WWII History Magazine Special - Battle of the Bulge 70th Anniversary

the

b at t l e o f t h e b u l g e

c olle cti o n . . .

Babe Heffron

Visit our site to learn about each print signer!

IN THE

COMPANY

OF

HEROES

Veterans of the Battle of the Bulge reunite at the American cemetery in Luxembourg. Here, they feel a presence amidst the cold. Something tells them they are not alone and this silent reunion is not the last. This powerful Matt Hall print starts at $95

O r d e r on l i n e at:

Orde r by phone:

www.ValorStudios.com

DEFENDERS

OF

BASTOGNE

570-435 -45 2 3

BREAKOUT

FROM

(M-F, 10-5 MST)

BASTOGNE

December 27, 1944: P-47s blast over Bastogne as Patton’s 3rd Army streams in, having broken the German siege. This beautiful Nicolas Trudgian print starts at $195 signed by 4 Bulge vets!

January 13, 1945: Easy Company celebrates the capture of Foy, Belgium, in this epic Matt Hall print. We have a small number of these rare, SOLD OUT prints, so order yours today!

Left: 30th Infantry Division veteran George Schneider

Left: Malmedy Massacre survivor Steve Domitrovich

W-MitchellMausers FP Bulge15.qxp_FP 10/14/14 2:21 PM Page 1

BB-Win14 TOC *cover credit_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 11/4/14 10:58 AM Page 4

TABLE

OF

CONTENTS

BATTLE OF THE BULGE

18

The Most Serious Reverse

Taking the brunt of Hitler’s surprise counteroffensive, the inexperienced 106th Infantry Division was torn to shreds. FLINT WHITLOCK

28

Desperate Jump in the Ardennes

The odds were stacked against the success of a German airborne operation launched during the Battle of the Bulge. BY ROB KROTT

36

Furious Delaying Action at Hosingen

A stand by elements of the U.S. 28th Infantry Division upset the German time table and prevented the capture of Bastogne. LEO BARRON

48

Heroic Defense at St. Vith

Troops of the U.S. 9th Armored Division contested the German advance and won precious time in the process. CHARLES GUTIERREZ

60

Battle at Crossroads X

A company of glidermen disrupted the timetable of the German 2nd Panzer Division. BY LEO BARRON AND DON CYGAN

70

Malmédy & the Bulge

Departments

The Belgian village near the site of the infamous massacre was successfully defended against German attacks during the battle. MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL REYNOLDS

06

80

Editorial

The execution of Private Eddie Slovik remains a forlorn footnote to the Battle of the Bulge. MICHAEL E. HASKEW

08

Breakthrough

German forces repeated history with their winter assault through the Ardennes Forest. MICHAEL D. HULL

12

Malmédy Massacre

SS troops under Lieutenant Colonel Joachim Peiper committed one of the war’s most publicized atrocities in the Bulge. MICHAEL D. HULL

14

Operation Grief

Led by SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny, Operation Greif was Germany’s Trojan Horse. BLAINE TAYLOR

COVER: A German Grenadier is photographed beside a convoy of burning American vehicles destroyed in the opening hours of the Battle of the Bulge. Photo: National Archives.

Lovely Weather for Killing Germans

General George S. Patton Jr.’s Third Army accomplished a fantastic feat of arms with the relief of Bastogne. ROY MORRIS JR.

88

Daredevil Tankers Turn the Tide

Against long odds, the American 740th Tank Battalion stymied Kampfgruppe Peiper at Stoumont. BY PATRICK J. CHAISSON

94

SS Elite Battle for Bastogne

The 1st Panzer Division Liebstandarte, Hitler’s bodyguard, fought for the key Belgian town in the waning days of the Battle of the Bulge. MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL REYNOLDS

104

551st at the Bulge

American paratroopers faced heavy odds and paid a fearsome price. DONALD ROBERTS II

114

The End of the Bulge

The German salient was eliminated when two American armies reestablished contact after 30 days of bitter combat. ARNOLD BLUMBERG

WWII History Presents: The Battle of the Bulge 70th Anniversary (ISSN 1524-8666). WWII History is published by Sovereign Media, 6731 Whittier Avenue, Suite A-100, McLean, VA 22101-4554. (703) 964-0361. WWII History Presents: The Battle of the Bulge 70th Anniversary © 2014 by Sovereign Media Company, Inc., all rights reserved. Copyrights to stories and illustrations are the property of their creators. The contents of this publication may not be reproduced in whole or in part without consent of the copyright owner. Subscription services, back issues, and information: (800) 219-1187 or write to WWII History Circulation, P.O. Box 1644, Williamsport, PA 17703. The Battle of the Bulge 70th Anniversary single copies $9.99 plus $3 for postage. Editorial Office: Send editorial mail to WWII History, 6731 Whittier Avenue, Suite A-100, McLean, VA 22101-4554. WWII History welcomes editorial submissions but assumes no responsibility for the loss or damage of unsolicited material. Material to be returned should be accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope. We suggest that you send a self-addressed, stamped envelope for a copy of our author’s guidelines. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to WWII History, P.O. Box 1644, Williamsport, PA 17703.

W-ClassicToys FP WWIIH Dec14.qxp_Layout 1 9/30/14 8:38 AM Page 2

BATTLE OF THE BULGE This was the last major German offensive of WWII and the single largest battle fought by Americans during WWII. You can recreate this Battle with our 240 piece set. Included in the set is our exclusive hand painted street front. The German army is led by 6 tanks consisting of Tigers, Panthers and Panzer IV tanks plus two hanomags and one 88mm cannon supported by over 85 German troops. The American army fights to hold their position with a force of 75 men supported by 4 Sherman tanks, 2 half tracks and 3 105mm cannons. To round out the set you will receiver a bridge and guard tower, stone walls, concertina wire and much more. The set also comes in a beautiful custom printed box with art work done by renowned WWII artist James Dietz. Order Classic Toy Soldiers 240 piece “Battle of the Bulge Playset” for $374.95 plus $35.00 S&H today.

BATTLEGROUND PLAYSET This 160 plus piece playset is the perfect set to get any toy soldier collector started into the Earopean Theater of WWII. Included in the set are over 45 Germans and 50 Allied troops including GI’s, French and British. You also get 5 German tanks, 1 German 88mm cannon, 2 Sherman tanks, 1 British Churchill tank, 1 US half track, and 1 US 105mm cannon. Additional accessories include barbed wire, heavy weapons, stone walls, trees, mortar pit, matching gun nest, and much more. This set is a tremendous value for the price. CTS 160 piece “Battleground Playset” can be yours for 174.95 plus $25 S&H. You save over $150.00!

THE BATTLE OF KURSK In the spring of 1943 the Germans gambled all their reserves on a massive attack in Russia. If their plan succeeded, they would destroy more than 5 Russian armies. The ensuing Battle of Kursk became the largest tank battle in history and one of the decisive turning points of WWII. You now can recreate this massive engagement with Classic Toy Soldiers 180 piece “BATTLE OF KURSK” playset. The set includes 60 Axis troops with 3 Panzer tanks and 88mm cannon to battle over 75 Russian troops accompanied by 4 T-34 tanks and a 105mm cannon. Include is a large railroad embankment turned into a fortified position, plus stone walls, barbed wire, and lots more. Order your 180 piece “Battle of Kursk Set” for $274.95 plus $30.00 S&H

BB-Win14 Editorial_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 11/4/14 5:26 PM Page 6

E DITO RIAL

Unforgettable The Biography of Capt.

Thomas J. Flynn

MICHEAL E. HASKEW

THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE EDDIE SLOVIK REMAINS A FORLORN FOOTNOTE TO THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE

By Alice M. Flynn

WWII hero 1st Lt. Tom Flynn of the 28th Infantry Division survived insurmountable odds during the Battle of the Bulge, the Hurtgen Forest and four Nazi POW camps, only to return home to his beautiful, young wife with Unforgettable memories that would haunt him for the rest of his life.

Winner of four book awards in 2012

A 2nd edition available in early 2015 will include:

- additional details on the Dec 16-18, 1944 action in Hosingen, Luxembourg, - WWII era photos of the town, and - an expanded list of the 110th Infantry Regiment GIs who fought there.

available on

UnforgettableVeteran.com 6

AT 10:04 ON THE MORNING OF JANUARY 31, 1945, A SINGLE PRISONER WAS bound and blindfolded in the courtyard of a French country house near the village of Ste-Marieaux-Mines. A detail from the 109th Infantry Regiment, 28th Division, fired a volley, carrying out the death sentence. The prisoner was not a member of the sabotage teams sent by SS Lt. Col. Otto Skorzeny behind American lines during the recently ended Battle of the Bulge. He was not a spy. He was a conscripted former petty criminal from Michigan—a replacement for the ranks of the 28th Division, which had suffered heavy casualties during the fighting in Western Europe in the summer and autumn of 1944. With the end of his life, Private Eddie Slovik became something else. He was the first American soldier executed for desertion under fire since the Civil War. No executions had taken place for such a crime in the U.S. military for 80 years, and none have taken place since. Why Slovik? Why then? Slovik had originally been classified 4-F due to his prison record, but as the cost in lives grew steadily during the war, his status changed to 1-A and he was drafted in January 1944. By August, he was headed to the front. When the convoy carrying Slovik and other replacements came under German shellfire, he and another soldier became separated from their company. Eventually, the pair happened upon the camp of the Canadian 13th Provost Corps. They remained there until October. The deserter did in fact rejoin his unit, but only briefly. A day after finding Company G of the 109th Regiment, Slovik walked away again. After another day, he turned himself in and penned and signed a confession that would play an important part in his undoing. The military tribunal that convicted him voted three separate times, each unanimously, for the death sentence. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the supreme Allied commander in Europe, was obliged to review Slovik’s case because of the sentence. He concurred. In his landmark 2002 biography Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life, acclaimed historian Carlo D’Este notes that during the campaign in Europe in 1944-1945 no less than 49 U.S. soldiers were arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for desertion. Slovik apparently refused at least one offer from the 28th Division judge advocate to return to his unit in exchange for dropping the charges against him. He also wrote a personal letter to Eisenhower asking for mercy. D’Este wrote, “In the Slovik case, however, the death penalty was imposed on a soldier who had committed no violent act and whose intent to desert was questionable. Eddie Slovik became a cause celebre when journalist William Bradford Huie published The Execution of Private Slovik in 1954. When Eisenhower was interviewed in 1963 by historian Bruce Catton, his recollection of the event bore the hallmarks of a faulty memory. Claiming he had sent his judge advocate general to offer Slovik an olive branch if he would express remorse and return to his unit, Eisenhower described Slovik as ‘one of those guardhouse lawyers who refused to believe that he’d ever be executed.… ’ “Slovik had actually written Eisenhower a heartfelt personal plea to spare his life, and would willingly have complied with an offer to return to duty. It has not been established if Eisenhower ever saw Slovik’s letter, but what is clear is that no one from SHAEF was ever sent to the 28th Division before Slovik’s execution.” It is noteworthy that incidences of desertion and self-inflicted wounds had reached a worrisome level in the ranks and that Eisenhower may well have felt compelled to offer Slovik as an example. The fact that the largest single fight in the history of the U.S. Army, the Battle of the Bulge, was at its height during a critical period in the disposition of Slovik’s case cannot be discounted either. Slovik was buried in the Oise-Aisne Cemetery at Fere-en-Tardenois, France. Ninetyfour other Americans, executed for the crimes of rape and murder, were also interred there. In 1987, more than 40 years after his death, Slovik’s body was exhumed and reburied in Michigan beside his wife.

BB-Win14 Editorial_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 11/4/14 5:26 PM Page 7

BATTLE OF THE BULGE 70th ANNIVERSARY CARL A. GNAM, JR. Editorial Director, Founder MICHEAL E. HASKEW Editor SAMANTHA DETULLEO Art Director

CONTRIBUTORS: Leo Barron, Arnold Blumberg, Charles Gutierrez, Michael D. Hull, Roy Morris Jr., Michael Reynolds, Donald Roberts II, Flint Whitlock

ADVERTISING OFFICE: BEN BOYLES Advertising Manager (570) 322-7848, ext. 110 [email protected] MARK HINTZ Vice President & Publisher BROOKE BLEE Subscription Customer Services sovereign@ publishersservicesassociates.com KEN FORNWALT Data Processing Director CURTIS CIRCULATION COMPANY WORLDWIDE DISTRIBUTION

SOVEREIGN MEDIA COMPANY, INC. 6731 Whittier Ave., Suite A-100 McLean, VA 22101-4554 SUBSCRIPTION CUSTOMER SERVICE AND BUSINESS OFFICE: 2406 Reach Road Williamsport, PA 17701 (800) 219-1187 PRINTED IN THE USA

7

BB-Win14 Breakthrough_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 11/4/14 10:59 AM Page 8

BREAKTHROUGH MICHAEL D. HULL

BY THE TIME AUTUMN ARRIVED IN 1944, THE ALLIED FRONT IN NORTHWEST Europe had expanded along its entire length, but it had run out of steam. Although the German Army was fighting more stubbornly than ever, the British, American, and Canadian armies had advanced so rapidly that they had stretched their supply lines to the limit. Truck convoys snaked endlessly eastward from the Normandy beaches through France, Belgium, and Holland, but it was not enough. The vanguard tank columns began to run out of gasoline, and the great Allied offensive came to a halt. After much of the Wehrmacht had been chased back across the

Siegfried Line, the supply crisis forced the Allied armies into an active defense. This gave German Führer Adolf Hitler the breathing time he needed to put into reality a dream he had been harboring of an all-out counteroffensive. This would have accomplished little on the Eastern Front or in Italy; the only opportunity for success lay in the West. Hitler knew that his best chance lay in BELOW: The initial rapid successes of the German drive through the Ardennes in 1944 could not be exploited quickly enough before Allied resistance stiffened, dooming the offensive to little more than a setback for the Allies. LEFT: Hitler confers with Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, and Col. Gen. Alfred Jodl.

Map © 2004 by Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

National Archives

German forces repeated history with their winter assault through the Ardennes Forest.

8

W-RZM FP WWIIH Dec14.qxp_FP 9/30/14 8:55 AM Page 1

BB-Win14 Breakthrough_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 11/4/14 10:59 AM Page 10

National Archives

exploiting the Anglo-American coalition, which he believed to be fragile and ready to crumble if subjected to pressure. He had nothing but contempt for Americans as soldiers, and if he cut their precarious supply lines he might be able to force them to capitulate. Hitler would split the Allied armies, push the British into the English Channel in a second Dunkirk, and press the Western Allies to agree to a separate peace so that he could throw everything he had against the approaching Soviet Army. The unbalanced, twitching Hitler was still clinging to the fantasy that he could reverse the course of the war, and there was no reason in his mind why his lightning breakthrough of May 1940 could not be repeated. The Führer dropped the bombshell on his senior Wehrmacht officers at a routine operations conference on Saturday, September 16, 1944, the day before the First Allied Airborne Army dropped into Holland for the ill-fated Operation Market Garden. Hitler spoke of a great counteroffensive using three armies. These would drive westward to the Meuse River and then seize the ultimate prize, the strategic port of Antwerp in Belgium. Planned in top secrecy and employing elaborate deceptions, the offensive, he insisted to his commanders, would split the British, U.S., and Canadian armies. Hitler named the operation Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine), originally code-named Christrose. The three armies would be bolstered with hastily drafted people’s infantry (volksgrenadiers) comprising conscripts, veterans, convalescents, and teenagers; with hundreds of new tanks from Production Minister Albert Speer’s armaments plants; and with a special brigade of German soldiers, fluent in English and disguised as American GIs, to confuse the enemy. Hitler planned his attack for November 1944, when the weather would be bad. The Nazi dictator's last great gamble and masterwork of self-delusion was based on two critical elements: surprise and weather. “Fog, night, and snow” would negate Allied aerial superiority and give 10

German half tracks storm through the Ardennes Forest in 1940 during the invasion of France.

him victory, the füehrer predicted. despite his assurances and euphoria, however, the German generals were not sold on the idea. Field Marshal Walther Model, Hitler’s “fireman” and the commander of Army Group B, was uncertain that the plan could succeed, and General Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, his trusted leader of the newly formed Sixth Panzer Army, viewed it with suspicion. The füehrer thought long and hard about a third critical element—where to counterattack the Allies. A thrust launched from Venlo, Holland, almost due west to Antwerp would cut the British Second Army and First Canadian Army from the Americans, but the low-lying terrain was crisscrossed with canals and streams and unsuitable for armor. A push against the junction of General Alexander M. Patch’s U.S. Seventh Army, coming up from the French Riviera, with General George S. Patton Jr.’s Third Army was a second possibility. But that section of the front was too fluid, and there was no foreseeable strategic objective there. Eventually, Hitler decided on one area in particular that had long attracted him, a place where history had been made before. This was the Ardennes Forest, where Luxembourg, Germany, and Belgium meet. Embracing thickly wooded hills, ravines, cliff-like ridges, and spring water health spas, the great Ardennes triangle extends north to Eupen, Belgium, south to northern Luxembourg, and west to the Meuse River valley. The area is almost impassable except for an eight- or nine-kilometer gap, the

Losheim Gap, which was named for a German hamlet just across the Belgian border. The gap had been used by the Germans three times before, which was probably why Hitler wanted to use it again. A German army had marched triumphantly through there in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War, and Kaiser Wilhelm’s spike-helmeted uhlans galloped through the pass and straight to the Meuse in August 1914. And, in May 1940, General Erwin Rommel had led his 7th Panzer Division through the gap to the Meuse on the third day of hostilities in France. The longer Hitler studied his maps, the more he liked the idea of the Ardennes invasion route. Using this difficult yet proven path to catch his enemies off guard would enable German troops to reach the Meuse River swiftly. And, fortuitously for the Führer, this proved to be the weakest sector of the 450-mile British-American line. The “ghost front” was thinly manned by four U.S. infantry divisions—the inexperienced 99th and 106th, and the 4th and 28th divisions, which were resting after being mauled in the terrible Hurtgen Forest campaign. For the Allies, the Ardennes was the quiet part of the front where nothing was likely to happen. The lessons of 1914 and 1940 went unheeded. In the fall of 1944, the Allied high command believed that the German Army was no longer capable of mounting a major offensive. But, if such an attack were possible, it would certainly not come through the virtually impenetrable Ardennes. Therefore, front-line and aerial reconnaissance reports of heightened enemy activity just a few miles away behind the rugged Schnee Eifel were disregarded. Consequently, early on the cold, snowy morning of Saturday, December 16, 1944, the Fifth and Sixth Panzer armies and Seventh Army burst through an 85-mile sector from Monschau to Echternach, rolling over unready American units and sowing widespread panic and confusion. Hitler had duped his enemies with a complete tactical and strategic surprise. However, his triumph would prove short-lived, for his gamble delayed Allied operations by only six weeks.

Warfare Network ad - All#2_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:09 AM Page 11

From the publishers of MILITARY HERITAGE Magazine

Get these authoritative e-Book Publications from the Warfare History Network

absolutely FREE!

Warfare History Network has created these e-Books and is making them available to you free with no strings attached. Well, actually there’s one string attached. When you download any or all of these free e-Books we’ll sign you up as a member of the Warfare History Network, and the good news is that’s also completely free. Warfare History Network is the official web portal of MILITARY HERITAGE, WWII HISTORY MAGAZINE, WWII QUARTERLY, and CIVIL WAR QUARTERLY. As a member of Warfare History Network you’ll have access to all of the fresh, in-depth perspectives on a wide variety of topics including battles, weapons, leaders, strategy, and more. All written by the top experts in the field.

As a member of Warfare History Network you’ll have access to hundreds of military history articles from the archives of our magazines, you’ll be able to download any and all of our free e-Books, plus you’ll receive WARFARE HISTORY DAILY, our free email newsletter to bring you important new facts and insights, all at absolutely no cost to you.

There’s no cost, no risk, and no obligation to buy anything.

Download your free e-Books today at:

www.WarfareHistoryNetwork.com/free-briefings

BB-Win14 Malmedy Massacre_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 11/4/14 11:00 AM Page 12

MALMEDY MASSACRE MICHAEL D. HULL

SS TROOPS UNDER LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOACHIM PEIPER COMMITTED ONE OF THE WAR'S MOST PUBLICIZED ATROCITIES IN THE BULGE.

Both: National Archives

ONE OF MANY MONSTROUS EVENTS OF WORLD WAR II OCCURRED ON December 17, 1944, the day after the opening of the Battle of the Bulge. On that chilly Sunday afternoon, Combat Command R (CCR) and artillery battalions of Maj. Gen. Robert W. Hasbrouck’s U.S. 7th Armored Division were rolling from Eupen, Belgium, to the divisional assembly area around St.-Vith, moving south along a route that should have been well behind the fighting. At the same time, a German panzer spearhead was heading west from Moderscheid, Germany, toward Stavelot, Belgium. This was a battle group of the SS Leibstandarte “Adolf Hitler,” the tip of General Josef “Sepp” Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army. The battle group was commanded by Obersturmbannführer (lieutenant colonel) Joachim Peiper, a tall, hardened veteran of fighting in Poland and Russia who was pressing to get to the Meuse River. The American and German columns were bound to cross—at a road junction just south of the town of Malmedy in eastern Belgium. The CCR’s tanks reached the junction first and lumbered on toward Ligneuville. Fifteen minutes after the last American Sherman tank had disappeared over a rise, the first of Colonel Peiper’s Tiger and Panther tanks, half-tracks, and self-propelled guns halted just east of the intersection. The U.S. artillery trains following CCR should have been passing then, but the long column was strung out and a few trucks had squeezed into the 7th Armored Division column. The trucks carried 125 men of B Battery of

ABOVE: A U.S. soldier looks out over corpses discovered in a field near Malmedy. INSET: SS Lt. Col. Joachim Peiper was convicted and sentenced to death for the killing of U.S. POWs. 12

the 285th Field Artillery Regiment’s observation battalion. Peiper’s leading half-tracks ambushed the American trucks, raking them with machine-gun fire. The surprised GIs leaped out and flung themselves into ditches for cover. The hapless Americans were swiftly rounded up, disarmed, and herded into a nearby snow-covered field. They were ordered to line up and wait until German troops following could take charge of them. Tiger tanks were parked at both ends of the pasture. Peiper did not want his advance impeded by prisoners, so his battle group moved on toward Ligneuville as the American captives stood terrified and shivering in the field. They quietly watched German vehicles stream westward. When the column paused, the enemy and American soldiers stared at each other. Then, after about two hours, a German in a half-track stood and casually fired a pistol at the prisoners, felling a medical officer and an enlisted man. “Stand fast!” shouted an American officer. “Don’t run!” Almost immediately, another pistol was fired at the bewildered, helpless GIs, and then German automatic weapons opened up. “We all lay on our stomachs, and every tank that came by would open up with machine guns on the group of men lying on the ground,” reported Private James J. Mattera. “This carried on about 30 minutes, and then it stopped all at once. Then about three or four Germans came over to the group of men lying on the ground. Some officers … were shot in the head with pistols. After they left, the machine gunners opened up.” Recalled Private Homer D. Ford, another survivor, “They came along with pistols and rifles, and shot some that were still breathing and hit others in the head with rifle butts. I was hit in the arm. The men were all laying [sic] around moaning and crying. When the Germans came over, they would say, ‘Is he breathing?’ and would either shoot them or hit them with the butt of the gun. After they fired at us, I lay stretched out with my hands out, and I

could feel that blood oozing out. “I was laying [sic] in the snow, and I got wet and started to shiver, and I was afraid they would see me shivering, but they didn’t. I heard them shoot their pistols while next to me; I could hear them pull the trigger back, and then the click. The men were moaning something terrible. I also heard the butt hit their heads, and the squishing noise.” Twenty GIs, most of them wounded, tried to crawl away, and a dozen were killed by their pursuers. At least 86 American prisoners died in the snow at Malmedy. A few out of the original 125 battalion members, like Mattera and Ford, survived by losing consciousness or feigning death, and later escaping. At the war’s end, they would testify against the perpetrators of the massacre. When U.S. combat engineers later dug the bodies out of the deep snow, the American high command ordered the atrocity publicized. Word was passed down through the ranks of units in the Bulge:

National Archives

BB-Win14 Malmedy Massacre_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 11/4/14 11:00 AM Page 13

A U.S. soldier stares at the dead body of a child killed by Joachim Peiper’s Panzerkorps in Stavelot.

take no SS troops as prisoners. From then on, some American combat units took no German prisoners at all. To the aroused GIs, Peiper was now “Enemy No. 1.” After the initial panic and confusion that had routed many American units when the panzer groups had stormed through their thin lines in the Ardennes, a grim new spirit of determination took hold. “Malmedy” was its battle cry. Meanwhile, Colonel Peiper’s battle group pushed on westward, killing more POWs and Belgian villagers, but it failed to reach its objective. Peiper’s force was cut

off and encircled after crossing the Salm River. Only 800 officers and men out of 5,000 escaped. Shortly after the war in Europe ended, a U.S. military tribunal at Dachau, Bavaria, condemned 43 Waffen SS officers, including Peiper, to death, and 23 to life imprisonment. In March 1948, the influential Senate Armed Services Committee voted for the commutation of 31 of the death sentences. The following month, General Lucius D. Clay, head of the U.S. European Command, reduced the remaining death sentences from 12 to six, but none of the accused SS perpetrators was ever executed or served a full sentence. After 13 years in jail, Peiper, General Dietrich, and other Malmedy defendants were released in the Stuttgart area on parole and then probation. Still a hero to his SS veterans, the handsome, Berlin-born Peiper died on July 14, 1976, in a suspicious fire at his home in the village of Traves in east-central France.

The Beasts of Buchenwald Award-winning, chilling portrait of Buchenwald’s sadistic first commandant and his equally brutal wife. Illustrated. HC - $24.95 / SC - $17.95

Fight On A fascinating account from a member of the legendary Thunderbirds with an insider’s view of Hitler’s Germany. Illustrated. HC - $24.95 / SC - $17.95

Buy directly from Cable Publishing and get 25% off plus FREE SHIPPING! Survivor of Buchenwald An eloquent memoir of one man’s endless, agonizing days in the Nazis’ worst concentration camp. Illustrated. HC - $24.95 / SC - $17.95

Do Well or Die A member of the famed 10th Mountain Division relates the rigorous training required to successfully fight Hitler’s army in Italy’s rugged mountains. Illustrated. SC - $17.95

Books and e-books are also available from Amazon. Buchenwald: Hell on a Hilltop Sadistic doctors, murders, torture, and the power of the human spirit to survive are well narrated in Book 3 of the Trilogy. Illustrated. HC - $25.95 / SC - $18.95

The Lady Gangster Award-winning memoir of the USS Fuller, Queen of the Attack Transports, in the Pacific Theater. Illustrated. HC - $23.95 / SC - $16.95

CABLE PUBLISHING • www.cablepublishing.com • Email: [email protected] • P: 715-372-8499 / F: 715-372-8448

13

BB-Win14 Operation Grief_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 11/4/14 11:02 AM Page 14

OPERATION

G R I E F B L A I N E TAY L O R

Operation Greif, led by SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny, was Germany’s Trojan Horse during the Battle of the Bulge.

National Archives

During the hard-fought Battle of the Bulge in contested Belgium late in 1944, an American Army jeep with four soldiers in it stopped at a gasoline pump manned by GIs and the driver politely asked for “Petrol, please.” The GI at the pump eyed the quartet of clean-cut soldiers nervously, in turn asking, “Tell me, do you know where you are?” The driver, a German soldier wearing a GI’s uniform over the top of his own as stipulated by international law, panicked, floored the pedal, and sped off in flight. He lost control of the vehicle on the icy road and crashed into the lead truck of a convoy coming the other way. The jeep flipped over, and the “Americans” were captured, their subterfuge thus discovered. The men were members of the eighth unit belonging to an elite, all-volunteer outfit called the 150th Panzer Brigade, commanded by SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny, the man the Allies called “the kidnapper of Mussolini,” “spy, saboteur and murderer,” and “the most dangerous man in Europe.” The Germans were participating in Operation Greif, a daring component of the Ardennes offensive. This incident is recounted in detail in Skorzeny’s 1975 work entitled My Commando Operations: The Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Daring Commando. As he noted therein,

14 DATE

“Under intense questioning, one of our comrades admitted what he thought was true: a special unit under my command was supposed to kidnap Gen. Eisenhower and cause the commanders of the British and American armies to disappear, as well as their staffs.” This stunning bit of information dovetailed perfectly with a previously intercepted and filed captured enemy directive. OKW (High Command of the Armed Forces) Order 0012759 had called for a thousand men in the German Army who spoke English to volunteer for a new, topsecret unit under the personal command of the most dreaded enemy commando on the Western Front: Skorzeny. Ignored by U.S. Army Intelligence at first, now it seemed to make perfect sense. Immediately, the Military Police and security forces guarding the top commanA dead German infiltrator in U.S. uniform, confirmed rumors that Skorzeny’s men were behind American lines during the Battle of the Bulge.

BB-Win14 Operation Grief_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 11/4/14 11:02 AM Page 15

Author’s Collection

ders of the Allied armies—Supreme Allied commander General Dwight David Eisenhower, British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, and General Omar Nelson Bradley—went into high gear. Eisenhower himself was virtually a prisoner in his own headquarters outside Paris, and Bradley was personally halted and quizzed on all things American by wary GIs until he could prove his own identity. In fact, again according to Skorzeny, so terror-stricken were the Allies by the swift successes of the first few days of Adolf Hitler’s surprise winter offensive that had caught the Americans and British napping in the Ardennes that Monty seriously advised his prime minister, Winston Churchill, that a second reimbarkation of all of His Majesty’s ground forces, á la Dunkirk in 1940, might have to be undertaken. The only problem was that Dunkirk itself had been in enemy hands since D-day. As the three major German drives sliced forward through all American resistance—taking thousands of prisoners and murdering many at a crossroads at Malmedy in Belgium—Colonel Skorzeny’s men were causing havoc behind Allied lines in a new type of war not seen before on the European Continent, all by preset design, it seemed. As for the shadowy, giant, scar-faced SS man, Skorzeny was rumored to be at several Allied command locations, including both Paris and Versailles, seeking to carry out his top mission of either kidnapping or killing Eisenhower. But was he? In his memoirs, he denied it, writing that the mission assigned by Hitler himself had nothing to do with martial terrorism and creating confusion behind enemy lines, but rather with seizing strategically important bridges. In the fall of 1944, American Army Rangers wearing German uniforms had been instrumental in helping to take Aachen, the first German city to fall to the Allies. From this, Hitler had gotten the

Bulge. ABOVE: SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny commanded the elite 150th Panzer Brigade, which staged numerous commando operations.

idea of using the same stratagem against the Allies themselves in his upcoming attack in the Ardennes. On October 20, 1944, the Führer called in his favorite undercover warrior for a top-secret briefing, explaining the basic premise of the overall offensive, which was to split the Allied camps in two, capture the resupply port city of Antwerp, terrorize the enemy, force a second Dunkirk evacuation on the British, defeat the Americans, and hopefully win a political end to the war in the West. This would allow the Germans to concentrate on their main enemy in the East: Josef Stalin’s Red Army. Who knows? Hitler mused. Perhaps the defeated Allies might even join Nazi Germany in defeating the Russian colossus now driving on Berlin. What Hitler needed from Skorzeny, he explained, was a Nazi version of the famed Trojan Horse that would penetrate the enemy lines by stealth, seize key bridges in their rear in advance of the charging German armored spearheads, and thus materially aid the main German thrusts led by Generals Erich Brandenburger and Baron

Hasso von Manteuffel of the regular army and the Waffen (Armed) SS commanded by his favorite field commander, Josef “Sepp” Dietrich. Skorzeny’s 150th Panzer Brigade started off with 3,300 men, two American Sherman tanks, six armored cars, and four British vehicles, plus 15 jeeps and all manner of American uniforms, light weaponry, and ammunition. The overall attack began on December 16, 1944, but all the objectives were not reached as hoped for. Soon the attack got bogged down in massive traffic jams on the muddy Belgian roads—just as during the Waterloo Campaign over 100 years earlier. Recalled Skorzeny, “The enemy had undoubtedly been surprised by this unforeseen offensive, but they clung to their ground, whereas we had hoped to see them retreat without fighting.” Thus, Skorzeny was forced to abandon his original mission, which was approved by the German 6th SS Panzer Army staff, but there had also been some unexpected gains as well. Noted British author James Lucas in his 1985 work Kommando: German Special Forces of World War II, “Some reversed road signs had confused an American tank battalion moving towards the front. A unit had been bluffed into withdrawing from a village which it held. Telephone wires had been cut and an ammunition dump had been blown up. … There had, however, been a psychological result. “The realization among American soldiers that there were Germans in U.S. uniform active behind the front line produced in some of the non-combatant detachments an outbreak of spy mania. Sentries posed catch questions and the unfortunate who was challenged and did not know, for example, that Harry James was a trumpet player or failed to have a detailed knowledge of the leading baseball teams, was liable to be arrested, beaten up or threatened with execution as a spy.” Of Skorzeny’s teams, seven infiltrated WWII QUARTERLY

15

National Archives

BB-Win14 Operation Grief_WW-Mar04 Ordnance 18, 20-23 11/4/14 11:02 AM Page 16

SS troops from a Skorzeny spy unit pay the ultimate price at the hands of a U.S. firing squad.

U.S. lines and one even made it to the sought-after Meuse River. The other men were caught, and soldiers from one—Einheit Strelau—were tried and convicted as spies, then shot by firing squad. Skorzeny protested this later, both at his own Dachau war crimes trial and in his memoirs, citing the vagaries of international law in their defense and his. According to the late American author Glenn B. Infield in his 1981 biography, Skorzeny: Hitler’s Commando, “Did Skorzeny try to assassinate Eisenhower? This question has never been answered satisfactorily. … In 1945, Skorzeny denied that he had ever intended to assassinate Eisenhower. … ‘I realized that it would be impossible to stop all the rumors …’” What was happening “on the other side of the hill?” According to her own postwar memoir, Eisenhower Was My Boss, by Ike’s Irish-born driver, Lieutenant Kay Summersby Morgan, “Security officers immediately turned headquarters into a virtual fortress. Barbed wire appeared. Several tanks moved in. The normal guard was doubled, tripled, quadrupled. The pass system became a strict matter of life and death, instead of the old formality.” The sound of loud car exhausts brought calls to Ike’s office to see if he was still alive and unwounded, but the supreme commander himself refused to worry, growling that he had a war to fight. He 16 DATE

did agree, however, to move into a more sheltered compound, but still his guards worried that he would be shot by an unseen enemy sniper while out smoking and walking. On December 22, a report arrived stating that Skorzeny’s undercover SS troopers had made it to the Café de la Paix in Paris, but Ike stormed out anyway. “Hell’s fire! I’m going for a walk," he shouted. “If anyone wants to shoot me, he can go right ahead. I’ve got to get out!” His U.S. Naval aide, Captain Harry C. Butcher, later recalled in his 1946 memoir My Three Years with Eisenhower that the general was irked by all the extra attention he was receiving, particularly in being followed by a jeep full of armed MPs. There was still more. According to Skorzeny’s 1955 biographer Charles Foley in Commando Extraordinary: The Remarkable Exploits of Otto Skorzeny, an Eisenhower lookalike, one Lt. Col. Baldwin B. Smith, helped to protect the general. “Daily the colonel drove in the Supreme Commander’s car between his house at St. Germain and Versailles—saluting with that quick flash for which ‘Ike’ was known—and waiting for a bullet or pistolfired grenade. … ” Of particular interest to American Army MPs were Nazi spies said to be masquerading as British generals, even one as Field Marshal Montgomery! By December 23, the tide of battle had

already turned against the Germans. The Allied air forces returned to the skies to bedevil the Nazis on the ground once more. Noted Skorzeny afterward, “We had continually to stop and throw ourselves into the ditches at hand: at such times we would lie flat on our bellies, our noses buried in manure.” His 150th Panzer Brigade was relieved by a regular infantry division on the 28th, settled into billets east of St.-Vith, then joined in the general retreat following the defeat of the overall offensive. His silent “terrorist” attack had been an unqualified success. General Bradley, at his corps headquarters in Luxembourg, mused aloud about “half a million GIs … playing cat and mouse with each other every time they met … The rear areas were being panicked by disguised Germans.” There were roadblocked generals everywhere, with rank badges meaning nothing to ordinary GIs who saw closet Nazis universally, and all passwords were distrusted. If the Battle of the Bulge was rightly called the largest ever fought by the standing U.S. Army, the disinformation campaign spawned by Hitler’s stratagem directed by Skorzeny was the most devious it had ever encountered. After the war, Bradley recalled that he had proved his nationality, “the first time by identifying Springfield as the capital of Illinois (my questioner held out for Chicago); the second time by locating the football guard between the center and tackle on a line of scrimmage; the third time by naming the current spouse of a blonde called Betty Grable.” For his part, British Prime Minister Churchill on January 6, 1945, wrote to Soviet dictator Josef Stalin asking for a relieving offensive on the Eastern Front from the Red Army. Secretly, the prime minister feared that Stalin might cut another political deal with Hitler, as the Russians had done in 1939. However, most historians since the war have opined that Hitler’s bold gamble could not have worked. Towson, Maryland, freelancer Blaine Taylor is the author of a quartet of books on the Axis Pact powers in World War II.

WWQ Full Page Sub ad-NEW_Layout 1 11/4/14 3:44 PM Page 1

WWII QUARTERLY The Hardcover Journal of The Second World War

Each quarterly issue is meticulously printed and bound in vivid full color on thick, luxurious, oversized paper. WWII QUARTERLY brings you in-depth coverage of the battles, campaigns, strategy, and tactics, and uncovers fresh new facts you may not have heard before. For example, you’ve probably read that Hitler’s Atlantic Wall was heralded as a mighty series of bunkers, underwater obstacles and artillery that was impenetrable against an Allied invasion. But WWII QUARTERLY reveals to you that it was anything but…

Do you know why Stalin launched a massive offensive in a secondary theater against little Finland in June 1944? WWII QUARTERLY fills you in on all the details and shows you how this conflict played an important role in the Allies plans for their Normandy landing. But we’ve only scratched the surface. WWII QUARTERLY brings World War II to life. All this brought to you in 4 beautiful hardbound volumes…an excellent addition to your world war II library! And there’s no risk to you! Order now, and if at any time you decide you’re unsatisfied with the publication, cancel and you’ll receive a full refund on all unserviced issues…no questions asked!

Curtis 07256

Not available on newsstands, the WWII QUARTERLY Hard-bound Edition can only be obtained and collected through this personal subscription offer.

D-DAY

82nd & 10:1st

AIRBORNE

Heroic Stand at Grai gnes

n

SPRING 2014 Volume 5, No. 3

Curtis 02313

WWII QUARTER LY

Savage Fight For Okinawa Fallschirm ger Assault on jä Cr ete

TARGET: HIRO SHIMA

TERRIBLE TOLL

Marines

VITAL THRUST TO

Ranger s Dar ing D-DAY Assault

SUMMER 2013 4 Volume 4, No.

B-17s Over Berli n

Pointe du Hoc

n

FLYING THROUG H DEADLY FLAK

ON TARAWA

WWII QUARTERLY

KTILA Fero cio us FigMEI ht for Burma

SPRING 2014

Chur chill's Fighting

Irish Brigade LSDORFF OTTO VON KNOBE

er Power in Panz RETAILER DISPLAY

the East

UNTIL JUNE 9

ROSSA OPERATION BARBA

Escaping thelaught Ger man Ons

+

Sally & Tokyo Rose, Iwo Jima Diary, Axis Factories, GI Photo Album Camouflaging Aircraft

SUMMER 2013

RETAILER DISPLAY

UNTIL AUGUST 19

WWII QUARTERLY is also available in digital format for iPad, iPhone, Android, Kindle, and more. See our website for details.

www.WarfareHistoryNetwork.com/magazine

BB-Win14 106th Division_Layout 1 11/4/14 10:21 AM Page 18

The Most Serious

REVERSE By Flint Whitlock

It

dreds of unheated trucks and hauled eastward, crossing into Belgium on December 10. The troops did not see Paris. What they saw instead from the backs of their trucks was a burned and broken landscape that bore grim testimony to the ferocity of the fighting that had taken

across a storm-tossed English Channel to France and up the Seine River. The young soldiers of the “Golden Lion” Division who had hoped to spend a few days in Paris were disappointed. The division was loaded like cargo into hun-

place for the past six months. The ruins of homes, shops, churches, and factories— the enormous reality of which exceeded a thousandfold what the young soldiers of the 106th had expected—spoke mutely of the desperate battles that had been waged

Photos courtesy (left to right): Mary E. Smith; Peter Iosso; Dr. Robert Kline

took the HMS Queen Elizabeth, the largest passenger liner afloat, only five days to transport the entire 106th Division from New Jersey to Glasgow, Scotland, making port on November 17, 1944. The troops were then taken by train to Portsmouth, England, and transported

18

across the European continent during the past six months. Scattered along the roadsides and in the fields were the twisted and blackened hulks of tanks, trucks, half-tracks, ambulances, artillery pieces, jeeps, aircraft, and military hardware of all kinds. Not all of it, however, was German; plenty of wrecked and bloodstained American vehicles littered the fields, farms, roads, and towns. The men of the 106th collectively gulped and hoped that things were considerably quieter wherever they were going. On December 11, the Golden Lions, half-frozen from their long ride, detrucked in St.- Vith, a quaint, eastern Belgian town. Named in honor of the martyr St. Vitus, the first settlers had put down roots in the area in AD 863. Over the centuries, the town has found itself in the center of numerous wars. At the end of 1944, St.Vith again lay in the path of great armies. At St.-Vith, the Ardennes Forest of Belgium melds with the Schnee Eifel region of Germany, and the two areas are virtually indistinguishable from one another. Broad farmlands and thick groves of trees are spread over a series of rolling hills and

BB-Win14 106th Division_Layout 1 11/4/14 10:21 AM Page 19

National Archives

In this photo staged during the Bulge attack, a German Grenadier poses for the camera along the road to Poteau. OPPOSITE: Private James V. Smith, Pfc. Peter Iosso, and Sergeant Robert Kline (left to right) were three members of the 106th Infantry Division who survived the opening hours of the Ardennes offensive.

19

BB-Win14 106th Division_Layout 1 11/4/14 10:21 AM Page 20

20

National Archives

deep river valleys, intercut by narrow, winding roads. To call the region “mountainous” would be overstating the case. Steep in places and heavily forested in others, the region’s undulating terrain is perhaps more akin to the gently rolling Appalachians of central Pennsylvania. In January 1944, the Schnee Eifel, a high, pine-covered ridge that runs from the northeast to the southwest, was heavily fortified with bunkers, pillboxes, and antitank obstacles—part of the Germans’ Westwall, or Siegfried Line, of defenses. The broad Allied push had come to a dead stop in autumn along the GermanBelgian border at Aachen and the Hürtgen Forest, due to a variety of factors, which included bad weather, heavy casualties, a serious shortage of fuel and ammunition, increased German resistance, and plain exhaustion. On December 7, 1944, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, head of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, met with his highest American and British commanders in Maastricht, Belgium, to map out plans for future operations. It was decided that a fresh offensive, in early 1945, must be mounted to keep the German defenders on their heels and prevent any further loss of offensive momentum. The Allies held a 400-mile front, running from Nijmegen, Holland, to the FrenchSwiss border at Basel. Occupying the northern front, or left flank of the Allied line, was British Field Marshal Sir Bernard Law Montgomery’s Twenty-first Army Group, while General Omar Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group occupied the area to the south. Holding the northern half of Bradley’s line was Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson’s U.S. Ninth Army and Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges’ First Army, the divisions of which had seen months of heavy fighting. On their right flank, from Monschau south, were spread the 99th, the 106th, and the 28th Infantry Divisions. Next to the 28th, which was badly stretched-out, was the exhausted 4th Infantry Division. Below Luxembourg stood Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s Third Army. At Saarbrücken, the

Troops of the ill-fated 106th Infantry make their way to the front through a snowy Belgian wood.

front turned east and was the responsibility of General Alexander Patch’s Seventh Army, which had landed on the French Riviera in August. It was decided that Montgomery would send his forces in an all-out thrust toward the Rhine north of the Ruhr. Simpson’s Ninth Army would be attached to the British force. Farther south, as part of a one-two punch, Eisenhower would send Patton’s Third Army racing toward Frankfurt-am-Main. Hodges’ First Army, consisting of the V, VII, and VIII Corps, would also play a major role in the coming fight. The VII Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, would spearhead the offensive and head for Cologne. Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow’s V Corps would exploit any VII Corps successes. Chosen to take part in the V Corps offensive, the battle-weary 2nd Infantry Division was pulled out of its positions east of St.-Vith and trucked northward to the vicinity of Dom Butgen-

bach. Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton’s VIII Corps, on First Army’s southern flank, had no immediate role in the upcoming operations, but was told to be ready to follow up Allied gains. December 13 was set as D-day for the start of the operation. Guarding the supposedly “impenetrable” forest east of St.-Vith in the VIII Corps area were the inexperienced 99th and 106th Infantry Divisions. There they would get a taste for living near the front, hear the distant rumble of artillery fire, and act as reserves. Although a veteran of World War I, the 106th’s commanding general, 52-year-old Maj. Gen. Alan Jones, had never led a unit of any size in combat, let alone a 14,253-man infantry division. Most of his officers, noncoms, and enlisted men were equally green. Through no fault of its own, the 106th was about as ill-prepared for combat as any division America ever put into the field. From activation to departure for its port of embarkation, the 106th lost a total of

BB-Win14 106th Division_Layout 1 11/4/14 10:21 AM Page 21

in four days the German Army would launch the largest offensive since the invasion of the Soviet Union. He would throw almost everything he had at the Americans. Three armies with 13 infantry and seven panzer divisions, plus an additional five infantry divisions in OKW reserve on alert or en route to the front, totaling some 290,000 men, 2,617 artillery pieces, 1,038 tanks and self-propelled guns, and a handful of aircraft. Only 80,000 Americans held the 75-mile line between Monschau and Luxembourg City. Hitler believed the 99th and the 106th Divisions, occupying the schwerpunkt (point of attack) in front of St.-Vith were too inexperienced to put up much of a fight.

