The Polish Army on the Eve of World War 2

WALTER M. DRZEWIENIECKI

THE POLISH ARMY ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II Background

of theModern

Polish Army

Although Poland had ceased to exist as an independent nation by the end of the eighteenth century, the tradition of the Polish armed forces as a sovereign arm of the nation could not be buried with the state. It had lived

throughout theNapoleonic period inGeneral Dabrowski's Legions, in the and the Congress small but splendid armies of the Duchy of Warsaw was it almost destroyed by the defeat of the Kingdom of Poland, but unsuccessful insurrection against Russia in 1863-64. The man who reintroduced, almost forced upon Polish society, the idea of a military organization as the only force which could regain indepen dence for Poland was Jozef Pilsudski. Prior toWorld War I, he created and, subsequently, a small, the First Brigade, which fought along quasi-independent military legion, side the Austrian armies for the independence of Poland against themost oppressive of the occupants, Russia. The Austrians in time increased Polish participation in the war to three brigades. These legions constituted per some paramilitary

organizations

in Galicia

haps themost important, but by far not themost numerous, element from which a new army of the independent Polish state was created in 1918.1 They, together with the secret POW organization, contributed some 2,500 officers.2

Service in the legions was voluntary, but Polish youth were also subject to draft into the armies of all three occupation powers. Hundreds of thousands of young men fromGalicia had to serve in theAustro-Hungarian army, and thousands obtained commissions either in the regular army or in the reserves. After the Empire's disintegration, between 12,000 and 15,000 officers joined the new Polish army.3 Since the lion's share of partitioned Poland was under Russian occupa of Polish conscripts wore Russian uniforms and later

tion, the majority

1See Marian Army),

Bellona,

"Wskrzeszenie Wojska Polskiego"(The 1959, 1:3-17; 11:127-138; 111:225-235; and Polski, 1905-1918 zbrojna o niepodlegtosc

Reestablishment

Kukiel,

IV:319-325.

See

of the Polish also Waclaw

(Armed Struggle for Poland's 2nd ed. (Warsaw, 1905-1918), 1935) and Wtadyslaw Independence, Pobog-Malinowski, historia polityczna 1864-1945 Polski, (Most Recent Polish Political History, Najnowsza Lipiriski, Walka

1864-1945) 2Marian 3Ibid.

(Paris:

n.p., 1953), vol. I. Przed ipo maju

Romeyko,

(Before and after May)

54

(Warsaw,

1976),

I, 93.

The Polish Army

55

served in the Polish

units created by the Russian high command. It is estimated that between 40,000 and 50,000 officers (including 10,000 profes sionals) were mobilized by the tsarist army in the years 1914-17, and out of this number about 25,000 joined the independent Polish army in 1918.4 The one army in which most Poles declined to serve as professional

soldiers was that of Imperial Germany. They were, of course, subject to draft, but only a small percentage were commissioned. Hence, only about 1,000 officers with German training were later available for the Polish army.5

Finally, between 1,500 and 1,750 officers, Polish and non-Polish, arrived in Poland in 1919-20 from France, where they had served with the French army. Some of these were volunteers from the United States and other Western

hemisphere countries.6 All these officers had one common failing. They had never been able to acquire high-level military experience beyond that of the infantrydivision, as none of the foreign powers would tolerate Polish nationals serving above

that level. The only exception involved two Poles in theRussian army, and these had gained their advancement only because, unlike most Poles, they were non-Catholic. Quite possibly this lack of upper-level experience influenced the situation within thePolish army between the twoworld wars and handicapped its preparation for war with Germany. Thus composed, the Polish army in 1918 had no uniform training, tradition, background, or military doctrine. Many officers did not even

speak good Polish. Yet this army, equipped with weapons of every type, under the inspiring leadership ofMarshal Pitsudski, managed not only to secure frontiers for the new state, but also to win the war with the new Communist Russian state in 1920. Polish Armed Forces

after the Russo-Polish

War

For a few years after theRusso-Polish War the composition of theArmy remained unchanged, apart from the fact that a new element had begun to appear on the lowest level in the persons of young officers who had not served in any foreign army and whose only loyalty was to independent

