was launched on June 26, 1933, completed on July in

31, 1934,

May

1942,

renumbered

and sunk by

U.S. submarine

July

27, 1943.

Scamp on

1-168

the

strong naval task forces at sea for months on end, supplying themselves as they went, without having to return to base. The second was the "leap-frogging" offensive which by-passed outlying Japanese garrisons and concentrated on targets of vital strategic importance. But the third was the virtual destruction of Japanese shipping by American submarines. This not only prevented Japan from conveying her

considerable reserves of manpower to the threatened sectors of her island empire. It also prevented her from supplying and reinforcing the troops already there. As far as materiel was concerned, the Pacific war became a one-sided conflict, this applied to the Japanese and

and

U.S. submarine arms as to every other sphere. At the beginning, in December 1941 the opposing submarine forces in the Pacific were fairly well balanced with only a slight advantage to the Japanese. The Imperial Combined Fleet had 60 submarines, the U.S. Pacific Fleet 55. But a glance at the numbers of submarines built ,

by both sides during World War II shows completely this position was trans-

how

formed. Between January 1942 and the end of the war the Japanese managed to launch 106 new submarine hulls. The Americans launched 204. And the other side of the coin-the numbers of submarines lost to enemy action and accidental causes-is even more revealing. Between Pearl Harbor and their surrender

the Japanese lost 125 submarines, the Americans only 54 -and it must be borne in mind that for the first 18 months after Pearl Harbor, until the Battle of the Atlantic was won in the summer of 1943, the U.S. Navy was fighting a two-ocean war. These are the basic statistics of the submarine war in the Pacific theatre, and they show how completely the Japanese submarine arm was dwarfed by that of the U.S. Pacific Fleet by the end of the war. But when the Japanese Combined Fleet had launched its bid for instant victory in December 1941 its leaders had accepted only expect decould that they feat from a long-term war with the United States. Far more serious was their failure to grasp the correct function of the submarine in modern war. Like the tank, the submarine is an offensive weapon, forged to carry the assault home to the enemy. And if a fair comparison is to be drawn for the opposing submarine strategies used by the Americans and the Japanese in the Pacific, it may be

in the radically different ways in which the Germans and the Western Allies employed their tanks in the campaign of 194'0. The Panzers were massed into the "armoured wedge", the steel tip of the hurtling lance; the French and British still thought of the tank as the infantry support weapon par excellence. Even when the Allies did try to launch massed tank attacks before the final

found

A The Japanese submarine a Type

Bl

boat. This boat

1-26,

was

launched in 1940, completed on November 6, 1941. She was sunk off Leyte in October 1944.

collapse came in the West, those attacks were essentially defensive, aimed at restoring stability to the shattered Allied front. So it was with the Pacific submarine war. By the last year of the war the

American submariners were carrying out "wolf-pack" patrols as deadly as any undertaken by the German U-boat aces in their Atlantic heyday. The Japanese, however, had always cast their submarines in a defensive role. There had been a time when this decision had seemed to make sense for the Japanese Navy. In 1922 the Washington naval limitation treaties had sought to

V The Japanese submarine

1-176,

KD7

a Type boat. She was a boat of 1.630 tons' standard

displacement, launched as 1-76 in 1941, completed as 1-176 on August 8, 1942, and sunk by the American destroyers

Franks. Haggard, and Johnston on May 16, 1944.

The American Consolidated PBY-5A patrol

Engines: two Pratt & Whitney R- 1830-92 Twin Wasp radials, 1,200-hp each. Armament: two .5-inch and three .3-inch Browning machine guns, plus four 1,000- or 500-, or twelve

100- lb bombs, or four 650- or 325- lb depth bombs, or two Mark 1 3-2 torpedoes. Speed: 179 mph at 7,000 feet. Climb 1 9 minutes 1 8 seconds to 1 0,000 feet. Ceiling: 14,700 feet. Range: 2,545 miles maximum. :

Weight empty/loaded: 20,910/35,420

Span: 104 Length: 63 Height: 20

Crew:

2404

7-9.

lbs.

feet.

feet

lOi inches.

feet 2 inches.

flying boat

^

,

anticipate a new international warshipbuilding race by "pegging" the strength ratios of the world's leading navies. This process had left Japan third in the league behind Britain and America. By that time it was perfectly obvious that the biggest naval rival whom Japan could expect to face in the event of any future war would be the United States and her Pacific Fleet based on the Hawaiian Islands. And it was the problem of tackling such a hypothetical threat with inferior numbers that gave birth to the defensive role of the Japanese submarine arm. As the U.S. Pacific Fleet steamed westward into Japanese waters, the Japanese submarines would launch repeated attacks, whittling down the American battle fleet until the Japanese surface fleet could meet it in battle on equal, if not superior, terms. But this was in the years before naval air power came into its own with the carrier task force. And it

was based on an assumption which War I had already

the events of World

proved fallacious.

programme, with results that have been abundantly described elsewhere in this

And this "battleship obsession" kept the Japanese submarine arm from expanding into a purely offensive role. history.

Only limited successes This is not to deny that the Japanese were capable of building good boats. During and after World War I they had studied the best (and worst) Western models and had drawn their own conclusions as to the optimum combination of speed, range, diving depth, and hitting-power. Of all the different types and modiflcations of submarine which the Japanese produced by the end of World War II, the Type Bl vessels may be taken as fairly typical of the Japanese fleet (as opposed to coastal defence) submarines. The Bl boats had a standard displacement of 2,198 tons, were capable of 23^ knots on diesel and 8 knots on electric motors, had a cruising radius of 14,000 miles, and were possessed of an armament of one 5.5-inch gun, two 25-mm cannon, and six 21-inch torpedo tubes. They carried 17

The tension of the Anglo-German naval building race in the years before 1914 had conditioned the world to expect that the coming of war would speedily result in a dreadnought Trafalgar between the opposing battle fleets. But this did not happen; and even when the battle fleets did clash at Jutland in 1916 it was a hideous accident for which the Germans

torpedoes, plus a seaplane.

had to compensate by running for home as best they could. For the Japanese in the first 12 months after Pearl Harbor, this anti-climactic situation was reenacted. They could not entice the rem-

marked

A Cramped accomodation on board an American submarine. Although first priority had to be given to the boat's

armament and machinery, very careful thought was devoted to the problems of habitability

which had a considerable influence on crew performance, especially on long patrols.

Midway But these

fleet submarines were earfor scouting, not for strike-force

duties. Again, the strategic

importance

nants of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to try the conclusion of a decisive action -and they had largely themselves to blame. Ever since her defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima in 1905, Japan had been in the forefront of current naval development. Japan's new battle fleet had been equipped with some of the toughest warships in the world, and the Washington treaties had been expressly intended to prevent her from building even more formidable vessels. This forward thinking

of this scouting role was not lacking. Far from it. A classic example was Operation "K", on the eve of Midway. "K" envisaged the use of submarines as refuelling bases for long-range scout flying boats. Based on French Frigate Shoals, the submarines were supposed to refuel the flying boats before they made the last air reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to check that the U.S. Paciflc Fleet was there, duly waiting to be lured into the ambush at Midway. But "K" had to be abandoned. The three Japanese

had lived on and had resulted in the Japanese aircraft-carrier building programme. But by the late 1930's it had been fatally compromised by the obsession with continued "super-battleship" construction -a paradoxical wedding of modernity and obsolescence. This meant that at the time of Pearl Harbor the Japanese Navy did not have a long-term carrier-building

that the Americans had arrived at French Frigate Shoals themselves. Yamamoto did not get the information he needed to convert the strike at Midway into the final destruction of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and his outer submarine patrol lines were thrown out of schedule by the setback. Nevertheless it fell to the sub-

submarines-/-i2i, 1-122, and I-123-(ound

2405

marine arm to win the biggest Japanese

launching group operations against an

success at Midway, when Commander Tanabe of 1-168, who had been reconnoitering Midway itself since the previous month, caught the immobilised carrier Yorktown with the destroyer Hammann lying alongside and sank them both with a salvo of four torpedoes. After Midway the six-months' struggle for Guadalcanal ensued, and it was in this period i"hat the Japanese submarine arm came the nearest it ever did to

enemy fleet. The intense sea fighting in the Guadalcanal area ran the full gamut from cruiser-destroyer clashes to carrier duels and battleship actions, with the balance constantly on a knife-edge. In August-September 1942, the Japanese submarine force kept the situation fluid by temporarily neutralising the American carrier strength in the South-West Pacific. On August 31 the 1-26 crippled the Saratoga so badly that she remained hors

de combat for the next three months. A fortnight later the U.S. Pacific fleet suffered its first carrier loss since Midway, when 1-19 torpedoed the Wasp and made an inferno of her. There was no chance of saving the blazing carrier and she was sunk by her own side. In the same

attack other submarines blew the destroyer O'Brien out of the water and damaged the battleship North Carolina. But that was the last real success scored by the Japanese submarine arm against

V The American submarine

the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The story of the next 18 months- Japan's defeat on Guadalcanal, the long fight for the Solomon Islands chain, and the eventual loss of Bougainville-amounted to the grindingdown of Japan's magnificent night-fighting cruiser and destroyer crews in desperate attempts to supply their island garrisons. And while this was in progress a change had come over the planning of

17j 8 knots and an armament of one 3-inch gun and six 21-inch

further additions to the Japanese sub-

considerably. She

marine

in 1947.

fleet.

Cuttlefish, one of two units in the 1933 "Cachalot" class. She

had a displacement

of 1,1301 1,650 tons, with speeds of

tubes (with 16 torpedoes). During the war the gun was moved to a position in front of the conning tower, and A.A. armament was increased

was scrapped

was not the only way the Allies could move up supplies for their fleets in the Pacific. As examples of how big sub-

The giant subs and biggest Japanese "attack" submarines -the giant "1-400" (Type STo) class were ordered. These boats were the biggest submarines ever built by any power, and the plan was to use them to destroy the Pacific exit of the Panama Canal. 1-400 and her sister-ships had a standard displacement of 3,530 tons. Their overall length was 400j feet and their beam 39^ feet. They could cruise 37,500 miles and dive to 325 feet, and their twin shafts were driven by four sets of diesels. They were so big that provision was made for camouflaging them with dummy funnels while cruising in home waters. Their armament was one 5.5-inch gun, ten 25-mm cannon (a sign that one of the biggest lessons of World War II, the danger of enemy air power, had not gone unlearned), and eight 21inch torpedo tubes. Each of them could In 1942 the last

carry three specially-designed seaplane bombers, dismantled and stacked in huge, watertight hangars, plus torpedoes and bombs for them. What the " Yamato" class battleships were to the surface fleet, the I-400's were to the submarine arm. But both ideas were based on fatal misconceptions. There was no point in building giant battleships if there were not

enough carriers to keep off enemy aircraft. there was no target which could

And

possibly justify the construction of the

I-400's-noteventhePana

2408

^

Canal, which

marines could be built, the I-400's stood alone. But they were white elephants. Only three of them were completed (1-400, 1-401, and 1-402). None of them was ready for service before

1945 (1-402

was not

A A Japanese merchantman end and at the hands submarine in the wide reaches of the Pacific. The meets

its

of a U.S.

nature of Japan's outer perimeter, based on a series of small, scattered islands, without resources of their own, meant that Japan had to keep them supplied by means of a constant stream of ships. Thus the

completed until July of that year). Oddly enough all three survived the massive American submarines knew American bombing of Japan's naval bases where to look for their prey and surrendered -to be sunk by the and their task was made the

Americans

in 1946.

Japan did not introduce a convoy system until late in the war. Even then, there

easier as

were insufficient escort craft

Useless fanaticism The three

I-400's are a perfect example of Santayana's dictum that fanaticism consists of redoubling your efforts when you have forgotten your aim. Admiral Donitz and his U-boat flotillas not only had a good chance of strangling the British Isles by striking at their supply-routes: the U-boats came perilously close to doing so. Japan, on the other hand, could hardly even begin to embarrass the North American continent by submarine attacks. It is not so much a question of looking back with the benefit of hindsight and stating what the Japanese Navy should have done with its submarines. What could it have done? A concentration of long-range fleet submarines could have seriously embarrassed America's direct scalane from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor-but

give these smcHl convoys protection.

to

much

A The end of two more Japanese cargo vessels, seen through the graticule of their sinker's periscope.

would only have made sense in the months before Midway. After June 1942 the centre of gravity of the naval war in this

the Pacific shifted to the South-West Pacific, and that was where the Japanese submarines could have done most damage. Although the range of the best Japanese fleet submarines was great, it was not enough to have begun to be a serious threat to the West Coast-Pearl Harbor route and to the New Zealand-South Pacific-Australia route. The successes achieved by the Japanese submarines during the sea fight for Guadalcanal give a clue as to the best submarine strategy which Japan could have followed after the initiative was lost in the Solomons: biding her time, and committing strong submarine flotillas to gnaw at the American task forces once the target of their next attack had been definitely pinpointed and that attack committed. Instead the Japanese fleet commanders fell into the trap of fighting attrition battles with their surface forces;

and in these battles they lost so heavily (the equivalent of an entire peace-time fleet was sunk at Guadalcanal) that the submarine force was headed in another direction. The Solomons campaign proved decisively that running in supplies on the surface by night was futile and extravagant. Submarines must therefore be used for the job in future battles. This was a compound error. First, the American "leap-frogging" island strategy asked for nothing better than that the

Japanese should dissipate their efforts in trying to supply by-passed island garrisons. And second, the building of supply submarines and the conversion of existing boats for supply duties only drew more teeth from the already ineffective Japanese submarine

As

force.

was, the supply role forced on the submarine programme produced the Type it

No less than 12 of them were with numbers running from 1-361 to 1-372. The emphasis was on stowage and range. They carried no toi'pedoes but Dl

boats.

built,

2409

retained the standard 5.5-inch gun and two 25-mrn cannon. The Dl boats had an endurance of 60 days; they could cruise 15,000 miles on the surface and had an extremely generous submerged cruising radius of 120 miles, conferred by the fitting of extra batteries. They could carry up to 82 tons of supplies plus 110 troops, and on their outer casings they could carry two 42-foot landing-craft. To help land supplies at journey's end, two big inflatable rubber rafts were also included.

Sea Devil (submarine) 300 miles east-southeast of Yokosuka, September 16,

pedoes).

1944.

At the beginning of the war the Japanese submariners had placed great hopes in their midget submarines, which also had to be carried to within range of the target by parent ships. These attacks had nearly all ended in fiasco; and the Kaiten

destroyer.

And

their

respective

fates

speak for themselves: 1-361: Sunk by carrier aircraft 400 miles south-east of Okinawa,

May

30,

1945.

1-362:

Sunk by

1-363:

Mined

U.S.S. Fleming (destroyer escort) 320 miles north-north-east of Truk, January 18, 1945.

Kyushu, October

off

29,

1945.

1-365:

1945.

Surrendered and scrapped in U.S.A. 1-370: Sunk by U.S.S. Finnegan (destroyer escort) 120 miles south of Iwo Jima, February 26, 1945. 1-371: Torpedoed by U.S.S. Lagarto (submarine) in the Bungo Straits, February 24, 1945. 1-372: Sunk by carrier aircraft at Yokosuka, July 18, 1945. These melancholy figures show the appalling wastage of the Japanese submarine force in the closing months of the war. But one further bizarre refinement lay in store for Japan's submarines. This was part and parcel of the kamikaze programme as it affected the Navy, and it involved the modification of submarines to carry Kaiten (one-man suicide tor-

These 12 submarines were all launched during 1944, the last of them, 1-372, on November 8. Not one of them could have threatened so much as an American

1-364:

Japanese submarines), April 1946. Surrendered to U.S. 1-367: Survived. Navy and sunk (with the bulk of the captured Japanese submarines), April 1946. 1-368: Sunk by carrier aircraft, 35 miles west of Iwo Jima, February 27, captured

Torpedoed by U.S.S.

Torpedoed by U.S.S. Scabbardfish (submarine) of Yokosuka,

1-366: Survived.

75

miles

south-east

November

Surrendered

28, 1944.

to

U.S.

Navy and sunk (with the bulk of the

1-369: Survived.

^ An American submarine commander lines up his prey. Note the men at the diving plane controls in the background.

programme

end of the war was was the logical development of the myopia and strategic misapprehensions which had bedevilled the Imperial Japanese submarine force at the

little better. It

throughout the war. It is

necessary to catalogue the mistakes

which rendered the Japanese submarine arm virtually impotent, simply because they are matched by such a totally different story in the American camp. Even by the end of the Pacific war, the American submarine force in the Pacific was only a tiny fraction of the total American naval strength in the theatre: a mere two per cent. Yet that two per cent achieved one of the biggest feats in naval history.

A Kairyu suicide craft photographed in Yokosuka after the end of the war. The type was based loosely on the Type A midget submarine, and the first prototype was built late in 1943. Full scale production got

under way in February 1945, and by the end of the war 215 had been completed.

The type displaced 19\ tons submerged, had a diving depth of 330 feet and a submerged range of 36 miles at 3 knots, of two

and an armament

18-inch torpedoes or a 1,320-lb

charge in the nose. were carried.

Two crew

equipped by sea. Yet the Japanese, for all the matchless fighting tradition of their Navy, committed one of the most appalling blunders in naval history -one which, as Tojo admitted, helped lose them the warin failing to safeguard their mercantile shipping^.

They did not

sail their ships in

convoy;

and they did not, in consequence, develop any effective anti-submarine techniques.

The result was a gift for the aggressive American submariners, who ended the war being credited with the destruction of 63 per cent of Japanese shipping. When itemised, this percentage is seen to be made up of 1,152 Japanese merchantmen of over 500 tons, a total of 4,861,317 gross tons. And the bulk of these sinkings was

Once the desperate situation of summer 1942 had been retrieved for the U.S. Pacific Fleet by Midway, conditions were ripe for its submarine force to go into action on the offensive. And everything was on the U.S. side. If we agree that the Japanese made fatal mistakes in the basic use of their

of the American submarines British and Dutch submarines operating out of the Indian Ocean also drew blood, but their credited "kills" only made up about two per cent of the

own

already scheduled to receive one of the most successful "production-line" class of warship ever produced: the "Gato" class submarines. These boats displaced 1,525/2,415 tons, with a waterline length of 307 feet; they could make 20^ knots on diesel and 10 knots on electric motors. Their armament concentrated on the submarine's main punch: torpedoes. They carried ten 21-

submarines,

it

must be concluded

that these were nothing to the errors made in safeguarding their own shipping

from enemy submarine attacks. The victories won b.y the Japanese down to Coral Sea and Midway had given them an empire consisting of the western half of the Pacific Ocean, punctuated by dots It was a sea empire, whose "provinces" could only be supplied and

of land.

the

work The

alone.

total.

it

The U.S. Navy was fortunate that when went to war its submarine arm was

2411

inch tubes (two more, be it noted, than the gross Japanese I-400's. In addition they had a 5-inch gun and a 40-mru quick-firer. A total of 200 Gato's had been launched by the time of the Japanese surrender, and 27 "Tench" class boats, the latter

being improved Gato's. It is significant, as an indication of the fantastic output of the United States' warship-building pro-

gramme, that all these submarines were produced from the same number of yards as the Japanese possessed. America's submarines as totalled above came from the yards of Manitowoc, Mare Island, Electric Boat, Portsmouth, Cramp, and Boston; Japan's from Kure, Sasebo, Mitsubishi, Yokosuka, and the two Kawasaki yards at Kobe and Senshu. It is interesting that in the beginning the American submariners were bedevilled by the same defect which limited the early successes of the U-boat commanders

of

World War

II:

faulty torpedoes.

They

tended to run too deep and suffer from temperamental magnetic pistols. (The Japanese, by comparison, had the decisive upper hand in torpedoes with their oxygen-propelled "Long Lance", used to such deadly effect by their surface ships in the Battle of the Java Sea and in the Solomons battles.) This, however, did not prevent them from wreaking havoc among the isolated Japanese merchantmen. Topscoring submarine of the "Gato" class boats was Flasher, which sank 21 ships totalling 100,231 tons; four others of the same class-Rasher, Tang, Silversides, and Barb-a\\ managed to score total "kills" of over 90,000 tons. American tactics were far more aggressive than those of their opposite numbers. One obvious reason for this was the invaluable aid of radar- both air-search and surface-search -which began to be installed in American submarines from 1942. But in general the Japanese pro-

duced few enterprising submarine commanders of the calibre of Commander Tanabe of 1-168, who evaded destruction at Midway by diving into his own diesel smoke and hiding under the American destroyers searching for him. The Americans, on the other hand, produced commanders who became adept at the daring "down the throat" shot-surfacing directly ahead of a charging enemy and torpedoing head on. Slightly less hairraising was the "up the kilt" shot from astern.

The losses of the Japanese Dl boats quoted above contain other evidence. 2412

Three of the sunk boats were the victims of American submarines; two were sunk by American escort destroyers, by 1944 and 1945 an essential part of the carrier task force's screen. Certainly the biggest "kill" scored in a single American submarine attack came on November 29, 1944, when Archerfish put four torpedoes into the giant new carrier Shinano and sank her off the Japanese coast. Such, in outline, is the unsung story of the submarine war in the Pacific, which played so great a part in the defeat of Japan. On the Japanese side there was a confused and short-sighted blend of the old and the new; on the other there was unchallengeable technical superiority, wielded bv masters of their trade.

A The end of the road for the depleted remnants of Japan's submarine striking force: the 1-400, 1-401,

and

1-14 (left to

moored alongside the U.S. submarine tender Proteus.

right)

1-400 and 1-401 were sister ships and are described in the text, and 1-14 was one of four Type units: I-l and 1-15 were not completed. 1-13 was sunk on December 16, 1944, and 1-14 was

AM

surrendered at sea. The boats of this class

had a

displacement of 4,762 tons submerged, low speeds of 16iJ5h knots, and an armament of one 5.5-inch and seven 25-mm guns, plus six 21-tubes (12 torpedoes) and two seaplanes.

CHAPTER 158

TheBritish Pacific Fleet by Captain Donald Macintyre

The crucial Allied agreement on how World War II should be conducted was that the war in the Pacific should be subordinated to the defeat of Germany. Nevertheless, when the naval war in European waters had turned decisively in favour of the Allies in September 1943 with the defeat of the U-boat campaign in the Atlantic and the elimination of the Italian fleet in the Mediterranean, Winston Churchill at once offered to President Roosevelt to send a squadron to the Pacific.

The motive behind this offer was twoThere was a genuine desire to repay the generous assistance Britain had received from the United States; there was

fold.

V

Fleet

Air

Arm

fighters on the

Corsair

hangar deck of a

carrier of the British Pacific Note the variation on the

Fleet.

ordinary roundel, with the red centre deleted to avoid confusion with the Japanese hinomaru or "meatball" markings.

also the need to restore British prestige in the Orient by sharing in the defeat of Japan. A distinct lack of enthusiasm

with which this proposal was regarded by the all-powerful head of the U.S. Navy, Admiral Ernest J. King, had a similarly complex source. King's single-minded

devotion to the Navy he served was coloured by a widely-felt and long-standing jealousy of the Royal Navy's erstwhile domination of the oceans of the world. He was determined that its eclipse behind the newly arisen sea power of the United States should be permanent. At the same time he was convinced that the Royal Navy, experienced in and trained and equipped for the relatively short-range warfare in European and Atlantic waters, could not be re-shaped and re-equipped in time to fight effectively in the vast spaces of the Pacific. King correctly appreciated that the British would find it very difficult to build up the essential logistic organisation. Apart from the establishment of huge stocks of stores and equipment at a main base-in this case Sydney, N.S.W., many thousands of miles from their source-it required the onward transport of such supplies via an advanced base, a further 2,000 miles (in the event it was to be 3,500 miles) to the operational area. In fact, a huge fleet of repair ships, store carriers, ferry carriers, ammunition ships, fast tankers, amenity ships, harbour service craft, the whole known as the "Fleet Train", would have to be procured. The majority of these would be merchant ships. And as, by an early agreement when

the United States entered the war, the building of standard merchant ships had been made exclusively a task for American shipyards, while British yards concentrated mainly on warships, and as British merchantmen were for the most part worn out by five hard years of war, ships of the Fleet Train would have to come mainly out of the American building

programme. Nevertheless, by September 1944, Churchill, when offering to place the British main fleet under United States supreme command to operate against the Japanese in the Pacific, felt able to state that an adequate Fleet Train had been assembled. In November of that year the British Pacific Fleet was formed at Colombo with Admiral Sir Bruce Eraser as

Commander-in-Chief. It was to be centred upon a squadron under RearAdmiral Sir Philip Vian, composed of the its

fleet

carriers Indefatigable, Illustrious,

2413

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Victorious, and Indomitable, to be joined later by the Formidable and Implacable.

Designed in 1936 with the possibility of Italy in mind, and the likelihood of having to operate within range of superior, shore-based air forces,

war with Germany and

these

ships

incorporated

a

thickly-

armoured

flight-deck. In the first four to be built this restricted them to a single

hangar and

to

an

aircraft

complement of

about 50, as compared with the 100 aircraft in two hangars in the U.S.S. Essex and her numerous sisters, where the flight deck was a light structure with a wooden deck. The Indefatigable and Implacable were modified to give them an extra half-hangar and a complement of 72 aircraft. British battleships, an essential part of any carrier task force, were slower than American contemporaries.

By this stage of the war a programme of re-equipment of the Fleet Air Arm with American types of carrier aircraft- Hellcat and Corsair fighters and Avenger torpedo-bombers -was in progress. These were to take the place of the Seafires and Sea Hurricanes, unsuitable adaptations of R. A.F. fighters, and the unsuccessful Barracuda torpedo-bombers which were all that the British aircraft industry had been

able to provide. Not only did the British aircraft lack the robustness necessary for deck operation, but their fuel endurance was also less than that of American types. Unfortunately only four of the carriers were to be re-equipped before the B.P.F. joined the 5th Fleet-with consequences which will be discussed later. An escort of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers would support the carriers. As Fraser would be too senior to serve directly under

A The battleship Howe passes through the Suez Canal en route to the Far East. < < Preparing for a mission on board a British carrier operating in the Pacific.

fleet commander, he was to his flag ashore while Vice-Admiral

an American fly

Sir Bernard Rawlings with his flag in the battleship King George V would command the British Pacific Fleet at sea.

This

fleet,

steadily built

based on Colombo, was up and trained through the

autumn and winter of 1944. It was "blooded" and trained in a series of carrier strike operations directed at the Japanese-held oil installations in Sumatra and Java. The new methods and tempo of carrier operations which had been evolved in the Pacific War were exercised; and when the fleet reached Sydney on February 10, 1945, it felt ready to operate alongside the U.S. 5th Fleet in the current operations to capture Okinawa. Whether this could be effectively done, however, was

2415

< and > Carrier operations. V Resupply at sea for a British destroyer.

One

of the

main

disadvantages under which the B.P.F. had to operate was the inadequacy of its Supply Train of depot ships

and

iiX

t

s.>-'*m

h>

auxiliaries.

to depend to a crucial degree upon how ready the Fleet Train was to give its

essential support.

When the B.P.F. moved

forward to the advanced base of Manus in the Admiralty Islands, it was to be sadly disappointed in this respect. Out of 69 ships earmarked for the Fleet Train, only 27 had arrived, many of the remainder having been delayed by the chronic labour troubles of the Sydney waterfront.