ABOVE: A sentry of the 106th stands watch along the Schnee Eifel in eastern Belgium. BELOW: A school in St. Vith, served as the headquarters for the 106th Infantry Division. Heimatmuseum St. Vith

opinion in Britain and America to force Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt to negotiate a peace. Then, perhaps with Britain and America as allies, the Germans could defeat the Soviet Army and forestall a takeover of Europe by the Communists. Hitler scanned maps for a suitable place from which to launch his counterassault. Then he saw it, the Ardennes, the same improbable place through which his divisions had begun their surprise invasion of France and Belgium in 1940. Here he envisioned scores of divisions and thousands of panzers and artillery pieces crashing through the “impenetrable” forest and straight into the soft spot of the American front lines—a soft spot currently occupied by the unsuspecting 106th Infantry Division. While the Allies would later call the operation the “Battle of the Bulge,” Hitler codenamed it Wacht am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine). It was not the Rhine River, however, that Hitler planned to secure. It was instead the vital port at Antwerp, some 75 miles west of Aachen, that he hoped to reach, while simultaneously driving a wedge between American and British forces. The American high command saw no reason to expect a German counterthrust of any great magnitude in the Ardennes. Intelligence reports indicated no major enemy buildup or unusual “chatter” in communications that might suggest the Germans were about to launch a major attack. Even ULTRA, the system that had broken the German ENIGMA codes, deciphered nothing conclusive. Just as the Allies had hoodwinked the Germans about the Normandy invasion, the Germans had devised a deception plan to convince the Allies that Germany was going to stay on the defensive. They made sure that the Allies received this carefully planted information. On the night of December 11, 1944, a number of high-ranking German generals were summoned to the Führer’s underground forward headquarters, known as the Adlerhorst, in the resort city of Bad Nauheim. There, Hitler announced that

U.S. Army Military History Institute

12,442 of its best-trained men. These were pulled out during training at Camp Atterbury, Ind., and either sent overseas as replacements or transferred to divisions that had been alerted for overseas movement. Bringing the division back up to full strength was a flood of Army Specialized Training Program students, fresh from their college classes, as well as the rookies from the infantry replacement centers at places such as Camp Wheeler, Geor., whose military training was minimal at best. The division had other problems as well. One historian noted, “Unlike Regular Army and National Guard divisions, [the 106th] had no distinctive history or achievements, unit pride, or connection with any particular state or region.” Once it arrived at the front, the 106th began to acclimate itself to its new positions. While the 2nd Infantry Division, which the 106th replaced, had earlier plotted out preregistered artillery concentrations and established liaison with the 14th Mechanized Cavalry Group to its north, the 106th had yet to adequately carry out either of those two essential tasks. The officers of the 106th may have thought that, as new arrivals at the front, they would be given time to get their feet wet before anyone expected them to engage in any “real” soldiering. They may also not have realized that the division, in its positions in the Schnee Eifel, represented a deep penetration into German territory. The situation was ripe for disaster. In the autumn of 1944, Nazi Germany was being crushed from three sides. From the east, the huge Soviet Army was slowly pushing back the enemy. From the west and south, American, British, and Free French forces were inexorably forcing the German Army into a massive retrograde action. From overhead, daily raids by thousands of Allied aircraft were pounding the Third Reich into shattered, smoldering, unrecognizable rubble. To save his nation, Adolf Hitler, Germany’s supreme commander, decided to gather as many forces as he could and strike back hard in the west. His hope was to inflict serious casualties, causing public

Stunned, the generals could not believe their ears. Many privately believed that the Führer had long ago lost all touch with reality, and this scheme confirmed their beliefs. They did their best to change Hitler’s mind, pointing out that their formations were much too weak, the Allies were much too strong, and the chances for victory were nonexistent. Hitler had heard

21

BB-Win14 106th Division_Layout 1 11/4/14 10:21 AM Page 22

National Archives

this type of defeatist talk from his generals before, however, and he would not be moved. The operation would go ahead as planned, whether they liked it or not. While the five infantry and four SS panzer divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army, under SS Obergruppenführer (lieutenant general) Sepp Dietrich, would strike Gerow’s V Corps between Aachen and Monschau, the center thrust would send General der Panzertruppen (general of panzer troops) Hasso von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army into the 28th, 99th, and 106th Divisions. Von Manteuffel’s force consisted of four infantry and three panzer divisions totaling 90,000 men, 396 tanks and assault guns, and 963 artillery pieces. To the south, General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger’s 60,000-man Seventh Army would hit Middleton’s extended VIII Corps line, comprising one regiment each from the 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions, and a Combat Com-

22

mand from the 9th Armored Division, along the Germany-Luxembourg border. A thousand paratroopers would also drop behind American positions. As an extra surprise, hundreds of English-speaking Germans dressed in American uniforms, driving captured American vehicles, and commanded by SS Obersturmbahnführer (lieutenant colonel) Otto Skorzeny would be employed in “Operation Greif” to sow confusion and disinformation behind the lines as they dashed ahead of the panzers. It seemed that Hitler had thought of everything. Although German ammunition and fuel stocks were low, and much of the equipment was in poor condition, Hitler gambled that German desperation, surprise, and audacity would be enough to help ensure victory. On the night of December 15-16, 1944, two regiments of the 106th Infantry Division were thinly spread atop four and a

half miles of a gently sloping ridge in the Schnee Eifel, just inside Germany’s border with Belgium. The left flank of Colonel George L. Descheneaux, Jr.’s 422nd Infantry Regiment touched the village of Schlausenbach, while the right flank met Colonel Charles C. Cavender’s 423rd Regiment near Oberlascheid. The 423rd’s lines then extended southwest to the town of Bleialf. The third regiment, Colonel Alexander Reid’s 424th, was located four miles southwest of Bleialf, around Winterspelt. Division headquarters was six miles behind the front line in St.-Vith. To the 422nd’s and 423rd’s front lay wide farm fields and groves of fir trees. No one expected much action in this sector. Except for the distant and sporadic thud of artillery and occasional patrols by both sides, the situation along the front was about as quiet as war could get. That situation suited many of the new arrivals just fine. Scanning the far side of the valley with binoculars, officers saw no reason to think that a major attack was imminent. Binoculars, however, could not penetrate the thick woods to see the stores of ammunition and fuel being built up, the hundreds of panzers, half-tracks, and self-propelled artillery pieces lined up track-to-track, the thousands of armed men assembled for the great operation. Aerial reconnaissance did show heavy concentrations of men and equipment, but this was misinterpreted as enemy units merely passing through the Eifel area on their way to bolster German lines to the north or south. Even General Bradley failed to attach adequate importance to the ominous signs, admitting later, “I had greatly underestimated the enemy’s offensive capabilities.… We could not believe he possessed sufficient resources for a strategic offensive.” For most of the men of the 106th Division, trying to keep warm in bunkers and foxholes along the Eifel ridge, everything was peaceful. According to 19-year-old Pfc. Peter Iosso, a machine-gunner with Company E, 422nd Regiment, dug in eight miles east of St.-Vith, the loudest thing in

National Archives

BB-Win14 106th Division_Layout 1 11/4/14 10:21 AM Page 23

ABOVE: Attempting to hold ground against mounting pressure from German infantry supported by heavy tanks, soldiers of the 106th return fire from behind an embankment. OPPOSITE: Two members of a Luftwaffe field division advance into an abandoned American camp as comrades secure jerricans of fuel.

his sector was “the snow that fell off the branches of the evergreens.” Iosso noted that his unit had only been on line for a few days. “We had just arrived there and replaced the 2nd Division. The guys in the 2nd Division told us there wasn’t much going on. We had a machine-gun nest in a pillbox with logs over it—kind of a primitive shelter. We thought we would probably serve a couple of weeks there and then get R and R [rest and recuperation] and have a good time somewhere else, then return to this kind of phony war.” Robert Kline, a communications sergeant with Company M, 423rd Regiment, was in a log-covered dugout. “The Germans ran patrols up through us about every night. You weren’t supposed to shoot at them, because you’d give away your position. One guy had a dog jump in on him—scared him to death.” All along the American lines, the night of December 15-16 was pretty much like the previous few nights. There was a little distant gunfire; a lot of hand-rubbing and foot-stomping by sentries trying to keep warm; hours of monitoring the radio net to hear if anything important, or even interesting, was happening; trying to sleep in the wet and cold; and thinking about what tomorrow and the day after would

bring. For those who had been “gung-ho” and had enlisted enthusiastically for the cause, their military ardor had waned. War was a cold, dirty business, uncomfortable, and, at times like this, exceedingly boring. For many married soldiers, that night’s thoughts drifted homeward, picturing what their wives might be doing at that exact moment. Thousands of freezing men in the woods and hills east of St.-Vith thought about home and pondered their future. For many, there would be no future. A few miles east of the American lines beneath the towering, frosted pines of the Ardennes, the massive German war machine stirred to life. Soldiers shouldered their rifles and Panzerfausts and climbed aboard their trucks and half-tracks. Panzer commanders gave their men the signal to move out, and the cold night air was suddenly filled with the roar of engines and clouds of choking diesel exhaust. All along the 80-mile front, the snow crunched beneath the tires and tracks of the vehicles as over a quarter-million men headed west, grimly determined to do their holy duty to save the Fatherland or die trying. In the small hours of December 16, 1944, as the sleepy, unsuspecting American sentries scanned the terrain in front of them, the pre-dawn blackness of the eastern horizon suddenly lit up like an arti-

ficial dawn, as though the end of the world were at hand. Thousands of German guns flared as their rounds screamed toward the American lines. Seconds later, the projectiles began splattering on the ground, bursting in the air, and tearing into the trees, hurling hot, jagged fragments into their unsuspecting victims. Men who had been dozing just moments earlier were now jerked out of their slumber by noise and concussions that none had ever before experienced. Shaking the sleep from their brains and suddenly fueled with adrenaline, soldiers grabbed for their rifles and rushed to their assigned defensive positions. Others, terrified at the bright white-orange flashes and the splintering of tall pines that accompanied the eruptions of thousands of shells, took off running to escape the steel storm. After a barrage that seemed to last several eternities, the fire lifted. Those soldiers who had survived saw ghostly shapes moving toward them through the trees—whitewashed panzers accompanied by infantry in snow camouflage. While elements of the 18th Volksgrenadier Division kept the men of the 106th occupied to their front, the rest of the enemy division was already slipping around the flanks, between the seam of the 422nd Regiment and the 14th Cavalry Group to the north, and the 423rd and the 424th to the south at Bleialf. The immediate objective of the German units was Schönberg, behind the 106th. When the first German shells began falling, Peter Iosso dashed back out to his machine-gun post, but a round exploded nearby, knocking him unconscious. When he awoke, he was lying in the snow with a bloody chin and throbbing feet. “Though my stiff legs and frostbitten feet resisted,” he said, “I managed to get back to company HQ. At another time I would probably have been taken to the ‘rear,’ but the Germans had broken through our lines. Somebody bandaged my chin. But the battle began and the aid station was no help to me because they were getting ready to retreat. I was cut off from my company and had to retreat with the company headquarters people.”

23

BB-Win14 106th Division_Layout 1 11/4/14 10:21 AM Page 24

24

Pfc. Joseph Mark, a communications specialist, was at his switchboard in a pillbox that served as headquarters for the 3rd Battalion when the battle erupted. “I was putting through switchboard calls from our artillery observer in the front to our artillery in the back. Our position held initially. We stopped them cold in front of us, but they got around us on both sides.” Pfc. James V. Smith, an ammunition bearer for a mortar platoon in Company H, 423rd Infantry Regiment, was with his

St.-Vith was in a panic. Civilians were attempting to flee while German shells, fired from batteries at Prüm 15 miles away, bombarded the town, and German armored columns were spotted closing in. No one, least of all General Jones, seemed to know what was happening to his forward regiments. At his Paris headquarters, General Eisenhower was not panicked or even terribly concerned by the reports coming from the front. To him, the Ardennes counteroffensive signaled that the war

section near Bleialf. “We started having these three-quarter-ton trucks passing us, heading for the rear. We could see all these dead soldiers stacked up in the trucks. That didn’t cheer us up very much.” Smith’s mortar section began firing toward the enemy. “The first round we fired hit a church steeple in the town and blew the church steeple apart. The next round— we had used a magnesium round—hit very near a tank that was coming around a corner in the town. Our observers said a lot of Germans came out of the tank and several things were on fire there.” By late morning on the 16th, the 14th Cavalry Group was being pushed back to the Holzheim-Andler line, uncovering the 422nd’s left flank in the process. On the 423rd’s right flank in the village of Bleialf a street battle resembling a Wild West shootout was taking place. The seam between American units was torn. The German breakthrough above and below the 422nd and 423rd Regiments was about to snare the division in a classic double envelopment.

was nearly over. He wrote, “We had always been convinced that before the Germans acknowledged final defeat in the West they would attempt one desperate counteroffensive. It seemed likely to Bradley and me that they were now starting this kind of attack.” The SHAEF brass decided that the 7th Armored Division, part of Hodges’ First Army to the north of the penetration, and the 10th Armored Division, in Patton’s Third Army operating to the south, should be immediately rushed to the area of the breakthrough to pinch off the threat The situation for the Americans on the front lines, however, was fast becoming untenable. On December 17, the Germans had driven the 14th Cavalry Group back to St.-Vith. Southeast of St.-Vith, the Germans had pushed back the 424th Regiment and taken the town of Winterspelt. A plan was formulated to gather whatever troops could be found in and around St.Vith and head for Schönberg, thereby opening an escape corridor for what was left of the 422nd and 423rd Regiments.

If Eisenhower was calm and confident, General Jones was despondent. Incorrectly informed that Combat Command B (CCB) of the 7th Armored Division, just starting out from Maastricht, Holland, 60 miles to the north, would arrive early on the 17th, Jones hoped that his besieged regiments could hold out that long. Speeding south from Maastricht several miles in advance of his CCB tanks was Brig. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke. He first reported to VIII Corps headquarters in Bastogne, where General Middleton informed him of the deteriorating situation in the 106th’s sector. The next morning, the forward elements of the 7th Armored reached Poteau, five miles west of St.-Vith. Already there were problems. The SS spearhead had cut the 7th’s route of march and killed Colonel Church M. Matthews, the division’s chief of staff. The situation around St.-Vith quickly came to a head on the 17th. At about 1430 hours that afternoon, with two of his three infantry regiments—about 9,000 men— surrounded and the third fighting for its life, two-star General Jones made the remarkable decision to turn over the defense of the St.-Vith sector to one-star General Clarke. Clarke, however, could do little to change the situation for the better as he was still waiting for his tanks to arrive. At last, on the evening of the 17th, the first tanks of the 7th Armored clattered down the cobblestone streets of St.-Vith. The next day, CCB linked up with the CCB of the 9th Armored Division moving up from the south. The two armored units, along with an ad hoc assemblage of infantry, engineer, artillery, and support units, formed a defensive line east of St.Vith and prepared to hold back the attack. Following behind the 7th Armored column was Battery B of the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion. The small convoy had passed through Malmédy and was a few hundred yards south of Baugnez when it came under fire from SS Obersturmbahnführer (lieutenant colonel) Joachim Peiper’s panzers. The lightly armed Americans who survived the initial assault surrendered, but were then lined

BB-Win14 106th Division_Layout 1 11/4/14 10:21 AM Page 25

up in a field and shot. Altogether, 86 GIs were murdered in cold blood by Peiper’s SS battlegroup. Sergeant Robert Kline, Company M, 423rd Regiment, felt that the situation was going from bad to worse. “The second or third night of the Bulge,” he said, “they sent 12 tank destroyers up but they all got knocked out. In the afternoon, Captain Hardy told us to get into the foxholes that were all around there. The corporal and I crawled into these slit trenches and a German patrol came through there—boy, they’re good; you don’t hardly see ‘em. The corporal was off to my right and one of those ‘potato-masher’ grenades landed about a foot from his head and went off. It made a hole in the ground but it never touched him. “A little bit later, I heard somebody say, ‘You gotta turn in your gas mask.’ I said the hell with that; I’m not turning in my gas mask. I didn’t know who they were— just a bunch of guys in American uniforms. I found out later that they were Germans in American uniforms.” Kline’s company commander maintained contact with Lt. Col. Earl Klinck, the battalion commander, while Kline stood guard all night long outside the bunker “with a little carbine and two clips—16 bullets to fight a major battle! I hadn’t had any sleep for about two or three days. Captain Hardy told me that Colonel Klinck said, ‘We’re going to pull out and he wants you to go with him’— which is the dumbest thing we’ve ever done in our life. When you’re dug in, you don’t pull out. Where’re you gonna go? If you’re dug in, make ‘em come get you.” Kline reported to battalion headquarters, where the colonel ordered him to pack up the battalion’s radio and move out. Kline noted, “About 10 o’clock at night, we stopped in the woods, and Colonel Klinck pulled a ‘klinker.’ He took out his flashlight to look at a map without covering up and all hell broke loose. We started getting bombarded with all these shells. A shell went off to the right of me and it must have been concussion—or else I was so damned tired because I hadn’t slept for

three or four days—I didn’t wake up until daylight the next day. There wasn’t one person in sight; everybody went off and left me. Maybe they thought I was dead. There I was by myself, in the daylight. “I was also supposed to be the reconnaissance sergeant, but I didn’t have a compass or a map—not a damned thing. I had an idea which way everything was going, so I walked and walked, and pretty soon I met the executive officer from our company. He had his head all bandaged up and his eyes were staring. I should have told him to stay with me, ‘cuz he was in shock and was going the wrong direction. He told me that Captain Hardy had been killed.” Shortly thereafter, Kline was wounded in the calf with a wooden bullet and taken prisoner.

their way through the dense forest, descend a steep hillside, cross a stream, and climb another slope. The wounded would be left behind with medics who volunteered to be taken prisoner. A few hours later, the regiments received another even more startling order from Jones. Instead of merely withdrawing, they were to go onto the offensive against the enemy that had captured Schönberg! Even for seasoned troops, this would have been a tough assignment. For cold, frightened, inexperienced, and disorganized troops who had lost hundreds of comrades and who had never before been in combat, it was an impossibility. The attack never stood a chance. The men who chose to stand and fight were killed; the others were taken prisoner.

National Archives

Dead GI’s lie beside their 76mm anti-tank gun in Honsfeld.

At dawn on the 18th, Maj. Gen. Jones ordered the 422nd and 423rd Regiments to disengage with enemy units to their front and fall back to St.-Vith. To accomplish this mission, the already confused regiments, their communications in tatters, many of their leaders dead, and the weather worsening, would need to make

The Germans had managed to encircle the 106th Division and were attacking it from the rear. Further, the tankers who had come to save the two cut-off regiments were themselves now fighting for their lives between St.-Vith and the Schnee Eifel. Forced to pull back, they were unable to rescue Cavender’s and Descheneaux’s men.

25

BB-Win14 106th Division_Layout 1 11/4/14 10:21 AM Page 26

Having failed utterly in his first action as a combat commander, the disgraced Maj. Gen. Jones departed his command post in St.-Vith and joined the long procession of men and vehicles heading west toward safety. Pfc. James V. Smith’s unit, Company H, 423rd Regiment, was still lobbing mortar rounds from a barnyard when German shells began crashing all around. “There were two large oxen there that the farmers used for plowing the fields,” Smith said, “and with all the mortars landing all around us, the oxen began to run everywhere, their bellowing making a terrible noise.” With the situation worsening, Smith’s unit was ordered to redeploy once more. “All of a sudden, we got pinned down by German mortars again, and we were held in that field for quite a long time. I took cover in a deep tank track in the mud.” After about two or three hours in that position, the enemy fire let up and Smith’s Two German motorcyclists armed with MP-40s follow a King Tiger tank as American POWs march along a road towards the rear.

26

unit was told to move forward. “We moved up to the edge of the woods and found our company commander; he had been run over by his jeep driver—his right arm and shoulder. He had his .45 out and he was very nervous. He was waving it around with his left hand—we were glad to get away from him. He told us to take a certain road and go into the next town. He had already sent Sergeant Webb, who was the platoon sergeant of one of the machine-gun platoons.” What the captain did not know was that Sergeant Webb was already dead, killed in an ambush. “We went down that same road and ran into the same ambush that Sergeant Webb had run into. They opened up on our line of jeeps with machine guns—I think there were three of us at that time, three jeeps and trailers—just raking the jeeps and trailers. A lot of people got hit.” Faced with annihilation, Smith’s section leader ordered his men to cease firing and surrender.

Pfc. Joseph Mark, Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, had managed to avoid capture for three days and, on December 19, was riding in a jeep in a long line of American vehicles trying to reach St.-Vith. It was pandemonium. “The Germans were laying in some fire on the road,” Mark recalled, “so I jumped out and ran into the woods. The firing was up front so I went the other way. I saw hundreds of Americans giving up in a field. I broke up my rifle and surrendered. I thought that the war was over for me and that the worst was over but I was wrong. The worst was coming.” On the same day Mark surrendered, Pfc. Jack Crawford, with the 590th Field Artillery Battalion, was also taken prisoner. “It was early in the morning and I had managed to get my breakfast. All of a sudden, we started getting shelled again, and everybody started taking cover in the wooded area there. Finally, the shelling stopped and the fellows started saying, ‘Throw down your weapons; they’ve got

BB-Win14 106th Division_Layout 1 11/4/14 10:21 AM Page 27

us surrounded,’ and the Germans started coming out of the woods. We didn’t even see them coming; they just started coming out of the woods. Some of the guys didn’t even have a chance to get dressed; they got captured without even their boots on. I managed to get my coat and we were led away.” Pfc. Pete House, also of the 590th FA Battalion, was high-tailing it to the rear, towing a 105mm howitzer behind a weapons carrier. After daylight on the 19th, he said, “We pulled off the road and up a hill to the left and went into firing position. Only had three rounds in the battery. Took tremendous fire from the Germans. … After the shelling lifted, Joe Krause came by and told me were going to surrender. [But] we decided not to become prisoners [and] started running through the woods. We came to a clearing where a number of officers were standing around, including our battalion commander. With his permission, about 20 of us attempted to get back to our lines. We ran in a westerly direction for what seemed about an hour until we came over the crest of a hill where we came under direct fire from German anti-aircraft guns in position along a north-south road. Those of us that survived surrendered. “After capture, we were assembled by the side of the road. While waiting, the Germans prepared their AA weapons for transport. A German officer told one of the Americans to help. The American said it was against the Geneva Convention to help. The German said, ‘Ja, Geneva Convention,’ and shot him.” After the Germans had collected several hundred Americans, the group started walking eastward. House said, “We had to carry our wounded the best we could until we arrived in Bleialf where we were told to leave them. The road east through the mountains was crowded with German men and equipment moving into battle. What surprised me were the number of horses used to move men and equipment. Their armored infantry were riding bicycles. “The roads that day were packed with tanks, artillery, and other gear.… We were

under the command of a German warrant officer who was riding in what looked like a Volkswagen. As soon as he could get by the equipment on the road, he would come speeding through our column blowing his horn. Then he would be stopped by more tanks and trucks. “I was a very tired 20-year-old who finally was too stubborn to move out of his way. This upset him, so he got out of his vehicle, pulled out his pistol, and aimed it at my head. I heard a click. The German in the turret of a tank alongside the road had cocked his machine gun, aimed it at the warrant officer, and yelled something in German. The warrant officer put his pistol back in the holster and got back in his vehicle. This German tank commander who saved my life wore the silver skull [insignia] of the SS.” At a December 19 meeting in Verdun with Bradley, Devers, and Patton, Eisenhower decreed, “The present situation is to be regarded as one of opportunity for us and not of disaster. There will be only cheerful faces at this conference table.” Patton, as befitted his brash, aggressive nature, dared the Allies to “have the guts to let the sons of bitches go all the way to Paris. Then we’ll really cut ‘em off and chew ‘em up.” Ike smiled and replied that the enemy would never be allowed to cross the Meuse. He was true to his word. After shattering the 99th and 106th Divisions and roaring through St.-Vith, the German juggernaut rolled eastward, past Stavelot and Malmédy, around Bastogne, and toward the Meuse. It never got there, nor anywhere close to its ultimate objective of Antwerp. The salient that the attack had created now became a spearpoint that was broken into small, ineffective pieces by the hammer blows of the American First and Third Armies. The outcome was little consolation to hundreds of men of the 106th Infantry Division who had been caught in the blast furnace of the violent German assault and lay dead, their corpses frozen in the snow, their blood turned to ice. The thousands who surrendered were marched eastward to the near-

est railheads at Prüm and Gerolstein and packed in groups of 65 or 70 into boxcars, with no idea where they were going or what lay ahead. A medic remembered that the latrine facilities inside the boxcars were “horrendous and appalling: two simple boxes placed somewhere in the middle of the car. It added to the chaos among the men when someone had to defecate. Urination was generally done against the walls or through the cracks in the floorboards. The air was putrid and fecal-smelling and made worse by being confined in a very tight space. The stench was unbelievable.… It led to loud arguments and fighting between the men as to when, where, and how to urinate or defecate.” Although out of the battle zone, the POWs were not out of danger, as Allied aircraft attacked the trains daily. Once the Yanks arrived at their assigned camps, the nightmare was just beginning. Most of the soldiers were transported to Stalag IX-B at Bad Orb, near Frankfurt, where they were subjected to horrible living conditions, inadequate food and medical attention, and brutal treatment by their guards. Even worse, the Jewish-American soldiers were separated from their comrades at Stalag IX-B and taken farther east to work as slave laborers in tunnels at Berga-an-der-Elster, near Gera. It was a journey from which many would never return. As Army historian Hugh Cole wrote on the destruction of the 106th Division, “The number of officers and men taken prisoner on the capitulation of the two regiments and their attached troops cannot be accurately ascertained. At least seven thousand were lost here and the figure is probably closer to eight or nine thousand. The amount lost in arms and equipment, of course, was very substantial. The Schnee Eifel battle, therefore, represents the most serious reverse suffered by American arms during the operations of 1944-45 in the European theater.” Flint Whitlock is the editor of WWII Quarterly magazine. This article is excerpted from his book, Given Up for Dead: American POWs in the Nazis' Slave-Labor Camp at Berga, published in 2005 by Basic Books.

27

BB-Win05 Stoesser_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:14 AM Page 28

In 1944, Germany’s once victorious armies were in retreat on all fronts. Germany’s borders were threatened, and the American Army already occupied the German city of Aachen, the ancient city of Charlemagne and one-time capital of the Holy Roman Empire. The front was fairly quiet, with Allied attacks into the Fatherland being con-

strategic reserve of 25 Volksgrenadier divisions and at least six panzer divisions. The Volksgrenadier divisions were largely staffed by noninfantry personnel including surplus Luftwaffe and Navy rear-echelon types. These levies were quickly trained in basic infantry tactics and issued Army uniforms. The 18th Volksgrenadier Division under the command of

Desperate Jump

Ardennes IN THE

The odds were stacked against the success of a German airborne operation launched during the Battle of the Bulge. By Rob Krott

tained, but back in Germany towns and cities were emptied of all available men to form the new Volksgrenadier divisions that would comprise the bulk of the forthcoming offensive. With the draft age lowered to 16 years and extended to include 50year-olds, this was one of a series of drastic “Total War” measures designed to supply the German Wehrmacht with troops for a final counteroffensive. An additional 750,000 men were called up to form a new

28

Generalmajor Gunther Hoffmann-Schonborn patrolled the Schnee Eifel area and was largely typical of these new polyglot and inexperienced divisions. Formed in Denmark in September 1944, from the remains of the 18th Luftwaffe Field Division (destroyed earlier in the Mons pocket fighting), it comprised 9,500 men, mostly untrained civilians, unassigned naval personnel, and Air Force ground crews, assigned in three grenadier regiments.

BB-Win05 Stoesser_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:14 AM Page 29

Armed with a variety of German and captured weapons, a group of Fallschirmjäger roll through Liegneuville, Belgium to rejoin the main body of Kampfgruppe Peiper.

29

BB-Win05 Stoesser_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:14 AM Page 30

Both: National Archives

Reconstructed from Luftwaffe and Navy units, plus a strong mixture of Volksdeutsche (persons of German descent) and civilian draftees drawn in by the new draft laws, the 18th Volksgrenadier Division lacked trained noncoms and officers, averaging only one officer and one noncommissioned officer per company. Field Marshal Gerd von Runstedt, Commander in Chief West, would command Wacht am Rhein—also referred to as Operation Herbstnebel (Autumn Mist). He had three Army Groups—H, B, and G—to execute the offensive. Army Group B, under the command of Field Marshal Walther Model, would carry out the main attack, and the Sixth (later SS) Panzer Army would spearhead the offensive. The Sixth Panzer Army was strengthened with four SS panzer divisions, four of the new Volksgrenadier divisions, and the 3rd Parachute Division, recently reconstituted after its severe losses in Normandy. Parts of the 3rd Parachute Division had been fighting in the Düren forest in the

30

German paratroopers plummet from a Junkers Ju-52 transport plane. RIGHT: Major August von der Heydte led the Fallschirmjäger Lehr Battalion.

south before being sent north to join the Sixth Panzer Army. The 3rd Parachute Division’s 5th, 8th, and 9th Regiments would all take part in the offensive. They were to head west, clearing the way for the armored spearhead of the Sixth Panzer Army, a Panzer Kampfgruppe (battle group), Kampfgruppe Peiper, under the command of SS Sturmbannführer (Major) Joachim Peiper. The 3rd Parachute Division, part of the 1st SS Panzer Corps, and the 5th Parachute Division, which was part of the German 7th Army, were to be used as infantry, not airborne assault troops, in the operation. The battle plan also called for a small parachute drop in the Ardennes. Kampfgruppe von der Heydte would make a parachute assault into the Ardennes to secure key terrain on December 17. On December 8, Generaloberst (Colonel General) Kurt Student, commander of

Army Group H and former commander of the German airborne forces, was given eight days’ notice to launch an airborne attack in support of the Sixth Panzer Army. He immediately chose Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) FriedrichAugust Freiherr (Baron) von der Heydte, a Bavarian-born aristocrat, to organize a battalion-sized unit of Fallschirmjäger (paratroops) and lead the parachute assault codenamed Operation Stoesser (Falcon). Oberstleutnant Von der Heydte would form a composite parachute battle

BB-Win05 Stoesser_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:14 AM Page 31

Group headquarters on December 15. Von der Heydte would have to gather a force of over a thousand men, drop them deep behind American lines in the Germans’ first and only operational night jump, and capture a series of important road junctions in the Hohes Venn leading from the Elsenborn-Malmedy area toward Eupen for the armored spearhead units. The German paratroopers would then block the enemy’s reinforcement route through the Schnee Eifel south of the Elsenborn area. The drop zone was approximately 11 kilometers north of Malmedy in the Monte Rigi area of the Schnee. The objective was a main road junction that led to Verviers, Eupen, and Malmedy—the main route for any American reinforcements being rushed into the area. Von der Heydte was to hold

the road junction until met by the 12th SS Hitlerjugend (Hitler Youth) Division, the lead element of the Sixth Panzer Army. If the mission was delayed by 24 hours their secondary objective was to secure the bridges crossing the Ambleve River until met by Sixth Panzer Army armored units. Von der Heydte was told that the German armor would reach him within 24 hours. With only a week to prepare, Student ordered each of the battalion commanders of the First Parachute Army to send von der Heydte a hundred of their best men. Unfortunately for the Germans, the Fallschirmjäger of 1944 were not the highly trained soldiers who jumped onto Fort Eben Emael in 1940 or Crete in 1941. Many of them were not even parachutequalified. On D-day there were 150,000 men in the Fallschirmtruppen, but only

Map © 2002 by Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

group consisting of a hundred men from each battalion within the First Parachute Army under the command of Generaleutnant Eugen Meindl, which was subordinated to Army Group H. He would then organize these men into four infantry companies, a heavy weapons company, and a pioneer and signals platoon. Student’s choice was a good one. Von der Heydte, who began the war as an antitank company commander, had volunteered for the airborne in August 1940. By December 1944, he was a highly decorated former commander of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Parachute Regiment and 6th Parachute Regiment, and was the commander of the Battle School of the First Parachute Army in Aalten, Germany. Kampfgruppe von der Heydte would assemble in Aalten and then report to General Model’s Army

The Fallschirmjäger of Kampfgruppe von der Heydte dropped on the northern shoulder of the growing Bulge on December 16, 1944. Dummies filled with straw were also dropped. 31

National Archives

BB-Win05 Stoesser_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:14 AM Page 32

Investigating the wreckage of a Ju-52 shot down by antiaircraft fire, U.S. soldiers pause as they encounter the bodies of dead German paratroopers, December 17, 1944.

30,000 were actually trained parachutists. And worse yet, some of the parachute regimental commanders dumped their undesirables, including some inexperienced soldiers fresh from basic training, on von der Heydte rather than sending him their best men. Von der Heydte had to send 150 men back to their units as unsuitable candidates. He had only a few men with previous combat jump experience and only about 20 percent of his composite unit was qualified to jump with weapons, so containers had to be used. The operation would be a night jump. After 1943, the requirements for the award of the paratrooper’s insignia upon the completion of basic parachute training included at least one night jump. But this would be the first and only nighttime combat jump. They would also jump into the woods, something the Germans had practiced in training. The preparations for Operation Stoesser were rushed. The Fallschirmjäger were issued additional equipment, and some received hasty jump training. There was little time for any training or organization as a cohesive unit.

32

To complicate matters, von der Heydte’s transport of about a hundred Junkers Ju52s were piloted by mostly young and inexperienced crews. Von der Heydte was under the command of SS Oberstgruppenführer (General) Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, commander of the Sixth Panzer Army, which was to provide the main armored thrust in Operation Wacht am Rhein. Sepp Dietrich, the former butcher’s apprentice and Nazi beerhall putsch participant, came from a Bavarian peasant family and was a marked contrast to his fellow Bavarian, Baron von der Heydte. Dietrich, a close confidant of Hitler, had risen to high rank as a reward for leading the squad that assassinated Storm Trooper (SA) leader Ernst Rohm during the infamous Night of the Long Knives. When von der Heydte conferred with his commander, Dietrich’s headquarters could provide neither photographs nor reconnaissance of the drop zones. When asked if he could have carrier pigeons in case of radio problems, Dietrich, drunk at the time, replied, “This is an army not a zoo! If I can run a panzer army without pigeons

then you should be able to lead a kampfgruppe without them.” Operation Stoesser would get 300 straw-filled paratrooper dummies attached to old parachutes. They would be dropped along with the Fallschirmjäger to make the unit look bigger than it actually was. Von der Heydte received his final briefing at Sixth Panzer Army headquarters on December 15. The time of the drop or Phour (Parachute Hour) was set for 2 am on the 16th. He had only 12 hours to issue his orders for the jump. His composite unit of mostly inexperienced paratroopers would make a night combat jump behind enemy lines, without prior reconnaissance, under inclement weather conditions, and in high winds. Von der Heydte did not rate his chances of success as high. On the evening of December 15, he formed his unit to load on trucks for the move to the airfield. By midnight, only about a quarter of the paratroopers had reached the airfield at Paderborn due to lack of sufficient truck transport. Gasoline for the trucks to carry the paratroopers to the airfields was stolen by another division. Because von der Heydte was related to Colonel Klaus von Stauffenberg, the staff officer who had attempted to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944, the Sixth Panzer Army began a formal investigation, thinking von der Heydte had deliberately sabotaged the operation. The parachute operation was delayed, but Wacht am Rhein went ahead as planned. In the center and the south the Fifth and Seventh Armies made good progress, but in the north the Sixth Panzer Army’s advance bogged down when its armored columns encountered heavier than expected resistance and became backed up on the narrow forest roads. Regardless of the lack of progress, the parachute drop was still on. German radio intercepts confirmed that American reinforcements were being rushed to the front. Although delayed until 3 am on the 17th, von der Heydte’s mission was still to secure the main road junction near Malmedy and stop the American reinforcements. With Kampfgruppe von der Heydte

finally assembled on the airfields, the Fallschirmjäger loaded 112 Ju-52s. The pilots and jumpmasters were given instructions for the drop, but had no joint training. Flown by an ill-assorted group of pilots, half of whom had never flown combat missions, the Ju-52 transports lifted off at midnight on December 16. Several navigational aids were used to assist the inexperienced Ju-52 crews, including searchlights and tracer fire from antiaircraft guns. Once the transports crossed over the Allied lines, they began to lose formation due to inexperience and partly due to a strong headwind, which many pilots did not take into account. Allied flak further dispersed the aircraft formations, throwing some pilots miles off course. A Messerschmitt fighter dropped flares a few minutes before P-hour to mark the drop zone, but only a few of the pilots saw them. As von der Heydte later wrote: “Cooperation with pathfinders in night jumping requires the most accurate timing. Because of incorrect wind data, the pathfinders in the Ardennes operation arrived at the drop zone almost a quarter of an hour too early. In this way not only was the American air defense warned in advance, but the last transport planes were no longer guided and had to drop their men blindly.” The jump was a total disaster. The German paratroopers were scattered across the Belgian countryside. Many of them were dropped miles from the original drop zone, and some even landed in Holland. Only 10 of the transports, including von der Heydte’s, actually made it to the drop zone. One rifle company was dropped behind the German lines 30 miles away from the drop zone. Most of the signal platoon with the unit’s radios fell just in front of the German positions south of Monschau. With a drop zone in the woods and ground winds of 36 miles per hour (normally German paratroops were only able to jump with ground winds less than 14 miles per hour), the casualty rate on the drop was over 10 percent. Some of the Fallschirmjäger , killed on landing, were

National Archives

BB-Win05 Stoesser_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:14 AM Page 33

Soldiers of the 1st Division inspect a German supply container dropped into American held territory near Bullingen, Belgium, in January 1945.

not found until the spring thaw months later. The survivors and other German parachute troops were so bitter over the lack of training and preparation and the high casualty rate that an article in the December 22, 1944, edition of Nachrichten Fur Die Truppe (the German equivalent of the Stars and Stripes) was entitled “Operation Mass Murder.” The German equipment was also largely at fault. They probably fielded the worst parachutes used in WWII. Because of the German parachute design, the high ground winds were especially dangerous for the Fallschirmjäger . According to von der Heydte: “The German parachute fell short of requirements. It caused an excessive swinging motion in gusty weather, it was hard to control, and too much time was required to get out of the harness. Too much importance was probably attached to safety in jumping and too little to suitability for combat operations. The casualties which were sustained from enemy action because the soldier was unable to free himself from his harness quickly enough were far greater than the casualties which might have been caused by care-

lessness in opening the single-fastening harness release in the air.” The German RZ (Ruckenpackung Zwangauslosung “rucksack packed to open”) series of parachutes (primarily the RZ-16 and the RZ-20) had a single strap between the back of the body harness and the chute. This resulted in a face-down position requiring knee and elbow pads and a forward roll upon landing and led to many landing injuries. To allow for proper deployment, the paratrooper had to leap forward in a swan dive or “crucifix position” when exiting an aircraft. Control during the descent was almost impossible except for a highly trained, physically adept paratrooper. Even then only a slight bit of control was possible. The forward-roll landing also prevented the parachutist from carrying much equipment on his body. Except for pistols, grenades, and the occasional submachine gun, German paratroopers had to rely on containers for their main combat equipment and weapons. The parachute canopy was attached to the harness with four clips, one at each thigh and two on the left chest, that were difficult to undo when under fire

33

National Archives

BB-Win05 Stoesser_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:15 AM Page 34

A soldier of the 1st Division’s 16th Regiment questions captured Fallschirmjäger as the tide begins to turn during the Battle of the Bulge.

or when the trooper was being dragged by the wind. Because of this, the Germans issued each Fallschirmjäger a gravity knife to cut the parachute risers in an emergency. During Operation Stoesser it was snowing heavily, the winds were heavy, and many were dragged across the drop zone, causing injuries. Some of the injured would die of exposure in the harsh weather conditions. Because he was recovering from an accident, von der Heydte’s left arm and shoulder were still in a splint, so he jumped wearing a captured Russian “triangular” parachute. It suffered less oscillation on descent than German designs and was steerable, so he could pick his landing site and avoid further injury. He injured his right arm in the jump anyway. Three hours after the drop only about a hundred Fallschirmjäger had linked up with their commander in the assembly area at the fork in the Eupen road north of Monte Rigi. By the morning of the 17th, von der Heydte had assembled only a company’s worth of Fallschirmjäger , some of whom were injured. According to von der Heydte, “By dawn I had collected 125 soldiers—a little more than a tenth of the

34

Kampfgruppe.” With only a fraction of his unit available for action, von der Heydte formed a defensive perimeter in the woods and sent out small patrols to pick up information, ambush any American units they encountered, search for their missing weapons containers, and gather stragglers. Because of the difficulty in jumping with weapons while using an RZ parachute, only a small percentage of the men had jumped with their weapons and most of the weapons containers were lost during the drop. Many of them had no rifles. The signals platoon with the unit’s radios was still 30 miles away. Von der Heydte was about eight miles from the German ground forces but had no way to contact them. Reconnaissance patrols were sent out to make contact with elements of the Sixth Panzer Army. Many never returned. Those who did return had been unsuccessful. By the evening of December 17, von der Heydte had made contact with another 150 scattered stragglers of his composite battalion, but he still did not have an effective fighting force. Although his patrols found more stragglers, with no more than 350 men, no sup-

port weapons, no fire support, and no radio communications, he spent the day lying low and continued sending out small patrols. It was now too late to carry out the planned operation of blocking American reinforcements, even if the operation had gone nearly according to plan. The day after the drop, a group of Fallschirmjaeger had a very close call. They were resting in a ditch when a very large convoy of American vehicles drove by. It was a column from the American 1st Infantry Division, the Big Red One, but the Americans, thinking that the Germans were other Americans, merely waved. The other German Fallschirmjäger hid in the woods and watched helplessly as the reinforcements they were supposed to stop rolled past. German patrols captured a few prisoners, including a motorcycle dispatch rider carrying the operations orders for the U.S. Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps, but had no way to process them to the German rear or keep them, so they were sent back to the American lines with the German wounded. Von der Heydte sent a personal note to the 101st Airborne Division commander, Maj. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, whom he knew by reputation from the fighting in Normandy, asking the paratrooper general to care for the wounded Fallschirmjäger . The aristocratic von der Heydte could count on the Americans to care for his wounded. Earlier that year, on July 4, during the Normandy campaign, the 6th Fallschirmjäger Regiment commanded by von der Heydte (then a major) had halted an attack of the U.S. 83rd Infantry Division, inflicting very heavy casualties on its 331st Infantry Regiment. The division lost nearly 1,400 men during its attack south of Carentan toward Periers. Major von der Heydte returned captured American medics along with a note to Maj. Gen. Robert C. Macon, the division commander, saying that he thought Macon probably needed them. In the note von der Heydte also requested that, if the situation were ever reversed, he hoped General Macon would “return the favor.” A three-hour cease-fire

was called during which 16 seriously wounded Americans were evacuated in addition to those recovered from German aid stations and wounded Fallschirmjäger in American aid stations were turned over to German medics. The Germans located other wounded on the battlefield for the American medics. The chivalry of von der Heydte’s Fallschirmjäger was widely known since the American press published an account of the incident. Without success, the Luftwaffe tried to re-supply the paratroopers, who were in desperate need of weapons, ammunition, food, warm clothes, and medical supplies. However, they received only one container filled with cheap brandy and damp cigarettes. Von der Heydte’s situation was critical: He had no contact with the Sixth Panzer Army, he had many wounded, and the Americans were closing around them. With his unit nearly surrounded, he decided to send his wounded and unfit back to where he thought the German front line was. The remaining paratroopers were organized into an assault group to break through the Allied encirclement. The breakout attempt failed, and the Fallschirmtruppen took heavy casualties. On December 21, von der Heydte organized the survivors into small groups of two to three men and ordered them to attempt to reach the German lines he believed to be at Monschau. Von der Heydte, his adjutant, and his orderly moved out in the direction of Monschau, believing it to be in German hands since it was a first-day objective of Operation Wacht am Rhein. But Monschau was not in German hands. It was occupied by a U.S. Army engineer battalion. Von der Heydte was in bad shape. The pain from his shattered left forearm and the injury to his right arm suffered during the jump became unbearable. On December 23, he ordered his companions to leave him. Entering the outskirts of Monschau alone, he rested in a local house. He stayed there for a couple of days trying to recover before he asked a local resident to contact the Americans. Their headquarters were in a hotel in the town. Von der Heydte, com-

Imperial War Museum

BB-Win05 Stoesser_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:15 AM Page 35

German parachutists ride aboard a massive Tiger II tank, one of hundreds used during the Battle of the Bulge.

mander of the only German night combat parachute jump in history, surrendered. Kampfgruppe von der Heydte’s mission failed to achieve its objective of seizing the key crossroads and delaying American reinforcements. But Operation Stoesser, the last large- scale German parachute drop of the war, should not be dismissed as a complete failure. The presence of German paratroopers behind the Allied lines caused alarm among the troops and the higher echelons. The dummy Fallschirmjaeger—probably the most successful aspect of the entire operation—were dropped north of Camp Elsenborn and confused the Americans. Because the Fallschirmjäger were scattered over such a vast area in the drop and isolated units engaged the Allies, their number was greatly overestimated. Initially it was thought that whole divisions were dropped instead of a scattered battalion. This, combined with the presence of SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny’s English-speaking commandos driving American jeeps behind the lines while wearing American uniforms and the initial success of the offensive, had a tremendous psychological effect on the American units in

the Ardennes. The reports of enemy paratroopers resulted in numerous alerts in the American rear areas. The Fallschirmjäger succeeded in altering the deployment of American troops from reinforcing the front, forcing them to search for German paratroopers. This helped to tie up the American reserve for a few days. Von der Heydte summed it up best: “The airborne operations connected with the Ardennes offensive were definitely a failure. The force committed was far too small ... the training of parachute troops and troop-carrier squadrons was inadequate; the Allies had superiority in the air; the weather was unfavorable; preparations and instructions were deficient; the attack by ground forces miscarried. In short, almost every prerequisite of success was lacking.... At that time the Wehrmacht was so hopelessly inferior to the enemy in manpower and materiel that this operation can hardly be justified and is to be regarded only as a last desperate attempt to change the fortunes of war.” After the war, von der Heydte went on to become a general in the West German Bundeswehr before passing away on July 7, 1994.