Poland. The systematic training of new officers had already been initiated under theGerman occupation inNovember, 1917 and this continued after the independence of Poland was proclaimed on November 11,1918. Other wise, the balance among the various groups was at first preserved since all were needed to fight wars against the Russians,

*Ibid *lbid., p. 94. 6//>/
theGermans,

theUkrain

The Polish Review

56

ians, and even the Czechs and the Lithuanians. For example, the Com mander-in-Chief was the former commander of the First Brigade of the Polish Legion, Jozef Pilsudski, and his Chief of Staff was the former

(lieutenant general) Tadeusz Rozwadow in the overall command ski; fighting against theGermans was in the hands from the Russian army. Itwas, how of General Jozef Dowbor-Musnicki one a matter time before of ever, only group (former legionnaires from the

Austrian Feldmarschalleutnant

First Brigade) would take over (after Pilsudski's coup d'etat in 1926), and come from foreign rapidly retiremost of the senior army officers who had armies. The result was that by 1939 the following important posts were in the hands of Pilsudski's legionnaires: ?The ?The ?The

Inspector General (Commander-in-Chief) Chief of General Staff and his associates Minister of Military Affairs and his deputies

?About

80 percent of the generals in the Inspectorate General

(army

commanders) ?About 80 percent of army corps commanders ?About 70 percent of divisional commanders ?About

50 percent of cavalry brigade commanders.7

in 1923,Marshal Pilsudski retired from both his army and In the same year the Polish armed forces began a plan of posts. political reorganization which had been approved by Pilsudski prior to his retire Meanwhile,

ment.

The Russo-Polish War, as has been pointed out, was won with weapons and equipment of every type captured for themost part from disintegrating foreign armies. Not until the final stages of the war was a substantial shipment of French hardware received and used effectively.After thewar, the Poles bought from France a huge amount ofWorld War I equipment and arms no longer needed by theFrench. Thus, the peacetime Polish army possessed a grand mosaic of weapons and equipment already obsolescent and of little value for the future defense of the country.

According to the 1923 plan prepared by the Polish General Staff, the peacetime army was to consist of thirty infantrydivisions, eleven cavalry brigades, ten tank battalions, ten air-force regiments, and a proportional

total strength of theArmed Forces was to amount to 17,000 officers, 30,000 NCOs, and about 230,000 men. In case of war the overall strengthwas to be doubled to sixty infantrydivisions and about 1,500,000 officers and men. The plan was to be completed by 1935,8 number of other services. The

in the stuzba w Wojsku 1917-1939 7Stanisiaw Kopariski, Moja Polskim, (My Service Polish Army, 1917-1939) 1965), pp. 302-303. (London: Veritas, do wojny"(Our War Preparations), 8Jozef Zajac, "Nasze przygotowania Kultura, No. 1-2 (1961), pp. 161-162.

The Polish Army

57

but itnever was. Nevertheless, substantial progress was made in the field of weaponry. For example, all troops received the same rifle, theMauser 98, and the same kind of light and medium machine guns; also most of the

artillery units were uniformly equipped with French guns. Unfortunately, the decision of theMinister ofMilitary Affairs, General Sikorski, to create a special army corps to guard the Polish Wladyslaw eastern frontier (the Frontier Defense Corps?K.O.P.) impossible to secure enough military equipment

made itpractically for the sixty infantry divisions ifwar broke out. For many years the army had to train, equip, and feed hundreds of thousands of additional soldiers who could not be called to arms in 1939. Furthermore, as a result of General Sikorski's

decision and of subsequent reforms introduced byMarshal Pilsudski after 1926,when he resumed his former army posts, the budgetary allotment for the upkeep of troops under arms was so high that relatively littlewas leftfor

new equipment and modernization of the nation's armed forces.9 Pilsudski also decided to divide the responsibility for military affairs

between two separate units: theMinistry forMilitary Affairs for peacetime command of the armed forces and the Inspectorate General for prepara tion for future wars. As a result, therewas great confusion regarding the respective responsibilities of the two authorities, and future high command ers were

separated from their troops and staffs.10Other negative con sequences of this division of power included lack of organized training for future higher commanders.