Under these conditions and in the humid heat of a climate for which the British warships were ill-adapted, it was deeply disappointing to be delayed because of an apparently continuing unwillingness of the American allies to welcome them. Admiral King, knowing the B.P.F.'s logistic weakness, was still holding out for it to be used as part of the U.S. 7th Fleet in General MacArthur's South-West Pacific Command in the less-sophisticated naval task involved in the re-conquest of Borneo. Not until March 18 were his objections overborne and, under orders to form part of the U.S. 5th Fleet, the British force sailed from Manus as Task Force 57 on the 23rd. Admiral Vian commanded the carrier squadron with his flag in the 23,000 ton Indomitable. The aircraft comnlement of the four carriers

2418

was

Indefatigable

as folio

s

Fighters 40 Seafires

Bombers 20 Avengers

9 Fireflies

36 Corsairs 16 Avengers Indomitable 29 Hellcats 15 Avengers Victorious 37 Hellcats 14 Avengers Though the B.P.F. was nominally a Task Force, it was less than equivalent to one of the four Task Groups of which Task Force 58, the 5th Fleet's carrier element, was composed. It was placed under the command of the C.-in-C. 5th Illustrious

Fleet, Admiral Spruance, but its tactical control was reserved to Admiral Rawlings. Combined with the well-founded doubts of the Americans that the lessexperienced and, in some ways, less wellequipped British carriers, their speed restricted by the comparatively slow escorting battleships, could operate effec-

tively in close conjunction with their

Task Groups,

own

this resulted in the British

force operating at this time independently and against a separate complex of targets. While the main body of the 5th Fleet operated in direct support of the assault on Okinawa, the B.P.F. struck at airfields in the Sakashima group of islands to the southward, which the Japanese used as staging points for their aircraft. The first strike was flown off at sunrise on March 26, 1945, when 60 Corsairs and Hellcats and 24 Avengers attac'ked air-

A Grumman Avenger bombers

off

torpedo-

on a strike.

deck

fuelling at sea (when the lack of experience in all concerned and the unreliable equip-

struck the carrier's superstructure as it crashed alongside. The several kamikaze attempts on that day, of which this came nearest to success, were only the back-wash of the first massed attack, or kikusui, by some 355 kamikaze planes and an equal number of normal bombers on the 5th Fleet. Their attack fell chiefly on the air warning pickets of destroyers maintained at a distance from the fleet. Three of these were sunk as well as three destroyers of the circular screen round the carriers; 18 more were damaged. Other kikusui attacks were to follow and would continue until well into June. In that period no less than 27 ships were to be sunk by suicide attacksandl64damaged, including several American carriers, whose unarmoured flight decks made them very

ment and methods employed were

V Bombs burst along a runway on Ishagaki Island in the Sakishima group during a British carrier strike intended to draw Japanese reinforcements away from the landings on Okinawa.

now justified itself, preventing cripp-

on Miyako Island. Seafires, on account of their poor endurance, were kept airborne over the fleet as Combat Air Patrol; they were to be restricted to this defensive role throughout the campaign. With two-day intervals for refields

ex-

posed) similar strikes were repeated over the next 26 days. The targets allocated had proved disappointing; few enemy aircraft were encountered, while the coral airfield runways, cratered during the day, were repaired each night before daylight. On the other hand the ground defences were far from negligible and a number of carrier planes were shot down. And on April 1 the B.P.F. had its first experience of attack by Japanese suicide planes -the kamikaze. Early that morning one of these broke through the fighter defence to crash and explode against the base of the Indefatigable 's island, killing 14 men and injuring 16 more. The armoured flight

damage; within a few hours the ship was again operational. In a second attack on the 6th, this time on the Illustrious, the suicide bomber just failed to hit the flight deck, though its wing actually ling

V Firefighters at work after a kamikaze has crashed onto a British carrier. It was in such circumstances that the armoured decks of the British fleet carriers proved their worth.

flight

vulnerable. As early as the second week in April the American C.-in-C. was having to consider withdrawal of the fleet from the operations. To assist his defence arrangements, the B.P.F.'s targets were switched on April 12 and 13 to airfields in the northern part of Formosa whence it was believed that many of the most experienced enemy attacks were coming. The raids were successful, with 16 Japanese planes shot down for the loss of only three British. They drew down on the British carriers some determined attacks in return, all of which were defeated by fighters of the C.A.P. or shot down by gunfire. The first period of duty for the B.P.F. should have ended on the 13th, but to relieve the pressure on the 5th Fleet from the massed attacks which went on throughout the 14th, Admiral Rawlings offered to return for a further period after refuelling on the 14th and 15th, an offer which was readily accepted. Finally, on April 20, after gathering in the last returning aircraft, the B.P.F. shaped course for San Pedro Bay, Leyte, for a brief period of rest and replenishment.

There the Formidable, carrying six Helland 36 Corsair fighters and 12 Aven-

cat

gers, joined to replace the Illustrious,

which was by this time in need of a refit and whose fighter squadrons had passed the accepted limit for an operational tour of duty. And on May 1 the B.P.F. sailed again to resume the task of neutralising the Sakishima airfields. Nothing has been said up to now about the two battleships, five cruisers, and 11 destroyers of the fleet. Their functions were almost entirely in support of the carrier squadron, the battleships and cruisers with their antiaircraft gunfire, the destroyers to guard against submarine attack (which in fact never materialised) and to act as distant air-warning pickets to back up the overcrowded radar information. Now, how-

ever,

some

on May 4, Admiral Rawlings brought

fresh interest into the lives of the larger ships by taking the battleships King George V and Howe and his cruisers to bombard the airfields on Miyako. While this large proportion of the fleet's anti-aircraft gunnery strength was away, a kamikaze attack managed to evade the C.A.P. A Zero fighter and its bombs

crashed onto the Formidable, holing even her stout armoured flight deck: splinters penetrated the ship's central boiler room and her speed was reduced to 18 knots. Eight men were killed and 47 more injured. Eleven aircraft on deck were destroyed. Yet within 90 minutes the Formidable was living up to her name, steaming at 24 knots and operating her aircraft. During the same attack another suicide pilot had attempted to do the same to the Indomitable but bounced over the side before his bomb exploded, doing only minor damage. Until May 25 Task Force 57 repeated its previous operational pattern with two days delivering strikes on enemy airfields followed by two days of replenishment.

On May 9 the Formidable was hit again squarely on her flight deck in the middle of her parked aircraft, 18 of which were destroyed. But 50 minutes later she was ready to operate aircraft. At about the same time a kamikaze exploded near the forward lift of the Victorious. The deck was holed and a serious fire started. Two minutes later a second bomber crashed the ship but bounced over the side before exploding. The Victorious was only out of action for a short while. But both she and the Formidable had lost so many aircraft that they had to withdraw for three days to rendezvous with a ferry carrier of the Fleet Train and embark more. The last strikes by British planes in the Okinawa campaign were delivered on

May 25, after which Task Force 57 shaped course for Sydney for repairs and recreation in preparation for the coming assault on the Japanese homeland. As the Indomitable was in need of a refit, her place was to be taken by the newly arrived Implacable, whose aircraft complement was 48 Seafires, 12 Fireflies, and 15 Avengers. Admiral Vian shifted his flag to the Formidable. While the remainder of the fleet was at Sydney, the newly-joined Implacable and three cruisers, Newfoundland the New Zealand Achilles, and the Canadian Uganda were given some operational training and experience in an air strike and bombardment on the Japanese base at Truk in the Carolines on June 14. By the end of the month the B.P.F. had re-assembled at Manus. When they sailed for the operational area on July 6, however, the Indefatigable had to be left behind owing to a breakdown of all her air compressors. Thus it was a force of only three carriers, ,

with one battleship,

five cruisers, and 18 destroyers which on July 16, 1945 made rendezvous with the American force, now designated the 3rd Fleet, under Admiral William F. Halsey. This called for a change of the B.P.F.'s Task Force number to 37. A change in the command structure was to take place also. How it came about, the American C.-in-C. reveals in his autobiographical Admiral Halsey 's Story: "When I was informed at Pearl Harbor that the British Pacific Fleet would report to me, I naturally^ assumed that I would have full operational control, but when I re-read the plan at Leyte, I discovered that tactical control had been reserved. This would force me to present Admiral Rawlings with three alternatives and I did so now. 1. Task Force 37 would operate close aboard us as another Task Group in Task Force 38: it would not receive direct orders from me, but it would be privy to the orders I gave Task Force 38. These it would consider as suggestions to be followed to our mutual advantage, thereby assuring us a concentrated force with concentrated weapons. 2. Task Force 37 would operate semiindependently some 60 to 70 miles away, thereby preserving its technical identity at the cost of a divided force. (I stipulated that I would consent to this choice only if the request were put in writing.) 3. Task Force 37 would operate completely independently against soft spots in

Japan which we would recommend

if

so desired. Rawlings did not hesitate. He said, 'Of course, I'll accept No. 1'. My admiration for him began at that moment." So, though the arrangement went far beyond what had been agreed at the highest levels, the B.P.F. was virtually absorbed into the U.S. 5th Fleet. No doubt it was inspired by Admiral Spruance's statement at the end of T.F.57's period under his overall command, that "the B.P.F. had gained sufficient experience to form part of the United States First Carrier Force". This was a real compliment to a force which had had to absorb in three months the expertise of carrier warfare over the vastness of the Pacific which the Americans had had more than three years to perfect. The B.P.F. accepted the situation with enthusiasm and strove to operate with

A Burial

at sea.

2421

V

Hellcat fighters line up for

take-off.

the same slick efficiency as their allies in spite of the very real handicaps of slower ships, of a multiplicity of aircraft types, of the need to fly aircraft on and off at shorter intervals owing to the low endurance of the Seafires, and the slower, less well-equipped tankers which made every refuelling an occasion for contrivance and improvisation followed by a high-speed dash through the night to rejoin the American part of the fleet. The massed air attacks by the Japanese had petered out by the end of June. Now, until the end of the campaign, though there was still need for a defensive C.A.P. overhead (48 enemy aircraft were shot down over the fleet during July and August), the majority of the B.P.F.'s aircraft joined in the steady pounding of Japanese ports, shipping, and facilities which was intended as preparation for the final invasion. Surviving units of the Japanese fleet were sought out and made the object of special attention until all had been destroyed. On the night of July 18, the King George V and two Common-

wealth cruisers joined with American

heavy units to hurl some 2,000 tons of shell into a factory area near Tokyo. On July 20 the Indefatigable rejoined, having completed repairs. Meanwhile large reinforcements for the B.P.F. were gathering in Australian waters. They included the battleships Duke of York and Anson, the new light fleet

carriers

Venerable, Colossus, and

Vengeance, and a number of cruisers and destroyers. They were too late to take an active part in the Pacific War.

On August 6 and 9, respectively, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed by atomic bombs; but it was not until the 14th that the Japanese capitulation was confirmed and operations ceased. From Task Force 37 a Task Group consisting of the Indefatigable, the battleship Duke of York, two cruisers, and ten destroyers was formed to remain with the 5th Fleet

and be present at the formal Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay. The remainder returned to Sydney -a first stop on the return journey to England.

-CHAPTER

I

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A On the Salween front in north Burma: men of Marshal Wei Li-huang's "Y" Force, an army group 72,000-men strong operating from Yunnan, move up supplies. Early in 1944

"Y"

Force was authorised to advance south into Burma to link up with the Sino-American forces under Lieutenant-General Joseph Stilwell, finally freeing

Burma Road from Japanese control. Previous page: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Chinese war effort against Japan the vital

since 1937.

2424

Japan had been pursuing a policy of economic penetration and military intervention in China since 1931. Her victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 had established her as a great power, and during the next quarter of a century,

Japan had become a powerful military and industrial nation. China, however, was still an ancient empire, stagnant and decaying, and did not progress at anything like the same rate as Japan during this period, although in the late 1920's, most of China was united under the political and military leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who initiated a programme of military, economic, and industrial reform. In December 1936, Chiang reached agreement with Mao Tse-tung to end the civil war with the Communists, and it was at this point that Japan decided to overthrow Chiang and capture

China. This was, in

effect,

the start of

World War II. Japanese troops, ostensibly on night training manoeuvres, attacked unwary Chinese troops guarding the

Marco Polo Bridge at Lukouchiao, near Peking (Peiping) on July 7, 1937. Fighting intensified as the Japanese Government refused the Chinese National Government's offer to negotiate, and sent more

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troops to northern China. Japan refused to admit she was involved in a war, although her troops occupied Peking and Tientsin, saying they were merely reestablishing law and order in China.

The Chinese National Government's army numbered two million poorly trained and equipped troops. The Chinese Communist army, comprising 150,000 guerrilla

^

in north-west China, at first supported Chiang against the Japanese, but they too lacked modern equipment. There were no trained reserves, no navy, and only a few obsolete aircraft with inexperienced Chinese and foreign mercenary pilots. Raw materials existed, but factories capable of turning these into weapons did not. China's great asset was

troops

A Chinese troops move up towards the front in Yunnan in 1943.

2425

TICIPAfING

IN

NATIONAL

WAP FUND

< < An American poster

calls

for help for China, the first

nation to resist Japanese aggression. < Three men of a Chinese airtransportable infantry unit inspect the device on an

American airman's flying jacket. This notice told the reader

was and was intended to safeguard American aircrew in that the wearer of the jacket

friendly,

the event of their being forced

down

in an area whose inhabitants were unfamiliar with Americans and did not know of the existence of the war. The

aircraft to

move Chinese

air-

transportable infantry came from the India-China Wing, Air

Command, U.S.A.A.F. V The Americans supplied the Chinese Army with most of its Transport

equipment, and set up training establishments to teach the use of modern weapons. Here Brigadier-General Thomas S. Arms, head of such a school in Kwangsi Province, shows an

American

rifle to

Chiang

Kai-shek (in cape). At the left is General Pai Ch'eng-hsi, deputy chief-of-staff of the Chinese Army.

V Chiang Ka\ shek and Lt.-Gen. Albert C. W^demeyer. In autumn 1944, the Japanese launched a major offensive in East China, and when Roosevelt suggested that Stilwell be appointed head of all Allied forces in China in an effort to halt

demanded

it,

Chiang

Stilwell's recall.

On

October 18 he was replaced by Wedemeyer, then a majorgeneral, as Chiang's chief-of-staff of the new China Theatre that replaced the China-Burma-India Theatre. > > Chinese troops watch a

and head

training exercise.

> V Ceremony

to

mark

the

arrival of the first convoy over the Stilwell Road from Namkam to Kunming on February 4, 1945.

2428

her population of 500,000,000, but her agriculture could produce barely enough food for all these people. Japan's army consisted of about 300,000 regular troops, equipped with modern weapons, and 150,000 Mongolian and Manchurian troops, commanded by Japanese officers. Japan had two million reserves, a powerful, modern navy, and efficient air arms. Her factories were capable of turning out considerable quantities of weapons and equipment although she was dependent on foreign sources for

raw materials. Japan was confident of victory. Troops were landed at Shanghai on August 8, 1937, but met determined Chinese resisttance. Japanese reinforcements were

rushed to Shanghai, but even so, the Japanese were pinned to their beachheads outside the city for several weeks, and Shanghai was not captured until November 8. The Japanese then advanced up the Yangtze river towards Nanking, the capital, which fell on December 13, and the invading troops ran amok for several days. Chiang, however, had moved his capital to Hankow in central China, and to the surprise of the rest of the world, the government did not collapse. More fighting followed, and eventually Chinese regular forces and guerrillas under General Li Tsung-jen defeated a Japanese force of 60,000 in the Battle of Taierchwang. This victory did much for Chinese

morale. The Japanese, though, were even

/

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Chinese gun crew in action

with an American-supplied M3 105-mm howitzer on the Burma front.

^ 105-mm howitzers and their Chinese Expeditionary Force crews at an American training centre in India during 1943.

2430

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was born in 1887 and led the Chinese opposition to the Japanese invaders

throughout the war. When Japan invaded China in 1937, Chiang was head of the ruling

Kuomintang

Party,

with his capital at Nanking.

With the overrunning and destruction of the Shanghai and Nanking areas, Chiang into the remote western reaches of China. He continued the war against Japan from his new capital, Chungking. Chiang wasmade retreated

Chairman

of the National Defence Council in 1939 and Chief of State in 1943. The Chinese struggle against Japanese aggression had long been admired by the Americans, but it was not until after

Pearl Harbor that the U.S. could send China more than volunteer aid. It was not until 1943, however,

more determined and advanced westward

river drowned many troops, and destroyed supplies, tanks, trucks, and guns. The advance was halted, and the Japanese shifted their line of advance further south, to capture Hankow on October 25, 1938. Determined Chinese

changed their strategy. In 1939 they launched more amphibious operations, hoping to capture China's remaining ports and cut off her foreign supplies, and so precipitate the downfall of Chiang and his government. Accordingly, most of the ports were taken, but China still had two supply routes via which she could obtain supplies. One was along the narrowgauge railway from Haiphong in French Indo-China to Kunming, and the other was through British Burma and then

resistance resulted in the bloodiest fighting of the war in China. Chiang's capital was moved again, to Chungking, and the Chinese implemented a scorched earth policy in front of the Japanese, who seized Canton late in 1938. Because the war was far-flung, inconclusive, and expensive, the Japanese

along the narrow, twisting Burma Road to Kunming. The Japanese soon cut the railway, and on July 18, 1940, Britain acceded to Japanese demands that the Burma Road be closed. However, it was reopened in October, after the defeat of Germany in the Battle of Britain, and with the support of America, which wished to ship

from Kaifeng to seize the important railway junction of Chengchow, preparatory to an advance down the railway to Hankow. In desperation, the Chinese broke the Yellow river dikes, and the flooding

when

it

appeared as though China might collapse, that the United States started to supply the Chinese Army on a massive scale. But this aid soon started to dry up

when

the Americans realised that there was probably a better case for developing U.S. air power in China than the none too efficient Chinese Army. Moreover, as a result of Chiang's ever worsening relations with Stilwell, his chief-of-staff, SinoAmerican relations deteriorated rapidly. But the

Americans still Chiang's China

expected be the fourth of the great powers after the war -until the Nationalists were ousted by the Communists in 1949. to

2431

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A Chinese troops training in India hear a speech from Chiang Kai-shek on December 21, 1943, in which they were told that on their arrival at the front they

would come under the overall authority of Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia.

<

March-past.

4

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It

Lend-Lease supplies to China. In late 1940, the Japanese expanded their partial occupation of Indo-China and seized air bases from which their bombers could reach the Chinese section of the Burma Road, and to protect this, the "Flying Tigers" came into being. In 1937, the Chinese Government invited recently-retired U.S. Army Air Corps Captain Claire Chennault to become its aeronautics adviser. He accepted and was appointed Colonel in the Chinese Air Force. He spent the next three years training Chinese and foreign mercenary pilots in his concepts of aerial warfare, but found it difficult to achieve decisive results while the Japanese had air superiority and he obsolete aircraft. He built up a reliable early warning system during this time by distributing radio sets to patriotic peasants, so that details of Japanese planes taking off in China could be relayed to his own headquarters, enabling his planes to get off the ground before they could be attacked. As the Chinese Air Force was not a force in being, Chennault suggested to Chiang the establishment of a special air group of trained American fighter pilots. He enlisted some 90 volunteers for this from America, in addition to 150 qualified mechanics and administrators to serve as ground support, and they were known as the American Volunteer Group (A.V.G.).

Chennault taught his team all he knew of Japanese aircraft and methods of warfare. America supplied P-40 planes under LendLease, and some of the pilots painted eyes and a row of teeth on the planes, making them look like flying tiger sharks, hence the name "Flying Tigers". In December 1941, Chennault sent one of his three squadrons to Kunming to protect the terminus of the Burma Road from air attack. Another was stationed at Mingaladon airfield in Burma to reinforce the R.A.F. The third squadron, the reserve, was rotated regularly with the others after they became active. By February 12, 1942, the "Flying Tigers" had shot down almost 100 enemy planes for a loss of 15 of their

f

•«

1-

i»

own.

The A.V.G. was disbanded in July 1942, and was superseded by the China Air Task Force (with Chennault in command), which proved a worthy successor to the

f

"Flying Tigers". The Japanese suspended their operations in China during 1942, due to other *

2434

'

offensives in south-east Asia. An occupation army of one million remained

'

y -

*v

-

•^'» China to protect towns and railways. The Chinese, however, were in no position

in

to take advantage of this inactivity, since they were desperately short of materiel and munitions. Guerrilla activity

continued unabated, however, in Japanese occupied China and in eastern China, which was cut off but not overrun by the Japanese. At first, all the Chinese forces were united against the Japanese, but

Mao

Tse-tung's

Communists

seized the

opportunity to increase their influence in areas occupied by the Japanese and thus out of contact with the National Government. In fact, guerrillas in north-western China had an unofficial truce with the Japanese, which allowed the latter to release troops from here and concentrate more forces against Chiang's army in central and southern China.

The weakness of isolated China was demonstrated by Japanese successes in minor offensives planned to give experience to new units, and also to take the Chinese rice crop. These "rice offensives" took place in unoccupied China and enabled the Japanese troops to obtain

< < Chinese poster "The American airman, remover of the Japanese yoke". :

A Smiling faces : men of the 359th Brigade of the Communist 8th Route Army with captured Japanese 7.7-mm Model 92(1932) heavy machine guns. When Japan invaded China, a truce was agreed in the civil war, and the Nationalists even went so far as to support the 8th Route Army under General Chu Teh. On September 25, 1937. in the Battle of P'inghsinkuan (in the Wutai mountains of northern Shansi) the Japanese 5th Division was defeated by General Nieh Jung-chen's 115th Division of the 8th Route Army. This was the only divisional-sized engagement fought by the Communists in the whole war. < A Min Ping militiaman with a pair of home-made land mines.

food easily, whilst depriving the Chinese.

2435

t

A How Japan's Axis partner Italy

saw

the

war

in

China: a

painting from the June edition of

Corriere

.

ha Domenica .

.

7,

1942

del

December 1943, the Chinese managed to repulse a rice offensive in the Battle of

In

Changteh. China came within the area of American strategic and logistical responsibility. In 1942, Lieutenant-General Joseph Stilwell arrived in Chungking to head an American military mission to advise the Chinese Army. Chiang immediately made Stilwell his Chief-of-Staff, and sent him straight to troops he British.

2436

Burma

to

command

the 30,000

had dispatched to help the The Chinese forces distinguished

themselves, but were forced to withdraw in the face of Japanese superiority. Stilwell learned of the Chinese will to resist. In July 1942, the U.S. created the China-

Burma-India Command, under Stilwell, and combat support to China. With ground communications to China severed by Japan's conquest of Burma, the Americans arranged a long-range supply airlift from bases in north-eastern India to Kunming. Because of Japanese bases in northern Burma, the supply planes were forced to fly at 21,000 feet and for logistical

i

more over the eastern Himalayas. This route became known as the "Hump". At first, the airlift was quite inadequate for China's needs, as not

many

planes were

available.

The supplies were needed by both Stilwell and Chennault. Chennault believed that victory could be obtained by airpower alone, and thought that he should have the bulk of the supplies, while Stilwell wanted to build up the army. He directed that supplies be shared proportionately, but Chiang disagreed and

supported Chennault. The result was that Chennault received the bulk of the "Hump" tonnage, which was increasing as more planes became available. Despite violently disagreeing with this decision, Lieutenant-General Stilwell accepted Chiang's order. Chennault was promoted and his command enlarged and redesignated the 14th Air Force in March 1943. Chennault was then able to gain air supremacy over most of China, and his bombers ranged as far as Formosa.

A

.

.

and how

the Japanese

themselves saw it: infantry follow a Type 89B "CHIRO" medium tank over an incompletely demolished bridge.

continued on page 2443

2437

SmWEll AND CHENNAUIT:

A

General Stilwell, holding an

Ml

carbine, in the front jeep

somewhere

in

Burma.

> Major-General Claire Chennault displays the newly-designed "Flying Tiger" emblem of his 14th Air Force. The badge was designed by Sergeant Howard Arnagard, seen on Chennault's right, to

commemorate the famous American Volunteer Group or "Flying Tigers", who served with the Chinese before America's entry into the war.

The personal relationships hetween Chiang Kai-shek, Lieutenant-General Joseph Stilwell, and Brigadier-General Claire Chennault played a major role in the shaping of events in the ChinaBurma-India theatre of war. From 1937, Chennault was Chiang's aeronautics adviser. He a colonel in and trained the Chinese Air Force, and he instigated the establishment of the volunteer group of American pilots who flew as the "Flying Tigers" in support of China against the Japanese. When America entered the war, this group was absorbed in the U.S.China Air Task Force, Chennault rejoining the U.S. Air Force and taking command.

became

China in head an American military mission sent out to adStilwell

1942,

2438

to

arrived in

vise the Chinese Army. Chiang appointed him his Chief-of-Staff, and in July 1942. the U.S. created the China-Burma-India Theatre,

of which Stilwell had command, give logistical and combat support to China, and for control, under the British, of American and Chinese troops in India and Burma. Stilwell was therefore responsible simultaneously to the to

American Joint Chiang, and

to

commander

Chiefs-of-Staff,

to

the

British

in India.

went straight to Burma of forces which Chiang Kai-shek had dispatched to help the British. During this time, Chennault and Stilwell met and worked together to plan the air support for ground forces in combat in Burma. The Chinese troops had to withdraw to India, and relations between Chennault Stilwell

to take

command

and Stilwell cooled as differences in their opinions over the

way

to

win the war became apparent. Japanese victory in Burma meant the closing of the Burma Road, and supplies could then only reach China by air over the Himalayas, and only in small quantities. Chennault believed his aircraft played a far more vital role than the army, and that Japan could be defeated by air power alone. He, therefore, must have the supplies. Stilwell could see the danger of the Japanese launching ground attacks to capture the airfields, and he thought the army must be equipped to meet this threat. He was also anxious to reopen the

Burma

Road so that more supplies could reach China, and wished to strengthen the Chinese land forces for an invasion of Burma.

The Americcins in China

General Joseph "Vinegar Joe" W. Stilwell was born in 1883. In World War I he had

been an Intelligence and after the end of

officer,

war

the

Chinese

specialised

13 years in

in

He served

affairs.

China between

the wars, and when the U.S. entered the war, Stilwell was given command of the American forces in the China-Burma-India theatre to bolster the Chinese and British. In 1942 Stilwell was Kaiappointed Chiang chief-of-staff. At first major task was the safeguarding of the Burma Road,

shek's his

the vital supply artery along which materiel was moved into China. But the Japanese proved too strong, and Stilwell's men were forced back into India, where the Chinese

Expeditionary

Force

was

trained and equipped by the U.S. in preparation for the counter-offensive. In 1944 the

Japanese launched a major offensive in China, and when they overran the areas in which the U.S. 14th Air Force's bases were located, the Americans suggested to Chiang that Stilwell be made commander of all Chinese, as well as American, forces in China. Chiang refused vehemently and in

October demanded Stilwell's He was replaced by Major-General Albert C.

recall.

Wedemeyer.

Stilwell's final

post was as the commander of the U.S. 10th Army in the Pacific from

war-time

June

1945.

whom made

A

hard

difficult situation

war

man

with

to deal. Stilwell had the best of a very

during the

in China.

2439

Chinese American groundcrew work on a P-40 of the 76th Fighter Group at Kunming in

A

Stilwell used his authority

at

directed that the supplies be divided proportionately. Chiang entered the argument

November

1942.

From

left to

right

they are Staff Sergeants Pak On Lee of Portland, Oregon, George Lunn of New York, and Philip Pon of New York.

and

point. He agreed with Chennault, and thought that great dividends came from airpower. He also wanted to spare

at this

the army as much as possible, and disagreed with many of Stilwell's ideas on the reorganisation of the

Chinese

Army.

The American

however, agreed with Stilwell, and directed that

Joint

Chiefs,

supplies be shared. Chiang

2440

was

not content with this decision, and Chinese diplomats brought pressure to bear on President Roosevelt, who sided with Chiang. As the result, Chennault had his way. He was promoted, and his command was enlarged and renamed the 14th Air Force on

March

10, 1943.

was very annoyed, but he obeyed the order, and henceforth, fuel and Chennault's ammunition requirements got priority over all other necessary supplies. Chennault was then Stilwell

able to gain air supremacy over most of China. Because of the diversion of supplies from the army to the air

Chiang would not permit Chinese troops in China to participate in Stilwell's planned two-pronged offensive into north Burma, and only with reluctance did he countenance the advance of Chinese troops from India, force,

since this would not affect the supplies to China. A further problem was the deteriorating relations between

Wy^CfflflfAIR FORCE flAS DONE TO TtlE

the Nationalist Chinese and the

Communists, which led Chiang to establish blockade of a Communist-held regions of China, thus diverting troops from fighting the Japanese. Chiang resented Stilwell's efforts to withdraw these troops, and he rejected Stilwell's suggestion that the Communists be incorporated into the Nationalist Army. Stilwell was dismayed by the incompetence and corruption which existed in the army. Chiang and Stilwell therefore

became

bitter personal enemies.

that supplies to China be shared

Stilwell's prediction that the

between ground and air forces. He and the Joint Chiefs recommended to Chiang that Stilwell

Japanese would attempt to capture the air bases in China was well founded, and Chinese resistence disintegrated in front of the advancing Japanese. All through the summer of 1944, Stilwell and his staff vainly

recommended various measures to Chiang for an effective defence. The American Government was ver\' alarmed lest China collapse totally. Roosevelt saw now that Stilwell had been right in urging

be placed in full command of all the armed forces in China. Chiang refused flatly, and demanded the recall of Stilwell to the United States and that another general be sent out in his place. Roosevelt had no option but to comply with Chiang's wishes, and on October 18.

1944,

Stilwell

was

m

A A The 14ih Air Force's early combat record.

A P-40 fighters of the American Volunteer Group take off on a sortie against the Japanese.

recalled.

His place was taken by MajorGeneral Albert Wedemever.

2441

Major -General Claire L. Chennault was born in 1898 and organised the American Volunteer Group (or "Flying to serve with the Chinese before the United

Tigers"")

States entered the war. In after America 1942, had entered the war, the American Volunteer Group was amalgamated into the

July

rest of the U.S.A.A.F. forces

now

serving in China. By that time, however, they had succeeded in destroying 300 Japanese aircraft, thus slowing the Japanese advance. In 1943 Chennault was made a major-general and given command of the U.S. 14th (Volunteer) Army Air Force in China, and took part in the Washington Conference on Far Eastern strategy. By July 1943 Chennault's pilots had won air superiority in Eastern China, and thereafter supported the Chinese Army in its struggle to drive the Japanese back into the sea. In July 1945, however, after he had refused to disband the Sino- American wing of the Chinese air force, Chennault resigned his command of the 14th Air Force.