35

BB-Win14 Hosingen_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:12 AM Page 36

A stand by elements of the U.S. 28th Infantry Division upset the German time table and p

ACTION AT

FURIOUS DELAYING

HOSINGEN

THE VOICE CACKLED OVER THE RADIO. “Hosingen is falling slowly. They are out of ammo and the tanks cannot hold them. They are hand-grenade fighting from building to building. Hand grenades are all they have.” The signalman operator scribbled the message in the radio log. It was from Major Harold F. Milton, the commander of 3rd Battalion, 110th Infantry Regiment. The signalman looked at his watch. The

36

time was 6:50 pm on December 17, 1944. The signalman shook his head. The last 36 hours had changed everything. It was the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge. Facing the two German panzer corps, which numbered over five divisions, the 28th Infantry Division had only three understrength regiments, the 112th, 109th, and the 110th Infantry. It was a disaster. Within a matter of hours, outposts disap-

peared as the tidal wave of German armor, artillery, and infantry swept over them. By the morning of the 17th, entire companies and battalions started to vanish as the German tsunami roared westward toward the Meuse River. The Germans seemed unstoppable everywhere—except in Hosingen. At Hosingen, two companies from the 110th Infantry Regiment blunted and delayed an entire German Volks-

BB-Win14 Hosingen_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:12 AM Page 37

BY LEO BARRON

© James Dietz

d prevented the capture of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. |

grenadier regiment for more than 48 hours. Hosingen was a small, picturesque town that sat astride a north-south artery along the heights overlooking the Our River, which marked the border between Germany and Luxembourg. Many of the soldiers were reminded of the Shenandoah Mountains, so they called the road Skyline Drive. The most distinguishing feature of

Hosingen was the water tower that dominated its skyline. The builders had erected it on the northeast side of town, and from there an observer could see across the Our River and deep into Germany. Thus, it provided the 28th Infantry Division a perfect observation post to monitor German activities. In addition to the tower, on the southern outskirts of Hosingen was an east-west road that started at the Our River and

In this painting by artist Jim Dietz, soldiers of Company K, 110th Infantry Regiment man a Browning .50-caliber machine gun and fire their M1 Garand rifles at the approaching Germans in defense of the town of Hosingen, Luxembourg. These troops were joined by troops of B Company, 103rd Engineer Battalion and five tanks from the 707th Tank Battalion.

meandered westward to the Clerf River several miles beyond Hosingen. This eastwest road was crucial for any attacker or defender who wanted to control this part

37

BB-Win14 Hosingen_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:12 AM Page 38

developed a plan to isolate the town and then bypass it. This task fell to the 77th Volksgrenadier Regiment under the command of Colonel Martin Schriefer. Because of the new task organization, the 77th Regiment now had only two battalions instead of three. A Captain Weber was the commander of 1st Battalion, while Captain Josef Raab commanded 2nd Battalion. All the senior officers were seasoned veterans who had spent months fighting on the Eastern Front. Furthermore, right behind the 77th was Reconnaissance Battalion 26 and the Panzer Lehr Reconnaissance Battalion, whose mission was to capture Bastogne and assist the 77th if the need arose. Waiting for the 77th Volksgrenadier Regiment on the west bank of the Our River was the 110th Infantry Regiment. Because of the huge area it had to defend, Colonel Hurley E. Fuller, the regimental commander, decided to strongpoint several villages instead of trying to cover a front of 10 miles. To add to his woes, his division commander, General Norman Cota,

needed a reserve and so he detached Fuller’s 2nd Battalion, leaving Fuller with only two infantry battalions. This Hobson’s choice forced him to determine which strongpoint was the most important. To Fuller, Hosingen seemed the likely choice, so he directed his 3rd Battalion to defend it with several companies: K Company, a section from M Company, one platoon from the Anti-Tank Company, and B Company of the 103rd Division Engineers. Company K was under the command of Captain Frederick Feiker, whose executive officer was Lieutenant Thomas J. Flynn. Like the rest of the regiment, K Company’s new sector was far too large for a rifle company to defend. Therefore, Feiker and Flynn decided to concentrate their defenses Both: National Archives

of the Ardennes. To control both of these roads then, the attacker needed to control the town. General Heinrich von Luttwitz, the commander of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps, had foreseen that Hosingen was key terrain, and in his operation order he placed it along his panzer corps’ main axis of advance. Luttwitz then tasked the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, under the command of General Heinz Kokott, to neutralize the town. He wanted Kokott to push four battalions across the Our River at 5 am on December 16 and then push westward to Drauffelt on the banks of the Clerf River. From there, the Panzer Lehr Division would assume the vanguard and conduct a forward passage through lines so that it could push its panzers to the Meuse River. Meanwhile, if the Panzer Lehr could not capture Bastogne through a coup de main, the task would fall to the 26th Volksgrenadier Division. Kokott, though, understood that Bastogne was out of the question if he could not neutralize Hosingen first. To ensure its neutralization, Kokott

LEFT: Wearing heavy winter overcoats, German troops move forward during the opening days of the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans intended to seize the key Belgian town of Bastogne, but the tenacious defense of Hosingen bought precious time for U.S. soldiers to prepare defenses at Bastogne. ABOVE: Colonel Hurley E. Fuller (left) of the 110th Infantry Regiment led the defense of Hosingen. General Norman Cota (right) weakened Fuller’s defense, detaching a battalion as reserve.

within the town. First, Feiker covered the southern approaches with antitank guns since that was the likely avenue of approach for enemy armor. Then he positioned 1st and 2nd Platoons to cover the northern and eastern sides of the town. He placed 3rd Platoon to watch south of town. For artillery, Feiker had both his 60mm mortars and an 81mm mortar section from the battalion. Finally, he sited his observation posts on a piece of high ground just southeast of the town, one in front of 3rd Platoon and another in the water tower. Company B, 103rd Engineers was also in the town but was commanded by Captain William Jarrett; its mission was to maintain the roads, not fight the Ger-

38

BB-Win14 Hosingen_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:12 AM Page 39

Map © 2014 Phillip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

mans. That was all Feiker had to fight an entire German regiment. During the afternoon of the 15th, the soldiers of K Company began to see things that were abnormal. Their previous patrols had reported that the German unit opposite them was only capable of patrolling, and though the officers considered an attack possible no one at battalion cared to discuss it and so the subject remained moot. The patrols, though, gave a different story. Their observation posts (OPs) reported hearing an increase in vehicle traffic and heavy equipment, but the thick forests hid the suspicious vehicles from view. At 6 pm on the evening of the 15th, the OPs reported hearing more noises. Lieutenant Flynn decided to hear for himself, so he trudged down to the southern observation post. He listened for a bit, but he could not figure out where the sounds were emanating from or what they were. They sounded like motorcycles, but he was not totally convinced. He shrugged his shoulders and marched back to the com-

mand post. It was getting dark, and he was cold. Anyway, he figured the morning patrol might find out more information about the odd sounds coming from across the river. Unfortunately, he would not get the chance to send out that patrol. German sergeant Ludwig Lindemann, the acting commander of 6th Company, 2nd Battalion, 77th Volksgrenadier Regiment adjusted his gear. He was marching into battle again, and this time it was against the Americans. Several years of war against the Russians had inured him to combat, but the Americans were a different enemy, and he was fighting on different ground, too. This new terrain was a tangled mess of deep gullies, countless streams, precipitous cliffs, and neverending evergreen trees. This would be a knife fight. His company stepped off around midnight on the 15th and started its descent to the Our River. When they reached the river, Lindemann and his Volksgrenadiers crossed a temporary bridge that the pioneers had built out of rafts and planks. When they all had reached the western

The German push through Luxembourg toward Bastogne resulted in the creation of the southern shoulder of the great bulge that developed during the drive toward the Meuse River. The Germans rapidly advanced through the Grand Duchy, encountering few pockets of resistance. The most significant delay occurred at Hosingen.

bank, Lindemann then led the men up the steep hill toward Hosingen. After several hours, the Volksgrenadiers reached a road just east of town. There, the company halted and lay down in the wet and chilly brush. In front of Lindemann were a treeless valley and Hosingen itself. He looked down at his watch. It was 3 am. They had two more hours before the reckoning. For several hours, nothing happened. Now, it was almost 5:30 on December 16. The K Company observer atop the water tower at Hosingen rubbed his hands and then cupped them over his mouth to keep them warm. Then, he caught a glint out of the corner of his eye. He turned and noticed more and more lights flickering along the ridgeline that marked the border of Germany. To the observer, they looked like hundreds of camera flashes going off during a boxing match. He quickly picked up

39

BB-Win14 Hosingen_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:12 AM Page 40

end of town. He dodged through the explosions toward a position that was behind the light machine gun section that watched Skyline Drive from the north. From there, he reasoned he could place suppressive fire on a likely avenue approach for the enemy. A mile south of Hosingen, a rifle squad from 3rd Platoon, K Company was trying to stay warm while on OP duty. Their observation post was a rustic farmhouse that had been turned into a bunker with 18-inch-thick concrete walls. That morning, all the men were lounging around upstairs in one of the three small rooms.

ullstein bild / The Granger Collection, New York

his field telephone and started his report. “This is the OP in the water tower and I can see a hundred pinpoints of light coming from Germany—.” He never finished his sentence. Suddenly, the roar of a hundred steam locomotives overwhelmed him, and then the entire world exploded as hundreds of shells rained down on the town, severing all wire communication. The dark, early morning sky became day several hours early as 300 pieces of artillery and mortars blanketed the Allied lines with a deadly rain of steel. Inside Hosingen, it felt like God had

During the opening phase of the Ardennes Offensive and the resulting Battle of the Bulge, German Mark V Panther tanks halt along a snowy roadway. When stiff American resistance was encountered at Hosingen, tanks of the Panzer Lehr Division were committed to the fighting. OPPOSITE: An American soldier stops in a doorway of a shattered house in a small Luxembourg village. The defenders of Hosingen disrupted the German timetable for 48 crucial hours by also occupying smaller surrounding towns.

unleashed death and destruction on Sodom and Gomorrah. Fire shot down from the heavens, and within seconds several buildings went up in flames. In response, Captain Feiker tried to raise his battalion on the phone, but the shelling had already cut the line. Luckily, the SCR 300 radios still worked, and he alerted Major Harold Milton, his battalion commander, that all hell had broken loose in Hosingen. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Flynn decided that the best place to assist in the control of the company was in a foxhole on the north

40

The squad’s medic, Private James F. Sansom, recalled after the war that Sergeant John Reardon, the squad leader, was giving his morning report over the field telephone when the barrage came crashing down around them. All of them instinctively ducked. Then, several blasts rocked the farmhouse, and suddenly the line went dead. Mortar rounds were detonating around them like giant kernels of popcorn. One soldier peered through a window and could see what looked like muzzle flashes from the wood line 1,000 yards

away. Before he could get a second look, a German machine gun opened up, peppering the walls like hailstones. The soldier dove behind the wall as the windows exploded, showering him with glass shards. No one in that room thought that the attack on this lone farmhouse was part of a much larger offensive. Some of them thought it was just a large patrol. They soon found out how wrong they were. For Lindemann, the artillery bombardment also was terrifying. Most of the Volksgrenadiers were lying down when the howitzers and mortars roared. He listened as the rounds whistled over his head and then watched the hillside in front of him erupt. Geysers of dirt and branches shot up into the air as each shell exploded. Meanwhile, the ground shuddered and shook. Suddenly, one shell burst near them, instantly killing one man and wounding several others. It was war, and the barrage needed to be that close to be effective. It was unfortunate, but the hellish barrage continued. Between the blasts, Lindemann kept looking at his watch. Finally, after 30 minutes the hurricane ceased swirling. At that exact moment, the Luftwaffe antiaircraft gun crews switched on their searchlights, and the heavens came alive as beams bounced off the clouds and bathed the area in light. That was the signal, Lindemann recalled. He stood up and then waved his hand forward. The forest floor sprung to life as the rest of the company emerged from the ground. Their task was securing the avenue of approach to Bockholz while bypassing Hosingen to the north. Even though it was still dark, Lindemann could make out the first houses of Hosingen to his right, and he continued to push his men forward through a meadow. After 45 minutes, the barrage finally petered out. On the American side, Captain Jarrett instinctively took stock of his losses while he tried to reestablish security around his perimeter. The initial news was mixed. Seven of his trucks were out of commission as result of the shrapnel puncturing all of the tires. Conversely, his company had not suffered any casualties.

BB-Win14 Hosingen_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:12 AM Page 41

Thinking this was a prelude to an attack, he quickly reestablished communications via an SCR 300 radio and runners with K Company. Next, he ordered his engineers to mine the north-south approaches into town. After his men finished their tasks, they all settled into the foxholes and waited. It was now 7:05. Sensing a lull, Jarrett decided to get a better look at his lines from his company OP, which he had set up in Hosingen’s church tower. He clambered up the stairs and looked toward the wood line. As he peered to the south, he saw shapes inching toward the southern edge of the town and Skyline Drive. They were German soldiers. He immediately called over to Lieutenant Morse, the platoon leader for the 81mm mortars, and requested a fire mission to target the columns. Soon, Jarrett could hear the thumping sound of mortar rounds swishing out of their tubes. The rounds wreaked havoc on the column. Like a leaderless mob, the Germans scattered in every direction. Then, another K Company squad position that was in a farmhouse southeast of the town center joined in the melee. It was a slaughter, and it initially stunned the German advance in this sector. Jarrett was not the only one who had a placed a bull’s eye on a German column. Between 6:15 and 7:15, K Company OPs reported hearing infantry coming up from the draw to the east. Around 7:30, the north side of town unexpectedly exploded. Company K’s light machine guns opened up on another force that had emerged from the draw. Lieutenant Flynn then directed one of his 60mm mortars to drop more rounds on the unsuspecting column. For the Volksgrenadiers, it was a rude awakening that the Americans were still there. Without warning, .30-caliber machine gun rounds ripped into the lines of troops. Like their comrades to the south, this group scrambled in a desperate search for cover while machine gun tracers lanced through their column. The ditches provided little safety from the mortar storm that burst around them.

Farther south, the Germans had better luck. After the bombardment ended, Lindemann pushed forward through the fields south of Hosingen. Unlike his brethren just outside of town, Lindemann faced little resistance. He could hear the machine-gun fire off to his right, but to his front it was silent. When they reached a group of buildings, a few American soldiers appeared, wearing only their undergarments. Instead of fighting, they retreated through a garden and then faded into the darkness. Lindemann smiled. They had secured their first objective with few casualties. He halted his company and directed them to form a perimeter for security. After a few hours of waiting, Lindemann received some welcome news from his headquarters. The 2nd Battalion had succeeded in its mission of isolating Hosingen from the south and, unbeknownst to Lindemann, his company had severed the lines between K Company and its 3rd platoon. Now, Lindemann’s orders required him to push his company onto the next objective—the forest between Hosingen and the town of Bockholz, farther west. Battalion wanted his 6th Company to clear the forest of American forces. Reading the order, Lindemann nodded his head and shot a

glance at the woods to the west. With a wave of his hand, he ordered his company to move out. As they were marching away from the road, Lindemann glanced back at Hosingen. For his company, the battle for Hosingen was over, but for his division the battle had only begun. Meanwhile, at the 26th Volksgrenadier Division headquarters in Herbstmuhle, General Kokott flipped through the latest reports. The news so far was good. The assault detachments of the 77th had advanced west of Hosingen, and his artillery had pinned the defenders of Hosingen inside the town, allowing his units to bypass it to the south. The reports of the desultory flanking fire coming from Hosingen did not trouble him. It should have. For Feiker back in Hosingen, the situation was beginning to calm down, but it was far from ideal. After the initial attack, Feiker and Flynn realized they had lost all contact with 3rd Platoon, the OP on Steinmauer Hill, and the company’s attached antitank sections. In short, a third of their infantry and nearly all their anti-tank capability were gone. Luckily, thanks to his battalion commander, Major Milton, Feiker had Captain Jarrett’s entire engineer company.

41

Both: National Archives

BB-Win14 Hosingen_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:12 AM Page 42

ABOVE: Alerted to the German advance from the east, a U.S. soldier mans a Browning .30-caliber water-cooled machine gun somewhere in Luxembourg. OPPOSITE: Some defenders of Hosingen managed to escape from the embattled town as the Germans took control and made their way westward to rejoin units of the 28th Infantry Division. These soldiers of the 28th are entering Bastogne to regroup.

Jarrett and Feiker next decided the best place for B/103rd Engineers was on the west side of town and in direct support of other K Company positions to the south and north. Feiker watched with a smile as the engineers dismounted their lethal Browning M2 .50-caliber machine guns. Each of Jarrett’s platoons had one of them. The M2 was a belt-fed killing machine that could outshoot most direct fire weapons and could punch through light armor. With them, Jarrett and Feiker had turned Hosingen into a fortress. Unfortunately, the Germans initially chose to bypass the town from the south. Feiker watched as the German columns continued to plod their way westward from the Our River to Bockholz. To disrupt this, Feiker decided that a fire mission of 105mm howitzer rounds might upset the German timetable. He then placed a call on the radio to Major Milton and requested a fire mission. Milton, though, had only bad news for Feiker. Lindemann and his company had pushed ahead into Bockholz where C Battery of the 109th Field Artillery had set up its howitzers. Thus, instead of providing on-call indirect fire missions, the artillerymen of C Battery were desperately trying to defend their own positions. By 8:40 am, they reported that they were “being overrun and need help immedi-

42

ately.” Milton told Feiker that he could not provide any howitzer support. Meanwhile, German troops continued to march westward past Hosingen unmolested. As the morning dragged on, the soldiers of K Company and the engineers of B Company waited. Their order from Major Milton was to hold the town of Hosingen and expect reinforcements. At 10:30, Feiker, sensing that the battle could be a long one, requested more ammunition. Milton told him he would receive an ammunition push the following morning. It would never reach Feiker. Sansom and the others south of Hosingen did not know how bad their situation was. With the Germans in Bockholz, 3rd Platoon was now several miles behind enemy lines, and with each passing hour those lines were moving farther away. Around 1 pm, the Germans drew first blood. Shots rang out and Sansom heard the awful cry for a medic. Sansom ran into the barn and bounded up the stairs to the loft. Joe Glick, the BAR gunner, was lying on the floor. Sansom quickly knelt down next to Joe. Searching with his fingers, he could feel the exit wound above Glick’s right ear, and he could see that Glick had lost consciousness. He injected a shot of morphine to numb the pain and bandaged the wound

to staunch the bleeding. He then checked Glick’s pulse, which was weak, so he started CPR. After nearly 30 minutes, Joe Glick was dead. Another soldier picked up the BAR and took up his position on the perimeter since the Germans outside would not allow them to mourn the loss of their friend. By now, Kokott’s morning enthusiasm was beginning to fade as the day dragged on into afternoon. Around noon he received reports that the 77th Volksgrenadier Regiment’s forward momentum was sputtering to a halt just east of Bockholz. Meanwhile, enemy resistance in Hosingen was increasing, and as a result the pesky Americans had blocked his main supply route from Hosingen to Bockholz with mortar and antitank fire. Kokott knew he did not have the forces on hand to take Hosingen. He would have to call on the soldiers from the replacement training battalion to attack the town. Then, he got another piece of discouraging news. He discovered they would not be ready until 3 pm at the earliest. In addition, his reserve regiment, the 78th Volksgrenadier, would not arrive in the battle area until later that night. In short, Hosingen would remain in American hands until at least the evening of the 16th. Back in Hosingen, the situation had stabilized, but it was an uneasy stalemate. Colonel Fuller decided that tanks might swing the balance back in his favor. The 707th Tank Battalion was the armored reserve for the 28th Infantry Division, and Colonel Richard W. Ripple, the 707th’s commander, had developed and rehearsed a plan to rush his tanks into predesignated sectors to counter any potential German attack. On the 16th, he put that plan into action. Lieutenant Robert A. Payne was part of that plan. Payne was the leader of 3rd Platoon, A Company of the 707th Tank Battalion. At 3 pm, his commander ordered him to advance south down Skyline Drive to Hosingen and provide armored support to the troops trapped there. At 3:15, Payne’s platoon of five M4 Sherman tanks started to rumble down the road toward K Company, arriving safely at Hosingen

BB-Win14 Hosingen_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:12 AM Page 43

around 4 pm after running a gauntlet of machine-gun and small arms fire. Payne and Feiker then quickly dispatched the tanks to positions around the town. Payne sent three of the Shermans to a piece of high ground southeast of town to cover the east-west road. He sent another tank to the north side of town to provide 1st Platoon, K Company some firepower. The tank then rolled into a defilade position and aimed its 75mm gun northward down Skyline Drive. Finally, Payne drove his own tank into town to guard the southern approaches of Skyline Drive. Meanwhile, to the south, Private Sansom watched the sunset. Around 4 pm, his squad had wounded and captured two Germans who had passed too close to the

sance Battalion to clear out the defenders of Holzthum and Consthum west of Sansom’s farmhouse. This kampfgruppe (battle group) was under the command of Major Gerd von Fallois. One of the tanks from Kampfgruppe von Fallois had halted next to the farmhouse on its way to Holzthum. A panzer crewman shouted something at the house in German. Suddenly, one of the prisoners yelled back at the crewman in response. Sansom, deciding that it was no longer a good place to hide, scampered downstairs. Before he reached the bottom, a terrific explosion hurtled him into the air before he came crashing down on the floor. Shaking his head, he struggled to his feet. As he slowly regained his wits,

THAT NIGHT THE GERMANS HARASSED THE DEFENDERS OF HOSINGEN, AND THE AMERICANS RETURNED THE FAVOR.

barn and farmhouse. While Sansom bandaged and guarded the prisoners, he heard the unmistakable sound of clinking and clanking coming from outside the house. He went over to the window. Outside, a German tank had rolled into the yard. The tank came from the Panzer Lehr Reconnaissance Battalion. Because of the dogged resistance of the Americans, Kokott had committed the Panzer Lehr Reconnais-

he glanced out the window and watched the tank belch smoke like a dragon. Then, it lurched back and drove away, leaving him unharmed. He decided to abandon the prisoners. When he thought the coast was clear, he sprinted back toward the barn to tell his squad leader, Sergeant Reardon, what had just happened. Some of these tanks would end up in the fight to capture Hosingen.

For the antitank gunners and heavy machine gunners from M Company, the sudden German attack had left them stranded in the southern part of Hosingen. They no longer had contact with the rest of K Company, or for that matter with anybody else. All day long, the battle for the southern edge of Hosingen raged, but the Germans could not breach the defenses. The antitank guns took a fearful toll on German vehicles trying to race down the road. Fortunately, American casualties had been light with only one man sustaining a leg wound. For Sergeant John Forsell, the situation looked grim as dusk rapidly turned to night. The men could not stay and fight since they were low on ammunition. Together with the platoon leader from M Company, the NCOs decided the best course of action was to sneak through German lines and head west to the battalion headquarters. They probably figured that the rest of K Company was facing the same dire conditions and would do the same thing. Sergeant Forsell and the rest of the NCOs collected the men and conducted a final headcount. Forsell recalled the incident after the war. “I gave a lieutenant an azimuth by which to lead the men back to headquarters and after a final check, I would bring up the rear with anyone that was left behind.” With that, the platoon leader moved the column out. Forsell then bounded from house to house, ensuring no one was left. At one house, he heard some noise coming from the cellar. When he wandered down the old stone stairs, he found two soldiers huddled in a corner, shaking with fear. Forsell grabbed them and hurried them outside. When they stepped onto the street, Forsell saw a house that had its lights on. “I want you stand by the door and pull security,” Forsell ordered the two soldiers. Forsell then pulled out his Colt Model 1911 pistol. With a deep breath, he pushed open the front door. Inside, he stumbled on two German soldiers, a man, his wife, and a priest eating dinner around a table. Forsell leveled his pistol, but before he could fire, the priest jumped up, waving

43

BB-Win14 Hosingen_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:12 AM Page 44

his arms. Blocking Forsell’s line of sight, the priest pleaded with Forsell not to shoot the startled German soldiers, whose eyes had just seen their lives pass before them. Not wanting to shoot a man of the cloth, the merciful sergeant stepped back with his weapon drawn, and then instructed the priest. “Tell the German soldiers not to make any moves because I have two other soldiers waiting for me outside. Tell them to wait 15 minutes before they even move.” The priest nodded his head and then conveyed the sergeant’s warning to the soldiers who were frozen in their seats.

Back in Hosingen, Payne’s tanks were already getting into trouble. Around 5 pm, two German tanks appeared on the road from Eisenbach. Immediately, the three Shermans on the southeast side of Hosingen opened up with their 75mm guns. Within minutes, the tank commanders realized their position was indefensible, and they requested permission to fall back into the town. Payne approved their request, and the Shermans rolled back into Hosingen. Feiker also pulled back the accompanying infantry. German vehicle traffic then resumed along the road.

Soldiers of the 28th Infantry Division, separated from their units as the Germans advance through the Ardennes, temporarily halt in Bastogne to reorganize. Unlike many American soldiers, these men retained their weapons during the withdrawal from the German onslaught.

Suddenly, one of the American soldiers ran inside the house, sputtering. “Sergeant, someone’s coming down the street.” Forsell shot one last glance at the Germans. Then, he turned and stepped outside onto the road. Grabbing the two soldiers, they darted west to a nearby field. Using the haystacks in the meadow as concealment, the men scurried to each one until they were beyond the German lines. After several hours, they arrived at their battalion headquarters. They were among the handful of men who had escaped from the Hosingen encirclement. They would be the last.

44

Around 10 pm, Feiker contacted Major Milton to remind him of his supply situation. He informed his commander that Payne’s tanks did not bring more ammunition. Milton reassured him that he would try to get more supplies to Feiker and his company. Unfortunately, the Germans had other ideas. That night the Germans harassed the defenders of Hosingen, and the Americans returned the favor. On several occasions, German grenadiers would try to run the gauntlet and dash across Skyline Drive south of Hosingen. Feiker’s riflemen,

though, saw them and made the crossing a risky affair. Using their .50- caliber machine guns and rifles, the American soldiers sat cross-legged in the street and picked them off like ducks at a shooting gallery. Meanwhile, the Germans peppered the town with desultory small arms fire to remind the Americans they were still there. Furthermore, K Company observers could see that German scouts were edging closer to the town as the night dragged on. On the morning of the 17th, the 77th Volksgrenadier Regiment settled on harassment attacks to keep the pressure on the Hosingen defenders. In the early morning hours, the grenadiers set up several fighting positions southeast of Hosingen and engaged targets in the town with small arms fire. These attacks were more of a nuisance than a threat, and after sunrise 2nd Platoon, K Company had a clear line of sight to the German positions. Within minutes, machine guns, BARs, and Garands blasted away at the luckless grenadiers who were now out in the open. The Germans yielded and fell back toward the wood line. As the morning passed, soldiers in 1st Platoon, K Company began to detect sounds echoing north of town. The gurgling and humming of diesel engines and the clanking of tank treads alerted the defenders that it was only a matter of time before the Germans tried again. The men of 1st Platoon sensed the Germans would bring tanks next. They were right. At 8:30 am, reports that German tanks were moving began to filter into Milton’s battalion command post. The reports claimed that the Germans had concealed a column of 20 tanks just east of Hosingen in the wood line. Ten minutes later, Major Carl Plitt, the division’s operations officer, reported that the tanks were indeed east of Hosingen and had an unknown number of infantry with them, and they were “firing point-blank at buildings setting them on fire.” By 9 am, the Germans were attacking again, and this time it was from the east. Lieutenant Payne reported back to his battalion that this attack had tanks and

BB-Win14 Hosingen_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:12 AM Page 45

Both: National Archives

infantry, and by 9:35 they were penetrating the outskirts of town. While the Germans tried to push into Hosingen from the east around 10 am, the water tower observers watched as two halftracks approached the town from the north down Skyline Drive. The first half-track was clearly an American M3, but they could not make out the trail vehicle. No one had received any reports to expect a pair of halftracks. Lieutenant Payne had to make a snap decision since the vehicles were now about 1,500 yards from the town and closing fast. He paused for a moment and then ordered the Sherman commander to hold his fire and remain in the defilade position. It was a lucky move. Waiting for the tank to reveal its position were two German tanks hiding in the wood line. The half-track drivers, realizing that the ruse had failed, swung around to escape. As they turned around, the men in the water tower could see that the second vehicle was a German half-track. The Germans had failed, but they would try again, and soon. Farther south, the remnants of 3rd Platoon were beginning to yield to the overwhelming German attacks. For Private Sansom, the night had passed uneventfully. Sansom and other soldiers had stayed in the barn’s loft while German tanks and trucks rumbled by the farm. Fortunately, they had discovered a small room behind a stack of hay bales that provided them a place to hide. Throughout the morning, various groups of German infantry walked into the barn, turned over some hay bales, and satisfied no one was hiding in the building, finally leave. Around 10 that morning, another German patrol stepped into the barn. This group was far more thorough than the previous ones. Suddenly, one of the grenadiers pulled back the bale of hay and found the entrance to the hidden room. Standing before him was a squad of American soldiers. Waving his submachine gun, he shouted in German, “Hier! Rause!” Sansom and the rest of the squad then raised their hands and walked out, with Sansom in the lead. They were going to survive, but for them, the war was over.

American soldiers rest amid the rubble of destroyed buildings in Wiltz, Luxembourg. As the Germans pushed into Hosingen, the American defenders destroyed each house as it became overrun to prevent their being used by the Germans for cover. The GIs exacted a terrible toll on the Germans in the process.

Kokott wanted Hosingen destroyed, but his intelligence section estimated that the Americans had a reinforced battalion and some armor defending it. It was now almost noon on the 17th, and Hosingen remained in American hands. As a result, Hosingen was seriously jeopardizing the corps’s entire supply system. As ordered, the German replacement battalion was in position to attack Hosingen from the north. Kokott had also brought his 2nd Battalion from the 78th Volksgrenadier Regiment to provide more firepower. To help these battalions, he authorized the 78th to have additional flamethrowers and antitank guns. Kokott figured that if he could not get the stubborn Americans to surrender Hosingen, then he would burn and blast them out. The replacement battalion would attack that afternoon, but 2nd Battalion would not be ready until the following morning. As for the 77th, he ordered it to push westward, leaving the 78th and the replacement battalion to deal with Hosingen. Around 1 pm, the two German tanks that had been waiting in an ambush position northwest of town opened fire. Their target was the water tower. Luckily for the American observers hiding in the tower, the builders had constructed it using reinforced concrete. Hence, even if the 75mm

rounds breached the concrete walls, the steel that served as the tower’s skeleton frame easily deflected the shrapnel. The water tower was a tailor-made observation bunker, so the observers remained in operation, identifying targets for the mortars and the tanks in the town. Now, the grenadiers from the replacement battalion started their attack. Six more tanks linked up with the original two, bringing their overall strength to eight. Meanwhile, the grenadiers began to advance from the woods to the west. The engineers on the west side of town opened up on them with murderous fire. To the north, another group of grenadiers appeared. In response, 1st Platoon roared to life, ripping into the pockets of grenadiers with light machine guns and 60mm mortars. The initial results were mixed. 1st Platoon had pinned the grenadiers in the north, but the German infantry from the west was making headway. The tempest of small arms fire coming from the north prevented U.S. bazooka teams from closing with the troublesome tanks. In response, Feiker decided to support the platoons with some Shermans, and they rolled north to stop the German armor. The tanks traded shots, but neither scored any lethal hits. Gauging the ferocity of the German assault, Feiker decided that this was the big push.

45

BB-Win14 Hosingen_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:12 AM Page 46

The battle was bitter. As the afternoon dragged on, the grenadiers were beginning to score some successes. The 1st Platoon, contesting each house, lost all its light machine guns, one of its 60mm mortars, and one heavy machine gun. Meanwhile, the Germans continued to hammer away at the water tower. Sitting there, Lieutenant Flynn and his team used a radio to report the action. Finally, one round exploded too close to his position. He felt the blast wave suck the air from his lungs as the concussion shook the confined space. When he returned to his senses, he realized his radio was no longer transmitting because the concussion had damaged the crystals. He could still hear Feiker’s

“WE ARE STILL MAKING THEM PAY——HOUSET O HOUSE. WE ARE STILL IN THERE BUT DON’T KNOW FOR HOW LONG.” voice on the receiver, but he could not respond. He needed to reply because the Germans were inside the north end of town now. Flynn had only one option. He climbed down the tower and dashed into the open street. He could hear the crackles as bullets zinged by him and ricocheted off the building walls. In addition to the bullets, huge 75mm rounds from German tanks whooshed through the air. Their impacts ripped out chunks of masonry and showered him with flecks of stone. Finally, he reached Captain Feiker at the K Company CP and informed him of the German penetration at the north end of town. Meanwhile, Captain Jarrett had his men conduct a scorched earth tactic to prevent the Germans from taking advantage of the

46

buildings as cover. Using their explosives, they blasted apart the buildings or set them on fire. It was a deliberate process. When the soldiers determined that the house was no longer tenable, they would fall back to the next house, and the engineers would go to work. At sunset, the German tanks were firing away at the water tower at point-blank range. In addition to the tanks, groups of grenadiers had infiltrated into the town and were clearing each section with typical German efficiency. Soon, Feiker gave the order, and the men in the water tower escaped unharmed while the maelstrom swirled around them. The grenadiers, sensing that the Americans were falling back, pressed home their advantage. Using snipers and panzerfaust and panzerschreck antitank weapons, they blasted their way into each house. The Americans, though, were waiting for them on the other side. When their position in the house became untenable, the infantrymen from K Company sneaked out the back door and lay in ambush when the grenadiers appeared at the front door. This way, the GIs were exacting a terrible toll on the Germans. Each house now was a bunker and each floor a mausoleum. No one had given the order, but most of the men from 1st Platoon assumed the rally point was the company CP at Hotel Schmitz, and that is where they ended up as the fighting continued into the night. However, not all could escape, and isolated pockets of 1st Platoon and 2nd Platoon continued to battle in the northern section of town. For Lieutenant Payne and his tank platoon, the situation was not much better. When the fighting kicked off, Payne’s tanks supported the K Company infantry in the northern section of town, but eventually they started to suffer losses, too. A panzerfaust knocked out one of the Sherman tanks, and another Sherman was lost to enemy fire. This left Payne with only three tanks. As the Germans squeezed the perimeter Payne ordered his three remaining tanks to establish a cordon around the K Company CP. To add to his list of woes,

Payne no longer had communications with his higher headquarters at the 707th Tank Battalion. Meanwhile, Feiker continued to request artillery to harass the German units moving along the east-west road and attacking the town. Each time, battalion denied his requests. Milton could no longer provide fire support because his howitzer batteries had retreated farther west and could no longer range Hosingen with their guns. In short, Hosingen was far enough behind enemy lines that the 109th Field Artillery batteries could no longer support them. They were on their own. For Major Milton, K Company’s situation was dire. At 6:02 pm, division intelligence confirmed reports that at least eight German tanks were roaming inside Hosingen. After receiving more disquieting news, Milton reported K Company’s situation to the division headquarters at 6:50. Company K had little ammunition left, and the men resorted to hand grenades. They were still battling building to building, but it was only matter of time. Around 7:40 pm, the division switchboard operator received another message from Hosingen. Feiker’s voice sounded defiant. “We are still making them pay— house to house. We are still in there but don’t know for how long.” As the 17th drew to a close, Feiker kept Milton apprised of his situation. The Germans were tightening the screws on his beleaguered company. All day, Milton had been pestering Colonel Fuller to allow K Company to withdraw. Fuller had refused. Now, it was too late. Elements of the 2nd Panzer Division had overrun Fuller’s own headquarters in Clervaux earlier that evening. When Milton suggested that Feiker try to infiltrate through German lines to break out of Hosingen, Feiker rejected the suggestion. Feiker’s answer was stoic: “It was impossible; too much heavy stuff around .” Meanwhile, Major Milton kept trying to help K Company. At 3:05 am on the 18th, he called the acting regimental commander, Colonel Theodore Seeley. The Germans had overrun the regimental head-

BB-Win14 Hosingen_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:12 AM Page 47

quarters earlier that night, and now Seeley had taken over. “Is there anything we can do for K Company?” he pleaded. Seeley’s answer was stark. “There is nothing we can do—all of us are in the same boat.” On the morning of the 18th, the men in Hosingen watched helplessly as the progression of German vehicles and horsedrawn artillery continued their march westward. They had little with which to thwart the German steamroller. They had only two rounds of smoke for the 81mm mortar, and all their 60mm mortars were out of action. In fact, the men were scrounging around for small arms ammunition for their rifles. In addition, their .50caliber ammunition was nearly gone. They were saving it for one more worthwhile target. A little after 7 am, the target presented itself. Lieutenant Hutter, one of the engineer platoon leaders, saw four horse-drawn carts carrying ammunition. As they drew closer to the northern end of Hosingen, they reached a choke point 400 yards from his position, and a traffic jam ensued. He nodded his head and pointed at the congested mass of horses and carts. In

response, an M2 machine gun and several other light machine guns opened up a blistering fusillade, and the rounds tore into the packed columns, tearing apart the horses and wooden carts. The massive burst lasted two seconds, but that was all Hutter needed. The carts exploded into balls of flame that licked the sky. Chaos overwhelmed the column, sending horses and men everywhere. Captain Jarrett later remarked, “It was a grand sight.” Unfortunately, it did not save them. At 8:25 am, Colonel Daniel B. Strickler, the executive officer of the 110th Infantry Regiment, reported K Company’s condition to Major Plitt at division. His words left no doubt as to K Company’s eventual fate. “K Company cannot do what was suggested to them,” he told Plitt on the phone. “They are still holding out and cannot do anything else. They [K Company] reported considerable enemy artillery and trucks at Bockholz. They were at the following grid 814584. [Just west of Hosingen] They are taking care of it with what little they have because they are under observation.” Several minutes later, Major Milton reported over the phone directly to the division tactical operations center. “K Co

ullstein bild / The Granger Collection, New York

These soldiers, captured during the first few days of fighting, are led away from the front by their German captors. About 300 Americans were captured at Hosingen after delaying the German advance for 36 hours, which helped prevent Bastigne from falling into German hands.

has been pushed in more. They have destroyed all secret documents they have in their possession. Engineers that are also with them have done the same.” The Germans were closing in on the isolated pockets of Americans in Hosingen, and Jarrett could see that the end was near. His water was gone, his soldiers had little ammunition left, and the Germans had surrounded the town of Hosingen with tanks. Jarrett decided to speak to Feiker about the futility of resistance. Both of them then decided to surrender to the Germans, but only after they had destroyed most of their own equipment so it would not fall into enemy hands. The engineers used thermite grenades, TNT, and gasoline to burn out the engine blocks of their vehicles, while they provided their excess TNT to the tankers and the infantry to do the same. Sometime between 8 and 10 am, Feiker and Jarrett cobbled together a white flag made out of cloth and headed out to parley with the Germans while Lieutenant Payne’s remaining tankers hung white panels across the fronts of their tanks. Seeing the panels and the flag, the Germans stopped shooting. After reaching the German lines, the two American officers discussed the terms, and then at 10 am, the Germans escorted the two back to Hosingen under guard. Back at the company CP, the radioman sent his last report to Major Milton. He told the battalion commander they had completed their mission to best of their ability, and they were now surrendering to the Germans. The time was 10:07. When Feiker and Jarrett got back to the CP, they told the men to line up in columns of three with their hands placed firmly on their helmets. Lieutenant Flynn estimated that there were approximately 300 American prisoners. When Flynn added up the tally for wounded and killed that were defending the town, the numbers were remarkably low. The total was 10 wounded and seven killed. The German commander who received the town’s surrender was shocked when he learned the number of American wounded and dead. He was even more Continued on page 126

47

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:15 AM Page 48

Heroic Defense Troops of the U.S. 9th Armored Division contested the German advance during the Battle of the Bulge and won precious time in the process.

T

he U.S. 9th Armored Division arrived in the European Theater of Operations in late October 1944 as a reserve for Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps. On December 9, 1944, Brig. Gen. William Hoge’s Combat Command B (CCB) of the 9th was attached to V Corps to support the 2nd Infantry Division in its planned attack through the Monschau Forest as part of the U.S. Army’s strategy to capture or destroy the Roer River dams. For this mission, CCB consisted of the 14th Tank Battalion, the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion (AIB), the 16th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and miscellaneous smaller units vital to any major command. General Hoge set up his command post in the Belgian village of Faymonville, approximately 12 miles north of the town of St. Vith, unaware of the pivotal role his command was to play in a very different battle. The German plan for the attack through the Ardennes, an offensive that would forever be known as the Battle of the Bulge, was to be accomplished in the conventional manner. Infantry divisions would begin the attack along the entire length of a 50-mile front, forcing a rupture along the Allied line and giving the German panzer divisions freedom of movement in the unoccupied ground beyond the front. Since speed was the key to success of the German plan, two panzer armies would spearhead the offensive. One, the Sixth Panzer Army, was commanded by SS Obergruppenführer (brigadier general) Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, and the other, the Fifth Panzer Army, was commanded by General Hasso von Manteuffel. The Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies were to advance abreast, cross the Meuse River, and then drive for the Belgian port city of Antwerp, a major staging and supply center for the Allied armies in western Europe.

48

Overall operational command for the offensive fell to Field Marshal Walther Model. General Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army was to attack from Prum in the north down to Bitburg and Bastogne in the south. The village of St. Vith lay approximately 12 miles behind the front lines on December 16, 1944, the day the offensive code-named Operation Watch

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:16 AM Page 49

at St. Vith By Charles Gutierrez

on the Rhine began. The town was also in Fifth Panzer Army’s area of advance. St. Vith is built on a low hill surrounded on all sides by slightly higher rises. Its population in 1944 was about 2,000, and its citizens were very much pro-German. Six paved or macadam roads converged at St. Vith, but none of these was considered by the Germans to be a major military trunk line. The closest of the northern German

National Archives

armored thrust routes ran through Recht, about five miles northwest of St. Vith. The closest primary German armored thrust route to the south ran through Burg Reuland, also about five miles from St. Vith. The capture of St. Vith was, however, important for three other reasons: to ensure the complete isolation of Allied troops that might be trapped on a nearby ridge called the Schnee Eifel; to cover the

German supply lines unraveling behind the armored corps to the north and south; and to feed reinforcements laterally into the main thrusts by using the St. Vith road net. Thus, the Fifth Panzer Army commander ordered that St. Vith be taken no later than the second day of the offensive. The job of capturing St. Vith went to the Fifth Panzer Army’s 66th Corps, commanded by General Walther Lucht. The

49

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:16 AM Page 50

National Archives

50

Shown conferring with Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower (far right) are (left to right) Maj. Gen. John Leonard, commander of the 9th Armored Division, Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton, commander of the VIII Corps, and Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group.

106th Infantry Division. On his way to St. Vith, General Hoge stopped in Faymonville to alert his command to be prepared to move immediately. Hoge departed Faymonville at approximately 1800, arriving at General Jones’s headquarters in the St. Josephs Kloster about a half hour later. Within the Kloster, General Hoge found a division headquarters staff in a state of disarray and confusion. No one knew what was happening. Clerks were running everywhere and junior staff officers were arguing among themselves; upstairs, however, Hoge found General Jones remarkably composed. Jones explained to Hoge that his division was being attacked along its entire front and that two of his three regiments, the 422nd

and the 423rd, had been partly surrounded in the Schnee Eifel area just east of Schoenberg. What Jones did not tell Hoge was that in one of those regiments his own son was serving at regimental headquarters. Initially, General Jones wanted Hoge to move his command into the Losheim Gap at Maderfeld and arrive there at dawn on December 17 to counterattack and erase the enemy penetrations that were threatening 106th Division positions on the Schnee Eifel. Soon after General Hoge left 106th Division headquarters for the drive back to Faymonville, Jones received a call from Middleton informing him that a combat command of Brig. Gen. Robert Hasbrouck’s 7th Armored Division would be arriving at St. Vith at 7 AM on the 17th. The entire division was to follow shortly thereafter. Although General Jones was deeply worried about his two regiments on the Schnee Eifel, he was also highly concerned about the German advances in the Winterspelt area where his 424th Infantry Regiment was defending. Situation reports suggested that the Germans were intent on crossing the Our River at Steinebruck. Now with a new armored combat command due to arrive at 7 AM the next day, and with the rest of the division to follow, Jones believed he would soon have the potential to deal with both the Schnee Eifel and Winterspelt emergencies. Therefore, he

BELOW: German soldiers move past an abandoned U.S. armored vehicle during the early hours of the Battle of the Bulge. The stand of the 9th Armored Division at St. Vith, Belgium, slowed the momentum of the Germans. OPPOSITE: A Sherman tank of the 9th Armored Division heads into action against the advancing Germans during the Battle of the Bulge. The fighting in the Ardennes was some of fiercest of the war on the Western Front.

National Archives

corps consisted of two infantry divisions. One, the 18th Volksgrenadier Division, was holding the northern reaches of the Schnee Eifel. The other, the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division, bore the number of an infantry division destroyed on the Eastern Front, which had been reconstituted. It was at full strength and supplied with the latest equipment. The 62nd, like the 18th, included three regiments of two battalions each. Its mission was to break through to the south of the 18th Volksgrenadier in the Grosslangenfeld-Heckhuschied sector, advance northwest on a broad front, and seize the Our River crossing at Steinebruck, five miles southeast of St. Vith. Once the bridge at Steinebruck was seized, the 62nd was to support the 18th Volksgrenadier Division’s drive on St. Vith by blocking the western and southern routes in and out of the town. At approximately 0530 on December 16, eight German armored divisions and 13 infantry divisions launched their all-out attack on five divisions of the U.S. First Army. The German armored and infantry attacks were preceded by the shelling of the American positions with at least 657 light, medium, and heavy guns and howitzers and 340 multiple rocket launchers. On this day, CCB of the 9th Armored Division was still in its assembly area in the vicinity of Faymonville. Its supporting field artillery battalion was at Kalterherberg, two miles south of Monschau, engaged in firing missions for the 2nd and 99th Infantry Divisions. The American plan was that once the 2nd Infantry Division reduced the German defenses at the Wahlerscheid crossroads, CCB was to spearhead a drive to the reservoirs north of Gemund and Schleiden. To this end, General Hoge was in the town of Monschau to check on the possibility of getting his command across in that area. While making his reconnaissance at Monschau he received an urgent message to call V Corps headquarters. The message was that his command was now back with VIII Corps and that he was to go to St. Vith and report to Maj. Gen. Alan W. Jones, commander of the newly arrived

National Archives

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:16 AM Page 51

decided to use the 9th Armored at Winterspelt, since capture of that area by the Germans would open to the enemy a direct route to St. Vith, a route even shorter than that leading from the Schnee Eifel. Thus, the job of rescuing the two trapped infantry regiments on the Schnee Eifel passed from the 9th to the 7th Armored Division. At St. Vith, Lt. Col. William H. Slayden was with Jones when Jones received the call from Middleton concerning 7th Armored Division support. Slayden had been sent to Jones by Middleton as an adviser until the 106th Division could become acclimated. Slayden, knowing that the nearest units of the 7th Armored Division were at least 60 miles away in the Netherlands, had serious doubts that a whole combat command could reach St. Vith on the 17th, much less by 7 AM. However, he kept these misgivings to himself. At CCB, 9th Armored Division’s headquarters in Faymonville, General Hoge was just finishing up his briefing for his command’s move to the Losheim Gap and Manderfeld when the call came through from General Jones informing him of 9th Armored’s new Winterspelt mission. Since

the move from Faymonville to Winterspelt involved a greater distance, Hoge decided to get his command on the road immediately. The time was approximately 1800 on Saturday, December 16, when Combat Command B of the 9th Armored Division began its move to St. Vith. At about noon that day, the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division’s 190th Regiment had broken through north of the 424th Infantry Regiment’s Cannon Company. The Germans were now on the high ground north of Eigelscheid overlooking the road to Winterspelt. General Frederich Kittel, the division commander, ordered his mobile battalion up from his 164th Regiment reserve at Pronsfeld and into the attack along the Winterspelt road. This battalion hit the 424th’s Cannon Company at the Weissenhof crossroads. Outnumbered and in danger of encirclement, the cannoneers and their rifle support from C Company made a platoon-by-platoon withdrawal toward Winterspelt. By dark, just as General Hoge’s command was getting underway from Faymonville, Kittel’s mobile battalion and infantry from the 190th Regiment were closing in on Winterspelt.