Another factor that adversely affected the state of Polish readiness for war with Germany was Marshal Pilsudski's conviction that the Soviet Union was Poland's principal enemy, and that all efforts should, therefore, be directed towards preparing the defense of the eastern frontier.We shall return to this question a little later.

One final shortcoming of the army was the relatively low percentage of officers with higher military education. After Pilsudski's reforms,most of the generals occupying positions of responsibility, including the Inspector General himself, had no formal higher military education and out of the entire officers' corps of 18,668, only 903 (or 4.84%) were graduates of staff colleges.11

Polish Armed Forces The German-Polish

9Ibid., p.

in 1935 non-aggression

pact of 1934 was supposed to guar

169.

i rozbudowy 1936-1939. Polskie, Proby modernizacji Wojsko 10Eugeniusz Kozlowski, and Development) 1936-1939. Attempts at Modernization (Warsaw, (The Polish Army, 1964), pp. 14, 15, and 45-79. "Ibid.,

p. 77.

The Polish Review

58

antee the security of Poland's western frontier. However, since the Ger in spite of their frequent assurances of good intentions towards Poland, were rapidly proceeding with themilitarization of their country, the new Inspector General, Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly (Pilsudski died inMay, 1935), decided to initiate a study of the overall military situation in case of German attack. At the same time, the General Staff was still continuing itswork on the defenses of Poland's eastern frontier. The firstconsequence of the emphasis on the possible need to defend the

mans,

western frontierwas the creation of a new mobilization plan "W,"12 which could be used in the event of war, not only with the Soviet Union but also

with Germany. The plan was probably one of the best ever prepared by any army. At the same time,Marshal Rydz-Smigly, ingreat secrecy, instructed a number of generals from the Inspectorate General and certain staff officers from theGeneral Staff to start preliminary studies of the defense of Poland's western border. On the basis of these studies, the Inspector General later formulated his own plan for a defensive war with Germany.13 Needless to say, Rydz-Smigly's generals did not find Poland's defensive ability in the west adequate, even after taking into consideration that the security of the western frontier depended heavily on the alliance with France and, later, with Great Britain. The study also revealed that the Polish Army was still at the level of 1914, and that, because of its military poor organization and outdated equipment, itwas no match for the new

German

forces.

Under

these

circumstances,

the Poles

had

no

alternative

other than to undertake immediate modernization of theirmilitary ma chine.14 The study also showed that about 10.5% of the Polish Army consisted of antiquated cavalry units while the percentages of such units in Germany and the Soviet Union amounted to only 2.1% and 6.2% respec tively.15 Similar disparities, to the disadvantage of Poland, existed in artillery, air force, armored forces, and other services. One can say that, in general, Poland's 1935 war machine had an un usually high percentage of infantry and cavalry and a relatively low per centage of air, artillery, tank, and other services. Moreover, Polish infantry and cavalry divisions were poorly equipped with field guns: four lightguns for an infantry battalion, as against the Germans' eight or more; and no

12From the name of its author, Colonel Jozef Wiatr. See Polskie Sify Zbrojne w Drugiej wojnie swiatowej (The Polish Armed Forces inWorld War 11) (London: Instytut Historyczny im. Gen. Sikorskiego, 1951), Vol. I: Kampaniawrzesniowa (The September Campaign)pt. 1, 292-298. Subsequently PSZbr. "Ibid, pp. 114-128. 14 Previous plans of modernization (Generals Konarzewski, Fabrycy, Pilsudski's approval. See Kozlowski, gain Marshal op. cit., p. 15. isIbid.

and Piskor)

did not

The Polish Army

59

antitank guns at all. Polish infantrydivisions had neither organic, medium, nor antiaircraft artillery, nor any tank units. They had some 57 mmgs and 34 lmgs, far fewer, however, than similar German divisions could count. While in most European armies supply and maintenance units were

mechanized, Polish divisions had only horse-drawn supply columns which slowed down themovement of divisions and made them vulnerable to air attacks. Polish cavalry brigades were similarly antiquated. Already poorly

equipped with machine guns and artillery, theywere altogether lacking in tanks and mechanized supply columns. Polish armored units were small, organized as independent battalions and even companies! Emphasis was on small reconnaissance tanks,where

as Poland's neighbors, the Soviet Union and Germany, were concentrating on the production of attack tanks. Within most European armies, tanks were gradually becoming one of themain services, ifnot themost impor

tant, but in Poland they still remained a support service. The prospects of mechanization of the Polish Army once war broke out were bleak since, for example, in 1936 therewere only 140 cars and trucks in the entire nation for each infantrydivision to be mobilized. At the same had 2,300 vehicles, Germany 4,700 and France

time, the Soviet Union 12,900 per division.16

The equipment of Polish engineer units was rather primitive. There were a few bridge- and road-building units without proper mechanical equip ment. Similar German and Soviet units, on the other hand, were totally mechanized.