> Key man in China's early struggle against Japan : Lt.-General Joseph W. Stilwell. 2442

continued from page 2437

high explosive bombing attacks. Stilwell predicted that the Japanese would attempt to capture the air bases by level,

Japanese offensive Early in 1944, 20th Bomber Command came to the Chinese theatre with new B-29 "Superfortress" bombers, able to fly at 350 mph and to carry 20,000 pounds of bombs to targets over 1,500 miles from their bases. In June, they commenced the mission assigned to them at the Cairo Conference, namely to attack the home islands of Japan from bases in China. For this purpose, extra-long runways were constructed by Chinese coolies in Ch'eng-tu, and from here, 68 Superfortresses set off on their first raid on Japan on June 15 to hit a steel plant on the Japanese island of Kyushu. Owing to the difficulty of transporting supplies over the "Hump", the main bases of the B-29's were in India. Between raids on Japan, the B-29's attacked Japanese bases in south-east Asia from Calcutta. Commanding 20th Bomber Command was MajorGeneral Curtis LeMay. He and Chennault worked together on joint operations and tried out a new bombing method with lowlevel incendiary attacks instead of high-

ground attack, and to meet this threat, the Chinese Army must be built up. Events were to prove him right. In the winter of 1943 and early spring 1944, the Japanese conducted a number of offensives. On May 27, 1944, the Japanese 11th Army, 250,000 strong, initiated a south-westward drive from Hankow to Ch'ang-sha. On the same day, the 23rd Army, 50,000 strong, struck west from the Canton area. This was the first large-scale offensive since 1938, and at first, Chinese resistance was stubborn, helped by the air attacks of Chennault's pilots. However, Ch'ang-sha fell on June 19. The Japanese met strong resistance at Heng-yang, which fell only after an 11-day siege, but after this, Chinese resistance disintegrated and seven of the

A The

re-assembly of a

dismantled jeep, after U had been carried over a mountain by porter.

U.S. Air Force's 12 bases fell into Japanese hands. The invaders then turned west

towards Kunming and Chungking. Stilwell desperately tried to reorganise the Chinese to resist more effectively, but there was little he could do about equipment as Chennault had claim to most of the supplies arriving over the "Hump".

2443

< A General Wedemeyer addresses men of the U.S. Nth Air Force at their base at Hsi-an in Shen.'ii. < With a singular lack of heavy construction equipment in China, some 300,000 Chinese men and women were drafted in to build airfields for the U.S. Air Force by hand. As soon as a runway was finished, the labourers moved on to build another, and U. S. aircraft started to operate against the Japanese. Seen here is a B-24 Liberator, a type that

performed sterling work theatre.

?M^'

in this

i

i

•r

^..

The inability of the Chinese to stop the Japanese alarmed Washington. Stilwell vainly recommended various measures to Chiang to reconstitute an effective defence. urged President Roosevelt Chiang to grant Stilwell full command of all armed forces in China. Chiang and Stilwell were bitter personal enemies, and Chiang answered Roosevelt's plea with the request that Stilwell be recalled to America and replaced by another American general. Stilwell was consequently relieved on October 18, 1944, and the

China-Burma-India

Command was

solved. Major-General Albert

dis-

Wedemeyer

replaced Stilwell as commander of a new China Theatre, and as Chief-of-Staff to Chiang.

The Japanese drove on. In November, they captured Kuei-lin, Liu-chou, Manning. The 14th Air Force was driven out of eastern China and forced back into the south, where the bases used by the B-29's were available, as 20th Bomber

A Chinese groundcrew at work on an American-supplied aircraft under the watchful eye of a sentry. Note the camouflaged dispersal huts.

Command

was transferred to the Marianas early in 1945. In mid December, the Japanese advanced towards Kuei-yang, Kunming, and Chungking. Wedemeyer, however, got on with Chiang rather better than Stil2445

'^^ well had done, and persuaded Chiang to agree to the transferoftwoveteranChinese divisions from the Burma front, and these troops became the backbone of a revitalised defence. Forces were also brought from other parts of China, and in December, the strengthened Chinese ground forces, supported by the 14th Air Force, counter-attacked eastofKuei-yang, and this stabilised the situation. The immediate danger of complete defeat and the collapse of China was averted. The strength of the opposition at Kuei-yang surprised the Japanese, and they called off their offensive to reorganise their forces and strengthen their lines of communication. General Wedemeyer took advantage of the lull to reorganise the Chinese forces. He had an easier time than Stilwell, as the land supply route to China was now open again as a result of the successful Allied offensives in northern Burma.

January and February 1945 saw renewed Japanese offensives in south-east China, when Japanese troops made wide gains in the coastal regions between Hankow and the French Indo- China border. Three more 14th Air Force bases were captured. The railway line from Han-yang to Canton was also captured at this time. Chinese troops here were completely cut off from western China, and so had received very little new equipment, and were thus unable to stop the Japanese advance, despite repeated attacks by the 14th Air Force. In late March, the Japanese attacked on a broad front between the Yellow and Yangtze rivers in order to capture the American air bases at Laohokow and An-k'ang. This move surprised the Allies, and the Japanese netted the rice crops and captured Laohokow town and airfield.

Wedemeyer and Chiang rushed

< A Chinese-manned American M5 Stuart light tank on the Burma front. A American tactical

training

for the Chinese: Lieutenant

William

S.

Alabama,

Levey of Birmingham, lectures on grand

with the aid of Captain Shien Pei as interpreter.

tactics

reinforce-

2447

> American M5 the

move

in

light tanks

on

China.

V Sergeant Elmer J. Pence adds a "kill" symbol to the side of a Curtiss P-40 fighter of the 26th Fighter Squadron of the 51st Fighter Group in China. > V Captain Paul N. Bell in the cockpit of his P-40 "Grand Slam" in China.

to the front. The Chinese counterattacked and halted the Japanese drive

ments in

mid April. The Japanese moved

their offensive further south, towards the air base at Chihkiang, but were again checked by a Chinese counter-attack at Ch'ang-te on May 8, in which the 14th Air Force played a decisive role. This was the first serious defeat for the Japanese in China for nearly two years, and, realising they were over-extended, the Japanese Government ordered the withdrawal of troops from south China. More Japanese troops were needed in Manchuria, menaced by the Soviet threat to enter the war. Chinese counter-offensives during May cut a corridor to Indo-China, and by July 1, some 100,000 Japanese troops were marooned in the Canton area, a similar number having moved back into northern China. The air force continued to harass the Japanese until the end of the war. The dispute over the distribution of supplies had strategic consequences beyond China. Concentration on the air force at the expense of the army meant the abandonment of the Burma invasion, and the loss of Chennault's air bases deprived Nimitz and MacArthur of expected aid in the Pacific.

M? sr^'

^iHgf^.

'

-*

i

v^^.

^ '"^.

Cross-country transport, Chinese fashion.

>A

dismantled Lend-Lease

is portered over a mountain Yunnan. Directing the

jeep in

is Captain Lui An (hands on hips), Chinese Foreign

operation

Bureau officer attached Chinese "Y" Force's

Affairs to the

American operations

staff.

After

was used by Lieutenant-General Soong Hsi-lien, commander of the re-assembly, the jeep

Chinese 11th Army Group, to reconnoitre roads to be used by captured Japanese transport. V The rear wheels and axle of a six-wheel truck arrive in

Kenanpo

in

Shansi Province.

CHAPTER 160

Burma Road: Chinas lifeline

Previous page:

A

Throughout World War Chinese

soldier supervises coolies as they repair a landslide on the Burma Road. Natural disasters like flooding

and landslides

more hazardous in the early years than the Japanese raids. V Not all caravans were motorised. Here porters with pack mules and balancing

made

the journey

poles take a break in their journey.

II,

the

vital

Contemporary Burmese

political leaders,

problem of transporting supplies into China loomed large. In 1937-39, during the undeclared Sino-Japanese war, the occupation of the coasts of China by the Jap-

however, regarded operations on this road with very little enthusiasm, the desire to keep the doors of Burma shut against foreign intruders being an old

stimulated intensive efforts to build supply routes from the interior of China to the outside world. Perhaps the most notable of these was the construction by the British and Chinese of the 681mile road from the Lashio railhead to Muse on the China-Burma border, and on to Kunming. This highway, called the Burma Road, was made passable to motor transport in 1938 by the labours of thousands of Chinese coolies, and for three years, the Burma Road shuddered with the passage of several thousand trucks carrying war supplies to China.

theme in Burmese history. China was dependent on supplies from abroad to enable her to continue in the war against Japan. As well as the Burma

anese

Road

route,

a trickle of supplies also

reached China along the narrow-gauge railway from Haiphong, in French IndoChina, to Kunming. With the defeat of France in Europe, though, Japan demanded and received from the Vichy Government the right to land forces in French Indo-China. The Haiphong-Kunming railway was closed in June 1940. The Japanese followed this by demand-

ing the closure of the Burma Road, and on July 18, 1940, Britain, hard pressed by Germany, reluctantly complied. China was now virtually isolated, but Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese people remained steadfast. The Burma Road, fortunately, did not remain closed for long. Britain defeated Germany in the Battle of Britain, and Churchill, with the backing of the United States, which wished to ship Lend-Lease supplies to China, ordered the reopening of the Road on October 18, 1940. This was now the only supply route to China, and large quantities of American LendLease military supplies began to arrive in Rangoon. From here, they travelled by steamer up the Irrawaddy, and by road and rail north through Mandalay to Lashio where they joined the Burma Road.

Air support from the 'Tlying Tigers" Air-power is important in any theatre of war, but in Burma it was a dominating factor from the start. In planning at this

time, great reliance was placed on the ability of air forces to halt, or at least to delay greatly, the advance of enemy columns. Over the next three years, however, this was shown to be a fallacy. Air attack alone could not stop the movement of either side. Even if it could, the Anglo-American air forces in Burma were not then of a size to attempt it. The air force in Burma consisted of only one R.A.F. squadron, equipped with Buffaloes, and a flight of the Indian Air Force having only a few obsolete machines. The Chinese Air Force also had a handful of antiquated planes. To redeem this situation, the American Volunteer Group (A.V.G.) was formed by Colonel Claire

A Winding up the contours of a Chinese mountain range: this aerial view of the Ledo or Stilwell

Road

illustrates the

considerable geographical barriers that faced the

Chinese and American engineers. The 478-mile road cost $148,910,000,

and was

opened in January 1945. In just under two years the United States Army would

officially

declare

it

"surplus property".

Chennault, Chiang Kai-shek's aeronauadviser, its major task being to protect the Burma Road, which was extremely vulnerable to air attack. The A.V.G. base was in Kunming, China, but Chiang, realising the importance of Rangoon for the Burma Road, sent the 3rd Squadron of the A.V.G. to R.A.F. Mingaladon, near Rangoon. If the Japanese succeeded in occupying Burma and closing the Road, China's ability to resist Japan would be greatly diminished. The defence of Burma was thus imperatics

2453

-m

A

Early days of the war in the East, and Rangoon docks

Far

of Allied shipping. first stage of the journey to China via the Burma

are

still full

This was the

Road. < < Lend-Lease goods wait in Rangoon. In the foreground are crated trucks for the road; in the background fighter aircraft are stacked in crates.

< An American ship in the Irrawaddy Docks in Rangoon. She still carries the Stars and Stripes markings which distinguished her as neutral before America's entry into the war. i

.1

I.O'*'***"'

I 2455

tive.

Without the flow of supplies over the

Burma Road,

the likelihood that the A.V.G. could continue to function effec-

China was nil. The A.V.G. was equipped with 100 P-40 Tomahawk aircraft, supplied by America through Lend-Lease, and the airmen were tively in

Life blood of the road, trucks

(ready built or as engines and chassis) were quickly moved up to the Burma Road. V A convoy of Chevrolet trucks leaves

Rangoon.

hand-picked volunteers from the American air force. The pilots decorated their planes, which were consequently known as the "Flying Tigers". The Allied air forces were contending however. The odds, great against Japanese aircraft were superior in number and range, but by February 12, 1942, the Flying Tigers had shot down almost 100 enemy planes for the loss of only 15 of their own, spurred on, no doubt, by a reward of 500 dollars for every Japanese plane downed. On December 23, 1941, the Japanese launched their first raid on Rangoon. On January 20, 1942, after almost a month of bombing raids against Rangoon and other

military installations in Burma, Japanese land forces crossed the Thai border into southern Burma. Their purpose was to cut the link between Rangoon and Kunming

and then to capture Burma. Rangoon was captured on March 6, 1942, and Lashio, the southern terminus of the Burma Road, on April 29, along with 44,000 tons of Lend-Lease supplies destined for China.

fell

Japanese forces cut the

Road of the Burma Road, the only land routes to China were the old highway across the Sinkiang province from Russia, and the caravan trails across the Himalayas and through Tibet from India. Neither of these routes was ideal for transporting large quantities of goods to China. The route through Sin-

With the closing

i

kiang was over thousands of miles of overloaded Russian railways, and although the caravan route through Tibet was a much shorter journey, only pack animals could traverse the mountain trails, which meant that heavy equipment could not be carried.

The Hump' The

of

Lashio

was

therefore a crushing blow to the Chinese, but they survived it through the establishment of the air lift over the "Hump" from India fall

to China.

Pioneers over the Himalayan Hump to China from India were Colonels Old and Tate. After Colonel Old had made the first it

V Indian labourers load bales of cotton on to trucks at Lashio. The road carried commerical as well as military traffic, for Japan controlled China's ports, and

consequently the latter was forced to rely on the overland route for imports and exports.

2458

surveying

flight.

Colonel Tate proved

was usable by transporting

13,000

Chinese troops to General Stilwell in India during the 1942 monsoon season. Operating between 16,000 and 22,000 feet with oxygen, the pilots flew through almost all weather, although sometimes monsoon rains and wind delayed the flights for days at a time. When the accident rate became high, Chinese pickets were paid so much for every pilot saved. Although the tonnage carried over the "Hump" was low in the beginning, the stepped up the monthly average to 20,000 tons during 1943. Even when the planes made their regular journeys, however, there were

Americans

difficulties

Kunming China

in moving the goods from to the forward bases of the

Task

Force, which were regions surrounded by Japanese, and defended only by poorly equipped Chinese armies. The China Air Task Force had superseded the A.V.G. in July 1942, and most of the "Hump" supplies were allotted to it as Chiang Kaishek and Chennault believed that decisive results could be achieved through air-

Air

situated

in

power alone. For raids against Japanese installations in Burma, China, and Indo-China,

the China Air Task Force needed a large amount of aviation gasoline. With the closing of the Burma Road, all fuel had to be flown in over the "Hump"; then it had to be carried or rolled by Chinese coolies over hundreds of miles of dirt road to reach the air bases. To carry one day's supply of fuel from Kunming to Kuei-lin took 40 days if carried by cart, and 75 days if rolled by coolies. On March 10. 1943. the China Air Task Force was enlarged and redesignated the 14th Air Force, still under the command of Chennault. Fuel was in very short

supply at this time, not so

much because

of an insufficient number of planes to ferry goods to China, but due to bottle-

necks along the route from Calcutta and Karachi to the airfields in Assam. Indian rail facilities were disorganised and inadequate to convey large quantities of goods quickly. There was also a delay on the part of the British to complete the V Lashio railway station. Here necessary airfields in Assam on time. the supplies were off-loaded from The "Hump" air lift enabled the Chin- goods trains and on to trucks for ese to receive supplies to continue in the war. What had happened to the land forces in the meanwhile?

the journey into China.

The

picture shows the three modes of transport available-human, animal, and motorised.

The land force commanders In the last days of April 1942, the commanders of the Allied forces in Burma

and China (Slim. Stilwell. and Alexander) realised that they could no longer hold any line against the Japanese in Burma. The troops therefore withdrew to India, to do so undertaking a 20-day journey of hard foot-slogging through 140 miles of jungle and mountain.

On arriving in Delhi. Stilwell stated that he regarded Burma as a vitally important area for re-entry into China, and that it must be recaptured. Stilwell's determination and implacable will were to be one of the constants during the Allied planning for the return to Burma.

While the British and Chinese forces were struggling through the mountains into Assam, there were still six Chinese divisions in operation in eastern Burma, being vigorously pursued by the enemy. In the middle of May, it appeared that the Japanese were about to launch a major attack up the Burma Road, advance into Yunnan, and capture the terminus of the Road. They did not in fact do this, and later they denied they had any plans to do so, but Chiang and Chennault were convinced that a major attack was imminent. Before the end of April, Japanese units were pushing north from Lashio up the Burma Road with tanks and motorised infantry. Having swept aside Chinese

A Indian and Chinese drivers stop for a wash on the outskirts of Lashio. Their trucks would have been driven from Rangoon, and would be loaded at the dumps at Lashio in preparation for the 1,400-mile drive to

Chungking.

< < When

the

cut. aircraft

"over the

Burma Road was

began

to fly supplies

Hump". Here an

elephant demonstrates nature's answer to the fork-lift truck as it loads drums of fuel, vital for the U.S. aircraft operating in China.

opposition, they reached the gorge of the river. Their advance was halted here, however, when the Chinese destroyed the bridge. By the end of May the Japanese held

Salween

2461

Trucks loaded with drums of morning mist on the Burma Road. The journey was

V

fuel in the

a break, except at night or at the customs barriers. The trucks would drive in convoy, though distances between each vehicle could be up

made without

to

half a mile.

in.

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Burma and were in a dominating strategic position. Though temporarily checked by monsoon rains, they were poised to attack either India or China, and could certainly bomb Calcutta, where most of the American and British supplies were concentrated.

Various plans were put forward at this time for the recapture of Burma. The American priority was supplies for China, by road or air, and they therefore wanted the offensive to take place in northern Burma. The Americans also favoured the construction of a new overland route to China, and planned a route for this. The British, too. had a projected road plan, but the American one was chosen, and the

building of the road was assigned to the Americans. They possessed the necessary manpower, materials, and engineering experience on a large scale. Stilwell was made responsible for the road. The plans were drawn up by Brigadier-General Raymond Wheeler. American engineers, under the command of Colonel Arrow-

smith and later General Pick, commenced work on the road on Christmas Day 1942, cutting the first trace at Milestone Zero, just outside Ledo. They aimed at reaching Shinbwiyang, 103 miles away at the head of the Hukawng valley, within a year. The Ledo Road project was an ambitious scheme. Tt aimed at cutting a three-lane highway in gravel from Ledo, the rail-

iS*9>^

V

Aircover and its vital concomitant, fuel.

<<

A Curtiss Hawk 81A-3 (P-40C) Tomahawk fighter is uncrated in Burma. < Yunnanese coolies load drums of fuel at Lashio. V Assembled fighters,

less their

characteristic "Flying Tiger" insignia, wait on an airfield in Burma. Capable of absorbing much battle damage, tractable

but slow, the P-40 remains one of the controversial aircraft of the war.

Overleaf: Lashio stacked with Lend-Lease supplies. The depot was to fall on April 29, 1942 and with it some 44,000 tons of supplies were lost.

-5rnr-.Ji4 igLijajiyi .iwwwBiiiwg i

—

•x^

^.x^aR

-

way terminus

in

north Assam, through

the Patkai hills in north Burma, down the Hukawng valley to Myitkyina, across the Irrawaddy to Bhamo, where it would join up with the old British road from Bhamo to Namkham. It would then go on to the little village of Mong Yaw where it would meet the old Burma Road. The overall distance to the Chinese border was 478 miles. The eventual destination of the convoys, starting from Ledo, was Chungking, the Nationalist Chinese capital and Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters, nearly 2,000 miles away. Building the road involved the most

complicated

engineering

and

extreme

hazards. The uncharted track led through formidable country with cliffs, enormous peaks, hushed forests, and winding rivers. As well as geographical hazards, there were also extremes of temperature, and disease (including malaria, black-water fever, dysentery, and scrub typhus) was rife. Men fought disease by oiling, disinfecting, and spraying the countryside, but even so the sickness rate was high. Fits of depression were also common to the road builders. Yet progress was made in conditions that at any time other than

war would have been intolerable. Life was not eased by the frequent infiltration of Japanese behind the Allied lines: balanced in high trees, they sniped at those working on the road, and seriously

hampered progress.

American materiel paves the

way

As the American engineering battalions composed mostly of negroes with a cadre of white operatives -pushed forward, so the stream of

men and

materiel behind

them increased. From America by ship to Karachi and Bombay, then across India by train, came more bulldozers, graders, sifters, caterpillars,

units, hills,

medical units, supply

and transport. From India and the 50,000 coolies came to work on the

road.

The monsoon season presented more problems. Rain fell at the rate of up to 15 inches per day, and this led to floods and landslides. Mules and vehicles got bogged down, and bulldozers were lost over collapsing steep banks. The men, wet all the time, slept in waterlogged tents or jungle-hammocks. The soggy 2467

>

Trucks queue

to

for their journey to

be loaded

Chungking.

>> A

suspension bridge, complete with Nationalist Chinese symbol and blockhouse and guard. U.S. aircraft destroyed the bridge over the Salween gorge to delay the

Japanese thrust

in 1942.

f-m ^

"'^v '^

EHiaitiHn

•^w

V ^•.

r^

V A wrecked

truck. Operators

rebuild trucks. Despite this, it was estimated that it took 2,000 trucks a month to replace those worn out on the Burma

v^^r

M

t

V> A

Chinese town over the

The war

in

^m

5 »

I

J,

..*.***«-*-**'

China was a

curious mixture of the modern with the mediaeval.

2468

Btscr-

<

\

{

-••

I

Pi

Road. border.

I

r

ii" i-tf

hnn^^^ ^^^I

would cannibalise wrecks and

t

-%*»^

^di

i

-

—Si.

jungle became infested with long, purple leeches.

During the monsoon months, though, there was little likelihood of interference from the Japanese north of the Hukawng valley, and the Chinese 38th Division left its Ledo base and was deployed in front of the engineering group as forward protection.

Top

priority status

allocated At the "Trident" Conference in May, 1943, the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff urged the importance of operations in northern Burma, and directed that an offensive designed to facilitate the building of the road should begin before the end of the year.

The Ledo Road followed the course

of

Burma through the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys, and on

the

fighting

to Myitkyina,

in

which had

fallen to Stil-

Chinese and American troops in the middle of 1944. The road then had to be carried on to Bhamo, from where the Japanese had withdrawn, and then on well's

to

Namkham.

The

Stilwell

Road opens

to traffic On January 31.

1945. a

ceremony was held

on the Burma-China border at Wan-t'ing chen. With great fanfare and rejoicing, a convoy, largely composed of American journalists out on a spree, and the Chinese 6th Route Army, left for Kunming. The Ledo Road was now officially open.

Chiang Kai-shek proposed that the combined Burma and Ledo roads be renamed the Stilwell Road in honour of the man who had worked so hard to break the land blockade of China. The value of the Ledo Road was questioned by some who doubted if it would ever repay the expenditure in men and resources devoted to it. Sadly, in November 1946, the Ledo Road was declared "surplus property" by the United States it

Army after the altogether vital part

had played in keeping China

in the war.

2469

V

China, destination of the

Burma Road. The gate-house

to

the ancient ramparts of Shakwan,

^sr'.

with fortifications from another age. Despite the depredations of the civil strife which

T

had

continued since 1911, the Chinese had faced the Japanese longer than any other nation in the East. For the first two years of the war with the West, the Japanese still maintained that the Chinese were the toughest troops they

had

faced.

W-

-'».

#•

-

'^

Ar.:L:

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v_

Vrt

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«

V After

the

bombing and

artillery barrage, the infantry

moves in Company E, 129th Regiment, 37th Division, advances into Tuguegarao, the provincial capital of Cagayan on .

Luzon

CHAPTER 161

Luzon

.

.

island,

June

26, 1945.

a

Despite the fact that Luzon, the "capital island" of the Philippines, was the largest Japanese-held island between New Guinea and Tokyo, the American planners had by no means been unanimous in the opinion that it should be recaptured. Admirals King and Nimitz had argued that it would be better, once a foothold had been established in the Philippines with the capture of Leyte and Mindanao, to bypass Luzon and go straight for Formosa. General MacArthur was the passionate champion of the liberation of all the Philippine islands before making the next

advance towards Japan. When it was decided to invade Leyte in October 1944two months ahead of the original schedule -MacArthur announced that he would be ready to invade Luzon by the end of December, giving the 20th as a provisional date. This was so much in advance of the earliest possible date by which an invasion force could be deployed for an assault on Formosa that it was decidedfortnight before the troops went in on Leyte-to invade Luzon. MacArthur was forced to postpone the date for the Luzon landing by the slow progress of the battle for Leyte. Here the American forces were bedevilled by sluicing autumnal rains, which converted the island battlefield into a quagmire. By the end of November the Luzon attack had been put back to the second week of January: the 9th. In addition, it was decided to capture the island of Mindoro as a curtain-raiser to the main landing on Luzon. This would mean that the Luzon force would not have to rely on the flooded airfields on Leyte -apart from the fleet aircraft-carriers-to provide air cover for the landings. Mindoro, right on Luzon's doorstep, would provide excellent "frontline" airstrips for round-the-clock operations; and its capture was entrusted to a specially-formed unit known as the Western Visayan Task Force. Consisting of two reinforced regiments under the command of Brigadier-General William C. Dunckel, it was to attack on December 15, while the struggle for Leyte was still

moving to its close. During the three-day voyage from Leyte to Mindoro the ships of the Task Force had to endure heavy kamikaze attacks; the flagship Nashville was badly damaged by a kamikaze, and Dunckel himself was wounded (though he was able to stay in command). But the Mindoro landing went in according to plan on the morning of the 15th. It was unopposed; Dunckel's men

%

.^-SV"

2473

i^^'^^-k-^mPrevious page: at Above: Approaching the beach Mindoro on December 18, 1944 an L.C.I, launches a barrage of rockets.

Below:

On Luzon,

Guard landing

U.S. Coast

craft

unload

The troops heading for Manila. beaches are already secured.

> Troops in training dash across makeshift rope bridges while under simulated fire. A scene at the Pacific Combat Training Centre at Oahu.

V The "Bangalore" in action. The weapon consisted of lengths of metal pipe filled with high explosive,

and when placed

in

position under barbed wire the flying metal blasted gaps in the wire. Infantry and engineers could then storm through.

A At Binmaley, on Luzon

island,

men and equipment continue

to

pour ashore as engineers struggle with a bulldozer (centre) in

an effort to make the route inland easier to follow. < An L.S.T. unloading heavy equipment at Blue Beach,

Mindoro

island, as American home their attack.

forces press

2475

Japanese headquarters Areas held by the Japanese up to the end of the war Front line on Jan. 17 11 Airtxjrne Division's

drop

on Feb. 3

XI

Corps

(Hall)

lands

Jan. 29 (8th Army)

part 11 Airborne Div

(8th Army) lands Jan. 31

CATANDUANES 24

Div.

(8th Army)

158 Regt. Combat Team lands Apr.

1

SULUSEA

Western Visayan Task Force (Dunckel) lands Dec. 15. 1944

2476

SAMAR SEA

SAMAR

pegged out a large beach-head with no and work on the airstrips began at once, while the interior was still being

difficulty

mopped

up.

By December

23 two

new

airstrips were already in use on Mindoro and the build-up of aircraft for the Luzon attack could begin. To use MacArthur's

own words, "Mindoro was the gate": the turn of Luzon had come.

Yamashita's problems On paper, the Japanese force which would defend Luzon looked a formidable one: over 250,000 men of the 14th Area Army, commanded by General Tomoyuki YamaBut in fact Yamashita's prospects were not bright, and he knew it very well. Most of his units were under-strength and shita.

short of supplies. The virtual elimination of the Japanese Combined Fleet at Leyte Gulf meant that he would be getting no more supplies by sea. And the air battles during the prolonged fight for Leyte had whittled down the number of operational

on Luzon to around 150. These would have no chance of halting the aircraft

American invasion force as it approached Luzon, let alone of commanding the skies over the land battlefield. Yamashita knew that his troops would not be able to stop the invaders getting ashore, and that he did not have sufficient men to defend the whole of Luzon. In total contrast was the strength of the American forces. They were organised in the fashion which had launched the attack on Leyte. The land fighting was entrusted to General Walter Krueger's 6th Army -over 200,000 men, exclusive of reinforcements -which would be conveyed to its destination and shielded on landing by Vice-Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's 7th Fleet. The 7th Fleet-over 850 vessels strong-included the battle fleet, under Vice-Admiral Jessie B. Oldendorf,

< American

operations to clear

Luzon.

A A column of American amphibian tanks pauses along a road on Luzon. Despite the glum expression on the face of the Filipino at left, the original war-time caption enthuses "... natives greet the tanks and assure them that although their village was destroyed, they would much rather have the Americans than the plundering

Japs".

which had smashed Nishimura's battle squadron in the Surigao Strait during the battle of Leyte Gulf, and which was now to spearhead the invasion of Luzon by bombarding the landing beaches. Admiral William F. Halsey's 3rd Fleet would provide strategic air cover by launching carrier strikes on northern Luzon and Formosa, and land-based air cover would be the contribution of General George F. 2477

Kenney's Far East Air Forces, which would begin the battle from their bases on Leyte and Mindoro.