At the close of the first day of battle, General Lucht could look with some satisfaction at the day’s events, although his 62nd Volksgrenadier Division had yet to break through the American line. Lucht anticipated that the Americans would counterattack the next day, but that their reaction would be too late to avoid complete encirclement. At about 1:15 AM on December 17, a platoon from 9th Armored’s D Troop, 89th Recon was detailed to proceed through St. Vith in a southeasterly direction and seize the high ground along Highway N27 south of Steinebruck. The troop was to hold until relieved by the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion (AIB) and then reconnoiter farther down the road toward Winterspelt. However, this platoon never completed its mission. While on its way, the platoon was commandeered by a colonel from the 106th Division. The colonel ordered the troop east along the road to Schoenberg to delay a German tank and infantry team approaching St. Vith from that direction. The platoon lost four men missing and two wounded in the ensuing engagement. The Command’s main body was led by the 27th AIB with B Company in front,

51

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:16 AM Page 52

National Archives

followed by Headquarters and C Company. Company A of the 27th AIB had been assigned to the 99th Infantry Division and was in the process of being retrieved when the march to St. Vith began. Next came B Company, 9th Armored Engineers; the 16th Armored Field Artillery; B Company, 482nd Antiaircraft Artillery; and the 14th Tank Battalion. Elements of D Company, 89th Recon screened the flanks. General Lucht’s plan for December 17 was simple. A mobile battalion of the 18th Volksgrenadier Division was already moving on Andler to seize the Schoenberg bridge and the road to St. Vith. The southernmost battle group of the 18th Volksgrenadier would also undertake a mobile thrust and, finally, the 62nd Volksgrenadier would break loose at Heckhuscheid and drive for the Our River Valley. The leading vehicles of General Hoge’s command entered St. Vith on Sunday morning just as dawn was breaking and halted close to the 106th Division’s command post at the St. Joseph Kloster. Inside the command post, General Hoge learned that the Germans had launched a heavy assault on Winterspelt against the men of the 424th Infantry. General Jones wanted

52

Hoge to use the infantry of his 27th AIB to seize the series of hills near Winterspelt while the 14th Tank Battalion was to remain west of the Our River for use as the situation developed. The ultimate objective was to open an escape route for the soldiers of the 424th. An attack to the east by the 7th Armored Division could then relieve the two surrounded regiments of the 106th. Colonel Alexander D. Reid, commander of the 424th Infantry Regiment, had reason to fear encirclement. During the early hours of December 17, the Germans laid heavy mortar and artillery fire on the front-line positions of his regiment. The situation on Reid’s left flank was unclear, and the Germans were attacking in considerable force against his right flank. Elements of the 62nd Volksgrenadier had taken the eastern half of Winterspelt during the night, and at daybreak reinforcements finally drove Colonel Reid’s 1st Battalion from the village. The 424th Infantry had its back to the Our River, and if the Germans seized the bridge at Steinebruck and spread along the far bank his regiment would be hard pressed to effectively withdraw. Communications with division headquarters in St. Vith were

limited to liaison officers running along a road now being shelled by the Germans. Although the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division drove the American defenders from Winterspelt, all was not going well for the Germans. The 424th Infantry still blocked the road to the Our River and Steinebruck. General Lucht hurried to Winterspelt to get the 62nd Volksgrenadier moving to the Our. Although the 62nd Volksgrenadier captured Winterspelt, its losses were high and its left regiment had made little headway in the Heckhuschied sector. On the road to Winterspelt, General Hoge soon learned that the situation there was worse than General Jones had described. The column came upon stragglers from the 424th Infantry retreating in disarray toward St. Vith. Hoge managed to stop the stragglers, and created a provisional company from the 424th to reinforce the 27th AIB on its march toward the Our. With the unexplained disappearance of D Troop from the 89th Reconnaissance Platoon, Company B, 27th AIB became the leading element. At approximately 9:30 AM on December 17, B Company was the first 9th Armored Division unit to cross the Our River. Soon after its crossing, B Company ran into German infantry dug in along the high ground overlooking the village of Elcherath. Staff Sergeant Frank Mykalo knocked out a German machine-gun position, enabling the men in the lead half-tracks to dismount and deploy along the side of the road. In the 27th AIB’s move to take the high ground, B Company advanced along the center of the road. A Company moved south under the protection of the high river bank, while C Company deployed along the left side of the road as the enveloping company. During the assault, B Company suffered about 40 casualties including its commanding officer, Captain Henry D. Wirsig. During the 27th AIB’s assault, a call went out for the 14th Tank Battalion to join the action. In minutes, a platoon of medium tanks from A Company of the 14th Tank Battalion rolled across the bridge at Steinebruck and placed high

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:16 AM Page 53

hours of December 17, Brig. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, commander of CCB, 7th Armored Division, arrived at General Jones’s command post in St. Vith at approximately 1030. By this time the Germans had essentially closed the trap on the two infantry regiments on the Schnee Eifel. Jones wanted Clarke to counterattack immediately with his combat command “and break that ring that these people have closed around the Schnee Eifel.” It was a clear disappointment to Jones when Clarke told him that he, his operations officer, his aide, and his driver were the only representatives of the 7th Armored Division to have reached St. Vith at that time. Furthermore, General Clarke had no

Winterspelt rather than Schoenberg. It appeared now that the fate of his two northern regiments was sealed. Late on December 17, General Manteuffel was concerned with the lack of progress in his attack beyond the Schnee Eifel toward St. Vith. Since St. Vith should have been taken on December 16 or the 17th at the latest, he decided to leave his command post at Waxweiler and spend the night with the 18th Volksgrenadier Division at Schoenberg. While walking to avoid the traffic congestion, Manteuffel encountered his superior, Field Harshal Model. Model informed Manteuffel that he would be given the Führer Begleit Brigade, which was nearly equal in strength to an National Archives

explosive and heavy machine-gun fire on the enemy’s position in the woods and along the draw. By noon, the 27th AIB, with the help of Company A, had retaken that first stretch of high ground. By midafternoon, General Hoge ordered his infantry to halt and dig in. Counter to the plan laid out earlier by General Jones, Hoge had decided to launch his attack on Winterspelt with the entire 14th Tank Battalion as the lead element rather than with the more vulnerable infantry of the 27th AIB. The 14th Tank Battalion was on its way to the Steinebruck bridge when Brig. Gen. Herbert T. Perrin, assistant commander of the 106th Infantry Division, drove up carrying a message from General Jones. Perrin told General Hoge, “You can continue this attack on towards this back country, but you must be back on this side of the river by nightfall.” Hoge could not see much sense in making an attack, taking ground, and then turning right around and coming back, especially if the attack was successful. So, rather than spill blood needlessly to take meaningless ground, Hoge called off the attack on Winterspelt. His troops remained in place, and the pullout to the west side of the Our River began at dusk. Fortunately for Colonel Reid, word came at about 5:30 PM that his 424th Infantry Regiment was to withdraw immediately. By the end of the day, the 27th AIB had withdrawn through Steinebruck without casualties despite enemy shelling of the village. Both B and C Companies pulled back to the vicinity of Neidingen, near the battalion command post, while the 14th Tank Battalion established a perimeter defense around its assembly area near Breitfeld about halfway between the Our and St. Vith. Troop D, 89th Recon held the sector from Steinebruck to Weppeler while A Company, 27th AIB put up a defensive line anchored on the high ground east of Maspelt. Between these units, a place was found for the provisional company composed of the 424th Infantry stragglers. While 9th Armored was thus engaged in the Winterspelt area during the morning

ABOVE: Tanks of the 9th Armored Division roll through an abandoned French village. During the defense of St. Vith, the 9th Armored and several other American units suffered heavy casualties. OPPOSITE: Near the border with Luxembourg, the crew of a 105mm artillery piece belonging to the 9th Armored Division load and fire on enemy positions during a concentrated barrage on December 21, 1944.

idea when his command would arrive. During the rest of the day and on into the evening of December 17, CCB, 7th Armored moved into St. Vith and began a buildup that resembled a large horseshoe on the high ground to the east of the village. Although the 7th Armored Division was finally arriving, General Jones had been led to believe that the whole division would arrive in St. Vith starting that morning. Jones had been counting on this when he sent Hoge’s 9th Armored Command to

American light armored division, for the upcoming assault on St. Vith. The brigade had 9,000 men, Mark IV tanks, assault guns, 104mm and 105mm artillery, 88mm antiaircraft guns, and a number of heavy automatic weapons batteries. Troop D, 89th Recon had positioned its troop headquarters and first platoon to cover the bridge over the Our. During the night, the troopers experienced harassing fire from light and medium artillery and could observe enemy infantry and at least

53

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:16 AM Page 54

A disabled German tank lies abandoned along the edge of a slushy road as an American tank destroyer rumbles past. The wintry conditions during the Battle of the Bulge temporarily hindered the employment of U.S. air power.

four tanks moving along high ground to the south of the river. At approximately 1 AM on December 18, a German force of about 30 men tried to cross the Our at Steinebruck after a brief artillery barrage. They were repulsed by machine-gun fire. A second attempt on the bridge, made by about 40 men four hours later, was also thrown back by machine-gun fire. Both assault groups suffered heavy casualties. Fire from the 16th Field Artillery broke up other enemy formations trying to assemble on the high ground to the south. One German tank went up in flames. The provisional company of 424th stragglers disappeared during the night. To cover this dangerous gap in the line C Company, 27th AIB was ordered to the Our between Troop D, 89th Recon and Company A, 27th AIB. On its way to the new position, C Company came under a sudden artillery and rocket barrage in the village of Lommersweiler. Unable to advance, it pulled back to the nearest high ground and dug in. Sometime later that Monday morning, General Hoge sent his liaison officer to St. Vith to learn the dispositions of CCB, 7th Armored Division. En route, the officer

54

was approached by a member of General Clarke’s staff who told him that German tanks were approaching St. Vith along the road from the north. He was also told that all that stood in their way were two troops of the 87th Recon Squadron, and a few antiaircraft half-tracks. The staff officer wanted to know if 9th Armored could spare some desperately needed troops. After listening to the information provided by General Clarke’s staff officer, General Hoge decided to go to St. Vith himself to assess the situation. Before departing, however, Hoge gave orders to Lt. Col. Leonard E. Engeman, commander of the 14th Tank Battalion, to get a strong force ready to move out to assist 7th Armored should it become necessary. Once in St. Vith, Jones explained that only the leading elements of the 7th Armored Division had arrived thus far and that St. Vith’s northern approach was under attack. Hoge immediately got on the phone and ordered Engeman to move out. Engeman set out with two task forces to meet the enemy. One task force was made up of A and B Companies of the 14th Tank Battalion, B Company of the 482nd Antiaircraft Artillery, and another platoon of the 14th. The second task force consisted of B Company of the 811th Tank Destroyers. Both task forces reached St. Vith shortly before noon on the 18th to find not

one, but two German attacks moving against the town. One task force encountered reconnaissance probes on N27 conducted by units of the 1st SS Panzer Division approximately 1,000 yards north of St. Vith. The Sherman tanks of B Company repulsed the enemy with fire from their 76mm guns. When B Company pulled back to refuel and rearm, A Company passed through to take up the fight. The second task force hit another probe by the 1st SS Panzer and pushed it out of Hunningen. Both American units were able to drive forward, and the Shermans knocked out six German armored vehicles. The two task forces held onto their respective positions, deflecting all German armored attempts to penetrate St. Vith, until they were relieved late in the afternoon by CCB, 7th Armored Division. By dark, Lt. Col. Engeman and his two task forces were back in their assembly area in the vicinity of Breitfeld. During ceremonies observing the 20th anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge, General Clarke was able to talk to General Manteuffel and discuss German operations against St. Vith. Clarke asked, “Why in the world when I had only 2,500 men available to my command on December 17, did you not just execute a powerful frontal assault and overrun me?”

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:16 AM Page 55

Manteuffel answered, “We estimated that we were up against a division, and perhaps against an entire corps. We made several probing attacks, and every time we went into your position, we encountered armor. Our preliminary briefings had told us that there would be no armor in our path. When you get surprised like this, you become cautious.” Undoubtedly much, if not most, of the armor encountered by Manteuffel's probing actions during the early days of the German offensive belonged to CCB, 9th Armored Division. South of St. Vith, even as Lt. Col. Engeman’s task forces were responding to the 7th Armored’s cry for help, Germans of the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division were trying to get across the Our River at Steinebruck and hit St. Vith from that direction. The bridge at Steinebruck was intentionally left intact by General Hoge on the outside chance that some of the American troops trapped in the vicinity of the Schnee Eifel might be able to maneuver their way there. However, by noon on December 18 it was quite apparent to Hoge that the Germans infiltrating across the river were converging on the bridge in such numbers that it had to be blown. Under cover of automatic weapons fire from a platoon of light tanks, Sergeant Eugene Dorland and two other men from the engineers went into the cold, bullet-splattered water carrying three cases of TNT and placed their charges on the south abutment of the bridge. The resulting blast damaged the bridge to such an extent that the Germans would not be able to bring vehicles across for at least 24 hours. Although the bridge over the Our was blown, the German presence kept growing. At about 1:30 PM, three German selfpropelled guns and 19 or 20 horse-drawn artillery pieces went into position on the high ground 800 yards to the southeast of Steinebruck. After putting down a heavy concentration of artillery fire, the Germans moved their infantry across the river east of the position held by the 2nd platoon of D Troop, 89th Recon. The troop’s request for armored support was denied by General Hoge because the tank companies he

had sent north to help the 7th Armored had not yet returned and no reserve was on hand. However, Company B, 27th AIB was sent to help ease the situation, covering the cavalry’s left flank. With the enemy inside Steinebruck and excellent direct fire by the German artillery, what was left of 2nd Platoon, 89th Recon withdrew along the St. Vith road. All but five troopers of 2nd Platoon were lost to enemy action. The 9th Armored Division’s position at the Our was no longer tenable. Because the Our had ceased to be a barrier anywhere else, General Hoge felt that there was little to gain in continuing to overextend his command to hold the low ground along the river. Having first conferred with General Jones, Hoge ordered a withdrawal

Rather than spill blood needlessly to take meaningless ground, Hoge called off the attack on Winterspelt. from the river to begin after nightfall. CCB’s new position blocked the main Winterspelt-St. Vith highway and the valley of the Braunlauf Creek, a second natural corridor leading to St. Vith. CCB, 9th Armored was linked on its left with CCB, 7th Armored and what was left of the 424th Infantry Regiment on its right. Although the Germans were quick to build up beyond the Our River after the American withdrawal, they made no immediate moves against the new American line. Rebuilding the blown bridge to get their assault guns across was their first priority. The defense of St. Vith was now achieving some kind of order in contrast to the chaos that had reigned during the previ-

ous three days. The area being defended was beginning to take the form of a large horseshoe, its axis running approximately northeast to southeast. The northern prong of the horseshoe was composed of CCB, 7th Armored Division from Poteau and Vielsalm. The rounded portion of the horseshoe was composed of Colonel Dwight Rosebaum’s CCA, 7th Armored between Poteau and Rodt and General Clarke’s CCB, 7th Armored in the very center protecting St. Vith. The southern prong was defended by General Hoge’s CCB, 9th Armored, with the weakened 424th Infantry Regiment tied in and bent back protecting Burg Reuland. The greatest danger existed in the 424th’s position because the regiment’s flank lay vulnerable to attacks by the 116th Panzer Division to the south. The distance from Burg Reuland on the southeast to Poteau on the northwest was about 10 miles with only a single secondary road as a line of retreat for thousands of men defending the horseshoe against attack from three directions. Early on the 19th, the Germans made reconnaissance probes. At about 9:30 AM, the enemy attacked St. Vith from Hunningen to the north, apparently in an effort to envelop Clarke’s left flank. The fight lasted for more than three hours before the Germans withdrew, leaving one burning tank and approximately 150 dead. Having failed to find a soft spot to the north, the Germans then moved against Hoge’s 9th Armored command in the south; however, even before this attack got going three German tanks were knocked out and the rest of the probing force withdrew. Manteuffel had hoped for considerably more on the 19th. The reason for this comparative respite was due to the fact that the roads to the German rear were completely jammed. Adding to the slowdown of operations against St. Vith, the 18th Volksgrenadier Division was still using two of its three regiments and all but one of its artillery battalions against the two trapped 106th Infantry Division regiments. It would be unable to turn its full strength on St. Vith until the American surrender

55

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:16 AM Page 56

in that area. Manteuffel met near Wallerode with Model and Lucht that day. There was little they could do other than vow to get the attack moving early on the 20th. By that time the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division should have the bridge at Steinebruck rebuilt, at least two regiments of the 18th Volksgrenadier Division should be forward, and the Führer Bagleit Brigade should be ready to make the principal thrust down the Ambleve highway into St. Vith. Moreover, at least a regiment from the 1st SS Panzer Division was in sporadic conflict with the American defenders in the Recht-Poteau area and, in the south, elements of the 560th Volksgrenadier Division, part of General Walter Krueger’s 58th Panzer Corps, were also identified as pushing against American forces in the St. Vith salient. General Jones and his staff had pulled out of St. Vith on the morning of the 18th for Vielsalm. Since General Hoge was supposed to be under Jones’s command and did not understand the overall situation around St. Vith, he decided to find out exactly what was going on. During the afternoon of December 19, Hoge visited Clarke’s command post in St. Vith and expressed his frustration with the current chain of command. After Clarke and Hoge settled upon a mutually supportive command structure, Clarke noted that Hoge’s command was, for the most part, forward of a railroad track built on a high embankment. Should 7th Armored lose St. Vith, 9th Armored would be unable to withdraw on its own axis. Hoge and Clarke agreed that Hoge’s entire command should be withdrawn west of the railroad tracks. To execute this maneuver, Hoge’s entire command would have to move all the way up to St. Vith and back down again. The move would also have to be done under the cover of darkness in severe wintry conditions. Orders for CCB, 9th Armored to move to a new defensive position were issued at 1600. The supply trains led the way north on N27 to St. Vith. They were followed in order by the half-tracks and other vehicles of the 27th AIB, the tank companies, the

56

antiaircraft company, and the engineers. The foot elements of the 27th AIB were then to move out with Company B, 482nd Antiaircraft Artillery and some light tanks from Company D, 14th Tank Battalion following behind Company B, 27th AIB. The move had scarcely begun when an enemy attack hit the junction between Company B, 27th AIB and Company D, 14th Tank Battalion. The guns from a platoon of Shermans, the antiaircraft company, and a mortar platoon supplied a covering barrage, which broke up the German assault and inflicted heavy casualties. The circuitous march up one road and down another led to a new line just a few hundred yards to the west of the old one and was miraculously carried out while under attack without the loss of any men or equipment. By midnight on the 19th, the horseshoeshaped defense of St. Vith had taken form. The sector now defended by CCB, 9th Armored extended across five miles of rugged terrain that was primarily held by the three infantry companies making up the 27th AIB. Company B was stationed east of Galhausen and maintained contact with the nearest elements of the 7th Armored Division on 9th Armored’s left flank. Situated next to B Company were Company A, 27th AIB and Company D, 14th Tank Battalion. Company B of the 9th Engineers and D Company of the 89th Recon joined the line to supplement the armored infantry. The CCB command post was moved to Neubruck, a small group of farmhouses on Braunlauf Creek about two miles southwest of St. Vith. No reinforcements were expected. The next move was up to General Lucht’s corps. Manteuffel’s operation in the St. Vith area was already three days behind schedule. On the morning of the December 20, three tank destroyers were placed in support of Company C, 27th AIB. Approximately three hours later a German company marched out of Neidingen and along the road leading straight into C Company’s position, apparently totally unaware of 9th Armored’s recent change of position. The armored infantrymen kept themselves well

hidden until the column was directly in front of them and then opened fire. The surviving Volksgrenadiers fled in disarray. That night, infantry patrols found German medics removing their wounded. Late on the 20th, patrols of the 82nd Airborne Division, on the other side of the Salm River, established contact with patrols of the 7th Armored Division. With this contact, all units in the vicinity of St. Vith, including 9th Armored Division forces, passed to the command of Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne Corps. December 20 was a day of disappointment for the Germans around St. Vith. Generals Manteuffel and Lucht had planned an all-out attack to take St. Vith starting at daylight with a three- pronged envelopment by the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division against 9th Armored positions in the south. The 18th Volksgrenadier Division was to attack along the two roads from Schoenberg, with the Führer Begleit Brigade assaulting from the north. In addition, elements of the 116th Panzer Division and the 560th Volksgrenadier Division were moving against the weakly held southern flank of St. Vith defended by remnants of the 424th Infantry Regiment of the 106th Infantry Division and the 112th Infantry Regiment of the newly arrived 28th Infantry Division. However, the monumental traffic jams in the Losheim Gap and at Schoenberg continued to delay both the 18th Volksgrenadier Division and the Führer Begleit Brigade, and not until after daylight on the 20th would a bridge be ready at Steinebruck for the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division. Those factors dictated that at least another 24 hours would be needed before a major assault on St. Vith could begin. When Model released the Führer Begleit Brigade to General Manteuffel, he thought that he would be able to gain quick access to the St. Vith road network. Once St. Vith was taken, Model intended to drive the brigade swiftly for the Meuse River or cut behind the opposition on the Elsenborn Ridge that was bottling up the Sixth Panzer Army. Moreover, it was expected that Gen-

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:16 AM Page 57

Together they broke up the attack. Although the Germans were facing stiff resistance all along the American defensive line, they were determined to take St. Vith. Late in the day, the Germans launched three major attacks, each directed along a main road leading into the town. At about 1700, the enemy attacked along the Schoenberg road from the east; at 1830, they came down the Malmedy road from the north, and at 2000, an attack started from the southeast along the Prum road. Each attack was preceded by an intense artillery barrage

Armored headed for Bauvenn. Confusion, darkness, and mud slowed the move, but by morning a medium tank company and a platoon of riflemen had reached the village. The 7th Armored had taken a beating in defending St. Vith. At least 900 soldiers who had stood in front of the town were either dead or captured. The division had lost four companies of armored infantry. This left General Clarke with only one full company of soldiers. Despite the loss of St. Vith, General Ridgway believed that the American National Archives

eral Lucht’s two infantry divisions would be forwarded to the Salm River sector as right-wing cover for two panzer corps. Such was not the case, however, and by the evening of the December 20, the Germans were feeling the growing negative effects of the St. Vith salient. The failure to capture St. Vith was preventing the linkup of the Fifth and the Sixth Panzer Armies. In addition, the massive traffic jam caused by the inability to pass through St. Vith was creating acute shortages of gasoline and ammunition well to the west of St. Vith. Accordingly, that evening Sixth Panzer Army commander Dietrich issued orders to the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to move to the south so that parts of that corps could assist Manteuffel in taking St. Vith. The men of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had expected to be on the Meuse by December 19, but on the night of December 20 the Americans still denied them access to St. Vith. At daybreak on December 21, the Germans launched their first assault of the day on Hoge’s CCB. The Germans attacked the center of the 27th AIB. This initial thrust carried the enemy approximately 400 yards into the battalion’s sector. The guns of two platoons of Company A, 811th Tank Destroyers were overrun. A scratch force made up of one platoon of riflemen from Company A, 27th AIB and a platoon from Company B, 9th Engineers were sent to contain the Germans. A platoon of medium tanks counterattacked, and the enemy retreated. By 1245, the original line was restored, and the antitank guns of Company A, 811th Tank Destroyers were recovered. Farther to the north, in the 7th Armored sector, the pressure exerted by the enemy was also intense. By 1300 on the 21st, the entire line was ablaze with German artillery, rockets, tanks, and infantry. When a particularly heavy onslaught was launched against 7th Armored, near 9th Armored’s left flank, Company A, 14th Tank Battalion shifted its mediums to fire directly on Breitfield in support of its armored neighbor to the north. The 16th Field Artillery also pitched in, as did a battalion of 155mm howitzers sited around Commanster.

For heroism in action at St. Vith, Technical Sergeant Michael Chincher of the 9th Armored Division receives the Distinguished Service Cross from Maj. Gen. John W. Leonard, the division commander, on April 11, 1945.

lasting from 15 to 35 minutes. At about 2130, General Clarke phoned General Hoge to tell him that the enemy was entering St. Vith from the north and that his forces were withdrawing to form a new line northwest of the city. Since 7th Armored’s withdrawal meant that 9th Armored’s left flank would be in danger, the two generals agreed that Hoge would have to readjust part of his line to maintain contact with Clarke’s new rearward position. The village of Bauvenn was designated the linkage point for the two combat commands. In blinding snow and on slippery roads the tanks and infantry of CCB, 9th

armored and infantry forces defending St. Vith since December 16 could still hold. Ridgway’s 82nd Airborne was building a fairly firm line west of the St. Vith defenders to prevent the Germans from cutting off the salient from the rear. He also hoped the 3rd Armored Division soon might attack to remove all threat of encirclement. Based upon this fairly optimistic view, Ridgway, shortly after midnight, ordered the entire St. Vith force to withdraw from its current positions and form a defensive ring west of St. Vith and east of the Salm River. Ridgway’s plan was premised on the

57

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:16 AM Page 58

assumption that that the American forces in this goose egg-shaped defense could be supplied by air; however, whoever drew up the plan was thinking in terms of supply requirements for the lighter airborne divisions, not for fuel-hungry and shell-reliant armored forces. The troops were exhausted and spread out. The fortified goose egg ran nearly 10 miles in diameter, containing a mass of forest and only one decent road running northwest to southwest. This was no place to conduct a mobile defense with armor-heavy forces. At 2 AM on December 22, the Führer Begleit Brigade launched its attack against the town of Rodt, a small village west of St. Vith. As a result of 7th Armored’s earlier regrouping, Rodt was the junction point between CCA of the 7th Armored under the command of Colonel Rosebaum and General Clarke’s CCB. Rodt was garrisoned by the service company of the 48th AIB and some drivers belonging to the battalion whose vehicles were parked there. Resistance by service company personnel in Rodt was fierce with every possible man—drivers, cooks, radio operators— employed in the defense; however, after nine hours of battle against the much superior German force, Rodt fell. The fall of Rodt effectively split 7th Armored’s CCA from General Clarke’s CCB. Clarke pulled back his left flank to protect Hinderhausen, a key position on the emergency exit route to Commanster and Vielsalm. Not long after Rodt fell to the Führer Begleit Brigade, an attack came against the 7th Armored from the direction of Recht. Although it was beaten off, the attacking Germans were identified as new to the area, soldiers of the 9th SS Panzer Division, a cause for considerable concern. After learning of the attack by the Führer Begleit Brigade, Brig. Gen. Hasbrouck, commander of the 7th Armored Division, sent a message to General Ridgway urging withdrawal, which in part read, “P.S. A strong attack has just developed against Clarke again. He is being outflanked and is retiring west another 2,000 yards refusing both flanks.... Hoge has just reported an

58

attack....” Two regiments of the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division attacked 9th Armored positions early that morning, their goal to gain the Salm River at Salmchateau. After that morning’s enemy assaults, the line of the 27th AIB was reestablished west of Neubruck. Companies A and B held a line from Grufflingen to Hohenbusch with

The failure to capture St. Vith was preventing the linkup of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. Company A, 14th Tank Battalion to their north. Troop D, 89th Recon and Company D, 14th Tank Battalion formed a line from Grufflingen to Thommen, and Companies B and C of the 14th Tank Battalion took up positions between Thommen and Maldange. General Hoge moved his command post to Commanster. That evening General Clarke also put his command into Commanster. The commanders were at the center of the Foret Domaniale du Grand Bois. This forest was criss-crossed only by trails. The American armor of the 7th and 9th Armored Divisions plus supporting units were being pressed into an area in which motorized forces—tanks, half-tracks, selfpropelled artillery, tank destroyers—operated with great difficulty. Despite nearly a foot of snow, the ground underneath was still soft, and with the passage of only a few heavy vehicles it was soon churned into a morass of mud. The mud had made the roads and open areas impassable for armored vehicles. Although the American forces in the St. Vith area came under command of General Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne Corps, the Airborne Corps itself was under the command of Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, overall commander of the northern sector of the Bulge. Field Mar-

shal Montgomery, believing that Ridgway’s Corps could not attack successfully toward Vielsalm and that the American forces within the goose egg could better be used in support of other forces committed to the northern shoulder defense, decided upon a general withdrawal. Therefore, Montgomery ordered Ridgway to attack to the southeast until Vielsalm could be reached, ensuring an escape corridor for those trapped within the defense. At about midday, the field marshal sent a message to General Hasbrouck: “You have accomplished your mission—a mission well done. It is time to withdraw.” Under the chain of the northern sector command, only General Ridgway was unsure of Field Marshal Montgomery’s decision to withdraw from the defense. In the early afternoon of the 22nd, he arrived at General Hasbrouck’s headquarters in Vielsalm to plan the withdrawal. Because Ridgway was not in total agreement with the withdrawal and to get a feel for the real situation on the ground, he and Hasbrouck made their way to General Clarke at Commanster. After conferring with Clarke, Ridgway wanted to talk to one more man in whom he had supreme confidence—Brigadier General Hoge. Hoge and Ridgway had been on the West Point football team together when Ridgway had been the team’s manager. Ridgway knew Hoge to be calm, courageous, and imperturbable. If Hoge told him that the situation was bad, then without a doubt the situation was worse than he thought. Double-talking his identification over the radio with allusions to West Point football days, Ridgway gave Hoge a location at which to meet him. During his meeting with Hoge, Ridgway became convinced that defending this area any further would be futile. Although both men agreed that a withdrawal at this stage was the wiser decision, Hoge was skeptical that, given the weather and ground conditions, the defenders would be able to get out. Hoge pointedly asked Ridgway how it could be done. Ridgway answered, “Bill, we can and we will.” The withdrawal plan called for a general pullback west of the

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:16 AM Page 59

Salm River to an assembly area in the zone controlled by the 82nd Airborne Division in the vicinity of Lierneux. Aside from the cold and mud, there was also the enemy to contend with. Before the day ended, renewed fighting broke out along the entire front. There was a bitter struggle to the south of Grufflingen, and the Germans were again active in the Neubruck area. General Clarke again called on the 9th Armored for assistance to help stiffen his line, and Hoge responded by sending the 3rd Battalion, 424th Regimental Combat Team. The two commanders agreed that even without the mud to contend with the withdrawal would have to be delayed simply because of heavy enemy pressure. At 1 AM the 23rd, D Troop, 89th Recon lost an armored car and a jeep to antitank guns. At 1:30 the 27th AIB was hit hard and the sector held by Company B, 9th Engineers was deeply penetrated, causing the armored infantry to fall back under the protective guns of Company A, 14th Tank Battalion. An assault on Thommen forced out the troops holding the town, and efforts to retake it failed. Another attack hit the left flank of 7th Armored. Farther to the west, the 82nd Airborne, trying to keep a corridor open for the St.

Vith defenders, was coming under intense pressure from the 2nd SS Panzer Division. In light of these circumstances, General Hasbrouck felt compelled to write to Clarke that unless the withdrawal began soon “the opportunity will be gone.” During the night of December 22, a cold wind had begun to blow out of the east bringing what weathermen call a “Russian high.” Although both Clarke and Hoge noted it, they saw little hope that the ground might freeze in time to aid their withdrawal, but after receiving Hasbrouck’s message Clarke stepped out and tested the ground. He could not believe it. The ground was frozen solid. Shortly thereafter, Hasbrouck called and asked, “Bruce, do you think you can get out?” Clarke answered, “A miracle has happened, General! That cold snap that hit us has frozen the roads. I think we can make it now. At 0600 I’m going to start to move.” General Hoge received his order to pull CCB, 9th Armored out at 6:05 AM on December 23. The formations started to peel backward in succession from opposite Neubruck to Maldingen. As each unit joined the rear of the column, it took its turn being the rear guard. Company A of the 14th Tank Battalion had some trouble

Continued on page 126

National Archives

St. Vith lies a desolate ruin on February 7, 1945, days after the desperate fight for control of the key Belgian village was over. After several weeks of fighting, the Germans were forced to abandon their winter offensive and relinquish all the territory they had gained during the Battle of the Bulge.

disengaging. Two of its tanks were mired in mud that had not frozen and had to be retrieved by a tank dozer. Then, four German antitank guns covering the Grufflingen-Maldange road were encountered. One gun, firing from the house that had been the 14th Tank’s command post an hour earlier, disabled two of the Shermans, but the other tanks managed to knock out the four antitank guns plus three German command vehicles. Ninth Armored and its attachments traveled southwest on N26 to the junction with N33 west of Beho, then turned north on N33 to Salmchateau, and finally west on N183 through Lierneux to MalempreJevigne, southeast of Manhay. The tanks of the 14th Tank Battalion and the halftracks of the 27th AIB paused to pick up the foot elements of the 424th RCT, 106th Infantry Division. Company C, 27th AIB withdrew under heavy artillery and sniper fire but managed to destroy a number of German vehicles. The last of the St. Vith defenders to come out were Task Force Jones and the 112th Infantry Regiment. These troops were hit by the Führer Begleit Brigade and driven from Rogery to Cierreux in some disarray. Fortunately, a tank destroyer from Vielsalm turned up and hit the leading two German panzers, which drove the rest for

59

BB-Win05 Crossroads X_Layout 1 11/4/14 12:35 PM Page 60

Battle at Crossroads X

American glider troops march down a snowy road during the winter of 1944. Men of Company B, 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry Regiment held a crucial crossroads during the Battle of the Bulge and disrupted the timetable of the German panzer spearhead that was tasked with capturing key bridges across the Meuse River.

60

BB-Win05 Crossroads X_Layout 1 11/4/14 12:35 PM Page 61

A company of glidermen disrupted the timetable of the German 2nd Panzer Division and influenced the outcome of the Battle of the Bulge. By Leo Barron and Don Cygan

National Archives

For the cold and hungry GIs of Company B, 1st Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry Regiment, holding the western approach to Bastogne would push the men to the limits of their endurance. During several frigid days in December 1944, the young glider fighters of the 101st Airborne Division fought over a bleak intersection outside the Belgian town. The intersection, nicknamed Crossroads X by the men, quickly became the focus of bloody struggle between the Americans and Germans, as the might of Adolf Hitler’s armored forces desperately sought a way into besieged Bastogne. Private First Class Carmen Gisi of B Company remembers the contested landscape as if it was yesterday. “After the battle at the Crossroads we found out that we were fighting the first elements of the Germans’ 2nd Panzer Division,” Gisi recalled years later. “We were told we held up the offensive for two days, which was very critical to the Germans.” Due to the stubborn actions of Gisi’s single company, the might of the 2nd Panzer Division would be stymied in its attempts to break into Bastogne’s “back door” during the early days of the famous siege. The contest for Crossroads X would become brutal and desperate as seasoned Americans faced German armor. In the bigger picture, the valiant holding action by B Company would help put an end to the Battle of the Bulge. When the glidermen of Company B, 1/401st Glider Infantry leaped from the tailgates of the trucks that brought them to the outskirts of Bastogne on the night of December 19th, many of them had no clue where they were. The hours spent in the exposed trucks had been cold and miserable, and the men were happy the trip had come to an end. Initially, Lt. Col. Ray Allen, the battalion commander, ordered

61

BB-Win05 Crossroads X_Layout 1 11/4/14 12:35 PM Page 62

Both: Carmen Gisi

his companies to take up positions straddling the Marche Road and to prepare to defend the ground past the town of Mande St. Etienne. This location would help protect the road and was closest to the original assembly area, which grew increasingly quiet that night as the last groups of Screaming Eagles marched off to their positions. Bad news had arrived earlier that evening. The division’s 326th Medical Company had set up a field hospital in an open area to the west of Crossroads X (the intersection of the Marche Road and the Barriere Hinck). It was the 101st’s farthest position west of Bastogne. Almost as soon as they had pitched their tents, the hospital crew, believing they were in a safe rear area, had been attacked by advance elements of the 2nd Panzer Division. Rumors quickly reached the high command that the hospital had been wiped out. In the Heinz barracks headquarters back in Bastogne, the acting division commander, Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, looked visibly shaken when he heard the news, even if the particulars were unknown at the time. Not only would the division now find itself woefully short of corpsmen, medical officers, and supplies, but McAuliffe was concerned that the Germans had managed to get behind the American defensive perimeter so quickly. The news of the attack was a wake-up call for McAuliffe. He now realized how fast the Germans were moving. He needed to move immediately to regain control of the situation and secure the rear of his defenses around Bastogne. The man leading the mission to recapture the vital crossroads was Captain Robert J. MacDonald, the no-nonsense commander of 1st Battalion’s Baker Company. Like many World War II commanders, MacDonald was young. A reporter who knew MacDonald described him: “When young MacDonald stood up straight, he towered over his battalion commander like a beanpole: six feet, three inches tall; soaking-wet weight, 145 pounds. His flesh was so sparse that his shoulders were rubbed raw by the strap

62

ABOVE: Glider infantryman Carmen Gisi, kneeling in the center of this photo, took possession of a camera lost at a shattered field hospital and took numerous photos around the operations area of Company B, 1/401st Glider Infantry Regiment near Crossroads X. BELOW: Another photo taken by Carmen Gisi shows men of Company B in their snowy foxhole near Bastogne. Gisi is at far right in this group.

when he carried a pack. Only 23 years old, MacDonald had learned his lessons well in combat in Normandy and Holland.” That night, MacDonald received a warning order around 10:30 PM. Shortly afterward, the patrol, led by MacDonald himself, crossed the line of departure and headed west. He recalled how his company had ambushed a German infantry column marching down a road in Holland several months earlier. He vividly remembered how exposed the Germans were when he ordered his machine guns to open fire. He ordered his men to approach stealthily in the foggy dark, keeping strict noise discipline. MacDonald also divided Baker into two columns. Sneaking through

the ditches on either side, each group moved cautiously, purposely keeping off of the Bastogne-Marche Road. As the men approached the crossroads they could see the orange reflection of burning vehicles in the night sky. An even more troubling clue as to the fate of the hospital soon reached their ears. MacDonald’s men heard the strangest of sounds. It was a loud, continuous wail. Gisi, the young gliderman from New Jersey, remembered how eerie and shrill the noise was in the damp night air. When the Americans climbed a ridge overlooking the crossroads, they viewed a scene of utter devastation. Laid out in front of them were 16 burning 21/2-ton trucks. The vehicles had been abandoned by the roadside, still in convoy along the Salle-Barriere Hinck Road. A driver’s body had slumped forward in the cab of one of the trucks, lying on the horn and producing the wailing noise. Several bodies lay strewn about the fields near the hospital tents. MacDonald surveyed the scene and quickly began to formulate a plan. First, he sent two scouts down the slope to reconnoiter the area. The GIs crept stealthily away and after several minutes returned to report the Germans were still milling around the area. MacDonald breathed a heavy sigh. He knew Baker Company was about to go into battle again. This time, instead of the dikes and wet fields of Holland, it would be over a misty road junction in Belgium. As MacDonald and his men prepared to recapture the crossroads, the radio operators at the 327th Regimental Headquarters tracked their progress. As the reports came in, they scribbled messages on radio logs to keep their commanders informed. It had been a busy morning so far. One of the men taking notes belonged to Captain William L. Abernathy’s S2 section. For him, the news was not good. At 12:45 AM, reports filtered in that the Germans had sent half-tracks mounting heavy machine guns to guard Crossroads X. In addition, the Germans supposedly had captured an American armored vehicle and were using it to defend the same crossroads.

BB-Win05 Crossroads X_Layout 1 11/4/14 12:35 PM Page 63

Moreover, if there was any doubt about the fate of the medical company, the report at 1:15 AM confirmed the Americans’ worst fears. A jeep driver had escaped and reached one of the security patrols on the perimeter. The lucky paratrooper was from the 326th Medical Company and reported that indeed the Germans had captured the entire company, including the wounded on litters. As the Germans herded the prisoners together, several of the machine gunners in an African American transport company opened fire with their heavy machine guns. Chaos ensued as men on both sides dove for cover. Bullets zipped and zinged everywhere, slaying friend and foe alike. Within a few Patricia A. O’Malley

Carmen Gisi

unit had machine-gunned the tents and trucks, even though many were clearly marked with red crosses. In short, the Germans were at Crossroads X in force. It began to look like Baker Company would have a major fight on their hands. Meanwhile, Gisi could not believe the Germans were being so loud and careless. As one of the pair of scouts that MacDonald had sent to the crossroads to investigate the situation, he and a comrade crouched on their knees just below the short incline to the road, hidden from the Germans by the dark. Cautiously, the two men had snuck up to the road, clutching their M1 Garand rifles, fingers hovering

commence the attack. The rest of the company would then come down firing in an extended line, parallel to the road. As Gisi waited, he still could not believe the Germans were so close and so blatantly violating the military doctrine of noise discipline. “We could actually see them [the German soldiers] pretty well. Geez, even in the dark, I was 4-5 feet away, and Charlie and I were crouching on our knees behind that little rise there. We could hear them talking in German and their hobnails on their boots as they walked back and forth on the road.” The Germans had let their guard down. They had not pushed out local security ele-

Map © 2012 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

ABOVE LEFT: Lieutenant Clarence “Gus” Ryan was in the thick of the fighting at Crossroads X with Company B, 1/401st Glider Infantry Regiment. ABOVE RIGHT: Private First Class Carmen Gisi of Orange, New Jersey. RIGHT: American control of Crossroads X seriously impeded the progress of the German 2nd Panzer Division. A key to the defense of the road junction at Bastogne, Belgium, Crossroads X was held by glider troops during the most critical phase of the battle

moments however, the Germans killed the brave truckers, ending the fight. During the ensuing chaos, the plucky jeep driver had escaped, frantically making his way back to American lines. The information he provided was quickly relayed to McAuliffe’s headquarters. According to the driver, close to 100 Germany infantrymen had occupied the crossroads. With them were two half-tracks and multiple small arms, which seemed to confirm the earlier report. According to other survivors of the attack, many of the Germans were wearing civilian clothes and American uniforms as a ruse. However, unlike the soldiers, the officers wore the standard German field uniforms. Survivors stated that the German

over the triggers. “It was a miserable night. Dark. Snow flurries,” Gisi recalled. “Sergeant [Mike] Campana [Gisi’s platoon sergeant] instructed me and Charlie Sawyer to head out first, since we were scouts.” Campana told Gisi and Sawyer to fire two shots, which would be the signal to

ments to ensure their area was safe. MacDonald’s glidermen were about to teach them a fatal lesson for their military indiscretions. MacDonald’s plan was similar to a double envelopment. He quickly gathered his platoon leaders and platoon sergeants and, like a kid outlining a complex play on a

63

BB-Win05 Crossroads X_Layout 1 11/4/14 12:35 PM Page 64

sandlot football field, explained his plan. On the northeast side, Campana’s 3rd Platoon would occupy a blocking position to prevent Germans from escaping down that road. On the southwest side, 1st Lt. Selvan E. Shields would establish another blocking position. Meanwhile, 1st Platoon, under 1st Lt. John T. O’Halloran, and weapons platoon, under Technical Sergeant Robert Dunnigan, would set up a support position in the middle, facing almost directly at Crossroads X. Awaiting the signal from the scouts, the officers and senior NCOs moved out to their platoons. Lieutenant O’Halloran returned to his platoon and quickly briefed them on the operation. The glidermen of 1st Platoon moved out. When they were close to the objective, O’Halloran gave the order and the men lay down on their stomachs, as if

that moment that Gisi fired the two shots, splitting the night like thunder. Suddenly, over 100 slivers of light shattered the darkness. The steady rat-tat-tat of M1919 machine guns and the heavy chugging sound of Browning Automatic Rifles echoed across the rolling fields. For the Germans trapped in the crossfire, it was direct-fire death. The Germans scattered in all directions. When 1st Platoon heard Gisi’s rifle shots, the men stood up and opened fire. While they were firing, they marched forward to the trucks like gunslingers in an old Western film. When they reached the burning vehicles, some of the men then tossed hand grenades into the wood line just beyond the crossroads to kill any retreating Germans. Meanwhile, some of the German soldiers tried to escape down the northern and southern

National Archives

A half-track leads a column of German panzergrenadiers toward the front during the Battle of the Bulge. Veteran troops such as these took on the lightly armed men of Company B, 1/401st Glider Infantry Regiment at Crossroads X and failed to dislodge the plucky Americans in a timely manner.

to slither their way toward the burning trucks. While they waited for the signal, and though they were a little farther away than Gisi and Sawyer, the men of 1st Platoon could also hear the Germans chatting and laughing, oblivious to the impending attack. To 1st Platoon’s right, 3rd Platoon edged forward into its attack position. It was at

64

roads only to find the Americans waiting for them. For many of those Germans, it was their last decision. For the Americans, it was easy pickings. Only a handful of Germans managed to escape westward on the road to Tenneville. Nearby, Gisi and Sawyer saw shadows rapidly approaching. The two men quickly aimed their M1s at the dark blobs. They

called out to make sure the targets were German before they opened fire. The reply was in German. Campana’s platoon was still coming down from the ridge behind them, but Gisi knew they could not wait for them. They had to act now. As fast as they could squeeze their triggers, the two men shot round after round into the shadowy shapes. Gisi remembered: “Those Germans were close. They came right in front of our company when we hit them. I know when we [he and Sawyer] fired we killed a few of them. We even threw some grenades, but it was a short fight.” If any Germans had remained, Gisi felt sure the grenades had killed them. By the time the platoon reached the two scouts by the road, the fighting had ended. Gisi was thankful he had dodged death again. Fortunately, Baker Company suffered only one casualty. Gisi’s buddy, Frank Almovich, suffered a minor wound when a bullet grazed his left ear. Campana also had a close call when a German rifle round ricocheted off the buckle of his ammo belt. Other than that, Baker Company had successfully recaptured the crossroads intact. Captain MacDonald instantly informed Allen that the crossroads was in American hands. It was now 0445 hours. Even in the dark, MacDonald could make out the wreckage that was once the hospital in the field beyond the road. His men cautiously approached the tents, searching for comrades. They found no survivors. Allen called back and ordered MacDonald to set up a battle position with his company to defend the crossroads from any subsequent German attacks. MacDonald acknowledged the order and went to work. He knew he was out on a limb, far from the rest of his battalion. He could only hope the Germans did not know how vulnerable his position truly was. As dawn broke on the morning of the 20th, MacDonald and his men continued to explore the crossroads. The dead were everywhere. To the relief of everyone present, someone finally pushed back the body of the dead driver from the wailing truck horn. According to Gisi, the only

BB-Win05 Crossroads X_Layout 1 11/4/14 12:35 PM Page 65

sound after that was the eerie crackling of the flames in the burning vehicles. When he entered the abandoned field hospital, Gisi discovered two dead paratroopers. The Germans had slit their throats. One of the luckless paratroopers was still on a stretcher with his arm attached to a bag of blood plasma on a stand. Still, Gisi is not sure to this day that what he witnessed was the result of an execution. “I think the Germans did that because they were too badly injured—to put them out of their misery.” Gisi began to rummage through the wreckage and debris left behind. Reaching down in a hastily dug foxhole, he found a camera that still had some film. He turned around and snapped a photo of the abandoned field hospital. The empty tents, flapping in the breeze, were a reminder that the fortunes of war could turn on anyone at any time. The medics working in the hospital probably thought they were well behind friendly lines and protected from an enemy attack. Tragically, they were mistaken. MacDonald’s company salvaged whatever supplies and equipment they could find, including ammo, gas, rations, and medical supplies. The biggest haul was two .50-caliber machine guns removed from the trucks. The glidermen were thrilled to have these pristine weapons that were still caked with the waxy Cosmoline from the original packaging. The heavy barreled machine guns would come in handy in the further fighting for Bastogne. By 8 AM, Captain MacDonald radioed Allen that his position was secured. Looking over his shoulder toward Bastogne, MacDonald could barely see where the next American unit was, even with the gradual rising of the fog and daylight. In fact, it was over 4,000 yards away near the town of Flamierge. Baker Company was an island. Despite this isolation, orders were orders. Allen had told him to defend the crossroads, and that was that. To make matters worse, MacDonald had no artillery support. A forward observer from the 333rd Artillery Group would show up later that day, but even he had no way to

call back to division artillery. All MacDonald could do was hope the Germans did not press the issue and try to recapture

self. Earlier, he had two tank destroyers from 3rd Platoon, Baker Company of the 705th under his command, but they had

National Archives

Armed with bazookas, soldiers of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division man a roadblock along the defensive perimeter at Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge.

the crossroads. If they did, Baker Company could end up like the field hospital. Later that morning, the ever-present fog rolled back in and blotted out the sun. MacDonald knew what that meant. The Allied fighter-bombers were not flying, and when the P-47s could not fly, the Wehrmacht would take advantage, moving its tanks out in the open. Sure enough, within a few minutes MacDonald and the rest of Baker Company could hear the clanking of metal tracks from the direction of the little town of Salle to the north. MacDonald’s GIs jumped into their foxholes and waited. Soon, they could see the steel monsters—two German Panther Mark V tanks from the 2nd Panzer Division. They were only 50 yards up the road from Crossroads X when they rolled to a stop. With a great grinding of gears, the two metal leviathans turned and moved off the road. MacDonald probably swore to him-

left not long after they had arrived, believing the glidermen had things under control. The tank destroyer commanders did not think any German armor was about. They were wrong. There was a moment of nervous waiting on both sides, perhaps as the tankers were sizing up the situation from inside their steel hulls. Suddenly, the Panther crews opened up with machine-gun fire spraying the crossroads with bursts of 7.92mm bullets. Luckily, because they were firing blind, the bursts went over the heads of the glidermen hunkered down in their foxholes. MacDonald’s men were smart enough to realize this was more than they could handle without proper antitank support. No one shot back at the Panthers. With no reaction, the tank crews probably thought the Americans had left. The two tanks gunned their engines and headed

65

BB-Win05 Crossroads X_Layout 1 11/4/14 12:35 PM Page 66

Carmen Gisi

The abandoned and wrecked American field hospital discovered by troops of B Company. This eerie photo is another taken by Private First Class Carmen Gisi with the camera he found lying in a nearby foxhole. The medical personnel and patients at the hospital were either killed or captured by the Germans.