Polish signal units were relatively well equipped with telephones. Radio units, however, had to rely on equipment purchased from France after World War I which, by themid-1930s, was obsolete. Thus, the Polish Air Force, tank units, and higher headquarters were without a reliable com munications

network. The Polish Air Force was

in a particularly painful and dangerous situa Pilsudski the role of the Air Force was reduced to reconnaissance and liaison between larger army units. As a result of this lack of understanding of the importance of the air force in futurewars, the tion. Under Marshal

Ministry ofMilitary Affairs reduced itsbudget almost every year. By 1936 the Air Force budget amounted to only 50% of that of 1926. According to estimates by the Polish General Staff, the Soviet Union, which in the 1920s had fewer aircraft than Poland, had by 1935 expanded itsair force to 5,000 planes or ten times as many of Poland. The superiority of theGerman Luft waffe was of similar proportions.17

"Ibid,

pp.

16-17.

"Ibid,

pp.

17-19. See also PSZbr.,

I, pt.

1, 148-166.

The Polish Review

60

Reorganization

and Modernization,

1936-1939

The findings of Rydz-Smigly's task force were shocking and prompted his 1936 decision to prepare a plan for the expansion and modernization of Poland's armed forces. As the new Polish constitution of 1935 greatly

improved the position of the Inspector General and endowed him with substantial additional powers,18 he was in an advantageous position to carry out his plans. To start with, Rydz-Smigty retiredmost of the top echelon of the army and replaced themwith men of significantly higher qualifications, although most of these were drawn from Pilsudski's legionnaires. He also greatly

improved the position of the General Staff, nevertheless, choosing as its chief one of the youngest generals who, naturally, had some difficulty exercising his authority with older generals. Rydz-Smigly also created a new coordinating "Committee for theDefense of the Republic" (Komitet

The President of the Republic was the com Obrony Rzeczypospolitej). mittee's chairman, with the Inspector General as deputy chairman, and the deputy chief of the General Staff, as secretary. Simultaneously with the personnel and organizational changes just de scribed a special committee was set up on theGeneral Staff level to prepare

the actual plans for expanding and modernizing the Polish armed forces.19 Itwould seem, unfortunately, that the entire Project was initiated without first developing an overall picture of the future army.20 Such a vision emerged only gradually, as the plan was being implemented.

Basically, the new plan called for the increase of fire power of infantry divisions up to the general European level through the allocation of addi tional machine guns, small caliber mortars, antitank guns, and field artil lery. However, as a result of financial and industrial limitations, Polish divisions would have actually remained 50% below the European level in antitank and antiaircraft artillery, medium and heavy mortars, and radio equipment. The plan also called for a substantial increase of mechanized transport in divisional headquarters and supply units.

General Stachiewicz claims that the plan also called for the creation of ten new reserve divisions. The equipment which was manufactured and allocated to the army allowed for the formation of only seven reserve

^Dziennik

Ustaw

R.P.

(Journal

of Laws

after Kozlowski, Quoted 19Waclaw Stachiewicz,

pp. 22-23. Pisma (Works),

1939 (War Preparations and Kozlowski, passim. 20 Kozlowski, p. 24.

in Poland),

(Paris,

of the Republic

Vol.

of Poland),

I: Przygotowania wojenne See also PSZbr.,

1977), passim.

No.