Bombardment and

assault

was obvious to both sides where the invasion must be directed: across the superb beaches of Lingayen Gulf, which was where the Japanese had landed their It

in December 1941. Lingayen Gulf leads directly into the central plain of Luzon, to Manila and the magnificent anchorage of Manila Bay. Yamashita was not going to attempt to meet the invaders on the beaches, nor offer them a set-piece battle once ashore. He grouped his forces in three major concentrations which, he hoped, would

main forces

confine the Americans to the central

Yamashita's strategy, in short, was very like Rommel's attempts to "rope off' the Allies in the Normandy bocage after D-Day. But- as events in Normandy had already proved conclusively -the most plain.

dogged defence was not likely to hold out for long against an invader with control of the air and uninterrupted supplies and reinforcements from the sea. On January 2, 1945, the first ships of Oldendorf's bombardment force headed out of Leyte Gulf, their destination Lingayen. A punishing ordeal lay ahead of them, for they became the prime targets for Luzonbased kamikaze attacks which began on the 4th, while Oldendorf s force was still threading its way through the Sulu Sea. On that day a twin-engined kamikaze crashed into the escort carrier Ommaney Bay, damaging her so badly that she was beyond salvation and had to be sunk. On the 5th the American force was well within reach of the Japanese airfields on Luzon-under 150 miles -and the kamikaze attacks rose in pitch. In the afternoon, while the Americans were passing the mouth of Manila Bay, 16 kamikazes broke through the American air screen and attacked, inflicting damage on nearly a dozen American and Australian ships, including two escort carriers, two heavy cruisers, and two destroyers. Nor were

^^1

-

the Japanese attacks confined to aircraft alone: two Japanese destroyers appeared, but were seen off in short order. Air strikes from the escort carriers sank one, Momi, and damaged the other. On January 6 Oldendorf 's ships entered

Lingayen Gulf and began to move into position for the bombardment -and the kamikaze attacks reached their climax. The weather was working for the Japanese. A low, dense overcast blanketed the airfields on northern Luzon, preventing Halsey's pilots from masking them with

continuous patrols. Bad weather meant nothing to the Japanese pilots -except that their chances of immolating themselves on their targets were enhanced. By nightfall on the 7th two American battleships -A^e if Mexico and California three cruisers, three destroyers, and several other vessels had been more or less badly damaged, and three of them, fast minesweepers {Palmer, Long, and Hovey), sunk. But this was the last great effort of the kamikazes of Luzon. On the 7th, Halsey's planes battered the Luzon airfields so heavily that the last opera-

tional Japanese aircraft were

withdrawn

from the Philippines. Oldendorf's ships had played an invaluable role in soaking up the punishment which might otherwise have savaged the troop transports and landingcraft bringing the invasion force. Now they went ahead with their bombardment programme, which raged for the next three days. Early on the morning of January 9 the troop convoys moved into Lingayen Gulf. At 0700 hours the final stage of the pre-landing barrage was opened and at 0900 the first wave of landing-craft headed in to the beaches. Shortly after 0930 the spearhead troops were ashore -but there were no Japanese troops to meet them. Yamashita had pulled back all his forces not only from the beaches but from the immediate hinterland, with the result that by nightfall on the 9th Krueger's army had established for itself a beach-head 17 miles wide, which reached four miles inland at its deepest extremities. And, true to form, MacArthur himself had landed in triumph, duly captured for

V The build-up of equipment on Luzon continues -bulldozers and cranes roll ashore over a pontoon quay. Clearing obstacles from the main routes across the island and rubble from city streets was as important a task for these back-up forces as repairing and extending runways for aircraft. Overleaf: Above: Troops from Blue Beach Lingayen Gulf, fan out into the interior of Luzon island. Early

was light, thanks to bombardment mounted by sea and air. Below: The still-smouldering resistance

the massive

bodies of Japanese soldiers killed by a flame-thrower. They were among 23 flushed out of their foxhole by men of the 25th Infantry Division.

posterity by the camera.

The 6th Army punch was a two-corps On the right flank was MajorGeneral Oscar W. Griswold with XIV affair.

Corps, consisting of the 37th and 40th Infantry Divisions. Griswold's corps had the task of breaking through to Manila and liberating the capital, a task obviously dear to MacArthur's heart. But before this could be done the left flank of the lodgment area had to be made secure from any heavy counter-attacks from the north, and this was the job of Major-General Innis P. Swift's I Corps (the 6th and 43rd Infantry Divisions). Until Swift had made the left flank secure, Krueger was going to take his time about pushing on to Manila-and he was wise to do so. For Swift's corps was faced by the "Shobu" Group, the largest of Yamashita's three concentrations, 152,000-men strong and well dug in along a chain of strongpoints 25 miles long, from Lingayen Gulf to the Cabaruan Hills. Foul weather on the 10th, ramming home the vulnerability of the landing beaches by causing considerable disruption, made it clear that Swift's task was of vital importance. But his progress against the tough Japanese defences remained slow, much to MacArthur's chagrin. Not until the end of the month did I Corps, reinforced with the 25th and 32nd Divisions, push the Japanese back into the mountains after a tank battle at San Manuel on the 28th. They reached the

approaches

to

Yamashita's

H.Q.

at

Baguio and drove east through San Jose reach the eastern shore of Luzon, pushing a corridor across the island. This now cut off Yamashita from his troops in the island's centre and south. Griswold and XIV Corps met with scanty opposition as they began their advance to the south. By the 16th they were across the Agno river, still with little or no opposition-but Krueger was yet unwilling to push too far ahead in the south until he was convinced that the northern flank was secure. But on January 17 MacArthur intervened, stressing the need for an immediate drive on Manila. There were plenty of good reasons. The Americans needed the port; they needed the airfield complex at Clark Field for Kenney's planes; and they were anxious to liberate the inmates of military and civilian prison camps before the Japanese had time to harm them further. But now Griswold's corps in its turn came up against the second of Yamashita's deto

fensive concentrations.

2480

capture the Olongapo naval base and < The flamboyant General drive across the root of the Bataan Penin- MacArthur took every sula to Manila Bay. Unlike MacArthur opportunity to visit the troops in the front line and boost their in 1942, Yamashita refused to run the morale. Here troops aboard the risk of getting any of his troops trapped Nashville crowd the decks on Bataan, but Hall's corps had two weeks as he embarks in a landing of tough fighting before it reached Manila craft to visit his men ashore. Bay. The second landing went in south of the bay at Nasugbu, 50 miles south-west of Manila. It was made by the bulk of the 11th Airborne Division; the plan was to tie down Japanese troops in southern Luzon and open up a second approach route to the capital. On February 3 the rest of the division dropped inland, on Tagaytay Ridge; the division concentrated and moved north-east towards Manila, but was stopped on the outskirts. It was clear that if Manila was to be taken it would have to be from the north. Once again the impetus came from MacArthur. "Go to Manila!" he urged on January 30. "Go around the Nips, bounce off the Nips, but go to Manila!" His exhortations went right down the line of Griswold's corps to the two divisions which would do the job: the 37th Infantry and the newly-arrived 1st Cavalry. Their main concern and objective was the big civilian internment camp at Santo

Battle for Manila The second part of Yamashita's forces that the American troops encountered on Luzon was the "Kembu' Group, 30,000 men under Major-General Rikichi Tsukada, stationed in the mountains west of the central plain of Luzon to defend the Clark Field sector. Griswold's corps first encountered heavy opposition from the "Kembu Group at the town of Bamban on January 23. It took over a week of extremely heavy fighting before XIV Corps forced the Japanese back from Clark Field. By January 31 the "Kembu" Group had lost over 2,500 men and had been forced to retreat into the mountains; the Clark Field complex was in American hands and Griswold was able to resume his drive on Manila. In the last days of January, two more American units landed on Luzon. The first was XI Corps, commanded by MajorGeneral Charles P. Hall, consisting of the 38th Infantry Division and a regiment of the 24th Division. It landed on the west coast of the island to the north of the Bataan Peninsula, and its mission was to '

Tomas, which was liberated on February 3 by a "flying column" of tanks from the 1st Cavalry. The prisoners in Santo Tomas were in an unenviable position, hearing the sounds of a tough battle outside the walls and fearing the worst until an unmistakable American bellow of "Where the hell's the front gate?" was followed by 1st Cavalry tanks smashing through the entrance. Hard on the heels of 1st Cavalry came the 37th Infantry, which pushed through to Old Bilibid Prison and liberated 1,300 civilian internees and P.O.W.s. The northern suburbs of Manila were in American hands. But the battle

was only beginning. MacArthur had declared Mani-

for the city

In 1942 la

an open

a

battlefield,

than turn it into and Yamashita had no

city rather

intention of fighting for the city in 1945. But there were 17,000 fighting men in Manila over whom he had no controlthey were not Army troops. They were naval forces under the command of RearAdmiral Sanji Iwabachi, who was determined to hold Manila to the last. He split his men into separate battle groups, gave each of them a section of the city to de-

and prepared for an all-out battle. unique episode was about to be added

fend,

A

to the history of the Pacific war: its only

2481

uvban

battle.

The Americans took some time to realise what lay before them, but a week of vicious fighting and rapidly-mounting casualties forced them to accept that there could be no question of taking Manila without cracking the Japanese out of their positions at the expense of the city's buildings. By the 12th, XIV Corps had forced the Japanese in front of them back into Intramuros, the old walled inner city of Manila. South of the city the paratroopers of the 11th Airborne Division had run up against tough defensive positions built by the Japanese sailors on Nichols Field. Here, too, an inch-by-inch struggle developed, with the paratroopers getting artillery support from the guns of XIV Corps to the north. It was an unrelieved killing-match, eliciting a grim signal from one of 11th Airborne's company commanders: "Tell Halsey to stop looking for the Jap Fleet;

dying on Nichols Field." after the 11th Airborne joined hands with 1st Cavalry on February 12, it's

Even

the battle for Manila was far from over. Iwabachi's sailors held on grimly both in Intramuros and the rest of the city and over a fortnight of murderous fighting lay ahead. It was given a fresh element of horror by the fact that the Japanese refused to evacuate non-combatants, and it went on until the very last flickers of Japanese resistance were stamped out on March 3. MacArthur's obsession with the recapture of Manila had exacted a terrible

The Filipino capital lay in ruins. Civilian casualties have been set as high as 100,000. American losses topped 1,000 killed and 5,500 wounded. As for the Japanese defenders of Manila, they had upheld the fighting traditions of the Imperial Japanese Navy by dying virtually to a man. While the slaughter in Manila was still running its course, the clearing of the island forts in Manila Bay had begun. First came the overrunning of the Bataan Peninsula by XI Corps, begun on the 14th and aided by a landing at Mariveles, at price.

the tip of the peninsula, on the following day. It only took a week to flush the scanty Japanese forces out of their positions on Bataan; compared with the carnage in Manila it was an easy task. Corregidor, the strongest fortress in Manila Bay, was a different story. In May 1942 the American garrison had capitulated within 48 hours of the first Japanese landings on the island. In 1945 it took over ten days of bitter fighting before the Americans got the island back. Their assault went in on February 16, a com-

bined parachute drop and amphibious landing which rapidly gained control of the surface defences. But the Japanese still had to be flushed from their positions underground, and the island was not declared secure until the 28th. MacArthur himself visited Corregidor on March 2. Ready as always with a memorable bon mot, he announced: "I see that the old flagpole still stands. Have your troops hoist the colours to its peak and let no enemy ever haul them down."

The three smaller forts in the Bay remained. On Caballo and El Fraile, horrible measures were taken to break the resistance of the Japanese when they refused to surrender. Diesel oil was pumped into their positions and ignited with phosphorus

shells

and

fused

T.N.T.;

Caballo was cleared on April 13, El Fraile on the 18th. The Japanese evacuated the third island, Canabao,

and the Americans

encountered no resistance when they landed there on April 16. Three months after the first American landings in Lingayen Gulf the Japanese had been forced out of central Luzon, the capital had been liberated, and Manila

Bay was clear to Allied shipping. But still the battle for Luzon was far from over. Yamashita still had 172,000 Japanese troops under arms. They held the north and south-east of the island; Manila itself was still within range of Japanese guns, and the dams and reservoirs containing the bulk of the capital's water supplies were still in Japanese hands.

Pilots of the 201st

Mexican

Fighter Squadron line up in front of their P-47's on Clark Field, Luzon, in July 1945.

The American Vought F4U-1A Corsair fighter-bomber

Engine: one

Pratt

& Whitney R-2800-8W

2,250-lip emergency rating. Armament: six .5-inch Browning 53-2 machine guns with 400 rounds per gun, plus two 1,000-lb bombs or eight 5-inch rockets. Speed: 41 5 mph at 20,000 feet. radial,

MG

Climb: 3,120 feet per minute Ceiling: 37,000 feet.

Range: 1,560 miles with drop

initially.

tanks.

Weight empty/loaded: 8,695/11,093 Span: 40 feet 1 1 1 inches. Length: 33 feet 4^ inches. Height: 15 feet.

2484

A Caught

in a ravine, these

eight Japanese were picked off by U.S. infantrymen using small-arms. Three of the Americans look down at the

dead enemy.

<

Evidence of Japanese

atrocities in the Philippines-

the unearthed remains of some

3-400 Filipino

men and women.

With their hands

tied

behind

their backs, the victims were

bayoneted.

2485

A The

only street fighting of war took place in

the Pacific

Manila, capital of the Philippines. through still smoking

G.I.s pass

ruins in the city's suburbs.

> MacArthur and members of his staff stand amidst the ruins of the American hospital at Fort Stotensburg, Clark Field, after the Japanese had been driven

back from the area.

Moreover, the Japanese still controlled the most direct sea route through the central Philippines, forcing any Allied shipping heading west for Manila to take an expensive 500-mile detour. Until these problems had been solved and Yamashita's forces had been ground down to total impotence, there could be no question of taking the next step towards Tokyo. The

relieved on the 13th by the 43rd Division, which kept up the pressure and, in conjunction with 6th Division, punched deep into the centre of the "Shimbu' Group's Kne. On the 14th, General Hall's XI Corps relieved Griswold on this front and continued the offensive. By the end of March, the 43rd Division had struggled through to the east side of Laguna de Bay and had

Luzon began. The most urgent problem facing the 6th Army was the big Japanese concentration east of Manila. This was the "Shimbu"

completely unhinged Yokoyama's left. Further to the north, however, the 6th Division failed in its drive to capture Wawa and Ipo Dams. It took the whole of April, in the face of implacable Japanese resistance, for the 6th Division to struggle forward into position for a final assault. By this time the successes in the south enabled the 43rd Division to be switched north to add more weight to the next

last stage of the battle for

Group, under the command of LieutenantGeneral Shizuo Yokoyama: 80,000-odd troops, based on the 8th and 105th Divisions. The bulk of the "Shimbu Group, 30,000 strong, was dug in along the southern end of the Sierra Madre range along '

the line Ipo Dam-Wawa Dam-Antipolo, extending south to the great lake of Laguna de Bay. Griswold and XIV Corps launched the first determined narrowfront attack against this strong position on March 8, following two days of intense softening-up by Kenney's bombers. By the 12th, the 1st Cavalry Division had battered its way through the maze of fiercelydefended Japanese cave defences and was

2486

attack.

This was heralded by three days of saturation bombing which dumped 250,000 gallons of napalm on the Japanese posiThe attack proper was launched on the night of May 6 by the 43rd Division. In this battle the American forces were aided to the north by 3,000 Filipino guerrillas, who kept Yokoyama's left flank fully engaged. At last, on May 17, joint Ameritions.

2487

can and Filipino attacks seized Ipo Dam intact. Further south, the 6th Division was relieved by the 38th Division, which ground away at the exhausted Japanese. Finally American persistance told, and the "Shimbu" Group's survivors began to melt away. Wawa Dam fell-also intact -on May 28, by which time the "Shimbu' Group had been destroyed. By this time, too, the lesser problem of the "Kembu' Group, west of Clark Field, had also been solved. While the bulk of Griswold's corps prepared for the final advance on Manila at the end of January, the 40th Division had been left to mask the to

"Kembu" force of 25,000 in the heights

which

it

had retreated

after the loss of

Clark Field. Here, too, the Japanese made the fullest use of their advantage in terrain and it took over two months of concentrated pressure by three American divisions -first the 40th, then the 43rd, and finally the 38th-before Tsukada accepted the inevitable. On April 6 he ordered his surviving forces to go over to independent guerrilla warfare. Two more Japanese concentrations south of Manila were also successfully broken up in these gruelling weeks. These were the "Fuji" Force commanded by Colonel Fujishige-an Army/Navy agglo-

-TTj

-

*^'-

••

"^.'J^

asm mil

tiiaa tiiti lUII •••II

meration of about 13,000 men, originally

of'Shimbu' Group-and 3,000 Army and Navy troops down on the Bicol part

Peninsula, the south-eastern "tail" of

Luzon. Again, it was a story of repeated battles throughout February and March, with Filipino guerrillas working in coordination with the regular American forces. By the end of April "Fuji' Force had gone the same way as the "Kembu" Group, while an amphibious landing at Legaspi on the Bicol Peninsula by the 158th Regimental Combat Team had battered west and joined up with 1st Cavalry Division. Southern Luzon was free. But the greatest obstacle of all remained: Yamashita and the 110,000 troops of the "Shobu' Group in the north. While the battles in the centre and south of Luzon it was impossible for Krueger more than three divisions against Yamashita the 33rd, 32nd and 25th. Aided

continued,

to send

:

^ >

.^

-< -

,

ttt

< A and < < Bombing Japanese power into oblivion. Clark Field was under almost constant attack by both bombers and fighters. In both pictures "parafrag" bombsfragmentation bombs released by parachute-can be seen hitting air

the airfield.

A To be captured by the enemy was a worse fate than death, according to the Japanese military code of honour. When men of the 37th Infantry Division entered the town of Bayombong on Luzon, they found this hospital ward- with all the patients dead. Before evacuating the town, the Japanese had killed their

own wounded

rather

than let them suffer the humiliation of falling into the hands of the enemy.

< American troops examine a Type 95 light tank, knocked out by tank destroyers.

by the 37th Division, the 33rd pushed forward to take Baguio, Yamashita's former H.Q., on April 26; but it took the whole of May and June for Swift's I Corps to break across the Balete Pass, take Bambang, and push on into the Cagayan valley. Airborne forces were dropped at 2489

'^'-v*7\ T

2490

U

^—'A. *

-*-.

-r^>.'-^T'

the northern end of the Cagayan valley towards the end of June: they drove south and joined up with 37th Division at

Tuguegarao on June 26. By the end of June Yamashita had 65.000 men still under arms. They had been forced back into the mountains to the south of Bontoc and although it was now quite impossible for them to make any effective challenge to the American hold on Luzon, they nevertheless held out until the end of the war and kept four divisions tied down in consequence. Of all the Japanese forces told to hold the Philippines for the Emperor. Yamashita's men were the ones who came closest to fulfilling their mission.

Thus by the end of June 1945 the battle of Luzon was over. It had been a unique struggle, the most "European"" battle of the entire Pacific war. Fought out on an island the size of Britain, it had seen tank battles, amphibious landings, paratroop drops and guerrilla warfare, with a bloody street battle as well. Japanese losses were immense, totalling around 190.000. Ameri-

.r

-•

W-i

>>^

A The debris of war -three children huddle for shelter in the ruins of Manila. At least they survived to be cared for by the Americans- some 100,000 civilian residents of the city died.

can losses were 8,000 killed and 30,000 wounded. Further hard fighting lay ahead before the Pacific war would be brought to its close. But there would never be another conflict like the fight for Luzon. MacArthur had never been ordered to liberate the entire Philippine archipelago. In fact, the British had been told by General Marshall that once the vital objectives had been secured in the Philippines, the liberation of the smaller islands would be left to the Filipinos themselves, with no major American forces taking

But MacArthur had other ideas; and as long as it was clear that there were no other major objectives for the considerable American land, sea, and air forces in the Philippine area, he was allowed to have his way. The clearing of the central and southern Philippines was entrusted to the U.S. 8th Army, under Lieutenant-General Robert L. Eichelberger, whose first task was to

part.

2492

clear the short-cut sea route through the Visayan Passages. This began with a landing on the north-west coast of Samar on February 19 to clear the San Bernardino Strait and it continued through the month of March, with the occupation of small islands such as Burias, Siniara, Romblon, and Tablas. The last in the sequence was Masbate, and on April 5 Eichelberger reported to MacArthur that the Visayan Passages had been cleared. In the meantime, the liberation of the key islands in the central and southern Philippines had already begun. Eichelberger's opponent in the area was the commander of the Japanese 35th

Army: Lieutenant-General Sosaku SuzuHis forces numbered 100,000, dotted

ki.

over scores of islands, unable to concentrate or assist each other, but prepared to put up as tenacious a fight as their colleagues on Luzon. And fight they did. By the middle of April Eichelberger's forces

had made a grand

total of 38 amphibious landings in the central and southern Philippines. None was on the same scale as Leyte or Luzon-but each met with resistance that was no less determined. Palawan was the first major target: 270 miles long, the westernmost outrider of the Philippine archipelago. The American 186th Regimental Combat Team from the 41st Division landed on Palawan on February 28, but it took it over a week to break the resistance of the 1,750 Army and Navy troops on the island. On March 20 an airstrip at Puerto Princesa began to

function.

Ten days before this, however, the rest of the 41st Division had descended on the westernmost tip of Mindanao, second largest and most southerly of the Philippine group. The long, thin Zamboanga Peninsula was their objective, but again it took over two weeks of fighting before their foothold was secure. In the meantime, 41st Division units had been detached to clean out the Sulu Archipelago, the string of diminutive islands stretched between Mindanao and Borneo. This

< An American poster designed to boost Filipino

morale. Clearing the Philippines and the recapture of the key areas in northern Borneo. This latter task was entrusted to the Australian I Corps under Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie

V

Morshead. The Japanese had some 16 Army battalions and two

Navy detachments

Army

of the 37th

in the island. I Corps'

naval support was furnished by the U.S. 7th Fleet.

Although

had been planned

to

it

retake the

whole of Borneo as a stepping stone towards Java, it was finally decided only to capture the oil producing areas and Brunei.

SANA Aus. 9Div. (June 10) Au's

(March

20 Bde. i^^^mB'.

(J une 20)

^^'f

BUSUANGA

^Aus. 26 "Bde. Group

SARAWAK

(Mayl) us.

Corp

(Mors03d) Makass

%

AusFDiv. (Jul

40 Div. (March 18) 186R.C.T.

^^^ US

8th

(Feb. 28)

ARMY (EICHELBERGER)

Butuan

ATTACKS AM-L=AMERICAL DIVISION

2 coys.

24

DIV.

(March

SULU SEA

Bay

Div.

<

(MaylO

8)

Japanese 35th Army (Suzuki, then Morozumjf)

BALABAC f-*-*

186R.C.T.

26^*108 R.C.T.

J^^acajalar ' Dipoid| ^^y

Kabasalan

(lands April 16)

Sirawai 41 Div.

(March 21)

Kibawe

(March 10)

2493

A The

war-time caption

to this

aerial photo of Manila's residential district claims the

damage was done "after the Japs had burned it in their retreat ."In reality a large part of the damage would have been caused by American bombing. .

.

> A

flame-thrower operated by

men

of the 37th Division hits a

Japanese pillbox positioned at the corner of an apartment building. The lower picture shows the result a few seconds later- burning bodies of Japanese soldiers.

started easily-Basilan, nearest island in the Sulu group to Zamboanga, was unoccupied but Jolo, in the centre of the chain, was another matter. It was held by 4,000 Japanese troops who fought hard for three weeks after the landing went in on April 9. Even after the main resistance was broken mopping-up continued in the interior of Jolo until July. Next came the turn of the southern Visayas, four medium-sized islands on roughly the same latitude: from east to west, Bohol, Cebu, Negros, and Panay. Eichelberger divided this group into two. aided by the mountain spine of Negros which partitions the island into Negros Occidental and Negros Oriental. Panay and western Negros were given to the 40th Division; eastern Negros, Cebu, and Bohol to the Americal Division, originally raised in New Caledonia from non-divisional units in the Pacific theatre, and veterans of Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and Leyte.

The 40th Division landed on Panay on

March 2494

18 and wasted no time in complet-

ing its assignment. It was considerably helped by strong guerrilla forces; they took Panay's largest port, Iloilo, on the 20th, crossed straight to the island of Guimaras, and landed on the western coast of Negros on March 29. Surprise had been their biggest ally to date, but awaiting them was the biggest Japanese force in the Visayas: 13,500 Army and air force troops commanded by LieutenantGeneral Takeshi Kono. A prolonged battle lasted through April and May before Kono made the inevitable decision to take to the mountains. Over 6,000 of his men were still alive when the war ended. By far the biggest fight in the Visayas fell to the Americal Division, which landed near Cebu City on March 26. There it found formidable defences, including mined beaches an obstacle which 8th Army forces had not had to tackle before.

A

fortnight's hard fighting was needed to prise the Japanese out of their defences and start the mopping-up -but, once again,

the Japanese were still holding out in June. In the meantime, Americal troops

had subdued Bohol

in a

mere two weeks

after their landing on April 11, and had crossed to eastern Negros, where they joined 40th Division in hunting down the last 1,300 Japanese troops still on the run.

After the clearing of the Visayas and the Sulu Archipelago, only Mindanao

remained: Mindanao, second largest island in the Philippines, and the island which MacArthur had originally planned to liberate first. It was a formidable obstacle. Suzuki had placed over half the 35th Army on Mindanao, intending to make the island the last bastion of Japanese resistance in the Philippines. He did not live to fight this last-ditch battle himself, as he was killed by American aircraft in April. His successor was Lieutenant-General Gyosaku Morozumi, who took over the 43,000 men of the garrison.

V Crossing the Cagayan river beside the remains of a bridge blown by the Japanese. Men of the 139th Regiment, 37th Infantry Division, advance to attack Cagayan city.

Despite the imposing size of their forces on Mindanao, the Japanese only controlled about five per cent of the island. The remainder was under the virtual control of the best equipped, organised, and led guerrilla forces in the Philippines, under the command of Colonel Wendell W. Fertig. The fact remained, however, that the Japanese held all the populated areas of Mindanao-hence MacArthur's determination to oust them.

The April

battle

Mindanao began on when General Sibert's X

for

17, 1945,

Corps landed at Illana Bay. Driving rapidly inland, Sibert's forces covered 115 miles in 15 days and pounced on Davao, depriving the Japanese of their last major town in the Philippines. Davao fell on May 3, but over a month of hard fighting in the hills of the interior lay ahead. Subsequent landings on the north coast of

Mindanao,

at

Macalajar Bay and Butuan

Bay, sent further American columns inland to split up the Japanese mass, which was not disrupted and forced into the jungle until the last week of June. There remained some 2,000 Japanese in the extreme south of the island, who had been cut off there ever since Sibert's pounce on Davao in April-May. These fugitives were the objective of the last seaborne landing of the long struggle for the Philippines which had begun in Leyte Gulf in October 1944. On July 12 a battalion of the 24th Division went ashore to work with the local Filipino guerrillas in rounding up the Japanese. And they landed in Sarangani Bay, the southern-

most

inlet

on Mindanao's

MacArthur had planned

to

coast.

reconquest of the Philippines at this point. Instead it was the scene of the very last action in the campaign.

^-»t' 2496

Once

launch the

*>• *

CHAPTER 162

Kamikaze: 'the divine wind' by Jonathan Martin

On October

25, 1944. the Battle of Leyte Gulf was at its height. Shortly before 1100, the surviving ships of Rear-Admiral Clifford Sprague's "Taffy 3" escort carrier group were repairing damage caused during their engagement with Admiral Kurita's battleships and preparing to recover their aircraft. Inevitably the Americans were slightly off their guard when six "Zeke" (Mitsubishi A6M Zero) fighters swept in low over the sea towards them. Anti-aircraft guns engaged the attackers but, instead of attempting a conventional bombing or strafing attack, one of the Zekes roared over the stern of

the St Lo and deliberately crash-dived onto the flight-deck amidships. The aircraft bounced overboard, but its bomb went through the deck and exploded.

Two minutes later a second explosion rocked the ship as the aviation fuel in the hangar went up. By 1100 hours the St Lo was aflame, and at 1121 she sank. The other carriers were similarly attacked Kalinin Bay was hit twice while a third aircraft crashed nearby; another missed the bridge of the Kitkun Bay but struck the port catwalk; and the sixth Zeke crashed astern of White Plains but caused only minor damage. About 100 miles to the north another :

A "The

ayth Suicide L'nit takes

Nakaminato base" by the Japanese artist Usaburo Ihara. The aircraft appear to be Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa off from the

single-seat fighters

adapted

to

the role.

part of the escort force had a similar experience: at about 0740 hours four

Zekes approached Rear-Admiral Thomas Sprague's "Taffy 1" at high altitude and dived on the carriers. The Santee was hit forward of the elevator while Sangamon and Petrof Bay suffered near misses. A

2497

few minutes later the last aircraft hit the Suwanee, causing heavy casualties. However, all damage was repaired within two hours and the carriers were able to resume operating their aircraft. Pacific Fleet had suffered its casualties from the Kamikaze Toku6e^sMifo^e^j7jai- the "Divine Wind Special Attack Force" of suicide pilots whose massive and despairing attacks were to horrify the Allied forces during the remainder of the war. Although October 25 saw the first mass suicide attacks, it was probably not the first action by the

The U.S.

first

The

final impetus for setting up the kamikaze units was provided by the inevitability of the American attack on the Philippine islands and the pitifully small Japanese force available to defend them. The Japanese were determined to first

hold the Philippines at all costs, since would cut the home islands off from the essential oil and other supplies their loss

kamikazes, for on October 21, while supporting the Leyte landings, the cruiser Australia had been struck by a lone Zeke. This hit the bridge, killing 20 men (including the captain), wounding 54. and forcing the ship to retire from the battle zone.