back toward Salle. MacDonald and his men breathed a sigh of relief. Possibly, this had been some sort of armored reconnaissance, but they knew the Germans would return to push the issue. It was only a question of when. On the 21st, Captain MacDonald awoke to another miserable, cloudy morning. This morning, the fog seemed to be at its worst, virtually surrounding his men. It seemed he would never see the sun again. Each day at Bastogne was like living in a London fog bank. MacDonald knew that once again the fog meant there would be no air support. He shook his head. Logically, the Germans also realized it was another chance to try something against his position, probably with armor. He looked outside his command post, watching some of his glidermen chomping on K rations while huddling in their foxholes, trying to stay warm and dry. Others were up and moving around, conducting their morning rituals. In their positions astride the Marche Road and on the heights above Crossroads X, it had been quiet for most of the morning. The only action so far had occurred when forward observers detected some enemy tanks firing at them from northwest of the crossroads. In response, an observer requested a fire mission from the 463rd, which responded with a brief but apparently

66

effective barrage. Other than that, the morning had passed uneventfully. Suddenly, explosions and gunfire tore through the stillness of the cold morning, as if a thunderstorm had burst among them. In his position to the right of the line, Sergeant Campana of 3rd Platoon heard the Germans vehicles before he saw them emerge from the mist. Without waiting for orders, he told his squad leaders to hold their fire. He wanted to know what was rolling down the road before firing on it. Even in the thick fog, Campana could tell that the vehicle sounds seemed to be coming from the town of Salle to the north, once again, most probably Germans. The glidermen checked their weapons, making sure they were loaded and ready. As they waited in their foxholes and the vehicle noises increased, the anticipation began to build. MacDonald’s men could hear the humming of German engines. Finally, after waiting for a couple of interminable minutes, the vehicles emerged from the murky clouds like Viking ship prows in the Norse Sea. Lined up in a row were several German Kubelwagens and a truck. The truck was towing some type of artillery piece. Luckily, 3rd Platoon had more than just machine guns and rifles. Campana had brought up one of the 57mm guns from the regiment’s Anti-Tank Weapons Company, and the crew quickly sighted the gun

at the lead Kubelwagen. Campana gave the signal. Fire erupted along the entire line as the platoon targeted the lead car. The Kubelwagen exploded as round after round tore through its thin steel plating. As a result, the entire German column sputtered to a halt, but before they could back up, Campana’s men turned their attention on the trail vehicle. Within seconds, it, too, was a burning wreck. Now, the entire column was trapped between the two destroyed vehicles. One Kubelwagen managed to weave its way through the maelstrom and escaped, frantically driving away at full speed. The others were not as fortunate. As the German soldiers jumped down from their vehicles, Campana’s riflemen blasted away at them. It was a textbook linear ambush. Deadly and sudden, within few short minutes it was over. Carmen Gisi recalled what happened after the ambush. “Well, we went down to see what we’d hit. I think all of the Germans were killed. We killed about 50, I think. Several got away. I don’t recall any prisoners, no—I’m pretty sure they were all either killed or ran off. I remember searching this one officer, I’m sure he was SS—a tall guy. We found American cigarettes and candy that had been taken off our guys from the field hospital. That made us mad, you know.” Hearing the action, Captain MacDonald rushed to the scene in time to witness the death throes of the German column as the last few vehicles were stopped by 57mm rounds. MacDonald nodded with grim satisfaction. His men had performed like the seasoned veterans that most of them were. They acted independently, like good troopers who did not rely on a call to their higher headquarters for orders and decisions. MacDonald was pleased that independent-minded NCOs like Mike Campana were the backbone of his company, and this morning they had shown their commander why Baker Company was one of the best in the regiment. After the firing died down, MacDonald called Colonel Allen to inform him of the good news. By 9 AM, regiment knew that Baker

BB-Win05 Crossroads X_Layout 1 11/4/14 12:35 PM Page 67

Author’s Photo

Company had destroyed an entire enemy column. It did not take long for Captain Abernathy to determine the column belonged to the 2nd Panzer Division. Several days before, the 2nd Panzer Division, part of the XXXXVII Panzer Corps, had burst through the Allied lines along the Our River. The division, commanded by Colonel Meinrad von Lauchert, was to execute the decisive operation for the Fifth Panzer Army. Its mission was to secure the crossings along the Meuse River near the city of Dinant. For the first few days, the 2nd Panzer Division had tasted the fruits of victory. It had fought a bitter and tough battle to cross the Our River, but after it had penetrated the crumbling defenses of the 110th Infantry Regiment, it roared westward like an unleashed lion. Its next victim was elements of the 9th Armored Division near Hamiville on the 19th. After a brief but one-sided battle during which the 2nd Panzer Division destroyed over two dozen tanks from the 9th Armored, it pushed through the forces of Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division and the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment at Noville. To the Americans, it seemed no one could stop them. Farther south, the Panzer Lehr Division, 2nd Panzer’s partner in the offensive, failed to capture Bastogne through a coup de main. The 101st Airborne Division had won the race to the town and secured the vital road hub. As a result, the supply lines of the 2nd Panzer Division had to circle around Bastogne from the north and then to the west. Overextended and vulnerable, this logjam created unforeseen problems, including increasing the amount of time it took vital supplies, such as gasoline and ammunition, to reach von Lauchert’s forward units. One such problem was the nondescript crossroads west of Bastogne, Crossroads X, where MacDonald and his men were stubbornly holding out, depriving the Germans of this vital road junction. Baker Company’s action on December 21 had an important effect on the Germans. For von Lauchert, the ambush at Crossroads X forced his hand. He could

This modern view of the battlefield at Crossroads X near the Barriere Hinck shows the gentle ridge that Company B troops used as concealment prior to launching their devastating attack on a German column traversing the Salle Road, seen in the distance.

no longer afford to ignore the American presence there since his forces and supply train were transiting so close to the nearby roadway. Now, he had to commit a Kampfgruppe, or battle group, to isolate and contain the American forces at Crossroads X, which he assumed to be a large task force. Had he known it was only a company, he might not have allocated so much combat power. The Germans, however, could not take any chances. It was becoming essential that none of the American units in Bastogne be permitted to use the roads and push out, potentially recapturing the bridge crossing at the Our River, which would interfere with the German objectives to the west. In short, because of the aggressive actions of MacDonald’s men at the crossroads, the Germans believed the resistance meant a sizable U.S. unit was holding the area. The skirmishes at the intersection had grown from a nuisance to a serious threat to the German line of communication westward to the Meuse River. For the Americans, it had been a job well done, even if they did not know how they had already disrupted the German plans for taking Bastogne and continuing to the Meuse River. For MacDonald’s men, however, their battle was just starting. That afternoon, MacDonald’s 3rd Platoon continued to occupy its positions north of the highway looking west toward

Marche. In front of them were the smoldering remains of the German column they had destroyed over an hour earlier. The glidermen were still pretty juiced up from the successful ambush, and it helped that it had been so one-sided. They had not lost a single man, but they had slaughtered scores of Germans. Regardless, many of the men guessed that the Germans were not going to give up so easily. Plenty of MacDonald’s men were veterans of Holland and Normandy. They had seen enough war to realize that their luck was probably not going to last. Fate could easily fall the other way. MacDonald knew that anticipating the next German move could pay dividends yet again, saving the lives of soldiers and guaranteeing success for his small company. Early warning was one way to prevent an ambush. Therefore, he placed two bazooka teams forward of Campana’s 3rd Platoon and the crossroads. An hour after the Kubelwagen ambush, the bazooka teams bore fruit. Around 1230 hours, the bazooka men again heard the clanking of treads coming from the direction of Marche. Two tanks from 2nd Panzer were rapidly approaching, feeling their way up the road. Removing the safety pins, the American loaders slid the 2.36-inch rockets into each tube and wrapped the tiny wires from the back of the rockets into the magneto clamp on

67

BB-Win05 Crossroads X_Layout 1 11/4/14 12:35 PM Page 68

the back of each bazooka tube. They then patted the gunners on the back as a signal that they were loaded. The gunners readied themselves for action, fingers hovering over the large triggers. Private Joe Karpac squinted, trying hard to peer into the misty gloom. Suddenly, he could make out two German Mark IV tanks heading straight down the road. Long before, Karpac and men of the other team had worked out a system where they would draw the tank’s fire, and after the tank fired, shoot before the tank could reload. It was a risky system if the gunner had the guts to expose himself. This would be even riskier today, since Karpac noticed they had only a frontal shot, the place where a tank’s armor is thickest. The gunners tensed as the metal beasts edged closer to their positions. Finally, the lead tank fired its main gun, shattering the silence. Karpac dashed into the road before the tank could get off a second shot. He had only seconds to look down the sight of his bazooka at the lead tank and pull the trigger. The M6 HEAT (High-Explosive, Anti-Tank) projectile whooshed from the barrel. Karpac could only watch helplessly as the round missed. Before the other enemy crew could get a bead on Karpac, he dove for cover. With a great blast, the trailing tank shot its main gun at the elusive bazooka gunner. Now, it was the second bazooka gunner’s turn. Like Karpac, he jumped out to engage the tank, and like Karpac, he missed. Again, the trailing tank blasted its gun at Karpac’s comrades, but it missed too. Amazingly, Karpac summoned up the courage to try this little stunt again. He felt confident he would not miss a second time. After the second tank had fired, he dashed back into the street. His heart was beating faster than a snare drummer on parade. Karpac took a deep breath to steady it. He peered down the tube sight again. The tank seemed to grow in his sights like some great charging beast. Finally, he pulled the trigger. In less than a second, the rocket sailed over the road and slammed into the

68

German tank, which began to shudder and stall. Thick, oily smoke rose up from within it like a sputtering stove. The effect was contagious. The crew of the other tank retreated. Shifting to reverse, the German driver began to back away from the surviving vehicle. The tank left the smoking wreck to its fate, clanking off to where it had emerged out of the fog. Once again, MacDonald’s glidermen had successfully defended the crossroads. The men took a break, smoked cigarettes, congratulated each other, and breathed a sigh of relief. They knew it would probably be only a brief pause before the next German attack. While Karpac and company were chasing off tanks near Crossroads X, their battalion commander, Lt. Col. Ray Allen, sensed it was time to rethink his plan. Baker Company’s little combat outpost had certainly disrupted Wehrmacht movements around the crossroads as well as holding off multiple enemy probes over the last 24 hours, but it was isolated and dangerously exposed. The crossroads was getting harder and harder to defend. Allen knew that if the Germans decided to press their numbers, they would easily overwhelm MacDonald’s tiny force. As the morning drew to a close and he received the reports, Allen was becoming more convinced it was time to bring back MacDonald and his boys. At 11:30 another straggler from the 28th Infantry Division arrived at the command post. He was tired, haggard, and sullen. Still, he provided some valuable but troubling information to Allen: the Germans were in Sibret. In fact, the straggler said he had seen two tanks and 30 Germans there. If that was the case, it meant the Germans had finally cut the road to Neufchateau and Bastogne truly was surrounded. The news became worse in the afternoon. One of Allen’s own patrols reported back at 1220 that the Germans had occupied the town of Chenogne with 30 soldiers. According to Allen’s map, Chenogne was a mere 11/2 miles northwest of Sibret, and Sibret was only three miles from his own CP near the town of

Flamierge. He gritted his teeth. If he did not pull Baker Company back soon, the Germans would likely come up from the south and cut off MacDonald’s men. If that happened, Allen would be unable to do anything to support or rescue the lone company. After all, his other two companies, Able and Charlie, were having troubles of their own. Both were busy defending other parts of the sector. As a matter of fact, the entire battalion was out on a limb with only a thin stream of supply and communication to Allen’s headquarters. Allen knew that division headquarters wanted them out there, and no other orders had come down from Harper or anyone higher to relinquish the crossroads and pull B Company back. The whole situation was making Allen anxious. He knew that with each passing hour, as the Germans continued to move through the fog banks groping to find gaps or the flanks of the his lines, the situation for MacDonald and his men grew more and more precarious. By midafternoon, Baker Company’s situation was beginning to deteriorate. MacDonald’s stubborn glidermen had not suffered any significant losses, but the Germans were pushing hard on three sides, and it was merely a matter of time before they broke through the lines somewhere around the 1/401st salient. Since Baker was the most extended company, Allen felt it was the one unit most in peril at the time. This was confirmed at 1:50 PM when Allen heard the radio crackle as MacDonald reported that they were under attack again. It was the third push the Germans had attempted that day. Allen made sure his command post forwarded every report to regiment as quickly as possible. He knew that Harper’s regimental headquarters would pass this information along to division headquarters. McAuliffe had left Allen the discretion to withdraw when he felt his battalion was in danger of being cut off. Pulling B Company back a bit would help him consolidate his already thin line of defense around Mande and Flamierge. Welcome news finally arrived that after-

BB-Win05 Crossroads X_Layout 1 11/4/14 12:35 PM Page 69

National Archives

noon. McAuliffe had discussed the situation with his staff, and after careful consideration McAuliffe had agreed to withdraw Baker Company from Crossroads X. The signal was coded and sent to Allen. Almost immediately, and with a certain measure of relief, Allen had his radio operator instruct MacDonald to pull back in the manner prescribed. Allen then looked at his watch. It was now 2 PM. He hoped that it was not too late. Several hours later, Captain MacDonald stomped the mud off his boots as he entered the battalion headquarters to report that his company had safely returned from Crossroads X. Thankfully, the company’s withdrawal went smoothly. The men had commandeered some of the trucks from the abandoned field hospital and used the vehicles to transport the company and its support elements almost three miles back to friendly lines. As a result, the whole process took very little time to complete. Within a half hour the men of Baker Company were digging in on a new line of defense near the town of Flamizoulle. Still, MacDonald was fuming. He realized how shaky his position had truly been. He felt his entire company had been fighting off Germans with little support from the rest of the battalion, much less the division. Frankly, he had no idea why he was out there hanging onto the crossroads by his fingernails. Any commander knows that it is hard to get his men to fight for something when he, himself, could not see the purpose behind their mission. MacDonald, who by nature was a bit volatile, struggled to control his anger and frustration when he went to see Allen. Several years after the war, MacDonald recalled his feelings that night: “From a company commander’s position up to this point I frankly could see no sane reason for our having been out on the mission that we had just completed for such an extended period of time. This is a dangerous state of mind for any commander to be in.” Allen could see that his subordinate was angry. In a fatherly fashion, Allen imme-

In the aftermath of a fight during which they knocked it out, American soldiers inspect the hulk of a German PzKpfw. V Panther tank. Troops of B Company stood their ground against several German tanks at Crossroads X during the height of the Battle of the Bulge.

diately calmed his company commander. “It’s good to see you back, Robert. You probably wondered why you were out there for so long,” Allen said, shaking MacDonald’s hand. MacDonald nodded and replied, “As a matter of fact, sir, I did wonder why we were out there for so long.” “I realize you were out there with no one on your flanks. However, your little outpost really disrupted the German panzer division trying to sweep around to the north,” Allen explained. “Anyway, since Bastogne appears to be cut off there was no need for you to keep the road westward open anymore. Hence, division decided to pull you back. You’re going to be the reserve for now.” The young captain, hearing his new orders, snapped a quick a salute and left the room. He would eventually learn that his commander was right. For three critical days, his lone company of glidermen had seriously disrupted the German line of communication around Bastogne. In fact, tactically, Crossroads X had become a microcosm—a tiny version of Bastogne. Because it was denied the road junction, the 2nd Panzer Division had to travel farther

out of its way to reach its next objective. As early as December 20, the 2nd Panzer Division was already experiencing a fuel shortage that slowed its operations. In addition, the division eventually had to commit an entire Kampfgruppe to recapture the vital road junction so that the Americans could not threaten the critical bridgehead at Ortheuville to the west. Together with the roadblock obstacles around Champlon, which were the handiwork of U.S. Army combat engineers, the Germans were forced to slow their advance. In the end, the constant disruptions and tiny battles sapped the strength of the 2nd Panzer Division. As a result, it ran out of gas within sight of its ultimate destination, the crossings at the Meuse River. Had von Lauchert’s division been able to reach the Meuse, the Battle of the Bulge might have ended differently. Thanks to the efforts of men like Robert MacDonald, Carmen Gisi, Mike Campana, Joseph Karpac, and the other members of Baker Company of the 1/401st, the German tanks sputtered to a halt and fell victim to Allied armor and the U.S. Army Air Forces on Christmas Day, 1944.

69

BB-Win14 Malmedy_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:20 AM Page 70

MALMÉDY IS AN ATTRACTIVE and prosperous town situated in eastern Belgium, 15 miles from the German border. But it was not always so. In 1871, it was part of the Prussian Reich (Empire) and it was only after Germany’s defeat in World War I that, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, it was ceded to Belgium. Needless to say, this forced change of nationality was unpopular with most of the inhabitants who continued to speak, and consider themselves, German. Then,

on May 10, 1940, Belgium was again invaded by the Germans and Malmédy found itself returned to Hitler’s Third Reich. However, this new status was again short-lived. In September 1944, following the successful Allied landings in Normandy and subsequent race across France, American troops entered the town, and Malmédy once more became part of the Kingdom of Belgium. Just three months later, at 7 AM on Saturday, December 16, four mammoth

The Belgian village near the site of an infamous massacre was successfully defended against German attacks during the great battle. Three SS Panzergrenadiere dash across a road seeking cover. This photograph—like others from the series in which it is a part—was probably staged after actual combat at this site had ended.

70

310mm shells fired from German railway guns fell on the town, killing 16 civilians and causing considerable damage. Hitler had launched his last great offensive in the West and, although neither the local inhabitants nor the Americans stationed in the town knew it, they were lying directly in the path of Waffen SS General Sepp Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army! Sepp Dietrich had three corps to command: I SS Panzer Corps with the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions (Leibstandarte

BB-Win14 Malmedy_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:20 AM Page 71

MALMÉDY

By Major General Michael Reynolds

& the Bulge

National Archives

71

BB-Win14 Malmedy_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:20 AM Page 72

and Hitlerjugend), plus one parachute and two Volksgrenadier divisions; II SS Panzer Corps with the 2nd and 9th SS Panzer Divisions (Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg), and the LXVII Corps with two Volksgrenadier divisions. The plan called for the parachute and Volksgrenadier divisions to make a break in the crust of the American defense, and then form a hard shoulder on the right flank of the proposed advance. The 1st and 12th SS would then surge across the Meuse south of Liège in one all-powerful wave, followed by the II SS Panzer Corps, which would then exploit to the northwest and seize Antwerp. Malmédy was the first major objective of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. The second, much larger group had the collective title of 150th Panzer Brigade; it comprised some 3,000 men and was to be equipped with armored vehicles. Its task was to move at night in three Kampfgruppen (battle groups, KGs), on parallel lines to the advancing panzer spearheads and seize bridges over the Meuse. During the event, some of Skorzeny’s four-man commando teams, using U.S. jeeps and uniforms, successfully penetrated American lines, with at least one reaching Malmédy and another getting as far as Huy on the Meuse. A number of American units were based in Malmédy in December 1944. Along with military government personnel and military police, there was a field evacuation hospital, a reinforcement depot, B Company of Lt. Col. Dave Pergrin’s 291st Engineer Combat Battalion, and the 962nd Engineer Maintenance Company. These latter two units were part of Colonel Wallace Anderson’s 1111th Engineer Group. Dave Pergrin, age 27, was a civil engineer by profession and a keen soldier by inclination. After graduating from Penn State College in 1940, he joined the Army and by September 1943 had risen to command the 291st. His unit landed in Normandy on June 24, 1944, and after the breakout through France reached the Ardennes the following September. By

72

December, his companies were based in Malmédy, Stoumont, and Werbomont and were fully involved in road maintenance and an Army winterization program that saw them cutting timber in the forests and working sawmills in the local towns. Over the two months they had been there, Pergrin’s men had come to know the area and its people extremely well. Life for these rear-based troops was really quite pleasant. After the German withdrawal in September, life in Belgium quickly reverted to normal; the Walloons (French-speaking Belgians) and Americans got on well together, and the tensions of the German occupation soon eased. However, it was not quite as relaxed in Malmédy where many of the German-speaking inhabitants treated the Americans with a sullen indifference. After all, some of the men from the town and the immediate area were still serving in the Wehrmacht! Food rationing for civilians was still in force, but blackout restrictions were virtually forgotten, and by early December everyone had begun to think about Christmas. Certainly, no one thought the Germans were capable of taking any offensive action at this stage of the war, and the arrival of the four 310mm shells came as a great shock. Indeed, one of the most remarkable things about the American side on December 16 is that although the 99th Infantry Division was engaged in very heavy fighting just to the east and northeast of Malmédy throughout the National Archives

day, the Americans in the town were seemingly unaware of what was happening and that they were about to be engulfed in a major German offensive. There is not a single entry in the daily log of Colonel Anderson’s 1111th Engineer Combat Group to indicate anything unusual, and Pergrin himself was certainly in the dark about what was going on. He wrote later: “Captain John Conlin, our B Company commander in Malmédy came to see me [about the 310mm shells]… I immediately took off [for Malmédy]… and discovered great damage near the General Hospital…. After Conlin had taken over the job of taking care of the wounded and repairing craters in the road, I left Malmédy… I [did not] have the faintest idea that the spearhead of the Sixth Panzer Army would come crashing through in the next 24 hours.” Fortunately for both the Americans and the civilians in Malmédy, Hitler’s great plan went badly wrong on the first day of his offensive. By midnight on December 16, the American 99th Division, although by then reduced to half-strength, was still holding most of its positions and the German Volksgrenadiers and paratroopers had failed to achieve any sort of breakthrough. Indeed, the Hitlerjugend’s armored KGs were still on the German side of the frontier! Similarly, the Leibstandarte’s advance was more than 12 hours behind schedule, and its two leading KGs were also still in Germany.

BB-Win14 Malmedy_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:20 AM Page 73

National Archives

On Sunday morning, December 17, Lieutenant Frank Rhea, a West Point officer commanding 3rd Platoon in B Company of the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion, decided to visit some of his men working on road maintenance between Waimes and Bütgenbach, just to the east of Malmédy. He had no idea that a major German offensive had started, but as he drove east he was puzzled by the heavy volume of U.S. traffic moving past him, heading west. He visited his work detail and then decided to go on to Bütgenbach to the 99th Division headquarters to find out what was happening. On arrival, Rhea was told that German tanks had broken through just to the east of Bütgenbach. Needless to say, he rushed back to Malmédy to report to his company commander, Captain John Conlin. This alarming news was immediately passed on to Dave Pergrin. At about the same time, Pergrin’s superior, Colonel Wallis Anderson, heard from his liaison officer at V Corps headquarters that German tanks had been seen in the vicinity of his 629th Engineer Light Equipment Company at Bütgenbach earlier that morning but had been repelled. Although this was inaccurate information, Anderson naturally decided to take action. He ordered the 629th Engineer Light Equipment Company to pull back to Malmédy and told Pergrin to go to the town and assume command of all the engineer units there. During his drive to Malmédy, Pergrin ran into an armored column of the 7th Armored Division moving through Trois Ponts, and on arrival in Malmédy he found another column of the same division transiting the town. Both these columns were heading south to help the battered and beleaguered 106th Infantry Division in the St. Vith area. The report of German tanks near Bütgenbach had made Pergrin very uneasy, but there was little he could do other than send out an exploratory jeep reconnaissance on the road toward Waimes, call for the machine guns and machine gunners of his A Company at Werbomont, and order road-

Camouflaged with white paint, German tanks traverse an icy road toward the River Meuse and a date with destiny. OPPOSITE: Caked with mud and accompanied by a German war correspondent, an officer and driver belonging to Kampfgruppe Peiper examine a map to determine their next move.

blocks to be set up on all the major approaches to Malmédy. At about midday, the jeep patrol brought back more disturbing news. German tanks were approaching Thirimont, only four miles southeast of Malmédy. They were part of KG Peiper, the leading element of the 1st SS Panzer Division. Pergrin realized at once that if these tanks turned northwest toward Malmédy there was virtually nothing he could do to stop them. Fortunately for Pergrin and his men, the eyes of the commander of the KG, SS Lt. Col. Jochen Peiper, were firmly set on Ligneuville to the south. As far as Peiper was concerned, Malmédy was the responsibility of the 12th SS Hitlerjugend. The only uncommitted troops in the U.S. First Army on the morning of December 17 were the 99th Infantry Battalion (Separate); the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion, less C Company, which was guarding 12th Army Group commanding general Omar Bradley’s tactical headquarters in Luxembourg City; and A Company of the 825th Tank Destroyer (TD) Battalion. They were all based to the west of Spa. These three units were alerted for a possible move between 1100 and 1300 hours. At roughly the same time, General Courtney Hodges, the First Army com-

mander, asked for the 30th Infantry Division, part of General William H. Simpson’s Ninth U.S. Army, to be moved south to the Stavelot–Malmédy area as soon as possible. His request was granted, and units of the division received a warning order at 11:40 AM. The first regiment, the 119th, was on the move at 4:25 PM. The 117th and 120th Infantry Regiments were directed to the Malmédy area and the 119th farther to the west. In Malmédy itself there had been something of a panic on that Sunday morning. Apart from Pergrin, his B Company, and the 962nd Engineer Maintenance Company, everybody else had “bugged out.” Pergrin knew that these few engineers could not possibly hold the largest town in the region without substantial reinforcements in the form of infantry, TDs, and artillery; nevertheless, he made the brave decision to stay on in the town. At about midday, one of the serials in the 7th Armored Division column transiting Malmédy, B Battery of the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, arrived outside Pergrin’s temporary headquarters in the Renz house on the St. Vith road. In the leading jeep were two officers who told Pergrin they were heading south through Ligneuville to St. Vith. Pergrin warned them that German armor had

73

BB-Win14 Malmedy_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:21 AM Page 74

been seen just to the east of their proposed route and advised them to turn around and divert via Stavelot, Trois Ponts, and Vielsalm. However, the two officers decided to continue the way they were heading and moved off at about 12:30 PM in the direction of Ligneuville—with disastrous results. Little did they know that four miles down the road they would run into KG Peiper and become involved in the single largest massacre of U.S. troops in Europe. As a result of this meeting with KG Peiper, 84 Americans died and 25 were wounded. Fifty-six men survived, of which seven became prisoners of war. There were no German casualties. Although the massacre took place in the hamlet of Baugnez, this tragic incident became known as the Malmédy Massacre. At about 2:30 PM, Dave Pergrin, having heard gunfire to the southeast, decided to

message to his rear headquarters at Haute Bodeux stating that there had been some sort of massacre of American soldiers in the vicinity of Malmédy. At the same time, he ordered his own C Company, based 14 miles to the west at Stoumont, to reinforce him in the town. Pergrin’s message about a massacre no doubt helped to focus minds at First Army headquarters, for at 5 PM the 99th Infantry and 526th Armored Infantry Battalions and A Company, 825th TD Battalion, already on standby, were ordered to proceed to Malmédy at once. At about the same time, Pergrin sent a further message to his boss, Colonel Wallis Anderson, telling him that the German armored column had moved south from Baugnez toward Ligneuville. He had learned this from the B Battery survivors. This message made a major impact on Anderson. It meant that German tanks

National Archives

BELOW: U.S. Army combat engineers, having wired a tactically important bridge with 850 lbs. of dynamite, await orders to destroy it. OPPOSITE: Although initially successful, the German armored spearhead at the Bulge lost momentum as pockets of American troops provided stiff resistance at key points, such as Malmédy and Bastogne.

make a reconnaissance in that direction. Sometime between 3:15 and 4:15 PM, after dismounting from his vehicle at Geromont and proceeding with one of his sergeants, Bill Crickenberger, on foot, he encountered three of the American survivors. He rushed them back to his headquarters and sent a

74

were only 16 miles from First Army headquarters at Spa and only 12 miles from his own at Trois Ponts. By last light on the 17th, the immediate threat to Malmédy had been lifted, but there was no doubt in anyone’s mind that the defenders were still in grave danger.

At 11:15 PM, Colonel Anderson, knowing the 629th Equipment and 962nd Maintenance Companies were of little use in an infantry role, ordered Pergrin to send them back to a location near the Meuse. Between 3 AM and dawn on Monday, December 18, major U.S. reinforcements reached Malmédy. Pergrin, with his 180 engineers, had bravely stayed in the town, but with only mines, demolition charges, light machine guns, and bazookas, for which they had precious little ammunition, the seven roadblocks they had set up on the major approaches into the town formed only a very primitive defense. One can only wonder what might have happened if the armored KGs of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend had broken through the stubborn American defenses at Krinkelt and Rocherath, or Jochen Peiper had been ordered to switch routes and advance through Malmédy! The first infantry unit to arrive in Malmédy was Lt. Col. Harold Hansen’s 99th Infantry Battalion, consisting mainly of first-generation Norwegian Americans. It was completely in the town by 3 AM. Shortly after this, the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion, less two companies, and A Company of the 825th TD Battalion, less a platoon, came in and deployed on the east and south sides of the town. This group was subordinated to Hansen, and by first light a reasonable defensive posture had been adopted, absorbing Pergrin’s roadblocks. At 10:10 AM, Colonel Walter Johnson, commanding the 117th Infantry Regiment of the 30th Infantry Division, arrived in Malmédy, with his 3rd Battalion. They had been expecting to find the town in German hands and were relieved to find Hansen and Pergrin there with the situation under control. They were disgusted, however, with the scenes that met their eyes: abandoned American equipment, clothing, documents, and food wherever they looked. The 3rd Battalion immediately started to prepare positions on the southeast side of the town. During the first daylight hours of December 18, KG Peiper, having advanced

BB-Win14 Malmedy_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:21 AM Page 75

Map © 2014 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

through Ligneuville the previous evening, attacked Stavelot, five miles west of Malmédy. Despite some heroic actions by the American defenders, the battle was over by 10 AM and the town abandoned to Peiper’s column. Part of the defending force, the 1st and 2nd Platoons of A Company, 526th Armored Infantry Battalion, and the one remaining TD of the 1st Platoon, 825th TD Battalion, withdrew to Malmédy, which they reached at midday. The afternoon of the 18th saw a major strengthening of the Malmédy defenses. At 1 PM the command post of Colonel Branner Purdue’s 120th Infantry Regiment was established in Bevercé, a mile north of the town. At this stage, the plan was for the regiment to act as a reserve. Accordingly, one battalion was deployed at Bevercé, one to the east of Malmédy at Chodes, and the other to the west of the town on the Stavelot road. Following the deployment of the 3rd Battalion of the 117th Regiment on the southeast side of Malmédy, another battalion of the regiment, the 2nd, took up positions on the west side of the town between Burninville and Masta. The 1st Battalion of this regiment had been diverted to Stavelot where a major crisis had developed following its fall to KG Peiper. On Tuesday, December 19, the commander of the 30th Division, Maj. Gen. Leland Hobbs, decided to concentrate the whole of the 117th Infantry Regiment in the Stavelot sector and give responsibility for the defense of Malmédy to Colonel Purdue’s 120th Regiment. Accordingly, all existing units in the town were placed under Purdue’s command, Lt. Col. Ellis Williamson’s 1st Battalion of the 120th Infantry, supported by 1st Platoon, B Company, 823rd TD Battalion, and 3rd Platoon, A Company, 825th TD Battalion, relieved the 3rd Battalion of the 117th Regiment on the eastern flank, and Lt. Col. Peter Ward’s 3rd Battalion took up positions on the southwest side of Malmédy. The 2nd Battalion was held in divisional reserve at Bevercé. Pergrin retained responsibility for the demolitions on the

Warche River bridge, the large railway viaduct on the west side of the town, and the three railway underpasses on the southern side. His engineers, now relieved of responsibility for five of their original roadblocks, put out more mines, while his machine gunners thickened up the infantry on the railway embankment. During the afternoon, K Company of the 3rd Battalion, 120th Infantry established strong positions on both sides of the Warche bridge. The other two TDs of 2nd Platoon, A Company, 825th were located near a house, now demolished, on the south side of the bridge. The four M10s tank destroyers of 2nd Platoon, B Company, 823rd TD Battalion were held as a mobile reserve behind the railway embankment. Two 90mm, one 40mm, and two quadruple 50-caliber antiaircraft guns of the 110th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Robert Wilson, also joined the defenses and were placed on the high ground to the north of Malmédy in a position where they could dominate the southern approaches. By last light on the 19th, the Malmédy defenses were in good shape, and the arrival of the 1st Infantry Division in the Butgenbach–Waimes sector ensured that the efforts of the 12th SS Panzer Division to break through toward the town from the east would be frustrated.

There was no fighting in the Malmédy sector on Wednesday, December 20, although intermittent artillery fire fell on the town. However, in the latter part of the day KGs X and Y of SS Lt. Col. Otto Skorzeny’s 150th Panzer Brigade assembled in the Ligneuville area for action against the town on the 21st. Kampfgruppe Z had been unable to reach the area in time for the attack but was seen as a potential reserve. Kampfgruppe X was equipped with one Sherman and five Panther tanks disguised to look something like Shermans. It comprised two infantry companies of about 120 men each and a heavy company with two panzergrenadier, two heavy mortar, and two anti-tank platoons; it also had pioneer and signal platoons. Kampfgruppe Y had the same organization, but was strengthened by Sturmgeschutze (StuG, armored assault guns) instead of tanks. Sepp Dietrich’s orders to Skorzeny were simple. On Thursday the 21st, he was to capture or at least neutralize Malmédy and, most importantly, to open up a route toward Spa for the 12th SS Panzer Division and also clear the road from Malmédy to Stavelot. This latter task was vitally important for the resupply of KG Peiper, which was now in trouble well to the west in the area of La Gleize and Stoumont.

75

BB-Win14 Malmedy_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:21 AM Page 76

German intelligence on Malmédy was sketchy. It was based on one of Skorzeny’s own commando patrols, which had penetrated the town on the 17th and found only Pergrin’s few engineers. The Germans had no idea that since then it had been strongly reinforced. Skorzeny was given no artillery support for his attack, so he decided his only hope of success was to surprise the Americans. Both KGs were to attack in the dark, KG X from due south and KG Y down the main Baugnez–Malmédy road. Kampfgruppe X was targeted not on the town, but on the vital road junction south of

…THE AMERICANS HAD NOT APPRECIATED THAT THE ROAD JUNCTION JUST TO THE WEST OF THE WARCHE RIVER BRIDGE WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO THE GERMANS THAN THE TOWN ITSELF. Burninville. This initially required securing the Warche River bridge. Unfortunately for Skorzeny, one of his men was captured near Malmédy on Wednesday afternoon and revealed, under interrogation, that the town was to be attacked at 3:30 AM the following morning. By midnight, all the American units had been warned. When Skorzeny’s men advanced down the hill toward Malmédy at 3 AM on the 21st, Lt. Col. Ellis Williamson’s 1st Battalion of the 120th Infantry and the four TDs of 3rd Platoon, A Company, 825th TD Battalion were ready for them. The

76

fact that this attack was launched nearly four hours before the attack by KG X on the south side of Malmédy would indicate that it was seen by Skorzeny as more of a decoy than a serious attempt to capture the town. By attacking that much earlier, he probably hoped to draw U.S. reserves to the eastern approach. The leading infantry company of KG Y ran straight into B Company, 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry near the railway crossing on the main road to the east of Malmédy. Captain Murray Pulver, the company commander, described what happened in his book Longest Year: “Company B was given a position on the main road leading south to St. Vith… we quickly set up a road block at a small settlement called Mon Bijou… at 3 AM, an American halftrack came down the road followed by a column of tanks and other vehicles. The half-track hit a mine and lost its front wheels… when the half-track was disabled a group of German soldiers moved forward and one yelled ‘Hey! We’re American soldiers— don’t shoot!’ But they didn’t fool those two great soldiers. Sergeant Denaro let loose with his Browning automatic rifle and Sergeant Henderson fired and knocked out a TD following the half-track. Very soon the whole of 1st Platoon were engaged. The road was narrow with a high bank on the right and a gully on the other side making it impossible for the German tanks to advance. Barbed wire prevented foot soldiers circling us to get the mines [laid by Dave Pergrin’s men] off the road.… Very soon we began receiving heavy mortar and machine gun fire.… I think every gun in the 230th Artillery fired in our support… Things remained pretty hot until daylight. We could hear the tanks moving around but our artillery was giving them hell. Soon the tanks backed off, turned round and retreated… We lost two men killed and had four wounded.” This was one of the first occasions when American artillery used the new and highly secret “Pozit” fuse. This caused a shell to burst above, rather than on contact with, the ground, thus show-

ering fragments over a much wider area. This had a devastating effect on the attacking German infantry and the KG, having lost two StuGs, was stopped dead in its tracks. One of the StuGs had been abandoned practically intact after a high explosive round had caused minor damage at the rear. Skorzeny’s main attack came at 6:50 AM on the 21st, not 4 AM as some reports say, against the American right flank. It will be remembered that the main Malmédy defense line was the railway embankment running roughly west to east on the south side of the town. B Company of the 99th Infantry Battalion, with two TDs of 2nd Platoon, A Company, 825th TD Battalion, was responsible for the Rue de Falize railway underpass. B Company, 526th Armored Infantry had its 2nd and 3rd Platoons with the other two TDs of 2nd Platoon, A Company, 825th covering the other two underpasses, while its 1st Platoon with two 57mm antitank guns was sited at the railway viaduct over the main road leading into Malmédy from the west. Companies I and L of the 3rd Battalion of the 120th were located in the western part of the town, well inside the railway embankment, and they do not seem to have been involved to any extent in the day’s fighting. Company K, on the other hand, with a machine gun platoon of M Company and the four towed TDs of 1st Platoon, B Company, 823rd TD Battalion, sited as they were in the area of the Warche River bridge and the vital road junction just to its west, would bear the brunt of the German attack. A large paper factory still stands just to the east of the bridge, and until a couple of years ago there was a lone house on the opposite side of the road. The headquarters of 1st Platoon, B Company, 823rd TD Battalion was located in this house with two of its TDs nearby; the other two TDs were north of the river. South of the paper mill was a large open area, now completely built over, stretching a good half-mile before the ground rises quite steeply. This area had been heavily mined

BB-Win14 Malmedy_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:21 AM Page 77

and sown with trip flares by Pergrin’s engineers. Four M-10 TDs of the 2nd Platoon, B Company, 823rd TD Battalion were in reserve in a central position behind the railway embankment. Six artillery battalions were capable of firing in support of the Malmédy defenses, and it will be recalled that the antiaircraft guns of the 110th AAA Battalion were deployed on the north side of Malmédy. In reserve, in the area of Bevercé, were the 2nd Battalion of the 120th, the rest of Hansen’s 99th Infantry, and B Company, less one platoon, of Lt. Col. George Rubel’s 740th Tank Battalion which had now arrived as part of Hobbs’s divisional reserve. Skorzeny’s men had an impossible task. Despite all these forces there were two serious defects in the Malmédy defenses. First, the Americans had not appreciated that the road junction just to the west of the Warche River bridge was more important to the Germans than the town itself. Its capture would open up the roads to Spa and Stavelot. This misappreciation had led to only weak forces being positioned at the Warche bridge and road junction complex, and this weakness was further exacerbated by the fact that the boundary between the 117th and the

120th regiments was drawn too near to the vital road junction. As one regimental history puts it, “It must be said that the responsibilities of the two sister regiments at the vaguely defined inter-regimental boundary were none too explicit.” The other incredible weakness was that the Warche River bridge could not be blown because the detonator for the demolition had been removed. It had always been the intention of the First Army chief engineer to withdraw Pergrin’s battalion from Malmédy as soon as it could be relieved by the 30th Division’s engineers, but Hobbs had argued for it to remain under his command, and he had won the day. In preparation for their expected withdrawal, however, Pergrin’s men had handed over responsibility for the demolitions on the Warche River bridge and the railway viaduct to the infantry. For safety reasons, the detonators had been removed. Shortly after 6 AM, the entire area around the paper factory was illuminated by flares set off by the attacking infantry and tanks of KG X. One part of the KG followed the Rue de Falize toward the railway underpass where the leading Panther tank “brewed up” on a mine. The

99th Infantry Battalion’s after-action report says the attacking column consisted of three U.S. jeeps, one half-track, an American M-8 armored car, a Tiger tank, and two Shermans. The 825th TD report speaks of a jeep, half-track, and Tiger being knocked out. In fact, there was only one Sherman in the whole of Skorzeny’s force, and the so-called Tiger was, of course, a Panther. For some two hours the accompanying infantry tried to breach the American defenses at the railway embankment, but B Company, 99th Infantry and the TDs of the 825th held firm and, helped by artillery using the new pozit fuse, the Germans were repulsed with, according to the 99th Infantry, 100 killed. The 825th TD section claimed to have captured two jeeps and an M8 in working order and rather magnanimously added in their report, “Company B, 99th Inf Bn also engaged the enemy at this point.” They admitted the loss of one of their TDs and to suffering four casualties. As soon as flares illuminated the area in front of the paper mill, the main group of KG X headed straight for the Warche bridge. The fact that it could not be blown was a tragedy for the defenders. The his-

Standing watch at a crossroads near Malmédy, U.S. troops wait for the inevitable clash with the Germans.

National Archives

77

BB-Win14 Malmedy_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:21 AM Page 78

tory of the 120th Infantry Regiment says two 3rd Battalion outposts were overrun before the enemy reached the area of the paper factory. The lone house near it became the center of severe fighting. The TDs sited there took the attacking tanks under fire, but the house was soon surrounded by German infantry, and it was not long before the 823rd crews abandoned their TDs. They managed to remove or destroy the firing pins and sights on all four guns before most of them took refuge in the house along with three of Pergrin’s engineers and some members of K Company—33 men in all. By 8:30 AM, one of the Panthers had crossed the bridge to the north side while others covered it from near the house. When it began to dawn on the Americans that the Germans were focusing on the road junction and the boundary between the two regiments rather than the town, a crisis of confidence began to set in. At 8:40, G Company of the 2nd Battalion, 117th Infantry, on K Company’s right, was on full alert, and a section of 3rd Platoon, C Company, 823rd TD Battalion operating with it was moved to face the threat. A single gun of this section claimed to have destroyed a Tiger, a Sherman, a German manned M-10, and two more Panthers or Tigers! This claim was certainly never substantiated. Two days later, a sergeant of the 291st Engineers was told to check the whole area north of the Warche River for abandoned or knocked-out German vehicles—he found none! Rumor then began to take over. At 10:30 AM, an unconfirmed report said there were Germans in Meiz, a mile northwest of the road junction. This was untrue, but certainly by midday the Germans had driven two K Company platoons some distance to the north of the bridge and road junction area and had written down the third platoon. Survivors took shelter in the paper factory, and one of them, Pfc. Francis Currey, was to be awarded a Medal of Honor for his gallantry during this action. Lieutenant Kenneth Nelson, commanding the machine-gun platoon with K

78

Company, was to be awarded a posthumous Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the fighting, and his platoon sergeant, John Van Der Kamp, the same medal. The situation was now considered serious enough to move the reserve 2nd Battalion of the 120th to the area of Burninville, north of the threatened road junction and to deploy two 90mm AAA battalions as far back as Francorchamps. It is not clear how many, if indeed any, more Panthers crossed the river, but by early afternoon the situation had begun to stabilize. KG X was simply not strong enough to break through. Two Panthers had been disabled near the bridge, one by Francis Currey, and the paper mill position was holding firm. American artillery fired 3,000 rounds during this battle. Amazingly, the lone house too remained in American hands despite the fact that, believing it to be in German hands, the Americans took it under fire from the railway embankment at about 10 AM with both artillery and machine guns. One of the engineers and a K Company corporal eventually got out of the house in the early afternoon and managed to get back to the main U.S. position behind the railway embankment; there they reported that the house was still in U.S. hands and that only 12 men remained alive out of the original 33. Considering that tanks and infantry were fighting around the house for several hours, it is remarkable that anyone there survived at all; but this report, and similar statements that entire TD crews were killed or wounded, are not supported by the actual casualty returns.

National Archives

The 30th Division report for December 21 shows B Company, 823rd TD Battalion had one man wounded and six missing; the 1st Platoon lost all four TDs (two were later recovered), two half-tracks, four jeeps, and a 1-ton truck with trailer; the 3rd Battalion of the 120th Infantry suffered seven men killed and five wounded. The 291st Engineers had one man killed and another wounded at the lone house and a third man killed by mortar fire. The 526th Armored Infantry counted four men wounded. For Otto Skorzeny, observing the action on the high ground to the south, it was obvious that by midafternoon his attack had failed at considerable cost. His tanks had barely managed to cross the bridge, and none of his force had breached the railway embankment. The KG commander, who had personally led his men in the battle around the paper factory, came limping back on the arm of a medical officer, wounded in his rear end. By 3:25 PM, the Germans were clear of the road junction, bridge, and paper factory area; at 4 PM two M-10s of 2nd Platoon, B Company, 823rd moved through the Falize underpass. Their after-action report noted that they fired on two German tanks concealed in buildings south of their positions. After first knocking off a corner of a building to expose the tank hiding behind it, three armor-piercing rounds sent the tank up in flames. Another tank in the vicinity was also destroyed, but it is believed that this tank might have been previously damaged by friendly artillery. The tank behind the building was a disguised Panther later found beside the café at La Falize. The Operational Research Section of the 2nd Tactical Air Force visited the Malmédy area in early 1945. It found “Panthers all disguised as Shermans by the addition of thin sheet metal superstructures. One of these had been destroyed by the crew and the others by American artillery.” At the end of the day, the American defenses had held and, despite all the problems, Malmédy was safe from the

BB-Win14 Malmedy_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:21 AM Page 79

Germans. The 150th Panzer Brigade had lost 150 men killed, wounded, or missing. Skorzeny himself was wounded in the face by artillery shrapnel as he neared his original headquarters in Ligneuville that evening. On Friday, December 22, Dave Pergrin was ordered, rather belatedly, to demolish the Warche River bridge, the massive railway viaduct, and the Rue de Falize underpass. It ensured that Malmédy became a fortress on its southern and western flanks, but it proved to be a waste of time and explosives. There would be no more enemy attacks on Malmédy, although intermittent German artillery fire continued to fall upon the town for the rest of December. However, it was the Americans rather than the Germans who now wreaked death and destruction on the town, its people, and its defenders. Perhaps due to the mass evacuation of the town by all but Pergrin and his brave engineers on the 16th and 17th, there was a general misconception throughout First Army that Malmédy had fallen to the Germans. The fact that the better part of two regiments of the 30th Division, two independent battalions, and numerous subunits had moved into or through the town was virtually unknown in the chaos of the American bugout. Even the Stars and Stripes described Malmédy as being occupied by the enemy, as did the Belgian national newspaper, La Libre Belgique, and the Belgian Radio Nationale. Even allowing for some confusion over the status of Malmédy, there can be no excuse for the bombing of the town at 3:26 PM on the 23rd by six U.S. B-26 Marauders of the IXth Bombardment Division’s 322nd Bombardment Group, part of the Ninth U.S. Air Force. The flight, led by Major C.F. Watson, dropped 86 500-pound bombs on the town, in conditions the pilots described as “unlimited ceiling and visibility.” Malmédy lies 33 miles from the intended target, Zulpich. The pilots admitted that they had failed to find their primary target and reported that they had bombed Lammersum, six miles farther on. Five of

ABOVE: Combat engineers attempt to remove an abandoned German tank. Disguised with U.S. markings, this vehicle was probably used in the attack on Malmédy. OPPOSITE: Scanning the horizon down the barrel of his .30-caliber machine gun, this soldier from the 30th Infantry Division watches for signs of enemy movement.

them reported excellent results. This is not surprising since much civilian property in Malmédy was damaged and many people were killed or injured. The 120th Regiment lost three killed, four wounded, and three men missing. After this raid, a First Army spokesman announced that as the Germans had entered Malmédy the town had been bombed. Peter Lawless of the British Daily Telegraph newspaper interrupted to tell him that he had just returned from the town, that there were no Germans there, and they had bombed their own troops. The following day, Christmas Eve, at 2 PM in perfect visibility and with the snow-covered Malmédy valley looking like a Christmas card, 18 Consolidated B-24 Liberator heavy bombers of the Eighth U.S. Air Force struck again, causing massive damage. The main square and town center were leveled and many other parts of the town devastated by bombs and fires. The 120th Regiment casualty report for the day shows 98 killed, wounded, and missing, although some of these casualties occurred in the

three companies of the regiment, which by then were involved in the fighting around Stavelot. The 291st Engineers, who did sterling work with their skilled manpower, had one man killed and the commanding officer of B Company, which had been in Malmédy since before the offensive started, was badly injured. No evidence to explain this bombing has been found in Air Force reports, and the unit responsible remains unknown. On Christmas Day there was a third and final air raid. Four B-26s of the 387th Bombardment Group dropped 64 general-purpose bombs on the town despite the ground-to-air recognition panels that had been displayed on many buildings. The intended target was St. Vith, 12 miles to the south, and aircraft-to-ground visibility was three to four miles. The Malmédy town memorial names 178 civilians killed during the three air raids. Many more were injured. Although the IXth Bombardment Division acknowledged the mistakes made on the 23rd and 25th, the Ninth Air Force did not. The Continued on page 126

79

BB-Win14 Bastogne Relief_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:24 AM Page 80

Lovely Weather

80

BB-Win14 Bastogne Relief_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:24 AM Page 81

L

BY ROY MORRIS JR.

ieutenant General George S. Patton was not particularly religious—in fact he was something of a practicing pagan—but even Patton felt the need for a little divine intervention after weeks of wretched weather in the autumn of 1944 had snarled the Allied advance toward Germany. On December 14, at his field headquarters in Nancy, France, Patton summoned Colonel James O’Neill, chaplain of Patton’s Third Army. “Chaplain,” he said, “I want you to publish a prayer for good weather. I’m tired of these soldiers having to fight mud and floods as well as Germans. See if we can’t get God to work on our side.” “Sir,” said O’Neill, “it’s going to take a pretty thick rug for that kind of praying.” “I don’t care if it takes a flying carpet,” Patton grumbled. “I want praying done.” O’Neill dutifully obeyed, after first pointing out that “it usually isn’t a customary thing among men of my profession to pray for clear weather to kill their fellow men.” That said, he quickly roughed out a prayer that was specific enough to meet the general’s immediate meteorological demands, while not actually calling on the Lord to smite the Germans personally. “Almighty and most merciful Father,” O’Neill prayed, “we humbly beseech Thee, of Thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have had to contend. Grant us fair weather for battle. Graciously hearken to us as soldiers who call upon Thee that, armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory, and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies, and establish Thy justice among men and nations.” Patton was so pleased with the chaplain’s ecumenical contribution that he had it printed on the front of thousands of Christmas cards and distributed to the soldiers in his army eight days later. On the back was a personal message from Patton himself, wishing the men a merry Christmas and adding characteristically, “I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty, and skill in battle. We march in our might to complete victory.” By the time the men received the cards, however, the entire thrust of the army’s advance had changed dramatically. Instead of driving east toward the Saar River and the heart of Germany’s war-making industry, Patton’s hard-charging soldiers would find themselves racing northward to relieve their besieged comrades in Bastogne, Belgium. Although the Americans received numerous warnings that an attack in the Ardennes might be imminent, George S. Patton was the only high-ranking Allied officer to take the advance warnings seriously. After listening to a December 9 report from his G-2 (intelligence officer),

U.S. Army tanks and vehicles take cover in a Belgian town during the German winter offensive that precipitated the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans overran a number of hamlets in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg but were unable to reach the River Meuse and the strategically vital Belgian port city of Antwerp, which lay beyond.