38, pt. 286.

w Polsce,

1935

I, pt. 1, 167-228

The Polish Army

61

divisions, but at the lastmoment, during the summer of 1939, two addi tional divisions were formed with personnel and equipment from the Frontier Defense Corps (KOP).21 The reserve divisions, however, were short on artillery, and some of their equipment was inferior.Nevertheless, in the years 1938-39, all infantry divisions received very good 37 mm "Bofors" antitank guns (nine for regular divisions, six for the reserves), and, also at the lastmoment, 7.9 mm antitank rifles of Polish production (one

per platoon in regular division, fewer in the reserve). In addition, most of the regular divisions were provided with one mechanized battery of 40 mm "Bofors" antiaircraft guns and some medium artillery (one battery for regular divisions; the original plan had called for one battery of 155mm howitzers and one of 155mm guns). Further improvement in artillery and heavy mortars was planned for 1940 and 1941. The plan did not call for an increase in the number of regular cavalry

brigades, but some regiments were gradually to be mechanized to form four mechanized brigades (only one was fully, and another partially, organized in the summer of 1939). Horse brigades were to receive one mechanized each (none were received, and most got only regular infantrybattalions), some tanks, antitank, and antiaircraft artillery, as well as modern signal and engineer units. The cavalry plan was only partially infantry battalion

in 1939.22 to the start of themodernization program, the Poles had begun to Prior introduce into the army a number of light tanks (7.51.) and some extremely

realized

light reconnaissance vehicles (TK and TKS). The Ministry of Military Affairs had purchased a fewVickers light tanks, which, after some changes, were subsequently manufactured in Poland and introduced into the army under the name of "light tanks 7 TP" (7 t. Polish tank). In addition, a

units were organized. After 1935 the problem of the armored forcewas frequently discussed by do spraw theCommittee forArmament and Equipment (KSUS?Komitet was an i extensive and underway. Unfortunately, study uzbrojenia sprzqtu) the generally poor economic condition of the country and its lack of a

number of armored trains and motor-car

sufficient industrial base precluded not only the formation of armored divisions, but even of a larger number of mechanized brigades. The only practical solution, the committee concluded, was to manufacture tanks

be used to support the existing infantry divisions. These tanks would have to have heavy armor and be of relatively limited support An attempt to purchase a tank of this type (French Renault 35 speed. and/or Somua) failed, and, as a result, the Poles had to limit themselves to

which

could

21Stachiewicz, p. 98. 22Ibid, pp. 98-101.

The Polish Review

62

what theywere able tomanufacture at home: TKS and 7 TP. Shortly before the war, France, under pressure of the deteriorating political situation, agreed to supply Poland with some modern tanks. A sufficient number to form one battalion arrived in Poland in July, 1939,23?too late to be used effectively during thewar. In themeantime, home production of tanks did not develop satisfactorily, and during the last three years before thewar, the Polish army only 149 units were manufactured. As a consequence, remained weak in armored units.24

The Polish Air Force Poland entered the period of peace at the close of the Russo-Polish War of 1919-21 with a somewhat large and impressive air force, mainly pur chased from France. Most of these aircraft, however, were obsolete when received. Worse, there was neither an adequate network of airfields and

other facilities nor a sufficient industrial base to maintain them. The industrial base came into existence only after Poland had built her own aircraft factories and developed new models in the late 1930s. In 1936, after

useless aircraft had been withdrawn, the overall strength of the Polish Air Force was reduced by 50% to 417 aircraft, including the slow R-XIII (93), the obsolete Potez XXV and Breguet 19 (c. 170), P-7 and P-l 1 (130), and

Fokker

(18). The air force plan of 1936-37 called for new equipment for the existing airforce regiments (six) and a special force of light bombers, as well as substantial reserves of weapons, ammunition, and equipment. Since liter ally all existing Polish aircraft were unfit formodern warfare, they had to be replaced as soon as possible. Thus, Poland's youthful aircraft industry had to prepare new models. This enterprise needed, of course, substantial time and an enormous financial commitment. The help of Poland's ally, France, was requested but was not obtained in time. For example, a new observation plane could not be issued because France had failed to supply aircraft engines! Plans for new types of fighter planes and bombers were prepared by Polish engineers, but their production could not be started until 1940?too late for the September war. The hard-pressed Polish General Staff ordered from France 1939.

160 modern

fighters?"Morane

The prototype of a very good modern

23Ibid., pp. 110-114. 24 to Kozlowski, According p. 164, in 1939 the Polish Renault R. 35 (50), Vickers and 7 TP (161); TKandTKS

(102).