These first suicide attacks and their evolution into the main offensive weapon of the Japanese during the last part of the war were born of despair. In June 1944 the last hopes that the Japanese Navy might have had of continuing to fight the Americans by conventional means had been shattered during the Battle of the Philippine Sea. In one day three carriers and more than 400 carrier-borne aircraft with 445 crew had been lost, while more than 100 land-based aircraft were also destroyed. The materiel cost was frightening, but what was even more serious was that these were the last even partially trained aircrews available. Now the bulk of the Japanese pilots were under-trained, outnumbered, and under-equipped, hitting only ten per cent of practice targets. Faced with the fact that most of their men were going to almost certain and useless death, it was inevitable that naval officers should look desperately for more certain ways of attacking the enemy -and that the most dedicated of them should begin to think of the possibility of deliberately piloting their bombs into the enemy ships. During the summer of 1944, this idea was put forward by Rear-

Admiral Sueo Obayashi, commander of the 3rd Carrier Division, and Captain Eichiro lyo, commander of the carrier Chiyoda, to Admiral Ozawa, commanderin-chief of the carrier forces. Considerable impetus was given to their arguments by the action of the commander of the 26th

Air Flotilla, Rear-Admiral Arima, who l^d a force against the American fleet off Luzon and appeared to crash his aircraft deliberately on the Cc ier Frinklin.

2498

of South-East Asia. The high command drew up Operation "SHO" (see Chapter 155).

Crucial to this plan was the neutralisation of American carrier-borne airpower, since if this were not done the battleships would be attacked and sunk long before they reached their goal. The main responsibility for this rested on the 1st Air Fleet in the Philippines. But the

A A Four kamikaze p//o
elite

of some of kamikaze pilots.

-

1st Air Fleet simply did not have sufficient aircraft to have any chance of carrying

jiro

out its task successfully. On September 9, the American fast carriers had blasted the main Japanese base on Davao, causing considerable damage. The main fighter force, which had been training at Clark Field on Luzon island, was immediately transferred to Cebu island to defend

were operational. On the day of his arrival Ohnishi received instructions that Operation "SHO" had begun and that he

Ohnishi arrived to take over the 1st Air Fleet, only 30 Zekes and 30 bombers

should activate the aerial side of it. Ohnishi was one of Japan's most experienced pilots, and had fought extensively in China. He had helped to plan the Pearl Harbor operation and had been

one of Admiral Yamamoto's chief aides in the build-up of the Imperial Navy's air arm. A forceful, arrogant, but highly capable officer, he had no illusions about the impossibility of his task. On October 19, Ohnishi went to the headquarters of Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, and put it to him that the only way to ensure that the American carriers were neutralised was by undertaking suicide attacks. Despite initial objections, Ohnishi received permission to set up the first attack groups, and during that afternoon he went to Mabalacat airfield where the 201st Air Group, with all the

available Zeke fighters, was based. There he explained his ideas to the executive officer of the base, Asaicki Tamai, and the

senior staff officer of the 1st Air Fleet, Rikihei Inoguchi. Both were initially disconcerted by his suggestion that they should set up the first Special Attack Unit, but after discussion with the flight commanders, Tamai agreed to do so without delay. A 23-year-old regular officer, Lieutenant

Yukio

Seki, was selected as commander of the force, which was given the title

"Shimpu" Attack Corps (another way of reading the characters for "kamikaze" -the name of the divine wind which had scattered the fleet of Genghis Khan during his attempted invasion of Japan in the 13th century). The first 24 volunteers were divided into four sections -S/zr7ei-

Davao, but the Americans appeared to have withdrawn. However, two days later the Americans launched a surprise attack on Cebu, catching more than 100 Zekes lined up on the runway. Over 50 were destroyed and many others damaged; over two-thirds of the Japanese strength had been put out of action. Reserves were called in urgently, but when, on October 17, Vice-Admiral Kaki-

shima, Yamato, Asahi, and Yamazakuranamed after the words of a patriotic poem. The next day Commander Nakajima, adjutant of the 201st Air Group, flew to Cebu and there organised the setting up of a second unit. As at Mabalacat there

was no

difficulty in recruiting volunteers. In fact, throughout its existence, the kamikaze corps -and the other methods of suicide attack which were developed never lacked volunteers, although these might vary in their standards. Extreme patriotism, and acceptance by both military and civilians that they should serve Emperor and country even to the extent

2499

of deliberately laying down their lives, were a fundamental part of the traditions of pre-war Japan. With several earlier examples, and the whole weight of national tradition behind them, it was not surprising that the Japanese leaders should have turned to mass suicide as a weapon of war, or that they should have found so many volunteers ready and eager to follow them. The first flights of the Shimpu Attack Corps took place on October 21. Sixteen took off to attack the American carrier force supporting the Leyte landings, but inadequate reconnaissance meant that they were unable to locate the enemy and

A

itmaia^

MIL^ Mii

Army

Air Force also prepared to follow the Navy's example. Throughout the next three months, while the Americans struggled to reconquer the Philippines, they were subjected to unrelenting kamikaze attacks. One of the worst during the Leyte operations came on November 25 when six

Zekes and two "Judies" (Yokosuka D4Y Suisei carrier bombers) attacked the fast

-'i~aBaiMBia

d

but one aircraft returned to base. That aircraft may well have been the one which crashed onto Australia. For the next three days, similarly unsuccessful flights were undertaken, but on October 25 came the attacks on "Taffy 1" and "Taffy 3", which resulted in the sinking of the St Lo. These two actions, in which ten aircraft were able to sink

carrier task force. The fleet carrier Essex, two of her sister ships, and the light carrier Independence were hit. On December 13 more than 100 Japanese aircraft, about one-third of them kamikazes, attacked the U.S. forces gathering for the landing on Mindoro. The cruiser Nashville, flag-

one carrier and damage

communications office were wrecked. Thereafter the U.S. ships were attacked almost every day until Japanese attention was switched to the ships preparing for the final landing at Lingayen Gulf. On January 3, 1945 the escort carrier

all

five others,

were

seen as a triumphant vindication of the kamikaze idea. Admiral Ohnishi returned to Japan to request as many aircraft as possible for suicide attacks, while further units were set up, using a wide variety of aircraft, bombers and dive-bombers as

2500

well as Zekes. The 2nd Air Fleet, which had arrived in the Philippines on October 23 and undertaken several unsuccessful conventional attacks, was amalgamated with the 1st on October 26 and began preparing Special Attack Groups. The

ship of the force, was hit and her flag bridge, combat information centre, and

Ommaney Bay was

so seriously

damaged

that she had to be abandoned and sunk. The luckless Australia was hit five times between January 6 and 9; although 44 men were killed and 72 wounded she was able to remain in action. During the landing the battleships New Mexico and Colorado, cruisers Columbia and Louisville, and 21 other vessels were hit. To maintain this level of attack the Japanese set up a training base on Formosa where crews received a sevenday course in kamikaze tactics before being flown to the Philippines. Attack

methods had been standardised using two main approaches: either at high altitude to about five miles from the target

October 25, 1944 and January 25, 1945, about 447 attacks were launched. Of these, 201 had been completed, 67 aircraft had been shot down by U.S. fighters or antiaircraft fire, and 179 aircraft had returned to base after failing to locate targets.

The American forces had lost two escort carriers and three destroyers, while 23 cruisers, five battleships, nine cruisers,

23 destroyers, and 27 other vessels had been damaged. The kamikazes had killed 738 men and wounded 1,300. The airborne kamikazes had launched the most spectacular and numerous attacks of the campaign, but they had not been the only suicide units in action, for

\

^© 3i

followed by an ever-steepening dive, or a low level approach at about 30 feet above the sea followed by a climb to about 1,000 feet close to the target and a nearvertical dive. But the continual fighting and the nature of the weapon that they were using inevitably took its toll of Japanese strength. Early in January, the 1st Air Fleet flew its last mission with five Zekes and was then withdrawn to Formosa. The last major attacks of the campaign were launched on January 13,

damaging the escort carrier Salamaua and the destroyer Bagley, and the last flight of all took place on January 25. During the three months between

the Japanese Navy had been developing two other weapons which first went into action in the Philippines. The first use of "human torpedoes" by the Japanese navy had been during the Russo-Japanese war; during the attack on Pearl Harbor two-man midget submarines had been deployed in an attempt to penetrate the anchorage. These had pointed the way for a development of the 24-inch Type 93 torpedo, the giant "Long Lance" which had created havoc amongst Allied surface units during the early engagements of the war. During the winter of 1942-3 two naval lieutenants and a naval architect, Hiroshi Suzukawa, developed a

^
Zero fighter on a

kamikaze mission roars in towards the "Casablanca" class escort-carrier White Plains. A A kamikaze comes down over the "Clevelandl Fargo" class light cruiser

Vicksburg, ex-

Cheyenne.

2501

V "The kamikaze corps leaving from the Tachikawa base", a painting by Santaro Iwata.

•»\

^#*

design for a piloted version of the Long Lance - which became known as the i^a/^en ("Heaven Shaker"). This had an extra section, fitted aft of the warhead, which contained a compartment for the pilot and his controls. The size of the warhead was tripled to 3,400 lbs-reckoned to be enough to sink even the largest ships-and the range to an estimated 48 miles. Plans were sent to the Naval General Staff during 1943 but no action was taken until after the disaster at the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Then a prototype was approved -although it was insisted that

some means of escape must be provided for the pilot-volunteers were called for, and a unit set up near Kure. The first Kaiten strike was made in November against the American naval base at Ulithi by three fleet submarines each carrying four Kaiten. The force sailed on the 8th, but 1-37 was sunk by the U.S. destroyer Nicholas on November 12. On the 20th, 1-47 launched her four Kaiten off the coast of Ulithi. Three explosions were heard before the submarine set sail for home. U.S. destroyers attacked 1-36 when she had launched only one

1 Kaiten but she managed to escape and return to port. On the basis of the reported explosions and subsequent reconnaissance flights it was estimated that an aircraft carrier and two battleships had been sunk, and the operation was judged a great success. In reality, only the tanker Mississinewa had been sunk. Plans were now drawn up for a more ambitious attack early in 1945 and during the first week of the year six submarines set sail with 24 Kaiten to strike at various U.S. anchorages. Between January 11 and 13, a total of 20 Kaiten was launched

against targets off New Guinea, the Palaus, the Admiralty Islands, and Guam. One exploded soon after leaving its mother ship, but the other 19 were again extravagantly credited with making 15 hits. None of these can be authenticated from American records, but the Japanese now envisaged a major increase in Kaiten activities. A new training centre was set up and 200 recruits began to learn the difficult art of controlling the Kaiten. Several attempts were made to halt the Iwo Jima landings with Kaiten, but on no occasion were any launched since Continued on page 2510

!••>

ij»>r'

^

t 1

I \i

'A

m

I

I

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?f

f

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^ ^ m^

2504

Japsm's wat eUatt When Japan went

to

war

in

she was one of the best prepared belligerents. At that time eight per cent of her national product went on war materials. However, being an island not rich in raw materials, she had to import her oil, iron ore, and 1941

most strategic metals. Even

be-

massive attacks by bombers, which reached their daily climax in March 1945, her supply lines were being constricted by submarine and air attack on fore

the

American

merchant shipping.

From 1941 to 1944 her industry production expanded: truck reached a peak in 1941, tanks and

artillery ammunition in 1942, and small arms production remained at its 1943 peak until

on building

fast patrol craft

Throughout

the

1944.

Though artillery production

production reached

at its highest in 1943, anti-

in 1944.

guns were being built in increasing numbers up to 1944. Explosives remained at the same level from 1941 to 1944. Japan ceased production of battleships in 1942, and at that cruiser construction was its peak, but by 1944 they

time at

too had ceased to be built. These cutbacks in the building of ships and tanks reflect the lack of steel available to industry as the war progressed. As a poor substitute

Japan

concentrated

world, its

war

high point

Japan was no exception for in September 1944 her production had reached 332 per cent of the average monthly rate in 1941.

Aircraft were at 628 per cent of the average monthly rate in 1941, navy ordnance at 528 per cent, naval ship-building at 233 per cent, merchant ship building at 508 per cent. Army ordnance reached 274 per cent of the average monthly rate in 1941 in February 1945. Vehicles were at only 35 per cent of the 1941 output. .

<< A Japanese schoolgirl works

was

aircraft

and

submarines.

in a

Nagoya aircraft would have been

factory. This

either the Aichi or the

Mitsubishi company. Of a total of 69,888 aircraft built in Japan during the war, 3,627 were built

by Aichi and 12,513 by Mitsubishi -23.1 per cent of the total.

V < Tokyo silversmiths reckon up the value of silver collected from civilians to buy strategic war materials from Germany.

< An

air force recruit learns

about aero engine maintenance. ^ Air force flying recruits. But

was by now too scarce allow proper training.

fuel

to

a.

2505

From September to July (the full month of production

last

during the war) there was a 53 per cent decline in production. This was attributable to a shortage of steel and raw materials, lack of transportation, lack of skilled workers, and increased absenteeism. Copper, nickel, and other minor metals were in short supply, and this forced a time-consuming change in the design of engines. There still remained a need to divert valuable steel into building tankers because at the beginning of the war Japan possessed very few of her own. In 1941 her labour force was composed almost entirely of adult male Japanese. By 1944 half the workers were women, children and Koreans. The chief loss, however, were the skilled workers who had been drafted into the forces.

X MiMMm

A

Japanese schoolboys at work

making wooden pan effort to

lids in

an

save metal.

A> >

Engine maintenance. Air force inspection. But as

a result of battle attrition and lack of pre-war planning, both the Army and Navy air arms were by the middle of 1944 at a !-prv l,„f,

(,1)1)

r*'

^.

"~~--

^ 'y

''ya

•>

-iir

Absenteeism was caused by on residential areas, disease, and by the need to spend air attack

more time food foraging. When the bombing

started,

production took a further plunge. Army ordnance was down by 26 per cent, naval ordnance by 28 per cent, and naval and merchant ship building went down by 10 to 15 per cent. Figures are not available for the Japanese air industry, and with motor vehicle output already low, the bombing

had little effect. However, the

lack of transportation affected pn^duction when attempts were made to disperse industry to make it a harder target for the bombers. Army and naval ordnance went down by a further 12 per cent, though there was little effect on simply because ship-building, it is difficult to disperse a shipyard. The effect on the produc-

V Elements of the Imperial Japanese Navy, which by the end was to consist of little more than light units.

of 1944

war years. of the weapons employed were either the same or improvements of the ones with which

tion was sufficient to bring about a complete collapse in production. industry, the aircraft In

ducted during the

Most

airframe production went down by 33 per cent, engine by 57 per cent, and propeller by 42 per cent. By July 1945 68 per cent of the aircraft industry had been dispersed, but it was only operating at about 25 per cent of its

Japan had begun the war in 1941. Approaches were made to Ger-

many

to

provide

information

about tank and aircraft design, and a Panther tank was purchased by the military mission headed by Ishide in November 1944. However, whether or not Japan would have had sufficient steel to start mass production of heavy tanks in 1944 is very

capacity.

Predictably the manufacture of delicate products like radio, radar, and communications and electrical equipment was severely curtailed by the bombing. One curious feature of Japanese war production was the relatively small amount of research con-

questionable.

Another scheme which had more chance of success was the plan

to

manufacture

copies

of the Me 163B twin-jet fighter

"Komet" and a based on the Me 262. The Komet type aircraft had one flight on July 7, 1945, which ended in a crash and the destruction of the aircraft. Even if the B-29's had never reached her war industries, Japan's factories were being brought to a halt by the U.S.

submarine

blockade

on

her

strategic imports. Unlike Britain, which was in a similar position

between 1940 and 1943, she did not have in the belligerent neutrality of Russia anything to approach the generosity offered by the United States in peace and war.

«»

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CJiSC^WI*

-11

mti^ mM^

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MXY7

The Japanese Mitsubishi G4M2e Model 24J "Betty" transport and Yokosuka Model 11 "Okha" (Cherry blossom) suicide aircraft

Engines: three Type 4 Mark 20 rockets, 1,764-lbs thrust

Warhead: 2,646

I

Model

in total.

lbs of high explosive.

Speed: 576 mph in terminal dive. Range: 23 miles. Weight empty/loaded: 970/4,718 lbs.

Span

:

1

6 feet 9^ inches.

Length 1 9 feet 1 0| Height: 3 feet 9| :

inches. inches.

(Okha).

2509

Continued from page 2503

the U.S. anti-submarine screen prevented the fleet submarines from getting close enough to their targets. The final attempt to operate the suicide torpedo was made on March 26 when four submarines with 18 Kaiten sailed to attack shipping off Okinawa. It was a complete failure, with two of the mother submarines being sunk before they reached the target area and the others so heavily attacked that they were barely able to escape without launching their weapons. The other naval suicide weapon which was developed was the Shinyo suicide boat. This was about 18 feet in length and powered by one or two automobile engines. A high-explosive impact-fused warhead was carried in the bow and the maximum speed was between 25 and 30 knots. The type was used in the Philippine and Okinawa campaigns, and caused the loss of at least two destroyers, Charles J. Badger and Hutchins.

duced with the help of the Aeronautical Section

of

Tokyo University, created

considerable interest amongst his superiors and in August an emergency development programme was set up at the Naval Air Research and Development centre. This, the Marudai project, resulted in the "Okha' ("Cherry Blossom") suicide bomb. Carried beneath a "Betty"

(Mitsubishi G4M) bomber to within 20 miles of its target, the Okha 11 had a 2,646-lb

warhead and was powered by

three solid-propellant rockets which gave it a speed of about 400 mph. In October Captain Motoharu Okamura was instructed to start recruiting and training pilots for Jinrai Butai, the "Corps of Divine Thunder", which would operate the new weapon. Early in November the Okha made its first successful flight and the first 50 to be completed were loaded on the new 68,000-ton carrier

Shinano to be taken

to

Formosa. The

/-^' ^>t

Once the Philippines had been secured, U.S. attacks moved to the very coasts of Japan. On February 10, 1945 Task Force 58, the U.S. fast carriers, sailed to strike at Tokyo and the air bases near it as a preparation for the attack on Iwo Jima. On February 19 the landings took place against fierce opposition but by March 17 the island had been completely occupied. There was virtually no kamikaze activity during the operation except for an attack on February 21 by aircraft from the 3rd Air Fleet in the Tokyo area which sank the escort carrier Bismarck Sea and damaged the Saratoga, forcing her to withdraw from the battle area. During the summer of 1944 a junior pilot. Ensign Mitsuo Ota, had also come to the conclusion that the only way to make sure of hitting the enemy was to pilot the bomb right onto its target, and he had begun to draw up proposals for a special weapon. His first design, pro2510

giant ship set sail from Yokosuka at the end of the month but on the 29th she was torpedoed four times by the U.S. submarine Archerfish and sank within two hours. No more Okha were yet available. The next U.S. target was Okinawa, the first of the Japanese home islands to come within range. On land the com-

manding general made elaborate

pre-

parations for a defence to the last man, while the Japanese Navy drew up plans for massive suicide attacks against the American fleet. At the beginning of March the Japanese had just over 2,000 aircraft available for the defence of Okinawa. These were divided amongst four air fleets 300 with the 1st on Formosa, 800 with the 3rd around Tokyo, 600 with the 5th on Kyushu, and 400 with the 10th on Honshu. Before the Americans launched their assault an attempt was made by the Japanese at a pre-emptive strike against :

the Pacific fleet's base at Ulithi. The attack was made by 24 'Trances" (Yokosuka PlY Ginga) bombers, each carrying a 2,000-lb bomb and flown by a kamikaze pilot. The unit took off on March 10 guided by four flying boats, but before the aircraft were halfway to their objective they were recalled, since a recon-

naissance report suggested that there was only one carrier at Ulithi. This was found to be false-there were, in fact, eight fleet carriers and seven escort carriers in the anchorage, but it was too late to continue the operation that day. Early the next morning the aircraft took off again. The weather was bad and the kamikazes lost their guides. Thirteen of them developed engine trouble and had to return but the remaining 11 were able to reach the base unobserved and dive on the ships. Results were disappointing, for only one hit was made, causing damage to the carrier Randolph. Between March 18 and 20 the invasion of Okinawa was heralded by a series of massive attacks made by Task Force 58 on targets on Kyushu. About 50 kamikazes struck back, and the carrier Franklin was crippled, while hits were made on the Essex, Wasp, and Enterprise. On the 21st a Japanese reconnaissance

apparently undefended and stationary about 350 miles off the coast. Vice-Admiral Ugaki, commander of the 5th Air Fleet, decided that this would be the ideal opportunity to try out the Okha. Eighteen were loaded onto their bombers and every available flghter was gathered to protect them. The Betty bomber was already totally outclassed, and when carrying the heavy Okha it was almost unmanoeuvrable. When it was found that only 55 Zekes flight sighted three carriers

V The camera gun in an American fighter catches the destruction of a "Betty" bomber carrying an Okha (Cherry Blossom) suicide craft. The Americans dubbed this latter the "Baka" (Fool). The shifting horizon in the photographs is

the result of the fighter

jockeying for the best firing position.

A

"^

^ kamikaze pilot

adjusts a

comrade's helmet and scarf just prior

to a

mission.

< Kamikaze pilots

with

ceremonial insignia.

were available. Commander Okamura's

recommended that the operation should be abandoned since they reckoned that it would be impossible for the aircraft to get near enough to their targets before being shot down. But Ugaki, who had come to see the force take off, was insistent that they should go. Eight Zekes were unable to take off because of mechanical faults and 17 of the remainder had to turn back. When the staff

2511

was only 50 miles from the carriers' was met by 50 Hellcats, which burst through the fighter screen and fell on the bombers. One was shot down immediately and although the remainder jettisoned their Okhas to take evasive action, 13 more were shot down in quick succession. The last four disappeared into clouds, hotly pursued by the Americans fighters, and were never seen again. Thus ended the ignominious first sortie of the Okha. The only successful occasion on which they were used was on April 12, when eight bombers took off. Only two hits were made; one sinking the picket

were learning from experience and picket destroyers had been stationed around the island to give advance warning of the approach of kamikazes. They more than proved their worth, but these lightly armed ships turned out to have the most exposed task of any naval unit. Distributed singly or in pairs, and lacking fighter cover and massed gunfire support from other ships, they were an easy target and suffered very heavy casualties. Frequently the picket on a particular station had to be changed more than once a day because of battle damage, while one pair of destroyers reported more than 50

destroyer Mannert L. Abele and the other damaging the destroyer Stanly. In all some 800 Okha ll's were built, but only 74 were ever dispatched on missions and of these 56 were either jettisoned or shot down with their mother planes. Only four ever hit their targets. While these attempts were being made to use the Okha, the kamikazes were engaged in their biggest and most savage battle. During the preliminary bombardment for the landing on Okinawa the cruiser Indianapolis, flagship of Admiral Spruance, the force commander, was put out of action. But the Americans

kamikaze attacks in less than 24 hours. The Japanese defensive plan, codenamed ''KikusuV ("Floating Chrysan-

force

it

V An Okha

bomb, captured

hangar by American occupation forces when they arrived in Japan in 1945. The Japanese had had high intact in

its

revetted

hopes that the wide use of such weapons would inflict unacceptable losses on the Allies when they finally launched their invasion of the Japanese home islands.

> An Okha piloted bomb, taken on Okinawa, under examination at the

Naval Aircraft Modifica-

tion Unit at Johnsville,

Penn-

sylvania. In the centre photograph a naval officer investigates

and in the bottom one Lieutenant Wilson Pritchett the cockpit,

takes a look at the three rocket motors.

2512

themum", the crest of a 14th-century general who had led his army to certain death in a suicide operation), envisaged massive and co-ordinated kamikaze attacks on the landing forces, and the first of these was launched on April 6. Some 355 kamikazes swept at the American fleet, sinking two picket destroyers, two ammunition ships, and one L.S.T., and damaging more than 22 others.

On

the same day the other part of the operation began -the final

Kikusui

suicide charge of the remnants of the Japanese fleet. The super-battleship Yamato, the cruiser Yahagi, and eight destroyers set sail for Okinawa with only sufficient fuel to enable them to reach the island. Once there they would beach themselves in front of the U.S. fleet and fight

until

their

ammunition was

ex-

hausted or they were totally destroyed. Sighted by U.S. submarines, they were heavily attacked by aircraft on the 7th and the Yamato, Yahagi, and four destroyers were sunk. On the 11th the kamikazes made an attempt to get through to the carriers of Task Force 58, which was stationed off the north of Okinawa to provide air cover and act as a diversionary target for suicide pilots. Attacks were launched throughout the day, but no direct hits were made. Eight near misses caused minor damage to the battleship Missouri and the carrier Enterprise. The next day, the attacks were switched back to the pickets and landing support ships. Some 185 kamikaze attacks were launched, of which 151 were shot down before they reached their targets. The remainder succeeded in sinking a destroyer and

damaging three battleships and

six des-

troyers or escort destroyers.

Almost every day off Okinawa the American naval forces were subjected to some kamikaze attacks. But the main Japanese assaults against the ships lying off the beach-head came in ten major attacks -the third of which took place on August 16 with 165 aircraft, but little major damage ensued. By the beginning of May, the savage rate of the earlier fighting was inevitably taking its toll on the Japanese. The numbers of aircraft and trained crews had fallen off drastically and the American defences were steadily improving. In the last major attack, on May 11, 72 kamikazes were shot down before they reached their targets. Two managed to hit Task Force 58's flagship. Bunker Hill, forcing ViceAdmiral Mitscher to transfer to Enterprise. The next day, he detached two task groups to raid Kyushu. Considerable damage was caused, but during the operation Enterprise was hit by a kamikaze and Mitscher was forced to transfer his flag yet again, this time to the Randolph. The last attacks by the kamikazes during the Okinawa campaign came on June 21 and 22, but little damage was caused. On July 2 the island was finally secure -the Americans having lost 26

2513

- •- -^w. " rf . .

.#

v-»'

-?>^i5^

the Okinawa campaign Japanese launched operation Kikusui, their fiercest kamikaze

During the

attacks.

A The

U.S.S.

Hazelwood

lies

low

kamikaze on 29 April, 1945. V Damage to the hangar deck of U.S.S. Sangamon from a suicide attack on 5 May, 1945.

'^5^T>5W^n

A A Zeke

U.S.S. Missouri off Okinawa,

in the water after a

t>

hit

steep dive attacks the cruiser

11 April, 1945.

Columbia at Lingayen Gulf, January 1945. > V A kamikaze attack on the

had

suicide plane in a

The Missouri

cope with eight attacks on that day. All were near-misses causing only minor damage. to

X

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ships to suicide attacks with a further 164 damaged. Approximately 1,465 kamikaze aircraft had taken part in the largest suicide operation of the war. The Royal Navy had also been involved with the kamikazes during the Okinawa operation. Task Force 57 of four carriers and two battleships had joined the U.S. fleet on March 16 with the job of neutralising the Sakishima Gunto island group to the east of Formosa. It suffered frequent attacks, and hits were made on the carriers Indefatigable, Formidable and Victorious, but it was found that the armoured decks of the British carriers gave them considerably better protection than the wooden decks of the American ships and none was out of action for more ,

> Kamikaze pilots

ing up the American invasion force before it reached the shore fell on the kamikazes. Thousands of pilots were recruited and hastily trained for suicide attacks. Small emergency airstrips were built up and down the coasts. The kamikazes were to be dispersed on these so as to be relatively immune from enemy attack before flying off" on their one-way missions. More than 5,300 aircraft of all types (ranging from fighters and bombers to training aircraft and flying boats) were available for suicide attacks; a further 5,000 would undertake escort duties and conventional attacks. Once all

the kamikazes had been used these aircraft would take their place. Over 700 Okha 11 's were available and the Japanese

receive their

ceremonial cup of sake before departing on their last flight.

> A During the American KyUshu: a "Judy" (Yokosuka D-^YSuisei)

carrier sweep off

carrier-borne dive-bomber hurtles down towards the sea in

flames after being hit by American A. A. fire. On suicide missions the type could carry a 1,764-lb bomb-load. > V A "Betty" hits the sea astern of an "Essex" class fleet carrier.