National Archives

81

BB-Win14 Bastogne Relief_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:24 AM Page 82

maintaining strict radio silence, a sure indication that something was afoot. “I want you, gentlemen, to start making plans for pulling the Third Army out of its eastward attack,” Patton demanded. “Change the direction 90 degrees, moving to Luxembourg and attacking north.” Like much of what Patton did instinctively, it would prove to be a prescient decision. On the German left, the two-corps-strong Seventh Army, commanded by General Eric Brandenberger, drove to within 12 miles of Luxembourg City, capital of Luxembourg and the advanced command post of the

National Archives

Colonel Walter Koch, that the Germans were pulling select panzer divisions out of line north of the Third Army’s present position, Patton directed his staff to begin preparing “limited outline planning” to counter any enemy threat from the north. That way, he reasoned, “We’ll be in a position to meet whatever happens.” Specifically, he wanted a study of contingencies “of what the Third Army would do if called upon to counterattack after such a breakthrough.” On the night before the German assault, he followed up on Koch’s report that the enemy was

National Archives

ABOVE: Much of the civilian population of Bastogne left the town with the approach of battle. Here, some of the townspeople, now refugees, seek safety. American troops have halted along the street, where no snow has fallen as of the date of this image. BELOW: American vehicles left behind by the 30th Infantry Division are surveyed by German troops.

82

Allied 12th Army Group and the Ninth Air Force. Brandenberger, an experienced tank commander whose bland appearance belied a steely resolve, had been given a more limited, although still ambitious, assignment: to protect General Hasso von Manteuffel’s left flank while at the same time crossing the Our River and driving on to the Meuse. Brandenberger accomplished the first part of his mission, but with great difficulty. That difficulty came in the form of the veteran U.S. 4th Infantry, the “Ivy Division,” which had stormed ashore at Utah Beach and fought its way clear across France. Famed novelist Ernest Hemingway, who accompanied the 4th Division on its drive east, later told division commander Maj. Gen. Raymond “Tubby” Barton, “You had one of the greatest divisions in American military history.” Helped by Brandenberger’s lack of heavy artillery, Barton was able to limit the German penetration on the southern shoulder of the battlefield and prevent a planned conjunction of the Fifth and Seventh German Armies east of Echternach. At his military headquarters far to the rear, Adolf Hitler read the first situation reports from the front citing widespread panic among the American forces and convinced himself that his long-shot gamble was working. Getting on the telephone with General Hermann Balck, commander of Army Group G in reserve south of the Ardennes, the Führer rasped out a premature victory cry. “Balck! Balck!,” he exulted. “Everything has changed in the West! Success—complete success—is now in our grasp.” Balck, who was a good deal closer to the front, was not so sure, but he sensibly kept any dissenting opinions to himself. As it was, thanks to the valorous stands being made by the individual American units scattered throughout the snow and fogwracked Ardennes, Hitler’s boast would prove badly misguided. Even as the Führer exulted, Allied leaders were taking steps to checkmate and reverse the Germans’ initial successes. In the face of the incredibly complex and fluid battlefield situation confronting them, Eisenhower and Bradley somehow kept

BB-Win14 Bastogne Relief_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:24 AM Page 83

“Brad,” said Patton, “this time the Kraut has stuck his head in the meatgrinder.” With a swift tur n of his fist, he added, “And this time I’ve got hold of the handle.”

Both: National Archives

their calm. Conferring by phone, the two decided to commit their only remaining reserve divisions, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, along with the 7th and 10th Armored Divisions, to the fight. Starting from their base in Reims, the 82nd and 101st moved out on the afternoon of December 17. Because the weather was still atrocious, the airborne rangers could not take to the skies. Instead, commandeering some 11,000 jeeps, trucks, motorcycles, and other wheeled transport, the troopers began a breathless 107mile dash to the front over icy, fogshrouded roads. The 82nd was diverted to Werbomont, a crossroads town 18 miles northwest of the key crossroads village of St.-Vith, where the 7th Armored Division was holding off a German force many times its size. Meanwhile, the 101st continued east toward Bastogne, an ancient market town that sat astride the vital network of roads leading out of the Schnee Eifel. With the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Maj. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, still en route back to France from a meeting in England and 101st commander General Maxwell Taylor also away, command of the 101st Airborne devolved upon its artillery chief, Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe. A slightly built 46year-old native of Washington, D.C., McAuliffe was affectionately nicknamed “Old Crock” by his men for his goodnatured comment that parachuting was hard work for “an old crock” like him. This hardship, however, had not prevented him from dropping into Normandy and the Netherlands during the division’s DDay and Market Garden operations. McAuliffe was a notably unflappable individual, a trait that would stand him in good stead in the days to come. By 9 am on December 19, McAuliffe and his men had reached their destination. Before he left, he had been given a simple order: “Hold Bastogne.” While McAuliffe and his men were organizing a defense of Bastogne with the polyglot assortment of troops who had earlier retreated into the city, the American high

LEFT: Lieutenant Hasso von Manteuffel commanded the 5th Panzer Army. RIGHT: Sepp Dietrich, Hitler’s personal bodyguard, commanded the Waffen SS units forming the vanguard of the German thrust.

command was meeting at Verdun, France. On the morning of December 19, Eisenhower convened the emergency meeting with a determined sense of calm. “The present situation is to be regarded as one of opportunity for us and not of disaster,” Eisenhower told his grim-faced lieutenants as they met around a single potbellied stove on the second floor of a dilapidated French Army barracks near the old battlefield. “There will be only cheerful faces at this conference table.” Patton, sitting alongside Omar Bradley and Lt. Gen. Jacob Devers, did not need to be bucked up. “Hell, let’s have the guts to let the sons of bitches go all the way to Paris,” he said. “Then we’ll really cut ‘em off and chew ‘em up.” When Eisenhower asked him how soon he could organize a counterattack, Patton immediately responded, “As soon as you’re through with me.” Eisenhower wanted more specifics—when exactly could Patton move? “The morning of December 21st,”

said Patton, “with three divisions.” “Don’t be fatuous, George,” said Eisenhower. “If you try to go that early, you won’t have all three divisions ready and you’ll go piecemeal. You will start on the 22nd and I want your initial blow to be a strong one. I’d even settle for the 23rd if it takes that long to get three full divisions [into action].” Patton assured Ike that he would indeed be ready by then, and the supreme commander gave the go-ahead for what would become one of the most spectacular relief missions in American military history. For the drive to Bastogne, Patton was given operational command of the U.S. VIII Corps, which at that time was strewn in all directions and lacked the ability to communicate directly with headquarters. In many ways, Patton would be operating on his own, making a dangerous flank march in the face of an overwhelming enemy attack. It was something the flamboyant 59-year-old Californian relished. Now, the two old friends walked out together to Patton’s jeep. “Funny thing, George,” said Eisenhower, who had just received a promotion to fivestar general three days earlier. “Every time I get another star I get attacked.” “And every time you get attacked, Ike, I have to bail you out,” Patton responded. He was, in fact, feeling thoroughly optimistic, having already set his staff to preparing the very movement that Eisenhower wanted. A few minutes later Patton left Verdun, stopping just long enough to share a last encouraging word with Omar Bradley. “Brad,” said Patton, “this time the Kraut has stuck his head in the meatgrinder.” With a swift turn of his fist, he added, “And this time I’ve got hold of the handle.” Heading south in a jeep with his senior aide, Lt. Col. Charles R. Codman, Patton began three days of furious, nonstop activity in which he reorganized, reoriented, and redirected 350,000-man-strong army, turned it 90 degrees from the east to the north, and began the relief march on Bastogne that would decisively turn the Battle

83

National Archives

BB-Win14 Bastogne Relief_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:24 AM Page 84

84

of the Bulge in the Allies’ favor. First, Patton drove to Thionville, headquarters of the XX Corps, where he conferred with corps commander Maj. Gen. Walton H. Walker about the Army’s abrupt change in plans. It was nearly dark when the conference ended, and Walker persuaded the

within a dozen miles of the capital and no one was sure how much closer the enemy was prepared to come. Patton, however, was unperturbed. He met with various subordinate commanders, changing existing orders and arranging for the 4th Armored Division and the 80th Infantry

always impatient Patton to spend the night, warning him that English-speaking German commandos wearing American uniforms were active in the rear and posed a very real danger on the jumbled roads between Thionville and Luxembourg City. Patton grudgingly agreed, borrowing a toothbrush and pajamas from Walker, but sent Lt. Col. Codman on to Nancy to begin packing up Patton’s headquarters. The next morning Patton drove into Luxembourg City. German units were

Division to rendezvous the next day at Arlon. Patton tarried in Luxembourg City just long enough to buck up Generals Raymond Barton and William H.H. Morris, commander of the 10th Armored Division, which was guarding the city’s perimeter. The tough-minded soldiers needed no personal bucking up, and Patton continued on to Arlon, confident that he was leaving Luxembourg City in good hands. Later that night, Patton wrote to his wife that he had “earned my pay. I visited seven

divisions and regrouped an army alone. It was quite a day, and I enjoyed it.” At Arlon, Patton continued his personal reshuffling of commands and priorities. Having already overridden an order from Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton, the erstwhile commander of the VIII Corps, to send Combat Command B (CCB) of the 4th Armored Division into Bastogne unsupported, Patton exploded at his old friend. “Troy,” he said, “of all the goddamn crazy things I ever heard of, leaving the 101st Airborne to be surrounded in Bastogne is the worst!” Middleton, a courtly Mississippian who had bypassed West Point to become the youngest colonel in the Allied Expeditionary Force in 1918, was accustomed to Patton’s theatrical volatility. Patiently he explained that the decision to hold Bastogne had come down from Eisenhower himself. Patton, who no doubt already knew this, swiftly changed tack. “All right, Troy,” he said, “if you were in my position, where would you launch the attack? From Arlon or from Neufchateau?” Middleton recommended using the Neufchateau road for the main relief thrust, but Patton wanted to keep his armor and infantry together to maximize their impact and lessen the chance for disorganization. He opted instead to begin his move toward Bastogne from Arlon, sending the 4th Armored Division up the Arlon road and masking its movement by routing the 80th Infantry Division through the hills and valleys to the east, with the 26th Infantry Division guarding the armor on its left flank. Shuffling corps and divisions into place for the drive on Bastogne, Patton held a final meeting with his subordinate commanders at Arlon on the night of December 21. He had tirelessly worked to get the movement into shape, and in his selfdescribed role as the Army’s “ray of sunshine and backslapper,” he continued to bolster his officers’ morale, urging them to think aggressively and reminding them that Eisenhower wanted an attack with “lots of depth.” He set the jumping-off time for the advance at 0600 hours on

BB-Win14 Bastogne Relief_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:24 AM Page 85

ing. Get him up here, I want to pin a medal on him.” O’Neill was still in Nancy, but he was rushed northward by jeep to meet the general, who greeted him warmly. “Chaplain,” said Patton, “you’re the most popular man in this headquarters. You sure stand in good with the Lord and the soldiers.” That said, Patton pinned a Bronze Star on O’Neill’s breast, possibly the first such decoration ever awarded for praying. The clearing weather, however, was not a blessing for the Americans. The bright sun thawed the roads, turning them into mud-slathered nightmares for the tanks and halftracks. After its all-night fight at Burnon, CCB resumed its drive northward on the 23rd, arriving at the outskirts of Chaumont, which lay at the bottom of a large “sugar bowl” or depression surrounded by steep hills. More German paratroopers from the 5th Parachute Division continued to resist the advance, and RIGHT: Maj. Gen. Maxwell Taylor seen with his deputy, Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe. BELOW: With infantry fanned around their flanks, armored vehicles of the 4th Division move steadily towards besieged Bastogne. OPPOSITE: An M-4 Sherman tank of the 4th Armored Division covers a stretch of highway near Bastogne. Note the white star made dark—a trademark tactic employed by the 4th—used to reduce the vehicle’s visibility.

an airstrike was called in to soften up the enemy position. Meanwhile, the 10th Armored Infantry and 22 Sherman tanks of the 8th Tank Battalion attempted to sweep around the village from the west and north. The Shermans bogged down in the muddy countryside. The Germans then brought up about a dozen 75mm guns mounted on remodeled Mark III tank carriages and blasted away at the Americans from a dense screen of woods. Company A, 10th Armored Infantry, tried to bull its way into Chaumont, but was driven off in fierce house-to-house fighting. Some 65 men in the company were killed, including all the

Both: National Archives

December 22. There was only one more order to give; “Drive like hell.” The advance began as scheduled the next morning, with the soldiers of the Third Army moving out from camp newly accompanied by Chaplain O’Neill’s instantly famous “Weather Prayer.” Unfortunately, the advance began in fog and heavy snow, and O’Neill somewhat defensively reminded Patton that he had prepared the missive several days earlier, with the Saar offensive in mind, and had not had time to change the wording. “Oh, the Lord won’t mind,” Patton said. “He knows we’re too busy right now killing Germans to print another prayer.” Moving cautiously up the Arlon-Bastogne highway, the advance covered only seven miles on the first day. At Martelange, Combat Command A (CCA) of the 4th Armored Division was held up by a large crater left behind by American engineers who had also demolished all the bridges over the swiftly flowing Sure River. To further complicate matters, a rifle company from the German 5th Parachute Division commenced a determined 15-hour-long firefight with the Americans, hampering efforts to construct a Bailey bridge across the river. CCB, advancing on the west, also ran into problems at Burnon, where another company of German paratroopers bedeviled the tankers and held up the advance for much of the day and night. The infantrymen in the 26th and 80th Divisions had a busy day as well. At separate times during the first day’s advance, both divisions clashed with elements of the 352nd Volksgrenadier Division, which had inadvertently crossed the American lines at a right angle while continuing their own westward advance. A shower of small arms and antitank fire quickly drove off the Germans, and the GIs slogged grimly north through the snow toward Bastogne. The next morning dawned sunny and clear. Patton, back in Luxembourg City to monitor events, looked out the window and watched happily as Allied war planes flew overhead to bomb and strafe German positions. “Goddamn!” Patton cried. “That O’Neill sure did some potent pray-

85

BB-Win14 Bastogne Relief_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:24 AM Page 86

officers. First Lt. Charles R. Gniot, the last surviving officer, stayed behind in the village to cover his men’s retreat, a stand that earned him a posthumous Distinguished Service Cross. By nightfall, CCB was still stalled on the outskirts of Chaumont. Following along after managing to bridge the Sure River at Martelange, CCA also ran into stiff German resistance, this time at the town of Warnach, and it too abruptly went to ground for the night. Patton, predictably, was infuriated by the delays. Grabbing a phone, he lambasted Maj. Gen. John Millikin, commander of the III Corps. “There’s too much piddling around!” Patton shouted. “Bypass these towns and clear them up later. Tanks can operate on this ground now.” As the armor’s experiences that day had shown, this was not necessarily the case, but it was little consolation to the weary tankers, or to their equally weary compatriots bottled up inside Bastogne. At the end of the day, General McAuliffe added his voice to the din of displeasure filling the wires. “Sorry I did not get to shake hands today,” he said. “I was disappointed.” An anonymous staff officer added a mocking footnote to the general’s message. “There is only one more shopping day before Christmas!” he gibed. Inside Bastogne morale remained high, due partly to the elite makeup of the 101st Airborne, and partly to the knowledge that “Georgie’s boys” were on the way to relieve them. McAuliffe, who had reorganized the remnants of the other units into a makeshift force dubbed “Team Snafu,” appealed to the residents of Bastogne to give up their bedsheets and tablecloths for use by his men as camouflage snowsuits. Since he spoke fluent French, this was an order easily understood. Less clear at first, at least to the enemy, was McAuliffe’s terse response to a demand from General Heinrich von Luttwitz that he surrender Bastogne and avoid imminent annihilation. McAuliffe’s oneword answer would go down in military history as the very epitome of American resilience and grace under pressure. “Nuts,” he said.

86

The German messenger receiving the reply was unsure whether it was “affirmative or negative.” Colonel Joseph Harper of the 327 Infantry Regiment, McAuliffe’s chosen emissary, assured him that the answer was emphatically negative and that “in plain English it is the same thing as ‘Go to Hell!’ I will tell you something else,” Harper added. “If you continue to attack we will kill every goddamn German who tries to break into this city!” The messenger formally saluted and returned to his lines. The same high sky that thawed out the roads leading into Bastogne and delayed Patton’s relief column also enabled Allied planes to airdrop supplies into the beleaguered city. Some 240 relief sorties were

If the Germans could get between the 4th Armored Division and the 26th Infantr y Division, they could split the two columns completely apart and wreak havoc with the American advance.

ABOVE: Several U.S. casualties of the 4th Armored Division lie slain in a field near Chaumont, Luxembourg. BELOW: Donning white camouflage, members of the 4th Armored Division patrol the woods near Bastogne for German holdouts. Both: National Archives

flown by American C-47 transports, which parachuted a total of 1,446 packages into Bastogne on December 23. Despite the sun, however, the weather was frigid, with temperatures dropping at night to near zero. Nevertheless, spirits remained high within the garrison, as the self-styled “Battered Bastards of the Bastion of Bastogne” continued to hold out, secure in the knowledge that Patton was coming. On Christmas Eve, the relief column pushed doggedly closer to its goal. At Warnach, CCA finally managed to drive the Germans out of the village, killing 135 of the enemy but taking 68 casualties. Meanwhile, CCB pushed on to the village of Hompre, three miles south of Bastogne. A potentially grave threat arose at Bigonville, two and a half miles east of the Arlon-Bastogne highway, where the Führer Grenadier Brigade, composed of elite troops who formerly had guarded Hitler’s headquarters, suddenly appeared. If the Germans could get between the 4th Armored Division and the 26th Infantry Division, they could split the two columns completely apart and wreak havoc with the American advance. Maj. Gen. Hugh Gaffey, commanding 4th Armored, quickly ordered Colonel Wendell Blanchard to bring up the division’s Reserve Combat Command and drive away the Germans before that could happen. Moving down a secondary road that Blanchard described as “sheer ice,” CCR struck the enemy at Bigonville. As had happened earlier at Chaumont and Warnach, the fighting quickly became houseto-house and hand-to-hand. Eventually, the weight of the American tanks proved decisive, and German defenders were mowed down remorselessly as they attempted to flee from burning barns and out-buildings set on fire by tracer bullets. A total of 328 Germans surrendered at Bigonville, and the immediate threat was removed. Patton wanted his men to continue attacking throughout the night on all fronts, but the men were exhausted by the heavy fighting and the sheer physical effort it had taken to slog up and down the snow

BB-Win14 Bastogne Relief_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:24 AM Page 87

National Archives

ABOVE: A group of Douglas C-47 transport aircraft bring supplies to war weary troops in Bastogne. A total of 842 planes and 31 gliders made the trip. RIGHT: Sgt. James Hendrix is awarded the Medal of Honor by President Harry Truman for his actions at the Belgian town of Assenois.

National Archives

and mud-covered hills and valleys. By nightfall on Christmas Eve, the advance had ground to a halt just a few miles south of Bastogne. Inside the city, both besieged Americans and their German prisoners gathered to celebrate the approaching holiday. McAuliffe, going from foxhole to foxhole and cellar to cellar, attempted to spread some holiday cheer. He had already released a special message wishing the men a Merry Christmas. “What’s merry about all this, you ask? We’re fighting—it’s cold—we aren’t home. All true, but what has the proud Eagle Division accomplished with its worthy comrades of the 10th Armored Division, the 705th Destroyer Tank Battalion and all the rest? Just this: We have stopped cold everything that has been thrown at us from the North, East, South and West. Allied troops are counterattacking in force. We continue to hold Bastogne. By holding Bastogne we assure the success of the Allied armies. We know that our divisional commander, General Taylor, will say: ‘Well done!’ We are giving our country and our loved ones at home a worthy Christmas present and being privileged to take part in the gallant feat of arms and are truly making for ourselves a

merry Christmas.” Stopping outside the town’s police station where the German prisoners were being held, McAuliffe listened to the familiar Christmas carols being sung in German; “Stille Nacht” and “O Tannenbaum.” Going inside, the general endured good-natured gibes from the prisoners, who promised him that soon he would be a prisoner and they would be in Antwerp. After the Germans quieted down, McAuliffe simply wished them a Merry Christmas and continued on his way. The good cheer was largely dissipated a few minutes later when German bombers began dropping two tons of bombs onto Bastogne near the railroad station. In a city

department store that had been converted into a hospital, a bomb came straight down the chimney, fatally burying many of the wounded, their guards, and nurses who had taken refuge in the cellar. Christmas morning dawned clear and cold. In Luxembourg City, Patton looked out his window and exclaimed, “Lovely weather for killing Germans!” At the front, Gaffey had shifted CCR to Neufchateau, several miles to the west, and sent the reserve rumbling northward toward Remoiville. Meanwhile, CCA ground slowly toward Hollange, overrunning two German artillery battalions, as CCB advanced from Hompre to link up with CCR. The infantry, too, was on the move, driving the Germans back to the east bank of the Sure River. It was hard, unrelenting action, fought blindly in the deep woods, steep ravines, and twisty ridges of the Bourscheid triangle between the Sure and Sauer rivers. At one point, Americans in an outpost east of Ringel were amazed to see a small German detachment marching casually toward it in a column of twos. Believing the Germans were coming to surrender, the GIs waited patiently, only to realize at the last minute that the enemy was still armed. A heavy burst of machine gun fire quickly ended the abortive German “counterattack.” On Christmas night, while Generals Patton and Bradley dined together at Bradley’s Continued on page 124

87

BB-Win05 Stoutmont_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:25 AM Page 88

Against long odds, the American 740th Tank Battalion stymied Kampfgruppe Peiper, the German spearhead at Stoumont during the Battle of the Bulge.

Daredevil Tankers Turn “PEIPER MUST BE STOPPED!” Lieutenant General Courtney M. Hodges, commanding the U.S. First Army, looked up from his maps and saw chaos everywhere. All across the Ardennes Forest, American forces were reeling from a surprise German counterattack that struck on the morning of December 16, 1944. While some frontline units stubbornly held their ground, others simply disappeared— annihilated by the Nazi juggernaut. One marauding enemy column particularly worried General Hodges. This was Kampfgruppe Peiper, the spearhead of the German 1st SS Panzer Division. Named for its commander, SS Lt. Col. Jochen Peiper, this powerful force was headed for the crossroads city of Liege, first stop

88

toward its ultimate objective of Antwerp and the Belgian coast. Amid reports of mass surrenders on the front lines and English-speaking German commandos terrorizing the First Army rear area, Hodges’s staff began hearing rumors of a massacre involving Kampfgruppe Peiper at Baugnez, near Malmedy. There, on December 17, some 80 American soldiers were ruthlessly gunned down after surrendering to Peiper’s troops. Even as Kampfgruppe Peiper rampaged westward toward Liege, Hodges looked for help to defeat it. He first contacted the Ninth Army, which promised the 30th Division then refitting near Aachen. Hodges then appealed to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in

Europe, for release of the Theater Reserve. Ike agreed, and within hours the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were on their way from camps in France to the Ardennes. But getting these reinforcements into position would take time, a precious commodity. Small groups of combat engineers, antitank gunners, and infantry bought vital hours when they blew bridges and set roadblocks across Peiper’s path, hindering his advance. Even antiaircraft crews got into the fight, firing their 90mm guns over direct sights. First Army needed accurate information to find and then halt the German advance. Hodges’s staff sent out tiny, unarmed Piper Cub spotter planes to track the progress of Kampfgruppe Peiper as it headed west along

BB-Win05 Stoutmont_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:25 AM Page 89

Tanks of the U.S. 740th Tank Battalion negotiate a snowy roadway during the Battle of the Bulge. These tanks are accompanied by paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division.

the Tide the Ambleve River Valley. Crashing through Ligneuville, Stavelot, and La Gleize, the enemy column was, by midday on December 18, only 12 road miles from First Army headquarters, located in the resort town of Spa, Belgium. Hodges pushed his reinforcements, the 30th Infantry and 82nd Airborne Divisions, into blocking positions along the Ambleve Valley. However, to stop Peiper’s tanks Hodges needed armor of his own. His staff could find only one available unit, the 740th Tank Battalion, codenamed “Daredevil.” There was a catch: the Daredevils had no tanks. The 740th Tank Battalion, so desperately thrust into action against Kampfgruppe Peiper, was formed in March 1943

Both: National Archives

By Patrick J. Chaisson at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Within a few weeks the 740th moved to a heavily guarded enclosure far from the main post. All passes were canceled, and each soldier was sworn to secrecy. Only then did the troops learn their new mission—the 740th was to become a “special” outfit, equipped with searchlight tanks designed to illuminate the battlefield at night. Everything about the Canal Defense Light (CDL) tank was classified. Built on an M3A1 medium tank chassis, the CDL, or “gizmo” as 740th crews called it, used a high-intensity carbon arc lamp inside the turret to light up the night sky while blinding enemy defenders. Orders soon arrived transferring the 740th to Camp Bouse, Arizona, for intense training.

The battalion arrived at Camp Bouse, part of the Desert Training Area, in October 1943. Very few gizmos were available for training, so the men spent their days performing menial work details. On November 12, Lt. Col. George K. Rubel took command of the 740th Tank Battalion. A wiry, 40-ish professional soldier from Phoenix, Arizona, Rubel was a battle-hardened veteran of the North Africa campaign. He immediately set out to turn his battalion into the best tankers in the U.S. Army. While Camp Bouse had few CDLs, there were plenty M4 Sherman tanks to go around, as well as piles of 75mm main gun ammunition. Rubel started his training program with the basics of driving and firing, day and night, over the roughest terrain.

89

BB-Win05 Stoutmont_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:25 AM Page 90

Map © 2013 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

ABOVE: Pockets of American resistance, particularly at Stoumont, Belgium, where the American 740th Tank Battalion stood its ground, and at the crossroads town of Bastogne, slowed the German timetable and ultimately led to the defeat of Hitler’s last gamble in the West.

Everyone learned to drive a tank. The entire battalion qualified with pistols, carbines, rifles, and Thompson submachine guns. Tankers lived on their iron chariots, learning to maintain the machines as if their lives depended on them. All winter long the battalion trained. When time came to take the Individual Tank Crew Test, the 740th passed with an average score of 83.73 percent, the highest record in the armored force at the time. Top-shooting gunners even competed for an $80 prize offered for the best crew qualification score. Drawing on his own combat experience, Lt. Col. Rubel insisted that all tanks fight with the hatches open instead of buttoned up as armored force doctrine prescribed. “Everyone looked for targets,” Rubel later wrote, “and if they didn’t see the enemy first they didn’t live.” This practice paid many dividends later. Departing for England in July, the outfit came across Utah Beach three months later.

90

The Daredevils then drove across France to join the First Army in November 1944. While the 740th was marching toward the front, it received news that its special mission was cancelled and the unit would reconfigure as a standard medium tank battalion. This meant it was to reequip with M4 Sherman medium tanks and M5A1 Stuart light tanks. Unfortunately, First Army could lend the 740th only nine Shermans and a few M5A1 Stuarts for familiarization purposes. When German forces commanded by Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt launched their Ardennes counteroffensive on December 16, the 740th Tank Battalion was garrisoned in Neufchateau, a muddy Belgian village 50 miles behind the front lines. Within hours it was ordered to deliver its nine borrowed M4s to another unit. This left the Daredevils with three Stuarts and two scrounged assault guns. On the 17th, Rubel paid a visit to First Army headquarters in Spa. There he

learned the true extent of the German breakthrough and was told the 740th might have to fight as infantry, a task it was neither trained nor equipped to perform. Alarmed, Rubel returned to his command post and ordered the battalion to prepare for immediate action wherever it was needed. The situation looked grim. It was then that fate intervened in the person of Colonel Nelson M. Lynde, who was organizing the defense of Sprimont, an enormous vehicle repair depot sitting a dozen miles west of Peiper’s advance positions. Lynde informed First Army Headquarters that his depot had several tanks on hand ready to fight but no crews to man them. Someone remembered Rubel’s dismounted Daredevils, and at 12:45 pm on December 18, orders went out: move to Sprimont, draw all available armor, and prepare to defend the depot. Two hours later, Captain James D. Berry (nicknamed “Red” for his shock of flamecolored hair) had Company C on the road to Sprimont. Rubel followed along with his command section and as many mechanics as he could muster. Time remained their chief adversary. Could the tankers get into action before Peiper attacked? What the Daredevils found at Sprimont shocked them. The depot had but three tanks on the ready for issue line, and these were all missing essential pieces of equipment. Of the 25 armored vehicles present, most had been damaged in battle and then cannibalized for parts. They lacked working radios, weapons, and even tool sets. Company C’s tankers swarmed on the equipment, laboring through the night to ready any vehicle they could get out the gate. Staff Sergeant Charlie Loopey’s crew ended up with an M36 tank destroyer, while Sergeant John A. Thompson drew a duplex-drive amphibious Sherman that was missing the breech block for its 75mm main gun, not to mention all three machine guns. Captain Berry ordered Thompson and his “damned duck” to the rear of the column—they would fight. Some tankers had to ride M7 self-propelled howitzers or M8 assault guns, neither of which they had ever trained on.

BB-Win05 Stoutmont_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:30 AM Page 91

The Daredevils also found at Sprimont two M24 Chaffee light tanks, part of a demonstration unit traveling around to acquaint U.S. troops with these new vehicles. The M24s would go into battle too, their crews learning by doing or dying. While the Daredevil tankers hurried to prepare their mounts for combat, the situation along the Ambleve River was deteriorating badly. On December 18, Maj. Gen. Leland S. Hobbs’s 30th “Old Hickory” Division began moving into position along the northern shoulder of Peiper’s penetration. His 119th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Edward M. Sutherland, had advanced a reinforced battalion to occupy the village of Stoumont, blocking Kampfgruppe Peiper’s westward progress. Overnight the riflemen of 3rd Battalion, along with eight towed 3-inch guns of the 876th Tank Destroyer Battalion, dug in frantically to prepare for an SS attack. At 7am on the 19th, German paratroopers and SS panzergrenadiers accompanied by several Mark VI tanks emerged from the dense fog in front of Stoumont, firing on all suspected targets. Blasting the weary GIs from their fortifications, Peiper’s forces gradually gained a toehold in the village and began pushing the Americans out. A company of M4s from the 743rd Tank Battalion then arrived to help slow 3rd Battalion’s retreat, but by noon the Germans held all of Stoumont.

Hobbs absorbed this news with great concern. His 119th Infantry had been knocked out of the last defensible position in the Ambleve Valley. Only the 119th’s understrength 1st Battalion remained as a reserve. If it failed to halt Peiper, the way to Liege and beyond would be wide open. Hobbs ordered Sutherland to hold at all costs. He then begged First Army for additional armored support; the brave tankers of the 743rd were completely out of ammunition and had to resupply. Staff officers from the 30th Division spread out in all directions to find anyone who could help hold the line west of Stoumont. One such officer discovered Captain Red Berry and Company C of the 740th posted near Sprimont. Hobbs contacted First Army, requesting the 740th Tank Battalion be attached to his 30th Infantry Division. This was quickly done, and by 2 pm the Daredevils were on the move. Company C led off. Passing the 119th Regiment command post with his 14 badly needed Shermans, Captain Berry shouted encouragingly to a nearby officer: “They’re bastard tanks, but we’re shooting fools!” The Ambleve River Valley was just wide enough on its north bank for a winding macadam road, paralleled partially by a rail line. Steep, wooded valley walls and the deep-running Ambleve further restricted mobility. The day was cold, and icy fog kept visibility down to 100 yards or less. There

National Archives

American infantrymen of the 30th Division march down a country lane somewhere in Belgium. Nearby lies the body of a dead German soldier, while several destroyed German tanks bear mute testimony to the ferocity of a recent engagement.

was only one way to go, down the road, and all afternoon the 1st Battalion of the 119th Infantry waited for Peiper’s tanks. By 3:30 pm, in a cold drizzle and with dusk already starting to settle, the Germans had yet to appear. Lt. Col. Robert H. Herlong, commanding the 1st Battalion, conferred with Captain Berry. They decided to organize their own spoiling attack with Berry’s tanks covering the road while Herlong’s infantrymen protected their flanks. Their objective was Stoumont Station, a small granite block structure 800 yards away. Third Platoon, led by Lieutenant Charles D. Powers, went first. Powers moved out cautiously, hugging the cliff side of the road while his machine guns riddled every possible target. The young lieutenant stood up in his turret, scanning for enemy tanks. He knew his Sherman was no match for a German heavy Panther or Tiger tank, so his crew’s lives depended on firing first and accurately. The American column had advanced several hundred yards when Powers’s tank rounded a curve near Stoumont Station. Powers spotted a Panther, camouflaged with brush, 100 yards away. The gunner, Corporal Jack D. Ashby, fired once, his shot striking the gun mantle before deflecting down into the driver’s compartment and setting the enemy tank ablaze. Moving forward, Powers’s crew identified another Panther. Again Ashby’s aim was true, his shell ricocheting off the Panther’s lower front slope plate. At this critical moment, Technician 5th Grade Howard Henry, the lieutenant’s loader, reported that the gun was jammed. Powers’s Sherman was helpless, and he waved the next tank up to finish off the wounded SS Panther. The next vehicle in line was not even a tank. Staff Sergeant Charlie W. Loopey and his crew happened to draw an M36 tank destroyer at the Sprimont repair depot. Neither Loopey nor his gunner, Corporal William H. Beckman, had ever seen an M36 before but thought they could get this lightly armored tank killer running. While Loopey’s M36 had only thin

91

BB-Win05 Stoutmont_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:26 AM Page 92

armor plate, it did carry a powerful 90mm cannon. Corporal Beckman used it to blast the second Panther, firing three rounds into the German behemoth until it caught fire. By this time, Powers’s loader had cleared the jammed gun and the platoon leader resumed his place at the front. Advancing another 150 yards, Powers sighted a third Panther in the growing darkness. Ashby fired again, blowing the muzzle brake off the tank’s main gun. Two more shots put the Panther out of action permanently. Lieutenant Colonel Herlong then halted the attack for the night. In 30 minutes of combat, Berry’s “bastard tanks” had recaptured Stoumont Station and blunted Peiper’s advance down the Ambleve Valley. Months of hard, realistic training at Camp Bouse had paid off enormously, but the 740th’s war was just beginning. Protected by the three burning Panthers, Herlong’s riflemen dug in while their Daredevil brethren paused to resupply and rest. One tanker described his first night on the line at Stoumont Station: “It was too cold to sleep. All we could do was curl up in the tank like dogs.” During the night, more tanks fresh from the Sprimont depot moved up to join Berry’s command. Fuel, ammunition, and radios also made their way forward. With artillery finally in position, American infantry and tankers prepared to resume

their attack at dawn. Weather conditions on the 20th remained poor, with cold, rain, and fog hampering visibility. This time, 2nd Platoon, led by 1st Lt. John E. Callaway, spearheaded the attack. Riflemen from the 1st Battalion, 119th Infantry provided flank protection while artillery and mortars stood by ready to fire. The day’s objective was Stoumont, two miles up the road, where Peiper’s main force was waiting. Within minutes Callaway encountered a Panther, which his gunner dispatched with an armor-piercing shell that “opened its muzzle up like a rose.” Second Platoon then destroyed two SS half-tracks before running into a minefield that blew both tracks off Staff Sergeant Homer B. Tompkins’s M4. Though shaken up, Tompkins and his crew scurried to safety despite heavy German machine-gun fire. The Americans captured the hamlet of Targnon that day, moving to the outskirts of Stoumont before nightfall and violent SS counterattacks halted their progress. Late in the afternoon, some American infantrymen occupied St. Edouard’s Sanatorium, a large brick building on the eastern edge of Stoumont. Situated on a steep hill, whoever controlled it dominated the battlefield. The enemy knew this and around 11 pm launched a fanatical counterattack.

National Archives

This aerial view depicts St. Edouard’s Sanatorium at left center and the Belgian village of Stoumont at far right. Both locations were the scenes of heavy fighting during the desperate battle between the 740th Tank Battalion and elements of German SS Kampfgruppe Peiper.

92

Between 50 and 100 SS panzergrenadiers, many screaming “Heil Hitler,” stormed St. Edouard’s and pushed the GIs out. Held up by a sharp cliff, the Daredevil tankers could do nothing to help. They had to wait for daylight to resume their attack. At 4 am on December 21, 1st Lt. David Oglensky’s M4 crawled cautiously forward. Suddenly, according to driver Technician 4th Grade Robert Russo, “All hell broke loose.” Shells from a hidden antitank gun pierced Oglensky’s tank, forcing his crew to bail out. As the lieutenant boarded the next Sherman in line a panzerfaust rocket hit that tank, causing it to burst into flames. German panzerfausts then blasted two more M4s. In an instant, four tanks were destroyed, three of them burning fiercely. With the road blocked and St. Edouard’s Sanatorium in Peiper’s hands, the American attack bogged down almost before it started. Had American commanders known of Kampfgruppe Peiper’s critical fuel shortage, they would have felt better about their situation. Already forced by the fuel shortage to cancel his drive on Liege, Peiper was even now radioing for permission to withdraw eastward. Peiper’s failure to capture vital bridges or American fuel depots meant his still powerful force was stuck in Stoumont, a difficult place to defend. Many of his heavy tanks, their gas tanks almost empty, started moving back toward La Gleize, where it was hoped that supply trucks would meet them. Interestingly, almost a million gallons of gasoline were stacked in 5-gallon jerry cans along a road two miles north of Peiper’s route through the Ambleve Valley. Had the Germans known of it, they could have brushed aside the company of Belgian soldiers guarding this depot and solved their fuel problem. Back in Stoumont, the 119th Infantry Regiment and 740th Tank Battalion became part of Task Force Harrison, named for Brig. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., the 30th Infantry Division’s assistant division commander. Additional forces from the 3rd Armored Division had joined the battle north and east of Stoumont,

BB-Win05 Stoutmont_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:26 AM Page 93

pushing Peiper’s forces closer to their base in La Gleize. The noose was tightening, but first Stoumont had to be retaken. From a hill near Targnon, Lt. Col. Rubel somehow acquired a self-propelled 155mm howitzer and began shelling the enemy-held sanatorium. Firing over open sights, Rubel’s personal artillery piece hurled about 50 high explosive rounds into the sturdy structure before darkness fell. The Germans inside were stunned but refused to yield. Captain Berry thought of a way to throw the Germans out. That night he crawled completely around the sanatorium and found a place where a road might be built that could support tank traffic. Using volunteers from Company C and the infantry, Berry had a corduroy track built of shotup trees and shell casings. By daybreak on the 22nd, Berry had maneuvered a platoon of M4s right up to St. Edouard’s. Firing through the windows, they kept the SS inside pinned down while soldiers of the 119th entered to recapture the main building, this time for good. Almost 250 civilians, many of them children, were later found dazed but unhurt in the sanatorium’s cellar. Meanwhile, Powers and Loopey dispatched two more lurking tanks, one a Panther, the other a captured Sherman. This broke the back of Peiper’s defense, and the SS remaining in Stoumont quickly fled toward La Gleize. Coordinated attacks by the 2nd Battalion, 119th Infantry and Combat Command B of the 3rd Armored Division moving in from the north hurried them on their way. By nightfall, the U.S. advance had gone 2,000 yards past Stoumont while enduring ferocious German resistance. Retaking Stoumont was a costly fight; in its first battle the 740th Tank Battalion lost five tanks and six men wounded. Miraculously, no Daredevils were killed. Infantry losses ran higher: the 1st Battalion, 119th Infantry suffered 106 casualties, including 18 killed, 60 wounded, and 28 missing. On December 23, Task Force Harrison resumed its attack but ground to a halt short of La Gleize. Peiper’s men fought desperately, hemmed in by the 119th

American soldiers gaze at the hulk of a German Tiger tank knocked out near La Gleize during the final stage of the Battle of the Bulge. The fate of the German Ardennes offensive was sealed when the U.S. 740th Tank Battalion stopped Kampfgruppe Peiper at Stoumont.

Infantry to their west, 3rd Armored Division columns attacking from the north, and paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne pushing steadily from across the Ambleve at Cheneux. Deadly German fire kept the Americans out of La Gleize that day, but everyone knew the end was near. It was after dark on December 23, and Peiper’s nine-day race to the Meuse River had ended in total failure. Out of fuel, ammunition, and supplies, he passed the word to his exhausted troops: “Destroy your equipment and escape on foot.” What was left of Kampfgruppe Peiper abandoned La Gleize before dawn on Christmas Eve. The Germans left behind at least 28 heavy tanks, 70 half-tracks, eight armored cars, and numerous artillery pieces. Counting dead, wounded, and captured, Peiper lost over 85 percent of his original 5,800-man force. Escaping with him to the German lines were a mere 800 frozen, dejected soldiers. On December 29, the Daredevil tankers joined the 82nd Airborne Division. Rubel’s tankers got along well with the aggressive 82nd, one paratrooper even noting, “The 740th was the only tank outfit that could ever keep up with us.” Once the Battle of the Bulge officially ended in January 1945, Allied forces began the final offensive in Western Europe. The Daredevils moved from unit to unit, sup-

porting at times the 8th, 63rd, and 86th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 82nd Airborne, as they marched across Germany. While their infantry comrades occasionally went into reserve, the Daredevils stopped only for maintenance or resupply. They were always on the go, but that was how they preferred it. The men of the 740th realized that only hard, relentless fighting would bring an end to the war. V-E Day found the Daredevils occupying Ulzen, Germany. They had been at the tip of the spearhead for 138 days of nearly constant combat, and it was now time to take stock. The death toll for the Daredevil tankers included 43 officers and enlisted men killed in action. They had also suffered an astonishing 57 tanks lost during their six months on the line. On the positive side, Lt. Col. Rubel’s 740th Tank Battalion accounted for 69 enemy tanks destroyed, including 17 Tiger and Tiger IIs. The Daredevils also smashed or captured hundreds of cannon and combat vehicles. They even shot up 200 airplanes, most of them caught on the ground when the battalion overran an airfield at Hagenow. Captain Berry, Lieutenant Powers, and Staff Sergeant Loopey each received a Silver Star for their actions at Stoumont. Every 740th tanker who fought there was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation.