406"?but light bomber

none arrived in

"Los"

had been

army had 887 light tanks as follows: (574)and World War IRenault R17

63

The Polish Army

designed a little earlier, in 1938, and by 1939 the Poles had managed to supply their airforce regiments with 36 aircraft of this type.25 The Poles had put forth a tremendous effort to modernize their Air

Force, and their accomplishments were indeed noteworthy. However, due to conditions existing in 1939, the entire Air Force could count no more than 511 aircraft, and only a small percentage of those were modern.26 And this was

the aviation that alone had to face the thoroughly up-to-date Luftwaffe of at least 3,000 aircraft! Conclusion

this discussion, some additional comments must be made the field regarding organization of the army. The highest operational unit in the peacetime army was the infantry division. Although there were corps commands (ten), their commanders had only administrative respon sibility.During war, the Polish armed forces were to be organized into 6-7 To conclude

armies and several ad hoc organized "operational groups." All armies and some operational groups were to be commanded directly by theComman der-in-Chief.27 Apparently the Polish Commander-in-Chief overestimated

his and his staffs ability to command, for this system simply did not work and could not work under Polish conditions. The backbone of the Polish army in peace as well as in war was the

infantry regiment (equivalent to theAmerican and British brigades). There were 90 such regiments in the regular Polish army, and itwas up to them, according to the field manuals, to achieve victory in the field. The com manders of these extremely important units, however, were not supplied in peace or war with staffsof adequate numbers and training. Unfortunately, themodernization plan of 1936 paid little, ifany, attention to the command structure of the infantry regiment. Subsequent war experience proved that thiswas perhaps themost serious shortcoming of the army, and one which could have been corrected with a relatively small expenditure of time and

money. This deficiency is even more difficult to understand when one takes into consideration that a cavalry brigade, which was substantially weaker and less important than an infantry regiment, was supplied with a well trained, similar-to-divisional staff.28

25Stachiewicz,

pp.

114-123. 122. Other

See

pp. 220-270. give different numbers.

also Kozlowski,

authors

E.g., author, Boje polskie, 1941), pp. 36-38 estimates the total 1939-1941), (London, (Polish Fighting, in Komisja stwierdzita (Warsaw, number of Polish aircraft at 388 and Tadeusz Cyprian 1, pt. 1, 191-400 aircraft in fighting units. 1960), pp. 379-477, and PSZbr., 26Stachiewicz,

p.

1939-1941

pp. 95-98. M. Drzewieniecki, Wrzesniowewspomnieniapodporucznika ber Reminiscences of a Second Lieutenant), 1978), pp. 173-179. (Warsaw, 27Stachiewicz, 28 Wlodzimierz

(The Septem

The Polish Review

64

All in all, a student ofmilitary historymust conclude that during the years immediately preceding the outbreak of theWar, thePoles made an impres

sive effort to improve the fighting ability of their armed forces. The trouble was, they simply did not have enough time and resources to fulfill their plans. However, even had all plans been realized, Poland's ability to survive the last war would still have been dependent upon the attitude and actions of her allies, France and England, and her eastern neighbor, the Soviet Union. All three proved to be totally unreliable.

AMERICAN POLONIA: THE CULTURAL An appraisal of contemporary

American

Polonia and a guide for the future

Eleven leaders eight

Polish

American

speak out on issues confronting

thePolish American

community

Dean Professor

ISSUES

Dr. James S. Pula Dr. Thaddeus V. Gromada

Attorney

Leonard

Attorney

David

Walentynowicz Franasiak

Archivist

Mary Cygan

Educator

Rev.

Dr.

Professor

Dr.

Eugene

Judge

Honorable Ann T. Mikoll

Attorney Judge

Engineer

Marion Honorable

L.

N.

F. Chrobot Kusielewicz Baruch T.

L. Kowalski

Alfred F. Bochenek

Published by theAmerican Council of Polish Cultural Clubs. Price: $3.75 including postage and handling fromACPCC, c/o A. F. Bochenek, 8726 Brook Road, McLean, Va. 22102. Also available at thePolish Institute.