'^>i<^ than a few hours. It was now obvious that the next Allied objective must be an invasion of Japan. Despite surface

hopeless position, lacking a experienced pilots, or sufficient fuel to operate most weapons, and with its cities being devastated every day by the Superfortresses of the U.S. Air Force, the Japanese Government-largely forced by the intransigence of the army leaders -was determined to fight on. As the Allied planners worked on Operation "Olympic", the largest amphibious operation ever envisaged, which was to begin with a landing on Kyushu on November 1, 1945, the Japanese prepared their defences. Once again the responsibility for breakits

fleet,

were hurrying to produce other designs for rocket or ramjet powered variants. Backing this aerial armada would be more than 400 Koryu and Kairyu suicide submarines (five- and two-man developments of the Kaiten) and at least 2,000 Shinyo suicide boats. Finally, and most bizarre of all, were the Fukuyuru, strong swimmers who would swim carrying mines on their backs to explode against Allied ships.

The stage was set for the greatest act of mass suicide in history when on August 6 an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Three days later a second bomb on Nagasaki at last gave the Japanese leaders the face-saving excuse they needed to accept the inevitable and surrender.

On August 14 Naval Imperial Headquarters ordered that all kamikaze operations should be suspended. Many Japanese refused to accept what they saw as national disgrace. More than and many hundreds of and civilians took their own lives. Among them the originator of the first kamikaze operations, Admiral 1,000

army

naval

officers

officers

Ohnishi, who disembowelled himself in the traditional manner on August 16. Refusing the coup-de-grace, he died in agony several hours later, leaving a message that he apologised with his death to the souls of the men he had ordered to their doom, and to their

bereaved families. One of his subordinates took a more spectacular way out. On hearing the order to suspend operations, Vice-Admiral Ugaki, determined to die in the same way as his men, ordered three aircraft to be prepared at Oita airfield. He took off on August 14, followed by ten other aircraft piloted by aircrew determined to follow his example, and headed for Okinawa. None of them returned, but it is symbolic of the ultimate futility of the kamikazes that no attacks were reported on any Allied ships during that day. The kamikazes had cost the Allied forces more than lives and added immensely to the strain of operations in the Pacific theatre. But ultimately, as a weapon of despair, they were powerless to halt the steady build-up of American power and its advance to the coasts of Japan. Brought up with centuries of tradition of the sanctity of human life, the Western mind finds it difficult to comprehend how thousands of men could have volunteered deliberately to take their own lives. For this decision was not even made in the heat of battle. A kamikaze volunteer might have to wait weeks, or even months, before going into action, and during that time he had to live with the reality that every day might be his last. Yet there are no records oi kamikaze pilots deliberately going back on their decision. Morale in all units was high and men actually competed to be allowed to go on operation-

Only if one remembers and understand the background within which these men were brought up and the massive weight of tradition which saw death in battle and suicide as noble and honourable institutions is it possible to understand something of the mentality which gave birth to and sustained the kamikaze operations. al missions.

tries to

2517

A An American

officer "takes a

spin" in one of the 300 "Shinyo" suicide craft captured by the

Kerama

U.S. forces in the

island

group off the south-west coast of Okinawa. Launched from the beach by trolleys, the boats were painted dark green to blend with the background foliage. The two angled metal contraptions at the stern are launchers for

5-inch rockets, intended to put off the aim of the American light defences by shooting out a cloud of incendiary bullets. The boats displaced up to two tons, were 16^ to 18 feet long and capable

of speeds of between 25 and 30 knots, and were armed with a 4,406-lb warhead or two depth

charges, fused to detonate on impact. > A Japanese human torpedo on its f>

launching

rails.

> The kamikaze was Japan's

desperate response, in the latter stages of the war, to the materiel superiority of the United States.

Volunteers abounded for these special attack forces of suicide pilots who crashed their bomb-

laden planes directly onto U.S. warships. Although successful during the Philippines campaign, October 1944, the kamikazes

were

during Okinawa, June

less effective

battle for

the 1945,

when

U.S. forces detailed picket destroyers to give advance

warning of their

attacks.

Overleaf: Many Americans feared that with Germany defeated, the British government would try to avoid involvement in the war against Japan. This poster was designed both to reaffirm Churchill's pledge to the

American government and people that Britian will fight to the end, and to prepare the British people for such a struggle.

2518

Great Britain will pursue the WAR AGAI NST IW in© If Ci If CiICIb :

JAPAN WINSrON CHURCHILL

AFTER 163 nt ^^

n im

.

illiam Fowler

.

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late as March 6, 1945 Major-General Curtis E. LeMay. who had recently replaced Brigadier-General H. S. Hansell as commander of the 21st Bomber Command, remarked: "This outfit has been getting a lot of publicity without having really accomplished a hell of a lot in

As

bombing results." To date, the tactics employed had been high level precision attacks by B-29's. However ice. high winds, poor visibility, and air turbulence made navigation and accurate bombing very difficult and it had taken up to eight separate H.E. raids to

have any appreciable

effect

on some

targets.

Late in 1944 the B-29's had been moved from China and India to bases on Saipan.

^

O Guam, and Tinian in the Marianas. They made their first raid on Truk on October 28, and on November 24 they hit Tokyo.

< Bombs tumble down from U.S. Superfortress bombers onto the already blazing waterfront of a Japanese port.

Japanese fighter attacks from Iwo Jima A A B-29 Superfortress unloads were eliminated when the island was over Anshan in Manchuria, secured in March 1945, and its landing home of the Showa steel works. grounds subsequently saved the lives of This was the second largest integrated iron and steel works in 24.761 men in 2,251 emergency landings the Japanese system, and played by crippled B-29"s. a key part in Japan's developSince high altitude daylight raids were ment of her colony of Manchuria not giving good results, LeMay, who was as an industrial entity. by nature an experimenter, decided to Previous page: test the effectiveness of incendiary

bombs

against these targets. The attack would be a massed assault against the industrial cities, delivered at low level, at night. Two light test raids were made against

Nagoya on January

3,

American groundcrew load clusters of incendiary bombs into a medium bomber. The same

type of incendiary was used to help burn out the heart of Japan.

and Kobe on 2523

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February 4. The planners were pleased in the United States and a full-scale operation was suggested to evaluate the effectiveness of this type of attack. It was mounted on the nights of March 9-10, 1945, and the target was Tokyo. LeMay staked his career on the operation, for many pessimists had predicted that at low level the B-29's would suffer very heavy losses. To increase the bombload, and prevent the aircraft from firing at one another in the dark, he had ordered that they should fly with unloaded guns. In place of the 8,000 rounds of machine gun ammunition normally carried, they added 3,200 pounds of bombs. In addition, the low-level approach would save the engines and further increase the bomb-load. On average each plane would carry six tons.

The lead squadron was loaded with

180

M47 70-pound napalm bombs which were to start fires to bring out the motorised fire-fighting equipment. The planes which

followed would carry 24 500-pound clusters of M69's, a six-pound oil incendiary,

very effective against lightly constructed buildings. These clusters were set to burst so that they would give a minimum density of 25 tons, or 8,333 M69's, per square mile.

The 334

loaded with about 2,000 tons of bombs, came over the area in three B-29's,

wings at altitudes between 4,900 and 9,200 feet. The weather was better than usual with little cloud cover and a visibility of ten miles. As they unloaded their bombs, the crews saw the flames spread to form bigger fires.

The crews reported they could bomb visually and were meeting only light A. A. fire, with no fighter opposition. Later formations found the target obscured by smoke and had to range wide over the area in search of new targets. Turbulence from the fires made the bomb runs difficult as the aircraft rose in the intense heat waves. On the return flight, tail gunners could see a glow for 150 miles. For the raiders it was an inexpensive attack; flak damaged 42 bombers, 14 were lost, and of these the crews of five were rescued. The loss ratio was 4.2 per cent, which compared well with the 3.5 per cent figure for all B-29 raids and the

January. For the inhabitants of Tokyo it was a horrifying and awesome experience. 5.7 for

Police records

show that 267,171 buildings

were destroyed and 1,008,005 people made homeless. There were 83,793 dead and

40,918 wounded, and it was nearly a month before the last body was removed from the ruins. Photographs revealed that 15.8 square miles of the city had been burnt out; this included 18 per cent of the industrial area and 63 per cent of the commercial centre and the heart of the congested residential area. The Intelligence officers of the 21st Bomber Command removed 21 numbered industrial plants from their target lists. Less than 24 hours after this attack a force of 313 B-29's began taking off on the afternoon of March 11 with the target of Nagoya, Japan's third largest city and centre of her aircraft industry. One aircraft ditched on take off, and 19

A Part of the horrific aftermath of a fire raid on Tokyo: the bodies of hundreds of burnt men, women, and children litter the streets of the capital after the all-clear.

V The remains of a components assembly hall in one of the Mitsubishi plants at Nagoya, after a B-29 raid from the Marianas. Mitsubishi was the largest aircraft engine,

and

second largest airframe, constructor in Japan.

<<

U.S.

Navy

carrier-borne

aircraft set off to attack industrial targets near Tokyo.

others

turned

back

with

mechanical

The 285 which reached the city unloaded 1,790 tons of incendiary bombs from between 5,100 and 8,500 feet. Despite the fact that the bomb-load was 125 tons heavier than that dropped on Tokyo, there was no general holocaust. There were 394 separate fires, and posttrouble.

strike photographs revealed that 2.05 square miles of the city had been des-

troyed. Though 18 numbered industrial targets (that is plants given a special designation in target folders) were damaged or destroyed, the aircraft plants

were not knocked

out.

it had an adequate water supply, well-spaced fire breaks, an efficient fire-fighting service which operated promptly and effectively, and that night there was no wind to fan

Nagoya survived because

the initial fires into bigger blazes. For the raiders the attack was again an inexpensive operation-the only bomber lost was the one that ditched at take off.

major road and rail links, it was a great commercial and administrative centre. In 1945 it had an estimated population of 2,142,480.

Like other major cities, it was congested and inflammable. It had never been hit before by any major strikes, and now stood ready for destruction by fire. On March 13, after heroic efforts by the maintenance crews, 301 B-29's took off, each carrying six tons of bombs, and this time the low wing carried .50-inch

ammunition for lower forward and aft turrets as well as for the tail guns. The target was obscured by clouds when the 274 bombers that reached Osaka began their run. Using radar they achieved a better concentration than the attack on

Nagoya. In three hours they dropped 1,732.6 tons of bombs and burned out 8.1 square miles of the city centre. As the flames increased, fire fighting and A.R.P. services collapsed, and 119 major factories

I

A A Superfortress takes off from Harmon Field on Guam for a mission over Japan. The capture of the Marianas had featured in U.S. plans particularly because air bases for the giant B-29

bombers could be

built there.

Twenty others were damaged, 18 by and two by fighters. Osaka was the next target. The

flak city

produced about one-tenth of Japan's war-time total of ships, one-seventh of her electrical equipment, and one-third of her machinery and machine tools. Its

army arsenal furnished 20 per cent of the and requirements, not assemble aircraft, Osaka contained many sub-contractors producing engine parts. Besides having

2526

army's

ordnance

though

it

did

were destroyed and 134,744 houses burned down, with 1,363 damaged. The Osaka fire department listed 3,988 dead, 678 missing, and 8,463 injured. It was the Tokyo fire-storm again, with men and

women

suffocating in makeshift shelters or roasted alive as they rushed through the flames. Now it was the turn of Japan's sixth largest city. On March 16 the bombers

came to Kobe. Like Osaka cally a virgin target".

it

was

"practi-

A

port with a long irregular water it was easy to pick out on a radar scope. On either side of the harbour were important heavy industrial installations. It was Japan's most important overseas port and a focus for inland transportation. The bomb-load for the attack was different this time because the earlier operations had used up nearly all the available stocks of M47's and M69's. The B-29's would be carrying MlTAl's, 500-pound clusters of 4-pound magnesium thermite incendiaries. While these bombs would be effective against the dockland and industrial buildings, they would have less impact on the flimsy houses. In two hours and eight minutes, 307 front,

bombers unloaded 2,355 tons. Japanese were up this time, but they did not interfere with the raid -though they made 93 attacks, none of the three B-29's lost was hit by fighters. The post-attack photographs looked disappointing. Only 2.9 square miles fighters

E

fifth of the city) had been desHowever, on the ground the Japanese could assess the cost in human and industrial losses more accurately. About 500 industrial buildings were destroyed and 162 damaged. Among those heavily damaged were the Kawasaki shipyards, where 2,000-ton submarines were built. The loss of 65,951 houses left

(about a troyed.

242,468 people homeless. Police records showed 2,669 dead or missing and 11,289 injured.

The March campaign was brought to a close with a return visit to Nagoya on the night of the 19th. The bomb loads carried by the different wings reflected the way the fire raids had used up the available stocks of incendiaries. Every third plane carried two 500-pound general purpose H.E. bombs to disorganise the fire-fighters. The 314th Wing carried M69's, the 313th M47's, and the 73rd a mixed load of M47's and M76's. A total of 1,858 tons of bombs was dropped by the 290 aircraft which reached Nagoya, and because of smoke and searchlights, the bomb aimers had to use radar. This time they burned out three square miles and damaged the Nagoya arsenal, the marshalling yards, and the Aichi engine factory; but the Mitsubishi plants

escaped with minor damage. It had been a good month for the 21st Bomber Command. It had flown 1,595 sorties in 10 days (three-fourths as many as had been flown in all previous missions)

and the 9,365 tons of bombs dropped were three times the weight expended before

March 9. Though

there had been a great strain on both flight and maintenance crews, they had recovered quickly and morale was very high. Men and machines had

shown that they could achieve spectacular results for a loss ratio of 0.9 per cent in crew, far lower than that for day-light missions. The lower altitudes allowed a higher bomb-load to be carried and caused

2527

less

wear on the engines. In Washington

and

Guam

target

the planners adjusted their

programme and prepared

a three-

phase list with 33 targets rated A, B, or C according to their relative industrial value. Some like Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe had been hit before, but the planners felt that some of their urban areas still merited attention. The first phase emphasised the destruction of ground ordnance and aircraft plants, the second machine tools, electrical equipment, and ordnance and aircraft parts. Phase three would be implemented in the light of the results from the first 22 targets.

And what

jai«itj3Biii'

^*
Japan? The attacks had left behind 32 square miles of cinders and fire-blackened buildings in four major cities. Not only had strategic targets of

been destroyed, but factories producing goods for home consumption. Workers lost their homes, or accommodation in factory dormitories, and the evacuation which followed added to the labour problems already caused by the conscription of adult males. Early in 1944 some 600,000 houses were demolished to provide fire breaks, and since building materials were not provided, the destitute families had to find shelter with friends and relatives, or in public buildings. Natural disasters added to their misery, for 1945 was a year of excessive rainfall and floods. Local fires and earthquakes destroyed a further 500,000 houses. By July about a quarter of all the houses in Japan had been destroyed by all causes and some 22 million people, about three-tenths of the population, had been made homeless. Operations in support of the landings at Okinawa diverted the bombers from major incendiary attacks for two months. The savage fighting for the island, and the suicidal attacks on shipping, convinced LeMay that he should try to bomb Japan into surrender, rather than see this slaughter repeated on a larger scale in the invasion of the main islands. The new campaign was inaugurated with a day-light attack on Nagoya on May 14. A total of 472 bombers dropped 2,515 tons of M69's from between 12,000 and 20,500 feet. Though the raid burned only about 3.15 square miles, Mitsubishi's No. 10 engine works lost its Kelmut bearing plant and suffered other damage. An attack on the docks and industrial areas to the south on the night of May 16 showed how effective low-level night attacks were in contrast to the daylight high-level operations. In the May

2528

14 raid ten B-29's were lost, two to enemy action. The night attack had only three

A A box

of B-29's wings

its

afternoon way over the Pacific en route for a night mission over the Japanese late

due to mechanical failure. As it was a low-level attack, the aircraft carried homeland. eight tons as against 5.3 on day-light A> Bombs cascade from the raids, and so a total of 3,609 tons of mixed bellies of American Superfortress M47's and M50's were dropped. The raid bombers. burned 3.82 square miles and heavily > The results of such bombing the wreckage of a Japanese port. damaged Mitsubishi's No. 5 aircraft works. Nagoya was finished as a target losses, all

:

for area attacks. Little purpose is served in detailing all the raids made between May and June. With variations such as day-light escorted operations, or mixed bomb-loads, they brought fiery destruction to the major cities of Japan. Total urban area Destroyed City (in square miles)

Tokyo Nagoya Kobe Osaka

110.8

56.3

39.7

12.4

15.7

8.8

59.8

15.6

Yokohama

20.2

8.9

Kawasaki

11.0

3.6

257.2

105.6

Totals

N<«r*^'

-

/>-

z^r^ The Japanese capital received a double knock-out blow on the nights of May 23 and 25. In previous raids 5,000 tons of bombs had destroyed 34.2 square miles, and 2,545 tons had been expended in precision attacks. In the first raid, for the loss of 17 bombers, 520 B-29's dropped 3,646 tons of bombs and destroyed 5.3 square miles. The second raid brought the bombers close to the Imperial Palace and "took out" parts of the financial, commercial, and governmental districts of the city.

The bomb-load was lighter, but some 3,262 tons dropped by 502 aircraft yielded results which had not been anticipated: 16.8 square miles, the greatest area destroyed in a single raid, lay smoking beneath the reconnaissance aircraft when they visited the city. With 50.8 per cent of the entire city reduced to ashes and rubble, Tokyo was removed from the list of incendiary targets.

In the campaign some 4,678 sorties were flown and 27,164 tons of bombs dropped. And for the loss of 70 aircraft and damage to 420, a further 48 square miles of target areas were burned out. But there still remained the smaller cities undamaged by fire, and now they experienced the terror by night. Sixty attacks, following the same tactics employed against the main targets, were

made between June 17 and August 14. As a rule a B-29 wing would take one city, and in

this way. four targets could be attacked on one night. The 21st Bomber

Command flew 8,014 sorties and dropped 54,184 tons ofincendiaries, and for the loss of 19 bombers destroyed 63.75 square miles, about half the total area of all the targets. Such was their confidence, the Americans now dropped leaflets to warn the civilians in these cities before they struck. But while 12 cities would receive the leaflets, only four would be attacked. Despite this, the people poured into the country. Sensing the desperate mood of the nation, the Minister of Home Affairs, Motoki Abe, said later: "I believe that after the 23-24 May (sic) 1945 raids on Tokyo, civilian defence measures in that c ty, as well as other parts of Japan, were considered a futile effort." But Mamoru Shu;emitsu, the Foreign Minister, asserted that though "day by day Japan turned into a furnace the clarion call was accepted. If the Emperor ordained it, they would leap into the flames. That was the people of Japan." .

.

.

'•^'

V

A << Crew of "Waddy's Wagon", the fifth B-29 to take off on the first Tokyo mission from Saipan and the first to land: Capt. "Waddy" Young (captain), Lt. Jack Vetters (pilot), Lt. John Ellis (bombardier), Lt. Paul Garrison (navigator), Sgt. George Avon (radio operator), Lt. Bernard Black (engineer),

Kenneth Mansio (engineer), and Sgts. Lawrence Lee, Wilbur Chapman, Corbett Carnegie, and Sgt.

Joe Gatto (gunners).

A

"^

and A

Civilians leave

Tokyo for the safety of the country. < Superfortresses pass over the Marianas en route to Japan. V < Emperor Hirohito inspects some of the damage to Tokyo. V Burnt-out Tokyo, with only the shells of concrete buildings left standing. In the foreground is

the

Hihonbashi area, and

across the

Sumida

Koto ward.

river the

The American Boeing B-29 Superfortress heavy bomber

Engines: four Wright R-3350-23 Cyclone radlals, 2,200-hp each. Armament: up to twelve .5-mch Browning machine guns and one 20-mm cannon, plus up to 20,000 lbs of bombs. Speed 365 mph at 25,000 feet. Ceiling: 33,600 feet. :

Range: 5,380

miles

maximum.

Weight empty/loaded: 69,610/ 120,000

lbs

Span: 141 feet 21 Length: 99 feet Height: 27

feet 9 inches.

Crew: 10-14.

2532

inches.

CHAPTER 164

IwoJima

Previous page: U.S. Marines raise the Stars and Stripes on the top of precipitous

As

Mount

Suribachi, which dominates the southern part of Iwo Jima, on

February 23, 1945. A The first two assault waves close the beach shortly before

0900 hours on February 19. The wave hit the beaches at 0902, with elements of the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions soon moving inland to consolidate the beach-head.

first

A>

Amphtrack

vehicles

move

a piece of real estate, to

little

in

towards the beaches. > Marines unload stores from the gaping jaws of landing craft on Futatsune beach.

offer

anyone:

it

Iwo Jima has is an island

4f miles long and 2^ miles wide at its southern end, dominated by the 550-foot high Mount Suribachi, an extinct volcano. There are some sulphur deposits, a plain of black volcanic sand, and in the north a plateau of ridges and gorges between 340 and 368 feet high. In 1944 there were five villages on the island, in the centre and to the north of the plateau. The importance of the island to both the Japanese and the Americans lay in the two airfields that had been built, and the third under construction, by the Japanese. From these bases Japanese aircraft could intercept the B-29's bombing Japan, and operate against the bomber bases in the Marianas. The island, if captured, would provide the U.S. with a fighter base

and emergency landing strips

for crippled bombers.

The

island's

commander, Lieutenant-

General Tadamichi Kuribayashi, was fully aware of the island's importance, and set out a series of "Courageous Battle

Vows" for the defenders. One of these was "Above all, we shall dedicate ourselves and our entire strength to the defence of the islands." Kuribayashi's men worked hard, and by the summer of 1944 had driven tunnels through the plateau, laid minefields, and built

2534

gun and machine gun emplacements.

U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and submarines located 642 blockhouses before the landings. Never loath to expend vast amounts of material in an effort to spare the lives of their men, the Americans began early with the bombardment of Iwo Jima. On June 15, 1944, carrier planes struck at the island. The attacks continued during the rest of the year, reaching a climax with continuous strikes for 74 days by

Saipan-based bombers. The final three-

day naval bombardment was carried out by six battleships and their support elements. The leading wave of L.V.T.s hit the beach at 0902 hours on February 19, 1945 to the north-east of Mt. Suribachi

and began immediately to claw

its

way up

the black sand. The assault troops were men of the 4th Marine (Major-General Clifton B. Cates) and 5th Marine (Major-General Keller E. Rockey) Divisions, both part of MajorGeneral Harry Schmidt's V 'Phib. Corps. The 3rd Marine Division (Major-General Graves B. Erskine) was in corps reserve. In overall command was LieutenantGeneral Holland M. Smith. The troops had practised landings on a similar stretch of beach, and had "stormed" a hill resembling Mount Suribachi. Reconnaissance had also given them some idea of the strength of the

2535

._ FRONT LINE ON FEBRUARY ,

I-

defences and the initial bombardment had blown away some of the camouflage and exposed further emplacements. But what they did not know was that their adversaries had built what was probably the most complex defence system in the Pacific. Although only eight square miles in area, Iwo had 800 pillboxes and three miles of tunnels (Kuribayashi had planned 18). Guns were carefully sited to cover the beaches and a series of inland defence lines. The formation entrusted with the defence, the 109th Division, had 13,586 men by February 1, and there were also some 7,347 Navy troops on the island. There were 361 guns of over 75-mm calibre (with 100,000 rounds of ammunition), 300 A.A. guns (150,000 rounds), 20,000

Kitano Point

Iwo Jima 19

_ FRONT LINE ON FEBRUARY 24

® AA-N

'^'

FRONT LINE ON MARCH 1 FRONT LINE ON MARCH 11 TAKEN 1020 HOURS ON FEBRUARY 23 LAST JAPANESE POCKET CEASES TO RESIST ON

MARCH

26

•

Tachiwa

^

Point

landing beaches should be covered by bunkers. The Japanese tanks were no match for the American Shermans, and so were positioned hull down in the gullies that scored the island. The gun sites were dug so that the weapon slits

3 Marine Div. (in reserve)

U.S. 5 Marine Div.

€>

V Amphibious Corps

(Schmidt)

Suribachi

2 Tobiishi Point

2536

guns and machine guns (22 million rounds), 130 howitzers (11,700 rounds), 12 heavy mortars (800 rounds), 70 rocket launchers (3,500 rounds), 40 47-mm antitank guns (600 rounds), 20 37-mm antitank guns (500 rounds), and 22 tanks. Kuribayashi had elected to fight a static battle inshore from the beaches, but the Navy had insisted that possible light

J

MILES

were just

visible at ground level, and the positions were linked with tunnels. An awesome struggle awaited the Americans.

< < Iwo Jima in February 1945: a small, black volcanic island, its southern end Suribachi. < Landing craft destroyed by Japanese mortar fire surge against the black sand beach in

dominated from by

Mount

The photograph was taken two days after the

the Pacific swell. initial landings.

V A Marine, armed

with an

Ml

carbine, covers a patrol slowly

working

1

its

way up Mount

Suribachi. The capture of this important feature was entrusted to the 28th Marine Regiment of Major-General Keller E. Rockey's 5th Marine Division, supported by the 105-mm howitzers of the 3rd Battalion, 13th

same

Marine Regiment, from the division. Note how good a

view of the landings the

Japanese would have had. < V The assault on Iwo Jima by the U.S.

V Amphibious

Corps.

V The southern end of Iwo Jima under intcrisive aerial bon.bing and naval gunfire

attack.

_S-

> A Marine helps a wounded comrade to the beach and transport back to a hospital ship. > V Men of the 28th Marine Regiment, 5th Division, capture the first prisoner to be taken on Iwo Jima. For one and a half days he had feigned death in a shell crater until a Marine saw him breathing faintly (Centre) The Japanese is given a cigarette,

and

(right) is

recovered by stretcher.

< Marines

rest in their

foxholes during the push inland.

V American armour makes way up

to the front

its

past a

knocked-out Japanese

gun pit.

The Japanese back

hit

and naval bombardment beon Iwo Jima drove the Japanese into their bunkers, and when the Marines landed, optimists suggested that it might be an easy operation. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that any of the defenders could have survived the bombardment, whose finale had included 1,950 rounds of 16-inch shell, 1,500 of 14-inch, Massive

air

fore the landings

400 of 12-inch, 1,700 of 8-inch, 2,000 of and 31,000 of 5-inch. It was the heaviest pre-landing bombardment of the war. In addition to shellfire. the Navy had

6-inch,'

also used aircraft to drop bombs and napalm, and fire a multitude of rockets. But although some of their weapons were destroyed, "the Japanese garrison cozily sat it out in their deep underground shelters".

The first wave of Marines had crossed just 200 yards of the beach when they were caught in a savage cross-fire from hidden machine guns. Simultaneously, mortars firing from pits only a few feet wide began to drop bombs on the men and vessels along the shore. The U.S. Marine Corps had embarked on the most costly operation of

its

history.

Despite the fire from these positions that needed explosives, flame-throwers

or tanks to overcome, elements of the 5th Marine Division managed to drive across the island on the morning of D-day. When the advance halted for the night at 1800 the Americans were far short of their objectives, but had managed to isolate Mount Suribachi. Such was the strength of the Japanese positions, however, that it was not until D — 3 that the extinct volcano was firmly surrounded. The following morning, the 28th Marines (with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions forward and the 1st in reserve) gained 200 yards of the mountain's lower slopes. The next day an air strike by 40 planes preceded an attack that reached the foot of the mountain. On the 23rd a patrol of the 2nd Battalion's Company F reported that the Japanese had gone to ground. A larger patrol reached the rim of the crater and was involved in a brisk fire fight.

This patrol, under Lieutenant Harold G. Shrier, hoisted a small (54 x 28 inch) .^^i^m

•<>•

/

Ltj

The fighting for Iwo Jima was the bloodiest encountered by the U.S. Marines in their history. But included in the great fleet of supply and support ships that stretched back to the U.S. were hospital ships, fully equipped to deal with all types of

combat wounds.

< Support for

a 5th Division

Marine wounded when a mortar bomb exploded just beside him. V Three Marines move a wounded man down "Yellow" Beach while under mortar fire.

^-

V The view towards Mount Suribachi from Motoyama airfield No. 1. > A motorised rocket unit opens up on a Japanese strongpoint.

The American heavy cruiser Pensacola Displacement: 9,100

tons.

Armament:

ten 8-inch, eight 5-inch A. A., two 3-

pounder, twenty-four 40-mm, seventeen 20-mm, and eight .5-inch guns, plus four aircraft. Armour: 3-inch belt, 2-inch deck, 1 5-inch turrets and barbettes, and 8-inch control tower.

Speed 32^ :

knots.

Length 585J feet. Beam: 65a feet. Draught: 22 feet. Complement: 653 (peace:

time).

The American destroyer Allen M. Sumner Displacement: 2,200

Armament:

six

Speed 364

knots.

tons.

5-inch and twelve 40-nrim guns, plus ten 21 -inch torpedo tubes. :

Length 376i :

Beam:

Draught: 19

feet.

Complement:

2546

feet.

41 feet.

350.