93

BB-Win14 Liebstandarte_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:31 AM Page 94

THE 1ST PANZER DIVISION LIEBSTANDARTE, HITLER’S BODYGUARD, FOUGHT FOR THE KEY BELGIAN CROSSROADS TOWN IN THE WANING DAYS OF THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE. By Major General Michael Reynolds story of Hitler’s Bodyguard, the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte (LAH), in the battle for Bastogne does not begin until after the siege of that city had been raised by the U.S. 4th Armored Division, part of General George Patton’s Third Army, on December 26, 1944. By then the American Bastogne salient posed such a threat to the flank and rear of German Army Group B that it could no longer be ignored—in fact, by then Bastogne was becoming the center of gravity of the whole Battle of the Bulge. As a consequence, the men who wore Hitler’s name on their cuffs found themselves rushed to this new sector. Their division had already suffered heavily in its failed attempt to break through in the northern sector of the Bulge, but the fighting in which it was about to take part was some of the most bitter and costly of the entire campaign. It will probably come as a surprise to many readers to learn that American casualties in the second half of the Battle of the Bulge (December 30, 1944,

THE

94

BATTLE FOR BASTOGNE

BB-Win14 Liebstandarte_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:31 AM Page 95

A Panther tank of the 1st SS Panzer Division “Leibstandarte” moves forward warily as its commander scans the horizon for signs of enemy forces.

ullstein-bild / The Granger Collection, New York

95

BB-Win14 Liebstandarte_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:31 AM Page 96

ullstein-bild / The Granger Collection, New York

ABOVE: A Waffen-SS Panzer IV tank rolls forward along a snow-covered road during the Battle of the Bulge. By January 1945, the last desperate German offensive in the West had lost its momentum. OPPOSITE: On January 1, 1945, American Sherman tanks fire their 75mm cannon at German positions in the Belgian countryside. Although they were no match for the German panzers in one-on-one confrontations, sheer weight of numbers tipped the balance of power to Allied armor.

through January 12, 1945), were nearly one-third higher than in the first half. In the same way that the Bastogne salient was causing problems to Army Group B, it was clear to the senior U.S. commanders that they had to fill the gap between their 4th Armored Division and the 26th Infantry Division to its southeast. In particular, it was important to push the Germans away to the east from the BastogneArlon road—the main open artery into the Bastogne pocket. To this end, the 35th Infantry Division was ordered to advance into the gap and given the BastogneLongvilly road as its ultimate objective. By the evening of the 29th, it was lying directly in the path of the eastern prong of the German counterattack designed to cut

96

Patton’s III Corps corridor into Bastogne— the counterattack in which Hitler’s Bodyguards were to participate. On December 28, 1944, the LAH was transferred to XXXIX Panzer Corps in General Hasso von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army. Headquarters Army Group B reported that night: “Kampfgruppe 1st SS Panzer Division, with its Panzer Regiment, Panzerjäger Battalion, 1st Panzergrenadier Regiment, Artillery Regiment, Pioneer Company and Armored Reconnaissance Platoon, left the Vielsalm area at 1625 hours and moved into the … Longvilly area.” In fact, owing to fuel shortages, some elements of the LAH were unable to start their move until midday on the 29th, by which time the division had become part of Army Group Lüttwitz, a new unified command comprising both the XXXIX and XLVII Corps. General Heinrich F. von Lüttwitz had been given the task of eliminating the Bastogne salient. During the night of the 29th, the LAH moved farther south to the Tarchamps-

Lutremange area, from where it was to launch its attack. This part of the Duchy of Luxembourg was hilly and heavily forested, with a very restricted road network. It was bitterly cold; the roads were icy, and a blanket of snow covered everything. The LAH’s attack was to be supported on its northern flank by the 167th Volksgrenadier Division (VGD) and a Kampfgruppe (KG) of Panzer Lehr’s 901st Regiment, which included some Mk IV tanks. The latter was already in the sector but worn down and understrength. The 167th VGD had arrived from Hungary on December 24 and then, after detraining on the east bank of the Rhine, had experienced great difficulty in reaching the Bastogne sector. To add to its problems, the division had no heavy weapons, and although a third of its men were veterans of the Russian Front, many others were recently joined Luftwaffe personnel. On the LAH’s southern flank, a regiment of the 5th Parachute Division (FSD), already in the line and resisting the advance of the U.S. 35th Division, had also

BB-Win14 Liebstandarte_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:31 AM Page 97

been ordered to support the attack, but it too was tired and seriously understrength. For its new mission, the LAH commander, SS Maj. Gen. Wilhelm Mohnke, divided his depleted division into two KGs. The northern KG, under the command of SS Captain Werner Poetschke, comprised all the available tanks, two weak battalions of panzergrenadiers, and a pioneer company. It was tasked with capturing Lutrebois and then advancing to the BastogneArlon road in the vicinity of Remonfosse. At the same time the southern KG, under SS Lt. Col. Max Hansen, was to capture Villers-la-Bonne-Eau and reach the Bastogne-Arlon road via Losange. It consisted of the 1st SS Panzerjäger Battalion, all the remaining panzergrenadiers, an SS reconnaissance platoon, and a pioneer company. After reaching the Bastogne-Arlon road, both KGs were to continue their advance west to link up with the Führer Begleit Brigade (FBB) and the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division (PGD) in the area between Assenois and Hompré, south of Bastogne. H-Hour was set for 6 AM on the 30th. Suggestions that the infamous SS Lt. Col. Jochen Peiper, the designated commander of the LAH’s 1st SS Panzer Regiment, was a “backseat driver” in KG Poetschke during this operation can be discounted. Following the defeat of his KG in the northern sector of the Bulge from December 17-25, he was suffering from mental and physical exhaustion and

“WHEN THE SMOKE CLEARED I SAW THAT MY HATCH WAS GONE. WHAT I DID NOT SEE WAS THAT THE HIT HAD TORN OUR CANNON RIGHT AWAY FROM THE TURRET.” had been evacuated. How strong was the LAH at this time? There is very little firm information from German sources, but it is still possible to determine the strength of the division with reasonable accuracy. It is clear that the 1st SS Panzer Battalion still had a theoretical strength of 16 Panther and 26 Mk IV medium tanks. Karl Rettlinger’s 1st SS Panzerjäger Battalion had suffered little and should have had about 18 Jagdpanzer IVs and the corps’ 501st SS Heavy Battalion still counted 33 Tiger II tanks in strength, although it is unlikely that more than 15 were operational. How many of these tanks and Jagdpanzers actually reached the Bastogne area remains a matter of conjecture, and, out of a total of 93, it is unlikely that more

than 50 saw action there. With regard to infantry, Hansen’s 2nd and Rudolf Sandig’s 1st SS Panzergrenadier Battalions were allocated to KG Poetschke, while Hansen was left with the remnants of his 1st and 3rd battalions. Overall, it seems probable that each Leibstandarte KG had the equivalent of about one panzergrenadier battalion. The relevant front line on December 30 ran south from Neffe, through the woods to the east of Marvie, then along the line of the woods and the Lutrebois-Lutremange road to Villers-la-Bonne-Eau and Livarchamps, and finally away to the east below Harlange. As already mentioned, the American 35th Infantry Division lay directly in the path of the German attack. One of its regiments (the 134th) had captured most of Lutrebois in the early evening of December 29, and another (the 137th) had taken Sainlez and Livarchamps from the 5th FSD and, during the night of the 29th, penetrated into Villers-la-Bonne-Eau with two companies. “They couldn’t completely dislodge a company of German Pioneers and ended up sharing the village with them for the rest of the night,” the divisional history reported. The 320th Regiment of the 35th Division was at this time “engaged in bitter battle” with elements of 5th FSD around a farm and in the woods 1,000 meters southeast of Harlange. The division had suffered 148 battle casualties in three National Archives

97

BB-Win14 Liebstandarte_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:31 AM Page 98

days of fighting to reach this line. The artillery fire plan heralding the LAH attack was weak and ineffective due to a shortage of ammunition. Nevertheless, the leading tanks of KG Poetschke moved forward from Lutremange on parallel roads at 6:25AM. Fortunately for Mohnke’s men, the morning of the 30th dawned cloudy with poor visibility. Although this kept the Allied fighter bombers away for the first few hours of the attack, it also prevented the assistance that had been promised by the Luftwaffe. Poetschke’s tanks met no resistance other than from artillery fire as they approached Lutrebois, which was held by a battalion of the 35th Division (3/134th), with another battalion (2/134th) deployed in the wood line on the ridge dominating the valley to its south. Artillery fire delayed the advance, but panzergrenadiers soon infiltrated the American lines south of Lutrebois. Others engulfed the village, and

seven tanks hooked around to the north. American tank destroyers claimed four of them, and two were said to have been knocked out by artillery fire, while one was immobilized on a mine. News of the German attack reached the headquarters of Combat Command A (CCA) of the 4th Armored Division at 6:35AM. This combat command was located just to the east of the BastogneArlon road and behind the northern regiment of the 35th Division. It was basically facing north with its advanced elements at Remonfosse. The American commander wasted no time and ordered his units to turn east in support of the 35th Infantry Division. The after-action report of CCA reads, “Counter-attack of at least infantry battalion strength supported with SP guns and 20 to 30 tanks drove 3/134 out of Lutrebois and enemy infantry infiltrated through the woods to within 400 yards of the highway [Bastogne-Arlon road] seri-

ously threatening our position.” With the northern regiment of the 35th Division forced to withdraw south through the woods toward Losange, Poetschke’s 6th SS Panzer Company’s Mk Ivs were nearing Point 535, from where they could see Remonfosse and some 2 miles of the Bastogne-Arlon road. The 7th Panzer Company was heading for Saiwet, and CCA’s situation was indeed becoming serious. Urgent action was needed. The Americans deployed an armored infantry battalion with two tank companies (51st Armored Infantry Battalion and B & D/35th Tank Battalion) in support into the woods to the west of Lutrebois. They also brought ground attack aircraft and all available artillery into play. The weather had improved as the day progressed and the LAH tank companies, now that they were out in the open, were extremely vulnerable. CCA’s report goes on: “At about 1100 hours B Company (strength six tanks)

ullstein-bild / The Granger Collection, New York

98

BB-Win14 Liebstandarte_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:31 AM Page 99

Map © 2007 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

engaged thirteen enemy tanks advancing NW out of Lutrebois, destroying eleven of them without loss. With clear weather and good visibility air and artillery support was [sic] excellent, the air getting seven confirmed tank kills and the artillery breaking up several troop concentrations. Hugh M. Cole’s Official History of the U.S. Army adds more information about the air support. “The main body of the 1st SS Panzer KG appeared an hour or so before noon moving along the Lutremange-Lutrebois road; some twenty-five tanks were counted in all. It took two hours to bring the fighter-bombers into the fray, but they arrived just in time to cripple or destroy seven tanks and turn back the bulk of the Panzers.” Further details are to be found in the after-action report of the CCA: “Thirteen German tanks ... reached the woods southeast of Lutrebois, but a 4th Armd Div artillery spotter in a Cub plane spotted them and dropped a message to Co B of the 35th Tank Bn … six Sherman tanks and a platoon from the 701st TD Bn formed an ambush near a slight ridge that provided hull defilade and waited. The leading German company (or platoon) which had six Panzers, happened to see Co A of the 35th and as the fog briefly lifted, turned, with flank exposed, in that direction. The first shot … put away the German commander’s tank and the other tanks milled about until all had been knocked out. Six more German tanks came along and all were destroyed or disabled. In the meantime the American TDs took on some accompanying assault guns, shot up three of them, and dispersed the neighboring Grenadiers.” These reports equate reasonably well with the few German accounts of events on the 30th, although they claim many more tanks knocked out. A member of the 7th SS Panzer Company, Manfred Thorn, remembered, “At about 0930 hours we reached the Lutrebois hills.… American infantry were scattered through the left portion of the forest, right along the road. The forest lined the road for only a hundred meters, then the first houses of Lutrebois could be seen…. At the end of the for-

ABOVE: Originally formed as Hitler’s personal bodyguard, the 1st SS Panzer Division “Leibstandarte” failed to secure the Belgian crossroads town of Bastogne, which was a key to the entire German offensive. OPPOSITE: On January 15, 1945, German infantrymen pick their way through a wooded area during the costly Ardennes offensive. Hitler’s bid to capture the port of Antwerp and split the Allied armies in the West ended in failure.

est a Panther stood on the right…. On the horizon to the west I saw the last Panzers of the 6th Company disappearing behind a hill. They were driving in the direction of Remonfosse…. The Company then drove in a wide wedge formation toward the hills 4km south of Bastogne [north of Remonfosse]. On our right were the woods, to our left open ground, behind us Lutrebois…. At 1515 hours we noted several Panzers behind us already hit and burning. Within ten minutes six of our Company’s Panzers were knocked out.” Whether the Panther referred to was that of Werner Poetschke we shall never know, but his command Panther was certainly put out of action and he and his adjutant, Rolf Reiser, were given a lift back to their

command post later in the day in a 7th Company Mk IV. Thorn’s Mk IV withdrew into the forest after last light and eventually reached Bras. Another member of the 7th Company, Rolf Ehrhardt, described his participation. “We bypassed the center of the village [Lutrebois], leaving it on our left and … headed northwest…. Suddenly we saw movement near the 6th Company. The Panzers angled to the left and one fired its main armament…. The artillery fire became stronger. Then there was a new tone in the explosions—a harder, drier whipcrack…. The fire was coming from due west (from a dominating wooded ridge which runs for some 2 miles along the west side of the Bastogne-Arlon road)…. The

99

BB-Win14 Liebstandarte_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:31 AM Page 100

100

armored guns moved in and around the town shooting into the houses occupied by elements of the 3rd Battalion. Two of these guns were knocked out by bazooka fire and the rest withdrew out of bazooka range and shelled the houses with direct fire…. Companies K and L were cut off from the rest of the Battalion.” At 2:45PM the German advance continued and the Chateau Losange was captured by 6PM. But this was to be the high-water mark of Hansen’s advance, for as the leading elements of his KG reached the main Bastogne-Arlon road, just to the west of the Chateau, they came under intense artillery fire and direct tank and antitank fire from parts of CCA and the 137th Infantry Regiment. The attack stalled, and Hansen gave orders for his men to go firm. By last light on December 30, the Leibstand- arte was holding Point 535, Lutrebois, the Chateau Losange area, and Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, and the 35th Division had been forced back to a line running from Remonfosse to Sainlez to Livarchamps. But the German counterattack had failed in its mission of crossing the Bastogne-Arlon road and reaching the Assenois area, and the cost had been heavy. At least 20 tanks and Jagdpanzers were lost, and many panzergrenadiers killed and wounded. Nevertheless, the attack had driven a wedge 2 miles wide and 2 miles deep into the flank of the Bastogne corridor and, as the Official History says, “It had achieved an important secondary effect, becoming, as it did, a true spoiling attack that put the 35th [Division] out of the running from 31 December on.” The concurrent attack by the 167th VGD along the axis of the Bras-Bastogne road met with some initial success and reached the first houses of Bastogne itself; however, in the face of intense artillery fire, attacks by fighter-bombers and finally a counterattack by armored elements of CCA, the division ended the day at the western edge of Marvie. The 5th FSD held its ground on the 30th against limited attacks by the 35th Division but was too weak to join in the overall Ger-

man assault on the Bastogne corridor. There are no detailed reports of the fighting on the eastern side of the Bastogne corridor on December 31 from either the Americans or Germans. Clear weather produced plenty of air activity—the Germans claiming 3,550 Allied aircraft operating against 550 of their own. Ralf Tiemann’s History of the LAH says

National Archives

Amis must have set up anti-tank guns further to the left of the 6th Company. Two shells exploded in front of our tank…. A tank was knocked out in front of us…. It was almost a relief when we were hit ourselves…. When the smoke cleared I saw that my hatch was gone. What I did not see was that the hit had torn our cannon right away from the turret.” Yet another member of the same company told later how he and his tank commander drove forward again that night to search for damaged tanks. They found six, all from their own company and still burning, in a row in an open field. Amazingly, only two crewmen had been killed during the day; SS Captain Oskar Klingelhöfer had suffered burns but would soon return to command what was left of the company. In the southern sector of the LAH’s front, KG Hansen’s advance progressed well despite an appalling route that twisted its way through woods and up and down deep valleys. By mid-morning, SS Captain Haft’s panzergrenadiers, with support from at least seven Jagdpanzers, had relieved the few German pioneers who had shared Villers-la-Bonne-Eau with the Americans the previous night. The AAR of the 35th Division describes what happened: “Companies K and L of the 3/137th Infantry came under attack by seven tanks [Jagdpanzers] heavily supported by infantry. The Panzers moved in close, blasting the stone houses and setting the village ablaze. At 0845 a radio message reached the CP of the 137th Infantry asking for the artillery to lay down a barrage of smoke and high explosive, but before the gunners could get a sensing the radio went dead. Only one of the 169 men inside the village got out.” The report of the U.S. infantry regiment involved gives more details: “At 0645 the 3rd Battalion held four buildings in Villersla-Bonne-Eau and by 0900 the enemy activity and resistance in the town increased considerably. Enemy assault guns [Jagdpanzers] and SS troops moved into the town in the morning to reinforce the enemy garrison [pioneers] and the

the fighting continued with “undiminished ferocity” on the 31st, with both LAH KGs reaching the Bastogne-Arlon road again at about midday before being pushed back again to their start points by “massive artillery fire and counter-attacks during the afternoon by the 4th Armored and 35th Infantry Divisions.” Neither of the U.S. divisional after-action reports makes any mention of this. CCA of the 4th Armored merely says, “Positions taken up late on 30 Dec were improved and strengthened … enemy tank lurking in edge of woods was destroyed.” The 35th Division’s after-action report says, “The Division was ordered to attack to the north-east, supported by tanks from the 4th Armd Div, to capture the two

BB-Win14 Liebstandarte_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:31 AM Page 101

510m high hills north-east of Lutrebois, but no progress was made.” The war diary of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, commander-in-chief of German forces in the West, has the following entry for the 31st: “A report from Army Group B at 1215 hours again described the ferocity of the fighting around Bastogne. The western attack group [3rd PGD and FBB]

chance of cutting the Bastogne corridor and that a direct attack against the town was more likely to bring success. The decision was to bring the LAH’s sister division, the 12th SS Hitlerjugend, into action in the Bastogne sector with disastrous results. Its personnel casualties would reach catastrophic proportions in the ensuing fighting, and the division was to lose seven Mk

the 35th Division mentions German counterattacks by tanks as well as infantry after the 137th Infantry had captured four houses in the village of Harlange. It seems likely that part of Hansen’s KG assisted the 5th FSD in resisting American attacks in that area too—the so-called tanks probably being Jagdpanzers. The American reports for January 5-6

cannot advance any further without the support of the eastern group [LAH and 167th VGD]. The eastern group has indeed resumed the attack, but can only gain a little ground. The deployment of artillery will bring some relief. In spite of this, the forces committed so far appear to be insufficient to achieve the assigned objective.” January 1-2, 1945, saw only limited activity on the Leibstandarte’s front. The Americans claim to have cleared Hansen’s men from Losange and the woods to the west of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, but KG Poetschke still controlled the area of Point 535 and Lutrebois. The commander of Army Group B, Field Marshal Walter Model, had now come to the conclusion that there was little or no

IV tanks, six Panthers, 17 Jagdpanzer IVs, seven Jagdpanzer Vs, and 18 armored personnel carriers. On January 3, elements of the 35th Infantry Division managed to infiltrate into Lutrebois, and on the 4th, KG Poetschke launched a local counterattack with armor to recover the village. Although initially successful, the attack failed and by last light the Americans were in control with the German tanks back in Lutremange. Even so, the Germans continued to hold the woods to the south and east of Lutrebois. Although Hansen’s men had lost the road junction just to the northwest of the village, they were still firmly in control of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. Farther east, the after-action report of

On January 11, 1945, tanks of the U.S. 6th Armored Division move forward in pursuit of the retreating Germans as a snowstorm rages.

speak only of heavy resistance to all their attempts to advance against the LAH and make no mention of the following account of events in the History of the Leibstandarte: “On 5 and 6 January, the attack [against the Bastogne-Arlon road] was continued in the 167th VGD and LAH sectors. The advance of the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Battalion of the 1st Regiment, which contained only 80 men, together with the remaining assault guns out of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau against Losange stalled right from the start under concentrated blocking fire from the artillery of the 35th Infantry and 4th and

101

BB-Win14 Liebstandarte_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:31 AM Page 102

6th Armored Divisions. The attack by the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Battalion from the forest west of Tarchamps to regain Lutrebois, with approximately 100 men supported by the remnants of the 6th SS Panzer Company and several combat groups from the 1st SS Panzer Regiment with Panthers, made it to the enemy positions on the edge of the town. There it was repulsed by the concentrated commitment of all infantry weapons and heavy antitank gunfire. Although the Leibstandarte continued to hold its positions throughout January 7, the overall situation facing the Germans at this time was becoming so serious that there was a distinct possibility of another Falaise Pocket-type disaster. The following day, Hitler authorized Field Marshal Model to give up the area west of Houffalize and south of Bastogne. The withdrawal of the LAH was scheduled for the 10th. In the meantime, current positions were to be held. On January 9, Patton’s III Corps launched a coordinated attack to eliminate the mini bulge southeast of Bastogne. The after-action report of the 35th Division is succinct. “The Division was ordered to resume attacking to the north-east. The 320th Infantry, with elements of the 6th Armored Div in support, advanced 800m. The 134th Inf gained a kilometer.” According to the History of the LAH, “The Americans attacked … along with strong armored support and continuous artillery fire, from the direction of Losange and Livarchamps against the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Battalion’s positions on the western edge of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau. During the evening a single penetration was achieved into the center of the village. It was blocked by the battalion and SS pioneers committed with the support of assault guns. The battalion prepared to counterattack … during the night.” There are no reports of similar actions on other parts of the front. On January 10, the 5th FSD and 167th VGD began to fall back to the BizoryWardin-Bras line. Early that morning the LAH also began its withdrawal to an area

102

east of St. Vith, where it was to return to the command of I SS Panzer Corps. By that date, the U.S. 35th Division had suffered 1,432 battle casualties—its only consolation being that it had inflicted grievous harm on its major adversary. A member of Hansen’s 2nd SS Panzergrenadier described part of the withdrawal: “In the early morning of 10 January we received orders to evacuate the Lutremange–Villers-la-Bonne-Eau corridor and assemble to the east. It was nearly light when we reached the hilltop on the road to Harlange [Tarchamps]. There [at the boundary with the Duchy of Luxembourg] we again came under fire from American tanks and suffered bloody losses. We reached Doncols, east of Bastogne, in the afternoon.” The U.S. regiment tasked with the capture of the same area described events as

follows: “Supported by tanks and TDs, the 137th Infantry pushed ahead against the enemy on January 10, making a slight gain and capturing the much sought and fought for town of Villers-la-Bonne-Eau, a target of the Regiment for the past thirteen days. The Regiment attacked at 0915 … and by 1400 had two buildings on the edge of the battered town. Later in the afternoon, the entire village was cleared…. At 1400 the road leading from Lutremange was choked with enemy vehicles and an air strike and artillery pounded the column…. The Regiment suffered heavy casualties today.” Villers-la-Bonne-Eau had only 15 houses before it became engulfed by war, so it is hardly surprising that by January 10 the village had almost ceased to exist. The Americans estimated that 6,000 artillery rounds fell on it in just one day’s fighting. During the following four days a few

BB-Win14 Liebstandarte_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:31 AM Page 103

minor but costly actions were carried out by small armored elements of the LAH to cover its withdrawal, but for all intents and purposes the LAH’s commitment in Hitler’s last great offensive in the West was over. After three weeks of intense combat, it was a mere shadow of the division that had entered battle on December 16. No firm figures exist for the strengths of the panzergrenadier battalions, but it would appear that they totaled no more than a few hundred men. In the case of armor, official strength returns for the LAH and the Corps’ 501st SS Heavy Panzer Battalion dated January 15, 1945, relate some surprises. They show the 62 tanks and 15 Jagdpanzers or assault guns still on strength, 19 Mk IVs, 12 Panthers, 11 Jagdpanzer IVs, four Sturmgeschutz StuG assault guns, and 33 Tiger IIs; of these, three Mk IVs, one Panther, two StuGs, and 13 Tigers were under repair. From these figures it is possible to make a reasonable estimate of the losses suffered during the fighting in the Bastogne area: seven Mk IVs, four Panthers, seven Jagdpanzers, and two Tigers. Coincidentally, U.S. Army personnel photographed two of the Panthers and the two Tigers soon after the battle. One of the Tigers was allegedly near Villers-la-Bonne-Eau and the other in the Wardin area. Readers may be surprised that the losses in armor quoted above are much lower than those claimed by the Americans, but it has to be appreciated that the nature of the ground in the Lutrebois-Losange area precluded the deployment of large numbers of armored vehicles. Further, the Official History of the U.S. Army states, “Two or three units would claim to have destroyed what on later examination proves to have been the same enemy tank detachment and a cumulative listing of these claims—some 50-odd German tanks destroyed—probably gives more Panzers put out of action than 1st SS Panzer brought into the field.” It is also somewhat strange that there was no mention by either side of Tigers being involved in the Lutrebois-Lutremange fighting. This would seem to indi-

ABOVE: Sergeant George Meyer looks in disbelief at the scars from six direct hits against an enemy Mark VI Tiger tank. The thick armor of the Tiger withstood the successive impacts during desperate fighting in the Bulge. OPPOSITE: Looking for the nest of a German sniper in the Belgian town of Lutrebois, Sergeant Herbert S. Liman of the 134th Regiment, 25th Infantry Division watches for telltale movement.

cate that very few reached that area, and the fact that a photograph was taken of one allegedly knocked out on January 8 in the First U.S. Army sector, would tend to confirm this. There is, however, a report by an American tank company that claims that two Tigers knocked out four of its tanks in the Mageret area in the late afternoon of January 4. The summary of operations for January 1945, by the battalion of which that company was a part, has the following entry for January 5: “Destroyed 2 Tiger tanks.” These reports tend to confirm statements that a KG, comprising some 14 to 16 Tigers of the 501st SS Heavy Panzer Battalion, operated in the general area to the east of Bastogne from December 28 to January 10. No reliable details of this KG’s actions are provided. And so ended the part played by Hitler’s Bodyguard in the Ardennes campaign. In summary, it can be said that the division had been ordered to fight through unsuitable

terrain, starved of essential supplies, and denied the air support this type of operation demanded. But it also has to be said that, due to failures by German intelligence staffs, the men of the LAH had often been surprised by the situations in which they found themselves and by the speed of the American reaction to their attacks. There was one more thing that spelled disaster for Hitler’s last offensive in the West: the bravery and tenacity of the American frontline soldier. This came as a shock to the Germans who, like their Führer, had a poor opinion of the U.S. Army. Michael Reynolds is a retired major general in the British Army. He is a veteran of the Korean War and the former director of NATO’s Military Plans and Policy Division. Reynolds is a recognized expert on the Battle of the Bulge. He initially directed and later appeared as a guest speaker on some 50 British Army and NATO battlefield tours in the Ardennes. He has written three well-received books on the subject.

103

BB-Win14 Bulge 551st_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:33 AM Page 104

American paratroopers faced heavy odds and paid a fearsome price.

BY

SUMMER’S END 1944 Adolf Hitler had unveiled his elaborate plan for a counteroffensive in the Ardennes. The American sector that the attack would penetrate was held by General Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps, which was a part of General Courtney Hodges’ First Army. In all, Middleton’s VIII Corps stretched for some 75 miles. General Eisenhower had thinned this portion of the Allied line in order to utilize more of his combat power to attack other areas. The site that Hitler had chosen to break through the Allied line was not only thinly defended but held mainly with understrength or inexperienced divisions. German General Alfred Jodl, chief of the army’s operational staff, labeled the operational plan for the attack Herbstnebel (Autumn Fog). The code name was appropriate because the Germans knew that if this offensive had any chance of success, it had to take place

104

551

st

when Allied air forces would be grounded for inclement weather. As it turned out, the weather during much of the German counteroffensive was some of Europe’s worst in decades. As Hitler’s forces penetrated the American divisions and began driving west, the “bulge” in the line increased in size with each passing hour. Eisenhower began maneuvering forces to try to stop the enemy advance. One of the units Eisenhower maneuvered was SHAEF’s (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) reserve. This was General Matthew Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne Corps. At the time of the German attack, Ridgway’s Corps was garrisoned in and around the town of Rheims, France. The XVIII Airborne Corps consisted primarily of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions with various other airborne forces attached. Two of the attached airborne units were the 517th Para-

BB-Win14 Bulge 551st_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:33 AM Page 105

at the Bulge BY DONALD ROBERTS II

© James Dietz

105

BB-Win14 Bulge 551st_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:33 AM Page 106

National Archives

chute Infantry Regiment commanded by Lt. Col. Rupert Graves and the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion commanded by Lt. Col. Wood Joerg. The 517th and the 551st had both been part of the 1st Airborne Task Force, which had jumped in support of Operation Dragoon, the Allied invasion of southern France on August 15. Following the successful conclusion of Operation Dragoon, the paratroopers were transported north to join the XVIII Airborne Corps near Rheims. The 517th was billeted at Soissons, and the 551st settled into Laon by December 12, only four days before the Germans launched their Ardennes offensive. Following the attack on December 16, the XVIII Airborne Corps was assigned to Hodges’ First Army on the northern shoulder of the German penetration. Because Ridgway was in England at the time of the attack, General James Gavin (82nd commanding general) became acting commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps. Gavin moved the 101st Airborne Division to Bastogne, Belgium, which was a vital crossroads located almost in the center of the 40mile-wide German breakthrough. The 82nd Airborne Division, along with the attached 551st, 517th, and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalions, was ordered northward to the vicinity of Werbomont, Belgium. Along the northern shoulder of the German advance, the 82nd with its attached units was ordered to deploy into a jagged line that ran roughly from Stavelot southwest to Werbomont. It was along this line that the paratroopers of the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion would begin their mission to repel Hitler’s battle-hardened soldiers. Although many American units were withdrawing in the face of Manteuffel and Dietrich’s determined attack, the men of the 551st tried to reach their destination. Confusion seemed to be the tenor for this period of the battle. Normally the trip to Werbomont should have taken about four hours by truck. For two days, December 19 and 20, the men of Colonel Joerg’s Battalion tried to reach Werbomont. Constant road blockages, enemy artillery fire, low-

106

“Let everyone hold before him a single thought—to destroy the enemy on the ground, in the air, everywhere— destroy him.” level Luftwaffe attacks, and snowstorms all combined to slow the advance. Road congestion was the biggest problem during the move toward the front. There were countless American armor and artillery units “moving to the rear.” Lieutenant Dick Goins, 3rd Platoon Leader in C Company, recalled one of his men saying, “They [the retreating Americans] were moving back quite rapidly, and we were moving forward.” Goins knew what the trooper was thinking. It was both “disheartening” and nerve-wracking to witness “our forces” retreating. Through the afternoon and into the night of the 21st, the trucks carrying the men of the 551st began reaching Werbomont. The paratroopers were then assigned to the 30th Infantry Division already in place along the battle line. The airborne men were ordered to leave their heavy overcoats and overshoes behind because the battalion “was going to be

moving fast and could not afford to be bogged down with heavy gear.” Their belongings were supposed to catch up to them at the front at a later date. Thus began the strange, nightmarish odyssey of the 551st. For the next two weeks, the men of the battalion would be unattached and reattached to many different combat units as they fought many battles against a determined enemy and waged a constant, terrible battle with the severe weather. A few days before Christmas, the German attack reached its high-water mark. On the 22nd, Eisenhower sent a stirring message to all the troops fighting in the Ardennes: “By rushing from his fixed defense the enemy may give us the chance to turn his great gamble into his worst defeat…. Let everyone hold before him a single thought—to destroy the enemy on the ground, in the air, everywhere—destroy him.” Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army was stopped short of the Meuse River, while along the northern shoulder of the “bulge” Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army continued to thrash around and try to find a way to continue its push toward Antwerp. By Christmas Eve, the 551st had dug defensive positions near Stavelot somewhere on the right flank of the 30th. The men of the battalion began to feel isolated in their forested bivouacs, and the paratroopers felt out of place attached to a regular infantry division. Moreover, the continued confusion along the American line further contributed to the seclusion felt by the men. The temperature, which hampered operations, dropped to near zero at night. Perhaps worst were the constant rumors—“the Germans were coming— they had already passed us—we are cut off—they are wearing GI uniforms and driving captured U.S. vehicles—they were taking no prisoners—they are just down the road and coming with a panzer division of Royal Tiger tanks.” Later that day, Colonel Joerg received orders to attack an enemy SS unit that was judged to be about two battalions in strength and reinforced with tanks. They were dug in near a bridgehead across the Salm River. The attackers would not only

BB-Win14 Bulge 551st_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:33 AM Page 107

have to cross open ground, but the river as well. Colonel Joerg, believing that this attack would be suicidal for many of his men, began to visit them in their front-line positions. To Sergeant Don Garrigues, the colonel appeared “worried” and “not completely himself.” Everyone knew the reason. Infantrymen dread “face-to-face” encounters with tanks. Although it happened frequently at the “Bulge,” no one ever relished the idea. Late on Christmas Eve, the attack was called off because most regiments of the 82nd were pulled back to “tidy up the American battle line.” Spirits rose among the men in the 551st. The men of Joerg’s battalion spent Christmas trying to stay warm; eating boiled, rubberized turkey; and giving thanks for their good fortune. Few men realized it would be the last lull to fall upon the 551st. During the next two days, heavy attacks by the 9th Panzer and 62nd Volksgrenadier divisions along the 82nd’s front forced Ridgway to unattach the 551st

from the 30th Infantry Division and reattach the battalion to the 82nd. By December 27, SHAEF decided that Ridgway’s XVIII Corps would spearhead the upcoming First Army’s counterattack along the northern shoulder of the breakthrough, while Patton’s Third Army would begin a push from the south. General Gavin, now back in command of his division, was itching to get the Allied attack going. At the time, the 551st was in position near Rahier. Gavin met with Colonel Joerg and ordered him to probe the enemy’s strength to the front. The men of Joerg’s Battalion would then conduct the “raid in force” by first moving past the American front lines then attacking and advancing about four miles to the village of Noirefontaine, returning with prisoners. It was nearly 11 pm on the 27th when Joerg’s men moved through the battered and weary men of the 508th Parachute Regiment and into enemy territory. Joerg decided to place Captain Tims Quinn’s C Company in the lead for the attack. Cap-

BELOW: German SS troops move forward during the December phase of the battle. OPPOSITE: Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway on the left and Maj. Gen. James Gavin on the right confer during the Battle of the Bulge. Both commanded paratroopers, who bore much of the fighting.

tain Marshall Dalton’s A Company would advance on the right flank, and Captain Jim Evans’ B Company was held in reserve. Occupying the village of Noirefontaine were two companies from the 164th Regiment, 62nd Volksgrenadier Division, and a company (more or less) from the 9th SS Panzer Division. Joerg’s men caught the enemy by surprise at Noirefontaine. Nevertheless, within minutes, A Company came under enemy smallarms and artillery fire. A promised “fiveminute barrage” to soften up the Germans never came. All of a sudden, a Panzer IV emerged from the darkness heading straight for Quinn’s men. Quinn immediately yelled for bazooka men: “I want you to go up the road and don’t come back unless you are dragging them damned tanks by the tail!” The bazooka men were back in minutes, mission accomplished. To make up for the lack of promised artillery support, Lieutenant Robert Buscher’s 81mm mortars opened up on the objective. Soon, almost every building was ablaze, and enemy soldiers were running everywhere. Buscher’s mortar men fired more than 400 rounds during the raid.

National Archives

107

National Archives

BB-Win14 Bulge 551st_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:33 AM Page 108

The “close-in” fighting in the village lasted about 30 minutes. B Company moved south through the village to machine-gun the secondary objectives—the villages of LaChapelle, Odrimont, and Amcomont. By 2:30 am, Evans’ men had successfully repulsed two determined counterattacks by the enemy and, with the light machine-gun platoon from Headquarters Company, delivered fire on their objectives. By 5 am, Joerg’s Battalion began retracing its steps back to friendly lines. The men

on the northern shoulder of the “Bulge.” The spearhead of the Allied attack would be delivered by General J. Lawton Collins’ VII Corps. Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne Corps would go into the line with VII Corps. On New Year’s Day, Colonel Joerg attended a meeting at Gavin’s headquarters and was told the 551st would be attached to the 517th Battalion for the upcoming offensive planned for January 3. The men of Joerg’s Battalion went into

The only official Army photo ever to identify the 551st. It shows them moving up to the front lines very early in the Battle of the Bulge.

the line between the 517th on their left and Gavin’s 505th Parachute Regiment on their right. The plan was for the entire force to attack and swing like a gate along a front 15 miles wide. The 517th was ordered to capture the villages of Trois-Ponts, Mont de Fosse, and Saint Jacques. The 551st’s objectives were to take Herispehe Ridge as well as the town of Dairomont while moving in the direction of the little village of Rochelinval on the Salm River. The 505th Parachute Regiment was ordered to capture Fosse, Reharmont, and Noirefontaine. Joerg put A and C Companies in the lead to attack the ridge, with B Company in reserve. Company commanders recommended that the battalion’s heavy overcoats and overshoes be left behind again to ensure fast movement during the attack.

literally stepped in their old tracks to avoid enemy mines. The 551st carried 15 of their wounded buddies as well as six prisoners back through the 508th’s lines. Three of their comrades had been killed. Both Colonel Joerg and General Gavin were satisfied with the performance of the 551st. The raid behind enemy lines represented the first American attack against the enemy in the XVIII Airborne Corps area of operation. The battalion’s S-3 officer, Major Ray “Pappy” Herrmann, felt that the 551st’s good performance in the Noirefontaine raid firmly established it with “the 82nd Airborne family.” By the end of December, Eisenhower began pushing for an all-out offensive against the Fifth and Sixth Panzer armies

108

At 6 am, men of the battalion began moving toward their line of departure (LD). Company A’s Communications Sergeant, Doug Dillard, remembered that “it was like walking on a sled run and I fell down several times and so did others, their weapons banging on their heads.” Herispehe Ridge lay 700 yards across an open, snow-covered field from the LD. As A and C Companies began their attack, they were met with heavy artillery and mortar fire. Captain Quinn watched four rounds of 82nd artillery strike the far edge of the woods where the Germans were well dug in. Quinn turned to the FO (forward observer) and exclaimed, “That’s perfect! Now give us the concentration.” The FO answered, “That is the concentration.” The FO explained that, due to the ammunition shortage, division artillery could only engage “definite” targets. By 8:30 am, enemy artillery and mortar fire had become gruesomely accurate. One round killed the entire 60mm mortar squad that had been attached to A Company. Sergeant Charlie Fairlamb, an FO from the battalion mortar section, said that as the men began to cross the little, sunken road (LD), “casualties mounted very rapidly. It seemed as though we just couldn’t get started. The Germans were holding the high ground with perfect visibility from dug-in positions, and we were out in the open.” Just when it seemed that it couldn’t get much worse, two Tiger tanks appeared, one to the front and one on the flank of the attacking men. Corporal Joe Cicchinelli of Company A remembered that the men of the 551st “made good targets” in their dark uniforms in the white snow. The Tigers began firing “point-blank” at the paratroopers. “You either ran or got killed. It was just annihilation. There was nothing to protect you except snow.” Quinn’s C Company made it into the enemy-held tree line along the ridge. Company A, on the left, had been under extreme enemy fire and could not keep pace. Colonel Joerg radioed Quinn and had him stop his attack until A Company came up. The halt was a mistake. Quinn’s

BB-Win14 Bulge 551st_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:33 AM Page 109

men had succeeded, with hand-to-hand fighting, in kicking the Germans out of their foxholes. But as soon as the paratroopers stopped their advance, enemy artillery fire swept the ridge for 15 minutes, killing or badly wounding 45 men from the company. Heavy fighting continued until twilight with A Company suffering very heavy casualties in their attack across the frozen ground. As B Company came up into the Herispehe Woods, Lieutenant Ralph Wenthold heard “clanking so loud it sounded like a construction site. There, A Company was trying to pierce the frozen soil for foxholes.” Slowly the men of the battalion began to take stock of the day’s action. Many in A Company seemed to be in shock from the battle and from the heavy losses. Looking back, A Company’s Second Platoon Leader, Lieutenant Dick Durkee, reported: “As we staggered down the road [through Herispehe Woods], I happened to look back at the battlefield and the sight will never leave me. The bodies of our comrades were strewn about where they had fallen and were partially covered with snow. I could see one man leaning against a fence-post—he apparently was going to climb over it but just didn’t quite make it. One of our machine guns was still there in position, and the gunner and assistant gunner were lying behind their guns—but they will never fire it again. Just before I rounded a bend in the road I looked back once more and bid the dead goodbye as the snow completely covered them and hid them from the wartorn world.” During the night it became difficult for the men of the 551st to keep their extremities from freezing while in their fighting positions. Moreover, it became too dangerous to fall asleep—with the temperature dropping below zero degrees Farenheit, a man could die in his sleep. This fate would be suffered by many of the 551st during the offensive. A number of 551st paratroopers began to have strong feelings of isolation. Much of this had to do with being an independent battalion and being passed around from

one unit to another in a very short period. Making matters worse, the 551st had lost contact with the 517th on the left and the 505th on the right. As the cold and the forest pressed in on the men (whose overshoes and overcoats had not yet caught up with them), their minds as well as their bodies were numbed. Adding to the isolation was the knowledge that only four of the battalion’s 38 radios remained in operation following the battle. To top all else, the jeep carrying Christmas presents from home had taken a direct hit from a “Screaming Meemie” (rocket fired from a six-barreled launcher). A feeling of loneliness and despair made worse by lack of sleep and food began to invade each trooper. The attack on Herispehe Ridge had cost the battalion 189 casualties, almost a third of its strength. A Company was down to 45 men. C Company fared a little better. Since Company B had 83 men remaining, Colonel Joerg decided to have it lead the attack the next day. The objective for the attack that day, January 4, was to clear out a pocket of Germans by-passed during the previous day’s attack. To do so, the 551st had to turn its attack 90 degrees toward the tiny village of Dairomont. Once Dairomont was cleared, the battalion was then to advance to a position west of the village of Rochelinval and dig in. Jumping off, B Company’s progress was slowed by accurate sniper fire around 4 pm. While C Company tried to flank the Germans by advancing on the right, Colonel Joerg ordered A Company into the attack because it had some of the battalion’s finest

“You either ran or got killed. It was just annihilation. There was nothing to protect you except snow.”

sharpshooters with which to counter the enemy sniper fire. Lieutenant Donald Booth, now in command of the depleted company, ordered Second Platoon forward. Booth split the platoon in two parts, one commanded by Lieutenant Dick Durkee and the other by Lieutenant Jerry Quinn. German machine-gun teams began firing on Durkee’s men first. Quinn moved his men into the woods, trying to encircle the enemy. As the German infantry began to swing its weapons around to shoot at Quinn’s team, Durkee’s men advanced and began firing as fast as they could. The mist and fog made it difficult for the men to determine friend from foe along the German defensive line. All of a sudden, Durkee shouted, “Fix bayonets!” He knew that if his squad was going to reach the enemy, he had to move his men quickly while the German machine-gun crews were concentrating on Quinn’s team. All the emotions the men had been feeling seemed to well up in them during this attack. Durkee’s men assaulted the enemy with a tremendous ferocity across the snow-covered ground. Lieutenant Durkee was the first to reach the enemy line. He and his men bayoneted, clubbed, and shot their way across and through the enemy positions. “They [the Germans] never had a chance. The men, having seen so many of their buddies killed and wounded during the past twenty-four hours, were not in a forgiving mood, and every Kraut was killed to a count of sixty-four. They all died in their foxholes.” During the attack on Dairomont, the men of Joerg’s battalion had the support of two tanks. Before the assault, the tankers were promised that “two companies” would accompany them into battle. Following the fight, an angry tanker complained to battalion headquarters that “all during the attack I never saw more than ten or fifteen men.” Someone from headquarters replied back, “Well, there are only about twenty men left out of those companies.” To that the tanker stated, “We would never have gone within a mile of that town if we had known you only had twenty men left to support us.”