2547

Stars and Stripes flag. Shortly afterwards a larger flag was obtained from an L.S.T., and Schrier decided that this should be raised instead of the first flag. This was photographed by Joe Rosenthal, an Associated Press photographer. The picture of the six men struggling to drive the pole into the volcanic soil has become a classic of the last war. On March 1, the 28th Marines were moved to the northern sector, to join battalions of the 23rd, 24th, and 25th Marines (4th Division) and the 26th and 27th Marines (5th Division), which had been entrusted with the task of clearing Airfield No. 1 and driving northwards. It was a battle in which daily gains were measured in hundreds of yards. On February 21 the 21st Marines (3rd Division) were ordered ashore to help. On the morning of the 24th, after a 76-minute naval bombardment, an air strike, and fire from Marine artillery, the tanks of the 4th and 5th Divisions moved ofl". One thrust was directed along the western side, and the other along the eastern side, of the airfield. Mines and anti-tank guns stopped the first, but the second pushed on and began to take Japanese emplacements under close range fire. The 5th Division had gained some 500 yards by the end of the day. On the same day, the 3rd Marine Division landed, and was allotted the task of driving along the centre of Iwo's northern plateau. Once this was taken, the Marines would be able to push down the spurs leading to the sea. The plateau was an extraordinary feature, eroded into fantastic shapes by wind, rain, and volcanic activity. The division launched its attack at 0930 on the 25th. It was a slow and costly operation, as the attack met the main Japanese line of defences. Three days of attacks, in which the Marines brought up flame-throwing tanks to incinerate the Japanese in their shell-proof bunkers, finally broke through the line. On the 28th the Marines secured the ruins of Motoyama village and the hills overlooking Airfield No. 3. The Americans now held all three airfields, the objectives of the landings, but the fighting was by

no means over.

On the last day of the month, the Marines attacked the two small features of Hills 382 and 362A. Their size was misleading, for each contained a warren of tunnels and bunkers. The crest of Hill 382 had been hollowed out and turned

\

< < Marines burn their way through the outer defences of Mount Suribachi with what the original caption on the photograph describes as "Devil's breath on Hell's island". On the left is Private Richard Klatt of North Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, and on the right Private First Class Wilfred Voegeli. ^ < A captain of the 21st Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division, inspects a Japanese dug-out after it has been hit by a

bomb.

'

< Marines shelter by the remnants of a Japanese sulphur mine and refinery. ^ A 155-mm away

at

howitzer blasts one of the last Japanese

positions in the north of the island.

into a huge bunker housing anti-tank guns and other artillery. Tanks were

To the south of the there was a massive rock which became known as Turkey Knob, with a natural bowl christened the Amphitheater. The fighting for both features became so intense that they became known as the Meatgrinder. A series of savage local battles was fought on March 1. And although Hill 382 fell that day, it was not until the 10th that the Japanese defending Turkey Knob and the Amphitheater were destroyed. The attack on the Hill 362A complex on March 2 was a marked departure from normal Marine practice-they attacked sited in the gullies.

hill

at night.

Although movement through

the rugged terrain was slow and tiring, the tactics surprised the enemy. After a fierce fight on the 8th, the Marines were in possession of the whole area. Despite the loss of these key points, the Japanese continued to fight with their customary aggressiveness. On the 8th

they launched an attack on the junction between the 23rd and 24th Marines. Caught in the open without artillery support, the attack failed with 650 dead. With this defeat the Japanese defence began to crumble, and the battle moved into the mopping up stage. Individual strongpoints were in no mood to surrender, however, and as they had ample stocks of food, water, and ammunition, they could hold out for some time. Indeed, on March 15, many of the last defenders attempted to infiltrate the

American lines. The last pocket to be destroyed was that at Kitano Point, which was declared officially secure on March 25. But that night over 200 Japanese emerged from the flame-blackened and shell-scarred

V

'

Vl

V ::?^

rocks.

Led in person by Kuribayashi,

some say, they tore into the bivouac area occupied by the sleeping men of the 5th Pioneer Battalion. A defensive line was set up by the Army's VII Fighter Command and the Marines' 8th Field Depot and by dawn at least 223 Japanese, including their leader, lay dead. The conquest of Iwo Jima had cost the Marines 5,931 dead and 17,372 wounded. But by the end of the war the island's airfields had saved the lives of 24,761

V The Americans consolidate: telephone lines fan out from a headquarters north of Mount Suribachi to improve communications between

commanders and front forces mopping resistance.

line

up Japanese

pilots and aircrew. Of the 21,000 Japanese defending the island, only 216 were taken prisoner. If this was the cost of taking an island of only eight square miles and which had been Japanese only since 1891, what would be the cost of the conquest of Japan?

American

^-t^

^^

>^.i-iv

.W&LdM;:.^

^-^

\if^

CHAPTER 165

Okinawa: the plans Operation "Iceberg" was the name of the plan the island of Okinawa was the target. The American aim was to achieve the penultimate victory of the Pacific war: the seizure of a firm base on the very doorstep of Japan as a prelude to the final conquest of the Japanese home islands. And the ensuing battle was fought on a scale as yet unknown in the course of the Pacific war: a bloody, protracted fight to the finish which forced the Americans to exert every ounce of their strength. After all the agonising first-hand experience gained in the long road from Guadalcanal to Iwo Jima, Okinawa proved yet again that the Japanese will to resist defied all possible estimates when tested on the battlefield. The Okinawa plan was given its official blessing by the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff on October 3, 1944. It was envisaged as ;

only one of three major offensives intended to stretch Japanese resources to their limits, the other two being the conquest of Luzon and the reduction of Iwo Jima in the Bonin Islands. Luzon would be invaded in December 1944, Iwo

Jima in January March.

1945,

and Okinawa

in

In view of the vital nature of the target a major bastion of Japan's inner island defences -it was essential that as much Intelligence as possible should be amassed. Aerial photography was an obvious source, but the difficulties were considerable. Okinawa was 1,200 miles from the nearest American air bases when it was selected as the objective of "Iceberg". B-29's flying at their high altitude only obtained small-scale photographs; carrier aircraft could only be assigned to Okinawa for photographic reconnaissance when the

of the 2nd Battalion, Marine Regiment, on "Green" Beach 1 during the Okinawa landings on April 1, 1945. "Green" Beach 1 was the

A Marines

6th

extreme northern flank of the landings.

<

h.

A Japanese pillbox,

struck

by a direct hit from an amphtrack armed with a 75mm howitzer, blows up. <] < A Marine working party aids the flow of supplies from an

up to the troops on March 1.

L.C.I,

front

at the

2553

#

A Japanese

installations

and

shipping under attack from U.S. carrier-borne aircraft during the

preliminary operations for the capture of Okinawa. < Flame-thrower tanks in action en route to Naha, the main city of Okinawa.

J$ii£iSi?-%~-

programme

of carrier

operations per-

Other

problems included the prevalence of local cloud cover and the

mitted.

large size of Okinawa itself: 60 miles long 2 to 18 miles wide, making it extremely difficult to obtain a mosaic of photographs covering the whole island. However, reconnaissance did collect sufficient information to suggest that the main strength of the Japanese defences would be encountered in the southern half of the island around Naha and Yontan-the best two out of the four operational airfields on Okinawa. The final estimate of the strength of the garrison was 65,000 men.

and from

Japanese strength What the cameras failed to reveal was that Lieutenant-General Mitsuru Ushijima's 32nd Army was in fact over 100,000 strong. Regular troops (infantrymen, gunners, and special services) totalled 77,199, and there were 20,000 auxiliary troops known as Boeitai. These were drafted into the Japanese Army to serve in labour and supply duties, relieving the fighting troops of ammunition worries, and thus playing an important part in the battle. In addition to the Boeitai there was a large contingent of Okinawan conscripts assimilated by the regular units on the island. Precise figures for these conscripts are not available but have been set as high as one-third of the total garrison strength. Japanese hopes for the defence of Okinawa were strikingly similar to those for the defence of Luzon. The high command ordered that the island must be held. Wildly exaggerated estimates were pinned on the hitting power of the air and sea kamikaze forces. It was expected that kamikaze attacks on the American invasion fleet and the initial beach-head would cut off the first troops ashore from their supports, making it possible for the Japanese garrison to sally out against the stranded American troops and fiing them back into the sea. Like Yamashita on Luzon, however,

Ushijima knew how

heavily the odds were stacked against him. He had no illusions about what was coming and accepted that he would be unable to stop the Americans from getting ashore and establishing a beach-head too strong to be destroyed. Ushijima therefore planned to hold the

strategically vital southern half of the island with the bulk of the 32nd Army, digging it in and forcing the Americans to batter away at its positions at as high a cost as the Japanese troops could exact. Naha and Shuri were the central nodes of the defence. No landing north of Chaton on the west coast or Taguchi on the east coast (just south of Kadena air-

would be opposed. The Americans might get ashore. They might overrun the spindly northern region of the island. But until they had destroyed every last stronghold held by the units of the 32nd Army in the south they could not field)

force a decisive victory -let alone claim the conquest of Okinawa and move on to more deadly operations against the Jap-

V Plumes

conquest of Okinawa constituted an awe-

of smoke rise from town of Toguchi on the Motobu peninsula and from the islet of Sesoka after a raid by

some armada of battle-wise fighting units.

U.S. strike aircraft.

anese homeland.

The American forces earmarked for the

the

A Marines watch from

the crest

of a hill as a barrage of phosphorus shells explodes on a

Japanese position further down the slope.

< A Marine machine gun

crew

provides covering fire. A> ^ roadside aid station, manned by naval corpsmen. From here the seriously wounded could be sent to the rear after initial treatment had been given. The main casualty centre was

warned of the arrival of the more serious cases by walkie-talkie radio.

> A 37-mm gun of the 6th Marine Division pounds a Japanese strongpoint.

^f' A American

infantry wait for lift before

the barrage to

continuing their advance. A> A combined flame-thrower and tank team flushes out a

Japanese pocket. > > Senior American commanders on Okinawa watch the progress of their plans. From left to right they are

Lieutenant-General Simon Bolivar Buckner, commanding general of the 10th Army, Major-General Lemuel C. Shepherd, commanding general of the 6th

Responsibility for taking the troops to and shielding and supporting them once they came ashore rested with Admiral Raymond A. Spruance's 5th Fleet. Its Joint Expeditionary Force, commanded by Admiral Richmond K. Turner, was designated Task Force 51.

their target

the division.

».(lgkM'

commanded by

^^HikJ^

Vice- Admiral Sir Bernard

Rawlings, designated Task Force 57 although it was only the equivalent of a

American carrier group. The land forces consisted of the newlyformed 10th Army under General Simon B. Buckner. Okinawa would be the first single

The American

shows:

invasion

1.

fleet

This, the invasion fleet proper, comprised half a million servicemen, over 300 warships, and over 1,139 auxiliary vessels

and landing

craft. It was shielded by Vice-Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Task Force 58, which would also carry out the

initial

bombardment and neutralisation

of the Japanese defences. Task Focce 58 consisted of four fast carrier groups, together with the British carrier force

2558

.

battle for 10th Army but not for its component units, as the following breakdown

Marine Division, and

Brigadier-General William T. Clement, assistant commander of

*\^k>

XIV Corps (Major-General John

B.

Hodge) 7th Infantry Division-Attu, Kwajalein, Leyte 96th Infantry Division Leyte 2. Ill Amphibious (Marine) Corps (MajorGeneral Roy S. Geiger) 1st Marine Division-Guadalcanal, New Britain, Peleliu 6th Marine Division regiments Marshalls, Guam, Saipan 3.

from

Reserve

27th

Infantry

shalls,

Saipan

Division -Gilberts,

Mar-

77th Infantry Division -Guam, Leyte 2nd Marine Division -Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Saipan, Tinian. Thus the seven divisions which would land on Okinawa were made up of officers and men steeped in the overall experiences and lessons of the Pacific war since

August

They totalled about 154,000 of them belonging to the five divisions which would make the initial landings along the eight-mile sweep of the Hagushi beaches on the west coast between Sunabe and Zampa Point. D-day for Okinawa was set for the morning of April 1, 1945. It was to be preceded by the 1942.

men- 116,000

capture of the Kerama Retto, a group of small islands 20 miles west of southern Okinawa, which would then be used as an

advanced base. Yet these preparations, meticulous though they were, could do little about the basic problem confronting the Americans: the awesome resolution of the Japanese fighting man.

CHAPTER

166

Okinawa: the battle The Americans began the first phase of the battle for Okinawa on March 18 when carrier-borne planes began pounding Japanese airfields on Kyushu. On the 19th the Americans switched to the naval bases at Kobe, Kure, and Hiroshima and to Japanese shipping in the Inland Sea. Kamikazes and bombers hit back fiercely,

damaging Yorktown, Wasp, and

Enterprise and setting Franklin ablaze. Task Force 58 began to withdraw on the afternoon of the 19th, and during the next 48 hours was harried by repeated Japanese air attacks. These, however, were fought off by the American fighter pilots, who ran up impressive scores. The tally of Japanese aircraft destroyed between March 18 and 22 was 528, and 16 surface ships were damaged during the same period, including the super-battleship Yamato. Mitscher's force had amply fulfilled its role. When the main landings went in on Okinawa, the Japanese were unable to throw in a serious air counter-

attack for a week. Next on the schedule was the seizure of the islands of the Kerama Retto group, a task entrusted to the 77th Division under Major-General Andrew D. Bruce. This was a campaign within a campaign, a faithful miniature of the "islandhopping" programme as a whole. A preliminary reconnaissance and bombardment preceded the actual assault, which was launched on the islands of Aka, Geruma, Hokaji, and Zanami on March 26. Initial progress was so rapid that Bruce decided to take Yakabi Island as well, and it fell with minimal resistance on the first day. The Japanese reacted in familiar fashion on Aka and Zanami, pulling back into the interior after conceding the fight for the beaches. The same thing happened the following day when Tokashiki was attacked, together with Amuro and Kuba. The Keramas were declared secure on the 29th. but the Japanese on Aka and Tokashiki insisted on refusing to surrender

Before Okinawa, American forces captured various small islands in the area.

A Raising the flag on Aka. V Assembling above the beach on Geruma. March

25. 1945.

until the official capitulation of Japan. The occupation of the Keramas was

rounded out with the emplacement of two batteries of 155-mm guns on the coral islands of Keise Shima, a mere 11 miles off the Haguchi beaches. These guns would add to the fire-power of the pre-invasion bombardment, and their emplacement on Keise Shima was a repetition of a trick used with great success during the battle for Kwajalein.

Pre-landing bombardment Keramas were still being work of preliminary bombardment and minesweeping in the approaches to Okinawa had already been While the

cleared, the intricate

started by Vice-Admiral William H. Blandy's Task Force 52. The first offshore shelling began on March 25, but the job of clearing the dense minefield which the

>

Japanese had laid off the Hagushi beaches was not completed until the evening of the 29th. Blandy himself called it "probably the largest assault sweep operation ever executed". In the week before the assault the American warships pounded the Japanese defences with over 13,000 shells of calibres ranging from 6-inch to 16-inch, while the carrier planes flew 3,095 sorties, covering targets requested by 10th Army. In the last three days, as the offshore obstacles were cleared, the warships steadily shortened the range and intensified their fire. With the method born of experience and the most detailed planning, an intricate naval ballet manoeuvred 1,300 ships into position for the assault on the morning of April 1. "Land the landing force" Admiral Turner's order was signalled to the invasion fleet at 0406 hours on the Ist-four and a half hours before the moment scheduled for hitting the beaches with the first wave. As the long ranks of

The American Landing Ship, Medium (Rocket) Displacement: 520

tons.

Armament: one

5-inch and two 40-mm A. A. guns, four 4.2-inch mortars, and 85 to 105 5-inch rockets. Speed 12.5 knots. :

Length: 203^ feet. Beam: 34i feet. Draught: 7^ feet.

Complement:

» ,

^• i

50.

Wite

The American Landing Ship, Tank Displacement: 1,625

Armament:

eight

tons.

40-mm

A.A. guns (some

vessels had a 5-inch gun). Speed: 11.6 knots.

Length: 328 feet. Beam: 50 feet. Draught: 1 1^ feet.

Complement:

1

10.

I

The American Landing Displacement; 246

Armament:

five

Craft, Infantry (Large)

tons.

20-mm

A.A. guns.

Speed: 14.4 knots. Length: 159 feet. Beam: 231 feet. Draught: 5| feet.

Complement:

1=

25.

."

:^'mj^ii.

L

I

2563

landing-craft jockeyed into position for the approach, the terrain behind the beaches shuddered and smoked like a volcano under the shellfire of the bomforce. The boats moved off at 0800 in perfect conditions and the run-in proceeded as easily as a peace-time manoeuvre. As the bombardment lifted and the gunfire shifted inland the first boats began to ground, almost exactly on schedule, just after 0830. To the troops the actual landing came as an almost ludicrous anti-climax. "Where are the Japs?" was the question every man was asking as the cautious advance into the interior began. Meanwhile the landings continued without a hitch. By the evening of April 1 over 60,000 troops had landed on Okinawa and had pegged out a beach-head over eight miles wide and over two miles deep

bardment

in places.

"An enemy landing attempt on the eastern coast of Okinawa on Sunday morning was completely foiled, with heavy losses to the enemy." That was how the Japanese boasted of the feint attack made by 2nd Marine Division (Major-General Thomas E. Watson) on the far side of the island from the Hagushi beaches. The Marines had made it look like a genuine attempt, with eight waves of boats dressed in line and covered by

bombardment. They moved in simultaneously with the approach to the Hagushi beaches, reversed course precisely at 0830, and headed back to their parent

The same performance was made on the morning of the 2nd and the force was then withdrawn. vessels.

marked the first day when resistance at last was encountered. The advance continued during the next three days but by April 9 both divisions had been fought to a halt and XXIV Corps had not attained its prescribed objective. On the 9th the 383rd Infantry fought its way on to Kakazu Ridge but were forced to withdraw after a bloody fight. A "powerhouse attack" on April 10 was also repulsed, and the Japanese were still very much in possession of their strongpoint at Kakazu on the 12th. The first round had undoubtedly gone to the Japanese in precisely the sort of battle that Ushijima had planned. American morale was also depressed by President Roosevelt's death, which the Japanese promptly exploited for propaganda. "We must express our deep regret over the death of President Roosevelt," sions, April 5

genuine

ran one

leaflet.

"The 'American Tragedy'

now

raised here at Okinawa with his death Not only the late President but anyone else would die in the excess of worry to hear such an annihilative damage. The dreadful loss that led your late leader to death will make you orphans on this island. The Japanese special assault corps will sink your vessels to the last destroyer. You will witness it realised in the near future." In the overview the Japanese were whistling in the dark: they certainly had little to boast about as far as naval victories were concerned. On April 7 the "Special Sea Attack Force" had sortied on a one-way mission to Okinawa. It was a suicide run, aimed at sending the superbattleship Yamato into the midst of the is

.

.

^5H:

American invasion

On the second and third days the Marines and infantry pushed right across the island and cut it in two, with 96th and 7th Divisions wheeling to the south on the right flank and feeling out the first Japanese resistance around serious

Momabaru. By the evening of April 3 interrogated Japanese civilians and liberated P.O.W.s. had informed the advancing troops that the main Japanese forces had pulled back to the south. The puzzle of the non-existent enemy had been solved: the

Okinawa had still to begin. The push to the south was carried out by XXIV Corps: 96th and 7th Divisions, battle for

who began

the cautious probing of Ushi-

jima's defence outposts.

2564

fleet and dealing out destruction as possible before meeting her inevitable end. But Yamato had been sunk by carrier planes before she had even sighted Okinawa. With the grip of the American navy unshaken, it was the Japanese who remained the "orphans of Okinawa", for all the local successes they might win. Much more important was the nature of the battle itself, with the Japanese having to accept the consequences of their defensive strategy. The cost of halting XXIV Corps by April 12 had been grievous: about 5,570 for the Japanese and 451 for the Americans. Despite this twelve-fold imbalance. 32nd Army now went over to the offensive to try to exploit the discomfiture of XXIV Corps by pushing it back to the north.

as

Fast progress

For both

divi-

much

In two days of intense fighting the Japanese counter-attack, carried out by

A Men of a U.S.A.A.F. liaison squadron rescue one of their Stinson L-5 Sentinels caught in a flash flood on Okinawa. These small planes were invaluable for co-ordinating

movements with ground

troops.

components of 62nd and 24th Divisions, was repelled at all points. It was a costly deviation from the basic strategy of staying in strongpoints and letting the Americans suffer the losses. By dawn on the 14th stalemate had settled once again

to press

over the front

carrier to intensify the air umbrella over the Okinawa battlefield. le shima was a formidable nut to crack. The 2,000 troops on the island had, by exploiting civilian labour, made it a miniature Iwo Jima as far as prepared defence positions were concerned. Major-General Andrew D.

line.

Meanwhile Buckner had reversed the original plan of tackling southern Okinbefore clearing the north of the and had unleashed Geiger's island, Marines (6th Marine Division) on April 3. Driving north-eastwards along the nar-

awa

row "neck" of Okinawa, the 6th Marines had reached the sea and cut off the Motobu Peninsula by April 8. But it took them another 12 days to clear the peninsula and they had to exert every effort to crush the main Japanese position at Yae-Take with concentric attacks. Not until the 20th was Japanese resistance in the peninsula broken, and enough Japanese escaped to the hills to begin organised guerrilla warfare. After changing his plan and clearing northern Okinawa, Buckner also decided

ahead with capturing leshima, the 5-mile-long oval island 3i miles off the Motobu Peninsula. The Japanese had built three airstrips on le shima and that

was Buckner's main the island and use

it

objective: to seize as a natural aircraft-

Bruce's 77th Division was earmarked for the capture of le shima, and the landings went in on April 16. Despite vigorous resistance, the 77th Division had overrun the western half of the island with its airstrips by the end of the 16th. But the Japanese still held out in le town. Five more gruelling days were needed before the island was declared secure, and even then the fighting continued until the 24th. The fight of le shima epitomised the bitterness of the Okinawa campaign;

commenting on

it,

General Bruce said 2565

•Jopi

too

-p-imlr

/##

«

«-*^«

m

fcwtt

-"

*d5_a.

-^

.jSP!«il»^%:;.^ST^«»^^^

-^"^^

T/

^

/

y^


molten-lead pattern of anti-

aircraft shells silhouettes Corsairs of the 'Hell's Belles'

Marine Corps

fighter squadron during a Japanese raid on Yoltan airfield, Okinawa.

V Some of the 300 warships and over 1100 auxiliary vessels involved in the amphibious landings on the Ryukyu Islands. > Part

of the pre-landing

bombardment - rocket fire from an L.C.I. (Landing Craft Infantry).

> V Carrying a white flag, these Japanese naval troops surrender to a U.S. Marine during the last few days of the fighting on Okinawa. Note the youth in the background approaching with hands held well aloft.

i-i.?^ >i:**s

1

»j

*

^%^-

256'

that "the last three days of this fighting bitterest I ever witnessed".

were the

Surprise attack Back on the southern front, Buckner was preparing to succeed with stealth where open attacks had failed: a surprise attack on the Shuri defences, pushing

The attack of April 19 was a complete failure and cost XXIV Corps 720 casualties. The Japanese fought like furies and held off all the American attempts to slip round their strongpoints.

yard."

The zones of fire of their artillery and mortars had been carefully drawn and covered all sectors of the front. One regimental commander in the 96th Division commented bitterly after the battle: "You cannot bypass a Jap because a Jap

-».:

deep into the Japanese lines and bypassing strongpoints such as the Kakazu Ridge. The attack was set for April 19 and was to be launched by a surprise penetration by General Hodge's 27th Division on the 18th.

Hodge summed

it

up when he said: "It is going to be really tough. There are 65,000 to 70,000 fighting Japs holed up in the south end of the island, and I see no way to get them out except blast them out yard by all

2568

^^T

*

"^^^Sm^ ^^ '^^

does not know when he is bypassed." Despite their failure in the attack of April 19 the Americans had no choice but to keep up the pressure on the Shuri defences. When the fighting died down with the coming of darkness on the 19th a gap of nearly a mile yawned between 27th and 96th Divisions and General Griner, commander of the 27th, knew that it must be plugged. But the attack of April 20 went the same way as that of the

19th. This time the problem was a Japanese strongpoint which squarely blocked the line of advance west of Gusukuma towards the Machinato airfield-a strongpoint which had got the very best out of the terrain, was heavily manned, and which had to be cleared out, not bypassed. The Americans called it "Item

Pocket" and it took them another exhausting week before it fell. Impromptu names for the key landmarks "Charlie Ridge", "Brewer's Hill", "Dead Horse Gulch"-became feared and hated names during the incessant fighting between April 20 and April 27, when the Pocket

Marine Division on April 30, and the 6th Marine also earmarked for a shift south to the front. The fall of Item Pocket on April 27 was followed by an exact replica of the preceding seven days-and then, on May 4, the Japanese unleashed a counter-offensive aimed at smashing the 10th Army and driving its fragments into the sea. It was an ambitious plan, envisaging amphibious landings deep in the rear of the American

centre

of

<<

After hurling an explosive mouth of a cave, a Marine patrol waits for any surviving Japanese to emerge. into the

<^

Fighting in the streets of

Naha, Okinawa's main

city.

Many

buildings were set on fire by Americans as the only way to flush out Japanese troops.

was eventually declared secure. Weeks however, Japanese were still emerging from the deep bolt-holes and caves which had given the position its strength. later,

In the meantime the 7th, 27th, and 96th Divisions battered away at the outer Shuri defences on the centre and left of the front. On the latter sector the Japanese had based their defence on "Skyline Ridge", blocking the approach to Unaha and Yonabaru airfield. In the centre,

Japanese hands. While the fight for Item Pocket raged on the right flank, the Americans struggled painfully forward until at last, by April 24, they had taken both Kakazu and Skyline Ridges. After three weeks' ordeal the outer shell of the Shuri defences had finally been cracked. At the end of April. Buckner reshuffled

Kakazu Ridge was

still

..tfe.«r&r:?s*S£^;:--s-. 'rt-'-.it"^

in

his front-line divisions, many units of which were badly in need of a rest. The 27th Division was relieved by the 1st

positions -but it suffered the same fate as the earlier Japanese attack. The amphibious operation was a total fiasco. Despite a temporary breakthrough in the centre and the recapture of Tanabaru Ridge, the Japanese 24th Division had shot its bolt

A

V.E.

Day on Okinawa-

while Europe celebrated, there

was no respite for these Marines as the bitter struggle continued. One unit goes in as another pulls back from the fighting in

Naha.

by the 7th and Ushijima had no choice but to fall back on the defensive, having achieved little but to delay the American advance for just under a week. (During the fighting for the Tanabaru Ridge the

2569

news of the German surrender reached Okinawa. "Well, now," said a colonel of the 17th Infantry Division, as he sniped at the Japanese with an Ml carbine, "if we just had the Japs off the escarpment we'd be all right, wouldn't we?")

Once Ushijima's counter-attack had been safely held, Buckner saw in it a chance for a breakthrough. The attack had drawn the last fresh Japanese reserves into the line, and a prompt resumption of the initiative could well prove decisive. The result was the renewal of the attack on May 10 and its culmination on the 21st with the clearing of a "funnel" on the left flank which enabled the 7th Division to edge forwards into the inner ring of the Shuri defences. In this phase the decisive actions were the clearing of the eastern sides of Conical and Sugar Hills, which bent back the extreme right wing of the Japanese line. Plotted on a map, it seemed that the way was open for the rolling-up of the front from the eastbut the Japanese remained in firm control of their positions and no breakthrough came. And now, in the fourth week of May, the elements sided with the Japanese. The rain poured down and the battlefield of Okinawa dissolved in mud. Transport was paralysed and it was impossible to move heavy equipment through the floods and quagmires-but there was no diminution of the pressure. With the Japanese centre north of Shuri still rock steady, Buckner ordered the flanking divisions to intensify operations and bend back the Japanese wings as far as possible. It was an exhausting and undramatic process. With every day's new advances the "bulge" being formed round Shuri seemed to herald the total envelopment of Ushijima's men-but still the Japanese refused to break and the casualties continued to soar. With the rain and the mud and the pattern of attrition in men's lives (one dead American for every ten dead Japanese by the end of May) the battle of Okinawa was taking on the nature of the most hideous trench-warfare pounding match of World War I and with as few obvious results. Yet now at last the persistence of the Americans was rewarded. Even before the ominous constriction of the flanks of the 32nd Army in the last weeks of May, General Ushijima had made the decision to yield the Shuri Line and withdraw to the south after a conference with his staff on May 21. The consensus of opinion had been that to hold on at Shuri would only

2570

mean that the 32nd Army would be destroyed earlier than necessary, without having inflicted sufficient losses on the Americans. The 32nd Army would make its last stand at the southern tip of Okinawa. Supplies and wounded began moving south on the night of May 22-23, heading for the positions previously constructed by the 24th Division.