109

BB-Win14 Bulge 551st_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:33 AM Page 110

By the end of the third day of the offensive, January 5, the men of the 551st had pushed the enemy back nearly a mile and a half. The battalion had suffered 90 men killed, 150 wounded, and two captured. Many of the lightly wounded paratroopers refused to report their injuries, prefering instead to treat their own wounds. The men were afraid that if they reported to an aid station, they would then be sent to a replacement unit and would never return to their buddies in the 551st. On January 6, the temperature fell to between zero and 10 degrees. The numbing cold caused as many casualties as the constant German artillery fire. Some of the men “lay down for a while and froze”— they died in their sleep. Nearly 25 died this way during the offensive, as did many of

the wounded troopers, before they could be evacuated to an aid station. Before the next phase of the offensive, the 551st was attached to the 504th Parachute Regiment. As the Americans kept up their determined attacks, the Germans began to withdraw more and more forces across the Salm River. The only remaining bridgehead in use to the Wehrmacht and SS was located at the tiny village of Rochelinval. Rochelinval was a hamlet of perhaps a dozen small houses on a plateau over the river. To guard the bridge, the Germans had dug in several machine guns along the bluff. The guns covered the open ground over a steep gully to the tree line 300 yards to the west. Colonel Joerg received orders to attack the town and hold it, thus preventing more

Germans from escaping over the river. Having suffered so many casualties from both the Germans and the cold weather, Joerg knew that the mission to attack Rochelinval would be very difficult. But he and his men knew they could do the job. Joerg hoped, however, that his battalion would not be sacrificed by becoming lost in the constant shuffling of being passed around to first one unit then another as had happened all week long. The attack was scheduled to jump off early on January 7. Joerg moved his command post to the edge of the forest just a mere 300 yards from the enemy’s fortifications at Rochelinval. The colonel briefed his few remaining officers. The 60 men of A Company would lead the assault from the left flank. Lieutenant Booth

The Hard Journey of the 551st Before and After the Battle

IN

November 1942, successful graduates of the Army’s jump school were screened by Major Wood Joerg for suitability to join what would later become the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion (PIB). Late in December, some 450 selectees were shipped to Panama. There, 125 men of Company C, 501st PIB became the cadre for the 450 new men arriving from the States. The 551st was thus born with the blending together of the two groups of paratroopers. The number selected for this unit, 551, seemed to help separate the battalion from all other airborne units. The basic numbering sequence for airborne units was from 501 to 517. The number 551 was selected for Major Joerg’s Battalion in order to confuse the enemy. U.S. Army leaders decided that if they skipped numbers in the sequence, enemy forces would think there were more paratrooper regiments than there really were. Prior to shipping out for Panama, the men had “picked up” their battalion mascot out of a civilian’s front yard. She was a “black and umber” 10-week-old dachshund. The men named her Furlough. Private Jim Heffernan smuggled her onboard his transport ship in his gas mask container. Furlough remained a well-

110

loved addition to the battalion up to its entry into the Battle of the Bulge. Shortly after the battalion’s arrival in Panama, Colonel Joerg began calling his men “GOYAs” or “GOYA BIRDS.” The meaning, Get Off Your Ass, fit the “get up and get the job done” attitude of the newly formed, fiercely proud, independent parachute battalion. Intensive combat training began almost immediately in the mountains and jungles of Panama. At the same time, the Goyas began improving their jump equipment. Sergeants Lloyd Larkin and Duke Spletzer devised a special harness that allowed Larkin to jump with his 30caliber Browning machine gun strapped tightly to his parachute harness. Noting Larkin’s success, the 60mm mortar men went to work on their own designs that would allow them to jump with their mortars. The Goyas’ unit patch was designed in Panama as well. Its prominent palm tree and machete paid tribute to the unit’s training days in Central America. The patch, however, was not widely distributed to the Goyas until their return to the States. During 1942, the islands in the Caribbean Sea had become the hunting grounds for German Uboats determined to sink as many of the cargo ships steaming toward the United States as pos-

sible. The island of Martinique, a French colony with a pro-German Vichy government, had become a particular haven to refuel, resupply, and repair German submarines. The American government was aware of this and, as a result, planned to end Germany’s military activities in the Western Hemisphere. The 551st, along with other units, had been placed in Panama with the understanding that they might one day invade Martinique and establish a pro-American government on the island. In the event of such a mission, A Company’s objective was the island’s airfield. Company B would be parachuted next to the government’s important facilities to destroy and capture its offices, water supply, communications, and economic centers. C Company would drop on Fort-deFrance and kill or capture the 3,500 defenders. In the end the mission was canceled. The show of force by the U.S. military was sufficient to force the pro-Vichy government to surrender to U.S. Rear Admiral John Hoover. Although their mission had been aborted, the men took pride in their part of the political victory. In August, the battalion shipped back to the United States. The training in Panama had welded the battalion into a spirited, close-knit fraternity. The men were sent to San Francisco, and then

BB-Win14 Bulge 551st_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:33 AM Page 111

divided his men into two “mini-platoons.” A Platoon was led by Durkee and Lieutenant Charles Dahl. B Platoon was commanded by Lieutenants Charlie Buckenmeyer and Joe Kienly. B Company’s job was to maneuver around to the right to try and envelop the enemy position on the south end of the village. The 40 men in C Company, commanded by Lieutenant Leroy Sano, would be held in reserve in the tree line with Joerg’s command post until needed. After surveying the enemy positions from his command post, Joerg knew the objective would be very difficult for his battered companies. The men had been up for over four days and with little food. Many had been wounded in some manner, and it was a rare trooper whose feet had

to Camp Mackall, NC, for more training. There they made the only U.S. Army training jumps from towed gliders. Tragically, in February 1944, eight troopers on a jump landed in the deepest part of Kinney Cameron Lake and drowned, an accident that seers the memory of survivors to this day. In April the Goyas shipped out of Norfolk, Va., heading for the war in Europe, landing first in Algiers, then Sicily and Italy. The 551st’s initial test in combat came during an airborne drop into southern France as part of Operation Dragoon on August 15, 1944. For the next three weeks, the Goyas fought battles against the occupying German forces. They were the first Allied troops to liberate Nice. On September 4 the battalion entered the Maritime Alps and engaged in artillery duels with, and patrols against, the Germans. During the campaign in southern France, Lieutenant Robert E. Buscher’s HQ Company’s mortar platoon perfected a rapid-fire firing technique that would serve the battalion well through to their final battle at the “Bulge.” This ability became an especially important advantage for the independent 551st, because the battalion was continually plagued by inconsistent artillery support from the various units it found itself attached to. On November 18, after 96 days of combat— the longest of any American airborne unit during the European campaign—the battalion was pulled out of the battle line and trucked back to

not turned black from the constant subfreezing temperatures. Nevertheless, Joerg planned for the best. He sent Lieutenant John Belcher in search of three tanks that had been promised to support the attack. He tried to coordinate artillery support that had been promised to soften the Germans up. Because the 551st had been newly attached to the 504th, communication should have been established with the 376th Field Artillery Battalion. Instead, the request for fire support went to the 460th Field Artillery Battalion assigned to support Graves’ 517th. The 460th told the paratroopers that they could not support Joerg’s attack because it was outside their zone of fire. Livid, Joerg got on the line and, following a heated discussion, four rounds

National Archives

The 551st’s Sgt. Doug Dillard of A Company when the regiment was in the French Alps during November 1944.

the Mediterranean coast. Following two weeks of rest and training, the 551st was then transported by train to Rheims, where General Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne Corps was assembling. From there, the men would march into the cold, forested reaches of the Ardennes; the battalion would never return. Since the war, the members of the 551st Association have been instrumental in bringing longoverdue recognition to the battalion. In 1985, at Noirefontaine and again at Rochelinval in 1989, monuments were unveiled, and the men of the 551st participated in ceremonies that recognized the valor, devotion to duty, and sacrifice

were fired at the enemy positions along the bluff at Rochelinval. Thus ended the 551st’s artillery support for the day. They would receive no more explosive rounds for the remainder of the attack. It was not yet 6:30 am. Sergeant Don Garrigues realized that the too few rounds only “succeeded in waking the Germans up.” As the men of the battalion moved into position, many of them could hear the Germans preparing for the attack only 300 yards away. Lieutenant Durkee later said, “I knew we were all going to die.” The man who only two days before had led the spirited bayonet charge at Dairomont was again preparing to lead his men into another grim attack against a tough opponent. A misfire on one of the battalion’s

displayed by their fallen comrades during the Battle of the Bulge. They dedicated a stone marker at Arlington National Cemetery and placed a memorial to the eight they lost in the training-jump accident in North Carolina. Just before the battalion’s official disbanding in 1945, Major Holm had recommended the 551st for the Presidential Unit Citation for actions at Rochelinval on January 7, 1945. In the fever of war, the recommendation was lost. In 1994, the request for the citation was submitted again but denied on technical grounds. The death of Colonel Joerg and the scattering of his men to other units all seemed to erase the fact that the 551st had existed; too many records were lost. Rare mention of the battalion was ever made in books that cover the battles in which the 551st fought. In fact, in many publications, credit has been mistakenly given to other units for accomplishing the very deeds the men of the 551st had struggled long and hard to achieve. But the 551st survivors did not give up. Following further review, the men of the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion received recognition for their contribution. In ceremonies at Rochelinval and then again five days later at the Pentagon, the “lost battalion,” for its extraordinary performance at the Battle of the Bulge, was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation on February 23, 2001. Donald Roberts II

111

BB-Win14 Bulge 551st_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:33 AM Page 112

National Archives

machine guns started the attack at 6:30 am. Deadly German and American tracer bullets crisscrossed the open gound between the two forces. Everything seemed to be happening very quickly. Booth was killed by a burst of machine-gun fire before he had taken two steps. Lieutenant Durkee yelled for his men to follow him up a narrow lane that led straight into Rochelinval. The Germans had emplaced a machine gun at the head of the lane and could fire down its entire length. Durkee placed a squad on either side of the brush- and tree-lined lane. Two other machine guns were firing on A Company from oblique angles as well. A Company’s lead scout, Private Robert Mowery, was hit and killed almost as soon as the men began moving up the lane. Sergeant Robert Hill raced forward, grabbed up Mowery’s BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle), and fired two full magazines at the enemy before he, too, was shot down and killed by the wall of fire. As Durkee advanced along the path, he picked up a bazooka from a fallen trooper’s dead grasp. Taking aim at the machine-gun position doing the most damage to his men, Durkee fired, and the machine-gun nest exploded, its crew falling wounded and dead. Lieutenants Durkee and Dahl now found

112

that they were the lead scouts for the company. Crawling forward with two other men, the group then came under fire from a sniper operating from a corner of a building. Spotting him, Durkee thought, “I could lob a grenade in and get him.” Durkee yelled to Dahl to cover him. Durkee’s first lob fell short. Yelling to Dahl to “keep firing,” Durkee rolled to grab another grenade and realized the covering fire had stopped. Glancing at Dahl, he saw that his friend had been shot dead through the neck. Durkee then shouted back to his runner to move the riflemen forward so the attack could continue. Private Pat Casanova yelled back, “Sir, they’re all dead.” Stunned, Lieutenant Durkee knew that he couldn’t continue the attack on the village with only two men. By the time he managed to crawl back to safer ground, he learned he was now the commander of A Company, which now consisted of only nine men. Elsewhere along the battalion’s line, First Sgt. William Harper of C Company had witnessed A Company’s almost total annihilation. The scene prompted him to crawl through enemy machine-gun, artillery, and mortar fire across the open ground to a stone wall at the village perimeter. He then managed to toss in a grenade that destroyed one of the guns that had devas-

tated A Company. Colonel Joerg had climbed out of his foxhole and ran to the edge of the tree line to observe the battle. Almost immediately, the forest erupted in a torrent of artillery explosions in the treetops. One round, a 120mm high explosive, burst right over him. His helmet was sliced and a piece of hot metal cut into his head. News of the colonel’s mortal wound traveled fast. The men were stunned. Many collapsed momentarily in the snow, speechless. But the attack continued. The men of B Company kept advancing toward the stone outcropping from which the Germans were concentrating their fire. At around 9:30 am, 113 rounds of smoke were finally fired, helping A Company withdraw on the left. When Colonel Joerg had fallen mortally wounded, the command of the battalion passed to Major Bill Holm. He pushed C Company into the attack along with B Company on the right. A Platoon, Company C completely overran and killed an entire machine-gun section, along with 12 riflemen, without a single paratrooper falling. As B Company pushed up the right flank, drawing closer to the outskirts of the village, it continued to be hounded by mortar fire. Then it was suddenly rushed by a squad of German infantry. Just as

BB-Win14 Bulge 551st_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:34 AM Page 113

Kevin Hymel

swiftly, a squad from B Company charged them back. “It was a rare double charge of opposing foot soldiers” with both sides sustaining a number of casualties. Heavy fighting continued throughout the morning on the American right. Around 11:30, a solitary U.S. tank rolled up in support of B and C Companies. Its turret was jammed, pointing backward into the woods. But Lieutenant Sano talked its commander into attacking with the battalion. Sano believed that the battalion would have “an advantage in its mere presence,” even though the tank had limited effectiveness. Although there was some discussion among the troopers following the battle about exactly how effective the tank had been, most agreed that “it may have saved our ass. He [the tank] kept their heads down.” The spirited attacks by the 551st paid off around noon as the paratroopers began moving into Rochelinval. House-to-house fighting continued for some time. But then soldiers of the 183rd Regiment of the 62nd Volksgrenadier Division began surrendering in large numbers. By the end of the day, the 551st had captured over 400 enemy. The commander of the division, General Frederich Kittel, wrote that while the 62nd had been “able to bring the enemy’s largescale attack to a standstill ... they did not do so at Rochelinval.” The battle for Rochelinval marked the end of the fighting for the men of the 551st at the Battle of the Bulge. Although they cut off an escape route for the enemy, the ranks of the 551st had been nearly destroyed by a combination of the Germans and terrible weather over five days. During that time the men of the battalion had had very little sleep, food, or rest. The paratroopers had watched as their buddies were torn apart by enemy artillery rounds, shot down by machine-gun fire, and frozen to death because they had fallen wounded or simply fallen asleep. They had seen their beloved colonel killed as well. Of the 643 officers and men of the 551st who went into battle on January 3, only 110 remained on the duty roster by the end of the day on the 7th. The others had been

ABOVE: The terrain over which the 551st had to attack held forest, field, and tree-lined lanes. OPPOSITE: Men of the 505th Parachute Regiment move into a town in January.

killed in battle or by the cold; had been wounded and were in an aid station or hospital somewhere in Belgium, France, or England; or were missing in action. The majority of the remaining men in the 551st were “walking wounded.” Taking everything into consideration, the 551st Parachute Battalion sustained a 94 percent casualty rate, “the highest rate of any battalion to fight at the Battle of the Bulge.” And yet, the men of the 551st had successfully captured every objective they had been assigned. Following the Battle of the Bulge and the restoration of the original American battle line, the 551st was officially disbanded. Thus on February 10, 1945, it ceased to be an integral fighting battalion in the U.S. Army. Sergeant Don Garrigues said, “A piece of paper did something the Germans couldn’t do—eliminate our gallant battalion.” Most of the 110 men remaining in the battalion were given individual orders to report to the parachute battalions throughout the 82nd Airborne Division. Until the end of the war in Europe, the men of the 551st carried the airborne spirit with them to their new units, but they remained 551st men in their hearts. When Hitler had first envisioned, planned, and then executed his counterof-

fensive through the Ardennes in December 1944, he believed that his armies could duplicate the same success they had enjoyed in May 1940. He thought his soldiers would be facing the same inexperienced American soldiers his regiments had broken at Kasserine Pass in February 1943. He was wrong. The men of the 551st and their fellow GIs along the northern shoulder of the “Bulge” showed a hardened combat expertise far greater than Hitler had imagined. Battalions like the 551st Parachute Infantry Battalion had displayed the determination, courage, and willingness to get the job done no matter the odds. Those were the true characteristics of the American fighting man in the Ardennes during the Battle of the Bulge. The men of the 551st, determined to achieve total victory over their enemy, had endured the horrors of combat and merciless cold to accomplish everything asked of them. They were American paratroopers. Donald Roberts II was an infantryman in B Co. 2/504th PIB 82nd Airborne Division from 1973 to 1975. He has a master’s degree in Military Studies from American Military University. He currently teaches American History at Christa McAuliffe Middle School, Boynton Beach, Florida.

113

BB-Win14 Houffalize_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:36 AM Page 114

ednesday, December 27, 1944, found the military situation in the Ardennes Forest of Belgium stalemated. After 12 days of unrelenting struggle, the American and German forces on this part of the Western Front found themselves locked in brutal combat, unable to drive each other back. The Americans were situated west beyond the Meuse River, the Germans along the West Wall to the east. Both antagonists knew this situation would not last long. With the large volume of American infantry, tanks, artillery, and air power streaming into the theater of operations, supported by British forces

114

to the north and west, it would be just a short time before the initiative slipped from the hands of the Wehrmacht into those of the Allies. Realizing that a breakthrough across the Meuse River and then on to the principal Allied supply port of Antwerp was no longer possible, the German focus of the Battle of the Bulge dramatically changed. The German generals wanted to evacuate the 75-mile-long, 40-mile-wide salient, or Bulge, which the Wacht am Rhine (Watch on the Rhine) offensive of mid-December had driven into the American lines, but Hitler, as Supreme Com-

mander, refused to allow the withdrawal. Instead, he ordered that all the available resources left to his army in the area be directed toward the elimination of the Americans defending the vital road junction of Bastogne. The Führer had been enraged that Bastogne had not only held out against his army’s onslaught, but had been relieved, even if tenuously, from encirclement on December 26. Concluding that the failure to capture Bastogne was the fundamental cause of the Germans inability to cross the Meuse, Hitler decreed on the 26th that the town must “be cleared,” a euphemism for

BULGE

BB-Win14 Houffalize_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:36 AM Page 115

Matthew B. Ridgway, in charge of the U.S. 17th Airborne Corps, urged their ground commander, General Omar Bradley, to begin immediate and simultaneous attacks on the northern and southern shoulders of the Bulge. The pleas of these experienced soldiers, however, went unheeded. After the German siege of Bastogne had been broken, Patton again put forward his plan for the eliminating the Bulge. This time he placed the scheme in front of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe. It called for Patton’s army to drive north and northeast from Luxembourg City into the

American tanks and armored gun carriers drive over snow-covered terrain to Samree during the Battle of the Bulge. Capture of the city opened the way to Houffallize, heart of the Bulge.

By Arnold Blumberg

© Corbis

its complete destruction along with any and all defending enemy troops. As those responsible for carrying out Hitler’s will scrambled to organize this effort, the U.S. Army revised its plans for continuing the fight in the Ardennes. Before December 27, the Americans had to conduct a defensive war against an initially overwhelming attack by German forces. From that date onward, the U.S. field commanders determined to use their growing materiel strength in an offensive manner. Even before the 27th, men like General George S. Patton Jr., the flamboyant leader of the U.S. Third Army, and General

115

BB-Win14 Houffalize_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:36 AM Page 116

westward-protruding portion of the Eifel region of the Ardennes. There it would link up with a thrust by the U.S. First Army coming south from the area of Pruem, a road junction a little over 10 miles inside Germany, southeast of St. Vith. Patton’s approach was to cut off the enemy penetration at its easternmost base. Although Patton’s counterpart in First Army, Lt. Gen. Courtney Hodges, agreed with Patton in principle, he did have one serious reservation about the plan. He felt that the road network over which his army would have to conduct its advance was inadequate to sustain the heavy force of armor and transport needed for First Army to deliver an effective blow. In this objection, he was supported by Bradley, commanding the U.S 12th Army Group. Bradley doubted the suitability of Patton’s design for additional reasons. First, he felt that the terrible winter weather in the Ardennes would curtail both the movement of American ground forces and the necessary air support vital to any successful offensive operation. Second, lack of reserves to sustain the attack and the difficult terrain that would be encountered in the American drive greatly concerned him. If the objections of his U.S. comrades were not enough to squelch Patton’s audacious plan to cut off the Bulge at its base and bag every German in it, the reservations of British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery definitely put a damper on the idea. Montgomery had been given command of all the Allied forces, including the U.S. First and Ninth Armies, north of the Bulge on December 20. This was deemed necessary because of the complete breakdown of communications between the First and Third Armies due to the German breakthrough. Montgomery did not believe First Army would be able to launch a serious offensive for three months because of its losses during the Bulge fighting. He also cited the lack of any sizable reserves available to support an assault by First Army. The field marshal’s refusal to commit more British forces to the Bulge area in order to free up American divisions for an offensive made certain that a lack of reserves would

116

dog the American effort to push back the Germans in the weeks to come. As an alternative to Patton’s proposal, Montgomery, with backing from Bradley, got Eisenhower to consent to a plan to eliminate the Bulge by cutting it off at the waist, not the base. As presented, Third Army would strike northeast from Bastogne toward St. Vith while First Army moved southeast. The two armies would meet at the town of Houffalize, nine miles northeast of Bastogne. After the link-up, the Americans would attack east to St. Vith. Assigned to carry the weight of the attack for Third Army was Maj. Gen. Troy

H. Middleton’s VIII Corps, part of the First Army, but for command and control purposes serving under Third Army. Middleton’s troops were to jump off from their positions around Bastogne, move west of that town, then northeast to Houffalize. The corps, which comprised about 90,000 men, was made up of one combat command of the 10th Armored Division, the 11th Armored Division, the 17th and 101st Airborne Divisions, and the 87th Infantry Division. First Army’s main effort would be made by its VII Corps under Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins. Heavily reinforced and

BB-Win14 Houffalize_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:36 AM Page 117

approaching 100,000 men, VII Corps included the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions; the 83rd, 84th, and 75th Infantry Divisions; and 12 independent artillery battalions. Starting from the Hotton-Ourthe River area across the Bastogne-Liege highway, it was to advance southeast between the Ourthe and Lienne Rivers to take the high marshland of the Plateau des Tailles, which commanded the town of Houffalize 12 miles away. The standoff in the Ardennes abruptly ended with a renewed German push against Bastogne. While the front remained quiet in the north, between Jan-

uary 2 and 4 repeated attacks were delivered by the Wehrmacht on the Americanheld bastion in the south. Under a hail of concentrated U.S. artillery fire in conjunction with American III Corps counterattacks, the Nazis were stopped cold. This proved to be the final German offensive effort in the Battle of the Bulge. Concluding that the enemy’s attacking power was spent, Montgomery ordered the First and Third Armies to commence their attack toward Houffalize on January 3. From January 3 through 14, the American northern and southern strike forces edged toward Houffalize. The going was

tough. The Ardennes proved to be a natural military obstacle, easy to defend and murderous to attack. They not only had to face a determined and enterprising foe, but also freezing weather, severe icy conditions, snow to depths of up to two feet, dense pine forests, deeply cut ravines, steep cliff-like ridges, and swift streams. Compounding the extremely difficult geography was a general lack of roads in the region. Road movement was critical, especially in First Army’s area of operations. Only one major road, the LiegeHouffalize-Bastogne highway, led directly to the objective. A network of secondary LEFT: Tanks of the 11th Armored Division await orders to move on Compogne. BELOW, LEFT: Lt. Gen. George S. Patton and Maj. Manton Eddy pause for a photo in France. BELOW, RIGHT: Lt. Col. Michael J.L. Greene. National Archives

National Archives

roads and tracks intersecting with numerous villages, bridges, defiles, and hairpin curves would have to be navigated in the face of enemy opposition. The conditions were miserable for both armored and nonarmored vehicles, requiring that the infantry often take the lead and engage the enemy alone since the tanks and assault vehicles could not freely maneuver in the wilderness. Additionally, overcast conditions decreased visibility to the extent that close air support and artillery were never assured. Facing the two American drives toward Houffalize was a mixture of German infantry and panzer formations. These were mere shells of their former selves after the ferocious fighting they had been through during the past weeks. Strengths in the infantry divisions varied from 1,500 to 2,500 men, and there were around 5,000 to 6,000 personnel in the panzer

117

BB-Win14 Houffalize_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:36 AM Page 118

National Archives

units. Losses had been so high and maintenance so difficult that a German armored division counted itself lucky to have 30 fighting vehicles operational at any given time. The Waffen SS panzer divisions of Sixth Panzer Army, fronting the northern part of the Bulge, had either been shifted to the Bastogne sector by mid-January or pulled back behind St. Vith to guard against an attack near the base of the original German penetration. This left only understrength formations, including the 560th Volksgrenadier Infantry Division and the 116th Panzer Division to face the American onslaught from the north. Fearing an imminent collapse of that face of the salient and the potential entrapment of German troops at the most distant penetration of the Bulge, the commander of the Fifth Panzer Army, General Hasso von Manteuffel, requested an immediate pullback to a line anchored on Houffalize. His plea was not granted until January 8, and then only to the extent that the tip of the Bulge was evacuated. The snail-like pace of the northern and southern thrusts to Houffalize continued through the 14th, hampered by snowstorms and clever German resistance centered on the use of minefields and ambushes abetted by counterattacks employing small groups of mixed

“When Houffalize is taken, we will have a junction between the First and Third Armies, which will put Bradley back in command of the First Army. This will be very advantageous, as Bradley is much less timid than Montgomery.” Thus wrote George Patton in his diary on the night of January 12, 1945. In the same entry, he noted that VII and VIII Corps should be in Houffalize by the next day, “as there is not much in the way.” The Third Army chief was mistaken; January 13 came and went with the main concentration of VIII Corps seven miles from the town. Notified that elements of the First Army were just west of Houffalize on the banks of the Ourthe River, Patton determined to take it by pushing a flying column of Third Army troops north. The move would not only give his command credit for the amputation of the German bulge, but would also deprive Montgomery of the honor. To Patton, the feat would be a repeat of the race to Messina 17 months before. There, to Montgomery’s profound chagrin, the Americans under Patton beat the British to that city, signaling the end of the campaign for Sicily. Patton gave the task of taking Houffalize to Brig. Gen. Charles S. Kilbrun’s 11th Armored Division and, via the fortunes of war, Major Michael J.L. Greene was tapped to lead the operation. Greene was

…GREENE HAD HIS OWN PROBLEM: HOW TO GET TO HOUFFALIZE IN THE GROWING DARKNESS, OVER UNFAMILIAR TERRAIN AND AGAINST AN ENEMY WHOSE LOCATION AND STRENGTH HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT. infantry, armored, and antitank forces. On the 14th, Hitler was finally persuaded to allow a withdrawal of his army to the high ground just east of Houffalize, extending northward behind the Salm River and southward through existing positions east of Bastogne. On January 15, an advance guard of the 101st Airborne entered the village of Norville five miles south of Houffalize.

118

a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy class of 1941. Before being assigned to the 11th Armored, he had served in the 2nd and 7th Armored Divisions, rising from platoon to squadron leader. After attending the Command and General Staff College in 1943, the 26-year-old was posted to the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron of the 11th Armored Division as its executive officer.

On January 15, the 41st, commanded by Lt Col. H.M. Foy, was attached to the 11th Armored Division’s Combat Command A and deployed along the northern fringe of the Les Assins Woods near the village of Monaville, Belgium. At 11 am on the 15th, the squadron, made up of Troops A, C, D, and E supported by the 16 Stuart light tanks of Company F, was ordered to hand over responsibility for its sector to the 17th Airborne Division and move to Monaville and then north and east to Bertogne. The squadron protected the left flank of Combat Command A’s eastward advance along the line Pied Du Mont WoodsComogne-Rastadt-Velleroux. When Greene reached Bertogne with most of

BB-Win14 Houffalize_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:36 AM Page 119

the unit in tow during midafternoon, he discovered Colonel Foy had gone forward with Troop C, leaving Greene in command of the bulk of the squadron. No sooner had Greene reached the town than the commanding officer of Combat Command A, Brig. Gen. W.A. Holbrook, Jr., accompanied by the division chief of staff, Colonel J.J.B. Williams, drove into the village looking for Colonel Foy. Greene reported that Foy was not in town. General Holbrook looked at the major and said, “Okay. We have another mission that you and the remainder of the squadron must undertake. This is an extremely important mission, a must, directed by the army commander.” He went on to say, “We must get to Houffal-

ize tonight and contact the First Army as it comes down from the north.” Colonel Williams then spoke up and in a grave voice told Greene, “This is a difficult assignment for anyone because Houffalize is at least 10 miles behind German lines. But someone must get through to establish contact with the 2nd Armored Division as it comes down from Achouffe. They may be already there. General Patton wants this mission accomplished without delay, and he wants this division [11th Armored] to do it.” Holbrook broke in at this point with a wave of his hand and the comment, ”Here is an excellent reconnaissance squadron mission. We’ve got to get around to the northern flank of the division and then

A U.S. soldier runs past a halftrack still smoking from a direct hit in Langlois, Belgium outside Houffalize.

through the German lines if they extend that far. It should be interesting.” Greene showed no emotion as the other two officers spoke, but his mind was going a mile a minute. He knew that the approaches to Houffalize, except by way of the main highway, were indistinct snow-covered trails meandering through dark woods—woods that would become a lot darker as night neared. Putting such thoughts aside, Greene ordered the squadron operations officer to round up any tanks and assault guns available and put D Troop on alert to move out immediately. The major then began to study maps of the area and plan the details of the opera-

119

BB-Win14 Houffalize_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:36 AM Page 120

tion. Not long afterward, Colonel Foy joined the group of officers pouring over the maps in the squadron command post. Foy formally put Greene in charge of the force heading into Houffalize. Greene’s ad hoc strike force consisted of Troops D and E, the 2nd Platoon of Troop A, and the light tanks of Company F, the latter unit under Captain Harold Mullins. The last two units were on outpost duty beyond the town of Bertogne, so they were radioed to meet Troops D and E outside the village of Rastadt, two miles from Bertogne, as soon as possible. Riding in his half-track behind the last vehicle of the point, Greene led his small, lightly armed command, consisting of 17 M5 light tanks, 15 M8 Greyhound armored cars, six assault guns, 15 jeeps, and six M3 halftracks with 450 men, out of Bertogne at 5:30 pm As Greene’s group departed Bertogne, about 15 miles to the northwest, stood other American soldiers also determined to reach Houffalize. Like their comrades to the south, the men of the U.S. 2nd Armored Division had been plodding their way toward Houffalize since January 3. Forming the right wing of the VII Corps’ advance with the 84th Infantry Division in support, the unit had moved over a fourmile front for almost two weeks in atrocious winter weather, confined to roads that were treacherous due to ice and drifting snow. Major General Ernest Harmon, commander of the 2nd Armored, summed it up nicely when he reported that the roads and trails his command had to travel on were “regular toboggan slides.” By January 9, Harmon’s troops neared the Ourthe River and were preparing to make the final lunge to Houffalize. On the 15th, division engineers bridged the river, and that evening an infantry patrol entered the village. They reported back that no enemy soldiers were seen. A concerted effort to take the town was made by Combat Command A the next day. While troops skirted the Ourthe River to the north, Sherman tanks charged in from the west. The tankers met small arms and antitank fire from panzergrenadiers of the 116th Panzer Division.

120

Meanwhile, on the 15th, Greene’s column moved as fast as it could to the south on slippery roads toward its objective. Two miles outside of Rastadt, an enemy minefield disabled Greene’s halftrack. Fortunately, no one was injured in the explosion. After finding a detour around the minefield, Greene, now traveling in an armored car, entered Rastadt a little after 7 pm. There he met the platoon from Troop A and Captain Mullin’s light tank company. Happy to see his reinforcements, he was less pleased with other things he saw in the village. Before Greene reached Rastadt, elements of Combat Command A had been driven back from the town of Velleroux by a German counterattack. Although the Germans

However, Greene had his own problem: how to get to Houffalize in the growing darkness, over unfamiliar terrain and against an enemy whose location and strength he knew nothing about. A look at their maps showed Greene and his officers that they would have to take a single-lane dirt road, which was under at least a foot and a half of snow, from their present position north to Bonnerue, then continue over a trail intersected by a branch of the Ourthe River, which flowed through a deep valley west of Houffalzie. Daunting as the task was, Greene lost little time in getting his command on the road. He formed a main column with a reconnaissance detachment in the lead. The latter would

National Archives

A Nazi SS captain lies dead behind his command car as U.S. soldiers survey the scene near Houffalize.

had then retreated toward Houffalize, the Americans continued their own confused withdrawal through Rastadt. The retreating U.S. soldiers in the village were disorganized, unnerved, and leaderless, many simply milling about the streets as buildings burned around them.

act not only as a point formation, but also seek out alternative routes for the main force during the movement. Greene hoped to avoid any contact with the Germans until he reached Houffalize. As his column cleared Rastadt at about 11 pm, January 15, Greene planned what

BB-Win14 Houffalize_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:36 AM Page 121

Map © 2004 Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis, MN

he would do once he reached Houffalize. First, he would deploy his troops around the objective to contain any enemy found in the town. Second, the area of high ground south of the hamlet would be seized so cooperation with Combat Command A could be maintained. Third, patrols would be sent across the Ourthe River to make contact with the 2nd Armored Division. Greene had hoped to bypass Bonnerue by moving cross-country to the south and east, but the rugged terrain and the deep snow forced the GIs to pass through the village. Moving by bounds, one unit going through the town while others covered the move, the squadron rattled through Bonnerue without incident. Unknown to Greene and his men, remnants of a German infantry company were hiding in the town as he came through. These Germans were captured on the 16th by another platoon of Troop A coming through Bonnerue. Upon reaching the high ground northeast of Bonnerue, the American column’s progress was slow and tedious as it made its way in the dark through a thick forest and deep snow. The night was so dark and the snow so deep that one of Greene’s officers, Lieutenant Gene Ellenson, had to walk the entire distance to keep the column on the right route. Greene recalled later that they ”proceeded slowly, nervously and anxiously through the long dark night hoping that the next minute would bring daylight and the objective.” At 3 am, they reached the Rau de Suhet stream about two miles west of Houffalize. The bridge over the watercourse was intact. The men began to cross, congratulating themselves that they would not have to get their feet wet to reach the opposite bank. Not far from the bridge they discovered that the trail leading from the stream traversed a moderately high slope and was ice coated. Wheeled vehicles could not ascend the hill. So, for the next two and a half hours the tanks had to drag all the other motor vehicles up the hill. By 5:30 am on January 16, the height had been crested and the

After the German thrust forward to the Belgian port city of Antwerp had failed, the fate of Nazi forces in the West had been sealed.

squadron placed in column of march to move along the track that led out of the Bois du Couturie and descended into the Ourthe River Valley. As the Americans rounded an unfinished water mill, their goal, Houffalize, came into view 600 yards to the east. Greene prepared to make a dash for the town, but before he could issue the order, the lead armored car of 2nd Platoon, Troop A fell victim to a well concealed tank trap dug in the middle of the road just 200 yards from Houffalize. The trapped armored car blocked the road and stopped every vehicle behind it from going forward. Frustrated by the mishap, but determined to get into town, Greene and Ellenson got out of their command vehicles and walked the distance to the town limits. Having done so, the two officers started to return to the stalled column. To their left and on top of a nearby rise, Ellenson spotted two figures in a foxhole. His repeated shouts at them to get their attention were without effect, and the two U.S. officers, thinking they were from a 2nd Armored Division patrol, decided to ascend the

ridge and speak with the supposed friendlies. As they climbed the hill, Greene yelled to his armored car commander, Sergeant Till, that he and Ellenson were going up the hill and would return shortly. When Greene and Ellenson were about 50 yards from the strangers in the foxhole, they saw one of the occupants rise and aim a machine gun at them while shouting “Hande Hoch,” German for “Hands up!” The two Americans halted. Ellenson raised his hands, turned to Greene, and said, “I guess we are caught, Major.” Greene hesitated for a second, then yelled to Till to start shooting at the Germans. As Till fired his machine gun at the enemy soldiers, the two American officers took the opportunity to slide down the hill and hot-foot it toward the column of waiting vehicles. The Germans did not fire at the fleeing Americans, but turned and ran back to the town. Sergeant Till’s burst of fire seemed to set off a barrage of machine-gun, antitank, and mortar rounds directed at the immobile troopers from rear-guard elements of the 116th Panzer Division at Houfallize.

121

National Archives

BB-Win14 Houffalize_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:36 AM Page 122

THE STUART LIGHT TANKS … MOVED INTO THE TOWN, FIRING THEIR 37MM CANNON AND .50-CALIBER MACHINE GUNS, SETTING FIRE TO BUILDINGS, AND FLUSHING OUT GERMANS IN THE PROCESS…. Greene immediately ordered his men and vehicles to disperse and seek cover. Greene still had the mission of making contact with First Army in Houffalize. This required that he stay near his current position. To do this in the face of active enemy resistance, he decided to contain the Germans in the town with two of his six 75mm self-propelled assault guns from a position near the mill. In addition, he ordered Troop D to dismount and occupy the high ground south of town and act as forward observers for the assault guns, which began to bombard the town with indirect fire. Lastly, he moved the light tank company closer to Houffalize and the Ourthe River so the tanks could fire at any enemy holed up in Houffalize. About this time, Greene received a radio message that Combat Command A was

122

going to continue its push for Houffalize at 8 am. Although he tried, he could get no information on the whereabouts of the 2nd Armored Division. Soon after his dispositions were completed, German mortar fire was directed at the American assaultgun location, and several crew members were wounded. The guns were moved back. Artillery fire also fell on D Troop. Under the shelling, the troop relocated a little, but still managed to keep the town under observation from the north, south, and east. The situation was not made any easier when it was confirmed that the missiles raining down on D Troop came from First Army guns. Around 9 am, D Troop’s commander, Lieutenant Ellenson, reported that he saw dismounted men 1,500 yards away, moving southeast on rising ground on the

north shore of the Ourthe River. Feeling confident they were from First Army, Greene dispatched a patrol to meet the men Ellenson had seen. After sending the detachment to the north, Greene ordered the tank company to break into Houffalize. He realized that tanks alone could not secure the place, but wanted them to merely dash in, size up any remaining enemy opposition, dash out again, and join D Troop south of town. The Stuart light tanks rushed over the open ground and road where the armored car had been caught in the tank trap, receiving only small arms and mortar fire as they advanced. The Stuarts then moved into the town, firing their 37mm cannon and .50-caliber machine guns, setting fire to buildings, and flushing out Germans in the process, and then withdrew to join D Troop. The waves of men Ellenson had seen north of the Ourthe River early on January 16 were in fact members of the 2nd Armored Division, specifically part of Lt. Col. Hugh O’ Farrell’s Task Force A, Combat Command A. During the morning, part of O’Farrell’s command, Company F, 41st Armored Infantry, was having its picture taken by Sergeant Douglas Wood, a cameraman from the 165th Signal Photo Company. As Wood began filming the infantrymen lounging in their foxholes, a figure appeared out of the woods. He was waved in by the 2nd Armored men and soon followed by others. The newcomers, the patrol sent by Greene, had waded across the cold Ourthe River. During their trek, Greene’s men had been joined by Colonel Foy. The colonel asked to be taken to a senior officer in charge, so Wood brought him to Colonel O’Farrell. The men recognized each other immediately, having been classmates at the Armor School at Fort Knox, Ky. It was 9:05 am, and the juncture between the American First and Third Armies had become a fact. The Bulge had been erased at last. Around 10 am, Greene’s patrol reported back to the major on their meeting with elements of the First Army. Greene also heard of a link-up between his 3rd Pla-

BB-Win14 Houffalize_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:36 AM Page 123

toon, A Troop and a 33-man patrol from the 334th Infantry Regiment, 84th Infantry Division, at the village of Engreux about 1,000 yards southwest of the Ourthe River at 9:45 am. The union of the two American armies had been cemented along the entire length of the Ourthe. Houffalize was secured by Combat Command A in the late hours of January 16.

The little town, a prewar resort with a population of 1,200, stands in the loop of the Ourthe River. Correspondent Harold Denny wrote that Houffalize appeared to be a “miniature St. Lo,” due to the extensive damage inflicted upon it by American air bombardment while it had been held by the Germans. The town, which traced its roots back to medieval times, was a major

National Archives

BELOW: A soldier from the 11th Armored Division shares a handshake with a member of the 84th Infantry in Houffalize. OPPOSITE: A soldier reloads his M-1 rifle near the bodies of two dead Germans in the bitter cold of January, 1945.

supply depot for the German Army during the Battle of the Bulge and also served as headquarters for the 116th Panzer Division in the struggle’s final stages. Just before Houffalize fell to the Americans, most of its inhabitants had fled and were living in the nearby woods. U.S. air and artillery attacks had not spared a single building. Civilian survivors told the Americans that over 200 of their number had been killed and more than 300 wounded during the week before the town was occupied by American forces. Major Greene and his combat team did not get the opportunity to enter the object of their strenuous two-day mission. The 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was withdrawn to Bonnerue at 4:30 pm on the 16th, leaving an outpost to the west of Houffalize.. An hour before they started their move back, the last of the 116th Panzer Division troops retired from the town. Final resistance from the Germans was a running battle with a Tiger tank positioned on the main road leading into the town from the north. A Mark IV tank, situated in the town’s center near a roofless gray stone church, offered some parting shots before clanking its way east. According to General Patton, the fall of Houffalize “terminates the German offensive. Now we will drive them back.” What he did not confide in his diary was that the elimination of the Bulge failed to do what most needed to be done; cutting off the German retreat eastward. Estimates assert that only about 20,000 Germans were captured when the Bulge was eliminated. Patton had argued that to remove a monkey hanging from a tree by its tail, the proper methodology would be cutting off the tail, not punching the monkey in the face. The pincer movement on Houffalize was a “punch in the face,” which predictably failed to eject the monkey from the tree. Arnold Blumberg last wrote for WWII History on the Czech-designed 38(t) armored vehicle. He resides in Baltimore, Maryland.

123

BB-Win14 Bastogne Relief_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:24 AM Page 124

L ov e ly We a t h e r Continued from page 87

SUBSCRIBE

TO

WWII History $24.99 FOR ONE YEAR!

800-219-1187 124

headquarters in Luxembourg City, Colonel Blanchard and his staff huddled over a current map of Bastogne that had been airdropped to them at Remoiville, six miles southwest of the Allied stronghold. Blanchard devised a plan of attack that would carry CCR through the villages of Remichampagne and Clochimont to Sibret, which sat atstride the NeufchateauBastogne road. Aerial reconnaissance showed Sibret to be heavily fortified, and Blanchard expected the ultimate breakthrough battle to be fought there, with full fighter-bomber support. On the morning of December 26, CCR started for Remichampagne. The ground was frozen solid and the tanks made good time. A squadron of P-47 Thunderbolt fighter-bombers appeared and blasted the remnants of German resistance out of the village. Reaching Clochimont by early afternoon, the spearhead of CCR, Lt. Col. Creighton Abrams’ 37th Tank Battalion, sat revving its engines while Abrams consulted with Lt. Col. George Jaques, commander of the 53rd Infantry Battalion, which was supporting the armored attack. Standing on a hillside overlooking the village, Abrams suggested to Jaques that rather than continue northwestward to Sibret, which was swarming with Germans, they instead simply make a break for Bastogne through lightly fortified Assenois. Jaques readily agreed. At 4:30 pm, under screening fire from several dozen 105mm and 155mm howitzers, the tiny assault column made its move. Captain William Dwight, Abrams’ operations officer, led the way with C Team, comprised of Company C of the 37th Tank Battalion and Company C of the 53rd Armored Tank Battalion. First Lt. Charles P. Boggess was in the lead tank, swiveling his 75mm cannon as he raked German paratroopers who were bubbling up from the cellars of Assenois. American riflemen leaped down from their accompanying half-tracks to meet the

Germans, and a shooting, clubbing, stabbing melee ensued in the streets of the village. Private James Hendrix, a 19-year-old Arkansan, was at the forefront of the fight. Shooting one German in the neck, Hendrix clubbed another with the butt of his M-1 rifle. He then singlehandedly captured two 88mm gun crews, disarmed two other enemy machine guns, and held off attackers while two wounded comrades could be safely evacuated. Hendrix then rescued a fellow American who had been badly wounded and was trapped in a burning half-track. The man was on fire, and Hendrix smothered the flames with his own body. The soldier later died, but Hendrix was awarded the Medal of Honor for his service that day. Boggess pressed onward with five Sherman tanks and one remaining half-track. The halftrack ran over a mine and exploded, blocking two of the tanks, but Boggess kept going with the other three. Breaking from the woods, Boggess saw some American troops preparing to attack an enemy pillbox on the outskirts of Bastogne. He obligingly did it for them, blasting the pillbox to smithereens and sending the Americans diving for cover. “Come on out,” Boggess cried. “This is the 4th Armored!” Cautiously, helmeted heads appeared from assorted shellholes. Finally, one of the men stood up and gingerly approached the tank. Second Lt. Duane J. Webster of the 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion, 101st Airborne, walked up to Boggess, who leaned down from his perch atop the tank to shake hands. A few minutes later, Captain Dwight arrived at the perimeter with the company’s other two tanks. A slender officer appeared from a nearby observation post. “How are you, General?” Dwight asked, saluting. “Gee,” said Anthony McAuliffe, “I’m mighty glad to see you.” The siege of Bastogne was over. Roy Morris Jr. is the editor of Civil War Quarterly magazine. Morris has written numerous books, including Fraud of the Century on the controversial U.S. Presidential election of 1876.

WWII Full Page ad-NEW_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:39 AM Page 125

It took 6 Years to Fight… and 300,000 American Lives to win.

Now, WWII is being revealed as never before.

WWII HISTORY The Foremost Authority on the Greatest War In History Curtis 02313

ine.com www.wwiihistorymagaz

D-DAY!

e Pre sen

ts:

OPERATION BA RBAROS

SA Nazi Assault On

Airborne Fight At La Fiere

www.wwiihistorym

agazine.com

ROSTOV

ine.com

www.wwiihistorymagaz

Legendary Fighter Ace

WWII HISTORY APRIL 2014 Volume 13, No. 3

MARKET-GARDEN

“Flak Was Our Worst Enemy”

2 Volume 13, No.

In Kula Gulf

+

Fight at

FEBRUARY 2014

JUNE 2014

ne AirborBes t at Amtrac Landings

TARAWA sault Red Army Asrg on Königsbe

Allied Betraya of Eastern Eurol pe Patton Liberate s Paler

Navy Shootout ERATION, S, COVERT AIR OP JAPAN’S SUPER SUB IEWS, AND MORE! REV BOOK & GAME

Saipan

B - 17 TA I L G UNNER

n

4 Volume 13, No.

One GI’s Bloody Fight for Colmar

on Savage Combat

WWII HISTORY

n 2014 WWII HISTORY JUNE

Assault on Kiev

Curtis 02313

DOUGLAS BA DER

RUSSIAN FRONT

+

Her itag

Curtis 02313

Mil itar y

N MIDAIR COLLISIO

FEBRUARY 2014

9 B-17 vs. Me-10

mo

KILLING OF HEY DRI BOOK & GAME CH, JAPANESE ARMY FIGHTE R, REVIEWS, AND MORE!

+

SPRINGFIELD ARY’S LEADER, HITLER AND HUNG MORE! REVIEWS, AND BOOK & GAME

M1903, RETAILER: DISPLAY

UNTIL MARCH 3

APRIL 2014

RETAILER: DISPLAY

UNTIL APRIL 28

7 R: DISPLAY UNTIL JULY

RETAILE

Now available in traditional print, as well as digital format WWII HISTORY Magazine is more like a fine reference for your history library than it is like a regular magazine that you just flip through and discard. Incisive articles from the top experts in the field are beautifully illustrated with historic photos, paintings, and battle maps. In just the first few issues, you’ll gain a fresh new understanding of the war. For example: • What went wrong with Operation Barbarrossa • The behind the scenes actions that led to the Kassel Raid Disaster • What happened when the Aussies took on the Japanese along the Kodoka Trail. • Why it took so long for the US Cavalry to switch from horses to mobile armor.

Each issue, WWII HISTORY’s regular columns discuss important specifics on the war: • PROFILES, where you’ll meet the heroic individuals who changed the course of history … • ORDNANCE, where you’ll field test the hardware that made the difference between victory and defeat. • INSIGHT, where you’ll learn aspects of the war you won’t find elsewhere … OUR GUARANTEE: Order now, and if at any time you decide WWII HISTORY isn’t for you, you’ll receive a full refund on all unserviced issues, no questions asked!

Subscribe now! Visit our website below for our best subscription offers!

www.WarfareHistoryNetwork.com/magazine

BB-Win14 St. Vith *Silo_Layout 1 11/4/14 11:16 AM Page 126

126

Hosingen

S t . Vit h

M alm é dy Continued from page 79

Continued from page 59

Continued from page 47

only official reference ever made to these tragic raids was when General Carl Spaatz, the ranking general of the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe, mentioned an alleged misbombing of Malmédy during an Allied air commanders’ conference on January 4, 1945. In the postwar years, various excuses for these attacks have been offered in mitigation. The real reason why they happened is very simple and was known to those responsible within a few hours—human error. By Christmas Day, the ground threat to Malmédy had disappeared, and the overall situation in the Ardennes had changed radically in favor of the Americans. Both the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions had been pulled out of the line and were reorganizing for a new attack designed to cross the Meuse between Huy and Namur some 25 miles to the southwest. They had been replaced in the Malmédy and Stavelot areas by Volksgrenadiers in a defensive role. On January 13, 1945, the 30th Infantry Division attacked south from the Malmédy sector as part of an offensive designed to finally eliminate the Bulge. Dave Pegrin’s 291st Engineers were with them. They had built a new Bailey bridge across the Warche at the site of the old wooden bridge which had seen so much fighting on December 21, and they cleared routes through the numerous minefields laid by the Germans to the south of Malmédy. By a strange quirk of fate, it fell to Pergrin’s C Company to uncover the bodies of the victims of the Malmédy Massacre in the field beside the Ligneuville–St. Vith road at Baugnez. A few days later, the 291st said goodbye to Malmédy forever. Malmédy is now a thriving town with excellent hotels, restaurants, and shops, and there are no signs of what happened more than 60 years ago—only at the memorials by the main church and at the Baugnez crossroads is one brought face to face with the tragic events of December 1944.

cover. Task Force Jones and the 112th Infantry eventually found their way into 82nd Airborne Division lines during the night of the 24th, but not before the units suffered heavy losses. The losses in men and equipment for CCB, 9th Armored, as with the rest of the American units defending St. Vith, had been severe. The line companies were down to one officer apiece. Staff officers were casualties. A platoon of tank destroyers had vanished. The hardest hit, though, were the armored infantrymen of the 27th AIB with nearly 300 battle casualties. Ten tanks, numerous supply vehicles, armored cars, and jeeps were lost to enemy action. Ninth Armored sent out billeting parties as it reached its new area. A two-day rest was planned for everyone. This break appeared to be only a dream, however, as it seemed every outfit wanted a piece of CCB, 9th Armored to help shore up its positions. The new sector assigned to CCB was on the fringe of territory the Sixth Panzer Army had mapped out for its further maneuvers. General Lucht’s 66th Corps was shifted from General Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army to the Sixth Panzer. The 27th AIB was ordered to establish a defensive position south, east, west, and southeast of Malempre. Roadblocks were set up and manned. Mines were laid. By 11 PM enemy patrols tested 27th AIB’s new position and a night attack was thrown back with the help of D Troop, 89th Recon. The heroic defense of St. Vith, though costly in men and materiél, disrupted the German timetable extensively. Rather than reaching the Meuse and driving on to Antwerp, the offensive stalled and eventually was turned back. The stubborn defenders of St. Vith played a major role in defeating the final German offensive of World War II in Western Europe.

shocked when learned that only two companies had defended the town. The Germans believed they were facing a reinforced battalion. The loss of Hosingen opened the eastwest road for German military traffic. When Kokott learned of the size of the Hosingen garrison, he was impressed that such a little band had held out against such overwhelming odds. He wrote after the war that Feiker had earned Kokott’s respect, and he singled him out in a postwar interview. Kokott finally had Hosingen, and his division and the Panzer Lehr Division could now push westward to Bastogne. However, the damage had been done. The Panzer Lehr Division did not reach Bastogne in time. In fact, the U.S. 101st Airborne Division had beaten the German tanks by only a few hours. The consequences were dire for the Germans. They surrounded Bastogne, but they could never take the crossroads town, and because of that, their supplies lines were overextended. When they were within site of the Meuse River their tanks ran out of gas. After the war, General Fritz Bayerlein wrote that the failure of the German Army to take Bastogne seriously jeopardized the Ardennes offensive, and he then concluded that the chief reason why his Panzer Lehr Division could not reach Bastogne in time was the dogged defense of Hosingen, which held up the 26th Volksgrenadier Division and the Panzer Lehr for over 36 precious hours—36 hours they could not afford to lose.

First-time contributor Charles Gutierrez is the son of a 9th Armored Division veteran. The Pontiac, Michigan, resident also served 10 years in the U.S. Army.

Leo G. Barron served two tours during Operation Iraqi Freedom with the 101st Airborne Division as a rifle company executive officer and as a battalion intelligence officer. He holds a Masters Degree in history from Western Michigan University and a bachelor’s degree in History from the College of the Holy Cross. An avid historian, he resides in Sierra Vista, Arizona, where he teaches at the U.S. Army’s Intelligence Center.

W_LibertyShip FP WWIIH Dec14.qxp_FP 9/26/14 2:04 PM Page 1

W-DriveATank FP Bulge15.qxp_FP 10/14/14 2:44 PM Page 1