The Japanese

retreat

With the rearguard holding on

in front of Shuri, the Japanese pulled out with skill and discipline, and their move was largely completed by the end of May. The Japanese move was helped by the sluicing rains and the lowering overcast, which seriously impeded American aerial reconnaissance. From May 26, however, the

long Japanese columns were kept under general surveillance from the air: and a 10th Army staff meeting on the evening of May 30 reached the conclusion that although the Japanese were still holding before Shuri, their line was little but a tough shell. It was widely believed that Ushijima had made his decision too late and that the campaign was all over bar the mopping-up. Once again it was a serious under-estimation of the actual situation. Shuri fell at long last on May 31, but Buckner's divisions did not, as expected, trap the 32nd Army in a pocket and wipe it out. Nor were they able to prevent it from pulling back and forming yet another solid front in the south. For this the Americans could certainly blame the adverse weather conditions: "We had awfully tough luck to get the bad weather at the identical time that things broke," lamented Buckner. Thus the scene was set for the last round of the battle for Okinawa. The southern end of the island is best described as a downward-pointing arrowhead. The Shuri Line had crossed the shank of the arrowhead above the barbs; and now the 32nd Army had pulled right down into the very tip of the arrow. An amphibious operation coped with the western barb of the arrowhead, the Orotu Peninsula, trapping the remnants of RearAdmiral Minoru Ota's naval troops and wiping them out by June 15 after a tenday battle. Meanwhile the first attacks on the main Japanese position behind the Yaeju-Dake Ridge had begun. It took five murderous days-June 12-

A A Lieutenant-General Simon Bolivar Buckner (left) with Major-General Roy S. Geiger. A few days after this picture

was taken, Buckner was killed by enemy fire and Geiger succeeded him as commander of the 10th Army. A On Okinawa an unusually large number of Japanese began to surrender. This officer decided to give himself up after hearing a broadcast from an offshore landing craft. > Snatching a well-earned rest, two Marines sleep in a foxhole next to their machine gun.

17-to crack the Yaeju-Dake position: days in which the fighting was as intense as ever. The Japanese still had to be blasted and burned from their foxholes, and a new American flame-throwing tactic was to bring up a 200-foot fuel supply hose from which to spray napalm on Japanese positions. By June 17 the survivors of the 32nd Army had been blasted out of their front-line position and compressed into an area eight miles square. After more than two and a half months of superb endurance, the men of the 32nd Army had reached the end of five

their tether. Between the 18th and the 21st they were split into three independent pockets and it was obvious that the end was near. Buckner sent a personal appeal to Ushijima to see reason and save the lives of his last men. Ushijima re-

ceived

it

with vast amusement.

He radioed

his last message to Tokyo on the evening of the 21st, and he and his chief-of-staff,

General Isamu Ota, committed ritual hara-kiri the same night. The last organised resistance-on Hill 85, between Me-

Makabe was broken on the Although "Old Glory" was formally

deera and 21st.

raised over

Okinawa

at the 10th

Army

headquarters on the morning of the 22nd, mopping-up operations lasted until the end of the month; and the Ryukyus campaign was officially declared ended on July 2.

The

cost

Allies had conquered Okinawa and were now only 350 miles from Kyushii itself. The objective of "Iceberg" had been

The

achieved, but at a terrifying cost. Total

American battle casualties were 49,151. The Americans had lost 763 aircraft and 36 ships sunk; another 368 of their ships

had been damaged. But the Japanese had 110,000 men, including conscripts and drafted civilians, and even this has to be an approximate figure. Only 7,400 Japanese prisoners were taken on Okinawa most of them in the last days when the 32nd Army was disintegrating. Ten major kamikaze attacks had been thrown against Okinawa, using up some 1,465 aircraft; and the total number of suicide sorties was 1,900. The Japanese losses in aircraft were staggering: 7,800. The Imperial Navy lost 16 ships sunk and four damaged. What did the Okinawa campaign prove ? lost

2571

#

"

V Marines move cautiously over "Cemetery Ridge". Enemy snipers keep them pinned down, seeking cover among the gravestones.

First and foremost, it gave a bitter foretaste of what the Allies could expect if

they ever tried to land on Japanese soil. was the bloodiest fight of the Pacific war. But above all it proved that nothing could stop the Allies in the Pacific from moving where they wanted, even if it did mean killing every Japanese in their way. And Ushijima himself paid tribute to this in his last message to Tokyo. "Our strategy, tactics, and technics all were used to the utmost and we fought valiantly," he reported. "But it was as nothing before the material strength of the enemy. It

The end

of Japan's

Navy

After the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, the Japanese Combined Fleet could no longer be recognised as the proud and

which had gone to in December 1941. It was a shrivelled husk, largely immobilised by lack of fuel. efficient fighting force

war

Never again after Leyte did the Combined Fleet concentrate its strength to fight the carrier task forces of the American and British Pacific fleets. But the surviving Japanese warships still had a part to play, and they remained highpriority targets for the Allies until the end of the war. The Midway disaster of 1942 had caused

the Japanese to adopt an accelerated and expanded carrier-buildingprogramme, but they never made good the losses of Coral Sea and Midway. The programme was a dual affair, including the construction of brand-new carriers from the keel up and the conversion of merchantmen and suitable warship hulls. Typical of the former category was the Taiho, lost in her first battle-the last big carrier clash of the Pacific war in the Philippine Sea (June 19, 1944) during the campaign in the Marianas. Taiho had actually been laid down before Pearl Harbor, but for months work on her had proceeded at a crawl. She displaced 29,300 tons, compared with the 25,675 tons of Shokaku and Zuikaku. She could achieve 33 knots and carried 74 aircraft (53 of them operational and 21 spare). But the details of her fate reveal the very great changes which had affected the Japanese carrier force between the days of Pearl Harbor and the last year of the war. The American submarine Albacore put a torpedo into Taiho on the morning of June 19. At first there seemed very little to worry about:

2573

fuel tanks had been ruptured and the flight-deck elevator jammed shut, but Taiho could still maintain full speed. The

two

immediate hazard was the spreading fumes from the liberated oil and aviation

The principal fuel of the vessel in 1944 was crude oil. as a result of overall shortages. The ship's ventilators were

spirit.

put on full blast in an attempt to dispel the fumes- a fatal decision. The fumes were spread throughout the vessel and continued to accumulate. The inevitable end came when a spark on the hangar deck detonated them. The effects were cataclysmic. A tremendous explosion shook Taiho from stem to stern, blowing

out the hangar walls, ripping the flight deck, and perforating the ship's bottom. She sank within minutes, the victim of an elementary hazard of carrier life

which had been obvious

As

for years.

the second category of the "last generation" of Japanese carriers, a typical example may be cited with Shinyo. She started life as the German luxury liner Scharnhorst, which had been at Kobe since the outbreak of war in 1939. Scharnhorst was purchased by the Japanese Government in the months after Midway; she was renamed Shinyo, and her conversion was begun at the Kure Naval Yard in November 1942. Parts were

2574

for

cannibalised from the uncompleted skeleton of "Hull III", the fourth "Yamato" class super-battleship (significant of the belated swing away from Japan's pre-war obsession with the big battleship as the prime mover of sea power). Scharnhorst's original electric turbines were retained; they were in fact only the second set to be used by a ship of the Imperial Navy. In her new guise, Shinyo finally joined the fleet in mid-December 1943. She was not present at the Battle of the Philippine Sea but was given a further eight 50-mm A. A. guns after that action, giving her a total of 50. Completely unarmoured, Shinyo had a best speed of 22 knots. Her air

group consisted of a maximum of 33 planes 27 operational and six spare. And she fell victim to the far-ranging American submarine arm, being torpedoed by the Spodefish in the China Sea on November 17, 1944.

AA

Brigadier-General William Wallace (left), chief of fighter command, and Major-General Francis P. Mulcahy, commander of the 10th Army's Tactical Air Force, study the latest operations report at Yontan J.

Giant aircraft-carrier But the biggest conversion job in the Japanese carrier programme was that of the giant Shinano, originally the third (after Yamato and Musashi) of the superbattleships. Shinano's whole story was

airfield,

Okinawa.

Two men of the 1st Marines gaze down at a wounded

A

'^

one of monstrous error and wasted effortmuch like the giant Japanese "1-400"" submarines. To start with, argument raged for weeks over what sort of aircraftcarrier she should be: an orthodox carrier or a giant floating depot-ship and mobile base, carrying no aircraft of her own but able to supply and equip-and provide an additional flight-deck for- an entire carrier fleet. The final result was a compromise. Shinano would be a carrier supply-ship, but she would also have a few fighters of her own for self-defence and a hangar for storing them. This caused immense difficulties, because Shinano's hull had been completed up to the

by 131

feet. She could steam at 27 knots, she bristled with defensive armament, and she could carry 47 aircraft. At last, the backbone of Japan's new carrier fleet was finished -but the carrier fleet did not exist. There were carriers; there were aircraft; but there was little or no fuel for either, and certainly no trained aircrew. Shinano was, in fact, an aweinspiring but thoroughly useless white elephant. And her end was little short of bathos. On November 28, 1944, she left

Yokosuka

for a brief shake-down cruise, escorted by three destroyers. She had not been at sea 24 hours, let alone moved out of sight of land, when she was caught by

**

Japanese

At the bottom dead American. A Just north of Naha, two U.S. Marines manhandle their bazooka into position. A> With the plasma bottle hooked onto his rifle, a Navy soldier.

of the truck

is

a

Hospital Corpsman administers blood to a wounded Marine.

*«.

%.

^*i

main deck by the time of the decision to convert her. The work crawled along-

hit

as slowly, in fact, as did that on Germany's only aircraft-carrier, Graf Zeppelin-in a dreary stop-go rhythm. When the builders were finally galvanised into an allout effort, after the defeat in the Philippine Sea, it was too late. All the reserves of trained aircrew had been whittled away to the point of extinction. Nevertheless, the work on the useless giant moved to completion and Shinano was ready for service in November 1944. She was the biggest aircraft-carrier in the world, and the best protected. Her armoured flight-deck stretched 840 feet

Musashi had proved what tremendous punishment the class could take and still stay afloat. Musashi had been singled out as the main target for American air attacks as Kurita's battle fleet struggled through the Sibuyan Sea. Plastered by bombs and ripped by repeated torpedo hits, she had refused to sink, and her expert crew kept her afloat by skilful counter-flooding for hours until the end. Shinano was not vitally damaged at all by Archerfish's torpedoes and could still make 18 knots. But her inexperienced

the American submarine Archerfish, and by a salvo of four torpedoes. In the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Shinano's

sister-ship

2575

crew neglected practically every damagecontrol rule in the book. The waters rose and spread from compartment to compartment; she kept on her course at full speed; and her captain would certainly

have been court-martialled for gross negligence if he had not gone down with S/imano, seven hours after the torpedoing, at 1017 on November 29. Mobility and hitting-power are the prerequisites of a carrier force, and by 1945 the Japanese carrier force had no fuel and no aircrew. This in turn meant that the surviving units of the Imperial Navy were now finally denuded of their air umbrella and were, from a strategic point of view, little more than floating scrap-iron. The Americans went ahead with the last major offensives of the Pacific war-Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okin-

awa-secure in the knowledge that the Japanese Navy would never pose a serious threat to them again. To the Japanese high command it was unthinkable that the Emperor's last warships should be bombed to destruction in their home ports, or hunted down independently at sea. The kamikaze strategy was therefore applied to the Japanese Navy-but, as with the Army and Navy air forces, the problem remained one of materiel, not men. There were thousands of eager volunteers willing to show their veneration for their Emperor by immolating themselves on an enemy carrier and taking as many Americans with them as possible. The difficulty was in getting them there. The Navy, as we have seen,

developed two main kamikaze weapons

own: kaiten and explosive speedHowever, the best suicide weapon remained the aircraft, plummeting down on its target from the skies. of its boats.

Kamikaze mentality The ambitious "SHO" plan which had thrown the massed strength of the Combined Fleet against the Americans at Leyte had been motivated by the kamikaze mentality: to do as much damage as possible with inferior resources. And the of one of the most bizarre episodes in naval history: the suicide sortie of the Yamato during the opening phase of the long battle for Okinawa, in April 1945. Japan's defensive strategy was based on the idea of "Dunkirking" the spear-

same held true

2576

head troops, once they had got ashore, Overleaf: On a rocket strike and disrupting the Allied offensive plan against Japanese positions close to the front line: Corsairs of the by raising as much havoc as possible. And "Death Rattlers" Fighter it was to this end that the "Special Sea Squadron of the 2nd Marine Attack Force" was formed. It consisted of Air Wing. the Yamato and a light destroyer escort. Using literally the last dregs of the country's fuel oil stocks, the Yamato would make straight for the invasion beaches at Okinawa, deal out maximum destruction to the American invasion fleet, then beach herself and fight to the last shell available for her huge 18-inch guns.

Under the command of Vice-Admiral Seiichi Ito, the force sailed from Tokuyama in Japan's Inland Sea on the afternoon of April 6: Yamato, surrounded by a ring of eight destroyers and the light cruiser Yahagi. The Japanese squadron had barely cleared Japanese territorial waters before it was spotted by American submarines patrolling the Bungo Strait, between the islands of Shikoku and Kyushu. Once out at sea, Ito altered course to the west, steering into the East China Sea preparatory to a last turn to the south for the final run down to Okinawa, and his ships were sighted at 0822 hours on the 7th by reconnaissance aircraft from Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 58. A mighty strike of 380 dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers took off from Mitscher's carriers at 1000, when the Japanese force was some 250 miles away-just before Yamato and her frail ring

swung

to the south. contact was made and the final ordeal of the Yamato began. The American pilots were impressed by the massive A. A. fire which came up at them: the Japanese had learned the lesson of air power well, and by the time of her last voyage Yamato bristled with no less than 146 25-mm A. A. guns. Most impressive of all, however, were the SanShiki shells fired by her main armament, which may be best described as 18-inch shotgun shells. Yamato's main battery was designed for use in the antiaircraft role and the San-Shiki shells were crammed with incendiary bullets. The idea was that the shells would be fired into a group of enemy aircraft; the shells would then burst, like a shotgun

of

escorts

Around noon the

first

fired into a fiock of birds, mowing down the enemy planes. It was found, however, that the terrifying blast of Yamato's 18inch guns when fired at maximum elevation only served to disrupt the main volume of A. A. fire. The San-Shiki shells

The American Curtiss SB2C-3 Helldiver dive-bomber

t

Engine: one Wright R-2600-20 Cyclone radial, 1,900-hp. Armament: two 20-mm cannon and one .5-inch Browning machine gun. plus up to 1 ,000 lbs of bombs or a torpedo.

Speed 294 mph :

at

1

6,700

feet.

Ceiling: 29,300 feet. Range; 1 .925 miles.

Weight empty loaded 14,042

Span 49 :

1

0,400/

feet 9 inches.

Length 36 Height: 13 :

Crew:

:

lbs.

feet 8 inches. feet 2 inches.

2.

2577

1 m

S^^A '

- '*fA>1Sl.>

^i.

» is

'.*

- trv^


k

proved to be a failure, like so many other impressive-sounding Japanese ideas. The Japanese had the weather -squalls and low clouds-on their side, but little else. The Special Attack Force had no fighter cover whatever and the American bombers were able to make almost unimpeded progress as repeated waves swept in to the attack. The ring of Japanese destroyers soon broke up under the stress of constant manoeuvre to avoid torpedoes. Pounded to a wreck, Yahagi sank shortly after 1400 hours; and 25 minutes later came the turn of Yamafo. She had taken a

Cape Hedo

Okinawa 10

5

le

shima

airfield

MINNA

Aha

April 12

•

SESEKO

.,,^ _. . April 15

SHIMA

EAST CHINA SEA

Zampa

Point

Hanza^

Amphibious Corpse

III

(Geiger)

U.S. 10th

TAKABANARE

Army

SHIMA

(Buckner) XXIV Corps NAGANNU ,L, (Hodge) SHIMA .

KAMIYAMA SHIMA I

Henna

6 Marine Div

Kuba

June 4

TSUGENJIMA

Machinato

77O1V

96 Div

'^.

f

March 31

7 Div

Jap. 32nd

Oroku Peninsula

jonaberu

27 Div April 10

Army

((Jshijima)

Naha airfield

FRONT LINE ON APRIL 4, 1945 FRONT LINE ON APRIL 30 FRONT LINE ON MAY 31 FRONT LINE ON JUNE 14 JAPANESE DEFENCE LINES

Anza

Such was the Battle of the East China Sea on April 7, 1945. It was the end of the Dreadnought age-the last time that a battleship was sunk by enemy action on the high seas. The wheel had indeed come full circle since Pearl Harbor in December

KUTAKA SHIMA

MAE SHIMA

AIRFIELDS

A ^Mabuni

2

Marine Div

(makes dummy assaults on

of the battle fleet lay at Kure, Japan's great naval base. There were the Ise and Hyuga, absurdly converted to seaplanecarriers by the removal of their aftev turrets.

With equal absurdity they had

Cowering in the Japanese home ports lay the remnants of the Imperial Navy. At Yokosuka there was the battleship Nagato, in her heyday the strongest battleship in the world with her 16-inch

classified the 4th Carrier Division of the 2nd Fleet in November 1944. In March 1945 they had finally been taken off the active list and now served as A. A. batteries. Also at Kure was the Haruna, the last survivor of the ''Kongo'' class battle-cruisers built on the eve of World War I. With the Kongos Japanese designers had shown the world that they had seen through the inherent weaknesses of the battle-cruiser concept by specifying their order for fast battleships; and the Kongos had been extensively reconstructed between the wars.

main armament. Her last action had been Leyte Gulf, where she had escaped the

in 1945

holocaust of the battleships. Now in the summer of 1945 she was inoperative, inglorious, with her funnel and foremast removed to assist camouflage. The rump

naval power.

The remnants

2580

JAPANESE RESISTANCE ENDS ON JUNE 2? SHURI LINE

Kiyan«

when

the superb Japanese carrier arm had proved the vulnerability of the battleship once and for all. Yamato's sacrifice was totally useless; she had never even sighted Okinawa, let alone taken any pressure off the gallant Japanese garrison there. On the Japanese side of the ledger there was only one completely insignificant flicker of success: a kamikaze hit on the carrier Hancock. 1941,

9

April

Sl^A

y ^

77o,v

V77D1V

era ends

Bise

April 16

;

An

+ A^

^

KOURI SHIMA

lESHIMA

fearful beating; at least ten torpedoes had hit her, plus seven bombs. Her crew was unable to cope with the inrush of

water, or keep her upright by counterflooding. Yamato finally capsized and sank at 1425. Admiral Ito and nearly all the ship's company of 2,400 men went down with her. Four of the escorting destroyers were sunk as well, and the battered survivors turned for home.

onaV

MILES

been

Another genuine museum-piece at Kure

was the old target-ship Settsu, whose construction had helped place Japan fourth after Britain, the United States, and Germany as a Dreadnought

April 1-2)

A The American

conquest of

Japanese island of Okinawa. > A One of the many Japanese efforts to mislead the Americans the

as to their strength:

dummy

planes - made of wicker captured on Katena airfield on April 1, the first day of the invasion. aerial view of Okinawa's

> V An main

city,

Naha,

after

continuous bombingby the Americans.

2581

l\

>'

*.

•V ^A, *>*

X

•*,

%

1

^lai 1

personally:

it

was

to be a formal revenge

The Combined Fleet

for Pearl Harbor,

There were seven Japanese

tion without the British Pacific Fleet. It took the form of a fearsome three-day blitz on the Japanese naval bases.

aircraft-

an all-American opera-

among them

concentrating on Kure. Between July

Hosho, the first carrier in the world to be designed as such from the keel up, which had been launched after World War I. When she served as fleet carrier training ship, most of the Japanese Navy's crack aircrews learned their trade aboard her. She had survived Midway as

24 and 26, 1945, the American carrier forces struck round the clock. In those hectic days they sank the Amagi, Ise and

carriers in

was the

home waters.

First

little

Yamamoto's last serviceable carrier and was still in service in 1945. The other six carriers Ibuki Amagi, Katsuragi, Kaiyo, Ryuho, and Junj'o- represented the losing ,

struggle to restore carrier protection and hitting-power to the Combined Fleet. Apart from destroyers and submarines still in service, the only other major units of the Combined Fleet in Japanese ports in 1945 were six cruisers. With American carrier planes now able to range at will over the Japanese homeland, it was only a matter of time before these sorry survivors were singled out for destruction. Admiral Halsey planned it

A The mighty Japanese Yamato during

battleship

her

fitting out in 1941.

< A Marine

in the shattered

remains of Naha, the main of Okinawa.

city

Settsu, and five cruisers, effectively destroying Japanese hopes of

Hyuga, Haruna,

forming a possible suicide squadron from their last heavy warships. If any one date is required for the formal annihilation of the Japanese fleet, it may be set as July 24-26, 1945.

Midget

craft

Although the British did not participate in the mass attacks on the Japanese naval bases, they were nevertheless active during this final phase. Ranging over the Inland Sea, British carrier planes sank two frigates and several other small fry, and also claimed a hit on an escort 2583

The Japanese destroyer Yukikaze Displacement: 2,033

tons.

Armament: six 5-inch and four 25-mm A. A. guns, plus eight 24-inch torpedo tubes.

Speed: 35

knots.

Radius: 5,000 miles Length: 388i feet. Beam 354 feet. Draught: 12J feet.

at

18 knots

:

Complement:

240.

'>

nrrr.

The biggest feather in the caps of the British, however, was earned thouscarrier.

ands of miles away: in a dramatic and successful midget submarine attack on the port of Singapore. At Singapore lay the Japanese heavy cruisers Takao and Myoko, both of them marked down for attack by the Sub-

2584

marine Fleet.

of the crippled in her detailed

of the British Pacific XE-craft - improved versions

Flotilla

Two

midget

submarine

which had

the German battleship Tirpitz Arctic lair in late 1943-were for the job: XE-1 (Lieutenant J. E. Smart) and XE-3 (Lieutenant Ian Eraser). On July 30, 1945, the two midgets

Hi

were on their way to the approaches to Singapore Roads, towed by their parent submarines: Spark (XE-l) and Stvgian {XE-3).

In the history of submarine warfare attack is particularly interesting because of the use of the echo depthfinder in navigating to the target. By 0600 hours on July 31 -set as the day for the attack-X£-5 was manoeuvring up the Johore Strait at 30 feet. The boomhardly a formidable affair, with a permanent gate some 300 yards wide-was safely passed at 1030 and the target, Takao, was sighted at 1250. As XE-3 closed in on her victim there was a disthis

with a loud clang at 1442 hours. With great daring, Fraser decided to make his attack with XZ-^ wedged squarely beneath Takao's hull. The attack used two weapons: limpet mines, attached to the enemy hull by the XE-craft's diver, and fused explosive charges, released from the midget's hull from inside. Opera-


undergoing sea Sata Point, October 30,

1941.

V Under attack from bomb- and torpedo-carrying planes of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Yamato is surrounded by water fountains from near-misses.

concerting moment. As Fraser put it, "I was very upset to see a motor cutter filled with Japanese liberty men only about 30 yards from my periscope." XE-3, however, remained undetected as she crawled towards Takao across the uneven harbour bottom, fetching up against the hull of the Japanese cruiser

2585

/

ting with great difficulty in the murky waters of the harbour, diver LeadingSeaman J. Magennis attached six limpets to Takao's bottom. It was a long and

> Proud beginnings - and the ignominious end of the Japanese Imperial Navy. The world's first purpose-built aircraft carrier, the Hosho, which actually survived the war. > V A Japanese destroyer with survivors clinging desperately to its sides, sinking in April 1945.

V The death throes of the Yamato. Armed with massive

18-

inch guns, this 65,000-ton "superbattleship" could outshoot any vessel in the U.S. Navy. But it was air power that destroyed the Yamato in 1945. Sent on a suicide mission to help defend Okinawa, she was sunk by a force of no less than 386 U.S. aircraft while still 270 miles from her objective.

2586

exhausting job, for he had to scrape off patches of weed and barnacles to get the limpets to stick. After placing the mines and returning inside XE-3, Magennis had to go back outside and release the starboard explosive charge, which refused to detach itself. Tired though he was, Magennis had no hesitation in immediately volunteering for this strenuous and extremely dangerous job. As Eraser's report has it: "He went on oxygen again at 16.25 hrs. and made his exit to the casing with a large spanner in his hand. After seven minutes he managed, by much banging at the carrier and levering at the release pins, to get the carrier away." With the explosives safely placed in position, Fraser turned to the task of wriggling XE-3 clear of her victim and retreating to the open sea for the rendezvous with Stygian. Despite several harrowing moments the retreat passed off safely. The boom was passed at 1949 hours and at 2100 XE-3 was able to

down the Johore Rendezvous was safely made with

surface and proceed Strait.

Stygian at 2345 hours. Smart, in XE-1, had had bad luck from the start of the approach. One mishap after another had combined to delay his attack so badly that he risked being caught inside the boom if he had pressed

on to his own

target.

Smart therefore

took the extremely brave decision to attack Eraser's target as well and take the risk of being blown up by the detonation of XE-3's limpets and charges. The possibility of this was heightened by the fact that the detachable charges were fitted with disturbance fuses, and XE-1 would stand a likely chance of setting them off. But the calculated risk taken by Smart paid off; he dropped his charges

and retreated

safely.

A

final

mishap was

a 24-hour delay in the rendezvous with Spark. Fraser and Magennis received the Victoria Cross for their attack. Smart the

Distinguished Service Order. As for tlie unfortunate Takao, left with two sets of explosive charges and six limpet mines, the resultant explosion destroyed her as a fighting ship.

2587

The Japanese battleship Yamato Displacement: 64,200

tons.

Armament:

nine 18.1 -inch, twelve 6.1 -inch, twelve 5-inch A.A., 146 25-mm A.A., and four 13-mm

guns, plus six aircraft. Armour: 16-inch belt, 9-inch deck,

255-inch

turrets,

and 19J-inch

control tower.

Speed 27 :

knots.

Radius: 7,200 miles Length 863 feet. Beam 1 27J feet. Draught: 34i feet.

16 knots.

at

'

jg^ -^Jt^^ I

:

.,1?..

S9

.

.

:

Complement:

2,500.

The Japanese

aircraft-carrier

Displacement: 62,000

tons.

Shinano

Armament: sixteen 5-inch and 145 25-mm A. A. guns, pTus 336 5-inch rockets, and 47

Armour: 15|-inch

aircraft.

belt

and

4-inch deck.

Speed: 27

knots.

Radius: 10,000 miles Length: 8723 feet.

Beam

:

1

3U

at

18 knots.

feet.

Draught: 33J

Complement:

feet.

2,400

^^r

^j^XO^e

'^^W'f^ "

2588

<^

"VlR/nP" *^

|r

^rT«^-»nC/

2589

> The end of the Ise, awash in Kure harbour after three raids by U.S. bombers. The Ise had had two main gun turrets removed for the installation of a flight deck, making her into an

unprecedented carrier-battleship.

The

effectiveness of this

combination was never put to the test, however, as the Japanese navy suffered defeat after defeat.

Inglorious end The postwar fate of the Japanese warships which survived Halsey's Blitz of July 1945 was inglorious. Nagato, last of the battle fleet, was used as a target ship during the Bikini Atoll atom test in 1946, together with the cruiser Sakawa. The other cruisers and carriers were either

2590

used as targets, scrapped, or sunk at sea by the victors-the Americans in particular sank a hecatomb of surrendered Japanese submarines off Gato Island in April 1946.

The fate of the last vessels of the Imperial Japanese Navy was the grim end to a remarkable story. Japan's emergence as a modern power only dates from the last three decades of the 19th Century. By careful study of the best European

models, she built a navy second to none in either materiel or fighting spirit in under 30 years. In that period Japanese naval designers not only participated in the birth of the Dreadnought era: they proved again and again that they could lead the world in laying down new concepts for the development of the fighting ship and the evolution of naval warfare. What went wrong? It is now generally accepted that Japan's decision to go to war in December 1941 was a calculated risk, a gamble which came within an ace of success. But as far as the total defeat of her prime instrument of war in the conPacific -the Combined Fleet -is cerned, several serious errors stand out. The first is that in 1941 the Combined Fleet was a contradiction in terms. Its carrier force was superb but the battle* fleet-the big gun-was still looked to as the weapon which would bring decisive victory. Submarine strategy was totally misguided on the Japanese side, whereas the Americans used their submarines correctly and reaped the rewards. Above all, however, the Japanese naval strategists had to cut their coat according to their cloth: the one thing they could not afford was a war of attrition, and this

they got. The Guadalcanal campaign, for example, cost them the equivalent of an entire peace-time fleet-losses which could never be replaced. The very speed with which the Americans assumed the offensive in the Pacific, never to lose it, showed what a narrow margin the Japan-

Navy had. And the result was an

ese

unreal metamorphosis which led the Japanese into building huge white elephants like Shinano and the aircraft-carrying 1-4400" submarines. It saw the Combined Fleet change from an instrument of the offensive and of victory to a sacrificial victim whose purpose was only to stave off defeat. This process first became dominant at the time of the Marianas campaign in June 1944, and it was the leitmotif of the final destruction of the Combined Fleet. That there was great heroism among the V A Japanese destroyer is men who took Yamato out on her last blasted in two by a direct hit from voyage cannot be doubted. But the former U.S. B-25 bombers. American cold professionalism which had carried aircraft finally shattered any hope the Japanese Navy to its high tide of that the Japanese navy could win victory in the summer of 1942 was gone. the war in the Pacific. In ships, in men, and in men's ideas, too Overleaf: Most of the 110,000 Japanese defending Okinawa much had been lost in the disastrous did so to the death. This naval naval operations in the Solomon Islands, lieutenant is one of only 7000 at Midway, and in the battle of Ley te Gulf. who were taken prisoner.

2591

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